Philosophers Speak of God

Table of contents :
Prologue: Deity as Inclusive Process and Tragic Ij)ve
Preface
Acknowledgments
Table of Contents
Introduction: The Standpoint of Panentheism
Chapter I: Ancient or Quasi-Panentheism An Enunciation of Themes
LAO-TSE (Fourth Century [P] b.c.)
THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES (Fifth [?] Century b.c. to Second Century a.d.)
PLATO (ca. 427-cu. 347 b.c.)
Chapter II: Aristotelian Theism
Chapter III: Classical Theis?n
hereafter be endowed, and altogether *e °n’ P ,. ,
he foreknows all their actions and pas- boundary of happinas, partabngof sjons nothing else by which he can be ren-
things, a
AUGUSTINE (354—430): GOD AND TIME
ANSELM (1033-1109): GOD AS ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
AL-GHAZZALI (1058-1111): MOHAMMEDAN THEISM
MAIMON1DES (1135-1204)
AQUINAS (1225?-74?)
DESCARTES (1596-1650)
LEIBNIZ (1646-1716)
KANT (1724-1804)
CHANNING (1780-1842)
VON HOGEL (1852-1925)
: GOD AND SUFFERING
«* %z%
Chapter IV: Classical Pantheism
SANKARA (ca. 788-820)
RAMANUJA (c«. 1016-1100)
SPINOZA
ROYCE (if
.98
JEFFERS (1887 ): TRAGIC PANTHEISM
Chapter V: Emanation,sm or Exclusive Monism PLOTINUS (ca. 205—70)
Chapter VI: Temporalistic Theism
LEQUIER (1814—62)
Chapter VII: Modem Panentheism
SCHELLING (1775-1854)
FECHNER
PEIRCE ^F'«do,n
ciridim of- 4]A gt
mewphy"^*’ 477
.“"’'"ring,,28

Citation preview

Philosophers Speak of God By

Hartshorne Charles Hartshornc and 1111d

William L. Reese

Philosophers Speak of God

T h e U niversity of C hicago P ress • C hicago 37

Cambridge University Press, London, N.W. 1, England Copyright 19S3 by The University of Chicago. All righti reserved. Copyright 19f 3 under the International Copyright Union Published 19S3. Composed and primed by T he U niversity o r C hicago P ress , Chicago, Illinois, US.A.

Prologue: D eity as Inclusive Process and Tragic Ij)ve perfect in his Love and has no room to I. MAHANAM BRATA grow, but it is a mystery that he grows BRAHMACHARI For Sankara there is only one truth, without cessation. In this process of and that is the Absolute.. . . It is neither never ending augmentation all the val­ creator, nor preserver, nor savior, nor ues of joyful delight that are realized providence. For all these expressions remain conserved with Him for all time. [Doctoral thesis, "The Philosophy of Sri presuppose relation, and the Absolute Jiva Goswami (Vaisnava Vedanta of the Ben­ is beyond relations. The realm of rela­ gal School)” (Swift Hall Library, University tion is the realm of phenomena for of Chicago, 1937) .1 Sankara, and hence theology belongs to II. A. N . W H ITEH EA D the phenomenal world. . . . W hen the Absolute limits itself, it becomes God. All realization is finite, and there is Different, however, is the view of no perfection which is the infinitude of Ramanuja , and very , different is that of all perfections. Perfections of divers Sri Jiva. For Ramanuja, the Absolute itare among themselves discordself is a personality-----He is the Provi- ant dcncc and the Lord----- Sankara places This principle of intrinsic incompatiGod below the Absolute and prefers to bility has an important bearing upon call him the lower Brahman. Ramanuja Gur conception of the nature of God. makes them identical and puts them on ^ conccrpt of impossibility such that the same throne. . .. Sn Jiva places God God himserlf casm^ t surmount it, has above and beyond the Absolute. This been for centuries quite familiar to perhaps appears illogical. H ow can there theologians. . . . But curiously enough, be anything beyond the Absolute? so far as I know, this notion of incomFor Sn Jiva . - the Absolute Being patibility has never been applied to is all-existence, all-knowledge, and all- ^ ' the Divine ieaiiu t i ^ We jov. S n Jiva can express it in one word. must conceive ^ Divine ^ ^ T he Absolute ReaGty is love. It is dus active entertainment of all ideals, with nature of the Absolute that accounts for the to their finite realization, each its unceasing expressiveness. T he nature in its §ue season. a process must of perfect Love is to overflow. So far ^ inherent in G od.s wherebv as the Absolute is a perfect Being, it is his infinity u acquiring realization. ' steady c a K and immutable, but so [AdvJ ir„ of ’ „ „ .nd J57.l far as the outburst of Love is concerned, rr it is a mobile, flexible, and dynamic subThe ascription of mere happiness, and stance. Due to perfect integrity, the of arbitrary pow er to die nature of G od Absolute is a Being, and due to in- is a profanation. This nature . . . redomitable impetus for expressiveness, it ceives into its unity the scattered effccis a Becoming. Since it is a Becoming, tiveness of realized activities, trans­ it has a “life” and a “history.” . . . Be- formed by the supremacy of its own cause of the exuberance of fulness, the ideals. T h e result is Tragedy, Sympermanent being becomes fluent. pathy, and the Happiness evoked by acKrisnadas, a contem porary follower tualized heroism, of Sri Jiva, w rites that G od is full and O f course w e are unable to conceive

PROLOGUE

the experience of the Supreme Unity of Existence. Bur these are the human terms in which we can glimpse the ori­ gin of that drive towards limited ideals of perfection which haunts the Uni­ verse. This immortality of the W orld of Action, derived from its transforma­ tion in G od’s nature, is beyond our imagination to conceive. The various attempts at description arc often shock­ ing and profane. \Vhat does haunt our imagination is that the immediate facts of present action pass into permanent significance for the Universe. The in­ sistent notion of Right and Wrong, Achievement and Failure, depends upon this background. Otherwise every activity is merely a passing whiff of in­ significance. [The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitebead, ed. P. A. Schilpp, pp. 697-98.)

God suffers in it roo. God shares his creatures’ destiny. [T he Destiny o f Man, pp. 41 42 and 40.)

IV. S0R1.N KIERKEGAARD The minds of men so often yearn for might and power, and their thoughts are constantly being drawn to such things, as if by their attainment all mysteries would be resolved. Hence they do not even dream that there is sorrow in heaven as well as joy. . . . The learner is in error, and that by reason of his own guilt. . . . Men some­ times think that this might be a matter of indifference to God, since he does not stand in need of the learner. But in this we forget . . . that God loves the learner. Ana just as that kingly grief of which we have spoken can be found only in a kingly soul, and is not even named in the language of the multitude III. NICOLAS BERDYAEV of men, so the entire human language [There is a] continuation by man of is so selfish that it refuses even to sus­ the creation of the world . . . man, who pect the existence of such a grief. But is able to enrich the very divine life for that reason G od has reserved it to himself, this unfathomable grief: to itself. . . . know that he may repel the learner . . . [The Russian Idea, p. 24).] that the learner has brought destruction Is all tragedy that of fate, or is a upon himself. Christian tragedy possible? Traditional [Philosophical Fragments, pp. 23 and 21.] theology is afraid of the very idea of it, though it is curious that the religion of V. G . T . FE C H N E R the Cross should deny tragedy. . . . Is not that the best G od for us who Christianity reveals freedom which is bears within himself our good fortune the prim ary source of tragedy. . . . and misfortune? . . . W h a t would he Tragedy . . . need not necessarily be a be if he looked upon our misery merely conflict between good and evil, the from the outside, as we look upon the divine and the diabolical.. . . T he most misery of a beggar in rags to whom we tragic situations in life are conflicts be­ throw a penny? . . . G od does not view tw een values which are equally noble your pain m erely from the outside, but and lofty. And this implies that tragedy he feds it along w ith you yourself . . . exists within the Divine life itself. and is kept incessantly busy effecting . . . W e can only reconcile ourselves the removal o f evil. to the tragedy of the world because [Zend-Avesta, p. 249.]

Preface This work aims to present—by sclec- ment of such objections as the editors tions from some fifty writers ranging in deem valid. Thus selections expressing time and space from I .ao-tse, Plato, and the classical conceptions are first preSankara to Whitehead, Rcrdvaev, and sented; the student is given opportunity Radhakrishnan-the chief philosophical to see the various views positively and conceptions of deity. It also aims to aid from the iasidc, and yet he is not left readers in estimating the validity of without help in the task of comparative these conceptions. The work is thus two evaluation. In the general Introduction things: ( I ) a book of readings in philo- an argument is outlined for the supesophical rheology-thc first of its kind- riority of one of the main types of conand (2) a systematic analysis and eval- ception, which we term “panentheism” uation of theistic (and atheistic) ideas, or “surrclativism." Its chief recent rep1. There are anthologies of philos- resentative among philosophers is ophy, and of religious writings or sa- Whitehead, but we trace it back to crea scriptures, but not of philosophical Plato, Ramanuja, and Schelling; and treatments of the central religious idea, something like it can be found in most O ut of the vast array of writings by of the outstanding theologians of rephilosophers dealing with the nature cent times—Berdyaev, Nygren, Nie•nd existence of Cod, sample texts buhr, and even, to a lesser extent, Barth, (some of them not elsewhere available The book is designed partly as a hisin Fnglish) have been chosen, repre- torico-systematic argument pointing to scniing the principal concepts of deity a definite conclusion. which a new analytic classification Thus this volume Ls, we think, unique shows to be logically possible. By this in two respects: in the adequacy with means the material is reduced to man- which man’s efforts to think rationally, ageable proportions, and yet no major or with intellectual responsibility, about concept is omitted. The coverage is deity arc covered through samplings of thus relatively objective; passages arc the great texts, old and new; and in the included not merely because the editors evaluation of this historical panorama agree with them, or like them, but be- from the standpoint of certain prevacause, taken together, they acquaint the lent views in current metaphysics and student with the totality of views philosophy of religion which have not among which, or something like them, yet had time to embody themselves anyone seeking a philosophical solution very extensively in historical and scholof the religious problem must decide, arly surveys. Highly skeptical or atheistic views are W hat is the use of such an undcrakalso included. ing? 2. T he classification of doctrines emT he quantity of works in which ployed is shown to have historical as great philosophic minds have set down well as systematic significance and is thoughts about deity is so vast, and made the key to an interpretation of these works are w ritten in so many lanthe meaning of the historical develop- guages, from so many pointB of view, ment. Each selection is prefaced by a and at so many periods o f time, that a sympathetic introduction from which student going into a library to look criticism has been largely excluded; but into the m atter for himself, to ascertain it is followed in most cases by a critical what great intellects have actually dona com m entary devoted to the /rank state- w ith this problem, confronts an over-

P R E K A C: K

whelming task. As a rcsulr he usually contents himself with a few samples, chosen either at random or according to the religious and philosophical convic­ tions or interests of himself or his teacher or adviser. This has two disad­ vantages. First, he does nor discover the full range of alternatives which the roil of generations over the civilized world liequeaths ro us for our acceptance or rejection. This range of alternatives, however, is precisely our chief heritage in this matter. For if we could leam what c m be believed, and for what reasons or upon what arguments, and still be unable to determine what is true, then the task of religious philosophy must for us be entirely hopeless. For we would have been furnished with every philosophical resource, save that which only we ourselves can provide, namely, our own judgment. But every­ one who has had philosophical experi­ ence knows that to attempt to think out for one’s self, without help from one’s ancestors, the range of possible doctrines is hardly a feasible enterprise. The second disadvantage of the usual procedure is that the possibilities which random or prejudiced sampling of the literature will be apt to miss are likely to be important. This is a subject in which strong prejudices have nearly al­ ways been operative. The histories and comparative studies have been written with a good deal of bias. Authors of various “orthodox” allegiances, and this includes multitudes o f very learned men, have done what they could to make certain posibilitics for thought ap­ pear to be the possibilities. N o t that they have done anything so crude as to limit the possibib'ties ro their own ten­ ets. This would have been too manifest­ ly illegitimate and would not have satisfied their own or anyone’s con­ science. T h ey have done something m ore subtle and insidious. N o t only is it usual to limit the inquiry almost entire­ ly to ou r W estern culture, and indeed

(especially among Furopcan scholars) sometimes largely to one’s own coun­ try, but there is the even worse tenden­ cy to set up artificially limited options such as theism and pantheism, or infinite God and finite God, or immutable and mutable G od—and many more. In cvcrv such case, analysis discloses that one mav believe in God while being about equally far from (or near to) the posi­ tions mentioned, as customarily con­ strued. God may, in some aspect, be in­ finite and, in some other aspect, finite, and the same holds with respect to the predicate “mutable” or the pantheistic predicate “coextensive with reality,” or “includes all things within his own be­ ing.” In all intellectual fields one meets the phenomenon of half-truths con­ fronting one another, agreeing only in this: that all alike deny the whole truth, which is more subtle and manv-sided than any one of them alone. W hen something like the whole truth is ex­ pressed, the half-truth addicts pounce upon it almost as one man with charges of compromise, evasion, or confusion. It lacks the sort of dramatic trenchancy which men so love to defend—and attack. T he obstacles to fair sampling of the history of thought which have just been outlined are inherent in the problem, and we can claim no immunity. But we have at least reflected upon these obstacles and have, we trust, overcome them sufficiently to render this work a uniquely comprehensive book of theistic meditation. W e have, it is true, at­ tem pted no posture of impartiality as between various doctrines. Such a pos­ ture tends to be either an affectation or a confession of incompetence. O n the one hand, if we, surveying for many years the history of theisric specula­ tions, w ere able to draw no conclusion for ourselves, how could we ask stu­ dents to do so? And if nothing fol­ lowed from the study to which w e in­ vite them, w hy should they undertake

PREFACE

it? On the other hand, if we have translated some twenty pages of it. The drawn conclusions hut conceal them, it Nietzsche, Zeller, ana portions of the of course would follow, not so much Kant translations are also our own; that the student would he spared expo- while the passages from Lequier and sure to their influence, as that he would Pflcidcrer, and the admirable Fock undergo this influence without warning paraphrases of Socinus, arc here, so far as to its character. W e propose through as we know, presented for the first time our Introduction to give luin fair notice in English. of the “bias" of this work. There is no simple xvay of describing In the choice of selections our the division of labor between the two guiding idea has been that we wish to author-editors. Every chapter and alexhibit the whole outline of what men most every main aspect of the book have thought-in a philosophically dis- contains the work of both. Chapters ii ciplincd w ay-about the central rcli- and viii-x were primarily Mr. Reese’s gious problem. W e have also given responsibility. The prefatory notes and weight to the testimony of scholars commentaries concerning Plato (chap, with whose philosophical or religious i), Peirce, W atts (chap, vii), Brightman creeds we disagree concerning the rela- (chap, viii), Alexander, Berman, Ames, rive importance of various thinkers. W e Cattell (chap, ix), and Nietzsche (chap, have included, as recognized spokesmen xiii) are almost entirely of his authorof groups whom we have not the right ship as are also considerable portions of to ignore, Aquinas, Maimonidcs, and the discussions of Aristotle (chap, ii), Sankara. But we have also insisted upon Philo (chap, iii), Plotinus (chap, iv), a hearing for manv thinkers, especially Fcchner, Weiss (chap, vii), James, of the last hundred and fifty years, who Ehrenfels (chap, viii), and certain addiliavc not wholly identified themselves rional prefatory notes as that for W iewith any great religious body of doc- man (chap. x). Mr. Reese, too, in most trine, but whose intellectual abilities of these and some other cases largely are to be taken seriously, and who seem selected the passages and throughout the to us to have contributed penetrating book performed much of the editorial analyses not simply duplicating earlier detail work. Mr. Hartshome wrote the ones and to have achieved positive in- general Introduction and a majority of sights, partly through their comparative the commentaries and prefatory notes, freedom with respect to bodies of reli- The translation of Fechner was first gious doctrine. Such are Schelling, made by Mr. Reese but was revised Fechner, and, in a very different vein, jointly. T he plan of the book grew out Feuerbach. N o doubt glaring omissions, of discussions between us, ana without not justified by any principle, and du­ intensive joint effort neither it nor any­ bious inclusions coula with plausibility thing much like it could have been con­ be charged against us. T he literature is ceived or executed. vast. Since the book is too long for thor­ W ith some exceptions we have felt ough study in a single course (unless compelled to rely upon existing trans­ continued for a whole year), teachers lations of non-Enghsh sources. Fcch- assigning it will doubtless wish to select ner’s great chapter xi of his Zend- certain parts for emphasis. F or instance, Avesta, only three pages of which have one m ight omit all but one or tw o key previously been rendered into English figures m each of the longer chapters or (in Lowrie’s T he Religion of a Scien­ in P art Three. T h e student would thus tist), seemed to us too valuable and too acquire an outline knowledge of the unjustly neglected to omit; so we have panorama of theistic and antitheisric

PREFACE

doctrines, while also receiving some mentioned of these has been sadly muti­ suggestions at least of how much there lated by the sense-destroying punctua­ remains for him to know. Obviously tion of one of his modern cJitors). In all cases a new section number other plans could be followed. We be­ lieve that the book is sufficiently rich means a new locus in the text. This de­ in the variety and high quality of the vice thus rakes the place, where it included materials to be of permanent occurs, of ellipses indicating omission value to any serious student. He there­ (except where the new passage does fore need not object to the fact that its not begin with the first word of a sen­ scope may' exceed the needs of a single tence) and also facilitates the furnish­ course. The selections should of course ing of references at the ends of selec­ be supplemented, where possible, by tions and in our commentaries. The subheadings employed in the further reading in the works of the au­ thors found most significant With this selections are our own (except where understanding the book offers a design marked by asterisks). Their function is for adult education in the subject, not to suggest some of the principal ideas which the passages chosen seem to us merely a brief initiation into i t In transcribing texts or existing trans­ to express and to compensate so far as ole for the loss of continuity and lations, we have usually adhered to the wording, punctuation, and spelling of ground inevitable in an anthology the authors or translators. Only a few of this type. The subheadings arc almost obvious slips have been corrected. To the only form of editorial interpreta­ modify punctuation in a work such as tion in which we have indulged within this is a complicated and, to judge the series of passages from a given by the disastrous results sometimes author. (In some few cases an explana­ achieved, a hazardous undertaking. In tory word or jphrase has been inserted the case of some authors who wrote the in brackets. W nere previous translators English of an earlier century, but wrote or editors have used this practice, we it wonderfully well, such as Hume or have sometimes, to avoid confusion with George Eliot (Mary Anne Evans, who our own bracketed insertions, reduced so brilliantly and eloquently translated the previous brackets to parentheses— Feuerbach), one hesitates to make any which some of the translators them­ changes (all die more because the first- selves use for editorial inserts.)

C

Acknowledgments XLV1II; Plato, Dialogues (trans. by B. Jowett); Aristotle, Works (trans. by B. Jowett); J. Stenzel, Plato's Method of Dialectic (trans. by D. J. Allan); M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam; Rhys Davids (trans.). The Buddhist Suttas T. k T. Clark, Publishers: M. Buber, 1 and Thou (trans. by R. G. Smith) Librairie Armand Colin: J. Lequier, La Recherche d'une premiere vfriti Columbia University Press. Schelling, Ages of the World (trans. by F. deW. Bolman) Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion: "Paul’ Weiss, “God 'and ~ _J *the *“ World,” in Science, Philosophy, and Religion: A Symposium (1 9 4 1 ) Andrew Dakers, Ltd.: Lao-tse, Tao T l Ching (trans. by H. Ould) E. P. Dutton ft Company: Augustine, Con­ fessions (trans. by E. B. Pusey); F. von Hiigel, Essays and Addresses; Spinoza, Abingdon-Cokesburv Press: E. S. BrightEthics (trans. by A. Boyle) man. The Problem of God George Allen ft Unwin, Ltd.: Leibniz Dr. Mildred Focht: Chr. Ehrenfels, Cos(trans. N____ by_ Bertrand Russell and G. E. mogonie (trans. by M. Focht) Moore), passages cited in The Philos- Walter de Gruyter & Co. (successors to ophy of Leibniz, by B. Russell; B. VaGeorg Reimer Verlag): O. Pfleidercr, risco, Know Thyself (trans. by G. SalGrundriss der christlichen Qlaubensvadori); S. Radhakrishnan, An Idealist J*hre View of Life Harper ft Brothers: L. Berman, Behind the American Scandinavian Foundation and Universe the Princeton University Press: Kierke- Harvard University Press: G S. Peirce, gaard. Philosophical Fragments (trans. Collected Papers; H. A. Wolfson, Spiby D. F. Swenson) noza; H . G W arren, Buddhism in Trans­ Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.: Josiah lation Royce, Studies in Good and Evil Hogarth Press: S. Freud, The Future of G. Bell ft Sons, Ltd.: Philo Judseus, Works an Illusion and Civilisation and Its Dis­ trans. by C. D. Yonge); Plotinus, Com­ contents plete Works (trans. by K. S. Guthrie); Henry Holt ft Company: E. S. Ames, Schopenhauer, Essays (trans. by Belford Religion; A. Schweitzer, Out of My Life Bax) and Thought Benziger Brothers: Thomas Aquinas, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc.: A. N. Svmrna theologica (trans. by Fathers of Whitehead, “Immortality,” in The Phithe English Dominican Province) losophy of Alfred North Whitehead The Clarendon Press (Oxford): Sankara Liveright Publishing Corporation: S. Freud, (trans. by G. Thibaut), in The Sacred The Future of an Illusion Books of the East (ed. by M. Muller), Longmans, Green ft Company: W , James, Vols. XXXIV and XXXVIII; RamannEssays on Faith and Morals and A Ph*■ ja (trans. by G. Thibaut), ibid., Vol. ralistic Universe

We are grateful to Professors Gus­ tave F.. von Griinchaum anti George V. Bobrinskov for some corrections in connection with al-Gha/.zali and Hindu pantheism, respectively. For substantial assistance in the interpretation of Aris­ totle, we must thank Dr. Alan Gewirth. But, for the most part, we have dared to rely upon our own research, inade­ quate though it must be over so vast a field. Considerable portions of the manuscript were read by Dorothy G Hartshomc, to whom we are deeply indebted for many corrections and improvements in style. The following publishers, authors, and editors have kindly granted us per­ mission to use (in some instances trans­ late) selections from the authors and publications specified.

xi

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Longmans, Green & Company, Ltd.: Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (trans. by T. K. Abbott) The Macmillan Company (New York): S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity; N. Berdyaev, The Russian Idea; A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Process and Reality, and Religion in the Making The Macmillan Company (London): Origenes, Selections (trans. by R. B. Tollinton) Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.: R. B. Cattell, Psychology and the Religious Quest Max Niemeyer Verlag: Hans Bauer, Die Dogmatik det AlghasszalPs W. W. Norton & Company: S. Freud, A New Series of Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis The Open Court Publishing Company: Asvaghosha, Discourse on the Awaken­ ing of Faith in the Mahay ana (trans. by T. Suzuki); Anselm, Proslogium (trans. by S. N. Deane); Descartes, Meditations (trans. by J. Veirch); Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Correspondence with Amauld (trans. by G. R. Mont­ gomery); Kant, Prolegomena (trans. by P. Carus) Oxford Press (London): R. Davids (trans.), The Sacred Books of Buddhism, Vol. II Pantheon Books: R. Jeffers, Selected Poetry Princeton University Press: Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments (trans. by D. F. Swenson)

R(.-island, O. R., Vcrlagsbiichhandlung: E. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Gricchen Vol. Ill, Part I Review of Religion, The: Charles Hartshornc, “The Mathematical Analysis of Theism” Routledgc and Kegan Paul, Ltd.: Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed (trans. by M. Friedlander) Stephen Roycc: Josiah Roycc, The Con­ ception of God P. A. Schilpp: W. R. Denncs, “Preface to an Empiricist Philosophy of Religion,” in College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy, Vol. Ill Albert Schwcirzer: Schweitzer, Christiani­ ty and the Religions of the World Charles Scribner’s Sons: N. Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man (trans. by N. Duddington); J. H. Breasted, The Dawn of Con­ science Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge: R. Davids (trans.), Bud­ dhism The University of Chicago Press: Des­ cartes, “Reply to Objections,” in From Descartes to Kant (cd. by T. V. Smith and Marjorie Grene); J. M. P. Smith and F.. J. Goodspecd (cds.), The Complete Bible: A n American Translation; H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good Paul Weiss: Weiss, arriclc published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion (see above)

Table of Contents I ntroduction : T hf. Standpoint of P anentheism

1

A. The Law of Polarity B. A Classification of Theistic Doctrines

1 15

PART ONE. CLASSICAL VIEWS I. A ncien t or Q uasi-P a n e n th eism : A n E nun ciatio n of T h em es ( ETCKW

—God as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the World): I khn aton , H in du S criptures , L ao- tse , J udeo-C hristtan S crip ­ tures ,

II.

29

P lato

A ristotelian T h eism (EC—God as Eternal Consciousness [Not Knowing or Including the World]): A ristotle

III.

C lassical T h eism (ECK-God as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing [but Not Including] the World): P hilo , A u g u stine , A n se l m , al - G hazzali, M a im o nides , A quinas , D escartes , L eib n iz , K a n t , C h a n n in g , von H ugel .

IV.

C lassical P a n t h eism

VI.

76

(EC K W -G od as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing and Including the World [So Far as "Real”]): A svaghosha, S ankara, R a m a ­ n u ja ,

V.

58

165

S pin o za , R oyce , J effers

E m a n a t io n ism

(E -G od as Bare Eternity, the “One”):

P lo tinus

211

(ETCK—God as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing [but Not Including] the World): S octnus , L equ ier 225

T e m po ra listic T h e ism

PART TW O . MODERN VIEWS VII.

(E T C K W —God as Eternal-Temporal Conscious­ ness, Knowing and Including the World in His Own Actuality [but Not in His Essence]): S c h e l u n g , F ech n er , P eirce , P fleid erer , V arisco, W h it e M odern P a n e n t h e is m

head ,

V ni.

B erdyaev , I qbal , S c h w e it z e r , B uber , R a d h akrishnan , W eiss , W atts

J a m e s , E h r en fels , B rig ht m a n .

DC.

231

(E T C K W —God as Eternal-Temporal Conscious­ ness, Knowing or Partially Knowing, and Partially Including the World):

L im it e d P a n e n t h e is m

335

E x t r e m e T em po r a l ist ic T h e is m ( T C K -G od

as Purely Temporal Con­ sciousness, Knowing or Partially Knowing the World): A lexander , B er ­ m an,

A m e s , C a tte ll

.

.

.

365

( T —God as Purely Temporal [but N ot Conscious and N ot Knowing the World]): W ie m a n .395

X . E x t r e m e T e m p o r a l u t ic T h e is m

XIV

TABLE

OF C O N T E N T S

PART THREE. SKEPTICAL OR ATHEISTIC VIEWS ANCIENT AND MODERN X I.

XII.

R e u g io - pra gm atic S k e p t ic is m :B udd hism

411

L ogico - m eta ph y sica l S k e p t ic is m : C arneades and H u m e , S chopen h a u er , F euerbach 416

XIII.

M otive - T orque or P sychological S k e p t ic is m : N ietzsche , F reud

4^7

XIV.

A S k e pt ic ism B ased o n A nalysis o f M e a n in g : D e n n e s

4^

EPILOGUE T h e L ogic o f P a n e n t h d s m .

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INDEXES Index o f N a m es G eneral Index

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Introduction: The Standpoint of Panentheism A. TH E l,A W OF POLARITY A principal aim of this sourcebook is to exhibit a pattern in the history of rational reflection about God. Some will say we have imposed this pattern upon the material; but we rather think we have found it there—or, at least, that we have found something like it. We also think the pattern points a moral, a lesson taught by man’s intellectual and reli­ gious history. The lesson is that man’s reason, here as elsewhere, tends toward oversimplifications, which it can over­ come only through more or less painful disillusionment with initial, all-too-neat and easy formulas. Whitehead’s maxim, “Seek simplicity—and mistrust it," ap­ plies to all intellectual inquiry, no mat­ ter how exalted its subject matter. Ac­ cordingly, we should be grateful to our theological and philosophical ancestors who sought simplicity in their notions about God and thus took a necessary first step in our behalf. (Examples will be found in many chapters of this book.) It is harder to feel gratitude toward their contemporary disciples who have not yet reached the stage of mistrust, and who employ the “method of tenac­ ity" in defense of ancient ideas. Still, the question is difficult, we all share more or less in similar weaknesses, and there is perhaps a need that some should continue to call attention, with the ef­ fectiveness derived from partisanship, to the earlier stages in the development of theistic thought, without which, or something equally one-sided, more ade­ quate notions could probably not have been achieved. It is true that the idea of “God," that is (to give a preliminary definition), the supremely excellent o r all-worshipful being, first reaches vivid consciousness in an emotional and practical, not in an explicitly logical or analytic, form and

that this preanalytic form is not par­ ticularly simple. There is a wealth of expression, often highly poetic, not wholly consistent, of feelings and im­ peratives of behavior, with a relative absence of definition, analysis, or dem­ onstration. But the dearth of logical technique is partly compensated for by a richness of insight into the funda­ mental experiences from which alone a meaningful idea of God can be derived. If nothing is sharply defined in primi­ tive theism, neither perhaps is anything wholly or sharply excluded, almost the entire testimony of life in its universal aspects being given a hearing-aithough not, for all that, without one-sided em­ phasis upon, or relative neglect of, cer­ tain aspects. T he Old Testament, the Hymns of Ikhnaton, and the Upanishads are examples of this primitive theism. Then come the early attempts to de­ fine, analyze, complete, ana purify. Aristotle, Philo, ana Sankara are out­ standing representatives of this phase. As generally happens, the analyses are at first somewhat crude and one-sided. It is comparatively easy to say; G od is strong rather than weak; hence in all relations cause, not effect, acting, not acted upon or “passive.” H e overflows into innumerable consequences and deri­ vatives but does not himself derive any­ thing from others or depend upon them. Secure and trustw orthy “beyond shad­ ow of turning," he is therefore eternal, not temporal; necessary, not contingent o r accidental; wholly actual and in no respect potential. Further, he is spiritual, not corporeal; simple, not a compound (for then something must have put him together); absolute, or w holly inde­ pendent, not relative or dependent. T he method here is this: taking each pair of ultimate contraries, such as o n e a n d many, permanence and change

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u, an tnar is necessary to rule tradiction in terms. 1 his raises the ques­ out every other individual is simply to tion: “W hat is to be meant bv ‘God’?’’ omit qualification of the general attri­ In other words, what is the subject mat­ butes, lie is good-period. He is wiseter of this book? Up to a certain point, period. He is powerful-period. Thus we answer this question in agreement God alone is strictly or simply holy, with the monopolarists. “God" is a omniscient, omnipotent; and this means name for the uniquely good, admirable, that he alone is without arbitrary or great, worship-eliciting being. Worship, peculiar limitation upon his righteous­ moreover, is nor just an unusually high ness, wisdom, or power (we shall see degree of respect or admiration; and the that this docs not mean that he has a excellence of deity is not just an un­ monopoly of power, that he determines usually high degree of merit. There is all events); he and he alone has or is a difference in kind. God is "perfect,” the conceptual ultimates in these attri­ and between the perfect and anything butes. Thus the essential meaning of as little imperfect as you please is no certain basic value-concepts themselves merely finite, but an infinite, step. The must be exhausted if we are to “praise superiority of deity to all others can­ God" properly. (Does it really alter not (in accordance with established this to urge that God is superior to and word usage) be expressed by indefinite beyond all our concepts—as though “su­ descriptions, such as “immensely good," perior" or “beyond” were not also our “very powerful,” or even "best" or concept? T o say that God is better than “most powerful," but must be a superi­ just good is to say that he is more good ority of principle, a definite conceptual than good, and this is a doubtfully divergence from every other being, ac­ helpful play of words.) If God is tVie tual or so much as possible. W e may conceptual ultimate of various attri­ call this divergence “categorical suprem­ butes, without arbitrary qualification, acy.” N ow our suggestion is that there then his merit is not a mere matter of is a monopolar and a dipolar way of fact, for factuality always consists in introducing some qualification upon conceiving such supremacy. According to either way, the divine concepts. Wherever there arc grada­ superiority is regarded as a m atter of tions, we can distinguish between these principle, not m erely of degree. Let us only on a factual basis by comparison, elucidate this. O ne cannot say precisely, as when we say that this is larger than through principles or concepts alone, that or better than that. W e cannot say, wherein the “nobility” of Lincoln, in through mere concepts, how large or contrast to that of all other humane good. (A meter is a comparison with men, actual or possible, consisted. O r certain objects known to exist.) Where, what constituted the precise “wisdom" however, there is no auestion of degree of Confucius, in contrast to that of or quantity, but simply of the ultimate other sages. O r the strength of Caesar, fulfilment of a concept, no factual com­ in contrast to other strong men. W ith parisons are needed to complete our nondivine individuals, one must always meaning. From the foregoing we can sea why affix peculiar qualifications to general adjectives in order to reach the individ- theism is a central or th t central, philo-

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sophical issue. For the question of a con­ identical wirh existence. Hence, by def ceptually ultimate form of basic attri­ im'tion, they are not “Gods.” Further butes, since it is no question of fact, if self-existence were to be attributed cannot fall within the province of nat­ to several beings, then for any one of ural science bur must be assigned to them the others would constitute a sort that study which is concerned with of environment which it did not con­ fundamental meanings or principles, to trol; for, since all would enjoy self­ which factual disrinctioas are neutral— existence, all would be essentially that is, to philosophy. It is a question equals. In such a democracy of supreme about knowledge as such, and in prin­ beings it is only the democracy itself ciple, whether there c a n -o r m ust-be that could be genuinely self-existent, an all-inclusive knowing, an actual om­ dependent for existence on nothing niscience. Again, it affects the very else; and thus the members of the de­ concept o f existence w hether there can mocracy would not self-exist after all or must be a being who “exists neces­ and would not be “Gods.” sarily,” whose existence is so utterly se­ This inevitability of monotheism pro­ cure that his nonexistence expresses nei­ vides (again through ambiguity) one ther a fact nor even so much as a pos­ more source of the monopolar preju­ sibility. And only such security would dice. There can be but one deity; there be the conceptual ultimate of security. are many nondivine beings: hence the Hence it is not surprising that theologi­ divine may legitimately and innocently ans have generally agreed to regard be contrasted to other realities as the God as the being who, in principle, ex­ O ne versus the M any. This, however, ists, “whose essence it is to exist," rather ceases to be an innocent truism if one than, as w ith all other beings, existing forgets that the oneness here concerns merely in fact and by accident o r on individuals, not internal aspects or parts. sufferance o f other things serving as T h e class of “deities” can have but one causes, conditions, o r favorable (but m em ber and therefore is “not a class” potentially unfavorable) environment. in the usual sense. But logically quite In some sense, then, G od m ust coincide different is the question: “May there w ith Being as such; fo r he cannot be not be a genuine class of parts or factors w ithout existence, and therefore equal­ o r states of the one divine individual?" ly existence cannot be w ithout him, so This question must be judged independ­ th at the very meaning o f “exist” must e n t ^ and on its merits. Similarly, the “necessity” of deity be theistic (o r else theism is itself w ith­ out cognitive meaning, as positivists w hich follows from categorical suprem­ say it is). G od is thus die great “I am,” acy refers to his existence as an individ­ the one whose existence is the expres­ ual and ceases to be a truism if it is sion of his ow n pow er and none other, construed to mean that everything in w ho self-exists—rather than is caused, G od’s total reality is necessary. Cate­ o r happens, to exist—and b y whose gorical suprem acy is a comparison (or po w e r o f existence all other things an incom parability) of G od w ith re­ spect to other individuals, not of the exist. F rom the foregoing w e can see w h y actuality of G od in contrast to w hat he it is n o t possible to conceive m ore than himself m ight have been. T h a t G od one G od. If several “G ods” could exist, could not fail to exist as himself is not then this “existence” m ust be som ething equivalent to saying th at he could in distinguishable from any one o f them ; no fashion be other than he is. A man fro m this it follows th a t th ev do not Is himself through a variety of states; self-exist and d o n o t exist b y being w e m ust consider objectively and fairly

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whether a categorically supreme form with abstract aspects of identity. Of of this very distinction between indi­ course we can also say, “The present viduality and state is not required. Nor state of becoming is”; but this is no need we accept the customary argument more than to say, “The present state of that the divine existence must be self­ becoming.” The “is” adds nothing. existence, hence must be involved in Questions about being arise in present the very concept of being or existence; ^^TK:ricrice and for present experience. and therefore (it is thought) being must “This experience” (as involving more here have priority over becoming. On than just “my,” or just human, experi­ the contrary, any general concept or ence) is the final reference to concrete­ principle will express categorical su­ ness. And this experience is always premacy, so long as arbitrary factual something that becomes. {imitations are unnecessary in order to The old Platonic objection (objec­ distinguish the divine individual from tions based on Scripture will be con­ others. Becoming is not inferior to be­ sidered later) to the conception of the ing in this regard. Perhaps, whereas deity as changing is, of course, that all other beings are accidental products of change implies previous or subsequent becoming, we should think of God as defect, and hence the supremely excel­ qualifying becoming essentially, so that lent or “perfect” being cannot change. he is always certain to become, his life Once more we have an ambiguity. being a process inherent in all process, “God is perfect” may mean various in process as such, or within which all things. In any reasonable usage it means process must occur, therefore begin­ certainly not less than this; he has no ningless (for his beginning would be a possible rival (no equal or superior) process independent of him and with among individuals. He could not be himself as accidental product) and for equaled or excelled by another. But the same reason endless. If several gods could he be excelled by himself in an­ become, then none of them could be other state? This is a question different the essence of process but must be its in principle from the other question. It must be dealt with independently. products o r accidents. It may seem, however, that the con­ True, you m ight suppose that one God is the essence of process or becom­ ceptual ulrimates of value must exclude ing and another of being. But being be­ even self-excelling. How can one go comes, or becoming is—being ana be­ beyond what is already the uttermost coming must somehow form a single possible? Of course, one could not. In reality. M odem philosophy differs from those attributes of righteousness, wis­ most previous philosophy by the dom, and power, with which we have strength of its conviction that becom­ so far been dealing in our account of ing is the m ore inclusive category. This categorical supremacy, God cannot be does not mean th at it is “more real.” excelled even by himself. But this is on W e can abstract from the stages of be­ the assumption that these attributes do coming various real common factors admit an ultimate form. It seems they and call these “being.” Redness “is” do; for ultimate goodness is the ade­ in diverse stages o f process. But the quate taking into account of all actual process includes redness and m ore-even and possible interests, each given hs if all qualities com m on to diverse stages due; ultimate wisdom is dear, certain, are taken as represented by “redness.” adequate knowledge, whose content is Process is not the mere identities of all m at is, as it is, the actual as actual, "being” ; it is the identities w ith the dif­ the possible as possible; ultimate power ferences, o r rather it b the diverse states is power adequate to control die uni-

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verse in the best possible way. But sup­ is true not merely because man is a |jm posing for the moment all this to be ited, imperfect creature but because granted, it docs not follow that all cate­ values are in principle subject to incom. gorical aspects of value admit ultimate patibilitics. A sonnet and a ballad ex­ forms. Take happiness, for instance. clude each other’s merits. T rv to put W ho indeed wants wisdom or power them together in a supcrpocm.'aiul here except as it somehow contributes to or too you will meet alternatives, mutually forms part of someone’s happiness? exclusive possibilities for the supefW hat, then, is “ultimate happiness’’? pocm. Even if the whole universe is in The theological treatment of this ques­ question, it cannot be ex-cry possible tion seems to have been, for the most kind of harmonious whole but must be part, weak and fallacious. If happiness one kind, excluding others that mif is as close to ultimate happiness as a experience van- not only as to harmony man can ever get. Surely that is not the or unification of the factors but also as clue to divine happiness. Moreover, to variety and depth of the contrasts “knowing all things” w ould mean be­ among them, absolute richness must be ing aware of vast misery and much in­ absolute unification of absolute variety. tense suffering in the world as well as But absolute variety could only .............. mean of much joy and immense quantities of all possible variety. Here again xvc run pleasure. Could “absolute happiness’’ into contradiction: there arc: mutually accrue from or even coexist w ith this exclusive forms of variety. mixed knowledge of good things and So the old argumentation that runs, evil things? T o condense a long argu­ “G od is eternally perfect; hence, of ment, our only clues to w hat happiness course, he cannot improve or in any in principle is seem to be in conflict sense increase in value,” implicitly de­ with the idea (or pseudo-idea) of “ab­ nies the all-inclusive value, happiness, solute” happiness. Such a state could to the supreme individual. Must wc not not be the mere absence o f discontent; proceed more cautiously and define ‘perfection” rather as the categorically for, as we have seen, to take that as the measure is an insult to all animals above ultimate form of all attributes that ad­ the very lowest. T he higher animals mit such form (it can be shown that have correspondingly m any ways of they are abstract aspects of value) and being discontented! T heir desires are the categorically superior form of all m ore complex, richer, m ore inclusive attributes that do not admit an ultimate than others, so that their satisfaction, form (they are all ways of expressing when they are satisfied, is indeed su- the concrete value, happiness)? By cateperior; but they are no m ore likely to gorically superior we mean such that be com pletely satisfied. Absolute happi- no o ther individual can rival it, thus ness m ust then be the logical m onstros- leaving open the door to self-excelling, ity: com plete satisfaction o f all possible T hrough such self-excelling the most desires—so to speak, infinite success o f excellent being changes, not into a more th e advertisers in aw akening desires, excellent being, but into a m ore cxccland infinite success o f the producers in lent state o f the same being. G od acm eeting them . B ut there are incom pati- quires, say, some new quality of enjoyble desires and values. U ntil one has m ent. H e has not changed from “hinim ade this truism central to one’s self” into another person, another in­ th o u g h t abou t life, one has not the be- dividual, any m ore than I do when 1 ginm ngs o f practical wisdom. “You engage in a new conversation, perhaps m ust renounce.” said G oethe; and this w ith an old friend. T his is no doubt

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only a'1 analogy, but the theologian mate totality of actualities for anyone cannot dispense with analogies. The to know. question is: “Docs he play fair with It must be admitted that contempo­ them; docs he give every promising rary science seems, priina facie, to imply analo'gV its due consideration?” With the ultimate inclusion of all becoming respect to most theologians of the past, within being. The simple wav to inter­ the answer (we suspect) is: “Far from pret relativity physics is in terms of the ’ God has (they held) consciousness Minkowski manifold of events in spaceanalogous to a man s consciousness but time, taken as a complete totality' covnot a body analogous to a man’s body, cring all time as well as all space. For, He has will analogous to will in us, un- :iff --------L: this view •in favor ' we reject of the demanding analogous to our under­ theory of process as creation of new standing, but nothing analogous to sen­ events whose totality is itself new each sation or emotion; above all, nothing time it is referred to, we seem to imply analogous to diversity of states with a division between the settled enduring personal self-identity. Thus the world, down to and including the the asserted analogy is rendered prob- present, and the open future; and this lematic in the extreme by the negation division looks very like the unique siof analogies logically inseparable from multaneity which the new physics deit. dares cannot be discerned, "flic diffiW hat would it mean to say that God culty seems grave. The philosophy of could have been “himself," though with process must, it appears, contend either other “experiences”? Any experience, that the “looks very like” represents a to be that of God, the supremely excel- mistaken identification or else that there lent one, must be ideally clear and ac- is indeed a unique simultaneity, even curate as to its objects; it must be “om- though our method of physical obserniscient,” that is, infallible and adequate vation through signal traasmissions apexperience. But adequate experience or parenrly fails to reveal it. Both contenknowledge of this world is different tions have been defended by philosofrom adequate knowledge of some al- phers and scientists. The task of evalutemative world. If another world was ating them will not be attempted in this or is possible, then so was or is another book. It is one of the most important divine knowledge, identical with the philosophical tasks of our time, first in adequacy to its existent objects W e must also recognize that most maintain, with classical but with diverse objects existing and logicians still .............................. ’ theists, that all truth, even truth of fact, divinely known as existing. The classical idea was rather this: is timeless or tenseless. If “ rain in Chi­ God knows in eternity and in a wholly cago on March 30, 1953,” is found true necessary w ay w hatever at any time on that dav, it would, according to this exists to be known. But this, to some view, have been true had someone as­ of us at least, is meaningless, for we find serted it in 1900 or 900. Thus from the that the notion o f an eternally fixed standpoint of truth there is no such total content o f “all time” is a contra- thing as an open future, or ^indeed as diction in terms. T im e is “objective “future,” save in the sense of “later than modality" (P eirce); it unites determi- some other event.” There is no such nate, actual, past reality w ith indetermi- qualitative difference between fumrity nare, potential, future reality. This un- and pastness as that between thedeterion is perpetually enriched by new ac- minate and the indeterminate. There is tualides, and there can, by the very really no “becoming,” for every event meaning of time o r process, be no ulti- simply is w hat it is in its locus in

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temporal series, as “viewed" bv the of propositions concerning matters of timeless eye of “truth.” The totality of fact and yet to contest "the tensclcss events does not become but timelessly theory of truth would indeed be fool­ is. But, then, neither do single events ish. But can we be fairlv driven to the become; for, if a single event became tenselcss theory of propositions (save or came into being, there would to that as at most a useful logical fiction)? It extent be a new totality. rather looks as though dipolar theism It may well be that this view has a must stand or fall with the answer to convenient simplicity for purposes of this question, which we shall not fur­ logical analysis. It seems to us another ther discuss in the present volume.1 question whether it is correct. In par­ However, even granting the possibil­ ticular, it is an error to deduce the view ity of an eremal knowledge of “all in question from the Law of Excluded time,” we may still argue that, if an­ Middle if that is taken as a principle other totality of temporal things was limiting propositions to the tw o values, possible (as theologiaas have generally true ana false. Suppose that, in 1900, neld and as must be held if creation is “It will rain in Chicago on March 30, regarded as a free act), then the divine 1953,” was false; it does not follow knowledge of the existence of this other that “It will not rain in Chicago on totality must also have been possible. March 30, 1953,” was true. W hat fol­ Thus one still does not escape the im­ lows is onlv that one and only one of plication of an alternativeness of divine the two following propositions was spates. This alternativeness, however, is true: (a) “[As of 1900] it will not rain intelligible only in temporal terms; for in Chicago on March 30, 1953,” or (if) it is meaningless to say that etemitv “T he relation of rain to Chicago on might have happened to be otherwise March 30, 1953, is fin 1900] still inde­ than it is. terminate, a m atter of open possibility.” It should already be apparent (though (A t any later time one may say, “As of it was almost wholly overlooked in the 1900, the relation . , . was indetermi­ best-known theological and philosophi­ nate.” ) W e have, then, three proposi­ cal writings of the past) that to admit tions, tw o o f which must be false and change in G od need not mean renounc­ one true in each case: ‘I t will,” “It will ing ms prerogative of existing necessar­ not,” ‘T h e re is [when the statement is ily. If I can be myself, w hether I do made] no settled will o r will not con­ this—at a certain time—or that, experi­ cerning the predicate, place, and date ence this or experience that, am in this in question.” Thus, besides will and possible state or in that possible state, will not, we have m ay-or-m ay-not as then G od as necessarily existing may modes of predication, not, however, as differ from me in principle thus: his tru th values. “M ay-or-m ay-not” must possible states are co-ordinate w ith the itself be true o r false. A creationist de­ nies th at statements o f the form, “Rain 1. For a somewhat fuller treatment see in Chicago, at time T ,” are complete Charles Hartshomc, Man's Vision of God and propositions capable o f being true or the Logic of Theism (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), pp. 98-105. For the views of a false. A proposition, he will contend, logician who rejects the notion of timeless unless it concerns mere abstractions like truths about temporal occurrences see Felix those o f pure mathematics, must de­ Kaufmann’s essay in Philosophic Thought in scribe some section o f process from France and the United States, ed. M. Farber (Buffalo, 1950). For the timeless view see w ithin som e section o f process. A tense Daniel D. Williams’ essay in Structure, Meth­ is always involved, explicitly or implic­ od, and Meaning, ed. Henll, Kallen, and Langitly. T o adm it the tenseless formulation er (New York, 1951).

NTRODUCTION

possible states of existence in general, state, of the divine life. Here is the and so, whereas some possible states of place for the negative theology. Here existence in general would mean that I, we must confess our incurable igno­ for example, could not exist at all, by rance. Indeed, we cannot imagine now contrast, in any state of existence in the actual contingent world looks to general God can and will exist in some God, who sees it against the background thereto appropriate stare of himself. In of an immense if not an infinite past, other terms: according to the usual or and with no inhibitions of prejudice or monopolar view, necessity of existence apathy to dilute for his apprehension its means that there is no need to adjust to wealth of qualities of life and feeling others; according to the dipolar view, and sensation. it means unlimited capacity to adjust If the traditional view of God as ex­ succcssfully-that is, with preservation clusively and in all respects necessary of individual integrity-or it means abil­ violates the Law of Polarity, so docs ity to adjust to all others, whoever and the opposite extreme, the view of him whatever they may be. Given such ca­ as exclusively contingent, implying that pacity, the individual cannot fail to his very existence is a mere accident. exist. This view (which is classical monopo­ Nothing of all this will be understood larity in reverse) is somewhat favored by one who cannot detach himself at by the prestige of empirical science in least a little from the inveterate habit of our age. Science concerns itself with viewing polar contrasts as invidious; facts and sees necessities only in mathe­ who thinks, for example, that “con­ matics or logic, viewing these as mere tingent” can only mean something bad tools for the investigation of facts. It is by comparison with “necessary.” Nec­ plain that no mere fact could make any­ essary and contingent are not rivals in thing exist necessarily. W e mean by a merit but complementary poles of a “fact” something whose denial is con­ unity in which is all meaning and all ceivable though false; that is, a fact is value. Only if we distinguish carefully, the realization of a possibility. But ab­ contrasting, not the necessary as such solute security or necessity of existence with the contingent as such, but the means an existence which is not to be necessarily existing individual with con­ contrasted to any contrary possibility; tingently existing individuals, have we it means existence as a matter of prin­ ciple and meaning, not merely of fact. a question of comparative merit. If everything in G od were on the N ow the question, “Do first principles same level of necessity as the universal and meanings involve the existence of traits of existence as such, then how any being (who thus exists necessarily), would G od be anything more or less or do they not?” is a question as to the than just these traits themselves; that is, content of the first principles or ulti­ how would he be a concrete individual mate categories themselves. It is a pure­ rather than an abstract universal or ly philosophical question. For philoso­ complex of universals? In monopolar phy is the theory of first principles or terms an intelligible answer cannot, we ultimate categories. Unless, then, we think, be given to this question. Con­ know the necessary existence and es­ tingent facts are knowabie not through sential nature of God, or his necessary concepts alone but always, in part at nonexistence (for a merely factual non­ least, through direct intuitions. More­ existence is meaningless here), we do over, only G od himself can, w ith any­ not know what our fundamental con­ thing rem otely like adequacy, intuit a cepts mean. Thus die solution of base ^hole-accident, a particular contingent philosophical questions and of base

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theological ones cannot be separated. proof for an unmoved mover set out As another illustration of this, take from a principle that actuality is (unomniscience. Could any being as a mere conditionally) “prior to potentiality," matter of fact know absolutely all there that is, to any mode of reality other is? Such a conceptual ultimate could than actuality. In that case there arc not just happen. Each of us happens to only the alternatives: (1) there is nothknow certain things and happens not ing, not even potentiality; or (2) to know certain others. It depends on there is an actuality which is not an acchancc and circumstance, on mere facts, rualization (of antecedent potentiality), how our knowledge and ignorance are which contains in itself the equivalent distributed. But could the ignorance, or superior of all that ever could be the cognitive maladjustment and inade- actualized, and from which all actualiquacy, simply by chance and circum- zation (if such there be) derives. Now stance reach zero? That we are partly the first alternative is stark nonsense. If ignorant and that we exist by chance nothing is either actual or possible, then and upon sufferance of favorable cir- there is no thought and no object of cumstances—are these not two aspects thought and no meaning and no truth, of the same limitation or deficiency? That this is so plainly could not be true. Our knowledge is restricted because it For truth itself must be either actual or is not a pure matter of principle that possible. So we arc left with the second we know but of fact; and facts may be alternative, which posits the unmoved favorable or unfavorable to knowledge mover; and we reacn this result without of this or that given item. That all rne benefit of any particular facts, even the facts should ever (for any factually ex- fact of motion. ishng knower) be favorable witfi reThe flaw in this proof is that both spect to all the objects of knowledge the premise and the conclusion embody seems infinitely unlikely in such a strict the monopolar prejudice. Prior to both sense as to be downright impossible, potentiality ana actuality, according to Only a being who knows things on the Law of Polarity, is the tension bcprinciple, without contrary possibility, tween them; their union in a process could, it seems, be omniscient. which is neither simply actual nor simSimilar remarks may be made about ply potential. In this process ever-new ultimate goodness or holiness o r power, stares of actuality, each with its own One conclusion from these considera- distinctive possibilities for further ac­ tions is that a merely “empirical theol- rualization, are reached. In accordance ogy” is a contradiction in terms. The with this view, God is the union of susrudy of mere facts, as such, yields only preme actuality and supreme potentialfacts, more or less universal or particu- ity, supreme activity and supreme pasjar; but God as a mere fact, however sivity, supreme being and supreme beimportant or comprehensive or basic, is coming, the most strictly absolute and God as not God. Another consequence the most universally relative of all enis that the distinction between a priori tides, actual or possible. W e believe the and aposteriori proof for God is in- cosmological proof can be reconvahd. Tjie proofs are all a priori; proofs structed accordingly. (See our discusfrom principles or categories, not from sion of Aristotle in chap, ii.) facts; proofs from necessities, not from But is not such double predication contingencies. contradictory? T h e answer is that there Traditional proofs were really of this is no law o f logic against attributing a priori character, desnite their seeming contrasting predicates to the same indito rest upon some fact. T he famous vidual, provided they apply to diverse

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contrarics good and evil. The answer sequences. First, it implies that to conis that all contrasts, according to dipo- trast God merely as the “eternal” with larity, do fall within God (since, in one the world as “temporal” is questionaspect of his reality, he is the most com- begging. For we have to ask whether plex and inclusive of all beings), but he has not both an eternal and a temcach contrast is in G od in its own ai>- poral aspect. (True, divine “time,” like riate way. Thus, for instance, only divine predicates in general, must be y ultimate or categorical contrasts categorically supreme.) But, second, if can be used to describe the fixed char- G oa be conceived as in one aspect temacter of God, that which is essential to poral, relative as well as absolute, “mathis very existence or individuality, ter” as well as “form,” there may be no Now evil, in the sense of wickedness, longer any good reason to deny, but is not a universal category. For example, good reason to affirm, that through this the animals are incapable of it, because relative, temporal, material aspect deity of their unconsciousness of principles, includes the world. Thus the motif of And God is incapable of it, as we shall pantheism may, in a somewhat novel see (e.g., in our “Comment” on al- fashion, be given its due. The distincGhazzali). T hus wickedness is not in don from the classical form of panthethe divine “character” at all. True, the ism remains; for the view is that in the contrast between G od’s goodness and absolute aspect of his dipolar nature die the wickedness of various individuals deity is not the actual world and does does fall w ithin G od (whose total real- not even include it. ity is more than his mere character or In addidon to the questions just disessential individuality) but not in such cussed concerning the relations of God fashion that he could be called wicked, to eternity, to time, and to die world even in his particular states. A round or universe, there are two others that stone may be w ithin a square building we wish to make crucial for our clas—to use a crude analogy. Evil in the sification of types of theism. These are: sense of suffering, however, is indeed, “Is God conscious?” and “Does he we believe, a category. And, if so, the know the universe? Is he omniscient? dipolar view m ust hold not only that One might query the exactitude of

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the terms used in these questions. Is the expressions as “beyond consciousness’’ term “know” meant literally, it may be (or “beyond personality” ) or to the asked, or is it analogical rather than notion of a more eminent way of having univocal? Must we not distinguish be- or containing all things than literally tween “unconscious” and “supercon- having or containing them. Certainly scious,” between what is below and the best consciousness or personality is what is above or beyond consciousness beyond our mere human consciousness or knowledge? For the moment, let it or personality- in quality. But that is albe said simply that knowledge is meant ready said by affirming its “best” status, in the sense appropriate to rigorously or its unique excellence, thus implying that categorically supreme excellence (this any other kind of consciousness must is our reply to tne inevitable chaise of be inferior. W hy affirm the uniqueness anthropomorphism) and that such ex- twice over, and that not as a mere matpressions as “beyond consciousness” are ter of rhetorical emphasis but as an rather eulogistic or emotional than alleged doctrinal distinction? Similarly, logical or cognitive. Since God is, by if God is all-inclusive, of course this in­ definition, categorically supreme, almost elusiveness is not just ordinary incluno one denies anything to his essential siveness, say, that of a man in relation nature, save with the contention that he to his cells, merely stretched to cover is better off without it. Similar remarks the universe. Most criticisms of “panapplv to the contention that, while God theism”—and many formulations by its does not literally contain the universe, defenders—are too crude on such mathe does something much better, viz., en- ters to have much value, joys a “more eminent” analogue of all The affirmative answers to our five its values, since he is cause of all its be- questions—Is God eternal? Is he to n ­ ing and goodness, or since he is pure un- poral? Is he conscious? Does he know derived being and good. W e are not the world? Does he include the world? asking, for the moment, "Does he do —can be symbolized by the following something better than this or that?” but letters: only “Does he do this or that?” A girl Eternal—in some (or, if T is omitted, who admits that her fiancl is not a pro­ in all) aspects of his reality devoid fessor is not thereby debarred from sub­ of change, whether as birth, death, sequently demonstrating that he is increase, or decrease something even better (tf this be pos­ Temporal—in some (or, if E is omit­ sible), say, a great statesman. ted, in all) aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of Furtherm ore, a main purpose of this some kind book is to present evidence to show Conscious, self-aware that, when tne questions above form u­ Knowing the world or universe, omlated are answered w ith any but one set o f answers, the result is absurdity, and w . . , . .... this w hether there be “something bet- W w ° ^ -« c lu s iv e , having all things as te r” to consider o r no. T here is also eviconstituents dence that the “best” form o f consciousIf all the five factors are asserted toness, or of knowing o r inclusiveness, gether, E T C K W , they define the docbecomes conceivable only w hen the trine we call “panentheism” (also “surcorrect combination of them, along relativism "). T h e joint affirmation of T w ith the right relation to time, has been and E (if consistently carried through) found. As this has seldom happened, it insures, as will w e hope become apparis n o t surprising th at so m any attem pts ent sooner o r later to the reader, the have been made to give m eaning to such conform ity o f a doctrine w ith the prin-

INTRODUCTION

ole of polarity discussed above. This Panentheism. Plato, Sri Jiva, means rhat there will be no favoritism Schelling, Fcchner, Whiteas betw een■i vultimate contraries. (When head, Iqbal, Radhakrishnan F and T are thus both affirmed, it is to The Supreme as Eternal Con­ be understood that each is meant to apsciousness, not knowing or I t0 a different aspect of the divine including the world. Aristo­ telian theism L ing, so that no formal contradiction „ The Supreme as Eternal Con­ results.) By omission of one or more of sciousness, Knowing but not the five factors, such omission being including the world. Classical taken as implying denial, one can de­ theism. Philo, Augustine, An­ fine various views which, by compari­ selm, al-Ghazzali, Aquinas. son with panentheism, may be termed Leibniz “truncated” doctrines. Some of these F. The Supreme as the Eternal combinations, however, may be dis­ beyond consciousness and missed as too obviously without plaus­ knowledge. Emanationism. Plotinus ible meaning. Thus it seems unmeaning The Supreme as Eternal Con­ to suppose that a being with full know!- t u w sciousness, Knowing and inedge of all the universe will lack selfeluding the World (so far at awareness or consciousness, and hence “real"). Classical pantheism. we omit combinations like EK W or Sankara, Spinoza, Royce EK, which affirm knowledge but not ETCK The Supreme as Eternal-Tem­ consciousness. Or, again, assuming that poral Consciousness, Know­ anv being with (supreme) self-aware­ ing but not including the ness will know w hat it includes, we world. Temporalisdc theism. need not consider such combinations as Socmus, Lequier as EtemalETCW , which imply divine conscious­ ETCK(W) The Supreme >upre Temporal Consciousness,part­ ness of a world-including self, without ly exclusive of the World. knowledge of the w orld which is in­ Limited panentheism. fames, cluded. Finally, it seems evident that Ehrenfels, Brighrman every being has some status w ith re­ spect to time as well as eternity, in that T (C )(K ) The Supreme as wholly Tem­ poral or emerging Conscious­ it must be one of the following: (1) in ness. Alexander, Ames, Carte11 all aspects eternal; (2) in all aspects T The Supreme as Temporal noneremal or tem poral; (3) in some as­ and nonconscious: Wieman pects die one ana in some aspects the other. Accordingly, every admissible T he above table, granted its (we combination m ust begin w ith E or with hope) not grossly arbitrary choice of T or with E T , and there can be no such initial representatives or founders of the truncated combinations as C W K , which eight doctrines, follows a chronological would be silent as to tem poral status. order. (In our sequence of chapters we Om itting a few remaining combina­ follow this order, save that we devote tions as of little apparent importance, a separate chapter to modem panenthe­ ism and a separate main division—Pan historical o r otherwise, and in tw o admitting attenuated forms of one of Three—to skeptics. Otherwise, both the five factors-indicated by parenthe- within chapters and in the succession of s « - w e have as significant for our pur- chapters, the order is chronological) poses the following: O ur classification exhibits the history ETCKW The Supreme as Etemal-Tem- of theistic speculations as poral Consciousness, Know- long experiment in omission. Leave oat tag and including the W orld, all characters save eternity and con-

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sriousncss, and you have Arisrorle’s self- ly the supreme subject, must have obindosed deity, whose entire being con- jects which are other than just itself, sists in “thinking of thinking,” aware- Finally, and least often realized conccmncss concerned only with itself. Leave ing classical theism (F.CK), it is to be out temporality and world inclusiveness, observed that knowledge is deficient and you have the standard doctrine of unless it fully and literally contains its medieval and early modern theology, objects. ECK is the paradox of a knowlJewish, Mohammedan, and Christian, edge whose objects change, though the which therefore seems eminently to de- knowledge-of-thcsc-objects docs not serve the ride, “classical theism.” Leave change, and which is wholly necessary, out all save etemality alone, and you though the objects arc not. Thus we have the One of Plotinus. Omit only have a complex—knowlcdge-of-X— the factor of temporality, and you have which is immutable, though a constitu­ t e God-totality, conscious and cogni- ent of this complex is mutable, a comrive, of Spinoza, and (less equivocally plex which is wholly w ithout continaffirmed) of Royce. Om it or attenuate gency, though some of its constituents die factor of world inclusivcness, and are contingent (could have been otheryou have Brightman’s tcmporalization wise). T o deny the applicability of this of classical theism. Om it eternity, and reasoning is to imply that what there you have the emergent theism of Alex- is in the divine is only “knowledge of" ander and others. Om it all but tempo- rather than “knowledge of X.” W hen rality, and you have W ieman’s view of we are told that it is the world that has G oa as the mysterious creativity in life relation to God, rather than G od to the which, though not aware of self o r world, we are in effect informed that, world, produces ever-new values. while X is known by G od, G od does W hat is the lesson o f this vast in- not know X, which seems senseless. It tellectual experiment? W e hold that it is useless to sav that G od knows directis that none of the omissions succeed, ly his own essence and that, this being that the “truncated” views really are the cause of all, knowledge of it imparts mutilations, and that thought has been knowledge of X. If G od knows that by forced back, more and more imperative- knowing his essence he knows X, then ly, to the integral panentheistic concep- he knows X, and there we have the rion adumbrated by Plato. W e hold that complex in question. If not, he is ignoetem ity in total abstraction from rime rant o f som ething know n to classical o r becoming (EC, ECK, E C K W ) is theists. Besides, we are told that G od abstract—as w hy should it not be?—and could conceivably have “decided” not deficient, for all that is said to the con- to cause X. Bur, then, the essence must trary, in fulness o f actuality. It seems be neutral, as betw een the existence and clear that eternity, in abstraction from nonexistence o f X. F or G od cannot have consciousness and knowledge and from been free to decide against som ething the actual universe (the One o f Plotinus), implicated in his very essence. If, then, is deficient in actuality (E ). It is m ere the existence o f X is not implicated in form w ithout content, unity which uni- the essence, know ledge o f tne essence fies nothing—save unity itself. But, again, will not im ply know ledge o f th at existas to A ristotle’s theism (E C ), w e m ust ence. ECK is thus even m ore manifestly note th at self-awareness is em pty o f inconsistent than EC. content unless the self has some other T h ere seem tw o sources fo r the com ­ m ode o f awareness than its awareness m on refusal to adm it this. O ne is a failo f its awareness o f its awareness—o f ure to distinguish the truism th a t the what? E very subject, even and especial- thing know n m ust be o th er than the

•V

knowing from the quite different stipu- we directly feel. Do we not also include lation that the known must he outside these feelings? Arc they not features of the knowing. A constituent of a whole our consciousness at the moment? is certainly other than the whole, yet Suppose that the divine knowing is obviously not outside it! But, we shall indeed a self-inclosed reality, with the perhaps be told, the object must not known entities outside it; we then have only he other than—it must also be in- a total reality, God-and-W orld, which dependent of—the knowledge. Suppose is more inclusive than either, and of this too be granted, why may not parts \\ hich God is one constituent and be independent of the whole containing W orld the other. If it is held an impiety them? Must cverv whole be “organic ’ that God have constituents, what about with respect to all its constituents? Most the more obvious impiety that he should philosophers, at least, would reject such be a mere constituent? The entire quesan extreme view. But then they must tion alters its meaning according as one not argue, "independent of, therefore includes or omits the temporal factors, outside, the knowledge.” E or T . A purely eternal deity can have T he second source of the denial that no constituents. Granted. Also, to have divine knowledge can literally include constituents in just the wav in which the world within itself is an unconscious purely temporal (“corruptible” ) beings piece of anthropomorphism. The very have them is certainly unworthy of people who insist that divine knowledge deity. But to have constituents in the is radically different from human knowl- manner appropriate to a being with an edge, so that the term “know” is here eternal aspect, but for the rest (in cateanalogical rather than univocal, are of- gorically supreme fashion) temporal, is ten the ones who argue (in effect) as something that neither classical theism follows: W e as knowers do not literally nor classical pantheism, nor any other include the known; therefore, God docs commonly held traditional doctrine, has not. This is to forget that human so- adequately considered, called “knowledge* of any concrete If the supreme lacks awareness of the actuality is mostly ignorance and for the world (E C E ), then he is not supreme rest mostly guesswork and probability, in awareness. Besides, the adequate In the highest sense of “knowledge,” awareness-of-X is logically X plus somenamely, direct, infallible, concrete, clear- thing, and thus there is no sense to the ly conscious apprehension, we human notion of something superior to all possubjects can scarcely be said to have any sible awareness. But, on the other hand, knowledge. G ranted that we do not “ in- if the supreme has awareness of the elude” mountains when we “know ” world, then, as we have seen, it cannot them, unless in some very attenuated be w ithout the contingency and change sense of include, equally we do not of the latter. know mountains, except in a very atT h e only way, we suggest, consisttenuated sense of “know ,” by com pari- ently to relate the supreme to awareness son w ith w hat the w ord means w hen and to the world is to admit a temporal we say that G od knows mountains, aspect of deity. A t once the foregoing W hat, then, is to dem onstrate that the difficulties vanish. F or the temporal astw o attenuations are not identical? F ur- pect of deity can very well include the therm ore, w herever our knowledge tem poral world, since a changing whole achieves som ething like infallibility, it can certainly contain changing elements, also becomes evident that it includes the and since the novel can certainly be know n w ithin itself. T h u s w e know, in know n by knowledge similarly novel, a sense infallibly, the aches and pains o r the contingent b y knowledge like-

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wise contingent. There will then be for whom whatever happens in the connothing paradoxically superior to the tingenr world is literally a matter of iMsupreme, no entirety of reality other difference. Such a being is totally “iinthan the supreme itself, no more con- passible” toward all things, utterly increte object of reference from which sensitive and unresponsive. This is the deity is abstracted. Rather deity will be exact denial that ‘‘God is love.” It means the integrated totality, the ultimate con- that nothing we can possibly do, enjoy, crete from which all abstract features or suffer can in any way whatever conare taken. tribute a satisfaction or value to the T he beauty of this position is that, if divine life greater or different from a changing reality can include a chang- what this life would have possessed had ing world, it can equally well include we never existed or had our fortunes an unchanging factor. For a whole, in been radically other than they are. order to change, has no need of altering Strange that for so many centuries it all its components; indeed, it need not was held legitimate to call such a deity “alter” any, since it will suffice to ac- a God of love, or purpose, or knowlquire new components. There is ob- edge! W hat we really have is the idea viously change in the passage from abc of sheer power, sheer causation, bv to abed. Yet no component has altered, something wholly neutral as to what, unless the absence of d be called a com- if anything, may be its effects. The p o n en t-a strained use of language at naked worship of pow er is with wonbest. derful exactitude, although unwittingPrecisely the same applies if, instead ly, enshrined in this doctrine. Is it wholo f change in components, w e speak of ly an accident that a hierarchical view contingency and necessity. If a whole of ecclesiastical polity is historically is necessary, all its parts or members connected therewith? m ust be. But if a whole is accidental, E, or the doctrine of Plotinus, is the not all its parts need be so. Suppose, in paradox of a Something superior to all A bed, A has being by necessity, and else but totally w ithout internal contrast b ,c ,d z r e contingent items of existence, o r diversity, even, apparently, such as It will then be true that A b e d exists is implied in self-awareness. However, contingently. F or instance, suppose A as we shall sec, Plotinus is wiser than he is the generic form “adequately know- knows, and he almost gives us the twoing whatever exists, as existent, and aspect doctrine, E T C K W , but w ith a whatever is m erely possible as m erely brave attem pt to make it look like a possible,” and suppose that b means ‘'a one-aspect doctrine. A fter Plotinus, the certain thing adequately know n as exist- T and W factors are lost for a thousand ent and as having a certain accidental years. But indirectly these factors concharacter,” and that c means “som ething tinue to qualify the dom inant concepelse know n as having another accidental tion. F or example, Jesus is a tem poral character.” A is then a necessary law of being; yet, it was said, Jesus is G od. the divine knowing, w ith contingent Since identity is a transitive relation, application to each particular case, w hat it seems that G od is a tem poral being is not contingent being only th at there after all. (If it is b u t one of the “tw o are some such applications o r other. natures” w hich is G od, then G od is a T h e logical difficulties o f EC K are part o f a man; or, if Jesus is not a man, not, contrary to com m on opinion, bal- but a G od-m an, then both “G o d ” and anced by adequate religious values. A “m an” are constituents o f a w hole deity w ho cannot in any sense change w hich is m ore than either and w hich, or have contingent properties is a being in one aspect, is temporal.)

1

>U C T I O N

The same sort of thing happened in contingent objects, similarly inexpressIndia and China. The suprcinc-Brahina, ible, and (as we have seen) only by Nirvana, Tao—is often described as inconsistency does ECK, or classical timeless and wholly absolute; but, if the theism, appear to escape this limitation, empty abstractness of the supreme so E makes even self-awareness inexpressconceivcd is unsatisfying, then Vishnu ible from the standpoint of deity. Thus or the Deified Buddha or an Avatar will ETCKW is the truly catcgorial con­ serve better. Is it not time to face the ccption of the supreme, the conception issue at its center: W hy not put con- that reduces the categories to their crctcncss, which means time as well as proper status as essentially expressions eternity, passivity as well as activity, of deity. Then anything you please is sensitivity as well as power, into our either God as knowing tnc world, or concept of the supreme? ( In what sense, the world as known by God, or some if any, deity has been peculiarly “in- aspect of these; but, since the subject carnatc” in a man is a question that may includes its object, the form of the obthen be discussed on its merits instead ject is a form of the subject, on its “conof being given a spurious meaning by tent" side. T o describe the knowing-ofassigning it the role of mitigating initial all-things is to describe all things known blunders in our concept o f deity.) as well; so any category refers either to N ow we come to views which admit an aspect or to a member of the divine the T factor. They may do this either reality. Thus to be “actual” now is to in combination with E or without it. be enjoyed by deity now (implying that In the latter case, the use of the word there is a diversity of now's in G od); “G od” is of dubious propriety. Only in to be “possible” now is to be something m ythology, not in any philosophy or God may come to enjoy. T he divine is systematic theology, can one speak of thus not pure actuality but the standard a merely created deity, a deity with no or definitive actuality, and by the same undcrived being whatever. Even apart token he is the standard or definitive from the terminological question, the potentiality. T he theory of pure actualibasic point is that only a deity whose ty makes G od neither the definitive acexistence or essential individuality is tuality nor the definitive potentiality, eternal can have much philosophic rel- For it implies that you cannot say what cvance. T h e relevance lies just in the is actual and what is merely potential way in which deity alone among in- by saying what G od is, because his acdividuals is able to unite time and etem i- tuality (according to the theory) has ty, necessity and contingency, actuality no alternatives and is wholly neutral as and potency, and thus to explain the regards alternative possibilities. Thus categories by exhibiting them as ab- the omniscient being cannot function, stractions from its ow n actuality. B ut as he logically ought to, as the measure this function is equally jeopardized by of all things, the actual as actual, the the omission either of E o r of T from possible as possible. For he is not difthe union E T . ferential as between actualized and nonW ittingly o r unw ittingly, all views actualized potentialities in the world, other than E T C K W sacrifice categori- This incurable neutrality, w hich is ality. EC, EC K, E, and E C K W make metaphysical incompetence, is the price the category of tem porality (and w ith of m onopolanty. Pantheists seek to it contingency, relativity, diversity, evade the problem b y denying that com plexity) extrinsic to God, inexpress- there is a real distinction between actual ible in term s of the divine nature. EC, and possible (even R oyce finally did in addition, makes knowledge, as having this). T h ey thus make deity differential

PHI LOSOPHERS

(in Pickwickian fashion) by abolishing all intelligible difference. Against afi these difficulties, the T factor is our safeguard. It makes the W factor, the pantheistic motif, innocuous and thus opens the door of escape from the par­ adoxes of a supreme reality w hich y et cannot intelligibly contain the totality o f the actual. Since the W factor, as rendered in­ nocuous by the T factor, is radically different in its implications from the W factor as otherw ise interpreted, to call both E C K W and F.TCK W by the one term “pantheism ” is to open the door to num erous fallacies of ambiguity. E T C K W has been called, by several w riters (w ho have not always clearly defined their view ), “panentheism,” anti this term seems in every respect ap­ propriate. G od is not just the all of (o th er) things; but y e t all other things are literally in him. H e is not just the w hole o f ordinary individuals, since he has unity o f experience, and all other individuals are objects of this experi­ ence, w hich is no m ere sum o f its ob­ jects; m oreover, his identifying “per­ sonality traits" are entirely independent o f any set o f ordinary actual individuals w hatever. T o be himself he docs not need this universe, but only a universe, and only contingently does he even contain this particular actual universe. T h e m ere essence o f G od contains no universe. W e are tru ly “outside” the divine essence, though inside G od. I t w ill no dou b t strike some as strange that, in listing the five factors th at dis­ tinguish the various ideas o f G od, noth­ ing is said as to “will” o r “freedom ” in G o d o r as to “personality,” and also n othing as to “pow er,” “creation,” or “goodness.” Surely, it m ay be thought, these are vital fo r religion, and their om ission a serious oversight. In brief, o u r defense is th a t the co rrec t interrela­ tio n o f o u r five factors will constitute a fa irly adequate definition o f divine will, freedom , personality, pow er, good­

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ness; whereas, without these five fac­ tors, the traditional terms will have no sharp conceptual significance but will be merely honorific or emotional, mere epithets. Classical theists have often spoken of divine personality, or divine persons (as in the T rinity), and have derided the pantheists because of their “impersonal” deity; but what personali­ ty m ight be if entirely devoid of tem­ poral process, potentiality, and passivity, they have as little told us as the pan­ theists. T he same holds for “will” and “freedom .” In the shcerly eternal, what is eternally is, and there' is no meaning to the question, “W hat m ight it have been?” Hence, if G od’s will is that of a sheerly eternal being, it is meaningless to ask, “W hat m ight his volition have been (other than the actual one to create the w o rld )?” And hence to speak of freedom, alternatives of possible voli­ tion, is here out of place. O n the other hand, if G od is an eternal-temporal being, eternal in essential individuality, tem poral in the flux of his acts and ex­ periences, if he is conscious and knows all things, how can he fail to be also a volitional personality? W h a t is aware­ ness, apart from all volitional response? Could one be aware, in the fullest de­ gree, of the joys and sorrow s of others and not share these sufficiently to wish to further the one and hinder the other? W e think that only a verbal psychology could seem to justify such an abstrac­ tion of awareness from evaluation and response. Awareness is essentially a re­ sponse, an adaptation to others. And w hat is “personality” b u t an enduring individual character o r essence in a flux o f such responses? As such is it know n to psychology and com m on experience. W n a t has m ade certain ideas o f G od im personal has been the denial o f al­ ternativeness, o f the distinction betw een character and ac t such that, o f tw o m utually incom patible possible acts, either one w ould express the same in­ dividual o r personal character. N o w

INTRODUCTION

*3

time is the order of alternativeness—the tion in their self-creation (Whitehead), order which relates real and merely po- According to many of the greatest p o ­ tential acts. Thus T in our symbolism losophcrs, experiences are the very acmight perhaps as well have been P, for tuality of all things, and they arc always potentiality. It is the denial of potential- in one xspcct re/f-crcatcd. N o mere ity to deity, or the denial of temporal- manipulation of pre-existent things can ity, that makes any genuine conception make a single new experience, nor can of divine personality impossible. (In anything not the subject of that experirhus equating nontcmporal with non- cnee make it to be what it is. It must potential, we arc in agreement with the make, enact, itself, great tradition of Western theism. What, then, becomes of the famous which has almost always either denied idea of creation ex nihilo? Whereas, it both or affirmed both of deity and has is commonly said, ordinary creative acassumed their equivalence.) tion presupposes “m atter/’ divine creaIt is often thought that any two per- tion does not. Admittedly, ordinary sons, even God and a man, must each eases of creative power lack, in princibc outside the other. But this seems a pie, something reserved for the categoritoo narrow and ungencralized use of cally supreme case. But, still, “out of anthropomorphic analogy. Human per- nothing’' is a dubious way of formulatsons are indeed outside each other in ing this categorically privileged way space, since each is but a part of the of creating. Does God create an adult whole actuality'. But the whole of ac- out of nothing or out of a child? T he tuality, as content of the experience of creative functioning of deity involved one person, will be “outside'’ the other in the production of Beethoven’s music persons only as a whole is—partly—out- certainly did not treat as nothing the side its parts (Fechner); they, however, free self-decisions of Beethoven’s predwill certainly not be outside it! Mutual ecessors in composition. Only in conexternality here is not required. Mutual nection with an absolute first moment action and reaction, on the other hand, of time has even divine creation no are indeed required. T he whole-person antecedent data or conditions. (The and part-person interact. If they did not, contrary views of Augustine and Aquithen, since being is always (in one as- nas will be considered in chap, iii.) pect) power, any part which, in relation O ur classification of doctrines stresses to the whole, had no power to act but consciousness and knowledge but not was m erely passive would, in this rela- volition and power. There is an advantion, have no being, and hence, contra- tage in this. F or only a conscious being dictorily, would not be a part. T o have w ith complete knowledge, or one “to a self-deciding part is not to decide that whom all hearts are open,” can be part but rather to enjoy or suffer its trusted to use pow er in ways approself-decision. As Fechner has said, not priate to the state of these hearts. This all volitions in a mind need be by that is the goodness of God. (See our “Commind. T h e sense in which evil is in G od m ent” on al-Ghazzali in chap, iii.) is thus explained. G od suffers our evil It should be granted that any classifiacts, b u t his volition is always of good, cation of doctrines is somewhat arbiI t can be claimed that this does not limit trary and that other classifications rethe perfection o f the divine pow er b u t main not only possible but for some makes it the ideal case of w hat all pow er purposes superior. But there seems to essentially is—pow er over powers, par- be a real need to counteract the venertial determ ining of the finally self-de- able tendency to put pow er o r causality term ined actuality of others, participa- or eternity upperm ost in theological

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speculation, leaving divine conscious­ power-worship cannot be countered by ness, awareness, and responsiveness to the simple expedient of accusing us of take' their chances, often very poor the contrary superstition, effect-wor­ chances at that. T o impute responsive­ ship, process-worship. W e worship suness or love or even awareness or voli­ premc-being-in-supremc-bccoming, sution to a nontemporal being has always preme-causc-in-supremc-effcct; that is, seemed at best a pious fiction. W ords we worship the supreme, not any polar like “knowledge” or “personality” or category. If it be said that, after all, “will” come cheaply enough; the task is supreme-inferior is a polarity’, we reply to find a logical structure in our think­ that even here we worship the supremeing about deity that makes room for as-containing-thc-inferior and deriving the ideas thus labeled. enrichm ent from this containing. Even Since the m onopolar doctrine assimi­ inferior being-becoming is not degraded lates the contrast between G od and in this doctrine but glorified by the other individuals to that between being recognition of its contribution to God and becom ing (o r cause and effect, or himself. N othing is debased to the status simplicity and com position), one may of irrelevance, whereas in the monosay that in this doctrine the category of polar procedure all becoming and all cfbeing is virtually the object of worship, fects are mere impertinences, since beand the contrary pole is degraded. So ing just as being is held to have all value. w e m ay speak o f “ontolatiy,” worship G od should least of all require the kind o f being, or similarly “etiolatry,” w or­ of praise that makes the better seem ship o f cause. N o w the rem edy for still better by saying that the inferior is these diseases is not to substitute the even less than inferior, is nothing, mere­ contrary pole, worshiping becoming ly evil, o r w holly negligible. But that and effect, and degrading being and is the kind of praise he has generally cause. T h e rem edy is to recognize that received! W e thus read our lack of both poles under each category apply imagination, o r of generosity, or simply in one w ay to G od and in another to of love, into G od himself. Some o f our selections present proofs other individuals. G od is neither being as contrasted to becom ing no r becom ­ o r argum ents fo r the reality of God. ing as contrasted to being; b u t cate­ All such arguments am ount to this: that gorically suprem e becom ing in w hich the proposition, "T h ere is a supremely there is a fa cto r o f categorically su­ excellent being, w o rth y o f worship,” prem e being, as contrasted to inferior expresses fundam ental o r categorical becom ing, m w hich there is inferior aspects of experience and thought, being. B oth poles have tw o levels, ana­ while the denial of this proposition con­ logically but n o t sim ply com parable. tradicts such aspects. T h ere can be as T h e divine becom ing is no m ore divine m any argum ents for G o d as one can than the divine being; b u t both are in­ distinguish fundam ental aspects o f ex­ com parable (except analogically) to perience and thought, and it seems un­ o th er being o r becom ing. F o r the line likely th at there is but one possible w ay o f categorical suprem acy m ust always o f m aking such distinctions, o r one fixed num ber o f resulting arguments. be crossed. T h e divine becom ing is m ore ulti- T h e list w e propose is as follows: there m ate than the divine being only in the arc three argum ents corresponding, sim ple sense o f being m ore inclusive, spectively, to aesthetics, ethics, and theo f being co n c rete w hile the o th er is ab- o ry o f know ledge, o r beauty, goodness, strac t. So w e m aintain th at o u r charges and tru th , and th ree argum ents coro f cause-w orship o r being-w orship o r responding, respectively, to the ideas of

cosmic order, cosmic contingency (or achieved a nearly correct version (pre­ change), and, finally, the very idea of sented as supplement to an incorrect God, or supremely excellent being, one which is all that most commentators himself. In the order named, the six ar­ seem to have noticed) of one step in guments arc: the aesthetic argument, the ontological argument. Plotinus the ethical argument, the epistemologi­ seems sometimes to be groping toward cal (“idealistic” ) argument, the design an aesthetic argument (impeded by his argument, the cosmological argument, failure to appreciate variety or contrast and the ontological argument. All of as no less essential to beauty than these arc found in some form from unity), but the possibilities of this form fairly early rimes but are usually so have not yet been properly evaluated. stated that they stand or fall by the Kant offered an ethical argument, lim­ tenability of classical theism, classical ited severely by his assumption of the pantheism, or Aristotelian theism. Only absolute independence of deity, from in rather recent times have the argu­ which it followed that the union of ments begun to shake off allegiance to righteousness and happiness which is one or other of these doctrines as their indeed the “supreme good” to be served predestined conclusion. Since these by our actions must be man’s rather doctrines arc paradoxical, and any ar­ than G od’s, so that God becomes the gument, however cogent, can be denied means to our ethico-hedonic self-real­ if one is willing to perpetrate paradox ization, instead of our self-realization (contradiction), it is no wonder that being seen (W hitehead) as our enjoy­ the usual statements of arguments for ment of the privilege of contributing to God have been found less and less con­ the self-realization of deity, which vincing. A t best these statements pose alone can possess the literal summttm a dilemma: accept the paradoxes o f the bonum. Every one of these arguments for conclusion of the argument or the para­ doxes of the atheistic denial of the con­ theism can, we believe, be given a more exact and perspicuous form than has clusion. T he cosmological argument, blended hitherto been given them. But this is a w ith the argument from order, seems subject for another occasion. T he reader is now invited to see how to appear first in Plato (Laws x). Au­ gustine gave a version, hardly a perspic­ far the analysis presented in this intro­ uous or satisfactory one, of the argu­ duction illuminates the intellectual his­ m ent from truth, which was almost to ry presented in samples through the correctly formulated b y R oyce in his following pages. It may be that he will Conception o f God. Anselm, we believe, find another interpretation more con­ will y et be granted the glory of having vincing. If so, good luck to him ’

PART ONE

Classical Views

it

Chapter I: Ancient or Quasi-Panentheism A n Enunciation of Themes IK H N A T O N

(ca .

1375-58

b .c

.)

More than three thousand years ago The world subsists in thy hand, there appeared “the first monotheist," For thou art length of life of thyself, Ikhnaton, pharaoh of Egypt. He or his Men live through thee. . . . supporters composed a number of astonishingly eloquent hymns of praise Thou riscst beautifully, O living Aton, Lord of eternity; to the sun-god, sole deity and creator of all things. It is easy to dismiss this dei­ T hy glowing hue brings life to the hearts of men, fication of the sun as naive. But since, on the one hand, the use of light as W hen thou hast filled the T w o Lands with thy love. symbol of divinity is continuous prac­ tice in theological history, and since, on O God, who himself fashioned himself, the other, the ancient Egyptian had no Maker of every land. . . . definite knowledge of the real nature Thou makest the hearts of men to live of the heavenly bodies or of light—even by thy beauty. . . . we are mystified enough in these mat­ ters—it seems reasonable to temper our All flowers live and what grows in the soil criticisms of the “idolatry” or “materi­ ality” of Ikhnaton’s view. For him the Is made to grow because thou dawnest. They arc drunken before thee. sun with its light was supremely “liv­ ing,” intelligent and purposive (having All cattle skip upon their feet; the birds in the marsh fly w ith joy, “heart” ), “wise," “loving,” self-existent Their wings that were folded are (“length of life of thyself” ), “maker” spread, of all, adored by all. The spiritual quali­ Uplifted in adoration to the living Aton. ties here attributed to the sun-goa are [Sec. 1, James Henry Breasted, The Drum of not only ethically exalted but are less primitive intellectually than the quali­ Conscience (New York: Charles Scribner’s 19)3), verses from pp. 284, 284, 285, 286, ties attributed to deity in many later Sons, 287, 288, 288, and 289, respectively.] documents. COMMENT

“T h e Earliest M onotheisnf ’

O sole G od, beside whom there is It is manifest that such poetic out­ pourings are not doctrinal metaphysics no other. T hou didst create the earth according and that no classification in precise metaphysical term s can unequivocally to th y heart. . . . apply to them. H ow ever, there is an F or thou hast made them for thyself, alternative to the usual procedure of T h o u lord of them all, who weariest either rejecting the ancient religious thyself for them . . . . w ritings as m ere crudity o r idolatry or T h o u didst make the distant sky in forcing them into the mold of classical theism (o r pantheism ). F or if anything order to rise therein, In order to behold all that thou hast is clear it is that these spiritual ancestors of ours did n o t intend to sacrifice all made. . . . 1.

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predicates implying dipolarity. It is reasonable to infer that the followers of Aron believed that the Supreme Re­ ality was not temporal in the inferior sense of having been bom or of being in danger of destruction. God lives, not rovided this happens or that docs not; ut, rather, he is of himself length of life. And he is in some sense or aspect self-creative. But these men were not in love w ith abstract concepts like be­ ing, eternity, absoluteness, o r infinity. T hey did not worship such thin ab­ stractions, b u t rather love, conscious­ ness, vision, and beauty. Indeed, the concreteness often regarded as mere

SPFAK

OF

H I N D U S C R IP T U R E S (ca. 1 0 0 0 T h e oldest of surviving religions, Hinduism, goes back to the Vedic hvmns, composed 1000 b . c . o r earlier. These hymns, regarded as divine in ori­ gin, contain a strong element o f pan­ theism, by w hich w e mean the view th at G od, although devoid o f tem poral­ ity and spatiality, is neverthless tne in­ clusive o r sole reality. Such pantheism involves a m onopolar emphasis, and this emphasis is found in m ost o f the later com m entators w ho constitute the chief figures in H indu philosophy. Being is exalted over becom ing, identity over difference, cause over effect, independ­ ence over dependence. In the BhagavadG ita this one-sidedness is, as it were, sum m ed up and canonized. A ction in this w orld o f tim e and diversity is in­ deed a d u ty som ehow included in de­ votion to th e im m utable O ne through w h ich bliss is achieved; w e are to act w ith o u t valuing the results o f action o r th e w o rld in w hich th e y are brought about. B ut w h y th ere sfiould be even an illusion o f diversity, and a universal te n d e n c y to desire th e fruits o f diverse a c tiv ity , is a m y stery . T h e suprem e u n ity is conceived fo r th e m ost p art as exclusive o f th e polarities o f existence. I t in clu d es th e ir un re ality , n o t th eir re ­

GOD

crudity and primitive idolatry serves to some extent as a safeguard against the sophisticated idolatry of characterizing God solely by the abstract qualities of independence and self-sufficiency. Perhaps the most serious objection to Ikhnaron is his failure to stress “right­ eousness” in God as well as love and beauty. Here, too, there arc compensa­ tions. The w ild abuse of the idea of divine justice, as seen in the cosmic ex­ tension of penal codes and rewards and the excessive moralization of reality, makes some of us feel kindly toward the God-intoxicated aesthete who w-as Ikhnaton. b .c

.)

ality; it does not really include them. And how it can m atter at all w hether we achieve happiness or not is equally unclear. T h e O ne is not enhanced by our devotion (Bakti), and, since we are not really distinct from the One, nei­ th er are we really enhanced. N o clear idea o f divine love for the creatures is to be found, and in reality such love would be m ere self-devotion. In so far as these hym ns represent pantheism, they will be discussed later (chap. iv). B ut w e would deny that pantheism is the only conclusion which can be draw n from the V edic hymns; indeed, the hym ns are themselves far from being w holly consistent in their expressions. In some apparently atypical passages, such as those w e here present, the panentheistic alternative is implied. H y m n to T im e • 2. T im e, the steed, runs w ith seven reins (ray s), thousand-eyed, ageless, rich in seed. T h e seers, thinking holy thoughts, m ount him, all th e beings (w orlds) are his wheels. W ith seven w heels does this Tim e ride, . . . im m ortality is his axle. . . .

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He carries hither all these beings Rudra, Parganya, Yama, Mritvu, Tsana. (worlds); . . . they call him Time in the highest heaven. He was not strong enough. H e cre­ He surely did bring hither all the be­ ated the Vis (people), the classes of ings (worlds), he surely did encompass Devas. . . . all the beings (worlds). Being their fa­ He was not strong enough. He cre­ ther, he became their son; there is, ver­ ated the Sudra colour (caste), as Pushan ily, no other force, higher than he. (as nourisher). This earth verily is Time begot yonder heaven. Time Pushan (the nourisher); for the earth also (begot) these earths. That which nourishes all this whatsoever. was, and that which shall be, urged He was not strong enough. H e cre­ forth by Time, spreads out. ated still further the most excellent . . . in Time the sun burns. In Time Law (dharma). Law is the Kshatra are all beings, in Time the eye looks (power) of the Kshatra, therefore there abroad. is nothing higher than the Law. In Tim e tapas (creative fervour) is Thenceforth even a weak man rules a fixed; in Tim e the highest (being is stronger with the help of the Law, as fixed); In time brahma (spiritual exalta­ with the help of a king. tion) is fixed; Tim e is the lord of every­ [Sec. 2, The Sacred Bookt of the East, ed. thing, he was the father of Pragapati. F. Max Muller (Oxford: Garendon Press, By him this (universe) was urged 1897), XL1I, 224-25. Sec. ), iWd, XV, Part II, 85, 88-89.] forth, by him it was begotten, and upon him this (universe) was founded. COMMENT

T he Universal Self 3. In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person. H e looking round saw nothing but His Self____ H e feared, and therefore any one who is lonely fears. H e thought, “As there is nothing but myself, w hy should I fear?" Thence his fear passed away. For w hat should he have feared? Verily fear arises from a second only. But he felt no delight. T herefore a man w ho is lonely feels no delight. H e wished for a second. H e was so large as man and w ife together. H e then made this his Self to fall in tw o (pat), and thence arose husband (pati) and w ife ( patnl). . . . V erily in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. T h a t being one, was n o t strong enough. I t created still fu rth e r the m ost excellent Kshatra (p o w er), viz. those Kshatras (pow ers) am ong the Devas—Indra, V aruoa, Soma,

Much of the Hindu emphasis on monopolarity seems to us a way of saying that the essence of God is abso­ lute, immutable, independent, a glory which nothing can tarnish or enhance; also that this essence is in all of us, a universal point of identity in all differ­ ences. W e shall argue later (in com­ menting upon Plato and Aristotle) for the great truth in this traditional affir­ m ation. But missing from such tradi­ tional interpretations are the emphases present, for example, in the preceding passages, w ith their implication that it is also of the essence of G od that there should be divine accidents w hich are in no sense less real, but are m ore con­ crete, than the m ere essence, consti­ tuting a glory inclusive of the essential glory as the concrete includes the ab­ stract. W e subm it that it would be hard to imagine a clearer statement, in primi­ tive m ythical form, of the doctrine that

PHILOSOPHERS

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F

GOD

becoming is the inclusive side of the du­ Upanishads vies with impersonal no­ ality, being-becoming, than the Athar- tions of the original One Thing, Ls va-Vedic “Hym n to Time.” The strik­ enough to render the purely pantheistic ing figure of the wheel pictures immor­ account of this literature a debatable tality as deity’s axle; t v implication, rendering. For personality as purely ab­ then, the temporal world of becoming solute is a mere jumble of words. A is the wheel’s rim, revolving about the person knows, that is relates himself to, changeless axle. The conclusion would other beings; he has purposes with ref­ appear to follow that real temporal, as erence to them, etc. All of this is con­ well as eternal, components make up tradicted by a strict pantheism. To the reality which is God. And how bet­ make personality supreme is to make ter convey the notion that the Supreme dipolarity supreme, for a person intrin­ is both cause and effect, both creator sically and irrcducibly involves the con­ and creature, both productive and re­ trast between dependence and independ­ ceptive, than by describing the “lord of ence, fixity ana change, as both real. all’’ as both father and son of the Herein lies part of the ground for our worlds? Still, again, w hat better em­ insistence that early expressions about bodiment could there be of the prin­ God almost by necessity involve dipolar ciple that nonsocial reality is deficient metaphysics and pancnrheistic motifs. reality (im plying that relativity is some­ If the main line of Hindu metaphysics how m ore than the m erely “absolute”) developed only one side of an initial than the description from the Upan- dipolar insight, the same is true of ishads o f the one Self which, finding Christian and M ohammedan theology’s itself w ithout “delight,” enriches its main line, which we call classical the­ own life and “strengthens” itself by ism. But, in all of them, some approxi­ m ultiplying beings w ith which it can mation to a dipolar view is to be found, enjoy relationships? Even the mere as, for instance, in Sri Jiva and many presence o f the concept of divine per­ others in India, including some contem ­ sonality, which in the Vedas and the porary H indu thinkers.

L A O -T S E (F o u rth C en tu ry [P] Taoism is one o f the oldest o f the m ore subtle religious doctrines. T he T a o T 6 C h i n g seems to have been com ­ posed in the fourth century b .c . and to derive from sources som ewhat earlier. Lao-tse is a legendary character whose very existence is disputed. T h e Taoist doctrine is prim arily a design for living ra th e r than a view o f the cosmos, ex­ alting such qualities as inaction (it is said to have been a time o f “unem ploy­ m ent” am ong scholars), inconspicuous­ ness, m odesty, and noninterference. But m ore is involved; to praise inactivity seems to involve depreciating a certain hum an attitu d e o f wishing to dom inate,

b .c

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to rule tyrannically so th at the ruled are essentially puppets. Also depreci­ ated is a certain practicality that is for­ ever wishing to be cause o f effects en­ visaged definitely in advance. T h e T ao ­ ist attitude m ay yield som ething fo r the life of man and G od, the view, namely, that rule should inspire rather than ma­ nipulate, that its role is to furnish an atm osphere o r m edium in w hich things freely g ro w o f themselves rather than being m ade to be o r becom e. A part from this design fo r living, w e find some fascinating b u t elusive m etaphysi­ cal suggestions w hich deserve later com m ent.

K

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D ouble N a tu re o f the Tao

All creatures, trees, and plants are soft and tender in their early growth. 4. The Tao thnr can he expressed is And in dying become withered and not the Unchanging Tao; dry. The name that can he named is not the Thus we may say that rigidity and Unchanging Name. hardness arc related to death. The Unnamahlc is that from which Heaven and earth derived, leaving it­ While weakness and tenderness are re­ lated to life. . . . self unchanged. Thinking of it as having a name, let it And truly, the Greatest Ruler interferes the least. be called the Mother of all things. [See. 4, Hcrmon Ould, The Way of Accept­ He who is without earthly passions and without desire can perceive the pro­ ance: A New Version of I.ao Tte's Tao T i found mystery of that unmanifested Ching (London: Andrew Dakcrs, Ltd., 1946), existence. He who has not rid himself of desire can perceive only the Manifest, with its differentiations. Nevertheless, the Manifest and the Unmanifest are in origin the same. This sameness is the M ystery of Mys­ teries, the deep within the deep, the Doorway into all M ystery. . . .

verses from pp. 1J-16, 22, 42, 90, 42.1 COMMENT

The conceptual element is somewhat more heavily stressed here than in the ns to Aton and the Vedic hymns. assertion that there is an unchang­ ing ultimate from which change pro­ ceeds is clear enough. In so far, the theory leans either toward classical the­ Because the world recognizes beauty as ism or toward emanationism, especially beauty, ugliness is known to be ugly. the latter, since no attribution of con­ Everyone knows goodness to be good­ sciousness to the Unchanging seems to ness, and to know this is to Know be made. W e are told that the unmani­ w hat is not good. fested, undifferentiated, and unchang­ Similarly, existence implies non-exist­ ing T ao and die differentiated manifest ence; changing principle are originally the T he hard and the easy complement same in a way that baffles explanation. each other; . . . T h e truth, we are reminded, is not in Before and after, earlier and later, back one side of the ultimate contraries but and front— in the contrariety itself, the active with All these com plem ent one another. the passive, existence w ith nonexistence Therefore the Sage, the self-controlled (actuality w ith potentiality? being with man, dwells in actionless activity, becom ing?). Moreover, Taoism praises poised between contraries. . . . just that w hich unbridled classical the­ T h e highest good may be likened to ism ultimately dispraises, namely, the “passive,” receptive, responsive, un­ water. dominating, “yielding,” ,{tender,” pli­ W a ter benefits all creatures y et does ant. In so far, it is a corrective to the not strive o r argue w ith them. all-too-unmistakable apotheosis of the It rests content in those low ly places masculine, managing, practical, causa­ which others despise. . . . tive, in our traditional theism. But, also, H e w ho while recognizing his manhood Taoism is hardly a pantheistic doctrine, for the characteristic denial of reality Yet holds also to his wom anhood. Becomes a channel for all the w orld----- to the changing and diverse seems rela-

r

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PHILOSOPHERS

lively absent. And nature is praised rather than depreciated. All this, plus Taoism’s polemic against any principle of rigid causative control, is at least vaguely favorable to a nonrmneated

SPEAK

dipolar view of the Supreme. If wc claim I.ao-tsc for this position, it is without wishing to strive with anyone who disputes the claim. Such strife would hardly be in the spirt of the Tao!

T H E J U D E O - C H R I S T I A N S C R IP T U R E S (F ifth [? ] C e n tu ry b . c . to S econd C e n tu ry a . d . ) In contrast to the Egyptians, the H e­ any analogy to the sympathy, the re­ brews avoided selecting any one natu­ sponsiveness, the deriving of value from ral phenomenon, such as “light,” as pe­ others, which is an essential dimension culiarly divine. True, man himself was of love? Those who insist upon simply somehow an “image of G od,” and the combining u tter nonrclarivity of deity views of the earliest biblical authors, with the assertion that, metaphorically which later writers struggled to refine, speaking, G od knows and loves the contained elements of anthropom or- world are speaking, in our judgment, hism. Moreover, however far the Te­ not analogically but equivocally. For centuries certain biblical passages, nement was carried, we can say—as we did of Ikhnaton—that the biblical samples of which are set forth herein­ authors certainly had no intention of after, have been interpreted by thcoloians who were convinced that their giving up the spiritual or psychological ogma of a purely absolute deity was predicates of deity, such as will, knowl­ edge, and love, in order to exalt some supported thereby. W e invite the mere monopolar category of Being or reader to judge w hether or not absoInfinity. Quarrel if you will w ith meta­ Iutisric dogmas are indeed present in phorical expressions' like “the w rath of the following lines. God,” or his “pity,” as wholly nonlit­ T h e Creator eral concessions to the weakness of the 5. W hen G od began to create the human understanding; still, it may be heavens and the earth, the earth was a suggested that the minimum to be ex­ pressed by such metaphors is this: that desolate waste, w ith darkness covering God is not blankly neutral to the hap­ the abyss and a tem pestuous wind rag­ penings in the world, not simply abso­ ing over the surface of the waters. T hen lute w ith respect to them, but rather G od said, evaluatively sensitive to the differences "L et there be light!” in all things in a w ay analogous to A nd there was light; and G o d saw “pleasure" and “displeasure” in us. T he that the light was good. G od then sepa­ issue is not: Shall these term s have a rated the Tight from the darkness. G od simply identical or “univocal” meaning called the light day, and the darkness when used of G od and o f us? Theolo­ night. Evening came, and m orning, the gians agree that the meaning is analogi­ first day. c a l T h e issue is rather: Shall there be T hen G od said, tw o levels o f evaluative sensitivity o r “L et there be a firm am ent in the m id­ responsiveness, tw o forms o f relativity, dle o f the waters to divide the waters ordinary and divine, o r shall we destroy in tw o !” the m etaphor entirely by try in g to A nd so it was. G od m ade the firm a­ m aintain an analogue o f “love” w ithout m ent, dividing the w aters th at w ere be-

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low the firmament from tliosc that were “Be fruitful, multiply, and fill the above it; and Clod called the firmament waters in the seas; and let the birds mul­ sky. Evening came, and morning, the tiply on the earth!” second day. Evening came, and morning, the fifth Then Cod said, day. “I.et the waters below the sky be Then God said, gathered into one place so that the dry "Let the earth bring forth the various land may appear!” kinds of living creatures, the various And so it was. God called the dry kinds of domestic animals, reptiles, and land earth, and the gathered waters seas. wild beasts of the earth!” God saw that it was good. And so it was. God made the various Then God said, kinds of wild beasts of the earth, the “Let the earth produce vegetation, various kinds of domestic animals, and seed-bearing plants and the various all the various kinds of land reptiles; kinds of fruit-trees that bear fruit con­ and God saw that it was good. taining their seed!” Then God said, And so it was. The earth brought “Let us make man in our image, after forth vegetation, the various kinds of our likeness, and let him have dominion seed-bearing plants and the various over the fish of the sea, the birds of the kinds of trees that bear fruit containing air, the domestic animals, the wild their seed. God saw that it was good. beasts, and all the land reptiles!” Evening came, and morning, the third So God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created day. Then G od said, him; he created both male and female. “Let there be luminaries in the firma­ Then God blessed them, and God said ment of the sky to separate day from to them, night; let them serve for signs, for fixed Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, times, and for days and years; and let and subdue it. . . . them serve as luminaries in the firma­ Further, God said, ment of the sky to shed light on the “See, l give you all the seed-bearing plants that are found all over the earth, earth!” And so it was. G od made the two and all the trees which have seed-bear­ great luminaries, the greater luminary ing fruit; it shall be yours to eat. T o all to rule the day and the smaller one to the wild beasts of the earth, to all the rule the night—and the stars also. . , . birds of the air, and to all the land rep­ God saw that it was good. Evening tiles, in which there is a living spirit, 1 give all the green plants for food. ’ came, and m orning, the fourth day. And so it was. G od saw that all that T hen G od said, “Let the waters teem w ith shoals of he had made was very good. Evening living creatures, and let birds fly over came, and morning, the sixth day. T hus the heavens and the earth were the earth across the firmament of the finished, and all their host. O n the sky!” And so it was. G od created the great seventh day G od brought his w ork to sea-monsters and all the various kinds an end . . . desisting on the seventh day o f living, gliding creatures w ith which from all his w ork in w hich he had been the waters teem, and all the various engaged. So G od blessed the seventh kinds o f w inged birds. G od saw that it day, and consecrated it, because on it he was good, and G od blessed them, say­ had desisted from all his work, in doing w hich G od had brought about creation. ing,

3| l I I . O S O P ii i- « s

S 1> F. A K

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of context, then almost anything can be “proved” by citing words. In Philo, as the earlicstinstanccadcquately known to history, begins the long talc of the metaphysical abuse of Scripture. Texts which were not written to answer ab­ struse philosophical questions (formu­ lated usually in terms heavily loaded with monopolarity) arc made to re­ At this point a defender of Philo spond to such questions. T o criticize might interrupt, saying that the incor­ Philo here it is not necessary to quarrel ruptibility of the categorically supreme with his faith in the reliability' of Scrip­ being contradicts its being a soul in the ture. For prior to the question of truth above sense. Reply: This is again an is the question of meaning. “T he Lord instance of monopolarity or arbitrary our God is One” certainly meant that one-sidedness in rheology. An ordinary polytheism was to be rejected; but what soul in an ordinary body is corruptible; is there to prove that it meant the denial but the question just raised concerns no of every form of internal complexity in such soul bur rather a categorically su­ the one divine Person? Again, the pro­ preme soul in a likewise categorically hibition of idols or images of deity is supreme body. Now, this categorical not, of itself, a rejection of the view supremacy involves an incomparable su­ that God has a physical aspect. It im­ periority in that capacity to integrate plies only that, if there be such a physi­ the diverse activities of the body and, cal aspect, it is, as such, unique and in­ through the resulting superior richness comparable, so that no man-made con­ of life, to dominate these activities and struction or controllable object could rule them, which constitutes soul in represent it. Suppose the entire physical general. But the only way to give cate­ universe Ls the “body of deity” ; does it gorical uniqueness to the divine soul in follow that one could construct a statue such terms is to say that this soul can of the Most High or that the form of an ahvays integrate the activities of its animal, say, could be even a caricature body, which is the universe, in order of the divine form? T h e universe is, to maintain its own coherence as reflec­ among physical objects, utterly unique, tion and guiding genius of these activi­ and perhaps just as m uch so as is the ties. This reign is one which cannot be divine “W ill’’ o r “Pow er” among wills overthrown, not because the ruler is or powers. N o t even the saying, “None impassive, but because his unique flexi­ hath seen G od,” contradicts the identi­ bility of response can deal with any fication of him, in physical aspect, with situation which the ruled are capable of the universe. For it is at least highly producing or ever could be capable of problematic in w hat sense, if any, one producing. can see the universe. If ou r bodily cells In our criticism so far we may seem could see a few o f the cells around to have forgotten Philo’s contention that them, they still m ight be incapable of only God himself can show us his na­ seeing the physical man w hich these and ture. that revelation through Scripture multitudes of other cells compose o r of is crucial. But, even so, the man who having any notion of the form of a quotes Scripture (like the man who man. N o w the difference betw een the wrote it) is still a man and not God. universe and the things w e definitely W hat tells him that his quotation is see is incom parably deeper than that adequately in context? Or, if it is out between cells and a man. W e see the r u le r o f this c it y c an n o t e xist w ith no su itab le c it y to rule o r w ith to o g r e a t a d isru ption o f th e o rd e r ly fu n c tio n in g o f his c ity . I f a ru le r is, as said ab o v e, p re ­ em in en t in p o w e r b e ca u se p re -e m in e n t in resp on siv eness, th en o f c o u rse his in ­ te g r ity c an n o t su rv iv e to o g r e a t a lo ss o f c oh e re n ce in th a t to w h ic h he r e ­ sp o n d s.)

Cl . A S S 1C A I.

stars but not that in them which binds them to each other and all other things as members o f a cosm os. Even the text, I am hath sent thee” (in response to the request for the divine nam e), m ay be far enough from the m etaphysical pronouncem ent Philo and his innumerable successors will have it to be. T h e H ebrew word originally, scholars tell us, meant “ breathe” rather than “ am .” T h u s it cannot decide the issue betw een being and becoming. A pp arcntly it rather denotes the act o f living. It m ay be legitim ate (though

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to unrighteous ones,” is what the passages seem to say, if viewed without metaphysical prejudice. It is o f course an entirely unrealistic view o f language to suppose that, every time we really mean “ unchanging in the respect under discussion,” we expressly formulate this qualification rather than simply say, “ unchanging,” leaving it to the context to fix the limits of what is meant. There is no reason to expect biblical writers not to avail themselves o f this normal practice and every reason to think that they did so.

certainly bold) to read into the passage Let us turn to the basic metaphysical an assertion that deity is the one who problems of Philo’s system. Philo must cannot fail to live, the one who pri- relate the absolute or nonrelative God mordially and immortally exists as liv- to the universe whose destinies he diing, the one to whose life there is no rccts and minutely surveys. Our author contrary possibility. But to go further is more or less aware of the difficulties and infer that the life of deity is simply this involves. His principal resource for timeless or immutable is to manipulate dealing with them is in the concept of Scripture for ends that cannot be shown divine “powers,” also termed “properto have been even implicitly contained ties.” These are plural only in terms of in the minds of its writers. O f course, if their effects. From the self-sufficient one is convinced that all change is cor- actuality of deity it follows that there ruption, or implies the possibility of is no limit to the effects he can produce, corruption, then an immortally living There is even a created reason (Logos) being cannot change. But the axiom, containing all the intelligible forms of “Change implies corruptibility," is itself things, or Platonic ideas—a thought nonbiblical, a foreign principle of meta- which anticipates Plotinus and even, physics which must be evaluated on its W olfson holds, the Christian Trinity, own merits or demerits. Surrelativism That Philo does not in this way remove denies the axiom, and therefore it can- the difficulties of his position will probnot adm it the use of Scripture as proof ably be apparent. For example, the docof divine im mutability. trine (sec. 39) denies complexity to O f course, there are biblical texts deity, which means that he does not which seem directly to assert the pure contain the complexity of die world etem ality of G od. “I am the Lord, and within himself. But it is also denied that I change not.” B ut none of these texts the world contains God. So it seems occurs in a context in w hich the strict metaphysical question of a being in all aspects im mutable is under discussion, creature are constituents. This whole is On the contrary, th e context is always neither God nor w orld but a third enthat of the discussion of some specific tity of which no account is given in the sort of m utability, such as vacillation of system. O r does Philo mean it when he purpose, o r nonadherence to a resolu- says, “G od contains the world?” But tion once form ed. *‘I do not make and then G od is complex, then unm ake m y m ind on a given issue Again, we know of G od only his or alter m y principles from righteous power, and this only in term s of its

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effects. But “having” or “producing” ef­ actualities once achieved, complexity as fects seems to mean relation to these well as integrity, yes, and suffering as effects. Yet, it is held, God made the well as joy. If God is more simple than world in pure freedom and in such a the one (in the ordinary sense of unity), wav that it contributes nothing to his he is also more complex than any nonbeing, which is self-sufficing. Still, if divinc composite thing, actual or possi­ God had not made the world, he would ble. He is the eternal model of com­ not have “had” it as his effect. H ow is plexity, passivity, change-the individual God-having-a-certain-effect and God whose individuality is inseparable from not having it simply and wholly the the principles of integration of diversi­ identical entity (as he must be if totally ty, responsiveness to others, passage to independent of the creation)? W e seem novel values—and he is this just as truly driven to say that, while the world has as he is the model of personal self-identi­ God as its maker, God does not have ty or singleness, activity, permanence, the world which he has made. Likewise, or steadfastness. H ow this view contrasts with the the world is known by God, although it would be incorrect to say that he knows Philonian will appear more and more the world (for to know is to be in re­ fully in our discussions of later authors. lation to). And how can there be a real It will also be clear how heartily we arc passive relation (world to G od) where able to admire Philo for his insistence upon the voluntary character of God, there is no real active one? Thus the attempt to combine the his freedom, of which, as Philo says, spiritual self-sufficiency of deity, which man has a spark. On the other hand, we was Aristotle’s sole theme in theology fail to see any meaning whatever in the (at least, in the Metaphysics), with the idea of volition if combined with the notions of creation and providence notion of absolute nonpotentiality. If seems to encounter downright logical something is willed freely, then some­ contradictions. T hat for Philo, in con­ thing else m ight have been willed in­ trast to Aristotle, G od creates all things, stead. But the divine volition is either even perhaps their “m atter," does not essence or accident; if essence, then it remove the contradictions, since “God could not have been otherwise, and is creates the world” asserts a relation of not free save in the SpinozLstic sense, G od to the world—all the more plainly which is not Philo’s and is not, we so if the creation is held to be willed, think, biblical; while, if the volition is intentional. W e shall see if Philo’s suc­ accident, then there are accidents in cessors are any better able to deal with G od after all. (O r shall we say that the divine volition is not in but outside of the problems of this type of doctrine. N othing in the foregoing criticisms deity?) Yet here too we cannot criticize is to be taken as directed against Philo’s Philo w ithout wishing to praise him. admirable contentions that G od exists For his notion of miracle as expressing essentially, not accidentally; that he is the final superiority of creative fiat over no mere particular instance of the cate­ mere law or order and his insistence gories o r general conceptions—fo r in­ that man as well as G od has something stance, of life o r value—but is essentially, of this supralegal creativity point in the categorically existent, living, good, wise, direction of the doctrine which, in etc. W e m erely hold that this is to be W hitehead, Berdyaev, and others, seems construed w ith polar fairness, as involv­ to us the highest pinnacle of philosophiing an essential, not m erely accidental, co-religious speculation. B ut only out­ passivity as well as activity, openness to side classical theism can this doctrine novelty as well as capacity to retain attain full clarity.

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A U G U S T I N E (354—4 3 0 ): G O D A N D T IM E \ um isrin c is an o u ts ta n d in g example S C h r is tia n s of a man w h o , like Ph'lo o n c e s a t u r a te d with VJ,l-C GreekK P h ilo , is is aatt oniv '

objections to the idea of “creation" as he understands it. Having disposed of th« c objections, the matter is closed,

$worthiness l .* " p h y of the vision of of God s AuB’“ “ “ of " “ thought "WT Bui God pro- 50 not "so Ifar as the,in‘ history is claimed by the Jewish sacred w rit,n p _ concerned. Something m om ento! has t0 which Augustine adds theNevv Tes- been inaugurated, even though for more tament and the creeds of the church, than a thousand years nothing comes of The problem of the following passage it. B ■ how to understand the Genesis ac1S unt of creation, on the assumption, Eternity and Time which it never occurred to our author 59. Lo are they not full of their old (any more than it did to Philo) to ques- leaven, who say to us, “W hat was God tion seriously, that G od is a wholly im- doing before He made heaven and mutable or nonrcmporal actuality. The earth?' “For if (say they) He were proposed key to the relations of eternity unemployed and wrought not, why and the temporal w orld is the recogm- does H e not also henceforth, and for non that time is m erely the order of ever, as He did heretofore? For did any the created, so that there can be no new motion arise in God, and a new problem of w hat the eternal was doing will to make a creature, which He had “before creating.” T h e eternal creates never before made, how then would in his eternity, although the result is that be a true eternity, where there a temporal order w ith a beginning or ariseth a will, which was not? For the first state. T o establish firmly the view will of God is not a creature, but before that time is m erely a dimension of the the creature-, seeing nothing could be created and does not apply to the crea- created, unless the will of the Creator tor, Augustine is not content m erely to had preceded. T he will of God then argue 1 1 1 j L ° L only clinch 1 just how, o r in w hat sense, time is an cannot be truly called etemaL But if order of the created, and he finds the the will of G od has been from eternity familiar reference to m oving bodies, as that the creature should be, why was the essential and sufficient condition of not the creature also from eternity?" time, unconvincing. T his leads him to W h o speak thus, do not yet underan analysis of tem porality as essentially stand Thee, O W isdom of God, Light (at least, in one aspect) psychological, of souls, understand not yet how the not merely physical, an analysis w hich things be made, which by Thee, and in to some extent anticipates the m ore fully Thee are made: yet they strive to corngeneralized notions of Bergson, W hite- prehend things eternal, whilst their head, and M ontague on the same sub- neart fluttereth between the morions of ject. It is arguable th at the Saint here things past and to come, and is soil un­ makes a great discovery (though of stable. W ho shall hold it, and fix it, that course it nas precedents, fo r instance, it be settled awhile, and awhile catch in Lucretius). T ru e , this discovery is the glory of that ever-fixed Eternity, incidental to his chief purpose, w hich and compare it w ith the rimes which is merely to elim inate certain irrelevant are never fixed, and see that it cannot

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be compared; and that a long time can­ Thou art: neither in any time was time not become long, but out o f many mo­ not. tions passing by, which cannot be pro­ The Paradoxical Nature of Time longed altogether; but that in the Eter­ At no time then hadst Thou not made nal nothing passeth, but the whole is present; whereas no time is all at once any thing, because time itself Thou present: and that all time past, is driven madest. And no times are coetemal with on by rime to come, ana all to come Thee, because Thou abidest; but if they followeth upon the past; and all past and abode, they should not be times. For to come, is created, and flows out of what is time? W ho can readily and that which is ever present? W ho shall briefly explain this? W ho can even in hold the heart o f man, that it may stand thought comprehend it, so as to utter still, and see how eternity ever still­ a word about it? But what in discourse standing, neither past nor to come, ut- do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we under­ tereth the times past and to come? 60. Seeing then Thou are the Creator stand, when we speak of it; we under­ of all times, if any time was before stand also, when we hear it spoken of Thou madest heaven and earth, why say by another. W hat then is time? If no they that Thou didst forego working? one asks me, I know: if I wish to ex­ For that very time didst Thou make, plain it to one that asketh, I know not: nor could times pass by, before Thou yet I say boldly, that I know, that if madest those times. But if before heaven nothing passed away, time past were and earth there was no time, why is it not; and if nothing were coming, a time demanded, what Thou then didst? For to come were not; and if nothing were, there was no “then,” when there was time present were not. Those tw o times then, past and to come, how are they, no time. N or dost Thou by time, precede seeing the past now is not, and that to time: eke shouldest Tnou not precede come is not yet? But the present, should all times. But Thou precedest all things it always be present, and never pass into past, by the sublimity of an everpresent time past, verily it should not be time, eternity; and surpassest all [things] fu­ but eternity. If time present (if it is to ture because they are future, ana when be time) only com eth into existence, they come, they shall be past; but Thou because it passeth into time past, how art the Same, and T h y years fail not. can we say that either this is, whose T h y years neither come nor go; where­ cause of being is, that it shall not be; as ours both come and go, that they all so, namely, that we cannot truly say may come. T h y years stand together, that time is, but because it is tending because they do stand; nor are departing not to be? thrust out by coming years, for they And y et w e say, “a long tim e" and pass not away; but ours shall all be, “a short tim e” ; stilL, only of time past when they shall no more be. T h y years o r to come. A long time past (for ex­ are one day; and T h y day is not daily, ample) we call an hundred years since; but To-day, seeing T h y To-day gives and a long time to come, an hundred not place unto to-m orrow , for neither years hence. But a short time past we doth it replace yesterday. TTiiy To-day, call (suppose) ten days since; and a is E ternity; therefore didst T nou beget short time to come, ten days hence. But T h e Coetemal, to whom T hou saidst, in w hat sense is that long o r short, T his day have I begotten Thee. T hou which is not? F or the past, is not now; hast made all things; and before all times and the future, is not yet. L et us not

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87 say, “it is long” ; but of the past, but one day only; the rest being to “ *e hath been long” ; and of the future, come, if it be the first; past, if the last; 4 will be long.” O my Lord my Light, if any of the middle, then amid past and hall not here also T hy T ruth mock at to come. Sh»n? For that past time which was long, See how the present time, which alone S s ' i t long when it was now past or we found could be called long, is \T en it was y et Prcscnt:' For then abridged to the length scarce of one ht it be long, when there was, what day. But let us examine that also; be­ S o ld be long; h u t when past it was no cause neither is one day present as a 1 neer- wherefore neither could that be whole. For it is made up of four and long, which was not at all. Let us not twenty hours of night and day: of then’ say, “time past hath been long” ; "'hich, the first hath the rest to come; for we shall not find, what hath been the last hath them past; and any of the lone, seeing that since it was past, it is middle hath those Before it past, those more; but let us say, “that present behind it to come. Yea, that one hour rilne was long” ; because, when it was passeth away in flying particles. W hat­ present, it was long. For it had not yet soever of it hath flown away, is past; Lssed away, so as not to be; and there­ whatsoever remaincth, is to come. If an i n there was, w hat could be long; but instant of time be conceived, which can­ after it was past, that ceased also to be not be divided into the smallest particles long, which ceased to be. of moments, that alone is it, which may Let us see then, thou soul of man, be called present. W hich yet flies with whether present time can be long; for such speed from future to past, as not to thee it is given to feel and to measure to be lengthened out with the least stay. length of time. W h a t w ilt thou answer For if it be, it is divided into past and me? Are an hundred years, when pres- future. The present hath no space, ent, a long time? See first, w hether an W here then is the time, which we may hundred years can be present. For if the call long? . . . first of these years be now current, it is And yet, Lord, we perceive intervals present, but the other ninety and nine of rimes, and compare them, and say, are to come, and therefore are not yet, some are shorter, and others longer.. . . 61. 1 ask, Father, 1 affirm not; O mv but if the second year be current, one is now past, another present, the rest God, rule and guide me. “W ho will tell to come. A nd so if w e assume any m id­ me that there are not three rimes, (as dle year of this hundred to be present, we learned when boys, and taught all before it, are past; all after it, to boys,) past, present, and future; but come; w herefore an hundred years can­ present only, because those two are not? not be present. B ut see at least w hether O r are they also; and when from future that one w hich is now current, itself is it becometh present, doth it come out present; fo r if the cu rren t m onth be its of some secret place; and so, when refirst, the rest are to com e; if the second, tiring, from present it becometh past? the first is already past, and the rest are F or where dia they, w ho foretold things not yet. T herefore, neither is the year to come, see them, if as yet they be not? now current present; and if n o t present For that which is not, cannot be seen, as a whole, then is n o t the year present. And they who relate things past, could For tw elve m onths are a year; of w hich not relate them, if in mind they did not whatever be the cu rre n t m onth is pres- discern them, and if they were not, drey ent; the rest past, o r to come. Although could no way be discerned. Things then neither is th at cu rren t m onth present; past and to come are.”

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Permit me, Lord, to seek further. O to come; or rather of the future, dost my hope, let not my purpose be con­ teach things present? For, what is not, founded. For if rimes past and to come neither can it be taught, l oo far is this be, 1 would know where they be. way out of my ken: it is too tnighty Which yet if I cannot, yet I know, for me, / cannot attain unto it; but from wherever they be, they are not there Thee I can, when Thou shalt vouchsafe as future, or past, but present. For if it, O sweet light of my hidden eyes. W hat now is clear and plain’is, that there also they be future, they are not yet there; if there also they be past, they neither things to come nor past arc. are no longer there. Wheresoever then N or is it properly said, “there be three is whatsoever is, it is only as present. times, past, present, and to come”: yCt Although when past facts are related, perchance it might be properly said, there are drawn out of the memory, not “there be three times; a present of things the things themselves which are past, past, a present of things present, and a but words which, conceived by the present of things future.” For these images of the things, they, in passing, three do exist in some sort, in the soul, have through the senses left as traces m but otherwhere do 1 not see them; pres­ the mind. Thus m y childhood, which ent of things past, memory; present of now is not, is in time past, which now things present, sight; present of things is not; but now when 1 recall its image, future, expectation. If thus we be per­ and tell of it, I behold it in the present, mitted to speak, I see three times, and because it is still in m y memory. W heth­ I confess there are three. Let it be said er there be a like cause of foretelling too, “there be three times, past, present, things to come also; that of things which and to come” : in our incorrect wav. as yet are not, the images may be per­ See, I object not, nor gainsay, nor find ceived before, already existing, I con­ fault, if w hat is so said be but under­ fess, O my God, I know not. This in­ stood, that neither w hat is to be, now deed I know, that we generally think is, nor what is past. For but few things before on our future actions, and that are there, which we speak properly, that forethinking is present, but the ac­ most things improperly; still the things tion whereof we forethink is not yet, intended are understood. because it is to come. W hich, when we I said then even now, we measure have set upon, and have begun to do times as they pass, in order to be able what we were forethinking, then shall to say, this time is twice so m uch as that that action be; because then it is no one; or, this is just so much as that; and longer future, but present. so of any other parts of time, which be W hich way soever then this secret measurable. W herefore, as I said, we fore-perceiving of things to come be; measure times as thev pass. And if any that only can be seen, which is. But should ask me, “H ow knowest thou?” what now is, is not future, but present. I m ight answer, “I know, that we do W hen then things to come arc said to be measure, nor can we measure things that seen, it is not themselves which as y et are not; and things past and to come, are not, (that is, which are to be,) but are not.” But time present how do we their causes perchance o r signs are seen, measure, seeing it hath no space? . . . which already a r e .. . . M y soul is on fire to know this most T hou then, Ruler o f T h y creation, by intricate enigma. Shut it not up, O Lord w hat w ay dost T hou teach souls things m y G od, good Father; through Christ to come? F or T hou didst teach T h y I beseech Thee, do n o t shut up these Prophets. By w hat w ay dost T hou, to usual, y et hidden things, from m y de­ whom nothing is to come, teach things sire, that it be hindered from piercing

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know that I speak this in time, and that ?h°v enlightening mercy, O Lord. «?Vin?, !on& spoken of time, that very 1 62 1 heard oncc froni a lcamcd man’ long ’ is not long, but by the pause of rhc motions of the sun, moon, and time. How then know I this, seeing I rha constituted time, and I assented know not what time is? stars’p0r why should not the motions of Do I then measure, O my God, ^ b o d i e s rather be times' Or, if the and know not what 1 measure? I measalights 1 of heaven should cease, and a ure the motion of a body in time; and ’s wheel run round, should there the time itself do 1 not measure? Or pot­ " no time by which wc might measure could I indeed measure the motion of a those whirlings, and say, that either it body how long it were, and in how oved with equal pauses, or if it turned long space it could come from this ^m etimes slower, otherwhiles quicker, place to that, without measuring the that some rounds were longer, other “ me in which it is moved? This same shorter? Or, while we were saying this, time then, how ______ M.V, w do_____„ I measure? do we should we not also be speaking in time? by a shorter time measure a longer, as Or should there in our words be some by the space of a cubit, the space of a syllables short, others long, but because rood? for so indeed we seem by the those sounded in a shorter time, these space of a short syllable, to measure in a longer? G od, grant to men to see the space of a long syllable, and to sav say in a small thing notices common to double the other. Thus things great and small. measure we the spaces of stanzas, by 63. Let no man then tell me, that the the spaces of the verses, and the spaces motions ...... . of the heavenly bodies consti- of the verses, by the spaces of the feet, tute times, because, when at the prayer and the spaces of the feet, by the spaces n had stood still, till he of the syllables,. and the spaces of long, of one, the sun , ____ could achieve his victorious battle, the by the spaces of short syllables; not sun stood still, but time w ent on. For in measuring --------:— L---------by pages/r(for ’’then we meas­ its own allotted space of time was that ure spaces, not times;) but when we battle waged and ended. I perceive time utter the words and they pass by, and then to be a certain extension. B ut do we say “it is a long stanza, because I perceive it, o r seem to perceive it? composed of so many verses; long Thou, Light and T ru th , w ilt shew me. verses, because consisting of so many Dost T hou bid m e assent, if any de­ feet; long feet, because prolonged by so fine time to be “m otion o f a body”? many syllables; a long syllable because double to a short one.” But neither do Thou dost n o t bid me. 64. F or and if a body be sometimes we this way obtain any certain measure moved, sometimes stands still, then we of time; because it may be, that a shortmeasure, not his m otion only, b u t his er verse, pronounced more fully, may standing still too by tim e; and w e say, take up more time than a longer, pro“it stood still, as m uch as it m oved” ; or nounced hurriedly. And so for a verse, “it stood still tw ice o r thrice so long a foot, a syllable. W hence it seemed to as it m oved” ; o r any o ther space w hich me, that time is nothing else than proour m easuring hath either ascertained, traction; b u t of what, I know not; and or guessed; m ore o r less, as w e use to I marvel, if it be not of the mind itself? say. Tim e th en is n o t th e m otion of a F or w hat I beseech Thee, O my God, body. do I measure, w hen I say, either indefAnd I confess to T hee, O L ord, th at initely “this is a longer rime than tia tT 1 yet know n o t w h a t tim e is, and again or definitely “this is double th a r? T hat I confess un to T hee, O L ord, th at I I measure time, I know; and yet I n w s-

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urc not time to come, for it is not yet; nor present, because it is not protracted by any space; nor past, because it now is not. What then do I measure? Times passing, not past? for so I said. Courage, my mind, and press on mightily. God is our helper, He made us, and not vee ourselves. Press on where truth begins to dawn. Suppose, now, the voice of a body begins to sound, and does sound, and sounds on, and list, it ceases; it is silence now, and that voice is past, and is no more a voice. Before it sounded, it was to come, and could not be measured, because as yet it was not, and now it cannot, because it is no longer. Then therefore while it sounded, it might; because there then was what might be measured. But yet even then it was not at a stay; for it was passing on, and passing away. Could it be measured the rather, for that? For while, passing, it was being extended into some space of time, so that it might be measured, since the present hath no space. 66. But when ended, it no longer is. How may it then be measured? And yet we measure times; but yet neither those which are not yet, nor those which no longer are, nor those which are not lengthened out by some pause, nor those which have no bounds. W e measure neither times to come, nor past, nor present, nor passing; and y et we do measure times. Measured Tim e Is in M ind 67. It is in thee, m y mind, that I measure times . . . the impression, which things as they pass by cause in thee, remains even when they are gone; this it is which still present, I measure, not die things which pass by to make this impression. This I measure, when I measure times. Either then this is rime, o r I do not measure times. W h a t when we measure silence, and say th at this silence hath held as long time as did that voice? do we not stretch out our

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thought to the measure of a voice, as if it sounded, so that we may be able to report of the intervals of silence in a given space of time? For though both voice and tongue be still, yet in thought we go over poems, and verses, and any other discourse, or dimensions of mo­ tions, and report as to the spaces of rimes, how much this is in respect of that, no otherwise than if vocally we did pronounce them. If a man would utter a lengthened sound, and had set­ tled in thought how long it should be, he hath in silence already gone through a space of time, and committing it to memory, begins to utter that speech, which sounds on, until it be brought unto the end proposed. Yea it hath sounded, and will sound; for so much of it as is finished, hath sounded al­ ready, and the rest will sound. And thus passeth it on, until the present intent conveys over the future into the past; the past increasing by the diminution of the future, until by the consumption of the future, all is past. But how is that future diminished or consumed, which as yet is not? o r how that past increased, w hich is now no longer, save that in the mind which enacteth this, there be three things done? For it expects, it considers, it remem­ bers; that so that w hich it expecteth, through that which it considereth, pass­ eth into that which it remembereth. W ho therefore denieth, that things to come are not as yet? and yet, there is in the mind an expectation of things to come. And who denies past things to be now no longer? and y et is there still in the mind a m em ory of things past. And w ho denieth that the present time hath no space, because it passeth away in a moment? and y et our consideration continued!, through w hich th at which shall be present proceedeth to become absent. It is not then future time, that is long, fo r as y et it is not: but a “long future,” is “a long expectation o f the future,” nor is it time past, w hich now

CLASSIC*

h t is long; but a long past, is is noh of the past.” “a long to rcpcat a Psalm that 1 1 am ® | begin, my expectation knou-'o e o ' f thc whole; but when is extendy

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of it had passed away from the beginning, what, and how much there remained unto the end. But far be it that Thou the Creator of the Universe, the Creator of souls and bodies, far be it, that Thou shouldcst in such wise know m„ „ W M & l y f S i

Repeated,Xand expcct.uon « to what 1 what hckno w cth !< .rh M reth » n S "S h am about to repeat, but consideration known song, arc through expectation of is present with me that through it what the words to come, and th/rem em berJ s future, may be conveyed over, so mg of those that are past, varied and , 5 to become past. W hich the more it his senses divided-not so doth anv is done again and again, so much the thing happen unto Thee, unchangeably more thc expectation being shortened, eternal, that is, the eternal C re a to r* is the memory enlarged; till the whole minds. Like then as Thou in the Beexpectation be a t length exhausted, ginning knewest the heaven and the when that whole action being ended, earth, without any variety of T hv shall have passed into memory. And this knowledge, so modest Thou in the Bewhich takes place m the whole Psalm, ginning heaven and earth, without any the same takes place in each several por- distraction of T hy action. Whoso urition of it, and each several syllable; the derstandeth, let him confess unto theesame holds in th at longer action, where- andJ whoso L ■ ■ • not, •let him understandeth of this Psalm m ay be a part; the same confess unto Thee. holds in the w hole life o f man, whereof [Sec. 59, The Confessions of St. Augustine, all the actions o f man are parts; the trans. E. B. Pusey (New York: E. P. Dutton same holds through the whole age of & Co., 1907), pp. 259-60. Sec. 60, ibid., pp. 261-64. Sec. 61, ibid., pp. 265-68. Sec. 62, iWd., the sons of men, w hereof all the lives pp. 268-69. Sec. 63, ibid., pp. 269-70. Sec. 64, ibid., p. 270. Sec. 65, ibid., pp. 271-72. Sec. 66, of men are parts. 68. And now will I stand, and be­ ibid., p. 272. Sec. 67, ibid., pp. 273-75. Sec. 68, come firm in T hee, in m y mould, T h y ibid., pp. 275-77.] truth; nor will I endure the questions of men, w ho by a penal disease thirst for T here must, Augustine seems to ar­ more than th ey can contain, and say, “what did G od before H e made heaven gue, be something capable of embracing and e a r t h . . . L et them see there­ past, present, and future within a unity. fore, that tim e cannot be w ithout cre­ For only if there are different mo­ ated being, and cease to speak that van­ ments of time, all existing as parts of ity. . . . C ertainly, if there be a mind one whole, is there time as a knowable, gifted w ith such vast know ledge and measurable entity at all. But when and foreknowledge, as to know all things as w hat does such a whole exist? A and to com e, as 1 know one wefi- whole of time cannot consist essentially wn Psalm, tru ly th a t m ind is passing in “m otion”; for a body may remain at wonderful, and fearfully amazing; in rest for a time. Moreover, how is a mo1 ■• •■ ------ Whf»n rhe hodv :

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events form portions of the space-time his preoccupations inhibited. Memory continuum and that a whole of motion and anticipation solve the problem of is simply a portion of this continuum the unity of time only so far as, thanks pervaded by certain characters, a to them, the past is not simply the no^world-line. This solution, which is longer, and the future the not-yct, ex­ the final apotheosis of Eleaticism, re­ istent. The parts of a whole must exist duces becoming entirely to being. The when the whole exists; and, if a collec­ totality of happenings does not happen; tion of the moments of time never ex­ it just is. But then nothing happens. Be­ ists in any rime, then time never exists. coming is explained away. But, thanks to memory and anticipa­ Augustine apparendy does not even tion, the past and future in a sense exist think of this ‘’solution.” And vet in a now. But, on the other hand, if they sense it is finally his own. For to G od’s both exist now, what makes the one immutable vision of all time every fact past and the other future? “No longer” is simply present. But Augustine leaves and “not yet” must retain some mean­ this conception as an obscure back­ ing, if the unity of the no-longcr and ground of his thinking, while in the the not-yet is to have meaning. Augus­ foreground he wrestles with the ques­ tine’s solution seems to be to distinguish tion, “H ow is time given to us as a between the real past, which does not whole?” In present experience, he an­ really now exist (and yet eternally it is swers, is the past found, as the remem­ there for G od!), and the memory of bered or retained, the still somehow it, which does; and so with future things possessed, and the future is found as and the anticipation of them. Is it then the anticipated or in a fashion already memories of the past and anticipations possessed. Here is the unity sought for, of the future which are long or short, in which a transition from moment A not the past and future themselves? But to moment B, to be followed by mo­ this solution is too subjectivistic. It gives ment C, is contained as a unit. W e ex­ us a unitary image of temporal passage, perience the present as following a cer­ which can be divided into hours or tain past which in a fashion is still there days, but not a unitary temporal passage for us, and consequently the present’s itself. M oreover, if only the present has relation to that past can be there also. the mode of actual existence, then the And we experience the future as in a past is either an inactual potency or has fashion already there for us, so that we some third mode of being w hich is nei­ now are in relation to that future. If / ther actuality nor potentiality. This am the moving body, then m y having third mode seems never to be elucidated been in Paris is real for me here in Chi­ in G reek or medieval philosophy. The cago. But mere em pty m atter cannot be present comes into being, our author positively conceived to contain in it­ says, by pushing the previous present self as here in Chicago a reference to a out of being—into what, sheer nonen­ previous sojourn in Paris. (T h a t from tity? B ut this is characterless, and the certain “laws” this m ight be inferred past has very definite character. Into a is m erely the problem over again. H ow m ere possibility? This is nonsense. W e can a law be inscribed in a lump of do not say m erely, “W ashington could stuff located som ewhere in space? W h a t have crossed the Delaware, or could is Jaw to m ere stuff?) have lived.” W ashington is fact, not So far we are echoing Augustine or, mere possibility. Indeed, nearly all the at least, confirm ing his view that the “facts* w e refer to as such are past, not m otion o f bodies does n o t explain time. strictly present. T h e nature o f process B ut to us m any questions arise w hich is not explained, then, m erely by treat-

C I. A S S I C A I. 9}

nbination of tw o forms of _ ic as a c° ’ c and future, plus the be1ooentity’ P gcnt; nor is it explained by •ng t^lC PrC two forms of possibility, ' rearing 'c 15 jjlVi the present. H ow Lius a° aCtU ' the0? • n human memory, as Au-fo bring 1 mS insufficient. For we g S 'm u c h more than we remember, i H e forgotten past nonentity.U answ er which seems ^ g g ^ te d hv Augustinc s view of God is that only J ignorance is die future or the

But Augustine has the due, if only he were interested in following it up. Human memory is a partial retention of the being of the past in the being of the present, in spite of which retention the P3^ 's not effectively, with anything like its full actuality, contained in the present. Hence it is correct to d i s t i c h W ^ o u r memo™ the past itself.*’ But then after all K.V* man awareness is not in £ adequate measure of things! HF . I S M

Elucidation of Categorical Supremacy 11. W hat art thou, then. Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be con­ ceived? But what art thou, except that which, as the highest of all beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from nothing? For, what­ ever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived of. But this cannot be conceived of thee. W hat good, there­ fore, does the supreme Good lack, through which every good is? There­ fore, thou t just, ~~ ‘ ' blessed, and truthful, , ve^ ** *sbctter to be than not to •r possible to conceive of a being • " ‘‘°1f 11 ,s bctter to be just than not which cannot be conceived not to ex- LiesL j >etter t0 be blcsscd than not irt- and this is greater than one which If” -. . . . . . can be conceived not to exist. Hence, . ut’ ^ b m ig h it is better for thee to if that, than which nothing greater can „e ’ ‘ compassionate, passionless, than he conceived, can be conceived not to ° o be these tlungs; how an thou . . . exist, it is not that, than which nothing once compassionate and passionless? erreater can be conceived. But this is an _ . irreconcilable contradiction. There is, Compassion N ot Literally in God then, so truly a being than which noth72. For, if thou art passionless, thou ing greater can be conceived to exist, dost not feel sympathy; and if thou dost that it cannot even be conceived not to not feel sympathy, thy heart is not exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, wretched from sympathy for the our God. wretched; but this it is to be compasSo truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O sionate. But if thou art not compasLord, m y G od, that thou canst not be sionate, whence cometh so great consoconceived n o t to exist; and nghtly. For, iatjon to the wretched? How, then, art if a mind could conceive of a being bet­ thou compassionate and not compas­ ter than thee, the creature would rise sionate, O Lord, unless because thou art above the C reator; and this is most ab­ compassionate in terms of our experi­ surd. And, indeed, w hatever else there ence, and not compassionate in terms of is, except thee alone, can be conceived thy being. not to exist. T o thee alone, therefore, it Truly, thou art so in terms of our belongs to exist m ore tru ly than all other beings, and hence in a higher de­ experience, but thou art not so in terms gree than all others. F or, w hatever else of thine own. For, when thou beholdest exists does not exist so tru ly , and hence us in our wretchedness, we experience in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. the effect of compassion, but thou dost W hy, then, has th e fool said in his not experience the feeling. Therefore, heart, there is no G od (Psalms xiv. I), thou art both compassionate, because since it is so evident to a rational mind, thou dost save the wretched, and spare thee;. and not that thou dost exist in th e highest de- those who sin against w gree of all? W h y , except th at he is dull compassionate, because thou art affected and a fool? by no sympathy for wretchedness.

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Manner of God's Existence: His Eternal Wholeness 13. But if through thine eternity thou hast been, and art, and wilt be; and to have been is not to be destined to be; and to be is not to have been, or to be destined to be; how does thine eternity exist as a whole forever? O r is it true that nothing of thy eternity passes away, so that it is not now; ana that nothing of it is destined to be, as if it were not je t? . . . neither yesterday nor today nor tom orrow thou art; but simply, thou art, outside all time. For yesterday and today and tom orrow have no existence, except in time; but thou, although noth­ ing exists w ithout thee, nevertheless does not exist in space or time, but all things exist in thee. For nothing con­ tains thee, but thou containest all. Hence, thou dost permeate and embrace all things. Thou art be­ fore all, and dost transcend all. And, of a surety, thou art before all; for be­ fore they were made, thou art. But how dost thou transcend all? In w hat way dost thou transcend those be­ ings w hich will have no end? Is it be­ cause they cannot exist at all w ithout thee; while thou art in no wise less, if they should return to nothingness? For so, in a certain sense, thou dost tran­ scend them. Or, is it also because they can be conceived to have an end; but thou by no means? For so they actually have an end, in a certain sense; bur thou, in no sense. A nd certainly, w hat in no sense has an end transcends w hat is ended in any sense. O r, in this w ay also dost thou transcend all things, even the eternal, because th y eternity and theirs is present as a whole w ith thee; w hile they have n o t y et that part of their eternity which is to come, just as th ey no longer have th at part w luch is past? F o r so thou dost ever transcend them , since thou art ever present w ith thyself, and since th at to w hich they

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have not yet come is ever present with thee. 74. Therefore, thou alone, O I,orj art what thou art; and thou art he who thou art. For, what is one rhing in the whole and another in the pans, and in which there is any mutable element, is not altogether what it is. And what be­ gins from non-existence, and can be conceived not to exist, and unless it sub­ sists through something else, returns to non-existence; and what has a past ex­ istence, which is no longer, or a future existence, which is not y e t-th is docs not properly and absolutely exist. But thou art what thou art, because whatever thou art at any time, or in any way, thou art as a whole and forever. And thou art he who thou art, properly and simply; for thou hast neither a past existence nor a future, but only a pres­ ent existence; nor canst thou be con­ ceived as at any time non-existent. But thou art life, and light, and wisdom, and blessedness, and many goods of this nature. And yet thou art only one su­ preme good; thou art all-sufficient to thyself, and needest none; and thou art he whom all things need for their ex­ istence and well-being. Reply to Gtrunild’s Defense o f the Fool 75. You say—whosoever you may be, who say that a fool is capable of making these "statements—that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is not in the understanding in any other sense than that in w hich a being that is altogether inconceivable in terms of reality, is in the understanding. You say that the inference that this being exists in reality, from the fact that it is in the understanding, is no m ore just than the inference th at a lost island most certain­ ly exists, from the fact that when it is described the hearer does not doubt that it is in his understanding. B ut I say: if a being than which a greater is inconceivable is not under­ stood o r conceived, and is not in the

CLASSICAL

nderstanding or in concept, certainly °"h!r God is not a being than which a tttharcr is inconceivable, or else he „ gnr understood or conceived, and is not the understanding or in concept. But I call on your faith and conscience to attest that this is most false. Hence, that than which a greater cannot be conreived is truly understood and conLjved, and is in the understanding and in concept. Therefore either the grounds on which you try to controvert me are not true, or else the inference which you think to base logically on those grounds is not justified. ° g ut you hold, m oreover, that suppos­ ing that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is understood, it does not follow that this being is in the understanding; nor, if it is in the under­ standing, does it therefore exist in reali­

as a whol conceived not n to « t is existent, can be conceived

be c d n r T ^ * ceived >f * exists, cannot be cona being than°whTh ° thcrwisc- « “'n o t conceivcd ^ h ic h * grCatCr cannot be means J L ™Ch “ ^consistent. By means, then, does it at any place c __ nent docs ir at a"v nU™ L any time fail to exist as a whole: but it exists as a whole everywhere and always. Do you believe that this being can in some way be conceived or understood, or that the being with regard to which these things are understood can be in concept or in the understanding? For if it cannot, these things cannot be under­ stood with reference to it. But if you say that it is not understood and that it is not in the understanding, because it is not thoroughly understood; you should say that a man who cannot iace the direct rays of the sun does not see g n answer to this, I maintain positive­ the light of day, which is none other ly: if that being can be even conceived than the 7 ------" w*"' uu“-1 to be, it must exist in reality. For that than which ^ r e a t ^ 111^ 7 l than which a greater is inconceivable ceived exists and C° L cannot be conceived except as w ithout ing, ’ ^ mextent-that the understand­ at least’ to this these beginning. . . . statements regarding it are understood. Moreover, I will venture to make this Perfect Island N ot Perfect m the assertion: w ithout doubt, w hatever at Relevant Seme any place o r at an y tim e does not exist— even if it does exist at some place or at 16. But, you say, it is as if one should some time—can be conceived to exist suppose an island in the ocean, which nowhere and never, as at some place surpasses all lands in its fertility, and and at some time it does not exist. For which, because of the difficulty, or rathwhat did not exist yesterday, and exists er the impossibility, of discovering what today, as it is understood not to have does not exist, is called a lost island; and existed yesterday, so it can be appre- should say that there can be no doubt hended by the intelligence th at it never that this island truly exists in reality, exists. And w hat is n o t here, and is else­ for this reason, that one who hears it where, can be conceived to be nowhere, described easily understands what he just as it is n o t here. So w ith regard to hears. N o w 1 promise confidently that if an object of w hich the individual parts do not exist at th e same places o r times: any man sisnail devise anything c * all its parts and th ere fo re its very whole either in reality o r in concept alone (exean be conceived to exist now here o r cept that than which a greater cannot never. . . . M oreover, w h a t is composed be conceived) to which he can adapt of parts can be dissolved in concept, and the sequence of m y reasoning, I wiU be non-existent T h erefo re, w hatever at discover that thing, and will give him any place o r a t a n y tim e does n o t exist his lost island, not to be lost again.

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But it now appears that this being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived not to be, because it exists on so assured a ground of truth. . . . Hence, if any one says that he con­ ceives this being not to exist, I say that at the rime when he conceives of this either he conceives of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, or he does not conceive at all. If he does not conceive, he does not conceive of the non-existence of that of which he does not conceive. But if he does conceive, he certainly conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist. F or if it could be conceived not to ex­ ist, it could be conceived to have a be­ ginning and an end. But this is impos­ sible. He, then, w ho conceives of this being conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist; but he who conceives of this being does not con­ ceive that it does not exist; else he con­ ceives w hat is inconceivable. T he non­ existence, then, of that than which a greater cannot be conceived is incon­ ceivable. W h y Ordinary Things, but N o t God, Can Be Conceived N o t T o Exist 77. . . . all objects, except that which exists in the hignest degree, can be con­ ceived not to exist. F or all those objects, and those alone, can be conceived not to exist, w hich have a beginning or end or composition o f parts: also, as I have already said, w hatever at any place or at any time does not exist as a whole. T h a t being alone, on the other hand, cannot be conceived not to exist, in w hich any conception discovers neither beginning n o r end no r com position of parts, ana w hich any conception finds always and everyw here as a whole. Be assured, then, that you can con­ ceive o f y o u r ow n non-existence, al­ th ough yo u are m ost certain th a t you exist. I am surprised th a t you should

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have admitted that you are ignorant of this. For we conceive of the non-exist­ ence of many objects which we know to exist, and of the existence of many which we know not to exist. ^ 18. So, then, of God alone it can be said that it is impossible to conceive of his non-existence. 19. For the non-existence of what does not exist is possible, and that whose non-existence is possible can be con­ ceived not to exist. But whatever can be conceived not to exist, if it exists, is not a being than which a greater cannot be conceived; but if it does not exist, it would not, even if it existed, be a being than which a greater cannot be con­ ceived. But it cannot be said that a being than which a greater is inconceivable, if it exists, is not a being than which a greater is inconceivable; or that if it existed, it would not be a being than which a greater is inconceivable. It is evident, then, that neither is it non-existent, nor is it possible that it does not exist, nor can it be conceived not to exist. For otherwise, if it exists, it is not that which it is said to be in the hypothesis; and if it existed, it would not be w hat it is said to be in the hypothesis. T h e Conceivability o f That than W hich N one Greater Is Conceivable SO. . . . you say that when you hear of a being than w hich a greater is in­ conceivable, you cannot conceive of it in term s o f any real object known to you either specifically o r generally, nor have it in y o u r understanding----But obviously this is not true. For everything that is less good, in so far as it is good, is like the greater good. It is therefore evident to any rational mind, that by ascending from the lesser good to the greater, w e can form a consider­ able notion o f a being than which a greater is inconceivable. F o r instance, w ho (even if he does n o t believe th at w h a t he conceives of

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• rc in reality) supposing that there is consistently meaningful- that cXlS * good which has a beginning and positivism (which asserts t h e meaning^nSg. _ js s0mc S'?0” n0t conceive that a good lessness or the ____ absurdity of all such an enC*’ h t t e r which, if it begins, docs ideas) is incorrect. How does he know •s inuch be ’ ^ ncj that as the second “maximal greatness” is not similar to “ not f :f ^ c« cr than the first, so that good nnm h~ ^ ----------g°hich has neither beginning nor end, . „rh it is ever passing from the past “ conceivable.) Only slight allot, rhe present present to the future, is is mod#. i„, .u 7 *a*5,Ignt th° g h the better^ than tf e second? And that far this d if f i c u lt y ,^ ™ t o t f m. t l meet refute S e r than this is a being-w hether any ism (which Carneades had positivbeing of such a nature exists or n o t- long before Comte or Carnanl In £hich in no wise requires change or Anselm here appeals to f S ? but part motion, nor .s compelled to undergo far he is suggSting that t h e \ r l m e n t change or motion. is of no use to secular philosophy How Is fhis inconceivable, or is some being ever, he also proposesP rational prong's greater than this conceivable? O r is not for admitting the insistency of this to form a notion from objects than r m t i\~ . y nis con P £ n V h£ve‘ghth reP‘y t0 Gaunilo which a greater is conceivable, of the k[sec. 80]). The grounds, as there pre­ being than w hich a greater cannot be sented, leave a good deal to be desired, conceived? T here is, then, a means of indeed, it is hard to see how classical forming a notion of a being than w hich theism, with its paradoxical view of a greater — is - inconceivable. , ( , , , deity, could ever establish the consistSo easily, then, can the fool who does ency of its basic conception. But a difnot accept sacred authority be refuted, ferent form of theism, perhaps free from if he denies that a notion may be formed incurable paradox, "might ^ p l o y ^ th e from other objects of a bem g^than argument without exposing itself to the which a greater is inconceivablerB ut if same objection. Hence the present turn any Catholic w ould deny this, let him to a nonclassical form of theism gives remember th a t the invisible things of the ancient argument of Anselm a new God, from the creation of the world, relevance. are clearly seen, being understood by Anselm wrestles valiantly with the the things th at are m ade, even his eter­ difficulties of classical theism. God helps nal power and G odhead. (Romans i. those in misery but does not pity them 20) ™nSuffer syroparf'ctically with them. (Sec. 69, St. Anselm, Proslogium; Monologi- W h y not? Because not to suffer is bet­ um; An Appendix in Behalf of the Fool by ter than to suffer; and that than which Qatmilon; and Cur Deus Homo, trans. S. N. none greater can be conceived must, by Deane (La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing definition, always have the better of two Co., 1901, 1945), pp. 1-2. Sec. 70, ibid., — " II. Sec. 71, » m ,p p . 10- 11. Sec. 72, ibid' pp Predicates- So although the ef1J-14. Sec. 71, ibid., pp. 25-26. Sec. 74, iHd., fect uP?n the wretched is as if God (g. 27-28. Sec. 75, ibid., pp. 153-56. Sec. 76, sympathized with them, really he does which anal­ PP- 1S&-59. Sec. 77, ibid., p. 160. Sec. 78, not. w e have here an effect ” ‘ ogy with our experience fails to illumi­ p** 167^« j SCC' ?9, ^ P' 162< SeC' *** ibid' nate. But, worse than that, Anselm has only shifted the difficulty. For he says COMMENT that G od beholds us in our wretchedAnselm’s m ost vulnerable assumption, ness. N ow this puts G od in relation to “ far as w e see, is his belief th at the us, makes him relative rather than mereldea of an absolute m axim um o f g reat- ly absolute; and therewith classical the-

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ism, which is Anselm’s doctrine, is con­ tradicted. Besides, how does one behold, know, intuir-use what word you will— the wretchedness of someone? H ow can a being know what wretchedness is if no shadow of suffering, disappointment, unfulfilled desire or wish, has ever been experienced by that being? Classical theists have never, to our knowledge, given us the least inkling of an answer to this question. Could rhe adequate, full, concrete knowledge of a particular state of suffering be anything else than a sympathetic participation in that suf­ fering? It is notable that a great Christian rcdecessor o f Anselm in one passage at ast adopted the opposite solution of the same problem. T he following, from Origen, is one of the rare genuinely dipolar utterances in all patristic the­ ology:

E

When I speak to a man and entreat him on some account to have pity on me, if he is a man without pity, ne is quite un­ affected by the things I say. But if he is a man of gentle spirit, and no callousness of heart has grown within him, he hears me and has pity upon me; his feelings are softened at my prayer. Something of the kind I pray you imagine with regard to the Savior. He came down to earth in pity for the race of men. By our affections He was affected before He was affected by the suf­ ferings of the cross and condescended to take our flesh upon him. Had He not been affected, He would not have entered into association with the life of men. First He is affected; then He comes down and is seen. W hat is that affection whereby on our account He is affected? It is the affec­ tion of love. The Father Himself too, the God of the Universe, long suffering and of great compassion, full or pity, is not He in a manner liable to affection? Are you unaware that, when H e orders rhe affairs o f men. He is subject to the affections of humanity? The very Father is not impas­ sible, without affection. If we pray to him, H e feels pity and sympathy. H e experi­ ences an affection of lore. H e concerns himself with things in which, by the

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majesty of H is nature, He can have concern, and for our selves He bears th° affections o f men e

.1

The translator remarks: “As a rule his position is that no iraOos (affection) must be attributed to the divine nature But his expressions are difficult to rec­ oncile.” And of course Origen could not stem the torrent of etiolatry and being-worship sufficiently to work out a doctrine o f divine Effect and Becom­ ing. Nevertheless, in a moment of dar­ ing and great honesty, he did set down the logic of the Christian view, undis­ torted for the m om ent by Greek philo­ sophical prejudice and oriental or Ro­ man despotism and legalism. True, he guards himself w ith “in a manner” and “in which, by the majesty of His nature, H e can have no concern.” But these scarcely spoil the picture. T hey can be harmonized w ith the dipolar doctrine that it is not the divine essence which can be relativized w ith respect to par­ ticular things o r events but only the divine actual experiences, w ith their un­ imaginable fulness of accidents, of con­ tingent concreteness. T h e admission of a dipolar nature in the supreme reality frees the connection which Anselm discovered between per­ fection and necessity o f existence from a certain paradox w hich is probably the chief cause of the prevalent failure to appreciate the ontological argument. T h e paradox is this: W e intuitively feel that full, concrete actuality is a surd w ith respect to any abstract essence or formula. T h e definition of perfection, any definition, is clearly such a formula. T herefore. . . . N o w this reasoning is valid and certainly quite as cogent as Anselm ’s argum ent could possibly be. But, if w e shift to a dipolar view of 1. Origines: Selections from the Commen­ taries and the Homilies, trans. R. B. Tollinton (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; New York and Toronto: Mac­ millan Co, 1929), pp. 15-16.

I .ASSI CAI .

THEISM

can reconcile the two reason- polar interpretation, the objection falls-, deity' v,c ^ a t is proved by the famous for here we assert as necessary no one ingss reinterpreted, is not any ac- divine actuality, but only that the class Pr°°^._ even divine, but only an exist- of divine actualities is nor null TV.;* Cnrc a ilT d istin c t. T h e existence * C Zm^ „div!ne potentialities for expeProved'necessary is just as abstract as riencing,” is itself plainly somethine ab[he essence connoted by perfect or stract and g en eral,------------B____ , concrete particu“categorically supreme.’' G od exists if lar thing. Yet it requires that there be

there is any divine actuality, any actual some such concrete thing. Which or state, no m atter which among possible just what, among the innumerable di­ ones, manifesting the divine essence. vine possibilities, is a question of fact Realization of a kind of possibility is and entirely beyond the reach of ab­ what personal existence always means. stract proof. So the contentions of the [ exist if some possible state of my life two main parties to the dispute are rec­ is actual, no m atter which. In ordinary onciled. W hat a triumph tor Anselm— — - (and this includes that of any ny even though one which might have sutC^wcivable island, however “perfect’*) prised and troubled him! concciv-----both actuality and existence are con­ T he transition from Anselm's view tingent, because it depends upon the of divine perfection to the dipolar alter­ rest of the universe (and upon G od) native is easily made. “None greater whether the life o r existence of the can be conceived" is subtly ambiguous. thing can go on at all, or w hether it be- It might mean that we conceive an eneins vnu, at all. In the divine form of the such that no other entity could distinction existence-actuality, actuality conceivably be greater, or it might is still contingent, since there are alter- mean that we conceive an individual native possibilities for the divine life or such that no other individual could conexperience. B ut here there is no possi- ceivably be greater. The difference is bility of a w orld state excluding any- that the second formula allows the posand-all divine experiences of that state, sibility that the same individual may be On the contrary, it follows from the conceived as potentially in a greater very meaning of “divinity” that, what- state than its actual state, even though ever happens, G o d can and will have the formula excludes the possibility of experience of th at happening and will any other individual (no matter in what accordingly exist. T h u s the most cogent state) being greater. Otherwise excounterargument to th e proof turns out pressed, while the one formula posits a to be irrelevant to the proof itself—taken being unsurpassable by anything, the as a discovery th at categorical suprem- other formula posits a being unsurpassacy, exclusion of all possible rivalry able save by itself. N ow Anselm probwith other individuals, necessarily ex- ably woula have argued that a being ists. T h e counterargum ent is relevant which could be surpassed by itself (and fatal) only w ith respect to a proof would be surpassed even more by anfavoring th e m onopolar interpretation other being so complete that it could of “categorical suprem acy.” F or on that not be surpassed even by itself. This interpretation, a divine existent and a would reduce the second formula to a divine actuality cannot be distinguished, contradiction- But only on one assumpand thus o u r invincible intuition into the tion: that a being unsurpassable by anytranscendence o f actuality w ith respect thing, even itself, hence an absolute to all essences bars th e w ay to a proof maximum of value in all respects, is of existence fro m essence. O n the di- genuinely conceivable. There are def-

-....

tity

I.OSOPHER

inite reasons for denying this. One of them is this: All possible value, a sheer maximum of value, is excluded by the law that values involve mutually incompatible alternatives, that potential value can therefore not be exhausted by any

SPEAK

OK

actual value. However this may be ' is remarkable how powerful Anselm’1 formulas arc, in that but little chani?S is required in them to embody the out come of the chief criticisms of so manv centuries. '

A L - G H A Z Z A L I (1 0 5 8 - 1 1 1 1 ): M O H A M M E D A N T H E I S M Contemporary’ with Anselm was the Islam. He was essentially a theologian great Mohammedan orthodox theologi­ rather than a philosopher; but he had an, al-Ghazzali. W hat was his theology? wrestled mightily with certain philo­ In some Mohammedan circles Aristoteli­ sophical systems, and his thought is giv­ an theism was able to flourish in a purer en here as a specimen of religious doc­ form than was possible among Jews or trine which fuses monopolar metaphys­ Christians. Thus we find the character­ ics with certain obvious values of reli­ istic Aristotelian denial that God knows gion in a system which was coherent concrete particulars openly professed enough for practical purposes in an en­ by several of the great Moslem philos­ vironment that somewhat discouraged ophers, whereas no Christian and criticism. T he following passages arc among Jews only Gerson (so far as we translated (w e apologize for this) from know) wished or dared to do this. But a Germ an rendering, which was as close such a doctrine is as incompatible w ith as we could come to the original. We Mohammedanism as with most other do not believe that the meaning is great­ religions. So in al-Ghazzali we find the ly in doubt, except so far as this type most emphatic possible defense of the of philosophy is obscure in any lan­ doctrine o f omniscience in the non- guage and to any man, w hether he real­ Aristotelian sense. Inasmuch as M o­ izes it or nor. hammedan philosophy had become deep­ T h e passages are taken from the most ly implicated in so grave a heresy as the im portant w ork of the author, his Re­ aenial of omniscience and particular suscitation o f the Sciences o f Religion. providence, the sense or illusion of har­ T h ey are part o f an opening section of m ony between theology (basing itself Book II containing a declaration of faith in part upon sacred writings) and phi­ intended to be taught to children and losophy tended to be less in evidence therefore w ritten in “rhym ing prose.” than in the Christian parallel. N o doubt It is to be borne in m ind that numer­ m any causes contributed to this. And ous “liberal theologians” in Islam have o f course there were other issues than defended views incom patible w ith some those of omniscience and providence of al-Ghazzali’s doctrines; for instance, which caused conflict between philos­ his assertion that the im mutable divine ophers and theologians. will determ ines all events, good or bad, Al-Ghazzali w ent through a pro­ to the last detail. Also, as w e shall see, longed religious crisis o f doubt and it is not easy to show that Aquinas, for search, cultivated the m ystic w ay w ith example, held a different doctrine on g reat personal sacrifices from a w orldly this m atter; and certainly the tw o agree standpoint, and finally achieved a dog­ that the divine know ledge in its eternal m atic position w hich for him was satis­ and im mutable com pleteness envisages fa cto ry and which helped to crystallize every event. W e think th at philosophi­ the thinking and religious feeling of cally the m ain point is th a t this is a form

CLASSIC*!.

T HF . I S M

•u/ time, not as though the knowledge were newlv arisen in him or communicated to him " ' rlprp'm • ’ ' V’^S aH fhat exists, and c; ents- Thus a» t h i n S . good or had . . . acts Gf obedience disobedience, they all occur solely ac­ cording to his decision and determina­ tion, his wisdom and will. W hat he wills, takes place, and what he does not will, does not take place. . . . His will consists in his essence like his other properties and belongs to him always. From eternity he willed the existence of things in the times appointed for them, and they come into being at those The Categorical Supremacy of God times and no others, precisely in accord­ Si Praise be to G od, the creator. . . . ance with his knowledge and will. He is one in essence, unequalled, unique, S3. He brought forth the creation to sole incomparable, alone without op­ reveal his power . . . not as though there ponent or rival. H e exists from the be­ were for him any necessity or need for ginning, w ithout predecessor, from all the creation................ lua gen„cn_ . . . It is. proof U of1 his rtem ity, beginningless; he endures, none erosity, and not a necessity, that he follows him, he is everlasting without showers mercy and------good,.u..gs thingsupon upon ---------, ---end. . ■ • H e is no substance and there his hi« servants, a pure ~rr. __ i_6 Vfor gift on his pan, are no substances in him; he is not an he could have punished his servants with accident and there are no accidents in every possible affliction, suffering, and him. . . . H e is high above heaven and illness. And if he had done so, it would earth, and yet is “ closer to a man than have been just of him. not bad and un­ his own arteries” . . . fo r his presence is just. [For—the author has pointed out— not like that o f a body . . . he is not in we have received all things from him, things nor are things in him. . . . In his and there is nothing which we possess essence no o th er thing can exist, nor in our own right of which he could can his essence be in anything outside rob us.] 84. Everywhere he could have done him. H e is exalted above change and Ev< alteration; for him there are no hap­ the opposite of what he has actually penings, no m isfortune can befall him, done . . . or he could have done the but rather he possesses everlastingly the same things earlier or later, properties o f his m ajesty, beyond the lSec. 81, Hans Bauer, Die Dogmatik dreach of decay, and fo r the attributes Gbasudis Nacb dent U Buch semes Hesptof his perfection he needs no grow th or tserkes (Halle: Buchdruckerei des Waisenprocess of perfecting. T h e existence of hauses, 1912), pp. 8-10. Sec. 82, ibid., pp. 10-11. Sec. 83, ibid„ p. 13. Sec. 84, ibid., p. 57.1 kis essence is rationally knowable. 82. H e know s all things knowable. . . COMMENT “he knows the v ery tread o f the black­ One of the merits of al-Ghazzali is bird in the darkest night upon hard the daring honesty with which he re­ stone" and notices th e m ovem ent o f the motes in the sunbeams. . . . H e knows veals the basic logic of classical the­ ism. This doctrine is essentially the the inward m otives and impulses and the most secret thoughts, w ith an eternal identification of the good and worship­ ful w ith the powernil, supreme value knowledge w hich he has had before all

lar theism which iasists upon / pion°P° and divine freedom dco ^ cifvnCro create or not to create the short, it is classical theism, world' .^ /M o h am m ed an variations. It ,vith m"l0y thc 1 inspired the livcs lives of of countless countless mdmill?ns and, if on1/ for rhat reason’ de* rves respect. It may be remarked that the first , ree sentences give a good statement of hat we have called the categorical su­ premacy of deity. Only in the following P aeCS is the definite monopolar ver­ son of this supremacy introduced.

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with supreme cause as such. It is close glorious without any such service to the naked worship of power. One manifestation—according to the logic °t grovels before the One who does what­ the doctrine. K of ever is done (good or bad). True, it is Even our present author docs not not a worship of automatic, blind, or wholly avoid such evasions. He too d j unconscious pow er; the One knows dares that G od’s dealings with us c.\ what he is doing and freely decides up­ hibit generosity on G od’s part, u h Cn on it. But this agrees with the supposi­ what he really (if he is consistent! tion that the worshiper of sheer power wishes to say is that God is simply in­ takes as his ideal the political form of different to us and our fate, whether power. T he One is the absolute despot, we suffer or not, and whether deserved­ who arbitrarily and as a m atter of wnim ly or not. Indifference is not generosity! disposes o f the activities and lives of his And our author, in the heat of arguing subjects, com pletely neutral or indif­ G od’s lack of obligation to promote ou? ferent to their own feelings and deci­ good, declares that God is indifferent sions. Logically, all who assume as an even to our obedience or disobedience axiom that Cause and G ood coincide of his will and is exalted above all pur­ are in al-Ghazzali’s camp, though they poses and all questions of advantage. usually seek to disguise this somewhat. G od has no inrenrioas, benevolent or W hat is the theory of value associated otherwise, in regard to the world, since w ith the doctrine? H ere too our author nothing in creation can make any dif­ is adm irably clear and forthright. Obli­ ference to the good which he enjoys. gation is a m atter of sanctions, of some T he liberal notion that G od would not anticipated good to the agent, either cause anyone to suffer through no fault in this life o r the next. (Bishop Paley of his own, or w ithout subsequent com­ said the same; did Aquinas offer a clear pensation, is held to be refuted by the alternative?) G od, being pure Cause, example of the animals, w ho often suf­ self-sufficient, unmodifiable, can receive fer, always innocently, and who can no good o r evil result from any action, hardly be thought to receive compensa­ hence fo r him there is no obligation and tion in an afterlife. It may be subm itted that our author’s no right o r w rong. T he liberal Mo­ hammedan theologians who, shocked at basic trouble is not in the particular such transcendentalized despotism, de­ fashion w ith w hich he elaborates the clared that G od m ust act justly and to classical o r cause-w orshiping doctrine prom ote the good o f his creatures are but in the doctrine itself. A mere easily refuted. T h eir “m ust” has no as­ “cause” cannot have purposes, good or signable meaning. G od is n o t con­ bad. T o achieve a purpose is to enjoy an strained by anytning. A nd there is no effect and, in this enjoym ent, to be an divine purpose to effect w hich certain effect. T h e basis of goodness, moreover, actions are indispensable means; for is a sense for the weal or w oe of others, w hat purpose can a self-sufficient being and this is essentially sym pathy, taking pursue? H e already has any good its their joy o r sorrow into one’s self. This success could involve. means being effect o f them as cause. So In Jew ish and Christian classical the­ long as this is denied o f G od, there will ology w e find a som ew hat different w ay be either sophistical evasions or worship of speaking. B ut do w e find a definite of m ere pow er. T h e famous “fatalism ” of the Mos­ logical alternative? O ne speaks, fo r in­ stance, o f the purpose o f the w orld as lems is in evidence also in o u r theologi­ serving o r m anifesting the g lory o f G od, an. It tends to go w ith the exaltation of as though he w ould n o t be equally cause as such. If to be cause is the great

CLASSIC

. _ the greatest tiling will be that of — ■”g,’i,l,.,~ in gVcry every aspcc' .. thing’ aspect, phenomena .arc effects, in no sense their own ^-hich,J irL cts ;n simptyorcself-determine jf.determined. Only in rather docs dil o... cause t° times r. s jo es a different view begin recent e,f fclt^ the doctrine doctrine that that all all ,v\ « ake"V1 itself felt, the t0nialitV involves a certain self-causa*cta*UtL L r metanhvsical freedom «„

Hisham. That strange man maintained that “God knows himself always but (other) things only after they come into being.” “If God had known things from all eternity they must have been " “u:>l ,,avc Deen th erm e lv--------~ '~ T / 1”r " ''V (and here is t h * ‘ But’ nevcrtlie'ess , \ _ . . 1hc1rc 15 thc part), God’s comes

I property By this ingenious dodge, condition, indeed, of the possibility of Hisham seeks to avoid the problem of henomena but not of their actuality. how change can be i i the perfect beThis they must themselves enact, as ing.a “self-created creatures.” If this is para­ As another example of what happens doxical, it cannot at w o n t be more so once . U1I ice cclassical lass, r»l theism L accepted, conthan the conceptions of classical theism, sidcr the debates over the “«em ’itv of For example, consider the logical con- the Koran.” Is it the very words that sequences of saying. G od s eternal es- are eternal, or merely the divine ideas sence contains knowledge and volition expressed in the words? How trivial the which exactly define all temporal proc- debate, once it is considered that all di­ css. Thus w e have an eternally true vine ideas are eternal, according to the premise from w hich logically follows doctrine, and so is God’s knowledge of the existence of this very world. (For the least actions of the creatures, and God’s knowing and willing the exist- thus, since “knowing and known are ence of this w orld surely implies that inseparable,” the actions themselves only existence.) N o w ^ w hat a^ necessary seem products of becoming to our igpremise implies is itself and in the same norant and benighted mode of knowsense necessary (principle of modal ing. ' They are as eternally present to the logic). W h a t is m eant by saying that eternal gaze as the most exalted entities. God m ight have made a different T hey may be said to come “into being,” world? Surely in th at case he would but they do not come into or before have know n and willed a different one; divine knowledge; they just are there. that is, his know ledge and will would And this knowing measures the reality have been otherw ise. T his implies that of things! W hat more absolute existence his actual know ledge and will w ith re­ than to be divinely known to exist; if spect to this w orld is an accident, not fixedly known, then so existent! Lehis necessary essence. So n o t all the quier was later to elaborate the argu­ candor and courage o f ou r author in ment into the finest and most exact de­ developing th e shocking consequences tail. O ur German translator of al-Ghazof the doctrine fo r hum an conceptions that --------------this theologian was of good and evil can enable him to avoid zali __ —suggests — — the incoherence o f his fundam ental ex- partly inspired by Christian ideals and altadon o f cause above effect. E tiolatry, offers the hypothesis that the inoculacause-worship, is the unsuspected source tion of Mohammedanism in such ways of his troubles. w ith a minute dose of Christian idealism This comes o u t in a curious w ay in 2 ^ M Horten> Die pbiloioptiub* Sytthe thought o f a M oham m edan philoso- teme speevlathai Tbeologen im 1dm pher of tw o and a half centuries earlier, (Bonn, 1912), pp. 172-71.

I IO

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may furnish the reason for its compara­ sibility, which is that God loves all crca tive immunity to Christian proselytiz­ turcs, well behaved or not; that his ai„ ing. Perhaps there is room for another is to foster intense, varied, zestful, and' or supplementary explanation. May not therefore in a measure free and’selfthe existence in Christianity of the same determined, crcaturcly living at each obstacle to a consistent rheology of love moment, so that the creatures may en­ which operated in Mohammedanism, joy themselves and he may own this namely, the prejudice of monopolariry, crcaturcly enjoyment as also his by and especially of cause-worship, have sympathetic appropriation. This is not prevented Christianity from seeming a indifference, and it is equally remote definite alternative with unequivocal from a cosmic bookkeeping of deserts superiority? A genuine acceptance of with respect to reward or punishment “God is love” is not easily learned, even God need not have the legalistic com­ from Christian—or Jewish—theologians. plex. It is as though an orchestra leader For few have had the courage, and the were to assign instruments and indeed intellectual freedom and penetration, to notes essentially in terms of reward and work out a metaphysics on this basis. punishment rather than in terms of op­ Either we admit that love is always timal chances of good performance. The cause-effect, in principle dipolar, and present of the creatures is not for the then a liberal theology, or theology of sake of their past and its accumulated love, not of mere power, of human deserts but for its own sake and that freedom, not of servitude to an abso­ of the future. W h y assume an idea of lute despot, lies open before us, or we divine righteousness which inverts this have no genuine alternative to the w or­ order and then debate about whether ship of power as power, the self-suffi­ love or m ercy can be brought in to cient, aloof, and indifferent just as self- mitigate the harsher implications of the sufficient, aloof, and indifferent. W e assumption? Love alone is the essential feel grateful to Mohammedanism for principle. Only if reward or punishment refusing to gloss over the issue, or at contributes to present and future least for allowing it to come close to beauty of experience, creaturely and the surface, with brave candor and divine, made relevant to each other by (within the limits of an intrinsically in­ love, have they any extra-legal signif­ coherent assumption) maximal consist­ icance whatever o r any place in theol­ ency. ogy. So we m ay go part way w ith our Furthermore, the denial that G od is ancient friend’s seemingly so shocking required to deal out pain and pleasure denial of divine obligation to dispense according to past deeds and fortunes in good and evil “justly.” order to meet our demand for cosmic As to G od’s having no obligations at “justice” is, in our opinion, not nearly all, and being under no “must” to do so shocking as the total context of our good, we say that the m ust is simplv author makes it appear to be to our the essence of G od w hich is love. He Christian sensibilities. W e agree with cannot fail to love, and his actions are al-Ghazzali that God is not a distribu­ certain to express this love somehow. to r o f pood and bad who is subject to W h y should we dem and more? Are we a cosmically extended notion of appro­ to suppose that our feeble love can tell priate rewards and punishments. But us how infinite love m ust o r m ight ex­ w hat is shocking is the alternative to press itself, save in the vaguest and most this which is proposed, namely, that general way? B ut it seems a good guess G od is indifferent to the creatures. that it could not express itself in terms There is a radically distinct, third pos­ intelligible to those afflicted w ith the

te g ^ '^ fo s f b l/tb a t the tragedies of ex- " S t w e b f 1 a * Cannot wcl1 **k U ‘S re Should be essentially punish- divine somcthing through istCn or its good fortune essentially o h m W u “ '° the feclings of ^ " rds The fre e d o m of other mcli w e c a ™ L ™ the r i g h i t o fCd creatures, the interplay of our own as u ? L c £o d % C,aim " & *> far »nd w ith the blind sway of natural is the divinV • • d ° Ur ne,ghbor- This freCd fblind just so far as laws, in the To a n n S ^ ^ ” ’ and “ is absolutclaW of impersonal uniformities), the extemPthcr ' WC j Ulst lovc; to that SCnl l unity of life and its interdepend- Need we J l S ^ P ^ h m e n t. • • - an>’ other? The beauty of SOCI3' (the^best and most sensitive*souls fn®®_far from the least dependent for drer V * °Wn argument; all othere are kcl.S these and other roncidfc n ic u M y i t . -J .feelings)-these considgrading is the nonon that the tragedies erarions make the notion of justice in inherent in social and free exigence this sense inapplicable. Unfortunately, c aUchor, w ho sees that reason cannot must all be channeled away f” m t he loving and dumped into the laps of the justify the notion, yet holds to it in some form on the sole basis of the loveless. As though their lack of love were not almost tragedy enough! And Koran. , ,. . . The contrasting notion or divine jus­ as though the loving would enjoy the tice is as follows. G od is on our side in spectacle of their fate, would really es­ life’s tragedy, in that he shares it with cape feeling it themselves! Tragedy is us, along w ith all our longing for hap­ inescapable, since it comes through piness, so that this longing counts for freedom and sensitivity, not through all it is w orth in the divine life, is just the cunning manipulation of deity. 3 5 rcai ........................ .. e. “have _________ This is not the view of al-Ghazzali. as real there as in us. W an advocate w ith the Father,” w ho says for ir may not be much farther from us the whole of w hat we say for our- his than from that of many a Christian selves, w ithout the least omission. Only divine. The idea slowest to dawn is all other creatures have the same advo- that there is nothing prior to love, to cate; and the integrity of the divine the cosmic divine principle of “shared life, which all enjoy and require, must [and free] experience” (Dewey), neibc maintained. W e are then denied ther “power" nor “justice” nor “knowlnothing through divine indifference to edge” nor “being” nor “cause.”

MAIMON1DES (1135-1204) Maimonides (o r Moses ben M aimon) faced the same task as Philo (and in pan the same as Anselm ) of reconciling Judaism w ith philosophical tenets de­ rived from the G reeks. B ut th e later author is m ore o f an A ristotelian and less of a P latonist and, like Aristotle and most unlike Philo, is a highly sys­ tematic thinker w ho offers elaborate arguments, neatly set o u t in order, for his assertions—thus paving the w ay for the vast argum entation, on similar Aris­

totelian foundations, of Thomas Aqui­ nas. The Philonian paradoxes are readily recognized, above all, that of the indescribability of a deity who, neverthe­ less, for religious (yes and even for philosophical) purposes, inevitably must be described as “will,” “ruler,” etc. The proof that G od is indescribable is ad­ mirably rigorous, seeming to leave no possible loophole. Especially notable is the demonstration of the impossibility

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god

(on the premises) that any positive predicates ascribable to deity could have anything in common with those accessible to our experience and

moved mover as the clinching phil0_ sophical argument to establish the im. mutability, hence the nonpotcntinlity, hence the simplicity, of deity. Where there is composition, the elements The outstanding example is knowl­ together to constitute deity might bc edge. If we say that God knows the otherwise arranged, so such a deity world, we cannot mean by knowledge must bc mutable. And, of course, “The anything of what the word signifies in Lord our God is One” stands ready to other cases. The demonstration has not, confound anyone who deviates in the we think, ever been refuted within the slightest from the most extreme antiframework of classical theism. One polvtheism, from the most rigorous de­ cannot know with infallible accuracy, nial not only of many divine beings but that is, as the divine must know, an ob­ even of many aspects o r factors in one ject capable of being otherwise, save divine being. W ith such premises, with a Knowledge that could have been shared by all classical theists of Eu­ or could be otherwise (which would rope, is it anything but logical consist­ contradict the pure necessity attributed ency and candor to admit the complete to deity by this tradition). Knowledge indescribability of God? Yet, wc must and objects correspond, in true knowl­ ask, was the prohibition on description edge, and given an alternative object really observed by its proponent, and, O ' instead of O, we must have knowl­ if he had observed it, could any reli­ edge of O' instead of the knowledge of gious or even philosophical values have O. Mutability or nonnecessity of thesurvived such a pure negativism? To known therefore means mutability or have sharpened this issue with such contingency in the knower. T o support skill is a signal contribution of Mai­ Maimonides on the impossibility of log­ monides. ical escape from this axiom, we have A ttributes Either Essential the admissions of Gcrsonides, Amauld, or Accidental and Leibniz (secs. 117-18). W hat, for Maimonides, results from this impossi­ bility? That “knowledge” has no posi­ tive content when appbed to deity. W e use the same wora, but no common meaning goes with it, for divine and human knowing. Later thinkers (espe­ cially Thomas Aquinas) endeavor to meet the difficulty by distinguishing univocal and analogical common meanbasic assumption, as w ith Philo and Anselm, is the immutable perfec­ tion o f the divine or—it is the same—his utter simplicity. As w ith the earlier thinkers, this assumption has a num ber o f roots, biblical and Greek, and it is not supposed that either a d ea rly ra­ tional mind or a deeply religious one could question it. Maimonides stresses the Aristotelian argument fo r an un-

85. . . . it is a self-evident truth that the attribute is not inherent in the ob­ ject to which it is ascribed, but it is superadded to its essence, and is con­ sequently an accident; if the attribute denoted the essence o f the object, it would be either mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say “man is a man,” or the explanation of a name, as e.g., “man is a speaking animal” ; for the phrase "speaking animal” includes the true es­ sence of man, and there is no third ele­ ment besides life and speech that con­ stitutes man; w hen he, therefore, is de­ scribed by the attributes of life and speech, these are nothing b u t an expla­ nation o f the name “m an,” th at is to say, that the thing w hich is called man, consists o f life and speech. It will now be clear that the attribute m ust be one

C l. A S S I C A I.

1 HF.IS M

0f two things, either the essence of the imagine a relation between intellect and object described—in that case it is a sight, although, as we believe, the same mere explanation of a name, and on kind of existence is common to both; that account we might admit the attri­ how, then, could a relation be imagined bute in reference to God, but we reject between any creature and God, who has it from another cause as will be shown nothing in common with any other be­ r the attribute is something different ing; for even the term existence is ap—or U'h *" bicct described, sonic extra- plied to Him and other things, accordneous element; in that case mg to our opinion, only by way of from s u p e r a d d e d element: the attribute would be an accident, and pure homonymity. Consequently there he who m erely rejects the appclation is no relation whatever between Him “accidents” in reference to the attri­ and any other being. For whenever butes of G od, does not thereby alter speak of a ‘ ”l " ,rc,,cvw wC their character; fo r everything super- these h e lL T ? Lbmvcen tWo ^ings, added to the essence of an object joins when two„ things belong species; but to different it without form ing part of its essential species though of the same class, there properties, and that constitutes an ac­ is no relation between them. We there­ cident. cident. A dd ro this the logical conse- fore do not say, this ted compared with quence of adm itting many attributes, that green, is more, or less, or equally viz., the existence of many eternal be­ intense, although both belong to the ings. T here cannot be any belief in the same class-colour; when they belong unity of G od except by admitting that to two different classes, there does not H e is one simple substance, without any appear to exist any relation between composition or plurality of elements; them, not even to a man of ordinary’ one from whatever side you view it, intellect, although the two things be­ and by w hatever test you examine it; long to the same category, r.g., be­ not divisible into tw o parts in any way tween a hundred cubits and the heat and by any cause, nor capable of any of pepper there is no relation, the one form of plurality either objectively or being a quality, the other a quantity, or between wisdom and sweetness, be­ subjectively. tween meekness and bitterness, although N o Relation betw een G od and all these come under the head of qual­ Creatures ity in its more general signification. 86. [The question is] . . . whether How, then, could there be any relation some real relation exists between God between God and His creatures, conand any o f the substances created by sidering the important difference bcHim, b y w hich H e could be described? tween them in respect to true existence. T hat there is no correlation between the greatest of all differences. Besides, Him and any o f H is creatures can easily if any relation existed between than, be seen; fo r th e characteristic of tw o God would be subject to the accident objects correlative to each other is the of relation; and although that would equality o f th eir reciprocal relation, not be an accident to the essence of N ow , as G od has absolute exisrence, God, it would still be, to some extent, while all o th er beings have only possi- a kind of accident. You would, thereble existence, as w e shall show, there fore, be wrong if you applied affirmaconsequently cannot be any correlation rive attributes in their literal sense to (betw een G o d and H is creatures). T h at God, though they contained only relaa certain kind o f relation does exist be- dons; these, however, are the most aptw een them is b y som e considered pos- propriate of all attributes, to be emsible, b u t w rongly. I t is impossible to ployed, in a less strict sense, in refer-

114

PHILOSOPHKKS

cnce to God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things ex­ ists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when those things change to which God is in relation.

SPEAK

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believe concerning the attributes occur­ ring in the books of the Prophets; sonic may also be taken as expressions of the perfection of God by way of compari­ son with what we consider as perfec­ tions in us.

Describing God by His Actions God Is w ithout Potentiality 87. Fire melts certain things and 89. W e have already, on several occa­ makes others hard, it boils and con­ sumes, it bleaches and blackens. If we sions, shown in this treatise that every­ described the fire as bleaching, black­ thing that implies corporeality or pas­ ening, consuming, boiling, hardening siveness, is to be negatived in reference and melting, we should be correct, and to God, for all passiveness implies yet he who does not know the nature change; and the agent producing 'that of fire, would think it included six dif- state is undoubtedly different from the ferent elements, one by which it black­ object affected by it; and if God could be affected in any way whatever, anens, another by which it bleaches, third by which it boils, a fourth by other being beside Him would act in Him. All which it consumes, a fifth by which it Him and cause change ■" melts, a sixth by which it hardens things kinds of non-existence must likewise be —actions which arc opposed to one an­ negatived in reference to Him; no per­ other, and of which each has its pecul­ fection whatever can therefore be im­ iar property. He, however, w ho knows agined to be at one time absent from the nature of fire, will know that by Him, and at another present in Him: virtue of one quality in action, namely, for if this were the case, H e would (at by heat, it produces all these effects. If a certain time) only be potentially per­ this is the case with that which is done fect. Potentiality always implies non­ by nature, how much more is it the existence, and when anything has to case with regard to those who act by pass from potentiality into reality, anfree will, and still more with regard to other thing that exists in reality is reGod, who is above all description. If quired — :—J to *—effect a — that‘ *---T¥transition. Hence we, therefore, perceive in G oa certain it follows that all perfections must real­ relations of various characters—for wis­ ly exist in God, and none of them must dom in us is different from power, and in any way be a m ere potentiality. power from w ill-it does by no means G od w ithout Accidental Properties follow that different elements are really contained in Him, that He contains one 90. It is known that existence is an element by which H e knows, another accident appertaining to all things, and by which He wills, and another by therefore an element superadded to which He exercises power. their essence. This must evidently be 88. On the contrary, H e is a simple the case as regards everything the existessence, without any additional element ence o f which is due to some cause, whatever; H e created the universe, and . . . But as regards a being whose existknows it, but not by any extraneous ence is not due to any cause—G od alone force. There is no difference w hether is that being, for His existence, as we these various attributes refer to His ac- have said, is absolute—existence and estions or to relations between H im and sence are perfectly identical; H e is not His works; in fact, these relations, as we a substance to w hich existence is joined have also shown, exist only in the as an accident, as an additional element, thoughts of men. This is w hat we must His existence is always absolute, and

. flS never been a new clement or an ac- or that of the sun in sending forth light, Sent in Him- Consequently God ex- but consists in constantly giving them " • rence Similarly He lives without CX'S inc the attribute of life; knows, P °hm jt possessing the attribute of wlcdge; is omnipotent, without pos*n0. the attribute of omnipotence; is sess*ng jthout ssessing the attribute wisdom; all this reduces itself to one °nd the same entity; there is no plural­ ity >n Him.

rule, as we shall show; wc say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its crea­ tures; when wc say that it is not feeble, we mean that its existence is ca­ pable of producing the existence of many other things; by saying it is not ignorant, we mean “it perceives" or “it lives,’’- f o r everything that perceives is Negative Attributes of God alivc-by saying “it is not hasty, and 91. Know that the negative attributes does not abandon its creatures," we of God are the true attributes; they do mean that all these creatures preserve not include any incorrect notions or a certain order and arrangement; they any deficiency whatever in reference are not left to themselves, or produced to'G od, while' positive attributes imply aimlessly, but whatever condition they polytheism, and are inadequate, as we receive from that being is given them with design and intention. W c thus have already shown. learn that there is no other being like 92. T he negative attributes, however, unto God, and we say that He is One, are those which arc necessary to direct i.e., there are not more Gods than one. the mind to the truths which we must It has thus been shown that every at­ believe concerning G od; . . . e.g., it has tribute predicated of God either de­ been established by proof that some be­ notes the quality of an action, or-w hen ing must exist besides those things the attribute is intended to convey some which can be perceived by the senses, idea of the Divine Being itself, and not or apprehended by the mind; when we of His actions-the negation of the op­ say of this being, that it exists, we mean posite. that its non-existence is impossible. W e 93. All we understand, is the fact that thus perceive th at such a being is not, H e exists, that H e is a Being to whom for instance, like the four elements, none of all His creatures is similar, who which are inanimate, and we therefore has nothi in common with them who « 15 i ,V1" g \ xerXPrCr ng uh e Kby ,t is not dead. W e call such a being incorporeal, because w e notice that it is unlike the heavens, w hich arc living, but material Seeing that it is also different from the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence to some cause, w e say it is the first, expressing thereby that its existence is not due to any cause. W e further notice, th a t th e existence, that is, the essence, of this being is not limited to its ow n existence; m any existences emanate from it, and its influence is not like that of the fire in producing heat,

does not include plurality, who is never foo feeble tQ 5UCC other bein and whosc relatioJ to the d iv erse is that of a to a boat; and even ^ not a rea, relatk)n, a real s ^ ilc , but serves onjv to convey to us the idea that G o d 'rules thc universe; that is, that H e it duraton, and preserves ic necessary arrangement. . . . In the contemplation of His essence, our comprehension and knowledge prove insuffiden t; in die examination of His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol

PHILOSOPHERS

Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure! 94. . . . every perfection we could imagine, even \( existing in God in ac­ cordance with the opinion of those who assert the existence of attributes, would in reality not be of the same kind as that imagined by us, but would only be called by the same name, according to our explanation; it would in fact amount to a negation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and this knowledge, which admits of no change and of no plurality, embraces many changeable things; His knowledge re­ mains unaltered, while new things are constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it exists, while it ex­ ists, and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without the least change: you would thereby declare that His knowl­ edge is not litre ours; and similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus necessarily arrive at some negation, w ithout obtaining a true conception of an essential attribute. [Sec. 85. Tbe Guide of tbe Perplexed of Mahnonidet, trans. M. Friedlander (London: Trflbner & Co. [Ludgate Hill], 1885), I, 17475. Sec. 86. ibid^ pp. 182-84. Sec. 87. ibid., p. 187. Sec. 88, ibidn pp. 190-91. Sec. 89, ibid., p. 199. Sec. 90, ibid., pp. 204-5. Sec. 91, ibidn pp. 207-8. Sec. 92, ibia., pp. 209-11. Sec. 9J, ibta., p. 212. Sec. 94, ibid., p. 222.]

Let us begin w ith Maimonides’ con­ tention that the ascription o f a plurality o f attributes to deity amounts to poly­ theism, the admission o f a plurality of eternal beings. This is a confusion of logical level! A m ere property is not a deity in any reasonable sense. O nly if the several properties could conflict w ith each other, o r interact as agent and patient, o r require a higher will to com pose their differences, o r som ething o f th at sort, does the question o f poly­ theism arise. M onotheism means th at all wills are ordered by the will o f one su­ prem e individual, th at all tru th is

SPEAK

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known by a supreme knower, etc. Of course, supreme will and supreme knowledge are inseparable and in this sense one. Even in us plurality of psv. chic dimensions docs not conflict with the integrity of the individual; still less in the supreme or categorical instance W hat may be granted to Maimonides is that an individual totally without ac­ cidents could not have positive attri­ butes, even essential ones. Volitional or cognitive individuality, personality, is intelligible only as an essence capable of an indefinite or infinite number of embodiments in successive experiences or acts. T he acts are accidents, and the essence is separable from, or independ­ ent of, any such act or set of them, while the acts are not separable from the essence. T he acts are, however, not eternal (though indestructible), and hence no plurality of eternal beings re­ sults. A ny possible such act will be re­ lated to any other as possible experi­ ences of the one divine being, whose diverse states are all interconnected in categorically supreme fashion to con­ stitute one personal Life. This Life in­ deed exists w ithout possessing existence as an accident, the accidental aspect be­ ing w hether the life takes just this par­ ticular course or that, enjoys just this particular content or that. And this life is likewise good w ithout possessing goodness as an accident, that is to say, the essential goodness of divinity is no addition to it b u t eternally inherent. A nd so on w ith essential perfection of knowing and o f power. Say, if one wishes, that all these essential traits are b u t one, diversely called goodness, life, pow er. W h a t w e contend is that this one essence cannot possibly be identical w ith the G od whose essence it is. For it is abstract, and he is concrete; it ex­ cludes all particulars, and he includes them ; it is nis personality trait, and he is the person w ith actual experiences (d o w n to the given m om ent) charac­ terized b y the trait.

CLASSICAL

Ii kc ' v « « - __--- .

i

THEISM

t

r -------- u mj j o s c m e relations

ployed. Thus is that all relation must be correlation and imply that the two things belong in one class. Universals and particulars are related, or the nooon of universal loses its function of furnishing predicates of particular things. But they are not correlative or equal for that which has the relation is more concrete than that which lacks it. T hus concrete particulars really have whiteness or roundness, but these universals are in themselves innocent of entanglement w ith this or that particular. In this freedom from entanglement consists their abstractness. Thus also an unrelated G od m ust be abstract. T he denial of relations to God is a gigantic paradox. F or then what becomes o f the description of God in terms of “his” actions upon the world? " ’ "

between them. Thus they are abstractions from something more concrete, This, we affirm, is the rule where something is not in itself related, Maimonides comes to the verge of a dipolar insight when he says that, if God really had relations, it would not require any change in his essence when he acquired new relations (as new things come into being in the world), This suggests that God has an unchanging essence but an ever changing actuality composed of essence ana acddents. Naturally, Maimonides cannot

we are m a state or manic ignorance w ith respect to him. F or it is denied that we know his absolute o r nonrelarive essence, w hat he is in independence of the w orld and would be were there no w orld. But it is also denied that he itas accidents o r relations to his effects, So the w o rd G od stands for the U nknowable purely and simply. And even negative descriptions posit relations, reb o o n s o f otherness betw een G od and w hat is denied o f him. T ru e, it may be held th at these relations are in the other u iu ijp , n o t in

uoo;

u u t u ic n

m

of essence suggests it, for all thought is by contrast, and W hat God is cssenrially is in implied contrast to W hat God is inessenoally. Essence and accidents are correlative notions. It is a truism __ _____ i______ i____j r '__i j ___ u . that, on the one hand, God, since he is perfect in wisdom, knows all reality, is omniscient, and is so essentially and without possibility of failing to be; but, on rite other hand, it is mere fact that we men exist, and while we can infer that it is fact that God knows us as ex­ istent, yet, since we might not have existed, obviously G od might have known us as nonexistent and would then not have known us to exist. Hence his knowing that w e exist is not essential to him but merely factual, contingent, The foregoing argument is in effect

uv-

comes a constituent of the complex, X-

—

,

I 18

P H II. OS O P H E R S

SPEAK

OF

GOD

“God knows the world” has no positive tive idea of God is worthless for any meaning, there being nothing ldentifi- purpose. Gersonides himself sought to ably common between divine knowl­ escape the difficulty by a return to edge and ordinary knowledge. And so Aristorelianism, to the view that deity with the other predicates applied to is aware not of the concrete or particu­ deity. They really have only negative lar aspects of the world but only of its meaning. God is not ignorant, in that spiritual plan or “providence,” as em­ neither ordinary nonknowlcdge nor or­ bodied in the motions of the heavenly dinary knowledge can be applied to bodies and whatever is necessitated thereby. O ur acts of free choice being him. This program of exclusively negative not thus necessitated, God knows of attributes of deity is not and it seems them only what they may be, only their could not have been consistently car­ possibilities. Gerson argued that, if God ried through. W hich is negative, “po­ eternally knew our free acts as definite tential” or “actual”? The Tatter is af­ they would eternally be definite and so firmed, the former denied, of deity. at no time open for determination or Which is negative, cause or effect? The decision, at no time really free. This latter is denied, the former affirmed. Is would be “error, not knowledge” ; for it merely negative? Again, which is the acts are really free, and true knowl­ negative, acting with intention and de­ edge must be of things as they are, sign, or unintentionally? The former hence of the possible or unsettled as is affirmed. Is “giving” nothing posi­ having this unsettled character. It is cu­ rious that Gerson did not see (obvious­ tive? “Living?” “Perceiving?” Suppose one says, “God is above, be­ ly because of his monopolar or etiolayond, or superior to all our descrip­ trous attitude) that since free acts are tions.” Above is a relation! Is G od then determinate after they have happened, related? O r does the saying merely yet are not determinate either before­ mean that our descriptions are beneath hand or eternally, the only way God God, inadequate to him, but that he is can know the whole truth is for him to not above or beyond or superior to have, besides his eternal knowledge of what we affirm of him. Thus if we say, ure possibility, tw o forms of temporal “Triangles consist of several lines,” this nowledge w ith respect to each partic­ description is inadequate and poor, but ular free act, first only the knowledge one cannot perhaps imagine how “su­ of w hat m ay-or-m ay-not take place, periority to this description” could be and then the additional knowledge of something in triangles. It is nothing to what does take place and has taken them how poorly we describe them, place. In short, as Socinus and Lequier and precisely because they are uncon­ cogently argue, the knowledge of tem­ scious and unknowing, mere objects not poral process must itself be a temporal subjects. Is that how G od escapes re­ process (w ith complete retrospective lations to us? Is he unconscious rather definiteness and w ith exactly so much than conscious? ( “Superconscious” indeterminacy of anticipation as there would be a relation.) is real freedom in reality). Maimonides, In the very passage of our text where Gerson, Socinus, and Spinoza agree that the impossibility o f knowing the char­ eternal knowledge, in any sense we can acter o f G od is most emphatically pro­ conceive it, can have no contingent ob­ nounced, we find “will,” “rule,” “he jects. But the first concludes: Knowl­ gives,” “he preserves,” A nd well did edge in G od is not really knowledge, Gersonides, a most acute thinker, reply though it does em brace the contingent. to Maimonides that a com pletely nega­ T h e second concludes: T h e knowledge

E

CLASSICAL

THEISM

A Q U IN A S (1225?-74?) For no other philosopher have such claims been made as for this one. Indeed, non-Thom ists cannot but see more than a trace of idolatry in the aura of virtual infallibility that Thomists often seem striving; to im part to their master. But one claim w hich a Thomist has made is perhaps not open to this objection. Gilson once suggested that St. Thom as was “the greatest arranger of ideas that ever lived. As this implies, the ideas expounded in the famous summae are not to any great extent new, but how th ey are put through their paces, as it w ere, how skilfully set forth in orderly array! W e must also bear in m ind th at this is the first or nearly the first o f the great Christian theologians to w hom the Aristotelian writings w ere in large part accessible, And how carefully ne pondered them his com m entaries snow us. O n the other hand, no m an ever had a m ore exquisite sense of the line betw een orthodoxy and heresy, b y w hich w e need not mean betw een “rig h t doctrine” and

“wrong doctrine” but rather between accepted doctrines and those not acceptcd. True, the charge of heresy was actually made, but the ultimate judgment of the church on this point was reasonable enough; the doctrines of the Fathers, taken collectively, are scarcely departed from in the Thomistic system, Thus we have in this man the most Aristotelian Christian and the most Christian Aristotelian that one could

The problems of Thomism are the problems of all classical (Philonian) theists, except for a special emphasis upon Aristotelian conceptions. One which Philo and Maimomdes had already broached was that of the relations between God and the world and the difficulty these offer for the doctnne that God is wholly nonrelative and simpie. Aquinas gives the classic text on this topic, in the course of which he

PHILOSOPHERS

SPEAK

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GOD

makes a fine contribution to the theory tions. Thomas thinks it has, however, of “external’’ and “internal” relations, to an analogically common meaning. But use language current recently. The it is an analogy which inverts the two Thomistic language is perhaps better: terms, giving the “subject” the very role that relations are either “real” or merely taken, in the ordinary case, by the "logical.” Relations may be real so far object! The issue can be focused, as we have as some terms are concerned, but, with respect to other terms, it may be only repeatedly seen, on the question of di­ a way of viewing them to say that they vine knowledge as having contingent are related thus and thus. They are then and mutable objects. W hat status can related for some mind but not for them­ be assigned to the relations involved, selves. And the example of knowing and without renouncing the basic tenet that the thing known is persuasive: knowl­ God is devoid of contingency and edge or science has to conform, and change? Thomas seeks to deal with thus incur genuine relation, to its ob­ these problems. W e arc not aware of jects, not vice versa. Only with fictions, any important advance upon his treat­ which are not cognitions, is the object ment of them—within the confines of conformed, related, to thought about it. classical rheism -in the seven centuries Knowing is relative to the known, de­ since he wrote. pendent upon it as one term of the cog­ G od’s Relations to the W orld nitive relatioa O f course the known as N ot Real in God “known” involves the knower, but even then not any particular knower rather 95. Reply Obj. I. . . . N ow a relation than another, since if anyone knows the of God to creatures, is not a reality thing it is known. On the other hand, in God, but in the creature; for it is in the knowing is different with each al- God in our idea only: as, what is knowtemarive particular object T o know able is so called with relation to knowlthat “elephants exist” is (different knowl- edge, not that it depends on knowledge, edge from that which could know that but because knowledge depends on it. “elephants do not exist” T o know is Thus it is not necessary that there to hold for true upon adequate evi­ should be composition in the supreme dence, and one cannot thus hold for good, but only that other things are true contradictory propositions. Hence deficient in comparison with it. . . . actual knowing is relative to what in 96. I answer that, T he names which particular happens to exist and therefore im port relation to creatures are applied as existent can be known (knowledge to G od temporally and not from eter­ of possibles merely as possibles is some­ nity. thing else). But what in particular is T o see this we must leam that some known in a given knowledge is not in have said that relation is not a reality, its existence relative to this Knowledge. but only an idea. But this is plainly If, then, the known, or object, is the seen to be false from the veiy fact that nonrelarive, and knowing or subject the things themselves have a m utual natural relative, factor, as we nave just seen, order and habitude. Nevertheless, it is must not God, as all-knowing, be su­ necessary to know that since relation premely n---the has ovr v extremes, itk happens 1 in ✓ relative? O --------contrary, --------— / *says « •« tw a -T T a u v iiiw , i 1 1 three uu^g Thomas, the divine knowing is creative ways that a relation is real or logical, and hence not at all the same thing as Sometimes from both extremes it is an human knowing. So we are back to idea only, as w hen m utual order or Maimonidcs. Knowing has no literal habitude can only be betw een things in common meaning in the tw o applica- the apprehension of reason; as when we

CL

THEISM

, 2|

say a thine is the same as itself. For in God there is no real relation to crea­ reason apprehending one thing twice tures, but a relation only in idea, inas­ regards it as two; thus it apprehends a much as creatures are referred to Him. certain habitude of a thing to itself. And Thus there is nothing to prevent these rhe same applies to relations between names which import relation to the being by I/.* and •— ,.non-being, formed ■ • reason, creature from being predicated of God apprehending non-bexvg as an extreme, temporally, not by reLon of any change Tffic same is true of relations that follow in Him, but by reason of the change of upon an act of reason, as genus and the creature, as a column is on the right species, and the like. of an animal, without change in itself, r tfo w there are other relations which but bv change in the animal are realities as regards both extremes, 91.'Reply Ob). 4. Relations signified as when for instance a habitude exists bv these names which are applied to between tw o things according to some God temporally, are in God only in reality that belongs to both; as is clear idea; but the opposite relations in creaof all relations consequent upon quanti- tures '-----------’ t'Jor ' ’ is it incongruous • are real. that ty- as great and small, double and half, God should be denominated from rela­ and the like; for quantity exists in both tions really existing in the thing, yet so extremes: and the same applies to re­ that the opposite relations in God should lations consequent upon action and pas­ also be understood by us at the same sion, as motive power and the movable time; in the sense that God is spoken thing, father and son, and the like. of relatively to the creature inasmuch Again, sometimes a relation in one as the creature is related to Him: thus extreme may be a reality, while in the the Philosopher says (Metaph. V .) that other extreme it is an idea only: and the object is said to be knowable rela­ this happens whenever tw o extremes tively because knowledge relates to it. are not of one order. . . . In science and Reply Ob). 5. Since God is related in sense a real relation exists, because to the creature for the reason that the they are ordered either to the knowl­ creature is related to Him: and since edge o r to the sensible perception of the relation of subjection is real in the thmgs; whereas the things looked at in creature, it follows that God is Lord themselves are outside this order, and not in idea only, but in reality; for H e hence in them there is no real relation is called Lord according to the manner to science and sense, but only in idea, in which the creature is subject to Him. inasmuch as the intellect apprehends W hether This Name, HE W H O IS, them as term s of the relations of science Is the Most Proper Name of G o d P and sense. H ence, the Philosopher says 98. / answer that, This name, he who (M etaph. V .) that they are called rela­ re, is most properly applied to God, for tive, n o t forasm uch as they are related to other things, b u t as others are related three reasons:.. ____T :i___ C— /m. tUo Cl per Ibecause v n n i of its signification. For First, to them. Likewise fo r instance, on the right is not applied to a column, unless it does not signify form, but am ply it stands as regards an animal on the existence itself: Hence since the exist­ right side; w hich relation is not really ence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q . HI, A, 4), it in the colum n, b u t in the animal. Since therefore G od is outside the is clear that among other names this one whole order o f creation, and all crea­ specially denominates God, for every­ tures are ordered to Him , and not con­ thing is denominated b y its form. Secondly, o f its univerversely, v c ia c iy , it i t is m u i aanifest r u i c a i th u i at a i creatures u w i u i w are — --------/ » on\ account ---% really related to G o d Him self; whereas sality. For all other names are either less

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universal, or if convertible with it, add isrencc follows on the form, so in like something above it as least in idea; hence manner to understand follows on the in a certain way they inform and deter­ intelligible species. Now in God there mine it. Now our intellect cannot know is no form which is something other rhe essence of God itself in this life, as than His existence, as shown above (Q. it is in itself, but whatever mode it III.). Hence as His essence itself is also applies in determining what it under­ His intelligible species, it necessarily stands about God, it falls short of the follows that His act of understanding mode of what God is in Himself. There­ must be His essence and His existence. fore the less determinate the names arc, Thus it follows from all the fore­ and the more universal and absolute going that in God, intellect, and the they are, the more properly are they object understood, and the intelligible applied to God. Hence Damascene says species, and His act of understanding (De Fid. Orth, i.) that, h e w h o is , is are entirely one and the same. Hence, the principal of all names applied to when God is said to be understanding, God; for comprehending all in itself, it no kind of multiplicity is attached to contains existence itself as an infinite His substance. and indeterminate sea of substance. Now by any other name some mode of W hether God K nows Things substance is determined, whereas this Other than Himself ?* name h e w h o is , determines no mode 100. W e proceed thus to the Fifth of being, but is indeterminate to all; Article:— and therefore it denominates rhe infinite Objection 1. It seems that God does ocean of substance. Thirdly, from its consignification, for not know things besides Himself. For all it signifies present existence; and this other things but God are outside of above all properly applies to God, God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. whose existence knows not past or fu­ Quaest., qu. xlvi.) that G od does not ture, as Augustine says (De Trin. v.). behold anything out of Himself. There­ fore He does not know things other than Himself. Whether the A ct of God's Intellect Is His Substance?* Obj. 2. Further, the object under­ 99.1 answer that. It must be saidstood that is the perfection of the one who the act of God’s intellect is His sub­ understands. If therefore G od under­ stance. For if His act of understanding stands other things besides Himself, were other than His substance, then something else will be the perfection something else, as the Philosopher says of God, and will be nobler than He; (Metaph. xii.), would be the act and which is impossible. perfection of the divine substance, to Obj. 3. Further, the act of under­ which the divine substance would be standing is specified by the intelligible related, as potentiality is to act, which object, as is every other act from its is altogether impossible; because the act own object. Hence the intellectual act of understanding is the perfection and is so much the nobler, the nobler the act of rhe one understanding. Let us object understood. B ut God is His own now consider how this is. As was laid intellectual act. If therefore G od under­ down above (A. 2), to understand is not stands anything other than Himself, an act passing to anything extrinsic; for then G od Himself is specified by some­ it remains in the operator as his own act thing else than Himself; which cannot and perfection; as existence is the per- be. Therefore H e does not understand faction of the one existing: just as ex- things other than Himself.

CLASSICAL

0 n th e contra ry

lx. is written: A ll

th it'V aTC n a ked “n d ° p£n

H,S eyes

THEISM

,

the similitude of things other than Himse lf-

. . . . . Reply O bj. l.T h c passage of AugusGod necessarily knows tine in which it is said that God ieei things other than Himself. For it is man- nothing outside H im self is not to be ifest that He perfectly understands taken in such a way, as if God saw Himself; otherwise His existence would nothing outside Himself, but in the not be perfect, since His existence is sense that what is outside Himself He His act of understanding. Now if any- docs not see except in Himself, as above thing is perfectly known, it follows of explained. necessity that its power is perfectly 'Reply O bj. 2. The object understood known. But the power of anything can is a perfection of the one understanding be perfectly known only by knowing not by its substance, but bv its image to what its power extends. Since there- according to which it is in the intellect fore the divine power extends to other as its form and perfection, as is said things by the very fact that it is the in De A nhna iii. For a stone is not in first effective cause of all things, as is the soul, but its image. Now those things clear from the aforesaid (Q. II., A. 3), which are other than God are underGod must necessarily know chings other stood by God, inasmuch as the essence than Himself. And this appears still of God contains their images as above more plainly if we add that the very explained; hence it does not follow that existence of the first efficient cause- there is any perfection in the divine viz., G od—is His own act of understand- intellect other than the divine essence, ing. Hence whatever effects pre-exist R ep ly O bj. 3. The intellectual act is in God, as in the first cause, must be in not specified by what is understood in His act of understanding, and all things another, but by the principal object unmust be in H im according to an intel- derstood in which other things are unligible mode: for everything which is derstood. For the intellectual act is in another, is in it according to the specified by its object, inasmuch as the mode of that in which it is. intelligible form is the principle of the N ow in order to know how God intellectual operation: since every operknows things other than Himself, we ation is specified by the form which is must consider that a thing is known in its principle of operation; as heating by tw o ways: in itself, and in another. A heat. Hence the intellectual operation is thing is know n in itself when it is specified by that intelligible form which known by the proper species adequate makes the intellect in act. And this is the to the knowable object; as when the image of the principal thing understood, eye sees a man through the image of a which in God is nothing but His own man. A thing is seen in another through essence in which all images of things are the image of th at w hich contains it; as comprehended. Hence it does not fol­ when a part is seen in the whole by low that the divine intellectual act, or the image of the w hole; o r when a man rather God Himself, is specified by anyic w n m irm r hb vy rh« imfloe in is seen in *a m m irror the image in the thing else than the divine essence Itself. m irror, o r b y any other mode by which W hether God K nows Things Other one thing is seen in another. than Himself by Proper K nowledge?• So w e say th a t G o d sees Himself in W e proceed thus to the Sixth Arti­ Himself, because H e sees Himself through H is essence; and H e sees other cle:— Objection 1. It seems that G od does things not in themselves, but in Him ­ self; inasm uch as H is essence contains not know things other than Himself by ( H e b - >v ( / answer that,

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proper knowledge. For, as was shown is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew (A. 5), God knows things other than itself as the principle of heat, would Himself, according as they are in Him­ know the nature o f heat, and all things self. But other things are in Him as in else in so far as they are hot; so God their common and universal cause, and through knowing Himself as the prin^ are known by God as in their first and ciple of being, knows the nature 0f universal cause. This is to know them being, and all other things in so far as by general, and not bv proper knowl­ they are beings. But this cannot be. For to know a edge. Therefore God knows things be­ sides Himself by general, and not by thing in general and not in particular is to have an im perfect knowledge of proper knowledge. Obj. 2. Further, the created essence it. Hence our intellect, when it is re­ is as distant from the divine essence, as duced from potentiality to act, acquircs the divine essence is distant from the first a universal and confused knowl­ created essence. But the divine essence edge of things, before it knows them cannot be known by the created essence, in particular; as proceeding from the as said above (Q. XII., A. 2). Therefore imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from neither can the created essence be Physic, i. If therefore the knowledge known by the divine essence. Thus as of God regarding things other than God knows only by His essence, it fol­ Himself is only universal and not spe­ lows that He does not know what the cial, it would follow that His unefercreature is in its essence, so as to know sranding would not be absolutely per­ what it is, which is to have proper fect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is agaiast what was knowledge of it. Obj. 3. Further, proper knowledge of said above (Q . IV., A. I). W e must a thing can come only through its prop­ therefore hold that G od knows things er ratio. But as God knows all things other than Him self w ith a proper by His essence, it seems that H e does knowledge; not only in so far as being not know each thing by its proper ratio; is common to them, but in so far as one for one thing cannot be the proper ratio is distinguished from the other. In proof of many and diverse things. Therefore thereof we may observe that some wish­ God has not a proper knowledge of ing to show th at G od knows many things, bnt a general knowledge; for to things by one, bring forw ard some ex­ know things otherwise than by their amples, as, fo r instance, that if the proper ratio is to have only a common centre knew itself, it would know all and general knowledge of them. lines that proceed from the centre; or On the contrary, T o have a proper if light knew itself, it w ould know all knowledge of things is to know them colours. not only in general, but as they are dis­ N o w these examples although they tinct from each other. N ow G od knows are similar in part, namely, as regards things in that manner. Hence it is w rit­ universal causality, nevertheless they ten that H e reaches even to the division fail in this respect th at m ultitude and o f the soul and the spirit, o f the joints diversity are caused by the one univer­ also and the marrow, and is a discem er sal principle, n o t as regards that which o f the thoughts and intents o f the heart; is the principle of distinction, but only neither is there any creature invisible in as regards th at in w hich they communi­ H is sight. (H eb. iv. 12, 13). cate. F or the diversity o f colours is not / answer that, Some have erred on caused by the light only, but by the this point, saying that G od knows things different disposition o f the diaphanous other than Him self only in general, th at m edium w hich receives it; and likewise,

CLASSICAL

THEISM

the diversity of the lines is caused by less He knew all the ways in which His their different position. Hence it is that own perfection can be shared by others, this kind of diversity and multitude can- Neither could He know the very nature not be known in its principle by proper of being perfectly, unless He knew all knowledge, but only in a general way. modes o f being. Hence it is manifest In God, however, it is otherwise. For that God knows all things with proper jt was shown above (Q. IV., A. 2) that knowledge, in their distinction from whatever perfection exists in any crca- each other. ture, wholly pre-exists and is contained Reply Obj. 1. So to know a thing as in God in an excelling manner. Now not it is in the knower, may be understood only what is common to creaturcs-viz., in two ways. In one way this adverb being— belongs to their perfection, but so, imports the mode of knowledge on also what makes them distinguished the part of the thing known; and in that from each other; as living and under- sense it is false. For the knower does standing, and the like, whereby living not always know the object known acbeings arc distinguished from the non- cording to the existence it has in the living, and the intelligent from the non- knower; since the eye does not know intelligent. Likewise every form where- a stone according to the existence it has by each thing is constituted in its own in the eye; but by the image of the stone species, is a perfection; and thus all which is in the eye, the eye knows the things pre-exist in God, not only as re- stone according to its existence outside gards w hat is common to all, but also the eye. And if any knower has a as regards w hat distinguishes one thing knowledge of the object known accordfrom another. And therefore as God ing to the (mode of) existence it has contains all perfections in Himself, the in the knower, the knower nevertheless essence of G od is compared to all other knows it according to its (mode of) essences of things, not as the common existence outside the knower; thus the to the proper, as unity is to numbers, intellect knows a stone according to the or as the centre (of a circle) to the intelligible existence it has in the intel(radiating) lines; b u t as perfect acts to lect, inasmuch as it knows that it underimperfect; as if I were to compare man stands; while nevertheless it knows what to animal; o r six, a perfect number, to a stone is in its own nature. If however the im perfect numbers contained under the adverb so be understood to import " " ' the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true only in general, b u t also by proper that the knower has knowledge of the knowledge; thus, for example, whoever object known only as it is in the knowknows a man, knows an animal by prop- er; for the more perfectly the thing er knowledge; and whoever knows the known is in the knower, the more pernum ber six, know s the number three feet is the mode of knowledge, also b y proper knowledge. W e must say therefore that G od not As therefore the essence of God con- only knows that things are in Himself; tains in itself all the perfection con- but by the fact that they are m Him, tained in the essence of any other being. H e knows them in their own nature and far m ore, G od can know in Himself and all the more perfectly, the more all of them w ith proper knowledge. For perfectly each one is in Him . the nature proper to each thing consists R * P b O b j . 2. T h e created esence is in some degree of participation in the compared to the essence of G od, as the divine perfection. N o w G od could not imperfect to the perfect act. T h erefore be said to know Him self perfectly un- the created essence cannot sufficiently

1j 6

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lead us to the knowledge of the divine absolutely necessary, must have an ab­ solutely necessary consequent. For the essence, but rather the converse. Reply Obj. 3. The same thing cannot antecedent is to the consequent as prin­ be taken in an equal manner as the ratio ciples are to the conclusion: and from of different things. But the divine es­ necessary principles only a necessary sence excels all creatures. Hence it can conclusion can follow, as is proved in be taken as the proper ratio of each Poster, i. But this is a true conditional osition, If God knew that this thing thing according to the diverse ways in be, it 'will be, for the knowledge of which diverse creatures participate in, God is only of true things. Now, the and imitate i t antecedent conditional of this is abso­ Whether God Knows Singular Things?• lutely necessary, because it is eternal, 101. . . . since God is the cause of and because it is signified as past. There­ things by His knowledge, as stated fore, the consequent is also absolutely above (A. 8), His knowledge extends necessary. Therefore whatever God as far as His causality extends. Hence, knows, is necessary; and so the knowl__ n~A :o _____ ____ .. _i_as the active power of God extends not edge of G od is not of contingent things, only to forms, which arc the source of Obj. 3. Further, everything known by universality, but also to matter, as we God must necessarily be, because even shall prove further on (Q. XLIV., A. what we ourselves know, must neces2), the knowledge of God must extend sarUy be; and, of course, the knowledge to singular things, which are individual- of God is much more certain than ours, ized By matter. For since H e knows But no future contingent thing must things other than Himself by His es- necessarily be. Therefore no contingent sence, as being the likeness of things, or future thing is known by God. as their active principle, His essence On the contrary, It is w ritten (Ps. ------Lbe --L ---------------_r I---------------fcjfh maj e ^ must the sufficing principle of know­ xxxii. 1 5 ), ing all things made by Him, not only hearts o f every one o f them: W ho unin the universal, but also in the singu­ derstandeth all their works, that is, of lar. T he same would apply to the men. N ow the works of men are con­ knowledge of the artificer, if it were tingent, being subject to free will. productive of the whole being, and not Therefore G od knows future contin­ only of the form. gent things. 1 answer that, Since as was shown Whether the Knowledge o f G od Is o f above (A. 9), G od knows all things; Future Contingent Things?* not only things actual but also things 102. W e proceed thus to the Thir­ possible to H im and the creature; and teenth Article:— since some of these are future contin­ Objection 1. It seems that the knowl­ gent to us, it follows that G od knows edge of God is not of future contingent future contingent things. things. For from a necessary cause pro­ In evidence of this, we must consider ceeds a necessary effect. But the knowl- that a contingent thing can be considedge of God is the cause o f things ered in tw o ways; first, in itself, in so known, as said above (A. 8). Since far as it is now m act: and in this sense therefore that knowledge is necessary, it is not considered as future, but as w hat He knows must also be necessary. present; neither is it considered as con­ Therefore the knowledge of God is not tingent (as having reference) to one of o f contingent things. tw o terms but as determ ined to one; Obj. 2. Further, every conditional and on account o f this it can be infalli­ proposition of which the antecedent is bly the object o f certain knowledge, for

S

1. A S S I c A 1.

T HF.I SV

I1(.e to instance t the sense of sight, as when Reply Obj. 2.. .. Therefore we must see that Socrates is sitting down. In reply otherwise; that when the anteced­ 1 her wav a contingent thing can be ent contains anything belonging to an considered as it is in its cause; and in act of the soul, the consequent must be his way it is considered as future, and taken _______ „ is „ in m itself, lt . but as it is in not__ as it as a contingent thing not yet determined the soul: for the existence of a thing in Jo one; forasmuch as a contingent cause itself is different from the existence I f a has relation to opposite things: and in thing in the soul. For example, when 1 this sense a contingent thing is not sub- say, What the soul understands is m ect to any certain knowledge. Hence, material; this is to be understood [as whoever knows a contingent effect in meaning] that it is immaterial as it is in its cause only, has merely a conjectural the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likeknowledge of it. N ow God knows all wise if 1 say, If God knew anything, it contingent things not only as they are will be, the consequent must be under­ in their causes, but also as each one of stood as it is subject to the divine them is actually in itself. And although knowledge, that is, as it is in its pre­ contingent things become actual sue- sentiality. And a_ j thus -l... it :---is necessary,r a_ cessivelv, nevertheless God knows con­ also is the antecedent: for everything tingent'things not successively, as they that is, while it is, nmst necessarily be, are6 in their own being, as we do; but as the Philosopher says in Periherm. i. simultaneously. T he reason is because Reply Obj. 3. Things reduced to act His knowledge is measured by eternity, n time, are known by us successively as is also H is being; and eternity being in time, but by God (are known) in simultaneously whole comprises all time, eternity, which is above time. Whence as was said above (Q . X., A. 2). Hence, to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch all things that are in time are present as we know future contingent things to G od from eternity, not only because as such; but (they are certain) to God H e has the types of things present w ith- alone, whose understanding is in eterin Him , as some say; but because His nity above time. Just as he who goes glance is carried from eternity over all along the road, does not see those who things as they are in their presentialitv. come after him; whereas he who sees H ence it is m anifest that contingent the whole road from a height, sees at things are infallibly know n by God, in- once aU travelling by the way. Hence asmuch as th ey are subject to the divine what is known by us must be necessary, sight in their presentiality; yet they are ^ e n as it is in itself; for what is future

» sr&'&scjjwS!

their ow n causes. Reply O b,. 1. Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent b y reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the m ovem ent of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things kno w n b y G od are contingent on account o f th eir proxim ate causes, while the know ledge of G od, which is the first cause, is necessary.

necessary according to the mode |n ate s u b le t to the knowledge as already stated, but nQt absoiutciy ^ considered in their own axxs^ Hence also the proposition, Everything known by Goa must necessarily be, is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided, and false; for the sense is, Everything w hich G od knows is neeessary. If understood of the saying it is composite and true; for the sense is,

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This proposition, 'that -which is known by God is necessary.’ Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, It is possible for a white thing to be black, it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, a w hite thing is black, can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this dis­ tinction does not hold, for instance, if I said A black crow can be w hite; for in both senses it is false. N ow to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God can­ not be not known. This objection, how­ ever, would hold if these words that which is know n implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they im port an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. W hether the Knowledge o f G od Is Variable?* 103. Obj. 2. Further, whatever God can make, H e can know. But G od can make more than H e does. Therefore He can know more than H e knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. 104. Reply Obj. 2. G od knows also w hat H e can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that H e can make m ore than H e makes, it does not follow that H e can know more than H e knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge o f vision, according to which H e is said to know those things w hich are in act in some period o f time. But from the fact th at H e knows some things m ight be w hich are not, o r th at some things

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might not be which arc, it does not fol­ low that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability 0f things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know and afterwards knew, then His knowl­ edge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from 'the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that G od can know more than H e knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. T h e Divine W ill W hether W hatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily?* 105. W e proceed thus to the Third Article:— Objection 1. It seeins that whatever God wills H e wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever G od wills, H e wills from eter­ nity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore w hatever H e wills, H e wills necessarily. Obj. 2. Further, G od wills things apart from Him self inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. N o w G od wills His own goodness necessarily. There­ fore H e wills things apart from Himself necessarily. Obj. 3. Further, whatever belongs to the nature of G od is necessary, for God is of Him self necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (Q . II., A. 3). But it belongs to His nature to will w hatever H e wills; since in G od there can be nothing over and above H is nature as stated in Metaph. v. 6. T herefore w hatever H e wills, H e wills necessarily. Obj. 4. F urther, being th at is not necessary, and being th at is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If,

A S S 1 C A I.

therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that H e wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possi­ ble for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contin-

THEISM

that i ... . . .

P1-0! * 1- object. Hence God u ills H is own goodness necessarily, cvcn as we will our own happiness necessari­ ly. and as any other faculty has neces-

Himself in so far as they are ordered to which is indifferent to one or the other His own goodness as their end. Now in of two things, no action results unless willing an end we do not necessarily it is inclined to one or the other by some will things that conduce to it, unless other power, as the Commentator they are such that the end cannot be [Averroes] says on Phys. ii. If, then, the attained without them; as, we will to Will of God is indifferent with regard take food to preserve life, or to take to anything, it follows that His deter­ ship in order to cross the sea. But we mination to act comes from another; do not necessarily will things without and thus H e has some cause prior to which the end is attainable, such as a Himself. ______ horse for a joumev which we can take Obj. 6. Further, whatever God knows, on foot, for we can make the journey H e knows necessarily. But as the divine without one. The same applies to other knowledge is His essence, so is the di- means. Hence, since the goodness of vine will. T herefore whatever G od God is perfect, and can exist without wills, H e wills necessarily. other things inasmuch as no perfection On the contrary, the Apostle says can accrue to Him from them, it fol(Eph. i- II): W h o w orketh all things 'lows that ............................... His willing things apart from according to the counsel o f His will. Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet Now , w hat we w ork according to the it can be necessary by supposition, for counsel of the will, we do not will nec­ supposing that He wills a thing, then essarily. T herefore G od does not will He is unable not to will it, as His will necessarily whatever H e wills. cannot change. / answer that, T here are tw o ways Reply Ob]. 1. From the fact that God in which a thing is said to be necessary, wills from eternity whatever He wills, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. it does not follow that H e wills it nec­ W e judge a thing to be absolutely nec­ essarily; except by supposition. essary from the relation of the terms, as Reply Obj. 2. Although God neceswhen the predicate forms part of the sarily wills His own goodness, He does definition of the subject: thus it is ab­ not necessarily will dungs willed on ac­ solutely necessary that man is an animal count of His goodness; for it can exist . . . In this w ay it is not necessary that without other things. Reply Obj. 3. It is not natural to God Socrates sits: w herefore it is not nec­ essary absolutely, though it may be so to will any of those other things that by supposition; for, granted that he is H e does not will necessarily; ana yet it sitting, he m ust necessarily sit, as long is not unnatural or contrary to H js naas he is sitting. A ccordingly as to things ture, but voluntary, willed b y G od, w e m ust observe that Reply Obj. 4. Sometimes a necessary H e wills som ething of absolute necessi- cause has a non-necessary relation to an ty: b u t this is n o t tru e of all that H e effect; owing to a deficiency in the efwills. F o r th e divine will has a necessary feet, and not in the cause. £ven so, the relation to th e divine goodness, since sun’s pow er has a non-oecessary rek-

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tion to sonic contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect nor in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God docs not neccssarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namcly, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good. Reply Obj. 5. A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, deter­ mines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. Reply Obj. 6. As the divine existence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary rela­ tion to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute ne­ cessity so as to be necessary in them­ selves, in so far as they exist in them ­ selves; it follows that G od knows nec­ essarily whatever H e knows, but does not will necessarily whatever H e wills. W hether the W ill o f G od Im ­ poses N ecessity on the Things W illed?* 106. W e proceed thus to the Eighth Article:— Objection 1. It seems that the will of G od imposes necessity on the things willed. F or Augustine says (Enchir. 103); N o one is saved, except w h o m G o d has w illed to be saved. H e m ust therefore be asked to w ill it; for if H e wills it, it m ust necessarily be. O bj. 2. Further, every cause that can­ not be hindered, produces its effect

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necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Fhys. ii. 84): Nature always works in the satne way, if there is no/f, ing to hinder it. But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom. ix. 19): W ho resisteth His tall? Therefore the will of God im_ poses necessity on the things willed, Obj. 3. Further, whatever is nccessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that ammals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. N ow things created by God are related to the divine u/iii as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass: and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely. On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of ne­ cessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things. / answer that, T he divine will im­ poses necessity on some things willed but not on all. T h e reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that w hat G od pro­ duces by necessary causes is necessary; and w hat H e produces by contingent causes contingent. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for m o reasons. First, be­ cause the effect of a first cause is con­ tingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun’s power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect o f a secondary cause can hinder G o d ’s will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinc­ tion betw een the contingent and the necessary is to be re ferred only to sec­ ondary causes, this m ust be independent o f the divine intention and will; which

uiv *■£)-" o &■ ------- - •• juutiuujc« ratner tnan building up of the universe. Therefore a supersubject? Every example which to some effects H e has attached neces- Thomas can give, every example that sary causes, that cannot fail; but to ever has been given, we think, cooothers defective and contingent causes, firms this supposition. Thus the animal from which arise contingent effects, has relation to the column, not the Hence it is not because the proximate column to the animal; for nothing causes are contingent that the effects noticeable happens to the column by willed by G od happen contingently, virtue of the relative positions of it and but because G od has prepared contin- the animal, whereas something does hapgent causes for them, it being His will pen to the animal, which guides ns that they should happen contingently, behavior with reference to such things. Reply Ob]. 1. By the words of Au- avoiding or approaching the column gustine we must understand a necessity according as its purposes indicate. It m things willed by G od that is not ab- is the animal, not tne column, that takes solute, but conditional. For the condi- account of relations. And this is because tional statem ent that if G od wills a of its superior subjectivity, its awarething, it m ust necessarily be, is neces- ness! But probably Thomas is thinksarily true. ing merely of the fact that the animal R eply Ob]. 2. From the very fact moves in relation to the column, not that nothing resists the divine will, it vice versa. Very well, which is superior, follows th at not only those things hap- a self-moving organism, or a fixed in­ pen that G od wills to happen, but that organic aggregate of crystals? W hich they happen necessarily or contingently is God more like, a superstone or a according to H is will. superorganic individual? i n h i v ronsM iuents have neLet us take another analogy. The

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a m anner o f speaking to say that the abstract “ is em bodied"’ in ju st this par­ ticular concrete o r that. “ T h e num ber t w o ” is not a different entity because at a given m om ent som eone em bodies it by puttin g dow n tw o dots. B u t a set o f dors m ust be different acco rd in g as it docs o r docs not em bod y the num ber tw o. T h is an alogy su ggests that the nonrelative (ab so lu te) is tne abstract rather than the con crete, as the form er an alo gy su g g ested that it is o b jec t rather than su bject.

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takes place) w ould have been fal«. know ledge, since E would not hawl taken place. T h is is the supposition of possible falsirv in the know ledge of , infallible in tcllect-a pure absurdity T h at, the supposition o f which involved intrinsic absurdity, is impossible, and its denial is unconditionally necessary H en ce “ E rakes place” is,' in spite of T h om as, on his ow n prem ises uncon d itionally n ecessary, and there can be no co n tin gen cy in the w orld.

Again, take his reply to objection 2If then G od is supremely absolute, that since things as in the mind can he must, it seems, be that which is most have properties they do not have in abstract and merely objective, o r least themselves—thus, for instance, material concrete and least subjective or con­ things as in the mind arc immaterial— scious. Yet G od is to be the supremely so things contingent in themselves can rich and conscious being! G ranted that be necessary as present to the divine we must think analogically in these mind; further w hat is, while it is, must matters, does it follow that we may necessarily be, and w hat is presented arbitrarily invert the logical structure to God, since it is presented to God, it of all the analogies and still claim that necessarily is so presented. But (we to subject or concrete (rather than to rejoin) either it is or it is not a logical object o r abstract) in the ordinary or possibility that the thing m ight not have nondivine case corresponds the super- existed; if it is a possibility, then, if subjective or superconcrete in the di­ it had not existed, it would not have vine case? By all the evidence, the cor­ been present to G od as existent, and respondence m ust be wrecked by the then ne would not have known that inversion. T h e only defense is in term s it existed. But this is (according to o f the m onopolar axioms from which Thom ism ) impossible, since we are told classical theism derives. But upon w hat that G o d ’s knowledge is wholly neces­ valid analogy can these axioms them ­ sary. N ow w hat implies the impossible selves rest? Is not all experience thor­ is impossible. H ence the nonexistence oughly polar? of the thing is impossible, not merely C oncerning the key problem o f clas­ “while it is presented,” but absolutely; sical theism, w hether a w holly necessary fo r it implies as possible w hat under being could know the contingent, we no circum stances could be possible, com m ent as follows on T hom as’ argu­ namely, that som ething actually in God, m ent as presented in the thirteenth his knowledge, m ight have been other­ wise; th at is, it implies th at G od has article (sec. 102). First, his reply to objection 1: that accidents. T h e reply to objection 3—that all a cause w hich cannot fail to be can have effects w hich could have failed events, no m atter w hether those we call to occur, if the necessary cause is not past o r future, are determ inate from the the total cause, if subsidiary causes are standpoint o f eternity—seems adequate­ also required fo r the thing; fo r these ly refuted by Socinus (sec. 287). It m ay fail, and the effect n o t take place. is a splendid illustration of w hat Berg­ B a t (w e rejoin) in this case the neces­ son calls “spatializing time,” that is, sary cause (G o d ’s know ledge th a t E supposing all its parts determ inate.

Concerning the nonnecessity o f G od ’s willing the w orld; it is held that, al­ though he necessarily wills his own goodness, the w orld is not essential to this goodness, so he wills it nonneces­ s i t y . But then there are tw o kinds 0f volitions in G o d : those that are there necessarily and those that are there nonncccssarily. Y et all the being o f G od is held to be p u rely necessary. Ergo, the nonnecessarv acts are not in the being they. are either in _eing o- f G o d. . Still . G od o r not in him. I f in him, then he has accidents, additional to what is necessary in him. If not in him, what ; m eant b y callin g them “ his" acts,

Concerning divine will and freedom (sec. 106), and the reply to objection 1, we argue: the phrase, “if God wills a thing,” is self-contradictory, or simply meaningless, ^on the classical assumptions that God's will is his essence. There can then" be' no “if” about it, and the word illegitimate. Concerning the reply to objection 2: since (not if) God wills (with his very essence, hence neccssarily) that we do something, we must necessarily do it, for his will is said to be irresistible; and if he has willed that we nevertheless do it nonnecessarily, he has then willed a contradiction, and even he cannot actualize a - , v,v are w e assured always that contradiction! Reply to objection 3: and w y .„ . l : _ ggjgnce”? « r '" > * ‘G o d ’s will is his essence” ? as before, God is powerless to achieve W e are told (sec. 105, reply to ob­ a self-contradictory volition that we do jection 4 ) th at it is due to a d efect in something without possibility of not the w o rld th at G o d cou ld have willed doing it, yet contingently, i.e., with pos­ not to create it. T h u s, supposing the sun sibility of not doing it! is sure to shine, still the plant m ay not Even if the reply to objection 1, with grow , o w in g to its d efective ability to its meaningless “if” clause, were admis­ respond to the sun. B u t if the sun willed sible, it would amount to saying that that th e p lan t w o u ld g ro w bu t could a sinner might not have sinned if God instead have w illed that it w ould not had willed ____ ____ 1IU1. n ilu UI1 that...he should not. And on grow, we should then have to admit the reasoning offered, God could have that such willing is a nonnecessaty willed: let him not sin, and let him factor in the being of the sun. T he sole nevertheless act freely in avoiding sin. relevance of w hat is here said would Well, then, w hy did God not so will? be if it w ere m eant that G od’s willing It seems hard to see any excuse for to create the w orld and his willing not his neglect to will the good in this in­ to create the w orld are identical wulings stance, since on the; principles offered ____ l themselves; b u t in the one case the there would be no sacrifice of human world manages to come into being, in freedom. the other it does not. But w ho would Is this really the best that theism can dare, on the basis of classical theism, do? If so, how strong indeed would to say this frankly as the meaning of be the position of positivism, holding divine “w ill”? Yet w hat other meaning that the idea of God is a mere confu­ sion or absurdity! fits the reasoning?

DESCARTES (1596-1650) As every student o f the history of philosophy know s, there is a famous ^circle” in the reasoning o f Descartes concem ing G o d as the ground of the trustw orthiness o f ou r knowledge,

Doubting die reliability of human perceprion and memory, Descartes wonders w hether even the self-evident principles of mathematics are wholly certam. Perhaps some powerful being is

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causing us in all our mental operations to deceive ourselves in some subtle way that we ourselves cannot detect. Then Descartes proves the existence of God as a perfect being; this being must have created us, and, since it is perfect, it would not be so unjust as to condemn us to invincible self-deception; rather, we must suppose that, as created, our faculties are excellent and designed to lead us to truth—provided only we em­ ploy them carefully and as best we can. But, protest the critics, it is by the very cognitive powers that we have affected to doubt that we have proved God. So how in this way can the doubt be disposed of? Formally regarded, there is a vicious circle here. But it is possible to see dimly indicated in the reasoning a line of thought that would not be circular. If one puts the question, “O n what supposition may we trust our cognitive faculties?” the answer can only be, “On any supposition.” For to make supposi­ tions, to think at all, is already to rely upon these faculties. But the proper question is rather, granting we are bound to suppose, in thinking, th at w e can think to some purpose: ‘‘H ow are w e to understand tnis presupposed re­ liability of the human mind? W hat does it mean to say that w e can find the truth? Indeed, w hat is meant by ‘tru th ’?” Surely a mind that can think to any purpose is som ething w ith a certain am ount of inner coherence and of har­ m ony w ith its world. F o r a mind to exist at all already involves so m uch. B ut the question remains: Can the m utual co-ordination of things be m ere­ ly their ow n affair, o r does it neces­ sarily express a com m on subordination to some supreme power? A nd w hat is m eant b y tru th about events long past and n o t fo r us open to unequivocal evidence? W h a t preserves intact the “having occurred” o f such past events? A ll these m atters become intelligible w ith the conception o f G od as the su­

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prem e ordering and all-knowing minH And although we cannot prove wifk m athem atical certainty that G od would not wish us to be deceived, still th only w ay w e can imagine o f serving such a G o d is tru stfu lly to use such faculties as he has given to us; and thk tru st seem s m ore intelligible than trust in som ething w e cannot imagine what som e com m un ity o f forces which noth ing orders in m utual relationships som e w h olly unim aginable ordering force other than will and mind. b

So we submit that Descartes (and with him, Spinoza, Leibniz, Peirce W hitehead, etc.) was on the right track in seeing the intelligibility of knowle d g e -n o t its guaranty, for we have no alternative but to trust it—in the pos­ sibility of our finding evidence for God that is to say, in the intelligibility for us of his existence. Let us see what this evidence, o r part of it, was. The reader will please note that, except in his reply to objections, Descartes, like Anselm in the first paragraph of his discussion of the ontological argument, speaks as though “existence” (in con­ trast to nonexistence) were a predicate or quality, to lack which would be to fall short of perfection; whereas, in the formulation to which objections drove him, he makes explicit that the con­ trast is n o t betw een existence and non­ existence but betw een necessary and contingent modes of existence. As An­ selm had said, if G od’s existence were not necessary b u t accidental, then he would be im perfect, w hether he existed o r failed to exist. A n accidental existent, o r a candidate for contingent existence, be the existence granted o r withheld, is a tem poral, dependent entity, not an eternal, independent one. Contingency is limitation. O n this point Anselm was clearer than Descartes on the whole. O n the other hand, Descartes is a bit stronger in his dealing w ith the question, “H o w do I know that 1 have a genuine idea of perfection

Cl . A S S I C A I .

rather than a confused o r seif-contra­

I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that 1 am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a-----beini ig more perfect than Descartes's Ontological Argument, myself, by comparison of which 1 knew Final Version the deficiencies of my nature? Iffl. In the idea or concept of a 109. (fling existence is contained, because conceive a God unless as existing, any we are unable to conceive anything more than l can a mountain without except under the form of an existent; a valley, yet, iust as it docs not follow that is, possible or contingent exist­ that there is any mountain in the world ence is contained in the concept of merely because I conceive a mountain CnCC A thine, but necessary and per- with a valley, so likewise, though 1 conlirn,lcxistence in the concept of a su- ceivc God as existing, it does not seem to follow on that account that God premcly perfect being. exists; for my thought imposes no ne­ Proposition l* cessity on things; and as I may imagine The existence of God is known from a winged horse, though there be none the consideration of his nature alone. such, so I could perhaps attribute exist­ ence to God, though no God existed. Demonstration• But the cases are not analogous, and a T o say th at something is contained fallacy lurks under the semblance of in the nature o r in the concept of any­ this objection: for because I cannot thing is the same as to say that this conceive a mountain without a valley, is true of that thing. . . . But necessary it does not follow that there is any existence is contained in the nature or mountain or valley in existence, but simply that the mountain or valley, in the concept o f G od. whether they do or do not exist, are H ence it is true to say of God that inseparable from each other; whereas, necessary existence is in him, or that on the other hand, because l cannot God exists.® conceive God unless as (necessarily] 108. A nd I m ust not imagine that existing, it follows that (the necessary I do not apprehend the infinite by a true or perfect mode of] existence is in­ idea, b u t only b y the negation of the separable from him, and therefore that finite, in the same w ay that I comprehend repose and darkness by the nt^a- be rca% exists: not that this is brought don o f m otion and light: since, on the about t y my thought, or that it uncontrary, 1 d e a rly perceive th at there P0^ any necessity on things, but, on is m ore reality in the infinite substance ]be contrary, the necessity which lies than in the finite, and therefore that in *n tbc thing itself, that is, the necessity some w ay I possess the perception (not^ie. existence of God, determines me don) of th e infinite before that of t0 think “ » this way: for it is not in to conceive G od od without without the finite, th at is, the perception of G od my P°w er to conceive aa G i--------bein before th a t o f m yself, fo r how could [n e c * ® y^ ]j existence, that is, a being supremely perfect, and yet devoid of < sunremelv 3. To retain the force of Descartes's em- an absolute perfection, as 1 am free to phasis on necessity (as a superior kind of ex- imagine a horse w ith or without wings. Su CT d . Rep!esA ° ° bt ctUmt\ N o r m ust it be alleged here as an wc nave taken the liberty of adding the word •• • , . . . ® , in brackets wherever,™ the following pas- ob>ef ° n’ » m truth necessary sages from the Meditations, it seemed to be t0 admit that G od exists, after havmg implicit. supposed him to possess all perfections,

dictory pseudo-idea?” H ere, w e think, js the critical question.

But thoug

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since [necessary] existence is one of them, but that my original supposition was not necessary; just as it is not necessary to think that all quadrilateral figures can be inscribed in the circle, since, if I supposed this, I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus, being a figure of four sides, can be therein inscribed, which, however, is manifestly false. This objection is, I say, incompetent; for although it may not be necessary that I shall at any time entertain the notion of Deity, yet each rime I happen to think of a first and sovereign being, and to draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the storehouse of the mind, I am necessi­ tated to attribute to him all kinds of perfections, though I may not then enumerate them all, nor think of each of them in particular. And this necessity is sufficient, as soon as I discover that [necessity of] existence is a perfection, to cause me to infer the existence of this first and sovereign being; just as it is not necessary that I should ever imagine any triangle, but w henever I am desirous of considering a rectilineal figure composed o f only three angles, it is absolutely necessary to attribute those properties to it from w hich it is correctly inferred that its three angles are not greater than tw o right angles, although perhaps I m ay not then ad­ vert to this relation in particular. But when I consider w hat figures are ca­ pable o f being inscribed in the circle, it is by no means necessary to hold that all quadrilaterial figures are of this num ber; on the contrary, I cannot even imagine such to be the case, so long as 1 shall be unwilling to accept in thought aught that I do not clearly and distinctly conceive: and consequently there is a vast difference between false suppositions, as is the one in question, ana the true ideas that were bom w ith me, the first and chief o f w hich is the idea o f G od. F or indeed I discern on m any grounds th at this idea is not

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factitious, depending sim ply on m thought, but that it is the represen t/ tion o f a true and immutable nature in the first place, because I can Con ccivc no other being, except C o d to w hose essence [the necessary mode’ ofl existence pertains; in the second be cause it is im possible to conceive’ two o r m ore g o d s o f this kind; and it beinp supposed that one such G o d exists 1 clearly see that he m ust have existed fro m all eternity, and w ill exist to all etern ity; and finally, because I appre­ hend m any oth er properties in God none o f w hich I can either diminish or change.

[Sec. 107, Rene Descartes, S e c o n d R e p lie s to trans. Marjorie Grene, quoted in

O b je c tio n s ,

T . V. Smith and Marjorie Grene,

F r o m D es­

c a r te s t o K a n t (Chicago: University of Chi­ cago Press, 1940), pp. 161-62. Sec. 108, Deic a r te s ’ M e d it a tio n s a n d S e le c tio n s f r o m the P r in c ip le s o f P h ilo s o p h y , trans. John Veitch

(Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 191)) pp. 54-53. Sec. 109, ib id ., pp. 78-80.] COMMENT

T he greatest weakness of Descartes’s argument (w hen w e correct, as he him­ self learned to do, the initial error of treating simple universal existence as a predicate o f a “p erfection” and sub­ stitute the m odality, necessity-with-respect-to-existence) lies in his failure to establish and clarify the initial thesis of the argum ent—“I have an idea of per­ fection.” Has he such an idea? If our criticisms o f classical theism are sound, Descartes’s supposed idea of G od is really incoherent and in the same class w ith those self-contradictory notions of whose “falsity” o r “factitiousness” he speaks. W hat, then, of his argument purporting to show th at he cannot be w ithout a tru e idea o f perfection, as the standard b y w hich he becomes aw are o f his ow n im perfections? One m ay answ er th at consciously Descartes has the classical pseudo-idea o f the di­ vine nature b u t th at unconsciously he

CLASSICAL

has the genuine idea which all men / w c think) intuitively have, the dipolar conception o f perfection as having a remporal and relative and composite a^DCCt as well as an eternal, absolute, fnd sim ple one. In this dipolar perfec­ tion all truth is contained, truth about the and actual “ Past and actual, about the futu re and indeterminately potential as futu re and indeterminate,

THEISM

and how far indeterminate. It is by this as standard that our real defects and imperfections are judged. W e, for our part, uttle know what is determinately actual and past, what is future and more or less indeterminate. The panentheistic concept fits the Cartesian situa­ tion—apart from its ecclesiastical factors better than the classical one that alone was considered by Descartes.

LEIBNIZ (1646-1716) Leibniz rendered two great services individual units of reality was a great in connection with theism. (1) He was contribution to theism of all varieties. the first not to propose (for Campanella (2) Leibniz, by applying his power and others had done that) but to work of exceptionally dear statement and out the only coherent program, as it analysis to certain traditional theistic seems to us, of relating God and the conceptions, accomplished, in spite of world, by treating the universal prop­ himself, a reductio ad absurdum of these erties of created things as inferior forms ideas which has materially aided in of that which, in supremely excellent breaking their spell and thus in open­ form, constitutes the divine nature. ing up fresh possibilities for thought. Thus, if knowledge is perfect in God, This is not a service he intended to then it is im perfect, but still present, perform, but its value is nonetheless in all other individuals. For the differ­ real. ence between the perfect and the im­ Knowledge and Will in All Beings perfect is not that between something and nothing, or infinity and zero, but 110. In God are present: power, between the infinite and the finite (so which is the source of everything; far as infinity comes in properly at all). knowledge, which contains the details A ccordingly, to set up a threefold of the ideas; and, finally, will, which division-G od, the perfectly knowing changes or produces things in accord­ individual; m en and the like, imper­ ance with tfie principle of the greatest fectly know ing individuals; molecules, good. T o these correspond in the cre­ atoms, particles, individuals not know­ ated monad, the subject or basis, the ing at all—is to destroy any logic in faculty of perception, and the faculty the theistic conception. T h e divine at­ of appetition. In God these attributes tributes cannot anyw here be present are absolutely infinite or perfect, while in m erely zero degree, for G oa is in in the created monads or in the enall his w orks positively reflected and telechies they are imitations approach­ imitated thereby. T ru e , Campanella, ing him in proportion to their perfec­ Cardanus, and Telesius o f the Renais­ tion. sance period had set u p this principle. Perfection in G od and the World But th ey did nothing cogent w ith it in 111. T he conception of God which detail. D espite all the mistakes in Leib­ niz’s m onadology, his systematic at­ is the most common and the most full tribution o f “perception” and “appeti- of meaning is expressed well enough tion,” in how ever low ly forms, to all in the words: G od is an absolutely per-

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OK

GOD

feet being. The implications, however, right angles arc equal to each other of these words fail to receive sufficient arc necessary truths; but it is a con consideration. For instance, there arc tingent truth that 1 exist or that there many different kinds of perfection, all are bodies which show an actual right b of which God possesses, and each one angle. of them pertains to him in the highest 114. But there must be also a suffi­ cient reason for contingent truths or degree. W e must also know what perfection truths of fact; that is to say, for the is. One thing which can surely be af­ sequence of the things which extend firmed about it is that those forms or throughout the universe of created be­ natures which are not susceptible of it ings. to the highest degree, say the nature of 115. In my opinion, if there were no numbers or of figures, do not permit best possible series [of things in the of perfection. This is because the num­ world], God would certainly have cre­ ber which is the greatest of all (that ated nothing, since he cannot act with­ is, the sum of all the numbers), and out a reason, or prefer the less perfect likewise the greatest of all figures, imply to the more perfect. contradictions. The greatest knowledge, 116. God, however, has chosen the however, and omnipotence contain no most perfect [world], that is to say impossibility. Consequently power and the one which is at the same time the knowledge do admit of perfection, and simplest in hypotheses and richest in in so far as they pertain to God they phenomena, as m ight be the case with have no limits. * a geometric line, whose construction W hence it follows that G od who was easy, but whose properties and ef­ possesses supreme and infinite wisdom fects were extremely remarkable and acts in the most perfect manner not of great significance. only metaphysically but also from the T h e A ntinom y o f Necessary moral standpoint. 112. Certain m odem writers . . . bold­ Knowledge and W ill w ith Contingent Objects ly maintain that that which G od has made is not perfect in the highest de­ 111. [Amauld:] . . . w hat do we gree, and that he m ight have done bet­ know at present of G od’s knowledge? ter. . . . T o show that an architect W e know that he knows all things and could have done better is to find fault that he knows them all by a single and with his work. Furtherm ore this opin­ very simple act, which is his essence. ion is contrary to the H oly Scriptures W hen I say that we know it I mean when they assure us of the goodness of that we are sure that this m ust be so. G od’s work. F or if comparative per­ B ut do we understand it? . . . Further, fection were sufficient, then in w hat­ are we able to conceive that, although ever w ay G od had accomplished his the knowledge of G od is his very es­ work, since there is an infinitude of sence, w holly necessary and immutable, possible imperfections, it would always he has, nevertheless, knowledge of an nave been good in comparison w ith tne infinity of things which he m ight not Jess perfect; but a thing is little praise­ have nad because those things might w o rth y w hen it can be praised only not have been? It is the same in the in this way. case o f his will w hich is also his very 113. A truth is necessary when the essence w here there is nothing except opposite implies contradiction; and w hat is necessary; and still he wills and w hen it is n o t necessary it is called has willed, from all eternity, things contingent. T h a t G od exists, th at all w hich he would have been able not to

C1 .AS SI CAI .

ivil). 1 find thcrcfore a g rcat deal of uncertainty in the manner in which we usually represent to ourselves that God

THEIs M

H ovj Bad Acts, Though Chosen by

Divine Decree, Are Yet Contrary to Divine Conrmands 121. . . . God desires everything * ? / * [Leibniz:] It is . . . very difficult which is an object of his particular in­ t0 explain perfectly how God has knowledge which he was able not to tention. When we consider the objects of his general intentions, however, such have, that is, the knowledge of pre­ as are the modes of activities of created vision, for, if future contingencies did things and especially of the reasoning t exist, G od would have no vision »- ... it- he m ifrh r h-avn is true rh that might have " e^ ref ' vhom God wishes to ° f th,k n o w le d g e of future contingen- f ° r WC.must mak. P> 5Jlno maximal realization o f value is pos-

*5°

PHILOSOPHERS

All in all, Kant is a classical or mono­ polar rheist who emphasizes the theoret­ ical difficulties in this position more than his predecessors but hopes to save it by appeal to a construction of the moral law which, particularly in this applica­ tion, is open to no less grave objections. His G oa becomes a cosmic magistrate

SPEAK

OF

GOD

and policeman who sees to it that the good are given their deserts-an anthro­ pomorphic conception, indeed, of the ultimate end of existence! W hat remains valid is Kant’s insistence that we cannot rightly renounce the notion that there must be some supreme end to which in ethics we may adjust our purposes.

C H A N N I N G (1 7 8 0 -1 8 4 2 ) The emptiness of the merely simple and fixed deity of classical theism was for ages partly concealed by the doc­ trines of the T rinity and the Incarna­ tion. G od was wholly simple and im­ mutable, y et after all there were in him no less than three personalities, w ith a sort of process or quasi-becoming con­ necting them. And one of these person­ alities was somehow identical w ith the human Jesus. Since, however, Jesus was finite, changeable, and embodied, and God is infinite, immutable, and wholly immaterial, there had to be tw o natures in Jesus, the first w ith one, and the second w ith the other, of these tw o sets of properties. Yet the tw o natures were one substance. T hen, since Jesus suf­ fered, and since the church is the mysti­ cal body of Jesus, the need that there be suffering in deity and that we, w ith ou r very being, may contribute to the divine is met, but only by an astonish­ ing defiance of logic, according to w hat many o f us think w e see in this pro­ cedure. T h e case was stated w ith suc­ cinctness and boldness by Channing, a w riter whose ethical and social insights seem fresh and inspiring after m ore than a century. C hanning also pointed to the incon­ sistency in speaking o f a G od of love, while y e t attributing to him actions that seem to call fo r a very different motive.

words, it subverts in effect, the unity of God. According to this doctrine, there arc three infinite and equal persons, pos­ sessing supreme divinity, called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, as described by theologi­ ans, has his own particular conscious­ ness, will, and perceptions. They love each other, converse with each other, and delight in each other’s society'! T hey perform different parts in man’s redemption, each having his appropriate office, and neither doing the work of the other. T he Son is mediator, and not the Father. T h e Father sends the Son, and is not himself sent; nor is he con­ scious, like the Son, of taking flesh. Here, then, we have three intelligent agents, possessed of different conscious­ ness, different wills, and different per­ ceptions, perform ing different acts, and sustaining different relations; and if these things do not imply and constitute three minds or beings, we are utterly at a loss to know how three minds or be­ ings are to be formed. It is difference of properties, and acts, and consciousness, w hich leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings, and, if this mark fails us, ou r whole knowledge falls; we have no proof that all the agents and persons in the universe are not one and the same mind. 135. W e complain of the doctrine of O b j e c t i o n s to the T r in i t y the T rin ity , that, not satisfied with m aking G od three beings, it makes 134. W e object to the doctrine o f the T rin ity , th a t w hilst acknow ledging in Jesus C hrist tw o beings, and thus intro-

CLASSICAL

THEISM

, infinite confusion into our conin heaven. W e venerate not the lofti­ ouC