Philosophical Horizons (Modern Chinese Philosophy) 9004396292, 9789004396296

Table of contents :
Contents
Significant Chinese Philosophical Concepts
Translators’ Introduction to Philosophical Horizons
1 Introduction
2 The Dual Character of Philosophy
3 Problems and Methodology
4 The Completion of the Person and Its Multiple Dimensions: Education within a Philosophic Horizon
5 The Content of Value Concepts
6 Ethical Life and Practical Morality
7 The View of Man and the View of Matter: the Philosophical Implications of Ecological Problems
8 Metaphysics and Other Matters: Responses to a Number of Philosophical Questions
9 Chinese Philosophy as Philosophy
10 Chinese Philosophy: Questions and Their Evolution
11 Identification and Recognition
12 Dao and Chinese Philosophy
13 The Question of Human Nature in Chinese Philosophy
14 The Idea of Reason and Rationality in Chinese Philosophy
15 The Study of Philosophers in History
16 The Concept Gongzheng (“Justice”) in the History of Chinese Thought
17 The World of Emotions in the Book of Songs
18 Metaphysical Principle and Principle of Value: the Way (Dao 道) and Natural Spontaneity (Ziran 自然) in the Philosophy of the Laozi 
19 Meritocratic Politics: Its Meaning and Limitations
20 The Great (Modern) Debates: Substance and Function, Past and Present, China and the West
21 Analytic Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy
22 Metaphysical Thought in a Post-Metaphysical Age: an Interview with Yang Guorong
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Philosophical Horizons

Modern Chinese Philosophy Edited by John Makeham (La Trobe University)

volume 18

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mcp

Philosophical Horizons Metaphysical Investigation in Chinese Philosophy By

Yang Guorong Edited and translated by

Paul J. D’Ambrosio, Daniel Sarafinas, Sharon Small, Ady van den Stock, and Stefano Gandolfo

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018061504

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1875-9386 isbn 978-90-04-39629-6 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-39630-2 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents List of Significant Chinese Philosophical Concepts vii Translators’ Introduction to Philosophical Horizons ix 1 Introduction 1 2

The Dual Character of Philosophy 6

3

Problems and Methodology 14

4

The Completion of the Person and Its Multiple Dimensions: Education within a Philosophic Horizon 22

5

The Content of Value Concepts 39

6

Ethical Life and Practical Morality 43

7

The View of Man and the View of Matter: the Philosophical Implications of Ecological Problems 60

8

Metaphysics and Other Matters: Responses to a Number of Philosophical Questions 70

9

Chinese Philosophy as Philosophy 96

10

Chinese Philosophy: Questions and Their Evolution 129

11

Identification and Recognition 140

12

Dao and Chinese Philosophy 146

13

The Question of Human Nature in Chinese Philosophy 166

14

The Idea of Reason and Rationality in Chinese Philosophy 178

15

The Study of Philosophers in History 197

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Contents

16

The Concept Gongzheng (“Justice”) in the History of Chinese Thought 209

17

The World of Emotions in the Book of Songs 221

18

Metaphysical Principle and Principle of Value: the Way (Dao 道) and Natural Spontaneity (Ziran 自然) in the Philosophy of the Laozi 238

19

Meritocratic Politics: Its Meaning and Limitations 256

20 The Great (Modern) Debates: Substance and Function, Past and Present, China and the West 272 21

Analytic Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy 288

22

Metaphysical Thought in a Post-Metaphysical Age: an Interview with Yang Guorong 303

Bibliography 327 Index 330

Significant Chinese Philosophical Concepts biran 必然 (“what is necessarily the case”) chengji 成己 (“completed self,” “refined self”) chengren 成人 (“complete person,” “perfected person,” “refined person”) dangran 当然 (“what should be the case”) dao 道 (“way” “method” “principle”) de 德 (“power,” “virtue”) du 度 (“proper measure”) fa 法 (“law” “method”) gong 公 (“public,” “general,” “to make public”) gongzheng 公正 (“justice”) he 和 (“harmony”) jian’ai 兼爱 (“universal love”) jing 经 (“dogma,” “guideline,” “constant”) jingjie 境界 (“state of mind,” “spiritual state,” “realm”) junzi 君子 (“superior person”) li 礼 (“ritual” “ritual propriety”) li 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” “coherence”) lixing 理性 (“rational,” “reason”) liyi 礼义 (“ritual propriety and morality”) lizhi 理智 (“intellectual reason”) ming 名 (“names”) qi 气 (“material force,” “air,” “stuff”) quan 权 (“measure,” “expedient,” “transitory”) ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) shi 实 (“actualities”) shi 事 (“thing[s],” “event[s],” or “matters”) shiran 实然 (“what should be the case,” “the way things are”) shu 恕 (“reciprocity”) si 私 (“private,” “individual,” “secret”) tianming 天命 (“the mandate of heaven”) tong 同 (“sameness”) wu 无 (“non-being,” “non-presence,” “to lack”) wuwei 无为 (“non-action,” “doing non-doing,” “acting without interfering”) xiao 孝 (“filial piety”) xing 性 (“nature,” “disposition,” “natural tendencies”) yang 阳 (“bright,” “light,” “higher”) yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “equitable”)

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yin 阴 (“shade,” “dark,” “lower”) you 有 (“being,” “presence,” “to have”) zheng 正 (“central, “straight/upright,” “to align/correct”) zhengming 正名 (“rectifying names”) zhengyi 正义 (“justice”) zhong 中 (“nascent equilibrium”) zhong 忠 (“faithfulness”) zhongshu 忠恕 (“faithfulness and reciprocity”) ziran 自然 (“self-so,” “natural,” “spontaneity”)

Translators’ Introduction to Philosophical Horizons Paul J. D’Ambrosio is associate professor of Chinese philosophy at East China Normal University in Shanghai, China, where he also serves as Dean of the Center for Intercultural Research, fellow of the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture, and the program coordinator ECNU’s English-language MA and PhD programs. He is the author of 真假之间 (Sincerity and Pretense in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Genuine Pretending) (Kong Xuetang Press, 2019), co-author (with Hans-Georg Moeller) of Genuine Pretending (Columbia University Press, 2017), editor (with Michael Sandel) of Encountering China (Harvard University Press, 2018). Additionally, he has authored over 50 articles, chapters, and reviews, and has translated several books on Chinese philosophy. Ady Van den Stock is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Languages and Cultures at Ghent University in Belgium. His research is focused on the development of Sino-Islamic traditions of thought in modern China and on modern Chinese philosophy, specifically New Confucianism and Marxism. He has published a monograph devoted to the latter topic entitled The Horizon of Modernity: Subjectivity and Social Structure in New Confucian Philosophy (Brill, 2016) and translated the work of Chinese philosophers such as Li Zehou, Yang Guorong, and Feng Qi. He currently serves as Executive Director of the Académie du Midi Philosophical Association and as board member of the European Association for Chinese Philosophy. Dan Sarafinas is from Pembroke MA. He holds a B.A.  Phil. from Loyola Marymount University, an M.Phil. from Zhongnan University, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Macau. He has served on translation teams working on texts by Li Zehou, Yang Guorong, and Guo Qiyong. Sharon  Y.  Small is currently a post-doctoral fellow at East China Normal University. She received her PhD from the Department of Philosophy at Peking University where she specialized in Ancient Chinese Philosophy with focus on Daoism using recently excavated manuscripts. Her research interests include both Ancient and Modern Chinese thought along with the development of ideas and language in Pre-Qin times. Aside from research, Sharon currently works as a translator for contemporary Chinese scholars. Stefano Gandolfo was originally trained in Economics and Philosophy (B.A. double major, cum-laude, Honors in Philosophy) at Yale University where

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he also had the opportunity to rigorously study Chinese as a Richard U. Light Fellow. Upon graduation, he pursued his graduate studies in Peking University in Chinese Philosophy (M.A. cum laude, Exceptional Thesis Award, Outstanding International Student Award) over a span of three years as a CGS Scholar. Currently, Stefano is an Ertegun Scholar at the University of Oxford where he is reading for a DPhil in Chinese Philosophy (Oriental Studies) under the supervision of Professor Dirk Meyer. The writings of Yang Guorong 杨国荣 (born in 1957 in Zhuji 诸暨, Zhejiang province) span over three decades and have given shape to one of the most comprehensive and challenging bodies of philosophical work in the presentday Chinese intellectual landscape. He is author of over a dozen books and countless articles, an increasing number of which is being made available in English translation.1 As is reflected in the essays collected in the current volume, 1  The 11 volumes of the Collected Works of Yang Guorong (Yang Guorong zhuzuo ji 杨国荣著作 集) was published in 2009 by East China Normal University Press. The following articles and monographs are already available to an English-speaking audience (in chronological order of publication): “Transforming Knowledge into Wisdom: A Contemporary Chinese Philosopher’s Investigation,” Philosophy East and West, 2002, 52(4): 441–458; “The Debate between Scienticists and Metaphysicians in Early Twentieth Century: Its Theme and Significance,” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2002, 2(1): 79–95; “Mengzi and Democracy: Dual Implications,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2004, 31(1): 83–102; “Knowing, Being, and Wisdom: a Comparative Study,” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2005, 5(1): 57–72; “On Luo Congyan’s Ethics,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2006, 1(1): 102–113; “Being and Value: From the Perspective of Chinese-Western Comparative Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, 2008, 58(2): 267–282; “Names and Words in the Philosophy of Zhuangzi,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2008, 3(1): 1–26; “Wang Yangming’s Moral Philosophy: Innate Consciousness and Virtue,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2010, 37(1): 62–75; “An Outline of Concrete Metaphysics,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, 2012, 43(1): 43–59; “Metaphysics,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, 2012, 43(4): 7–26; “Morality and Human Existence from the Perspective of Moral Metaphysics,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, 2012, 43(4): 27–50; “The Maturation of the Self and the Refinement of Things,” Contemporary Chinese Thought, 2012, 43(4): 51–85; On Human Action and Practical Wisdom, translated by Paul J. D’Ambrosio and Sarah Flavel (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013); “Virtue, Norm, and Moral Practice,” Dao: a Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2014, 13: 99–110; “Morality and Social Solidarity from the Perspective of Chinese Philosophy,” in Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalizing World, edited by Janusz Salamon, 115–128 (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2015); The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: a Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being, translated by Chad Austin Meyers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). Translations of the following books are forthcoming: Shan de licheng 善的历程 (The Path of Goodness) from 1994 by Paul J. D’Ambrosio and Robert Carleo; Lunli yu cunzai 伦理与存在 (Ethics and Existence) from 2002 by Paul J. D’Ambrosio, Robert Carleo, and Seth Crownover; Lun dao 论道 (On Dao) from 2011 by Paul J. D’Ambrosio, Chad Meyers, Ady Van den Stock, et al.; Zhongguo zhexue ershi jiang 中国哲学二十讲 (Twenty Lectures on Chinese Philosophy) from 2015 by

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his interests as a thinker are wide-ranging, extending from the Book of Songs (Shijing 诗经) to classical pre-Qin thought, Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, and contemporary currents of Western philosophy such as phenomenology and existentialism. This already presents us with one of the most salient and important characteristics of Yang’s philosophical undertaking, namely an insistence on maintaining a close connection between history (shi 史) and thought (si 思), as the title of one of his books from 1999 indicates. Yang’s philosophical analyses are often if not always accompanied by and embedded in extensive researches into intellectual history. According to his own understanding, he inherited this methodological focus on the “unity of thought and history” from his teacher and forebear at East China Normal University (Shanghai) Feng Qi 冯契 (d. 1995), whose philosophy of “wisdom” (zhihui 智慧) can hardly be set apart from his sustained historical reconstruction of the “logical development” of traditional Chinese thought.2 Indeed, before he began developing and presenting his own constructive philosophy, Yang Guorong was probably best known for his astute and ambitious studies of the great Ming dynasty Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d. 1529) and the latter’s impact in the subsequent development of Chinese thought. This phase in Yang’s research crystalized in the two seminal books, Wangxue tonglun—cong Wang Yangming dao Xiong Shili 王学通论—从王阳明到熊十力 (An Introduction to the Wang School of Neo-Confucianism: from Wang Yangming to Xiong Shili) from 1990 and Xinxue zhi si—Wang Yangming zhexue de chanshi 心学之思—王阳明哲学 的阐释 (Thinking through the Heart-Mind: an Interpretation of the Philosophy of Wang Yangming) from 1997.3 Unlike thinkers classified under the general heading of “New Confucianism” however, Yang’s researches into the history of Chinese thought show little or no sectarian bias, nor do they attempt to directly reassert the normative value (let alone superiority) of the Confucian creed in modern society. Rather, his approach to Chinese traditions of thought seems to motivated by a genuine desire to think through the historical dimension of the particular philosophical problems he is wrestling with, instead of presenting the former as a ready-made solution to the later. Like all great modern Chinese thinkers, he thus draws freely and adroitly on Confucian, Daoist, as Dimitra Amarantidou; Zhuangzi de sixiangjie 庄子的思想界 (Zhuangzi’s Philosophy) from 2017 by Paul J. D’Ambrosio, Dan Sarafinas, and Dimitra Amarantidou. 2  For more details, see Yong Huang, “Feng Qi’s Ameliorism: Between Relativism and Absolutism,” in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, 213–234 (Malden: Blackwell, 2002) and Ady Van den Stock, “The Curious Incident of Wisdom in the Thought of Feng Qi (1915–1995): Comparative Philosophy, Historical Materialism, and Metaphysics,” Asian Philosophy, 2018, 28(3): 241–258. 3  The latter work is being translated by Ady Van den Stock.

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well as Buddhist texts, all while staging a dialogue with Western thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. The close nexus between the historical and constructive dimensions of Yang’s philosophy is also borne out by his study of late imperial “evidential studies” and the reception of science and technology in modern Chinese thought entitled The Metaphysical Dimension of Science: the Genesis and Evolution of Scientism in Modern China (Kexue de xingshang zhi wei: Zhongguo jindai kexuezhuyi de xingcheng yu yanhua 科学的形上之维—中国近代科学主义的形成与衍化) from 1999. In the last chapter of this book, entitled “Returning to Concrete Existence” (Huigui juti de cunzai 回归具体的存在), Yang effectively articulates the programmatic aim of his “mature” philosophy, namely that of developing a “concrete metaphysics” ( juti de xing’ershangxue 具体的形而上学).4 For Yang, only a form of metaphysics which heeds this call of returning to the concrete historical as well as social dimensions of human existence stands a chance of overcoming and sublating the critique and rejection of metaphysical thinking often seen as coinciding with the emergence of continental as well as analytical currents of modern Western philosophy. Such a movement toward the “concrete” also entails transcending the disciplinary differentiation characteristic of modern academic philosophy and attempting to recover “wisdom” as the original goal of philosophy in China as well as the West. While Yang is hardly insensitive to the complex problems raised by the endeavor of cross-cultural thinking, he does not allow himself to be restrained by the exaggerated sense of methodological doubt that often haunts the discipline of comparative philosophy. Instead, in Yang’s work, research into the history of Chinese thought accomplishes something similar to the “leap” out of the sterile vicious circle of Kant’s reflexive critique of reason suggested by Hegel in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit: the question concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge is “resolved” by returning to its actual historical trajectory, which is part of an ongoing process instead of something that is yet to be initiated.5 In this sense, the essays in this volume can be seen both as stepping stones toward the concrete and as concrete incarnations of the unity of history and thought Yang Guorong has consistently pursued throughout the years.

4  Yang’s trilogy on “concrete metaphysics” compromises the books On Dao (Lun dao 论道), Ethics and Existence (Lunli yu cunzai 伦理与存在), and The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things (Chengji yu chengwu 成己与成物). 5  See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 46–57.

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This book is a collection of essays. They were published in various academic journals and newspapers throughout China over the past several years and were later collected into the present volume. Readers are thus encouraged to study chapters in this text in any order they see fit. Since each chapter is a distinct essay we have decided to reference major figures, concepts, and texts accordingly. That is, by introducing the first instance of a figure, concept, or text with Chinese characters, translations, and dates afresh in each chapter. All translations from other sources are the respective translator’s own, unless otherwise indicated. When referring to passages from Chinese classics, we cite the chapter and section number as they appear in the online version of the text at the Chinese Text Project website (www.ctext.org), unless otherwise noted. The style of the translation also varies in each chapter, reflecting not only the translator’s preferences, but also the changes in Professor Yang Guorong’s own voice throughout these works. Readers will also notice that some translations of key concepts vary to a limited extent. For example tian dao 天道 is sometimes translated as “heavenly dao” and other times as “the dao of heaven,” these differences speak to the various connotations being highlighted in Professor Yang’s writing. For the reader’s convenience a list of key philosophical terms and their various translations is included in this book. It should be noted that these translations, and their employment in the book do not necessarily reflect the philosophical attitude of the translator. These terms are translated according to professor Yang Guorong’s understanding and many of the English renderings come directly from him. Additionally, depending on the context some characters are not translated but left in pinyin (Romanized Chinese) with definitions in parenthesis. For example, Chapter  16 is on gongzheng 公正, which is commonly translated as “justice,” but since gongzheng is the major topic the word is not translated. We have also opted to use simplified Chinese, as the original book was published in simplified Chinese. We also wish to express our gratitude to each of the translators for their excellent work, to Katie Sullivan, Ryan Mernin, and Frank Saunders Jr. for helping me edit the manuscript, as well as Qin Higley and Parisa Syed from Brill for their patience and understanding throughout this process. Paul J. D’Ambrosio

Lamma Island, Hong Kong S.A.R. October 2018

Ady Van den Stock Ghent, Belgium October 2018

Chapter 1

Introduction In the midst of our interactions with people and the world, we have always been confronted with the problem of knowledge of the world and knowledge of people themselves.1 From the early periods of myths and shamanism to today’s various forms of knowledge and academic disciplines, they all use different methods to open up unknown frontiers. Whether it is myth, shamanism, or even science, they can all be seen as particular approaches to understanding the world, representing different historical periods’ efforts to understand the world and revealing different methods used to investigate the world. There can exist different horizons toward the understanding of the world and persons. “Horizons” penetrate into many diverse perspectives and also contain different points of view concerning the investigation of questions, the latter is concretely manifested as the distinctions between concepts such as experience and transcendence, skill ( ji 技) and dao 道 (“way” “method”). Taking the pursuit of wisdom as its guiding direction, philosophy’s horizon should first of all use the dao perspective, which is different than using a “skill” perspective or “tool” (qi 器)2 perspective. The horizon of the “tool” or “skill” perspective mainly reflects the horizon of knowledge. Looking at this from a more internal level, the contemplation of philosophy on one hand takes the presence of the world and the existence of the person as its object, thus possessing a universal character. While on the other hand it exhibits the particular and partial investigation of human nature and heavenly law. With this in mind, the horizon of philosophy contains universality, individuality, and other dimensions. Gilles Deleuze believed “philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts”3 and Hegel connected philosophy and ideas together, believing that ideas are what philosophers research, not mere concepts.4 In its practical 1  This chapter was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau. 2  Translator’s note: This term qi (器), meaning vessel, tool, or specific thing is used in the ancient Chinese classics to refer to sacrificial vessels. In the Daoist texts, it is often used to express a sort of artificiality in opposition to pu (朴), or the inherent qualities or natural state that exists before being fashioned by man. 3  Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy?, Translated by Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, (Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 5. 4  Hegel, G.W.F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Translated by Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_002

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Chapter 1

form, philosophy both constructs and analyzes concepts, and is also related to ideas. We can understand concepts in a different respect: the general sense of concepts themselves touches upon ideas, but when speaking about concepts and ideas in relation to each other, they have a distinguishing emphasis and ideas point more in the direction of a unity. Based on this latter meaning, starting off with concepts and basing them on ideas seems to reflect the different horizons of philosophy. Broadly speaking, after philosophically grasping the world, many different horizons can be seen, and this particular type of horizon takes a philosophic stance toward the world and simultaneously allows for different meanings to emerge from the world. In regard to ontology, we should recognize that we only have one world, and for that matter, the real world is a public one. However, because of the different horizons, the meaning of the world emerges in many different forms. From the perspective of the interrelatedness of the comprehending subject, in one respect every subject’s life background, value perspective, and cognitive orientation are different, and thus each subject’s horizon is different. This generates a field of meaning with its own particular features, leaving the subject within “a different world” in some sense. On the other hand, the comprehending subject must have a foundation for a fusion of horizons, ceaselessly reaching for a certain level of common understanding and a “common world,” the latter of these being necessary for the intercommunication and social interaction between subjects. The creation of “different worlds” and movement towards a “common world” creates two interrelated aspects of comprehending and grasping the world, and associated with this process is the division and fusion of horizons. In regard to the individual, one’s horizon constitutes their background for grasping the world and also brings some restrictions to this process. As a consistent and stable perspective toward the world, one’s horizon not only contains one’s understanding of the world in an epistemological sense, but also frames one’s attitude toward the world with respect to one’s values. Approval of any type of philosophic position makes it easy to pursue an investigation from only this perspective and neglect other possible angles of understanding. At this point it is important to pay attention to the transformation and expansion of one’s horizon. Purely having one particular horizon as a foundation will often restrict one’s understanding of things, while the transformation or expansion of one’s horizon is necessary for overcoming the restrictions brought on by a solidified and rigid horizon. In fact, the previously mentioned “dao perspective” implies continuously overcoming the simplification and rigidity of one’s horizon and moving toward the concrete, real world through the expansion of one’s horizon.

Introduction

3

The thought and distinctions of the relevant questions in this book include the fields of human nature and heavenly law and also express a concrete philosophic horizon. In recent years, despite my research being primarily concentrated in the fields of the world of meaning and practical philosophy, as represented by the two books The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being (Chengji yu chengwu: Yiyi shijie de shengcheng 成己与成物－意义世界的生成) and Human Action and Practical Wisdom (renlei xingdong yu shijian zhihui 人类行 动与实践智慧) respectively, I have simultaneously been working on questions within other fields, and this book is a compilation of a number philosophic manuscripts I have been working on since 2009. The manuscripts took shape from various sources including academic lectures, records of speeches from academic conferences, as well as papers and meditations on the classics. The content of these manuscripts touches on different aspects within the domain of philosophy. Roughly speaking, they can be broken into four parts. The first part addresses philosophic questions in a general sense, such as the characteristics of philosophy itself, the approach to philosophic research, education within philosophic horizons, philosophic elucidations of ecological questions, etc. The second part concerns an understanding of Chinese philosophy, such as the meaning of “philosophy” within the field, the position of Chinese philosophy, etc. The third part is comprised of an investigation into a number of concrete issues within the history of Chinese philosophy that touch on general concepts and questions such as Chinese philosophy’s dao, the question of human nature, the concept of “justice” etc., as well as particular people and texts. The fourth part concerns major schools of thought within modern Western philosophy, and also, more specifically, contains a brief analysis of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. What is philosophy? Throughout the evolution of the history of philosophy we have continuously faced this question. One of the distinguishing characteristics that makes philosophy different from other academic disciplines is that it not only confronts the world, but is also meant to reflect on its own role, and the question “what is philosophic questioning” is an embodiment of this type of self-reflection that philosophy engages in. The many manuscripts incorporated into this book also touch on different aspects of this topic. In recent years, the evolution of philosophy has appeared to move more in the direction of specialization, and philosophers have gradually become more professional and specialized. After the beginning of the 20th century, following metaphysics being called into question and the change in direction of linguistics, this trend developed a step further. As a result of this we have distanced ourselves from and forgotten wisdom. A transformation of philosophy’s horizon can also

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Chapter 1

be seen here, and this transformation seems to have more of the tendency of shifting from wisdom towards knowledge. In order to take one more step toward engaging in a self-reflection of philosophy, we must refocus on the intrinsic nature of philosophy as wisdom. The circumstances that Chinese philosophy has confronted have had their own distinct characteristics. Since the point in time that Chinese philosophy acquired its recent form, Chinese philosophy’s identity has been a controversial topic. Starting out from its universality, its particularity, or other horizons, the understanding of Chinese philosophy and the position given to it have been quite diverse. A true grasp of Chinese philosophy must be based on Chinese philosophy, while returning to a wider meaning of philosophy itself. This equally touches upon the transformation and expansion of horizons. Philosophy both possesses a common, universal form, while a diverse and personalized form also emerges. Very early on Chinese philosophy distinguished between “skill” and “dao,” or “the pursuit of learning” (weixue 为学) and “the pursuit of dao” (weidao 为道). Within this distinction, “skill” and “in the pursuit of learning” refer to the object of the horizon of experience, while “dao” and “in the pursuit of dao” refer to human nature and heavenly law, the latter belonging to the domain of wisdom in a broad sense. Taking wisdom of human nature and heavenly law as content, Chinese philosophy can no doubt be classified as falling under the scope of philosophy. In addition to this, approval and recognition of the dual horizon must be formed. Recognition implies affirmation of the individuality and particularity of the form of philosophy, and that the substance of philosophy values diversity. The compliment to this is the affirmation of Chinese philosophy as a specific form of philosophy, which contains universal meaning, and behind its recognition lies the confirmation of this type of universal theoretical meaning. From an historical perspective, Chinese philosophy has formed a variety of theories and questions during the course of its evolution, and to concretely understand Chinese philosophy, one must enter into these relevant theories and conduct a multifaceted inspection of the questions contained within. From human nature to selfhood, from cognition to politics, from schools of thought to individuals, this book is meant to embody the intent of research of the theories and questions within Chinese philosophy. All of these topics revolve around the questions of Chinese philosophy itself and the theme never leaves the two fundamental aspects of “heavenly dao” or “dao of heaven” (tiandao 天道) and the “humanistic dao” or “dao of man” (rendao 人道). Despite involving the diversity of these subjects, the research approach will be relatively consistent and, as such, will concretely demonstrate that the pursuit of learning has no Chinese-Western distinction and also show the unification

Introduction

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of history and thought. The pursuit of learning without any Chinese-Western distinction implies that any limiting and confined academic tradition will be avoided, that the investigation of Chinese philosophy will start off from an open academic position. The unification of history and thought emphasizes the connection between the history of philosophy and philosophic theories. These two points can simultaneously be seen as recalling and reflecting upon the internal horizons embodied within the process of Chinese philosophy. Following the confluence of Chinese and Western philosophy in recent years, Chinese philosophy has been unable to continue to advance within its own tradition, the interaction between Chinese and Western philosophy having become an unavoidable historical trend. Regarding Western philosophy since the 20th century, analytic philosophy and phenomenology have undoubtedly been its two most important styles of thought. With that in mind, this book will take the distinctions between these styles of thought in order to discuss the works of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. There exist many different types of technical investigations of concrete details within the history of philosophy, and these documents are meant to enable us to grasp the important philosophic character exhibited by analytic philosophy and phenomenology as important schools of thought within the contemporary Western world, opening up their inner philosophic meaning. This book also includes relevant academic responses and interviews as an appendix in order to allow the reader to understand my academic research background on a wider level. Whether it is the investigation of the world or the pursuit of wisdom, each embodies, on one hand, uniqueness and, on the other hand, its internal limitations, and the corresponding research in this book is no exception. As described previously, to overcome this type of limitation requires a further deepening of research and an unceasing expansion of one’s horizon.

Chapter 2

The Dual Character of Philosophy I In its original form philosophy’s characteristics differ from other particular academic subjects.1 As seekers of wisdom we all know that philosophy is different from the other diverse forms of knowledge. In history, philosophy has been known as the mother of science, and in the Middle Ages in Europe it was identified as a branch of science and referred to as “natural philosophy.” In the 20th century, it was of the opinion of Albert Einstein that philosophy can be believed to be the mother of all scientific inquiry. Whether or not taking philosophy as “the mother of scientific inquiry” is a precise way of putting things can be discussed further, but from one aspect it reveals the distinction between philosophy and the specifically scientific branches of learning. The different branches of learning under the definition of science have the characteristics of being divided into classes and divisions, with each branch having its own respective boundaries and its own aim directed towards a concrete target within the realm of experience. Philosophy is a different branch of learning within this horizon. It is not limited by a specific realm or objects of experience, rather, its characteristics lies in stepping over the boundaries of different branches of learning and, from the dimension of the entirety, understanding the existence of the world and the being of the person itself. From this perspective, philosophy undoubtedly seems to transcend this characteristic of disciplinization. However, after entering modern times, a variety of disciplines gradually formed following the development of science and the differentiation of the knowledge systems. In connection with this has been the evolution and development of the modern educational system, especially the instillation and differentiation of academic disciplines within universities as they become structures for research and lectures on different disciplines. After philosophy had been integrated into the interdisciplinary university educational system, it gradually evolved into a specific course taught within universities. Being one type of concentration of study among many within a university system, 1  This text is based on a recording of a speech made by the author at the “Chinese Philosophy’s Disciplinization and Transition” forum, held in January, 2012 in Hangzhou. It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_003

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philosophy also began to present a unique knowledge system which was embodied within different levels of professional settings, curriculum systems, research paradigms, and so on. With the diversification of knowledge and development of the education system in recent years as a historical background, philosophy has acquired an intellectual nature and the characteristics of an academic discipline to a degree that the academic disciplinary sense of philosophy and the aforementioned modern process of development are intrinsically related. This trend of disciplinization is most prominently displayed in modern times, especially in the case of some philosophical research approaches since the 20th century. In speaking about analytic philosophy while simultaneously focusing attention on discriminating amongst concepts, it reinforced research norms, methods of research, and also, following the continuous evolution of the content discussed, this field began tending more toward technicalization due to the specialization of analytic philosophy. As a result, philosophy began to concretely manifest the features of an academic discipline, or to put it in other worlds, as a specific form of knowledge. In general, since modern times, the trend towards the professionalization of philosophers has corresponded with philosophy itself becoming more specialized, moving more toward a kind of intellectualization, and these features of philosophy have been obviously manifested within modern analytic philosophy. When reflecting on the disciplinization of philosophy at today’s point of development, we can have a broader understanding of the process. On one hand, we need to pay full attention to the actual form that philosophy has taken over the course of its evolution in recent years. This is because philosophy has already taken on the characteristics of disciplinization in some sense, and this cannot be avoided or ignored, even by those who take an attitude of historical nihilism. On the other hand, we should also squarely face that aspect of philosophy’s origins which is meant to transcend disciplinization. To put it briefly, we can understand philosophy from its disciplinized aspects and also regard it as that which transcends disciplinization; the latter reflects the innate form of philosophy and the former reflects its historical evolution. This duality within the direction of modern philosophic research repeats itself again and again. For example, the previously mentioned analytic philosophy relatively favors the disciplinization direction of philosophy. Another influential style of thought within modern western philosophy, phenomenology, embodies more of the understanding of philosophy as that which transcends disciplinization. Martin Heidegger distinguishes philosophy from other specific spheres in his book What is a Thing?, saying “there are no fields in philosophy, because philosophy itself is not a field. Something like a division of labor is senseless in philosophy; scholastic learning is to a certain extent

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indispensable to it but is never its essence.”2 Heidegger did not give a specific explanation of his comment “philosophy is not a field,” but his meaning is relatively clear: he was emphasizing distinguishing philosophy from specific fields of knowledge. Similarly, in 2007 at Stanford University I was able to have a number of discussions with Richard Rorty about questions of philosophy. When discussing how to understand philosophy, Rorty put forth a direct and frank perspective: “philosophy is not a discipline.” One of the features of an academic discipline is that it touches upon specific fields of knowledge, and when understanding philosophy from a merely disciplinary horizon, it equates philosophy to the various specific fields of knowledge. Heidegger had a philosophic background in phenomenology while Rorty first came from a background in analytic philosophy, which he would later criticize. Both philosophers’ positions and backgrounds were different, but in coming from different positions and backgrounds in the “modern” context, agreed with each other that philosophy is separate from general intellectual disciplines. This indicates that phenomenologists and former analytic philosophers, or philosophers who had come from a background in analytic philosophy but no longer identify with it, give more credence to the aspect of philosophy which transcends disciplinization. Incidentally, Heidegger stressed that “scholastic learning” does not constitute the essence of philosophy, which is an indication by way of negation that philosophy is different from the general characteristics of academic disciplines. In addition to making this point by way of negation, he also put forward the existing features of philosophy. In his book Being and Truth Heidegger said the following about the meaning of philosophy: philosophy is “the unceasing, questioning struggle over the essence and Being of beings.”3 More plainly put, philosophy touches on the essence of being and “the Being of beings,” and this essence and “Being of beings” realizes or opens up this type of interrelated process between essence and being with the person itself. From Heidegger’s point of view, a person’s being points towards the struggle between the essence of being and the “Being of beings.” From another point of view, the realization and opening up of the essence of being and “being of beings” is inseparable from the activity of humans themselves. What he refers to as “being of beings” is equivalent to “an existing thing.” A point to pay attention to regarding this is that philosophy is not merely abstract reasoning concerning being and 2  Heidegger, Martin. What is a Thing?, Translated by W.B. Barton, Jr and Vera Deutsch, (South Bed: Regnery/Gate Way. INC., 1967), p. 3. 3  Heidegger, Martin, Being and Truth, Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 7; 9.

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its essence, but rather, it is from beginning to end the process associated with persons themselves realizing or opening up to the essence of being (reaching “the being of beings”). Although Heidegger’s “struggle over the essence and ‘being of beings’” is clearly speculative in nature, it also contains an abstract form to grasp the meaning of being through the process of a person’s existence. Using a philosophic understanding toward the above-mentioned, ceaseless struggle highlights the conspicuous differences between philosophy and other disciplines that are directed toward knowledge of the world. II This duality also restricts our learning and thinking within the field of philosophy. Under the premise that philosophy has already acquired the form of some type of academic discipline, there is no doubt that studying the disciplinization of philosophy has certain significance in today’s research in philosophy. Specifically speaking, emphasizing disciplinization implies placing importance on the unique academic training demanded by the field of philosophy. In the course of study and research in the field of philosophy, this kind of academic training should not be ignored. Philosophic thinking and the basic training for research, such as logical analysis or the demonstration of a point of view through rational argument, are inevitable in the course of philosophic research. It is only through this training that we can clarify philosophic problems, use a clear form to reveal the philosophic point of view, and, through criticism and debate, deepen philosophic reflection. In addition to this, Western philosophy since Ancient Greece and Chinese philosophy since Pre-Qin both went through a long process of evolution which contained many theoretical successes and also contained intellectual content on the level of historical reality. The latter includes the lives of philosophers, the background of the emergence of philosophic theories, the relationships between philosophic schools of thought and individuals, and so on. This is equally important to the intellectual understanding of the history of philosophy and to philosophic thought. Furthermore, this content is relevant to the form of philosophy as an academic discipline. From this point of view, the elements of philosophy as an academic discipline have unavoidable significance. While paying attention to the above-mentioned elements, it is also important to place sufficient importance on the characteristics of philosophy which transcend the features of academic disciplines. If we merely focus on the features of philosophy as an academic discipline, it becomes easy to understand philosophy as a pure system of knowledge, which would bring philosophy a step

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closer to being a technical form and, to use the parlance of Chinese philosophy, would cause “dao” to become “skill.” On the level of wisdom, philosophy is an original expression of the primitive investigation towards existence. Aristotle pointed out that wisdom points towards “cause and principle.”4 Looking at it philosophically, cause and principle involve existence’s foundation and origin, and the investigation of the foundation and origin of existence is consistent with what is referred to as “skill” entering “dao.” If one unilaterally emphasizes philosophy as a discipline and a set of knowledge, it is possible to turn the pursuit of “dao” into the operation of “technique,” and as a result deviate from philosophy’s internal nature. We must further investigate the important philosophic questions, such as the understanding of the unity of the world, the exploration of human freedom, the standards for the ideal moral person, and so on. These questions are often involved within the field of metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, etc., and it seems that purely knowledge-based, disciplinized fields often neglected them. In fact, merely focusing on philosophy as a discipline and knowledge base will often make it easy to marginalize wisdom’s pursuit of Dao. In short, the attitude and perspective with which we should treat philosophy, including Chinese philosophy, is to focus on philosophy as a discipline, while fully affirming philosophy as that which transcends disciplines. The dual form of philosophy as both a discipline and that which transcends disciplines is not merely an historical accident associated with the differentiation of knowledge that has occurred in modern times, but is also related to the internal rules of philosophy itself. As mentioned previously, speaking in terms of its original meaning, philosophy takes the pursuit of wisdom as its direction. Although wisdom cannot be equated to knowledge, it is also not completely separate from knowledge. From the perspective of the process of grasping the world and understanding the person, it emerges that knowledge and wisdom have an interactive relationship. If it is said that philosophy as a discipline has more of an association with the level of knowledge, then philosophy as that which transcends disciplines has an association with the pursuit of wisdom. In terms of the relationship between knowledge and wisdom, in one respect knowledge is within the process of grasping being, but it is only by being promoted to the level of wisdom that the real world is able to be reached. Another aspect of this relationship, speaking in terms of wisdom, is that not only does it never truly disassociate itself from knowledge in its own process of formation, but wisdom itself also needs to constantly be embodied and worked into the 4  Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Translated by Richard McKeon, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 691.

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field of knowledge. The above-mentioned relationship between knowledge and wisdom sets up and restricts the disciplinization and transcendence of disciplines contained within philosophy on a deeper level. Putting it simply, the internal relationship between knowledge and wisdom forms the foundation of philosophy’s duality between its disciplinization and transcendence of disciplines. Looking at it from another perspective, confirming philosophy’s disciplinization and transcendence of disciplines simultaneously means recognizing the interaction between knowledge and wisdom. Taking the aforementioned as a horizon, we should give double attention to modern philosophy’s analytic philosophy and phenomenology. Analytic philosophy more closely embodies the characteristics of philosophy as a discipline and, when focusing on analytic philosophy, we should fully recognize the corresponding disciplinary characteristics contained within philosophy. Specifically speaking, valuing analytic philosophy is of great importance to the promotion of thought and research, and the expression of standards of philosophy. Overall, contemporary Chinese philosophy seems to pay insufficient attention to analytic philosophy, and this might be related to the tradition of Chinese philosophy. During a similar time period, Chinese philosophy seems to have relatively ignored formal logic and thus has had difficulty forming a sense of approval toward valuing strict logical analysis. Related to this, conceptual analysis and theoretical proofs often appear in a relatively weak form. In the field of research, the concepts of some works often failing to achieve the necessary clarity and their conclusions often lacking sufficient proof, constitute a bias toward Chinese philosophy with respect to the form of thought. The above questions, first of all, reflect the level of philosophy as an academic discipline (expressed as flaws in the disciplinary sense), and to overcome these biases, analytic philosophy, as a prominent form of philosophy with disciplinary characteristics, should be given sufficient attention. Compared to analytic philosophy, phenomenology places more of an emphasis on philosophy as that which transcends disciplines. As such, it gives more attention to the internal questions of philosophy, including questions of metaphysics. Compared to the later years of the evolution of analytic philosophy, during which a tendency toward a type of technicalization emerged, phenomenology had a more conscious awareness of its own exploration of wisdom. In regard to metaphysics, despite philosophers within the school of phenomenology such as Martin Heidegger who criticized traditional metaphysics, they never completely rejected contemplation of metaphysical questions, and in fact, Heidegger in Being and Time put forward what is referred to as “fundamental ontology.” As has been previously mentioned, philosophic research cannot be restricted to merely the field of knowledge or as

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an academic discipline. Instead we must pay sufficient attention to its nature as that which transcends disciplines and its internal tendency to seek wisdom, and we should not ignore this regarding phenomenology either. It can be seen that along with the affirmation of philosophy, both as an academic discipline and as that which transcends disciplines, we should recognize and accept the philosophic significance of contemporary mainstream philosophy as containing different philosophic emphases. III The general properties of philosophy simultaneously regulate its special form. Acting as a unique form of philosophy, Chinese philosophy has also faced the aforementioned questions in its modern course of development. Historically speaking, the interaction between its birth process along with its characteristics as a discipline and that which transcends disciplines has been intertwined and interrelated within Chinese philosophy as a discipline in a modern sense. Chinese philosophy as a modern discipline is formed first by taking Western philosophy as a reference system. In the modern evolution of Chinese academics, Hu Shi’s Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy was seen as the first modern work on the history of Chinese philosophy. This work can, in some sense, be said to have established the initial paradigm for the history of Chinese philosophy, and that paradigm, in the context of this book, was constructed by referencing Western philosophy. It is impossible, in fact, for Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline to completely cut off its relationship with Western philosophy. In this sense, to discuss the discipline of Chinese philosophy as separate from Western philosophy is unhistorical. However, while Chinese philosophy was acquiring its form as a modern academic discipline, it simultaneously started out on a process, which inevitably led it to return to its own traditions. Its specific content is expressed within a modern philosophic horizon, and conducts an even deeper explanation and clarification of traditional wisdom. As such, in one respect, Chinese philosophy used Western philosophy as a background reference in its formation as a modern academic discipline. Yet in another respect, having acquired the form of an academic discipline, the substantive content of Chinese philosophy returned to contemplation of Chinese traditional wisdom. Chinese philosophy in this latter respect has the characteristics of that which transcends disciplines. Its continual return toward the source of wisdom implies a transcendence over pure knowledge and technicalization. In this process, the interaction between wisdom and knowledge can be seen, and it is not difficult

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to notice the relationship between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. This type of interaction and relationship both theoretically and historically reflects the intertwining of Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline and as that which transcends academic disciplines. In the course of the formation of Chinese philosophy as a modern discipline, these above characteristics are often bound up together. Considering this previous premise of being limited to merely “using China to explain China,” it becomes difficult to understand Chinese philosophy as a modern discipline. Chinese philosophy as a modern discipline takes Western philosophy as a frame of reference. Without this aspect, although it might be focused around the Hundred Schools of Thought, Classical studies, and other traditional forms of thought, Chinese philosophy would not be considered a modern discipline. However, from another perspective, purely using the model of Western philosophy to arrange Chinese philosophy makes it difficult to sufficiently manifest the wisdom contained within Chinese philosophy itself. Under a stiff and mechanistic structure, Chinese philosophy might sink down into a sort of external knowledge form with neither a theoretical personality nor a deep inner meaning, and its meaning would serve as merely a footnote of knowledge to Western philosophy. Regarding Chinese philosophy as a discipline from the perspective of its formation and development, as it is clear that the above two directions each have their own biases, a reasonable way of proceeding is to give dual attention to the integration between Chinese and Western philosophy and to the interaction between knowledge and wisdom. In fact, it is just this integration and interaction which gives meaning to the essence of the form of Chinese philosophy as a discipline and the process of its formation. It can be seen that the mutual connection between the nature of Chinese philosophy and its broader philosophic meaning in regard to its position and understanding involves both its modern significance as a discipline and its deeper significance as that which transcends disciplines. Aside from attention paid to the interaction between knowledge and wisdom on a philosophic level, grasping Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline is historically preconditioned on the interaction between Chinese and Western philosophies. Both of these fusions constitute the unique form of Chinese philosophy as a modern discipline’s process of formation. While affirming Chinese philosophy both as a discipline and as that which transcends disciplines, we must also pay attention to the interaction between knowledge and wisdom contained within this dual personality, while also regarding the specific historical background of its integration with Western philosophy.

Chapter 3

Problems and Methodology There exists a very close connection between philosophic questions and the philosophic method.1 In a certain sense, philosophic questions internally regulate the philosophic method, and this can be recognized within different forms of contemporary philosophy. In terms of analytic philosophy, the questions with which it deals are principally related to signification, and the meaning of signification primarily involves language. From the above perspective of philosophic questions regulating the philosophic method, analytic philosophy manifests this specifically in its logical analysis of language. In regard to phenomenology, despite Husserl’s early criticisms of psychology and his later interest in the living world, the essence of one of the philosophic questions with which he was deeply concerned was how to provide a foundation for philosophy on the level of consciousness. His theory of intention and the related eidetic intuition, eidetic reduction, transcendental reduction, and other methods of phenomenology, can all be traced back to this question either directly or indirectly. This methodology of using pure consciousness as direction and analytic philosophy’s emphasis on linguistic analysis are two clearly different approaches. From another perspective, there also exists an internal connection between method and theory. Theory always internally embodies method, and method can be seen as the application of theory. One only needs to consider the various philosophic systems within the history of philosophy to see this relationship. Different theoretical systems of philosophy internally contain unique methods. For example, Hegel’s system of philosophy contains the method of dialectic thought, and through reading the works of Kant, one realizes the internal connection that emerges between his emphasis on differentiating various domains and his method of delimitation. The above is a reflection of the correlation between method and questions generally and method and theory in a wider sense.

1  This article was originally published in Social Science Research, week one (2012). It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_004

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I In terms of contemporary philosophy, we should first mention the relationship between theoretical speculation and logical analysis. This relationship involves the question of the connection between substance and form within the course of philosophic research, and, as is expressed in classical German philosophy, also touches upon the relationship between reason and understanding. Looking at it from a more internal level, this question concerns the debate surrounding wisdom and knowledge. Taking a broader meaning, what is referred to as theoretical speculation includes philosophic contemplation, intuition, experience, insight, etc. Using Feng Qi 冯契 (d. 1995) as an example, his method is related to rational intuition, dialectical synthesis, and moral self-evidence. Compared to theoretical speculation, the basic form of logical analysis mainly expresses two aspects: one is definition of concepts, and the other is argument from point of view. The former involves the definition and clarification of concepts. The latter involves raising a proposition on the basis of a certain foundation and reason, putting forward a logical defense of the argument, and showing the logical connections between different arguments and between the premise and conclusion. Within contemporary philosophy, phenomenology and analytic philosophy are two major trends of thought, and both express a different emphasis in terms of research method. Comparatively speaking, phenomenology makes more use of theoretical speculation, and this characteristic corresponds to its questions of primary interest. In regard to phenomenology, as well as each school of thought and person that focuses on phenomenology, they are more concerned with philosophic questions on a substantive level, rather than the merely formal level of logical analysis. From early Husserl to Heidegger in his later period, as well as the various recent phenomenologists, they all express concern with philosophic questions of substance. It is out of the development of the system of phenomenology, with an emphasis on hermeneutics, that the person’s being, the course of history, and other questions are brought into the process of understanding, thereby revealing the domain of substance. Phenomenology’s deep concern for philosophic wisdom in the traditional sense, as well as its historical connection to theoretical speculation and the traditional philosophic concern toward wisdom is clearly evident in its interest toward questions on a substantive level. Speculation itself, of course, can be further distinguished. There can be a concrete form of speculation and also an abstract form of speculation. The concrete form of speculation always involves the historical course of reality and the plurality of life practices. While the abstract form of speculation is

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often set apart from the course of history and disconnected from life practices. To use the language of Chinese philosophy, the above differentiation involves “discussing dao through tools” and “discussing dao without tools.” The “dao” here can be seen as the object of philosophic speculation, and, in a broad sense, the “tools” refer to the actually existing form, as well as the real course of history and life. Concrete speculation uses “discussing dao through tools” as its internal characteristic feature, while abstract speculation emerges from “discussing dao without tools.” Phenomenology’s theoretical speculation, in a certain sense, has overtones of abstract speculation, which can be noted specifically within the works of Husserl. Although he pursued a strict, scientific form as a target for philosophy, the manifestation of his practice and his work concerned intuition and reduction of conscious phenomenon, emphasizing suspended reality and suspended historical process, which can loosely be expressed as “leaving tools to discuss dao.” As one type of philosophic form, phenomenology touches on philosophic wisdom and its relevant philosophic questions on a substantive level, but also emerges out of the form of abstract speculation. Analytic philosophy pays a similar amount of attention to logical analysis, and its philosophic thought has developed the corresponding characteristics of rigor and clarity. However, it often gives an excessive emphasis on formalization in its logical analysis. In a certain sense, its research is restricted to the boundaries of language and does not overstep its limits, resulting in the relationship between language and existence becoming equally suspended. Even when discussing the field of metaphysics, analytic philosophy often emphasizes questions of metaphysics (such as “what is there?”), but does not touch on any actual target within the physical world. Rather there is more of an emphasis on existence within language or the meaning of the language used when discussing existence. To use Peter Strawson’s concept, this sort of discussion can be classified as descriptive metaphysics. In distinguishing existence itself and the language we use when discussing existence, there seems to be two distinctions created. It can be said that within analytic philosophy, the relationship between language and the actual world is somewhat similar to the relationship between Kant’s phenomena and noumena. They both mainly restrict language to outside of the real world, and out of this emerges the theoretical consequence of wisdom becoming forgotten and the related evolution of philosophy toward a technicalized and intellectualized form, both of which reflect the movement of “dao” becoming “skill” on different levels. Likewise, analytic philosophy often rejects philosophic questions with substantive significance. This is the logical consequence of analytic philosophy being taken to its extreme.

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The above approaches toward analytic philosophy and phenomenology should of course be sublated. People often negatively view speculation as being obscure and occult. However, if philosophy departs from speculation, it would be very difficult to truly return to the exploratory research of philosophy itself. In a certain sense, it can be said that without theoretical speculation, there would be no philosophy. Therefore, it is clear that the concrete form of theoretical speculation needs to be given affirmation. On the other hand though, with a lack of logical analysis, it becomes difficult to promote research of philosophic questions. That being said, theoretical speculation and logical analysis are both aspects that should not be ignored when reflecting upon philosophic research. II In pursuing a theory of existence, philosophic research touches on the relationship between philosophic thought and history with actual social life. The history of philosophy and reality is the dual root of philosophic research and constitutes the relevant background within the process of philosophic research. This meaning of the history of philosophy is related to the relative independence of philosophy as theoretical thinking; social life is related to philosophic research as its root in reality. There exists an internal connection between philosophy as a discipline and its own history. Truly understanding what philosophy is cannot be divorced from its history. The many questions of philosophy are often ancient but with a fresh take, and these sorts of questions are inseparably related to the internal evolution of the history of philosophy itself. From this respect, there is a relatively large discrepancy between philosophy and the empirical sciences. When demonstrating scientific research, it is generally unnecessary to refer to the past. For example, when researching physics, it is not necessary to refer to what Aristotle understood as physics. In researching philosophy, however, one must constantly look back to the past traditions and history. From the beginning of the history of philosophy there emerged an internal continuity between philosophic questions. In this sense, one must have a historical consciousness and also must pay a high degree of attention to the traditions of philosophy itself. In general, philosophic research should avoid unhistorical philosophy, especially when dealing with theoretical research. Instead one should pay particular attention to the research subject’s historical source and foundation. When attempting to construct one’s own theoretical system, there exists a common tendency for some people to believe that historical research

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has no merit and everything starts out of nothing. Within this type of horizon, if one speaks of history, it is often from the perspective of negation. This perspective is obviously lacking a deep historical consciousness. From the perspective of philosophic research itself, greater attention needs to be paid to the evolutionary process of philosophic history. Another important aspect of the background of philosophic research is real life. Social life is diverse and constantly changing, and the premises of philosophic questions are unable to be divorced from this type of background in reality. Speaking specifically, the significance of real life toward philosophic questions is embodied in at least two aspects. On one hand, it enables the questions of philosophy to obtain new meaning. As mentioned previously, one of the characteristics of philosophic questions, which is different from empirical science, is the way in which they are “ancient but always fresh.” The “fresh” in this context comes from real life. The questions of metaphysics have a long presence within the history of philosophy; however, these types of questions have emerged with different meanings and forms in different time periods. We are currently in the information age, and questions related to this, such as virtual relationships within a virtual reality, are constantly being raised. Looking at this from a philosophic level, virtual reality and virtual relationships touch on new types of metaphysical questions, and these types of questions are clearly inseparable from real life. On the other hand, the development of real life will often cause some questions to become more prominent within philosophy. This point is noticeable within the trends of philosophic research over time. If one pays attention, then one can see that political philosophy, for example, has gradually become an important area of thought, and may continue to be in the foreseeable future. Why has political philosophy garnered this much attention? To answer this question one must refer to the background of real life, which includes political changes becoming more urgent because of the increasingly complicated nature of international political relations, and so on. With this in mind, when engaged in the process of philosophic research, one cannot limit and confine research to the narrow domain of history, but must also pay sufficient attention to the background of real life. To sum up, while engaged in philosophic research, it is important to, on one hand, avoid philosophy which is not connected to history, and on the other hand, to avoid philosophy that is divorced from social life. III With history having already surpassed regionalism and having entered into a phase of globalized history, and different philosophic traditions having

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already encountered each other’s backgrounds, the question of how to handle the relationship between a world-horizon and individual characteristics has become an important difficulty facing philosophic research. What is referred to as a world-horizon or world-perspective is a way of investigating and understanding philosophic questions that transcend any specific tradition and include a broader background. Following the gradual transformation of history into world history, the dimension of the philosophic world has gradually come into prominence. While on the other hand, individual characteristics touch upon the creativity and uniqueness of philosophy. The dimension of universality under the world-horizon is mutually connected to the construction and development of philosophy itself. The world-horizon further touches upon the evolution of philosophy’s multiple resources and pluralistic wisdom. This sense of world wisdom implies transcending individual or closed off traditions, utilizing the diverse wisdom formed by people of different cultural backgrounds, and advancing a deeper understanding and philosophic thought of the world. In regard to philosophy, during similar time periods, both Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy independently developed under their own traditions. Then as history turned into world history, philosophy for the first time was able to transcend a single theoretical resource and tradition, allowing it to use the plurality of human wisdom to promote an understanding of the world. In the recent years, with Chinese and Western philosophy having encountered each other, how to move in the direction of a world philosophy has become an important question for Chinese philosophers. This can also be seen as the background for all of philosophic research. The development of economic globalization in the 21st century has made our having a world vision and world-horizon even more important. Philosophic research needs to utilize a range of philosophic wisdom, and not merely limit itself to one individual intellectual resource. Chinese philosophers should summarize the already existing philosophic tradition within China and the results of its development, and also pay substantial attention to Western philosophic wisdom, from Ancient Greece onward. This actually involves the oft-discussed problem of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy. There appears to exist many leanings concerning this question, such as simplistically interpreting Chinese philosophy in terms of Western philosophy, attempting to create a sharp dividing boundary between Chinese and Western philosophy, steadfastly requiring the method of “using China to explain China,” and so on. In order to understand the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy, however, we must jump out from between China and the West and inspect it from a broader world philosophy horizon. This implies that the results of thought in Chinese and Western

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philosophy should be seen as topics for philosophic thought and important resources for constructing a system of philosophy. In addition, philosophic research also needs an individual consciousness, or an individual character. From Ancient Greece and the pre-Qin period through today, philosophic thought has always expressed itself as a pursuit and exploration of individualized wisdom. In fact, any type of a creative philosophic system has an individual form, and philosophic creativity is unable to be separated from an individualized exploration. The philosophic individuality and diversity of a philosophy under a world-horizon has an internal consistency. When stepping into the background of a world history, globalization and individualization do not necessarily conflict. Philosophers from different cultural traditions and life circumstances still have individualized philosophic thought. Perhaps it is better to say that globalized thought is embodied by the approach of individualization. Within the process of moving toward a world philosophy, each philosopher’s background, traditions, and other personal experiences are reflected within his or her individual consciousness and thoughts concerning particular problems, and embodied by his or her understanding of different philosophic resources. Having accepted this premise, it follows that any philosopher’s individual characteristics will correspondingly emerge out of the results of his or her thought. The globalization of philosophy and the diversity and individuality of philosophy are two aspects of the same process. From this perspective, when forming a world-horizon and vision, it is also important to possess an individual consciousness and concern for individual characteristics. The blending together of these two aspects serves as the premise for the contemporary advancement into creative philosophic research. In terms of a more direct methodological perspective, philosophic research should emphasize dialectic concepts. For some time, the return to Kantian thought seems to have become a mainstream trend. We also need to pay an equally high degree of attention to the philosophy of Hegel. This is not only because of the insights of Hegel’s theories, but also because in his approach to philosophic research there exists a positive significance in Hegel’s philosophic method which avoids attachment to one single way of thinking while neglecting others. Within the process of philosophic research, we are faced with many questions and concerns, and it often becomes very easy to favor one aspect of the thought process over others. For example, in the case of the relationship between speculative theory and logical analysis, scholars engaged in phenomenological research often favor speculative theory, while scholars engaged in research concerning analytic philosophy prefer logical analysis. In the case of those who neglect dialectical thought, the question of how to fuse these aspects together often lacks self-awareness. Likewise, the topic of the

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interrelatedness of the history of philosophy and real life can easily encounter a similar problem. Researchers who focus on history have often forgotten about real life, while those who take an approach toward practical life sometimes neglect the unique historical form of philosophy. Moving forward, it is also often easy to become overly attached to one aspect when dealing with the question of the relationship between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy and the question of philosophic universality and particularity. If dialectic concepts can be formed or accepted, it would no doubt help to minimize these different partialities and achieve an understanding of the relevant questions that are more in accordance with reality, and as a result, advance and deepen contemporary philosophic research.

Chapter 4

The Completion of the Person and Its Multiple Dimensions: Education within a Philosophic Horizon I Education, as an important aspect of social life, is based on human development: it is oriented around people rather than objects.1 Education affects and changes existence, but it doesn’t change things or the outside physical world, but rather the people themselves. In Kant’s work on education he writes that in the world “man is the only being who needs education.”2 According to Kant, animals need only to utilize their instincts to follow their nature, unlike humans who need to undergo the process of education. In this sense, it can be said that education separates humans from other beings (including animals). The fact that humans are the only beings that require education also sets the mission, or goal, of education. Education, at its core, takes the idea of “becoming a person” as its internal directive and “the completion of the person” (ren de wancheng, 人的完成) as its goal. What is referred to as “the completion of the person” can be understood on different levels. First, “the completion of the person” implies transforming a human into a person with a social character, or “a person in a social sense.” The “person in a social sense” here is distinguished from a being as a mere organism. Humans are of course first and foremost biological organisms, but a human as an organism is still not a person in its completed sense, and for the former to become the latter, education is an indispensable element. Related to this, education is also a necessary condition for the cultural integration of a person. What is referred to as a person of culture is differentiated from a being of nature. In nature, humans and other animals do not have any fundamental differences, but people are able to transcend through education and the reception of culture. In a similar sense, education is essential for the transformation of a human into a civilized person. What is 1  This article is taken from a recorded lecture the author gave at East China Normal University (huadong shifan daxue 华东师范大学) in January of 2011. It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau. 2  Kant, Immanuel, On Education, translated by Annette Churton, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 1.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_005

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referred to as a civilized person differs from that of a pre-civilized being, and this distinction between civilized and pre-civilized can, in a broad sense, be expressed by the distinction of “cultured” and “wild.” Education is the necessary condition for the transformation of a pre-civilized form to a civilized form, or from “wild” to “cultured.” In this respect, education constitutes an important premise and condition for the completion of a person. II For a human, through education, to become a genuine person, or in other words, to use education as a channel for a person to achieve its completed state, involves multiple dimensions. First, in a narrow sense, the transmission and reception of education and knowledge is interrelated. Regarding the educator, the process of education involves the transmission of knowledge, and regarding the student, education involves the reception of knowledge. The transmission of education involves two aspects. The first aspect refers to the passing on of accumulated achievements of the evolution and development of culture. In this sense, the reception and conveyance of knowledge is an important channel for the continued inheritance of cultural achievements. The second aspect is that this process of receiving and imparting knowledge simultaneously leads the person to gradually learn how to exist in a social mode. It is only under the premise of having different forms of and content within knowledge systems that a person is able to go from “wild” to “cultured,” and exist in the world in a socialized, civilized manner. From the perspective of “the completion of the person,” education not only involves the topic of receiving and imparting wisdom, but is also related to ethical cultivation. Ethics is one of the preconditions for the maintenance and continuation of society: the establishment of an ordered society is inseparable from the dimension of ethics. In relation to this, to become a socialized person in its true sense, the individual must have a basic moral character, and in these terms, there exists an internal connection between education and ethical cultivation. The formation of moral character involves the internalization of standards. Moral character does not innately come from heaven, but it is also not something completely devoid of any content. Looking at its substantial content, moral character is the standards of social ethics formed within a specific time and social background, which is then internalized within an individual. The internalization of general standards, in forming the moral character of an individual, must occur in many phases, and education constitutes one

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important aspect. From another perspective, the formation of moral character is not merely for the purpose of allowing an individual to become accepted as a qualified member of society through adaptation, but is also extremely important for the spiritual promotion of the individual. If an individual lacks moral character, it becomes difficult to maintain a flourishing social existence. In this sense, the educational process, which uses moral cultivation as a goal toward both self-promotion and self-completion, is equally necessary. Going forward, education is also related to the training of ability. Ability can be broadly distinguished into two aspects: a spiritual-theoretical level of ability and practical ability. These two types of ability are actually not completely separated, and we can use the analytic method for further review. The spiritual-theoretical level of ability is more broadly related to “knowledge.” It involves both sensibility and rationality, and also includes non-rational aspects, such as imagination, intuition, insight, experience, and so on. Education constitutes an important factor in the promotion of the above abilities. Regarding a person’s most basic sensibilities, its most direct and original forms are those of sight, hearing, and the like, which, to a certain extent, include the domain of nature (physiology or biology), but cannot constitute a person’s ability in a strict sense. For these types of biological functions to transform into a person’s ability, one must go through a process, which must include education. It can be easily noticed how in our daily life education can guide us on how to observe and examine. The ability of observation formed after a person goes through a period of training has an important difference in terms of content and quality from the original functions (such as sight or hearing). For example, the types and forms of vegetation change when traveling from sea level to high above sea level. A traveler with no background in botany might just enjoy the sights of the scenery, but one trained in botany will immediately and acutely recognize the correlation between the condition of the vegetation and the elevation in altitude. It is not very difficult to see the connection between sensibility, ability of observation, and education. Regarding rationality, we can look at it from two perspectives. In terms of form, rationality is significantly linked to logical thought. The fundamental condition for thought process to obtain significance is being in accordance with the rules of logic (first amongst these is the law of identity). The fundamental requirement for the law of identity is that there needs to exist a definite connection between concept and object, and this law must be followed in order to have a valid thought process. Rejecting the law of identity would lead to the content of thought being inconceivable and devoid of meaning. The process of ensuring an individual’s thoughts are logical is a vital part of education. With respect to substance, rationality touches upon cognition, evaluation, and other

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aspects. Cognition is more related to “bringing light to the truth,” and evaluation is more related to “seeking the good.” Rationality is not an innate skill, and whether it is true understanding or grasping the good, a person’s ability must go through the process of education to gradually cultivate, train, promote, and develop it. In addition to this, ability in a broad sense also includes non-rational aspects such as imagination, intuition, etc. Imagination acts as an important aspect in grasping the world, and is also not innate, but rather must be guided by experience. Intuition is the aspect or internal rule by which one grasps the world in a relatively abbreviated form. Intuition does not resemble the order of logic, that is, starting from a premise, going through multiple stages, and coming to a conclusion, but is rather a direct understanding of the object. The formation of this ability is equally inseparable from the educational process, broadly speaking. From the perspective of the process of forming and cultivating ability, the individual certainly needs education for guidance and training. Practical ability is linked to spiritual-theoretical ability. The central embodiment of practical ability is the process of the individual resolving practical problems which, specifically speaking, can be separated into two aspects: the first is different types of technical abilities, including the different skills needed within productive labor or other activities, and the second is practical wisdom in a universal sense. Practical activity is not merely limited to the level of pure skill or technical ability. It equally relies on practical wisdom, which is embodied by practical ability in a broad sense. Practical ability in a broad sense undoubtedly includes specific technical abilities, however, it seems that it is unable to achieve wisdom on the level of “dao,” and it is equally difficult to reach the level of perfection through the practical process. Practical wisdom’s specific form of expression and content is diverse, and one of its important roles is to properly integrate general principles, rules, and specific practical circumstances. General principles primarily regulate universal behavior, but the individual’s objective circumstances are so varied and diverse that general principles are unable to provide a model of behavior for how to act in every scenario. This leads to the question of how to apply universal principles to specific circumstances. This requires practical wisdom. The formation, cultivation, and promotion of this type practical ability in a broad sense must be done through practice and is inseparable from the varied educational process. Although we observe different aspects on the level of spiritual-theoretical and practical abilities when using an analytic method of investigation, they are both mixed together within the process of a person’s practical existence. Practical ability includes theoretical ability, and theoretical ability is bound up in practical ability. Looking at it broadly, the correlation between these

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two abilities and the unification of “knowledge” and “capability” in a wideranging sense are inseparably connected. In fact, ability both embodies the broad meaning of “knowledge,” and is interconnected with the practical course of “capability.” Apart from knowledge, moral character, and ability, education involves another important aspect, that is, aesthetic character. This sort of aesthetic character is not limited to understanding concepts of beauty or the promotion of aesthetic tastes; the character of the beautiful includes a much wider meaning. In terms of the fundamental goal of education, i.e. achieving personhood or the completion of the person, this “beauty” has more of a characteristic of reflecting a synthesis, or wholeness. This synthesis, or wholeness, is not merely reflected in the unification of “the truth,” “the good,” or “the beautiful,” but rather connects the entirety of a person’s existence. In daily life “perfection” is often spoken of, but taking a person’s existence as a horizon, “perfection” refers more to the wholeness of the completed form of a person or, in other words, the whole person’s achievement of the ideal. We can see here that “perfection” contains the connotation of beauty as well as the dimension of wholeness and unification. The wholeness and unification reflected by beauty and the characteristics of beauty itself are interconnected. If we analyze “the beautiful,” it is not difficult to recognize that “the beautiful” primarily reflects the unification of sensibility and rationality. From the perspective of aesthetics, sensibility always refers to the external form, having a particular structure and appearance and it is therefore difficult to equate the general sense of “beauty” to an abstract concept. But from a different perspective, reason is permeated within sensibility, and this is one of the characteristics of “beauty.” Using this perspective, the outer appearance and inner aesthetic ideal is perfectly blended together. Similarly, “the beautiful” often reflects the unification of universality and individuality. Speaking from one perspective, “the beautiful” is specific, not abstract, has a specific form, and carries with it the characteristics of individuality. But in another respect, universality is always contained within the individual form. According to Kant, when we make an aesthetic judgment, this type of judgment concerning “the beautiful” simultaneously has universal validity: judgments regarding “the beautiful” are not merely applicable one specific individual thing. Beauty that is applicable merely to an individual thing and nothing more can hardly be considered “beautiful” in the true sense. The above characteristics of beauty create a specific example within the power of judgment. Kant connects beauty and the power of judgment when investigating aesthetics. Within Kant’s critique of philosophy, the critique of pure reason involves the field of metaphysics and is also interconnected with the cognitive process, while the critique of practical reason is more related

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to ethics, and the critique of judgment is primarily related to aesthetics. Regarding the person’s abilities, the power of judgment has synthetic characteristics. The intellectual abilities of sensibility, reason, imagination, intuition, insight, experience, etc. use an integrated method to act on each other within the power of judgment. Regardless of the level, making a judgment always synthetically reflects the multi-faceted abilities of a person. According to Kant’s understanding, “the beautiful” also reflects this type of synthetic form. Within Kant’s system, he sees “the beautiful” as the “bridge” which connects pure reason and practical reason. This “bridge” has a linking and synthetic signification. This type of synthetic form contained within aesthetics appears especially important for the modern person. As is well known, at a certain point in history following the division of labor, that human existence became increasingly unbalanced. The division of manual labor is the most basic form of division of labor. The ancient Chinese practice of “men tilling the field, women weaving” is a type of division of labor based on gender. Following industrialization, people were increasingly restricted to certain segments within the division of labor. The development of the various abilities of people subsequently received more restrictions. Marx and other philosophers of his time, such as those of the Frankfurt school, criticized modern society, especially the alienation that occurred following the development of capitalism. One result of this alienation is people becoming unbalanced: people increasingly became one segment within the system of the division of labor. “The completion of the person,” as the goal of education, implies that the person should not be restricted to a sort of unequal one-sidedness, rather the person should receive a well-rounded development. Being restricted to an aspect makes it difficult to truly “become a person.” So how does one discard this unbalanced one-sidedness? It is at this point that the synthesis used in the process of aesthetics proves to be especially important. This is also one of the reasons why so many philosophers and thinkers place importance on the process of aesthetics. In On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, Schiller also investigates the process of aesthetic education. In particular, he points out the characteristics of synthesis contained within aesthetic experience, believing it to be different than scientific thought. In the aesthetic process, different experiences are often synthesized together. These characteristics of the aesthetic process allow intellectual restrictions to be discarded in order to achieve a relatively comprehensive form of existence. With this in mind, the aesthetic education and the related promotion of a beautiful character not only form aesthetic tastes in a narrow sense, or an understanding of the concept of “beauty,” but also are inseparably related to the completion of the person on a deeper level.

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Related to the completion of the person, another aspect within the development of a person which requires attention is the problem of “the body.” The previous discussion focused on the “the mind,” but the person in its complete sense should arrive at the harmonious unification of “the body” and “the mind.” In this sense, “the body” is extremely important. “Physical education” is currently a part of the modern education system. Keeping in mind the completion of the person as the goal of education, “the body” itself involves the question of how to obtain a humanized form. “The body,” in its narrow sense, is a biologically a being with no fundamental difference between other animals. To make “the body” a humanized form implies imbuing it with social culture, which is inseparable from the process of education. In a broad sense, this also requires a physical component. Morality cannot merely stop at the concept of “the good,” on a theoretical level, but must also be put into practice. “The body” constitutes an important aspect in the process of putting this into practice. Speaking in a broader sense, a person’s words, actions, and gestures within a social life are all interconnected with “the body.” Whether or not these actions are able to obtain a civilized form is interrelated with whether “the body” obtains a civilized form, and this process is equally inseparable from education in its broad sense. From early on, China attached a great deal of importance to “ritual,” and one of the important meanings of “ritual” is the regulation of a person’s different methods of action. “Ritual” also has a type of polishing effect, giving the manner of one’s words and actions a civilized form. This civilized form constitutes an important aspect of existence in a social and cultural sense, and always occurs with the transformation of “the body” in a biological sense toward existence in a social sense, which simultaneously carries with it an educational function. III Regardless of whether we are speaking from a social, historical level or from an individual level, education as a social occurrence is carried out as a process and is involved in different relationships. Regarding the previously mentioned process of imparting and receiving knowledge, the substance of this process always involves two basic elements: the educator (the subject of education) and the person being educated (the object of education). Looking at it from the perspective of the educator, during the course of imparting knowledge one faces the problem of the relationship between “guiding” and “leading.” “Guiding” primarily emphasizes respect for the one receiving education, including giving attention to her aspirations, interests, and other aspects.

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Education is not a passive process, it is not such that the educator unilaterally imbues the student with a system of knowledge, rather, it is a mutually interactive process between the educator and student. Within this process, the question of how to grasp and respect the student’s internal aspirations, interests, and individual characteristics constitutes an extremely important aspect. “Guiding” implies avoiding uni-directionally imbuing and unilaterally enforcing education. In another respect, one should also avoid turning “guiding” into a simple pandering. Under what is referred to as “joyful education” and “education for all-around development,” it is often easy for “guiding” to become “pandering.” A similar phenomenon may emerge under other forms of education as well. For example, in order to create a more lively educational experience, the educator may use more narrative demonstrations to replace substantive teaching content, and if this method is excessively relied on, it would become easy to turn “guiding” into “pandering.” The effect of pandering is that it leaves the student at his or her original level, or even drops a level, and does not allow the student to truly develop through education. Because of this, in emphasizing the process of “guiding,” we should give a corresponding amount of attention to “leading.” The internal goal of “leading” is to substantially improve the student in terms of knowledge, method, ability, and other aspects. How to appropriately integrate “guiding” and “leading” together is an unavoidable question within the educational process. Associated with “guiding” and “leading” is individuality and universality. In effectively carrying out the process of education, one aspect which needs to be emphasized is the individual differences of each person being educated, or as the Confucians refer to it, “teaching in line with the student’s ability” (yincai shijiao 因材施教). Every individual will demonstrate differences in intelligence, interests, social background, and ability because no two individuals are completely the same. In the course of education, a high degree of importance should be placed on these differences. If one completely ignores the differences amongst students, the effectiveness of education will be restricted. From a modern perspective, what is referred to as “teaching in line with the student’s ability” includes at least two aspects: one is that the process of teaching should give attention to the personal differences of each student, and the second is that one of the goals of teaching should be to cultivate unique personalities. The focus of the educational process should not be to teach many people according a single model of personality. The world itself is diverse and abundant, and so is a person’s existence. In the educational process, the question of how to cultivate unique personalities equally deserves a high degree of attention. In fact, traditional thought on education from very early on was consciously aware of this question from a practical and theoretical perspective. The notion of

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“teaching in line with the student’s ability” had already been raised by Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE). Kongzi also taught this way in the everyday course of educating his students. The Lunyu 论语 (The Analects of Confucius) recorded many of the dialogues between Kongzi and his students. Sometimes different students ask the same question, but Kongzi provided different answers to the different questioners. This is an embodiment of attaching importance to the personal differences amongst students. However, education as a process also has an element of universality, and the goal of education, for an individual to become a person in its true sense, also contains universality. Education in modern schools also has regulations for universality in terms of grasping systems of knowledge, and the educator ought to be aware of these requirements for universality. In fact, the philosophers of the past engaged this question on different levels. When discussing imparting a skill, Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d.  289  BCE) pointed out: “a great artificer does not, for the sake of a stupid workman, alter or do away with the markingline. Yi did not, for the sake of a stupid archer, charge his rule for drawing the bow.”3 The emphasis in this quote is on the question of universality. Rules and guidelines serve as a general standard of conduct containing universality, and despite the fact that each specific student might have differences in terms of his or her ability to grasp a certain skill, (i.e. some being relatively clever and some being relatively slow), the master craftsman will not change these guidelines on account of some individuals not being able to adapt to them. The premise here is that one should not lower universal standards because of differences in ability among students. How to simultaneously respect the personal differences of students and preserve the universal standards of education is a question that needs to be faced within the process of education. The educational process often also involves the problem of the relationship between standardization and openness. Standardization is seen in the requirement for relative certainty in the goal, standards, and other aspects of education. From the perspective of education in modern schools, standardization is specifically shown in the relative stability of teaching material. However, whether we are speaking on behalf of the educator or the student, the educational process always has an element of flexibility and openness. While teaching materials maintain standardization, there remains space for openness regarding how to specifically carry out the lesson, and different teachers can have different teaching methods, even when using the same teaching materials. In fact, we cannot dictate a way of teaching based on the standard of teaching material: even if it is standardized teaching material, 3  Mengzi 7A41.

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the specific teaching method has openness and flexibility. Equally, different courses and different stages of education will present diversity and differences. From this perspective, education is not a single, closed-off process. The vitality and rigor is also an important element which needs adjustment. The educational process should both possess vitality and receptiveness as well as provide a rigorous and clear explanation for the fundamental principles of knowledge. To put it briefly, vitality and rigor, openness and standardization need to be combined together without giving emphasis to one over the other. The above is primarily concerned with the educator (subject of education) within the process of imparting knowledge. The object of education (the receiver of education or student) is equally involved and is confronted with different concerns. The first thing element of this is the relationship between “learning” and “thought.” Very early on, Kongzi mentioned “learning without thought is labor lost, and thought without learning is perilous.”4 Within the educational process, “learning” mainly emphasizes receiving already existing knowledge and grasping the knowledge accumulated by predecessors, and “thought” is more associated with creative thinking. It is different than passive, mechanistic memorization and repetition, but rather, is expressed by a creative understanding, or even extensive elaboration, of already received knowledge. How to combine together receiving existing knowledge with the creative understanding and elaboration of this knowledge is an unavoidable question and is the substance of “learning” and “thought.” Connected to this is the question of how the student (object of education) should treat the educator (subject education) while simultaneously dealing with the relationship between “learning” and “thought.” Related to the aspect of receiving already existing knowledge, the student (object of education) needs to respect and trust the educator (subject of education). On the other hand, however, the student cannot blindly follow the educator (subject of education), but rather should emphasize independent thought. Speaking from the perspective of knowledge, and in connection with the relationship between “learning” and “thought,” the educational process also involves the relationship between “scholarship” and “skepticism.” “Scholarship” is the process of accumulating and expanding knowledge, and “skepticism” is the reflective critique of existing knowledge, with the latter holding a similar position as the previously mentioned “thought.” During the history of Chinese thought, different schools of thought often put differing degrees of emphasis on these two concepts. The Confucians put a relatively larger amount of focus on scholarship, and although they affirm the idea “hear many things 4  Lunyu 2:15.

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and put to the side that which you are skeptical of,”5 when speaking about “learning,” the Confucians always put scholarship in a prominent position. By contrast, the Daoists pay more attention to the side of doubt and skepticism. The Daoist repeatedly use terms like “diminishing day by day” (ri sun 日损) and “sit and forget,” (zuowang 坐忘) which reflects their attitude towards knowledge from the past. Laozi’s 老子 (dates unknown) focuses on arriving at the wisdom of dao, which requires “diminishing day by day” and eliminating existing knowledge from one’s mind. The practical meaning of Zhuangzi 庄子 (d. 286 BCE) “sitting and forgetting” is to deconstruct the knowledge and experience formed throughout the history of society. Experiences and knowledge from the past have two characteristics. One of these characteristics is that they form a background of knowledge; if one engages in learning new things with a lack of knowledge from the past, this process of learning becomes difficult and shallow. Another characteristic, however, is that the structure of knowledge from the past may prejudice one’s learning of new things. Relatively speaking, Confucians emphasize the guiding and foundational function of existing knowledge and experience when engaged in the process of new learning. While the Daoists are more suspicious of the distorting effect that knowledge and experience from the past may have on the process of new learning, and to avoid this negative influence they promote “diminishing day by day” and “sitting and forgetting.” Regarding the educational process, “scholarship” and “skepticism” are necessary components: we cannot focus on only one aspect and neglect the other. How we integrate together “scholarship” (the accumulation and extension of knowledge) and a critical reflection of knowledge from the past is yet another question we must face when considering the educational process. IV The broad meaning of education simultaneously contains moral cultivation. This perspective of moral cultivation also involves a series of problems. First among these is the relationship between reason and demonstration. Within the process of moral education the student must be allowed to understand what one ought to do, how one ought to do it, etc. The process of grasping what one ought to do, ought not do, and how it ought to be done always involves an understanding of rules. These rules restrict the choice of actions or behavior and influences judgment concerning action: before one has committed 5  Lunyu 2:18.

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an action, these rules provide a standard according to which one chooses an action, and regarding an action having already been committed, these rules provide standards by which to judge the quality of that action (the correctness of the action, or whether it was good or bad). Regardless of whether it is the student or the teacher, understanding these general rules referred to as “making its reasoning obvious” (ming qi li 明其理) constitutes a very important part of moral cultivation. Making the student understand these general rules mainly involves the process of reasoning. One of the consequences of reasoning is that one’s actions go from being spontaneous to being conscious. For one to develop one’s actions from being a spontaneous reaction to a conscious reaction, one must go through the process of “making its reasoning obvious.” For example, the early Confucians had already begun to differentiate between the spontaneous form and the conscious form of action. Mengzi differentiated two forms of action, namely “acting benevolently and righteously” (xing renyi 行仁义) and “acting out of benevolence and righteousness” (you renyi xing 由仁义行). Although “acting benevolent and righteous” is done in accordance with certain behavioral norms, when a person acts benevolently and righteously he or she frequently is not consciously aware of it: the person is perhaps only acting this way by chance, which is what contemporary ethics refers to as “moral luck.” These types of action are not conscious actions, but rather arise from spontaneity. “Acting out of benevolence and righteousness” comes from a deep understanding of the norms and standards of benevolence and righteousness, and subsequently involve consciously acting based on these norms and standards. In the course of one’s moral practice, one should go from “acting benevolently and righteously” to “acting out of benevolence and righteousness,” and moral education brings about the necessary elements for transformation. Moral development should not be taught by merely relying on preaching; rather one needs a moral exemplar to demonstrate moral practice. In terms of child development, we see that much of the earliest behavior of a child is imitation, even though at that moment the child does not understand the principles of ethics in the least. Most of the time children watch how older people act, and then act accordingly. From the wider perspective of society, in order to make an individual member of that society understand how to act, the use of a moral exemplar is extremely important. When Kongzi said “when we see a virtuous person, we should emulate them” (jianxian siqi 见贤思齐)6 he already recognized the way in which when we see a person of moral integrity: we consider how to follow their example. Aristotle also mentions that if we 6  Lunyu 4:17.

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want our own actions to be just, we must act like a just person. In short, within the process of moral education, demonstration is extremely important, and how to integrate demonstration and reason is also very valuable. Another important point of consideration within the process of moral cultivation is guidance and self-restraint. Guidance is mainly shown in the education and examples given to the individual through the influence and restrictions of society. Self-restraint derives mainly from the individual’s experience, self-reflection, and awareness. The external influences and restrictions from society and the experience and self-restraint of the individual himself are mutually related and interactive within the broad sense of moral cultivation. One important aspect of achieving personhood is the relationship between morality and the individual who is involved in the process of moral cultivation. Generally speaking, the essence of morality is the internalization of universal rules, and thus morality carries with it an aspect of universality. If one only emphasizes the requirement for universal rules in the process of moral education, it becomes easy to create a biased tendency in one’s personal cultivation. The Confucians strongly emphasize achieving personal character and achieving a fully formed self, or what they refer to as a chengren 成人 (“complete person,” “perfected person,” “refined person”) and chengji 成己 (“completed self,” “refined self”), but they also often understand the “chengren” as a “sage” (chengsheng, 成圣). Within Confucian texts the “chengren” and sage are interchangeable. What is referred to as the sage is, as the name suggests, the person’s achievement of sageliness. The implication associated with the sage is that every person uses the sage as a model of emulation, yet struggles to achieve the level of personal integrity of the sage. This viewpoint has a positive feature in that it affirms that every person has the potential to achieve a perfected personhood, or as Mengzi says “all men can become like Yao and Shun” (ren jie kecheng yaoshun 人皆可成尧舜),7 and this expresses a belief held universally by Confucians. However, from the perspective of its ultimate goal, this pursuit can also lead to a sort of undifferentiated uniformity of the person’s character. Here it is not difficult to see the historical limits of the traditional theory of personality. Within modern society, education should not cultivate all personalities uniformly, but rather should focus on the development of each student’s multifaceted personality. How to reconcile the achievement of one’s moral integrity with the preservation of each individual’s traits is an unavoidable problem within moral cultivation and ethical education.

7  Mengzi 6B22.

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V As previously stated, the educational process includes cultivation of ability. In terms of cultivating and promoting ability, the question, first of all, surrounds the relationship between potentiality and actuality. Every individual has the potential for the ability to develop, but this potential must be actualized. It is difficult to view actual ability when merely considering potential: if one merely has potential ability for something, we can only say that individual person has the possibility to reach that actual ability, but we are unable to say that person has formed that ability in reality. For potential to transform into ability it must pass through different segments of this process. In this process education constitutes an undeniable aspect. How potential transforms into actuality is an important question facing education. In terms of education within a school, this is a question of training and practice. Regarding the educator, education within the school might put an emphasis on training, and education in this sense often focuses on how to train the student. In regard to the student, emphasis is put on how to train oneself. Training and practice each has its own emphasis. Related to this is the relationship between cultivation and development. Cultivation places an emphasis on the use and influence of society and the educator, while development involves hard work on behalf of the individual himself, including how to transform a potential circumstance into an actual circumstance. In the course of cultivating ability, attention should be paid to the diversity and discrepancies of abilities among people. Regarding this aspect, the educator should be proficient at finding each student’s intrinsic abilities or potential. Discovering a person’s talents can in some sense be said to be discovering that person’s potential, and this is useful so long as the educator is imparting a system of knowledge. For the student, the ability to be consciously aware of one’s own abilities and potential is equally very important. The above two points are equally important for the development of potential. Moving forward, education also involves the formation of a beautiful character. The process of the formation of a beautiful character also involves relationships between many other aspects. As previously mentioned, beauty is expressed in the unification of sensibility and rationality. In the process of cultivating a beautiful form, questions about how to harmonize these two and the relationship between “truth” and “beauty” need to be addressed. From a broad perspective of a value system, the truth, the good, and the beautiful are inseparable. Speaking of the beautiful, we can first consider the problem of the relationship between “beauty” and “truth.” In one respect, truth contains beauty, and this can be scientifically shown through experiments. In the

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process of scientific research, when knowledge of the subject has reached a near complete stage, the results of this research will also induce a sense of beauty. This perception of beauty is often not only experienced by just the researcher, but often reverberates among the research community as a whole. A complex natural process can ultimately be expressed in an extremely concise formula, and this formula not only contains truth, but also has aesthetic significance. If the results obtained through scientific research are extremely complicated, not only has the researcher not achieved the ideal outcome in terms of truth, but also is lacking an aesthetic sense of beauty. In another respect, beauty often expresses truth. When the Daoists say “heaven and earth have great beauty, yet are silent” (tiandi you damei er buyan, 天地有大美 而不言),8 they are affirming the beauty of nature. The object of this type of beauty contains internal truth, that is, the intrinsically beautiful character of heaven and earth simultaneously expresses the existence of truth. Daoists emphasize natural beauty and thus believe that all man-made objects lack beauty. “The world knows the beautiful as the beautiful, thus there is ugliness” (tianxi jie zhi meizhi wei mei, si e yi 天下皆知美之为美, 斯恶矣)9 expresses this point. The communication and interaction between truth and beauty is extremely important for the cultivation of a beautiful character. Beauty and truth are related to each other and also to the good, which brings up the question of the relationship between beauty and the good. From the perspective of the completion of the person, completed beauty and completed good are interrelated: the completed beauty of a person implies complete goodness. Accordingly, beauty and the good are also intrinsically linked together. More generally, beauty expresses itself as a fusion of purpose and regularity. Beauty reflects the existence of truth and has its purpose in the sense that an object’s form and structure often correspond to the person’s aesthetic needs. Regularity reflects truth, and purpose contains value content, or from a broad sense, the good. Related to this is what is referred to as beauty of personal character, its important factors touching upon inner character and virtue, but simultaneously also concerning itself with the form of personality. Neo-Confucians from the Song and Ming dynasty school of lixue 理学 (“School of Principle”) use “sageliness” when referring to the outer form of personal beauty. Beauty and the good are intrinsically related in this type of personal character: in one respect, they reflect the majesty of ethical personal power, and in another respect, give people a sense of aesthetic beauty. It can be clearly seen here that beauty and the good are fundamentally harmonious 8  Zhuangzi 22. 9  Laozi 2.

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within “sageliness.” Functionally, beauty has use in its ability to purify one’s soul. When speaking of tragedy, it reflects a conflict between two powers that each has its own rationale. When appreciating the beauty of tragedy, a person experiences the fierce shock, purification, and baptism of the conflict, and thus the spirit world is cleansed. From another perspective, it demonstrates its usefulness in that it cultivates one’s ethical character. Throughout the history of Chinese thought, Daoists have emphasized more strongly the unification between “beauty” and “truth,” while Confucians more strongly have emphasized the interactivity between “beauty” and “truth,” or what is referred to as “harmony of beauty and truth.” Using the completion of the person as direction, the educational process should unify together beauty and the good as well as beauty and truth. In a wider sense of the meaning, education simultaneously involves the relationship between academic education (inside the school) and social education (outside of school). The process of academic education and social education are difficult to separate when speaking of the cultivation of knowledge, morality, ability, beauty of one’s character, and other aspects. Academic education and social education both have the objective and intention of achieving personhood in the individual, that is, the molding and completion of the person. From the perspective of the educational process, these two aspects both have a kind of internal continuity. Whether it is the transmission and reception of knowledge, formation of morality, cultivation of ability, or creation of aesthetic taste, the guidance of the school and the influence of society are mutually related to the growth of the individual, and between them exists a continuous and complimentary relationship. Regarding the cultivation of ability, there exists an inherent relationship and interactivity between training within school and practice within society. In the dimension of aesthetics, in one respect the school has an undeniable use in forming the aesthetic tastes of the individual, such as deeply influencing one’s appreciation and criticism of classical music, historical paintings, and other forms of high art, and in another respect the social trends within aesthetics (every time period has its own unique aesthetic trends) creates an important influence on the individual. In addition to this, within the content and method of education there also exists a complimentary relationship between education within school and education outside of school. Education within school often emphasizes the transmission of new knowledge, while education outside of school consolidates and transmits prior knowledge through “learning and constantly practicing” and “reviewing the old and knowing the new.” School emphasizes standardization, and outside of school there emerges more of an openness, including free reading and imagination.

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The relationship between academic education within school and social education outside of school is simultaneously “extensive” and “restricted.” “Extensive” refers to an expansion while “restricted” can be understood as a deepening. Expansion and deepening are both necessary within the growth of an individual in the general sense. Relatively speaking, because of the influence of many different factors, school emphasizes a deepening of education whereas in society the expansion of education seems to be more evident. It also appears to be this way in terms of morality and aesthetic tastes. In general, the reality of social life seems to be more abundant and diverse, while education within a school emphasizes guiding the student in a more focused way. Speaking of art, aesthetic trends are extremely diverse within one’s social life and there are a many different influences on the individual. Within the school, as previously mentioned, the student is guided through many methods that emphasize aspects of the finest art. Here we can see the mutual interaction between the diversity of aesthetic trends within the social sphere and the conscious instruction within the school. Here it must be said that the educational process and the person are closely interrelated. As Kant says, in this world it is only the human that requires education. The essence of education concerns the completion of the person, and this is carried out in a multifaceted process.

Chapter 5

The Content of Value Concepts In a broad sense, a value perspective can be seen as an evaluation of the world and people, containing a value orientation, principles, standards, ideals, etc.1 As an evaluative concept, a system of values involves standards and has a rigid connotation. At the core of a value perspective is a value system, which involves an understanding and validation of foundational or universal value principles by members of society from a specific time period. From a metaphysical view, core value principles are in one respect derived from the real world or reality of existence, and in another respect, reveal a possible world: the orientation and the possible direction of the development of things are related. A value perspective is always connected to the possibilities contained in real existence and reveals the historical necessities of a specific period of social development. The connection between a value perspective and actual existence indicates that it is inseparable from reality, and the connection between a value perspective and possible directions point to the form of what social existence ought to be. The form of what ought to be is always connected to an ideal goal, and as it relates to the general core of a value system, involves the historical necessities of a specific society and the ideal goal for the development of that society. Regarding its specific use, a value perspective has the function of being a social adhesive: individual members of society fall under a common value perspective, which when mutually combined, create a social whole. Kongzi said “those whose courses are different cannot work together” (dao butong, buxiang weimou 道不同, 不相为谋).2 From this it can be said that when courses are similarly under a common value system, different members of society can associate, coordinate, and cooperate for the maintenance of social order. On a different level, the notion of values also provides the basis for political legitimacy. Throughout history, the determination of whether or not some political order has had legitimacy has been intrinsically related to that society’s widely accepted core values. The distinction between the king (wang 王) and the feudal chiefs who ruled by military force (ba 霸) during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods encountered the problem of political legitimacy. Many different value perspectives and judgments were asserted 1  This article was originally published March 31, 2012, in Guangming ribao. It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau. 2  Lunyu 15:40.

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by thinkers involved in the debate about the related forms of government. The thinkers who affirmed the principles of benevolence, the idea that using criminal law and violent means (or what is referred to as “the way of the feudal chiefs” (badao, 霸道)) as the way of governing society, had no political legitimacy. Today, political legitimacy is similarly related to the value system people choose and affirm. In fact, when people call into question whether any type of system has political legitimacy, it is based on conflicting values between that system and its opponents. In this respect, a core value perspective has intrinsic meaning to the political systems we recognize as legitimate. Looking at this from the viewpoint of the individual, a value perspective is related to a specific course of action. As mentioned above, value principles themselves have a guiding function. They reveal a practical goal and provide a standard for a practical process. Regarding the goal, a value perspective leads the individual toward accepting the common ideal for society, and in regard to standards or norms, a value perspective specifies what one ought to do or ought not to do within a practical process. With this in mind, a core value perspective serves a guiding function for individuals within a society. Another important use of value perspectives for society is that it offers guidance for the soul. In a general sense, a value perspective offers direction for the common spiritual pursuit of members of a particular society. Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d.  479  BCE) mentioned “setting one’s will on dao” (zhiyu dao 志于道). Here “dao” refers to a value ideal, and the will directed toward dao reflects a pursuit toward an ideal goal. From the perspective of the individual’s existence, value perspective provides the precondition for the nourishment of one’s spirit. By affirming specific value principles, the meaning of the individual’s existence acquires an internal foundation and, related to this, transcends the meaninglessness of existence. Both an orientation of values and spiritual sustenance provide an internal foundation for the spiritual guidance of members of society in different ways. During a period of social change the reconstruction of values is raised to an important level. Looking at this historically, during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods the corresponding value system of Confucian rites and music that had developed since the Yin and Zhou dynasties began to be challenged. In one respect, the binding laws of a transcendent being (tian 天) began to slowly relax, and in another respect, the rituals imbued with traditional significance which had been restrictive in a practical way became continuously weaker. How to create a new direction in values gradually became a universal concern for the people of that period. Kongzi’s principles of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) can be seen as a conscious response to this question. The way of benevolence (rendao 仁道) is based on the person’s most natural and

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innate emotions and uses the affirmation of the person’s innate values as its substantial content. The distinction between humans and birds establishes that humans’ innate values are different from other animals. It is these types of new values that offer a possibility for a society to obtain spiritual direction during changing times. After having gone through the long historical process of the Qin and Han dynasties, these values gradually became accepted as universal value concepts. A similar experience can also be seen in Western history. During the evolution from the Middle Ages to modern times, what were once considered sacred values were gradually called into question and the problem of how to form new values and principles became a focus of attention for the people of that time and a long time afterward. The values of freedom, equality, and democracy were gradually formed during this long process. Value systems do not only face the problem of identity, but also the question of how they function, and this moves us one step closer to the externalization and internalization of value systems. Externalization is the fusion of value systems with a specific social system, cultural form, and pattern of daily life, all culminating into an interrelated level. We see this, in fact, within Kongzi’s teaching. Kongzi emphasized the unification of “benevolence” and “ritual” (li 礼). Benevolence constitutes universal value concepts, and ritual is the form of external systemization. From Kongzi’s perspective, these two are inseparable: ritual should embody the demands of benevolence, and benevolence, acting as the role of an innate value concept, needs to be implemented within the system of ritual. When speaking of values in the modern West, it was ultimately through the creation of social and political systems that these values were able to be concretely implemented and integrated into the everyday life of people. Models of behavior are related to the operations of systems and daily life. The Confucians venerate the sage, who, as one who embodies the value ideals which they affirm and pursue, is held as their model for personal behavior. Throughout history, the Confucians repeatedly revered the sage as a model for imitation. What is referred to as “following the doctrines of Yao and Shun, and the laws of Wen and Wu” (zushu yaoshun, xianzhang wenwu 祖述 尧舜,宪章文武) expresses this aspect and also expresses the use of these models of behavior within politics and everyday life. In fact, the real influence and use of value concepts often comes through the establishment of ideal models of behavior and the emulation, imitation, and realization of these models of behavior. Apart from the process of externalization, value systems also involve a process of internalization, which implies its fusion with one’s inner consciousness and spirit. Kant mentions that the faculties of the soul include the faculty of knowledge, of desire, and of feeling pleasure or displeasure. By extension we

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can say that the above-mentioned faculties are related to “I think,” “I desire,” and “I am pleased.” Regarding the actual use of value concepts, the unification of “I think,” “I desire,” and “I am pleased” is reflected by the identification between the conscious judgment of reason (I think), the voluntary demand of the subject (I desire), and the self-approval of emotion (I am pleased). Within the process of accepting value principles, it is only by being based on the voluntary comprehension of reason and the affirmation of perception and the attainment of perceptive happiness that the demands and orientation of these principles are able to be accepted as the inner consciousness of an individual, be integrated into his existence, and thus truly influence his behavior. The use of the value perspective described above is related to the transference of knowledge of the senses to knowledge of the body/mind. Knowledge of the senses stops at the boundary of semantics and concepts, whereas knowledge of the body/mind is integrated with the entire individual, reflected by the integration of body and mind, knowledge and morality, and ability and intention. Changing knowledge of the senses to knowledge of the body/mind correspondingly implies that speech, theories, and other conceptual activities are transformed through the unification of the body and mind. This unification implies that one’s value concepts have already been internalized as a general pragmatism, and on a different level regulate one’s behavior.

Chapter 6

Ethical Life and Practical Morality Whether looking at it from the perspective of the group or the individual, human life is multifaceted, and ethics is one very important aspect of it.1 Traditional Confucianism had already specifically taken the humans’ ethical life as a fundamental characteristic that distinguishes them from other beings. As an important aspect within human life, the ethical life has a substantially practical character, which is to say, according to its essence, ethical life is always related to moral practice. The subject of ethical life and moral practice is the human: ethical life takes the person as the subject and moral practice is expressed as an activity of the person. Understanding ethical life and moral practice from the perspective of the life and practice of the person involves many segments, and these segments can in some sense be said to constitute the possible preconditions of ethical life and moral practice itself. I From a general perspective, as an important aspect of human existence, ethical life can be seen as the form and process of the person being in the world in an ethical sense. This form and process develops diverse social activity and expresses itself in the daily activity of the living world, including understanding and accepting specific ethical concepts as well as involving related ethical concepts to people and affairs. From a fundamental perspective, “ethics” concerns human relations and is included within its general principles. In one respect, having a life with ethical significance (ethical life) causes the person to exist within an ethical domain and, from another respect, guarantees the development of order within human relations. An important distinction between humans and animals is that humans have rationality, and thus have been bestowed with ethical life in a conscious form, and related to this is a cognitive dimension of ethical life. As 1  This article was originally based on a lecture given at the Nanjing conference entitled “Public Morality and Modern Civilization” held September of 2013. Related research includes the National Social Science Fund’s major project “Research on the Cognitive Foundation and Structure of Chinese Culture” (Project number 10&ZD064) and the Ministry of Education’s major project “Practical Wisdom: History and Theory” (Project number 11JJD720004). It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau.

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the structure of ethical life, cognition essentially involves the grasping of related objects (including humans themselves) on the level of knowledge. Cognition includes various aspects, such as scientific research, political practice, economic movements, etc. The questions of cognition within ethical life point toward the person itself as the subject and seek to resolve issues such as “what sort of being constitutes the subject of ethical life,” “who is the subject of ethical life,” and “what sort of character does this subject have.” While the subject of ethical life is the person, the ethical life is just one aspect of the multifaceted life of humans. Therefore, investigating this from a fundamental perspective, the question “who is the subject of ethical life” is related to a wider question, namely, “what is man” or “what are humans?” Historically, philosophers have looked at these questions from many different angles. During the pre-Qin period, Confucians began to catalogue the differences between people and birds. The investigation of what was referred to as “distinguishing people and birds” sought to find the fundamental difference between humans and other animals, which can be seen as a variant of the universal question “what is man?” The above question posed by Confucians is interconnected to ethical life. The question “what is man” (or the fundamental point of difference between people and other animals) is essentially aimed at grasping the ethical life of the subject. Similarly, in the history of Western philosophy we can see a similar concern. For example, Kant once raised four questions: “what can we know,” “what ought I to do,” “for what can I hope,” and “what is man.”2 While in the sequence of these questions “what is man” seems to be placed last, speaking from the perspective of ethical life, “what is man” has logical priority: the question “what is man” must be first resolved in order to go on to investigate and understand the ethical life. From very early on, in Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy, the question “what is man” has been explored. The person’s actual existence has the dimension of sensibility that reflects itself through the capability of perception, and also manifests in the form of perceptive needs (for example, hunger is desire for food, thirst is desire for water, coldness is desire for clothes). Simultaneously, the person also has a rational character and is able to consciously use logical thought to differentiate true, false, good, bad, etc. The person’s dimension of reason is more internally reflected in its pursuits on the spiritual level. The realm of ethics for Chinese philosophers takes the promotion of the spiritual level as its direction, and out of this also emerges the pursuit of reason. As the unity of perceptual existence and regulations of reason, the person is a single individual: there is no abstract, 2  Kant, Immanuel, Logic, translated by Robert Hartman, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1988), p. 29.

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general person. However, another aspect of the person is that people live within a community and have a communal character. Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 BCE) endorsed this idea that the unique characteristic of the person was the ability to “commune.”3 Corresponding to sensibility and reason is individuality and communality. The person has natural characteristics or tendencies, but also has a social character that transcends nature, including morality. Confucians demand that natural tendencies be made moral, which implies that one ought to elevate oneself from having natural desires and tendencies to being moral in a social sense. This perspective recognizes the mutual relationship between natural tendencies and morality as acting with a socialized character. Understanding “what is man” does not merely emerge in an abstract, speculative sense, but rather is tied to the previously mentioned ethical life. People’s different perspectives often influence, restrict, and regulate their understanding of ethical life. As previously described, the person has a perceptual character as well as rational regulations, is an individual as well as communal, and has innate tendencies as well as a socialized existence. Throughout the history of philosophy, the different understandings of the question “what is man” have often manifested as different emphases on the above distinctions. In regard to the relationship between sensibility and reason, some philosophers give prominence to the rules of perception, while others emphasize the person’s rational character. In the relationship between the individual and community, some put a stronger emphasis on the unique characteristics of the individual, while others pay more attention to the person’s communal character. The different types of knowledge that different people have access to also influence their understanding of the ethical life. In fact, the different understandings of the ethical life among philosophers come from the diverse understandings of “what is man.” For the philosophers who emphasize the rational character of the person, the ethical life is the pursuit to regulate life according to the domain of reason. In the Song and Ming dynasties, some prominent figures within the lixue 理学 school (“School of Principle”) viewed the person as the embodiment of the law of heaven or the nature of heaven and earth, and therefore advocated sincerity, taking the honest Confucian scholar as a model for living. While philosophers who emphasize more of the sensible character of the person believe that the person should be primarily concerned with the activity associated with satisfying their feelings. This is more indicative of the Empiricists’ understanding of ethical life. The cognitive branch of the ethical life is of course not limited to the perspective of the subject, but speaking from the substantive level, this type of 3  See Xunzi 9.

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understanding logically constitutes the precondition for understanding the ethical life and directly conditions the concrete stipulations for it. The second level of the ethical life concerns evaluation. The cognition spoken about earlier involves the “what is” questions in a broad sense, whereas evaluation gives more direction to judgement of values, including good and bad, virtue and evil, or benefit and harm. If we change the method of formulating the question “what is the subject of the ethical life” and, in a broader sense, “what is man,” we get “who is living” or “who lives?” Logically speaking, once we grasp the above question, the next question is “for what are we living” or “why live?” The question “why live” is purpose-oriented, and so evaluative questions become necessary. The question “why live” touches on human values and bears great significance to human life. The answer to this question cannot be separated from value judgments within the human sphere. Additionally, this question also pertains to “what sort of life is worth living” or “what sort of life is the good life?” Looking at it historically, whether it is Chinese philosophy or Western philosophy, thinkers have repeatedly investigated questions related to “what sort of life has meaning?” Ultimately, this question points to the more fundamental question “why live?” In Kongzi’s (“Confucius”) (d.  479  BCE) demand to “set one’s will on the dao,” the “will” is directed toward a particular goal, which in this case is “dao.” For Kongzi, the meaning and objective of life is embodied in the process of the pursuit of “dao.” The term “dao” in Chinese philosophy has many meanings: it might point toward the dao of heaven, including the universal laws of the world and cosmos, or it could point to the sense of dao referred to in “set one’s will on dao,” which is the social, cultural, and moral ideal. There is more related to this latter sense of the word, and the corresponding implication of “setting one’s will to dao” is that one should pursue and attempt to bring these ideals into existence. The Daoists, however, have a different perspective and understanding of the ideal form of existence as the natural condition, or that which is in line with man’s innate nature. Daoists’ perspective on the goal or meaning of life is that the meaningful life, or the life worth pursuing, is that which maintains and preserves the person’s innate tendencies, or that is to say, after one’s innate nature has been achieved or influenced externally, returning once again to one’s original form. The stipulations for life’s goal, the identification of the ideal form of society, and the previously mentioned question “what is life” are all closely interrelated. The target of life for the Daoists is to preserve or return to man’s original nature and avoid man-made standards or external systems which restrict or distort man’s original nature. The precondition for this type of understanding is to take man’s original nature as the most real, most perfect form. For Daoists, the

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truest form of the person is one who takes what is natural as one’s internal rule. Therefore, the meaning of life is to preserve and return to natural tendencies. Just as the Confucians emphasize that the person should “set one’s will on the dao” as a direction for life, this understanding is also related to the Confucian understanding of the person. The previously mentioned “distinction between people and birds” projects the idea that people have a rational character and, especially, an ethical character of existence. From this it follows that for Confucians, pursuing dao provides content for the ethical life. In Western philosophy, Aristotle links together a meaningful life, or a life worth living, with happiness. His understanding of happiness, however, is quite broad, and the distinctive trait of a happy life is concerned with reason (including contemplation), and is not merely based on utility or satisfying sensory needs. It is evident that different life ideals and goals reflect different value pursuits. The ethical life is related to this type of value judgment or value pursuit. The goal of life, with respect to different understandings of the ideal life, is related to different judgments concerning the value significance of the ethical life and the question “why live?” This type of understanding and judgment reflects the dimension of values within the ethical life. Moving a step further from the question “why live,” is the question “how to live?” This question specifically involves what method one should use to transform this meaningful life, which is worthy of pursuit, into reality. Concretely speaking, this question and the standard of behavior within the ethical life are interrelated. Using Chinese philosophic concepts to explain, the standards mentioned here are “appropriate guiding standards,” meaning they have a limiting, guiding, and restrictive signification. From the perspective of the ethical life, standards primarily regulate what one can and cannot do. However, they also inform the question of “how to do?” The question of what can one or cannot do is concerned with the legitimacy of an action, whereas “how to do” is concerned with how one can achieve a certain goal and typically involves methods of behavior. When an action has not yet happened, standards restrict the person’s choices, and when an action is in the process of happening, standards stipulate the specific method of action and thus guide it. The multifaceted principles and rules within the ethical life such as “do not lie” and “do not steal” all fall under the fundamental standard for the ethical life. This type of standard regulates the choices for how to act within different situations. To use “do not lie” as an example, this standard used to guide the person to speak truthfully and maintain an honest character. After the completion of an action, how does one evaluate that action? In other words, according to what does one appraise whether the action was good or bad, legitimate or not? These standards provide a criterion by which one can evaluate and judge those actions.

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If some type of action is in accordance with the evaluator’s ethical principles (standards), then this type of action obtains approval, otherwise it is denied. What has been discussed previously can be broken down into three questions: “who lives,” which is related to cognition, “why live,” which is related to evaluation, and “how to live,” which is related to standards of behavior. “Who lives,” “why live,” and “how to live” are logically correlated. However, as a specific person trying to live an ethical life, investigating and reflecting on the above questions will always lead to the following question: “how well am I living?” Every individual will each have an experience and sense about his or her own life. “How well am I living” is the individual’s own sense of his or her life and, as a philosophic concept, this sense is referred to as “existent sense.”4 What is commonly called one’s sense of happiness can be seen as an expression of existent sense. Compared with the special experience within the process of living, existent sense can be seen as a feeling toward life as a whole. The “sense” here is extremely important and needs to be given special consideration. Briefly speaking, this “sense” can be understood as a synthesis of spirit, which includes universal values and levels of rational cognition. It also permeates the individual’s life beliefs and emotional wishes, and also constitutes an important aspect within one’s ethical life. As previously mentioned, the subject of the ethical life is a specific individual, and for that specific individual, various types of vivid experiences, which are neither abstract nor unfathomable, but rather existent in a synthesized form within every living individual, are formed during the process of living. In short, the identifying characteristic of this type of “sense” is the multifaceted dimensions of the spirit, condensed into one, which takes a vivid form within the individual. As the concrete form of “sense” described above, “existent sense” includes various connotations. While it is primarily within the domain of reason, many different understandings toward life (including the subject, meaning of life, mode of life, etc.) are ultimately included within “existent sense,” and these understandings have their own reason content. In this way, existent sense takes reason as its way of dealing with meaning. Of course, this form of reason does not always exist in the form of introspection. In many situations, it is often vague and implicit. Other than the rules of reason, existent sense also 4  On a logical level, the question of “how to live” can be both analyzed from the perspective of the other (the third person) and can be reflected upon by the individual himself (the first person). The former is expressed as an external investigation, which involves the analysis and judgment of the individual’s life situation and origin, whereas the latter relates to the individual’s own inner experience and feelings. In regard to the concrete unfolding of the ethical life, the latter aspect has an internal connectivity with the individual, and this is what existent sense is in reference to.

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includes the individual’s internal intentions and desires. These intentions and desires consolidate the person’s life ideal and embody the individual’s different life pursuits, thus differentiating existent sense from a vague and general form. Furthermore, existent sense is also concerned with the person’s emotional experience. Emotions are people’s most vivid perceptions and experiences, and within existent sense, including perceptions and experiences of an individualized meaning of life, these perceptions and experiences take true emotional feelings as content and are individualized and personal. In addition, existent sense also permeates value beliefs, which represent the general perspective the person has concerning the meaning of life. Existent sense contains knowledge and evaluation on a rational level, and also contains perception on an experiential level. A characteristic of existent sense is that it does not exist in an abstract conceptual form, but rather is completely real and related to the personal perceptions and experiences of every individual. Existent sense also simultaneously includes conditioning life goals, orienting the universal values which provide meaning to life, and permeating the unique, personal values of the individual. This aspect does not exist in a separate form, but rather is internally bound up in one cohesive form. The above-mentioned content, which is condensed within existent sense, also appears as an individualized internal consciousness. From the perspective of the form of existence, existent sense often exhibits a mixture of self-awareness and tacit knowledge as its character trait. In one respect, it contains the meaning and form of self-awareness, and on the other hand, its conscious content is not always in the form that can be expressed through words, but often takes a hidden, implicit form. Existent sense in the above sense is related to “realms” ( jingjie 境界). As the inner spiritual worlds of the person, realms also express the form of the development of the synthesized spirit, which includes the blending of reason and sensibility, the conscious and the unconscious, etc. As the form of the synthesized spirit, existent sense takes understanding of meaning as its core. As previously described, in terms of its substance, existent sense essentially manifests itself as the individual’s synthetic perception of the meaning of existence. The core of this type of perception is to understand, grasp, and experience meaning. Generally speaking, meaning includes the realm of cognition-comprehension and the realm of goals-value.5 The fundamental meaning of existent sense is found on the goal-value level and can take different forms of existence. When the person transforms the original object to 5  Refer to the first chapter of Yang Guorong’s Chengji yu Chengwu: Yiyishijie de Chengcheng, 成己与成物: 意义世界的生成 [The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being], (Beijing: The People’s Press, 2010).

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assess her ideal existence through the creation of values, meaning is embodied in the form of existence of the physical self and meaning thus has a type of external characteristic. Within existent sense, the appearance of meaning has an internal form and is correspondingly more closely connected with the individual’s experience, reflection, and perception. Here we can see a type of interaction: the understanding of meaning causes existent sense to have determined content, which is different from random and unrelated ideas. Existent sense allows meaning to exist internally. In abstraction, “sense” can be understood from a common perspective and can also be grasped on an individual level. Within existent sense, however, common sense and individual sense is still intertwined together. Common sense can be seen as a specific social group’s universal consciousness. Ordinary people always have a universal consciousness, which in China is commonly referred to as “people have a common heart, the heart has common li” (ren tongci xin, xin tongci li, 人同此心, 心同此理). “People have a common heart” implies that which all people have, and “the heart has a common li 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” or “coherence”)” points to the idea that this type of universal consciousness transcends the individual. Chinese philosophy often distinguishes between li and shi 事 (“thing[s],” “event[s],” or “matters”). Shi is item by item, each having its own unique characteristics, while li has universality, different from the general stipulations contained within objects and things. Li always emphasizes the aspect of universality, and correspondingly, “people have a common heart, the heart has a common li” emphasizes the common sense among all people. This type of common sense constitutes the meaning of existent sense. Common sense is involved in the previously mentioned rational cognition, the acceptance of an orientation of universal values, etc. Apart from common sense, existent sense also includes the level of the individual. Speaking concretely, common sense, or the universal common consciousness, does not take an abstract, independent, external form of existence, but rather is internal within each and every individual and integrated within the individual’s consciousness. It is within the individual that common sense achieves concrete implementation and obtains actual form. To sum up, universality and individuality, common sense and individual sense, are all bound up together within existent sense. What kind of significance does existent sense ultimately have in the context of the ethical life? This question touches on its actual role in the ethical life. In the investigation of the relationship between existent sense and the ethical life, it is not difficult to see that the significance of existent sense is primarily in bringing the ethical life close to the individual, or in other words, to lead the ethical life toward the individual and incorporate it into the individual’s

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existence. A double meaning of existent sense emerges here. One aspect is that it is internal to ethical life and is concretely manifested as the experiences and perceptions of the individual within the process of the ethical life. The other aspect is that it is admitted into the ethical life and becomes the precondition for the possibilities within the ethical life through the level of thought. Recall that cognition is more closely related to the form of knowledge in a general sense. In the ethical life, cognition demonstrates a special role in that the understanding of the questions “what is the subject of the ethical life,” “what is man,” and “who lives” is included within the dimension of knowledge. Take the question “why live” as the subject for investigation. Evaluation is involved in the value judgments for the meaning of life, and connected to this is the orientation of universal values. It more directly presents a universal character along with its interrelated standards, standards that aren’t restricted to the individual, but rather function to restrict universally within a specific social group. Thus, we can see, cognition, evaluation, and their related value principles and universal standards all have the characteristic of transcending the individual. In terms of its relation with the person (expressed as generalized knowledge), these value principles and ethical standards often take external forms. Cognition, evaluation, and universal standards are certainly necessary, but for the specific individual, they seem to be presented more as objects of thought, having transcendence and lacking interdependency. In these circumstances, the individual can form rational cognition, make value judgements, and understand universal standards, but these aspects can also be divided or isolated from the individual’s process of existence. What is referred to as the deviation between knowledge and action is in some sense rooted in this type of alienation. However, when the above-mentioned principles, ideals, and standards fuse together with existent sense, the gap between the dimension of universality involved in the ethical life and the individual’s existence itself begins to close. This fusion brings the ethical life into the individual. To put it bluntly, existent sense causes the individual’s perspective on life (including grasping the subject of life, understanding the meaning, understanding how to live, etc.) and the existence of the individual himself to have internal correlation. To use a concept within Chinese philosophy, the significance of existent sense is that it gives the ethical life immediacy and direct vitality. What is referred to as immediacy is the interdependency and inseparableness of the individual’s existence. “Personal experience” is based on the individual’s experience of comprehension and the formation of a specific understanding, and this type of knowledge from experience and understanding is different from abstract reasoning or external demands, and is instead more closely related to each and every real individual. Immediacy and direct vitality not only have

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individual directivity, but also carry the implication that they are inseparable from the individual itself. In fact, within the field of ethics, the importance of existent sense to the individual lies in that it makes the ethical life have immediacy or direct vitality to the individual. It is only in this form that the ethical life can have the possibility of moving the person from alienation to an interrelation with people, ultimately becoming the true life of the individual himself. II As described earlier, the ethical life is essentially practical, and thus, when speaking of the ethical life, it is inseparable from moral practice. In terms of its true form, the person’s existence unfolds into multiple dimensions, and the ethical life reflects one aspect within the person’s multi-dimensional existence. From the perspective of the ethical life itself, its form of existence is not limited to any extreme, but rather has a well-rounded character. This type of distinctive totality can be understood from two different angles. First of all, the ethical life contains a dualism: it is simultaneously one aspect of the person’s multidimensional existence, and yet also multifaceted, the latter being reflected in the various aspects of life. One’s daily activities involve the ethical life, from social interaction to work and labor. The ethical life is linked through the entire process of existence, from beginning to end. Although there exist differences in what one believes to be ethical at different stages of life, these differences do not imply that the ethical life is connected to only some periods of time and not others. From this perspective, it is clear that the ethical life presents an integrated totality. Comparatively speaking, moral practice can be seen as the embodiment of the ethical life under specific space-time circumstances and concretely displayed as the course of various behaviors. As the concrete course of behavior in a specific context and the embodied form of the ethical life, moral practice equally involves different segments contained within the ethical life. Moral practice as conscious behavior is inseparable from the person’s cognitive process. Moral cognition is primarily involved with the inner knowledge of the subject of moral practice, or broadly speaking, “knowing oneself” or “self-awareness.” As the subject of ethical practice, what type of ability and character ought one form? How does one cultivate this type of ability and character? How does one overcome possible biases toward deviations in moral requirements? These questions involve the moral subject’s cognition. Realistically, human relationships are necessary for moral practice: if the world only consisted of one independent actor without the multifaceted

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relationships between people (generalized human relations), there would be no moral practice. Because of this we are able to grasp the question of human relations or knowledge of “the relationship among people.” Very early on the Confucians proposed the demand to “know men.” Kongzi understood “know” as primarily “knowing men,” that is to say, knowing and understanding human relationships. The duty of morality takes realized ethical relationships as its foundation, and the specific method of moral behavior is based on different human relationships. Within the Confucian standard of behavior expressed as: between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity,6 the different behavioral demands “affection,” “righteousness,” “attention to separate functions,” “proper order,” and “fidelity” take the human relationships of father and son, sovereign and minister, husband and wife, old and young, and friends as its foundation. In this sense, grasping human relationships (in broad terms, “knowing men”) logically necessary for ethical behavior. Moral practice also involves an understanding of general moral principles. For example, the Confucian ideas of “the way of benevolence” and liyi 礼义 (“ritual propriety and morality”) both concern universal value principles and moral principles. Understanding “the way of benevolence” and liyi implies grasping universal value principles and moral principles, and as a result, guiding a person’s behavior. Carrying out moral behavior involves observing and grasping the specific moral context. Moral practice always happens within a specific space-time and background, that is to say, a situational context, whereas the features of general principles are such that they transcend particular situations. How then are universal principles used in a diversity of situations? This is an unavoidable question within the process of carrying out moral behavior. The Song and Ming dynasty lixue school of Neo-Confucians speaks of “one principle with many manifestations” (liyi fenshu, 理一分殊), which concerns the relationship between universal moral principles (“one principle”) and diverse moral situations (“many manifestations”). Connecting universal principles and specific situations through concrete observance and analysis constitutes an important aspect for adapting moral cognition. In a broad sense, cognition is concerned with “what is” and evaluation is primarily connected with “what ought one to do,” which includes verification 6  Mengzi 3A4.

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of a goal, choices of behavior, etc. The question of what kind of behavior has positive value, thus the choice of what ought to be done, versus what kind has negative value, and thus constitutes what ought not to be done, are related to the broad sense of moral evaluation and judgment. Questions that pertain to cognition are more concerned with knowledge within the moral domain, and questions that are more evaluative are more notably connected with judgments concerning value significance. On a practical level, carrying out moral practices concerns values, or what ought to be the case, and is also related to facts or reality (including the concrete circumstances for behavior). The connection between cognition within the moral domain and evaluation is based on the above-realized form of moral practice. Extending this idea, evaluation is also connected with the recognition of moral facts. Speaking broadly, moral facts, include two aspects: the first is an occurrence on an objective level (for example, a certain person once lied), and the second is related to the application of value principles and their significance when applied to this occurrence (from the principle “do not lie,” comes the standard that lying is not appropriate behavior). Phenomena on a purely objective level are treated merely as facts about the natural world; they do not constitute moral facts. Pure moral principles or standards primarily present significance of concepts and do not constitute the objectivity of facts. It is only by integrating these two aspects together through moral judgment that moral facts can be formed. The situation of a person lying is by itself merely an occurrence with no other relevance, and it is only when the moral principle “do not lie” is used to judge this phenomenon that it emerges as a fact within the moral domain (that fact being that lying is unacceptable moral behavior). Facts themselves are different from what is, but rather are the objects of that which enter the person’s domain of knowledge and action. Regarding moral facts, the relationship between facts and the person is such that their significance emerges through the use of moral judgments, which derive from moral principles. Moral judgment is a type of evaluation with value significance, and an evaluation using moral judgment ultimately leads to the recognition of a moral fact. The blending of objective phenomena and moral judgments, in a certain sense, manifests moral facts. If we say their relationship with objective phenomena makes moral facts different from what is given to us subjectively, then the permeation of moral judgment makes moral facts different from the natural world. This relationship between moral judgment and the recognition of moral facts in one respect further reflects the correlation between cognition and evaluation, and in another respect, provides an internal foundation for “what I ought to do” (or “what I ought not to do”). After having passed through moral judgment and having been recognized as good or bad, the quality of any

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type of behavior is not only seen as a fact which happened within the moral domain, but it is also simultaneously classified and included within a list of choices to make or not make. Within moral practice “what should one do” and “how one ought to do something” are closely related. Relative to cognition and judgment on the “what is” level, the broad sense of “ought” contains more value implications and has a closer connection to the moral ideal and moral purpose. Looking at it concretely, “how one ought to do something” concerns a method of behavior, and the recognition of this is inseparable from normative behavior. Similar to the process of carrying out an ethical life, moral norms restrict the choices regarding “what one ought to do,” and also stipulate “how one ought to do it.” The former implies that different behavior is chosen based on the received and recognized universal norms, while the latter demands one recognize a specific method and channel for this behavior according to specific norms. Investigating one step further from “what is,” “what one ought to do,” and “how one ought to do it,” we face the question of how to implement moral knowledge and moral evaluation. Looking at this from the perspective of Chinese philosophy, this touches on the debate of knowledge and action in the moral domain. “What is” is related to moral knowledge, “what one ought to do” and “how one ought to do it” are related to moral judgment, and all three of these questions are broadly included in “knowledge,” while the implementation of moral knowledge and moral judgment concerns “action.” How to understand what is good and how do the one’s actions transform “knowledge” into “practical “action” (moral action)? These questions steers us toward “moral sense” within the practical realm. Moral sense and the previously mentioned “existent sense” are related to the same subject of “sense,” but both include different connotations and inclinations. “Existent sense” is primarily expressed as the embodiment of the synthesized spirit, related to the comprehensive character of the ethical life, and also has the feature of comprehensiveness. Comparatively speaking, “moral sense” is more connected to concrete moral practice and action, and can be seen as internal to the concrete synthetic form of ethical consciousness’ process of practice. The actual use of moral sense is primarily seen in the occurrence of moral practice and its process of being carried out. As the synthesized consciousness within moral practice, moral sense is different from the purely subjective perception understood by non-­cognitivists within ethics, as it instead contains a multi-concept dimension. Broadly speaking, moral sense adds rationality to the knowing and understanding of universal moral principles and norms, and emotion to the acceptance or rejection of these norms and principles. It is also involved in grasping relevant

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circumstances and the various intentions and experiences of people under those circumstances. Looking at it from a broader perspective, the process of moral practice often includes the person’s intention. These intentions are often involuntary, and therefore, only become specific motivations for action when there is rational reflection and evaluation. People are different from animals in the sense that animals behave according to their spontaneous intentions. Yet a person’s intentions must first conform to society’s universally approved value principles and the individual’s moral demands before they can become motives for action. After this motivation has been formed, one still must make a choice regarding a certain action. Intention, motivation, choice, and decision separately constitute different segments of moral practice, and moral sense permeates through all of these separate segments. Conversely, it can be said that the various segments of moral practice are restricted by moral sense in a different sense. Extending this further, the moral domain contains an intuitive form of consciousness (called “moral intuition”) which is intrinsically connected to the aforementioned moral sense: the intuition concerning something being ethically good or evil, appropriate or inappropriate, is often based on the individual’s internal moral sense. Practical moral actions are not carried out merely based on abstract moral laws and decrees. In reality, one does not first consider how moral laws dictate action and then from there commit an act. Instead, moral laws and the individual’s evaluation, judgment, choice, and decision are often interwoven, and everywhere in this process the restrictive impact of moral sense is reflected. Similar to existent sense, moral sense is internal and within the individual’s consciousness, as opposed to an external, abstract, and empty form. In fact, the specific content of evaluation, judgment, choice, and decision is inseparable from the individual’s moral sense. In this specific form of moral consciousness, the distinction between ethical cognition and non-cognition becomes sublated. The position of pure cognition often leads the individual to become a merely rational observer, which results in understanding, but not demonstrating it in action. The road of an absolute non-cognitive approach can easily lead to the individual being completely controlled by affection, and results in the tendency to act without knowledge or understanding of why. Through the construction of dimensions of cognition and affection, moral sense simultaneously provides a foundation for the realization of moral action. We have already described the core of existent sense as sense of meaning, while the core of moral sense is primarily expressed as a sense of duty or responsibility. Duty or responsibility has a different method of presenting itself: it can be expressed as an external moral command and as an internal demand from the individual himself. Within moral sense, duty is not necessarily an external

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decree nor is it superior to the individual, but rather the individual’s internal desires and demands of the self are combined into an integrated whole and internalized into a single, stable intention for action or behavior. Taking moral sense as a form of existence, the moral demands, moral knowledge, internal desires, emotional identity, etc. contained within duty are intertwined, integrated, and condensed into the individual’s moral consciousness. As previously described, existent sense brings the ethical life close to the individual, giving it immediacy and direct vitality. Similarly, the significance of moral sense lies in making moral consciousness truly exist in one’s heart, becoming the true form of thought possessed by the individual. Moral sense discards the abstraction of moral concepts such that they are not isolated or disassociated from the individual, and instead transforms into the true existence of the individual. Within moral sense, ethical principles and moral concepts are not merely expressed as external laws, nor are they compared to the individual’s aspiration as an alien existence or internal “other.” It is not isolated from the self, and is also neither empty nor real, but rather is integrated into the individual’s system of consciousness, becoming true self-awareness. The above meaning of sense is not merely restricted to the ethical domain. When an individual is studying a foreign language, and stops at the point when he grasps the grammar and accumulates enough vocabulary, even if he his understanding of the grammar is deep and his vocabulary extensive, his grasp on the language might still remain somewhat shaky. The reason for this is that his knowledge of the grammar and accumulated vocabulary has not truly integrated into his language consciousness, but rather exists in some abstract or separate form. It is only through forming a language sense that knowledge of grammar and memorized vocabulary are able to discard their externality, separateness, and abstraction, and turn into the internal composition of language consciousness that allows the individual to have fluent command of the foreign language. Broadly speaking, the “sense,” like that of the musical sense for musicians, the sense of the ball in sports, the sense of the paintbrush for painters, etc. is similar to the moral sense within moral practice, and is interconnected with the various types of “sense.” In other words, merely understanding moral rules and memorizing moral laws does not indicate the true possession of moral consciousness. It is only by forming a moral sense that universal moral principles and demands are able to transform into the internal consciousness of the individual, and it is only this way that the individual can become a moral subject in its true sense and can act in a way which embodies the correct way easily, without thinking. As the concrete form of moral consciousness, moral sense has universal content which includes knowledge of moral principles and norms, a grasp

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of the moral subject’s universal rules, understanding of relationships among people, etc. Simultaneously, as the internal constitution of the true self, moral sense permeates into the individual’s perception, experience, and aspirations. Combining both of these together manifests as the blending of communal sense and individual sense within the moral domain. Kant divides the faculties of the mind into the faculty of knowledge, the faculty of desire, and the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure.7 By extension, we can summarize these faculties as “I think,” “I desire,” and “I am pleased,” and within the ethical domain they are combined together into one integrated whole. Regarding the relationship between moral practice and moral principles, “I think” involves universal moral principles, which are primarily related to understanding on the rational level. Without rational understanding, the individual’s behavior is likely to lack self-awareness. Regarding its nature, moral actions are not prompted by external compulsory forces, but rather come from the individual’s true aspirations, and thus are concerned with “I desire.” Moving one step forward, perfect ethical behavior should simultaneously be based on an emotional sense of identity and should produce in the individual a type of joy. The Confucians emphasize “doing good is as good as lust” (haoshan dangru haohao se, 好善当如好好色). Here the “as good as lust” means that because the outer appearance of beauty leads to a joyful feeling, this feeling is naturally formed and is not forced to happen. In the moral pursuit (the good), when one reaches a similar state as “lust,” then moral practice has more of the characteristic of “I am pleased.” In contrast to this, one rebelling against moral principles will cause one to feel guilty and not at peace, and thus will lack joy. If it is said that the “I think” is comparatively more connected to the dimension of universality within moral sense (common sense) and the “I desire” and “I am pleased” more closely embodies the link between moral sense and the individual’s particular perceptions and experiences (individual sense), then this communal sense and individual sense is interwoven together. As the moral sense’s specific form of existence, this type of interweaving constitutes the internal mechanism of ethical behavior and provides a driving force to carry out ethical behavior. Taking moral sense as the cause of one’s action, moral action will overcome external force and internal difficulties, achieving a conscious, voluntary, and natural form. As the person’s form of existence, ethical life and moral practice contain different aspects. If it is said that the dimension of cognition gives us of selfawareness, the dimension of evaluation gives us value content, and universal 7  Kant, Immaneul, Critique of Judgment, Werner Pluhar (trans.) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), p. 13.

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norms create their order as they’re being carried out, then existent sense with confirmation of meaning as its core makes the ethical life have interrelatedness and immediacy to the individual, and moral sense with recognition of duty as its core makes ethical concepts become that which truly exists in one’s heart. These two aspects, in the actual unfolding of the ethical life and moral practice, provide an internal guarantee for one another. From a synthetic perspective, the interaction of these two aspects simultaneously creates the preconditions and requirements for the possibility of the ethical life and moral practice.

Chapter 7

The View of Man and the View of Matter: the Philosophical Implications of Ecological Problems I In the wake of historical development, ecology has gradually become an issue which people have no choice but to face squarely.1 Generally speaking, the ecological problems that have arisen are interrelated with the existence of humans themselves. As we all know, humans came from nature and are intrinsically natural, but they also have left nature and tend to resist it. Discussions surrounding the distinction between humans and heaven (tianren zhi bian 天人之辩) within Chinese philosophy involve this relationship. The primitive, natural world does not have any ecological problems. It is only when people split away from nature (division of heaven and human) and become a separate type of existence (referred to as nature’s “other”) that ecological problems happen. Before humans appeared, nature experienced many changes such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and droughts, but because this evolution of nature happened before the existence of humans, it did not constitute a problem. After humans separated themselves from nature as “the other,” not only did their actions create various kinds of ecological problems, but also gradually gave significance to natural evolution, which originally did not have ecological significance. Following the appearance and development of humans, pure natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods, and droughts transformed into important aspects of ecological evolution, mainly because these changes had a direct impact and influence on the existence of humans. Ecological problems are indeed difficult to separate from human existence and it is often said that ecological problems are primarily human problems. Ecological problems arose out of the existence of humans and are interrelated with distinct features of this existence. Only humans have the consciousness to create value and the ability to do so in this world, and it is only humans that are able to make various types of indelible imprints on nature through their own creative actions. In fact, humans live in the actual world, a world different from the natural existence, which humans have formed through their own 1  This chapter was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_008

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creative action. What the Confucianism referred to as “supporting the transforming and nourishing powers of heaven and Earth” (zan tiandi zhi huayu, 赞天地之化育) and “regulate the mandate of heaven and use it” (zhi tianming er yongzhi 制天命而用之) affirms the productive process of humanity’s participation in the world. Humanity’s process of producing value is simultaneously the process of producing meaning, and meaning itself has many connotations: it can express an active or positive nature and can also express a passive or negative nature. In terms of the relationship between heaven and humanity, active or positive meaning manifests as a harmonious relationship between the two, while passive or negative meaning expresses more unilateral relationship. As such, ecological problems stem from a unilateral relationship between heaven and humanity, which implies going from a balanced relationship to an imbalanced one. An important reason for the imbalance between heaven and humanity stems from people pursuing their own value goals and creating their own values while ignoring the laws of nature. The process of value creation is related to people’s value goals, but this process necessarily originates from reality and the laws internal to it. If the pursuit of value goals and the creation of values ignores or even rejects the laws of nature, then various types of tension between heaven and humanity will be formed leading to the separation of the two, and thus leading to various ecological problems. This relationship between the process of creating values and the occurrence of ecological problems in one aspect demonstrates the correlation between ecological problems and the existence and activity of humans. To sum up, people leaving and resisting nature has historically led to the occurrence of ecological problems. Expressing this through Chinese philosophic concepts, this precondition assumes the separation of heaven and humanity. Using the perspective of the separation from or relationship with heaven and humanity to understand ecological problems specifically involves a dual perspective: the view of humanity and the view of matter. The resolution of ecological problems and the rational construction of an ecological relationship are inseparable from the specific understanding of this dual horizon. II The horizon of ecological problems is first expressed from the perspective of “the view of human.” Speaking broadly, “the view of human” is understanding and appraising the world from the perspective of a person. This type of

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view includes multiple meanings. It not only involves rational cognition in the narrow sense, but also concerns values. Rational cognition is specifically expressed as the grasp on a factual level of nature itself and the relationship between nature and the world. The concern with values places the significance of values between heaven and humanity. Chinese philosophy had very early on recognized these aspects. Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d. 289 BCE) points out “he is affectionate to his relatives, and benevolent to the people. He is benevolent to people generally, and kind to things” (qinqin er renmin, renmin er aiwu 亲亲而仁民, 仁民二爱物).2 This involves three different objects: relatives, the people, and things, and three types of value positions or attitudes: affection (associated with family love), benevolence (treatment with a compassionate heart), and kindness (cherishing and protective treatment), the latter of these belonging to a broad sense of “view,” that is, inspecting and grasping objects by their value. Not only should one ascribe value to “relatives” (members within the domain of family ethics) and “the people” (members of general society), but one should also take the emotional position of cherishing and being protective toward “things” in a broad sense. On a substantial level, this type of emotion should permeate value content. The Song and Ming lixue 理学 school (“School of Principle”) took this a step further and said “the people are my brothers and I share life with all things” and “the person of benevolence is in unity with the ten thousand things.”3 These principles imply understanding all things of the world with respect to people and providing to them a corresponding value signification. This perspective requires us to show proper value concern to objects other than humans, and also reflects the view of human value connotations. Chinese philosophy not only involves value concerns regarding nature and other objects of inquiry on the level of essence, but also mentions how to carry out the general ideas and principles of these value concerns. For this latter aspect, we can use an important proposition from the Zhongyong 中庸 (“Focusing the Familiar” or “Doctrine of the Mean”) to summarize as follows: “The ten thousand things are nourished together without harming one another.”4 From the perspective of the treatment of nature, this notion implies that every individual and every object within nature has its reason for existence and can exist together without excluding one another. Looking at the relationship between humans and nature, nature acts as the object coexisting 2  Mengzi 7A45. 3  Translator’s note: “The ten thousand things” (wanwu 万物) is a common term in Chinese literature which is otherwise translated as “all things” or the myriad things.” 4  Zhongyong 31.

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with humans and its existence has equal significance. From the perspective of the relationship between heaven and humanity, this reflects the value orientation of the understanding and treatment of nature in “the ten thousand things are nourished together without harming one another.” Extending this further, “the ten thousand things are nourished together without harming one another” does not merely express a theory of understanding nature and the relationship between humans and nature, but also constitutes a starting point for grasping relationships between humans. From a primitive level, different individuals, social classes, groups, ethnicities, and countries within human society should each have their own living space within the social domain and ought to exist together without excluding one another. In connection with this, these individuals, social classes, groups, ethnicities, and countries should have equal rights in enjoying and utilizing natural resources. In accordance with the principle that “the ten thousand things are nourished together without harming one another,” the rights of different individuals, social classes, groups, ethnicities, and countries should receive recognition and respect, and the members of one group should not be given more power to negate or exclude other members with equal rights. However, in the development of human history, these principles have never truly been realized, rather, in contrast, we have seen that often some social class, group, ethnicity, or country will exploit and consume natural resources in a way that far surpasses or even overwhelms other social classes, groups, ethnicities, and countries. This sort of phenomenon is undoubtedly related to inequality within human society and if this sort of inequality is left uninhibited, it will ultimately lead to ecological problems. When certain members of society or countries excessively consume natural resources, the lack of equilibrium between heaven and humanity will be exacerbated just as the previous generation’s excessive occupation of nature will lead to ecological disasters for later generations. Thus, today’s ecological problems and society’s unbalanced utilization of natural resources have a connection that is difficult to deny. As can be seen from the above, relationships between people are ancillary to the relationship between heaven and humanity. In one respect this expresses the perspective, which had already been mentioned, that ecological problems are ultimately human problems. Correspondingly, resolving ecological problems requires investigation and understanding from the human perspective. As previously expressed, using the human’s “view” involves using a rational method to understanding the world, including looking upon the world from a value horizon. Speaking logically, if we understand the relationship between heaven and humanity as well as synergetic interpersonal relationships, it will often lead us to a strong utilitarian consciousness, thereby creating an

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imbalance in people’s relationships and the relationship between heaven and humanity. The value concerns involved in “the view of human” that aim to restrict these tendencies toward partiality no doubt have positive significance. Of course, as will be discussed later, if we merely stop at the horizon or view of human, or excessively emphasize this horizon, it will often lead to a narrow anthropocentric worldview. Narrow anthropocentrism is primarily displayed as taking the immediate benefit of humanity as the only starting point for investigation of how to deal with the relationship between heaven and humanity, and thus directing us to unilaterally take possession of and obtain nature, leading to many different forms of ecological imbalance. III Related to the ecological domain and “the view of human” is “the view of matter.” Taking this as a horizon is to reject viewing the world from the perspective of humanity’s value goals, and instead emphasize inspecting nature based on the laws of nature itself, thereby grasping the actual conditions for the harmonious relationship between humanity and heaven. Humans themselves are part of nature, and sustaining their existence requires food, water, sunlight, etc., and thus makes them part of the ecological chain. As a part of nature, people must obey the laws of the natural order and, as such, the actions and developmental process of people should be consistent with the circulatory system of nature itself. Looking at the historical development, when early humans were still in the hunting gathering stage of existence, to a certain degree humans and nature maintained a cyclical relationship in the primeval sense. “At sunrise go to work, at sunset rest” in one respect, reflects the cyclical relationship between human and nature. The circular movement of people going back and forth between “work” and “rest” and of nature’s “sunrise” and “sunset” present a consistency between humans and nature. During the agricultural and nomadic periods of civilization, the problem of the relationship between humans and natural ecological balance began to become much more diversified and complicated. After industrialization people gradually began removing themselves from the circulatory system of nature, and as a result of unilateral intervention, conquered nature, bringing about various ecological problems. People’s survival relies heavily on the system of nature, and the destruction of nature ultimately threatens human existence, so in a sense we can say that protecting nature is protecting the human race. Equally significant, the protection of human existence should include the protection of nature itself. From the perspective of “the view of human,” humans are often

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taken as the ultimate end; therefore extending the protection of human existence to the protection of nature can be seen as an extension of taking humans as the ultimate end. From a philosophic perspective, the Daoists have a relatively conscious awareness of the relationships mentioned above. Daoists take nature as the first principle, demanding to respect the laws of nature, presented in the Laozi 老子 (“Book of Master Lao”) as “dao patterns itself on what is natural (dao fa ziran 道法自然).”5 Of course, patterning oneself on nature isn’t a mode of action at all, and in fact, the Daoists also affirm human action. However, for the Daoists, human action is preconditioned on its adherence to natural laws. This includes two aspects: purposiveness and accordance with natural law. The Daoists emphasize that the purposiveness of action should not deviate from natural law. Related to this, the Daoists also refer to “act without acting” (“wei wuwei, 为无为”). Within this horizon, inaction constitutes one unique method of acting, and the unique characteristic of inaction is that it takes accordance with the laws of nature as its fundamental precondition for action. It can be easily seen that the Daoists provide a fair amount of concern to the aspect of “the view of matter” within the relationship between heaven and humanity. However, the tendency to idealize nature also exists within the Daoist philosophic school of thought. For Daoists, primordial nature is the most ideal form of existence that one should preserve, protect, and to which one should return. As a result, Daoists tend to have an equal view of heaven and humanity, and view them as having equal value significance. The Laozi mentions: heaven and earth do not act from benevolence; they deal with the ten thousand things as the dogs of grass are dealt with. The sages do not act from benevolence; they deal with the people as the dogs of grass are dealt with.6 This idea implies that people and nature should be looked upon as being completely equal. What having an equal view of humanity and heaven means is the elimination of any differences between humans and nature, and from this view it is difficult to confirm the internal rule that humans are beings who have the consciousness and ability to create value. In fact, once this rule of humans as value subjects is eliminated, then ecological problems themselves will be eliminated; it implies a return to the primeval world with no separation 5  Laozi 25. 6  Ibid., 5.

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between heaven and humanity, to a time during which, although there were many types of changes in nature as previously mentioned (e.g. earthquakes, floods, etc.), the changes did not constitute ecological problems. Perhaps here we can make a distinction between narrow anthropocentrism and “the view of human.” As described previously, narrow anthropocentrism mainly has its origins in an excessive exaggeration of “the view of human,” which, in its broad sense, is expressed as connecting human’s value goals to an understanding of the relationship between humans and nature. While we should try to refrain from this sort of bias, we are unable to completely break away from the next horizon presented here. Regarding ecological problems, the reason why we strive so hard to establish an ideal and harmonious ecological system is ultimately for the sake of creating a more perfect and fair environment for human existence. In the same way, the occurrences of ecological problems and humans are interconnected, we are unable to separate the solving of ecological problems and the existence of humans. If we completely reject “the view of human,” then it often easily leads to ecocentrism. The Daoist position of an equal view of heaven and humanity admittedly does include many implications, but if we inappropriately emphasize this viewpoint, it seems that we may replace the human horizon with nature’s horizon, thereby leading us to an unwanted ecocentrism. IV Next, we will separately investigate the dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of matter.” From the perspective of resolving ecological problems, a reasonable way of proceeding is the blending of this dual horizon. In other words, “the view of human” and “the view of matter” should not exclude or stand opposite to one another, but rather should be integrated together. In terms of ecological philosophy, the above mixture of horizons contains multifaceted significance. This first thing to deal with is the unification of purposiveness and accordance to natural law. Purposiveness implies human action and the creation of values in the world, which is the process of pursuing value goals. This is an important characteristic of a person’s existence and activity, and people are not able to abandon this type of pursuit of value goals and ideals. If they completely give up and deny the pursuit for value goals and ideals, it may lead to the partialities which the Daoists expressed, the logical result of which is once again returning to the natural form of existence in which there is no distinction between heaven and humanity, thereby eliminating the ecological problem.

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The pursuit of purposiveness should not depart from the laws of nature. This can be understood from at least two perspectives. In one respect, people’s value goals are based on their own needs and ideals rooted in reality. This reality includes nature and its intrinsic laws, so in this way value goals, from the point of their formation, are inseparable from nature and its internal laws. From another aspect, the realization of value goals is inseparable from practical activity, and within the process of realizing value goals, people’s practical activity is equally unable to ignore laws of nature, but rather must respect and obey these laws in all circumstances. The history of humankind continuously tells us the following: showing scorn for the laws of nature will inevitably result in nature’s merciless punishment. If it is said that denying people’s value goals directs us toward narrow ecocentrism, then alienation from the laws of nature directs us toward narrow anthropocentrism. Taking the unification of purposiveness and accordance to natural law as preconditions will transcend and discard narrow ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. The blending together of the dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of matter” simultaneously involves an understanding of the relationship between heaven and humanity. The separation of heaven and humanity serves as the precondition for occurrence of ecological problems, and interconnected with this precondition is the blending of the dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of matter” and the question of how to deal with the relationship of heaven and humanity. At this point in time, the understanding of the relationship between heaven and humanity generally tends toward emphasizing the unification of the two parts. However, if we inspect this “unification,” we find that it includes many different implications. This “unification” can be an original, pre-civilized state of affairs. In a primitive world and natural state of existence, all objects fall under this form of “unified.” Similarly, the early period of human existence and early humans’ activity with nature (such as the hunting-gathering mode of existence) displayed a unified relationship in a primitive sense. If we had stayed at this type of primitive “unification” then the basic precondition to the historical development of humans would be lost, ecological problems would not occur, and consequently there wouldn’t be any need to investigate and resolve such problems. Of course, the development of humanity cannot merely take the distinction between heaven and humanity as its direction forward because this biased and unbalanced view has led to the origin of ecological problems. A more reasonable direction is, with heaven and humanity having already separated, to continuously rebuild this unity within the process of historical development. In other words, what is truly important here is not to return to a unified primitive form, but rather to continuously

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transcend the separation and confrontation between heaven and humanity at different historical stages and for both of them to achieve a higher form of unity. In fact, from a historical perspective, ecological problems are only able to be resolved through continuously rebuilding the unity between heaven and humanity. Merely admiring the primitive form of nature and singing the praises of heaven and humanity’s original unity are only able to achieve a type of abstract and shallow fulfillment rather than truly resolving ecological problems. This ecological predicament was caused purely by humans, but to reject human activity is nothing other than cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face and therefore the only way to overcome it is through the rational activity of humans. Here, it is through humanity’s intent and hard work, oriented with positive meaning, that the unity between heaven and humanity can be continuously rebuilt within the course of historical evolution. Through this type of rebuilding process, on one hand humanity’s value goals will continue to be realized, and on the other hand, people once again become part of the circulatory system of nature on a higher level and also part of the harmonious relationship between formation and nature. Circular economy, as a part of economic development, has a similar connotation as this above concept. Here, the ecological cycle in the sense of purposiveness in the pursuit of values and reestablishing the unification of heaven and humanity demonstrates mutual integration and a parallel relationship. Looking at this from a more metaphysical level, the above direction is simultaneously seen as the unification of the dao of heaven and the dao of human. Within the meaning of value sense, this emerges as the unification of the principles of human and the principles of nature. The principles of the dao of human include “the view of human,” that is, affirming the person’s value goals and value pursuits. Principles of nature are expressed as “the view of matter,” that is, respecting and affirming the internal laws of nature itself. The internal concepts reflected in the cohesion of heaven and humanity on a historical level is the continuous unification of the dao of heaven and the dao of human, principles of nature and principles of the dao of human. In this also lies the essential significance of the unification of the dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of matter.” Understanding this from a broader background, investigating the interaction between heaven and humanity and the blending of the dual horizon mentioned above, what follows next involves the relationship between the ethical and aesthetic horizon. “The view of human” does not only imply emphasizing people’s value pursuit, but also the demand to assume various value responsibilities, which include people’s responsibilities to themselves as well as their responsibilities to nature. Responsibility and duty are of an identical and both have inherent significance and thus an awareness of responsibility is founded

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in the ethical horizon. Early on, the Daoists recognized “heaven and earth have great beauty, yet are silent,”7 that is, nature itself has an aesthetic dimension. Fair and harmonious ecological relationships always present aesthetic significance, and a damaged ecological system is often unable to provide people with an impression of beauty. In certain regions of the earth today, polluted rivers, barren wastelands, dusty paths, and smog filled skies are pervasive. These ecological evils not only have negative significance on the level of values, but also seem to lack a sense of beauty from an aesthetic perspective. In comparison to those ecological evils, bright blue skies, clear rivers and streams, and verdant fields, not only have positive value significance, but also provide a delightful sense of beauty: when we take bluer skies and clearer water as ideal goals for ecological systems, it simultaneously embodies aesthetic pursuits. Speaking in these terms, the unified dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of matter” undoubtedly intrinsically involves the unification of the aesthetic and the ethical horizons. The aesthetic horizon takes beauty as its subject and the ethical horizon is related to the good and in this sense, the blending of these two simultaneously establishes the unification of beauty and the good, and thus constitutes humanity’s pursuit of value ideals in a wider dimension. When discussing ecological problems from the perspective of the relationship and interaction between heaven and humanity, the ultimate goal is a harmonious human society with sustainable development. Within this course of development, on one hand people themselves work toward perfection through the creation of values, and on the other hand the world in which people live continuously tends toward perfection on a higher level. This idea is implied in what is referred to as “assisting the transformation and nourishment of heaven and earth.” It can be seen, then, that the perfection of humans and the perfection of nature has inherent unity, and this type of unity can be understood as “the shared beauty of heaven and human.” It is just this ecological concept toward which the dual horizon of “the view of human” and “the view of nature” points.

7  Zhuangzi, 22.3.

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Metaphysics and Other Matters: Responses to a Number of Philosophical Questions I Most of the questions raised by my colleagues have been focused on the connotations and significance of “concrete metaphysics” ( juti de xingshangxue 具体的形上学).1, 2 Here I will provide a brief and comprehensive response to these questions. The concept of “metaphysics” has had different understandings throughout the history of philosophy, but on the most basic level we can say it concerns the theory of being. This sense of metaphysics is related to the distinctions between “skill” and “dao,” knowledge and wisdom; it implies grasping the world and going from “skill” and entering into “dao,” going from knowledge and arriving at wisdom. On the level of “skill” and knowledge, the world expresses itself as more of a differentiated form, and going from “skill” to “dao” implies a movement from the perspective of differentiation to a more unified horizon. The central difference between wisdom and knowledge is also reflected in this way. I have also distinguished between the abstract and concrete forms of metaphysics. Abstract metaphysics is primarily expressed as leaving the human and discussing dao. The “human” here is related to the historical process of knowledge and action, and what is referred to as leaving the human and discussing 1  During the first session of the conference entitled “History and Thought: Horizon of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy,” held 5–8th of May, 2011, a collaboration of the Philosophy department of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Philosophical Analysis Journal, Peking University Press, and others, the author spoke about his three works on concrete metaphysics, namely A Treatise on Dao (daolun, 道论), Ethics and Being: Treatise on Moral Philosophy (lunli yu cunzai: daode zhexue yanjiu, 伦理与存在:道德哲学研究), and The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being (Chengji yu chengwu: Yiyishijie de shengcheng, 成己与成物: 意义世界的生成). This article is some of the responses given to the scholars which were recorded and later written down. For responses to other question given at this conference, please refer to the appendix. It was translated by Daniel Sarafinas, Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at the University of Macau. 2  The author’s perspective concerning “concrete metaphysics” can be found in A Treatise on Dao, Ethics and Being: Treatise on Moral Philosophy, and The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_009

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dao is leaving knowledge and a course of action to construct various kinds of speculative worldviews and models of the universe. This method of investigating existence already possesses this abstract characteristic from the outset. Taking the unification of the self as the internal regulation of being is connected with this kind of investigation of being and already stipulates this abstract characteristic from the beginning. Self-identity as the internal law of existence is interrelated with this investigative method, and this identity is one with no differences. Another characteristic of abstract metaphysics is that it is closed off. Time is a very important dimension when discussing questions of being, as it is interrelated with process and historicity. However, the fundamental deficiencies of the above rules within abstract metaphysics cause it to be closed off and non-process oriented. The abstract form of metaphysics expresses a tendency of “leaving tools and discussing dao,” and from another perspective, this notion creates the disjoint between metaphysics and the physical realm. While simultaneously concerned with the field of metaphysics and investigating the ultimate origin, abstract metaphysics is often far away and unrelated to the physical realm, which, as a result, often leads to the separation, even to the point of complete division, of metaphysics and the physical realm. Speaking of “concrete metaphysics” as relative to the abstract form of metaphysics, the above summary implicitly contains my understanding of concrete metaphysics. First, “concrete metaphysics” does not presuppose or create any kind of speculative or transcendental being, but is an understanding of the world within the historical process of human’s knowledge and action, or to put in other words, it is to not leave the human in order to discuss dao. Second, the concrete form of metaphysics uses the unification of plurality to reject abstract identicality, and this unification is expressed as the merging of reason and things, form and use, root and branch, etc. To use Chinese philosophic concepts to express this, its characteristic is harmonious diversity (he er butong, 和而不同). In Chinese philosophy, “harmony” signifies unification, but also includes diverse provisions, thus differentiating it from abstract identicality. In Zhang Zai’s 张载 (d.  1077) description of the dao of heaven, he mentions the “great harmony” (taihe, 太和). The “great harmony” here is a metaphysical concept, and in this sense “harmony” from a metaphysical perspective affirms the unification of the myriad different things of the universe. Third, the concrete form of metaphysics affirms the temporality and process of being, that is, it understands the unification of being as the unfolding unity within a process rather than through the isolation of the self. Fourth, “concrete metaphysics” understands the world as the unification between dao and tools, thus it is neither leaving dao and discussing tools, nor the other way around. From another perspective, this kind of unification between dao and

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tools is concretely expressed as the communication between metaphysics and the physical realm. Speaking from a philosophic level, giving attention to the empirical world is to avoid any kind of abstract speculative way forward: if one completely ignores the empirical world, it becomes very easy to fall into a speculative fantasy. In this sense, the unity of dao and tools, communication between metaphysics and the physical realm, is an important aspect to our understanding of the real world. The fifth point, as a theory of being, in its theoretical form, metaphysics simultaneously expresses the unification of form and substance. It is not merely restricted to debates within the field of language, nor does it stop at the formal level of logical analysis, but rather calls for it to go from language to the world, to understand and grasp actual being through logical analysis, as well as to affirm the unification between factuality and normativity. In this sense, my understanding of metaphysics is different from the descriptive metaphysics and formal metaphysics found within analytic philosophy. The above can be seen as a general overview of “concrete metaphysics.” A central concept is involved here, that is, “concrete” or “concreteness.” We can understand “concrete” from two aspects: being itself and our grasp of being. Regarding being itself, actual and true being is concrete being. If we say that within Kant’s horizon, the form, transcendental, and a priori often occur in the same sequence, then in my understanding, concreteness, actuality, and truth also occur in the same sequence. The actuality, which is related to concreteness, is distinct from the general meaning of reality, and the difference between these two lies in whether or not they can enter the process of the person’s knowledge and action. When it does not enter the process of the person’s knowledge and action, in regard to being we can only confirm it as “somethingness” (you, 有), and the reality of this “somethingness” cannot be denied, but when it has not entered the process of knowledge and action, in regard to people, it lacks actuality. It is only after the world has entered the person’s domain of knowledge and action that it is able to have the character of actuality, and this character of actuality and what I’ve referred to as concreteness are in accord with one another. In this sense, being outside of the realm of knowledge and action is abstract and manifests a kind of commonality with Kant’s “thing-in-itself,” and to confirm the concreteness of being implies rejecting this kind of abstract nature. “Concreteness” simultaneously has an internal connection with the previously mentioned understanding of metaphysics in that it implies unity of plurality or a unity which contains many differences, and also expresses the temporality and process of time, etc. These above aspects can be seen as the manifestation of concreteness within being itself.

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From the perspective of grasping being, “concreteness” and the previously mentioned understanding of metaphysics also have interrelated aspects because they imply understanding and grasping the object within the historical process of knowledge and action, and thus are separate from leaving the human and discussing dao. Simultaneously, concreteness is expressed as taking on the horizon of the dao perspective. What is referred to as “taking the dao perspective” implies grasping the concrete unification of being, and also the linking together of the different horizons of the person’s grasp of being. In recent years, philosophy has already differentiated epistemology, ontology, axiology, ethics, aesthetics, and other branches, and in some sense each branch is expressed as its own unique horizon. “Taking the dao perspective” further implies engaging these different horizons rather than being biased to only one side. In other words, regarding being itself, it implies the arrival at its unification and process, and regarding the grasping of being, it requires the linking up of different horizons of investigation. As can be seen, “concrete metaphysics,” as I understand it, implies using a concrete horizon to arrive at concrete being. Here, arriving at a concrete form of metaphysics (the concreteness of theory of being) and returning to the concreteness of being (being its own concreteness) are mutually unified. From my perspective, arriving at the above-mentioned unification is simultaneously a manifestation of moving toward the boundary of wisdom in a philosophic sense. Speaking in a general sense, metaphysics can be understood as the horizon of the human. Metaphysics is the human’s understanding and investigation of the world and always reflects the human horizon. “Taking the dao perspective” is also the person’s choice to “take the dao perspective,” and in this sense, there are no horizons completely separated from humans. The foundation of the actuality of “taking the dao perspective” lies in the individual person’s process of being, which is concretely manifested as the historical process of knowledge and action, and the historical content of this process is the mutual cultivation of self and things. To put it simply, metaphysics acts as the horizon of the person; its foundation is based on the person’s process of being, concretely unfolding as the historical interaction between knowledge and action, and taking the mutual cultivation of self and things as its substantial content. In recent years, the criticism of metaphysics has been without end, and therefore to raise the topic of metaphysics seems a little out of fashion. This touches upon the problem of how to understand the significance of metaphysics. The significance of metaphysics and the origin of being itself are difficult to separate. Investigating and understanding the world from a philosophic level, regardless of whether one uses an ontological, epistemological,

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axiological, or ethical horizon, is inseparable from the problem of being, and in this sense, being is the pre-conditional stipulation to understanding this world. Historically, this type of originality of being already manifested itself in Hegel’s philosophy. In some sense, Hegel’s logic is his ontology, and within this he first speaks about a theory of being. In other words, being is logic’s starting point to investigate the world from a philosophic level for Hegel. This arrangement has its theoretical significance, and is not merely a speculative construct. From the perspective of understanding the world, the question of being is certainly unavoidable and, moreover, it stipulates the necessity of metaphysics. Metaphysics is different from the empirical sciences in that it is unable to discover facts using the empirical method, and so, it begs the question, does it have intelligibility? This is one of reasons metaphysics is often called into question. Regarding this, there are at least two aspects of it we need to look at: first, regarding the cognition-comprehension level, any particular perspective, discourse, or concept only needs to be free of any logical contradictions to be comprehensible, which according to formal logic is the condition of possibility for meaning. In this regard, for a metaphysical argument to at least have meaning within the domain of cognition-comprehension, it must only lack logical contradictions. In other words, in terms of what is comprehensible, metaphysics has intelligibility and significance. From the perspective of “concrete metaphysics” and connected with the unification of dao and tools, this concrete form of metaphysics also has intelligibility. The dao here acts as the object of metaphysics, and being certainly not a speculative construct, intercommunicates with tools or the empirical world. If we say that this is primarily on a formal level, speaking in regard to it not having logical contradictions, then here the empirical world can be introduced into this framework, and thus can affirm that, from the perspective of the unification of dao and tools, metaphysics has intelligibility. When referring to intelligibility, particular stress is put on its meaning in terms of cognition-comprehension. Moving forward, understanding metaphysics in terms of goals and values, we can equally see the internal meaning within metaphysics, which concretely opens up the historical process of the mutual cultivation of the self and things. In fact, we can see certain metaphysical concepts within daily life. In general, every individual who has not been baptized into empiricism naturally carries with them certain metaphysical concepts, which take the form of common sense to express interconnectedness with and a concrete understanding of the world. Although these concepts are formed under the precondition that they have not yet been introspectively reflected upon, they nonetheless influence the person’s daily life in many ways.

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Another question connected to metaphysics involves the transcendent being. Specifically, does the idea of the ultimate being within the realm of religion (for example, God) have any significance? Here it is necessary to briefly mention how we should regard the ultimate being within the realm of religion. We can understand this kind of transcendent being from the two perspectives of substantiality and functionality. A transcendent object as a substantive concept (like God) involves the metaphysical domain’s question of being, whereas the question involved with a transcendent being as a functional concept (including the type of concept of God) is what kind of significance does it actually have for society and the individual? It is quite easy to enter into metaphysics in the speculative or abstract sense when discussing a transcendent object on the substantive level. This is also related to the criticisms levied by empiricists against this kind of concept. We certainly do not have adequate grounds to determine the existence of a transcendent being as a substantive concept. However, there is another level of significance regarding a transcendent object as a functional concept within the realm of religion in terms of constructing a social life and the individual’s spiritual world. Historically speaking, it is an unavoidable fact that the functional concept of a transcendent being once created varying degrees of influence on the person’s social life, political operation, and daily interactions through religious organizations. Moreover, it has provided spiritual comfort for and settled the spiritual life of the individual, which is undeniable and has been constantly displayed through history, even up until today. In recent years, the function of the transcendent object on the social level, such as the unification of church and state, the church intervening in the secular political regime, etc., has gradually diminished, and the function and significance of religion in this sense within modern society has been continuously weakened. However, it might be very difficult to dispel the influence of a transcendent being within the individual’s spiritual domain in a similar historical period, and in the same amount of time in the future, its significance will still exist. Looking at it from a more concrete horizon, there exist similarities between the significance of religious phenomenon and the significance of mysticism. This level of significance can be investigated from two different perspectives. First, religion itself can become the object of explanation, even if it is mystical experience within the realm of religion, and it can also be a religious experience in a broad sense combined with research and explanation. Within the above process of explanation, not only can the various phenomena, which are included in religion, be expressed using a logical form, but they can also accordingly act as the objects of a unique explanation which provides cognitive

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content. Second, it can be seen from the process of a religious believer’s experience that this experience is often associated with his spiritual pursuit and ultimate concern, and when this experience is able to satisfy his spiritual need, it will reveal to him a certain kind of meaning. If we say that under the previously mentioned background (making religion the object of investigation) religion contained a kind of meaning on the level of cognition-comprehension, then under next kind of circumstance (taking the experience of the religious believer as a directive) religion presents even more meaning in terms of goals and values. II In the book The Mutual Cultivation of the Self and Thing: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being, I made the cultivation of self and things one of the central concepts. Professor Huang Yong 黄勇, however, believes that between the cultivation of the self and things, there is still a segment which needs to be considered, which is “cultivation of people.”3 There is no doubt that this perspective deserves attention. Here I would like to briefly discuss a perspective on the question surrounding “accomplishing the person.” First, I would like to mention that in the book The Mutual Cultivation of the Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy on the Meaning of Being, the cultivation of the self mainly refers to achieving one’s personhood: in the revised edition of this book “the cultivation of the self” is more clearly defined. The notion of “one’s personhood” includes the person as an individual or self, and also includes others’ as well as groups’ personhood. Broadly speaking, “the cultivation of things,” which is related to “the cultivation of the self,” includes two aspects: one aspect is transforming heaven’s heaven into human beings’ heaven, or in other words, to transform natural existence into a humanized existence. The second aspect involves the perfection of the domain of society itself. Actually, the person as the “self” and the person as the “other” both 3  Refer to Huang Yong’s Cultivation of people: Between the Cultivation of the Self and the Cultivation of Things (Chengren: Zai chengji yu chengwu zhijian 成人: 在成己与成物之间), from a paper in Philosophical Analysis Journal, originally based on the first session of the conference entitled “History and Thought: Horizon of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy,” and later compiled in Juti xingshangxue de si yu bian: Yang Guorong zhexue taolunji 具体形 上学的思与辨—杨国荣哲学讨论集 [Thought and Distinctions of Concrete Metaphysics: A Compilation of Yang Guorong’s Philosophic Discussions] He Xirong 何锡蓉 (ed.), (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2013). The words here are Professor Huang Yong’s, which are all from this text unless explicitly stated otherwise.

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belong to “one’s personhood” and both should be included in the broad sense within the process of the cultivation of the self and things. The cultivation of the self and the cultivation of things within the above-mentioned horizon neither unfold in any one direction or linear method, nor are they separated from one another. Although there can be different emphases within the process of analysis and discussion, in reality the two are always in the process of historical interaction. The main content of the cultivation of things can be understood as achieving the world, which includes what is naturally present in the perfection of the humanized and social domain, and in this sense, undoubtedly involves and contains the process of cultivating people in a broad sense. In relation to cultivating people, social perfection is reflected in providing concrete social and historical conditions for the perfection of the person within the above horizon. In other words, it constructs the preconditions and background for the cultivation of people (the completion of the person) on a wider level. From a narrow perspective of the achieving the self, its connotation equally should include achieving the other: the person’s true standard of perfection is to not merely be concerned with the other’s external benefit, social wellbeing, etc., but rather should be more reflected in making the other’s achievement of virtue as one’s own affair. A truly perfected person cannot merely be concerned with how to complete one’s own virtue and nor whatsoever with the character of the other. In fact, the true perfection of virtue is always reflected in concern for the social good and for the other’s moral features. The Confucian scholars of the past often criticized the moral degeneration of the world, which included their disappointment and dissatisfaction with others’ moral realms not being high enough. In a substantial way, this kind of criticism is premised on a concern for the moral perfection or accomplishment of the other. In short, to truly have virtue, one should be concerned with elevating one’s own realm, and also with the other’s moral situation. Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 BCE) holds the complete (quan 全) and refined (cui 粹) as the ideal for human character. Complete and refined means perfect, and this type of perfection is the mutual unification of achieving the self and achieving the other. Achieving the other in the above sense includes at least two aspects. First, having a perfect personal character has an objective function of being an exemplar, that is, it normally has the use of a paragon of virtue or model, but this function or use is not achieved specifically for this purpose: if someone does something only so that others will follow his or her example, it is not truly being an exemplar. An exemplar acts for an objective effect and not to deliberately let others follow his or her example. Kongzi’s (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE) words “when we see a virtuous person, we should emulate them”

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in one respect reflects this emphasis on the paragon’s natural demonstration of virtue. Second, subjectively speaking, those with virtue also need to provide guidance and cultivation to others. The two aspects of objective model behavior and subjective guidance are mutually related. These are the related aspects involved in the perfect individual accomplishing the self. One needs to pay particular attention to the question of the relationship between autonomy and conditionality in the process of cultivating personal character. The cultivation of character is primarily a process based on oneself, which, historically speaking, the Mencian system of Confucianism recognized. Here, achieving personhood and achieving things are different and should be separated. Achieving personhood needs to include the adequate development of a leadership role within the individual self, and the external guidance, transformation through education, etc., is mainly for enlightening one’s own consciousness. The promotion of the final state of being relies on the person completing the self and refining his or her individual virtue. Kongzi questioned: “is one’s practice of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) done by oneself, or is it done by others”4 and also asserted that “I wish to be ren, and then ren arrives.”5 These concepts emphasize that the origins of personal cultivation of character begin with the individual. Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d. 289 BCE) has his theory on the original goodness of human nature and, on a metaphysic level, turned the basis of personal cultivation and promotion of the self from external to the internal. The theory of the original goodness of human natures stresses the internal basis of personal cultivation being on the individual. The original goodness of human nature implies that humans have the possibility to perfect the self, and this possibility constitutes the precondition for personal cultivation. Although the theory of the original goodness of human nature has the problem of presupposing innate tendencies, it recognizes that the basis of perfecting personal character lies in oneself, which is not nothing. As opposed to achieving personhood, achieving things does not need to consider the problem of autonomy; things themselves do not take autonomy as their internal directive. Admittedly, achieving things requires following the laws of the thing itself, but this kind of “following the laws” mainly involves the use of things by people (people implement and complete things). Achieving personhood also has an external function, but for the person, this kind of function still operates through the self: it is only by transforming into individual consciousness and voluntary demands that it will possess real significance. It is not difficult to see, as opposed to the transformation of things being dependent on people, that 4  Lunyu 12:1. 5  Lunyu 7:30.

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the achievement of personhood is, fundamentally speaking, the achievement of the self. If we set “cultivating people” in between “cultivating things” and “cultivating the self,” it becomes “cultivating people” in a narrow sense, and taking this as a point of concern, it often directs how to help other people achieve their own self. When we use this concept to regard oneself and others, in other words, the relationship between the function of the self and achieving the other, it potentially contains a negative tendency. This negative tendency is concretely expressed as understanding personal cultivation as a kind of process of external inculcation or even imposition: at least in theory, it is impossible to eliminate this possibility. In Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (d. 1200)6 explication of the thought within Daxue 大学 (“The Great Learning”), he put an emphasis on “renovate the people” (xinmin 新民).7 Looking at it logically, this phrase has the implied meaning of transforming people, and in some sense implies training a “new person” (xinren 新人). Liang Qichao 梁启超 (d.  1929)8 also spoke about a “doctrine of the renovation of the people” (xinmin shuo, 新民说), which contains the idea of transforming the people. The change from traditional people (min, 民) to modern “renovated people” also implies this transformation. There is a kind of historical connection between this understanding and Zhu Xi’s “renovation of the people.” Moreover, there also exists theoretical coherence between Zhu Xi’s idea of “renovating the people” and the stress on the use of “li 理” (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” or “coherence”) or “heavenly principle” (tianli, 天理) to restrain people. Within the above relationship between “heavenly principle” and people, “li” manifests as more of a dominant function; the individual should comply with the “heavenly principle” and seek to model oneself after it. Here external norms and external restrictions clearly have a more important position. By comparison, Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d.  1529)9 disagreed with the doctrine of “renovating the people,” believing that the ancient Great Learning text should instead be read in the original sense as “love the people.” “Renovate the people” returning to 6  Translator’s note: Zhu Xi was one of the most prominent figures in the rationalist school of Neo-Confucianism. 7  Translator’s note: The idea of “renovating the people” is based on Cheng Yi’s 程颐 belief that “loving the people” (qinmin, 亲民) should be read as “renovating the people” in The Great Learning. This idea was carried on and written about by Zhu Xi. 8  Translator’s note: Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was a Qing dynasty journalist and reformer. He was one of the leaders of the Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898. 9  Translator’s note: Wang Yangming (d. 1529) was one of the founders of the idealist school of Neo-Confucianism. As opposed to Zhu Xi’s rationalistic understanding of li, he believed it was to be found within oneself. Along with Zhu Xi, he is considered one of the most important Neo-Confucian thinkers.

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“love the people” is similar to Wang Yangming’s theory of innate knowledge (liangzhi shuo, 良知说). An important point within the theory of innate knowledge is that it affirms that the completion of the person and the person’s cultivation is mainly based on the individual’s innate knowledge. For Wang Yangming, moral restraint cannot rely on external enforcement, but must rely on enlightenment and returning to one’s own innate knowledge, thus it is expressed as more of a shaping of the self. In fact, if we say that “renovation of the people” involves such and such external shaping, then “loving the people” points more to the achieving the person’s self. In some sense early Confucianism had already recognized the abovementioned problem, and here we can investigate Confucius’s idea of zhongshu 忠恕 (“faithfulness and reciprocity”). What is referred to as zhong 忠 (“faithfulness”) can be described in the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects”) as “wishing to be established, he makes others established, wishing to be eminent, he makes others eminent.”10 From the perspective of “the cultivation of people,” it puts emphasis on how to help the other to complete oneself, and logically, this one directional “helping the other,” or externally pushing the other forward, might lead to external inculcation or even imposition. Perhaps it is precisely in light of this that Confucius, when affirming “zhong,” simultaneously emphasizes shu 恕 (“reciprocity”). This concept can be best described in the Lunyu as “what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.”11 Relative to “zhong” (“wishing to be established, he makes others established, wishing to be eminent, he makes others eminent”), “shu” (“what you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others”) manifests more of a respect toward the individual’s internal desires. It is easy to see that “zhong” and “shu” exist in a mutually conditioning relationship, and thus only speaking about “zhong” may indeed lead to some negative results. In fact, looking at it from the process of the development of Confucianism, specifically within Xunzi’s later development of Confucianism, the concept of “zhong” seems to be extended much further. Xunzi believed that human’s original nature is evil, thus people lack the internal possibility of the perfection of the self (an original evil nature cannot lead to good personal character), and under this precondition, the person’s transformation and cultivation can only depend on “li” and “fa” 法 (“law” “method”). That is to say, it is only under the guidelines of external “li” and “fa” that people are able to move toward the “complete and refined.” This kind of perspective makes it easier to connect the process of the cultivation of people to external conditions, neglecting the training of personal character. In some 10   Lunyu 6:30. 11   Lunyu 12:2.

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sense, Xunzi gives more emphasis to “zhong” within the concept of “zhongshu” and pays insufficient attention to “shu.” This trend is still evident today. It is not difficult to recognize that speaking of “cultivating people” purely in the sense of accomplishing the other may lead to negative results in regard to personal cultivation of character. To put it briefly, for an overall understanding of “cultivating the self” and “cultivating things,” the two both contain the content of “cultivating people” in different senses. The expansion process of “cultivating the self” both involves providing exemplary behavior on an objective level, and also includes providing guidance on a subjective level. The fulfillment of “cultivating things” both involves the interaction between the self and others, and also involves the perfection of society, the latter implying creating ideal social and historical conditions for the growth of the self and others. Another aspect of this issue is that emphasizing “cultivating people” in the sense of only “achieving the other” might lead to reducing the individual’s autonomy, even to the extent that it may lead to some kind of external imposition. III In A Treatise on Dao, Ethics and Being: Treatise on Moral Philosophy and The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being, I discussed moral principles and other questions from a different perspective. Regarding this, professor Wang Qingjie 王庆节 mentioned two problems in his paper “Discussing Moral Requirements and Ethical Principles” (Ye tan daode yingdang yu lunli guifan, 也谈道德应当与伦 理规范).12 First, there is the question of how to realize the unification of general moral principles and concrete situations. From an ethical level, the process of using general principles is always connected with an analysis of the concrete situation. General principles do not regulate how the individual should specifically act within different situations, but rather, they provide overall direction. These principles need to be related to a variety of circumstances and require a specific analysis of circumstances in order to implement them into specific 12  This was originally from a paper presented during the ‘Philosophic Analysis’ session at the academic seminar entitled “History and Thought: The Horizon of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy.” It was later included in in juti xingshangxue de si yu bian: Yang Guorong zhexue taolunji 具体形上学的思与辨—杨国荣哲学讨论集 [Thought and Distinctions of Concrete Metaphysics: A Compilation of Yang Guorong’s Philosophic Discussions] He Xirong 何锡蓉 (ed.), (Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2013). The words used by professor Wang Qingjie are not sourced in this text.

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action. This relationship can be understood through the proposition of “one principle with many manifestations” from the Song and Ming dynasty lixue school of Neo-Confucianism. “One principle” refers to general principles or standards, while “many manifestations” refers to different circumstances. Thus the combination of “one principle” and “many manifestations” is always implemented into the specific process of action. Naturally, the next question is how do general principles and specific situations combine with one another? I am afraid that there is no fixed or uniform model for this. In fact, there exists no general formula or schema in the process of moral practice, and furthermore, individuals could hardly memorize any general formulas and procedures or grasp how to implement general principles and rules within concrete situations. Circumstances and situations are variable, and the method of using general principles in different circumstances involves both an understanding of these principles themselves and an analysis of the specific situation. Broadly speaking, this is related to the concept of du 度 (“proper measure”). As a philosophic category expressed as a noun, the basic meaning of “du” is the unification of quality and quantity, and going further, “du” points to the appropriate and concrete fusion between relevant rules or relevant aspects of particular things or events. This kind of fusion and unification both ensures the stability and continuity of the nature of things, and leads that thing to exist in its most suitable form under its specific conditions. To be in accord with “du” implies that all of one’s determinations and judgments have been just right, or, it could be said that the combination of the internal demands contained by general principles and concrete circumstances have reached the most suitable form. Referring to Wang Qingjie’s example, questions such as whether or not “white lies” are proper or whether or not I should extend my hand to save my drowning sister-in-law involve specific rules (such as men and women should not touch one another13) and value principles on a more universal level (respect for the value of human life), as well as reflection on the concrete situation (human life being threatened). Here “du” reflects a kind of practical wisdom. The process of practical wisdom and purely formalized reasoning is different, as the process of formalized reasoning has a definite order and model, whereas practical wisdom must be based on a practical situation in which one makes concrete analyses, determinations, and choices. We must use 13  Translator’s note: Men and women not directly touching one another, when giving and receiving gifts for example, was Confucian etiquette under the system of ritual propriety. The question of whether or not one should extend one’s hand to save one’s drowning sister-in-law was posed in the Mengzi and refers precisely to this rule of men and women not touching one another. Mengzi, of course, answers this question in the positive.

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practical wisdom rather than programmed reason when we combine general principles with concrete circumstances. The function of the above mentioned practical wisdom is completed through the action of the subject. Here the subject is obviously particularly important. The Confucians recognized this, and when the particularities of the person’s behavior is discusses in the Yizhuan 易传 (“Commentary to the Book of Changes”) it is written: The transformations and shaping that take place are obtained from the changes (of the lines); the carrying this out and operating with it is obtained from the general method (that has been established). Seeing their spirit-like intimations and understanding them depend on their being the proper men.14 The “transformations and shaping that take place” and the “carrying this out and operating with it” both involve practical action in the general sense, whereas “seeing their spirit-like intimations and understanding them” implies the deep grasp of the above process on the level of wisdom, and is ultimately completed through the knowledge and action of the subject, which is what is emphasized by the reference to “being the proper men.” In fact, the implementation of an understanding of “du” and function of wisdom depends on action. Similarly, the question of moral virtue is of particular significance. Moral virtue does not merely involve action, but is also concerned with the accomplishment of the person (the promotion and development of the person himself), and from the perspective of practical morality, how to accomplish the person is no doubt an important question: using practical wisdom by fusing general principles or rules and concrete situations, and ultimately “being the proper men.” Professor Wang Qingjie’s second question involves the basis of rules. Rules regulate what people should or should not do, and have both a guiding and restrictive function. I have discussed the question of rules from a different perspective in A Treatise on Dao, Ethics and Being, and The Mutual Cultivation of the Self and Things, and here I will briefly mention it again. Professor Wang Qingjie believes that I understand rules as “the harmonious result between ‘necessity’ (laws of what exist in reality) and ‘actuality’ (consideration of what exists in reality).” This generalization includes some misunderstandings. In fact, I do not place rules as a harmony between “necessity” and “actuality.” What I stress is that rules act as a natural matter of course from a metaphysical 14   Yijing 易经 [The Book of Changes], “Xici Shang” 系辞上 [Appended Phrases I], line 12. Translation by James Legge, ctext.org.

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level, taking necessity and what actually exists as their foundation: although rules are primarily expressed as a natural matter of course, they are inseparable from actuality and necessity. I once used the example of traffic regulations, which also includes rules. The formation of these rules involves vehicles, the road, and pedestrians, and takes the density of vehicles on the road, speed of the vehicles, etc. as the basis. Here the car, road, pedestrians, and other aspects are actually existing things, and can be classified under “actuality.” Simultaneously, under the conditions of modern transportation, there exist internal connections between these aspects, and in some respect these connections have necessity, such as when a vehicle exceeds a certain speed and the cars on the road do not maintain a certain distance between one another, if the car in front suddenly and dramatically reduces the speed of his car, the car behind will ram into the back of that car. Traffic regulations act as matters of course, and according to the above mentioned, these kinds of actuality and necessity form the basis. Of course, rules are also in some respect a matter of convention, such as the traffic regulations that dictate whether to drive on the left side of the road or the right side being primarily. Even under the conditions of conventions mentioned above, however, one still needs to consider the relationship between the vehicles, the road, and the pedestrians. In general, rules use actuality and necessity as their basis in a metaphysical sense. Looking at it from a social, and especially a moral perspective, rules can be regarded as the formalization of duty in some sense. Within the domain of morality, rules are derived from the idea of duty: duty regulates what to do and how one should do it, or what not to do and how not to do it. So, whence comes the origins of duty? This question touches upon practical human relations. In some sense, human relations compose the origins of rules and duty. The Confucian tradition was conscious of this relatively early, and here I quote Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (d. 1695): life weighs us down to the earth, only having our parents and siblings, these insoluble emotions, inherent in us, are called real, and is the beginning of the naming of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) and yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” or “equitable”).15 Of course, one has the natural dimension of a bloodline binding one to one’s parents and siblings, but as the product of social relationships within the family 15  Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲, “Mengzi Shishuo 孟子师说 [“The Sayings of Master Mengzi”]” in Huang Zongxi Quanji 黄宗羲全集 [“The Complete Collection of Huang Zongxi”], vol. 1, (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji Chubanshe, 2005) 101.

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or other groups, it is more of a kind of social ethics: ren and yi are kinds of duty which concretely manifest themselves in the form of xiao 孝 (“filial piety”), duty toward one’s brothers, and compassion. According to Huang Zongxi, once an individual becomes a member of a family he should assume the responsibility and duty stipulated by this network of ethical relationships, namely, to fulfill one’s obligations which take the form of filial piety, compassion, etc. Huang Zongxi’s perspective represents the universal Confucian perspective. In fact, looking at the theoretical sources, Huang Zongxi’s idea mentioned above can be viewed as an explanation of Liu Zongzhou’s 刘宗周 (d.  1645) thought. The filial piety and fraternal duty emphasized by Confucians is representative of their taking human relations as the root, and the duty assumed by the family member is representative of taking the ethical relationships between members as the foundation. To put it simply, human relations are a type of actual relationship, and this kind of relationship stipulates what different i­ ndividuals’ roles ought to be: if you are engaged in some sort of human relation, you should assume the duties and responsibilities stipulated by this relationship. As shown, the rules and duties of morality are not some sort of transcendent or abstract formulation, but are ultimately derived from human relationships. The “moral duty” which professor Wang Qingjie mentions is in fact equally based in human relationships. This duty itself, stipulated through human relations, is also a result of historical decisions: in the process of historical evolution, the requirements for how one ought to act (for example, a father should be kind, children should be filial, etc.) gradually achieves social validation, and this validation needs to be interconnected with the development of social history itself. It is only when the members of society comply with these norms and rules that family relationships become stable, and human existence and social order are assured. What is reflected here is not the desire of some individual, but rather the historical requirement for social existence and development, and this requirement in some sense is expressed as historical choices. After a long period of evolution, followed by their summary and promotion by later philosophers and thinkers, these choices took on the form of a canonical system. It is not difficult to notice that if one traces these norms within the moral domain back to their origins, one should return back to history itself, return back to actual human social relationships, and this is my general understanding regarding the foundation of norms within this domain. In addition to this, professor Wang Qingjie also believes that “a moral ‘ought’ is primarily a ‘demonstrative’ ought rather than a ‘prescriptive ought.’” My perspective regarding this is that it is not proper to separate “demonstrative oughts” from “prescriptive oughts.” In fact, within actual moral practice, the two appear as mutually interactive. “Demonstrative oughts” inherently include

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prescriptive elements, and “prescriptive oughts” within concrete behavior appear with demonstrative significance. “Demonstration” always appears through the specific personal character, and after “demonstrative” and “prescriptive” is the relationship between personal character and prescriptions. Generally speaking, prescriptions both reflect the social needs of a historical period and permeate into its common moral ideal. This kind of ideal takes the reality of social existence as its foundation and also obtains its concrete form out of the various ideal personal character types with “demonstrative” significance. The demonstrative significance of the ideal personal character does not completely overstake prescriptions. Looking at it historically, every period of social development has often existed with the behavioral prescriptions suitable to that period’s social situation. These prescriptions do not necessarily take on a systematic or self-aware form initially, but within a specific time period act as a conditioning element which influences people’s behavior and takes on a prescriptive or quasi-prescriptive function. While it is true that the ideal personal character provides a concrete form for its prescriptive function, it is also influenced by the value principles from the time period in which they exist and reflects these value concepts and prescriptions. Behind the ideal personal character, one can always see a specific historical period’s value orientation and corresponding prescriptive, and furthermore, the personal character’s “demonstrative” function itself is preconditioned on a particular value. It is here that the personal character in the demonstrative sense and a particular prescriptive function cannot be clearly distinguished from one another. To put it briefly, personal character with demonstrative significance as a prescriptive function provides a real and actual form, and these prescriptions come from the orientation of society’s values and other areas that condition the demonstrative significance of personal character, and in the historical unfolding of moral practice, these two are presented as mutually conditioning. IV In regard to epistemological questions, my book A Treatise on Dao dealt with the question of “objectivity,” to which professor Chen Jiaming 陈嘉明16 16  Refer to Chen Jiaming 陈嘉明, “Daolun de Xushi Fangshi ji ‘Keguanxing’ Wenti 道论的 叙事方式及 “客观性” 问题 [Problems of Modes of Narrative and ‘Objectivity’ in the Daolun].” This was originally from a paper presented during the ‘Philosophic Analysis’ session at the academic seminar entitled “History and Thought: The Horizon of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy.” It was later included in Concrete Metaphysics

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responded with suspicion. Here we will discuss two major points surrounding “objectivity.” The first point is about an understanding of objectivity itself. Modern epistemology often criticizes the idea of objectivity very much while recognizing very little. From my perspective, however, it is impossible to avoid the idea of objectivity while discussing epistemological questions. We can understand objectivity in at least three different ways. The first is in the sense of the foundation and origin of knowledge. We can connect what Kant refers to as the “thing-in-itself” to understand this level of objectivity. As we know, Kant distinguished between phenomena and the “thing-in-itself,” and although he never specifically discussed whether or not the “thing-in-itself” had objectivity, he did affirm that in addition to a priori conditions such as space and time as forms of intuition and categories of pure reason, the formation of knowledge also requires experiential content, and this content is not subjective, but instead takes the thing-in-itself as its external source. Going further, we can also take the following perspective to understanding objectivity within the field of epistemology: if we accept that knowledge has experiential content, and this experience is different from purely subjective consciousness or a subjective construct, then we simultaneously must also accept that knowledge has an objective source and objective foundation. In fact, as opposed to subjective fantasy or subjective fabrications, experience always has an objective source or objective basis. There is no doubt that the method of the function of this objective basis (how it functions with people) can be further discussed, but it seems that we must first affirm that experiential content has an objective basis. The second way we can understand objectivity is that it has a limiting significance, which can be seen as its negative significance. The use of the person’s subjective capacity as well as the various inter-subjective discussions all have the possibility of creating a kind of subjective “overstepping of the bounds,” and objectivity in this sense expresses a limitation to the possibility of this kind of overstep. People’s imaginations and suppositions can of course be freely carried out, but it doesn’t matter how much one considers or imagines a “heavenly horse riding across the skies,” there are limitations. If it is said that rules of formal logic such as the law of identity or the law of contradiction mainly provide limits to the use of the person’s capability for knowledge on a formal level (that significant thought activity is not able to breach the rules of formal logic), then principles of objectivity provide similar limits to the use of the person’s capability for knowledge on an even more substantial level (free thought, creative imagination, etc. cannot surpass the most basic limits of the requirements Thought and Debate: A Collection of Philosophic Discussions with Yang Guorong. The words used by professor Chen Jiaming are not sourced in this text.

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for objectivity). Here, objectivity in its substantial sense lies in restricting and avoiding arbitrary structures. The third way to understand objectivity is through its guiding function. It is impossible for people to reach the limits of knowledge of the world, and in the same sense, it may be impossible for people to reach complete objectivity. But objectivity can still act as a kind of goal; guiding and influencing the development and exercise of knowledge, and in this sense, giving it a guiding function. This guiding function is also similar to the function of Kant’s “thing-in-itself” within the process of knowledge. In summary, regarding objectivity, aside from its specific method and mechanics of use, we can affirm objectivity in at least the above three ways. The second major point touches upon the question of inter-subjectivity. As Professor Chen Jiaming emphasized, regarding objectivity, we can only speak in the sense of inter-subjective unanimity or agreement and cannot transcend this scope. The problem here lies in that inter-subjective unanimity equally requires a foundation or basis. This basis involves at least two levels, that is, dangran 当然 (“what should be the case”) and shiran 实然 (“what is the case” or “the way things are”). “What should be the case” involves general standards, rules, and procedures. When involved in an inter-subjective discussion, the different subjects need to comply with fundamental standards, rules, and procedures, and if these formal requirements are not fulfilled it will be difficult to achieve inter-subjective unanimity. At the same time, inter-subjective unanimity and agreement is not merely empty formal reasoning, but instead also has substantial content, and this substantial content is related to the external facts of “the way things are.” This connection with “the way things are” includes referring to facts of experience. Under circumstances which involve experiential content and when both members of the debate reach a stalemate, it is often the case that external facts must form the basis of judgment, and in this sense inter-subjective unanimity clearly cannot be completely separated from “the way things are.” If we merely limit ourselves to what is within the scope inter-subjectivity and do not move outside of inter-subjective relationships, we can achieve no more than a public character. Public character is different from universal validity: public character does indeed push us beyond the world of individual thought, and providing the individual with a public form of knowledge allows for communication and mutual criticism within a community, but it is unable to guarantee the universality, validity, or truth of knowledge. Subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and objectivity are all necessary elements to the actual unfolding of the process of knowledge. How these three aspects specifically affect and interact with one another requires more research, but speaking on principle, objectivity, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity all have their place

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in the actual process of knowledge, and if we merely attach ourselves to one aspect it will become difficult to arrive at true knowledge. V Metaphysics not only implies things on the ontological level, but can also contribute to an epistemological investigation, and this is an area which “concrete metaphysics” touches upon. In the article A View of “Concrete Metaphysics”: A New Development of the Line of Thought from Jin Yuelin and Feng Qi17 Professor Yu Zhenhua 郁振华 poses many questions with theoretical significance from a cognitive method of metaphysics, metaphysics in the sense of a general process of knowledge, questions regarding truth and falsity of knowledge within the field of metaphysics, and others. These questions deserve a deeper investigation, and here I will first provide some overall thoughts as a preliminary response. Yu Zhenhua’s first questions were proposed as follows: [concrete metaphysics] has seeking wisdom as its goal and demands grasping existence in its entirety, but what kind of cognitive capability does this require? What difference is there between this kind of capability and the cognitive capabilities required to grasp certain concrete forms, aspects, processes, and arrangements of existence? These are relatively complicated questions which involve many different aspects. Using related ideas, we might be able to investigate further from the several aspects below. In general, “grasping the entirety of existence” touches upon metaphysical knowledge, “grasping certain concrete forms, aspects, processes, and arrangements of existence” refers to experiential knowledge, and both include the broad sense of the process of knowledge. As such, these two elements need to utilize the capabilities of perception, experience, reason, intuition, imagination, insight, judgment, etc. However, according to Kant and Hegel’s thought, the person’s abilities can also be distinguished according to the realms of sensibility, understanding, and reason. If we use this as our perspective, then 17  This was originally from Concrete Metaphysics Thought and Debate: A Collection of Philosophic Discussions with Yang Guorong. The words used by professor Yu Zhenhua are not sourced in this text.

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“grasping certain concrete forms, aspects, processes, and arrangements of existence” primarily involves sensibility and understanding, whereas “grasping the entirety of existence” refers more to reason. In terms of the capability and method of cognition, the distinction between understanding and reason is especially important. This type of understanding refers to a specific object, and related to this, within one aspect of grasping a specific object it uses concepts to integrate the complexity of the sensibilities, and within another aspect it primarily restricts them within a specific boundary by using a delimiting method to grasp the object, with this latter being similar to experiential knowledge. In relation to this, reason takes the limits beyond understanding and arrives at the unification of existence as its internal character. Kant distinguished understanding and reason, writing “understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the unity of the rules of understanding under principles.” This unity of reason “is quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding.”18 Concepts of pure understanding are categories, and the concepts of pure reason are ideas. To put it briefly, understanding provides a unity of the various types of intuition through concepts or categories (concepts of pure understanding), and reason unites the understanding, which is limited within a particular boundary through concepts which provide direction. In this sense, we can understand the feature of reason as that which steps over the boundaries of understanding, and from the perspective of method and ability of knowing the world, “grasping the entirety of existence” more so expresses the use of the faculty of reason in this sense. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, the above use of the faculty of reason can be expressed as “taking the dao perspective,” while the understanding would be similar to “taking the tool perspective” or “taking the skill perspective.” “Tool” and “skill” have their limits, thus “taking the tool perspective” or “taking the skill perspective” is often limited within a particular boundary; “dao” surpasses these bounds, and “taking the dao perspective” implies going from limitations toward integrations and unity. “Grasping the entirety of existence” implies understanding existence in a metaphysical method, which is interrelated with a speculative method. When taking the entirety of existence as its object, philosophy is unable to separate itself from speculation. The speculation here is expressed by using a synthetic method to illuminate and clarify existence, and it contains the opening up of its object and permeation into the subject’s understanding and ability to 18  Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 303.

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elucidate; it involves “what is the case,” necessity, and “what should be the case.” In other words, philosophical speculation not only takes the formal recreation of stepping over boundaries as the entirety of the world, but also permeates the person’s existing ideal, including concepts such as how the world should be. Speculation in its broad sense can have two forms: abstract speculation and concrete speculation. Abstract speculation is often divorced from the natural world and only engages in transcendent thought in the realm of metaphysics. Conversely, concrete speculation holds the interaction of the natural world and metaphysics as its precondition, and that the functioning of this relationship is the pursuit of the unity of being. This includes the transformation and expansion of horizons, or, as Zhang Zai refers to it, “broadening one’s heart-mind” (da qi xin 大其心). The rational intuition, dialectical synthesis, and moral selfproof which were discussed by Mr. Feng Qi can be seen as a more concrete form of speculation in this sense. Philosophy needs speculative thought, and the questions surrounding human nature and the dao of heaven or grasping the entirety of existence cannot be separated from concrete speculation. Analytic philosophy has generally rejected speculation, and thus is unable to grasp concrete existence, often leading it to a philosophical impoverishment. The second question posed by Yu Zhenhua is: “compared with commonsense propositions, scientific propositions, and logical propositions, in what sense do metaphysical propositions help to understand the universe and life?” In my book, The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: A Contemporary Chinese Philosophy of the Meaning of Being, I touch upon this question, and here I will restate some of it. The distinctions between common sense propositions, scientific propositions, and propositions of logic indicate that their relationships with the specific objects or forms of the realm of experience are different, and metaphysical assertions do not refer to specific fields or objects of existence, but rather to existence itself or the world as an entirety. Regarding the world itself, it makes tools and things appear as well-defined forms and also acts as concrete existence which contains internal unity, or what is referred to in the Laozi 老子 (“Book of Master Lao”) as “when all things flourish, each returns to its root” ( fu wu yunyun, ge gui qi gen 夫物芸芸, 各归其根).19 Common sense and scientific propositions approach the world more so as tools and things, and this approach is no doubt necessary to deeply understand the world, but the original form of the world doesn’t just exist as separate appearances. Using the method of “division” and “separation” to grasp the world is embodied as that of the person being under a specific set of conditions, but 19   Laozi 16.

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the real world itself is not limited to the form of “being divided into classes and categories” ( fenmen beilei 分门别类). Metaphysical assertions imply the connection of a world divided by different things and tools, and as a result, understanding of the world begins to step across boundaries and move toward a more concrete form. If it can be said that, within the realm of knowledge, the intersection of branches of learning promote an understanding of the actual world through experience, then metaphysical assertions promote grasping the actual world on a metaphysical level through the transcendence of “division into classes and categories.” Modes of existence simultaneously involve how the world exists. When discussing the relationship between the ten thousand things, the Zhongyong 中庸 (“Focusing the Familiar” or “Doctrine of the Mean”) mentions that “the ten thousand things nourish each other without harming one another, the course runs together without conflicting.” The ten thousand things under heaven, while different from one another, exist together, thus are compatible and construct a form of mutual existence without friction. Under the form of what is referred to as the “order of heaven” (tianxu 天序 or tianzhi 天秩) in Chinese philosophy, the being of the ten thousand things overcomes confusion and hysteria (wang 妄) and obtains an intelligible character. This faith in the order of metaphysics breaks through to the horizon of world experience and also creates the internal preconditions for the object of understanding through common sense and science. Regarding the relationship between scientific research and the law of causation, confirmation of causal relationships serves as the starting point for scientific knowledge. Whether causal relationships are affirmed by way of a priori concepts (Kant) or the law of cause and effect are accepted through the person’s practical activity, the confirmation of the universality of causal relationships is necessary in order for the possibility of scientific knowledge. Hume however called the idea of causal relationships into question, thus endangering the foundation of scientific knowledge. Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (d. 1984) points this out in particular when he argues “Hume’s comments made me feel that induction was illogical, cause and effect was unreliable, and the foundations of scientific theory were unstable.”20 The proposition that there is nothing without a cause (the universality of the order of cause and effect) has a metaphysical connotation, while simultaneously constituting a metaphysical basis for exploring the cause and effect relationship of different things. In fact, within common sense and scientific propositions, there are always different forms which involve metaphysical propositions. Broadly speaking, even if one uses logic to grasp the world, it is very difficult 20  Jin Yuelin 金岳霖, Lundao 《论道》 [On Dao] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1987), 4.

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to separate oneself from metaphysical ideas. In Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World, for example, although his goal was “that all of metaphysics [be] banished from philosophy,”21 the idea of “the world” and the “structure” of the world permeates into some kind of metaphysical idea. Looking at it from the above perspective, metaphysical statements not only directly reveal an understanding of the world by using different distinctions and delimitations, but also participate in the understanding of the world by permeating common sense, scientific, as well as logical propositions. Equally, value oriented metaphysical ideas also guide and promote significance for people in their lives, life ideals, and other knowledge within this domain. In regard to the idea of jingjie 境界 (“state of mind,” “spiritual state,” “realm”) which Chinese philosophy emphasizes as a concept that contains metaphysical connotations, jingjie both contains an understanding of being, as well as concentrates the person’s value placed on his own being and serves as a receptacle for the person’s ideal for living here. The investigation of the hereness of the world is interconnected with the being of the person himself, and jingjie expresses a kind of spiritual grasp of the world and the person himself. This grasp unfolds according to the form of rational realization and the method of the spirit in practice. Within the process of seeking truth, turning toward goodness, and tending toward the beautiful, jingjie reveals the picture of the world that the person has arrived at and understands and internally influences and deepens the significance of life for the person, that person’s understanding, and pursuit of his ideal way of being. As can be seen, jingjie, containing metaphysical ideas, both permeates into the person’s understanding of life’s significance and conditions issues such as the value the person has toward being. From one perspective, it reflects the function of metaphysical statements in grasping aspects of cosmic life. Regarding Yu Zhenhua’s third question, his summary is as follows: If we affirm that metaphysical statements have cognitive significance, then it must be stated that metaphysical propositions have the possibility for truth or falsity. Since metaphysical statements are different from analytic and synthetic propositions, then in what sense do metaphysical statements have the possibility for truth or falsity? What does the truth of metaphysical statements mean? What does the falsity of metaphysical statements mean?

21  Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudo Problems in Philosophy, Translated by Rolf A. George, (London: Routledge & Paul, 1968).

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One of the fundamental characteristics of propositional knowledge is its inclusion of true or false content. If metaphysical statements are understood as propositions, then these propositions can no doubt be judged from the level of truth or falsity. From a general perspective, using a metaphysical method to grasp the world equally involves questions of truth and falsity. Of course the truth and falsity of metaphysical statements is different from the truth and falsity of synthetic propositions (experiential knowledge) and analytic propositions (including logical propositions). Synthetic propositions involve specific objects and its truth or falsity depends on its corresponding object. The truth or falsity of analytic propositions depends on whether or not they contain any logical contradictions. Metaphysical statements take grasping the world as its direction, and their truth or falsity corresponds to whether or not they truly grasp the world on this level. It is not difficult to see this in traditional metaphysics. Plato’s theory of forms, for example, (in which the world is dualistic, and forms are the only truly existing things, and the world of experience is merely a copy of the forms) is a metaphysical claim that clearly cannot be considered a true grasp of the world. Likewise under the precondition of affirming the reality of the world, the unity of substance and function and the identification with the inseparability of being and its foundation expresses a more truthful understanding of the world. Here, the metaphysical statements characterized by a grasp of the world in its entirety equally present a difference between true and false. Of course, the method of judgment of the truth and falsity of metaphysical statements and experiential knowledge is different. Synthetic propositions on a experiential level can be validated through specific experiential facts, whereas metaphysical statements as a grasp of the world in its entirety have no way of being validated merely through specific experiential facts. However, they can be tested through the life of the humanity as a whole and historical practice. Here we should pay particular attention to the life of humanity as a whole and the unfolding of history in understanding and judging the meaning within metaphysical ideas. On its broadest level, the metaphysical idea that the world is real and not illusory has been continuously confirmed by the practice of human life from ancient times until today. Although philosophers can question this, once they return to actual existence, the fireworks of the human world will remind them that they are certainly not living in an illusion. This is, of course, similar to the proof G.E. Moore gave for common sense, but common sense originally is derived from life itself. This kind of proof of collective life based on evolution of the human era is a type which is different from both logical argument and various proofs from experience. To go further, science and common sense (synthetic propositions in a broad sense) themselves are

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laden with metaphysical ideas on different levels, and when they are proven correct by empirical facts, this confirmation also tests the metaphysical knowledge permeated within them. Looking at this more concretely, content with many different aspects is often integrated into metaphysical statements, and truth or falsity contains different connotations when related to this. In traditional metaphysics, there are thoughts on existence that contain some areas including science, for example, regarding the explanation of what ultimately constitute all things. And these different metaphysical theories include: all things are constituted by water, fire is the source of all things, or the principle of all things is the atom. Based on its nature, theories on the composition of things originally belonged to the discourse of science (such as physics), and in this sense, metaphysical statements like the one above can be seen as expanding into the discourse of science or “overstepping” the bounds of science. Other positions on existential metaphysics, such as the complete or absolute spirit, involve abstract speculation. The truth or falsity of the above two metaphysical statements have different connotations: the truth or falsity of the first position (about the constitution of things) substantially involves scientific propositions, while the truth or falsity of the second position is different from a scientific proposition because it concerns an understanding of the world as an entirety. Judging the truth or falsity of the former position must often draw on assistance from the empirical sciences, such as drawing on modern physics to test elementary particles, and in one respect, to empirically explain the constitution of things simultaneously provides a basis to judge traditional metaphysical statements on the formation of “the ten thousand things.” Judging the truth or falsity of the latter, as mentioned previously, must be based on the historical unfolding of the life of humanity as a whole and the many aspects of practical activity. Empiricism believes that metaphysical statements cannot be proven or falsified. Its precondition is to limit evidence primarily to what is within experience, and if it is pulled into the life of humanity as a whole, it goes beyond these limits. What is referred to as the life of humanity as a whole is related to the historical process and also involves the multifaceted living practice. The primary thing corresponding to speculative totality is not individual experience, but rather it is the totality of living practice because its truth and falsity can also only be continuously shown within the historical unfolding of the life of humanity as whole.

Chapter 9

Chinese Philosophy as Philosophy Attempts to understand Chinese philosophy as philosophy have a unique ­history.1 It can be investigated in the context of Western philosophy or from the perspective of Chinese philosophy itself. Mainstream Western philosophy, beginning with Hegel, does not properly situate Chinese philosophy. In Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel mentions Chinese philosophy but does not incorporate it into his definition of what counts as philosophy. In his view, Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE) is “China’s major philosopher,” but his thought is merely common-sense ethics: “In his thought, there is no analytic philosophy at all.” Although, says Hegel, the Yijing 易经 (“Book of Changes”) involves abstract ideas, it is not profound, it arrests at thinking of the most superficial.2 After Hegel, it seems that the mainstream Western philosophical understanding of Chinese philosophy continued as before. For major Western philosophers, Chinese philosophy never appeared on the horizon. One notices this in the courses offered in the philosophy departments of famous Western universities today: the most prestigious universities in Europe and North America, including Harvard, Oxford, Princeton, Cambridge and more, do not have Chinese philosophy as part of their curriculum. In these universities Chinese philosophy can be found only in departments such as East Asia, Religious Studies, History, and others that are not philosophy. This phenomenon again suggests that, in comparison to its Western counterpart, Chinese philosophy is not considered philosophy in the genuine sense. On the other hand, once philosophy had taken the form of an academic discipline in modern China, it inspired a number of different arguments about how to understand it. The question “Is Chinese philosophy a philosophy?” has become a source of controversy. Here we ought to mention the phrase “Explain China through China.” The original meaning of this direction is to explain Chinese learning through Chinese scholarship. According to this view, when one employs the concept of philosophy to explain Chinese thought, one is already approaching the subject through a Western framework. Such 1  This article was originally presented as a lecture in March 2013. It was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University. 2  See, Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures on the History of Philosophy. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simon (trans.) (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, & co., ltd., 1892).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_010

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an argument is based on the premise that philosophy is distinctly Western, and that therefore using the concept and term to analyze Chinese thought will cause the loss of the original form and meaning of the subject. In the rather extreme discourse of explaining China through China, we find a certain tendency: first to reconstruct philosophy as the history of philosophy; then to reconstruct the history of philosophy as intellectual history, and finally to reconstruct intellectual history as academic history. Contained in this pattern of reconstruction is the question of whether Chinese philosophy can be a modern academic discipline. These competing contexts create an unavoidable problem for basic efforts to understand Chinese philosophy. I A concrete solution to the questions offered above would be a solution to our understanding of philosophy itself. The two questions “Is Chinese philosophy a philosophy?” and “What is philosophy?” are closely related. Before Chinese philosophy can be thought of as philosophy, we must first approach the question “What is philosophy?” Roughly speaking, philosophy cannot be defined by its manifestation in a specific tradition or form but according to its underlying formulation and universal characteristics. At its base, as a form for conceptualizing the world, the principle formulation of philosophy is apparent in the questioning of knowledge or in the reflection of wisdom. This definition can be found not only in the etymology of the word and its related wisdom but in a more substantial sense has its origins in the facts below: precisely by its means of closely questioning knowledge or reflecting on wisdom, philosophy separates itself from other forms of conceptualizing the world. Wisdom in this sense becomes that which connotes the essence of philosophy; it regards knowledge above all else. As is well known, the characteristics of knowledge are categorized according to the different ways in which we perceive the world, the most representative model being science. Science requires the separation of knowledge into different branches. Indeed in today’s China, the Chinese word kexue 科学 (“science”) or fenke zhi xue 分科之学 (“separating knowledge into branches”) has been translated into “science.” This demonstrates the special characteristics of science. The separating into branches of knowledge signifies conceptualizing the world by categorization. If we examine the specific branches of science, it becomes clear that each is a specific field of vision or point of view taken to one aspect of the world. The field of natural sciences includes physics, chemistry, biology, geography, geology, etc. Each of these categories emphasizes a specific dimension

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through which to understand an object in question. The field of social sciences includes sociology, politics, economics, law, etc., and is mainly used to understand objects brought into question by those fields. Regardless of whether we are referring to the natural sciences or the social sciences, the field and object of research will always have distinct boundaries. This phenomenon makes it clear that at the level of knowledge, understanding the world is done by separation, using methods of demarcation. However, before knowledge of the world was observed separately according to these different categories, the world existed as a unified and whole form. Concrete reality is a whole entity and a unified existence. Regarding this fundamental fact, the desire to grasp the world itself using concrete facts cannot be satisfied using only the form of knowledge. Instead of observing and studying by this mode of separation, we need instead to step over the boundary of knowledge and approach this question at the level of an integral unity. The fundamental difference between wisdom and knowledge is that, in attempting to grasp the world, wisdom steps over the model of boundaries. In this light, wisdom stands in contrast to the way of understanding the world through categories. In concrete terms, wisdom develops in two directions: understanding the world and understanding humanity. Regarding the first direction, we can garner something from Kant’s reflections. In his philosophy, Kant differentiates between distinct forms of understanding existence, including perception, knowledge, and reason. He says that reason has specific connotations; in principle, the goal of research is the manifestation of ideas, which include the spirit, the world, and god. Among these, the world is understood as a comprehensively unified phenomenon. For Kant, the comprehensively unified phenomenon constitutes the world.3 The world as an idea of form is in the first place a unified whole. This understanding of the world is different from approaching phenomena through the lens of perception and knowledge. In this sense, the ways of understanding the world that Kant spoke of, such as reason and wisdom, are part of a single sequence, and can be viewed as metaphysical wisdom. Indeed, understanding the world from a philosophical perspective involves comprehending it as a single entity and a unified form. The latter necessitates adherence to what is called the principle of unity. In their concrete manifestations, theories of development allow us to understand the world through wisdom.

3  Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 323.

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Nietzsche also addresses the question above. In Beyond Good and Evil, he criticizes philosophers whose works are limited to specific fields, maintaining that these types of philosophers “restrict themselves, furthermore specializing in a certain field, thereby no longer achieving the high degree they should possess, no longer possess a vision that transcends limits, they no longer survey all around, and no longer conceive everything.”4 To “specialize” requires the knowledge of the branches of learning; a “vision transcending limits” is the natural form of philosophy. Here we can see that the innate features of comprehending the world through philosophy lie in such a vision, and that to specialize signifies a divergence from the natural form of philosophy. The process of understanding human beings involves a similar set of characteristics. Regarding human existence, there are many different angles of observation and study. Human beings can be understood as biological objects. According to this framework human existence is first and foremost biological, a perspective that entirely restricts our knowledge of humans to the concrete domain of biology. A consideration of human beings’ social characteristics places them in the context of society, where they become the objects of sociology, politics, and other specific disciplines. Human psychology and consciousness present yet another framework for understanding human existence. Each of the above frameworks belong to the pursuit of knowledge. Biology, sociology, political studies, psychology, etc., each have their own fixed objects and boundaries. In contrast, the characteristics of wisdom are found in transcending the divided and researched knowledge of such disciplines. Examining human existence as a unified mutually-related and multi-sided formulation gives us a concrete understanding of human beings. On an intrinsic level, human beings do not only have conscious attributes in a general sense, but moreover contain a spiritual world connected to rationality, emotions, willpower, imagination, intuition, and other mental attributes. Wisdom, linked with spiritual phenomena, does not only manifest itself in the psychological process of understanding, but permeates the essential properties of values, and is moreover embodied in the pursuit of truth, good, and beauty. In order to understand the spiritual world in its relationship to wisdom one must first understand the inherent integration of human comprehension with truth, good, and beauty, as unrestricted by any unilateral mental rule. Beyond any set of rules, the spiritual world can be understood from a more significant 4  Nietzsche, Fredrich, Beyond Good and Evil, translated by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, 1966), 121.

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perspective. In concrete terms, it is possible to observe and study the spiritual world from the perspective of human consciousness and intrinsic abilities. The essential characteristic of consciousness is reflected in two forms: idealistic consciousness and task consciousness. The essence of the idealistic consciousness is demonstrated by the question “What should I pursue?” while task consciousness is demonstrated by question “What should I undertake?” In this sense, consciousness emerges as an innate moral integrity in the human mode of conduct. Along with this innate moral integrity comes the human ability to actualize. This ability may be understood as the intrinsic power to change oneself and the world though personal conduct. At the spiritual level, the true form of the human being is embodied in the integration of consciousness (moral integrity) with these innate abilities. True personality or the freedom of personality expresses itself in this blend of moral integrity and ability. This understanding of the world and human beings differs from that of knowledge, which grasps specific objects and organizes them into categories. Philosophy serves as a platform from which to closely question people’s understanding of the world in terms of its origins or roots. Science seeks truth; philosophy goes a step beyond and questions truth itself. Art seeks beauty; philosophy goes a step beyond and asks what beauty is. Ethics seeks good; philosophy goes a step beyond and asks what is good. This sort of questioning done by philosophy inquires into and reflects on the origin of these concepts. In its attempts to explain the world, knowledge (including science) depends on how it grasps the object; its regulations and rules. Wisdom (philosophy), on the other hand, goes a step further and asks whether this process of grasping objects is possible, and how it could be possible. Regarding the function of human beings in the world, knowledge mainly considers the question “What is it?” while philosophy poses value questions such as “What does it signify?” (or “What is its significance?”) “What should it become?” and so on. To summarize, by grasping existence through wisdom, it is possible to understand general theories and ideas of the origin of the cosmos and human life. This is specific to the understanding of the existence of the world and of people. This questioning and understanding both constitutes the concrete contents of wise thought, and reveals the innate substantive characteristics of philosophy. Philosophy manifests itself in the employment of ideas. One of the most important characteristics of philosophy is its use of ideas to investigate or contemplate wisdom.

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On a more substantive level, the distinction between wisdom and knowledge reveals the difference between philosophy and the intrinsic rules of science. According to this view, the fundamental characteristics of philosophy are transcending the limits of knowledge and attempting to comprehend the world through wisdom. Of course, this is not to say that there is no connection between philosophy and science. Just like wisdom and knowledge, philosophy and science cannot be completely separated. However, unlike any attempt to grasp the world through knowledge, philosophy is indeed distinct from science. Philosophy comprehends the world through ideas, and in this aspect is also different from art. As is well known, art generally comprehends the world through images. This is demonstrated in the dividing line between the distinct realms of image thinking and logical thinking. The practice of philosophy demands one draw support from imagination and various other means, however the dominant aspect of philosophy lies in grasping the world by the means of theoretical thinking. To do this one must put ideas to use and implement them. Historically speaking, the degree of creativity and distinctiveness in philosophical thought has always been reflected by the core ideas of philosophers. In the history of Western philosophy, Plato’s philosophy has always been associated with his idea of the ideal. Before him, the philosophy of the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides emphasized existence and other closely related concepts. Chinese philosophy reflects this same characteristic. Kongzi’s system of thought cannot be separated from the concept of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”). This is demonstrated by the saying: “Kongzi values humaneness.” In contrast to Kongzi, the core of Laozi’s 老子 (dates unknown) philosophy is made up of dao 道 (“way” “method” “principle”), ziran 自然 (“self-so”) and other concepts. Another famous school in pre-Qin times is Mohism, which takes jian’ai 兼爱 (“universal love”)5 as one of its core concepts, as explained in the saying: “Mozi values universalism.” The unique and creative contents of philosophical systems, whether Chinese or Western, always take core concepts as concrete vehicles to convey their ideas. The process of applying concepts manifests itself in two phases. One is the generation or composition of concepts, the other is their analysis. The generation or composition of concepts creates new ideas or bestows existing ideas with new contents. The former is “new wine in new bottles,” the latter is “new wine in old bottles.” 5  Lü Shi Chun Qiu 呂氏春秋, 99.1.

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When philosophers construct a new philosophical system, they either put forward new concepts or give new contents to existing concepts. This process manifests itself as the creation or composition of new ideas. In addition to generating ideas, the second important aspect of applying new concepts is their analysis. The generation of ideas first involves the formulation of new concepts, or the extension of the meaning and exposition of existing concepts. The analysis of concepts is a logical examination of accomplished ideas, of their definition and their contents. From a negative perspective, the analysis of concepts also includes the question of their existence. A study of critical bias is also involved. In this study the task is to show ambiguity, or even inappropriate or mistaken meanings certain concepts may contain. This emerges concretely in contemporary analytical philosophy. The study of philosophy and thought cannot be separated from the use of concepts. At the level of form, the practice of philosophy and its manifestations use concepts. This includes the construction of concepts, the generation of new ideas, and likewise the analysis of accomplished concepts. This is demonstrated in the way past philosophers understood philosophy. Speaking about the characteristics of philosophy, Kant pointed out that “philosophy restricts itself to universal concepts,” and “always considers the universal in the abstract sense of concepts.”6 The universal involves the unification of existence, such as the universal concept of the world which reflects the unification of all phenomena. In Kant’s view, we grasp the unity of existence through concepts we consider universal. Kant also maintains “at least in its intentions, metaphysics entirely follows the composition of a-priori synthetic propositions.” Kant continues in an even more universal sense and links philosophy to these a-priori synthetic propositions.7 “A-priori” signifies the necessity of universality, and “synthetic” indicates the new content that knowledge contains. Philosophy is an a-priori synthetic proposition. “A-priori” emphasizes rules at the level of form and is connected to logical analysis. “Synthesis” refers to the generation and suggestion of new concepts, which relates to the composition of ideas. In this sense, “a-priori synthesis” refers both to the analysis of concepts for the preservation of forms and, at the level of content, to the composition of concepts. When Kant understood philosophy as an a-priori synthesis proposition, an a-priori synthetic judgment, he also affirmed the practice of philosophy as the analysis of concepts, which relates to their structure. 6  Kant, 1998, 578; 590. 7  Ibid., 578; 55; 591.

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Broadly speaking, the implication of concepts is demonstrated in the process of judgment and inference. Just as knowledge is established through judgment, philosophical notions are also formed using judgment or propositions. Simple concepts are not always evident in concrete philosophical standpoints; philosophical notions only obtain their concrete emergence during the process of judgment. Merely saying “humaneness,” without expressing a definite philosophical viewpoint, is invalid. Unique philosophical notions are expressed only through forms such as “Humaneness is loving others” or “The gentlemen do not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to humaneness,”8 and other broad judgments. Furthermore, basing philosophical notions on concepts and expressing them through judgment begins a process that is inseparable from inference. Regardless of whether we affirm a notion, question it, or negate it, such a process requires reason, evidence, and proof through argument. At the level of form, fixed judgment as the premise for inference expresses judgment as its conclusion. Judgment involves a link between concepts. In this sense, both judgment and inference manifest themselves as the application of concepts. Philosophy as a practice involving concepts is constantly in the process of applying those concepts, a process directly related to their composition and analysis. Different philosophers and schools of philosophy emphasize one or the other of these two parts of the practice. Some philosophers or schools stress their composition, while others emphasize their analysis. Modern philosophy demonstrates this well. From a global point of view, the main line of thinking in philosophy since the beginning of the twentieth century is found in phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Phenomenology raises a series of concepts, for example intentionality (which Husserl, although he did not originally develop it, bestowed with new meaning), pure consciousness, pure ego, eidetic intuition, categorical intuition, transcendental reductionism, etc. While giving prominence to the composition of concepts, phenomenology does not pay equal attention to their analysis. In this way, the philosophical system emerges as speculative and obscure. Works on phenomenology are often hard to grasp and difficult to understand. The composition of concepts is stressed, and their analysis neglected. Another major school that emerged during twentieth century is analytic philosophy. Unlike phenomenology, it stresses the analysis of concepts rather than their composition. Because of this, the tendencies that distinguish 8  Lunyu 4.5.

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analytic philosophy are the formation of philosophy and its technicalization. Such technicalization often undermines the reflection of wisdom as the essential characteristic of philosophy. Although analytic philosophy presents us with a nuanced analysis of established ideas, it seems that it rarely deepens our understanding of the essential features of the world and human beings. This is connected to its strong emphasis on the analysis of concepts, and its neglect for their composition at the level of substance. Through the orientation of wisdom, philosophical meditation is always condensed into theoretical forms. Philosophy has left us with many classical texts, which we can think of as the crystallization of philosophical wisdom. At the same time, however, genuine philosophy is found in the process of exploration, and through this process one continuously and gradually expands one’s self, revealing one’s own significance. Indeed, a philosophical theory is not only formed through this process of exploration, but the understanding and comprehension of its significance results from this process. In this sense, philosophy is a kind of theory that reveals itself as a kind of activity. As an activity concerning theoretical thought, in principle, philosophical exploration means to refuse to accept or endorse readily available and existing views or opinions. At the level of substance, philosophy requires free and independent thought. Without independent thought, philosophy cannot exist. Philosophy as an activity implies its own inseparability from its history. Philosophy manifests itself in the process of historical development; if we were to depart from the historical process of philosophical evolution, there would be no way to answer the question “What is philosophy?” Seeking to genuinely understand the connotations of philosophy, a dialogue with philosophers is necessary. The process of reflecting on and understanding philosophy is a process of returning to history and holding a dialogue with previous philosophers. This dialogue often takes the form of interpretation; a philosopher’s reflection is the crystallization of his meditation process. By holding a dialogue with a philosopher through the interpretation of his thought, one can gradually reveal and understand his mental journey, thereby experiencing in some way his meditation process. Through this dialogue, we can gradually develop a rather concrete understanding of the question “What is philosophy?” As the pursuit of wisdom, philosophy is also a process of unceasing criticism and reflection. Through the use philosophical thinking, one cannot agree with an established conclusion without subjecting it to a process of criticism. Philosophy can accept without reflection neither existing knowledge, dogma, or points of view. Philosophy reflects on existing propositions, notions, and

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theories through the lens of criticism, and moreover demands a close examination of its own foundations. In short, criticism is a fundamental characteristic of philosophy. One of the philosopher’s missions is to reflect on existing ideas and systems. He then rejects arguments that have not withstood criticism, and opposes prepared conclusions. Regardless of whether the point of view in question belongs to one’s self or to others, it requires both analysis and proof. This process of reflection and criticism is the most important characteristic of philosophical practice. What does the pursuit of wisdom through the employment of concepts involve? Here we can briefly look to some questions posed by Kant. Kant raises four famous questions: “What can I know?” “What should I do?” “What can I aspire towards?” “What does it mean to be human?” The first question involves theoretical reasoning in the field of cognition. Each of us may experience different cognitive processes in everyday life. The examination of mundane experience, along with the kind of examination done by scientists, involves a concrete cognitive activity. The progression from this specific cognitive process, to the evaluation of its possible grounds, to the investigation of the necessary conditions for reaching universal knowledge, is fundamental to philosophical thinking. Is knowledge limited? What can we know? What can we not know? Different forms of epistemology and theories of knowledge often evolve through such questions. The second question Kant raises involves rational practice or the realm of ethics. We can perhaps distinguish here between morality as a social phenomenon and moral philosophy as an ethical doctrine. Ethics manifests itself as a regulatory system; it defines what you should do and what you should not do. Moral philosophy is not satisfied with question of what can be done and what cannot be done. Beyond this it asks: Why should one make this choice and not that choice? What are the bases of the ethical principles that society requires people to follow? What kind of conduct can be viewed as ethical conduct (or, what are the characteristics of rational moral conduct)? How can we establish a universal moral order of society? How can we understand the connection between what we ought to do (accomplished conduct), and what we ought to become (accomplished self)? Seeking answers to these and other questions often leads to different forms of ethics and moral philosophy. The third question Kant raises refers to the ultimate goal or concern of individuals, which is often a religious pursuit. Philosophy, however, is not the same as religion. In religion the ultimate concern generally involves “the other side,” or the afterlife, but philosophy is based

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on human existence. Philosophy uses reason to explore questions including: What is the ultimate concern? How is the ultimate concern unavoidable? This category of question is often connected to the understanding of human beings in themselves. This problem of the ultimate concern is satisfied by the idea of god and unlimited existence. These ideas contain an ultimate guarantee, and the question need no longer be asked. Because of this, animals, for example, have a limited existence in the sense that they are limited by the characteristics of their species and have no method through which to transcend them. In that limited existence, there is no question of the ultimate concern. Human beings, in the same way, are not gods; they have limited existences, and their lives always move towards an end. But, from another perspective, human beings are unlike animals; humans can go beyond themselves, and construct ideals and goals beyond the form of their existence. In other words, human beings have both a finite and infinite existence, and can transcend their limited abilities. The ultimate concern is difficult to separate from the uniqueness of human existence. Therefore, philosophical investigation of the ultimate concern is based on the analysis and understanding of human existence. The fourth question Kant raises is of a more conclusive nature. The preceding three questions inevitably point towards this final problem of what it means to be human. This is not a biological question, nor is it psychological or sociological. It demands instead a generalized understanding of the human being. Such an understanding is closely related to both the multiple relationships human beings have and the historical process of human existence. In this sense, the question of what a human being is leads in the direction of the philosophy of history. The historical process of human existence is also connected to political order. The question of the political relationships between human beings belongs to political philosophy. Therefore, after Kant’s series of questions, historical and political philosophy began to pursue the question of what is human. Hegel and Marx represent different branches of this development. Using the questions raised by Kant, we have roughly examined the specific aspects involved in the practice of philosophy as a method of theoretical thinking that attempts to grasp existence. In general, these aspects concern the question “What is philosophy?” In the broad sense, its contents point towards an explanation and understanding of the world and human beings in and of themselves. The question “What is philosophy?” carries with it the question of how it should be done. This involves philosophy in the practical sense. As previously

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described, philosophy as the reflection of wisdom and a form distinct from knowledge grasps the world and human beings as they are, in and of themselves. The evident problem here is not merely to explain the interaction between human beings and the world, but to affect it. To explain the world and human beings is mainly to pursue the question of what “is,” while an attempt to change them approaches the question of what “should be.” The question of what should be requires a philosophical inquiry into normative issues. In concrete terms, the practical activity of philosophy in the sense of changing or accomplishing the world and the self, raises the question of whether philosophy offers guidance for the interactions between the world and human beings. Philosophy, unlike knowledge, does not merely interpret and explain the world and human beings, but provides this kind of effective guidance. The norms and practical guidance offered by philosophy concern what should be. This unfolds into two ways. The first way is demonstrated by the question “What should we accomplish?” which asks what kind of value goal should be pursued. Philosophy uses value ideals, value goals, and value principles to provide guidance to people’s practical activity. The practical activities of changing the world and human beings are the concrete contents of philosophy. They are based in a specific value principle and ideal: To change the world is to then allow the original world to change according to people’s ideals; To change human beings themselves is to guide them towards an ideal. Both concepts are closely related to universal ideals and value principles. Philosophy provides guidance for practical activity by exploring universal value principles and ideals. Related to the question of what we should accomplish is how we should accomplish it. In other words, how should we attain the form of ideal values? The first question emphasizes the value goals and ideals of practice, the latter mainly concerns how to employ such value ideals. In concrete terms, this question deals with ways and means of action. Philosophy does not merely examine universal values and ideals, but also explores the ways that people act in the world and in themselves: their interactions with the world, etc. More simply, this question asks what to do and how to achieve it. It is related to the question of how to do. This question focuses on the dimension of practical modes and provides guidance for the processes of practice. As it relates to the concept of what should be (normativity), philosophy not only guides human practice according to value goals but regulates the process of practice. In brief, at the level of substance, philosophy manifests itself as the reflection of wisdom. Its characteristics are found in crossing the boundary of knowledge and grasping the world from the dimensions of unity and wholeness. At the level of its form, philosophy appears as the practice of employing ideas,

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which can be interpreted as the concrete realization of theoretical thinking, and which involves the generation or construction of ideas, as well as their analysis and criticism. To summarize, regarding its attempts to grasp the world, the characteristics of philosophy are found both in its employment of concepts and ideas to develop the reflection of wisdom, and in their application to reality. Philosophy does not merely explain the world and human beings, but moreover attempts to change them. In terms of value goals and ideals, together with ways of practice, philosophy provides guidance for the practical process, thus demonstrating its significance in many ways. II We will now begin to observe Chinese philosophy using the above premises. The first question we face is: does Chinese philosophy have the philosophical characteristics and regulations detailed above? As is well known, the word that most closely approximates “philosophy” in Chinese is zhexue 哲学, which appeared in the lexicon only recently. Although the two words zhe 哲 “wisdom,” and xue 学 or “learning,” exist from rather early on in history, the concept of philosophy in the modern academic sense is something that first appeared much later. Philosophy manifests itself as either the pursuit or the reflection of wisdom. Wisdom in this sense is also a modern concept. However, the words zhi 智 (“wisdom,” “knowledge”) and hui 慧 (“intelligent,” “learning”) existed in ancient times, and even their use as a compound word is found in pre-Qin times (in Mengzi 孟子 [“Mencius”] [d. 289 BCE] for example). After the introduction of Buddhism in China, the frequency of their use as a compound word gradually increased. However, wisdom in the philosophical sense is a rather recent notion. Still, although the concept of philosophy is relatively recent, along with the word wisdom that relates to the essential implications of philosophy and other related notions, this does not mean that in traditional Chinese thought there is no theoretical activity or theoretical form for attempting to grasp the world in an intelligent way. Here we must distinguish between specific concepts and substantive ideas. The late emergence of specific concepts (such as philosophy and the related concept of wisdom) does not mean that the essential aspect of thought and reflection is absent from earlier thought. Historically speaking, attempts to grasp the world through the form of wisdom and at the level of substance

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emerged very early in the developmental of Chinese thought. The pursuit or reflection of wisdom is not unique to Western philosophy. Of course, the intimate journey to grasp the world has its unique form in Chinese philosophy, which manifests itself as the question of “human nature and the heavenly dao.” Ancient Chinese did not employ the concepts of philosophy and wisdom, but very early on began questioning human nature and the heavenly dao. At the level of substance, questioning human nature and the heavenly dao is different from exploring at the level of objects or apparatus; its characteristics are to grasp the world in a way that is not limited by specific boundaries. As a concept distinct from the knowledge of objects, human nature and the heavenly dao appears early on: it is found in pre-Qin documents such as the Lunyu 论语 (The Analects of Confucius). Indeed, Kongzi’s disciples used to sigh with emotion: “The master’s discourse on human nature and the heavenly dao, cannot be heard.”9 However, this does not mean that Kongzi did not discuss human nature or the dao, but refers instead to the idea that Kongzi’s discourse on the subject was always connected to human beings’ existence and the world’s “being,” and that he was less disposed to the use of an abstract and dialectical method. From what we see in the Lunyu, Kongzi observed human nature and the heavenly dao from many perspectives, and conducted his observations in distinction from the form of the knowledge of objects and according to a belief in the concrete existence of human beings and the being of the world. Overall, the search for human nature and heavenly dao is a method for grasping the world that differs from concrete knowledge or the knowledge of objects. If we consider the phrase in its separate parts, the “heavenly dao” is associated with the universal principles of the world or the principle of the ultimate, and “nature,” which in the narrow sense refers to human nature, in the broad sense relates to the entire human existence. In its compound form, nature and the heavenly dao is thus a general principle involving the cosmos and human existence. In this sense, nature and the heavenly dao constitutes the reflection of wisdom, which refers to this general principle of the cosmos and human existence. The pursuit of nature and the heavenly dao therefore takes as its substantial contents this same general principle. From pre-Qin times forward, the pursuit of nature and the heavenly dao is inseparable from the development of Chinese philosophy. We should note, however, that the reflection of wisdom throughout Chinese philosophy does 9  Lunyu 5.13.

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not simply take the form of this pursuit. Chinese philosophy has gradually developed a theoretical self-consciousness using a variety methods for grasping the world that are distinct from knowledge. In the Ming dynasty, scholars distinguished between “rhetorical practices” and the “learning of nature and dao.” While rhetoric concerns concrete knowledge (rhetoric and composition), the learning of nature and dao surpasses the realm of knowledge. Towards the end of the Ming dynasty, Gao Panlong 高攀龙 (d. 1626) argued that nature and dao are without boundaries, thus studies are borderless. In this way he connected nature, dao, and academic pursuit, and moreover figured the pursuit of nature and dao (that is, nature and dao as objects of study) as an endless process. Gong Zizhen’s 龚自珍 (d. 1841) understanding of the study of human nature and dao requires attention. A successor to ancient philosophy and at the same time a pioneer of modern Chinese philosophy, Gong Zizhen holds a unique place in the history of Chinese philosophy, and formed a bridge between its earlier and later stages. At the close of classical Chinese philosophy, Gong Zizhen acknowledged with full self-awareness that the study of human nature and dao (the questioning of human nature and the dao) is different from exploration at the level of knowledge. This point is well-argued in his work on subject classifications. Gong Zizhen was a philosopher who lived under the Qing Dynasty. The orientations of academics under the Qing can for the most part be described by the School of Qianjia. While evaluating the thought and works of Ruan Yuan 阮元 (d. 1949), the most important figure of the Qianjia School, Gong Zizhen distinguished between different academic disciplines: philology (including phonology and script), collation, directories, institutions, history, science, the “nine numbers” (including astronomy, calendars, tuning, etc.), the study of texts, the study of historical records, and the study of human nature and dao.10 From Gong Zizhen’s point of view, the study of human nature and dao includes classical learning, the study of li, “principle,” the pursuit of knowledge, and the reflection of aspects that relate to virtue. It is impossible, in the process of learning, to completely eschew the reflection on and questioning of the aspects of human nature and dao. Although sinology is understood mainly to concern the realm of “under the forms” (that is, concrete knowledge

10  Gong Zizhen 龚自珍, Ruan Shangshu nianpu di yi xu 阮尚書年譜第一序 [An Introduction to Ruan’s Chronicles on the Shang Book of Documents] in Gong Zizhen quan ji 龚自 珍全集 [A Full Collection of Gong Zizhen’s Writings] (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 1999), 225–227.

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as opposed to metaphysics), it also involves the question “How do the Han Chinese people talk about human nature and dao?”11 Compared to the study of human nature and dao, the studies of exegesis, collation, institutions and all others are designated as intellectual disciplines concerning knowledge. The study of collation involves the collation and organization of texts. That of exegesis concerns the understanding of texts. The study of institutions and their histories requires the examination of regulations and systems. These “knowledge disciplines” can be considered in the broadest sense as specialized studies or the studies of objects, while the study of human nature and dao is by contrast not restricted to the realm of designated knowledge, and instead questions the objective of human nature and the heavenly dao. Through the study of objects, we grasp the world through the method of distinction. The study of human nature and dao, however, concerns universal principles of the cosmos and human life. The difference between the study of objects and the study of human nature and dao is precisely the difference between knowledge and wisdom. This difference expresses Gong Zizhen’s self-aware understanding of the differences between the two ways of attempting to grasp the world. The study of human nature and dao is intrinsically the same as philosophy, insofar as each pursues the reflection of wisdom. Chinese philosophy does not only comprehend the world by revealing wisdom in the study of human nature and dao, but moreover, because this is way of comprehending the world that is different from the knowledge of objects and specialized skills, forms a self-aware theoretical consciousness. To gain a better understanding of the characteristics of the study of human nature and dao as something different from the study of objects or specializations, we can perhaps briefly trace how Chinese philosophy figures the relationship between dao and skill, and dao and objects. First, we may examine the understanding of the relationship between dao and skill in Chinese philosophy. As a universal principle, dao is distinguished from skill. Beginning in pre-Qin times, Chinese philosophers began to distinguish between the two, and moreover established a complete, self-aware consciousness of this distinction. This point is exemplified in the section on “Cook Ding Carving an Ox” in the Zhuangzi 庄子 (“Book of Master Zhuang”). “Cook Ding Carving an Ox” is a famous parable in the Zhuangzi. Cook Ding is an expert in ox carving, who can carve an ox in the most skillful and perfect manner. While carving an ox, Cook Ding is completely aware of each part of 11  Ibid., 347.

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the skeleton, “applying his hand, leaning on his shoulder, and planting his feet,” each movement like a dance and quite perfect. Every sound he utters in the process of carving is like music, very pleasing to the ear. After Cook Ding finishes carving the ox, he “stands up with the knife in his hand, looks all around, and has a leisurely air of satisfaction,” an expression of self-satisfaction. Most people change their carving knife once a month, those with more skill replace it once a year. Cook Ding has been using the same knife for nineteen years and it is still as good as new. Why, in the process of carving an ox, does Cook Ding arrive at this exceptional realm? The fundamental point lies in “loving the method of dao, advancing in the Dao through skill.”12 Cook Ding takes a concrete skill and elevates it to the level of dao. In this chapter, Zhuangzi deliberately distinguishes between skill and dao: Skill is technical work and involves experimental knowledge; dao exceeds this level. Confucianism also distinguishes between Dao and concrete objects. In fact, it purposefully stresses this distinction. Kongzi says, “Know dao in the morning, in the evening one can die.”13 This indicates the importance Kongzi placed on dao. The Yijing, a Confucian classic, continues this thread and discusses the relationship between dao and objects at the universal level, as expressed by the saying, “Above the forms is called dao, below the forms is called utensils.” There are concrete differences between dao and utensils. Utensils refer to concrete objects, and defining them is the objective of the studies that belong to the realm of experience and knowledge. Dao, on the other hand, surpasses this domain of experience. Questioning dao is distinct from the pursuit of knowledge and objects. Because reflection and discrimination refer to the domain of xingshang 形上 (“above forms”) they essentially belong to the same category of understanding the world through wisdom. In Chinese philosophy, the distinction between the study of human nature and dao and the study of objects or the study of skills is consciously made. Dao in this sense, a metaphysical notion distinct from skill and objects, can be understood as both the principle of uniformity in the world and the principle of development in the world. Functioning as the objective of philosophical questioning in the reflection of wisdom, its essence is uniformity. While it identifies the universal principles of the world by “hearing the dao,” Chinese philosophy also places importance on understanding human beings. This is demonstrated in its efforts to interrogate the meaning of human nature.

12   Zhuangzi 3.1. 13   Lunyu 4.8.

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Competing schools of thought diverge in determining which elements to emphasize in their attempts to understand the human being. Confucianism emphasizes the distinction between human beings and beasts, asking, in a sense, how to become a human being. In Confucianism, the most basic characteristics of a human as a human, are found in the self-aware rational consciousness. The self-aware rational consciousness is composed primarily of ethics, and is thus concretely manifested as a self-aware ethical consciousness. As repeatedly emphasized by Mengzi, Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 BCE), and others, it is precisely this ethical consciousness that separates human beings from beasts. Xunzi compared human beings with other forms of existence, and maintained that the fundamental difference between human beings and other existences is found in rightness. Rightness is a universal moral norm as well as a self-aware consciousness of this norm (ethical consciousness). Confucianism also connects the ideal form of existence and the multiple aspects of development. Kongzi’s saying “The accomplished man is not a utensil” suggests that human beings should form multi-faceted personalities rather than limit themselves to a single aspect. According to Xunzi, this concept further unfolds into being “complete and unmixed”: “The accomplished man knows the insufficiency of his incompleteness and imperfections, and that is the beauty.”14 Perfection is the achievement a fully developed character. This is precisely the understanding of human beings described by the study of human nature and dao. The Daoist view of the human being concerns the perspective of dao. In Daoism, dao is interrelated with nature, and the investigation of how to become a human being does not depart from the metaphysical premise of dao and nature. Of course, the Daoist understanding of the human being is different from that of Confucianism. From the Daoist point of view, natural circumstances and human nature are ideal forms. The perfect character, in this sense, should either progress towards or return to natural circumstances. Despite the basic differences between Confucianism and Daoism in their understandings of how to become human and how to be an ideal person, the two schools share certain similarities in their investigation of these questions. Both schools reject a conception of human existence that figures human beings as objects or utensils. In terms of value, however, the two emphasize differently the principle of the humane way versus that of natural circumstances and human nature. Confucianism gives priority to the principle of the humane way, and considers the self-aware ethical consciousness to be the fundamental 14   Xunzi 1.18.

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trait of the human being. In Daoism, heavenly nature and the natural world are perfect forms of existence. In this sense, according to Daoist philosophy, the principle of nature is the most valuable principle. Confucianism and Daoism developed these distinct concepts. In the broad sense of value systems, however, the Confucian principle of the humane way and the Daoist principle of the natural way are both indispensable. In general, ways of grasping the world outside of the use of knowledge, skills, and objects form the essential contents of the reflection of wisdom. In this regard, the Western term “philosophy” and the Chinese “study of human nature and dao” are related. We may affirm that the traditional study of human nature and dao both incorporates philosophical characteristics and has philosophical significance. However, the practice of Chinese philosophy is not entirely congruent with established standards in the West, but should instead be understood according to its own characteristics. Regardless of whether we use the Western term “philosophy” or the Chinese “study of human nature and dao,” their common traits are that they exceed the prearranged study of knowledge, skills, and objects, and attempt to grasp the world through wisdom. In other words, in the pursuit or the reflection of wisdom, the Chinese study of human nature and Dao and Western philosophy are one. So far, we have considered the essential contents of these categories. In terms of form, philosophy manifests itself by employing concepts, and the reflection of wisdom unfolds through concepts. In this aspect, Chinese philosophy demonstrates characteristics common also to Western philosophy. Chinese philosophy begins to emphasize the problem of language at a very early stage of its development. Names, it was recognized, and speech in general, involve the use of language concepts. In this sense, concepts appeared rather early on the horizon of Chinese philosophy. Kongzi describes zhengming 正名 (“rectifying names”). This has both political, practical applications as well as philosophical concerns, in terms of epistemology, logic and other aspects of study. Indeed, in the realm of philosophical discussion, the study of dao human nature and is inseparable from the use of language (concepts). Chinese philosophers observed two aspects of language: its generation or formation, and its analysis. The true creativity of Chinese philosophy lies in its use of language generation to invent new language (concepts), in order to form its own philosophical systems. The process of interpreting the connections between these concepts realizes these systems. In this sense, the formation of philosophical systems in Chinese philosophy is dependent upon the generation of different concepts.

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Kongzi, as previously mentioned, developed the concept of “humaneness,” which was central to his philosophical thought. In addition to this, he defined “the practice of rightness,” which concerns how to carry out the ideal or principle of humaneness. “Loyalty and devotion,” another of his defined concepts, describes this practice. The meaning of loyalty is conveyed in the saying, “Wishing to be established himself, he seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others,” and the meaning of devotion in that which says not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself. In moving towards the practice of rightness, loyalty and devotion constitute important parts of one’s reflection on the way of humaneness. Kongzi also describes a connection between humaneness and the concepts of yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty”) as well as knowledge. As the core of Kongzi’s philosophical system, humaneness relies for its significance on the development of the adjacent concepts described here, as well as the concrete development of and observation of the connection between these concepts. Laozi makes the following observation: “The dao that can be spoken, is not the constant dao; the name that can be named, is not the constant name.”15 His distinctions between the dao that “can be spoken” and the “constant dao,” and the name that “can be named” and the “constant name,” express a unique concern with language. In concrete terms, this describes the difference between names in the metaphysical sense (constant names) and names in the sense of everyday use (the names that can be named), and argues that we cannot use everyday concepts and language to grasp metaphysical principles. In terms of its concrete contents, Laozi’s philosophy is formed in connection to his core concepts: the dao and ziran 自然 (“self-so,” “natural”). Dao can be understood as a metaphysical principle, while self-so expresses a value principle. Dao as the implication of a metaphysical principle, and the value principle expressed in self-so, constitute the core of Laozi’s philosophy. As for philosophical formations, the advocacy of these two core concepts is closely related to the discussion of the relationship between them. Similarly, the philosophies of Mozi 墨子 (d.  391  BCE), Mengzi, Zhuangzi 庄子 (d. 287 BCE), and other Chinese philosophers are inherently connected to the core concepts they raised. As Mohism developed into a school distinct from Confucianism, its philosophical thought was reflected in Mozi’s concepts, such as universal love, mutual benefits, and so on. The saying “Mozi esteemed universality” is clarified by those concepts. Mengzi raised “human nature is good,” humane government, and other concepts, thereby promoting Confucian 15   Laozi 1.

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thought. Zhuangzi constructed his world of thought through concepts such as qiwu 齐物 (“equalizing things and affairs”) xiaoyaoyou 逍遥游 (“roaming at ease”) and others. This demonstrates the relationship between the generation of language and the formation of philosophical systems. While emphasizing the generation or formation of concepts, Chinese philosophers also placed importance on their analysis. Although this was never fully developed, that does not mean Chinese philosophers were completely detached from the analysis of concepts. Indeed, beginning in pre-Qin times, the development of Chinese philosophy was inseparable from language analy­ sis. The analysis of language is first expressed in defining concepts. When Chinese philosophers raised concepts, the connotations of relevant concepts were explained in many ways. In addition to proposing his core idea of humaneness, Kongzi defined it from different aspects. He describes it, for example, as ai ren 爱人 (“loving people”), and in this way both affirms that the core of humaneness is loving human beings, and demonstrates the intrinsic value principle of human beings. Kongzi also defined the implications of propriety, which are expressed in the following saying: “‘It is according to the rules of propriety,’ they say. Are gems and silk all that is meant by propriety?”16 Propriety is another major concept proposed by Kongzi. Is it possible to understand propriety merely from the aspect of objects such as jade and silk? Kongzi’s answer is negative: “If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with the rites of propriety?”17 If we do not regulate ourselves according to humaneness, then propriety becomes a simple matter of form and lacks its essential connotations. Avoiding this requires an analysis of both concepts. On the one hand, Laozi maintains that it is difficult to grasp metaphysical principles through everyday language. On the other hand, he sorts out core concepts from different angles. As for the concept of dao, the Daodejing gives various definitions: “That which one looks at but does not see, it is named ‘minute.’ That which one listens to but does not hear, it is named ‘silent.’ That which one holds but does not get, it is named ‘smooth.’”18 In affirming that dao exceeds sight, hearing, and other sensory activities, the Daodejing gives dao prominence over the rules of perception. In the broad sense, these explanations can be viewed as the analysis of concepts. The process by which 16   Lunyu 17.11. 17   Lunyu 3.3. 18   Laozi 14. See Moeller, Hans-Georg, Daodejing: The New, Highly Readable Translation of the Life-Changing Ancient Scripture Formerly Known as the Tao Te Ching. (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2007), 37.

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philosophers realize their systems of thought is closely related to the concrete analysis and explanation of their own language. This analysis reflects the formation and development of philosophical systems. Both Kongzi’s core notion of humaneness, and the Daodejing’s theory of dao, reflect this point. The arguments that took place between different schools of thought and protagonists during the Warring States period provide the context for the differentiation and analysis of language (concepts) in these texts. Chinese philosophers emphasized this context, known as the Contention of the Hundred Schools of Thought. Mengzi coined the term “argumentation.” Argumentation refers to the differentiation between related concepts, including the analysis and evaluation of related concepts. The requirement for differentiation is “knowing speech.” Mengzi affirmed his own strength of knowing and speaking, and explained knowledge of speech as follows: “What is knowledge of speech? It is said: As for flattering words, know what they conceal; As for excessive words, know their trap; As for iniquitous words, know their distance; As for evading words, know their limitations.”19 Flattering, excessive, iniquitous and evading words are designated forms, their characteristics lie in their different inclinations. Here, knowledge of speech is expressed through a critical observation of linguistic inclinations. The debate between philosophers takes for its subject the differentiation and analysis of language (concepts). Debate in this sense also occurs within individual schools of thought. Xunzi conducts a verbal attack upon Mengzi, also a member of the Confucian school. In the Fei Shier Zi 非十二子 (“Contra Twelve Philosophers”) chapter of the Xunzi 荀子 (“Book of Master Xun”), he criticizes Mengzi: They have initiated a theory for which they claim great antiquity, calling it the Five Processes theory. Peculiar and unreasonable in the extreme, it lacks proper logical categories. Mysterious and enigmatic, it lacks a satisfactory theoretical basis. Esoteric and laconic in its statements, it lacks adequate explanations.20 Not only does this passage concern a divergence in view, but moreover it concerns the implications of concepts. It refers to related concepts in the Mengzi 孟子 (“Book of Master Meng”) that are formulated in a manner that is difficult to understand (mysterious and enigmatic), does not accord with logic 19   Mengzi 2A1. 20  Knoblock, John. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. vol. 1. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1988), 224.

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(lacks proper logical categories), and lacks analysis (adequate explanations). Whether or not this kind of criticism accurately describes Mengzi’s true mode of thought can perhaps be debated, but what we do see here is the critical analysis of concepts. Throughout the history of Chinese philosophy, new ideas have often been elucidated through the method of commentary and annotation, such as Wang Bi’s 王弼 (d.  249) annotations of the Zhouyi 周易 (“Book of Changes”) and the Laozi (“Book of Master Lao” also known as the Daodejing), Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (d. 1200) collected annotations of the Si Shu 四书 (“Four Books”) Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 (d. 1692) annotations of Zhang Zai’s 张载 (d. 1077) Zheng Meng 正蒙 (“Correcting Blindness”), and others. These philosophers annotated the works of their predecessors in order to elucidate their own thoughts. Commentary and annotation inherently includes the analysis and differentiation of language (concepts). After the introduction of Buddhism in China, a few Chinese Buddhist schools (such as the Yogācāra) emphasized the importance of placing names and appearances, themselves concepts, under concrete analysis. Language, in its use and its analysis, manifests itself in the study of human nature and dao, and constitutes the major characteristics of Chinese philosophy. The use of language involves both the generation and construction of concepts, as well as their analysis and differentiation. In this aspect, the Chinese study of human nature and dao reflects the universal function of philosophy, which is to grasp the world through the form of concepts. The linguistic contents of the study of human nature and dao require investigation. As previously described, Kant raised four questions involving different aspects of philosophy; these questions can be used to examine the Chinese study of human nature and dao. The first question, “What can I know?” regards problems of epistemology. It is generally believed that Chinese philosophy deals primarily with ethical or moral issues and does not pay much attention to epistemology. In fact, Chinese philosophy examines epistemological issues in a unique way. Kongzi famously says, “When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it—this is knowledge.”21 This statement affirms the connection between ignorance and knowledge: knowing that one is ignorant is knowledge, or rather self-knowledge. This unification between knowledge and ignorance is understood as the starting point of epistemology. Here it becomes evident that Chinese philosophy began rather early on to explore epistemological problems, beginning with this description 21   Lunyu 2.17.

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of knowledge. Epistemological problems also produce the question of the possibilities of knowledge and the limitations of what one can know. Yet other important figures in Chinese philosophy approach these related problems in the negative sense. Zhuangzi says, “There is a limit to our life, but to knowledge there is no limit. With what is limited to pursue after what is unlimited is a perilous thing.”22 This confirms the boundaries of understanding and our inability to transcend those boundaries. The discussion of knowledge in Chinese philosophy revolves around questions of how knowledge begins, whether knowledge has boundaries, and if it is possible to exceed those boundaries. Next in this examination of epistemological problems in the history of Chinese philosophy is the relationship between the concepts “ability” and “must.” The formation of these concepts can be traced back to the entrance of Buddhism into China. However, the relationship between these two concepts would become crucial to the efforts of Chinese philosophers to explain epistemological processes. Ability is not a natural matter in the context of its relationship to must. It is specific to human beings, that which people question and employ, and is described as “part of the outer world which can be recognized and understood.” Ability refers to a specific application of relevant objects, and moreover produces a certain cognitive result. In other words, it “has merits for understanding the world.” Thus, there is a close relationship between these two concepts. Considering this, we can see, on the one hand, “the ability of cognition is aroused by cognitive objects.” This means that the function of subjective knowledge is knowing objects. That is, it must accord to objective knowledge.23 In the sense of epistemological philosophy, this understanding of the relationship between reason and ability is comparable to that of the relationship between subject and object; they are essentially linked. Although Chinese philosophy does not have the concepts of subject and object in the modern Western sense, these concepts essentially involve the same epistemological issues. Chinese philosophy offers abundant answers to the question “What should I do?” It has a rich tradition of investigating moral or ethical issues. Kongzi says: “One cultivates himself to give rest to others.” To “cultivate oneself” refers to the moral cultivation of the person; to “give rest to others” refers to social stability and the implementation of social values. In Kongzi’s view, on the one hand, the person should mold and elevate himself according to 22   Zhuangzi 3.1. 23  Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Chuan Shan quan shu 船山全書 [A Collection of Wang Fuzhi’s Writings] vol. 2. (Changsha: Yuelu shu she, 1988), 376.

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the principle of the humane way. In this sense, to cultivate oneself means to change oneself. On the other hand, people must carry social responsibility. In Kongzi’s view, carrying personal responsibility and carrying social responsibility cannot be separated; they are both what the person should do. Consciously fulfilling personal and social responsibilities is precisely what Kongzi understood as the general meaning of what one should do. The Daoist understanding of what one should do accords to natural principles. Regarding the maintenance of and return to one’s own nature, Laozi said, “dao emulates the self-so”; Zhuangzi said, “Do not extinguish heaven by human”; and others continued the discussion. While Confucianism and Daoism have different understandings of what one should do, both reflect upon this issue. The question of ultimate concern, “What can I aspire to?” is uniquely manifested in Chinese philosophy. Kongzi says, “Let the will be set to dao,” directing people to question their reality and to focus their energy on dao. In Kongzi’s view, human life should be led in pursuit of dao. After Kongzi, the Song-Ming School of Principle raised the following idea: “Establish your heart-mind for heaven and earth, set your destiny for the people, continue to study for going towards sagehood, set peace and stability for the ten thousand generations.” The essential directions here, after establishing the dominant position of human beings in the universe, are to care for the entire world, to continue the lifeblood of culture, and to implement eternal peace. In the Confucian understanding, these are the ultimate goals that human beings ought to pursue. Broadly speaking, these ideas gain their significance as answers to the question, “What should I aspire for?” In Confucianism, this, the ultimate concern, is a part of daily practice. Chinese people scarcely distinguish between the world of reality and that which lies beyond it, a characteristic which explains this tendency to understand the ultimate concern in the context of immediate reality. This is concretely displayed in the Zhongyong. In the Zhongyong. it says “to raise it to its greatest height and brilliancy, to pursue the course of the mean.” The first part of this phrase is an expression of the ultimate concern, and has the same meaning as “let the will be set on dao.” “To pursue the course of the mean,” emphasizes that one should realize the ultimate concern in daily practice. On the one hand, Chinese philosophy incorporates the ultimate concern expressed by the question “What should I aspire for?” while on the other hand its responses to this question are determined by its unique characteristics. The posited relationship between the ultimate concern and daily practice reflects the influence of these characteristics, distinguishing this thought from the tendencies of religion.

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Finally, the question that directly relates to “What is a human being?” is “How does one become human?” In order to answer this question and establish what it means to be human, Chinese philosophy draws a distinction between human and beasts. What’s more, attempts to understand what it is to be human have a broad relationship to historical processes. In this aspect, Chinese philosophy expresses a self-aware theoretical consciousness. Confucianism produced a dense historical and traditional consciousness, the main purpose of which was to affirm the continuity of historical development. Kongzi said: The Yin dynasty followed the regulations of the Xia; where it took from or added to them can be known. The Zhou dynasty has followed the regulations of Yin; where it took from or added to them can be known. Some other may follow the Zhou, and though it should be at the distance of a hundred ages its affairs may be known.24 The Yin dynasty carried on the legacy of the Xia dynasty, and the Zhou carried on the legacy of the Yin dynasty. While there is continuity between them, there are also changes as each affects the other. Therefore, although many generations may pass, the history of the Zhou can be predicted if it is continued by the imperial dynasties. It is possible to predict history, and this possibility affirms that it evolves continuously and not without order. The evidence for this continuity is in the past, and is undoubtedly the same for the history of philosophy. In Chinese philosophy, attempts to understand historical processes often employ the concepts of power and reason. When Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (d. 819) questioned the origin of feudalism (distinct, it should be noted, from the feudal system of prefectures and counties), he said, “Feudalism is not what the sages intended, it is power.”25 The formation of feudalism (the system of enfeoffment) is therefore not the result of the intentions of the sages, but is the historical dictation of power. Wang Fuzhi took this notion one step further and defined the theoretical connection between reason and power: “Among the inevitable in power see reason. Since power cannot be avoided, it should be exercised on the behalf of reason.”26

24   Lunyu 2.23. 25  Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元, Liu He Dong ji 柳河东集 [Collection of Liu’s Works], vol.  1. (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 2008), 44. 26  Wang Fuzhi, 1988, 238.

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Power and reason are related, but the two are not the same. Unlike reason, there are many aspects to power. Reason expresses the necessary tendency incorporated in the concept of power, hence Wang Fuzhi’s saying “Among the inevitable in power see reason,” which emphasizes this point. Understanding historical processes in terms of the unification of reason and power allows historical philosophy to more deeply realize them. Chinese philosophy began to discuss the connection between propriety and law just as it began to emphasize historical processes, focusing its concerns on the generation and circumstances of social order within the course of human existence. The debate that developed around propriety and law was an important one among pre-Qin philosophers. The study of the “inner sage outer king” in later Confucianism (especially that of the “outer king”) involved questions of government practice, in its principles and other aspects. Thus, the debate on propriety and law, studies of the outer king and the ideal of the king who follows dao, and the advocacy of ruling by virtue all involve political philosophy in the broad sense. In addition, in Chinese philosophy, the question of ethics is closely connected to political practice. Mengzi developed Kongzi’s principle of the humane dao into advocating for humane government, which concretely demonstrates this point. In this context, the questions relating to what it means to be human concern both historical and political philosophy. Responses to them in Chinese philosophy were developed over a long process of discussion. From the normative aspect of philosophy, Chinese philosophy linked together “clarifying dao” and “practicing dao” rather early in the course of its history. Clarifying dao pursues clarification of human nature and dao; it is related to explaining and interpreting the world. Practicing dao signifies the modification of the study of human nature and dao into a practice, something humans can use to change the world and to mold themselves. The unification of clarifying dao and practicing dao implies the affirmation and concern to the normative aspect of the study of human nature and dao (the reflection of wisdom). In the Zhongyong 中庸 (“Focusing the Familiar” or “Doctrine of the Mean”), it says, “What heaven has conferred is called nature, an accordance with nature is called dao, the regulation of dao is called instruction.” The meaning of instruction implies guidance and regulation. In a certain sense, the connection between nature, dao, and instruction describes the regulatory tendency of the study of human nature and dao. This tendency can be briefly explained by examining the thought of the two schools of Confucianism and Daoism. Early on, Confucianism raised the notions of “accomplishing the self” and “accomplishing the world.” Accomplishing the self refers to following the Confucian value principles and ideals as a guide for

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personal development. To accomplish the world is to participate in changing the natural world, including heaven, earth, and things themselves. Related to this are a series of notions that refer to changing the world according to human ideals and value ideals. These include: “assisting the nourishing powers of heaven and earth,” “controlling and employing the mandate of heaven,” and “transforming ‘heaven’s heaven’ into the heaven of human beings,” among others. Similarly, regarding the social domain, Confucianism traces the ideals of the kingly dao or the outer king. Implementing the ideal of the kingly dao means achieving world change in the socio-political sphere, a sub-category of changing the world in its broad meaning. Understanding the world according to the study of human nature and dao and grasping the principles of life in the universe (clarifying dao), transform according to the above processes into guiding world change and guiding the actual practice of human beings (practicing dao). This sense of guidance or regulation is consciously manifested in the study of human nature and dao, or in Chinese philosophy. On the surface, Daoism discusses ziran 自然 (“self-so,” “natural”) and wuwei (“non-action,” “doing non-doing,” “acting without interfering”) and appears to pay little attention to actual practice. However, in its essential meaning, Daoism does not negate practice but attends to its many aspects. Non-action in Daoism does not mean to do nothing. Rather, it is often understood as a characteristic of action, phrased as “act without action.”27 This means action in the manner of non-action, and not simply doing nothing. What does it mean to act in the manner of non-action? Non-action can be understood as being in accordance with dao or one with dao. To “act without action,” then, is to act in accordance with dao, and is precisely the type of action that Daoism pursues. Action in this sense is closely related to the concept “dao emulates the self-so,” which similarly expresses unified processes of clarifying dao and practicing dao. From the Daoist perspective, dao is the ultimate and universal principle that should be followed in practice. The concept “dao emulates the self-so” suggests that practice should be carried out according to dao. Regarding the study of human nature and dao, Daoism applies the concept of regulation and affirms its value. The study of human nature and dao is connected to the process of practicing dao, and its relevance is presented accordingly. By moving beyond skills and utensils, and distinguishing knowledge of objects from other methods of attempting to grasp the world, the Chinese study 27   Laozi 3.

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of human nature and dao involves the same effort to transcend the world of knowledge and reflect through wisdom as does philosophy. Thus, the Chinese study of human nature and dao marks itself as philosophy in the true sense. Although, in concrete expressions, Chinese discuss the study of human nature and dao and Westerners talks about philosophy, the actual tendencies of both studies are fundamentally the same. The study of human nature and dao and philosophy are both reflections of wisdom, and the essential connotations of each are the same. In terms of form, philosophy necessarily implies the application of concepts, which concerns both the construction of concepts and their analysis. Similarly, the study of human nature and dao involves the generation of language and its analysis. In the Wei-Jin period, there was a development in the debate surrounding names and principles of analysis. The subject of these principles includes human nature and dao; debating names concern the analysis of language (concepts). Therefore, the connection between the study of human nature and dao and language (concepts) produces a conscious assertion. In this discussion, using the questions Kant raised, we saw that the Chinese study of human nature and dao essentially involves the same reflection on relevant questions and domains of discourse as philosophy. In terms of what is meant by philosophy, the Chinese study of human nature and dao produces a sense of regulation and guidance over the reflection of wisdom, and brings it to the level of conscious concern. According to these descriptions, the Chinese study of human nature and dao includes philosophical contents, and essentially belongs in the category of philosophy. III In clarifying Chinese philosophy as philosophy, there are still more relevant problems that demand attention. First we must confirm the identification of philosophy as the reflection of wisdom and that the exploration of wisdom includes diversity. As previously mentioned, philosophy manifests itself as the pursuit of wisdom, or as the attempt to grasp the world using methods distinct from knowledge. These are universal characteristics, regardless of whether we are talking about philosophy or the study of human nature and dao. In terms of philosophy’s concrete realization, the reflection of wisdom manifests itself as a diverse and individualized process. Historically speaking, the evolution of philosophy in the West has developed through ancient Greek philosophy, medieval scholasticism, modern continental rationalism, British empiricism, German dialectic philosophy, modern analytic philosophy,

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phenomenology, and other forms. Thus, philosophy takes on different features and different domains of discourse depending on the period, and the application of concepts is likewise subject to historical differences. From pre-Qin times to the two Han dynasties, the Wei-Jin period, Sui and Tang dynasties and Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, the characteristics of the study of human nature and dao, or philosophy, have likewise developed over time, and in turn provided us with a variety of connotations and points of emphasis to examine. On the one hand, both Chinese and Western philosophy use wisdom, in the methods we have discussed, to understand and grasp the world; on the other hand, according to the process of historical development, the two emerge with distinct characteristics across epochs. Moreover, within the same historical period, the reflections and debates of individual philosophers have their own specific characteristics. For example, in ancient Greece, we find that each philosophical system has its own individual characteristics, from the Presocratic philosophers such as Parmenides, Democritus, and Pythagoras, up to Plato and Aristotle. Their uses of wisdom, points of focus, theoretical standpoints, and so on are obviously distinct. In ancient Chinese philosophy, Laozi, Kongzi, Mozi, Mengzi, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi each have unique features of thought. On the one hand, philosophical reflection manifests itself as the exploration of wisdom, while on the other it unfolds as a diverse and individualized process. The forms and characteristics of philosophy are not only different between the periods of its development, but also between people and schools belonging to the same historical period. On the macro level, these differences emerge as distinct philosophical traditions. Chinese and Western philosophy are characterized by their methods of grasping the world beyond the knowledge of objects and the methods of the separate branches of learning. These methods involve questioning the world and human existence or human nature and dao, but in their specific focuses they exemplify different characteristics. Relatively speaking, by questioning human nature and dao, Chinese philosophy emphasizes a focus on human nature or the question of human existence, whereas Western philosophy stresses the question of heaven and the true reality of the world. Indeed, the distinction above has only a relative meaning; as a matter of fact, both Chinese and Western philosophy examine questions of human nature and heaven, as well as reality and human existence. Their differences, however, can be found in their individual emphases. In terms concepts and their application, both Chinese and Western philosophy are concerned with construction and analysis. However, while

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Chinese philosophy focuses on both conceptual structures and conceptual differentiation, it is relatively weak in the analysis of concepts. Feng Youlan 冯友兰 (d.  1990) distinguished between systems of forms and systems of substance, and according to this distinction Chinese philosophy stresses the system of substance and does not expand its philosophical system using rigorous forms. In contrast, Western philosophy began to stress the level of form at an early stage and developed detailed concept analyses. The difference in characteristics between Chinese and Western philosophy, as stated above, explain why for a long time Chinese philosophy was not considered philosophy in the true sense. At the level of form, the characteristic of analyzing concepts and constructing a formal system in Chinese philosophy indeed differs from its Western counterpart. In a certain sense, this difference constituted one of the reasons why the mainstream philosophers in the West questioned whether Chinese philosophy was philosophy at all. The relative weakness of Chinese philosophy in the aspects mentioned above also provides an explanation for why contemporary Chinese philosophy is more consistent with phenomenology. In contrast to analytic philosophy, phenomenology stresses conceptual structures, and is not as concerned with the analysis of concepts. With a similar emphasis on the construction of concepts as opposed to their analysis, Chinese philosophy seems to demonstrate a correlation to phenomenology. Thus, the two are rather easily theoretically comparable. Philosophy creates normativity, and in this aspect, Chinese and Western philosophy express similar tendencies. Both affirm that philosophy, or the study of human nature and dao, provides guiding tools for accomplishing the self and accomplishing the world. Chinese and Western philosophy, however, emphasize these two aspects differently. Chinese philosophy focuses on accomplishing the self, or in other words, it observes more the process of accomplishing the self. Western philosophy, on the other hand, systematically observes the process of accomplishing the world. Indeed, we must stress that this does not mean that Chinese philosophy completely neglects the accomplishment of the world, nor Western philosophy the accomplishment of the self. As previously described, selfaccomplishment and world-accomplishment together constitute the meaning of both Chinese and Western philosophy. Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, both philosophies approach these issues differently. Thus, while stating that Chinese philosophy is indeed philosophy, our approach to research must be premised on these differences. Confirming

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Chinese philosophy as philosophy requires that we attach great importance its unique contents and to the study of human nature and Dao. As previously described, the study of human nature and dao is manifested as the reflection of wisdom, which is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The essential goal of emphasizing the study of human nature and dao, as contained in the philosophical system of the past, is to grasp its philosophical connotations. In terms of the study of philosophy, one must avoid the mistake of reductionism—in other words, reducing philosophy to the history of philosophy, reducing the history of philosophy to the study of intellectual history, and reducing the study of intellectual history to the study of academic history. The theoretical conclusion of this process of reduction is often the non-existence of Chinese philosophy. Advocates of “explaining China through China” express this theoretical inclination. At the level of form, one must give equal attention to both the generation or construction of concepts and their analysis. The generation or construction of concepts is related to what Feng Youlan called “innovation,” the significance of which is its promotion of philosophical thinking and attempts to form a new philosophical system. If there is no generation or construction of concepts, it is hard for philosophy to develop; new forms cannot be constructed. Accordingly, we should attach great importance to the generation and construction of concepts. The formation of a new philosophical system and attempts to explain its relevant questions are realized through generation and construction. The study of philosophy is not merely “adherence” but innovation as well, and the latter cannot be separated from the generation or construction of concepts. Chinese philosophy must also stress the analysis of concepts. The analysis of concepts refers also to the distinction and definition of concepts. This is necessary for grasping the connection between concepts and demonstrating the points of view being presented, as well as for the critical consideration of existing concepts. In a broad sense, the analysis of concepts includes not only the process of distinguishing and analyzing concepts, but of criticizing notions and logical demonstration as well. In the study of Chinese philosophy, the generation or construction of concepts cannot be separated from their analysis. If we only analyze concepts, and do not generate or construct them, it will result in the loss of wisdom. As it loses wisdom, philosophy easily becomes a mere technique or formalized void. In this case, as contemporary analytic philosophy often demonstrates, it becomes difficult to incorporate living wisdom. If, on the other hand, we

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merely pay attention to the construction of concepts and neglect their distinction and analysis, philosophy may perhaps be develop into a speculative, abstract, and obscure system, unable to truly grasp the world. Contemporary phenomenology seems bent in this direction. To summarize, in the study of Chinese philosophy, it is difficult to distinguish between substance and form. The pursuit of wisdom at the level of substance inherently requires the unification of concept generation and analysis at the level of form.

Chapter 10

Chinese Philosophy: Questions and Their Evolution In its original meaning, philosophy appears as the search for the individualization and variation of wisdom.1 In Chinese philosophy, the reflection of wisdom unfolds through the pursuit of human nature and dao, which achieves its concrete realization through the application of a series of questions. Based in the historical development of ancient Chinese philosophy, modern Chinese philosophy has returned to wisdom in a new aspect and has continued the contemplation of wisdom in a new form. I The historical evolution of Chinese philosophy contains an inherent ideological thread. In order to capture this thread we must first grasp some basic philosophical questions, and proceed to reveal how different philosophers and schools approach their own explorations and promote their understandings of a set of problems at different levels. First is the question of the relationship between both individualization and universalization and the individual and the whole. In the historical evolution of Chinese philosophy, these relationships develop in different directions. In terms of either dao or ontology, speaking at the metaphysical level, these developments involve both specific and universal phases, and the connection between the specific and the general. From Laozi onward, Daoism speaks of the unity between dao and de 德 (“power,” “virtue”), as expressed in sayings like “Honor dao and cherish de,” and “dao generates them, de nourishes them.” Confucians explored the mutual interactions between the individual and the group, and during the Song and Ming dynasties carried this a step further with the development of the concept of “one principle with many manifestations” (liyi fenshu, 理一分殊). The Daoist discussion of the relationship between dao and de intrinsically reveals that there is some sort of communication between the principle of unity and the principle of individuality. By the time the Daodjing implored 1  This chapter was published in Philosophical Analysis 2010, presented here is a modified version. It was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University.

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followers to honor dao and cherish de, it had already explicitly expressed this position: dao provides a unified basis of existence, and de in its relation to dao designates the specific. The direction “honor dao” provides the underlying basis for the realm of phenomena of moving towards concrete existence. “Cherish de” implies a concern with the particular. This two-pronged direction confirms simultaneously the principles of unity and individuality. The issues above are reflected in the Confucian notion of universality and particularity. As a philosophical notion, universality and particularity has complex connotations, first mentioned in Cheng Yi’s 程颐 (d.  1107) saying, “The Western Inscription clarifies universality and particularity, thus the two roots of Mohism cannot be separated.”2 Universality and particularity in this domain of discourse refers primarily to ethical principles and the methods of their implication. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200) extended this interpretation, bestowing it with an ontological meaning. When explaining the relationship between the Taiji 太极 (“Supreme Ultimate”) and the myriad beings, Zhu Xi said: The two energies and the five phases are the reason why heaven bestows life on the myriad beings and generates them. From the tip, by the means of the root cause, the differences in the five phases originate from the reality of the two energies, which both stem from a single principle. This is combining all the myriad beings and talking about the combination, and in this case it is all about the single supreme ultimate. From root to tip, its reality is a single principle and the myriad beings each separates into its concrete being. Therefore, among the myriad beings, each has its own single supreme ultimate, and whether they are big or small there is not one that does not have its own particularity.3 The Supreme Ultimate is the single utmost principle. Its origins can be traced backwards from the tip (the objects of experience), to the myriad beings, to the five phases from which these beings originate, to the two energies of yin and yang from which these phases originate, to the Supreme Ultimate, wherein these energies are rooted. Therefore, the Supreme Ultimate is the origin of the myriad beings; from ultimate existence to empirical reality, the Supreme Ultimate is scattered through the objects of experience. The concept of universality designates an underlying principle as the root of the myriad beings, 2  Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi 程颐. Er Cheng ji 二程集 [A Collection of the Writings of the Cheng Brothers], vol. 1. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 1981), 609. 3  Zhu Xi 朱熹. Tongshu zhu 通書注 [Notes on the Books], in: Zhuzi quan shu 朱子全書 [Collected Works of Zhu Xi] vol. 13. (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 2010), 117.

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while that of particularity suggests that it is sensible to define specific objects according to their apparent variety. Each concept reflects the universal condition of principle from a distinct aspect. Some Chinese philosophers stress the concept of unity and wholeness, while others are more concerned with individuality. Some attempt to destroy the tension between the two. Over the course of these disagreements, the understanding of the relationships between the individual and the whole, and the particular and the general has gradually deepened. Regarding the humanistic dao, the relationship between the individual and the whole touches upon questions of the self and the group, and the self and society. The discussion of these questions involves historical points of view and is connected to epistemology. According to popular interpretations of classical Western philosophy, subjects such as epistemology, ethics, logic, and natural philosophy are clearly separated. It should be noted that, according to the theoretical formulation of Chinese philosophy, these fields are inseparable. Using the lens of the humanistic dao, an examination of the relationship between the individual and the group incorporates questions of life outlook, ethics, and historical points of view. In order to grasp them in concrete terms, we must note that the notions and concepts of Chinese philosophy incorporate manifold meanings: they often transcend the boundaries of a single field (e.g., epistemology or ontology). This overlap is widespread. Indeed, it is no easy task to grasp this point completely. In sum, on the one hand we want to express the philosophical implications of a variety of concepts and notions in Chinese philosophy, beyond a mere generalized and chaotic reproduction of these ideas in modern Chinese; on the other hand, however, we cannot neglect the unique and complicated nature of this discussion in Chinese philosophy, and must avoid the simple and unsuitable methods for handling this issue. A major school of thought in Chinese philosophy, Confucianism not only confirms the unity of the group and the self in the realm of the human dao, but also addresses these questions from the angle of personal cultivation. Kongzi’s (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE) saying, “Set your will on the dao, and set your base on virtue,” affirms the universal ideal (dao) of personal cultivation and the unity of intrinsic personal foundations. What’s more, in Chinese philosophy the relationship between the individual and the whole is reflected in the connection between names and reality. The School of Names, too, was concerned with these relationships and distinguished between “specific names” and “general names.” Questions like these are not only dealt with in distinct ways between schools of thought, but are inherently multidimensional. This discussion has

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an important philosophical significance, which has been confirmed, to some extent, in modern Chinese philosophy. In Western philosophy, beginning in ancient Greece, the relationship between the universal and the specific has been investigated in all its various dimensions. Plato figured the universal ideal as real existence, thus emphasizing the universal. Aristotle called the “first entity” the most basic being, referring in this sense to the individual. These unique emphases produced different understandings of the relationship between the individual and the whole. Continuing on, from the texts of medieval Europe to modern philosophy, debates such as those between nominalism and realism, and experimentalism and rationalism, picked up on this discussion. In ancient Chinese philosophy, discussions of the relationship between skill and dao, utensils and dao, and the group and the self, not only reflect the universality of philosophical issues, but demonstrate unique characteristics of thought and ways of dealing with these oppositions. The second fundamental problem in Chinese philosophy is the relationship between rationality and irrationality. To reveal the characteristics of Chinese philosophy, we will not discuss rationality and emotionalism, but instead rationality and irrationality. In fact, irrationality includes emotionalism, and involves feelings, intentions, intuition, and imagination, among other things. In Chinese philosophy, schools such as Daoism and Chan Buddhism are very concerned with intuition. This phenomenon is clearly not encompassed by the concepts of rationality and emotionalism, but involves in the broader sense the relationship between rationality and irrationality. In the pursuit of dao, rationality and irrationality are often intricately intertwined. There are both rational and perceptual differences, as well as the interactions between rationality and intuition, imagination and will, and more. The forms of expression for these problems are manifold. Throughout history, when questioning how we can know objects or clarify dao, some Chinese philosophers focus their attention on rationality, and others emotionality. The division between Confucius and Mozi reflects this point. The writings of some philosophers stress intuition, for example the Daodejing, which says, “One who hears the Dao diminishes daily.” The inherent belief here is that one can grasp Dao by letting go of knowledge and experience. This way of grasping existence manifests itself as “still observation and mysterious views,” which implies intuition. These questions also relate to both personal cultivation and the ethical domain. Chinese philosophy validates feelings and intentions, but at the same time it does not neglect rationality. This point can be demonstrated through

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reference to the Confucian school of thought. While explaining ethical practice and the development of personal character, some Confucian philosophers emphasize moral conduct in conjunction with emotions and feelings such as commiseration, integral parts of personal cultivation. This transcends rationality in the narrow sense (that is, rationality at the level of cognition). Another aspect of these problems concerns rightness and propriety as guidance, which involve rational norms at the level of value and bring conduct to the level of consciousness. On the one hand, Mengzi 孟子 (d. 289 BCE) talks about the da ti 大体 (“great body”) emphasizing “the organ of the heart-mind,” while on the other hand, he also understood the emotion of commiseration as one of the seeds necessary for becoming humane. The organ of the heart-mind is connected to the great body, and reflects the rule of reason. Commiseration, shame, and other feelings are connected to emotions, and involve problems such as the motivation towards moral conduct and the cultivation of an ethical personality. In general, these questions are not restricted to one specific approach or perspective, but rationality, in particular, may be approached at various levels. From the perspective of modern philosophy, the discussions of these issues involve separate philosophical fields, such as epistemology, ethics, and ontology, among others. The relationship between rationality and irrationality (emotions, etc.) is woven between them. This relationship also pertains to the understanding of the human being. This is linked to the question of how to become human, which involves a variety of philosophical focuses. In their concrete existences, what are the core traits of human beings as humans? Some schools and thinkers in Chinese philosophy saw rationality as the most essential of these traits. In its distinction between humans and beasts, Confucianism promoted ethical rationality (humaneness, rightness, etc.) as this most essential attribute. Other schools of thought, Mohism for example, placed human sense ability in a more prominent position. Each school of thought understood the human being differently. At one point in history, some philosophers attempted to discard what they saw as simplistic understandings of the human being and overcome the opposition between rationality and irrationality. They confirmed the coexistence of rationality and sensibility, at a certain level, and determined a concrete unity between rationality and irrationality. Between the Ming and Qing dynasties, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) demonstrated these beliefs. The relationship between rationality and irrationality is expressed in both the process of knowing objects and that of knowing human beings. It also appears in the analysis of the “great body” and the “small body.” The great body refers to the organ of the heart-mind, and the small body to the eyes and the

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ears. This relationship is likewise reflected in the domain of ethics, where the cultivation of personal character and perfect ethical conduct inherently concerns the connection between rationality and emotionalism. During this process of cultivation, advocating the rational in order merely to instill an awareness of the external is not sufficient. We must at the same time be moved by emotions. Thus, guidance should stress the communication of emotions with the rational. In the sense of conduct, merely obeying external propriety or universal principles is not enough. We must also observe the internal will of the individual. A third central problem in Chinese philosophy is the relationship between the relative and the absolute. In his book Zhongguo gudai zhexue de luoji fazhan 中国古代哲学的逻辑发展 (“The Development of Logic in Chinese Ancient Philosophy”) Feng Qi 冯契 (d. 1995) figures the connection between these concepts as an important aspect of Chinese philosophy. The connection between the relative and the absolute manifests itself in our cognition of the world and is reflected in our practical human processes. The relationship between the relative and the absolute is the relationship between what we can know and what we do know. Philosophers who emphasized absolutism often conceived of things in dogmatic terms. In contrast, philosophers who emphasized relativism often expressed this tendency in their skepticism. The debate between the two is expressed in the distinction between relativism and dogmatism. In practice, these concepts can achieve their expression on different levels, for example in the Confucian discussion of the relationship between jing 经 (“dogma,” “guideline,” “constant”) and quan 权 (“measure,” “expedient,” “transitory”). Underlying this distinction is the connection between absolutism and relativism. Balance signifies commitment and tolerance as the criteria of conduct, and as the relative value of principle. It affirms that, in different times, places, and conditions, there are restrictions to human conduct and accordingly emphasizes the analysis of specific situations. The unchanging standard, on the other hand, promotes more of an absolute principle. Overall, in the above descriptions, we observe different schools of thought, philosophers, and ways of thinking in Chinese philosophy. Every one of these has a specific significance in the evolution of Chinese philosophy. Each analysis focuses on the construction of these different theories into specific segments of this evolution, and the ways they can be deconstructed and bypassed. In this way, the innermost significance of this evolution is revealed. Failing to recognize these fundamental segments may lead to a preoccupation with trivial descriptions and materials.

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Aside from philosophical problems of universal significance, the history of Chinese philosophy includes such topics as: “the debate between heaven and man,” “the debate between propriety and law,” “the debate between two political systems,” “the debate between names and reality,” “the debate between existence and nothingness,” “the debate between forms and spirits,” “the debate between power and fate,” “the debate between heart-mind and matter, knowledge, and practice;” “the debate between dao and utensils, principle, and qi 气 (“air” “stuff”),” as well as “expanding the learning,” “sitting in oblivion,” “human nature,” “customs,” “studying dao,” “honoring the nature of virtue,” and others. These issues are central to the fundamental philosophical questions described in this section, and should be seen as general philosophical questions considered in Chinese philosophy. While interrogating the history of Chinese philosophy in terms of universal perspectives, one finds that these issues obtain unique characteristics. This observation contains two aspects of equal importance. On the one hand, we must recognize concepts and issues specific to Chinese philosophy; on the other hand, we are tasked with discovering their universal philosophical implications. What is the philosophical significance of these unique concepts and issues? This question requires proper analysis, as any such investigation lacking in depth and substance will produce a history without philosophy. At the same time, however, the concrete manifestations of the general philosophical questions described here can neither be neglected, should we seek to avoid producing philosophy without history. In brief, the study of the history of philosophy presents us with both the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history. Bringing these notions together, we must pay attention to the unique and historically variable attitudes of Chinese philosophers. This includes their approach to proposing questions, their ways of expression, the concepts applied in their discussions, the characteristics of their terminology, and so forth. If we do not fully stress its uniqueness, then the history of Chinese philosophy will easily be written in terms of that of Western philosophy. At the same time, however, we are tasked with revealing the universal philosophical meaning concealed in China’s peculiar expressions, concepts, and propositional systems. In translating this universal significance, this analysis should employ such terminology as ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, historical perspective, and historical philosophy as part of its categorization and expression of theory. This can and should be accomplished without suggesting the Westernization of Chinese philosophy, in which case the significance of our use of these terms

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would be lost. The important issue here is whether such an analysis is accurate, and not whether it or not it should be attempted. If we are satisfied with a mere list of ideological materials, we cannot convey the full significance of the history of Chinese philosophy in its evolution. II A major transformation in Chinese philosophy has occurred in modern times. The issues discussed, the style of their discussion, as well as the modes of their expression are subject to both continuity and change between modern and ancient Chinese philosophies. From the Qin and the Han dynasties onward, the social form in the background of the evolution of ancient Chinese philosophy was relatively stable. This constitutes one of the characteristics of ancient Chinese philosophy. This stability has changed drastically in the modern era, a change which is reflected in its philosophy. While examining modern Chinese philosophy, we must stress the differences between ancient and modern forms. When Feng Qi compiled his books on ancient and modern Chinese philosophy, he made a distinction in the two titles: Zhongguo gudai zhexue de luoji fazhan 中国古代哲学的逻辑发展 (“The Development of Logic in Chinese Ancient Philosophy”) and Zhongguo jindai zhexue de geming jincheng 中国近 代哲学的革命进程 (“The Process of Revolution in Modern Chinese Philosophy”). The different characteristics of the two subjects are reflected in the phrases “logical development” and “revolutionary processes.” There are two points to be considered regarding the background of modern Chinese philosophy. The first of these involves concepts. The level of concepts is primarily related to “Western learning spreading to the East.” This suggests that both the contents and forms of modern Chinese philosophy were substantially influenced by the West. One may even go so far as to say that the interaction between Chinese and Western philosophy and culture constitutes an important prerequisite to China’s modern philosophy. The second point concerns social developments. Regarding modern social developments, it has been maintained that modernity has seen “the greatest change in three thousand years.” Modern social developments have taken place at the level of material objects, political control, and ideology, among others. Changes at the level of material objects have taken place in correspondence with the direction to “beat someone by playing his games only better” (which means “learning the advanced technology of the West to resist the invasion of Western powers”). Systematic

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change followed political reform, and conceptual changes took place according to the transformation of values, world views, and social history. The threads of these social changes can be pulled from different directions. In terms of philosophy, we may proceed to emphasize two aspects. First, as previously described, Feng Qi used the phrase “revolutionary processes” to describe the evolution of modern Chinese philosophy. The result of these revolutionary processes may be understood as the development of new methods of philosophical observation, the transformation of the issues at stake, and the shift in content. In modern times, such observations go without saying. The traditional philosophical understanding of the world, centered around the notion of the “heavenly dao,” encouraged speculation and intuition. In contrast, understandings of the world in modern philosophy are strongly connected to the results of empirical scientific knowledge, although many of these understandings are implausible. Moreover, the scientific research incorporated by modern philosophy has often been far removed from proper empirical science. For example, at turn of the twentieth century, Chinese philosophers still employed the term “ether” and other erroneous concepts, and used such concepts in their analyses of traditional philosophy. Nonetheless, the incorporation of empirical science gave Chinese philosophy its modern form. In terms of the humanistic dao and the relationship between the individual and society, modern philosophy generally emphasizes individual rights and a diverse personal character. The change in contents from ancient to modern philosophy can be seen across the board, and is apparent in the ideological shift from the cultivation of an “accomplished sage” to the cultivation of a variety of civilian personalities. Second, in terms of form, modern Chinese philosophy moves unceasingly in the direction of the times, leaving behind classical forms for the modern and contemporary. This intrinsic tendency may be analyzed at two levels. The first is form, at which level the above changes are manifested in the transformation from substantive to formal philosophical systems. This transformation is evident in works of professional philosophers following the May Fourth Movement. Feng Youlan distinguishes between “a system of substance” and “a system of forms.” Like the system of forms, the system of substance has a core notion (or purpose), but the core notion (or purpose) is not developed according to a structure. Many of the ancient Chinese philosophical systems can be described as systems of substance. Many modern philosophers construct their philosophical systems according to an emphasis on form. As mentioned above, professional philosophers following the May Fourth Movement made conscious efforts in this regard.

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The writings of Feng Youlan, Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (d.  1984), and other philosophers demonstrate this point. The emphasis on logical analysis in modern philosophy is related to this shift. Ancient Chinese philosophy, embedded in its philosophical traditions, does not stress formal logic and is relatively weak in logical analysis. The transformation from systems of substance to systems of form is related to the modern emphasis on logical analysis. Through this transformation, contemporary philosophers characterize in concrete terms the modernization of Chinese philosophy. The second level at which contemporary Chinese philosophy demonstrates its tendency towards modernization is reflected in its separation of philosophy into different categories. In ancient China, understandings of the world and of human beings were discussed according to the general concepts of the heavenly dao and the humanistic dao. Indeed, both of these involve ontology, ethics, epistemology, logics, and other categories. The specifying function of these categories, however, was eschewed in favor of the broadly defined heavenly dao, humanistic dao, pursuit of dao, and other concepts. At the start of modernity, these broad philosophical concepts gradually disappeared from discussions of philosophical issues. Discussions that once took place according to the traditional view of the heavenly dao are now had in terms of ontology and cosmogony, while those that once regarded the humanistic dao are had according to the categories of ethics, historical philosophy, political philosophy, and others. The debates between knowledge and conduct, in the traditional sense, have begun to develop into epistemology in the modern sense; the debates over names and reality have transformed into discussions of logic. This constant progress towards categorization is generally associated with the gradual development of the modern form of philosophy. To summarize, in ancient Chinese philosophy, philosophical questions were as a general rule concerned with and encompassed by the pursuit of dao. Since the beginning of modernity, however, such questions have developed according to a new form and a new set of philosophical categories. In terms of its overarching development, Chinese philosophy began in preQin times and has reached a new stage in the modern era. Feng Qi’s notion of “wisdom theory” suggests that, in form and essence, Chinese philosophy’s contemporary system continues its historical course. Moreover, in a certain sense, the contemporary system reflects the continuing progress of the philosophical reflection of wisdom. In an even broader sense, there is a historical connection between ancient and contemporary Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese philosophy

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returns to wisdom from a new level, and through its new form continues the deep reflection of wisdom. By tracing the historical course of wisdom in Chinese philosophy, we can see that both the ancient and the contemporary express a unified process. There is a logical thread revealed in this process, maintained through these changes over time.

Chapter 11

Identification and Recognition In general, the paradigms of research are always related to the objects of study.1 The object’s form of existence necessarily modifies the way we approach it. In terms of research into Chinese philosophy, an understanding of its unique form must be included in the discussion of which methods to use in approaching its contents. On a broader level, we may understand the characteristics of Chinese philosophy according to the dimensions of form and substance. There is no doubt that Chinese philosophy has its own form. The objects of contemporary discussions on the history of philosophy (the various schools, theories, and systems from pre-Qin to modern times) are concluded in history, and in this sense manifest themselves in abstract forms. In another sense, however, these forms are in a continuous process of generation, and their contents continuously grow broader and deeper over the course of historical evolution. This process has yet to reach its conclusion. Today, Chinese philosophy may still be seen as a continuing process. Essentially, the nature of its formation and the process of its generation are one, and together they constitute its historical characteristics. On a more substantive level, this involves the connection between the history of philosophy and specific philosophical theories. In its accomplished and completed form, Chinese philosophy has historical characteristics. In terms of its generative characteristics, however, Chinese philosophy is constituted by its theoretical contents. Before the various theories and systems found in the history of Chinese philosophy had hardened into completed objects, they existed as the products of philosophers’ theoretical explorations in specific historical periods. In other words, what begins in a theoretical form later becomes a historical object, which then displays historical characteristics. In their original forms, the questions of what Chinese philosophy is and how it is researched are related. Their relationship is logically based in the inherent connection between the historical forms of Chinese philosophy and its theoretical connotations. The characteristics of Chinese philosophy described

1  This chapter appeared as a paper in Literature, History and Philosophy (Wenshizhe 文史哲), 2010, vol. 1. It was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University.

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above require that in order to study and understand Chinese philosophy, we need both a historical and a theoretical perspective. We should note at this point, in light of Chinese philosophy’s modern academic form, the work done by Hu Shi 胡适 (d. 1962), Feng Youlan 冯友兰 (d. 1990), and others in developing an understanding of the depth of Chinese philosophy’s historical and theoretical characteristics, and their relationship to each other. Indeed, for philosophers and historians of philosophy alike, an emphasis must be placed on the approach to research. While some take a historical perspective, others focus on theoretical connotations. Overall, however, it seems difficult to strictly separate the two: the study of Chinese philosophy requires both “a philosophy that has history” and “a history that has philosophy.” The above argument is premised on an understanding of Chinese philosophy as philosophy. In terms of logic, before we can understand Chinese philosophy as philosophy we must ask, if indeed it is philosophy, what form of philosophy it contains. This kind of question involves the issue of recognition. Recognition becomes an issue according to the understanding of Chinese philosophy among the world’s mainstream forms of philosophy. As described elsewhere, Hegel mentions Chinese philosophy in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History but does not regard it highly. Opinions such as this continue to this day. Chinese philosophy has yet to appear on the horizon of mainstream Western philosophical systems: they maintain that Chinese philosophy is not a form of philosophy, and do not include it as a member of the philosophical community. Recognition has surfaced as an issue because of a number of fundamental problems with understanding philosophy: What is philosophy? Which systems of concepts are considered philosophy? Apart from its universal characteristics, can philosophy be expressed in a diversity of specific forms? What mainstream Western philosophy recognizes as philosophy seems only to be a single one of its forms: that which began in ancient Greece and has evolved into modern Western philosophy. In their distinction from this, systems like that of Chinese philosophy are not included in the Western understanding of philosophy. This understanding of philosophy obviously maintains a bias. There may indeed be different understanding of philosophy, which will lead to different definitions. In fact, up until today, the question “What is philosophy?” has had no consolidated answer. Systems of philosophy, with their unique philosophical backgrounds, have their own understandings of the term. However, we can nonetheless achieve a general consensus.

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As described repeatedly above, as a form of thought differing from knowledge, philosophy first and foremost manifests itself as the pursuit of wisdom. At this level, philosophy without doubt contains common and universalizing traits: regardless of individual form, every system of philosophy displays characteristics that distinguish it in some way from the pursuit of empirical knowledge. In the broadest sense, we can think of philosophy as a kind of intellectual pursuit, or wisdom, distinct from the form of knowledge. Upon recognizing these universal characteristics of philosophy, the next step is to raise the question of whether the reflection of wisdom can emerge through various forms. Considering the actuality of forms, the answer to this question is, undoubtedly, yes. Because philosophy has universal and general characteristics, it necessarily emerges in a variety of forms and incorporates these individual forms into its meaning. What’s more, considering only the evolution of Western philosophy in its evident variation, it becomes clear that regardless of whether we are talking about different schools or different periods in history, the multitude of systems contained in Western philosophy itself display their own unique characteristics. As previously mentioned, Chinese philosophy distinguished very early on between the concepts “on behalf of learning” and “on behalf of dao.” On behalf of learning concerns an objective in the domain of experience, while on behalf of dao concerns human nature and dao. The latter concept belongs, in the broad sense, to the domain of wisdom. As the reflection of wisdom concerning human nature and dao, Chinese philosophy should undoubtedly be understood as a unique form of philosophy. Broadly speaking, the variety of styles of the reflection of wisdom, or philosophy, is a result of differences in aspects such as form and substance. In terms of philosophical forms, despite their common points of emphasis, Chinese and Western philosophy indeed display distinct characteristics. Emphasizing one characteristic, however, does not necessarily mean disregarding other aspects. One cannot deny a specific form of philosophy’s status as philosophy simply because of its particular emphasis. In affirming Chinese philosophy’s unique orientation to the reflection of wisdom, there is no reason not to recognize its universal philosophical characteristics. The problem of identification emerged as a result of Chinese philosophy’s academic tendency in recent years, and is related to that of recognition. Following developments in economics, politics, and other fields in the twentyfirst century, there was a striking increase in the local consciousness of Chinese academic circles. The approach to the question of Chinese philosophy’s status as philosophy changed accordingly.

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Those with a rather strong local consciousness felt that Chinese learning should use Chinese concepts to provide explanations. As for Chinese academics of the past, can their thought and learning be incorporated into the category of philosophy? This raises further questions. The logical premise of this question is that philosophy is a Western concept, as is furthermore the case with philosophical forms. If philosophy originated in the West, then classifying Chinese philosophy as philosophy implies its Westernization. This concerns the problem of identification. Though the problem of identity seems diametrically opposed to the problem of recognition, these two poles are in fact linked. Recognition takes Western philosophy as the sole paradigm and raises questions accordingly. Questions of identification arise only after the development and strengthening of local consciousness. Despite their different standpoints, the two have similarities, which manifest themselves through the question of Chinese philosophy’s status as philosophy. If we are to say that recognition concerns the variety of philosophical forms, then identification must concern the universality of philosophy. Although Chinese philosophy emerges through the unique form of the study of human nature and dao, its questioning of the world and of human existence at the level of wisdom can be traced back to philosophy, a way of grasping the world. Although Chinese philosophy does not employ the concepts of subject and object in the Western sense, and instead concerns more the relationship between the two, the knowledge of the world indeed has an epistemological meaning. Although there is no simple compatibility between subject and object in the Chinese sense and in that of the West, the two concepts nevertheless have an epistemological meaning, implying a necessary relationship between the two philosophies. In a certain sense, this demonstrates the fact that Chinese philosophy has universal philosophical contents, and therefore is not necessarily and should not be considered separate from universal philosophical forms. The use of local consciousness to separate Chinese philosophy from philosophy expresses narrowness and prevents one from sincerely grasping the connotations of Chinese philosophy. Identification affirms the universal characteristics that mark Chinese philosophy as philosophy, resisting the self-demarcation and self-isolation that dissociates Chinese philosophy from philosophy. Having identified these characteristics as displayed in the modern academic form of Chinese philosophy, we must encourage their transformation into objects of understanding, discussion, and criticism in world philosophy, and go one step further in allowing them to participate in the construction of world philosophy.

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Corresponding with the union between identification and recognition, on the one hand, it is necessary to fully affirm the individual characteristics of each philosophical form. Behind recognition is the articulation of individuality and uniqueness; the essence of the concept is a respect for variety. In observing and conducting discussions related to Chinese philosophy, one must especially consider the concrete connotations, specific forms of expression, and unique meanings and significations in its use of language and concepts. Recognition at this level both acknowledges that philosophy can emerge in diverse forms, and stresses the individual uniqueness of those forms. On the other hand, one cannot neglect the universal significance embedded in the form of Chinese philosophy. Behind identification is the articulation of universality; the essence of the concept is the self-aware consciousness, one that confirms the universal theoretical significance of Chinese philosophy. In observing and learning Chinese philosophy, one must stress its individual characteristics and unique form while simultaneously paying heed to this universal significance. It must be emphasized that the union between recognition and identification is not merely something to be observed in past philosophical perspectives. Chinese philosophy is both a historical form and a part of the process through which history is generated. This process continues today and manifests itself in the construction and development of Chinese philosophy in a modern context. In the background of the interaction between Chinese and Western philosophy, this construction and development signifies an emerging world philosophy. A world philosophy transcends a single or closed tradition, employing the various resources of wisdom developed by human beings in different cultures and improving our understanding of the world and the depth of philosophical thinking. In the coming together of Chinese and Western philosophy, the interaction between ideas and thoughts formed in distinct traditions becomes possible. Thus, at the level of identification, philosophy’s problems and its object of reflection are often related. At the level of recognition, however, the method of pondering philosophical problems and the path towards solving them may be expressed through a variety of characteristics. Dialogue and communication between cultures may provide both new resources to philosophical thought and depth to our understanding of the world. According to its original and most basic meaning, philosophy manifests itself as the observation of both the individualization and variation of wisdom. Taking the union between recognition and identification as our

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approach, historical reflection and theoretical meditation, perspectives of world philosophy, the pursuit of individualization, and the universal question and multiplicity in wisdom each present an interactive form in the contemporary continuity of Chinese philosophy. This kind of interaction not only gives universal significance to Chinese philosophy, but moreover gives its unique characteristics.

Chapter 12

Dao and Chinese Philosophy A core concept of Chinese philosophy, dao 道 (“way” “method”) refers both to the tian dao (天道), “heavenly dao” or “dao of heaven,” and the ren dao (人道), “humanistic dao” or “dao of humans.”1 As opposed to skills or techniques, dao transcends the realm of experience and manifests itself in the metaphysical realm of wisdom. Correspondingly, achieving Dao by means of skill not only indicates a transcendence of boundaries, and an integral understanding of the real world, but moreover implies a shift from knowledge to wisdom. Such an understanding is expressed through the process of “observation through dao.” The intended result of this process is a unified vision of dao, one that has overcome unilateral understandings and achieved the wisdom of dao. In Chinese philosophy, dao contains a variety of meanings, each of which can only be known and realized in the self. The link between dao and human beings manifests itself as practical wisdom. According to the notion of “setting the will in dao,” dao concerns personal growth and development and the cultivation and perfection of one’s personality. I Historically, every distinct philosophical tradition includes some basic or core concepts. In pursuit of the origin of Western philosophy, we find the concept of “logos” common among ancient Greek texts. Some contemporary, self-reflexive critiques of Western philosophy and Western culture (particularly those belonging to postmodernism) figure logoscentered thought as fundamental to this tradition. With reference to such criticism, we find as well that logos maintains a unique position in Western philosophy and culture. Likewise, the Chinese philosophical tradition has its own core concepts, encompassed by dao. The most primitive meaning of dao is a way, road, or path. This meaning is apparent in the Shijing 诗经 (“Book of Songs”): “The way to Zhou was like 1  This paper first appeared in Journal of Yunnan University 云南大学学报, vol. 6: 2010. It was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University.

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a whetstone, and straight as an arrow. The officers trod it, and the common people looked on it,”2 and “Long and tedious will be our marching; we shall hunger; we shall thirst. Our hearts are wounded with grief, and no one knows our sadness.”3 In this sense, dao refers to the way or path that simultaneously forms the human being and serves as his foundation. The features of this path have even more significance, however. It transforms into a general principle offering possibility to both the cosmos and human life. Throughout the historical development of Chinese philosophy, dao is bestowed with a higher universal implication. As a universal principle governing both the cosmos and human life, dao is on the one hand used to explain and to illustrate all phenomena of heaven, earth, the myriad things, and the complexities of the social sphere. On the other hand, it is presented as the underlying foundation of existence; the diversity of all life is traced back to dao. In Chinese philosophy, dao is expressed and developed by the concepts of heavenly dao and humanistic dao. Heavenly dao refers to nature and the cosmos, an implication which can be traced to the earliest classics of ancient China. In the Zhouyi 周易 (“Zhou Book of Changes”), we find one such early expression of this meaning in the phrase, “That which is above material form is called dao, that which is below material form is called vessel.”4 That which is above material form is differentiated from the diverse phenomena of the world of experience. In contrast to such phenomena, dao is the metaphysical reflection of the unity of existence. Insofar as dao is the ultimate principle of existence, the unlimited diversity of objects and natural phenomena transcend their distinctions and merge in their inherent relation. In this sense, unity is the core meaning of the heavenly dao. Another important meaning of dao can be found in the Zhouyi, which says, “One yin and one yang is called dao.”5 One yin and one yang refers to the interaction between the two opposite but complementary forces of yin and yang. This phrase refers to the changes and evolution of the world. Regarding actual existence, the world not only has manifold diversity but is moreover situated in a process of transition. How can we understand this process of change? Is 2  Shijing 诗经 (“Book of Songs”) in: Legge, James. The Chinese Classics. Vol. 4. (London: Trubner & Co., 1871). 3  Ibid. 4  Wang Bi 王弼, Han Kangbo 韩康伯, Kong Ying 孔颖. Zhouyi Zhengyi 周易正义 in Wu Ying Dian Shisan jing zhushu 武英殿十叁经注疏. Internet Resource: http://ctext.org/library .pl?if=gb&res=77712. 5  Ibid.

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there an internal governing rule to it? “One yin and one yang is called dao” can be seen as an answer. In this manner, dao functions as the foundation and integrated source of unity in the world of unlimited multitude and diversity. On the other hand, dao is the governing principle of the changes and development of the world. Dao has been considered as both the unified origin of the world and the rule of development in the world. According to this notion of dao, the world is not disorganized and chaotic, and subject to random change; changes occur in formal order. In terms of the relationship between the many and the one, the myriad things can be unified by a single Dao. This principle of order likewise applies to the fluctuation and evolution of things. Briefly, the above description of the heavenly dao suggests that heaven, earth, and the cosmos have an intrinsic order, and that dao is the most profound embodiment of this order. Dao refers not only to the heavenly dao but also to the humanistic dao. In the broadest sense, the humanistic dao concerns human beings, human activity, and the organization of human societies. dao manifests itself as the general principle of social activity and historical change. A well-known quote from the Zhouyi reflects this meaning: “The dao of the established man is called humaneness and proper conduct.”6 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) elaborates on the meaning of the humanistic dao while discussing the characteristics of social evolution. He says: In ancient times, there was no dao of bowing and making way for each other, in the times of Yao and Shun there was no dao of consoling the people and punishing an oppressive ruler, in the Han and the Tang dynasties they did not have the dao we have now, and now we do not have the dao of other dynasties.7 Dao is understood here as the dao of human beings or, in other words, dao in the social domain. Dao in the sense of humanistic dao concerns the ideal society, ideal culture, ideal government, ideal ethics, and so on. It was also understood as something reflected in society, culture, politics, ethics, and other value principles.

6  Ibid. 7  Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Zhouyi wai chuan 《周易外传》卷五 [Secrets of the Zhou Book of Changes] vol. 5. In: Chuan Shan Quan Shu 船山全书 [Collected Essays of Wang Fuzhi] vol. 1. (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1998), 1082.

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These implications of dao were elucidated in the treatises of ancient philosophers. Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE), the pioneer of Confucianism, said, “The superior person seeks dao and does not seek food,”8 and “The superior person worries about dao and not about being poor.”9 Seeking dao involves the pursuit of dao, worrying about dao manifests itself as a deep concern with the subject. The connotations of this concern with and pursuit of dao are the concern with and pursuit of the ideal society, culture, ethics, and so on. Kongzi also said, “Those whose dao(s) are different cannot lay plans for one another.”10 Here, dao refers to the ideal society or civilization, and the ideal political ethics. If our ideal values are different, and our pursuits of them dissimilar, then we lack a common language, and it becomes difficult to associate and communicate with each other. This is the significance of Kongzi’s saying. Another important notion contained in dao that Kongzi raises is suggested in the saying, “A human being can broaden dao, dao cannot broaden the human being.”11 Broadening dao refers to the fact that human beings can broaden the ideal socio-political and cultural ideals to achieve their implementation. Thus, dao is also the contents of these ideals, embodied in social, cultural, political, and moral practices. Dao in the sense of the humanistic dao also finds expression as a type of regulatory system. Regulation has two important functions: In its positive aspect, it tells human beings what they can do and how they should do it, or in other words it guides human beings towards what they should do; In its negative aspect, it tells people what they cannot do and applies restrictions and limitations to human conduct. Thus, dao in the sense of the humanistic dao contains a regulatory aspect. The above implications of dao, along with its primitive significance as a path, all suggest forward progress and a destination. By extension, dao functions to guide people towards a destination, or rather towards the achievement of a specific goal. Dao signifies guidance in a specific sense. Long after the original emphasis of this concept, it continues to develop and thus to function as a kind of norm or standard. Chinese philosophy repeatedly connects li 礼 or “ritual propriety,” and fa 法 “law” or “method” to dao:

8  Lunyu 2.14. 9   Ibid., 15.32. 10  Ibid., 15.40. 11  Ibid., 15.29.

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Law stems from propriety, propriety stems from rule. Rule and propriety are dao.12 The compass and the square are the utmost of the square and the circle, propriety is the utmost of the human dao.13 Law, the utmost dao under heaven.14 Propriety manifests itself in the organization of the political sphere and functions as a system of norms. Propriety belongs to the people, just as the compass and the square belong to making the circle and the square. The compass and the square provide a criterion for the circle and the square, propriety provides a general norm for proper human conduct. Similarly, the law makes concrete regulations dictating what is and is not appropriate, thereby asserting a set of regulations. Indeed, as a counterpart to propriety, the law as standardization implies a more specific sense of enforcement. In Chinese philosophy, despite the difference in characteristics of propriety and law, each is figured as an embodiment of dao, as affirmed in the following quotes: “Propriety, the utmost of the human dao,” and “Law, the utmost dao of all under heaven.” Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d. 289 BCE) said, “To obtain dao is to have much support, to lose dao is to be neglected.”15 Here, dao is used in the sense of principle and of value norms. One of the functions of such norms is to provide a standard against which to evaluate conduct. If conduct conforms with a specific standard, we can interpret it as reasonable. If it does not, then it can be considered improper. The phrase “to obtain dao is to have much support” suggests that conduct should conform with a general value principle or norm in order for it to be well-received publicly and considered legitimate. If it does not, it then lacks legitimacy, making it impossible for it to receive public approval. Other schools of thought in Chinese philosophy are likewise concerned with the standards proposed by dao. The school of Huang-Lao argues, “dao generates law.”16 Dao is understood both as the foundation of reality and as the source of law. By extension, this understanding of Dao figures it as the source not only of existence but of norms as well. 12  Li Xiangfeng 黎翔凤 (ed.), Guanzi jixiao buzheng 管子集校补正 [Collection of Annotations to the Guanzi], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2009). 13   Xunzi 荀子 19. In: Knoblock, John (trans.). Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. Vol. III. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994), 55. 14   Guanzi, 45. In: Li Xiangfeng (ed.), 2009. 15   Mengzi, 2B3. In: Lau, D.C. Mencius. (London: Penguin Books Press, 1970), 85. 16  Chen Guying 陳鼓應 (edited and annotated), Huangdi Sijing jin zhu jin yi 黃帝四經今 注今譯 [A Modern Annotation of the Huangdi Sijing]. (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2016), 2.

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Legalism places an equivalent importance on dao. Han Feizi directs us to “comply with dao and li 理 (‘principle’ or ‘coherence’)” thereby distinguishing between these two concepts. In comparison with principle, dao is an even more fundamental rule. In this context, to comply with dao is to give significance to dao as a unique standard. The heavenly dao implies biran 必然 (“what is necessarily the case”) and is the foundation of the cosmos and nature. On the other hand, the meaning of the humanistic Dao, which is the ideal and norm for the social domain, is expressed by dangran 当然 (“what should be the case”). In considering this relationship, one finds that dao touches upon the questions of what the world is and how the world exists, as well as questions of what one should do and how one should act. In terms of the heavenly dao, the world is a unified diversity in a constant process of transformation. In terms of the humanistic dao, these questions involve the human being in himself, as well as his behavior in society. It should be noted that, from the perspective of dao, these questions are inherently related to one another. II In to Chinese philosophy the concept of dao includes both the heavenly dao and the humanistic dao. It is distinct from both specific things and specific knowledge and skill. This point was clarified in Zhuangzi’s 庄子 (d. 286 BCE) famous story “Cook Ding Carving the Ox.” The defining feature of this fable is its elevation of dao above skill. The inherent connotation of this distinction between skill and dao is as follows: restriction at the level of knowledge and skill can nevertheless lead to a whole and comprehensive understanding of the object. In this sense, the concept of “entering dao by skill” suggests that by understanding the world through experience and skill we elevate our grasp of it. We are met with a similar distinction in Confucianism. As mentioned above, Confucianism affirms, “What is above material forms is called dao, what are below material forms are called vessels.” This saying establishes the difference between dao and vessels. Dao is something above material forms, reflecting both wholeness and comprehensiveness, while vessels are particular, concrete objects. The intention of this distinction is to contradict the idea of vessels as being restrictive. It suggests instead that, by following vessels, we move in the direction of dao. Vessels are specific things with boundaries between one another. At the level of vessels, the world emerges in separate forms. However, we frequently nonetheless take what is above the existence of forms and separate it from these restrictions. Thus, in departing from vessels and moving in

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the direction of dao we transcend these boundaries and arrive at an understanding of wholeness, of the unification of the cosmos and the myriad beings. While discussing the relationship between dao and the myriad beings, Xunzi 荀子 (d.  238  BCE) provides an illustration, saying, “The myriad beings for dao are all one side, one thing for the myriad beings is one side. The foolish one takes one thing and one side and himself believes he knows, this is not knowledge.”17 Things belong to the category of vessels. “One-sided” is a type of restriction, a one-sided thing. We are met not by one thing, however, but by myriad things, which appear to us in their diversity. Seen from the dimension of dao, however, the myriad things are, in Xunzi’s sense, merely one side. In his comparison of dao to the myriad things, Xunzi makes prominent dao’s characteristics of wholeness and unity. Every designated object has restrictions; this object is not that object. If we focus only on this aspect, it becomes difficult to achieve a true understanding of the world. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, in attempting to understand the world we must transcend these restrictions, and move not only from one thing to the myriad things but continue one step further and elevate our vision to the dao. As for the different forms through which to grasp the world, the distinction between skill and dao also concerns that between knowledge and wisdom. Relative to dao, skills operate at the level of knowledge gained from experience. Knowledge always points towards concrete objects. dao transcends the sphere of experience and manifests itself as metaphysical wisdom, which likewise signifies having transcended the restrictions of knowledge and arrived at a full understanding of the world. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, only by understanding dao as the one can we arrive at the domain of wisdom. In the “advance from skill to dao,” we find a reference to surpassing these restrictions, arriving at a true and whole comprehension of the world, and thus moving from knowledge in the direction of wisdom. III In Chinese philosophy, dao is not only the principle of the world itself but also the contents of human understanding and recognition of the world. As previously noted, the phrase, to “advance from skill to dao,” also refers to the shift from understanding at the level of knowledge and skill to understanding at 17   Xunzi 19. In: Knoblock, 1994, 14–23.

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the level of wisdom. Understanding the world through wisdom is to realize the true form of the world. Kongzi said, “There is one single thread binding my way together.”18 The dao, or way, contains a universal value principle and concerns knowledge of the world. This phrase refers to the preservation of a consistent value principle, and demonstrates an understanding of the world that includes both general and finite substances. Kongzi said, “He has not lived in vain who dies in the evening having been told about dao in the morning.”19 Here, dao similarly incorporates the notion of form. From a logical point of view, “hearing the dao” is linked to speech; the prerequisite of the dao that can be heard is the dao that can be spoken of. In fact, except for the meaning of dao as a road or path, the most primitive meaning of dao involves speech. In the Shijing, we find the following formulation: “The story of the inner chamber cannot be told. What would have to be told would be the vilest of recitations.”20 Dao, as implied here, here refers to speech. The Confucian understanding of dao stresses the origin of its overall meaning in this sense of speech becoming a “dao that can be spoken of.” In terms of the contents of dao, “hearing dao,” “seeking dao,” and “achieving dao” make up a single sequence, which implies the achievement of a true understanding. Thus, according to Confucian classics, the meaning of dao was originally concretized as a true recognition of the world. Regarding the true form of dao, Chinese philosophy often distinguishes between that which is done “on behalf of learning” and “on behalf of dao.” We can see this the Daodejing 道德经 (“The Way and Power”), which says, “One who engages in learning increases daily. One who hears of the dao diminishes daily.”21 To “engage in learning” is to engage in a process of seeking knowledge in the realm of experience, though its objective is primarily limited to a specific object in the world of natural phenomena. “On behalf of dao” refers to one’s focus on the metaphysical foundation of existence. This is the effort to grasp the principles of unity and development in the world. In Laozi’s 老子 (dates unknown) view, to engage in learning in daily experience is an endless and increasing process of knowledge accumulation. 18   Lunyu 4.15. In: Lau, 1979, 33. 19  Ibid. 4.8. 20  Qiang You Ci, Odes of Yong, “Book of Songs” Legge, James (trans.) 1871. http://ctext.org/ book-of-poetry/odes-of-yong. 21  Moeller, Hans Georg (trans.), Daodejing: The New, Highly Readable Translation of the LifeChanging Ancient Scripture Formerly Known as the Tao Te Ching. (Chicago and La-Salle: Open Court Press, 2007), 115.

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The concept on behalf of dao is premised on the deconstruction of that ­experience-based system of knowledge, a process of diminishment. The difference between these two processes demonstrates the difference between knowledge and wisdom. Through the form of wisdom, dao emerges and manifests itself as something that concerns true knowledge of the world. Similar ideas are evident in the Zhuangzi 庄子 (“Book of Master Zhuang”). In the Tianxia 天下 (“All Under Heaven”) chapter Zhuangzi 庄子 (d. 286 BCE) critiques the thought of previous and contemporary schools. In his view, different thinkers and schools of thought only stress specific aspects of dao and have yet to grasp the meaning of dao as something comprehensive, thereby causing “the dao of all under heaven to split”: Everyone in the world did whatever he wished, and was the rule to himself. Alas! the various schools held on their several ways, and could not come back to the same point, nor agree together. The students of that later age, unfortunately, did not see the undivided purity of heaven and earth, and the great scheme of truth held by the ancients. The system of the dao was about to be torn in fragments all under the sky.22 The “system of the dao” referenced here functions as the whole truth, but between the Hundred Schools of Thought it was split into many fragments. The Warring States period was a time of contention among the Hundred Schools. Various schools were formed, each established its own explanations, and debates were held between them. According to Zhuangzi’s understanding, these people and school of thoughts, for the most part, captured just one side of the dao and failed to comprehend dao itself from the all-encompassing point of view. This fractured the original unity and intactness of the truth. Zhuangzi, worried about this phenomenon, repeatedly proposed his criticisms. Similarly, in Confucianism, we find an affirmation of the all-encompassing character of dao. Xunzi compares and observes the various notions and doctrines of Confucian schools as well as those of former kings and sages. In his view, the genuine Confucian scholar always considers dao as a single thread. According to this view, dao is the conception of the world as stable and intact, a stability which is reflected in different processes of advancing knowledge:

22   Zhuangzi 33. Legge, James (trans.). See electronic resource: http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/ tian-xia.

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“Through a thousand affairs and ten thousand changes, his dao is one—this is the confirmation of a great Confucian.”23 Likewise, throughout history, though modes of existence varied, the dao of the sage kings (their grasp of the world, as well as the general wisdom they considered) was identical from beginning to end. This type of wisdom is solidified in the ancient classics: “The dao of the Hundred Kings is at one with the sage. Hence, the dao expressed in the Odes, Documents, Rituals and Music returns to this oneness.”24 As the concrete form for recognizing the world, dao is in a continuous process of responding to change, revealing its total consistency: What has remained unchanged through the Hundred Kings is sufficient to be regarded as the connecting thread of dao. With each rise and fall, respond with this connecting thread: apply the connecting thread with reason, and there will be no disorder.25 To summarize, the unity of dao is reflected in two aspects: grasping the wholeness among diversity, and revealing the consistency among various changes (the principle of consistency). From these two distinct aspects, we conclude that dao is both the principle of unification and the principle of development. Both opposite and complementary to the affirmation and persistence in the unity of dao is to discard the saying: “The system of the dao was about to be torn in fragments all under the sky.” Xunzi’s discussion in “Dispelling Blindness” emphasizes the latter aspect. Regarding blindness,26 Xunzi conducts an analysis as follows: One can be blinded by desire or aversion, by the beginnings of things or their end, by what is remote or what is near, by broadness or shallowness, by antiquity or modernity. Since each of the myriad things evokes a different reaction, there is none that could not obsess the mind. This is the universal flaw of the operation of the mind.27

23  Knoblock, 1994, 79; translation modified. 24  Ibid., 76. 25  Ibid., 21. 26   Bi 蔽 means “to keep in ignorance” by “covering, concealing, beclouding,” as well as what “blinds” or “obsesses” us. For an explanation on the translation of the title Jie Bi 解蔽 as “Dispelling Blindness” see Knoblock, 1994. 88. 27  Knoblock, 1994. 100.

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Blindness is one-sidedness. Dispelling blindness demands one overcome every kind of one-sidedness, until he has achieved a comprehensive truth. According to Xunzi, if there are differences between objects, it is possible for them to be unilaterally oriented. If we examine once aspect and neglect the others, we may be caught in the trap of prejudice. Thus, regarding knowledge of the world, only after we have overcome one-sidedness can we reach true recognition. For Chinese philosophy, true recognition results from the process of observation through dao, and its contents are represented through the unified dao. Thus, only by discarding and overcoming biases can one reach a true understanding of the world. Obtaining the truth through this process of observation also means to reach wisdom through dao. IV In Chinese philosophy, dao is the ultimate principle of truth, cosmic unity, and human life. It is impossible to separate dao from human beings. In the Daodejing, it says, “In the land, there are four greats”:28 “Therefore, the dao is great, Heaven is great, the earth is great, the king is also great. In the land there are four greats, and the king positions himself where they are one.”29 Most importantly, the king indicates a political identity. This passage emphasizes that the king exists in relation to heaven, earth, and dao. He is another form of existence—that is, of human existence. In other words, the king is understood as a symbol or a sign marking human existence.30 Following this, in the same chapters, is the sequence: “Human beings follow earth as a rule, earth follows

28  Moeller, 2007, 63. 29  In Chapter twenty five of the Laozi this sentence has the “king” (wang 王) character twice, the He Shanggong 河上公 and Wangbi 王弼 versions have “king,” Fuyi’s 傅奕 version (Tang Dynasty) Daodejing guben pian 道德经古本篇 as well as Fan Yingyuan 范应元 (Song Dynasty) Laozi Daodejing guben jizhu 老子道德经古本集注 have “human” (人). However, based on the silk manuscripts of the Laozi from Mawangdui (马王堆帛书老子) as well as the Guodian 郭店 bamboo versions, this sentence has “king” (wang 王), hence we can confirm that the earliest versions had “king” and not human beings in general. 30  Wang Bi commented on Chapter  25 and said: “Human nature is the most esteemed between heaven and earth, and the king is the ruler of the people.” (Wang Bi 王弼 Laozi Daodejing zhu 老子道德经注). The main point in this annotation is that the word ren 人 for human beings is interpreted as wang 王—king.

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heaven as a rule, and heaven follows dao as a rule.”31 Thus, the king represents human beings. The concept of the four greats refers essentially to four items: dao, heaven, earth, and humans. In the broadest sense, wu, “things,” are also included (as part of heaven and earth). The four greats also involves people and encompasses the highest principle of both things and human beings, which is none other than dao. Dao as the highest principle is not really separate from human beings; they are two of the four greats of the land and are interrelated. Similar notions can be found in Confucianism. Confucianism repeatedly emphasizes that dao is not detached from human beings: “Dao is not far from human beings. When people try to pursue dao, which is far from the common indications of consciousness, this cannot be considered dao.”32 Dao is not something that exists in separation from human beings. If dao leaves the human sphere, it becomes merely an object of abstract analysis difficult to present in its true form. The pursuit of dao unfolds in ordinary words and ordinary action: “The dao of the superior person may be found in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common men and women; but in its utmost reaches, it shines brightly through heaven and earth.”33 Dao has universal characteristics; however, its transcendence can only be discarded while opening up to people and acting as a concrete part of human life in the world. One of the significant implications of emphasizing that dao and human beings are inseparable and interact with each other is that each of the various meanings of dao has only emerged through knowledge and the actions of human beings (including the process of recognizing the world and its changes). At the level of the heavenly dao, dao is the unified source of the myriad beings, and its meaning is demonstrated by the unceasing process of humans attempting to grasp the world. Similarly, at the level of the humanistic dao, dao as the ideal society and system of norms finds its meaning in the gradual emerging process of creating cultures, as well as in the daily actions of human beings. The concept of the ultimate origin is not distinguishable from the concept of unification; existence obtains its relative significance, which cannot be separated from human recognition of and functioning in the world. Flowers deep in the mountains bloom and wither on their own, and the question of their beauty occurs only in the aesthetic activity of human beings.

31  Moeller, 2007. 63. 32   Zhongyong 13. 33   Zhongyong 12.

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In the same way, dao as the ideal human society and a system of norms is formulated through knowledge and the actions of human beings. Implied in the above descriptions of dao is the idea “dao is not far from humans.” From a philosophical perspective, the inherent result of the theorization of dao in these various senses is to link the process of human efforts to understand the world with the process of generation. This approach is different from that which uses an artificial method of argument to compose an abstract world. In every respect, it stresses the significance of grasping the world in terms of the generation of meaning. Another implication of this connection between dao and human beings is something called “dao of everyday use.” This concept emphasizes that dao does not exist apart from daily conduct; it is an intrinsic part of everyday life. The importance of this notion lies in its rejection of the perception of dao as something that exists on in the other world or as an object of transcendence. This notion figures dao as something on in this world, giving it an intimate relationship with daily conduct. In terms of value, it allows people to observe real and concrete existence and not a transcendent, otherworldly existence. In the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects”), there is a similar notion. When Kongzi’s disciple asks Kongzi to teach him about serving supernatural beings, Kongzi’s response is, “While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve supernatural beings?” His disciple proceeds to ask about death, and as before Kongzi’s response is, “While you do not know life, how can you know death?”34 Supernatural beings, contrary to actual human beings, transcend our experience. Death signifies the end of this life, and these opposites are antithetical forms of our actual existence. In Kongzi’s view, we should be concerned not with transcendent beings or something remote from our actual existence, but instead with that actual existence and with life. In short, with reference to the notion “dao is not distant from people,” we find that in all respects Confucianism draws our attention back to the actual world. The above notions do not only exist in Confucian and Daoist philosophies, but are in some manner also reflected in the ideologies of religions. For example, Buddhism. Buddhism is a religion that originated in India, which upon importation to China experienced a process of development and transformation through which it gradually became inclined towards Chinese characteristics. The classic form of syncretized Buddhism is Chan Buddhism. As it became a Chinese form of Buddhism, the most important characteristic of Chan 34   Lunyu 11.12.

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was its focus on integrating the “Loka” (this world) with the “Lokuttara” (the other world).35 In ancient Buddhism (original Buddhism), the highest goal of human life is to become a Buddha, which signifies having broken out of the cycle of reincarnation and entered the transcendent kingdom of heaven. Thus, there is a sharp distinction between the Loka and the Lokuttara: only by transcending the profane (secular) world can one reach the permanent kingdom of heaven. However, from the perspective of Chan Buddhism, there is no such sharp distinction between the Loka and the Lokuttara. If one is involved in life, and without ceasing his involvement awakens from the confusion of reality, then he may at once enter the realm of the kingdom of heaven. The boundaries between the Loka and the Lokuttara are connected. In fact, this perspective is compatible with the concept, “dao is in daily usage.” The otherworldly, or the transcendent world, is therefore connected to the actual world; there is no existing gap between them. In one sense, this phenomenon indicates that the understanding of dao in Chinese philosophy influences beliefs found in Chinese religions. In short, at the philosophical level, the affirmation of a connection between dao, human beings, and society links the metaphysical with the actual. The fundamental direction here is to pursue meaning in actual existence as opposed to in fabricated debates over cosmogony and worldviews. At the level of value, this direction is expressed in a concern with actual existence, far removed from abstract discussions. This concern reflects the pursuit of dao and constitutes the most crucial aspect of wisdom in Chinese philosophy. The concept “dao is not far from the person” suggests that human practice cannot be separated from dao. In practice, dao manifests itself as “the middle way.” Confucianism repeatedly discusses the “middle way” or the “way of the golden mean.” Mengzi advocates “standing in the middle path,”36 and Xunzi says, “What is good in the way, its middle is to be followed, the unbalanced cannot be the way.”37 As dao is the principle of practice, its meaning is reflected in taking the middle course. The middle is not merely a quantitative concept. If we approach it in terms of quantity, however, the middle is the point of equal distance between two extremes. Nevertheless, in Chinese philosophy, the term applies 35  Translator’s note: Shijian yu chu shijian 世间与出世间, namely “this world” and the “transcendent world” originate from the Pali: “Loka” and “Lokuttara”—which I choose to maintain in this translation. 36   Mengzi 7A4. 37   Xunzi 17.

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to the process of practice. It is a principle that brings all kinds of relationships into harmony, and is associated with the core connotations of dao. In terms of the heavenly dao, the middle expresses the unification of the multitude. In this sense, the middle way harmonizes every aspect in a whole entity. When diverse things are placed in a single system, how do we position them in their appropriate places and enable each one to achieve its correct position? This is the problem that the middle way attempts to solve. Dao is likewise reflected in the process of change and manifests itself as the principle of development. In terms of processes, the middle applies to the problem of how to harmonize different stages of evolution. As described here, middle implies a concentration on the concept of measures. Although ancient Chinese philosophers did not use the word measure in a philosophical manner, sayings such as “too far is as bad as not enough,” “the middle way,” etc. express this concept. This sense of consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of measures, can also be considered as a kind of practical wisdom. In other words, when associated with practice, dao is developed through this concept of measures in order to turn practical wisdom into something concrete. This concept of measures has a number of implications for that of practical wisdom. The Zhongyong 中庸 (“Focusing the Familiar”)38 raises an important issue, saying, “The myriad things grow together but do not harm one another.” This proposition has an ontological meaning, and touches upon the practices of human beings. From the ontological point of view, it suggests that each of the various kinds of beings in the objective world has a foundation for its existence; they are all equal under the sky. In other words, the different objects in the objective world are related by their coexistence. From the perspective of human practice, the saying, “The myriad things grow together but do not harm one another,” concerns the coexistence of different individuals, nationalities, and countries. The problem with this relationship is that it recognizes the differences between individuals and the splits between distinct social realms. These separations belong to a process of historical evolution. How does this process construct different forms of existence in the world without conflict? This is the substantial question addressed by this saying. This process of growing together without interference requires a principle of the middle way such as that which is offered by the concept of measures, one which is suited to harmonize the commonalities of society. There is no 38  The title Zhongyong as “Focusing the Familiar” follows the translation by Roger T. Ames and David Hall. See: Ames, Roger  T. and Hall, David (trans.). Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Interpretation of the Zhongyong, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001).

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definite rule for this method of harmonization, which moreover has no constant sequence. It must be regulated according to concrete human practices. This form of regulation reflects the wisdom of measures. Regarding the spiritual life of the individual, the Zhongyong says the following: The moment at which joy and anger, grief and pleasure, have yet to arise is called a zhong 中, “nascent equilibrium”; once the emotions have arisen, and have all been brought into proper focus, this is called he 和 “harmony.”39 This approaches the question of equilibrium, focus, and harmony in terms of emotions. What have yet to arise, in this sense, are emotions that have not yet made an outer appearance; once the emotions are revealed we ought to pursue harmony. In order to achieve harmony, we need “proper focus.” This is called preserving the “correct measure” when revealing emotions. In specific contexts, joy, anger, grief, and pleasure all have their specific measures (extents to which they are revealed), and one must grasp appropriate behavior in order to achieve that which is most suitable. To “exceed” or to “fall short of” expresses a lack of mental harmony and unity. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200) speaks about this in more concrete terms. Discussing joy, anger, grief, pleasure, and other emotions, he says the following: As for both happiness and anger, happiness should be to a certain degree, if one’s happiness exceeds that degree, this is not harmonious; anger should be to a certain degree if one’s anger exceeds that degree, this is not harmonious.40 Harmony is a form of unification and can be viewed as an expression of dao in the mental realm. According to Zhu Xi, the emotions that cannot be maintained according to the correct measure of a given circumstance are the difference between he (“harmony”), “what should be the case,” and reality. Insofar as they exceed this measure they deviate from harmony. Zhu Xi’s criticism of that which is not harmonious implies the following: conforming to a correct measure is prerequisite to achieving a form of mental harmony. The concepts of the correct measure and the middle way constitute 39  Ames, Roger and Hall, David (trans.). 2001. 40  Zhuxi 朱熹 Zhuzi Quan Zhu《朱子全书》[Zhu Xi’s Complete Writings], vol. 16, (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 2010), 2042.

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practical wisdom, and imply that individuals should transform themselves in order to maintain their situation in a certain realm, a realm that enables them not to exceed the correct measure. In Chinese philosophy, the significance of the middle way is that it is often realized in the connection between jing 经 (“dogma,” “guideline,” “constant”) and quan 权 (“measure,” “expedient,” “transitory”). The jing or “constant” refers primarily to the universality and the absoluteness of principles, and transitory to their flexibility. The latter is premised on the analysis of different circumstances. The analysis of concrete situations creates a suitable harmony between the constant and the transitory. This is also a concrete manifestation of the middle way. Kongzi says, “The superior person’s stance towards the world is this: there is nothing he insists on, nothing he refuses, he simply aligns himself beside the appropriate.”41 The original meaning of yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” or “equitable”), is comparable to the concept of “what should be the case.” When used in the context of that which is not insisted upon and not refused, however, it refers not only to the suitable but also to the appropriate. When facing complex objects and relationships in the world, people should not rely on one specific mode of action (people should not insist), nor should they reject possible opportunities (people should not refuse). They should instead choose the most appropriate way of action according to the specific circumstances. These two concepts manifest themselves in human efforts to maintain the middle way between insistence and rejection of specific modes of action. This is the practical wisdom found in the analysis of concrete situations. V The middle way is an embodiment of dao in practical wisdom. In a certain sense, it manifests itself as the link between dao and human beings. In Chinese philosophy, apart from its development into concrete practical wisdom, the concept of the middle way involves the question of a person’s growth and development, or the cultivation and perfection of one’s personality. Kongzi says, “Set your heart on dao, base yourself in virtue, rely on humanness, and journey in the arts.”42 Setting your heart means defining a goal and beginning to work towards its achievement. Dao reflects a certain value ideal. 41   Lunyu 4.10. 42   Lunyu 7.6.

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Thus, to set your heart on dao means to take this value ideal as the goal of personal development. What is meant, in concrete terms, by a personality cultivated to perfection under the guidance of dao? In our effort to answer this question, we must refer to another point of view held by Kongzi. Discussing the junzi 君子 or “superior person,” Kongzi says, “The superior person is not a vessel.”43 The superior person refers here to a perfected personality, while a vessel refers to a designated implement. As previously noted, Chinese philosophy makes a clear distinction between dao and vessels with the saying “Above the forms is called dao, below the forms is called vessel.” Dao displays universality and unity, it transcends objects; the concept of vessels refers to specific, delineated objects. In concrete terms, the concept of vessels has two significant meanings. The first is of a thing that exists in contrast to human beings (vessels are things and not human beings). The second meaning is of a designated thing with specific attributes; this thing and not that thing. Thus, there is a clear distinction between each vessel, or thing. In this context, Kongzi’s saying has at least two implications. First, human beings and things do not exist on equal terms. Second, the human being cannot be defined by a specific aspect. In other words, while the superior person is an ideal character, he nonetheless embodies the concept of “humans as humans” (unlike things), as well as the variety of human characteristics that cannot be simplified or defined unilaterally. This kind of variety is often understood in Chinese philosophy as something complete and pure. The prescriptions for the ideal character are intrinsically related to the unity of dao. In a certain sense, the unity and completeness of dao serves as the ontological foundation for the diversity of the ideal character. In terms of values, the ideal character is also expressed through mental orientation, which is similarly connected to the diversity that exists in dao. As previously mentioned, dao is not only the principle of existence and the pattern of transformation in the world, but also describes the humanistic dao (i.e. value principles, social ethics, ideals, etc.). Thus, it is both an intrinsic part of the world itself as well as something governing concrete reality. Authenticity is always the intrinsic principle of dao, regardless of whatever form dao takes: as a part real existence or as a way for grasping the reality of existence, dao first and foremost demonstrates the true characteristics (of anything). Regarding these true characteristics, dao is inherently concerned with the good. As the humanistic dao, it embodies value ideals, as well as cultural and social ideals. Here again it is inherently concerned with the pursuit of the 43   Lunyu 2.12.

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good: in order to establish an ideal society, we must orient ourselves primarily according to the good. The heavenly dao is likewise directly linked to the pursuit of the good, yet in terms of the practical activities of human beings, the heavenly dao acts both as the creator of values and the provider of their foundation. Thus, the concept of the heavenly dao incorporates the principles of existence, the activity of creating values, and maintains the notion of universal rule. The creation of values is expressed through the pursuit of the good. In this sense, dao is without doubt closely connected to the good. Moreover, dao is also connected to the idea of beauty. In Chinese philosophy, heaven and earth have their own beauty: Heaven and earth have great beauty but it is not spoken of, the four times have their brilliant rule but it is not discussed, the myriad beings accomplish intrinsic order but it is not mentioned.44 In this case, “heaven and earth” refers also to the dao of heaven and earth. In terms of the heavenly dao, the significance of the dao of heaven and earth includes that of beauty. In Chinese philosophy, the humanistic dao is likewise associated with beauty. One of the concrete manifestations of the beauty of the humanistic dao is in personality. Chinese philosophy often figures ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” or “equitable”) li 礼 (“ritual,” “ritual propriety”) and yong 勇 (“bravery”) as the ideal characteristics, which when placed together are also considered “the beauty of dao”: “The great humaneness, appropriateness, and bravery is the beauty of dao.”45 The direction “set your heart on dao” is based on a connection between truth, goodness, and beauty. Placed together these serve as a foundation for the development of the diversity of the human character and constitute the implied values of the ideal character. A personality guided by dao develops according to the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty. The perfected character manifests itself not only as an inherent characteristic but always through an outer form of expression as well. What’s more, it emerges concretely in the process of proper conduct. Here the connection between speech and conduct, and knowledge and conduct, is involved. These 44   Zhuangzi 22.2. 45  Xu Gan 徐干, Zhong Lun 《中论》 [Balanced Discourses], in Xu Gan Zhonglun xiaozhu xia 《徐干中论校注下》 [Annotation of Xu Gan’s Balanced Discourses] vol. II, edited by Chi Tian 池田 and Xiu San 秀三, (Bejing: Jingdu Daxue Wenxuebu Yanjiu Jiyao, 1986).

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connections likewise concern the inherent implications of dao. As previously mentioned, one of the original meanings of dao is of a path, a path which can be taken, as for example in the phrase, “dao, once walked, is accomplished.”46 Dao also refers to both speech and truth. In this sense, the pursuit of dao inherently unfolds in the interaction between speech and conduct, or knowledge and conduct. Regardless of whether we are referring to speech or truth, the question is always how we concretely realize or practice dao. This is evident in the phrase, “Sit and speak, raise up and implement, see if it can be practiced.”47 According to its implications, dao also defines the mode of existence of the ideal character: the process of the development and cultivation of the human character inherently demonstrates the connection between knowledge, speech, and conduct. Chinese philosophy repeatedly emphasizes that both speech and conduct, as well as knowledge and conduct, should be unified. This notion likewise constitutes the meaning of to “act on behalf of dao.”

46   Zhuangzi 2.6. 47   Xunzi 23.

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The Question of Human Nature in Chinese Philosophy I The discussion of human nature first and foremost involves xing 性 (“nature,” “disposition,” “natural tendencies”) in the broad sense, as well as its various implications.1 The idea of nature in ancient Chinese philosophy corresponds closely to the modern philosophical concept of benzhi 本质 (“essence”). Early on in the history of Chinese philosophy, Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d. 289 BCE) conducted a deep investigation of human nature. His basic argument is: “Talking about human nature is about carrying on.”2 According to this idea, the discussion of nature is substantially developed at the level of “carrying on.” This concept serves as the foundation of all beings. Therefore, it has a direct connection to the modern philosophical concept of essence. In Western philosophy, the direct correlate would be the idea of nature, which inherently contains the significance of the concept of essence. Indeed, what we must observe here is the difference in emphasis between essence and nature. Nevertheless, we should also observe their similarity, as we can neither deny nor ignore the connection between these two philosophical concepts. These issues concern the relationship between human nature and essence. These two concepts, in both their philosophical discussion and concrete manifestation, present at times differences in their preferred emphases. In certain contexts, the concepts of human nature and inherent qualities are related, and are thus connected to the already accomplished and existing form of the inseparable outline (fixed rule) that human beings have. The inherent qualities of an individual being indicate that such individuality exists alongside an innate formulation. Thus, the inherent qualities of human beings have similar connotations. In contrast, the concept of the essence of the human being emphasizes a deeper level of social significance. Karl Marx understood the essence of the 1  This chapter was first published as an article in Philosophical Analysis 哲學分析, 2013, Vol. 1. It was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University. 2  Mengzi 4B54.

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human as “the sum of social relations.” He expressed the concrete implications of this notion as previously described. This essence of the human is not inherent. In their absolute beginning, human beings have only a biological existence, and obtaining their essence depends on a broader sense of the process of social practices connections. The human essence itself gradually takes form within this process, thus carrying the meaning of both becoming and accomplishing. According to the famous existentialist saying, existence comes before essence. Contained in this concept is a deconstruction of essentialism. One of the implications of its logic is that the essence of the human being is not something inborn: human beings are first thrown into this world and later, through the process of their ideas, intentions, and choices, gradually form their own essence. In this sense, existentialism takes essence as a second nature. It should be noted that there are differences between the concrete implications of human nature and human essence: human nature refers to something innate, something we already have and that, as an established form, cannot be chosen, while essence is connected to the process of becoming and accomplishing. On a different level, however, precisely as described above, nature and essence are not sharply distinct. The concepts of human nature and human essence have meeting points. Regarding human nature, neither the terms used in Chinese philosophy nor the meanings implied in Western philosophy merely indicate the general significance of innate qualities, but express instead the fundamental point that human beings differ from other beings. In Chinese philosophy, the concept of human nature emphasizes that humans are fundamentally different from birds, beasts, and animals. The discussion of human nature in Chinese philosophy often involves distinguishing humans from animals. Human nature is expressed in this sense and provides the fundamental difference between humans and beasts. In Western philosophy, there are similar notions regarding the understanding of human nature. In David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, the title alone tells us that this work discusses this concept. As for its contents, it analyzes the human understanding of sympathy and passion, and ethical practices in relation to them. Regardless of whether it is understanding in the broad sense, or emotions in the context of ethics, this debate provides rules for the difference between humans and animals or humans and other forms of existence. Therefore, when Hume discusses human nature, he places importance on the difference between human beings and other forms of existence. In the twentieth century, John Dewey published a book titled Human Nature and Conduct. This book focuses on the discussion of human nature, and more

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importantly connects human nature to conduct. While emphasizing that the rules for conduct describe ideal practice, they must necessarily be based on a consciousness intrinsic to human nature. Several subsequent philosophical discussions contain similar arguments. In the Oxford Companion to Philosophy, there is a section titled “Human Nature.” It concerns the explanation of “what is essentially human.”3 In the history of both Chinese and Western philosophy, all discussions of human nature involve the basic point of human beings differing from other types of existence. In this sense, the concept of human nature has common qualities with the concept of human essence. In the broad sense, both human nature and human essence concern the intrinsic characteristics of being human and principles of behavior. We must distinguish between two aspects of this issue: what is essentially human or human nature, and real human existence or the concrete existence of human beings. As described above, human essence is the fundamental distinction between human beings and other types of existence (including animals). However, real existence, or concrete existence, does not only include essence but also the principles of behavior that are common to both humans and animals, or other biological creatures. In their real and concrete existences, human beings do not merely emerge in a bare essential form but, in a broader sense, with characteristics common to animals and biological creatures. As Karl Marx said: Food, drink, sexual behavior and so on, admittedly are genuine functions of human beings. But, if these functions are separated from other human activities, and moreover become the ultimate and sole purpose, then, in this abstraction, they are then the same as animal functions.4 We must pay special attention to the fact that Marx first affirms that eating, drinking, sexual behavior, and other functions are considered “genuinely human.” He understands the background of human beings according to the genuinely human. At the same time, however, Marx emphasizes that if the above functions are separated from other social activities and considered only in their abstract form, then they are functions that belong merely 3  Honderich, Ted (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 402. 4  Marx, Karl. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The Chinese version titled: 1844 nian jingji xue zhexue shou gao 年经济学哲学手稿 1844 was published by the People’s Press in 1985. See page 51 of the Chinese version.

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to animals. He connects the functions of animals to what is genuinely human and distinguishes pure animal functions from those of human beings. Thus, the genuinely human can also be understood as the concrete human being. Regarding the conception of the concrete human being, animal functions obviously cannot be ignored: if we overlook these functions human beings appear only as abstract and bare essences and not as living, existing creatures of flesh and blood. In this sense, the discussion of what is genuinely human must include those animal features. In the philosophical sense, these features are part of what constitutes perceptual dimensions. However, if we want to distinguish human existence from other existences (including animals), we must link the discussion to what is essentially human and stress human nature. In this sense, understanding the functions of eating, drinking, and sexual behavior as genuinely human is not entirely distinct from understanding the essence of human beings as the sum of social relations. One can say that the former understanding figures human beings as a concrete and genuine existence, while the latter describes the essence of human beings as humans. In attempting to understand human beings, these two aspects must be considered. In distinguishing between human beings and other animals, we must first of all note the fundamental differences (what is essentially human), and while grasping the concrete existence of humans need also to consider the multitude of behavioral patterns. In sum, the question of human nature and of what is essentially human should be explored in relation to actual and concrete existence. We cannot limit our understanding of human beings to natural functions, nor dwell at the abstract level of essence. II The discussion that follows in understanding human nature draws us back to the context of Chinese philosophy. In Chinese philosophy, this understanding requires more than merely discussing human nature through human nature. Chinese philosophy, especially Confucian philosophy, asks a more fundamental question: “How does one become a person?” or “What does it mean to be human?” Of course, Chinese philosophy (including Confucian philosophy) does not explicitly raise this issue in the contemporary style. Through its points of emphasis, its theory is essentially concerned with the question of how to become a person. This is easily recognized in the Confucian discourse on distinguishing humans and beasts.

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In the Confucian discussion of human nature, there is an intimate relationship between human nature and its patterns and the distinction between humans and beasts. Confucian philosophers are exceptionally concerned with distinguishing between human beings and animals. In the Confucian theory of human nature, the understanding of humans as essentially good is connected to the question of how to become a human being. Mengzi puts forward the theory of the si xin 四心 (“four heart-minds”): The heart-mind of compassion is the seed of benevolence; the heartmind of shame, of dutifulness; the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart-mind of right and wrong, of wisdom.5 A cursory analysis of this passage tells us that, in the broadest sense, the four heart-minds involve moral sentiment and have different emphases. The senses of compassion and of shame can be understood as moral sentiments, while the senses of courtesy and modesty, and right and wrong, are related more to the rational sentiments of awareness. In Mengzi’s view, if one possesses only these basic sentiments of morality and rationality he can nonetheless be called a human being. In addition, Mengzi mentions “slight” as a key concept, saying, “Slight is the difference between man and lower animals.”6 This does not mean that there are no differences between humans and beasts. On the contrary, it suggests that humans and beasts have fundamental differences. According to Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (d. 1200) theory: “Although it is said that the differences are slight, exactly in this lies the difference between humans and animals.”7 These few basic points describe Mengzi’s four heart-minds, especially the implicit moral and rational sentiments. According to Mengzi, it is precisely these few fundamental points that separate human beings from other forms of existence. Mengzi’s understanding of human nature is closely linked to his understanding of what it means to be a human being. At this point we are confronted by a new problem: in terms of extrinsic qualities, it seems that there is a tension in Mengzi’s understanding of the human being. On the one hand, Mengzi affirms that all people have four heart-minds:

5  Mengzi 2A23. In: Lau, D.C. (trans). Mencius. (London: Penguin Books Press, 1970), 83. 6  Mengzi, 4B13. In: Lau, 1970, 131. 7  Zhuxi 朱熹 Zhuzi Quan Zhu 《朱子全书》 [Zhu Xi’s Complete Writings], vol. 16, (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 2010), 358.

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The heart-mind of compassion is the seed of benevolence; the heartmind of shame, of dutifulness; the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart-mind of right and wrong, of wisdom.8 On the other hand, he also says: Without the heart-mind of compassion, one is not human; without the heart-mind of shame and dutifulness, one is not human; without the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty, one is not human; without the heart-mind of right and wrong, one is not human.9 The two seem to be contradictory: Mengzi claims that every person has a heart-mind of compassion and shame, but the logic of his argument, “Without the heart-mind of compassion, one is not human,” suggests the possibility of a situation in which one lacks the heart-mind of compassion, and of other moral sentiments. The key, here, is in the distinction between what should be and what is naturally there. According to Mengzi, in terms of what exists naturally, human beings are all born with four heart-minds (of moral and rational sentiments). In terms of the actual configuration of existence, however, and for a variety of reasons, the moral sentiments that people naturally have may be lost. Moreover, once they are lost, the person is no longer a person in the natural sense. Precisely because of this, Mengzi goes on to say, “The sole concern of learning is to go after this strayed heart-mind”10 This pursuit of the strayed heart-mind is based on this concept of the loss of the natural heart-mind. One of the functions of the cultivation of moral integrity is to seek the return of the heart-mind, which we had naturally and lost. If we say that all human beings naturally have the four heart-minds, then the process of going after the strayed heart-mind is something that we should do (here again, what should be is opposed to what is naturally there). In fact, Mengzi’s two arguments are not contradictory: all human beings naturally have the moral sentiments of compassion and shame, but in reality these sentiments may be lost. Once their four heart-minds are completely lost, human beings are no longer human beings in the genuine and natural sense.

8  Mengzi 6A4. 9   Mengzi 2A18. 10   Mengzi 6A34. In: Lau, 1970, 167.

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Mengzi emphasizes the pursuit of the strayed heart-mind in order for people to become genuine human beings. In daily life, people often criticize those who lack moral principle and do outrageous things (offend heaven and reason), to the degree that they hurl the rebuke, “They are not human!” This criticism emerges at the level of what should be. In Mengzi’s point of view, there is an innate relationship between the natural and what should be. As for basic motives, human beings naturally have moral and rational sentiments, and in the natural sense we are all human beings. However, the moral sentiments we have can be lost in the process of actual existence, and we therefore need to establish the view of reality as it should be. Thus, the pursuit of the strayed heart-mind can be seen as the concrete way to achieve the state of what should be. According to Mengzi, achieving the state of what should be signifies a return to our nature. In different Confucian systems, for example in Xunzi’s 荀子 (d.  238  BCE) philosophy, the natural and what should be may exist on separate levels. Xunzi says, “Human nature is evil,” maintaining: Human nature is evil; any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion. Now, the nature of man is such that he is born with a love of profit. Following this nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy tendencies to grow and courtesy and deference to disappear. Humans are born with feelings of envy and hatred. Indulging these feelings causes violence and crime to develop and loyalty and trustworthiness to perish. Man is born possessing the desires of the ears and the eyes. Indulging these desires causes dissolute and wanton behavior to result and ritual and moral principles, precepts of good form, and the natural order of reason to perish. This being the case, when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges his natural inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop. This is accompanied by violation of social class distinctions and throws the natural order into anarchy, resulting in cruel tyranny. Thus, it is necessary that man’s nature undergo the transforming influence of a teacher and the model and that he be guided by propriety and moral principles. Only after this has been accomplished do courtesy and deference develop. Unite these qualities with precepts of good form and reason, and the result is an age of orderly government. If we consider the implications of these facts, it is plain that human nature is evil and that any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion.11 11  Knoblock, 1994, 151.

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The notion that the natural disposition of human beings tends to be evil is obviously not very compatible with reality as it should be. That something should be means that it is in accordance with the standards of propriety and etiquette. From Xunzi’s perspective, the shift from natural evil to becoming as one should be involves a process of transforming human nature by conscious exertion. To transform human nature means to change the natural orientation of an evil nature, which in turn causes the existence of the human being to comply with social norms (propriety and etiquette). For Xunzi, the natural and what should be are contradictory. Only by discarding our natural disposition can we arrive at the state of what should be. In this regard, Xunzi and Mengzi develop their thought in different directions. In Xunzi’s understanding, natural human nature is not human nature in the genuine sense. Only by transforming human nature through conscious exertion and changing the evil disposition of human nature can one obtain human nature in a genuine sense. Xunzi further elucidates this point in his description of human nature. While comparing human nature to other forms of existence, Xunzi says: Water and fire have Qi but are not generated, grass and trees are generated but do not have knowledge, birds and beasts have knowledge but no etiquette, human beings have qi, are generated, have knowledge, and even have etiquette, therefore they are the most precious of all under heaven.12 Knowledge includes consciousness, desire, and so forth. In his description of human nature as evil, Xunzi mentions that in the very beginning, human beings have all kinds of natural desires, such as the desires of the ears and the eyes, among other sensory desires. Those sensory desires belong to the category of knowledge in the broadest sense. According to Xunzi, mere knowledge does not indicate one has become a person in the genuine sense. On the contrary, only when one goes a step further and elevates this knowledge into etiquette can one be considered an accomplished person. In short, the fundamental difference between human beings and other existences is etiquette. Human nature in this sense is not what Xunzi calls the genuine human nature. Only by “transforming human nature by conscious exertion” can one develop etiquette as a part of one’s nature. Only then it is genuine human 12   Xunzi 9. For an alternative translation see: Knoblock, 1990, 103–4.

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nature. In this sense, the discussion of human nature is closely related to the question of how to become a human being. Systems outside of Confucianism have different understandings of human nature. For example, Daoism understands true human nature as that which comes from heaven. At a first glance, it seems that the Daoist discussion of human nature is not as closely connected to the question of how to become a person. Daoism considers human nature to be the rule of existence in the natural sense, which implies that human beings and nature are inherently linked. Daoism does not directly refer, in the genuine, Confucian sense, to any kind of humaneness. If we go a step further in this analysis, however, we notice that when the Daoist philosophical system discusses a heavenly nature, it refers not to a pure nature but to one that incorporates values and ideals. From the Daoist perspective, a human nature that includes propriety and etiquette is a distortion of heavenly nature. An existence associated with propriety and etiquette is not true nature. Only by discarding human contents and returning to heavenly nature, can one achieve a genuine human existence. In Daoism, the understanding of human nature has an essential relationship to the question of how to become a human being (that is, the question of the genuine configuration of the human being). In terms of the connection between what is naturally so and what should be the case, Daoism tends towards an understanding of the natural as what should be. In this aspect, Daoism bears similarity to Mengzi’s philosophy. There is an essential difference, however, in the two understandings of human nature. In Mengzi’s philosophy, the concept of the natural incorporates moral sentiments (which are expressed as the seeds of humaneness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom). Daoism on the other hand, takes the natural (heavenly nature) as the basis for the naturally so, and moreover considers heavenly nature to be opposed to worldly, human qualities. Daoism accordingly directs us, “Do not extinguish the heavenly by the human,” lest you “lose your nature to custom.”13 Here we have two different understandings of human nature, the Confucian and the Daoist. There is a connection between their theoretical standpoints and their different understandings of human nature. This connection is evident as well from another perspective: in Chinese philosophy, the question of human nature cannot be separated from the more fundamental question of how to become a human being. 13   Zhuangzi 17.5.

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III There is a logical connection between the questions of how to become a human being and how to become an accomplished person. The issue of human nature applies to both questions, as well as that of how to reach the realm of the greatest good, in the moral sense. The latter refers to the issue of becoming an accomplished person, discussed in abundance in Chinese philosophy. Discussion of human nature, throughout Chinese philosophy, surrounds what is natural to the human being. However, the theories includes in this discussion are characterized by the link they draw between the discussion of human nature and the pursuit of a consummate character. In brief terms, the issue of human nature does not stand alone; in its most basic definition it forms the premise of the theory of the accomplished person. From the Confucian perspective, the distinction between human beings and animals is intrinsically related to the difference between the sages and common people. As repeatedly discussed here, in the Confucian view (such as that of Mengzi), the fundamental difference between human beings and animals is found in the seeds of goodness, such as the heart-mind of compassion. This not only distinguishes humans, but allows them to aspire towards a perfectly configurated existence. The distinction between sages and common people presents the question of whether one can turn the above distinction into fact. Sages can expand the seeds of goodness to their maximum, which in turn not only distinguishes humans from animals but pushes them towards perfection, and has the potential to transform those seeds into actual human characteristics. Only by completing this transition, can one become a human being in the genuine sense and achieve an ideal personality. Here we find that, in concrete terms, there is a close relationship between the theory of human nature and the that of the accomplished person. From the above perspective, Kongzi’s (“Confucius”) (d.  479  BCE) view of human nature gives us a rather concrete understanding of the subject. As is well known, Kongzi spoke about nature together with practice, saying, “By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart.”14 Broadly speaking, practice in this sense includes two aspects. The first is custom, i.e. the social environment in the broad sense. The second is practice itself, in the sense of the individual activity of knowing and doing. From Kongzi’s point of view, the original nature of every human being is similar (though he never explicitly says whether this original nature is good or 14   Lunyu 17.2.

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evil). However, because of differences in acquired environments and practices, individual characters develops in different directions. In the Mengzi 孟子 (“Book of Master Meng”), nature, in the phrase “Nature is inherently good,” is “the nature at hand.” According to Mengzi, this original nature is good and provides every person with the potential to achieve perfect moral sentiment. This potential also serves as the necessary foundation of a consummate personality. Accordingly, for Mengzi, perfect moral integrity is not something to be absorbed or to have forced upon oneself externally, begins with this inner potential. Mengzi emphasizes the theory of human nature, in the most fundamental sense, as good, to establish an inherent foundation for the consummate personality. All human beings can become the great sage-rulers Yao or Shun. The premise for this is that all human beings have an original good nature as a foundation. This explains why, from a certain aspect, Chinese philosophy does not require a transcendent god, or an existence transcending our own experience and surpassing limits to reach an ultimate source. In Chinese philosophy, especially in the Confucian tradition of Mengzi and his followers, the original nature of human beings already has this inherent foundation. All that a person needs to do is to expand this foundation in order to accomplish himself and his personality. Unlike Mengzi, Xunzi stresses and develops Kongzi’s saying, “By practice they get to be wide apart.” Logically speaking, because Xunzi maintains that human nature is originally evil, it cannot serve as the foundation for development towards perfection. We must therefore examine existing customs (environments) and practices, which “transform human nature by conscious exertion.” Xunzi stresses the function of acquired propriety and etiquette, including legal regulations and other guidelines and restrictions, in changing one’s original evil nature and allowing him to move towards perfection. Xunzi’s theory of human nature also serves as the premise for a theory of the consummate character (that is, the theory of the accomplished person). Precisely because human nature does not tend towards goodness, “transforming human nature by conscious exertion” through the acquired practices of propriety, etiquette, and indoctrination is indispensable. These transformative practices are what Kongzi called customs and practices. While Mengzi and Xunzi develop Kongzi’s understanding of human nature in different directions, both connect it to the perfection of one’s character. Although their starting points differ, their proposed goal is the same: based on the potential of all humans to become Yao or Shun, the accomplished person is a universal ambition.

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Of course, there is a substantial difference in their methods for becoming an accomplished person. Mengzi emphasizes that human nature is essentially good, based on which the human being has an inherent foundation for becoming a perfect person. Xunzi relies for this foundation on the external influence of propriety, etiquette, and legal regulations, human nature being for him essentially evil. While Mengzi proposes an inherent foundation for becoming an accomplished person, he does not bear in mind Kongzi’s saying, “By practice they get to be wide apart.” Xunzi, affirms the function of acquired practices, cannot but neglect the inherent foundation of the accomplished person. Corresponding to this is the understanding that the growth of the human being is externally developed through a process of imposition. This is called “continually progressing and never reverting to his beginnings.”15 This concept developed during the Qin Dynasty, a development reflected in the saying, “Make the officials your teacher and the law their teachings,” which emphasizes the function of external restrictions deriving from social norms. This is an approximation of Xunzi’s concept, and seems directly connected to his thought. To summarize, Mengzi and Xunzi have different inclinations and theories of human nature, but demonstrate by way of these differences the universal character of the concrete implications of this discussion. 15   Xunzi 3.

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The Idea of Reason and Rationality in Chinese Philosophy Lixing 理性 (“rational,” “reason”) is a modern concept in Chinese philosophy that relates to reason and rationality.1 Although the terms li 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” “coherence”) and xing 性 (“nature,” “disposition,” “natural tendencies”) existed in ancient times, their combination and the acquired meaning is recent.2 That the term itself appears later on in history does not mean, however, that Chinese philosophy lacked concepts or ideas related to rationality. Broadly speaking, lixing refers to a coherent line of thought (unlike imagination, direct sensual perception, or awareness) and other forms of ability and function. It also refers to rational awareness, which combines the development of knowledge with a rational mode of conduct, and to its result. Classical Chinese philosophy did not distinguish these conceptual dimensions, but contained nonetheless the essence of the rational. In their original meaning, the above two dimensions of the rational are not unrelated or isolated from one another; in the concrete use of the concept, the forms of these dimensions are intertwined Chinese philosophy provides for close observation of these connected circumstances. I The rational is related to thought. In Chinese philosophy, rationality displayed in thought is generally related to the heart-mind, as expressed in the saying, “Thinking belongs to the office of the heart-mind.”3 1  This chapter was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University. 2  Li 理 and xing 性 appeared as a compound in classical Chinese texts. When Liu Xie 刘勰 (465–?CE) discussed different music in history he said: “Licentious, sorrowful, angry, and grieving sounds. They are not the core principles of one’s nature. Harmonious emotions are the virtuous tones of music.” (See: Liuzi Jijiao 刘子集校 [Collected Works of Liu Xie], (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 1985), 37.) Here we see the words li and xing used together as a compound. However, “lixing” in this context is not the same as the modern idea of rational. Li in this case means “arrangement,” referring to an organized nature, “lixing” corresponds to “harmonizing the emotions.” 3  Mengzi 6A21. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_015

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As a philosophical concept, the heart-mind embodies a variety of meanings and is related to rationality, emotions, and willpower. Nevertheless, as opposed to sensory knowledge, the expression of rationality in the heart-mind requires the activity of thought. Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 BCE) raised the issue of the heartmind having “characteristics of knowledge”: The heart-mind has characteristics of knowledge. Characteristics of knowledge, only when it rests on evidence provided by the ear is it possible to have awareness of the defining characteristics to know sounds, and only when it rests on evidence provided by the eyes it is possible to know shape.4 The characteristics of knowledge of the heart-mind are understood as the prerequisites for sensory knowledge. In this sense, the heart-mind is concerned with rationality. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) explicitly connected the heart-mind with the process of thought and said, “The heart-mind generates thinking,”5 as well as, “Heaven and the reflection of the heart-mind must exhaust the two, and then one is wise and clever.”6 The heart-mind that is related to thought or reflection concretely displays the characteristics of rationality. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, the process of extending one’s knowledge (recognition) does not part from the form of activity of thinking through the heart-mind: “Wisdom is generated through emptiness, the concealed is exhausted through thought, this is called knowledge acquisition.”7 Thinking through the heart-mind in the above domain of discourse relates primarily to both the form and activity of rationality. Rationality at the level of essence is manifested in universal contents such as reason, dao, justice, and others. When a person is one with the heart-mind, and the heart-mind one with reason, one aspect of this point is expressed. Mengzi 孟子 (“Mencius”) (d. 289 BCE) said, “The heart-mind has common elements.” He continues with a specific explanation: “What are the common elements of the heart-mind? 4  Xunzi 22. In: Knoblock, 1994. 129–30. 5  Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Shangshu Yinyi: tai jia er 尚書引義 [Interpretation of the Shang Book of Documents] in Chuan Shan Quan Shu 船山全書 [Wang Fuzhi’s Complete Writings], vol. II. (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1988), 301. 6  Wang Fuzhi, Xu Chunqiu Zuoshi Zhuan Bo Yi 续春秋左氏传博议 [An Extensive Commentary on Zuo’s Spring and Autumn Annals]. In: Chuan Shan Quan Shu 船山全書 [Wang Fuzhi’s Complete Writings], vol. V. (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1993), 617. 7  Wang Fuzhi. Shangshu YinYyi: shuo ming zhong er 尚書引義 [Interpretation of the Shang Book of Documents], in Wang, 1988. 312.

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We call them reason, and justice.”8 Reason and yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “equitable”) have common characteristics and are affiliated with the heart-mind. They do, however, have different focuses. Reason emphasizes the inevitable (necessity), while justice is more concerned with the way things should be. Nevertheless, in its later evolution, reason is often bestowed with a broader meaning. Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (d. 1200) definition of reason demonstrates this point: “As for all the things in the world, they must all have a logical cause, and a principle for the way they should be, that is called reason.”9 Reason, in the sense described here, does not refer merely to necessity; as with justice, it concerns the way things should be, and affirms the existence of universal norms (the standards for how things should be). In terms of rationality, the heart-mind, unlike sense perception, connotes the existence of the universal principle of existence and universal social norms. In terms of rationality and dao, the heart-mind in its relation to rationality (i.e. the reflection of the heart-mind) manifests a natural inclination towards dialectics. In discussing the debates among philosophers, Xunzi said, “Dialectics and explanations, by not allowing objects to become differentiated from their names, are used to illustrate the way of action and repose.”10 Dialectics concern rational argumentation and inference. In preventing objects from becoming “differentiated from their names,” dialectics comply with the logical form of the law of identity. “The way of action and repose” concerns the principles of change and development within existence. Logical forms apply to the relativity between the certain and the static. Illustrating “the way of action and repose” (comprehending the principles of change and development within existence) displays the characteristics of dialectical thinking. Wang Fuzhi said, “He who probes into the very root of things but loses his perspective, is a thief of Dao but remains in surplus.”11 Probing into the very root of things expresses a process of rational thinking, but to lose perspective is to grasp only one side of the things, and to be unable to grasp the unity in the wholeness of the things. In such circumstances, according to Wang Fuzhi, it is difficult to avoid deviating from the truth (harming the dao). Emphasizing the importance of the 8   Mengzi 6A22. 9   Zhu Xi 朱熹. Daxue huo Wen Shang 大學或問上 [Inquiries into the Great Learning]. In: Zhuzi Quan Shu 朱子全書 [Complete Collection of Zhu Xi’s Writings] vol. VI, (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 2002), 512. 10   Xunzi 22. In: Knoblock, 1994. 132. 11  Wang Fuzhi, Zhouyi Wai Zhuan [Commentaries on the Zhou Book of Changes]. In: Wang, 1988, 1076.

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process of rational thought, this view maintains that the premise for observation should be to notice the different aspects of things. Included in this view is the idea of dialectical thinking. From the perspective of Chinese philosophy, rational thinking cannot be limited to one side of things, and what’s more should reflect their processes of change: It is kept only through knowing the principle for its reciprocal wholeness, therefore one can carry out this without hindering that. In its change must exist its wholeness and in its wholeness must exist its change. Wholeness and change advance together so there is great usefulness, both are kept as one in the heart-mind and can thus be called the numinous.12 The direction to “carry out this without hindering that” suggests that, when grasping things in the process of thought, one should pay attention to their various aspects and to the reciprocity between them (and between aspects of different things). One must avoid strictly separating the things. The phrase, “In its change must exist wholeness and in its wholeness must exist change,” expresses that the things’ qualities of wholeness and change are not completely opposite to each other. Grasping unity (wholeness) cannot be separated from the process of change. The dialectical relationship between wholeness and change is the precise object of rational thinking (the object of the heart-mind) and at the same time constitutes its concrete substance, that which is “kept as one in the heart-mind.” In the case of necessity, the heart-mind-reason directs itself towards comprehending the world. In the case of the way things should be, the heartmind-reason directs itself towards practice. In this sense, the emphasis on the rational in Chinese philosophy (connected to the heart-mind, or reason, as the circumstance of thought) is associated to the connection between knowledge and conduct. In other words, the content of rationality is that which is comprehended of the world, and thus affiliated with practice. In their mutual relationship to rationality, knowledge and conduct are undivided. Chinese philosophy does not often acknowledge speculative rationality disconnected from practice. It is therefore difficult to separate theoretical rationality from practical rationality. This relationship between theoretical and practical rationality is connected to that between cognition and evaluation. Rationality in the broad sense involves 12  Wang Fuzhi, Zhangzi zheng meng zhu: Tian dao 张子正蒙注: 天道. [An Annotation of Zhang Zai’s Zhengmeng: On the Heavenly Dao] In: Wang, 1993, 72.

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cognition, but also concerns evaluation. The goal of cognition is to acknowledge the reality of the world and recognize other human beings. Evaluation is an effort to grasp the relationship between different values. Human beings must necessarily focus their attention through reason. Evaluation means judgment based on profit and harm, good and evil. In the broad sense of value forms, one must acknowledge and choose what is good. Despite the historical relativity of profit and harm, good and evil, if one accepts and affirms the principle of judgment, then only selecting the good and discarding the evil can be viewed as rational conduct. In the inverse, knowing something is harmful or not good and nonetheless insisting on it is thus clearly irrational. In Chinese philosophy, the cognition of facts and the evaluation of values are often associated. Knowledge involves the question of what something is, in terms of its factual contents, and as well as what something signifies, a question of value. The first question attempts to grasp the multitude of meanings in things themselves. The second asks what value things have for people. In Chinese philosophy, these two questions are the interrelated contents of rational activity. The debate over right and wrong in Chinese philosophy encompasses the ideas of both correct versus incorrect, in the epistemological sense, as well as of proper versus improper in sense of values. The criterion for distinguishing right from wrong in the epistemological sense is the ability to grasp the object as it is. Determining whether something is proper or improper in the sense of value depends on whether that thing accords to the principle of the way things should be. Later Mohism takes “distinguishing between right and wrong” as the primary purpose of argument. Mohism therefore understands the distinction between right and wrong in the sense of epistemology and implies the distinction between proper and improper in the sense of value. Up to the present, clear discrimination between right and wrong has always involved not only the truthful understanding of facts, but also the pursuit of the proper and improper in the sense of value. In terms of cognition, the debate between right and wrong develops through the unification of cognition and evaluation in the process of the reflection of the heart-mind (rationality). The relationship between cognition and evaluation is echoed in the interaction between knowledge and conduct. In discussing how to govern the world, Mozi 墨子 (d. 391 BCE) says: The wise man who has charge of governing the empire should know the cause of disorder before he can put it in order. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. It is like the problem of a physician who is attending a patient. He must know the cause of the ailment before he can cure

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it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot cure it. How is the situation different for him who is to regulate disorder? He too must know the cause of the disorder before he can regulate it. Unless he knows its cause, he cannot regulate it. The wise man who has charge of governing the empire must, then, investigate the cause of disorder.13 Although in appearance this passage only concerns how to act, it nonetheless touches upon the understanding of knowledge. Regardless of whether it is “knowing the cause of disorder” or “knowing the cause of a disease,” the knowledge involved includes the factual cognition of the object in its related domain (grasping the reason for the occurrence of disorder or disease). This kind of knowledge is not restricted to cognition at the level of facts. It is also a knowledge of value: knowing the origin of disorder is necessary for governing an empire; knowing the origin of a disease is necessary for treating an illness. This is knowledge that goes beyond merely recognizing the definition of things in and of themselves. Instead, it comprehends the way things function in their relationship to human beings. Achieving the latter is a process of evaluation. To summarize, in Chinese philosophy, rationality as expressed through reflection is first and foremost related to the heart-mind. Because the reflection of the heart-mind manifests itself as a concrete activity, it takes reason, justice, and dao, among others, as its innate contents. Rationality in Chinese philosophy is dialectical, insofar as it presents itself as a coherent line of thought. This form of rationality, in the sense of both the cognition of things (or beings) and the evaluation of judgment and assertion of values, presents two sides of a single coin. II As previously described, the development of both the process of knowledge and that of its conduct signifies that lixing in the broad sense refers to rationality. Rationality concerns the rational method of knowledge and conduct as well as its results. At the level of knowledge, rationality in the sense of reason expresses an adherence to the principles of thought, and as a concept emphasizes justification and foundation. In discussing the rational in the process of debate, Mozi says: 13  Mozi 4A1. See Legge (www.ctext.org/mozi/book-4).

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The magnanimous remind each other of the principle of right and wrong and of what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected. He who has no cause follows him who has it. He who has no knowledge follows him who has knowledge. Running short of argument, he would acknowledge defeat, seeing good he would be converted.14 In other words, what is accepted or rejected during the process of debate depends on its justification and foundation. This method of argument stands in opposition to that which requires clinging to one’s opinions or rhetorical exaggeration without foundation; it has rational, or reasonable, characteristics. Chinese philosophy highly regards the saying “generates by cause, develops by reason, and carries out by categories.”15 In a broader sense, this phrase means, “Accomplished speech has reason, preservation has cause,” and reflects the requirements of rationality. In Chinese philosophy, rationality in the sense of reason is also associated with appropriateness. For Chinese people, the activities of speech and conduct, and knowledge and conduct, as according to reason, must conform to propriety. Indeed, propriety and reason often appear to be connected. Both concern appropriateness: Propriety follows the emotions of the people, goes along with the principle of appropriateness, and is used to set up rituals. Therefore, those who follow propriety are said to have principle. Principle is also such, it clarifies the distinction of social statuses to understand appropriateness. Therefore, propriety comes out of appropriateness, appropriateness comes out of principle. Principle follows the appropriateness of matters.16 Appropriateness here is not an abstract principle; it expresses the suitability of speech to action. That they follow the appropriateness of matters indicates that speech and conduct accord to principle. Having taken suitability as its form, principle is based in the concrete conditions of the emergence and development of that suitability. In this case, that which accords to principle takes the form of appropriateness. Examining the historical evolution of Chinese culture, one finds that many use pragmatic rationality to generalize the Chinese understanding of

14   Mozi 9B6. See Legge (https://ctext.org/mozi/anti-confucianism-ii). 15   Mozi 11A3. 16   Guanzi 36.6.

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rationality.17 Pragmatism here is distinguished from speculative analysis or abstraction, and thus reflects, from a certain perspective, the above characteristics of rationality in Chinese philosophy. Of course, the term pragmatism may itself cause some ambiguity. Therefore, the relatively abstract and speculative rationality in Chinese philosophy is understood in more concrete terms as the unification between appropriateness and that which accords to principle. With conduct (practice) in the background, the Chinese philosophical understanding of reason or rationality involves emotions as well. Indeed, the heart-mind of rational thinking concerns both reason and emotion. The unification of cognition and evaluation as the contents of the reflection of the heart-mind implies the following tendency: evaluation, at the level of value, always implicates affection. In terms of etymology, qing 情 (“emotion,” “circumstance,” “situation”) describes a certain factuality, expressed in compound words like shiqing 事情 (“the actual situation”), qingjing 情景 (“circumstance”) and others. In Chinese philosophy, the original meaning of the character for emotions is related to factuality. Another basic meaning of the word applies to the inner sentiments of human beings.18 Sentiments are significant in terms of value: if we say that the universal norms and principles (yi 义 [“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “equitable”]) primarily express the value orientation of reason at the level of form, then sentiments develop an essential consciousness of value. Mengzi says: A gentleman is sparing with things but shows no humaneness towards them; he shows humaneness towards the people but is not attached to them. He is attached to his parents but is merely humane towards the people; he is humane towards the people but is merely sparing with things.19 Humaneness, blood relations, and love are separated according to the different objects to which they relate, and manifest different contents of sentiment: humanness acts as a broad sentiment in the realm of the humanistic dao, and it is first displayed in the relationships between people (that is, in the broad sense of “the people”) and the process of interaction (philanthropy). Blood relations involve sentiment based on family ethics (familial affection) and are 17  See Li Zehou 李泽厚, Shiyong lixing yu Legan Wenhua Shenghuo 实用理性于乐感文化 [Pragmatic Rationality and an Optimistic Culture], (Beijing: SDX Publishing, 2005). 18  From the perspective of etymological changes throughout history, “qing 情” in the sense of emotions was perhaps a later development of qing in the sense of “the actual situation of the things” (shiqing 事情). However, our focus here is not etymological evolution. 19   Mengzi 7A45. See Lau, 1970, 192.

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primarily demonstrated between family members (“loving one’s own family”). Love is the sentiment of cherishing and caring in the broad sense, and in this case is based on the relationships between human beings and other beings (things). This is demonstrated in the way people cherish things, i.e. “loving the beings.” Regardless of whether they describe the connections between one’s self and one’s family, other people, or things, these concepts refer to practical intentions distinct from rational planning and argument, and apply to inner sentiments. At the same time, the variety of sentiments described here manifest themselves in different practical relations, and reflect different emotional contents. Their authenticity is associated with the particularity and authenticity of emotions felt towards things in their actual forms of existence. The concreteness and authenticity of sentiments indicates their essential value content. Conforming to sentiment signifies a specific value orientation at the level of substance. Conforming to reason, on the other hand, suggests a value orientation at the level of form. Practical activity, in both cases, is conducted with appropriateness, an appropriateness that likewise conforms to reason or rationalization in the sense of value. In terms of communication between subjects, outside of the use of dialogue, discussion, mutual evaluation, and other linguistic activities that allow people to understand one another, communication involves emotional connection between subjects. The speaker not only enlightens the listener through reason but moves him emotionally. One should not merely use logic to make the listener accept the contents of speech but should also cause him to be convinced at heart through emotional influence. From the positive aspect, emotions are often linked to being pleased. That is what is meant in the saying, “The sentiments of all people can be pleased.”20 Emotions also provide an intrinsic foundation for communication among people. The kind of emotion that encourages communication between subjects develops from the pursuit of genuine emotions, an enthusiasm for the genuine and the good, the willingness to accept sincere criticism, and other such attitudes. Speech that depends merely on the power of logic is often grave and stern coercion, difficult for a person to delightfully accept as criticism. Only by affecting sincere feelings can one cause people to trust and to be convinced. The listener, on the other hand, should intend to approach the speaker with an attitude of sympathetic understanding. This includes believing in the sincere 20  From the Guodian 郭店 Bamboo Manuscript of Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (“Human Nature Is Brought Forth by Decree”).

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intentions of the speaker in seeking the truth. It also means considering issues from the perspective of others, placing yourself in the other person’s shoes as a means of reflection, in order to grasp their authentic intentions. Understanding and communication between subjects is often provoked by emotions: “Begin by accessing emotions, end by accessing appropriateness.”21 Here, emotions are broadly described as a direct and primeval intrinsic consciousness, while appropriateness concerns the way things should be at the rational level. In this sense, beginning with emotions and ending with appropriateness also signifies the development of emotions into reason. This view indicates that in Chinese philosophy, reason, in the sense of rationality, is characterized by its emergence alongside emotion. In terms of the interactions between the self and things, and social associations, rationality in the broad sense involves the mutual experience of sentiments between oneself and others. In Chinese philosophy, sentiments refer to this kind of mutual experience between things (objects): “Heaven and earth feels and the myriad things are born in transformation.”22 This also points to the fact that human beings are made coherent to the world and to others through sentiments: “When emotionally moved it is coherent with all phenomena and events under the sky.”23 Here the world is connected to others; sentiments are different from imposed perspectives, and are also distinct from logical analysis. Coherency does not merely refer to showing good sense but to empathy, at the level of sentiment. Concretely speaking, the development from sentiment to coherency is “participating in the genesis of the universe.” Through the process of accomplishing oneself and of accomplishing things, one may comprehend the unity of sentiment and reason between oneself, the world, and others. This relationship between sentiment and coherency is confined neither by literal associations nor by rational debate. It not only includes the essential contents of conduct, but also the unity of sentiment and reason. Lixing, in this sense, concerns the process of rationality in social association. Nevertheless, in Chinese philosophy, lixing in this sense is different from the simple procedure of rationality. Reaching reason through sentiment (the reciprocated feelings between oneself and others, the merging of sentiments and reason) demonstrates that rationality, in the broad sense, includes essential value contents.

21  Ibid. 22   Zhouyi 周易 (“Zhou Book of Changes”), 31. 23   Zhouyi 周易 (“Zhou Book of Changes”), Xici shang 繫辞上 (“Explanation of Hexagrams”).

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The next step in this sympathetic understanding between subjects and reciprocation of sentiment is to do as one wishes would be done by others. In discussing how to implement the principles of the way of humaneness, Kongzi says: The man of great humaneness, wishing to be established himself, seeks to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks to enlarge others. To be able to do unto others as one would do unto oneself, this may be called the prescript of humaneness.24 Phrased here as “to do unto others as one would do unto oneself,” it is a notion of putting oneself in someone else’s place and spreading the self to others. This is based on two premises: on the one hand, the acting subject has the capacity for rational inference, and on the other hand, the subject should be deeply concerned about the emotions of others. The two, integrated together, express emotional extrapolation. Mengzi further develops this idea by advocating the following: Treat the aged of your family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families.25 Making these comparisons between people requires rational inference and the emotional communication between subjects. Simple logical inference is a procedural activity and does not involve essential contents. It does, however, have rational elements. Nevertheless, rationality primarily emerges through form. Extrapolation based on emotional communication (the extrapolation of emotions), however, expresses both a logical form (inference) and value contents (humaneness and love). Rationality, in this sense, is therefore found to have a substantial meaning. For Confucianism, moral practice in the broad sense is established according to this kind of inference: There are no young children who do not know loving their parents, and none of them when they grow up will not know respecting their elder brothers. Loving one’s parents is humane; respecting one’s elders is

24   Lunyu 6.30. 25   Mengzi 1A7. Lau, 1970, 56.

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rightness. What is left to be done is simply the extension of these to the whole empire.26 Family relations and respect for elders include ethical contents (humaneness and rightness) and hold a fundamental, primitive ethical sentiment, meant to be extended “to the whole empire.” This passage directs us to take the primitive sentiment of humaneness and rightness and universalize it, while directing sentiments outward. As a means of putting into practice the humanistic dao and other value principles, the extrapolation of sentiments manifests rationality. At its source, the extrapolation of sentiments conditions the same practical activity that develops from its projection outward, giving this activity a rationalized form in the essential sense. In concrete terms, in the domain of discourse above, sentiments and reason do not merely broaden the process of rationalization but also have the characteristic of mutual integration. As for the qualities of sentiments, a distinction is often made between integrity and non-integrity. As for the relationships between oneself and others, there is a sentiment of sympathy in the case of others’ misfortunes. This is a sound emotional response, while the opposite, feeling pleasure at the misfortune of others, shows a lack of integrity. To form sentiments of integrity, one must be guided by rational principles of value norms. At the same time, the process of emotional expression must be moderated. According to the Zhongyong 中庸 (“Focusing the Familiar” or “Doctrine of the Mean”): “When pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy have not yet appeared, it is called the middle way; after they have appeared but are all under control, it is called harmony.” Having “not yet appeared” means that the emotions have yet to be expressed. The phrase that follows refers to the point at which emotions are externally revealed and must conform to certain value principles (for example, integrity) and maintain the appropriate measure, neither exceeding nor falling short of the mark. The moderation of emotions also requires the inner guidance of reason. In the above aspects, reason and sentiment emerge without doubt in a mutually influential relationship. In its practical process, the integration of emotions and reason involves many aspects. When one conforms to emotions and reason, his practical activity in the social domain tends towards rationality: He whose sentiments can reach the entire world, without going against reason, guarding the regulation of the great middle, without losing its 26   Mengzi 7A15. Lau, 1970, 184.

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timeliness, and who acts according to this, can then conform to the proper middle way of the sages.27 Here political activity is involved. “The entire world” includes the human heart-mind in the world. “He who’s sentiments can reach the entire world” describes the tendency of the human heart-mind in the world (including the tendency of emotions). Reason expresses the value principles and existing norms of a certain period. In terms of conduct, one can achieve the “proper middle” only when one’s conduct complies with the human heart-mind in the world (including the tendency of emotions) and follows the principle of the way things should be and the principle of necessity. This can also be interpreted as the concrete development of renmin 仁民 (“humaneness towards people”). At the level of practice, humaneness towards people involves political activity. Political activity in the social sphere often concerns profit and loss. If this activity is not carried out against convention, then it conforms to emotion and to the characteristics of dao. In this sense, conformity to emotion and reason is not restricted to the emotional communication between subjects but is developed in the actual process of practice. The process of blending emotions and reason manifests itself in the meaning of the phrase, “The heart-mind is one with its reason.” In its essential meaning, this idea concerns universal principles and expresses common sense, a common sense not restricted to aesthetic consciousness (as in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant) and that tends towards common values. Above we mentioned Mengzi’s view: “What is common to all heart-minds? Reason and rightness.”28 With reason and rightness as its contents, this intrinsically linked consciousness (that which is common to all heart-minds) can be viewed as a universal value orientation that emerges in the form of common sense. Associated to the relationship between reason and rightness, that which is common to all heart minds is also concerned with universal principles. The unity between reason and rightness constitutes the concrete implications of reason in the phrase, “The heart-mind is one with its reason.” Rightness fuses the intrinsically linked consciousness with universal principles and reflects the unity between emotions and reason. 27  Hu Yuan 胡暖, Zhouyi kouyi 周易口义 (“An Oral Commentary on the Zhou Book of Changes”), Chapter 10. This commentary was orally transmitted by Hu Yuan and recorded by his disciple Ni Tianyin 倪天隐. 28   Mengzi 6A7.

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In its extended meaning, the above process requires both conforming to emotion and conforming to reason, and involves subject-object relations as well as the relevant practical activity. The saying, “humane towards the people and sparing with the things,” includes the concept of cherishing and caring for things. If we say that “humane towards the people” reflects the practical principle of how to treat others or the group in terms of one’s relationship to them, then “sparing with the things” describes the relationship between oneself and things. The relationship between heaven and man develops according to the practical principle of how human beings should treat nature and other beings. Zhang Zai’s 张载 (d. 1077) saying, “People and the things were born of the same parents,” has a clarifying description: Qian is my father, Kun is my mother; even such a small creature as I, finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters and all things are my companions.29 Zhang Zai considers the entire world as one big family, to which applies the sentiment of love towards others and which includes the intention of cherishing things. This is in line with Mengzi’s saying, “Humane towards the people and sparing with the things.” This concept applies to the various contents of distinct sentiments. Here, however, it affirms that the process of “participating in the genesis of the universe” should accord both to reason (the heavenly dao) and to sentiments (humanistic dao). Later on in history, the School of Principle repeatedly confirmed, “The one who is humane is one with heaven and earth and the myriad beings.” This can be interpreted as an extension of the saying, “People and the things were born of the same parents,” and is consistent with Mengzi’s philosophy. In terms of humaneness, to be one with the myriad beings reflects a deep rational concern for all existence between heaven and earth, a concern that moreover affects intrinsic sentiments (human sentiment). Rationality in the sense of consciousness (the reflection of the heart-mind) is one with cognition and evaluation. Insofar as it characterizes the practical process in Chinese philosophy, it includes both sentiment and rationality.

29  Zhang Zai 张载, Zhang Zai ji 张载集 [A Collection of Zhang Zai’s Writings], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuj, 1978), 62.

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These two tendencies reflect Chinese philosophy’s concept of the rational in its broadest sense. III Contemporary Chinese philosophy demonstrates continuity in its understanding of rationality. Liang Shuming’s 梁漱溟 (d. 1988) view is surely representative of this. Among contemporary philosophers, although he is not the only one who deals with rationality, Liang Shuming offers unique hermeneutics of the idea of rationality. Liang Shuming’s interpretation of rationality can therefore be interpreted as a modern manifestation of the traditional Chinese philosophical understanding of rationality. Although by Liang Shuming’s time the understanding of rationality in Western philosophy had already entered China, he wrote that he did not easily accept it. Before this, however, he made a distinction between lizhi 理智 (“intellectual reason”) and lixing (“the rational”): “The rational and intellectual reason are two aspects of the function of the heart-mind: the aspect of knowledge is called intellectual reason, the aspect of sentiment is called the rational.”30 This brief definition of the rational links it, on the one hand, to the reflection of the heart-mind. On the other hand, it links it to sentiment. This understanding of the rational continues the traditional understanding, in Chinese philosophy, of conformity between reason and sentiment. The distinction above is based on the different meanings of reason: There are differences as to what is called reason, thus, it seems suitable to apply different names. The first is reason of human emotions, it might as well be called “emotional reason,” the next is reason of observing the things, it might as well be called “matter reason.”31 Intellectual reason and the rational both involve reason, but this reason is divided into matter reason and emotional reason. Each offers a different ways of comprehension:

30  Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, Zhongguo wenhua yao yi 中国文化要义 [The Essentials of Chinese Culture], in Liang Shuming Quanji 梁漱溟全集 [A Collection of Liang Shuming’s Writings], (Jinan: Shandong People’s Press 1990), 125. 31  Ibid., 127.

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Emotional reason parts from subjective likes and dislikes beyond one’s cognitive ability; matter reason does not part from subjective likes and dislikes beyond one’s cognitive ability.32 Matter reason exists in a factual realm; its knowledge is based on what we can grasp. In this sense, it does not involve “subjective likes and dislikes.” Emotional reason exists in a realm of values, values which may be called “reasonable” (conforming to emotion and to reason). Reason is not separate from desires and sentiments (including subjective likes and dislikes). The above understanding of reason is associated with the traditional distinction in Chinese philosophy between the two circumstances of reason: what is necessary and what should be. Of course, traditional philosophy emphasizes the conformity between the two. As a modern philosopher, Liang Shuming places more emphasis on their separation. Separating them aims also to provide an ontological and epistemological basis for his understanding of the rational. In Liang Shuming’s view, knowledge as the point of reference for intellectual reason is primarily expressed as cognitive ability, while the rational, in its relationship to emotion, concerns the pursuit of goals. “For example, calculating numbers,” he says. “The heart of calculation is intellectual reason, but seeking the precise answer is rational.”33 This depth of purpose allows the rational to include value-related contents. In Liang Shuming’s understanding, the form of rationality that includes value is what separates human beings from other forms of existence: “Human beings only differ from other beings in the life they seek, that is they have one thing that motivates them upward, seeking a life conforming to reason.”34 Conforming to reason displays a sense of value, and can be seen as the rationalization of values. The difference between the rational, in terms of substance, and intellectual reason is related to this, and involves as well the distinction between rationality in the sense of cognition and in the sense of evaluation. As previously described, from the perspective of Chinese philosophy, both the factual characteristic of cognition and the significance of values in evaluation develop in such a way as to demonstrate the unity of rationality in these two senses. This view affirms the relationship between the two during the process of recognition.

32  Ibid., 128. 33  Ibid., 125. 34  Ibid., 126.

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However, cognition and evaluation have their own unique connotations. The cognition of facts and the evaluation of values are indeed inseparable in the process of recognition, but the two have their own relatively independent focuses. If we merely affirm their relatedness and overlook their distinct formulations, we will constrain the depth and development of our understanding of the cognitive process. As a modern philosopher, Liang Shuming’s perspective is not limited by the concept of combining and not dividing, and his distinction between rational and intellectual reason expresses this point. This view obviously moves positively in the direction of deepening the understanding of the cognitive process as well as that of the internal formulations and characteristics of the notion of rationality. Indeed, understanding intellectual reason as the function and assignment of knowledge, and rationality as having value connotations, necessarily places the two in different positions. For Liang Shuming, despite reason being a formulation not completely separate from the rational, the fundamental traits of humans as human beings find their expression in rationality: Taking intellectual reason as the specific characteristic of human beings, seems not as profound and obvious as rationality. Therefore I say: the special characteristics of human beings can be found in the rational.35 Regarding the difference between intellectual reason and the rational, Liang Shuming gives the rational a more favorable position, one based on the sense of value contained in the concept. Explaining the different connotations of intellectual reason and the rational, Liang Shuming makes a figurative illustration: For example, in school exams, the student answered a question wrong, this is a mistake of knowledge. But if the student copies on the exam, this is another kind of mistake—that is, a mistake of conduct. The former mistake, is learning incapability, what should be qualified as an intellectual problem; the latter mistake, is a problem of moral character. An intellectual problem is connected to intellectual reason; a problem of moral character is connected to the rational.36

35  Ibid., 126. 36  Ibid., 128.

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Intellectual reason and knowledge of facts are related to mistakes; the rational involves value in determining whether something is proper or not. For Liang Shuming, the latter concerns the purpose of human development and therefore has fundamental significance. Liang Shuming’s understanding of the connotations of the rational and its cultural significance develops from a background in traditional Chinese philosophy. According to Liang Shuming, the unique features of traditional Chinese culture are found in an emphasis on the rational in the sense described below: When ancient Chinese came across the rational, they believed it was something that ‘heaven placed in the self,’ the significance of human life was placed in values … in the two or three thousand years following the Zhou and Kongzi, Chinese culture has put weight on this, almost as if placing all efforts on this one point.37 The rational is associated with “the significance human life places in values.” This gives priority to the rational over intellectual reason. However, comparatively speaking, in traditional Chinese philosophy the concept of the rational incorporates the contents of cognition while also including value connotations; its unique features are found in the inseparability and interrelatedness of the two aspects. Liang Shuming focuses on relating the rational to values, thereby giving prominence to the values of rationality or the value aspect of the rational. Though it shifts the theoretical focus, it seems that this view is not absolutely disconnected from modern Western notions of the rational. Historically speaking, when Liang Shuming distinguished between intellectual reason and the rational, the imported modern Western notion of the rational was his background. Modern Western understandings of the rational give prominence to it in the sense of cognition, an understanding that is limited to intellectual reason. Liang Shuming argues that what is rational in the genuine sense, should deeply concern values. While nonetheless affirming that traditional Chinese culture deals insufficiently with rationality in the sense of cognition, Liang Shuming argues that it displays superiority in its understanding of the rational at the level of value, a tendency described as “excelling in rationality, lacking in intellectual reason.”38 Thus, in its distinction between intellectual reason in the cognitive sense and the rational in the sense of values, Liang Shuming’s perspective clearly veers 37  Ibid., 137. 38  Ibid., 276.

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from the modern Western notion of the rational. In a certain sense, it is precisely because his idea of the rational is based in modern Western philosophy that Liang Shuming evades the orientation of traditional Chinese philosophy and, in discussing the rational, does not separate between cognition and value, thereby revealing a modern perspective distinct from the traditional one. Thus, in its regard for the value aspect of the rational, this understanding has absorbed the idea of the rational in traditional Chinese philosophy. This entanglement between ancient and modern, China and the West, is itself a response to modern Western notions of rationality, and penetrates the modern interpretation of the traditional Chinese philosophical notion of rationality. This complex also demonstrates the historical continuity and change between notions of rationality in Chinese philosophy traditional and modern.

Chapter 15

The Study of Philosophers in History The study of philosophers began in pre-Qin times.12 It was a glorious era in intellectual history. Large quantities of thinkers rich with original ideas cropped up everywhere in a historical spectacle. As for their social status, the philosophers were considered shi 士 (“scholars”) in the broad sense. In terms of their ideological and cultural characteristics, the philosophers were the first to form systematic thinking in Chinese intellectual history. In the narrow sense, the study of philosophers began in the pre-Qin era; in the broad sense, philosophers, as well as the related study of philosophers, are a constant in the historical evolution of Chinese thinkers, a process that has yet to reach its conclusion. I The intrinsic characteristics of the study of philosophers are understood according to different aspects. At the historical level, the study of philosophers maintains, in a sense, the continuity of thought and culture. Although each has his own original ideas, the philosophers from the Hundred Schools of Thought are not completely disconnected from a single source of thought. Prior to the development of the study of philosophers, the Shijing 诗经 (“Book of Poetry”) the Shang Shu 尚书 (“Book of Documents”), the Zhouyi 周易 (“Zhou Book of Changes”) and other classics were already prominent. These texts had various influences on the thought of philosophers. In demonstration of this point, when the philosophers compiled their writings, they often quoted from the Shijing, the Shang Shu, and other documents. Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE) gives us the phrase “a transmitter and not a creator, believing in and loving the ancients.” The concept of the transmitter here represents the continuity of history. Of course, this does not mean that Kongzi did not create at all, but rather that creation is premised on the 1  This chapter was translated by Sharon Small, a post-doctoral candidate at East China Normal University. 2  Translators note: the word zhuzi 诸子 is an inclusive title referring to the various ancient sages from the classical schools of thought, for a matter of convenience I chose to translate it here as “philosophers” in order to avoid confusion though at the expense of losing the full range of its original meaning.

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emphasis of transmission. The elucidation, by philosophers, of past thought emphasizes different points, but is united in the historical process of the development of this thought. Historical continuity in the study of philosophers is also reflected by a broader aspect of social and cultural history. As early as the Han dynasty, Ban Gu 班固 (d. 92), in the Hanshu Yiwenzhi 汉书艺文志 (“Book of Han: Treatises on Art and Literature”) refers to the sayings: “The philosophers emerged from the king’s court”; “The spread of Confucianism, emerged out of the ‘ministry of education’”; “The spread of Daoism, emerged out of the office of records”; “The spread of the school of Yin Yang, emerged out of the office of Xihe”; “The spread of Legalism, emerged out of the office of judicial matters”; “The spread of the school of names, emerged out of the office of rites,” among others. The origin of these sayings can be traced back to Liu Xin’s 刘歆 (d.  23) Qi Lue 七略 (“Seven Summaries”). In modern times, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (d. 1936) affirms this in his Zhuzi xue lue shuo 朱子学略说 (“On Studying the Philosophers”). The notion that philosophers from different schools of thought have their roots in a single text does not necessarily accord to historical fact. From another angle, however, this perspective demonstrates the degree to which the development of the study of philosophers is historically related to cultural development. In short, the import of the saying, “The philosophers emerged from the king’s court,” is not constrained by a definite historical verdict. Its meaning should be understood in the context of the wide range of historical continuity that the philosophers provide. Another important aspect of the study of philosophers (and in some sense an even more important aspect) is the breakthrough in thought that it offers. Compared to the understanding of the world and its related objects that existed before it, the study of philosophers is indeed rich in creativity. Although academic standpoints differ, every school of thought at the time was based in contemporary issues and in different understandings of the principles of the cosmos and human life. Each school promoted its own core notions, and constituted a self-sufficient system of thought. Kongzi raised the concept of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) as a goal to aspire towards, thereby establishing the system of thought called Confucianism; Laozi’s 老子 (dates unknown) dao and ziran 自然 (“self-so,” “natural”), among other concepts, formed early Daoist thought; Mohism developed the concepts of jian’ai 兼爱 (“universal love”) and mutual benefit, and thus separated itself from Confucianism. What is normally called the Axial Age refers to the historical period of the philosophers. The metaphor describes the creativity of thought that the

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philosophers introduced. Pre-Qin times were in some ways similar to ancient Greece. The period saw the formation of new and creative systems of thought. This breakthrough of originality became the source out of which later was developed. From the Han dynasty to Wei-Jin times, through the Sui and the Tang, the Song and Ming, and up to our time, the development of Chinese thinking can always be traced back to pre-Qin times. From another angle, the study of philosophers emerged in a breaking forth of new thought, and at the same time represented a historical discontinuity in thought. Contemporary thinkers such as Hu Shi 胡适 (d. 1962) have said that philosophers do not come out of the king’s court. This statement expresses the shared disadvantages of the king’s court and the philosophers, and implies an even broader perspective. Arguing that the philosophers emerged out of the king’s court affirms the historical continuity of their thought. Arguing the opposite figures the study of philosophers as a breakthrough in cultural thought, transcending that which came before. In broad terms, in regard to the ideology and concerns of the study of philosophers, we can refer to Sima Qian, who says, “To examine the relationship between nature and man, one must understand the changes from the past to the present.” While the contents of the study of philosophers are complicated and diverse, all schools of thought broadly touch upon the two issues above. “The relationship between nature and man” refers to the relationship between human beings and nature, and to that between human beings and an object or existence that transcends experience. From different angles, the philosophers each touch upon a common issue. The distinction between heaven and man makes up one of the most fundamental philosophical arguments. Each of these schools of philosophy contain theories that develop the understanding of the relationship between heaven and man: the Confucian advocacy of the principle of the humanistic Dao as well as the notion of tianming 天命 (“the mandate of heaven”); the Mohist emphasis on universal love and heaven’s will; the Daoist dictates, “dao emulates the self-so,” and, “Do not extinguish heaven by the human.” There is a distinction to be drawn here between the value systems that emphasize natural principles and those that give prominence to the humanistic dao together with the metaphysical formulation of heaven. “Past and present” in Sima Qian’s 司马迁 (d. 86 BCE) saying is not merely a notion of time, but also contains concrete historical, cultural, and political connotations. In a certain sense, the view that the philosophers emerged from the king’s court also concerns this aspect of the issue: the king’s court refers to the historical contents of politics and culture. Believing that the study of the

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philosophers is related to the king’s court affirms that the study of the philosophers involves politics and culture in a broad sense. Another important topic related to the distinction between heaven and man in pre-Qin times is the debate surrounding propriety and law. This question concerns political advocacy and the principles of governing a state. The question remains whether the ideal should be to “lead by laws, uniform by punishments,” or to “lead by virtue, and uniform by propriety.” The debate between propriety and law also concerns the distinction between the hegemon and the king. Should one implement a humane government and the way of the king (which is virtuous, as opposed to the way of the hegemon), or should one employ a hegemonic rule? This debate was developed in a variety of ways by different philosophers, involving different understandings of the ideal governmental system and social structure. At the level of form, this debate concerns the question of antiquity versus modernity: rule by propriety, i.e. the way of the king, takes the three dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou) as its ideal, an ideal of the past; legal rule, i.e. the way of the hegemon, reflects contemporary forms of government. Still today, the question of past and present includes many political and historical aspects. Modern thinkers place importance on the debate of past and present, China and the West, and their formulations of the past and present involve different standpoints, historical orientations, and preferred forms of government. Prior to the philosophers, the examination of the relationship between heaven and man was often entangled with the activity of divination, which primarily concerned the “shaman,” as well as the later “wizards,” “prophets,” and “diviners.” For a long time, those positions controlled the communication between heaven and man (transmission between above and below). On the one hand, they expressed the wishes and desires of human beings to heaven, on the other they transmitted heaven’s will to the people. In this sense, those who held these positions acted as bridges and intermediators between human beings and heaven, and as specialists or authorities were considered to be the ones who grasped the relationship between humans and heaven.3 In the broad sense, in order to understand and maintain the 3  From a historical point of view, in the broad sense the shaman experienced a shift from proceeding over a wide range of shamanistic activities to a gradually professionalized career. According to the Chuyu 楚語 (“Sayings of Chu”) section of the Guoyu 国语 (“Sayings of the State”), there was a period in history where “every household had a shamanistic lineage,” henceforth, Zhuan Xu 颛顼 (one of the five legendary Emperors, said to be the grandson of the Yellow emperor): “Through what belongs to the gods commanded Zhong of the southern region who was the officer of the Heavens, through what belongs to the people commanded

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relationship between heaven and humans, the shaman used witchcraft as his channel and form. Overall, witchcraft represented mystery and transcendence over nature. In this way, there was always a sense of mystery in the understanding of the relationship between heaven and humans. Thus, prior to the philosophers, the understanding of past and present involved social, political, ideological, and cultural contents, and was often controlled by the political ideology of the king or the king’s court. Traditional social politics and cultural activities primarily revolved around “establishing rules for ceremonies and composing appropriate music for different occasions,” as well as maintaining the continuity of tradition and the gains and losses of the system of rites. The regulation and interpretation of music and ceremony was conducted by members of the uppermost levels of the dynasty. This has a close historical connection to the saying, “Studies belong to the officials.” With the emergence of the philosophers, however, the situation changed dramatically. The examination of the relationship between heaven and man no longer belonged only to the shamans, and the government no longer ideologically monopolized the process of understanding the changes between past and present. The title shi 士 or “honorific scholar,” which marked the social status of the philosophers, was distinct from both the title of a shaman and of an official in the king’s court. In a sense, it was a combination of the identity and function of both. The philosophers began to assume the originally separate responsibilities of the shamans and court officials: the examination of heaven and man and understanding past and present. This breakthrough is significant, as it not only sparked new interpretations of these concepts but substantial changes to their form and content. As opposed to the mysterious forms of witchcraft used by shamans to communicate between heaven and man, the debates of the philosophers had more realistic contents and rational forms. In contrast to the official ideologies of the king’s court, the elucidation and understanding of the philosophers’ systems Li of fire who was the officer of Earth,” forming the structure of “ending the communications between heaven and earth.” This signifies that the communication between heaven and earth was the broad meaning of the shaman profession Although this narrative is not a historical description in the strict sense, it does reflect a process of historical evolution. On one hand, the professionalization of the shamans enabled the shamans to have authority in their profession. On the other hand, it gave them an opportunity to become a unique social class which formed a close relationship to the officials, enabling the emergence of professions such as wizards, profits and diviners.

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of thought offered more personal and creative expressions of the political, cultural, and historical contents of past and present forms. If the first development involves the shift from supernatural and mystical methods of grasping the world to rational ones, then the second marks the transformation of an official mode of thought into a personal and independent one. This second development accompanied the historical shift of learning from government to the private sector. This was not a complete break; the philosophers did not do away with mysticism entirely. Compared to the shamans and court officials that preceded them, however, the philosophers had more rational and independent forms of thought. The disputes of the philosophers in pre-Qin times demonstrated a process of rational thinking and were expressed as an independent discourse. We may observe, in the study of philosophers, not only the relationship between the classics and history, but moreover the relationship between the classics and the philosophers. Of course, in pre-Qin times, the field of classical studies had yet to be developed. Nevertheless, as described above, the Zhouyi, the Shijing, the Shangshu, and other texts that would later become part of the canon of classical studies already existed. Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d.  1529) and Zhang Xuecheng 章学诚 (d.  1801) have the similar sayings: “All history is in the five classics,” and, “All history is in the six classics,” which emphasize the union between history and this canon. Broadly speaking, the canons that appeared later and served as vehicles for learning the classics, as well as their related theories, appeared to have an internal connection to the study of the philosophers. On the one hand, the Shijing, the Shangshu, and other canonical works that became the focus of classical studies were constantly quoted by the philosophers, and collectively functioned as a fundamental source for their thought. These documents, which would later become parts of the canons and serve as vehicles for classical learning, had an important impact on the philosophers. On the other hand, a few of the most important philosophers, such as Kongzi and Mengzi, were themselves incorporated into the canons and the study of classical learning. In the later evolution of Chinese thought, a distinction developed between canons, histories, philosophers, and anthologies, one which is related to the distinction between classical learning and historiography, and classical learning and the study of the philosophers. However, from the historical point of view, the study of the philosophers and what was later considered the thought, or content, of the classics are not isolated from each other. This type

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of integration also had a restrictive impact on the subsequent development of Chinese thought. II The characteristics of the study of the philosophers include both historical continuity and creativity, as well as consistency between the study of the philosophers and the content of what later became classical learning. The development of Chinese thought has endless continuity. In the Han dynasty, Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (d.  104), Yang Xiong 杨雄 (d.  18), and other figures continued the pre-Qin systems of thought. At the level of form, Yang Xiong compiled his works in imitation of the traditional classics. His Taixuan 太玄 (“The Canon of Supreme Mystery”) imitates the Zhouyi, and his Fayan 法言, “Exemplary Sayings,” follows the style of the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects” or “Analects”) He nonetheless, however, proposed unique and creative thought. This reflects the link between canon and philosopher: on the one hand, after the formation of classical learning, a few of its protagonists (such as Dong Zhongshu) became major scholars of the field; on the other hand, they also created their own original systems of thought. Therefore, they can be seen as philosophers of the Han dynasty. The later titles Dongzi (master Dong) and Yangzi (master Yang), also implied the proximity between the philosophers and the characteristics of their thought. During the Wei-Jin dynasties, philosophical thought was once again newly revived. Not only Confucianism, but Daoism, Mohism, the School of Names, and other schools of thought, went through a multi-dimensional elucidation. Wang Bi 王弼 (d. 249), He Yan 何宴 (d. 249), Ji Kang 嵇康 (d. 262), Guo Xiang 郭象 (d. 312), and others are representative figures. Wang Bi’s Zhouyi Zhu 周易注 (“Annotations of the Changes”) He Yan’s Lunyu ji jie 论语集解 (“Collected Explanations of the Analects”) Guo Xiang’s Zhuangzi Zhu 庄子注 (“Annotations to the Zhuangzi”) and others reveal simultaneously the historical continuity and originality of the thought of the philosophers. Similarly, in Wang Bi and He Yan, one finds an innate compatibility between classical learning and the study of the masters. They are themselves classicists, although nonetheless philosophers of the Wei-Jin period. Han Yu 韩愈 (d.  824), Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (d.  819), Liu Yuxi 刘禹锡 (d. 842), and others from the Tang dynasty similarly reflect the unity between “expounding” and “creating,” as they develop traditional thought and elucidate

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traditional Confucianism under new historical circumstances. As for the original characteristics of their thought, they are considered philosophers of the Sui-Tang dynasties. During the Song-Ming period, the School of Principle was established based on Confucian tradition. This school developed Confucian thought in new directions. The “Five Masters” of the Northern Song dynasty4 investigated the classics and interpreted the traditional canons of the past. In this sense, their thought reflects historical continuity. However, the Five Masters of the Northern Song established their own creative system of thought. Their title reflects the proximity between their work and their philosophical thought, and their status as original thinkers of the Song dynasty. Historical continuity, creativity, ground breaking thought, and the integration of classical learning with the study of the pre-Qin masters are all demonstrated in this period. During the Qing dynasty, the study of the philosophers as an object of research received much attention. In a certain sense, the Qing dynasty again reflected a revival of the study of the philosophers, expressed in their regard for pre-Qin philosophers as a objects of research. The research on the study of the philosophers during the Qing dynasty, especially in the “Qian Jia school,” emphasized textual research and criticism, interpretation, glossing and commentary on classical texts, as well as the collation of these texts, among other methods. Nevertheless, this research was not limited to these methods alone. Gong Zizhen 龚自珍 (d. 1841) conclusively summarized the learning of the Qian Jia School of thought while evaluating the works one of the representatives of that school, Ruan Yuan 阮元 (d. 1849). He drew a distinction between the different kinds of academic realms that Ruan Yuan touched upon, including interpretation and the creation of glossaries and commentaries on classical texts, the collation of classical texts, inscriptions on metal or bronze, historiography, legal systems, and others. In this regard, he paid special attention to xing dao zhi xue 性道之学 (“the study of nature and dao”) and maintained that this was an important aspect of Ruan Yuan’s academic research. The study of nature and dao is related to the investigation and contemplation of nature and the heavenly dao, and involves modern perspectives of philosophical contents as well as creativity of thought. Concern for the studies of nature and dao clarifies that even in the Qian Jia period the philosophers were 4  The Song Dynasty is historically divided into the Northern Song (960–1127) and the Southern Song (1127–1279). The “Five Masters” of the Northern Song are known for the revival of Confucianism into what is called today “Neo-Confucianism.” They are: Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐 (d. 1073), Zhang Zai 张载 (d. 1077), Shao Yong 邵庸 (d. 1077), Cheng Hao 程灏 (d. 1085) and Cheng Yi 程颐 (d. 1107).

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an empirical object of research. Although scholars at that time emphasized creativity, in doing so they continued the tradition of pre-Qin philosophers who concentrated on creativity of thought. In contemporary times, the study of the philosophers has become an important field of research. The major characteristics of modern research on this subject are expressed in its situation in the context of modern academic disciplines. Liang Qichao 梁启超 (d. 1929), Zhang Taiyan, Hu Shi, and others began from the perspectives of literature, history, philosophy, and other academic disciplines, and investigated the ancient books and thought of the philosophers according to this modern approach. The studies of the philosophers thus took on a modern academic form. As described earlier, from the Han dynasty to modern times, research on the study of the philosophers has often been connected to classical learning. In this sense, even though the philosophers continued to develop creative thought, this development of thought maintains its basis in classical learning. This became an orthodox ideology that has since restricted the evolution of thought in various ways. As a result, the relationship between the study of the philosophers and classical learning also presents a rather complicated framework. On the one hand, in the development of classical learning, the individualized creative tradition in the study of the philosophers did not disappear, and the classicists themselves often associated philosophers with unique characteristics of thought in their own times. On the other hand, the ideology of classical learning, in terms of values and other aspects, placed restrictions on independent reflection. The idea of “not considering things outside of one’s position” reflects this point. In modern times, with the end of the study of Confucian classics, thought (including the research on the study of philosophers) has developed in the direction of disconnecting classical learning and the study of the masters. This does not suggest so much a disruption in the continuity of thought as a break away from the above-mentioned restrictions implied by an orthodox ideology. In a certain sense, in modern times and especially in the wake of the New Culture Movement of the twentieth century, the independent thought and discussion of pre-Qin times has reemerged; modern thinkers in new historical conditions continue to “observe the relationship between heaven and human, and examine the transformations between past and present.” Moreover, simultaneous to their use of past resources of thought, through creative reflection they form a new system of thought. In the twenty-first century, in the wake of unceasing reflection on traditional thought, the study of the philosophers was examined from different

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aspects. The rise of the “revived studies of the masters,” reflects this point. The philosophers themselves are thinkers with creative ideas, and the study of the philosophers therefore manifests itself through unique and creative systems of thought. In this sense, the study of the philosophers is formed naturally by creative thinking and is not an external or artificial construction. Accordingly, if we consider reviving the studies of the masters a goal of academics for the development of thought, then the concept of the studies of the masters is likewise neither an artificial or external construction, but the product of creative reflection on the cosmos and human life, social history, and realistic questions produced in a new historical background. We need to distinguish between two kinds of forms: the historical study of the philosophers as an object of research and the study, formed through creative thinking, of the philosophers in a new era. The former belongs to the academic disciplines of history and intellectual history, the latter involves the formation and development of new systems of thought. The revived studies of the masters in a strict sense corresponds to the latter form; it signifies the formation of new thinking and new systems of thought in new historical settings. The intrinsic characteristics of the study of the philosophers are historical continuity, creativity, and the breakthrough of thought. The revived study of the masters (or the formation of new systems of thought) involves these characteristics. We can borrow the saying promoted by the modern philosopher Feng Youlan 冯友兰 (d. 1990), who understands the development of thought by “adherence to the original text” and “innovation.” In broad terms, adherence to the original text emphasizes the historical dimension, incorporating empirical research based on the historical approaches to the classics, such as interpretation and the construction of glossaries and commentaries on classic texts, their collation, compilation, the arrangement of documents, and so on. Research in this sense requires reviewing and reflecting on past thought, comprehending the arguments, and reflecting on their creativity and vitality, and thus provided modern thinking with an important source of thought. Related to the concept of adherence to the original texts is that of innovation. Considering the connection between the development of thought and the studies of the philosophers, innovation approaches in its definition the breakthrough in thought that characterizes the philosophers. It signifies the continuity of thought among philosophers who place importance on the creativity of that thought. Indeed, in modern times, creative thinkers have always both adhered to the original texts and used different methods to innovate in their thought.

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In its distinguishing between adherence to the original texts and innovation, Feng Youlan’s thought can be traced back to the traditional School of Principle of Cheng Yi 程颐 (d. 1107) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200). In this sense, Feng Youlan’s thought corresponds to the concept of adherence to original texts. At the same time, however, he absorbed the neorealism of modern Western philosophy and, by combing it with the School of Principle, developed the so-called “New School of Principle.” The “new” (or “neo”) in the New School of Principle reflects innovation. Moreover, the New School of Principle itself can be viewed as a product of innovation. Broadly speaking, current academic thought develops according to this kind of innovation. Innovation is necessarily caught up in the interaction in thought between China and the West in recent years. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the introduction to Guoxue cong kan 国学丛刊 (“Series of Studies of Ancient Chinese Civilization”) Wang Guowei 王国维 (d. 1927) said: Regarding both Chinese and Western studies, when one flourishes so does the other, if one declines so does the other. Common practice is established, giving a boost to each other. Moreover, in our contemporary world, speaking of science today, without the arousal of Western learning, Chinese learning cannot flourish, the same for the West—without the arousal of Chinese studies, Western learning cannot flourish.5 This passage concerns the approach to the research of ancient Chinese civilization, as well as the broader meaning of the way thought develops. Encounters between China and the West have a historical background; innovation demonstrates the fusion of Chinese and Western studies. From a more significant perspective, this fusion indicates the process of the construction and development of world civilizations. In terms of this development, the Chinese tradition of thought and its Western counterpart serve as important resources, and the interaction between the two is a major premise for development. In this sense, the revived study of masters offers a system of thought for developing a world civilization. Compared to the traditional study of the philosophers, the revived study of masters brings a series of new connotations and a new form. As two inseparable aspects of the development of thought, adherence to original texts and innovation cannot be detached from each other. The 5  Fu Jie 傅杰 (ed.), Wang Guowei Lunxue Ji 王国维论学集 [Anthology of Wang Guowei’s Discussions on Education] (Kunming: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2007), 339.

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formation of new thought cannot begin from nothing; it is always based on prior thought and its process of evolution, and moreover develops or dissipates based on the degree of existing thought. The meaning of adherence to original texts is found in the process of sorting out past thought and its development, a process that expands the rich contents of ancient thought and provides a theoretical source for thought going forward. In this sense, adherence to original texts is the starting point of innovation. Should it stop at this adherence, however, thought easily becomes stuck in the past, unable to continue moving forward. This is not only unhelpful for the generation and development of thought, but also restricts past thought to its finite, historical significance. For continuation we therefore need innovation. The fundamental spirit of innovation is in breaking through past thought or advancing past thought, and the logical result is the formation of a new system of thought. In the process of their application, adherence to original texts and innovation mutually influence each other: adherence to original texts includes a logical reconstruction and interpretation of past thought that already incorporates innovation; innovation is fundamentally based on the development of thought. Contemporary discussions of the revived studies of masters should emphasize the unity of adherence to original texts and innovation in the process of the development of thought. Adherence to original texts signifies the historical continuity of thought, while innovation refers to the creativity and development of new thought. At the historical level, this connection reflects the continuity of both the philosophers’ ideas and the endless breakthroughs in thought. In reality, it serves as a foundation for the formation of unique creative systems of thought.

Chapter 16

The Concept Gongzheng (“Justice”) in the History of Chinese Thought In the history of Chinese thought, “gong” 公 (“public,” “general,” “to make public”) and “zheng” 正 (“central, “straight/upright,” or “to align/correct”) have been differentiated in terms of epistemological and value connotations.1 On the epistemological level, gong relates to an objective perspective, and zheng has connotations of conforming, corresponding, or consistency. In terms of value meanings, gong is primarily related to “public,” but it is not completely identical to the modern notion of “public.” Its meaning involves transcending individuality and privacy. The value implications of zheng indicate integrity, fairness, and appropriateness, while simultaneously connoting binding commitment or restraint and norms. The use of the cognate gongzheng 公正 often refers to the value meaning (of these terms). Speaking to value perspectives, gongzheng generally reflects the fair and impartial treatment of every member in a group. As a traditional concept gongzheng differs from zhengyi 正义 (i.e. the standard translation for “justice”); but there is a potential for communication between gongzheng and principles of justice (zhengyi). I From a historical perspective, the concepts gong and zheng are often used separately. In terms of their general conceptual meanings, “gong” is, first and foremost, the opposite of si 私 (“private,” “individual,” “secret”). The distinction between gong and si, from pre-Qin times onwards, is reflected in one major aspect. Namely, in the field of the debate between gong and zheng, gong expresses a transcending of the individual, whereas si is separated from any particular value connotation, and is more related to the individual. The distinction between gong and si here is mainly a distinction between transcending the individual and relating to (or focusing on) the individual. 1  This chapter was translated by Paul  J.  D’Ambrosio of East China Normal University. D’Ambrosio is the Dean of ECNU’s Intercultural Center, a Fellow of the Institute of Modern Chinese Thought and Culture, and Associate Professor of Chinese Philosophy. Unless otherwise indicated all translations from classics are D’Ambrosio’s.

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As a philosophical concept, zheng, from a negative perspective, mainly means not deviating from a particular standard; from a positive perspective, it means conforming to, or being consistent with, certain standards. Concretely speaking, conformity or consistency means complying with “what should be the case (dangran 当然),” or “what is necessarily the case (biran 必然).” Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200), notes, “If the common is not zheng, then its good and evil certainly cannot conform to principle.”2 Here zheng is mainly understood as “conforming to principle.” “Principle,” in Neo-Confucianism, includes two connotations: namely, that is the case, and that should be the case. Zhu Xi explains, “As for the beings under heaven, all must have a reason why things are so, and standards of how things should be, that is called principle.”3 “That is why it is the case,” is what is necessarily the case, and “that should be the case” means “what should be the case.” “What is necessarily the case (biran)” (“that is the case”) mainly indicates universal laws of existence, and “what should be the case (dangran)” mostly involves norms for action in the realm of human society. Taking “conforming to the principle” as the concrete connotation of zheng, demonstrates that the concrete connotation of zheng is conforming to laws of existence as well as that which should be the case. Accordingly, we can see a common meaning in gong and zheng. Further analysis shows that gong and zheng can be distinguished as having two aspects, namely epistemological and value connotations. As mentioned above, on the epistemological level, when Chinese thinkers talk about gong, it is often related to an objective perspective, which is called the “gong heartmind (gongxin 公心).” Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 BCE) talks about “distinguishing with the gong heart-mind (yi gongxin bian 以公心辨).”4 This means that when making distinctions one should start from one’s “gong heart-mind.” Here, “gong heart-mind” indicates an objective perspective, which is characterized by transcending individual prejudices or biases—analyzing and grasping things from a universal and objective perspective. Xunzi also says “gong generates clarity, bias generates darkness.”5 This also has to do with the epistemological meaning of gong, which is why it is opposed to bias. A bias is a prejudice, or seeing one side (of something). Gong, as the opposite of a bias, is a more comprehensive perspective. Epistemologically speaking, gong, and not bias, implies relative

2  Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Quan Shu 朱子全書 [Zhu Xi’s Complete Writings], vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2000), 933. 3  Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Quan Shu, 512. 4  Xunzi 22.12. 5  Xunzi 3.12.

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objectivity and a comprehensive perspective on the object being investigated; it is not a one-sided or partial view. Zheng is linked with gong. As mentioned above, on the most general level zheng connotes conformity and correspondence, in the epistemological realm, zheng implies conforming to facts. Concretely speaking, zheng is, first and foremost, concerned with the relationship between names (ming 名) and actualities (shi 实). When names and actualities are accurately matched, we can understand this as zheng. Xunzi is quite concerned with the relationship between names and actualities. He criticized those of his time who “gave names without authority and confused the proper names.”6 That is, those who fabricated names with no corresponding actualities, that threw “correct names” (zheng ming 正名 [zheng names]) into chaos. Here, correct names (zheng names) are names that correspond to actualities—these correct names are characterized by accurately corresponding to objects and affairs. For example, the word “water” is used to indicate water as an object, and should not be used to indicate fire—this is correct naming. So confusing proper names means confusing the accuracy in the relationship between names and actualities. Xunzi was very unhappy with certain figures in the “School of Names” (ming jia 名家), he thought that they often confused names, and analyzed certain problems in a way that was often oriented towards sophistry. One of the implications of sophistry is that there is confusion in terms of the correct and corresponding relationship between names and actualities. The meaning of zheng, as described above, does not mean that it completely exhausts every perspective. Xunzi also points out that: When the Sage is termed an “exacting investigator,” this does not mean that he can investigate with exactness all that a professional investigator can. Rather, it means that he possesses a limited goal.7 In other words, being good at investigating an object does not mean that all matters, no matter how trivial are covered, or that one has a command of the entirety of something, but rather that there is zheng (in one’s investigation). It means that one’s perspective is in line with reality, and conforms to principles. Being in line with reality means corresponding to facts, and conforming to principles means being in accord with the internal laws and regulations of things. On this level zheng means uniformity between names and actualities;

6  Xunzi 8.14. 7  Xunzi 8.14.

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it also indicates conforming to the original state of the object. And this also includes epistemological connotations. From the perspective of values, gong and zheng have their own unique (respective) meanings. Here gong is, first and foremost, related to “public,” but this “public” is not completely the same as the modern meaning of “public.” As mentioned above, the general connotation of gong is transcending the individual and the private. The Liyun (礼运), or “Ceremonial Usages,” section of the Liji 礼记 (“Book of Rites”) records: “When the grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky,” which inherently points to the value of the group or community and public. Zhu Xi also emphasizes that “Impartiality is a broader great without a private sense.”8 Here Zhu Xi 朱熹 implies a sort of “public nature (gonggong de xingzhi 公共的性质).” Later, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) developed this idea, arguing, The first emperor of the Qin privatized the will in the world to abolish the system of the feudal lords, and under the disguise of his selfishness (si), implemented the public system (gong) of the counties. This is something promoted by the gods themselves.9 Here gong and si are opposites, and “the world to abolish the system of the feudal lords, and under the disguise of his selfishness (si), implemented the public system (gong) of the counties.” speaks to the abolition of the Qin feudal system and the implementation of a system of prefectures and counties. Although the political form was still an expression of the Emperor’s will, it was the embodiment of a type of historical demand to transcend the Emperor’s will. In other words, behind the si of the individual, there was an implication towards an orientation to the public. In terms of values, gong includes openness and tolerance. In the Laozi 老子 (“Book of Master Lao”), this meaning is mentioned. Laozi 16 reads: “Knowing constancy is tolerance, tolerant and thus gong, gong and thus rulerly, rulerly and thus heavenly, heavenly and thus like dao, dao and thus lasting, without a body not decaying.” In the Laozi “knowing constancy” means having a grasp of the universal dao 道 (“way”, “method”). This is not the same as concrete knowledge, and is expressed as knowledge of the constant dao. According to the Laozi, once dao is grasped, one can reach the level of gong—which is expressed as a mental realm (or attitude) of tolerance and openness. It is 8  Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Quan Shu, 933. 9  Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 Chuan Shan Quanshu 船山全书 [Collected Essays of Wang Fuzhi], vol. 10, (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1988), 68.

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another step towards becoming compatible with heaven (nature), and being compatible with heaven implies compatibility with dao. When explaining chapter  16 of the Laozi, Heshang Gong 河上公 (1st century  CE) argues that gong means nothing is not tolerated, “there is nothing that is not tolerated, so gong is zheng and there is no si.”10 In terms of the individual, this means there is a type of “open-mindedness (kaifang de xionghuai 开放的胸怀).” In terms of value, zheng means, first and foremost, straight, upright, and fair. Fairness implies impartiality—a lack of biased orientation. Zhu Xi writes, “Zheng is without bias.”11 Being “without bias” is to be correct and without any bias. Another connotation of zheng is appropriateness. Zhu Xi makes this extremely clear when he says that zheng means “conforming to principle.” Zheng and “conforming to principle” refers to speech and action that conform to principle, which is another way of saying that the speech and action are appropriate. Furthermore, zheng also contains restrictive and normative meanings. In some Confucian classics this point is made quite explicitly. The Daxue 大学 (Great Learning) talks about “zheng heart-mind,” and sincerity. The “zheng heart-mind” refers to restraints on one’s inner thoughts, making them return to what is correct. Xunzi elaborates more concretely saying “The nature of people today is evil, it is necessary to rely on teaching to achieve zheng,”12 and “The one who understands ritual propriety can rectify his/her body.”13 Speaking logically, since human nature is evil it can only be made zheng—without bias—and to conform to what should be the case, through external rituals and laws. Here zheng is both a verb and a noun: in “rectify (zheng),” as in “rectify (zheng) the body,” expresses the restriction and regulation of the individual. Zheng is also used as a verb, it expresses regulations and restrictions. According to Xunzi, the individual is not an abstract spirit or concept, the person cannot be separated from his or her existence as body and flesh, so restrictions on the person also imply “rectify (zheng) the body.” The zheng in “it is necessary to rely on teaching to achieve zheng” is a noun. Here zheng appears as a type of ideal goal or outcome (the state of returning to what is correct). Xunzi also says “Abide by Dao then act, correct and zheng oneself, do not be destabilized by external things, this is what can be considered a sincere superior person ( junzi 10  He Shanggong 河上公 Laozi Daode jing He Shanggong Zhangju: Gui Gen di shi liu 老子道 德经河上公章句: 归根第十六 [He Shanggong’s Commentary and Organization of the Daode jing of Laozi: Returning to the Root, Chapter Sixteen], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1993), 63. 11  Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Quan shu, 933. 12   Xunzi 23.2. 13   Xunzi 1.15.

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君子).”14 In this quote zheng’s unbiased and fair connotations are connected with one another, expressing an inner unification. To “zheng oneself” indicates self-restraints, and “not to be destabilized by external things” means avoiding bias or distortion. In sum, to “zheng oneself” is also a way of restraining oneself, and putting oneself in a place of being zheng and unbiased. Mohists have a similar understanding of zheng. Mozi 墨子 (d. 430 BCE) writes,

Rightness is zheng. How do we know that rightness is the zheng? Because with rightness the world will be orderly; without it the world will be disorderly. So, I know that rightness is the zheng.15 “Rightness” here broadly refers to what should be the case. Mozi is taking “rightness” as zheng, or, what should be the case to guide and restrain people. Correspondingly, zheng in the quote above refers to focusing on norms. II In the history of Chinese thought and Chinese philosophy, gong and zheng have been distinguished and understood or investigated separately, but they are also often connected and used together. In fact, already in the Xunzi, gong and zheng were linked and used as “gongzheng.” The combination of gong and zheng into a single term (gongzheng), involves some epistemological connotations. When talking about debates Xunzi brings up this idea, “One honors zheng and the upright and despises the vulgar and quarrelsome. Such are the disputations and explanations of the scholar and superior person.”16 In other words, talking about the process of argumentative reasoning, Xunzi says that the focus should be on what is gongzheng, and that those who are simply concerned with winning the argument, or base it on language alone, are to be held in contempt and are disdainful. Concretely speaking, here gongzheng refers to having a grasp of things, affairs, and principles in the speech process—that is, the content of speech should conform to the way things actually are and should reflect common sense. It is not enough just to win a battle of words. From the perspective of what is described above “gongzheng” undoubtedly has epistemological connotations.

14   Xunzi 6.14. 15   Mozi 墨子 7.28. 16   Xunzi. 22. In: Knoblock, 1994. 133–34; translation modified.

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However, the coupling of gong and zheng more often speaks to value connotations. From a value perspective, the combination of gong and zheng is about general fairness and fairness to each member of a community. In other words, every individual, as a member of a community, should be treated with fairness and impartiality. There are two concrete implications here. The first implication is the embodiment of the vision of the group, namely locating individuals from a communal perspective, and thus seeing the individual as a member of the community. And the second implication is also the affirmation of the individual as a member of the group, which means that he or she should be treated equitably and with fairness. Being equitable and fair involves issues relating to evaluation criteria. So what can be seen as fair, and what counts as equitable? Although many thinkers have not given a clear analysis of the modern context with regard to this issue, their discussions provide some general understandings. Using everyday language to describe fairness and equitability, we can say that they are first and foremost related to “following the patterns of nature and one’s conscience (tianli liangxin 天理良心).” Under certain conditions, there is no concrete or uniform standard (or criteria) for understanding how to treat each person according to gongzheng, all we can do is ask whether one is “following the patterns of nature and one’s conscience.” Throughout history, and up to today, when there are matters of serious not gongzheng, the Chinese will say “Where is the natural pattern? (And, is it being followed?) Here, the “natural pattern(s)” are not some abstract principles, but rather speak to a person’s internal consciousness and concepts. This can be called “everyone shares this heart-mind mentality (rentong cixin 人同此心)” or “heart-minds agree with this pattern (xin tong ci li 心同此理).” In actuality, “following the patterns of nature and one’s conscience” is a type of common sense. However, this type of common sense differs from the aesthetic consciousness in Kant’s philosophy in that it is about shared value consciousness. Mengzi 孟子 (d. 289 BCE) writes, All palates have the same preference in taste, all ears in sound, all eyes in beauty. Should heart-minds prove to be an exception by possessing nothing in common? What is common to all heart-minds? Reason and rightness. The sage is simply the man first to discover this common element in my heart-mind. Thus, reason and rightness please my heart-mind in the same way as meat pleases my palate.17

17   Mengzi 6A1. In: Lau, 1970, 164.

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In terms of taste, audible, and visual senses, humans have similar orientations, and the heart-mind is also like this. According to Mengzi’s understanding, the commonality of all humans’ heart-mind is li 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” “coherence”) and yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “equitable”). The content of inner communication and awareness (i.e. as a type of common sense), in terms of patterns and appropriateness, is, in some respects, manifested as a common sensibility of value orientation. This constitutes the concrete content of “following the patterns of nature and one’s conscience.” We can thereby see that this sense of gongzheng as a standard or criteria has some hue of abstractness and metaphysics. An even more concrete criterion for judgment is ritual (li 礼): How can one act in a way that is fair and equitable towards others? In concrete social spheres, we can use ritual as a criterion for judging what is gongzheng: General accordance with “ritual” standards for treating each individual implies the expression of fairness, impartiality, and equitability. Here ritual (li) regulates what Xunzi calls “metric boundaries (duliang fenjie 度量分解)” and comprises the standard for evaluating gongzheng. The second major connotation of the coupling of “gong” and “zheng” has to do with being in accord with regulations, being appropriate, and maintaining order. Appropriateness and order are often manifested as certain modes of action in the political sphere. Concretely speaking, we can divide these into top-down and bottom-up manifestations. In terms of top-down manifestations, Xunzi writes, “If the superior is zheng and right, his subordinates will be amenable and honest.”18 This means that if the rulers act according to gongzheng, then the people will be easy to direct and made amenable and upright. In terms of bottom-up manifestations, the Hanfeizi 韩非子 (Book of Hanfei) comments, “All ministers are impartial and right and not selfish, do not hide their virtue, and do not advance the unworthy. In that case, how hard can it be for the ruler to select the worthy?”19 If the body of ministers can push the people to be gongzheng and not si (selfish), then the ruler can establish order without taking direct action. The gongzheng we are speaking about here is primarily involved with the mode of implementing actions in the social and political realms. At the same time gongzheng requires that this is appropriate and orderly. So we can see that in the contexts of these arguments gongzheng is closely related to order. Whether we are speaking about the ruler, or the participation of ministers in political activities (including the election of candidates),

18   Xunzi 18.2. In: Knoblock, 1994, 33; translation modified. 19   Hanfeizi 韩非子 38.

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if a unified and general standard can be used, then the entire process becomes appropriate and orderly. The above views on “gongzheng” are often in conflict with “si” (private/ selfish issues), and this point has been brought up again and again in Chinese philosophy. In the Confucian system, Xunzi requires “gongzheng and no si.”20 In the Daoist tradition Heshang Gong also affirms Xunzi’s idea. So we have the idea that gongzheng is often associated with selflessness (i.e. not si). In other words, in their view, gongzheng is always opposed to si. Logically speaking, distinguishing between gongzheng and si means overlooking the individual’s interests and their rights. Si is often linked to the individual’s rights. Thus, requiring gongzheng over si, could, when gongzheng is emphasized, lead to a type of overlooking personal interests. III The above description is on a conceptual level, which roughly outlines the connotations of “gong,” “zheng,” and “gongzheng.” As a concept in the Chinese tradition, “gongzheng” is often used in a more Western linguistic context to mean “justice.” So what exactly is the connection between gongzheng and justice? The investigation and analysis of this problem also involves a discussion of the modern meaning of the concept of gongzheng. Looking at these issues from the perspective of actual connotations, justice, as a universal or general principle of value is not a uniquely Chinese concept. Although the characters “zheng” 正 (“central, “straight/upright,” or “to align/ correct”) and yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” or “equitable”) have existed since ancient times, the combined use of these characters, in zhengyi, is not exactly the same as “justice” in Western philosophy. Of course we cannot take the words too literally here: when we see the two characters zheng and yi in ancient texts, we cannot simply equate them with “justice.” The core content of zhengyi as justice is a focus on rights. From Plato and Aristotle to Rawls, almost everyone (in the West) who discusses justice has noticed this point. Plato argues that justice is giving each what they are due.21 The real meaning of this is that people get what they deserve. For Aristotle, justice means that equals ought to have equality, and this primarily means that things should

20   Xunzi 25.4. 21  Plato, Republic in The Collected Dialogue of Plato, translated by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 581.

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be properly allocated. Although there are some differences, these views both share a concentration on rights. In order to focus on rights, it is necessary to first understand the principle of the autonomy of individuals. Here individual autonomy includes selection and determination of various aspects of the goals of development, through the proper use of one’s capacities (including physical strength and intellect), leading to the fulfillment of various goals and so on. These aspects are concretely expressed through the free development of individual rights. Rawls takes individuals’ liberties as the first principle of justice, while Nozick takes the self as the starting point for justice. These two look at the same point from different perspectives, and although they disagree on how to understand individual rights, they are similar in the sense that each believes individuals have the right to develop freely. Early Enlightenment thinkers, such as John Locke, did, in a sense, also focus on this point. The freedom that individuals have to develop their rights includes political and economic areas, as well as culture and education and so on. In sum, rights are one of the core aspects of justice, and rights are primarily associated with individual rights. From the perspective of logic and history, too much emphasis on individual rights can (and often does) lead to tension between individuals: in society each person has his or her own inherent capacities, endowments, and unique backgrounds, and if they are developed accordingly it will often cause differences, opposition, and mutual reprehension. In an attempt to solve this problem Rawls introduced the so-called Difference Principle, which emphasizes social and economic inequality as only justifiable under the following conditions, namely, that in a social system the most disadvantaged must have access to the maximum benefits possible in order to ensure equal opportunity for all. Rawls attempted to qualify the possible consequences of the principle of justice accordingly. With this as a background for a starting point to investigate the concept of justice in the Chinese tradition, we can notice some unique characteristics and meanings. First, as mentioned above, the traditional notion of gongzheng, as a value perspective, tends to contain a type of overlooking of some individual rights. From the perspective of the modern transformation of values, this type of overlooking of individual rights should undoubtedly be discarded. However, at the same time it also needs to absorb the idea that individuals are closely linked to the community or society, as the traditional notion of gongzheng does in fact include. As mentioned above, one precondition in the traditional notion of gongzheng is to investigate individuals according to their social relationships, to look at individuals as a member of a community. Fair

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and impartial treatment should be correspondingly given. This idea of linking individuals to the community still has positive implications today. At the same time, as mentioned above, the Chinese notion of gongzheng includes coordination, compromise,22 and order. Determining whether something is gongzheng often takes “ritual” as the standard, and the core of “ritual” is coordination, compromise, order, and harmony. The fact that in traditional Chinese thinking the function of “ritual” is linked to harmony, and an emphasis on “harmony as the most valuable function of ritual,”23 is worthy of particular notice. Taking the affirmation of individual’s rights as the actual content of justice is recognizing the individual’s freedom to develop. Logically speaking, if this sense of autonomy is overly emphasized, there will be some deviation from social coordination, compromise, order, and harmony. We see this evident in the social changes of the 19th and 20th centuries. Early Enlightenment thinkers discussed individual autonomy and rights in the context of natural laws and endowment, giving individual rights a prominent position. Locke affirmed individual rights, including the right to life, to liberty, and to property, etc. One of the main concepts in this notion of rights is the individual’s freedom to develop; “one of the main concepts in this notion of rights is the individual’s freedom to develop, which provides a real gap between the market economy and the concrete implication of rights.” Formally, the market economy constituted the boundaries of personal freedom, however, due to the aforementioned individual differences and social qualifications, the historical process of these structures has brought about actual injustices (not gongzheng). Additionally, another logical consequence of this development is extreme social division, and because of this, there is tension and even confrontation between different members of society. This makes it difficult to achieve harmony within society. The workers’ and Socialists movements in the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen as the consequence and historical response to this notion of rights. From a theoretical perspective, the focus on coordination, compromise, order, and harmony in the traditional Chinese notion of gongzheng can suppress these types of consequences, and undoubtedly provide a positive (and constructive) perspective. Furthermore, when discussing zhengyi and/or justice, we need, in addition to principles of individualism, to include principles of human equality. Here “human” indicates the value of human essence, which is also a recognition and 22  Translator’s note: Xietiao 协调 is being translated as two words, namely coordination and compromise, to cover its broad connotations. 23   Analects 1.12.

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affirmation of equality in terms of value. In early Chinese Confucianism this point was already noted. Mengzi, for example, argued that human nature is good, and that from this perspective there is no essential difference between individuals. Based on this, Mengzi emphasized “sages and I are of the same kind,”24 and “Yao and Shun [ancient sage-rulers] are the same as all people.”25 The focus here is on “sameness” (tong 同), which shows that there is a relationship between all people (including sages and ordinary people). If we disregard an abstract understanding of people, then this is difficult to see. And in some ways this type of view permeates the idea that people (and human nature) are equal. In terms of its actual manifestation, it is true that there are differences between individuals in terms of their endowments, abilities, and social backgrounds. However, humans are, in and of themselves, ends, and in terms of this value people are essentially equal to one another. For the individual, this is equality in terms of value, and for this reason there is an inherent basis for equality of access and receiving of resources for development. From a broader social perspective, this type of equality of human nature is a precondition for the required just social distributions of resources for development. Every individual, regardless of their background or ability, has value as a person, and should all have the basic resources for survival and development, including basic necessities and social resources. Chinese people take “following the patterns of nature and one’s conscience” as an intrinsic standard for gongzheng (or “justice”), and in some ways this implies an affirmation of the aforementioned issues. Starting with the dual principles of individual autonomy and equality of human nature, we should recognize the right everyone has to fully develop, and we should affirm everyone’s right to obtain basic necessary recourses. It is thereby not difficult to see that here we have a possibility for communication between Western principles of justice and the traditional Chinese notion of gongzheng. Through this communication, we can see that, on the one hand, some aspects of the traditional Chinese notion of gongzheng do not fit contemporary needs. While on the other hand, it contains valuable historical concepts, which, after being reinterpreted, can help overcome some of the one-sidedness (i.e. the overemphasis mentioned above) of Western principles of justice.

24   Mengzi 6A2. 25   Mengzi 4A4.

Chapter 17

The World of Emotions in the Book of Songs In discussing the Shijing 诗经 (“Book of Songs”), Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) once pointed out: “The Songs convey emotions” (shi da qing 诗达情).12 Earlier on, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d.  1200) had already articulated a similar point of view in arguing that the specificity of the Book of Songs lies in the fact that it “expresses emotions by resonating with things (感物道情) and gives a voice to the nature of feelings” (吟咏情性).3 Obviously, these two thinkers considered the expression of emotion to be an important aspect of the Book of Songs. Indeed, there are certain points of commonality between “poetry” (shi 诗) and “music” (yue 乐), and the early Confucians paid a considerable amount of attention to both of these. The Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects” or “Analects”) often touch upon the topics of poetry and music. What poetry and music have in common is mainly the fact that each of them involves the expression of emotions. Generally speaking, it is undeniable that the Book of Songs displays a rich and diverse emotional world which ranges from everyday life to the fields of society and politics and extends from worldly pursuits to ultimate concerns. I On the level of everyday life, the expression of emotion in the Book of Songs concretely unfolds itself in different aspects: in the first place, it deals with emotions of love, which embody the emotional relationship between men and women. In this regard, the emotions displayed in the Book of Songs in turn have different characteristics in terms of content. The first kind of love we encounter is admiration or adoration. An expression of this type of emotion can be found in the poem Guanju 关雎 (“Fish Hawks Squawking”): “A beautiful and virtuous 1  Originally published in Zhongguo wenhua 中国文化, spring edition 2012. This chapter was translated by Ady Van den Stock, postdoctoral research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden. 2  Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Shi guang zhuan 诗广传 [“General Commentary on the Book of Songs”], vol. 1, in Wang Chuanshan quanji 王船山全集 [The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi] vol. 3, (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1996), 325. 3  Zhu Xi 朱熹, Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类 [Conservations of Master Zhu, Arranged by Topic], juan 80, in Zhuzi quanji 朱子全集 [Complete Works of Master Zhu] vol. 17, (Shanghai: Guji Shubanshe, 2010), 2748.

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maiden, waking and sleeping I search for her. Unable to find her, she is on my mind both day and night. Oh how long must I be saddened, tossing and turning I get no rest.”4 What we have here is an extremely animated description of a lover who cannot stop thinking of the one he adores, who lies “tossing and turning” at night and is unable to fall asleep. This poem also expresses the feeling of adoration between men and women very poignantly. Another example is the following: “There is a beautiful woman, so fine her features, so gentle is she. It was my wish to meet her accidentally.”5 The admirer falls in love at first sight after a chance encounter, and after this accidental meeting he can’t get her out of his head. The feeling of adoration between men and women flows from these verses. On the one hand, this kind of adoration is grounded in the natural differences between the two sexes and encompasses the natural dimension of the mutual attraction between members of the opposite sex. Correspondingly, the display of emotions such adoration gives rise to embodies a natural kind of emotional sincerity. On the other hand, these poems also convey an eager yearning for genuine love between human beings, a yearning that has social implications. At the same time, the expression of this type of love between men and women in the Book of Songs has its own intrinsic proper measure (du 度), which manifests itself in a certain sense of restraint, something which was later noticed by Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE). In discussing the poem “Fish Hawks Squawking,” Kongzi pays particular attention to the fact that it is “joyful without being wanton” (乐而不淫).6 Here, “wanton” means exceeding the proper measure. By saying that the poem is “joyful without being wanton,” Kongzi makes it clear that moderation is required for conveying emotions. For Kongzi, the poem “Fish Hawks Squawking” is marked by emotional sincerity, while at the same time not exceeding the proper bounds. Another subject of emotional expression pertaining to the lifeworld is yearning or longing between lovers, which is primarily manifested between husbands and wives. In concrete terms, this can involve the case of a husband yearning for his wife as well as the other way around. What we come across first of all in the Book of Songs is the longing of a wife for her husband, a topic which a great number of poems in this work address. The verse “I have not

4  Shijing 诗经 [Book of Songs], Zhou nan 周南 [Songs of Zhou and the South], Guanju 关雎 [“Fish Hawks Squawking”]. [Tr. note: In what follows, translations from the Shijing are based on Gao Heng 高亨, Shijing jinzhu 诗经今注 [Annotated Version of the Book of Songs] (Shanghai: Guji Chubanshe, 1980).] 5  Shijing, Zheng feng 郑风 [Airs of Zheng], Ye you mancao 野有蔓草 [“Creeping Weeds in the Open Country”]. 6  Lunyu 3:20.

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seen my lord, my heart is heavy with sorrow”7 conveys the feeling of longing a wife feels for her husband who is in some place far away. In totality it reads: “Not having seen my lord, my heart is full of grief. Only after I have seen him and am by his side will there be joy in my heart again.”8 As long as she has not seen her husband, the wife is full of anxiety, only after she has set eyes upon him again will she feel more at ease. Another verse along these lines goes as follows: “When I have not seen my lord, I am struck with grief. After I have seen him, my heart will be settled ( jiang 降).”9 “Settled” here means setting aside one’s worries. The wife in this poem is filled with sorrow over not yet having seen her husband who has gone off to some remote place, but will regain her calm as soon as she is reunited with him. What these lines express is the longing of a wife for her husband who has gone away to enlist in the army or who has gone into battle. Another topic related to the kind of feelings we encountered in the above is the continuous yearning of a husband for his wife: “When I think of my honest wife, my tears fall down like rain. How could I not long to return home? I fear that I am trapped here.”10 These verses convey the feelings of an official who has been ordered to go and serve in a distant place. Thinking about his wife at home far away in his hometown causes his “tears to fall down like rain.” Of course he wishes he could return home soon. But he is following orders, and if he were to return home just because he feels like it, he would be punished. What is displayed here is an extremely conflicted state of mind wrought with contradictions. Compared to the adoration between men and women grounded in the attraction between the two sexes which we encountered earlier on, this kind of yearning or longing between husband and wife has slightly more ethical substance. Accordingly, the concrete content of the emotions in question also changes: what these poems express is concern for the object of love, as well as a longing grounded in such a form of concern, which is not merely based on the adoration between men and women on a natural level, but also has deeper social implications. In the Book of Songs, the feelings between men and women are not only expressed in an affirmative fashion, but also appear in a negative guise. One of the ways in which the latter manifests itself is the sadness that accompanies changes of heart: “Do not think of your former marriage, find yourself 7  Shijing, Shao nan 召南 [Songs of Shao and the South], Caochong 草虫 [“Insects in the Grass”]. 8  Ibid. 9  Shijing, Lu ming zhi shi 鹿鸣之什 [Decade of Lu ming], Chu che 出车 [“Going out in my Carriage”]. 10   Shijing, Gu feng zhi shi 谷风之什 [Decade of Gu feng], Xiao ming 小明 [“Little Brightness”].

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a new match.”11 A wife is looking for a new sweetheart, which gives rise to sad feelings on the part of her husband. “You do not think of me, but do you really believe you are the only one for me?”12 Here we are dealing with another kind of emotion: the wife in this poem tells her husband “you may have scorned me, but it’s not like I don’t have other admirers.” As such, this poem conveys the resentment of a wife toward her husband. In concrete terms, it deals with the wife’s dissatisfaction over the fact that her husband has fallen in love with someone else. Sadness is often accompanied by hatred, and hatred can be seen as a negative form of emotional expression. However, even in such a negative expression of feelings, there is also a positive meaning to be discerned: the sadness or hatred men and women feel when faced with a change of heart is predicated on the recognition that husbands and wives have the right to love as well as to be loved. A change of heart occurs against the backdrop of rejection, and the latter comes down to a negation of the right to be loved. From a positive perspective, the sadness that accompanies the experience of rejection is grounded in an affirmation of the right to be loved. Relations between husbands and wives involve mutual love in an active sense, while also being related to being loved in a passive sense. In cases where a person has suffered rejection or has been abandoned, he or she is usually deprived of the right to be loved, which gives rise to a feeling of sadness between the two parties. Such sadness also constitutes one of the ways in which emotions are expressed in everyday life. Another type of emotion related to the lifeworld has a more positive ethical significance. This type of emotion primarily manifests itself in the love between parents and children (mothers and fathers and sons and daughters). First, there is the concern of children for their parents: “My poor parents, how they toiled in bringing me up.”13 What is expressed here is a person’s mournful feeling over the fact that his parents had to slave away to raise and support him. Second, we come across the gratitude children feel toward their parents: “Who would have supported me if not my father? Where would I have been without my mother? When I leave home I feel nothing but sorrow, when I come back it is as if I am still far away. My father brought me to life, my mother raised me, they comforted and nourished me. Bringing me up and educating me, caring for me and looking out for me, saving no efforts to fill my stomach. The debt 11   Shijing, Hong yan zhi shi 鸿雁之什 [Decade of Hong yan], Wo xing qi ye 我行其野 [“I Travel through the Open Country”]. 12   Shijing, Zheng feng 郑风 [Airs of Zheng], Qianchang 褰裳 [“Holding up My Garments to Wade across the River”]. 13   Shijing, Gu feng zhi shi 谷风之什 [Decade of Gu feng], Liao e 蓼莪 [“Luxuriantly the Vines Grow”].

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I wish I could repay to them is as vast and boundless as the sky.”14 In this poem, the poet expresses a feeling of profound grief when looking back at all the hardships his parents had to endure in bringing him up and taking care of him, their untimely death having deprived him of the opportunity to repay his gratitude to them. The related verses “I will always think of them with a filial heart, cherishing filial piety is a law”15 and “Where there are people supporting them and helping him, there is filial piety and virtue”16 count as early embodiments of the concept of filial piety (xiao 孝). The transition from simple gratitude to filial reverence adds an additional layer to the feelings experienced in relation to one’s parents. Third, there is the sense of responsibility children feel toward their mother and father. Such a sense of responsibility is not simply based on duty in a legal sense. Rather, it is grounded in an inner form of care and thus is more emotional in substance. This kind of feeling is conveyed by verses such as “The king’s affairs are never finished, I worry that my parents remain uncared for.”17 Because they have been summoned to go into battle or perform labor service and their superiors expect them to complete an endless amount of tasks, the authors in such poems do not have the opportunity to perform the duties to their parents as sons and daughters, which gives rise to emotional anxiety and grief. Such emotions obviously have an ethical content. Apart from the feelings between parents and children, other emotions based on kinship ties include cherishing the memory of one’s ancestors or forebears: “My heart is beset by grief and sorrow when I think of my ancestors.”18 “Thinking of my ancestors” here is permeated by a feeling of longing for them. Apart from the relations between family members, everyday life also compromises social intercourse in a broader sense, which in turn involves different forms of emotional relations. One of these, the contact between friends, takes up a prominent position. As is well known, friendship is an important social relationship, and Confucians would later come to consider friendship as one of the “five relations” (wu lun 五伦),19 thereby confirming the status of friendship as one of the fundamental forms of human relations. Similarly, the Book of Songs touches upon different aspects of this relationship. “I have an honorable guest, in my heart I do love him,” “I have an honorable guest, in my heart I do 14  Ibid. 15   Shijing, Wen wang zhi shi 文王之什 [Decade of Wen wang], Xiawu 下武 [“Successors”]. 16   Shijing, Sheng min zhi shi 生民之什 [Decade of Sheng min], Quan a 卷阿 [“Curving along the Earthen Hill”]. 17   Shijing, Tang feng 唐风 [Airs of Tang], Di du 杕杜 [“Solitary Birch-Leaf Pear Tree”]. 18   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Xiaowan 小宛 [“Small”]. 19  Tr. note: The other four relations are those between ruler and servant, parent and child, husband and wife, and between siblings.

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rejoice in him.”20 These verses convey the joy people feel over having a welcome guest or friend paying them a visit and staying over. Emotions between friends usually present themselves as amicable feelings of companionship, and such joyfulness also serves to convey the importance attached to the emotions involved with friendship. Of course, there are also negative sides to the social relations between people. Consequently, the corresponding emotions often appear in a negative guise. We see this in the idea that “gossip is a dreadful thing” (人言可畏): “How dreadful it is when people gossip all the time.”21 “Do not believe what people say, you really cannot trust them.”22 “When people speak, refrain from trusting them.”23 In verses such as these, “dread” (wei 畏) embodies a negative kind of emotion: tensions between people are reflected emotionally and give rise to the emotional experience of dread. Likewise, “mistrust” (wuxin 无信) between people is developed into a feeling of doubt. Such experiences are always grounded in actual or potential conflicts between people within the process of social intercourse. Approaching other people with a feeling of fear and mistrust or with a feeling of friendship respectively count as the negative and positive aspects of the process of everyday social intercourse. II In comparison to the everyday lifeworld, the domains of society and politics would seem to be more closely tied up with rational activity. That being said, as a concrete process in which human beings participate, the socio-political domain also includes an emotional dimension. In many places, the Book of Songs touches upon this emotional aspect. In the Book of Songs, emotional experiences within the fields of society and politics primarily manifest themselves in the feelings of anger and resentment: “Vexed is my heart when I think of my misfortune. The people are innocent, but they have all been turned into slaves. How misfortunate am I, where is good fortune to be found?”24 An individual living in society is lonely and has nothing or no one to rely on. He wonders where the people who have been reduced to slavery will find good fortune. Such helpless questioning implies dissatisfaction with those in power. “The dead lie by the road, even though there are people to bury them. But the 20   Shijing, Tong gong zhi shi 彤弓之什 [Decade of Tong gong], Tong gong 彤弓 [“Red Bows”]. 21   Shijing, Zheng feng 郑风 [Airs of Zheng], Jiang zhongzi 将种子 [“I Beg You”]. 22   Shijing, Zheng feng 郑风 [Airs of Zheng], Yang zhi shui 扬之水 [“The Little Ditch”]. 23   Shijing, Tang feng 唐风 [Airs of Tang], Cai ling 采苓 [“Gathering Liquorice”]. 24   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jien nanshan], Zhengyue 正月 [“First Month”].

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mind of our sovereign is made up, and there is little else but cruelty there. How great my grief as my tears fall down.”25 Dead bodies lie by the side of the road, and even though there are people who could bury them, the ruler is cruelhearted and remains completely indifferent to the misfortunes of the masses. Every time the person in the poem thinks about this, he is grieved and lets his tears stream down. In between the lines, we can detect a feeling of compassion, and the anger toward the political state of things is also hard to miss. At the time, those in power would often requisition labor from the people, and those drafted for labor service were usually not treated as human beings. This practice gave rise to a strong sense of resentment: “Which plants are not withered and black? Is there anyone left who is not alone? Poor conscripts are we, alone and not treated as people.”26 These verses betray the plaintive feelings of someone who finds himself in inhumane circumstances, while at the same time entailing a political feeling of anger and resentment. Such feelings are not devoid of content, but imply a kind of challenge to the legitimacy of those in power. In a positive sense, the precondition for such dissatisfaction and anger is the idea that those in power should care for the people and allow them to live and work in peace and contentment, while the real state of affairs is quite the opposite and the people are living in miserable circumstances. Since those in power fail to perform their duties, their legitimacy has become questionable. Another form in which emotions present themselves within the fields of society and politics is concerned consciousness (youhuan yishi 忧患意识). In the Book of Songs, this type of consciousness can be seen at many points. Being concerned implies rational reflection on politics, but also expresses itself in a state of mind with many different layers. Lines such as “Troubled and melancholy is my heart when I think of the cruel state of things in the country”27 reveal a certain kind of emotional experience. In the verses “My acquaintances say I am grieved, strangers ask me what it is I am looking for,”28 the poet is overlooking the ruins of the old capital of the Western Zhou dynasty (1046–771 BCE), Haojing 镐京, and is faced with a desolate scene of debris. He is moved by this sight and overwhelmed by sorrow and anxiety because it reminds him of the troubles besetting politics in his own time. “When I think of how lawless they are, I find no peace either standing or walking. So much 25   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Xiao pan 小弁 [“Small Flapping Wings”]. 26   Shiijing, Yu zao zhi shi 渔藻之什 [Decade of Yu zao], He cao bu huang 何草不黄 [“Which Plants Have not Turned Yellow? ”]. 27   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Zhengyue 正月 [“First Month”]. 28   Shijing, Wang feng 王风 [Airs of Wang], Shu li 黍离 [“Millet Drooping”].

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trouble in my heart, it cannot be stopped or forgotten.”29 The many lords and the princes, dukes, and ministers do not abide by the laws and regulations, so that society is beset with crises, something the poet is extremely concerned about. “Such is my sadness that it seems as if my heart had been tied into a knot. Why are those in power so cruel toward me? When wildfires flare up, there is someone to extinguish them, but none came when the illustrious capital of the Zhou was destroyed by the concubine Bao Si.”30 Those in power wallow in debauchery and bring the country in danger. Such historical lessons from the past serve to reinforce immediate political concerns. If we say that feelings of political anger inherently entail a challenge toward those in power, then a political form of concerned consciousness is more likely to manifest itself in a concern for the country and society. This concern is permeated by a value orientation directed toward the community. Such value orientation had a strong influence on later Confucians. An emotional experience slightly different from political anger and concerned political consciousness is the feeling of dissatisfaction toward social inequality, the latter counting as another form of emotional expression within the field of society. “They have good wine as well as fine meats. They bring their neighbors together and are friendly with their relatives. When I contemplate my solitude, my heart is filled with grief.”31 Some are surrounded by distinguished guests and have good liquor and food at their disposal, while others are lonely and helpless. Through this sharp contrast, the author conveys his feelings of indignation and injustice. On the level of actuality, this kind of emotional experience is instigated by the inequality of present conditions in society. III During the Shang (ca. 1600–1460 BCE) and the Zhou dynasties, an early religious outlook had already starting developing which would later manifest 29   Shijing, Hongyan zhi shi 鸿雁之什 [Decade of Hong yan], Mian shui 沔水 [“Surging Waters”]. 30   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Zhengyue 正月 [“First Month”]. [Tr. note: According to Confucian lore, Bao Si 褒姒 was a concubine of king You 幽 of Zhou who was partly to blame for the downfall of the Zhou dynasty. In an attempt to amuse the gloomy Bao Si, king You had repeatedly lit the capital’s warning beacons, causing the nobles to rally to his aid for nothing. When the capital was finally besieged and overrun by nomads, the nobles no longer responded to king Yu’s calls for aid because they no longer trusted him.] 31  Ibid.

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itself in the Book of Songs in different forms. In the Book of Songs, emotion in a religious sense primarily expressed itself as reverence ( jingwei 敬畏), which has heaven (tian 天) as its concrete object. In the Shang period, heaven was not only seen as an ultimate form of existence endowed with ontological significance, but was also understood as a transcendent force governing society and controlling the lives of individuals. As such, reverence for heaven expressed itself in a focus on transcendent existence. For the authors of the Book of Songs, “in its greatness, heaven makes no mistakes. Should you persist in going against its virtue, you will bring great calamity to the people.”32 In other words, it is impossible for heaven to make mistakes, and if someone in power commits a fault, this will anger heaven, which will heap calamities upon the people. As a transcendent form of existence, heaven has the function of bringing peace to the people: “How great is heaven, illustriously observing the world below, surveying all four corners of the world, seeking out peace for the people.”33 From way on high, heaven ensures peace for the multitudes. For those in power, this implies that they must always act reverently toward heaven: “Be reverent in the face of the anger of heaven, do not presume to act wantonly like a child. Show reverence to the vicissitudes of heaven; do not dare to act as you please. How great is heaven, it follows you wherever you go. How clear-sighted is heaven, it sees you no matter how far you wander.”34 Heaven can perceive the smallest of details and sees all the comings and goings of those in power, following every move they make, with nothing escaping its sight. Similarly, for the common people, this means that they too have to maintain a feeling of reverence toward heaven: “All you people, pay attention to yourselves with reverence. Why do you show no reverence for each other, why do you not stand in awe of heaven?”35 Every individual not only has to obligation to preserve his selfesteem and show respect for others, but also and above all has to approach heaven with a feeling of reverence. Related to reverence is the emotion of gratitude toward heaven: “When our ancestors (zengsun 曾孙) lived a long life, it was heaven bestowing this blessing upon them.”36 The people of the Zhou dynasty called their ancestors “grandsons of old” (zengsun). These verses have the following meaning: the fact that my people have attained longevity completely depends on the protection 32   Shijing, Dang zhi shi 荡之什 [Decade of Dang], Yi 抑 [“Beautiful”]. 33   Shijing, Wen wang zhi shi 文王之什 [Decade of Wen Wang], Huang yi 皇已 [“How Great”]. 34   Shijing, Sheng min zhi shi [Decade of Sheng min], Ban 板 [“Irregular”]. 35   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi [Decade of Jie nanshan], Yu wu zheng 雨无正 [“Ceaseless the Rain”]. 36   Shijing, Gufeng zhi shi 谷风之什 [Decade of Gu Feng], Xin nanshan 信南山 [“Lofty the Southern Mountain”].

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provided by heaven. These lines inherently convey a deep feeling of indebtedness toward heaven. In reverence, there is an entwinement of respect and fear, which is predicated on affirming that heaven has the ability to reward goodness and punish wrongdoing. At the same time, when it comes to the problem of how to act toward heaven, the emotion of reverence is often connected to a feeling of indebtedness. In both cases, we are dealing with the expression of a form of ultimate concern along with the search for a spiritual place of repose. Another form of consciousness expressed by the Book of Songs in the face of transcendent existence is doubt and anger. In the Book of Songs, we encounter a feeling of skepticism toward heaven at various instances. “Look over there in those woods, there is only firewood and leaves of grass to be found. With the people suffering as much as this, see how muddled and dark heaven remains.”37 The people are faced with calamities, but still heaven stays dark and deaf as if it’s merely a dream. “The mandate of heaven is lawless, I cannot follow my friends in being so at ease.”38 In this context, “lawless” (bu che 不彻) means not following a fixed course. What is criticized here is the inconstancy of the heavenly mandate (tianming 天命). “There is a supreme lord on high, does he hate anyone?”39 These verses express doubt concerning the idea that a transcendent heaven would be able to hate someone. “I look up to the great heaven, oh when will it grant me peace?”40 These lines ask when heaven will finally bring peace to humanity. In the kinds of doubts we just encountered we find skepticism, but also a kind of dissatisfaction, desperation, and denunciation, which are all predicated on the yearning for justice: in hoping that heaven will provide a guarantee for social justice, the authors of these verses reveal their dissatisfaction with heaven, which has not fulfilled its role of ensuring that justice takes its course. Additionally, behind such skepticism and denunciations, we are also presented with an inclination toward skepticism, namely an expression of incredulity toward the idea that heaven really has the function of rewarding good and punishing evil. In a certain sense, this latter attitude is permeated with the spirit of rationalism.

37   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Zhengyue 正月 [“First Month”]. 38   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Shi yue zhi jiao 十月 之交 [“With the Conjunction of Sun and Moon in the Tenth Month”]. 39   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], Zhengyue 正月 [“First Month”]. 40   Shijing, Dang zhi shi 荡之什 [Decade of Dang], Yunhan 云汉 [“The Milky Way”].

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IV As a transcendent form of existence, the concept of heaven touches upon the meaning of existence on an ultimate level. While being focused on the meaning of existence in its transcendent aspect, in terms of content, the Book of Songs at the same time points toward the sense of actual existence, and contains many-layered emotional expressions of the meaning of human life. In the Book of Songs, we find the following celebrated passage: “Heaven engendered the multitudes of people, each thing has its own regularity. The people have been accorded with a proper standard, what they love is exemplary virtue.”41 The later Confucian classics would often invoke these verses. According to the account in the Book of Songs, human beings have an innate basis for goodness. The kind of “proper standard accorded to them” (bingyi 秉彝) provides the inner condition for the possibility of any acquired tendency toward the good. It involves the inclination toward bringing about what is good, while also being permeated by an emotional identification with goodness: on the one hand, the human inclination toward goodness constitutes the condition of the possibility for human beings becoming good. On the other hand, this inclination remains grounded in an emotional identification with what is good. While the so-called “proper standard accorded to them” primarily provides an innate basis for goodness, in actual existence, human beings also face the question of how they ought to “exist” (zai 在). When it comes to this problem, the Book of Songs conveys the following belief: “Have no shame in the face of other people, have no fear in the face of heaven.”42 “Having no shame in the face other people” can be understood as the idea of standing one’s ground by abiding by moral laws in word and action. “Having no fear in the face of heaven” requires a person to hold firm in a more ultimate sense. Both of these phrases give expression to a certain view on the meaning of existence from two different sides, including the expression of a sublime sort of moral integrity in the domain of human life. Needless to say, actual human existence is not a bed of roses and the situations people face are mostly far from ideal. When facing suffering or misfortune, individual human beings will often lament being born at the wrong time, something we also encounter throughout the Book of Songs: “In my heart sorrow still lies concealed when I think of my home country. I was born at the 41   Shijing, Dang zhi shi 荡之什 [Decades of Dang], Zheng min 蒸民 [“Heaven Engendered”]. 42   Shijing, Jie nanshan zhi shi 节南山之什 [Decade of Jie nanshan], He si ren 何斯人 [“Who is this Person”].

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wrong time and met with the anger of heaven.”43 While it is true that attributing an individual’s misfortune to heaven displays a certain consciousness of the transcendent, up to a point, the phrase “I was born at the wrong time” also reveals the helpless existential feeling of an individual who cannot get a grip on his own fate. Such a feeling conveys an emotional lament over the meaning of human existence in a negative manner. Adversity in life and a bad twist of fate can often make an individual wonder whether life ultimately has any meaning. This becomes apparent in the following verses: “The blossoms of the crossvine are fresh and in full bloom. Knowing how things stand for me, it seems better not to have been born at all.”44 The first lines are a description of nature: in the natural world, plants and flowers are full of vitality and teeming with life, while by comparison, the author of this poem is facing tremendous difficulties, and already realizes that it would have been better not have come into this world to begin with. Here the meaninglessness of human existence is expressed by bringing natural life into sharp relief with human suffering. At the same time, such a feeling of meaninglessness presents itself as a negative form of emotional expression. As we can see, the Book of Songs touches upon many different aspects of the emotional expression of the meaning of human existence, including the tendency toward and identification with what is good, as well as doubts over the meaning of existence brought on by the difficulties human beings face in life. As such, the Book of Songs once again presents us with a rich and manifold emotional world. V From the overview provided in the above, it can be seen that the Book of Songs conveys emotions through poetry and gives a voice to human nature through feelings (以情咏性), thereby revealing the importance it attaches to the world of emotions. In the Book of Songs, emotions are first of all reflections of sincerity and naturalness, qualities that are always connected with each other. From the poetic expression of love, care between parents and children and friendship in the lifeworld to the emotional expression of the meaning of human existence, there is nothing artificial or theatrical about the feelings described in the Book of Songs; everything is sincere and natural. As Wang 43   Shijing, Dang zhi shi 荡之什 [Decade of Dang], Sang rou 桑柔 [“Tender Mulberry Tree”]. 44   Shijing, Yu Zao zhi shi 渔藻之什 [Decade of Yu zao], Tiao zhi hua 苕之华 [“Flowers of the Crossvine”].

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Fuzhi once pointed out: “Emotions are the nexus between yin and yang” (情者, 阴阳之机也).45 The transformations of yin and yang are characterized by the fact that they are completely natural and spontaneous. Since the same goes for emotions, Wang adds that “emotions spring from what happens unwillingly” (发乎不得已者, 情也).46 In the Book of Songs, regardless of whether we are dealing with everyday life or with the realm of politics, the expression of emotions is always characterized by sincerity and naturalness. The close interest in emotions in the Book of Songs had a profound impact on later Confucianism. As a matter of fact, from the pre-Qin period onwards, Confucians started paying a great deal of attention to emotions. This becomes apparent in Kongzi’s interpretation of the obligatory three-year period of mourning after the death of one’s parents. When his student Zai Wo proposed that “mourning for a period of three years is long indeed,” meaning that it was too long, Kongzi responded with the following analysis: When an exemplary person is in mourning, he takes no pleasure in eating sweet foods, gets no joy from listening to music, and does not feel at ease in his own home. That is the reason why he lets go of these things. But please, do go ahead if you feel comfortable doing so. […] The three-year period of mourning is observed throughout the whole world.47 When their parents have passed away, it is common for children not to enjoy the taste of food and drink and to take no pleasure in listening to music. This counts as a natural expression of the fact that they miss their parents. The three-year period of mourning is grounded in such natural psychological emotions. According to Kongzi, mourning is a form of filial piety and in itself constitutes a manifestation of the way of humaneness (rendao 仁道). Since natural emotions are inherent to and lie at the basis of the three-year period of mourning, the principles of the way of humaneness, which are rooted in filial piety and fraternal duty, in turn conform to the natural requirements of the psychology and emotions of human beings, instead of appearing as artificial obligations. Obviously, for Confucians, humaneness as a universal value principle has its inner basis in emotions. In discussing the significance of the Book of Songs, Kongzi points out: “If one does not study the Songs, one lacks the means of expression (无以言).”48 45  Wang Fuzhi, 1996, 323. 46  Ibid., 325. 47   Lunyu 17:21. 48   Lunyu 16:13.

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On the one hand, this passage refers to rhetorical refinement and other aspects of the process of speaking (studying the Songs can make a person’s speech and rhetoric more refined). The distinction between civilized and uncivilized language primarily involves its formal and external aspects. On the other hand, in a more substantial sense, the reason why the Analects claim that a person lacks the means to express himself if he fails to study the Songs is related to the analysis provided in the above, where we argued that sincerity in the expression of emotions constitutes an important dimension of the Book of Songs. Accordingly, the Songs can have an edifying influence on the sincerity of human beings and help shape sincerity in intention. From this perspective, the idea that “if one does not study the Songs, one lacks the means of expression” has the following meaning: without the edifying influence of the Songs, it is difficult to nurture sincerity in intention, which in turn can lead to a person “saying one thing and meaning the other” (言不由衷). In other words, the process of speaking will remain deprived of the means to convey intentions in a sincere manner. By reciting and absorbing the Songs, a person can gradually foster emotional sincerity, thus to a certain extent ensuring sincerity in speech. After Kongzi, Mengzi 孟子 (d. 289 BCE) continued investigating emotions and approached the feeling of compassion as the sprout of humaneness (ren zhi duan 仁之端). The feeling of compassion is an inner emotion, while humaneness is a universal value principle. Compared to Kongzi, Mengzi elevates emotions to an even higher status. In his view, the feeling of compassion is a form of human empathy and constitutes the point of departure for humaneness. Additionally, this inner emotion can also come to manifest itself in the field of politics. What Mencius calls “humane government” (renzheng 仁政) is based on “the feeling of not being able to bear the sufferings of others” (bu ren ren zhi xin 不忍人之心), and the latter too belongs to the category of internal emotions. This shows us the importance of emotions in Confucianism. What lies behind emotions are intrinsic value conceptions and ultimate concerns. In concrete terms, the axiological significance of emotions first of all expresses itself in focusing on and caring for human beings. Before all else, emotions are directed toward human beings. This can be seen in many places throughout the Book of Songs. In the feeling of love between men and women, the focus lies on individual human beings: the object of love is always a wholly unique individual. In social relationships (ethical relations), attention shifts to others. In the domain of politics, it is the community which comes to the fore. In each of these cases, it is the human being that serves as the object of concern on different levels. This can be seen as a concrete manifestation of the axiological implications of emotions in the Book of Songs.

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At the same time, emotions imply a search for the meaning of human existence. In the expression of emotions, one can consistently observe an inquiry into the question “what does it take for a life to become meaningful?” A perfect human life is predicated on the existence of a suitable political environment in reality. In the Book of Songs, the lack of such an environment in one’s own day and age often reveals itself in feelings of concern (youhuan) and anger. The social background always remains external to the individual. For an individual, this means that he has to stand his ground within real life, while also upholding himself in a more ultimate sense. This is expressed in the verses “have no shame in the face of other people, have no fear in the face of heaven,” which we encountered in the above. Moreover, for the authors of the Book of Songs, one should not adopt a nihilistic attitude toward the possibility of individual happiness. Laments over having been born in the wrong age, the troubling realization that life is not worth living and other feelings all express the search for happiness in a negative form. As far as the authors of the Book of Songs are concerned, human existence can only become meaningful if it encompasses the search for a transcendent level as well as actual happiness. One of the prominent characteristics of the world of emotions in the Book of Songs is the entwinement of emotion and principle (li 理). This entwinement is an important aspect of the expression of emotions in the Book of Songs. In the fields of politics, ethics, and religion, the expression of various sorts of emotions has a rational content. Ethical emotions include the conscious concern for and sense of responsibility toward one’s parents and other human beings. This sense of responsibility is the embodiment of an ethical form of rationality or practical reason. On the one hand, political anger is a manifestation of the principle of justice: calling the legitimacy of those who currently hold political power into question is predicated on an affirmation of the principle of justice, a principle which is rational in substance. On the other hand, such anger is also run through with a sense of justice, which has an emotional significance. The interweaving of an emotional sense of justice and a rational principle of justice bears witness to the relatedness and interconnectedness of emotion and principle (li). In the concern (youhuan) over politics, rational arguments and judgments are intermingled with anxiety. When someone claims that troubles in politics result in social chaos, this qualifies as a kind of rational argument, but at the same time, the anxiety felt over the occurrences in question counts as an expression of emotions. Here too, the link between emotions and a certain political stance becomes apparent. Similarly, turning heaven into an object of doubt implies the weakening of a person’s emotional identification with and reliance on heaven. At the same time, it includes a form of skepticism toward the existence of a transcendent power and implies a spirit of rationalism.

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The entwinement of emotion and principle had a major impact on later Confucians: one can find traces of the overall focus on emotions as well as the wholly distinctive entwinement of emotion and principle throughout the subsequent evolution of Confucianism. In discussing the Book of Songs, Kongzi himself indicated: “The Songs can provide a person with inspiration and with a way of observing things. They allow us to come together and express our complaints (诗, 可以兴, 可以观, 可以群, 可以怨).”49 “Inspiration” (xing 兴) mainly refers to the kind of emotional encouragement which leads a person to spiritual improvement. “A way of observing things” (guan 观) primarily emphasizes the need for a sober outlook on social phenomena. The Book of Songs contains portrayals of many different aspects of what social life was like at the time. Therefore, studying the Songs, simultaneously allows a person to come to an understanding of all kinds of social phenomena. Whereas “inspiration” is first of all tied up with emotions, what the Analects call a “way of observing things” refers to grasping and understanding society and is more rational in content. “Coming together” (qun 群) involves an emotional connection between different individuals, while also being related to the ties between different communities. Emotions are one of the most important means of communication between different communities, and the idea that the Songs serve as a crucial medium for emotional communication is grounded in this simple fact. Confucianism paid special attention to poetry and music and approached them as concrete forms of emotional expression. The emotional content in question has an important function in solidifying the ties between human beings, a point which Xunzi’s 荀子 (d. 238 BCE) made clear with reference to music: “Music leads to harmony and identity, ritual regulations distinguish between what is different.”50 One of the functions of ritual is to draw boundaries in accordance with a certain measure, thus distinguishing people from each other and determining their respective duties and obligations. Music is characterized by the fact that it transcends boundaries of political rank and allows different members of society to communicate with each other on an emotional level, thereby buttressing solidarity and reverence in society, establishing a connection between people and allowing them to come together. In terms of their emotional content, the Songs have a function similar to that of music. Lastly, “expressing complaints” (yuan 怨) refers to allowing people to achieve psychological balance through an emotional catharsis and thereby attain a more robust internal spiritual state. In the above, we mentioned that Mengzi considers the feeling of compassion to be the sprout of humaneness, an outlook which is predicated on 49   Lunyu 17:9. 50   Xunzi 20:3.

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treating the feeling of compassion as an emotion which includes an ethical form of consciousness: this feeling can be understood as an emotion that has been endowed with ethical content. Here too, the entwinement of emotion and principle becomes apparent. In the Song dynasty (960–1279), Cheng Yi 程颐 (d. 1107) came to advocate the idea of “bringing one’s emotions into accordance with nature” (xing qi qing 性其情): “That is why a person with insight restrains his emotions and moderates them. He rectifies his mind and nurtures his nature. That is why we speak of ‘bringing emotions into accordance with nature.’”51 This idea first appeared in the work of Wang Bi 王弼 (d. 249). In his discussion on how to ensure the rectitude of emotions, Wang pointed out: “If one does not bring one’s emotions into accordance with nature, how would it be possible to keep them in the right state? This is how emotions must be rectified.”52 Cheng Yi developed this insight further. In the context of debates in the Neo-Confucian learning of principle (lixue 理学), “nature” (xing 性) is an embodiment of universal heavenly principle (tianli 天理). Accordingly, the idea of “bringing emotions into accordance with nature” can be seen as the internalization of this universal heavenly principle within the individual. In contrast to “emotion,” “nature” is more rational in substance. In developing Wang Bi’s notion of “bringing emotions into accordance with nature,” Cheng Yi laid the emphasis on transforming “emotions” into “nature,” which comes down to endowing emotions with a rational content. While it is true that this line of thought entails a trend toward the rationalization of emotion, it also reveals an awareness of the connection between emotion and reason. From the perspective of intellectual history, the Confucian understanding of emotion outlined in the above can be traced back to the earlier Book of Songs and other classical texts. Indeed, in combining emotional expression with rational forms of content, the Book of Songs counts as an early classic which exerted a crucial influence on later generations and came to constitute one of the main theoretical resources for Chinese, and especially Confucian, thought. Figures from Kongzi down to Zhu Xi and Wang Fuzhi all had their own unique understanding of the Book of Songs and approached this work as an important source for their own thought. This makes it clear that the Book of Songs has an important place in the history of Chinese philosophy and Chinese intellectual history in general.

51  Cheng Hao 程颢 and Cheng Yi 程颐, Er Cheng ji 二程集 [Collected Writings of the Brothers Cheng] vol. 1, (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), 577. 52  Wang Bi 王弼, Wang Bi jijiaoshi 王弼集校釋 [Critical Edition of the Writings of Wang Bi], Edited by Lou Yulie 楼宇烈 vol. 2, (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), 631.

Chapter 18

Metaphysical Principle and Principle of Value: the Way (Dao 道) and Natural Spontaneity (Ziran 自然) in the Philosophy of the Laozi In the philosophical system of the Laozi 老子 (“Book of Master Lao”),123 metaphysical principles observed from the perspective of the way of heaven (tiandao guan 天道观) and principles of value within the perspective of the way of humanity (rendao guan 人道观) appear as intrinsically interrelated. As far as the perspective of the way of heaven is concerned, we know that the Laozi takes dao 道 (“way” “method” “principle”) as its first principle. As the ultimate basis of existence, the way is not an anthropomorphic or teleological kind of being, but rather has ziran 自然 (“self-so,” “natural,” “spontaneity”) as its fundamental mode of existence. The idea that “the way follows the example of nature” (dao fa ziran 道法自然)4 serves to make this clear. Following the example of nature within the perspective of the way of heaven becomes concretized within the observational stance provided by the way of humanity, where it counts as a principle of natural spontaneity on an axiological level. The line of thought outlined in the above, centered on the concepts of dao and ziran, reflects the correspondence between the way of heaven and the way of humanity, and also reveals the interpenetration of metaphysical and axiological principles. I The Laozi immediately makes its purpose clear in starting off by introducing the concept of dao: “The way that can be spoken of is not the constant way (dao ke dao fei changdao 道可道非常道).”5 What we should pay attention to here first of all is the distinction between the way “that can be spoken of” (kedao 可道) and “the constant way (changdao 常道).” On a semantic level, the 1  This chapter was translated by Ady Van den Stock, postdoctoral research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden. 2  Originally published in Jianghan luntan 江汉论坛, 2013: 5. 3  Tr. note: The Laozi is also known as the Daodejing 道德经 (“Classic of Dao and Virtue”). 4  Tr. note: Laozi 25. 5  Laozi 1.

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word dao originally covered at least two different meanings: first, “speaking,” and second, “path.” The phrase “can be spoken of” (kedao) in the Laozi corresponds with the first layer of meaning. On the one hand, dao in the related original sense of a path or way expresses something substantial and solid, while at the same time designating an orientation toward a certain goal. By extension, dao in the sense of a path can signify guiding or leading. This conception of dao shows certain similarities with the idea of dao in the phrases “guiding them through government” (dao zhi yi zheng 道之以政) and “guiding them through virtue” (dao zhi yi de 道之以德) in the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects” or “Analects”),6 where it covers the meanings of “leading” and “providing a norm.” In relation to this connotation of dao, the expression kedao 可道 (“possible of being dao-ed”) refers to what is effable, but can also designate that which provides normative guidance to everyday actions. Accordingly, the opening sentence of the Laozi means: “that which can be spoken of and guides our everyday actions is different from the ‘constant way’ as an ultimate principle.” The character chang 常 in the expression changdao 常道 primarily means “lasting” (hengjiu 恒久). As a matter of fact, in the silk manuscripts of the Laozi, changdao is directly rendered as hengdao 恒道, which makes it clear that there is no sharp difference between the words chang and heng. At the same time, from an etymological perspective, the character chang is also related to the word chang 裳, which signifies “undergarments.” For human beings, undergarments serve as a means to cover themselves, and in this sense, the original meaning of chang 常 involves the ideas of concealing and hiding.7 Accordingly, chang in the expression changdao also has the meaning of concealing. Looked at from another angle, concealing can refer to what remains hidden and does not appear: what has been concealed has not yet been revealed. For us today, it is hard to ascertain whether or not the author of the Laozi intentionally made up of this metaphorical meaning of chang 常 (as chang 裳), but if we look at its original meaning, it does seem that chang 常 also involved the idea of something that remains hidden without appearing. On the level of the way of heaven, what remains hidden without appearing signifies that which transcends the senses (that which cannot be grasped through the sense organs) and differs from external phenomena (which have an outside appearance). In 6  Lunyu 论语 2:3. 7  In the Shuowen jiezi 说文解字 we read: “Chang 常 means undergarments.” Duan Yucai 段玉裁 (d. 1815) makes the following comment on this passage: “In the Shiming 释名 it says: ‘Outer garments are called chang 裳. Chang denotes an obstruction serving to screen oneself off.’” See Duan Yucai, Shuowen jiezi zhu 说文解字注 [Annotations to the Shuowen jiezi] (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1981), 358.

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sum, “the constant way” (changdao) is not only something that defies expression and differs from everyday norms, but is also characterized by the fact that it transcends the phenomenal (by remaining hidden without appearing). The transcendence of changdao is coterminous with its sense of constancy: what appears on a phenomenal level is always subject to change and lacks the characteristics of stability and constancy, whereas the basic mode of existence of that which remains hidden without appearing includes stability and constancy. As an enduring form of existence, dao constitutes the origin of the myriad things: “this is called the root of heaven and earth.”8 By means of distinctions such as that between the constant dao, which cannot be spoken of, and the dao, which can be spoken of, or between norms within the field of experience and ultimate principles, the Laozi elevates dao into a universal and ultimate principle and uses it to explain the entire world. As such, dao becomes the first principle in the field of metaphysics. From the perspective of modern philosophy, in its concrete content, a first principle should compromise the principles for the unity and development of the world. As is well-known, in the evolution of early Chinese philosophy, such a principle first appeared in the form of the notions of yin 阴 (“shade,” “dark,” “lower”) and yang 阳 (“bright,” “light,” “higher”) and the theory of the five phases (wu xing 五行). The perspective offered by the theory of the five phases on the way of heaven is related to the rough materials (metal, wood, water, fire, and earth) human beings encounter on an empirical level, which are used to explain the formation of the world. As such, the five phases are hard to completely detach from these materials as they appear on an empirical level. In comparison to the primitive theories of yin and yang and the five phases, using the ultimate principle of dao to interpret the world obviously qualifies as a leap forward in terms of theoretical thought. Understanding the world also involves the relation between “observation” (guan 观) and existence: “Therefore, constantly abide in non-being when desiring to observe its subtleties, constantly abide in being when desiring to observe its boundaries” (故常无, 欲以观其妙; 常有, 欲以观其徼).9 It is worthwhile 8  Laozi 6. 9  Laozi 1. I should add that there are two ways of punctuating this sentence: either by introducing a pause after wu 无 (“non-being) and you 有 (“being”), or after wu yu 无欲 (“without desires”) and you yu 有欲 (“having desires”). These two different ways of punctuation are related to the second sentence of this chapter: “Non-being is called the beginning of heaven and earth, being is called the mother of the myriad things” (无, 名天地之始; 有, 名万物 之母). There have always been disagreements concerning how to punctuate this last sentence. People such as Wang Bi 王弼 (d.  249) introduced a pause after wuming 无名 and you­ming 有名, so that we get “that which has no name” and “that which has a name” instead

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paying attention to the kind of “observation” or “observational stance” (guan) mentioned in this passage. The appearance and non-appearance (hiddenness) of what exists are both related to a certain observational stance: “apparent” means that which can be observed (that which is located inside the observable realm). The “hidden” on the other hand cannot be observed (it lies outside the domain of the observable). Behind this conception lies the crucial insight that interpreting the world cannot be detached from the existence of human beings as such: “observation” means human observation, and regardless of whether we are dealing with observing things from the perspective of “non-being” (wu 无) (the way, dao) or from the perspective of “being” (you 有) (virtue, de 德), in each case it is human beings who are doing the observing. The hiddenness and non-appearance or the external appearance of the world are both related to the “observational stance” of human beings. The visible (manifest) and the invisible (hidden) are also relative to human observing: it is only with reference to human observation that there can be a difference such as that between what is hidden and what is manifest. Outside of human observation, the problem of the manifest (visible) and the hidden (invisible) would not impose itself: in existence as such (benran de cunzai 本然的存在), there is no distinction between being manifest and being hidden. It is only through the involvement of human observation that a difference between the hidden and the apparent emerges. This makes it clear that human beings reveal and understand the world within the process of their own existence (including the process of “observing”). On a more fundamental level, the sense of “guiding” implicit in the word dao means that dao is not only a metaphysical principle on the level of existence, but also has a certain normativity on an axiological level. As I indicated in the above, in the philosophy of the Laozi, dao is both the way of heaven of “non-being is called” and “being is called.” Others like Wang Anshi 王安石 (d. 1086) interpreted this sentence as saying “non-being is used to name the beginning of heaven and earth; being is used to indicate the mother of the myriad things,” thus placing a break after you 有 and wu 无. (See Wang Anshi Laozi zhu jiben 王安石老子注辑本 [Wang Anshi’s Collected Notes on the Laozi], edited by Rong Zhaozu 容肇祖, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1979). On the level of content, the two different readings are not mutually exclusive: that which is “nameless” (wuming 无名) cannot be expressed through words in the field of experience. On its part, “non-being” (wu 无) means that which has no concrete determinations. Actually, the “nameless” and “non-being” refer to the same thing (the way or dao). The difference between “having a name” (youming 有名) and “being” (you 有) can be approached in a similar manner. In terms of the sentence structure, it is best to introduce a pause after wu 无 and you 有 in this sentence (“constantly abide in non-being when desiring to observe its subtleties, constantly abide in being when desiring to observe its boundaries”) if one chooses to do the same for the second sentence of this chapter in the Laozi.

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and the way of humanity. The former is focused on metaphysical principles, whereas the latter is concerned with principles of value. For the Laozi, dao constitutes the supreme ground of existence and is its own ultimate cause. Accordingly, the development of a world grounded in dao essentially manifests itself as a form of self-movement (ziji yundong 自己运动): it is neither expressed as a conscious and goal-oriented process, nor is it propelled by an external force, as the phrase “the way follows the example of nature” indicates. This is the fundamental significance of “natural spontaneity” (ziran). From the perspective of the way of heaven, in its original meaning, ziran means the opposite of “made to happen in a certain way” (shiran 使然) and signifies “being like this out of itself” instead of “having been made this way.” When one talks about something “having been made this way” (shiran), this means that the thing in question was propelled by an internal goal or by an external force. Furthermore, from an axiological perspective, “natural spontaneity” is the opposite of what is artificial. Natural spontaneity is related to human beings, while also involving the object [of human action]. The affirmation of natural spontaneity in relation to the former (human beings themselves) expresses itself in a focus on inner heavenly nature (tianxing 天性) (the essential nature of human beings). In relation to the latter (the object of human action), the praise of natural spontaneity appears as a sense of reverence for heaven and earth as external things (natural objects). In the philosophy of the Laozi, there is an inherent connection between the notion that the way follows the example of nature (from the perspective of the way of heaven) on the one hand and the idea of being in harmony with nature (from the perspective of the way of human beings) on the other. As the embodiment of a certain value orientation, the principle of natural spontaneity encompasses the importance human beings attach to their own heavenly nature as well as the care they devote to heaven and earth as external things (natural objects). Historically speaking, what Confucians paid attention to first and foremost was the cultivation and improvement of virtuousness (dexing 德性) and the normative guidance provided by rituals. Virtuousness, which consists of things such as humaneness (ren 仁) and righteousness (yi 义), is not the same as heavenly nature (tianxing) in the sense of a natural state. The normative guidance provided by rituals is meant to transport human beings from “a barbaric state” (ye 野) (a mode of existence prior to civilization) to one of culture (wen 文) (a civilized state of existence). Virtuousness and ritual both give expression to the transcendence of nature (heaven) on different levels. From the perspective of the relation between heaven and human beings, the transition from a natural to a civilized mode of existence undoubtedly has a positive

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value and meaning. However, the excessive rigidification of ritual norms often runs the risk of transforming norms into a form of external coercion, and if virtuousness becomes an internal regulation strictly opposed to a person’s heavenly nature, this can result in the alienation of human nature. By contrast, the focus on natural spontaneity in the Laozi has the distinct advantage of serving to avoid the negative consequences which can result from the rigidification of the way of humaneness (rendao 仁道). That being said, departing from a focus on the principle of natural spontaneity, the Laozi also comes to regard social norms such as humanness and righteousness on the one hand and the way on the other as mutually exclusive, as we can see in the following passage: “When the great way is abandoned, then there is humaneness and righteousness. When wisdom and intelligence emerge, hypocrisy appears. When the six relations in the family are not in harmony, then we have filial piety and parental love. When states and families are in chaos, then there are loyal ministers.”10 According to the understanding articulated in the Laozi, dao, as observed from the perspective of the way of heaven, remains in a unified state and transcends divisions. The appearance of phenomena such as good and evil signifies the disintegration of values within the domain of the way of humanity, and this disintegration in turn manifests itself as a deviation from the way. Consequently, the Laozi goes on to adopt a skeptical and dismissive stance toward the development of civilization as well as the norms related to this development: “Give up humaneness, abandon righteousness and the people will return to filial piety and parental affection.”11 If we look at the evolution 10   Laozi 18. 11   Laozi 19. In the remnants of the Laozi in the Guodian bamboo slips, this sentence reads as follows: “Give up wisdom, abandon debate, and the people will be a hundred times better off. Give up skillfulness, abandon profit, and thieves and robbers will perish. Give up artifice, abandon reflection, and the people will return to filial piety and parental affection.” The main difference with the commonly used edition of the Laozi lies in the fact that no mention is made of “humanness and righteousness” here. However, on a philosophical level, there is no fundamental difference in meaning between the two versions. “Humaneness and righteousness” can be understood in a broad or a narrow sense. In a narrow sense, they correspond to the ethical principles advocated by Confucianism. In a broad sense, “humanness and righteousness” can refer to systems of social norms in general. Concomitantly, the critique of humanness and righteousness in the Laozi targets Confucian ethical principles, but also touches upon normative systems in general. For the Laozi, the main reason why one should steer clear from worldly wisdom and social systems of norms (including the ethical principles of Confucianism) is because they run the risk of making us deviate from our original nature and giving rise to hypocrisy. A similar train of thought is expressed in the Guodian version of the Laozi when it mentions: “giving up wisdom and abandoning debate,” “giving up skillfulness and abandoning profit,” and “giving up artifice and abandoning reflection.” The fundamental meaning of

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of society, it is clear that the excessive rigidification of norms is likely to result in the external coercion of human beings and lead to the alienation of human nature. However, without the restriction provided by social norms, it is hard to provide human beings with proper rational guidance. Additionally, the absence of norms can easily result in the disintegration of society. Without social order, there is no way to guarantee that human beings will move from a natural to a civilized state. Moreover, it becomes very difficult to allow human beings to truly attain a mode of existence that is in accordance with their inner nature. Seen from this perspective, there is clearly an intrinsic one-sidedness to the Laozi’s propagation of the principle of natural spontaneity. II In the philosophy of the Laozi, the principle of natural spontaneity is related to human existence, while also touching upon the relation between human beings and heaven and earth (the objective world). From the perspective of the way of heaven, the Laozi confirms that unity is the original state of dao and stresses the idea that dao follows the example of nature. While unity is the opposite of division, the idea of following the example of nature not only revolves around the perspective of the way of heaven, but also is also significant for the way of humanity. From the latter perspective, following the example of nature means showing reverence for the rules proper to the objective world within human activity itself. As such, the Laozi strongly emphasizes that human beings should remain in accordance with the rules of the objective world itself in their interaction with nature, a point which is expressed in the notion of “not acting while acting” (wei wu wu 为无为).12 The meaning of “acting” in this phrase refers to human activity in a broad sense, including its effects on heaven and earth and other external objects. “Not acting” involves the manner of “acting” in the former sense and refers to not going against objective rules through human intention and interference. In sum, as an embodiment of the principle of natural spontaneity in the field of the way of humanity, “not acting while acting” expresses a distinct kind of action: a mode of acting by not acting. As a form of conduct, it conveys the importance attached to being in accordance with regularity. As an orientation of action, “not acting while acting” compromises an affirmation of the unity of human beings and these phrases is that turning one’s back on natural spontaneity can be seen as the intrinsic cause behind all sorts of negative social phenomena. 12   Laozi 3.

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heaven (human beings and nature). As a matter of fact, when it comes to the relation between human beings and the objective world, the Laozi is not primarily focused on the human transcendence of and separation from nature, but rather on maintaining and safeguarding the unity of human beings and nature. As a considerable number of commentators have confirmed, the principle of natural spontaneity in the perspective described in the above has a positive significance for harmonizing the relation between human beings and nature and avoiding the loss of balance resulting from excessive human action. That being said, in its focus on natural spontaneity, the Laozi in a certain sense tends to idealize the natural state of existence. From the perspective of the way of heaven, the primordial and undivided way comes to be seen as the ultimate ground of existence. For the Laozi, the myriad of things, which exist in a state of division, are ultimately aimed at returning to the unified way: “Reaching emptiness is the ultimate, maintaining stillness is sincerity. The myriad of things act alongside each other, I observe how they return ( fu 复). Many are the things in the world, each going back to their roots. Going back to the root is called stillness, this is known as returning to their mandate (ming 命), returning to their mandate is called constancy.”13 The immediate sense of fu 复 is “going back to” and “returning to.” According to the Laozi, if the myriad of different things searches for their origin, they will be led back to dao as their ultimate ground. From the perspective of the way of human beings, a mode of existence that has not yet been affected by human action has a primordial significance. In contrast to the developed state of civilization, such a primordial form of existence has a more ideal character. Therefore, the Laozi inclines toward returning to a mode of existence prior to civilization: “Give up sagacity, abandon wisdom, and the people will be a hundred times better off. Give up humaneness, abandon righteousness, and the people will return to filial piety and parental affection. Give up ingenuity, abandon profit, and there will be no robbers and bandits.”14 Sagacity and wisdom, humaneness and righteousness, and ingenuity and profit refer to skillfulness in terms of thoughts and concepts, social norms, and technical abilities respectively. For the Laozi, all these things took shape after the development of civilization and are largely detrimental rather than beneficial to human survival. It is only by discarding these forms of civilized value that it becomes possible to restore an honest and simple kind of social morality and thus allowing people to live a better life. Departing from this premise, the Laozi puts forward a small state with few people as a social ideal: 13   Laozi 16. 14   Laozi 19.

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In a small state with few people, even if one provides many different kinds of implements, the people will not use them. When one teaches the people to see death as a grave matter, they will not wander off into the distance. Even if there are ships and carriages, no one will make use of them. Even though there are shields and weapons, no one will take them up. Let the people return to the use of tying knots instead of writing. Sweeten their food, embellish their clothes, and bring peace to their homes and joy to their customs. Neighboring states can be seen from a distance and people can hear the sound of each other’s chickens and dogs, but they will die of old age without ever having gone abroad.15 “Many different kinds of implements” refers to tools, the use of tying knots is contrasted with the use of writing, boats and carriages belong in the category of means of transport on water and land, shields and weapons refer to military equipment. These things all bear witness to the concrete accomplishments of civilization in different respects. By contrast, a small state with few people is a form of society preceding civilization. Approaching a small state with few people as the ideal society implies standing aloof from the achievements of civilization and returning to a form of existence before civilization. In comparison to the transcendence of nature occurring in a civilized form of existence, the idea of a small state with few people gives stronger expression to the unity of human beings and nature. Historically speaking, in the process of the development of civilization, one often comes across a certain antinomy: while on the one hand, this process counts as an expression of the progress and development of society, on the other hand, progress is always accompanied by negative consequences. Consequences such as an increase in wealth often leads to greed, advances in knowledge can simultaneously provide evil schemes with the necessary resources, the transformation of nature can result in a loss of balance between heaven and humanity, and so on. The fact that the Laozi took notice of such historical phenomena undoubtedly speaks to its theoretical acumen. However, at the same time, in its emphasis on the negative consequences of civilizational progress and its skepticism toward and condemnation of the development of civilization as such, the Laozi seems to have gone over to the other extreme. Actually, from a historical perspective, the negative results of the process of the development of civilization can only be resolved through further civilizational development. Adopting a skeptical stance toward civilization itself and 15   Laozi 80.

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attempting to return to an antediluvian state of existence seem to betray a lack of historical awareness. When it comes to relation between heaven and humanity, affirming the unity of these two obviously has a positive significance. That being said, this relation itself should be understood on a historical level. The relation between heaven and human beings can present itself as a natural unity, but also in a form of unity that has been attained after having gone through a process of differentiation. From a historical perspective, at the time when the ability of human beings to affect nature was still extremely limited, the unity of human beings with nature always expressed itself as a unity on a rudimentary level, which was characterized by the fact that it had not gone through a process of differentiation. We can describe this mode of unity through the phrases which Zhuangzi 庄子 (d. 286 BCE) would later use: “Living together with birds and beasts, forming a group along with the myriad things.”16 Following the intensification and development of the human impact on nature, human beings never ceased to remove themselves from nature. Accordingly, the original unity between heaven (nature) and human beings gradually moved in the direction of differentiation. Needless to say, heaven and human beings cannot simply remain in a state of differentiation and separation. Actually, against the background of the interaction between heaven and humanity, human beings have to ceaselessly attempt to reestablish a form of unity with nature after having gone through a process of differentiation. As such, the unity between heaven and human beings can present itself in two different forms: first, in a rudimentary and natural form of unity preceding differentiation, and second, in a reconstructed form of unity subsequent to the process of differentiation. In the interaction between heaven and humanity, human beings never cease reestablishing a higher form of unity with nature in the very process of removing themselves from nature. It is this reestablished form of unity that embodies historical progress in a more profound sense. Admittedly, the Laozi did display insight into the positive significance of the unity of heaven and human beings, but the latter was primarily understood as a unity before differentiation, whereas the form of unity attained after having gone through a process of differentiation did not receive the attention it deserves. This last point constitutes another inherent limitation of the Laozi’s understanding of the relation between heaven and humanity. In line with the understanding of the relation between heaven and human beings described in the above, the Laozi also defines the boundaries between the respective value and significance of heaven and humanity. As I already 16   Zhuangzi 9.2.

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mentioned, from the perspective of the way of heaven, the Laozi approaches the original state of the way as one in which the myriad things have not yet become differentiated. From the viewpoint of the way, the myriad things are intermingled and unified, with no differences existing between them. This notion drawn from the perspective of the way of heaven expresses itself in the way of humanity, where it is endowed with a corresponding axiological sense as the principle of natural spontaneity. This principle is concretely embodied in the following passage from the Laozi: “Heaven and earth are not humane (bu ren 不仁), they treat the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is not humane, he treats the common people as straw dogs.”17 The idea that “heaven and earth are not humane” and that “the sage is not humane” has a specific significance from the viewpoint of the way of heaven, but is also relevant to the way of humanity: from the perspective of the way of heaven, the myriad things in the world are all one, with no ontological differences existing between them. As far as the way of humanity is concerned, from the perspective of the principle of natural spontaneity, there is nothing unique or superior to human existence in comparison to other things. It is only in this sense that a civilized state different from nature no longer counts as something valuable which human beings should yearn and strive for. Quite the opposite, it is precisely nature as an obsolete form of existence that is worth preserving and returning to. It is here that we can see the link between metaphysical principles observed from the perspective of the way and the axiological principal of following the example of nature. Obviously, the Laozi idealizes nature and has the original unity of heaven (nature) and human beings as its innermost theoretical origin. III The unity between heaven and human beings also surfaces in the Laozi’s understanding of the manner in which both of these “exist” (zai 在). This much becomes clear in the following passage: Heaven lasts and the earth endures. The reason why heaven lasts and the earth endures is that they did not come into existence for themselves (不自生), which is why they are capable of lasting and enduring. Therefore, the sage puts himself first by placing himself last; he preserves

17   Laozi 5.

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himself by remaining outside of himself. Couldn’t it be because he lacks self-concern? This is how he brings about what concerns him.18 The first half of this passage involves questions on the way of heaven, while the second half is related to problems in the field of the way of humanity. As a whole, even though both parts refer to slightly different concrete objects and fields, they are both related to the manner in which something exists; in the first case how the world exists, in the second how human beings themselves exist. In this context, the expression “heaven and earth” has different meanings and refers both to “heaven” and “earth” separately, as well as to nature and the myriad things in general. Actually, in Chinese philosophy, “heaven, earth, and the myriad things” are often mentioned in one breath, and indicate the objective world as a totality. Correspondingly, “heaven lasts and the earth endures” stands as a metaphor for the lasting nature of the objective world. But how does the objective world reach such a lasting state? This question concerns the manner in which the objective world exists. The statement that heaven and earth “did not come into existence for themselves, which is why they are capable of lasting and enduring,” can count as an answer to this question. “Coming into existence for themselves” refers to consciously and purposefully striving for eternity and permanence, “not coming into existence for themselves” has the exact opposite meaning. For the Laozi, it is only by not consciously and purposefully striving for anything that heaven and earth are able to attain permanence and eternity. All of the above applies to the perspective proper to the level of the way of heaven (the existence of the world). From the standpoint of the way of humanity, the passage from the Laozi quoted in the above touches upon the question concerning how human beings should exist. The existence of heaven and earth is discussed in terms of its actuality (shiran 实然), whereas human existence concerns the problem of the ought (dangran 当然), that is to say, of how human beings ought to exist. In this passage, the Laozi mainly gives concrete expression to the mode of existence that human beings ought to adopt by taking the sage as its object. In the context of the statement “the sage puts himself first by placing himself last,” “first” and “last” do not merely refer to a temporal relation, but can be understood more generally as designating the beneficial and harmful aspects of social life. “Placing oneself last” means not purposefully striving for an advantageous position and by doing so attains a beneficial mode of existence (thus “putting oneself first”). “Remaining outside oneself” has a similar meaning: it is 18   Laozi 7.

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not being obsessively concerned with oneself, which allows a person to attain a relatively peaceful state of existence. Consequently, the Laozi draws the following conclusion: “Couldn’t it be because he lacks self-concern? This is how he brings about what concerns him.” In Chinese philosophy, “self-concern” (si 私) is often related to the individual, as opposed to what is public or common (gong 公). The latter has a universal dimension and involves the collective and other human beings. By contrast, “self-concern” is mainly tied up with the self and the individual as well as with the interests of the individual self. In an extended sense, it also expresses individualized goals. Therefore, “lacking self-concern” comes down to not purposefully pursuing or being deeply concerned with one’s own interests. “Bringing about what concerns oneself” means completing one’s own interests. We should note that the Laozi does not categorically reject “selfconcern” and does not completely deny the fact that self-concern can have a positive meaning and value (can be beneficial) as a mode of existence. As I argued in the above, the expressions “putting oneself first,” “preserving oneself,” and “self-concern” can broadly be understood as saying that self-preservation is a form of existence with positive aspects. The crucial question here is this: how can such a positive and dynamic form of existence be attained? This question is related to the problem of how a person should exist, which we raised in the above. In the Laozi, resolving this problem is predicated on the renunciation of purposefulness (mudixing 目的性). From the perspective of the way of heaven, heaven and earth proceed according to their own laws. They are not controlled by an external goal or steered by some internal purpose. Only in this way are heaven and earth able to attain an existential state of eternity and permanence. Likewise, by way of human beings, the sage is able to arrive at a positive mode of existence precisely by not purposefully pursuing his own interests. This positive mode of existence gains concrete expression in the practice of “putting oneself first,” “preserving oneself,” and “bringing about what concerns oneself,” and is coterminous with the idea that “heaven lasts and the earth endures” from the perspective of the way of heaven. As a form of existence, the fact that “heaven lasts and the earth endures” mainly expresses itself in palpable results. The statement that “they do not exist for themselves” on the other hand refers to the motives and goals tied up with the question concerning “how to exist.” According to the understanding articulated in the Laozi, we should not attribute a purposeful striving to the motions of heaven and earth. Correspondingly, in terms of human existence, although “putting oneself first,” “preserving oneself,” and “bringing about what concerns oneself” are clearly important; these modes of existence should not be approached by

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purposefully searching for them and bringing them into the level of motivated action. It is only when a person renounces purpose on the level of motivated action that he can attain a positive form of existence. This conception in the Laozi embodies its orientation toward transcending purposefulness. From an axiological perspective, the transcendence of purposefulness is continuous with the principle of natural spontaneity: as a matter of fact, in the Laozi, the affirmation of the principle of natural spontaneity and the rejection of purposefulness appear as two different aspects of the same process. Logically speaking, turning natural spontaneity into a value principle calls for the renunciation of purposeful striving in human activity. To a considerable extent, this conception would become a consistent value orientation throughout the history of Daoism. In the work of another representative Daoist, Zhuangzi, the link between an emphasis on the principle of natural spontaneity and the eradication of purposefulness remains apparent. In his argument concerning heaven and human beings, Zhuangzi puts forward the idea that “one should not destroy heaven through humanity” and stresses the principle of natural spontaneity in a similar fashion as the Laozi. As such, Zhuangzi goes on to point out: “That which acts by not acting is called heaven” (wu wei wei zhi zhi wei tian 无为为之之谓天).19 “Acting by not acting” is first of all opposed to consciously striving after something and is characterized by not acting intentionally. The description of “heaven” as “acting by not acting” entails a rejection of purposefulness. Accordingly, for Zhuangzi, the ideal mode of action is “acting without knowing what one is doing, walking without knowing where one is going,”20 that is to say, action without any purpose or intention, which implies abandoning purposefulness for the principle of natural spontaneity. In this regard, there is a strong continuity between the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. In terms of their actual form, activities in which human beings affect objects always involves two aspects: the goal of the action and the laws of existence [governing the object]. Correspondingly, the unfolding of practical action involves conformity to purpose as well as conformity to [objective] lawfulness. The first expresses the human search for value, the latter involves the relation between such a search on the one hand and the laws of existence on the other. When the Daoists call upon us to reject purposefulness through the principle of natural spontaneity, this can be taken as an expression of the attempt to avoid negating the lawfulness of existence through purposefulness. The importance of this attempt for the rational development of the activity and practice of human beings can hardly be underestimated. 19   Zhuangzi 12.2. 20   Zhuangzi 23.4.

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Of course, logically speaking, an exaggerated emphasis on the fact that purposefulness should be done away with could result in the search for values and ideals being suspended altogether. In this respect, the philosophy of the Laozi seems to have certain limitations. To sum up, the idea that “heaven lasts and the earth endures” observed from the perspective of the way of human beings” provides the problem of “how human beings should exist,” which poses itself on the level of the way of humanity, with a necessary ontological precondition. For the Laozi, from the viewpoint of the way of heaven, the world as such is a process that exists naturally and spontaneously without any purposefulness at all. Natural spontaneity as a mode of existence constitutes the basis for human existence within the field of society. Once again, metaphysical principles on the level of the way of heaven and value principles on the level of the way of humanity present themselves as interrelated. IV Another crucial problem addressed by the philosophy of the Laozi is how to restrain or get rid of social conflicts and maintain social order. The principle of natural spontaneity praised in the Laozi is relevant to this issue as well. The Laozi begins by investigating the source of social conflicts. For the Laozi, the attribution of value to an object or the establishment of an object of value will unavoidably give rise to all sorts of desires for value, and the further development of such desires will result in a struggle for fame and material gain. Since it is the establishment of values that lies at the origin of conflicts, it is of paramount importance to start out by doing away with the establishment and the search for value at the basis of strife. According to the Laozi, the desire for value first of all manifests itself in a desire for “fame” (ming 名) and “gain” or “profit” (li 利), and these notions are tied up with the elimination of conflict: “When the worthy are not esteemed, the people will not struggle amongst each other. When goods that are hard to come by are not deemed valuable, the people will not turn into robbers. When what is desirable is kept from view, the minds of the people will not be brought to disorder.”21 The “worthy” (xian 贤) mentioned in this passage can be seen as examples of virtuousness. The virtue of worthiness has always stood as a social symbol for fame and prestige. “Goods that are hard to come by” symbolize material gain. Not treating the “worthy” as worthy and not treating “goods that are 21   Laozi 3.

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hard to come by” as valuable entails a negation of the valorization of objects and an elimination of the value-character of objects. If the “worthy” are no longer the object of esteem and “goods that are hard to come by” cease being treated as valuable items, the search for such forms of fame and gain also loses its meaning. In a more fundamental sense, regardless of whether we are dealing with the esteem that comes with fame or with striving after material gain, both of these ultimately lead back to human desires and aspirations. If one eliminates the desire for fame and material gain at the root, then the phenomenon of the search for fame and gain becoming an end in itself will also cease to appear. Based on this conception, the Laozi stresses that “when what is desirable is kept from view, the minds of the people will not be thrown into disorder.” The idea of keeping what is desirable from view means that desirable objects are not allowed to appear or that such objects are hidden away. In subjective terms, this strategy touches upon what originally gives rise to all sorts of human desires. In terms of the social field and the objective dimension, the problem becomes whether or not objects that give rise to desires should exist. If objects continuously present themselves in the space between “the desirable” and “desire,” or if objects are always imbued with a set of values, then this will give rise to desires on the part of the subject. For the Laozi, a relatively good solution to this problem consists of doing away with objects which might give rise to desire, so that human desires are rid of their objective source. In a nutshell, the idea that “when what is desirable is kept from view, the minds of the people will not be thrown into disorder” comes down to eliminating all sorts of objects which could produce desire and cutting off the genesis of desire at the root, thereby allowing the people’s mind to return to tranquility and doing away with the breeding ground for conflicts in society. This conception in the Laozi can be seen as a further development of the principle of natural spontaneity. According to the Laozi, the evolutionary process of civilization is often accompanied by negative phenomena. Fame, appearing in a moral form (esteeming the worthy is always related to morality) as well as all sorts of material gain expressed in the guise of goods that are hard to come by, can both cause human beings to strive for the fame and material gain related to these things. On the one hand, this standpoint expresses an aspiration to avoid conflicts and disorder in society, while at the same time containing a series of rather negative value orientations. It is certainly true that desires can give rise to conflicts and other negative phenomena if they are not properly moderated and regulated. However, first of all, from a social perspective, the negative consequences of desire are not completely impossible to control. Actually, through systems, norms and other restrictions, society

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is perfectly able to restrain the unbridled pursuit of desires. The Confucian rituals had the important historical function of restricting human desires, as Xunzi 荀子 already indicated. In discussing the origin and function of ritual, Xunzi points out: Where do the ritual regulations originate? In this: human beings are born with desires. If they cannot obtain what they desire, they will most certainly persist in searching for what they want. If there is no measure or boundary (无度量分界) to their search, then this will inevitably result in strife. Strife leads to chaos, and chaos leads to impoverishment. The former kings hated this sort of chaos. This is why they set up ritual regulations and righteousness in order to ensure proper distribution ( fen 分), to cultivate human desires, and to provide people with what they seek for. They made sure that desire was not short of objects, and that objects would not be undone by desire, so that desire and the objects of desire could sustain each other in coming into being. This is the origin of ritual.22 What Xunzi calls “measure or boundary” in this passage refers to a certain boundary and scope in the existence and transformation of things. Throughout different periods in the field of society, there has always been a certain “proper measure” (du 度) in the distribution of the natural resources necessary for human survival. If the search for natural resources exceeds this “proper measure,” this could lead to the disintegration of social order. Moreover, the distribution of resources presupposes that each member of society remains in his own proper place. The significance of ritual regulations lies in the fact that they provide different members of society with a place of their own within a certain “boundary” ( fenjie 分界), thus allowing them to search for and obtain the resources they need according to their specific position in society without usurping the place accorded to others. This is what guarantees social order and stability. The above function of ritual regulation simultaneously manifests itself in the limitation as well as restriction of desires. Furthermore, desires as such do not only have a negative significance. In their original form, desires point toward objects which do not yet exist or which one does not yet possess. Desire means is that a person is not satisfied

22   Xunzi 19.1A.

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with his or her present mode of existence and attempts to arrive at an ideal horizon, which has not yet come into being, the latter often serving as a driving force for creative activity. Historically speaking, the internal force of the human creation of value frequently stems from the inner desires of human beings. As Hegel once pointed out: “Nothing great in the world has ever been accomplished without passion.”23 The kind of passion Hegel is talking about here includes human desires and aspirations. For him, the feeling of passion is tied up with desire and often forms the crux of historical evolution. In calling for the elimination of desire as the source of conflict, the author of the Laozi could run the risk of repressing the human creation of value along with its inherent driving force. Logically speaking, there seems to exist an internal paradox in the Laozi’s conception of value as described in the above. On the one hand, the Laozi turns natural spontaneity into a principle of value. If the realization of this principle is followed through to the end, it will eliminate and do away with cultural concepts and concepts of value opposed to nature. On the other hand, the principle of natural spontaneity itself also implies a certain value orientation, namely that of idealizing nature and endowing natural spontaneity with preeminent value. As a matter of fact, the principle of natural spontaneity embodies a value concept opposed to the Confucian principle of the way of humaneness. In short, if the principle of natural spontaneity is radicalized, it requires us to do away with all principles of value and to abandon striving for value in every possible sense. However, the principle of natural spontaneity qualifies as a specific value principle in its own right, one which embodies a value orientation different from that of Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism and other schools of thought. This is a paradox present in the Laozi and also counts as a problem inherent to Daoist philosophy in a broader sense. Such a tendency brings out the complexity of the Laozi’s philosophy: on the one hand, there is a theoretical connection between its metaphysical principles, as observed from the perspective of the way of heaven, and its value principles, as seen from the standpoint of the way of humanity. On the other hand, there is an internal logical tension in the Laozi’s outlook on value derived from its perspective on the way of heaven.

23  G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of History, translated by J.B. Sibree (Kitchener: Batoche Books 2001), 37.

Chapter 19

Meritocratic Politics: Its Meaning and Limitations Governing the country through meritocracy, that is to say, through the “capabilities of the worthy” (xianneng 贤能), can be seen as a Confucian political idea.1 Confucianists accorded different positions to “worthiness” (xian 贤) and “capability” (neng 能), while also paying attention to their unity. In comparison to the systems and procedures we find in the field of politics, meritocracy is more closely tied to the inner moral character and the capabilities of human beings. As such, it is clear that affirming the role of meritocracy in political practice can make a positive contribution to avoiding the reduction of politics to its systematic and procedural forms. Of course, since meritocracy refers to the moral character and the capabilities of individual human beings, it is impossible to completely separate its impact from systems, norms, procedures and the like. Additionally, the introduction of worthiness and capability into the field of political practice and the checks put in place on the negative effects this might have, needs to be guaranteed on a systematic and procedural level amongst others. In this sense, the worthiness and capability of the subject of practice and the systems and procedures on the level of the political system are far from mutually exclusive. I Bringing meritocracy in relation to political practice is one of the characteristic traits of Confucianism. When we talk about meritocracy in the sense of a form of politics from a Confucian perspective, the first thing we encounter is the relation between “worthiness” and “capability.” Mengzi 孟子 (d. 289 BCE) already drew a distinction between the two: “The worthy have positions, the capable hold offices (贤者在位, 能者在职).”2 Within this distinction, “worthiness” mainly involves inner moral character or virtuousness (dexing 德性), whereas “capability” points to the actual competence of ruling a country and governing the world. The kind of “positions” (wei 位) related to “worthiness” 1  This text was originally published in Tianjin shehui kexue 天津社会科学 [The Tianjin Journal of Social Sciences] 2013, 2. This chapter was translated by Ady Van den Stock, postdoctoral research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden. 2  Mengzi 2A4.

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refer to honorable position in society. The “offices” (zhi 职) corresponding to “capability,” on the other hand, primarily denote administrative and executive positions. The basic manner in which the worthy are treated is with respect. The capable for their part are faced with the problem of how they can be put to use: “If a ruler respects the worthy, puts the capable to use, and gives positions to people of outstanding talent, then all the officials in the country will be pleased and desire to serve at his court.”3 In this distinction, virtuousness and competence each have their own place, but on a social level, paying close attention to the virtuous worthy and the competent capable are both absolutely indispensable. It is only when the worthy are respected and the capable are put to use that all the officials in the country will desire to serve the ruler. In discussing the order of the world, the Li ji 礼记 (“Book of Rites”), one of the classical texts of Confucianism, also touches upon the distinction between worthiness and capability: “When the great way was put into practice, the world was a common good (tianxia wei gong 天下为公). The worthy were chosen and the capable employed, speech was sincere and harmony was cultivated.”4 From this standpoint, against the background of the idea that the world is a public good, both “worthiness” and “capability” should be given equal attention. In comparison to Mengzi, who confirms the importance of worthiness as well as capability after having drawn a distinction between them, the Book of Rites positively affirms the relatedness of the two in a more direct manner. Needless to say, affirming the connection between worthiness and capability does not imply disregarding the fact that both have different places. Actually, the Book of Rites also stipulates that the two have different social functions: “The former kings showed esteem for those with virtue, honored those following the way, and appointed the capable.”5 “Those with virtue” (you de 有德) and “those following the way” (you dao 有道) belong to the category of the worthy in a broad sense. “Showing esteem for those with virtue and honoring those who follow the way” almost corresponds to what Mengzi calls “respecting the worthy,” and “appointing the capable” shows certain resemblances to Mengzi’s idea of “employing the capable.” From the perspective of historical evolution, the sentence “when the great way was put into practice, the world was a public good” expresses the presupposition of a kind of ideal society. In turn, the notion of “choosing the worthy and employing the capable,” which is predicated on the existence of such a society, also primarily has the character of a socio-political ideal. “Respecting 3  Mengzi 2A5. 4  Liji 9. 5  Liji 10.

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the worthy and employing the capable” on the other hand is unfolded as an actual political requirement. Accordingly, worthiness and capability have both an ideal dimension as well real content. On the level of actuality, both worthiness and capability have a dual character. “Worthiness” is regarded as virtuousness, which concretely manifests itself in an individual’s inner moral character. In terms of content, such a form of moral character corresponds to an individual’s value orientation and axiological stance: virtuousness and moral character themselves can be seen as an embodiment of values and ideals. As far as their mode of development is concerned, virtuousness and moral character are grounded in individual self-cultivation. The worthiness of the people appraised by Confucianism is always incorporated in their individual search for value or existence. In praising Yan Hui’s 颜回 (d.  481) worthiness and virtuousness, Kongzi (“Confucius”) (d. 479 BCE) exclaimed: “How worthy is Hui! Having only a bowl of food and a gourd of water, he resides in a narrow lane. Others cannot bear such hardships, but Hui does not allow such things to affect his joy. How worthy is Hui!”.6 By maintaining an optimistic outlook on human existence in dire material circumstances, worthiness and virtuousness display the inner moral character tied to an individual’s value orientation As a form of virtuousness, this kind of “worthiness” not only involves an existential quest on an individual level, but also expresses itself as a moral character interrelated with society and has a more general social significance. This is what Mengzi indicates in his discussion of “employing the worthy”: The ruler of a state employs people on the basis of their worthiness only when he has no choice. Since this involves advancing those from lowly backgrounds over those from noble backgrounds and those who are remote from him over his relatives, must he not be cautious? When those on the left and right all say that someone is worthy, one should not yet believe it. When the great officers all say a person is worthy, one should not yet believe it. When all the people in the state say that a person is worthy, then one should investigate, and if one finds that he is worthy, only then should one employ him.7 The phrase “when all the people in the state say that a person is worthy” implies that the virtue of worthiness connected to the individual in question has already been realized within the field of social life external to the individual 6  Lunyu 6.11. 7  Mengzi 1B7. [Tr. Note: Translation quoted, with modifications, from Mencius, translated by Irene Bloom (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 21.]

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and has met with the approval of the community. As a socialized form of virtuousness, “worthiness” equally manifests itself as a political moral character. On top of that, it counts as a quality that the leader of a state should possess. As far as the figure of the ruler is concerned, being endowed with such a moral character makes him a worthy ruler, who is characterized by the respect he shows for his ministers and the care he devotes to the people: “a worthy ruler must be respectful and frugal, show reverence for his subordinates, and take from the people in a regulated manner.”8 If we can say that the virtue of worthiness as an existential orientation is a “private virtue” (side 私德), then on the level of socio-political life, it counts as a “public virtue” (gongde 公德). In a way similar to “worthiness,” as a competence and ability, “capability” also expresses itself on various levels. Still, as I already mentioned, “worthiness” first of all emphasizes an individual’s moral character. In contrast, “capability” is more directly embodied in the process of governing, which belongs to the field of society. As a competence related to a certain “office,” “capability” is connected to various forms of administrative activity and expresses itself as an ability to deal with all sorts of political affairs. Success in an official career or efficiency in running a state is often tied up with these different competences. Seen from a broad perspective, “capability” also involves the activities of the ruler of a state. As far as the ruler is concerned, his capacity to govern the state primarily expresses itself in his ability to employ and control other people: “A sovereign proves his capability by appointing others.”9 In a more negative sense, this means that if a ruler lacks these capacities, this will result in upheavals in the state: “If a ruler is not capable, his state will be in disarray.”10 From the perspective of the distinction between worthiness and capability, capability in this sense constitutes the condition of the possibility for political order and the governance of society. In Confucianism, the differentiation of worthiness and capability not only expresses itself in the field of society, but also concerns the individual cultivation and improvement of virtuousness. When Mengzi puts forward his theory of the “four sprouts of the heart-mind” (si duan 四端), he takes these to refer to ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”), yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “righteousness”) and so on. At the same time, the four sprouts are also understood as the point of departure for nourishing virtuousness:

8  Mengzi 3A3. 9  Xunzi 11.5B. 10   Xunzi 15.1C.

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The mind’s feeling of pity and compassion is the sprout of humaneness; the mind’s feeling of shame and aversion is the sprout of righteousness; the mind’s feeling of modesty and compliance is the sprout of ritual propriety; and the mind’s sense of right and wrong is the sprout of wisdom. Human beings have these four sprouts just as they have four limbs. For one to have these four sprouts and yet to say of oneself that one is unable to fulfill them is to injure oneself, while to say that one’s ruler is unable to fulfill them is to injure one’s ruler.11 As the seeds of moral consciousness, the four sprouts constitute the intrinsic foundation for the nourishment of virtuousness, while also counting as an enabling condition for the inner capacities proper to the nourishment of virtuousness. This becomes clear in the statement “for one to have these four sprouts and yet to say of oneself that one is unable to fulfill them is to injure oneself.” “Capabilities” in the field of morality are not merely incorporated in the process of individual self-cultivation, but are also developed into the capacities necessary for moral practice (to achieve goodness). In the latter sense, Mengzi draws a distinction between “capability” and “action” (wei 为): If it were a matter of taking Mount Tai under one’s arm and jumping over the North Sea with it; and one were to tell people, ‘I am unable to do it,’ this would truly be a case of being unable to do it. If it is a matter of bowing respectfully to an elder, and one tells people, ‘I am unable to do it,’ this is a case of not doing it rather than a case of being unable to do it.12 For Mengzi, all human beings have the ability to engage in moral practice. “Not doing it” refers to having the capacity for goodness while not actually doing what is good. The “capability” corresponding to this “action” primarily designates a competence within the field of moral practice. It is apparent that both “worthiness” and “capability” have a dual nature in different senses: as a form of virtuousness, “worthiness” is tied up with an individual’s inner moral character, but also involves the process of practice on a social level. Likewise, as a form of competence, “capability” involves the ability to rule a state, while at the same time being related to individual moral cultivation. In these respects, worthiness and capability appear as intrinsically connected. At the same time, it is this interrelatedness which determines the inseparability of worthiness and capability in political practice. 11   Mengzi 2A6. [Tr. note: Quoted from Bloom, Mencius, 35.] 12   Mengzi 1A7. [Tr. note: Quoted from Ibid., 9.]

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II According to the Confucian understanding, the process of governing a state involves worthiness and capability, but should also follow general norms or a universal way. Both aspects are interrelated and influence each other. In his discussion of governance, Mengzi points out: If one had the eyesight of Li Lou and the dexterity of Master Gongshu but lacked the compass and square, one would not be able to form squares and circles. If one had the keen ear of Music Master Kuang but lacked the six pitch pipes, one would not be able to adjust the five notes correctly. If one had the way of Yao and Shun but lacked humane government, one would not be able to rule the world […] And when it comes to government, can anyone be considered wise who does not follow the way of the former kings?13 The compass and the square and the six pipes function as norms, which determine how a person ought to do something. Similarly, a humane government counts as the embodiment of the way of the former kings and also encompasses the proper order for governing the state. It is worth noticing here that Mengzi brings “the way” into relation with “the square and the compass,” that is to say, with rules and norms, thus endowing it with the sense of being universally normative. “Humaneness” first of all manifests itself as a moral ideal, whereas norms are related to the executive activities and procedures of political practice. In this respect, the virtue of worthiness related to the moral ideal of humane government appears as continuous with the capability of knowing how to put the way into practice (of how to act in accordance with the way). From a Confucian perspective, normative restrictions do not just manifest themselves as formalized rational procedures. The norms employed in the process of governing the state are always connected with the moral personality: From the compass and the square comes the ultimate standard for circles and squares, and from the sage comes the ultimate standard in human relations. One who desires to be a ruler must fully develop the way of the ruler; one who desires to be a minister must fully develop the way of

13   Mengzi 4A1 [Tr. note: Quoted from Ibid., 73–74.]

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the minister. In either case, all that is required is to take Yao and Shun as the model.14 The square and the compass originally served as the standards used by craftsmen to determine squareness and roundness and later came to take on the meaning of norms of behavior in general. The sage indicates a perfected and ideal personality. As the model for a perfect personality, the sage is not only endowed with the inner virtue of worthiness, but also has the ability to pacify the world. Such an understanding is already displayed by Kongzi in the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects” or “Analects”): “Zigong said, ‘If a person could extend his benevolence to the people and bring relief to the multitudes, what would you think of him? Would you call such a person humane?’ Kongzi said, ‘Surely he would be more than just humane. Such a person would be nothing less than a sage.’”15 Obviously, the idea of “extending benevolence to the people and bringing relief to the multitudes” is not only limited to a person’s inner virtues, but also at the same time relates to the practical ability of bringing order to the state and pacifying the world. By turning this into a characteristic feature of the sage, Kongzi makes it clear that the sage is also at the center of other related moral qualities. Mengzi establishes a correspondence between the sage and norms, which has the following implication: in the political practice of “being a ruler” and “being a servant,” behavioral norms can appear in the form of a perfected personality. In other words, this perfect personality can acquire a certain normative meaning. When the sage is made into an example, he simultaneously performs a guiding and restricting function with regard to the political practice of how to be a ruler and a servant. When such a perfected personality (the sage) becomes a form of existence within the field of politics, the intrinsic connection between the inner virtue of worthiness and the capabilities embodied within political activities such as being a ruler and servant becomes even more apparent. The introduction of the notion of a perfected personality into political practice comes down to a recognition of the function of the virtue of worthiness within political practice, while also qualifying as a more substantial confirmation of the intrinsic bond between “worthiness” and “capability,” As I already noted in the above, the statement according to which “the worthy have positions, the capable hold offices” entails a distinction between “worthiness” and “capability.” If this distinction is approached too rigidly, then this logically implies that it is possible for the two sides of the distinction to become 14   Mengzi 4A2 [Tr. note: Quoted from Ibid., 75.] 15  Tr. note: Lunyu 6.30.

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separated. The innermost sense of ascribing both “worthiness” as well as “capability” to the character of the subject of political practice is offering a certain guarantee that such a separation can be avoided. Departing from the conception outlined in the above, Confucianism pays significant attention to self-cultivation. When it comes to the relation between the world, the state, and the family, Confucianists start out by emphasizing the central significance of the individual: “There is a common saying among the people: ‘The empire, the state, the family.’ The basis of the empire lies in the state, the basis of the state lies in the family, [and] the basis of the family lies in the self.”16 The centrality of the self or the individual we see here determines the importance of self-cultivation for pacifying the world: “The exemplary person holds to principles which serve to cultivate himself but bring peace to the world.”17 Pacifying the world belongs to political practice in a broad sense. Self-cultivation on its part is a form of individual moral perfection. Turning self-cultivation into the precondition for pacifying the world means that political practice cannot be separated from the restrictions provided by morality, restrictions which express themselves as the virtue of worthiness and in other forms. Basing themselves on the function of the virtue of worthiness in political practice, Confucianists investigated the different characteristics of “good government” (shanzheng 善政) and “good teaching” (shanjiao 善教): “Good government is not as efficient as good teaching in swaying the people. The people show fear for good government, but display love for good teaching. Good government provides them with resources, whereas good teaching gets to their hearts.”18 “Government” lays particular emphasis on legal regulations, whereas “teaching” primarily refers to the idea of “transformation through teaching” (jiaohua 教化). Implementing a legal system serves to make people submit to it by instilling fear into them and making them cautious about their actions. “Transformation through teaching” provides the people with guidance and thereby leads to sincere convictions, so that they will genuinely identify with and accept the restriction imposed by society and the state. The former is characterized by coerciveness; the latter is marked by voluntarism. “Fearing it” and “loving it” embody two different horizons. Before Mengzi, Kongzi had already drawn a distinction between “guiding them through government” (dao zhi yi zheng 道之以政) on the one hand and “guiding them through virtue” (dao zhi yi de 道之以德) on the other: “If one guides them through government 16   Mengzi 4A5. 17   Mengzi 7B32. 18   Mengzi 7A14.

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and keeps them in check through punishments, the people will avoid such punishments but lack a sense of shame. If one guides them through virtue and keeps them in check through ritual, they will have a sense of shame and r estrain themselves.”19 This passage touches upon two different methods of governing the state as well: first, dominating the masses by means of legal regulations and bringing unity to the will and behavior of the multitudes through criminal law. Second, providing guidance to the people by means of moral norms, and unifying their ideas through ritual regulations. What Kongzi favors is the latter method. In his view, one should not externally coerce the masses, but rather focus on getting them to identify with and accept norms internally. By means of the process of transformation through teaching, one can lead the people to experience a feeling of shame when their behavior violates a certain nom, and thus to be genuinely affected by it. Kongzi’s perspective is embodied in the following approach toward governing the state: the political order of society is safeguarded by nourishing and improving people’s intrinsic virtuous nature. Correspondingly, the virtue of worthiness also displays a double sense within political practice: it signifies the self-perfection of virtuous nature on the part of the ruler, who must go on to govern the state through his virtue, as well as the improvement of moral character on the part of the ruled, which will cause them to conform to social norms on their own initiative. Keeping “good government” in check through “good teaching” mainly concerns the social dimension. As far as the individual is concerned, Mengzi draws a distinction between heavenly “nobility” (tianjue 天爵) and “human nobility” (renjue 人爵): There is a heavenly nobility and a human nobility. Humaneness, righteousness, loyalty, and trustworthiness: these are what is meant by heavenly nobility. Being a duke, minister, or high official: these are human form of nobility. The people of old first cultivated their heavenly nobility before attending to their human nobility. Nowadays, people cultivate their heavenly nobility out of a desire for human nobility. When they have attained human nobility, they discard heavenly nobility. So deep is their delusion that they will certainly perish in the end.20 “Heavenly nobility” has the virtue of worthiness as its substance, whereas “human nobility” involves things such as social identity and social status within the actual political and legal system. In Mengzi’s opinion, members of 19   Lunyu 2.3. 20   Mengzi 6A16.

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society are not merely people situated within legal ties, but are also beings who exist within moral relations. The form of existence in terms of social status and legal relations represented by “human nobility” should be guided and restricted by the moral mode of existence embodied in “heavenly nobility.” We can see here that Mengzi was already aware of the fact that limiting our mode of being to identity in the legal sense or to social status while neglecting or rejecting the moral orientation within social existence will have negative social consequences. In sum, Confucianists believe that it will prove hard to ensure the orderly functioning of society if we only pay attention to “goodness” or focus exclusively on “legality”: “Goodness alone is not enough to govern, laws cannot be put into practice by themselves.”21 “Goodness” refers to moral regulations; “laws” indicate universal norms and regulations in general. Accordingly, the first phrase (“goodness alone is not enough to govern”) refers to what society expects of the individual, so that it “places responsibility with others” (zeren 责人). By contrast, the second phrase (“mere laws cannot be put into practice by themselves”) gives expression to an individual’s expectations of himself, or what is called “assuming responsibility oneself” (zeji 责己). Of course, for Mencius, although neither of these can be dispended with within the process of governing a state, “assuming responsibility oneself” or “goodness” would seem to occupy a more dominant position: “If a person’s actions have no effect, he should turn within and examine himself. If he has rectified himself, the whole world will follow.”22 It is easy to see that recognizing the unity of “goodness” and “legality” under the condition that virtuousness maintains its priority shaped the mainstream of Confucian political philosophy. Looked at from the perspective of the relation between worthiness and capability, “goodness” first and foremost involves “worthiness,” whereas the process of ruling through law is more closely connected to “capability.” Correspondingly, confirming the unity of “goodness” and “legality” also means recognizing the connection between “worthiness” and “capability.” III In comparison to Confucianism, modern political philosophy seems to tend toward driving a wedge between the domains of the individual on the one hand and of politics, as well as the public sphere in a broader sense, on the 21   Mengzi 4A1. 22   Mengzi 4A4.

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other. Narrowly speaking, the public sphere is situated in between the organization of political power and the domain of the individual. In a broader sense, the public sphere and the organization of political power are both opposed to the domain of the individual. Within this distinction, morality (including virtuousness) is often considered a problem belonging to the individual domain, whereas abilities proper to the domain of politics are usually understood as regulations, which are tied up with the organization of political power as well as the public sphere. For modern political philosophy, practical activity within the socio-political domain mainly manifests itself as a process carried out according to certain rules and procedures. As such, although this process undoubtedly requires executive abilities, the latter has nothing to do with moral character or the problem of virtuousness. Moral character and virtuousness are exclusively related to the domain of the individual or the private person. That being said, as I already argued in the above, looked at from the perspective of the relation between worthiness and capability, the virtue of worthiness and competence both have a dual nature: the virtue of worthiness appears as an individual form of virtuousness, but also contains a social and public orientation. Likewise, capabilities are meant to serve the public sphere of society and politics, but also qualify as the inner abilities with which an individual is endowed. Furthermore, capabilities are related to the individual enhancement of virtuousness. On the one hand, the relations between worthiness and capability described in the above make it clear that the domain of the individual and the public sphere of society and politics cannot be completely separated from each other. On the other hand, their interrelatedness makes it hard for activities within the public sphere of society and politics to depart from the moral character of individuals, including their inner virtue of worthiness. There is no doubt that socio-political activity requires systems, rules, and procedures, but behind such systems and behind political activities we find human beings. The rational functioning of systems and the effective development of political activity cannot be set apart from the subject behind them: it is precisely the subject of political activity which provides systems with internal vitality and makes the development of practical activities possible. As concrete subjects, human beings not only have to be equipped with the necessary capabilities, but also need moral self-control. From the way of humaneness or justice in a broad sense to the honesty and self-discipline required for exercising power and so on, these moral qualities or forms of the virtue of worthiness all serve a restraining function over and against political activity on different levels. Moreover, in a certain respect, they provide a safeguard for the rational functioning of the system.

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Generally speaking, the rational functioning of systems and the effective development of political activity is not only tied up with the inner moral qualities of the subject of practice, but is also related to handling interpersonal relations. When the function of ritual regulations is discussed in the Analects, Kongzi puts forward a famous argument: “In the use of ritual, harmony is most precious.”23 The kinds of “rituals” Confucianists talk about denote a system of universal norms; yet they also cover the socio-political system. The Zhou rituals Kongzi admired so much refer to the socio-political system of the Zhou period. By contrast, “harmony” appears more as a kind of ethical principle embodied within the process of social intercourse. In a negative sense, “harmony” requires people to relieve tensions and control conflicts by coming to mutual understanding and communicating with each other. In a positive sense, it means that people should share the same mindset and virtues and cooperate with each other. Originally, ritual regulations involved actions on the level of the system (such as holding ordinary ceremonies, establishing the structure of social ranks, the promulgation and execution of government decrees, the dealings between rulers and servants and so on), but Kongzi brought these activities within the system into relation with “harmony” as an ethical principle and stressed that it is of supreme importance to abide by and embody the principle of “harmony” in the functioning of ritual regulations. He already saw that it is interpersonal relations which lie behind the system and that the functioning of a system cannot be separated from handling interpersonal relations in a rational manner (coming to mutual understanding between different parties through the principle of “harmony” and thereby doing away with conflicts and promoting cooperation). In short, the process of functioning of the system (ritual regulations) needs to be guaranteed by a moral principle (harmony). Similarly, Mengzi attached a great deal of importance to “harmony,” as becomes apparent in his famous argument that “the seasons of heaven are not as important as the advantages of the earth. The advantages offered by the earth are not as important as harmony between people.”24 If we take meritocratic politics based on worthiness and capability as a model of governance within the fields of society and politics, then the basic characteristic of this model is the fact that it places the focus on the individual within the domain of politics as well as on the inner worthiness and capability of human beings. By “choosing the worthy and employing the capable,” people endowed with virtuousness and capability are accorded different positions within the political field, which provides a safeguard for the development of 23  Tr. Note: Analects 1.12. 24   Mengzi 2B1.

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political practice. As I described in the above, traditional Confucianism drew a distinction between “worthiness” and “capability” and stressed the notion that “the worthy hold positions, the capable hold offices” and the idea that a ruler should “respect the worthy and put the capable to use,” thereby attempting to give shape to a structure of mutual checks and balances between “worthiness” and “capability.” However, logically speaking, the division between “worthiness” and “capability” would seem to result in a separation of virtue (ethics) and government (politics). While political governance is exclusively related to capabilities, social honor can be traced back to the virtue of worthiness. Capable officials engaged in governing the world and people of moral worth each belong to separated fields. Even though, as we already mentioned, the Confucian understanding of political practice is intrinsically characterized by a confirmation of the function of morality, and despite that fact that its emphasis on the normativity of the human personality (the sage) also compromises a rejection of the separation between worthiness and capability, the idea that “the worthy hold positions, the capable hold offices” and that a ruler should “respect the worthy and put the capable to use” still logically entails the kind of separation between virtue and government described above. There is an intrinsic tension between worthiness and capability. As far as their actual mode of appearance is concerned, as concrete practical subjects, people engaged in politics are always determined by their capabilities while also possessing a dimension of virtuousness. Both of these restrict and influence political practice: “holding office” requires the virtue of worthiness, and similarly, “having a position” requires capabilities. The actions of a subject of political practice with the operations of the system and the process of government are realized through the unity of “worthiness” and “capability.” Taking persons who are both “worthy” as well as “capable” as the subjects of political practice can undoubtedly contribute to the rational functioning of the political system and the efficient development of administrative activities within the field of politics. That being said, in this line of thought, meritocratic politics as such cannot be separated from the political system. First of all, we are faced with the question of how people endowed with “worthiness” and “capability” can be placed at the center of political practice or turned into leaders within the field of politics. It goes without saying that such people are more or less the ideal subjects of political practice. However, their own “worthiness” and “capability” alone cannot guarantee that they will become political leaders: such a guarantee obviously has to be provided on the level of the system. It is only by designing a quasi-perfect system and putting related procedures into place, that one can provide the preconditions allowing people endowed with worthiness and capability to enter into the political arena. In this regard,

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systems and procedures on a formal level are far from unrelated to the subject’s moral character (virtue of worthiness) on a more substantial level. In terms of the process of the functioning of politics, worthy and capable persons will always face the problem of how to avoid losing themselves after having actually become political leaders. As inner personal characteristics, “worthiness” and “capability” are far from unchanging. Power has the ability of changing society, but can also change those in power. As historical developments have shown time and again, if power is no longer properly supervised or kept in check, it will often lead to corruption. It is possible that similar changes occur in the case of worthy and capable persons who have gained political power. Just as worthiness and capability themselves cannot guarantee that worthy and capable persons will move to the center of politics, it is unlikely that these qualities can ensure that such people will always maintain their “worthiness” and “capability.” In this regard, the need for systemic checks and balances reappears: in order to avoid the transformation of worthy and capable people into something else after they have gained political power, systemic supervision and checks are indispensable. As a matter of fact, the functioning of the system as such has a restrictive effect on the subjects of political practice. In a negative sense, the design of the system can keep people from behaving badly. As far as the relation between the social system and individual action is concerned, society can give shape to a specific background or field of practice by putting certain systems in place, and thereby placing certain restrictions on individual behavior. The Shang jun shu 商君书 (“Book of the Lord Shang”), which falls outside the Confucian canon, was already aware of this point and stressed that in the field of society and politics, a structure has to be created within which “the conditions do not allow for ill-doing” (势不能为奸).25 “Conditions which do not allow for ill-doing” refers to putting a political system in place which makes individuals unable to do evil: whether an individual likes it or not, the objective “conditions” (shi 势) make it very hard for him to commit evil acts. The restriction of the individual by the system counts as another expression of how meritocratic politics is tied up with the functioning of the system. On a more fundamental level, “worthiness” and “capability” are not pregiven moral qualities at all. They cannot be formed if the individual does not engage in self-study and self-cultivation and participate in the process of practice in a broad sense. On the other hand, worthiness and capability are impossible to detach from education, training, and guidance on a social level. In a certain sense, education, training, and guidance involve another form of influence of 25   Shang jun shu 商君书, Hua ce 画策 [“On “Designing Policy”].

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the social system on the individual: in this respect, the relations between the individual and society and between the individual and other human beings unfolds itself as a process of mutual interaction. Obviously, whether we are dealing with the formation of worthiness and capability or the improvement of moral character, by positively realizing worthiness and capability or avoiding negative changes in moral character, in each of these cases it is impossible to rely solely on worthiness and capability themselves, as these are always permeated by the effects of the social system in a broad sense. As a specific mode of politics pursued by Confucianists, meritocratic politics clearly differs from a democratic system of politics in the modern sense. If we look at where their respective emphases lie, we can see that meritocratic politics focuses on the subjects of political practice (human beings), whereas democratic politics unfolds itself as the functioning of procedures based on a specific political system. In terms of how both ground political power, meritocratic politics is shaped in a manner that does not involve elections. By contrast, democratic politics relies on different forms of election. However, on a more substantial level, both meritocratic and democratic forms of politics involve “worthiness” as well as “capability.” In meritocratic politics, it is the ruler and the minister that count as the subjects. Although Confucianists always assigned “worthiness” and “capability” to “positions” and “offices” respectively, within an ideal form of meritocratic politics, as subjects of practice, both “rulers” and “ministers” (or “wise monarchs” and “good ministers”) were expected to possess the characteristics of “worthiness” and “capability.” Likewise, ideally speaking, leaders elected within the system of democratic politics not only need “capabilities,” but also require “worthiness.” At the same time, the debate between meritocratic and democratic politics touches upon the relation between “personal rule” (renzhi 人治) and “rule by law” ( fazhi 法治). On a formal level, meritocratic politics provides a safeguard for governing a state and pacifying the world by means of the moral qualities of human beings, which is an embodiment of the idea of personal rule. Democratic politics emphasizes rules and procedures and is more strongly marked by the importance of ruling by law. That being said, as I argued in the above, in a substantial or real sense, it is impossible to completely detach the personal rule embodied within meritocratic politics from universal norms and the procedures related to them. Even when rulership is hereditary or when the ruler assigns government officials, certain rules have to be observed and specific procedures have to be followed, such as, for example, the regulation according to which the throne is passed on to the eldest son of the emperor’s first wife. In a similar vein, although democratic politics is first and foremost

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based on certain rules and procedures, the latter’s effective implementation is not completely unrelated to the individual moral qualities of the people involved in democratic politics. In sum, meritocratic politics also involves rules and procedures, while democratic politics cannot be separated from the moral qualities of individuals. Within actual political practice, the distinction between meritocratic and democratic politics is relative. Similarly, the distinction between personal rule and rule by law has a relative meaning. As far as the construction of a modern political system and the unfolding of political practice is concerned, we have to heed the fact that meritocratic politics focuses on the virtuousness of the subject of practice and the political orientation of the human personality, without neglecting the basic stance of democratic politics in giving a prominent position to rules and procedures. From a positive or constructive perspective, we can say that modern political practice has to come face to face with the problem of how we can establish a positive interaction between procedures and rules on a formal level, on the one hand, and individual moral qualities and virtuousness on the other.

Chapter 20

The Great (Modern) Debates: Substance and Function, Past and Present, China and the West I “Substance-Function” (tiyong 體用) is one of the most important coupledconcepts in Chinese philosophy.1 Historically, “substance” and “function” emerged as concepts during the pre-Qin era, but it wasn’t until the Wei-Jin period that the terms were deliberately used as a single coupled set. Thinkers of the time, associated with the so-called “obscure studies” (xuanxue 玄學) school, paid a considerable amount of attention to the concept of “substancefunction.” The school, along with Wang Bi 王弼 (d.  249 CE)—one of the paramount figures of his time and in Chinese intellectual history—placed the problematic of “substance-function” along the debates of “being” (you 有) and “non-being” (wu 無), and “roots” (ben 本) and “ends” (mo 末). In his words: “The myriad phenomena surely are precious and take non-being as their function, and their substance cannot leave non-being. If their substance was not in non-being, then [the myriad phenomena] would lose their significance.” Following the development of Chinese philosophy, the category of “substancefunction” acquired deeper theoretical foundations and broader interpretative usage. Generally speaking, Chinese thinkers most often argued for and affirmed the non-duality of substance and function and opposed the division of the two. Philosophical deliberation on issues such as the relationship between li 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” “coherence”) and “material force” qi 气 (“air,” “stuff”) or dao 道 (“way,” “method,” “principle”) and “phenomena” (qi 器) were, from the Wei-Jin era up until the Ming and the Qing, seen from the perspective of the non-duality of substance and function, making the coupled-concept one of the most fundamental ideas in Chinese thought. And just like the debates about being and non-being, roots and ends, li and qi, and dao and phenomena, so too the debate on substance and function primarily has a metaphysical dimension to its conceptualization.

1  This chapter was translated by Stefano Gandolfo, a PhD student at the University of Oxford.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396302_021

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Comparatively speaking, philosophers of the mid-Qing era turned their attention to “simple studies”—that is philology—and focused less on the philosophical meaning and value of texts, remaining rather silent on the theoretical dimensions of “substance-function” issues. Conversely, in the late Qing and early modern periods, the “substance-function” debate witnessed not only a meaningful philosophical revival but also a transformation in its usage and implications. “Substance” and “function” not only had metaphysical import but became aligned with the pressing issues of modernization and westernization: the past-present and China-West polemics. Philosophically, “substance” and “function” are first expressed through the ideas of “essence” and “property,” which are respectively the inherent foundations of existence and their external relative manifestations. “Substance” and “function” also came to be understood as root and end and later came to acquire a much broader meaning in the theoretical field of the heavenly dao (tiandao 天道), that is of ontological and metaphysical issues. From the modern period onward, and following the linking-up of “substance-function” with the “past-present” and “China-West” debates, “substance-function” as a concept entered the realm of the human dao (rendao 人道), that is of socio-historical issues. “Substance-Function,” “past-present,” and “China-West”: these were the principal ideas that dominated early-modern Chinese discourse. In this chapter, the coupled-concept of “substance-function” is going to be understood and employed in its original and sustained metaphysical meaning. The “ChinaWest” issue can initially appear as merely a spatiotemporal issue, but when seen alongside its connection to “substance-function” and its deeper cultural implications, the question is transformed into an issue of cultural compatibility and comparability. If it is possible to combine Chinese and Western cultures, then what is their shared foundation that allows for such combination? How will (and should) such a combination look like? Will the foundation be Chinese with added combined elements from Western culture or the other way around? Similarly, the “past-present” debate broadly pertains to temporal relations, but in the early-modern discourse, the temporal dimension in which the concept was used was for issues of tradition and modernity: is modernization based on traditional culture or rather is it opposed to it? In modern China, the “substance-function,” “past-present,” and “China-West” debates have influenced one another giving rise to formulations such as “China as substance, the West as function,” “West as substance and China as function” as well as “China as substance and function,” and “The West as substance and function.” All of these notions, obviously, are imbued with their specific historical meaning and therefore their historical limitations.

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II When analyzing the debates on “Substance-Function,” “Past-Present,” and “China-West” the most common idea unifying the three is the theory of “China as Substance, the West as Function” [henceforth, represented as Substance (China)/Function (West); variations of this position will be similarly formulated and they all follow the same reading rule]. Historically, Feng Guifen 冯桂芬 (d. 1874) proposed the foundations for the idea of Substance (China)/ Function (West) in Jiao Binlu kangyi 校邠庐抗议 (“The Protest of Jiao Binlu”) in which he wrote: “China’s Confucianism is the source, and the methods of all the other countries are the complement.” In April of 1895, in Wanguo Gongbao 万国公报 (“The Myriad States Journal”), he published an essay titled Jiushi Ce 救时策 (“A Strategy for Saving Time”), which more clearly expanded on the idea of “Chinese knowledge as substance, and Western knowledge as function.” In 1896, Sun Jia’nai 孙家鼐 (d. 1909) developed a similar idea: “We must use Chinese learning as the core, and Western learning (xue 学) as the complement; Chinese knowledge as substance and Western knowledge as function.” Then, in 1898, Zhang Zhidong 张之洞 (d. 1909) wrote Quan Xue Pian 劝学篇 (“An Essay on Advancing Learning”) whose core idea was “old knowledge is the substance, new knowledge is the function” where “old” and “new” here mean “Chinese” and “Western.” What we can discern, from the mid- to the late 19th century is the progressive formation of the Substance (China)/Function (West) idea. From the internal structure of Substance (China)/Function (West), “China” refers to a set of cultural imports of conceptual nature and specifically to the traditional value system of “Confucian social relations” (lunchang mingjiao 倫常名教) as expressed by Feng Guifen. The “West” on the other hand, denotes the “Western” system of knowledge for science and technology, and therefore in an expanded use of the term, “function” comes to encompass the methods, means, and tools of Western science and technology. Just as “Chinese” and “Western,” encompass as a proposition several distinct possibilities and implications, so does the entire idea of Substance (China)/Function (West). First, Substance (China)/Function (West) implies using traditional value norms as the foundation for socio-political governance, while using factual knowledge and its related material means from the West to achieve these goals—function is secondary to substance. It is easy to see the abstract and theoretical nature of the relationship between “knowledge” and “values” and between “conceptual existence” and “real/material existence:” in the relationship between concepts and reality, concepts are the substance and reality is the function, and in the

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relationship between values and knowledge, values are the substance and knowledge is the function. From a metaphysical point of view, as Yan Fu 严复 (d. 1921) later was apt to point out, the Substance (China)/Function (West) idea has a dualistic understanding of substance and function. According to Substance (China)/Function (West), “China” and “West” represent two distinct cultural manifestations and thus “substance-function” must be separated in order to fit the division of the two cultures. “China” is only substance, “West” is purely function and thus the different cultural manifestations are understood to fit a division between “substance” and “function.” Applying the cultural division of “ChinaWest” on “substance-function” implies they are divided entities as well: substance comes to bear a complete and comprehensive relationship with the Chinese traditional value system while function denotes only Western ideas and methods. A complete divisional existence is created within “substancefunction,” stripping it bare of any internal, dynamic, and inter-penetrating relationship. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the relation between Chinese and Western cultures, Substance (China)/Function (West) has a further implication. Later on, this notion acquired a more specific expression: Chinese traditional values should be the foundation of Chinese society and elements of Western culture should be used to supplement the traditional system. In other words, aspects of foreign cultures should be based on the characteristics and particularities of the native culture. From this outlook, Substance (China)/ Function (West) implicitly agrees with an understanding that different cultures can mutually affect one another and that this interaction must include the native culture. The Substance (China)/Function (West) theory does have, however, one large internal tension: on the one hand, as we have already seen, placing China exclusively as substance, and the West exclusively as function creates a wedge within “substance-function” which runs counter to the non-duality of substance and function, as it was historically understood. Nonetheless, the Substance (China)/Function (West) tenet acknowledges or even affirms the possibility of mutual interaction between the two cultures, a point that, in 20th century Chinese understandings of cultural dissemination and hybridization, came to be seen very positively. The long historical process of acculturation of Buddhism in China provides an excellent example of how two cultures can interact and influence one another. In the process of entering China, Buddhism underwent a process of Sinification, first being influenced by Obscure Studies and later culminating in the formation of the Zen (chan 禅)

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sect of Buddhism. Through the different phases of this long process of acculturation, we can see the interplay between the two cultural systems. In this sense, the Substance (China)/Function (West) thesis embodies the concept of a long historical process of exchange and interpenetration. Similar to the question of “China-West” is the issue of “past-present.” While the “China-West” relationship rests primarily on a spatial understanding of a culturally imbued distinctiveness, the “past-present” polarity refers to a temporal dimension focused on the issue of the relationship between modernity and tradition. Following the logic of Substance (China)/Function (West), modernity should happen on the basis of a traditional value system. Here two points are implied: first, that the conceptual realm is not limited to a traditional value system opposed to modernization but rather that it stresses the need to lay the foundation of modernity on tradition. Second, that Substance (China)/ Function (West) was primarily established on the idea of “returning to the foundation while opening up to the new.” Thus it provides for the theoretical emphasis in favor of cultural preservation and control of the effects of modernization. We can see that the relationship between “Past-Present” within the Substance (China)/Function (West) thesis encompasses both tendencies of cultural hybridity and exclusion, social modernization and reactionism. It is not hard to see that in the background of the debates of “substancefunction,” “past-present,” and “China-West,” the theory of Substance (China)/ Function (West) embodies an internal complexity—evident in its divisions of the “substance-function” relationship, the theoretical approach to the relation between Chinese and Western cultures, as well as that of tradition and modernity—which, in turn, brings out other concepts that require our attention. In a modern context, all internal premises and implications of Substance (China)/Function (West) require that we pay further attention to its multi-dimensionality. III In the contexts of these debates, beyond the well-established Substance (China)/Function (West) position, the opposite formulation Substance (West)/ Function (China) (“The West as substance, China as function”) emerged in the 1980s, with Li Zehou 李泽厚 providing one of its most systematic interpretations. On the linguistic level, Li Zehou’s formulation of Substance (West)/Function (China) is identical to the initial Substance (China)/Function (West) with

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“China” and “West” being merely placed in the reverse sequence. However, in the Substance (West)/Function (China) formulation, Li Zehou gives his own unique interpretation to the terms “substance” and “function.” To this effect, Li Zehou has made it clear that: [T]he “substance” I use is not the same as that used by others; it first and foremost refers to the social noumenon, therefore encompassing the material and daily life. I have already stressed that the existence of society is the social noumenon, and a successful negotiation of “substance” is social existence, which is neither ideology nor “knowledge.” Social existence is the social mode of production and is also the life that ordinary people experience in their actual daily lives. This is derived from the philosophical noumenon of historical materialism, which is the foundation of human existence. Modernization is foremost the transformation of this “substance,” a transformation in which the evolution of science and technology have an extremely important role, so important that they constitute the basis for the existence of the social noumenon. For it is through science and technology that the development of society’s productive forces and the sum of transformations that occur in society’s existence are brought about. Therefore, technology is not “function” but rather falls within the scope of “substance.” Following this line of thought, the “substance” in Substance (West)/Function (China) is primarily employed to denote social existence, daily life, means and factors of production, and so on. Therefore, Li Zehou takes his understanding of “substance” one step further in its differentiation from Zhang Zhidong’s theory of Substance (China)/Function (West), saying that, [M]y ‘substance’ and Zhang Zhidong’s ‘substance’ are exact opposites. Zhang’s understanding takes conceptual forms, political structures, and socio-ethical norms as ‘substance’ while my understanding takes society’s productive forces and modes of productions as ‘substance.’ As for “function” in Substance (West)/Function (China), Li Zehou explains it thus: This ‘Chinese function’ encompasses ‘Western substance’ as employed in China and further includes the ways and methods of realizing ‘Western substance’ (i.e. modernization) as informed by traditional Chinese culture

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and ‘Chinese knowledge.’ In this ‘function,’ the original ‘Chinese knowledge’ has been renewed, replaced, and transformed. In this ‘function,’ the ‘Western substance’ awaits to be accurately and fully ‘sinicized’ and is no longer transformed into Substance (China)/Function (West) under the flag of ‘Sinification’ … In Substance (West)/Function (China), the key lies in ‘function,’ specifically in how China will really be capable of entering modern society in a relatively smooth and healthy manner; how the modernization of people’s lives can lead to a healthy and forward-looking development; how individual contracts can act as the legal foundations for the development of modern social life; and how to achieve all of these in China’s unique way: indeed a long list of hard questions. On the one hand, the West’s modern development—which arose from science and technology—is faced with the question of which aspects of Chinese cultural background—fixed as it is—are most suitable in the modernization effort; on the other, the contrary issue is how to use traditional Chinese culture and concepts in order to reduce the negative impacts of scientific and technological advancement. A comprehensive look at Li Zehou’s points shows that he has given a lot of consideration to these issues. In his view, one of the features of Chinese traditional culture is its musicality, its fondness for music, and its emphasis on musical appreciation, sense, and sensibility. Another feature is the emphasis on “emotion” with great stress on the emotive dimension of kinship, which later gave rise to his theory of the “emotive substance” (qing benti 请本体) using it as the foundation for understanding traditional Chinese thought and society. For Li Zehou, the above can provide a solution to the unidimensional progress of science and technology, which can lead to its reigning supreme, producing cold-hearted human relationships. We can see that the implications behind “function” have gone through several transformations: it no longer is just property or capacity, but has come to include the ideas of cultural suitability, applicability, and responsiveness. Obviously related to “substance” and “function” are the terms “China” and “West.” In Li Zehou’s Substance (West)/Function (China) formulation, “West” denotes all material productive conditions and functions, encompassing not only science and technology but also ideological constructs, including Marxism: Wanting to use “the West as substance”—from technology, productive methods, forms of political management and control, all the way to ideologies (including Marxism and all other important theories, concepts,

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etc.)—in order to transform “Chinese knowledge” is going to change the core structure of traditional Chinese culture and is going to produce a transformation in the consciousness of this received wisdom. Opposed to “West” is “China,” which denotes the framework of the current lived reality of Chinese society and further refers to Chinese traditional values and notions. On the one hand, the theory of Substance (West)/Function (China) is concerned with the question of how to apply Western theory to the established Chinese reality, bound by its current historical predicament. On the other hand, the theory zooms in on the issue of how to draw from Chinese traditional thinking in order to respond to the developmental process of Western culture. The issue touches upon the ways in which social existence and social norms come to interact, how the latent re-affirmation of society and daily life is rife with theoretical beliefs, and how Chinese and Western cultures can interact, impact, and improve one another. It goes without saying that in the theoretical space of Substance (West)/ Function (China), using “substance-function” to talk about “China-West” can inherently lead to a wide range of distinct issues, therefore making the object of discussion rich with ambiguity. From the deepest level of theoretical foundations, Substance (West)/Function (China), the ‘China-West’ term is based on a specific historical reality with concrete and distinct cultural manifestations. “Substance-Function” operates as a concept in metaphysical space, which includes the ideas of “root-end,” “essence-property,” “foundationmanifestation,” and “primary-secondary” among other coupled-concepts. Thus, when we use “substance-function” to analyze “China-West,” it becomes harder to reveal the actual relationship between the two: the relationship between Chinese and Western cultures is just too complex to fit into simple schema such as “root-end,” “essence-property” and so on—simplifications and errors inevitably creep up. Substance (West)/Function (China) confers new meaning on “substancefunction” and “China-West,” as it provides a new understanding of the relationship between the two. From the broad field of the “substance-function” and the “past-present,” and “China-West” debates, a move from the thesis of Substance (China)/Function (West) to Substance (West)/Function (China) no doubt shows a radical conceptual transformation. However, as already seen, the historical implications of the transformation of the “substance-function,” “past-present,” and “China-West” debates implies that the Substance (West)/ Function (China) thesis is fundamentally concerned with issues of identity and existence.

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IV From the perspective of the development of modern Chinese thought, beyond the formulations of Substance (China)/Function (West) and Substance (West)/ Function (China), there also exists another route in the theoretical matrixes of the “substance-function,” “past-present,” and “China-West” debates—and that different path is Yan Fu’s contribution. Yan Fu’s ideas on the issue were primarily formed in the late 19th century, at a time when the Substance (China)/ Function (West) thesis captured China’s intellectual imagination. Yan Fu, however, proceeded from critiquing the thesis as the starting point for his theory. Therefore, logically speaking, Yan Fu’s way of thought sits outside the polarity of Substance (China)/Function (West) and Substance (West)/Function (China). As we have already seen above, the debates on “substance-function,” “pastpresent,” and “China-West” are concerned with three types of relationships. These types of relationships are namely between substance and function, the past and the present, and China and the West. On the first relationship, Yan Fu first and foremost stressed the idea of the non-duality of the two components. Seen in its historical context, the main object of his criticism was the Substance (China)/Function (West) thesis against which he posited his own theory on the non-duality of substance and function. Yan Fu held that: Substance is the name of an object. Given the substance of an ox, its function is to carry loads on its back; given the substance of a horse, its functions is to travel long distances. No one has ever heard that an ox is the substance and the horse is the function. Yan Fu upheld the traditional conceptualization that substance and function are a paired set: each object has its own substance and its own function, substance and function cannot be separated, a separation simply amounts to talking about the substances and functions of different objects. In Yan Fu’s eyes, the biggest problem with the Substance (China)/Function (West) tenet was that from a formal point of view it separated substance and function along the line of China and West: substance is relegated to China, function is tied to the West. Through his refutation of the logic behind the Substance (China)/ Function (West) thesis, Yan Fu also affirmed on a formal level the impossibility of separating the existence of a foundation and the existence of appearances, the existence of entities and that of their functions—positions that can be seen as modern extensions of the traditional Chinese ideal of the non-duality of substance and function.

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For Yan Fu, the debate on substance and function was strongly tied to the debate on dao and its manifestations. From the perspective of the relationship between dao and its manifestations, the non-duality of substance and function implies that dao lies within its manifestations, that it cannot be separated from the sum of its representations. In Chinese philosophy, dao is the universal principle of existence and only by means of semantic extension does it acquire its secondary meaning of concept, theory, or ideal. Opposite to the universal dao, its manifestations emerge concretely in the form of existent reality—everything that is clearly present in the real world. Discussing the issue of substance and function from the perspective of the relationship of dao and its manifestations, the manifestations are the substance and dao is the function. The unity of dao and its manifestations represents a general concept or principle that forms the foundation of the existent reality. Yan Fu’s idea and Li Zehou’s understanding of the relationship of substance and function are consistent. As we have seen above, one of the major features of Li Zehou’s presentation of the substance-function relationship lies in the affirmation of the relationship of conceptual systematicity and social existence. Based on the above perspective on the issues of substance-function and daomanifestation, Yan Fu explained his theory on the China-West relationship: “Chinese knowledge has its own substance and function, Western knowledge has its own substance and function; the two [cultures] stand when divided, and collapse when merged together.” In short, the substance of Chinese knowledge determines its function, and the substance of Western knowledge determines its function—an idea that can be summarized as Substance (China)/Function (China)–Substance (West)/Function (West). Distinct from all the other formulations we have seen above, Yan Fu’s thesis constitutes the third pole in the substance-function debate of modern Chinese philosophy. From the perspective of cultural interaction and permeation, Yan Fu’s formulation that “China and the West each has its own substance and its own function” has several implications. When looking at the China-West relationship, the first point we need to make in the Substance (China)/Function (China)–Substance (West)/Function (West) theory is that it acknowledges and, in fact, welcomes the possibility that Western culture acts as the foundation for modern Chinese society. There is no way to divide the function of Western knowledge from its substance. At the time, it was generally agreed that, in order to strengthen the state and the military, the function of Western knowledge was necessary. However, according to the principle of the non-divisibility of substance and function, the desire for wealth and power cannot be actualized merely through function but also necessitates a simultaneous adoption of Western substance, which is not merely limited

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to methods and instruments but also includes broader evaluative principles, economic systems, social norms and so forth. No doubt, this idea goes beyond the Substance (China)/Function (West), which only acknowledges the function of Western knowledge and does not recognize the theoretical possibility of assuming a Western substance. From the perspective of the relationship between past and present, the notion that substance and function are non-divisible implies that the traditional value system is an impediment to modernization. The relationships between substance and function and dao and its manifestations are nondivisible. Its manifestations are the existent reality (including the existence of science, technology, and society), and dao is the general principle and universal ideal, which by extension comes to signify the traditional value system (as a society’s underlying ultimate principle). According to the idea that dao is function and its manifestations are substance, its manifestations are seen as the substance of reality which determines the form of the value propositions out of which dao is manifested—and not the other way around. The above understanding of substance-function and dao-manifestations and the tenet of Substance (China)/Function (West) are obviously mutually exclusive. The latter is based on the idea that the traditional value system is the foundation for social development, emphasizing the goal of “returning to the foundation when opening up to the new” by placing Confucian social teachings as a way to respond and complement the modernization process. For Yan Fu, the traditional dao could never come to determine the modern concept and its manifestations. Yan Fu highly regarded the introduction and study of Western culture and further argued that accepting modern Western culture provided a deep and internal foundation for modern Chinese society. Using academic education as an example, Yan Fu said, “As of present, our country’s instruction establishment is the [traditional] hall. Simply put, in China’s modern predicament, the State’s first priority should be the introduction of Western knowledge.” Regardless of whether it is seen through the lens of the interaction between past-present or between tradition-modernity, Yan Fu’s position reflects the belief that the times need to follow the course of the evolution of history. Through his emphasis on education, Yan Fu also made his theory Substance (China)/Function (China)–Substance (West)/Function (West) concrete. If we want to take our observations on Yan Fu’s views on the substancefunction, past-present, and China-West debates one step further, we cannot but point out that his theory has correct and positive implications but also includes several misconceptions. The latter is clearly seen in the fact that, using Substance (China)/Function (China)–Substance (West)/Function (West) as a

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theoretical starting point, we are inevitably led to a strong cultural separatist position. According to Yan Fu’s understanding, Chinese and Western knowledge each has its own substance and function, and therefore China and the West each has its own substance and function and the two cannot be placed in a meaningful relation: Chinese and Western cultures are self-inclusive, exhibiting an internal unity which creates a barrier against mutual interaction and interpenetration. Based on this concept, Yan Fu often stressed the need to introduce traditional Western culture, but he unfortunately often overlooked the fact that even such cultural integration requires a native cultural foundation. Even though, as we saw in the previous section, the Substance (China)/ Function (West) and the Substance (West)/Function (China) theses have different understandings regarding the nature and existence of Chinese and Western cultures, they both acknowledge and affirm the viability of cultural interaction and hybridization. On the other hand, if we accept the idea that Chinese and Western cultures each has its own substance and function, the issue of cultural cross-pollination evaporates. In this regard, Yan Fu’s notion reveals a tendency toward cultural essentialism and exclusionism. When introducing Western knowledge and criticizing traditional Chinese learning, Yan Fu often presented the two as non-compatible entities, and often took Chinese knowledge to be completely outside of the scope of modern academic inquiry. In one essay entitled Jiuwang Juelun 救亡决论 (“On Salvation”), Yan Fu discussed the above points: “This is the reason I take ‘learning’ (xue) to mean the rules and principles of Western knowledge, and conversely everything that China has to offer cannot be considered ‘learning.’” Yan Fu’s view fails to recognize the positive and negative elements of Chinese and Western learning or that, in the process of introducing Western knowledge, the native knowledge will have an unavoidable role. Yan Fu’s contemporary Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (d. 1936) noticed and pointed out Yan Fu’s limitations. He criticized the one-sidedness of the efforts to introduce Western learning: “only admiring other countries’ knowledge and not acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of our country’s knowledge and not grasping even one thing [from our knowledge] is the first kind of bias.” Even though Zhang Taiyan’s critique was not explicitly directed toward Yan Fu, its contents definitely pertain to what Yan Fu said and stood for: only praising other countries’ learning and not grasping even one thing from China’s received wisdom overlooks issues of cultural integration and inter-mixing. This is an inherent limitation in Yan Fu’s understanding of the relationship between China and the West. We noticed before that, in the Chinese modern predicament, the separation of the issues of past-present and China-West is almost impossible, as the

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two are inextricably bound to each other. In this, Yan Fu exhibited a striking awareness. In his comparison of the differences between Chinese and Western cultures, Yan Fu pointed out that: When talking about the issues of [the relationship between] China and the West, their most dissimilar feature—the one that cannot be resolved—is that the Chinese are fond of the past and disregard the present, whereas Westerners use the present to conquer the past; the Chinese view the succession of order and disorder, of growth and collapse, as the natural order of human affairs, whereas Westerners view boundless progress, growth without falling into collapse, order without falling into chaos as the ultimate principle of politics. Based on this, the difference between China and the West is a difference between conceptions of past and present, which means that the difference between China and the West constitutes a partition between the past and the present. From this perspective, it is even harder to avoid the tension between tradition and modernity. Thus, even though the Substance (China)/Function (West) and the Substance (West)/Function (China) theses are dissimilar, they do agree that Chinese and Western cultures can mutually influence each other and that tradition and modernity can be linked up. In this regard, Yan Fu’s theory that China and the West each has its own substance and function appears to have a greater theoretical limitation: starting from Yan Fu’s position it becomes almost impossible to pay any attention to how it is possible to have cultural interaction across space and time, how one culture relates to another, and how the past is perceived, used, affirmed or rejected, revived or condemned in the present. Historically, the debates on substance-function, past-present, and China-West have informed to a very large extent the culturalist debates of modern China. And, within the bounds of these debates there are several distinct orientations, each with its own theoretical merits and limitations—a point that applies even to Yan Fu, one of modern China’s most brilliant minds. V As we have seen above, the substance-function relationship is a traditional philosophical tenet, which in its modern manifestation has acquired a revived form with a concomitant expansion of its internal presuppositions. Since then the substance-function debate has been entangled with the past-present and China-West questions, the three borrowing from and affecting each other. As for its internal presuppositions, the China-West issue touches upon the spatial

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dimension of inter-cultural relation, whereas the past-present question looks at the temporal dimension of the relationship between tradition and modernity. And it is exactly here that there exists a merging, metaphysically, with socio-historical and moral issues. The substance-function debate in its modern manifestation was transformed from an issue lying on the metaphysical level to one relating to social history and ethics. This transformation was one of the most important developments of Chinese philosophy as it was entering modernity. Historically, the development of traditional Chinese society exhibited a relative stable form: dynastic cycles aside, social structures did not undergo a fundamental or radical transformation. Therefore, with the advent of modernity, the historical experience of the past was perceived as devoid of substantial change, the so-called “changeless three thousand years.” This constituted an important background for the emergence of Chinese philosophy during modernization: under the assumption of relative social stability, the focus of ethical issues was primarily limited to the sphere of ethical reasoning itself. And when the assumption was that society was experiencing massive and violent changes, the issues of the social and historical domains were easily transported to the field of philosophical argumentation, disagreement, and debate. The traditional issue of substance-function moved past its metaphysical plane and acquired socio-historical and ethical implications, a transformation reflecting the higher-order linking of historical change with philosophical reasoning. Using the changes in modern thought as a prism, we can see that the broadening of the substance-function debate includes, in and of itself, a wide set of distinct implications and meanings. In the process of intermixing the substance-function debate with the past-present and China-West issues, not only did the substance-function coupled-concept acquire richer meaning but so did modern thinkers’ grasping of the China-West relationship and their understanding of the modernization experience. The substancefunction coupled-concept as a philosophical idea functioned as a theoretical tool to understand and explain the complex and intricate relationship between China and the West, the past and the present. The Substance (China)/Function (West) and the Substance (West)/Function (China) tenets both operate under the framework of the coupled-concept of substance-function and affirm the historical connection between China and the West as well as tradition and modernity. The Substance (China)/Function (China)–Substance (West)/ Function (West) position, on the other hand, through a different interpretation of the substance-function relationship, emphasizes the differences that exist between the basic elements of the three debates. Regardless of whether the substance-function category is used to stress the link between China and the West or the past and the present or to emphasize their differences,

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each way of thinking has its own theoretical and historical significance in deepening our understanding. Substance-Function is a metaphysical category imbued with specific connotations, which were initially expressed as the relationships between root-end, reality-capacity, or more generally internal foundations and external manifestations. Logically, the substance-function relationship embodies both aspects. First, the mutual interaction between substance and function was repeatedly affirmed by traditional thinkers: “substance and function have the same source, there being not the smallest gap between them” and “for the substance, the function lies within the substance and for the function, the substance lies within the function” are but the most emblematic defenses of the non-duality of substance and function. These views affirm the mutually interactive and interpenetrative relationship between the two. More broadly, using the root-end, reality-capacity, foundation-manifestation pairs as more concrete examples, the substance-function relationship also exhibits a primary and secondary (leading and following) dynamic. Therefore, using the substance-function concept to explain the China-West and past-present relationships, theoretically means that there are two possible orientations: either that substance-function are non-dual, affirming the inherent and inescapable link between China and the West and the past and the present; or, from the perspective of primary and secondary relations, affirming a specific hierarchy between the China and the West, etc. It is easy, under the conceptual form of Substance (China)/Function (West) and Substance (West)/Function (China), to take the China-West, past-present, and other relationships between cultural forms and equate them to relations such as root-end, substance-property, foundationappearance, and therefore further distortions in our understanding. In reality, starting with the Substance (China)/Function (West) and Substance (West)/ Function (China) tenets to understand the China-West and past-present relations, we can also see the same kind of bias and distortion. Starting with the substance-function relationship, the Substance (China)/Function (West) tenet often places the traditional Chinese value system as the substance or the root (i.e. the leading or dominant aspect) and takes Western culture as the function or the end (i.e. the following or secondary aspect). Therefore, the rootend relationship is transplanted in our understanding of the culturally bound relation between China and the West. It is also true for the past-present relationship, where the so-called “returning to the foundation when opening up to the new” takes the traditional value propositions as the foundations for the development of modern society, embodying a latent understanding of past and present similar to that of root and end. Under this theoretical outlook, it

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is hard to acquire a meaningful or truthful comprehension of the relationships between Chinese and Western culture or tradition and modernity. Both the Substance (China)/Function (West) and Substance (West)/ Function (China) tenets, as well as the idea that “China and the West each have their own Substance and Function,” all avoid the aforementioned issue of associating China-West or past-present to the theoretical implications of root-end and primary-secondary. However, in understanding the inherent relationship and interaction between Chinese and Western cultures and between past and present, there is no way to have a suitable comprehension: logically, all of these concepts share an underlying understanding that the components of the theoretical sets can be separated. In other words, using the theoretical framework of the substance-function debate to discuss the issues of past-present and China-West will either (a) affirm the inter-relationship of the two, but inescapably insert the dimension of primary-secondary or root-end in defining the nature of the relations, or (b), if it emphasizes the distinctions between past and present and China and the West, then it will run the risk of labelling the individual elements as absolute distinct entities. This shows that the use of the substance-function debate to understand the issues of modernity and tradition and China and the West has considerable theoretical limitations.

Chapter 21

Analytic Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy Analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy are often seen as two completely different philosophical systems.1 Yet, from the perspective of Chinese philosophy, analytic philosophy does not merely constitute an existence of a philosophical “other,” nor is it just an incommensurable system of thought. Either from a historical review of Chinese philosophy or from the perspective of contemporary Chinese philosophy, the significance of having a solid understanding of the connection—and the possibility of establishing a ­connection—between analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy cannot be overlooked. I Even though analytic philosophy and—broadly speaking—philosophical analysis are distinct, they are hard to differentiate. In Western philosophy, philosophical analysis has a longstanding tradition which can be traced back to ancient Greece. The Socratic dialogues in Plato as well as Aristotle’s arguments exhibit (in different degrees) a prowess in philosophical analysis. Aristotle’s “Categories,” “Prior Analytics,” and “Posterior Analytics,” among other works, deal directly with issues of logical analysis and, from a broader perspective, his treatment of metaphysical, ethical and other types of questions is defined by philosophical analysis. Starting from Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza and up until Kant, analytic thought and reasoning have had a continuous progression giving rise to a longstanding and mature tradition. Nonetheless, when discussing the links between analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy, we must place our attention on the early 20th century philosophical school whose main representatives were Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. In the development of this philosophical movement, analytic philosophy came to include the Vienna School, the Oxford ordinary language philosophy with Ryle and Austin as its main representatives, and Quine and Davidson later on in the United States. More broadly speaking, Rawls’s work can also be considered part of the analytic philosophy school. 1  This chapter was translated by Stefano Gandolfo, a PhD student at the University of Oxford.

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As a distinct philosophical movement, analytic philosophy has several important aspects. First, analytic philosophy points out that what matters most in our understanding of the world, and ourselves, is not the objects themselves we wish to talk about but rather the language we employ to describe these external objects—this change in focus has been termed “the linguistic turn” of philosophy. From one perspective, analytic philosophy has never argued against the existence of existence itself and in fact analytic philosophers have repeatedly tried through the medium of linguistic analysis to grasp and affirm existence. In this sense, analytic philosophy has never departed from traditional philosophy’s argumentative and theoretical boundaries. From another perspective, analytic philosophy aims to affirm existence, and more importantly existence within language—a point that sets it apart from philosophical thinking of the past. Thus, analytic philosophy’s emphasis on placing language as the main focal point of theoretical scrutiny can be summed up in Quine’s expression of “semantic ascent.” Semantic ascent is, on the one hand, the examination of an object through the examination of the linguistic expressions regarding that object and, on the other, the placing of philosophical focus on the linguistic level. A key fundamental goal of any philosophical thinking is to attain a certain degree of universality and certainty in its conclusions—it is worth our attention then in understanding how analytic philosophy, with its focus on language, manages to attain that. Different from directly analyzing physical objects, this kind of reasoning places greater importance on the differences between the linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects of an object. Generally speaking, simple or direct apprehension of a physical object can lead to two different outcomes. The first is the substantiation of physical objects and the background of this substantiation often implies a certain extra-experiential, theoretical approach. In traditional philosophy, this tendency has manifested itself in the varied natural philosophies or the several kinds of theoretical metaphysics. The second outcome is philosophical research and experiential science. Historically, philosophy in its early stages was all-embracing and was viewed as the mother of all sciences. The use of the scientific method by philosophy to analyze external objects and phenomena logically entails several possibilities for the “scientification” of philosophy, a tendency clearly present in early empirical theories. However, analytic philosophy is not only concerned with external objects and phenomena. Analytic philosophy also emphasizes the division between language and mind. From a logical perspective, using mental processes— an internal and introspective phenomenon—as the object of philosophical theory can lead to a tendency towards solipsism or self-absorption. Therefore overcoming the purview of private experience and attaining universality and

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definiteness become a nearly impossible task. Generally speaking, from a negative perspective, using language as the object of philosophical inquiry leads to the overcoming of extra-experimental and theorizing approaches, avoids equating philosophy to experience-based science, and implies that philosophical research goes beyond the investigation of mental phenomena. From a positive perspective, using language and linguistic reductionism as the target of investigation can lead to universality and definitiveness in philosophical inquiry: just as there is a difference between physical and mental phenomena, language as an object of inquiry also entails a similar method of analysis and a similar yardstick of measurement—to analytic philosophy, this can provide the possibility of reaching universality and definiteness. Language is connected to logical analysis: employing language as object and logical analysis as method are two indivisible sides of analytic philosophy. Logical analysis mainly consists of two aspects. The first is analysis and delineation of concepts: in the field of analytic philosophy, the laying out of concepts requires a rigorous delineation and a lucid clarification of the concepts and their connotations and implications. The other aspect is argumentation: setting forth a theory requires a rigorous, robust, and detailed set of arguments. Borrowing from expressions within Chinese Philosophy, “argumentation” can be summed up in two ways: “it stands to reason” (yanzhi chengli 言之成理), which means that the argumentative process has to conform to a certain structure and adhere to logic; and “to have sufficient grounds” (chizhi yougu 持之有故), which means that a theory has to have a logical foundation. Explication of concepts and rigorous argumentation are two traits of the analytic method that cannot be overemphasized. This methodology helps cast away the tendency of ad hoc theorizing, thus pushing philosophy farther away from the field of mere subjectivity. The essence of philosophical thought is never accidental or mercurial—rather it is the result of proof. Ideas that have not undergone the test of reason are nothing more than subjective opinions held by individuals. In this vein, philosophy without rigorous logical analysis has abetted the expansion of mystical theories, for in the history of philosophy, ideas of a mystical nature have often been mixed with philosophical thinking and personal experience has never been exposed to logical scrutiny. Similarly, philosophy can easily be equated to common sense: common sense is self-evident and does not require argumentation or reflection. Philosophy is obviously not fully severed from common sense, but philosophy is required to go through a process of investigation and argumentation to expand upon and correct common sense. A higher-order logical analysis, simultaneously builds on the process of “talking about truth” or “stating the truth,” which is the essence of logical

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analysis. When analytic philosophy uses logical analysis as its primary method to resolve linguistic issues, it implies a commitment to truth since both concept analysis and theoretical argumentation are part of the process of “talking about truth.” The expressions used above (“it stands to reason” and “to have sufficient grounds”) also imply “talking about truth.” Philosophical concepts are not the same as ad hoc theory, subjective experience, or common sense— rather philosophical ideas require the process of argumentation, which is the process of “talking about truth.” Philosophical ideas must also be directed towards others or towards an academic community—they have to be in the public sphere where its members can evaluate, discuss, and reject ideas. In order for other people to accept a theory, it has to be done on specific grounds and principles, and discussing these grounds and principles is “talking about truth.” It is easy to see then, that the essence of logical analysis points at exactly this: philosophical thought and argumentation is the process of “talking about truth.” A big component of analytic philosophy is the pursuit and questioning of meaning. The process of disambiguation of concepts and logical argumentation implies the disambiguation of meaning qua meaning—it aims to answer the question what is meaning. Different schools and philosophers have proposed various theories to answer this question. The Referential Theory of Meaning or the Functional Theory of Meaning are just two examples of some of the most established of these theories. Thus, meaning as such has entered analytic philosophy’s process of delineation and clarification of concepts, a complex issue which can become itself the object of philosophical analysis. For example, in the 1920s, Ogden and Richards wrote the “Meaning of Meaning,” a book entirely focused on the question of meaning. Generally speaking, meaning can be divided into two aspects: form and essence. From the perspective of understanding and knowledge, meaning is related to form and is seen as an essence. On the formal level, meaning must adhere to logic, an idea reflected in Jin Yuelin’s 金岳霖 (d. 1984) statement that in the law of identity “meaning is possibly the most basic condition in the end.” The law of identity requires that a concept has a definite meaning, and that in a fixed context, posses a certain set of connotations which do not alter at will. The law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle, on the other hand, determine the conditions that meaning’s form can take. On the essential level, context-specific meaning is connected to the nexus of reality and knowledge: using our processes of rational understanding as guide, meaning always includes knowledge. The meaning of “meaning” is evident in something “being understandable;” when we say “a concept has meaning” we mean that the concept can be understood—conversely a concept that cannot be understood does not have

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meaning. For example, “daytime is heavier than water” is a sentence with no meaning because it cannot be understood. From a formal perspective, a concept is non-comprehensible and lacks meaning comes from non-adherence to logic. Following the Mohists’ principle that objects of “different categories cannot be compared” (yilei bubi 异类不比), “daytime” and “water” are phenomena of different classes, the former being related to time and the latter related to matter, and thus a comparison between them violates this principle. The above comparison has no meaning for it has content that cannot be understood and therefore cannot be known. Beyond issues of comprehension and knowledge, meaning is also related to people’s objectives, and can thus acquire power. In the objective-oriented sense, “to have meaning” signifies the realization of a certain goal; the content expressed in a concept or sentence has a positive function. If the content does not have a value conducive to the realization of a certain goal, then it lacks meaning. For example, “a mantis is obstructing a cart” (tangbi dangche 螳臂当车) is a meaningless statement, but as a Chinese saying, it has value when used to describe people who are unaware of the limitations of their own strength. Does the original, literal meaning of the phrase “a mantis is obstructing a cart” have meaning? It does not, because for the purpose of “obstructing a cart,” the minuscule mantis does not have any function. Meaning in this context occurs on the level of functionality, and in this field of discourse, whatever has meaning has value, and conversely whatever is meaningless does not have value. Generally speaking, the so-called “absurd” also points to a nonsensical yet functional aspect of language—an aspect inextricably related to the existence of people and everyday language—and therefore the “absurd” simply means that it does not have a positive bearing on a specific purpose and therefore lacks meaning. Judging from the two aforementioned dimensions of meaning, analytic philosophy mostly emphasizes the former (the aspect of understanding and knowing) and there is less focus on the purpose-value aspect. Analytic philosophy obviously also discusses issues of value, but the main focus of such analyses is not the realization of value. On the broad issue of “the good,” analytic philosophy’s concern is the meaning of the word or concept of “the good” and not so much “what is in actuality a good thing.” Similarly, concerning the “morally good,” analytic philosophers are concerned with what this concept entails at the end, or in other words, when we call a certain behavior “morally good,” what does the “morally good” component of the sentence actually mean. Instead, analytic philosophy places less focus on questions such as what are the conditions for the realization of the morally good or how does one put

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into practice the morally good. From this we can see that analytic philosophy is almost unilaterally concerned with questions around meaning. To sum up, analytic philosophy, the school of thought of a generation, had language as its primary philosophical object of contemplation, used logical analysis as its primary methodological tool, and placed more significance on the understanding-knowing aspect of meaning. And building on the three aspects, it also set up its own internal rules of reasoning and argumentation. However, apart from these three traits, analytic philosophy also has other characteristics. From the perspective of analytic philosophy’s internal logic, “delineation” of concepts (i.e. demarcation and clarification of ideas and their implications) and argumentative rigor are one and the same: delineation sets clarity between the noetic boundaries of concepts and therefore prevents that concepts can be muddied or intertwined. As a way of thinking, delineation can be traced back to Kantian philosophy: the division between “phenomenon” and “object,” “perception/understanding” and “reason,” “pure reason” and “practical reason,” and so forth rendered these concepts very clear and distinct from one another. This way of thinking has had a clear influence on analytic philosophy. Such efforts of conceptual delineation are not only exhibited in the differentiation between ideas, but also in the division between the linguistic and extralinguistic world (a division echoing Kant’s differentiation between “phenomena” and “objects”). One of the results of delineation is the difficulty to grasp the wholeness of the totality of phenomena. The world and its objects can be divided in several different ways, but before phenomena are perceived as distinct, they are in essence united into one single whole. Under the gaze of delineation, it becomes very hard to attain an understanding of the totality of the world in itself. Of course, the philosophical position of Holism exists within analytic philosophy, but unlike traditional Holism, which is concerned with the grasping of the inherent existence of the totality of the world, analytic philosophy focuses on a linguistic debate on how to understand the relationship between language and the world or how the meaning of a word comes to be only within a relevant contextual whole (and not from a mere isolated set of sounds or symbols). Understanding linguistic meaning from the relationship between words and context is a term known to as “semantic holism” and as such we can see that Holism, within analytic philosophy has not escaped the linguistic field of discourse. Related to delineation of concepts is the evolution of idealization. Analytic philosophy employs conceptual idealization to resolve philosophical issues, a

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methodological inclination perfectly captured in analytic philosophy’s go-to tool of “thought experiments.” A thought experiment is a hypothesis on a certain idealized situation or a specific pre-condition in situational context. A great example of a thought experiment is Hilary Putnam’s “brain in a vat,” which asks us to accept that: (a) the body and the brain are separated, (b) the brain can survive on its own in the vat, and (c) the brain is fed a stream of information in such a way that the brain cannot tell that it is itself just a brain in a vat. This is done in order to make the point that, in principle, it is impossible to distinguish between the real and the unreal. In the field of ethics and politics, we also encounter the use of thought experiments to tackle key issues. The most famous example is Rawls’s “the veil of ignorance” as set up in his book A Theory of Justice. “The veil of ignorance” is a supposition that prior to any discussion about justice, all participants in a discussion on how to structure society do not know the state in which they will be in this society and therefore do not know their age, sex, social position, wealth and so forth. Rawls aims to show that in this hypothetical scenario, the participants discussing the issue of justice will reach a specific agreement. In this sense, Rawls’s discussion on ethics does not differ greatly from analytic philosophy. The main feature of idealization or thought experiments is the extraction of a specific situation from its concrete reality, as for example the “brain in a vat” places the human brain outside of the body and “the veil of ignorance” places people outside of their specific and actual social realities. Such method of discussing and investigating philosophical questions embodies a boldness in abstraction. Philosophical investigation no doubt requires abstraction, but stopping at that then will render it impossible to reach real outcomes. The union of delineation and idealization results in logical formalism when handling philosophical issues. Formalization is exhibited in the division between language and world (existence). The process of filtering-out of the actual world happens only on the level of linguistic signification-analysis and its associated conceptual formalism. Indeed, in the later phase of analytic philosophy, there was no small number of questions and discussions concerning existence with several ontological and metaphysical theories being expounded. However, what we need to point out is that when analytic philosophy discusses existence and even when it aims to set up a metaphysical theory, its primary focus is not existence per se but rather the ways in which language and linguistic meaning are used in discussions about existence. In P.F. Strawson’s book, Individuals, this point is very clear. Strawson differentiates between “revisionary metaphysics” and “descriptive metaphysics,” and in his opinion, the right approach to take is descriptive metaphysics, which is

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a discussion of the meaning of the concepts employed when we talk about existence. And similar to Strawson, Quine’s “ontological commitment” affirms that existence is fundamentally placed on the linguistic level and that analytic philosophy does not discuss the existence of objects or reality. Seen from a different perspective, “formalization” implies the separation of language from mental processes. As we have already seen above, analytic philosophy confines the object of philosophical discussion solely to the linguistic plane, which simultaneously implies the separation between language and mental processes. Analytic philosophy places a high emphasis on this distinction and a lot of analytic philosophers have tried repeatedly to avoid any questions regarding mental activities and processes. Analytic philosophy indeed has a branch of “philosophy of mind,” however its focus is not the mind, but rather the linguistic terms used to discuss the mind, consciousness, and other mental phenomena. In the eyes of analytic philosophers, the actual processes of the mind lack a clear form and a definite content. Therefore there is no logic-based methodological tool available to grasp mental processes— questions pertaining to philosophy of mind and psychology should be argued away. Michael Dummett’s formal separation of thought from mind implies the separation of psychology from thinking. As stated above, philosophical investigation cannot merely end with subjective experience; however, placing philosophical examination (including linguistic analysis) apart from mental and psychological processes is in itself another extreme. Summing up, there are two main divisions in analytic philosophy: the division of language and world—“the limits of language are the limits of my world”—and the division of the process of logic-based language analysis from the processes of actual human psychology. Stemming from two different perspectives, these two divisions exemplify the pursuit of formalization and lead to a further division between the level of formalized investigation and the grasping of the actual world. Intimately related to the above is the tendency towards a more technological and knowledge-based system of thought. Analytic philosophy uses logical analysis as its main methodological tool, leading to further refinement and systematization of knowledge and the creation of new technological products. Judging from its earliest appearances, such technological tendency is best seen in the use of artificial languages or modern mathematical logic in discussing philosophical problems. Of course mathematical logic is an exceptionally specialized field and obviously has several distinct sub-systems. But from the point of view of further technological advancement the two are similar. Philosophy itself has gained its own technological trait. Analytic philosophy’s focus has always been the analysis of everyday language, and even though

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this level of analysis does not need to employ the tool of mathematical logic, it still exhibits the tendency towards a more technological way of thinking. Philosophers who have aptly analyzed everyday language, often have a rather rigorous linguistic training comprised not only in linguistics but also literature. For example, Austin, an exemplar of the everyday language philosophy school had intimate knowledge of everyday language and expressions but had also received a rigorous classical training. His acumen at linguistic analysis lay on a solid linguistic background. Thus, in the analysis of both artificial and everyday languages, philosophy, at varying degrees, is linked to the tendency towards increased technological advancement. The tendency towards increased technological advancement is linked to the tendency towards an increase in knowledge: it is impossible to separate technological improvements from the quest for knowledge. When rendering philosophy closer to technology, the focus of philosophy also shifts toward the form of knowledge. Thus, philosophy itself is becoming day-by-day more knowledge-based. The intellectualization of philosophy and the pursuit of philosophical wisdom are at their core distinct—as we follow the tendency for further intellectualization, philosophy will depart further from the field of wisdom. II Related to the forms of analytic philosophy, Chinese philosophy has its own very unique characteristics. From the formal perspective, Chinese philosophy first and foremost exemplifies the unity of “generated” and “generator.” Through historical change, Chinese philosophy had already taken the form of the generated, and the object of what we study now (from pre-Qin philosophy onwards) had already become a definite object of inquiry. In this sense, Chinese philosophy already has a complete character and exhibits a “generated” historical form. From a different perspective, however, before the formation of a philosophical object of investigation, Chinese philosophy opened-up to generations of philosophers who reflected upon issues from all historical periods and created, in essence, philosophical theories themselves. This kind of philosophical reflection—manifested in the endless progression of history—acquires as its object of inquiry the history of philosophy and acquires its form through historical change. It is on this point that Chinese philosophy exhibits a generative trait: following the expansion of philosophical investigation at different periods, philosophical theory itself never stops being generative. Every generation of philosophers used the previous generations’ conclusions as their

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starting point and in turn provided the starting point for the next generation of thinkers. This kind of philosophical reflection, on the one hand, creates a philosophical theory produced within a specific socio-historical context, and on the other, creates a philosophical object that is already generated from the process of historical development. Philosophers have always set out to answer and reflect on the philosophical problems they encountered, and Chinese philosophy, in each historical period, acquired a new expansion and expression. Reflecting on this process, Chinese philosophy as a whole exhibits the conjoining of generated and generator. Behind the merging of generated and generator is the even-more-meaningful unity of history and philosophy. And on this level Chinese philosophy acquires the form of both history of philosophy and active philosophical theorizing. As a form of contemplation on wisdom, Chinese philosophy has repeatedly pursued the issue of “nature and the heavenly Dao” (xing yu tiandao 性與天道). From a theoretical perspective, this philosophical pursuit aims to grasp the type of wisdom which entails an investigation on the form of meaning. In terms of meaning, Chinese philosophy has mostly placed its focus on the purpose-value dimension (which is not to say that Chinese philosophy has completely overlooked the understanding-knowledge aspect of meaning). The two fundamental traits of Chinese philosophy—the unity of generated and generator and the unity of history and philosophy—set up the premise for the historical and theoretical connection between Chinese and analytic philosophy. The historical link pertains to the connection between analytic philosophy and the generated facet of Chinese philosophy, while the theoretical link applies to the connection between analytic philosophy and the generative and expansive process of Chinese philosophy. Looking from a historical perspective, Chinese philosophy has mostly focused on systems of substance, and compared to Western philosophy has not placed much focus on systems of form. (Of course, that does not imply that Chinese philosophy completely lacks discussions on systems of form, but rather that relatively speaking, it has placed greater emphasis on systems of substance). The generated aspect of Chinese philosophy has often not prioritized the precise and clear delineation of concepts and categories. This is not to say that concepts and categories within Chinese philosophy do not have a fixed and determinate content, but rather that when Chinese philosophers used concepts and categories, they did not place too much emphasis on the formal aspect of delineating and explicating them. In the process of developing its own methods of argumentation, the systematic approach to substance was given greater emphasis. Indeed, every innovative Chinese philosopher has had his aim or core concept around which a philosophical system was

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ultimately built. However, when erecting such systems, Chinese philosophers often did not proceed through logical inference or reasoning from a formal perspective. Obviously, Chinese philosophy also has an analytic component, as seen in Xunzi, with the ideas of “distinguishing” and “combining” (bian he 辨合) or in Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200), with the idea of “detailed analysis” (zhufen haoxi 铢分毫析) which calls for a specific examination of the nature of the questions at hand. In this sense, it cannot be said that Chinese philosophy lacks an analytic dimension, yet, as a whole, Chinese philosophy did not place great emphasis on the precise delineation of concepts nor on the formal systematization of theories. The abovementioned characteristics of Chinese philosophy determine the way in which Chinese philosophy looks back and examines its own history. Yet what is needed right now is to learn and borrow from the methodology of analytic philosophy and use it to expand the research done in the history of Chinese philosophy. Specifically, scholars of Chinese philosophy need to delineate and vigorously clarify concepts within the history of Chinese philosophy. It is not that concepts within Chinese philosophy do not have a definite meaning, but rather that they have never been formally explained and categorized—using logical analysis to do so is essential to the point of being unavoidable. If scholars of Chinese philosophy accept the suitability of analytic philosophy, then our understanding of Chinese philosophy will undoubtedly widen. And, if logical analysis is acknowledged as an appropriate methodological tool, then our reflection within Chinese philosophy will undoubtedly deepen. Related to the delineation of concepts is the further clarification of philosophical theories. As a theoretical system mostly focused on systems of substance, Chinese philosophy has a lot of rich theories and ways of thinking. How to explain and bring forth the subtle and deep meaning of traditional Chinese concepts is a question demanding serious methodological contemplation from contemporary scholars of the history of Chinese philosophy. And on this aspect we have to pay special attention to rigorous logical analysis. In regard to the study of pre-Qin philosophy, thinkers at the time repeatedly discussed the concepts of “humaneness” and “ritual” (ren 仁 and li 礼)—concepts that can be reflected upon from different angles and perspectives. From the ethical perspective, the relationship between substance and form is very important. Humaneness mostly included a meaning substantively, its fundamental point being the acknowledgement of the inherent value of human beings and the recognition of that value qua humans. On the other hand, ritual is relatively more inclined toward the aspect of form (including the questions of how to act or how to value etc.) and embodies the requirements of rules. From the aspect of daily life and

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through the practical issues of how should one act and how can morality be put into effect, ritual compared to humaneness includes a more formalized aspect of rules. These two aspects—the value of substance and the requirements of formalized rules—endlessly interplay in Confucian thought. Even though, one rather straightforward way of unifying humaneness with ritual is to join the formal element with the substantive aspect—a connection which exists only latently in the Confucian system without having received direct and clear expression. Employing the tools of analytic philosophy in doing philosophical research on Confucianism today will help explain and clarify—among many other issues—the latent connection between humaneness and ritual. This process of formalized, logic-based explanation and clarification will, at the same time, open up the inherent universality and eternal value of Chinese philosophy. In history of philosophy, it is obvious that one cannot simply stop at the level of latent meanings like in traditional philosophy. Judging from its form, the Lunyu 论语 (“Confucian Analects” or “Analects”) appears to be a collection of unrelated dialogues, however, upon further research and contemplation it has an inherent yet hidden substantive connection requiring further elucidation. Furthermore, the connection between the core concepts of ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”), yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” “equitable”), li 礼 (“ritual” “ritual propriety”), zhi 智 (“wisdom”), 理 (“principle,” “reason,” “defining pattern,” “coherence”) needs a logic-based approach, as do the unseen connections between premises and conclusions, concepts and theories. In short, Chinese philosophy is in need of rational reconstruction—without it one is doomed to merely repeating opinions and explanations of the past or translating the ancient texts into a modern language. Conducting research in Chinese classical texts today requires the use of the methodology of analytic philosophy, and through concept clarification, theory elucidation, and rational reconstruction we can come to grasp the theoretical system and significance of Chinese philosophy. Reconstructing ideas will also endow Chinese philosophy with a modern form which will enable Chinese philosophy to enter the global philosophical discourse as a modern academic discipline whose value is not limited to one geographical location. The most significant contribution of analytic philosophy to Chinese philosophy is within history of philosophy (the generated form). As already stated, Chinese philosophy has a generative process which includes generation itself. From the point of view of generation, contemporary Chinese philosophical research can expand upon traditional Chinese philosophy without in any way being dissociated from it. The direction of contemporary Chinese philosophy is determined by the construction of modern Chinese philosophy as well

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as by the questions that such modern formulation produces. Contemporary Chinese philosophy both by expansion and construction exhibits, in essence, two aspects of the same generative process. From either the perspective of the construction of contemporary Chinese philosophy or the modern expansion of Chinese philosophy, the relationship between Chinese and analytic philosophy can progress into new dimensions. First and foremost, the interaction between the two can take shape in an exchange between logical analysis and metaphysical wisdom. In the previous section we repeatedly saw that one of the main focal points of analytic philosophy is logical analysis. At the same time, however, philosophy from its very definition cannot avoid the pursuit of wisdom. The contemplation of wisdom is philosophy’s original orientation, and contemporary Chinese philosophy cannot escape this trajectory either. How can logical analysis and metaphysical wisdom be brought together? On one hand, contemplation of wisdom has to go through the initiation of logical analysis, and on the other, logical analysis cannot merely stop at the formal level but rather needs to have the inner value of wisdom. Simply put, we need to pursue wisdom through logical analysis and partake in a logical analysis that incorporates wisdom. Logical analysis and contemplation of wisdom may seem to be mutually exclusive: analysis focuses on division, its tendency is to delineate, its focus of inquiry is the part; wisdom, on the other hand, focuses on unity, its emphasis is on the apprehension of the whole. In the construction of modern Chinese philosophy the above tension requires resolution. Contemplation of wisdom through logical analysis imbues logical analysis with the imports of wisdom thus dissolving the tension. One of the most representative expressions of modern Chinese philosophy is Fang Qi’s 冯契 (d.  1995) theory of wisdom which embodies the unity of logical analysis with the contemplation of wisdom. Fang Qi’s topic on wisdom opens up a broader epistemology which, on the one hand, includes logical analysis that provides a rigorous delineation of concepts and a logical argumentation for theoretical points. Yet, on the other hand, it does not stop at the formal level of logical differentiation, but instead uses knowledge of the world and knowledge of oneself—the leap from recognition to wisdom—as its philosophical orientation. In other words, he embodies the principle of “speaking about truth” by expanding it though logical analysis on a contemplation of wisdom. Behind the relationship between analytic and Chinese philosophy are two distinct philosophical traditions. Intimately related to the development of the Western philosophical tradition, analytic philosophy finds its roots in Ancient Greece; and, similarly, being part of long-standing philosophical tradition, the Chinese study of the issue of “nature and heavenly Dao” finds time and

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again a mature expression. Through logical analysis and other methodological tools we can bring forth the meaning of concepts within traditional Chinese philosophy that have previously been impossible to grasp. Thus, in sum, the formation of contemporary Chinese philosophy cannot be limited to only one uniform road, but must instead take full notice of several distinct traditions, use a multitude of philosophical wisdoms, have a global outlook, and use as its methodology analytic philosophy to analyze and grasp the classical texts of the Chinese tradition. Furthermore, in constructing contemporary Chinese philosophy, we have to move past the limits of language, return to existence itself, and employ the analytic method, while avoiding entering a purely experimental and ad hoc way of arguing. This process is not only related to Quine’s semantic ascent, but also entails a “semantic descent.” Semantic ascent involves shifting the conversation from objects to language, in an effort to comprehend existence itself through understanding our language concerning existence. Semantic descent, on the other hand, involves moving from a conversation about language to one about objects, a return to existence qua existence. Single-focused semantic ascent, as we have seen in the previous section, can lead to a tendency to an overdependence on a technological way of thought, whereas a return to existence itself means a return to the pursuit of wisdom. In such a way, the interplay between the content of semantic ascent and semantic descent functions as a representation of the mutual exchange between analytic and Chinese philosophy and of knowledge and wisdom. The interplay between semantic ascent and semantic descent has different meanings in different contexts. As we have seen above, meaning is expressed in two different aspects: the understanding-knowing aspect of meaning and the purpose-value aspect of meaning. Relatively speaking, analytic philosophy favors the former and Chinese philosophy the later, but the two are merely two aspects of the same idea and can be merged into one. This can be seen through the pursuit of questions such as what is, what does it mean, and what ought to be. What is pertains to the understanding-knowing aspect of meaning, what does it mean places emphasis on the latent value of meaning within existence and what ought to be takes us one step further from the reflection of how the world actually is to how the world should be. Philosophy’s task—analytic, Chinese, or otherwise—should not only be to understand how the world is, but also how the world should be—a progression from an understanding of the world towards a changing of the world. In the eyes of Chinese philosophy, the pursuit of the three questions above has been manifested in the process of chengji 成己 (“completed self,” “refined self”) and chengwu 成物 (“completion of things”). Self-realization involves

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knowledge and transformation of oneself, whereas the completion of things involves knowledge and transformation of the world—the combination of the two establishes the process of knowledge and action. In fact, as a philosophical issue, meaning itself can come into being only after it is placed into the general scope of knowledge and action, for if it is beyond the scope of knowledge and action then neither the understanding-knowing aspect of meaning nor the purpose-value aspect can exist. Meaning is derived from people and therefore always comes into being as the process of knowledge and action—the unity between self-realization and the completion of things. The creation and examination of meaning ultimately materializes in the completion of these two interrelated processes. In the context of the formation of modern Chinese philosophy the question of the interplay between realization of the self and the completion of things should continue to be one of the main focal points. The relationship between analytic and Chinese philosophy, as well as our understanding of meaning as a fundamental component in the interplay between self-realization and the completion of things, signals a return to the contemplation of existence and the pursuit of wisdom.

Chapter 22

Metaphysical Thought in a Post-Metaphysical Age: an Interview with Yang Guorong Interviewers: In April  2011, Beijing University Press published three of your books on “concrete metaphysics” ( juti de xing’ershangxue 具体的形而上 学): On Dao (Lun dao 论道), Ethics and Existence (Lunli yu cunzai 伦理与 存在), and The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things (Chengji yu chengwu 成己与成物).1,  2 Additionally, the Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought is about to devote a special issue to introducing your work on concrete metaphysics.3 To borrow an expression from Habermas, we currently find ourselves in a “post-metaphysical era.” Why do you put so much effort into investigating and pursuing metaphysics today? Yang Guorong: As I have already said many times before: from a historical perspective it appears that ever since the beginning of the modern era, especially from the twentieth century onwards, philosophy has tended to become more and more specialized and professionalized following the theoretical challenges to and rejections of metaphysics as a theory of existence. As a consequence, philosophers have increasingly become “specialists.” For philosophy itself, this has meant that the divisions between its various disciplines have also gradually grown more marked, even to the point of becoming insurmountable, and as a consequence philosophy as such has degenerated from a “way” (dao 道) into a “technique” (shu 术), from reflection on wisdom to a technical kind of knowledge. This has resulted in the intellectualization of philosophy and the forgetting of wisdom. Bringing renewed attention to metaphysics points toward a return to wisdom, and concrete metaphysics can be seen as an investigation into this return. 1  The following text is an abridged and revised version of an interview with the author conducted by Liu Liangjian 刘梁剑 and Wu Wenyi 吴闻仪, originally published in Zhexue fenxi 哲学分析 [Philosophical Analysis], 2012, 5. It was translated by Ady Van den Stock, post­ doctoral research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden. 2  Tr. note: To date, only the last work in this series is available in English translation: The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things, translated by Chad Austin Meyers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016). 3  The relevant texts of the special issue entitled “Yang Guorong’s Concrete Metaphysics” can be found in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, 2012, 43: 4.

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Interviewers: Is it true that in your opinion, metaphysics can be divided into “abstract metaphysics” and “concrete metaphysics”? Yang Guorong: That is correct in a general sense. In texts which deal with this issue, I have indicated that the abstract mode of metaphysics often tends either to stress returning to the foundation of existence by taking the conceptual as the origin of being and asserting some ultimate totality (daquan 大全), or, conversely, to construct a worldview on the level of language. The common trend toward one-dimensionality in both approaches entails an estrangement from actual existence. However, the original mission of metaphysics as a theory of being is to disclose and clarify the concreteness of existence. In this constant process of attaining and returning to the concrete, metaphysics calls upon us to get rid of the obfuscation of being by abstract thought, while at the same time dispelling the divisions within existence. In this regard, concrete metaphysics is metaphysics in the proper sense of the word. Interviewers: In your previous works, you drew a distinction between two forms of ontological inquiry. For example, in an article from 1992 entitled “Knowledge and Wisdom: Feng Qi’s Philosophical Meditations” (Zhishi yu zhihui—Feng Qi xiangsheng de zhexue chensi 知识与智慧—冯契先生的哲学沉思) published in volume  12 of Philosophy Inquiry (Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究), you made the following statement: “Roughly speaking, there are two lines of thought in ontological research. The first line of thought consists of constructing a model of the universe or a worldview without regard to the process of knowledge, an approach that often runs the risk of getting bogged down in empty speculation. The second approach to ontology investigates existence by starting out from the process of knowledge.” Feng Qi’s 冯契 (d.  1995) epistemology in a broad sense (guangyi renshilun 广义认识论) brought the unity of ontology and epistemology to the forefront. Can these two inroads into ontology be understood as a distinction you appropriated from Feng Qi’s philosophy? In 1996, you completed the manuscript for The Thought of the Learning of the Heart-Mind (Xinxue zhi si 心学之思). In the third chapter of this book, entitled “The Distinction Between the Heart-Mind and Things” (xin wu zhi bian 心物之辨), you derived a “dual path for reflecting on existence” from the divide between Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200) and Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d. 1529). In the history of Song-Ming Confucianism: “Wang Yangming restricted the investigation of existence to the world of meaning, whereas the brothers Cheng 程 and Zhu Xi clearly took a different path by construing their reflections on being

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from a cosmological angle and from the perspective of the logical relations between principle (li 理) and material reality (qi 气). This latter approach can in a certain sense be seen as a turn toward ontology.” In an interview from 1997 published in volume  4 of Trends in Philosophy (Zhexue dongtai 哲学动态), you further indicated: “Perhaps there are two possible ways into ontological research. The first approach combines ontology, epistemology, and logic, so that the meaning of existence is grasped from within the process of knowledge in a broad sense. Philosophers from Kant and Hegel to Marx embody this approach in different ways, but in each case the unity of being (or substance) on the one hand and method on the other counts as the innermost principle of their thought.” “The second approach unites ontology with ethics and theories of value. Here, it is the search for and realization of the meaning of existence by human beings themselves which constantly discloses being. This line of thought points toward the unity of being and the horizons [of human existence] (cunzai yu jingjie de tongyi 存在与境界的统一). Chinese philosophy is a fairly typical embodiment of the second path of inquiry.” Would we be correct in assuming that there is a developmental process going on in your division between these two inroads into ontological research which already implicitly contains the distinction between abstract and concrete metaphysics? Or, to put it differently, could we say that you had already started thinking about concrete metaphysics from very early on? When looking back at the genesis of your concrete metaphysics, which symbolic turning points do you identify? Yang Guorong: Broadly speaking, metaphysical issues and ontological problems were always one of my interests. An emphasis on the concreteness of being and on grasping the concrete nature of modes of existence would seem to run through the whole trajectory of my philosophical thought. As for the question as to how I eventually came to develop concrete metaphysics, there was a specific process at work here in my thinking. In 1995, I took the relation between being and the horizons [of human existence] as a field of research in a text on Feng Youlan’s 冯友兰 (d. 1990) philosophical thought. When this text was later published in Chinese Social Sciences (Zhongguo shehuikexue 中国社会科学), it bore the title “Being and Horizon” (cunzai yu jingjie 存在与 境界). As for the tentative introduction of concrete metaphysics, that probably took place around the end of the nineties. I am thinking of the last chapter of The Metaphysical Dimension of Science (Kexue de xingshang zhi wei 科学的 形上之维) published in 1999, entitled “Returning to Concrete Being” (Huigui

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juti de cunzai 回归具体的存在), as well as related texts already published in Chinese Social Sciences in the previous year, which were later collected in my book History and Thought (Shi yu si 史与思). Interviewers: Can the publication of your Ethics and Existence in 2002 be seen as the symbol of a genuine transition from research into the history of philosophy to philosophical research as such? Yang Guorong: Perhaps that is one way of looking at it. Before that, some of my theoretical reflections were mainly woven into my historical research, whereas in Ethics and Existence research into theory clearly became the central topic. By the way, that reminds me of the question you raised earlier on4 concerning how one goes about writing books, for example whether one can write a book on philosophy without using quotations. I think this problem can be approached from two sides, that is to say, either on a substantial or on a formal level. On a formal level, perhaps the use of quotations is related to the attention nowadays paid to academic standards. On a more substantial level, I have said time and again that philosophical thought can hardly be separated from the history of philosophy, and that thought and history cannot be completely detached from each other. I pay quite a lot of attention to historical evidence in discussing philosophical problems. However, in contrast to the questions of the empirical sciences, the problems of philosophy are always both ancient and new at the same time. Behind different forms of expression, one can still discern similar objects or points of attention, which is perhaps related to the conditions of human existence as such: the existential process of human beings has distinct orientations within different historical stages, but at the same time there is the universal dimension of what makes human beings human (as distinct from animals). Correspondingly, a series of fundamental questions treated by philosophy, such as “what exists”?, “how does it exist?,” “what is the meaning of the world?,” “how can we create a world?” (i.e. how can we make the world conform to the ideals and the rational requirements of humanity?), “how can human beings complete themselves?” and so on, were always a common concern for human beings throughout different historical periods. Similarly, a philosopher who consciously reflects on human existence cannot circumvent these questions, which are grounded in the conditions of human existence. Philosophical research in any age should not and cannot shy away from rethinking the different kinds of reflections formulated 4  Tr. note: This question is not included in the current text, which is an abridged version of the original interview.

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throughout history and from offering a theoretical response to them. In my writing of philosophical books, such a response has always expressed itself as a critical reflection on past thought. Interviewers: Does this mean that the unity of history and thought also counts as a fundamental methodological premise of concrete metaphysics? Yang Guorong: I probably wouldn’t speak of a “fundamental methodology,” but it did serve as an inroad into philosophical reflection for me. This method of combining historical research with theoretical exposition is something I first adopted from Feng Qi. It is characterized by looking back at the history of philosophy on the basis of fundamental theoretical meditations, while at the same time engaging in constructive philosophical work by rethinking history. Needless to say, we can trace this method back a lot earlier, since Hegel already put forward the thesis that philosophy is the consummation of the history of philosophy and the history of philosophy is the unfolding of philosophy. Even if Hegel seems to have been gradually forgotten in contemporary philosophy, I still think that his point is far from outdated. Obviously, theoretical interpretation should not content itself with simply approaching history in a historical fashion. It has to put its object of study in a rational historical perspective and, above all, bring its lasting and vital concepts as well as its universal theoretical significance to the forefront. Thereby turning it into a conceptual resource that can respond to the problems of this age and help rebuild contemporary philosophy. This is precisely one of the main things I try to achieve through my research into the history of philosophy. Research into the history of philosophy is always hard to separate from philosophical thought. From the point of view of actuality, the history of philosophy appears as the unfolding of philosophy within the process of history. There would not be such a thing as Western philosophy without the various philosophical systems that existed in the West from ancient Greece to the present day, and likewise, there would not be any Chinese philosophy without the various schools of thought and multitude of theories that arose from the pre-Qi period onward. If one bypasses the history of philosophy, one cannot hope to resolve the question as to what philosophy is ultimately all about. Regarding the problem of philosophical thought and research into philosophy, I would say that on the one hand philosophy cannot be constructed out of nothing and that every new philosophy has to depart from the problems raised and the results gained by previous philosophies. On the other hand, sorting through and interpreting the history of philosophy is always conditioned by a researcher’s philosophical “prejudices,” which permeate his philosophical opinions. In this sense, one could say that research into

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the history of philosophy is simultaneously philosophical research, and that historical clarification and theoretical elucidation are inseparable. Interviewers: The word “unity” (tongyi 统一) appears very often in your works. Would it be correct to say that unity (the dialectic of opposites) functions as one of the most fundamental philosophical and conceptual matrices of your concrete metaphysics? And doesn’t this concept have a strong overtone of the Hegelian dialectic? Yang Guorong: I have always maintained that we should not only go back to Kant, but also to Hegel. From the perspective of the distinction between the understanding (Verstand) and reason (Vernunft) in German Idealism, especially if we adopt Hegel’s view on this distinction, Kant was philosophically more inclined toward the understanding. One of the ways in which the domain of the understanding expresses itself is in its proclivity for drawing boundaries. By comparison, Hegel gave stronger expression to overcoming boundaries and rejecting oppositions and presented us with the domain of reason, which differs from that of the understanding. In its interpretation of the world and of human beings as such, the understanding favors division and differentiation, which is obviously of crucial importance, but if one stops short at this, there is always the risk of getting lost in the domain of abstraction. In this regard, we should take Hegel very seriously. An important characteristic of Hegel is his attention for concreteness and his constant emphasis on concrete concepts, which is something I can relate to. But on the other hand, from the perspective of his philosophical framework as a whole, Hegel still appears as someone who looks at things from the standpoint of the mind (yi xin guan zhi 以心观之) and understands this world of ours on a spiritual level: his whole system ends with spirit, departs from spirit, and finally returns to spirit after having passed through nature. In this sense, his system is characterized by a certain closure, and even though he does have an awareness of concreteness and the notion of reason, all in all this is still more of an isolated concept than a process. In this respect, I find it very difficult to accept or agree with Hegel’s ideas. As for the “concrete metaphysics,” which I myself have put forward, it expresses itself as an open system which does not contain what you called a “most fundamental philosophical and conceptual matrix.” Interviewers: We are bit puzzled about the following issue: doesn’t the mode of exposition along the lines of a dialectical synthesis have significant merits as well as certain limitations? More specifically, this mode of exposition has the merit of avoiding becoming attached to X after having gained an insight

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into X and disregarding any other spontaneous tendencies in thought, without losing X and other conceptual dimensions different from X out of sight (or maybe because of the principle of parsimony, we are generally not capable of considering more than two possible dimensions at the same time). That being said, the mode of exposition along the lines of a dialectical synthesis also seems to have certain limitations: one fails to consider conflicts between the relata of the synthesis, and the insight into “unity” one has already arrived at actually impedes us from delving into the matter any deeper and probing the profoundly complex relations between the affairs in question. In any relation, there are both positive connections and restrictive ties; these two aspects coexist simultaneously. However, according to its fundamental orientation, a mode of exposition along the lines of the dialectical synthesis always jumps from the part to the totality in one stretch. So in a nutshell, we could say that it has insight into connections while remaining blind to restrictions. This mode of exposition approaches the “synthesis” (he 和) of both aspects in a relation with an optimistic idealism, but it more or less ignores the dimension of conflict between the relata. Because it sees identity while ignoring difference, it lacks a necessary sense of tension. What are your views on this matter? Yang Guorong: There are two aspects involved in this issue: the first is the mode of existence of the world as such, the second is the method and the path human beings have at their disposal for grasping existence. As for the first aspect, the actual world itself does not exist in a state of contradiction and diremption at all. Of course there are different determinations, aspects, and processes in this world, but in reality all of these things are mutually related. Accordingly, it is impossible to disregard these relations if one wants to grasp the authentic mode of existence of the word. As for the second aspect (the method and the path human beings have for grasping existence), it is true that we should pay attention to the differences and tensions within the world itself and thereby come to grasp the richness and plurality of the world. However, at the same time, we should not merely remain at the level of differences and tensions, but rather try to grasp the actual relations involved. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the process of interpreting the world, it is clear that rational insights, the development of concepts, and the formation of new perspectives always come about by revealing and expanding intrinsic connections within existence: the development of science is often predicated on discovering previously undiscovered connections between different laws, and philosophy is certainly no exception in this regard. By extension, confirming the relationality of different aspects does not mean overlooking differences or conflicts. Logically speaking, “unity” (tongyi

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统一) is not the same as “identity” (tongyi 同一), and confirming relations and unity is predicated on recognizing difference, or “differences in nature” (yizhi 异质) and “differences in orientation” (yixiang 异向): only when we recognize the existence of such differences do we become able to better observe interconnections. The more pressing issue here is not to remain at the level of difference after having noticed differences in nature or orientation, but to go on to grasp actual connections: such different determinations or dimensions are not separated from each other in the real world of actuality. What we have to point out is that a confirmation of the concreteness and the unity of the world itself and the relation between human beings and the world are not marked by closure. Quite the opposite, it is more likely to manifest itself as a process that is open toward the future: the so-called rejection of separation and the move toward a concrete form of unity are themselves realized within a specific historical process and are dynamic in nature. Needless to say, from a processual perspective, the unity arrived at during a certain stage can serve as the starting point for another division, and the latter can in turn provide the preconditions for arriving at a more profound form of unity. However, existence as such is a form of unity shaped by different determinations, and this ontological fact is the reason why it will prove difficult to arrive at authentic existence by simply sticking to a certain aspect or by moving in only one direction. Constantly paying heed to the unitary forms of existence within a process is the precondition for grasping authentic existence. Departing from this outlook, I always emphasize the idea of “being finished but not yet completed” ( ji ji er wei ji 既济而未济) from the Book of Changes (Yijing 易经) and give a prominent place to temporality and historicity in affirming unity.

Interviewers: A mode of exposition along the lines of the dialectical synthesis also often makes a critical synopsis of different viewpoints throughout the history of philosophy. Here it seems to suffer from a certain limitation as well: the critique of these viewpoints is mainly conducted on a logical level, but doesn’t seem to pay any attention to their concrete and historical orientation (including their specific implicit ontological presuppositions, conceptual frame of reference, forms of thought, and so on). Such a mode of exposition has insight into the logical continuity between different philosophical standpoints and their synthetic potential, but tends to neglect the cultural differences and historical discontinuities between different forms of thought, as well as the concomitant differences in arriving at a synthesis. In other words, the “dialectical synthesis” may be capable of synthesizing different viewpoints on a logical level, but cannot synthesize different levels of logic. Do you think this is a problem?

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Yang Guorong: Maybe it is. What we have to consider first of all here is the problem of the relation between logic and history. In discussing my method of doing research into the history of philosophy, I once referred to the distinction between proving and interpreting. In providing proof, one lays particular emphasis on the logical dimension, and it is possible to leave out a lot of details, whereas in interpreting, we have to pay more attention to the plurality of facts. If we focus on historical details, we discover that the historical background, relations between teachers and students, and existential encounters can all influence the work of philosophers. For historical research, such details are of major importance. But from a different perspective, philosophy has its own characteristics, and we have to get a hold of some of its basic and central points. Maybe at this instance, we cannot but abstract from certain historical details. In a sense, that means sacrificing historical richness and variety. But as far as the gradual process of coming to an understanding of thought on a philosophical level is concerned, it is a price we have to be willing to pay. From the perspective of my own path to philosophy, the mutual interaction between history and thought and the simultaneous concern for historical research and theoretical reflection has been consistent throughout. As far as research into the history of philosophy is concerned, what I focus on is how to bring implicit philosophical problems to light, while attempting to grasp the historical characteristics of a certain object of inquiry. In other words, one should not be satisfied with providing a rendition of ancient thought in modern Chinese, but rather go on to inquire into the underlying universal theoretical meaning of the object in question. When it comes to reflecting on theoretical problems in philosophy, I personally believe that it is necessary to pay attention to the cognitive results already available in the history of philosophy. As I have always stressed: thought cannot start out from nothing, real philosophical work cannot leave the history of philosophy behind. On a fundamental level, even a highly innovative philosopher like Wittgenstein did not depart from the history of philosophy. In the very least, the work of Wittgenstein was developed against the general background of the rise of analytical philosophy, and I’m pretty certain that without this background, Wittgenstein’s philosophy wouldn’t have existed either. Interviewers: Regarding the distinction between “concrete metaphysics” and “abstract metaphysics,” we already learned something about the process by which you came to work out this conception in your philosophy as well as the methods you elaborated in relation to this distinction. But how is concrete metaphysics able to attain the “concrete”?

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Yang Guorong: There are many different avenues to the concrete in the discourse of concrete metaphysics: it concerns the interconnection between the metaphysical and the physical, but also affirms the relations between the “being there” (zai 在) of the world and the process of human existence itself. Concrete metaphysics does away with abstract identity by means of a form of integration marked by plurality, while at the same time striving to interpret the totality of existence as a fusion of fact (shi 事) and principle (li 理), root (ben 本) and offshoot (mo 末), and essential constitution (ti 体) and practical function (yong 用). It pays attention to the unity of this world, but also recognizes the temporality and processual character of existence. In comparison to the speculative construction or transcendental positing of existence, concrete metaphysics is geared more toward the world of meaning. In this respect, a theory of existence concerning how to attain different modalities of the concrete and the return to concrete forms of existence are intrinsically related. Interviewers: In terms of its object of inquiry, concrete metaphysics focuses on “concrete existence,” or in other words, “the concreteness of existence.” So, in the end, what should we understand by “the concreteness of existence”? Yang Guorong: Unlike the idea that it is possible to work out a speculative worldview divorced from human existence, I believe that existence cannot be grasped outside of the “being there” (zai) of human beings. The “being there” of human beings can be understood as a process of knowledge and action in a broad sense, expressing itself both in the “being there” of the individual as well as in “communal existence” (gongzai 共在) within the field social history. The latter has nothing to do with what Heidegger understands by “fallenness,” but rather constitutes the real and authentic form of existence. In this respect, I can relate more to Marx. Marx investigates human beings on the level of social history and requires us to come to an understanding of the world within the revolutionary process of changing the world. Such a manner of understanding is different from speculative insight and poetic imagination; it more deeply and directly penetrates the dimension of real existence. In contemporary philosophy, it was Feng Qi who concretely developed this Marxist line of thought. On the basis of his epistemology in a broad sense, Feng Qi established a connection between ontology and epistemology and between knowing the world and knowing the self, and consequently rejected a model of the universe or worldview that transcends experience. Moreover, he emphasized the importance of disclosing the way of heaven (tiandao 天道) within the historical process of knowing the world and creating values. This vision differs from

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speculative ontology and constituted an important intellectual background for my own thinking. Interviewers: Did Heidegger have a major impact on your philosophical reflections? In 1987, the year in which you finished your Ph.D. dissertation entitled A Comprehensive Study of Wang Learning (Wangxue tonglun 王学 通论), a Chinese translation of Being and Time was published, which was a major event in the academic world of the eighties. In 1990, you wrote the following in a text called “Human Existence and Existential Philosophy” (Ren de cunzai yu cunzai zhexue 人的存在与存在哲学) published in volume 1 of the journal Shulin 书林: “In comparison to a speculative form of metaphysics focused on providing a worldview or a model of the universe, existentialism pays more attention to human existence as such. What it has developed from this outlook is an existential philosophy centered around the “being there” of human beings.” In The Process of Goodness (Shan de licheng 善的 历程) completed in 1992, there is a clear increase in the occurrence of the word “existence,” and “human existence” becomes a relatively important and primary philosophical term. In 2005, you went on to publish a crucial theoretical work called The Dimension of Existence (Cunzai zhi wei 存在之维). Are these instances evidence of Heidegger’s influence on you? Yang Guorong: Heidegger’s thought is very important to me. Maybe some of my expressions are occasionally reminiscent of Heidegger. From the perspective of metaphysics, Heidegger’s thought merits our attention, both in terms of his insights as well in terms of the things he remained blind to. In my opinion, Heidegger’s contributions as a major philosopher are primarily related to Being and Time. In his later thought, he drew human beings into the labyrinth of language, so that it often comes across as mere wordplay. Heidegger did not talk about the world outside of human knowledge and action, or the process of human existence as such. In this respect, there are points of agreement between him and Marx. Of course, Heidegger mostly focused on individual existence, whereas Marx displayed a more concrete understanding of human beings and the world by paying attention to the level of social and historical practice. I find it hard to agree with some interpreters who turn Marx into a Heideggerian of sorts. Actually, trying to endow Marx’s concepts with contemporary relevance by bringing the notion of existence into the Marxist system could obscure the basic characteristics which make Marx what he is: the point at which Marx exceeds Heidegger is precisely in the transcendence of individual existence and the inclusion of human historical practice.

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By the way, when East China Normal University reissued some of my books (including The Dimension of Existence: Metaphysics in a Post-Metaphysical Age) in a collection entitled Collected Works of Yang Guorong, I made use of this occasion to change the title of the new edition from The Dimension of Existence to On Dao. I also added some related appendices without changing much about the content of the book as a whole. My intention in changing the name of this work to On Dao was to give expression to the Chinese philosophical background of my research into the problems in question: in Chinese philosophy, discussions of metaphysical problems were mainly arrived at through reflecting on and inquiring into the way of dao 道. The title On Dao serves to convey this perspective. Interviewers: You draw a distinction between the existence of the world and the existence of human beings themselves. Moreover, you stress that it is impossible to grasp the existence of the world outside of human existence as such. You have indicated time and again that we should not leave the “being there” of human beings out of sight. Is this of crucial importance for guaranteeing the “concreteness” of concrete metaphysics? Yang Guorong: These two things are undoubtedly related. In a broad sense, existence does not only include “being” (you 有) in an ontological sense, but also involves human “existence” (zai) itself. Theoretically speaking, the search for existence is always related to the existence of human beings. In comparison to “being” in an ontological sense, the “being there” of human beings themselves is more clearly unfolded within the human process of knowledge and action; it essentially manifests itself as a form of existence within historical practice. In isolation from human existence as such, being (cunzai 存在) is merely elementary (benran 本然) and self-enclosed (zizai 自在) in character; it is precisely human existence itself which ensures that being is disclosed to human beings. Therefore, one cannot engage in empty speculation concerning being outside of the “being there” of human beings. Metaphysics essentially constitutes a human perspective, but abstract metaphysics always tries to determine being outside of the existential process of human beings. Needless to say, the “being there” of human beings itself is not external to being; it is always at the same time endowed with a certain ontological significance. Human beings penetrate being within their own existence, while at the same time further comprehending their own “being there” on an ontological level within the process of gaining an understanding of being. On the other hand, from the perspective of the existence of the world, concrete metaphysics takes the fact that “this world exists” as a point of departure.

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It does not inquire into the reason as to why this world exists, nor does it concern itself with what existed before this world or what will come after. The expression “this world” refers precisely to a form of existence in which human beings live and which is positively attested to by the “being there” of human beings (by the process of knowledge and action in a broad sense). On a commonsensical level, the fact that “this world exists” is constantly corroborated by our practice in life. From a philosophical perspective, the analysis of questions concerning what the world is or how the world exists and so on always remains grounded in the existence of the world as such. Another basic fact related to the existence of the world is this: there is only this world. In an ultimate sense, the unity of existence is derived from the fact that there is only this world. “There is only this world” means that there is not some other kind of existence transcending or running parallel to the world we know. This also implies that the mode of existence of this world is not one of duality or separation. The metaphysical way (xing’ershang zhi dao 形而上之道) and physical embodiments (xing’erxia zhi qi 形而下之器) are not two different kinds of existence, but rather constitute two different modes of appearance of the same world. Interviewers: “This world exists” already seems to qualify as a specific metaphysical presupposition in its own right, that is to say, as a presupposition grounded in a specific metaphysical stance which at the same time embodies the particular traits of this metaphysics. Wouldn’t it be possible to imagine a different sort of metaphysics, one which departs from ideas such as “this world does not exist,” “this world is an illusion,” or “maybe this world exists,” such as the metaphysics of co-dependent origination and the emptiness of nature (yuanqi xingkong 缘起性空) that we find in Buddhism? Yang Guorong: I think there at least two different aspects to approaching the fact that “this world exists.” First, on a logical level, we could employ Descartes’s method of proof: the moment we start doubting that this world exists or posit the “non-being” (wu 无) of this world, such doubting and positing logically confirm the existence of the one who is doing the doubting or positing. Furthermore, the form of existence that we are dealing with here is embedded in existence in a broader sense: on the level of actuality, it is impossible for the one doing the doubting or the positing to exist within real emptiness or absolute nothingness. At the very least, his existence is predicated on the presence of the basic conditions which make life possible. At the same time, whenever we posit “non-being,” such a form of “non-being” counts as a specific hypothesis, and is not itself identical to absolute nothingness, but constitutes a kind

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of “being” in a broad sense. In the history of philosophy, Laozi 老子 took “nonbeing” to be the origin of the world, but such “non-being” is not absolutely non-existent, but rather indicates the absence of any specific determinations, as Hegel already saw. Second, in a more substantial sense, “this world” points toward the real world, which cannot be severed from the human process of knowledge and action: the world itself comes into being within the process of knowledge and action in a broad sense. Similarly, it is difficult to separate the human inquiry into the world from the existence of this world (the fact that this world exists): that this world “is” constitutes the precondition for any human inquiry into the real world as well as for doubting the real world. Interviewers: So, does “there is only this world” mean that “this is the only real world there is”? If so, a person could easily go on to draw the following conclusion: this world exists, and what exists is rational, which would result in the lack of a critical attitude toward “this world.” What do you make of this problem? Yang Guorong: The idea that “there is only this world” is mainly concerned with countering the introduction of duality into the world and opposing the illusory construction of another world beyond this one. In its own right, the world itself is also still in the process of becoming. At the same time, as an actual form of existence which differs from things as they are in themselves (自在之物) or an elementary form of being (本然之在), the world is always tied up with the process in which human beings “assist in the transformation and creation of heaven and earth” (赞天地之化育), permeated by human participation, and thus encompasses different future-oriented possibilities. In this sense, I’m not at all denying that this world is capable of changing and has the possibility of perfecting itself. This possibility constitutes the precondition for further investigation of the world in a critical manner: critique is essentially grounded in various values and ideals, and in turn such ideals are predicated on the different future-oriented possibilities that are contained within the world itself. The world is both finished and not yet completed. “Finished” refers to its actuality, “not yet completed” encompasses its various future-oriented possibilities. Interviewers: In order to counter the deficiencies of abstract metaphysics, concrete metaphysics has accentuated the idea that the existence of the world cannot be separated from human existence. However, there is also the ontological fact that human existence cannot be separated from the existence of the world. In stressing human existence, isn’t there a clear risk of overlooking

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the self-sufficiency (zizaixing 自在性) of the world and losing our sense of reverence for the world? Doesn’t this lead to anthropocentrism? Yang Guorong: I usually talk about the world on the level of actuality. Unlike things as they are in themselves, the real world enters into relations with human beings in all sorts of ways. On the one hand, the world encompasses the dimension of human existence, but on the other hand, this does not lead to the world losing its self-sufficiency. As for the question of reverence, this always points toward a transcendent entity on a substantial level. Such an entity is sometimes expressed in the language of metaphysics as the noumenon (wu ziti 物自体), or as a sovereign deity in the language of religion. It is hard to get beyond speculation in debates on transcendent existence. If reverence refers to venerating a transcendent entity, it remains debatable whether it is meaningful. We should recognize the finitude of human beings, which serves as the necessary precondition for maintaining our rational vigilance. However, recognizing the finitude of human beings does not amount to positing a transcendent sovereign deity. In a non-transcendent sense, showing reverence for the world means respecting the laws of existence, recognizing the finitude of human beings, and earnestly and cautiously unfolding the interaction between human beings and the world and between human beings themselves (in Chinese philosophy, “reverence” ( jing 敬) itself means doing something earnestly and cautiously, not being careless and wanton). As for the problem of anthropocentrism, I think we have to distinguish between anthropomorphism in both a narrow and a broad sense. In a narrow sense, anthropomorphism reflects on problems from the perspective of the interests of human beings in a certain time and place and looks upon human beings as the transcendent sovereign ruler of everything that exists. This outlook should be rejected. On the other hand, anthropocentrism in a broad sense cannot be overcome, regardless of whether we are dealing with the idea that “human beings are ends in themselves” in an axiological sense or with the epistemological directive of “looking at things from a human perspective.” Axiologically, endeavors such as reestablishing a unity between heaven and human beings and restoring the natural environment by overcoming narrow anthropocentrism are essentially devoted to allowing human beings themselves to attain a more perfect horizon. Nowadays, some opponents of anthropocentrism seem to speak in the name of nature, but it is essentially humanity which speaks on behalf of nature: just as the problem of meaning does not present itself on the level of elementary (self-enclosed) existence, nature as such has no awareness of value and cannot become a subject of value. Similarly, the perspective in which “things are observed from the standpoint of the way” (yi dao guan zhi 以道观之)

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is actually still a human mode of observation, and not one belonging to a transcendent entity. Interviewers: We also noticed that you constantly stress “looking for points of connection” (qiu qi tong 求其通). How should we understand such connections? What is the intrinsic relation between concrete metaphysics and this search for connections? Yang Guorong: On a fundamental level, metaphysics is guided by a search for meaning. In the dimension of meaning, looking for connections counts as the basic requirement of concrete metaphysics. “Looking for connections” indicates transcending the distance and separation between knowledge and existence, reactualizing the unity, totality, and concreteness of existence, and also points toward the unity of the perspectives and methods we have at our disposal for grasping existence. Concrete metaphysics strives to arrive at the unity of existence, while also bringing together different orientations in the reflection on wisdom. As such, it embodies the transformation of the search for connections into an intrinsic directive in two levels. On a metaphysical level, “connections” do not simply refer to logical connectedness or to the absence of contradictions within philosophical systems or theories themselves. On a more profound level, “connections” manifest themselves in disclosing and clarifying the unity and concreteness of existence. In other words, they always transcend the level of logic; they involve existence as well as the relations between the different perspectives on and paths toward grasping existence, which gives them a more substantial sense. Whereas Kant applied himself to drawing boundaries, I myself am more interested in reactualizing the unity of existence itself and bridging the different fields and subdivisions in philosophy. What I emphasize is this: in accordance with the endeavor of looking for connections, the developmental process of metaphysics essentially expresses itself in bridging different philosophical perspectives by means of a clarification of the fundamental nature of existence. The profoundest sense of establishing connections within the field of philosophy consists of revealing the authentic form of existence: the interconnections between different perspectives reflect the unity and the concreteness of existence. Interviewers: How is this train of thought further developed in your concrete metaphysics?

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Yang Guorong: By clarifying the fundamental nature of the dimension of existence and by giving expression to the diversity of philosophical questions concerning truth, goodness, and beauty or knowledge and value, concrete metaphysics manages to fuse different philosophical perspectives, while also constituting a search for wisdom, which points toward an authentic form of existence. On the level of existence and value, concrete metaphysics poses the question “what is the human being?” It enters into the “world of meaning” by coming to an understanding of human beings and the ways in which human beings interpret existence. On an epistemological level, which belongs to the dimension of the humanization of existence, object and subject and intrinsic and external features form a single unity. On a methodological level, the different methodologies ranging from logical laws, imagination, and intuition to normative concepts, as well as theories as systems of concepts all have an intrinsic ontological basis, namely “the way of reality” (xianshi zhi dao 现实之道). At the same time, practice or action has an impact on its object, and counts as a mode of human existence in its own right, so that modes of thought and action become fused with modes of existence. On the level of language, concrete metaphysics approaches language both as a modality of existence in a broad sense as well as a form of grasping existence. On an aesthetic level, the aesthetic process embodies the power of the subject and simultaneously reveals a certain view on existence. The latter could also be seen as an existential or aesthetic order within the field of aesthetics. In the domain of morality (“goodness”), ideals of the good and the realization of goodness, which form the concrete content of morality, always point toward human existence itself. Moreover, by regulating the human personality along with its modes of conduct, moral order, and so on, these ideals and their realizations concretely participate in the construction of an authentic world in the social sphere: morality is based on the existence of the social sphere, while also providing certain guarantees for this kind of existence (the existence of human beings as such). In sum, on the one hand, in accordance with the disclosure of the ontological dimension of knowledge, aesthetics, and morality, the unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful acquires a metaphysical basis. In turn, the concreteness and authenticity of existence is constantly corroborated through this very process. On the other hand, in being guided by authentic existence, the various fields of philosophy will no longer be categorically separated: as specific ways for grasping the world, ontology, axiology, epistemology, ethics, methodology and other fields will become more integrated and interconnected.

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Interviewers: You mentioned “the world of meaning” in the above. Actually, the subtitle of the third book in your series of works on concrete metaphysics, The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things, reads: “genesis of the world of meaning” (yiyi shijie de shengcheng 意义世界的生成). How should we understand this genesis? Yang Guorong: From a global perspective, the problem of meaning became an important philosophical topic starting from the beginning of the twentieth century. In the end, what analytical philosophy discusses is precisely the problem of analyzing meaning, and although the approach of phenomenology differs from that of analytical philosophy, it actually focuses on the problem of meaning from another angle. If analytical philosophy could be said to approach meaning on the level of logic and language, then in phenomenology— including the later currents of existentialism and hermeneutics—the inquiry into meaning is related to human existence: existentialism pursues the meaning of human existence. The “hermeneutic object” in hermeneutics is not merely restricted to texts, but also includes the subject (the writer and the reader). The ontological dimension is a crucial characteristic of the hermeneutics that was developed from phenomenology. My own investigations are somewhat different from these two approaches. In my understanding, meaning is not limited to the levels of logic and language, nor should writers and readers imprison it within individual existence or the creation and interpretation of texts. Rather, I point toward the world of meaning by investigating it on a historical level. From an encompassing perspective, the occurrence of meaning is grounded in the process of the mutual cultivation of self and things. The mutual cultivation of self and things was originally a concept within Chinese philosophy, but I gave it a new meaning. The differentiation of elementary objects (benran duixiang 本然对象) from humanized forms of existence is the historical precondition for the fact that meaning does not only appear in a conceptual form, but also manifests itself as a humanized reality. The former (meaning in a conceptual form) expresses itself as a kind of existence that is known or interpreted, denotes a certain content to which value has been accorded through a process of evaluation, and also discloses different kinds of spiritual horizons. The latter denotes transforming “heaven as it is for heaven” (tian zhi tian 天之天) into “heaven as it is for human beings” (ren zhi tian 人之天) through practical activity, going on to endow elementary objects with the imprint of humanity, and transforming them into things which embody human values and ideals. There is a mutual relation between the different modalities of meaning and the interaction between human beings and the world, a relation that concretely manifests itself in a manifold world of meaning. As a historical

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product of the process of the mutual cultivation of self and things, the world of meaning is guided by the human understanding, determination, and practical use of existence (the existence of the world and the existence of human beings as such). In an encompassing sense, it can be seen as a form of existence that has entered into the domain of human knowledge and action, has been endowed with the imprints of humanity, and embodies human values and ideals. As such, the world of meaning expresses itself as a unity of meaning in its conceptual and its real form. Through the creative activity of bringing the world and the self to completion, the human search for meaning at the same time constantly produces a world of meaning with a variety of modalities. This interpretation of the world of meaning implies a rejection of the narrow determination of the world of meaning in the traditional Song-Ming Confucianism, modern existentialism, analytical philosophy, and scientism. The process of the mutual cultivation of self and things intrinsically touches upon the problem of how the world of meaning can come into being. Asking how a world of meaning is possible involves offering an analysis of the grounds and conditions for this process and of how these grounds and conditions are related to the intrinsic capacities of human beings as well as to externally imposed universal norms. At the same time, the analysis of this question is enmeshed with the endeavor of providing a theoretical response to the philosophy of Kant, modern analytical philosophy and phenomenology, and traditional Song-Ming Confucianism and contemporary New Confucianism. Interviewers: Does concrete metaphysics necessarily point toward the world of meaning? Yang Guorong: As I mentioned in the above, in a concrete form of metaphysics, it is always difficult to separate grasping the world from human existence in itself. As a theory of existence, the true objective of metaphysics is not to provide an ontological picture of the world in its elementary state or of things as they exist in themselves, but rather to clarify the meaning of existence within the process of human knowledge and action as such. It is only when existence enters into the process of human knowledge and practice that it is disclosed to human beings. Looking for something such as existence outside of the process of human knowledge and action tends to lead to empty speculation. In terms of the unitary form of existence, we can say that the elementary unity contained in the natural world does not constitute an object of inquiry for metaphysics at all. What metaphysics focuses on is the meaning realized by an object when it is brought into the process of human knowledge and action. Such a form of meaning is grounded in what is in the case (shiran 实然), but

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also involves what ought to be the case (dangran 当然). Regardless of whether we are dealing with the level of actuality or that of value, the modes of existence that are disclosed to us in this way differ from any picture of the cosmos in its elementary form and actually present us with a world of meaning. Interviewers: Concrete metaphysics is devoted to connecting human existence and the existence of the world. The related ideas of cultivating things and the self, as well as the notion of the world of meaning, seem to point toward this goal. In a certain sense, do such reflections amount to a meditation on and a critique of scientism? Yang Guorong: Since the modern age, the problem of assigning a place to the world of science and the world of the humanities would seem to have become a point of interest for intellectuals time and again. The essence of science is manifested in the process of human activity in the world, so that it is precisely within the process through which things as they are in themselves are transformed into things as they are for us that science reveals itself as a mode of human existence. However, there is more to human existence than just this dimension. The process through which human beings disclose and transform the world does not merely denote scientific knowledge. Scientism takes the scientific worldview as the only true form of existence, which is obviously one-sided. The humanized world as a world of meaning can expresses itself in the scientific worldview, but can also appear in a humanistic form. From an encompassing point of view, a humanized world always indicates a form of existence that has entered into the domain of human knowledge and activity. The human understanding of the world is not all limited to scientific knowledge, and the search for an inquiry into meaning always has many different dimensions. Humanistic research and inquiry, which appear in the form of interpretation, evaluation, determination and so on, have an equally important function in the construction of a humanized world: just as science is immersed in the process of turning things as they are in themselves into things as they are for us by methods such as factual knowledge, humanistic inquiry also participates in the process of transforming the world in its elementary state into a humanized world through methods such as interpreting meaning. Interviewers: You see science as one of the many possible forms of human existence. But to a large extent, this “one of many” form of existence seems to have become the only possible one. The existence of the world and human existence face a common problem in this respect. Couldn’t we say that the divide

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between science and the humanities is one of the most obvious expressions of this problem? Yang Guorong: As different forms of human existence, the fields of science and the humanities undoubtedly have their own legitimacy. In my research into scientism at the end of the nineties, I already pointed out the following: the separation of science and the humanities since the modern age has led to a distance and an opposition between two different kinds of knowledge, culture, and fields of inquiry. This distance and opposition has not only resulted in cultural conflicts, but has also introduced divisions into existence itself. After such a prolonged period of separation and tension, we cannot avoid addressing the timely question of how to restore unity. The process through which science and the humanities move toward unification from separation denotes a cultural form of integration in a general sense, while also pointing toward a rejection of divisions within existence and a restoration of the many related orientations of existence. In one word: it comes down to returning to concrete existence. On the other hand, the disciplinary division between science and the humanities intrinsically entails a difference in the meaning of rational inquiry. These different meanings of rational inquiry, first of all, express themselves in the division between instrumental reason and axiological reason. Scientism mainly emphasizes rationalization in an instrumental sense, which lets itself be guided by efficiency and usually allows knowledge to trump over wisdom, thus resulting in a forgetfulness of wisdom and the impoverishment of human beings. The actual path toward transcending the abovementioned divisions and oppositions consists of returning to “this world.” As I already said, “this world” can be understood as referring to a concrete form of existence in which human practice and knowledge are revealed. Interviewers: Your concrete metaphysics draws widely on the work of Chinese and Western philosophers. As we understand it, the most important among these thinkers, apart from Hegel, Heidegger, and Feng Qi, who were already mentioned in the above, include Marx, Habermas, Wang Yangming, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) and so on. How do you approach the relation between Chinese and Western philosophy? Yang Guorong: From a broad perspective, both Chinese and Western learning originally appeared as a search for wisdom (for a way or dao 道). However, historically speaking, both traditions still developed into different systems. Since the beginning of the modern age, the existence of Western philosophy already

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counted as an ontological fact as far as Chinese philosophy was concerned. Neither the reinterpretation of ancient philosophy nor reconstructions of philosophy could disregard this fact. Historically, corresponding to its lack of interest in formal logic, Chinese philosophy mainly presented itself as a system in a substantial sense, but remained relatively deficient when it came to developing formal systems of philosophy. Any interpretation of traditional philosophy to some extent constitutes a process of logical reconstruction. Such reconstructions involve formal systematization, and there is no doubt that Western philosophy can provide us with some models in this respect. Of course, failing to properly deal with the Western philosophical background as well as methods of comparative investigation might give rise to certain problems. These problems are, for example, when comparisons lead to forced analogies or when ancient thought is straightforwardly modernized without further ado, and we certainly have to be wary of such tendencies. However, while it is true that human thought displayed different characteristics due to differences in the historical backgrounds of the East and the West, there are always points of similarity between the problems these different traditions were dealing with. In other words, there may have been differences in terms of the way in which problems were posed and resolved, but the content of the problems in question always displayed a certain similarity, and it is this similarity which made a more profound comparison and dialog between Chinese and Western philosophy possible. It is precisely in this sense that I completely support the idea that “there is no difference between China and the West in terms of learning” (xue wu zhong xi 学无中西), which is emphasized by Wang Guowei 王国维 (d. 1927) at the beginning of the previous century. Interviewers: If there is no difference between China and the West in terms of learning, doesn’t this mean that we are moving toward a cosmopolitan philosophy? Throughout the elaboration of your concrete metaphysics, you frequently mention the idea of a “cosmopolitan philosophy” (shijie zhexue 世界哲学). In your view, why is such a form of philosophy necessary, and where should we look for the possibilities of bringing it about? Yang Guorong: Following the spread of Western philosophy to China and the encounter between Chinese and Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy already acquired a cosmopolitan dimension. Historically speaking, Chinese and Western philosophy each had a relatively independent course of development. That being said, against the background of the fact that history has already transcended local boundaries and is moving toward a unified world, it has already become impossible for philosophy to restrict itself to a local

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perspective. We need a concept of cosmopolitan philosophy that matches the formation of world history. From the perspective of cosmopolitan philosophy, there is no doubt that both Chinese and Western philosophy count as a shared treasure for the field of philosophy and that both of them should be understood as a universal resource for the continuation and further development of a cosmopolitan philosophy. As a matter of fact, within the process of moving toward a cosmopolitan form of philosophy, philosophy already has become able to transcend a homogeneous approach to theoretical resources and traditions and to advance our understanding of the world by truly taking advantage of the diversity of human wisdom. The perspective of a cosmopolitan philosophy is something intrinsically required by the return of philosophy to its authentic form, and concrete metaphysics embodies an approach that is consistent with this requirement.

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Index A priori 72, 87, 92, 102 Action 32–33, 47–8, 55–57, 65, 70–73, 83 Actuality 35, 72, 83–84, 249, 317, 322 Aesthetic(s) 26–27, 36–38, 68–69, 319 consciousness 190, 215 Analytic philosophy 3, 5, 7–8, 11, 14–17, 22, 104, 117, 126, 127, 288–98 Aristotle 10, 17, 33, 47, 132, 217–8, 288 Autonomy 78, 81, 218 Body 28, 42, 133, 213, 294 Buddhism 108, 118, 119, 132, 158–59, 275–76 Cause and principle 10 and effect 92 Chan Buddhism 132, 158, 159 Common sense 50, 58, 74, 91–94, 190, 215–16, 290–1 Communication 88, 144, 186–88, 190, 236 Community 45, 88, 141, 212, 215, 218–19 Compassion 62, 85, 170–71, 175, 227, 234, 236, 237, 260 Confucianism 43, 61, 78, 80, 112–13, 114, 116, 120–23, 131, 133, 149, 151, 154, 157–59, 174, 188, 198, 203–04, 220, 233, 234, 236, 243 n11, 255–59, 265, 268, 299 Confucius, see Kongzi Consciousness 14, 50, 55, 56, 60, 78, 87, 100, 103, 111, 113, 160, 168, 173, 187, 190–91, 215, 227–28, 230, 232, 237, 295 historical 17, 18 individual 20, 49, 50, 56, 78 inner 41–42 local 142–43 moral 56, 57, 260 Continuity 17, 37, 82, 121, 197–98, 199, 201, 203–06 Contradiction 74, 87, 94, 309 Correct 213, 217 measure 161–62 names 211 Dao 道 (the way) 1–4, 10, 16, 40, 46, 47, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71–74, 90–91, 101, 109–13, 114, 115, 118, 120, 122–26, 129, 131, 132,

135, 137–38, 142, 146–61, 163, 179, 180, 183, 189, 190, 191, 198, 199, 204, 212–13, 238–41, 242–45, 257, 272, 281–82, 303, 314 Daodejing 道德经 (The Classic of the Wayand Virtue) 116, 117, 118, 132, 153, 156 Daoism or Daoist 32, 36, 37, 46, 65, 66, 69, 113, 114, 122, 123, 129, 132, 174, 198, 199, 203, 217, 251, 255 Daxue 大学 (Great Learning) 79, 213 Desire 41–42, 44–45, 49, 57–58, 172–73, 193, 200, 240 n9, 252–55 Diversity 20, 31, 71, 124, 155, 163–64, 319, 325 Du 度 (“degree,” “proper measure”) 82, 222, 254 Emotion 41–42, 49–49, 57–58, 132–33, 134, 161, 167, 178 n2, 185, 185 n18, 186–91, 192, 193, 221–26, 226–30, 231–37 Emotionalism 132, 134 Environment 66, 176, 235, 317 social 175 Essence 7–9, 62, 100, 113, 144, 166–69, 179, 219, 273, 279, 291 Existential 95, 167, 232, 250, 258, 259, 306, 313–14, 319, 320–21 Experience 1, 4, 6, 15, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 48, 48 n4, 49–51, 58, 75–76, 87–88, 89, 91, 94–95, 112, 130, 132, 142, 146, 147, 152–53, 187, 226, 227–28, 241 n9 External 34, 46, 50, 51, 56, 77–80, 88, 134, 176–77, 213–14, 242, 273, 289, 314, 321 forms 26, 50, 51, 56 laws 57, 213 Externalization 41 reason, reasons 15, 26–27, 32–34, 42, 44–45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 57, 61, 71, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 99, 119, 121–22, 133, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186–187, 189–95, 210, 215, 235, 237, 290, 308, 323 Feng Qi 冯契  15, 91, 134, 136, 137, 138, 304, 307, 312, 323 Filial piety, affection 85, 225, 233, 243, 245 Frankfurt school 27

Index Freedom 10, 41, 100, 218–19 gongzheng 公正 (“justice”) 209, 214, 215–16, 217, 219, 200 Good 28, 35, 36, 37, 46, 56, 58, 99, 100, 115, 163–64, 175, 176, 182, 186–87, 220, 230, 231, 243, 264, 292, 293, 319 Goodness 36, 78, 93, 164, 175, 176, 230, 231, 260, 265, 319 Guanzi 管子 (Book of Guan Zhong) 150 n12, 150 n14, 184 n16 Habermas, Jugen 303, 323 Hanfeizi 韩非子 (The Hanfeizi) 216 Happiness 42, 47–48, 161, 235 Harmony 37, 71, 83, 160–162, 189, 219, 236, 242–43, 257, 267 Hegel, G.W.F. 1, 14, 20, 74, 89, 96, 106, 141, 255, 305, 307–08, 316, 323 Heidegger, Martin 7–9, 11, 15 Human nature 1, 3–4, 78, 91, 109–13, 114, 115, 118, 122–25, 126–27, 129, 135, 142–43, 166–70, 171–77, 213, 220, 232, 243–44 Hume, David 92, 167, 288 Husserl, Edmund 14, 15, 16, 103 Ideal, ideals 26, 39, 40, 41, 46, 67, 93, 106, 107, 113, 122, 131, 148–49, 151, 157, 168, 174, 175, 200, 246, 251, 257, 258, 262, 293–94, 319 human character 77, 86, 164–65, 245 moral 55, 66, 86, 261 person 10, 47, 66, 113, 163 value 69, 107, 108, 123, 162–63 Ideas 1–2, 89–90, 93–95, 98, 101–02, 105–06, 107, 108, 197, 273–75, 290–91, 299 Identity 24, 41, 57, 87, 143, 180, 291, 310 Imagination 24–25, 27, 37, 87, 89, 99, 101, 132, 280, 319 Insight 15, 24, 27, 89, 312 Integration 22 of body and mind 42, 90, 99, 100, 189 of Chinese and Western philosophy  13, 283 Intention 14, 42, 49, 56, 132, 167, 187, 234, 244, 251 Intentionality 103 Internalization 23, 34, 41, 237 Inter-subjective 88 Irrational 132–33, 182

331 Jin Yuelin 金岳霖  92, 138, 292 Judgment 26–27, 39, 42, 46, 47, 51, 54–56, 82, 88, 103, 182 Justice (see also gongzheng) 3, 179–80, 183 Kant, Immanuel xii, 14, 16, 20, 22, 26, 27, 41, 44, 58, 72, 87–88, 89, 90, 98, 102, 105–06, 118, 124, 190, 215, 288, 293, 308, 318, 321 Knowledge 1, 6, 7, 8, 9–13, 15, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30–32, 35–37, 41–42, 49, 51, 70, 80, 87–89, 90–93, 97–101, 103, 105, 107, 109–10, 113–15, 118, 119, 135, 142, 152, 154, 164–65, 173, 179, 183, 193, 212, 274–75, 281, 282–83, 297, 302, 304, 318–19, 322 and action 51, 54–55, 72–73, 83, 302, 312–16, 321 and experience 32, 132 and skill 151 and wisdom 10, 11, 13, 70, 111, 152, 154, 301 moral 55, 57 Kongzi 孔子 (Confucius) 30, 31, 33, 39–41, 53, 77, 78, 96, 101, 109, 112, 113, 115–22, 125, 149, 153, 158, 162–63, 175–76, 188, 197, 198, 202, 222, 233, 234, 236, 258, 262, 264, 267 Labor 27, 52, 225, 227 Language 57, 72, 114–118, 124, 144, 289–90, 292–96, 299, 301, 313, 317, 319, 320 Learning 4, 5, 7–8, 31–32, 108, 110, 142–43, 153, 171, 202–05, 207, 274, 238, 323–24 branches of 6, 92, 99, 125 Li 理 (“principle,” “pattern,” “coherence”)  33, 36, 45, 62, 79, 151, 178, 216, 235, 237, 272, 299, 305, 312 Liang Shuming 192–95 Lifeworld 222, 224, 226, 232 Liji 礼记 (Book of Rites) 212, 257 Limits 87, 90, 99, 295 of knowledge 88 101 of language 301 Liu Xie 刘勰  178 n2, Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元  121, 203 Marx, Karl ix, xii, 27, 106, 166, 168, 305, 312, 313, 323, Mencius, see Mengzi

332 Mengzi 孟子 (or, Mencius) 30, 33–34, 53 n4, 62, 78, 82n, 108, 113, 115, 117, 118, 125, 133, 150, 159, 166, 170–74, 176, 177–79, 185, 188, 190–92, 215–16, 220, 234, 236, 256–65 Mengzi 孟子 (Book of Mengzi) 117, 176 Metaphysics xii, 3, 10, 11, 16, 18, 26, 70–75, 89, 92, 95, 102, 216, 240, 289, 294, 303–05, 307, 308, 311, 312–19, 321–22, 324, 325 abstract 70–72, 75, 304–05, 312, 314, 316 concrete 70–74, 89, 312, 314, 316, 318, 319, 321–25 Mozi 墨子  101, 115, 125, 132, 182–83, 214 Music 37, 40, 57, 112, 178 n2, 201, 221, 233, 236, 278 Nature 22, 24, 36, 45, 60–69, 110, 166, 199, 204, 213, 215, 220, 232, 237, 238, 242–43, 246–49, 264, 297, 300, 308, 310, 315, 317 Needs 44, 47, 67, 86 Neo-Confucianism xi, 36, 53, 79 n6, 79 n9, 82, 204 n4, 210, 237 Nietzsche, Fredrich 99 Norms 7, 33, 40, 55, 57, 59, 79, 85, 107, 113, 133, 149, 150, 151, 157–58, 173, 177, 180, 185, 189–90, 209–10, 214, 240, 243–44, 245, 256, 261–62, 264–65, 267–68, 270, 274, 279, 282, 321 Noumenon 16, 277, 317 Nozick, Robert 218 One-sided 27, 152, 156, 211, 220, 244, 283, 322 Openness 30–31, 37, 212 Order 39, 43, 53, 59, 64, 82, 85, 92, 105, 106, 121–22, 148, 172, 214, 216, 219, 244, 254, 257, 259, 261–62, 264, 284, 319 Other, the 60, 77, 79–81 Passions 167, 255 Perception 42, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 55, 58, 89, 98, 116, 158, 178, 180, 293 Plato 94, 101, 125, 132, 217, 288, Power(s) 37, 61, 122–123, 227–29, 235, 266, 269–70, 292 Practical process 25, 40, 108, 189, 191 Practical reason 26–27, 235

Index Practical wisdom 25, 82–82, 146, 160, 162 Psychological 233, 236, 99, 106 Purpose 24, 36, 46, 55, 137, 193, 195, 249–52 -value 292, 297, 301, 302 Qi 气 (“air/gas,” “vital breath”) 135, 173, 272, 305 Qing 情 (“concrete or true state of affairs,” “things,” or “human feelings/emotions”)  185, 237, 278 Qun 群 (“grouping”) 236 Rawls, John 218, 288, 294 Reason xii, 15, 26–27, 32–34, 42, 44–51, 71, 79, 82–83, 87–90, 98, 112, 103, 105, 119, 122, 133, 172, 178–81, 183–86, 189–95, 214, 216, 237, 272, 290, 293, 299, 308, 323 Ren 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”) 33, 40, 78, 84, 101, 190, 198, 233, 242, 259, 289, 299 Resources 144, 220, 263 natural 63, 254 Rightness 113, 133, 189–90, 214 the practice of 115 Rights 63, 137, 217–19 Ritual 28, 40–41, 44, 53, 149, 164, 172, 184, 213, 216, 219, 236, 242–43, 254, 260, 264, 267, 298–99, 320 Rules 10, 24–25, 30, 32–34, 45, 47–48, 57–58, 82–85, 87, 90, 99–100, 102, 116, 167–68, 201, 244, 261, 266, 271, 283, 293, 298–99 Science 92, 94–95, 98, 100, 101, 110, 274, 278, 282, 289–90, 322–23 empirical 17–18, 74, 137, 306 Self-awareness 20, 49, 52, 57–58, 110 Shang Jun Shu 商君书 (The Book of Lord Shang) 269 Shi 事 (“thing[s],” “event[s],” or “matter[s]”)  50, 186 n19, 312 Significance 24, 36, 50, 54, 57, 60, 65, 68, 69, 75, 86–87, 93, 135, 144–45, 195, 245, 248, 314 Speculation 15–17, 90–91, 95, 137, 304, 314, 317, 321 abstract 13, 15–16, 91, 95

Index

333

Spirit 37, 40–41, 48, 93, 95, 87, 208, 213, 308 Spiritual 24–25, 40–41, 49, 55, 76, 99–100, 161, 230, 236 -theoretical 24–25, 44, 49 world 49, 75, 99–100 Spontaneity 33, 238, 242–45, 248, 251–53, 255 Structure 13, 26, 32, 36, 42, 88, 93, 126, 137, 200, 219, 267, 268, 269, 274, 285, 290 Subject 2, 28, 31, 42, 43–44, 46, 48, 51–52, 54, 57–58, 83, 90, 119, 143, 186–88, 190–91, 266, 268–71, 319–20 Subjectivity 55, 78, 81, 87, 87, 119, 183, 193, 253, 290, 291, 295

Wang Fuzhi 王夫之  118, 121–22, 133, 148, 179–181, 212, 216, 221, 237, 323 Wang Qingjie 81–83, 85 Wang Yangming 王阳明  xi, 79–80, 202, 304, 323 Wisdom xi, xii, 3–4, 6, 10–13, 15–16, 19–20, 23, 25, 32, 70, 73, 83, 97–101, 104–05, 107–09, 111–12, 114, 124–25, 127–28, 129, 139, 142–45, 146, 152–56, 159–60, 174, 243, 245, 296–97, 299–302, 303, 304, 318–19, 323, 325 Wittgenstein, Ludwig xi, 288, 311 Wuwei 无为 (“Non-doing” or “Non-assertive action”) 65, 123

Tacit knowledge 49 Technology 136, 274, 277–78, 282, 296 Tool, tools 1, 16, 71–72, 74, 90–92, 246, 274, 294–296, 298–99, 301 Truth 26, 35–37, 72, 88–89, 93–95, 100, 154, 156, 164, 165, 180, 182, 187, 290–91, 300, 319

Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Human Dispositions Arise from Destiny) 186 n20 Xunzi 荀子  45, 77, 80–81, 113, 117, 125, 152, 154–56, 159, 172, 173, 176–77, 179–80, 210–11, 213, 214, 216, 217, 236, 254, 298

Universal 1, 4, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29–30, 34, 39, 41, 44, 50–51, 56, 58, 82, 88, 92, 102, 105, 118, 124, 129–32, 135, 142–45, 147, 157, 162–64, 176, 177, 179, 189, 210, 212, 217, 282, 289, 290, 299, 306–07, 311 laws, principles 46, 111–12, 134, 190, 210, 237, 240, 281 love 101, 198–99 regulations, rules 58, 109, 115 value principles, standards, norms 49, 53, 55, 57, 58, 107, 113, 123, 180, 185, 233–34, 265, 267, 321 Utilitarianism 63 Virtue(s) 36, 46, 77–78, 83, 110, 116, 122, 129, 131, 135, 162, 200, 216, 225, 229, 231, 239, 241, 257, 259, 261–64, 266–69

Yi 义 (“appropriate,” “human relations,” “duty,” or “equitable”) 84, 115, 162, 164, 180, 185, 216, 217, 259 Yizhuan 易传 (The Great Commentary of the Book of Changes) 83 Zhang Zai 张载  71, 118, 191, 204 Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean) 62, 92, 120, 122, 160–61, 189 Zhouyi 周易 (Book of Changes) 118, 147–48, 197, 202–03 Zhu Xi 朱熹  79, 118, 130, 161, 170, 180, 207, 210, 212–13, 221, 237, 298, 304 Zhuangzi 32, 112, 115–16, 119, 120, 125, 151, 154, 247, 251 Zhuangzi 庄子 (Book of Master Zhuang) 111, 154, 203, 251