Philosophical Habit of Mind : Rhetoric and Person in John Henry Newman's Dublin Writings 9789731997629, 9789731997612

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL HABIT OF MIND

ZETA SERIES IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY Coordinator: Dr. Mihail NEAMŢU Advisory Board: John BEHR (St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary, US); David BRADSHAW (Kentucky University, US); Tristram ENGELHARDT JR (Rice University, US); Gyorgy GEREBY (Central European University, Hungary); Jean-Yves LACOSTE (Catholic Institute, Paris, France); Nicholaos LOUDOVIKOS (Ecclesiastical Academy of Thessalonica, Greece); Andrew LOUTH (Durham University, Great Britain); Virgil NEMOIANU (Catholic University, Washington DC, US); Russell RENO (Creighton University, US) Argument: Theology in the 21st century can think through its themes of reflection only by mirroring the polyphonic character of the early Christian tradition, seen asan open project. Patristic authors distinguished themselves through their constant attempt to construe Christian doctrine by contemplating theologically and conversing philosophically about truth, goodness, beauty, looked upon as first attributes of God. Thus, early Christianity did not bring about the divorce of revelation from the philosophical, aesthetic, literary or civic pursuit of truth. The early scholastic thinkers endeavoured, in their turn, to reconcile the patristic legacy with the metaphysical systems of Greek origin in ways that were later challenged both by theologians of Eastern Orthodox and Protestant persuasion. This new book series aims at exploring the conceptual and institutional organisation of Christian faith in conversation with different aspects of Western civilisation. In what way does the Eastern Orthodox differ from the Christian Latin understanding of fides et ratio? What was Athens to Jerusalem, and how different was Mecca from these European centres of art and thought? How does theology today relate to the Western history of ideas? How can the relationship between the Church and the secular politeia be envisaged in accordance with the particularities of each culture? These are only some of the many broad questions hosted by this Zeta Books series.

Angelo Bottone

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HABIT OF MIND

Rhetoric and Person in John Henry Newman’s Dublin Writings

¤

¤ Zeta Books, Bucharest

www.zetabooks.com

© 2010 Zeta Books for the present edition All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronical or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. ISBN: 978-973-1997-61-2 (paperback) ISBN: 978-973-1997-62-9 (ebook)

To my family

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter one

Dublin Writings: History and Composition . . . . . . . . 1. The Catholic University in Ireland . . . . . . . . . 2. University Discourses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Occasional Lectures and Essays . . . . . . . . . . 4. The Catholic University Gazette and The Atlantis . . . 5. Sermons and Other Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 17 25 33 43 50

Chapter two

Source Ideas of the Human Person: Agreements and Disagreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 1. Aristotle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2. Cicero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 3. John Locke and Utilitarians . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Chapter three

The Constitutive Elements of the Human Person . . . . . . 1. The Intellectual Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The Moral Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The Artistic Dimension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter four

130 130 155 166

The Gentleman and the Educated Man . . . . . . . . . . 174 1. The Gentleman: Knowledge and Morality . . . . . 174 2. The ‘Religion of Philosophy’ . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

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Chapter five

Paradoxes and Failures. Newman’s Idea of the Educated Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 1. Paradox and Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 2. The Philosophical Habit of Mind . . . . . . . . . 216 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 INDEX OF NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Acknowledgments

I would like to begin by thanking my PhD supervisors Dr Teresa Iglesias and Dr Gerard Casey for their guidance, support and encouragement throughout my doctorate. I feel immensely privileged to have had the good fortune of being able to study Newman in Dublin, and in particular at University College Dublin. I sincerely hope I have done justice to my subject, and to my advisors, who gave so freely of their time and made many useful suggestions and criticisms that have assisted me in bringing this project to fruition. It all began with an invitation from Dr Teresa Iglesias, whom I met for the first time in Oxford during the International Newman Conference in 2001. Since that time she has always been warmly supportive of me, on both the intellectual and personal levels. I must record my thanks to Dick Dunne, Secretary of the Newman Society of Ireland. I owe him a great debt for his unfailing kindness, and the perceptive and beneficial comments he made on an earlier version of this work. I have been very fortunate to be the recipient of a M. B. Crowe Newman Research Scholarship from the International Centre for Newman Studies in UCD. I would also like to acknowledge the fellowship support I received from the Government of Ireland during my first year in UCD, as well as that received through the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have been indeed privileged to have had the benefit of the thoughtfulness and wisdom of a number of people: Dr Fran O’Rourke, who examined my thoughts on Aristotle; Prof. Domenico Jervolino, with whom my interest in Newman began,

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and who remains still a source of inspiration; my bishop, S. E. Rev.ma Bruno Forte, who, since his suggestion to attend the Oxford conference in 2001, has always been caring and helpful. An Italian version of this work has been published with the title John Henry Newman e l’abito mentale filosofico. Retorica e persona negli Scritti Dublinesi by Edizioni Studium, Rome 2010. I want to thank the Edizioni Studium for the permission to publish it in English. It would be wrong to end my acknowledgements without remembering those who helped me in many ways: Mauro Senatore, Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo, Luigi Walt, Andrea Fiamma, Dwight Lindley, Paul Shrimpton, Declan Farrell, Rev Professor Thomas Norris, and Victoria, who is always on my side.

INTRODUCTION

John Henry Newman spent seven years of his life assisting with the foundation, and then guiding, the Catholic University of Ireland. All the studies published to date regarding his Dublin university project have two substantial limits: the first is that they deal mainly with one work, namely The Idea of a University; the second is that they are generally focused on his educational thought. This means that Newman’s writings related to his Dublin enterprise have not been considered in their totality and in their full significance. My work is primarily intended to overcome this incompleteness in knowledge, and to expand the still partial understanding of these writings. The first chapter is designed to present a complete and definitive listing of all the works, published and unpublished, to be included under the heading of Newman’s Dublin Writings. With the exception of the well-known volume The Idea of a University, all the other works are not easily accessible, and only The Idea of a University has received a critical edition.1 Rise and Progress of Universities was reprinted in 2001,2 however, the Catholic University Gazette and the Atlantis journal were never been reprinted after Newman’s lifetime. My aim in bringing together everything Newman wrote for publication, as well as everything he preached or delivered as a 1 John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University (Oxford, 1976). (Here after Idea). 2 John Henry Newman, Rise and Progress of Universities and Benedictine Essays with an Introduction and Notes by Mary Katherine Tillman (Leominster, 2001) (Here After RP.)

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introduction

speech, is to consider them as parts of a unique, single, project. For the purpose of this work three criteria have guided my selection in determining which of Newman’s writings are to be regarded as Newman’s Dublin Writings: 1. The writing must be directly connected with the Catholic University of Ireland. 2. The writing must have been intended as a public or an official statement. 3. The writing must be concerned with the period between Newman’s first visit to Ireland in September, 1851, and his retirement in August, 1859. In accordance with the first criterion, I will not consider as part of Newman’s Dublin Writings those works which were written or published by Newman during the years 1851-59 which are not related to the University, such as the novel Callista. In accordance with the second criterion, all the entries in Letters and Diaries will be taken into account for their historical significance, but I will not consider them as part of Newman’s Dublin Writings if they were not written for a public purpose. My concern with the entire corpus of Newman’s Dublin Writings will not be limited solely to those works written or published by Newman in the years 1851-59, but will also include any subsequent editions, and any successive publication or posthumous collection, unless the work does not fall within the dates as noted in the third criterion stated above. It has often been claimed that The Idea of a University remains today a fundamental text for any philosophical discussion on third level education. It is my intention to illustrate that all of Newman’s works related to his university project must be considered in order to gain a more complete understanding of his thought. When considering the critical studies that have been devoted to this period of Newman’s life, a progressive enlargement of the interpretative vision of the scholars can be noticed. Ian Ker, critical

introduction

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editor of the Idea, writes: “One sometimes has the impression that by The Idea of a University some critics mean only the Discourses; but of course by bringing the Discourses and the Lectures and Essays together into one volume under a common title, Newman was doing something rather than merely assembling a miscellaneous collection of essays on university education.”3 In talking about Rise and Progress of Universities Fergal McGrath notes: “Though far less known than the Idea of a University, this collection of essays is of equal, if not greater, value for the full understanding of Newman’s educational views.”4 Mary Catherine Tillman reaffirms the view that Newman’s educational philosophy has three great pillars in the Dublin writings. The first pillar is the celebrated Discourses, in which his vision of the university is presented theoretically; the second pillar is the Occasional Lectures and Essays, an illustration of this vision; and the third is Rise and Progress of Universities where the university has progressed from a mere abstract notion to a living institution.5 My aim in this project is to add to these three elements of Newman’s Dublin Writings those works which have never before been incorporated, and which have largely been ignored. In this way, two major contributions to Newman scholarship are envisaged: the first is to present the entire collection of Newman’s Dublin Writings; the second being to bring to light the significance that this entire group of writings has for an interpretation of Newman’s philosophical thought, and specifically his concept of the human person. The first chapter is arranged as follows. The first section will concern itself with providing the historical background necessary to understand the process by which the decision for the erection of a Catholic University was taken and the Dublin Ian Ker, “Introduction” to John Henry Newman, Idea, p. xxxii. Fergal McGrath, Newman’s University: Idea and Reality (Dublin, 1951), p. 319. 5 See Mary Katherine Tillman, “Introduction” to John Henry Newman, Rise and Progress of Universities (Leominster, 2001). 3 4

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Writings were conceived. In the following two sections I will deal with the various editions of the University Discourses and the Occasional Lectures and Essays, providing a brief outline of the contents of each chapter. I will then introduce the two university journals that Newman established. In the final section I will present a detailed survey of all other papers that, in my view, should be included among Newman’s Dublin Writings. For the historical account I have mainly drawn from two works: Newman’s University Idea and Reality6 by Fergal McGrath, and Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-18657 by Colin Barr. The first text is a scholarly volume that, although published in 1951, is still considered a standard for anyone wanting to understand, in detail, Newman’s project in Dublin. Colin Barr, on the other hand, provides an updated and sometimes persuasive study of the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland. His work is “consciously designed to supplant McGrath’s Newman’s University”8 and with this purpose in mind he defends the thesis that the leading role of Dr Paul Cullen in the institution of the Catholic University of Ireland has yet to be recognized fully. In the second chapter I relate Newman to Aristotle, Cicero and Locke. These are three authoritative figures mentioned and discussed in the Dublin Writings, although there are no major studies on this issue. Aristotle was a central figure for the development of Newman’s thought. The Aristotelian influence is widely acknowledged, but nonetheless usually underestimated; for instance, he is never mentioned in Fergal McGrath’s Newman’s University. In what emerges from my study, Aristotle is the main source of inspiration for the Dublin Writings. I will examine in detail how Newman made profit of his ethical and Fergal McGrath, Newman’s University: Idea and Reality (Dublin, 1951). Colin Barr, Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-1865 (Leominster, 2003). 8 Barr, op. cit., p. 7. 6 7

introduction

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rhetorical thought vis-à-vis an analysis of the various passages from Aristotle’s works that Newman quotes or refers to in his Dublin Writings. I believe that, in Newman’s view, Cicero represents the best specimen of the liberal, educated, man; this is a view Newman held since his early years in Oxford. In the second section of the second chapter I will discuss how Cicero symbolises the excellence of intellectual activity, but also the limits of the man educated outside the Christian faith. I will also evaluate the use that Newman made of Cicero’s De Officiis. In section three of the second chapter I discuss two claims that Newman posited regarding John Locke. I will argue that Newman was correct in considering Locke to be the father of the Utilitarians, and in maintaining that the Lockean model of education is inspired merely by the principle of utility. I am particularly concerned to compare and contrast Locke’s and Newman’s treatment of the study of foreign and ancient languages as their opposite views represent diverging conceptions of the human person and of education. No scholarly work has yet attempted to explore this aspect in their thought. In the third chapter I will explore the different dimensions of the human person in the Dublin Writings. In the first section I will present the intellectual dimension and offer a critical appraisal of Newman’s treatment of the problem of unity of knowledge, while also examining and discussing his concept of philosophy. In the second section I will deal with the moral dimension of the human being and the relationship between morality and knowledge. I will endeavour to show how Newman, in his defence of liberal knowledge, faces and opposes three positions representing the majority of the trends expressed in modern ethics, namely, utilitarianism, deontologism, and sentimentalism. I will introduce the distinction between direct and indirect ends of a university, and prove that Newman employs this distinction to argue for a separation, but also for a

18

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mutual support, of knowledge and morality. The third section is devoted to the artistic dimension of the human person. My contribution intends to show that the Dublin Writings share a unity that is not merely chronological but also conceptual. The fourth chapter deals with the figures of the gentleman and the educated man. In the first section I will discuss the relationship between knowledge and morality. I will attempt to explain Newman’s concept that the cultivation of the intellect has an object distinct from that of morality. On purely secular grounds, he proposes the complete separation of intellect and morality based on the direct end of a university being the teaching of universal knowledge, and therefore its aim is intellectual rather than moral. However, a university also has indirect ends, and in this respect knowledge and morality can and ought to support each other. The noble figure of the gentleman hence incorporates a balanced mixture of moral and intellectual virtues. In the second section of the chapter I will argue that the gentleman was not the model of the human person that Newman had in mind when he was elaborating his Dublin Writings. For Newman, the gentleman represents the highest balance of knowledge and morality that humanity can attain without religious principles. Newman does not repudiate this ideal, rather he goes beyond it, thereby illustrating the limits of the ‘religion of philosophy’, i.e. the fallacy of the notion that culture improves humanity. The fifth chapter is intended to be a personal reflection on the issues that Newman raised, and particularly on the use we can make today of his notions of the philosophical habit of mind. I will contrast his thought with that of some contemporary thinkers, and finally conclude with some general remarks.

CHAPTER ONE

Dublin Writings: History and Composition

1. The Catholic University in Ireland At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Trinity College, the sole constituent college of the University of Dublin, was the only institution that provided third-level education in Ireland. When it was founded in the year 1591 it was open to students of any religious denomination. From 1637, with the Statute of Charles I, Catholics were excluded from being members of the College due to an “obligation laid on ‘all students’ of attending divine service and receiving the Holy Communion according to the Anglican Rite, and by the oath against Popery (Pontificia Religio) to be taken by the Fellows.”1 With the Catholic Relief Act of 1793, the parliament abolished the religious tests that declared that it should be “lawful for Papists … to hold or take Degrees, or any Professorship in, or be Master or Fellows of any College to be hereafter founded in this Kingdom, Dublin”.2 A Royal Letter of 1794 allowed Catholics to proceed to the degree levels in Trinity College, though scholarships and fellowships were reserved for members of the Church of Ireland, and there was no religious teaching for Catholic students. In spite of these changes, the University of Dublin, as the universities of Oxford and Cambridge in England, was still quite clearly an Anglican institution and the government kept it that way.3 McGrath, op. cit., p. 4. Chartae et Statuta Collegii Sacrosanctae et Individuae Trinitatis Reginae Elizabethae juxta Dublin (Dublin, 1844), p. 162 as referred by McGrath, op. cit., p. 4. 3 When still in Oxford Newman opposed a bill to abolish religious tests at Oxford and Cambridge. See Colin Barr, Paul Cullen, John Henry, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-1865 (Leominster, 2003), p. 83. 1 2

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After the Relief Acts of 1782 and 1793, and under the direction of the Catholic clergy, as well as of the members of various religious congregations, more formally organized schools began to appear. With rare exceptions, until 1811, when the Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in Ireland was founded, mixed religious education was almost unknown. With the relaxation of the Penal Laws and their final abolition by the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, the Catholic population would enjoy, at last, the possibility of being present without restriction in social life, and the freedom to organise itself according to its needs and aims. In the same years, the government expressed the intention of establishing National Schools for pupils of all denominations. In this process there was no agreement among the Irish bishops regarding the participation of members of the clergy as teachers or of Catholic children as students. Many Catholic churchmen thought it would be wiser to allow Catholics use the institutions provided at the government’s expense rather than undertaking the costly exercise themselves, which seemed destined to failure. As it was difficult to present certain subjects in a religiously neutral manner, most of the bishops contended that mixed education would bring Catholic children to Protestantism, and then on to indifferentism. The hierarchy was hence divided on the issue. Eighteen bishops sided with Dr Daniel Murray, archbishop of Dublin, whose political sympathies had always been with the government; and ten sided with Dr John MacHale, archbishop of Tuam, who denounced the mixed system in a series of letters addressed to Lord John Russell, and reproached Dr Murray for his excessive tolerance. The serious divergence of view amongst the bishops led in 1839 to an appeal to Rome for an authoritative decision. The Rescript which, after some delay, was issued on January 16th, 1841, left the matter to ‘the prudent discretion and religious conscience of each individual bishop’. It added, however, certain admonitions, notably that efforts should be made to secure

Dublin Writings: History and Composition

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Catholic lecturers in religion and history in the training schools, to eliminate the common, so-called fundamental religious instruction, and to have school property vested in the clergy. As a result of this Rescript, controversy ceased for a few years and, except in the archdiocese of Tuam where Dr MacHale set up his own schools, the Catholic clergy acquiesced in the system.4

During the years between the foundation of the National System in 1831 and Peel’s university proposal in 1845, the Catholic bishops had given frequent public expression to their well-founded doubts about the system itself, and about its practical working. With the history of mixed religious education in primary schools in their minds, the bishops viewed the proposal, to extend its principles to university education, with extreme caution. The new university proposal was implemented in 1845, when Sir James Graham, secretary of state for the Home Department, introduced into parliament the project of erecting three new colleges that might well unite in forming a new university. They were to be in Belfast, Cork and either Galway or Limerick. These new colleges were open to students of every denomination, and non-sectarian programmes were provided according to mixed education. There would be no religious tests for admittance, no religious topic introduced into the curriculum, and no religious instruction would be given except at the expense of each denomination. The only sectarian institution that would remain was the existing Trinity College Dublin. As in the case of the National Schools, the bishops held different and opposing positions. “A minority, under the leadership of Dr Murray and Dr Crolly, being inclined to waive theoretical objections and give the plan a trial, whilst the majority, led by Dr MacHale, were disposed to stand out for a solution on definitely denominational lines. The proposed conditions bore signs 4

Ibid., p. 35.

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of being a compromise between the two policies.”5 It is important to note that during this period Ireland was suffering from the Great Famine; the population of the country was virtually halved as hundreds of thousands of people were starving to death or forced to emigrate. Hence survival, rather than education, was the main concern for the majority of the population. On June 1st, 1846 Gregory XVI died, and was succeeded on June 16th by Cardinal Mastai Ferretti, bishop of Imola, who took the name of Pius IX. His aversion towards mixed education was well known. “Dr. MacHale and Dr. Slattery, Archbishop of Cashel, wrote on behalf of the Irish bishops who were opposed to the Queen’s Colleges, congratulating the Pope on his accession and urging him to take action against the Colleges. In his letter of thanks, Pius IX replied that Propaganda was considering the matter, and took the opportunity to urge the bishops to unity.”6 On 9th October 1847 the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda decided in favour of the majority party among the bishops opposing the plan. Towards the close of the rescript they issued there occurred the first reference to the project of founding a Catholic university in Ireland. The decision of Propaganda Fide was not regarded by either the minority bishops, or by the government, as final, and indeed, its terms invited further representations in Rome where consultations took place between 1847 and 1848. Those bishops who were opposed to the proposed colleges went to Rome while, throughout the summer, Propaganda considered the documents submitted by the rival parties. In 1848 Ireland was suffering from the Great Famine that decimated the population, while Rome was a place of barricades and bombs. The revolutionary revolt had forced Pius IX, who was initially regarded as a liberal pope, to leave the city. One of the consequences of the Italian situation was the growing suspicion, if not aversion, of the Church towards the liberal and democratic 5 6

Ibid., p. 46. Ibid., p. 63.

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principles that were inspiring many independence movements all over Europe. A contemporary historian interprets this situation as follows: “Embattled Rome looked with great suspicion on all that smacked of contemporaneity, seeing the falsehood in it rather than the truth, and on all that it judged to be tainted with liberal values, whether these were anti-clerical, indifferentist or actually directed towards the good of the Church.”7 On 11th October Propaganda Fide responded with a second rescript stating that, having considered the revised statutes and the opinions of bishops, the Holy See was unable to mitigate the previous decision “on account of the grievous and intrinsic dangers of the same Colleges”. This second rescript to the bishops also urged, as a means to achieve the necessary “sacerdotal concord”, the holding of episcopal meetings according to canonical prescriptions. Additionally, a further reference to “the erection of a Catholic University” can be found in the document.8 In spite of the papal pronouncements, the government proceeded with preparations for the opening of the three colleges in Belfast, Cork and Galway, although Limerick was excluded. They were called Queen’s Colleges, they opened their doors in October, 1849 and Presidents were appointed to two of the Colleges. Fifty-three of the sixty professors were Protestants, and this fact was perceived as further corroboration of the anti-Catholic nature of the Government project. On April 6th, 1849, Dr William Crolly, archbishop of Armagh, who was the most determined member of the minority and was inclined to accept the plan, died. Dr Paul Cullen, rector of the Irish College in Rome, was chosen to replace Crolly as the new archbishop of Armagh. Dr Cullen was the senior and official Irish presence in Rome where he had been living since the age of seventeen, initially as a student at the Urban College of Louis McRedmond, Thrown Among Strangers: John Henry Newman in Ireland (Dublin, 1990), pp. 38-39. 8 See Decreta Synodi Planariae Episcoporum Hiberniae apud Thurles habitae anno MDCCCL (Dublin, 1851); as referred by McGrath, op. cit., p. 67. 7

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Propaganda, then as vice-rector and finally rector of the Irish College. “So many of the bishops in Ireland individually employed him as their Roman agent; that is to say, he conducted business for them with the Holy See, conveyed their views to the Curia and reported back not only the outcome of their representations but the general news from Rome and the Roman view of world events.”9 He had great weight in ecclesiastical affairs and, being a determined opponent of mixed education, had without doubt influenced the decision contained in the two rescripts regarding the Queen’s Colleges. His appointment appeared as further confirmation of the Vatican policy towards Ireland and the English government, a policy inspired more by firm principles than by practical reason and good sense. Some bishops were inclined to allow their clergy to accept appointments in order to provide a guarantee for the few Catholics who had enrolled in the Colleges. Bishop Laurence O’Donnell of Galway and Bishop Cornelius Denvir of Down and Connor, whose dioceses hosted the Queen’s Colleges, agreed with the government institutions. This minority amongst the archbishops was represented by Dr Murray, whose long life was drawing to a close, but who maintained that the Queen’s Colleges could also be accepted as a practical means of access to university education for Catholics. “Murray spoke from long experience of dealing with British administration and gradually securing improvement after improvement in the circumstances of his co-religionists. He thought the Catholic University was an illusory ideal, not worth pursuing when opportunities of true value were at hand for the taking. Many in the Episcopal body agreed with him, even if they now felt hampered in expressing their views, given the stance of the Holy See.”10 In reality, however, on April 18th, 1850, Rome prohibited the clergy from holding any office in the Colleges, laying on 9

McRedmond, op. cit., p. 19. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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the bishops the obligation of discouraging their subjects from entering them. Rome urged them to adopt a common policy in the matter. Accordingly, the bishops unanimously decided that a National synod should be held for the purpose of formulating a policy on the university question. The decision was approved by Pius IX and Dr Cullen was appointed apostolic delegate, with the task of convening and presiding over the synod. The bishops who were to compose the synod met in Thurles on August 22nd of that same year. The synod condemned the Queen’s Colleges and adopted a number of measures in order to assure practical results from the resolution. “No bishop was to co-operate in the administration of government of the Colleges. The clergy were prohibited, under pain of suspension to be incurred ipso facto, from holding any office in them, whether as professors or deans of discipline. The laity were to repudiate and shun them on the ground that they involved grave and intrinsic dangers to faith and morals.”11 If the bishops were united in condemning the Queen’s Colleges as dangerous, there were some adverse reactions regarding the refusal to allow clerics to take office. The Acta of the synod were signed by all the bishops, however, those who had urged a more tolerant policy dispatched a petition to Rome asking further consideration of the disputed issues. The pope replied that the question had to be considered closed with the synod. The British government answered the ecclesiastical position by issuing letters for the establishment of the Queen’s University in Ireland. The condemnation of the Colleges by the Holy See, and by the bishops, would ensure the failure of the Queen’s College due to the non-involvement of Catholic students. In reality, the rescripts and the Acts of Thurles did not absolutely prohibit Catholics from attending the Queen’s Colleges, but the terms of both documents were such that no conscientious Catholic could believe himself exempted, except for very grave reasons. 11

McGrath, op. cit., p. 73.

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A mere condemnation, however, was not enough to ensure the non-involvement of Catholic students in the Queen’s Colleges. To prevent this it would be necessary to provide instruction for the potential student body of Catholics, and therefore imperative that an alternative plan to the Queen’s Colleges be implemented. Propaganda had in mind the rapid success of Louvain in Belgium, where in 1834 the bishop had re-established the old Catholic University. A plan on a similar basis in Ireland might be expected to yield a similar beneficial result. A Catholic University Committee was appointed to examine the project of a new university.12 The Committee consisted of the four archbishops of Ireland, namely Dr Cullen of Armagh, primate of all Ireland, chairman; Dr Murray of Dublin; Dr Slattery of Cashel; and Dr MacHale of Tuam. One bishop from every province was also included on the Committee. In addition, every member had the right to co-opt one priest and one layman. The Committee drew up an Address to the People of Ireland, urging that funds be raised with a view to founding an institution that could “provide for the Catholic youth of Ireland education of a high order”.13 On April 15th, 1851 Dr Cullen wrote a letter to John Henry Newman asking for advice on how to set up a university, and requesting him to deliver ‘some lectures on education’ in Dublin. Newman accepted the invitation, and on September 30th, 1851 he travelled to Ireland for the first time. During this brief visit he met some bishops, discussing with them the university to be founded, and he also assisted a subcommittee in writing a Report on the Organization of the Catholic University of Ireland and its Postscript. The report was presented to the Catholic University Committee on 12th November 1851, and at the same 12 The Minutes of the meeting of the Catholic University Committee are kept in the UCD Archives. 13 Quoted in McGrath, op. cit., p. 100.

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meeting Newman was appointed ‘on acclamation’ president of the University. 2. University Discourses Newman gave the first of his lectures on University Education on Monday, May 10th, 1852 in the Rotunda in Dublin, and he delivered four additional lectures on consecutive Monday afternoons. All the important intellectual figures were in attendance, thirteen Trinity Fellows, eight Jesuits, a great many clergy and also some ladies.14 Joseph Gordon, one of Newman’s fellow Oratorians, wrote him in a prophetic vein: “you are writing for the world and for posterity, though speaking to an audience.”15 Newman’s Discourses were written under considerable mental stress due to legal trouble. Giacinto Achilli, an apostate Italian Dominican, had been attacked by Newman in the fifth of his lectures, which were subsequently published under the title On the Present Position of Catholics in England. On 4th November, 1851, with the help of the Evangelical Alliance, Achilli brought a criminal action for libel against Newman, who was required to provide evidence of his charges, and later forced to stand trial. The process went on until June 1852, exactly the period after Newman’s lectures in Dublin. In January 1853, the final verdict only required Newman to pay a fine of £100, and, although he was not imprisoned, the stress of the trial had severe consequences on his work and health. In the introductory Discourse, shortest of the five, Newman made a preliminary remark about the confessional character of the claims he would put forward. Even if his purpose to found a Catholic university was clear, he stated that his proposed See the letter to Ambrose St John, May 11th 1852 in John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, p. 83. 15 Letter from Joseph John Gordon, May 19th 1852; reported in McGrath, op. cit., p. 160. 14

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principles could also be accepted by non-Catholics, and, furthermore, that Protestants would accept them more easily than Catholics. In a letter sent to his dear friend Henry Wilberforce on the 17th April, 1852, referring to this first Discourse, Newman wrote: “I am going to treat my subject merely as a matter of philosophy, not of Catholic duty”.16 Even though the project of the Catholic University of Ireland eventually failed to endure, the success of the Discourses lies in the universal character of Newman’s vision of a university, and in his attempt to avoid arguments to support this vision by directly appealing to faith. According to McGrath, “The tenor of the first five Discourses show that Newman had adhered to his purpose of treating his subject from the philosophical standpoint, and that the University which he envisaged was ‘a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church’ ”.17 One could conclude that if the Idea is still considered a classic in education theory today, it is because of its schematic arrangement, which overcomes the narrow limits of specific religious tenets. In Discourse II Newman defines theology as a science of the intellect, not of faith, common to every reasoning person. On this ground he defends the teaching of theology in a university. His argument is very simple: if theology is a branch of knowledge, and if a university is by definition a place for universal teaching that should take into account all the sciences, to exclude one of them would imply a severe injustice. I say, then, that if a University be, from the nature of the case, a place of instruction, where universal knowledge is professed, and if in a certain University, so called, the subject of Religion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable,—either, on the one hand, that the province of Religion is very barren of 16

p. 70. 17

See John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV (London, 1964), Ibid., p. 168.

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real knowledge, or, on the other hand, that in such University one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted.18

Newman recalls in this second Discourse his experience at Oxford where, particularly in Oriel, he had lived with illustrious representatives of religious liberalism, which he considered to be a development of philosophical rationalism of the seventeenth century.19 Most of Newman’s life could be seen as an opposition to theological liberalism that, as he recalled also in the Apologia, affirms that there is no positive knowledge in matters of religion. Whereas he claims that: Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton’s doctrine is knowledge. University Teaching without Theology is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as Astronomy.20

In Discourse III Newman discusses the relationships between theology and other forms of knowledge. He puts forth a holistic conception: knowledge is a whole in which each discipline has its dignity and its role: Sciences are the results of that mental abstraction, which I have spoken of, being the logical record of this or that aspect of the whole subject-matter of knowledge. As they all belong to one and the same circle of objects, they are one and all connected together; as they are but aspects of things, they are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other.21

For Newman, all sciences are connected and interrelated, so it is impossible to teach any one of them without taking them all, theology included, into consideration. Although he accords great Idea, p. 21. See Lina Callegari, Newman La fede e le sue ragioni (Milan, 2001). 20 Idea, p. 42. 21 Idea, p. 51. 18 19

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value to theology in the organization of the studies, philosophy is for him, in some sense, the science of sciences. He believes unity of knowledge, which keeps man away from errors and deviations, is guaranteed by the employment of this integrating faculty. The comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and by a philosophical habit of mind, and which in these Discourses I shall call by that name.22

Originally only three lectures had been planned. Two further lectures were given, while another five Discourses were written but never delivered.23 Discourse IV deals with the consequences of the exclusion of theology from the university curriculum, and Newman suggests that all the other sciences will feel the effects of this in as much as they have as their own object the human person. Partiality is for Newman a characteristic of every discipline taken on its own, and it becomes an error when the achievements of one science are asserted to be valid in an absolute way. No science whatever, however comprehensive it may be, but will fall largely into error, if it be constituted the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth, and that, for the simple reason that it is encroaching on territory not its own, and undertaking problems which it has no instruments to solve.24

According to Newman, all our knowledge must fit into a framework of connections and relations by and through which Idea, p. 51. “There is no clear indication in Newman’s correspondence that there was any definite agreement as to the number of lectures to be given, but in view of the success of the first five, it may be taken that he would have been willing to deliver the remainder.” McGrath, op. cit., pp. 154-155. 24 Idea, p. 74. 22 23

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they gain sense. If theology is excluded all the other sciences will exceed their proper boundaries, and thereby intrude where they have no right to do so. Discourse V of 1852, titled ‘General Knowledge Viewed as One Philosophy’, was not published in the 1859 and 1873 editions. Let us now give a short presentation of the five Discourses that were never delivered. Discourse V of the final edition gave Newman the most trouble, and we will see later how harsh criticism caused him to revise the work many times.25 Newman conceives of knowledge as a system where the intellect works in order to seal in one form the data given by sensibility, science, and tradition. The ideal of knowledge introduced in this Discourse is a vision capable of catching everything as a whole. The field of knowledge is a universe, an ordered cosmos where everything has its own definite meaning. There is a harmony in things springing from their being part of Creation, but also a unity given by the intellect that, by contemplating them, inserts them in the horizon of sense. “To have mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy.”26 In the next three Discourses Newman touches upon three main questions: the relation of intellectual culture to mere knowledge, to professional knowledge and to religious knowledge. In Discourse VI Newman defines a university as being the place where universal knowledge is taught. “It educates the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it.”27 Even if born within Christianity, the university institution has a universal value, namely the cultivation of the intellect. Newman claims that its primary end is not research, (he would leave that to the academies); instead, the aim of the university would be one of teaching. For this reason, at the centre of his idea of a university, he places the student and his life Ker, op. cit., p. xxxii. Idea, p. 113. 27 Idea, p. 126. 25 26

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among his fellow students and teachers. For Newman, the end of intellectual training, and of a university, is not learning or acquisition, it is thought or reason exercised upon knowledge. This is what Newman calls ‘philosophy’. In Discourse VII Newman means to contrast the concept expressed firstly by Locke, and later by the Edinburgh Review, according to which education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. According to this utilitarian view, if everything has its price, and if there is a great outlay in education—either from a social or an individual point of view—we have the right to expect a return of a kind that justifies it. In this view, university activity has a market value, its product being education and its expected benefits being the scientific discoveries or the improvement of civil economy.28 Utility would be the justification of the higher education institutions in this case, but the adoption of utility as a leading value involves significant consequences in relation to the organization of study and is antithetical to Newman’s views. Newman therefore attacks Locke and his followers. In his Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke advises fathers to have their children spend time acquiring what would later be useful for them, avoiding verse-making or Latin, which they will soon forget. All the while they should not neglect writing in a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and indispensable to most trades. According to Newman, the English philosopher “limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, simply as such.”29 It would surely be absurd to neglect education on those subjects necessary to the future profession of the young man, but the tone of Locke’s observations 28 29

See Idea, p. 153. Idea, p. 159.

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clearly goes farther and sounds as a condemnation of any teaching that tends to the general cultivation of the mind. Newman henceforth resumes the old polemic that some decades before had placed Oxford University in opposition to the Edinburgh Review which, following Locke, maintained that no good could derive from a system that is not based on the principle of utility.30 Locke insisted on individual utility as the end of education; the Edinburgh Review looked at the broad community, considering the progress of science as the highest good and the authentic end of a university. Newman replies that intellectual culture is its own end. He believes that liberal education reaches at the same time, even if not directly, the personal utility that Locke pursued, and the social utility, which the Edinburgh Review aimed for. Utility will follow from the search for good, but the opposite is not necessarily true for Newman. The final two Discourses discuss the relations between mental culture and religion. In Discourse VIII Newman presents the mutual benefit of the cultivation of the mind and of moral virtues. A cultivated mind will feel scorn for vices, and a religious man will be more disposed to the pursuit of knowledge. There can be found here the famous definition of a gentleman as “one who never inflicts pain”31 This Discourse also contains a long critique of the concept of the educated man in Lord Shaftesbury and the tendency, typical of intellectuals, to confuse moral sense and conscience, sin and offence, to human taste. Newman, having celebrated in the previous Discourse the virtues of the cultivation of the mind, in the last one analyzes the possible damage to religion that liberal education may involve and indeed perpetrate. Liberal institutions may also be hostile to truth derived from religious revelation because they have a For a long account of this debate see Thomas Docherty, Criticism and Modernity: Aesthetics, Literature and Nations in Europe and its Academies (Oxford, 1999), pp. 205-245. 31 Idea, p. 208. 30

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tendency: “to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation.”32 The educated man risks judging everything, mystery and miracles included, according to his knowledge, closing himself to Revelation. If our mind is the measure for everything there will be no space for any truth that is not intelligible, that does not enter into our categories, that does not satisfy our expectation, all with serious consequences for religion. Newman thinks that because nature and grace, reason and revelation, come from the same divine author, there cannot be real collision with physical science, even if it happened in the past. He finds three sources of hostility between science and theology: their drift, their method of proof and their subject-matter. The first source is linked to the interference made by religious criticism in a province not religious; this has made scientists sore, suspicious and resentful. The second source is linked to the difference of method according to which truth is reached in theology and physics. Scientists, “scorn any process of inquiry not founded on experiment […] but as to Theology, they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it.”33 The third reason regards the subject-matter of knowledge. Science studies physical world, Revelation has reference to circumstances which did not arise till after the heavens and the earth were made. […] power, wisdom, goodness are the burden of the physical world, but it does not and could not speak of mercy, long-suffering, and the economy of human redemption, and but partially of the moral law and moral goodness.34

In an institution that aspires to teach all forms of knowledge, theology will have for Newman, among other things, the task of confining scientific method to its proper limits. Idea, p. 217. Idea, p. 224. 34 Idea, p. 225. 32 33

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To conclude this section on the Discourses, we only need to add that they appeared in the form of fortnightly pamphlets, the first five published shortly after delivery, while the second five were released on 13th October 1852. Newman gathered the ten Discourses in the first edition, dated Fest. Praesent. B. V. M. (November 21st) 1852, while they were actually published on 2nd February 1853, with a Preface and a comprehensive Appendix. He entitled the work Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin, and they were published by James Duffy of Dublin. 3. Occasional Lectures and Essays The Catholic University of Ireland was formally opened on 3 November 1854.35 The lapse of three years since the appointment of Newman as president of the university was initially caused by the opposition of Dr Daniel Murray, archbishop of Dublin, to the project. Murray’s fear was that a university in Dublin would potentially increase anti-Catholic sentiments in England and thereby threaten Maynooth seminary. Murray eventually died on 26th February, 1852 and the difficulty was overcome, particularly because he was replaced by Dr Cullen, who was the strongest supporter of the new university. Even after Murray’s death, however, Irish bishops were divided on the enterprise. Its strongest opponent was Dr John MacHale, archbishop of Tuam, who was opposed to Newman’s wish to appoint English professors to, and MacHale viewed the university mainly as an expression of Cullen’s interests. rd

35 “The Classes were formed on the Fourth of November and the Lectures in Classics Mathematics and Modern Languages commenced on Monday Morning the Sixth of November.” Thomas Scratton, The Catholic University Record of Transactions Commencing with November 1854, CU/8 UDC Archives, p. 6. This Record was discovered in 1986, with other relevant material, in Newman House, Dublin, and never has never been considered by scholars.

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The Achilli trial was the second reason for the late opening of the university. Moreover, Newman complained in his letters about the lack of communication between Cullen and himself. This is better understood if we consider the delicate political situation, and the difficult relationships amongst the bishops. Colin Barr holds that Cullen was rude to Newman for reasons of strategy, that is, that he was stalling for time and desired to be perceived as holding a position between Newman and Dr MacHale.36 This strategy proved useful, as in March, 1854 Pius IX formally appointed Newman as rector and required the Irish bishops to meet in synod, along the lines Cullen had originally suggested. In the meantime, Cullen purchased a magnificent Georgian House on St Stephen’s Green, today called Newman House. And during this same time Newman, who had been in Ireland since February, was travelling intensively and beginning to establish important connections with strategically placed prelates. The synod opened on 18th May and closed two days later, following the granting of approval for the establishment of a university on the model of Louvain. The statute allowed Cullen to open the University with the rector he wished, but he also alienated many bishops in the process. The University was ultimately to possess the four faculties of arts, medicine, law and theology, but at first only the faculty of arts could be founded.37 A great source of inspiration for Newman was 36 “Given the level of opposition from MacHale and his allies it is hard to see Cullen’s approach as anything other than success; the university did in fact open with Newman in charge. He managed to walk the tightrope between Newman’s oft-stated desire to make his own (English) appointments and MacHale’s adamant opposition to any such nominations.” Barr, op. cit., p. 109. 37 “The faculties of the university were to be five, the traditional four with the addition of science, which was raised from a subdivision of arts to an independent schola as it was at Louvain. […] Science, although it was inaugurated with a dean and three professors, never had any students, and no classes were formed. The principal reason for this was that the students could not enter the school until they had passed through two years of arts, but as the university lost most of its students after two years, science was never needed. This difficulty also operated in the

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surely his rich Oxford experience, but he became particularly interested in the recently established Catholic University of Louvain. He corresponded with its rector, requesting informants. Newman shared his interests with Cullen who, while still in Rome, had written a memorandum about Louvain and its striking success, and Louvain had been the dominant influence in the report submitted by the Thurles subcommittee in November, 1851. From October 1853 Newman began to make appointments to the various university positions. “Of the fifteen names that Newman submitted for the archbishops’ consideration, seven were English and had their professional origins in Oxford or Cambridge. Of the fifteen appointments, there were to be six professors and nine lecturers.”38 Newman urged that, to attract students, it was essential that celebrity professors should be chosen to fill professorial chairs in relation to the more important subjects. He conceived education to comprise a balance between personal influence and organized discipline, with personal influence being the priority. Students were to be separated into small communities of twenty or so, with each community having a dean and two or three young men serving as tutors. A certain number of bursaries should also be provided, to be obtained by concursus, which would stimulate industry on the part of the students, and diminish the expense of providing for their upkeep. Newman, as rector, gave some inaugural lectures and wrote several essays addressed to the members of the Catholic University of Ireland. They were collected and published in London in 1859 with the title Lectures and Essays on University Subjects—a companion volume to the first English edition of the Discourses, which had been previously published in Ireland. Since 1873 the two engineering school, which was subsidiary to arts and which opened in the autumn of 1855 with the proposal of a five-year course. Once again there was a professor, very well qualified, but it does not appear that he ever had any student.” Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 159. 38 Barr, op. cit., p. 129.

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works have always been published together under the title: The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated I. In Nine Discourses delivered to the Catholics of Dublin II. In Occasional Lectures and Essays addressed to the Members of the Catholic University.39 The lectures and essays are not arranged in chronological order but according to their contents, which are somewhat lighter than the content of the Discourses. Three essays concern Letters, in themselves and in relation to Christianity; three regard methods of teaching and learning; the other three deal with the proper relation between Christianity and Science; and one is about the challenge that Positivism offered to religion. In the first lecture of this collection, titled ‘Christianity and Letters’, Newman presents the standards of education in ancient and modern civilizations, and traces analogies between them and Christianity. It was read as the opening lecture of the Faculty of Arts courses, on 9th November 1854, six days after the opening of the Catholic University of Ireland, and was reported in the Catholic University Gazette.40 Scratton, the secretary of the Catholic University, writes in his Record: “On Thursday the Culler notes: “The fact that Newman called his work The Idea of a University is interesting because characteristically he named his books from their literary form rather than their subject matter. With only a few exceptions his works are all Sermons, Lectures, Discourses, Tracts, Verses, Historical Sketches, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, an Apologia, and the like. Even the Idea of a University, in the first edition of its two parts, was entitled Discourses and Lectures and Essays, and these formal designations were retained in the secondary title of the third edition. But they were preceded there by the phrase ‘the idea of a university’ because it was that idea which gave unity to the two parts and indeed to all of Newman’s educational writings.” Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), pp. 173-174. 40 This lecture was published in the Catholic University Gazette, n. 25, 16 November 1854, pp. 193-200. In a letter to T. W. Allies, lecturer in philosophy, Newman wrote: “I consider the Lecture which will appear in the Gazette of next week November 16 has something of the Philosophy of History in it.” John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 293. See also McGrath, op. cit., p. 334. 39

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ninth of November an Inaugural Lecture was delivered at the University House, Stephen’s Green by the Very Reverend the Rector. The Subject of the Lecture was, the Opening of the Classical and Mathematical Schools of the University.”41 Newman arranged a programme of Inaugural Lectures to be delivered by the professors in order to open and introduce the new institution to the city of Dublin. After the first lecture, titled ‘On the place held by the Faculty of Arts in the University Course’, each university teachers gave a lecture, in his own field every Thursday evening until the end of the term. The project was so successful that Newman planned a more ambitious programme for the second term to include two types of course, an academic one in the morning and a more popular one in the evening. The evening classes were intended to extend the advantages of the University as far as possible and ladies too could attend them.42 It can be said that in spite of the limitations common to all the universities of the time, due to these evening lectures, from the outset, women could take advantage of the new Catholic University of Ireland.43 ‘Literature’, the second lecture of the collection, was read on 3rd November 1858, the day before Newman’s definitive departure, at the opening of the academic year of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters.44 It is perhaps the best known of these Scratton, op. cit., p. 7. On 16th January 1855 Thomas Scratton wrote to Newman: ”Will ladies be admitted to McCarthy’s lecture? He seems to think they ought to be and I am in some perplexity as I shall have shoals applying here.” Newman replied: “Certainly if Ladies attend the Poetry Lectures, it ceases to be an academical meeting. The mixed Lectures of last term were the sort of exception or anomaly, by way of advertisement, which is not uncommon. I do not object to Ladies being admitted to Mr McCarthy’s lectures; but, if so, it is quite impossible that I can send young men with pencil and paper to take down notes. However, let it be so – the circumstance that the Lectures are paid for will be the excuse for making a distinction.” Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 353. 43 See McGrath, op. cit., p. 350. 44 “On Wednesday the Rector lectured to the School of Philosophy and Letters in the University Room at 2 P. M.” Scratton, op. cit., p. 94. 41 42

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lectures, where Literature is defined as ‘personal use or exercise of language’.45 Insisting on the inseparability of twofold Logos, the thought and the word, Newman states: “A great author, Gentlemen, is not one who merely has a copia verborum, whether in prose or verse, and can, as it were, turn on at his will any number of splendid phrases and swelling sentences; but he is one who has something to say and knows how to say it.”46 The third essay concerning Letters is titled ’Catholic Literature in the English Tongue’ and it has four parts: 1. In its Relation to Religious Literature; 2. To Science; 3. To Classical Literature; 4. To Literature of the Day. The first three parts were published in the Catholic University Gazette under the title ‘On the formation of a Catholic Literature in the English Tongue’.47 In this long essay Newman deals with the particular relationship between English literature, ‘formed on Protestantism’, and Catholicism. He recommends its study, in spite of the presence of authors, like Milton and Gibbon, proud and rebellious creatures of God but endowed with incomparable gifts. Newman speaks of the desirability of forming a Catholic Literature, but, until it comes into being, students should not avoid what he calls: ”the untutored movements of the reason, imagination, passions, and affections of the natural man, the leapings and the friskings, the plungings and the snortings, the sportings and the buffoonings, the clumsy play and the aimless toil, of the noble, lawless savage of God’s intellectual creation.”48 The next essay, ‘Elementary Studies’, brings together many articles from the Catholic University Gazette and the Letter of the Rector to the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters on the introduction of religious teaching into the schools of that Idea, p. 275. Idea, p. 246. 47 ‘On the formation of a Catholic Literature in the English Tongue’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 14, 31 August 1864, pp. 105-109 and n. 15, 7 September 1854, pp. 113-119. 48 Ibid., p. 317. 45 46

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Faculty.49 It is the longest of the essays and provides an illustration of Newman’s methods as a teacher. Its tone and style are different from the other parts of the Lectures and Essays on University Subjects, as some of his thoughts are presented in the form of a dialogue or a letter. Newman critically analyzes, and sometimes satirizes, the statements of educational theory of his time, while long passages are devoted to translations from Greek and Latin. The essay ‘A Form of Infidelity of the Day’ merges two articles that appeared in December 1854 in the Catholic University Gazette.50 Its main subject is the exclusion of theology from the University, and Newman had also extensively tackled this same problem in the Discourses. He avails himself of the opportunity to warn against an obsessive preoccupation with only one subject, and he humorously refers to “the fisherman in the drama, whose eulogy on his deceased lord was, that ‘he was so fond of fish.’”51 The next essay is ‘University Preaching’. Part of the text is a modified version of the letter ‘On the subject of University Preaching’ to Bishop D. Moriarty, which was published in the Catholic University Gazette in March, 1855.52 Another part had been printed in the Catholic University Gazette in April, 1855 under the title ‘Preaching with or without book’.53 For Newman, the pulpit was an essential part of university life; and for this reason this essay, which is rich with guidance for composing 49 The letter was later reprinted in John Henry Newman, My Campaign in Ireland (Aberdeen, 1896) pp. 157-167. 50 John Henry Newman, ‘On the nascent infidelity of the day’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 30, 21 December 1854, pp. 236-240; n. 31, 28 December, pp. 243-248. 51 Idea, p. 397. 52 John Henry Newman, ‘Letter of the Rector to the Right Rev. D. Moriarty, D.D., Bishop of Antigonia, Coadjutor-Bishop of Kerry, On the Subject of University Preaching’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 41, 8 March 1855, pp. 394-400. 53 John Henry Newman, ‘Preaching with or without book’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 42, 5 April 1855, pp. 416-419.

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sermons, finds its place among university subjects. The occasion of the essay was the initiative whereby sermons were delivered in University Church, Dublin, by distinguished preachers. Newman writes in this essay that some of them accompanied their promise of appearing in the pulpit of the new University “with the natural request that I, who had asked for it, should offer them my own views of the mode and form in which the duty would be most satisfactorily accomplished.”54 After the three essays regarding the methods of teaching and learning we find two lectures dealing with the relationship between religion and science, which was already discussed in Discourse IX. The Medical School of the Catholic University of Ireland was opened on November 2nd, 1855, in the second year of the University’s existence. The Inaugural Lecture was given not by Newman, who was unable to attend due to illness, but by Andrew Ellis, Professor of Surgery and Dean of the faculty.55 In the following month Newman presented a lecture that later was published with the title ‘Christianity and Physical Science’.56 The next essay, ‘Christianity and Scientific Investigation’, was never Idea, p. 405. ”On the second of November the School of Anatomy Medicine and Surgery was formally opened by an Inaugural Lecture from the Professor of Surgery, Andrew Ellis Esq. The lecture was very well attended and the School excited general admiration, both for the completeness of its arrangements and the perfect order of every department.” Scratton, op. cit., p. 24. 56 It has now become clear that this lecture was read not in November 1855, as the title in the final edition states, but in December 1855. It was originally planned for 6th December and Newman in his Diaries writes: “About December 10, I read a lecture in the Medical School”. See Letters and Diaries, vol. XVII, pp. 30, 80 and 82. Evidences from the Catholic University Gazette (n. 3, January 1856, p. 3) and from the Report by Thomas Scratton clarify this matter finally. Scratton (op. cit., p. 34) writes: “On Monday December 17 the Rector, the very Rev. Dr. Newman delivered a lecture in one of the theatres of the School of Medicine Cecilia Street. The subject of the Lecture was ‘The connection between Physics and Theology’.” The mistake may be due to confusion with the opening date of the Medical School. 54 55

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delivered,57 although it contains the famous passage on the imperial intellect: What an empire is in political history, such is a University in the sphere of philosophy and research. It is, as I have said, the high protecting power of all knowledge and science, of fact and principle, of inquiry and discovery, of experiment and speculation; it maps out the territory of the intellect, and sees that the boundaries of each province are religiously respected, and that there is neither encroachment nor surrender on any side.58

The evening classes, which began in 1854, were suspended at the end of the academic year, but due to the requests of a number of young men engaged in business in Dublin they were reopened with great success in April, 1858. The statute passed in 1857 enabled students attending these evening classes to sit examinations and to graduate. The lecture ‘Discipline of Mind’ was given by Newman in University Church on November 2nd, 1858, two days before his final departure from Dublin.59 He proudly recalls: I can truly say that I thought of you before you thought of the University; perhaps I may say, long before;—for it was previously to our commencing that great work, which is now so fully before the public, it was when I first came over here to make pre­ parations for it, that I had to encounter the serious objection of 57 A note that is present only in the 1859 edition states that this lecture, written for the School of Science, was never delivered. See John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVII, pp. 71, 79. 58 Idea, p. 459. 59 In his diary Newman wrote ‘Nov. 4 … off for Bm. [Birmingham]’ and there is the added note: ‘Never been in Ireland since (Sept. 3, 1874).’; see McGrath, op. cit., p. 473. Thomas Scratton writes: “On Tuesday November 4th the Rector, Dr. Newman, delivered a lecture to the Dublin College of Evening Classes in the University Church at 8 P. M.” Thomas Scratton, op. cit., p. 94. But he is wrong because November 4th 1858 was a Thursday and not a Tuesday. We also have evidence from Newman’s Diaries that the lecture was given on November 2nd.

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wise and good men, who said to me, “There is no class of persons in Ireland who need a University;” and again, “Whom will you get to belong to it? who will fill its lecture-rooms?” This was said to me, and then, without denying their knowledge of the state of Ireland, or their sagacity, I made answer, “We will give lectures in the evening, we will fill our classes with the young men of Dublin.”60

‘Christianity and Medical Science’, the last lecture of the collection, was read the very day Newman left Ireland for the last time, 4th November 1858.61 After the lecture he distributed prizes and gold medals to the successful medical students. McGrath writes: “His departure immediately after the delivery of his three inaugural addresses must have deepened the sense of loss of those who heard them, for it was in such discourses, embodying the noblest ideals, and opening up the widest vistas of thought, that Newman was at his best, and did his greatest work for the University.”62 The work that we know today as The Idea of a University had a long and complex editorial history. In 1857 Newman was envisaging a new compressed edition of the Discourses to be called The Genius, Scope, and Method of Universities. This second edition was published in 1859 in London by Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, as a companion volume to Lectures and Essays on University Subjects. Its title was The Scope and Nature of University Education; or University Teaching considered in its abstract Scope and Nature. It appeared in Everyman’s Library, containing eight discourses, with the first and second ones combined, and the fifth omitted. The 1859 abridgment involved more than 800 textual changes and omissions, from single words to whole paragraphs. In the final 1873 edition Newman restored Discourse I and omitted the second half of Discourse II; over 750 of the Idea, p. 480. There is no mention of the lecture in Scratton’s Record. “On Thursday Nov. 6 the Rector presided at the distribution of prizes in the Faculty of Medicine in the University Church at one P. M.” Thomas Scratton, op. cit., p. 94. 62 McGrath, op. cit., p. 473. 60 61

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revisions were retained. The 1873 edition collects in one volume the Discourses and the Lectures and Essays under the title: The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated I. In Nine Discourses delivered to the Catholics of Dublin II. In Occasional Lectures and Essays addressed to the Members of the Catholic University. Newman made 240 further changes to the Discourses, which were also renamed. The first and the second discourses were again separated, but the fifth still omitted. The Lectures and Essays were also corrected, mostly from a stylistic point of view, and before Newman’s death other editions with minor textual changes appeared, but the 1873 version is commonly known as the definitive edition. 4. The Catholic University Gazette and The Atlantis One of the first tasks Newman undertook at the onset of the University actually being established was the setting up of a periodical. As he recalls in What I aimed at,63 this publication “would contain a record of the University proceedings, would be a medium of intelligence between its governing body and members, would give a phantasia of life to it in the eyes of strangers, would indoctrinate the Irish public in the idea of a University.”64 In November 1853 Newman requested Mr Henry Wilberforce to be the editor of the proposed Catholic University Gazette, with the subject and tone of the first edition planned as “the history of the rise of the University scheme, the tone not controversial, but courteous to opponents and Queen’s Colleges.”65 The plans did not materialize, however, and Newman was obliged to undertake the editorship himself, until September 1854 when Ro­bert Ornsby accepted the role. The Catholic University Gazette was a small weekly periodical, consisting of just eight pages, published from June 1st, John Henry Newman, My Campaign in Ireland (Aberdeen, 1896), pp. 290-304. (Here after My Campaign). 64 My Campaign, p. 294. 65 My Campaign, p. 295. 63

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1854.66 In January, 1855, under Ornsby’s direction, the size of each issue was increased to sixteen pages, and the price was likewise doubled to two pence. It published monthly from March, 1855 until the end of 1856. Newman wrote: “[the Gazette] fully answered my expectations while it was in my hands; afterwards, it fell off, and came to an end. This was a mis­ fortune.”67 Newman wrote more than fifty articles for the Catholic University Gazette and used most of them in his later books.68 Seven articles became part of the Lectures and Essays on University Subjects, 1859, and four more articles taken from the Catholic University Gazette were added to these seven and included in the second part of The Idea of a University. The article University and King’s College in London was reprinted in My Campaign in Ireland.69 Twenty historical articles on the University were collected from the Gazette and published by Newman in 1856 with the title Office and Work of Universities. They were renamed Rise and Progress of Universities in the 1872 edition, this being “more appropriate to the context” (text from advertisement), and later placed in the third volume of Historical Sketches.70 It must be noted that, unlike the Discourses, the Occasional Lectures and Essays and the articles later collected in Rise and Progress of Universities were written when the Catholic University had already been established, and Newman’s projects were met with both admiration and refutation. Compared to the other two publications, The Catholic University Gazette began on June 8th with the publication of two issues, the first dated June 1st. Price was one penny. 67 My Campaign, p. 295. 68 Newman contributed thirty-one articles during his own editorship and eighteen afterwards; another nine of them have no signature so their authorship is not clear. Fifty-three of them are in volume I and five in volume II. 69 My Campaign, pp. 325-334. 70 Due to a typographical mistake the chronological order of their edition does not correspond to the order expressed in their titles, volume II being published in 1873 and volume III published in 1872. This because in their first edition there was no indication of the order of the volumes. 66

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Rise and Progress of Universities was not directed towards an intellectual audience, which was the one attending his preparatory discourses, but to a wider and more heterogeneous lay public. In the articles, Newman takes up the thread of just some of the matters he dealt with in the Discourses. He leaves out, for instance, the problem of the role of theology in the curriculum, primarily because after the foundation of the Catholic University of Ireland it was no longer relevant. In the same way, the reflections on philosophy as ‘the science of sciences’ are no longer considered. Themes regarding the organization and the balance of the different academic bodies are predominant, but once more, Newman tackles them in a very personal and creative way as an historical narrative. Mary Katherine Tillman writes: “In the ‘Dublin Discourses’, Newman’s presentation of the idea, or formal notion, of a university was like the large and sweeping strokes of a pencil sketch, showing the outlines of the notion as a whole, and the perfectly balanced relationships of parts to whole. In the illustrations of his 1852 Appendix and of the ‘Occasional Lectures and Essays’, Newman filled in detail, dimension and colour – as if painting a portrait; and now, in Rise and Progress of Universities, the idea university comes fully to life in the imagination, and is set in dramatic motion – almost like the protagonist of a great epic.”71 In Rise and Progress of Universities Newman chose to present the life of higher education in its development from ancient Greece to modern times. He does not, however, give a detailed and rigorous historical account; and some historians might find cause to complain about this. “It is, rather, a work of historical imagination – perhaps something like the creative cultural histories of Herodotus, where fact often gives way to enchanting description and embellished story-telling; or like the dramatic history of Thucydides.”72 Newman represents in an imaginative but 71 72

Mary Katherine Tillman, Introduction to RP, p. L. Tillman, op. cit., p. XXXVII.

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plausible way the realisation of an ideal type: the universitas, and he provides a variety of examples, with each one embodying it in a different way. The two fundamental aspects of university living for Newman are discipline and personal influence. These two aspects are manifested in the communal life within the college and in the person of the teacher respectively. A University embodies the principle of progress, and a College that of stability; the one is the sail, and the other the ballast; each is sufficient in itself for the pursuit, extension, and inculcation of knowledge; each is useful to the other. The University is for the world, and the College is for the nation. The University is for the Professor, and the College for the Tutor; the University is for the philosophical discourse, the eloquent sermon, or the well contested disputation; and the College for the catechetical lecture. […] The University being the element of advance, will fail in making good its ground as it goes; the College, from its Con­ servative tendencies, will be sure to go back, because it does not go forward. It would seem as if a University seated and living in Colleges, would be a perfect institution, as possessing excellences of opposite kinds.73

University education for Newman clearly derives from the balance of discipline and influence. “The ‘University principle,’ then is expansive personal influence, whereas the ‘Collegiate principle’ is concentrated discipline; the former defines, the latter completes. And in the flourishing university, both principles ideally work together in harmonious accord.”74 Newman demonstrates how throughout the centuries, from the Athens schools to the medieval universities up to the contemporary universities, many educational systems followed on from each other, sometimes harmoniously, sometimes dialectically, but always with discipline and influence present. 73 John Henry Newman, ‘Abuses of the Collegiate System’, Catholic University Gazette, n. 29, 14 December 1854, p. 227. Also in RP, p. 228. 74 Tillman, op. cit., p. XLIX.

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The two chapters, Colleges the Corrective of Universities and Abuses of the Colleges, devoted to the Oxford University, present this old institution as an example of the abuse of the college system, where research has been sacrificed in the name of internal traditions. The Colleges, left to themselves, in the course of the last century became shamefully indolent and inactive. They were in no sense any longer places of education; they were for the most part mere clubs, and sinecures, and almshouses, where the inmates did little but enjoy themselves.75

An abuse of privileges granted to these academic bodies occurred, such that, with time, they deviated from the university mission, thereby losing sight of their authentic purpose in Newman’s opinion. Newman considers the colleges, ideally speaking, to be the continuation of the ancient monastic schools that preceded the rise of the medieval universities. After the golden age, during which the rise and spread of the medieval universities was a shining example of the balance of both discipline and influence, political change in the fifteenth century led again to the dominance of the college power.76 A progressive loss of the international character of universities is perceived, and they become more and more the expression of local bodies, fitting the local classes’ needs. The article ‘Professors and Tutors’ is expressly devoted to the problem of the university organization. Newman opposes the German model of a university, where the teacher and the lesson are a central aspect of the college model, and students are guided by tutors who take care of their studies. He proposes a mixed system, where college life and lessons are alongside each other. If the lesson is the ‘being’ of a university, the college is its ‘wellbeing’; colleges constitute the integrity of a University77, they John Henry Newman, ‘Abuses of the Collegiate System’, Catholic University Gazette, n. 29, 14 December 1854, p. 230. Also in RP, p. 235. 76 See RP, pp. 221-222. 77 RP, p. 182. 75

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“have no pretension indeed to be the essence of a University, but are conservative of that essence”.78 According to Newman human relations among the students, and between them and their teachers, are vital forms of beneficial interaction during the years of study. The tutor is somewhat of an intermediate figure because he takes part in the common life, shares places and times of the college, and at the same time is himself a teacher, looking after the intellectual growth of the many that are entrusted to him. McGrath affirms: “With this conviction in his mind of the primary value of personal influence in the relations between teachers and pupils, it is not surprising to find that, from the beginning, Newman’s whole inclination was to stress it rather than formal discipline. In this, it would appear, his views were more liberal than those of at least some of his clerical associates.”79 Besides the Catholic University Gazette, Newman intended to institute a journal specifically devoted to the publication of researches by his faculty. In the calendar of the 1856-7 session it was explained that in order to take another step in advance of its successes, the University was launching a new periodical ‘as the repository and record of its intellectual proficiency’.80 On the same announcement a list of subjects was provided on which papers were promised by the professors. The first issue of The Atlantis: A Register of Literature and Science appeared on January 1st, 1858; thence forward it appeared biannually in 1858, 1859, 1862 and 1863, with a final single edition in February, 1870. Each issue contained about two hundred pages and was divided in three portions, devoted respectively to Literature, Science and Notices, Literary or Scientific. McGrath underlines: “It had a markedly scientific character, in consonance with its original purpose of justifying to the public RP, p. 189. McGrath, op. cit., p. 337. 80 My Campaign, p. 430. 78 79

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the faculty of science, but there were many literary contributions. O’Curry wrote constantly on Celtic literature, and one of Denis Florence McCarthy’s translations from Calderon first saw the light in its pages. Liturgists will be interested to note that among Newman’s rare contributions was a curious little article on the Ordo de Tempore,81 devoted to a somewhat complicated exposition of the manner in which the movable feasts are fixed.”82 From the beginning it was clear that the publication would not get underway without considerable financial outlay, and as time passed the University was unable to sustain the expenses. Newman recalls that “The Atlantis magazine […] originated in the same idea, the object of encouraging our scientific labours, and forming the faculty, and making its members work together, and advertising the University. The literary portion of it was necessary as padding, because science does not deal in words, and the results of a year’s experiments may be contained in one or two pages; but the literary portion ought to have been paid for, and was not, and so the publication dragged on its life with difficulty, and now, I suppose, may be considered to be defunct.”83 Of all the articles Newman had written for the Atlantis only two were later republished. The first one, “The Mission of the Benedictine Order”, appeared in the inaugural issue of the Atlantis in January, 1858, and concluded with the words: “To be continued”. The second appeared under the title “The Benedictine Centuries” one year later, in January, 1859. Newman republished both Benedictine essays in 1872 in Historical Sketches III under their present titles, which are, respectively, “Mission of St. Benedict” and “Benedictine Schools”. Looking at the history of education in the Christian era, Newman portrays three religious orders that “represent the teaching given by the Catholic Church during the time of The Atlantis, Vol. V, No. 1, 1870, pp. 1-12. McGrath, op. cit., p. 438. 83 My Campaign, p. 299. 81 82

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their ascendancy”. They are the Benedictines in ancient times, when society was breaking up, the Dominicans in medieval times, a period of re-construction, and the Jesuits, when the Reformation commenced. Each of them exemplified the intellectual training of their times for Newman. To St. Benedict he assigns “for his discriminating badge, the element of Poetry; to St. Dominic the Scientific element; and to St. Ignatius, the Practical”.84 Even if, in these writings, he also deals with the issues of personal influence and discipline, it must be recognised that the main subject of the Benedictine Essays is not education, but monasticism. 5. Sermons and Other Papers Newman exercized profound influence as a preacher and leader of the Tractarian Movement while he was Vicar of St. Mary’s, the university parish in Oxford. The pulpit was for him an essential part of university life, and he wished to introduce in Dublin the Oxford tradition of sermons given by distinguished preachers.85 His idea was realised when University Church was opened in May 1856, and he was the most notable preacher. “There is practically no mention of them [Sermons] in his correspondence, but a few stray references show that they attracted large congregations. Thus on July 22nd, after his second sermon, ‘The Religion of the Pharisee the Religion of Mankind,’ he wrote to St John ‘I had 1,000 people to my sermon on Sunday, and cleared above £21.’”86 RP, p. 366. “Newman addressed to them all a memorandum containing two brief but salutary stipulations, the exclusion of political subjects, and a time limit – generous enough to our modern minds – of forty minutes.” McGrath, op. cit., p. 414. 86 Ibid., p. 415. See also John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVII, p. 329. 84 85

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Eight of his sermons, preached in 1856 and 1857, were published in London in 1857 under the title Sermons Preached on Various Occasions. During Newman’s life this work went through six editions, with the last one being published in 1887. In the third edition, 1870, two new sermons and notes were added, and in the fourth edition, 1874, another sermon was added. The importance of these sermons is not comparable with the fortune Newman had as a preacher in Oxford, but nevertheless, they were conceived to play a particular and undeniable function in the education given by his University. “In his style and tone we see Newman combining his role of rector/ teacher with that of pastor – roles which he himself believed were inseparable.”87 In the first sermon, preached the Sunday after the opening, Newman clarifies the essential place of University Church in his project: I wish in the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion. […] Devotion is not a sort of finish given to the sciences; not is science a sort of feather in the cap. […] I want intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual.88

The Catholic University of Ireland eventually went into decline for many different reasons. Firstly, this was due to the limitations of its own promoters. Newman, for instance, had little knowledge of the political and social situation of post-famine Ireland, and because of his English origin it was often difficult for his Irish contacts and peers to accept him. Moreover, he worked under a great personal stress due to the Achilli affair. He had not given up his position in the Oratory in Birmingham 87 McCartney D. and O’Loughlin T. (ed.) Cardinal Newman and The Catholic University: A University College Dublin Commemorative Volume (Dublin, 1990), p. 110. 88 John Henry Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (London, 1874), p. 13. (Here after Sermons).

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and this twofold allegiance, which involved frequent travels between England and Ireland, affected his achievements in Dublin. He said that he expended two times more effort than should have been required in order to achieve what needed to be accomplished while he was in Ireland. It is not necessary to stress how the attractiveness of the new University was linked to Newman’s reputation, so that when he finally left forever the University had much less to offer to prospective students and professors. Irish bishops never reached an agreement on the Catholic University of Ireland, and the tension between the two principal figures, Cullen and MacHale, and their followers, prevented the Catholic University from being identified as a common enterprise of the whole Irish Church. Even if the historian Colin Barr has successfully proved that Cullen always acted according to the best possible intentions, his strong personality, at least as it was perceived by Newman, negatively affected the development of the University.89 McGrath writes: “It cannot for a moment be doubted that the influence of Dr Cullen on the University and its identification with him militated gravely against its success. It is obvious that he was a man who had few friends and many enemies, that his strong political views estranged him from, and rendered him incapable of, seeing good in those opposed to him, that he had a natural inability to entrust responsibility to others, and an excessive caution in acting himself.”90 Besides the human limitations of those involved in the University, it must be added that the historical realities of the situation also contributed to its failure. The Catholic University never had enough students; this was due to a lack of secondary schools functioning as feeder institutions for the University, and the fact that the Maynooth seminary absorbed all ecclesiastical students. In 89 See Colin Barr, Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-1865 (Leominster, 2003) 90 McGrath, op. cit., p. 503.

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addition, the Irish Catholic elite and middle class were not sizeable enough to provide a sufficient number of pupils. Moreover, the Catholic University was not able to attract students from other countries, especially one of the most likely recruiting grounds, i.e. England. Oxford and Cambridge, in 1854 and 1855, abolished religious tests for matriculation and the B.A. degree, with a corresponding diminution of English Catholics’ interest in an institution overseas. From the beginning of his project Newman was well aware of these problems, and before the University was opened he wrote in a letter to his dear friend William Froude: “The great difficulty, between ourselves is, that, what with emigration, campaigning, ruin of families, and the pusillanimity induced by centuries of oppression, there seems to be no class to afford members for a University – and next, there is a deep general impression that this is the case, which is nearly as hopeless a circumstance as the case itself, supposing that case to be a fact.”91 The final, but nonetheless important, reason for the failure of the Catholic University was its lack of a charter, or formal licence by the State to confer degrees. In fact, only the Medical School, which did not need a charter because it was linked to the Royal College of Surgeons, survived. Arthur Dwight Culler in his study The Imperial Intellect writes: “The lack of a charter for granting degrees, the division and hostility among the bishops, the dearth of pupils, and the simple poverty of the land –these are the reasons for the relative failure of Newman’s university. But although the university languished and the nations of the world never came flocking to Dublin for their education, there did go forth from Dublin a conception of education which has deeply influenced the universities of the Englishspeaking world. And in this sense one might say that the institution at Dublin did become an ‘Imperial University’”.92 John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 66. See also Ibid. p. 68. 92 Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 170. 91

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In 1896, Father William Neville of the Oratory, personal secretary to Newman, printed for private circulation various papers relating to the Catholic University under the title My Campaign in Ireland Part I Catholic University Reports and Others Papers. Despite the title alluding to a prospective second part, only one volume was actually published. Most of the papers collected in My Campaign in Ireland were written by Newman, and all relate to his Dublin activity. Neville presents them in chronological order with an extended Advertisement and many notes. The longest and most important documents from My Campaign in Ireland are the official Reports. The rector was requested to send an Annual Report to the Archbishops regarding the University, and Newman produced three Annual Reports for the years 1854-5, 1855-6 and 1856-7.93 These are detailed accounts and deal with such aspects of the University as its establishment, the appointments of professors, the erection of the library and of the church, the foundation of a printing press and of a Museum of Antiquities, the conferring of degrees and prizes, the arrangement of students’ accommodation and of the Rector’s House. In My Campaign in Ireland two reports connected with the three official ones are also reprinted, they are Memoranda, presented during the synodal meetings held on May 20th, 1854 and on June 20th, 1856. The former, written at the end of the first academic year, is a relatively brief presentation of the aims and the organization of the new Catholic University of Ireland, while the latter represents an updated idea of the university project, with stress placed on the afforded expenses. Two other relevant papers printed in My Campaign in Ireland are the Report on the Organization of the Catholic University of Ireland and its Postscript. These are the very first writings by Newman related directly to the University. They were written in 93 A fourth one on 1857-58, must have been written but is now lost. See My Campaign, p. xxxviii.

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conjunction with his colleagues Dr Patrick Leahy, who was soon to become the archbishop of Cashel, and Mr. Myles W. O’Reilly. The papers were presented to the University Committee on November 12th, 1851 the same day as Newman was acclaimed president of the new Catholic University of Ireland.94 A first project of the University to come is herein drawn; it would regard mainly the organization of the faculties and the government of the University. In My Campaign Neville collected some official administrative and academic pieces, in addition to the official reports. The first is a detailed Scheme of Rules and Regulations submitted by the rector to the Council in April, 1856 regarding the constitution of the University, the discipline of the members, the academical course, and the examinations. The second is a long letter dated June, 1856. It was written by Newman to the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters and addresses the introduction of religious teaching into the schools of that faculty as he considers this teaching congruous and desirable. He directly recommends the study of ecclesiastical history and history of Scripture, while pure theology, he contends, should be excluded in favour of doctrinal subjects as contained in the catechism. Part of this letter was reprinted in the essay titled ‘Elementary Studies’, in the second part of The Idea of a University. The largest section of My Campaign in Ireland consists of a Supplement in which relevant speeches, articles or notes are collected. Discourse I and V, as published in the first 1852 edition of The Scope and Nature of University Education, are reprinted in the Supplement in order to present them in their original form, i.e. before editorial changes. In subsequent editions Discourses I and II were combined and Discourse V was omitted. After these two Discourses in the Supplement can be found the Statement of August 14th, 1852. This consists of a long letter 94

The original paper and its draft can be found in the UCD Archives.

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to Dr Cullen, Archbishop of Dublin, in which Newman details his wishes and perplexities concerning the future development of the University, although this letter was never sent.95 Among other things, it contains a remarkable mention of the possible erection of a theatre for students, but this plan was not pursued. It is followed by a rough and unfinished copy written by Newman as an introductory paper to the Dublin correspondence, with the title ’What I aimed at’. Some portions from the initial Address to the students at the opening of the University on November 3rd, 1853 can be also found in the Supplement. Unfortunately, the Address was not preserved except in these notes.96 Neville also included in the Supplement the article University and King’s College in London, taken from the Catholic University Gazette of May 15th, 1855. This was in order to clarify Newman’s thoughts regarding the Liberalism of his time, and the need to confront, through a Catholic University, the advancing infidelity in Ireland.97 It is followed by a written record of the first and only University Senate meeting at which Newman presided on January 15th, 1857. My Campaign in Ireland also contains, under the title The Catholic University: its Defence and its Recommendation, a collection of newspaper articles that Newman wrote in 1857. These 95 “I wrote him [Cullen] a very long statement setting forth my own views on the best mode of starting the University. When I had written it, I had not courage to send it; but instead I wrote him a letter in which I said ‘I have written you a long letter, so full of details, that I am ashamed to send it. It seems to me, it will only plague your Grace, considering how much your thoughts are employed.’” My Campaign, p. 291. See also John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, pp. 145-150. 96 In order to recollect the atmosphere of the first day of the new University, these notes may be usefully amplified by reference to an article, written by Robert Ornsby, Professor of Classical Literature, contained in the issue of the Catholic University Gazette of February 1st 1855. 97 John Henry Newman, ‘University and King’s College in London’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 43, 15 May 1855, pp. 433-436.

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were written in order to encourage public discussion in England on the Catholic University of Ireland.98 Two brief but important documents regarding the Atlantis can also be found in the volume. The first one, taken from the Calendar of the Irish Catholic University of the Session of 185657, is a prospectus of a new Literary and Scientific Periodical, with an appendix providing a list of subjects on which papers were promised by the Professors.99 The second document is an introduction to the first issue of the Atlantis journal. My Campaign in Ireland also contains two papers that were written after Newman’s retirement and hence are not to be considered part of the Dublin Writings. One is a contribution to a book called Omaggio Cattolico ai Principi degli Apostoli Pietro e Paolo, presented to Pius IX in honour of his jubilee. The second is the speech Newman gave in Rome when he was made cardinal by Leo XIII on 12th May 1879. In addition to Newman’s works, the volume also includes some extracts from the official Letters of Pius IX and of Propaganda Fide regarding the Catholic University, some reports from the professors, some notices from the Catholic University Gazette, a note by Pollen on the University Church, some addresses to Newman on his elevation to cardinalate, with his replies, and an abstract of “gross receipts and expenditures” updated to October, 1855. All this material, although historically relevant to the Catholic University of Ireland, was not written by Newman, and so for my purposes it is not taken into account as part of his Dublin Writings. All in all, I suggest that My Campaign in Ireland should be read as an integration of the more famous writings that Newman Six of them were published in the first half of 1858. There are also there brief articles gathered under the heads Contemporary Events – Home Affairs. They were published by Newman as editor of the The Rambler in May and June 1859, when his Irish stay had been completed but his concern with the University still alive. 99 An original copy, which belonged to Eugene O’Curry, can be found in the UCD Archives. 98

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produced while he was in Dublin. The material illustrates and brings to light many facets of the real life and functioning of the Catholic University of Ireland and, as Culler suggests, they represent in some way a correction to the theoretical model presented in the Idea.100

Culler writes: “A study of the Catholic University of Ireland provides the most significant corrective to the Dublin Discourses, for whereas in the latter Newman had insisted upon a curriculum exclusively liberal, in his actual university only the first two years were so; and whereas in the Discourses he had repudiated the notion that research was a function of the university, in Dublin he made it a very prominent function. Apparently, seeing the needs of Ireland at firsthand and thinking more largely and practically about the problems of society than he had before, he did actually attain to a broader and more realistic conception of a university than that which he had expressed in his lectures. But after all, those lectures do not pretend to say everything about a university that can be said. Despite their title, they do not speak of a university in toto but only of the arts portion and of that portion only in its inner idea.” Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 226. 100

CHAPTER TWO

Source Ideas of the Human Person: Agreements and Disagreements

1. Aristotle There is no doubt that Aristotle is the philosopher who most influenced Newman in his Dublin enterprise, even if this influence has still to be fully appreciated.1 He is the author that Newman cites most, with more than twenty direct or indirect quotations in the Idea of a University, and at least ten in Rise and Progress of Universities.2 Discourse V of the Idea contains the greatest tribute Newman ever made to a non-Christian author: While the world lasts, will Aristotle’s doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great 1 It is surprising that Aristotle is never mentioned in Fergal McGrath’s Newman’s University: Idea And Reality, which is probably the best study on Newman and the university. I agree with Joshua P. Hochschild when he maintains that “The influence of Aristotle—especially the Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics—is widely acknowledged but nonetheless usually underestimated. It is assumed that because Newman’s exposure to Aristotle was early, it does not give us much insight into Newman’s mature thought. Such an assumption counts against both the consistency of Newman’s intellectual career and the implicit Aristotelianism of the central features of Newman’s philosophy.” Joshua P. Hochschild, ‘The Re-imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman’, Modern Age, Fall 2003, pp. 333-342. 2 Aristotle is quoted also in some of the letters and in some of the notes Newman wrote in those years. See John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, pp. 45, 95; vol. XVI, pp. 130 and J. Derek Holmes (ed.) The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, pp. 25, 38.

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Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it.3

Aristotle’s presence is so intense in Newman that the author of the entry ‘John Henry Newman’ in the Catholic Encyclopaedia wrote: ”he never went beyond Aristotle in his general views of education.”4 I will endeavour to refute this judgment, showing not only how much Newman owes to Aristotle, but also how original was the use he made of the Philosopher. It cannot be disputed that Newman was amply familiar with Aristotle’s work. In his early years at Oxford he read the Rhetoric, the Poetics and the Nicomachean Ethics.5 Talking about Newman’s philosophical preferences, Sillem says, “It is worthwhile noting that Newman retained throughout his life a special affection for the Rhetoric, urging it upon his students during the few years he was a Tutor, and sometimes even quoting it in his letters.”6 What Sillem affirms is true, in that Newman remained interested mostly in these works throughout his life. By contrast, he had little contact with other important Aristotelian works such as De Anima, the Physics and the Metaphysics, which he rarely Idea, pp. 109-110. William Barry, ‘John Henry Newman’ in The Catholic Encyclopaedia (Robert Appleton Company, 1911), vol. X, pp. 794-800. 5 These three books were part of the Greek curriculum for Honours in Classics, which he attempted in 1820. See Edward Sillem (ed.), The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman (Louvain, 1969), p. 151 note n. 6 for a detailed account of different translations and editions of Aristotle’s works in Newman’s library. 6 Thomas Mozley wrote to his mother in December 1826: “I have received very great attentions this term, both from my tutor (Newman) and the Dean. I go up to Collections next Thursday; after that I shall stay in Oxford a week to read Dr. Whately’s ‘Rhetoric’ preparatory to making a careful study of Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’ at home, which Newman, my tutor, strongly recommends.” Anne Mozley (ed.), Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman During His Life in the English Church (London and New York, 1890) p. 116. See also Sillem, op. cit, p. 151. 3 4

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mentioned or referred to. In his Dublin Writings we find quotations only from the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics, while in the Grammar of Assent seventeen passages are taken from the Nicomachean Ethics, three from the Rhetoric, two from the Poetics and none from any of Aristotle’s other writings. In 1819, when he was a student in Trinity College, he wrote an elaborate analysis of the Rhetoric under the guidance of the Dean, the Rev W. Morgan Kinsey. In the same period he carried out a careful reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, which, according to Mark Pattison, was the great ‘stock in-trade’ of the examiners in Oxford.7 In these early years two writings possess an explicit Aristotelian character: the article titled On the Analogous Nature of the Difficulties in Mathematics and those of Religion, which he wrote for the Christian Observer in March 1821; and the essay Poetry with reference to Aristotle’s Poetics, which was published in the first issue of the London Review in 1829.8 Frank M. Turner notes that no further significant commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics appeared in English until 1894.9 7 Quoted in Culler, op. cit., p. 18. See note n. 106. Turner writes: “After the adoption of the Examination Statute of 1800, which established a more formal and rigorous program of study and evaluation, the Ethics rapidly assumed a central place in the Literae Humanories program and maintained that position for the rest of the century. More Oxford students read the Ethics, or at least its first four books, than any other single treatise, and more tutors had to teach it.” Frank M. Turner The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven and London, 1981), pp. 323-324. 8 The essay was published again in the first volume of Essays Critical and Historical. See John Henry Newman, Essay Critical and Historical (London, 1871), vol. I, Essay I. See also Geoffrey Tillotson ‘Newman’s Essay on Poetry: An Exposition and Comment’ in Criticism and the Nineteenth Century (London, 1951), pp. 147-187. 9 “Yet no British philosopher, logician, or classicist wrote a significant commentary on Aristotelian logic. The Poetics fared little better. John Henry Newman wrote an essay on that treatise when he was a very young scholar, but no further significant commentary appeared until S. H. Butcher published Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art in 1894.” Frank M. Turner The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven and London, 1981), p. 322.

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Newman’s interest in Aristotle grew through the influence of Richard Whately, whom he worked with from 1822 until 1828. At that time, Whately was attempting to restore Aristotelianism in Oxford, in opposition to the Scottish School of Philosophy at Edinburgh University and the Common Sense School of Thomas Reid.10 Culler writes: “it was Whately who made them [the Ethics and Rhetoric] for many years the leading class-books of his university. For the deep Aristotelian character of Oxford minds, in both his own generation and the generation thereafter, no one was so responsible as Whately.”11 He is in fact the author of the entries ‘Aristotle’, ‘Rhetoric’, ‘Logic’ and ‘Metaphysics’ in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. Newman played an active part in this Aristotelian revival in Oxford, and in the Preface of his well-received Elements of Logic, in 1826, Whately thanked Newman as “the original author of several pages”.12 It is almost certain that in these years of collaboration the young scholar helped his master in the drafting of the equally influential Elements of Rhetoric.13 In one of those curious coincidences of life, during Newman’s Dublin period Richard Whately was the Church of Ireland archbishop of Dublin, although they never met. The obituary written in the Times of London on the occasion of Newman’s death reads: “One old See Jamie Ferreira, Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt (Oxford, 1986). Culler, op. cit., p. 39. 12 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (London, 1826), p. viii. Newman gave a detailed account of his contribution to the volume in a letter sent to William Monsell on the 10th October 1852. See John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, pp. 175-179. 13 Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (London, 1828). “Richard Whately himself had a great influence in shaping Newman as a rhetorician. […] He also engaged Newman to make a handwritten copy of ‘Method of Composition,’ which we now know was the ouline of the famous rhetoric text that Whately published two years after the logic text”. Edward P. J. Corbett, ‘Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry Newman’, College Composition and Communication, n. 31 (1980), p. 402. See also Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia, 1989), p. 8 and p. 240 note 29. 10 11

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friendship he found to be lost beyond recovery. After some ineffectual attempts at mutual civility, he and Archbishop Whately found it more convenient to pass without recognition, painful as it might be to both of them.”14 With the development of his own thought Newman’s interest in Aristotle waned. He became particularly dissatisfied with Aristotelian logic as it was unable to grasp the complexity of human life. In the University Sermons he quotes Aristotle a few times criticising, particularly in the second sermon, his description of the virtuous man.15 It was only after his conversion to Catholicism that Newman’s earlier interest reappeared.16 Indeed, most of his ideas on the intellectual dimension of the human being come from a creative interpretation of Aristotle. Even if Newman does not dare to engage himself in metaphysical dilemmas, he moves within that Aristotelian frame of mind which we could call classical realism. We can consider Aristotle’s whole life as an attempt to provide structure and sense to the entire knowledge of his time via interrelating the different branches of the current sciences according to an overriding principle of unity. This is precisely the task of a university in modern times, according to Newman. In his Dublin Writings he links the proper organization of the sciences to the way in which the human mind conceives reality. This has its basis not in a transcendental subject but, on the one hand, in the structure of reality and, on the other hand, in the intellectual dimension of the person. The assumption underlying all Newman’s thought is that everything that exists forms a large ‘Death of Cardinal Newman’, Times, August 12 1890, pp. 7-8. See also John Henry Newman, Autobiographical Writings (London and New York, 1956), pp. 69 and 84-85. 15 Sermon VIII also contains a quotation from the third book of Aristotle’s Ethics. Aristotle is briefly mentioned in Sermon XIII. 16 “[…] when he became a Catholic, Newman’s regard for Aristotle was far less reserved and cautious; his works indeed abound in eulogies of the Philosopher”. Sillem, op. cit, p. 159. 14

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system, each portion of which has countless relationships with the other parts. Knowledge consists in the apprehension of these parts, whether in themselves or in their mutual positions and bearings. The entire universe is so intimately knit together that we cannot separate portion from portion, or operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction and artificial division. Knowledge is one because reality is one and to know is to know reality.17 What I want to suggest is that the very idea of a unity of knowledge, which is the core thought of Newman’s Dublin Writings, is Aristotelian. Newman does not elaborate a hierarchy of sciences, neither does he structure a precise system in which each science has its own position. In contrast to Aristotle, whose mind was more encyclopaedic, Newman emphasises, rather, the need for a unity, leaving to the scientist or to the scholar the task of making this unity a reality for everyone, at least in so far as providing scientific or scholarly proof of unity. The underlying rationale of university education, at least as Newman intended it, is universal knowledge, which is yet another Aristotelian concept. “All men by nature desire to know” says the famous opening sentence of Metaphysics.18 Universality is here meant in at least two senses: all men want to know, and knowledge regards everything. The very word ‘university’ expresses the convergence towards unity at which all disciplines aim, while at the same time also expressing the space that any discipline must hold in order to investigate its object. Using this concept Newman is able to argue for the inclusion of theology in the university curriculum: if the university is the place of universal knowledge, he maintains, no field of study can be excluded. Universal knowledge can be understood on two levels: institutional and personal, the university and the scholar. What is relevant for my research is not so much Newman’s educational project, as his idea of the human being that lies 17 18

See Idea, p. 45. Aristotle, Metaphysics I,1 980a.

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behind the project, and hence what it means for the man that Newman had in mind to pursue universal knowledge. In the Idea, one of Newman’s most appealing descriptions of philosophy has a strong Aristotelian character. “Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy.”19 This has clear reference to Aristotle for at least two reasons. Firstly, it alludes to the beginning of Aristotle’s Politics where it is stated: “For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave”.20 The second reason is because the metaphor of the map is explicitly related to Aristotle in the article The Strength and Weakness of Universities. Abelard,21 which later became the sixteenth chapter of Rise and Progress of Universities, where Newman connects the rise of the university with the forming of a new philosophy inspired by the discovery of Arab and Latin translations of Aristotle: “Aristotle, the most comprehensive intellect of Antiquity, as the one who had conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of knowledge, and subjecting all things to one profound analysis, became the presiding master in their lecture halls.”22 It is worth noting that in the 1852 edition the passage (“Not to know the relative disposition …”) is followed by a Latin quotation that has been moved in following editions. The original quote reads: Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.23 Idea, p. 113. Aristotle, Politics I, 1 1252a. 21 John Henry Newman, ‘The Strength and Weakness of Universities. Abelard’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 26, 23 November 1854, pp. 202-206. 22 Ibid. p. 203. Also in RP, p. 195. 23 Virgil, Georgics II, 489-490. In the Appendix to the 1852 edition of the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Newman reported a 19 20

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The passage is from the Georgics of Virgil. Even if ‘to know the causes of things’ (rerum cognoscere causas) is a perfect summary of Aristotle’s theory of knowledge, Virgil was actually referring to Lucretius, the Roman epicurean poet. Newman moved this quote from the Fifth Discourse, where he addresses Liberal Knowledge, to the Sixth Discourse, where he describes the intellect that has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, and which he found to be common to all the greatest ancient schools: peripatetic, stoic and epicurean. I want now to present a thesis that no Newman scholar has proposed: namely that the main source of inspiration for Newman’s Dublin Writings is Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous man that was developed particularly in the Nicomachean Ethics. Newman’s originality lies in the fact that he applies these reflections not merely to the person as such, but to a social body, which is the university, and moreover, not for ethical purposes, but rather in the intellectual realm. I suggest the primary reason previous commentators have not proposed this interpretation is because they have only considered the Idea of a University, and given no relevance to other works of the same period, in particular Rise and Progress of Universities. In order to better understand my thesis it is necessary to provide a brief account of Aristotle’s thought on this particular issue. Aristotle wrote the Ethics, and dedicated it to his young son Nicomachus, with a view to instructing him in the ways a good person should live and a good society should be structured, in order to make such lives possible. Ethics, according to Aristotle, is not a collection of moral rules, rather it considers how a person can have a fulfilled life and how he can achieve his full potential in the context of a community. In order to perform a long quotation from Francis Bacon’s Advantages of Learning in which these verses are mentioned. See John Henry Newman, Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin. (Dublin, 1852), p. 404. These same verses are also commented on by Blaise Pascal in the 73rd of his Pensées.

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good action it is not sufficient to know merely what is right or wrong, it is also necessary to be trained; therefore Aristotle claims that his work has also this practical aim. Since the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged is not, like others, theoretical in its aim – because we are studying not to know what goodness is, but how to become good men, since otherwise it would be useless – we must apply our minds to the problem of how our actions should be performed, because, as we have just said, it is these that actually determine our dispositions.24

Aristotle provides a hierarchy of reasons why actions are performed: we make or do things for their own sake or for the sake of something else that we want. The highest of all ends is the fulfilled life of the community. Politics and ethics both aim towards the good, and they are intimately connected. But what is a fulfilled life? Aristotle does not say so much about what it consists of, but rather calls it eudaimonia. If, then, our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all the other ends – if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for this will involve an infinite progression, so that our aim will be pointless and ineffectual) – it is clear that this must be the Good, that is the supreme good.25

The supreme good is that which is desired for its own sake and for the sake of which we desire all other ends or goods. Every person wants the best from their life, and everything he does can be explained as a contribution to achieve that end, so his actions are means to an ultimate end, or telos. The fulfilled life is the most complete end and is sufficient of itself. It is sought for its own sake and not for something else. Aristotle calls aretē the habitual disposition towards the good, a term which may be translated as virtue. Virtue is not necessarily 24 25

Aristotle, Ethics II, 1 1103b 26-31. Aristotle, Ethics I, 1 1094a 19-22.

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meant in a moral sense, but simply as excellence of character. Eudaimonia is an activity in accordance with aretē, i.e. in accordance with ethical and dianoetical virtues. Moral virtues are dispositions of character; they drive the choices that are made to attain some particular end established by the reason. They concern the irrational soul as they are excellent conditions of passions. We are constituted by nature to receive moral virtues, but their full development in us is due to habit.26 Dianoetical or intellectual virtues, instead, concern the perfection of the rational soul. Similar to the ethical virtues, they are habitual dispositions but they aim at the intellectual good.27 Given this short sketch of Aristotle, we can proceed to consider the way Newman profited from the Aristotelian paradigm. The most important text that I put forward in order to support my thesis is an article that Newman published in the Catholic University Gazette titled ‘Professorial and Tutorial Systems’,28 which later became the fifteenth chapter of Rise and Progress of Universities with the title ‘Professors and Tutors’.29 In this article Newman quotes extensively from the seventh and eighth paragraphs of the first book of Aristotle’s Ethics. In his discussion as to whether or not a University should be conducted on the system of professors, or on the system of colleges and college tutors, he uses the concepts of integrity and happiness. I purpose, then, to state here what is the obvious safeguard of a University from the evils to which it is liable if left to itself, or what may be called, to use the philosophical term, its integrity. By the “integrity” of anything is meant a gift superadded to its nature, without which that nature is indeed complete, and can act, and fulfil its end, but does not find itself, if I may use the expression, in easy circumstances. It is in fact very much what See Aristotle, Ethics I. See Aristotle, Ethics VI. 28 John Henry Newman, ‘Professional and Tutorial Systems’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 10, 3 August 1854, pp. 75-80. 29 RP, pp. 179-191. 26 27

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easy circumstances are in relation to human happiness. This reminds me of Aristotle’s account of happiness, which is an instance in point. He specifies two conditions, which are required for its integrity; it is indeed a state of mind [soul in the original article from the Catholic University Gazette], and in its nature independent of externals, yet he goes on (inconsistently we might say, till we make the distinction I am pointing out), he goes on, I say, after laying down that “man’s chief good is an energy of the soul according to virtue,” to add, “besides this, throughout the greater part of life,—for, as neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring, so neither does one day, nor a short time, make a man blessed and happy”.30

The first thing to be noted is that Newman makes an original use of Aristotle, adapting to the university his reflections on the moral agent. We may find the presentation of a university as a moral actor bizarre, but here morality is conceived not as a theory of obligations, but in an Aristotelian sense: how to live a full and rich life. Newman was trying to provide an answer to the question: How can a university have a rich life? And this becomes, for him, a moral problem. Thinking in Aristotelian terms, Newman distinguishes between the concept of a nature, which entails a basic definition of an entity, and its perfection. He then, in presenting an analogy between a human being and a university, elaborates his notion of integrity, which, in my interpretation, corresponds to the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia. It is “a gift superadded to its nature, without which that nature is indeed complete, and can act, and fulfil its end, but does not find itself, in easy circumstances.” A university is a body that, when based on a system of lectures and professors, already possesses its ‘natural’ features, but it is not complete, and therefore cannot achieve its full potential. It is for this reason Newman holds the view that a university 30 RP, pp. 180-181. Aristotle’s quotes are from Ethics I, 6 1098a 16-17; 20-22. Unless otherwise noted, all citations include the original emphasis and punctuation.

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requires also colleges and tutors, which is one of the main subjects discussed in Rise and Progress of Universities.31 He writes: Here then is one condition, which in some sense may be said to fall under the notion of “integrity;” but, whether this be so or not, a second condition, which he proceeds to mention, seems altogether to answer to it. After repeating that “happiness is the best and most noble and most delightful of energies according to virtue,” he adds: “at the same time it seems to stand in need of external goods, for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to perform praiseworthy actions without external means, for many things are performed, as it were by instruments, by friends, and wealth, and political power. But men deprived of some things, as of noble birth, fine progeny, a fine form, have a flaw in their happiness; for he is not altogether capable of happiness, who is deformed in his body, or of mean birth, or deserted and childless; and still less so, perhaps, if he have vicious children, or if they were dear and dutiful, and have died. Therefore it seems to demand such prosperity as this; whence some arrange good fortune in the same class with happiness; but others virtue.”32

To develop ethical and intellectual virtues students need to be trained and they need external aids. They need to be trained throughout the greater part of their life for ‘neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring’; and they need external assistance because it is impossible, or at least ‘not easy, to perform praiseworthy actions without external means’. According to this perspective, knowledge, conceived in the broadest possible sense, has a social dimension, and a university is the place for the ethical and intellectual happiness of the student. A university would provide for its students intellectual training only, but not a full human flourishing, without the moral and religious discipline of the colleges and the personal influence of the tutors. From this premise Newman argues for a college and tutor system that could help the professors to achieve 31 32

See also John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, pp. 136, 482. RP, p. 181. Aristotle’s quotes are from Ethics I, 8 1099a 24; 1099a 31-b8.

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their ends. “The Professorial system fulfils the strict idea of a University, and is sufficient for its being, but it is not sufficient of its well-being. Colleges constitute the integrity of a University.”33 It is clear now that Newman’s concerns in the Dublin Writings are how the good student should live, and how a university should be structured in order to make such lives possible, and essentially this is an application of Aristotle’s concepts to Irish education of the time. Hence we can affirm that Newman’s idea of a university is a revised Aristotelian idea of a university. What emerges is an organic, comprehensive, conception of the human being requiring an integral formation in both the intellectual and moral spheres. Even when Newman maintains that the main and direct end of a university is not moral but intellectual, he recognises the preservation of morality as an indirect end. He wrote to a friend: “I do not think a University has to do with morals, as it has to do with faith – nor do I think the Church on the whole employs a University for morals, (except as teaching them, but that comes under faith)—but I think she uses small bodies in the Universities, Colleges, Halls, etc. etc. as the preservative of morals, more naturally.”34 These thoughts illustrate another important aspect of Newman’s idea of the human person: intellectual and moral virtues can be developed only inside a community. Students need a community that embodies a specific educational ideal. He emphasizes that the attendance at such communal places and the influence of teachers and tutors will administer a code of conduct to pupils, and will furnish them with principles of thoughts and action. Their communal life will lead to the construction of a moral and an intellectual ethos in which the living teaching of this youthful community “will take shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a genius loci”.35 RP, p. 182. (Author’s emphasis). John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, p. 136. (Author’s emphasis). 35 Idea, p. 147. 33 34

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What I am suggesting here is that Newman, following Aristotle, holds a position very close to contemporary communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre.36 Newman can be considered to have anticipated the neo-Aristotelianism which arose in the twentieth century. As Edward J. Sillem wrote, “Newman does not make any show of being a disciple of Aristotle in these Discourses by referring constantly to his name or by quoting texts; but he builds his entire position on principles which are no less purely Aristotelian for being purely Newman’s as well.”37 I will argue this thesis in more detail in the final chapter. The use Newman makes of what I have called the Aristotelian paradigm is not limited to the problem of the Professorial versus the College system. This very same Aristotelian schema of an essence, which is a basic definition of an entity, and the integrity that fulfils it, can be also found at the very beginning of the Idea where Newman, after having affirmed that a university is a place for the cultivation of universal knowledge, states: Such is a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church’s assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its integrity. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office.38 This same passage is quoted in its entirety in the article Professors and Tutors and demonstrates Newman’s awareness of the importance of this schema in his arguments. In addition to all the considerations we have already presented, Newman, at least in this case, is considering externals as supernatural aids, while Aristotle is always limited to the natural world. In Aristotle there Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘The Very Idea of a University: Aristotle, Newman and Us’, New Blackfriars, vol. 91 (2010), pp. 4-19. 37 Sillem, op. cit., p. 161. 38 Idea, p. ix. 36

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is almost no place for a supernatural intervention; he speaks sometimes of a second nature, but this expression has no religious connotation. This is precisely the reason why Newman appreciated him so much: the absence of overt religious issues gave him great freedom to avail himself of the Greek philosopher. Reporting the judgement expressed by the editors of a recent edition of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, in the Idea Newman states: “that great theologian [St. Thomas] made an alliance, not with Plato, but with Aristotle, because Aristotle, unlike Plato, confined himself to human science, and therefore was secured from coming into collision with divine.”39 Plato was more dangerous than Aristotle because the latter ‘confined himself to human science’. This thought helps us also to understand why Aristotle, who is so present throughout the Dublin Writings, is almost never mentioned in the Apologia Pro Vita Sua. The reason, I suggest, is that the Apologia, written in 1864, a few years after his Dublin enterprise, was the history of his religious opinions, not of his philosophical tenets. The Greek philosopher had an intense influence on Newman’s philosophical views but not so much on his religious beliefs.40 In The Arians “‘Not without reason,’ they say, ‘did St. Thomas acknowledge Aristotle as if the Master of human philosophy; for, inasmuch as Aristotle was not a Theologian, he had only treated of logical, physical, psychological, and metaphysical theses, to the exclusion of those which are concerned about the supernatural relations of man to God, that is, religion; which, on the other hand, had been the source of the worst errors of other philosophers, and especially of Plato.’”Idea, p. 431. The quotation is from P.-C. Rous-Lavergne, E. D’Yzalguier, E. Germer-Durand, ed., De Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Gentiles seu Summa Philosophica (Nemausi: 1853), i. vii. 40 On the different attitudes held by Christian theologians towards Aristotle, Newman writes: “Here, Gentlemen, observe the contrast exhibited between the Church herself who has the gift of wisdom, and even the ablest, or wisest, or holiest of her children. As St. Boniface had been jealous of physical speculations, so had the early Fathers shown an extreme aversion to the great heathen philosopher whom I just now named, Aristotle. I do not know who of them could endure him; and when there arose those in the middle age who would take his part, especially since their intentions were of a suspicious char39

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of the Fourth Century he even calls Aristotle ‘the Bishop of the Arians’! I want now to defend the thesis that Newman also works inside an Aristotelian frame of mind when he argues for liberal knowledge. I will add however, there is so much evidence to support this assertion that its defence is almost unnecessary. The part of the Idea where Aristotle is most quoted is section four of the Fifth Discourse; this is the section devoted to an explanation as to why knowledge is to be considered its own end. The first quotation is a verse, in Greek, of the tragic poet Agathon; it is taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI, 4 1140a 20.41 Newman is defining liberal art and puts it in opposition to servile art in which the mind has little or no part. Then he adds: Parallel to such servile works are those arts, if they deserve the name, of which the poet speaks, [[Techne tuchen esterxe kai tuche technen]] which owe their origin and their method to hazard, not to skill; as, for instance, the practice and operations of an empiric.42

acter, a strenuous effort was made to banish him out of Christendom. The Church the while had kept silence; she had as little denounced heathen philosophy in the mass as she had pronounced upon the meaning of certain texts of Scripture of a cosmological character. From Tertullian and Caius to the two Gregories of Cappadocia, from them to Anastasius Sinaita, from him to the school of Paris, Aristotle was a word of offence; at length St. Thomas made him a hewer of wood and drawer of water to the Church. A strong slave he is; and the Church herself has given her sanction to the use in Theology of the ideas and terms of his philosophy.” Idea, p. 470. 41 Newman in his footnote says “Arist. Nic. Ethic. vi.”. Agathon was a tragic poet who lived around 445-401 BC. He is one of the main characters in Plato’s Symposium and his works have been lost. We have only fragments and this is the sixth fragment of the Dindorf collection. Aristotle quotes him also in Poetics IX, 1451b 21 and XVIII, 1456a 18 and 29. 42 Idea, p. 106. The Greek verse is in an unnumbered footnote, without translation; it means ‘Art has a love for chance and chance for art’. In the original 1852 edition Newman referred to tuche as ‘chance’, which he later amended to ‘hazard’, while he wrote ‘quack’ instead of ‘empiric’.

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He is here affirming that parallel to servile art there is a kind of art that comes from what he calls ‘casual abilities’. Liberal art instead comes from the exercise of mind, of reason, of reflection; it is not meant to be useful nor does it come from chance. There then follows a further explanation of the concept. This paragraph, the fourth of the Fifth Discourse, is the core of Newman’s defence of liberal education, and it is also where he quotes Aristotle twice, from the Nicomachean Ethics and from Rhetoric. Newman continues in his consideration of what liberal arts were in ancient times and how they have changed: in Greece, for instance, medicine was practised by slaves, while physical exercise in the palæstra and Olympic games was considered part of the liberal arts. This is clearer when we understand that liberal knowledge is that “which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be informed (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our contemplation.”43 Therefore, bodily exercise can have these ‘liberal qualities’, while the intellectual one may lack them. Following this line of thought, even theology ceases to be liberal when it is cultivated not as a contemplation but for the purpose of preaching or of catechesis. Newman then contrasts this vision with the Baconian philosophy and, to conclude the section and summarise, he quotes extensively from the words of one he refers to as ‘the great Philosopher’, i.e. Aristotle: “Of possessions, those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those liberal, which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the using.”44 The passage, with which Newman summarises his conception of liberal education, is from the fifth chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, and it is immediately followed by the paragraph 43 44

Idea, p. 108. Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 5 1361a 15-20. (Author’s emphasis).

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with the famous eulogy quoted above.45 In this section of the Rhetoric Aristotle is discussing happiness, which he defines as well-being combined with virtue. He makes a list of the prevailing notions on the nature and meaning of the term ‘happiness’, but he is concerned not so much with an ethical discussion of them, and in fact he is simply cataloguing the popular views on the topic. Among the component parts of happiness there is wealth, whose constituents can be useful, when they are productive, or liberal, when they are desired for their own sake.46 Here Aristotle is repeating the useful/liberal distinction that he has already presented in other places.47 If it were necessary that I should corroborate my claim, that Newman works inside an Aristotelian frame of mind when he argues for liberal knowledge, there could be no better proof than this: he chose to sum up his points with a quote from the Rhetoric. Sections 3 and 4 of the Fifth Discourse, which are the core of his definition of liberal education, begin with Cicero and end with Aristotle, and in particular, with the two works for which Newman retained a special affection throughout his life: the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric.48 These two books, which are See Idea, pp. 109-110. It is worth noting for our discussion on the gentleman that Rhys W. Roberts in his translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric renders, in this passage, eleutheria not as ‘liberal’ but as ‘gentlemanly’. “The constituents of wealth are: plenty of coined money and territory; the ownership of numerous, large, and beautiful estates; also the ownership of numerous and beautiful implements, live stock, and slaves. All these kinds of property are our own, are secure, gentlemanly, and useful. The useful kinds are those that are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment. By “productive” I mean those from which we get our income; by “enjoyable,” those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of them.” 47 See for instance Politics VIII, 2. 48 Walter Jost noted that “It is known that Newman had a ‘deep fondness’ for Cicero and a lifelong ‘special affection’ for Aristotle, but it is generally forgotten in what high esteem rhetoric, as a study and practice in ideas and expression, was held in the Oxford of Newman’s day.” Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia, 1989), pp. 7-8. 45 46

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probably the most important in the Oxford curriculum49, continued to inspire Newman in his latter years, and they most definitely cast their shadow over his Dublin Writings. It is true that, as maintained before, with the development of his own thought Newman’s interest in Aristotle decreased for a time. This was the case at least until his conversion, and the particular Aristotelian aspect with which he was dissatisfied was the logic, as he deemed that it was unable to grasp the complexity of human life. My understanding is that his unchanged attachment to the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric instead is due to their relevance for human life. Rhetoric in fact, as study and practice, is not less concerned with the human person than ethics. If, for Newman, logic totally ignored the personal dimension of knowledge, rhetoric represented to him a model of reasoning not rigorously exact, but nonetheless with its own rationality and its own manner of coping with the problem of practical life in a non-arbitrary way. This explains why he never lost his interest in it, and why he took inspiration for his concept of liberal education from Aristotle and Cicero, two philosophers who devoted much of their lives to rhetorical thought.50 One characteristic that distinguishes Aristotle’s rhetoric from those who preceded him is his analysis of human character, and his inclusion of motivations and emotions in that analysis. Influenced by Plato’s Phaedrus, he recognises that in order to produce the intended and appropriate effect, in a person or group of people, different speeches must be adapted to a variety of minds and characters; and therefore, knowledge of all aspects of human beings is necessary in order to address the most appropriate discourse to the “After all, with the possible exception of the Nicomachean Ethics, there was hardly a more important book in the old Oxford curriculum than the Rhetoric of Aristotle, which exerted a profound influence on some of the greatest Victorian writers” Martin Svaglic, ‘Method in the Study of Victorian Prose: Another View’, The Victorian Newsletter, n. 2 (Spring 1956), p. 3. 50 See Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman. (Columbia, 1989), pp. 22-24 and 79-82. 49

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most appropriate audience and thereby achieve the desired affect. This particular attention to the human person is, in my interpretation, the reason for Newman’s attachment to Aristotle, and I will attempt to prove my claim via an analysis of some of the passages from the Rhetoric that Newman employs in the Idea of a University. An important point of difference between rhetoric and science is that the rhetorician is not indifferent to the conclusion he reaches, and is in fact concerned to cause others to reach the same conclusion. Indeed, his character contributes greatly to the effectiveness of his demonstration, hence the quality and efficacy of his arguments are closely related to his personality. This is precisely one particular aspect of the Aristotelian rhetoric that Newman recalls a number of times. For instance, when at the end of the essay ‘English Catholic Literature’ he complains about the lack of individuality among the writers of his time, he adds: “Orators and preachers are by their very profession known persons, and the personal is laid down by the Philosopher of antiquity as the source of their greatest persuasiveness.”51 And as we recall, literature is for Newman a personal use of language such that style and content cannot be separated: they both express the self of the writer.52 One’s character traits not only affect one’s language, they can also be a means to making it more effective. But we may ask which work of the ‘Philosopher of antiquity’ was Newman referring to in the above passage. Personality as a means of persuasion is a theme that Aristotle covers in the second chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, and it is probably these passages that Newman had in mind when he was composing his essay: “Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question Idea, p. 329. “The elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self.”Idea, p. 280. 51 52

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is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses”.53 The instrumentality of personal characteristics is a topic common to the two thinkers we are considering. Newman refers again and more extensively to this same passage in his essay ‘University Preaching’, which is probably the most relevant for understanding his own rhetorical theory. In this composition, which collects two articles he wrote for the Catholic University Gazette, he states that the preacher’s object is the spiritual good of his hearers. For the accomplishment of this task he recommends ‘simple earnestness’. This will create earnestness in the others by sympathy, while any interference or lack of it will blunt the force of the most cogent arguments.54 In this context Newman calls again on the authority of Aristotle: Hence it is that the great philosopher of antiquity, in speaking, in his Treatise on Rhetoric, of the various kinds of persuasives, which are available in the Art, considers the most authoritative of these to be that which is drawn from personal traits of an ethical nature evident in the orator; for such matters are cognizable by all men, and the common sense of the world decides that it is safer, where it is possible, to commit oneself to the judgment of men of character than to any considerations addressed merely to the feelings or to the reason.55

The two quotations from the Idea just noted both refer to the same passage from the second chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric I, 2 1356a 3-20. Idea, p. 407. 55 Idea, pp. 407-409. 53 54

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Rhetoric. I believe a short presentation of the Aristotelian theory of rhetoric is opportune here to assist a better understanding of the use Newman made of these passages. Rhetoric is defined by Aristotle as the ability to treat technically what is possibly persuasive in every given case.56 It teaches one to discover the means of persuasion (pisteis).57 There are two kinds of rhetorical proofs: non-technical proofs, for instance, confessions or documents that do not depend on the rhetorician’s actions or efforts; and technical proofs that may be established by the rhetorician’s own agency. The non-technical ones are merely employed as they are found, because the speaker cannot prepare them, while the technical proofs must be invented—hence the Latin term inventio—through rhetoric. These technical means of persuasion are based on a method and rest on an analysis of what is persuasive. They are constituted essentially by speeches, i.e. arguments, and they are of three kinds. The first kind of persuasion refers to the moral character of the speaker, the second one consists of the proper disposition of the listener, and the third one depends on the argument itself.58 These three means of persuasion correspond to the three aspects every speech consists of: the speaker, the listener to whom the speech is addressed and the subject which is treated in the speech.59 Newman’s reference to the first kind of persuasion is a clear indication of his attention to the personal dimensions of communication. In the essay ‘University Preaching’ he holds that the preacher’s persuasiveness depends on his sincerity, and eventually on his moral character, as arguments and personality are related. Rhetoric I, 2 1355b 26ff. Rhetoric I, 2 1355a 10-11 and also I, 2 1355b 25-26. 58 “Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself.” Rhetoric I 1356a. 59 See Rhetoric I, 3 1358a 37 ff. 56 57

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Rhetoric is here conceived not in the derogatory sense of an artificial technique to deceive the audience, but as a means better to achieve the object of preaching, i.e. the spiritual good of his hearers. It is not a sophistry, but rather a discourse aimed at producing an effect, and it nevertheless aims at truth. In this respect Newman is, again, Aristotelian. In the passage already mentioned,60 Aristotle asserts that the arguments that persuade through the moral character of the speaker are those that highlight his honesty and therefore make him worthy of his hearers’ confidence. The audience will more easily accept an argument from a credible speaker, especially when there is room for some doubt. To appear credible the speaker has to display practical wisdom (phronēsis), a virtuous character and good will.61 The treatment of the intellectual virtue of phronēsis was developed by Newman in his later writings, particularly in the Grammar of Assent, but at this time he appears to be more concerned with the character of the speaker. A comprehensive training in rhetorical skills requires the study of human beings; it necessitates a comprehensive analysis of human motives, feelings, actions, habits, tendencies, virtues and vices. Aristotle viewed rhetoric as a discipline in connection and contrast to those branches of philosophy with which it stands in immediate relation, in particular, with the study of man as an individual and as a member of society, or in relation to ethics and politics. Knowledge of moral characteristics, i.e. vices and virtues, and of passions, i.e. the essence and causes of moral characteristics, must be regarded in relation to ethics, which for Aristotle is part of politics. Hence, in the Aristotelian architecture of disciplines, rhetoric stands between politics and dialectics, the universal art of testing opinions on general questions. Another passage from the Idea of a University is interesting and worth quoting, as Newman refers again to the Aristotelian treatment of the three kinds of persuasion: 60 61

Rhetoric I, 2 1356a 3-20. See Rhetoric II, 1 1378a 6 ff.

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Aristotle, then, in his celebrated treatise on Rhetoric, makes the very essence of the Art lie in the precise recognition of a hearer. It is a relative art, and in that respect differs from Logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason, whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded.62

This quote is taken from the mentioned essay ‘University Preaching’, and in this particular section Newman is discussing what distinguishes a university sermon from other types of sermons.63 He stresses the peculiarity of a university audience, made up of young educated men, and he quotes from various ecclesiastical writers who recommend having an awareness of the composition of the audience. Newman then calls again on the authority of Aristotle, and I believe that the reference is once again to the second chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric.64 We have then, in a few lines, the two hinges of Newman’s conception of rhetoric: its contrast with logic and its personal dimension. Logic, which Newman cultivated during his years in Oxford, is limited to the correctness of reasoning, but it fails to recognise the fact that people are always necessarily involved, in other words, it lacks humanity. Rhetoric is instead relational and contingent, it is always employed to move someone. The logician refers not to people but to symbols, while when we argue in daily life, as rhetoricians, we appeal not only to reason but to the whole living person, often consciously attempting to effect an emotive response to achieve our ends. The true office of a writer Idea, p. 415. “It is true, this is also one of the elementary principles of the Art of Rhetoric; but it is no scandal that a saintly Bishop should in this matter borrow a maxim from secular, nay, from pagan schools. For divine grace does not overpower nor supersede the action of the human mind according to its proper nature; and if heathen writers have analyzed that nature well, so far let them be used to the greater glory of the Author and Source of all Truth.” Idea, pp. 414-415. 64 In the endnotes to his critical edition of the Idea of a University Ian Ker says: “Rhetoric, I. ii. I.” See Idea, p. 656 note 335. 62 63

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is not to ‘compel’ but to ‘move’, and to do so not mainly by means of objective and strict logic, but by suggestion, probability, appeals to emotions, values, and beliefs. The rhetorician’s work depends upon his audience; in his arguments he is forced to assume sentiments and principles that are held by and acceptable to the audience, and to this end he must study their characters. The writer or the speaker has to take into account who he is talking to. Newman notes: “we cannot determine how in detail we ought to preach, till we know whom we are to address”.65 This care for the listener is of even greater importance in religious discourse, in fact Newman maintains that university sermons are intended to preach “[…] not for instruction of the whole world, but directly for the sake of those very persons who are before him.”66 To summarise, the passages from the Rhetoric to which Newman referred all have in common one aspect: attention to the human person. Turning our attention back to the Nicomachean Ethics, another implicit reference to Aristotle is made when Newman traces an analogy between ethical deliberation and scientific research. In the lecture Christianity and Scientific Investigation he says: “as we are told in Ethics to gain the mean merely by receding from both extremes, so in scientific researches error may be said, without a paradox, to be in some instances the way to truth, and the only way.”67 The doctrine of the mean is presented in the second book of Aristotle’s Ethics, where he maintains that virtue often lays between two excesses. As already presented, for Aristotle the fulfilled life is the most complete end of human existence and it is sufficient of itself, it is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. What I am hoping to illustrate is that Newman transfers this Aristotelian premise from the ethical to the intellectual dimension. Idea, p. 415. Ibid. 67 Idea, p. 474. 65 66

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In the Idea he continually affirms that knowledge, in its proper sense, is an end in itself, it is a tangible, real and sufficient end. In contradistinction to Locke and the Edinburgh Review, he maintains that every kind of knowledge, if it is really such, is a reward for the human mind in and of itself. It holds not an instrumental but an intrinsic value; it is not merely a means to something beyond it, but an end sufficient to pursue for its own sake. Even if Newman does not deny the advantages accruing from its possession, he states that its very acquisition alone satisfies a need of our human nature. It seems to me that Newman here is paraphrasing Aristotle: the intellectually fulfilled life is the most complete end and is sufficient of itself; it is sought legitimately for its own sake and for no other reason. From what I have thus far illustrated we can state that Newman’s thoughts regarding liberal education fall within the framework of the Aristotelian theory of virtues. Additionally, Newman anticipates a reflection that was widely developed during the second half of 20th century, especially in English-speaking philosophy. The end of man, for Aristotle, is the attainment of the perfection due to his nature, and this perfection is reached through the exercise of good actions; when this exercise becomes a habit it is called virtue. Likewise, in the Idea Newman affirms: Whereas our nature, unlike that of the inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection, but depends, in order to it, on a number of external aids and appliance, Knowledge, as one of the principal of these, is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us after the manner of a habit, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end.68

Behind this concept is the principle that every being has a natural end, and for human beings the full attainment of their natural function, their perfection, is happiness (eudaimonia), conceived in a broad sense. The entire first section of the Sixth 68

Idea, p. 104. See Aristotle’s Ethics I, 8 1099a 31-b8.

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Discourse, ‘Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning’, is an expression of Newman’s grievance regarding the lack, in the English language, of a proper word to convey intellectual proficiency or perfection.69 In order to address this deficiency, Newman uses the terms philosophy or philosophical knowledge to express the higher virtue of intellect. This is extremely clear in the last part of Discourse V considered previously: Liberal Education, viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence. Every thing has its own perfection, be it higher or lower in the scale of things; and the perfection of one is not the perfection of another. Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good in their kind, and have a best of themselves, which is an object of pursuit. [….] There is a physical beauty and a moral: there is a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being, which is natural virtue; and in like manner there is a beauty, there is a perfection, of the intellect. There is an ideal perfection in these various subjectmatters, towards which individual instances are seen to rise, and which are the standards for all instances whatever.70

Even if Aristotle is not expressly mentioned, it is difficult to deny that Newman here again is thinking from inside an Aristotelian worldview, that is, namely a world with a hierarchic order and differing grades of perfection. It is not surprising that Newman calls liberal education the perfection of the intellectual virtues, and on this point he follows Aristotle who, in his Ethics, clearly distinguishes ethical from dianoetical virtues.71 What does surprise me, however, is that in his Dublin Writings Newman See Idea, pp. 124-125. Idea, pp. 121-122. 71 The Birmingham Oratory keeps a copy of the Ethics utilised by Newman when he was a tutor in Oriel College. He used to write on the text questions and passages intended to serve as basis in the class discussion. Among these we find “What thing alone is requisite for the possession on one of the arts? Is this the same thing of much avail in the moral virtues?” 69 70

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does not draw so much on the sixth book of the Ethics, where the various intellectual virtues are discussed, but he draws more from other parts of the same work. In particular, the absence of any reference to phronēsis should be noted. The greatest philosophical achievement of the later thought of Newman is his extension of the Aristotelian ethical notion of phronēsis into epistemological matters; the whole Grammar of Assent, in fact, is an attempt to deal with the problem of the justification of beliefs using this notion. In the Dublin Writings the concept of phronēsis is not employed, but I wish to demonstrate that we find some premises for its further development. If my thesis is correct, we can establish a line, an Aristotelian line, that can be traced from the Dublin Writings to Newman’s more mature works, particularly to the Grammar, which is the most interesting work from a philosophical point of view. In the Grammar he states: “as to the intellectual position from which I have contemplated the subject, Aristotle has been my master.”72 When, in the Fourth Discourse of the Idea, Newman criticises the political economists of his times, Nassau William Senior in particular, for maintaining that wealth is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness, he appeals to a ‘higher science’ called ‘Architectonic Science or Philosophy’.73 ‘Architectonic Science’ is an expression that Aristotle uses at the very beginning of the Ethics and it refers to politics, seen as a practical science that studies the supreme good for man. Aristotle also uses the same expression at the end of the seventh chapter of the sixth book of Ethics, where he treats the intellectual virtue of wisdom. In both cases, ‘architectonic science’ refers to politics as the full realisation of phronēsis, the dianoetical virtue of judging in practical matters. Architectonic science then, for Newman, is a higher science in the sense that it is employed to rank every other discipline, he says “[It] disposes of the claims and arranges the places 72 73

John Henry Newman, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, p. 430. Idea, p. 91.

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of all the departments of knowledge which man is able to master”.74 It seems to me that in Newman the expression ‘architectonic science’ has a slightly different sense from the Aristotelian one; it is just a synonym of philosophy, conceived not as a discipline but as a virtue of mind.75 Newman does not elaborate a clear distinction between different intellectual virtues, as Aristotle did in the sixth book of his Ethics, but he uses ‘philosophical habit of mind’ as a general term for most of them. In this sense, architectonic science is for Newman probably closer to wisdom than to prudence or to art (technē), but it does not have the specifications of the Aristotelian doctrine. One final quotation to be considered is, again, from the Nicomachean Ethics and can be found in the Third Discourse of the Idea. Newman is here treating the question of the exclusion of human agency from an account of reality and from the explanation we give of the world. He calls on Aristotle who, in the third book of Ethics, distinguishes between a variety of causes of things in the world. The Greek philosopher maintains that besides nature, necessity or chance, ‘the mind (nous) and human agency’76 can also be origins of movement and causes of what happens in the world. Newman’s interest here is not to give an account of deliberative behaviour from a psychological point of view, but to stress the role of human will in history. If we want to understand the world we cannot avoid taking into consideration the human being as an agent with desires, choices and ends. It is significant that Newman chose Aristotle as the example of a defence of human agency against any form of reductionism. He says: Idea, p. 91. In the Grammar of Assent Newman employs this expression as general term for the moral and intellectual judgment. “Judgment then in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it.” Grammar of Assent, p. 342. See also Culler, op. cit., p. 182. 76 Aristotle, Ethics III, 3 1112a 32. Newman says: “The mind and everything which is by means of man.” Idea, p. 53. 74 75

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Certainly; it would have been a preposterous course, when he would trace the effects he saw around him to their respective sources, had he directed his exclusive attention upon some one class or order of originating principles, and ascribed to these everything which happened anywhere. It would indeed have been unworthy a genius so curious, so penetrating, so fertile, so analytical as Aristotle’s, to have laid it down that everything on the face of the earth could be accounted for by the material sciences, without the hypothesis of moral agents. It is incredible that in the investigation of physical results he could ignore so influential a being as man, or forget that, not only brute force and elemental movement, but knowledge also is power. And this so much the more, inasmuch as moral and spiritual agents belong to another, not to say a higher, order than physical; so that the omission supposed would not have been merely an oversight in matters of detail, but a philosophical error, and a fault in division.77

The negation of human agency is precisely the supposed phi­ losophical error that Newman believed was spreading amongst the scholars of his time. He writes many pages imagining what a university would be were it based on those scholarly accounts of human reality viewed in mere physical and mechanical terms. I suggest these are among the most pertinent pages of the Idea, as they address questions still applicable to, and relevant for, today’s discussions and debates. Newman attacks all forms of naturalism that deny any specificity of human reality. Human beings, according to these philosophies, are part of the natural world and they should be treated as any other natural being. The prevailing belief being that the study of humans ought to be organized through methods developed by positive sciences, and in effect it would make no difference if the subject of study is human civilisation or Jupiter’s moons. This is just another form of reductionism, allowing theorists to take the simplest route in so far as comprehending the complexities of human agency and human subjectivity. 77

Idea, pp. 53-54.

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Freedom, according to Newman, enables the human mind to transcend nature, and so cannot be reduced to any natural principle. We can say then, that in these passages, Newman anticipated and began to answer positivism and, after it, all the philosophies of the ‘death of the subject’ which have been maintained during the twentieth century. I think we touch here on the questions at the core of Newman’s interest: How can we study the human being? How can we understand the human being? The whole of the Dublin Writings are an answer to these two questions, and what I believe is most relevant for my thesis is that when Newman elaborates his own answers to these questions Aristotle is ever present in his thought and mind. 2. Cicero After Aristotle, Cicero is, I suggest, probably the main source of inspiration for Newman’s Dublin Writings, although Newman’s scholars have not given him the attention he deserves.78 Newman was familiar with Cicero from his early years, even before his attendance at Oxford. In the months preceding his admission into residence in Trinity College in June 1817 he read Cicero’s Cato major, Laelius, De officiis, De amicitia and De senectute.79 When in Oxford, he wrote to his mother claiming he found the lectures on the De officiis “childishly easy”.80 Cicero’s works were In the Idea of a University and in Rise and Progress of Universities there are more than twenty direct or indirect references to Cicero. Like Aristotle, Cicero is never mentioned in important studies like Fergal McGrath’s Newman’s University: Idea And Reality, neither is he discussed by Edward Sillem in his Introduction to The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman (Louvain, 1969). 79 His personal copy of E. H. Barker’s edition (1813) of the Cato major and of the Laelius is dated August 17, 1816. From his diaries and records of studies we know that he read the De officiis, the De amicitia and the De senectute from the middle of March till the 1st of June 1817. 80 Letter to his mother, 28th November 1817. 78

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common objects of study and examination for students of that time and Newman’s acquaintance with this Latin author grew to the extent that when in 1824 the editors of the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana were not pleased with the entry on ‘Cicero’, they asked Newman, who was only twenty three years old, to write a new one. He accomplished this in two months. A contemporary scholar has defined this article as “the most qualified and complex response to [Cicero’s] rhetorical theories” of the time.81 The article was later collected in the first volume of Historical Sketches82 and a portion of it is included in the Appendix to the 1852 edition of the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education.83 Cicero is admired here not only for his style, but is regarded as the first great Latin philosopher who, having travelled and visited the greatest thinkers and rhetoricians of his time in his youth, imported and developed Greek thought in Rome.84 Before the works of Cicero, no attempts worth considering had been made for using the Latin tongue in philosophical subjects. The natural stubbornness of the language conspired with Roman haughtiness to prevent this application. The Epicureans, indeed, had made the experiment, but their writings were even affectedly harsh and slovenly, and we find Cicero himself, in 81 Mary Rosner, ‘Reflections on Cicero in Nineteenth Century England and America’, Rhetorica, IV (Spring 1986), p. 169. 82 John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. I, (London, 1872), pp. 239-300. 83 Idea (1852), pp. 410-412. 84 The young Cicero is also portrayed in an article of the Catholic University Gazette. “Or it is a young man of great promise as an orator, were it not for his weakness of chest, which renders it necessary that he should acquire the art of speaking without over-exertion, and should adopt a delivery sufficient for the display of his rhetorical talents on the one hand, yet merciful to his physical resources on the other. He is called Cicero; he will stop but a short time, and will pass over to Asia Minor and its cities, before he returns to continue a career which will render his name immortal; and he will like his short sojourn at Athens so well, that he will take good care to send his son thither at an earlier age than he visited it himself.” John Henry Newman, ‘Athens, considered as a type of a University’, Catholic University Gazette, n. 5, 29 June 1854, p. 34. Also in RP, p. 35.

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spite of his inexhaustible flow of rich and expressive diction, making continual apologies for his learned occupations, and extolling philosophy as the parent of everything great, virtuous, and amiable.85

Newman praises Cicero as the creator of the Latin philosophical language, but also recognises in him a deficiency in depth and originality of thought. It must be allowed that he is deficient in depth; that he skims over rather than dives into the subjects of which he treats; that he had too great command of the plausible to be a patient investigator or a sound reasoner. Yet if he has less originality of thought than others, if he does not grapple with his subject, if he is unequal to a regular and lengthened disquisition, if he is frequently inconsistent in his opinions, we must remember that mere soundness of view, without talent for display, has few recommendations for those who have not yet imbibed a taste even for the outward form of knowledge, that system nearly precludes freedom, and depth almost implies obscurity. It was this very absence of scientific exactness which constituted in Roman eyes a principal charm of Cicero’s compositions.86

These same kinds of judgements are echoed in some passages included in the 1852 Appendix of the Idea,87 where the superficiality and the inconsistency of Cicero’s opinions are tolerated and even occasionally admired as signs of rhetorical talent.88 85

261.

John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. I, (London, 1872), p.

Ibid., p. 263. “When we pass from Greece to Rome, we are met with the common remark, that Rome produced little that was original, but borrowed from Greece. It is true; Terence copied from Menander, Virgil from Homer, Hesiod, and Theocritus; and Cicero professed merely to reproduce the philosophy of Greece. But, granting its truth ever so far, I do but take it as a proof of the sort of instinct which has guided the course of Civilization.” Idea, pp. 260-261. 88 “Some writers, as Lyttelton, have considered it an aggravation of Cicero’s inconsistencies, that he was so perfectly aware, as his writings show, of what was philosophically and morally upright and honest. It might be suffi86 87

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Traditional historiography has never judged Cicero an innovative contributor to Western thought, as he has been considered in relation to rhetoric as a discipline. Newman followed this judgement when he presented Cicero as an eclectic philosopher. In spite of that, however, Newman seems to appreciate the ambiguity of Cicero’s positions, and especially his ability to get profit from the use of different and sometime conflicting sources, thereby accommodating theoretical principles to actual circumstances. Thus, in the capacity of a statesman, he calls in the assistance of doctrines which, as an orator, he does not scruple to deride. […] in questions connected with the interests of society, he thus uniformly advocates the tenets of the Porch, so in discussions of a physical character we find him adopting the sublime and glowing sentiments of Pythagoras and Plato. Here, however, having no object of expediency in view to keep him within the bounds of consistency, he scruples not to introduce whatever is most beautiful in itself, or most adapted to his present purpose.89

Newman’s early writing on Cicero is important here, not only because it was utilized again in the Idea, but also in that it assists us to understand the mixed opinions Newman held with regard to Cicero throughout his life. We find that Newman is at one and the same time capable of appreciation and caution, respect and watchfulness, all the while granting a great latitude to the skilled rhetorician. Nonetheless, if Aristotle is generally referred to with enthusiasm and reverence in the Dublin Writings, cient to reply, that there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life; that Cicero in fact was apt to fancy (as all will fancy when assisted by interest or passion) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception to the broad principles of duty.” Idea (1852), pp. 410-411. 89 John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. I, (London, 1872), pp. 272-273. And also, “however inappropriate this boast may appear, he at least pursues the useful and the magnificent in philosophy; and uses his academic character as a pretext rather for a judicious selection from each system than for an indiscriminate rejection of all.”

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this is not the case for Cicero, towards whom Newman manifests certain ambivalence.90 My interpretative thesis is that Cicero, more than Aristotle, represents in Newman’s view a specimen of the liberal educated man. He is employed to demonstrate the excellence of intellectual activity, but also the limits of the man educated outside the Christian faith. The hesitant attitude that Newman has for the pagan world, which he admires even when he does not concur, is also displayed in the ambiguity of his judgements regarding Cicero. It may also be suggested, however, that this display of ambivalence and hence tolerance in Newman is quite significant. Recognising the allowances he made for the rhetorician and the pagan world quite possibly offers a necessary insight to anyone attempting to gain a complete understanding of Newman; and this tolerance in action and thought may also provide further illumination for Newman’s disapproval of censorship. I will treat this issue at length and in greater detail in the following chapter, but at present I wish to touch on an aspect of Newman’s thought that has been consistently overlooked by critics; viz., when in the treatment of a topical issue, particularly in the Idea, Cicero is mentioned, he is always mentioned in connection with Aristotle.91 Newman most certainly appreciates Cicero as a pupil, even if not a very faithful pupil, of Aristotle. Newman has, since his younger years, always understood the two thinkers in connection. In the article for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana he writes: Though the works of Aristotle were not given to the world till Sylla’s return from Greece, Cicero appears to have been a considerable proficient in his philosophy, and he has not overlooked the important aid it affords in those departments of science which are alike removed from abstract reasoning and fanciful theorizing. To Aristotle he is indebted for most of the principles laid down in his rhetorical discussions while in his Culler noted: “Cicero, who was praised in one place for understanding that knowledge may be pursued for its own sake, was censured in another for the trifling and sophisticated nature of that pursuit.” Culler, op. cit, p. 229. 91 See for instance Idea, p. 77 or p. 339. 90

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treatises on morals not a few of his remarks may be traced to the same acute philosopher.92

The section of the Idea where Aristotle and Cicero are both extensively employed is the Fifth Discourse, which is devoted to an explanation of why knowledge is to be considered its own end. To illustrate his conception of liberal knowledge, Newman chose, among ‘similar passages in a multitude of authors’, some extracts from the first book of Cicero’s De officiis. If, as I suggest, liberal knowledge is the main topic of the entire discussion about university education, it is surprising that scholars have not considered in detail this major source of Newman’s thought. Cicero’s De officiis is without doubt one of the most influential texts of moral philosophy in Western civilisation, along with many of Plato’s works and Aristotle’s Ethics.93 Indeed it was required that students in the Catholic University of Ireland gained a proficiency in this text in order to pass the philosophy examination. The three direct quotes that we find in the Fifth Discourse of the Idea of a University each come from the beginning of the first book of the De officiis, which deals with the honestum. This was a concept rarely used in Rome before Cicero, and of vague significance in the Roman political vocabulary. Cicero borrowed it from the Stoic theory of virtues and adapted it to Roman society. His model was the Peri tou kathekontos by Panaetius, a Stoic philosopher from Rhodes.94 Cicero elaborates Panaetius’ theories by supplementing his source with examples 92 John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. I, (London, 1872), p. 274. Talking about Cicero’s rhetorical works, he also says: “he professes to have availed himself of the principles of the Aristotelic and Isocratean schools, selecting what was best in each of them, and, as occasion might offer, adding remarks and precepts of his own.” Ibid., p. 278. 93 See ‘Influence through the Centuries’ in Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 39-49. 94 Panaetius (c. 185- c. 100 BC). His originality lays primarily in shifting the concern of moral philosophy from the theoretical problems of the sage to the efforts of ordinary people trying to make progress toward virtue.

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from Roman life. In rendering the Greek kalon with honestum, Cicero transferred this term from the aesthetic to the social sphere.95 Andrew R. Dyck, writing on sections 18 and 19 in his commentary on the De Officiis says: “Panaetius’s theory of virtues required a certain amount of tailoring, especially to make his first virtue fit the dimension appropriate to the life of Roman gentleman.”96 Let us now analyse in detail the use that Newman makes of Cicero’s thought in section 3 of the Fifth Discourse. The previous section ended with an implicit but clear reference to Aristotle.97 Newman affirms that knowledge, as one of the principal aids for the perfection of our nature, has a value “for what its very presence in us does for us after the manner of a habit, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end.”98 Then section 3 begins: Hence it is that Cicero, in enumerating the various heads of mental excellence, lays down the pursuit of Knowledge for its own sake, as the first of them. “This pertains most of all to human nature,” he says, “for we are all of us drawn to the See Dyck, op. cit., p. 69. Dyck, op. cit., p. 31. 97 See Aristotle Ethics I, 8 1099a 31-b8. 98 Idea, p. 104. In the 1852 edition Newman wrote: “[…] after the manner of a habit, by a sort of opus operatum, […]”. It is curious that Newman used here the theological expression opus operatum. This is a technical phrase, first found in the writings of Peter of Poitiers, and then adopted by the Council of Trent, employed by theologians to signify the spiritual effect in the performance of a religious rite which accrues by the virtue inherent in it, or by the grace imparted to it, irrespective of the minister and the intention of the recipient. Newman is tracing an analogy between the effects that sacraments have on their recipients and the effects of the presence of knowledge in us. He maintains that once knowledge has become a habit, it produces in us positive effects that go beyond our own intentions. In the later editions this sentence was deleted. Newman found it probably too technical or thought it inappropriate to use a theological expression in this context. These same terms opus operatum are employed in another section of the Idea of a University according to their proper theological sense. See Idea, p. 378. 95 96

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pursuit of Knowledge; in which to excel we consider excellent, whereas to mistake, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, is both an evil and a disgrace.”99

The passage quoted by Newman is taken from De officiis I, 18.100 For the sake of our study, it is interesting to note that in these sections Cicero was presenting and discussing the four sources, or parts, of the honestum. These are 1. cognitio, 2. a second virtue, unnamed by Cicero, consisting of iustitia, beneficentia and liberalitas, 3. magnitudo animi and 4. decorum.101 This Latin term honestum has been rendered in English as ‘goodness’102 or ‘moral goodness’.103 Newman, however, in speaking of honestum, speaks not of goodness or moral goodness, but instead employs the phrase ‘heads of mental excellence’. I believe he is correct in the sense that honestum conveys a mixture of virtues, not only moral, but also intellectual and aesthetic virtues. Cognitio, the first of Cicero’s four divisions of the honestum, is certainly the most intellectual of the virtues. It involves both pure research (in studiis scientias cognitionis) and the method by which it is possible to make distinctions regarding things that are morally right and conducive to a good and happy life (in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum). My exercise in philological analysis will help us to gain a deeper understanding of Newman’s thought. It is worth noting Idea, p. 104. “[Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus, primus ille,] qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et dicimur ad congitionis et scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem, errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe dicimus”. Cicero, De officiis I, 18. 101 See Dyck, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 102 Cicero, On Moral Obligation. A new translation of Cicero’s ‘De Officiis’ with Introduction and Notes by John Higginbotham (London, 1967). 103 Cicero, De Officiis, with an English translation by Walter Miller (London, 1913). 99

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that the concept of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, which is the topic of this Discourse, is also employed at the beginning of the section to render Cicero’s cognitio veri. Cicero praises this virtue as the one that touches human nature most closely (maxime naturam attingit humanam), and Newman says it ‘pertains most of all to human nature’. In a few sections previous, Cicero also states that this virtue is especially hominis propria, and Newman continues his arguments, going back precisely to this section 13. And he considers Knowledge the very first object to which we are attracted, after the supply of our physical wants. After the calls and duties of our animal existence, as they may be termed, as regards ourselves, our family, and our neighbours, follows, he tells us, “the search after truth. Accordingly, as soon as we escape from the pressure of necessary cares, forthwith we desire to see, to hear, and to learn; and consider the knowledge of what is hidden or is wonderful a condition of our happiness.”104

Newman, in the first lines, summarises sections 11 and 12 of the first book of De officiis, where personal and social duties are presented as deriving from natural instincts, and then quotes from section 13.105 In this part of De officiis Cicero provides an analysis of the elements given to the human being by nature. It was common in the account of Stoic ethics to start from the natural impulses and then to proceed on to the treatment of the moral development that follows in humans by virtue of the possession of reason. The statement that the search after truth is peculiar to man (hominis propria) is a clear reference to “All men by nature desire to know”, the famous opening sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics106 Idea, p. 104. “[In primisque hominis est propria] veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere, cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus”. Cicero, De officiis I, 13. 106 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1 980a. 104 105

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often recalled by Newman as well. Here Cicero is considering the essential differences between humans and animals, trying to derive the four ‘parts’ of the honestum from drives natural to the human being. In the quotation, the connection should be noted between knowledge of what is hidden or wonderful (rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium) and happiness (ad beate vivendum), a connection that is repeated at the end of section 19. As an activity of the rational part of the soul which distinguishes human beings from animals, the pursuit of knowledge has a value in itself.107 In this Discourse Newman is defending the thesis that knowledge is its own end, against the Utilitarians, and the choice of this particular passage from Cicero illustrates that he does not exclude pleasure and happiness as outcomes of intellectual activities. In defending knowledge for its own sake he recognises it as a component of a happy life. We cannot help but compare this passage with some similar lines from the Ethics where Aristotle maintains that happiness is an activity in accordance with the virtue of the best part of us, i.e. the intellect, so contemplation is the most pleasant of the virtuous activities.108 Newman also wants to stress the separation of the pursuit of knowledge from other activities. One can devote himself to theoretical pursuits only after the satisfaction of basic needs. Let us listen to Newman’s own comment on Cicero’s passage: I wish you to observe, Gentlemen, how distinctly it separates the pursuit of Knowledge from those ulterior objects to which certainly it can be made to conduce, and which are, I suppose, solely contemplated by the persons who would ask of me the use of a University or Liberal Education. So far from dreaming of the cultivation of Knowledge directly and mainly in order to our physical comfort and enjoyment, for the sake of life and person, of health, of the conjugal and family union, of the social tie and civil security, the great Orator implies, that it is only after our physical and political needs are supplied, and when we are “free 107 108

See Dyck, op. cit., p. 93. See Aristotle, Ethics X, 7 1177a 12 ff.

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from necessary duties and cares,” that we are in a condition for “desiring to see, to hear, and to learn.” Nor does he contemplate in the least degree the reflex or subsequent action of Knowledge, when acquired, upon those material goods which we set out by securing before we seek it; on the contrary, he expressly denies its bearing upon social life altogether, strange as such a procedure is to those who live after the rise of the Baconian philosophy, and he cautions us against such a cultivation of it as will interfere with our duties to our fellow-creatures.109

Newman uses Cicero’s De officiis with an explicit polemical intent: he wants to oppose utilitarianism in all his forms. Newman and Cicero both deny that learning should be pursued with a view to individual or social utility. Positive consequences are not excluded when utility is the guiding principle of learning, but knowledge is not meant to be cultivated primarily to reach these ends. Cicero wrote the De officiis for his son Marcus, and with it he clearly intended to fulfil his paternal duty in respect of offering practical guidance to his child, who appeared in need of such guidance to the philosopher. The book, however, was also intended for public circulation and was addressed to an entire category of young people in need of similar advice. Marcus, it seems, who was aged twenty one at the time, was not pursuing his studies seriously enough. When it came time for him to choose a career his father wanted to assist him, and thus provided him with the book in the hopes of giving the young man a sense of direction. Particularly in the third part of the work Cicero stresses the importance of studying, although in the sections quoted by Newman Cicero also warns young people against an opposite risk: i.e. of becoming overly involved in study at the risk of endangering their public career. These two aspects, study and public duty, need to be separated. Not only physical, but also political, needs have to be supplied before one engages in the cultivation of knowledge. Intellectual pursuits are 109

Idea, p. 105.

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meant to fill out one’s otium, this is the reason Newman reminds his readers that Cicero denies the bearing of knowledge upon social life altogether, as study should not interfere with the life of a Roman statesman or with his duties.110 In support of this view Newman relies again on the De officiis. This time the passage is from section 19 of the first book.111 ‘All these methods,’ he says, ‘are engaged in the investigation of truth; by the pursuit of which to be carried off from public occupations is a transgression of duty. For the praise of virtue lies altogether in action; yet intermissions often occur, and then we recur to such pursuits; not to say that the incessant activity of the mind is vigorous enough to carry us on in the pursuit of knowledge, even without any exertion of our own.’ The idea of benefiting society by means of ‘the pursuit of science and knowledge’ did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation.112

This section of the Idea concludes with a comparison of Cicero and Cato. Cato is presented as the representative of the practical spirit of Rome, and as an antecedent of the Utilitarians, precisely because he ‘estimated every thing by what it produced’.113 It might 110 In De officiis I, 71 Cicero also maintains that “perhaps those some men of extraordinary genius who have devoted themselves to learning must be excused for not taking part in public affairs.” 111 “Quae omnes artes in veri investigatione versantur; cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; tum agitatio mentis, quae numquam acquiescit, potest nos in studiis cognitionis etiam sine opera nostra continere.” Cicero, De officiis I, 19. 112 Idea, pp. 105-106. 113 “This was the ground of the opposition which the elder Cato made to the introduction of Greek Philosophy among his countrymen, when Carneades and his companions, on occasion of their embassy, were charming the Roman youth with their eloquent expositions of it. The fit representative of a practical people, Cato estimated every thing by what it produced; whereas the Pursuit of Knowledge promised nothing beyond Knowledge itself. He despised that refinement or enlargement of mind of which he had no experience.” Idea, p. 106.

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appear curious, or maybe even contradictory, that Newman employs Cicero’s arguments to attack the Utilitarians while just ten years earlier, in his ‘Tamworth Reading Room’, he depicted Cicero as the antecedent of Lord Brougham and Sir Peel, who were campaigning for education to take the place of religion as a source of morality in society.114 Even more curious is that in the Appendix of 1852 Cicero’s ethical principles are not taken very seriously, while Cato ‘the Elder’ is seen as a virtuous man with coherent views. Newman proposes again some extracts from his early article in the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, and exhibits no problems in justifying Cicero’s inconsistencies, maintaining that “[Cicero] in fact was apt to fancy (as all will fancy when assisted by interest of passion) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception to the broad principles of duty.”115 Here Cicero is functioning just as an example of the more general unreliability of ancient Romans in the matter of morality. Their model of the virtuous man was not so much for imitation, but it was a mental idea, fruit of their imagination,116 so that “if an individual here or there, as Scipio or Cato, attempted to conform his life to his philosophical conceptions of virtue, he was sure to be ridiculed for singularity and affectation”.117 Newman, at least in these pages, takes no stance in the conflict between the condescending accommodation of Cicero and the inflexible determination with which Cato procured the dismissal of Greek philosophy. Unsurprisingly, in both cases, for Newman, it was not philosophy that made the man virtuous.118 114 John Henry Newman, ‘The Tamworth Reading Room’ in Discussions and Arguments (London, 1891), pp. 264-265. 115 Idea (1852), p. 411. 116 “[They] regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the creature of their imagination, rather than a model of imitation, an idea which it was a mental recreation than a duty to contemplate.” Idea (1852), p. 411. 117 Ibid. 118 “Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavour of the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant? It abandoned Brutus, as he

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Cicero not only inspired Newman but he had an important place in the curriculum of the Catholic University of Ireland, in fact, prospective students of the University faced admissions exams which included a brief oral translation from Greek and Latin.119 Newman discusses this issue in various articles that appeared in the Catholic University Gazette, and which were later collected in the essay ‘Elementary Studies’ in the Idea of a University. In the first part of this essay Newman presents two dialogues between two students and their examiners, and the second dialogue is a meticulous recreation of an exam on Cicero’s Letters, Ad Familiares.120 We also find many of Cicero’s works among the required books for the examination for the Scholar’s degree, i.e. the academic level of those who had already passed two years under the supervision of a tutor. In philosophy they had to study Cicero’s De officiis, Tusculanae Disputationes and De Finibus; for criticism: the De Oratore or Orator; for Latin: the Orationes Verrinae, the Tusculan Questions, the De Officiis and the De Natura Deorum.121 Without doubt Cicero is the author whose name appears most often in the University list. 3. John Locke and the Utilitarians John Locke is another constant presence in Newman’s work. If, in the Dublin Writings, Aristotle was the main source of Newman’s inspiration, John Locke has been his life-long adversary. In the Grammar of Assent Newman wrote: “I have so high a respect both for the character and the ability of Locke, for his sorrowfully confessed, in his greatest need, and it forced Cato, as his panegyrist strangely boasts, into the false position of defying heaven.” Idea, p. 116. The reference is to Cato ‘the Younger’. 119 See My Campaign, pp. 130-135. 120 Idea, pp. 342-343. Originally in ‘The Entrance Examination a trial of accuracy’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 4, 22 June 1854, pp. 25-32. 121 See The Catholic University Gazette, n. 45, 5 July 1855, p. 460.

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manly simplicity of mind and his outspoken candour, and there is so much in his remarks upon reasoning and proof in which I fully concur, that I feel no pleasure in considering him in the light of an opponent to views, which I myself have ever cherished as true with an obstinate devotion.”122 Newman became familiar with Locke’s works in his early youth. In his Autobiographical Writings he remembers that during the long summer vacation of 1818, at the age of 17, he was “taken up with Gibbon and Locke”.123 Scholars presume that at that time he read the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In the Idea of a University, Newman mentions John Locke a few times and quotes extensively from him in the fourth section of the Seventh Discourse. Here Locke is associated with the Utilitarians and considered to be the main inspiration of the Edinburgh Review. According to Newman, Locke did on the individual level what the Edinburgh reviewers wanted to do on a social level, namely to make utility the goal of education. I have already considered, in the previous chapter, the objections Newman provides against Utilitarianism: he does not deny that what is useful has to be pursued as worthwhile, but he replies that what has its end in itself has its usefulness in itself also. His strategy consists in showing that where there is a good intellect, utility will ensue, because a superior intellect is not only admirable in itself, but also diffuses its gifts to the world around it. His main argument is that “though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful”.124 I will now take into consideration another sort of problem: was Newman correct in considering Locke to be the father of the Utilitarians? Is the Locke model of education, as Newman maintains, inspired merely by the principle of utility? 122 John Henry Newman, Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London, 1870), p. 162. 123 John Henry Newman, Autobiographical Writings (London and New York, 1956), p. 40. 124 Idea, p. 165.

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What I intend to demonstrate is that Newman is right in his criticism, even if he, apparently, does not provide an adequate account of Locke’s positions. Moreover, I will argue that Newman deliberately chose to evaluate those passages from Locke’s work that relate to the study of foreign and ancient languages, and not to others, because they represented for him the paradigmatic example of a diverging conception of the human person and his education. Was Newman right when he maintained that usefulness is the primary value Locke accords to education? To answer this question we must examine Locke’s theory of education in detail. Firstly, the merits of John Locke as an educator and an educationalist should be recognised. It is also useful to note his strong belief in the formative power of nurturing, and in the nurturing benefits of education on the student. In the first paragraph of the Thoughts he emphatically writes: “Of all the Men we meet with, Nine Parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education”.125 Educated in Oxford, he was lecturer in Greek and in Rhetoric. He supervised not only the course of study of the students, but he also provided guidance in matters of finance and morals. Having left Oxford at the age of 35, he went on to act as medical adviser to the family of the earl of Shaftesbury at Exeter House in London. Locke tutored their son, who himself holds a significant place in the history of English philosophy, and who is discussed by Newman in the last paragraphs of the Eighth Discourse of the Idea of a University. Locke felt an aversion towards schools, and preferred private and domestic education. It is important to note, possibly for this reason, that he wrote for gentlemen and noble people. John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, § 1. (Here after STCE, followed by section number. References to a particular edition of this work will be indicated specifying in parenthesis the year of publication. Unless otherwise noted, all citations include the original emphasis and punctuation.) 125

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The Thoughts were written for a specific purpose: the education of the son of a country gentleman. Fundamental features of that education-the employment of a tutor, the close supervision by parents, the curriculum, even the details of diet-would have been available only to a very small portion of the parents and children of seventeenth-century England. Locke was well aware of the niceties of the rank and fortune, and proposed different routes for the son of a prince, a nobleman, and an ‘ordinary gentleman’s son’.126

The target of Locke’s interests becomes evident when we bear in mind the four values he promotes in his theory of education: virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning.127 Locke had experience and a reputation as a tutor to the sons of the nobility and gentry, having fostered pupils at the university, in a household and on the grand tour. Some Thoughts Concerning Education, the work from which Newman quotes, originated out of a request made by Edward Clarke and his wife, Locke’s friends and distant relatives, for advice on rearing their son. Locke began a correspondence with Clarke, following on from the request for advice, and after substantive revisions Locke’s letters were collected and published in 1693. However, it cannot be overlooked that Locke had been writing on the subject of education from at least 1664. Some Thoughts Concerning Education is a very specific manual on how to guide and mould children into moral and social persons, and the work fits into a well-established tradition of discourses containing advice to parents and tutors. Locke is apparently guided by a strong ethical purpose; in Some Thoughts Concerning Education he wants to provide a training and educational programme for the development of a moral person. Individual and social virtues play a central role in his Richard Aldrich, ‘John Locke’, Prospects, vol. 24, no. 1/2 (1994), p. 69. “That which every Gentleman (that takes any care of his Education) desires for his Son, besides the Estate he leaves him, is contain’d I suppose in these four Things; Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning.” STCE, § 134. 126 127

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thought, and we find a continuity between his educational writings and his other works. As for Newman, and perhaps even more for John Locke, a philosophy of human nature, a theory of knowledge and ethical and political doctrines are all necessarily interrelated. For instance, his reference to the child as a ‘white paper’ fits nicely with his well-known empiricist epistemology.128 Paradoxically, Newman believes that in Locke, and especially in his followers, these aspects are too tightly connected, and in the Idea of a University he wants to stress the distinction between intellectual and moral excellence. If it is true that we cannot find an adequately developed moral theory in Locke’s work, Some Thoughts Concerning Education is at least generally considered by scholars as an important text for a recollection of his ethical themes. John W. Yolton particularly emphasises this ethical dimension, and in his Introduction to the work, writes: “Locke’s answer to the question, ‘How is man to become moral?’, was ‘through education’. Some readers of Locke interpret his emphasis upon reason and rationality as an attempt to discover through reason alone how to be moral.”129 Our task now is to establish what ‘moral’ means here. John Locke appears to be inspired by virtue ethics, and as Yolton holds in his Introduction, almost half of Some Thoughts Concerning Education concerns the proper exercise of virtue130. 128 In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II.i.2 (Here after ECHU, followed by book, chapter and section number) Locke states: ”Let us suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas”. 129 John W. Yolton, Introduction in STCE (1989), p. 26. 130 “It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that Locke’s Some Thoughts is mainly a treatise on moral education. Virtue is the health of the soul, the aim of education is to produce a healthy, virtuous person. While Locke writes about educating the son of a gentleman, his treatise is less about gentlemen than it is about developing a moral character. Morality was not limited to gentlemen, although there is greater importance for such persons to be virtuous. …. Some Thoughts is in effect a manual on how to guide the child to virtue. Close to half of its total sections are concerned with this topic.” Yolton, op. cit., p. 18.

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Although ethics may indeed be part and parcel of Locke’s work, I intend to prove that even if he is using the traditional language of moral education, virtues, for him, have lost any reference to the pursuit of the good. In many respects Locke’s theory of moral virtues reminds us of Aristotle, even if Locke never directly refers to him in his Thoughts.131 Rather, the moral works he believes should be studied are Cicero’s Offices, Grotius’ De Jure Belli et Pacis and Pufendorf ’s De Officio Hominis et Civis.132 In 1697, in a Draft Letter to the Countess of Peterborough, Locke wrote: With the reading of history I think the study of morality should be joined. I mean not the ethics of the School fitted to dispute, but such as Tully in his Offices, Pufendorf De Officio Hominis et Civis, et De Jure Naturali et Gentium, and Aristotle, and above all the New Testament teaches, wherein a man may learn how to live, which is the business of ethics, and not how to define and distinguish and dispute about the names of virtues and vices. True politics I look on as a part of moral philosophy, which is nothing but the art of conducting men right in society and supporting a community amongst neighbors. Wherein Aristotle may be best to begin with, and then afterwards, if he pleases, he may descend to more modern writers of government, either as to the foundations and forms of politic societies, or the art of ruling them.133 Locke explicitly refers to Aristotle in Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Studying for a Gentlemen, a short treatise written in 1703, but not when he talks of morality. “The study of Morality I have above mentioned as that, that becomes a Gentleman, not barely as a Man, but in order to his business as a Gentleman. Of this, there are Books enough writ both by Ancient and Modern Philosophers; But the Morality of the Gospel doth exceed them all, that to give a Man a ful knowledge of true Morality, I should send him to no other Book, but the New Testament. But if he hath a minde to see how far the Heathen world carried that science, and whereon they bottom’d their Ethicks, he wil be delightfully and profitably entertained in Tully’s Treatises De Officis”. STCE (1989), p. 321. On Locke’s study of Aristotle see also James L. Axtell, The Educational Writings of John Locke (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 30-31. 132 See STCE, § 185 and 186. 133 Axtell, op. cit., pp. 395-396. 131

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I agree with Michelle E. Brady when she affirms that in Aristotle we find an education of desire while in Locke there is an education of reason.134 Locke’s concept of virtue is constructed through the opposition of reason to desire. He says: “the Principle of all Vertue and Excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own Desires, where Reason does not authorize them.”135 We will see later how this apparent stoicism is eventually a form of refined hedonism. In order to develop moral virtues, the child must be properly guided by his tutor and by his family. As Locke is an Empiricist in his theory of knowledge, so too is he an Empiricist in his pedagogy. Children are not to be taught by rules, but through the repetition of good practices, so that, by repeated performances, with time these actions will become habits.136 Fathers should be the example for their children, Locke believes, as they learn more from what they see than from what they are taught.137 He compares people to ‘camelions’, because they take a tincture from things around.138 Education, according to Locke, should aim to shape the psychological and motivational structure of the child, enabling him to attain rational control of his desires and thereby his life. Rational control over desires is a recurrent theme in Some Thoughts. As the Strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, so also does that of the Mind. And the great 134 Michelle E. Brady, ‘The Nature of Virtue in a Politics of Consent: John Locke on Education’, International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 45, n. 2 (June 2005), pp. 157-173. 135 STCE, § 38. 136 See STCE, § 66. 137 Carrig maintains that in Locke the relationship between the teacher and the student is fundamentally paternal since the teacher is the father and the student is his child. See Joseph Carrig, ‘Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: the Assent to Locke’, The Review of Politics, 63 (2001), p. 44. 138 “Children (nay, and Men too) do most by example. We are all a sort of Camelions, that still take a Tincture from things near us: Nor is it to be wonder’d at in Children, who better understand what they see, than what they hear.” STCE, § 67.

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Principle and Foundation of all Vertue and Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny himself his own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho’ the appetite lean the other way.139

Desire is proper to children and, in the learning process, it has to be denied in favour of reason. Reason is the door through which we enter into maturity, i.e. the age of reason, and therefore into society.140 “Education’s primary task is to train reason in the proper calculation of how to achieve our given end.”141 To be rational means to be able to choose well, to be able to recognise the right action, the right behaviour, the right choice. The disposition to consent appropriately is the goal of education, and on this ground Joseph Carrig, a contemporary Lockean scholar, maintains that in Locke’s educational writings reason is another name for the father’s will. Perpetual respect for paternal authority is the principal goal of Locke’s educational system—a system which ‘settles’ this respect through the inculcation of ‘good’ habits, the manipulation of the child’s desire for freedom, and the control of the boundaries of his experience. 142

Is education transformative or, as Michelle E. Brady affirms, “designed to protect children from society’s attempts to transform them”?143 Are children supposed to be trained towards independent judgements or towards conformity? In spite of the emphasis on reason in Locke’s discourse, we are not yet dealing here with the Enlightenment’s idea of rational autonomy. I sugSTCE, § 33. “Education literally humanizes the child by bringing him to reason and virtue, the defining marks of man and of that community of mankind which was so important for Locke.” Yolton, op. cit., p. 25. 141 Michelle E. Brady, ‘The Nature of Virtue in a Politics of Consent: John Locke on Education’, International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 45, n. 2 (June 2005), p. 165. 142 Carrig, op. cit., p. 48. 143 Brady, op. cit., p. 158. 139 140

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gest, in accordance with Carrig, that Locke’s idea of education aims to make children follow their father’s will, which, generally speaking, is conformed to social expectations. Education has its justification not only in the improvement of individuals, but also in society’s improvement. Yolton notes: “Education takes place within the family; it consists primarily in turning children into persons, into persons who embody natural laws and the rationality on which civil society and civil laws (as well as the community of mankind) are based.”144 If the intention of Some Thoughts Concerning Education is to raise people capable of self-government, it also aims to produce citizens capable of participation in political government.145 In this respect, it has to be read not only as a pedagogical work but also as a political one. The manner in which Locke envisages the teaching of virtues is particularly explicative of their conception in his thought, and is especially in contrast to Newman. Locke believes that children should be made to be in love with being well thought of146. The motivational character of education for children lies in the reward of being praised. Before children are able to judge with their own reason, their best guide will be reputation, which is the ‘Testimony and Applause that other People’s Reason, as it were by common Consent, gives to virtuous and well-ordered Actions’147. Children should act in order to be appreciated and admired, and their parents should rebuke them for their faults only in private, while the ‘Commendations Children deserve, they should receive before others’.148 Virtues are such in as much as they are public. Yolton, op. cit. p. 18. See Brady, op. cit., p. 157. 146 “If by these Means you can come once to shame them out of their Faults, and make them in love with the Pleasure of being well thought on, you may turn them as you please, and they will be in love with all the ways of Vertue.” STCE, § 58. 147 STCE, § 61. 148 STCE, § 62. This section was added with the 3rd Edition. 144 145

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Locke concedes that reputation is not the guiding principle or the measure of virtues, but he seems not particularly concerned with a religious or natural foundation of morality. In fact, any mention of God and natural law in Some Thoughts Concerning Education is usually brief and without reflection. From this analysis, I hope it is becoming clearer that reason in Locke is taken as a cultural construct, and that it can be understood as the internalisation of social expectations expressed in the will of the father over the child. The resulting rationalisation of desire, via the training of reason in the child, is the means through which education is attained; and virtues are nothing other than well-performed actions, in which the judgement on the performance follows not a moral criterion, but a social one, resulting in mere practical effectiveness and good reputation. My thesis is that despite Locke’s usage of the traditional language of moral education, virtues for him have lost any reference to the pursuit of the good and mean merely social praise or blame.149 Morality for him is the right behaviour that someone has to perform in order to be accepted by his peers and in society. As Michelle E. Brady rightly says, “virtue appears to be reduced to enlightened self-interest”.150 Virtue is not the pursuit of the good, but only good conduct; it is no longer viewed as a human excellence attained via the pursuit of the perfection of human nature. Morality in Locke no longer regards intention, but rather is concerned with external behaviour. If Aristotle spoke of ethical and dianoetical virtues, referring to moral and intellectual excellence, in Locke we find a new different form: social virtues, i.e. the excellence in gentleman’s social life.151 “The difficulty with Locke’s education to virtue, then, is that virtue as such is defined in terms of wholly arbitrary moral conventions, without regards to their substance.” Joseph Carrig, ‘Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: the Assent to Locke’, The Review of Politics, 63 (2001), p. 59. 150 Brady, op. cit., p. 160. 151 “Locke’s approach to virtue is novel, not in its connection between virtue and praise, but in its peculiar division of the law and in its approach to the 149

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Once we have understood Locke’s interpretation of the dynamic of commendation and disgrace, in which the motivational structure of education consists, we need to ascertain the basis on which moral judgements are structured. Is the suspension of desire sufficient for making good choices? Certainly it is not; in order to act morally an idea of good, an ideal standard, is necessary. Brady writes: “Given Locke’s focus on esteem, it appears that the law of opinion serves as the proper standard for judgement. The desire for esteem holds ‘the great secret of education’, and the most effective way to teach children virtue is to make use of their love of esteem (STCE, secs. 56, 54)”152 This is true, and I would add that besides esteem and opinion, the only other standard for moral judgements offered by Locke is that of pleasure and pain. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he writes that things are “Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain”.153 His moral theory appears then to be an interesting mixture of social conformism, public praise, and private condemnation all geared towards fomenting a type of individual hedonism. We could distinguish here between what is the best method for training children and what is the real value fathers should pursue. One could argue that the appeal to esteem and reputation is just an educative method: praise and blame are only reinforcements normative issue involved. These novel positions begin a ‘sociological’ approach to virtue. It should be apparent now why this term be appropriate. For Locke lays down certain fundamental themes of sociology. First, he stresses the importance of social groups, as a pre-political phenomenon, in the formation of opinion and behavior. Second, he adopts a methodological neutrality to the normative issue. That is, virtue is approached from a detached or value-free point of view.” John P. Hittinger, ‘Why Locke Rejected an Ethics of Virtue and Turned to an Ethics of Utility’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. LXIV (1990), p. 270. 152 Brady, pp. 165-166. 153 ECHU, II.xx.2. “[…] while Aristotle understood happiness as the fulfilment of the defining human activity, however, Locke’s description reduces it to ‘the enjoyment of Pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness’ (ECHU II.xxi.62). …. Any qualitative distinction between the standards of the pleasant and the good, however, has been eliminated”. Brady, op. cit., p. 164.

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used by fathers to better nurture their children. Are esteem and pleasure the criteria for adults as well? Unfortunately, yes, is the answer. All the passages on the education to virtue we mentioned echo the twenty-eighth chapter of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which is dedicated to ‘Moral Relations’. Here Locke affirms: “Good and Evil […] are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law”154. And he soon distinguishes three kinds of laws we refer to in order to judge the rectitude of an action: divine law, civil law and the law of opinion or reputation.155 “By the Relation they bear to the first of these, Men judge whether their actions are Sins or Duties; by the second, whether they be Criminal or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.”156 In modern terms, we find here three sources of moral norms: religious morality, legality and social conformity. For Locke, virtues and vices are synonymous with social conformity and deviation (he says disagreement). Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Vertue and Vice is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World: whereby several actions come to find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashion of that place.157

One might argue that Locke is only giving an explanation of how judgments are formed, that he is providing not a prescriptive ECHU, II.xxviii.5. See also ECHU, II.xx.2 and II.xxi.42. Locke first used this triple partition in a manuscript in 1678, taking inspiration from his contemporary French political theorists, in particular from the analysis of the Jansenist Pierre Nicole on the role of interests and reputation in social behaviour. Curiously, in the first edition of the Essay he calls the third law ‘the law of philosophers’! 156 ECHU, II.xxviii.7. 157 ECHU, II.xxviii.10. 154 155

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but a descriptive account of practical laws. However, then the question arises as to whether a prescriptive account is ever given, and it seems to me that the Essay does not satisfy this necessity. Moreover, this same connection of virtue and vice with the positive and negative sanctions of the law of reputation is repeated in several places in the Essay and in Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Locke was not unaware of the difficulties associated with his position. In 1694 James Lowde in his A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man, attacked Locke’s account of virtue and vice as moral relativism, and later the third Early of Shaftesbury did the same.158 To answer his critics, Locke, referring to a previously mentioned passage, wrote in his Preface to the second edition (1694): “I was there, not laying down moral Rules, but shewing the original and nature of moral Ideas, and enumerating the Rules Men make use of in moral Relations, whether those Rules were true or false.”159 He also goes on to affirm the “eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong”. To confirm his position he refers to I.iii.18, but here he talks of virtue as an action ‘conformable to God’s will’, only using a hypothetical sentence, without a strong and explicit commitment. And even when, in the same Preface, he seems to believe that virtue is what is ‘in its own nature right’, he soon maintains that this principle teaches little. It is clear that Locke here, besides defending himself, is trying to explain culturally relative moralities, i.e. why cultures “Thus virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law or rule than fashion and custom; morality, justice, equity depend on law and will and God indeed is perfectly a free agent in this sense; that, free to will anything, that is however ill: for He wills it, it will be made good; virtue may be vice, and vice virtue in its turn if he pleases. And thus neither right or wrong, virtue or vice, are anything in themselves; nor there is any trace or idea naturally imprinted on human minds.” Third Earl of Shaftesbury, The life: unpublished letters and regimen of A. A. Cooper, ed. B. Rand (New York, 1900), pp. 403-404. Quoted in James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Context (Cambridge, 1993), p. 212. 159 ECHU (1979), p. 354. 158

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hold different moral views.160 He does not argue for an explicit cultural relativism, as he maintains that moral rectitude must be judged by that ‘standing and inalterable Rule’ which the Law of Nature is161, but the connection between cultural norms and a moral law, be it from nature or from divine command, remains problematic and unresolved.162 In some passages it seems to me that the problem Locke tries to solve is how to link the divine command, which he does not deny, with the different uses of virtue made by men. Even if their foundation is in a no better qualified ‘Law of Nature’,163 the moral principles manifest themselves in societies, and even though societies might have different conceptions of virtues and vices, the form of their manifestation is always the same: i.e. through esteem and reputation. Thus, social acceptance becomes the invariant form of morality through which virtues and vices are established. Praise and blame are the positive and the negative sanctions of the law of reputation. There is a clear aporia in the Lockean system and critics are well aware of it. In his account of morality, the third source of law appears to be the one treated at most length and seems to be at the core of Locke’s interests. W. von Leyden, in the Introduction to Locke’s Essays on the Law of Nature, discusses which reasons prevented Locke from making enquiries in the Essay into an 160 See John P. Hittinger, ‘Why Locke Rejected an Ethics of Virtue and Turned to an Ethics of Utility’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. LXIV (1990), pp. 269-270. 161 ECHU (1979), p. 354. 162 Locke, in order to sustain his thesis, even quotes the letter of Saint Paul to the Philippians, where virtue and praise are connected and there is an appeal to common repute. “Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.” Philippians, 4:8. (King James Version). 163 For a discussion of Locke’s ambivalent positions regarding natural law see Steven Forde, ‘Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, n. 2, April 2001, pp. 396-409.

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absolute standard of morality. He maintains that Locke was interested more in the origin of moral ideas than in the ultimate nature of things164, so he was led more by a descriptive aim than a prescriptive one. I believe this attempt to justify Locke’s limits is easily refuted. Some Thoughts Concerning Education is clearly a prescriptive work, with its clear aim being to provide directions to fathers who wanted to educate their children. Here vice and virtue are not only described as synonymous with pain and pleasure, but they are also presented as such, as an educational model. Lockean education, therefore, is based on enlightened self-interest. The rational control of desire aims only to a refined form of hedonism in which a person has been educated to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. After this analysis we can affirm that Locke’s appeal to esteem and reputation is not just an educative method, but one of his sources of morality, the one he seems to be more impressed by and more interested in. We should now provide an answer as to why, if moral hedonism is so central in Locke, it is not explicitly discussed by Newman. For a justification of Newman’s inadequate account we have to consider that his purposes, in the Idea, were mainly polemical, and therefore his discussion necessarily had to be selective and restricted to the point in question. Newman did not wish to present a comprehensive account of Locke’s views, rather he wanted to show why and how Locke can be considered the father and main inspiration of the Edinburgh Reviewers. This is the first reason he does not deal with the problem of moral education in 164 “Locke’s aim here is to show how, as a matter of fact, men come by their moral ideas, regardless whether the rules to which they compare their actions so as to arrive at moral ideas are true or false. This project is part of the novel scheme of the Essay: it reflects ‘historical, plain method’ and self-chosen task to inquire into ‘original and nature’ of ideas rather than into the ultimate nature of things. Its merit lies in the attempt to define different kind of moral evaluation, rather than to consider morality as the embodiment of absolute standard of truth.” W. von Leyden, Introduction to John Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature (Oxford, 1954), p. 76.

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Locke, which seems to be so pivotal in Some Thoughts Concerning Education. The second reason is that this particular issue is treated in the Eighth Discourse, where not Locke, but his most famous pupil, Shaftesbury, is criticised, although it seems clear to me that dealing with the student he is also confronting his master and followers. Newman nonetheless attacks Locke not from the ethical but from the dianoetical point of view. This is another confirmation that in the Idea of a University his main interest was not a defence of moral virtues but of intellectual ones. Once we have established that the most important character of morality in Locke is social acceptance, the next step is to ascertain exactly how a notion of usefulness comes to the fore. There is an illuminating sentence where Newman summarises this connection between appearance, hedonism and utility: “To seem becomes to be; what looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains. As well may we measure virtue by utility as by such a rule.”165 Newman is actually speaking of the ‘Religion of Philosophy’, not only of Locke, but of the general ethical temperament of the civilised age. In order to understand the passage from moral virtue guided by the good to utility I propose a reading of Locke on two different levels: the level of the values for children, and the level of the values for the fathers. From what we have seen in Locke virtues and virtuous behaviour are never motivated by anything higher than their social usefulness. Behind his whole discourse on praise and blame there is no moral tension, but only social convenience and individual hedonism. My thesis is that the hermeneutical principle that lies behind Locke’s theory of education is this: what the father believes to be useful then becomes virtuous for the child. Earlier we questioned whether there was a difference between the best method to train children and the real value that fathers should pursue. The answer was negative, and I endeavoured to show that 165

Idea, p. 201.

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the appeal to esteem and reputation was not just a fictional educative method. Now I maintain that it is because it is useful to the father that his child should be trained in some particular ways, according to particular values. Or, even better, when not strictly for the mere utility of the father, the justification will be found in the children’s future. For Locke, in every case the ultimate end of education is an adult, whether it be the father or the child in his future years, while for Newman the core of education is the student and his mind. In fact, he attacks Locke because: That celebrated philosopher has preceded the Edinburgh Reviewers in condemning the ordinary subjects in which boys are instructed at school, on the ground that they are not needed by them in after life.166

And also, [Locke] limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, simply as such.167

It would not be inappropriate here to talk of useful virtues. Newman’s judgments are confirmed by the words of Joseph Carrig, who writes in a recent article: Virtue is most frequently mentioned in conjunction with indus­ triousness and being good for something. In this respect, Locke’s is not so much an education to virtue as an education to the useful. The ‘rule of reason’ is primarily necessary for the production of goods, and the emphasis on industry makes virtue an important end of education only because ‘virtuous’ individuals serve a public purpose. Thus, virtue is not presented as a good itself.168

Newman is correct when he recognises Locke as the father of contemporary Utilitarianism as expressed in the Edinburgh Review. Idea, p. 158. Idea, p. 159. 168 Carrig, op. cit., p. 57. 166 167

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Locke hides utility behind a virtuous surface, whereas the Reviewers go further and do away with the virtue structure, just keeping the usefulness. Newman’s criticism is not, as one would expect, that knowledge must be moral, but that it must not pursue utility as its first end. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Newman maintains that when something is intellectually good it is also useful. We now need to analyse the three passages that Newman quotes from Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education. I find it particularly interesting to note that the three extracts from Some Thoughts Concerning Education quoted in the Idea of a University pertain to the study of language, of foreign languages in particular, and not to other subjects or to moral education. My thesis is that Newman finds the weak (and revealing) position of the whole Lockean system in the teaching of languages and poetry because of his own special interest in this particular issue. Modern and classical languages are the paradigmatic example for a completely different conception of the human person and his education in Locke and Newman. The first quotation reads: ‘Tis matter of astonishment that men of quality and parts should suffer themselves to be so far misled by custom and implicit faith. Reason, if consulted with, would advise, that their children’s time should be spent in acquiring what might be useful to them, when they come to be men, rather than that their heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash, a great part whereof they usually never do (‘tis certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and so much of it as does stick by them they are only the worse for.169

The ‘deal of trash’ Locke is talking about in this section is Greek and Latin, ‘arguing in Mood and Figure’, and ‘the abstruse Speculations of Natural Philosophy and Metaphysicks’. 169 This quotation, from Idea VII, 4, is slightly different from the original STCE, § 94 as Newman avoids capital letters for proper nouns and he also italicises some words for the purpose of his argumentation. I have retained his punctuation and capitalisation. This consideration stands also for the other two quotations.

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He complains that a great part of what was at that time fashionable in the schools of Europe was needless and avoidable, while only ‘Prudence and good Breeding are in all the Stations and Occurrences of Life necessary’.170 And also: Latin and Learning make all the noise; And the main stress is laid upon his Proficiency in Things a great part whereof belong not to a Gentleman’s Calling; which is to have the Knowledge of a Man of Business, a Carriage suitable to his Rank, and to be Eminent and Useful in his Country, according to his Station.171

‘Useful’ is the keyword of section 94 of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and in quoting from Locke, Newman emphasises this word with an italic font. A few passages later, in that same section, Locke affirms: And since it cannot be hop’d he should have Time and Strength to learn all Things, most Pains should be taken about that which is most necessary; and that principally look’d after which will be of most and frequentest use to him in the World.172

Once again, utility is presented as the main motivation for study. Newman correctly selected the quotation in the Idea from this section 94, in order to support his claim that Locke limits education to subjects that are ostensibly needed in future life. The second quotation is concerned with making verses. 170 The full quote must be appreciated: ‘A great part of the Learning now in fashion in the Schools of Europe, and that goes ordinarily into the round of Education, a Gentleman may in a good measure be unfurnish’d with, without any great Disparagement to himself or Prejudice to his Affairs. But Prudence and good Breeding are in all the Stations and Occurrences of Life necessary; and most young Men suffer in the want of them, and come Rawer and more Awkward into the World than they should, for this very reason, because these Qualities, which are of all other the most Necessary to be Taught, and stand most in need of the Assistance and Help of a Teacher, are generally neglected and thought but a slight or no part of a Tutor’s Business.’ STCE, § 94. 171 STCE, § 94. 172 STCE, § 94.

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I know not what reason a father can have to wish his son a poet, who does not desire him to bid defiance to all other calling and business; which is not yet the worst of the case; for, if he proves a successful rhymer, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I desire it to be considered, what company and places he is likely to spend his time in, nay, and estate too; for it is very seldom seen that any one discovers mines of gold or silver in Parnassus. ‘Tis a pleasant air, but a barren soil.173

The passage is taken from section 174 of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and in this part of the work Locke is treating the study of Latin. In this same section he also affirms: “If these may be any Reasons against Children’s making Latin Themes at School, I have much more to say, and of more weight, against their making Verses.” The rationale is always the same: poetry is useless, and in particular, because it is often associated with gaming, it is also dangerous as by gaming the gentleman risks to lose his estates. The third quotation reads: Can there be any thing more ridiculous than that a father should waste his own money, and his son’s time, in setting him to learn the Roman language, when at the same time he designs him for a trade, wherein he, having no use of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from school, and which ‘tis ten to one he abhors for the ill-usage it procured him? Could it be believed, unless we have every where amongst us examples of it, that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which he is never to use in the course of life that he is designed to, and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades indispensably necessary?174

This third quote is particularly well chosen as it clearly shows the different attitudes Locke and Newman had not only in respect to the classical world but also to alterity in general. Locke’s stance regards not only classical languages but also modern ones: 173 174

STCE, § 174. STCE, § 164.

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they are learned only for their utility. This shows what, according to Locke, is the real value that motivates study and life in general. “Men learn Languages for the ordinary intercourse of Society and Communication of thoughts in common Life without any farther design in their use of them.”175 It has to be noted, once again, the occurrence of the concept of use in society. John W. Yolton, in his Introduction to Some Thoughts Concerning Education, tries to justify Locke’s utilitarian attitude: “Foreign languages and the contemporary teaching techniques for learning languages typified for Locke the wasteful preoccupation by tutors and parents with subject-matter rather than with the training of character.”176 On the contrary, I think it is clear, from a closer analysis, that Locke is here concerned not with the training of character, but rather he wants children to avoid wasting time by limiting the study of languages to their mere usefulness. In fact there is no reference to character in these thoughts. Newman is correct when he maintains that Locke “limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, simply as such.”177 I believe that the opposing conceptions Locke and Newman held of how and why languages are to be learned demonstrate their contrasting ideas of the human person and his education. To better understand that, we need to examine their theories of translation in detail. Newman in The Idea of a University devotes two long passages to reflections on translation but scholars never considered them worthy of attention.178 One occasion in which his views on STCE, § 168. Yolton, op. cit., p. 28. 177 Idea, p. 159. 178 The translation of the Classics is a subject that in those same years inflamed an illustrious discussion between Newman’s brother, Francis Newman, and Matthew Arnold. See Francis W. Newman, Homeric Translation in Theory and Practice (Oxford, 1861) and Matthew Arnold, On Translating Homer (Oxford, 1861). See also Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility (London and New York, 1995), pp. 118-147. 175 176

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translation are presented is given in the refutation of a sermon in which Lawrence Sterne had attacked classical authors because, compared to the Bible, they “lose most of their graces whenever we find them literally translated”.179 Newman maintains that to be capable of easy translation is no test of the excellence of a composition, otherwise the multiplication table would be ‘the most gifted of all conceivable compositions’.180 To support his views he gives examples of the passage from one fine art to another: from sculpture to painting; this is what contemporary linguistics, following Roman Jakobson, would call intersemiotic translation. Expression and style are so related to the artist and to his language that every translation necessarily implies that something is lost and something is untranslatable. No language is like another, every one has different “ideas, turns of thought, delicacies of expression, figures, associations, abstractions, points of view.”181 These ideas are further developed by Newman in his essay Elementary Studies, published in the second part of The Idea of a University, when he discusses the Latin and Greek entrance exams to the Catholic University. This is the longest of the essays in the Idea, where Newman gathers and modifies some of his articles previously published in the Catholic University Gazette. The tone and style are different from other parts of the work, and Newman in fact presents his own method through the use of dialogue and letters, analysing and criticising educational theories of his time. Unfortunately, this section of the Idea was never properly considered by scholars of Newman and none of the works on his Dublin Writings deals with it at length. Besides the more strictly linguistic aspects, what is relevant from a philosophical point of view is Newman’s conception of the diversity of languages. He maintains the thesis of the irreducible uniqueness of every language, tightly connected with Idea, p. 271. Idea, p. 287. 181 Idea, p. 286. 179 180

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the history of the people who speak it and the great authors who have developed it according to their personality and style. As a young student, Newman, like Locke, had been educated in Classics scholarship, spending hours translating from Greek and Latin. For prospective students of the Catholic University of Ireland, and as mentioned in a previous section, admission exams included a brief oral translation from Greek and Latin.182 Newman, in his essay, shows how behind even a brief text an extremely rich cultural world lies, and translation can be the occasion to deepen the knowledge of the examinee. “[…] one word, even by itself, affords matter for a sufficient examination of a youth in grammar, history, and geography.”183 In the first part of the essay Newman presents two dialogues between two students and their examiners. In the first dialogue the Greek word anabasis is examined. The interlocutors begin with the etymology of the word and progress until they reach the history and geography that it implies. The student is presented as a negative model however, because even if he knows the words he is unable to go beyond their mere meanings. He possesses a shallow scholarship, something closer to curiosity than to knowledge. The second dialogue instead presents an exam about Cicero’s Letters Ad Familiares. The student in this case shows greater possession of his scholarship. The two situations are later discussed through an exchange of letters between the first student and his father, between the father and the examiner, and between the father and one of his friends. Newman makes use of the two examples to illustrate his theory on translating. Following Samuel Johnson’s scheme184, he According to the Catholic University Gazette, the entrance examination for the year 1854 consisted of “Latin compositions and of questions submitted to the candidates on paper; after which a further trial was given to each student separately, by questions asked and answered vivâ voce.” The Catholic University Gazette, n. 36, 1 February 1855, p. 320. See also My Campaign, pp. 130-135. 183 Idea, p. 336. 184 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, 1827). 182

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divided Grammar, which is “the art of using words properly”185, into four parts: Orthography, Etymology, Syntax and Prosody. Grammar taken as a whole is: “the scientific analysis of language, and to be conversant with it, as regards a particular language, is to be able to understand the meaning and force of that language when thrown into sentences and paragraphs.”186 The examiner in the dialogue, through the test of translation, has to ascertain if the student knows: […] Etymology and Syntax, the two principal departments of the science of language,-whether he understands how the separate portions of a sentence hang together, how they form a whole, how each has its own place in the government of it, what are the peculiarities of construction or the idiomatic expressions in it proper to the language in which it is written, what is the precise meaning of its terms, and what the history of their formation.187

Here the idea emerges, which is typical in Newman’s philosophy, that knowledge is holistic, to know is to give form, to put particulars inside a whole, and therefore to know a text means to be able to give a place to every element of it. Thomas Docherty in his Criticism and Modernity reads Newman’s concept of grammar as an equivalent of today ‘theory’ in literary studies as long as it allows the student to see the relation between particular and universal.188 What I am trying to show is that the comprehensive view that ought to guide the translator’s work is a paradigmatic example of Idea, p. 334. Idea, p. 334. 187 Idea, p. 335. 188 “Like Vico, Newman finds in the adequacy of the logos a fundamentally theological foundation for knowledge and for the university. Inasmuch as grammar is, broadly, ‘theory’, it is grammar that allows the student to see the relation between particular and general, or between his present instant and the eternal, between the secular and the sacred.” Thomas Docherty, Criticism and Modernity: Aesthetics, Literature and Nations in Europe and its Academies (Oxford, 1999), p. 217. 185 186

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Newman’s concept of liberal knowledge; as when we translate, according to Newman, every particular case can be seen and understood only as playing its part in a more general state of affairs. To translate an English sentence into Latin is to frame a sentence, and is the best test whether or not a student knows the difference of Latin from English construction; to construe and parse is to analyze a sentence, and is an evidence of the easier attainment of knowing what Latin construction is in itself. And this is the sense of the word “Grammar” which our inaccurate student detests, and this is the sense of the word that every sensible tutor will maintain. His maxim is, “a little, but well;” that is, really know what you say you know: know what you know and what you do not know; get one thing well before you go on to a second; try to ascertain what your words mean; when you read a sentence, picture it before your mind as a whole, take in the truth or information contained in it, express it in your own words, and, if it be important, commit it to the faithful memory. Again, compare one idea with another; adjust truths and facts; form them into one whole, or notice the obstacles which occur in doing so. This is the way to make progress; this is the way to arrive at results; not to swallow knowledge, but (according to the figure sometimes used) to masticate and digest it.189

What I am trying to illustrate is that Newman’s insistence on the study of languages, both contemporary and classical, plays into his broader project of the study of the human being. The study of the human being for Newman is linked to an ideal that favours the formation of personality through liberal education, rather than education guided by mere utilitarianism which the members of the Edinburgh Review, following Locke, were pursuing. Newman himself had many times, especially as a young student, taken part in Latin composition competitions. He was not only fluent in Latin, but he thought it to be the best language to convey philosophical and scientific arguments. In a letter written in 1853, during his Dublin period, he states: “I think Latin 189

Idea, pp. 335-336.

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is the concomitant of scientific proof – and it has struck me that, if I ever turned my ‘Development’ or ‘University Education’ into syllogism, I should write in Latin.”190 After his conversion to Catholicism he was asked by English bishops to lead a new complete translation of the Bible into English, a task that he accepted enthusiastically but that he could never perform.191 Newman’s educational interest in the benefit of foreign languages and cultures was not limited to ancient times; from the beginning, we can find French, Spanish and Italian among the subjects taught at the Catholic University of Ireland. This is parti­ cularly significant if we take into account that the same college, on its opening day, contained only fifteen teachers and seventeen students.192 Newman is also credited with the establishment of the first chair of Irish History and Archaeology. He asked Eugene O’Cur­ ry to take on the position, and he personally attended his lessons and encouraged the publication of his works.193 The Atlantis, the Catholic University journal specifically devoted to the publication of research, hosted many contributions by Eugene O’Curry on Celtic Literature and a translation of Calderon by Denis Florence McCarthy, professor of poetry.194 John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, p. 381. Newman discussed the different translations of the Bible in his article ‘The Text of the Rheims and Douay version of holy scripture’ published in the Rambler, vol. 1, pp. 145-169 (July 1859) and later in Tracts theological and ecclesiastical (London, 1874) with the title ‘History of the Text of the Rheims and Douay Version’. 192 Lecturer in Italian and Spanish Languages from 1854 to 1863 was Augusto Cesare Marani from Modena. Peter la Page Renouf was lecturer in French Literature. James Burton Robertson, lecturer in Modern History and Geography, was also the translator of some of the works of Moelher, Schlegel and Hergenroether. 193 See Michael Tierney, Struggle with Fortune A Miscellany for the Centenary of The Catholic University of Ireland 1852-1954 (Dublin, 1954), pp. 121 and ff. 194 Writing on contemporary university, Jaroslav Pelikan noted: “A special area of concern must be the business of translation, where the university press has both the opportunity and the obligation to take the lead of the entire pub190

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As I tried to demonstrate, when we consider the study of languages in Locke, we hardly find an interest that transcends the mere use we can make of them. It seems that everything has to be justified by its usefulness, even the way grammar is taught: I would not be mistaken here, as if this were to under-value Greek and Latin: I grant these are Languages of great use and Excellency, and a Man can have no place amongst the Learned in this part of the World who is stranger to them. But the knowledge a Gentleman would ordinarily draw for this use out of the Roman and Greek writers, I think he may attain without studying the Grammars of those Tounges, and by bare Reading, may come to understand them sufficiently for all his purposes.195

While, for Newman, translation, which necessarily includes a good knowledge of grammar and syntax, is a way of training the mind: Consider, for instance, what a discipline in accuracy of thought it is to have to construe a foreign language into your own; what a still severer and more improving exercise it is to translate from your own into a foreign language.196

In sum, I tried to prove that in Locke education aims to the training of the gentleman, and the formation of his character intends mainly to make him well accepted in society, with Utility being the ultimate criterion for learning. Newman identifies these aspects in Locke and rightly names him as the father of the contemporary Utilitarians. He illustrates his arguments with examples from Locke’s educational writings, in particular some passages concerning the study of languages. Their opposing lishing community. Translation and the diffusion of results of research through scholarly publication are, taken together, fundamental to the vocation of the university.” Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of a University: A re-examination (New Haven and London, 1992), p. 343. 195 STCE, § 168. 196 Idea, p. 501.

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views of translation serve to represent a paradigmatic example of their diverging conceptions of the human person, and hence, in accordance with philosophical tradition, necessarily diverging views on his education.

CHAPTER THREE

The Idea of the Human Person: Constitutive Elements

1. The Intellectual Dimension A classical philosophical notion is found at the core of all Newman’s writings related to the Catholic University of Ireland, that is, the unity of knowledge. This is a theme as old as philosophical reflection itself. When the Greeks asked the question of ‘arche’, or the first principle of every reality, they were simultaneously enquiring about the criterion by which we unify our knowledge. The identification of a unifying principle gave birth to an organic conception of knowledge, and therefore to a unitary interpretation of the world and of human happenings. This subject, common to the philosophical tradition, gains particular relevance during the nineteenth century, due to the development of knowledge in general, and of the sciences in particular. The growth of human knowledge involved speculations about its method and sense, and much critical reflection on what, how and where it was possible to learn and teach, i.e. the acquisition and transferability of knowledge. For many philosophers, the theory of knowledge and university teaching were hence intrinsically connected. German Idealism, the most important philosophical school of the first half of the nineteenth century, can be largely interpreted as a discourse regarding the conception and articulation of a theoretical justification of the notion of unity of knowledge. In Hegel, the process of the unity of the Spirit, or Geist, gives birth to a complete, organic, unity of knowledge through a dynamic tension that dialectically unifies different sciences. In

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1818 Hegel, at the height of his fame, was called to teach in the recently founded University of Berlin, and in 1829 he became rector of the University, succeeding Fichte. Fichte and Schleiermacher had taught in Berlin, and Schelling after them. Von Humboldt wrote the constitution for what would later be called the Humboldt-Universitaet. The University of Berlin was the exemplary objectification of an idea of a university, a living embodiment of that organic articulation of knowledge around a centre, to which Fichte, Hegel and Humboldt had given their justification on a speculative level.1 In the English-speaking world of the nineteenth century there is no great philosopher, nor is there any philosophical school which connected theoretical reflections with the tasks of a university. The only possible exception, with its unique aspects, can be found in John Henry Newman and his works related to the Catholic University of Ireland. A debate on university reforms took place in England and Scotland during the first decades of the century, but it regarded mainly the curriculum and the new disciplines.2 Great socio-economic changes were See Luc Ferry, Alain Renault, Jean-Pierre Pesron (ed.), Philosophies de l’université. L’idéalisme allemand et la question de l’université (Paris, 1979). 2 “The eighteenth century had witnessed a woeful decay in the level of studies of both great seats of learning. At the end of that century the only recognised course in Oxford, that for the B.A., had degenerated into a classical course of the most narrowly literary type, with a smattering of Aristotelian philosophy. […] During the eighteenth century a formal examination, the Senate House examination, had been instituted for the degree, but it was almost purely mathematical. There was no entrance examination and, incredible as it may seem to the modern mind, peers could get their degree without examination. […] In 1800 a new Examination Statute prescribed a formal examination in place of the old disputations for both Bachelor’s and Master’s degree and also a separate examination for Honours. The examination for Masters, however, was dropped after a five years’ trial, and has never been restored. In 1808 another examination, Responsions, was added in the second year, consisting of Latin, Greek, Logic and Geometry. By 1830 the classical degree had been restored to something of its proper fullness, and included history, rhetoric, poetry, moral philosophy and political economy, thus approximating to 1

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underway in the United Kingdom which brought attendant changes for and within the general populace: the process of industrialization; the rise of the workers’ movement and of trade unions; the rise of democratic movements; increasing rates of literacy; and Election Law reform. The newly emerging middle classes wished to gain full access to the market and into the decision-making processes; likewise, admission to the educational system was gaining a growing importance for social status and inclusion. There was also an increasingly widespread assumption that men could and should rise in the social hierarchy through access to education. The traditional professions were not taught in the universities, but rather learned through practical experience.3 However, the useful disciplines were becoming more and more important; in particular, political economy was developing in the United Kingdom as the result of the doctrines of Smith, Ricardo and Malthus.4 At the beginning of the nineteenth century many critics in Parliament and the popular press attacked the only two universities in the Greats degree of today. In 1833 a formal examination in medicine was introduced, and in 1850 a third examination, Moderations, was brought into the classical course between Responsions and the final degree. New schools were instituted for law and modern history. But for all the students, even those of medicine, the classics remained the fundamental part of the degree.” Fergal McGrath, The consecration of learning, lectures on Newman’s Idea of a university (Dublin, 1962), pp. 4-5. 3 Legal and medical instruction remained essentially on an apprenticeship system. Members of the older professions, when they let in new members, seem to have thought of themselves as admitting educated gentlemen to small, self-governing groups of social equals; it was assumed that the applicant would be known personally to those who were to judge his qualifications. See William Joseph Reader, Professional Men: the Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-century England (London, 1966), pp. 47, 61-62. 4 A good test of Newman’s attitude toward political economy is his treatment of the subject as rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. Among the first group of teachers recruited there was a professor of political economy, John O’Hagan, a lawyer who contributed to the Atlantis and later published literary essays.

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England, Oxford and Cambridge. The criticisms included charges of religious exclusivism and that their narrow curricula were far removed from professional life and the sciences. These are the same themes on which Newman focuses his attention, namely, the relationship between education and social needs, the role of religion in the curriculum, and its relationship with the State. The educational standard was generally low, and despite the progress of Mathematics and Physical Sciences in France and Scotland, English students were still educated according to an old formula. Education was primarily oriented towards introducing students to the life of the gentleman, its ultimate aim being social respectability rather than academic proficiency. In Oxford, reform efforts led to a rise in the standard of the classics course, and to the restoration of its philosophical and historical character, but they did not address the urgent problem resulting from the virtual exclusion of all other subjects. The Edinburgh Review, a well known social and literary journal, in 1808 commenced a famous attack on the just renewed Oxford curriculum in classics. The defence at that time was rallied by Edward Copleston, Oriel fellow and vicar of St Mary’s, and by John Davison, Fellow and Tutor in Oriel.5 The debate was raised again between 1832 and 1845, and initially, Newman engaged with it. McGrath affirms: In the course of the nineteenth century, the field of human knowledge was vastly widened by scientific discovery, and its intricacy vastly increased by the new complications in the fabric of society brought about by the machine age. The problem, therefore, was created of how much of this wide and varied body of knowledge the university should, or even could, embrace.6 The seventh discourse of the Idea contains a large extract from an article in defense of classical education published by Davison in the Quarterly Review in 1811. Already in 1852 Newman published an essay in the British Critic entitled ‘John Davison’. See John Henry Newman, Essays Critical and Historical (London and New York, 1871), vol. II, Essay XV. 6 Fergal McGrath, Newman’s University: Idea and Reality (Dublin, 1951), p. 300. 5

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Even if he was writing for an Irish public, Newman had in mind his extensive experience in Oxford and the English debate of the previous decades. In his Dublin Writings can be found all the problems discussed in the same years by Wilhelm Von Humboldt in Germany, Ernest Renan in France, Antonio Labriola in Italy: namely the relationships amongst different disciplines, the need for balance between traditional and new subjects and a critical reflection on the sense of knowledge.7 For Newman, it was clear what the main problem of the contemporary university system was: The majestic vision of the Middle Ages, which grew steadily to perfection in the course of centuries, the University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has almost gone out in night. A philosophical comprehensiveness, and orderly expansiveness, an elastic constructiveness, men have lost them, and cannot make out why. This is why: because they have lost the idea of unity.8

For Newman the idea of unity had been lost in the modern world, and the most striking example was to be found in the field of education. The very aim of knowledge is the first question Newman addresses in his Idea of a University. If every particular science is the basis of definite arts, carrying on to tangible results, then what is the purpose of what he calls liberal knowledge? Newman affirms that knowledge, in its proper sense, is an end in itself, a tangible, real and sufficient end. Every kind of knowledge, if it really is such, is a reward for the human mind. It holds not an instrumental, but an intrinsic, value; it is not merely a means to something beyond it, but an end sufficient to pursue for its own sake. Newman does not deny the advantages accruing from its possession, but he states that its very acquisition alone satisfies a need 7 See Armando Rigobello (ed.), L’unità del sapere. La questione universitaria nella filosofia del XIX sec. (Rome, 1977). 8 Idea, p. 423.

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of our nature. Newman conveys this view from classical thought, from Latin and Greek philosophy, introducing many passages from De officiis of Cicero to support his ideas. In contrast to Cato, who esteemed everything according to what it produced, Cicero argued for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and he believed that its cultivation need not necessarily benefit society. Since knowledge can only be sought and obtained when physical and social needs are fulfilled, and people are freed from duties and cares, its acquisition, however, pertains mainly to free men. Newman borrows this understanding of knowledge from ancient Rome in order to go back to the original meaning of liberal knowledge. The word ‘liberal’ comes from the Latin adjective ‘liberalis’, i.e. worthy of a free man, and is the opposite of servile. The contrast between liber (free man) and servus (slave) reflects conflicting attitudes towards a man’s occupation, that is, the free man acts for his own pleasure, the slave in order to satisfy both his own needs and his master’s will. Similarly, liberal knowledge serves nothing other than itself; it is worth possessing for what it is and not merely for what it does. It must be emphasised that what Newman meant by the word ‘liberal’ in no way pertained to political or theological liberalism.9 On the contrary, as he stated on the occasion of his becoming a Cardinal, all his life had been a struggle against liberalism in religion, which reduces the mysteries of God to the level of human understanding, human feeling and human convenience. Moreover, all the Dublin Writings are, in an extended sense, a refutation of arguments carried out by modern liberal thinkers (Locke, Bentham) and politicians (Brougham, Peel).10 Newman’s thoughts regarding liberal education fall within the framework of the Aristotelian theory of virtues, anticipating a .

9 See J. Derek Holmes, Factors in the Development of Newman’s political attitudes in James Bastable (ed.), Newman and Gladstone Centennial Essays (Dublin, 1978). 10 See Thomas J. Norris, Only Life Gives Life (Dublin, 1996) chapter 6 and Lina Callegari, Newman La fede e le sue ragioni (Milan, 2001).

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reflection that was widely developed during the second half of the twentieth century, especially in English-speaking philosophy. Newman holds that knowledge can be seen at the same time both as a power and as a good. Bacon’s legacy is evident when Newman affirms that knowledge is a power that has a result beyond itself, but he also claims that “prior to its being a power, it is a good; that is, not only an instrument, but an end”.11 It is an end in itself which, when it resolves itself into a tangible fruit, is called useful knowledge, and when it falls back upon the reason which informs it, it is liberal knowledge. The same person may cultivate it in both ways at once, and this means that it is not a question of the knowledge itself as an object, but of personal attitude towards one’s own attainments. The principle of real dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness, considered irrespectively of its results, is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why it admits of being called Liberal. Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy.12

The real philosopher is the one who has a ‘view’ or better, who, having a map of his worldview, knows how and where to find a place for every acquisition of knowledge, and how to configure his attainments. Newman calls this a habit, a personal possession, an acquired endowment that cannot be lost, once we possess it and as long as the mind functions properly. This is the reason why it is more appropriate to speak of a university as a place of education than of instruction, because its purpose is not to teach a method or an art, but to form a character, in a personal and permanent manner. Newman conceived his University in Dublin in terms of a collegiate and tutor system, where the 11 12

Idea, p. 112. Idea, p. 113.

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whole personality was trained, because he thought that the way one learns and knows is strictly connected with a person’s character traits. Newman specifies that his reservations about professional or useful knowledge do not imply that a university does not teach particular disciplines or professions. The only way to teach all knowledge is to embrace all its branches. What he has in mind, instead, is that a scientist or any other professional person, thanks to a liberal education, will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession.13

Newman links the proper organization of the sciences to the way in which the human mind conceives reality. This has its basis not in a transcendental subject, rather, on the one side in the structure of reality, and on the other side in the intellectual dimension of the person. The postulation underlying Newman’s thought is that everything that exists forms a large system, each portion of which has countless relationships with the other parts. Knowledge consists in the apprehension of these parts, whether in themselves or in their mutual positions and bearings. “There are no natural or real limits between part and part; one is ever running into another; all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with another.”14 The entire universe is so intimately knit together that we cannot separate portion from portion, or operation from operation, except by a mental abstraction and artificial division. If reality is in fact united, then where does the fragmentation that humans experience and perceive come from? What is the 13 14

Idea, pp. 166-167. Ibid., p. 45.

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relationship between the One and the Many? The unity of reality has, for Newman, a counterpart in the limits of the human mind. He affirms that, in spite of its capabilities, the human mind cannot take in the whole of reality at a single glance, it must look at its different aspects from all the possible points of view in order to conceive them as a whole. Newman uses the metaphor of the short-sighted reader15 whose ‘eye pores closely, and travels slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its inspection’. This is likewise for the man of science, all the different parts and details need to be confronted in order for him to be able to express a sound judgment of the whole. As we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides, the mind goes round about it, noting down, first one thing, then another, as it best may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself a knowledge of that universe into which it has been born.16

Structure is an important concept to grasp in order to understand Newman’s idea of knowledge. A structure is a set of elements where every constituent part has its value according to the place it maintains inside the set. The value of each part is the relationship that it has with the others. Newman affirms: Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, till that whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading It has to be noticed that when Newman talks about knowledge he uses most of the time metaphors linked to the sense of vision. See also Ibid., pp. 131, 136, 140, 179, 496. 16 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 15

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and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one defi­ nite meaning.17

This idea of wholeness often recurs in the Dublin Writings and is always connected with the logical principle that unity does not mean simplicity but the harmonic order of parts; therefore, the universal enlargement of mind “is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence.”18 If we want to synthesise in one expression this idea of the universal enlargement of mind, we could affirm that it means ‘to struc­ ture’.19 Knowledge for Newman is not the mere accumulation of information, he maintained that the intellect20 of man perceives in the senses something beyond them. It seizes and unites what the senses present to it; it grasps and forms what need not have been seen or heard except in its constituent parts. It discerns in lines and colours, or in tones, what is beautiful and what is not. It gives them a meaning, and invests them with an idea. It gathers up a succession of notes into the expression of a whole, and calls it a melody.21

The proper function of the intellect is, using a scholastic language, to give form to the objects on which it is employed, to place data inside a structure, thereby rendering them intelligible. In musical terms this can be understood as a melody being much more than a succession of notes, it is what links constituent parts and gives them harmony, or their unity. Only the human mind is capable of exercising the faculty of ordering into a coherent Ibid., p. 137. Ibid., p. 137. 19 Newman’s recollection, in fact, possesses striking similarities with the method later developed by Structuralism. 20 Newman makes no distinction between intellect and mind and often uses both terms indifferently. 21 Ibid., p. 75. 17 18

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system those objects which the senses and experience convey to it; its task is to re-establish an order, an intelligibility out of the fragmentation of data. “It distinguishes between rule and exception, between accident and design. It assigns phenomena to a general law, qualities to a subject, acts to a principle, and effects to a cause.”22 Newman strongly emphasises the active role of the human mind: it holds the formative power that reduces to order and meaning our acquisitions and makes the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own. Knowledge, in its broader and deeper sense, means to put in relation; its enlargement being a comparison of ideas one with another, and a systematising of them. Our minds grow and expand when we not only learn, but also when we refer what we learn to what we know already. A truly great intellect, is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no centre. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.23

Two basic principles can be found in Newman’s sketch of a theory of knowledge: on the one side the wholeness and unity of the world granted by the Creator24, and on the other, the partiality and the fragmentation of the human mind. In this dialectic of limits and powers of the intellect, the unity of knowledge is at the same time a need and a task; the human mind is simultaneously the origin of fragmentation, because of its incapacity for taking in the whole of reality at a single glance, but also the Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 134. 24 “I have said that all branches of knowledge are connected together, because the subject-matter of knowledge is intimately united in itself, as being the acts and the work of the Creator.” Ibid., p. 99. 22 23

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principle of unification, as it possesses the faculty of giving a harmonious order to parts. Sciences are precisely the partial views, or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its subjects in order to reduce them to unity.25 The world can be seen from different perspectives and, as far as they consider various aspects, they are incomplete so that, on the one hand they need external assistance, one by one, by reason of their incompleteness, and on the other they are able to afford it to each other, by reason, first, of their independence in themselves, and then of their connexion in their subject-matter.26

Our vision is always from a particular and partial perspective; in order to be complete it needs to be exercised in the most expansive and diverse way. Using a visual metaphor Newman compares knowledge to a combination of colours, where very different effects are produced by a difference in their selection and juxtaposition; in fact red, green, and white change their shades according to the contrast to which they are submitted. In like manner, the drift and meaning of a branch of knowledge varies with the company in which it is introduced to the student. If his reading is confined simply to one subject, however such division of labour may favour the advancement of a particular pursuit certainly it has a tendency to contract his mind. If it is incorporated with others, it depends on those others as to the kind of influence which it exerts upon him.27

All the disciplines, being the logical record of this or that aspect of the whole subject-matter of knowledge, belong to one and the same circle of objects, and they are one and all “The problem of the partiality of sciences is in fact a specification of the more general philosophical problem of the partiality or abstractive character of all finite, human understanding whatsoever.” Michael Baur, ‘Newman and the Problem of the Partiality and Unity of the Sciences’, Proceeding of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 77 (2003), pp. 111-127. 26 Ibid., p. 47. 27 Ibid., p. 100. 25

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connected together. Newman does not deny the value of every single science, but he does acknowledges their limits: “They are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves, though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes; on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other.”28 Only if we take them together in unity can there be a complete and universal knowledge. Once the reality of universal knowledge has been accepted, a further question arises as to the means by which it is to be attained. Newman maintains that the intellect does not discern truth intuitively; no direct or simple vision of truth is ever given, but a complex process of acquisition, mediation and comprehension is necessary. Knowledge is possible only, “by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions, by the employment, concentration, and joint action of many faculties and exercises of mind.”29 These are not innate or spontaneous activities, they must be taught, developed and exercised; and for Newman the university is the necessary and appropriate site for this intellectual training. What is interesting in Newman is the role of philosophy in the architecture of the sciences. He claims for philosophy, meant in a very broad sense, the task of systematising, of ordering the objects which sense conveys to the mind into a system, and uniting and stamping them with one form. He uses various terms for this activity: Philosophia Prima, Liberal Knowledge, Science of Sciences, but it will become clear later in this examination that philosophy is here conceived not as a meta-theory which explains every possible acquirement, but as an interpretative practice. Newman speaks of a philosophical habit of mind; he does not present a comprehensive system of all possible knowledge, rather a reflection on the sense and the place of all types of learning in human life. 28 29

Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 151.

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Newman highlights two relevant dangers in intellectual activity, and he suggests that in both of them our need for unity leads to confusion between parts and wholeness. The first danger is partiality, namely the tendency somebody has to consider his discipline of study as unique and complete.30 The several conclusions of different branches of learning “do not represent whole and substantive things, but views, true, so far as they go; and in order to ascertain how far they do go […] we must compare them with the views taken out of that object by other sciences.”31 A convergence between the numerous forms of knowledge is required because, for Newman, only when they are viewed in their totality can they “approximate to a representation or subjective reflection of the objective truth, as nearly as is possible to the human mind.”32 Taken separately there is no doctrine contained in them which could not be in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, almost every statement could be perverted and made false, because it is not the whole truth. An accurate apprehension of an object is only possible in proportion to the number of sciences which the mind has mastered. In the whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatise, except hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles.33 This conception of the mutual interdependence of the disciplines therefore has significant, relevant, consequences in relation to the methods used in research and for the organization of teaching. The second danger for the learning man, closely connected with the first, is the unjustified enlargement of a discipline; namely, “Men, whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond if it happens to fail them.” Ibid., p. 137-138. 31 Ibid., p. 49. 32 Ibid., p. 47. 33 See Ibid., pp. 49. 30

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the tendency to extend beyond the legitimate limits, method and contents of the discipline with which he is concerned. No science whatever, however comprehensive it may be, but will fall largely into error, if it be constituted the sole exponent of all things in heaven and earth, and that, for the simple reason that it is encroaching on territory not its own, and undertaking problems which it has no instruments to solve.34

The human mind has a natural drive such that it cannot keep from speculating and systematising; however, when it cannot properly exercise these faculties it abandons itself to all kinds of wild hypotheses and conjectures. In its impetuousness it pronounces without sufficient data, expresses flippant judgments and shallow generalisations.35 In one delightful passage Newman notes: Hence the misconceptions of character, hence the false impressions and reports of words or deeds, which are the rule, rather than the exception, in the world at large; hence the extravagances of undisciplined talent, and the narrowness of conceited ignorance; because, though it is no easy matter to view things correctly, nevertheless the busy mind will ever be viewing. We cannot do without a view, and we put up with an illusion when we cannot get a truth.36

Man normally aspires to having a comprehensive viewpoint, and his impetuous need for truth leads him, using a topical metaphor, to the usurpation of territories where he has no authority. Drop any science out of the circle of knowledge and the other sciences will close up, exceeding their proper bounds, and intruding where they have no right. Newman was mainly concerned with the exclusion of theology from the university curricula, but his consideration still stands today for any field of Ibid., p. 74. See Ibid. p. 75. 36 Ibid., p. 76. 34 35

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knowledge.37 Michael Baur writes: “The integration of the sciences is an on-going task. This is so, not only because the sciences themselves are always expanding and developing; but also because the human tendency towards intellectual totalization and usurpation is itself not a passing affliction or a temporal condition”.38 Newman is particularly alarmed about these kinds of misuses in the study of the human being. In the Idea he affirms that man may be viewed “in relation to the material elements of his body, or to his mental constitution, or to his household and family, or to the community in which he lives, or to the Being who made him; and in consequence we treat of him respectively as physiologists, or as moral philosophers, or as writers of economics, or of politics, or as theologians.”39 However, as long as we confine ourselves to one or only some subjects, and we do not take account of the entire person, the defect in our knowledge will be greater in proportion to the importance of the relationships omitted. Further, Newman maintains not only that one science, or family of sciences, is not the whole truth, but also that not even the whole secular science can rightly claim to possess complete knowledge. Revealed truth enters to a great extent into the province of science and the arts, and to put it on one side, on the basis that secular science embraces all facts of these disciplines, is simply to do science a great damage because God’s revelation has man as beneficiary. Different sciences will suffer from the omission of the revealed truth as long as they regard the study of the human person. “I do not say that every science will be equally affected by the omission; pure mathematics will not suffer at all; “The systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance.” Ibid., p. 51. 38 Michael Baur, ‘Newman and the Problem of the Partiality and Unity of the Sciences’, Proceeding of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 77 (2003), p. 113. 39 Ibid., p. 48. 37

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chemistry will suffer less than politics, politics than history, ethics, or metaphysics.”40 What distinguishes Newman from many of his contemporaries is the stress he places on the human person. In his writings there is no concept comparable to a transcendental subject; he consistently speaks of the real, living, human person, complete with limits and capabilities. Universal knowledge regards individuals; it is the perfection of the individual intellect according to its distinctive characteristic traits.41 When the intellect has once been properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it will display its powers with more or less effect according to its particular quality and capacity in the individual. In the case of most men it makes itself felt in the good sense, sobriety of thought, reasona­ bleness, candour, self-command, and steadiness of view, which characterize it. In some it will have developed habits of business, power of influencing others, and sagacity. In others it will elicit the talent of philosophical speculation, and lead the mind forward to eminence in this or that intellectual department. In all it will be a faculty of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession.42

The intellectual excellence that Newman describes here is a power belonging to every single human mind, if properly trained. He writes not for the interest of science as such, but for the care of the persons, for whom he was conceiving, and later directing, the Catholic University of Ireland. A university is for him more a place of education than of instruction, because it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character.43 From these elements of Newman’s thought, taken from his Dublin Writings, an initial comparison can be drawn with other modern thinkers regarding the concept of the unity of knowledge. Ibid., p. 72. See Ibid., p. 137. 42 Ibid., p. 19. 43 See Ibid., p. 114. 40 41

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Knowledge, in Kant, is a consequence of the judgement, it is to put order, by way of the formal structures of intellect, in the phenomenal world that surrounds us. Unity lies not in an objective status of the reality external to the object, but in the organic connection of the judgements inside the thinking subject. To know means to unify, because the structure of judgement is a unifying synthesis of subjects and predicates. Later, in most of the post-Kantian philosophy, knowledge from an ordering activity becomes a creative one, and the unity of knowledge becomes the expression of an absolute activity. The ideal of the romantic poetics develops into a rigorous dialectical operation, centre and hinge of a new encyclopaedia whose parts are moments of a process where the truth is the process itself, that is, history. From this point of view Newman is clearly closer to classical realism than to most thinkers of his time, as he never denies that reality has an order that comes from the Creator. Furthermore, the creative power of the human mind, which he always refers back to the real person and not to a transcendental subject, does not erase the given structure of reality. Newman clearly states that sciences approximate to a representation or subjective reflection of the objective truth, as far as it is possible to the human mind.44 So this objective truth precedes, logically and chronologically, human knowledge, and it is the end to which human knowledge ought to aim to conform. Are Newman’s views still relevant today? It would seem that they are not if we consider them from a practical point of view, primarily because the conception of knowledge as a whole seems practically unmanageable in the face of the breadth and depth of the current state of the sciences today; to possess a comprehensive notion of the updated achievements of all the branches is impossible. Is the university the best place to acquire the philosophical habit that Newman had in mind? Probably not, but this argument warrants a deeper discussion. Certainly the university is no longer the only institution for advanced learning; great traditions of 44

Ibid., p. 47.

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thinking confront themselves not so much only in the university and academic journals, as in the past, but today’s great debates are also waged via public opinion, largely due to modern communications and the media. Nevertheless, the multiplication and the fragmentation of the disciplines intensifies the need for unity, and what is still significant in all Newman’s productions related to the Catholic University of Ireland is, I believe, mainly his treatment of the problem of the unity of knowledge. As we have seen before, Newman assigns to philosophy a pivotal role in the unification of knowledge: The comprehension of the bearings of one science on another, and the use of each to each, and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all, one with another, this belongs, I conceive, to a sort of science distinct from all of them, and in some sense a science of sciences, which is my own conception of what is meant by Philosophy, in the true sense of the word, and of a philosophical habit of mind.45

Philosophy has not to be understood here as a sort of meta-discipline that gives account of every achievement of human knowledge. Newman never meant to create a sort of encyclopaedia of the sciences, as we can find in Hegel, Comte or Rosmini. Dwight Culler, in his seminal study on Newman’s educational ideal, rightly affirms: With the problem of knowledge as such Newman was not deeply concerned – when he thought about it at all, he inclined to the commonsense view – but with the problem of how the mind can reconcile the unity which is the deepest need of its own nature with the multiplicity which is the most obvious character of the external world, he was deeply and even passionately concerned.46

In the Dublin Writings, philosophy is meant not as a discipline above all the others, but as a unifying activity. It is the exercise of the faculty of systematisation and should be interpreted Ibid., p. 51. Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 204. 45 46

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as the satisfaction of a quest for sense and order. I believe that the closest current reflections to Newman’s philosophy can be found not in epistemology but in the philosophical hermeneutics debates.47 His idea of philosophy, being so broad and inclusive, is much closer to a reflection on the sense of comprehension, than to a detailed theory of knowledge, which he actually never wrote. It is not casually that Georges Gusdorf, in his Les origines de l’herméneutique, situates Newman inside the tradition of the romantic hermeneutics48 because his interest, especially in the Dublin Writings, is not the possibility of knowledge, which he never denies, but its meaning. Newman’s call for a convergence between the numerous fields of knowledge reminds me of the ‘long route’ of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Ricoeur maintains that the subject does not know itself directly but only through the signs deposited in cultural traditions, therefore, hermeneutical understanding occurs only through the mediation of human sciences that take into account a diversity of cultural materials stemming from their research. Similarly, in Newman, human understanding can take place only through the comprehensive and diversified approach of different disciplines. Philosophy is not the ultimate explanation or a meta-discipline, but it is that particular habit of mind that should lead every form of research. Following the metaphors presented by Newman, an analogy can be drawn between the learning man and the reader. The world can be known because it has an author, its meaning is open to the reader, and the scientist is the reader of the book of nature. Learning is not just a passive acquisition but results from the work of the learner, it is open to the horizon of possible experiences, and different views will give different accounts of it. The conflict of interpretation is solvable only with the most 47 I am referring particularly to Gadamer’s and Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics. 48 Georges Gusdorf, Les origines de l’herméneutique (Paris, 1988). See also Thomas K. Carr, Newman and Gadamer: Towards a Hermeneutics of Religious Knowledge (Atlanta, 1996).

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comprehensive and diversified approach, and the university is the proper seat of universal learning because it is the place where all branches of knowledge meet and confront one another. The quest for meaning is always coupled with any search for truth, in every field of learning, and Newman reclaims this task for the philosophical habit of mind. Behind the search for unity there is a need for self-comprehension, a need for an understanding of the human experience of learning and, ultimately, for an understanding of the value of humanity itself. Newman’s persistent idea of knowledge conceived as the capability of placing acquirements into a total frame should be interpreted as the capacity to make sense of things, and the postulate underlying all his thought is that things and facts are capable of being reduced to order because they are part of Creation. In the gap between the unity of creation and the need for the unity of our knowledge, the creative power of the human mind finds its place. Knowledge is not a record, a passive reception, but the action of that formative power which reduces to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements. I wish to stress this active power of the human mind. If our mind is the cause of fragmentation of knowledge, because of its inability to take in the whole of reality at a single glance, it has also the principle of unification, as it possesses the faculty of giving order to all these diverse parts. The unification of reality occurs not by intuition or mystic illumination, not with a single glance, but through a practice, through the ‘long ruote’ of study and education. Sciences are precisely the partial views by means of which the mind looks out upon its subjects in order to reduce them to unity. As Michael Baur suggests, the partiality of sciences is only a specification of the more general philosophical problem of the finite character of human understanding.49 It would be reductive to consider Newman’s thoughts on knowledge 49 See Michael Baur, ‘Newman and the Problem of the Partiality and Unity of the Sciences’, Proceeding of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 77 (2003), pp. 111-127.

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to hold good only for academic life. They represent a broader reflection on the intellectual dimension of the human person. Learning is not just a passive acquisition of information but necessarily results from the work of the learner. Newman posits a creative capacity within the human mind when he affirms that, aside from being the source of fragmentation, it also contains the means of unification, as it possesses the faculty of giving an order to parts. This order given to reality is not spontaneous or schematic, but it is the outcome of a creative activity. I want now to defend the thesis that this creative activity has strong affinities with classical rhetoric. If we analyse Newman’s description of the effects of education we will find those traits that in the classical tradition belonged to rhetoric. He says: It is the education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant.50

I am suggesting here that Newman was thinking, whether consciously or unconsciously, of four of the five ‘offices’ of classical 50 This paragraph continues with an illustration of the effects of education in social life: “It [education] shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent; he is able to converse, he is able to listen; he can ask a question pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably, when he has nothing to impart himself; he is ever ready, yet never in the way; he is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you can depend upon; he knows when to be serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious with effect. He has the repose of a mind which lives in itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad. He has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar, and with which failure and disappointment have a charm.” Idea, p. 178.

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rhetoric: inventio (a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments), dispositio (a truth in developing them), elocutio (an eloquence in expressing them), and actio (a force in urging them).51 The rest of the quotation conveys exactly the ability of a rhetorician. This should not surprise us, given Newman’s education in Oxford, where rhetoric, as a study and practice in ideas and expression, was held in high esteem.52 In January, 1836 he wrote to his dear friend Hurrell Froude: “You and Keble are the philosophers, and I am the rhetorician.”53 In his Introduction to Richard McKeon’s Rhetoric, Mark Backman writes: “Invention refers not only to words but to facts, data, methods, and systems. Rhetoric is more than an expressive art; it is an organizational principle that provides the framework within which we can reveal and arrange the significant part of any human undertaking.”54 It seems to me that the organizational principle here attributed to rhetoric corresponds to Newman’s idea of the philosophical habit of mind, conceived as the capability of placing acquirements into a total frame, the capacity to make sense of things. Newman’s philosophy is thoroughly interpretative and predicated on the mediatorial role of mind and language. The mind is creative in producing its discoveries and in organising its attainments while language expresses them through its various forms of performance.55 The articulation of these different moments is precisely the object of rhetoric, and the mind, or the intellect (the two are synonyms for Newman), needs to be educated in it. We may say that in some There is nothing here that reassembles the ‘memoria’. See Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia, 1989), pp. 7-12. As a young scholar Newman helped Richard Whately in the drafting of the influential Elements of Rhetoric (London, 1828). 53 John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. V, p. 225. 54 Mark Backman, ‘Introduction’ in Richard McKeon Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery (Woodbridge, 1987), p. xx. 55 The topic of language will be treated more extensively in the third section of this chapter. 51 52

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sense the philosophical habit of mind is the result of a proper rhetorical education. In being mediatorial the mind is also constitutive of knowledge, it not only exhibits it, but also plays an active part in its acquisition through the ‘long route’ of study and education. This is why it is correct to speak here of an ‘epistemic rhetoric’ as it comprehends more than style or mere sophistry. Walter Jost, more than any other scholar, has defended the rhetorical stance of Newman’s thought. He maintained that: Newman in fact is the first modern thinker to articulate what rhetoricians these days call ‘epistemic’ rhetoric—the view that rhetoric has an epistemological or truth function—and in so doing show himself to be a rhetorical theorist of vastly greater interest than his Oxford tutor, the influential Richard Whately. In this way it can be seen not only that rhetoric illuminates Newman, but Newman sophisticates our knowledge of rhetorical theory and our critical appreciation of rhetorical practice.56

Epistemic rhetoric can be defined as the faculty of judgement and discrimination, a faculty that plays a central role throughout the Newman’s Dublin Writings.57 “In short, ‘rhetoric’ in both senses, as a narrow art of literary excellence and as a general faculty of judgment and discrimination, is for Newman the centerpiece of liberal education, quite as it was for Vives. The curriculum, text-oriented and steeped in the study of language, seeks to cultivate the power of appreciation and judging.”58 One last aspect of the intellectual dimension of the human being must be considered. Newman stated that the university is the place 56 Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia, 1989), p. xiii. 57 “The philosophy of an imperial intellect, for such I am considering a Universi­ty to be, is based, not so much on simplification as on discrimination”. Idea, p. 461. 58 Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia, 1989), p. 197. Juan Luis Vives was a sixteenth-century Spanish humanist. Newman quoted from some of his works in the 1852 Appendix to the Idea. See Idea (1852), pp. 399-401.

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where all branches of knowledge meet and confront one another, and is therefore the only proper seat of universal learning. In Rise and Progress of Universities there is an illuminating passage in which Newman affirms that in his day big cities were taking the place of the ancient university so far as they were a seat of court, high society, politics, law and letters. This holds much more nowadays. The newspapers, magazines, reviews, journals, and periodicals of all kinds, the publishing trade, the libraries, museums, and academies there found, the learned and scientific societies, necessarily invest it [the city] with the functions of a University; and the atmosphere of intellect, which in a former age hung over Oxford or Bologna or Salamanca, has, with the change of times, moved away to the centre of civil government.59

This passage illustrates the awareness Newman had regarding the decreasing relevance of the university in regard to cultural production but, at the same time, gives a broader sense to his reflection on knowledge, allowing us to apply his thoughts not only to academic knowledge, but also to the intellectual dimension of human existence. “We cannot then be without virtual Universities; a metropolis is such”60 he said. The whole world, not only cities, is today a virtual university in so far as every place may achieve communication with others, but at same time this virtual university has no other place of unification than in the learner himself. The lack of a centre, where everything converges, is a peculiarity of our contemporary condition61, and is best exemplified by the internet, the virtual university par excellence. With the multiplication of intellectual experiences the need for unity dramatically emerges in order to avoid the risk of the fragmentation, not only of knowledge, but of the whole of human life. 59 RP, p. 13. Originally printed as ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 2, 8 June 1854, p. 13. 60 RP, p. 14. 61 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Manchester, 1984).

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A unified theory of knowledge, which has been a mainstream tendency in modern philosophy, from the Enlightenment to Positivism and Neopositivism, and in some forms of contemporary analytical philosophy, is hardly sustainable in the postmodern age. The unity of knowledge, in my opinion, can be pursued only in the direction traced by Newman, as a personal and collective search for the sense of the human intellectual dimension. Understanding is more than a method, it is a habit of mind. Newman’s conception of philosophy, conceived as an interpretative praxis, opens up a dimension that is not just one among other fields of inquiry, but rather constitutes the necessary reflection common to all of them. This certainly does not exclude the possibility that the sciences go their own way and have their own methods which consist of objectifying the object of their research. Newman does not limit himself to a theory of science which, in the name of methodological rigour, robs us of certain experiences of other fields, other expressions, other texts and their claim to validity. Instead, in many senses, Newman anticipates the critics of reductionism when he claims that there is not one single method valid for every discipline, but their mutual concurrence is needed to achieve universal knowledge. Sciences demand comparison and adjustment, they complete, correct and balance each other. This also impacts the way research in every field is conducted; it becomes a dialogical enterprise between disciplines, thereby increasing the understanding within each discipline. 2. The Moral Dimension Thoughts regarding the moral dimension of human existence can be found in many of Newman’s Dublin Writings, but a preliminary assumption must be drawn in order to avoid confusion. Unlike the intellectual dimension, a critical account of the moral dimension presents more difficulties. Although he may intend to address his thoughts to a wider audi-

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ence than Catholics alone,62 Newman does not always put forward a clear distinction as to whether he is reasoning about Christian or secular ethics, or if he is talking about believers or human beings in general. As a result, conflicting or diverging principles and ideas are found throughout his entire body of work. Any contingent ambiguity can be resolved by bearing in mind that his Dublin Writings were addressed to very different target audiences: the Discourses were directed to a common and mixed public, mainly from the local intelligentsia, including lecturers of Trinity College; the sermons were instead preached to pupils gathered in the University Church during the service; while the Lectures were given to students and member of the faculties of the Catholic University of Ireland. Hence Newman’s various purposes must be understood in the context of relating to a variety of audiences, which in turn necessitated that he employ various tones, forces and sometimes opinions. My primary aim is to illustrate how Newman, in his defence of liberal knowledge, faces three positions representing the majority of the trends expressed in modern ethics, namely utilitarianism, deontologism, and sentimentalism. Sifting out his moral reflection from the mass of thought regarding university education, I intend to show how Newman provides a critique of the principal moral theories or tendencies of his times, while taking much of his inspiration from Aristotle. When Newman was writing on the scope of a university, he was not only dealing with the practical problem of setting up the Catholic University of Ireland, but he took into account a wide discussion on the use and the end of knowledge. The debate had strong ethical relevance in that it regarded ends, values, decisions and views. Moreover, it is in his treatment of the relationship between knowledge and morals that Newman wrote his most interesting and, even today, most relevant pages during the years of his Irish enterprise. 62

“I wished to carry along with me those who were not Catholics”. Idea, p. 69.

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My reconstruction of Newman’s position will consider its relevance in regard to ethics in both social and individual aspects. What I find interesting is that Newman attacks utilitarianism mainly on the social level, while criticising sentimentalism and the concept of moral autonomy, which is at the basis of deontologism, on the individual level. Utilitarianism, more than any other moral doctrine, had in those times a strong practical relevance, as it was translated into a political project. In fact, one of the targets of Newman’s discussions was Henry Brougham, lord chancellor from 1830 to 1834, who reformed the English legal system on Benthamite utilitarian principles, and who had a significant role in the foundation of the University of London. Moral sentimentalism, instead, was an ethical position spread mainly among the Victorian educated class, with a small amount of political significance. In Newman’s account, utilitarianism holds that everything has its price and, therefore, usefulness must be the measure of intellectual labour. This view is held for both individual and societal aims. Representatives of these two positions are, respectively, John Locke and the members of the Edinburgh Review, namely Richard Payne Knight, John Playfair and Sydney Smith. Locke, according to Newman, limited utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil. Following Locke, the Edinburgh Reviewers extended this principle to the wider level of society, protesting that no good could come of a system that was not based upon the principle of utility. Furthermore, they considered the advancement of science as the supreme and real end of a university. If everything has a worth, they stated, there must be a return for the costs that society invests in the promotion of the advancement and the spreading of learning. The principle of the maximisation of good is here applied to learning. Newman was facing questions that are significant still today: What is the real worth, in the market, of the item called Liberal Education? Should a university be established on the basis of the philosophy of utility?

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Newman does not deny that what is useful has to be pursued as worthwhile, but his answer to the Utilitarians is that what has its end in itself also has its use in itself. In support of his views, a long parallel between bodily and intellectual health is set out. They both have an end and a use in themselves, being the necessary precondition for every other activity. I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke’s question; for if a healthy body is a good in itself; why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contem­ plates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature?63

As the body needs to be exercised with a view to general health, so too does the intellect, in order to reach a healthy state, and a university, Newman affirms, is the proper place for this cultivation. His strategy consists in showing that where there is a good intellect, utility will ensue, because a superior intellect is not only admirable in itself but also diffuses its gifts to the world around it. His main argument is that “though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful”.64 Newman here carries out an inversion in the axiological order: good is more important than utility. It should not be forgotten that he is actually discussing mainly dianoetic virtues, and therefore good is intended not just from a moral point of view, but mainly from an intellectual one. Nevertheless, I think that, although he is arguing about the particular subject of education, he addresses the very core of the structure of the Utilitarians’ arguments. Consequentialists maintain that whether an act is right depends on its consequences, so education ought to be pursued only if it has useful consequences. Behind their ideas lies the 63 64

Idea, p. 163. Idea, p. 165.

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more general principle that the value of an action, taken by an individual or by a social body, is in its consequences. Confusing the level of the end with the level of consequence, a theory based on this principle leads to an effective flattening of ends, and their values, to consequences. Newman does oppose this principle and, inverting the order of its terms, proves that better consequences come by aiming for higher ends. This kind of argument has strong similarities with the critiques that contemporary virtue ethicists, following Aristotle in particular, have put forward against consequentialism in moral theory: there are values preceding, both logically and axiologically, any consequence.65 Newman’s argument, “though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful”,66 leads to the same effects aimed at by the Edinburgh Reviewers, namely utility, but these effects are the by-products of higher pursuits and ends. Furthermore, he argues against the use of the principle of utility as a decisionmaking procedure, i.e. the agent must calculate all consequences of his act: “I […] deny that we must be able to point out, before we have any right to call it useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or work, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete end.”67 He puts stress on the performer and on his character, rather than on the effects of his action. A parallel can be easily introduced with ethical virtues: as the good man will perform good acts, so the good intellect will act well. It is because man possesses a good intellect that he can act intellectually; it is from the excellence of character, conceived morally or intellectually, that the good and the useful come. The properties of action, and of knowledge, are defined in terms of the aretaic properties of See Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, n. 33 (1958), pp. 1-19. 66 Idea, p. 165. 67 Ibid. 65

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agents, rather than the other way around.68 Likewise, in the case of education, an institution promoting the excellence of the intellect will have useful consequences, because “though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful”. Another moral doctrine that Newman attacks is deontologism, or rather, the concept of moral autonomy that is its basis. His critique is strongly related to his conception of conscience and moral law. Conscience is a theme constantly present in Newman’s reflection; he links it with the idea of God in a bidirectional sense: an internal law bears witness to an external lawgiver and, vice versa, only God, through revelation and grace, can illuminate, refine and give it strength. In the sermon ‘Dispositions for Faith’, preached in the University Church in Dublin, Newman holds that every person has a commanding dictate inside, “a law, an authoritative voice, bidding him do certain things and avoid others”,69 this is his moral conscience. Even if its particular injunctions are not always clear or consistent with each other, nevertheless it commands, “it praises, it blames, it promises, it threatens, it implies a future, and it witnesses the unseen.”70 Since man did not create his conscience, he cannot then destroy it. His power over it is extremely limited, he can silence it, distort its directions, but cannot emancipate himself from it. “He can disobey it, he may refuse to use it; but it remains.”71 Newman was so convinced of the authoritative power of conscience as to consider it the best way to demonstrate the existence of God, because an internal law witnesses an external lawgiver. So called Virtue Epistemology has developed a similar approach to knowledge in the last two decades. See W. Jay Wood, Epistemology. Becoming intellectually virtuous (Grand Rapids, 1998). 69 John Henry Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (London, 1874), p. 64. 70 Ibid., p. 64. 71 Ibid., p. 65. 68

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This Word within us, not only instructs us up to a certain point, but necessarily raises our minds to the idea of a Teacher, an unseen Teacher: and in proportion as we listen to that Word, and use it, not only do we learn more from it, not only do its dictates become clearer, and its lessons broader, and its principles more consistent, but its very tone is louder and more authoritative and constraining.72

Conscience can be trained, and the more a person tries to obey it the keener it will become. Moral sense can be improved and the perception of transgression can grow to be more delicate and sensitive. Newman recognises that liberal knowledge, because it is gained by self-discipline and refines our taste, may, but not necessarily, lead to benefits for the moral traits of the character. The refinement of the mind and the disgust towards excesses and enormities of evil, which are moral effects of intellectual cultivation, may have their roots not only in religious faith, but also in a purely natural conscience. Can there be moral knowledge? Newman affirms that while physical nature remains fixed within limits and laws, moral and social nature lie within the realm of will, choice and freedom. The phenomena that are the basis of morals do not have the luminous evidence of physical nature, they are not so strong and obvious, but are equivocal and feeble compared with it. In the lecture Christianity and Medical Science, addressed to the students of medicine of the Catholic University of Ireland, he states: “The reflection of sky and mountains in the lake is a proof that sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight, or the mist, or the sudden storm hurries away the beautiful image, which leaves behind it no memorial of what it was. Something like this are the Moral Law and the informations of Faith, as they present themselves to individual minds.”73 Nobody could deny, for instance, the existence of conscience, but the force of 72 73

Ibid., p. 65. Idea, p. 514.

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its injunctions are feeble compared with the palpable evidences of Physical Science. We feel the presence of moral duty but also see its ambiguity; this happens because man is not in a mere state of innocence. The imperfect state of human beings requires illumination and strength in order to know and perform good. Reason, through the study of natural man, can reach the principles of the natural moral laws, but it can hardly carry them out. Divine revelation and grace come to the help of man, showing him more clearly what is right or wrong and giving him strength.74 Newman’s account of conscience is deeply rooted in a Christian conception of the world. From this perspective he critiques Victorian morality and its examples as evident in the educated class, attacking two of their peculiarities: moral autonomy and sentimentalism. The first is refuted by a psychological argument, while the second is refuted by a logical one. Treating of the dangers of knowledge for morality, he affirms that liberal knowledge has a special tendency to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation. Man, satisfied with his attainments, closes himself to the sense of mystery, because “knowledge exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things”.75 Furthermore, beauty, which is a peculiar aspect of liberal knowledge, risks being made the test of truth and the sufficient object of intellect. One of the leading traditions in modern ethical theory holds that to be a moral agent is to be autonomous, or self-directed. Moral precepts are imposed by the agent upon himself, and the penalty for their violation is self-contempt and inner abhorrence.76 Newman explicitly opposes this view, pointing out the 74 For a more comprehensive account of Newman conception of conscience see Teresa Iglesias, ‘Newman on Conscience and Our Culture’, Milltown Studies, n. 49 (Summer 2002), pp. 19-49. 75 Idea., p. 217. 76 See James Rachels, Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Boulder, 1997), p. 118.

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limits of natural conscience in educated men who refuse to recognise its divine origin. “Fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming.”77 An explicit critique of the so-called ‘moral autonomy’ is introduced at this juncture. In a civilised age, of which intellectuals are the best representatives, Newman says, conscience tends to become what is called a moral sense, the command of duty, a sort of taste, and sin is seen not an offence against God, but against human nature. I believe the fundamental trait that distinguishes and contrasts Newman’s conception of conscience with that of his opponents is openness. Moral conscience for Newman is openness to the Other in a twofold way: openness to a Lawgiver and to the world. If rejecting the first, the rejection then impinges on the second. He gives examples of virtuous men of his time who are also “proud, bashful, fastidious, and reserved”78 because moral law to them is nothing more than the dictation of their own minds, and they are not capable of looking beyond themselves to their Maker. Their object, however unconscious, is “to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves that they have done their duty.”79 A sense of degradation substitutes for contrition because their conscience has transmuted into self-respect. They are no longer sinners in their own estimation, they have simply behaved foolishly, and their only recourse is to ascribe the lapse to their personality. They become victims of this intense self-contemplation, and what they call autonomy closes them on themselves. With strikingly subtle sensitivity, Newman links moral autonomy to individualism and solitude, Idea., p. 191. Ibid., p. 192. 79 Ibid. 77 78

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showing that the tendency of educated men is to swallow up their fear in self-reproach, shutting themselves up in themselves. “Fear carries us out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within the round of our own thoughts.”80 Deontologism is here attacked from a psychological point of view, as it makes men closed in upon themselves. Incapable of admitting their misery and of speaking of their own feelings, men become closed to other men, who could judge them. Newman then proceeds to the consideration of the effect of intellectual culture in amiable and unaffected minds, especially in men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind. He takes the Emperor Julian in ancient times, and Lord Shaftesbury in modern times, as examples of those who have maintained that being virtuous is nothing more than being graceful in conduct. The fallacy of this position, easier to observe in gentlemen than in philosophers, is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience, i.e. moral sentimentalism. In these liberal and generous characters vice is evil only because it is unworthy, despicable, and odious. Newman’s argument against moral sentimentalism is that: there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, that almost every statement is perverted and made false, because it is not the whole truth. They are exhibitions of truth under one aspect, and therefore insufficient; conscience is most certainly a moral sense, but it is more; vice again, is a deformity, but it is worse.81

The idea of wholeness, so important in Newman’s account of the intellectual dimension of man, is here used in moral issues. He accuses this doctrine of superficiality and ineffectiveness because of its narrow conception of the human person. It is much better, he holds, to measure virtue by utility than by a rule that confuses good with what pleases. Half truth is often the most gross and 80 Ibid., p. 191. 81 Ibid., p. 200.

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mischievous of falsehoods. Furthermore, as he explains in Rise and Progress of Universities, this fallacy is a result of a logical confusion due to an inversion of terms: “True though it be, that virtue is always expedient, always fair, it does not therefore follow that every thing which is expedient, and every thing which is fair, is virtuous.”82 Newman’s refutation of moral sentimentalism is made mainly from a logical point of view. As for utilitarianism, he points out here a confusion between expected consequences, i.e. fairness, and ends, i.e. good action. Moreover, he stresses that elitism is a peculiarity of sentimentalists and that its effects cannot be extended to humanity at large. Sentimentalism is ineffective because it can stand good only for some refined spirits. A superficial doctrine can only have superficial effects, in fact no real conversion of character can follow from a philosophy which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice merely vulgarity and ‘ungentlemanlike’. As long as this doctrine appeals only to nature, it will fall under its dominion and “since it cannot dissuade men from vice, therefore in order to escape the sight of its deformity, it embellishes it.”83 This same argument is repeated in Rise and Progress of Universities when Newman presents ancient Athenians as an example of a people that took beauty as the main guide of life. He maintains there that, If beautifulness was all that was needed to make a thing right, then nothing graceful and pleasant could be wrong; and since there is no abstract idea but admits of being embellished and dressed up, and made pleasant and graceful, it followed as a matter of course that any thing whatever is permissible.84

Newman calls attention to what has been later called the ‘heterogenesis of the ends’, namely the characteristic of many modern philosophies to produce results that are the exact opposite of RP, p. 80. Idea., p. 202. 84 RP, p. 84. 82 83

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the original intentions.85 “Thus at length we find, surprising as the change may be, that that very refinement of Intellectualism, which began by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it.”86 If detection is the concern and decency the only virtue, to seem becomes to be. Once visible beauty and tangible fitness are made the measure of wrong and right, appearance becomes the criterion. There is no other choice, philosophy cannot deeply regenerate the very essence of man and must settle instead for setting right the surface of things. 3. The Artistic Dimension The most complete and comprehensive manifesto of Newman’s poetics can be found in the second of his Occasional Lectures and Essays. Under the title Literature he reproduces a lecture given at the opening of the academic year of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters on November 3rd, 1858, the day before his definitive departure from the Catholic University of Ireland. Newman’s conception of literature provides access to his larger views on imagination and its relation to knowledge and morality. His main thesis is that language is the locus of subjectivity, as opposed to Science, which celebrates objectivity, but it is also as opposed to Theology, in which truth has a distinctive role. With his typical dialectical strategy, Newman presents a contraposition of topical pairs. “Literature expresses, not objective truth, as it is called, but subjective; not things, but thoughts.”87 He uses here a non-intellectualistic concept of thought that comprehends ideas, feelings, views, reasoning and other operations of the human mind. Thoughts are opposed to things, which find their expression in scientific language, in symbols. It is worth noting that Newman puts together, under the same type, things Augusto Del Noce, Il Suicidio della Rivoluzione (Milan, 1978). Idea., p. 202. 87 Idea, p. 274. 85 86

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and objective scientific truths, because “they exist in themselves, not by virtue of our understanding them, not in dependence upon our will, but in what is called the nature of things, or at least on conditions external to us.“88 For science, words are symbols, they are easily translatable with a clear reference to the world of things, while in literature the emotive and poetic function of language, i.e. the expression of thought, prevails over the referential. “Metaphysics, ethics, law, political economy, chemistry, theology, cease to be literature in the same degree as they are capable of a severe scientific treatment”89, while literary language would not exist if there were no living speakers; this language gives expression to the ‘inner man’, it brings out the ways in which people view and experience the world. Newman is quite clear: literature is the personal use or exercise of language.90 However, we must still ask what, exactly, does this mean? Can there be a language used by only one person? It is my belief that in these reflections the ‘personal’ must be understood not as opposed to what is ‘common’ or ‘social’, but as opposed to what is ‘impersonal’. He means that literary language is where differences emerge and personality prevails, and this is because the peculiarities of the writer or speaker imbue his own language with a unique character. To support this view Newman introduces another pair of terms: thought and speech. Recalling the Greek logos, which means both reason and speech, Newman holds both their interdependence and inseparability in reality. With a colourful metaphor he maintains that language is the lawful wife in her own house and not the hired servant, the mere mistress of the reason. It cannot be simply used, but it deeply influences our own thinking, feeling and behaviour. If literature, for Newman, is the personal use or exercise of language, then personality finds its expression in literary style. Idea, p. 274. Idea, p. 274. 90 Idea, p. 275. 88 89

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Newman criticises those who consider fine writing to be an addition from without to the matter treated of. Style and content, like thought and speech, are inseparable. Style is ‘thinking out into language’, it is the image of mind, the expression of the self. “The elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self.”91 As we have seen, Newman’s strategy, similar to structuralism, is to depict the main features of literature through oppositions: objective/subjective; personal/impersonal; thought/speech; style/content; matter/expression; writing/speaking. What I find particularly noteworthy is that, in Newman, language is the locus of subjectivity that can also be interpreted as a collective subjectivity. Personal is not opposed to common but to the impersonal; Newman, in fact, when he talks about the personal exercise of language, underlines “the connection between the force of words in particular languages and the habits and sentiments of the nations speaking them”.92 Thus, he considers a nation having personal habits and sentiments as a collective subject. In national literature inter-subjectivity is created mainly through the work of its great writers. If language is the locus of subjectivity—both singular and plural subjectivity—the genius then is the single subject in which plural subjectivity recognises itself. “He expresses what all feel, but all cannot say; and his sayings pass into proverbs among his people, and his phrases become household words and idioms of their daily speech, which is tessellated with the rich fragments of his language.”93 In the person of genius the creative powers of language achieve their paramount exercise. In the English Catholic Literature essay Newman affirms that if great authors, are in great measure the creatures of their times, they are on the other hand in a far higher sense the creators of their language. Idea, p. 280. Idea, p. 276. 93 Idea, p. 292. 91 92

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It is indeed commonly called their mother tongue, but virtually it did not exist till they gave it life and form. All greater matters are carried on and perfected by a succession of individual minds; what is true in the history of thought and of action is true of language also.94

Why is Newman here so interested in the sense of genius? I think because he was presenting his conception of a University, which is the place for the display of the excellence of intellectual virtues, and a genius is an example of excellence of character or qualities. Works of poetic or literary excellence reveal the power of man over language, and such examples should have a beneficial and even inspirational influence on university students. Traditionally, the artistic imagination has been conceived as representational when it reproduces some pre-existing reality, or creative when it produces works which lay claim to an original status in their own right.95 The artistic genius portrayed by Newman exemplifies both of these types of artistic production: he reproduces his own times and contemporaneously creates their new language. Newman opposes the literary genius to the logician and the sophist. The logician refers not to thoughts but to symbols and he engages in logical arguments, while the literary genius does not argue but declaims and insinuates, thereby appealing not only to reason but to the whole living person. On the other hand, the sophist hides his lack of substance behind a complicated style, and this cannot be recognised as an authentic and worthy undertaking by Newman. In his article on preaching, which was originally published in the University Gazette and later became the Sixth Essay of the second part of The Idea of a University, Newman strongly affirms that the great orator is somebody who has something to say and knows how to express Idea, p. 312. See Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination (London and New York, 1994), p. 15. 94 95

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it. Arts are not an empty game, a flatus voci, a speech about nothing; they must have something to say.96 We can also apply Newman’s reflections to a collective subject: the genius finds his correspondent in great civilizations; they do, on a historical level, what a genius does in a particular situation. Newman speaks of civilizations as “an association not political, but mental, based on the same intellectual ideas, and advancing by common intellectual methods.”97 Great civilizations are founded on a social genius, i.e. on a spread of shared excellence. In his Dublin Writings Newman also deals with the delicate question of the relationship between arts and morality. However, despite the fact that he is far from portraying literature as moralistic, at the end of The Idea of a University he openly opposes every kind of censorship, even inside the Catholic University.98 In Discourse VIII he holds that education aims to prepare students for the world and should not exclude any great authors, even those who wrote against faith or morality. To keep students far from secular literature because of its potential danger is, for Newman, to leave them weak and unprepared for the world external to the University. ‘It is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into them’99. If censorship were enforced and certain literature kept from students, on the grounds of ‘immorality’, this would simply be a disservice to them, as once they leave the university they would be lost, without any rule for discriminating good from evil, innocence from sin. You have refused him the masters of human thought, who would in some sense have educated him, because of their incidental corruption: you have shut up from him those whose thoughts strike home to our hearts, whose words are proverbs, Idea, p. 411. Idea, p. 254. 98 See Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 263. 99 Idea, p. 232. 96 97

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whose names are indigenous to all the world, who are the standard of their mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their countrymen, Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because the old Adam smelt rank in them; and for what have you reserved him? You have given him “a liberty unto” the multitudinous blasphemy of his day; you have made him free of its newspapers, its reviews, its magazines, its novels, its controversial pamphlets, of its Parliamentary debates, its law proceedings, its platform speeches, its songs, its drama, its theatre, of its enveloping, stifling atmosphere of death. You have succeeded but in this—in making the world his University.100

In the third Essay Newman analyzes English literature, but even when he expresses his displeasure at the lack of a Catholic ethos in this tradition he does not despise its greatness. Literature is the manifestation of the natural man, complete with his weaknesses and limits, and it should be learnt for what it is. He believes the Church, especially in the context of a Catholic University, should fear no knowledge, and it should purify rather than suppress human nature. Newman’s principle is not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to ensure that no doctrines pass under the name of truth but those which claim it rightfully. Now we must ask what is the role of imagination in the acquisition of truth? The Dublin Writings contain a paradigmatic illustration of how imaginative arts can add knowledge to argumentative discourse. University education is the great theme that concerned Newman during his period in Dublin. In The Idea of a University he discusses university education from a theoretical point of view; in the Rise and Progress of Universities he provides a narrative handling of the same subject. Following his presentation of an idea of a university he provides an image of it through history. As Mary Katherine Tillman writes in her Introduction to Rise and Progress of Universities, Newman takes an “historical approach to recounting the gradual realisation of each living idea 100

Idea, p. 233.

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through its developments and variations over the centuries.”101 His narrative approach implies a certain amount of imaginative work, and historians could complain about the fidelity to details. However, what is relevant for our reflection is that the action of his imagination is valid for Newman, as it produces an account of the subject that serves to complete and complement what he had already written. The fact that Newman himself felt the need to deal in a fictional manner with a subject that had already received his extensive treatment on a theoretical level is a clear demonstration of his confidence in the heuristic force of the imaginative arts. They are heuristic because of their capacity to open and unfold new perspectives, but also epistemic when they add further knowledge to a subject. I believe it can be claimed that Newman was more a man of arts than of reasoning or action. Some suggestions to support this may derive, for instance, from consideration of the Benedictine Essays; two articles appeared in the university review Atlantis in 1858 and 1859, and were later published in the second volume of Historical Sketches.102 Newman therein traces an analogy between the psychological development of man and the advancement of Church history. He separates the course of education within Christianity into three periods, in each of which a religious order has best represented its spirit. These three orders are the Benedictines, the Dominicans, and the Jesuits; and their respective defining characteristics are: poetry; science; and practical sense. These three orders have a parallel within the human faculties, and Newman emphasizes that nothing is lost through each passage or phase of the development from poetry to science to prudence, within humans and in Church history. In the second part of the Idea he asserts that what we tend to do all through life, both as a necessity and as a duty, is to unlearn Mary Katherine Tillmann, Introduction to RP, p. LXXV. John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. II, pp. 363-430 and pp. 431-487. 101 102

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the world’s poetry, which is typical of children.103 In these essays Newman’s personal preference for the Benedictines, and thus for poetry, is clearly expressed. A note on the text says that due to ‘the temporary suspension of the Atlantis’ only the articles on the Benedictines were written and published; although there must have been other reasons why he did not complete his trilogy at a later point.104 In any case, the long treatment devoted to monasticism and its schools shows how the poetic ethos of the Benedictines was the most congenial to his temperament.105

Idea, p. 331. See Ian Ker, John Henry Newman. A Biography (Oxford, 1988) p. 457. 105 See Placid Murray, Newman the Oratorian (Leominster, 2004), p. 82 on the possibility that Newman might have considered joining the Benedictines. 103 104

CHAPTER FOUR

The Gentleman and the Educated Man

1. The gentleman: Knowledge and Morality The relationship between knowledge and morality is a theme recurring in most of the pages of the Dublin Writings, and one to which Newman certainly devoted much of his care. A man such as Newman, with a deep ethical sense and an incisive intellect, would be expected to argue for a convergence of education and morals. This expectation is especially understandable if we bear in mind that the Discourses were written with a view to establishing a Catholic University, and that it was in a Catholic University Newman gave his speeches as a rector and in the University Church his Sermons. It is not surprising, therefore, that he perplexed his contemporary readers when he firmly stated that liberal education has an object distinct from virtue, and that the end of university education is intellectual, not moral or religious. “Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another; […] Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman.”1 This is a delicate position that requires extensive explanation; it has, firstly, considerable effects on the conception of a university, and secondly, on the relationships of the different constituent elements of the human being, particularly reason and moral conscience. Was not Newman’s education project aiming to train good Catholics? What is his conception of the gentleman? Is the gentleman synonymous with the man of a philosophical habit of mind? Is the gentleman the model of the human person that 1

Idea, p. 120.

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Newman had in mind when he was elaborating his Dublin Writings? The distinction between virtue and knowledge is an issue that Newman treated about ten years before the Dublin Writings in a series of satirical letters published in the Times and later collected in his essay ‘The Tamworth Reading Room’.2 In 1841 Sir Robert Peel, in his ‘Tamworth Speech’, had outlined what Newman perceived as the proclamation of Utilitarianism as the official educational philosophy of the State. Peel’s program was to raise the ethical tone in society through education, according to the principle that ‘in becoming wiser a man will become better’. Newman in his essay refuted Peel’s arguments, defending the opposite thesis, i.e. that secular knowledge without personal religion could not assure the moral improvement of society. Intellectual study alone was not sufficient to train the moral character of the masses.3 After a decade he defended again the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, resorting to the same kind of thoughts he had expressed in ‘The Tamworth Reading Room’, but he soon realised that if his stance had appeared too conservative in Protestant Oxford, it was perceived as too liberal in Catholic Dublin. Newman has no doubt that the end of a university is intellectual culture, and that it must be employed in the education of the intellect. In the Idea he states: A University, taken in its bare idea, and before we view it as an instrument of the Church, has this object and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical produc­ John Henry Newman, ‘The Tamworth Reading Room’ in Discussions and Arguments (London, 1891), pp. 261-276. 3 “In morals, as in physics, the stream cannot rise higher than its source. Christianity raises men from earth, for it comes from heaven; but human morality creeps, struts, or frets upon the earth’s level, without wings to rise. The Knowledge School does not contemplate raising man above himself; it merely aims at disposing of his existing powers and tastes, as is most convenient, or is practicable under circumstances.” Ibid., p. 272. 2

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tion; it professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture; here it may leave its scholars, and it has done its work when it has done as much as this.4

Affirming that liberal education has an object distinct from virtue Newman found himself between two strong and opposing positions. His intention was to reply to the position, expressed by Lord Macaulay in his essay on Bacon5, that education had to replace religion in the formation of a public moral conscience.6 This same idea imbued the politics of Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel. Similarly, but for opposite reasons, many Catholics, and above all Dr Cullen, archbishop of Dublin, wanted education to sustain religion in the formation of a public moral conscience. They were interested in learning only insofar as it ministered to religion. In both cases, the university was intended not as an end in itself, but as a vehicle by which to educate students for the purpose of civic or religious utility. Newman put forward the thesis that the end of university education is intellectual and not moral or religious. He did so mainly in his Sixth Discourse Knowledge its Own End,7 which is the Fifth in the final edition. Before its publication, he received harsh critiques from some of his fellow Oratorians who maintained that the end of a Catholic University was to make good Catholics. He was thus compelled, in order not to disappoint the expectations of his friends and the Catholic hierarchy, to write an Introduction, omitted in the collected edition, in which he clearly distinguishes between the direct end of a University, which is cultivation of the mind as such, and the indirect effects, which are also religious.8 In Idea, p. 125. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Critical, Historical and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems (New York, n.d.). 6 See Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), pp. 259-262. 7 In the 1852 edition the title was ‘Philosophical Knowledge its Own End’ while the 1859 edition’s title was ‘Liberal Knowledge its Own End’. 8 See John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, pp. 129-132. 4 5

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a letter written in July 1852 to Dr David Moriarty,9 president of All Hallows in Drumcondra and later bishop of Ardfert, Newman says: “I do not think a University has to do with morals, as it has to do with faith – nor do I think the Church on the whole employs a University for morals, (except as teaching them, but that comes under faith-) but I think she uses small bodies in the Universities, Colleges, Halls, etc. etc. as the preservative of morals, more naturally.”10 As I will try to illustrate in the following paragraphs, Newman’s position was rather complex. In order to understand him, we must clearly distinguish between direct and indirect ends, their consequences, being either positive or negative, and whether he is considering a University as such, or the specific case of a Catholic University in Ireland. Newman clearly affirms that the object of liberal education is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence. Following Aristotle, he specifies that everything has its own perfection, in the scale of things, and the perfection of one is not the perfection of another. “There is a physical beauty and a moral: there is a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being, which is natural virtue; and in like manner there is a beauty, there is a perfection, of the intellect.”11 All these subjects are absolutely distinct; aesthetics, morality and knowledge have their own fields and scale of values. To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time, it is absolutely distinct from it.12 9 Newman dedicated the first volume of Historical Sketches to Dr David Moriarty. 10 John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XV, p. 136. (Author’s emphasis). 11 Idea, p. 122. See also Idea, p. 104. 12 Ibid., pp. 122-123.

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Newman holds in these passages an absolute autonomy of knowledge from morals. He recalls the plain failures of the professors who have attempted to make man virtuous, assuming that refinement of mind was virtue. Educated men are not self-evidently the virtuous portion of mankind, so every political project aiming to the formation of a public moral conscience exclusively through education is fated to fail: “from the time that Athens was the University of the world, what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without practising, and to aspire without attaining?”13 It is not a paradox that the greatest apologist of the philosophical mind in education was also extremely critical of knowledge as source of virtue. In order to consider the real drive of his position we should bear in mind that these remarks are made in the chapter in which he defends the thesis that knowledge is it own end. In this chapter his purpose is to prove that the distance that separates knowledge from utility is the same as the distance that separates knowledge from morality. His treatment of the two relationships runs in parallel, and follows the structure of reasoning seen previously. As knowledge must be pursued for itself, and utility will follow in due course, so positive consequences for morality will also follow from intellectual activity pursued for itself. He considered it a mistake to burden knowledge with virtue or religion as it is with the mechanical arts: “Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the loom in motion, or to direct the steam carriage; be it ever so much the means or the condition of both material and moral advancement, still, taken by and in itself, it as little mends our hearts as it improves our temporal circumstances.”14 Newman claims the autonomy not of morals but of knowledge, being at once anti-utilitarian and anti-moralistic, while despising neither utility nor virtue. In confronting these two 13 14

Ibid., p. 115. Ibid., p. 120.

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aspects, no Victorian was better suited to talk about morality and education than he, rich with his Oxford experience and as a religious leader of educated men. I think it is because of his deep moral sense and long familiarity with human nature that he distrusts their fragility.15 Moreover, his views appear clearer if we bear in mind that in these passages he was considering the direct ends, not the effects, of university education. For this reason, Culler believes that he “was simply making a distinction in logic which could never be made in fact.”16 Newman recognises that the cultivation of the intellect, even if it has an object distinct from morality, has moral effects on the individual and in turn on society. In the Idea of a University he presents some of the lineaments of the ethical character that the cultivated intellect will form. He firstly affirms that philosophy, which is here another name for liberal knowledge, rescues man “from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state.”17 Intellectual employments occupy the mind with noble objects and, whatever their content, they do a work that is materially good as long as they expel the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect. Our moral constitution is so weak that we need some expedient or instrument to resist evil, an expedient that is sufficiently congenial and level with the compass of our nature. Intellectual activity, even if only temporarily, interests the scholar, turning him aside from vices. An educated man can obtain moral profit by his own activities. A second influence, in fact, which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature, according to Newman, is the tendency to refine the mind, giving it a disgust and abhorrence towards excesses and enormities of See passages on the weakness of human nature towards temptation in Idea, p. 185. 16 Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 151. Culler also wonders if this distinction was really worth all the attention Newman gave it. Ibid., p. 261. 17 Ibid., p. 184. 15

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evil. He affirms that a cultivated mind feels scorn and hatred for some kinds of vice and even if it cannot mend the heart, after bad actions have been committed, it does at least give birth to an intense remorse that will prevent future sins. Newman is here depicting a balanced mixture of moral and intellectual virtues that serve to incarnate the noble figure of the gentleman as “one who never inflicts pain”.18 This famous passage, often quoted out of context, must be considered and discussed in detail. We find two portraits of the gentleman in the Dublin Writings; the longest and most well-known is in the last section of ‘Knowledge and Religious Duty’, the Eighth Discourse of the Idea of a University, in which he discusses the bearing of intellectual culture upon religion. But Newman presents another similar sketch, shorter and never considered by critics, in the article ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, published in the Catholic University Gazette and later in Rise and Progress of Universities under the title ‘What is a University?’19 In both cases Newman is concerned with the lineaments of the ethical character that the cultivated intellect forms. He deals not with the end of education, which is the liberal mind, but with its consequences on the character of the scholar. He considers how moral and intellectual virtues manifest at the same time in the same subject, and I find this particularly interesting for my research as it elucidates his understanding of the different dimensions of the human being. The traits of a gentleman’s personality, his attitudes towards life and towards others in society, are marvellously presented in the celebrated first portrait of a gentleman: He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; Idea, p. 208. See also RP, p. 10. John Henry Newman, ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 2, 8 June 1854, pp. 10-14, reprinted in RP, pp. 6-17 with the title ‘What is a University?’. 18 19

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and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature […]. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets every thing for the best. […] He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny.20

The first aspect that needs to be clarified is that although Newman has been accused of being a social elitist, in his description of the gentleman there is no mention of money, status, privilege or power. These are no constitutive elements of Newman’s ideal; his point is resolutely ethical and intellectual, not sociological. In this phenomenology of the gentleman it is difficult to distinguish between ethical, aesthetic and intellectual characteristics. They all appear interrelated and balanced in this noble figure who seems almost an incarnation of the perfect man. It is not surprising that many readers have taken Newman’s sketch as a model of the human being, given its capacity of fascination and attraction. He depicts the gentleman with such dedication that we tend to 20

Idea, pp. 209-210.

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forget that this charming figure is presented only to be soon dismissed and rejected. His positive characteristics are somehow exaggerated on purpose. In reality, the tone of these pages is slightly ironic; I would not say satirical, but certainly ambiguous. We are easily confused if we read the passage out of context, its context being a discussion of the limits of intellectual culture when it is cultivated outside religious principles. In fact, a significant part of the description is devoted to the religiosity of the gentleman: If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization. Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.21

There is no sign of condemnation in these lines. Criticism is postponed, disapproval will soon become evident, but for the moment Newman aims only to show the best of this fascinating 21

Idea, pp. 210-211.

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character. Sometimes, in some passages, this description of the gentleman has almost the form of a self-portrait: He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clearheaded to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence: he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits.22

Don’t we see here Newman himself, in the intent of understanding his opponents? Begley compared the description of the gentleman with the portrait of Saint Phillip Neri, both similar in style and both occurring at analogous positions in the penultimate and in the final Discourse. “This is not to suggest that the gentleman and the saint are the same. On the contrary, the two types may differ greatly. Indeed, as Ker has remarked, the tension between the gentleman and the saint, between “the genuinely unconditional insistence on the absolute value of knowledge in itself” and “the equally firm conviction that knowledge is emphatically not the highest good,” stands at the center of The Idea of a University.”23 Curiously, all the best scholars who have commented on these pages have tried to identify an antecedent figure from whom Newman might have taken inspiration.24 Arthur Dwight Culler, for instance, maintains that the chief literary influence upon Newman’s portrait of the gentleman is The Polite Philosopher, an eighteenth century work by James Forrester. Ronald B. Begley believes that Culler exaggerates Forrester’s influence25 and I agree Idea, p. 210. Ronald B. Begley, ‘Too Diffident to Define: The Gentleman in Newman’s The Idea of a University’, Faith & Reason, (Winter 1993). 24 See Katherine Tillman, ‘”A Rhetoric in Conduct”: The Gentleman of the University and the Gentleman of the Oratory’, Newman Studies Journal, vol. 5/2 (2008), pp. 6-25. 25 Ronald B. Begley, ‘Too Diffident to Define: The Gentleman in Newman’s The Idea of a University’, Faith & Reason, (Winter 1993). 22 23

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with him, as the evidence Culler provides to support his statements is quite weak and limited to a few quotations contained in the Appendix to the 1852 edition of The Idea of a University.26 Begley, on the other side, proposed a more convincing model: the portrait of the ‘megalopsychos’ or ‘great-souled man’ as presented in the fourth book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Begley provides a persuasive comparison of the two characters—Aristotle’s megalopsychos and Newman’s gentleman—claiming that both are described not as receivers but as givers of benefits; they overlook injuries and wrongs, they are candid about their likes and aversions, they eschew gossip and self-revelation, they are almost indolent, they are similar in misfortune.27 Walter Jost, instead, maintained that Newman’s ideal of the gentleman is the modern equivalent of Quintillian’s vir bonus dicendi peritus, the good man skilled in speaking. He recognises that the moral charge is less pronounced in Newman, but the function of the gentleman and that of Quintillian’s orator is the same; they are both “generalists capable of handling all subjects, locating values, making connections, resolving ambiguities.”28 Even if not precisely inspired by Quintillian, Newman was certainly inspired by the great figure of a classical orator in ancient Rome, with whom he was thoroughly familiar. It is generally forgotten in what high esteem rhetoric, as the study and practice of ideas and expression, was held in Newman’s day, and we can not deny that some of the characteristics of the gentleman portrayed in the Idea have a rhetorical stance: He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient See Idea, pp. 437-438. Begley, op. cit. 28 Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman. (Columbia, 1989), p. 176. 26 27

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sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. […] If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it.29

Newman presents an ideal that, although not easily reducible to historical exemplification of a type, was not unlike that which the ancients held when they educated persons in the art of rhetoric.30 2. The ‘Religion of Philosophy’ Is the gentleman the model of the human person that Newman had in mind when he was elaborating his educational project? No, it was more than that. According to the interpretation I am proposing, the gentleman was not Newman’s positive ideal of man, even if his characteristics might be included in the ideal. Firstly, even if liberal education does manifest itself in good manners and habits, it is itself much more than these simple manifestations. Moreover, because Newman’s model of human completeness contemplates virtues that can be reached only with the help of divine grace, and therefore only through a Christian life, a liberal education on its own still falls short of producing the ideal. Talking about his Irish enterprise, in the ‘Preface’ to the Idea of a University Newman writes: Our desideratum is, not the manners and habits of gentlemen;— these can be, and are, acquired in various other ways, by good Idea, pp. 209-210. “[Newman’s] educated man would be truly a ‘liberal individual,’ but closer to the pattern of a Roman gentleman in the days of Cicero than to that of a twentieth-century social and economic leader.” Charles Frederick Harrold John Henry Newman: An Expository and Critical Study of His Mind, Thought and Art. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1945. p. 92. 29 30

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society, by foreign travel, by the innate grace and dignity of the Catholic mind;—but the force, the steadiness, the com­pre­ hensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained without much effort and the exercise of years. This is real cultivation of mind; and I do not deny that the characteristic excellences of a gentleman are included in it. […] Certainly a liberal education does manifest itself in a courtesy, propriety, and polish of word and action, which is beautiful in itself, and acceptable to others; but it does much more.31

On the other hand, in the portrait published in the Catholic University Gazette, Newman makes it clear that the manners of the gentleman are acquired in high society and can not be expected to be learned from books.32 Idea, p. xvi. “For instance, the polished manners and high-bred bearing which are so difficult of attainment, and so strictly personal when attained,—which are so much admired in society, from society are acquired. All that goes to constitute a gentleman,—the carriage, gait, address, gestures, voice; the ease, the self-possession, the courtesy, the power of conversing, the talent of not offending; the lofty principle, the delicacy of thought, the happiness of expression, the taste and propriety, the generosity and forbearance, the candour and consideration, the openness of hand;—these qualities, some of them come by nature, some of them may be found in any rank, some of them are a direct precept of Christianity; but the full assemblage of them, bound up in the unity of an individual character, do we expect they can be learned from books? are they not necessarily acquired, where they are to be found, in high society? The very nature of the case leads us to say so; you cannot fence without an antagonist, nor challenge all comers in disputation before you have supported a thesis; and in like manner, it stands to reason, you cannot learn to converse till you have the world to converse with; you cannot unlearn your natural bashfulness, or awkwardness, or stiffness, or other besetting deformity, till you serve your time in some school of manners. Well, and is it not so in matter of fact? The metropolis, the court, the great houses of the land, are the centres to which at stated times the country comes up, as to shrines of refinement and good taste; and then in due time the country goes back again home, enriched with a portion of the social accomplishments, 31

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How shall we explain this sudden change of thought? Ian Ker, in his ‘Introduction’ to the critical edition of The Idea of a University, writes: “Throughout the Discourses there is a perpetual element of suspense, as evaluations are constantly modified by the author’s changing point of view. […] But the most remarkable and dramatic shift of perspective in the Discourses is to be found in its most famous part – the celebrated portrait of the ‘gentleman’ in Discourse VIII.”33 Newman adopts an almost paradoxical rhetorical strategy: he demonstrates the limits of intellectual excellence in order to promote a higher form of excellence. “The gentleman is Newman’s portrait of the limitations of intellectual cultivation, quite as much as an evocation of its benefits.”34 The gentleman is at the same time both the best product of liberal secular education, and also an imperfect model of humanity, at least when compared to that which a Christian education can lead. “It is precisely at this moment, as we admire the qualities of the gentleman, that Newman asserts that even the most excellent liberal education by itself falls short of making the Christian.”35 We should not forget that this famous portrait is placed at the end of the Eighth Discourse, a discourse in which Newman deals with the bearings of intellectual culture on religion. The gentleman is presented not at the beginning of the Idea, as an example to imitate, but at nearly the end of the book, to contrast him with the highest ideal that combines intellectual proficiency and religious piety. He is ‘beau-ideal of the world’.36 which those very visits serve to call out and heighten in the gracious dispensers of them. We are unable to conceive how the “gentlemanlike” can otherwise be maintained; and maintained in this way it is.” John Henry Newman, ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 2, 8 June 1854, pp. 11-12, reprinted in RP, pp. 9-10. 33 Ian Ker, Introduction to John Henry Newman, Idea, pp. xlix-l. 34 Laurence Wright, ‘On the passivity of Newman’s ‘gentleman’: negotiating incoherence’, English Studies, n. 3 (1999), p. 239. 35 James L. Heft, ‘The Gentleman and the Christian’, unpublished, p. 4. 36 Idea, p. 211.

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We can be easily confused by Newman’s dialectical movement of thoughts that affirms and then denies, that portrays so magnificently and then dismisses with the same vigour, although because this tactic is employed by many a philosopher we ought not to be surprised by Newman’s mental gymnastics. Indeed, the strategy is also useful in illustrating that the gentleman, who appears as an object of temptation, is someone we may admire, but whom we must not indulge. We have already noted the ambivalent attitude Newman has towards Cicero, but also towards Gibbon37 and Goethe,38 for instance. They are sometimes presented in a good light, as examples of excellence, and sometimes as dangerous foes. “Cicero, who was praised in one place for understanding that knowledge may be pursued for its own sake, was censured in another for the trifling and sophisticated nature of that pursuit.”39 Culler maintains that this ambivalent attitude towards culture reproduces a conflict that was central in Newman’s educational experience. In fact, since his adolescence, Newman was struggling between his intellectual aspirations and his sense that this knowledge was somehow forbidden. I believe that we do not need to hypothesise a schizophrenic character – although Culler even speaks of ‘two persons’ in him40—to explain Newman’s ambivalence. We are all fascinated by and afraid of great minds, especially when we are not of their opinion. It is the same with Newman, I think, whose admiration for the character of the gentleman, which is 37 Newman condemned Gibbon’s principles but admired his intellectual capacities. See Idea, p. 285. 38 “Goethe is cited as one of the ‘truly great intellects’ of all time, and yet the tenor of this intellect, as Newman shows by copious extracts from a contemporary biography, was toward an aloofness and self-sufficiency which is cold and repellent and ultimately un-Christian”. Culler, op. cit., pp. 229-230. 39 Culler, op. cit., p. 229. 40 “With a kind of exaggeration one might say that these two persons were respectively the author of the humanistic and the religious discourses in the Idea of a University.” Culler, op. cit., p. 228.

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the exemplification of human intellectual excellence, does not prevent his disapproval. The section describing the gentleman concludes with an important specification: “Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle.”41 These traits are certainly good, but not good enough when compared with the fulfilment to which Christian religion can lead human beings. The portrait of a gentleman is a description of the excellence of the natural man, the highest balance of knowledge and morality that humanity as such can reach without additional religious instruction or influence. His lineaments “are seen within the pale of the Church and without it, in holy men, and in profligate; they form the beau-ideal of the world; they partly assist and partly distort the development of the Catholic. They may subserve the education of a St Francis de Sales or a Cardinal Pole; they may be the limits of the contemplation of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon. Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Athens; and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe.”42 The ambivalence of Newman mirrors the precarious nature of a purely naturalistic ideal of humanity if considered from a religious point of view. This ideal can produce a saint or a heretic, both of them with the traits of a gentleman. Newman admires or condemns this cultural ideal contingent upon whether it assists or distorts his own model of humanity. And even when he is critical, he does not repudiate it, but instead he goes beyond it. It is, accordingly, with no surprise or shock that after long pages of praise and admiration for the philosophical habit of mind we confront Newman’s dismissal of the role of moral philosophy in improving the moral standard of people. When, in the Appendix to the 1852 edition of the Discourses on the Scope 41 42

Idea, p. 221. Idea, p. 221.

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and Nature of University Education, Newman needs to provide some example of how ‘liberal knowledge acts partly on the side of Christianity, partly against it’, he chose a few pages from the entry on ‘Cicero’ that he had written for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana in 1824.43 Here Cicero, as ancient pagans are in general, is presented as an example of the failure of philosophy in providing a solid moral ground for existence. The ancients, according to Newman, did not so seriously acknowledge the principles of morals as to apply them to the conduct of life. “Even when they proposed them in the form of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the creature of their imagination, rather than a model of imitation, an idea which it was a mental recreation than a duty to contemplate”.44 If an individual in ancient times attempted to conform his life to his philosophical conceptions of virtue he was sure to be ridiculed. Philosophy was cultivated for intellectual amusement, not in order to discover the truth, Newman says. This took place in Greece, where ‘the love of speculation pervaded all ranks’, but even more so amongst the Romans, who were busy in their political enterprises, deficient in philosophical acuteness and with no time or inclination for abstruse investigations. Cicero is again presented as a negative example in the pages of the Idea where ‘Religion of Philosophy’ is discussed. Philosophy is unable to sustain men when they find themselves in difficult situations. “Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavour of the fickle populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant? It abandoned Brutus, as he sorrowfully confessed, in his greatest need, and it forced Cato, as his panegyrist strangely boasts, into the false position of defying heaven.”45 This passage echoes a similar one from the ‘Tamworth Reading Room’ essay: “When Cicero was outwitted by Caesar, he Idea (1852), pp. 410-412. See John Henry Newman, Historical Sketches, vol. I, (London, 1872). 44 Idea (1852), p. 411. 45 Idea, p. 116. 43

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solaced himself with Plato; when he lost his daughter, he wrote a treatise on Consolation. Such, too, was the philosophy of that Lydian city, mentioned by the historian, who in a famine played at dice to stay their stomachs.”46 It is in the context of discussing the limits of the ‘Religion of Philosophy’—the pretension of culture of making people better and becoming a sort of religion—that Newman presents us with a memorable passage in which he openly defends the autonomy of knowledge from morality or utility, and also disputes its incapacity to change man’s conduct profoundly. Despite the length of the passage, its worth lies in its shrewd rendering of this topic. Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another; good sense is not conscience, refinement is not humility, nor is largeness and justness of view faith. Philosophy, however enlightened, however profound, gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no vivifying principles. Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentlemen, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a University; I am advocating, I shall illustrate and insist upon them; but still, I repeat, they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,—pleasant, alas, and attractive as he shows when decked out in them. Taken by themselves, they do but seem to be what they are not; they look like virtue at a distance, but they are detected by close observers, and on the long run; and hence it is that they are popularly accused of pretence and hypocrisy, not, I repeat, from their own fault, but because their professors and their admirers persist in taking them for what they are not, and are officious in arrogating for them a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human 46 John Henry Newman, ‘The Tamworth Reading Room’ in Discussions and Arguments (London, 1891), p. 265.

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knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man.47

The best philosophy can do, as any other humanistic discipline, is to raise individuals to the level of their fellows, make them, in short, into gentlemen.48 The cultivation of the intellect has moral effects not only on the individual but on society as well. The intellectual recreations that are present in modern cities may lead to an advancement of the social ethical tone. Cheap literature, libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings and gardens to please the eye and to give repose to the feelings, external objects of whatever kind, which may take the mind off itself, and expand and elevate it in liberal contemplations, these are the human means, wisely suggested, and good as far as they go, for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the individual soul, but of society at large.49

Here we find, again, the idea that in modern times a city provides the intellectual facilities, already mentioned above, that were in the past a prerogative of a university. In Rise and Progress of Universities Newman writes that, whether we will or not, in every great country, the metropolis becomes a sort of necessary university.50 This means that his reflections regarding the cultivation of the intellect hold good for every kind of cultural activity, not only university education. Idea, pp. 120-121. See Culler, op. cit, p. 238. 49 Idea., p. 189. 50 RP, p. 14. “The very same kinds of need, social and moral, which give rise to a metropolis, give rise also to a University; nay, that every metropolis is a University, as far as the rudiments of a University are concerned.” RP, p. 50. Originally in The Catholic University Gazette, n. 7, 13 July 1854, p. 51. See also Idea, p. xxii. 47 48

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In Newman’s view profit is not the measure of virtue’s worth, nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the exercise of good habits is a source of benefits to the performer of such acts and to society at large. Similarly, intellectual virtues are substantial goods, inseparable from their social and political usefulness, even if this usefulness is not their main aim.51 Social development has helped moral improvement, providing means to its cultivation; but they are and remain merely means and not ends. Their manner of use depends on the ethical character of men. The same activities and the same means could also lead to the spreading of errors, false conceptions and vices, when led by bad persons. As Newman clarifies in the Preface to the Idea, if a university is a place of teaching universal knowledge, its object must be intellectual and not moral. Such is a university in its essence, but practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its object duly without the Church’s assistance, which is necessary for its integrity. While he has stated his belief in the theoretical autonomy of knowledge from religious morality, he maintains that a practical link exists between the two. He explains this view by introducing a parallel with physical health at the end of the Fifth Discourse: Body and mind are carried on into an eternal state of being by the gifts of Divine Munificence; but at first they do but fail in a failing world; and if the powers of intellect decay, the powers of the body have decayed before them, and, as an Hospital or an Almshouse, though its end be ephemeral, may be sanctified to the service of religion, so surely may a University, even were it nothing more than I have as yet described it.52

The distinction between the direct end of a University, which is cultivation of mind, and the indirect effects, which are religious, is related to the concept of the division between the natural order “If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world.” Idea, p. 177. 52 Idea, p. 123. 51

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and the supernatural order. This is a fundamental principle for understanding Newman’s ethics. Natural order pertains to natural man, which is the human condition as such, while supernatural order pertains to those who live under the grace of God. The relationship between these two orders is such that the latter does not cancel the former, but perfects it. “We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own.”53 Moral law has two sources from the same Author. The first is internal, it is the conscience implanted in our nature. It guides our life, helping us to discriminate right from wrong. The second source is external, namely Divine Revelation. Revelation enlightens, strengthens and refines conscience. They are interactive, recognising and bearing witness to each other. “Nature warrants without anticipating the Supernatural, and the Supernatural completes without superseding Nature“54. This twofold principle of natural and supernatural is essential because it allows Newman to profit from any good teaching that comes from heathen ethics, particularly from Aristotle and Cicero, as long it does not negate Christian beliefs. In addition, Newman appeals to the same principle when he states that no great author or work, even if not Christian, ought to be excluded from University curricula.55 Conversely, it is because of this principle that his ideas on the university succeeded also among people who did not share his religious beliefs. His reflections on the gentleman stand good for the merely natural man and, similarly, his defence of liberal education has a universal application that overcomes his personal choices and convictions. Newman was asked to establish in Ireland not a secular but a Catholic university and, as he states in the Preface to the Idea, the main interest of the Irish Catholic hierarchy was: Idea, p. 123. RP, p. 79. 55 See Idea, p. 203. 53 54

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not science, art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of knowledge, but some benefit or other, to accrue, by means of literature and science, to his own children; not indeed their formation on any narrow or fantastic type, as, for instance, that of an ‘English Gentleman’ may be called, but their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or intellectual.56

For this reason, in spite of his claim that knowledge is distinct from utility and morals, he also argues for their potential accord when he is talking of his specific Irish enterprise. This apparent inconsistency may be explained considering the actual target of his works and the topic of discussion, i.e. the Catholic University of Ireland. One of the aims of Newman’s Dublin Writings was precisely to demonstrate that the Church’s interest in founding an educational institution does not pervert the nature of the university. Religiosity was a key element in his project. He is, for instance, particularly explicit in the first of the sermons preached in the University Church to the young students, where he affirms that: I want the same roof to contain both the intellectual and moral discipline. Devotion is not a sort of finish given to the sciences; nor is science a sort of feather in the cap, if I may so express myself, an ornament and set-off to devotion. I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual.57

In the same sermon, Newman affirms that the separation of intellectual ability and talent from virtue is a great misfortune, and a consequence of the fall of man. Separation provokes disorder and confusion, and Newman’s educational project aims to integrate the entire person in all his faculties. A Catholic university is a place for an integral formation, and the college, with its communal life under the direction of tutors, Idea, p. xi. John Henry Newman, ‘Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training’, in Sermons preached on various occasions (London, 1874), p. 14. 56 57

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has a special role in the training of intellectual and moral traits of individual character: The University is for theology, law, and medicine, for natural history, for physical science, and for the sciences generally and their promulgation; the College is for the formation of character, intellectual and moral, for the cultivation of the mind, for the improvement of the individual, for the study of literature, for the classics, and those rudimental sciences which strengthen and sharpen the intellect.58

Newman desires an education that is at the same time plainly liberal and clearly Catholic: Here, then, I conceive, is the object of the Holy See and the Catholic Church in setting up Universities; it is to reunite things which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put asunder by man. Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought. Nor have I any thought of a compromise, as if religion must give up something, and science something. I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons.59

Nothing profitable will be lost to the true liberal mind and, additionally, religious influence and communal life in college will complete the formation of the whole person. In conclusion, Newman’s views on the relationship between knowledge and morality work on different hermeneutical levels. On purely secular grounds, he proposes their complete separation, because the direct end of a university is the teaching of universal knowledge, and so its aim is intellectual, not RP, pp. 228-229. John Henry Newman, ‘Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training’, in Sermons preached on various occasions (London, 1874), p. 13. 58 59

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moral. But a university also has indirect ends, namely the elevation of the tone of society and the refinement of the individual, and in this respect knowledge and morality can support each other. In the particular case of a Catholic university, as with the one he was asked to establish in Dublin, it cannot fulfil its object duly without the Church’s assistance, which is necessary for its integrity.60 The highest balance of knowledge and morality that humanity can reach without religious principles is presented in his description of the gentleman. Newman does not repudiate this ideal but he goes beyond it, thereby showing the limits of the ‘religion of philosophy’, the pretension of culture of making better people.

60 “Such is a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church’s assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its integrity. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office.” Idea, p. ix.

CHAPTER FIVE

Paradoxes and Failures. Newman’s Idea of the Educated Man

1. Paradox and failure It is almost commonplace to refer to our contemporary condition as critical; critical in the twofold sense of this adjective, as in a crisis and as in criticism. At the risk of superficiality, for at least two centuries it seems that we have been at a turning point, placed at an historical juncture where the past seems to be no longer reliable and the future is uncertain and worrying. Traditions look as if they are dying inevitably, and progress shows no reasonable horizons of hope. This permanent state of uncertainty appears to be due to our inclination, almost an intellectual duty, to criticise everything, to exercise a disenchanted judgment on every possible aspect of our reality. Newman writes in the precise period during which this crisis erupts and begins to show its most devastating effects. According to his analysis, the core of the modern crisis lies in the mounting difficulty of offering a unifying synthesis of knowledge. As we have seen before, in The Idea of a University he writes: The majestic vision of the Middle Ages, which grew steadily to perfection in the course of centuries, the University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has almost gone out in night. A philosophical comprehensiveness, and orderly expansiveness, an elastic constructiveness, men have lost them, and cannot make out why. This is why: because they have lost the idea of unity.1

1

Idea, p. 423.

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This lack of unity, of a unifying subject, has repercussions for the idea of a university, but similarly on the conception of knowledge and its place in society. In considering the subject of the university it is possible to maintain that Newman was dealing with the broader crisis of knowledge and society, as long as we accept that the conditions of the university were mirroring and reflecting what was happening in the outside world. It has been noted by distinguished scholars that on the political level this intellectual crisis, and the elaboration of an updated model of a university, coincides with the raising of national states.2 In a period of massive modifications, the university as a social institution was at the same time an object and an agent of change. In addition, Newman warns against the personal and social consequences of intellectual partiality and fragmentation. In the Idea of a University he quotes from his old provost in Oriel, Dr Edward Copleston, who in writing about the economic or intellectual division of labour, maintains that the human being, “while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate part of some powerful machinery.”3 In the post-Enlightenment era a unifying synthesis of knowledge becomes more and more difficult for two types of reasons: the first is the multiplication and progressive differentiation of academic disciplines with their own methods of enquiry; the second reason is the lack of one single, coherent, theory which is able to give a proper account of reality, of the world and of the human being. Any conception of knowledge as a whole has to 2 See Thomas Docherty, Criticism and Modernity: Aesthetics, Literature and Nations in Europe and its Academies (Oxford, 1999), and Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Harvard, 1996). 3 Idea, p. 168. Originally in Edward Copleston, A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford. Containing an Account of Studies pursued in that University, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1810), pp. 107-112.

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face the broadness and dispersion of current sciences. Is a synthesis ever possible? How and where? What are its social and political implications? In this final chapter I will summarise how Newman handled these questions, and I will compare his positions with our current condition, one hundred and fifty years after his Dublin Writings. In our reflection we will be guided by two categories: paradox and failure. My thesis is that the failure of Newman’s university enterprise is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of contemporary knowledge. Both run parallel and require a mutual understanding. The first paradox is that at the same moment when universities are everywhere4, the university institution as we know it seems to disappear. A modern society is unthinkable without the university, but vice versa, the overwhelming presence of social demands and the intervention of external influences have almost destroyed the traditional idea of a university in favour of a thirdlevel education system inspired by the techno-bureaucratic notions of excellence, performance and productivity. The contemporary university is controlled, measured and overseen by external powers, and its legitimacy is granted externally. Thomas Docherty has well expressed the frustration of academics when they are asked to justify their particular status: For many – especially for many in government today – the question posed to the university and most pointedly to its humanities disciplines is simple and crude: how can you justify your existence and privileges? The answer required by governments is equally simple and crude: we are to justify our existence in terms applicable not to the academy, but in terms applicable rather to industry and business, that is, economically and “Except perhaps for big–time soccer, the university seems to have become the most nearly universal manmade institution in the modern world.” Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of a University A re-examination (New Haven and London, 1992), p. 22. 4

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instrumentally. ‘English’, for example, is to be justified not by its contributions to the cultural formation, freedom, and betterment of autonomous and critical human subjects, but rather by how efficiently it operates in the production of individuals who will – as more or less direct consequence of their engagement with literature – contribute directly to the economic profile and profit of themselves and, yet more importantly, of the nation.5

The university has proved to be remarkably adaptable over the course of its long history, but the more society and the State have intervened to sustain this institution the more its autonomy has been compromised. The advancement of the global economy seems to make problematic the idea of pursuing truth while preserving or promoting cultural enrichment, and indeed may even call into question the legitimacy of pursuing truth at all. Contemporary universities increasingly function as performance-oriented, heavily bureaucratic, entrepreneurial organizations committed to a narrow conception of excellence, all of which must be recognised as resulting from the imperative of international competitiveness which cannot be separated from the reliance on corporate funding necessary for many schools and colleges if they hope to remain operational. This problem has its beginnings at the birth of the modern concept of a university, and Newman saw it more clearly than anyone. Every new beginning comes from some other beginning’s end. The university is not a modern invention, its idea started and grew through the Middle Ages in Christian Europe; it is a medieval invention based on a metaphysical unity and a coherent social setting. At the end of the eighteenth century the idea of a university found new life, and this was for two main reasons that served new purposes in line with a changing world: to cope in a single institution with the growing number of disciplines, and also to train the emerging classes and to answer their request for access to education for all sectors of society. Newman works on the 5

Docherty, op. cit., p. 2.

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tension between these two factors: the demands of the new scholarships and the new classes’ need of social mobility and inclusion.6 Is the end of a university to provide personal formation or to satisfy social demands? Do we educate for life or for a job? Newman’s Dublin Writings are in some ways a tentative answer to this old dilemma. He would maintain that the first can be reached through the second. In training professionals we train their intellect. The primary end of Newman’s project, however, was not to supply a social demand, but to promote a certain vision of the human being, an idea of the educated man. As we have seen in his discussion with the Utilitarians, liberal education reaches at the same time, even if not directly, the personal utility that Locke pursued and the social utility at which the Edinburgh Review aimed. Utility will follow from the search for good, but the opposite is not necessarily true. Nothing can be more useful than a good mind. This holds true particularly in today’s world where, in the so called ‘knowledge economy’, organizations require from employees not specific content but general skills, and the universities are arguably the primary source of such skills. In Newman’s conception of the educated man, the pursuit of intellectual excellence goes along with the cultivation of the character. He wrote: […] it is more correct, as well as more usual, to speak of a University as a place of education, than of instruction, though, when knowledge is concerned, instruction would at first sight have seemed the more appropriate word. We are instructed, for instance, in manual exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of business; for these are methods, which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained in 6 Of course, a modern university has also other aims: research, publications, museum, etc. I agree with Jaroslav Pelikan that “essentially the business of the university can be said to consist of three interrelated stages: the advancement of knowledge through scholarly investigation; the extension and interpretation of knowledge through teaching, including professional training and the diffusion of knowledge through scholarly publication”. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 117.

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rules committed to memory, to tradition, or to use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent, and is commonly spoken of in connexion with religion and virtue.7

On Sunday 5th November, 1854, two days after the opening of the Catholic University of Ireland, Newman gave a soirée at University House. Unfortunately we do not have the text of the animating address to the students with which he concluded the ceremony, but only a report published in the Catholic University Gazette. It reads: He began saying that the first question before them was: ‘What are they here for?’ and the most obvious answer was, to prepare for their respective profession: law, medicine, the ecclesiastic state, engineering, or mercantile pursuits. But that was not all that a university education was intended for. He would explain his meaning by a story which he had heard many years ago, in early life. There was a widow lady who had suffered some reverses in fortune, and was left with a large family. One of them was obliged to accept a situation, which appeared beneath his rank, and expressed naturally some regret at this. The mo­ ther, who was a wise person, said: ‘My dear Charles, remem­ber the man makes the place, not the place the man.’ They were here to receive, no matter what their intended profession was, an education which would alike fit them for all. Of course, the University was also intended to provide an education of special use in the professions but it was more than that; it was something to fit them for every place and situation they might meet with in life.8

A frequent misreading of Newman assumes that, because of his reservations about professional or useful knowledge, his Idea, pp. 114-115. John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 563. (Author’s emphasis). 7 8

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university did not teach particular disciplines or professions. As he said in his opening speech, the Catholic University of Ireland was also meant to provide a professional education, but always having as its first mission to fit its student for every place and situation.9 The value of the university training was not limited to its bearing on future jobs, it was to include the pursuit of intellectual excellence and, as far as possible, the cultivation of the character. Some might find it ironic that the Medical School, where professional training prevailed, was the only School of the Catholic University of Ireland that really succeeded and lasted through time. Nonetheless, another example of Newman’s interest in intellectual culture for professional workers, i.e. an argument against his complete disavowal of professions as he would have ignored this contingent if that were the case, is seen in his establishment of the free evening classes. These courses were intended to extend the advantages of the University as far as possible by involving the working young men of Dublin who were unable to attend during the day, and who were unlikely able to afford regular university tuition. Providing an intellectual cultivation for “If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education, let me not be supposed, Gentlemen, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them. In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something particular? It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge, and in no other way. I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education.” Idea, pp. 166-167. 9

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the Catholic working class of the time Newman was also compensating for a cultural deficit that prevented them from playing an active part in civil society. The idea of preparing for life those who already had jobs was another example of the enlargement of the human person effected by liberal education. The philosophical habit of mind is not only good in itself, insofar as it constitutes a perfection of the intellectual abilities, but also due to its social and cultural implications. The training of students’ characters is no longer amongst the goals of a university. In spite of Newman’s reflections, through the course of history the opposite model has prevailed, the one defended by the Edinburgh Reviewers that privileges utility and professionalisation. The consequence is that not only has the university lost its identity, and in fact today its name applies to institutions with widely different functions and characters, but it also often fails to fulfil expectations from the external environment.10 This is another paradox: the more university follows society the more it will stay behind it, as society moves faster. The role that the university had in the last century, in respect of training students for future jobs, has now been taken over by a greatly expanded and far more diverse set of higher education providers. Today, new formative agencies provide continuous education over the workers’ lifetime to cope with the increasingly rapid obsolescence of knowledge and skills.11 According to a recent study, “traditional higher education may well become See Gordon Graham, The Institution of Intellectual Values (Exeter, 2005). Already certain large firms have decided that the skill and training needs of their employees are so extensive and perhaps so specific that it is more effective to provide them through their own ‘corporate university’ rather than using traditional institutions. Some of these corporate universities are far more advanced than traditional colleges in terms of pedagogy, curriculum design and evaluation. See Ben R. Martin and Henry Etzkowitz, ‘The origin and evolution of the university species’, Journal for Science and Technologies Studies, vol. 13, n. 3-4 (2000), pp. 9-34 and Arthur Levine, ‘The Remaking of the American University’, Innovative Higher Education, vol. 25, n. 4 (2001), pp. 253-267. 10 11

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the follower rather than the pacesetter in this new postsecondary world.”12 Is there any reason why a Microsoft or Google credential should be less prestigious than one from a State University? The concept of university as an institution of unique purpose is dissolving. In addition to the two traditional aims of teaching and research, universities are now seen as taking on a third mission: that of contributing to the economy. It has been suggested that these increasingly close links between universities, government and industry can be couched in terms of a ‘triple helix’ model.13 The result is the emergence of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ which combines teaching, research and contributing to the economy, particularly in the local region. In this ‘triple helix’ what in the past were considered national and common interests are now often identified with private interests. Public accountability is reduced to what is acceptable for powerful corporate players. This is for the university only a premise to facilitate the shift from an institution with an allegedly public mission to a private, profit making, company. Can we return to Newman’s views? Are they still relevant for today? Let us first consider them in contrast with other proposals. In April 1980 Jacques Derrida presented a deconstructive reading of Immanuel Kant’s famous Der Streit der Fakultaeten (1798) at Columbia University. In his text, titled Moloch; or, The Conflict of the Faculties, Derrida focuses on the modern idea of a university, particularly the German model, and even if he never mentions Newman, the English prelate is discussed extensively in other texts collected in the same volume.14 Derrida’s considerations on the German model will help us to compare with Levine, op. cit., p. 262. Loet Leydesdorff and Martin Meyer, ‘The Triple Helix of university.industry.government relations’, Scientometrics, vol. 58, n. 2 (2003), pp. 191-203. 14 See Robert Young, The Idea of a Chrestomathic University in Rand Richard A. (ed.) Logomachia The Conflict of The Faculties (Lincoln and London, 1992), pp. 97-126. 12 13

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Newman’s that which I would define not so much as the English, or the Irish, but as the Catholic one, where Catholic is meant as universal. Derrida maintains that: The Western university is a very recent constructum or artifact, and we already sense that its model is finished: marked by finitude, just as, at the instauration of its current model, between The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) and the foundation of the University of Berlin (10 October 1810, at the close of the mission entrusted to Humboldt), it was thought to be ruled by an idea of reason, by a certain link, in other words, with infinity. Following this model, at least in its essential features, every great Western university was, between 1810 and about 1850, in some sense re-instituted.15

Newman’s mode of operation consists in taking again the classical idea of liberal education, which was developed in medieval times, and elaborating an updated version of it. The model to which Newman was appealing appears to be dead forever, never to be risen again, at least on a large scale. What does the future hold for the university? Will we still be able to talk about a university in any sense?16 Bill Readings, in his profound study The University in Ruins, calls contemporary university ‘posthistorical’ as it is an “institution [that] has outlived itself, is now a survivor of the era in which it defined itself in terms of the project of the historical development, affirmation, and inculcation of national culture.”17 The university as an historical institution has always been subject to social, political and religious forces while at the same time attempting to fulfil a variety of roles and expectations. It has been noted that, on the political level, the post-Enlightenment Derrida, p. 10. See Ben R. Martin and Henry Etzkowitz, ‘The origin and evolution of the university species’ in Journal for Science and Technologies Studies, vol. 13, n. 3-4 (2000), pp. 9-34. 17 Readings, op. cit., p. 6. 15 16

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intellectual crisis and the elaboration of an updated model of a university coincided with the rise of national states. The university was meant to play a leading role in the production of a national subject, and in the creation of a culture that could validate and sustain it. In the Humboldtian model, for instance, as an apparatus of the state, the university institution functioned with the view of offering to the emergent nation a people capable of living up to the model idea of the nation-state. Conversely, the concept of a ‘national culture’ was the unifying element of the university curriculum, as well as the justification for the founding of universities and the privileges that the national States granted to the institutions. Thomas Docherty writes: In or about December 1810, humanistic education changed. The turn of that century was a period in which there was much lively debate over what constituted the nature of the university; and, importantly, it was in this period that the question assumed the corollary task of identifying a national culture and a national character through education, most often through an education grounded in a conception of a foundational philosophy which served to unify the variety of the disciplines. The modern university is thus in a very precise sense, an aesthetic institution, indebted to the principles of regularity and harmony in which ostensible difference or variety can be found (in the manner of Hutcheson and subsequent aesthetic) to occlude an essential unity and identity. The classic formu­ lation here, of course, is that of Humboldt, who, in 1810, wrote his report on the founding of the University of Berlin. As is well known, and as has been noted most pointedly recently by Bill Readings, Humboldt’s conception of the university, his ‘idea of the university’, was fundamentally aligned with the formulation of the German nation-state: university education in Berlin was to be a ‘university of culture’. 18

According to this interpretation, the crisis of the university as an institution in the twentieth century can be linked to the fading of national states, and to the decline of the national cultural mission 18

Docherty, op. cit., p. 205.

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that provided its reason for being. If a political element is particularly evident in the establishment of the University of Berlin, some nationalistic factors are also present in the debate between the Scottish Edinburgh Review and the English University of Oxford.19 Newman’s university project, on the other hand, can be characterised as Catholic and therefore universal; it overcomes nationalistic restraints, in spite of the problems he had with the Irish hierarchy in appointing English lecturers or with Irish nationalism of the time.20 Arthur Dwight Culler maintains that, properly considered, Newman’s university was not the Catholic University of Ireland, but a Catholic University in Ireland. He writes: To many persons the choice of Ireland as the seat of an inter­ national university was preposterous, but Newman with his characteristic energy of vision had already devised a theory to explain it. The world, he wrote, had grown away from the south and west of Europe into five continents, and Ireland stood in ‘the centre of the Catholicism of the English tongue, with Great Britain, Malta (perhaps Turkey or Egypt), and India, on one side of it, and North America, and Australia, on the other’. Students from all these countries would come flocking to Ireland as to their center. Turbans would mingle with top hats and fezzes with coonskin caps, and the cosmopolitanism of the Middle Ages would be realized again. In other words, Newman’s division of his university into ‘nations’ was not a piece of idle medievalism but was a practical preparation for the foreign students who he really believed were coming.21 Thomas Docherty talks of “[…] opposition between, on one hand, an English system of education, characterized (or caricatured) as monolithic, narrow, homogeneous and lacking in the capacity to give autonomy to its participants – or, in a word, lacking culture; and, on the other hand, a Scottish system mooted as pluralist, democratic, ‘cultivated’, cosmopolitan, heterogeneous, and guaranteed to produce diversity among its participants that is required for the elaboration of a democratic culture.” Docherty, op. cit., p. 214. 20 See Colin Barr, Paul Cullen, John Henry Newman, and the Catholic University of Ireland, 1845-1865 (Leominster, 2003). 21 Arthur Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A Study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal (New Haven and London, 1955), p. 168. Newman’s 19

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In being envisaged not only for Irish people, but for any Catholic of the English-speaking world, the Catholic University of Ireland represents an exception amongst the new universities born in the nineteenth century, and it is probably the first supranational university institution of the modern era. This is also one of the reasons for its failure; the English State never wanted to concede a charter (a formal licence to confer degrees) to it, and Irish nationalism of the time did nothing to assist, and may have hindered, Newman in his project. He had little knowledge of the political and social situation of post-famine Ireland, and because he was English it was difficult for him to gain acceptance by his Irish contacts and peers. Newman had a much broader worldview than many of his contemporaries, although his firm grounding in history cannot be overlooked. In the lecture Christianity and Scientific Investigation, which was written in 1855 for the School of Science but never delivered, he explicitly compares his Dublin enterprise to the Roman Empire. We count it a great thing, and justly so, to plan and carry out a wide political organization. To bring under one yoke, after the manner of old Rome, a hundred discordant peoples; to maintain each of them in its own privileges within its legitimate range of action; to allow them severally the indulgence of national feelings, and the stimulus of rival interests; and yet withal to blend them into one great social establishment, and to pledge them to the perpetuity of the one imperial power;— this is an achievement which carries with it the unequivocal token of genius in the race which effects it. […] What an empire is in political history, such is a University in the sphere of philosophy and research.22

English patriotism would hardly have been acceptable in the Irish context of Newman’s time, and in his Dublin Writings he quotation is from John Henry Newman, My Campaign in Ireland (Aberdeen, 1896) p. 94. 22 Idea, pp. 458-459.

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never displays any signs of it. He was at least aware of the inherent difficulties of establishing a Catholic University in a land with a majority Catholic population dominated by Protestants. In my opinion he never gave a sectarian tone to his project, and this was a conscious decision. The concept of the ‘university’, qualified by the adjective ‘Catholic’, produces what is for Newman essentially a tautology: as a universal institution a university cannot be but Catholic, i.e. open to the whole world.23 Catholicism in this respect is another name for universalism. 24 Newman’s intentional inclusion of foreign and classical languages in the curriculum of the Catholic University of Ireland falsifies, I think, a common interpretation among scholars of the relationship between modern universities and national states. Bill Readings, for instance, maintains that in Newman’s essay Literature, the second essay of the second part of the Idea of a University, “Explicitly national, literature thus replaces philosophical science in uniting the dual sense of culture as both product and process, as general object and individual cultivation.”25 It is correct that Newman talks of language as the locus of a collective subjectivity, underlining “the connection between the force of words in particular languages and the habits and sentiments of the nations speaking them”.26 He traces an explicit link between literature and the achievement of a national self-consciousness created mainly through the work of its great writers, but in the Catholic University of Ireland the teaching was not limited to English 23 See Thomas Docherty, ‘Newman, Ireland, and Universality’, Boundary 2, vol. 31, n. 1 (2004), pp. 73-92. 24 “The special quality of being comprehensively universal while being intensively local, which is connoted by the term catholic as applied to the church, does seem to fit into the university in a special way. As a catholic and international institution, the university continues to be the object of worldwide discussion and debate.” Pelikan, op. cit., p. 24. 25 Readings, op. cit., p. 77. 26 Idea, p. 276.

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literature, but included Italian, Spanish, French and Irish literature. If in nineteenth century universities literature plays the role of national unification, it is not so much the case in Newman’s university, which is a transnational one, where literature rather has a formative function; it is an exercise of the philosophical habit of mind. This notion of the formative function of literature is clearly presented in the first Discourse of the second part of the Idea of a University. This Discourse was originally read on November 9th, 1854 as the opening lecture of the Faculty of Arts courses, six days after the opening of the Catholic University of Ireland.27 Newman exposes here the standards of education in ancient and modern civilisations, and traces analogies between them and Christianity.28 He queries which field of study offers “the most robust and invigorating discipline for the unformed mind.”29 His definitive answer is that the study of classics provides an Idea, pp. 249-267. This lecture was originally published in The Catholic University Gazette, n. 25, 16 November 1854, pp. 193-200. In a letter to T. W. Allies, lecturer in philosophy in the Catholic University of Ireland, Newman wrote: “I consider the Lecture which will appear in the Gazette of next week November 16 has something of the Philosophy of History in it.” John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 293. See also McGrath, op. cit., p. 334. 28 We mention before Newman’s universalism but he was of course a man of his own time, as are we all, and as such he could easily be target today of allegations of imperialism and Eurocentrism when in this same discourse, for instance, he maintains the superiority of Western civilization over other ones. “I am not denying of course the civilization of the Chinese, for instance, though it be not our civilization; but it is a huge, stationary, unattractive, morose civilization. Nor do I deny a civilization to the Hindoos, nor to the ancient Mexicans, nor to the Saracens, nor (in a certain sense) to the Turks; but each of these races has its own civilization, as separate from one another as from ours. I do not see how they can be all brought under one idea. Each stands by itself, as if the other were not; each is local; many of them are temporary; none of them will bear a comparison with the Society and the Civilization which I have described as alone having a claim to those names, and on which I am going to dwell.” Idea, pp. 251-252. 29 Idea, p. 263. 27

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august method of enlarging the mind, cultivating the intellect and refining the feelings.30 At the core of his Arts faculty Newman placed not national literature but Greek and Latin language and literature; these were also the subjects required for the entrance examinations. Newman considered these examinations so important as to treat them extensively in a series of articles in the Catholic University Gazette and an essay in the Idea.31 Classical scholarship is not only a useful instrument to train the mind, but serves as conveyor of a vision of the world. Civilisations, Newman holds, are “not political, but mental, based on the same intellectual ideas, and advancing by common intellectual methods.”32 Greek and Roman culture, upon which Christianity is based, operates as a basis for an ideological construction of subjectivity. The student enters into a tradition and becomes an active part of it through sharing not only some common ideas, but also the same intellectual processes that characterise Western thought.33 It would be a misreading of Newman to assume that there are no political implications that come out of his concept of liberal knowledge. He recognises that “liberal knowledge, […] together with the knowledge which effects it, may fitly be sought 30 “In a word, the Classics, and the subjects of thought and the studies to which they give rise, or, to use the term most to our present purpose, the Arts, have ever, on the whole, been the instruments of education which the civilized orbis terrarum has adopted; just as inspired works, and the lives of saints, and the articles of faith, and the catechism, have ever been the instrument of education in the case of Christianity. And this consideration, you see, Gentlemen, invests the opening of the School in Arts with a solemnity and moment of a peculiar kind, for we are but reiterating an old tradition, and carrying on those august methods of enlarging the mind, and cultivating the intellect, and refining the feelings, in which the process of Civilization has ever consisted.” 31 See Idea, pp. 331-380. 32 Idea, p. 253. 33 See also ‘On the Utility of Classical Studies’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 41, 8 March 1855, pp. 402-407. This is an abstract of the Inaugural Lecture delivered on 23 November by Mr. Ornsby, Professor of Classical Literature.

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for its own sake; that it is, however, in addition, of great secular utility, as constituting the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life”.34 Liberal education produces not only good scholars but also good citizens. Intellectual virtues are inseparable from their social and political usefulness, even if this usefulness is not their main aim. The construction of a civic dimension is not the direct end of education, nonetheless the graduates of the Catholic University of Ireland are called on to change and improve their land. The University has a political impact on the community through the students it prepares and produces. In a famous passage at the end of the Seventh Discourse of the Idea of a University, Newman affirms: “If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world.”35 In the Preface to the Idea Newman uses an even stronger tone to express the need for countering the oppression of Irish Catholics which prevented them accessing the education which is necessary for the man of the world.36 Instead of focusing on past grievances, however, Newman set up a formative institution that could provide the qualifications necessary to reverse the injustices of the time. He Idea, p. 214. Idea, p. 177. 36 “Robbed, oppressed, and thrust aside, Catholics in these islands have not been in a condition for centuries to attempt the sort of education which is necessary for the man of the world, the statesman, the landholder, or the opulent gentleman. Their legitimate stations, duties, employments, have been taken from them, and the qualifications withal, social and intellectual, which are necessary both for reversing the forfeiture and for availing themselves of the reversal. The time has come when this moral disability must be removed. Our desideratum is, not the manners and habits of gentlemen; —these can be, and are, acquired in various other ways, by good society, by foreign travel, by the innate grace and dignity of the Catholic mind; —but the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained without much effort and the exercise of years.” Idea, pp. xv-xvi. 34 35

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understood that some portion of the remedy involved character formation and cultural development. This social and political relevance of the Dublin Writings has not been sufficiently remarked by commentators.37 Whether or not Newman’s project is recoverable, entirely desirable, or whether such an ideal university ever existed, the social role of the university as expressed by Newman cannot be ignored. Whilst it seems unlikely that a return to a purely liberal educational paradigm, as envisaged by Newman, is possible, there remains considerable space to consider how university education should be oriented, what social functions and needs it ought to fulfil, and whether or not it is possible to act in accordance with any new conclusions drawn about the nature of a university. Newman’s life can be interpreted in terms of political and cultural criticisms levelled at the Victorian establishment and culture, as Gauri Viswanathan did in her Outside the Fold. Conversion, Modernity and Belief.38 I would agree with Kevin W. Hula that “in a political reading of Newman, ‘knowledge for its own sake’ is really a first step towards the political and economic emancipation of Ireland”39, but what I am concerned with in my research is not the sociological or political relevance of his enterprise, but its implications for a philosophical idea of the human person. It seems to me that if there is a difficulty in conceiving a satisfying idea of the university today, it is not so much due to a political crisis, i.e. the end of national states as Docherty and Readings seem to maintain, but to an intellectual and anthropological deficiency.40 Even if the Catholic University of Ireland failed, I think that what can be saved of the model The only exception is Kevin W. Hula Political Picadors and the University, unpublished. A paper given at Loyola University, Baltimore, in 3 December 2001. 38 See Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the Fold. Conversion, Modernity and Belief (Princeton, 1998). 39 Kevin W. Hula, op. cit., p. 2. 40 For a discussion on postnational subjectivity see Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship? (Princeton, 2004). 37

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proposed by Newman is his elaboration of that particular way of training minds that he called liberal knowledge, and the conception of the educated person he envisaged. 2. The Philosophical Habit of Mind Was, and is today, a university the best place to acquire the philosophical habit that Newman had in mind? The contemporary university is no more the main centre of production of culture, its role has become more peripheral than ever. Derrida writes: The university member has to surrender any representation as a ‘guardian’ or ‘trustee’ of knowledge. Certainly such representa­ tion once constituted the very mission of the university. But with the library no longer being the ideal type of archive, the university no longer remains the center of knowledge, and can no longer provide its subjects with a representation of that center. […] The university is (finished) product, I would almost call it the child of an inseparable couple, metaphysics and technology. At the least, the university furnished the space or the topological configuration for such an offspring. It is a paradox that, at the moment when such offspring overflows the spaces assigned it, and the university becomes small and old, its ‘idea’ reigns everywhere, more and better than ever.41

Again, was, and is today, a university the best place to acquire the philosophical habit that Newman had in mind? As I have tried to show in my research, his reflections regarding the cultivation of the intellect hold good for every kind of cultural activity, not only university education. Newman was aware of the changes occurring during his times. For instance, he states that in modern times a city provides the intellectual facilities that were in the past a prerogative of a university. He recognised with some concern that “the authority, which in former times was lodged in Universities, now resides in very great measure in [the] literary world”.42 In the 41 42

Derrida, op. cit., pp. 14-15. Idea, p. xxii.

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second issue of the Catholic University Gazette, published at the very beginning of his Dublin enterprise, he wrote that, whether we will or not, in every great country, the metropolis becomes a sort of necessary university.43 And also: “The very same kinds of need, social and moral, which give rise to a metropolis, give rise also to a University; nay, that every metropolis is a University, as far as the rudiments of a University are concerned.”44 On the other hand, he maintains that even in the past the university was not necessarily the natural habitat for wisdom and discovery. Works indeed of genius fall under no art; heroic minds come under no rule; a University is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors, of founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of nations. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or Shakespeares, though such miracles of nature it has before now contained within its precincts.45

I find it paradoxical that Newman’s model of a university is still considered today as the greatest university model, at least in the English-speaking world, as it is based on a failure. This is so because not only did the Catholic University of Ireland not succeed, but in spite of a general appreciation of his ideas the model failed to be accepted at large. My thesis is that it failed not just because of particular circumstances, due to the Irish political and social situation of the time, but because it necessarily had to, as probably there is no place for such an institution in our contemporary world. This, however, does not mean that we do not need it. Newman’s idea of a university is paradoxical in the 43 John Henry Newman, ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 2, 8 June 1854, pp. 10-14, reprinted in RP, pp. 6-17 with the title ‘What is a University?’. 44 RP, p. 50. Originally in The Catholic University Gazette, n. 7, 13 July 1854, p. 51. 45 Idea, p. 177. For an opposite view see Jaroslav Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 40-42.

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fact that it is necessary without being possible, it is a sort a regulative ideal.46 What has to be saved today is not his institution, which is already lost, but his message. If the university is not necessarily the best place to acquire the philosophical habit that Newman had in mind, we should concentrate not on the institution itself, but on the idea of the human person he wanted to promote with it. “We cannot then be without virtual Universities; a metropolis is such”47 he wrote in the Catholic University Gazette. The whole world, not only cities, is today a virtual university in so far as every place may achieve communication with others, but at the same time this virtual university has no other place of unification than in the learner himself. With the multiplication of our intellectual experiences the need for unity dramatically emerges in order to avoid the risk of fragmentation, not only of knowledge but of our whole of human life. This leads to a further question. Is it possible to recover that unifying framework that, according to Newman, the spirit of inquiring clearly and critically has as a goal? In this respect, we cannot avoid another paradox: the more human knowledge grows, the less we are able to control and organise it. Moreover, the human race has to face the increasingly rapid obsolescence of knowledge and skills. “The vastness of the modern field of positive knowledge” Bill Reading writes, ”renders the extended totality of knowledge incommensurable with individual understanding.”48 This holds not only on the personal but also on the global level. Our ignorance necessarily 46 “There never was a golden age because ‘the idea of a university’ is not the sort of thing that can be fully realized and permanently secured. Rather, it is a regulative ideal that gives us our bearings and against which trends and tendencies are to be judged. But though it is a mistake to think that such ideals could be secured for ever, it is equally a mistake to think that their articulation is therefore unnecessary”. Graham, op. cit., p. 162. 47 John Henry Newman, ‘The primâ facie idea of a University’, The Catholic University Gazette, n. 2, 8 June 1854, p. 13. Reprinted in RP, p. 14. 48 Readings, op. cit., p. 65.

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grows in relation to the increasing number of human attainments, discoveries, inventions, doctrines, theories; as these diverse and multiplying knowledges expand they are further and further beyond our capacity for understanding, even if this is more to do with the quantity than the quality of these knowledges. Jaroslav Pelikan reminds us that Newman was well aware of the unlimited task that the educated man has to face. Already in 1852 the sheer quantity of information available in the civilized world was so formidable as to be utterly daunting, and it would be fatuous to read Newman’s definition of ‘universal knowledge’ as either an assignment or a promise or a claim. Before the preface is finished, he has made clear that he does not have in mind producing scholars ‘who can treat, where it is necessary, de omni scibili,’ on every subject in the world and perhaps beyond this world.49

Although the impossibility for the individual of controlling and managing the totality of human knowledge has been accepted as a matter of fact, with the progress and expansion of disciplines, a project of a unified theory of the world has not been abandoned. After an initial period of explosion and dispersal, we can find nowadays a convergence, at least in some fields, towards a unification of knowledge. For instance, we talk today of the unification of the real, especially in cosmology and biology. The problem is that this unifying tendency is mostly limited to physical reality. It does not find a similar correspondence in the realm of humanities where indeed the contrary, i.e. a dissolution of unity and the mushrooming of increasingly esoteric specialty fields, appears to have happened. In the last century, after the death of God, philosophy has contemplated the death of the subject, but out of that has sprung a plethora of identity theories, thereby illustrating what may possibly be understood as a human need for unifying discourses, grand narratives and the 49

Pelikan, op. cit., p. 41.

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like, however fragmented, dislocated or unseated the tendency itself has become. Newman somehow anticipated and previewed the outcomes of the premises posited in his times. His plea for a place for theology and ethics in the university curriculum was motivated not so much by mere religious fear, but because he understood that the reasons given for their exclusion would ultimately lead to a much broader denial of the specificity of what is properly human, and eventually to the abolition of the concept of human nature. As we have seen before, Newman thought that the negation of human agency was the philosophical error spreading amongst the scholars of his time. Newman attacked those philosophies that considered human beings as merely part of the natural world and therefore maintained that humanity can only be explained by positive sciences. Man was seen as a psychophysical mechanism ruled by material laws aimed at his own preservation. In the name of neutrality in respect of the value and ends of human existence, the people Newman had in his mind would have argued for the elimination of any discipline that could not reach results based on a consensual, verifiable, method. Theology and ethics would be relegated to matters of private taste and belief, and no anthropology would ever be possible. Newman maintains that in such a perspective there would be no university, no Encyclopaedia, no knowledge at all. We will suppose that a difficulty just now besets the enunciation and discussion of all matters of science, in consequence of the extreme sensitiveness of large classes of the community, clergy and laymen, on the subjects of necessity, responsibility, the standard of morals, and the nature of virtue. Parties run so high, that the only way of avoiding constant quarrelling in defence of this or that side of the question is, in the judgment of the persons I am supposing, to shut up the subject of anthropology altogether. This is accordingly done. Henceforth man is to be as if he were not, in the general course of Education; the moral and mental sciences are to have no professorial chairs,

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and the treatment of them is to be simply left as a matter of private judgment, which each individual may carry out as he will. I can just fancy such a prohibition abstractedly possible; but one thing I cannot fancy possible, viz., that the parties in question, after this sweeping act of exclusion, should forthwith send out proposals on the basis of such exclusion for publishing an Encyclopædia, or erecting a National University.50

Not only the lack of common understanding of what the human being is, but even only the simple fear of searching for it, Newman says, would make a university an impossible project. Alasdair MacIntyre lamented ‘the capacity of the contemporary university not only to dissolve antagonism, to emasculate hostility, but also in so doing to render itself culturally irrelevant’.51 As it is clear, Newman is not arguing for a necessary agreement among scholars, rather he believes in the need for confrontation between disciplines. Rival points of view, from different fields of enquiry or from within the disciplines themselves, have to be compared, not for the sake of dissent, but in order to reach a richer truth. This cannot be attained without a tendency towards some unity. Sciences, into which our knowledge may be said to be cast, have multiplied bearings one on another, and an internal sympathy, and admit, or rather demand, comparison and adjustment. They complete, correct, balance each other. This consideration, if Idea, p. 54. Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (London, 1990), pp. 218-219. Gerald Graff was maintaining something similar when he wrote: “Clearly, we still long to think of education as a conflict-free ivory tower, and the university tries to live up to this vision. While it welcomes diversity and innovation, it neutralized the conflicts which results from them. This it does by keeping warring parties in noncommunicating courses and departments and by basing the curriculum on a principle of live and let live: I won’t try to prevent you from teaching and studying what you want if you don’t try to prevent me from teaching and studying what I want.” Gerald Graff, Behind the Culture Wars: how teaching can revitalize American education (London and New York, 1992), pp. 6-7. 50 51

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well-founded, must be taken into account, not only as regards the attainment of truth, which is their common end, but as regards the influence which they exercise upon those whose education consists in the study of them. I have said already, that to give undue prominence to one is to be unjust to another; to neglect or supersede these is to divert those from their proper object. It is to unsettle the boundary lines between science and science, to disturb their action, to destroy the harmony which binds them together. Such a proceeding will have a corresponding effect when introduced into a place of education. There is no science but tells a different tale, when viewed as a portion of a whole, from what it is likely to suggest when taken by itself, without the safeguard, as I may call it, of others.52

What a praise of pluralism both between and within disciplines! These reflections imply some methodological consequences; the tendency towards a unified understanding demands a proper method that, according to his suggestions, is to be found in a dialogical approach to research and to teaching.53 This stands for the relationship between the lecturer and his pupils—and Newman provides some examples in this respect54but also amongst scholars. This dialogue has a diachronical and a synchronical dimension, it extends through generations— many stages—and through space—many minds. Drawing an analogy with Aristotelian ethics, Newman underlines the importance of error and of fallibility in the attainment of the truth: Idea, pp. 99-100. See Idea, pp. xix-xx for a summary of Newman’s method in education. 54 “You have come, not merely to be taught, but to learn. You have come to exert your minds. You have come to make what you hear your own, by putting out your hand, as it were, to grasp it and appropriate it. You do not come merely to hear a lecture, or to read a book, but you come for that catechetical instruction, which consists in a sort of conversation between your lecturer and you. He tells you a thing, and he asks you to repeat it after him. He questions you, he examines you, he will not let you go till he has proof, not only that you have heard, but that you know.” Idea, p. 489. See also Newman’s articles on entrance examinations collected in the fourth section of the second part of The Idea of a University. 52 53

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[…] as we are told in Ethics to gain the mean merely by receding from both extremes, so in scientific researches error may be said, without a paradox, to be in some instances the way to truth, and the only way. Moreover, it is not often the fortune of any one man to live through an investigation; the process is one of not only many stages, but of many minds. What one begins another finishes; and a true conclusion is at length worked out by the cooperation of independent schools and the perseverance of successive generations. This being the case, we are obliged, under circumstances, to bear for a while with what we feel to be error, in consideration of the truth in which it is eventually to issue.55

Contemporary technologies, which Newman would have dreamt about, today help us in this dialogical enterprise between disciplines and inside of them; the whole world seems to have become a kind of large university. Pelikan wrote: “Universal knowledge as an ideal is, obviously, not a realistic goal for any one university, but it is in considerable measure realistic as a goal for the university community world while. […] In at least one respect these ideals of ‘universal knowledge’ and ‘knowledge for its own end’ do seem to have become more realistic rather than less realistic since Newman: for example, the impact of technology, and above all of the computer, on university research and teaching.”56 Such technologies are changing the process of research and knowledge production in a number of ways, transforming the whole globe into a community of scholars. If ‘universal knowledge’ is not conceivable any more as a single theory of the whole, nonetheless its need has not vanished. Not only to be valued for their method, Newman’s Dublin Writings have to be read as a wide reflection on the personal and collective search for the sense of the human intellectual dimension. He was trying to reconcile the whole man, and all his faculties: the intellectual, the moral and the artistic dimensions, in one educative 55 56

Idea, pp. 474-475. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 41.

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experience.57 What interested him was the personal nature of learning. I believe that Newman’s Dublin project is a specimen of his holistic vision of the educated man. His Dublin Writings superbly exemplify an interdisciplinary approach, or better still, an integrated approach to the elaboration of a conception of the excellent human being if we consider the diverse handling of the same subject: theoretical, narrative, pastoral, architectonical, homiletic, etc. This was not unusual for him. How difficult is it today for us to find such a versatile personality in his body of works: pamphlets, sermons, poems, novels, translations, historical and theoretical treatises, articles. Even his private letters and notes are a source of many insights. In fact, I consider it a work of genius.

57 “I say that, as we admit, because we are Catholics, that the Divine Unity contains in it attributes, which, to our finite minds, appear in partial contrariety with each other; as we admit that, in His revealed Nature are things, which, though not opposed to Reason, are infinitely strange to the Imagination; as in His works we can neither reject nor admit the ideas of space, and of time, and the necessary properties of lines, without intellectual distress, or even torture; really, Gentlemen, I am making no outrageous request, when, in the name of a University, I ask religious writers, jurists, economists, physiologists, chemists, geologists, and historians, to go on quietly, and in a neighbourly way, in their own respective lines of speculation, research, and experiment, with full faith in the consistency of that multiform truth, which they share between them, in a generous confidence that they will be ultimately consistent, one and all, in their combined results, though there may be momentary collisions, awkward appearances, and many forebodings and prophecies of contrariety, and at all times things hard to the Imagination, though not, I repeat, to the Reason.” Idea, p. 465.

Conclusions

The concern Newman had in establishing a university was a concern regarding the proper place of every discipline in our understanding of the world as human beings. What interested him was the personal nature of learning. The whole Dublin Writings are an answer to these two questions: How can we study the human being? How can we understand the human being? What I believe is relevant is that in elaborating his own answers, Newman always has Aristotle in his mind. Why Aristotle? Because, even without agreeing with every aspect of his doctrine, Aristotle provides Newman with a coherent attempt to integrate different forms of knowledge towards a unity. If, since the nineteenth century, there has been a return to Aristotelianism in philosophy, Newman anticipated this interest without being influenced by Neo-Scholasticism. He was no Thomist and was received into the Catholic Church before the great Thomist revival of the nineteenth century began. He elaborated autonomously his own particular reading of the Greek philosopher, complaining that “we live in an age of the world when the career of science and literature is little affected by what was done, or would have been done, by this venerable authority.”1 He was not Aristotelian in theology; in fact the Greek Fathers that Newman studied and translated in his youth were anti-Aristotelian, inclined instead towards Platonism.2 Idea, p. 55. See Louis Dupré, ‘Newman and the Neoplatonic Tradition in England’ in Terrence Merrigan and Ian Ker (ed.), Newman and the Word (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), pp. 137-154. 1 2

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Newman did not follow him in the division of the intellectual virtues or of the different aspects of the soul, he is not particularly interested in the Metaphysics or in his Physics. He calls on the Aristotle of the Ethics, especially the first books, rather than of the Organon, borrowing his ideas of liberal education, of perfection of intellectual virtues, of the unity of knowledge. I believe that in the philosophical reflection of Newman the Dublin Writings represent a step, an incomplete stage. In questioning the sense of knowledge Newman touches some issues that will find a comprehensive treatment only late in his life with the Grammar of Assent, his philosophical masterpiece with a strong Aristotelian bent.3 These aspects are the relationship and the integration between scientific and religious rationality and the role of practical reasoning in the establishment of our beliefs. In particular, Newman’s conception of the ‘philosophical habit of mind’ is deeply Aristotelian. As I have tried to demonstrate, philosophy in Newman is not a discipline, it is an attitude. Newman was not concerned with the establishment of an additional philosophy course or department, but with its cultivation in every area of study. That the spirit which should animate a whole institution is also a subject taught in it is a paradox already discussed at the end of eighteenth century by Kant and Shelling. Jacques Derrida, writes: That the essence of the university, namely philosophy, should also occupy a particular place and a faculty within the university topology, or that philosophy in and of itself should represent a special competence – this poses a serious problem. It did not escape Schelling, for example, who objected to Kant about it in one of his Vorlesungen ueber die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1802). According to him, there cannot be a particular faculty (or, therefore, power, Macht) for philosophy: ‘Something which is everything cannot, for that very reason, be anything in particular.” It is a paradox of this university topology that the 3 See Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground (London and Notre Dame, 1993).

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faculty bearing within itself the theoretical concept of the totality of university space should be assigned to a particular residence, and should be subject, within the same space, to the political authority of other faculties and the government they represent.4

Philosophy, in the Dublin Writings, is not an academic discipline that would supervene on the others from some privileged point of view. Rather, it is a virtue; it is a name for the excellence of our intellectual abilities.5 The realm of this philosophical habit of mind is every discipline. I tried to show its role in the study of the Classics and in translation, which are learned not only for their utility, as held by John Locke, but for the enlargement of our minds. This particular interest falsifies the common interpretation among scholars of the relationship between modern universities and national states. If literature plays a role of a national unification in nineteenth century universities, it is not so much the case in Newman’s university, a transnational one, where literature and languages have a formative function; they are an exercise of sophistication, clear thinking, and a disciplined mind. Moreover, it is through the exercise of this philosophical habit of mind that we enter into civilisation. The unity of knowledge, in my opinion, can be pursued only in the direction traced by Newman, as a personal and collective search for the sense of the human intellectual dimension. Understanding is more than a method, it is a habit of mind. Newman’s conception of philosophy opens up a dimension that is not just one among other fields of inquiry, but rather constitutes Derrida, op. cit., p. 25. “The phrase ‘a philosophical habit of mind’ describes what Newman had originally struggled to name, a ‘perfection or virtue of the intellect,’ which he first called simply ‘philosophy.’ So philosophy is not just a science, but a virtue, and this in the specifically Aristotelian sense of an acquired capacity or ‘habit.’” Joshua P. Hochschild, ‘The Re-imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman’, Modern Age, Fall 2003. 4 5

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the necessary reflection common to all of them. Newman does not limit himself to a theory of knowledge which, in the name of methodological rigour, robs us of certain experiences of other fields, other expressions, other texts and their claim to validity. Instead, in many senses, Newman anticipates the critics of reductionism when he maintains that there is not one single method valid for every discipline, but their mutual concurrence is needed to achieve the universal knowledge. Against Utilitarians and Reductionists, Newman not only recognises the dignity and legitimacy of all disciplines—and also of other forms of wisdom—but in the name of the unity of the intellectual experience he claims on one hand their distinction, and on the other hand their convergence. This convergence is needed in order to light and orientate the subject in the formulation of his judgment and choices, particularly when they have an existential character. Newman provides an answer to the mounting intrusion of modernity in the mechanisms of production and control of knowledge—mechanisms expressed in his times through the requirement of updating curricula and the introduction of new disciplines—through a revisiting and re-appropriation of an ideal. His liberal education is centred on the notion that the individual person ought to be the focus of attention, and that the overriding aim of education should be to foster the person’s potentiality. In re-reading the classical ideal he re-formulates and re-constructs it. He re-thinks this archetype in the Idea of a University, he envisages it through the different Reports on the Organization of the Catholic University of Ireland, he narrates it from an historical point of view in Rise and Progress of Universities, he makes it real through the experience of the Catholic University of Ireland, he provides an updated chronicle of it in the Catholic University Gazette, he gives it in an architectonical form in the University Church.6 The Dublin Writings must be 6

John Henry Newman, Letters and Diaries, vol. XVI, p. 308, note 5.

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understood as rhetorical, in the sense not only that they articulate a rhetoric of education, but that they exemplify one as well. With what outcomes? I believe that scholars have not considered fully the outcomes of this experience and its failing character. Maskell and Robinson noted that “[t]he university has been remade not in defiance of Newman but in indifference to him. But he says things that, if anybody paid attention to them, could not fail to kill instantly our new orthodoxy about the universities making us rich”.7 The Newman and Cullen university was in many senses a failure, but his Dublin Writings are a work of a genius. His concern for the partiality of sciences is a specification of the more general philosophical problem regarding the partial nature of all finite understanding. We have to accept the necessarily fallible and limited character of every human project, while at the same time we are called to develop its potential. What is left of his idea of the human person is not only its theory but its necessity. Newman teaches us that truth and sense can only be found in the wholeness, but also that the unity of knowledge is a collective and fallible task. To accept our limits, and also our failures, does not mean to be condemned to ineptitude and scepticism, but rather that we always need to be open to truth, in any new form.

7

Maskell and Robinson, The New Idea of a University (London, 2001), p. 25.

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(B) Works on Newman’s Philosophy Books Allington, Nigel and O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas Light, Liberty and Learning: The Idea of a University Revisited. Warlingham: Warlingham Park School, 1992. Allsopp, Michael and Burke, Ronald (ed.) John Henry Newman Theology and Reform. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1992. Brown, David (ed.) Newman. A Man for Our Time. London: SPCK, 1990. Callegari, Lina Newman, La fede e le sue ragioni. Milan: Paoline, 2001. Carr, Thomas K., Newman and Gadamer Towards a Hermeneutics of Religious Knowledge. Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1996. Casey, Gerard Natural Reason: a Study of the Notions of Inference, Assent, Intuition, and First Principles in the Philosophy of John Henry Cardinal Newman. New York: Peter Lang, 1984. Coreth Emerich, Neidl Walter and Pfligersdorffer Georg Christliche Philosophie im katholishen Denken de 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts. Graz: Verlag Styria, 1987. Delaura, David J. Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England: Newman, Arnold, and Pater. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969. Dessain, Charles S. John Henry Newman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Dunne, Joseph, Back to the Rough Ground: ‘phronesis’ and ‘techne’ in modern philosophy and in Aristotle. London and Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1993. Ferreira, M. Jamie Scepticism and Reasonable Doubt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Gauri, Viswanathan Outside the Fold. Conversion, Modernity and Belief. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

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Hollis, Christopher Newman and the Modern World. London: Hollis & Carter, 1967. Holloway, John The Victorian Sage: studies in argument. London: Archon Books, 1962. Jost, Walter Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1989. Ker, Ian John Henry Newman. A Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Ker, Ian and Hill A. G. (ed.) Newman after a Hundred Years. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. MacIntyre, Alasdair God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009. Magill, Gerard (ed.) Discourse and Context. An Interdisciplinary Study of John Henry Newman. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993. Martin, Brian John Henry Newman His Life and Work. London: Chatto and Windus, 1982. Norris, Thomas J. Only Life Gives Life. Dublin: The Columba Press, 1996.

Articles Artz, Johannes “Newman as a Philosopher”, International Philosophical Quarterly, n. 16 (1976), pp. 263-287. Blehl, Vincent F. “The intellectual and spiritual Influence of J. H. Newman”, The Downside Review, n. 111-112 (1993), pp. 251-257. Corbett, Edward P. J. “Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry Newman”, College Composition and Communication, n. 31, pp. 402-411. Louis, Dupré “Newman and the Neoplatonic Tradition in England,” in Terrence Merrigan and Ian Ker (ed.), Newman and the Word. (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), pp. 137-154. Crosby, John F. “Newman on the Personal”, First Things, n. 125 (2002), pp. 43-49. Fenlon, Dermot “The ‘Aristocracy of Talent’ and the ‘Mistery’ of Newman”, Louvain Studies, n.15 (1990), pp. 203-225.

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Hochschild, Joshua P. “The Re-imagined Aristotelianism of John Henry Newman”, Modern Age, Fall 2003, pp. 333-342. Holmes, Derek ”J. H. Newman: History, Liberalism and the Dogmatic Principle”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. XXIII (1974), pp. 86-106. Hummel, T. “John Henry Newman and the Oriel Noetics”, Anglican Theological Review, n. 74 (1992), pp. 203-215. Iglesias, Teresa “Newman on Conscience and Our Culture”, Milltown Studies, n. 49 (Summer 2002), pp. 19-49. Kenny, Anthony “Newman as a Philosopher of Religion” in David Brown (ed.) Newman. A Man for Our Time, Londra, SPCK, 1990. Ker, Ian ”Newman’s Standing as a Philosopher”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 78 (2005), pp. 71-81. Merrigan, Terence “Newman the Theologian”, Louvain Studies, Vol. 15 n. 2-3 (1990), pp. 103-118. Merrigan, Terence “Newman’s Oriel Experience: its Significance for his Life and Thought”, Bijdragen, n. 47 (1986), pp. 192-211. Naulty, Robert A. “Newman on Conscience”, Sophia, n. 27 (1988), pp. 26-30. Newman, Jay “Cardinal Newman’s Attack on Philosophers”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. L (1976), pp. 196-207. Penaskovic, R. “The Influence of Saint Augustine on J. H. Newman”, Louvain Studies, n. 9 (1982-83), pp. 353-362. Wicker, B. “Newman and Logic”, Newman Studien, vol. V (1962), pp. 251-268. Willians, I. “Faith and Scepticism: Newman and the Naturalist Tradition”, Philosophical Investigation, n. 15 (1992), pp. 51-66.

(C) Other Works Books Aristotle, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, Politics and Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford translation, edited by J. Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

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Balibar, Étienne We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Chappell, Vere The Cambridge Companion to Locke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Chartae et Statuta Collegii Sacrosanctae et Individuae Trinitatis Reginae Elizabethae juxta Dublin. Dublin, 1844. Decreta Synodi Planariae Episcoporum Hiberniae apud Thurles habitae anno. MDCCCL Dublin, 1851 Del Noce, Augusto Il Suicidio della Rivoluzione. Milan: Rizzoli, 1978. Docherty, Thomas Criticism and Modernity: Aesthetics, Literature and Nations in Europe and its Academies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Dyck, Andrew R. A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. Fabro, Cornelio Introduzione all’ateismo moderno. Rome: Studium, 1969. Ferry Luc, Renault Alain, Pesron Jean-Pierre (ed.), Philosophies de l’université. L’idéalisme allemand et la question de l’université. Paris: Payot, 1979. Graff, Gerald Behind the Culture Wars: how teaching can revitalize American education. London and New York: Norton, 1992. Gusdorf, Georges Les origines de l’herméneutique. Paris: Payot, 1988. Johnson, Samuel A Dictionary of the English Language. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1827. Kearney, Richard The Wake of Imagination. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Kirk, Russell The Conservative Mind: from Burke to Eliot. Chicago: Regnery Books, 1986. Lear, Jonathan Aristotle: the Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited with a foreword by Pater H. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Locke, John The Educational Writings of John Locke. A critical edition with introduction and notes by James L. Axtell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Locke, John Essays on the Law of Nature. The Latin text, with a translation, introduction and note, together with transcripts of Locke’s shorthand in his journal for 1676. Edited by W. von Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.

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Locke, John Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Abridged and edited with an introduction and commentary by F. W. Garforth. London: Heinemann, 1969. Locke, John Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Edited with introduction, notes, and critical apparatus by John W. and Jean S. Yolton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Lord, Carnes Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992. Lyotard, Jean-Francois The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. Macaulay, Thomas Babington Critical, Historical and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems. (New York: Lovell, Coryell and Company, n. d.) MacIntyre, Alasdair Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition. London: Duckworth, 1990. Maskell, Duke and Robinson, Ian The New Idea of a University. London: Haven, 2001. Matthew, Arnold On Translating Homer. Oxford, 1861. McKeon, Richard Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery. Edited with an Introduction by Mark Backman. Woodbridge: OX Bow Press, 1987. Minogue, Kenneth R. The Concept of a University. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2005. Newman, Francis W. Homeric Translation in Theory and Practice. Oxford, 1861. Pozzo, Riccardo (ed.) The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy. Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Rachels, James Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997. Rand, Bernard The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900. Rand, Richard A. (ed.) Logomachia The Conflict of The Faculties. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1992. Reader, William Joseph Professional Men: the Rise of the Professional Classes in Nineteenth-century England. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966. Readings, Bill The University in Ruins. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

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Articles Aldrich, Richard “John Locke”, Prospects, vol. 24, no. 1/2 1994. Anscombe, Elizabeth “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy, n. 33 (1958), pp. 1-19. Barry, William “John Henry Newman” in The Catholic Encyclopaedia, (Robert Appleton Company, 1911), vol. X, pp. 794-800. Brady, Michelle E. “The Nature of Virtue in a Politics of Consent: John Locke on Education”, International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 45 n. 2, pp. 157-173. Carrig, Joseph “Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: the Assent to Locke”, The Review of Politics, n. 63 (2001), pp 41-76. Crittenden, P. J. “Thoughts about Locke’s Thoughts about Education”, Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 15 n.2 (1981), pp. 149-160. “Death of Cardinal Newman”, Times, 12 August 1890. Forde, Steven “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, n. 2 (April 2001), pp. 396409. Hittinger, John P. “Why Locke Rejected an Ethics of Virtue and Turned to an Ethics of Utility”, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. LXIV (1990), pp. 269-270.

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Index of Names

Acheron 65 Achilli, Giacinto 25, 34, 51 Agathon 74 Aldrich, Richard 105 Allies, Thomas William 36, 212 Anastasius Sinaita (saint) 74 Anscombe, Elizabeth 159 Aquinas, Thomas (saint) 73 Aristotle 73-89, 92-98, 102, 107, 108, 111, 112, 156, 159, 177 Arnold, Matthew 122 Axtell, James L. 107 Backman, Mark 152 Bacon, Francis 66, 136, 176 Balibar, Étienne 215 Barker, Edmund Henry 89 Barr, Colin 14, 17, 34, 52, 209 Barry, William 60 Basil (saint) 189 Baur, Michael 141, 145, 150 Begley, Ronald B. 183, 184 Benedict (saint) 49, 50 Bentham, Jeremy 135 Boniface (saint) 73 Brady, Michelle 108-112 Brougham, Henry Peter 101, 135, 157, 177

Brutus 101, 190 Butcher, Samuel Henry 61 Caesar (emperor) 190 Calderon de la Barca, Pedro 49, 127 Callegari, Lina 27, 135 Carey Moraunt (countess of Peterborough) 107 Charles I (king) 17 Carr, Thomas K. 149 Carrig, Joseph 108-111, 118 Cato 89, 100, 101, 102, 104, 135, 190 Cicero 14, 15, 76, 77, 89-107, 124, 135, 185, 188, 190, 194 Clarke, Edward 105 Comte, Auguste 148 Cooper, Anthony Ashley. See Shaftesbury 114 Copleston, Edward 133, 199 Corbett, Edward P. J. 62 Crolly, William 19, 21 Cullen, Paul 14, 17, 21-24, 33-35, 52, 56, 176, 209, 229 Culler, A. Dwight 35, 36, 53, 58, 61, 62, 87, 93, 148, 170, 176, 179, 183, 184, 188, 209

247

INDEX OF NAMES

D’Yzalguier, Eugène 73 Davison, John 133 Del Noce, Augusto 166 Denvir, Cornelius 22 Derrida, Jacques 206, 207, 216, 226, 227 Dindorf, Karl Wilhelm 74 Docherty, Thomas 31, 125, 199, 200, 201, 208, 209, 211, 215, Dominic (saint) 50 Duffy, James 33 Dunne, Dick 9 Dunne, Joseph 226 Dupré, Luis 225 Dyck, Andrew R. 94-96, 98 Ellis, Andrew 40 Etzkowitz, Henry 205, 207 Ferreira, Jamie 62 Ferry, Luc 131 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 131 Forde, Steve 115 Forrester, James 183 Forte, Bruno 10 Francis de Sales (saint) 189 Froude, Hurrell 53 Froude, William 152 Gadamer, Hans Georg 149 Germer-Durand, Eugène 73 Gibbon, Edward 38, 103, 188, 189 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 188 Gordon, Joseph John 25 Graff, Gerald 221 Graham, Gordon 205, 218

Graham, James 19 Gregory of Cappadocia 74 Gregory XIV (pope) 20 Grotius, Hugo 107 Gusdorf, Georges 149 Harrold, Charles Frederick 185 Heft, James L. 187 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 130, 131, 148 Hergenroether, Josef 127 Hesiod 91 Higginbotham, John 96 Hittinger, John P. 112, 115 Hochschild, Joshua P. 59, 227 Holmes, J. Derek 59, 135 Homer 99, 122, 171 Hula, Kevin W. 215 Humboldt, Wilhelm von 131, 134, 207, 208 Hutcheson, Francis 208 Iglesias, Teresa 9, 162 Ignatius (saint) 50 Jakobson, Roman 123 Johnson, Samuel 124 Jost, Walter 62, 76, 77, 152, 153, 184 Julian the Apostate (emperor) 164, 189 Jupiter 188 Kant, Immanuel 147, 206, 226 Kearney, Richard 169 Keble, John 152 Ker, Ian 12, 13, 29, 82, 173, 183, 225 Kinsey, W. Morgan 61 Knight, Richard Payne 157

248 la Page Renuof, Peter 127 Labriola, Antonio 134 Leahy, Patrick 55 Levine, Arthur 205, 206 Leydesdorff, Loet 206 Locke, John 14, 15, 30, 31, 102-122, 126, 128, 157, 158, 202, 227 Lowde, James 114 Lyotard, Jean-Francois 154 Lyttelton, George 91 Macaulay, Thomas Babington 176 MacHale, John 18-20, 24, 33, 34, 52 MacIntyre, Alasdair 72, 221 Malthus, Thomas 132 Marani, Augusto Cesare 127 Marcus (Cicero the Younger) 99 Martin, Ben R. 205, 207 Maskell, Duke 229 McCarthy, Denis Florence 37, 49, 127 McCartney, Donal 51 McGrath, Fergal 13, 14, 17, 21, 23-26, 28, 36, 37, 41, 42, 48-50, 52, 59, 89, 132, 133, 212 McKeon, Richard 152 Menander 91 Merrigan, Terence 225 Meyer, Martin 206 Miller, Walter 96 Milton, John 38 Moelher, Johann 127 Monsell, William 62 Moriarty, David 39, 177 Mozley, Anne 60

INDEX OF NAMES

Mozley, Thomas 60 Murray, Daniel 18, 19, 22, 24, 33 Murray, Placid 173 Neri, Philip (saint) 183 Neville, William 54-56 Newman, Francis 9-18, 24-107, 116, 117-130, 133-229 Nicomachus 66 Norris, Thomas Joseph 10, 135 O’Curry, Eugene 57 O’Donnell, Laurence 22 O’Hagan, John 132 O’Loughlin, Thomas O’Reilly Myles W. 55 Ornsby, Robert 43, 44, 56, 213 Panaetius 94, 95 Pascal, Blaise 66 Pattison, Mark 61 Peel, Robert 19, 101, 135, 175, 176 Pelikan, Jaroslav 127, 128, 200, 202, 211, 217, 219, 223 Pesron, Jean-Pierre 131 Peter of Poitiers (saint) 95 Pius IX (pope) 20, 23, 34, 57 Plato 73, 74, 77, 92, 94, 191, 225 Playfair, John 157 Pole, Reginald (cardinal) 189 Pufendorf, Samuel von 107 Quintillian 184 Rachels, James 162 Rand, Benjamin 114 Rand, Richard A. 206

249

INDEX OF NAMES

Readings, Bill 199, 207, 208, 211, 215, 218 Reid, Thomas 62 Renan, Ernest 134 Renault, Alain 131 Ricardo, David 132 Ricoeur, Paul 149 Rigobello, Armando 134 Robertson, James Burton 127 Robinson, Ian 229 Rosmini, Antonio 148 Rosner, Mary 90 Rous-Lavergne, Pierre Célestine 73 Russell, John 18 Schelling, Friedrich 131, 226 Schlegel, Friedrich von 127 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 131 Scratton, Thomas 33, 36, 37, 40-42 Seneca 101, 190 Senior, Nassau William 86 Shaftesbury 31, 104, 114, 117, 164, 189 Sillem, Edward J. 60, 63, 72, 89 Slattery, Michael 20, 24 Smith, Adam 132 Smith, Sydney 157 St John, Ambrose 25, 50

Sterne, Laurence 123 Svaglic, Martin 77 Terence 91 Tertullian 74 Theocritus 91 Tierney, Michael 127 Tillman, Mary Katherine 11, 13, 45, 46, 171, 172, 183 Tillotson, Geoffrey 61 Tully, James 107, 114, Turner, Frank 61 Venuti, Lawrence 122 Vico, Giovambattista 125 Virgil 65, 66, 91 Viswanathan, Gauri 215 Vives, Juan Luis 153 Von Leyden, Wolfgang 115, 116 Whately, Richard 60, 62, 63, 152, 153 Wilberforce, Henry 26, 43 Wood, W. Jay 160 Wright, Laurence 187 Yolton, John W. 106, 109, 110, 122 Young, Robert 206

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