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'Philoponus': on Aristotle on the soul 3.1-8
 9781306724074, 1306724074, 9781472500335, 1472500334, 9781472501905, 147250190X, 9781472551481, 1472551486

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Introduction
Textual Emendations
Translation
Notes
English-Greek Glossary
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z
Greek-English Index
A
B
D
E
G
H
K
L
M
N
O
P
S
T
X
Z
Subject Index
A
B
C
D
E
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P.

Citation preview

‘PHILOPONUS’ On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8

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‘PHILOPONUS’ On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8

Translated by William Charlton

LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com Bloomsbury is a registered trade mark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in 2000 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. Paperback edition first published 2014 © 2013 William Charlton (Preface, Richard Sorabji) William Charlton asserts his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury Academic or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN HB: 978-0-7156-2897-3 PB: 978-1-4725-5849-7 ePDF: 978-1-4725-0190-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. The present translations have been made possible by generous and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr and Mrs N. Egon; The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO/GW). Typeset by Ray Davies Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents

Preface Introduction

vii 1

Textual Emendations

17

Translation

19

Notes

153

English-Greek Glossary

167

Greek-English Index

183

Subject Index

207

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Preface Richard Sorabji In On the Soul 3.1-8, Aristotle first discusses the functions common to all five senses, such as self-awareness, and then moves on to Imagination and Intellect. This commentary on Aristotle’s text has traditionally been ascribed to Philoponus, but William Charlton argues that it should be ascribed to a later commentator, Stephanus (the quotation marks used around his name indicate this disputed authorship). ‘Philoponus’ reports the postulation of a special faculty for self-awareness, intended to preserve the unity of the person. He disagrees with ‘Simplicius’, the author of another commentary on On the Soul (also available in this series), by insisting that Imagination can apprehend things as true or false, and he disagrees with Aristotle by saying that we are not always free to imagine them otherwise than as they are. On Aristotle’s Active Intellect, ‘Philoponus’ surveys different interpretations, but ascribes to Plutarch of Athens, and rejects, the view adopted by the real Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’s On Intellect that we have innate intellectual knowledge from a previous existence. Instead he takes the view that the Active Intellect enables us to form concepts by abstraction through serving as a model of something already separate from matter. Our commentator further disagrees with the real Philoponus by denying the Idealistic view that Platonic forms are intellects. Charlton sees ‘Philoponus’ as the excellent teacher and expositor that Stephanus was said to be. The second half of this commentary (‘Philoponus’: On Aristotle On the Soul 9-13) is translated by Charlton in a companion volume which also includes a translation of Stephanus’ commentary on Aristotle On Interpretation. June 1999

Richard Sorabji

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Introduction 1. The problem of authorship The commentary on de Anima 3 translated here appears in the manuscripts as a continuation of commentaries on de Anima I and 2 by John Philoponus. In a later hand, however, in the twelfth-century codex Parisinus 1914, and in the fifteenth-century Estensis 3 F 8, it is said to be ‘from the voice of Stephanus’, and Michael Hayduck in the Preface to his 1897 edition attributes it, though with some diffidence, to the Stephanus of Alexandria who is the author of a commentary on the de Interpretatione. We have a Latin translation by William de Moerbeke of a lost Greek commentary on de Anima 3, chapters 4-8 (referred to below as the de Intellectu) which is generally agreed to be by Philoponus, and which is completely different from the commentary on these chapters in our Greek in de Anima 3. This tells against Philoponus’ authorship of the latter, though not decisively. For Philoponus could at different times have written two different commentaries on the same work, and if the Greek in de Anima 3 is by someone else, it is a mystery what happened to that other author’s in de Anima 1 and 2, for the commentary on the third book does not begin as if it were a work standing on its own. Since 1897 the issue has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion. Among those who are substantially of Hayduck’s opinion are: Raymond Vancourt, Les derniers commentateurs alexandrins d’Aristote. L’école d’Olympiodore. Étienne d’Alexandrie, Lille 1941. H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, Phronesis 31 (1976), reprinted in Aristotle Transformed. H.J. Blumenthal, ‘John Philoponus and Stephanus of Alexandria: two Neoplatonic Christian commentators on Aristotle?’ Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D.J. O’Meara, Albany 1982. L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962. Wanda Wolska-Conus, ‘Stephanus d’Athènes et Stephanus d’Alexandrie. Essai d’identification et de biographie’, Revue des Études Byzantines 47 (1989). Mossman Roueché, ‘The definitions of philosophy and a new fragment of Stephanus’, The Philosopher, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 40 (1990).

2

Introduction

Among dissentients are: É. Évrard, L’école d’Olympiodore et la composition du ‘Commentaire à la Physique’ de Jean Philopon, Ph.D. dissertation, Liège 1957. W. Bernard, ‘Philoponus on self-awareness’ Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, ed. R. Sorabji, London and Ithaca NY 1987. P. Lautner, ‘Philoponus, in de Anima III: quest for an author’, Classical Quarterly 42 (1992). In the Introduction to my translation of the Latin version of the de Intellectu I argue that the author of the Greek commentary on de Anima 3, G3 for short, is not Philoponus. To my arguments there I shall add only one point. G3 twice refers to observations on the de Anima by Ammonius (473,10; 518,32). The only recorded commentary by Ammonius is the one written up by Philoponus. If these references are to Philoponus’ commentary, and G3 calls the author of that commentary Ammonius, G3 can hardly himself be Philoponus. But is he Stephanus? 2. Stephanus Philoponus was a prolific polymath. His surviving commentaries on Aristotle run to more than three thousand pages of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. He also produced an abundance of works of his own on medicine, astronomy, cosmology, theology and grammar. For a short account of his life and work, the reader may be referred to Richard Sorabji’s chapter ‘John Philoponus’ in Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, ed. R. Sorabji, London 1987. Stephanus, by comparison, is a shadowy figure. I know of little that has been written about him in English, though there are secondary sources in Latin and French: Hermann Usener, De Stephano Alexandrino Commentatio, Bonn 1880, Kleine Schriften Bd 3, Leipzig 1914, pp. 247-323; and two works cited above, R. Vancourt, Les derniers Commentateurs, and W. Wolska-Conus, ‘Stephanos d’Athènes et Stephanus d’Alexandrie’. The name Stephanus appears a number of times in sources for the history of philosophy in the sixth and seventh centuries. John Moschus (Migne, PG 87 2929d) reports attending lectures by a ‘sophist’ Stephanus in Alexandria between 581 and 584. The ninth-century Syrian author Dionysius Telmahrensis refers to a ‘sophist’ Stephanus who was encountered in Alexandria at about the same time by Probus and John Barbur and who held controversial views on the Hypostatic Union (see J.-B. Chabot, Historiae Ecclesiae auctore Dionysio Telmahrensi Fragmentum, in E.W. Brooks, Historia Ecclesiae Zarachariae Rhetori vulgo ascripta, Louvain 1953, pp. 151-4; K.-H. Uthemann, ‘Stephanos von Alexandrien und der Konversion des Jacobiten Probus, des späteren Metropoliten von Chalcedon’, in C. Laga, J.A. Munitz and L. van Rompay (eds), After

Introduction

3

Chalcedon. Studies in Theology and Church History. Offered to Professor Albert van Roey for his Seventieth Birthday, Leuven 1985, pp. 381-99.) The prologue of the seventh-century Theophylact Simocatta to his History bears witness to a restoration of higher education at Constantinople after the death of Phocas in 610, and Usener (op. cit. p. 251) makes the conjecture (accepted by many scholars, including Richard Sorabji in his General Introduction to the Commentators) that to revive philosophy the Emperor Heraclius summoned Stephanus from the chair of philosophy in Alexandria and gave him an official title, a salary, and a dozen assistants. Certainly in the later years of Heraclius’ reign there was at Constantinople a Stephanus of Alexandria who wrote on astronomy, astrology and alchemy. The commentary on the de Interpretatione mentioned above is attributed to a Stephanus in the sole manuscript of it that we possess (Parisinus Graecus 2064) and so is our commentary on de Anima 3 in the two manuscripts to which I have referred. Mme Wolska-Conus attributes commentaries on the Categories and Prior Analytics to the author of the de Interpretatione commentary on the basis of his 2,11-12; 30,17; 45,23-4 and 54,1-2, and although I do not think that these passages need be taken to refer to actually existing commentaries on these works by Stephanus, she assembles evidence of various attributions to a Stephanus of commentaries not only on them but on the Sophistici Elenchi, the de Caelo and Porphyry’s Isagoge (op. cit. pp. 9-10, notes). Finally commentaries on some medical works, notably the Prognosticon and Aphorisms of Hippocrates and the Therapeutic of Galen, are attributed to a ‘philosopher’ Stephanus whom one manuscript (Ambrosianus S 19) calls ‘Stephanus of Athens’. There is wide consensus that our commentaries on de Anima 3 and the de Interpretatione are by the same man, and that this man is identical with the writer on astronomy and astrology who was in Constantinople in the time of Heraclius and who is given in manuscripts referred to by Usener, op. cit. pp. 248-9, as ‘great teacher’, ‘catholic teacher’ and ‘ecumenical teacher’. Mme Wolska-Conus wants to show that he is identical also with the Alexandrian sophist of John Moschus and Dionysius Telmahrensis, with the medical Stephanus of Athens, and with Pseudo-Elias, the author of the commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge formerly attributed, it is now thought wrongly, to the sixth-century Alexandrian commentator Elias. This single individual, she thinks, came originally from Athens, between 580 and 610 lived in Alexandria, where he was called ‘Stephanus of Athens’, and after 610 lived in Constantinople where he was called ‘Stephanus of Alexandria’. To show that Stephanus of Alexandria and Stephanus of Athens are the same, she says: ‘Different as are their subject-matters, the medical commentaries on Hippocrates and the philosophical commentaries on Aristotle raise questions in the same manner, have the same formulas for introducing and closing a discussion, use the same modes of reasoning with pedantic exact repetitions, both have frequent recourse to the posing

4

Introduction

of problems to which they offer several solutions, and finally reproduce each other in several places in their teaching and interpretation’ (p. 34). And she illustrates this claim by comparing what is said in the commentaries on the Prognosticon and on de Anima 3 about sleep, locomotion in animals and imagination. She also cites a number of passages from the commentary on de Anima 3 (588,10-12; 452,32-453,1; 462,15-17; 487,9-12; 501,1-26; 595,20-2) to show the author’s interest in medicine. While I have not examined the medical commentaries very thoroughly, my first impression is that the commentary on the Prognosticon, at least, shows the same traits of personality and style as the in de Anima 3 and the in de Interpretatione. The identification of the commentator on Aristotle with the sophist visited by John Moschus and the theologian mentioned by Dionysius seems to me plausible enough, though Mme. Wolska-Conus’ positive evidence for it is slight. As to Pseudo-Elias, she claims that Stephanus is the author, not only of the commentary on the Isagoge which we possess, but also of a variant commentary on the same work which is among the sources of the Dialogues of Severus bar Sakku (op. cit. p. 69). Unfortunately she offers no external evidence for these last identifications. Mossman Roueché (op. cit.) finds a difficulty for them in the inferior philosophical capacity revealed in Pseudo-Elias. Mme Wolska-Conus proposes the following biography for her composite figure. Stephanus was born in Athens in 550-55, when the city was still echoing with the philosophy of the closed Platonic school. On completing his secondary education at the age of seventeen or thereabouts, he went to Alexandria, where Olympiodorus has just been succeeded in the chair of philosophy by Elias, and Philoponus, long occupant of the chair of grammar, may still have been alive. He followed Philoponus both in the breadth of his interests and in adopting monophysite views, though he later returned to the orthodox theological fold. After 610 he removed to Constantinople, perhaps summoned by the Emperor as Usener suggested. He taught, among others, Tychikos, teacher of the Armenian Ananias of Shirak (whose autobiography is translated by H. Berberian, in Revue des Études Arméniennes 1 (1964), pp. 189-91), and died before 638. This story, though conjectural, seems to me perfectly credible. Of those who dispute the attribution of in de Anima 3 to Stephanus, Bernard does not offer any arguments, limiting himself to a long sceptical footnote, but Évrard and Lautner are more expansive. Évrard points out that the arguments of Hayduck are inconclusive. If, he says, there were differences in doctrine and not just in form between the Greek and the Latin commentaries on de Anima 3, they could not be ascribed to the same thinker, but Vancourt has shown there are no such differences. And resemblances of style between in de Anima 3 and Stephanus’ in de Interpretatione would have probative force, but no such resemblances have been identified. Blumenthal in his 1982 article men-

Introduction

5

tioned above and I in my introduction to the de Intellectu try to meet the demand for differences in doctrine, and I shall speak below about resemblances in style, but Évrard draws the conclusion that the authorship of in de Anima 3 remains uncertain. Lautner’s conclusions are more decisive. Against Stephanus’ authorship he marshals the following considerations. (1) At 541,24-6 G3 seems to speak of the pre-existence of the human soul. An Alexandrian Christian of Philoponus’ time could have accepted this doctrine, but Stephanus, writing after Justinian’s edict of 543, and teaching in Constantinople, centre of theological orthodoxy, could not. (2) At 457,24-5 we read: ‘The unit is not a number, as was demonstrated in the arithmetical discourses.’ There is no evidence that Stephanus wrote on arithmetic, as distinct from astronomy and astrology. (3) G3 alludes to work of Philoponus and Ammonius without mentioning them by name (458,25-6; 481,27-9; 571,17-18; 528,35), which shows that he was in close contact with them, to say the least, whereas Stephanus at in de Interpretatione 5,13; 21,38; 66,1 and 67,17 refers to Ammonius by name or as ‘our teacher’. (4) Blumenthal argues that G3 is other than Philoponus on the ground that he refers more often to other commentators by name than does the author of in de Anima 1-2. If G3 is Stephanus, ‘why do we not find any sign of this attitude in his in de Interpretatione as well?’ (p. 515) These ‘items of evidence’, Lautner says, ‘are perhaps sufficient to establish that Stephanus cannot be the author of the in De Anima 3’. Furthermore, (5) G3 postulates a pneumatic body in which the common sense-ability resides (481,18-20; 482,11-12); the same doctrine appears in Philoponus’ commentary, 52,6; 158,7-34; 161,1921; 201,31; 433,34-5. Lautner concludes that G3 is either Philoponus himself or a pupil of Philoponus other than Stephanus. I am not convinced. Talk of pneumatic body (5) is not peculiar to Philoponus; it pervades Neoplatonic commentaries (for some references, see H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, in Richard Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, pp. 310-11), and the whole Alexandrian school was influenced by Neoplatonism. At 541,24-6 (1) the pre-existence of the soul appears as something presupposed not by G3 but by unnamed difficulty-raisers. The reference at 457,24-5 (2) may be to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 14, not to some later treatise. (3) Similarly 458,25-6; 481,27-9; 571,17-18 and 528,35 need not refer to anyone beyond Aristotle. (Incidentally ‘our teacher’ in in de Interpretatione 5.13 is surely contrasted with Ammonius.) (4) Stephanus’ commentary on the de Interpretatione contains plenty of references to other writers by name: Theophrastus, Galen, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus and, as Lautner himself observes, Ammonius. Evrard and Lautner are right that we cannot say that G3 is the Stephanus responsible for our in de Interpretatione, simply on the ground that both divide their commentaries in Divisions (tmêmata) and Lectures (praxeis), and both employ the technique of double exposition, first a

6

Introduction

continuous exposition (theôria) of a substantial length of text, and then comments on particular gobbets of this text (lexis). These practices go back to Philoponus if not to Ammonius, and seem to be standard in Alexandria from the time of Olympiodorus (head of the philosophy school roughly from 540 to 565). But I think that anyone who reads the two commentaries in Greek will, like Hayduck, feel there is a strong similarity of personal style. The in de Interpretatione is said to be ‘from the voice of Stephanus’. This means that it is written by someone who attended his lectures, not by Stephanus himself, and the in de Anima is given a similar proximate source. We do not know at what speed the lectures were delivered. C. Hignett used not only to dictate his lectures on Greek History in the Hall of Hertford College, Oxford, but to walk up and down between the tables to make sure everyone was taking him down correctly. It must not be thought that unless lecturers at Alexandria did likewise, no inferences can be drawn from style. Even if a lecturer speaks fast, some idiosyncrasies of vocabulary and sentence-structure are likely to be preserved in notes, and the general cast of the lecturer’s mind ought to come through. Perhaps the most prominent trait of G3 is a liking for order and clarity. This appears in several ways. He tells us what he is going to do before he does it, sometimes sketching the plan of a theôria in advance, and imposing a tight structure on texts that in themselves are loose or discursive (477,23-31, 506,20-507,9; 553,22-4; 594,27-32), and he also tells us when he has finished doing something he has been engaged in – ‘that is the problem’ he will say, having stated it, and ‘that is the solution’ e.g. 448,29-30 and 449,6; 455,18 and 455,25). He lists and numbers points (kephalaia, 534,20-535,1), problems (aporiai), differentiations (diakriseis, 494-6), arguments (epikheirêmata), things had in common (koinôniai 509,9; 516,22-517,3), pleas (sunêgoriai, 563,22-564,18) and so forth. He provides ‘divisions’ (diaireseis), systematic classifications of things that fall under concepts, of cognition (gnôsis) 490,20-34, the indivisible (adiaireton) 544,4-15, imagination (phantasia) 589,35-590,4, cf. 500,23-5. No doubt he used the work of predecessors for these divisions (see, e.g., Sophonias 116,30-117,36, possibly preserving Philoponus), but he probably made them neater and shows a strong taste for them. And we have explicit remarks like these: ‘Such is the whole problem, but because of the lack of clarity, let us go over it again briefly’ (527,18-19). ‘We raised certain other matters in the theôria but since we looked at them superficially it seems best to take up the discussion again. It is better to cover the same ground twice than to miss anything out’ (570,5-7). ‘See how, though the text looks like a single continuum, we have cut it into four proofs’ (582,279). As it happens, de Anima 3 contains some of the least clear chapters in Aristotle. The whole section on the intellect (chapters 4-8) is extremely difficult, and modern readers despair of finding a consecutive train of thought in chapters 6 and 7, but regard them as collections of jottings. The

Introduction

7

regimentation which G3 imposes on them in the theôriai 542,21-547,22; 553,19-556,7 and 562,18-563,7 is truly impressive. Of a piece with this enthusiasm for clarity and order is a fondness for logic. There is a logical digression at 590,17-20. He readily uses logical terminology like lêmma (‘assumption’ 474,16), sunêmmenon (‘conditional proposition’ 447,20 etc.), prosdiorismos (literally ‘further differentiation’, i.e. ‘quantifier’ 476,3-4). He makes frequent use of the tactic of casting an argument into fairly rigorous syllogistic form: so 447,16-19; 485,25-9; 487,21-2; 494,19-22; 496,29-497,2; 500,12-17; 502,10-12; 579,25-6; 580,1-3; 586,20-2; 590,22-4; 593,26-8; 603,2-12; 603,28-604,2. Occasionally he states a syllogism that is plainly fallacious, e.g. 603,29-30, but there is no reason to think he is unaware of the fallacy. Next, G3 likes direct speech. His commentary is peppered with the words ‘look!’ and ‘see!’ (idou, hora). He presents the debate on whether the heavenly bodies have sense-perception (597,2-598,6) almost as a dialogue. He apostrophises Aristotle (464,13; 563,27.34), Alexander of Aphrodisias (471,2; 537,19; 537,33-4), Empedocles (487,25), Marinus (537,19), Plato (575,1) and an unnamed objector (526,2), and he makes Empedocles (452,7) and Homer (486,23) address Aristotle. This produces a pleasant air of briskness and vivacity. These three traits contribute to making a good teacher, and so does G3’s tendency to make a meal of what is readily intelligible, and keep away from conceptual morasses. He deals briefly and firmly (note especially 535,1-2) with the notoriously difficult chapter 5; he explains with limpid clarity (576,8-577,32) why purposive movement cannot be due to the powers of the vegetable soul, but not how it can be due to the soul at all; and he lingers affectionately on such intriguing but slightly unphilosophical topics as heavenly bodies (595,33-598,6), zoophytes (600,13-601,3), the lethal potentialities of various kinds of sense-object (602,7-20, cf. 472,4-20, 476,18-25) and the psychology of animals (488,34-489,6, 496 27-497,10), but avoids confusing us with such questions as how Aristotle can hold that the intellect comes to be identical with the objects of thought. 564,25-565,6 skirts delicately round the hard sayings at 431b21-4. If he had set an examination on de Anima 3 for his pupils, even the dimmest of them should have got good marks. Could this be why the titles associated with the name Stephanus (see Usener, op. cit. pp. 248-9) speak of him as a teacher and not just as a philosopher? A final personal trait I think we can discern is an interest in grammar. He uses words like ‘hyperbaton’ (514,16; 531,1; 548,28; 568,11; 606,1) and makroapodotos (‘with the main clause long delayed’, 582,32) which would startle a philosophical audience in the English-speaking world today, and see 474,34-475,5; 475,29-476,7; 490,15-16. To turn to more linguistic points, G3’s Greek seems to me easier and more transparent than that of other ancient commentators on the de Anima, and it has certain idosyncrasies. He likes adverbs which are fairly

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Introduction

uncommon formations from nouns or adjectives, and might be compared with the ‘-wise’ formations that were popular some years ago, for instance: anupokritôs, holikôs kai kosmikôs, holotelôs, kentrikôs, morphôtikôs, horikôs, spermatikôs, toioutotropôs, tupôtikôs. He also likes unusual compound verbs: anakhlizein, katamathêmatikeuein, kuriolektein, pareistrekhein, prokharattein, prophantazesthai, prothesaurizein, sunupakouein, hupainittesthai. The words dusthêratos, laburinthôdês, homokhronos, philenklêmôn, têlaugôs, are also characteristic of him. He uses the word exôthen, literally ‘from outside’, to say that an argument is taken from outside Aristotle’s works: 503,9; 525,25; 526,29; 578,6; 578,34; 583,6. When he wants to say that Aristotle attends to a point later he uses parakatiôn; 493,24; 519,6; 519,13; 522,7; 563,12. He favours the word gumnazein for trying out or setting out an argument, 463,34; 467,15; 472,21-7; 480,20-4; 481,8, and also likes to flag porismata, ‘corollaries’: 470,19; 472,4(bis); 475,9; 475,11; 475,14; 476,8; 547,15; 566,20. Some constructions are conspicuous too. ‘Whence is it clear?’ pothen dêlon, he often asks, that something claimed is in fact the case: 447,23; 450,4; 450,6; 454,13-14; 494,30; 496,28; 496,32; 497,2; 603,5; 603,8. He often introduces a further reason for something with the words ‘and because’, kai hoti: 478,11; 483,7; 519,5; 535,24; 535,26; 537,21; 546,22; 571,8; 573,2; 575,31; 577,37; 578,10; 578,20; 591,18; 596,3-4; 601,30, cf. 584,15. G3’s love of order and clarity is conspicuous in Stephanus’ in de Interpretatione. Stephanus sketches the plan for a coming theôria at 24,13-18, 39,28-32 and 53,4-10. He likes numbering sections, reasons, arguments, proofs etc., and telling us when he has come to the end of each, for example 26,21-32; 31,12-26; 34,34-5; 63,22-65,26. We are given ‘divisions’ of predicates (11,9-21), of sentences (17,29-18,3), of kinds of potentiality (61,8-21). The pat lists of things from which it is clear that names are not natural and of things signified by onoma (9,27-9; 11,26-8) recall G3’s list of ways in which an opinion can come unstuck at 502,27-33. Aristotle is told what he ought to have said at 60,1 in tones like those of G3 at 451,7-15. A commentator on the de Interpretatione may be assumed to have some interest both in logic and in grammar. Stephanus, however, shows particular affinity with G3 in setting out arguments with syllogistic rigour (e.g. 1,15-17; 15,29-30; 67,35-68,2) and in raising certain gratuitous linguistic points, for instance at 23,37-24,6 (on the lack of a word antiprotasis, with which we may compare 474,32-475,5) and 26,35-27,9. He also thinks it worthwhile to point out a difference between the usage of philosophers and that of grammarians at 12,9-13, and between the interests of grammarians and rhetoricians at 19,3-6. The de Interpretatione does not provide much opportunity for enlarging on unphilosophical topics (though a dry text does not prevent the Stephanus who commented on Hippocrates’ Prognosticon from telling a long, racy story about Antiochus’ love for his stepmother at 58,21-62,5); but Stephanus shows himself pupil-friendly by the amount of space he gives

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to determining the full number of formally different propositions that are possible at 24,37-25,39, 39,32-40,17 and 54,13-55,22 and by his enthusiasm for tables; he offers three tables of modal propositions, where no one else provides more than two. We hear little about animals, but camels appear as an example at 10,11, as they do at 450,7. The in de Interpretatione does not reveal the free use of apostrophe so conspicuous in the in de Anima 3 but that should rather be counted a difference in literary style than an indication of a difference in the author’s personality. We have the occasional idou (14,39; 25,16 etc.) and other traces of plain speaking, e.g. ‘But that is not true’ (21,32). The two commentaries show linguistic similarities, but these are limited. Hayduck in his Preface to the in de Anima (p. v) says: ‘Whereas in the first two books Philoponus’ painstaking verbosity (verbosia industria) is everywhere apparent, there is peculiar to the third book a certain ascetic, attenuated conciseness (ieiuna quaedam et exilis brevitas).’ This does not seem to me an apt description of in de Anima 3; I think Mme Wolska Conus is nearer the mark when she speaks of ‘pedantic exact repetitions’ (‘des symmetries pédantes et répétitives’); and I suspect Hayduck was applying to the in de Anima 3 the impression he received from the in de Interpretatione which is indeed closely pruned, especially in comparison with the commentary on the same book by Ammonius. The in de Interpretatione is considerably more concise than the in de Anima. The lectures (praxeis) are less than half the length. But this may well be because it was taken down by a different student who preferred to be concise. (Mme Wolska-Conus ventures the surmise that students at Constantinople were not of the same calibre as students at Alexandria; if that is right, one might assign the in de Anima to Alexandria, and the in de Interpretatione to Constantinople.) But although the in de Interpretatione differs from the in de Anima 3 in these ways, there is not such a dearth of stylistic resemblances as would constitute a reason for thinking it has a different source. We have pothen dêlon questions at 5,16; 35,9; 66,29 and 67,34. Stephanus uses parakatiôn at 3,6; 16,25; 18,27; 20,1; 21,35; 30,38; 43,13; gumnazein at 44,18; 45,8; 64,35-65,1; 67,28. He begins a sentence kai hoti at 3,9, and derives a porisma at 32,25. Considerations drawn from outside Aristotle’s works are called exôthen (34,34; 36,9). There are some noticeable compounds, e.g. sunupakouein (19,17), prosupakouein (13,32; 19,16), arkhoeidesteros (13,33), aperilêptos kai akatalêptos (53,15) and (a word that caught Stephanus’ eye in Ammonius) dusantibleptotatos (66,7-8). The de Interpretatione and de Anima 3 are so different in subject matter that one cannot expect to find in commentaries on them many significant agreements or disagreements in philosophical doctrine. It may be worthwhile, however, to note that imagination, which according to Philoponus (de Intellectu 61,84-5; 62,9-63,23) impedes contemplation of God and is generally a nuisance, is given an important role in acquiring knowledge of God by G3, at 563,38-564,14, and by Stephanus at 35,27-8; and Stephanus,

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though a Christian, shares (38,29-30) G3’s realism about universals, mentioned below. While I must repeat Hayduck’s warning that from these things a certain conjecture cannot be made (certam ex his rebus de illo scriptore coniecturam capi non posse), I personally am persuaded that G3 is the Stephanus of the in de Interpretatione, and will take the liberty of referring to him as Stephanus below. 3. The in de Anima 3 It is difficult for scholars today to imagine what academic life was like in the sixth and seventh centuries. In Britain, perhaps, it was non-existent. Stephanus was a contemporary of St Augustine of Canterbury, and the society which Bede describes Augustine as finding in Kent was certainly not one in which commentaries on Aristotle were in high demand. How different things must have been in Alexandria. For nearly nine hundred years it had been the greatest centre of higher education in the world. Endowed by the Ptolemys with its Library and Museum, it had included among its teachers Euclid, Aristarchus the astronomer and his namesake the grammarian, and among its pupils Archimedes and Galen. It had founded geometry, edited the classics, and measured the Sun and the Moon. Under the Roman Empire it became famous first for Jewish and then for Christian theology: the home of Philo and Origen, the see of Athanasius and Cyril. But by the sixth century the fires seem to have been burning low, both in Alexandria and in Greece, and in Alexandria they were destined to be finally and violently extinguished when the city fell to the Arabs in 640. Stephanus was perhaps the last senior scholar of Alexandria. The in de Anima 3 gives us a view, as through a narrow window, of a world in which there is no presentiment of impending disaster, but something of a sunset atmosphere. An intense conservatism prevails. Literary quotations are mostly from Homer, and never from anyone later than Euripides. And as there might have been no literature in the last thousand years, so history might have stood still. There is no mention of any historical event after the time of Plato or reference to any social or political institution, such as the Roman Empire, the Byzantine civil service, or the Christian Church, that was unknown to the fourth century BC (being dragged to court, 582,18-19 was a classical phenomenon). Stephanus often discusses other commentators from Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, and takes issue with them in a way recognisably similar to that in which a modern writer takes issue with rival interpretations. But about what lies outside the limits of the professional study of Plato and Aristotle, his lips are sealed. This conservatism shows itself particularly in the examples, as if there were a strong preference for examples that had been used many times before, and a convention not to seek examples outside certain areas. When

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there is a moral conflict, with reason advocating one course and passion, or the lower side of our nature, another, the only thing that passion finds pleasant is sex (560,5-6; 576,12); the other deadly sins are all eclipsed by lust; and the sole object of lust envisaged is a prostitute (pornê, 583,26; 590,14). The only alternative attractions reason can offer are philosophy tutorials and prayer (590,14; 579,4; cf. also 555,19-20; 562,13-14). There is no mention of politics or commerce as possible fields of moral conflict, and only a brief and unrealistic mention of war (578,15-16). If Stephanus had been lecturing to clerical students at a seminary, this narrow range of examples might have seemed appropriate, but I suspect that showing a closer knowledge of the world would have been thought undignified in a philosopher. The most a philosopher could do was to modify an example to suit his auditors; if you wanted an example of forethought and deliberation, making a coat to protect onself against the cold (Sophonias 142,20-5) might be less convincing for Egyptians than contructing a roof to shelter from the sun (585,8-13). The tradition of the Alexandrian school was Neoplatonist (for detailed justification of this statement, see essays 1, 13 and 14 in Aristotle Transformed), and although Stephanus himself was a Christian, his departures from Neoplatonism are minimal. He retains, for instance, the Neoplatonic doctrine that we have three bodies, one ‘of luminous form’ (597,18), one of pneuma (481,20) and one earthy or shell-like (482,12). Westerink says (Aristotle Transformed, p. 340): ‘he accepts unquestioningly the authority of Christian dogma and of the Bible’, but the passages he cites do not provide strong support for these claims. To show Stephanus’ unquestioning acceptance of Christian dogma, he refers us to 527,29-32, which runs: ‘But since that God is intellect is the view neither of Plato nor of pious doctrines [eusebesi dogmasin] – for God is superior to intellect, for which reason he is also called ‘Providence’ [pronoia], as coming before intellect, – come, let us resolve the problem in another way.’ The unquestioning acceptance of the authority of the Bible is supposed to appear from 547,11-14: ‘That is why it is said “He said, and it came to be”. But this saying [logion] may be interpreted in two ways: what he knows, he also says, and this also comes about [sc. we have three independent facts]; or because his activity is all at once, and that is why it is said “He said, and it came to be”.’ Westerink is also a little misleading when he says (ibid.) that the ‘old tenets’ of the eternity of the world and the fifth substance, the pre-existence of the human soul, and the rationality of the heavenly bodies ‘continue to reappear’ in him; he certainly does not commit himself to their truth. Westerink is right, however, that ‘there is no attempt at a wholesale revision of the traditional material from a Christian point of view’ and Stephanus seems happy to accept a Neoplatonic psychology with three bodies, a heavenly, a spiritual or pneumatic and a material or shell-like, and a division of the soul that attaches sense and imagination to the pneumatic body. He also seems to take a Neoplatonically realistic view of

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universals, whether transcendent (467,3, cf. in de Interpretatione 38,2930) or in re (481,14). But although Stephanus’ Christian beliefs do not have much obvious effect on his philosophy, the passages in which he reveals them, e.g. 528,13; 536,11-13; 537,26-7; 538,19-21; 545,27; 547,9-11; 586,5; 587,11, his talk of the Creator (for whom he uses the Platonic term ‘demiurge’, dêmiourgos, 474,2 etc.) of divine illumination (486,38), and divine Providence (564,1), contribute to our picture of philosophy in the sixth and seventh centuries. They show that it was being done by people close in their view of the world to philosophers of the mediaeval West and to philosophers today who adhere to their ancestors’ faith. Such latter day believers will find it easier to imagine themselves in the same pew with Stephanus than with Philoponus or any earlier philosopher who fails to make it into Migne. A certain credulity about astrology (attested by 526,36 as well as by the treatise for Timotheus) only brings him closer to our fin-de-siècle croyants. We see, then, first in Alexandria and then in Constantinople, a man of classical education and Christian beliefs, with little to say about the rougher side of secular life, but a good teacher. He is scrupulously loyal and warmly devoted to the academic tradition in which he is schooled; well read in the literature of his subject; a master of the formal logic and the linguistics of his day. If we think of him as trying to give a course on de Anima 3 which will leave his pupils with some clear ideas about it and enable them to impress an external examiner, we may judge that he has done an excellent job. Of course, that is a highly anachronistic view. What if we enquire into his originality, or ask what fresh insights he offers into the philosophical problems which Aristotle discusses in de Anima 3? He is certainly capable of being critical; he mounts spirited defences, for instance, of Empedocles and Homer against Aristotle’s attacks at 486,6-487,5, and puts Aristotle right about imagination at 488,21-30. The founder of the Lyceum is owed nursling’s dues (450,20; 467,4), not slavish assent. And if not the originator, he is a lucid and forceful expositor of an idea which is absent from classical philosophy but appealing to the heirs of Descartes and Locke, the idea that we are conscious of the functioning of our senses by a special attentive faculty, prosektikon, an intellectual capacity for reflecting or turning in (epistrophê) on ourselves (464,30-467,12). 4. The in de Interpretatione The de Interpretatione was a popular text in sixth-century Alexandria. Besides the commentary of Stephanus we have that of Ammonius (to which I refer, by page and line of Busse’s 1897 CAG edition, simply as ‘Ammonius’), fragments of a commentary by Olympiodorus, and most of an anonymous commentary, the two last edited by Leonardo Tarán under the title Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, Meisen-

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heim 1978. In the Supplementary Preface to his edition of Ammonius, Busse describes a second anonymous commentary, apparently later in date but still representing the Alexandrian tradition, which survives in manuscript but has not been printed, and Philoponus and Elias appear to have written commentaries which are now lost. Tarán’s anonymous commentator resembles Stephanus in making extremely free use of Ammonius, and also in being much briefer than Ammonius, writing in a simple, direct style. He is, in fact, clearer and less ambitious philosophically than Stephanus. He is independent of Stephanus; at 16,12-15 (Tarán), for instance, he uses material about Achilles from Ammonius 63,10-13 which is missing from the parallel Stephanus 16,1-12. And he does not agree with Stephanus on any of the points which Stephanus makes against, or independently of, Ammonius. Athough Stephanus refers to Ammonius by name only at 5,13; 21,38; 66,1 and 67,17, he depends heavily upon him, even helping himself to felicitous turns of phrase like suntomias erastês, ‘enamoured of brevity’ (12,32, taken from Ammonius 47,21; the Anonymous Commentator fancied it too: see Tarán 103,5). Hayduck in his Preface to his 1885 CAG edition goes so far as to say: ‘He brings forward hardly anything that is not expounded more carefully and copiously (diligentius et uberius) by Ammonius’ (p. vi). A more sympathetic editor might have said that Ammonius brings forward hardly anything of value that is not more clearly and concisely expounded by Stephanus. In fact, though Stephanus omits a fair amount of material in Ammonius, he also provides material Ammonius does not. Tarán (p. ix) mentions 12,1-6, where he refers to Galen. The following are other passages I have noticed in which he goes his own way. 5,13-19: rejection of Ammonius’ distinction between gramma and stoikheion. 12,9-13: difference between grammarians and philosophers in their use of ptôsis. 17,17-28: solution to the question whether ‘statement’ is univocal or equivocal in terms of ‘focal meaning’. 19,13-21: definition of a sixth form of sentence, additional to declarative, interrogative etc. 22,9-11: Aristotle needs a small preliminary assumption (lêmmation) for his account of contradiction. 23,38-24,6: why no word antiprotasis? 35,34-36,8: divine foreknowledge and the problem of evil. 47,17-50,3; 57,15-21; 65,27-32; 68,5-9: attempt to demolish the distinction between ‘is-not a just man’ (simple denial) and ‘is a not-just man’ (assertion from transposition). 63,12-66,34: various amendments to Ammonius’ treatment of the arguments in de Interpretatione, ch. 14. 67,17-27: the definite article and the universal quantifier.

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Stephanus also does some discreet depaganising. He never refers, as Ammonius does, for instance, at 38,27-39,2 to gods in the plural, or mentions oracles as Ammonius does at 135,3-7 and 137,12-23, and when showing how language is conventional he omits the religious and sexual material in Ammonius 35,21-36,21. Stephanus’ contribution, mentioned just now, to the problem about future contingents, would hardly have been possible for a pagan: ‘If the Divine knows that a human being is going to do something, in the case of the good it is reasonable not to prevent it. But why not in the case of the evil? For instance if it knows that the infant is going to be a sorceror, a scourge, a murderer. Can the Divine prevent it or not? To say “It cannot” is most impious. So it can. But if it can prevent it, but does not wish to, that is characteristic of someone malevolent and maleficent. To this we say that the Creator has given self-determination for the sake of future goods.’ Vancourt says of his Christianity ‘certainly on reading the commentary on the de Interpretatione one could not divine it’ (p. 29); I find this surprising. Readers will judge for themselves how far, when Stephanus departs from Ammonius, he carries them with him. Two points of difference may be mentioned between him and a modern writer on the topics in the de Interpretatione. First, when he wants to prove a logical theorem – to prove, say, that one proposition is logically equivalent to another or that one proposition is not the negation of another – he never tries to do this by natural deduction from axioms: his method is always to give examples to show that the propositions are true or false together. See, for instance, 27,15-34; 31,11-20 and, most notably, 47,33-49,2. This apparently rigorously extensional approach relies on the notion of a ‘materiality’, see 22,23 and note and 53,3-7, which is a kind of modality de re. Secondly, he never uses symbols, and though variables were available in his time, he had no perspicuous means of indicating scope. This affects his treatment of the problem of future contingents. The Alexandrian solution of this problem, the solution which appears if we put Ammonius 152,33-155,8, the Anonymous Commentator 64,7-66,15 and Stephanus together, is that while necessarily (if p then p) it is not the case that if p then necessarily p; and while necessarily (either we shall reap or we shall not reap) it is not the case either that we shall necessarily reap or that we shall necessarily not reap. They express this, however, very awkwardly. The Anonymous Commentator speaks of disjuncts neither of which is necessarily true or necessarily false as true or false ‘indefinitely’ (aoristôs, 67,1-2; though perhaps he means only, like Ammonius 139,14-15, that truth and falsehood are divided in an indefinite way between them,1 not that they are possessed in an indefinite way).2 And all three writers try to make the point in terms of a distinction between what is necessary simply, haplôs, and what is necessary hypothetically, ex hupotheseôs. They say that (where p is a proposition in the ‘materiality’ of the contingent), if p is the case, then hypothetically necessarily p. This terminology is particu-

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larly unfortunate because Aristotle himself uses ‘necessary hypothetically’ not for what is implied or entailed by something, but for what is necessary if some benefit is to be achieved or evil to be averted. If your sister falls overboard it may be necessary hypothetically to dive in after her: not because ‘She fell’ implies ‘You dive’, but because your diving is necessary if she is not to drown or be devoured by aquatic carnivores. Aristotle’s hypothetical necessity is a moral or practical necessity. The absence of means of indicating scope may also be responsible for the dubious argument of 47,17-49,12, see my note to 47,25. And it is very apparent in the examples of propositions of various kinds given in the appendix. Hayduck says that this appendix is not by Stephanus, because the positioning of the negative ‘not’ is often inconsistent with what is laid down in the body of the commentary (p. viii). In my notes I say that the Greek is ambiguous, and can be taken to conform with Stephanus’ canons. The ambiguity could be removed if there were a way of showing whether the scope of a negative is a proposition or a part of a proposition. I should like to record my gratitude to Henry Blumenthal, Paolo Crivelli, Peter Lautner, and the galaxy of anonymous commentators who have vetted parts of my translation in a most helpful and constructive spirit; to Sylvia Berryman, who has been far more than a copy editor and to whom I owe many corrections and improvements; and to the patient and tactful Editor in Chief, whose Olympian overview of the whole field of ancient commentary on Aristotle and Plato is always at the service of contributors. Notes 1. i.e. that while one is true and the other false, it is not determined (hôrismenon) in advance which is which. I take it that this is not a solution, but something a good solution should entitle us to say. 2. Mario Mignucci in ‘Ammonius’ sea battle’ (Ammonius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9 with Boethius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9, translated by David Blank and Norman Kretzmann, London and Ithaca NY 1998, pp. 53-86), claims that Ammonius too thinks that of ‘We shall reap’ and ‘We shall not reap’ one is indefinitely true and one indefinitely false. He has to work hard to make the notions of indefinite truth and falsehood intelligible, and I do not think Ammonius’ text forces us to attribute them to him.

Sigla In de Anima 3 Text: Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 15, see Hayduck below. D: Codex Parisinus Graecus 1914. Hayduck: Michael Hayduck, Joannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de Anima libros commentaria, Berlin 1897. OCT: Aristotelis de Anima, ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1956. Philoponus, de Intellectu: Jean Philopon, commentaire sur le de Anima d’Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. G. Verbeke, Louvain 1966.

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Ross: Aristotle, de Anima, ed. Sir David Ross, Oxford, Clarendon 1961. Sophonias: Sophoniae in de Anima paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck, CAG 23.1, Berlin 1883. t: Commentaria in Aristotelis de Anima, ed. Victor Trincavellus, 1535 Themistius, in de Anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, CAG 5.3, Berlin 1899.

In de Interpretatione Text: Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Vol. 18.3, see Hayduck below. Ackrill: J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle’s Categories and de Interpretatione, translated with notes, Oxford 1963. Ammonius: Ammonius in de Interpretatione, ed. A. Busse, CAG 4.5, Berlin 1897. Anon: Anonymous Commentary on Aristotle’s de Interpretatione (Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064), ed. L. Tarán, Meisenheim 1978. Hayduck: Michael Hayduck, Stephanus in librum de Interpretatione, Berlin 1885. OCT: Aristotelis Categoriae et liber de Interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford 1949. P: Codex Parisinus Graecus 2064

Textual Emendations 450,28 458,25 460,26-7 462,20 466,33 466,34 469,32 470,14 472,4 473,27 483,30 486,6 492,9 492,10 493,4 497,9 531,21 538,6 544,8-9 548,10 560,11 564,31 568,24 568,28

Reading sumbebaiousthai for sumbolaiôsasthai Deleting interrogation mark in Hayduck (which is not in t) The quotation marks here, omitted by Hayduck, are present in t Reading dusgnôstotera for dusgnôsta, as Hayduck suggests Reading epanalabôn for enapolabôn Punctuating before nun as Wolfgang Bernard suggests Reading legontos for legontes Correcting tês to tou Reading sunêgageto for eisêgageto Reading akoên, which, as Hayduck says, has dropped out Reading toutesti asômatos for esti sômati Reading mêtin for aisthêsin, as Hayduck suggests Reading hautê for autê with the OCT Reading hautê for autê and phantasian before legô Reading akontes for hekontes Reading prosklisei instead of prosklêsei, as Hayduck suggests Reading to euthu tou euthei einai for to euthu einai following Hayduck Reading graphei with D instead of grapheiôi Accepting Hayduck’s insertion of ê kai dunamei kai energeiâi amerês Rejecting Hayduck’s unnecessary insertion of oion Retaining the MSS’ krustalloeidê in place of Hayduck’s emendation en tôi gar is inserted by Hayduck Inserting ê after enuloi as Hayduck suggests Reading trita in place of tria

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‘Philoponus’ On Aristotle On the Soul 3.1-8 Translation

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[Concerning Soul Book III] [FIRST DIVISION] [LECTURE 1] 424b22-4 That there is no sense1 besides the five, by these I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, one might be assured from the following. Having directed his labours in the foregoing to the vegetative and non-rational souls, now he wants to speak to us of the rational soul too, and to enquire after its substance and powers and the features that differentiate its powers from one another, and from the superior powers of the non-rational soul. He enquires what differentiates imagination and opinion from thought and thought from intellect. For opinion, though a power of the rational soul, seems to have something in common with the common sense and with imagination; and on that account he enquires what differentiates them. So the aim of the present work remains to discuss the rational soul. The aim in the present book is not, as some think, to complete the discussion of the non-rational soul. For even if he makes mention of the common sense and the imagination, it is not that he has this as his principal aim, but it is in order that he may present the features that differentiate the powers of the rational soul from those of the non-rational, it is for that purpose that he mentions the non-rational soul. So the aim of the whole book is to treat of the rational soul and not at all of the non-rational. But those who like to find faults raise a problem here. They say that in that case he ought to have discussed only imagination and common sense; he should not have continued to discuss sense too; whereas in fact we see that at the beginning of the book he immediately speaks of the number of senses, enquiring if they are five or more. There was no need to do that enquiry now if he really intended only to make mention of the superior powers of the non-rational soul with a view to setting out what differentiates them from the lesser powers of the rational. For the superior powers of secondary substances always have something in common with, some relation to, the inferior powers of primary substances, as happens, indeed, here. The superior powers of the non-rational such as common sense and

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imagination have something in common with opinion, which is the lowest of all the rational powers. That is the problem. We shall meet it by saying that even if he makes mention of the five senses, he does not do this for no purpose, but lest anyone should think that there is some sense other than the particular ones which discerns the sense-objects of the five senses. For if he did not now show that there are five senses only and neither more nor less, perhaps someone would think that there are not only five but another sixth particular sense which discerns at the same time objects of sight, hearing and smell, and there is no need of a common sense. In order, then, that no one should suppose this, on this account he now shows that there are five senses only, and that which discerns them is not another particular sense, so there is a need for the common sense. So even if he does enquire into the number of the senses, it is not for the sake of the senses themselves that he does this, but for the sake of the common sense. And he makes mention of common sense and imagination not for their own sake but for the sake of what differentiates them from the rational powers. So we may conclude that the aim is still to discuss the rational soul. That is the aim. He shows, then, from the very beginning that there are only five senses, using the following hypothetical syllogism. He says this: if there were a sense missing, there would be a sense-organ missing too; but there is no sense-organ missing; so neither is there a sense missing. That is the demonstration. But since the conditional premiss is disputable (for why, in reality, if there were a sense missing, would there be a sense-organ missing too?), and the minor premiss which says ‘but there is no sense-organ missing’, so neither is there a missing sense, is disputable too (for what makes it clear if there is no sense-organ missing?) come, let us demonstrate both, the conditional premiss and the minor. First we shall demonstrate the conditional which says that if a sense is missing, a sense-organ is missing too. We demonstrate this by three arguments. This is the first. A sense and a sense-organ are relatives. For a sense perceives through a sense-organ, and a senseorgan is an organ of a sense. But if two things are relatives, as one is, so is the other. Clearly, therefore, if a sense is missing, a sense-organ is missing too, by the necessity that governs relatives. That is the first argument. Second argument. The sense is something that uses, and the sense-organ is what is used, if it is not going to be to no purpose. So if a sense is missing, a sense organ is missing too, unless it is to no purpose, which would be absurd, since it is absurd to say that nature makes anything to no purpose. That is the second argument. Third argument. Senses can never intuit sense-objects immediately; they always intuit them through sense-organs as intermediar-

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ies. Where there is a sense, then, there is every need for a sense-organ through which the sense intuits its sense-objects. If a sense is missing, then, clearly there is also missing a sense-organ through which the sense intuits the sense objects. These, then, are the arguments that establish the conditional premiss. Let us next add those that establish the minor. These are two inductive arguments, of which the first is this. From everything from which sense organs ought to arise, they already do. That being so, no sense-organ is missing. [Proof of the first point.] There are four elements, and there is the fifth heavenly body. From the fifth body there arises no sense-organ; for the fifth body is eternal, as some people say, whereas the sense-organs are destructible. Next, no sense-organ could arise from fire; for fire is destructive, and how could a sense-organ arise from that which destroys? Again, no sense-organ could arise out of earth all on its own; for on its own it resists imprints and would not readily receive the imprints of the sense-objects. But if it is mixed with other things earth can make sense-organs; and indeed the sense-organ of touch and taste has a large share of earth, for the sense-organ of touch and taste is flesh, which has a large share of earth. Fire, as he says himself [425a6], is in all the sense-organs. So it is possible to find fire and earth in sense-organs, but neither fire nor earth ever makes sense-organs on its own, for the reasons stated. There remain air and water, which can make sense-organs [sc. on their own]. And indeed, water makes that which is of crystalline form,2 which is what the organ of sight is. And air is the organ of hearing and smell. For the air which is built into the nose and the ears is itself the organ of hearing and smell. Well then: if from everything from which a sense-organ can arise, a sense-organ has arisen, no sense-organ is missing. That is the first inductive argument establishing the minor premiss. But Aristotle raises two difficulties about this argument. First, why does he say that there is no sense-organ missing? Look! Senseorgans are missing. There are five senses but only three sense-organs, water, air, earth. So the inductive argument has established nothing; rather it has augmented the problem. How can the minor premiss say ‘No sense-organ is missing’? See! Two are missing. That is the difficulty. To this we shall reply that in name there are only three sense-organs, but in fact there are five. For even if the organ of touch and taste involves earth, it is not the same earth. If the same earth were the sense-organ of touch and taste, in whatever part there is touch there should be taste too, since the non-rational soul with all its powers is in all parts of the animal, and we say it is because of the unsuitability of the organ that it does not exercise all its powers throughout the animal. There should [be taste], if the same earth is

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the sense-organ, and the power is present – lest anyone should hold that responsible. But in fact there is not taste in everything. Why, at least, does not the hand taste, though it has touch? So it is not the same earth. You see that it is the same in name but different in fact. Again, even if there is air in hearing and smell, it is not the same. By ‘air’ I mean not the air outside – for all the air outside serves to carry both odours and sounds – but I mean the air that is built into hearing and nose and is peculiar to them. This is not the same but different. For the air in hearing cannot carry odours or that in the nose sounds. So even if in name there are three sense-organs, in fact there are five. That is the solution of the first difficulty. The second difficulty starts from the contrary of the first, and is this. There are more sense-organs than senses, which is absurd. If the sense-organs come to be on account of the senses, there ought to be as many sense-organs as senses, and no more. But as it is, we see there are more sense-organs than senses. At least, there are two sense-organs for one sense. Air is the sense-organ for smell in footed and winged animals, water in those that live in water. They say, at least, that fish have some moisture in their nostrils which serves to carry odours. So there are two sense-organs for one sense. We resolve the difficulty by saying that there are not two senseorgans for the same animal, but for one, water is the sense-organ for smell, and for another, air. So the sense-organs are neither more nor fewer. The first argument for establishing the minor is inductive3 and does not carry necessity. For first, there are two sorts of fire, one destructive, the other life-giving. So even if it was impossible for a sense-organ to arise from the destructive sort, it could from the life-giving. Furthermore, we see that the air outside the body carries odours and colours and sounds, but nevertheless for animals that have only three senses, I mean touch, smell and taste, it does not carry colours, though it is no less such as to carry them, but it does not, because there is not the power. So what absurdity is there in saying that in the same way even for us who have five senses, there are further sense-organs, but they do not lay hold of anything because there are not senses in them?4 So the first argument is inductive and not genuine. Aristotle’s second inductive argument is this. If a sense-organ is missing, a sense-object is too. But a sense-object is not missing. For this is the conditional premiss,5 and it too needs demonstration. This, he says, is clear from induction. We lay hold of things that are at a distance, namely sounds, colours and odours, and also of things close, I mean objects of touch and flavours. If, then, we lay hold both of things at a distance and of things near, clearly we lay hold of everything. So no sense-object is missing. And if a sense-object is not

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missing, clearly neither is a sense-organ. This is shown by conversion with negation.6 This is Aristotle’s second argument, and it does not carry necessity. Granted that we lay hold of things at a distance, whence is it clear that we also lay hold of all things near? For granted that we perceive all objects of touch, do we perceive all flavours? Whence is it clear there are not objects of taste that escape our notice? Some of us, at least, have not eaten the flesh of camels. So some sense-objects are missing. Since the arguments of Aristotle are on the inductive side, it is better to use the argument of Themistius which he gives in the Commentary.7 He says it would not be possible for the rational soul to come in if the animal were not already adorned with all the powers of the non-rational soul. For in objects below the Moon, where there is the better there is also the worse. Clearly, then, if we have rational souls, we shall also have all the powers of the non-rational. So if man has only five senses, it is clear that there are only five. There are only as many as man has, and neither more nor fewer, since man has all, in that he also has what is superior to them, I mean the rational soul. He would not have it unless all those that were more deficient were present. So he has all, and since he has five, there are five only. That is Themistius’ argument, and paying our nursling’s dues to Aristotle we shall show that this proof too belongs to him. In the text [425b10-11] he asks why the blind rat, which has motion, does not have sight; for it is odd that where there is the superior there should not be the inferior. And he offers the solution that it has sight, indeed, but it is covered over by a membrane – it has to be, since the blind rat feeds underground, and would be sure to be blinded if it were not covered. So nature gave its first thought to nourishment. If he shows, then, in the case of this soul with motion, that there are five senses, he knows this proof that there must be only five of them. For where there is the better there is also the worse. It is possible also to confirm8 the conclusion in a Platonic way. The simple bodies are five – there are four elements and the ether – and the regular solids are five because of the simple bodies – there is pyramid, cube, octahedron, dodekahedron and eikosahedron. Just, then, as because the simple bodies are five the solid shapes too are five, so, clearly, the senses also are five and not more. That completes the continuous exposition with God’s help. 424b22 That there is not a further sense besides the five9 At the end of the second book he enquired whether touch was one sense or many; so now he shows that there are five senses, and that is all, in order that, this being shown, it will be clear that touch is a

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single sense. He is right to do this, since of animals some have two senses, and some three; that is why he enquires how many senses there are. For if all animals had the five senses, enquiry about this would be superfluous. 424b24 For if of everything of which touch is the sense, [we have sense even now]

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Without stating either the conditional premiss or the minor, he establishes the minor, and being conscious of the lack of clarity, he states the conditional premiss in the middle, and then after this establishes the rest of the minor premiss. He should have said: ‘If a sense is missing, a sense-organ is missing too. But a sense-organ is not missing. So neither is a sense.’ And he should have established the minor, that a sense organ is not missing, and shown this from the proposition that every sense lays hold of its objects either immediately or through an intermediary (for we have both, the immediate and also the mediated). But he passes over everything else and starts from this, showing that we have sense without an intermediary. ‘For if ’, he says, ‘in the case of all those objects the sense for which is touch’, we act without an intermediary (for the objects of touch are affections of touch and are immediate sense-objects,) and we have touch, then we have sense without an intermediary. He says this out of order in that, though he should establish that we also have sense without an intermediary, he passes this over and says: ‘It is necessary, where there is a sense missing, that there is also a sense-organ missing.’ For recognising the lack of clarity he has put the conditional premiss in the middle. Then he turns and establishes the minor premiss, saying, as has been stated, that we lay hold of objects of touch immediately, but there are other things that we lay hold of through a medium. 424b29-30 And such things as we perceive through a medium and not by touching the things themselves, we perceive by the simple [bodies]10

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He establishes the minor premiss [saying] that there are also in us things that lay hold of their objects through an intermediary, such as sight, hearing, smell; these lay hold through the simple bodies as media. He calls water and air ‘simple’ because they are elements. It is through these that the three [distance] senses lay hold of their objects. 424b31-2 And the situation is, that if several sense-objects different from one another in kind are perceived through one

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[intermediary, what has a sense-organ of this sort must be perceptive of both] He resolves an unspoken difficulty. He resolves a difficulty he has not raised, and the fullest thanks are due to those who have thus divined the thought of the ancient writer. He should have raised the difficulty that though there are two sense-organs, air and water, still, the sense-objects are three, colour, sound and odour, and then after this he should have resolved it, but he speaks as if he had already raised it. The solution goes like this. Through one sense-organ we lay hold of several sense-objects, which sense-objects, he says, differ in kind. For sound and odour are heterogeneous. It is necessary, he says, that air, being in [the organs of] hearing and smell, should lay hold of both sound and odour. And though he should have said ‘odour’ he says ‘colour’ instead of ‘odour’ in order not to depart from what is safe. That is how some expound the passage.11 Others say he is rather speaking against Empedocles. Empedocles says: ‘If it is not possible according to you, Aristotle, for a sense-organ to arise either out of fire or out of earth on its own, produce sense-organs by which they may be laid hold of, and like known by like.’ Aristotle then replies to him that if through one intermediate perceiving thing and sense-organ several sense-objects are known, as through air, for instance, both colour and sound are, because we can both see through it and hear through it, why is it odd that one sense too should know several things? 424b34-425b2 And if several things are [intermediaries] for the same object, as air and water are for colour, for both are transparent, [what has either of them will perceive what is perceived through both] He raises the other difficulty. He says that there is a sense-organ missing, for there are several that share the one. Air and water both share the transparent, which he calls ‘colour’. So there is an organ missing because there are two things that carry colour, but sight is one. He resolves this too. Through a single sense-organ we lay hold of both. He who has the one, he says, that is, the wet, by which he means the pupil, knows both transparents.

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425a3-4 And of the simple bodies, sense-organs are composed of only these two, air and water He establishes the minor, that the sense-organs that have an intermediary must be three, since they can be composed only of air and water, and sight, hearing and smell have these [materials].

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Translation 425a5 And smell is of one or the other12

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Some say that he says this because smell has a share of one or the other, that is, of each of the two, air and water, of air in us and of water in aquatic animals. Others take ‘one or the other’ to mean ‘one of them’, that is, it has a share of one of them, for instance of air.13 425a5-9 Fire is either [the material] of none, or common to all

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He does well to say ‘common to all’. For every sense is nourished. If it is nourished, it digests. All digestion is through the hot. Fire, then, is needed as hot by every sense. 425a6-7 Earth is either [the material] of none or is in touch14 Even if the earthy is set apart for touch, he does ill to bring in touch just now, because the discussion is of senses that operate through an intermediary. 425a8-9 [Whence it would remain that there is no sense-organ apart from water and air,] and some animals have these even now

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Some animals, he says, have the five senses, if they are complete and not deformed. And in order that someone may not say to him ‘Look! The blind rat is a complete animal, but does not have sight’, he says that it does have eyes, but nature has protected them with a membrane, in order that, when digging earth, it may not easily be blinded. In general, as many animals as have change in respect of place have the five senses. For change is better than sense, and where there is what is better there is what is worse. If there are some animals that have change in respect of place but not the five senses, such as mussels and grubs, well, nature has made up the full measure of what they lack in some other way. See, then: this is clearly his own argument, that where there is the better there is also the worse. This is not just a peculiarity of the commentators. 425a11-13 So if there is no other body, nor any affection that belongs to none of the bodies here, no sense is missing.

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He says ‘body and affection’, that is, bodily affection. What does he mean? He is drawing the conclusion to what went before. If, he says, there is no bodily affection outside of the elements (he says this because of the fifth substance) to make a sense-organ (for he certainly wants it to be capable of being affected, whereas that [the fifth

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substance] is unaffected) it follows that there is no sense-organ missing. That completes the lecture with God’s help. [LECTURE 2] 425a14-16 But neither can there be a special sense-organ for the common objects, which we perceive incidentally by each sense, such as change, staying unchanged, shape, size, number, [one] Having shown in the preceding lecture that there is no sixth sense besides the five, he now shows the same thing again. Since he said in the second book of this treatise that there are common sense-objects, such as size and shape, number, change, staying still (size and shape are common to sight and touch, and the other three, change, number and staying still, are common to all five), perhaps someone might think that there is a sixth sense besides these five which discerns these common sense-objects. So he now shows in the present continuous exposition that there is not any other sixth particular sense that discerns the common sense-objects. This he shows in the following way. If the common sense-objects are proper to this special sense, then they are incidental objects of these five. For if a thing belongs to two things, and is proper to one, clearly it belongs to the other incidentally. If it were proper to the other too, it would no longer be proper to the first. For look, it belongs to the other too. So if the common sense-objects are proper to the sixth sense, then they are sense-objects to these five incidentally. But they are not sense-objects to these five incidentally, as I shall show. It follows that there is no sixth sense, to which these so-called common sense-objects are proper. That the common sense-objects are not sense-objects incidentally to five senses, this too is established by hypothetical reasoning, as follows. Things that are sense-objects incidentally do not produce an affection in the sense, as I shall show. But these produce an affection in the sense. Therefore they are not sense-objects incidentally. Whence is it clear that things perceived incidentally do not produce an affection in the sense? This too he shows, as follows. He says that there are two sorts of thing perceived incidentally: that which falls under a different sense, as sight discerns the sweet from colour – at least, if we see something wet and yellow, we say that this is honey, and this is said to be perceived incidentally, when from the colour sight recognises the sweet. Either, then, what is perceived incidentally is this, or it is what falls under no sense, like substance. Substance falls under no sense, but it becomes known from the things incidental to it. For we recognise Cleon’s son not because he is Cleon’s

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son, not, that is, because he is a substance, but from the things that are incidental to him, say because he is pale, because he has a pot-belly, or the like. These two things, then, are sense-objects incidentally. And neither of these two things that the expression signifies produces an affection. A sense-object of one sense does not produce an affection in another even if it is recognised from it. The sweet, at least, does not produce an affection in sight, even if it is recognised by sight through the mediation of yellow colour. Neither does that which is a sense-object of no sense produce an affection in sight, even if it is recognised by it. So it has been shown that incidental senseobjects do not produce an affection in that sense by which they are perceived incidentally. So in brief the force of the whole argument is this. The common sense-objects are not objects proper to any sixth sense other than the five. If they were proper sense-objects of some sixth sense they would be incidental objects of these five. For as colours, which are proper objects of sight, are incidental objects of taste, so shape, size and the rest, they were proper objects of another sixth sense, would therefore be incidental objects of these five. But they are not incidental objects of these five. For incidental objects do not produce an affection in the sense, but the common sense-objects do produce an affection in the senses. He showed this by saying that there are two things perceived incidentally. There is that which is recognised by one sense of itself and by another incidentally, and that which of itself falls under no sense, like substance. Neither of these produces any affection in the sense. But the common sense-objects do produce an affection, as is shown in the second book of this treatise. Continuous change and small letters produce a blunting of sight. Clearly, then, the common sense-objects are not objects of perception incidentally. This is the whole structure of the argument, which consists of two hypothetical syllogisms and one categorical.15 That completes the first section. In the second section [425a30] he raises a problem that goes like this. How on earth is it that the senses do not attend each to its own business and know each what is its own, but sometimes one knows what belongs to another? For if sight and taste, at least, act together with regard to a thing, say honey, and we simultaneously see and taste honey, if the following day honey falls under our sight, it tends not only to know what is its own, e.g. that it is yellow, but jumps ahead of taste also and knows that it is sweet. That is the problem. We give its solution like this. It sometimes happens that two senses act together, for instance sight and taste at the same time in connection with honey, the one tasting that it is sweet, the other seeing that it is yellow, and then these two are brought to their termination at the common sense and there leave their imprints; and then the next day

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when honey appears and yellow colour, imagination stirs up the imprints in it of sweet and yellow which it received at the same time the preceding day, and it declares that this sort of thing is sweet. That, then, is the solution of this problem: the common sense received both imprints, the one from taste and the one from sight, and the following day when the imprint from sight is stirred up by our having seen honey, thereupon the imprint from taste too is stirred up, and the one imprint is, so to speak, réchauffé by the other, and thereby we recognise that it is sweet, even though we do not taste it. And indeed, error too arises from this, and a person who has not tasted Colophonian resin, but only seen it, may say it is honey because it resembles it in colour. Having resolved the difficulty he then raises another that is more acute: so far as it does this, the common sense knows the sweet of itself and not incidentally.16 For it has the imprints of both, of sight, that it is yellow, and of taste, that it is sweet. Clearly, then, the following day, even if we have not tasted, but only seen the honey, we say non-incidentally that it is sweet. For the common sense has the imprints of taste, and stirring them up again says that it is sweet. If, then, being stirred with respect to the imprints of sweet it says that it [sc. what is seen] is sweet, the common sense does this of itself, and not incidentally. That is the problem. We reply that even if it has the imprints of sweet things, still it is not by themselves that they are stirred. For the supposition was that we did not taste the honey, but only saw it. So it is incidentally that it declares that it is sweet. For it was the imprints of sight that were stirred of themselves; for it saw that it was yellow. But incidentally the imprint of taste was stirred because the imprint of sight was. So much in reply to the second difficulty, and that completes the second section. In the third section [425b4-11] he raises the problem why we have two or more senses laying hold of one and the same thing, for instance sight and touch of shape and size, and all five senses lay hold of number. So why is this? Why does not each sense lay hold [only] of its own object? That is the problem. Aristotle replies that several senses lay hold of the same things on this account, that there may be common sense-objects. And having said this, Aristotle ends this text.17 But if anyone asks why there is any need for common sense-objects at all, we may say to him what Plato says in Republic 6 and the Timaeus. We say that these common sense-objects are the subjects of the mathematical sciences. Shapes, numbers, changes, magnitudes and stayings still are the common sense-objects, and these are the subjects of the mathematical sciences. Since, then, we need to get to know the subjects of mathematics accurately, and they are known

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accurately through being known by more senses than one, for this reason there are common sense-objects. But if that is so, Aristotle contradicts himself. For in the second book of this work he says that the proper sense-objects are known more accurately [418a11-19, cf. 428b17-25]. How is it that he now says the common sense-objects are more accurate? We reply that he does not contradict himself. The proper sense-objects are known more accurately than the common by their own senses. For instance white is proper to sight, and size is a common object of sight; and sight knows white more accurately than size. So in relation to each sense, the proper sense-object is known more accurately than the common. Sight knows the common object dimly, and touch too knows it dimly, and, in a word, each sense knows it more dimly than its proper object. But the knowledge of the several senses, when it comes together, makes accurate the knowledge of the common object. So too says Hesiod: ‘If you add little to little and do this often, soon something large will arise.’18 But it should be known that even if the knowledge of the proper sense-objects and that of the common are both accurate, still, that of the proper is more accurate than that of the common. For sight knows both of them, the common and the proper, of itself, but sense knows the proper more. That is the continuous exposition. 425a14-16 But neither can there be a special sense-organ for the common objects which we perceive incidentally by each sense, such as change, staying unchanged19

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Again without stating the conditional premiss or the minor he refutes the minor. He should have said: ‘If no sense [sc. out of the five] lays hold of the common sense-objects as its proper objects, and if, when no sense lays hold of things as its proper objects, these are the subjects of another sense, then the common sense-objects are the subjects of another sense, and there will be a sixth sense-organ and sense.’ He should have said this, and established the negative point that there is no sixth sense. But he starts from here and shows that there is not a sixth sense. There is not, he says, a special sense-organ for the common objects, since [if there were] the other senses would lay hold of them incidentally. But in fact they are affected by them. And see how unclearly he uses ‘incidentally’. He ought to have said ‘since the other senses would perceive them incidentally’. But he actually says ‘which we perceive by each sense incidentally’. For if there were in reality a sense-organ for the common objects, then the five senses would perceive them incidentally; but they do not perceive them incidentally, as we demonstrated in the continuous exposition. Therefore there is no sense-organ proper to them.

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425a16 Number, one20 Note that he contradistinguishes one from number. For the unit is not a number, as was demonstrated in the arithmetical discourses.21

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425a16-17 For we perceive all these by change, [for instance magnitude] Here is the resolution of the difficulty. What does he say? That the common sense-objects are not sense-objects incidentally because we perceive them by change. By ‘change’ he means the affection, the alteration.22 The common sense-objects, he says, produce an affection, whereas no sense-object perceived incidentally produces an affection. Perhaps someone will raise the problem: why does he say that the common sense-objects get to be known through change, that is, through causing change? For see! Staying still is itself one of the common sensibles, yet it does not cause change in the sense-organ, since it is staying still. To resolve this difficulty the philosopher Plutarch23 says that it is by discerning it from the opposite kinds of change that we get to know staying still, and because of this one might be said to be changed. And every change is a kind of state, and every state is as it were a kind of affection. So we are properly said to be affected in a way and to be in a state by staying still also. People raise another difficulty here. Why, they ask, do we say that the proper sense-objects do something with regard to the sense, that is, things perceived of themselves come to be [perceived] through change, and things perceived incidentally not through change? For I have seen, as it might be, some yellow thing, and this imprint of yellow has stirred the other imprint in me of sweet, and I have said that this is honey. So see! I got to know this too by a kind of change. Plutarch has a reply to this too. When we say that we perceive the common sense-objects by change we ought to draw a further distinction which Aristotle omits in the present text, though he plainly states it elsewhere. We perceive the common sense-objects by change, but not in the way distinctive of sense. For even if the imprint of sweet in me is stirred, still, it is not in the way peculiar to sense. For the sweetness is not stirred in me through the tongue. I get to know the proper sense-objects through the way distinctive of sense itself. I see white, and I taste sweet things, and the same with the others. Note that he has given it out that the five common sense-objects are common to the five senses. But there are not more than three common, as was said,24 unless you should say that he means magnitude in each sense, and not [just] in quantity, for instance a great sound, or a great white. Then it is common to all. And shape – if you were to take it as covering the smooth and the rough, and say that

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the smooth is pleasant and the rough painful – this too will be found an object common to every sense. 425a18 [And so shape too,] for shape is a kind of magnitude25 25

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Some people say ‘Look! He says that shape too is a kind of magnitude. Why did he say in the Categories26 that magnitude is a species of quantity but shape is a species of quality? See! He says that magnitude and shape are the same.’ We reply that Aristotle is not even now saying that magnitude and shape are the same. It is because magnitude always attends shape, and it is not possible to conceive of shape apart from magnitude, that he says ‘shape is a kind of magnitude’, that is, what has shape is a magnitude, not shape itself. He says that we lay hold of ‘what is staying still by its not changing’ [425a18-19] for this reason, that he said above that an affection is a change. Now, since we see things that are remaining as they are, with the affection neither diminishing nor increasing because they are remaining as they are, whereas we see things that are changing being now in one way and now in another with the affection diminishing or increasing according to their change, for this reason he says that we perceive what is staying as it is unchangingly, that is, in the same way. 425a19 Number by denial of the continuous and by the proper objects He says that number is [perceived] from denial in that it is not continuous, since number is one of the things that are discrete. But what does he call ‘continuous’? The unit, which he refers to above [a16] in ‘one, number’. He calls it this because it is undivided. We know numbers greater than one, he says, through their not being one. And that is well said. This getting to know by denial occurs not only with common sense-objects but with proper sense-objects too. The proper senseobjects become known of themselves and primarily, the common sense-objects of themselves but secondarily. For instance we get to know not just ten things, but also the proper objects in them, ten white things or ten ochre things or ten red ones. So the common senseobjects must also contain some proper sense-objects. Number, then, comes to be known in two ways, either by denial of the continuous or by our coming to know the proper sense-objects. 425a20 For each sense perceives one thing

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number falls under the five senses. And if that does, it follows that the other common sense-objects do too. That he means this, he himself shows in the text when he says: 425a20-1 So it is clear that there cannot be a sense proper to any of these whatever [for instance of change; for then it will be as we now perceive sweet by sight]

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It is as if he said that it has become clear that there cannot be a sixth sense which lays hold of the common sense-objects. And he mentions change as an example of the common sense-objects. If, he says, there were some other sixth particular sense which lays hold of the common sense-objects as its proper objects, these common sense-objects will be things we get to know by the five other senses incidentally. And he gives the example of getting to know the sweet by sight. It becomes known to it incidentally. He then states the two things signified by ‘incidental sense-object’.

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425a22-4 That is because we happen to have perception of both, by which we know when they coincide He expresses the idea of how it is possible from yellow to get to know sweet. It is because we have perception of both earlier (‘earlier’ is omitted in the passage, as Plutarch says), of sweet, perhaps, and of yellow. The common sense, he says, is of both. For since, he says, we have sense both of sweet and of yellow, [that is,] sight and taste, because of this when yellow colour comes along the imprint of sweet is stirred and we come to know that it is honey from the imprint which was taken when sight and taste acted together.

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425a24-5 Otherwise we should perceive only incidentally27 This joins on to what is above. If, he says, you say that the common sense-objects are subjects of another sense, you are saying nothing else but that the other senses perceive them incidentally, which is not the case. 425a25-6 As we perceive the son of Cleon, not because he is the son of Cleon [but because he is white] As an example of one thing that is incidental to perception, he gives substance. This is not the subject of any sense. Cleon’s son, he says, is seen not as a substance but insofar as he is white. White is incidental upon Cleon’s son.

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Translation 425a27-8 But of the common objects we already have common sense which is not incidental

The common sense-objects, he says, have common sense. By ‘common sense’ he does not mean the common sense of which he speaks next, but he calls the five senses ‘common sense’. So what he says is this. The common sense-objects have another common sense which lays hold of them non-incidentally. For this he has shown, as we also have shown in the continuous exposition. 425a28-30 So there is no proper sense. For we should not perceive them at all except in the way it has been said that we see the son of Cleon28

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He here gives the conclusion of the argument, and says that therefore there is no proper sense for the common sense-objects. ‘Except in the way it has been said we see the son of Cleon’,29 that is, incidentally. But it has been shown that the five senses lay hold of the common objects non-incidentally. For they lay hold of them through change, and this does not belong to things perceived incidentally. 425a30-2 But the senses perceive one another’s proper objects incidentally,30 not because they are the particular senses they are, but because they are one, when perception occurs at one time31 [in relation to one thing] The second case signified by ‘incidental’, he says, is that of the subject of another sense, as when sweet is known from yellow. For above he gave the other case, the incidental object which is not subject to any sense. What is he saying now? That the senses lay hold of each other’s objects incidentally, not they are the senses they are, but because they have one common [power of] sense. This infers incidentally from the colour concerning sweet. He does well to add [425b1] ‘in relation to one thing’: it must be of one single thing that the common [power] discerns the colour and the flavour through the two senses. That is when the common sense discerns what is incidental, when earlier through two senses it has had the imprints of the same thing. But see what he says, that the common sense knows incidentally how to differentiate white and sweet. We said in the continuous exposition that this belongs to it of itself. We say that the differentiation belongs of itself to the common sense, whereas drawing inferences from colour about sweet things belongs incidentally, since one thing is inferred from another. 425b2-4 For it does not belong to either of them to say that both

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are one.32 That is why people fall into error too, and if something is yellow it is thought to be bile He says it belongs to the common sense, and not to one particular sense, to say that the honey is one thing, even if sweet is an object of taste and yellow is a colour. For the particular sense falls into error, and thinks that everything yellow it sees is honey.

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425b4-5 Someone might enquire for the sake of what benefit we have more senses than one33 But why is it that, given we have several senses, we do not lay hold of the common sense-objects with one sense? The solution offered is: in order that we may not have less grasp of the common sense-objects. And he calls the common sense-objects ‘attendant’ [b5] not meaning that they are of marginal importance, but because they follow upon the proper objects of each sense as more perfect and more intelligible fellow-travellers. He does not himself say what we said, that the common objects are the subjects of great sciences. For change [in respect of place] and staying still are the subjects of astronomy. Even if the stars are always in motion, still, it seeks to know their location relatively to one another; for in imagination it makes them into constellations and they are in places. And shape and magnitude are subjects of geometry, while number when taken as non-material is the subject of arithmetic, and taken in matter and in sounds is the subject of music. 425b6 Such as change and magnitude and number

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He says this including the others also through these. He includes staying unchanged through change and shape through magnitude. For shape is in magnitude. 425b6-8 For if there were sight alone, and that was of white, they would escape notice more and all would seem to be the same The philosopher Plutarch expounds the difficulty we stated in the third section of the continuous exposition as follows. Why has nature not marked off the common sense-objects for one sense, seeing that even in the five senses themselves we see many sensible opposites?34 And it is rather Aristotle who says this, for the solution fits it. He resolves the difficulty in the present passage by saying that if the common sense-objects fell under one sense only, say, for example, sight, and there also fell under this same sight the proper senseobjects, such as white or colour, the common sense-objects would

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escape notice, and number, shape, change and the rest would be thought the same as colour. But as it is, we contemplate number not only in colour but in sounds and odours, and in that way they are differentiated from one another. If one of the five senses discerned these they would much more elude us, since they are hard to hunt down even now when we get to know them through the five senses, and if one of the five were missing they would be even harder to know.35 But why do I say that? If [only] one sense discerned them we should not get to know them at all. But as it is, he says, since the common sense-objects belong to differing senses and are contemplated in several, on this account it is clear how they differ both from one another and from the proper sense-objects. That completes the lecture. [LECTURE 3]

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425b12-13 Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must be either by sight that a person perceives he sees, or by another [sense], etc. Having shown in the foregoing that there is not a sixth sense which has the common sense-objects as its proper sense-objects, he now wants through what follows to put forward another enquiry. He enquires whether perhaps there are not just five senses, but ten. Since, he says, we see and perceive that we see, and hear and perceive that we hear, do we, he enquires, see and perceive that we see by the same sense, or is there one sense that sees the colours that are subjects of sight, and another that perceives the activity of sight, that is, another that perceives that we see? There are two things, then, to be enquired into. One is whether it is with the same sense, that of sight, that we both see colours and perceive the activity which sees colours; and the other is whether one sense sees colours and another perceives that we see, in other words, perceives the activity of sight. Having gone through these problems he resolves them. He says it is not possible that one sense should see [colours] and another perceive the activity of sight, since [then] there would be no proper sense-objects, but all sense-objects would be common. For if you take colours, they will be common to the power to see and the power which sees that we see, and if you take sounds, they will be common to the sense of hearing and to that sense which lays hold of the activity of hearing, that is, which perceives that we hear. And the same with the other senses. But that no sense-object should be proper, that all should be common, does not yet appear absurd. But he attaches another absurdity to the statement [sc. that there are two senses]. If, he says, it is

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by one sense that we see, for example, and by another that we know that we see, does that sense by which we perceive the activity of seeing also itself perceive its own activity? Or is there yet another sense which lays hold of its activity? If you should say that it lays hold of its own activity itself why does not the first sense too, which lays hold of colours, lay hold of its own activity? Since, then, the statement is arbitrary, it is not the case that one sense lays hold of colours and another perceives the activity. But it is not possible that there should be a sense other than this which perceives that we see and hear, which lays hold of its activity. For there will be another sense for that, and so to infinity. If it is false that there is this series to infinity, then it is a false statement also that says that the senses which lay hold of the sense-objects are other than those which lay hold of their activities. Then he attacks the other statement, the one which says that the same senses lay hold of their subjects and of their own activities. He brings forward a difficulty and he resolves it; from which we can surmise that Aristotle is of this opinion, that he thinks that the same senses lay hold of the sense-objects that are their subjects and of the activities. The difficulty which says it is not the same sense that lays hold of its subjects and that perceives its own activity goes like this. He tries out his argument for sight, and says that seeing is nothing else but laying hold of colours, and the activities of the senses are not colours; for the activities are incorporeal; therefore sight does not lay hold of activities. In resolution of this difficulty he says that seeing is not always a laying hold of colours, since we also lay hold of darkness. But darkness is not a colour. So the statement is false. And besides, even when I concede that seeing is laying hold of colours, even so there is no absurdity. For the activities are coloured in a way. That they are coloured in a way, even if not properly – for how could something incorporeal be said properly to be coloured? – but anyhow it is clear that they would be said to be coloured from the ‘sparks’36 that also appear even after the disappearance of the object of sight. Things like lights remain about the sense of sight even after the departure of the bright sense-object, from which it is clear that the activity is coloured. This happens with animate beings that, even in the absence of the sense-object, are able to keep hold of the imprints. It does not happen with inanimate things like mirrors: when the sense-object departs nothing remains, for there is nothing that holds it. But we say to this: ‘You argue badly, Aristotle. The activities of sight are not coloured, but the transparent is the cause of [seeing] “sparks”. The transparent itself, after the disappearance of the visible object, outlines sparks and flashes in sight.’ These are the things that are declared in the text and, to put it briefly, the Aristotelian mind is patent. He wants the particular

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senses to lay hold both of the things subject to them and of their own activities too. But Alexander in his Commentary37 wants the five senses to lay hold of the sense-objects that are their subjects, and the common sense to lay hold both of the subjects and of their activities. Plutarch said it was the function of the rational soul to know the activities of the senses. For he says that this happens by virtue of the inferior part of the rational soul, which is opinion. For opinion, the most common part of the soul and the inferior, joins the rational to the non-rational. For, as we have often come to know, it is always by the inferior parts of themselves that the first are joined to the second. So that is how it is now. He says, then, that it belongs to opinion to do these things and lay hold of the activities of the senses. But more recent interpreters neither tremble at Alexander’s frown nor pay heed to Plutarch, but pushing Aristotle himself to one side they have devised a newer interpretation. They say that it belongs to the attentive part of the rational soul to lay hold of the activities of the senses. For the rational soul, according to them, does not have only five powers, intellect, thought, opinion, rational wish and choice; they add another sixth power to the rational soul, which they call ‘attentive’. This attentive part, they say, stands over what happens in a human being and says ‘I exercised intellect’, ‘I thought’, ‘I opined’, ‘I became spirited’,38 ‘I experienced desire’; and in general this attentive power of the rational soul ranges over all the powers, the rational, the non-rational and the vegetable. If, they say, the attentive power is to range over all, let it go over the senses too and say ‘I saw’, ‘I heard’. For it is proper to what lays hold of the activities to say this. If it is the attentive part, then, that says this, it follows that this is what lays hold of the activities of the senses. For there ought to be one thing laying hold of all, since the human being is one. If one laid hold of these and another of those, it would be, as he himself says elsewhere [426b19], as if you perceived this and I that. It must, then be one thing, and that is the attentive part. This attentive part roves over all powers, cognitive and vital. But if it is roving over the cognitive it is called ‘attentive’, which is why, when we want to rebuke someone who is wool-gathering in his cognitive activities we say ‘Pay attention to yourself!’ Whereas if it is going through the vital powers it is called ‘conscious’, which is why the tragedy says ‘Conscience, since I am conscious to myself of having done terrible things’.39 The attentive part, then, is what lays hold of the activities of the senses. And Plutarch, they say, did ill to hold opinion responsible. For there ought to be one thing that lays hold of the activities of all the powers, and opinion does not lay hold of the activities of intellect. It does not say ‘I exercised intellect’ or ‘I thought’. Even if it says ‘I opined’ or ‘I became spirited’, still, it cannot contemplate the activities of the better powers. But saying this they are not accusing Plutarch.

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For I nowhere found him saying that the power which perceives the activities of the senses belongs to opinion, but in this he agrees with Alexander, and he too holds the common sense responsible.40 Both are convicted of speaking wrongly, since they say that the common sense lays hold of the activities of each sense. For the common sense lays hold of nothing that is not a sense-object. Every sense-object is in a body, but the activity is not in a body. Hence it is not a sense-object. And if it is not a sense-object it does not fall under the common sense. We agree with these that there is not a sixth sense which gets to know that [we see and hear]. Not, however, because the same sense sees and knows that it sees, but because this belongs to the rational part of the soul, and of this, to the attentive. That there is not a sixth sense that knows that [we see and hear] we accept from what Aristotle says. But that it is the same sense that perceives and gets to know it perceives, we do not accept from his saying ‘I do not find it follows that the activity is coloured, if the same sense does know that [it is acting], since sight does not know colour only, but also light and dark.’ We shall say to him: sight of itself knows only colour, and it knows the others by denial, by their not being colour, and is not affected by them. But no one knows his own activity in the same way as things known by denial. So even when it lays hold of colour, it does not know [this] because the activity is coloured. And that it is absurd to say that the activity is coloured in a way, is clear. For it is incorporeal, and how can what is incorporeal be coloured? It will also share in both white and black at the same time, since it sees them at the same time, which is absurd. It is better, then, to say that the sense-organ is coloured, not the activity. And if assurance of this is derived from [our ‘seeing’] lights, we say that this is not a colouring of the activity but a powerful impulse from the sense-object causing an affection in the sense-organ, and imagination, taking the imprint of this affection, keeps it, and that is why lights are seen by it. That it is not a colouring is clear, since it is seen even when we shut our eyes. For it should be known that imagination is nothing other than faint sense, just as sense is lively imagination.41 Besides, it is absurd that the same sense should know that it sees. For it must be by reflecting back on itself42 after having seen the colour that it gets to know it sees. But if it reflects on itself it also has an activity which is separate [sc. from matter], and what has a separate activity has a separate substance, and on that account is eternal and incorporeal. So someone who says in an ambiguous way that the rational soul is immortal will be shouting out plainly that the non-rational soul is immortal; which is absurd. The senses are not eternal, and for that reason do not reflect on themselves. And if they do not reflect on themselves they do not lay hold of their own

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activities. For a thing’s reflecting on itself is nothing other than its laying hold of its own activities. So Aristotle does not speak rightly but, as we said, it belongs to the attentive part of the soul to get to know the activities of the senses. And that this is so can be seen from the things themselves. For when reason is engrossed with something, even if sight sees, we do not know that it has seen because reason is engrossed. And later, when reason comes to itself and, though not seeing the friend, even now says that it has seen him, it is as if it were taking up43 a small imprint of the thing seen and, though it was engrossed, now44 having come to its senses it said that it saw. So it belongs to reason to say ‘I saw’. If anyone raises the difficulty: how can it be said that reason is engrossed with universals, but now we say that it acts along with particular senses, say this in reply: when it uses the body as an instrument it acts in connection with particulars, whereas when it does not use it as an instrument it is engaged with universals; and now it uses the body. So much on that. But we are not paying our nursling’s dues to Aristotle but making out that his account is false. Let us say, then, that he agrees with us. When he says that the sense knows it is acting he says it knows this, not as a sense, but as a tool of reason. He said above [425a22-4] that sight knows the sweet not as sight but as common sense, and he says this now in the same way. Not only does he do this, but common usage has this custom, [as] when it says that the adze made the chair. See! The tool is credited with the work, not that it made it, but that the craftsman used it in making it. That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition. 425b12 Since we perceive that we see and hear45

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He did well to say: ‘we perceive that we see’ and not: ‘since we see’. For he is not trying out the argument only for sight but for every sense. That is why, using ‘perceive’, he states the argument in a common way. 425b13-14 But it will be the same [sense] for sight and for the colour subject to it

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therefore makes his argument unclear. Then, wishing to clarify what the subject is, he brings in colour. For colour is the subject for sight. 425b14-15 So either there will be two for the same thing, or it will be of itself Here he brings on the absurdity. He says that if this is how things are and one sense perceives the subject and another the activity, it will follow that there will be two senses for the same thing, for example for colour there will be sight and the other sense that perceives the activity of sight, and two things will be found perceiving the same thing of themselves and not incidentally, which is absurd. If, on the other hand, it is the same sense that perceives the colour and its own activity, another absurdity follows: there is a sense of itself.

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425b15 Again, if it [the sense by which we perceive sight] were other [either it will go on to infinity, or it will be the sense for itself] Next he attaches another absurdity to the same hypothesis, the one that says that the power perceiving the activity is other [than the one perceiving the subject].

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425b17 So we should do this with the first It is as if he had said that we should stop with the first and say that it lays hold of itself, and sight gets to know that it perceives the colour, and hearing likewise that [it perceives] the thing heard, and the same with the others. For if saying that another sense knows that [we perceive] leads the account into difficulty we must, he says, go to the first and say that it knows its own activity. He ought rather to have said ‘immediately’, so as to say ‘so we should do this immediately with the first’. There are some, also, who interpret the present passage as follows. If the sense which lays hold of the activity of the other sense [the original one] lays hold of its own activity, why does not the first too, which is the one laying hold of the subject, lay hold of its own activity? This sort of thing is arbitrary.

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425b17-18 But there is a difficulty. If to perceive by sight is to see, [and what is seen is colour or what has it] Here he states the difficulty for the other hypothesis, the difficulty that if the same sense lays hold of the subjects and the activities, that

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first thing which sees will have colour too. He does well to add ‘first’,46 since sight receives the forms of sense-objects in acting towards things that are external, and he says that even before this it will have colour of itself, if it is to be an object of sight to someone else. 425b20 It is plain, then, that perceiving by sight is not just one thing

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Here is the solution of the stated difficulty. And note that he did solve this difficulty, or if you like he gave reassurances as one who is more persuaded of this opinion, but left unsolved the remaining difficulty brought [467,31-2] against this opinion, the difficulty that if it is one power that sees and that gets to know the activity, the same thing will be perceived and perceiver. But he thinks that because he has refuted the opposing opinion he has also resolved this difficulty. These are his reassurances over the difficulties. 425b22-3 Further, that which sees too is coloured in a way.

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‘In a way’ is added in place of ‘in some way or other’. For the activity, he says, is coloured.47 That, with God’s help, completes the lecture. [LECTURE 4]

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425b26-7 The activity of the sense-object and the activity of the sense are one and the same, but their being is not the same He has said above that the activity is in some way or other coloured (he showed this from the ‘lights’ that appear before our eyes after the sensible object has ceased to be present), and that the actual sense acts by receiving the forms of the sense-objects; and having got as far as this in the preceding [lecture], he now wants to develop this. It is as if he said: ‘What do I mean, the forms of the sense-objects go to the actual sense from the actual sense-object?’ The sense-object is twofold, potential and actual and the sense is twofold, potential and actual. The actual sense, then, is the same as the actual sense-object. For if the activity is coloured, and the sense-object is colour, the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object. He is speaking, of course, of the sense-object that is proportional [to the sense], for the disproportionate destroys sight. If it were the same as the disproportionate sense-object it would be destructive of itself, which is absurd. But do not think, because he says that the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, that he means the accounts also of the sense-objects are in the sense,48 since he does not say even that the

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rational soul has accounts of things,49 but that it is like a tablet on which nothing is written. That they [the senses] have accounts is Empedocles’ view. He says ‘By earth we have sight of earth’.50 Aristotle does not say this, but that it is because of what is easily imprinted. The actual sense is easily imprinted and easily shaped for receiving the forms of the things that are actual sense-objects. That is why he says that the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object. He establishes this as follows. First, if actual sense, he says, is nothing but having actual sense-objects, and actual sense-objects are the things that are had by sense, and the thing had and what has it are the same, it follows that actual sense too is the same as the actual sense-object. He also demonstrates the statement more acutely and physically51 in another way. He says this. In the third book of the Physics52 it is shown that every agent and patient are the same in subject, but differ in how they are related. We remember him saying,53 at least, that learning and teaching are the same in subject,54 but differ in how they are related. For the same speculative thought in relation to the pupil is learning and in relation to the teacher teaching. So every agent and patient are the same in subject but different in how they are related. If, then, actual sense is a kind of patient, and the actual sense-object a kind of agent, it is then clear that we may conclude that they are the same in subject but different in how they are related. That is how he proves the statement physically. But it should be recognised that though there are two ways of being related, one towards the actual sense, which is having, and one towards the actual sense-object, which is being had, it is in the one case of hearing that he takes the two ways of being related, because in some cases one of the ways of being related has no name. There are five senses, but in the case of only one, I mean hearing, are there names for both the ways of being related, that of the actual sense-object and that of the actual sense. In the case of the actual sense, the way of being related is called ‘hearing’, and the way of being related of the actual senseobject is called ‘sounding’. In the cases of the other senses, it is not possible to find a name. The way of being related of actual sight we call ‘seeing’, that of the55 actual thing seen we ought to call ‘colouring’, but we do not, and we shall learn the reason for that in the detailed commentary [474,32-475,5]. Since, then, the two ways of being related do not have names in the cases of all the senses, for this reason it often escapes notice, and we do not notice the two ways of being related. Aristotle says this, and Alexander56 thinks fit to derive from it an argument supplementary to those Aristotle has himself provided in the preceding to show that the five senses lay hold of their own

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activities. If, says Alexander, actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, and actual sense lays hold of the actual sense-object, it clearly follows that actual sense lays hold of itself. For this is nothing else but the activity of sense. For it is when it acts that it is said to be actual. So since actual sense lays hold of itself it clearly follows that sense lays hold of its own activity, which is what Aristotle thinks. That is what Alexander says; but we say that he does not speak truly. This supplementary argument here does not follow. The first point is true, that actual sense is the same in subject as the actual sense-object, and actual sense lays hold of the actual sense-object. But the second point is not also true, the point that if sense perceives the actual sense-object it therein also lays hold of itself.57 Besides, actual sense gets to know not by virtue of what is common [to it and the actual sense-object], but by virtue of what differentiates it. It gets to know in virtue of being affected, and that differentiates it, for sense is affected, while the sense-object affects. So I shall not concede this, O Alexander, that when actual sense gets to know, it is by virtue of being the same as the actual sense-object. And if I should concede even this to you, for actual sense perceives not the way of being related, but that thing in respect of which it is the same as the actual sense-object, what is this? Clearly the subject. For it is the same in subject, but different in the way in which it is related. And what is the subject? Clearly the forms. These, then, are all it perceives. What follows, then, is that actual sense lays hold of its own subject, not its own activity, and its subjects are the forms of colours. So much on that. But Aristotle infers from what has been said, first that if the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, clearly if there is the actual sense there is also the actual sense-object, and if the actual sense passes away there passes away also the actual sense-object – as a thing seen but not as a subsistent thing. This is not the case, however, with potential sense and the potential senseobject. Not that they do not exist together; for they obey the law of relatives and if there is potential sense there is also the potential sense-object, while if there is not the former, neither is there the latter. So in respect of being, the potential sense-object chimes in with the actual and potential sense with actual. But they are discrepant in that actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, whereas potential sense is not the same as the potential sense-object. And that is reasonable. For there is nothing here to make them grow together and unite them. In the case of the actuals the forms of the senseobjects come to be in the activity of the sense, and thereby make a certain relationship and natural junction. The activity itself joins together and makes sense object and sense the same. In the case of the potentials the forms of the sense-objects have not yet come to the activity of the sense, and therefore there has not yet arisen commu-

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nity and unity. On this account, then, actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object, but potential sense is not the same as the potential sense-object. But the Protagoreans did not draw this distinction. They said that sense and sense-object are the same without distinguishing and saying that the actual are the same but the potential not. And that is not surprising. For the Protagoreans did not admit that there was the potential at all, or provide any subsistence for sense-objects. They said that sense-objects only are so long as they fall under sense, since they did not speak of the potential sense-object but only of the actual, and called it the ‘offspring’ of the senses.58 If we see, they say, there is colour, and if not, there is not. For sweet and white are by convention. So they spoke well, even if without drawing distinctions, for this reason, that sense and sense-object are the same. So if they had ever said ‘actual’ the conclusion would have followed.59 That is the first corollary. In the second he enquires why the extremes of sense-objects destroy the actual sense. He shows this as follows. Actual sense is a consonance, a consonance is a proportion, and a proportion is destroyed by too little and by excess. For example, 6 has to 3 a ratio of double, as does 1 to 2. If you add 1 to 2, the double is not preserved, and if you take 1 from 6 the double is not preserved. The ratio will not tolerate addition to or reduction from one term. ‘One term’ is well said, for if you add to both, for example if you add 1 to 3 and 2 to 6, the ratio of double is preserved in 8 to 4; that is why ‘one’ is said. If a ratio, then, will not tolerate addition to one term or reduction, but is destroyed, neither, it follows, will the sense accept a reduction or increment of the sense-object, but is destroyed. But excess destroys all at once – for if it lays hold of it, at that moment it is affected and either forced apart or compacted, and destroyed. Whereas defect causes harm over time. For not acting is harmful. People in caves, if for a long time they do not see, become blind, just as people who do not hear suffer the same thing simply through not acting, in accordance with the Hippocratic saying ‘Movement strengthens, inactivity wastes’. We have set out the argument generally for sense and sense-object, but he sets it out for hearing, and rightly, because in the case of hearing there is a word both for the subject, ‘sounding’ and for the sense, ‘hearing’. In the case of sight and taste it has been said that there is not a word for the subject. And he has another reason for setting it out for hearing: he mentions consonance, and ‘consonance’ is properly applied to sound, as we shall show. Sound is the subject of hearing. That is why he sets out the argument for hearing. He carries the argument on as follows. If actual hearing is the same as sound, and sound is a consonance, not of itself to itself but to hearing (for that is what the argument wants, but he calls the

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community ‘consonance’)60 – if sound, then, is a consonance, and consonance a proportionality – that is, a proportionality of the sound to the sense of hearing (and by ‘proportionality’ he does not mean mixture; for that is not what he thinks, but just as we say that the burden has a proportionality to the shoulder for being carried, but not that there is also a mixture, so also sound has proportionality to hearing through being the same in subject, but there is no mixture) – if, then, the consonance is a proportion, and a proportion does not tolerate addition to one term – and so on as was said above. But Syrianus61 thinks fit to say that even if he had not mentioned sound in the construction, the argument would not be defective. For if he says ‘Actual hearing is a consonance’ it is clear that hearing is a consonance with that of which it is the hearing; and what is that, if not sound? So it is included. And if he had said only ‘sound’,62 hearing would have been included. For with what is sound a consonance if not with that to which it is sound? And it is sound to hearing. Why, then, does he mention sound? On account of consonance, in order to show that ‘consonance’ is said properly of sound. Or perhaps he wanted also to say both in order to say what the things are that have something in common. The philosopher Ammonius63 raises the problem: why does he conclude that actual sense is a consonance through the actual senseobject as middle term? Why does he not say straight off that actual sense is a consonance? For it is consonance as the actual sense-object is. If, then, each is a consonance through an attunement to the other, why on earth does he allot the consonance [initially] not to the sense but to the actual sense-object? That is Ammonius’ difficulty, and he resolves it by saying that ‘consonance’ is taken from ‘sound’, as the word itself shows, and sound is a sense-object. For this reason, then, he allots consonance to the actual sense-object and not to the actual sense. That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition. 425b28-9 For it is possible for that which has hearing not to hear First he says that the actual sense and the actual sense-object are the same in subject, since it is ‘in being’, that is, in account, that they differ, just as ascent and descent are the same in subject (both are on the ladder) but differ in account (for going up is one thing and going down another). Then he says that this fits only the actuals; it does not fit the potentials. For there are also potential sense and potential sense-object. It is possible for someone who has 64 not to hear; for if the hearing belongs potentially he does not

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hear; and again if the object is [only] potentially a thing heard he does not hear it. 426a2-3 If change and acting and the affection are in the thing acted on65 Here he sets out the speculation from the Physics66 that actual sense is the same in subject as the actual sense-object but different in the way it is related. Change differs from acting in that where there is change there is acting, but it is not the case that wherever there is acting there is change. The Creator67 acts, but acts without himself being changed. Affection and action are changes, but this change, if it is related to the agent, is called ‘action’, and if to the thing affected, ‘affection’. He says ‘in the thing acted on’ in place of ‘in the thing affected’. He wants to reach the conclusion that, if affection and action are the same in subject (for both are changes), and change is in the thing acted on, that is, the thing affected, then necessarily, as he says, the actual sense and the actual sense-object are the same. For the sense is a kind of patient and the sense-object a kind of agent. That change is in the patient is clear. For if it were in the agent, everything which changes [something else] will itself be changed, even the First Cause, which is absurd.

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426a3-4 [Necessarily also] actual [sound and] hearing are in the potential68 The text lacks the word ‘hearing’ so as to give ‘in the potential hearing’ [i.e. the organ of hearing]. 426a5-6 That is why it is not necessary that what changes should itself be changed

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Then, having taken the assumption, he digresses and says that change is not in the changer but in the thing changed. For if it were in the changer, it too would be changed. 426a7 The [activity] of that which hears is hearing or audition69 Hearing is one thing, audition another. Hearing is the activity itself, audition is the laying hold, just as the clap itself is called ‘sound’ and the affection arising in me from the clap is called ‘sounding’.70 Knowing, then, that they differ, he differentiates them by saying [a7-8] ‘Hearing is twofold and sound is twofold’. There are the potential and the actual.

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Translation 426a10-11 [For just as the action and the affection are in the thing affected,] so also the activity of the sense-object and the activity of that which perceives are in that which perceives71

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To make clear what is said, let us set out the argument with a model. When a carpenter makes a door his activity is in the wood and the affection of the wood is in the wood itself; and in the same way, when we see, the activity of the sense-object, of colour, say, is in sight, and the change of that which perceives (by ‘that which perceives’ he means the sense, [calling it] from the subject) is also in sight itself and not in the sense-object, that is, the colour, any more than [the change caused by the carpenter is] in the carpenter. 426a11-12 But in some cases there are names for them, for instance ‘sounding’ and ‘audition’72

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Why, if in the case of hearing, we have both ‘audition’ from the sense and ‘sounding’ from the sense-object that is its subject, do we not also speak thus in the case of seeing? Why do we have ‘seeing’ [taking the word] from the sense but not ‘colouring’ from the subject? We reply, because ‘colouring’ indicates nothing else but the coloured body [the word being taken] from its having colour, something other than it, so it does not come from the subject itself, whereas ‘sounding’ comes from the subject itself. We also enquire: why do we not say ‘flavouring’ from the subject of taste, as we say ‘taste’ from the sense. To this reply: the name ‘flavouring’ is a cookery-term, so it is not used in connection with natural things. 426a15-16 And since the activity of that which perceives and the activity of the sense-object are one, though they differ in being, they [the hearing and the sound, spoken of in this way73] must pass away together and be preserved together

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Here he derives the first corollary of the fact that the actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object – the same in subject, that is, but different in how it is related. But we ought not to call this a ‘corollary’. For it is not because they are different [only] in account that it follows they pass away and are preserved together, as he says, but because they are relatives. So we ought to call this another thesis, and not a corollary. 426a19 But with those that are potential, it is not necessary But with potentials, he says, it is not necessary. What is not necessary? Not that they should be together. It is necessary that they

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should be together by the law of relatives. That which is potential sense-object exists together with potential sense, as the actual senseobject does with the actual sense. What, then does he say is ‘not necessary’? Clearly the first, that it is not necessary that potential sense should be the same as the potential sense-object, as we said in the continuous exposition.

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426a22 [But the physicists of the past] in part spoke correctly, in part incorrectly [thinking there is nothing white or black without sight] He is hinting at the Protagoreans. He says that they spoke correctly in saying that actual sense is the same as the actual sense-object. But they did not speak correctly in that they said the potential also were the same, and said without qualification that all were the same when they should not have said without qualification that they were the same. Plato too refutes this doctrine in his dialogue the Protagoras.74

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426a27 Since some sound is a consonance75 The ê in the second syllable of eidê is not the definite article but part of a connective. It is as if he had said ‘Since some sound is a consonance’. What is the ‘some sound’? Clearly actual sound. It is that which is proportionally related to actual hearing. It [ê] cannot be a definite article since it is attached to the predicate. For definite articles are equivalent to further differentiations76 and further differentiations are always attached to the subject. But here he takes ‘consonance’ as the predicate of hearing and sound. Therefore we ought not to take the ê as a definite article, since otherwise it will be found to be construed with the predicate. So say that ei dê is one part of speech. Here is the second corollary mentioned in the continuous exposition. In it he wants to say why the extremes of sense-objects destroy the senses. He does this through consonance and proportion, as was said.

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426a27-8 Sound and hearing are in a way one and in a way not one.77 This is well said. Sound and hearing are one in subject but in account and in how they are related not one but different. So they are one and not one. 426a28-9 and consonance is a proportion He says this to show that the consonance of hearing with sound is not

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a mixture but they are consonant by virtue of a proportion. In the continuous exposition it is said how. 426a30 [Hearing too must be a kind of proportion.] And on this account each [object] that is excessive destroys [hearing]

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That the excessive destroys should be taken as common, as applying to hearing, taste, sight and smell. For excesses destroy the senses. Each sense has things that destroy it, sight the overbright, such as the light of the sun, hearing the sound of thunder, smell mephitic vapours, taste poisons, and touch fire and snow. That is why arts have been conceived that please the senses, painting for sight, music for hearing, scent-making for smell, cookery for taste, and for touch, baths and weaving. 426b2-3 and sweet and bitter things, because the sense is a kind of proportion

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Wishing to give examples of sense-objects that destroy the sense, he also adduces sweet. Perhaps this destroys the sense by breaking it up, as too does the fatty. He says ‘because the sense is a kind of proportion’ because sense, he says, is a proportion, and a proportion does not tolerate excess. Therefore neither does sense, being a proportion and a kind of commensurability. 426b3-4 Which is why they are also pleasant, when they are brought pure and unmixed to the proportion, for instance the sharp, the sweet, the salty

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Here he wants to say what sort of sense-object is pleasant, and he says that that sense-object is pleasant which is first pure and unmixed, but does not remain pure,78 but is brought to proportion, that is, to mixture. Things that are mixed are pleasant through purifying the extreme, for instance the low and the high are not pleasant if you do not mix them; for consonance and pleasure follow the mixture as a mean. 426b6 And to touch, the warm and the cool79

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To touch, he says, the warm and the cool are pleasant. And notice how he says ‘the warm’, that is, that which can warm, and ‘the cool’, that which can cool. For they are pleasant when they can receive tempering. Disproportionate cold and hot are painful. He does well, then to say that what is pleasant to touch is warm and cool, not hot and cold.

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If he had said the latter he would have meant the extremely hot and cold, which do not please touch but actually destroy it. That is the lecture. [LECTURE 5] 426b8-9 Each sense, then, has its subject sense-object, and belongs in the sense-organ as such. He has discussed the five senses and taught that there is not another sixth sense contradistinguished from the five; and lest anyone should think, because of this argument, that there is not the common sense either, he wants through what follows to show that there is the common sense; not only that, but that this common sense is also incorporeal; and in addition, thirdly, that it acts atemporally. For it is not the case that it knows sweet at one time and white at another, but at the same now80 it knows that this is sweet and that that is white. Fourthly, he puts forward a problem about the common sense and gives a false solution; then he refutes the false solution; and then, after this, gives the true solution. That is the plan of the continuous exposition; come, let us spread each of these things out. First, then, that there is the common sense is to be shown as follows. Since we know not only that things of the same kind differ, things like white, black, grey, yellow and so on, but also that heterogeneous things do like white and sweet, we must enquire what part of the soul it is that gets to know this difference. For even if intellect gets to know this sort of difference and says that white is different from sweet, still, it is not of itself that intellect states this sort of difference, but it brings in sense to use as a tool. Without sense it would not be possible to know sense-objects. So if white and sweet are sense-objects, how can intellect know them without bringing in sense to use as a tool? Neither immediately nor of itself would intellect be able to say they are different. And [there is the further argument] that things which do not have intellect know that these things differ. At least a dog, simply looking and not tasting, knows things that can be tasted. At least, it knows that meat is tastable, even if it does not taste it but only looks, and that a stone is not tastable even before tasting. So it is not intellect that says sweet is different from white, but sense. What sense? Is it one of the five, or two of them, for instance sight and taste? We say it does not belong to one sense to know this sort of difference. If it were one sense that knows this difference, then it would know not only its own sense-object but one belonging to another. For what gets to know a difference first knows what the differing things are, if it is to know also in what respect they differ.

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The sense, then, which gets to know that white differs from sweet will know not only white but also sweet. But this is absurd, to fuse the senses and say that sight knows gustatory qualities. So it is absurd to say that one of the five senses knows how heterogeneous objects differ. And let no one say that it is not necessary to know sense-objects belonging to another [sense]: once it knows its own objects, that something is white, it then knows by denial that something is not white; and it knows the difference in this way, by knowing that it is not white. Let no one say this; for we are asking not ‘What is it that gets to know that white differs from not white?’ but ‘from sweet?’ The not-white could also be odour or hot; but we said in a determinate way ‘sweet’. We must definitely, then, know the sweet positively, if we are to learn its difference from white. So it is not one sense that knows this sort of difference. Nor two senses, for instance sight and taste. For it should be one thing that states their difference. For if it is not one thing that receives the forms of both, how will it be able to know how they differ, with one sense receiving the white form and the other the sweet? For judges too want to hear both sides to get to know how they differ. If, then, what states the difference of white from sweet is one thing, what discerns it will be one thing too. So it is a property neither of the two senses to know that these things differ, nor of one particular sense. So it belongs to another sense besides the five to know that white differs from sweet. Is this divided off from the five senses or not? We reply that it is not. For it has been shown that there is not another sixth sense divided off from these five. So it is common. It has been shown, then, that there is the common sense. That completes the first section. In the second section he shows that the common sense is not a body. If it was a body it would function part by part, for every body functions part by part. So if it were a body it would never receive both sweet and white in the same part, but in one of its parts it would receive sweet, in another white, and there would not be a thing that discerns at all. Such a state of affairs, he says, would be as if you perceived this and I that. So the whole common sense as a whole perceives sweet and white. If the whole did not lay hold of them as a whole, how could it discern them, not getting to know both? And even if I concede that white and sweet can be received in the same part, contrary qualities cannot, qualities like white and black or hot and cold. And besides, if it were a body it would have to act by touching the sense-objects. For every body acts by touching. But the common sense does not act by touching the sense-objects. So it is not a body. That is the second section. In the third section he shows that it functions atemporally. He

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shows this as follows. As the common sense speaks, so also it gets to know. So if it states at a single now that sweet is different from white, and it is not the case that at one now it states white to be different and at another sweet, it clearly follows that it is also at a single now that it knows that sweet is different from white. For when the common sense states at one now it states [at one now] not incidentally but of itself, just as, to take an example, think of this statement of mine: ‘I now hear that Plato when he came to Sicily fell in with Socrates.’ Look! Here ‘now’ relates of itself to my hearing, for it is now, in reality, that I hear. Whereas in relation to Plato’s arrival ‘now’ is incidental.81 For even if I now hear, there is nothing absurd in his having got there long ago. But if it should happen that a seafight now takes place, and in the now in which it took place I said ‘I now hear a seafight is taking place’, then ‘now’ applies in relation to me (for I now hear) and also of itself in relation to the seafight; for that too takes place now. The common sense, then, in that same now in which it states that white is different from sweet also perceives the difference. The ‘now’ belongs of itself both to the saying and to the knowing. So the common sense acts atemporally. That is the third section. In the fourth section he puts forward the problem. How, he asks, does the common sense discern contraries, for instance white and black or hot and cold? For it discerns not only heterogeneous objects but objects of the same kind. So it is worthwhile to raise the difficulty how contrary forms come to the common sense. If it were a body there would be no difficulty. We could say that one contrary comes to one part and another to another. But since it is incorporeal and without parts we raise the difficulty: how do contrary forms come to be in the same thing? And again, if, though it were incorporeal, it acted temporally, we could say that one contrary comes at one time and another at another – for instance at this time hot and at that time cold. But since it acts atemporally and at the same now, for this reason it is worthwhile to raise the difficulty. So the difficulty acquires formidability from the two preceding sections. If it were a body there would be no problem (for it could receive the contraries in different parts), and if, though incorporeal, it acted temporally, again it could receive the contraries at different times. But since it both is incorporeal and acts atemporally, because of this we raise the problem how it receives contrary forms at the same time. That is the problem. He sets it out in relation to the common sense. But it fits the particular senses more. For they lay hold of contraries more than does the common sense. But the common sense lays hold of the things of which the particular senses lay hold, whereas the particular senses do not in all cases lay hold of the things of which

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the common sense lays hold. So for this reason he sets out the difficulty in relation to the common sense. Such is the difficulty. Then he resolves it as follows. He says that the common sense is both one and many, one in subject but many in how it is related, which is to say, in account. The other senses issue from the common sense as from a common spring, so the latter is one in subject but many in account. Insofar as it is one, it discerns the difference, and insofar as it is many in account it receives the contraries. That is the false solution. Aristotle refutes it by saying that things which are the same in subject and different in account, while they are in potentiality can receive opposites, but cannot receive opposites when they come to be actual. For example, the hot and the cold are the same in subject, for they come to be in one subject, and differ in account; but still they cannot be actual at the same time. Neither, then, can the common sense, because it is one in subject and many in account, go further and receive contrary forms of sense-objects at the same time. Having thus refuted the false solution, he gives another solution that is true. He says that the common sense is one in subject and also many in subject. This is how this solution differs from the former: the former said that the common sense is one in subject and many in account, whereas this says it is both one and many in subject. To try out the account with a model, think, please, of a centre and five straight lines running out from it and then diverging from one another. This centre is both one in relation to its own nature and also many. For that one is the end-point of each line even after they have diverged from one another. And do not say: ‘How, being without parts, can it be distributed to each of them?’ Such is the nature of incorporeal things, just as animal at least, is both one in nature and many, for the whole of it is present as a whole in each individual’s nature. If, then, the common sense is both one and many in subject, as one it thereby discriminates, but as many it gets to know many things, even if they should be contraries. That is what the text says. But since this exposition is a bit logical, let us conceive a more physical solution.82 Here it is. The common sense itself is incorporeal. But it is in the body as subject, for the pneumatic body83 is its subject. The forms of sense-objects, even if they are contrary, come to be in the pneumatic body one in one part and another in another. Then this power discerns the affections in the pneuma. That is how we resolve the argument, and we say that the contrary forms come to be not in something without parts but in something that has parts, namely the pneumatic [body], one in one part and another in another. Say also that in a material way it does not lay hold of the contraries together, but in discerning it does lay

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hold of them together, since it discerns the contraries at the same time. But if you attend, not even in discerning. For it is said in the de Interpretatione84 that contrary opinions are not those that say contrary things about contraries, for instance that white forces apart and black compacts, but those that say contrary things about the same thing, for instance that white both forces apart and compacts. These are contrary opinions. So if the common sense says that white forces apart and black compacts, it will not in any way be affected, since does not make contrary discernments, but both are true, and it has not declared contrary things of the same thing. So even in discerning it does not lay hold of opposites. So the foregoing solution is fine. And note that though he blames Plato for mathematicising nature, he himself resolved physical matters through mathematical. For look! He gives a solution through a mathematical point. But to this we reply that Plato is not blamed for resolving physical matters through mathematical, but because he constructs physical magnitudes out of mathematical. After saying this, because he says that imagination and common sense are the same he sets out the discussion of imagination and turns to the teaching on the rational soul so as to show that this and not the non-rational is what first sets in motion. That is the continuous exposition.

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426b8-9 Each sense, then, has its subject sense-object, and belongs in the sense-organ as such Each sense, he says, lays hold of its own sense-objects and is in its own sense-organ, when the organ is in its natural state. By ‘senseorgan’ he means either the pneuma or the shell-like.85 The sense, then, which is in the sense-organ itself knows the objects of the same kind, and from here naturally sends them on to the common sense. For if each sense knows the objects of the same kind which are contrary, and the common sense knows the heterogeneous objects, it follows that there is a common sense. Plato too before Aristotle invokes a common sense when he says ‘if not, we are like people in the wooden horse’:86 there is no sense in the wooden horse common to those men. 426b12-15 But since we discern87 white and sweet and each of the sense-objects in relation to each, by what do we have the further perception that they differ? By sense, necessarily, since they are sense-objects It is necessary, he says, that we get to know heterogeneous objects by some sense, because we are laying hold of sense-objects, and sense-

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objects are so called with reference to senses, [arguing] as though on the ground that reason does not lay hold of sense-objects; so he has not shown anything from this.88 We, however, gave a fine proof [478,11-15] from non-rational [animals] of this, that it does not belong to the rational [soul]. For indeed a dog discerns that sweet is different from white, since it does not go for everything white – it does not go for a stone – but only for what is succulent. 426b15-16 Hence also it is clear that flesh is not the last sense-organ

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Here is the second section. And note that he calls the body ‘flesh’ and the sense ‘sense-organ’. He ought to have referred to that and said that the last sense is not the body. But he himself says that the last sense-organ is not flesh. By ‘the last sense’ the common sense should be understood. He calls it ‘last’ because the senses are brought to their termination there and the imprints in them, having gone through all, come to it. If, he says, the common sense were a body then it would have to be by touching the sense-objects that it discerns them. And [another reason why the common sense is not corporeal is] because it does not perceive in a separated way, by different parts of the body in which it is, since that would be as if I perceived this and you that. For if there is not one power that discerns the white and the sweet, that is as if there were two people who perceived different objects and said they were different, though each did not know what the other perceived. 426b20-1 But the one must say that they are other

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One sense, he says, must say that sweet and white are other and that white and sweet are. The same thing says it, and what says it should not be a separated body. 426b22 So as it is with saying, so it is with thinking and perceiving89 He says ‘think’ in place of ‘imagine’. 426b23-4 And that it is not possible [to discern separate things] in a separate time either [is clear from this]

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time. For it says both now, now in the genuine [use of] ‘now’; not in the incidental, as when what happened long ago I now say has happened – as though because I now hear of it, the Trojan War were now happening. ‘Now’ is said in the genuine way when I now know what is now happening; and he says that in the same way the common sense too pronounces its differentiation according to the genuine use of ‘now’. When it perceives it differentiates – for to act in connection with what is absent belongs to imagination.

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426b28-9 So it is inseparable and [differentiates] at an inseparable time This is the common conclusion of the two sections. He says that if at the same time, at the same now, it differentiates the sweet from the white and the other, that is, the white from the sweet, clearly it both is inseparable, that is, incorporeal,90 and acts at an inseparable time, that is, atemporally. 426b29-30 But the same thing cannot be affected by contrary changes at the same time. Here is the fourth section of the continuous exposition. He opens up the problem and asks: if the common sense is incorporeal and acts atemporally, how can it lay hold of contraries at the same time? For if it were a body, one part could lay hold of white and another of black at the same time.

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427a1 [If it is sweet, it changes sense or] thought [in one way]91 He means [by ‘thought’] either imagination or the activity of intellect. 427a2-3 Is what discerns, then, at once undivided in number and inseparable in time,92 [but separated in being?] Here is the false solution of the problem. He calls it ‘one in number and inseparable in time’ that is, one in subject, but many in account. But instead of saying ‘in account’ he says many ‘in being’ [a3]. Insofar as it is many, then, it receives contraries, and insofar as it is one it discerns them. In account it is divisible, that is many – for what is divided becomes many – but in subject it is undivided and one. Wanting to indicate the subject, he says ‘undivided in number and place’ [a5]. 427a5-6 Or is that impossible? Here is the refutation of the false solution to the difficulty. In

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potentiality, he says, the same thing can receive contraries and be undivided. ‘But not in being’ [a7], this in place of saying ‘in actuality it cannot receive contraries’, For in acting it is divided. For when the white, say, and the black are acting the subject is divided and torn apart, and does not remain undivided. 427a9-11 But it is like what some call a ‘point’: as it is one and two, so it is also divided93

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Here is the second solution. Just as a point is both one as a point and two or many insofar as it terminates straight lines together, and, as many, is separated: so too is the sense. Insofar as it is like a point, the perceiving thing is one and together, but insofar as it is the common exit for the sense-objects, as the point is for the lines, it is also two and discerns many. But insofar as it is one, it lays hold together and atemporally. 427a14-16 Concerning the source, then, by which we say that an animal is a thing that perceives, let our determination be made like this. He says ‘by which’ in place of ‘by virtue of which’. Not that an animal has several sources: it is not for that reason that Aristotle says ‘I am speaking of that source by which we say an animal perceives’, but because it is one and many, as Plutarch says. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture and the first Division. [SECOND DIVISION] [LECTURE 1] 427a17-19 But since people define the soul chiefly by two differentiating features, change in respect of place and thinking, discerning94 and perceiving, etc.

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Because changing all at once is bad, both in speech and in action, for this reason he does not go straight from the non-rational [soul] to the rational, but first states a certain differentiation of the cognitive powers of the non-rational and the rational; he then also differentiates imagination from the cognition of reason; and in the middle he differentiates imagination from the particular senses, differentiating the non-rational [soul] in relation to itself, which was not his aim. And he says that imagination is not sense or opinion, neither does it consist of both. But before differentiating these things, wishing to make the differ-

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entiation all the greater he says what they have in common. The cognitions of the non-rational and the rational have this in common, he says, that they are both discernments. And they have something else in common, inasmuch as people in the past confused the cognitive powers of the rational and the non-rational. For they called the activities of the senses ‘intelligence’; they called non-rational activity by the name of rational, calling sense and imagination ‘intelligence’. Empedocles did this when he said: ‘Shrewdness for human beings grows in relation to what is present.’95 For from this usage we infer that he said shrewdness and intelligence deal with sense-objects. The syllogism goes like this. Sense lays hold of sense-objects. What lays hold of sense-objects lays hold of things present. So sense lays hold of things present. It is thus concluded in the first figure that sense is what lays hold of things that are present, and he calls this ‘shrewdness’. So he confused the names and called sense ‘intellect’. Some, however, say that it is not intellect he called ‘shrewdness’ but thought: for he says that thought is active in relation to what is present. And he uses ‘grows’ instead of ‘is active’, and does well to say ‘increases’. For activity increases a power just as, on the contrary, inactivity harms it. For ‘movement strengthens’.96 If he says, then, that thought is active about things that are present, and what is present is known by sense, it follows that that sense and thought are the same. But this is ill taken. For sense is not the only thing that is active about what is present: thought is too. Indeed, it is more so, because sense has its sense-object external to it, whereas thought has its own proper thing within, and brings it out when it wishes. So even if he says that thought is active about what is present, he does not make it sense. And we can say the same if by ‘shrewdness’97 he means intellect. That is the first usage of words; we have now shown it gets him nowhere. But he brings forward another usage by Empedocles, which really is to the point. Saying what differentiates dreams, Empedocles says that it is from activities by day that nocturnal imaginings arise. And he calls this imagination ‘thinking’98 where he says ‘Whence it befalls them always to judge things that are other’.99 Look! You can see from far off that he calls cognition by the non-rational [soul], imagination, I mean, ‘thinking’. And Empedocles is not alone. Homer himself says: ‘Such is the mind of earth-dwelling men as the father of gods and men directs each succeeding day.’100 By ‘mind’ he here means sense, and by ‘day’ the sense-object. See then, he says, Homer too calls perception ‘mind’ and there has arisen here a disturbance of names. We, however, say on Homer’s behalf: ‘O Aristotle, you have understood the distich ill. By “mind” he means “mind”, and by “day” he means not the sense-object but fortune or fate. The idea behind the

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lines is this, that the mind of human beings is as their fortune determines.’ The distich is like what is said in the tragedy, ‘We have minds according to our fortunes.’101 For when someone is poor he is modest in character but when he has becomes rich he becomes boorish. But this does not fit everyone, that their minds are as their fortunes, but only those who are careless, debauched and matterbound in their life. Hence the poet did not say simply ‘men’ and leave it at that, but added ‘earth-dwelling’, thereby making clear to us the matter-bound character of their life. Those whose life is not matterbound do not change with fortune in the same way. So Homer’s usage did not confound names either. And some plead in defence of Empedocles too that dreams do not arise only from traces left behind by the senses, but from other things also. They have three causes. One is the one mentioned, when imagination makes the dreams out of the senses. But the rational soul too is responsible for dreams, when it finds the solution to an enquiry; and so is divine illumination when we foretell the future. So if he says ‘Whence it befalls them always to judge things that are other’, he has his gaze on dreams from the rational soul. Thinking becomes other in dreams because during the night the physical powers are more evident and the rational soul is blunted; the latter acts more during the day. Aristotle has a further complaint against Empedocles: not only does he confuse names, but also when he said that like is known by like he spoke about cognition, but not about error; though he ought to have spoken about error more than about knowledge because our error is more extensive. The cause of this is coming to be102 and the soul’s dimness of vision in matter. Just as in a pestilential district there are more sick people than healthy, so when souls are in a state of coming to be, ignorance prevails over knowledge. Since, then, we are more in error he ought to have spoken more about error. For Empedocles is not of the opinion that error does not exist. The opinion itself that there is no such thing as error was refuted by Plato. If, then, he is of the opinion that there is no such thing as error, let him be refuted by the Protagorean arguments.103 If he is of the opinion that there is such a thing, why does he not give its cause? Perhaps, then, we should infer that if cognition is cognition of what is like, it follows that error is contact with what is unlike, and through one opposite he wants us to understand the other opposite as well. This does follow for him. But we do not agree that knowledge is cognition of what is like. We refute this by a syllogism. If the knowledge of contraries is one and the same, and contraries are unlike, it follows that like does not come to be known by like. For see! The knowledge is one, and it knows two contraries. If the knowledge, then, is like one of the contraries, it follows that it is not like the other; yet it gets to

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know it. So like does not come to be known by like, O Empedocles. If cognition, then, is not contact with what is like, neither is error contact with what is unlike. So much in opposition to Empedocles. Then he says how the cognitive powers of the non-rational [soul], which are sense and imagination, differ from those of the rational. And first he says what differentiates sense from intellect because these also have a great deal in common. For they alone of the powers both of the non-rational soul and of the rational intuit things in an indivisible way. For sense lays hold of its own sense-objects atemporally, as was shown a little way above,104 and intellect similarly acts atemporally. Since, then, they have much in common, for that reason he starts by saying how they differ. Intellect differs from sense, then, in that sense is in all animals whereas intellect is not: it is in man alone. That is how intellect and sense differ. Next he says how sense differs from thought. He says that sense does not readily err, whereas thought errs readily. Thought errs readily for two reasons: either because sense is occupied with things that are plain and clear, and thought with things that are hidden; or because sense intuits things atemporally and, to put it simply, at the first attempt, whereas thought proceeds through intermediate premisses and conclusions, from which error tends to arise. For it is only thought that syllogises, whence also it errs. These are the two reasons on account of which thought errs. Sense differs from thought, then, either in this or because sense belongs to all animals and thought to those that have reason. Then, after that, he says how imagination differs from sense and thought. He says imagination differs from them in that it is intermediate between sense and thought. It starts from sense; sense gives imagination starting points. The latter then gives starting points to thought, for without imagination, thought cannot act. That is how imagination differs from sense and thought. Then, in addition, he says how opinion and imagination differ. We can imagine what we want (for we can imagine both a three-cubit man and a twenty-cubit man, and we can form an image of a goat-stag and a centaur).105 But we cannot be of whatever opinion we want. We can say that twice two are ten, but not be of that opinion, and say that fire does not heat, but not be of that opinion. So imagination is in our power, whereas opinion is not in our power. But if truth is to be told, not all imagination is in our power either. For that which occurs in sleep is not: we do not imagine in sleep the things we want. And why do I say ‘in sleep’? Not all imagining that occurs when we are awake [is in our power]. For when I imagine things that are as they are, I cannot imagine them except as they are. For instance if I want to imagine Socrates, I cannot imagine him elegant and fair-skinned and long-haired. I have to imagine him bald

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and dark-skinned and pot-bellied. So the precise difference is this, that opinion is never in our power, whereas imagination is sometimes in our power. That is the first difference. And I state a second difference too, like this. When we have imagined war we are never frightened, but we are as if we were seeing it in a picture; but being of the opinion that there is a war we are immediately frightened. That is the second difference. Against it the following difficulty may be raised. ‘What do you mean, when we imagine fearsome things we are not agitated? A horse does not have opinion. But if it sees a whip raised it backs away as though frightened by the imagination of fearsome things.’ That is the difficulty. To it we reply that this is assent,106 which of itself belongs to opinion and is the substance of opinion, but which is incidental to imagination. So when, opining fearsome things, I assent, I am agitated, and again when, imagining fearsome things, I assent, I am agitated. The horse too, then, is agitated by the imagination because of assent; since if assent does not occur it is not agitated. That being said, that, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition. 427a17-18 But since people define the soul chiefly by two differentiating features, change in respect of place and thinking and discerning

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Alexander thinks the ‘since’ is to no purpose, because there is no main clause. Plutarch, however, says that the main clause comes further down, where he says ‘that perceiving and exercising judgement are not the same [is plain]’ [427b6-7]. The meaning of the whole passage is this. Since people in the past defined the soul by two differentiating features, by change in respect of place and by thinking and discerning and perceiving, and understood thought and perceiving to be one and the same thing, that exercising judgement and perceiving are not the same is plain from this. Aristotle does this in order to convict Homer and Empedocles of going astray about names. It should be noted that he takes ‘discerning’ in rather a wide sense to apply both to the rational and to the non-rational [soul], whereas he applies ‘thinking’ only to the rational and ‘perceiving’ only to the non-rational. 427a19-20 And thinking and exercising judgement seem to be like perceiving something, for in both of them the soul discerns In the present passage Aristotle goes through the reason for people’s going astray in the past and the point from which they went astray. He says that since discernment is common both to sense and to all

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other cognition, for that reason they understood them all to be the same, and that became the cause of their going astray.

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427a28-9 As we made distinct also in our opening remarks107 For it was said above that cognition comes about by what is like; we quoted ‘By earth we have a sight of earth and by water of water’, and the other sayings of Empedocles. Here he takes up another Empedoclean point: he says he makes thought the same as touch. For he says that intelligence comes from contact with the like. Only touch lays hold by contact. So he calls intelligence touch. But it is possible to say to Aristotle that ‘contact’ is equivocal even in relation to the senses. The contact of touch is one thing and that of sight another. Grant, then, that there is another contact in the case of intelligence, and the conclusion does not follow that intelligence is the same as touch. 427b4 [Therefore of necessity either, as some say, all that appears is true,] or error must be contact with the unlike Just, he says, as contact with the like is cognition, so contact with the unlike is error, so you must not take ‘contact’ to be in all cases touching; it is equivocal, as we said. But if that is so, he says, and you know what cognition is, you are also in possession of what error is. For cognition of opposites is one. But no chance difficulty now follows for us. If cognition is by contact with the like, and cognition of opposites is one, it follows that sense will become like opposites at the same time, which is absurd; it acts by becoming like, and it lays hold of opposites at the same time. But there is nothing absurd in becoming like opposites in discernment. If air, though inanimate, discerns contraries at the same time, would it not be absurd if sense, which is animate, did not discern opposites at the same time?

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427b6-7 That perceiving and exercising judgement are not the same, then, is plain See the main clause for what was above.108 Since the soul is defined by two differentiating features, change and thinking, that the soul’s cognition is not the same as sense is clear from this. The ‘then’ is put in because of what has been said in between. In the past it was the custom, when the main clause in a long sentence arrived, to add ‘then’. And see that here he says loosely that the contemplative intellect ‘exercises judgement’. This belongs to potential intellect. Since, then, he uses certain words sometimes speaking accurately and sometimes loosely, let us level up the roughness of his speech by a division. Cognition [gnôsis] either comes about in connection with external

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things and makes sense [aisthêsis], or it comes about in connection with internal things and makes intelligence [noêsis] in the broader sense. It is rightly called ‘broader’ because imagination too acts in connection with things that are internal, and this is called ‘passive intellect’ [nous pathêtikos]. But activity in connection with internal objects is occupied either with something universal or with something particular. If with what is particular, it makes imagination [phantasia]; if with what is universal, it makes what is genuinely intellect [nous]. But cognition about universals itself is either better than [knowledge] by inference [sullogismos], in which case it makes contemplative intellect [theôrêtikos nous] dispositional [kath’ hexin] and actual [kat’ energeian] or it acts by inference, and makes what is genuinely thought [dianoia] and in the broader sense supposal [hupolêpsis]. For ‘supposal’ is applied both to thought and to opinion [doxa]. But if it acts worse than by inference it makes what is genuinely opinion and supposal. Thought occurs either in connection with things we contemplate, in which case it makes systematic knowledge [epistêmê], or in connection with things to be done. And if the things to be done require deliberation [boulê] it makes practical judgement [phronêsis] – for practical judgement requires deliberation. But if the things to be done do not require deliberation,109 it makes skills [tekhnai]. For the man of skill, insofar as he is a man of skill, does not deliberate, though insofar as he is a human being, he does. From the division, then, it has appeared that he spoke loosely in saying here that the contemplative intellect exercises judgement. In the passage before us he differentiates actual intellect from sense, in that sense belongs to every animal (for every animal is an animate, perceiving substance), whereas intellect does not belong to every animal, and even in those to which it does belong it is not always present in actuality, even if it is present dispositionally. And it is matter for rejoicing if even in old age one receives the addition of wisdom [sophia]. 427b8-9 But neither is thinking, which comprises rightly and not rightly [ neither is this the same as perceiving] Neither is potential intellect, he says, the same as sense. Wishing to say what potential intellect is, he says ‘which comprises rightly and not rightly’. Here he states the difference between thought and sense. For he calls thought ‘potential intellect’. It is in it that can be seen what is right and what is not right. For actual intellect always thinks rightly. Either it makes contact or it does not, so it is inerrant. But potential intellect, that is, thought, sometimes thinks rightly and sometimes not rightly; for it sometimes attains truth and sometimes

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runs into falsehood. And that is how it differs from actual intellect, since the latter is inerrant. And he differentiates potential intellect or thought from sense by this: sense on the whole attains truth about its own objects, when the further conditions are preserved, for instance that the distance is commensurate and the sense is unaffected, whereas thought on the whole runs into falsehood, since it is in the region of error. And do not think, because sense attains truth more than does thought, that therefore it is also superior. For it is because of the senses that thought runs into falsehood, because it is interwoven with them. And indeed, when it is separated from its ragged garments it makes demonstrative syllogisms and becomes very shrewd, as the poet says ‘Then the very shrewd Odysseus stripped off his rags’.110 And do not think this puzzling, if in itself sense attains truth, but when interwoven with thought it becomes a contributory cause to it of error. That happens because when it acts by itself it is occupied with particular things, and it attains truth, whereas when it is interwoven with thought, which acts in connection with universals, it makes it individualise the universals, from which error arises. Always the better is debased by the presence of the worse, while the worse is not debased by the better.

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427b9-11 Rightly, in practical judgement, systematic knowledge and true opinion, not rightly in the contraries of these111 Having said that potential intellect judges rightly and not rightly he states those things that are proper to right [thinking], practical judgement, systematic knowledge and true opinion, and to [thinking] that is not right, practical folly, systematic error and false opinion. His illustrating rightness of intellect through practical judgement is loose, as has been said, but he illustrates rightness of thought through systematic knowledge. The other112 clearly is said with reference to opinion.

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427b11 Neither is this the same as perceiving113 Having divided thought into thinking rightly and thinking not rightly, he then says how both are different from sense. 427b14-15 For imagination is different from both sense and thought What does he mean? The connective [‘for’] is as if in relation to a problem; it is as if someone were raising the difficulty: if sense is different from intellect then it will be the same as imagination. So he

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solves it by saying that imagination is something else besides sense and opinion. And he here says how imagination differs from thought and sense.

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427b15-16 This114 does not occur without sense, and without this there is no understanding115 This thought, he says, I mean imagination,116 does not occur without sense, and without this thought, he says, there is no supposal. For it has been said that ‘supposal’ is applied to systematic knowledge and practical judgement and opinion. Some interpreters say that neither of these things is true. For there is imagination even apart from sense, that of the goat-stag. But they said that imagination about sense-objects does not exist without sense. And there is opinion, which he calls ‘supposal’, without imagination, opinion about things divine. So add that opinion about senseobjects or particular things needs imagination. And see: here you have it that imagination is not the same as opinion or sense, but something intermediate receiving from sense and giving to opinion. So it is intermediate, and that which is intermediate is different from the extremes. It is not the case that imagination, opinion and sense are the same. 427b16-18 And that thinking117 is not the same as supposal, is plain. For the former affection is under our control

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He uses ‘supposal’ for opinion and ‘thinking’ for imagination. He says, then, that this is the difference between imagination and opinion, that imagining is in our power but being of an opinion is not in our power. Hence we can imagine what is false, but we cannot make what is false our opinion. For we can imagine that twice two is five, but we cannot make that our opinion, except by way of acting, where it may be said that ‘The tongue has sworn, the mind remains unsworn’.118 For an opinion a person holds not by way of acting he holds as true, and he is not turned aside from it, unless somehow by speech, as is aptly expressed in the line ‘You have persuaded me by a speech that is a most clever drug’.119 Some people raise the difficulty: ‘What? Do we not often fall into imaginings that we do not want?’ But he did not say that we are masters of our imaginings, but of imagining when we wish. And besides, it is in our power to imagine when we wish, but it is not in our power also [not to imagine] when we do not wish. If, then, it is not in our power when we do not wish, it follows that we also imagine against our will.120

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427b19-20 [For it is possible to put something before one’s eyes,] as people do when using mnemonic systems or image-making ‘Mnemonic’ refers to people taking imprints121 from sense-objects, who also attain truth; he calls ‘image-makers’ those who construct a representation, who also run into falsehood. So imagination is analogous to an image-maker, and opinion to someone using a mnemonic system. He says ‘before one’s eyes’ [427b18] instead of ‘ready to hand’.

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427b20-1 But being of an opinion is not under our control. We must necessarily run into falsehood or attain truth In opinion, he says, either what is false is shown or what is true, whereas imagination can also have what is false as true. 427b21-2 Further, when we opine something fearsome or frightening [straightaway we are affected accordingly]

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This is how opinion and imagination differ. In opinion straightaway we are afraid, if we form an opinion of something frightening, whereas in imagining, as he says [427b23] ‘we are as if [we were looking at a picture]’, that is, we neither fear nor are disturbed; we are as we were before, without being in any way changed. 427b24-5 And supposal itself comprises different things, systematic knowledge and opinion and practical judgement He now uses ‘supposal’ in a broad sense for the rational soul. It comprises, he says, different things, which we will state below; not that he means to state these things in another treatise, but that he means to say how they differ further down. But now, he says, imagination is to be differentiated from opinion and sense. It has already been differentiated from opinion, but he has to differentiate it from sense too. Of that, with God’s help, the next continuous exposition treats. That is the lecture.

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[LECTURE 2] 427b27-9 But concerning thinking, since it is other than perceiving, and seems to comprise on the one hand imagination and on the other supposal, let us first draw distinctions about imagination and after that speak of the other Having differentiated imagination from opinion in what went before,

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Aristotle now wants to differentiate imagination itself from sense too. This makes it worthwhile to raise a problem. If the aim in the third book is to discuss the rational soul, and if he mentions the powers of the non-rational soul at all only to differentiate them from the rational, then why is it that now he does not differentiate them from the rational [soul] but from one another? For now he differentiates imagination from sense, though they are both powers of the nonrational [soul]. That is the problem. We say that he does this in order that his account may be complete and nothing may be left hanging as a loose end; or because he is next going to differentiate imagination from opinion and sense together. The differentiation which is coming, then, of imagination from opinion and sense together will not be clear if he has not first differentiated each on its own; so for that reason, having in the former passage differentiated imagination from opinion alone, he now wants to differentiate it from the senses too: it is in order that the next differentiation may be clear, in which he differentiates it from opinion and sense in conjunction. He differentiates imagination from sense by six arguments, of which the first is this. If imagination is the same as sense, then since we imagine when we dream, we ought then to perceive also. But we do not perceive. So imagination is not the same as sense. What? You say that dreams belong to potential sense? But dreams are a kind of activity, and when sense is in potentiality it is at rest and does not act. But neither do they belong to actual sense. For in dreams every sense is at rest. That is the first differentiation. The second differentiation is taken from new-born children. We see, he says, that new-born babies act with sense, for sense belongs to us,122 but not with imagination. If new-born babies act with sense but not with imagination, it follows that sense is different from imagination. And whence is it clear that new-born babies do not act with imagination? From the fact that they suck at every breast to begin with, even if it is a breast of stone or a cow’s udder or what you will,123 but later only at its mother’s. That would not happen if it were not the case that to start with the imprints of the mother’s breast are not put away, but later they are. And the point at issue is shown not only by that. Though they have formerly come close to fire and been burnt, they approach fire again. That happens because imagination is not acting. If it were acting, the child would have received an impression from the former burn and would not approach a second time. From their approaching fire, then, and sucking at every breast, it is clear that they do not act with imagination. The third differentiation comes from grubs, winged insects and ants. For look! These have sense, but they do not have imagination, as is shown by their wandering manner of movement. They wander

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because their imagination has not received the imprints of the former route. That is the third proof. Both it and the second seem to be logical and contrary to what was said in the second book. It was said there that where there is sense there is also appetition, and where there is appetition there is also imagination,124 so that, with appetition as a middle term, imagination definitely follows sense. Why, then, does he say that grubs have sense but do not have imagination? Perhaps even grubs have imagination, but it is confused and dim, and because of the dimness it does not act. Then both what is said here and what is said there will be true, there, that where there is sense there must be imagination too, and here, that it is not the case that where there is sense, straight off there is also imagination. For it is dim and confused. Here is another difficulty it is worthwhile to raise. Granted that grubs do not have imagination, why does he say that ants and winged insects do not have imagination? He speaks falsely in that. Ants do have imagination, as is shown by their knowing their underground habitation. And bees too have imagination. They know their hives, and there they bring to birth the honey. If evident facts declare that they have imagination, why does he say that they do not have imagination? That is the difficulty. To it we reply that imagination is twofold. There is reminiscent imagination and there is teachable, by virtue of which we are taught, which the parrot too has; it is by virtue of it that it is taught human speech. Of which sort of imagination, then, does Aristotle deprive these animals? We say, not of the reminiscent but of the teachable. That is the third differentiation. The fourth differentiation issues from the manner of cognition. Sense acts concerning things that are, whereas imagination acts also concerning things that are not. For this reason it happens that sense, when it is in its natural state, always attains truth, whereas imagination sometimes runs into falsehood. For it forms representations also of things that are not as things that are. That is the fourth differentiation. The fifth differentiation has the guise of an answer to a difficulty. Someone might raise the following difficulty. Sense and imagination are the same to this extent, that when we have sense that is faint and that does not fall under the observation of others we call it ‘imagination’. At least, if one sees things from a distance one says ‘I either imagine or see this in the distance’. Hence if the bystanders do not see it they say ‘You are imagining, my friend’ instead of ‘You see dimly’. You see, then, how dim sense is called ‘imagination’. It is as if Aristotle were meeting this difficulty in the fifth differentiation. He says that we should not immediately think, because dim sense is

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called ‘imagination’ in common usage, that imagination and sense are the same. For if they were the same, not only ought dim sense to be called ‘imagination’ but accurate sense too. But in fact nobody calls accurate sense ‘imagination’. So sense and imagination are not the same. Then the sixth and last differentiation. If we take someone with his eyes shut, then he will not see colours (how could he see, with his eyes shut?) but still he imagines colours. If they do not act together, then, sense and imagination are not the same. Aristotle does well to take someone with his eyes shut, not someone blind. If he had proposed someone blind, perhaps you would think of people blind from birth, who do not imagine concerning colours at all because they have no imprints of them. There are six differentiations, then: from dreams, from new-born children, from grubs, winged insects and ants, from the manner of cognition, from the difficulty and from people with their eyes shut. That completes the first section. In the second section he differentiates imagination from all the powers of the rational soul. Of these, some are always true, such as intellect and systematic knowledge, and some are sometimes true and sometimes false, like thought and opinion. Imagination differs from those that always attain truth, in that it sometimes runs into falsehood while they are always true. It differs from those that sometimes attain truth and sometimes run into falsehood, in that they are in rational animals only, while this is not only in rational animals but also in non-rational. Whence is it clear, someone might ask, that neither thought nor opinion is in non-rational animals? He goes on to construct syllogisms [to the conclusion] that opinion is not in non-rational animals. The first syllogism is constructed in the second figure, as follows. Whatever has opinion also has rational conviction. Non-rational animals do not have rational conviction. Therefore non-rational animals do not have opinion. Whence is it clear that non-rational animals are not rationally convinced? He goes on to construct another syllogism, like this. Non-rational animals are not persuaded. But the things that are persuaded are the things that are rationally convinced, for persuasion is the efficient cause of rational conviction, and rational conviction is the end of persuasion. There is a syllogism, then, to restate it, in the first figure, as follows. Non-rational animals are not persuaded. Things that are not persuaded do not have rational conviction. Therefore non-rational animals do not have rational conviction. But we raise a difficulty about this too. Whence is it clear that non-rational animals are not persuaded? We see that snakes, persuaded by conjurations, throw themselves in the fire. Again, the lion is tamed by being persuaded by the hunter, and the horse by the

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horse-breaker. We reply to this that the snake is not persuaded, but is driven by necessity by the conjurations and against its will. Neither is the lion or the horse or any other animal that is domesticated persuaded, but it becomes habituated. Persuasion and habituation are not the same. Assent is the common genus of persuasion and habituation, but habituation comes about through a kind of vital bending,125 whereas persuasion comes about by cognition. Animals that are domesticated, then, are not persuaded but habituated, because they assent. For persuasion, as was said, occurs through reason126 and belongs to the rational soul, whereas habituation belongs not only to the rational soul but to the non-rational as well. That is the continuous exposition.

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427b27 But concerning thinking, since it is different from perceiving127 It was said also above that he used the word ‘thinking’ indiscriminately. By ‘thinking’ now he means imagination and supposal. Then he also divides it into these two, and says: let us speak about imagination in the primary sense, what is so called when the word is used properly and not applied metaphorically to the senses,128 and about supposal. 428a1-2 If indeed imagination is that by virtue of which we say a phantasm129 comes to us, and not what we mean when speaking metaphorically He said above that it is within our power to imagine what we wish, and this fits voluntary imagination; but there is also imagination against our will, which is taken from phantasms, that is, from sense-objects; there is not only voluntary imagination, which he rightly calls ‘metaphorical’,130 since it carries off from things that are and constructs a representation of that which is not, for instance a centaur131 from a horse and a bull. If there is imagination against our will, then, I do not imagine what I wish, but by some one discerning power I imagine what is false as false and the truth as truth. For by this we also differentiate false from true. And opinion too and perception differentiate false from true in this way, by getting to know things as they are.132 428a4-5 [Is it some one of those powers or dispositions by virtue of which we discern or133 attain truth or run into falsehood?] Such are sense, opinion, intellect, systematic knowledge But someone will say ‘How is it that above he said that intellect always attains truth, but now he says it also sometimes runs into

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falsehood? For he says “by virtue of which we discern or attain truth or run into falsehood”, such as “systematic knowledge” and “intellect”, and counts intellect and systematic knowledge along with things that sometimes run into falsehood.’ We reply that truth and falsity do not fit all the things he mentions, but truth fits some, such as intellect and systematic knowledge (for these discern the true), and both truth and falsity fit others, such as opinion and sense. It is possible to supply a further additional differentiation of intellect and sense. First this. If sense acts concerning something, so does intellect, and it acts better than sense (for do not think it absurd that intellect should sometimes occupy itself with particulars), but there are things concerning which intellect acts and sense does not. For intellect knows substance, whereas sense fails to reach substance. Secondly, sense does not know its own activity, but intellect knows both its own activity and that of the other [powers]. That intellect acts in connection with universals, and has the sense-object134 internal to it, while sense acts in connection with what is particular and external, goes without saying. 428a5-6 That it is not sense, is clear from the following

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Here is the first differentiation of sense and imagination. He divides sense into potential and actual, and says that imagination is not the same either as potential sense or as actual. Not as potential, because we act clearly in dreams, and at that time sense is potential and does not act. Nor is it the same as actual either; since we should never imagine in our sleep (but in fact we do imagine), because in sleep [sense] is potential and not actual. So imagination is not the same as actual sense. If it has been shown, then, that it is the same neither as potential sense nor as actual, it follows that sense differs from imagination. 428a8 Then sense is always present Here is the second differentiation of sense and imagination. 428a9 And if it were the same in actuality, to all [wild beasts imagination might belong].

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Here is the third differentiation. Some people have thought that, since he divided sense into potential and actual, he is here differentiating imagination from actual sense.135 Their differentiation is like this. If imagination were the same as sense, everything that has actual sense ought to have imagination too. But that seems not to be the case. We say that those things have imagination which have it

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fully articulated and complete, so that they are also capable of learning. But grubs and ants, even if they have imagination, have it dim and inarticulate. If, therefore, these do not have imagination, clearly sense and imagination are not the same. And some say that he does well to say we must enquire ‘if they are the same in actuality’, for imagination and sense can be the same potentially: imagination sometimes receives from sense. 428a11-12 Then they [sc. perceptions] are always true, but most imaginings that occur are false

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Here he gives the fourth differentiation of sense and imagination. 428a12-13 Then we do not even say, when we act accurately [with regard to the sense-object, that this appears to us a man] Here is the fifth differentiation. 428a15-16 And what we said, indeed, earlier, sights appear to people even when they have their eyes shut Here is the sixth differentiation. Some people say that he wants to differentiate imagination from potential sense. The differentiation is: how is it that someone with his eyes shut sees colours? If when his eyes are shut sight is present potentially, but he imagines, and again after opening his eyes he imagines,136 clearly imagination is not the same as potential sense. He says ‘we said earlier’ for this reason, that he also mentioned earlier the lights137 that stay on before sight. They are both sense-objects in that they are seen, and not sense-objects, since the sense-object is absent; and they are imagination, because we see them with our eyes shut, and not imagination, because the lights are massed blows of the sense-object,138 and when the blow is present, imagination does not act. If, therefore, when this light does not belong to sense, it belongs to imagination, and when it belongs to sense it does not belong to imagination, imagination and sense are not the same. 428a16-17 But neither is it any of those [powers] that always attain truth Here is the second section, in which he differentiates imagination from intellect and systematic knowledge. By ‘intellect’ here we should understand thought. And see how he puts forward the exposition of it as a proof. He differentiates them by the fact that intellect and

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systematic knowledge always attain truth, whereas imagination sometimes also runs into falsehood. 500,1

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428a18-19 It remains, then, to see if it is opinion. For opinion comes both true and false. Here he wants to show that imagination is not the same as opinion. It is worthwhile to raise the problem why, after having shown this above, he shows it again. And perhaps it may be said that since they have much in common, for that reason he differentiates them several times. They have things in common because always the last parts of things that are primary are the same as the first parts of things that are posterior, so that there is no gap. Opinion is the last part of reason, and imagination the first part of the non-rational [soul], so they are practically the same. And say also another thing, that opinion and imagination are occupied with true and false, so they have something in common in this too, and for this reason he differentiates them. He differentiates them syllogistically as follows. Imagination belongs either to all non-rational animals, according to the former Aristotle who put dim imagination into all non-rational animals, or to some, according to the present Aristotle who does not put accurate imagination into every non-rational animal. If imagination, then, belongs either to some non-rational animals or to all, and opinion belongs to no non-rational animal, it follows that imagination and opinion are not the same. The construction is in the third figure. 428a19-20 But rational conviction follows opinion139

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This provides the differentiation from imagination, and the demonstration of one premiss of the syllogism, the one which says that opinion belongs to no non-rational animal. Where there is opinion there are also persuasion, rational conviction and being persuaded. For it is not possible for someone who is of an opinion not to be rationally convinced of his opinion. And where there are persuasion and rational conviction there is reason. But reason does not belong in non-rational animals. So it follows that there is no opinion in non-rational animals either. Persuasion is the activity of the persuader in relation to the persuaded, rational conviction is the finished state and cognition of the person persuaded, being persuaded is dim cognition and the route to opinion, and opinion is the idea that prevails after these things. 428a21 And rational conviction belongs to no wild beast140 People have raised a difficulty about horses. How is it that they fear the whip and are subject to the horse-breaker if not by some kind of

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persuasion? We say it is not through persuasion but through some kind of habituation. For they have the habit of being constantly beaten by it and assent. For we say that assent is the common genus of persuasion and habituation. The problem was also raised how snakes are persuaded by conjuration if non-rational animals do not have persuasion. We said that this is not persuasion either. The snake does not hear the thing said but the voice. It retreats to the fire when conjured because it is forced by demons of some kind that fear the conjuration. And to put it simply, that which is persuaded can be persuaded to change its mind, and being persuaded to change one’s mind belongs to cognition. For cognition about the same thing is not always the same. But what is habituated is always disposed in the same way about the same thing; the horse always fears the whip. It follows that habituation does not belong to cognition and is not the same as persuasion. That cognition is not always the same about the same thing is clear, since that is why we say that the spider does not make its web by prior deliberation and cognition, because it always makes it in the same way, and similarly the bee with the comb. If it was from prior deliberation, it would do the same thing now in one way and now in another.

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428a22 Again if141 rational conviction follows on every opinion The ‘again’ looks as if it is introducing another proof that imagination differs from opinion, but it is not; it is an establishment of the first proof.142 That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 3] 428a24-6 It is plain, then, that imagination cannot be either opinion with sense, or opinion through sense, or an interweaving of opinion and sense, etc. Having differentiated imagination in the foregoing from opinion and sense, addressing each on its own, now he wants to show that imagination is not a plaiting together of sense and opinion, or opinion together with sense, or opinion through sense. Aristotle wants to show that imagination is none of these three things, and he shows it is none of them through a single argument. And let no one think that these three are the same as one another. They are different from one another. For if I say that imagination is not opinion together with sense,143 I take both as bringing about imagination in the way two doctors might bring about health. So he says this first, that opinion and sense do not bring about imagination

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together. If I say that imagination is not opinion through sense, I mean that opinion is not an efficient cause of imagination, which efficient cause brings about imagination through sense as an instrumental cause, so that opinion would be the efficient cause of imagination and sense the instrumental – as the doctor is said to bring about health through blood-letting. If I say, then, that imagination is not opinion through sense I mean that opinion is not the efficient cause of imagination through sense as instrumental cause. But neither is imagination an interweaving of opinion and sense, that is to say, they are not material causes of imagination, opinion and sense. For as the interweaving of wine and honey is the matter of honeyed wine, so the interweaving of sense and opinion will be the matter of imagination. But it is not [strictly speaking] an interweaving because sense and opinion no longer stay intact when they make imagination, but are mingled. In the first two limbs [of the division] both opinion and sense stay intact, both when both are efficient and when one is efficient and the other instrumental. Imagination, then, is neither opinion and sense together, with both being efficient [causes], nor opinion through sense, with the one efficient and the other instrumental, and neither is it an interweaving of opinion and sense with both being material. That imagination is none of these, Aristotle shows through a single argument like this. Opinion, he says, fights with sense, and nothing consists of two things that fight together and are acting in the conflict. So imagination does not consist of opinion and sense. That opinion and sense fight is clear from this. Sense sees the oar in water broken, but opinion at the same now is rationally convinced it is intact. So opinion fights with sense. Again, sight sees the Sun a foot across and at the same now opinion shows it is many times as big as the whole Earth. Nothing consists of things that are fighting with one another at the same now. Neither, it follows, does imagination consist of opinion and sense. For if opinion achieves truth and sense runs into falsehood about the same thing, and imagination consists of these, it follows that it will be both attaining truth and running into falsehood about the same thing, which is absurd. But someone will say that perhaps, even if opinion thinks this about the Sun when acting by itself, still, when it is interwoven with sense, it is changed to become like it and runs into falsehood. For sense always has the supreme power, since oaths too are always sworn with regard to sense-objects.144 So when opinion is found chiming in with sense and no longer fighting against it, clearly one of the combatants has been destroyed, and it is not absurd if something consists of them.145 To this we reply that opinion is destroyed in four ways. The person who is of the opinion is destroyed, for example the man dies. Or the

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thing that is the subject of the opinion changes. For instance if I am now of the opinion that Socrates is seated, and he has stood up, clearly the opinion that he is seated has, as true, been destroyed. True opinion, then, is destroyed either if the person who is of it is destroyed or if the thing it is about changes. And opinion is destroyed also if forgetfulness takes over, or if the contrary opinion overcomes the first. But now none of these things has ensued. The man who was of the opinion has not perished; the thing it was about has not changed (the Sun has remained many times as big as the Earth); forgetfulness has not come along (for when you wish [to think about the matter], astronomy forces you to say that the Sun is larger than the Earth); and neither has a contrary opinion overcome the soul, but the same opinion remains in force. If, therefore, the four rules which keep opinion from destruction are preserved, it follows that the opinion remains, and neither of the combatants has been destroyed. That is Aristotle’s argument; it is the one that shows that imagination does not consist of opinion and sense because nothing consists of things that are fighting with one another; but opinion and sense fight; therefore imagination does not consist of opinion and sense. That is Aristotle’s argument. And it is also possible to supply from outside [his works] three further arguments that plead for Aristotle. The first of them is this. If imagination consists of opinion and sense, non-rational animals should not have imagination, since they do not have opinion, a component of imagination for us. That nonrational animals do not have opinion has already become clear in the foregoing, since we said that opinion is part of the rational soul, and the non-rational animals do not have a rational soul; so they do not have opinion either. That is the first argument. Second argument. As things are, so does opinion opine, and sense too for the most part attains truth. But imagination much more often runs into falsehood. It follows that imagination does not consist of opinion and sense. But this argument is false, in my view, since it is possible for there to be something in the composite which there was not in the simple [components]. For instance in the bodies of animals there are colours, say red, that there are not in the elements. It would not be absurd, then, if imagination too were composed of opinion and sense, though they do not run into falsehood and it does, because there is something in the composite that is not in the simples. So this argument does not altogether carry necessity. But the third argument does carry necessity. It goes like this. Nothing that consists of things that are not in our power is in our power. If opinion, then, is not in our power, and neither is sense in our power (for it is impossible, when colours are present and the air is lit up and the eyelids are not closed, not to see; and again, when we do see, it is impossible to see white colour as black or grey or the like)

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– if the simples, then, opinion and sense, are not in our power, it follows that neither will imagination, if it is composed of them, be in our power. But imagination is in our power. I form a representation of a man as tall as the sky and of a goat-stag. If imagination, then, is in our power, it follows that it is not composed of opinion and sense. For nothing that is in our power consists of things that are not in our power. That is the third argument. And we shall show that imagination is not a mixture of opinion and sense either.146 If it were a mixture of these, imagination ought to know what is intermediate between the two, and since opinion says that the Sun is 170 times as big as the Earth, and sense thinks the Sun is a foot across, imagination, being intermediate between these, ought to shun the cognition of either extreme and say that the Sun is 100 times as big as the Earth. But it does not say this. It follows that it is not a mixture of opinion and sense. So much on that. But it is plain that Aristotle is saying these things against Plato, when he says that imagination does not arise out of a mixture of opinion and sense. For in the Sophist Plato plainly says that imagination is from opinion and sense.147 Perhaps, then, Plato does not mean this, but because imagination is intermediate between opinion and sense, and it is customary to say that intermediates are produced by the extremes, for this reason he said this. For indeed, he says in the Timaeus148 that the soul arises out of being that is without parts and being with parts. What is without parts is not mixed; but because the soul is intermediate between them, on that account he says it is out of them. Or say that he is not even referring to what is genuinely the power of imagination, but he here calls ‘imagination’ the false phantasms that seem to be true. For the denoument of the argument in the Sophist is as follows. Socrates149 says to the sophist: ‘You are a mountebank: you occupy yourself with what is not.’ The sophist replies: ‘So what is not, according to you, is, if I busy myself with it. Everything with which someone is occupied must also be. So if I occupy myself with what is not, it follows that what is not, is.’ When the sophist says this, Socrates replies that [the phrase] ‘what is not’ is [used] in many ways. It is used of the unutterable, that which nowhere and in no way is; or of what is other; or of what is better than being, which is called ‘the super-real’, or of what is worse than being, which is called ‘the sub-real’; and falsehood too is called ‘what is not’. And there are many different varieties, he says here, of falsehood; but he says that one species of falsehood comprises things that seem to be true, as with the broken oar. He speaks of this falsehood as imagination arising from opinion and sense because it is intermediate between them, since both opinion and sense attain truth, but sense [only] for the most part. So much on behalf of Plato. And one might say to Aristotle: ‘You chide Plato for saying this, though you yourself

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have said that dim sense is imagination150 and that opinion is from sense and imagination because these precede opinion. If you say things like that, how can you censure others?’ That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

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428a26-7 Both on account of these things 151 What is the force for him of the present passage, that he says ‘both on account of these things’? Either on account of what is going to be said, or on account of what was said earlier. For if it has been shown that opinion and sense are not in our power it follows that imagination does not arise out of them, since [if it does] it too will not be in our power. 428a27-8 And it is clear that the opinion will not be other than that which is the thing of which there is also at the same time sense.152 What is he saying? That if imagination were in any way a product of opinion and sense, these – I mean opinion and sense – ought to be occupied with the same thing. For the opinion that Socrates is just and the sense that he is white will not produce imagination, but both opinion and sense should think that Socrates is just. And when they are both occupied with the same thing it should not be the case that one of them is [occupied with the thing] of itself, for instance opinion thinks Socrates rational, while sense [is occupied with something rational] incidentally, so that [of itself] it thinks him white, but so that it too thinks him rational, and [does so] of itself. So opinion and sense, being occupied with the same thing and both of them of themselves, if indeed that were possible, would produce imagination. 428b1-2 Having something appear, then, will be opining what is perceived not incidentally

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He uses ‘having something appear’ instead of ‘imagining’. It is as if he said that imagining, therefore, according to those who say it is an interweaving, will come from opinion and sense. He does well to add ‘not incidentally’ so that sense may perceive it of itself, as was said just above. 428b2-3 But things appear falsely about which at the same time we have a true supposal Here he refutes those who say that imagination consists of an inter-

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weaving of opinion and sense. He says that if that were so, because sense sees the Sun as a foot across, but opinion thinks it is many times as large as the Earth, it will turn out that imagination says both what is true and what is false, which is absurd. He calls opinion ‘supposal’. 428b4-5 So it turns out, either that it has discarded its own opinion.153

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Here he starts to enumerate the ways in which it is possible for an opinion to perish. They are four; we stated them in the continuous exposition. He says ‘though the thing is preserved’ [428b6] to show that opinion and sense in acting are not damaged. He should have said ‘though he and they are preserved’ – ‘he’ referring to the opiner, and ‘they’ to the thing opined and the activity. For if these are [preserved] the opinion is not damaged. 428b7-8 Or if anything has it,154 the same [opinion] must be true and false Here he states the absurdity. He says that if anything has the same opinion and has not lost it by one of the stated rules for how an opinion can be lost, clearly according to you who say these things, imagination consists of true and false things at the same time, which is absurd, the false sense that sees the Sun [a foot across] and the true opinion that knows it is many times larger than the Earth. 428b8-9 But it would become false when the thing changed without one’s knowing155

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It follows, he says, that imagination is neither sense by itself nor opinion; neither does it consist of them, that is, of an interweaving of opinion and sense. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 4] 428b10-13 But since it is possible, when one thing is changed, for another to be changed by it, and imagination seems to be a kind of change, and not to occur without sense, but in things that perceive and of things of which there is sense, etc. The present continuous exposition teaches four things. First, what imagination is – and that is reasonable. Having said above what it is not, he now says what it is. And he has another reason for doing this, since he proposed to teach about those parts of the non-rational [soul] which are rational in form. Since he did not teach about imagination above, therefore, he does so now. That imagination is rational in form is clear from its being called ‘passive intellect’. That, then, is why he teaches what imagination is. Then, after that, he says what imagination and sense have in common. Someone might reasonably raise the difficulty that he ought rather to say what is common to things that are altogether remote, opinion and imagination. For it is a dialectical principle that one ought to say what is common to things that are altogether remote, and opinion is remote from imagination because one belongs to the non-rational and the other to the rational [soul]; whereas sense is not very remote from imagination, for they belong to one soul, I mean the non-rational. Why, then, does he say what they have in common? In reply to this, say it is reasonable for him to do this. For the difficulty was raised above why, having proposed to differentiate the non-rational [powers] from the rational, he now differentiates the non-rational in relation to itself. So it is to show that the above differentiation was sound that he now says what they have in common. That is the second section. In the third section he enquires why imagination is so called. And in the fourth section he enquires why it is given us by the Creator. Let us start with the first and say what imagination is. But before we do that, let us take in advance an assumption that will help us to the definition. It should be known, then, that just as [in general] of things there are, some only change [something else], some only are changed, and some both change and are changed, so it is in us. The sense-object only changes; the sense both changes and is changed (for it is changed by the sense-object and changes imagination); and among non-rational animals, imagination only is changed – for in our case, being changed by sense it changes opinion. These points being taken in advance, it should be known that imagination is a power that through sense as an intermediary receives the forms of sense-objects. That is the definition of imagination.

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But right at the entrance people may raise the difficulty against it that this account does not at all differentiate imagination from the common sense. For the common sense too is a power that receives the forms of sense-objects through sense as an intermediary. And if anyone were to say that this definition does not fit the common sense because that knows immediately that white and sweet differ, acting along with the senses, and not through sense as intermediary, we say to him that even if it acts along with the senses, still, it does not lay hold of these things immediately, but it receives from sight the imprint of white and from taste the imprint of sweet, and discerns and pronounces that they are different. So the present definition does fit it too. But we say that imagination receives the forms through the mediation of all sense, both common and particular, whereas the common sense receives the forms through the mediation only of particular senses. So that is the difference between imagination and common sense, and that is the solution. And that this definition attains truth, and imagination does act through sense as an intermediary, is clear from the blind. Those who are blind from birth have no imagining about colour at all. Similarly with the deaf from birth: what imagination have they about sounds? This makes it clear that imagination acts always through the mediation of the senses. But this gives rise to a difficulty worthy of being raised. What? Does not imagination form representations of certain things sense has not seen? Sense has not seen a goat-stag, at least, or a man as tall as the sky, but still imagination forms representations of these things. So imagination forms representations of things sense has not seen, and acts without sense. That is the difficulty. In reply to it we shall say that even when it forms representations, it again takes its starting points from sense. For it has seen a goat on its own and a stag on its own, and taking these simple starting points from sense it has formed the composite representation too. And if it also forms a representation of a man as tall as the sky, still, it has previously seen an individual man. This, then, is how this difficulty too should be resolved. And he does well on account of something else also to say ‘through sense as an intermediary’, on account of the medium. For that too receives the forms of sense-objects, but not through sense as an intermediary. And do not think that sense is better than imagination for this reason, because imagination acts through it. For it is not as something which brings about imagination that sense contributes to it, but as something which serves it, like the medium. Hence it is not better. For by this argument you could say that imagination is better than opinion, since it serves opinion. But in fact it is agreed that

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opinion is better because it belongs to the rational soul, while imagination belongs to the non-rational. And when I say that imagination receives the forms of senseobjects, do not think it is imprinted according to the sense-objects, since the first imprints would be obliterated by those that come later; it receives only the accounts. From its being said that imagination acts through sense as an intermediary, Themistius draws the conclusion that imagination is shown to act not only after the senses but together with them.156 For if when the senses are acting it receives the imprints from them, and does so not like an inanimate container, but receives them and knows them at the same time, clearly imagination acts at the same time as sense, and we shall show that Aristotle says this in the text. But he speaks ill. It is not when imagination receives the forms from the senses that it also acts; after the senses have finished, that is when imagination acts. For if it acted at the same time as the senses, how would it differ from the common sense? The common sense is what acts at the same time as the particular senses. So imagination acts after the senses. For it must receive the forms into itself from sense and only then act. So if the senses do not send on [the forms] imagination does not act. It must, therefore, act after the senses have finished. It is worthwhile to raise the difficulty: ‘Look! I direct my gaze at the Sun, and I send the imprint to imagination, and I remain contemplating the Sun for another hour, and imagination acts while I am still directing my gaze and seeing the Sun.’ But then the first look by virtue of which I sent the form to the imagination has ceased. So imagination acts after sense, and Aristotle’s account stands firm. That completes the first section. In the second section he says what imagination and sense have in common. It should be known, then, that imagination and sense have the same sense-objects. That is why they have something in common and are both in the same way occupied with them. Just as sense has both common and special sense-objects, and both things that are sense-objects of themselves and things that are sense-objects incidentally, as has already been said, so imagination too occupies itself with these things. That is the first thing in common. Second thing in common. Just as sense always attains truth about the proper sense-objects, attains it less about the incidental objects, and still less about the common objects, so too imagination. Those are the two things common to sense and imagination. That is what Aristotle says. But it is worthwhile to raise two difficulties. The first of them is this. Why does Aristotle now [428b278] say that imagination always attains truth about the proper senseobjects, when above [428a12] he said that imagination does not

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always attain truth, but sometimes also runs into falsehood? That is the difficulty. In reply to it we may say that imagination is twofold. There is the imagination which only receives forms and is, as it were, a repository, and the imagination which depicts whatever it wants. The one that receives the forms always attains truth, and for it, this statement that says that imagination always attains truth about the proper sense-objects is true. But the one that depicts whatever it wants, that is the one that runs into falsehood. When it depicts things that are not, it runs into falsehood, and of it the things said above are true, that imagination runs into falsehood. That is the first difficulty and its solution. Second difficulty. How is it that above157 he said that sense attains truth about the common sense-objects more than about the incidental, and now he says the contrary, that it attains truth about the incidental objects more than about the common? That is the difficulty. In order that we may make Aristotle consistent both with himself and with the facts, we shall resolve it as follows. As was said also above, there are two kinds of incidental object: individual substances, which do not at all fall under any sense but are thought of from the things incidental to them; and a sense-object is incidental which falls under another sense, as sweet is an incidental object for sight – for of itself it is a sense-object of taste. Since there are these two kinds of incidental sense-object, this statement and the one made above can both be true. If by ‘incidental sense-object’ you take individual substances, the statement above is true: for sense attains truth more about the common sense-objects than about individual substances. That sense attains truth more about the common sense-objects than about individual substances is clear from the fact that sense is more affected by the common sense-objects. By individual substances it is not affected at all, for sense is not affected in any way by substance as substance. But it is affected by the common objects, as has already been shown [455,2-8]. For it is forced apart by large size and compacted by small [cf. 455,6-8], and is similarly affected by the other [common objects]. And a sense gets to know more that by which it is affected, and attains truth about that about which it gets to know more. It follows that sense achieves truth more about the common objects than about individual substances, and in this way the statement above is true. But if you take the incidental sense-objects to be the other thing signified by ‘that which is incidental’, then the statement is true which says that sense attains truth more about that which is senseobject to another sense than about the common sense-objects. This is shown as follows. That which is close to what always attains truth, attains truth more than that which is not. The proper sense-objects always attain truth, and the sense-object of another sense is closer,

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as I shall show, to the proper sense-objects than are the common sense-objects. It follows that that which is a sense-object of another sense attains truth more than the common sense-objects. That this is closer, is not hard to see. For it should be known that neither the proper sense-objects nor the sense-objects of another sense are separable from matter; so they are close to each other because they cannot be separated from matter. Neither whiteness, which is a proper sense-object of sight, nor sweetness, which is a proper sense-object of taste, can be thought of apart from matter. But the common senseobjects can be thought of apart from matter; for it is by separating them from matter that philosophers have set up mathematics. It is from the common sense-objects that arise the objects of mathematics. If the sense-objects of another sense, then, are closer to the proper sense-objects than are the common sense-objects, and those that are closer to the proper sense-objects attain truth more, it follows that the sense-objects of another sense, which are one thing signified by ‘the incidental’, attain truth more than do the common sense-objects. So both this statement is true which says that sense attains truth more in connection with the incidental than in connection with the common sense-objects, and also the statement above is true which says that sense attains truth more in connection with the common objects than in connection with the incidental. But it should be known that the common sense-objects are both coarse-grained and accurate. Insofar as they are grasped by one sense they are coarse-grained, but insofar as they are grasped by all, they are accurate. That the common sense-objects do not become accurately known by a single sense is shown by the fact that people sailing past think the land is moving and the ship is stationary. See! They are mistaken about what stays still, the land, and what is in motion, the ship, because they are accustomed to knowing things by sight alone. And there is another way in which we can be seen to be mistaken about staying still. We think stars, which are always in motion, are stationary. And sight makes mistakes about numbers, thinking that things in different spheres are in one. For look! We say that the Moon is in Aries or Taurus. But Aries is in one sphere, the non-planetary, and the Moon in another. We also make mistakes about shape and size. Distant things which are square and large we think small and round because their angles do not appear. But someone will say that insofar as we have this case, it is not possible to know even the incidental objects. If you say that distance makes it impossible to know the common objects, the incidental too will not be seen because of distance. That the person approaching from afar is white, we know; that it is Theaetetus or Socrates we do not know. In reply to this it may be said that it is only on account of distance that the incidental objects are not seen, but the common

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objects are not seen as they are even from nearby. For see, when we look from directly underneath at a tight-rope, though in fact it is curved,158 we think it is stretched out straight. And in a picture we see the white159 patches standing out and the black as it were cut into it – which is why they make breasts white. Shape is responsible for this. So this difficulty too is resolved. That completes the second section. In the third section we enquire why imagination is so called. Because in imagination sense-objects have come to rest. So because it is a state of rest for the things that have come to light, on that account it is called ‘imagination’. By ‘things that have come to light’160 he means all sense-objects that have been made manifest.161 For it receives the imprints of all the senses, but since sight is the best of all, for that reason it is called after its subject, light. For imagination is named from light. That completes the third section. In the fourth and last section of the continuous exposition we enquire why imagination is bestowed on us and what its end is. We should know, then, that it is bestowed on non-rational animals either for them to have something analogous to reason or because through it they provide themselves with food. For ants act in accordance with imagination when they store up for themselves in advance a treasury of corn for nourishment. But on rational animals imagination is bestowed either that the body may be more serviceable and suitable for the reception of what is better – for if it did not become suitable to receive imagination, how could it receive the rational soul? And we have imagination for another reason, in order that when reason is deranged in judgement, being overlaid with certain affections, we may have this administering our affairs, for instance when we are sick or drunk, when we can hardly act according to the rational soul because of the unsuitability of the instrument. That, with God’s help, completes the fourth section and the continuous exposition and the second Division, in which he differentiates the rational soul from the non-rational. For in the first Division he differentiated the non-rational soul in relation to itself, in the present second Division, as we have said, he differentiates the rational soul relatively to the non-rational, and in the Division that comes next he compares the rational soul with itself. 428b10-11 But since it is possible, when one thing is changed, for another to be changed by it162 He starts with the assumption163 and says that [in general], among things that are, there is that which is changed by something else and by which a further thing is changed, and that this happens in the case of the soul too. Just as, in the world of things, we see that the hand

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changes [sc. moves] the crowbar and the crowbar the stone, so sense is changed by the sense-object and this changes imagination. For after sense has intuited the sense-object and received the senseobject’s form, it keeps it, and imagination intuits this form, and that is how imagination arises, as Plutarch says, which is why he defines it as a change of the soul which is stirred up proximately by actual sense. And do not raise a difficulty about how it may be that at night we imagine this particular man though sense is not then acting. For imagination remains and has the imprints from the seeing that occurred before; that is why, even though sense does not act in the night, I imagine. The ‘but since’ refers to what was said above. For since he said above that it [imagination] is not opinion or sense, now he says ‘but since’ it is changed by sense, imagination is a power receptive of forms of sense-objects through sense as an intermediary.

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428b12-13 But in things that perceive and of things of which there is sense We must perceive, he says, and only then imagine. For those deformed from the start do not imagine. That is why he says ‘in things that perceive’. But why does he say ‘and of things of which there is sense’? Because of those who are not blind from birth but who lose sight around about the second year, before imagining. These too cannot imagine about colours. Even those who have sense, if they lose it at the beginning, do not imagine. So therefore it is not possible to imagine about things that do not fall under our attention through the senses.

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428b14 And this must be like the sense, [it would not be possible for this change to belong without sense] Here begins the second section, in which he tells us what imagination and sense have in common without having yet defined imagination. Then he back-tracks and defines it, and then, having done so, gives a fuller account of what they have in common. So now he says that imagination must be like sense because imagination concerning sense-objects cannot occur without sense. He does well to add ‘possible’ [428b15] lest anyone should think it is possible to imagine separately from sense. For this follows of necessity. 428b16-17 And what has it must do and undergo many things in accordance with it164 He does well to say ‘many’. It does not do everything in accordance with imagination, but things that have it without reason do [all]

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things in accordance with it, for instance ants go out in accordance with it to collect together food. Nor do we always undergo things in accordance with imagination. For when lying with someone we emit semen without any prior imagining, as sometimes happens to us in sleep, it is not by imagination that we are affected. He does well, then, to say that we neither do nor undergo all things in accordance with imagination. And see how, before completing what they have in common, he explains what the end of imagination is.165 428b17 And it must be both true and false166 He returns to what is common. He says that sense and imagination have something in common in attaining truth and running into falsehood. They come to have this in common because they have the same sense-objects and lay hold of them in a similar way.

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428b18-19 Sense of the proper objects is true or has the least possible falsehood

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Now he says something safer than what was said above. Above [428a11; 418a11-12] he said that sense does not run into falsehood at all about the proper objects, but here he says that at times it does also run into falsehood. Why does he say that sense has some little falsehood about the proper objects? Because of their smallness. When a drop of black is mixed with a lot of white, it cannot differentiate it. 428b19 Secondly there is sense of the incidence of these things,167 and here it is already possible for falsehood to come in

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The second [class of] sense-objects, he says, are the incidentals. We raise the difficulty: if we say that substances are incidental senseobjects, how can we say that they are incidental, when they are substances? We say that there is no absurdity. In the way in which we say it is incidental to a master to be a human being, in this way also we say now that substance is incidental to colours. For see! In the former case, predicating in an unnatural way, we say that human being, which is a substance, is incidental to master, which is something incidental. He says ‘and here’ [428b20-20a] instead of ‘and in imagination’. For incidental sense objects are in that also. 428b21-2 For it does not run into error about its being white, but it does about whether it is this or something else that is white Here again he is speaking of sense. That it is white, sight knows; for

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white is a proper sense-object of sight, and about the proper senseobjects truth is attained on the whole. But it runs into error about that to which this white belongs, for instance the individual substance, whether it is Cleon or Alcibiades. For it does not know also that this white belongs to Cleon, even if it knows that it is simply white. 428b22-3 Thirdly, [sc. there is sense] of the common objects which follow upon the incidental objects to which the proper objects belong A third sort of sense-object, he says are the common sense-objects. Then, wanting to clarify what he means by ‘common sense-objects’, he says ‘the things that follow upon the incidental sense-objects in which also the proper objects belong’. By ‘incidental sense-objects’ we mean individual substances. In the individual substance there are change, size and the other common sense-objects, and also the proper objects. For colour is in an individual substance.

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428b25 And the change which comes about through the agency of the activity will differ from the sense.168 Here he states the second thing common to sense and imagination. The statement must be read as having its words out of order.169 The change, he says, which comes about through the agency of actual sense, that is, imagination, which is stirred up by these three stated kinds of sense, that of the proper objects, that of the incidental and that of the common, this imagination, he says, will differ from all the kinds of sense from which it arises, since it is evident that what occurs when the sense object has to be present is different from that which also occurs sometimes when it is not. But, he says, it has truth and falsity proportional to the kinds of sense. Just as among them the first mentioned, that of the proper sense-objects, is true, so also imagination when this sort of sense is most present will be true. And as the remaining two kinds of sense, that of the incidental objects and that of the common, were sometimes true and sometimes false, so also would be the imaginings that come from them, whether they are present or not.

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428b27-8 And the first when the sense is present is true Drawing conclusions from this passage Themistius170 says that imagination acts at the same time as sense, because it says that imagination attains truth ‘when sense is present’.

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Translation 428b30 If, then, nothing else has the things that have been said171

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[Nothing else,] that is, except imagination, and if imagination has the things that have been said, which also complete its substance, I mean the definition, then clearly imagination is ‘a change coming about through the agency of actual sense’ [429a1-2]. And note where he defines imagination, saying this in the middle. 429a2-3 But since sight is sense most of all

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It should be known that what in us is intellect, in non-rational animals is imagination. For we, when removed from sense-objects, act in accordance with intellect, but non-rational animals act in accordance with imagination. For sense-objects are readily taken away, but intellect and imagination, in what has them, are always there. But Plutarch thinks imagination is twofold. And its end in the upward direction, or at least its beginning, is the end of that which thinks, while its other end is the summit of the senses. Imagination contributes nothing to intellect or thought, but on the contrary is cleaned up by intellect and thought, and they perfect what is imperfect in it, and even lead it to truth, to the extent to which it is capable of truth. Hence imagination wants to follow everywhere and be changed at the same time [as they], wishing to obtain a share of reason and truth. And that marvellous man Plutarch gives a fine model for it, so it is worthwhile also to state it. He says that just as two lines touch each other at a single point, so the upper part of imagination touches that which thinks. For just as that point is both the same and other, the same in that it is one, but other because we can take it both with the upper line and with the lower, so too imagination can be taken both as one and as two, since it brings together into one what is divided in the sense-objects, and what is

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simple and, so to speak, unitive in divine things it pounds up into certain imprints and differing forms. 429a7 Some because intellect is covered over He does well to say ‘covered over’. For intellect is always there in us and acting, but it is sometimes hidden through disease or anger or drunkenness. These screen it off so that sometimes its activity is not known. But if that is so, clearly he is of the opinion that the rational soul is immortal. For he does not say that it is affected in derangement, but that it is covered over. That, with God’s help, completes the second Division and the lecture.

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[THIRD DIVISION] [LECTURE 1] 429a10-13 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soul gets to know and exercises judgement, whether it is separable, or not separable in magnitude but in account, we must see what differentiates it and how thinking ever comes about After differentiating the non-rational soul from the rational he now goes on also to differentiate the rational soul in relation to itself. In connection with the rational soul he has three enquiries. First, whether it is destructible or indestructible. Secondly, he differentiates the rational soul from sense. And do not be puzzled why, after differentiating sense from rational soul above, he does the same again. Since the differentiation will help him to show that the rational soul is eternal, for that reason he states it. Then, a third section, he enquires how thinking comes about. The present continuous exposition carries out the enquiries of the first two sections. He starts with the second section, that is, the difference of reason from sense, because this helps, and occupies the relationship of a proof, to show that the rational soul is eternal. And wishing to make the differentiation urgent, he first says what reason and sense have in common. And do not find it a problem why, having stated what they have in common above, he also states this now. For know that what they have in common also helps to show that the soul is immortal. So he starts from what reason and sense have in common. The first thing he says they have in common is that they are both potential, both reason and sense, and neither does the soul have accounts of the objects of intellect (for it is like a writing tablet on

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which nothing is written, according to Aristotle), nor does sense have accounts of the sense-objects, but they only receive imprints and forms. For sense does not lay hold of the sense-object but of a kind of imprint of the sense-object. For sense fails to reach the substance. The rational soul, even if it does think substance, still does not, it either, have imprints of objects of intellect. That is the first point in common. Second point in common. Both the rational soul and sense are potential, though the rational soul is so by virtue of suitability and sense by virtue of having the disposition; but still, both are potential, and if they are, it must be that they go to actuality through being affected. Being affected, then, is common to them. But because being affected pointed to the rational soul’s being destructible, for this reason he says that they undergo an affection which is perfective, not destructive. It is not affected with regard to its substance, but with regard to the activity. For cognition is the activity of intellect, and changes from being potential to being actual. And that is the third point in common, that both undergo perfective affections. But so that from what they have in common you may learn that the soul is immortal, you should know that what is genuinely the soul [i.e. the rational soul] undergoes perfective affection more than sense. For sense is destroyed by excesses, whereas the soul is made more limber as a result of excesses. From that it is clear that it is eternal: it is never destroyed. Those are the points in common. Sense differs from the rational soul in that when sense acts in connection with what is more of a sense-object it is blunted for dealing with things that are less, whereas the rational soul when it acts in connection with what is more [intelligible] acts more in dealing with what is less. For instance if sight sees disproportionate white or a labyrinthine shape it is affected by these things and does not lay hold of what is less white. But intellect, even if it acts concerning great things, is limbered up by that, and acts all the more concerning lesser. And what is the cause of this? Because sense needs the body and does not act without it, and because the body is compacted or forced apart by excesses and is affected, that is why it cannot act concerning the lesser things. But the intellect does not need the body so as to be affected when the latter is, but is limbered up in connection with the greater things and finds is easy to grasp the lesser. And this shouts aloud the eternity of the soul. So its eternity is shown from the difference between sense and intellect too. And we shall show by a proof of our own that the soul is eternal, which was the first section. If the soul thinks all things,172 it is eternal. For it could not think all things if it were a body or a form in matter.

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If it were a body it would have to be a mixture that was either hot or cold, and a mixture does not think similar mixtures. It follows that it will not think similar mixtures, and it will not longer think all things. For it has been said [424a2-3] that touch does not lay hold of what is similarly cold or hot. But why say that it is a form in matter and uses the body as an instrument? But if it uses it as an instrument it will not think the instrument, and again it will not think all things. If it thinks it too, it will need another instrument, and so ad infinitum. Besides, an instrument helps that of which it is an instrument. But the body impedes the soul’s acting. Therefore it is not its instrument. Since this too, then, has been said, that, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

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429a10 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soul gets to know173 It is not possible to draw from this Plutarch’s conclusion that all souls are one many-powered substance, and that this is true is shown by his saying that one part of the soul is the rational part. For he now calls this a ‘part’ in the following way. Since many things contribute to holding the body together he says that this part of the soul too, that is, the rational soul, is one of the things that help the body. For how could he say it is one many-powered substance when he has supposed that there is indestructible soul and destructible?174 It is not possible that of the same substance one part should be destructible and another indestructible. That is how we reply to him. And to Alexander [we say]: ‘See how he calls intellect “part of the soul”. When he says intellect is eternal, do not say he means the intellect from outside:175 he means that which is in us.’ For it should be known that ‘intellect’ signifies three things in Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias states these three in one way and Plutarch in another. Alexander says that the first thing signified by ‘intellect’ is potential intellect, such as is present in the case of children. In children there is potential intellect. Second after potential intellect is signified dispositional intellect, as is present in the case of complete human beings. Complete human beings, who have then acquired knowledge of things, are said to have dispositional intellect. The third thing signified by ‘intellect’ is actual intellect, that which is from outside, the completely perfect, which is not dispositional or potential, so that it is simple and always actual, that which governs the universe. These are the three things signified by ‘intellect’ according to Alexander. But Plutarch does not accept this; he states the things signified by ‘intellect’ differently. He says that the first thing signified by ‘intellect’ is dispositional intellect, and this sort of intellect is present in

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the case of children. For Plutarch wants babies, according to Aristotle, to have accounts176 of things, and the rational soul to know all things, and learning not to be genuinely learning but recollection. For this reason he gives children dispositional intellect that has accounts of things; but they do not know things, he says, because they need to learn, which learning is recollection. The second thing signified by ‘intellect’ is what is dispositional and actual at the same time, as intellect is in the case of complete human beings. In these there is both dispositional and actual [intellect], for they have already learnt and come to know things and, as it were, recollected them through learning. The third thing signified is intellect that is actual only; such is intellect from outside, perfect intellect. These are the three things signified by ‘intellect’ according to Plutarch. Ammonius censures both of them, both Alexander and Plutarch, saying that both are wrong and that they err both severally and together.177 Their common error is that both say that the third thing signified by ‘intellect’ is actual intellect from outside, which is, in a word, God. Aristotle is not now discussing the intellect from outside because he has not entered upon a theological treatise, and besides, the discussion now is about that intellect which is part of the soul. He begins, at least, by saying ‘About the part of the soul by which it thinks and gets to know’. If, therefore, he is now speaking of intellect that is part of the soul, how can this signify intellect from outside? That intellect which is from outside is not part of the soul. And because, further down, he says that this actual intellect arises from potential intellect in us; intellect from outside does not come from potential intellect in us. And if they should also say that, when he says intellect thinks all things, he is speaking of intellect from outside, they speak falsely there too. The potential intellect that is in us has thinking of all things just as the sketch for a likeness has the imprints, even if they are not plain, of all the things that will be shown. Intellect too, then, has thinkings of all things, even if they are not plain; and when it thinks they become plain. And that it is what he called ‘part of the soul’ that he says is eternal further down, is shown by his saying ‘This part of the soul only is eternal’ [cf. 430a23], [the part] only that consists in the rational soul, not the others. That is the common mistake they both make. And again, each goes wrong on his own, as follows. Alexander, in that he is not willing to say anything against the text, but always tries to follow it and now too falls into contradictions. Taking his start from the text, he thinks that intellect itself and its substance are potential, and does not say that it is potential in respect of its activities, for instance the intellect of children is with regard to us potential, because it does not yet know the forms of things, but is suitably disposed for getting to know them, and to that extent is

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potential because its activity does not yet know the things that are. But Alexander says that the very substance of intellect is present potentially in the case of children, and establishes this saying that intellect is potential, and if it is potential by virtue of suitability, clearly it does not yet have the form, but is only matter. For everything that is potential in the first way178 is in matter. Intellect, then, is matter and does not have form, lest being muddied by form it should incline to the cognition of its own form and should not know forms contrary to it.179 For as the transparent is colourless so that it may serve to carry colours impartially, in the same way intellect, he says, is formless that it may know all forms. So says Alexander, altogether erroneously. For if it is formless for this reason, that it may know all things that are, he should extend the argument: it ought not to be anywhere in any way whatever. For it also knows what in no way is. And we refute Alexander not only in this way but from Aristotle himself. Aristotle himself says that intellect is the form of forms [432a2]. That is the error peculiar to Alexander, that he says intellect is formless. For he says that its substance is potential in children, and what is potential is formless. Plutarch too has a mistake peculiar to himself. He applies to Aristotle what belongs to Plato. Plato is the person who thinks that the intellect of children is dispositional and has accounts of things, not Aristotle. But Plutarch thinks that Aristotle too says this. How can he not be speaking falsely when Aristotle refutes him? He says that the intellect of children is like a writing tablet on which nothing is written, because it is suitable for receiving the accounts of things but has not already actually received them. Alexander and Plutarch, then, err both severally and together. So now let us say what is true. It should be known that we are of the opinion that intellect is always form. For the intellect of children is form, potentially receptive of forms, and insofar as it is form it is not potential, as Alexander thinks, but insosofar as it is potentially receptive of forms it does not have the accounts of things, as Plutarch thinks. Next let us say what things are signified by ‘intellect’. The first thing signified is intellect that potentially knows things, as is present in the case of children. The second thing signified is intellect that knows things dispositionally, as is present in people that are complete and know things, but stay still and are not acting with respect to them. The third thing signified is not intellect coming in from outside, as they think, but intellect that is dispositional and at the same time actual, as is the intellect of people who are complete, who know things, and who are bringing out their knowledge and acting in accordance with it. That is how we state the things signified by ‘intellect’.

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Translation 429a10-11 Concerning that part of the soul with which the soul gets to know and exercises judgement180

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He calls intellect ‘a part’ of the soul, not as though it were the least thing in the soul, but as if someone were reckoning up the entire cosmos, placed the Sun in order after all the rest, and then finally called the Sun ‘part of the universe’. He does well to say ‘with which the soul gets to know and exercises judgement’. For the soul has a contemplative part and a practical. By saying ‘with which it exercises judgement’ he indicates the practical part, and ‘with which it gets to know’, the contemplative. But what does he mean when he says that, concerning this part of the soul in which it gets to know and exercises judgement, we ought to enquire whether it is eternal or not, ‘whether it is separable or not separable in magnitude but in account’? Some people interpreted the present passage in this way, that it is ‘whether the intellect is separable from body or not separable from body, but separable only in concept and not also in actuality’. That is the first proposition,181 whether the intellect is separable and eternal. But this present interpretation in no way pleases Plutarch: he altogether condemns it. His interpretation is that Aristotle says this, meaning to say: ‘whether the intellect is separable from imagination and sense because it has another substance independent of them, or there is a single substance, which throws out before the intellect both imagination and sense, and which is many only in account.’ For that he is looking at these is clear from his just having finished discussing them. He does not enquire whether or not it is separable from body. For how can someone who has conceded that imagination is separated from body be in two minds about intellect, which transcends all the [other] powers, as to whether or not it is separate from body? And by ‘magnitude’ understand ‘substance’. So the first proposition is this, whether intellect is separated in substance from imagination and sense, or there is one substance for all, and they differ only in account. So much on that. But since Aristotle mentions the unmixed and unaffected and separable in order to show that the soul is eternal, Alexander undermines these three. First, the unmixed. He says that Aristotle calls the soul ‘unmixed’ because it is customary that when things are mixed they are first by themselves and only then mixed together. For see! In honeyed wine there is first honey by itself and wine, and only later are they interwoven. It is because the soul, then, is not first on its own before being mixed with the body, but is mixed with the body simultaneously with coming to be, it is for this reason that he calls the soul ‘unmixed’. He calls in ‘unaffected’, since it is not the suitability of the soul itself that is affected but the body by virtue

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of its suitability. Since, then, it is the being affected of the suitability that we call ‘affection’, and in fact it is not affected, for this reason he calls it ‘unaffected’. And he calls it ‘separable’, he [sc. Alexander] says, by virtue of its otherness, calling it ‘separable’ inasmuch as it is wholly different from the body. But he speaks ill. For by the argument by which he shows that rational soul is unmixed, unaffected and separable, it would be possible to show the same of sense. But in fact it is in differentiating reason from sense that he says these things belong to the rational soul. It follows that they do not belong to sense as well. Do you, then, take these things as shouting aloud the eternity of the soul and not as Alexander takes them. For if it is eternal it is definitely unmixed with matter, separable from it and unaffected. So much by the way. But the present text, as we say, states the first point in the enumeration down to ‘whether the soul is indestructible or not’.182

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429a12-13 We must see what differentiates it, and how thinking ever comes about183 By his saying ‘we must see what differentiates it’ the second section is enumerated, in which he means to say how reason differs from sense; and by ‘how thinking comes about’ he states the third section.

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429a13-14 If thinking is indeed like perceiving [it would be either being affected in some way by the object of thought, or something else like that] Here he starts from the things reason and sense have in common, and seems to start from the second thing in common, that both are affected, though that is out of order. The point that they are potential should have preceded it. For the second point in common arises from this. For if they are both potential, and that which is in potentiality needs affection in order that it may come to be in actuality, for this reason they also have in common being affected. But it could be said that he does start from the first thing in common. For he says that thinking is like perceiving and perceiving is in potentiality; from this it follows that thinking also is in potentiality. And lower down he states this thing they have in common clearly. It is also possible to explain in outline this gobbet. ‘If intellect is like sense’184 (instead of ‘if you suppose that intellect is like sense’), intellect too must be a thing affected in some way by the object of intellect, as sense also is by the sense-object. If it is not affected by the object of intellect there is ‘something else similar’ [a15] instead of ‘it is unaffected’. For because it seemed awkward to say that the rational soul is affected, for that reason he said ‘or something else

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similar’ – that is, [it undergoes] a perfective affection, not a destructive one. Then, as though adjudicating, he adds to the account ‘it must, therefore be unaffected’. Why does he put in the ‘therefore’? Not because he says ‘the rational soul is receptive of forms’; it is not for this reason that he concludes that it is unaffected (for this does not follow),185 but because he said ‘or’ it undergoes ‘some similar’ perfective affection; it is because of this that he concludes that therefore at any rate to this extent it is unaffected. 429a15-16 [It must be unaffected, therefore,] but receptive of the form and potentially such but not that Alexander here fell into error and thought that it is receptive of the forms (intellect, I mean) and is in potentiality; ‘but not that’ [he reads as being] in place of ‘but not a form’. He takes the words ‘but not that’ ill. By ‘but not that’ we ought to think ‘but it is not actually that of which it thinks’, as we said above. For intellect does have a form, or rather is a form, but the form it gets to know it does not have actually, but potentially. For intellect is potentially the objects of intellect and sense is potentially the sense-objects, not actually. 429a18-20 It must, then, since it thinks all things, be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may control, that is, in order that it may get to know If you want intellect to think all things, he says, you must suppose it unmixed with matter. For if you say it consists of matter, it will not know it. And indeed for this reason touch does not lay hold of what is of similar heat to itself. And for this reason also Anaxagoras, when he said that all things are of similar parts, did not suppose that intellect is of similar parts, in order that it may control all things, that is, get to know all things. What in Anaxagoras is ‘to control’ in Aristotle is ‘to get to know’. And it is quite right that a thing should not know the things it is of: for that which knows and that which is known want to be different. But Alexander again thinks otherwise. He says that if it thinks all things it is unmixed with forms and does not have a form. But we draw a further distinction and say that it is unmixed with the forms it knows, since it itself is straight off a form. Alexander may say to this: ‘According to you, the intellect is unmixed with the forms it gets to know, but it gets to know itself too, and you say that it is a form: so it is unmixed with itself, which is absurd.’ But we reply to him that it is as something thinking that it is unmixed with what is thought and other than it.

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429a20-1 For what is alien, appearing alongside, impedes and will get in the way186 What is he saying? That if the intellect was of matter, the matter itself would appear alongside, get in the way and impede its thinking not only of itself but of alien objects of intellect, that is, the others. It follows that it is not of matter. You can also interpret it in another way and say: if intellect actually had any forms of the things it gets to know, and was not all things potentially, it would be muddied and would not know accurately, just as neither will sight, if the transparent is coloured, know all colours accurately. That is what we say; but Alexander says that both here he wants intellect not to have form, and in what he infers [sc. in the next sentence]. For he says that it has no nature except only that it is potential. But we say that it is in this respect that Aristotle says it does not have a nature: its nature is not such as to have the forms of objects of intellect in actuality, as Plato thinks, but only in potentiality; since it is itself a form and its substance is actual.

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429a23 By ‘intellect’ I mean that with which the soul thinks and supposes Since imagination too is called ‘passive intellect’ he says that our present discussion is not about that, but about that intellect in virtue of which we exercise thought and suppose. Here he uses ‘intellect’ in a rather wide sense. By ‘exercise thought’ he indicates thought and by ‘suppose’, opinion. He says, then, that the intellect is nothing in actuality before it thinks, but in potentiality, and what is in potentiality is not its substance but its activity. And for that reason the intellect is not a body. For it would be of some quality, hot or cold. Nor does it use the body as an instrument. It is able to think great things and small alike, which sense, which does use the body as an instrument, cannot do. 429a27-8 And they say well who say that the soul is the place of forms He praises Plato. For he said above that the soul receives the forms of objects of intellect and only then acts, and for this reason he praises Plato who says that the soul is the place of forms. But he finds fault with him on two counts. First, that he says that all soul, and not just the rational soul, is the place of forms – though one might say on Plato’s behalf that he calls only the rational soul ‘soul’ and the others ‘animations’,187 which is why he says ‘All soul is immortal’.188 Even,

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then, if he says the the soul is the place of forms, still, he means only the rational [soul]. And he also finds fault with him on another point, that he says the forms are in the soul actually and not potentially. For Aristotle likens it to a writing tablet on which nothing is written and calls ‘learning’ what is genuinely learning, whereas Plato likens it to a writing tablet which is already inscribed, and calls learning ‘recollection’. 429b7 [And when it comes to be each thing in the way the knower in actuality is said to –] this comes about when it is able to act through itself

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What is he saying? That intellect which is in potentiality comes to be in actuality at that time when it is able to act with systematic knowledge and contemplatively. It comes about that intellect acts with systematic knowledge when the soul can act on its own. That is not always. It is with difficulty in old age. 429b8-9 even then it is in potentiality in a way, not, however as it was before it learnt and found out. And then it is able to think itself189 Even after learning things, he says, and becoming still, intellect is in potentiality. But it is not in potentiality as it was before learning something or finding it out. For before learning and finding out intellect is in potentiality in the former sense of ‘in potentiality’ that is, by virtue of suitability, but after learning it is in potentiality by virtue of having the disposition, which is the second thing signified by ‘in potentiality’. He calls this ‘in potentiality in a way’. He does well to mention learning and discovery, since all systematic knowledge is obtained either by learning or by discovery.190 That completes the lecture. [LECTURE 2]

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429b10-12 But since magnitude is one thing and being a magnitude another, and water and being water, and the same with many other things, but not with all [for with some it is the same, it discerns being flesh and flesh either each with something else, or with the same thing otherwise disposed191] He proposed to make three enquiries concerning the intellect, one whether it is eternal or destructible, a second, what it has in common with, and how it differs from, sense – which is also the starting point from which he stalks its eternity – and thirdly how thinking comes

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about. The first two he has adequately demonstrated in what has gone before. Now he has what is left before him for demonstration, and here he is investigating how thinking comes about. Aristotle starts by raising a problem. There are two kinds of cognition in us, that of the non-rational part, like the senses, and that of the rational, like intellect. And there are two sorts of thing we get to know, things that are in matter and sense-objects, and things that are non-material. Aristotle enquires in what follows whether each cognition is of its own thing – for instance the non-rational gets to know the things that are in matter and the rational only the things that are non-material. Or does the non-rational know only the things in matter, while the rational, being better, knows not only the things that are non-material but those in matter as well? That is the problem, and Aristotle adjudicates saying that the rational soul knows not only the things that are non-material but the things in matter as well. For if something knows what is better, all the more it knows also what is worse. So if it knows things that are non-material it must also survey the things that are worse than what is non-material, that is, the things in matter. For if intellect, which is rational cognition, knew only the things that are non-material, and did not know the things that are in matter, intellect will be in a certain respect non-intellect.192 Not thinking things that are in matter it will be non-intellect in respect of them. But it is absurd that intellect should be in some respect non-intellect. It follows that it does not know only things that are non-material but things that are in matter as well. That is what Aristotle says. And we are able to show from outside [his works] that intellect knows things in matter too. If it did not know things in matter, how could it set sense right? Sense sees the oar in water broken and the Sun a foot across, and intellect sets it right, showing that the oar is not broken and the Sun is larger than the Earth. How, then, could intellect set sense right if it did not think things in matter, that is, sense-objects? Besides we have a rule above that what knows the difference of one thing from another, all the more knows the differing things. If intellect, then, knows how non-material things differ from things in matter, it follows that it knows the things in matter. But perhaps you will say it is absurd for intellect to know things that are external. That belongs to sense because it knows things that are in matter and particular. For intellect knows only what is universal and it is for sense to know particulars, which are things in matter. I shall reply to you that intellect is one in subject but differs in account. For intellect either acts by itself only, and then it knows only universals; or it acts with sense, using it as an instrument, and then it knows things that are in matter and particular. For just as the same

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straight line is the same in subject but differs in account (for what is now straight may be bent and become curved), so too intellect, while being the same in subject, is analogous sometimes to a straight line, when it acts by itself and knows things that are non-material, and sometimes to a straight line that has been bent, when it is curved round towards sense and uses it as an instrument, and then it knows things in matter too. That is the first problem and its solution. There is a second problem before which we must first take this preliminary assumption, that what is brought from potential to actual must be altered, and the alteration is an affection. This being assumed in advance, the problem then proceeds. If intellect knows things in matter, clearly it is affected by them. It is brought by them from potential cognition to actual cognition, and what is brought from potential to actual is altered, and what is altered is affected. It follows that intellect is affected by things in matter. And since nothing is affected by what is not of the same matter, it clearly follows that intellect is of the same matter as things in matter, and is itself in matter and destructible. For things in matter are destructible. And how can it be destructible according either to Aristotle or to Anaxagoras who say it is unmixed with matter? That is the problem. Resolving it we say that you do ill to take it that everything which acts is also affected. That statement is false. That which acts is affected in turn only when it is of the same matter as the thing affected. Since, then, intellect is not of the same matter as things in matter there is no necessity for it to be affected by the things in matter when it knows them. For the Creator acts when he benefits us, yet he is not affected in turn by us. So those agents only are affected in turn which are of the same matter as the things affected. That solution is provided from outside [Aristotle’s works]. But Aristotle states another solution, which he also gives elsewhere.193 There are two kinds of affection, one perfective and the other destructive. In the case of the one that is destructive, the statement stands firm that what is affected comes to be like the agent. But when intellect knows sense-objects it undergoes a perfective affection which is rather to be called ‘being unaffected’ than ‘affection’. So again intellect is not affected. For things that are perfected by something do not have to be also of the same matter as it. For see! The cosmos is perfected by the Creator, and does not come to be of the same matter as he. Again, things here are arranged and made perfect by the heavenly bodies, and are not of the same matter as they. Again, air is made perfect by light and is not of the same matter as light. So intellect too undergoes from sense-objects that affection which is perfective, and being made perfect by them is not of the same matter as they. It should be noted that even if we say it undergoes an affection which is perfective, it is not the substance of intellect that the

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affection touches, but its activity. That is the second problem and its solution. Since these two problems took their point of departure from things in matter, it is right to raise a problem also about non-material things. Since intellect knows itself and reflects on itself, how does it know Is it by virtue of being intellect, or is it intellect by virtue of one thing and object of intellect by virtue of another? If it is intellect by virtue of one thing and thing thought by virtue of another, clearly it follows that intellect is not simple but composite. It has components insofar as it is intellect and insofar as it is thought. But if, avoiding this absurdity, you say it is thought by virtue of being intellect, you fall into another absurdity. For it is shown in the treatise on Proof194 that ‘that by virtue of which’ converts. So if by virtue of being intellect it is thought, then it is also the case that by virtue of being thought it is intellect, if they are to convert. But if it is by virtue of being thought that it is intellect, we obtain the conclusion that everything that is thought is intellect, and since objects of mathematics are objects of intellect, these too are intellects, which is absurd. But if you say that it does not think itself, you speak falsely. For if it does not think itself, how does it know that it is separated from the body? Such is the whole problem, but because of the lack of clarity, let us go over it again briefly. Since intellect thinks itself, either it is by virtue of being intellect that it thinks itself, and since ‘that by virtue of which’ converts, it will also be intellect by virtue of being thought, so that we conclude that all objects of thought and objects of mathematics are intellects; or else it is intellect by virtue of one thing and thought by virtue of another, and intellect will be composite, which is absurd. He resolves the difficulty by assenting to one of the limbs and saying that everything which is genuinely an object of intellect is intellect. For objects of mathematics are not genuinely objects of intellect, and on that account are not intellects. They are our conception, and we separated them from matter, since they are things in matter. But such things as derive, being objects of intellect, not from us but from within,195 those are intellects. For indeed if you mention angels, these too according to Aristotle are intellects, and if you mention him who patrols the non-planetary sphere, whom he calls ‘the Creator’,196 he too, according to Aristotle, is intellect. But since that God is intellect is the view neither of Plato nor of pious doctrine – for God is in fact superior to intellect, for which reason he is also called ‘Providence’,197 as coming before intellect – come, let us resolve the problem in another way. We say that the conclusion does not follow, that every object of thought is intellect. For first, objects of intellect are either genuinely objects of intellect, such as those things which are altogether nonmaterial, or not genuinely, but in the way in which sense-objects are

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said to be objects of intellect, such as a stone. The present discussion is about things that are genuinely objects of intellect. If that is so, things which are genuinely objects of intellect will be intellect, and nothing absurd will follow. Secondly, what really follows is not that every object of intellect is intellect, but that everything that thinks itself is intellect. For what does the problem say? ‘By virtue of being intellect it is thought.’ [Thought] by what? Clearly by itself. So, please, convert the whole proposition through ‘that by virtue of which’ and say: ‘by virtue of being thought by itself it is intellect.’198 That is the healthy conversion. So if what is concluded from the conversion is not that that which is an object of intellect is intellect but that everything which is an object of intellect to itself is intellect, it is no longer the case that every object of thought is intellect. And Aristotle’s solution does not please us, not only because of [what it implies about] the divine, but because universals are objects of intellect but not intellects. And to say that it is not as intellect that intellect knows itself is absurd. For in the first place, as we said, what is one in form and the same will be twofold, thinker and thing thought; and it will not know all of itself, for it thinks itself inasmuch as it is thought, not inasmuch as it thinks. So it is as intellect that intellect knows itself. That is the third object of enquiry. Fourth object of enquiry. If intellect knows itself, and intellect is always present to itself, why does it not always think itself? For we can see that we human beings rarely reflect on ourselves, but we think either about God or about the cosmos, and rarely about ourselves. But we ought always to think ourselves, since intellect is always present for itself. That is the problem. We say that it is because of mixing with things that are and attending to them that this happens. It is as if two people came along, and one is a friend and the other some famous person; we do not even say ‘hello’ to the friend because we are used to him, but we give our hand to the other. In this way too intellect, knowing that it is always present for itself, rarely thinks itself but often thinks things in the cosmos or above it. It is not by virtue of being intellect, then, that intellect does not always know itself, but this happens because of its activity. For just as in depressions the intellect does not at all know [itself] because of being turned away from itself, so when it is engaged on the business of another, devoting itself to the affairs of the body, it does not know itself; being at that time intellect not in actuality but in potentiality. Plotinus says that there is intellect that always knows itself and intellect that does not always know itself;199 here you can again take that which is actual as always knowing itself and that which is potential as not always. He speaks of it as always knowing because Plato200 speaks of the soul as always in motion. He takes ‘always in motion’ to refer to its making the body always living, but also to its

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making it always cognitive. And intellect, he says, is always cognising, and if we do not also perceive that it is always cognising, that comes about because of the disturbance made by the body. That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

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429b10-11 But since magnitude is one thing and being a magnitude another, and water and being water201 It is said also in the Categories and the Physics that this thing is one thing and [being] this thing another.202 ‘This’ signifies the two together, that which is form with matter, such as water or a magnitude, whereas ‘being this’ signifies the form alone without the matter, such as being water, being a magnitude.203 In the case of things that are in matter there is this [double] way of signifying, but in the case of things that are non-material, this and [being] this are the same, for in the case of God or a mathematical point or the like the same thing is signified by the two case-inflections. Aristotle’s entire meaning, then, is this. Does intellect know those things for which there is a difference between ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’, that is, things in matter? Or does it know only those things for which ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ are the same, that is, things that are non-material? So ‘magnitude’ means the two together, ‘being a magnitude’ the form alone, and ‘water’ means the two together, ‘being water’ the form alone.

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429b12-13 For in some cases they are the same being flesh and flesh204 He uses an inappropriate example. For in the case of flesh, ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ do not mean the same: this is the case only with objects of intellect. But in the case of things in matter, as we said, the accusative205 signifies one thing and the dative another. If flesh, then, is one of the things that are in matter, there is a divergence in the things signified by the accusative and the dative. He does this being, from the loftiness of his genius, contemptuous of examples, as is often his custom.

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429b13 It discerns either with something else or with the same thing otherwise disposed He is still raising the problem, and this should be joined on to what is above. Above he raised the problem whether intellect knows things in matter at all. Now, as though agreeing by his silence that it knows things in matter, he raises the problem whether perhaps it thinks things in matter with one part of itself and things that are nonmaterial with another. This thing he says, then, ‘it discerns now with

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one thing and now with another’,206 is in place of ‘objects of intellect with one part of itself and things in matter with another’. Plutarch and Alexander want what is non-material to be known by what is non-material and what is in matter by what is in matter. But Aristotle says that both of them, both things in matter and non-material things, are known by the same intellect, but now disposed one way and now another, now using the body as an instrument, in the case of things in matter, and now not, in the case of things that are non-material and objects of intellect. 429b13-14 For flesh is not without matter, but like snubnosed is this in this

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This passage is a plea for the opposite doctrine or the problem just raised. For having raised a problem in saying that perhaps the intellect thinks things in matter with one part of itself and nonmaterial things with another, he pleads in these words for the problem and says it is right that it should think things in matter with one part and non-material things with another. For flesh is not without matter; it is a thing in matter. For just as snubnosedness is ‘this in this’207 – in place of ‘form in matter’ – so too flesh is form in matter. So it is reasonable that the intellect should not think things in matter and non-material things with the same part. 429b14-16 With that which perceives, then, it discerns hot and cold and the things of which flesh is a certain ratio

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Here Plutarch and Alexander obtain the assurance: ‘Look! He himself says that things in matter are known by that which is in matter. He says it is by that which perceives that hot is known.’ So what do we say? That he is not saying this [as his real view] but pleading for the problem, and then here he introduces the true solution. He says that intellect uses the instrumentality of sense in discerning things in matter, that is, hot and cold. Then, since he has mentioned hot and cold, but flesh does not discern only these but also as many other things as enter into its commensurability, such as dry, wet, soft and as many others as are similar, but he could not mention them all in the text or it would make it too long, because of this he briefly signifies the rest by putting in ‘and the things of which flesh is a certain ratio’ that is, of which the account of flesh or its definition consists. Intellect, then, using the instrumentality of sense discerns cold and hot and the other things of which the definition of flesh consists. And Aristotle is of this opinion [as is clear] first from his resolving the third problem which says that if that which is an object of intellect is intellect then a stone too, being an object of intellect, is intellect.

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For he says there that objects of intellect are either genuinely objects of intellect or non genuinely, like sense-objects. So he says that sense-objects are objects of intellect, even not genuinely. If that is so, clearly he is of the opinion that they are thought by intellect. And we can obtain assurance from something else. It is he who says208 that just as objects of mathematics are separated in account, so also intellect differs from itself in account. If it differs from itself in account, it is clear that this is why it differs, that it may know things in matter and non-material things. For if it knew only non-material things, what need of difference?

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429b16-18 But with something else, either something separable or [something related to it] as a crooked line to itself when straightened out, it discerns being flesh This gobbet again proceeds interrogatively and takes its question from a division. The meaning is this. Since the intellect discerns things in matter with one thing and non-material things with another, are these parts of the intellect by which it discerns things in matter and non-material things separate from one another? Or are they like a line that is the same in subject but different in account? For it is one thing to be a straight line and another to be crooked. That is the aim. But we must take it interrogatively and paraphrase the text as being phrased with the words out of order.209 ‘With something else it discerns being flesh’ – in place of ‘with another part it discerns non-material things’. Then, with the words coming out of order, ‘with something else that either is separate from the other part that discerns things in matter, or, like the crooked line, is one intellect in subject but different in account’.

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429b18-19 And again in the case of abstract things, straight is like snubnosed, for it is with continuum He comes to his other example, objects of mathematics. What does he say? That like snubnosed, straight too must be in continuity as subject (for it is in some continuous body) but still we separate these things in account from continuity and say that in their case the essence is one thing, that is, the abstract form, and the matter another, the continuity. He shows by saying ‘being straight ’.210 So just as in these cases we separate the form and matter in account, so too intellect differs from itself in account. And he pleads now that objects of mathematics are things in matter. For the continuous, as he says, is the matter of shape, and shapes themselves are form. So objects of mathematics are things in matter.

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429b19-20 But [sc. it discerns] the essence, if being straight is something other than straight, with something else.211 20

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If, he says the essence, that is, the form, of objects of mathematics (for ‘essence’ signifies form) makes straight other ,212 that is, [if] ‘this’ is other than ‘[being] this’, then that [it] is something else. ‘With something else’ is in place of ‘then intellect discerns objects of mathematics with another part of itself, and not with the part which which it discerns nonmaterial things’. For if ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ are different, clearly they are things in matter. And we should note what Plutarch notes in his commentary, that Aristotle says that objects of mathematics have a subject. The gobbet, then, is: if the essence, that is, the form, keeps being straight, the ‘[being] this’, other than the straight, that is, the ‘this’, clearly they are in matter. And if they are in matter, the intellect discerns them with another part of itself, not that with which it discerns non-material things. 429b20 Let it be duality To what does this relate? To the forms in continuity. For abstract things reveal only one thing, the form, but things that are not abstract reveal two, the form together with the matter. And he rightly calls these things ‘two’ since they are in matter and admit of division like two. For abstract things are indivisible and like a unit. And indeed the bent line in being two reveals something of being in matter. So objects of mathematics also are of two sorts, in respect of their form, which we indicate when we say ‘being straight’ and in respect of form and matter, which we signify when we say ‘straight’. 429b20-1 So it discerns them either with something different or with something differently disposed213

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The conclusion, that necessarily it discerns things in matter and non-material things either with something different or with the same thing differently disposed. Then, giving the solution to the whole problem, he says: ‘So in general, in the way in which things are separable from matter, so it is also concerning the intellect’ [429b212]. That is, putting it as briefly as possible, just as forms are separated from matter only in conception and account, not in their actual subsistence, so also intellect is always inseparable from itself, being always the same in subject, but in conception and account is separated correspondingly to the things known.

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429b22-3 But someone might raise the problem, if the intellect is simple and unaffected [and has nothing in common with anything, as Anaxagoras says, how it will think, if to think is to be affected in some way] Here is the second problem, which says that if intellect knows sense-objects it will be affected by them. But nothing is affected by them if it is not of the same matter as they. This is signified when he puts into the text ‘for it is insofar as something is common to both that one acts and the other is affected’ [429b25-6] – in place of ‘[and] by virtue of what is common, that is, by virtue of the matter, [the other] is affected’. So if the intellect knows them, it is also affected by them. And if it is affected by them, it is of the same matter as they. But if it is of the same matter as sense-objects, intellect is no longer simple, but composite. So the argument is formulated analytically.

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429b26 And further, is it itself too an object of intellect? Before giving the solution of the second problem he here puts forward the third problem, and says that the intellect itself too is ([‘is’] in place of ‘is present as’) an object of intellect, how does it think itself? And as to the first he says that if it is in virtue of being intellect that it knows itself, there will be intellect in all objects of intellect, even in a stone, therefore, and a stone will be intellect. For it converts. He hints at this in the text where he says ‘either intellect will be present in the other things’ [429b27] (in place of ‘intellect will be present in the other objects of intellect’), so that all objects of intellect will be intellect. Then, before stating the other absurdity – that if it is not in virtue of being intellect that it knows [itself], it will be twofold, thinker and thing thought, and it will not know itself entirely, for it will not know itself as thinker – before this he introduces the solution of the second problem, saying that the object of intellect is one not in number but in form.214 There is what is genuinely and what is not genuinely an object of intellect, and what is genuinely an object of intellect is intellect. Then he introduces the other absurdity in the second215 problem, that if it does not know [itself] in virtue of being intellect, it will be twofold, so as to be both object of intellect and thinker. He brings that out, saying ‘it will have something mixed in, which makes it an object of intellect like the others’, in place of ‘it will have some sort of composition, which composition makes it intellect by virtue of one thing and object of intellect by virtue of another, like the other objects of intellect’. He does not say this because the other objects of intellect are composite (for all objects of intellect are simple), but intellect, he says, will have something that makes it an

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object of intellect as it makes the other non-material things objects of intellect. 429b29-30 A distinction has been drawn earlier about being affected in virtue of something common 15

Here he resolves the two problems, and first the second which concludes that intellect is of the same matter as sense-objects, saying that the name ‘affection’ is common [to more things than one]. There is perfective [affection] and there is destructive. So the affection that intellect undergoes is perfective, and the perfective is not properly called ‘affection’.

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Having said that intellect will be the objects of intellect, even a stone, and having said above that there are two kinds of object of intellect, that which is genuinely so and that which is not, now he says that intellect is in potentiality the objects of intellect that are genuinely so, and when it thinks them it is actually they. For intellect, he says, does not have the objects of intellect if it does not think them; it is like a writing tablet on which nothing is written. Iamblichus says: ‘And see that he says “writing tablet” and not “sheet of papyrus”. For it is not called a “writing tablet” if it does not have written letters on it. He says this meaning that the souls of children, which are potential intellect, have the accounts of things. So if he likens it to a writing tablet clearly it has accounts of things, just as the writing tablet has written letters. If he calls it “on which nothing is written”, it is in place of “ill written” because it has faint, non-evident written letters, as also we say of a tragic actor with a bad voice “He has no voice”. So Aristotle too (says he), like Plato, is of the opinion that objects of intellect are in the soul, and accounts of all things, and that there is recollection, not learning.’ He says this to show that Aristotle too is of the same opinion as he.216 430a2-3 And it is itself an object of intellect as are the objects of intellect217

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should be thinker and thing thought. For that which is genuinely an object of intellect, which he calls ‘what is known’, and what is genuinely intellect, which he calls ‘knowledge’, are the same. ‘Genuinely’ is added, because objects of mathematics are not genuinely objects of intellect. They are called ‘objects of intellect’ at all [only] because representations of them are formed by us and they depend on our conception.

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430a5 But the cause of its not thinking always should be investigated Here is the fourth point of difficulty, why intellect does not think always. He raises the difficulty but he does not solve it (but we have solved it already [528,11-24]), but goes back again after this to the solution of the problem which said that the objects of intellect will be intellect. Having said that in the case of things that are genuinely objects of intellect, that is true, he now says that in the case of those things that are in matter, which are potentially and not genuinely objects of intellect, object of intellect and intellect are not the same. For intellect is a non-material thing. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 3] 430a10-12 Since just as219 in all nature there is something which is matter for each kind (and this is what is all those things potentially), and something else that is cause and maker by making all things [as happens with skill in relation to material, it is necessary that these differences should be present in the soul too] After enquiring after four things in the case of potential intellect he then comes to actual intellect as well, and enquires into ten things concerning it. First, that intellect makes all things. Second, that it acts by its substance; for it is not in the way other substances put forth activities, it is not so with actual intellect. For the substance of actual intellect does not put forth its activity, but straight off its very substance is activity, and the substance of actual intellect is nothing else apart from its activity. Thirdly, he says, it belongs to actual intellect to think always and act and never leave off from acting. Fourth, that it is psychical.220 Fifth, that it is immortal. Sixth, that it is separable. Seventh, that it is like a disposition and light; for just as light does not itself make colours, but it makes evident colours that are already there, so also actual intellect does not make things, but imprints things that already are and engraves them on potential

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intellect. Eighth, that potential intellect differs from actual in time and not in subject. Ninth, that intellect forgets. Tenth, that it always acts with imagination. The text says that these ten points belong to actual intellect, and it says nothing else; but the interpreters have taken many different lines, some understanding actual intellect one way and some another.221 Alexander calls ‘actual intellect’ the one source of all things, the Intellect from outside. Marinus says that actual intellect is not the one source of all things but some supernatural222 or angelic being. But in a word, at least, he says that actual intellect is neither ours nor that of the one source of all things. Plotinus thinks that actual intellect is human intellect, which comprises what is always acting and what sometimes acts.223 For Plotinus goes astray from Plato; hearing from him that soul is always in motion, he thinks he calls it this because it always thinks, and on this account he believes that there is an intellect that is always thinking. So Plotinus says that what he calls ‘actual intellect’ is human intellect that thinks always. Plutarch, however, and this is our position too, does not think that intellect in us is twofold but simple, and this simple intellect, he says, is not always thinking but thinks sometimes. Plutarch, then, believes that by ‘actual intellect’ he means human intellect, which he also believes to think sometimes. That is how many opinions have arisen about actual intellect. They are four in number, those of Alexander, Marinus, Plotinus and Plutarch, and each of them has something to plead in its favour. So it is right to set out the pleas for each opinion. Alexander says that actual intellect is the First Cause.224 He goes astray from hearing him [Aristotle] say that it makes all things. Who is it that makes all things, if not the First Cause? So if Aristotle says that actual intellect makes all things, clearly by ‘actual intellect’ he means the First Cause. And again, because he says that actual intellect has its activity concurrent with its substance, which is peculiar only to God – for our intellect plainly brings about its activity through a power. And again because it always acts. Alexander’s error starts here and he says that these things fit no one but God alone. It is a peculiarity of God alone to have activity concurrent with substance and to act always. Plotinus was misled by its always acting and supposed an intellect in us that is always acting and calls this ‘actual intellect’. Marinus used the arguments of both and said that it is a supernatural intellect that Aristotle calls ‘actual intellect’. It is not human because he says it thinks all things and acts by its substance and thinks always. But neither is it the Intellect from outside. For if he says that it is analogous to light and a disposition and that it acts with imagination and forgets, these things do not belong to the Intellect from outside. His saying it is analogous to light and a

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disposition shows that these things are proper to an intellect that is between Intellect from outside and human intellect, a sort of angelic intellect. For light is intermediate betweeen that which illuminates and that which is illuminated, and a disposition is intermediate between suitability and having to hand. He likens the intellect to these, so clearly he is speaking of a kind of intellect intermediate betweeen the human and that which is from outside. But Plutarch pleads that the treatise is about the soul and Aristotle has no business now to discuss the Intellect which is from outside. It is human intellect that he calls ‘actual intellect’, because that is what the treatise he has undertaken is about. An attack, then, common to three of them, I mean Alexander, Marinus and Plotinus, arises from the text. For we find Aristotle saying that actual intellect is the same in subject but different in time in being potential and actual. For having formerly been in potentiality it comes later to be in actuality. If Aristotle, then, says this in the text, clearly by ‘actual intellect’ he does not mean God, as Alexander thinks. For God is not formerly in potentiality but always in actuality, being the spring of goodness. And neither is a supernatural or angelic intellect formerly in potentiality – for Aristotle wants these intellects to be actual. So Marinus too speaks ill. But there is something contrary to Plotinus as well. For according to him it acts always, and if so, it was not formerly in potentiality. But Aristotle says it was formerly in potentiality. It has clearly emerged, then, through this that he is not referring either to God or to an intellect that is supernatural or angelic, or to any intellect that acts always, but the discussion is about the intellect that is in us. That is the first attack. The second is this. Why does Aristotle say that intellect alone is immortal and eternal? For he says this too: ‘It alone is immortal and eternal’ [430a23]. For if we are thinking of the First Cause, it is not the case that it alone is immortal (for there are other things that are immortal), and again if we are thinking of that which is angelic or supernatural it is not the case that it alone is immortal (for the First Cause is immortal too); and again if we are thinking of the intellect which according to Plotinus is always thinking, neither is that alone immortal. For there are also other things that are immortal, such as intellects that think sometimes. For it is not only intellects which think always that are immortal; so, according to Plotinus, are intellects which think sometimes. So this too is a common attack on them, that they cannot find what intellect it is of which he says that it alone is immortal. But those who say that the human intellect thinks sometimes, and this is the only intellect there is, and we do not have another, are able to make a defence and say this: that there are many things that go to make up a human being, and of these intellect alone is immortal and

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eternal. We must reason that ‘alone’ is said relatively to the things that go to make up the human being. But Plotinus cannot give this defence. He supposes two intellects, that which thinks always and that which thinks sometimes. Which, then, can he call ‘alone immortal’? If that which thinks always, he speaks falsely. For that which think sometimes is immortal too. And if he says that that which thinks sometimes is immortal, so, according to him, is that which thinks always. So Plotinus is not able to say how we can call intellect ‘alone immortal’. He does well to add that intellect is ‘immortal and eternal’. For the non-rational soul also and the vegetative soul are immortal, but they are not eternal. For they bring along life, and nothing receives the contrary of what it brings along, so it follows that if they have life they are also immortal.225 They are not, however, eternal. A thing is called ‘eternal’ for being always in existence, but ‘immortal’ for being always living. So intellect alone of the things in us is both always in existence and always living; the non-rational soul and the vegetative are always alive but not always in existence. So this too belongs to the human intellect. These attacks apply commonly to all three. Against Alexander and Marinus we have this to say, that in the text he calls intellect ‘separable’, not ‘separated’. The First Cause, which Alexander says, and the supernatural, which Marinus says, is actual intellect, are separated, not separable. ‘Separable’ signifies ‘not yet separated, but capable of being separated’. They are already separated, both the First Cause and the supernatural or angelic intellect, not only in account but also in substance, that is, in subject. So we have an attack from the text that it says that actual intellect is separable and not separated. And there is another attack from his calling the actual intellect ‘psychical’.226 For neither is the First Cause psychical, O Alexander, neither is a supernatural being, O Marinus. So we cannot think that actual intellect is either a supernatural being or the First Cause, but only that intellect in us which sometimes acts, the human one. And also because he says in the text that it acts with imagination. Neither the First Cause nor any supernatural being acts with imagination, but only the intellect that is in us. That is a common attack on Alexander and Marinus. Against Alexander on his own we may say this. How can we think that by ‘actual intellect’ he means the First Cause, if he likens it to light and to a disposition? The First Cause is a substance, not a disposition, and brings forth227 substances, and is analogous not at all to light but to the Sun itself. So this too fits that intellect which is present in us. And again Aristotle says that just as light does not make colours, but makes plain colours that are already there, so too intellect seems to

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make all things by making them plain. But it is absurd to say this of the First Cause. The First Cause produces the very substance of things that are, and there is nothing that it has not made. And again, O Alexander, he calls it a ‘disposition’, and a disposition is that which is in potentiality in the second way.228 The First Cause is not in potentiality in any way. Again, Aristotle says of it that it is the same in subject but different in time in being potential and actual. The First Cause in no way has anything prior to itself either in potentiality or in actuality. Besides, he says that intellect forgets. How can that belong to Intellect from outside? It is the intellect in us that forgets through being impeded by its relation to the body. All the things, then, which Aristotle says fit actual intellect [show that229] his discussion is about the human intellect that is brought from potentiality to actuality. This will be demonstrated if we show that the things which seem not to belong to it, I mean making all things, acting by its substance and thinking always, do belong to it. It should be known, then, that actual intellect is said to make all things because it inscribes the imprints of all things in potential intellect. That is why Plato too likens it to a painter230 and Aristotle straight off proposes that it is a painter. For if potential intellect becomes all things, actual intellect makes all things. So this can belong to the human intellect. For it is not Intellect from outside that inscribes all things in potential intellect, but actual intellect in us. And the other gobbet fits it too, the one saying it acts by its substance. To understand this we must first go back a little. The knower is neither the soul alone nor knowledge alone but a mixture of both. The knower consists of soul and knowledge. And soul is analogous to matter, knowledge to form. And since, as we have come to know in the Physics,231 the form of everything is substance more than the matter, knowledge is the substance of the knower, and the knower acts by virtue of knowledge, which has been shown to be the knower’s substance. It follows, then, that it is by virtue of this that it is said to act by its substance, because knowledge is the substance of the knower. It is not by virtue of that lofty and exalted speculation that, as with God, its substance is the same as its activity – for with souls and other substances apart from the First Cause there is substance and power and activity. It is said to act by its substance because knowledge is said to be, as it were, the substance of soul. He gives intellect its name, then, from what is better. For since intellect acts by its activity, and it acts when it is in actuality, and in all things what is actuality and substance is better, for this reason, meaning to say that it acts by its activity he says it does so by its substance, that being what is better.232 In the same way we often indicate the whole by one [part] which is superior, as in ‘O Teucer, dear head’.233 This too, then, fits the actual intellect of the human being. For it thinks

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when it is in actuality. But intellect from outside is activity straight off. That he is using ‘substance’ because of its superiority is clear from his saying: ‘That this is so is clear. For the agent is superior to the patient and the source to the matter.’234 So he uses ‘substance’ because it is superior. And the third thing fits it, that intellect always thinks. Not, as Plotinus believes, because the same intellect thinks always throughout everything, for we are not saying that the intellect which is one in number always thinks; but because in the whole cosmos there is always a human intellect thinking. Even if I am not thinking, still, someone else is, and ‘always’ applies by succession, so that God’s irradiation may never cease to shine on us. For if we did not think always, but at times we did not think, it would cease. If this is how we say it always thinks, this belongs to human intellect. That it thinks always we apply not to one intellect in number but to all, just as we say that man lives always, not because of Socrates but because there is some man always living. Or else [we may say] that it is said always to think because it is always capable of thinking. The person who has intellect thinks at whatever hour he wishes. So this belongs to human intellect. For Intellect from outside is the one intellect in number that thinks all things. So much is said to outline the continuous exposition. But it is our task to indicate the ten points in the detailed commentary and fill them out. That is the continuous exposition. 430a10-11 Since just as in all nature there is something which is matter for each kind, and this is what is all those things potentially235

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What does he mean to show by this? That intellect makes all things and is psychical. He thus brings out the statement that just as in the fields of nature and skill there is the potential, which he calls ‘matter’, and the actual, which he calls ‘efficient cause’, so too in the soul, he says, there is potential intellect and actual intellect. And in saying ‘in the soul’ [a13] he shows that it is psychical. In actuality, then, it ‘makes all things’, from which you have it that it makes all things. See, then: two points.236 But why, having said ‘in each nature’,237 does he also say ‘in each kind’? Say that ‘in each nature’ is used in a more universal sense, and ‘in each kind’ in a more particular; so it is like this: just as in each animal (which he calls ‘nature) there is the potential and the actual, so there are these things in each kind, for instance the human kind or the equine, or in this or that.

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430a15-16 [There is intellect that is such by becoming all things, and intellect that is such by making all] like a sort of disposition, such as light. For in a way light too makes potential colours actual colours238 See! Another thing proper to intellect: he makes it analogous to a disposition and to light.239 And rightly, for as light makes colours visible – it does not make them colours, but it puts forth their activity – and as a disposition puts forth activity and not substance, so too the intellect that is in us puts forth activity and not substance. That is why it is analogous to them. And if that is so he is not talking of the divine intellect, for that puts forth substances as well. He makes our intellect analogous to a disposition in another respect too: not because it is a quality, but as a disposition stands to what is in potentiality in the first way240 (for it perfects it), so actual intellect perfects what is potential in intellect. But because he likens it to light Alexander falls into error, because Aristotle says it makes all things as does light. But he ought not to have fallen into error. For Aristotle adds ‘in a way’; God does not make all things in a way; he makes all things in every way. 430a17-18 And this intellect is separable and unmixed and unaffected, being by its substance actual241 See! He states another property242 [of intellect]: it is separable. Why did we not say ‘and unmixed and unaffected’ in the continuous exposition as he says now? Because these things are included in ‘separable’. The separable is also unmixed and unaffected. And in ‘being by its substance actual’ he states another property, that it acts by its substance.243 And that he here speaks according to what is superior is shown by his saying ‘for always the agent is better than the patient’, that is, the actual than the potential. For the agent is the actual, the patient the potential. ‘And the source’ is superior ‘to the matter’ [430a19], by ‘source’ meaning the form. So ‘substance’ is now said because it is superior, not because intellect has substance without power,244 for that applies to the Intellect from outside, not to ours, for that [i.e. ours] has powers. 430a19-20 Knowledge in actuality is the same as the thing [known] He throws in this in the middle: actual intellect is things, as potential intellect is potentially things.

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430a20-1 That which is in potentiality is prior in time in the one [but in all, not even in time] 20

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He states the further property of intellect245 that potential intellect is prior to actual intellect in time. And lest anyone should say that this is false as regards the whole cosmos (for the actual intellect of one person is prior to the potential of another; for it is not the case that in the whole cosmos sometimes intellect acts and sometimes it does does not, but always the actual intellect of one is before the potential of another, and that gives you this other property,246 that it thinks always) – for this reason, then, he says that the potential is prior to the actual in the one human being, not in the whole cosmos. For in the whole cosmos, people say, neither is prior to the other, neither the potential to the actual nor the actual to the potential. For if, according to Aristotle, the universe is eternal, neither is prior to the other, but they are contemporary. And this is like the enquiry raised by the simple, ‘which is first, the egg or the bird?’ He hints at this in saying ‘but in all, not even in time’ [a21], instead of ‘in the whole cosmos’ – and ‘in all’ in place of ‘on a holistic and cosmic view’ – ‘the potential does not precede the actual in time’. 430a22-3 And when separated, only this is what it is He throws in this in the middle too, that when intellect is separated and comes to be actual, then it comes to be what it is, that is, genuinely intellect. For the potential is not genuinely intellect.

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430a23 And this alone is immortal and eternal Look! Again he states another property:247 intellect is immortal and eternal. By ‘this alone’ he means [alone] of the constituents of the human being. For only this is eternal and immortal. For the nonrational and the vegetative soul, as has been said, is immortal but not eternal. It is called ‘immortal’ even if he is of the opinion that it is destructible, since it is not by virtue of being soul that it is destroyed but by virtue of being in a body. For that reason Plato too says that all soul is immortal, saying this of the vegetative soul and nonrational soul too. Matter, in contrast, is eternal but not immortal. That is why intellect is said to be imperishable248 as it is also said to be eternal and immortal. And observe that he is not saying this about the Intellect from outside. For ‘this alone’, being neuter, is construed with the earlier words that intellect is a ‘part of soul’;249 this part of the soul is immortal and eternal, whereas the Intellect from outside is not a part.

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430a23-5 But we do not remember, because this is unaffected, and the passive intellect is destructible See! He states this other property,250 that intellect forgets. Plutarch says that this is said in answer to the problem which asks ‘Why does intellect not always think, if it has within it that which is cognitive?251 Solving this, he says that the cause of this is its acting with imagination, and when that is destroyed it can no longer act through it or through itself. And people raise the difficulty: ‘Yes! Intellect forgets those things it has enquired after in the other [ante mortem] life, the particular things concerning which imagination has acted with it, because that is destroyed. But why does intellect not remember those things of which it itself retains the imprint from imagination and about which it has acted on its own? For we know that Aristotle himself believes that there are activities intellect has without imagination, for example reflection upon itself, consideration of incorporeal things, reflection upon the divine, cognition of universals – and in general all that it thinks apart from sense it thinks also apart from imagination.’ To this it may be replied that if in a disease affecting part of them people are distraught and forget the recent past as Thucydides says in his History, ‘they did not know themselves’,252 how much the more in a change affecting the whole of their life will they not forget what went before? From here you may take three253 doctrines. He is of the opinion that imagination is destructible, for see, he says that passive intellect is destructible. Another doctrine is that he calls that intellect which he says does not remember ‘unaffected’; so he says that the intellect which is in us is unaffected – for Intellect from outside is not said to forget.

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430a25 And without this, it thinks nothing He states the further property254 that without imagination intellect does not act. Observe that the statement is in need of explanation. For it does not always act with imagination, unless you should say that it is [always] when it is occupied with particulars. Or say also this other thing, that non-imaginative activities are few. For even when it acts concerning divine things, imagination runs out beside it, making an imprint of things for which there can be no imprints, and on that account Plato says it is the final evil.255 So if on the whole it acts with imagination, say that now he uses ‘always’ in place of ‘on the whole’. Or say this other thing too. Intellect does always act with imagination. For if sense is the start of all knowledge, and where sense is missing imagination is missing too, and if imagination, then thinking (which is why people blind from birth neither imagine nor

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think concerning colours), it clearly follows that separately from imagination intellect does not act. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture. [LECTURE 4] 20

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430a26-7 Thinking indivisible256 things is where there is no falsehood After potential intellect containing four points and actual intellect containing the ten points we have stated, he comes next to objects of intellect. And it should be known that in the case of the rational soul one should start from the intellect because that is clearer than the objects of intellect, whereas in the case of the non-rational soul one should start from sense-objects because they are clearer. For everywhere in teaching it is good to make one’s start from what is clearer. So having taught about intellect, he comes to the objects of intellect. He says that the object of intellect is indivisible. But do not think from this that he means intellect knows only indivisible things. It knows both indivisible and divided things, but it knows the divided in an indivisible and pointlike way. For the central point also contains the circle seminally. Intellect, then, knows all things in an indivisible way. For this is proper to intellect, to collect together and unite divided things and think them indivisibly. And that it knows even divided things indivisibly is shown by his saying in the treatise on Proof257 that that by which terms are known is not merely knowledge but the source of knowledge, using ‘source of knowledge’ for intellect and ‘knowledge’ for thought. And see! He says that intellect knows things termwise and indivisibly.258 But since the discussion is of that which is indivisible, it should be known that ‘indivisible’ is used in five ways.259 A term is called ‘indivisible’. For we know that a proposition has two terms, the subject and the predicate, for instance ‘Plato walks’ is a proposition, ‘Plato’ is a term and ‘walks’ is a term and, to put it simply, a term is, as we learn in the de Interpretatione,260 a simple spoken sound. That is the first thing signified by ‘indivisible’, a term. A second thing signified is a continuous magnitude. This is divided potentially but actually undivided. A third thing signified is that in quantity which is without parts, such as a point, a unit, a now. These are the indivisibles in quantity. A fourth thing signified by ‘indivisible’ is a form in matter. It is not this that is divided but its subject. The fifth thing signified is a non-material form. These are the five things signified by ‘indivisible’. There are two difficulties we can raise from this. One is how he can contradistinguish the other four indivisibles from a term, seeing that

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the other four are terms too. For each of them is a simple word, and therefore a term. It is not a proposition to say ‘continuous magnitude’, neither, again, is it a proposition to say ‘non-material form’.261 For each of these is one term only, and a proposition does not arise from one term only. If that is so, how can he contradistinguish them from a term, seeing that they are terms too? That is the first problem. To it we reply that it is one thing to say simply ‘term’ and another to say ‘term of a certain sort’. The first thing signified by ‘indivisible’ intimates simply a term, and the other four, terms of particular sorts. So it is not unreasonable but with good reason that he contradistinguishes what is simply a term from what is a term of a certain sort. That is the solution. The second problem people raise goes like this. Why does he contradistinguish a form in matter from a magnitude? For a magnitude is itself a form in matter. For this thing, magnitude, is the first form that comes along before all other forms to formless matter: first it is made quantitative and then after that it is made qualitative. If, therefore, magnitude is a form in matter, why does he contradistinguish it from form in matter, seeing that magnitude is subsumed under form in matter? That is the problem. To it we reply that he does not contradistinguish every form in matter from magnitude, but that [only] which comes upon matter after it has been given magnitude. For matter when it has received the form of magnitude remains [an object only] for conception, but when it has received the other forms it becomes a sense-object. So he contradistinguishes actual form from form in conception, that is, from the form of magnitude. For this, when it has come to matter, delivers it to conception; for it is not possible to see matter that has been given magnitude all by itself without any other form, except by conception alone. So magnitude may be a form in matter; but then he contradistinguishes it not from every form in matter, as I have just said, but from that which is actual and reveals matter as a sense-object. So these five things signified by ‘indivisible’ can be brought under a kind of division. The division is this. A term is either simply a term or a term of a certain sort. If it is simply a term it makes one thing signified by ‘indivisible’: a term. If it is a term of a certain sort, it is either potentially divided into parts but actually without parts or .262 If it is potentially in parts but actually without parts, either it is of itself in parts or incidentally. If it is of itself in parts, it makes continuous magnitude. If it is incidentally in parts it makes form in matter. That, then, is how it is if it is potentially in parts but actually without parts. If, however, it is both potentially and actually without parts, either it is with matter, and makes the indivisible in quantity, such as a unit, a point, a now; or it is non-material and makes a non-material form.

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Since, then, we have learnt from the division that there are five things signified by ‘indivisible’, let us next see how intellect thinks each of them. It should be known that it, a thing without parts, thinks a term which is without parts as a simple spoken sound, and so neither as false nor as true. For truth and falsity are not to be seen in connection with simple spoken sounds, but in connection with composites. And why, I ask, in the text does he mention only falsehood and not also truth? For he says that thinking in the case of indivisibles is about things where there is no falsehood, and does not add ‘and where there is no truth’. We have come to know in the de Interpretatione263 that not only falsehood but also truth is absent from simple spoken sounds. So why in the text does he mention only falsehood? We reply that his opinion in the Metaphysics is contrary to his opinion in the de Interpretatione. In the de Interpretatione he says that neither truth nor falsehood is to be seen in connection with simple spoken sounds, that is, in terms; it is in propositions that he says the true and falsehood appear. But in the Metaphysics264 he says that in simple words, that is, in terms, falsehood is not to be seen, but truth is to be seen. For when intellect with a simple intuition intuits each simple spoken sound, that is to say, each term, and thinks it on its own and of itself, adding nothing else, it thinks truly. For instance in saying ‘walks’ forthwith intellect thinks walking, itself alone, not adding anything else. Again, in ‘to eat’ it immediately thinks chewing, that is, the teeth moving up and down, without any addition. That is what he says in the Metaphysics. And now he follows that treatise and for that reason does not deny truth to simple words, but only falsehood; because intellect never runs into falsehood but always attains truth, according to the saying of Plotinus, ‘either intellect makes contact or it does not, so it is inerrant’.265 But it should be known that there are two kinds of truth, substantive and that which is contradistinguished from falsehood. An example of substantive is when I say ‘This is genuinely a man’: I say this in contrast to a man in a painting, for the latter is not genuinely a man. So simply because he really exists he is said to be truly a man. In a term too, therefore, we say that there is substantive truth because inasmuch as it is a term, it is true that it is, and we do not say this by way of contradistinction from the false. Having said this about intellect, that it knows terms truly, he turns to thought, and says that it not only attains truth but also runs into falsehood. And another thing: the form in which intellect knows all things is as being each one, whereas thought knows things as being composite, which is not the same. For intellect knows a thing as continuous and one, whereas thought knows a thing as composed of many things, like a door, for that is composed of many pieces of wood.

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Thought is like Empedoclean Friendship, which brings together things divided by Strife. And indeed it is said in Empedocles that if there were not Friendship, ‘many neckless heads would have grown’266 – that is, there would have arisen heads without necks if there were not Friendship to join them together. A third property of thought which he states in addition to these is that it runs into falsehood either through the predicate or through the tense.267 For if I say that man is winged, or will be or was, the proposition is false because of the predicate term, I mean ‘winged’. But if I say that the Trojan War was yesterday, then the proposition is false because of the tense.268 In the case of eternal things, falsehood comes only from the predicate, not from the tense as well. For if I say that God was or is or will be I always speak truly, for I speak of what always is. But in the case of things that are not eternal, propositions come to be false both from the tense and from the predicate. From the predicate, as when I say a goat-stag now exists. The falsehood arises not from ‘now’, the tense, but from ‘exists’, the predicate. And again, if I say ‘A shadow is now a body’ the falsehood comes not from ‘now’ (for not only is it not now a body but it was not and will not be either), but from saying it is a body. So in the case of things that come to be, falsehood arises in thought in two ways, either from the predicate or from the tense, whereas in the case of eternal things it comes only from the predicate. But none of these things belongs to intellect. For it thinks all things always and has no falsehood either from the predicate or from the tense. He states a fourth property of thought in addition to these, that it is occupied with propositions, whereas intellect is occupied with terms. And when I say ‘propositions’, do not think I say this in the way stated in the Logic,269 that it is occupied with assertion as composition, since assertion puts together the subject with the predicate, and with denial as division, since denial denies the predicate of the subject and divides it from it. Man, it says, is not white. For now we say that thought is occupied both with assertion as division and composition and with denial as division and composition. For assertion, insofar as it joins together, is called ‘composition’, but insofar as it consists in two things that can be taken apart, it is division. And denial, even if it says ‘Socrates is not pale’, joins dark to him and is again composition, but it is also division inasmuch as it separates pale from him. That is how thought is now said to be concerned with propositions. Having said these things by way of an excursus, since he has said how intellect thinks terms, he next enquires how it thinks undivided magnitudes, which were the second thing signified by ‘indivisible’. These are threefold, for magnitude is threefold. It is a whole, and has parts, and is composite. Intellect thinks it as a whole atemporally and

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at a now. For it is not possible for intellect to think it in a time. For every time is divisible. If it thinks it, then, in something divisible, the thing thought too, the magnitude, will be divisible; for as it is with the time, so it is with the magnitude. But it is actually undivided. For it thinks it as a whole, and a whole is undivided. It thinks it, then, not in a time but at a now. And also because if it did not know them270 atemporally and at a now, it would no longer think the whole in the same time, and it would be found that at some time it does not know it.271 But thought gets to know it in a time. But intellect also thinks the magnitude as a thing which has parts, thinking the different parts at different nows, and thinking each part actually at a now. But as a composite thing it is no longer thought by intellect but by thought. So a magnitude is thought in these three ways, as a whole, as something that has parts, and as a composite; and in two of them intellect thinks it, as a whole and as something that has parts, but as a composite is it thought by thought. But intellect knows the form in matter no longer of itself but through imagination as an intermediary. For intellect cannot think sense-objects of itself; it has need of imagination. So it thinks them through imagination as an intermediary. But it is not the case that, because intellect thinks through imagination as an intermediary, it therefore also thinks in parts. For even in imagination there is something indivisible. That this is true is clear from the fact that the first imprints are not made to disappear by the later: it is clear from this that there is something without parts in it. And it is in virtue of this thing without parts that intellect thinks. So again it thinks in a partless way. Again, intellect thinks that which is partless in quantity by denial. For just as we think darkness by denial of light, so also by denial of number we think the unit, by denial of time the now, and by denial of magnitude the point. So it is by denial that we think that which is partless in quantity. But if anyone says that black also is known by denial of white he speaks falsely. For both are made to have form and both act, the one compacting, the other forcing apart, and of themselves both are known positively. Unless you use ‘black’ in place of ‘dark’, as in ‘black death’.272 These things are known by our intellect negatively; but the Divine Intellect knows all things positively and intuitively, apart from evil. That, it does not know. Otherwise it would make it. For whatever it knows, it also makes. Its cognition is subsistence-giving. That is why it is said ‘He said, and it came to be’.273 But this saying may be interpreted in two ways: what he knows and says, this also comes about;274 or because his activity is all at once, and that is why it is said, ‘He said, and it came to be’. And there is a corollary you can

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derive from this. If he [Aristotle] says that intellect acts negatively, he cannot be speaking about the Divine Intellect. That is how intellect in us knows what is partless in quantity. Non-material forms it knows in the following five respects. Either as cause, and that either as efficient or as perfective275 – for it does not know it only as final cause, as some people think. And it knows it as having nothing contrary to it (for it may be contrary in some way to our good and to the light in us, but in itself it is not).276 And it knows it as thinker and thing thought. For having that which is divine within, that which is cognitive also thinks itself. That having been said, that, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition.

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430a28 [But in things in which there is false and true, there is some composition of thoughts] as though being one [– just as Empedocles said ‘whence in many cases sprouted neckless heads’ that were then put together by Friendship] See what he is saying: that intellect knows truth only, and where there is falsity and truth, that belongs to thought. And where there is composition, again that belongs to thought. And see: he has already stated the [first] two properties of thought. And thought thinks this composition, he says, as one thing. He does well to say ‘as though’. For it does not know the composition as something genuinely one, for to know what is genuinely one belongs to intellect, but thought knows it as one by juxtaposition. That is why it has something in common with Empedocles’ Friendship, in that it unites by juxtaposition and not genuinely.

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430a31 [So these separated things too are put together] for instance incommensurable and diagonal What does he want to say? That it is also from the predicate that thought attains truth and runs into falsehood. If it says that the diagonal is commensurable it speaks falsely on account of the predicate, for it is always incommensurable with the side. 277 it speaks truly because of the predicate.

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430a31-b1 And if they are things that have been or will be, it thinks the tense in addition and adds it What does he intend to say by this? That it is also through tense being well or ill added that truth and falsity arise in things. If you say ‘The Trojan War will take place’ you speak falsely because of the future

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tense; but if you say ‘it took place’ you speak truly because of the past tense. Truth and falsity, he says, are ‘always in a composition’ [430b2], not in simple things. For if you say that the pale thing Socrates278 is not pale, you speak falsely, and if you say that what is not pale is pale you speak falsely because the composition does not fit.279 And see that he calls both the assertion and the denial ‘composition’. It is also possible, he says [430b3], to call both ‘division’, because they consist of things that are different, and it is possible to divide them into the terms out of which they were put together. He does well to say ‘it is possible’ [b3]. For, if you care about the logical sequence, it is possible to call assertion ‘division’ because it is divided clearly into subject and predicate, and to call denial ‘composition’ because it is composed of subject and predicate.280 And that is how he speaks here, but in his Logic he calls only assertion ‘composition’ and denial ‘division’. 430b5 [But in any case what is false or true is not only that Cleon is white,] but also that he was or will be281

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What is he saying? That if the predicate is false, it is falsely said in every tense, for instance if you call Cleon white and he is not white, whether you say that he is white or was or will be, you speak falsely because of the predicate. The tense does not introduce a difference here. And see the two further properties of thought, that it is occupied with denial and assertion, which he calls ‘composition’, and he says it runs into falsehood either through the predicate or through the tense. 430b5-6 That which makes one is intellect in each case

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This is what was said also above. Read the sentence as having its words out of order:282 ‘That which makes each of these one is intellect’. For we said that intellect thinks even divided things in an indivisible way. And see that instead of ‘thinks’ he says ‘makes’. That is altogether remarkable. Just as that which is, gives to all things a share of being, and that which is beautiful, a share of beauty, so also intellect, in virtue of its own simplicity and unitivity, makes composite things simple. For intellect thinks them as simple and not as composite. 430b6-7 But since the undivided is twofold, the potentially and the actually, [nothing prevents it from thinking the undivided when it thinks length (for it is undivided in actuality) and in an indivisible time] He comes to the second thing signified by ‘indivisible’, which is

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magnitude or the continuous. Either this is potentially divided but actually undivided, like a magnitude, or actually divided but potentially undivided, like water. Intellect, then, he says, knows what is potentially divided as actually undivided, and what is actually divided as potentially undivided. And it knows these things, he says, ‘in an indivisible time’ also; otherwise in half it would know half. By an ‘indivisible time’ [b8-9] he means a now, speaking ill. For a now is not a time but a beginning of time.283 By a ‘now’ I mean an instant. But if you take the now that has duration,284 that has a beginning and a limit and is a time. But now we are speaking of the instantaneous now. It is not only because the undivided is twofold that he says the undivided is twofold, but because it is only when there is an actual cutting of a magnitude into two parts that it is divided.285 For a magnitude is either potentially or actually undivided. A length is actually continuous but potentially divided. Understand ‘length’ here [b8, b10] as being in place of ‘continuous’. He says, then, that nothing hinders intellect from thinking a length not insofar as it is divided but insofar as it is continuous. For it is continuous in actuality. This is to be taken as establishing what was said above, that intellect lays hold of composites as simples.

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430b9 For the time is divided and undivided in the same way [as the length] He says that it thinks in an indivisible time; and lest anyone should say that time is not indivisible, he says that time is divided and undivided, speaking ill. For he used ‘now’ in place of ‘undivided time’ ignoring the fact that the beginnings of quantities are not quantities.286 So the beginning of a time is not a time.

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430b10 So it is impossible to say what it thinks in each half This again is establishing what was said above, that if it is insofar as the time is divisible, and not insofar as it is undivided, that we think a ten foot plank, then in half the time, say, we should think half the plank, that is, five feet, and in the other half of the time the other five feet. But plainly that is not how it is. For the magnitude, he says, is not actually divided [sc. in thought] so that you can say that it thinks half in half the time, but is divided only in potentiality. Intellect thinks it as actually undivided. 430b11-12 But if it thinks each of the halves separately [it divides the time also at the same time] He uses ‘thinking’ [noein] loosely in place of ‘exercising thought’

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[dianoeisthai]. For he is talking now about thought. Having said that intellect thinks undividedly he says that thought knows each [part] separately in a divided way. And even when it knows them united and together it knows them as lengths composed of two components, ‘out of both’ as he puts it [b13], and it knows them ‘in the time that is for both’ [b13-14], that is, dividedly, and no longer as a length but as different lengths. For that is the meaning of ‘as if lengths’ [b13]. He does well to add ‘as if lengths’. For only one length is the subject, and if intellect thinks it at different times, what is one length in actuality will be [a plurality of] lengths, which is absurd. 430b14-15 But that which is indivisible not in respect of quantity but in form [it thinks in an indivisible time and with an indivisible part of the soul]287

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The third thing signified by ‘indivisible’. It is as if he said that there is nothing to hinder thinking even the continuous as undivided, because there is something undivided in it, and if something is one in form and indivisible it is agreed that it is known in an indivisible time and with an indivisible power of the soul. What is the indivisible power of the soul? Clearly intellect. 430b16 But it is incidentally, and not insofar as those things are divisible, [but insofar as they are undivided,] that by which it thinks288 and the time in which [sc. it thinks] [are indivisible]

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Forms in matter, he says, that intellect thinks are indivisible incidentally. In itself a form in matter is divisible, which is why even with a certain [finite] extension we can see the division of the continuum going on to infinity. But they are said to be indivisible incidentally because their unification comes to them from without. This, then, is what he is saying. It is not insofar as these forms in matter are divisible (‘insofar as’ in place of ‘by virtue of being’), it is not in that way that intellect thinks them; but even if they are divisible, intellect thinks them in an undivided way, because the soul thinks them with an undivisible part of itself (the indivisible part of the soul is intellect) and at an indivisible time. Interpret also as follows. Intellect knows lengths and shapes at an indivisible time and in an indivisible power of the soul incidentally, since those things are not indivisible of themselves but have their unification incidentally. What? Is anything that intellect thinks indivisible incidentally? We say that it is its nature to think in an indivisible way, but it thinks what is undivided incidentally because being undivided supervenes incidentally on these objects of intellect. Some people289 say that by ‘soul’ [at b15] he means imagination.

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Meaning to say what? That it is by using imagination that intellect gets to know forms in matter. It uses, he says, the indivisible part of imagination. For it has an indivisible part, as is shown by the fact that later imprints do not make the first ones disappear. But imagination too, he says, is divided incidentally because it is in a divisible subject. For form too is divided in this way. So the tool by using which intellect thinks, namely imagination, is divisible incidentally and not as imagination. And the ‘time at which’ intellect thinks is indivisible. Again, he calls a now a ‘time’. And the now, it too is divisible incidentally because it is in a time that is divisible. So we may conclude that he means here that even if imagination and the now in time are divisible incidentally, still, it is taking these things as indivisible and as one that intellect thinks forms in matter. And perhaps it is possible to say that he wanted to bring out something imagination and forms in matter have in common, that both are divisible incidentally.

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430b17-18 For there is something indivisible in them too, but perhaps not separable [which makes one the time and the length]290 There is, he says, both something indivisible in time, the now (again he uses words loosely) and also something indivisible in imagination which intellect uses. Why does he say ‘perhaps’ and make it questionable? Is it not agreed that imagination is not separable but destructible? Perhaps, then, we may say: since he calls it ‘passive intellect’ and says it acts with intellect, for this reason he could not say that it, as intellect, is inseparable. That is why he makes it questionable. [But whether it is separable or not separable, by this291] all things, both length and time, are thought as one. For this separable thing is in every length or time or continuum as in one. That is why intellect too, being separable, knows all things as one.

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430b19 And this is likewise in every continuum [both time and length] This what? It is in place of: ‘The form that is without parts and inseparable is in every time and length.’292 430b20 A point and every division Here is another thing signified by ‘indivisible’, that which is indivisible in quantity; that is to say, things in every way indivisible. But since of things in every way indivisible some are known by privation293 and some of themselves, he speaks first of those [known by] privation,

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because they are more easily known by us, like, he says, a point. This, as was said in the continuous exposition, is known by denial of the continuum. And after the point he brings in ‘things indivisible in that way’ so as to say line and surface. For these are the limits of other things. And perhaps it may be said: ‘What? Are lines and planes indivisible?’ We say: insofar as they are limits of other things they are indivisible. He mentions these things at all because not only is a point a division of a line, but also a line is a division of a surface and a surface of a solid. 430b20-1 and what is indivisible in this way is shown as is privation

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‘And what is indivisible’, he says, ‘in this way’, that is, like a point, is shown, it too, by ‘privation’. He says this because of incorporeal things and the divine, which are not known by privation. Surface is known by privation of depth, line by privation of depth and width, and point by privation of depth, width and length. He calls these ‘divisions’ [b20], and plausibly. For a point divides a line, a line a surface and a surface a body. In themselves they are indivisible. 430b22-3 [And a similar account holds for other things, such as] how it comes to know evil or black

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That evil is privation of fair294 is agreed. But that black is privation of white is false. Black is made to have form, as we said [547,5-6]. Perhaps, then, he says ‘black’ in place of ‘dark’, so that dark is privation of white, and by ‘white’ you understand light. Dark is a privation of that. 430b23 But that which comes to know must be potentially, and it must be in it.295 [But if to some one of the causes296 nothing is contrary, it gets to know itself and is in actuality297 and is separable]

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He says ‘be in’ in place of ‘be present in’. He is now enquiring how we must think what is divine, and he makes two preliminary assumptions. First, that the thinker must be potentially as is the thing thought. By ‘potentially’ he means by suitability. For Aristotle does not want there to be accounts of things in the soul. As the thing thought, then, is potentially, so must the thinker be too.298 For that which comes to know must in this way become completely like the thing to be known and be like it and be potentially it. And the thing known, in turn, must be present in the knower itself when it gets to know it – that is the second [preliminary assumption]. When the

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thinker is so disposed it knows the divine in the five respects stated [547,17-22]. He states all of them except [that it knows it] as cause. He says it has no contrary, for it has no linkage with anything or opposition at all because of its transcendence. That it is also ‘in actuality’ is clear, because it also knows itself. And please, as Plutarch says, do not think that ‘separable’ [b26] means [separable] only from the matter of bodies; it means also from psychical powers. He says ‘separable’ from them but he should have said ‘separated’; for the divine has been separated. So according to Aristotle’s statement [430b24-6], if a thing which is a cause299 has no contrary, that thing ‘knows itself and is in actuality and is separable’, and [this is true] not only [of] intellect but [of] anything else there may be of this kind. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 5] 430b26-7 Saying is [sc. saying] one thing of another, as is assertion300 [and is always true or false. But not all intellect is; but that which is of what a thing is in respect of essence is true, and is not [sc. thinking] one thing of another] Having shown that intellect is eternal and that it differs from sense, and shown how thinking comes about and how objects of intellect differ, he does not pass on from the intellect before stating the differentiation concerning it in a wholly complete way. His differentiation concerning intellect is threefold. He differentiates intellect occupied with simples from that which is occupied with composites, that is, from thought; potential intellect from actual; and practical intellect from contemplative. He does the first with one differentiation, the second with two and the third with three. Intellect, he says, which is occupied with simples differs from intellect which is occupied with composites, that is, from thought (for it is that which is occupied with composites) in that intellect always attains truth while thought both attains truth and runs into falsehood, and the true for intellect is not even like the true for thought. For the true for intellect is substantive truth, whereas that for thought is in a composition of one thing [thought] of another. Intellect is like sense occupied with its own sense-objects, which always attains truth. Thought is like sense occupied with incidental sense-objects; for that sometimes runs into falsehood and sometimes attains truth and involves composition. It knows one thing by another, for instance man by pale. So simple thoughts, analogous to sense attending to its own business and always attaining truth, always attain truth, whereas composite thoughts, analogous to sense attending to the business of another and sometimes attaining truth but sometimes

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running into falsehood because of this – they too sometimes attain truth and sometimes run into falsehood. That is how he differentiates intellect occupied with simples from intellect occupied with composites. Then next he differentiates potential intellect from actual, first because actual intellect is the things themselves, whereas potential intellect is not things unless it thinks them. Secondly, because potential intellect comes before actual in time in the one person, though in the whole [cosmos] it does not come before; for there are always both the potential and the actual. For there must always be the actual to lead the potential to being actual. And having made this differentiation in this way he also differentiates contemplative intellect from practical. The first differentiation he gives is this, that practical intellect is occupied always with particulars whereas contemplative is occupied also with universals. He gives a second differentiation: practical intellect always uses imagination, and contemplative does not. Third differentiation: in contemplative intellect there are true and false, whereas in practical there are good and bad. And this differentiation is rather to be preferred. For the second does not altogether carry necessity. For contemplative intellect too always uses imagination. And it should be known that contemplative intellect is not other than practical [intellect] in subject. For just as potential intellect is not other than actual [intellect] in subject (for it is the same), but differs only in time, so too practical intellect stands to contemplative: in subject it is the same, but different in how it is related. Contemplative intellect is analogous to sight discerning only the forms of colours and coming to know that this is white and that black. Practical intellect is analogous to sight not only knowing the forms of colours but also making the pleasant its own and turning away from the distressing. For like sight when besides the white and black it gets to know also the pleasant and the unpleasant, so too practical intellect knows not only the true and the false but also the good and bad; and the pleasant to sight is analogous to the good, and the unpleasant to sight is analogous to the bad. But intellect often chooses the unpleasant in place of the pleasant, because the unpleasant is good and the pleasant, sometimes, also bad. So this is the difference, that contemplative intellect acts without appetition, knowing only truth and falsity, whereas practical intellect acts with appetition, by knowing what is good and what bad. After taking the differentiation of the contemplative from the practical intellect this far, he provides us with yet another differentiation of intellect from sense. For since both in differentiating intellect from thought and again in differentiating contemplative intellect from practical he has likened intellect to sense, lest anyone should

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think that intellect is like sense in every way, for that reason he now provides a differentiation of intellect from sense and says that a particular sense, like sight, knows white and black, and sight is the common lodging for white and black, while for white and sweet the common sense is the common lodging. it is not sight but the common sense that knows the difference there is between white and sweet. As the common sense, then, is the termination of the particular senses, so also intellectual cognition is the common lodging of objects of contemplative intellect and intellectual action is [the common lodging] of objects of practical intellect such as good and bad. But of both, of objects both of contemplative and of practical intellect, the lodging is intellect. Plato used to call intellectual cognition ‘attentive’301 and intellectual action ‘conscious’. He said that they are the same in subject. For it is the one who knows that acts: life is linked to cognition, and it is one thing that says ‘I thought’ and ‘I fed’.302 If that were not so, it may reasonably be said it would be as if I perceived this and you that. But they differ in account in that one acts and the other knows. Aristotle too is of this opinion. And they have something in common in respect of their very subjects.303 What is good is also true, and what is bad is false. But they differ in that ‘good’ is said relatively to something (for what is good in virtues relatively to the soul is bad for the body); whereas ‘true’ is not said relatively to anything, but true is always the same and fair. For Plato’s statement is not to be accepted, that to concede to the maniac the pledge of the sword is true but bad.304 According to Aristotle, the true as such is always fair. It should be known that even if we say that the common sense is like intellect because as the common sense is the termination of all the particular senses, so also intellect is the termination of all objects of intellect, objects of thought and objects of opinion, still, there is a difference. In the case of the senses, the common sense is another one additional to the five, whereas in the case of objects of intellect, that which knows the difference is not something over and above the three, but one of the three. For intellect, which is part of the three – I mean opinion, thought and intellect – itself knows how objects of intellect differ from objects of thought and objects of thought from objects of opinion. That is how intellect is different from the common sense. And it should be known that just as common sense knows not only the things that the particular senses know, but other things in addition (for the common sense knows how the sense-objects that fall under sense differ, whereas the senses, as we have already said, do not know this: the particular senses know only sweet and white, but the common sense knows not only these things but that they are different), so too, then, intellect knows not only the objects of intellect, thought and opinion, but also how they differ. For what is known by

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the worse is known by the better too, but what is known by the better is not known by the worse. The difference, at least, between objects of thought, intellect and opinion is not known to either thought or opinion, but intellect knows it, being better than both, both thought and opinion. So there is an analogy like this. As black is to its proper thought, so is white to its proper thought, and alternando as black is to white, so is thought [of] white to thought [of] black. That, with God’s help, completes the continuous exposition. 430b26-7 Saying is [saying] one thing of another, as is assertion.305

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What does he want to say? That intellect occupied with simples is different from intellect occupied with composites; for it is occupied, he says, with assertion in the mind. This is as it were simple in the mental state and always true; whereas intellect occupied with composites is occupied with expressed assertion, which admits of true and false and involves composition because of the expression. His saying, then, that in all cases it is true or false [b27] must be taken as referring to expressed assertion, not to assertion in the mind. For ‘not all intellect runs into falsehood’306 in place of ‘attains truth or runs into falsehood’. [For intellect of simple thoughts attains truth only, it does not also run into falsehood; so not all intellect attains truth or runs into falsehood.] [Falsehood]307 is mentioned, he says, because of practical intellect. For contemplative intellect, in that it lays hold of simple and pure thoughts, does not run into falsehood, but practical intellect, because it combines forms in matter with itself and with one another, exercises thought, he says, in this and runs into falsehood on this account. So again, falsehood follows upon thought. 430b28-9 But that which is of what a thing is in respect of essence is true, and is not [sc. thinking] one thing of another

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It is as if he said that that kind of intellect alone [always] thinks truly which is in respect of what a thing is and of essence. ‘What a thing is’ indicates substance, and ‘essence’ indicates form. So what is said is something like this, that that intellect attains truth which lays hold of substance with respect to form, that is, which lays hold of form by itself. This is contemplative intellect, which always attains truth and is not [thinking] ‘one thing of another’ [b28-9], that is, which is not occupied with composites. Being occupied with composites belongs not to what is genuinely intellect but to thought. And do not think that intellect is the same in subject as thought but different in account, as was said in the continuous exposition;308 for intellect is different from thought in subject too.

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430b29-30 But just as the seeing of what is proper309 is true, but whether what is white is or is not a man, that is not always seen truly What is ‘the seeing what is proper’? [This is] in place of: ‘seeing what is proper and attending to its own business, for example seeing white and no more, not also seeing the substance to which this white belongs’, for that is not always true. For there are times when sense runs into falsehood about things that are sense-objects incidentally, as was said above.

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430b30 so it is with such things as are without matter What is he saying? That as sense stands to objects that are its own or not its own, so things without matter stand to objects of intellect. By ‘things without matter’ he means thought and intellect. For these are non-material powers. And object of thought and of intellect, on their side, are things without matter. Objects of intellect, which he also calls ‘simples’, are analogous, he says, to sight seeing what is proper to it; but objects of thought, which he also calls ‘composites’, he says are analogous to sight attending to the business of another, and wanting to know not only that the thing is white, but that it is a white man or a white horse.

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431a1-2 Actual knowledge is the same as the thing, [but potential is prior in time in the one] By ‘thing’ he means the object of knowledge. He says that actual knowledge is the same as its object. For knowledge does not come to know its object unless it has been made completely like it and become as it is. This [remark] is not put in to no purpose, but since the discussion is about objects of intellect, and objects of intellect become actual objects of intellect and are known by intellect through systematic knowledge as an intermediary, for that reason he makes mention of systematic knowledge and says that when it is actual it is like the object of knowledge. ‘But potential knowledge is prior to actual in the one’ individual [a2]. 431a2-3 but with regard to the whole, not even in time, [for all things that come into being are from what is in actuality] Some books have ‘with regard to the whole’ and some ‘simply’.310 What he means is that to speak simply, and with a view to the whole, in the whole cosmos the potential is not prior to the actual because all

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things are advanced to actuality by311 what is in actuality through what is able to advance [them]. Some people say that ‘what is in actuality’ need not be taken to refer to the Creator; the point is that what is potentially one thing is always something that is actually something else, for instance the semen that is potentially an embryo is actually semen, and the bread which is potentially blood is actually bread. But I think that they do not say well. For there is nothing which is always actuality alone and by which all things are advanced, except only the Creator. When he gets here Alexander says that the argument is disordered, since he [Aristotle] discriminated potential from actual intellect above, and he now does the same thing. To this we reply that the argument is repetitive, not disordered. For he does this now in order to give the whole differentiation at once. 431a4-5 The sense-object plainly makes that which perceives, from being potential, to be actual; for it is not affected or altered. [Hence this is another species of change. For change is the actuality of what is incomplete, and what is actuality without qualification is something else, [sc. the actuality] of what has been completed] What is the meaning of this text? He wants to differentiate practical intellect from contemplative. But before coming to the differentiation he wants to speak about sense for [one of] two reasons: either because intellect has something in common with sense inasmuch as it acts without an intermediary, or because he has a passion for using sense as a model in this differentiation, and that is why he says something about sense that he has said already, that sense is in potentiality when it is not acting by virtue of having the disposition and not, like thought, by virtue of suitability. And whenever the sense-object is present and the sense acts, the sense is brought to actuality by the presence of the sense-object. It is not through change that it comes to be actual. Sense is not affected or altered when it is brought from potentiality of the second kind to being actual. For Aristotle does not want what is brought from the second sort of potentiality to the second sort of actuality to be altered nor to be affected, so it is either not change or another species of change. For if anyone wants to call this ‘change’ let him call it another species of change over and above those mentioned in the Physics,312 and introduce a new classification of nature. Then he [Aristotle] also establishes that the advance from the second kind of potentiality to the second kind of actuality is not change. For he says that ‘change is the actuality of what is incomplete’313 (for change moves from incomplete to complete, and it [the incomplete thing] is affected and altered), but what is potential in the

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second way is complete. The activity of things that are complete is not change but something else besides change. So the passage from the second sort of potentiality to the second sort of actuality is not a change but a switch.314

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431a8 Perceiving is like mere saying and thinking [but when [sc. the soul perceives something to be] pleasant or distressing, as through asserting or denying it pursues or avoids] He is still differentiating contemplative intellect from practical. What does he say? That if, like sense, it has mere saying, that is, mere cognising and thinking, it is called ‘contemplative’. But if it includes experiencing pain and pleasure he says it asserts and pursues since we welcome it [sc. what gives us pleasure] and go for it. He calls welcoming it ‘asserting’, and what is painful we deny: we do not welcome it but actually avoid it. As though, he says, with the discerning power of practical intellect we discern good and evil. Do not, then, take everything to refer to the same thing.315 Then, since it has been shown above that sense and appetition are the same in subject, and he has to say that practical intellect acts with appetition, he says it acts with sense, sense and appetition being the same in subject. 431a11 [And to experience pleasure and distress is to be active with the perceiving mean] in relation to the good or bad as such316

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He does well to add ‘as such’. For things are not good or bad in themselves, but in relation to the animal, what conserves being called ‘good’ and what destroys ‘bad’. 431a12-13 And avoidance and appetition are this317 when in actuality, and that which is appetitive and that which avoids are not other [either than one another or than that which perceives; but their being is other] What is he saying? Comparing the actually distressing and actual pleasure he says they differ in account. He calls the distressing ‘that which is avoided’ and the pleasant ‘appetition’. Then, lest someone should think that we reach for something pleasant with one power and avoid what is distressing with another, he now says that pleasure and distress318 do not differ except in account. They do not differ in subject. For the subject of both is the non-rational part of the soul. But why do I say this, when there is no difference in subject even between perceiving and experiencing pleasure? The subject of these also is the non-rational. But they differ ‘in being’ [a14], that is, in

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account. He says this to show that contemplative intellect too differs from practical only in account. 25

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431a14-15 But to the thinking soul, phantasms stand in the same way as perceptions He uses ‘thinking soul’ loosely for contemplative intellect. What is he saying? That it too sometimes uses imagination as also does practical intellect. But even if it uses imagination, he says, to it phantasms are like perceptions, that is, like sense alone without pain or pleasure. But to practical intellect, which has good and bad as its subjects, they are, he says, as it were assertions and denials, and it then uses pleasure and distress, and pursues the pleasant and avoids the distressing. And this intellect always uses imagination because it always experiences pleasure and distress, which is not possible separately from imagination, but the first intellect [i.e. contemplative intellect] sometimes does not. It does not think any particulars without imagination, but it thinks universals even separately from imagination. But do not think that the good is the same as the pleasant or the bad as the painful. Sexual indulgence is a pleasant evil, and to control oneself about all things is a painful good. So do not think that the pleasant for practical intellect is the same as the good for it. 431a17-18 Just as the air makes the pupil to be of a certain quality, [and this something else, and hearing similarly, but the last thing is one, and one mean, though it is many in being . But what it is by which it discerns how sweet and hot differ has been said, indeed, before, but may also be said thus. There is one thing, but [sc. one] as a boundary mark]

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He is speaking of the common lodging. And what does he say? That as the air alters the pupil, and the pupil the pneuma, and that the power of crystalline form,319 and this [power] is roused and sees, and it is one and insofar as it discerns it is a mean, but in another respect it is different – that is, in account – from the other things that discern (for hearing too in the same way has some one thing that discerns), – as it is, then, in those cases, so also in intellect there is a common lodging which is a last thing and a discerning middle. The text says the first part of this, the part about sight and hearing, but it does not say ‘so also intellect has a lodging’. But having said the first, the Philosopher leaves us to understand the rest along with it, the part about intellect, and turns to other things. A particular sense, he says, discerns in this way,320 but it does not discern white and sweet, but there is something else which we

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mentioned above, he says [a21], and will mention also now, the common sense. This is the common lodging for these and is one like a boundary mark. By ‘a boundary mark’ he here means the centre of a circle, from which many straight lines issue forth.

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431a22-3 And these, being one by analogy and in number, stand to each321 as those things to one another What is he saying? That as the ‘boundary mark’, that is, the centre, [stands to the radii] so the common sense stands [to the other senses] both by analogy and in number. In analogy, because just as the centre stands to each of the lines from it, so the common sense stands to each of its senses; and as the lines have a certain analogy to each other, so, he says, have the particular senses a certain analogy to one another. That is how it is one by analogy. How is it one in number? Because just as there is one centre which has a relationship to many lines, so the common sense, itself one, has a relation to many senses. 431a24 For how is wondering how it discerns heterogeneous objects different from wondering how it discerns contraries, like white and black? Having said that as the common sense stands to the proper objects 322 do not, he says, wonder how a particular sense knows objects of the same kind, if you do not wonder how the common sense knows heterogeneous objects; for it is the same. 323 By ‘objects of the same kind’ he means black and white, for both fall under colour. By ‘heterogeneous’ he means white and sweet, for these, in that they fall under different senses, are in fact heterogeneous. 431a25-7 As the first [A324], white, is to the second [B], black, as they are to each other325 so let the third [C] be to the fourth [D]; [so that also alternando]326 He uses the letters here to indicate, A, white, B, black or sometimes sweet, and C and D for objects of intellect, so that C would be the account of white and D the account of black. And what does he say? That as the common sense knows the first and second (you may take the first still to signify white, the second sweet) so also intellect knows the third and fourth, that is, the accounts of these things. And intellect, he says, also knows ‘alternando’327 AC and BD, that is, both the sense-objects and the objects of intellect.

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431a28-9 [If, then, C and D should belong to one thing, it will be thus, as also A and B:] one and the same, but the being not the same, and that one likewise;328 [and the same account even if A should be sweet and B white]329 20

In subject, he says, they are the same – I mean the form of white or black, or white or black – but they are different in account. For we see white and black differently and we think them differently. 431b2 That which thinks, then, thinks the forms in phantasms

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What is he saying? That practical intellect thinks the forms of things using imagination; and as in that, he says, there are pursuit and avoidance, since it is appetition, so also there are these things in intellect when it experiences pleasure and distress. Either say that or this other thing, that above he calls sense-objects ‘phantasms’ and below he calls them ‘imagination’. And what is he saying? That intellect sometimes acts along with sense-objects and experiences pleasure and pain, and sometimes acts without sense, making use of imagination. When it sees torchlight and thinks it is an enemy’s, it acts with perception. But when deliberating where it should make war, then it uses imagination. 431b5-6 For instance, perceiving torchlight, that it is fire it gets to know by that which is common330

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What is [the meaning of] ‘it gets to know by that which is common’? Some say [that it gets to know] by the change [sc. in respect of place] of the fire. For change is a common sense-object. But it is absurd to say of what gets to know 331 for he spoke of that which gets to know. Say, then, that he says this because we get to know the fire by the common sense. He says this because he knows that whatever is a subject of a particular sense is also a subject of the common sense. 431b6-7 But sometimes by the phantasms in the soul [it reasons and deliberates what is future in relation to what is present] What is he saying? That when someone has imagined and deliberates on where to make war, and deliberates about what is present on the basis of what is past, and chooses the place that is pleasant and avoids that which is painful, then he uses imagination. It should be known, he says, that pleasant and distressing are always in [the sphere of] practical intellect, whereas the true or the false that is without action is in contemplative intellect. And this, he says, is in the same intellect

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as good and bad. They differ as absolute and relative, since the true is so called absolutely and is always the same, whereas the good is worthless and charming in relation to something. For what is good in relation to one thing, say the soul, is not good in relation to the body. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture.

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[LECTURE 6] 431b12-14 But abstract things, as they are called, it thinks,– just as, if [someone thought] snubnosed not as snubnosed but separately, as curved, [he would think it without the flesh in which the curved is, so it thinks objects of mathematics, which are not separated, as separated when it thinks them]332 Having differentiated simple intellect from composite, practical from contemplative and potential from actual, he returns to the object of intellect and now teaches about that. The object of intellect is form, and form is threefold: what is altogether in matter, like physical forms, what is entirely non-material, and what is in one way in matter and in another non-material, like objects of mathematics. Above333 he has examined form in matter, when he spoke of what is this particular thing, and also non-material form, when he enquired into being this. So now he comes to objects of mathematics and enquires how intellect thinks them. And he says that it thinks them not as forms in matter but as non-material. It does not know them in the same way as snubnosed, which it has to think in matter, in the nose, but it knows them like curved. For that is thought without matter. And intellect thinks objects of mathematics using imagination without parts as an instrument. For imagination is without parts: for when it conceives Socrates running, it conceives him as one thing, and not as something different from, and over and above, the running. For if imagination comes from sense, since that is not transition-making, it is clear that it too is without parts, and does not make transitions from one thing to another, but imagines all at once. From this what does he infer? That imagination, like intellect and sense, only attains truth and does not also run into falsehood, because imagining does not involve composition. And from this the soul is shown to be separable, since things that cannot be separated, I mean objects of mathematics, are separated by it in conception because it has separability in its substance. Having said this he enquires whether or not, if actual intellect is [identical with] things, and if it is in coming to be, it is able to know non-material things. He raises the problem, but for the moment he does not solve it. In regard to this Plato says that intellect, when it is in coming to be, can be a citizen of Heaven, and act in connection with

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non-material things and be contemptuous of the body. For if souls outside [the body] that are body-loving are always with body, even in tombs,334 what wonder if also souls in coming to be should act in connection with non-material things? So Plato; but Aristotle, further down,335 says that objects of intellect are of three sorts. First, there are non-material objects of intellect; secondly, there are intermediate objects of intellect; and thirdly, there are those in matter. And in the case of the non-material he says there is no need of imagination: the thinkings are non-imaginative. But when, he says, it thinks objects of mathematics, it uses imagination as subject. But even if it does use it as subject in knowing objects of mathematics, it does not follow from this that phantasms and objects of mathematics are the same. For phantasms are subjects only of imagination, whereas objects of mathematics are subjects also of the soul that uses imagination as subject. But forms in matter the soul gets to know by using sense and imagination as an instrument. If, then, there is non-imaginative activity, it follows that intellect in coming to be is capable of knowing that activity; it has no need of anything in order to know it. But he pleads as advocate for the opinion which says that intellect does not know forms that are in every way non-material. They are separate from matter. So it too should be separate from matter if it is to think them, since what gets to know ought to be made completely like what is known in every way. But in the animal it is not separated. So it does not know them. That is the first plea. But that is false, O Aristotle. For if intellect does not while it is in the animal know things that are in every way non-material, how is it that in your treatise the Metaphysics you both enquired after forms that are in every way non-material, and found them, and reported them to us? That makes it clear that even while it is in the animal, intellect knows forms that are in every way non-material. That is the first plea and the counter to it. Second plea.336 Intellect does not think non-material forms, because non-material forms do not exist at all; and since they do not exist, for that reason they are not thought by intellect either. That is the second plea. To it we reply: ‘How can you say this, Aristotle, when in other works you shout aloud in so many words that there are divine forms, which are what non-material things are? So there are nonmaterial forms.’ Third plea. Intellect always acts with imagination. It never acts on its own, but always with imagination, even when it acts in connection with divine things. For indeed there too it acts with imagination, and imagination always gets to know forms in matter; for it is from knowing the good order of the cosmos and the excellence of things that intellect is led to know the Providence that arranged them in order: so even when it thinks divine things it does not act without

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imagination. And imagination, as has been said, always knows things in matter, for imagination knows only those things which sense knows. If intellect, then, knows only those things that imagination knows, because it does not act without it, and imagination knows those things which sense knows, and sense knows only things in matter, it follows that intellect knows only things in matter, and does not in any way know non-material things as well. That is the third plea. To this we say in opposition that when intellect acts in connection with particular sense-objects, then it acts with imagination and does not depart from it from beginning to end, but is with it when [immersed] in sense-objects. But when it thinks divine things then it does act through imagination. For we said that it is from the good order and good arrangement we can see, that we are led across to the divine. So it does act through imagination. But it no longer acts with it; for it no longer needs it. Incorporeal things are thought even separately from imagination. That is the solution to the plea. Fourth plea. Intellect cannot think non-material things because intellect is the same as imagination. For like imagination it neither attains truth nor runs into falsehood. If intellect, then, is the same as imagination, and imagination does not think non-material forms, neither will intellect think non-material forms. That is the fourth plea. To it we reply that intellect is not the same as imagination, since imagination gets to know only qualities which the senses also get to know – for imagination knows nothing that sense does not know too. Whereas intellect knows substances. If imagination, then, does not know substances, and intellect does know substances, it follows that intellect is not imagination. That is why Plato too in the Theaetetus says ‘imagination does not attain to substance’337 – in place of ‘cognition of substance does not come its way’. So intellect is not the same as imagination. Having said this and taken the discussion of cognitive activities thus far, Aristotle wants to draw a common conclusion for his account that will apply to the activities in common. He says that through its cognitive powers and activities the soul is all things that are. For the things that are, all are either sense-objects or objects of intellect, which he calls ‘objects of knowledge’, and each of these is of two kinds. Everything is either potential or actual. 338 everything that is potential comes to be actual. All things, then, fall into four groups: potential sense-objects, actual sense-objects, potential objects of knowledge and actual objects of knowledge; and there is nothing among things that are, that is outside these four. But now, there are also these four in the soul. The soul has potential senses and potential knowledge, and actual senses and actual knowledge. But it is not the case, when we say that the soul is all things, that by this we mean that there are stones or wood in the soul; but [we say this] because

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the soul becomes like things and is an image of them, since like is known by like. And again, let no one accept the Platonic hypotheses and think that accounts are in the soul. Aristotle is not saying that either. But when there are potential sense and potential knowledge of things the suitability only for the things is present, and when there are actual sense and knowledge, then we get to know the accounts of sense-objects and objects of knowledge, and, in a word, then actual cognition comes about. Having said this by way of summary of the whole discussion, he turns from intellect to what changes [the animal] in respect of place. He ought to have gone on to that after sense. For he thought it best to turn from things that belong to more [animals] to things that belong to few. But he placed his discussion of this after discussing all the rational and non-rational soul because these things [sc. which he says about the rational and the non-rational soul] are also needed for teaching what that which in place is and what it is not. We say that it is not imagination or sense or intellect or that which nourishes or anything else like that. So if we did not have prior knowledge of these things, how should we know that it is not these things? That which changes in respect of place is mixed appetition from the non-rational and the rational. The appetition of the nonrational moves us when we follow our emotions, while appetition of the rational soul moves us when we follow reason. If we do not know, then, what the non-rational and the rational are, how should we know what is a mixture of them? That is why he comes later to that which changes in respect of place. And what does he teach about it? He takes Plato up on three points. First, why does he divide the soul as a whole into parts, when he ought to have divided it as a substance into powers? We plead in Plato’s defence that he divides soul universally as a whole into parts, into the physical, the non-rational, the logical; and he divides the particular souls as substances into powers.339 He does, then, know the latter division too. And if you raise the problem why he calls the spirited and the desiring ‘parts’, though they fall under one soul, the nonrational, then ask also why Aristotle says that intellect is a ‘part’ of the soul. Secondly, he takes Plato up for leaving a number of things out. He divides the soul into three, spirit, reason and desire, and houses reason in the brain, spirit in the heart and desire in the liver. But he leaves out that which imagines and that which perceives, that which changes in respect of place, that which is appetitive. But we say that he knows these things too and mentions them when he is doing natural science in the Timaeus. In the Republic he mentions [only] these three because they are needed for all the constitutions. When reason is master it produces aristocracy and monarchy, where spirit

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is master it produces democracy, and desire, the multiform beast,340 when combined with love of wealth produces oligarchy and when combined with love of pleasure produces, if it is law-abiding, aristodemocracy,341 if lawless, tyranny.342 So he mentions only the things that are useful to him, but he knows the lot. He takes Plato up, thirdly, on the ground that, in saying that reason is in the brain, spirit in the heart and desire in the liver, he tears appetition apart from itself. For appetition is a mixture of the rational with the non-rational, and these are in different places. So appetition too is torn apart. In reply to this, say that the whole soul is present in each part, but according as a part has greater suitability, reason or spirit appears; and appetition is not torn apart. That is the continuous exposition.

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431b12 But what are called ‘abstract things’ it thinks as if [someone thought] snubnosed ‘But abstract things’ is like a heading for the discussion, such as we find also in the Hippocratic writings, for instance in those on women there is the heading ‘But concerning the diseases of women’. That is how here too ‘abstract things’ is said.343 Wishing to show how abstract things are thought, he proceeds: ‘it thinks’ he says, ‘as snubnosed’. For snubnosed is thought with matter, and curved without. So he makes objects of mathematics, which he calls ‘abstract’, analogous to curved. For curved comes to be like something non-material, being abstract.

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431b15-16 So it thinks objects of mathematics, which are not separated, as separated344 In this he means to tell us the nature of objects of mathematics. These are thought separated, but not as things separated in actuality; only in conception. And from here we obtain a corollary: the soul is separable, since it separates things that are inseparable; if it were not separable it would never separate these.

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431b16 In general, actual intellect is things Since he has said that intellect separates mathematical forms and that is how it thinks of them, for that reason he adds this, that intellect is the same as things, so that its substance also is separated when it knows separable things, and it is itself separable and we know like by like.

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431b17-19 But whether or not it is possible for it to think anything separated without itself being separated from magnitude, we must consider later 30 567,1

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Here he puts forward the problem which we mentioned in the continuous exposition, that if actual intellect is [the same as] things, and things, insofar as they are objects of intellect, are non-material, it follows that intellect is non-material; and how can it be non-material if it is held in coming to be? How will it get to know non-material things if it is held in coming to be? He promises to give the solution in what follows. And it has also been shown above that it can think things in every way non-material provided that it does not use the body as an instrument but is unmixed with any body. 431b20-1 Now, summarising what has been said about soul, let us say again [that the soul is in a way all things that are. For things that are, are either sense-objects or objects of intellect, and knowledge is the objects of knowledge in a way, and sense the sense-objects] He brings forward the conclusion applying to all cognitive activities in common. The conclusion is that things that are, are all either sense-objects or objects of intellect. But as we said, he calls objects of intellect ‘objects of knowledge’. And he divides these into the potential and the actual, and shows that all these are in the soul, and that which is potential knows the potential, and that which is actual, the actual. Some people raise the problem, if all things that are, are either sense-objects or objects of intellect, and a thing is a sense-object or an object of intellect relatively to something, it will follow that all things that are, are relative, even the divine, which is absurd. We reply that all things that are, insofar as they are sense-objects and objects of intellect, are relative; but insofar as they have subsistence, they are of themselves. For even the black itself, insofar as it has subsistence of itself, is not something relative, though insofar as it is a senseobject, it belongs among relatives. 431b21 That the soul is in a way all things345

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431b23-4 But how this is, we should enquire346 [The answer is] that it is according as they are potential and actual, that sense is the sense-objects and knowledge the objects of knowledge. 431b28-9 [That in the soul which perceives and that which knows are potentially these things, the one the object of knowledge, the other the sense-object.] They must be either the things themselves, or the forms. Not themselves347 Having said above that we should enquire how sense lays hold of its objects, now he says that necessarily either the composite forms themselves are in the soul, that is, the form also with the matter, or the form itself by itself. But, he says, the composite forms are not in the soul. There is certainly no stone in it. Therefore necessarily the forms alone are present in the soul.

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432a1-2 So the soul is like the hand. For the hand is an instrument of instruments, and intellect is a form of forms, and sense a form of sense-objects

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What he is saying is something like this. Just as the hand, while being an instrument of the body, uses instruments, as a carpenter might use an adze, perhaps, or a measuring rod, so also the soul, while itself a form, is receptive of other forms, because it has accounts of forms within itself.348 Both intellect and sense are forms and receptive of forms in the same way because they have accounts of forms. But intellect is the form of all forms – for all forms are present in it when it is actual – whereas sense is the form only of sense-object forms, because it is sense-objects that are in actual sense.

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432a3-6 But since there is no thing, it is thought, separated and over and above magnitudes that are sense-objects, objects of intellect are in perceived forms, both the so called abstract objects and such as are dispositions and affections of senseobjects Here are the pleas, the first of which, he says, states that forms which are non-material in every way do not exist at all. This statement has its words out of order349 and is read as follows. There is nothing over and above perceived magnitudes, as everyone thinks, but the things that are, all are perceived magnitudes. He means to say that thoughts are of either the first sort or the second or the third,350 and that it

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knows the first non-imaginatively but the second and third with imagination, even if it uses it in one way as an instrument, in another as a subject.351 What, then, is he saying? Since there is no thing over and above magnitudes, that is, without matter, as some sense-objects are thought to be, such as objects of mathematics (for these appear to be separable, but they are not), because of this, he says, objects of intellect are in the forms of sense-objects; objects of mathematics, for instance, even if they seem separable, which are the second group. And the third are inseparable, the sense-objects. He refers to the second in saying ‘the so-called abstract objects’ and the third in saying ‘and such as are dispositions or affections of sense-objects’. For these are forms in matter and affections, being qualities in matter lives,352 and only their magnitude is separable in account. 432a7-8 And for this reason, therefore, a person who does not perceive would not learn or understand anything353

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Because these third354 are sense-objects. And he says here unclearly what is said clearly in the treatise on Proof. He says there that sense is the starting point of all knowledge355 because, as he says now, objects of intellect have to be in perceived forms. ‘In cases, then, where a sense is missing, that sort of knowledge is missing too.’356 Then, having said ‘would not learn anything’ he adds ‘or understand’, that is, or discover. For there are two routes to cognition, learning and discovery. 432a8-9 And when a person contemplates, he must at the same time contemplate a phantasm. [For phantasms are like perceptions]

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Having said that the forms of objects of intellect are in sense-objects, for this reason, he says, it is necessary that intellect should at the same time contemplate a phantasm, that is,  [use357] imagination as an instrument, since indeed sense is what makes it.358 So that whether we say that it uses imagination or that it uses sense, it is the same. In these words he states the second plea, that intellect acts along with imagination, and imagination does not know forms without matter. Neither, therefore, does intellect. 432a10 Except for being without matter Having said that phantasms are like perceptions, he says they are without matter. For the senses act in connection only with things in matter, and imagination only in connection with forms. But some people359 think he is joining ‘except for being without matter’ to

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intellect. Having said that it is the same whether you say intellect uses sense or imagination, he says ‘except that intellect knows what is without matter’.

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432a10-11 Imagination is other than saying and denial, [for it is an interweaving of thought that is what is true or false. But the first thoughts, what will distinguish them from being phantasms?] For it [imagination] is occupied with simples, which is why also it is without parts, being occupied with terms. Hence truth in it is substantive; it does not lie in composition. If, therefore, it neither attains [non-substantive] truth nor runs into falsehood, since it neither asserts nor denies, and if intellect similarly (according to the plea) neither attains truth nor runs into falsehood, ‘what will distinguish the first thoughts’, which are simple, from phantasms [431b12-13]? So intellect too will be imagination. It should be known that intellect and imagination and perception have substantive truth and know in a termwise manner. 432a13-14 Or are not even the others360 phantasms, though they are not without phantasms? These words are a refutation of the third plea. Having stated three pleas, he refutes only the third, saying ‘perhaps not even the other phantasms are thoughts’. But what sort of thoughts does he mean? Those which we have said are simple and on that account similar to imagination. ‘Though not’, he says, ‘without phantasms’, that is, they are not separate from imagination. So the thoughts arise through imagination, but imagination is not the same as intellect. Except, however, he says, when it thinks thoughts of the first kind it does not use imagination as an instrument, though it uses it with thoughts of the second and third kinds. But anyhow a phantasm and a thought are not the same. For a phantasm is in matter in a way, while a thought is non-material. It should be known that we raised certain other matters in the continuous exposition,361 but since we looked at them superficially it seems best to take up the discussion again from above. It is better to cover the same ground twice than to miss anything out. That, with God’s help, completes the lecture. It is possible that the Commentary originally stopped with this lecture, and that the lectures on DA 3.9-13 were added later with these bridging sentences. In that case the original Commentary may have been only on DA 3.1-8, and we need not wonder what became of the comments on the first two books.

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Notes 1. OCT has ‘no other sense’. 2. krustalloeides. The word is not in Aristotle, but later writers refer to an inner part of the eye as to hugron krustalloeides, literally, ‘the liquid of crystalline form’; see Philoponus in DA 2 especially 350,24-33, 364,34; 418,20. Aristotle says that the eye is of the same watery material as the brain, which is cold and wet: Sens. 438a12-14, b28-30. 3. Because it contains an enumeration of all the materials. 4. i.e. we might have something in us (sc. air or water) which is ‘such as to carry’ and sensitive to a sixth kind of sensible property, but we might lack a sixth sense and so not know this, just as an animal that has smell but not sight would not know that there are colours. 5. sunêmmenon; this looks like a slip for proslêpsis, ‘minor premiss’. 6. i.e. if a sense-organ is missing, a sense-object is; but a sense-object is not; so neither is a sense-organ. Contrast the invalid 447,36-9. 7. 81,15-17. 8. Reading sumbebaiousthai for sumbolaiôsasthai, ‘interpret symbolically’ according to Liddell and Scott. 9. Hayduck’s text has lemmata printed by themselves with references to Aristotle by page and line, and quotations printed in the commentary and distinguished by wider spaces between the letters. This passage is printed as a quotation, not as a lemma. The MS P 1914 makes no differentiation between lemmata, quotations and commentary. 10. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 11. i.e. as a reply to the difficulty that there are more sense-objects than sense-organs. 12. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 13. On the second interpretation Aristotle does not commit himself to saying that air and water both figure as materials of olefactory sense-organs. 14. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 15. What is the categorical syllogism? Perhaps that everything perceived incidentally falls into one of the two classes he distinguishes; nothing falling into either class produces an affection; therefore nothing perceived incidentally produces an affection. 16. The Commentator is referring to 425a27-8. Aristotle’s words here should, I think, be translated: ‘But we already have perception of the common objects which is non-incidental common to the special senses’, i.e. they are already perceived of themselves, not incidentally, by sight and touch (cf. 418a8-11). Understood in this way, however, they remove the need for the sort of ‘common sense’ commentators usually attribute to him. Our Commentator, therefore, suggests that he is raising a difficulty, though it is hard to see what the difficulty consists in. 17. What follows has little relation to 426b6-11. The Commentator quotes from these lines at 462,5, but I could believe that he knows of them only from a commentary by Plutarch, and that they are missing from his text.

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Notes to pages 32-45

18. Works and Days 361-2. 19. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 20. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 21. Probably a reference to Metaph. 14.1, 1088a6, not to some treatise by the Commentator. 22. sc. in the perceiver. Taking Aristotle’s statement in this way makes it very difficult to understand – the Commentator shows signs of desperation at 458,1-3 – and we might do better to suppose Aristotle is thinking of changes and stayings unchanged in the object perceived: we differentiate colour, shape and size because they change independently. 23. Plutarch of Athens (died 432); his commentary is lost. 24. 453,29-31. Note the slightly different treatment of this point at 311-12, 315. 25. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 26. Cat. 10a11. Deleting interrogation mark in Hayduck at 458,25 (which is not in t). 27. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 28. OCT brackets the words ‘we see the son of Cleon’. 29. The quotation marks here, omitted by Hayduck, are present in t. 30. This part of the sentence is not printed as part of the lemma by Hayduck. 31. Altering Hayduck’s textual layout. 32. This sentence is printed in parentheses in OCT. 33. OCT: ‘several senses and not just one’. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 34. cf. DA 2.11, 422b23-32 35. Reading dusgnôstotera, ‘harder to know’ for dusgnôsta, ‘hard to know’, as Hayduck suggests. 36. i.e. after-images. 37. Alexander’s commentary on the de Anima is lost, but this theory of consciousness appears in his own de Anima, 65,2-10. 38. i.e. I experienced the motivations of the ‘Spirited Part’ of the psyche, the thumoeidês. 39. Euripides, Orestes 396. 40. This seems inconsistent with 464,28-30. Perhaps the point is not that Plutarch explicitly says opinion is responsible, but that he implies this in saying that the ‘inferior part’ is responsible. 41. A striking anticipation of Hume. 42. epistrephousa, a Plotinian term: see, for instance, Enneads 4.8.4; 5.2.1. 43. Reading epanalabôn for enapolabôn, ‘intercepting’. 44. Punctuating before nun as Wolfgang Bernard suggests: ‘Philoponus on Self-Awareness’ in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London 1987, p. 159n22. 45. Neither this nor the next passage, 425b13-14, nor 425b17 at 468,1-2 is printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 46. Probably a play on words: Aristotle uses ‘first’ (prôton) to indicate the primary subject of seeing, but the Commentator finds it specially apt because this will be coloured prior to seeing. 47. Perhaps we should add, as Hayduck suggests, ‘in some way or other’. 48. i.e. that there is present in the sense knowledge of the universal forms the objects exemplify. 49. pragmatôn, a word used for things as constrasted with thoughts and words. 50. DK 31B109.1 51. A ‘physical’ demonstration, for Aristotle and his followers, is one that starts from premisses belonging to the same discipline as the conclusion, whereas a

Notes to pages 45-52

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‘logical’ one depends on general or non-technical considerations: GA 2, 747b28-30, cf. GC 1.2, 316a11, Metaph. 7.4, 1029b13, EN 7.3, 1147a24. 52. 202a31-b22. 53. Reading legontos for legontes, ‘we remember saying’, at 469,32. 54. e.g. my learning Pythagoras’ thereom from you and your teaching it to me are one and the same process. 55. Correcting tês to tou at 470,14. 56. In the lost commentary, presumably. 57. The context being opaque? 58. See Plato, Theaetetus 156A-E, apparently the Commentator’s source for the Protagoreans, though Plato does not use the same word, gennêma, as he, but ekgona. 59. Reading sunêgageto for eisêgageto, ‘he had introduced’, at 472,4. 60. The Commentator thinks that sound (phônê; strictly speaking sound with pitch, as distinct from noise) is called a ‘consonance’ insofar as it is ‘proportional’ to the sense of hearing, and insofar as it is proportional, the sense (or the air in the sense-organ) receives its form, and has this in common with it. 61. The commentary on the de Anima of Syrianus, disciple and successor of Plutarch at Athens, is lost. 62. i.e. if he had argued: ‘If sound is a consonance, and a consonance is a proportion, and a proportion is destroyed by addition, so is hearing.’ 63. The reference is probably (see my Introduction, p. 2) to the lost chapters of Philoponus’ in de Anima 3. 64. This word, as Hayduck says, has dropped out at 473,27. 65. OCT has: If change and acting [and the affection] are in the thing changed. 66. Physics 3.3, 202a13-b22. 67. The Commentator uses the word dêmiourgos, literally ‘craftsman’, which Plato uses in the Timaeus to refer to the divine maker of the world; like many early readers, he equates this figure in Plato with the Judaeo-Christian God. 68. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 69. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 70. We need not suppose that ‘sounding’ (psophêsis) is here being used to express the idea of a kind of sense-datum like ‘ringing in the ears’. Aristotle defines ‘that which sounds’ (psophêtikon) as ‘that which changes a single quantity of air continuously up to hearing’ (DA 2.8, 420a3-4). A string’s doing this, as distinct from merely vibrating, is ‘sounding’. 71. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 72. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 73. sc. as actual. 74. A slip: the Commentator means the Theaetetus. 75. The Commentator reads ei dê sumphônia phônê tis estin. OCT reads ei d’ hê phônê sumphônia tis estin, ‘if sound is a kind of consonance’. The original manuscript will have had, without spaces or breathings, eidê. The Commentator defends reading this as he does – though he takes eidê as one word, ‘if indeed’, and not as OCT does, ‘if ’ followed by the definite article. 76. prosdiorismoi, the technical term for quantifiers like ‘all’, ‘some’: for the equivalence of the definite article to the universal quantifier, see Stephanus in de Interpretatione 67,3-27; for the impropriety of attaching a quantifier to a predicate, 29,17-22. 77. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT brackets ‘and in a way not one’. 78. The text here, as Hayduck says, is dubious, though the meaning seems clear enough.

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Notes to pages 52-68

79. Bracketed in OCT. 80. Aristotle introduced the use of nun, the Greek word for ‘now’, to signify a durationless instant (Physics 4.10, 218a6, a24 etc.) 81. It does not modify ‘arrived’. 82. See note on ‘physical’, 469,29. The preceding account is ‘logical’, because Aristotle uses objects of mathematics as a model for psychological processes. 83. See Introduction, pp. 5, 11. The pneumatic body of the Neoplatonists, being separable, is not composed of Aristotle’s pneuma (see MA 10) which seems to be a kind of physical gas; though a couple of lines below the Commentator refers to it simply as ‘the pneuma’. 84. 23b3-7. But the example about black and white is not in this passage, but can be found in Plato, Timaeus 67E. 85. ostreinon. This is presumably a reference to the ordinary, earthen, as distinct from the pneumatic or the heavenly body: for the word, compare Proclus, in Timaeum 237,26 and 29. 86. Theaetetus 184D. 87. OCT reads ‘we also discern’. 88. Because reason does apprehend sense-objects, using sense as an instrument. 89. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 90. Reading toutesti sômatos for esti sômati, ‘inseparable in body’ at 483,30. 91. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 92. OCT omits ‘in time’. 93. OCT has ‘so it is also divided’. 94. In place of ‘discerning’, krinein, OCT has phronein, ‘exercising judgement’. 95. DK 31B106. 96. The tag from Hippocrates used at 472,20. 97. Reading mêtin for aisthêsin, ‘sense’, at 486,6, as Hayduck suggests. 98. phronêsis, here, however, meaning thought generally. 99. i.e. differences in waking experiences result in differences in dreams. cf. DK 31B108. 100. Odyssey 18.136-7. The Commentator completes the quotation; Aristotle quotes only the first phrase. 101. Euripides Hippolytus 701. 102. i.e. the world of coming to be in which we live, as contrasted with the Platonic world of being. 103. Theaetetus 152-83. 104. 479,22-480,3; 483,18-31. 105. The Commentator seems to mean by this (as the word he uses, hippokentauros, suggests) a mixture of a horse and a bull. 106. sunkatathesis, a Stoic term. 107. Hayduck prints these words as part of the commentary, but they are certainly a quotation, and probably a lemma. Aristotle’s reference is probably to 404b7ff.; the Empedoclean fragment quoted here is quoted at 404b13-15. 108. i.e. for ‘Since people define the soul’ etc., 429a17-18; see 489,9-11. 109. i.e. deliberation about whether or not to do them at all, not about how to achieve an objective already decided upon. 110. Homer, Odyssey 22.1. 111. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 112. i.e. his illustration of thinking not rightly. 113. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 114. Reading hautê for autê with the OCT. 115. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck.

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116. Reading hautê for autê and phantasian before legô at 492,10. Hayduck thinks that dianoia has replaced phantasia at this line and 492,11, but it is hard to think how such a corruption could have occurred. 117. OCT brackets ‘thinking’, noêsis, expecting us to understand ‘imagination’. 118. Euripides, Hippolytus 612. 119. A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, Adespota 317, Hildesheim 1964, p. 899. 120. Reading akontes, ‘against our will’, for hekontes, ‘of our own free will’ at 493,4. 121. See R. Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, London 1972, pp. 22-34. It is tempting to read topous, ‘places’, for tupous, ‘imprints’, at 493,7. 122. sc. from birth: cf. 417b16-18. 123. Reading hoiosoun with the MSS; but perhaps we should read oios ê, ‘or a sheep’s’. 124. See 413b21-4, 414b1-16. Aristotle is not as straightforward as the Commentator here suggests. There is some discrepancy between his treatment of the matter here and the treatment in Philoponus’ commentary on Book 2, 240,7-15 and 254,23-31. 125. Reading prosklisei instead of prosklêsei, ‘invocation’, at 497,9, as Hayduck suggests. Habituation is like a plant’s being trained into a shape by having its branches bent. 126. Or perhaps ‘through argument’. 127. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 128. As at 428a12-15, discussed above 496,2-4. 129. phantasma, an Aristotelian term for a mental image. 130. ek metaphoras. metaphora literally means a carrying across from one thing to another. 131. See on 488,18. 132. The Commentator is probably led to offer this tortuous interpretation because his text asserts at 428a3 that imagination is one of the powers by which we discern and think truly or falsely. In the OCT Ross inserts an interrogative particle, making Aristotle ask if it is one of these powers. This gives a better sense. 133. So quoted at line 33 below; the OCT has ‘and’. 428a4-5 is not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 134. aisthêton; perhaps a slip for noêton, ‘object of intellect’. 135. Instead of taking tês energeiai as an adverbial phrase, ‘the same in actuality’, as I have translated it, they supply aisthêsei, ‘the same as actual sense’. 136. Perhaps in view of lines 20-2 below we should insert ou, ‘he does not imagine’. 137. See 464,8 above. 138. See above, 466,12-15. 139. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 140. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 141. OCT omits ‘if ’. 142. OCT brackets these lines 428a22-4, which are, in fact, rather a repetition than an establishment of 428a19-22. 143. The MSS have here ‘If I say that imagination is opinion with sense’, which Hayduck rightly brackets. 144. e.g. ‘I swear by my head ’ 145. That is, if the original opinion has been destroyed, opinion and sense are no longer combatants, and it is not absurd if imagination consists of them. 146. i.e. a compound in which opinion and sense do not stay intact, cf. 502,3-4. 147. Sophist 264B.

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Notes to pages 80-95

148. 35A. 149. The Commentator confuses the Eleatic Stranger with Socrates, and includes among the varieties of ‘that which is not’ some that do not appear in the Sophist. The words ‘super-real’ (huperousios) and ‘sub-real’ (metousios) are not Platonic, but the Republic (6.509B) speaks of what is superior to being, epekeina tês ousias, and space in the Timaeus (49-51) is perhaps inferior. 150. See 428a12-14, but cf. 466,17 above. 151. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 152. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT reads: And because the opinion will not be about anything other than that, if it is, of which there is also sense. 153. OCT: true opinion. 154. OCT: if it still has it. 155. A difficult text. See Ross 1961, p. 288. 156. Themistius does at 92,4-7 say that imagination sometimes acts simultaneously with sense, though he does not deduce this from the statement that imagination acts through sense as an intermediary. 157. The Commentator may be thinking of 425b5-11. 158. i.e. it sags in the middle. I am assuming that êrtêmenon (from a verb meaning ‘attach to’, ‘suspend from’) kalôn (from kalôs, ‘rope’) means a tight-rope, though I have not found this example elsewhere in the literature of the Argument from Illusion. 159. That is, presumably, shape is what we are mistaken about; colour is responsible for the mistake. 160. phanthenta; Aristotle does not use this word in our text, but derives phantasia, ‘imagination’, from phôs, ‘light’. 161. phanerôthenta, another cognate word. 162. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 163. See above, 507,10. 164. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 165. sc. that we may act and be affected in accordance with it. 166. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 167. OCT supplies from 428b24. 168. OCT: ‘And the change which comes about through the agency of the activity of the sense will differ.’ 169. i.e. the words should be reordered as in the OCT. As the Commentator’s text stands, it is most naturally taken to mean: ‘The change which comes about through the agency of the activity of sense will differ from sense’; the OCT seems rather to mean: ‘The changes which come about from through the agency of the activity of sense will differ from one another (sc. as do the three kinds of sense).’ The commentary seems to want to find both meanings. 170. cf. Themistius 93,16-18. 171. Neither this nor 429a6 below is printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 172. i.e. if there is nothing it cannot have as an object of thought. 173. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 174. i.e. separable and inseparable (429a11-12). 175. Aristotle’s GA 2.2, 736b15-29 was understood by ancient commentators to imply that the intellect, or some part of it, enters the human body thurathen, ‘from outside’. I discuss this passage in Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (eds), ‘Aristotle on the place of mind in nature’ in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, Cambridge 1987, 412-14. In my opinion the only parts or capacities of the soul that Aristotle wants to have enter ‘from outside’ are those that enter the female with the semen at conception, and no sort of intellect does this.

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176. i.e. knowledge of the forms of things. 177. This account agrees partly but not wholly with what Philoponus says in the de Intellectu. The points about theology (518,36-519,1) and the intellect’s being a part of the soul (519,1-5) appear at 46,80-3 and 66,82-4, but as points against Alexander only, not against him and Plutarch together, and the objections to Alexander and Plutarch severally (519,15-520,6) do not appear (though Philoponus does note (37,81-38,84) that Plato held the view our Commentator attributes to Plutarch). If our Commentator did not have access to Ammonius independently of Philoponus, we must suppose that in most of what he says about Alexander and Plutarch here he is no longer reproducing Ammonius but speaking in propria persona. The opinion he attributes to Plutarch as a mistake ‘peculiar to himself ’ (519,38) is declared by Philoponus to be true (38,99-39,15, cf. 45,53; 48,28). 178. The first way of being potentially f is by being suitably constructed for receiving f; the second is having the relevant disposition. 179. This is, of course, the opposite of the reason given at 517,21-5 and below, 522,31-2. 180. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 181. problêma, a word that also appears in the parallel passage in Philoponus, de Intellectu, 7,41. 182. Paraphrasing ‘whether it is separable, or not separable in magnitude but in account’. 183. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 184. The gobbet is actually ‘if thinking is like perceiving’ (429a13-14). 185. Sense is receptive of forms but is not unaffected. 186. The Commentator takes ‘what is alien’, to allotrion, not as subject but as object, and understands: ‘[its own form] appearing alongside, impedes [the cognition of] what is alien’; similarly Alexander, de Anima 84,15-16. 187. empsukhiai; the word, however, is not in fact Platonic. 188. Phaedrus 245C. 189. OCT: think through itself. 190. Learning is a matter of mastering proofs, e.g. in mathematics, whereas discovery is conducting empirical research. 191. So the OCT continues; the Commentator’s text seems to have had a different punctuation: see 529,9 and note below. 192. anous, an echo, perhaps, of Plotinus, Enneads 5.9.2. 193. Perhaps a reference to 417b2-16, though there Aristotle speaks of the two kinds of affection as destructive and preservative, not destructive and perfective. 194. This looks like a reference to the Analytics but it is not clear what particular text the Commentator has in mind. In Posterior Analytics 1.4 Aristotle discusses grounds on which a thing may be said to be ‘in virtue of itself ’ something and seems to imply that if what is odd is in virtue of itself a number, then numbers are in virtue of themselves odd or even. 195. Literally ‘from indoors’, oikothen, a word expressing the opposite of thurathen, ‘from outside’. 196. ‘The Demiurge’; but the name and doctrine are rather Platonic than Aristotelian. 197. ‘Providence’ ought to mean ‘seeing in advance’, but the Greek word it translates, pronoia, means ‘thinking in advance’. The Commentator’s suggestion that it means ‘in advance of thinking’ is a characteristic play on words; cf. 469,18-20; 497,25; 513,18-19. 198. That is, if it is by virtue of being intellect that intellect is an object of

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thought to itself, then anything that is an object of thought to itself will, by virtue of that, be intellect. 199. I have not found a place where Plotinus says quite this, though Hayduck suggests that here and below at 535,8-9 the reference is to Enneads 5.9.5. There is a helpful discussion of the Commentator’s (not wholly consistent) reports of Plotinus by H. Blumenthal in Aristotle Transformed pp. 312-15. 200. Phaedrus 245C. 201. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 202. This distinction does not appear in the Categories, where there is no mention of matter or matter and form together, though Aristotle does use ‘being this’ locutions, e.g. 1a5; in Physics 2.2, 194a1-7 Aristotle distinguishes things ‘said like snubnosed’ and things ‘said like curved’, but the most relevant discussions are in Metaphysics 7. 203. The Commentator probably has in mind the difference between, say, a foot of rope (a magnitude) and being a foot long. What I express by ‘this’ and ‘[being] this’ the Commentator expresses by the accusative and dative case inflections (see below 529,4, 529,12). 204. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. OCT closes parentheses after ‘the same’, and makes ‘being flesh and flesh’ part of the next sentence. This punctuation would have saved the Commentator the need to attribute contempt for examples at 529,14-15. 205. airiakê, here and below at 529,14. We might expect ‘nominative’ (eutheia), but Aristotle used the accusative at 429b13. 206. The Commentator here alters Aristotle’s words. 207. Concavity in a nose: see Metaph. 7, 1030b16-20. 208. The Commentator is probably thinking of 429b21-2. 209. Because ‘with something else’, allôi, is separated from ‘it discerns’, krinei. 210. Following Hayduck’s suggestion and reading to euthei einai kai to euthu from Aristotle’s text instead of the dubiously grammatical to euthu einai at 531,13. 211. OCT: ‘But the essence, if being straight is something other than straight, is something else.’ 212. Following Hayduck’s suggestion and reading to euthu tou euthei einai for to euthu einai at 531,21. 213. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 214. The Commentator is referring to 429b28, ‘and [if] what is an object of intellect is one in form’, though in fact this seems to relate more to the third problem that the second. He seems to be using ‘one in number’ not in the usual sense of ‘one individual and not two’ but to express total and not merely generic sameness in form; cf. Aristotle Topics 1.9, 103a9-10. 215. Perhaps a slip for ‘third’. 216. i.e. as Plato. 217. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 218. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 219. OCT brackets ‘just as’. 220. i.e. it is part of the soul. 221. The account of the four lines of interpretation which follows resembles that of Philoponus in the de Intellectu 43,18-45,59, and may derive partly from it. A valuable discussion of the account here is provided by H.J. Blumenthal: ‘Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima commentaries’, in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1990, pp. 311-20. 222. Literally ‘demonic’, but ‘demon’ (daimôn) in this context has no pejorative significance. Socrates had a daimôn that was entirely benign. A daimôn is a

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supernatural being, inferior to a god and not, like a angel, tied to Judaeo-Christian theology. 223. See above on 528,26. 224. de Anima 89,18. 225. The argument is taken from Plato, Phaedo 105. 226. Aristotle does not explicitly call it ‘psychical’, the Commentator relies on his saying that there is a matter-cause distinction ‘in the soul’ (430a13). 227. proagei, a neutral word; Peter Lautner suggests emending to paragei which in Neoplatonic writing is used for the action specifically of an efficient cause. 228. The first way is by ‘suitability’. I am potentially a reader in the first way if my bodily structure is such that I can learn to read; I am potentially a reader in the second if I have learnt to read but am not now exercising the ability; v. DA 2.5, 417a22-8. 229. As it stands the sentence is ungrammatical; some words have probably dropped out. 230. Reading graphei at 538,6 with D instead of grapheiôi, ‘paintbrush’. The reference is to Philebus 39B. 231. Phys. 2.1, 193b6. 232. In this sentence the same Greek word, energeiâi, is translated ‘by activity’ and ‘in actuality’. The Commentator seems to be influenced by this, but the whole passage is best understood if we suppose he does not confuse the two notions. He takes Aristotle’s words to mean literally that actual intellect is ‘by [virtue of] its substance activity’; he thinks these are equivalent to ‘it acts by [virtue of] its substance’; he believes Aristotle really means ‘it acts by virtue of knowledge’ and he suggests Aristotle uses ‘substance’ instead of ‘knowledge’ because knowledge stands to intellect as its form or (in one sense of that word, see DA 2.1, 412a10) its actuality. Compare Philoponus, de Intellectu 57,75-58,96. 233. Homer, Iliad 8.281. 234. The words ‘that this is so is clear’ have been inserted by the Commentator (or are a doublet of the preceding words and should be bracketed) and the rest of the quotation is less than word-perfect. 235. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 236. Points 1 and 4 in the continuous exposition. 237. He does not say this but ‘in all nature’, that is, throughout the natural world. 238. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 239. Point 7. 240. See note on 537,34. 241. OCT: actuality. 242. Point 6. 243. Point 2. 244. i.e. not because it it does not act by virtue of a power. 245. Point 8. 246. Point 3. 247. Point 5. 248. The term used by Plato at Phaedo 105-6. 249. The Greek word ‘part’, morion, is neuter, whereas ‘intellect’, nous, is masculine. The use of ‘part of soul’ to which the Commentator refers is not in this chapter but at the beginning of chapter 4, 429a10. 250. Point 9. 251. Instead of gnôstikon, ‘that which is cognitive’, at 541,22 we should perhaps read gnôston, ‘its object of cognition’, especially as even before being separated

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Notes to pages 121-127

intellect can produce objects of thought from itself (429b7). Plutarch may be referring to the problem raised at 430a5-6. 252. The Commentator is probably refering to the description of the Plague, 2.49.8, though the quotation is not word for word. 253. Only two appear in what follows. Perhaps a sentence has dropped out or perhaps, as Hayduck suggests, we should amend ‘there’ to ‘two’. 254. Point 10. 255. Probably, as Hayduck suggests, a reference to Phaedo 66D, though Plato does not specifically mention imagination there. 256. The one Greek word adiairêtos has to be translated sometimes ‘indivisible’ and sometimes ‘undivided’. Similarly with diairêtos, ‘divisible’ or ‘divided’. It is usually clear which translation is more appropriate, but some of the heavy weather made both by Aristotle and by his commentators is to be accounted for by the ambiguity of the Greek terms. 257. The reference is to Post. An. 1.3,72b23-5. The word horos, however, which the Commentator uses in the sense of ‘term’ is probably used by Aristotle in that passage in the sense of ‘definition’. 258. Not in so many words. 259. cf. Philoponus, de Intellectu 65,56-66,71, where there is a fivefold classification that is very similar but not identical; again our Commentator could be borrowing. 260. See 16a19-21, b6-9, and the commentary of Stephanus 8,30ff. 261. i.e. to say ‘a yard’ or ‘an angel’. 262. Accepting Hayduck’s insertion. 263. 16a9-16. 264. 9.10, 1051b17ff, where Aristotle speaks of ‘touching’, thigein. 265. I have not found these words in Plotinus, but Enneads 5.3.17 speaks of intellect as ‘making contact’, ephapsasthai. 266. DK 31B57. Empedocles actually said that many neckless heads did arise – a line of which Aristotle seems to have been particularly fond. 267. In postclassical Greek the same word is used for time and for the grammatical feature of words and sentences we call ‘tense’. Here as below the Commentator, who is interested in grammar, probably uses it in the grammatical sense; and he probably takes Aristotle to use it in that sense at 430a31 (548,3 below), though it is doubtful if the word had acquired this technical use when Aristotle wrote. 268. The token-reflexive expression ‘yesterday’ (khthes) is treated as a tenseindicator, as by D.H. Mellor in Real Time. 269. cf. de Interpretatione 16a12-13 and Stephanus’ commentary 6,22-5. 270. sc. wholes, retaining auta at 546,23; but it might be better to read auto, ‘it’. 271. There seems to be some confusion between saying that if the whole is not present to thought at an instant, some part of it is not present at that instant, and saying that if the whole is not present at an instant, it is not present throughout the time to which that instant belongs. 272. Homer, Odyssey 12.92. 273. A reference to Genesis 1. 274. The choice seems to be between supposing that there are two distinct things, an act of divine thinking and saying, and a physical outcome, the latter being an effect of the former, and supposing that there is a single divine act which may appear to us either as a piece of thinking and saying or as a physical outcome. 275. That is, either as source of change or as final cause. 276. An allusion, perhaps, to evil spirits.

Notes to pages 127-132

163

277. As Hayduck says, words to this effect have dropped out. 278. Hayduck, I think unnecessarily, inserts hoion in 548,10 to give ‘If you say that a pale thing such as Socrates ’. 279. The meaning seems to be that the composition of subject and predicate in the speech does not ‘fit’ the composition of things and property in reality. 280. The Commentator does not note the difference between this suggestion, that saying Socrates is not pale is a special way of predicating pallor of him, from the suggestion of 546,10, that it is predicating darkness of him. 281. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 282. i.e. take hekaston in to dê hen poioun touto ho nous hekaston as coming immediately after poioun. 283. So Physics 4.13, 222a10-12. 284. i.e. we use ‘now’ for the present time-stretch, which might be quite extended – today, modern times, the post-glacial epoch: see Physics 4.13, 222a21-3. 285. This seems to be a play on words. The word I translate ‘twofold’ here, dikhôs, expresses the idea of something cut asunder. 286. The Commentator surely means that Aristotle uses ‘undivided time’ in place of ‘now’; but it is doubtful if he does. He seems rather to be comparing thinking of an undivided length and thinking of the parts separately with travelling continuously for a time and travelling for two time-stretches interrupted by a stop. 287. Editors of Aristotle transpose this sentence to 430b20. But Aristotle’s thought in these lines is difficult to follow on any reading. The Commentator seems to be commenting on the following text: ‘But that which is indivisible not in respect of quantity but in form, it thinks in an indivisible time and with an indivisible part of the soul. But it is incidentally, and not insofar as those things [the forms in matter] are divisible, but insofar as they are indivisible, that that with which [the soul] thinks and the time in which it thinks are indivisible. For there is something indivisible in them also, though perhaps inseparable, which makes the time [in which they are thought] and the magnitude one. And this is present likewise in every continuum, both time and length. 288. OCT: that which thinks. 289. This interpretation is mentioned by Philoponus, de Intellectu 77,63-86. 290. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 291. Line 551,28 is certainly corrupt, and the corruption either extends to or renders unintelligible the next two lines. I supply some words to introduce what follows, but it is unclear how the indivisible element in imagination can be in every continuum. 292. Understanding en holôi esti at 551,33-4 as ‘is present in every’ on the strength of Pr. An. 1.1, 24b26-7. 293. The same word is used to express privation, or a lack of something, and negation or denial. An instant is conceived as not extended in time, a point as not extended in length, a line as not extended in width, a surface as not extended in depth; each is known by ‘denial’ of some mode of continuous extension. 294. kalou; one might have expected ‘good’, agathou. 295. The OCT obelises the last clause; the Commentator takes the whole lemma to mean ‘That which knows must be potentially [what the thing known is actually] and the object of intellect must be [potentially] in it’. 296. OCT obelises ‘of the causes’. 297. The OCT here reads ‘and is actuality’ (or ‘activity’), energeia, following Simplicius and Themistius. The Commentator seems to have read ‘and is in actuality’, energeiâi with our MSS of Aristotle.

164

Notes to pages 133-141

298. It looks as though ‘potentially’ in this sentence has become displaced, and we should understand: ‘As the thing thought is, so should the thinker too be potentially.’ 299. The Commentator is going by the words tôn aitiôn at 430,25, which the OCT obelises. 300. OCT: as is denial. 301. This word is not in Plato’s surviving works. 302. Hayduck punctuates ‘I thought and I fed’ as a single utterance, making the statement pointless. 303. i.e. subject matters. 304. At Republic 1, 331C Plato says that returning the pledged sword to the maniac is bad, but not that it is true. 305. OCT: as is denial. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 306. It looks as if the Commentator at 430b27 reads ho de nous ou pas pseudetai, where our MSS have only ho de nous ou pas. 307. Some words have dropped out, possibly including ‘falsehood’ and the name of another commentator, e.g. ‘Falsehood is mentioned, Plutarch says, because of practical intellect’. 308. This is implied at 554,20-5, since practical intellect is a kind of dianoia, and elsewhere, e.g. in the division at 490,20-34. But there ‘subject’ means that which thinks; here it means the subject-matter thought about. 309. OCT obelises ‘of what is proper’. 310. The readings are holôs and haplôs. This passage is the only evidence for the second. 311. Literally, ‘out of ’ (ek). The Commentator is using Aristotle’s words at 431a3-4: ‘All things that come to be do so out of what is in actuality [as they are]’, but whereas the other interpreters to whom he refers apparently understand the preposition as introducing the material cause, he seems to understand it as introducing the efficient cause. He also seems to understand Aristotle as saying at 431a3-4 ‘There is one actual thing such that all things come from it’ rather than ‘For everything that arises there is something actual from which it comes.’ 312. Alteration, change of size, change of place and coming into being: see, e.g., Physics 3.1, 201a11-15. 313. a6-7; cf. Phys. 3.2, 201b31-3 314. metabolê, a more general word than kinêsis, ‘change’, cf. Physics 5.1, 224a21-b10. 315. An obscure warning. Perhaps the Commentator means that we should not be misled by the analogy into identifying practical intellect and judgement with mere sentience. 316. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 317. OCT: ‘are the same’. 318. i.e. what experiences pleasure and what experiences distress. 319. Retaining the MSS krustalloeidê in place of Hayduck’s emendation en tôi krustalloeidei, ‘power in that which is of crystalline form’. For that which is of crystalline form, see 448,19. 320. sc. as a mean relatively to objects proper to it, see lines 11-12 above. 321. OCT: stand each to each. 322. As the text stands, there is a lacuna here. We could eliminate it by reading hopôs for hoti hôsper in 561,3; ‘Having said how the common sense stands to the proper objects ’ 323. The Commentator reads Aristotle as asking why it is puzzling how we know white is different from black if it is not puzzling how we know white is

Notes to pages 141-144

165

different from sweet. It is more natural to read him as asking the reverse, why it is puzzling how we know white is different from sweet if it is not puzzling how we know white is different from black. On any reading, however, 431a20-431b1 are extremely difficult lines. It is hard to be confident about any reconstruction either of Aristotle’s thought or of his original text. 324. In Greek the letters A, B, C etc., serve as numberals in place of the arabic 1, 2, 3 etc. In Aristotle’s text the letters are used; in our text they are replaced by the words ‘first’, ‘second’ etc. 325. OCT brackets ‘as they are to each other’. 326. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 327. 431a27: ‘so also alternando’. This should mean: if A is to B as C is to D, then A is to C as B is to D; as white is to the account of white, so sweet is to the account of sweet. 328. OCT: and those ones likewise. 329. A very difficult piece of text. The words I have supplied follow the manuscripts of Aristotle; if that is the text the Commentator had, he perhaps understands Aristotle to be saying that as that to which white and black belong may be the same and one in subject but not in being, so may be that to which perception or knowledge of white and black belong. Ross thinks (Ross 1961 p. 305) that the Commentator read ‘If D and B should belong to one thing, the situation will be as if C and A did’, and amends accordingly; his ‘those ones’ for ‘that one’ is also an emendation. He takes C and D, however, to be further objects of sense, sweetness and bitterness, which is clearly not the Commentator’s understanding. Further on the text see Hamlyn, pp. 146-7. The passage is not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 330. Ross takes ‘by that which is common’ with the words that follow: ‘perceiving a beacon to be fire, and seeing by the sensus communis that it is moving, one knows that it belongs to the enemy’ (Ross 1961, p. 302). Hamlyn follows Bywater in deleting ‘by that which is common’. This passage is not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 331. The text as we have it here makes no sense, but I am not sure the corruption is very deep. The people the Commentator is criticising take Aristotle to be saying that we get to know that the light (whether torchlight or a beacon) is fire by its movement. The Commentator thinks this is confusing the object of the common sense with the common sense itself; that by which we get to know, is the capacity which gets to know, not that from which something is inferred. 332. Taking the Commentator’s text to be: ta de en aphairesei legomena noei hôsper an ei to simon, hêi men simon ou, kekhôrismenôs de hêi kampulon ei tis enoei, aneu tês sarkos an enoei en hêi to kampulon – houtô ta mathêmatika ou kekhôrismena hôs kekhôrismena noei hotan noêi ekeina. The OCT reads: ta de en aphairesei legomena hôsper, ei to simon hêi men simon ou, kekhôrismenôs de hôi koilon [ei tis] enoei energeiâi, aneu tês sarkos an enoei en hêi to koilon – houtô ta mathêmatika ou kekhôrismena , hôs kekhôrismena noei, hotan noêi ekeina. This might be translated: ‘But abstract things as they are called, just as if someone were in actuality to think snubnosed not as snubnosed but as hollow, he would think it without the flesh in which the hollow is – so it thinks objects of mathematics, though they are not separated, as separated when it thinks them as themselves. Further on Aristotle’s text see Hamlyn and Ross 1961 ad loc. 333. 429b10-18; see 528,34ff. and notes. 334. See Plato, Phaedo 81C-E. 335. 432a3-14, according to the Commentator. It is difficult, however, to discern this threefold classification in those lines, and still harder to find Aristotle saying

166

Notes to pages 144-151

what the Commentator would like him to say, that thought about completely non-material things does not involve imagination. 336. The first plea is derived from 431b17-19; the three that follow are extracted from 432a3-13, and in the detailed commentary below they are numbered first to third, not second to fourth. 337. At Theaetetus 186B-C Plato says that sense does not attain to ousia; ousia here does not mean quite what is means in Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, but Plato would certainly deny that it is by sense that we grasp the nature of a natural kind. 338. ‘For’ (gar) at 564,31 is inserted by Hayduck. But it might be better to omit this sentence altogether, since it seems pointless. D omits the preceding sentence, suggesting that there has been dittography. 339. The defence is that the division into parts is of the genus, soul, into species, and that a species of soul, e.g. vegetable (‘physical’) or animal (‘non-rational’), is divided into powers. 340. Republic 9, 588-9. 341. A useful word, not in Liddell and Scott, the meaning of which is clear. A system like ours in which election by ballot is used to secure ‘the best’ rulers would count as aristodemocratic. 342. By modern standards this account of what Plato says is far from accurate. 343 The purpose of this suggestion is to avoid having to fit ‘abstract things’ into the construction of the sentence that follows. Ross translated his similar text: ‘As regards abstract things, it is as if one had thought of the snub ’ (1961, p. 302). 344. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 345. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 346. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 347. Not printed as a lemma by Hayduck. 348. The Commentator is not usually willing to give such a handle to a Plutarchian interpretation of Aristotle. 349. The words the Commentator thinks are out of place are probably ‘it is thought’. 350. Either non-material objects of intellect or intermediate objects of intellect or forms in matter: see 563,12-13. 351. How is imagination the subject of mathematics? Perhaps because mathematicians have to use mental images, according to the Berkeleyan account in de Memoria 450a1-7. 352. Inserting ê after enuloi at 568,24 as Hayduck suggests. ‘Lives’, zôai, here probably means vital powers or souls. 353. OCT: ‘neither would a person who perceives nothing learn or understand anything’. 354. Reading trita at 568,28 in place of tria ‘three’, since of the three kinds of object of intellect, the first are not sense-objects. 355. See Posterior Analytics 1.18 and 2.19. 356. An inaccurate quotation of Post. An. 1.17, 81a38-9. 357. There is a lacuna here; ‘use’ has almost certainly dropped out, and possibly some further words. 358. The ‘it’ (hautês) is presumably imagination. 359. Referred to also by Philoponus, de Intellectu 117,1. 360. There is a case for reading tauta, ‘these’, with Ross 1961, following Themistius, in place of ta alla, ‘the others’, which, though the Commentator does not remark on it, is extremely hard to understand. 361. 565,7-566,7, concerning the next chapter of the de Anima.

English-Greek Glossary abstract: en aphairesei abstraction: aphairesis absurd, absurdity: atopon abundance: pleonazein account: logos accurately: akribôs speak accurately: kuriolektein accusative (case): aitiakê across, lead across: metagein act: energein act on: dran act together: sunergein acting: hupokrisis not by way of acting: anupokritôs action: pragma right action: katorthôma actuality: energeia; entelekheia in actuality: kat’ energeian; energeiâi; entelekheiâi acute: drimus addition: prosthêkê adduce: enistasthai adjudicate: epikrinein advocate, plead as an advocate: sunêgorein afar, from afar: telaugôs affect, be affected: paskhein be affected in turn: antipaskhein affection: pathos age, old age: gêras agent: poioun agitate: tarattein be agitated: ptoeisthai agree with: suntithesthai aim: skopos air: aêr alien: allotrios alive, be alive: zên all cases, not in all cases: ou pantôs alongside, appear alongside: paremphainesthai always in motion: aeikinêtos always living: aeizôos

alter: alloioun alteration: alloiôsis alternando: enallax ambiguous, in an ambigous way: amphibolôs analogous to: analogos be analogous to: analogein analogy: analogia analytically: kat’ analusin angel: angelos angelic: angelikos anger: thumos angle: gônia animal: zôon animate: empsukhos animation: empsukhia ant: murmêx appear alongside: paremphainesthai appetition: orexis have appetition for: oregesthai object of appetition: orekton appetitive: orektikos approach: epiballein; prosballein aquatic: enudros arbitrary: apoklêrôtikos argument: epikheirêsis; logos aristocracy: aristokratia aristodemocracy: aristodêmokratia arithmetical discourses: arithmêtikoi logoi arrange in order: diakosmein arrangement, good arrangement: eukosmia article (gr.): arthron articulate fully: diarthroun articulation: diarthrôsis ascent: anabasis assent (v.): sunkatatithesthai assent (n.): sunkatathesis assertion: kataphasis assumption (preliminary): lêmma assumptions: keimenon

168

Indexes

assurance, derive assurance, obtain assurance: pistousthai astronomy: astronomia think about astronomy: astronomein atemporally: akhronôs attach: sunagein attack (v.): apoteinesthai attack (n.): epiboulê; katadromê attempt: prosbolê attending to : katanoêsis attentive: prosektikon attunement: harmonia audition: akousis awkward: phortikos baby: paidion back away: anapodizein bad: kakos balance, that hangs in the: ampheristos bath: loutron be: einai; huparkhein in being: tôi einai thing that is: on coming to be: genesis beard: geneion bee: melissa; melitta belong: huparkhein belonging to another: allotrios belonging properly to: oikeios bending: prosklisis between, what has been said in between: metaxulogia bewitch: goêteuein bid: epitrepein black: melas blind: ektuphloun blind rat: aspalax blow: plêgê blunt: ambluôttein be blunted: amblunesthai bodily: sômatikos body: sôma of body: sômatikos body-loving: philosômatos book: logos boundary: horos brain: enkephalos bread: artos break: klan break off: apokoptein; diakoptein break up: diakoptein; ekluein

breast: mastos; mazos breathing: anapnoê breathing (gr.), with a rough breathing: daseôs brief, in brief: suntomôs bring about, that brings about: poiêtikos bright: lampros bring along: khorêgein bring forth: proagein bring forward: epagein bring into use: proskhrêsthai bring out: prokheirizesthai bring together: sunathroizein bring under: anagein build into: enkatoikodomein burden: phortion burrowing: katadusis business, attend to the business of another: allotriopragein attend to one’s own business: idiopragein camel: kamêlos capture, try to capture: thêreuein careless: rhaithumos carpenter: tekton carry: bastazein; diakonein serve to carry: diakonein such as to carry: diakonêtês case (gr.): ptôsis categorical: katêgorikos cause: aitia; aition; see efficient, final, instrumental, material, primary cave: spêlaion censure: kakizein centre: kentron certainly: pantôs champion: aristeus change (v. tr.): kinein; metaballein; ameibein (n.): kinêsis; metabolê that changes: kinêtikos be without changing: akinêtein without change: akinêtos change along with: sunkinein character: êthos characterise: kharaktêrizein chewing: masêsis chill: psuxis chime in with: sumphônein choice: proairesis

English-Greek Glossary choose: proaireisthai circle: kuklos in a circle: kuklikos citizen of heaven: ouranopolitês clarify: saphênizein clarity, lack of clarity: asapheia clause, main clause: apodosis clean up: anakathairein close, come close to: prosomilein close up: sustellesthai clutch: drassasthai coarse-grained: pakhumerês cohere: sumphuesthai cold: psukhros collect together: sunagein colour (n.): khroa; khroia; khrôma (v. tr.): khrômatizein colouring: khrômatismos; khrôsis comb: smênê come before: protereuein come close to: prosomilein come in: epiphoitan commensurability: summetria commensurable: summetros comment: hupomnêmatizein commentary, detailed commentary: lexis commentators: hupomnêsantes common: koinos thing in common: koinônia have something in common: koinônein community: koinônia compact: sunkrinein compare: sunkrinein complete (a differentiation, v.): holotelôs eipein complete (adj.): teleios completely perfect: panteleios composite: sunthetos composition: sunthesis concave: koilos conceive: epinoein conception: epinoia conclude, draw conclusion: sunagein conclusion: sumperasma concurrent: sundromos condition, further condition: prosdiorismos conditional premiss: sunêmmenon confirm: sumbebaiousthai confuse: sunkhein

169

confused: sunkekhumenos confusion: sunkhusis conjure: horkoun conjuration: horkos connective: prosthesis; sundesmos conscience: sunesis conscious, be conscious: sunaisthanesthai; suneidenai heautôi consciousness: sunaisthêsis consistent: amakhos consonance: sumphônia constellations, make into constellations: katasterizein constitution: politeia construct: plekein construction: plokê contact: thixis container: angeion contemplate: theôrein thing we contemplate: theôrêton contemplative: theôrêtikos contemplatively: theôrêtikôs contemporary: homokhronos contemptuous, be contemptuous of: kataphronein continuity: sunekheia continuous: sunekhês contradict: enantiousthai contradiction: enantiotês contradistinction: antidiastolê contradistinguish: antidiairein; antiastellein contrary: enantios be contrary to: enantiousthai contribute: suntelein contributory cause: paraition control: kuria control oneself: enkrateuesthai being out of control: akrateia convention, by convention: nomôi conversion: antistrophê undergo a conversion: tropeisthai convert: antistrephein convex: kurtos convict: dialenkhein; exelenkhein conviction, rational conviction: pistis convince, be rationally convinced: pisteuein cooking: mageirikê cooking term: mageirikon onoma cool: psuktos

170

Indexes

corollary: porisma correct: diorthoun cosmos: kosmos above the cosmos: huperkosmios in the cosmos: enkosmios counter, run counter to: enantiousthai counteract: antiprattein cover, be covered over: epikaluptesthai covering: khitôn; skepê crane: geranos creator: dêmiourgos credited, be credited: philotimeisthai crowbar: mokhlos crown: stephanoun crystalline, of crystalline form: krustalloeidês cube: kubos curve round: epikampein curved: epikampês; kampulos; kukloterês customary, what is customary: nomos cut into: enkolaptein cutting: tomê dark, darkness: skotos dative (case): dotikê deaf: kôphos debase: notheuein debauched: akolastos declare: apophainesthai decline: parakmê defect: endeia defence: apologia make a defence, plead in defence: apologeisthai deficiency in self-control: akrasia definitely: pantôs definition: horos deformed: pêrôma, pêros deliberate: bouleuesthai that which deliberates: bouleutikon deliberation: boulê democracy: dêmokratia demon: daimôn demonstrate: apodeiknunai demonstration: apodeixis denial: apophasis denoument: peripeteia depict: anazôgraphein depression: melankholia depth: bathos derange, be deranged in judgement: paraphronein

derangement: paraphrosunê derive: sunagein descent: katabasis desire: epithumia desiring: epithumêtikos destroy: phtheirein destructible: phthartos destructive: phthartikos detailed commentary: lexis deviant: diestrammenos devise: mêkhanasthai dialogue: dialogos diameter: diametros difference: diaphora differentiate: diakrinein differentiating feature: diaphora differentiation: diakrisis further differentiation: prosdiorismos difficulty: aporia raise a difficulty: aporein dig: oruttein digest: pettein digestion: pepsis digression: metaxulogia dim: amudros diminish: meioun dimly: amudrôs dimness of vision: ambluôpia disagree: diaphônein disagreement: diaphônia disappear, make to disappear: aphanizein discern: krinein in a discerning way: kritikôs discernment: krisis discovery: heuresis discrepant, be discrepant: diaphonein discrete: diorismenos disease: nosos disposed, in how disposed: skhesei disposition: hexis dispositional: kath’ hexin disproportionate: ametros disputable, be disputable: amphiballesthai distance: diastasis; diastêma distich: distikhion distinction, draw a distinction: diastellein without drawing distinctions: adioristôs further distinction: prosdiorismos

English-Greek Glossary distract: ekkrouein distress: lupê distressing: lupêros distribute: aponemein divide: diairein divide in parts: merizein divide off: diakrinein divided, divisible: diairetos divine (v.): manteuesthai divine (adj.): theios divisible in parts: meristos division: diairesis; tmêma doctor: iatros doctrine: dogma dodekahedron: dôdekaedron dog: kuôn domesticate: tithaseuein door: thura double: diplasios downward, on the downward path: katagôgos drag: surein dream (v.): oneirottein dream (n.): enupnion; onar; oneiros drop: rhanis drug: pharmakon drunkenness: methê dry: xêros earth: gê earth-dwelling: epikhthonios earthen: geôdês earthy: gêinos effect, side effect: sumptôma efficient cause: poiêtikon aition egg: ôion eikosahedron: eikosaedron elbow: ankôn elegant: asteios element: stoikheion embryo: embruon emission: ekpompê emit: ekkrinein end: telos loose end hanging: ekkremês end point: apoteleutêsis; peras end together: sumperatoun endow with life: zôoun engage, be engaged with: endiatribein engrave on: enkharattein engross, be engrossed: apaskholeisthai; askholeisthai

171

enjoyment: apolausis enquire: zêtein enquiry: zêtêsis object of enquiry: zêtêma enslave: andrapodizein enumerate: aparithmein equine: hippeios equivocal: homônumos thing said equivocally: homônumia error: apatê be in error: apatasthai systematic error: anepistêmosunê essence: to ti ên einai establish: kataskeuazein establishing argument, establishment: kataskeuê eternal: aïdios eternity: aïdiotês ether: to aitherion etymology: etumologia give the etymology of: etumologein eunuch: eunoukhos evident facts: enargeia example: paradeigma excellence: aretê excess: huperbolê excursus: parekbasis exist, really exist: huparkhein experience pain: aniasthai experience pleasure: hêdesthai explanation: paramuthia exposition: diexodos; ekthesis expressed: kata prophoran expression: prophora extending: ekstasis extension: ektasis extraordinary: exaisios extreme: akros; akrotês extremely: akrôs eye: opthalmos eyelash: blepharis in the eyelashes: blepharitis eyelid: blepharon fact: pragma fails to reach: atukhês fall under: hupopiptein false: pseudês false opinion: pseudodoxia falsehood: pseudos run into falsehood: pseudesthai fate: heimarmenê

172

Indexes

faults, one who loves to find faults: philenklêmôn fear: tremein fewness: oligotês fifth substance: pemptê ousia fight: makhesthai fight back against: anakrouesthai figure: skhêma fill out: platunein final cause: telikon aition finished state: apotelesma first cause: prôtê aitia; prôton aition fish: ikhthus fit, thing that does not fit: anharmodios flash: proaugasma flavour: khumos flavouring: khumôsis flesh: sarx follow: parepesthai; sunageisthai in the following way: toioutotropôs follow upon: parakolouthein folly, practical folly: aphrosunê food: khortos foot: pous a foot across: podiaios footed: pezos force: epagôgê foregoing: ta prolabonta force apart: diakrinein forget: epilanthanesthai forgetfulness, forgetting: lêthê form: eidos make to have form: eidopoiein formidability, acquire formidability: deinousthai formless: aneideos forthwith: exapinês forward, that goes forward: badistikos foundations: themelia fragrance: euôdia friendship: philia frown: ophrus fruit: mêlon function: ergon further condition, differentiation, distinction: prosdiorismos fuse: sunkhein gap: kenon gaze, direct gaze at: atenizein generated: genêtos

not generated: agenêtos genus: genos geometry: geômetria go astray: planasthai going astray: planê going up: anabasis go back to: anatrekhein go to make up: sumplêroun go over again: epanalambanein goat: tragos goatstag: tragelaphos gobbet: rhêseidion; rhêsidion God: theos good: agathos goodness: agathotês govern: gubernan grasp: katalambanein grow, growing up: anabasis grow together, make to grow together: sumphuein grub: skôlêx habitation, underground habitation: katadusis habituate, be habituated, become habituated: ethizein habituation: ethismos hair: thrix; trikhês be long haired: koman hand: kheir give one’s hand to: dexiousthai having to hand: prokheirisis hazardous: parabolos head: korsê heading: programma health: hugieia healthy, be healthy: hugiainein hearing: akousis of hearing: akoustikos can be heard through: diêkhês heart: kardia heat: to thermon; thermotês heaven, citizen of heaven: ouranopolitês heavenly body: ouranion heed, give heed to: enakouein hello, say ‘hello’ to: proskunein heterogeneous: heterogenês hint at: ainittesthai; hupainittesthai hive: smênos hold: katekhein keep hold of: katekhein

English-Greek Glossary homeomerous: homoiomerês honey: meli honeyed wine: oinomeli horse: hippos horse-breaker: pôlodamnês hostage: homêros hot: thermos hour: hôra house: katoikizein human, anthrôpeios; anthrôpinos human being: anthrôpos hunt, hard to hunt down: dusthêratos hypothesis: hupothesis hypothetical: hupothetikos by hypothetical reasoning: hupothetikôs idea: ennoia idle: argos ill-written: kakographos illuminate: phôtizein illumination: eklampsis image, become an image of: exeikonizein image-maker: eidôlopoios imagination: phantasia imaginative, non-imaginative: aphantastos non-imaginatively: aphantastôs imagine: phantasiousthai; phantazesthai that which imagines: to phantastikon imitating: mimêsis immediately: amesôs immobile: monimos immortal: athanatos impartially: adekastôs impede: empodizein imprint (v.): entupoun; tupoun easily imprinted: eutupôtos imprint (n.): tupos receive imprints: tupousthai resisting imprints: dustupôtos by way of imprint: tupôtikôs thing for which there can be no imprints: atupôtos impulse, purposive impulse: hormê inactivity: hêsukhia inanimate: apsukhos inarticulate: adiarthrôtos incidental, incidentally: kata sumbebêkos

173

incline: rhepein include: sumperilambanein incommensurable: asummetros incomplete: atelês incorporeal: asômatos increase: auxanein indefinite: aoristos in an indefinite way: aoristôs indestructible: aphthartos indicate: eisagein individual: atomos individualise: atomoun indivisible: adiairetos in an indivisible way: adiairetôs indivisibly: adiairetôs induction: epagôgê inductive: epagôgikos inerrant: anamartêtos infection: sêpsis infer: sullogizesthai inference: sullogismos infinity, to infinity: ep’ apeiron innate: emphutos inscribe: katagraphein already inscribed: engraphos insect, winged insect: muia inseparable: akhôristos instant: to akhares instrument: organon instrumental: organikos instrumentality of sense: aisthêtikon organon intellect: nous object of intellect: noêtos intellectual: noeros intellectually: noerôs intelligence: noêsis intelligible: noeros intermediary, without an intermediary: amesos interpretation: exêgêsis interpreter: exêgêtês interrogatively: erôtêmatikôs interweave: sumplekein interweaving: sumplokê intimate: ainittesthai intuit: epiballein; prosballein intuition: prosbolê intuitively: epiblêtikôs irradiation: ellampsis join on: sunaptein

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joint: ginglumos judge (v.), exercise judgement: phronein judge (n.): dikastês judgement, practical; judgement: phronêsis jump ahead: propêdan junction, natural junction: sumphuia juxtaposition: parathesis kind, of the same kind: homogenês know, get to know: gignôskein hard to know: dusgnôstos that is known: epistêtos knower: epistêmôn knowledge: eidêsis; epistêmê object of knowledge: epistêton have prior knowledge of: progignôskein systematic knowledge: epistêmê labour, direct labour: kamaton poieisthai labyrinthine: laburinthôdês ladder: klimax last part: eskhatia law: nomos law abiding: ennomos lay hold of: antilambanesthai that lays hold of: antilêptikos laying hold of: antilêpsis lead, take the lead of: protereuein lead across: metagein learning: mathêsis leave open: amphiballein length: mêkos letter: stoikheion written letter: gramma level up: exomalizein licentious: aselgês lie ready for: prokeisthai lie with: sunousiazein life: zôê endow with life: zôoun life-giving: zôogonos light: lampas; phaos; phôs like: homoios become like: homoiousthai make completely like: exomoioun very like: paromoios liken: apeikazein; eikazein; exeikazein; pareikazein

likeness: eikôn limb: skelos limber, make limber: gumnazein line: grammê; stikhos straight line: eutheia linkage: suzeuxis lion: leôn little, too little: meiôsis live: zên liver: hêpar living in water: enudros logical sequence: akolouthia location relativly to one another: katasterismos lodging: katagôgion loftiness of genius: megalophuia lofty speculation: hupsêlon theôrêma logical: logikos loins: aidoion long, make too long: mêkunein look (n.): thea look at: theôrein loose (speaking), loosely: katakhrêstikôs speak loosely, use words loosely: katakhrêsthai love of pleasure: to philêdonon love of wealth: to philokhrêmaton luminous, of luminous form: augoeidês main clause: apodosis taking a long time to reach the main clause: makroapodotos make up, go to make up: sumplêroun maniac: mainomenos manifest, make manifest: phaneroun many-powered: poludunamos marching with: prosekhês marginal, of marginal importance: parergos marvellous: thaumasios master (v.): kratein master (n.): despotês mastery, gain the mastery: epikratein material, material cause: hulikon aition in a material way: hulikôs mathematics: mathêmata objects of mathematic: mathêmata mathematicise: katamathêmatikeuein mature, be mature: akmazein maturity: akmê

English-Greek Glossary have maturity: akmazein mean: legein meaning: sêmasia measuring rod: kalamos mid-sky, be in mid-sky: mesouranein mind: phrên in the mind: endiathetos persuade to change one’s mind: metapeithein be in two minds: distazein minor premiss: elatton; proslêpsis mirror: esoptron, katoptron mistake: hamartia mixed: miktos mixing with: epimixia mixture: krama; krasis mnemonic, using a mnemonic system: mnêmonikos model: paradeigma moisture: hugrotês moment, for the moment: teôs monarchy: basileia mortal: thnêtos motion, always in motion: aeikinêtos mountebank: goês mouth: stoma move, that moves: poreutikos move up and down: donein movement: poreia change in movement: poreutikê kinêsis organ for movement: organon poreutikon mud: ilus muddy: epitholoun multiform: polumorphos multipartite: polumerês multitude: plêthos music: mousikê mussel: pelôris nail: onux name: onoma have a name: katonomazesthai natural: phusikos natural junction: sumphuia natural science, do natural science: phusiologein nature: phusis near at hand: prosekhês necessarily: anankaiôs necessary: anankaios

175

necessity: anankê neckless: anaukhên negation, conversion with negation: antistrophê sun antithesei negative (n.): arnêsis negative, establish negative point: anatrepein negatively: apophatikôs neighbour: geitôn neuter, in the neuter: oudeteros new, introduce a new classification: kainotomein new-born: neogenês night: nux noble: gennaios nocturnal: nukterinos non-imaginative: aphantastos non-imaginatively: aphantastôs non-material: aülos non-planetary: aplanês non-rational: alogos nose: rhis nostril: muktêr note: sêmeiousthai nourish: trephein nourishment: trophê now: nun nowhere, getting nowhere: aprosphoros number: arithmos have the same number: isosthenein nursling’s dues: tropheia oar: kopê oath: horkos occupy, be occupied with: katagignesthai octahedron: octaedron odour: osmê offspring: gennêma old age: gêras oligarchy: oligarkhia one, as being each one: henoeidês one or the other: thateros open, leave open: amphiballein open out: diastellesthai opinion: doxa be of the opinion: doxazein subject of opinion, object of opinion, thing opinion is about: doxastos of the same opinion as: homodoxos optic: optikos

176

Indexes

order, arrange in order: diakosmein good order: eutaxia out of order: skolios words out of order: huperbaton ordering: diataxis otherness: heterotês outline: prokharattein outside, from outside: thurathen overbright: huperlampros overcome: kataballein overlay: katakruptein overlook: paroran own, its own, belong as its own: oikeios make its own: spheterizesthai pain: ania experience pain: aniasthai painful: aniaros paintbrush: grapheion painter: grapheus painting: zôgraphia palsy, someone with palsy: parêtos papyrus, sheet of: khartion paraphrase: paraphrazein parrot: psittakos part: meros thing of similar parts: homomereia without parts: amerês in parts (adj.), divisible into parts: meristos in parts (adv.), part by part: meristôs divide in parts: diamerizein particular: merikos partition (v.): diamerizein partless: ameristos in a partless way: amerôs pass away: phtheiristhai pass through: parodeuein passage: agôgê (in text): rhêton passing away: phthora passion, have a passion for: truphan passive intellect: nous pathêtikos patient: paskhôn patrol: peripolein peculiar, peculiarity, way peculiar to: idiôma perceive: aisthanesthai perceiving, that perceives: aisthêtikos perceivingly: aisthêtôs perfect (v.): teleioun perfect (adj.): teleios

perfective: teleiôtikos periphery: periphereia perish: apollusthai person, famous person: lampros persuade: peithein persuade to change one’s mind: metapeithein persuasion: peithô pervade: phoitan pestilential: loimôdês philosopher: philosophos phlegm: phlegma physical: phusikos physicist: phusiologos picture: graphê pious: eusebês pit: bothros place: topos plain, make plain: phaneroun plaiting together: epiplokê plane: epipedon planetary, non-planetary: aplanês plant: phuton plea: sunêgoria plead: dikaiologeisthai something to plead: dikaiologia plead for, plead as advocate: sunêgorein please: hêdein; hêdunein pleasant: hêdus pleasantness: hêdutês pleasure: hêdonê experience pleasure: hêdesthai pledge: parakatathêkê plotting against: epiboulê pneuma: pneuma pneumatic body: pneumatikon sôma point: kephalaion; sêmeion; stigmê to the point: prosphoros point at issue: prokeimenon pointlike, in a pointlike way: kentrikôs poison: dêlêtêrion polemic, be in the heat of: apomakhesthai polyps: polupous poor: penês positively: kataphatikôs; ek kataphaseôs potential, in potentiality: dunamei potbellied: progastôr pound up: anamattesthai power: dunamis

English-Greek Glossary supreme power: kuros practical: praktikos practical folly: aphrosunê practical judgement: phronêsis prayer: eukhê preceding: proteraios precipice: krêmnos predicate (v.): katêgorein predicate (n.): katêgoroumenon premiss: protasis conditional premiss: sunêmmenon major premiss: meizon minor premiss: elatton; proslêpsis prepare: eutrepizein prevail: authentein principle: arkhê; logos prior deliberation: probouleusis prior imagining: prophantazesthai prior knowledge: progignôskein privation: sterêsis problem: aporia raise problem: aporein produce: paragein proof: epikheirêma proper: idikos belonging properly to: oikeios proportion: logos proportional: summetros proportionality: logos proportionally: summetrôs proportional to: analogos proposition: problêma; protasis supplementary proposition: porisma prostitute: porneia go to a prostitute: porneuein protect: skepazein Providence: pronoia proximate: prosekhês proximately: prosekhôs psychical: psukhikôs pull: helkein pulling: helxis pupil (of eye): korê pupil (learner): mathêtês pure: eilikrinês purpose, to no purpose: matên purposive impulse: hormê push (v.): ôthein push (n.), pushing: ôsis put forth, put forward: proballein put together: suntithenai pyramid: puramis

177

qualitative, make qualitative: poioun quality: poiotês quantitative, make quantitative: posoun question, as a question: erôtêmatikôs rag: rhakos ranged along with: sustoikhos rational: logikos rational in form: logoeidês non-rational: alogos reach, reach out: oregesthai fails to reach: atukhês react: antidran read: anaginôskein reading: anagnôsis (textual) reading: graphê reason: aitia; logos that reasons: logistikos reasoning: logismos reassurance: paramuthia reassure: paramuthein reception: diadokhê receptive: dektikos réchauffé, be réchauffé: anakhlazesthai reckon, reckon off: arithmein recollection: anamnêsis recognise: epigignôskein; gignôskein reduction: elleipsis reference: anaphora reflect: epistrephein reflection: epistrophê reflection: anaklasis refute: anatrepein; elenkhein refutation: anatropê; elenkhos reject: athetein related, way of being related: skhesis in how related: skhesei relation: emphereia; skhesis relationship: logos; skhesis remain still: menein reminiscent: anamnêstikos repetitive, be repetitive: dittologein repository: dokheion representation: anaplasma from a representation of: anaplattein reproach: elenkhein reptile: herpeton resist: antibainein resisting imprints: dustupôtos resolve: epiluesthai

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responsible: aitios hold responsible for: aitian restrain: anakhaitizein right, set right: epidiorthoun right action: katorthôma rod: rhabdos measuring rod: kalamos rooted, be rooted: rizousthai rope: kalôs rotation: dinêsis rough, with a rough breathing: daseôs roughness: trakhutês round: strongulos rout: phobein rove: phoitan rule: kanôn ruling part: hêgemonikon run out beside: pareistrekhein safe, what is safe: asphaleia safer: asphalesteros savoury sauce: karukeuma say: legein thing said: dialekton say against: epilegein say ‘hello’ to: proskunein saying: logion scent-making: murepsikê science: epistêmê do natural science: phusiologein screen off: antiphrattein seafight: naumakhia secondary: deuteros section: kephalaion see, can see: theôrein can be seen through: diaphanês thing seen: oraton see directly: autoptein seeing: orasis seeing sparks: marmarugai self-controlled, person with self-control: enkratês semen: sperma semicircle: hêmikuklion seminally: spermatikôs send on: eisballein sense: aisthêsis sense-object: aisthêton sense-organ: aisthêtêrion common sense: aisthêsis koinê special sense: aisthêsis idikê

incidental sense-object: aisthêton kata sumbebêkos instrumentality of sense: aisthêtikon organon way distinctive of sense: aisthêtikon idiôma senses, come to one’s senses: ananêphein sentence: logos separable, separate (adj.): khôristos separate (v.): khôrizein serve to carry, serve: diakonein serviceable: euergês set out: gumnazein set right: epidiorthoun setback to arise: antipiptein sever: diaskhizein sexual gratification: aphrodisia sexual indulgence: aphrodisiazesthai sink deeper into: embathunein shade, shadow: skia shape: morphê; skhêma have shape: skhêmatizesthai by way of shape: morphôtikôs shaped, easily shaped: euplastos share, lack a share: amoirein shell, animal with a shell: ostrakodermon shell-like: ostreinos shoulder: ômos shout aloud: boan shrewd, very shrewd: polumêtis shrewdness: mêtis shut eyes: kleiein ophthalmous have eyes shut: muein ophthalmous sick, be sick: nosein side: pleura side effect: sumptôma sight: opsis of sight: oratikos sign: sêmeion signify: sêmainein way of signifying: sêmasia silent, be silent: sigan similar, thing of similar parts: homoiomereia simple: haplous sinew: neuron size: megethos sketch: skiagraphia skill: tekhnê man of skill: tekhnitês

English-Greek Glossary thing in the field of skill: tekhnêton sky, as tall as the sky: ouranomêkês be in mid-sky: mesouranein sleep (v.): katheudein sleep (n.): hupnos smell: osphrêsis object of smell: osphranton can be smelt through: diosmos snake: ophis snow: khiôn snubnosed: simos snubnosedness: simotês so-and-so: deina soft-fleshed: hapalosarkos softness: malakotês solid: stereos solution: lusis sophist: sophistês source: arkhê soul: psukhê sound (adj.): spoudaios sound (n.): phônê; psophos sounding: psophêsis sparks, seeing sparks: marmarugai speak, speak of: legein speak accurately: kuriolektein speak truly: alêtheuein special (sense, sense-object): idikos species: eidos speculation, speculative thought: theôrema speech: logos sphere: sphaira spider: arakhnês spider’s web: arakhnion spirit: thumos spirited: thumikos; thumoeidês become spirited: thumousthai spoken sound: phônê sponge: spongos spring: pêgê stag: elaphos stand firm: rhônnusthai starting point: arkhê state: diathesis statement: logos stay still: êremein staying still: êremia staying unchanged: stasis still, remain still: menein stir up: diegeirein stomach: gastêr

179

straight line: eutheia straight off: autothen strand: plegma strife: neikos stronger: kreitton strongest: kratistos structure of argument: diaskeuê logou subject: hupokeimenon be subject: hupokeisthai sublunary: huposelênos subreal: metousios subsistence: huparxis; hupostasis subsistence-giving: hupostatikos subsistent: huphistamenon substantive: huparktikos subsume: anagein succession: diadokhê suck at: bdallein suitability: epitêdeiotês suitable: epitêdeios summer: theros sun: hêlios superficially: epipolaiôs superfluity: peritton superior: entimoteros; timios superlunary: huperselênos supernatural: daimonios super-real: huperousios supplementary proposition: porisma supply further, supply additional: proseuporein supposal: hupolêpsis suppose: hupolambanein; hupotithenai supreme power: kuros surface: epiphaneia surmise: stokhazesthai sweet: glukus switch: metabolê sword: xiphos syllable: sullabê syllogise: sullogizesthai syllogism: sullogismos syllogistically: sullogistikôs systematic knowledge: epistêmê with systematic knowledge: epistêmonikôs talking about: logos tall, as tall as the sky: ouranomekês tame: hêmeroun task: agôn taste: geusis

180

Indexes

object of taste: geuston Taurus: tauros teachable: didaktos teaching: didaxis temerarious: tolmêtias tempering: epitasis tense: khronos term: horos terminate together: sumperatoun termination: apoperatôsis bring a termination: apoperatoun termwise, in a termwise manner: horikôs terror: deilia text: lexis theological: theologikos thesis: problêma thing: pragma think: dianoeisthai; noein that which thinks: dianoêtikon think out: ennoein thinking: noêsis; pronoêsis thought: dianoia; noêsis exercise thought: noein take thought in advance: pronoeisthai taking thought in advance: pronoia tight rope: artêmenos kalôs think (discursively) dianoeisthai that thinks: dianoêtikon thought: dianoia object of thought: dianoêton thunder: brontê together, act together: sunergein put together: suntithenai two together: sunamphoteron tomb: taphos tooth: odous torch light: phruktos touch (v.), perceive by touching: haptesthai object of touch: hapton touch (n.): haphê trace left behind: leipsanon tragedy, said in a tragedy: tragikos tragic actor: tragoidos transcend: epanabainein transition, not transition-making: ametabatos transparent: diaphanês traveller, fellow traveller: sumparatheon

treasury, store up a treasury in advance: prothêsaurizein true: alêthês; alêthinos be true: alêtheuein truly, what is truly: alêthinos speak truly: alêtheuein truth: alêtheia attain truth, achieve truth: alêtheuein try out: gumnazein turn aside from: ekklinein; metatrepesthai turn away from: apostrephesthai two together: sunamphoteron unaffected: apathês being unaffected: apatheia unchanging: akinêtos unchangingly: akinêtôs unclear: asaphês unconfused: asunkhutos underground habitation: katadusis undermine: paratheirein understand: hupakouein understand along with: sunupakouein undifferentiated: adiaphoros undivided: adiairetos undividedly: adiaretôs unfold: anaptussein unification: henôsis unit: monas unite: henopoiein; henoun unitive: heniaios unity: henôsis universal (n.): katholou universal (adj.): katholikos universe: to pan unmixed: amigês unperceiving: anaisthêtos unpleasant: lupêros unspoken difficulty: sigêtheisa aporia unsuitability: anepitêdeiotês unteachable: adidaktos unutterable: arrêtos upward, on the upward path: anagôgos urgent, be urgent: katepeigein usage: khrêsis common usage: sunêtheia koinê vegetative: phutikos vehicle: to okhoun movement in a vehicle: okhêsis

English-Greek Glossary vice: kakia virtue: aretê vision, dimness of vision: ambluôpia vital: zôtikos voice: phônê having no voice: aphônos with a bad voice: kakophônos waking: egrêgorsis walk, power to walk: badistikê dunamis walking: badisis in walking: badistikos wall: toikhos wander: planasthai wander astray: paraplanasthai warm: thermantos waste: têkein water: hudôr living in water: enüdros wax: kêros way, by the way: parergos in some way or other: hamôsgepôs wealth, love of wealth: to philokhrêmaton weaving: huphantikê web, spider’s web: arakhnion welcome: dekhesthai

181

well: phrear whip: mastix width: platos will, against one’s will: akousios winged: ptênos winged insect: muia winter: kheimôn wish, rational wish: boulêsis within, from within: oikothen write writing tablet in which nothing is written: grammateion agraphon written letter: gramma ill written: kakographos wooden horse: dourios hippos wool-gathering, be wool-gathering: rhemnesthai word: lexis in a word: logôi eipein in so many words: diarrêdên words out of order: huperbaton work: ergon yellow: xanthos yield: eikein yoke together with: suzeugnunai zoophyte: zôophuton

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Greek-English Index adekastôs, impartially, 519,29 adiairetos, indivisible, 459,5; 484,15 542,27.28; 543,5.6.10.13.14.16.18; (division of) 544,5-16; 549,4.9.10.23-5; 550,24; 551,1.9.22; 552,2-4.10 undivided, 543,12; 549,5-6.8.13-16.30; 550,3 adiairetôs, indivisibly, in an indivisible way, 542,29-543,4; 551,5 undividedly, in an undivided way, 550,7.30 adiarthrotos, inarticulate, 499,1 adiaphoros, undifferentiated, 599,21 adidaktos, unteachable, 590,1.3.5 adioristôs, without drawing distinctions, 472,2 aeikinêtos, always in motion, 461,28; 511,1; 528,28; 535,10.11; 600,1 aeizôos, always living, 528,28-9 aêr, air, 448,18.20.21.40; 449,1.2.4; 452,18.28 agathos, good, 554,18.31-7; 559,5; 560,6; 580,11.12 etc. prôton agathon, the First Good, 586,5 agathotês, goodness, 536,12-13 agenêtos, not generated, 599,32; 600,2 agraphos, on which nothing is written, 469,18; 516,24; 524,14; 533,25.30 agreuein, stalk, 525,8 agôgê, passage, 558,30 agôn, task, 539,11 aïdios, eternal, 466,24; 516,14.18; 517,6.20; 518,7; 519,13.14; 520,34; 521,12; 537,4.5; 541,5-16; 545,25.28.36 aïdiotês, eternity, 517,18-19; 521,27 aidoion, loins, 578,18 ainittesthai, hint at, 475,23; 540,30; 582,2; 584,9.16

intimate, 543,25 aisthanesthai, to perceive, 447,28; 462,29-32; 463,1.3; 467,16; 489,13-15; 522,6; 596,19-21 aisthêsis, sense, (as contrasted with intellect and imagination) 446,21; 485,30; 487,29,30; 488,1; 490,6.10.15; 491,7.9.15.16; 492,6.15; 494,5; 498,13.15; 501,13; 506,26; 509,4-5; 512,31; 513,33; 514,15.17.18; 516,19; 521,37; 522,9.10; 554,39;568,1; see also kata dunamin, kat’energeian (a particular sense-faculty), 446,22; 447,3.17-19.27.31.35; 449,8-11; 450,14; 451,3.4; 453,26; 455,13; 456,15; 459,15; 462,31.32; 463,2.11; 469,9-10 aisthêsis idikê, special sense, 454,1-2; 573,24 aisthêsis koinê, common sense, 446,11; 447,1; 455,21-2.26.34; 456,1.3; 460,16-20; 465,25.26.28; 477,23-5.28; 479,8-9; 480,5.7; 481,3.6.15; 483,3-4; 555,5.7; 560,20.26.28; 561,5 aisthêtêrion, sense organ, 447,18; 448,3.4.25; 449,8-10.29; 452,1.8.9; 453,20-2; 457,13; 466,11.14; 482,11-13; 601,25; 602,10; 606,6.20.21 aisthêtikos, (that) which perceives, perceiving, 474,29; 574,13; 587,3 aisthêtikê psukhê, perceiving soul, 594,29.31; 595,36; 598,10 aisthêtikon idiôma, way distinctive of sense, 458,13.16 aisthêtikon organon, the instrumentality of sense, 530,9 aisthêton, sense-object, 447,5, 449,30; 452,2; 469,9.11; 561,26; 567,8; 568,19

184

Indexes

aisthêton idikon, special sense-object, 509,7 aisthêton idion, proper sense-object, 456,30.33; 457,3-6; 458,4; 459,10-12; 462,13.27; 509,10; 513,17,19; 514,9 aisthêton kata sumbebêkos, incidental sense-object, sense-object incidentally, 454,2.18; 455,3; 457,28; 458,5-6; 460,29-30; 509,10-11.24-5; 513,23.24; 514,8-9; 553,32-3 koinon aisthêton, common sense-object, 453,28.32.34; 454,1.5; 455,6; 456,17.19.23; 457,3-5.27.29; 458,10.17.19; 459,22; 462,8.12.14; 509,11.24.26; 510,2.4; 514,7 aisthêtôs, perceivingly, 576,15 aitherion, to, the ether, 450,29 aitia, reason, 488,2; 489,22; 558,13; 588,1; 593,4 cause 486,36 aitiatikê, accusative, 529,12.14 aitian, hold responsible, 448,38 aitios, responsible for, 578,36.39 aition, cause, see hulikon, organikon, poiêtikon, prôton, telikon akares, to, an instant, 549,11.13 akhôristos, inseparable, 483,30.31; 532,15; 566,21 akhrômatistos, colourless, 519,29 akhronôs, atemporally, 477,25; 479,22; 480,13.18; 484,30; 487,33.35; 488,4 akinêtein, be without changing, 595,8; 604,33-605,1 akinêtos, unchanging, without change, 594,19.24; 598,32 akinêtôs, unchangingly, 458,35 akmazein, be mature, have maturity 577,20.27.29 akmê, maturity, 577,13; 583,3; 598,12; 599,15 akoê, hearing, 472,22-473,7; 474,18.19 akolastos, debauched, 486,30 akolouthia, logical sequence, 548,15 akousios, against one’s will, 497,22-6 akousis, hearing, 470,11; 472,24 audition, 474,18.32 akoustikos, of hearing, 463,11

akrasia, deficiency in self-control, 593,13 akrateia, being out of control, 593,13 akratês, deficient in self-control, 578,16.19; 579,11 akribês, accurate, 456,29.36 akribôs, accurately, 456,24 akros, extreme, 492,20; 504,1.9 akrotês, extreme, 472,5; 476,8-9 akrôs, extremely, 477,17 alêtheia, truth, 544,20-31; 545,3.6.10 alêtheuein, attain truth, achieve truth, 491,13.16.19.26; 495,32; 496,24-6; 502,19-21; 513,12; 514,1.31; 545,13; 553,28.32.33; 554,3-5; 556,11.16.25.27; 569,19.20 speak truly, 545,27 to be true, 492,13 alêthês, true, 491,30-1; 504,23; 505,20; 506,7; 555,18.20.24.25; alêthinos, true, 506,6 what is truly, 585,25.28 alloioun, alter, 526,13.17; 558,20.22.28; 605,8 alloiôsis, alteration, 457,29; 526,14 allotriopragein, attend to the business of another, 528,23; 554,4; 557,13 allotrios, belonging to another, 478,19; 595,25 alien, 523,15-16 alogos, non-rational; 496,27.29-33; 503,11.13.14; 507,15; 511,27; 515,9.11 alogos gnôsis, non-rational cognition, 525,12.15.18 alogos psukhê, non-rational soul, 446,5; 450,11.13; 485,11.12.14; 494,7.10-11; 507,1.2.5; 541,8.12; 577,4-8; 597,19.26.31-2 amakhos, consistent, 509,27 amblunesthai, be blunted, 487,4 ambluôpia, dimness of vision, 487,10 ambluôttein, blunt, 455,8; 517,9 ameibein, change, 590,32 amerês, without parts, 504,10; 543,12; 544,8.9.13; 551,33 ameristos, partless, 546,37 amerôs, in a partless way, 546,37 amesôs, immediately, 447,35; 451,13 etc.

Greek-English Index without an intermediary, 451,16; 558,14; 601,21; 603,27 ametabatos, transition-making, 562,31 ametros, disproportionate, 469,14; 517,10-11 amigês, unmixed, 521,11-18; 523,5-11; 526,22 amoirein, lack a share of, 577,10; 596,37 amphêristos, that hangs in the balance, 593,15 amphiballein, leave open, 551,24.27 amphiballesthai, be disputable; 447,20-2 amphibolôs, in an ambiguous way, 466,22-3 amudros, dim, 495,14.15.17; 496,5; 500,13 amudrôs, dimly, 456,34.35; 592,29 anabasis, ascent, 473,23 going up, 473,24 growing up, 577,13 anakhaitizein, restrain, 581,15 anakhlazesthai, be réchauffé, 455,29 anagein, subsume, 543,33 to bring under, 589,8.9 anaginôskein, read, 568,12; 596,32-3 anagnôsis, reading, 582,6 anagôgos, on the upward path, 596,30 anaisthêtos, unperceiving, 594,35; 596,17.18 anakathairein, clean up, 515,17 anaklasis, reflection, 605,20.22.24 anakrouesthai, fight back against, 581,6 analambanein, restate, 496,36 analogein, be analogous to, 511,27; 535,34.36; 537,28; 538,14; 539,27-32; 557,12-13; 600,33 analogia, analogy, 556,5; 560,26.30 analogos, analogous to, 493,9 proportional to, 514,22 analusis kat’ analusin, analytically, 532,27 anamartêtos, inerrant, 491,12 anamattesthai, pound up, 515,29 anamnêsis, recollection, 518,23-4; 533,33-4; 596,6 anamnêstikos, reminiscent, 495,25.28

185

ananêphein, come to senses, 466,34 anankaios, necessary, carry necessity, 449,19; 503,24 anankê, necessity, 447,30 etc. anaphora, reference, 482,23 anaplasma, representation, 497,25 anaplattein, form representation of, 488,17; 495,33; 503,31-2; 508,1-6; 534,7 anapnoê, breathing, 575,15-16.18.19.26.28 anapodizein, back away, 488,35 anaptussein, unfold, 477,31 anarmodios, thing that does not fit, 548,11 anatrekhein, go back to, 577,4-5 anatrepein, establish the negative point that, 457,14; refute 477,29; 480,31; 481,2; 569,28; 599,12 anatropê, refutation, 484,18; 569,27 anazôgraphein, depict, 509,17-21 andrapodizein, enslave, 572,26-7 aneideos, formless, 519,30.31.36.37; 543,29 anepistêmosunê, systematic error, 491,33 anepitêdeiotês, unsuitability, 448,35; 511,36; 576,33-4; 577,9 angeion, container, 508,22 angelikos, angelic, 535,6.38; 536,13.18.23; 537,15 angelos, angel, 527,27 ankôn, elbow, 588,23 ania, pain, 559,29 aniaros, painful, 559,3; 560,5; 562,8 aniasthai, experience pain, 559,1; 561,28 anoikeios, inappropriate, 529,10 anôlethros, imperishable, 541,13 anomogenês, heterogeneous, 478,25; 480,6; 482,15.22; 561,5.7.8 anomoeidês, different in species, 586,3 anomoieidês, heterogeneous, 478,3 dissimilar in species, 579,30.31.32 anomos, lawless, 565,37 anomoülos, not of the same matter, 526,18-19 anous, non-intellect, 525,22.23.24 anthrôpeios, human, 539,24 anthrôpinos, human, 535,8.32.38; 536,2; 539,1.4-5.9

186

Indexes

anthrôpos, man, 450,14.16; human being, 490,34; 541,7 antibainein, resist, 588,36-7 antidiairein, contradistinguish, 477,22 antidiastellein, contradistiguish, 457,24; 543,17.22.26.28.32.36 antidiastolê, contradistinction, 545,11 antidran, react, 599,7 antilambanesthai, lay hold of, 449,32 et passim antilêptikos, (thing) that lays hold of, 464,22.23; 596,10 antilêpsis, laying hold of, 597,24 antipaskhein, be affected in turn, 526,24-8 antiphrattein, screen off, 515,33 antipiptein, setback to arise, 572,24 antiprattein, counteract, 583,15 antistasis, counter, 563,31 antistrephein, convert, 527,12-14.20.39; 532,33; 602,3; 606,14 antistrophê, conversion, 528,2 sun antithesei, conversion with negation, 450,2 anupokritôs, not by way of acting, 492,29 aoristos, indefinite, 580,28 aoristôs, in an indefinite way, 592,26.29 aparithmeisthai, enumerate, 505,23 apaskholeisthai, be engrossed, 596,11 apatasthai, be in error, 487,9.12-13 err, 488,1-8 fall into error, 461,20; 522,22; 539,35.37 apatê, error, 455,31; 487,8.13-18; 488,6; 490,1.3 apatheia, being unaffected, 526,33 apathês, unaffected, 453,21; 521,11-12.18.21; 542,4; 596,3.4.19; 597,3 apeikazein, liken, 537,27; 555,1; 589,19.20 apeiron ep’ apeiron, to infinity, 463,25 aphairesis, abstraction en aphairesei, abstract, 532,3.5; 566,8-16

aphanizein, obliterate, 508,18 make to disappear, 546,35; 551,10 aphantastos, non-imaginative, 542,10; 563,14.20; 584,9 aphantastôs, non-imaginatively, 568,15 aphônos, having no voice, 533,31 aphrodisia, sexual gratification, 576,12; 578,18; 579,6 aphrodisiazesthai, sexual indulgence, 560,5 aphrosunê, practical folly, 491,33 aphthartos, indestructible, 518,4.5 aplanês, non-planetary (sphere), 511,4; 527,28 apodekhesthai, agree with, 570,14; 591,17 apodeiknunai, demonstrate, 447,24.25.26; 457,23.25; 469,29; 525,9; 538,2; 587,1; 595,10; 596,36 apodeixis, demonstration, 447,19; 500,18 apodosis, main clause, 489,9.10; 490,13.16 apoklêrôtikos, arbitrary, 463,20-1; 468,12 apokoptein, break off, 582,7 apolausis, enjoyment, 589,33-4 apologeisthai, plead in defence, 486,34; 565,22 to make a defence, 536,31 apologia, defence, 536,34; 572,10.16 apollusthai, perish, 603,13 apomakhesthai, be in the heat of polemic, 575,4 aponemein, distribute, 481,12 apoperatoun, bring to termination, 455,21; 483,4 apoperatôsis, termination, 555,7.25.27 apophainesthai, declare, 455,24; 456,7; 464,17 apophasis, denial, 459,3.7; 466,5.6; 478,26-7; 546,4-10; 547,1-5; 548,12.17.19.24-5; 559,31 apophatikôs, negatively, 547,8-9.15 aporein, raise problem, raise difficulty, 448,24 etc. aporia, problem, difficulty, 448,25 etc. lack, 576,37 aporon, difficulty, problem, 495,18; 532,29

Greek-English Index apostrephesthai, turn away from, 554,28; 599,16 apoteinesthai, attack, 463,28 apotelesma, finished state, 500,23 apoteleutêsis, end-point, 593,6 apotiktein, bring to birth, 495,23 aprosphoros, getting nowhere, 486,12 apsukhos, inanimate, 490,9 etc. arakhnês, spider, 500,38; 590,4 arakhnion, (spider’s) web, 501,1 aretê, virtue, 555,20; 579,34.35 excellence, 563,40 argos, idle, 584,29 aristeus, champion, 593,27-30; 594,9 aristodêmokratia, aristodemocracy, 565,37 aristokratia, aristocracy, 565,34 arithmein, reckon, reckon off, 580,26 arithmêtikoi logoi, arithmetical discourses, 457,25 arithmos, number, 453,30; 457,24.25 arkhê, starting point, 488,12 etc. principle, 570,22 source, 587,3 etc. arnêsis, negative, 596,13.15 arrêtos, unutterable, 504,20 arthron, (definite) article, 475,29; 476,3-6 artos, bread, 558,2 asapheia, lack of clarity, 451,8.20 asaphês, unclear, 467,23 aselgês, licentious, 579,2 askholeisthai, be engrossed, 466,30-6; 573,1 asômatos, incorporeal, 463,37; 464,5; 466,9.22; 477,24; 483,19; 571,29 aspalax, blind rat, 450,21; 453,6; 595,30 asphaleia, what is safe, 452,5 asphalesteros, safer, 513,16 asteios, elegant, 488,27 charming, 562,13 astronomein, think about astronomy, 571,6; 573,4 astronomia, astronomy, 461,28 asummetros, incommensurable, 548,1 asunkhutos, unconfused, 589,39; 590,2 atelês, incomplete, 558,27; 577,11-30 atenizein, direct gaze at, 508,33.35 athanatos, immortal, 466,23.24;

187

516,1.21; 536,21-537,5; 541,6-16; 596,4.19 athetein, reject, 597,17 atimos, inferior, 464,25-7 atomos, individual, 481,14; 509,29.35; 510,8; 557,25 atomoun, individualise, 491,28 atopon, absurd, absurdity, 467,26 etc. atupôtos, thing for which there can be no imprints, 542,11 atukhês, fails to reach, 498,7; 516,27; 564,24 augoeidês, of luminous form, 597,18 aülos, non-material, 461,31; 525,13-24; 543,15; 547,17; 563,23.29,31; 564,15-18 aülôs, in a non-material way, 567,19 authentein, prevail, 487,12 autothen, straight off, 473,12 etc. autoptein, see directly, 574,17 auxanein, increase, 458,33.34 etc. badisis, walking, 544,34 badistikos, that goes forward, 591,32 in walking, 588,34 badistikê dunamis, power to walk, 577,20-1 basileia, monarchy, 565,34-5 bastazein, carry, 472,33-4 bathos, depth, 552,16-18 bdallein, suck at, 494,31; 495,4 bia, violence, 589,11 blepharis, eyelash, 595,16 blepharitis, in the eyelashes, 595,18 blepharon, eyelid, 503,28; 575,29 boan, shout aloud, 466,23; 517,19; 521,27; 563,35 bothros, pit, 598,30; 603,13 boulê, deliberation, 490,32.33 boulêsis, rational wish, 464,35; 585,22-3 bouleuesthai, deliberate, 490,34; 592,14 bouleutikos, that which deliberates, deliberative, 579,17; 589,37.38; 593,3-11 brontê, thunder, 476,21 daimonios, supernatural, 535,6.31; 536,13.18.23; 537,11.14 daimôn, demon, 500,33 supernatural being, 537,19.20.23

188

Indexes

daseôs, with a rough breathing 585,5 deilia, terror, 602,19.20 deina, so-and-so, 590,22.23 deinousthai, acquire formidability, 480,15 dekhesthai, welcome, 559,2.4 dektikos, receptive, 507,17.20.27.29; 508,9.17 dêlêtêrion, poison, 476,22 dêmiourgos, creator, 474,2; 507,9; 526,26.35; 527,29; 557,31; 558,4 dêmokratia, democracy, 565,35 despotês, master, 513,26.28 dexiousthai, give one’s hand to, 528,18 diadokhê, succession, 539,2 diairein, divide, 481,9 diairesis, division, 467,17-18.20; 546,5 of a concept, 490,19; 544,4; 589,36 diairetos, divisible, divided, 484,14; 549,5 diakonein, serve to carry, 449,2; 597,7 carry, 449,4; 519,29; 605,29 serve, 508,12.14 diakonêtês, such as to carry, 449,25 diakoptein, break off, 577,38 break up, 605,18.20.25 diakosmein, arrange in order, 564,1 diakrinein, differentiate, 483,26; 493,25.26; 494,4.5; 507,4.5 force apart, 472,17; 481,28; 510,4; 517,15; 547,6 divide off, 479,4.5 diakrisis, differentiation, 461,12.13; 494,14.17.25.26; 495,5 dialegesthai, speak, 460,18 dialektos, thing said, 500,32 dialogos, (Platonic) dialogue, 578,31 diamerizein, partition, 586,13; divide in parts, 605,19 diametros, diameter, 547,35 dianoeisthai, think (sc. discursively), 465,1.21; 550,6 dianoêtikon, that which thinks, 515,14.23 dianoêton, object of thought, 555,27.32.40; 556,2.3; 557,10.12 dianoia, thought, 446,9; 486,1.2.5; 487,39; 488,1-15; 489,29; 490,28.29.31; 491,9.10.12.15;

492,8.10,11; 496,23.28; 515,15.16; 545,13.14,17; 546,7.24.27.30; 550,6.8; 553,23.27-30; 556,32.34; 593,6 diaphanês, transparent, 464,15; 519,29; 607,9-10 can be seen through, 601,28 diaphora, difference, 478,1 etc. differentiating feature, what differentiates, 446,7.9 etc. diaphônein, be discrepant, 471,21 disagree, 581,30 diaphônia, diagreement, 596,35-6 diaporein, go through a problem, 463,6 diarthroun, articulate fully, 498,30 diarthrôsis, articulation, 588,23 diarrêdên, in so many words, 563,35 diaspan, tear apart, 484,22; 566,3.5.7; 572,15; 575,1 diastasis, distance, 574,15 diastellein, draw a distinction, 471,31.32 diastellesthai, open out, 592,28 diastêma, distance, 491,17 diaskhizein, sever, 572,12 diataxis, ordering, 573,5 diathesis, state, 458,1 mental state, 556,11 didaktos, teachable, 495,25.29 didaxis, teaching, 469,32.34 diêirêmenôs, dividedly, in a divided way, 550,8.11 diegeirein, stir up, 512,14 diêkhês, can be heard through, 601,28 dielenkhein, convict, 489,16 diestrammenos, deviant, 579,20.21 dikaiologeisthai, plead, 536,2 diexodos, exposition, 570,29 dikaiologia, something to plead, 535,19 dikastês, judge, 478,36 dinêsis, rotation, 589,12 diôrismenos, discrete, 459,4 diorthoun, correct, 591,16 diosmos, can be smelt through, 601,28 diplasios, double, 472,8-12 distazein, be in two minds, 521,6 distikhion, distich, 486,23.26 dittologein, be repetitive, 558,7 dôdekaedron, dodekahedron, 450,31

Greek-English Index dogma, doctrine, 529,29; 542,2.3; 586,25 dokheion, repository, 509,17 donein, move up and down, 545,1 dotikê, dative, 529,12.14 dourios hippos, wooden horse, 482,17.18 doxa, opinion, 446,9, 465,18.19; 488,15.21; 490,29.30; 492,15-21; 496,28-32; 500,3.8; 502,27.32; 503,2.4; 593,5.6 doxastos, subject of opinion, thing opinion is about, 502,28.31.35; 506,11 object of opinion, 555,27-556,3 doxazein, be of the opinion, 487,14-16; 488,18-20; 492,26-9; 502,28.29.31.34 dran, act on, 599,4 drassasthai, clutch, 599,6 drimus, acute, 455,33; 469,29 dunamis, power, 446,7; 465,12; 597,29.31 dunamei, kata dunamin, in potentiality, potential, 469,9; 519,19.20.22.24-6; 522,22.27; 558,20.21.26.28.30; 564,30-2.34.35; 567,9-11 aisthêsis, potential sense, 469,10; 475,18; 498,14.15; 558,16 nous, potential intellect, 491,7; 518,11; 534,31; 558,6 dusgnôstos, hard to know, 462,20 dusthêratos, hard to hunt down, 462,18 dustupôtos, resisting imprints, 448,10 egrêgorsis, waking, 575,27.29 eidêsis, knowledge, 518,14; 520,19; 596,23 eidopoiein, make to have form, 547,5-6; 552,24 eidos, form, 529,34; 531,12; 543,14; 562,20.22 species, 579,28.29.32 eidôlopoios, image-maker, 493,8.9 eikazein, liken, 538,6; 539,35 eikein, yield, 579,7 eikosaedron, eikosahedron, 450,31 eikôn, likeness, 519,10 eilikrinês, pure, 477,6.7 einai, to be, 537,7

189

on, thing that is, 567,8.12 tôi einai, in being, 484,12 to ti ên einai, essence, 531,11 eisagein, indicate, 523,32 eisballein, send on 482,13 eisdokhê, reception (in optics), 605,23-4 ekklinein, turn aside from, 595,9; 601,1 ekkremês, loose end hanging, 494,12 ekkrinein, emit, 513,6 ekkrouein, distract, 596,10.12.26 eklampsis, illumination, 486,38-487,1 ekluein, break up, 476,29 ekpompê, emission (in optics), 605,27 ekstasis, extending, 589,3 ektasis, extension, 550,25 ekthesis, exposition, 499,28 ektuphloun, to blind, 453,9 elatton, minor premiss, 590,17 elaphos, stag, 508,5 elenkhein, refute, 467,20 reproach 573,26; 574,5 elenkhos, refutation, 596,38 ellampsis, irradiation, 539,3; 588,3 elleipsis, reduction, 472,11.14.15 embathunein, sink deep into, 588,37 embruon, embryo, 558,1 empodizein, impede, 517,30; 596,23 be an impediment, 596,31 emphereia, relation, 446,26 emphutos, innate, 588,12 empsukhia, animation, 524,11; 572,8 empsukhos, animate (being), 464,10 enakouein, heed, give heed to, 574,16; 579,7 enallax, alternando, 561,17 enantilogia, contradiction, 519,17 enantios, contrary, 553,7.13 etc. enantiousthai, contradict, 456,26.29 be contrary to, 536,15 run counter to, 579,37.39 enargeia, evident facts, 495,23 endeia, defect, 472,17 endiathetos, in the mind, 556,10.15 endiatribein, be engaged with, 467,3 energeia, activity, 463,1.3.11-12; 464,4.23; 465,7.24; 466,6.7; 469,11; 528,21 actuality, 557,30; 558,19.27 energeiâi, kat’ energeian, actual, actually, in actuality, 469,8.9;

190

Indexes

471,5; 475,10; 480,33; 533,24; 549,5.6; 557,18; 558,1.2; 559,15; 567,10.11 aisthêsis, actual sense, 469,10; 470,1; 471,4; 472,5.6; 473,21; 475,9.19; 498,14-15 nous, actual intellect, 490,27; 491,11.14; 518,27.30; 520,18; 524,19; 534,30; 558,6 energein, act, 467,6; 470,25; 535,9.30; 540,7 energêma, activity, 486,14 engraphos, already inscribed, 524,15 enistasthai, address, 501,12 enkatoikodomein, build into, 448,20; 449,3 enkephalos, brain, 565,29; 566,2 enkharattein, engrave on, 534,30-1 enkhumos, succulent, 482,27 enkolaptein, cut into, 511,14-15 enkosmios, in the cosmos, 528,20 enkratês, self-controlled, person with self-control, 579,5.6.12 enkrateuesthai, control oneself, 560,6; 578,17 ennoein, think out, 573,2; 578,11 ennoia, idea, 459,31; 486,25; 500,25; 570,18 consideration 541,30 ennomos, law-abiding, 565,37 entelekheia, actuality, 558,3 entelekheiâi, in actuality, 557,29 entimoteros, superior, 446,8 entupoun, imprint, 534,30 enudros, living in water, 449,13 aquatic, 452,28 enulos, in matter, 525,13 etc. enulon eidos, form in matter, 517,22 etc. enulos zoê, matter-bound life, 486,30 enulôs, as being in matter, 486,33; 567,19 enupnion, dream, 486,35 epagein, bring forward, 567,7 epagôgê, induction, 449,31 force, 454,32 epagôgikos, inductive, 448,2.23.27; 449,19.28.29 epagôgikôteros, on the inductive side, 450,8

epanabainein, transcend, 521,7; 553,8-9 epanalambanein, go over again, 527,18-19 epiballein, intuit, 487,32 approach, 495,3 epiblêtikôs, intuitively, 547,9 epiboulê, plotting against, 595,13; attack, 607,5 epigignôskein, recognise, 454,19 epidiorthoun, set right, 525,26.28.30 epikaluptesthai, be covered over, 515,31; 516,2 epikampês, curved, 526,7 epikamptein, curve round, 526,9 epikheirêma, proof; 450,20.26; 516,17; 576,9.14.18; 578,35; 596,37 argument, 584,19 epikhthonios, earth-dwelling, 486,32 epikratein, gain the mastery, 590,15 epikrinein, adjudicate, 522,14; 525,17 epilanthanesthai, forget, 534,32; 537,39.40; 541,20.25.32; 542,1.5 epilegein, say against, 519,17 epiluesthai, resolve, 451,31; 526,22; 533,15 epilusis, solution, 462,10-11; 543,27 epimixia, mixing with, 528,15-16 epinoein, conceive, 458,29; 476,22-3; 562,29 epinoia, conception, 520,33; 527,25; 532,14.16; 543,36-544,1; 563,4; 566,19 epipedon, plane, 552,9 epiphaneia, surface, 552,8.12.17.20 epiphoitan, come in, 450,10 epiplokê, plaiting together, 501,13 epipolaiôs, superficially, 570,6 epistêmê, knowledge, 487,20 etc. systematic knowledge, 490,31 etc. science, 461,27; 607,1 epistêmonikôs, with systematic knowledge, 524,19-20 epistêmôn, knower, 538,12-19 epistêtos, what is known, 534,4 object of knowledge, 557,18-24; 564,29.32; 567,9 epistrephein, reflect, 466,19-27; 527,7; 528,13 epistrophê, reflection, 541,30 epitasis, tempering, 477,14

Greek-English Index epitêdeios, suitable, 511,31 epitêdeiotês, suitability, 521,19 etc. kat’ epitêdeiotêta, by virtue of suitability, 516,31; 519,25; 524,29; 558,16-17 epitholoun, muddy, 523,18 epithumetikos, desiring, 565,26; 574,28 epithumia, desire, 565,29.30.35; 566,3; 571,20.24; 574,6 etc. epitrepein, bid, 578,17 êremein, stay still, 494,24.25 êremia staying still, 453,29.31; 457,32.34; 458,3; 461,28; 510,38 ergatês, craftsman, 467,12 ergon, function, 464,24 work, 467,11 erôtêmatikôs, interrogatively, 530,29.34 as a question, 596,14 esoptron, mirror, 605,25 eskhatia, last part, 500,6.8 ethismos, habituation, 497,8.9; 500,28.30.37 ethizein, become habituated, be habituated, 497,7-12 êthos, character, 486,28 etumologein, give the etymology of, 515,7 etumologia, etymology, 515,5 euergês, serviceable, 511,30 eukherôs, readily, 448,11; 517,18 eukhê, prayer, 579,4 eukosmia, good arrangement, 564,11 eunoukhos, eunuch, 577,28 euôdia, fragrance, 571,11.13 euplastos, easily shaped, 469,22 eusebês, pious, 527,30 eutaxia, good order, 563,40; 564,11 eutheia, straight line, 481,8; 526,5.6.8.9 eutrepizein, prepare, 576,37 eutupôtos, easily imprinted, 469,21; 605,16 exaisios, extraordinary, 602,16 exapinês, forthwith, 544,34 exêgêsis, interpretation, 464,32 exêgêtês, interpreter, 464,30 exeikazein, liken, 587,29.31; 588,2 exeikônizein, be an image of, 564,38 exelenkhein, convict, 465,26 exomalizein, level up, 490,20

191

exomoioun, make completely like, 553,3; 557,20; 563,25 exôthen, from outside (his works), 503,9; 525,25; 526,29 gastêr, stomach, 600,31 gê, earth, 448,9.14; 452,8 gêinos, earthy, 453,2; 594,34; 595,2 geitôn, neighbour, 596,12.26 geneion, beard, 595,16.18 genesis, coming to be (the world of), 487,9-10; 563,6; 566,31; 567,1 genêtos, generated, 599,27.28 gennaios, noble, 578,35 gennêma, offspring, 471,37; 602,28.29 genos, genus, 579,27.28.32 geôdes, earthen, 594,35.36; 598,15; 600,21 geômetria, geometry, 461,31 geranos, crane, 580,7 gêras, old age, 491,4; 524,22 geuesthai, taste, 455,15 etc. geusis, taste, 448,13 etc. geuston, object of taste, 602,11 ginglumos, joint, 587,30; 588,17.28 gignôskein, know, get to know, 454,21 cognise, 528,30.31 recognise, 454,22 glukus, sweet, 454,17 etc. gnôsis, cognition, 490,14 etc. gnôstikos, cognitive, 465,12 etc. gnôston, object of cognition, 541,22 (see note); 572,21 etc. goês, mountebank, 504,15 goêteuein, bewitch, 581,29 gônia, angle, 511,6 gramma, written letter, 533,30 grammateion agraphon, writing tablet on which nothing is written, 469,19; 516,24-5; 520,4-5; 524,14; 533,25-30 grammê, line, 552,8-20 etc. graphê, reading, 598,17.21 picture, 488,32; 511,14 grapheion, paintbrush, 538,6 (see note) grapheus, painter, 538,6 (see note); 538,7 gumnazein, set out, try out (an argument), 463,34; 467,15; 472,21-7; 480,20.24; 481,8

192

Indexes

make limber, 517,6.13.17 hamartia, mistake, 519,15.38 hamôsgepôs, in some way or other, 468,30; 469,3 hapalosarkos, soft-fleshed, 600,33-4 haphê, touch, 448,13.32; 450,36; 451,16.17; 489,29-34; 595,2; 597,10; 598,24.37; 600,18.19.22; 601,5.7-10; 602,1-9; 603,7-12.20.21.25.27.29-32; 604,2.9.12 haplos, in general, 465,2 haplous, simple, 450,32; 527,9; 532,26 haptesthai, touch, perceive by touching, 601,19; 603,8.11 haptos, object of touch 449,33; 451,16 harmonia, attunement, 473,14 hêdein, please, 476,23 hêdesthai, experience pleasure, 559,1.20; 560,1; 561,25.28 hêdonê, pleasure, 559,15.18.30.32; 572,25 hêdunein, please, 477,18 hêdus, pleasant, 458,22; 554,28; 559,17.18; 560,4.5; 562,8; 607,14 hêdutês, pleasantness, 477,9 hêgemonikon, ruling part, 587,25 heimarmenê, fate, 486,24-5 hekatonebdomêkontaplasios, 170 times as big as, 503,37 hêlios, the Sun, 537,28 helkein, pull, 588,37.39; 589,1.12-19 helxis, pulling 588,35, 589,2.4.8-13; 591,29 hêmeroun, tame, 497,4; 602,30.31.32; 607,19 hêmikuklion, semicircle, 589,13 hêmisphairion, hemisphere, 590,11.12 heniaios, unitive, 515,28; 549,1 henoeidôs, as being each one, 545,14 henopoiein, unite, 542,31-2 henôsis, unity, 471,29 unification, 551,3 henoun, unite, 471,24; 547,31 hêpar, liver, 565,30; 566,3 herpeton, reptile, 591,32 hêsukhia, inactivity, 486,4 heterogenês, heterogeneous, 452,3 heterotês, otherness, 521,22 heuresis, discovery, 525,1; 569,2

hexis, disposition, 534,28; 537,27.34; 539,27.33; 558,16 nous kath’ hexin, dispositional intellect, 490,27; 518,13.16-17.27.28; 520,17 hippeios, equine, 539,24 hippos, horse, 488,35; 489,4; 497,4.6; 500,26.36; 596,28 dourios hippos, wooden horse, 482,17.18 hippos tês kakias, horse of vice, 596,26.27 holikôs, on a holistic view, 540,31 holotelôs, in a wholly complete way, 553,21 homêros, hostage, 570,23 homodoxos, of the same opinion as, 533,34-5 homogenês, of the same kind, 478,1; 480,6; 482,13; 561,4.6 homoiomerês, homeomerous, 597,23 homoiomereia, thing of similar parts, 522,34 homoiousthai, become like, 490,6-8 homoion homoiôi, like (known) by like, 487,7.22 homokhronos, contemporary, 540,28 homônumia, things said equivocally, 575,13 homônumos, equivocal, 575,12 homoulos, of the same matter, 526,19.24.34; 532,22.25.26 hôra, hour, 580,26.34 horasis, seeing, 470,14; 474,34.35 horatikos, of sight, 463,1.2.5-6.8 horaton, thing seen, 464,7 470,14; 602,18 horikôs, termwise, in a termwise manner, 543,4; 569,23 horkos, conjuration, 497,6; 500,30.33 oath, 502,24 horkoun, conjure, 500,32 hormê, purposive impulse, 576,26-8; 578,5; 583,19 horos, boundary, 560,21.25 definition, 507,10 term, 472,11; 543,6-10; 544,5-7; 545,24 hudôr, water, 448,18.27; 601,27; 607,10.11 hugiainein, be healthy, 487,11 hugieia, health, 501,20.26

Greek-English Index hugrotês, moisture, 449,13-14 hulê, matter, 502,1.2; 522,32; 523,14.16; 528,37; 529,33; 530,1; 531,12; 539,17; 541,12; 598,27; 599,1.4.5.9 hulikôs, in a material way, 481,25 hulikon aition, material cause, 501,29; 502,9 humên, membrane, 450,23; 453,8 hupainittesthai, hint at, 593,26 hupakouein, understand, 487,19 huparktikos, substantive, 545,6.7.10; 569,18.23 huparxis, subsistence, 567,15.16 huparkhein, belong, 461,14; 500,12; 514,9 to be, 449,6 really to exist 545,9 huperbaton, words out of order, 514,16; 531,1.3; 548,28; 568,11; 606,1 huperbolê, excess, 472,7.16; 517,5.6.15; 602,9; 606,18.21 huperkosmios, above the cosmos, 528,20 huperlampros, overbright, 476,20 huperousios, super-real, 504,21 huperselênos, superlunary, 594,22 huphantikê, weaving, 476,25 huphistamenon, subsistent, 471,15 hupnos, sleep, 498,18.19; 575,27.28 hupokeimenon, subject (grammatical) 476,4; 546,4.6; 548,16.17 (logical), 590,32 (i.e. subject matter), 456,21.23; 463,29; 511,23; 563,15 tôi hupokeimenôi, in subject, 473,22.23; 474,6; 475,10; 480,26; 530,32-3; 531,4; 571,22.26; 584,32 hupokeisthai, be subject, 472,27; 500,27; 563,18 hupokrisis, acting, 492,28 hupolambanein, suppose, 523,31.32; 570,20 hupolêpsis, supposal, 490,28-30; 492,11.12.16.24; 493,22; 497,16.18; 593,23 hupomnêma, commentary, 464,20-1; 531,25 hupomnêmatizôn, in his commentary, 575,7

193

hupomnêsantes, commentators, 453,15 hupopiptein, fall under, 454,16.20; 555,36 huposelênos, sublunary, 594,22 hupostasis, subsistence, 471,34; 532,14-15; 588,3 hupostatikos, subsistence-giving, 547,11 hupostrônnusthai, form a mattress, 601,8 hupothesis, hypothesis, 467,34; 565,2 hupothetikos sullogismos, hypothetical syllogism, 447,17; 455,10; hupothetikôs, by hypothetical reasoning, 454,11 hupotithenai, suppose, 518,4 hupotupôsis, outline, 539,10 iatros, doctor, 501,20.25; 588,10 idiazein, be peculiar, 449,3 idios, proper, 454,3-6.8; 457,11; 459,8.24; 460,26; 462,13; 540,3.19; 541,6 idikos, special, 454,1; 509,7; 573,24 of our own, 517,20 idiopragein, attend to one’s own business, 455,13; 554,2; 557,3 idiôma, peculiarity, 572,30.37.38 idiôma aisthêtikon, way peculiar to sense, 458,13.14.16 idiôtês, simple person, 540,29 ikhthus, fish, 449,13 ilus, mud, 588,37 isosthenein, be of the same number, 595,3-4 kainotomein, introduce new classification, 558,25 kakia, vice, 596,26.27 kakizein, censure, 518,32 kakographos, ill written, 533,30-1 kakophônos, with a bad voice, 533,32 kakos, bad, 554,18.31-7; 560,4.5; 562,11 etc. evil, 547,10 kalamos, measuring rod, 567,34 kalôs, rope, 511,12 artêmenos kalôs, tightrope, 511,12 kamêlos, camel, 450,7 kampulos, curved, 562,27; 566,14-16

194

Indexes

kanôn, rule, 503,3; 506,4; 525,31 kardia, heart, 565,30; 566,2; 587,24.25; 588,7.15.17 karukeuma, savoury sauce, 601,16 kataballein, overcome, 502,33; 503,2 katabasis, descent, going down, 473,23.25 katadromê, attack, 536,6.19.28; 537,8.16.17.24 katadusis, underground habitation, 495,21 burrowing, 595,31 katagignesthai, be occupied with, 488,3; 498,6 etc. katagôgion, lodging, 555,4-11; 560,9.14.16.21 katagôgos, on the downward path, 596,30 katagraphein, inscribe, 538,5.9 katakhrêsthai, use (words) loosely, speak loosely, 550,6; 551,23; 573,17 katakhrêstikôs, loosely, loose (speaking), 490,17.19.35; 491,34-5 katakruptein, overlay, 511,34 katalambanein, grasp, 603,11 katamathêmatikeuein, mathematicise, 481,34-5 katanoêsis, attending to, 528,16 kataphasis, assertion, 546,3.7.8; 548,12.16.19.25; 559,31 ek kataphaseôs, positively, 478,31 kataphatikôs, positively, 547,7.9 kataphronein, be contemptuous of, 529,14-15; 563,9 kataskeuazein, establish, 451,7.9.11.18.21.24 etc. kataskeuê, establishment, 501,6 establishing argument, 598,23 katasterizein, make into constellations, 461,30 katasterismos, location relatively to one another, 461,29 katêgorein, predicate, 513,29 katêgoroumenon, predicate, 476,3.5.7; 543,7; 545,22; 546,4; 548,16-26 katêgorikos, categorical, 455,11 katekhein, hold (in sensory system), 464,13 katepeigein, be urgent, 516,18-19; 600,14

katharos, pure, 556,19 katheudein, sleep en tôi katheudein, in sleep, 488,22.24 katholikos, universal, 596,7 katholikôteron, in a more universal sense, 539,21 katholou, universal, 596,23 etc. katoikizein, house, 565,29 katonomazesthai, have a name, 470,8.9.17 katoptron, mirror, 464,12 katorthôma, right action, 584,28 keimenon, assumption, 575,5 kenon, gap, 500,7 kentrikôs, in a pointlike way, 542,29 kentron, centre, 481,8.10; 542,30; 560,22.25.27.31; 589,20; 591,30 kephalaion, section, 455,11.12; 456,12; 479,8.20-3; 480,4 point, 535,1; 542,21.22; 587,12 kêros, wax, 605,13.14 kharaktêrizein, characterise, 598,15; 600,21 khartion, sheet of papyrus, 533,26 kheimôn, winter, 580,7.8.32 kheir, hand, 512,8; 567,33; 604,25-7 khiôn, snow, 476,22 khitôn, covering, 595,31 khorêgein, bring along, 537,3.4 khôristos, separable, 520,31-3; 521,1.22.23; 537,10.12.13; 540,3.5; 551,25.28-31; 563,3; 566,20.21.25.26; 573,16.19 separate, 466,21; 563,23.24 khôrizein, separate, 537,10.12-14.17; 563,4.26; 566,21 khortos, food, 587,9 khrêsis, usage, 485,24-5; 486,11.12 khroa, colour, 452,17 khroia, colour, 454,17.19; 461,8 khrôma, colour, 455,32; 466,4.5.7; 469,12; 471,10; 474,28; 475,1; 539,28 khrômatismos, colouring, 466,13.15-16 khrômatizein, colour (v.), 464,4.9.14; 466,2.7-9.11; 468,30; 469,11 khronos, time, 480,11.12.17; 483,21.31; 540,20.31 549,9.23-7.30-2; 550,2.32;

Greek-English Index 551,14.22.34; 580,2.3.15.16.22.27; 581,2.4 tense, 545,22.25.26.31.35.38; 548,5.7.26 khrôsis, colouring, 470,15; 474,35.36 khumos, flavour, 462,16; 601,16 khumôsis, flavouring, 475,3.4 kinein, change (transitive), 570,19-21 etc. kinêsis, change, 453,9 etc. kinêtikos, (that which changes), 570,14.27.29 etc. klan, break, 525,27.29 to bend, 526,7.9; 532,6 klimax, ladder, 473,24 koilos, concave, 588,20 koinônein, have (something) in common, 473,10; 485,17-19; 558,13 etc. koinônia, thing in common, 446,10-11.26; 516,19-23.29.30; 517,2; 521,37; 522,1-7; 600,14.19.25 etc. community, 471,28 koinos, common koinê aisthêsis, common sense, 446,11; 455,21-2; 464,22; 465,25; 477,23; 479,8-9; 480,5; 555,5.34-8; 560,20 etc. koinon aisthêton, common sense-object, 453,28 etc. koman, be long haired, 488,27 kôpê, oar, 502,14; 525,27.28 kôphos, deaf, 507,33; 601,35 korê, pupil, 560,10 korsê anaukhên, neckless head, 545,19 kosmein, adorn, 450,11 kosmikôs, on a cosmic view, 540,31 kosmos, cosmos, 520,23; 526,35; 540,21 krama, mixture, 503,35.36; 504,5; 538,13 krasis, mixture, 472,32; 504,3; 517,23.24 kratein, master, 523,1 keep hold of, 464,11 kratiston, strongest, 572,18 kreitton, stronger, 572,19.23 krêmnos, precipice, 583,9; 595,12-13 krinein, discern, 453,33 etc. krisis, discernment, 489,24; 490,8

195

kritikôs, in a discerning way, 481,25.26.33 krustalloeidês, of crystalline form, 448,19; 560,11 ktupos, clap, 474,21 kubernan, govern, 518,17 kubos, cube, 450,31 kuklikos, in a circle, 591,33; 597,1 kuklos, circle, 587,31; 589,20.23; 591,30 kukloterês, curved, 511,12 (see note) kuôn, dog, 478,11; 482,26 kuria, control, 590,9 kuriolektein, speak accurately, 490,19 kuriôs, properly, 464,5 kuros, supreme power, 502,23; 572,23; 579,22 kurtos, convex, 588,18.20 laburinthôdês, labyrinthine, 517,11 lampas, light, 464,8; 466,12.15; 469,4; 499,18.21.22 lampros, bright, 464,9 famous person, 528,17 legein, argue, 464,13 say, 447,22 speak of, 446,22 mean, 450,17; 504,7 leipsanon, trace left behind, 486,35; 581,14 lêmma, (preliminary) assumption, 474,16; 507,10, 512,5; 526,12 leôn, lion, 497,4.6; 581,8.13.17 lêthê, forgetfulness, 502,32; 503,1 forgetting, 506,10 lexis, text, 450,21; 521,29; 530,13 etc. word, 473,17 detailed commentary, 470,16; 539,11 etc. logikos, rational, 525,12 logikê psukhê, rational soul, 446,6.13; 447,15; 450,10.13.17; 465,33; 466,23; 485,11; 494,6-7; 496,22; 507,1; 508,15-16; 511,35.38; 512,2; 516,8-14; 517,8.9; 518,3; 521,24.26; 595,36; 596,39; 597,17 logical, 495,9 logikôteros, a bit logical, 481,17 logion, saying, 547,12

196

Indexes

logismos, reasoning, 585,23; 587,2; 596,25 logistikon, that which reasons, 593,8 logoeidês, rational in form 506,22 logos, account, 469,17.18; 516,24.25; 520,2.5.11; 533,28; 565,5; 596,8 etc. logôi, kata logon, in account, 473,22; 530,33; 531,5; 584,33 etc. argument 447,26.31.34.35; 448,23; 449,19.28.29; 450,8; 473,3; 477,23; 494,19 etc. diaskeuê logou, structure of argument, 455,10 book, 446,12.14; 453,28; 455,7 principle, 506,28 proportion, proportionality, 472,31-34; 473,1 reason (i.e. explanation), 488,8 reason (the faculty), 466,30; 467,7; 485,13; 488,9; 500,21; 516,19.23; 565,18.29.34; 566,2; 571,20; 573,22.31; 574,6; 576,11.12; 583,23; 586,22; 593,10.14.16 etc. relationship, 516,17 sentence, 599,36 speech, 485,10; 492,30 statement, 596,29; 597,18 talking about, 539,32 logôi eipein, in a word, 518,35 loimôdês, pestilential, 487,10 loutron. bath, 476,25 lupê, distress, 559,19.32 lupêros, distressing, 554,30.32.33; 559,15.16 unpleasant, 607,14 lusis, solution, 449,6; 468,22; 481,2.3.5; 484,10.25; 526,28 makhê, conflict, 502,12 makhesthai, fight, 502,11.13; 503,6 mageirikê, cooking, 476,24 mageirikon onoma, cooking-term, 475,5 mainomenos, maniac, 555,22 makroapodotos, taking a long time to reaching its main clause, 582,32 malakotês, softness, 595,33 manteuesthai, divine, 451,32 marmarugês, seeing sparks, 464,7.15 maskhalê, armpit, 595,19.21 masêsis, chewing, 544,35

mastix, whip, 488,35; 500,26.36 mastos, breast, 494,31; 495,4 matên, to no purpose, 447,32.33.34 etc. mathêmata, mathematics, 510,23 objects of mathematics, 510,24; 527,15.21.24; 531,8.20.23; 532,7; 562,22.24.27; 563,4 mathêmatikos, mathematical, 481,35 mathêsis, learning, 469,32.34; 569,1 mathêtês, pupil, 469,34 mazos, breast, 511,15 megalophuia, loftiness of genius, 529,14 megethos, size, 453,29 etc. magnitude, 546,15 etc. megethunai, give magnitude, 543,34 meiôsis, too little, 472,7 meioun, diminish, 458,33.34 meizôn, major premiss, 590,16.17 mekhanasthai, devise, 572,27 mêkos, length, 550,9-13.32; 551,29 etc. mêkunein, make too long, 530,13 melankholia, depression, 528,22 melas, black, 511,14; 547,5.7.8 dark, 567,16 meli, honey, 455,15; 461,19.21; 495,23 melissa, melitta, bee, 495,22; 501,2 mêlon, fruit, 571,12.13 menein, remain still, 589,5.10.18.21 mêpote, perhaps, 462,28 merikos, particular, 490,24; 526,1.5; 596,24.32 aisthêsis merikê, particular sense, 459,23; 461,18.20 meristos, in parts, 544,8.9 divisible into parts, 571,29.31 meristôs, part by part, 479,9 in parts (adv.), 546,33 merizein, to divide into parts, 571,30 mesotês, mean, 477,10; 560,12 mesouranein, be in mid-sky, 590,11 metaballein, change, 517,1; 590,31; 604,30-2 metabolê, change, 605,1 etc. switch, 558,31 metagein, lead across, 564,12 metapeithein, persuade to change one’s mind, 500,34 metaphora ek metaphoras, metaphorically, 497,18.24 (see note)

Greek-English Index metatrepesthai, turn aside from, 492,30 metaxu, to, the medium, 451,23, 508,9 metaxulogia, digression, 474,16 what has been said in between, 490,15 methê, drunkenness, 511,35; 515,32 mêtis, shrewdness, 485,25.29; 486,1 metousios, sub-real, 504,21 miktos, mixed, 600,17-29; 601,5-12 mimêsis, imitating, 597,35 mnêmonikos, mnemonic, using a mnemonic system, 493,7.10 mokhlos, crowbar, 512,8 monas, unit, 459,4; 543,13 monimos, immobile, 583,1; 598,32; 599,18.27-9 morphê, shape, 551,1 morphôtikôs, by way of shape, 574,15 mousikê, music, 461,32; 602,24 muein opthalmous, have eyes shut, 496,11-15; 499,14.15.20; 577,34 muia, winged insect, 495,5.19; 496,19 muktêr, nostril, 449,14 murepsikê, scent-making, 476,24 murmêx, ant, 495,5.19-21; 496,19; 498,31; 511,29; 513,4; 580,8; 590,3 mus, muscle, 575,21 naumakhia, seafight, 479,33-5 neikos, strife, 545,18 neogenês, new-born, 494,26 neuron, sinew, 587,24; 588,11; 591,27 noein, think, 491,11; 497,15 516,15; 517,21.22.28; 522,5.6.25.31.32; 525,10.23.30; 527,9-22; 528,1.7-9; 545,37; 546,13-37; 547,1-4.21.22; 564,10.14-17; 566,13.14.23 exercise intellect, 465,1.20 noêma, thought, 554,2.3; 556,5.6.16.19; 568,14; 569,21.29 noeros, intelligible, 461,26 intellectual, 555,9-12 noerôs, intellectually, 596,9 noêsis, intelligence, 485,21.23.25; 489,30.31.34; 490,21 thinking, 492,22.24; 519,9.11; 542,16; 583,31; 592,9,11 noêtos, object of intellect, 522,10,11; 527,8.15.20.24.26.33-7; 528,3.4;

197

530,19-21; 532,31.32; 533,1.5-13; 542,22-7; 555,29.32.40; 556,3; 557,9.11; 562,19.20 nomos, law, 471,17; 475,17; 588,9 what is customary, 521,14 nomôi, by convention, 472,1 nosein, be sick, 487,11 nosos, disease, 515,32 notheuein, debase, 491,29 nous, intellect, 446,10; 465,20; 478,4-14; 487,31-8; 490,25.27; 518,7.27; 522,9.10.23; 525,12.21; 527,6,8; 528,6.9; 536,26.27; 578,7; see also kata dunamin, kat’ energeian, kath’ hexin, pathêtikos, praktikos, theôrêtikos, thurathen meaning, 489,11; 529,4; 530,30 mind (i.e. meaning), 464,18 nun, now, 479,24-36; 480,1; 483,21-6; 543,13; 545,30-3 nukterinos, nocturnal, 486,14 nux, night, 576,26.27 odous, tooth, 544,35; 577,12.19 oikeios, its own, 478,19; 595,25 belong as its own, 572,31 belonging properly to, 584,12.13.28 oikothen, from within, 527,26 oinomeli, honeyed wine, 502,1; 521,15 okhoun, to, the vehicle, 589,16 okhêsis, movement in a vehicle, 589,15 oktaedron, octahedron, 450,31 oligarkhia, oligarchy, 565,36 oligotês, fewness, 581,18 ômos, shoulder, 472,33 onar, dream, 486,13-14.37.38 oneiros, dream, 494,23.25 oneirôttein, dream (v.), 494,20 onoma, name, 470,13 term, 475,4 onux, nail, 595,1 ôion, egg, 540,29 ophis, snake, 497,3.5; 500,30 ophrus, frown, 464,31 ophthalmos, eye, 453,7; and see muein opsis, sight, 448,19; 451,25; 453,30; 455,14.16; 456,8; 460,3; 462,12; 463,35.37; 464,8; 467,28; 468,3.18; 470,14; 476,20; 478,23.33; 510,37;

198

Indexes

511,2.22; 602,31; 605,26; 606,2.26; 607,1 optikos, optic, 605,27 oregesthai, reach out, 576,15; 582,12; 591,13.15; 592,2.3 have appetition for, 589,32.34 orektikos, appetitive, 574,32 to orektikon, that which is appetitive, 571,8; 572,15.31; 579,16.17.18.21-29; 587,8.9 the appetitive part, 572,33-6; 579,18 orekton, object of appetition, 571,8; 581,21.33; 585,28; 587,9,10.23; 590,7 orexis, appetition, 495,11.12; 554,35.36; 559,7-9; 565,15-17; 566,3-7; 573,6; 574,25.27; 575,2-9; 576,15-17; 579,10.11.14.16.31-9; 581,22; 585,19.22; 590,7-9; 592,4-13 organikos, instrumental, 502,6.8; 587,24.26.29; 588,6; organikon aition, instrumental cause, 501,24.25.28 organic, 583,1 organon, instrument, 467,1; 511,36; 517,27-31; 524,1.3; 526,4; 529,25; 551,13; 562,28; 563,19; 567,33.34; 568,16; 570,2; 576,7; 578,8.9.26 organ, 576,22.23.30.33.37; 582,27 aisthêtikon organon, instrumentality of sense, 530,9 oruttein, dig, 453,8 ôsis, pushing, push, 588,35.37; 589,4.8.9.11.13; 591,29; 602,17 osmê, odour, 449,33; 452,3.5 osphranton, object of smell, 601,17; 602,13 osphrêsis, smell, 448,20-2; 449,1.12.24; 452,4; 476,21; 601,36 ostrakodermon, animal with a shell, 600,32 ostreinos, shell-like, 482,12 ôthein, push, 588,35; 589,1.12.14.16; 604,28.29; 605,2 ôthesis, pushing, 589,3 oudeterôs, in the neuter, 541,14 ouranion, heavenly body, 526,36; 595,34.36.37.39; 596,3.16.27.33.36.39; 597,6.8.10.13; 598,1-3; 600,22.24

ouranomêkês, as tall as the sky, 503,32; 507,36; 508,6 ouranopolitês, citizen of heaven, 563,8 ousia, substance, 460,11,13; 519,23.37; 537,27.28.32; 571,15-18 atomon ousia, individual substance, 514,10-12 deutera ousia, secondary substance, 446,26 pemptê ousia, fifth substance, 453,20; 597,13; 600,23 ousiôdês, in substance, 563,4 paidion, baby, 494,31; 577,11.13.15 pais, child, 518,12.21.24; 519,20.24.37 pakhumerês, coarse-grained, 510,32 pan to, the universe, 520,24 panteleios, completely perfect, 518,16 pantôs, certainly, 453,21 definitely, 478,31 etc. ou pantôs, not in all cases, 480,23; 490,2 parabolos, hazardous, 580,1.4 paradeigma, example, 459,22; 460,11; 476,28; 529,10.15; 577,25; 585,7-8; 590,22 model, 474,25; 481,7; 558,14; 589,22; 604,23 paragein, produce, 537,33 paraition, contributory cause, 491,25 parakatathêkê, pledge, 555,22 parakatiôn, further down, 493,24; 519,6.13; 522,7; 563,12 parakeisthai, lie ready for, 595,26; 599,18 parakmê, decline, 577,13 parakolouthein, follow upon, 556,21-2 paramuthein, reassure, 468,23 paramuthia, reassurance, 468,28 explanation, 542,8 paraplanasthai, wander astray, 583,8 paraphrazein, paraphrase, 531,1 paraphronein, be deranged in judgement, 511,33 paraphrosunê, derangement, 516,2 paraphtheirein, undermine, 521,13 parathesis, juxtaposition, 547,30.31 pareikazein, liken, 588,32; 589,6-7

Greek-English Index pareistrekhein, run out beside, 542,11 parekbasis, excursus, 546,13 paremphainesthai, appear alongside, 523,14 parepesthai, follow, 515,19 parergos, of marginal importance, 461,25 parergôs, by the way, 601,13 paretos, someone with palsy, 602,1 parodeuein, pass through, 605,12.18 (see note) paromoios, very like, 594,11 paroran, overlook, 582,34 paskhein, be affected, 457,17; 526,15.18.19; 558,20.22.28 etc. pathos, affection, 453,18.20; 455,1.2.6; 458,32-4; 481,22; 511,34; 516,34; 517,3.5; 522,14.18; 526,30; 527,1.2; 533,17-19 emotion, 565,17; 576,11.12; 578,16.17; 579,34; 581,27; 583,15.17.25; 584,11; 590,15; 593,14.15 pathêtikos nous, passive intellect, 490,23; 506,24; 523,29; 542,3 pêgê, spring, 536,12 peithein, to persuade, 496,34; 500,23.24.34 peithô, persuasion, 496,35; 497,8.9; 500,21,22 pelôris, mussel, 453,12 penês, poor, 486,28 pepsis, digestion, 452,33 peras, end-point, 481,11 end, 450,36; 515,13 peripeteia, denoument, 504,14 periphereia, periphery, 598,3 peripolein, patrol, 527,28 peritton, superfluity, 577,1 pêros, deformed, 512,22 pêrôma, deformed, 453,6; 577,11.12.16.17.23.26-8; 583,2 pettein, digest, 452,33 pezos, footed, 449,12 phaneroun, make manifest, plain, 511,21; 537,30.31 phantazesthai, imagine, 488,15-16.17.23-7.31; 492,25-7; 493,1-3; 496,2-4.13; 497,21.27.28; 498,17-18; 507,33.34; 512,15.17.22-8; 580,21

199

phantasia, imagination, 446,9.11.15.20; 455,23; 466,17.18; 486,15.17; 488,10-15; 490,25; 492,6-8; 494,19.20.22.28-31; 495,25; 498,13.14.26; 499,1-6; 500,3.8; 501,11.13; 502,2.4; 503,5-6.7; 504,3.5; (defined) 507,16-35; 508,1.11; 509,4.5; (etymology) 511,18-24; 512,12; 513,3.6; 514,15.17; 515,2.5.7; 541,23.26; 542,2.7.8; 546,31-4; 551,7-9; 562,28-30; 563,14-16; 564,2-5; 582,9-16; (division of), 589,35-590,5; imagining, 499,5; 514,27; 584,10-11 phantasiousthai, imagine, 582,12-13 phantasma, phantasm, 504,13; 561,26; 563,17.18; 569,5.11.21.29; 593,1.2.4 imagining, 492,32 phantastikon, to, that which imagines, 574,27.32 phaos, light, 511,23 pharmakon, drug, 492,31 philêdonon, to, love of pleasure, 565,36 philenklêmôn, one who likes to find faults, 446,19 philia, (Empedoclean) Friendship, 545,17.19.20 philokhrêmaton, to, love of wealth, 565,36 philosômatos, body-loving, 563,9-10 philosophos, philosopher, 590,22-6.32 ho philosophos, the Philosopher, 560,17; 576,28; 584,29; 594,23 philotimeisthai, be credited, 467,11 phlebotomon, blood-letting, 501,25 phlegma, phlegm, 595,22 phluaros, garrulous, 596,11.26 phobein, rout, 593,26.27; 594,6 phoitan, rove, 465,12.13 to pervade, 571,11 phônê, sound, 472,26.27.29.31; 473,3.6-8 spoken sound, 543,9.19; 544,19.25 voice, 500,32 phortikos, awkward, 522,12 phortion, burden, 472,33 phôs, light, 476,21; 511,23; 535,34.36.38; 537,26.28.30 phôtizein, illuminate, 535,38.39

200

Indexes

phrear, well, 571,6; 573,4; 583,9 phrên, mind, 486,27.30; 492,29 phronein, judge, 486,16 to exercise judgement, 490,17.36 phronêsis, thinking, 486,15.17; 487,3 practical judgement, 490,32.33; 491,32.34; 492,12 phruktos, torchlight, 561,29 phthartikos, destructive, 448,8; 476,20; 516,35 phthartos, destructible, 448,7; 516,10.34; 518,4.5; 572,2.3 phtheirein, destroy, 472,14.15; 602,8.11-20 phtheiresthai, pass away, 471,14; 598,12 be destroyed, 472,8; 502,27-32 phthora, passing away, 598,12 phusikos, natural, in the field of nature, 475,5; 539,16 physical, 469,29; 481,18.35 phusikôs, physically, 470,3 phusiologein, do natural science, 565,32 phusiologos, physicist, 570,25 phusis, nature, 447,34; 450,25; 462,8; 576,35.37; 587,30; 588,32.33; 589,5.7-10; 598,31 phutikos, vegetative, 446,5; 537,2.7; 541,8.11; 574,9.26; 575,4; 576,20.29; 582,5.8.10.21; 595,35; 597,19 phuton, plant, 575,6-8; 576,19.20; 594,19.26.27; 595,5.6; 598,14.15.24.26.28; 599,9-11 pisteuein, be rationally convinced, 496,33,34; 500,21 pistis, rational conviction, 496,31.32.35; 500,20.21.23 pistousthai, derive, obtain assurance, 466,12; 530,5.23; 595,15 planasthai wander, 495,7; 590,2 go astray, 489,23; 535,9.21 planê, going astray, 489,16.22.25 platos, width, 552,18 platunein, fill out, 539,12 plêgê, blow, 499,21 plegma, strand, 572,14 plekein, construct (a syllogism), 496,29.33 pleonazein, abundance, 595,21.22

plêthos, multitude, 581,18 pleura, side, 548,1 plokê, construction, 473,3; 500,17 pneuma, pneuma, 481,22; 482,12; 560,10; 587,24.26.27; 588,2.3.8.10.12.24.31.38; 589,6.20.21; Kharônia pneumata, mephitic vapours, 476,22; 602,14 pneumatikon sôma, pneumatic body, 481,20.21.24 podiaios, a foot across, 502,16; 503,38 poiêtikos (that) brings about, 501,19 poiêtikon aition, efficient cause, 496,34; 501,23.24.27; 539,17; 547,18; 571,3.4.7; 581,30.35; 588,4-5; poiotês, quality, 478,23 poioun, make qualitative, 543,31 kamaton poiesthai, direct labours, 446,5-6 poioun, paskhon, agent, patient, 469,30-1 politeia, constitution, 565,34 pôlodamnês, horse-breaker, 497,5; 500,27 poludunamos, many powered, 517,35; 518,4; 571,37 polumerês, multipartite, 571,23 polumêtis, very shrewd, 491,22.23 polumorphos, multiform, 565,35 polupous, (nasal) polyps, 601,36 poreia, movement, 495,7; 583,1 poreutikon, that which moves, 575,17.23 poreutikon zôon, animal that moves, 594,21.24-9; 595,9.11.27.29.34.35; 600,13.15.19.34; 601,3 poreutikê kinêsis, change in movement, 575,16.31 organon poreutikon, organ for movement, 576,22.23 porisma, corollary, 472,4; 475,9.11.14; 476,8; 547,15; 566,20 supplementary argument 470,19.28 pornê, prostitute, 583,26 porneuein, go to a prostitute, 590,14 posoun, make quantitative, 543,31 pous, foot, 588,35-589,4 pragma, thing, 466,30; 488,3.5; 512,7; 566,24.30; 568,12.17

Greek-English Index action, 485,10 fact, 509,28 pragmateia, treatise, 453,28; 455,7; 602,34 praktikos, practical, 520,26.27 nous, practical intellect, 554,13-18.23.27.30.36.38; 555,1; 558,11; 576,8; 578,8.12.15; 583,13; 584,21-5; 586,8.9; 592,8.13.20.21 prakton, thing to be done, thing that can be done, 490,31-3; 578,10; 583,14; 586,4.6; 591,4.9 proagein, bring forth, 537,28 advance, 557,29.30; 558,4 proaireisthai, choose, 578,27.28; 592,14 proairesis, choice, 578,12-13.26-7 proaugasma, flash, 464,16 proballein, put forward, 477,28; 480,4; 532,30 put forth, 534,22.23; 539,29.30.32 problêma, thesis, 475,13 proposition, 520,34; 521,8 probouleusis, prior deliberation, 501,1 proêgeisthai, precede, 504,29; 522,2; 540,31 progastôr, potbellied, 454,24; 488,28 progignôskein, have prior knowledge of, 565,14 programma, heading, 566,10 prokeimenon, point at issue, 494,35 prokharattein, to outline, 464,16-17 prokheirizesthai, to bring out, 486,9; 520,19 prokheirisis, having to hand, 535,39 prolabon, foregoing, 446,5; 453,26-7 pronoeisthai, take thought in advance, 581,14 give first thought to, 450,25 pronoia, (divine) Providence, 527,31; 564,1 taking thought in advance, 581,7 propêdan, jump ahead, 455,17 prophantazesthai, prior imagining, 513,6-7 prophora, expression, 556,14 kata prophoran, expressed, 556,12,15 prosballein, intuit, 447,35; 488,5; 512,10 approach, 495,1

201

prosbolê, attempt, 488,4 intuition, 544,31 prosdiorismos, further differentiation (i.e. quantifier), 476,3.4 further distinction, 458,10; 523,6 further condition, 491,16-17 prosektikos, attentive, 464,32-3.36.37; 465,4.6.11.13.16.34; 466,28; 555,12 prosekhês, proximate, 581,36 marching with, 588,6 near at hand, 590,35; 600,7 prosekhôs, proximately, 512,14; 590,36 proseuporein, supply further, additional, 498,3; 503,9; 576,24-5; 583,7 proskhresthai, bring into use, 478,6-7.9 prosklisis, bending, 497,9 (see note) proskunein, say ‘hello’ to, 528,18 proslêpsis, minor premiss, 447,21.24; 448,1-2.24.28; 449,18; 451,7-9.12.21.24; 457,9.10 prosomilein, come close to, 494,35 prosphoros, to the point, 486,13 apt, 589,22 prosthêkê, addition, 472,11.14; 473,1 protasis, proposition, 543,6.7.19-21; 546,1.2.12 premiss, 488,5; 590,16; 593,22.24.32 proteraios, preceding, 469,6; 470,19 protereuein, come before, 554,10.11 to take the lead, 581,24 prothesaurizein, store up in advance a treasury, 511,29; 580,8 prothesis, connective, 591,1 prôton, deuteron, primary, secondary, 446,26-7 first, later, 546,35; 551,10-11 prôton aition, prôtê aitia, first cause, 474,11; 535,20.22.24; 537,11.14.18-20.23.26.27.32.37; 538,21-2 psêlaphan, feel, 577,35-6 pseudês, false, 463,25; 480,31; 505,20; 506,5.6; 544,19; 555,19; 556,14 pseudesthai, run into falsehood, 491,13.21; 495,33; 496,26;

202

Indexes

502,19-21; 503,17.22; 506,9-10; 509,15-16.21.22; 513,12.17.18; 545,4.13.21; 553,28.33; 554,4-5; 556,15-21; 569,19.20 pseudodoxia, false opinion, 491,34 pseudos, falsehood, 491,25; 504,22-4; 544,20-30; 545,4.11; 556,13 psittakos, parrot, 495,26; 590,3 psophêsis, sounding, 470,12; 472,23; 474,21.34 psophos, sound, 451,34; 452,2.4.12; 462,16; 474,20; 602,16 psukhê, soul, 446,6; 563,3; 570,13.15 see aisthêtikos, alogos, logikos, phutikos psukhikos, psychical, 534,27; 537,18.19; 539,15.19; 553,11; 575,14.15 psukhros, cold, 477,15-17; 601,31 psuktos, cool, 477,12.13.16 psuxis, chill, 602,20 ptênos, winged, 449,12 ptoeisthai, be agitated, 488,34; 489,3.4 ptôsis, case, 529,4 pur, fire, 448,7; 452,33 puramis, pyramid, 450,31 rhabdos, rod, 604,25; 605,3.4 rhaithumos, careless, 486,30 rhakos, rag, 491,21.23 rhanis, drop, 513,19 rhembesthai, be wool-gathering, 465,14 rhepein, incline, 519,28 rhêseidion, rhêsidion, gobbet, 522,8; 530,29; 531,26; 538,10; 595,37-8 rhêton, passage, 459,32; 468,8; 520,31; 529,29 rhis, nose, 449,3.5; 601,36 rhizousthai, be rooted, 576,23; 595,8 rhônnusthai, stand firm, 509,2; 526,31 saphênizein, to clarify, 467,23 sarx, flesh, 529,33; 530,1.11.15.17 selênê, the Moon, 511,3.4 sêmainein, signify, 454,25; 461,2; 510,10.27; 518,9-16.20.26.30; 520,12-16; 532,9; 543,10-12.14.16 sêmasia, way of signifying, 529,2 meaning, 607,18

sêmeion, sign (astronomical), 590,10 point, 515,22.24; 589,23.24 sêmeiousthai, note, 531,25 sêpsis, infection, 602,15 sigan, be silent sigêtheisa aporia, unspoken difficulty, 451,31 simos, snubnosed, 531,9; 566,14 simotês, snubnosedness, 529,34 skelos, limb (of a division), 467,20; 502,5; 527,23 skepazein, protect, 453,8 skeparnos, adze, 467,10; 567,34 skepê, covering, 585,8.10 skhesis, way of being related, 470,4.7.9.11-18; 471,4 relation, relationship, 537,40; 560,32.33 skhesei, in how disposed, related, 469,31.33.35 skhêma, shape, 453,29.30; 456,13; 458,21-30; 531,16 figure (of syllogism), 485,28; 496,30.36; 579,25; 580,1 skhêmatizesthai, to have shape, 458,30 skia, shadow, 545,32 shade, 585,11 skiagraphia, sketch, 519,9 skôlêx, grub, 453,12; 495,5.13.14.19; 498,31; 590,1; 595,31-2; 600,33 skoliôs, out of order, 451,18 skopos, aim, 446,12.13; 447,15; 485,15; 530,34 skotos, darkness, dark, 464,1; 547,8; 552,25.26; 602,33 smênê, comb, 501,2 smênos, hive, 495,22 sôma, body, 481,19; 483,15; 517,14.17.22.23.27; 521,5.6; 563,9.10; 581,20.23; 587,27.28; 588,13-16; 591,22.24.25; 599,2.4; 603,4.20 augoeides sôma, body of luminous form, 597,18 pempton sôma, fifth body, 448,5-6 pneumatikon sôma, 481,20 sômatikos, bodily, of body, 453,20; 588,3 sophia, wisdom, 491,4 sophistês, sophist, 504,15 spêlaion, cave, 472,18

Greek-English Index sperma, semen, 558,1.2 spermatikos, seminally, 542,30 sphaira, sphere, 511,3; 590,10 spheterizesthai, make its own, 554,28 spongos, sponge, 600,31 spoudaios, sound, 507,5 what is good, 576,11 stasis, being stationary, 543,19 stephanoun, crown, 593,28.29 stereos, solid, 450,30; 552,12 sterêsis, privation, 552,4.5.15-18 stigmê, point, 482,1; 484,26; 543,13; 552,6.14.18 stikhos, line, 486,25 stoikheion, element, 448,5; 451,27; 453,19; 594,34; 597,14; 600,23 letter, 561,10 stokhazesthai, surmise, 463,30 stoma, mouth, 600,31 strongulos, round, 511,6 sullabê, syllable, 475,29 sullogizesthai, infer, 461,7.15 syllogise, 488,6-7; 590,13.14; 593,5-6 sullogismos, syllogism, 455,10; 491,22; 496,29.30.33; 579,25; 580,1-4 inference, 490,26.27.30 sullogistikôs, syllogistically, 500,12 sumbainein, kata sumbebêkos, incidental, incidentally, 454,2.4.6-7.9-15; 455,1.3.34-5; 456,4.7-9; 457,16.18-22.28; 458,5-6 sumballesthai, help, 507,10 contribute to, 508,12; 515,16 sumbebaiosthai, confirm, 450,28 (see note) sumbolaiousthai, 450,28, meaning unclear (see note) summetria, commensurability, 477,2; 530,11-12 summetros, proportional, 469,13 commensurable, 547,35 summetrôs, proportionally, 476,1-2 sumparatheon, fellow traveller, 461,26 sumperasma, conclusion, 460,25; 488,5-6; 532,10; 564,27; 567,7.8; 600,6 sumperatoun, end together, 588,4.5 to terminate together, 484,26

203

sumperilambanein, include, 462,2; 473,5-6; 540,5; 586,16 sumplekein, interweave, 491,21.24-5.27; 521,16 sumplêroun, go to make up, 536,32.33 sumplokê, interweaving, 501,9.28; 502,1-3; 505,12.16; 506,14 sumptôma, side-effect, 595,14; 598,31 sumpheresthai, cohere, 572,17 sumphônein, chime in with, 471,19 sumphônia, consonance, 472,6.7.26.31; 473,1; 477,9; 596,30 sumphuia, natural junction, 471,25 sumphuein, make to grow together, 471,23 sunagein, conclude, draw (a conclusion), 473,11; 517,34; 564,27; 580,5.12 derive, 475,9 attach, 467,34 collect together, 513,5; 542,31; 587,22 sunagesthai, follow, 527,33.37 sunaisthanesthai, be conscious, 451,8; 580,7.24.32-3 sunaisthêsis, consciousness, 580,2.5.6.15.18.20.26.31-6; 586,21-3; 592,4; 595,23 sunamphoteron, two together, 528,35; 529,7.8 sunaptein, join on, 600,28; see also sunêmmenon sunathroizein, bring together, 515,27 sundesmos, connective, 475,30; 492,5; 592,23 sundromos, concurrent, 535,24.28 sunêgorein, plead as advocate, plead for, 503,9 529,31; 531,14; 563,22 sunêgoria, plea, 529,29; 535,19; 563,27.32.34.36; 364,7.14.18; 568,10; 569,21 suneidenai heautôi, be conscious, 465,15.16; 555,12 sunekheia, continuity, 531,9.11.12; 532,2 sunekhês, continuous, 459,3.4.12; 531,10.16; 543,11 sunêmmenon, conditional premiss, 447,20.24.25; 448,1; 449,31 (see note); 451,7-9.20-1 sunergein, act together, 455,14.19 sunesis, conscience, 465,16

204

Indexes

sunêtheia koinê, common usage, 467,9; 496,7 sunexerkhesthai, be common exit, 484,28 sunkatarithmeisthai, count along with, 497,34 sunkatathesis, assent, 489,1,5; 497,8; 500,29 sunkatatithesthai, assent (v.), 489,3.4; 497,10; 500,29 sunkekhumenos, confused, 589,39 sunkhein, confuse, 485,19.30; 486,34 fuse, 478,23 sunkhusis, confusion, 487,6 sunkinein, change along with, 582,16 sunkrinein, compare, 512,3 compact, 472,17; 481,29; 510,5; 517,15; 547,6 sunousiazein, lie with, 513,6 suntelein, contribute, 587,22.28; 591,22; 602,22 sunthêma anaplattesthai, form a composite representation, 508,6 sunthesis, composition, 546,3.7-11; 547,26.28; 548,11.12 sunthetos, composite, 527,10; 603,4-7 suntithenai, put together, 546,4 suntithesthai, agree with, 465,31 suntomos epagôgê, in brief the force, 454,32 sunupakouein, understand along with, 560,17 surein, drag, 582,18 sustellesthai, close up (intrans.), 592,28 sustoikhos, ranged along with, 589,36-8; 590,4 suzeugnunai, yoke together with, 584,1 suzeuxis, linkage, 553,8 taphos, tomb, 563,10 tarattein, agitate, 573,17 tauros, Taurus, 511,3 tekhnê, skill, 490,33 tekhnêton, (thing in) the field of skill, 539,16 tekhnitês, man of skill, 490,34 têkein, waste, 472,20 tekton, carpenter, 474,26.31 têlaugôs, from afar, 486,16 teleios, complete, 453,5.6

perfect, 518,31 teleiôtikos, perfective, 516,35; 517,3.4 aition teleiôtikon, perfective cause, 547,18 teleioun, perfect (v.), 539,34.35 telikos telikon aition, final cause, 547,19; 571,2; 581,31.32 telos, end, 576,10-13; 587,10.11 teôs, already, 547,27 for the moment, 563,7 teôs to proton, as to the first, 532,32 thateros, one or the other, 452,26 thaumasios, marvellous, 515,20 thea, look, 508,35 seeing, 512,17 theios, divine, 528,4; 542,10; 552,29; 553,6.12; 563,38; 564,1.10.12; 567,13; 590,8 themelia, foundations, 585,12 theologikos, theological, 518,36 theos, God, 518,35; 527,30.31; 528,13; 529,3; 536,11.12.17; 538,20; 545,27; 587,11 theôrein, to contemplate, 569,5 to look at, 570,6 can see, 586,31 theôrêma, speculative thought, 469,33; 583,7 speculation, 473,31; 538,20 hupsêlon theôrêma, lofty speculation, 538,19-20 theôrêtikos, contemplative, 520,26.28 nous, contemplative intellect, 490,17.27.35-6; 554,13-38; 558,12; 576,6.7; 578,7-9; 584,22.23 theôrêtikôs, contemplatively, 524,20 theôrêton, thing we contemplate, 490,31 thêreuein, try to capture, 570,15 thermantos, warm, 477,12.13.16 thermos, hot, 452,33; 453,1; 477,15-17; 480,5; 530,7.10.17 to thermon, heat, 588,12 thermotês, heat, 595,21 theros, summer, 580,32; 585,8 thixis, contact, 487,18.26; 489,30-490,5 tholoun, muddy, 519,27 threptikos, nutritive, 576,6-26 etc.

Greek-English Index to threptikon, that which nourishes, 576,17.21 thrix, trikhes, hair, 595,1.15.16 thumikos, spirited, 565,25-6; 574,28 thumoeidês, spirited, 575,9-10 thumos, anger, 515,32 spirit, 565,29.30; 566,2; 571,20.24; 572,6; 574,6 thumousthai, become spirited, 465,1.21; 597,33.38 thura, door, 545,16 thurathen nous, intellect from outside, 518,8.16.31.36; 519,4.6.8; 520,17; 535,5.34.36; 536,2.4; 537,39; 538,9.29; 539,9; 541,14; 542,5; 584,35.37 ti ên einai, to, essence, 531,18.20-1.27 timios, superior, 446,23 tithaseuein, domesticate, 497,7.10; 607,2 tmêma, division, 485,6; 511,37; 512,1.2; 516,3 toikhos, wall, 585,11 toioutotropôs, in the following way, 591,1; 593,3 tolmêtias, temerarious, 580,1; 586,19 tomê, cutting, 549,14 topos, place, see 493,7 note trakhutês, roughness, 490,20 tragelaphos, goatstag, 488,17-18; 492,14; 503,32; 507,36 tragikos, (thing said) in a tragedy, 486,27 tragôidos, tragic actor, 533,32 tragos, goat, 508,4 tremein, fear, 500,33 trephein, nourish, 452,32.33; 595,27; 599,17; 601,15-18 tropeisthai, undergo a conversion, 607,2

205

trophê, nourishment, 595,24.25; 599,16.19.20.22; 603,33.34; 607,14 tropheia, nursling’s dues, 450,20; 467,4 truphan, have a passion for, 558,14 tupos, imprint, 448,11; 455,22.23.26.27.29.35; 456,1.2.5.9.10; 461,10; 464,11; 493,7 (see note); 512,16; 516,26; 538,5; 546,35; 551,10 tupoun, imprint (v.), 508,17 tupousthai, receive imprints, 605,13.14.17 tupôtikôs, by way of imprint, 574,15 xanthos, yellow, 455,17; 460,1; 461,3; 478,2 xêros, dry, 530,12; 601,31 xiphos, sword, 555,23 zên, be alive, live, 600,1; 601,35-602,1 zêtein, enquire, 446,7 zêtêma, object of enquiry, 528,10.11 zêtêsis, enquiry, 462,28 zôê, life (i.e. soul), 568,24; 589,21 zôgraphia, painting, 476,23; 545,8 zôogonos, life-giving, 449,20.21 zôon, animal, 572,32.33; 589,28; 594,20; 599,30.31; (defined) 600,12-17 zôoun, endow with life, 588,24.30-1 zôophuton, zoophyte, 577,7.12.14; 589,28.29.34; 592,26.27; 594,22; 595,28.33-4; 600,13.15.18.30; 601,3; 604,11 zôtikos, vital, 465,12.15; 597,29.31.32 zôtikon idiôma, peculiarity of what is living, 572,30-1.37 zôtikê prosklisis, vital bending, 497,9

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Subject Index References in italics are to pages of the Introduction. Other references are to page and line of Hayduck’s text. Indexes refer to chapters in this and the companion volume. affections, perfective and destructive, 526,30-527,3 Alcibiades, as example, 514,2 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 470,18-471,10; 489,9; 521,12-28; 522,22-6; 523,4-11; 523,20-3; 529,22-3; 530,5-7; 535,4-5.18.20.27; 536,6.11; 537,9-41; 539,36; 558,5; 571,35; 590,39-591,1 on perceiving we perceive, 464,20-3; 464,30; 465,24-7 on intellect, 518,6-18; 518,32; 519,14-37; 520,7; 520,10-28 on heavenly bodies, 595,38-596,14; 596,33; 599,35 Alexandria, 10 Ammonius, 2, 5, 9, 12-14; 473,10-19; 518,32-3 and n. Ananias of Shirak, 4 Anaxagoras, 522,33-523,4; 526,21 angels, 527,27; 535,38; 536,13.18; 537,15 animals, defined, 600,16 composite and have touch, 601,4-602,33 Anonymous Commentator on de Interpretatione, 12-14 Antiochus, 8 appetition, 579,22-39; 585,5-16; 586,29-587,6 Aristotelian, 464,18; 572,17; 586,25; 596,36-598,6 Aristotle, 450,3.9.20; 452,7.10; 456,16.18.26-7; 458,11.27; 462,10; 463,31; 464,14.31-2; 465,35; 466,28; 467,4; 469,20; 470,18; 471,10-11; 480,31; 482,16; 486,23; 487,5; 489,16.22-3.31-2; 496,6.14; 500,13.14; 501,14-15; 503,5.8.10;

504,4.27; 508,24; 509,2.12-14.27; 516,25; 518,9.21-2.36; 519,34.35.38; 520,3.4; 521,11; 523,2; 524,14; 525,11.14.18.25; 526,21; 527,28.29; 528,5; 529,4.23; 530,18; 531,26; 533,32.34; 535,32; 536,3.6.10.14.16.20; 537,29-30.36.41; 538,6; 539,36.37; 540,27; 541,28; 553,1.13; 555,17.23; 558,21; 563,12.27.34; 565,2.27; 571,2; 572,6.30; 573,4.29; 574,1; 575,4-5; 576,28; 579,17; 580,23.27; 581,20.23.30.31.34.36; 583,6; 584,8.29; 585,32; 587,25; 597,5.17; 599,33.36; 600,4.12.23.24 purpose in writing de Anima 3, 446,12-18 Analytics, 527,12n; 568,29 and n. Categories and Physics, 528,34n Cat. 3a29-32, 571,17-18; 10a11, 458,25-6 de Int. 16a9-16, 544,24-9; 16a12-13, 546,3n; 16a13-18, 580,28-30; 16a19-21, b6-9, 543,9; 23b3-7, 481,27-30 HA, 591,23n MA 703b4-13, 575,19n Metaph., 563,28-31 Metaph., 9 1051b17, 544,26-545,2 Phys. 2 193b6, 538,15 Phys. 3 201a11-15, 558,24n; 201b31-3, 558,27; 202a31-b22, 469,30-5; 473,31-3 Phys. 4 222a21-3, 549,11-12n. Phys. 6 (i.e.7 243a1ff.), 589,8-9 Post. An. 1 72b23, 543,1 Respir. 470b6-480b3, 575,19n Sens. 437b10, 605,30-1 Somn. 575,32, 455a20-1, 597,27-8n.

208

Indexes

assent (sunkatathesis), 489,1-5; 497,8-10; 500,29 attentive faculty, 464,35-465,22; 555,12 Bernard, W., 2, 4; 466,34n Blumenthal, H., 1, 5; 528,26n.; 535,4n. body of luminous form, 597,18-20 causes, 501,17-502,9; 571,2-8; 581,33-6 change, distinguished from making, 473,33-474,2 change of place (i.e. movement), 575,12-33; 581,20-3; 587,8-18; 587,21-8; 590,6-36; 591,22-34; 594,19-27; 604,23-605,9 factors not responsible for, 576,5-579,8 and appetition, 579,9-39; 591,14-19 and sense, 595,9-27 Christianity, 4-5, 10-12, 14 Cleon, as example, 454,22; 460,12.14.27; 514,2.3; 548,22 cognition, division of, 490,20-34 Colophonian resin, 455,31 common sense, 477,21-30; 560,9-561,18 differentiates objects of different senses, 478,1-481,34 and perceiving we perceive, 465,25-31 and intellect, 555,2-11; 555,24-556,7 common sense-objects, 453,28-31 how common, 458,17-25 not proper objects of a sixth sense, 454,1-455,9 why there are common sense-objects, 456,18-26; 461,26-32 perceived by change, 457,28-458,17 compared with incidental, 509,23-510,31 coarse-grained and accurate, 510,31-4 error concering, 510,34-511,16 conscious, consciousness, 465,15-16; 555,11-17; 572,38-573,2; 580,1-5; 592,4 consciousness of time, 580,1-581,19; 586,19-27 Delium, 573,1 demons, 500,33

denial and assertion, 546,1-12 cognition, thinking by denial, 459,3-13; 547,1-10; 552,3-26 Dionysius Telmahrensis, 2, 4 divine illumination, 486,38-487,1; 539,3 divine things, 492,16; 515,28; 541,30; 542,10; 547,22; 552,16; 552,28-553,15; 563,35-564,2; 564,10-14; 567,13 Elias, 3, 4 Empedocles, 452,6-7; 487,5-27; 489,17.26-9; 547,31 B 57, 545,17-20 B 106, 485,23-4 B 108, 486,12-18; 486,34-487,5 B 109.1, 469,19-20; 489,27-8; 570,24 Empedoclean Friendship, 545,17-18 Euripides, Hippolytus 612, 492,28-9; 701, 486,27-8 Orestes 396, 465,16 Evrard, 2, 4-5 Galen, 3 Genesis 1, 547,12-14 God, 474,2.11-12; 507,9; 518,35; 526,26; 527,29-32; 528,4.13; 529,3; 535,25.28; 536,11-13.17; 537,11-39; 538,20-2; 539,3.9-10.31-8; 540,12; 541,13-17; 542,5; 547,8-17; 557,30-558,4; 584,35-7; 586,5; 587,11; 590,8 good, and evil, relative, 555,18-21; 559,10-12; 562,11-14; 586,6-8 and pleasure, 560,4-7 hair, 595,13-22 Hayduck, M., 1, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15 heavenly bodies, 595,34-598,6; 599,32-600,8 Heraclius, 3 Hesiod, Works and Days 361-2, 456,37-457,2 Hignett, C., 6 Hippocrates, 3, 8; 472,20; 486,4 (n.) Hippocratic writings, 566,11 Homer, 489,16 Iliad 8 281, 538,28 Iliad 10 535, 601,1-2 Iliad 11 466, 601,2

Subject Index Odyssey 12 92; 547,8 Odyssey 18 136-7, 486,18-34 Odyssey 22 1, 491,23 Iamblichus, 533,25-35 imagination, defined, 507,16-509,2 why so called, 511,18-24 division of, 589,36-590,4 called ‘passive intellect’, 490,23; 506,24; 523,29; 542,3; 584,17 without parts, 562,27-563,2 why given us, 511,25-36 voluntary and against our will, 492,31-493,4; 497,21-9 reminiscent and teachable, 495,25-9 and sense, 466,17; 494,18-496,20; 509,4-22 and common sense, 507,18-31; 508,27-9 and opinion, 488,15-489,5; 492,8-21; 508,13-16 not a combination of opinion and sense, 501,11-504,3 compared with sense and thought, 488,9-15 and appetition and movement, 574,24-30; 578,1-6; 592,2-593,11 stirs up imprints, 455,23 forms constellations, 461,30 immortality and eternity, 537,1-6 incidental sense-objects, 454,15-24 indivisibles, five kinds of, 543,5-16; 544,4-15 intellect, signifies three things, 518,8-520,20 potential and actual, 554,7-12 actual, 534,20-539,10 contemplative and practical, 554,12-37 and sense, 487,30-9; 498,3-11; 516,22-517,3; 554,39-556,7; 574,13-21 and imagination, 541,28-31; 542,7-18; 546,30-5; 554,15-20; 559,26-560,4; 561,23-562,8; 563,11-564,25; 569,4-570,5; 584,8-19 and appetition, 585,18-586,10 object of thought to itself, 527,6-528,31 not affected except perfectively, 526,12-527,4

209

and time, 546,17-27; 548,5-26; 549,23-550,4 gives unity, 548,30-549,2 thinks large things and small alike, 524,2 knows things in matter, 525,10-526,11 objects of, 527,33-5; 530,20-2; 542,24-543,4; 562,20-2; 563,11-13; 568,14-25 from outside, see God John Barbur, 2 John Moschus, 2, 3 Justinian, 5 knowledge, the same as its objects, 557,18-25; 566,23-6; 567,18-29 Lautner, P., 2, 4, 5, 15, 537,28n. Marinus, 535,5-8.18; 535,31-536,2; 536,6.15; 537,9-24 mathematics, objects of, 456,20-3; 461,30-2; 531,14-532,17; 562,24-563,5; 566,10-21 matter, 539,15-17; 543,27-544,4 matter, formless, 543,29-31 movement, see change new born children, 494,28-495,4 nutritive power, 576,8-28 Olympiodorus, 6 opinion (doxa), 446,10-1; 447,1; 496,29-32; 500,15-22; 593,4-11 perceiving we perceive, 462,29-467,12 Philoponus, 4-6, 12, 518,33n. in de Anima 18,26-8, 597,18n. in de Anima 240,7-15 and 254,23-31, 495,11n. in de Anima 440,13-23, 599,12n. de Intellectu 7,41, 520,34n. de Intellectu 43,18-45,59, 535,4n. de Intellectu 57,75-58,96, 538,27 de Intellectu 77,63-86, 551,7n. Phocas, 3 Plato, 456,19; 481,34-5; 487,15; 504,4-30; 519,37-520,2; 523,25; 524,6-16; 527,30; 533,33; 535,10-11; 555,12;

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Indexes

573,22.26.28.31; 574,5.24.26; 575,1; 586,12 as example, 479,29.31; 543,8; 590,33 Phaedo 81C-E, 563,7-11 Phaedo 105, 537,4n.; 541,13n. Phaedrus 245C, 524,11; 528,28; 541,11; 600,1n. Phaedrus 246B, 596,28 Phaedrus 247B, 596,26-7 Philebus 39B, 538,6 Republic 1 331C, 555,21-3 Republic 6, 456,20 Republic 6 496B-C, 578,30 Republic 6 509B, 504,21n. Republic 6 511A-C, 596,30n. Sophist, 504,14-26 Sophist 264B, 504,5-7 Symposium 219E-221A, 573,1-2n. Theaetetus, 475,26-7 Theaetetus 156A-E, 471,37n Theaetetus 184D, 482,16-18 Theaetetus 186B-C, 564,23-5 Theages, 578,31 Timaeus 456,20n.; 504,21n.; 579,19 Timaeus 35A, 504,9-10 Timaeus 70D-71B, 583,16n. on parts and powers of the psyche, 565,20-566,7; 571,19-572,15 on movement, 572,16-29; 581,24-36 Platonic, 450,28; 565,1; 572,17; 573,4-5 Platonists, 572,24; 596,37-598,6 pleasure, 477,5-18 Plotinus, 466,19-20n. 528,25-31; 535,8-13; 535,28-31; 536,6; 536,15-537,1; 538,33; 545,5 Plutarch of Athens, 457,34-458,3; 458,9-17; 460,1; 462,7-10; 464,23-31; 465,17-26; 485,5; 489,10; 512,12-14; 515,13-29; 517,34-5; 518,10.19-519,15; 519,37-520,7; 520,11; 520,34-521,10; 529,22-3; 530,5-7; 531,25-6; 535,13-16.18; 536,2-5; 541,20-4; 553,10; 571,35; 575,6-7; 584,6-8; 591,1-7; 595,38; 596,14-36; 599,36; 600,4.7 pneuma, 560,10; 587,24-589,26; 591,26-7; 597,25-7 pneumatic body, 481,20 Porphyry, 3 practical reason, examples of, 592,15-593,3; 593,26-594,11

Protagoreans, 471,31-472,4; 475,23-7 Protagorean argument, 487,16 Providence, 527,31 Pseudo-Elias, 4 Roueché, M., 1, 4 self control, lack of (akrasia), 593,13-16 sense, potential and actual, 469,3-472,4; 558,12-31 only five senses, 447,15-450,33 nomenclature, 474,19-475,5 destroyed by extremes, 472,4-20; 476,18-30; 602,7-20 error about proper objects, 513,16-20 see also intellect, thought sense organs, 448,3-449,28 shell-like body, 482,12 Sicily, 479,29 Socrates, 504,15.19; 573,1-2; 596,28 as example, 479,29; 488,26; 502,29.30; 505,1.3.4; 511,10; 539,6-7; 546,10; 590,32-3 Sophonias, 6, 11; 592,19n. Sorabji, R., 2 soul, 538,12-19; 591,14-15 immortal, 516,1.13-14; 517,3-31; 563,2-5; 585,1-2 division of, into parts and powers, 565,21-2; 571,9-572,15 Stephanus, Introduction passim subject and predicate, 543,7-8; 545,21-37; 546,1-12 substance, secondary, primary, 446,25-7 falls under no sense, 454,21-2 Syrian, 473,2 Tarán, L., 12 taste, 603,25-604,2 Thales, 571,6-7; 573,3-4; 583,9 Theaetetus, as example, 511,10 Theages, 578,30-1 Themistius, as example, 590,33 Paraphrasis 81,15-17, 450,9-19 Paraphrasis 92,4-7, 508,19-509,2 Paraphrasis 93,16-17, 514,29-31 Theophylact Simocatta, 3 Thrace, 580,8 thought (dianoia), called ‘potential intellect’ 491,9-15

Subject Index and sense, 487,39-488,9; 491,9-30 and intuitive intellect, 545,12-546,12; 546,22-30; 547,25-548,2; 553,25-554,7; 556,31-4 Thucydides, 541,33 time, 545,21-38; 580,16-17; 580,1-581,19; see also consciousness, intellect tragedian, anonymous, 492,31 Trojan War, as example, 483,24; 545,24; 548,7 Tychikos, 4 universals, 481,13-14; 528,5-6; 596,6-9

Usener, H., 2, 3, 4, 7 Vancourt, R., 1, 2, 14 visual ray, emission of, 605,23-8 walking, 588,33-589,5 Westerink, L.G., 1, 11 William de Moerbeke, 1 wisdom, 491,4 Wolska-Conus, W., 1-4, 9 zoophytes, 577,7-32; 589,27-590,5; 592,25-9; 595,28-33; 597,37-9; 600,13-601,3

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