Philo of Alexandria: On the Life of Abraham: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary 9789004423640, 9004423648

Table of contents :
‎Contents
‎General Introduction to the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series
‎Preface
‎Abbreviations
‎Introduction
‎1. The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Works
‎2. The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Life
‎3. Genre, Aims, and Audience
‎4. Structure, Content, and Exegetical Approaches
‎5. Use and Interpretation of the Bible
‎6. Major Themes
‎7. Intellectual and Cultural Influences
‎8. Previous Scholarship
‎9. Shared and Distinctive Features and Their Implications
‎10. Nachleben
‎11. The Text of the Treatise
‎12. Some Notes on the Method Used in the Translation and Commentary
‎Translation Philo of Alexandria On the Life of Abraham
‎Part One. Introduction, §§1–59
‎Part Two. The Life of Abraham, §§60–276
‎Notes to the Text and Translation
‎Commentary
‎Title of the Work
‎Part One. Introduction, §§1–59
‎A. Prologue, §§1–6
‎Chapter 1: Genesis and the Living Laws, §§1–6
‎B. The First Triad, §§7–47
‎Chapter 2: Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16
‎Chapter 3: Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§17–26
‎Chapter 4: Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§27–47
‎C. The Second Triad
‎Chapter 5: The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§48–59
‎Part Two. The Life of Abraham
‎A. The Piety of Abraham
‎Chapter 6: The Migrations of Abraham, §§60–88
‎Chapter 7: Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§89–106
‎Chapter 8: The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§107–132
‎Chapter 9: The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§133–166
‎Chapter 10: The Sacrifice of Isaac, §§167–207
‎B. The Humanity of Abraham, §§208–261
‎Chapter 11: The Dispute with Lot, §§208–224
‎Chapter 12: Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§225–244
‎Chapter 13: The Virtues and Death of Sarah, §§245–261
‎C. Conclusion, §§262–276
‎Chapter 14: Additional Encomia of Abraham, Epilogue, §§262–276
‎Bibliography
‎1. Philo of Alexandria
‎2. Other Primary Sources
‎3. Modern Scholarly Literature
‎Index of Biblical Passages
‎Index of Philonic Passages
‎Index of Other Primary Sources
‎Index of Modern Scholars
‎Index of Greek Terms
‎Index of Subjects

Citation preview

Philo of Alexandria On the Life of Abraham

Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series General editor Gregory E. Sterling

Associate editor David T. Runia

Editorial board Harold W. Attridge – Ellen Birnbaum John Dillon – Annewies Van den Hoek – Alan Mendelson Thomas Tobin, S.J. – David Winston

volume 6

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/pacs

Philo of Alexandria On the Life of Abraham Introduction, Translation, and Commentary

By

Ellen Birnbaum John Dillon

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Birnbaum, Ellen. | Dillon, John M. | Philo, of Alexandria. De Abrahamo. English Title: Philo of Alexandria, On the life of Abraham : introduction, translation, and commentary / by Ellen Birnbaum, John Dillon. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2021. | Series: Philo of Alexandria commentary series, 1570-095X ; volume 6 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “On the Life of Abraham displays Philo’s philosophical, exegetical, and literary genius at its best. Philo begins by introducing the biblical figures Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as unwritten laws. Then, interweaving literal, ethical, and allegorical interpretations, Philo presents the life and achievements of Abraham, founder of the Jewish nation, in the form of a Greco-Roman bios, or biography. Ellen Birnbaum and John Dillon explain why and how this work is important within the context of Philo’s own oeuvre, early Jewish and Christian exegesis, and ancient philosophy. They also offer a new English translation and detailed analyses, in which they elucidate the meaning of Philo’s thought, including his perplexing notion that Israel’s ancestors were laws in themselves”– Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020005056 (print) | LCCN 2020005057 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004423633 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004423640 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Philo, of Alexandria. | Philo, of Alexandria. De Abrahamo. | Abraham (Biblical patriarch) | Bible. Genesis–Criticism, interpretation, etc. Classification: LCC B689.Z7 P463 2021 (print) | LCC B689.Z7 (ebook) | DDC 222/1106–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020005056 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020005057 Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill‑typeface. ISSN 1570-095X ISBN 978-90-04-42363-3 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-42364-0 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For Donald, my κοινωνὸς ὄντως βίου, “partner to the truest extent in life” To David Winston, for many happy hours spent together in company with Philo

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Contents General Introduction to the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Gregory E. Sterling Preface xvi Abbreviations xix Introduction 1 1 The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Works 1 2 The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Life 12 3 Genre, Aims, and Audience 20 4 Structure, Content, and Exegetical Approaches 29 5 Use and Interpretation of the Bible 34 6 Major Themes 51 7 Intellectual and Cultural Influences 60 8 Previous Scholarship 66 9 Shared and Distinctive Features and Their Implications 72 10 Nachleben 77 11 The Text of the Treatise 79 12 Some Notes on the Method Used in the Translation and Commentary 80

Translation: Philo of Alexandria, On the Life of Abraham Part One: Introduction, §§1–59

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Part Two: The Life of Abraham, §§60–276 Notes to the Text and Translation

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Commentary Title of the Work

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Part One: Introduction, §§1–59 145 A Prologue, §§1–6 147 Chapter 1: Genesis and the Living Laws, §§1–6

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The First Triad, §§7–47 155 Chapter 2: Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16 155 Chapter 3: Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§17–26 164 Chapter 4: Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§ 27–47 173 The Second Triad 189 Chapter 5: The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§ 48–59 189

Part Two: The Life of Abraham 205 A The Piety of Abraham 207 Chapter 6: The Migrations of Abraham, §§60–88 207 Chapter 7: Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§ 89–106 231 Chapter 8: The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§ 107–132 250 Chapter 9: The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§ 133–166 277 Chapter 10: The Sacrifice of Isaac, §§167–207 302 B The Humanity of Abraham, §§208–261 333 Chapter 11: The Dispute with Lot, §§208–224 333 Chapter 12: Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§ 225–244 348 Chapter 13: The Virtues and Death of Sarah, §§ 245–261 368 C Conclusion, §§262–276 394 Chapter 14: Additional Encomia of Abraham, Epilogue, §§ 262–276 394 Bibliography 411 1 Philo of Alexandria 411 2 Other Primary Sources 414 3 Modern Scholarly Literature 421 Index of Biblical Passages 441 Index of Philonic Passages 447 Index of Other Primary Sources 461 Index of Modern Scholars 471 Index of Greek Terms 476 Index of Subjects 478

General Introduction to the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE–c. 50 CE) was a member of one of the most prominent families of the large and influential Jewish community in Alexandria. We know more about his brother and his family than we do about Philo. His brother, Gaius Julius Alexander, held a responsible governmental position (Josephus, AJ 18.159, 259; 19.276–277; 20.100) and may have been a substantial property owner (CPJ 420a and 420b) as well as the manager of the Egyptian estates of Julia Augusta, the mother of the emperor Tiberius (CPJ 420b). He had probably become known to the emperor’s family through Herodian intermediaries (Josephus, AJ 19.276–277). His praenomen and nomen suggest that the family was associated in some way with Gaius Julius Caesar. It may be that Caesar granted Roman citizenship to Alexander’s grandfather for assistance during the Alexandrian War (48–47 BCE). Alexander made the most of his position and contacts and became exceptionally wealthy (Josephus, AJ 20.100). He once loaned 200,000 drachmas to Agrippa I (Josephus, AJ 18.159–160). He covered nine of the temple doors in Jerusalem with gold and silver (BJ 5.201–205), an act of patronage that attests his immense resources as well as his commitment to Judaism. The rabbis later report that he had a Torah scroll with the names of God in gold letters (Sop. 1.9 and Sep. Torah 1.9). Alexander’s social and economic standing is confirmed by the roles of his two sons. The archive of Nicanor suggests that Marcus Julius Alexander, Alexander’s younger son, was active in the import-export business that moved goods from India and Arabia through Egypt to the West. He married Berenice, the daughter of Herod Agrippa I and later partner of the emperor Titus, but died prematurely c. 43 CE (Josephus, AJ 19.276–277). His older brother Tiberius Julius Alexander had one of the most remarkable careers of any provincial in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. Tiberius moved through a series of lower posts until he held governorships in Judea, Syria, and Egypt. When he backed Vespasian in the Flavian’s bid for the throne, his career quickly rose to its apex: he served as Titus’s chief of staff during the First Jewish Revolt in 66– 70 CE (Josephus, BJ 5.45–46; 6.237) and as prefect of the praetorian guard in Rome after the war (CPJ 418b). While his career strained his relationship with his native Judaism to the breaking point (Josephus, AJ 20.100; Philo, Prov. and Anim.), it attests the high standing of the family. The most famous member of this remarkable family was paradoxically probably the least known in wider circles during his life. This is undoubtedly due to

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the contemplative nature of the life that he chose. His choice was not total. He may have had some civic function in the Jewish community. At least this would help to explain why the Alexandrian Jewish community selected him to serve on the first Jewish delegation to Rome after the pogrom in Alexandria in 38CE, a delegation that probably included his brother and older nephew (Legat. 182, 370; Anim. 54). The political arena was not, however, where his heart lay; he gave his heart to the life of the intellect (Spec. 3.1–6). He undoubtedly received a full education that included training in the gymnasium, the ephebate, and advanced lectures in philosophy and rhetoric. His philosophical training was of enormous importance to his intellectual formation. While he knew and made use of different philosophical traditions such as Stoicism and Pythagoreanism, his basic orientation was Platonic. Middle Platonism (c. 80 BCE–c. 220CE) had become a vibrant intellectual movement in Alexandria in the first century BCE, especially in the work of Eudorus (fl. 25 BCE). Philo became convinced that Plato and Moses understood reality in similar ways, although he was unequivocal about who saw it most clearly. His commitment to Judaism is evident in his training in the LXX: he knew it with the intimacy of one who lived with it from the cradle. He also knew the works of some of his Jewish literary predecessors such as Aristobulus, Pseudo-Aristeas, and Ezekiel the tragedian. He was aware of a significant number of other Jewish exegetes to whom he alluded in his commentaries, but always anonymously (Opif. 26, 77, and Migr. 89–93). The most probable social setting for his literary work is a private school in which he offered instruction in much the same way that philosophers and physicians did. This was likely in his own private residence, but a setting in a house of prayer (synagogue) cannot be ruled out. One of the ways that he taught was through writing. His treatises constitute one of the largest Greek corpora that has come down to us from antiquity. We know that he wrote more than seventy treatises: thirty-seven of these survive in Greek manuscripts and nine (as counted in the tradition) in a rather literal sixth-century Armenian translation. We also have excerpts of another work in Greek and fragments of two more in Armenian. The lost treatises are known from references to them in the extant treatises, gaps in his analyses of the biblical texts in the commentary series, and testimonia. The treatises fall into five major groups: three separate commentary series, the philosophical writings, and the apologetic writings. The three commentary series are Philo’s own literary creations; the philosophical and apologetic series are modern constructs that group conceptually similar but literarily independent treatises. The heart of the Philonic enterprise lay in the three commentary series. Each of these was an independent work with a distinct rationale and form.

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Philo set each series apart through explicit statements about the design of the series (for the Exposition of the Law), the use of secondary prefaces to link treatises together (for the Allegorical Commentary and Exposition of the Law), distinct approaches to the biblical text (for all three series), the literary forms of the treatises in the series (for all three series), and the different implied audiences (for all three series). The most elementary of the three is the twelve (six in the manuscript tradition) book Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus that cover Gen 2:4–28:9 and Exod 6:2–30:10. As the title suggests, Philo used a question and answer format to write a running commentary on the biblical text. The questions are often formulaic, but demonstrate a close reading of the biblical text which is cited in the question. The answers typically introduce both literal and allegorical interpretations. Philo rarely used secondary or tertiary texts in these answers. While earlier Jewish authors such as Demetrius (FF 2 and 5) and Aristobulus (F 2) used the question-and-answer device within larger works, they did not write zetematic works. The closest literary parallel to Philo’s commentary series is the series of zetematic works which Plutarch composed. The pedagogical character of the format and the listing of multiple interpretations suggest that Philo’s Questions and Answers were written for beginning students in his school who needed to learn how to read the text closely as well as become familiar with the range of possible interpretations. The Allegorical Commentary shares some features in common with the Questions and Answers, but is profoundly different. Like the Questions and Answers these treatises use the question-and-answer technique in a running commentary. Unlike the Questions and Answers, the format is no longer explicit but is incorporated in a more complex form of exegesis. Literal readings are generally downplayed, although Philo sometimes includes them when he thinks they can contribute to the understanding of the text. The main focus, however, is on allegorical interpretations which are expanded through the introduction of secondary, or even tertiary, biblical texts (lemmata). While these expansions may give the treatises a meandering feel, in fact there is almost always a thematic unity that makes the treatise coherent. The scope is also different than in the QG and QE; the Allegorical Commentary provides a running commentary on Genesis 2:1–18:4 with some treatments of later texts in Genesis in the final treatises. Philo was by no means the first Jewish author to use allegory: earlier Jewish writers such as Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas had used allegorical interpretation; however, they did not write allegorical commentaries. Philo’s allegorical commentaries are closer in form to commentaries in the philosophical tradition, e.g., the Platonic Anonymous Theaetetus Commentary, Plutarch’s On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus, and Porphyry’s On the Cave of Nymphs. Yet even here there are considerable differences; for

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example, Philo’s treatises have more thematic unity than his pagan counterparts. Philo also offered some hints that he saw a larger unity to his allegorical treatment of Genesis. He linked six of the treatises together with secondary prefaces. In particular, he linked four of the five treatises that dealt with the story of Noah together (Agr., Plant., Ebr., Sobr.). This suggests that Philo may have thought of the larger structure of the Allegorical Commentary in biographical terms: he devoted three treatises to Cain (Sacr., Det., Post.), five to Noah (Gig./Deus, Agr., Plant., Ebr. 1–2, Sobr.), and five to Abraham (Migr., Her., Congr., Fug., Mut.). Cain represented the embodiment of self-love; Noah, who represented justice or perfection, was part of Philo’s first triad of virtuous ancestors; and Abraham, who represented virtue through learning, was part of Philo’s second triad of ancestors. Philo prefaced these biographically oriented works with treatments on creation and the primeval history (Leg. 1–3 [originally 4 or 5 books], Cher.) and concluded it with a work on dreams that addresses multiple texts throughout Genesis (Somn. 1–2 [originally 5 books]). His work on Conf. is a transitional text moving from Noah to Abraham. The goal of this allegorical interpretation was the ascent of the soul or the experience of God achieved through virtue and contemplation. If the Questions and Answers were for beginning students, the Allegorical Commentary was most likely composed for advanced students or other exegetes in the Jewish community. It certainly places much greater demands on the reader, as any modern reader who has worked through these treatises can attest. The third series, the Exposition of the Law, is different yet. It is not a running commentary, but a systematic exposition of the entire Pentateuch. Unlike the Questions and Answers and Allegorical Commentary, the Exposition of the Law rarely cites the biblical text—except for an occasional word or phrase— but paraphrases or summarizes it and provides a commentary on the summary. The treatment may include both literal and allegorical readings and in some cases regularly alternates between them, esp. in the biographies. The scope of the Exposition of the Law is also quite different: it extends beyond Genesis and Exodus to include the entire Torah. Philo wrote an introduction to the Exposition in the form of a biography in the two volume Life of Moses. The work is similar in function to Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus which introduces readers to the Enneads. Philo organized his understanding of the law in three parts (Praem. 1–3; cf. also Abr. 2–5; Mos. 2.45–47). The first part dealt with creation, demonstrating the harmony between the cosmos and the law (Opif.). The second part is the historical or biographical section that consists of biographies that show how the ancestors embodied the law before it was given to Moses (Abr., Ios. [the works on Isaac and Jacob are lost]). The third and most complex part is the legislative. Just like some later rabbis, Philo worked through the decalogue

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(Decal.) and then used each of the ten commandments as a heading to subsume the remaining legislation in the Torah (Spec. 1–4). Unlike the later rabbis, he added a series of appendices under the headings of virtues (Virt.). He brought the series to a conclusion in a treatise On Rewards and Punishments in direct imitation of the end of Deuteronomy. The series was probably intended for a broader audience—both Jews and interested pagan readers—that included but was not limited to the school. It may be that Philo offered public lectures at his school or in a house of prayer. If the three commentary series accentuate Philo’s role within the Jewish community, the last two groups of his treatises reflect his efforts to relate to the larger world. The philosophical works use Greek sources and philosophical genres to address some of the major philosophical issues Philo and his students confronted. So, he wrote two dialogues (Prov. 1–2, Anim.) that featured his nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander; two discourses that examined a famous Stoic proposition (Prob. and the lost Improb.), a thesis that set out arguments pro and contra (Aet. 1 and 2 [lost]), and an arithmology (Num. [extant only as an Armenian fragment]). The biblical text recedes and is replaced by citations from non-Jewish authors. These were probably for advanced students in his school. The apologetic works were probably written—for the most part—in connection with the events of 38–41CE. They were designed to assist Philo in his efforts to represent the Jewish community to the authorities. He wrote a work that was probably intended to help him with the embassy (Hypoth. [only extant in two Greek fragments]), a treatise holding out exemplars of Judaism (Contempl. and a parallel treatment on the Essenes now lost), and a five-volume treatment of the mistreatment of the Jews by Roman authorities who were punished by God (Flacc., Legat. [the five volumes were probably 1. Introduction and Pilate; 2. Sejanus, 3. Flaccus, 4. Embassy, 5. Palinode]). These works were likely intended for non-Jews or Jews dealing with non-Jews who probably comprised the largest audience. This expansive corpus is the single most important source for our understanding of Second Temple Judaism in the diaspora. While some of the esoteric and philosophical aspects of his writings reflect a highly refined circle in Alexandria, the corpus as a whole preserves a wide range of exegetical and social traditions which enable us to reconstruct a number of beliefs and practices of Jews in the Roman empire. The difficulty that we face is the limited evidence from other Jewish communities. This can be partially solved by expanding the comparisons to early Christian writings which were heavily indebted to Jewish traditions. As is the case with virtually all Second Temple Jewish texts composed in Greek, Philo’s cor-

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pus was not preserved by Jews but by Christians who found his writings so irresistibly attractive that they gave him a post mortem conversion. In some Catenae he is actually called “Philo the bishop.” A number of important early Christian authors are deeply indebted to him: Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Didymus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Ambrose in particular. While there is no solid evidence to show that New Testament authors knew his writings, they certainly knew some of the same exegetical traditions that he attests. His writings therefore serve both as a witness to exegetical traditions known and used by first-century Christians and as a source for some second-century and later Christians. One of the factors that made Philo so attractive to Christians was the way that he combined Greek philosophy, especially Middle Platonism, with exegesis. The eclectic nature of his thought and the size of his corpus make his writings a particularly important source for our understanding of several Hellenistic philosophical traditions. The combination of Middle Platonism and Jewish exegesis also makes Philo important for the study of Gnosticism, especially for those scholars who argue that the second-century Christian Gnostic systems had significant antecedents in Jewish circles. It is remarkable that in spite of the obvious importance of these writings and their complexity, no series of commentaries has been devoted to them. The present series is designed to fill that void. Each commentary will offer an introduction, a fresh English translation, and a commentary proper. The commentary proper is organized into units/chapters on the basis of an analysis of the structure of each treatise. Each unit/chapter of the commentary will address the following concerns: the context and basic argument of the relevant section, detailed comments on the most important and difficult phrases, passages where Philo treats the same biblical text, the Nachleben of Philo’s treatment, and suggestions for further reading when appropriate. There will be some variation within the series to account for the differences in the genres of Philo’s works; however, readers should be able to move from one part of the corpus to another with ease. We hope that in this way these commentaries will serve the needs of both Philonists who lack sustained analyses of individual treatises and those scholars and students who work in other areas but consult Philo’s works. Most of the volumes in this series will concentrate on Philo’s biblical commentaries. It may seem strange to write and read a commentary on a commentary; however, it is possible to understand the second commentary to be an extended form of commentary on the biblical text as well. While Philo’s understanding of the biblical text is quite different from our own, it was based on a careful reading of the text and a solid grasp of Greek philosophy. His commen-

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taries permit us to understand how one of the most influential interpreters of the biblical text in antiquity read the text. The fact that his reading is so different from ours is in part the fascination of reading him. He challenges us to enter into a different world and to see the text from another perspective. Gregory E. Sterling Yale Divinity School

Preface This volume on Philo’s On the Life of Abraham (Abr.) has its origins in the very establishment of the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series (see Sterling 1995). The work began as a project undertaken by John Dillon in response to a request by General Editor Gregory Sterling to contribute a volume to the series. Dillon’s choice fell on Abr., as it seemed to combine many aspects of Philo’s genius—philosophical, exegetical, and literary. After completing a translation and starting a draft commentary, however, Dillon began to miss the vast learning of his old friend, David Winston, in the field of Hebrew and Judaic Studies (see, e.g., Dillon and Winston 1983). Whether through coincidence or providence, around this time Ellen Birnbaum had accepted an assignment to produce a commentary on selected parts of Abr. for a project whose concern was to place works from the Second Temple period “back into their original Jewish context” and to “trace heretofore neglected connections” between these works and other Jewish sources “from the Hebrew Bible … to the vast body of Rabbinic writings” (Feldman, Kugel, and Schiffman 2013, xv–xvi; Birnbaum 2013). In 2007, for the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature Philo of Alexandria Group, David Runia organized a panel to feature Dillon’s work, and Birnbaum was one of the respondents. Shortly thereafter, with Runia’s encouragement, Sterling facilitated and arranged a collaboration between Dillon and Birnbaum. We two co-editors had been acquainted beforehand but, separated by an ocean, we met in person only twice during the entire duration of the project— in Dublin during the summer of 2009 and at the 2011 Annual SBL Meeting in San Francisco. Instead of face-to-face meetings or even phone calls, we took up the suggestion of Albert Geljon and David Runia (see, e.g., Geljon and Runia 2013) to produce the work in different colored print—with Dillon’s contribution in black and Birnbaum’s in red. Dillon produced the first draft of the translation and of the entire commentary, except for Chapter 12, which was drafted by Birnbaum. Birnbaum suggested small modifications to the translation and she expanded the commentary. She also drafted the Introduction, except for §11, which was drafted by Dillon; the sections on Parallel Philonic Exegesis and Nachleben; the seven excursuses; and the Bibliography. According to the color scheme just described, a reader of our draft manuscript would have discovered the introductory pages almost entirely in red with occasional patches of black; the translation almost entirely in black, with a few spots of red; and the commentary a combination of black and red—full consec-

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utive pages of one or the other color, a patchwork of black and red paragraphs, and occasional sentences interwoven with black and red words. At the outset of our collaboration, Dillon had professed an interest in Philo’s use of language and imagery and in parallels from Plato and other earlier Greek literature. Birnbaum declared her primary concern to be with how Philo used the Greek Bible and how his interpretations might compare with those of other biblical interpreters. Over the course of the project, however, both of us commented across these disciplines. The above description is meant to convey a sense of the mechanics of how we worked together over many years as we prepared our volume. At the end of our efforts, with a few clicks, the manuscript was converted entirely to black print and we happily present the result as the seamless product of our collaboration. We are pleased to acknowledge a number of organizations and individuals who offered valuable assistance and support over the decade or so of our collaboration. From 2015 to 2017, we benefited from a National Endowment for the Humanities Scholarly Editions and Translations Grant, which was helpfully administered by Yale University. Greg Sterling arranged for our collaboration, allowed us to apply for the NEH grant through Yale, served as Project Director when the grant was awarded, read through our 500-plus-page manuscript, offered very helpful comments, shepherded the manuscript through production, and, not least, entered the Greek for our transliterations! (We, however, remain responsible for their accuracy.) David Runia enthusiastically encouraged our collaboration at the outset and, generously responding to our many queries about substance, style, and process, was a constant source of help and support throughout the project. The additional, anonymous reader of our manuscript presented us with stimulating questions that led us to expand sections of the Introduction. For her splendid work in preparing the indices, we are deeply indebted to Kellyann Wolfe of Hiraeth Indexing. We gratefully acknowledge, as well, Dirk Bakker and Marjolein van Zuylen at Brill for guiding us with kindness and professionalism as our manuscript became a book and Cas Van den Hof of TAT Zetwerk for typesetting the text with careful attention to detail. Ellen Birnbaum would also like to thank Gloria Korsman, Associate Librarian for Research Services in the Andover-Harvard Theological Library at Harvard Divinity School, who readily assisted with multiple TLG (Thesaurus Linguae Graecae) searches, tracked down a variety of seemingly obscure references, and was a continual font of good cheer. Jon Levenson provided crucial insight into Philo’s treatment of Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac and graciously served as a wise consultant on matters biblical, philological, and theo-

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logical. Several individuals responded to specific inquiries, assisted with translations, and/or offered much-appreciated encouragement: Giovanni Bazzana, Julian Friedrich, Courtney Friesen, Shulamit Kahn, Stephen Kuehler, Sherry Leffert, David Lincicum, Sarah Pearce, and James R. Royse. Ellen Birnbaum would also like to acknowledge the pivotal influence of two individuals—her mentor, John Strugnell (1930–2007), who for many years stood by and provided expert guidance as she forged her approach to Philo, and James L. Kugel, from whom she gained a deeper understanding of how to read Philo as an exegete. Above all, her husband, Donald Altschiller, a professional librarian, kept her informed about a wide variety of sources, assisted her in locating them, and offered editorial advice. Her “partner to the truest extent in life” (Abr. 246), he helped to sustain her through many vicissitudes with much-needed good humor, perspective, and abiding love and support. John Dillon would like to thank his colleague Andrew Mayes, Professor of Hebrew (Emeritus) at Trinity College Dublin, for his help with many knotty questions involving either Hebrew or familiarity with the rabbinic tradition; and his wife Jean, for unfailing support and inspiration over more than fifty years. As we worked through this treatise, each section presented its own challenges and mysteries. The task of meeting these challenges and solving the mysteries as best we could has been deeply rewarding. If readers learn from and build upon our efforts, the rewards will be all the greater. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Dublin, Ireland

Abbreviations Abbreviations of biblical books, other ancient texts, and modern literature generally follow guidelines in The SBL Handbook of Style, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014); and The Studia Philonica Annual 31 (2019): 341–347. A small number are from A GreekEnglish Lexicon, by Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, 9th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940; repr., 1985), xxxviii–xlii. The list below is alphabetized by abbreviation rather than by title or source.

Abbreviations of Philonic Treatises Abr. Aet. Agr. Anim. Cher. Conf. Congr. Contempl. Decal. Deo Det. Deus Ebr. Flacc. Fug. Gig. Her. Hypoth. Improb. Ios. Leg. 1–3 Legat. Migr. Mos. 1–2 Mut. Opif. Plant.

De Abrahamo De aeternitate mundi De agricultura De animalibus De cherubim De confusione linguarum De congressu eruditionis gratia De vita contemplativa De decalogo De Deo Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat Quod Deus sit immutabilis De ebrietate In Flaccum De fuga et inventione De gigantibus Quis rerum divinarum heres sit Hypothetica Quod omnis improbus servus sit De Iosepho Legum allegoriae 1, 2, 3 Legatio ad Gaium De migratione Abrahami De vita Moysis 1, 2 De mutatione nominum De opificio mundi De plantatione

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abbreviations

Post. Praem. Prob. Prov. 1–2 QE 1–2 QG 1–4 QGE Sacr. Sobr. Somn. 1–2 Spec. 1–4 Virt.

De posteritate Caini De praemiis et poenis Quod omnis probus liber sit De providentia 1, 2 Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum 1, 2 Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim 1, 2, 3, 4 Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini De sobrietate De somniis 1, 2 De specialibus legibus 1, 2, 3, 4, De virtutibus

Other Abbreviations AB AJSR ALGHJ ANF ANRW

AYBRL BibOr BJS BZAW BZNW CBQ CBQMS CEJL ClQ CPJ CRINT CurBR D-K DSD EJ

Anchor Bible Association for Jewish Studies Review Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums Ante-Nicene Fathers Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Part 2, Principat. Edited by Hildegard Temporini and Wolfgang Haase. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972– Anchor Yale Bible Reference Library Biblica et Orientalia Brown Judaic Studies Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Catholic Biblical Quarterly Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series Commentaries on Early Jewish Literature Classical Quarterly Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum. Edited by Victor A. Tcherikover and Alexander Fuks. 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: 1957–1964 Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum Currents in Biblical Research Diels, Herrmann, and Walther Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 7th ed. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann. 1954 Dead Sea Discoveries Encyclopaedia Judaica. Edited by Cecil Roth. Jerusalem: Keter, 1972; repr., 1978

abbreviations EJL EPRO FC FIOTL FJTC FRLANT GCS G-G

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Early Judaism and Its Literature Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’empire romain Fathers of the Church Formation and Interpretation of Old Testament Literature Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte Goodhart, Howard L., and Goodenough, Erwin R. 1967. “A General Bibliography of Philo Judaeus.” Pages 127–348 in The Politics of Philo Judaeus, by Erwin R. Goodenough. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938; repr., Hildesheim: Georg Olms GLAJJ Stern, Menahem. 1974–1984. Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism. 3 vols. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities GRBS Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies Hen Henoch HTR Harvard Theological Review HUCA Hebrew Union College Annual HUCM Monographs of the Hebrew Union College IG I2 Inscriptiones Graecae. Editio Minor. Vol. 1. Edited by Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1924 JAL Jewish Apocryphal Literature Series JBL Journal of Biblical Literature JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JJP Journal of Juristic Papyrology JJS Journal of Jewish Studies JQR Jewish Quarterly Review JRS Journal of Roman Studies JSJ Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods JSJSup Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism JSNT Journal for the Study of the New Testament JSNT Sup Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series JSS Journal of Semitic Studies JTS Journal of Theological Studies LCL Loeb Classical Library LSJ A Greek-English Lexicon by Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1940; repr., 1985 LXX Septuagint/Greek Bible MGWJ Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums MT Masoretic Text

xxii NETS

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Pietersma, Albert, and Benjamin G. Wright. 2014. A New English Translation of the Septuagint. Electronic ed. (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/nets/edition/) NJPS JPS Hebrew-English Tanakh: The Traditional Hebrew Text and the New JPS Translation. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1999 (5759) NovT Novum Testamentum NovTSup Supplements to Novum Testamentum NRSV The HarperCollins Study Bible. New Revised Standard Version with the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books. Edited by Wayne A. Meeks, Jouette M. Bassler, Werner E. Lemke, Susan Niditch, and Eileen Schuller. New York: HarperCollins, 1993 OCD The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 3rd ed. Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. OECS Oxford Early Christian Studies OGIS Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae. Edited by Wilhelm Dittenberger. 2 vols. Leipzig: Hirzel. 1903–1905 PACS Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series PAPM Les oeuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie. Edited by Roger Arnaldez, Jean Pouilloux, and Claude Mondésert. 36 vols. Paris: Cerf, 1961–1992 PCH Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in deutscher Übersetzung. Edited by Leopold Cohn, Isaak Heinemann, Maximilian Adler, and Willy Theiler. 7 vols. Breslau: Marcus; Jüdischer Buchverlag S. Münz; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1909– 1964 PCW Philonis Alexandrini: opera quae supersunt. Edited by Leopold Cohn, Paul Wendland, Siegfried Reiter, and Hans Leisegang. 7 vols. in 8. Berlin: Reimer, 1896–1930. Repr., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962–1963 PG Patriologia Graeca [= Patriologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca]. Edited by Jacques-Paul Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1886 PhA Philosophia Antiqua Phil Philologos PLCL Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes). Edited by Francis H. Colson, George H. Whitaker, and Ralph Marcus. LCL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Heinemann, 1929–1962 POxy The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Edited by Bernard P. Grenfell and Arthur S. Hunt. London: Egypt Exploration Fund, 1898PRSt Perspectives in Religious Studies PTMS Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series RHR Revue de l’histoire des religions R-R Radice, Roberto, and David T. Runia. 1988. Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography, 1937–1986. VCSup 8. Leiden: Brill RSV The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocrypha. Revised Standard Ver-

abbreviations

SBL SBLMS SBLSP SC SCS SEAug SHR SO SPhA SPhAMA SPhilo SPhiloA SPhiloM SR STAC StPatr SVF TBN TLG TSAJ TUGAL VC VCSup VT WGRW WUNT YJS ZAW ZNW

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sion Containing the Second Edition of the New Testament and an Expanded Edition of the Apocrypha. Edited by Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977 Society of Biblical Literature Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers Sources chrétiennes Septuagint and Cognate Studies Studia Ephemiridis Augustinianum Studies in the History of Religions (supplements to Numen) Symbolae Osloenses Studies in Philo of Alexandria Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity Studia Philonica The Studia Philonica Annual Studia Philonica Monograph Series Studies in Religion Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum Studia Patristica Arnim, Hans Friedrich August von. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1924. Repr., Stuttgart: Teubner 1964 Themes in Biblical Narrative Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library. Edited by Maria C. Pantelia. University of California, Irvine. http://www.tlg.uci.edu Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur Vigiliae Christianae Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae Vetus Testamentum Writings from the Greco-Roman World Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Alten und Neuen Testament Yale Judaica Series Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kund der älteren Kirche

Introduction 1

The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Works

In the vast oeuvre of Philo of Alexandria, who composed dozens of works, the treatise De Abrahamo (Abr.) takes its place in the exegetical series termed in modern scholarship the Exposition of the Law. One of three sets of Philonic commentaries focused primarily on the Pentateuch—the other two series are known as the Allegorical Commentary and Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus (QGE)—the Exposition, with its programmatic and transitional statements scattered throughout, has justly been described as “the most systematic and thematically unified of the three commentaries.”1 To recognize and appreciate the place of Abr. in this series, we will first review its sequence of treatises and then consider the specific role of Abr. within this sequence. In addition, to gain the best understanding of this role, we will also take into account Philo’s overall plan for the Exposition and the rationales that he offers to explain this plan. a The Exposition and Related Treatises Philo opens the Exposition in De Opificio Mundi by praising Moses for introducing his legislation with an account of the creation of the world. In contrast to other lawgivers who either launch directly into their injunctions or else start off with wordy “mythical fictions” (§1), Philo writes, The beginning is … quite marvellous. It contains an account of the making of the cosmos, the reasoning for this being that the cosmos is in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos, and the man who observes the law is at once a citizen of the cosmos, directing his actions in relation to

1 Runia 2001, 6. For a brief review of Philo’s other works—which, besides the three exegetical series, include several philosophical and historical/political/apologetic writings—see the General Introduction. Recent detailed discussions of Philo’s oeuvre can be found in Morris 1987 and Royse 2009. Important earlier treatments include Massebieau 1889; Massebieau and Bréhier 1906; and L. Cohn 1899. On the difficulty of counting the number of Philo’s works, some of which have been lost, see Sterling 2012a, 256–260. On Philo’s lost works, see also Runia 1992a, 78–79. Although the title of QGE may be original to Philo, titles of the other two series are modern; see Sterling 2012b, esp. 57. According to convention, we italicize QGE but not the other two series titles. See also below, n. 9.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/978900

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the rational purpose of nature, in accordance with which the entire cosmos also is administered. Opif. 32 Abr. follows immediately after Opif. We know this because, opening with a “secondary preface” in Abr. 2, Philo writes that the creation account is given in “the preceding treatise” and in Abr. 13, he refers to an identifiable discussion from Opif. (47–52) as also being in “the previous treatise.” These internal references confirm that Abr. is meant to follow right after Opif. even though the two treatises do not appear in this sequence in either the manuscripts or most modern editions.3 Introducing the next treatise that we have, on Joseph, Philo remarks that since he has described the lives of three sages—each representing, respectively, learning, nature, and practice—he will turn now to the life of the statesman (Ios. 1). As we shall see, these three factors—learning or teaching, nature, and practice—correspond respectively to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Based on this statement in Ios., scholars have concluded that besides and between his Exposition treatises on Abraham and Joseph, Philo had also composed works on both Isaac and Jacob but these have not survived.4 In the treatise that follows Ios., on the Decalogue, after observing that in earlier works he has set forth the lives of wise men, “founders of our nation,” and “unwritten laws” (νόμοι ἄγραφοι), Philo now turns to a discussion of the “written laws” (οἱ ἀναγράφεντες νόμοι; Decal. 1). This treatise is followed by four others devoted to what he calls “the particular laws” (τὰ ἐν μέρει διατάγματα; Spec. 1– 4). According to several programmatic and transitional statements, for Philo the Ten Commandments represent the general headings of the laws, and the various particular laws can be grouped under each of these headings (Decal. 19–20, 154–175; Spec. 1.1; 2.1; 3.7; 4.1, 132; Praem. 2). Toward the end of Spec. 4, however, Philo observes that some laws do not fall under the general head-

2 The translation is from Runia 2001, 47. Translations of Abr. in this Introduction are ours. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Philo’s other treatises are from PLCL. (See also § 12 of this Introduction below.) 3 See Runia 2008, 134–137. Secondary prefaces served to “introduce a scroll that was part of a larger series,” orient readers “who moved from one scroll to another,” and help them quickly to recognize the contents of individuals scrolls (Sterling, 2012b, 60; see also 67). On the contents and order of works in the Greek manuscripts, see G-G, 137–177; see also PCW 4:xxviii–xxix. Abr. follows Opif. in two modern translations: the German (PCH) and Hebrew (Daniel-Nataf, Amir, and Niehoff 1986–2012). 4 A reference in Sobr. 9 may also be to the lost treatise on Isaac in the Exposition; see Sterling 2012b, 58; cf. Terian 1991, 32, with n. 15.

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ings of the Decalogue but instead are best grouped under “virtues of universal value.”5 These laws are addressed in the remainder of Spec. 4, whose theme is the virtue of justice, and in Philo’s next treatise, On the Virtues, which has sections on courage, humanity, repentance, and noble birth. Discussing these qualities in this latter treatise, however, Philo includes not only laws but also some narrative material (e.g., Virt. 34–50, 51–79, 198–225). Finally, the Exposition concludes with Praem., which is devoted to describing rewards for the good and punishments for the bad. It remains for us to address the much-debated relationship between two treatises on the life of Moses and the Exposition. Since in the Exposition Philo is setting forth the teachings of Moses in a systematic fashion and since, beginning with the Book of Exodus, the Pentateuch presents important accounts about Moses’s life and leadership, it would be a rather serious omission for Philo to neglect these accounts. The two treatises on Moses, however, cover much of this very material. Nonetheless, while these treatises would seem to be related to the Exposition, they do not appear to be an integral part of it. None of the programmatic or transitional statements within the Exposition indicate that these treatises on Moses belong in that sequence of writings. The second treatise on Moses refers back to the first but the opening of the first gives no indication of following after a preceding work or set of works. Instead, Philo begins his account of Moses’s life as follows: I purpose to write the life of Moses, whom some describe as the legislator of the Jews, others as the interpreter of the Holy Laws. I hope to bring the story of this greatest and most perfect of men to the knowledge of such as deserve not to remain in ignorance of it; for, while the fame of the laws which he left behind him has travelled throughout the civilized world and reached the ends of the earth, the man himself as he really was is known to few. Mos. 1.1–2

A.C. Geljon (2002, 13–46) has convincingly argued that the treatises on Moses are not only independent of any particular series but can also be categorized as a philosophical biography with the function of introducing Moses’s works. Although Geljon views these two treatises as an introduction to all of Philo’s works, the suggestion, put forth by E.R. Goodenough, that these treatises might

5 Spec. 4.133–134; the exact meaning of the passage is somewhat ambiguous. See Colson, PLCL 8:90 nn. b and c.

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in some way be a companion set to the Exposition in particular seems to make more sense.6 As David Runia has astutely observed, since the very title of the first treatise of the Exposition, On the creation of the cosmos according to Moses, presupposes that readers would know who Moses was, it is reasonable to assume that Philo may have prefaced his Exposition of Moses’s law with an introduction to the lawgiver himself.7 As we shall see below under § 3 on “Genre, Aims, and Audience,” the Exposition—unlike the Allegorical Commentary and QGE—appears to be directed for the most part to an audience less familiar with Moses, the Jews, and their Scriptures. Philo’s statement in Mos. 1.1–2 that he wishes to introduce Moses to those not familiar with him therefore meshes well with his apparent intentions in the Exposition. By contrast, the other two series presuppose a much higher level of knowledge about Moses’s teachings, and Philo’s audience in these writings would scarcely require such an introduction. In the Exposition passages Virt. 52 and Praem. 53, moreover, Philo explicitly refers to material that he had covered in his two treatises on Moses. All of these observations support the view that the two treatises most likely served as a kind of preface specifically to the Exposition.8 Having briefly reviewed the sequence of works that constitute the Exposition, we list these works below. Since Philo himself does not address the relationship between the treatises on Moses and the Exposition, these treatises are included in parentheses. Provisional titles of the lost treatises on Isaac and Jacob, presumably part of the original sequence, appear in brackets. Sequence of Treatises in the Exposition9 (De Vita Mosis 1–2) De Opificio Mundi De Abrahamo [De Isaaco] [De Iacobo] De Iosepho De Decalogo

6 Goodenough 1933; see also Sterling 2012b, 72–74; 2018b. 7 Runia 2001, 1. Regardless of whether or not the title of Opif. is original to Philo, the very opening passage of that treatise (Opif. 2) similarly assumes readers’ acquaintance with Moses. 8 Yet another source of support for this view is the similarity between Mos. 2.45–47 and Praem. 1–3, discussed below, regarding the structure of Moses’s teachings. See also Wilson 2011, 3–4. 9 Following convention, we use the Latin titles of the treatises; see Monique Alexandre 1997.

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De Specialibus Legibus 1–4 De Virtutibus De Praemiis et Poenis b Philo’s Plan for the Exposition As for the rationale behind the sequence of treatises shown above, Philo unfolds his plan for the Exposition at several different points and bases this plan on his understanding of the structure and purpose of the Mosaic teachings.10 For those teachings discussed specifically in Abr., Philo offers two different, though compatible, rationales or emphases. To understand these emphases and to determine the function of Abr. within the above sequence of treatises, we shall consider the following: (1) Statements about Moses’s teachings in Mos. 2.45–65 and Praem. 1–3; (2) Programmatic, transitional, and other, related statements in Abr. and other Exposition treatises; and (3) The full Greek title of Abr. As we shall see, the statements in Mos. 2 and Praem. emphasize the theme of reward and punishment, while other statements in Abr. and the Exposition and the full Greek title of Abr. emphasize the role of Moses’s teachings as laws. In addition, each of these emphases or rationales serves to explain why Moses’s legislation includes tales about various early figures. 1

Statements about Moses’s Teachings in Mos. 2.45–65 and Praem. 1–3 In Praem. 1–3, Philo identifies three “forms” (ἰδέαι) in the Mosaic “oracles” (λόγια) as creation, history, and legislation. According to this schema, “[t]he historical part is a record of good and bad lives and of the sentences passed in each generation on both, rewards in one case, punishments in the other” (Praem. 2). In Mos. 2.45–47, Philo divides “the most holy books” (αἱ ἱερώτατοι βίβλοι; our trans.) of Moses into two parts: a historical one and a second part that deals with commands and prohibitions. Because Philo further divides the historical part into two—namely, the creation of the cosmos and a “genealogical” account (τὸ γενεαλογικόν) about the punishment of the impious and reward of the righteous—the two passages essentially present the Pentateuch as consist10

Other extended treatments of the Exposition can be found in Sterling 2012b, 67–75; Borgen 1996 and 1997, 63–79; Sandmel 1979, 47–75; Wilson 2011, 1–7; and Goodenough 1986, 33–46. Although our own discussion covers essentially the same material, we present different perspectives, particularly with regard to the statements about Moses’s teachings in Mos. 2.45–65 and Praem. 1–3.

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ing of three sections: creation, lives of good and bad people and their rewards or punishments, and legislation.11 Whether we call the second section the “historical” or the “genealogical,” both passages describe it as discussing rewards to the good and punishments to the bad. Because this section is the most pertinent to Abr., let us consider more closely Philo’s further remarks in each treatise. In Mos. 2.47–48, as if anticipating a question about why Moses “began his lawbook with the history, and put the commands and prohibitions in the second place,” Philo explains that Moses wished to show two most essential things: first that the Father and Maker of the world was in the truest sense also its Lawgiver, secondly that he who would observe the laws will accept gladly the duty of following nature and living in accordance with the ordering of the universe … Mos. 2.48

One of Moses’s purposes in beginning his legislation with an account of creation, then, was to establish that his laws are in harmony with nature (see also Mos. 2.51–52). To underscore this equivalence, Philo goes on to provide two examples of how nature participated in punishing those who “rebelled against virtue” (Mos. 2.53–64). These examples include the flood of Noah’s time and then the destruction of the Sodomite cities by fire. In the midst of these disasters, however, two worthy individuals—Noah and Lot—were rewarded not only by being saved but also by becoming generators of new life, “inaugurators of a second cycle” (Mos. 2.65).12

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Although Mos. 2 and Praem. share the same rationale for Moses’s inclusion of the lives— i.e., to demonstrate rewards and punishments—each treatise deals with this theme somewhat differently, as shown below. In a rich and learned study, Adam Kamesar has suggested that Philo’s “tripartite classification of Pentateuchal genres” has parallels in earlier Hellenistic literature and that his use of this structure may reflect “an early Jewish Hellenistic attempt at understanding the genres of the Pentateuch from a Greek perspective” (1997, 186). See also Termini 2006, 265–277. On the meaning of “genealogical” (γενεαλογικός), see ibid., 273–277; also Colson, PLCL 6:470 n. a, and 6:606 n. on Mos. 2.47. Although he discusses the flood before the destruction of the Sodomite cities (Mos. 2.53– 56), Philo mentions the saving of Lot before Noah (Mos. 2.58–64). Consistent with his practice in the Exposition treatises of using proper names only minimally, however, Philo does not name either of them here. It is worth noting that Philo’s two examples of punishments are of events that took place before the written Mosaic laws were given. The exact nature of the misbehavior that caused the flood and of the sins of Sodom is debated. See our discussion in the commentary on §§ 27–47 and 133–166.

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In Praem. 1–3, Philo does not elaborate upon why Moses begins his legislation with creation nor does he highlight the role of nature. Instead, he organizes his presentation of rewards and punishments “under heads arranged in an orderly series, individual men, families, cities, countries and nations, vast regions of the earth” (Praem. 7), a schema that he attributes to Moses himself. Thereafter, describing rewards to individuals, Philo covers material in Praem. 10–51 very similar to that in Abr.—and, we must believe, in the lost treatises on Isaac and Jacob. Instead of recounting the lives of these individuals straightforwardly, however, in Praem. he presents an aspect of these figures’ lives as a reward to them. Abraham, for example, is rewarded with faith in God (Praem. 27, 49), while in Abr. 262, Abraham’s faith is presented not as a reward but rather a cause for praise.13 Programmatic, Transitional, and Other Statements in Abr. and Other Exposition Treatises Since in Mos. 2 and Praem. Philo identifies the three sections of Moses’s teachings and since the account of creation immediately precedes Abr., we might infer that Abr. will introduce the scriptural division that follows creation— whether this division be termed the “genealogical” (Mos. 2.47) or “historical” (Praem. 1–2). Philo himself, however, does not acknowledge this new division in Abr. explicitly. Moreover, although he alludes to rewards and punishments at different points throughout Abr., he does not make this theme central as he does in Praem. Instead Philo appears to follow a somewhat different schema in Abr. and thereafter until Praem. itself. Thus, in Abr. 3–5, after referring to the account of creation in the preceding treatise, Philo writes, 2

But since it is incumbent on us to investigate the laws systematically and in due order, let us postpone our study of those laws which are particular and, as it were, copies, and consider first those which are more allembracing and, so to speak, archetypes. These are those among men who have lived irreproachable and noble lives, whose virtues happen to have been recorded in the most holy writings … For those men are in fact living and rational laws … 13

Regarding Enos, Enoch, and Noah, compare, e.g., Abr. 7–47 and Praem. 10–23. In Praem. 2, Philo describes the historical part of Moses’s teachings as consisting of an account of good and bad lives and then of rewards and punishments. Because in Praem. 3 he observes that he has discussed all these and other matters earlier, it seems instead that he has already focused primarily on the lives and will now, in Praem., proceed to the rewards and punishments, including future rewards and punishments described in the section on blessings and curses (Praem. 79–172).

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In contrast, then, to his descriptions in Mos. 2.46–47 and Praem. 2 that lead us to expect that Philo will now introduce either the genealogical (Mos. 2) or historical (Praem.) part of Moses’s writings, Philo instead declares that the early biblical figures themselves are laws—specifically, more all-encompassing laws and living and rational laws. Philo further explains that Moses included the lives of these figures not only to praise them but also to instruct others and to influence them to emulate these models (Abr. 4). He then offers two more reasons why Moses included the lives of these figures in his legislation: First, Moses wished to show that the ordinances which are laid down are not at variance with nature; and secondly, that there is no great problem for those who wish to live under the established laws, seeing that the earliest generations, before any of the particular laws were written down, were able easily and without trouble to follow an unwritten legal system … Abr. 5

In the very introduction to the treatise, then, Philo puts forth two somewhat different notions—1) that the early figures were laws in themselves and 2) that they followed the particular laws before these were written down (Abr. 3–6; see also 16). At the conclusion of Abr., he explicitly acknowledges this difference. There, he declares that while some say that Abraham was “one who kept the law” (νόμιμος), Philo’s own view is that he was “himself a law and an unwritten ordinance” (νόμος αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ θεσμὸς ἄγραφος; Abr. 276). Regardless of this difference, both notions individually and together help to explain why Moses included tales about several ancient figures as part of his legislation. Two other transitional statements, in Ios. 1 and Decal. 1, shed further light on Philo’s approach and bring to the fore two smaller groupings in which Abr. takes its place in Philo’s work. According to Ios. 1, The factors which produce consummate excellence are three in number: learning, nature, practice. And these names are represented in three of the wise men to whom Moses gives the senior place. Since I have described the lives of these three, the life which results from teaching (ἐκ διδασκαλίας), the life of the self-taught (αὐτομαθής), and the life of practice (ἀσκητικός), I will carry on the series by describing a fourth life, that of the statesman (πολιτικός). In Abr. 52–54, Philo explains that the three patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob symbolize types of soul that strive toward the good along different paths:

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teaching or learning, nature, and practice, a distinction ultimately derived from Protagoras.14 Accordingly, besides introducing a new part of Scripture after the creation account, Abr. is also the first in a series of three biographies about the three patriarchs, wise men who achieved excellence through teaching or learning, nature, and practice, and first in a series of four biographies that also include the life of the statesman. Introducing his next treatise after Ios., on the Decalogue, Philo writes, Having related in the preceding treatises the lives of those whom Moses judged to be men of wisdom, who are set before us in the Sacred Books as founders of our nation and in themselves unwritten laws, I shall now proceed in due course to give full descriptions of the written laws. Decal. 1

Here, instead of mentioning either lives perfected by learning, nature, and practice or the life of the statesman, Philo speaks more generally of wise men, founders of the nation, and unwritten laws. Presumably this description is intended to include the treatise on Joseph among the preceding works, even though Philo does not explicitly speak of Joseph as an unwritten law.15 3 The Full Greek Title of Abr. Finally, the above observations about Abr. are further highlighted by the treatise’s full title in Greek, which translates as, “The life of the sage who has attained perfection through teaching, or [the first book] of the unwritten laws, that is, about Abraham.” Although we cannot know whether it is original to Philo, this title or small variations on it appear in several different manuscripts (see PCW 4:1 and our section below on “Title of the Work”). Two features

14 15

Cramer 1939, 1.171.31–32. See also Abr. 52–54 and the Detailed Comments on this passage. In Ios. 1 Philo acknowledges Joseph as a founding figure (φυλάρχος). On Joseph as wise, see Ios. 106 and 268–269. Philo may implicitly group Joseph as an unwritten law together with the other patriarchs and ancient figures, by contrast with the written laws recorded in the later books. Especially because of his ambivalent attitude toward Joseph in the Allegorical Commentary, however, it seems more likely that Philo reserves the characterization of “unwritten laws” specifically for Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Abr. 1–59). On Philo’s ambivalence toward Joseph, see Earp, PLCL 10:351–357. It is also interesting that Philo does not include Joseph in his account of rewards and punishments in Praem. Colson (PLCL 6:xii) remarks that the treatise Ios. is “something of an excrescence in [Philo’s] scheme,” a rather ironic observation when we recall that Philo interprets Joseph’s name to signify an “addition”; see, e.g., Mut. 89; Somn. 2.47; cf. Ios. 28, in which the etymology is “addition of a lord.”

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of this title are especially pertinent to our present discussion and reinforce our above observations. First, Abraham is characterized as a sage made perfect through teaching. That Philo views this treatise as the life of the sage perfected through teaching accords with his statement in Ios. 1 that he has presented three lives, each of whose excellence was attained in a different way.16 A second relevant feature of the title is that it presents the life of Abraham as pertaining to unwritten laws. This feature underscores our claim that in recounting the contents of the book of Genesis, Philo is concerned to demonstrate that even this part of Moses’s teachings should be characterized as laws. Indeed, the very first words of Abr. are “the sacred laws” and Philo begins this treatise by declaring, “The sacred laws being inscribed, as they are, in five books, the first is called … ‘Genesis’ …” (Abr. 1). Moreover, he expresses his intention “to investigate the laws systematically and in due order” (Abr. 3, our emphasis). These opening declarations and the full Greek title of the treatise, together with such statements as that Abraham himself was a law (Abr. 276) and that Philo will proceed from the unwritten laws to the written ones (Decal. 1), buttress the view that Philo is determined to characterize the teachings of Moses in Genesis as laws. Philo may intend this emphasis for at least the following interrelated reasons: first, by way of comparison with other lawgivers (Opif. 1–2; see also Mos. 1.1), he has introduced Moses specifically as a lawgiver, indeed, “the best of all lawgivers in all countries” (Mos. 2.12). In addition, the very word for Moses’s teachings in Greek is nomos (νόμος), a translation of the Hebrew torah (e.g., LXX Deut 1:5; 4:44; 31:9; 33:4). Although Philo can use νόμος with much broader connotations, he is also undoubtedly aware of its primary association with law.17 Finally—and most important—if Moses’s

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As explained below in our section “Title of the Work,” the words “the first book” are necessarily added and we have therefore bracketed them. We might also speculate that the lost treatises on Isaac and Jacob were similarly titled in Greek, with adjustments made for each treatise according to the way each patriarch achieved perfection and the treatise’s position as the second or third book of unwritten laws. The lost treatise on Isaac, for example, might have had a full title like the following (in translation): “The life of the sage who has attained perfection through nature, or the second book of unwritten laws, that is, on Isaac.” Likewise the translated full title of the lost treatise on Jacob may have been “The life of the sage who has attained perfection through practice, or the third book of unwritten laws, that is, on Jacob.” For Philo’s usage, see, e.g., Segal 1984; Reinhartz 1986. Philo uses νόμος in both the singular and plural to refer to Moses’s teachings. Use of the singular accords with the Greek translation of “Torah” as νόμος, while the plural νόμοι can also refer to specific laws or groups of laws within the Mosaic legislation (see N.G. Cohen 2007, 160 n. 10; also Bickerman 1988,

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teachings are indeed characterized as laws, then why does he introduce these laws with a book that not only contains an account of creation but is also filled with seemingly irrelevant tales about various ancient figures? As we have just observed, Philo addresses this question about the ancient figures in at least two ways: first, they serve as examples of good and bad behavior which is either rewarded or punished (Mos. 2.47–65; Praem. 4–7, 10–51) and, second, the virtuous among these figures are actually laws in themselves (Abr. 3–6, 16, 275– 276).18 With this understanding we can now organize the Exposition treatises into sections according to their functions. Although Philo has constructed this series based on his understanding of the threefold nature of Moses’s teachings as described in Mos. 2 and Praem., in framing the series itself he has introduced different—though occasionally similar—categories to highlight his own interpretation of these teachings.19 The statements in Mos. 2 and Praem., then, are descriptions of the Pentateuch. While these statements shed light on Philo’s approach in the Exposition, they are not descriptions of the Exposition itself. Instead Philo’s interpretation of Moses’s writings in this series begins by his correlating these writings with types of law and then with virtues and culminates in a discussion of rewards and punishments. Thus the creation account in Opif. establishes an equivalence between Mosaic laws and the law of nature. In Abr. and presumably the missing treatises on Isaac and Jacob, the early figures—Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—represent laws that are unwritten. These treatises along with Ios. also constitute a group of βίοι or “lives,” of ancient figures. The written laws are set forth as both general, in De Decalogo, and specific, in Spec. 1.1–4.132. In Spec. 4.133–238 and Virt., some of

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114–115; and Runia 2001, 106). Although Philo commonly uses νόμος in the singular to refer to Moses’s teachings as a whole (see, e.g., Ebr. 17; Opif. 3; Spec. 3.120; 4.137) he does not use it this way in Abr. Though different, these two rationales are compatible and it is not necessary to view them as signaling a change in Philo’s thinking on the matter, especially if we understand his statements in Mos. 2 and Praem. to refer to the Pentateuch and not the Exposition (see immediately below); cf. Sterling 2012b, 68–69, 74. See also Sandmel 1979, 55–63; Kugel 2012a and 2012b; and Sterling 2008a. In Virt. 194, Philo comments that “the lives of those who have earnestly followed virtue may be called unwritten laws.” For more on Philo’s understanding of the concept of “unwritten law,” see the commentary on §§1–6 and 262– 276, with the additional references provided there. Similar categories shared by the Pentateuch and the Exposition include “creation” (κοσμοποιία), which describes both Moses’s account and Philo’s own treatise Opif., and “legislation” (τὸ νομοθετικόν, Praem. 2), or “commands and prohibitions” (προστάξεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις, Mos. 2.46), which apply to the legislative parts of the Pentateuch and to Philo’s sections on written laws in the treatises Decal. through Virt.

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these laws, both unwritten and written, are associated with virtues of universal value, mentioned above.20 Finally, in Praem. Philo addresses rewards and punishments. Below, the Exposition treatises are outlined in accordance with Philo’s plan. For reasons mentioned earlier, we have listed the treatises on Moses in parentheses and bracketed the titles of works on Isaac and Jacob. The Plan of the Exposition (Preface: Mos. 1–2) Creation: Opif. Unwritten Laws/Lives of Ancient Sages – Unwritten laws and lives of sages perfected by teaching or learning, nature, and practice: Abr., [De Isaaco, De Iacobo] – Life of the Statesman: Ios.21 Written Laws – General Headings: Decal. – Particular Laws: Spec. 1.1–4.132 Virtues: Spec. 4.133–238, Virt. Rewards and Punishments: Praem. From the above, we can see that Philo’s treatise De Abrahamo is the first book of the unwritten laws, a grouping that presumably includes treatises on Isaac and Jacob as well. It is also the first of four biographies about wise men—three, who acquire virtue respectively through learning, nature, and practice, and a fourth who lives the life of the statesman. Finally, the biblical narrative on which Abr. is based belongs to what Philo elsewhere calls the “historical” or “genealogical” part of Moses’s teachings (Praem. 1–3; Mos. 2.45–47).

2

The Place of the Treatise in Philo’s Life

The order in which Philo composed his works has been a matter of great speculation. Only two surviving treatises, Flacc. and Legat. offer direct evidence for when they were written. In Flacc., Philo recounts events pertaining to a 20

21

In Virt. 198–225, Philo includes narrative material from what he elsewhere calls the “historical” (Praem. 2) or “genealogical” (Mos. 2.47) section. Presumably, however, “unwritten laws” refers only to the virtuous figures from these sections; see Virt. 194, quoted above, in n. 18. On the questionable status of Joseph as an unwritten law, see above, n. 15.

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violent uprising against the Jews that took place in 38CE. In Legat., he again describes matters relating to this uprising but also discusses his participation in an embassy to the Emperor Gaius Caligula in 38/39 or 39/40 CE and refers to the emperor Claudius, who came to power in 41 CE (Legat. 206). At the beginning of this treatise Philo speaks of himself as an old man (Legat. 1; cf. § 182). Since our interest is specifically in Philo’s Exposition treatise Abr., we will confine ourselves primarily to speculation about this series and will comment about its relationship to these datable events when they are relevant. The general consensus, with which we cautiously agree for reasons described below, is that Philo wrote the Exposition later in his life and in any case after his other two exegetical series, the Allegorical Commentary and QGE. a

Approaches to Dating the Exposition in Relation to Philo’s Other Works Conjectures about when Philo produced the Exposition in relation to his other writings and at what point in his life have generally been based on (1) Internal cross-references to his other works, (2) Assumptions about his intellectual or spiritual development, and (3) Interpretations of an autobiographical reference in Spec. 3.1–6. Although none of these approaches provides conclusive evidence about the dating and chronology of Philo’s works, each deserves consideration.22 1 Internal References In several places throughout his works, Philo refers to other discussions or writings of his own. Occasionally these references can be clearly identified, as we saw with his allusions to Opif. in Abr. 2 and 13 or to the treatises on Moses in Virt. 52 and Praem. 53. Sometimes too Philo alludes to works that have been lost. A number of references, however, are not clear because one cannot be certain whether Philo is speaking of an entire work or merely a shorter discussion. Examples of these difficulties can be found in studies cited by Morris (1987, 841–844) as well as in more recent investigations. Among the latter, especially notable are those of Terian (1991), who concludes that QGE is earlier than 22

In her survey of Philo’s life and works, Morris succinctly summarizes the debates on these matters particularly with regard to earlier scholarship (1987, 841–844). More recently, in a book entitled Philo of Alexandria: An Intellectual Biography, Maren Niehoff (2018) argues that Philo produced the Exposition under strong Roman influence, to which he was exposed during his participation in the embassy to Caligula and his subsequent extended stay. It is unknown, however, how much time Philo spent in Rome in connection with this embassy. Moreover, he could well have been exposed to strong Roman influence even in Alexandria, one of the most prominent cities in the Roman empire.

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the other two exegetical series, and Sterling (2012b), who, focusing only on the Allegorical Commentary and the Exposition, concludes that the Exposition is the later of the two. While the above studies address the difficulties with and ambiguities of a range of internal references, we will consider only one passage, Somn. 1.167–168, which is of particular interest because it mentions Abraham. There, as part of an interpretation of Gen 28:13, Philo explains that each of the three patriarchs represents virtue acquired in one of three ways: nature, practice, or learning. Of Abraham, he writes, “The oldest of them, Abraham, made use of teaching as his guide on the way that leads to the good, as we will show elsewhere (ὡς ἐν ἑτέροις … δείξομεν), to the best of our ability.”23 Although it is theoretically possible that this statement may refer to discussions in the Allegorical Commentary or QGE,24 Sterling (2012b, 58, with n. 24) reasonably understands Somn. 1.168 as pointing to Philo’s Exposition treatise devoted to Abraham’s life. Philo’s use of the future tense in this passage and the full Greek title of Abr., which describes the treatise as “the life of the sage who has attained perfection through teaching,” would similarly appear to support this conclusion. If Sterling is correct, however, and if the scholarly consensus is also correct that Philo composed additional Exposition treatises, now lost, on Isaac and Jacob, then it is somewhat surprising that in this Somn. 1 passage Philo does not similarly declare his intentions to speak about the other two patriarchs as well. Regardless, the passage does seem to suggest that while writing Somn. 1, Philo had in mind to produce a later work on Abraham that may well be identical to Abr., the subject of the present volume. 2 Assumptions about Philo’s Intellectual or Spiritual Development While the three exegetical series have important continuities, they are also marked by differences in genre, interpretations, ideas, and vocabulary. The Allegorical Commentary, for example, offers a running commentary on biblical

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Somn. 1.168; the translation is by Sterling 2012b, 58. For more on this passage, see Birnbaum 2010, 82–83 (references on these pages to Mut. 163 and 171–172 should be to Somn. 1.163 and 171–172). In Congr., for example, a treatise in the Allegorical Commentary, Philo allegorizes Abraham’s mating with Hagar as his engaging with the encyclical studies before he can acquire virtue or wisdom, symbolized by Sarah. It is unlikely that Philo is referring to this work, however, because in Somn. 1.168, he uses the future tense and it would appear that Congr. preceded Somn. 1. For a similar interpretation, see also QG 3.20–21. It seems unlikely as well, however, that Philo is referring in Somn. 1 to this brief QG discussion, in which this allegorization is but one of many interpretations and no emphasis is placed on Abraham per se as a model of learning.

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verses, or parts of verses, and incorporates sophisticated allegorical interpretations and references to secondary biblical verses. Occasionally Philo rejects the literal meaning in favor of the symbolic. By contrast, QGE is organized in question-and-answer format, with each question focusing on a particular aspect of a scriptural verse. Here Philo presents literal and allegorical interpretations side by side without remarking on their relative worth. By contrast again, the Exposition is arranged thematically, as we have seen, and Philo, quoting Scripture much less frequently, relies primarily instead upon paraphrasing. The Exposition as a whole contains fewer allegorical interpretations than the other two series; Abr. in fact is an exception to this observation. Two brief examples of different ideas (or perhaps emphases) among the series are that the Allegorical Commentary and QGE mention intermediaries, including the Logos, more often than the Exposition. The Exposition, meanwhile, unlike the Allegorical Commentary and QGE, presents early biblical figures—including the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—as unwritten laws. As for vocabulary, the Exposition frequently mentions “Jews” (Ἰουδαῖοι) and “the Jewish nation” (τὸ Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος), terms that never appear in the Allegorical Commentary and almost never in QGE. By contrast, the term “Israel” appears frequently in the Allegorical Commentary, occasionally in QGE, and only rarely in the Exposition. Finally, as a point of interest, of all Philo’s writings, the Exposition is the only one to mention a Latin word, namely, septem (Opif. 127).25 Some writers have emphasized certain differences to support theories about the chronology of these series and about Philo’s intellectual or spiritual development. Over a century ago, for example, Massebieau, along with Bréhier, noted a shift in Philo’s attitude toward political life. Attempting to match this shift with political events, they suggested that the Allegorical Commentary came later than the Exposition. Today, however, most scholars would disagree. L. Cohn, a contemporary of Massebieau and Bréhier, had already postulated the reverse order to place the Exposition after the Allegorical Commentary.26 More recently, Naomi Cohen declared “categorically” that “whether or not Philo himself underwent this metamorphosis” his “magnum opus” begins with a fundamentally philosophical emphasis in De Opificio Mundi, “proceeds through the allegorical and then the symbolical works, and culminates in a virtually normative Jewish frame of reference in Dec., Spec. Leg. I–IV, Virt. and Praem. 25 26

On some of these differences and others among the series, see Birnbaum 1996, 17–20, 43– 58, 88–90, 195–201; for additional observations, see Niehoff 2011a, 2011b, 2018; Böhm 2005. Massebieau 1889; Massebieau and Bréhier 1906; L. Cohn 1899. For a summary of their positions, see also Morris 1987, 841–844.

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et Poen.”27 Observing important similarities between Philo’s Exposition and Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities, another recent scholar, Maren Niehoff, similarly believes that the Exposition is the latest of the three series and she goes even further to suggest that Philo composed this series during his extended stay in Rome while participating in the embassy to Gaius (2011b, 2018; see also 2011a). Finally, in a suggestive article about Philo’s treatises on Moses, René Bloch argues that these works were written “around the same time” as the Legatio ad Gaium (2012, 76). If he is correct, and if we are correct in our assumptions about the relationship between these treatises on Moses and the Exposition (see § 1 of this Introduction), then—whether he was in Rome or not—Philo may have composed the Exposition after his meeting with Caligula in 39 or 40CE. While perhaps somewhat speculative, additional arguments may be marshalled in support of the lateness of the Exposition. Philo’s experience of the anti-Jewish violence in Alexandria and his embassy to Rome, for example, may have sharpened his desire to explain Moses and his philosophy to the outside world. Moreover, in this series Philo attempts to present all of Moses’s teachings, from Genesis through Deuteronomy, in systematic fashion and one is often best able to view the whole from such a perspective only after working through the specifics of the parts. Such a focus on specifics is surely characteristic of Philo’s Allegorical Commentary and QGE, even if Philo’s focus there is primarily on Genesis and to a lesser extent on Exodus. For these reasons and also because of the reference in Somn. 1.167–168, discussed above, and perhaps because of the reference in Spec. 3.1–6, discussed below, we agree that the Exposition is probably the latest of the three series. Nonetheless we must also acknowledge that arguments about Philo’s intellectual and/or spiritual development are too indefinite to support firm conclusions about the chronology of his works. 3 Interpretation of Spec. 3.1–6 The attempt to correlate Philo’s writings with particular events or developments in his life draws our attention to his reflections at the beginning of Spec. 3 (§§1–6). There, after looking back longingly on a more tranquil period when he was able to occupy himself with philosophy, Philo laments that he had recently been “plunged … in the ocean of civil cares” (§3). When he wrote this passage, however, he had managed to find a respite during which he might engage once more in expositing the meaning of Scripture.

27

N.G. Cohen 1995, 31. Cohen’s position has the added feature of grouping both series together as one large work, a position taken even earlier by Nikiprowetzky (1977, 192–202).

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Because we know from his other writings about the political crisis in Alexandria under Flaccus and Gaius, it is both natural and tempting to understand this Spec. 3 passage as relating in some way to those events. Together with Philo’s observation that he was an old man at the time of the embassy to Rome, this understanding of the Spec. 3 passage, if correct, would lend further support to the notion that Philo produced the Exposition toward the end of his life and after the other two series. (Here, we assume that Philo composed the Exposition treatises preceding Spec. 3 not too much earlier than the events to which he alludes.) Some scholars, however, have rightly pointed out that the passage may refer to other kinds of public demands on Philo’s time or may be a kind of literary construct (see, e.g., Colson, PLCL 7:631–632, notes on §§ 3 and 6; Morris 1987, 843–844, esp. n. 129). Although the conjectures are surely reasonable that the Spec. 3 passage may reflect events mentioned in Flacc. and Legat. and therefore signals the lateness of the Exposition, a more cautious approach is to recognize, along with other scholars, that “certainty about the absolute or relative chronology of Philo’s writings can never be attained” (Geljon and Runia 2013, 5). b Passages in Abr. That May Reflect on Philo’s Life and Times Despite this indeterminate conclusion, in a section on the place of Abr. in Philo’s life, we might mention some passages specifically from this treatise that may point to or reflect circumstances either in Philo’s own life or his environment and times. Although these passages do not help us to place the treatise chronologically among Philo’s works, they show how he drew or may have drawn upon details from his contemporary situation. For further discussion about all the passages mentioned here, see the commentary.28 In Abr. 62–67, for example, Philo appears to use examples from his environment to support his claim that leaving home as Abraham did was extremely difficult. In this context he mentions the penalty of banishment and argues that in his opinion this punishment is worse than death because the latter signals the end of woes but “exile is a beginning, not an end, of ever-new misfortunes, substituting for one death without further pains a myriad of deaths, each accompanied by sensation” (§64). As we know, the Romans indeed used

28

On rhetorical aspects of some of these examples, see the next section on “Genre, Aims, and Audience”; on exegetical aspects, see § 4 of this Introduction on “Structure, Content, and Exegetical Approaches.” Following Philo’s practice we refer to the patriarch as “Abraham” rather than “Abram,” even in discussions of events before his name was changed in Gen 15:17. On this issue, see § 12 of the Introduction below.

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banishment or exile as a punishment, as Philo himself attests in his account about Flaccus (e.g., Flacc. 151). In the same extended passage, Philo mentions other, less dire, reasons for leaving home—including travel for business, a political embassy, or tourism. Since his brother Alexander was very wealthy and his nephew Marcus was involved in the East-West trade, Philo must have had nearby examples of people who went abroad for business.29 He himself left home to participate in an embassy, as did his nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander,30 and one may also assume that his brother Alexander likewise engaged in such political activities because of his intimacy with Roman leaders. Finally, Philo’s example of tourism is very interesting indeed for he ascribes this pursuit to a “love of learning” (ἔρως παιδείας) and compares those who have not ventured abroad and those who have done so to the blind and sharp-sighted, respectively (§ 65). This remark suggests that Philo belonged to a privileged community of people who enjoyed the wealth and leisure to broaden their horizons through travel. To highlight Abraham’s piety in obeying the command to emigrate, Philo asserts that whatever their reasons for leaving home, all who do so eventually yearn to return to their ancestral land, family, and friends. In making this point, he offers a glimpse of the lively possibilities in antiquity to engage with the larger world away from what is familiar. Later in the same passage Philo provides further insight into contemporary circumstances when he specifies those whom Abraham would have left behind: clansmen, demesmen, fellow-students, companions, maternal and paternal blood-relations, native land, ancient customs, and a shared upbringing and way of life (§67). Perhaps Philo imagined that Abraham had to tear himself away from just such a society, but it seems likely that Philo’s own society formed the basis of his depiction. While the above examples illustrate how Philo may have drawn from the general circumstances of his day, other passages may provide insight into his own personal situation. Thus, when reflecting upon Enoch, who, according to LXX Gen 5:24, “was not found, because God transferred him,” Philo observes that one who was “transferred” in this way would be naturally hard to find since “evil is multiple and varied, and for that reason is familiar to the general run of people, but virtue is rare, so that it is difficult to grasp even by a 29 30

On Alexander, see Josephus, Ant. 18.159–160, 259; 19.276–277; 20.100; J.W. 5.205; Evans 1995. On Marcus, see Fuks 1951. See also D.R. Schwartz 2009, 12–14; Foster 1975, 60–72. Anim. 54; this may or may not have been the same occasion; cf. Terian 1981, 30–31. On this nephew, see Turner 1954; Étienne 2000; also Josephus, Ant. 20.100, 102; J.W. 2.220, 309, 487–498; 4.616–618; 5.45–46, 510; 6.237–243.

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few” (§19). He then describes the bad man as “obsessed with social activity” and “forever bustling around the market-place and the theatres, law-courts, meeting-places of council or popular assembly, and any sort of gathering or social group” (§20). The good man, by contrast, secludes himself and “if beset by too many visitors, he heads out of the city and spends his time on some isolated farm” reading ancient classics of poetry and prose (§ 23). As we remark in the commentary ad loc., one easily imagines Philo withdrawing from the busybodies of his society to a country estate where he can immerse himself in literature of the past. Other passages may likewise reflect Philo’s own personal circumstances. Introducing a section about Abraham’s dealings with Lot, for example, Philo observes that the patriarch was richer than usual for an “immigrant” (μέτοικος) and although his wealth rivaled that of the best-endowed natives and inhabitants they nonetheless dealt with him respectfully and without hostility (§209). Similarly in a later passage, when Sarah proposes to Abraham that he cohabit with her handmaid in order to produce an heir, Sarah acknowledges that she and Abraham possess great wealth, indeed more than would be expected for “immigrants” (μέτοικοι; §252). In both passages the emphasis on Abraham’s immigrant status is extraneous to the biblical text. Narrating the experience of the Israelites in Egypt in Mos. 1.34–36, Philo also speaks of the people’s status as strangers and “immigrants” (μέτοικοι) and some scholars have seen echoes in this passage of the situation of the Jews in Egypt in Philo’s own day.31 Perhaps Philo, who came from a very wealthy family, saw in Abraham and Sarah’s situation in Canaan a reflection of his own standing as a Jew in Alexandria. Besides these instances, one may perhaps detect further hints about Philo’s private circumstances when he turns to the relationship between Abraham and his nephew Lot in §§208–224. After describing Abraham’s wealthy and respected position, Philo refers to “those who were akin to him by birth, but alien to him in judgment” (§211). In his allegorical interpretation of the separation between Abraham and Lot (§§217–224), Philo characterizes the disagreement between the servants of each to be about the value placed upon different kinds of goods. Accordingly, Abraham’s servants represent lovers of virtues, the goods of the soul, while Lot’s servants represent lovers of wealth and glory, the external goods.32 It is well-known that Philo’s nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander left behind his ancestral customs to serve the Romans (Ant. 20.100). On the 31 32

Wolfson 1982, 2:397–400; Meeks 1976, 48–49; Bloch 2012. A similar contrast regarding different kinds of goods is found at the end of the treatise in §§ 262–267; see the comment at § 274 on “elder” and “primary” …

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basis of the rejection of his Jewish heritage alone, we might understand that he and Philo had different values. This inference draws support from a number of dialogical treatises in which Philo and his nephew defend opposing positions on certain intellectual issues, one of which is the value of goods of the soul in relation to those of the body and external goods.33 Since, in allegorizing the separation between Abraham and Lot, Philo introduces the philosophical question of the estimation of different kinds of goods, it seems possible that this interpretation may have been influenced by a real-life dispute with his own nephew. A final instance that may hint at Philo’s personal situation is a passage in which he vehemently denounces skeptics who question the impressiveness of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son Isaac (§§ 178–199). The intensity of Philo’s remarks suggests that the matter held great significance for him and was perhaps somewhat close to home. After considering various possibilities regarding the identity of these skeptics, we suggest that they may have been alienated Jews who disparaged the tradition (see the commentary ad loc.). Once again, Philo’s nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander may have been among this group. As with all the above suggestions, however, any connection between Philo’s interpretations in Abr. and his contemporary environment or personal circumstances remains entirely in the realm of speculation.

3

Genre, Aims, and Audience

a Abr. as a bios Along with Philo’s treatises on Joseph and Moses, Abr. is a valuable example of an ancient Jewish bios. In antiquity βίος, or “life,” was the term applied to a written account of a person’s life—similar to what we would today call a biography. In his very helpful studies on this kind of writing, Richard Burridge underscores that the genre was both “diverse and flexible” (e.g., 2004, 184; see also 1997); subjects might range from leaders and politicians to philosophers, authors, teachers, and religious figures. The purpose of a bios might be to praise or find fault with the subject and/or to hold the person up as a model to emulate.34 With 33 34

Prov. 2.7–20; for another treatise in which Philo and his nephew argue different positions, see Anim.; see also D.R. Schwartz 2009, 13–14; Étienne 2000. Burridge distinguishes between Greek and Roman biographies as to their purpose: “While the initial Greek intention may have been praise or blame through rhetoric, for the Romans the motive was exemplary—to emulate the exempla maiorum” (1997, 376). See

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such different kinds of subjects and aims, the bios might take different forms; it could be organized chronologically, thematically, or both, and encompass such topics as birth, ancestry, education, youthful activities, sayings, deeds, virtues, death, and burial. Finally, as a genre that was not formally recognized as such in handbooks of rhetoric, a bios would often overlap with other kinds of works, such as an encomium or history. It is useful to understand Abr. in light of the fluid nature of the bios. Although the treatise is most certainly a bios of Abraham,35 it must also be seen as a blend of genres, which include allegorical interpretations and a variety of rhetorical forms and devices. Before examining individual features of this work, we might best follow the advice of B. Gentili and G. Cerri, who observe that “[a] correct analysis of Greek biography should … proceed from within, that is, from the identification of the purpose the author has set for himself” (1988, 68). Philo appears to have several aims in this treatise. In examining his bios of Moses, Burridge (2004, 128) observes that Philo “has a clear intention in most of his work: to (re-) interpret Jewish beliefs via Greek, especially Platonic, philosophy, often using allegorical methods.” Another way to express this intention, perhaps, is to say that Philo wished to demonstrate that Mosaic teachings were highly relevant to his (Philo’s) readers and that these teachings embodied the best—and sometimes even better—of what Greek philosophy had to offer. This broad purpose, true of practically all of Philo’s exegetical works, certainly applies to Abr. as well. In addition, Philo has aims specific to Abr. and to different kinds of readers. Thus, as we saw in the section on the place of Abr. in Philo’s works, one of his aims in this treatise is to explain why Moses’s legislation includes seemingly irrelevant narratives about early biblical figures. Philo addresses this issue early on, when he declares his intention to study the laws that are “more allembracing and, so to speak, archetypes” of the particular laws (§ 3). Concerning these archetypes, he remarks, These are those among men who have lived irreproachable and noble lives, whose virtues happen to have been recorded in the most holy writings, not only with a view to celebrating them, but also with the aim of edifying those who come upon this account and inducing them to emu-

35

also Reed 2009; Petitfils 2016. Both purposes are apparent in Philo’s account of Abraham’s life; see esp. Abr. 4, quoted below. See, e.g., § 276 and the full Greek title of the treatise; also Sterling 2008a, 130; Niehoff 2012a and 2018, 109–130.

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lation (οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἐκείνων ἔπαινον αὐτὸ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας προτρέψασθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ζῆλον ἀγαγεῖν). Abr. 4

Further, according to Philo, Moses wished to show that his laws “are not at variance with nature” and that anyone might easily observe them, since the earliest generations managed “to follow an unwritten legal system” so that one might assert that Moses’s laws are “nothing other than reminders of the life of the men of old” (Abr. 5). Although Philo ascribes these intentions to Moses, they are clearly his own: to praise, to edify, and to present the early figures as embodiments of the later Mosaic injunctions. b Rhetorical Features in Abr. Explaining the connection between rhetoric and bioi, Burridge observes, While the primary purpose of bioi may not have been rhetorical in the strict sense of persuasion, it is inevitable that there will be rhetorical influence, at least in arrangement and style of most bioi, and in specific rhetorical forms and patterns in those Lives which seek to persuade the reader to take a certain view of the subject. 1997, 374

Burridge suggests that, like speeches, bioi often consisted of the following standard sections according to classical rhetoric: “the introduction, προοίμιον, followed by narration of the factual details, διήγησις, then the proof with the arguments to persuade the audience, πίστις, and finally the conclusion and final appeal, ἐπίλογος” (1997, 379). In the next section we will examine the structure and contents of Abr. in detail, but a look now at the general organization of the treatise will illustrate how Philo shapes his presentation to achieve his goals. Broadly speaking, one can recognize in Abr. all of the sections mentioned above by Burridge. Although the prologue (Abr. 1–6) pertains to the whole book of Genesis and not just Abraham, this section establishes a connection between this treatise and the preceding one (Opif.) and introduces Philo’s encomiastic and protreptic goals in what follows, which presumably includes not only De Abrahamo but also the lost De Isaaco and De Iacobo. After additional introductory material (Abr. 7–59), the narrative section is divided into two main parts: one, devoted to Abraham’s piety, that is his virtue in relation to God (§§ 60–207), and another, to his several virtues in relation to other people (§§ 208–261). These thematically arranged sections are, in turn, composed of different episodes in Abra-

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ham’s life, each of which serves in some way as an illustration or proof of Abraham’s virtues and of other points that Philo wishes to highlight. Finally, after some additional praises of Abraham (§§262–275), the epilogue (§ 276) concludes the bios and states what has been shown, namely, that Abraham was “himself a law and an unwritten ordinance.” The encomiastic nature of Philo’s bios of Abraham is reflected not only in the prologue but also throughout the narration of the patriarch’s life. Besides characterizing his concluding section as additional “praises” (ἔπαινοι, § 275; cf. § 262), Philo speaks earlier of his account as encomiastic (§ 217) and refers to the encomia of Abraham that he has offered previously (§ 255). In addition, to convince his readers of Abraham’s praiseworthiness, Philo displays a range of impressive rhetorical skills. In the section on the place of the treatise in Philo’s life, for example, we saw how he uses elaboration by adducing several contemporary examples such as banishment and travel for business, politics, or tourism to highlight Abraham’s piety in performing the very difficult task of leaving home in response to the divine command (§§ 62–67; cf. §§ 85–87). Similarly, in discussing Abraham’s three visitors (based on Gen 18:1–15) Philo employs the a fortiori argument that Abraham’s household must indeed have been happy and blessed to receive wise men as guests and how much more so must it have been to receive angels as visitors (§§ 115–116). A particularly striking example of Philo’s rhetorical abilities is found in §§178–199, where he vehemently defends the laudability of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac, which Philo call his “greatest deed” (μεγίστη πρᾶξις; §167). In that passage, Philo replies at length to critics “who love to carp and snipe at everything” (§178) and who are thus not impressed by Abraham’s behavior. In his extended refutation, Philo summarizes and analyzes the critics’ arguments, which include several examples of what they think is comparable to Abraham’s action, and shows why this action was both different from the others and admirable to the highest degree. The passage also displays Philo’s adept application of σύγκρισις (“comparison”).36 Philo’s use of the diatribe, found throughout the treatise, illustrates yet another rhetorical device. It is a common feature of his style, at the climax of an argument, or of the exposition of some topic, to launch into something resembling a diatribe in the Cynic-Stoic mode, just to put the icing on the cake, so to speak. These passages, however, do not qualify as diatribes in the style of a

36

For further discussion of this passage and the others mentioned here, see the commentary. Philo also uses σύγκρισις in § 48 to compare the two triads of biblical figures. See too Martin 2003; Priessnig 1929; Runia 2008.

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Bion or a Teles, in that they are not necessarily attacks on the behavior or conventions of society; instead, Philo uses a “diatribe mode” of discourse in order to generalize, or formalize, his position on some issue of a moral nature that arises from the narrative.37 Passages written in this mode contain many stylistic features of the diatribe, such as balanced clausulae—or strings of parallel epithets or phrases—as well as apostrophe, personification, and poetic and other literary references. Examples can be found in such passages as §§ 20– 25, a contrast between “the bad man” (ὁ φαῦλος) and “the good” (ὁ ἀστεῖος); §§42–45, a description of the flood as total and retributive for the wickedness of humankind; §§103–106, an allegorization of Sarah as virtue and the king of Egypt as the “body-loving intellect” (νοῦς φιλοσώματος); §§ 133–141, an extended description of the destruction of the Sodomite cities; §§ 160–165, an elaborate encomium on the sense of sight; and §§262–269, praise of disregarding external goods and bodily excellences in favor of the virtues of the soul. For more detailed comments on these passages, see the commentary. These are but a few illustrations of Philo’s rhetorical artistry. In addition, throughout the treatise, when setting forth accounts of events, points of view, and interpretations, Philo often makes sure to include proofs as an accompaniment, whether these proofs are biblical texts, aspects of the biblical narrative, or even physical evidence. Occasionally too he enlivens his presentation by inserting speeches of his own invention or else by elaborating upon very brief speeches that appear in the biblical narrative.38 c Other Characteristics of the Treatise In the ways discussed above and in the commentary below, Philo tries to convince his readers of his views about Abraham and other matters. Somewhat more subtle, however—at least to his modern readers—is his approach to showing that Abraham was an unwritten law, as he declares at the conclusion of the work. Indeed between the prologue and his conclusion, Philo mentions the phrase “unwritten law” only once, in §16. Nonetheless careful reflection suggests that it is through the very structure of the bios that Philo shows Abraham to have been an unwritten law. That is, by presenting the patriarch’s life according to his virtues, first in relation to God and then in relation to other people,

37

38

On Philo’s use of the diatribe, with references to further scholarly discussion, see Manuel Alexandre Jr. 1999, 115–116. On the diatribe as an “occasion for dwelling on a subject,” see LSJ, s.v. διατριβή, III; and Aristotle, Rhet. 3.17.10. For examples of proofs, see §§ 77, 81, 131, 141, 166, 226, 245, 255. For inserted or expanded speeches, a rhetorical device known as προσωποποιία, see §§71, 128–130, 175, 204, 224, 248– 252; also the Introduction below, § 9.

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Philo implicitly conveys that Abraham’s life followed the structure of the later, written laws. In the Decalogue, Philo discerns this same structure according to which the written laws embody, first, virtues in relation to God and, then, in relation to other people and he emphasizes this structure in his discussion of both the Decalogue and the particular laws classed under each of the ten headings.39 By presenting Abraham’s virtues in a similar framework to his exposition of the later, written laws, Philo establishes the patriarch as an embodiment and archetype of these laws.40 As we have noted, Abr. should essentially be classed as a bios, but it must also be recognized as a blend of genres. Although much of the treatise is clearly about Abraham’s life and character, many parts of the work are not. After the prologue (§§1–6), for example, Philo includes a lengthy introduction about a first triad of biblical figures (§§17–47) and then a second triad that includes Abraham, but also Isaac and Jacob (§§48–59). Indeed Philo turns to Abraham himself only in §60. Thereafter, while almost all of the so-called literal interpretations pertain to Abraham, most of these are interspersed with allegorical interpretations that illustrate the deeper meaning of the narrative and usually reflect upon universal truths about the soul and/or other abstract moral qualities.41 In fact, one section that has both a literal and allegorical interpretation alludes to Abraham only once, indirectly and tangentially (see § 142). This section (§§133–166), concerning the destruction of the Sodomite cities, is based on parts of Gen 18–19, in which Abraham plays a role, but Philo omits this role to focus solely upon other features. By inserting allegorical interpretations into his literal narrative, Philo breaks with the conventions of both Greek and Roman bioi to adapt the genre for his own purposes. One may think that these allegorical insertions could lend a 39 40

41

See, e.g., Decal. 50–52, 106–121; Spec. 2.62–63; 4.133–135, 143–148; cf. Her. 168, 172; Mos. 2.216. See also Termini 2006, 285–286; Sandmel 1979, 59; Wilson 2011, 1–7. For more on Abraham as an unwritten law and on the relationship between unwritten and written laws in Philo’s thought, see our remarks in the commentary on §§1–6 and 262–276. Although we in the 21st century perceive as somewhat indirect Philo’s demonstration that Abraham was an unwritten law, it is possible that his argument may have been more obvious to his contemporary readers. Sandmel, for example, points out that the same dual structure of piety and virtues can be found in 4Maccabees (1979, 59 and 178 n. 49); see also Termini 2006, 286. The allegorical interpretations related to the narrative about Abraham are found in §§68– 84, 99–106, 119–132, 200–207, 217–224, and 236–244; in §§68–84, even though the interpretation provides a spiritual meaning and refers to the soul or mind, this section also uses pronouns to refer to the patriarch and so does not provide a completely abstract meaning that is unrelated to Abraham. Philo applies rhetorical skills and techniques in his allegorical interpretations as well; see, e.g., Manuel Alexandre, Jr. 1998.

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somewhat choppy quality to Philo’s account. His inclusion of them, however, allows him to express what he believes to be the true meaning of the Genesis narrative about the patriarch and to show that this meaning applies far beyond the founder of the Jewish nation. Upon closer inspection, one also discovers that Philo integrates his allegorizations with literal accounts in a variety of ways, some of which are rather subtle. Thus his allegorical interpretation in §§68–84 seems to fluctuate between references to Abraham as a soul and a man (see n. 41). Immediately following, in §§ 85–87, Philo shifts from his allegorical interpretation to what he would term a literal one but without any explicit indication of this shift (see §4 of this Introduction below on “Structure, Content, and Exegetical Approaches”). In another example, in order to understand his allegorization in §§99–106, one would first have to be acquainted with the literal interpretation in §§89–98. (For additional illustrations of how Philo integrates his allegorizations with other parts of his treatise, see § 5f of this Introduction on “Dependencies and Interconnections between Philonic Interpretations.”) Even though several parts of this treatise, then, are not directly about Abraham himself and even though Philo combines different kinds of interpretations, he has nonetheless artfully strung together all the sections to produce a unified, well-wrought, and carefully planned work. In addition, as Runia (2008, 137) points out, the treatise includes a large number of “formal markers” to indicate transitions from one section to the next, e.g., from the introduction to the focus on Abraham (§60), from literal to allegorical interpretations (§§ 68, 99, 119, 147, 200, 217, 236; cf. §52) and from one topic or perspective to another (§§ 7, 17, 27, 48, 89, 107, 133, 142, 156, 167, 208, 225, 255, 262). Such a thoughtfully constructed work is characteristic of a syntaxis, or ordered composition, the term that Philo uses for several treatises in the Exposition.42 Moreover, these various characteristics suggest that Philo intended this as a work to be read. d Philo’s Intended Audience for Abr. Having reviewed the genre, some aims, and several rhetorical and other features, we might now ask for whom the treatise was composed. Since Abr. is an integral part of a larger series, we shall first consider Philo’s intended audience for the Exposition as a whole and then examine possibly relevant indications in the treatise itself. Opinions regarding Philo’s audience for the Exposition have varied, with some believing that Philo wrote only for Jews; some, that he wrote only for Gentiles; some, for Gentiles on their way to becoming Jews; and some,

42

See, e.g., Abr. 2, 13; Decal. 1; Spec. 1.1; 2.1; Virt. 52, 101; Praem. 3; cf. Mos. 2.1.

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for all the above.43 On a basic level it appears that in this series, unlike his other two exegetical series, Philo does not presuppose any familiarity with either Moses or his teachings. As we have seen, at crucial junctures throughout the series—i.e., introductions, conclusions, and transitions—Philo explains what he is doing and often why he is doing so. Assuming no prior knowledge, he introduces biblical figures and their symbolic import, recounts and explicates biblical narratives, and delineates various kinds of laws and their meaning(s). In contrast to the Allegorical Commentary, in which he appears to take for granted his readers’ deep knowledge of Scripture, in the Exposition he quotes biblical verses much less often and rarely cites secondary ones. Moreover, in the Exposition at large he presents fewer allegorical interpretations than either the Allegorical Commentary or QGE and when he does include these interpretations—as often in Abr.—he carefully explains the deeper meanings instead of taking for granted his readers’ acquaintance with them. In addition, as we have observed, of the three exegetical series, the Exposition is the only one to mention Jews or the Jewish nation, a feature that suggests that Philo may—at least in part—be addressing outsiders. Indeed some of his remarks about the Jews and their beliefs and practices are clearly apologetic. He also includes several declarations that proselytes are and should be welcomed and that kinship resides more in shared values than lineage. Occasionally too Philo denounces Jews who have turned away from or rejected their ancestral heritage.44 All the above observations suggest that Philo composed the Exposition as a whole for a broad readership and with multiple aims. Thus, he could have been writing for both Jews and non-Jews who were curious, interested, or hostile. His straightforward presentations of biblical narratives and laws would inform the curious, while his welcoming remarks about proselytes might appeal to the interested. The defensive remarks, meanwhile, might respond to criticisms by the hostile—whether among disaffected Jews or skeptical or antagonistic outsiders. Finally, although Philo appears to be addressing readers who have little acquaintance with Jewish traditions, because he presents these traditions from a very particular perspective the Exposition might also be of interest to Jews well-educated in their heritage who might benefit from a different way of interpreting this heritage. Obviously, however, at the very least, because Philo wrote 43 44

Examples of these various positions can be found in N.G. Cohen 1995; Goodenough 1933; Böhm 2005; and Birnbaum 1996. For apologetic remarks about the Jews, see, e.g., Spec. 2.162–167; Virt. 141. On proselytes and kinship, see, e.g., Spec. 1.51–52, 317–318; 2.73; Virt. 102–104, 108, 187–227; Praem. 152. On Jews who have rejected their heritage, see, e.g., Spec. 4.182; Praem. 152, 171–172; cf. Mos. 1.30–31.

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in Greek, his immediate intended audience—whether Jewish or not—would necessarily have had proficiency in reading and understanding this language. Before we consider Abr. in specific, it is worth noting that even though the treatises on Moses may not have formally belonged to the Exposition, many of the above observations about this series pertain to those treatises as well. In addition, in Mos. 1.1., Philo announces his intention to write the life of Moses, “the greatest and most perfect” man, and to bring knowledge of his story to those “who deserve not to remain in ignorance of it.” He goes on to complain that Moses has been ignored by Greek writers (Mos. 1.2). Although Philo’s explicit and primary aim here, then, is to inform the uninformed, our remarks about his possibly broader audience in the Exposition might apply to these works about Moses as well. Evidence specifically from Abr., the focus of our interest, likewise supports our contention that Philo probably wrote for a wide readership, with multiple aims. Thus, in his introduction to the treatise and throughout, he presupposes no prior knowledge of Genesis but instead summarizes its contents (§§ 1–2) and introduces and explains the importance of Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In setting forth several allegorical interpretations, Philo carefully explains passages’ deeper meanings, which, because these lend universal significance to particular scriptural details, might interest Jews who are open to a different approach as well as non-Jews. Philo also tries to depict Abraham in the best possible light, an effort that occasionally requires him to take great liberty with the text by omitting some features and adding others. This approach, however, is typical of biblical exegetes and need not rule out well-informed Jews as members of his audience.45 A couple of passages are marked by possibly apologetic motives. Explaining, for example, that the Hebrew word for Sabbath means “rest” (§ 28), Philo is careful to note that this name for the seventh day originates “not, as is held by some, because after six days the general mass of people left off from their usual tasks” but instead because the number seven is associated with peace. Here, he may be implicitly responding to non-Jewish critics in antiquity who accused the Jews of laziness because of their day of rest.46 Elsewhere Philo’s apologetic motives are more evident. Responding to malicious critics, he defends the laudability of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac (§§ 167–199). Although these 45

46

Pace Böhm (2005, 171–172), who assumes that he would not be writing for such an audience because they would “know better.” For examples of Philo’s omissions and additions, see § 5d of this Introduction below. On the practices of ancient biblical interpreters, see Kugel 1998, esp. 1–41. See the comment on as is held by some at § 28.

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critics might well be outsiders, it is also possible, as we and others have suggested, that they are skeptics who either are part of the Jewish community or have left it behind. In this passage, Philo may intend to address these critics directly and/or to provide arguments to Jews, who are similarly-minded to himself and who may encounter such critics. Finally, whether Philo’s immediate audience for Abr. was Jewish or not, its members would necessarily have been able to read and understand Greek and were likely familiar to a great degree with Greek culture. Philo sprinkles the treatise with references to or from such Greek writers or historical figures as Homer, the Archon Eponymous, Plato, Menander, and Heraclitus as well as with a few commonplace sayings.47 In sum, then, Philo composed Abr. with a variety of aims. As in the rest of the Exposition, he does not assume familiarity with Jews and their heritage and could be addressing both Jewish and non-Jewish readers—whether friendly or antagonistic. Although some writers have suggested that Philo wrote for either Jews or non-Jews but not both, for reasons explained above we believe that he crafted this treatise for a range of different readers and with multiple purposes.

4

Structure, Content, and Exegetical Approaches

On the most basic level, this carefully and artfully constructed treatise consists of two parts: first, a lengthy introduction (§§ 1–59) and, second, the main topic, namely, the life of Abraham (§§60–276). As we have observed, the introduction—which presents six early biblical figures, divided into two triads, as unwritten laws—was probably intended as a preface not only to the treatise on Abraham but also to works, no longer extant, on Isaac and Jacob. The account of the life of Abraham can be divided into three sections: Abraham’s piety, or his virtue in relation to God (§§60–207); his humanity, or his virtues in relation to other people (§§208–261); and, in conclusion, additional praises of Abraham (§§262–276). The first two of these sections, on Abraham’s virtues in relation to God and then to other people, compose the greater part of the bios. Each of these two sections can be further divided into specific episodes, or illustrations of virtue, from the patriarch’s life, and each episode but one 47

Some of these references are explicit; some, implicit. See, e.g., Abr. 10, 134, 228, 235; see also Lincicum 2013b, 147, 161. On the challenges of approaching and understanding the question of literacy in antiquity, see, e.g., W.V. Harris 1989; Humphrey 1991; Hezser 2001.

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(§§245–261) can be divided into what Philo generally calls the literal interpretation and the allegorical interpretation (see, e.g., §§ 68, 99, 131; cf. 88, 119, 147, 200, 217, 236). Before we present an outline of the treatise, a number of comments are in order regarding Philo’s different exegetical approaches, our own classification of his interpretations, and other features of the treatise and our outline. Although Philo often calls his presentation of the Genesis narrative a “literal” account, his rendition does not convey the plain sense of the narrative but instead may contain omissions and additions—the latter perhaps deriving from tradition or else his own imagination. Thus in his “literal” account of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt (§§89–98), Philo completely omits Abraham’s instruction to Sarah to present herself as his sister (Gen 12:11–13). His portrayal of Pharaoh as wanton and licentious is an embellishment external to the narrative.48 In addition, whereas Philo himself distinguishes between a literal and allegorical meaning, we have also identified a third kind of interpretation, which we have termed the “ethical.” This is generally embedded in or attached to the literal meaning and offers a moral or theological lesson based on this meaning (Dillon 1996a). As we have seen, for example, when Philo describes Abraham’s departure from Chaldea (§§60–67), he also elaborates on the difficulty of leaving home and emphasizes that regardless of the positive reasons why people leave their homes, they are always eager to return (§§ 63b–65). Because ethical and literal interpretations are closely connected and because Philo himself explicitly identifies only two kinds of interpretations, we have generally divided our discussion of the episodes of Abraham’s life according to the literal and allegorical interpretations and, when ethical interpretations are included, we have discussed the ethical in the same section as the literal.49 The one exception falls in §§167–207. Here Philo’s literal account of the sacrifice of Isaac is presented in §§167–177. From § 178 to § 199, however, Philo offers an extended refutation in which he defends Abraham’s action against 48

49

Philo does not explicitly characterize as “literal” every one of his presentations that correspond roughly to the Genesis narrative. Such an explicit characterization is absent, for instance, from the above example of Abr. 89–98. Whether Philo uses the word ῥητός or not, however, in this treatise all presentations of this type are marked by similar features of embellishment and omission. For an overview of Philo’s understanding of the term ῥητός, see the Excursus at the end of this section. Not all literal accounts include an ethical interpretation. We have not identified ethical interpretations, for example, in Philo’s literal accounts of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt (§§ 89–98), the dispute with Lot (§§ 208–216), and Abraham’s victory over the kings (§§ 225–235).

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the charges of critics. Since this section is rather lengthy, we treat it separately. Finally, at the end of §§60–88, following his allegorical interpretation in §§ 68– 84, Philo resumes his literal account but does not indicate that he is doing so. By comparing his language and argumentation in §§ 85–87 with that of §§ 60–67, however, we have determined that §§85–87 does not belong with the allegorization and instead picks up again with the literal. A few other features of our outline below deserve mention. We have observed that the treatise includes several formal markers to indicate transitions from one section or topic to another (see the list of these passages above, under § 3c, “Other Characteristics of the Treatise”). Although some transitional passages might therefore be regarded as standing alone, we have chosen to deal with them as part of the larger unit that they conclude or introduce. Also, Chapter 9, “The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities” (§§ 133–166), alludes to Abraham only in passing and does not illustrate his piety. Instead Philo explains that his intention here is to elaborate upon a point from his earlier allegorical interpretation.50 Nonetheless, since Philo presents literal, ethical, and allegorical exegeses of the narrative, we have treated this passage as a separate unit in the section on Abraham’s piety. Below is an outline of the treatise. Roman numerals I and II indicate the two basic parts, while capital letters designate the major subdivisions. Arabic numbers and small letters correspond exactly to chapters of the commentary in which the treatise passages are discussed. In addition to passage numbers from the treatise, we also include in parentheses general references from LXX Genesis that form the basis of Philo’s interpretations. More specific references are listed below in §5b of this Introduction. For detailed summaries, see the Analysis/General Comments at the beginning of each chapter. Outline of De Abrahamo I.

Introduction, §§1–59 A. Prologue, §§1–6 1. Genesis and the Living Laws, §§ 1–6 B. The First Triad, §§7–47 2. Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16 (Gen 4:26) 3. Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§ 17–26 (Gen 5:21–24)

50

For an explanation, see the commentary on this chapter. In §142, Philo refers to Abraham as “the sage”; see our comment ad loc. on of the three entities …

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II.

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52

Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§ 27–47 (Gen 6–8) C. The Second Triad, §§48–59 5. The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§ 48–59 The Life of Abraham, §§60–276 A. The Piety of Abraham, §§60–207 6. The Migrations of Abraham, §§ 60–88 (Gen 11:31–12:9) a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 60–67 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 68–84 c) Resumption of Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 85– 87 d) Conclusion, §88 7. Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§ 89–106 (Gen 12:10–20) a) Literal Interpretation, §§89–98 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 99–106 8. The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§ 107–132 (Gen 18:1–15) a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 107–118 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 119–132 9. The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§ 133–166 (Gen 19) a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 133–146 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 147–166 10. The Sacrifice of Isaac,51 §§167–207 (Gen 22) a) Literal Interpretation, §§167–177 b) Ethical Interpretation, §§178–199 c) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 200–207 B. The Humanity of Abraham, §§208–261 11. The Dispute with Lot,52 §§208–224 (Gen 13:1–11) a) Literal Interpretation, §§208–216 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 217–224

Since Abraham is stopped by an angel and does not actually sacrifice Isaac, in Jewish tradition this episode is known as the “binding” (in Hebrew, ʿaqedah) of Isaac because in preparing Isaac to be sacrificed, Abraham binds his feet (Gen 22:9). In Christian tradition, however, the episode is viewed typologically as prefiguring the crucifixion and is referred to as the sacrifice of Isaac. Conscious of these different approaches, we have termed the section “The Sacrifice of Isaac” because from Abraham’s perspective, the “sacrifice” is performed inasmuch as he assents to God’s command and is prepared to go through with it. Philo, in fact, speaks of this episode as Abraham’s “greatest deed” (§167) and observes that the act “was complete and perfect, even though not brought to a conclusion …” (§177). In keeping with his practice in this series, Philo does not mention Lot by name but refers to him instead as Abraham’s nephew (see, e.g., §§ 212, 214, 215).

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12. Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§ 225–244 (Gen 14) a) Literal Interpretation, §§225–235 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§ 236–244 13. The Virtues and Death of Sarah, §§ 245–261 a) Sarah’s Virtues, §§245–254 (Gen 16:1–4) b) Sarah’s Death and Abraham’s Moderation, §§ 255–261 (Gen 23:1–6) Conclusion, §§262–276 14. Additional Encomia of Abraham, Epilogue, §§ 262–276 (Gen 15:6; 22:16; 24:1; 26:5)

Excursus 1: Philo’s Use of the Term ῥητός Throughout his works, Philo uses the word ῥητός with a variety of meanings. His use of the term to refer to an embellished account of the plain sense of Scripture is prominent in the Exposition, and particularly in Abr. This usage is also found to a lesser degree in QGE, where Philo embellishes somewhat but not to the same extent as he does in Abr. Below is an overview, organized according to Philo’s different exegetical series and a non-exegetical work, of the range of meanings that he assigns to ῥητός. In the Allegorical Commentary, Philo’s use of ῥητός generally refers to the plain sense (e.g., Agr. 131, 157; Plant. 113), but it can also refer to what is spoken (e.g., Mut. 15). The adverb ῥητῶς is used to mean “expressly” (e.g., Leg. 1.60; 3.103; Det. 139). In the Exposition, ῥητός can denote what is spoken (Opif. 126; Abr. 20; Ios. 60; Spec. 3.178); the plain sense (Abr. 131, 217; Spec. 1.23, 200; 2.257); something fixed (Spec. 1.139; 2.220); or an embellished account of the literal narrative (e.g., Abr. 68, 88, 119, 200, 236; Ios. 28, 125; Spec. 2.29, 147). In QGE, in the very few Greek fragments where ῥητός appears, the word can mean the plain sense (e.g., QG 2.5; QE 2.21, 38), but Philo sometimes conveys an evaluation or lesson in describing biblical figures, for example, as wise, intemperate, or greedy, so his rendition of the literal sense is not strictly according the plain meaning (see, e.g., QG 3.24; 4.168, 172). Because we have so few occurrences of ῥητός in the Greek fragments, one would have to review the Armenian (or a translation of the Armenian) to gain further insight into precisely what Philo may have intended by this term. Finally, in Contempl., Philo uses ῥητός to indicate the literal words of the holy writings (§28) and “the literal ordinances” (§78) and it would seem that by this usage he means the plain sense.

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Use and Interpretation of the Bible

a Descriptions of and Terms for the Bible The very opening passage of Abr. (§§1–2) offers a rare perspective on Philo’s view of the Pentateuch and especially the Book of Genesis. In this passage, he writes, The sacred laws being inscribed, as they are, in five books, the first is called, and has its title recorded as “Genesis,” from the genesis, or creation, of the world, which it covers in its introductory section. It has been granted this title, despite the fact that a multitude of other topics are dealt with in it, peace and war, productivity and barrenness, famine and plenty, the great destruction caused to the things of earth by fire and water, or conversely the generation and nurturing of animals and plants by virtue of the tempering of the air and the seasons of the year, or of the various lives of men, whether virtuous or vicious; but since some of these are parts of the world, while others are events occurring within it, and the world is the perfection and consummation of all these, it is to it that he dedicated the book as a whole. This is the only extant passage from Philo’s exegetical works in which he acknowledges that the laws are contained in five books and explains why the first of them is called “Genesis.” His survey of its contents is also noteworthy, both for what he omits—especially God’s involvement with His creation—and for the very fact that he provides such an overview, something that he does not offer anywhere else for any other biblical book.53 As he does in his other writings, in Abr. Philo uses a variety of terms to refer to Scripture. These include “the holy scriptures [or writings]” (αἱ ἱεραὶ γραφαί; §§61, 121); “the holiest writings” (αἱ ἱερώταται γραφαί; § 4); “the sacred [or holy] books” (αἱ ἱεραὶ βίβλοι; §§156, 177, 258); “the holy word” (ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος; §§ 47, 52, 71, 206); “the literal text” (ἡ ῥητὴ γραφή; §131; cf. § 68); “the literal writings” 53

In the non-exegetical treatise Aet. 19, Philo similarly mentions the five books of the law and names the title of the first. In Opif. 12, he also appears to be referring to the title of this first book; see Runia 2001, 49, and 120, the comment on the appropriate name becoming. N.G. Cohen (2007, 26–29) considers references in Post. 127 and Sobr. 50 and concludes that neither passage mentions Genesis as a title. Niehoff (2011a, 171) sees this opening passage in Abr. as evidence that Philo was addressing non-Jews or at least an audience unfamiliar with Jewish Scripture. Runia, by contrast, might view this introduction as a kind of table of contents (2001, 98). For additional perspectives on this opening passage, see the commentary.

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(αἱ ῥηταὶ γραφαί; §236); “the text” (ἡ λέξις; §217); and “the oracles” (οἱ χρησμοί; §§50, 54, 56, 166, 262, 270; τὰ λόγια; §142).54 In § 11, he speaks of Scripture indirectly as “the immortal record of nature” (ἡ ἐν ἀθανάτῳ τῇ φύσει μνημή) but this is part of an interpretation of a phrase in Gen 5:1, “the book of the genesis of humans” and does not reflect his typical usage (see the commentary ad loc.). In Abr. Philo uses the various terms above to refer primarily to passages in Genesis; in three instances the phrase “the oracles” (οἱ χρησμοί) indicates passages from Exodus (§§50, 54, 56). On two other occasions when Philo cites passages beyond Genesis and Exodus, he attributes the words directly to Moses (§13, regarding Lev 19:24; §181, regarding Deut 12:31). Since Philo’s use of the Bible is closely intertwined with his interpretation of it, it is worth noting that besides acknowledging his biblical source through the terms just discussed, he occasionally distinguishes between this source and his own presentation of it. Thus, for example, Philo uses λόγος (§§256, 276) and “exposition” or “exegesis” (ἀπόδοσις; §§88, 119, 147, 200) to refer to his own account. In § 256, in fact, he speaks of the depiction of Abraham’s wife Sarah in both his own “account” (ὁ λόγος) and in “the oracles” (ὁι χρησμοί). The ways in which he speaks of the biblical source and his own rendering of it make clear that Philo is highly conscious of his role as an interpreter of Scripture and a re-teller of the narrative contained in the holy books.55 b Quotations, Allusions, Paraphrases, and Summaries Every section but one in our earlier outline of the treatise is based on or informed in some way by the Greek Bible, specifically, the Pentateuch.56 Philo’s 54

55 56

While Philo uses the plural λόγια in § 142 to refer to Scripture generally, he also uses the singular λόγιον in this treatise to refer to individual divine messages (§§169, 170, 189). Philo’s use of χρησμοί for the biblical text is very common in his writings, as is λόγια. At Mos. 2.188, the two terms are interestingly combined with “the holy books,” as follows: Now I am fully aware that all things written in the sacred books (ἱεραὶ βίβλοι) are oracles (χρησμοί) delivered through Moses; but I will confine myself to those which are more especially his, with the following preliminary remarks. Of the divine utterances (τὰ λόγια), some are spoken by God in His own Person, with His prophet for interpreter, in some the revelation comes through question and answer, and others are spoken by Moses in his own person, when possessed by God and carried away out of himself. One term that Philo does not use in Abr. to refer to Moses’s teachings as a whole is nomos (νόμος), in the singular, a standard Greek translation for Torah. See §1 of the Introduction, with n. 17. On Philo as an interpreter, see also Anim. 7 and Terian’s comments on that section (1981, 116–117). Only the allegorical interpretation in §§ 99–106 has no biblical quotations, allusions, or

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overview of the contents of Genesis in Abr. 1–2 relies on specific biblical incidents (see the list below and the commentary ad loc.). In the rest of the introduction (through §59) he quotes, alludes to, or paraphrases selected verses from Gen 4:26 through 8:19 and also quotes or alludes to three verses from Exodus and one from Leviticus. When Philo at last turns to the life of Abraham in § 60 he draws upon many sections of Gen 11:27–25:10, which contains most of the biblical narrative about the patriarch. From § 60 until the conclusion of the treatise (§276), all references but two—to Exod 3:14 in § 121 and to Deut 12:31 in § 181—are from Genesis. Much of what Philo terms his “literal” account can be characterized as a narrative retelling, which usually combines paraphrase, embellishments, and omissions. While some passages are clearly informed by his biblical source, others appear to originate from Philo’s own imagination or understanding of the text or perhaps from traditional exegesis. In the commentary we pay careful attention to Philo’s intertwining of paraphrase and interpretation.57 Following the chapters of the commentary as indicated in our earlier outline, in the table below we list passages in which Philo quotes (Q), alludes to (A), paraphrases (P), or summarizes (S) the verses shown to the right of the passage number. The assignment of Philo’s usage to these categories presents some challenges: Philo’s quotations are not always exact (see the discussion below on his biblical text). We have generally classed a reference as an allusion if words or a phrase resemble words or a phrase in a biblical verse but in a somewhat different form. By contrast, paraphrases convey the contents of a verse but, for the most part, in different words from the verse itself. Finally, in two instances in which Philo’s comments are based on several different passages or incidents, we simply list the passages and characterize his use as a summary. Further details, exceptions, and usages difficult to classify are discussed in a brief Excursus at the end of this subsection.

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paraphrases. In fact, part of this interpretation relies on Philo’s own embellished presentation in his “literal” account; see the commentary ad loc. On Philo’s “Bible” as a whole, i.e., beyond the Pentateuch, see Amir 1990 and N.G. Cohen 2007; see also Birnbaum 2014, 213–214, esp. n. 40 regarding controversies about using the term “Bible.” On the role of Genesis and Exodus in Philo’s writings, see Sterling 2012c and 2014c, respectively. Philo’s approach here has also been described as “rewritten Bible,” a term that has generated much discussion. See, e.g., Borgen 1997, 46–79; Kamesar 1999; Alexander 1987; Zsengellér 2014.

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Biblical Quotations, Allusions, Paraphrases, and Summaries in De Abrahamo 1.

2.

3.

4.

Genesis and the Living Laws, §§1–6 §§1–2 Gen 14; 16:1; 25:21; 29:31; 12:10; 26:1; 41:1–42:2; 19:24–25; 6:9–8:22 Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16 §7 Gen 4:26 §8 Gen 4:26 §9 Gen 4:26 Gen 5:1 §11 Gen 5:1 §12 Gen 2:7 Gen 4:26 §13 Lev 19:24 §14 Lev 19:24 Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§ 17–26 §17 Gen 5:24 §18 Gen 5:24 §19 Gen 5:24 §24 Gen 5:24 Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§ 27–47 §27 Gen 5:29 Gen 6:9 §28 Exod 16:23 §31 Gen 12:1 Gen 6:9 §32–36 Gen 6:9 §40 Gen 6:6, 12–13 §41 Gen 6:7–8, 14, 18 §42 Gen 7:11 §43 Gen 7:19, 20 §45 Gen 7:21–23 §46 Gen 6:9 Gen 8:1, 15–16, 18 §47 Gen 6:9 Gen 5:24 Gen 4:26

S

A Q Q Q Q A Q Q Q Q A A, Q A, Q Q, A Q Q, A A Q Q P P P A P A P Q A A

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6.

7.

8.

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The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§48–59 §51 Exod 3:15 §56 Gen 2:7 Exod 19:6 The Migrations of Abraham, §§60–88 a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 60–67 §62 Gen 12:1 Gen 12:4 §63 Gen 12:1 §66 Gen 12:4 §67 Gen 11:31, 12:9 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§68–84 §72 Gen 11:31 §77 Gen 12:7 §80 Gen 12:7 §81 Gen 17:5 §82 Gen 17:5 c) Resumption of Literal and Ethical Interpretations, Summary, §§85–88 §85 Gen 12:9 Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§89–106 a) Literal Interpretation, §§89–98 §§91–92 Gen 12:10 §§93–94 Gen 12:14–15 §§96–97 Gen 12:17 The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§107–132 a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 107–118 §107 Gen 18:1–2 §108 Gen 18:6 §§108–109 Gen 18:7 §110 Gen 18:10 §111 Gen 17:17; 18:11–12 §112 Gen 18:12, 15 Gen 18:14 §118 Gen 18:8 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§119–132 §119 Gen 18:1 §121 Exod 3:14 §131 Gen 18:3 §132 Gen 18:10

Q A Q

A P A P P P Q Q Q Q

A

P P P

P A P P P P Q P A Q Q Q

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9.

The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§ 133–166 a) Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 133–146 §133 Gen 13:13; 18:20, 25 §134 Gen 13:10 §§138–139 Gen 19:24–25 §140 Gen 19:28 §142 Gen 19:1 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§147–166 §156 Gen 1:3 Gen 1:4 §166 Gen 19:20 10. The Sacrifice of Isaac, §§167–207 a) Literal Interpretation, §§167–177 §168 Gen 21:1–2 Gen 22:2 §§169–170 Gen 22:2–3 §171 Gen 22:4–6 §§172–173 Gen 22:6–9 §173 Gen 22:7 §175 Gen 22:8 §176 Gen 22:9–12 b) Ethical Interpretation, §§178–199 §181 Deut 12:31 c) Allegorical Interpretation, §§200–207 §201 Gen 21:6 §206 Gen 18:12 Gen 18:15 11. The Dispute with Lot, §§208–224 a) Literal Interpretation, §§208–216 §209 Gen 13:2 §212 Gen 11:31, 12:5 §213 Gen 13:7 §214 Gen 13:7 §§214–215 Gen 13:8–9 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§217–224 §224 Gen 13:9 12. Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§225–244 a) Literal Interpretation, §§225–235 §§226–227 Gen 14:1–2 §227 Gen 13:10

P P P P P P Q A

P A P P P Q/P Q/P P Q A A A, Q

P P P A P Q

P P

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§228 §229 §230 §232 §§233–234 §234 §235

Gen 14:4 Gen 14:5, 8–12 Gen 14:13 Gen 14:14 Gen 14:15–16 Gen 14:16 Gen 14:18–20 Gen 14:22 b) Allegorical Interpretation, §§236–244 §241 Gen 14:10 §242 Gen 14:9 13. The Virtues and Death of Sarah, §§245–261 a) The Virtues of Sarah, §§245–254 §245 Gen 11:31, 12:5, 10–20 §§247–253 Gen 16:1–4 §254 Gen 16:15, 21:2 b) The Death of Sarah, §§255–261 §258 Gen 23:2–3 §261 Gen 23:6 14. Additional Encomia of Abraham, Epilogue, §§ 262–276 §262 Gen 15:6 §270 Gen 24:1 §271 Gen 24:1 §273 Gen 22:16 §274 Gen 24:1 §275 Gen 26:5

P P P P P A P A P A

S P P P Q Q A Q Q Q P/Q

As shown above, Philo quotes from 26 different biblical passages and alludes to 22; in some cases, he both quotes and alludes to the same verse. Of these 48 references, he quotes and/or alludes to six Pentateuchal passages beyond Genesis; two of these are integral to his presentation of the patriarchs (Exod 3:15 and 19:6 in §§51 and 56, respectively). By contrast, four of the six references from outside Genesis can be considered secondary to Philo’s interpretation: in § 13, he cites Lev 19:24 to illustrate Moses’s high regard for the number four; in § 28, in a digression related to the meaning of Noah’s name as “rest,” Philo quotes and alludes to Exod 16:23 because the Hebrew name sabbata, given to the seventh day, similarly means “rest” and the Exodus verse mentions the two elements of sabbata and rest; in §121, he mentions the divine name (ὁ ὤν) from Exod 3:14 as part of an allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s three visitors; and in § 181, he cites Deut 12:31 to support his view of the practices of foreign nations. As

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David Runia has observed, Philo’s limited use of secondary biblical lemmata in this treatise stands “in marked contrast … with Philo’s method in the Allegorical Commentary.”58 Philo’s use of paraphrase is fairly widespread and can be found in at least 60 sections of the treatise. As one might expect, most of these paraphrases occur in his “literal” interpretations, in which he retells the biblical narrative. When Philo refers to Scripture in his allegorical interpretations— through quotation, allusion, or paraphrase—it is generally, though not always, to support particular points of his exegesis. In keeping with the practice of earlier PACS volumes, we have presented biblical quotations in the translation in bold text and allusions in bold italics. Paraphrases are too pervasive for us to highlight them meaningfully in the translation but we discuss these in the commentary. Excursus 2: Classification of Philo’s Use of the Bible Although we have tried to classify Philo’s use of the Bible according to the guidelines specified above, his usage in some passages does not fall easily into our categories and it is sometimes difficult to be precise. In §§ 1–2, because Philo’s overview is so broad, we have listed verses representative of some of the features that he mentions but not all. Thus, for example, we refer to the verses that report the barrenness of Sarah, Rebecca, and Rachel, but not the verses that report all the births. Generally speaking, we have classified as quotations words that appear in the same form as in a biblical verse, including single words. Occasionally, however, a passage may include a word or words in the same form as in the biblical verse and another word or other words in a different form from what appears in the verse. In these cases, we have classified the passage as both a quotation and an allusion, and readers can discern the specifics from the words that appear in the translation in bold or bold italics (see, e.g., §§ 19, 27). We have not classified as either a quotation or an allusion mention of the name of a person or place unless both Philo and a biblical verse make a point that someone or some place was given that particular name. Thus, for example, we classify mention of “Abram” and “Abraham” in §§81–82 as a quotation of Gen 17:5, in which Abram’s name is changed to “Abraham.” Occasionally, Philo quotes the same words found in a biblical verse but in a different order. We have classified these references as quotations but readers should consult the commentary for more specifics. Sometimes a Philonic passage contains a form of a common word that appears in a biblical verse and it is challenging to decide whether appearance of 58

Runia 2008, 139; see also 2001, 14; 1984; and 1987.

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the word constitutes an allusion or a paraphrase. In his account of the flood, for example, Philo uses a form of the word πηγή, or “spring,” in § 42, but because the word functions somewhat differently in Philo’s description and in Gen 7:11, we have classified his usage as a paraphrase. By contrast, in § 43, Philo uses forms of “water” (ὕδωρ) and the phrase “high mountains” (τὰ ὄρη τὰ ὑψηλά) similarly enough to Gen 7:19–20 so that we have classified his usage as an allusion. In §173, when Philo narrates Isaac’s question in Gen 22:7, he (Philo) uses several of the same words found in Genesis and introduces some of his own, so that the question is partly a quotation and partly a paraphrase. In § 175, Philo’s rendition of Abraham’s answer in Gen 22:8 is a similar blend, as is Philo’s rendition of Gen 26:5 in §275. In §229, we have classified Philo’s report about the war between the kings as a paraphrase of Gen 14:5 and 8–12 because he is referring to only one episode. (Since Philo omits the specifics of Gen 14:6–7, we have not included these verses.) By contrast, in §245, Philo refers to several different incidents in which Sarah accompanied Abraham; in this case we have considered his usage as a summary. For more specific discussion about Philo’s use of the Bible in individual passages, please see the commentary. c The Text of Philo’s Pentateuch It is crucial to recognize that whether or not Philo knew Hebrew—a question that has been hotly debated—the version of Scripture on which he based his life’s work was the Greek translation. Indeed, because of a number of significant differences between the Hebrew and the Greek, some of Philo’s interpretations would be incomprehensible if one were unfamiliar with the Greek.59 As we have just noted, several of Philo’s biblical quotations are inexact. Because he relies so much on paraphrase in this treatise, it seems possible that it was not always crucial to Philo that he offer precise quotations; instead he may have simply wished to supply words close enough to the text to allow him to make his desired points or interpretation. Whatever the case, James R. Royse (2008, 156–165) has carefully examined Philo’s biblical quotations in this treatise and we could hardly do better than to refer the reader to his exemplary analysis. (See also the discussion of this study below in § 8b of this Introduction.)60

59

60

Throughout the commentary we point out such differences between the Hebrew and Philo’s text. For an excellent, still relevant overview of the debate about Philo’s knowledge of Hebrew, see Nikiprowetzky 1977, 50–96. In our opinion, it is unlikely that Philo knew much Hebrew, if any at all. On the larger question of “the aberrant text of Bible quotations in some Philonic writings,” see Katz (1950), the subtitle of whose book we have just quoted in part here.

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d Selection and Arrangement of Passages and Exegetical Implications A review of either our general or detailed listings of Philo’s biblical references in the two outlines above (§§4, 5b) reveals that he has offered a very selective account of Abraham’s life and rearranged the biblical order of certain events. Most significant among the omissions are the divine promises of offspring and land (Gen 12:2–3) and the covenant between God and Abraham (Gen 15 and 17), which includes these promises and the sign of circumcision. If we are correct in assuming that Philo wished to reach a wider audience of Jews and non-Jews, in part by showing that Jewish beliefs and practices hold universal significance, then it is understandable that he might exclude the biblical accounts of the very particular relationship established by God with Abraham and his offspring.61 Yet another noteworthy omission occurs in the midst of Philo’s narration of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt. Here Philo leaves out the significant detail that before the couple enters Egypt, Abraham asks Sarah to say that she is his sister. Recognizing that Sarah is beautiful, Abraham fears for his life should the Egyptians discover that he is her husband (Gen 12:11–13). By excluding this deception, Philo can then portray Pharaoh as lustful and licentious when he brings Sarah into his household (cf. Gen 12:14–15). Philo’s account thus whitewashes what some may have considered Abraham and Sarah’s questionable behavior and enables him (Philo)—in contrast to Genesis—to depict the king of Egypt in a thoroughly negative light.62 Other aspects of the narrative that Philo omits—for reasons that may vary—include the flight and then expulsion of Hagar in Gen 16:5–14 and 21:9–21, respectively; Abraham’s bargaining with the Lord in behalf of Sodom in Gen 18:16–33; the episodes with Abimelech (Gen 20 and 21:22–34); the burial of Sarah (Gen 23:8–20); Abraham’s sending away of his servant to find a wife for Isaac (Gen 24:1–9); and Abraham’s remarriage, death, and burial (Gen 25:1–10). Besides these omissions, the order in which Philo presents Abraham’s life is also significant. Because he organizes his account of the patriarch primarily 61

62

Philo does not mention the covenant in his series the Exposition of the Law, although he does speak about covenants elsewhere; see Birnbaum 1996, 128–159; and Grabbe 2003. See also Jaubert 1963, 375–442, who argues that Philo maintains the concept of the covenant but interiorizes it; Horbury 1986, 42–45, who points out that Philo equates covenant with gifts; Schwemer 1996, 92–101, who suggests that the notion of the covenant is important in Philo despite his infrequent mention of it; and Vogel, 1996, 210–221, who argues that Philo has his own interpretation of covenant. One might argue, perhaps, that the original teller of this tale may well have felt that Abraham’s ruse was necessary, as his casual murder by a lustful Egyptian would have aborted the whole Hebrew nation!

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according to Abraham’s virtues—first, in relation to God, and then, in relation to other people—the dispute with Lot, Abraham’s victory over the kings, and Sarah’s offer of Hagar to Abraham for the purpose of procreation (Gen 13, 14, and 16)—appear later in the treatise than the visit of the three strangers, the destruction of the Sodomite cities, and the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 18:1–15; and chapters 19 and 22). Philo’s omissions and the order of his presentation in themselves constitute a way of interpreting Abraham’s life. We have just observed how Philo’s selection of material allows him to cast Abraham as a universal exemplar rather than as the particular ancestor of a people with a special relationship with God— an ancestor, moreover, whose behavior may sometimes have been less than illustrious. If the omission of questionable actions contributes to a picture of Abraham as a moral exemplar, so too does Philo’s presentation of the patriarch’s life according to his virtues—rather than, say, chronology—further highlight Abraham’s standing as a figure to emulate, because Philo thereby makes explicit and showcases the patriarch’s admirable qualities. Whereas Genesis simply narrates most episodes in Abraham’s life with little or no comment, Philo emphasizes that Abraham exhibits piety in following the commands of the Lord and in meriting a visit from three divine figures. In his dealings with other people, Abraham likewise, according to Philo, exhibits justice, courage, wisdom, and moderation. Indeed, one of Philo’s purposes, which he attributes to Moses himself, is not only to praise Abraham but also to inspire others to follow his example (§4). In the very act of selecting what to relate and organizing the material according to categories of virtue, Philo puts an interpretive “spin” on this material in order to achieve his rhetorical aims. e Original and Traditional Exegesis The difficult question of which interpretations in Abr. are original to Philo and which reflect traditional exegesis requires us, on one hand, to consider the larger matter of Philo’s relationship to other exegetes and, on the other hand, to recognize the remarkable complexity of his interpretations. A towering figure in the realm of ancient biblical exegesis, Philo nonetheless belonged to a community of interpreters, who included predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, in Alexandria and elsewhere. Without his explicit attribution, it is impossible to determine the extent to which Philo was influenced by specific sources.63 Regardless, we have considered as much relevant evidence as possi-

63

Scholars have adopted a variety of approaches to this question; see, e.g., Bousset 1915; Hamerton-Kelly 1972; Mack 1974–1975, 1984; Hay 1979–1980; Tobin 1983; Goulet 1987.

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ble. Even if we cannot draw firm conclusions about the role of this evidence, at the very least it sheds light upon exegetical activity in antiquity, activity in which Philo was a lively participant. Whether the interpretations that he conveys in this treatise are original to him or derive from the ancient exegetical community, many of these interpretations are strikingly inventive and unusual amid all the traditions that have survived. In an Excursus below, we will briefly consider two illustrations. Broadly speaking, sources on which Philo may possibly have drawn include Jewish writings in Greek, unnamed exegetes mentioned by Philo himself, etymological lists, and writings in languages other than Greek, such as Hebrew and Aramaic. Although writings from the Jewish community in Alexandria are regrettably scarce, we do have evidence of Jews who wrote in Greek, most of whom probably came from Alexandria. Their writings encompass a variety of genres, such as questions and answers on Scripture, philosophical and symbolic interpretations, dramatic poetry, narratives, fictional accounts of adventure and romance, oracles, and wisdom literature. Examples include the fragments of the biblical interpreter Demetrius, known as the Chronographer; fragments of the Jewish thinker Aristobulus; the Letter of Aristeas; Ezekiel the Tragedian; Artapanus; Joseph and Aseneth; 3 and 4 Maccabees; the Sibylline Oracles (especially 3 and 5); and the Wisdom of Solomon. Philo’s later contemporary Josephus too may reflect earlier interpretations that either originated with Philo or had an influence upon him.64 In addition to these known sources, Philo himself mentions other exegetes, even if not by name. Indeed in Mos. 1.4, he declares his intention to tell the story of Moses as I have learned it, both from the sacred books, the wonderful monuments of his wisdom which he has left behind him, and from some of the elders of the nation; for I always interwove what I was told with what I read, and thus believed myself to have a closer knowledge than others of his life’s history. Although this remark pertains specifically to his account of the life of Moses, it seems to describe his approach to the life of Abraham as well since this account,

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Many of these sources can be found in English translation in Charlesworth 1983 and 1985; Holladay 1983, 1989, 1995, and 1996; and Feldman, Kugel, and Schiffman 2013. See also Winston 1979; Hadas 1951; Wright 2015; and White and Keddie 2018. For background, see Barclay 1996; Collins 2000. Some of these authors consider possible relationships between Philo and specific sources, e.g., Holladay 1995 (regarding Aristobulus); Winston 1979 (Wisdom of Solomon); see also Sterling 2014a (Ezekiel the Tragedian).

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while based on Scripture, incorporates both more and less than the biblical source. In his oft-cited study of Philo’s references to other allegorists, David M. Hay (1979–1980, 43) cites five such references from Abr.: §§ 99–106, 147– 166, 200–207, 217–224, and 236–244. As Hay himself points out about these references in general, though, it is not always clear whether these are real or imaginary exegetes and, if real, whether “they hold a specific interpretation or only might be inclined to do so” (1979–1980, 44). Of the five references listed above from Abr., in only one passage does Philo explicitly report that he has “heard” a specific interpretation from these exegetes (§ 99). To quote Hay again, however, “one is often hard put to decide exactly where their interpretation ends and his own begins” (ibid.). In the case of Abr. 99, we have judged the interpretation of these exegetes to be rather limited in the context of the rest of the allegorization (see below and the commentary ad loc.). Besides allegorical interpreters who may have influenced him, Philo also responds or refers to other kinds of interpreters. One set of these interpreters are critics who belittle as insignificant Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac (§§178–199). Also, at the very end of the treatise, he writes that “some” would claim that Abraham was law-abiding but Philo’s own view is that the patriarch was himself a law (§276). As we remark in the commentary ad loc., the Book of Jubilees and some rabbinic exegetes can be construed to hold a position similar to the one maintained by these “some” and Philo may well have particular interpreters in mind here.65 Throughout his exegetical writings, Philo mentions numerous etymologies, which often serve as a basis upon which he constructs more elaborate interpretations. In Abr. alone, he cites nine etymologies explicitly and may implicitly base one of his interpretations on another, unmentioned etymology.66 Scholars have investigated Philo’s use of etymologies and many share the opinion that he may have derived these from a traditional list.67 When Philo refers in § 99 to other exegetes, he mentions that the interpretation he has heard from them is based on etymologies of Abraham and Sarah’s names. Since he does not claim that these other exegetes themselves are the source of the etymologies, it is possible that they too made use of such a list.

65 66

67

For more discussion of the various interpreters implied in these two passages, see the commentary. See also Niehoff 2011a and Termini 2006, 281–282. The explicit etymologies are in § 7, for Enos; § 17, Enoch; §27, Noah; §28, Sabbath; § 57, Israel; § 82, Abram and Abraham (cf. § 99); § 99, Sarah; and §201, Isaac. The implicit reference is in § 212 regarding Lot, as explained in the commentary. See, e.g., Grabbe 1988, 3–17; Runia 2004b, esp. 113–116.

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An area of contention regarding possible influences on Philo pertains to the role of non-Greek—especially, Hebrew and Aramaic—sources, including evidence from later rabbinic literature. Although we agree with those scholars who argue that Philo likely did not know Hebrew (or Aramaic), our position is that, used wisely, these sources can shed light on Philo’s interpretations. Therefore, without claiming influence one way or the other, we cite as many relevant non-Greek sources as possible.68 If, up to this point, we have emphasized possible influences on Philo, this is in no way to imply that all of his exegesis in Abr. derives from tradition. Indeed such a conclusion is hardly warranted. Many of the interpretations in this treatise have no known parallels in non-Philonic sources. When Philo twice contrasts the views of other exegetes with his own in this treatise (§§ 178–199, 276; mentioned above), his explicit use of the first person suggests that he is expressing his own positions. This characteristic is particularly striking in § 184, which begins, “But I (ἐγὼ δέ) …” and at the end of that passage, in § 199, in which Philo refers to the many arguments that he has just offered. Similarly in § 276, he contrasts the opinion that “some” would hold with what “my account has made clear.” Philo may likewise signal that he is offering original interpretations when he inserts such phrases as “it seems to me” (μοῖ δοκεῖ) and other first-person expressions; see, e.g., §§98, 113, 126, 142–144, 206. Autobiographical references in his other writings further point to Philo’s great resourcefulness in producing fresh insights of his own (e.g., Spec. 3.6; Migr. 34–35). It is worth noting that Philo’s original contributions may well be found not only in his allegorical interpretations but also in his literal and ethical ones. See our discussion in §9 of this Introduction below on “Shared and Distinctive Features and Their Implications.” Since we lack conclusive evidence one way or the other, it is impossible to know whether or not some interpretations originated with Philo himself. At the same time, however, it is useful to keep in mind that because much of the exegesis in this work is highly complex, at least some of Philo’s originality may consist in his arrangement of and expansion upon what one of us has elsewhere termed “exegetical building blocks” (Birnbaum 2010). Whether Philo himself was responsible for these constructions or whether he borrowed them from others is again impossible to say. Either way, however, his intricate exegeses point to a sophisticated and perhaps unique way of reading Scripture by

68

On using the sources “wisely” see Birnbaum 2014, 201–204. For an overview of and references to the debate about comparing Philo with Hebrew and Aramaic sources, see Birnbaum 2006, 252–253.

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or within the Alexandrian Jewish community. In the Excursus below, we illustrate these observations by showcasing, in the first example, the complexity of Philo’s exegeses and, in the second, a very unconventional understanding of Abram’s change of name to “Abraham.” Excursus 3: Two Philonic Interpretations As we have noted, before focusing on the life of Abraham per se, Philo introduces two triads (§§3–59). The first consists of Enos, who represents hope; Enoch, repentance and improvement; and Noah, perfection among his contemporaries. While worthy in itself, this triad is overshadowed by the superior one of patriarchs, who symbolize three different ways of acquiring virtue— through teaching or learning (Abraham), nature (Isaac), and practice (Jacob). Many aspects of this interpretation have—to our knowledge—no parallel in any prior or contemporary source. It is therefore possible that this overall understanding of the early biblical figures is original to Philo. Some aspects of the interpretation, however, do indeed have parallels and may therefore be drawn from or influenced by earlier sources. As we show in the commentary, an association between Enos and hope is found in Philo’s Greek Bible (Gen 4:26). Regarding the link between Enoch and repentance, Ben Sira (44:16) writes that Enoch “was an example of repentance to all generations.” Like Philo, a rabbinic source too (Gen. Rab. 30:9) comments on Noah as being righteous but only in his generation. Although Philo does not directly explain how he comes to associate Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with each of the three qualities that he mentions, it appears that he links Abraham with teaching or learning in part because he understands the patriarch’s departure from Chaldea to signify his discovery of the one, true God. A similar understanding of this departure can be found in the Book of Jubilees, Josephus, and some rabbinic sources.69 None of these other interpreters, however, take the further step of linking Abraham with teaching or learning as part of a triple approach to acquiring virtue. Philo’s association of Isaac with nature and Jacob with practice can likewise be traced to ways of understanding particular biblical verses or episodes, but these associations have no known parallels before or contemporary to Philo. Some elements of Philo’s complex presentation of the two triads, then, may derive from or be influenced by earlier Jewish exegesis and others may not. Part of Philo’s originality, moreover, may consist in the very grouping of Enos,

69

Sandmel (1971, 60–61 n. 228) succinctly and adroitly summarizes resemblances and differences between Philo, Jubilees, Josephus, and the rabbis. See also Kugel 1998, 244–247.

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Enoch, and Noah together, along with their symbolic meanings, into one triad and his contrast of them with the higher triad of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and their symbolic meanings.70 In our second example, Abr. 81–84, Philo takes the extraordinary step of using a later episode in Abraham’s life as proof of his (Philo’s) interpretation of an earlier episode. In Gen 17:5, God changes Abram’s name to “Abraham” as part of His covenant with the patriarch, a covenant whose sign is circumcision. Instead of understanding the new name as part of a covenant, however, Philo reads this change of name as proof of Abram’s discovery of God, as expressed in Gen 12:7 (“God was seen by Abram”; see §§77–80).71 This way of reading Gen 12:7 goes beyond the plain sense of the narrative and although other sources understand Abraham’s departure from Chaldea and Harran to signify his discovery of God, no other known sources use Gen 12:7 as a proof-text in this way. Genesis 11:31–12:7 records various migrations of Abram and his family. First, they are led out of the land of the Chaldeans by his father and later Abram is commanded to leave by the Lord, who declares His intentions to make Abram a great nation and to bless him. In Gen 12:7, the Lord appears to Abram and promises to give the land of Canaan to his offspring. God’s apparently arbitrary selection of Abram as the recipient of His blessings is but the beginning of a particular and special relationship between Him and a line of Abraham’s descendants, namely, Israel and the Jews. Philo, however, declares that Abram’s migration from Chaldea and then Harran signifies his discovery of God (Abr. 68–80), a discovery potentially attainable by any soul that loves virtue (§68, cf. §61). According to Philo, “Abram” means “exalted father” (πατὴρ μετέωρος), while “Abraham” means “chosen father of sound” (πατὴρ ἐκλεκτὸς ἠχοῦς; §82). Philo further explains that the former name refers to Abram’s involvement with the astrological and meteorological beliefs of Chaldea, while the latter refers to the mind of the sage with his new understanding of God. As we explain in the commentary (see the Analysis/General Comments on §§68–84 and Detailed Comments on §§80–84), both etymologies can be roughly derived from the Hebrew. Since it is unlikely that Philo knew Hebrew, though, it would seem more probable that he adopted these meanings from a traditional list. If so, however, the application of these traditional etymologies to the context of Abraham’s migrations may be a separate matter. While this application may have arisen in exegetical circles prior or contemporary to Philo, it 70 71

For further details on these two triads, see Chapters 2–5 of the commentary; on Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, see also Birnbaum 2010, 2016. On Philo’s text of this verse, see the discussion by Royse (2008, 158–160).

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may also have been introduced by Philo himself. Regardless of its ultimate origin, the interpretation itself is remarkable. Philo gives new meaning to both episodes—the migrations and the change of name; uses the interpretation of the later episode to confirm his interpretation of the earlier one (see § 5f below); and shears both episodes of any particularistic significance. In these examples and many others discussed in the commentary, it is impossible to determine the line between Philo’s originality and his dependence upon tradition. Whatever the case, Abr. offers a precious treasury filled with highly creative, unusual, and richly complex interpretations.72 f

Dependencies and Interconnections between Philonic Interpretations A particularly noteworthy feature of Philo’s exegesis in this treatise is that he occasionally bases interpretations not on Scripture directly but rather on other interpretations that he himself presents elsewhere in this treatise. To fully understand certain exegeses, then, requires that the reader recognize their dependency on or interconnectedness with yet other interpretations. We have encountered this characteristic in the Excursus just above, in the case of Philo’s understanding of the patriarch’s change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham” (see §§80–84 and “Two Philonic Interpretations” above, under § 5e). Here, Philo views the name change as proof of his prior understanding of Abraham’s migration from Chaldea to Harran, which, according to Philo, culminates in God’s being seen by Abraham. In this instance, Philo presents a symbolic interpretation of the patriarch’s name change (Gen 17:5) as integrally connected to a symbolic interpretation of the patriarch’s migration (Gen 11:31–12:7). Because the exegetical dependencies and interconnections require fairly detailed explanations, in this section we simply call attention to this feature and refer the reader to our fuller discussions in the commentary. Thus, for instance, in §§89–106, Philo builds an allegorical interpretation upon his “literal” retelling of the biblical narrative about Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt (Gen 12:10–20; see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 7, part b). In another, rather intricate, example, within his “literal” retelling of Gen 18:1–15 72

Other examples of interpretations marked by their ingenuity include Philo’s understanding of the five Sodomite cities as symbolic of the five senses (§§147–166); the war between the kings as a battle between the four passions and the five senses (§§236–244); the alternating single and triple appearance of Abraham’s visitors as representative of different ways of perceiving or approaching God and His Powers (§§119–132); and Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac as the sage’s recognition that true joy belongs to God alone (§§200–207). See also Azariah de’ Rossi, The Light of the Eyes 3.1.4 (Weinberg 2001, 119) and §9 of this Introduction below on “Shared and Distinctive Features and Their Implications.”

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about Abraham’s three visitors, Philo inserts an elusive reference to two subsequent interpretations, his allegorical understanding of the same biblical passage in Abr. 119–123 and a later ethical interpretation of Gen 19 in Abr. 142–146. Indeed, to be more precise, the ethical interpretation in §§ 142–146 is dependent upon the allegorical understanding in §§ 119–123, and Philo’s comment in §110, part of a literal interpretation, alludes to both of these other interpretations (see our Detailed Comments at §110, Philo’s allegorical interpretation in §§119–123, and our comments at §142 on not for the sake … and § 143 on fitting to bestow …). Finally, in Abr. 236–244, regarding the war between the kings in Gen 14, Philo builds an allegorical interpretation upon one given in §§ 147–166 of the five Sodomite cities as the five senses. Although the second allegorical interpretation (i.e., in §§236–244) can stand alone and is not necessarily dependent upon the first (in §§147–166), the second can be seen as an extension of the first. Once again, the question can be raised whether the Philonic exegeses mentioned here are original to him or traditional. Believing that each interpretation must be considered on its own, we refer the reader to § 5e above, including the Excursus, and to our discussions in the relevant chapters. While we do not always address this question explicitly, we hope that the discussions provide enough information for curious readers to pursue the matter further.73

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Major Themes

Taking note of concepts, images, and motifs that Philo mentions more than once and that he develops to some extent, we have identified nine major themes in Abr. These are listed below and the references in our brief discussions reflect Philo’s frequency and length of treatment of them. A certain degree of subjectivity is involved in this selection. Different readers may find other themes or characterize those listed below in somewhat different terms (see, e.g., Runia 2008; Termini 2006). An example of a borderline case is the notion that the good man and the mind prefer solitude (§§ 22, 30, 87); in our opinion, Philo does not expand upon this notion sufficiently for it to be considered a major theme. An overriding concept, which securely fits this treatise into place with the other works of the Exposition, is the interconnectedness of law, nature, and

73

For an interesting study of another case, in Mos. 2, in which Philo presents an exegesis that builds not on Scripture but rather on Philo’s own interpretation, see Fraade 2014.

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virtue. This and the theme of reward and punishment are integral to Philo’s purpose in the Exposition. Abraham as a sage, the situation of the emigrant/immigrant (we use these words interchangeably), and contrasts between Abraham and others pertain to Abraham, as Philo presents him here. In other works as well, Philo calls Abraham a sage and occasionally contrasts him with others, including the other patriarchs Isaac and Jacob.74 In Abr., however, these contrasts are not merely occasional but instead contribute specifically to the image of the patriarch that Philo wishes to convey. The remaining themes—ideas about the Divine, the nature of the soul, high estimation of sight and the hierarchy of the senses, and different kinds of goods—appear in many of Philo’s other works too. In this section, we simply call attention to all these various themes and mention where in the treatise Philo alludes to them. In the next section, we consider possible influences underlying some of these themes. For detailed analyses of the passages in which these themes are found and for more on their background, please consult the commentary. a Law, Nature, and Virtue A theme that underlies the entire work—and, we might say, the entire series of the Exposition—is the interconnectedness of law, nature, and virtue. In Abr., Philo conveys this interconnectedness in various ways. In the prologue (§§ 3– 6), for example, he first reviews the different kinds of laws—archetypes and copies, general and particular, unwritten laws and established laws that came to be written. He asserts, moreover, that the exemplary figures mentioned in the holy books are themselves “living and rational laws.” These figures, who preceded the written laws but were naturally able to follow them, demonstrate through their virtuous lives that the established laws “are not at variance with nature.” Having set this foundation, Philo then builds upon it by presenting two triads of exemplary figures, each of whom represents a different virtue, as we have explained earlier. When he turns to the life of Abraham, Philo structures his presentation according to Abraham’s virtue in relation to God and then in relation to other people. As we have seen, this is the same structure that, according to Philo, underlies the later, written laws. In this way, the life of Abraham, an unwritten law, serves as an archetype of the later, written laws. Only at the end of the treatise, after he has set forth in detail the virtues of the patriarch, does

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See, e.g., Somn. 1.47–60, in which Abraham is compared with Terah and Socrates; see also Earp, PLCL 10:271–280; Birnbaum 2010.

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Philo again explicitly state that Abraham naturally followed the law and was himself a law (§§275–276). Philo declares, moreover, that his account has in fact demonstrated that Abraham was an unwritten law. Through his explicit statements and the very organization of his presentation, then, Philo expresses that the law of Moses, nature, and virtues are inseparably intertwined. b Ideas about the Divine A turning point in Abraham’s life is his discovery of the true God (§§ 68–88) and another theme in this treatise pertains, on one hand, to right beliefs about the Divine and, on the other, to God’s interaction with those who turn to Him and, conversely, those who turn away.75 When Abraham discovers God, he learns that, in contrast to Chaldean beliefs, the Deity is not equal to creation but instead is its Creator (§§75, 88). Moreover, as “a kind of charioteer and helmsman” (§70), He presides over and directs His creation “in accordance with justice” (§74). The lesson that God is in charge of and responds to His creation is repeated throughout the treatise in many ways. For one thing, God rewards the good and punishes evil, a notion that we will treat as a separate theme. In Egypt, Sarah is able to call upon God and, along with Abraham, to benefit from God’s kindness, mercy, and compassion (§§95–96). Following the destruction of Sodom, God, savior and lover of humanity, promotes unions as far as possible for the begetting of children (§137). When Abraham enters into battle against the kings who capture Lot, he (Abraham) trusts in God, “the defender and champion of the right” (§232), and through divine oversight emerges victorious (§ 235; cf. § 244). Earlier in the treatise we are told that God provides humanity with a name of Himself to enable people to call upon and supplicate Him (§ 51). Those who turn to God and associate themselves with Him are greatly blessed with “happiness” and “well-being” (eudaimonia, §§35, 87, 268), even as those who turn away experience the opposite (§35). Likewise, one who attains a vision of the Divine—an attainment secured with God’s help—has reached the highest

75

Our use of the masculine pronoun to refer to God reflects Philo’s own usage (see, e.g., his reference to God as “Father of all” in §§ 75 and 121) and that of the biblical verses that he interprets. For Philo’s use of neuter terminology to refer to the Divine, see our comments at § 76 on the beams pouring out from the Existent; §121 on the Father of all; and §270 on faith in true Being. In referring to God, we have also capitalized the masculine pronoun. In some passages, especially where Philo uses pronouns instead of proper names for biblical characters, this capitalization helps to clarify which pronouns refer to the Deity and which, to humans.

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point of eudaimonia (§58–59). That angels, divine messengers, visited Abraham’s household only shows how greatly blessed and happy his household was (§115). Perfect happiness and blessedness, however, belong to God alone. Nonetheless, to those who recognize this profound truth, God gives a share of this joy and blessedness to the extent that the recipient can partake of it (§§200–204).76 As for other beliefs about God, Philo asserts that whatever is done with God’s assistance is good (§§18, 39), even while what is done without divine oversight is without merit (§18). A related notion is that God bestows good things directly but assigns the opposite of good actions to His Powers (§ 143). All things, however, are possible with God (§§112, 175). Through His assistance, humans are able to perceive God, not with the eyes of the body but rather with those of the intellect (§57). In a lengthy allegorical interpretation (§§ 119–132), Philo further explains that under certain circumstances the mind can perceive God as the One who is but under other circumstances perceives Him together with His two Powers or else through one or the other of His Powers. c Reward and Punishment According to Philo, an integral feature of the historical or genealogical part of Scripture is reward of the good and punishment of the bad (see Mos. 2.47; Praem. 2; and our discussion above in §1). Although he reserves full treatment of this theme for his treatise Praem., Philo does incorporate it into Abr., though less centrally. Thus Noah—a member of the first triad and representative of one who achieves perfection but only in his generation—is rewarded by the second prize (§§38–39), which is nonetheless great: after the flood, he receives the dual gift of being both a survivor and founder of a new race (§ 46). The life of Abraham, according to Philo, similarly illustrates the theme of reward to the pious. In recognition of Abraham’s piety, God protects his marriage to Sarah during their sojourn in Egypt (§§ 90, 98). Also, as a reward for Abraham’s hospitality to the three mysterious visitors (§ 110) and for the moral excellence exhibited by both Abraham and Sarah (§ 254), the couple is blessed by the birth of a legitimate son. On account of his willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac, Abraham receives the gift of this son back in return (§ 177; cf. § 203). Finally, as a reward to Abraham for his faith, God confirms through an oath the gifts that He had promised him and in so doing speaks to Abraham as a friend (§273).

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For more on eudaimonia as a theme in Abr. and in Philo’s work in general, see Runia 2008, 146 and 149; and 2002.

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By contrast, punishment of evil is demonstrated though the great flood of Noah’s time (§§40–46), the affliction of the king of Egypt and his household with plagues (§§96–97), and the destruction of the land of the Sodomites (§§133–141).77 d Abraham as a Sage Throughout the treatise Philo portrays Abraham as a “sage” (σόφος) and a “good, or worthy, man” (ἀστεῖος). At the most basic level, he does this simply by using these words to describe the patriarch and indeed to substitute for his proper name.78 Philo sometimes makes explicit the virtues of the patriarch specifically as a sage or good man (§225; cf. §255). Occasionally too, he draws certain lessons from Abraham’s life. Thus Philo explains that the very name “Abraham” betokens his spiritual understanding as a sage (§§ 82–84; for details, see the passage and commentary ad loc.) When the patriarch hastens to prepare a meal for his guests, Philo observes that in the household of a sage “no one is slow in showing kindness” (§109). The purpose of the miracle that Abraham’s divine guests appeared, in human form, to eat and drink even though they did not do so in reality was to show favor to the good man and to demonstrate that God had indeed not overlooked the sage (§118). To be sure, this was not the first time that God rewarded his goodness (see, e.g., §90). Defending the greatness of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, Philo observes that “no deed of the sage is trifling” (§199). With regard to the symbolic meaning of this act, he explains that the sage sacrifices his own joy to God in recognition that “to rejoice is most proper to God alone” (§ 202). God, however, allots the sage a share of happiness in His wish that the soul of the sage “might rejoice and take pleasure in the spectacles provided by the universe” (§ 207). When Abraham’s neighbors declare him to be “a king from God amongst us” (Gen 23:6), Philo observes that the kingship of the sage is conferred by God (§261). Finally, in his concluding encomium (§§ 262–276), Philo declares the sage and the worthy man to be both “elder” and “primary” (§§ 272, 274). When considered all together, Philo’s references to the patriarch as a sage or worthy man, emphasis on his virtues, and observations about the ways of a sage promote the image of this ancestor as an ideal model for all to emulate.

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On the theme of reward and punishment, see also Termini 2006, 271; and Runia 2008, 149– 150. See, e.g., §§ 68, 77, 80, 118, 132, 142, 168, 213, 229, 255, 275 (σόφος); §§85, 90, 118, 214, 225, 242 (ἀστεῖος). Philo also uses these words in relation to Enoch (§22, ἀστεῖος), Noah (§§27, 31; σόφος); and the patriarchs generally (§ 37, σόφοι).

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e The Situation of the Emigrant/Immigrant As Philo emphasizes, Abraham’s first act of piety was to leave his home in obedience to a divine command (Abr. 60–67). In this section, Philo elaborates upon the challenges faced by the emigrant. Interpreting Gen 12:9 as the patriarch’s second migration in response to a divine oracle (§§ 85–87), Philo returns to this theme of the difficulties with which the emigrant must contend. While these discussions focus on the angst of leaving the familiar, in other passages Philo highlights the situation of the immigrant (or sojourner) in circumstances that are unfamiliar. Thus when Abraham and Sarah journey to Egypt to avoid a famine, Philo underscores their helplessness in a foreign land (§ 95). Later, however, he highlights Abraham’s success back in Canaan. Introducing the episode of the quarrel with Lot, for example, Philo comments on Abraham’s wealth and the high regard he enjoys from his neighbors, despite his immigrant status (§209). When Abraham prepares to go to war against the Sodomite kings who had captured Lot, he has few allies because he is “a foreigner and a sojourner” (§231). Nonetheless he manages to draw up three battalions and, trusting in God, prevails against the captors. Finally, when Sarah proposes that Abraham mate with her handmaid in order to produce offspring, she remarks on the couple’s prosperity, which, she claims, is unusual for immigrants (§ 252). In each of these cases, emphasis on and sometimes even mention of the patriarch’s status as an immigrant originates with Philo, not Genesis. All told, his treatment of this theme suggests that the emigrant must overcome many obstacles in leaving home and facing a new and sometimes hostile environment, but such settlers can indeed thrive and enjoy great success.79 f Contrasts between Abraham and Others To highlight Abraham’s excellence, Philo frequently presents him in relation to other groups or figures. In these juxtapositions, the patriarch is generally portrayed as superior. Thus even in the introduction, before Abraham becomes the focus of attention, Philo places him, along with Isaac and Jacob, in a higher 79

See our earlier remarks in § 2b of this Introduction regarding Philo’s possible association of Jews with immigrant status and his own identification with this status. Philo’s characterization of Abraham as “a foreigner and a sojourner” in §231 appears to have a scriptural basis in Gen 14:13; see our remarks on this phrase in the commentary. Another dimension to this theme, which Philo does not make explicit, is that he elsewhere describes Abraham as “the standard of nobility for all proselytes” (Virt. 219). Philo may be directing his message about Abraham’s hardships and success to potential proselytes, who, like the emigrant/immigrant, must leave behind an old home and settle in a new one (see Birnbaum 1996, 195–202).

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triad, by comparison with the threesome of Enos, Enoch, and Noah (§§ 48–55). In a second comparison, the three patriarchs likewise outshine their predecessors Adam and Noah (§§56–59). In allegorizing the migrations of Abraham as a wise man or soul that discovers God, Philo sets the patriarch against the background of the Chaldeans and their false beliefs about divinity (§§68–84). With its omissions and embellishments, Philo’s retelling of the sojourn of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt places the virtuous couple in stark contrast to their licentious host, the Egyptian king and, by association, his household (§§89–98); Philo’s allegorization of the episode further accentuates this contrast (§§99–106). The differences are underscored even more prominently when Philo then follows his account of the Egyptian king’s gross inhospitality with Abraham’s gracious reception of his three visitors (§§107–118). In this episode, we encounter a somewhat different contrast, namely, that between Abraham and his angelic visitors, who perceive the patriarch “as a kinsman and fellow-servant” (§116). When he narrates the destruction of the Sodomite cities (§§ 133–146), Philo mentions Abraham only once and in passing as “the sage” (§ 142). Focusing on the Sodomites instead, Philo defines their great sin as homosexual behavior, which leads to their inability to reproduce and—ultimately, as a consequence—to God’s destruction of their lush land so that it would never again be fertile. This narrative is sandwiched between two accounts about Abraham in which, first, he is promised a son (§110) and, then, having been blessed with this offspring, he follows God’s command to prepare this son for sacrifice (§§167–177). Although the comparison is subtle, the juxtaposition of these three episodes suggestively contrasts the Sodomites’ disdain for reproduction in accordance with the law of nature with the extraordinary circumstances under which Abraham’s progeny was born and preserved through divine intervention. In more explicit contrasts, Philo compares Abraham with examples from the Greeks and barbarians in order to defend the greatness of the patriarch’s deed in obeying the divine command to sacrifice his son (§§ 178–199). Introducing the quarrel with Lot, Philo first emphasizes that Abraham, the prosperous immigrant, was highly regarded among his neighbors. In what follows, Philo draws a sharp distinction between the peace-loving Abraham and his flighty, inconsistent nephew (§§208–216). When Abraham returns triumphantly after battling and overcoming the Sodomite captors of this nephew, he receives lavish praise from the high priest of the greatest God (§§ 225–235). Besides the angelic visitors and the virtuous Sarah (see, e.g., § 255), this is one other figure who comes across favorably when compared with Abraham; the two are described as friends and representatives of the good (§ 235).

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Following the death of Sarah, Philo introduces yet another contrast, this time between Abraham and his neighbors, whose leaders are impressed by the patriarch’s moderate expression of mourning in comparison with their own elaborate displays (§§260–261). Finally, in the concluding encomium of the patriarch, Philo contrasts Abraham’s faith in God with the value placed by Greeks and barbarians on artistic production (§ 267). Abraham’s merit of the title of “elder” also signifies a praiseworthy and perfect life in comparison with the outlandish and disrespectful ways of the fool (§§ 270–274). g The Nature of the Soul According to Philo the soul is often a site of great conflict, whether this is caused by its different components (§§29–30, 72, 74, 236–244), different forces (§§103–106), or different opinions (§§217–224). In a digression related to the number seven, Philo identifies the soul as composed of the restless five senses and speech, over all of which the ruling intellect dominates (§§ 29–30). Similarly, when Philo explains Abraham’s migration to Harran (§§ 72–74), on the basis of an etymology of “Harran” as signifying “holes,” he understands this point in Abraham’s journey to represent his introspection and reflection upon the five senses. Such contemplation will naturally lead to recognition of the “invisible mind,” which, like a puppeteer, restrains these senses and gives them slack to keep them in control. (This realization, of course, is analogous to and reinforces Abraham’s earlier recognition of God as Creator and Director of the universe.) Later in an allegorization of the war between the kings, Philo understands the four kings to represent the four passions and the five to represent the five senses. In this battle, only reason, with the help of God, can prevail over the nine elements (§§236–244). Although some specifics in these depictions vary in accordance with exegetical requirements, one nonetheless recognizes Philo’s consistency in mentioning the five senses controlled by reason. In two other accounts, he speaks of the soul as unable to accommodate the opposing forces of vice and virtue (§§ 103– 106) and the opposing doctrines of the love of virtues, the goods of the soul, on one hand, and the love of such external goods as wealth, glory, power, and noble birth on the other (§§217–224; see also the theme of different kinds of goods, discussed below). h High Estimation of Sight and Hierarchy of the Senses As the sense that perceives “the most beautiful of existing things” (§ 57), sight receives the highest praise from Philo. Indeed he speaks of the sight of both the body and the soul or mind and it is the latter kind of vision through which humans are able to apprehend the Divine (§§ 57–58, 72–76). The sense

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of hearing likewise has a non-physical counterpart, as Philo refers to a message from God “to those who have ears in their soul” (§ 127). While the three senses of taste, smell, and touch are the most animal-like, hearing and sight have a connection with philosophy (§§149–150). Between the latter two senses, however, sight is superior to hearing, which he calls “sluggish and feminine” (§150). In his allegorization of the destruction of the Sodomite cities, Philo views these five cities as symbolic of the five senses. Conveniently, according to Genesis, one of these cities is spared—the one that, according to Philo, represents vision—and this biblical detail allows him to expand widely about his high regard for this sense. Thus in an extended encomium on vision (§§ 150– 166), Philo declares it to be “the queen of the other senses” (§ 150). Because it reflects a person’s mental states, sight is “an image of the soul” (§ 153). It is the only one of the senses to remain active without stimulation while a person is awake. Most important, through observation of the universe, sight leads the mind to ponder philosophical questions and reflect upon the world’s Creator. Later, when he interprets the war between the kings of the five Sodomite cities and four others, Philo allegorizes the struggle as one between the five senses and the four passions (§§236–244). When he somewhat modifies his remarks to suit the specifics of the narrative, we see the adaptability of his approach to the hierarchy of the senses. Thus because (only) two of the five kings fall into wells and the others flee, Philo remarks—in contrast to his earlier inclusion of the sense of smell with touch and taste—that touch and taste “penetrate into the lowest depths of the body,” while eyes, ears, and the sense of smell manage to escape bodily enslavement (§ 241). i Different Kinds of Goods Twice in Abr., Philo, informed by his Greek philosophical background, devotes space to a contrast between different kinds of goods. Allegorizing the dispute between the servants of Abraham and of Lot (§§ 217–224), Philo attributes the quarrel to clashing values: the servants of Abraham represent lovers of the virtues, the goods of the soul, while the servants of Lot symbolize lovers of such external goods as wealth, glory, power, and noble birth. Ultimately the soul cannot abide these clashing values within itself and must cast out the latter component, as exemplified in the biblical narrative in which Abraham and Lot separate. At the end of the treatise, Philo praises Abraham for his faith in God and then contrasts this faith with external and bodily goods (§ 262–269), neither of which offers the kind of firm security provided when one trusts in God.

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Intellectual and Cultural Influences

With its ideas, interpretations, and the framework in which these are placed, Philo’s treatise on Abraham offers a unique presentation of the patriarch’s life. As suggested in earlier sections, however, both the content and the form of this work are shaped by important influences in Philo’s environment. Since the focus and aim of Abr. are to explicate Jewish Scripture, Jewish tradition constitutes a highly significant background factor. Philo’s understanding of the text, however, is also thoroughly informed by Greek and, to some extent, Roman philosophy; the treatise’s genre reflects Greek and Roman styles of writing; and Philo’s presentation is sprinkled with Greek literary allusions and other Greek and Roman cultural references. Below, we comment on Philo’s intellectual and cultural influences under the headings of a) Jewish tradition and b) Greek and Roman thought and culture. Regarding the second category, although the Greek component undoubtedly dominates, we leave open the possibility that Rome’s intellectual and cultural environment may also have exerted some influence. Philo’s Alexandria was under Roman rule, after all, and he himself participated in an embassy to that city, where he may have spent significant time.80 a Jewish Tradition A central event in Alexandrian Jewish history—and indeed in the history of the world—was the translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek.81 In Philo’s report about this momentous event (Mos. 2.25–44), he emphasizes that the original and its translation are regarded as equals and he strongly implies that the translators were divinely inspired: [I]f Chaldeans have learned Greek, [he writes,] or Greeks Chaldean, and read both versions, the Chaldean and the translation, they regard them with awe and reverence as sisters, or rather one and the same, both in matter and words, and speak of the authors not as translators but as prophets and priests of the mysteries, whose sincerity and singleness of thought

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The Roman writers Cicero and Seneca, for example, provide helpful background information for understanding Philo, even though he does not mention them. See, e.g., Horsley 1978; Winston 1995b; Weisser 2012. Niehoff has consistently emphasized the importance of Rome (e.g., 2001, 2011b, 2018). See, e.g., Rajak 2009.

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have enabled them to go hand in hand with the purest of spirits, the spirit of Moses.82 Mos. 2.40; cf. 36–37

Because many Alexandrian Jews, including Philo, were likely unable to read Jewish Scripture in the original Hebrew, it is hard to overemphasize the significance of the Greek translation for this community. Indeed the translation constituted the very foundation of their Jewish learning and enabled them to engage with and perpetuate their ancestral heritage. In §5e above (“Original and Traditional Exegesis”), we have addressed Philo’s role as a member of a community of exegetes and have suggested several possible influences from Alexandria and elsewhere. Here then we will offer but a few amplifications on our earlier observations. First, Philo is indebted to his exegetical community not only for specific interpretations but also for a way of thinking that brings Jewish tradition together with Greek modes of thought. We have noted, for example, that Philo structures his presentation of Abraham’s life in accordance with his virtues in relationship to God and then to other people and that this structure duplicates that of the later written laws, as Philo explains especially in his commentary on the Decalogue.83 Although Philo may apply this framework of virtues more specifically than his predecessors, he is indebted to a prior way of thinking that recognizes virtues as inherent to the foundation of Jewish law. According to Aristobulus, for example, “[T]he whole structure of our law has been drawn up with concern for piety, justice, self-control, and other qualities that are truly good” (Praep. ev. 13.12.8; Holladay 1995, 175). Similarly, in the Letter of Aristeas (131; Hadas 1951, 153), when the high priest Eleazar explains Jewish practices to Ptolemy’s ambassadors, he begins with the observation that “[o]ur lawgiver … in the first place laid down the principles of piety and justice and expounded them point by point, not alone by prohibitions but by commandments …” The notion that the virtues underlie Jewish law is likewise found in 4 Maccabees. In response to Antiochus’s order to eat unlawful food, the Jewish leader Eleazar declares, You scoff at our philosophy as though living by it were irrational, but it teaches us self-control, so that we master all pleasures and desires, and 82 83

As he occasionally does elsewhere, in both the Exposition and QGE, Philo uses “Chaldean” here to refer to speakers (or readers) of Hebrew. Decal. 50–51, 121; Termini 2006, 285–286; see also our Analysis/General Comments for §§ 262–276.

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it also trains us in courage, so that we endure any suffering willingly; it instructs us in justice, so that in all our dealings we act impartially, and it teaches us piety, so that with proper reverence we worship the only living God. 4 Macc 5:22–24; NRSV translation

Finally, Philo’s later contemporary Josephus similarly acknowledges the relationship between Jewish law and virtue when he writes, “… [W]e possess laws that are extremely well designed with a view to piety, fellowship with one another, and universal benevolence, as well as justice, endurance in labors and contempt for death” (Ag. Ap. 2.146; Barclay 2007, 249–250). If Philo’s blending of Jewish and Greek elements is informed by other Jewish sources written in Greek, his ideas about Scripture may also have been influenced to some extent by Jews living in the homeland and perhaps elsewhere. At the end of Abr., for example, Philo ascribes to “some” the opinion that Abraham obeyed the law, while Philo himself holds that the patriarch was himself a law (§276). We have observed that positions similar to that maintained by these “some” can be found in such sources as Jubilees and rabbinic literature.84 How might Philo, the Alexandrian Jew who wrote in Greek, have encountered ideas put forth by Jews, from Palestine and elsewhere, who read the Bible in its original Hebrew and composed their interpretations in Hebrew or Aramaic? For one thing, Philo acknowledges that he made at least one visit to the Jerusalem Temple (Prov. 2.64). Considering that his brother Alexander was responsible for plating in silver and gold nine of the ten Temple gates ( J.W. 5.201–206) and that Philo himself writes so passionately about this institution (Legat. 186–194; see also ibid., §§216–217), one imagines that this was not his only visit. One also imagines that such visits might have brought Philo into contact with Jews who shared with him their way of reading and interpreting Scripture. As suggested by the Letter of Aristeas, travelers from Palestine also visited Alexandria, and the Babylonian Talmud too contains several references to Alexandrian Jewish sages (Kurtzer 2009). It seems only reasonable that such travelers might have expressed their views about Scripture to fellow religionists when they all gathered in the synagogue to study their ancestral philosophy (e.g., Mos. 2.216). Regardless of the languages in which they studied, these various Jews shared a commitment to the teachings of Moses. Even

84

See the comments on “this man did the divine law …” at §275 and as some would have it … at § 276.

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if we lack clear evidence of exchanges among them, it is hard to conceive that such exchanges did not take place at all (see, e.g., Kugel 2012a, 308–311 = 2012b, 402–405; cf. N.G. Cohen 1995). Finally, regardless of the ways in which Philo was or was not influenced by other Jewish exegetes, one cannot mistake his deep devotion to the Jews and their tradition. As Runia reminds us, Philo’s “first loyalty” was to his people and their tradition and “his prime intellectual commitment [was] to the exposition of the thought of Moses” (2001, 31). As we turn to other intellectual and cultural influences on Philo, we would do well to keep in mind that he believed that the writings of Moses contained the best of Greek philosophy and that this conviction underlies and motivates practically all of his life’s work. b Greek and Roman Thought and Culture Greek philosophy was unquestionably the strongest influence from Philo’s non-Jewish background. Interaction among various schools of thought had by his time led to a blending of Platonic, Stoic, and Pythagorean ideas and the resulting intellectual conglomeration has come to be known as Middle Platonism.85 Philo’s Abr. bears witness to this blend of ideas, as we can see from several of the themes discussed earlier. At the same time, Philo’s commitment to the teachings of Moses occasionally leads him to modify the philosophical concepts that he adopts. A good example of this observation is found in the treatise’s very prologue, in which Philo’s discussion of the early biblical figures and different kinds of laws reflects vocabulary and notions associated with different schools of thought. Thus Philo speaks here of “archetypes” and “copies,” language drawn from Plato, especially in the Timaeus; “living and rational laws,” an amalgamation of Platonic, Stoic, and Pythagorean uses; “living in accordance with nature,” an ideal influenced by Stoicism; and “unwritten law,” a term used by Greek thinkers to refer to such different notions as unwritten customs or universal law(s). Philo’s general usage includes both connotations. As John Martens points out, however, Philo also introduces two unique applications of “unwritten law”—by associating it directly with nature and by claiming “in an idiosyncratic use of the term, that certain people are unwritten laws”86 (his emphasis). 85

86

Dillon 1995, 1996b; See also Sterling 2014b and the special section on “Philo and Middle Platonism” in SPhiloA 5 (1993, 95–155) with contributions by Sterling, Runia, Winston, Tobin, and Dillon. Martens 2003, 88. He comments too that Philo’s uniqueness in his use of “unwritten law” “has not been fully noted and stressed.” See also Najman 1999, 2003a, 2003b.

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As we have discussed, Philo is able to describe the early biblical figures, including Abraham, as unwritten laws because he believes that the same structure of virtue or virtues underlies both the lives of the ancient biblical figures and the later, written laws. In thus seeing virtue as underpinning the laws, Philo may have been influenced by notions expressed in Plato’s Laws (e.g., Annas 2010). Nonetheless Philo’s understanding of individual people as embodiments of the Mosaic law or as unwritten laws themselves appears to be his original contribution. In line with this focus on the ancient figures as models of virtue, Philo’s portrayal of Abraham as a sage is also largely influenced by Stoic ideals.87 The Platonic distinction between body and soul underlies Philo’s own distinction between literal and allegorical interpretations (see, e.g., §§ 147, 236; cf. §§68, 200, 217) and the influence of philosophy is especially apparent in his allegorical interpretations. There, for example, Philo draws upon various conceptions of the nature of the soul, informed by Stoic vocabulary of the ruling intellect (ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς), the five senses, and speech (§§ 29–30; cf. §§ 72, 74; see also §§82–84 regarding speech) or, implicitly, by the Platonic notion of a tripartite soul, according to which, in §§236–244, the three parts include the mind, senses, and passions. Philo’s ideas about the senses, passions, and equable states (εὐπάθειαι, also called “good emotions”) are similarly informed by Stoic conceptions, but Platonic influence is clearly behind his lengthy encomium on sight (§§150–166) and other references to the priority of this sense. As we saw earlier, another philosophical theme that Philo introduces pertains to different kinds of goods. Here he draws upon a three-part categorization of goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods. Originally developed by Plato, the schema was also adopted by Peripatetics and Stoics. In one passage (§§217–224), Philo contrasts only goods of the soul and external goods. In another, however, he introduces faith in God rather than goods of the soul as a value that offsets both bodily and external goods (§§ 262–269). In all the above examples, like so many others throughout his writings, Philo displays enormous facility with contemporary philosophical teachings, which he then adapts to suit his own purposes. Besides philosophy, other elements from Greek and Roman culture have made their mark on this treatise. We have already noted how Philo’s presentation of Abraham’s life accords with the genre of Greek and Roman bioi. His familiarity with and indebtedness to this and other kinds of literature are perhaps hinted at in his following remark, made in passing about the good man (ἀστεῖος):

87

Winston 1995b; see also Niehoff 2018, 109–130, 149–170.

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The good man … becoming a devotee of the quiet life, withdraws and embraces solitude, wishing to escape the notice of the multitude, not through any hatred of humanity … but owing to his having rejected that evil which is welcomed by the common throng … For this reason he mostly shuts himself up at home and stays there … or indeed, if beset by too many visitors, he heads out of the city and spends his time on some isolated farm, consorting more happily with those best of the whole human race, whose bodies may have been dissolved by time, but whose excellences shine forth through their surviving works, both poetry and prose, from which the soul may naturally derive improvement. §§ 22–23

As we suggest in the commentary, this idyllic portrayal may have an autobiographical component and reflect Philo’s own predilection for a repose in the country, where he might spend time with long-gone authors of poetry and prose. We understand the literature to which he refers to be Hellenic, especially since, as we have seen (§5a, above), Philo has a different way of speaking about Mosaic writings.88 As he does in his other works, in Abr. Philo does indeed evince a considerable acquaintance with different kinds of literature: he acknowledges, for example, that Homer is known as “the poet” even though there are many others besides him (§10)89 and in §134, he cites Menander (though not by name) to the effect that the primary origin of evils is goods in excess. When Philo responds to critics who disparage Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac, he (Philo) demonstrates impressive familiarity with other cultures. Although he does not specify the sources of his examples, he may possibly allude to Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia, Demophon’s sacrifice of his daughter Makaria, or the near sacrifice of Andromeda, daughter of the Ethiopian king Cepheus (§180). Similarly, he may refer to the practice of child sacrifice among Phoenicians and later Carthaginians. Going even further afield, Philo discusses the Gymnosophists of India and the Indian practice of self-immolation by men and their wives. One imagines that Philo has gained this ethnographic information not only from the critics to whom he responds but also perhaps from his own reading of such sources as Strabo.90 Yet another 88 89 90

David Lincicum suggests that the passage may indicate that Philo had his own private library (2014, 113). Elsewhere Philo also quotes Homer; see, e.g., Hernández 2014; Niehoff 2011a and 2012b; Berthelot 2011b; Lincicum 2013b and 2014; Koskenniemi 2010; Roskam 2017. See the comments at §§ 180 and 182.

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example in which Philo draws from his non-Jewish environment is his reference to the Graces (§54). As we note in the commentary, these figures may have already been incorporated into Alexandrian Jewish tradition before Philo, but it is nonetheless noteworthy that he recognizes their mythological standing. Besides these literary and ethnographic references, Philo also quotes some anonymous sayings.91 Another cultural arena, so to speak, that influences Philo is that of athletics.92 In Abr., Philo uses the imagery of victory in a contest (§ 35), various prizes (§§38–39, 110, 128) and athletes preparing for truly sacred games (§ 48). A particularly striking image is that of grief preparing itself to wrestle with Abraham’s soul (§256). In §§245–261, Philo’s discussion of the relationship between Abraham and Sarah appears to reflect yet another contemporary cultural influence, namely, ideals of companionate marriage. As conveyed particularly in several Roman sources, these ideals include an emphasis on wifely love, partnership, and even a wife’s accompaniment of her husband in battle. For further details, see Chapter 13, with the Excursus on “Proofs, according to Philo, of Sarah’s Wifely Love.” Finally, Philo alludes to a number of other features in his Greek and Roman cultural environment. We have seen, for instance, how he uses contemporary examples to highlight the difficulty of leaving home and how he introduces a range of figures from whom Abraham would have had to tear himself away (§§60–67). In other examples, Philo refers to the Greek use of “black” to signify ink (§10), the Athenian figure of the eponymous archon (§10), and triremes, a special kind of warship (§ 220). These allusions, even if made in passing, illustrate the degree to which he feels at home in Alexandria’s Greco-Roman society.

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Previous Scholarship

At the turn of the twentieth century, the publication by Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland of a major critical edition of most of Philo’s works quite literally set the foundation for all subsequent Philonic scholarship.93 The critical edition of Abr., which appears in volume four (out of six, not including the index volume),

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92 93

Lincicum (2013b, 161) mentions the following passages from Abr.: §25, “blind wealth”; §123, “a second best voyage”; § 194, “chaste forms of love”; §228, “satiety begets insolence”; §235, “friends have all things in common.” See also H.A. Harris 1976, esp. 51–95. For interesting background on how the two scholars came to work together, see L. Cohn 1892; Runia 2001, 38–39.

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came out in 1902. By the century’s end, the treatise had been translated into six modern languages and another translation has appeared more recently (see below). In the second decade of our own century, an English commentary was published on selections from Abr. Below, in the first section, we review these translations and partial commentary. In addition, a great number of studies have appeared that pertain to our treatise in some way. In the second section below, we consider only a small number of these studies, which address the treatise as a whole. Numerous other works that focus on particular aspects of Abr. are cited throughout the commentary. a Translations and a Partial Commentary In order of their appearance, the six twentieth-century translations based on the critical edition include those in German (J. Cohn 1909), English (Colson 1935), French (Gorez 1966), Spanish (Triviño 1976), Italian (Kraus Reggiani 1979), and Hebrew (Schur 1991). A new translation in Spanish has also been published recently (Torallas Tovar 2016). Unfortunately, however, we have not been able to consult this. All of these translations are annotated to some degree and most have introductions. In a departure from the critical edition of Philo that he co-edited, when L. Cohn came to edit the German translation, he decided to place Abr. immediately after Opif. on the understanding that this was the order intended by Philo himself.94 The translation, by Cohn’s older brother,95 is preceded by a brief introduction offering an overview of the treatise’s contents; occasional notes include helpful information, especially with reference to Hebrew and rabbinic sources. In preparing the present edition, we have benefited considerably from the English translation and comments of F.H. Colson in the Loeb Classical Library. Like other Loeb volumes, the Greek text on the left faces the English translation on the right. Colson’s notes pertain to the text of the treatise as well as to sources, parallels, and explanations of Philo’s meaning. The volume’s introduction includes reflections on the Exposition and particularly on the treatises on Abraham, Joseph, and Moses, which the volume contains.96 Since Colson’s volume appeared over 80 years ago, we happily have much to add toward illuminating the treasures of Philo’s work. Our indebtedness to Colson, however, is reflected at least in part by our frequent citations to his masterful contribution. 94 95 96

See L. Cohn PCH 1:vi; also Runia’s translation and discussion of the relevant part of Cohn’s preface (2008, 134–137). Runia 2001, 41 n. 132. While recognizing that the treatises on Moses may be separate from the Exposition, Colson himself does not take a firm position on the possible relationship (1935, xiv–xvi).

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Unlike other translations considered here, which include several treatises in one volume, the slim French edition is devoted entirely to Abr. Like the Loeb series, this translation includes the Greek on facing pages. A brief introduction—which addresses some characteristics of the treatise, especially the theme of the two triads—is followed by a similarly brief analysis of the treatise according to an outline of sections. Scattered notes throughout the volume focus primarily on the relationship between Philo’s account and the Bible and offer occasional parallels between Philo and other (non-Jewish) Greek writers. Because the 1976 Spanish translation presents Philo’s works in the traditional order found in the eighteenth-century edition of T. Mangey, an order adopted by Cohn and Wendland, Abr. is placed in volume three (of five) in a somewhat unusual collection of treatises that includes Her., Congr., Fug., Mut., Somn. 1–2, Abr., and Ios. The volume itself has no introductions to any of the treatises.97 Relatively sparse notes include biblical passages that underlie Philo’s presentation, cross-references to other Philonic treatises, and occasional explanatory remarks. In contrast to all the other translations discussed here, the Italian translation of Abr. is not part of a larger series on Philo’s works but instead appears in a stand-alone volume along with and between two other treatises: Opif. and Ios. Acknowledging Leopold Cohn and other scholars who believe that Philo intended Opif. to be followed by Abr., Clara Kraus Reggiani presents these two treatises in the intended order, followed by the next extant Exposition treatise, namely, Ios. (1979, 8–9, 24–25). The translation of Abr. is preceded by an outline of the treatise and a fairly substantial introduction, which discusses the treatise’s contents and themes in the sequence in which they appear. We have found very useful the many learned annotations, which include explanatory comments about Philo’s meaning and Jewish and Greek parallels and/or possible sources. Toward the end of the last century, a translation of Abr. appeared in Hebrew, published in the second of five volumes that have come out so far.98 Abr. is here presented after Opif. and is followed by Ios., Decal., and Spec. 1. An introduction by the series editor at that time, S. Daniel-Nataf, provides an overview of and reflections on the content of the treatise. The translation itself was done by 97

98

Volume 1 contains a general introduction to Philo, his works, and his thought, as well as a brief bibliography (Triviño 1975, 11–70). As noted earlier, this translation has been superseded by a new one (Torallas Tovar 2016). Volume 5, Book 2, on the Armenian treatises, is currently in preparation. See Daniel-Nataf, Amir, and Niehoff 1986–2012.

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C. Schur (1991) and is accompanied by ample and very helpful notes on Philo’s use of words, clarifications of his argument or interpretation, and relevant Jewish and Greek sources. In 2013, the Jewish Publication Society published a massive three-volume work entitled Outside the Bible: Ancient Jewish Writings Related to Scripture (Feldman, Kugel, and Schiffman 2013). Its aim was to make accessible to a wider audience Jewish works related to the Bible but relatively unknown beyond scholarly circles and to emphasize the Jewish context in which these works were produced. The section on Abr. (Birnbaum 2013), one of many Philonic writings represented in these volumes, begins with a brief discussion of the treatise’s contents and significance, along with a guide to reading, and then focuses on two selections: Abr. 1–88 and 262–276. Colson’s English translation appears at the top of the page with a commentary below. Especially since this partial commentary was authored by one of the present volume’s co-editors, we have incorporated a number of insights from this contribution. b Studies Devoted to Abr. as a Whole In an impressively learned article, C. Termini (2006) considers Abr. from several perspectives, as suggested in the subtitle, “Biography, Genealogy, and the Philosophical Meaning of the Patriarchal Lives.” Termini addresses Philo’s plan for the Exposition and examines continuities between Abr. and other Jewish exegetical sources, Greco-Roman biography, and Greek genealogical and historiographical writings. She then turns to Philo’s understanding of the relationship between creation, the patriarchal stories, and the laws and identifies the virtues as a key link in this relationship (see our Analysis/General Comments for §§262–276). In 2007, the Philo of Alexandria Group of the Society of Biblical Literature devoted a session to Abr. and two of the presented papers were published the following year in The Studia Philonica Annual, with a brief introduction by G. Sterling. After explaining that Philo understands the ancestors who lived before the giving of the laws as embodied laws in themselves, Sterling (2008) comments upon the significance of the treatise.99

99

At the time of the 2007 conference, John Dillon was the sole editor of the present commentary and he presented a sample, which included his translation of and general and detailed comments on Abr. 107–132. Respondents included Ellen Birnbaum, who later became a co-editor, and Erich Gruen. Other panelists included David Runia and James R. Royse, whose subsequently published papers are discussed below. (The session was presided over by Annewies van den Hoek.) See also the Preface of this volume.

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Runia’s thoughtful and informative contribution (2008) serves well as another introduction to our treatise. His main topics include the place of Abr. in editions and translations, formal features of the treatise, comparisons and thematic connections between Opif. and Abr., and the place of Abr. in Philo’s Exposition. As author of the PACS volume on Opif. (2001), he presents especially instructive and insightful analyses of links between the two Philonic works. Focusing on the text of Abr., Royse (2008) offers the heartening observation that because of the many Greek manuscripts that contain this treatise, “we can be more than usually confident that Philo’s Greek is to be found in some witness, and … there is less occasion [than with other Philonic works] for resorting to conjectural emendation” (152). He then considers various features of the Armenian translation. Unlike that of some other Philonic treatises, this version was not later translated into Latin by J.B. Aucher and so was not directly accessible to Cohn and Wendland, who in turn relied on the assistance of F.C. Conybeare. Because of several agreements between “the better Greek manuscripts,” from the eleventh century, and the Armenian translation, from the latter half of the sixth century, Royse notes that this translation offers confirmation “of prime importance” that the Greek readings we have go back centuries earlier (154). In the latter part of the article, after remarking that Philo’s direct citations of Scripture in Abr. are fairly rare, especially when this treatise is compared with the Allegorical Commentary, Royse devotes special attention to seven of these biblical citations.100 Readers will find Royse’s careful work on these aspects of Philo’s text both valuable and instructive. In an intricate examination of Abr., by paying close attention to Philo’s use of words and the structure of his composition J. Cazeaux (1983, esp. 85–176) identifies a variety of themes in the treatise, which, he claims, is characterized by an underlying unity.101 Not infrequently we ourselves observe features similar to those on which Cazeaux remarks but we usually offer different interpretations of these features or attach different significance to them. Although we do not detail Cazeaux’s arguments and conclusions in the commentary, we occasionally refer to his thought-provoking analyses of certain sections, and readers interested in exploring other perspectives may wish to consult his work. Two remaining studies, of book length, consider Abr. within much larger contexts. Building upon his earlier dissertation at Yale University under the 100 101

The Abr. passages and verses are as follows: § 13, Lev 19:24; §17, Gen 5:24; §31, Gen 6:9; §77, Gen 12:7; § 112, Gen 18:14; § 132, Gen 18:10; § 166, Gen 19:20. For a thoroughgoing and very useful discussion of Cazeaux’s complex approach to Philo’s exegetical writings, see Runia 1984; also R-R 327–328, ##8320 and 8321.

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mentorship of E.R. Goodenough, in 1971 Samuel Sandmel published Philo’s Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature. Sandmel’s primary aim here is to highlight important distinctions between Philo and the rabbis, with particular focus on their interpretations of Abraham. Before turning to the rabbis, however, Sandmel also surveys a variety of Jewish notions about the patriarch, first in Scripture itself and then in a range of Apocryphal, Pseudepigraphal, and Greco-Jewish sources, including Jubilees and Josephus, to name but two. The chapter entitled “Abraham in Philo’s Writings” constitutes the bulk of the monograph—indeed, over 100 pages. Here, Sandmel presents what he calls “the literal and the allegorical Abraham,” “the relationship between them,” and “the religious import of Abraham to Philo” (103). As the “primary source for the literal Abraham,” Abr. receives considerable attention (104–141 and elsewhere). Toward the end of this chapter, Sandmel observes, The study of Abraham … clearly reveals what to Philo is the true and significant religiosity. It is not only the observance of the particular laws, the Law of Moses. Beyond them true religiosity is the living in accord with nature, the rise of the soul above the obstacles of the body; the determination not to be contaminated by the evils inherent in the city, but to live in a pure state as though one were in heaven, and to receive the divine afflatus as the end result of the proper life. 197

In conclusion, Sandmel underscores the fundamentally different “religiosity” of Philo and the rabbis (ibid.), contrasts specific features of the Philonic and rabbinic approaches to Abraham, and declares the independence from rabbinic influence of Philo, whose Hellenization is “thoroughgoing and complete” (210). Although aspects of this study are somewhat dated,102 we have greatly benefited from Sandmel’s perceptive discussions and analyses. M. Böhm (2005) similarly devotes considerable attention to Abr. but with a rather different purpose. Conscious of tensions among Egyptian, Greek, and Jewish inhabitants in Alexandria, Böhm examines how Philo deals with biblical narratives about the patriarchs and their relatives throughout his different writings. In her opinion Philo composed his three exegetical series with different purposes and audiences in mind. All his work, however, may be understood to some extent as an effort to address and overcome the tensions among which

102

This observation is particularly true of the framework in which questions are posed at the outset of the study; see, e.g., Birnbaum 2006 and 1996, esp. 2–3.

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he lived (401–402). In Abr., Philo’s intended audience probably consists for the most part of interested non-Jewish men, although Böhm acknowledges that the audience could also include Jews who have little familiarity with their heritage (173–176). Thus Philo assumes no knowledge of Scripture and generally avoids use of proper names. In Abr. Philo is careful to present the patriarch in the most positive manner, in accordance with the norms of encomiastic bios literature. Toward this end, he omits unflattering details, like Sarah’s identifying herself as the patriarch’s sister (e.g., Gen 12:10–13, 18–19; cf. Gen 20:2–13) and instead emphasizes Abraham’s virtue. Similarly, he leaves out such particularistic elements as blessings, land, covenant, and circumcision and instead highlights the universalistic dimensions of the narratives (132–140). Indeed Philo’s selection of biblical passages and his organization of the treatise are designed to present Abraham as an ideal sage and God-fearing proselyte (168), who, like other biblical ancestors, stands as an eternally valid model for all (131). Readers will notice much agreement between Böhm’s thoughtful analyses of this treatise and our own observations, even if we hold a broader conception than she of the audience that Philo envisioned.

9

Shared and Distinctive Features and Their Implications

a Parallels with Other Philonic Writings In accord with other PACS volumes on exegetical treatises, toward the end of each chapter or chapter sub-unit we have included sections on Parallel Philonic Exegesis. Here, we identify—mainly with the help of Allenbach et al. 1982; Grabbe 1988; and Earp 1962—exegetical elements and interpretations similar to ones in Abr. Since in the Detailed Comments we note some parallels in other, non-Philonic Jewish sources, we have titled these concluding sections “Parallel Philonic Exegesis” to indicate that the parallels are found in other works of Philo himself. (For parallels in Christian sources, see § 10 on Nachleben just below.) An example of a passage with especially strong parallels in other Philonic works is Abr. 81–84, in which Philo explains the significance of the change in the patriarch’s name from “Abram” to “Abraham” (see the Parallel Philonic Exegesis section toward the end of Chapter 6, part b). Often, however, we have identified as parallels elements, such as etymologies, or parts of interpretations of the same biblical verses. Because it has occasionally been difficult to tease out parallels from differences in other Philonic passages, the Parallel Philonic Exegesis sections may also include interpretations that have some differences from those in Abr. In addition, we have included a small number of other, clearly different interpretations of the same verse because they are intrinsically inter-

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esting and highlight what is distinctive about each exegesis, including those in Abr. Although our analyses of parallels in these sections are not extensive, it is our hope that these sections will illuminate continuities between Philo’s interpretations in Abr. and his other exegetical works and will provide enough information for researchers wishing to probe these continuities more deeply. For further reflections on some of these parallels, see below under § c. Besides exegetical elements, Philo’s discussions of certain non-exegetical themes also have parallels in his other writings. (For major themes of the treatise, see §6 above.) A good example of such a theme with parallels in several other Philonic works is Philo’s encomium on sight (§§ 150–166; see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 9, part b). In these cases, we have generally mentioned relevant parallels in the Analysis/General Comments or Detailed Comments. Finally, other significant parallels include philological ones. To illuminate Philo’s sophisticated use of words and language, in the Detailed Comments we mention, when possible, other Philonic passages with parallel usages of words and phrases. b Unique Features of Abr. While all of these similarities are certainly interesting and show consistencies and continuities in Philo’s thought and style among his different exegetical series and other writings, especially intriguing are those features of Abr. that have no extant Philonic parallels. These features include: (1) Philo’s overview of the contents of the Book of Genesis (§ 1); (2) His description of the six early figures—Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—as archetypal laws (§§3–6); (3) A number of inserted or expanded speeches; (4) Several sustained and well-developed exegeses, including literal, ethical, and allegorical; and (5) In §§60–244, the regular alternation between literal and sometimes ethical interpretations, on one hand, and allegorical interpretations, on the other. For more on (1) and (2) above, see Chapter 1 of the commentary. Inserted speeches (3) include directions, supposedly found in “the holy writings,” to Abraham to leave Chaldea (§71); God’s address to souls about ways of approaching Him (§§128–130); God’s declaration that those who follow him may partake of joy (§204); the soul’s dismissal of a tendency within itself toward external goods (§224); and Sarah’s instructions to Abraham to mate with her handmaid (§§248–252). Two passages, while not quite full speeches, are slight expansions on scriptural verses: §175, based on Gen 22:8, Abraham’s reply to Isaac about God providing a sacrificial victim; and § 206, based on Gen 18:15,

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the reply to Sarah after she denies that she laughed. (On this rhetorical feature, known as προσωποποιία, see also §3b of this Introduction, above.) Other distinctive features of Philo’s sustained interpretations (#4, listed above) are too numerous to mention exhaustively; instead we call attention here to but a few examples. Thus, in §§63–67, in his literal and ethical interpretations of Abraham’s migration, Philo details the hardships related to leaving home and names specific groups and elements that the patriarch leaves behind. In §§85–87, returning to his literal (and ethical) account after his allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s migration, Philo picks up on these earlier themes in his only extant interpretation of Gen 12:9. In §§ 89–106, we have the only full-length discussion (both literal and allegorical) that Philo provides of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt (Gen 12:10–20). Philo’s vivid and condemnatory portrayal of Sodom in his literal interpretation in §§ 134–136 has had such a lasting influence that one commentator has declared that Philo “invented Sodom as we now know it” (Fone 2000, 91). Philo’s ethical interpretation in §§ 178– 199 is an extended, impassioned defense and praise of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac; to support his argument against critics of the Gen 22 narrative, Philo shows impressive familiarity with beliefs and practices of other cultures. In his literal interpretation in §§208–224, one of the rare exegeses of the episode in antiquity, Philo brings to life the dispute between Abraham and Lot’s servants (Gen 13:2, 5–11) and sets forth an allegorization of the episode that is found only here. Finally, in his literal interpretation in §§ 225–235, Philo brings together disparate details from Genesis to render the tale of the war between the kings (Gen 14) both comprehensible and dramatic. His allegorization of this conflict in §§236–244 builds upon an earlier allegorization of the Sodomite cities in §§147–166 and displays profound ingenuity. For further details on all of these observations, see the relevant chapters in the commentary. Earlier, in § 5e, we addressed the difficult challenge of distinguishing between traditional and original interpretations in Philo’s work. It is perhaps appropriate in the present context to emphasize that distinctive features are found in Philo’s literal, ethical, and allegorical interpretations and that this observation may signal original contributions from him on all three levels. Besides examples of specific interpretations that we have just noted, Philo’s very regular alternation in the “heart” of Abr. (i.e., from § 60 to § 244) between literal and, sometimes, ethical interpretations, on one hand, and allegorical interpretations, on the other, appears to be unique among his extant works (#5, above). In his other two extant bioi, Mos. 1–2 and Ios., Philo uses allegorization differently and much less systematically. We can only speculate about how he may have structured his no longer extant accounts of the lives of Isaac and Jacob.

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Implications of All These Features for Larger Questions about Philo’s Intellectual Development and the Chronology of His Works Finally, in a section on shared and distinctive features of Abr., it is perhaps worth reflecting more deeply on interpretations in Abr. that have parallels in the Allegorical Commentary and QGE to see whether these parallels may signal a development between interpretations or suggest something about the order in which Philo composed his treatises. In our opinion, these parallels do not offer sufficient evidence to determine either issue. Instead, differences between the series in the way that Philo presents his interpretations have more to do with the genre, aims, and intended audience(s) of each series. Thus in the Exposition, Philo provides detailed, accessible accounts in both his literal and allegorical exegeses because he is writing for a more general audience than in either of the other two series. In the Allegorical Commentary, he occasionally focuses on discrete elements of interpretations found in Abr., often within a discussion of a secondary biblical lemma (see Runia 1984, 1987). In QGE he similarly focuses on discrete elements of interpretations found in Abr., but in separate units, each of which is connected to a specific verse, verses, or part(s) of a verse. While this is not the place to develop this argument in full, here we shall comment briefly on a few examples. In Abr. 68–84, Philo understands Abraham’s migration from Chaldea and then from Harran to be the soul’s journey, first, from false beliefs in astrology and the equation of creation with the Creator and, second, from the realization that just as the senses are ruled by the mind, so too is the universe ruled by the primal God. According to Philo, the statement in Gen 12:7 that “God was seen by Abraham” (§ 77) demonstrates the intellect’s or Abraham’s progression from the false beliefs of Chaldea to belief in God. As further proof, Philo introduces the change of the patriarch’s name from “Abram” to “Abraham” in Gen 17:5. (For details of how this name change serves as proof, see §§81–84 with our comments and Excursus 3 above, “Two Philonic Interpretations,” under §5e of this Introduction. For further details on the symbolism of Chaldea and Harran, see §§ 68–76 with our comments.) In the Parallel Philonic Exegesis section at the end of §§ 68–84, we offer a number of parallels to all of these elements, especially from the Allegorical Commentary but also from Mos. 2, Virt., Praem., QG 3, and QG 4. All the components of Philo’s interpretation in Abr. can be found in the Allegorical Commentary and most can be found in QG 3 and 4 (unfortunately what we have from QGE does not contain interpretations of Gen 11:31–12:7, but elements from Philo’s Abr. interpretation of these verses can be found in connection with other verses). While Philo brings these various components together in Abr.

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to present a coherent, accessible interpretation, he treats some of the components separately in the other two, more text-centered, series according to the exegetical requirements of the context in each series. Differences in his exegeses in the separate series thus do not indicate a development but rather an adaptation to serve his purposes for each set of writings. At the other end of the spectrum from Abr. 68–84, which has many parallels to almost all components, is Abr. 236–244, an allegorization of the war between the kings in Gen 14, whereby the battle between the five Sodomite kings and four others represents a battle between the five senses and the four passions. The only parallels that we could find in the other exegetical series are two brief allusions in the Allegorical Commentary; the extant portion of QGE does not include commentary on Gen 14. In Ebr. 105, introducing an interpretation of Abraham’s words to the king of Sodom in Gen 14:22–23, Philo speaks of “wise Abraham, when he had routed the nine kings, the four passions that is and the five sense-faculties …” In a discussion of the number ten in Congr., Philo maintains that nine is “a number of great hostility, while the added one which completes the ten [the oracles] approve of as friendly.” To illustrate, he adds, “When the civil war burst into flames, and the four passions prepared for combat with the five senses, when the whole soul was on the point to suffer sacking and razing like a city, wise Abraham took the field, and appearing as the tenth, made an end of all nine governments” (Congr. 91– 92). These two brief passages from the Allegorical Commentary show an awareness of the symbolization found in Abr. of the four and the five kings and also the significance of Abraham as constituting the tenth to enter the battle (see Abr. 244). Can we then postulate that these shorthand references preceded or followed the extended account in Abr. 236–244? In our opinion, we cannot do either. In Abr. it suits Philo to present a coherent, engaging, and elaborate account of the allegorical meaning of the war described in Gen 14, while in the Allegorical Commentary in two different contexts, it suits him to allude to this meaning only briefly. Philo’s passing references in the Allegorical Commentary do not indicate that they are based on the fully developed account in Abr. or that they set the stage for Philo to develop such an account later. With the available information, we simply cannot determine whether Abr. came before or after Ebr. and Congr. The above two examples illustrate different ends of the continuum, where one end represents a plethora of parallels and the other, a minimum. Examples midway along the continuum, perhaps, are the literal interpretation of Abraham’s reception of the three visitors in §§107–118 and the allegorical interpretation of this episode in §§119–132. Both of these passages have parallels in

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the Allegorical Commentary and in QG 4 (see also Birnbaum 1995 and 1996, 85–90). While some may detect clues to a possible development in Philo’s interpretation (see, e.g., Siegert 1998, 12, and our discussion in the Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of Chapter 8), we stand by the position that the parallels do not provide enough evidence to make such a determination. Despite this negative conclusion, what the parallels do show is that underlying all three of Philo’s exegetical series is a considerable treasury of interpretations, upon which Philo draws and which he adapts in different ways to suit his particular aims in each set of his writings. We invite readers who would like to pursue the matter further to consult the Parallel Philonic Exegesis sections in all the relevant chapters.

10

Nachleben

It is well-known that Philo’s later influence, especially in the centuries immediately following him, was strongest among the Fathers of the Church, who preserved his works (see Runia 1993a). After Josephus, it would be fifteen centuries before another Jew (Azariah de’ Rossi) acknowledged Philo explicitly by name (see Weinberg 1988 and 2001, esp. 101, with n. 2; Marcus 1948; de’ Rossi, acquainted with Philo’s works in Latin translation, calls Philo by the Hebrew name Yedidyah, which shares with the Greek Φίλων a root meaning that pertains to friendship or love). Happily for us, Abr. is one of the treatises that de’ Rossi mentions by name in his work Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes), and, among other things, he cites approvingly Philo’s allegorizations of Abraham’s three visitors (Abr. 119–132), the binding of Isaac (§§ 200–207), the war between the kings (§§236–244), the cities of Sodom (§§ 147–166), and possibly Abraham and Lot (§§217–224; see the Nachleben section at the end of Chapter 11, part b) (Weinberg 2001, 114, 119). (Except for the last interpretation, the order here follows that of de’ Rossi’s own citations; see also the Nachleben sections of Chapters 8, part b; 10, part c; 12, part b; and 9, part b. Additional references to de’ Rossi are found in the Nachleben sections of Chapters 6, part b, and 13, part b). Although Philo’s thought and exegesis have some parallels in rabbinic writings, he does not seem to have had any direct influence on the rabbis, at least not through his treatise On the Life of Abraham. Accordingly, we have noted in the commentary, but not in sections on Nachleben, some similarities between Philo and rabbinic sources—and, for that matter, between Philo and other Jewish sources, including Josephus. Josephus may have known and used some of Philo’s writings, but it does not appear that he drew upon Abr. in any specific way (see Sterling 2013).

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Besides de Rossi, with one other exception, discussed below, our sections on Nachleben all refer to parallels between Philo and early Christian writers. We have located and identified these parallels by consulting the following sources: the notes in PCW; Runia 1992b and 1993a; and van den Hoek 1988 and 2000. For etymologies found in Philo and later Christian sources, we have also consulted Grabbe 1988. In addition, we checked the Biblia patristica indices (Allenbach et al. 1975–2000) for patristic treatments of verses interpreted in Philo’s Abr. and we selectively chose references to pursue and investigate. Seeing that certain sources contained several parallels to some sections in Abr., we also occasionally browsed translations of these sources: Origen’s Homilies on Genesis (Hom. Gen.), Ambrose’s treatise on Abraham (Abr.), and Didymus’s commentary on Genesis (In Gen.). Finally, some scholars have produced works in which they traced the history of interpretation of specific exegetical themes found in Abr. and later Jewish and/or Christian writers. In these cases (see, e.g., Fraade 1984; Lewis 1968; Arterbury 2003; Loader 1990; Thunberg 1966; D.S. Bailey 1955; Carden 2004; and Fone 2004), we have largely relied on the discussions and references in these works. As Runia (2001, 38) and Geljon and Runia (2013, 34) point out, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between Philo’s direct and indirect influence. We have thus for the most part limited ourselves to pointing out similarities and differences between Philo and later Christian writers. Two writers, however—Eusebius and Didymus—mention Philo either directly or indirectly in the context of interpretations relevant to Abr. and we can therefore be fairly certain that they relied upon this treatise itself (see the Nachleben sections in Chapters 2 and 13, part a); for Eusebius’s familiarity with the treatise, see also the chapter below on “The Title of the Work.” Because of striking parallels between their works and Philo’s Abr., Origen and Ambrose too may merit inclusion in this group of writers who knew Philo’s Abr. directly. In Hom. Gen., for example, Origen brings together, as Philo does, two biblical motifs that are quite separate in Genesis: the change in Sarah’s name (Gen 17:15) and the tale of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt (Gen 12:10–20). Likewise, in his treatise on Abraham, Ambrose suggests that God preserved Abraham and Sarah’s marriage in Egypt as a reward to Abraham for his piety, a notion that Philo makes explicit. (For details on these interpretations of Origen and Ambrose, see the Nachleben section in Chapter 7, part b). Finally, Alexander of Lycopolis, a non-Jew and non-Christian who lived in the third or fourth century CE, mentions as parallels to Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son (Gen 22) the stories in Greek history of people sacrificing themselves in order to save their cities (Contra Manichaei Opiniones Disputatio, ch. 24). In Abr. 179–180, Philo likewise mentions arguments of certain critics

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who see parallels in the Greek examples. Whether Alexander derived the idea of such parallels from Philo and, if so, whether directly or indirectly, is debatable. (For further details, see the Nachleben section in Chapter 10, part b). Our presentation of material in the Nachleben sections often does not follow the chronological order of later sources but is instead usually organized according, first, to individual elements (e.g., etymologies), when relevant, and, then, to exegetical themes in the order that they appear in Philo’s discussions. Also, while our examples in the Nachleben sections are illustrative of possible, later Philonic influence, these examples are in no way comprehensive. There may well be other Christian sources that make use of Abr. and even other Jewish and non-Jewish, non-Christian sources that do so as well. A project by Friesen, Lincicum, and Runia (forthcoming) currently under way to explore the reception history of Philo from antiquity to the present may uncover new avenues to explore in this area. Regardless, we hope that the examples of Nachleben that we have provided will offer readers a sense of the ways in which Philo’s treatise on Abraham was used or may have been used by at least some later writers. We hope too that these examples may stimulate interest in and provide a basis for further research on the treatise’s subsequent influence.

11

The Text of the Treatise103

The text of Philo’s writings has been transmitted through medieval manuscripts, which ultimately go back, via Byzantium, to the copies of Philo’s writings in the Episcopal library in Caesarea. In 1552 the editio princeps appeared, edited by the French classical scholar Adrianus Turnebus. Nearly two centuries later, the English scholar Thomas Mangey edited Philo’s writings. His edition in two volumes was published in London in 1742. It contains many improvements on the received text and also a large number of attractive conjectures. During the nineteenth century the need for a modern critical edition of Philo was felt, and two German scholars, Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, carried out this enormous task. The six volumes of their edition appeared between 1896 and 1915 in Berlin. The manuscript tradition of the De Abrahamo is quite a rich one, reinforced as well by the Armenian translation, which is marred by periodic misunder103

For this section, we borrow gratefully verbatim from the opening paragraph by Geljon and Runia (2013, 35) of § 8 on “The Text of the Treatise” in the introduction to their edition of Philo, On Cultivation, with subsequent adaptations appropriate to the present treatise.

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standings of the Greek, but also preserves many excellent readings (listed by L. Cohn in the Prolegomena to his edition, PCW 4:xxi; see also Royse 2008, 152– 156). The codices relevant to establishing the text are ten in number, as follows: B E K C F G M A H P

Venetus gr. 42 Oxoniensis Lincolniensis 34 Laurentianus conv. soppr. 59 Parisinus gr. 435 Laurentianus LXXXV 10 Vaticano-Palatinus gr. 248 Laurentianus X 20 Monacensis gr. 459 Venetus gr. 40 Petropolitanus XX Aa 1

Among these, the tradition represented by BEK is the superior one, largely supported by the Armenian translation. Our translation is based on the CohnWendland critical edition, and we also take due account of variants presented in Colson’s Loeb edition, which is itself based on that of L. Cohn. All such variants will be discussed in the notes to the translation or in the commentary.

12

Some Notes on the Method Used in the Translation and Commentary

The features of Philo’s mode of composition that challenge translators of his works have often been acknowledged (see, e.g., Runia 2001, 44; van der Horst 2003, 51; Geljon and Runia 2013, 38–39). His sentences, for one thing, can be much longer than what is customary for readers of English. Within one sentence, he can use several participial constructions. Between the beginning and end of some sentences, he occasionally sandwiches in a new thought. His florid and elaborate style is marked by frequent use of connective particles, newly coined or rare words, and pairs of synonyms, which we term in the commentary “collocutions.” To convey Philo’s meaning and a sense of his style, we have tried to offer as literal a translation as possible. Indeed, although we have broken up some sentences and used different ways of expressing the participial phrases, readers may recognize in the translation some of the same features noted above (to our knowledge, however, the translation does not contain any words of our own invention!). For clarification, we have occasionally inserted words in

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brackets that do not appear in the Greek. In much of the treatise, Philo uses the historical present, which we have usually found more effective to render in the past tense. As explained earlier, in accord with the style of other PACS volumes on exegetical treatises, we have highlighted in bold type words and phrases quoted directly from the biblical text, while we have set in bold italics words and phrases that allude to the biblical text but appear in different lexical or grammatical form. Because Philo paraphrases so frequently in his literal interpretations, we have simply indicated the source of these paraphrases, both earlier in this Introduction in §5b and in the commentary. To facilitate reading and comprehension, we have organized the translation under chapter headings and sub-sections and have occasionally inserted paragraph divisions and punctuation that do not appear in the text of PCW. Thus, as described in § 4 of this Introduction above, the translation consists of fourteen chapters and Chapters 6–13 are further subdivided into parts (a) and (b) and sometimes (c) and (d). After an initial discussion of the title of the treatise, the divisions of the commentary correspond exactly to this organization. Again following the format of other PACS volumes on exegetical treatises, each commentary chapter and sub-section (except for the discussion of the title) are composed of the following four sections: Analysis/General Comments, Detailed Comments, Parallel Philonic Exegesis, and Nachleben.104 In the Analysis/General Comments we present an overview of the section of Abr. under discussion in which we include a summary of the contents, a description of Philo’s line of argumentation, and, when necessary, an outline of specific points. We also address important exegetical and/or philosophical influences behind Philo’s presentation as well as specific issues or problems raised by his interpretation. The Detailed Comments are organized by lemmata directly from the translation. In this section, our comments range broadly from clarification of Philo’s meaning, acknowledgment of exegetical or philosophical influences, citation of parallels within and beyond Philo’s works, and discussion of notable stylistic or philological aspects. Observations about occurrences of words or phrases are based on the TLG database, accessed in July 2019. For our approach in the sections on Parallel Philonic Exegesis and Nachleben, see §§ 9 and 10 in this Introduction above. Finally, in some chapters, we have appended Excursuses on topics that merited consideration too elaborate to incorporate into the Detailed Comments.

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Chapter 6, part d, which discusses only § 88 as a conclusion, does not have sections on Parallel Philonic Exegesis or Nachleben.

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As we have noted in §5c of this Introduction above, whatever text of the Bible Philo had before him, the language of this text was Greek. In the commentary we occasionally compare the Greek biblical text with the Hebrew. To distinguish between the two, we usually include the words “Hebrew” or “Greek” near the verse reference or else, to indicate the Greek, we insert “LXX” before the verse reference. When neither of these indicators appears, readers may assume that there is no significant difference in meaning between the Hebrew and the Greek. Our use of “LXX” is conventional; it refers to the Greek text that Philo read and not to a specific Greek translation. Unless otherwise indicated, our translation of the Greek is either original or taken or adapted from Brenton (1999) and our translation of the Hebrew is either original or taken or adapted from NJPS. Numbering of verses from the Greek Bible follows Rahlfs and Hanhart 2006. Finally, unless otherwise indicated, translations of Philonic works other than Abr. and Opif. are from PLCL; translations of Abr. are ours, while translations of Opif. are from Runia 2001. For most personal and place names mentioned in the Bible, we have adopted conventional English renditions instead of transliteration—e.g., “Abraham,” instead of “Abraam”; “Sodom,” instead of “Sodoma.” (A couple of exceptions are “Enos,” which we use instead of “Enosh”—see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 2—and “Harran,” which we spell with two “r”s, as in the Greek.) The cases of “Abraham” and “Sarah” present us with particular challenges. In LXX Gen 17:5, God changes Abram’s name to “Abraam” in the context of establishing with him a covenant. For Philo, however, the change of Abram’s name to “Abraham” signifies the transformation undergone by the patriarch when he leaves Chaldea and discovers the one, true God (Gen 11:31–12:7; Abr. 68–84; see Chapter 6, part b). Since Philo associates this name change with an event described earlier in Genesis (i.e., Gen 12 instead of Gen 17), he (Philo) refers to the patriarch as “Abraham” in contexts where Genesis refers to him as “Abram” (i.e., Gen 12:10–17:4). In Abr., Philo discusses a number of biblical episodes from this section of Genesis (our Chapters 7, 11, and 12; see below for Chapter 13). Although he rarely uses proper names in this treatise, for clarity we ourselves must. To be consistent with Philo’s understanding, then, we use “Abraham” except when we discuss the patriarch’s change of name or quote verses that mention “Abram.” For several reasons, “Sarah” presents an even greater challenge. Philo does not associate Sarah’s name change (in Greek, from “Sara” to “Sarra”) with the departure from Chaldea in the way that he does Abram/Abraham’s name change. In addition, while the English “Abram” and “Abraham” serve to convey the change in both the Hebrew (from “Avram” to “Avraham”) and the Greek (from “Abram” to “Abraam”), there is no convenient way in English similarly to convey the change in Sarah’s name in both the Hebrew and the Greek. In

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Hebrew, her name is changed from “Sarai” to “Sarah” and the English “Sarah” reflects the change in the last letter of her name. The challenge therefore arises because we wish to adhere to conventions in English and because the English does not accurately reflect the change in Greek from “Sara” to “Sarra.” The matter of Sarah’s name is relevant in both Chapters 7 (“Abraham and Sarah in Egypt,” §§89–106; Gen 12:10–20) and 13, part a (“Sarah’s Virtues,” §§245–254; Gen 16). Since in these contexts the meaning of Sarah’s name before it was changed is not directly relevant, for the sake of simplicity we refer to Abram/Abraham’s wife as “Sarah” throughout, whether in the biblical or Philonic context, except in direct biblical quotations. Finally, for transliterations of Hebrew, we have followed the General-Purpose Style in The SBL Handbook of Style, 2nd ed. (2014, 58–59), except for the letter khet, which we transliterate as ḥ. Although the above paragraphs describe our approach in theory to a variety of issues, it has not always been a simple matter to carry out this approach in practice. As with so much else in this volume, however, we have followed our best judgment. Should this be deemed faulty at times, we request our readers’ indulgence and understanding, which we hope will be repaid by what can be learned from the rest of the work.

Translation Philo of Alexandria On the Life of Abraham

∵

part one Introduction, §§ 1–59

∵

a

Prologue, §§1–6 Chapter 1: Genesis and the Living Laws,1 §§ 1–6 (§1) The sacred laws being inscribed, as they are, in five books, the first is called, and has its title recorded as “Genesis,” from the genesis, or creation,2 of the world, which it covers in its introductory section. It has been granted this title, despite the fact that a multitude of other topics are dealt with in it, peace and war, productivity and barrenness, famine and plenty, the great destruction caused to the things of earth by fire and water, or conversely the generation and nurturing of animals and plants by virtue of the tempering of the air and the seasons of the year, or of the various lives of men, whether virtuous or vicious; (§2) but since some of these are parts of the world, while others are events occurring within it, and the world is the perfection and consummation of all these, it is to it that he3 dedicated the book as a whole. The manner in which the creation of the world was arranged we have detailed, as well as we could, in the preceding treatise. (§ 3) But since it is incumbent on us to investigate the laws systematically and in due order, let us postpone our study of those laws which are particular and, as it were, copies, and consider first those which are more all-embracing and, so to speak, archetypes. (§4) These are those among men who have lived irreproachable and noble lives, whose virtues happen to have been recorded in the most holy writings, not only with a view to celebrating them, but also with the aim of edifying those who come upon this account and inducing them to emulation. (§5) For those men are in fact living and rational laws, and he [Moses] honored them for two reasons. One is that he wished to demonstrate that the ordinances which are laid down are not at variance with nature; and secondly, that there is no great problem for those who wish to live under the established laws, seeing that the earliest generations, before any of the particular laws were written down, were able easily and without trouble to follow an unwritten legal system; so one might be driven to declare that the established laws are nothing other than reminders of the life of the men of old, preserving the ancient record of the deeds that they performed and the words that they used. (§ 6) For they were not school associates or pupils, nor did they learn from teachers what they should do and say, but listening to themselves and learning from themselves, they embraced conformity with nature, accepting that nature itself was—as in truth it is—the eldest of statutes, and thus they were subject to good rule all

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/978900

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their lives long, performing nothing blameworthy voluntarily, and, in the case of accidental mishaps, calling on God for forgiveness and propitiating Him with prayers and entreaties, thus securing for themselves a well-rounded life, achieving perfection in the spheres of both premeditation and the involuntary.

b

The First Triad, §§7–47 Chapter 2: Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16 (§7) So then, since the first step towards participation in goods is hope, and this like a highway is carved out and opened up by the soul which loves virtue, as it strives to attain true excellence, he [Moses] called the first lover of hopea “Human,”4 thus granting to him as a special honor the common name of the genus—(§8) for the Chaldean word for “human” is “Enos”b—on the basis that only he is truly a human who has expectation of good things and is firmly grounded in good hopes; from which it clearly follows that he considers one of faint hope as not a human, but a mere beast in human form since he has deprived himself of that which is the most proper characteristic of the human soul, hope. (§9) For this reason, indeed, in his desire to hymn the praises of the man of good hope5 in the finest way, when he has said that this man6 placed his hopesc in the Father and Maker of all, he adds: “This is the book of the genesis of humans,”d although fathers and grandfathers had already come into being; but he considered the former as the founders of the mixed race; but the latter that of the purest and thoroughly refined, which is the truly rational. (§ 10) For even as Homer is called “the poet”par excellence, despite there being a vast multitude of poets, and [ink] with which we write is called “the black,” though everything the opposite of white is black, and in Athens the senior among the nine archons, the eponymous, is called “the archon,” after whom the years are reckoned for dating purposes, on the same principle [Moses] gave the name “Human” par excellence to him who indulged in hope, passing over in silence the multitudes of others as not being worthy to be granted the same appellation. (§11) It was well judged, also, to speak of the “book” of the genesise of the true human. This was not off the mark, since indeed the man of good hope is worthy of commemoration, not such as is inscribed on pieces of paper subject to destruction by moths, but rather as is inscribed in the immortal record of nature, in which noble deeds are recorded. (§12) Furthermore, if one were to calculate from the first, earthborn man,f one will find that he who is called by the Chaldeans “Enos,”g but in the Greek language “Human,” comes fourth in sequence. (§ 13) Now among numbers the

a Gen 4:26

b Gen 4:26

c Gen 4:26

d Gen 5:1

e Gen 5:1

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fGen 2:7

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tetrad is honored both by other philosophers who accept the doctrine of incorporeal and intelligible essences, and in particular by the all-wise Moses, who, in honoring the number four, declares that it is “holy and to be praised”;a and the reasons for which that was said have been explained in the previous treatise. (§14) The man of good hope is likewise holy and praiseworthy,b even as, conversely, the man of faint hope is unholy and blameworthy, since in all situations he takes on fear as an evil counselor; for no two things, as they say, are so inimical to one another as hope is to fear and fear to hope; and quite reasonably so, for each of them is an expectation, in the one case of goods, in the other of evils, the natures of which are incapable of reconciliation or agreement. (§15) So much, then, it is sufficient to say about hope, which nature has placed like a gatekeeper at the doors of the royal virtues inside, that cannot be accessed without first cultivating this. (§16) Lawgivers and law-codes in all parts of the world have made great efforts to fill the souls of free men with good hopes; but he who comes to be of good hope without exhortation, and apart from commands, has been trained to this virtue by an unwritten law, learned by himself, which has been laid down by nature.

Chapter 3: Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§17–26 (§17) Second in order after hope comes repentance for sins and improvement. Hence it is that he [Moses] lists next the one who changed from a worse life to the better, who is called by the Hebrews “Enoch,” but as the Greeks would say, “receiver of grace,” of whom this specifically is said, that “Enoch was well pleasing to God, and he was not found, because God transferred him.”c (§ 18) For “transference”d denotes turning and change; and the change is for the better, because it comes about through the forethought of God; for everything done with the help of God is in all cases noble and advantageous, even as that which is done without divine care is of no profit. (§19) And it is well said of the one transferred that “he was not found,” (either) because his old, blameworthy life has been wiped out and made to disappear and is no longer found, just as if it had never existed in the first place, or because he who is “transferred”e in this way and ranked in the better class is by nature difficult to find, for evil is multiple and varied, and for that reason is familiar to the general run of people, but virtue is rare, so that it is difficult to grasp even by a few. (§ 20) Fur-

a Lev 19:24

b Lev 19:24

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thermore, the bad man, seeing as he is obsessed with social activity, is forever bustling around the market-place and the theatres, law-courts, meeting-places of council or popular assembly, and any sort of gathering or social group, letting loose his tongue in immoderate, endless, and ill-judged talk, casting confusion and spoiling things everywhere, mixing up truth with falsehood, what should be uttered with what should not be, private with public, sacred with profane, and serious with frivolous—all because he has not been trained in that fairest aspect of discretion, silence, with his ears pricked up to be ready for officious meddling in others’ affairs; (§21) for he is longing to learn of either the good or the evil fortune of others, so that he may straightway begrudge the former and rejoice at the latter—for the bad man is by nature a malicious creature, a hater of good and a lover of evil. (§22) The good man, on the other hand, becoming a devotee of the quiet life, withdraws and embraces solitude, wishing to escape the notice of the multitude, not through any hatred of humanity—for he is a lover of humanity, if anyone is—but owing to his having rejected that evil which is welcomed by the common throng, who take pleasure in what should rightly cause them lamentation, and grieve at what should properly give them joy. (§ 23) For this reason he mostly shuts himself up at home and stays there, hardly crossing his threshold, or indeed, if beset by too many visitors, he heads out of the city and spends his time on some isolated farm, consorting more happily with those best of the whole human race, whose bodies may have been dissolved by time, but whose excellences shine forth through their surviving works, both poetry and prose, from which the soul may naturally derive improvement. (§ 24) It is for this reason that he said that the transferred one “was not found,”a since he is hard to find and hard to catch. So he passes over to culture from ignorance, from witlessness to wisdom, from cowardice to courage, from impiety to piety, and likewise from hedonism to self-control, from love of fame to freedom from self-importance. What wealth is comparable to this, what acquisition of kingship or dominion is more advantageous than this? (§ 25) For, to tell the truth, the wealth which is not blind but sharp-sighted is the full complement of virtues, which, in contrast to bastard types of rule, falsely so named, must be considered the genuine and lawful administration, presiding justly over all alike. (§26) But we must not ignore the fact that repentance takes second place to perfection, even as a change to health from disease is inferior to a body that is free from disease. Uninterrupted perfection in virtues, then, stands nearest to divine power, but improvement over time is a boon peculiar to the naturally a Gen 5:24

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gifted soul which does not remain bound to childish interests but with the aid of more mature and truly manly aspirations strives after a state of serenity, and pursues a vision of what is noble.

Chapter 4: Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§27–47 (§27) It is for this reason quite natural that next after the repentant one he should rank him who is beloved by God and himself a lover of virtue, who in the language of the Hebrews is called “Noah,” but in that of the Greeks “rest”a or “just”b—both very suitable appellations for the wise man. “Just” is obviously so, since there is nothing better than justice, the leader among the virtues, which dominates them like the fairest one in a dance troupe; but “rest” is suitable also, since, by contrast, unnatural motion is the cause of upheavals and turmoils, faction-fights and wars, in which the bad involve themselves, while a life that is calm and tranquil and stable and, in sum, peaceful is sought by those who honor moral excellence. (§28) It is consistent of him [Moses], also, that he should give the seventh day, which the Hebrews call “Sabbath,” the name of “rest”c—not, as is held by some, because after six days the general mass of people left off from their usual tasks, but because in truth the number seven both at the cosmic level and in each one of us is always free from contention and war and rivalry, and is the most peaceable of all numbers. (§29) As witnesses to what has just been said we may adduce the faculties within us; for the six of them stir up unceasing and continuous warfare on land and sea, that is to say the five senses and the faculty of articulate speech—the former through desire for the objects of sense, failure to acquire which causes them distress, the latter babbling “with unbridled mouth” a host of things better left unsaid. (§ 30) The seventh faculty, on the other hand, is that involving the ruling intellect, which, when it has come to dominate the six and overpowers them with superior strength, retires into itself, embracing solitude and [rejoicing in]7 its own company, as being free from dependence on anything else and supremely self-sufficient, is then rid of the cares and concerns of the mortal race and embraces a mode of life which is calm and serene. (§31) So greatly, then, does he exalt the lover of virtue, that, in giving his genealogy, he does not, as is his custom elsewhere, present a catalogue of grandfathers or great-grandfathers or ancestors generally, either in the male or the a Gen 5:29

b Gen 6:9

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female line, but rather of virtues, proclaiming all but directly that the wise man has no other household and kindred and native landa than the virtues and actions performed in accordance with virtuous actions; for “these,” he says, “are the generations of Noah; Noah, a just person [or human], perfect in his generation, was well-pleasing to God.”b (§32) We should not ignore the fact that in this passage he is not using the term “human”c in the usual sense of “rational mortal animal,” but of human in the pre-eminent sense, of one who truly merits the name by having expelled from his soul the untamed and raging passions and most bestial vices. (§33) And this is evidenced by the fact that, after “human” he adds “just,” saying, “a human, a just one,”d inasmuch as the unjust is not a human (more strictly speaking, he is a beast in human form), and that only he is a human who is a devotee of justice. (§ 34) He says of him also that he became “perfect,”e indicating by this that he acquired, not just one virtue, but all of them, and having acquired them continued to practice each of them as occasion arose. (§35) And after crowning him as a victorious contender, he grants him the additional adornment of a most distinguished proclamation in declaring that “he was well-pleasing to God.”f What in the realm of nature could be better than this? What clearer proof could there be of moral excellence? For if those who are ill-pleasing to God are wretched, then it surely falls to those who are well-pleasing to be truly happy. (§36) However, it is not off the mark that, having commended the man on the basis of such virtues, he [Moses] should add that he was “perfect in his generation,”g thus indicating that he was not absolutely good, but only in comparison with the people of that time. (§37) For indeed after no long interval he will make mention of other sages, possessing a type of virtue quite unalloyed, who are not just being measured against the bad, nor deemed worthy of approval and precedence because they were better than their contemporaries, but because, having been granted a well-gifted nature, they preserved it undistorted, not by recoiling from evil practices, but by not falling in with them in the first place, and thus essentially adorning their lives through becoming practitioners of noble deeds and words. (§38) Most admirable of all, then, are those men who possessed impulses which were free and noble from birth, not in imitation of or in opposition to others, but embracing beauty itself and justice itself; yet admirable also is he who stands apart from his own generation and does not associate with any of the things that attract the enthusiasm of the throng. He will gain the second prize, though nature will grant the highest award to those others. (§ 39)

a Gen 12:1

b Gen 6:9

c Gen 6:9

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Nonetheless, second prize is also something great; after all, what is not great and greatly to be prized, of those things offered and bestowed by God? The clearest proof of this is the abundance of the graces which came his [Noah’s] way. (§40) For that period produced a crop of misdeeds, and every country and nation and city and household and each individual teemed with wicked activities, as all willingly and consciously battled, as if taking part in a contest, for the first prize in sinfulness—for they competed with all enthusiasm, each one striving to outdo his neighbor in magnitude of wickedness, and leaving nothing undone which would contribute to a blameworthy and accursed lifestyle. (§41) In face of this, God, being quite reasonably displeased that the creature which seemed to be the best, and which had been deemed worthy of kinship with Himself by virtue of sharing in reason, rather than practicing virtue as he should, pursued vice and all the forms of vice, decreed the appropriate punishment, resolving to eliminate all those then existing by means of a flood, not only those on flat ground and in low-lying areas, but even those dwelling on the highest mountains. (§42) For the great sea, rising to a height never experienced before, rushed in with all its force through its various outlets to the seas of our part of the world, and they in turn, swelling up, engulfed both islands and mainlands, while the constant streams of everflowing springs and rivers, both permanent and seasonal torrents, joined up, pouring into one another, and mounted upwards to the heights. (§ 43) Nor did the air remain still; for a dense and unbroken cloud covered the whole heaven, and there were violent winds and rumbles of thunder and flashes of lightning and falls of thunderbolts, to the accompaniment of unceasing downpours of rain, so that one would think that the parts of the universe were dissolving and striving towards the single elementary substance of water,a until, with what was above pouring down and what was below rising up, the streams rose on high, causing the disappearance not only of the submerged plains and lowlying grounds, but even of the peaks of the highest mountains.b (§ 44) For all parts of the earth sank below water, so that it was all snatched away and the world seemed to be shorn of a large part of itself, and its completeness and perfection mutilated in a manner unsuitable to be mentioned or even conceived of. Indeed even the air, except for a small part in the region of the moon, was all swallowed up, overcome by the rush and violence of the water which forcibly occupied its place. (§45) And then indeed did all sown crops and trees immediately perish—for a boundless quantity [of water] is as destructive as a total lack—and countless herds of animals died, domesticated as well as wild; for it was only to be expected that, if the most excellent class of being, humans, a Gen 7:19

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disappeared, none of the inferior ones would be left, since they came into existence to fulfill its needs, as slaves, in a way, to submit to their master’s orders. (§46) In the midst, then, of the onset of so many and such terrible evils, which that time rained down—for all the parts of the world, apart from those in the heavens, were disturbed beyond what is natural, as if through succumbing to a grim and deadly disease—only one household, that of the justa and God-beloved man mentioned above was preserved, receiving in the process two supreme gifts, the one that I have already mentioned, of not perishing together with all these others, the other of being in turn constituted as the inaugurator of a new race of humanity. For God considered him worthy to become both the end and the beginning of our race, the end of those before the flood, and the beginning of those after it. (§47) Such, then, was he who was best of those of his time, and such were the rewards bestowed upon him, even as the holy word has shown. Now the three mentioned above, whether you take them as men or as types of soul, constitute a harmoniously graded order; for the perfectb one is complete from the outset; the transferredc is a half-completed creature, having dedicated the former period of his life to vice, but the latter to virtue, to which he passed over and migrated; and the hoper,d as his very name indicates, is defective, yearning as he does always for the good, while never quite able to attain this, but resembling people on a sea voyage, who are striving to reach port, but yet remain at sea, unable to find a haven.

a Gen 6:9

b Gen 6:9

c Gen 5:24

d Gen 4:26

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The Second Triad, §§48–59 Chapter 5: The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§ 48–59 (§48) We have now set out the first triad of those who have sought after virtue. Of more weight, however, is the second triad, of which we must now speak. For the former is like the studies of those at the level of childhood, while the latter may be compared to the exercises of adult athletes in training for games that are sacred in the true sense, who, while despising bodily exercises, are working towards a good state in the soul, striving for victory over the passions, their opponents. (§49) The respects in which each of these differed from the others in their drive towards one and the same goal we will speak of in more detail presently; what should be specified about all three together, though, is something not to be passed over in silence. (§50) It so happens, in fact, that all these were of one household and one race, the last being the son of the middle one, and the grandson of the first, and all were both lovers of God and in turn loved by God, cherishing the true God and cherished in return by Him, who deemed it proper, as the oracles show, because of the heights of virtue which they attained throughout their lives, to associate them with His proper title. (§ 51) For He linked them together by uniting His own proper name harmoniously with theirs, calling Himself by a title blended from the three: “For this,” He says, “is my eternal name, ‘God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob’”a—substituting for an absolute title a relative one. And this, not unreasonably; for God has no need of a name, but even though not needing one, yet He granted to the human race a suitable appellation, so that by having a haven for their requests and prayers, they should not be deprived of their share of good hope. (§52) These words seem to be speaking about men of holy character, but in fact they are indications of a natural order which is more obscure than, and far superior to, the realm of sense-perception. For the sacred word would seem to be investigating types of soul, all of noble nature, one striving towards the good through instruction, one through natural ability, one through practice. For the first, by name Abraham, is a symbol of excellence derived from teaching, the middle one, Isaac, from natural ability, the third, Jacob, from practice. (§ 53) a Exod 3:15

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However, one should not ignore the fact that, while each of them lays claim to all three capacities, each acquires its title from that capacity which is dominant within it; for it is not possible for instruction to be brought to perfection without natural ability or practice, nor can nature rise to its proper limit without learning or practice, nor yet can practice, if it be not based on the foundations of nature and instruction. (§54) It is entirely appropriate, then, that he should have linked together these three—in theory, men, but really, as I have said, types of excellence, namely, natural ability, learning, and practice—in order that the eternal name revealed in the oracles may be referred not to human beings but rather to the three afore-mentioned capacities. (People call these by another name, the Graces, also three in number, either because God has bestowed upon our race these three capacities for the perfection of our lives, or because they have given themselves to the rational soul, as a gift perfect and most lovely.)8 (§55) For the nature of human beings is perishable, while that of the moral excellences is imperishable; and it is more suitable that the eternal should be called by what is imperishable rather than what is mortal, since imperishability is akin to eternity, while death is its foe. (§56) We should not neglect also to observe this fact, that, while he [Moses] presents the first human, the earthborn,a as father of all those born up to the flood, and the one who, together with all his household, was the sole survivor of that great destruction, because of his righteousness and general moral excellence, as father of the new human race which would spring up again, the oracles call this most august and admirable triad father of one species, which is given the epithets “royalty” and “priesthood” and “holy nation.”b (§ 57) And its name gives us an indication of its potency; for the nation is denominated in the language of the Hebrews “Israel,” which when translated is “one who sees God.” Now sight by means of the eyes holds the noblest place among all the senses, since through it alone are grasped the most beautiful of existing things, the sun, the moon, and the whole heaven and ordered world; but that which derives from the ruling principle of the soul excels all those other faculties which surround it: and this is wisdom, which is the “vision” of the intellect. (§ 58) As for him who has succeeded not merely in acquiring a scientific understanding of everything else in the realm of nature, but also in seeing the Father and Creator of all things, let him know that he has attained to the peak of good fortune; for nothing is higher than God, towards whom if one has succeeded in extending the eye of his soul, let him pray for permanence and rest in that state. (§59) Uphill roads, after all, are toilsome and slow, while the course downwards,

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manifesting more of the stampede than of any orderly descent, is swift and easy. And many indeed are the influences which force us downward, but none of them have any advantage when God, suspending the soul from His Powers, draws it to Himself with a more powerful pull.

part two The Life of Abraham, §§ 60–276

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a

The Piety of Abraham, §§60–207 Chapter 6: The Migrations of Abraham, §§ 60–88 a Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§60–67 (§60) All this, then, may serve by way of necessary preface concerning the three in common. We must now speak in turn of the areas in which each excelled individually, taking our start from the first. He, then, having become a devotee of piety, the highest and greatest of the virtues, strove to follow God and be obedient to His commands, taking His commands to be not just those communicated through voice and letters, but also those revealed through nature by clearer signs, which are grasped by the truest of the senses, rather than by the untrustworthy and unreliable sense of hearing. (§ 61) For anyone who beholds the order in nature and the constitution superior to all reasoning, the constitution under which the cosmos lives, is able to learn, without anyone stating it, how to practice a law-abiding and peaceful life, by attending to assimilation to the nobility associated with it. Now the clearest proofs of his piety are those provided by the holy scriptures; and we should mention first that which is also placed first in order. (§ 62) Impelled by a divine command concerning the abandoning of his native land and kinsfolk and ancestral home,a and the betaking of himself to another land, he made haste to comply, as if returning from a foreign land to his own rather than being about to uproot himself from his own toward a foreign one, deeming ready compliance with the command to be of equal value to the completing of it. (§63) And yet who else would be likely to be so unbending and immovable as not to be seduced and overcome by the attractions of kinsfolk and native land,b desire for which is in a way inborn and grows within each one of us, and constitutes more than, or at least as much as, the integral parts of our nature? (§64) As evidence for this we may adduce lawgivers, who prescribe as a penalty second only to death, for those convicted of the greatest offences, exile—though indeed, in my view at least, it is not second to it, if truth is to be the judge, but something much more grievous, at least if we take it that death is an end of woes, whereas exile is a beginning, not an end, of ever-new misfortunes, substituting for one death without further pains a myriad of deaths, each accompanied by sensation. (§65) Some men go voyaging for business reasons a Gen 12:1

b Gen 12:1

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through desire for gain, or on an embassy, or for the purpose of viewing the features of foreign lands through love of learning, possessing as forces drawing them towards remaining abroad, in the one case, the prospect of profit, in another, the chance of benefiting one’s city in a time of emergency in respect of the most pressing and essential issues, in yet another, the process of enquiring into those things of which they were previously ignorant, bestowing as it does both pleasure and profit upon the soul—for blind indeed, as compared with the sharp-sighted, are those who have not traveled abroad, by comparison with those who have—but nonetheless they are eager to see and salute their ancestral soil, greet their familiar companions, and rejoice in the most sweet and longed-for sight of their relations and friends, and indeed in many cases, when they see the affairs which drew them abroad being unduly prolonged, they have abandoned them, dragged back by a most irresistible desire for their familiar environment. (§66) This man, however, with a few companions or even alone, as soon as he received orders, emigrated from his home, and his departure was one of soul even more than of body, his love of the things of heaven surpassing his desire for mortal things. (§67) Taking thought, then, for no one, not clansmen, not demesmen, not fellow-students, not companions, not blood-relations on father’s or mother’s side, nor native land, nor ancient customs, nor community of nurture nor upbringing, each of which possesses an influential and attractive power that is hard to shake off, with free and unconstrained impulse he set off with all speed, first from the land of the Chaldeans, a well-endowed land, and at that time at its peak, to the land of the Harranians, and then again, not long after that, from this to yet another place, about which we will speak after first saying the following. b Allegorical Interpretation, §§68–84 (§68) The migrations set forth on the literal level of the text were performed by a wise man, but in accordance with the laws of allegory by a virtue-loving soul in search of the true God. (§69) For the Chaldeans, who devoted themselves above all to the study of astrology and attributed all things to the movements of the stars, held that everything in the cosmos was regulated by powers which are comprehended by numbers and proportions between numbers, and they paid homage to visible substance, taking no account of the invisible and intelligible, but investigating the order manifested in the former things [i.e., of visible substance] in relation to the circuits of the sun and moon and the other planets and fixed stars, and in relation to the changes of the annual seasons and the sympathetic influence of the heavenly bodies upon terrestrial things, and held that the cosmos itself was God, impiously likening the created to its Creator.

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(§70) Having been brought up, then, in this doctrine, and having followed Chaldean beliefs for some considerable time, as if from deep sleep he opened the eye of the soul and, beginning to view pure radiance in place of profound darkness, he followed the light and beheld what he had not seen before, a kind of charioteer and helmsman of the cosmos presiding over and directing in a salutary way His own creation, bestowing care and supervision upon all those parts of it which are deserving of divine concern. (§ 71) So then, in order to fix more firmly the vision that had been manifested to him in his mind, the holy word addresses him as follows: “Good fellow, large things are often observed in outline form in small ones, so that one looking to these latter enlarges his vision by an incalculable degree. So set to one side those entities that traverse the heavens and the lore of the Chaldeans, and transfer yourself for a short while from the greatest city, that of this cosmos, to a smaller one, by means of which you will better be able to comprehend the Director of the universe.” (§72) It is for this reason that he is said to have undertaken his first emigration, from the land of the Chaldeans to that of the Harranians. Now “Harran” in the Greek language means “holes,” thus symbolically, the sites of our senses, through which each naturally looks out as through peep-holes for the purpose of grasping its own proper objects. (§73) But what, one might ask, would be the use of these, if the invisible mind, like a puppet-master, were not directing them from within by its own powers, now relaxing and loosening them, now holding them back and forcibly reining them in, so as to allow the puppets harmonious motion, or, alternatively, rest? If you keep this example in your mind, you will easily understand that of which you earnestly desire to gain knowledge. (§ 74) For it is not the case that within you there is a mind designated as leader, which the whole commonality of the body obeys and each of the senses individually follows, while the cosmos, the fairest and greatest and most perfect creation, of which everything else is a part, is lacking a king who holds it together and administers it in accordance with justice. And if this king is invisible, let there be no astonishment at that; for neither is the mind within you visible. (§ 75) Anyone who thinks these things over and learns, not from some distant source but from a nearby one, namely, oneself and what belongs to one, will come to know clearly that the cosmos is not the supreme God, but rather the work of the supreme God and Father of all, who, while being Himself invisible, makes manifest all things, through distinguishing the natures of objects both small and great. (§76) For He did not consider it proper for Him to be perceived by the eyes of the body, perhaps since it was unholy for the mortal to make contact with the eternal, perhaps too because of the weakness of our eyesight; for it could not have handled the beams pouring out from the Existent, since it is not able to look directly [even] at the rays of the sun.

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(§77) There is a very clear proof of the migration which the intellect undertakes from astrology and the Chaldean doctrine; for right at the time of the sage’s migration it is said: “And God was seen by Abraham”a—from which it is clear that He was not visible to him before, when, under the influence of Chaldeanism, he was giving his attention to the choric movement of the stars, with absolutely no understanding that there was a well-structured and intelligible nature outside the cosmos and the realm of sense-perception. (§ 78) But when he emigrated and changed his place of residence, by necessity he came to recognize that the cosmos is subservient and not sovereign, not presiding but presided over by a causal principle which created it, something which his intellect, then first regaining its sight, beheld. (§ 79) For previously a great mist was poured over it by sense-perceptible objects, that, after he had dispelled it by means of fervid and brilliant doctrines, he was able with difficulty to gain as if it were in clear daylight a vision of that One who had been so long hidden and invisible. And He, by reason of his love for humanity, did not turn away as from Himself the soul who approached Him, but rather going to meet it He showed it His nature, in so far as it was possible for the beholder to see. (§ 80) And that is why it is said, not that the sage saw God, but that “God was seen”b by the sage; for it was impossible for anyone on his own to grasp the truly Existent, unless He revealed and showed Himself. (§81) Evidence in support of what I have said is provided by the alteration and change of his name; for the original name by which he was called was “Abram,” whereas he was called later “Abra(h)am.”c In the vocalization this involves merely the doubling of one letter, the alpha, but in significance this change carries great consequence and teaching. (§ 82) For “Abram” means, when translated, “exalted father,” while “Abra(h)am”d means “chosen father of sound,” the former indicating one who is termed an astrologer and student of the heavens, and thus a guardian of Chaldean lore, as a father might care for his offspring, while the latter indicates the sage; (§ 83) for through the word “sound” he hints at the uttered thought, and through the word “father” [he hints at] the ruling intellect—for the internal thought is by nature the “father” of the uttered, being senior to it and sowing what is to be said—while through “chosen” he hints at the worthy man; for the worthless character is aimless and confused, whereas the good is “chosen,” being selected out from all others by reason of merit. (§84) For the student of the heavens, then, there seems to be absolutely nothing greater than the cosmos, to which he attributes even the causes of all that comes to be. The sage, however, beholding with sharper eyes something more perfect, an object of intellection which rules and administers, by a Gen 12:7

b Gen 12:7

c Gen 17:5

d Gen 17:5

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which all things are dominated and directed, lays heavy blame upon himself for his former life, as having pursued a blind life-style, relying only upon the realm of sense, which is by nature a thing insecure and without solid foundation. c Resumption of Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 85–87 (§85) The second migration which the worthy man undertakes, once more in obedience to an oracle, is no longer from one city to another, but into a desolate place,a in which he spends his time wandering, though without any complaint about the wandering and the instability caused by it. (§ 86) And yet who else would not have grumbled, not only about being uprooted from his home, but also being driven from every city into pathless places difficult to access and penetrate? Who would not have turned back and retraced his steps homeward, giving little thought to future hopes, while striving to escape from present distress, considering it foolish to choose admitted evils for the sake of unseen goods? (§87) This one alone seems to have experienced the opposite, considering the sweetest life to be one free from consorting with the multitude. And that is after all a natural thing; for those who seek and desire to find God embrace the solitariness that is dear to Him, in this very respect striving first of all to liken themselves to His blessed and happy nature. d Conclusion, §88 (§88) So then, having provided both levels of exposition, the literal as relating to a man, and the allegorical as relating to a soul, we have revealed both the man and the intellect to be worthy of devotion, the one as having, in obedience to oracles, been dragged away from what was hard to tear oneself away from, while the intellect, because it did not, in a state of complete delusion, stand firm on sensible substance, considering the visible world to be the greatest and supreme deity, but through resorting to reasoning came to behold another, intelligible nature greater than the visible, and the maker and leader of both of these together.

Chapter 7: Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§ 89–106 a Literal Interpretation, §§89–98 (§89) These, then, are the preliminary stages of the one beloved of God, upon which follow actions that are notable indeed. Their magnitude, however, is not apparent to everyone, but only to those who have had a taste of virtue, who on a Gen 12:9

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account of the greatness of the goods of the soul are accustomed to disparage what would be an occasion of wonder to the many. (§90) So then, God, having approved the afore-mentioned course of action, straightway rewards the good man with a great gift, by preserving his marriage unviolated and safe in face of a threat to it from a powerful and intemperate man. (§91) The cause of this outrage arose from the following circumstance. Since a failure of crops had occurred over a long period, at one time by reason of excessive and disproportionate rainfall, at another because of drought and stormy winds, the cities of Syria, being hard pressed by unremitting famine, were becoming devoid of inhabitants, who scattered in all directions in search of food and for the procurement of necessities. (§ 92) Abraham, then, having learned of unstinting prosperity and abundance in Egypt, since the river irrigated the plains with its seasonal floods and the well-tempered winds brought to fruition and fostered a fine growth of corn, gathered up his whole household and headed off in that direction. (§93) He had a wife both superlative in soul and fairest in body above all of her contemporaries. When the ruling clique among the Egyptians laid eyes on her and marveled at her great beauty—for nothing escapes the notice of those in power—they informed the king. (§94) He in turn sent for the lady and, once he had beheld the remarkable sight that she presented, giving little regard to shame or to the laws which define the respect to be shown to strangers, but giving in to his licentious instincts, resolved in theory to take her in marriage, but in reality to dishonor her. (§95) But she, since she was in a foreign land and at the mercy of a licentious and hard-hearted tyrant, found herself at a loss as to whom to turn to for aid—for her husband was in no position to help her, fearful as he was in face of the threat emanating from stronger forces—and took refuge, along with him, in the ultimate source of support, which flows from God. (§ 96) And He, benign and gentle as He is, and solicitous for the defense of those suffering wrongs, taking pity on the strangers, inflicted upon the king pains hard to endure and heavy penalties, filling his body and soul with all sorts of evils difficult to heal, so as on the one hand to drive out all impulses tending to pleasure, and on the other hand to introduce concerns of an opposite nature, related to the relieving of incessant tortures, the harassment of which was racking him day and night. (§97) Indeed his whole household shared this punishment, as none of them had felt disgust at his lawlessness, but all of them, on account of their agreement, had practically participated in committing the crime. (§98) In this way the chastity of the wife was preserved, and God deemed it right to do public honor to the nobility and piety of the husband by awarding him this greatest prize, the preservation unharmed and unviolated of his marriage, which ran the risk of almost being destroyed—a marriage

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which was destined to produce not just a small number of sons or daughters, but rather a whole nation, and indeed the most God-beloved of nations, which in my view has been assigned, on behalf of the whole human race, the roles of priesthood and prophecy. b Allegorical Interpretation, §§99–106 (§99) However, I have also heard specialists in physical philosophy not inappropriately allegorizing the contents of this passage, who used to say that the husband here is being taken as symbolizing the good intellect, deducing from the significance of the interpreted version of his name a noble cast of soul; while his wife signifies virtue, her name being in Chaldean “Sarah,” but in Greek “ruling one,” by reason of the fact that there is nothing more dominant and authoritative than virtue. (§100) Now a marriage that is arranged under the stimulus of pleasure is characterized by the union of bodies, whereas one which is stimulated by wisdom is characterized by a union of reasoning powers in pursuit of purification and perfect virtues. The afore-mentioned marriages are completely opposite to each other. (§101) For in the marriage of bodies, the male sows, while the female receives the seed, but conversely, in that which is a union of souls, virtue, while seemingly taking on the role of wife, is naturally fitted to sow good counsels and noble reasonings and stimulations to the most life-enhancing principles, while reason, though deemed to be in the position of husband, receives into itself the sanctified and divine sowings. Or perhaps, rather, the account here has been skewed into falsity by the deceptiveness of the terms involved, since in the usages of language νοῦς partakes of the masculine gender and ἀρετή of the feminine. (§102) If, however, one is prepared to strip away the obscuring terminology and contemplate purely the bare facts of the situation, one will realize that virtue is by nature something male, insofar as it moves and arranges and stimulates fine thoughts of fine deeds and utterances, whereas reason is something female, seeing as it is moved and educated and helped, and in general is ranked in the passive category, and this passivity is its only means of deliverance. (§103) All people, then, even the worst, at least in theory honor and admire virtue as far as appearances go, but only the good practice its teachings. Hence the king of Egypt, the very one who symbolically represents the body-loving intellect, putting on an act as in a theatre, assumes a fraudulent appearance of fellowship, the incontinent with continence, the licentious with moderation, the unjust with justice, and summons virtue to himself through craving for good repute with the multitude. (§104) Observing this, the Overseer—for it is only God that can see into the soul—hates the fabricated character, and rejects it, and tests it with the most grievous tortures. And with what instruments are

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these tortures inflicted? Surely with none other than the parts of virtue, which coming next on the stage harshly inflict torment and injury. For the torture for greed is frugality, while the torture for lewdness is self-control; the lover of glory is put on the rack when unpretentiousness flourishes, and the unjust when justice finds praise. (§105) For there is no way that one and the same soul can govern two mutually hostile natures, vice and virtue; for which reason, when they are brought together, unresolvable and irreconcilable conflicts and wars are stirred up, despite the fact that virtue possesses a most peaceable nature, whose concern it is, they say, when the likelihood of a conflict looms, to survey its own capacity, so that, if this is strong enough to prevail, it will engage in battle, whereas if it is dealing with a comparatively weak capacity, it will not venture in the first place to enter the contest. (§ 106) For there is no disgrace for vice in being beaten, since a bad reputation is part of its very nature, but for virtue it is a reproach, since of all things a good reputation is most proper to it, which makes it natural for it either to win or to preserve itself free from defeat.

Chapter 8: The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§ 107–132 a Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§107–118 (§107) So much, then, for the lack of hospitality and immoderate behavior shown by the Egyptians. But as for the victim of this treatment, one may justly admire his love of humanity, seeing that, when in the noonday he observed three what seemed to be human travelers—their actual more divine nature had escaped him—he rushed up to them and begged them earnestly not to pass by his tent, but to come in, as was right and proper, and to partake of hospitality. And they, recognizing, not on the basis of his words but of his attitude, that he was genuine about this, assented without hesitation. (§ 108) He then, his soul filled with joy, set about eagerly for their prompt reception, and said to his wife: “Hurry and prepare three servings of ash-baked cakes.”a And he himself hastened to his cowsheds, chose out a calf that was tender and plump, and handed it over to a servant. (§109) The servant slaughtered it and prepared it with all speed; for in the household of a sage no one is slow in showing kindness, but women and men and slaves and free show the greatest enthusiasm for the service of guests. (§110) And so, having feasted not on the sustenance provided to them but rather on the gracious attitude and great, and indeed boundless, generosity, they provided him with a prize beyond his hope, promising him the birth of a Gen 18:6

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a legitimate son, guaranteed for the coming year. This promise was conveyed through one of the three, who was the best of them—for it would have been contrary to philosophy for them to have spoken about this all together, while it was fitting for the others to signify assent to the one who spoke. (§ 111) But they [sc. Abraham and Sarah], because of the unbelievable nature of the subjectmatter, did not give firm credence to the promisers; for by reason of their being far over the natural age-limit they had long since despaired of the birth of a child. (§112) So he9 says that after hearing, the woman first laughed, and subsequently, when they said to her, “Is anything impossible for God?,”a feeling ashamed, she denied this laughter; for she knew that all things are possible with God, having learned this teaching almost from the cradle. (§ 113) It is at this point, I think, that she first acquired a view of the figures before her no longer the same, but rather one more august, of prophets or angels who had transformed from a spiritual and soul-like nature into human form. (§114) We have now described the hospitality of the man, which is itself an incidental aspect of a greater virtue. That virtue is piety, about which we have spoken earlier, and of which the tale that has just been related is a particularly clear example, even if we were to assume that the strangers were men. (§ 115) But if some maintain that that household was happy and blessed, into which wise men happened to call in and stay a while, who would not have deigned even to stop and peep into it had they discerned any incurable passion in the souls of its inhabitants, I cannot conceive how I should express the excess of happiness and blessedness pertaining to that house in which angels were prepared to stop off and receive hospitality at the hands of humans—angels, those holy and divine natures, servants and lieutenants of the supreme God, through whose agency, as ambassadors, He announces such predictions as He wishes to make to our race. (§116) For how would they have been prepared to enter in the first place, if they had not recognized that all those within, like the welldisciplined crew of a ship, were acting in obedience to the single command of their director, as if of a captain? And how would they have allowed the impression of being feasted and entertained, if they had not regarded their host as a kinsman and fellow-servant who had taken refuge with their own master? Indeed we must reckon that at their very entrance all the parts of the household advanced still more in excellence, through being inspired by a sort of waft of perfect virtue. (§117) The gathering took place as one would expect, with the guests exhibiting towards their host due restraint in their feasting, addressing him with simple frankness, and having interactions appropriate to the occasion. (§118) It is remarkable, indeed, that, though they did not in fact drink or a Gen 18:14

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eat, they gave the appearance that they were both drinking and eating. But that is by the way. The primary and most marvelous thing is that they, incorporeal as they were, transformed themselves into the shape of humans for the benefit of that good man; for why else was this miracle performed than to provide a perception to the sage by means of a fairly clear vision that his being such as he was had not been overlooked by the Father? b Allegorical Interpretation, §§119–132 (§119) So much then for the literal exegesis; we may now commence the allegorical. Words uttered are symbols of things grasped by the mind alone. So then, when the soul is illuminated by God as if with noonday sun,a and, bathed through and through in intelligible light, it receives the rays shed all around free of shadow,10 it [the soul] grasps the triple appearance of a single subject, one representing the true being, the other two in the role of shadows cast by the first. Something like this happens also to those who dwell in the realm of perceptible light; for whether things are stationary or in motion, they often cast two shadows at the same time. (§120) Not that one should imagine that talk of shadows is properly applied to God; that is the misuse of a word merely in the interests of clearer exposition of the subject matter, since the truth is not so. (§121) The fact is, as anyone would declare who stands closest to the truth, that the central position is held by the Father of all, who in the holy scriptures is called, by His proper name, He who Is,b while the figures on either side are His senior Powers and those closest to the Existent—the one, the Creative, the other, the Kingly. The Creative Power is called “God,” for with it He has established and ordered the universe, and the Kingly, “Lord,” for it is right and proper for the one that creates to rule over and dominate that which has been brought into being. (§122) He who is in the center, then, escorted as He is by each of His Powers, provides to the mind endowed with vision the appearance, now of one, and now of three; of one, when the mind comes to be thoroughly purified and, transcending not only the multiplicity of numbers but even the dyad which is next to the Monad, it presses forward to that form which is unmixed and unconnected and on its own, with no need of anything else whatever; of three, when, not yet initiated into the great mysteries, it is still a celebrant of the lesser, and cannot grasp the Being alone by itself without anything else, but only through its activities, whether creative or ruling. (§ 123) This, as they say, is a “second-best method of sailing,” but it partakes nonetheless of such opinion as is beloved of God. The former mode [of cognition], however, does not a Gen 18:1

b Exod 3:14

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merely partake, but is itself God-beloved opinion, or rather it is a truth which is prior to opinion and more valuable than all conjecture. But we should set out what is being revealed here in terms more easily understood. (§124) There are three orders of human temperament, each of which is allotted one of the appearances described above: the best is allotted the central form, that of the truly Existent; that which comes after it, the one on the right, the Beneficent, whose name is “God”; and the third, the one to the other side, the Ruling one, who is called “Lord.” (§125) Temperaments of the best sort worship the Existent alone by Himself, without being diverted to anything else, by virtue of striving single-mindedly towards the honoring of the One; of the other two, one is presented and made known to the Father through the Beneficent Power, the other, through the Kingly. (§126) What I mean is something like the following. People, when they perceive others approaching them on the pretext of friendship, but in eager pursuit of advantage, are suspicious and turn away, fearing their bogus flattery and cozening as something deeply harmful. (§127) God, however, inasmuch as He is not vulnerable to harm, gladly welcomes all who choose to honor Him for whatever reason, deeming it right not to reject anyone at all, but instead He virtually proclaims straight out to those who have ears in their soul the following message: (§128) “My highest rewards will be reserved for those who honor me for myself alone; the secondary ones, however, will go to those who do so for their own sakes, either hoping to gain benefits or looking to find release from punishments; for even if these people’s worship is mercenary and not free from self-interest, nonetheless it falls within the precincts of the divine and does not stray beyond them. (§129) The rewards reserved for those who honor me for myself, however, will count as gifts of friendship, whereas the reward for those who do so for self-interested reasons, while not friendship, is that they are not held to be alien to me. For I embrace both the one who wishes to gain a share of my beneficent power for the partaking of goods, and the one who in fear propitiates my ruling and dominant authority for the avoidance of punishment; for I am well aware that not only will they not become worse through this, but they will be better through their sustained worship, as they practice piety unsullied and pure. (§130) For however diverse may be attitudes of mind which elicit the impulses to please me, they are not to be reproached, since they have only one aim and purpose, to serve me.” (§131) That the triple manifestation is essentially that of a single subject is made plain not only from the allegorical treatment, but also from the literal text, which includes the following features. When the sage begs the three figures in the form of travelers to accept hospitality from him, he addresses them not as three, but as one, saying, “Lord, if I have found favor with you, do not

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pass your servant by.”a Here “Lord” and “with you” and “do not pass by” and other such phrases are of their nature addressed to a single interlocutor and not to many. (§132) And when the guests show their goodwill to their host, once again it is a single figure, as if he were the sole one present, who promises the birth of a legitimate son, in these words: “I will come back to you at this season next year, and Sarah, your wife, will have a son.”b

Chapter 9: The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§ 133–166 a Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§133–146 (§133) With particular clarity and specificity he discloses in what follows what is being revealed. The country of the Sodomites, part of the Canaanite land (later called Syria-Palestine), abounded in a myriad of wrongdoings, particularly those concerned with gluttony and sexual license, and reinforced these with the grossness and multiplicity of other pleasures, so as now finally to elicit the condemnation of the Judge of all. (§134) The cause of this immoderate licentiousness among the inhabitants was the unremitting abundance of their resources; for, being blessed with deep soil and good supplies of water, their country enjoyed year by year bountiful produce of all types of crops, and “the greatest source of evils,” as it has been aptly remarked, “is an excess of good things.” (§135) So then, being incapable of bearing such abundance, gamboling like frisky beasts, they shook off the law of nature, devoting themselves to deep draughts of unmixed wine, luxurious food, and unlawful forms of sex; for not only in their lust for women did they subvert other people’s marriages, but also men had intercourse with males, the active partners having no respect for the common nature shared with the passive partners, and therefore in their efforts at begetting children they were exposed as sowing a seed that could not come to fruition; such exposure however, was of no help to them, as they were overborne by lusts that were stronger. (§136) Then, in consequence of gradually accustoming those who were born as men to take on the role of females, they contrived for them a female disease, an evil hard to combat, not only feminizing their bodies by softness and luxury, but also rendering their souls more degenerate, and indeed, so far as they were capable, they were corrupting the whole human race. At any rate, if Greeks and barbarians had combined together in adopting such unions, the cities would have become progressively denuded of population, as if emptied by a plague.

a Gen 18:3

b Gen 18:10

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(§137) So God, taking pity, inasmuch as He is savior and benefactor of humanity, fostered to the maximum the natural unions of men and women which occur for the sake of the getting of children, but in His indignation suppressed the unnatural and lawless ones, and those who longed for these He cast out and, acting in an unprecedented way, punished with punishments by no means usual, but outlandish and extraordinary. (§ 138) For he commanded the air, which was suddenly clouded over, to shed a copious rain, not of water, but of fire; and as the flame poured down solidly in an uninterrupted and unceasing rush, burning consumed the fields and meadows and leafy groves and very rough marshes and deep thickets; it consumed the plain and all the crops of grain and other sown seeds; it consumed also the mountain forests, burning the trunks right down to the roots. (§139) Cattle-stalls and houses and walls and indeed all constructions for both private and public use were utterly consumed, and in a single day well-populated cities had become a tomb for their inhabitants, while constructions of stone and wood had turned to ash and light dust. (§140) And when the flame had completely wiped out all things visible above the ground, it then, penetrating deep down, proceeded to burn the earth itself, and destroyed its inherent life-giving power, reducing it to utter infertility, so that it would never again be capable of bearing fruit or any kind of herbage at all. Even now, indeed, it still burns, for the heaven-sent fire, never quenched, is either active or smouldering. (§141) And the clearest proof of this is what can still be seen, for a memorial of the disaster that befell is the smoke that still rises and the sulfur that is mined there; whereas the most manifest indication of the former prosperity of the land is the one city remaining from the whole neighborhood and the land around it, the city being well-populated, and the land rich in pasturage and corn and generally fertile, left there as proof of the judgment executed by divine decision. (§142) However, it is not for the sake of setting out such mighty and unprecedented misfortunes that I have provided this account, but rather out of a desire to draw attention to the following fact, namely, that, of the three entities that appeared as men to the sage, the oracles say that only two proceeded to the land that was wiped out in order to destroy its inhabitants, whereas the third deemed it right not to go. (§143) This last was in my opinion the truly Existent, who considered it to be fitting to bestow good things in person by His own agency, while assigning only to His Powers, acting as His agents, the carrying out of operations of the opposite kind, in order that He might be regarded as the cause of good things only, but not primarily the cause of anything evil. (§144) This I think is the practice also of those kings who imitate the divine nature, that they extend benefits by their own agency, but establish punishments through others. (§145) But since, of the two Powers, the one is Benef-

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icent, the other, Punitive, each of them makes its appearance in the land of the Sodomites, because, of the five finest cities in the region, four were going to be consumed by fire, while one was to be left safe from all harm. For it was appropriate that destruction should be carried out by the Punitive Power, but preservation by the Beneficent. (§146) But since even that part that was saved was not in possession of virtues that were whole and complete, it was granted benefits by a Power of the Existent, while it was deemed unworthy to have bestowed upon it a vision of Himself directly. b Allegorical Interpretation, §§147–166 (§147) This is the account on the obvious level, suited to the multitude; it is now time to report on the hidden level, suited to the few, those who study features of soul, and not forms of body. On the symbolic level, the group of five cities represent the five senses within us, the instruments of the pleasures, through which all pleasures, whether small or great, are brought to fulfillment. (§ 148) For we derive pleasure from seeing varieties of colors and shapes in both inanimate and animate objects, or from hearing sounds most melodious, or through taste in matters of food and drink, or through smell in scents of sweet fragrances, or through touch, in things that are soft and warm and also smooth. (§ 149) Now the most animal-like and slavish of the five are the three senses, taste, smell, and touch, over which the most gluttonous and sensual of beasts, both tame and wild, become most excited; for through the whole day and night they are either insatiably occupied with feeding or the impulse to mate. (§ 150) But there are two senses that are imbued with philosophy and suited to leadership, hearing and sight. However, the ears are in a way more sluggish and feminine than the eyes, which through their boldness take the initiative with the objects of sight, and do not wait until stimulated by them, but rather go out in advance to meet them and even seek to make counter-movements. So let hearing, in view of its sluggishness and femininity, take second rank, and let special precedence be granted to sight; for it is this that God has designated as the queen of the other senses, establishing it above them all and, by situating it as it were in a citadel, has rendered it most akin to soul. (§151) One may seek confirmation of this from the fact that it alters along with the various states of the soul. For when grief afflicts it [the soul], the eyes brim with anxiety and dejection, while when joy possesses it, they smile and are merry. When fear dominates it, on the other hand, they are full of confusion and disorder, exhibiting shifts and quivers and irregular rolling movements. (§ 152) If anger prevails, the glance is rather harsh and bloodshot; while in the process of reasoning and reflection on some topic it is calm and remote, the organ of sight seeming almost to be matching itself with the intellect, while in moments

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of relief and relaxation it is correspondingly relaxed and slackened. (§ 153) Likewise, on the approach of a friend, it prefigures the feeling of goodwill by its bright and peaceful glance, while if an enemy should chance to appear, it gives evidence of the displeasure experienced by the soul. Under the influence of boldness the eyes seem to leap forward and start out of their sockets, while modesty induces in them gentle repose. In sum, one could say that the faculty of sight has been crafted as an image of the soul, and reveals, as the highest achievement of an art which has performed its work of imitation well, a visible nature as a mirror-like image of something which does not have this nature. (§154) But is not only in this respect that the beauty of the eyes surpasses the other senses, but also by reason of the fact that, even in wakeful moments— not taking into account the inaction proper to sleep—the employment of the others is interrupted; for whenever some outside stimulus does not stir them they suspend activity, whereas the activity of the eyes, for as long as they are open, is continuous and uninterrupted, [the eyes] being never sated, and in this way demonstrating the affinity which they have with the soul. (§ 155) This latter, however, being in perpetual motion, is activated both by day and by night, whereas the eyes, having a predominant portion of flesh in their makeup, have been granted as a sufficient boon the continuous exercise of their proper activities for a half portion of their entire allotted life-span. (§156) But the most important aspect of the usefulness of the eyes must now be stated. For it is only for sight, among the senses, that God caused light to arise, which is the fairest of existent things, and indeed was first in the sacred scriptures to be called “good.”a (§157) Now the nature of light is twofold; for the one sort shines forth from the useful type of fire, perishable as its source is perishable, and is subject to quenching, whereas the other is unquenchable and indestructible, being borne to us from the heaven above, where each of the stars pours out its rays as from ever-flowing springs; and with each of these sight is well acquainted, and through both it reaches out to the objects of vision to gain the most accurate apprehension. (§158) But need we make any further attempt to lavish words of praise on the eyes, when God has inscribed their true praises in heaven, namely, in the form of the stars? For to what end have the beams of the sun and moon and the other planets and fixed stars come about, if not to facilitate the activity of the eyes in the service of sight? (§ 159) Wherefore it is by using the finest of all gifts, that of light, that people view the contents of the universe, earth, plants, living things, fruits, the surgings of the seas, rivers both spring-fed and swollen by rain and melted snow, and

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various kinds of springs, some pouring forth cold water, others, hot, and the natures of all things that come to be in the air—forms which are untellable and incomprehensible by reason—and above all the heaven, which in truth has been wrought as a cosmos within a cosmos, and the beauties and divine glories within the heaven. What one of the other senses can boast ever to traverse such a range of objects? (§160) But leaving aside those senses which fatten at the manger that beast which is innate in us, desire, let us examine one that makes some claim to reason, namely hearing; the most intense and perfect form of it comes to a halt at the level of the air which surrounds the earth, when the force of winds and rumbles of thunder emit a great whoosh and alarming racket. (§ 161) But the eyes move in a flash from earth to heaven and the bounds of the universe, to east and west, north and south alike, and when they have reached their goal they provoke the mind to contemplate what has appeared to them. (§ 162) And the mind in turn, on receiving a corresponding experience, does not remain inactive, but, as being a sleepless and ever-moving entity, accepting from the sight stimulations to be able to contemplate intelligible reality, comes to consider whether these visible phenomena are ungenerated or had a beginning of generation, whether they are infinite or finite, whether there is one world or more than one, and whether the four elements make up the whole of reality, or the heaven and its contents have been allotted a special nature and received a more divine substance, which is not the same as the rest; (§ 163) and indeed if the world did come into being, by whose agency did it do so, and who is its Creator, both in respect of His essence and of His quality; with what purpose in mind did He create; what is He doing now, what is His occupation and way of life; and such other things as an enquiring mind which has wisdom as its companion is accustomed to investigate. (§164) These questions and others like them are the province of philosophy; and this makes it plain that wisdom and the love of wisdom [i.e., philosophy] take their start from no other faculty within us than that leader among the senses, sight, which is accordingly the only one from the land of the body that God preserved when He destroyed the others, because they enslaved themselves to the flesh and the passions of the flesh, while it [sight] proved powerful enough to raise up its neck and look around, and to discover from contemplation of the cosmos and its contents other joys much better than pleasures of the body. (§165) So then it was right and proper for one out of, as it were, the Pentapolis of the five senses—sight—to gain this special boon of continuing in existence after the others had been destroyed, because it does not confine itself to mortal things as do they, but deems it worthwhile to betake itself to the realm of imperishable natures, rejoicing in the contemplation of these. (§166) Hence indeed it is very apt that the oracles should characterize

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this city variously as “small” and “not small,”a thereby alluding in their riddling way to sight; for it is said to be “small,” because it is just a little part of the totality of which we are made up, but “great,” because it strives for great things, in yearning to contemplate the whole heaven and cosmos together.

Chapter 10: The Sacrifice of Isaac, §§167–207 a Literal Interpretation, §§167–177 (§167) I have now given as accurate an account as I was able of the details of the vision that was manifested to him, and of those notable and excellent acts of hospitality, where, while appearing to entertain, the host himself was entertained. I must not now pass by in silence his greatest deed, a tale worth the telling; for I might almost assert that it surpasses all God-beloved acts. At any rate I must tell of it what is appropriate. (§168) Now a son of legitimate lineage was born to the sage by his wife, a much-lovedb and only son, both supremely fair of body and excellent of soul; for he was exhibiting virtues of greater perfection than warranted by his age, so that his father cherished him with strong affection, not only out of natural goodwill but also out of conviction, as a judge of morals. (§ 169) Being so disposed [sc. towards his son], he suddenly received an oracle such as he never expected, to the effect that he should sacrifice his son on a certain lofty hill at a great distance from the city, being a journey of three days. (§ 170) He, although devoted to his son with an inexpressible love, neither changed his complexion nor weakened his soul, but remained unbowed, with a mind unyielding and unwavering, even as he was before. Overpowered by love of God, he forcibly quelled the power of all the names and love-charms associated with kinship, and, telling the divine message to no one within the household, he chose from among his large household of servants just two, the oldest and most devoted to himself, and set off, as if to perform some one of the regular rituals, with his son and himself as a fourth. (§171) Catching sight, then, from far off, as from a lookout, of the prescribed location, he ordered the servants to stay behind, and gave to his son the fire and wood to carry, deeming it suitable for the victim to bear the instruments of sacrifice—truly a light burden; for nothing is freer from toil than piety. (§172) Walking, then, with equal speed, not so much in body, but rather in mental attitude, along that brief road, whose end is piety, they arrived at the place indicated. (§173) And then, as the father set about collecting stones in a Gen 19:20

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order to construct an altar, the son, since he saw everything else made ready for sacrifice, but no animal, looking towards his father, said, “See here, Father, there is fire and there is wood,a but where is the sacrificial victim?” (§ 174) Another man, knowing what he was about to do and concealing it within his soul, would have been confounded by this remark, and, in a flood of tears, would have given an intimation of what was to happen through remaining silent because of excess of emotion. (§175) But he [Abraham], admitting of no change in either body or mind, with steadfast gaze and steadfast resolve, replied to his enquiry, “My child, God will see to a sacrificial victim for himself,b even in this vast wilderness, which perhaps makes you give up hope that such will be found; but be well assured that all things are possible for God, even such as would be insuperable and impossible for humans.” (§ 176) And on saying this, as quickly as he could, he snatched up his son, placed him on the altar, and, grasping his sword in his right hand, brought it to bear with the purpose of putting him to death. But God, the Savior, intervened first with a voice from the air, with which He ordered him to desist and not to touch the child, calling on the father twice by name, so that by diverting him and drawing him back, he should prevent him from going through with the slaughter. (§ 177) And so the one [sc. Isaac] was preserved, through God returning the gift and reciprocating the honor paid to Him in the form of the object of worship brought to Him, while for the other [sc. Abraham] the deed, complete and perfect, even though not brought to a conclusion, is inscribed and immortalized not only in the sacred books but also in the minds of those who read them. b Ethical Interpretation, §§178–199 (§178) But to those who love to carp and snipe at everything, who are accustomed to promote blame above praise, the deed that was done here does not seem great or marvelous, such as we conceive it to be. (§ 179) For they claim that many others who very much loved their families and their offspring gave up their own children, some to be sacrificed for their native lands, to become expiatory offerings either in times of war or droughts or flood or plagues, others in the cause of what was considered to be piety, without being really so; (§180) and indeed that, among the Greeks, very well-regarded figures, not private citizens only but also kings, with scant regard for their offspring, through the slaughter of these have both saved armies of great power and size, when enrolled as their allies, and destroyed a faction of their enemies without striking a blow; (§181) while as for barbarian peoples, they have long accepted the slaughter of children as a holy and God-loving action, an outrage that is mena Gen 22:7

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tioned, indeed, by the most holy Moses; for in indicting them for this pollution, he says: “They burn their sons and their daughters as offerings to their gods.”a (§182) And among the Indians, [they say] the Naked Sophists, even now, when they begin to succumb to the long-drawn-out and incurable disease of old age, before it has entirely overcome them, pile up a pyre and immolate themselves upon it, though they could have perhaps lasted for many years yet; and then the womenfolk, following on the previous deaths of their husbands, hasten gladly to the same pyre, and while still alive submit to being burnt along with their husbands’ bodies; (§183) these one might well marvel at for their bravery in showing such utter contempt for death, and in their desiring and running breathlessly towards it as if towards immortality. So then, they say, why is it fitting to praise him [Abraham] as the initiator of an inherently original deed, when it is something that private citizens and kings and indeed whole nations do when occasion demands? (§184) But I will reply to their malignity and bitterness as follows. Of those who sacrifice their children, some do this on the basis of custom, as they themselves stated was the case with some of the barbarian peoples; others act by reason of unwished-for and serious problems, whereby their cities and countries cannot prosper otherwise; and of these, some give up their children of necessity compelled by more powerful forces, while others do so out of a striving for glory and honor and good repute in the present, and a good reputation for the future. (§185) Now those who perform such sacrifices on the basis of custom are not, it would seem, performing any great deed; for long-standing custom often becomes the equivalent of nature, so that it lightens the burden of acts difficult to endure or bear, and lessens the excess of terrors associated with them. (§186) For those who make the offering out of fear, on the other hand, no praise is due; for praise is recorded in the case of voluntary achievements, while involuntary acts are ascribed to other circumstances, crises, or blows of chance, or necessities arising from human causes. (§ 187) And if anyone sacrifices a son or daughter in a quest for glory, he would more justly be blamed rather than praised, for purchasing with the death of those dearest to him an honor which, even if he possessed it, he should reject in order to secure the preservation of his children. (§188) We must therefore examine whether it was through being overcome by any of the above-mentioned considerations, custom or honor or fear, that he [Abraham] was induced to sacrifice his son. Now the custom of child sacrifice is not accepted by Babylon and Mesopotamia and the nation of the Chaldeans, among whom he was brought up and lived for most of his life, so that his a Deut 12:31

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perception of the terrible nature of the practice might have been blunted by familiarity with its frequency.11 (§189) Furthermore, there was no pressure of fear on him from any human source—for no one knew of the oracle that had been imparted to him alone—nor had any communal misfortune arisen, the solution to which demanded the slaughter of his most highly esteemed son. (§190) But did he pursue this deed in search of praise from the multitude? And yet what praise could there be in the midst of a wilderness, where there was going to be nobody present to commend him, but even his two servants had been purposely left far behind, so that he should not seem to be taking pride and showing off in adducing witnesses to his acts of piety? (§ 191) Let them [these critics] therefore place doors on their unbridled and evil-speaking mouths, and moderate the envy within them that rejects goodness, and let them refrain from undermining the virtues of men who have lived good lives, virtues that they [the critics] should help to adorn by their acclamation, as would be proper. That in fact his [Abraham’s] action is worthy of praise and love is easily recognized on the basis of many considerations. (§ 192) First of all, obedience to God, which is considered holy and valuable by all right-thinking people, he practiced to a high degree, so as never to disregard any of the commands given to him, without any show of ill-grace or displeasure, even if they were filled with labors and pains; and it is in accord with this that he accepted the oracle concerning his son with all nobility and firmness of purpose. (§ 193) Then, since it was not the custom in that country, as it is perhaps in certain others, to perform human sacrifice, which would have tended by continuous repetition to lessen the appearance of frightfulness, he himself would have been the first to initiate an utterly new and extraordinary action, such as I would think that no one would undertake, even if he had a soul forged of iron or of adamant; for, as the saying goes, “it is a hard task to fight against nature.” (§ 194) And having produced only this one legitimate son, he necessarily possessed a legitimate feeling of love towards him which surpassed all other chaste forms of love and much-vaunted friendships. (§195) Furthermore, there was a most compelling love-inducement, in that he had not produced his son in the prime of his life but in old age; for parents somehow have a particular regard for late-born offspring, either because they have longed for their birth over a protracted period, or because they can no longer hope for any others, since their natural forces have now come to a halt, as at a last and final boundary. (§ 196) From a large family, after all, to surrender up one to God as a sort of first-fruit of one’s children would be in no way outlandish, since one would have pleasures in those still alive as no small consolation and assuagements for the grief over the one who was sacrificed; but he who hands over his sole loved one accomplishes a

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deed greater than words could express, granting nothing to natural feelings of affinity, but leaning with all his weight towards the love of God. (§ 197) The following example of what he did, indeed, is quite remarkable, and more or less unique to this man. For other men, even if, for the salvation of native land or army, they give up members of their family to be slaughtered, either stay at home or betake themselves far from the altars, or, if they happen to be present, avert their eyes so as not to endure beholding the spectacle, while others do the slaughtering. (§198) But this man, in the role of priest, himself initiated the sacrifice, most loving father as he was, performing all this on the best of sons; and perhaps he would even have cut him up, offering his son up limb by limb, in accordance with the law of burnt offerings. In this way he did not incline partly towards his son, and partly towards piety, but he devoted his whole soul through and through to holiness, with minimal regard for ties of blood-kinship. (§199) Which, then, of the above-mentioned features is shared in common with others? Which of them is not remarkable and beyond the capacity of all words to express? Thus anyone who is not by nature a begrudger and troublemaker must be struck with astonishment and wonder at such an excess of piety, even if he takes into consideration at once not all the points that I have dwelt on, but even any one from the total; for a vision of any one of them in however trifling a form—though surely no deed of the sage is trifling—is sufficient to reveal the greatness and loftiness of his soul. c Allegorical Interpretation, §§200–207 (§200) However, our exposition does not stop at the level of the literal and obvious account, but seems to suggest also a nature too obscure for the many, which those will recognize who rank the intelligible realm above the sensible, and are able to see. (§201) This is as follows: he who is going to be sacrificed is called in Chaldean “Isaac,” but in Greek the word is translated as “laughter.”a But this “laughter” is not to be understood here as that which rises in the body from childish play, but rather from that equable state that arises in the mind, namely, joy. (§202) This the sage is said to sacrifice, quite properly, to God, thus indicating symbolically that to rejoice is most proper to God alone; for the human race is beset by grief and prone to fears, either of present evils or of anticipated ones, so as either to be tormented by unwished-for events already to hand, or shaken up by disturbance and fear about such events to come. But it is the nature of God to be free of grief and fear and untainted by any passion, since it [this nature] alone partakes in happiness and complete blessedness. (§ 203) To the type of mind which makes this true acknowledgment, God, in His goodness a Gen 21:6

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and love of humanity, having banished envy far from Himself, quite fittingly returns the favor of the gift, in so far as the recipient is capable of receiving it; and He virtually proclaims this in saying: (§204) “That the genus of joy and of rejoicing is the possession of none other than myself alone, the Father of all, I am well aware, but being in possession of it as I am, I do not grudge it to those who are worthy to enjoy it; and who else would be worthy, but one who would follow me and my wishes? For to such a one it will befall least of all to be distressed or afflicted by fear, as he journeys along this road, which is inaccessible to passions and vices, but is the regular path of equable states and virtues.” (§205) Let no one imagine, however, that joy pure and unmixed with grief comes down from heaven to earth, but rather it comes mixed from both elements, though with a predominant share of the better; in the same way too, light is in heaven pure and unmixed with darkness, but in the regions below the moon it appears to be blended with misty air. (§ 206) It is for this reason, it seems to me, that the eponym of virtue, Sarah, having first laughed,a then, when asked about it, deniedb her laughter, fearing lest she was claiming for herself joy, which is proper to no creature, but only to God. Hence it is that the holy word says, by way of encouraging her, “Do not be apprehensive! You really laughed,c and you do partake in joy.” (§207) For the Father did not permit that the human race be enmeshed exclusively in griefs and pains and incurable woes, but mixed in also some of the better nature, considering it right that the soul should once in a while enjoy relaxation and calm; and as for the soul of the wise, he wished that for the greater part of its life it might rejoice and take pleasure in the spectacles provided by the universe.

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The Humanity of Abraham, §§208–261 Chapter 11: The Dispute with Lot, §§208–224 a Literal Interpretation, §§208–216 (§208) Let so much be said, then, about the piety of the man, even though an abundance of other examples might be adduced. We must also investigate, however, his constructive dealings with his fellow human beings; for it is characteristic of the same nature to be both pious and humane, and one may observe in the same person each virtue, holiness in relation to God, justice in relation to people. Now to relate all of his achievements in this area would be a lengthy task, but it would not be out of place to mention two or three. (§ 209) Although being exceedingly rich in silver and gold, and possessing abundant herds of many animals, vying in wealth with the inhabitants and natives of the place who had sufficient means, and having become richer than was usual for an immigrant, nonetheless he was not the target of criticism from any of his hosts, but rather was continually commended by all who came into contact with him. (§210) But if, as tends often to happen, some conflict or dispute in relation to others arose from among his servants or associates, he tried to resolve it calmly, with gentle manners,12 discarding and driving forth from his soul all symptoms of contention and disturbance and civil strife. (§ 211) And it is no wonder if he behaved in this way towards others, who could have joined together and warded him off with a heavier and more powerful hand if he had initiated any unjust deeds, when even towards those who were akin to him by birth, but alien to him in judgment, when they found themselves desolate and alone and much inferior in property, he behaved with moderation, willingly accepting a lesser share when he could have had the advantage. (§ 212) For he had a nephew, who came along with him when he departed from his native land, an unstable and rather ambivalent fellow, veering this way and that, now fawning upon him with affectionate embraces, now rebelling and breaking off with him, by reason of the inconsistency of his moods. (§ 213) For this reason his household servants were quarrelsome and unruly, having no one to control them, and this was especially true of his herdsmen, who lived at a distance from their master; acting freely, then, in their boldness, they were always quarreling with those who were managing the herds of the sage, who generally gave way to them because of the gentle nature of their master. This behavior, however, turned them to senseless violence and provoked in them

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a shameless audacity, being angry already and fostering within themselves a spirit of no compromise, until they compelled the victims of their injustice to take steps for their self-defense. (§214) When a very severe battle had broken out,a the good man, on hearing about the counter-attack, and knowing that his own party was more substantial both in numbers and in resources, nonetheless did not allow the quarrel to proceed as far as victory, so as not to distress his nephew by the defeat of his own side, but standing in the midst of them, with proposals for agreement, he reconciled the disputants, not only for the present, but also for the time to come. (§215) For since he knew that if they lived together and shared the same space, they would continue to strive in obstinate contention, stirring up endless squabbles and wars against one another, in order that this might not happen, he thought it advantageous to abandon their communal existence and separate their dwelling-places. He therefore sent for his nephew and gave him the choice of the better land, being happy to grant that he should take whichever part he selected; for he would thereby gain the greatest of advantages, peace. (§216) And yet who else would have yielded in any respect to the weaker, when he himself was the stronger? Who, when he could have been victorious, would have been willing to be defeated, not taking advantage of his power? This man alone, placing the highest value not on strength and aggrandizement, but on a life free from discord and, as far as in him lay, one of tranquility, manifested himself as most admirable of all people. b Allegorical Interpretation, §§217–224 (§217) Since, then, on the level of the individual person, the account constitutes an encomium, but according to those who proceed from the literal to the intelligible level there is an indication also of types of soul, it would be fitting to investigate these too. (§218) Now there are in fact myriads of such types, arising from myriads of originating stimuli, in accordance with every sort of circumstance, but there are just two to be examined in the present context, of which one is the older, the other, the younger, the older being that which honors those things which are by nature primary and dominant, the younger, that which honors those things that are subordinate and ranked in the lowest place. (§219) The older and dominant are wisdom and self-control and justice and courage, and everything to do with virtue and with actions in accordance with virtue; the younger are wealth and fame and rule and noble birth—not that which is truly noble, but rather what the mass of people consider such— and such other things as occupy the third rank below what pertains to the soul and body, which is naturally the last. (§220) Each of these two types of soul posa Gen 13:7

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sesses, as it were, flocks and herds, the one, in its striving for what is external, has silver, gold, fine clothes, all the materials and means for wealth, and again, weapons, engines of war, warships, cavalry and infantry and naval power, all the conditions for domination, from which derive security of rule; while the lover of moral nobility possesses the doctrines proper to each virtue and the theoretical principles of wisdom itself. (§221) The champions and managers of each of these are, as it were, herdsmen of beasts; the herdsmen of those who prefer the external are the lovers of wealth and of glory, those who seek to be generals and such as long for power over the multitudes, while the herdsmen of those to do with the soul are such as are lovers of nobility and virtue, who choose, not false goods over true ones, but genuine ones over false. (§222) So there is between them a natural source of conflict, since they value none of the same things, but are forever in disharmony and dissension over the most essential issue in life, that is, the judgment as to what things are truly good. (§223) For a certain time, then, the soul was at war with itself and had to put up with this internal strife, not yet being thoroughly purified, but still in a state where passions and diseased conditions prevailed over healthy judgments; but from the moment when it began to be more powerful and with superior strength to demolish the fortress raised by the opposite doctrines, becoming winged and filled with resolution, it cuts off with a wall and separates within itself to exclude the type of soul which is fascinated by external matters, and conversing with it as if with a person, says: (§224) “There is no way that there can be a common dwelling-place and political relations between you and the lover of wisdom and virtue. Go, then, and, by changing your abode, remove yourself far away, having no further association, or rather being unable to have any association; for such things as you consider to be on the right, these he regards as being on the left, and such on the contrary as you consider left, these are deemed by him to be right.”a

Chapter 12: Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§ 225–244 a Literal Interpretation, §§225–235 (§225) However, the good man was not merely peaceable and a lover of justice, but also brave and skilled in war, not for the sake of fighting—for he was not quarrelsome or contentious—but in the interest of securing peace for the future, which is just what the opponents were destroying. (§ 226) And the clearest proof lies in his actions. The easterly portion of the inhabited world was in a Gen 13:9

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the possession of four great kings, to whom were subject the nations of the east, both beyond and on this side of the Euphrates. The rest of the nations remained peaceful, obeying the commands of the kings and paying their yearly dues without hesitation; only the land of the Sodomites, before it was consumed by flames, attempted to dissolve the peace, through a long-planned revolt. (§227) For this altogether flourishing land was ruled over by five kings, who divided between them the cities and the countryside, this latter not being vast in extent, but fertile in corn and well-forested and abounding in crops; for what size bestowed on other lands, its natural excellence granted to Sodom, for which reason it had attracted the admiration of many rulers, who were smitten by its beauty. (§228) These had hitherto delivered the prescribed tribute to the collectors of taxes, since they both respected and feared the more powerful figures whose subjects they were; but when they became sated with good things and, as tends to happen, satiety begot insolence, they developed ideas above their station and first of all shook off the yoke, but then, like wicked slaves, attacked their own masters, trusting rather to their dissident impulses than to any real strength.13 (§229) But they [i.e., the kings of the east], conscious as they were of their own noble birth and fortified by more powerful means of attack, advanced with exceeding contempt, as if they would prevail at the first onset. Joining battle, then, they scattered some to flight immediately, others they cut down, slaying on all sides from youth upwards and taking a great crowd of prisoners, distributed [them] amongst themselves with the rest of the booty. Indeed they led away even the nephew of the sage, who had recently settled in one of the five cities. (§230) This news, reported [to Abraham] by one of those saved from the rout, grievously disturbed him, and he could no longer be at ease through worrying about this, grieving for one alive more keenly than if he had learned of his death; for he realized that meeting one’s end, as perhaps the name itself shows, means the end of all the vicissitudes of life, and in particular of its misfortunes, while a myriad of unwished-for circumstances lie in wait for the living. (§ 231) However, as he prepared to initiate a pursuit in order to rescue his nephew, he was at a loss for allies, seeing that he was a foreigner and a sojourner, and no one dared to stand up to the irresistible forces of so many kings, especially as they had just been victorious. (§232) But he devised a most novel kind of alliance—for a way is found where there is no way, when one is set on just and philanthropic deeds; for bringing together his slaves, while ordering those who had been purchased to stay home (for he feared that they might desert), he counted his home-born ones, and dividing them into centuries, he marched out with three companies—not, however, trusting in these (for they constituted only a small percentage of the forces of the kings), but rather in God,

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who is the defender and champion of the right. (§ 233) So straining forward he made all haste, never slackening his speed, until, choosing his time, he fell upon the enemy during the night, after they had already had their supper, and were about to turn to sleep; and some he slaughtered in their beds, others he annihilated when they were arrayed all together against him, but he overcame all vigorously through his confidence of soul rather than through armaments. (§234) And he did not leave off until he had destroyed to a person the opposing army, including the kings, and left them strewn in front of the camp, while his nephew he led back in bright and glorious triumph, taking along in addition all the horsesa and the multitude of other animals, together with most copious booty. (§235) Then the high priest of the greatest God, seeing him coming back safe, bearing trophies, and with all his forces preserved—for he had lost none of his companions—struck by the magnitude of his achievement and considering, as well he might, that it was not without divine oversight and support that he had gained this success, raising his handsb to heaven, honored him with prayers and offered sacrifices of victory and gave a fine feast for all those who had taken part in the battle, rejoicing and taking pleasure as if in a success of his own. And his own indeed it was; for, as the saying goes, “the concerns of friends are in common,” and this is that much the more true in the case of the good, whose one purpose is to be well-pleasing to God. b Allegorical Interpretation, §§236–244 (§236) This is what the scriptures taken literally contain. But those who can view realities stripped of their corporeal covering and naked, who live through the soul rather than through the body, will declare that, of the nine kings, the four are the powers of the four passions within us, pleasure, desire, fear, and grief, while the five are the same number of senses, sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch. (§237) For in a certain way, being invested with power, they rule and lord it over us, but not to the same extent; for the five are subservient to the four, and provide compulsory tribute and taxes to them, as defined by nature. (§238) For it is on the basis of what we see or hear or smell or taste or touch that griefs and pleasures and fears and desires arise, as none of the passions would have any force on its own, were it not supplied with raw material by the senses. (§239) For these latter constitute the powers of the former, either by means of colors and shapes or through sound, either spoken or heard, or through tastes, or smells, or tactile sensations, which are soft and hard, or rough and smooth, or hot and cold; for all these are provided through the senses to each of the passions. (§240) And as long as the afore-mentioned tributes are paid, the alliance a Gen 14:16

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with the kings persists, but when they are no longer contributed to the same extent, then straightway disputes and wars break out; and this seems to happen when painful old age arrives, during which none of the passions becomes any weaker—and perhaps become even more dominant than was their power of old—but the eyes become weak and the ears hard of hearing and each of the other senses duller, so as not to be able to specify and judge each impression in the same way as before, nor to contribute in the same degree. It is reasonable, then, that, weakened as they are in every respect and already in decline on their own account, they should easily be overthrown by their opposing passions. (§241) The following detail, indeed, exhibits great insight into the nature of reality, to wit, that of the five kings two fell into wells, while three turned to flight; for touch and taste penetrate into the lowest depths of the body, conveying to the inner organs the data proper for them to deal with, while the eyes and ears and sense of smell generally venture outwards and thus escape the enslavement of the body. (§242) Now the good man, observing all this—when he saw those that were until recently allies and friends in an agitated state, and war in place of peace arising within the nine kingdoms, with the four striving against the fivea for dominant power—after watching for the right time, suddenly launched an attack, with the aim of establishing in the soul democracy, the best of constitutions, in place of tyrannies and lordships, and the rule of law and justice instead of the lawlessness and injustice which had previously prevailed. (§243) What I have been saying is not a mythical fabrication, but a fact of the greatest accuracy which may be observed within our very selves; for, while the senses often preserve concord with the passions by providing them with the objects of their perception, often as well do they rebel, and are no longer deeming it appropriate to pay the same dues, or not being able to do so, owing to the supervisory presence of reason; which, when it dons its full armor, consisting of the virtues and the doctrines and theorems proper to them, constituting as they do an irresistible force, overwhelmingly prevails. For it is not proper for the corruptible to cohabit with the incorruptible. (§244) Now the nine dominions, those of the four passions and the five senses, are corruptible and causes of corruption, but the holy and truly divine reason, using the virtues as a base of operations, and in number ranked as the all-perfect decad, goes into battle and, drawing on the superior power which resides with God, wins a decisive victory over the afore-mentioned dominions.

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Chapter 13: The Virtues and Death of Sarah, §§ 245–261 a Sarah’s Virtues, §§245–254 (§245) Sometime later his wife, most beloved of his heart and excellent in all respects, passed away, having exhibited countless proofs of her wifely love, such as her abandonment with him of her kinsfolk, her unhesitating departure from her homeland, her continual and successive wanderings in foreign lands, her endurances of famine, and her fellowship with him in battles. (§ 246) For always and everywhere she was present, missing no venue or crisis, his companion to the truest extent in life and the business of life, judging it right to share equally in both goods and evils alike; for not like some did she shy away from misfortunes, while waiting for good times, but she accepted with all readiness either lot as right and proper for a wedded wife. (§247) Though there are many tales that I could recount in praise of this woman, I will mention one which will serve as an eminently clear token for all the others. For, being childless and barren, and fearing lest this household beloved of God might be left totally deprived of offspring, she approached her husband and spoke as follows: (§248) “We have lived together now for a long time in mutual satisfaction, but as to the reason why we actually came together and why nature arranged the union of man and woman, the production of children has not occurred, nor is it to be hoped for in the future through me, as I am already over the proper age. (§249) Do not therefore suffer the consequences of my infertility, nor, out of consideration for me, hold back from the possibility of becoming a father; for there will be no jealousy on my part towards another woman, whom you would not be bringing to your bed out of irrational desire, but rather to fulfill a necessary law of nature. (§ 250) And indeed for this reason I will not refrain from introducing the bride myself, so that she will be able to supply what is wanting in me; and if the prayers for the engendering of children find favor, you will have legitimate offspring, and I will at least have adopted ones. (§251) And to avoid any suspicion of jealousy on my part, if you wish, take my handmaid, a slave in her bodily condition, but of free and well-born character, which has been proved to me on the basis of testing and probing over a long period, from the day when she was first brought into my household, by race an Egyptian, but in mind-set a Hebrew. (§ 252) We possess great resources and unstinting wealth, not as is usual with resident aliens— for already we surpass those endowed with the most conspicuous good fortune among the natives—but no heir or successor has appeared, though such would be possible, if you will heed my advice.” (§253) He then, in exceeding admiration for his wife’s ever renewed and flourishing devotion, and also for her well-calculated provision for the future,

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took on the girl approved by her until a child was produced—or, as the clearest accounts have it, merely until she had become pregnant; and when this happened after no long time, he then abstained from her, because of both his natural self-control and the honor which he rendered his wife. (§ 254) There was, then, a son born at that time from the handmaid, but a long time afterwards there was also born a legitimate son, after they had despaired of any procreation from each other, a reward for their moral excellence exceeding all their hopes, from the hand of God who delights in the bestowal of gifts. b Sarah’s Death and Abraham’s Moderation, §§ 255–261 (§255) It is enough to recount such indications as these about his wife, while more numerous are those occasions of praise for the sage himself, some of which I have gone through a little earlier. I have yet to relate, however, the incident concerning the death of his wife, a matter that should not be passed over in silence. (§256) For having lost such a companion of his whole life, whose qualities our account has shown and the oracles have indicated, when grief was already stripping off and dusting itself down to step into the ring against his soul, he prevailed like a trained athlete, vigorously strengthening and encouraging the natural opponent of passions, reason, which, having employed as a counselor throughout his whole life, he deemed it right to obey especially then, as it was giving him advice which was noble and most advantageous. (§ 257) The advice was as follows: not to chafe more than moderately as if at a misfortune which is extraordinary or unprecedented, nor yet to exhibit a total lack of emotion, as if nothing grievous had occurred, but, choosing the mean over the extremes, to try to observe moderation of the emotions, not being displeased with nature for taking back what she is properly owed, but alleviating, quietly and calmly, the impact of what had come to pass. (§258) The evidence for these things lies in the sacred books, which it is not proper to convict of false witness and which report that, after weeping for a short time over the body, he rather quickly rose up from the corpse, believing, so it seems, that prolonged grieving was alien to wisdom, by which he was taught to consider death not an extinguishing of the soul, but a separation and unhitching of it from the body, as it departs whence it came; and it came, as has been made clear in the account of the creation of the world, from God. (§ 259) And even as no reasonable person would take offence at having to pay back a debt or return a deposit to a creditor, in the same way he considered that one should not complain when nature takes back what is its own, but rather accept gracefully what must be. (§260) When those in power in the land came to him to show sympathy, on observing nothing of what was customary amongst them in connection

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with mourning,14 no lamentation, no singing of dirges, no wailing, either on the part of men or of women, but merely a calm and sober dejection pervading the whole household, they were greatly astonished, impressed though they had been previously by the general life-style of the man. (§ 261) Thereupon, not holding back their admiration for the magnitude and nobility of his virtue— for it was in all respects extraordinary—they approached him and declared: “You are a king from God amongst us!”a And indeed they were right; for other kingships are established by human agents, through wars and military expeditions and innumerable evils, which those who strive for domination inflict upon each other with the consequence of mutual slaughter, raising for the purpose forces of infantry, cavalry, and navy. The kingship of the sage, on the other hand, is bestowed by God, and the good man who receives it becomes the cause of evil to no one, but to all his subjects [the cause] of both the acquisition and the enjoyment of goods, proclaiming peace and good order.

a Gen 23:6

c

Conclusion, §§262–276 Chapter 14: Additional Encomia of Abraham; Epilogue, §§ 262–276 (§262) There is also a recorded commendation of him witnessed by the oracles to which Moses gave inspired utterance,15 in which he reveals that “he trusted in God,”a something which is a brief matter to express in words, but a very great task to confirm in deeds. (§263) For in what else should one trust? Should it be in rule or reputation and honors or abundance of wealth and good birth or health and good condition of the senses or in strength and beauty of body? But every sort of rule is a precarious thing, having innumerable competitors lying in wait; and even if it happens to be secure, this security is accompanied by a great host of evils, which those in power both execute and experience. (§ 264) As for reputation and honors, they are a most unreliable possession, resting precariously on the unconsidered sentiments and flighty reckonings of unreflective men; and even if they acquire some permanence, they do not by nature possess true good. (§265) Wealth and noble ancestry, in turn, may be the possession of even the most worthless of men; and even if they were to be confined only to the good, they would constitute occasions for praise of ancestors and luck, not of those who possess them. (§266) But neither is it right to pride oneself greatly on bodily excellences, in which the irrational animals far exceed us. For who among humans is stronger or more powerful than the bull, among tame animals, or, among wild ones, the lion? Who is more sharp-sighted than the hawk or the eagle? Who is so well-endowed as regards hearing as is that most stupid of animals, the donkey? Who is sharper in respect of smell than the dog, of whom hunters declare that, following the scent, it accurately tracks down prey, fallen at a great distance, that it has not seen in advance? For what sight is to others, this nostrils are to dogs that are skilled in hunting and tracking. (§267) [As regards health,] most of the irrational animals enjoy the peak of fitness and are more or less entirely free of disease. And in the contest of beauty, even some lifeless things seem to me to be capable of conquering and surpassing the fair forms of both men and women, such things [for example] as statues and images and portraits and in general all the works of both painting and sculpture, brought to perfection according to the principles of each art, to

a Gen 15:6

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which both Greeks and barbarians accord much honor for the adornment of their cities, by setting them up in the most prominent places. (§268) The only good that is infallible and secure, then, is trust in God, a consolation in life, fulfillment of good hopes, a dearth of evils, a feast of goods, a disclaiming of misfortune, a claiming of piety, an inheritance of good fortune,16 a bettering in all respects of the soul which founds and establishes itself on the Cause of all, which can do all things, but which wills only the best. (§ 269) For just as those who walk on a slippery path have their legs go from under them and fall down, while those who amble on a dry thoroughfare enjoy untrammeled progress, so likewise those who lead their soul along the path of bodily and external goods are preparing it for nothing other than a fall—for these things are slippery, after all, and supremely insecure; whereas those who strive towards God along the path of doctrines based on the virtues head straight upon a road that is safe and free from subsidence, so that one may declare with absolute assurance that he who trusts in the former things has no trust in God, while he who distrusts them has put his trust in God. (§270) But not only do the oracles bear witness to his faith in Being, that queen of the virtues, but they also bestowed upon him first the title of “elder,”a although those before him lived three or indeed many more times the number of years, none of whom do we hear of having been given this designation. (§ 271) And perhaps reasonably so: for the “elder”b in truth is considered as such not according to length of time but rather according to a praiseworthy and perfect life. Those, after all, who have spent a long span of time in a life-style focused on the body but without moral decency are properly to be described as long-lived children, having never been trained in lessons worthy of grey hairs; whereas the devotee of wisdom, both practical and theoretical, and of faith in God one might justly characterize as an “elder,”c a term having like significance to “primary.” (§272) For in truth the sage has a primary status among the human race, even as has the pilot in a ship, the ruler in a city, the general in war, as also the soul in the body, the mind in the soul, and again heaven in the cosmos, and God in heaven. (§273) And indeed that same God, out of respect for the man for his trust in Him, grants him His trust in return, by confirmation through an oath of the gifts which He had promised him, conversing with him no longer only as God to human, but also as friend to one familiar; for He, for whom His word is an oath, says, “By Myself I have sworn,”d for the purpose of fixing His resolve still more firmly and unshakably than before. (§274) So then the good man is and should

a Gen 24:1

b Gen 24:1

c Gen 24:1

d Gen 22:16

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be called “elder”a and “primary,” even as every fool is “younger” and “last,” inasmuch as he has no respect for tradition and focuses on the lowest elements in life. (§275) But enough about this. To the multitude and magnitude of his praises of the sage he [Moses] adds as it were this crowning dictum, that “this man did the divine law and all the divine commands”b—not instructed by writings, but striving by virtue of unwritten nature to follow his healthy and uncontaminated impulses. And when God gives His endorsement concerning these, what does it befit people to do other than to grant their firmest trust? (§ 276) Such, then, is the life of the first and founder of the nation—as some would have it, one who kept the law, but as my account has made clear, himself a law and an unwritten ordinance.

a Gen 24:1

b Gen 26:5

Notes to the Text and Translation 1

2

3

4

5 6 7

8

All headings and chapter numbers have been added by the editors and follow the outline in the Introduction, §4. Chapter numbers and titles correspond exactly to those in the commentary. Section numbers (in parentheses) follow those found in PCW and PLCL. We translate the Greek word γένεσις here as both “genesis” and “creation,” though the word can also mean “generation,” as we translate later in §1. It also carries the sense of “coming into being,” as in §§9 and 11, where, for smoother reading, we use “genesis.” See also Runia 2001, 94 n. 6. The subject is Moses. In this treatise and elsewhere Philo frequently refers to Moses indirectly and occasionally the translation will supply his name in brackets where the Greek does not include his name (see, e.g., §§5, 28, 36, 275). Depending on the context, other possible subjects may be Scripture or God. On the notion that Moses gave the book its title, see the comment at §1 on the first is called … For the sake of clarity or readability, we occasionally include other words in brackets that do not appear in the Greek. Here Philo uses ἄνθρωπος, which we translate as “human” to indicate the generic sense and to distinguish his use of this word from ἀνήρ, which we translate as “man” (as in §§1, 4, and 5). In Greek, ὁ εὔελπις, or “the one of good hope.” See also §§11, 14, 16. Cf. δύσελπις in §§8 and 14. In Greek, the pronoun οὗτος. On the significance of this word, see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 2. As Colson suggests, we either need another verb to govern the datives here, or they must be changed to accusatives. The former solution does indeed seem more appropriate to Philo’s stylistic tendencies. As he sometimes does, in §54 Philo separates two connected thoughts by inserting something else. Specifically, he sandwiches his remark about the Graces between the beginning of the sentence and the concluding purpose clause. The beginning and end of this very long sentence, however, belong together, since the point is that “he” (either God or Moses) most fittingly associates the three qualities of teaching, nature, and practice with the divine name so that God, who is imperishable, will be called by these imperishable qualities rather than by three mortal men—namely, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The more detailed explanation (which we have just summarized) as to why it is fitting to link the three qualities together with the divine name comes in the very next section (§55), immediately following the purpose clause. In order to highlight the full intent of the purpose clause and its connection, on one hand, with the beginning of the sentence and,

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9 10 11

12 13

14 15

16

notes to the text and translation on the other hand, with the more detailed explanation in §55, we have placed the beginning and end of this passage together in one sentence and inserted in parentheses Philo’s remark about the Graces as a separate sentence. See also the Detailed Comments on these sections (§§54–55). Φησί, which can be translated as “he says” or “it says,” may refer either to Moses or Scripture (see also n. 3). For this understanding, see the comment at §119 on when the soul is illuminated by God. For this reading, we have accepted Mangey’s suggestion to read κεχρῆσθαι instead of κεκρατῆσθαι. Gorez also accepts Mangey’s emendation on the basis of the Armenian (PAPM 20:98). This translation is based upon Mangey’s emendation πρᾳοτέρῳ ἤθει for the βαρυτέρῳ ἤθει of the mss. See further the comment at §210 on with gentle manners. As Colson notes (PLCL 6:112), the absence of a μᾶλλον, “rather,” before ἤ seems to preclude a contrast between στάσις (which we have translated “dissident impulses”) and ῥώμη (“strength”), and he therefore suggests its insertion. We agree with him. The translation that he offers, “trusting to sedition or violence,” without the insertion, makes much less satisfactory sense. Here we have accepted L. Cohn’s suggestion to read πένθεσιν instead of πενθοῦσιν. Colson also accepts this in PLCL 6:126 n. 1. As Colson points out ad loc., the mss. reading ἐθεσπίσθη (“was given inspired utterance”), an aorist passive, is most peculiar, and not paralleled elsewhere. His solution, which we have accepted, is to read the active ἐθέσπισε (“he gave inspired utterance”); cf., e.g., Her. 260; Decal. 32. On this passage, see the comment at §268 on a disclaiming of misfortune …

Commentary

∵

Title of the Work Over the centuries, the name of Philo’s Exposition treatise on Abraham has come down in both extended and abbreviated forms. The first reference that we have to a title for this work—Περὶ ἀποικίας καὶ βίου σοφοῦ τοῦ κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τελειωθέντος ἢ νόμων ἀγράφων (On the migration and life of the sage who has attained perfection through righteousness, or of the unwritten laws)—is found in a list of Philo’s writings provided by Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 2.18.4). Here, Eusebius links our treatise with another of Philo’s works (Migr.) and undoubtedly errs in mentioning “righteousness” (δικαοσύνη) instead of “teaching” (διδασκαλία) (Monique Alexandre 1997, 264 n. 65; see also Runia 1993a, 17 and 19). Indeed the title of this treatise handed down in the manuscripts is Φίλωνος βίος σοφοῦ τοῦ κατὰ διδασκαλίαν τελειωθέντος ἢ νόμων ἀγράφων· ὅ ἐστι περὶ ἀβραάμ (Of Philo, The life of the sage who has attained perfection through teaching, or of the unwritten laws, that is, about Abraham). The manuscripts contain a number of variants but these are fairly minor (see PCW 4:1). All manuscripts, however, omit what seems necessary, and which is accordingly added by L. Cohn, namely, τὸ πρῶτον (“the first [book]”) after νόμων ἀγράφων (“of the unwritten laws”). (See also Morris 1987, 846, with n. 135.) As we shall see, other scholars have taken a different approach to this part of the title. Although we cannot be certain whether the Greek title found in the manuscripts is original to Philo, it conveys an accurate view of the treatise’s proper place in the economy of his oeuvre, as has been discussed in the first section of the Introduction. (For background on papyrological conventions likely used by Philo—including placement of titles at the end of the work—see Runia 2001, 96.) Several features are worth noting: The title identifies the work as a βίος, or “life,” and thus reflects a secular genre of writing. Like some Greek names of other Philonic works that have been transmitted, the title of our treatise is a compound. The first component, which mentions the life of the sage perfected through teaching, alludes to the motif of the patriarchs as representative of three paths to virtue—through teaching (or learning), nature, and practice— and thus suggests that this treatise may be the first in a series. Reference in the second component to unwritten laws pertains to Philo’s interpretation of some early biblical figures as laws in themselves and may further suggest that this is the first in a series about such laws. The series’s remaining works, which have not survived, were devoted to Isaac and Jacob, who attain perfection through nature and practice, respectively, and who are similarly regarded as unwritten laws (see Abr. 3–6, 276; Ios. 1; Decal. 1; and the Introduction, §§ 1, 3, and 6). Whereas the first two components refer to Abraham in general or symbolic

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terms as a wise man or an unwritten law, the final part of the title makes explicit that this work is specifically about Abraham. (On some of these observations, see also Monique Alexandre 1997, 264–267, whose very interesting study has greatly informed our discussion.) While successfully relaying the place of this work in Philo’s larger scheme, the Greek title is also rather long. In several Greek and Latin sources, it becomes considerably abbreviated. An exception is Rufinus, whose Latin rendering of the title from Eusebius is De vita sapientis eius qui secundum iustitiam perfectam et leges naturales consummatus est (On the life of the wise man who has attained perfection according to perfect justice and natural laws). Here Rufinus follows Eusebius in retaining (in translation) the mistaken reading “justice” (δικαιοσύνη) and makes several questionable changes in addition (Monique Alexandre 1997, 272; E. Schwartz, Mommsen, and Winkelmann 1999, 2:1:155). By contrast, Jerome’s list of Philo’s works, rendered in Latin, records the title as De vita sapientis, or On the life of the wise man (Vir. ill. 11.5) Centuries later, PseudoSophronius, translating Jerome, provides the Greek title Περὶ βίου φιλοσοφικοῦ (On the philosophical life). Later yet, the Souda, based on the translation just mentioned, calls the treatise Περὶ βίου φιλοσόφου (On the life of the philosopher) (see Monique Alexandre 1997, 268–269, with n. 118; Turnebus and Hoeschel 1691; Mangey 1742, 1:xxviii; for additional variations on and permutations of the title, see also PCW 1:I–CXIII). A meaningful point in the history of Philonic treatise titles is marked by the translation of Philo’s works into Latin by Gelenius (1554). In his version, the title of our treatise in the table of contents and running heads is pared down simply to De Abrahamo (On Abraham). This name has persisted, whether as a main or running title, down to our own day—from the editions of Turnebus and Hoeschel (1613), to Mangey (1742), PCW (1902), PLCL (1935), and all other modern translations discussed in the Introduction, which mention this title either in Latin or in translation (see Monique Alexandre 1997, 259–260, 279– 280; and the Introduction, §8). At the beginning of his translation of the treatise, however, Gelenius (1554, 227) does use the long title, which he presents as follows: Philonis Iudaei: Vita Sapientis per Doctrinam perfecti, sive de legibus non scriptis, hoc est, De Abrahamo (Of Philo Judaeus: The life of the wise man perfected through teaching, or on the unwritten laws, that is, On Abraham). Gelenius’s short title, then, is simply the last two words of the longer one. It is noteworthy that—unlike L. Cohn in PCW (1902) and Morris (1987), centuries later—Gelenius simply inserts “de” before “legibus non scriptis” to understand this component of the title to be “on the unwritten laws” without an indication that this is the first book of such laws. This construal is understandable when we recall that Philo begins the

title of the work

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treatise with a discussion of six biblical figures whom he regards as “unwritten laws” before he focuses specifically on Abraham as one of these laws. Indeed this introduction takes up at least a fifth of the work (59 sections out of 276). Like Gelenius (and Turnebus and Hoeschel 1613 and 1691), Richter (1828) similarly inserts περί (“concerning”) before νόμων ἀγραφῶν (“unwritten laws”) and de (“concerning”) before legibus non scriptis (“unwritten laws”). In an interesting twist, C.D. Yonge singularizes the plural νόμοι (“laws”) when he translates the long title as On the Life of the Wise Man made perfect by Instruction; or, on the Unwritten Law, that is to say, on Abraham. This title, which appeared in his English translation of 1854, was changed in the Hendrickson edition of 1993 to On Abraham, with De Abrahamo in parentheses in the table of contents and on the first page of the translation. The title, in fact, continues to evolve. The first and second editions of The SBL Handbook of Style (1999, 2014) list Abraham as an abbreviation of the English title On the Life of Abraham. This name has a precedent in the edition of Mangey (1742), who used the Latin title De Vita Abrahami in his table of contents (see also Monique Alexandre 1997, 283 n. 210). On the Life of Abraham, a treatise name suggested by PACS Editor Gregory Sterling, was used in the collection of English translations and commentaries in Outside the Bible (Feldman, Kugel, and Schiffman 2013). In the present volume, we too have adopted this English title, which preserves both the beginning and end of the lengthy Greek heading, which may possibly go back to Philo himself. While thereby losing the symbolic meanings, our title nonetheless preserves the genre of Philo’s work and the name of its main subject, Abraham, to whom much—if not, strictly speaking, most—of the treatise is devoted. (On Philo’s direct treatment of Abraham, see the Introduction, §3.)

part one Introduction, §§ 1–59

∵

a

Prologue, §§1–6 Chapter 1: Genesis and the Living Laws, §§ 1–6 Analysis/General Comments Philo inaugurates his treatise by situating it within a broader context of Moses’s works and his own. Thus he begins with a conspectus of the very varied contents of the book of Genesis (§§1–2) and a discussion of different kinds of laws—particularly, what he calls “living and rational laws” (ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι) (§§3–6). In so doing, Philo introduces the reader to a new segment of Moses’s writings—namely, the narratives of Genesis following the creation account—and then to a set of his own writings pertaining to several early biblical figures whom he regards as laws in themselves. As discussed in the Introduction (§§1 and 3), by understanding these figures as laws Philo thereby provides a rationale for why Genesis—with its tales about Israel’s ancestors and their predecessors, but very little legal content—comes at the beginning and is an integral part of the Mosaic legislation. In accord with other ancient writers who use “secondary prefaces” to introduce individual works within a larger series, Philo also explicitly links this treatise with a preceding one, namely, De opificio mundi (§2), in which he deals with the order of the creation of the world. (On secondary prefaces, see Sterling 2012b, esp. 60–61, 67.) Philo’s overview of Genesis alludes indirectly to such features as the war between the kings (Gen 14); the barrenness of Sarah, Rebecca, and Rachel (Gen 16:1; 25:21; 29:31); the famines during the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Gen 12:10; 26:1; 41:53–42:5) and the years of plenty and famine in Egypt under Joseph (Gen 41); the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire (Gen 19:24– 25); and the flood during Noah’s time (Gen 6:9–8:22). Although the word “Genesis” refers only to creation and not to these other, diverse matters, Philo justifies this title by a variant of the argument from pre-eminence (see the comment at § 2 on it is to it that he dedicated …). He explains that all the other topics covered in Genesis relate to either “parts” (μέρη) of the cosmos or “events” that occur in it (παθήματα), so that it seems most suitable for the title to refer to the cosmos as a whole, which is “the perfection and consummation” of both the parts and the events (§§1–2). Notably absent from Philo’s survey of these parts and events is any reference to divine involvement with them. Indeed, rather than a narrative that eventually focuses on one family and its particular relationship with the Lord, the

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first book of the Mosaic legislation, as Philo presents it here, contains grand, universal themes that might appeal to a broad audience and, one could infer, pertains to nothing less than the entire cosmos (see the comment at § 2 on events occurring within it). This approach is consistent with his apparent purpose in the Exposition to introduce Moses and his legislation to those unfamiliar with them and to highlight and communicate the universal relevance of Moses’s teachings. (On Philo’s aims in this treatise, see the Introduction, § 3.) Philo now declares his intention to examine the laws in their proper sequence. He therefore puts off study of “those laws which are particular” (οἱ ἐπὶ μέρους νόμοι; cf. §3), namely, the Ten Commandments and the ordinances that, according to him, fall under each of those commandments. (These particular laws are the subject of the treatise On the Decalogue and the four books On the Special Laws.) The full plan of the present sequence of Exposition treatises (which presumably include lost works on Isaac and Jacob; see the Introduction, § 1) is here set out, with the archetypal “living and rational laws” preceding the particular ones which are their “copies” (εἰκόνες). As Philo explains, these “living and rational” laws are specific men whose words and deeds, recorded in Moses’s holy writings, are meant to be both applauded and emulated. Because these figures were able to follow “an unwritten legal system” (ἄγραφος ἡ νομοθεσία; § 5) without prompting by or guidance from anyone else, their lives exemplify two important lessons—first, that the established laws accord with nature and, second, that these laws can be easily obeyed (§§3–6). The importance of this prologue cannot be overstated. Although Philo frequently asserts that Moses’s legislation accords with the law of nature (e.g., Opif. 3; Mos. 2.11, 48), this is the only extant passage in which he further asserts and then elaborates upon the notion that several early figures were themselves laws, indeed archetypes of the later ones (see also Decal. 1). The ideas that Philo sets forth here raise the perplexing issue of the exact nature of the relationship between the later, particular laws and the lives of the early figures. Does Philo mean that each of these men followed the specific Mosaic ordinances or does he intend something else? For different views, including our own, see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 14 (on §§262–276) and the Introduction, §§3 and 6a. In addition, because Philo calls the particular laws “copies” of the archetypal living laws, another muchdebated question is whether or not he means to portray the particular laws as inferior to their archetypes. For various positions, see Nikiprowetzky 1977, 117–155; Martens 1991 and 2003, esp. 96, 103; Najman 1999; 2003a, esp. 127 n. 42; and 2003b; Reinhartz 1986, 342–343; and others cited in Birnbaum 2006, 250– 252.

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Regardless of the way in which one settles these questions, we have here a rare exposition of how Philo views the book of Genesis and its role in the Mosaic legislation. Standing at the beginning of Abr., this prologue clearly serves the broader role of introducing six “living and rational laws,” grouped in two triads: Enos, Enoch, and Noah, in the first, and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the second. (Moses too is considered to be a “living and reasonable law” [Mos. 1.162], but Philo deals with him separately; see the Introduction, § 1.) Of Philo’s extant works, this is the only treatise in which he discusses these two triads as laws (cf. Praem. 10–51). It is possible that in the now lost works on Isaac and Jacob Philo developed his ideas about these patriarchs as laws even further. Precisely because we do not have these works, however, his remarks in this section are all the more precious. Detailed Comments § 1. The sacred laws … in five books. For Philo these laws comprise those both written and unwritten. While the four books after Genesis abound in commandments, injunctions, and prohibitions, Genesis itself consists primarily of narratives. By portraying Genesis as a book of unwritten laws represented by the patriarchs, however, Philo can thus speak of “the sacred laws” (ἱεροὶ νόμοι) as being inscribed in all five books (see the Introduction, § 1). On Philo’s use of νόμος in the singular and plural to refer to Moses’s teachings, see the Introduction, n. 17. In Abr., Philo does not use νόμος in the singular for the Mosaic legislation as a whole. the first is called … “Genesis.” In the Greek translation of the Pentateuchal books, the titles, from which we derive our English titles, are based on the contents of each book. By contrast, the Hebrew titles are drawn from one of the opening words of each book. Philo’s belief in the authority of the Greek translation is so wholehearted that he ascribes the title “Genesis” to Moses himself (§2; see also Opif. 12, in which Philo offers different reasoning for Moses’s title). great destruction … by fire and water. Although the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was confined to a specific site, Philo alludes to this episode as if it were as extensive as the great flood of Noah’s day. Philo’s coupling of “fire and water” may be related to a Jewish tradition that Sodom was destroyed by a “flood of fire” (cf. Abr. 138 and Gen. Rab. 49:9, based on Gen 19:24; see also Kister 1994, 17–19; Feldman 2003). This theme may also be related to a philosophical notion that after very long cycles, destructions on earth will alternate between those by fire and those by water (Aet. 146–148; Plato, Tim. 22c–e). Other Jewish and Christian sources also link the flood and the destruction at Sodom because of the wickedness that brought about these punishments (see Loader 1990, e.g., 76, 121–124, 127, 129, 130, 132).

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whether virtuous or vicious. Like many other ancient exegetes, Philo often classifies biblical characters as either good or bad. Influenced by Greek thought, he uses the Greek ethical categories of virtue and vice (e.g., Plato, Resp. 1.348c; Aristotle Eth. nic. 2.5–6.1105b–1107a). §2. events occurring within it. The Greek word, παθήματα, which can connote events but also sufferings, is used by Aristotle to identify key elements in Greek tragedy and epic poetry (Poet. 6.2.1449b; 24.2.1459b; see also Richardson 1992, esp. 38). Maren Niehoff (2011a) has suggested that Aristotle’s approach to literature strongly influenced Alexandrian Homeric scholars, especially Aristarchus (3rd cent. BCE) and thus indirectly had an impact on Philo. Perhaps by using the term παθήματα with its implied Aristotelian associations and by describing the contents of Genesis as he does (see the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter), Philo wishes to convey that the writings of Moses can compete with the best of Greek literature. We may note, however, that two mss. (F and G) have μαθήματα (“lessons”) instead of παθήματα, a variant that may betoken a misunderstanding of, and thus discomfort with, the word as used here (see PCW 4:1). it is to it that he dedicated the book as a whole. In this variation on the argument “from pre-eminence” (κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν; §10), Philo explains that the title “Genesis” is appropriate because of the pre-eminence, so to speak, of the cosmos in the narratives (see the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter). A little further on (§10) he will employ this argument more explicitly in connection with the naming of Enos, the man of hope, as “Human”; see the comment at §10 on even as Homer … the preceding treatise. That is, Opif. See the Introduction, § 1, and the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter. §3. those laws which are particular. See the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter. as it were, copies … so to speak, archetypes. The “as it were” and “so to speak” (in both cases, the Greek is ὡς ἄν) with which Philo qualifies “copies” and “archetypes” may indicate that he does not wish to suggest that there is any definite set of laws of which any of the early figures is the archetype; rather, they all embody the particular laws as a whole. On Philo’s understanding of the relationship between these early figures and the particular laws, see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 14 (on §§262–276), along with §§ 275–276 and the comments ad loc. Philo’s distinction between copies and archetypes is influenced by Platonic thought; see, esp., Tim. 29b; also Runia 2001, 139, the comment at Opif. 16 on he first marked out and 151, the comment at Opif. 25 on archetypal idea of the ideas. §4. not only with a view to celebrating them. Praise of the subject was characteristic especially of the Greek βίος; see the Introduction § 3.

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edifying. With this word (προτρέψασθαι), Philo draws our attention to the fact that Moses composed his books not as a mere history of events, but rather as a protreptic to virtue for his contemporaries, and for later generations. A key element of the protreptic, as Philo presents it just below, is the demonstration that adherence to the Mosaic laws is in accordance with nature because the patriarchs exemplified them all naturally; such adherence should therefore be easy for people of later ages, who have them all laid down in advance. emulation. At least as far back as Homer, imitation of the hero was basic to Greek education (see Marrou 1982, 12–13, with reference to Plato, Phaedr. 245a). §5. living and rational laws. The expression “living laws” (ἔμψυχοι νόμοι) is used on a number of other occasions by Philo, e.g., Mos. 1.162, where Moses— like the early figures here—is presented as a “living and rational law” (νόμος ἔμψυχος τε καὶ λογικός); and Mos. 2.4, where the just or philosopher king in general is presented as a “living law” (νόμος ἔμψυχος). The doctrine of the king as a living law may be traced back to Plato, in the Republic and Statesman, but seems to have been formalized by the Stoics (cf. Musonius, ap. Stobaeus, Flor. 4.7.67), and appears in a number of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha (“Ecphantus,” On Kingship; “Archytas,” On Law and Justice; and “Diotogenes,” On Kingship); Philo merely adapts this concept to the case of the early biblical figures. The problem of the relationship between Philo and these Pythagorean treatises is a controverted one, but on the whole we are inclined to view the latter as Hellenistic productions, and accept that Philo was acquainted with some or all of them; cf. Thesleff 1961, 1972. See also Martens 2003, 31–66. not at variance with nature. Philosophers before the Stoics had understood law and nature to stand in opposition to one another, taking “law” in the sense of “convention.” The Stoics, however, formulated the concept of a type of law that serves as an expression of nature, which for them is identical with God; cf., e.g., Diogenes Laertius 7.88 (= §63C, Long and Sedley 1995, 1:394–395, and 1987, 2:390–391); and Mitsis 2003. Philo here adapts this Stoic position to his own purposes. Indeed the harmonious relationship between Mosaic law and the law of nature is foundational in Philo’s thought; see, e.g., Opif. 3; Mos. 2.48; also Runia 2001, 106–107. an unwritten legal system. In the context of this passage, the phrase ἄγραφος ἡ νομοθεσία appears to refer to the law of nature, which the early generations obeyed. This identification seems to be so especially in light of Philo’s remarks in §6 that the early biblical exemplars lived in conformity with nature and recognized nature as “the eldest of statutes.” The Greek phrase is similar to ἄγραφος νόμος (“unwritten law”), which Philo uses with a variety of meanings;

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see §16 with the comment on by an unwritten law … In other ancient sources, the notion can be found that those who lived before the laws were given obeyed an “unwritten law” (2Bar. 57, with reference to Abraham and his generation, his son, and his grandson) or “the law of nature” (Apos. Con. 6:12, with reference to the pre- or non-Israelites Enos, Enoch, Noah, Melchizedek, and Job). Each of these sources, however, seems to understand these concepts differently from each other and may understand them differently from Philo. (On the Apostolic Constitutions, see the discussion in Fraade 1984, 50–52). While we cannot pinpoint a precise relationship between these sources and Philo, it appears that a tradition existed in antiquity that those who lived before the written laws were given followed some sort of “unwritten legal system,” however this system was understood. See also the Introduction, §§ 6a and 7b. According to John Martens (2003, 88), Philo is unique among ancient writers in linking the concept of unwritten law with the law of nature. reminders of the life of the men of old. Although Philo does not say so explicitly, this phrase suggests that he may understand the early figures—i.e., Enos, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—to have followed what he calls the particular laws. Some early Jewish sources in fact portray some of the patriarchs as following these laws. See, e.g., 2Bar. 57, mentioned in the preceding comment; on Abraham specifically, see §275, with the comment on “this man did the divine law …” For another perspective, see also the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 14 (on §§262–276). §6. school associates or pupils. Philo here shows a close acquaintance with the realities of Hellenistic (and later) philosophical schools. He seems to recognize a distinction between ordinary or basic pupils of a philosopher (φοιτηταί— though this term can also be used to refer to pupils of a schoolmaster) and more senior followers, who might be denominated “associates” (γνώριμοι) or “friends” (φίλοι), and who might actually help with the teaching. Philo’s terminology indeed provides useful evidence that such a system was in place in this period. Other significant passages, which mention one or both of these terms, include Det. 49; Post. 141; Gig. 25; and Spec. 1.319, where we hear of “associates and pupils” (γνώριμοι καὶ φοιτηταί) specifically of Moses. Indeed Philo also uses these terms to describe authors of other biblical books (e.g., Psalms, Conf. 39; and Proverbs, Congr. 177) as followers of Moses. listening to themselves and learning from themselves. The collocution αὐτήκοοι καὶ αὐτομαθεῖς occurs also—sometimes with an additional word—at Plant. 168; Ebr. 94; Somn. 1.160, 168; and Praem. 27, all referring to Isaac; cf. Legat. 245. By emphasizing that all of these early biblical figures listened to and learned from only themselves, Philo somewhat undercuts his portrayal of Abraham as a wise man who attained virtue or perfection through instruction. In fact, despite

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references to this characterization of Abraham in §§ 52–54 and the long Greek title of Abr. (see the chapter on “Title of the Work”), Philo does not in this treatise allude to Abraham as someone who learns from another source. See, e.g., § 61, with the comment on For anyone who beholds …; also § 16 with the comment on by an unwritten law; and Birnbaum 2010. conformity with nature. This ideal, possibly first expressed by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, is, according to Philo, embodied both by the early biblical figures and the later Mosaic laws (see, e.g., Mos. 2.48; Diogenes Laertius 7.87; also Sandbach 1975, 52–59). voluntarily … accidental. The contrast between purposive and accidental transgressions is of course a generally recognized one, and is found in the Pentateuch (e.g., in Lev 4–5 and Num 15:22–31). Philo makes use of it elsewhere, e.g., at Post. 10–11, 48; Agr. 176, 180; Spec. 1.227, 259. Although the relevance of this contrast to the narratives in Genesis is not readily apparent, the distinction itself was significant for Philo’s understanding of humanity’s compound nature of rational and non-rational elements. Thus, as he states here, good people, who act in accordance with reason, would not be guilty of voluntary transgression. See Francis 2015a and 2015b, 16. calling on God for forgiveness. Scripture does not record such pleas for forgiveness by any of the six figures that Philo is speaking of here. He understands, however, that because of humanity’s compound nature (see the previous comment), even good people like these early figures cannot totally avoid involuntary transgressions. In later times the sacrificial system provided a formal means of restoring a proper relationship between God and the transgressor. Despite their living before the establishment of this system, however, the early figures, as Philo portrays them, found a way to restore this relationship through prayers and entreaties. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo’s overview of Genesis in §§1–2 is unique; that is, he does not provide a similar overview of this—or, for that matter, any other—biblical book in any of his other extant works. Likewise, although in Decal. 1 Philo refers to preceding treatises in which he has discussed the lives of wise men who are “unwritten laws” (νόμοι ἄγραφοι), in no other extant work does he speak of the early figures, including the patriarchs, as laws. Nachleben Some ancient sources later than Philo (e.g., 2Bar. and Apos. Con.) claim that the early figures of Genesis lived according to an unwritten legal system, but whether or not Philo had any influence on these sources is far from certain;

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see the comment at §5 on an unwritten legal system. By contrast, in Praep. ev. 7.6–7 Eusebius does indeed appear to draw upon Philo directly and he adapts Philo’s teachings for his own purposes. Eusebius’s most salient borrowings specifically from Abr. 1–6 include the notion that Moses prefaced his laws with a description of the lives of the forefathers in order to instruct and encourage followers to turn toward a pious life (7.7). Though they lived before the written laws, these forefathers behaved in an exemplary manner through right reasoning (7.7). Distinguishing between Hebrews and Jews (7.6), Eusebius also observes that Hebrews who came before Moses conducted their lives in accordance with nature. In a striking departure from Philo, however, the Church Father asserts that these Hebrews “had no need of laws to rule them, because of the extreme freedom of their soul from passions” (7.6; Gifford 1981, 327– 328). (On Eusebius’s borrowings from Philo, see also Johnson 2006, esp. 240– 241.)

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The First Triad, §§7–47 Chapter 2: Enos, The Man of Hope, §§7–16 Analysis/General Comments We now turn to a brief survey of three “pre-patriarchs,” as it were, who—while themselves exemplifying certain basic virtues, or conditions, for virtue—set the scene for the true patriarchs. The first of these pre-patriarchs is Enos (the Greek, which has no equivalent to the Hebrew letter shin, is Ἐνώς). Moses presents him in Genesis 4:26, which translates (literally) from the Hebrew as: “To Seth also a son was born, and he called his name Enosh. At that time it was begun to call upon the name of the Lord” (our trans.). In the Hebrew text, we find the passive, huḥal, of the root ḥll, “begin”; but the LXX translators seem to have misread the (unpointed) text as hoḥil, from the root yḥl, “hope.” Thus, for the second part of the verse they came up with: “this one hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God.” It is upon this misreading that Philo bases his interpretation of Enos as the personification of the virtue of hope. Citing the etymology of the Hebrew name Enosh, which means “human,” Philo declares that the quality of hope is uniquely human; indeed it is the defining characteristic of “the true human” (§§7–8). To prove this point, Philo quotes the verse immediately following (LXX Gen 5:1), which translates, “This is the book of the genesis of humans.” Since people had clearly existed earlier, this verse and its placement right after the birth of Enos show that with his quality of hope, Enos was founder of the truly rational race, in contrast to his predecessors, who belonged to a mixed race (§9). (Unlike the Hebrew, the Greek translation of Gen 5:1 allows for this interpretation; see the comment at § 9 on “This is the book …”) Philo then elaborates upon hope as the defining characteristic of humanity by explicitly mentioning the argument from pre-eminence (§10; see the comment ad loc. on even as Homer …)—that is, Moses “gave the name ‘Human’ [i.e., Enos] par excellence to him who indulged in hope, passing over in silence the multitudes of others as not being worthy to be granted the same appellation.” After further remarking on the appropriateness of the word “book” (βίβλος) in LXX Gen 5:1 (§11), Philo now observes that Enos was the fourth in birth-order from the first man (§12). This observation leads him to refer to Lev 19:24, in which the number four is also significant because the verse declares, “And in the fourth year all its fruit will be holy and to be praised [or, praiseworthy, an offer-

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ing of praise] to the Lord.” Philo cites the words “holy and to be praised,” which in the verse describe fruit to be offered to the Lord. In a clever shift, however, Philo understands these adjectives to modify the number four instead (§ 13). He then circles back to apply these adjectives to the man of good hope (§ 14). In conclusion, Philo praises hope as a necessary gatekeeper for access to “the royal virtues inside” and also praises the one who, trained by “an unwritten law,” arrives at the virtue of hope (§§15–16). The interpretations featured in this passage—especially, Enos as representative of hope, the first step in a progression of virtues, and hope as an essentially human quality, as evidenced by the meaning of Enos’s name—showcase the significance of Philo’s reliance on the Greek translation as well as his exegetical ingenuity. As noted above, there are substantial differences between the Hebrew and Greek wording of Gen 4:26. Indeed these differences are responsible for markedly different trajectories of interpretation of Enos and his times. (For a learned and insightful presentation of these different trajectories, see Fraade 1984; also Sandmel 1961). In our present passage (§§ 7–16), Philo takes advantage of two differences in particular: first, the rendering of the passive Hebrew verb huḥal (“it was begun”) as the completely different active Greek verb ἦλπισεν (“he hoped”) and, second, the indication of a specific hoper as “this one” (οὗτος), whom Philo identifies with Enos. (A third change—from “the Lord,” or “YHWH,” in Hebrew, to “the Lord God” [κύριος ὁ θεός] in the Greek—is not significant for Philo’s interpretation in this passage.) As for the first difference, although the verb change may be the result of a misreading by the Greek translators, it has also been suggested that they intentionally changed the meaning of the verse in order to avoid the impression that anyone else had discovered the Lord before Abraham or had known His name before Moses (Sandmel 1979, 178 n. 45; Harl 1986a, 119). Regarding the second difference, the Hebrew verb leaves ambiguous the question of who it was that began to call upon the name of the Lord. (For further analyses of differences between the Hebrew and Greek of Gen 4:26, see Fraade 1984, 5–11; Wevers 1993, 66–67.) Whatever the reasons for these differences, Philo’s interpretations are possible only because he bases them on the Greek translation. As for Philo’s exegetical ingenuity, he takes the further steps of introducing the etymology of Enos as “human” (ἄνθρωπος)—an etymology not provided in either the Hebrew or the Greek—and then, of characterizing hope as a uniquely human quality. In so doing, as Fraade points out, “Philo is the earliest writer explicitly to attribute significance to Enosh’s name” (1984, 20). We will see further instances, in the Detailed Comments below, both of the significance of Philo’s dependence on the Greek and of his interpretative prowess.

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Detailed Comments § 7. participation in goods. Or, enjoyment of goods. A major theme in this treatise is the notion of different kinds of goods—those of the soul and the body and external goods (see the Introduction, §6i). At the conclusion of the treatise, Philo will laud Abraham for his faith in God, which he (Philo) describes as, among other things, the “fulfillment of good hopes” and a “feast of goods” (§268). the first lover of hope. By calling Enos the first lover of hope, Philo may indicate some familiarity with the understanding of Gen 4:26 as reflecting a beginning, a sense explicit in the Hebrew (see the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter). Indeed Philo’s version of the verse may even have included the word “first,” as indicated in his citation in Det. 138, where he writes, “This one first hoped” (οὗτος ἦλπισε πρῶτον); see Fraade 1984, 8. §8. for the Chaldean word for “human” is “Enos.” In the Exposition and QGE, Philo sometimes uses “Chaldean” or forms of this word as a synonym for “Hebrew” to refer to speakers of the Hebrew language or to the language itself (cf. the comment at §69 on the Chaldeans; see also Wong 1992; Birnbaum 1996, 47). The normal Hebrew word for “man” is ish, but there is a rather more formal, or poetic, word enosh—Enos’s Hebrew name—which also denotes humanity in general. It is this latter word that Philo explains as ἄνθρωπος. The same etymology is to be found at Det. 138; Praem. 14; and QG 1.79. It is unlikely that Philo himself developed or knew first-hand the Hebrew etymologies that he refers to so frequently; instead it is more probable that he drew these word explanations from traditional lists. Regardless of whether the etymologies themselves are original to Philo, he may well have created many of the interpretations that are based on these etymologies, including the interpretation of “Enos.” See Grabbe 1988, esp. 155–156 on “Enos.” On whether or not Philo knew Hebrew, see Nikiprowetzky 1977, 50–96; for additional references on this debate, see Birnbaum 1996, 67–70. only he is truly a human … The remarkable doctrine that hopefulness is a basic human virtue, to the extent that “he who is of faint hope” (δύσελπις) is no longer worthy to be called a human at all seems to have been concocted by Philo on the basis of the LXX translation of both Gen 4:26 and 5:1 (see the comment at §9 on “This is the book …”). Other early Jewish and later Christian interpreters similarly hold Enosh in high regard. By contrast, on the basis of the Hebrew verse, the rabbis consider “the generation of Enosh” to be idolaters (see Fraade 1984 and 1998). expectation of good things. Philo’s understanding of hope is the same as is found in Pseudo-Plato’s Definitiones 416a. This source is generally dated either to the later Old Academy or to the early New Academy (4th–3rd centuries BCE)

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and may be based upon a Speusippan work entitled Horoi. In earlier philosophical and other writings, “hope” (ἔλπις) had signified mere expectation (e.g., Plato, Phileb. 39e). Often in both the Hebrew and Greek Bibles, words for hope carry the sense of confidence, in that humans place their hope in the Lord. For the range of understandings of ἔλπις and other words for “hope,” see Van Menxel 1983. §9. the Father and Maker of all. Philo here employs (as frequently elsewhere), the terminology of Plato’s Timaeus 28c, to characterize “the Lord God” (κύριος ὁ θεός), as mentioned in LXX Gen 4:26. Among other things, this Platonic designation underscores the universal nature of the Deity over the national dimension. (For a full list of Philonic passages and discussion of Philo’s use of this Platonic designation, see Runia 1986, 108–111). Although LXX Gen 4:26 specifies that Enos “hoped to call upon the name of the Lord God” (οὗτος ἦλπισεν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα κύριου τοῦ θεοῦ; our emphasis), here Philo simply states that Enos “placed his hopes in” (ἦλπισεν ἐπί) the Father and Maker of all. See also §58, with the comment on the Father and Creator of all things. “This is the book of the genesis of humans.” Although this verse (αὕτη ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων), introduces the genealogical list in LXX Gen 5:1–32, Philo applies these words retrospectively to Enos in order to explain why Moses (or Scripture) only now acknowledges the coming into being of humans even though many people existed prior to Enos. In an apparently original interpretation, Philo’s solution is that only the hopeful can be called true human beings. Unlike the Greek translation, which has “genesis” or “coming into being” (γένεσις) in the singular and “humans” (ἄνθρωποι) in the plural, the Hebrew speaks of “generations” (toledot) in the plural and “Adam” (adam) in the singular. The Hebrew adam can refer to generic humanity, but it is also the name of the first man; the Greek picks up on the former sense, and the Hebrew, the latter. The Hebrew verse, then, simply introduces the genealogy—i.e., the generations— of Adam, which follows, and does not present the same exegetical problem, posed by the Greek, that Philo addresses. the mixed race. That is, a mixture of rational and irrational (see also QG 1.79). As possessor of the uniquely human virtue of hope, Enos, according to Philo, established the “truly rational” race. See also Det. 138–139 and QG 1.80. In Praem. 13, which is also about Enos, Philo speaks of humans as a mixture of mortal and immortal. §10. even as Homer is called “the poet” par excellence. This is the development of the concept of naming “par excellence” or “pre-eminently” (κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν) adumbrated above in relation to the name “Genesis” for the first book of the Pentateuch (see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 1 and the comment at §2 on it is to it that he dedicated …). In our present passage (§ 10) the exam-

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ples given are fairly well-worn: “Homer,” “ink,” and “archon.” For others, see also such passages as Leg. 1.106, where the death of the soul through passions and vice is “death in the true [or pre-eminent] sense” (ὁ κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν θάνατος); and Fug. 72, where—with reference to Gen 1:27, which says that “God made the human”—Philo explains that the article before “human” (ἄνθρωπος) signifies that God created the human “intellect” (λογισμός), which is human “in the true [or, pre-eminent] sense” (see also below, §32). This grammatical and exegetical term is common enough in later literature, but there are comparatively few examples extant earlier than Philo; cf., e.g., Strabo 1.2.10: “The Pontic Sea was thought to be the largest of the seas in our part of the world, and for that reason they applied pre-eminently (κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν) to this particular sea the term ‘The Pontus’ (i.e., ‘Sea’), just as they spoke of Homer as ‘The Poet’” (translation adapted from H.L. Jones 1989, 77). “the black.” The Greek noun for “ink,” μέλαν, is the neuter form of the adjective μέλας, “black.” the eponymous. In Athens, the position of archon was the highest civilian office. Because, for dating purposes, years were named after the chief archon, he was called “the eponymous archon” (cf. Aristotle, Ath. pol. 3; also 4.1; 53.4; 56). §11. the “book” of the genesis of the true human … Here Philo comments on the phrase from LXX Gen 5:1 (see the comment at § 9 on “This is the book …”). By contrasting a book “subject to destruction by moths” with “the immortal record of nature”—implicitly Scripture—Philo underscores his claim that the written law of Moses is the same as the unwritten law of nature (see, e.g., Opif. 3; Mos. 2.48). In Det. 139, in which Philo interprets the same biblical verse, he uses the phrase “the book of God.” A related interpretation can be found at Leg. 1.19, where Philo, once again in the course of an exegesis, declares that the biblical phrase “book of the generation of heaven and earth” (Gen 2:4) is the Logos— “heaven” standing for intellect and “earth” for sense-perception. In the Logos are “inscribed and engraved the formations (συστάσεις) of all other things” (our trans.). subject to destruction by moths. The reference to indestructibility by moths is first found in a fragment of Pindar (frag. 243; Boeckh 2007, 676), where it is used in relation to the gold of the golden fleece, but Philo would hardly be acquainted with that. It turns up also, notably, in the New Testament (Matt 6:19; Luke 12:33), à propos treasures, either of this world or not of this world, the former being subject to the depredations of moths, the latter not. (See also Spec. 1.149.) §12. the first, earthborn man. This refers to Adam, whose creation from the dust of the earth is narrated in Gen 2:7. Philo distinguishes between this man

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and the man created “according to the image of God” (κατ᾽ εἰκόνα θεοῦ), as reported in LXX Gen 1:26–27 (see Opif. 69 and 134–136). On “earthborn” (γηγενής), see Runia 2001, 334, the comment at Opif. 136 on who was born from the earth. See also below, the comment at §56 on the earthborn. the Chaldeans. That is, users of the Hebrew language (see the comment at § 8 on for the Chaldean word …). Enos … comes fourth in sequence. How Enos is “fourth” is something of a problem, as noted by Colson ad loc. (PLCL 4:10–11 n. b). Enos should properly be fifth, after Adam, Cain, Abel and Seth. We must therefore assume that Philo intends to eliminate either Abel or Cain—the latter, if we may adduce QG 1.81, where it is stated that, in view of his foul homicide, Cain is to be “cast out like dung” (our trans.; to adapt a phrase from Heraclitus, frag. 96 D-K, 1:172), or the former, if we consider Gen 4:25, according to which Abel is substituted for by Seth. At any rate, the declaration of Enos as fourth gives Philo an opportunity to embark on a (brief) encomium of the number four. §13. by other philosophers … A pretty clear reference here to the Pythagorean-Platonist tradition, which maintains the reality of incorporeal and intelligible being—not the Platonism of Antiochus of Ascalon, we may note, but rather that of Philo’s compatriot Eudorus. the all-wise Moses. Philo frequently shows his esteem for the Jewish lawgiver by describing him as “all-wise” (πάνσοφος; see also, e.g., Det. 126; Post. 28, 169; Agr. 20; Plant. 27), an epithet that he also applies to Abraham (Cher. 18), Isaac (Cher. 47; Sacr. 43), and Jacob (Sacr. 48). As he sometimes does, Philo will show that Moses’s teachings (here, in Lev 19:24) resemble and accord with Greek philosophical ideas; occasionally Philo even claims that these ideas originated with Moses (e.g., Her. 214). holy and to be praised. In a rare reference to a secondary biblical lemma— rare, that is, for this treatise and the Exposition series in general—Philo presents a somewhat imaginative interpretation of LXX Lev 19:24, where it is prescribed that “in the fourth year all its fruit will be holy and to be praised (αἰνετός [or, praiseworthy, an offering of praise]) to the Lord.” The Greek ἅγιος καὶ αἰνετός, translates the ambiguous Hebrew, kodesh hillulim, which may be understood as “holy, an offering of praise” (RSV), but also as “set aside for jubilation” (NJPS). Scripture is unclear about what precisely should be done with the fruit, but presumably both the Greek αἰνετός and the Hebrew hillulim imply that it is meant to be used for praise to the Lord or to serve as the basis for which the people may praise the Lord. (For rabbinic exploration of the ramifications of this phrase for Jewish practice, see b. Ber. 35a.) Whereas the biblical words “holy and to be praised” describe the fruit, however, Philo uses the phrase in connection with the number four, suggested by the biblical verse’s mention of

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“the fourth year.” Elsewhere, at Plant. 117–125, the same text is adduced, with a reference back to the creation account at Gen 1:14–19, and a praise of four ensues, it being linked to light, which was created on the fourth day. (See also Somn. 1.33–34.) On Philo’s quotation of the biblical phrase in Abr. 13, see Royse 2008, 157. In Abr. 14, Philo will now adapt the phrase to describe “the man of good hope” (εὔελπις) as “holy and praiseworthy” (ἅγιος δὲ καὶ έπαίνετος) and will thereby return to the subject of hope. in the previous treatise. A reference to Opif. 47–52, in which Philo expounds on the qualities of the number four in relation to the fourth day of creation. §14. praiseworthy … blameworthy. Praise and blame are standard expressions of evaluation in Greek thought (e.g., Aristotle Rhet. 1.3.3–6.1358b–1359a; see also Deus 71). Based on the phrase “holy and to be praised” from Lev 19:24, Philo sets up a contrast between the man of good hope, who is holy and praiseworthy, and the man of faint hope, who is thus unholy and blameworthy. fear as an evil counselor. An echo here of Tim. 69d, where “overconfidence and fear” (θάρρος καὶ φόβος) are described as “witless counselors” (ἄφρονε ξυμβούλω). hope … and fear. Philo explains here why the two qualities are often contrasted (see also Mut. 163; Plato, Phileb. 32c). (On fear as one of the passions, see, e.g., §236.) incapable of reconciliation or agreement. The collocution ἀκατάλλακτοι καὶ ἀσύμβατοι is one that Philo rather favors. We find the adjectives paired again at Abr. 105; Ios. 156; and Legat. 205—though in each case in reverse order to that found here. Of the two words, “incapable of reconciliation” (ἀκατάλλακτος) is far the rarer, so that one would normally expect it to come second. §15. hope, which nature has placed like a gatekeeper … For the use of “gatekeeper” (πυλωρός) as indicating a protective and introductory force, cf. Spec. 1.31. The image of a gatekeeper at the very doors expresses Philo’s view of hope, represented by Enos, as the first in a progression of virtues in the journey of the soul (see also §26; in §268 faith is viewed as the “fulfillment of good hopes”). Similarly, for an encomium of hope as “fount of lives” (πηγὴ τῶν βίων; our trans.), cf. Praem. 10–14, which concludes with a repetition of the contents of Abr. 7–8. Philo often uses “nature” to refer to God (see, e.g., §§ 16, 38, 248, 257) and, in related fashion, he presents the law of Moses as equivalent to the law of nature (§5; Opif. 3; Mos. 2.48). For the virtues as “royal,” cf. Leg. 1.65: “for each of the virtues is in truth a sovereign and a queen” (ἑκάστη γὰρ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἡγεμονὶς καὶ βασιλὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστι; our trans.); also Post. 128. §16. this virtue. Although Philo speaks of hope as a virtue, it is not usually reckoned as such in Greek thought. Other qualities considered as virtues in Philo’s works but not typically elsewhere include “humanity” (φιλανθρωπία;

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Virt. 51–174) and “piety” (εὐσέβεια; Abr. 60). See Wilson 2011; on piety, see Sterling 2006 and 2007. by an unwritten law, learned by himself. The “self-taught” (αὐτομαθής) most often describes Isaac (e.g., Migr. 101; Somn. 2.10), but the term is linked here with Enos, as the man of hope. Like the other ancient figures discussed in §§ 17–59, Enos acquires virtue without instruction from any written laws (see §§ 5–6 and the comment at §6 on listening to themselves …). Philo uses the phrase “unwritten law” (ἄγραφος νόμος) in different ways; see also § 5 and the comment on an unwritten legal system. He applies it, for example, to the patriarchs themselves (Decal. 1; cf. Abr. 276) and to “the lives of those who pursue virtue” (Virt. 194; our trans.). The phrase can also signify customs (e.g., Spec. 4.149–150; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.14.7.1375a). Scholars have debated whether Philo’s use of “unwritten law” can ever be equated with rabbinic oral law. Although similar traditions can be found in Philonic and rabbinic writings, however, such an equation is highly unlikely (for an overview of the discussion, see Birnbaum 2006, 253). According to Martens, Philo is unique in applying the phrase to nature and people (2003, 88; see the Introduction, §7b). At the end of the treatise (§ 275), we also find a reference to “unwritten nature” (ἄγραφος φύσις), as opposed to any “writings” (γράμματα), as teaching Abraham to obey the divine commands. laid down by nature. On Philo’s use of “nature” to signify God, see the comment at §15 on hope, which nature has placed … Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo discusses similar themes related to Enos in Det. 138–139; Praem. 10–14; and QG 1.79–80. In Det. 138–139, Philo emphasizes that humans are characterized by hope, as shown through the meaning of Enos’s name as “human” and (as explained in Abr. 9) through LXX Gen 5:1, which follows immediately the verse about Enos (Gen 4:26) and declares, “This is the book of the genesis of humans.” In Praem. 10–14, Philo begins by stressing the importance of hope in the rational soul (Praem. 10–12). The one who hopes in God receives as his reward the name Enos and thus “takes the name which is common to the whole race as his personal name” (Praem. 14). In QG 1.79, Philo mentions the etymology of Enos as “human,” which refers to the rational part of the soul, and he defines hope as “anticipation of joy” and “expectation of good.” He explains in QG 1.80 that, coming right after Gen 4:26, Gen 5:1 confirms that through their capacity for hope humans are distinguished from other animals. Philo cites and/or discusses Lev 19:24 in Plant. 117–135; Somn. 1.33–34; and Virt. 158–159. The verse provides him with an opportunity in the Plant. and Somn. passages to praise the number four, as he does in § 13. In Somn. 1.33, Philo associates the description “holy and for praise” with the fourth year but in Plant.

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126–135 he explores what kind of “fruit” merits this description and identifies it as the fruit of education, thanksgiving (Plant. 126), also represented by Judah (Plant. 135). Finally, and from a different perspective, by noting in Virt. 158–159 that the fruit of the fourth year should be devoted as a thank-offering to God, Philo illustrates that Moses’s legislation is characterized by “fairness” (ἐπιείκεια, Virt. 160), a quality extended even to plants. Nachleben Among later, Christian writers on Enos, Philo’s influence is perhaps most apparent in the work of Eusebius (Praep. ev. 7.8), who acknowledges his indebtedness not directly to Philo but to “the learned of the Hebrews.” Like Philo, Eusebius views Enos as first in a series of virtuous exemplars to be emulated. He (Eusebius) too finds significance in Enos’s name. Thus he regards Enos as the first to hope to call upon the name of the Lord God and as a result to be called a “true human,” distinguished from the “earthborn” man, named Adam. Again, like Philo, Eusebius associates Enos with rationality and sets him apart from baser men, who are like irrational animals. Another similarity between Eusebius and Philo, but one not mentioned in Abr. 7–16, is that Eusebius interprets reference to the names Lord and God (in LXX Gen 4:26) as signifying the two Divine Powers, the Ruling and the Creative. On this association, see Abr. 119–132 with comments ad loc.; see also Fraade 1984, 59 n. 38. For further discussion of Eusebius’s interpretation of Enos and its relationship to Philo’s exegesis, see Fraade 1984, 56–60; Schroeder 1975, 62–64; Johnson 2006, 242; and Sandmel 1961, 21–22. Beyond Eusebius, other later writers exhibit parallels to or contain echoes of Philo’s interpretation. The Samaritan source Memar Marqah also “finds significance in Enosh’s name and the juxtaposition of Gen 4:26b and 5:1” (Fraade 1984, 32). Direct influence from Philo, however, would seem highly unlikely. Didymus the Blind preserves the etymology of Enos as “human” and sees Enos as “being truly human” (ὄντως ὢν ἄνθρωπος) (In Gen. 144–145). Other elements in his interpretation, however, are clearly non-Philonic (for details, see Fraade 1984, 68–70; see also Rogers 2017, 119–142, esp. 140). For references to additional occurrences of the etymology of “Enos” in later sources, see Monique Alexandre 1988, 376; Grabbe 1988, 155–156. Finally, an echo of §8 (cf. §14), may possibly be found in Clement, Strom. 2.6.27.2, in which he speaks of hope as “an expectation of the acquisition of the good.” It is also interesting that right beforehand (Strom. 2.6.26.5–27.1), Clement mentions repentance, since after Enos, symbol of hope, Philo will turn to Enoch, symbol of repentance. In the context of Strom. 2.6, however, Clement does not mention either Enos or Enoch (Ferguson 1991, 176; see also van den Hoek 1988, 182).

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Chapter 3: Enoch, The Man of Repentance and Improvement, §§17–26 Analysis/General Comments We turn now to Enoch (§§17–26), and specifically to LXX Gen 5:24: “Enoch was well-pleasing to God, and he was not found, because God transferred him (ὅτι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός).” The fairly plain implication of the text is that Enoch was transferred to another mode of existence (i.e., he died)—which is why he was “not found.” Philo, however, chooses to take the “transferral” in a moral sense (though at QG 1.86 he takes it in a more obvious, physical sense), and this gives him the opportunity to present Enoch as an emblem of repentance and the capacity to improve oneself with God’s help. The association of Enoch with repentance goes back at least as far as LXX Sirach, which was translated from the Hebrew perhaps a century and a half before Philo’s time and proclaims in (most versions of) verse 44:16: Ἐνὼχ εὐηρέστησεν κυρίῳ καὶ μετετέθη ὑπόδειγμα μετανοίας ταῖς γενεαῖς. Enoch pleased the Lord and was transferred, an example of repentance to the generations. our trans.

(One manuscript has διάνοια instead of μετάνοια; see Ziegler 1965, 333; PCH 1:100 n.) As Philo shows in QG 1.82–83, the link between Enoch and repentance can be traced to an understanding of LXX Gen 5:22, which states that “Enoch was well-pleasing to God after he begot Methuselah, two hundred years …” Because the verse specifies that Enoch was well-pleasing to God after he begot Methuselah—and implicitly not before—it is understood that at this point in his life Enoch repented. Indeed Philo writes that “on becoming a man and father, in his very procreation, [Enoch] made a beginning of probity” (QG 1.82). Philo’s statement in QG 1.83 that Enoch lived two hundred years after his repentance (instead of after he begot Methuselah, as in the verse) further confirms that Philo links Enoch’s repentance with his siring of Methuselah. In Abr., however, Philo focuses not on LXX Gen 5:22, as in QG 1.82–83, but on LXX Gen 5:24 and the notion that God’s transference of Enoch guaranteed that his change was for the better. Enoch thus symbolizes improvement as well as repentance. (See also Kugel 1998, 12, 28, 178–179, 193–194; Sterling 2008b, 81– 84.)

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In presenting Enoch as a representative of repentance and improvement, Philo also slips in an etymology of Enoch’s name as “receiver of grace” (§ 17). Philo focuses, however, not on the etymology but rather on the meaning of the transference, which, because it was accomplished through divine assistance, necessarily signifies a change for the better (§ 18). As for the statement that Enoch “was not found,” Philo explains that Enoch’s former, evil way of life was blotted out and in his new, virtuous state he was difficult to locate, since virtue is rare (§19). To support this observation, Philo offers a profile of the bad man, always out in public and stirring up trouble (§§ 20–21). The good man, by contrast, cherishes quiet and solitude and occasionally retreats from the city to a remote farm, where he can engage with literature produced by the best of humanity (§§22–23). Philo next details the passage of the transferred one (Enoch) from specific negative qualities to new, admirable virtues, which constitute true wealth and genuine sovereignty (§§ 24–25). Despite their positive value, however, repentance and improvement remain inferior to “uninterrupted perfection in virtues” (§26). On the basis of Gen 5:24, the biblical figure Enoch has enjoyed a full and impressive “afterlife.” Interpreters focusing on his transference imagined him to have ascended and been introduced to a wealth of wisdom about heaven, the cosmos, and the future. His having “walked with God” according to the Hebrew (see the comment at §17 on “Enoch was well-pleasing to God”) suggested, among other things, that he was profoundly righteous and may have had a special relationship with heavenly beings. Indeed Enoch’s reputation was so exalted, so to speak, that in some circles he was regarded as an equal or perhaps even a rival of Moses (Alexander 1998, esp. 87, 108). Philo’s approach to this biblical figure, however, is rather different and, it has been suggested, may have been constructed purposely to downplay Enoch’s implicit challenge to the primacy of Moses (ibid., 108; cf. Kraft 1978, 256). Thus, while clearly admired for his turning away from evil and his embrace of virtue, Enoch, in Philo’s portrayal, nonetheless symbolizes the inferior qualities of repentance and improvement, which take “second place to perfection” (§26). On Enoch’s “afterlife,” see further Ginzberg 2003, 1:119–131, esp. 121 n. 58; Box and Oesterley 1978, 482. On Enoch and “repentance” (μετάνοια), see Lührmann 1975. Detailed Comments § 17. repentance for sins and improvement. See the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter for the exegetical bases of Enoch’s “repentance and improvement” (μετάνοια καὶ βελτίωσις). The latter term seems not to be used before Philo (though it occurs frequently in his works), but μετάνοια has more of a history. It does not figure, however, as a moral term in the Greek philosophical tradi-

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tion, and would thus, like “hope,” constitute something of a Judaic strand in Philo’s thought (see, e.g., the comments at §8 on expectation of good things and at §16 on this virtue). In classical Greek, μετάνοια carries the sense primarily of change of mind or regret; in Jewish literature, the term takes on the additional meanings of repentance and conversion. Both of these latter senses are found in Philo, who uses the term and its cognates more often than earlier writers. See especially, e.g., Philo’s essay on μετάνοια in Virt. 175–186, in which he shifts from one sense to the other. For more on this concept, see J.N. Bailey 1991; Winston 1990, esp. 4–7; Behm and Würthwein 1967; Michel 1987; Monique Alexandre 1998; and Sterling 2008b. the Hebrews. That is, those who use the Hebrew language. “receiver of grace.” This etymology of Enoch as “he who is blessed” or “he who has received grace” (κεχαρισμένος) would seem to be based on the Hebrew root ḥnn, meaning “to show favor,” “be gracious” (whereas another root that better matches the letters of the name is ḥnkh, meaning, “to train, dedicate, or educate,” from which is derived the modern Hebrew word for “education,” ḥinukh). From the root ḥnn there is a noun ḥen, meaning “favor,” or “grace.” At Post. 41 and Conf. 123, Enoch is etymologized as “your gift, or grace” (χάρις σου), whose underlying Hebrew possessive would end with the letter kaph and thus correspond more closely to Enoch’s Hebrew name. Scripture refers to two Enochs—one, son of Cain (Gen 4:17) and the other, son of Jared, from the line of Seth (Gen 5:18). In Post. 41, Philo distinguishes between the two Enochs as son of Cain and descendant of Seth and views the former Enoch negatively, the latter, positively. In Conf. 123, Philo speaks of Enoch only as the son of Cain and as the projection of the unholy impulses of the Cain-mind. From his quotation of LXX Gen 5:24, it is obvious that in Abr. Philo has in mind only Enoch of the line of Seth. Philo’s association between Enoch and grace adds another feature in common between him and Noah, the third member of the first triad, who, like Enoch, is also said to be well-pleasing to God (see the next comment). Whereas Philo links Enoch with grace through an etymology, however, Scripture (LXX Gen 6:8) states explicitly that Noah “found grace with the Lord God” (εὗρεν χάριν ἐναντίον κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ). “Enoch was well-pleasing to God.” While the Hebrew of Gen 5:22 and 24 says that “Enoch walked (vayithalekh) with God,” the Greek has “Enoch was well-pleasing (εὐηρέστησεν) to God,” a difference that possibly reflects a deliberate avoidance of any anthropomorphic implications. The same discrepancy appears in Gen 6:9 regarding Noah, and similar substitutions of the verb εὐαρεστέω for Hebrew words based on hlkh (“walk”) with reference to God can be found in, e.g., Gen 17:1; 24:40; and 48:15. Less significant for our purposes, the Hebrew of Gen 5:22 has Enoch living 300 rather than 200 years after he begot

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Methuselah. For other relevant differences between the Hebrew and Greek of Gen 5:24, see the next comment. See also Royse 2008, 157–158; Wevers 1993, 71– 72. “and he was not found, because God transferred him.” The Hebrew translates as “and he was no more (ve-enenu) for God took him.” Because Enoch is not said to have died, speculation about what befell him and what he learned afterwards gave rise in antiquity to an impressive body of literature; see, e.g., 1 and 2Enoch (also Kugel 1998, 173–179, 191–194; Alexander 1998). In § 18, Philo will develop the significance of God’s transference of Enoch and in § 19, of his not being found. In Praem. 16–17, Philo understands that Enoch received two rewards, for abandoning evil and adopting virtue: a new home, based on his having been “transferred,” and a life of solitude, based on his being “not found.” §18. For “transference” denotes turning and change … The “transference” of Enoch, based on the LXX μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός, is taken by Philo here in a moral sense, whereas the intended sense of the Hebrew text that “God took him” (laqaḥ otho) is presumably rather that “God took him to Himself,” either through death, or some form of assumption into heaven. In Post. 43 and Mut. 38, Philo understands Enoch to have been transferred from the mortal realm to the immortal (see also Heb 11:5) and, in QG 1.86, from “a sensible and visible place to an incorporeal and intelligible form.” The notion that God transferred Enoch in a moral sense reinforces the understanding of Enoch as having earlier repented (see the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter). Philo’s interpretation here raises the interesting question of the balance between free will and divine direction, for although Enoch repented, it may be that it was only with God’s help that he actually improved. See, e.g., Leg. 3.213, in which Philo observes that not every soul wishing to repent has been permitted by God to do so; also J.N. Bailey 1991, 138. Cf. Wis 4:10–15, according to which God transferred Enoch as a preventive measure so that he would not be tempted by the sinners among whom he lived; also Gen. Rab. 25:1. We may note that in the other biblical passage where a word from the same Hebrew root is employed to denote a similar transference, i.e., the assumption of Elijah into heaven in a fiery chariot at 2Kgs 2:10, the verb laqaḥ is translated by the Greek ἀναλαμβάνω, “take up” (4Kgdms 2:9) so that no such moral interpretation as Philo here adopts would have been possible. Nonetheless in QG 1.86, Philo does associate Enoch with Elijah on account of their unconventional passages from this life (or from earth to heaven) and also mentions Moses (though not by name but as a “protoprophet”), because his burial place was unknown. For a linking of Enoch with Elijah in rabbinic literature, see Gen. Rab. 25:1; also Alexander 1998, 93, 109, 115. For this association in Christian sources, see Adler 1978, 273–275.

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everything done with the help of God … The thought that everything done with God’s help is fine and advantageous is a common one with Philo; see also, e.g., §143; cf. §268; Opif. 72–75; Conf. 180; see too Lam. Rab. 2.1.3 and Tanḥ. Tazria 9 on Ps 5:5. In our present passage (§§17–26), this notion supports the symbolization of Enoch as not only repentance but also improvement. divine care. In earlier Greek ἐπιφροσύνη seems to be a distinctively poetical word, going back to Homer (Od. 5.437), in the sense of “prudence”; Philo is the first recorded prose author to employ it, but now exclusively in the sense of “(divine) providence”; cf., e.g., Det. 61; Agr. 169; Migr. 171—22 instances in all. See also Geljon and Runia 2013, 255, the comment at § 169 on the supervision of God. §19. “he was not found.” The two explanations here for Enoch’s “not being found” are not intended to be exclusive alternatives; rather, the first refers to the personal state of the penitent, that his former, evil “life-style” (βίος) is entirely suppressed, while the second focuses on the comparative rarity of such a paragon of virtue in society; this latter observation in turn leads into a Philonic diatribe (§§20–21) against “meddling busy-ness” (φιλοπραγμοσύνη) (see the comments at §20 on obsessed with social activity and mixing up truth with falsehood). virtue is rare. For similar observations, see Post. 43; Migr. 59; Prob. 63. §20. obsessed with social activity. Philo may have borrowed the term “meddling busy-ness” (φιλοπραγμοσύνη) directly from Plato’s Republic 8.549c, where the genesis of the “timocratic” man is explained by his being “the son of a father who is good, but who lives in a badly governed state, and therefore steers clear of status and office and lawsuits and all that sort of φιλοπραγμοσύνη, and is happy to be discounted, so as not to invite trouble.” Philo, of course, carries the notion considerably further, and focuses not, like Plato, on the virtuous citizen who withdraws, but on the vulgar hustler who involves himself in all these activities, with an emphasis on the immoderateness (πρὸς ἄμετρον καὶ ἀπέραντον καὶ ἄκριτον διήγησιν) and indiscriminate nature (συγχέων ἅπαντα καὶ φύρων) of such a way of life. Indeed one imagines that Philo may have had specific individuals in mind among his fellow Alexandrians; see, e.g., Flacc. 20 (esp. on Isidorus as a type of φιλοπράγμων) and 41. For a similar listing of public gathering places, see Plato, Resp. 6.492b. mixing up truth with falsehood. Here follows a string of balanced epithets, which together with Philo’s high-flown language, is typical of the diatribe mode. See the Introduction, §3b. silence. For other praises of ἡσυχία as a social virtue, cf., e.g., Her. 257; Mut. 251; Somn. 2.37; Praem. 157. For Philo, a judicious silence is a characteristic of the wise or prudent man.

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with his ears pricked up. The text is quite uncertain here, but the general sense of τὰ δὲ ὦτα ἐπουρίσας should be “pricking up his ears,” or perhaps “spreading his ears like sails before the wind.” See also Colson, PLCL 6:14–15 n. 1. §21. a malicious creature, a hater of good and a lover of evil. The sequence of epithets βάσκανος καὶ μισόκαλος καὶ φιλοπόνηρος is typically Philonic, comprising as it does a commoner, more generic epithet (βάσκανος, “a malicious creature”), followed by one or two much rarer and more specific ones; μισόκαλος (“hating good”) occurs first in Philo, and φιλοπόνηρος, first in this sense (sc. “loving evil”; see also §199)—though it is used earlier, e.g., by the orator Dinarchus, in the sense of “loving evil companions” (frag. 89:37). §22. The good man. Philo now passes from the negative to the positive aspect of his diatribe, the praise of the way of life of the “decent man”—the ἀστεῖος, as opposed to the φαῦλος (“the bad man”; see § 20). Ἀστεῖος is a favorite term of Philo’s for the “good man,” or sage, as it is for the Stoics (along with σπουδαῖος). Cf. Somn. 2.230 (a good characterization of the ἀστεῖος): “The ἀστεῖος is, properly speaking, a borderline figure (μεθόριος), as being neither God nor man, but touching the extreme points of either, by his humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) the mortal race, and by his virtue (ἀρετή) the imperishable” (our trans.). Here Philo goes on to quote Lev 16:17, on the high priest as an example of such a borderline figure. solitude. For the significance of μόνωσις with regard to the mind and the other faculties within us, cf. §30 below. On Abraham’s solitude, see § 87. not through any hatred of humanity. Philo’s defense of the ἀστεῖος from the potential charge of “misanthropy” (μισανθρωπία) and his declaration that the good man is a “lover of humanity” (φιλάνθρωπος) call to mind his insistence elsewhere that the Jews are not anti-social and that both their lawgiver and their laws are characterized by “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία), which he considers a virtue akin to piety (e.g., Spec. 2.167; Virt. 51–174, esp. § 141). Indeed Philo devotes much of the latter part of Abr. (§§208–261; see also § 107) to demonstrating Abraham’s own love of humanity. the common throng. In Greek, ὁ πολὺς ὄχλος. The mob is always in the wrong for Philo; cf. Congr. 27: “the ordinary, vulgar mass of people” (ὁ πολὺς καὶ ἀγελαῖος ἀνθρώπων ὄχλος; our trans.) worships fame and wealth and pleasure; at Mos. 1.197, Moses reflects that “the multitude (ὄχλος) by its very nature is an unstable thing, shaken by the circumstances of the moment”; and at Ios. 64 the “common throng” (ὄχλος) is compared to a licentious woman, seducing the statesman, luring him away from his principles. On the “lazy and unoccupied mob” in Alexandria, see Flacc. 33. §23. some isolated farm. Μοναγρία is a very rare word, attested otherwise only at Alciphron 2.2 (= LCL 17.7). It is hard to resist the feeling that there is

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something of a personal edge to this passage on the ἀστεῖος, or “good man”; one can readily imagine Philo retiring with great pleasure into the countryside, either to visit his friends, like the Therapeutae, or just to catch up on his reading in a country retreat, while the recesses of his capacious town house would also afford modes of escape from the “common throng” (ὄχλος). both poetry and prose. From this phrase (διά τε ποιημάτων καὶ τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων), we may derive a hint of the wide range of Philo’s reading. The poets and prose authors here mentioned will not be Jewish, but Hellenic. See also Lincicum 2014, 113, who sees this passage as indicative that individuals could possibly have had their own private libraries. §24. hard to find and hard to catch. A typical Philonic doublet (δυσεύρετος καὶ δυσθήρατος): these adjectives are not elsewhere used together by Philo, though frequently apart. At Fug. 164, for example, “hard to catch” (δυσθήρατος) is paired with “hard to conceive” (δυσπερινόητος); this latter a hapax legomenon. So he passes over. In Greek, μεθορμίζεται, a nautical metaphor popular with Philo—other examples, all in a moral context, as here, include Congr. 108; Spec. 1.227; Praem. 15; and cf. below, §78, where there is both a literal and a spiritual departure envisaged. The list of what Enoch passes over from and to is comparable, though not identical, to the list in Virt. 180, in Philo’s discussion of “repentance” (μετάνοια) (Virt. 175–186; cf. Praem. 15). In this section of Virt., Philo begins by understanding μετάνοια as repentance, but later in the passage (§§181–182) it becomes clear that he also encompasses the change undergone by proselytes. Philo’s list here again exemplifies his use of balanced epithets, which are characteristic of the diatribe; see the Introduction, § 3b. §25. the wealth which is not blind but sharp-sighted. In Greek, ὁ μὴ τυφλὸς ἀλλ᾽ ὀξὺ βλέπων πλοῦτος. The image of a wealth not blind—as material wealth is blind—but sharp-sighted—as is spiritual or intellectual wealth—is much beloved of Philo; examples include Agr. 54; Sobr. 40; Her. 48. The image is derived from the portrayal of wealth as a blind god or character; see, e.g., Plato Leg. 1.631c; Aristophanes, Ploutos (“Wealth”), passim. Here in our Abr. passage it is identified with “the full complement (περιουσία) of virtues,” which is given a political coloration, as leading to perfectly just governance. bastard types of rule … genuine and lawful administration. While the latter refers to the just rule of the virtues, the former, according to a suggestion by E.R. Goodenough, may signify rule “by parts of the body or soul, or sense perceptions” (1969, 130 n. 31). Philo frequently contrasts “bastard” (νόθος) and “genuine” (γνήσιος), a contrast that goes back at least to Plato; see, e.g., § 221 and the comment on not false goods over true ones … In Virt. 180, Philo specifies that μετάνοια involves passing from “mob-rule” (ὀχλοκρατία) to “democracy”

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(δημοκρατία). In that context, as here, he may also have in mind moral rulership, although his precise intention is unclear. §26. repentance takes second place to perfection. In Greek, τὰ δευτερεῖα φέρεται μετάνοια τελειότητος. A reminder that “repentance” is not the highest moral state. It is here assimilated to the Stoic concept of “progress” (προκοπή), represented in this passage by “improvement” (βελτίωσις), which is in fact explicitly linked with “progress” (προκοπή) at Mut. 19, where it is similarly contrasted with “the most perfect” (τελειώτατοι). See also Virt. 176–177, in which Philo declares that “to be completely without sin is a singular trait of God or perhaps of a divine man” (our trans.); see also Fug. 157. Cf., however, Spec. 1.187, in which Philo writes that God “has given to repentance the same honour as to innocence from sin.” Philo’s view in the present passage (§ 26)— i.e., that repentance takes second place to perfection—is similar to Aristotle’s claim that the “temperate man” (σώφρων) is superior to the “morally strong,” or “self-restrained,” one (ἐγκρατής; Eth. nic. 7.2.1146a, 7.9.1151b–1152a). In rabbinic literature, the opposite position is maintained by R. Abbahu (b. Ber. 34b), who regards penitents more highly than “the perfectly righteous.” See also Luke 15:7; H.A. Wolfson 1982, 2:258–259; Winston, 1990, 6; cf. Midr. Prov. 6. childish interests. For a similar comparison between childish and adult pursuits, see §48. In the latter passage, all three in the first triad (Enos, Enoch, and Noah) are compared to the second triad, which comprises Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. a state of serenity … a vision of what is noble. These ideals correspond respectively to what is achieved by Noah (§§27, 30) and the second triad of patriarchs (§§56–59), including specifically Abraham (§ 79), the subject of this treatise. In this passage, then, Philo represents Enoch and his repentance as but a stage in a progression of moral and spiritual attainments (see also § 47). Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo discusses Enoch in Post. 40–43; Mut. 34–38; Praem. 15–21; QG 1.82–86; and we have alluded to aspects of his treatment in these passages in the commentary. In Post. 40–43, Philo addresses the difference between Enoch, son of Cain (Gen 4:17) and Enoch, descendant of Seth (Gen 5:18). The etymology of Enoch, “your gift,” can be understood in two different ways. Enoch, son of Cain ascribes “gifts” to the human mind, while Enoch, descendant of Seth, recognizes that everything is a gift of God. In Post. 43, Philo alludes to LXX Gen 5:24 when he observes that the latter kind of person (i.e., Enoch, descendant of Seth) is hard to find and that God has transferred those well-pleasing to Him “from perishable to immortal races … no more found among the multitude.”

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Similar themes appear in Mut. 34–38, in which Philo quotes parts of LXX Gen 5:24. He describes as rare and hardly found those whose mind aims to be well-pleasing to God. Indeed the scarcity of such types is confirmed by the statement that Enoch was transferred from mortal to immortal life. While the above two passages focus on Enoch’s quality of being well-pleasing to God rather than on his repentance, in Praem. 15–21, Philo does not even mention Enoch’s name but instead speaks of him as the quality of repentance personified. In this passage, then, Philo praises repentance for its eager striving toward betterment, which involves leaving behind covetousness and injustice and passing over to soberness, justice, and the other virtues. As its rewards for leaving behind evil, repentance receives a new home, and for “choosing the excellent,” it receives a life of solitude. As Colson points out, in this passage Philo does not mention Enoch’s quality of being well-pleasing to God (from the first part of LXX Gen 5:24) and the rewards of a new home and solitude reflect an understanding of transference simply as a removal “ ‘from familiar surroundings’” (PLCL 8:321 n. c). In QG 1.82–86, Philo addresses specific aspects of LXX Gen 5:21–24. Thus in QG 1.82, he notes that on becoming a father (LXX Gen 5:22), Enoch repented and was pleasing to God for two hundred years. It is interesting that Philo remarks here that Enoch “did not altogether remain in piety” but was nonetheless counted among the praiseworthy “for he was pleasing (to God) for so many years.” Philo further comments that “(Scripture) reveals the ordering of things. For not very long after the forgiving of Cain it introduces the fact that Enoch repented, informing us that forgiveness is wont to produce repentance.” In QG 1.83, Philo finds numerological meaning in Enoch’s having lived 165 years before his repentance and 200 years after (LXX Gen 5:21–22). (According to the Hebrew of these verses, by contrast, Enoch lived 65 years before the birth of Methuselah and 300 years thereafter.) Similarly, he (Philo) discourses on the significance of Enoch’s having lived 365 years (altogether) (QG 1.84, based on LXX Gen 5:23). Explaining in QG 1.85 why after Enoch’s end, Scripture notes that he was pleasing to God (LXX Gen 5:23–24), Philo gives as one reason— in contrast to what he says in QG 1.82—that after he repented, Enoch “did not again change until the end of his life.” In QG 1.86, Philo focuses on LXX Gen 5:24 and remarks that “the end of worthy and holy men is not death but translation.” Observing that Enoch was “said (to have moved) from a sensible and visible place to an incorporeal and intelligible form,” Philo then compares him to both Moses (called here the “protoprophet”), whose burial place is unknown, and Elijah, who ascended from earth to heaven.

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Nachleben The most apparent influence of Philo’s discussion of Enoch in §§ 17–26 is found, once again, in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 7.8. Although Eusebius speaks about Enoch only briefly, he focuses on Gen 5:24 and borrows several themes from Philo. Especially prominent is the idea that the truly wise person is hard to find, while one “of a different character” spends his time in all kinds of public places, where he “is swallowed up in the very gulf of wickedness” (Gifford 1981, 331). Like Philo, Eusebius too names different kinds of public areas, such as the marketplace, courts, taverns, and shops, and he too speaks of the “great mob” (πολὺς ὄχλος). Notably absent from Eusebius’s treatment, however, is the mention of Enoch as a symbol of repentance. Eusebius does, though, give an etymology for Enoch as “the grace of God.” Further references in Christian sources to explanations of Enoch’s name as related to the Hebrew ḥen, or grace, are listed by Grabbe 1988, 156. (These word explanations may or may not have been influenced by Philo.) Another Church Father who does mention repentance is Clement (Strom. 2.15.70.3), who appears to draw more directly from QG 1.82 than from Abr. To show that the Lord offers “modes of cure corresponding to the maladies,” Clement asks, “Does not God, after the pardon bestowed on Cain, suitably not long after introduce Enoch, who had repented?” (Coxe 1994, 363; see also van den Hoek 1988, 183). Finally, like Philo in QG 1.82 and like Gen. Rab. 25:1 (see the comment at §18 on “for ‘transference’ …”), some Christian sources also link Enoch with Elijah; see Adler 1978, 273–275.

Chapter 4: Noah, The Man of Perfection, in His Generation, §§27–47 Analysis/General Comments Third and last in Philo’s initial triad is Noah (§§ 27–47), whom Philo speaks of as a “wise man,” or σοφός (§27), and whom he depicts as similar in some ways to this ideal Stoic figure. As Philo explains, Noah follows naturally after Enoch because repentance, which Enoch represents, is secondary to perfection (§ 26), symbolized by Noah, who is described as “perfect” (τέλειος) in LXX Gen 6:9. Whereas Genesis mentions Enos, the first in the triad, in just one verse (4:26), and Enoch in seven verses (5:18–24), Noah plays a major role in no less than four biblical chapters (Gen 5:28–9:29; and the genealogy of his descendants follows in chapter 10). Philo’s discussion of this last figure in the triad is similarly longer than that of the two predecessors. Here, however, Philo omits details about Noah after the flood, such as his sacrifice, God’s blessing of him (on which the

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rabbinic Noahide laws are based), God’s covenant with him, Noah’s planting a vineyard, his drunkenness, and the curse upon Canaan—some of which topics Philo treats elsewhere (e.g., in Agr.-Sobr. and QG 2). We can divide the material that Philo does discuss in our present treatise into roughly three sections: (1) Noah’s virtuous qualities (§§27–39), with a digression about the seventh day in §§28–30; (2) the flood (§§40–45); and (3) concluding remarks (§§46–47). (1) Noah’s virtuous qualities (§§27–39), with a digression about the seventh day in §§28–30. Philo derives Noah’s virtuous qualities from both the etymology of his name in LXX Gen 5:29 and the description of him in LXX Gen 6:9. According to Philo, the name “Noah” means “rest” (ἀνάπαυσις) and “just” or “righteous” (δίκαιος), two qualities that he considers in reverse order (§ 27). For more on Philo’s understanding of Noah’s name, see the comment at § 27 on “rest” or “just.” Speaking about the appropriateness of linking the wise man with rest, calm, and peace, Philo digresses briefly (§§28–30) to discuss the peacefulness of the seventh day, or shabbath in Hebrew, which can—like noaḥ—be translated as “rest” (ἀνάπαυσις). Here he includes an allegorical interpretation to illustrate that the number seven represents peace and calm. Adapting Stoic ideas— which may also possibly be found in Aristobulus (Praep. ev. 13.12.12) and Sirach 17:5 (Greek, some versions)—about the division of the soul into several faculties, Philo writes that when the seventh faculty—i.e., the ruling intellect— achieves control over the other six—i.e., the five senses and articulate speech— it remains calm, separate, and self-sufficient. Philo’s association of the seventh day with peace rather than rest may have had an implicitly apologetic function because some writers in antiquity charged that the Jewish Sabbath instilled laziness (see the comment at §28 on as is held by some.) The basis for Philo’s remarks in §§31–39 is LXX Gen 6:9: “And these are the generations of Noe. Noe was a just man, being perfect in his generation, Noe was well-pleasing to God.” Observing the odd juxtaposition of the beginning of the verse, after which one would expect a list of family members, with the words that come next, Philo takes Noah’s genealogy to be his virtuous qualities. Like the Stoic sage or the cosmopolitan who has no country or family, so too does Noah belong to a family that consists of virtues and virtuous acts. Philo now comments on the latter part of LXX Gen 6:9, in which Noah is said to be “a just person,” “perfect,” and “well-pleasing to God.” Because Noah is described specifically as “perfect in his generation,” however, Philo takes this qualification to indicate that Noah’s perfection was only relative and not absolute. Using a

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favorite athletic metaphor, he describes Noah as achieving the second prize, which—though not worthy of the highest admiration—is nonetheless great, for whatever comes from God is good, even if what He bestows is secondary in nature. (2) The flood (§§40–45). In God’s sparing of Noah and his family after the flood, Philo sees proof of the worth of even this second prize, and he now turns to the story of that great cataclysm. Describing humanity’s wickedness (§ 40), Philo notes that God was displeased with the creature that “seemed to be the best, and … had been deemed worthy of kinship with Himself by virtue of sharing in reason” (§41). What follows is an extended portrayal, in diatribe mode (on which see the Introduction, §3b), of the course and effects of the flood (§§ 42– 45). Here this mode manifests itself in the elaboration of the whole concept of utter destruction by flood rather than in the employment of particular stylistic flourishes. Nonetheless one finds in §43 a notable sequence describing the storm that accompanied the flood, in §44–45 the description of the element of water coming to dominate the universe, and in § 46 the conceit (if it is fair to term it such) of Noah being gifted with the distinction of being the last of the former race and the first of the latter—all features redolent of the diatribe. Besides its obvious dependence on Gen 6–8—upon which Philo embellishes with such details as winds, thunder, and lightning—this portrayal seems to owe something to Plato’s description of periodic catastrophic floods in Laws 3.677a– 678e. In Plato, however, there is no suggestion of punishment being the cause of the flood (any more than in his account of the flood which destroys Atlantis in the Timaeus [25c–d], since that destroys Athens as well). Also, the Platonic flood is not total, as is that of Genesis, as the high mountains and those few primitive shepherds who dwell there are not affected. Here, by contrast, Philo, in keeping with the Genesis account, depicts the flood as both total and retributive for the wickedness of humankind. (3) Concluding remarks (§§46–47). The survival of Noah, along with his family, after this cataclysm is, according to Philo, one of “two supreme gifts,” the other being Noah’s distinction as the first of a new human race (§ 46). Here Philo may have in mind Deucalion, with whom he explicitly identifies Noah in Praem. 23. (In Ovid’s Metamorphoses [1.313–415], Deucalion and his wife similarly survive a devastating flood and he can thus be described as both the last of those who came before and the first of those who followed; see the comment at §46 on both the end and the beginning of our race). Finally, Philo concludes his discussion of the first triad by explaining that the three represent a progression, which he describes in reverse order (§47): Noah is perfect from the first;

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Enoch—as one whose earlier life was devoted to vice and later, to virtue— is “half-completed”; and Enos, the hoper—in a play on “hoper” (ἐλπίζων)—is “defective” (ἐλλιπής), because while striving toward the good, he is not quite able to achieve it. Noah is thus a transitional figure between two triads. Using the technique of σύγκρισις, or “comparison,” Philo first compares Noah, the good, with his evil generation (§36). Now he will compare the entire first triad, who are good, with a second triad, who are even better (§48; cf. §37). Unlike the second group of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, however, who naturally constitute a triad of father, son, and grandson, the triad of Enos, Enoch, and Noah constitutes a grouping of Philo’s own invention. This construction, based upon the virtues symbolized by each figure, has no apparent parallels among other biblical interpreters. Because Enoch and Noah were glorified among some ancient interpreters, it has been suggested that behind Philo’s presentation of the two triads may have been a wish to downplay the importance of the earlier figures and to highlight instead the importance of Moses and the patriarchal ancestors of the Jews. (On Enoch, see Alexander 1998, esp. 107–110; Boccaccini and Collins 2007. On Noah, see Dimant 1998, esp. 130–131; Stone et al. 2010. See also Kugel 1998, 194.) Detailed Comments § 27. It is for this reason quite natural. Since Philo has just explained that repentance holds a secondary, inferior place to perfection (§ 26), since Noah is described as “perfect” (LXX Gen 6:9; see §34), and since Enos, Enoch, and Noah represent a progression in virtues (see, e.g., § 47), Philo sees it as natural for Noah to follow upon Enoch, the repentant one. In Genesis, however, several generations separate Enos, Enoch, and Noah, and the three are not set apart or identified as a triad; this construction is found only in Philo’s works (see also Praem. 10–24 and the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter). beloved by God and himself a lover of virtue. In Greek, θεοφιλὴς καὶ φιλάρετος. The latter term (φιλάρετος) is used once by Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.8.10.1099a, but it is favored by Philo (64 instances recorded, e.g., in TLG and Borgen et al. 2000, 352). This epithet is granted to Moses at Virt. 175, where he is described as “loving virtue and beauty and, especially, humanity” (our trans. of φιλάρετος καὶ φιλόκαλος καὶ διαφερόντως φιλάνθρωπος); cf. also Opif. 128; and Leg. 3.130, where it is used for Moses with θεοφιλής, as for Noah here in § 27. Jacob too is described as “a lover of virtue” (φιλάρετος) at Somn. 1.45. See also Abr. 31. “Beloved by God” or “God-loving” (θεοφιλής) is classical, and Platonic (e.g., Resp. 2.382e; Phileb. 39e); see also §46, and the comment on the just and God-beloved man … in the language of the Hebrews. In Greek, Ἑβραίων μὲν τῇ γλώττῃ καλεῖται Νῶε. Philo alternates interestingly between “Hebrew” and “Chaldean” to

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describe either those who use the Hebrew language or the language itself. See § 8, with the comment on for the Chaldean word for “human” is “Enos,” and § 17, with the comment on the Hebrews. “rest” or “just.” Although “rest” is a proper translation of the Hebrew noaḥ, “just” is not. Philo uses the latter as an etymology, perhaps because LXX Gen 6:9 says that “Noah was a just person” (ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος). (Δίκαιος can be translated as both “just” and “righteous” and we sometimes use one or the other or both.) Whatever the reason for Philo’s association of Noah with the quality of being just, however, Philo frequently refers to him as “just [or righteous; δίκαιος] Noah” or as “the just one” (ὁ δίκαιος) (e.g., Post. 48; Agr. 2; Plant. 1); see also Wis 10:4. He also observes that Noah was “the first man recorded as just in holy scriptures” (Congr. 90). While Noah’s name comes from the Hebrew root nwḥ (“rest”), the Hebrew of Gen 5:29 provides an etymology based on a different root, nḥm (“comfort”): “This one will provide us relief [or will comfort us, yenaḥamenu] from our work …” Cf. the Greek, on which Philo’s etymology is based: “This one will allow us to rest (διαναπαύσει) from our works …” It is possible, but not certain, that the Greek translators of the Bible may have substituted this explanation to accord with the correct Hebrew root. For rabbinic discussion of the lack of correspondence between Noah’s name and the Hebrew biblical explanation, see Gen. Rab. 25:2; also Kugel 1998, 216–218. For an interpretation of the etymology of “Noah” in which Philo explains “rest” and “just” in relation to each other, see Det. 121–123. See also Grabbe 1988, 192–193. the wise man. A Stoic ideal. By applying this description to Noah and the patriarchs (§§37), Philo portrays them as universal exemplars. On Abraham as a sage, see the Introduction, §6d. justice, the leader among the virtues. In Greek, ἡ ἐν ἀρεταῖς ἡγεμονίς. Philo seems to be the first to use the feminine version of “leader” (ἡγεμών) in an ethical context, and he uses it quite frequently; cf., e.g., Decal. 119; Spec. 4.135 (of piety and holiness); Virt. 95 (of piety and humanity). He also uses it to describe sight among the sense-faculties, below at §§150, 164. See also § 60, with the comment on a devotee of piety … In the same way that δίκαιος can be translated as “just” or “righteous,” the Greek word δικαιοσύνη can denote “justice” or “righteousness.” Among Jewish writers in Greek, δικαιοσύνη sometimes carries the added connotation of observance of the commandments; see, e.g., N.G. Cohen 1995, 106–128; LSJ, s.v. δικαιοσύνη, #2. This sense is not prominent in the present context, but some of Philo’s readers may have been conscious of it. like the fairest one in a dance troupe. Philo’s reference to this convention of Greek drama shows that he was familiar with this aspect of Hellenistic culture and assumed his audience to be as well. In Praem. 53, he uses a like simile to describe “piety” (εὐσέβεια). There may also be here a reference to some such

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poem as Alcman’s Partheneion (ll. 40ff.), where the praises of the beautiful Agido and Hagesichora are being sung. unnatural motion. Stoics have used the phrase “unnatural motion (κίνησις παρὰ φύσιν) of the soul” as a definition for passion (SVF 3.462, 476; see PLCL 6:16 n. a). §28. the seventh day, which the Hebrews call “Sabbath.” In an apparent aside (§§28–30), Philo turns from Noah to the Sabbath. The Greek σάββατα (for the Hebrew shabbath) first appears in LXX Exod 16:23, where it is associated with “a holy rest (ἀνάπαυσις) to the Lord.” The transition from Noah to Sabbath is based on the verbal (and thematic) cue of “rest” (ἀνάπαυσις), a Greek translation for the Hebrew of both “Noah” and “Sabbath.” (On verbal and thematic modes of transition between a main biblical lemma and a secondary one, see Runia 1984.) Philo, however does not focus on rest but rather on the peacefulness of the number seven. On this number in Philo, see also Opif. 89–128; in Jewish tradition, see Ginzberg 2003, 1:8 n. 21. as is held by some. In Gen 2:3, God declares the seventh day holy because He Himself ceased from the work of creation. Philo, however, cites the claim of “some” that the Sabbath is based on the people’s cessation of work. By focusing on the peacefulness of the number seven instead of on rest Philo may be implicitly responding to critics who charged that the Jewish Sabbath inculcated laziness (cf. Spec. 2.60; see also GLAJJ: Seneca 1:431, no. 186; Tacitus 2:18, 25, no. 281; 5:4:3). at the cosmic level and in each one of us. In this passage, Philo focuses on the significance of the number seven within each of us; for the cosmic level, see Opif. 89–128, esp. 89, in which he calls the seventh day “the birthday of the cosmos” (τοῦ κόσμου γενέθλιον). §29. the faculties within us. Here Philo draws an opposition between the six physical faculties—the five senses and “the faculty of speech” (ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος)—and the intellect. Elsewhere (e.g., Opif. 117; Leg. 1.11; Her. 232; Mut. 111), however, Philo adapts the number of faculties to suit his purposes. Thus for example, in Opif. 117, the “lower,” or irrational, faculties are seven—the senses, along with speech and the reproductive faculty. In the latter passage, Philo is concerned to make a contrast between intellect as a monad and the other faculties as a hebdomad, in a manner truer to the Stoic origin of this multi-part division of the soul; cf. SVF 2.833. Here (i.e., in § 29), he needs a distinction between the six days of creation, involving activity, and the seventh, involving rest (ἀνάπαυσις). See also Sir 17:5 (Greek, some versions), Praep. ev. 13.12.12 (Aristobulus), and the comment at §30 on The seventh faculty … the faculty of articulate speech. Influenced by a doctrine often associated with the Stoics, Philo occasionally contrasts “articulate speech” (προφορικὸς λό-

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γος) with “internal speech” (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος); see, e.g., Mos. 2.129; Spec. 4.69. See also Kamesar 2004. through desire for the objects of sense. In Greek, πόθῳ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The notion that the senses have a “longing” (πόθος) for their sense-objects, and suffer discomfort when deprived of them, is a rather quaint one, which presumably arises from the observation that the senses need their respective senseobjects for their activation. “with unbridled mouth.” This is a quotation, ultimately, from Euripides, Bacchae 386: ἀχαλίνων στομάτων; cf. also Plato Leg. 3.701c. This reproach against the faculty of speech may seem odd, but must be viewed in the context of the diatribe here being conducted against the life of action and busy-ness. Philo uses the phrase again, also characterizing λόγος, at Her. 110. §30. The seventh faculty … the ruling intellect. Aristobulus may likewise associate “reason” (λὀγος) with the seventh faculty and with the Sabbath, but this is uncertain. Scholars debate whether the reference in Aristobulus (Praep. ev. 13.12.12) is to Stoic cosmology or Stoic psychology and anthropology; see Holladay 1995, 184–185, 230–232; and Walter 1964, 68–81. For use of “the ruling intellect” (ὁ ἡγεμὼν νοῦς), see Plato Leg. 1.631d; also Abr. 74, 83; Opif. 69; and Runia 2001, 225, the comment ad loc. on to the director of the soul, the intellect. retires into itself, embracing solitude. The concepts of “withdrawal” (ἀναχώρησις), and “solitude” (μόνωσις), as well as that of self-sufficiency of the intellect seem to betoken a tendency in Philo towards solitariness and withdrawal from society. For references in this treatise to the solitude of people, see § 22, in connection with “the good man” (ὁ ἀστεῖος), and §87, in connection with Abraham and those who seek God. On Philo’s savoring of his own respite from public affairs, see Spec. 3.1–6. calm and serene. Philo is fond of the collocution εὔδιος καὶ γαληνός, employing it on no less than four other occasions, viz. Conf. 43; Her. 285; Fug. 50; Mos. 1.214. The metaphor is a nautical one. §31. grandfathers or great-grandfathers or ancestors generally. Usually the biblical genealogies present the descendants, or “generations,” rather than the ancestors. proclaiming all but directly. In using the phrase μόνον οὐχὶ βοῶν ἄντικρυς, Philo may be adapting a somewhat similar phrase (μόνον οὐχὶ λέγει φωνὴν ἀφιείς) from the beginning of Demosthenes’s First Olynthiac Oration (1.2), which would have been a set text in any rhetoric class he might have attended. See also Congr. 154; Virt. 147. the wise man has no other household and kindred and native land than the virtues. To explain the peculiar mode (based on Gen 6:9; see the next comment)

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of “genealogizing” the lover of virtue here, Philo appears to draw on the Stoic concept that the sage is not properly a relation of anyone except other sages; cf. SVF 1.222–223; 3.630, 635: “the virtuous man” (ὁ σπουδαῖος) cannot be a “friend” (φίλος) to anyone not virtuous. Also related is the Stoic ideal of the “citizen of the world” (κοσμοπολίτης), who belongs not to a particular city but to a commonwealth of wise and virtuous people (see, e.g., Spec. 2.44–48). “Household,” “kindred,” and “native land” are similar to, even if not precisely the same as, what the Lord commands Abraham to leave in Gen 12:1; cf. § 62. “these … are the generations of Noah …” LXX Gen 6:9. Instead of following these opening words with a list of descendants, the verse immediately observes that Noah was “a just person, being perfect in his generation, Noe was wellpleasing to God.” Because of this unusual sequence, Philo understands Noah’s “genealogy” to be his virtuous qualities, each of which Philo will now consider in more detail. See also Deus 116–118; QG 1.97. For a similar notion, based on this verse, that the fruits of the righteous consist of good deeds, see Gen. Rab. 30:6 and Tanḥ. Noaḥ 2. §32. in the usual sense of “rational mortal animal.” Cf. Det. 139; see also Antisthenes, frag. 44b (Caizzi 1966, cited by Lincicum 2013b, 147). in the pre-eminent sense. Or, par excellence. Here Philo once again makes use of the “pre-eminent” (κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν) sense of a term, to redefine “human” in the strictest sense as a totally rational being, divested of any irrational, passionate element. See the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 1 (on §§ 1–6) and the comments at §2 on it is to it that he dedicated … and § 10 on even as Homer is called “the poet” par excellence. untamed and raging passions and most bestial vices. For other, similar uses of these epithets for the passions (“untamed and raging” [ἀτίθασα καὶ λελυττηκότα]), cf. Opif. 83: ἀτίθασοι λύτται; Mos. 1.26; Somn. 2.165. The animal imagery (“untamed”; “most bestial” [θηριωδέσταται]) also calls to mind Philo’s allegorization of Noah’s ark, with its animals, as the body, which has to make room for “the savage and untamed pests of passions and vices” (αἱ παθῶν καὶ κακιῶν ἀτίθασοι κἀξηγριώμεναι κῆραι) (Plant. 43). §33. after “human,” he adds “just.” Philo’s interpretation of this phrase would seem to arise from his ignorance of the underlying Hebrew, “ish tsaddik,” or “just man,” which includes, as in English, a noun and an adjective, even though the Hebrew tsaddik could also stand alone as a noun. (For a different interpretation of the significance of ish, or “man,” see Gen. Rab. 30:7.) In Greek the word “human,” or “person” (ἄνθρωπος) is also superfluous—δίκαιος may stand by itself, to signify a just person; so Philo sees the inclusion of this word as an assertion that the essence of humanity is to be just. Cf. §§ 7–10 about Enos, where Philo states that the essence of humanity is hope.

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§34. indicating by this. Philo seeks to extract the maximum significance out of the epithet “perfect” or “complete” (τέλειος) as referring not only to Noah’s “acquisition” (κτῆσις) of all the virtues, but also his active “employment” (χρῆσις) of them, thus showing once again his mastery of Greek philosophical terminology; see, e.g., Aristotle’s definition of philosophy as “the acquisition and employment of wisdom” (κτῆσις καὶ χρῆσις σοφίας), in his Protrepticus (frag. 52; Rose 1886, 62, line 8). Cf. §261 below, in connection with Abraham. Whereas Philo writes that Noah “became” (γεγονέναι) perfect, the Greek Bible uses the participle “being” (ὦν) (perfect), while the Hebrew notes that Noah “was” (hayah) “perfect” (tam, which can also be understood as “blameless” or “wholehearted”). See the Hebrew and Greek of Gen 6:9; also Gen. Rab. 30:8. §35. And after crowning him. Note here the imagery, much beloved of Philo, of winning in the games; see also §§40 and 48; Praem. 6. For an extended sequence of games imagery, cf. Agr. 111–123. “well-pleasing to God.” In the Greek Bible, this and similar phrases serve as substitutions for the Hebrew “walked with God” in several verses, such as Gen 5:22 and 24 about Enoch and Gen 6:9 about Noah (see the comment at § 17 on “Enoch was well-pleasing to God”). In Leg. 3.77–78, Philo discusses Noah’s quality of being well-pleasing to God in connection with his finding grace before God (mentioned in Gen 6:8, but not directly discussed here in Abr.). In Deus 118, Philo writes that being well-pleasing to God is spoken of after the other virtues (in Gen 6:9) because it is the acme of these virtues and “the definition of supreme happiness.” Elsewhere Philo speaks of being well-pleasing to God as a goal of life (see, e.g., §235; Virt. 184; and Praem. 24). See also the comment at §248 on in mutual satisfaction. wretched … truly happy. The related Greek words κακοδαίμονες and εὐδαίμονες further underscore the contrast between “those who are ill-pleasing” (οἱ δυσαρεστήσαντες) to God and “those who are well-pleasing” (οἷς εὐαρεστῆσαι συνέβη). See Nikiprowetzky 1996a, 241; also Runia 2001, 354 and 359, the comment at Opif. 152 on well-being … misfortune. §36. “perfect in his generation.” Philo, despite his warm commendation of Noah, now contrasts him significantly with the patriarchs whom he is about to celebrate (§§48–59), by giving a qualificatory emphasis to the phrase “in his generation” (Gen 6:9). The intent of the biblical phrase is ambiguous, and while some early Jewish interpreters understand it, as Philo does, to signify a qualification about Noah’s “perfection,” others see it very differently as a sign that Noah was quite remarkable indeed: for if he was able to be virtuous in his thoroughly evil generation, how much more virtuous might he have been in a better generation! (Gen. Rab. 30:9; see also Kugel 1998, 187.)

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not absolutely good. Philo sets up here a contrast between relative and absolute excellence, such as may owe something to the Stoic contrast between the person making progress (προκόπτων) or “improver”—the one on the way to perfect wisdom—and the achieved sage. We may note that the latter does not even have to “recoil from evil practices” (§37), since that person has nothing to do with them in the first place. in comparison with. Philo makes use of the rhetorical technique of σύγκρισις (“comparison”) here by contrasting Noah with the people of his time (a comparison between good and bad), on one hand, and with the superior triad of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (good and better), on the other (§ 37). For a comparison of the two triads, see §48. See also QG 1.96, in relation to Noah’s finding favor with God (Gen 6:8). On Philo’s use of σύγκρισις, see M. Martin 2003. the people of that time. In the Greek for this phrase (οἱ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γεγόνοτες), the word γεγόνοτες may be a play on γίγαντες or giants, mentioned in Gen 6:5. The exact role of these giants is not clear, but they are associated with the evil that God perceives in Gen 6:6 and 11–13. See QG 1.92; Kugel 1998, 181–183, 197–199, 206–207. §37. other sages. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. See the comment at § 27 on the wise man. §38. beauty itself and justice itself. We may note the characteristic Platonic terminology αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, and the implication that only the perfected sage, like the philosopher kings of Plato’s Republic, will have a clear vision of the forms. the second prize. Once again, imagery from the games, but the passage in Plato’s Philebus (22c–d) may also be an influence. There, while Socrates recognizes that if people were given a choice, then the mixed life of intellectual activity and pleasure would win the first prize, Socrates himself wishes to claim “the second prize” (τὰ δευτερεῖα), for intellect alone. On second place or prize, see also, e.g., Spec. 1.17 and 38 and the discussion in H.A. Harris 1976, 80–81; also Geljon and Runia 2013, 206, the comment at Agr. 121 on the second or third prize. nature. Another way of referring to God; see also, e.g., § 15 and the comment on hope, which nature has placed like a gatekeeper; §§ 16, 248. §39. of those things offered and bestowed by God. Philo believes that all things that come from God are good—even therefore Noah’s secondary status in relation to the later patriarchs. See also, e.g., § 18. The clearest proof. In God’s sparing of Noah and his family from the flood, Philo finds proof of his claim that even the second prize offered by God is something great. In this way, he makes a transition from the virtues of Noah to the flood account.

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§40. For that period produced a crop of misdeeds … Philo indulges here in one of his characteristic diatribes—no doubt with a glance at his own contemporary scene—to describe the state of the world leading up to the flood. In fact, however, the exact nature of the misdeeds is left vague in Genesis (6:5, 11–13) and similarly in Philo’s comments here. Other interpreters have tried to identify more precisely the evildoings that led up to the flood. See, e.g., Kugel 1998, 171–226; Dimant 1998, 124–134. as if taking part in a contest. Note again the games imagery: all are striving to secure “the first prize” (τὰ πρωτεῖα) in sinfulness. a blameworthy and accursed lifestyle. For other uses of “blameworthy” (ἐπίληπτος; the word used in this sense seems not to be attested earlier than Philo), cf. §19 above: Enoch leaves his former ἐπίληπτος βίος behind; and Leg. 3.68, where God “curses” (καταρᾶται) “blameworthy and disgusting” (ἐπίληπτος καὶ μιαρά) pleasure. §41. God, being quite reasonably displeased … Note the emphasis on God’s displeasure at the defection from virtue in a creature which shares with Him “reason” (λόγος), which He Himself bestowed. by virtue of sharing in reason. For Philo, reason is the very basis of humanity’s kinship with God. Cf. the exposition on this kinship at Opif. 77, 146. the appropriate punishment. Philo does not explain here why it was appropriate that God punished humanity specifically through a flood, but in Det. 170, he writes that the water was meant to cleanse and purify the soul of its unspeakable injustices. In Conf. 23–25, he comments that the totality of the flood was suitable because no part of the soul remained uncorrupted and thus no part was salvageable through the health of any other parts. For some similar interpretations in other sources, see Kugel 1998, 188–190. all those then existing. The flood destroyed not only humanity but also animals and even, Philo claims, plants. See §45 with the comment on all sown crops and trees. even those dwelling on the highest mountains. See Gen 7:19. In this detail, the biblical flood differs from Plato’s description of periodic floods in Leg. 3.677a– b (see the Analysis/General Comments in this chapter), since, in the latter, the high mountains with their scattered shepherds were unaffected. See also the comment at §43 on even of the peaks of the highest mountains. §42. For the great sea … According to LXX Gen 7:11, “all the fountains of the abyss burst forth, and the flood-gates of heaven were opened.” As suggested by Colson (PLCL 6:24–25 n. a), Philo appears to have understood the LXX phrase, “the fountains of the abyss” (αἱ πηγαὶ τῆς ἀβύσσου), to signify the ocean that surrounded the earth and filled “‘the vast hollows beneath the earth.’” Here Philo postulates an influx from this ocean and outbreaks of flooding from land-based

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water-sources (i.e., “the seas of our part of the world” as well as springs and rivers). In Abr. 43, Philo apparently interprets “the flood-gates of heaven” as “unceasing downpours” from heaven. Elsewhere, he interprets the flood allegorically; heaven, for example, represents mind or reason, earth represents body and senses, and both mind and body are overwhelmed by vices or passions. See, e.g., QG 2.18 on Gen 7:11; QG 2.29 on Gen 8:2; Conf. 23–25. §43. Nor did the air remain still. Philo embellishes the biblical account with such added details as winds, thunder, lightning, and thunderbolts. On the “unceasing downpours of rain,” see the previous comment. so that one would think that the parts of the universe were dissolving. The flow of Philo’s thought leads him to toy with the idea that all the four basic elements from which the cosmos is composed were dissolving into the single element of water (note the verb “were dissolving” [ἀναστοιχειούμενα], a term used by the Stoics to describe the resolution of all other elements into fire at the final “conflagration” [ἐκπύρωσις]; cf. Chrysippus, SVF 2.618). even of the peaks of the highest mountains. The mention of “peaks” (κορυφαί), though an obvious enough word, may be an intentional reminiscence of Plato’s use of the word at Leg. 3.677b—in which case we may discern an element of “one-upmanship” on Philo’s part over Plato; sc. “your flood only reached somewhat short of the peaks of the highest mountains, but our flood rose over those as well.” Plato’s purpose, of course, in sparing the mountainous uplands was to provide for the eventual revival of civilization; but to secure that, the biblical story has Noah and the ark! See also LXX Gen 7:19: “And the water prevailed exceedingly upon the earth, and covered all the high mountains (πάντα τὰ ὄρη τὰ ὑψηλά) which were under heaven.” §44. except for a small part … Philo recognizes that at least the higher portion of the air, that around the moon, and the realm of the heavenly bodies (see § 46 below), remained unaffected by the cataclysm, but the greater part of the air was indeed affected. On air and the region of the moon, see also Somn. 1.134. §45. all sown crops and trees. Scripture does not include these details. According to LXX Gen 7:23, God “blotted out every growth (ἀνάστημα; Hebrew, yequm) that was on the face of the earth from human to beast and serpents and birds of the sky” (cf. LXX Gen 7:4). The meaning of ἀνάστημα is ambiguous, but Philo apparently understands it to refer to plants, perhaps because his biblical text specifies “growth of vegetation” (ἀνάστημα φυτοῦ). See QG 2.15, with n. i by Marcus in PLCL suppl. 1:92; and QG 2.24. See also Pseudo-Philo, LAB 3.3; and Feldman 2003, 405. it was only to be expected. Here Philo explains why the animals were punished as well, especially since Gen 6:5–6 gives only the wickedness of humans as a reason for the flood. See too QG 1.94; 2.9. Some sources also portray animals

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as participating in the sinfulness that preceded the flood (see, e.g., Jub. 5:2; 1 En. 7:5; Kugel 1998, 187–188; Feldman 2003, 404–408). since they came into existence to fulfill its needs, as slaves. Another affirmation of the subordination of all the rest of creation to the domination of humanity. Cf. Opif. 77–88, esp. 77–78, in which Philo explains, as a reason why humans were the last to be created, that God first made everything in the universe ready to meet human needs. §46. apart from those in the heavens. See the comment at § 43 on Nor did the air remain still. the just and God-beloved man mentioned above. Here Philo alludes to some of Noah’s qualities mentioned in LXX Gen 6:8–9. Besides “just person” (Gen 6:9), with the word θεοφιλής Philo combines the aspects of Noah’s finding grace before the Lord God (6:8) and his being well-pleasing to God (6:9). On the difference between these latter two qualities, however, see Leg. 3.78. See also the comments at §27 on beloved by God and himself a lover of virtue, and § 35 on “well-pleasing to God.” both the end and the beginning of our race. For other references to this role of Noah, cf. Mos. 2.60, 65; QG 1.96. In Praem. 22–23, Philo similarly mentions Noah’s two prizes and identifies him with Deucalion, who in Greek mythology also survived, with his wife, a devastating flood and was thus both the end and the beginning of the race (see Ovid, Metam. 1.313–415). As Colson points out (PLCL 8:451–452), this identification of a biblical character with a mythological one is probably unique in Philo’s thought and perhaps also in that of other Jewish writers of his time. §47. the three mentioned above. That is, Enos, Enoch, and Noah, discussed here in reverse order. whether you take them as men or as types of soul. Whereas “men” (ἄνδρες) corresponds to Philo’s literal understanding of these early figures, “types of soul” (ψυχῆς τρόποι) reminds us of the “higher,” allegorical interpretation of both the preliminary triad and the fully-fledged triad. (The latter also symbolize types of soul; see §52). The preliminary triad represents gradations in virtue, Noah being “the perfect one” (τέλειος), “complete from the outset”; Enoch, “the transferred,” only “half-completed” (ἡμίεργος; see the next comment); and Enos, “the hoper,” “defective” (ἐλλιπής), but showing promise, and a desire for improvement (see also the comments below on as his very name indicates … and people on a sea voyage). The trio that we are about to study, on the other hand, all excel equally, but exhibit distinctive emphases, viz. learning, natural ability, and practice. complete from the outset … half-completed. “Half-completed” (ἡμίεργος) is contrasted with ὁλόκληρος (“perfect” or “complete”) also at Somn. 1.112, in which

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Philo declares that the power of reason does not function in a half-way manner but is complete in every way. Elsewhere in Greek literature, the word ἡμίεργος is used, of buildings and other such projects, with the sense of “half-finished.” Philo may be alone in using it in an ethical context. as his very name indicates, is defective. By using “defective” (ἐλλιπής), Philo apparently plays on the word “hoper” (ἐλπίζων). people on a sea voyage. Note the nautical imagery in respect of Enos. He is like seafarers seeking a safe harbor, but still battling the elements on the high seas (θαλαττεύοντες). For analogies, cf., e.g., Cher. 13; Det. 141; Post. 22, 100; Deus 175. Such nautical imagery probably came easily to Philo, living as he did in the great Mediterranean coastal city of Alexandria. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Although Philo deals rather extensively with Noah throughout his works, since he does not address matters pertaining to events after the flood in §§ 27–47, here we mention parallels related only to themes covered in our present passage. For fuller consideration of Philo’s approach to Noah, see Lewis 1968, 42–74; Geljon 2010; and Earp PLCL 10:392–396. By far the most frequent parallel is reference to Noah as “righteous” or “just” (δίκαιος) a characterization that appears with and without Noah’s name (for ὁ δίκαιος Νῶε, see, e.g., Agr. 2, 181; Mut. 189; for ὁ δίκαιος, see, e.g., Agr. 20; Conf. 105). In Congr. 90, Philo observes that Noah was “the first man recorded as just in holy scriptures.” In Det. 121, he explicitly gives the etymology of Noah’s name as δίκαιος (see also QG 2.45; cf. QG 1.87: “‘Noah’ is a sort of cognomen of justice”). In Leg. 3.77, however, he reports the etymology as either “rest” or “just.” Related to Philo’s brief digression on the Sabbath as “rest” (§ 28), in Cher. 87 he mentions that “Sabbath” means “rest” and emphasizes that the Sabbath refers to God’s rest and not that of humankind. As in Abr. 31, in Deus 116–118 Philo also remarks on the strange genealogy of Noah, whom he interprets symbolically, declaring that “the offspring proper to a good mind” are virtues (§118). In QG 1.97, he observes that “to the virtuous man virtue is truly a generation.” In other treatises, Philo comments on some of the same details as in Abr. about the flood, which he occasionally allegorizes. In Conf. 23, for example, he understands the deluge to take place in the soul, where, on the basis of LXX Gen 7:11 (see Abr. 42), “the ‘cataracts of heaven’ poured forth the torrents of absolute wickedness … and the ‘fountains from the earth,’ that is from the body … spouted forth the streams of each passion.” He likewise interprets the flood as taking place in the soul in Fug. 192, in which he understands “ ‘the cataracts of heaven’” to refer to the mind and the “‘fountains of the abyss,’” to sense-

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perception. “For only in this way,” he writes, “is a deluge brought upon the soul, when as though from heaven, that is the mind, wrongdoings burst upon it as in a cataract; and from sense-perception below, as it were from the earth, passions come welling up.” In Mos. 2.54, by contrast, he keeps to a fairly literal description, albeit with some embellishment about the downpours and the impact upon the cities of both the plain and the highlands. Referring to the flood in Virt. 201, Philo mentions that “even the highest mountains were swallowed up by the increasing magnitude and force of the mass of water which the flood produced.” As in Abr. 45, in QG 1.94 and 2.9, Philo similarly addresses why, along with humanity, the animals were destroyed. In addition to viewing animals as servants to humankind—as he does in §45—Philo allegorizes humanity as mind and animals as sense-perception, which perishes when “the chief ruler [i.e., the mind] is perverted and corrupted by evil” (QG 1.94). In QG 2.9, besides the reason that animals serve humanity, Philo offers the analogies of military troops being struck down when their king is felled and of parts of the body perishing when the head is cut off. For the deeper meaning, he observes that “when the soul is deluged by streams of passion … the earthy parts of the body … must die with it.” Finally, Philo speaks of Noah’s two gifts—of surviving the flood and starting a new race—in Mos. 2.60, 65; Praem. 22–23; and QG 1.96. Nachleben Themes discussed in this chapter that also appear in later Christian writers include references to Noah as “just” or “righteous,” explanations of his name as “rest,” interpretation of the phrase “in his generation” as a qualification regarding his virtue, and identification of Noah with the end of an era and the beginning of a new one (see Lewis 1968, 158–160). Especially in the first two instances, it is hard to determine whether Philo had a direct influence or whether the associations of Noah with the description “just/righteous” and with “rest” are simply traditional. References to Noah as “just” or “righteous” are found in Justin, Dial. 138; Origen, Hom. Gen. 2.3; Ambrose, Noe 1.2, Parad. 3.9; and Apos. Con. 8.12.24. For these and other references, see Lewis 1968, 46 n. 4, 101 n. 2. On Noah’s name as meaning “rest,” see Origen, Hom. Gen. 2:3 (this passage has both “requies” and “iustus”); Jerome, Qu. hebr. Gen. 5:29; also Theophilus, Autol. 3.19 (Kugel 1998, 217–218; Lewis 1968, 117 with n. 1; see also Grabbe 1988, 193). The notion that Noah was righteous only according to the standards of his time (§36) can be found in Origen Hom. Num. 9.1 and Jerome, Qu. hebr. Gen. 6:9 (Kugel 1998, 187; Lewis 1968, 133 n. 5; 159 n. 16). Finally, several Christian sources

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refer to Noah as the end or survivor of an earlier generation and the beginning of a new race. These sources include Pseudo-Clement, Tertullian, Origen, Ambrose, and Apos. Con. For specific references and further discussion, see Lewis 1968, 158–159.

c

The Second Triad Chapter 5: The Higher Triad of Patriarchs, §§ 48–59 Analysis/General Comments In this brief section, rich with exegetical themes, philosophical ideas, and even a mythological reference, Philo makes a transition from his introduction to the main subject of this treatise—and probably of two other, no longer extant, treatises that follow; these subjects are the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to each of whom Philo devoted a separate work (see Ios. 1; Decal. 1; also § 1 of the Introduction). Philo accomplishes this transition in two ways: First, he compares the triad Enos, Enoch, and Noah with the superior triad of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and expounds upon the excellence of this second triad (§§48–55). Next, he divides human history into three eras, headed respectively by the first, earthborn human (i.e., Adam); Noah; and then Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thereafter he elaborates upon the special qualities of the patriarchs’ descendant nation, whose name “Israel” signals its ability to see God (§§ 56– 59). Unlike the triad of Enos, Enoch, and Noah, who represent a moral progression, members of the higher, or superior, triad are all at the same level of virtue, or excellence. Indeed so great is their virtue that God Himself deemed it fitting to incorporate them into His name, “God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob.” Each patriarch, moreover, symbolizes a type of soul that acquires excellence through different means—teaching or learning, natural ability, and practice—and also symbolizes each of these means as a particular excellence in itself (§§48–53). In §§50–55 Philo provides valuable information about this patriarchal motif, which he uses extensively in his other exegetical series—the Allegorical Commentary and QGE—but less so in the surviving treatises of the Exposition. The motif appears to originate in a dilemma presented by LXX Exod 3:15, which Philo quotes in §51 as follows: “For this is my eternal name, ‘God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob.’” How can the eternal, imperishable God link the divine name with mortal, perishable human beings? Such an association seems inappropriate. The solution is to understand these perishable humans not as men but rather as the imperishable excellences of learning, natural ability, and practice (§§54–55). For more on Philo’s quotation and interpretation of Exod 3:15, see §§51–55, with comments ad loc.

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The idea that these three qualities, or capacities, are key to the attainment of excellence, or virtue, can be traced to the fifth-century BCE sophist Protagoras. Later thinkers, including Plato (e.g., Meno 70a) and Aristotle (e.g., Eth. eud. 1.1.1214a) mention this trio of qualities as well. By Philo’s time, these qualities were widely recognized as essential to the acquisition not only of virtue and other moral characteristics but also of such skills as oratory, poetry, and medicine (see the comment at §52 on instruction … natural ability … practice). Philo mentions in addition the intriguing detail that these symbolic qualities are also associated with the Greek mythological figures known as the Graces (§54). Unfortunately we have no extant verification of such an allegorization of the Graces. Nonetheless it is possible that the widespread Philonic motif of the three patriarchs as symbols of learning, nature, and practice was originally adapted from an earlier interpretation of these Greek goddesses. (See the comments at §54 on People call these by another name and the Graces.) Turning now to a different transitional strategy (§§ 56–59), Philo sets up three stages in human history, each headed by a different figure or figures: 1) the human race, fathered by the first, earthborn human (Adam), before the flood; 2) the human race, fathered by Noah, after the flood; and 3) a species— i.e., a subset of the human race—the nation called “Israel,” fathered by the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Drawing upon what was perhaps a traditional etymology, Philo explains that the species’s name “Israel” means “one who sees God.” The name “Israel,” then, expresses this entity’s vital characteristic, namely, the capacity to behold the divine. Philo now praises the faculty of sight in the body as the noblest of senses, through which one discerns the physical universe. Comparing the sight of the eyes with the sight of the intellect, he declares that one who has attained a vision of “the Father and Creator of all things” has reached the height of happiness (§58), an attainment facilitated by God Himself and His Powers. In distinguishing between physical and intellectual sight, Philo is undoubtedly influenced by Plato (e.g., Resp. 6.506e–511d; 7.517a–518d), who describes the object of vision as “the good” (τὸ ἀγαθόν). By positing God as the object of vision, Philo reflects later, Middle Platonist tendencies toward blending abstract philosophical notions with theological concepts. His emphasis on seeing God as the acme of human happiness, moreover, may be unique among philosophical and Jewish thinkers of his time (and, in fact, later). Before turning to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, then, Philo first establishes them as members of a most illustrious triad. On one hand, their outstanding virtue merited their incorporation into the divine name and they symbolize the excellences of teaching, natural ability, and practice. On the other hand,

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they also stand as ancestors of the collectivity that has the ability to see God, the highest human achievement. Detailed Comments § 48. Of more weight … is the second triad. Philo now uses σύγκρισις (“comparison”) to compare the good (i.e., the first triad) with the better (i.e., the second triad); see the comment at §36 on in comparison with. In some ancient Jewish literature Enoch and Noah held a glorified status. By portraying the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as superior to these predecessors, Philo may have wished to convey that the ancestors of the Jews—and, by implication, also Moses—were even greater than these earlier figures. (See the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 4 on §§27–47.) For another, similar Philonic presentation of the two triads, see Praem. 10–51. the studies of those at the level of childhood. See also § 26. Philo frequently compares childish and adult pursuits to highlight the superiority of the latter. Abraham’s successful procreation with Sarah after his initial mating with Hagar, for example, represents his advancement from the childish, encyclical studies to adult concern with the virtues (Congr. 19). Similarly, Isaac had no need of baby food but from early on was ready for adult nourishment (Somn. 2.10; on the widespread use of this kind of food metaphor in antiquity, see Penniman 2017). the exercises of adult athletes. We may note once again the games imagery, with the variation that these athletes disdain “bodily exercises” (σωμασκία) in favor of a “good state in the soul” (ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εὐεξία). In these spiritual contests, the “opponents” (ἀντίπαλοι) are usually the passions, as in this passage. Philo’s use of ἀντίπαλοι—which denotes, literally, wrestling opponents—calls to mind Jacob’s wrestling with his adversary at the Jabbok Ford (Gen 32:25– 33), an episode to which Philo assigns rich symbolic meaning (see, e.g., Mut. 14; Somn. 1.129). For other games imagery, see §35, with the comment on And after crowning him and §256, with the comment on grief was already stripping off … sacred in the true sense. Many Greek games, which involved physical competition, were entitled “sacred” (ἱεροί). Philo makes the point that this contest within the soul is “truly” (ὄντως) sacred. Cf. Agr. 110–123, an extended meditation on the importance of spiritual striving, couched in athletic imagery. §49. The respects in which each of these differed … As has been noted above (the comment at §47 on whether you take them as men …), the higher triad of patriarchs are all at an equal level of virtue, or excellence, but differ from each other in respect of the particular way in which each of them attains that excellence. Thus each possesses a characteristic that together constitute the three elements traditionally declared necessary for the attainment of Greek παιδεία

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(“education”): willingness to take “instruction” (διδασκαλία), “natural ability” (φύσις), and willingness to practice what one has learned (ἄσκησις). For now, however, Philo focuses on what they have in common. one and the same goal. Influenced by philosophical notions (see, e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1.1.1094a), and in contrast to Genesis, Philo introduces the idea that the patriarchs are in pursuit of a τέλος, or “goal.” This goal he understands in various different ways, which include elimination or defeat of the passions, acquisition of virtue, or attainment of the vision of God (see also Abr. 58 and Praem. 24). §50. of one household and one race. In contrast to the preliminary triad, as we have seen, who were not closely connected. lovers of God and in turn loved by God. Whereas Scripture offers no reason as to why the patriarchs receive God’s special attention, by describing them as God-lovers, Philo implies such a reason. For the conjunction of φιλόθεος and θεοφιλής, cf. Her. 82; Virt. 184. the true God. In contrast to the false deities worshipped by Philo’s contemporaries (see, e.g., Decal. 52–81; cf. Wis 13:1–15:19). because of the heights of virtue which they attained. Philo again shows the patriarchs to be worthy of God’s favor and he may thereby wish to imply that others who are virtuous might win divine favor as well. In the present passage, Philo claims that because of their virtue, God incorporated the patriarchs into His very name. §51. “For this,” He says, “is my eternal name.” A reference to LXX Exod 3:15. When Moses at the burning bush on Mt. Horeb asks what name of God he should use when he speaks to Israel, God at first replies (in LXX Exod 3:14), “I am the One Who Is” (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν). He then says, “Thus shall you say to the children of Israel: ‘The One Who Is has sent me to you.’ ” In LXX Exod 3:15, God speaks again as follows: “Thus shall you say to the children of Israel, ‘The Lord God of your fathers, God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, has sent me to you.’ This is my eternal name and my remembrance for generations of generations.” In this Abr. passage, Philo does not refer to Exod 3:14. Focusing only on Exod 3:15, he changes the order of the biblical statements, perhaps to emphasize God’s eternity before the association of His name with the patriarchs. He also omits the phrase “Lord God of your fathers,” perhaps to highlight God’s name as linked specifically with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In Mut. 11–13 and Mos. 1.74–76, Philo interprets Exod 3:14 and 15 together. See also the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of this chapter and Birnbaum 2016. substituting for an absolute title a relative one. That is, God’s name is associated with, or related to, the patriarchs (i.e., “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob”) instead of standing alone (e.g., “Lord” or “God”). See also Mut. 27–28.

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Philo makes use here of a grammatical, and also logical, distinction between absolute (normally καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, however, not καθάπαξ, as here) and relative (τὸ πρός τι), which would distinguish such a noun as “God,” which does not necessarily imply a relationship, from one like “father” or “son,” which, by contrast, does imply a relationship. For καθάπαξ used in this way, cf. § 36 above, contrasted with κατὰ σύγκρισιν: “he (sc. Noah) was not absolutely good, but only in comparison with the people of that time.” by having a haven for their requests and prayers. Philo sees God’s name as having an instrumental purpose, that is, to allow the human race to call upon Him. Although he writes that the patriarchs themselves called upon God with prayers and entreaties, Philo does not address the point that they would have done this before God revealed His name to Moses. See § 6, with the comment on calling on God for forgiveness. good hope. For other occurrences of ἐλπὶς χρηστή, where the phrase appears in the plural, see §§8, 16, 268. The Greek of Gen 4:26 says that Enos “hoped to call upon the name of the Lord.” Although Philo develops the connection between Enos and hope, however, he does not highlight specifically that Enos hoped to call upon the name of the Lord. (See the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 2.) §52. These words seem … but in fact they are … We move now to the allegorical level of exegesis, in accordance with which we are dealing no longer with men, but with “modes of soul” (τρόπoι ψυχῆς) and types of excellence. Philo here distinguishes between what seems to be (δοκεῖ) and what is (ἐστί) (cf. Migr. 86–88). Although Colson in PLCL (6:31) translates, “These words do indeed appear … but they are also statements about an order of things …” (our emphasis); καί (“also”) is missing in most manuscripts. Philo’s distinction between what seems to be and what is accords with his observations later in this passage (§54) that the three are men “in theory” (λόγῳ) but types of excellence “in fact” (ἔργῳ), and that the eternal name pertains not to humans but rather to the capacities of teaching, nature, and practice. Even though Philo generally accepts both literal and allegorical interpretations (Tobin 1983, 154– 161; H.A. Wolfson 1982, 1:115–138; Niehoff 2011a, 133–187), this instance appears to be an exception. For an explanation of why the literal would be unacceptable see §55, with the comment on it is more suitable … types of soul … a symbol of excellence. Whereas Philo at first understands the patriarchs to be types of soul that strive toward the good via three different means, he now shifts to describe them as types of “excellence” (ἀρετή) attained through one of these different means. instruction … natural ability … practice. Philo identifies the three patriarchs with the three components of successful learning as first propounded by the

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great sophist Protagoras in the fifth century BCE: “nature,” or “natural ability” (φύσις); “learning” or “instruction” (μάθησις, διδασκαλία—Philo uses both interchangeably); and “practice” (ἄσκησις). We learn of the Protagorean origin of this formulation only in a late doxographic source, the Anecdota Parisiensia (Cramer 1939, 1.171.31–32), but Plato allows it to appear, informally, in the major speech which he attributes to Protagoras in his dialogue of that name (323c– 328d), so its authorship seems reasonably assured. Further references to this trio of educational qualities can be found in Plato (e.g., Meno 70a) and Aristotle (Eth. nic. 1.9.1099b; 2.1.1103a; 10.9.1179b; Eth. eud. 1.1.1214a ff.); see also Diogenes Laertius (5.18) as well as other Greek thinkers, e.g., Isocrates (Antid. 186–189) and Xenophon (Mem. 3.9.1–3). By Philo’s time it had become a popular educational principle and was applied to the acquisition not only of virtue and other moral qualities but also of such skills as oratory, poetry, and medicine; see, e.g., the Latin writers Horace (Ars 408–411); Cicero (Arch; 1.1); and Quintilian (Inst. 1.26–27). See also Shorey 1909; Birnbaum, 2010, 74–75. Although Philo frequently allegorizes the patriarchs as learning, nature, and practice throughout his other two exegetical series—the Allegorical Commentary and QGE—he refers to this allegorization less often in the surviving treatises of the Exposition. Abr. 52, moreover, is one of only two extant passages (the other being Somn. 1.166–170) in which Philo provides an explicit key to this allegorization; in most other references he takes the allegorization for granted without elaboration. For the basis of Philo’s identification of each patriarch with each quality, see the Excursus at the end of the Detailed Comments in this chapter. §53. from that capacity which is dominant. For the formulation κατ᾽ ἐπικράτειαν, cf., e.g., SVF 2.424 (Chrysippus); Strabo 9.2.27; Sextus Empiricus, Math. 10.113 (good definition [opp. κατ᾽ εἰλικρίνειαν]); used only here by Philo. See also Philo’s use of κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν at §10, with the comment on even as Homer … and at § 32, with the comment on in the pre-eminent sense. §54. in theory, men, but really … types of excellence. See the comment at § 52 on These words seem … natural ability, learning, and practice. Philo here presents the three qualities in a different order from their correspondence to Abraham (learning), Isaac (natural ability) and Jacob (practice). Although natural ability would appear to be logically prior, instruction or learning (in §§52–54 and elsewhere Philo uses both “teaching” [διδασκαλία] and “learning” [μάθησις] and variations on these terms) can also come first, and natural ability second, since instruction can be viewed as drawing out natural ability, and thus starting the ball rolling, while “practice” (ἄσκησις) logically comes third. In any case, as Philo emphasizes, all of the figures concerned exhibit all three of the excellences, being identified

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with their own particular one only “by virtue of dominance” (κατ᾽ ἐπικράτειαν; see §53 and the comment on from that capacity which is dominant). People call these by another name. Here Philo may be providing a precious clue about how the patriarchs came to symbolize teaching, nature, and practice. It is possible that the Graces (see the next comment) were first associated with these symbolic values and that at some point, Jewish biblical exegetes transferred this symbolism to the patriarchs in response to the difficulty presented by LXX Exod 3:15 (see the comment at § 55 on it is more suitable). See also Dillon 1996b, 153; Amir 1984, 18–20; Birnbaum 2010, 88–91; and 2016. the Graces. These three goddesses have a long and varied history in Greek lore and mythology. Hesiod (Theog. 907–909) identifies them as daughters of Zeus and Eurynome and calls them Aglaia (“beauty”), Euphrosyne (“mirth”), and Thalia (“good cheer”). Worship of the “Graces” (Χάριτες) is well established within the Platonic tradition. Plato’s nephew and successor Speusippus erected statues of the Graces to adorn the shrine of the Muses set up by his uncle in the Academy to mark out the area frequented by the School (Diogenes Laertius 4.1), and this act may well constitute a symbolic recognition of these three components of successful learning, adopted from Protagoras. In his essay On Benefits (1.3.2–10), Seneca, a contemporary of Philo, preserves valuable details related to these figures. With apparent reference to a visual representation of the three Graces holding hands in a ring dance, he understands these goddesses to signify reciprocity in giving and receiving. He also mocks treatment of the Graces by Chrysippus (3rd century BCE) and other Greeks, who—rather than focusing on details related to the giving and receiving of benefits—pay attention instead to such aspects as the names of the goddesses and their parentage by Zeus and Eurynome. To underscore the insignificance of these aspects, Seneca complains that the names of these goddesses varied according to the whims of different writers. While Seneca disdains these approaches to the Graces, his observations suggest that different writers adapted these figures to suit their own purposes and thus lend support to Philo’s offhand remark that some people identified the Graces with learning, nature, and practice. It is interesting that Philo should be prepared to entertain the idea of these essentially pagan entities, and even, at certain points, to make them daughters of God (Migr. 31; QE 2.61; cf. also Post. 32; Fug. 141; Plant. 89). For the Graces likened to virtues, cf. Mos. 2.7. For further interesting perspectives, see Goodenough 1964, 9:217–224; and 1965, 12:169 n. 40; also Birnbaum 2010, 88– 91. either because God has bestowed … or because they have given themselves. Philo provides two explanations for why the three capacities (teaching or learning, nature, and practice) are called “Graces.” Either God in his graciousness has

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bestowed these gifts, or the capacities of teaching or learning, nature, and practice, personified as the Graces, have given themselves to humankind. The first explanation accords with Philo’s view that all (good) things come from God (see, e.g., Sacr. 57 on virtue as a gift of God; cf. Abr. 18 and 143). The second reflects the mythological approach discussed in the previous comment. §55. it is more suitable that the eternal should be called by what is imperishable rather than what is mortal. A difficulty presented by LXX Exod 3:15 is that when God presents His name as “God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob,” He is linking Himself, an imperishable being, with the patriarchs, who are mortal. Because this association of imperishable with mortal is problematic, Philo explains that the patriarchs should be understood not as mortal men but rather as the three imperishable capacities of teaching, nature, and practice. The Greek of Exod 3:14–15 differs significantly from the Hebrew, which does not give rise to the same problem. It is possible that the difficulty posed by LXX Exod 3:15 was the very seed that spawned what became an extensive Philonic motif of the patriarchs as three means of acquiring virtue (see also Mut. 12; Mos. 1.76). On this possibility and on the differences between the Hebrew and Greek of the Exodus passage, see Birnbaum 2016. since imperishability is akin to eternity. On the immortality of virtue, cf. Det. 75; Somn. 2.258. §56. We should not neglect also to observe. After comparing the two triads, Philo now introduces the three patriarchs in a different way. He presents an interesting succession here of three stages of humanity fathered by different figures: the first, earthborn human (Adam), as father of antediluvian humankind; Noah, of the human race after the flood; and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as the collective father of the royal, priestly, and holy nation called “Israel,” whose name denotes “one who sees God.” Although we are unaware of exact parallels to this three tiered-schema, it is interesting that m. Avot 5.2–3 observes that there are ten generations between Adam and Noah and between Noah and Abraham. In QG 1.87, Philo too notes that there are ten generations between the first, earthborn man (Adam) and Noah. the earthborn. See the comment at §12 on the first, earthborn man. The description of the father of humankind as γηγενής derives from the second account of the creation of humanity in Gen 2:7, in which it says that “God formed the human, dust of the earth …” In Hebrew, the very name of this earthborn father is Adam, which comes from the Hebrew adamah, or “earth.” It is interesting, however, that the idea of an “earthborn” father of the nation is shared by the Athenians, as exemplified by the figure of Erechtheus (e.g., Herodotus 8.55). For Greek-speaking Jews, the designation of Adam as “earthborn” (γηγενής), may have called to mind the similarly-depicted Erechtheus.

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this most august and admirable triad. The collocution περίσεμνος καὶ περιμάχητος is notable. The latter adjective (meaning “fought over,” “highly prized”) is Platonic (cf. Resp. 7.521a and Leg. 3.678e—though both cases in a negative context that emphasizes contention), but the former, περίσεμνος, is attested only in Greek comedy (Aristophanes, Wasps 604; Eupolis, frag. 333, Kock 1976, 1:346). Philo’s word choice may be influenced here by the use of the adjective περιούσιος in LXX Exod 19:5 (see the comment on this passage below on which is given the epithets). father of one species. By contrast to Adam and Noah, who were ancestors of the entire human “race” (γένος), Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were ancestors of only one “species” (εἶδος) of the human race, i.e., the “species” Israel. (Here Philo makes use of a conventional Greek distinction between genus and species.) which is given the epithets … The reference here is to LXX Exod 19:5–6, where the Lord addresses Moses on Mt. Sinai: “Now therefore, if you will obey my voice and keep my covenant, you shall be to me a special people among all the nations (λαὸς περιούσιος ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν); for all the earth is mine. And you shall be to me a royal priesthood and a holy nation.” For this latter verse the LXX text has ὑμεῖς δὲ ἔσεσθέ μοι βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα καὶ ἔθνος ἅγιον. (The Hebrew behind the Greek phrase for “royal priesthood” [βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα], is mamlekhet kohanim, “a kingdom of priests.”) Although “royal” (βασίλειον) serves as an adjective modifying “priesthood” (ἱεράτευμα) in the Greek biblical verse, in the manuscripts of Philo, “and” (καί) is inserted between “royal” (βασίλειον) and “priesthood” (ἱεράτευμα). This is also the case in Sobr. 66, where Philo quotes from the same verse; there he understands “royal” (βασίλειον) as a noun, which he interprets as “the King’s house” (ὁ βασιλεῖος οἶκος). For details on this interpretation, see the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of this chapter. As noted there, it is possible that Philo has the same interpretation in mind in our present passage. §57. “Israel,” which when translated is “one who sees God.” Philo’s etymology for Israel differs from the ones given in both the Hebrew and Greek Bibles (Gen 32:29), which themselves differ from one another. The Hebrew translates as, “Your name shall no longer be Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with beings divine and human and have prevailed.” The Greek translates as, “Your name shall no longer be called Jacob but Israel shall be your name, for you have prevailed with God and were powerful with humans.” In both Hebrew and Greek, Jacob’s first words after he wrestled with his opponent at the Jabbok Ford were (as translated), “… I have seen God face to face” (Gen 32:31), and this utterance may have given rise to the etymology that Philo uses. The original Hebrew behind this etymology may have been ish raʾah/roʾeh el (“the man who saw/sees God,” depending on the Hebrew point-

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ing). The full Greek version of this etymology (ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν θεόν) appears in the Prayer of Joseph, a source possibly contemporary to Philo; and variations on the etymology are found in such patristic writers as Origen (Hom. Num. 11.4.3) and Jerome (Qu. hebr. Gen. on Gen 32:28–29), who come after and are likely dependent on Philo (see also the section on Nachleben at the end of this chapter). For a later, Hebrew parallel, see Seder Eliahu Rabba 25(27). As with many of his other etymologies, Philo probably drew this one from a traditional list. Nonetheless, he greatly develops the association between Israel and the ability to see God, especially in his Allegorical Commentary. See Birnbaum 1996, 67–77; Hayward, 2005, esp. 156–219; Grabbe 1988, 172– 173. Now sight by means of the eyes. The pre-eminent place of sight among the senses is celebrated at Plato, Tim. 47a, from where Philo would seem to have taken the reference to its being the means for viewing the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies, and thus for deriving the concept of time and cosmic order (though Philo does not draw that conclusion explicitly). However, the comparison of this with the vision of “the ruling principle of the soul” (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν) is not to be found there, but may be drawing on Resp. 7.517a–518d (though the term for the highest part of the soul, ἡγεμονικόν, is Stoic in origin). For an extensive Philonic discussion of vision, see Abr. 150–164. wisdom, which is the “vision” of the intellect. A nice parallel to this thought occurs at Virt. 11: “Now as for impairment of the senses, further multitudes living with this have died prematurely because they have not been able to find a preventative cure. Set against it is wisdom (φρόνησις), the mightiest of our attributes, providing as it does eyes for the mind (ἐνομματοῦσα διάνοιαν), which in sharp-sightedness surpasses the eyes of the body, as they say, in whole and in full” (trans. Wilson 2011, 46–47, slightly altered); cf. also Sobr. 3. §58. the Father and Creator of all things. This phrase is borrowed from Plato, Tim. 28c, where Timaeus declares, “To discover the Creator and Father of this cosmos is indeed a hard task, and, having found him, it would be impossible to tell everyone about him” (trans. adapted from Lee 1971, 40–41). Here Philo credits Israel as having done precisely that, and he implies that this vision was accomplished without any particular difficulty, as a result of the beneficence of God himself. For an earlier occurrence of the phrase in this treatise, see § 9, with the comment there on the Father and Maker of all. the peak of good fortune. According to Aristotle, the goal of humanity is “good fortune,” “well-being,” or “happiness” (εὐδαιμονία; Eth. nic. 1.4–7.1095a– 1098b). Philo’s emphasis on seeing God as the height of εὐδαιμονία may be unique among Greek and Jewish thinkers. (See, however, Justin, Dial. 2.6 and the comment by van Winden 1971, 50–51.)

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the eye of his soul. This phrase, “the eye [or eyesight] of the soul” (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα), is borrowed ultimately from Plato, Resp. 7.533d. It is a phrase much beloved of Philo, who uses ὄμμα in the singular and plural; cf., e.g., Sacr. 36, 69 (Pharaoh maimed in the eyes of his soul), 78; Det. 22; Post. 8; Deus 181; Ebr. 44; and below, §70—32 recorded instances in all, including the rather affecting personal passage Spec. 3.1–6. Philo’s reference in § 57 to the “vision of the intellect” (ὄψις διανοίας) is a kindred concept. permanence and rest in that state. On the concept of μονή and στάσις in the intelligible world and other levels of existence, cf. Somn. 2.237. §59. Uphill roads, after all, are toilsome and slow. On “uphill roads” (ἀνάντεις ὁδοί) and their opposites, cf. Spec. 4.112, with much of the same phraseology and imagery. There seems to be a reminiscence here of Plato, Resp. 2.364d, where Plato, after quoting Hesiod, Works and Days 287–289, glosses it with “a long and uphill road” (ὁδὸς μακρά τε καὶ ἀνάντης). His Powers. Philo describes these intermediaries in various ways; see, e.g., § 121 and the comments on His senior Powers … and The Creative Power … Excursus: Philo’s Association of Abraham with Learning, Isaac with Nature, and Jacob with Practice Although Philo does not explain why he associates each patriarch with each particular quality—Abraham with learning, Isaac with nature, and Jacob with practice—it appears that these identifications may be based upon intricate interpretations—some of which he may have inherited—of specific biblical verses or episodes. Thus, he connects Abraham with learning on the basis of interpretations of Abraham’s mating with Hagar (Gen 16:1–6; Congr., passim); his journey from Chaldea (Gen 11:31; 12:1–7; e.g., Abr. 60–80; Praem. 58); and, secondarily, the change of his name from “Abram” to “Abraham” (Gen 17:5; e.g., Abr. 81–84). According to Philo’s allegorization of Abraham’s mating with Hagar, Hagar represents the “encyclical studies,” a curriculum of such subjects as grammar, geometry, astronomy, rhetoric, music, and others. Before Abraham, who symbolizes mind, can productively unite with Sarah—who at different points symbolizes virtue, wisdom, and philosophy—Abraham must study or engage with the encyclical studies, a process expressed concretely in Scripture as his mating with Hagar. Abraham’s journey from Chaldea represents his advancement from belief in astrology and the equation of creation with divinity to his recognition of the true God. Finally, his “migration” from false to true belief is confirmed by the change of his name from “Abram” to “Abraham.” For more on Philo’s understanding of these scriptural events pertaining to Abraham’s migration, see Chapter 6, part b. While Abr. is the primary source in which Philo discusses this interpretation of Abraham’s journey from Chaldea and his change of name from “Abram”

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to “Abraham” (§§60–84), contrary to what we might expect Philo does not state directly that these episodes represent Abraham’s learning process. In this treatise, moreover, he (Philo) completely omits the allegorical interpretation related to Abraham’s mating with Hagar, although he does refer to this biblical episode on the literal level (§§247–254). For more on these observations, see the comments at §60 on the three in common and at § 61 on For anyone who beholds … For more on the allegorization of Abraham’s mating with Hagar, see the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 13, part a. As for Isaac, on the basis of an interpretation of one or possibly two verses from Genesis 21 (e.g., Gen 21:8 in Somn. 2.10; Gen 21:2 in Fug. 167), this patriarch becomes associated with one who is naturally gifted. LXX Gen 21:8 reports that “the child grew and was weaned.” In Somn. 2.10, Philo describes Isaac as “selflearned and self-taught” (αὐτομαθὴς καὶ αὐτοδίδακτος [our trans.]): for Moses represents him as weaned (Gen. xxi. 8), absolutely disdaining to make any use of soft and milky food suited to infants and little children, and using only strong nourishment fit for grown men, seeing that from a babe he was naturally stalwart, and was ever attaining fresh vigour and renewing his youth. Informed by the report that Isaac was weaned, then, Philo views him as “naturally stalwart.” Perhaps because of this understanding, Philo goes on to link him with nature, or natural ability. Another possible source behind this association is LXX Gen 21:2, which says that Sarah “conceived and gave birth.” In Fug. 167, Philo understands this verse allegorically: This is he whom Holy Writ calls ‘Isaac,’ whom the soul did not conceive at one time and give birth to at another, for it says ‘she conceived and gave birth’ (Gen. xxi. 2) as though timelessly. For he that was thus born was not a man, but a most pure thought, beautiful not by practice but by nature. Although Philo allegorizes Isaac here as a “thought” (νόημα), his interpretation conveys the notion that the soul (i.e., Sarah) conceived and gave birth to Isaac simultaneously as if he was by nature perfect from the first with no need of time to develop between conception and birth. Thus, Philo’s understanding of Gen 21:8 may also contribute to the connection that he makes between Isaac and nature. Finally, an involved exegesis of Jacob’s wrestling with an adversary in Gen 32:25–33 leads this patriarch to be understood as one who acquires virtue

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through practice (e.g., Mut. 14). As one who wrestled, Jacob can be viewed as an “athlete” (ἀθλητής), a word often used synonymously with “one who practices” (ἀσκητής). It is likely this biblical episode, then, that lies behind Philo’s identification of Jacob as one who acquires virtue through practice. For further background and analysis of Philo’s understanding of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as learning, nature, and practice, see Birnbaum 2010. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Although elements of Philo’s interpretation of the two triads can be found scattered in other treatises (see the Parallel Philonic Exegesis sections in Chapters 2–4), in only one other work does Philo group together interpretations of the two triads and juxtapose them in a comparative way—namely, in Praem. 10– 51. In Praem. 24, quoted in part below, in his transition from the first triad to the second, Philo mentions some points similar to those he makes in Abr. 48–50: After this Trinity comes another Trinity holier and dearer to God, all belonging to one family. For it was a Father, a Son, a Grandson who pressed forward to the same goal of life, namely to be well pleasing to the Maker and Father of all. Beyond his presentation of the two triads in Abr. and Praem., just as Philo interprets LXX Exod 3:15 in Abr. 51–55, so too does he interpret this verse in Mut. 12 and Mos. 1.76. Unlike his treatment in Abr., in the larger context of both latter passages he also discusses the preceding verse, Exod 3:14, in which God declares, “I am the One who is” (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν). Philo understands this declaration to signify that no name can properly be assigned to God (Mut. 11; Mos. 1.75) and he therefore construes God’s statement in Exod 3:15 as a concession to humanity—“if, in their natural weakness, they seek some title to use …” (Mos. 1.76; cf. Mut. 12: “that the human race should not totally lack a title to give to the supreme goodness”). In Abr. 51, instead of asserting that God cannot be named, Philo simply remarks that “God has no need of a name” (our emphasis). Here too, however, he regards God’s name in Exod 3:15 (i.e., “God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob”) as a kind of concession to humanity so that they might have “a haven for their requests and prayers [and thus] not be deprived of their share of good hope.” Despite such differences between Abr. 51, on one hand, and Mut. 12 and Mos. 1.76, on the other, in both latter passages Philo also allegorizes the three patriarchs as abstract values—the virtues of teaching, nature, and practice (Mos. 1.76) or “the three natural orders, teaching, perfection, practice” (Mut. 12; on this variation from the usual teaching-nature-practice, see the comment on Mut.

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12 in PLCL 5:586). In these two passages, however, Philo does not explain, as he does in Abr. 54–55, why the patriarchs are understood in this symbolic way (i.e., so that the Deity would not be called by what is mortal). For more on these passages from Abr., Mut., and Mos. 1, see Runia 1988; 1993a, 328–329; 1995; and Birnbaum 2016. In Sobr. 66, Philo uses the phrase, based upon LXX Exod 19:6, βασίλειον καὶ ἱεράτευμα and adds the word θεοῦ. Thus, as in Abr. 54, he separates the words βασίλειον and ἱεράτευμα with καί and understands βασίλειον as a noun instead of an adjective, as it functions in the biblical verse (see the comment at § 56 on which is given the epithets …). In Sobr. 66, βασίλειον represents a royal home: Once more Jacob is the source of twelve tribes, of whom the oracles say that they are ‘the palace and priesthood of God’ (Exod. xix. 6), thus following in due sequence the thought originated in Shem in whose houses it was prayed that God might dwell. For surely by ‘palace’ is meant the King’s house, which is holy indeed and the only inviolable sanctuary. Here, Philo uses Exod 19:6 to support his interpretation of Noah’s prayer regarding Shem (LXX Gen 9:27): “May God widen for Japhet and let him dwell in the houses of Shem …” (PLCL translation; see Sobr. 59). In Sobr. 62, Philo proposes that Noah’s prayer may intend God as the one to dwell in the houses of Shem. Since Jacob is a descendant of Shem and it is said of Jacob’s descendants, the twelve tribes, that they are “the palace and priesthood of God” (based on Exod 19:6), Philo explains that βασίλειον refers to the house of the King—that is, God. Thus, the Exodus verse confirms that God does indeed dwell in the home of Shem’s descendants. It is possible that Philo also has this interpretation in mind in Abr. 56, where he similarly uses βασίλειον as a noun. It should also be noted that in Noah’s words, “[L]et him dwell in the houses of Shem,” “him” is generally taken to refer to Japhet rather than God. Philo too acknowledges this understanding immediately afterwards in Sobr. 67, where he proposes another interpretation, which refers to Japhet. Philo’s etymology in Abr. 57 of Israel as “one who sees God” has widespread parallels throughout his work; see, e.g., Conf. 56; Fug. 208; Somn. 2.173; Praem. 44; Legat. 4 (cf. QG 3.49; 4.233). Abr. 57 is one of only two extant passages in the Exposition in which Philo mentions this etymology (the other Exposition passage is Praem. 44). In Abr. 57, moreover, Philo speaks of Israel in connection with the “nation” (ἔθνος) of the patriarchs’ descendants. Much more frequently, he describes Israel as a γένος, an ambiguous term that can denote a race or class. For detailed analyses of Philo’s use of this etymology, see Birnbaum 1996; also Hayward 2005, 156–193; Grabbe 1988, 172–173.

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Nachleben As David Runia has observed, while Exod 3:14 is discussed extensively in patristic writings, the same is not true for the verse that follows, Exod 3:15 (Runia 1993a, 328–329; 1995, 3). Basil, however is a rare exception. In C. Eun. 1.13, before quoting Exod 3:15, Basil comments that God honored Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob by including them in His name “on account of their perfection in every virtue” (our trans. of διὰ τὸ εἰς πάσαν ἀρετὴν τέλειον). Although we do not find the learning-nature-practice motif here, Basil’s remark echoes Philo’s observation in Abr. 50 that God “deemed it proper … because of the heights of virtue which they attained throughout their lives (διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἀρετῶν αἷς συνεβίουν), to associate them with His proper title.” Even though our Abr. passage refers only to Exod 3:15 and not 3:14, readers may be interested in Runia’s observations that treatments of these two verses in Augustine—and much later in Pascal—may have had their roots in Philo’s own discussions of these verses in Mut., Mos. 1, and Abr.; see Runia 1988; 1993a, 328–329; 1993; and 1995; also Birnbaum 2016. It is also interesting to note that in a different context, Clement, without mentioning Exod 3:15, includes the learning-nature-practice motif in Strom. 1.31.2–5 (see van den Hoek 1988, 36–40). Another element in the Abr. passage found in later patristic writers is Philo’s etymology of Israel as “one who sees God.” Variations of the etymology can be found in such writers as Clement, Origen, Eusebius, and Jerome. Although it is probable that these writers are dependent on Philo, the etymology may also have been part of a generally known tradition. For specific references and further discussion, see Smith 1968, 266 n. 3; Smallwood 1970, 153–154; Hayward 2005, 330–351; Grabbe 1988, 172–173.

part two The Life of Abraham

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The Piety of Abraham Chapter 6: The Migrations of Abraham, §§ 60–88 a

Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§60–67 Analysis/General Comments Philo finally now focuses on Abraham alone. There follow two introductory sections (§§60–61), in which Philo emphasizes that Abraham, “a devotee of piety,” obediently followed God’s commands. Here Philo returns to one of the treatise’s earlier themes (§§5–6), namely, that divine commands are conveyed not only through spoken or written words but also through the natural order, which, in turn, is accessible to everyone via the sense of sight. Remarking that Scripture offers very clear demonstrations of Abraham’s piety, Philo turns in § 62 to a consideration of Abraham’s obedience to the divine command to migrate from his homeland (Gen 12:1–3). Instead of reporting the specific contents of this command, however, Philo focuses on the patriarch’s immediate compliance with it and on the difficulty of what he was asked to do—that is, to leave his old home for a new one. In §§63–65, Philo now enters upon one of his characteristic homilies in diatribe style on the love of one’s native place, and the misery of being parted from it. His first point is that attachment to one’s native place is hardly less powerful than other essential parts of our nature (§ 63). His second point is that legislators make such separation, in the form of “exile” (φυγή), a punishment second only to death—whereas it can be regarded as even worse than death, since it is the beginning of miseries, while death brings with it the end of all woes (§64). Third, he remarks that, though people may engage in foreign travel for reasons of business, or diplomacy (going on embassies), or even tourism (an interesting commendation here of the virtues of travel for broadening the mind), they are always pleased to return; whereas it is implicit that the exile and emigrant have no such consolation (§ 65). All three points form a suitable rhetorical background to the greatness of Abraham’s sacrifice in leaving his home (§66). To accentuate the sacrifice even more for his readers, Philo borrows from his contemporary environment to detail just what and whom the patriarch leaves behind and describes his original homeland as being at the height of its prosperity (§67). In §68, Philo refers to “the literal level of the text” (τὸ ῥητὸν τῆς γραφῆς) as setting forth the migrations of a wise man and it is implicit that he (Philo) con-

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siders his account in the previous section (§§60–67) to have addressed this literal level. We have, in addition, identified Philo’s diatribe on the attachment to home (§§63b–65) as an ethical interpretation; see the Introduction, § 4. For a very brief parallel to Philo’s literal and ethical interpretations here, see §§ 85– 87 and the related Analysis/General Comments for Part c, toward the end of the present chapter. Detailed Comments § 60. the three in common … each … individually. Philo now moves from his discussion of what the three patriarchs share in common (see, esp., §§ 49–51) to focus on each patriarch alone. This remark provides further support that Philo originally composed additional, separate treatises (now lost) on the lives of Isaac and Jacob (see Ios. 1; Decal. 1; and the Introduction, § 1). Philo’s declaration that “we must now [or next, ἑξῆς] speak …” shows that he composed this treatise in an orderly, systematic fashion (Runia 2008, 137). Because he earlier emphasizes that the patriarchs represent ways of acquiring excellence through learning or teaching, nature, and practice (§§ 52–54), we might reasonably expect him to mention here the ways in which Abraham exemplifies learning or teaching. It is therefore striking that in the remainder of the treatise Philo mentions neither of these qualities (i.e., μάθησις or διδασκαλία) in relation to Abraham (for possible reasons, see the comment at § 61 on For anyone who beholds the order in nature …). Instead, Philo organizes the treatise according to episodes that reflect, first, Abraham’s “piety” (εὐσέβεια; §§ 60–207) and, then, his “humanity” (φιλανθρωπία; §§208–261). He, then … A notable characteristic of this treatise is that Philo almost never uses Abraham’s name in paraphrasing the account of this patriarch’s life (for a rare exception, see §92). More commonly, Philo mentions Abraham’s name when he quotes a biblical passage or when the name is specifically relevant to the discussion (see, e.g., §§51, 52, 77, 81, 82). Similarly, Philo rarely calls other biblical figures by their names, whether in this or other treatises of the Exposition. When Philo does use the patriarch’s name, moreover, he uses “Abraham” rather than “Abram,” even when he quotes biblical passages or refers to the patriarch before his name is changed in LXX Gen 17:5 (see, e.g., § 77). This usage accords with Philo’s understanding of the change of name as a reflection of the patriarch’s move from false to true belief when he migrated from Chaldea; see the Introduction, §12. On Philo’s avoidance of proper names in Mos. 1–2, see McGing 2006, 131–134, who argues that—at least in those treatises—Philo may wish to steer clear of Hebrew names that might be unfamiliar to his hellenized audience. a devotee of piety, the highest and greatest of the virtues. “Piety” (εὐσέβεια) is one of the virtues that Philo adds to the four primary ones recognized by

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Plato and the Stoics—i.e., wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (e.g., Resp. 4.427e–434c; see also the comment at §16 on this virtue and Sterling 2006). Here, as he sometimes does, Philo identifies “piety” (εὐσέβεια) as “the highest and greatest virtue”—as against, more Platonically, justice, in § 27 (cf. above § 24, where “piety” [εὐσέβεια] seems to take the place of justice); see also Spec. 4.135; Virt. 95; cf. Abr. 270, where the “queen of virtues” is “faith” (πίστις). He also equates piety with the Pythagorean injunction to “follow God” (ἕπεσθαι θεῷ). In describing Abraham’s piety and readiness to follow God, Philo portrays the patriarch as worthy of God’s selection of him. By contrast, Gen 12:1–3 provides no context or reason for God’s command to Abraham. In Migr. 127–128, Philo also mentions the aim of following God, in connection with Gen 12:4: “Abram went just as the Lord spoke to him.” See the comments at § 62 on he made haste to comply and deeming ready compliance … taking His commands to be not just those communicated through voice and letters, but also those revealed through nature … In setting up this dual understanding of “commands” (προστάξεις) Philo reintroduces themes related to the law of nature, discussed at the beginning of the treatise (§§ 5–6) and in Opif. 1–3. Indeed in this introductory passage (§§60–61), he subtly establishes a tension between commands delivered in speech and writing and those perceived through observation of nature (see, e.g., the comment below at § 61 on For anyone who beholds …). Here Philo also paves the way for his allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s discovery of God though observation of the cosmos (§§68–71). This dual understanding of commands, moreover, lends to these commands, or laws, a universalistic dimension in that they might be discerned by anyone who observes the order in nature (§61). the truest of the senses. For this way of characterizing “sight” (ὅρασις), cf. § 57 above, but also the whole section §§150–164 below, all dependent ultimately on Plato’s praise of sight at Tim. 47a–c. The contrast with the “untrustworthy and unreliable” nature of hearing is notable; cf. Conf. 140; Fug. 208: Israel symbolizes sight, Ishmael hearing (but at Conf. 72, Israel, who represents seeing, is contrasted with Jacob, who symbolizes hearing). Elsewhere, however, sight and hearing are linked as the noblest of the senses, even if hearing is still the inferior of the two; see, e.g. Abr. 150; Spec. 1.29, 193. Considering that in LXX Gen 12:1 the Lord speaks His command to Abraham (καὶ εἶπεν κύριος τῷ Ἀβράμ), who would presumably seem to receive it through the sense of hearing, it seems rather bold of Philo to declare that hearing is “untrustworthy and unreliable.” Cf., however, Migr. 47–50, in which Philo declares that the words of God are perceived through sight rather than hearing. Again, Philo subtly lays the groundwork here for his allegorical interpretation that Abraham discovered God through sight, i.e., with the eye of the

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soul (§§70, 76–77). For the collocution “untrustworthy and unreliable” (ἄπιστος καὶ ἀβέβαιος), cf. Ebr. 205. §61. For anyone who beholds the order in nature … Here Philo picks up his claim, expressed in §5, that one of the lessons to be drawn from the earliest biblical figures, including the patriarchs, is that following the Mosaic laws, which are consistent with the law of nature, is not a difficult task. Thus he contends that “anyone” (τις) who observes the order in nature can “learn” (ἀναδιδάσκεται) to live in accordance with the law without someone offering explicit guidance (see also §75 and the comment there on Anyone who thinks these things over). The passive of ἀναδιδάσκω, in fact, also carries the sense of being better instructed or learning something better. This claim—that the lessons obtained from observing nature are available to anyone—contrasts with Philo’s depiction of Abraham as the exemplar of one who learns though instruction. That is, it may seem contradictory to maintain that teachers are unnecessary and at the same time to present the patriarch as a model of one who is taught. Philo may thus have avoided emphasizing Abraham as such a model in this treatise, though he certainly presents him as such elsewhere (e.g., Mut. 83–88; Congr. 34–38 and passim; Somn. 1.159–170; see also Birnbaum 2010, esp. 76– 81). the constitution superior to all reasoning. Or possibly “beyond all description” (παντὸς λόγου κρείττων). For the characterization of the cosmos as enjoying or living under a “constitution” (πολιτεία), and the concept of the cosmos as a world-city, in general, cf. Opif. 142; Ios. 69; Spec. 2.45; Praem. 41–42. See also Spec. 1.34 and QE 2.42 on the world as a μεγαλόπολις, or “great city,” and Abr. 71 on the world as the greatest city. Philo understands the law of nature to be the constitution of the cosmos. by attending to assimilation to the nobility associated with it. In the present passage, “likeness to nature” (or to the beauties [τὰ καλά; here translated as “the nobility”] of nature) is substituted for “likeness to God,” as a means of attaining harmony with the cosmos (cf. §87 and the comment there on to liken themselves to His blessed and happy nature). For the assimilation of the two ideals—an assimilation already made, it would seem, by Antiochus of Ascalon (cf. Cicero, Leg. 1.8.25)—see §6 above; also Decal. 81. In Praem. 11–13, Philo asserts that the ideal of acting in accordance with nature is quite inadequate unless it also means “setting one’s hopes on God.” See also Dillon 2016. the clearest proofs of his piety. From here through § 207, Philo will present a series of episodes from Genesis that he construes to be “proofs” (ἀποδείξεις) of Abraham’s piety (for a list of these episodes, see the outline in the Introduction, §4). This characterization is consistent with the views of several ancient interpreters that Abraham was tested again and again and was found to be

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faithful (see, e.g., Jub. 17:17–18; 1Macc 2.52; m. Avot 5.4; and Kugel 1998, 296– 299 and 308–309). These tests—or as Philo calls them here “proofs”—provide the organizing principle for the first part of Philo’s discussion of Abraham’s life (although we may note that the section concerning Sodom [§§ 133–166] actually makes no mention of Abraham at all!). In this treatise, Philo uses “proof” (ἀπόδειξις) only here. In other contexts in this treatise when he describes something as “the clearest proof,” he has the word πίστις for “proof” instead of ἀπόδειξις; see, e.g., §§141, 226, 247. we should mention first that which is also placed first in order. As in Scripture, Philo begins with Abraham’s departure from his homeland (Gen 11:31; 12:1–9). In the rest of the treatise, however, Philo does not always follow the sequence of the biblical narrative (see the Introduction, § 5d). §62. Impelled by a divine command … The expression “impelled,” lit., “smitten by an oracle” (λογίῳ πληχθείς), might seem rather strong as a description of God’s communication with Abraham, but, as Philo goes on to say, being ordered to leave one’s homeland and kinsfolk is indeed a heavy burden to place on anyone’s shoulders (cf. Mos. 2.179). From another perspective, though, πλήττειν is the usual word in Philo for being “struck” by any stimulus to the senses, such as a sight, sound, or smell (e.g., Leg. 3.57, hearing by voice; Post. 108, the “reason, or speech” [λόγος] by the “ruling principle” [ἡγεμονικόν]; Ios. 22, ears and eyes by their respective sense-data), so nothing much may be intended here. It is also possible that Philo employs this passive and somewhat vague locution as a way to avoid mention of the heartening promises attached to God’s direct command (Gen 12:2–3) so as to showcase the impressiveness of Abraham’s obedience even more (cf. §86 and the comment on future hopes …). Philo’s omission of God’s explicit command here also allows him more easily to present Abraham as discovering God only later (§§ 78–80; see Sandmel 1971, 111 and 115 n. 51). Indeed Philo does not report a direct command until § 71, where he presents it as delivered by “the holy word.” he made haste to comply. Rather than elaborating on God’s command, Philo instead emphasizes Abraham’s readiness to comply with it. Support for Abraham’s immediate obedience may be found in LXX Gen 12:4: “Abram went exactly as [or just as; καθάπερ] the Lord spoke to him.” See also Midr. Ps. 119:3. as if returning from a foreign land to his own. This phrase calls to mind Philo’s understanding of Abraham’s migration from Chaldea to Canaan as the patriarch’s conversion from false, Chaldean beliefs to belief in the one, true God (§§68–80; Virt. 212–219). Philo often describes the proselyte’s journey similarly as a migration from a background of false beliefs and worship to a new home with true beliefs and worship (see, esp., Spec. 1.52; also Birnbaum 1996, 202; and

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the comment at §78 on But when he emigrated …). In both cases, the abandonment of false beliefs renders the original homeland as, in a sense, “foreign.” deeming ready compliance with the command to be of equal value to the completing of it. Cf. Migr. 129 on LXX Gen 12:4: “[T]he actions of the wise man are nothing else than the words of God.” See also the comment above on he made haste to comply. Cf. too §177. §63. desire for which is in a way inborn. From here through § 65, in what we have termed the “ethical” interpretation, Philo expounds on the difficulty of leaving home. §64. a penalty second only to death … exile. Exile was the penalty that Gaius first imposed on Flaccus, for example, but he later ordered that Flaccus be killed; Flacc. 151, 161–165, 180–191. §65. Some men … To highlight Abraham’s sacrifice in leaving his homeland, Philo adduces contemporary examples that would be familiar to his readers. blind indeed, as compared with the sharp-sighted … An interesting use here of a contrast much beloved of Philo between “blind” (τυφλός) and “sharpsighted” (ὀξὺ βλέπων), normally used by him to characterize different kinds of wealth, cf., e.g., Agr. 54; Sobr. 40; Her. 48; and Abr. 25, with the comment on the wealth which is not blind … Whereas Philo often draws this contrast when speaking about those who value the world of the senses over that of the mind, here he contrasts those who are not well-traveled with those who are. Philo’s praise of traveling abroad provides an interesting counterpoint to his appreciation of the good man’s withdrawal to the solitude of the country farm (§§ 22–23) or the wilderness (§§85–87). These contrasts undoubtedly reflect the complexity of Philo’s own life with its public and private dimensions. We may note also the unique—both in Philo’s works and Greek literature generally—negative adjective “not traveled abroad,” ἀναποδήμητος from ἀποδημέω (the positive adjective ἀποδημητικός, “fond of traveling,” is common enough). For additional perspectives on Philo’s contributions to Greek vocabulary and our knowledge of Greek vocabulary, see Runia 1992c, esp. 313–317. §66. with a few companions or even alone. Here Philo returns to the biblical narrative. Although Gen 12:4–5 notes that Abraham departed with Lot, Sarah, and others, Philo leaves the detail about Abraham’s companions vague. Because he also understands Abraham’s migration as a spiritual journey of the soul and his discovery of the true God (§§68–80), Philo may have preferred to give the impression that Abraham proceeded alone. as soon as he received orders. See the comment at § 62 on he made haste to comply. his departure was one of soul even more than of body. This statement— which can also be translated as “his departure was one of soul rather than (πρό)

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of body” (our emphasis)—contributes to an ambiguity about Philo’s attitude toward the literal meaning (see also §52 with comment on these words seem … and §54, with the comment on in theory …). However he understands the plain sense of Abraham’s physical migration from Chaldea, though, Philo also sees it as a religious conversion; see §§68–84. his love of the things of heaven surpassing his desire for mortal things. The expression ἔρως οὐράνιος in Philo conceals an ambiguity. Here, the adjective οὐράνιος represents an objective genitive, “love of heaven” (cf. also Plant. 39; Contempl. 12); but in other places it has to do rather with the “heavenly love” of Plato’s Symp. (180c–182d), opposed to the “demotic” or “vulgar” (πάνδημος) type of love, as at Virt. 55 or Contempl. 59–60. Probably Philo saw no great distinction between the two usages. Παρευημερέω in the sense of “surpass,” is an extremely rare compound, but favored by Philo (e.g., Opif. 80, 168; Deus 3; Fug. 129—21 instances in all); before Philo, attested, in the passive, only in Diodorus Siculus 20.79. §67. not clansmen, not demesmen, not fellow-students … To describe—and inevitably bring to life for his audience—what and whom Abraham leaves behind, Philo again draws on his contemporary environment. with free and unconstrained impulse. This phrase suggests that Abraham followed his own promptings rather than God’s command (see § 62 with the comment on Impelled by a divine command … and § 68, with the comment on in search of the true God). first from the land of the Chaldeans … As observed by Colson (PLCL 6:34–35 n. a to §62), Philo seems to assume that the command to leave his fatherland and kinsfolk, recounted in Gen 12:1–4, was given to Abraham in Chaldea and not in Harran, despite the explicit mention of Harran in Gen 12:5. But as Colson also remarks, Philo may well have been influenced by the mention of Chaldea later, at LXX Gen 15:7: “I am God who led you out of the land of the Chaldeans, in order to give you this land to inherit.” He may, then, have ignored Gen 12:5, or possibly have concluded that the statement there, “Abram was seventy-five years old when he went out from Harran,” referred to a later departure from Harran to Canaan. Departure from the land of the Chaldeans, as we shall see, has an important allegorical significance for Philo. Since many other Jewish exegetes similarly found great significance in Abraham’s departure from Chaldea (see the comment at §70 on Having been brought up …), Philo’s interpretation may in fact reflect a long tradition of understanding Chaldea rather than Harran as the starting point where Abraham received the command; see, e.g., Josephus, Ant. 1.154; Acts 7:2–4; Whitenton 2012, esp. 155. a well-endowed land, and at that time at its peak. Extra-biblical details that heighten the difficulty and praiseworthiness of Abraham’s departure even more.

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to yet another place, about which we will speak. See § 85, where Philo returns to his literal interpretation. Parallel Philonic Exegesis In Her. 287, Philo alludes to the difficulty of leaving home—a difficulty that he emphasizes in his literal interpretation in Abr. When he discusses Abraham’s second migration in §§85–87, Philo similarly but much more briefly alludes to the hardship of leaving home. As far as we know, Philo’s description of the specifics of whom Abraham left behind does not have a parallel elsewhere in his work. In the Detailed Comments above, we have also noted parallels to Philo’s regard for piety as “the highest and greatest of the virtues,” his assessment of vision as “the truest of the senses,” and his description of Abraham’s “ready compliance” with God’s command as being equivalent to its fulfillment; see the relevant comments at §60 on a devotee of piety … and the truest of the senses and at §62 on deeming ready compliance … Nachleben The idea, mentioned in §60, that Abraham strove to “follow God,” a Pythagorean formulation, is also mentioned by Clement (Strom. 2.69.4–2.70.1), who links the Pythagorean phrase with Gen 12:4: “Abram went just as the Lord spoke to him.” Ambrose (Abr. 1.2.4) likewise understands this verse about Abraham to indicate his aim to follow God. Here, in the Philonic Abr., Philo himself does not make explicit the connection between the verse and the aim but he mentions the goal of following God (§60) and alludes to Gen 12:4 implicitly when he speaks of Abraham’s readiness to obey (§62). See the comment at § 60 on a devotee of piety …, which provides further Philonic references. See also van den Hoek 1988, 183 on Strom. 2.69.4–2.70.1. For possible echoes of Philonic ideas from this section in the work of Irenaeus, see the Nachleben section following the Detailed Comments on Philo’s allegorical interpretation (§§68–84) below. b

Allegorical Interpretation, §§68–84 Analysis/General Comments We turn now, through §84, to the allegorical exegesis of Abraham’s migration, in which the biblical text (Gen 11:31; 12:1–7) is taken to represent the journey of the soul from an exclusive concern with the material world and belief in astrology, represented by Chaldea (§§68–69). Once Abraham perceives, through the eye of his soul, a guiding presence directing the cosmos, the holy word instructs him to journey to Harran, so that he might understand more fully what he

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had begun to perceive in Chaldea (§§70–71). With its etymological meaning of “holes,” Harran represents reliance on the senses and the data that they provide. By reflecting on one’s own senses, Philo explains, one will similarly come to recognize a guiding presence, the mind, directing their activities, just as God directs the cosmos (§§72–76). That Abraham indeed masters this lesson and migrates completely from false Chaldean beliefs is confirmed, according to Philo, by the words in Gen 12:7 that God “was seen by Abraham [LXX: Abram].” The passive construction “was seen” (ὤφθη) reflects that one cannot see God by oneself but requires His cooperation in revealing Himself (§§ 77–80). (For the sources of Philo’s associations to Chaldea and Harran, see the Detailed Comments on these sections.) Philo now digresses to offer another proof for his above-mentioned interpretation (§§81–84). He finds this confirmation in Abraham’s change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham” (Gen 17:4–5). Whereas in Genesis this name change is part of the covenant between God and Abraham, Philo ignores that biblical context entirely. Instead he explains that “Abram” refers to the patriarch’s former preoccupation with astrology (or meteorology) as reflected in the name’s etymology “exalted father” (πατὴρ μετέωρος). By contrast, the name “Abraham” signifies the sage with his higher knowledge of a directing presence behind the cosmos, because that name’s etymology, “chosen father of sound,” refers to the mind of the wise man. Philo explains this meaning based upon an understanding of the “father of sound” as mind, or “inward thought” (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος)—which precedes and gives rise to (and is therefore “father” of) “spoken thought,” or sound (λόγος προφορικός). “Chosen,” moreover, is a reference to the man of worth. (For more on this etymology and the Stoic distinction between inward and expressed thought, see the comments at § 83.) As with most of his other etymologies, Philo may have derived the ones mentioned here from a traditional source or list or else directly from other exegetes. In § 99, for example, he mentions a similar interpretation, which he learned from “specialists in physical philosophy” (φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες) (on the meaning of this phrase and the identity of these people, see the comment on this phrase at § 99). In his allegorical interpretation, then, Philo assigns new meanings both to Abraham’s migration from Chaldea to Harran and to his change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham.” In addition, Philo applies his understanding of the change of name to substantiate his understanding of the patriarch’s journey. Although Philo’s etymologies may be traditional, his use of them to explain Abraham’s migration as he does may be originally and uniquely his own.

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Detailed Comments § 68. the literal level of the text. Philo refers to one level of his interpretations as “literal” (ῥητός; see also §§88, 119, 131, 200, 217, 236). In fact, however, his account differs in many ways from the plain sense of Genesis, as the comments on these interpretations will amply show. (See Excursus 1 in § 4 of the Introduction.) a wise man. This description universalizes the story of Abraham, whom Philo rarely mentions by name in this treatise. See also § 27, with the comment on the wise man, and the comment at §60 on He then … We also sometimes translate σοφός as “sage” to highlight Philo’s occasional likening of the patriarch to the Stoic or Platonic ideal. See the comment at § 84 on the student … the laws of allegory. For this expression (οἱ ἐν ἀλληγορίᾳ νόμοι), cf. Somn. 1.102 (earlier, at 1.73, we may note, they are termed rather κανόνες and similarly at Spec. 1.287). The nature of these laws is never spelled out by Philo, but he does give a strong sense of proceeding systematically in his allegorizing by finding significance, for example, in linguistic or numerological clues, especially in passages where the literal meaning is not acceptable as such. See on this subject Dillon 1996a. in search of the true God. Rather strikingly, Philo transforms the Genesis account of God’s command and Abraham’s obedience into the search of a virtue-loving soul for the true God. By implication this search is initiated by the soul itself rather than by God. §69. the Chaldeans … For the Chaldeans as representing “this-worldly,” materialistic wisdom, either manifested as an enthusiasm for astrology, or, in philosophy, Stoicism, cf. Her. 97; Congr. 49; Mut. 16; see also Earp, PLCL 10:298– 299 and the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis following the Detailed Comments on this section (§§68–84). A chief characteristic of “Chaldean” mentality is substituting creation for the Creator, and regarding the cosmos itself as God, a salient feature of Stoic philosophy—and also, if a doxographic report in Stobaeus is to be believed (Anth. 1.1.29b), of Polemon, the last head of the Old Academy. Philo’s associations with Chaldea, whose way of thinking is a regular target of his criticism, appear to be drawn from, and in line with, associations with Chaldea in the wider culture. See also Taylor and Hay 2012; Runia 2001, 111– 112, esp. the comment at Opif. 7 on admiration for the cosmos; and the comment below at §70 on Having been brought up … the sympathetic influence of the heavenly bodies … For the Stoic doctrine of cosmic συμπάθεια, cf. SVF 2.475, 534, 1211. In Migr. 178–181, Philo comments that Moses recognizes this sympathetic influence but disagrees with the Chaldean opinion about God. §70. Having been brought up, then, in this doctrine … Philo switches here from speaking about a soul to speaking about Abraham himself. Abraham

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(or Abram) is, of course, declared to have been born in the country of the Chaldeans (LXX Gen 11:26–28), but there is no suggestion in Genesis of any ideological beliefs to be associated with that setting. Drawing on the wellknown proficiency of the Chaldeans in astronomy and astrology, however, Jewish exegetes “put two and two together,” and imagined that Abraham would have become imbued with the Chaldean way of thinking. Although some Jewish sources hold a positive view of Abraham’s proficiency in astrology, Philo understands that the patriarch had to leave behind his Chaldean background completely. Cf., e.g., Pseudo-Eupolemus, in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 9.17.3–4; Artapanus, in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 9.18.1; Josephus, Ant. 1.158 (quoting Berosus); see also Kugel 1998, 249–250, 259–261. The rabbis look upon Abraham’s association with astrology both positively and negatively (Gen. Rab. 44:12; b. Ned. 32a on Gen 15:5; cf. b. B. Bat. 16b). To express Abraham’s adoption of Chaldean beliefs, Philo uses the word χαλδαΐζω, which appears to be found only in his writings. See also the phrase “the Chaldean doctrine” (ἡ χαλδαΐζουσα δόξα) in § 77; the comment regarding Philo’s vocabulary at § 65 on blind indeed …; and S.J.D. Cohen 1999, 177, esp. n. 12. as if from deep sleep. The image of being roused from “deep sleep” (ἐκ βαθέος ὕπνου) seems to occur before Philo only in the LXX at Sir 22:9: “The one who teaches a fool … rouses a sleeper from deep slumber (ἐξεγείρων καθεύδοντα ἐκ βαθέος ὕπνου).” Cf. Somn. 1.165, 2.106; Migr. 190; Congr. 81. The idea that the wakefulness of the senses is the slumbering of the intellect is to be found, e.g., at Her. 257; Somn. 1.80; and often in the context of the eye of the soul being “maimed” (πεπηρωμένος) or “shut” (μεμυκώς): Sacr. 69; Det. 22; Post. 8; cf. Sacr. 78; Migr. 222. See also the next comment. opened the eye of the soul. On the image of the eye of the soul, see the comment on this phrase at §58. Although Philo associates Chaldean beliefs with astrology, he does not state here explicitly that Abraham arrived at his new perception through physically observing the stars, as other sources claim (e.g., Jub. 12:16–21; Josephus, Ant. 1.155–156; see also Gen. Rab. 39:1 and Kugel 1998, 260– 261). Instead, according to Philo in this passage, the patriarch opened the eye of his soul. In Praem. 41–42 and implicitly in Abr. 60–61, however, Philo acknowledges that some people may indeed arrive at knowledge of God through physical observation of His creation. See also §§162–164. a kind of charioteer and helmsman of the cosmos. Imagery ultimately borrowed from the myth of the Phaedrus—“charioteer” (ἡνίοχος) at 246a–b, “helmsman” (κυβερνήτης) at 247c—but here Philo describes God as the ruler and guide of the cosmos, rather than of the individual soul, as in the Phaedrus (cf. also Opif. 46; Praem. 37–38). At Leg. 3.223–224, however, in a manner more faithful to the Phaedrus, both the terms “charioteer” and “pilot” are adduced to

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illustrate how the intellect should rule the senses in the individual soul. Also, at Opif. 88, the human is presented as being appointed by God as both charioteer and helmsman in relation to the rest of creation. care and supervision. For the collocution ἐπιμέλεια καὶ προστασία, cf. Spec. 1.16; Virt. 58. We may note that the participial form of “care” (ἐπιμελούμενος) occurs at Phaedr. 246e, to describe Zeus’s providential care of the universe. Philo often accounts for divine providence by explaining that the Maker cares for what He has made (see, e.g., Opif. 9, 171–172; Praem. 42). §71. the holy word addresses him. This address, invented by Philo, corresponds to “the divine command” mentioned in § 62 and accounts for why the patriarch left Chaldea for Harran. Whereas Philo shares in common with several other Jewish exegetes an understanding of why Abraham must leave behind the false beliefs of Chaldea (see the comment at § 70 on Having been brought up …), the explanation offered here about why Abraham should travel specifically to Harran may be original to Philo. large things are often observed … in small ones. In Plato’s Resp. 2.368e–369a, Socrates proposes the opposite approach, namely, to study justice in the state in order to learn about it in the individual. For a reference by Azariah de’ Rossi to the notion expressed in this Abr. passage, see the end of the Nachleben section following these Detailed Comments on §§68–84. transfer yourself … from the greatest city … to a smaller one. This exhortation to move from the study of the macrocosm, which is associated with a materialist philosophical position, to the microcosm of the individual, which will enable one the better to recognise the true “ruler” (ἔφορος) of the universe— because, as Philo explains in §74, the fact that the body and irrational sensesoul of the individual are naturally ruled by the intellect will point one in the direction of the corresponding arrangement in the universe—seems to embody an echo of the later view of the achievement of Socrates (e.g. Cicero, Tusc. 5.4; Acad. post. 15), as having brought down philosophy from the study of the heavens to the sphere of the individual. Often associated with Stoicism, the idea that a human is a microcosm of the universe is implicit in several earlier philosophical sources. First attributed to Democritus (frag. 34), the term “microcosmos” (μικρὸς κόσμος) can also be found in Aristotle (Phys. 8.2.252b). Philo, however, instead uses βραχὺς κόσμος (e.g., Plant. 28). See Conger 1967, 1– 28, esp. 16–19 and 28. For the microcosm-macrocosm idea in Plato, who does not use the term, see Tim. 29d–47e; in Jewish sources, see also Ginzberg 2003, 1:49 n. 4. On the cosmos as a city, see §61 and the comment on the constitution superior to all reasoning. the Director of the universe. For God as “Director” (ἔφορος) of the universe, see Mos. 1.36; Spec. 4.200; cf. Virt. 57 (here, of the soul). Often Δίκη, Justice,

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as “assistant” (πάρεδρος) of God, is presented as “Director” (ἔφορος) of human affairs; see Ios. 48, 170; Decal. 95, 177. §72. his first emigration. For Philo’s presentation of Abraham’s second emigration, see §§85–87. “Harran” in the Greek language means “holes.” This etymology is based upon the Hebrew ḥor, pluralized with a final nun, as in Aramaic (see Grabbe 1988, 218). For the allegorization of Harran as “holes” or sockets for the senses “to peer through” (διακύπτειν), cf. Migr. 188; Fug. 45; and Somn. 1.41–60 (where Harran is linked with Chaldea as homeland of materialists). In the last passage, Philo also associates Harran with the pursuit of self-knowledge espoused by Socrates, a stage that Abraham surpasses. See also the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis. §73. like a puppet-master. The image of the mind as a “puppet-master” (θαυματοποιός), manipulating the senses, may owe something to Plato’s famous image in Leg. 1.644d–e, where human beings are presented as “puppets” (θαύματα) of God. A closer approximation to this Platonic image may be found at Plant. 3, where God is characterized as a “puppet-master” (θαυματοποιός) (which can also be translated as “wonder-worker”) for His arrangement of the elements. §74. a mind designated as leader. A return to the macrocosm-microcosm parallelism of §71, with the mind here characterized as “leader” (ἡγεμών), followed by the body and each of the senses, a further reminiscence of Phaedr. 246e, where Zeus is described as “the great leader in the heavens” (ὁ … μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς), “followed by an army of gods and daemons.” See also Spec. 1.18. A similar analogy between cosmic reason and the human soul can be found in Diogenes Laertius 7.138–139; see also b. Ber. 10a; Opif. 69. §75. Anyone who thinks these things over. By using “anyone” (τις), Philo underscores that the knowledge that Abraham gains is available to anyone who reflects on the constitution of the body and the universe. This point, made also in §§5 and 61, and Philo’s further remark that one learns from oneself and not a “distant source” (see the next comment) are somewhat at variance with the portrayal of Abraham as one who receives instruction (§ 52). In this treatise Philo may have therefore avoided emphasizing Abraham’s role as a learner. See also the comment at §61 on For anyone who beholds … not from some distant source but from a nearby one. The contrast οὐ πόρρωθεν ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύθεν may be a reminiscence of Plato, Theaet. 165d: “to know close at hand but not at a distance” (καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή; Fowler 1987, 91), but the contexts are not very similar. Here (in the Philonic passage) the point is that the means of learning the true nature of God is not far to seek, but lies within us: we have only to use our intellects; in Theaet. the context per-

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tains to the nature of knowledge and perception and the question is whether one can know something “close at hand but not at a distance.” that the cosmos is not the supreme God. As purportedly maintained by the Chaldeans; see also §69 and the comments ad loc.; Decal. 52–61; Spec. 1.13–20. We have translated πρῶτος here as “supreme,” but it can also be rendered as “first”; see, e.g., QG 2.62, where Philo speaks of “the second God, who is His Logos.” See also Segal 1977. §76. unholy for the mortal to make contact with the eternal. Again, a possible reminiscence of Plato, Symp. 203a: “God does not associate with man” (our trans.). A nice parallel at Her. 265: “for it is not right for the mortal to associate with the immortal” (θέμις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι θνητὸν ἀθανάτῳ συνοικῆσαι; our trans.). Cf. also §55. the beams pouring out from the Existent. Cf. Opif. 71: “Filled with another longing and a higher form of desire …, it [sc. the intellect] thinks it is heading towards the Great King himself. But as it strains to see, pure and unmixed beams (αὐγαί) of concentrated light pour forth (ἐκχέονται) like a torrent, so that the eye of the mind, overwhelmed by the brightness, suffers from vertigo” (trans. Runia 2001, 64). The image may owe something to such passages as Plato, Resp. 7.515e or Leg. 10.897d, but a closer parallel may in fact be found in the Sibylline Oracles (frag. 1.10–14; Geffken 1902, 228): “For what flesh can see visibly the heavenly and true God, the Immortal, whose abode is in the heavens? Nay, not even face to face with the sun’s rays are men able to stand, being mortal, mere veins and flesh wedded to bone.” Cf. also Deus 77–79. Reference to God as the Existent—if the term here is the masculine ὁ ὤν—is related to LXX Exod 3:14: “And God spoke to Moses saying, ‘I am He who Is (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν),’ and He said, ‘Thus shall you say to the children of Israel, “He who Is (ὁ ὤν) has sent me to you.’” The Greek ὁ ὤν is a translation of the Hebrew ehyeh (“I will be” or “I am”). The masculine ὁ ὤν, however, also meshes nicely with the philosophical concept τὸ ὄν, “the Existent,” expressed by the neuter. Because the term appears here in the genitive case, it can be either masculine or neuter. See also §§ 80, 121, 122, 124, 270. §77. right at the time of the sage’s migration. This observation is not entirely consistent with Genesis, according to which, when the Lord appeared to him (Gen 12:7), Abraham had already departed from Harran, arrived in Canaan, and journeyed as far as Shechem (Gen 12:5–6). Philo, however, ignores these migrations to feature only two: from Chaldea to Harran (see § 67 and the comment on first from the land of the Chaldeans …) and then from Harran to the wilderness (Gen 12:9; see §85). Here Philo presents the declaration that God appeared to Abraham as if this occurred just when he left Chaldea, an understanding, of course, that very well suits Philo’s interpretation of the significance

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of Abraham’s leaving Chaldea behind. Philo does not discuss Abraham’s “second” migration, to the wilderness, directly in his allegorical interpretation, but this migration is the focus when he resumes his literal interpretation in §§ 85– 87. For Philo’s interpretation elsewhere of Abraham’s journey to Shechem (Gen 12:6), see Migr. 216–225. “And God was seen by Abraham.” This quotation from Gen 12:7 can also be understood as “God appeared to Abram.” (The LXX has “Lord” [κύριος], instead of “God” [θεός], and “Abram” instead of “Abraham.” On these and other aspects of Philo’s text, see Royse 2008, 158–160.) Like the Hebrew va-yera, the Greek ὤφθη expresses the verb “to appear” in the passive of the verb “to see,” and Philo understands it in this latter sense—i.e., that God was seen (see also § 80). In Philo’s interpretation, God’s appearance confirms—indeed serves as “proof” (τεκμήριον) of—the sage’s turning away from erroneous, Chaldean views about the nature of the universe and its first principle toward discovery of the one, true God. (For yet another proof, see §§81–84). Harran, in turn, represents a further opportunity for the sage to confirm his new knowledge by recognizing that just as the universe is governed by an invisible Director, so too in the individual, body and senses are directed by the invisible intellect. Both places, Chaldea and Harran, contribute to the sage’s new awareness, but here in §77, Philo appears to refer only to the migration from Chaldea. Although God makes contact with humans earlier in Genesis—when, for example, he speaks to such figures as Adam, Noah, and even Abraham—Philo was probably well aware that LXX Gen 12:7 has the first occurrence of a word (ὤφθη) that denotes God’s actually appearing and he (Philo) duly attributes to this verse a special significance. See also Det. 159. Cf. Ambrose (Abr. 2.3.9), who observes that one does not find any earlier reference to God being seen by Abraham. the choric movement of the stars. In Greek, “choric movement” is χορεία, or choral dance. The image can be traced to Plato; see Tim. 40c (also Runia 2001, 201, the comment at Opif. 54 on concordant choral dances). Instead of χορεία, several manuscripts have πορεία, which would denote simply the course of the stars (PCW 4:19). §78. But when he emigrated and changed his place of residence. Both the verbs μεταχωρέω and μεθορμίζω are used by Philo to express the concept of moving from one level of consciousness or reality to another. For the former verb, cf. Somn. 1.79; Spec. 1.309; for the latter, see §24 above (in relation to Enoch); Congr. 108; Praem. 27. subservient and not sovereign. For another contrast between ὑπήκοος and αὐτοκράτωρ, cf. Legat. 53 (in a political context); but ὑπήκοος is frequently contrasted with ἀρχών or ἡγεμών, both of which, like αὐτοκράτωρ, denote a ruler.

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§79. For previously a great mist was poured over it. The imagery of mist giving way to clear daylight will go back originally to a notable passage in Homer’s Il. 5.124–134, where the goddess Athena clears the “mist” (ἀχλύς) from the eyes of Diomedes, so that he may discern both man and god in the fighting. There is some evidence of this passage being allegorized in the Stoic exegetical tradition, since it is adduced by Heraclitus in his Homeric Allegories, ch. 30, Athena being characterized as “wisdom” (φρόνησις). Possibly showing his appreciation of this allegorization, Philo makes extensive use of this imagery elsewhere: Leg. 1.46; 3.171; Cher. 61; Deus 130; Migr. 197 (in conjunction with a reference to leaving Harran); Somn. 1.165; Spec. 3.4; Praem. 37–38. fervid and brilliant doctrines. For the conjunction of ἔνθερμος and διάπυρος, cf. Mut. 180; Somn. 2.67, where the words characterize a “a striving toward piety” (our trans. of σπουδὴ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν). §80. And that is why it is said … Philo attaches special significance to the passive use of the verb here, “God was seen” (ὤφθη; our emphasis). This for him indicates the impossibility of seeing with mortal eyes the fullness of the essence of God, though God, in his “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία; § 79), is happy to reveal as much of Himself to those who seek Him as is possible (καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν). This passive turn of phrase is employed again at Gen 17:1, on which we find an extended meditation at Mut. 1–17. See also the comment at § 77 on And God was seen by Abraham. §81. Evidence in support of what I have said. Philo uses Gen 17:5 in a very different context from Genesis, in which God changes Abram’s name as part of His covenant with the patriarch. Here Philo adduces etymologies to argue that Abram’s change of name confirms the interpretation that his migration from Chaldea signifies the patriarch’s—or the mind’s—shift in consciousness from Chaldean beliefs to belief in the one, true God (for a different confirmation, see also §77, in which Philo uses Gen 12:7 as a proof-text for his interpretation). Philo never acknowledges either that God Himself changes the patriarch’s name or that God establishes with Abraham a covenant, whose sign is circumcision. These omissions accord with Philo’s general approach in presenting Abraham as a universal model. The significance of the change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham” is dwelt on also at QG 3.43; Cher. 4, 7; Gig. 62–64; and Mut. 66–76. See also the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis. In the vocalization this involves merely the doubling of one letter, the alpha. The fact that Philo presents the change as simply involving the doubling of the Greek letter alpha is an indication of his limited understanding of Hebrew. In Hebrew, the change from “Abram” (Avram) to “Abraham” (Avraham) requires the addition of the letter he. “In the vocalization” (φωνῇ) is contrasted with “in significance” (δυνάμει).

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§82. For “Abram” means, when translated, “exalted father.” Although neither the Hebrew Bible nor the Greek supplies an explanation for the meaning of “Abram,” Philo’s etymology “exalted father” (in Greek, πατὴρ μετέωρος) is plausible, based on the Hebrew av (“father”) and ram (“elevated”). See Grabbe 1988, 127–128; Cher. 4; Gig. 62. In his rendering of “Abram,” Philo connects “exalted,” or “uplifted” (μετέωρος) with the study (and worship) of the heavens (μετεωρολογία), the mark of a “Chaldean” world-view. For a more detailed and explicit presentation of this interpretation, see Mut. 66–68. “chosen father of sound.” Philo’s etymology of “Abraham,” “chosen father of sound,” may be related to the Hebrew av (“father”) brr (or bḥr, “choose”; bḥr is the more common verb but does not fit the Hebrew letters as well as brr); and hemyah (“sound”); see Schur 1991, 91 n. 74; Grabbe 1988, 126–127. This etymology reflects Abraham’s new spiritual status as a sage because, as Philo explains in Mut. 69, the father of sound, or the uttered word (see the next comment), is the mind and “[t]he elect mind is the mind of the wise since it contains what is best” (see also Mut. 71; QG 3.43). For a similar interpretation about Abraham, see also §99. In Gen 17:5 (Hebrew), when God changes the patriarch’s name to Abraham, He explains, “For I will make you the father of a multitude of nations” (av hamon goiim; see also Gen 17:4). Although the letters of the first two Hebrew words correspond somewhat to those in Avraham, or Abraham, the letter resh remains unaccounted for (see also Gen. Rab. 46:7). §83. through the word “sound” he hints … Philo is here able to make use of the Stoic distinction between the “inward thought” (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and the “expressed thought” (λόγος προφορικός), which he makes use of also elsewhere at Mos. 2.127–129 and Spec. 4.69 (cf. SVF 2.135, 223). On the level of the individual, this distinction refers to the contrast between the thought in the mind and the spoken utterance, but on the cosmic or divine level, the distinction refers to the contrast between the reason-principle, or totality of reason-principles, in the mind of God, and that which proceeds out from Him to structure the world. See also Kamesar 2004. the ruling intellect. Cf. §§30, 74; Opif. 69. through “chosen” he hints at the worthy man. It is interesting that Philo here employs the adjective ἐπίλεκτος as a variant on ἐκλεκτός, which he has given in his etymology of Abraham (§82). Philo uses ἐπίλεκτος on two other occasions—Conf. 56: “For we are the ‘race of the Chosen ones of … Israel’” (γένος γάρ ἐσμεν “τῶν ἐπιλέκτων τοῦ … Ἰσραήλ”) and Post. 92, where Israel is described as “the chosen race” (τὸ ἐπίλεκτον γένος)—in either case borrowing the adjective from LXX Exod 24:11, as he doubtless is doing here. the worthless character is aimless and confused. Εἰκαῖος (“aimless,” or “unstable”) is an adjective often applied by Philo to the lower class of individ-

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ual (16 instances in the corpus), but it is not elsewhere combined with “confused” (πεφυρμένος). §84. the student of the heavens … The sage. A further characterization of the (Stoic) “meteorologist” as fixated on this material cosmos, as contrasted with the Mosaic (Platonist) sage, who duly recognises its intelligible ruler and helmsman. lays heavy blame upon himself. Genesis offers no obvious basis for this claim. a thing insecure and without solid foundation. For the conjunction of “insecure and without solid foundation” (ἀβέβαιος καὶ ἀνίδρυτος), the latter the rarer word, as so often in Philonic collocutions, cf. Spec. 4.88, 139. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo’s allegorical exegesis consists of several different elements, of which the major ones include the following: the symbolism of Chaldea as representative of a belief system, characterized by the equation of the universe with God and also belief in astronomy; the etymology of Harran as “holes”; based on this etymology, interpretation of Harran as representative of the senses and of a stage of knowledge; exegesis of the phrase in LXX Gen 12:7 “God was seen” (ὤφθη ὁ θεός) as indicative of Abraham’s seeing God, the culmination of his migration from Chaldea and also of the inability of anyone to see God without His self-revelation; the etymologies of “Abram” as “exalted father” and of “Abraham” as “chosen father of sound”; and, finally, as reflected by these etymologies, the patriarch’s change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham” as confirmation of a change from his belief in astronomy and equation of the universe with God to his belief in God as Creator and Director of the universe. We have mentioned passages with parallels to one or more of these elements in the Detailed Comments above and here offer a brief summary overview of these passages; for a more complete picture, readers are encouraged to consult the passages directly. On Chaldea as representative of a way of thinking, from which Abraham departed, see Her. 96–99 (an interpretation of Gen 15:7, in which God declares to Abraham “I … brought you out of the land of the Chaldeans”). Cf. Her. 277, 280, and 289, in which Philo comments regarding Gen 15:15 (God’s pronouncement to Abraham, “You shall depart to your fathers”) that “fathers” does not signify his Chaldean background. In Congr. 49–50, Philo speaks of Chaldea as symbolic of certain beliefs, in the context of discussion of Abraham’s brother Nahor. In Somn. 1.53–54, Philo likewise describes Chaldean beliefs and compares the Chaldeans with the citizens of Harran (see below). Passing reference is made in Somn. 1.161 to Abraham as coming from Chaldea and therefore needing the guidance of two Divine Powers as expressed in “the

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Lord God of Abraham” (Gen 28:13). Ebr. 94 presents Abraham as an example of one who left Chaldean meteorological studies to contemplate the uncreated. In Migr. 178–181, Philo expounds upon Chaldean beliefs and points out where Moses agrees and disagrees with these. In Mos. 1.23, Philo reports that Moses was instructed in the Chaldean science of heavenly bodies. Praem. 58 describes Abraham as “[t]he first who passed from vanity to truth” and refers to Abraham’s rejection of Chaldean teachings “for the sake of the fuller spectacle which he beheld.” Virt. 212–215 likewise emphasizes the false beliefs of Chaldea by contrast with the truth of the existence of the Creator. Abraham departed from Chaldea, induced by “[p]erception of these truths and divine inspiration” (Virt. 214). It is interesting that in Virt. 216, as a proof-text for the culmination of Abraham’s journey, Philo cites Gen 15:6 to observe that Abraham is the first to be “spoken of as believing in God.” By contrast, in Abr. 77, he cites as a proof-text Gen 12:7, to declare that God was seen by Abraham. For a similar use of Gen 12:7, see Det. 159. In this connection, it is also interesting that in Mut. 15–17, Philo cites Gen 17:1 (“The Lord was seen by Abraham”—cf. his citation of Gen 12:7, “God was seen”) as a proof-text of Abraham’s journey from Chaldea and its “airy speculations.” Here, in Mut., Philo finds it significant that Abraham sees the Lord (κύριος), i.e., the Ruling Power of the Divine (for a fuller explanation, see this passage within its larger context). The etymology of Harran as “holes” is found in Fug. 45; Migr. 188; Somn. 1.41; and QG 4.239. The first passage and last two passages mention Harran in connection with the place where Jacob flees to escape from his brother Esau (based on Gen 27:43 in Fug. 45 and QG 4.239 and on Gen 28:10 in Somn. 1.41). In Migr. 176–197 and Somn. 1.47–60, Philo details three stages of Abraham’s journey: Chaldea, Harran, and the discovery of God. The passage in Migr. contains several secondary biblical lemmata (see Runia 1984 and 1987). In Somn. 1.41–46, after expounding upon the understanding of Harran symbolically as the senses, Philo elaborates upon the meaning of the Harran stage of Abraham’s journey (Somn. 1.47–51, 55–58). Here he links Terah, who died in Harran, with Socrates and the level of insight captured by the saying “Know thyself” (Somn. 1.58). In his recognition of God (“the One who really is”; our trans.), Abraham surpasses the levels of knowledge represented by Terah and Socrates (Somn. 1.59–60). Besides his discussion in Abr. 80–84, Philo mentions the etymology of “Abram” as “exalted father” in Leg. 3.83; Cher. 4, 7; Gig. 62–64; Mut. 60–76; and QG 3.43. In all but the first (Leg. 3.83), he likewise discusses the etymology of “Abraham” and, as in Abr. 80–84, he also explains the meaning of the change of name from one to the other. In the one exception, Leg. 3.83–84, without mentioning the patriarch’s later name “Abraham,” Philo provides the etymology of

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“Abram” alone. Moreover, he offers a positive interpretation of the etymology “exalted father” by praising the non-threatening nature of a father and also the pursuit of higher matters, which include “the Deity and His nature.” In all other references to the etymology of “Abram,” however, Philo compares it negatively with the meaning of the patriarch’s new name “Abraham” as “chosen father of sound.” As in Abr. 80–84, in Cher. 4 “Abram,” or “exalted father,” signifies Abram’s belief in “the philosophy of the heaven and the beings existing therein.” Philo explains that the patriarch’s name was changed to “Abraham,” or “chosen father of sound,” “for to ‘sound’ is the function of the uttered word or reason, whose father is the mind when it has grasped the good” (Cher. 7). In Gig. 62–64, Philo explains the two names similarly to show that Abraham was a “man of heaven” (ἄνθρωπος οὐρανοῦ) before his name was changed, but afterwards he became a “man of God” (ἄνθρωπος θεοῦ). In Mut. 60–76, Philo provides the longest and most detailed explanation of the meaning of these two names and the significance of the change from one to the other. Additionally, he provides a detailed defense of the importance of this change in response to “the quarrelsome (φιλαπεχθήμονες; [cf. Abr. 178]) and captious type of people” (Mut. 60) who do not see the value in adding the single letter alpha. As in Mut. 60–76, QG 3.43 includes a similar explanation of the name change and lengthy defense of its significance. Nachleben Many patristic sources include one or more of the elements described above in the first paragraph under Parallel Philonic Exegesis. These sources include the following: In Abr. 2.3.9, Ambrose notes that God was seen by Abraham (Gen 12:7) only when he was no longer a Chaldean, and he (Ambrose), like Philo, characterizes Chaldean teachings as belief in the divinity of the world and stars. In Abr. 2.10.77, Ambrose also mentions in passing the etymology of Abraham as “elect father of sound.” Commenting on Gen 12:7 in In Gen. 216–217, Didymus finds significance in the words “God was seen by Abram.” Because God is invisible, the words of the verse indicate that seeing can be understood in two ways—to refer to sight of the senses, which perceives what is visible, and sight of the “intellect” (διάνοια), which, it is implicit, perceives what is invisible. Based on the passive form of ὤφθη, Didymus also remarks that to see God is impossible but it became possible because God, in His love of humanity and His goodness, allowed Himself to be seen. Didymus observes too that contemplating the harmonies in the universe, Abram abandoned his polytheistic error, which he had learned from his father. As a result, God allowed Himself to be grasped intellectually, after

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instructing Abram through hearing when He told him to leave his country and kin (Gen 12:1). Abram thus advanced through both the hearing and eye of his soul (here, Didymus differs from Philo, who does not acknowledge the role of hearing in his interpretation; see our comment at § 60 on the truest of the senses). In a comment on Gen 12:4–5, Didymus also mentions the etymology of Harran as “holes,” which symbolize the senses (In Gen. 213; see too Rogers 2017, 138–139). In Praep. ev. 11.6 (518c), Eusebius refers to Abraham as a meteorologist who had earlier become well-versed in Chaldean lore and knowledge of the stars and heavens and who was called “Abram,” which means “exalted father.” Eusebius then notes that God led Abram from worldly things to invisible ones beyond the visible and appropriately changed his name. Without supplying the etymology of “Abraham” found in Philo, however, Eusebius then quotes Gen 17:5. In Strom. 5.1, Clement speaks of Abraham as pursuing study of “aerial phenomena” and the elevated philosophy of heavenly movements and as being called “Abram,” which means “exalted father.” But after looking up to the heavens, he somehow “recognised God to be superior to the creation” and received an extra letter, alpha, “knowledge of the one and only God.” Clement then provides the etymology “elect father of sound” and, like Philo, explains that “by sound is the uttered word: the mind is its father; and the mind of the good man is elect” (trans. Coxe 1994, 446). Grabbe (1988, 126–128) also reports that the Latin etymology for “Abram,” pater excelsus (“exalted father”) is found in Jerome, Qu. hebr. Gen. 26.29 and Nom. hebr. 2.28. Philo’s Greek etymology for “Abraham” “elect father of sound” is found in Origen’s Cels. 5.45. For further references to these etymologies, see Grabbe. Besides the elements mentioned above, Philo’s literal and allegorical interpretations of Abraham’s migration have points of connection with a passage in Irenaeus’s Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching. In § 24 of that work, Irenaeus notes that Abraham searched for God, “urged by the eagerness of his spirit” (Robinson 1920, 91). This depiction calls to mind (a) Philo’s eagerness to follow God as portrayed in Philo’s literal interpretation (see, e.g., the comment at §67 on with free and unconstrained impulse), and (b) the notion in his allegorical interpretation that Abraham searched for God instead of being commanded by Him to depart from his homeland (see, e.g., § 68, with the comment on in search of the true God). Irenaeus also remarks that God “appeared unto Abraham, making Himself known by the Word, as by a beam of light,” a description that resembles §70, in which Abraham discovers God by perceiving “pure radiance in place of profound darkness” and by following the light. See also Lanne 1974.

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Finally, in his work Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes), the Renaissance Jewish writer Azariah de’ Rossi may allude indirectly to the speech in Abr. 71 instructing Abraham to migrate from the greater city to the smaller when he (de’ Rossi) mentions Philo’s “proven criterion; namely, that insignificant clues often demonstrate the truth of matters which are important and valuable to informed people” (see Weinberg 2001, 192). c

Resumption of Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§ 85–87 Analysis/General Comments Without calling attention to the shift explicitly, Philo now returns to what he would call the “literal” level (ῥητός) to speak about the “man of worth” (ἀστεῖος); indeed, his discussion parallels his literal interpretation of Abraham’s departure from Chaldea (§§62–67). Here (§85) Philo picks up on his earlier reference to Abraham’s migration to “another place” (§ 67), namely, the wilderness, or a desolate land, based on LXX Gen 12:9. Although Philo speaks of this as Abraham’s “second migration” (§85), according to Gen 12:5–6 and 8, which Philo ignores in this treatise, the patriarch journeyed to several other places prior to his departure for the wilderness (see the comments at § 77 on right at the time of the sage’s migration and at § 85 on The second migration). As in his earlier, literal interpretation of Abraham’s “first migration” (cf. § 62; for this phrase see §72), here too Philo portrays the patriarch’s second departure as being in response to a divine oracle. Scripture itself does not mention such an oracle, but citing this provides Philo with the opportunity to highlight again the patriarch’s virtue in willingly following a divine command that entails great hardship (compare, e.g., the opening words of §§ 63 and 86). His migration specifically to the wilderness, or desolate place, also gives Philo the stimulus for a mini-homily in diatribe style on solitude, first from the perspective of being separated from one’s familiar surroundings (§ 86), but then from the point of view of the desire of the sage to be free of the importunities of the multitude (§87). In fact, embedded in his remarks—what we might term a “mini-ethical interpretation”—is the lesson that those who seek God welcome such solitude and thereby liken themselves to His nature (§87b; cf. Philo’s ethical interpretation in §§63b–65 on the attachment to home). Detailed Comments § 85. The second migration … This is an interpretation of LXX Gen 12:9: “And Abram journeyed on, and having journeyed encamped in the wilderness” (καὶ ἀπῆρεν Ἀβρὰμ καὶ πορευθεὶς ἐστρατοπέδευσεν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ); cf. the Hebrew, which mentions the Negev but not specifically a wilderness. For explicit reference to

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Abraham’s “first migration,” see §72. On Philo’s omission of Abraham’s other journeys, see the comment at §77 on right at the time of the sage’s migration. Besides the migrations mentioned there from Gen 12:5–6, according to LXX Gen 12:8, before going to the wilderness, Abraham first traveled to a mountain east of Baithel (Hebrew, Beth El) and pitched his tent in the area of Baithel and Aggai (Hebrew, Ai). once more in obedience to an oracle. In fact, there is no indication in Genesis that the Lord issued any further command to Abraham to decamp into the wilderness. It is possible, perhaps, that based on the latter part of Gen 12:8, which states that Abraham “called on the name of the Lord,” Philo inferred that the Lord responded to Abraham and issued such a command but, if so, he does not make this inference explicit. a desolate place. In Greek, χώρα ἐρήμη. The Greek of Gen 12:9 has simply ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ (“in the wilderness”). In Philo’s writings, the wilderness, or desert, symbolizes the solitude of those who seek God. Philo sometimes contrasts the desolate wilderness and the bustling city; see, e.g., Decal. 2–17. See also Runia 2000a, esp. 370–372; Najman 2006. §86. who else would not have grumbled. Philo’s emphasis on Abraham’s easy willingness to comply with the (imagined) oracle to journey to the pathless wilderness echoes his earlier disquisition on the patriarch’s readiness to obey God and leave home, an arduous challenge even in the best of circumstances (§§63–67). difficult to access and penetrate. Δύσβατος καὶ δυσπόρευτος is a typical Philonic collocution, with the second element either more specific or more recherché than the first. In this case, the former adjective is found also at Ebr. 150, to describe the path to virtue, but the latter is used by Philo nowhere else, though its use goes back at least to Xenophon (Anab. 1.5.7). future hopes … unseen goods. A possible reference to God’s promises in Gen 12:2–3 and 7, to (among other things) make Abraham a great nation and give the land to his descendants. In the present treatise, Philo does not mention these promises (but see the comment at §98 on not just a small number). He does, however, interpret some of them allegorically in Migr. 1–126. §87. free from consorting with the multitude. The noun συνδιαίτησις often possesses rather negative overtones in Philo, denoting consorting with inferior things or people; cf. §67 above, and Somn. 2.16; Praem. 21, 100. One cannot help but see something of an autobiographical element in this passage. Philo, as a man of philosophic disposition who also occupied a prominent place in Jewish Alexandrian society, must frequently have longed to be able to retire to his study, or alternatively, to a country estate (cf., e.g., Spec. 3.1–6; also § 65 and the comment on blind indeed …).

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the solitariness that is dear to Him. For μόνωσις as a characteristic of God, cf. §30 above (the ruling intellect embraces μόνωσις); Opif. 151, 171–172; Her. 127 (divine wisdom embraces μόνωσις), 183; Spec. 2.176 (the monad as incorporeal image of God, assimilated to Him “in solitariness” [κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν]); and Praem. 20 (in the context of turning away from the revels of the multitude). See also §22. to liken themselves to His blessed and happy nature. Seeking solitude is one way that those in search of God can imitate Him; cf. the Platonic goal of assimilation to God (Theaet. 176a–b; see also Fug. 63). Although Philo does not interpret Lev 19:2 (“You shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy”), this biblical injunction may also have shaped his understanding of the goal of likening oneself to God. See also the comment at §61 on by attending to assimilation to the nobility associated with it. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo interprets Gen 12:9 only here out of all his extant writings. For parallels between this section and §§60–67, see the Analysis/General Comments of both sections. For parallel treatments of the wilderness and of solitude, see the comments at §85 on a desolate place and §87 on the solitariness that is dear to Him. Nachleben We have not found relevant later treatments influenced by Philo. While a couple of Church Fathers comment on Gen 12:9, their primary association with the wilderness is with temptation rather than solitude. See, e.g., Ambrose, Abr. 2.4.13; Didymus, In Gen. on Gen. 12:9 (224–225); cf. Matt. 4:1; Mark 1:12–13; Luke 4:1–13. d

Conclusion, §88 Analysis/General Comments In concluding, Philo summarizes the themes from each level of interpretation: the literal emphasizes the piety of the man, ready to fulfill even the most challenging divine commands; the allegorical highlights the recognition by the soul or mind of an intelligible order beyond the sensible one and of the Creator and Ruler of both realms together.

Detailed Comments § 88. both levels of exposition. This is a summation of the contents of both exegeses, the “literal” (ῥητός) and the “allegorical” (δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν), concerning respectively the wise man Abraham and the “Abrahamic” mind. For other oppositions between ῥητός and δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν ἀπόδοσις, cf. Ios. 28; Her. 289;

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Somn. 1.120; Praem. 65; for references in this treatise, see the comment at § 68 on the literal level of the text. having … been dragged away from what was hard to tear oneself away from. The adjective “hard to tear oneself away from” (δυσαπόσπαστος) picks up Philo’s earlier remarks at §67, where it is also used. It occurs in Philo in only one other place, in adverbial form, at QG 4.20, and nowhere else in previous Greek literature, apart from the (presumably earlier) pseudo-Platonic Axiochus (365b), there also in adverbial form.

Chapter 7: Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, §§ 89–106 a

Literal Interpretation, §§89–98 Analysis/General Comments Philo here makes clear that the initial migrations of Abraham, first to Harran and then into the wilderness, should be regarded as “preliminaries” (τὰ προτέλεια; §89) to his adventures proper. These preliminaries include his passing from the “Chaldean” level of consciousness, which honors creation instead of the Creator (§§68–70), to the stage of higher knowledge of the way the universe is structured—a knowledge confirmed by observation of a similar structure within himself (this stage represented by Harran; §§ 71–76)—and finally to knowledge of God (§§77–80), whom he then further seeks and strives to imitate by retreating into the wilderness (§85–87). At this point, Abraham the sage has attained the wisdom—as reflected in the change of his name from “Abram” to “Abraham” (§§81–84)—which enables him to meet the other challenges in the adventures that now await him. Indeed Philo construes the outcome of the very next adventure—Abraham and Sarah’s migration to Egypt—to be a reward to Abraham for his earlier spiritual achievements (§ 90). (On our references to the ancestral couple at this point as “Abraham” and “Sarah,” instead of “Abram” and “Sara,” see the Introduction, §12.) In dealing with this migration, which was forced by a severe drought in Canaan, Philo has to face up to the rather disreputable tale (Gen 12:10–20) of Abraham passing off his beautiful wife Sarah as his sister, in order to save himself, as he saw it, from the possibility of being murdered by the Egyptians. This deception may have seemed a perfectly sensible and prudential move to the first tellers of this tale, but to the sensibilities of Hellenistic Alexandria it had plainly become something of an embarrassment, and Philo moves swiftly to put an acceptable gloss on it. Indeed through various omissions and embellishments he casts the original narrative in an entirely new light. Not only does he emphasize at the outset (§90) that God rewards Abraham for his earlier

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actions by intervening to save his marriage—and Sarah—from violation but he (Philo) completely omits the perhaps prudential but surely deceptive instructions given to Sarah by Abraham at LXX Gen 12:13: “Say ‘I am his sister,’ that it may go well with me because of you, and that my soul will be saved on your account.” Similarly, Philo chooses not to recognize that Sarah was taken into Pharaoh’s house or that for her sake Abraham was presented with an abundance of livestock and servants, so that he flourished exceedingly (Gen 12:14– 16). Certainly not mentioned is that after Pharaoh and his household were afflicted with great suffering, Pharaoh confronted Abraham about his deception and in so doing declared that he (Pharaoh) had taken Sarah for his wife (Gen 12:18–19). Besides omitting from his account several of these troublesome and embarrassing details, Philo finds other ways to address them and to showcase the virtue of Abraham and Sarah, on one hand, and the wickedness of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, on the other. (In this passage Philo refers to Pharaoh simply as “the king.”) Philo underscores, for example, that the sanctity of Abraham and Sarah’s marriage was preserved (§§90, 96, 98) and that the king was both licentious and inhospitable (see, e.g., §§90, 94, 95). Thus Philo first describes the barren conditions in what he calls “Syria” as well as the fertility of Egypt that led Abraham to bring his household to this plentiful land (§§91–92). Commenting that Abraham’s wife excelled in soul and body, Philo reports that the Egyptian ruling class took note of her and informed the king about her (§93). He, without regard for decency or the laws of hospitality and with lascivious intentions, promptly sent for her (§ 94). Because she had no one to defend her and before the king could lay a finger on her, Sarah took her last refuge in God, who, in His mercy, afflicted the king with such pains as to expel any impulses toward pleasure (§§ 95–96). Also afflicted were the members of his household, who—because they expressed no dismay at the king’s behavior—were practically complicit in the outrage (§ 97). In conclusion, Philo repeats that “the chastity of the wife was preserved” and that God recognized the nobility and piety of her husband with the “greatest prize,” the protection of their marriage, from which issued the most God-beloved nation (§98). As the story is presented by Philo, then, what may at first appear to be a tale of deception and the unwitting violation of Abraham and Sarah’s marriage becomes instead a tale of virtue rewarded and licentiousness punished. For additional perspectives, see Geljon 2016; Niehoff 2004, esp. 423–426.

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Detailed Comments § 89. the preliminary stages. For this use of προτέλεια in a metaphorical sense, cf. Deus 148, where we find reference to the “preliminaries of wisdom” (τὰ προτέλεια τῆς σοφίας) in connection with Moses and the whole nation, all of whom mastered these preliminaries; and Congr. 5, where the phrase “the preliminaries to marriage” (τὰ προτέλεια τῶν γαμῶν) would seem to indicate a borrowing from Plato, Leg. 6.774e. the one beloved of God. The adjective θεοφιλής also carries the active sense of “God-loving.” Philo uses it as a substantive here and the word may refer to the man and/or the soul or mind. notable indeed. Literally, “not to be held in contempt” (οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητοι). Used idiomatically, this expression can denote something noteworthy (e.g., Mos. 2.248), but it may also be intended literally (e.g., Spec. 4.224; Legat. 364) and be directed to readers who may have felt that Abraham’s actions were in fact less than admirable. See the Analysis/General Comments above (for § 89– 98); also Niehoff 2011a, 98–99; Sandmel 1971, 117. In this passage, Philo contrasts what is valued by the virtuous but scorned by others with what is valued by the many but derided by the virtuous. those who have had a taste of virtue. For this turn of phrase, cf. Virt. 188, “of those who have either not tasted of wisdom, or barely touched it with their lips” (our trans.); and Mos. 1.190, “the mind of those who have tasted of holiness … casts scorn on earthly things.” Also, at Legat. 310, there is a reference to the Emperor Augustus as one who “tasted wisdom not just with the tip of his lips, but feasted upon it extensively” (our trans. of φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἄκροις χείλεσι γευσάμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστιαθείς). The metaphor is to be found in Plato, e.g. Resp. 2.358e. Considering that Philo holds such a low opinion of the sense of taste (§§149, 241), it is interesting that he nonetheless applies it metaphorically to signify the experiencing of something noble. §90. God, having approved the afore-mentioned course of action, straightway rewards the good man. Philo construes the outcome of Abraham and Sarah’s migration to Egypt—i.e., the protection and preservation of their marriage—as a reward to Abraham for his “afore-mentioned course of action,” recounted in §§60–88 (see also the comment at § 98 on not just a small number). That God rewards the good person (and punishes the bad) is one of the themes of the Exposition. See the Introduction, § 6c; also Runia 2008, esp. 147, 149–150; Termini 2006, esp. 271. by preserving his marriage unviolated and safe. In LXX Gen 12:19, after realizing Abraham’s deception in pretending to be Sarah’s brother rather than her husband, Pharaoh confronts the patriarch and declares that he (Pharaoh) had taken her “for a wife to myself.” Here, however, Philo asserts that God preserved

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the marriage from violation, a claim that he will repeat (§ 98; cf. § 96). The possibility that Sarah had been violated disturbed ancient Jewish interpreters, some of whom, like Philo, found ways to confirm that such a violation never took place. See, e.g., Genesis Apocryphon 20:16–17; Josephus, Ant. 1.163–164; Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 12:17–20; also Kugel 1998, 272–273; Pearce 2007, 198, esp. n. 117. On the approach of some Christian writers, see the Nachleben section at the end of this chapter. a powerful and intemperate man. A non-biblical characterization that Philo introduces. See also the comment at §95 on licentious and hard-hearted tyrant. §91. a failure of crops had occurred. Philo here goes beyond the mention in LXX Gen 12:10 of “a famine in the land” (καὶ ἐγένετο λιμὸς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς), by postulating two extremes of weather which might cause such an event—“excessive and disproportionate rainfall” (πολλὴ καὶ ἄμετρος ἐπομβρία) and “drought and stormy winds” (αὐχμὸς καὶ ζάλη). In the region concerned, however, the overwhelming probability would be the latter condition (even the mention of “stormy weather” [ζάλη] is odd, as this normally connotes a squally rainstorm, but it can be understood, presumably, as a parching wind, or dust-storm, and we have translated it as “stormy winds”). Philo may be simply envisaging contrasting extreme deviations from the mean, as a rhetorical balance to the immediately following characterization of the “fertility” (εὐθηνία) and “balanced temperature” (εὐκρασία) of Egypt (§92). the cities of Syria. This way of referring to the region reflects the circumstances of Philo’s own day rather than the biblical Canaan of Abraham and Sarah’s time (cf. §133 and the comment there on Syria-Palestine). §92. Abraham. This is the only occurrence in the entire treatise where Philo uses the patriarch’s name outside a biblical quotation or context in which his name is required. Philo’s avoidance of proper names is typical in the Exposition. As he does elsewhere, Philo refers to the patriarch as “Abraham,” instead of “Abram,” even though, according to Genesis, his name at this point has not been changed (see Gen 17:5) and the Introduction, § 12. unstinting prosperity and abundance. The collocution εὐθηνία καὶ εὐετηρία is popular with Philo (it occurs elsewhere at Mut. 260; Ios. 267; Spec. 2.192; Virt. 86; and Legat. 90). We may note that “prosperity” (εὐθηνία) seems to have become something of an official term in Ptolemaic and Imperial Egypt for good harvests and prosperity generally (e.g. OGIS 90.13; 669.4; 705; POxy. 1380.135). There was even, at least in later times (3rd cent. CE), a εὐθενιαρχής, as food commissioner (POxy. 1412.1). Especially because Philo rarely speaks of Egypt’s inhabitants with admiration and, in his allegorical interpretations, the land itself symbolizes the body and its negative concerns with the passions and senses, his positive depiction of Egypt’s qualities here is noteworthy. For an

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extensive investigation of Philo’s portrayal of Egypt, see Pearce 2007, especially her insightful discussion of §§89–106 on pp. 194–201. the well-tempered winds. We may note that “well tempered” (εὐκρασία) is given as a feature of both Egypt and antediluvian Athens by the Egyptian priest talking to Solon, at Tim. 24c: “the moderate climate” (ἡ εὐκρασία τῶν ὡρῶν). §93. a wife … superlative in soul … Again, Philo amplifies the text of LXX Genesis (12:11), which simply says that Sarah was “a woman of fair countenance” (γυνὴ εὐπρόσωπος). Since Scripture mentions Sarah’s physical attributes alone, it is only fitting for Philo to ascribe spiritual excellence to the wife of the nation’s founder and first matriarch of the Jews. See also Genesis Apocryphon 20:7. for nothing escapes the notice of those in power. This sounds like a piece of contemporary grumbling by Philo. The expression for “those in power,” or “in positions of prominence” (ἐν ἐξοχαῖς) is peculiar, and paralleled nowhere else. One might be tempted to suspect a scribal error here for ἐξουσίαις, which would be a more usual word. Earlier in this passage Philo also refers to these people as οἱ ἐν τέλει; see too, e.g., Flacc. 4, 141. §94. He in turn sent for the lady. In LXX Gen 12:15, the “princes” (ἄρχοντες) of Pharaoh bring Sarah to his house. Philo omits this detail and shifts responsibility to the king to build a case that he acted egregiously. It is noteworthy that for “lady” Philo uses ἡ ἄνθρωπος; see also §247 and the comment on in praise of this woman. giving little regard to shame or to the laws which define the respect to be shown to strangers. To expand upon the outrage committed by Pharaoh, Philo mentions his disregard of common decency and the laws of hospitality. Although these latter laws may not have been spelled out explicitly, from abundant portrayals in the Odyssey Greek readers would have been thoroughly familiar with standards of behavior expected between hosts and guests (see Pearce 2007, 180–182, 197). By omitting that Pharaoh believed Sarah to have been Abraham’s sister (Gen 12:11–13, 18–19), Philo leaves the reader to view the king as acting dishonorably and licentiously. See also the comment at § 95 on licentious and hard-hearted tyrant. resolved in theory to take her in marriage, but in reality to dishonor her. Philo omits Pharaoh’s pronouncement in Gen 12:19 that he took Sarah for his wife and instead presents this action as merely Pharaoh’s intention. Philo discredits this intention, moreover, by declaring that Pharaoh’s true aim was to dishonor Sarah. §95. licentious and hard-hearted tyrant. The combination ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὠμόθυμος is unique, but Philo uses “hard-hearted” (ὠμόθυμος) on six other occasions, with different adjectives; before him the word seems to occur only in

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Sophocles, Ajax 885. There is really no warrant in the Genesis account for characterizing Pharaoh in this way. He was a man deceived. Indeed according to LXX Gen 12:16, “they” (presumably Pharaoh and the Egyptians) treated Abraham well and enriched him with flocks and servants. The Lord punished Pharaoh for an objective violation of a married woman, and he (Pharaoh) protested strongly to Abraham when he discovered his mistake. He then ordered Abraham to leave, but allowed him to keep “all that he had” (Gen 12:18– 20). for her husband was in no position to help her, fearful as he was … In his retelling, Philo portrays Abraham as helpless and afraid. This description of him, while less than impressive, was undoubtedly preferable to the biblical account of Abraham’s counseling Sarah to deceive Pharaoh and of Abraham’s enrichment by the Egyptians. In his allegorical interpretation (§§ 99– 102), Philo will further address Abraham’s passive role. took refuge, along with him, in the ultimate source of support … Genesis does not mention that Sarah or Abraham appealed to God, a detail added by Philo that enhances their piety. According to LXX Gen 12:17, God afflicted Pharaoh and his house “because of Sara (περὶ Σάρας), Abram’s wife.” This phrase may have suggested to Philo (or perhaps his predecessors) that Sarah turned to God and in response to her He punished Pharaoh and his household. For a similar understanding of the Hebrew biblical phrase ʿal devar sarai as indicating that God responded to Sarah’s cries, see Gen. Rab. 41:2. The depiction of Abraham and Sarah turning to God while in an inhospitable foreign land may have resonated with Philo’s contemporary Jewish readers in the occasionally hostile environment of Alexandria. From another perspective, the appeal to God by Abraham and Sarah, visitors in an alien place, may also have called to mind the role of Zeus as protector of guests (Od. 14.57–58; cf. Pearce 2007, 198). Besides “the ultimate source of support,” the phrase ἡ τελευταῖα συμμαχία can be translated too as “the last available alliance.” §96. so as … to drive out all impulses tending to pleasure. Having understood Pharaoh’s actions as licentious, Philo here specifies the purpose of the afflictions brought upon him by God. With its implication that Pharaoh would be in no position to perform a husbandly role, this elaboration is another way that Philo addresses the problem presented by Pharaoh’s words in Gen 12:19 that he had taken Sarah for a wife (see also §90, with the comment on by preserving his marriage …; and §98). While in Genesis the affliction appears to have been a punishment for Pharaoh’s unknowing violation of Abraham and Sarah’s marriage, according to Philo the affliction prevented this violation. §97. as none of them had felt disgust. Philo makes explicit why Pharaoh’s household was also punished, whereas LXX Gen 12:17 simply states that “God

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afflicted Pharao with great and severe afflictions, and his house, because of Sara, Abram’s wife.” For different ways that this last phrase was understood, see the comments at §95 on took refuge … and §104 on And with what instruments … §98. the chastity of the wife was preserved. See § 90 and the comment on by preserving his marriage … God deemed it right to do public honor to the nobility and piety of the husband … Once again, Philo contrives not only to whitewash Abraham but also to present his behavior as a demonstration of his piety (see § 61 and the comment on the clearest proofs of his piety). unharmed and unviolated. The collocution “unharmed and unviolated” (ἀσινὴς καὶ ἀνύβριστος) seems to occur nowhere else, though Philo employs both adjectives elsewhere separately. See also §90 and the comment on by preserving his marriage … not just a small number of sons or daughters, but rather a whole nation. These words may be an indirect reference to God’s promise to Abraham in Gen 12:2 to make him a “great nation” (see also Gen. 15:5; 17:4–6; 18:18; 22:17). In his account of Abraham’s migration from Chaldea (§§ 60–88), Philo omits this and other divine promises (see the comments at §62 on Impelled by a divine command … and §86 on future hopes … uncertain goods). Whereas in Genesis, the promises appear to be an incentive to Abraham to obey God and to migrate, Philo presents them here as a reward for the piety that the patriarch has shown already (see also the comment at §90 on God … straightway rewards the good man). the most God-beloved of nations. This can also be understood as the most God-loving of nations. For the argument that Philo uses this characterization to recast the biblical, covenantal relationship between God and Israel and to play down God’s special love of the nation, see Birnbaum 1996, 172–174, 179–183. the roles of priesthood and prophecy. On several occasions, Philo writes that the Jews serve a priestly role for all humanity; see Mos. 1.149; Spec. 1.97; 2.162–167. This claim may be based on several biblical verses, including Gen 12:3b; Exod 19:6; and Lev 20:26. These verses, however, focus on the relationship between God and Abraham’s descendants, or Israel, and stop short of proclaiming that the nation will serve as priests on behalf of all others. As for the prophetic role of the nation, this is the only extant passage in which Philo makes such a claim. He may mean simply that the Jews will serve as intercessors who perform both priestly and prophetic functions. Alternatively, he may be basing his comment on the etymology of Israel as “one that sees God,” because prophets were also formerly known as seers (Her. 78). For further discussion of the nation’s priestly role and of this passage, see Birnbaum 1996, 166–169, 181, esp. n. 60.

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Parallel Philonic Exegesis Apart from our passage in Abr. (§§89–106), Philo addresses the episode of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt only once, in passing, elsewhere. Specifically, in Her. 287, delineating the various “wars” that Abraham experienced, Philo refers briefly to his having endured a famine (Gen 12:10). To show that this kind of war does not contradict the statement that the patriarch would die “nourished with peace” (Gen 15:15), however, Philo interprets the famine allegorically as a dearth of passions (Her. 289). Beyond any other direct treatment of Gen 12:10–20, Philo’s portrayal of the king of Egypt resonates with his discussion throughout his works both of Egypt in general and its king in particular. In Philo’s exegesis, Egypt often serves as a symbol of “the land of the body” and the land and its inhabitants are associated not only with the body but also with passions, senses, and pleasure (see Pearce 2007). As leader of this entity, the king of Egypt is similarly linked with these elements, and especially with passions, wickedness, licentiousness, pleasure, and/or lust (see, e.g., Leg. 3.13, 37–38, 212; Det. 93–95; Agr. 57; Ebr. 111, 208; Somn. 2.277; Ios. 151). In Abr. 89–98, then, Philo’s depiction of the king as “a powerful and intemperate man” (§90) and a “licentious and hard-hearted tyrant” (§ 95), who contrived to dishonor Abraham’s wife, fits in well with Philo’s broader characterization of the king. Thus while Philo does not explicitly interpret Gen 12:10–20 in any of his other extant works, in his treatment in §§ 89–98 of the role of Pharaoh, his household, and those Egyptians in power, “Egypt as symbol of ‘the land of the body’ is never far away” (Pearce 2007, 197). Finally, another aspect of Philo’s depiction—namely, the inhospitality of the king and his people—appears in another context, in Mos. 1.34–37, regarding the sojourn of the “Jews” in Egypt during Moses’s time. Nachleben Because elements from Philo’s literal and allegorical interpretations are combined by various patristic writers, we have treated the Nachleben for both of these interpretations together, at the end of the commentary on §§ 99–106. b

Allegorical Interpretation, §§99–106 Analysis/General Comments The allegorical interpretation of this incident begins with Philo’s attribution of the exegesis to “specialists in physical philosophy” (φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες), who, he writes, are not entirely “off the mark” (οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ, which we have translated “not inappropriately”). According to the allegorization, based on the etymologies of Abraham and Sarah’s (changed) names, Abraham represents “the good intellect (νοῦς)” and Sarah, “virtue” (ἀρετή) (§ 99). Philo next describes two

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kinds of marriages that are completely opposite to each other: one, based on pleasure, is a union of bodies, while the other, based on wisdom, is a union of reasoning powers seeking “purification and perfect virtues” (§ 100). In the first kind of marriage, the male, who sows seed, is the active partner, while the female, who receives seed, is the passive one. In the second kind of marriage, by contrast, the roles of “male” and “female” are reversed in that “virtue” (ἀρετή) is the active principle, sowing into the “intellect” (νοῦς) “good counsels and noble reasonings and stimulations to the most life-enhancing principles,” while “the intellect” (νοῦς) receives these in the manner of a female (§101). At this point, Philo raises a possible difficulty presented by the grammatical gender of “intellect” (νοῦς) as masculine and “virtue” (ἀρετή) as feminine (§101). He overcomes this difficulty, however, by insisting that if one disregards the misleading gender terms and considers the “naked facts” one will recognize that virtue indeed assumes a male role and intellect, a passive one (as is posited in the marriage based on wisdom) (§102). Philo now shifts to an exegesis of Pharaoh as “the body-loving intellect” (νοῦς φιλοσώματος), which tries to appropriate to itself an appearance of fellowship with virtue (§103), and which is duly punished by God for its shamelessness. The idea seems to be that the effort of the vice-filled soul or mind trying to maintain a veneer of commonality with such virtues as frugality and continence leads to torture for such an intellect. Indeed Philo declares that the very agents of the torture are the virtues themselves (§ 104)! In conclusion, he reflects that peace-loving virtue will engage in conflict only after determining that it is strong enough to do so (§105). Defeat holds no disgrace for vice, with its already bad reputation, but since good repute is integral to virtue, it must either win or avoid the challenge (§106). Having reviewed this interpretation, we may first enquire as to the identity of the “specialists in physical philosophy” (φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες). Are we to assume that they are Alexandrian Jewish exegetes prior to or contemporary with Philo himself, who have indulged in allegorization of the Pentateuch? Philo’s statement that he has “heard” (ἤκουσα) what these specialists said suggests that he may in fact have listened to their interpretations in a setting where Scripture was being expounded. Indeed he has referred to such settings in connection with the Sabbath (e.g., Mos. 2.216; Prob. 81–82; Hypoth. 7.12–13) and the symposium of the Therapeutae (Contempl. 75). Some scholars have also suggested a school setting in which such exegetical activity might have taken place. (For an overview of the debate with the further suggestion that Philo may have had his own private school, see Sterling 1999, 148–164; 2017a; 2017b; also Hay 1979–1980, 45 and 65 n. 21.) Regardless of the setting, however, Philo acknowledges that he has

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learned from others. In Mos. 1.4, for example, describing Moses’s life, he writes, “I always interwove what I was told with what I read, and thus believed myself to have a closer knowledge than others of his life’s history.” It is quite possible then that in our present passage in Abr. Philo is speaking about specific exegetical contemporaries who are offering either their own interpretations or those of their predecessors (see, e.g., Contempl. 29). (On the possibility that Philo may have read rather than heard other interpretations, see the comment at § 99 on I have also heard. For more on the “specialists in physical philosophy” [φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες], see the comment on this term at §99.) As an alternative approach, we might speculate in addition that Philo may simply be referring to Stoic allegorical exegetes of Homer (with whose work he was well acquainted), whose allegorization of, perhaps, Odysseus as the “noble soul” (νοῦς σπουδαῖος) and Penelope as “virtue” (ἀρετή) he himself has adapted to the case of Abraham and Sarah. It would seem to be characteristic of Stoic exegetes to emphasize, as Philo is doing here, that, in the case of the “marriage” brought about by “wisdom” (σοφία), in contrast to an ordinary marriage stimulated by pleasure, the traditional roles of male and female—represented by the grammatically masculine νοῦς and the grammatically feminine ἀρετή—might be reversed, as described above. Besides the identity of these exegetes, also unclear is how much of the interpretation derives from them and how much is Philo’s own contribution. David Hay, for example, observes that the challenge about the gender of the nouns νοῦς and ἀρετή posed in §§101b–102 appears to be an insertion, as do the comments in §§105b–106 regarding the peaceable nature of virtue (1979–1980, 51–52). He suggests, moreover, that these remarks may have been Philo’s own additions. Based on a close reading of §99, one can go even further to note that Philo ascribes to the “specialists in physical philosophy” (φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες) only the etymologies of Abraham and Sarah’s names. Given the available evidence, however, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the passage reflects the interpretations of others and/or of Philo himself. Beyond the sources of this interpretation, one might also question how it sheds light on the biblical narrative. At the most basic level, the interpretation compares two kinds of pairings (§100), one based on pleasure and one on wisdom, which appear to correspond respectively to the theoretical coupling of Pharaoh and Sarah, which Philo addresses in §§ 103–106, and the real union of Abraham and Sarah, which he addresses in §§ 99–102. Less clear is how the active role of virtue and the passive role of mind, or intellect (§ 101), are relevant. If we consider these roles primarily in relation to Philo’s own interpretations (both literal and allegorical) instead of to the Genesis narrative itself, however, these remarks become easier to understand.

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Thus, we may recall that in Philo’s “literal” version of the story (Philo himself does not describe his interpretation in §§89–98 as “literal,” but his treatment there—if compared with others that are so labelled in this treatise [see the comment at §68 on the literal level]—would appear to fall into this category), Abraham is largely absent after the couple arrives in Egypt (see the comment at §95 on for her husband …). It is possible therefore that in his allegorical interpretation Philo may be addressing the potentially troubling aspect of the patriarch’s passive role when his wife’s safety is threatened (see the comment at §102 on this passivity is its only means of deliverance). If so, perhaps the active role of Sarah—or virtue—can be understood as Sarah’s appeal to God (§95) and/or as virtue’s active part in afflicting the body-loving mind (§104). Both of these actions, moreover, may be a way of understanding the biblical claim in LXX Gen 12:17 that God afflicted Pharaoh and his house “because of Sara” (περὶ Σάρας); see the comments at § 95 on took refuge … and §104 on And with what instruments … Also relevant may be LXX Gen 12:16, which declares that Abraham was well-treated in Egypt because of Sarah (καὶ τῷ Ἀβρὰμ εὖ ἐχρήσαντο δι᾽ αὐτήν) and given flocks and servants. (See too LXX Gen 12:13, in which Abraham anticipates that things will go well for him and that his soul will live, both because of Sarah [διὰ σέ, ἕνεκεν σοῦ].) With its general focus on active and passive roles, then, perhaps the interpretation in §§99–102 was intended to address the matter of Abraham’s passivity as depicted in Philo’s literal interpretation as well as Sarah’s possible role, suggested by the biblical phrases noted above, in effecting certain outcomes. As for the pretense of the body-loving mind in associating with virtue (§ 103), this appears to correspond to Philo’s claim that Pharaoh intended only “in theory” to take Sarah for his wife “but in reality to dishonor her” (§ 94). God’s afflicting this character with tortures accords with both Gen 12:17 (Hebrew and Greek) and Philo’s literal account (§96). The idea that virtue itself was the cause of the tortures may—as we have just noted—have its source in Gen 12:17, specifically in the phrase, “because of Sara.” Philo does not acknowledge that Sarah entered Pharaoh’s house, but according to Gen 12:15, the princes of Egypt indeed brought her there. On an allegorical level, the (symbolic) presence of Sarah in Pharaoh’s house leads to strife because vice and virtue—which Pharaoh and Sarah represent, respectively—cannot co-exist in one soul. The concluding reflections about the peaceful nature of virtue may address the unexpectedness of virtue entering into conflict with vice (i.e., Sarah entering Pharaoh’s house) and the remark about the importance to virtue of good repute underscores what is at stake in such a confrontation (§§ 105–106). For additional perspectives, see Geljon 2016.

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Finally, we may note that features of the diatribe abound in §§ 104–106— both in details of style, such as parallel clausulae, and in rhetorical tropes, such as personification, in this case of virtue (see also the Introduction, § 3b). Detailed Comments § 99. I have also heard. Philo refers to different exegetes—both allegorists and others—in various contexts. That he “heard” them suggests that he may have listened to them in a synagogue, school, or other setting (see the Analysis/General Comments above for §§99–106). Since the verb “I have heard” (ἤκουσα) with a genitive can also denote reading, it is possible too that he read the interpretations to which he refers; see Schenkeveld 1992; Runia 2004b, 114, with n. 34. Elsewhere Philo also mentions having “heard” other interpreters (Ios. 151; Spec. 3.178; but cf. Fug. 55, in which the reference appears to be metaphorical). See too Hay 1979–1980, 45. specialists in physical philosophy. The exact identity of the φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες has been debated. In Post. 7, Philo likewise speaks of them as allegorists. He also refers to them (or simply to φυσικοί), however, in other contexts in which he links them not with biblical interpretation but with other kinds of knowledge. See, e.g., Opif. 132; Leg. 2.6; Mos. 2.103; Spec. 3.117; also Hay, 1979–1980, 46–47. It is possible that Philo’s association of φυσικοί with allegorical exegesis is connected to his discussion of God and nature in similar terms (as in §§ 15, 16, 38, 248; see also the comment at §15, on hope, which nature has placed …) and to his equation of the law of Moses with the law of nature (e.g., § 5; Opif. 3; see also the comment at §11 on the “book” …). Interpretation of the books of Moses is thus understood to pertain to the study of nature (e.g., Mos. 2.216). In a note on the φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες in §99, Colson, who translates the phrase as “natural philosophers,” suggests that this phrase might also be translated as “students of the (higher) truths of nature” and observes that “Nature is so closely akin to the divine … that allegorical truths such as these belong to its study …” (PLCL 6:52 n. a). In addition to using φυσικοί to denote exegetes, Philo frequently uses a form of φυσικός in the context of allegorical interpretations (see, e.g., Sacr. 102; Conf. 60; Fug. 19). Because similar uses of φυσικός appear in the Letter of Aristeas (§§143, 171) and the fragments of Aristobulus (Praep. ev. 8.10.2–3; 13.12.9), Philo’s usage may reflect a long-held understanding of the term (see also Holladay 1995, 136–137, with 206 n. 31; 178–179, with 224 n. 122). While the φυσικοί had earlier been identified with a group that discerned in Scripture a Stoic system of cosmology and natural science, Hay concludes that the term “physikos is often used in descriptions of allegorists and allegorical interpretation, but nowhere to identify a special class of Jewish allegorists bent

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on finding Stoic science in the books of Moses” (1979–1980, 47). Goulet goes so far as to attribute to the φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες an independent allegorical source underlying Philo’s work that Philo used and adapted for his own purposes. Goulet further suggests that this group might be identified with the Therapeutae (Goulet 1987, esp. 33–45, 525–541; cf. Runia 1989; Dillon 1994). See also Di Mattei 2006. not inappropriately. The phrase “not off the mark” (οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ), while not unusual, may gain a certain resonance from such a Platonic passage as Theaet. 179c, where Socrates ironically commends Theaetetus for οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ declaring that sense-perception and knowledge are the same. But it must be admitted that it is a common enough turn of phrase in Philo; cf., e.g., Opif. 12, where Moses is said to have acted οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ in conferring the title of “Genesis” on his book about the creation; Plant. 76; Ebr. 76; Her. 156; and Abr. 11, 36, 134. deducing from the significance of the interpreted version of his name a noble cast of soul. This seems to be a reference to the etymologizing of “Abraham” as “chosen father of sound” (πατὴρ ἐκλεκτὸς ἠχοῦς; cf. § 82 above), although officially—that is, according to Genesis—the change of name from “Abram” does not take place before he and Sarah go to Egypt (see Gen 17:5). According to Philo’s allegorical understanding, however, Abraham’s new name represents the mind of the sage—hence, as here, “the good intellect” (σπουδαῖος νοῦς)—and signifies Abraham’s spiritual achievements after migrating from Chaldea and learning the lessons of Harran (see §§ 81–84 with the comments ad loc.). Based on this understanding, then, at least on a symbolic level, Philo seems to have regarded the change of name as having taken place before the journey to Egypt. her name being in Chaldean “Sarah” … As elsewhere, Philo uses Χαλδαϊστί to indicate the Hebrew language (e.g., §201; Mos. 2.224; Praem. 44; Legat. 4; see also the comment at §8 on for the Chaldean word for “human” is “Enos”). The Hebrew word sarah (the feminine form of the more usual sar, or “official”) denotes a female ruler—thus, as Philo says here, her name means “ruling one” (ἄρχουσα, f.). In this treatise, Philo does not discuss the significance of Sarah’s name change from Sarai but in other passages he understands sarai (the Hebrew, according to him, for “my rule”) to represent specific virtue and sarah to represent generic virtue, which is superior. As he does with the change of name from “Abram” to “Abraham,” Philo describes Sarah’s name change in terms of the Greek letters. Thus he notes that her former name was Sara, with one rho, and her new name is “Sarra,” with a double rho; see Mut. 61, 77–78; QG 3.53; Grabbe 1988, 201. (In Hebrew, the change from sarai to sarah involves the change of the final letter from yod to he.)

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nothing more dominant and authoritative than virtue. Perhaps a reminiscence here of the famous dictum of Lachesis, daughter of Necessity, in Plato, Resp. 10.617e: “Virtue owns no master” (ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον). Here Philo links the etymology of Sarah’s name as “ruling one (f.)” with her symbolic interpretation as virtue (see the previous comment). §100. pleasure … wisdom. Philo contrasts two different kinds of marriages, the marriage of bodies whose bond is pleasure and the marriage of reasoning powers whose bond is wisdom. Presumably the point is that Pharaoh desired a union based on pleasure, while the marriage of Abraham and Sarah was based on wisdom. reasoning powers in pursuit of purification and perfect virtues. There may here be a reference to the account of virtues as purifications in Phaed. 69b–c and 81e–83e, such as later gave warrant to Plotinus (in Enn. 1.2) for postulating a higher, “purificatory” grade of virtue, above the “political” virtues set out in Resp. 4. We find mention of “perfect virtue” (τελεία ἀρετή) at, e.g., Leg. 1.61; 3.18 and 244 (this last reference à propos Abraham’s mating with Sarah, who is ἀρετὴ τελεία, while just below, at Leg. 3.249, we find a contrast between ἀρετὴ τελεία, προκοπή, and εὐφυία, indicating the Stoic provenance of such distinctions). At Spec. 1.201, again, we find mention of the intellect being “purified with purifications which are those of perfect virtue” (our trans. of καθαρθεὶς καθάρσεσι ταῖς ἀρετῆς τελείας). On the relationship between philosophy/wisdom and purity, see further Yli-Karjanmaa 2015, 96. §101. the sanctified and divine sowings. At Mos. 1.279, we hear of “divine seeds” (σπέρματα θεῖα) from which human souls are generated, in contrast to human seeds, from which human bodies are formed. That passage thus presents a rather different notion from the present passage in which divine sowings appear to represent “good counsels and noble reasonings and stimulations to the most life-enhancing principles.” Or perhaps, rather … In the exegetical tradition common to both Philo and the Neoplatonists, μήποτε (δέ, οὖν) is the standard way of introducing an objection to a previous opinion followed by a proposed correction (cf. Dillon 1996a, 130); cf., e.g., Leg. 3.60; Deus 107 and 122, the latter of which has ἴσως instead of μήποτε. Here Philo’s initial objection seems to concern merely the fact that the exegesis is “given the lie” (ἔψευσται) by the grammatical status of the two factors involved, νοῦς, a masculine noun, and ἀρετή, a feminine one. The problem seems to be that in the union based on wisdom the (grammatically male) intellect and the (grammatically female) virtue are acting in ways diametrically opposed to their (grammatical) genders, because “intellect” (νοῦς) is the passive recipient and “virtue” (ἀρετή), the active sower. But this is surely something that the φυσικοί would freely accept: Virtue is an active principle, corresponding, in

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Stoic terms (and in Philo’s own terms), to the Divine Logos, and in Aristotelian terms, to the Active Intellect, which is masculine; while our human νοῦς is, in Aristotelian terms, the passive intellect, which may be identified with the rational part of the soul, which is feminine. In §§101–102, Philo is developing further the position of the “specialists in physical philosophy” (φυσικοὶ ἄνδρες), but he is hardly contradicting it, in the way that the “or perhaps, rather” (ἢ μήποτε) would seem to imply. Perhaps this is just a case of Philo choosing to distance himself slightly from an allegorical interpretation, something that he does on a number of occasions by introducing a potential difficulty. Perhaps too Philo may be anticipating an objection that others might raise and is therefore offering clarification. At Sacr. 121, it may be noted, μήποτε δέ introduces merely an additional suggestion. §102. If, however, one is prepared to strip away … For the imagery of stripping off obscuring linguistic or other veils to get at the truth, cf. the use of ἀπαμφιάζω in a metaphorical sense at Leg. 2.53–54; Cher. 17; Gig. 53. Here, after suggesting that the gender of the nouns belies the true roles of virtue and reason, Philo observes that if one removes “the obscuring terminology”—presumably, the gender classification—one will realize the truth of the interpretation. In Fug. 51–52, although the exegesis and context are different from our Abr. passage Philo similarly questions the suitability of the gender of words like “wisdom” and the individual virtues, which are grammatically feminine but have a masculine nature or capacity. As here in our Abr. passage, however, he advises that one ignore the gender discrepancy and focus only on the quality denoted by the word’s meaning. See also Baynes 2002. this passivity is its only means of deliverance. Symbolically, this observation seems to mean that by remaining passive the mind is able to receive proper input for noble thoughts, which in turn lead to noble deeds and words. In relation to the biblical narrative, however—and, more specifically, in relation to Philo’s interpretation of this narrative—this statement may be a way of defending Abraham’s passivity and helplessness before Pharaoh and the Egyptians when Sarah is taken from him. In Genesis, Abraham is not passive in that he instructs Sarah to present herself as his sister. He also becomes rich with flocks and servants from the Egyptians and is later allowed to keep these. Philo, in his “literal” retelling, not only omits Abraham’s instructions to Sarah, but after the couple reaches Egypt, Philo refers to Abraham only once to remark that he was fearful and unable to help his wife, who then joined him in turning to God (§95; see also the comment there on for her husband was in no position to help her and the Analysis/General Comments above for §§ 99–106). §103. at least in theory honor and admire virtue as far as appearances go. These words may correspond to Philo’s observation in his literal interpretation

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that Pharaoh intended to take Sarah in marriage “in theory” (λόγῳ); see § 94 and the comment on resolved in theory … the body-loving intellect. For the concept of the νοῦς φιλοσώματος, cf. Leg. 1.33; Deus 111. The adjective may have been coined by Plato, at Phaed. 68b, à propos that a man not prepared to die indicates “that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body” (ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος)—the τις indicating the introduction of a neologism. In Philo’s allegorizations, the land of Egypt typically represents the land of the body; here, then, its king symbolizes the body-loving mind; see Pearce 2007, esp. 81–127; cf. Ios. 151–152. The association between Egypt, the body, and bodily pleasures goes back at least as far as Ezekiel, esp. 23:19–21; cf. 16:26. There are, however, some differences between the Hebrew and the Greek, so that it is not clear whether or not Philo’s symbolization of Egypt is in any way influenced by Ezekiel. See Kugel 1998, 577, esp. n. 24; and Pearce 2007, 97, esp. n. 87. putting on an act as in a theatre. For other instances of theatre imagery in Philo, cf. Gig. 31; Spec. 4.185; Flacc. 19. Here Philo is using the imagery to elaborate on Pharaoh’s apparent deception in pretending to honor Sarah, or virtue. The verb “simulate,” “assume a fraudulent appearance of” (ἐπιμορφάζω), seems unique to Philo; cf. Leg. 3.47; Det. 19; Deus 102. See also the verb ἐπείσειμι, “to come next on the stage,” in §104. through craving for good repute with the multitude. According to this interpretation, the king, or the body-loving mind, seems to assume that “the many” (οἱ πολλοί) hold virtue in high regard. It appears odd that Philo would represent them as esteeming virtue, even through the misguided perceptions of the king of Egypt; cf., e.g., §89 and the comment on notable indeed. §104. the Overseer. For other characterizations of God as ἔφορος cf. above § 71 and the comment on the Director of the universe. hates. It is somewhat unexpected to find Philo attributing such a negative emotion (ἐμίσησε) to God. See, however, Somn. 1.211 (θεομισής) and Decal. 131 (θεομίσητος), “God-hated” or “God-hating.” Use of θεοφιλής and φιλόθεος, both of which mean “God-beloved” or “God-loving,” is much more frequent; see, e.g., §§27, 46, 50, 89, 98. And with what instruments are these tortures inflicted? The conceit of virtues as “tortures” (βάσανοι) for their corresponding vices is remarkable (for similar uses of βάσανος/βασανίζειν, cf. Sacr. 80; Mut. 208–209; Virt. 60). The basis for the idea is that the soul cannot comfortably tolerate two hostile natures (§ 105), as they set up unbearable tensions within it. In connection with the biblical narrative, the implication is that the king of Egypt and Sarah cannot dwell in the same place together. Indirectly, then, this is another way for Philo to address the claim that Sarah had entered Pharaoh’s house (see Gen 12:15 and also the

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comment at §105 on it will not venture). In addition, Philo’s remark that the tortures are inflicted by the parts of virtues may be yet another interpretation of the phrase “because of Sara” (LXX Gen 12:17), in that the tortures are inflicted through virtue—i.e., through or because of Sarah. The biblical phrase has also been understood to signify that God responded to Sarah’s turning to Him; see § 95 and the comment on took refuge. For the torture for greed is frugality. Philo appears to be the first employ the noun “contentment with little” (ὀλιγόδεια). He frequently mentions it in the same context as “self-control” (ἐγκράτεια), which here serves as the “torture” for lewdness. See, e.g., Her. 48; Somn. 1.124; Mos. 2.185; Spec. 1.175. The two qualities appear in a much longer list of virtues at Sacr. 27, and the vices “greed” (ἀπληστία) and “injustice” (ἀδικία) appear in adjectival form in Sacr. 32. §105. unresolvable and irreconcilable conflicts and wars. For other instances of the collocution ἀσύμβατος καὶ ἀκατάλλακτος, cf. § 14 above, and Ios. 156; Legat. 205. virtue possesses a most peaceable nature. Virtue is described as “most peaceable” elsewhere only at Cher. 49. There do not seem to be pre-Philonic analogies for this thought. it will not venture in the first place to enter the contest. In his literal account, Philo does not say explicitly, as does Scripture, that Sarah entered Pharaoh’s house. According to Gen 12:15, Pharaoh’s advisors (not Pharaoh himself, as Philo implies in §94) brought her to his house. By contrast, in this allegorical interpretation, the reference to virtue entering a contest suggests a conscious choice and seems to assume that Sarah, as virtue, wittingly entered Pharaoh’s house (the soul), where symbolically virtue and vice cannot inhabit the same space. Although triggered no doubt, by the fact that, in Philo’s version of the story, Sarah declines to enter the household of the Pharaoh at all, this notion is an odd one—namely, that virtue, in certain particularly unpromising circumstances, may decline altogether to engage with an intellect of a sufficient degree of grossness, for fear of being beaten in “the contest.” §106. For there is no disgrace for vice … There are 18 instances of the use of “disgrace” (ἀδοξία) in the Philonic corpus, but this is the only occasion on which he explicitly presents it as proper to “vice” (κακία). a bad reputation is part of its very nature … a good reputation is most proper to it. A contrast between the words “bad reputation” (ἀδοξία) and “good reputation” (εὔκλεια) is also to be found at Virt. 10 and 37. Again, with reference to the biblical narrative (Gen 12:19), it was necessary to protect Sarah’s—or virtue’s— reputation from the notion of “defeat” by Pharaoh—or vice—i.e., his taking her in marriage.

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Parallel Philonic Exegesis As an interpretation of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt, Philo’s allegorization of two opposite kinds of marriage is not found elsewhere in his extant works. We can, however, locate parallels to individual elements of this allegorization in other passages. On the reference to the etymology of Abraham’s name, for example, see the comment at §99 on deducing from the significance …; §82; and the relevant comments in Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of §§68–84. On Sarah as virtue and “the ruling one (f.),” see Cher. 7; Mut. 77–78; QG 3.53, 4.122; Grabbe 1988, 201; and the discussion and references provided by Earp in PLCL 10:413. Finally, on the king of Egypt as symbolic of “the body-loving intellect,” see the comment on this phrase at §103 and the relevant comments in Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of §§89–98. On the king as symbolic of vice, see this same section. Nachleben Individual elements from Philo’s allegorization of Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt are found in the writings of various Church Fathers. Clement of Alexandria, for example, includes an explanation similar to Philo’s for the etymology of “Abraham” that accords with Philo’s characterization of the patriarch as symbolic of “the good intellect” (Strom. 5.1 in Coxe 1994, 446; cf. § 99; see also the Nachleben section following §§60–84). As for Sarah’s name, Ambrose mentions that the meaning in Greek is ἄρχουσα and explains the change in her name similarly to Philo (Ambrose, Abr. 2.11.85; for Philo’s explanation, see the comment at §99 on her name being in Chaldean “Sarah”). Thus he (Ambrose) observes that the addition of the letter “r” changed the meaning of Sarah’s name from “my sovereignty” to “one (f.) who rules” (ἄρχουσα), in Greek. (Although not relevant to our passage in Philo’s Abr., Ambrose then distinguishes between mortal and immortal qualities, specific and general, in a discussion that very closely resembles Philo’s interpretation of Sarah’s name change in QG 3.53.) Jerome too presents etymologies for “Sarai” and “Sarah” similar to those of Philo (i.e., “my ruler” and “ruler,” or ἄρχουσα), but in contrast to Philo he explains that the change did not involve the addition of a “rho” but must be understood according to the Hebrew (Qu. hebr. Gen. 27.21, on Gen 17:15; Hayward 1995, 49– 50). See also Nom. hebr. 72.25, 73.7, 75.1, and 78.14, where the etymology is listed as “princeps”; Grabbe 1988, 201. Although the above parallels regarding the etymology of Sarah’s name are of interest, more significant are those discussions that address this etymology in the context of Gen 12:10–20, because in Genesis, Sarah’s name is not

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changed until later (Gen 17:15). Origen, who also mentions the etymology of Sarah’s name as ἄρχουσα, like Philo, associates her thereby with virtue (Hom. Gen. 6.1). Strikingly, like Philo as well, he relates this symbolism to the sojourn of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt, but in the context of discussing a parallel episode in Genesis, which Philo himself does not address in Abr.—namely, the couple’s interactions with Abimelech in Gen 20 (see, however, QG 4.59–70). Thus, after observing that Sarah as virtue is united with the wise and faithful man, Abraham, Origen contrasts Abimelech and Pharaoh. He (Origen) claims that Abimelech desired Sarah with a pure heart while Pharaoh’s intentions were not pure. The Lord therefore afflicted Pharaoh but spared Abimelech. In Origen’s exegesis, Pharaoh represents the impure man and the exterminator, unable to take Sarah—i.e., virtue—as wife. Abimelech, by contrast, who represents philosophy, will succeed in uniting with virtue—because of his pure intentions— but in the time of Jesus, not of Abraham (Hom. Gen. 6.1–3). Like Philo, then, Origen suggests that Pharaoh did not succeed in violating Sarah. Unlike Philo, however, Origen defends Abraham’s telling Sarah to say that she is his sister on the reasoning that virtue is available to those who desire it (Hom. Gen. 6.1; cf. QG 4.60; see Doutreleau 2003, 186 n. 1). In his work On Abraham, Ambrose interprets the episode of Abraham and Sarah in Egypt in two places, 1.2.6–9 and 2.4.13–18, with a number of parallels to Philo’s exegesis in Abr. 89–106. Thus, Ambrose associates Egypt with the body, passions, and carnal pleasures (2.4.13–14) and likewise with “lust … extravagance, wanton covetousness, and unbridled passions” (1.2.6) (cf. our discussion under Parallel Philonic Exegesis following §§89–98). In the first passage (1.2.6– 9), Ambrose, unlike Philo, focuses on Gen 12:17–19, where, after God afflicts him, Pharaoh confronts Abraham. Ambrose observes that “God is the protector of marriage” (1.2.7; cf. Philo’s Abr. 89) and that even Pharaoh recognized that “the sin of adultery is to be shunned” (1.2.8). According to Ambrose, the episode is “most suitable to instil the zeal for piety, for whoso follows God is always secure” (1.2.9). Earlier (1.2.4), Ambrose interprets Abraham’s leaving home in response to God’s command (Gen 12:4) as his following God. Without directly addressing Pharaoh’s words that he took Sarah for a wife (Gen 12:19), Ambrose concludes by noting that “because in his zeal to fulfil the Heavenly precept Abraham had led his wife also into danger, God safeguarded the purity of the marriage too” (1.2.9). Ambrose does not mention the preservation of the marriage explicitly as a reward to Abraham for his piety as Philo does in § 90, but it is striking that, like Philo, he links this preservation with Abraham’s quality of piety in following God; the notion of a reward can thus be understood as implicit. (All translations of Ambrose in this paragraph are from Tomkinson 2000, 4–6.)

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In the second passage (2.4.13–18), Ambrose regards Sarah as a symbol of virtue and also wisdom (2.4.16). Like Philo (§§ 103–106), he too understands Pharaoh’s affliction (Gen 12:17) as the inability of the “proud mind” and “reprobate soul” to endure the presence of wisdom and virtue and claims that this mind thus separates itself from wisdom/virtue without penetration (2.4.16; Tomkinson 2000, 54). Ambrose further develops the notion of this incompatibility by speaking of a profligate attracted by chastity (2.4.17), who quickly sends it away, along with “the advisor who had striven to introduce into his mind the custom of chastity” (Tomkinson 2000, 55), an interpretation based on Pharaoh’s confronting Abraham and sending him away (Gen 12:18–19). Significantly, then, Ambrose too, like Philo, offers both a plain, or “literal,” and symbolic interpretation as a way to counter the notion that Pharaoh took Sarah into his house as a wife. Finally, the interpretation of Didymus shares only two significant parallels with that of Philo: first, an association between the Egyptians and “love of pleasure” (φιληδονία, In Gen. 226 on Gen 12:11–13), and, second, the symbolization of Sarah as virtue (ibid., 227), although Didymus does not link this quality with the meaning of her name. See also Boulnois 2010.

Chapter 8: The Visit of the Three Strangers, §§ 107–132 a

Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§107–118 Analysis/General Comments Following on his disquisition on the wickedness of the Egyptians, based on the story in Gen 12:10–20, Philo now skips several biblical chapters ahead and turns to an exegesis of the incident described in Gen 18:1–15: the visit of the three strangers to Abraham while he was sojourning by the oak of Mambre, his entertainment of them, and their promise that, despite the great age of the couple, Sarah would bear a son. Some of the intervening biblical tales, e.g., concerning Abraham’s dispute with his nephew Lot and his victory over the four kings (Gen 13–14), will be introduced later (§§ 208–244), to illustrate virtues other than piety, which—in this first section (§§ 60–207) of Philo’s biography of Abraham—is what concerns us at the moment. In §§ 247–254 Philo will also mention Sarah’s offering Abraham her handmaid (Hagar) for purposes of procreation (Gen 16:1–4). Strikingly, however, Philo completely omits the covenants between God and Abraham discussed in Gen 15 and 17. (For more on Philo’s selection from and rearrangement of the biblical narrative, see the Introduction, §5d.)

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By juxtaposing Abraham and Sarah’s sojourn in Egypt with the visit of the three strangers, Philo can contrast Abraham’s hospitality and φιλανθρωπία with the alleged “lack of hospitality” (τὸ ἄξενον; §107) and licentious behavior of his Egyptian hosts. (In Genesis itself, Abraham’s hospitality contrasts more directly instead with the inhospitality and violent behavior of the Sodomites in the very next chapter, Gen 19.) In addition, by reporting the promise of a son to Abraham and Sarah (§110), Philo can also demonstrate that God acts directly to fulfill His reward to Abraham, mentioned in the Egyptian episode in § 98. Philo’s treatment of this passage (Gen 18:1–15) is a most interesting example of his exegetical technique, including as it does all three forms of exegesis that he habitually employs, literal (§§107–113), ethical (§§ 114–118), and “physical”—i.e. allegorical/metaphysical (§§119–132) (see Dillon 1996a). Because Philo includes the ethical exegesis at the end of his literal interpretation and does not explicitly distinguish the ethical from the literal as he does with his allegorical interpretation (§119), we shall treat the literal and ethical exegeses together and the allegorical one separately (see also the Introduction, § 4). We have first (§§107–113), then, an exegesis on the literal level (though even so with some elements of moralizing), consisting of a paraphrase of the biblical narrative, but with some differences of nuance. Thus in § 107, Philo makes explicit his comparison between the inhospitality of the Egyptians and the hospitality of Abraham. He then relates that Abraham ran to greet the three strangers, who appeared as humans and whose divine nature eluded him. Perceiving Abraham’s sincere intentions, the visitors accepted the invitation to his tent, whereupon Abraham joyfully and hastily arranged to receive them by instructing Sarah to bake them cakes and selecting a calf for his servant to prepare (§§108–109). After being nourished by Abraham’s generosity rather than the food, the visitors promised Abraham and Sarah the birth of a legitimate son as a reward. Philo is careful to observe that only one of the three guests spoke, who was “the best of them” (§110). Because of their age, the couple did not believe the promise (§111) and Sarah at first laughed. Notably, at Gen 18:15 it is stated that Sarah denied that she had laughed at the strangers’ prediction, “for she was afraid,” whereas Philo (§112) prefers to attribute this denial to shame, for she recognized, when she was reminded, that all things are possible with God. Philo then comments that at this point Sarah recognized the divine aspect of her guests (§113). Secondly, in §§114–118, we find the ethical exegesis proper, based, as is usual (except when the literal subject-matter is of an absurd or disreputable nature), on the literal sense of the narrative. Thus Abraham’s hospitality is presented as the natural by-product of a higher virtue, namely his “piety”

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(θεοσέβεια; §114). Philo remarks that if a household where wise men visit is happy, blessed, and free of incurable passion, then how much more so is that household where higher beings, such as angels, will not hesitate to accept hospitality (§§115–116). Stress is laid on the moderation and simplicity of the entertainment (§117)—despite the killing of a fatted calf! Finally, Philo marvels that the visitors appeared to eat and drink, even though in reality they did not. Even more wondrous, the incorporeal beings assumed the form of humans in order to show the sage that God had not failed to recognize him (§118). Philo’s rendition of the narrative thus emphasizes Abraham’s hospitality even and especially when he remained unaware of his guests’ identity. Indeed in Philo’s retelling, this hospitality is rewarded by the promise of a son. Although Gen 18:8 claims that the guests ate, Philo reflects—both indirectly (§§110, 116) and directly (§118)—the belief that angels, who are incorporeal, do not eat. His primary source in this passage is LXX Gen 18:1–15, in which Abraham and Sarah’s guests are inconsistently described as divine and human (see the comment at §107 on what seemed to be human). Another influence, however, may also have been Greek and Roman tales of appearances by gods to unwitting humans, since Philo makes explicit, as Genesis does not, that Abraham was unaware of his guests’ identity and that at a certain point Sarah recognized their true nature. (See, for example, QG 4.2, in which Philo quotes Homer, Od. 17.485–488; also Arterbury 2003, esp. 362–363, with n. 21, and 364–365; and Sterling 2018a.) Detailed Comments § 107. So much then … On Philo’s mode of transition to this episode, see the comment at §119 on So much then for the literal exegesis … his love of humanity. Φιλανθρωπία is a virtue given wide mention in Philo’s works. A whole chapter is devoted to it in the De Virtutibus (§§ 51–174); see Wilson 2011, esp. 55–77, 157–357. It can refer both to God’s goodwill towards humankind (e.g., Abr. 79; Cher. 99; Spec. 2.79; and cf. φιλάνθρωπος below, at Abr. 203) and the concern felt by a person for fellow-humans (e.g., Ios. 240; Decal. 164; Spec. 4.18). The quality is frequently paired with “mildness” (ἡμερότης; cf. Cher. 99; Sacr. 27; Spec. 4.18; Virt. 121), or “fellow-feeling” (κοινωνία; cf. Spec. 1.324; Virt. 80), and, below, at Abr. 208, it is stated to belong to the same nature as “piety” (εὐσέβεια) or “holiness” (ὁσιότης), as its counterpart in the soul of the good man. in the noonday. Where the Hebrew of Gen 18:1 has keḥom hayom—translated as “in the heat of the day” (NRSV) or “as the day grew hot” (NJPS)—the LXX, on which Philo relies, fixes the time as “noon” (μεσημβρία). The impreci-

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sion of the Hebrew led to rabbinic debates about what time of day Abraham received his visitors (see, e.g., Gen. Rab. 48:8). See also the comment at § 119, as if with noonday sun. what seemed to be human. This renders Philo’s phrase ὡς ἄνδρας. LXX Gen 18:2 mentions “three men” (τρεῖς ἄνδρες) and gives no direct indication that these visitors were not human. The tale begins, however, with the statement (Gen 18:1) “And God appeared to him by the oak of Mambre”; while at 18:3 Abraham addresses the strangers, in the singular, as “Lord” (Κύριε). A confusing interchange between singular and plural and between divine and human continues throughout the tale. Philo addresses the vacillations between divine and human here in his literal interpretation and those between singular and plural in his allegorical interpretation (§§119–132), which he ends by quoting from relevant verses. See, however, §110 and the comments on through one of the three, the best of them, and for it would have been contrary to philosophy. their actual more divine nature had escaped him. It is interesting that Philo makes a point of noting Abraham’s lack of awareness about his guests’ identity, especially because Genesis does not address this issue. Later Philo will mention that Sarah recognizes the divine nature of the guests but he remains silent about Abraham; see §113 and the comment on at this point … not on the basis of his words but of his attitude. Abraham’s invitation to the travelers in Gen 18:3–5 appears genuine enough, but perhaps Philo includes this remark to emphasize both that the patriarch was wholehearted in extending his invitation and that his guests were fully able to perceive this wholeheartedness. §108. his soul filled with joy. Where Genesis simply describes Abraham’s actions and words, Philo adds that his soul was filled with the “good emotion” (εὐπάθεια) of “joy” (χαρά), perhaps to underscore Abraham’s heartfelt graciousness. Possibly too Philo may wish to intimate the birth—foretold later in this passage (§110)—of Isaac, whose name Philo understands allegorically as referring to joy (see §201, with the comment on from that equable state; cf. Congr. 36; Mut. 1; Praem. 31–32). three servings of ash-baked cakes. The term “hidden bread” (ἐγκρυφίας [ἄρτος]; LXX Gen 18:6), which refers to a cake baked by being covered over in the ashes, gives Philo occasion for allegory in Sacr. 59–62 and QG 4.8. In both passages, where Sarah is allegorized as virtue, the meaning is given of Abraham’s request that she take three measures of flour and bake hidden bread that one should guard as a secret the truth about God and His two chief Powers— symbolized by the three measures—since this is a doctrine that the uninitiated will not be able to comprehend correctly. (Such an interpretation would not be

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supported by the Hebrew of Gen 18:6, which mentions only “cakes” [ʿugot] but not specifically “hidden cakes.”) No such secretive caution is expressed here in § 108 or in Philo’s allegorical interpretation (§§119–132), in which the three visitors themselves, rather than the three measures of flour, symbolize God and His two Powers. In our present passage (§108), Philo compresses Abraham’s original instructions in Genesis to take three measures of flour and make ashbaked cakes into instructions simply to make three measures—or “servings,” as we have translated—of ash-baked cakes. Here Philo also omits certain other details about Abraham’s hospitality, such as his offer for his guests’ feet to be washed, but he (Philo) treats the passage much more fully in QG 4.1–19 (see also the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis below, after the Detailed Comments on §§107–118). §109. for in the household of a sage, no one is slow … Philo draws an explicit lesson from the Genesis narrative (18:6–7), which repeatedly emphasizes the haste displayed both by Abraham, in his actions and instructions to Sarah, and by his servant. §110. having feasted not on the sustenance provided to them but rather … After introducing Abraham and Sarah’s visitors as divine (§ 107), Philo subtly addresses an issue touched upon in as early a source as the book of Judges (6:21–22; 13:15–16), namely, that angels, or divine beings, being incorporeal, do not require physical sustenance and thus do not eat. By contrast, LXX Gen 18:8 positively asserts that they “ate” (ἔφαγον or ἐφάγοσαν, depending on the ms.). Philo addresses the matter explicitly in QG 4.9. For additional perspectives, see § 116 and the comment on allowed the impression … and § 118 and the comment on they gave the appearance … See also Goodman 1986, esp. 166–167. a prize. Using athletic imagery, Philo depicts the promise of a son as a “reward” (ἆθλον) to Abraham for his hospitality, a notion not expressed in Genesis. There, by contrast, the announcement of the upcoming birth is the fulfillment of God’s promise to Abraham in Gen 15:1–4. Although this promise is also presented as a “reward” (μισθός) in LXX Gen 15:1, the episode appears earlier than Gen 18 and the reward in Gen 15 is not a response to Abraham’s hospitality. a legitimate son. Although LXX Genesis does not describe Isaac as “legitimate” (γνήσιος), Philo uses this term for him several times in Abr. (see, e.g., §§132, 168, 194, 254). In this usage, he may have been influenced by Roman legal distinctions (Niehoff 2001, 17–33). See also the comment at § 25 on bastard types of rule … and Sobr. 8, in which Philo compares Isaac as γνήσιος with Ishmael as “bastard” (νόθος). through one of the three. Philo indirectly addresses the bewildering switch from plural to singular and back, which on the allegorical level he accepts as a sign of the various modes of divine presence. In Gen 18:10, the speaker, who

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predicts that Sarah will have a son, is singular. See also the comment at § 107 on what seemed to be human, as well as the following two comments. the best of them. The basis for this characterization is unclear unless we understand this comment in connection with Philo’s allegorical interpretation in §§119–130, in which he explains that the three visitors represent the Father of all (§121) or the Existent (§§121, 122) and His two Powers. According to this understanding, confirmed by QG 4.12, “the best of them” refers to the Father of all rather than to either of His two attendant Powers. The rabbis have a similar understanding of Abraham’s three guests as the Shekhinah (Divine Presence) and two angels (Gen. Rab. 48:9); see also b. Shevu’ot 35b. In Gen. Rab. 48:10, however, to identify whom Abraham addresses in Gen 18:3, R. Ḥiyya uses the phrase “the greatest among them” (lagadol shebenehem; other readings of the second word include shebenehen, shebahem, and shebahen) to refer to the angel Michael (Theodor-Albeck, 1965, 2:486; our trans.). See too the next comment. for it would have been contrary to philosophy. Cf. C.D. Yonge’s translation, “inconsistent with philosophy” (1993, 420). Philo’s claim that it would have been “contrary to philosophy,” or “unphilosophical” (ἀφιλόσοφον) of the three guests to speak all at once has been understood in different ways. One possible meaning is simply that it would have been conduct unbecoming of a philosopher—i.e., unwise, boorish, or odd—for all three men to have spoken at one time. Another possibility, however, is that we understand this perplexing comment in the light of Philo’s interpretations in §§ 119–130 and 142–146. The former passage presents two allegorical interpretations of Abraham and his three visitors in Gen 18:1–15. The latter passage, though part of an ethical exegesis in Philo’s literal interpretation of Gen 19, nonetheless relates to the former, allegorical discussion. Thus, in §§119–130, Philo explains that the three visitors symbolize the Existent and His two Powers. In § 143, Philo further explains that the truly Existent finds it “fitting to bestow good things in person by His own agency, while assigning only to His Powers … the carrying out of operations of the opposite kind.” If this suggestion about the relevance of these two passages is correct, then one can readily see why Philo deems it “contrary to philosophy” for all three guests to announce the promise of a son together. This is because, according to Philo’s philosophical understanding, the truly Existent Himself bestows good gifts “by His own agency” (δι᾽ αὑτοῦ), implicitly without the participation of His two Powers. See, however, § 115 and the comment on through whose agency … See also §143 and the comment on fitting to bestow good things … §111. But they … did not give firm credence. According to Gen 18:12–15, only Sarah reacted with disbelief—and laughter—to the promise of a son, presumably because she, unlike Abraham, did not know of God’s promise given in

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Gen 15:4 and 17:16. Indeed in Gen 17:17, Abraham too reacted with disbelief and laughter. Here Philo attributes disbelief to both Abraham and Sarah, but as in Gen 18:12–15, he attributes laughter only to Sarah. far over the natural age-limit. According to Gen 17:17, Abraham was by now a hundred years of age, and Sarah was ninety. Cf. LXX Gen 18:11: “And Abraham and Sarah were old, advanced in days, and womanly ways had ceased to happen for Sarah.” Elsewhere Philo interprets this verse symbolically to indicate, among other things, a (positive) end to the passions in Sarah’s soul; see, e.g., Cher. 50; Det. 28; QG 4.15. For other interpretations, see Ebr. 60; Fug. 128, 167; Post. 134; Somn. 2.185. See also the comment at § 248 on over the proper age. §112. when they said. In LXX Gen 18:13–14, the Lord questions Abraham about why Sarah laughed and adds, “Is anything impossible for God?” (On various complications pertaining to this quotation, see Royse 2008, 161–163.) When Sarah denies that she laughed, it is unclear whether it is God or Abraham who responds that she did laugh (Gen 18:15). Perhaps Philo addresses this ambiguity by using the plural pronoun here to imply that both God and Abraham asked the question, or, more likely, perhaps he is referring to all three guests, since even though only one delivered the promise, Philo writes that Abraham and Sarah did not believe the “promisers” (pl., ὑπισχνούμενοι, § 111). feeling ashamed. Cf. LXX Gen 18:15: “But Sarah denied, saying, ‘I did not laugh,’ for she was afraid (ἐφοβήθη γάρ).” Sarah’s fear suggests that she perceived the divine nature of her and Abraham’s guests, a perception on which Philo remarks (see §113, with the comment on at this point …). Nonetheless, Philo portrays her emotion as shame, which doubtless seemed to him more suitable to the situation than fear, and this reaction also reflects a more positive image of God. Fear would imply that Sarah anticipated a negative consequence from the Deity, whereas in Philo’s version Sarah’s shame arises from her apparent disbelief in divine omnipotence. See § 206, however, in which Philo portrays Sarah’s reaction as fear and provides a very different explanation. having learned this teaching almost from the cradle. Using the common expression “from the cradle” (see, e.g., Sobr. 24), Philo adds this detail about Sarah, apparently without regard for her birth and upbringing in the land of the Chaldeans (cf. Gen 11:29–31). See also his comment in Legat. 115 regarding the education of Jews. §113. at this point … she first acquired a view. Philo’s claim that Sarah now recognized the divine aspects of her and Abraham’s guests is noteworthy, especially since he (Philo) observes that their divine nature had earlier eluded Abraham (§107). Philo remains silent here about Abraham’s perception. In Gen 18:13, when the Lord addresses Abraham about Sarah’s laughter, it is unclear

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whether He speaks to Abraham in the guise of one of the guests and whether Abraham is aware of his guests’ identity. What is clear—and rather striking— is that Abraham appears to know that the Lord speaks to him regardless of whether he recognizes the true identity of his guests. Philo’s use of the first person (“it seems to me” [μοι δοκεῖ]) may indicate that this is his own interpretation. See also §126 and the comment on what I mean. For other instances of “it seems to me” (μοι δοκεῖ) in Abr., see also §§64, 98, 193, and 267; see too the Introduction, §5e. §114. the hospitality of the man. With this passage Philo begins his ethical interpretation, in which he draws explicit moral lessons from the narrative. Philo’s use here of the adjective “hospitable” (φιλόξενος) as a noun is notable; the only other occurrence of the word in the extant Philonic corpus is at Virt. 105, where it appears as an adverb (φιλοξένως). Abraham’s hospitality might be understood as a particular case of his φιλανθρωπία, which Philo mentions in §§107 and 109. Here, though, he claims that hospitality is an aspect of “piety” (θεοσέβεια), but does not clearly explain how the two are related. Part of the answer seems to be that it must be a pious household indeed that can show hospitality to both human and divine beings (see §§ 115–116 and the next comment). From another perspective, however, part of the answer may also be suggested in QG 4.2, 8, and 10, which mention that Abraham recognized his guests alternately as human and divine. Perceiving them as humans, he displayed hospitality and love of humanity; perceiving them as divine, he displayed piety (see also the section at the end of these Detailed Comments on Parallel Philonic Exegesis). On Abraham’s piety, see too Heb 13:2; Abot R. Nat. 7. In rabbinic sources, Abraham’s hospitality is sometimes linked to his role as a proselytizer; see, e.g., Gen. Rab. 43:7 on Gen 14:19; Gen. Rab. 48:8, 49:4. See also Arterbury 2003; Kugel 1998, 334–336. §115. wise men … angels. Somewhat verbosely Philo is saying that any household where wise men might visit must be happy, blessed, and without incorrigible passion, and therefore how much more happy, blessed, and without incorrigible passion must the household be where angels would receive hospitality. servants and lieutenants. Ὑποδιάκονος is a very rare compound, used elsewhere only by the Hellenistic author of comedy Posidippus (26.10). Both terms, “servants” (ὑποδιάκονοι) and “lieutenants” (ὕπαρχοι), are used separately elsewhere by Philo to describe the role of angels (e.g., Mos. 1.166, ὕπαρχος; Spec. 1.66, ὑποδιάκονος). We may note here the similarities between Philo’s depiction of this role and the Platonic doctrine of daemons as set out at Symp. 202a–203a, though Philo does not employ any of the key terms used there. through whose agency, as ambassadors. By implying that all angels serve to make predictions, this observation is somewhat at odds with the notion,

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discussed earlier, that God Himself bestows good things (see § 110 and the comment on for it would have been contrary to philosophy). Here, however, Philo may be making a general observation about angels without allusion to his allegorical understanding of the guests as the Existent and His two Powers, with their different roles. (The word ἄγγελος, after all, also carries the meaning of “messenger,” or “one that announces.”) Indeed Philo’s understanding of Abraham and Sarah’s guests as angels appears to be separate from and unrelated to his allegorical interpretation in §§119–130. §116. like the well-disciplined crew of a ship. Such nautical metaphors are reasonably common in Philo; see, e.g., Opif. 88; Leg. 3.223–224; Ebr. 86; Conf. 98. Cf. also Plato’s ship of state analogy in Resp. 6.488a–489a. allowed the impression of being feasted. Another reference to the belief that angels, as divine beings, do not physically eat. See also § 110, with the comment on having feasted … and §118, with the comment on they gave the appearance … a kinsman and fellow-servant … In this remarkable observation, Philo seems to suggest that the angels viewed Abraham as similar to themselves. For use of “fellow servant” (ὁμόδουλος) in Plato, see Phaed. 85b. who had taken refuge with their own master. Cf. § 95. §117. The gathering. The word actually used by Philo is συμπόσιον, which is peculiar, since there is no emphasis laid on the drink consumed. Philo may be glancing covertly at Plato’s Symposium, which was another moderate, restrained, and philosophical gathering (until Alcibiades barged in). Cf. too Philo’s use of the word in Contempl. (passim) to describe the sober gathering of the Therapeutae. See also Taylor 2003; and Niehoff 2010. §118. they gave the appearance that they were both drinking and eating. The problem of angels eating and drinking, which bothered several ancient interpreters, is not one that had occurred to the biblical composer of this story (see the comment at §110 on having feasted). The fact that Josephus, at Ant. 1.197, in telling the story, also talks of the angels as appearing to eat (οἱ δὲ δόξαν αὐτῷ παρέσχον ἐσθιόντων) seems to be indicative of a common tradition rather than of a direct dependence on Philo. A similar tradition appears in Targum Neophyti and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan on Gen 18:8 and in rabbinic sources, e.g., Gen. Rab. 48:14 (see also 48:11); b. B. Meṣ. 86b. Philo subsumes this phenomenon of eating and drinking under the more general marvel of immaterial essences taking on human form. On the question of angels eating, see also Goodman 1986, esp. 166–175; Kugel 1998, 342–345; Ginzberg 2003, 1:206 n. 143. his being such as he was. This unspecific phrase (τοιοῦτος ὤν) may refer to a particular aspect of Abraham’s situation such as his and Sarah’s childless state or, more generally, to his qualities, like piety and wisdom.

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Parallel Philonic Exegesis In other passages Philo sometimes blends aspects of the literal and allegorical interpretations that he presents separately in Abr. and we have included some additional relevant parallels in the Parallel Philonic Exegesis section after the commentary on §§119–132. The interpretations below pertain primarily to §§107–118. (See also Moreau 2015.) As he does in §§108–109, in QG 4.124 Philo emphasizes the haste of Abraham, Sarah, and the servant as they prepare to receive the guests. The context of this latter passage is Philo’s response to the question of why Rebecca “hasten[s] in everything” (at several points in Gen 24). Philo first remarks that “[e]xcellent and good people perform their good works without delay” (cf. Abr. 109). After describing the behavior of Abraham, his wife, and his servant, Philo then observes, “Whereas frivolous people are in doubt about those things which it is proper to delay, those who know how to do things accurately and clearly, when an opportunity is found, do not take a long time.” In §§107 and 109, Philo speaks of Abraham’s “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) but in §114, he speaks of the patriarch’s hospitality as an aspect of his “piety” (θεοσέβεια). In QG 4.2, Philo makes explicit that when Abraham perceived the guests as (three) humans, he displayed the quality of kindness toward humanity; when he perceived his guests as divine, he displayed holiness, or piety; cf. QG 4.10. In QG 4.8, commenting on why Abraham, his wife, and his servant hurry in preparing to entertain their guests, Philo similarly remarks that if Abraham thought he had human visitors, “he is to be admired for his humanity and hospitality.” If he thought that he was visited by God and His chief Powers, then “he was blessed and fortunate” (cf. § 115). In QG 4.9, Philo notes that it must be understood symbolically that Abraham’s guests “ate,” for “these happy and blessed natures do not eat food or drink red wine …” Instead, “just as human guests who are hospitably received and are gladdened with food rejoice in their host and entertainer, so does the Deity in those whom He finds sincerely and genuinely pleasing to Him. For, more figuratively, the pious and worthy life of a virtuous man is the food of God” (cf. §110). Finally, in an interpretation that combines elements from his literal and allegorical exegeses in Abr., Philo comments in Cher. 106 that “joined in commonalty of daily life and board with virtue-loving souls, [the Divine Potencies] sow within them the nature of happiness, even as they gave to wise Abraham in Isaac the most perfect thank-offering for their stay with him.”

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Nachleben Later discussions of or references to Abraham and his three visitors reflect Philo’s influence with respect to the emphasis, in his literal interpretation, on Abraham’s hospitality and on the promise of a son as a reward for this hospitality. In his article “Abraham’s Hospitality among Jewish and Early Christian Writers: A Tradition History of Gen 18:1–6 and Its Relevance for the Study of the New Testament,” A.E. Arterbury (2003) observes that Philo introduces these new emphases when he presents the biblical narrative, particularly in Abr. Based largely on Arterbury’s study, we note the following parallels between Philo and later, mostly Christian, writers. Like Philo, 1Clement (10.7) understands the granting of a son to the patriarch as a reward for his hospitality; cf. Abr. 110. John Chrysostom similarly believes that God rewards the patriarch for this quality (Hom. Gen. 41.7; cf. 41.12, 23, 26; Arterbury 2003, 366, 370). In portraying Abraham’s hospitality, Chrysostom also parallels another theme in Philo not mentioned in Abr. but referred to in QG 4.10, namely, that Abraham himself rather than any of his 318 servants attended to his visitors (Hom. Gen. 41.8). Augustine too picks up the theme of Abraham’s hospitality and mentions that Abraham himself served his guests (Trin. 2.10.19; Arterbury 2003, 370–371). The Apocalypse of Paul recognizes hospitality as a quality to be rewarded and as a show of humanity. In that work, Paul discovers that hospitality is “the key criterion” for entry to the third heaven, where he is welcomed by “ ‘Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Lot and Job and other saints.’” The angel tells Paul that “ ‘[a]ll those who have given hospitality to strangers’ are brought forth to this city and greeted by the righteous,” who say, “‘Because you have kept humanity and hospitality for strangers, come, receive an inheritance in the city of our God’ ” (quoted by Arterbury 2003, 369). Observing that Abraham, his wife, and his servant all make haste in preparing for their visitors, Origen remarks, as does Philo in § 109, that “in the house of a sage, no one is slow” (nullus piger est in domo sapientis; Hom. Gen. 4.1). The later Hellenistic Jewish writer of the Testament of Abraham, like Philo, also highlights Abraham’s hospitality (T. Ab. 1.1, 1.5, 20.15). Moreover, as Philo comments (Abr. 113), this source also notes that it is Sarah who first recognizes the visitors as angels (T. Ab. 6.1) (Arterbury 2003, 367–368, who lists T. Ab. 1.6 instead of 1.5; cf. Charlesworth 1983, 882). b Allegorical Interpretation, §§119–132 After Philo’s literal and ethical exegeses, which he offers together and calls “the literal interpretation” (ἡ ῥητὴ ἀπόδοσις; §119), the third, and longest, section (§§119–132) presents the allegorical exegesis. This is of great interest on vari-

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ous counts, including Philo’s ingenious solutions to why references to Abraham and Sarah’s visitors fluctuate between singular and plural, his notions about the “Father of all” and His Divine Powers, evidence of Platonic-Pythagorean influences on his discussion of numbers (see §122, with the comment on not only the multiplicity of numbers …), and his categorization of three classes of people (see the comment at §124 on three orders of human temperament). As so often in the case of allegorizing, the stimulus to allegory is provided by an anomaly in the text. In this case, in relating the words and actions of the (three) strangers, the biblical narrative switches inexplicably from the singular to the plural and back. (The narrative also switches from the divine to the human and back but Philo addresses this inconsistency in his literal and ethical interpretations; see §107, with the comment on what seemed to be human and the comment at §114 on the hospitality of the man.) Thus we have in LXX Gen the following: “God appeared to him” (18:1); “behold, three men stood in front of him” (18:2); “he said, ‘Lord, if I have found favor in your (s.) sight’ …” (18:3); “ ‘let them wash your (pl.) feet’” (18:4); “so he said [to Abraham], ‘Do as you have said’” (18:5). In 18:8 the subject describing the guests is again plural, but in 18:9– 10 we have: “He said to him, ‘Where is Sarah your wife?’ And he answered and said, ‘Behold, in the tent.’ He said, ‘I will surely return at this season next year, and Sarah your wife shall have a son.’” After this, in 18:13–14 and possibly but not certainly in 18:15 it is the Lord who is talking in the singular (see the comment at §112 on when they said). Interestingly, Philo waits until the end of his allegorization to acknowledge these textual anomalies, only some of which he cites and presents not as stimuli to allegorization but rather as proof-texts (§§131–132) for his prior interpretations. Regardless, the extraordinary series of vacillations between singular and plural, in Philo’s view, is put there by Moses to provoke us to thought. Philo’s solution to the puzzle is that God is both one and three and he (Philo) offers two explanations or ways of understanding this notion. First, the Deity, whom Philo calls “the Father of all” and “He who Is,” or “the Existent” (ὁ ὤν), can be apprehended as one if the soul has attained the summit of enlightenment possible for humans. Otherwise the Deity manifests Himself together with a pair of emanations, which Philo presents, with some apology for the crudeness of the image, as “shadows,” which are His “Powers” (δυνάμεις)—or at least His two chief Powers. These are known as the “Creative” and the “Kingly,” represented by the epithets “God” (θεός)—drawing on an etymology deriving from “establish” (τίθημι)—and “Lord” (κύριος)—based on the notion that the Creator rules what has been brought into being (§§119–121). In its most purified and transcendent state, “the mind that has vision” (ἡ ὁρατικὴ διάνοια) attains and receives the single appearance. When not yet initiated into the great mysteries, however,

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this mind perceives the divine through the activities or qualities represented by the Powers. This latter state of mind, though inferior, nonetheless belongs to what Philo calls “God-beloved opinion.” The former state, meanwhile, does not merely belong but is God-beloved opinion—and even more, is the truth (§§122–123a). Claiming to present his interpretation in more familiar terms, Philo now offers a slightly different approach (§§123b–130), in which he also describes the Powers somewhat differently, as the “Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) and the “Ruling” (ἀρχική), but also the “Kingly” (βασιλική), as before. Rather than focusing on the divine appearance as one or three, Philo instead adapts a motif about three classes of people (see the comment at § 124 on three orders of human temperament) and distinguishes among different motives of people as they relate to the divine. These motives are arranged in a hierarchy of worthiness but are all acceptable to God (§§124, 128–130). The highest is that of those who honor the Existent for Himself alone, whereas other people relate to the Deity through either His Beneficent or Ruling Powers, again according to their motives (§§124–125). Thus the second motive is that of those who are hoping to win blessings for themselves by their worship. Although humans are put off by such an approach, God welcomes all who turn to Him (§§ 126–127). This message is emphasized in a proclamation attributed to the Deity in which He declares that He accepts all worshippers regardless of their reasons for turning to Him. Here Philo introduces the third motive, that of those who fear punishment, and are hoping to avoid that. In this passage (§§ 128–130), the latter two stances are not strongly differentiated—they both fall short of the highest, totally disinterested motive. Those inspired by these inferior two motives thus do not attain the status of “friends of God” (cf. § 129), but they seem both to be more or less equally acceptable to Him. (See further Excursus 2, “Philo on Motivations for Serving the Divine.”) Finally, as noted earlier, Philo finds support for these interpretations about God and His two Powers in the anomalies of the literal text (§§131–132; see the comment at §131 on not only from the allegorical treatment …). Both ways of understanding these anomalies, then, present God as a trinity, though of a rather different nature to the later Christian trinity, all of whose members are alike in dignity, though differentiated as to function (see, e.g., Augustine, Trin. 2.11.20; Arterbury 2003, 371; and the section on Nachleben at the end of this chapter). The origin of Philo’s concept of the two chief Powers of God is by no means clear. We may note that in the Pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo, probably of the first century BCE, we find mention of the δύναμις of God, which goes through all the universe, where it is not fitting that God Himself should go, but that is only a single entity, more like the Stoic Logos—of

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which Philo also makes much use. This pair of functions for the Powers—the Creative and the Kingly—is quite distinctive, and may simply arise from an imaginative meditation on the two habitual titles of God in the Scriptures, θεός and κύριος. Philo’s alternative characterization of the Powers as “Beneficent” and “Ruling” have a parallel in rabbinic ideas about the divine middot, or “measures”; interestingly these are also associated with the two divine names, but the rabbinic association to the names is the reverse of that of Philo (see the comment at §121 on the Creative Power … and Excursus 1, “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers”). Detailed Comments § 119. So much then for the literal exegesis. Philo’s formulae of transition from the literal to the allegorical level of exegesis are various, as we have seen (cf. §§68 and 99 above). The contrast is most commonly between τὸ ῥητόν and τὸ ἀλληγορικόν, or τὸ δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν (using the more Platonic phrase), as here. (In this passage, Philo uses the feminine noun ἀπόδοσις, “exegesis,” and adapts the descriptions accordingly.) As he does on occasion, in §§ 114–118 Philo tacks what we have termed an “ethical” interpretation onto the literal one but does not include a formal label (see also, e.g., §§142–146, 178–199, and the Introduction, §4). In the present passage, however, he does introduce all three interpretations—the literal, ethical, and allegorical—in a similar fashion: τὸ μὲν οὖν … §§107, 114; τὰ μὲν οὖν … §119; all followed by δέ clauses. In these transitional passages, Philo briefly refers to what he has just presented before turning to his next topic (cf. §§48, 52, 60, 147, 167, 208, 236, 275). Words uttered are symbols. For this and similar sentiments, cf. Migr. 89; Spec. 3.178; Contempl. 78. This conviction is the foundation of Philo’s approach to allegorical interpretation. when the soul is illuminated by God. Because one light source can cast only one shadow, the imagery here is somewhat perplexing. The idea, however, seems to be that, if one is standing out in the noonday sun (at least as far south as Alexandria!), this one source of light can be seen to cast, not one, but two shadows. In that connection, it seems better to read τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ κεχυμένας αὐγὰς ἀσκίους δέχηται, as suggested by L. Cohn, for the ταῖς ἐν κύκλῳ κεχυμέναις αὐγαῖς ἄσκιος γένηται of the mss. Keeping the mss. reading at least involves altering the accusatives τὰς … κεχυμένας αὐγὰς ἀσκίους to datives, and seems to convey an erroneous impression that “free of shadow” (ἄσκιος) refers to the soul or the individual standing in the sunlight, rather than to the sun’s rays. as if with noonday sun. Philo takes advantage of the LXX specificity about when Abraham received his guests to use the imagery of sun and shadows at noon. See the comment at §107 on in the noonday. Cf. Deo 2.

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intelligible light … perceptible light. Philo draws on Plato’s analogy between the sun (perceptible light) and the good (intelligible light) in The Republic (6.506d–509b) and applies this analogy to perception of the divine. they often cast two shadows at the same time. That Philo should speak of two shadows appearing in the realm of perceptible light, presumably from one light source, is no less puzzling than his application of this imagery to the intelligible realm (see the comment on this passage, just above, on when the soul is illuminated by God …). On Philo’s use of the imagery of light generally, see Arnaldez 1963 and Nikiprowetzky 1989. §120. the misuse of a word. Philo here makes use of the concept of κατάχρησις to refer to the analogical application of a word to a context where it cannot be taken literally, and so to that extent is “misused.” In the present context, Philo is speaking about κατάχρησις in relation to his analogy between the image of light and shadows and his ideas about God and His Powers. The term κατάχρησις is attributed already to Aristotle by Cicero (Orator 27.94), but it becomes common, at least in surviving texts, only in the second century CE and later. Philo uses it, or its corresponding adjective or adverb, καταχρηστικός or καταχρηστικῶς, elsewhere at least eleven times, e.g., Cher. 121; Mut. 13; Somn. 1.229 (noun, opp. “truth” [ἀλήθεια]); Leg. 2.10 (adverb, opp. “properly” [κυρίως]). Either of these (noun or adverb) is extremely rarely attested in surviving authors earlier than Philo—e.g., Philochorus, frag. 178a (Jacoby 1964, 9:149); Strabo 7.7.11 (καταχρηστικῶς); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Comp. 3.46 and 63 (κατάχρησις)—but this is doubtless a function of the paucity of surviving texts. See also Manuel Alexandre, Jr. 1998, esp. 44, and Runia 1988. §121. the Father of all. One of Philo’s many expressions for the Deity. In this allegorical interpretation Philo also calls the Deity “the Existent” (ὁ ὤν [masc.], §§121, 125; or τὸ ὄν [neuter], §122); “the truly Existent” (§ 124; masc. or neuter), “the Father” (§125) and “God” (the last, despite his explanation that this term is reserved for the Creative Power rather than the Supreme Being; see § 127 and the comment on God … gladly welcomes). See also QG 4.12 in relation to this episode from Gen 18. His proper name, He who Is. Here Philo uses the masculine (ὁ ὤν), rather than the neuter (τὸ ὄν)—which he also uses on occasion, e.g., in § 122 (see the previous comment); Deus 11 (κατὰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν μονάδα, τὸ ὄντως ὄν); Somn. 1.230 (juxtaposed with ὁ ὤν); Post. 28. On this divine name, expressed in LXX Exod 3:14, see also the comment at §76 on the beams pouring out … Earlier Philo discusses another name for the Deity from Exod 3:15; see § 51 and the comments on “For this,” He says, “is my eternal name” and substituting for an absolute title a relative one. See also Siegert’s comment on Deo 4 (1998, 12), discussed in the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis, toward the end of this chapter.

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His senior Powers … The use of the epithet “senior” (πρεσβύταται) is an indication that Philo also envisages other Powers of God that are not brought into the discussion here, but it is not clear how firmly he is wedded to the concept of a fixed number of Powers. In Fug. 94–105, for example, we find a more elaborate system of five Powers, but this number is tied to the exegesis of the five cities of refuge of Num 35:9–15, and the latter three, the Merciful, the Legislative, and the Forbidding, are really little more than aspects of the two chief Powers. See also the next comment and Excursus 1, “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers.” The Creative Power is called “God” … and the Kingly, “Lord.” Philo here alludes to a traditional etymology according to which “God” (θεός), derives from the verb “to establish” (τίθημι), and thus is a fitting name for the Creative Power; see also Conf. 137; Mos. 2.99; Spec. 1.307. Herodotus (2.52) ascribes this etymology to ancient times. Later in this passage (§§124, 125, 129), Philo also calls the “Creative” Power (ποιητική) the “Beneficial” (εὐεργέτις), and the “Kingly” Power (βασιλική), the “Ruling One” (ἀρχική; §124). Elsewhere the two senior Powers are also given the titles of “Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) and “Punitive” (κολαστήριος), when Philo wishes to sharpen the contrast between the “positive” and “negative” aspects of God’s administration; cf. Spec. 1.307 and below, at § 145, à propos dealing with the Sodomites; in Legat. 6–7, these two descriptions are applied to an even broader range of Divine Powers. See too Excursus 1, “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers.” for it is right and proper for the one that creates to rule … Cf. Philo’s occasional observation about divine providence that the Maker should care for what He has made; Opif. 8–9, 171–172; Spec. 3.189; Praem. 42; cf. Ebr. 13. §122. escorted as he is by each of His Powers. The word “escorted” (δορυφορούμενος) embodies a metaphor which may go back to Plato (cf. Resp. 9.573a; Tim. 70b), but may also show the influence of the Pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo 398a. It (or the noun δορύφορος) is frequently used by Philo in connection with God and His Powers; cf. e.g. Sacr. 59; Spec. 1.45; Legat. 6; see also Munnich 2013. the mind endowed with vision. The adjective ὁρατικός is favored by Philo to describe the faculty of spiritual sight; cf., e.g., Plant. 36; Mut. 258; Ebr. 107. Although the phrase here appears to refer to any mind that is able to “see,” Philo often uses ὁρατικός in relation to the name “Israel,” whose etymology he understands as “one who sees God.” See §57 with the comment on “Israel …” and Birnbaum 1996, 91–127. now of one, and now of three. Here Philo alludes to the exegetical difficulty— namely, the perplexing variation between the singular and plural subjects in the description of Abraham’s visitors—that gives rise to his creative allegorical interpretation. In §§131–132, he quotes from specific verses to illustrate the confusion; see also the comment at §131 on not only from the allegorical treatment …

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not only the multiplicity of numbers … Here Philo seems to be working with a distinctly “neo-Pythagorean,” mathematicized version of Platonism—such as would be propounded by members of the Old Academy like Speusippus and Xenocrates, but also, more recently, by Eudorus of Alexandria—according to which the forms are regarded as archetypal numbers, subordinate to a primal pair of Monad and Dyad. In Eudorus’s system, even the Monad which is paired with the Dyad is transcended by a supreme One, and in this (Abr.) passage there seems to be some hint of this last concept (though Philo’s language is less than clear) in his talk of “press[ing on] to that form [ἰδέα, used loosely] which is unmixed and unconnected and on its own” (see the next comment). It is not made quite clear whether one is “pressing on” beyond the Monad or simply to the Monad, but it would not suit Philo very well to make a distinction between Monad and One, unless he could identify the Monad with God’s Logos, which is an entity that he is not making use of here. unmixed and unconnected. The collocution ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀσύμπλοκος is a nice example of the Philonic habit of yoking a relatively common word, whether adjective, noun or verb, with a much less common one. In this case “unconnected” (ἀσύμπλοκος) seems to be unique in the corpus. It is found in later Gnostic and Christian sources (e.g., Ptolemy in his Letter to Flora; Cyril of Alexandria), but never prior to Philo. not yet initiated into the great mysteries … Mystery imagery, involving the contrast between the greater and the lesser mysteries, is popular with Philo, cf., e.g., Sacr. 62; Leg. 3.100; Cher. 49. Here he uses this imagery to argue that the divine appearance as one or three corresponds to the spiritual capacity of the mind. §123. a “second-best method of sailing.” In Greek, δεύτερος πλοῦς. This is a proverbial Greek expression for the second-best alternative solution to a problem, or “Plan B” (originally referring to the use of oars rather than sail, when the wind fails), but Philo will have borrowed it from Plato, e.g., Phaed. 99d; Phileb. 19c. Philo elaborates on the phrase in Somn. 1.44 and also employs it at Decal. 84 and Somn. 1.180. The former mode. That is, the perception of the Divine as one rather than three. or rather it is a truth which is prior to opinion. Here Philo corrects himself, in a thoroughly Platonic spirit, for using the expression “God-beloved opinion” (θεοφιλὴς δόξα); cf. Praem. 27. On the distinction between opinion and knowledge, see, e.g., Resp. 5.476d–480a; Theaet. 200d–201c. in terms more easily understood. Philo now shifts to what is essentially another interpretation. As in the first interpretation, the three guests are understood as the Existent and His two Powers, but now these Powers are called

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“Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) rather than “Creative” (ποιητική) and “Ruling” (ἀρχική) as well as “Kingly” (βασιλική). In the prior interpretation (§§ 119–123a), the human mind, depending on its spiritual capacity, perceives an appearance of either one or three. In the interpretation that Philo is about to present, humans, depending on their motive, either perceive the Existent Himself or approach Him through one of His two Powers, which represent different functions or qualities. §124. three orders of human temperament. In Greek, τρεῖς … ἠθῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τάξεις. This reference to the “three orders of humans” has a counterpart in another three-way distinction that is aired in Gig. 60–61, between the earthborn, the heaven-born, and the God-born. In that typology, the earth-born favor the pleasures of the body; the heaven-born, characterized by the heavenly element of the intellect, are engaged in matters of the arts, knowledge, and learning; and the God-born are portrayed as mere sojourners in this realm of existence, their true home being in the divine realm, where they contemplate the forms. Here (Abr. 124), by contrast, Philo distinguishes between motivations for worship (see also the Analysis/General Comments above, for §§ 119–132, and Excursus 2, “Philo on Motivations for Serving the Divine”). The motif of three classes of people can be found in other thinkers as well; cf. Dillon 1989. the one on the right. On the significance of the right side, see, e.g., Legat. 95. the Beneficent, whose name is “God.” For the etymological rationale of this, see the comment at §121 on the Creative Power … Because of the relationship between τίθημι and the act of establishing, the etymology goes better with “God” (θεός) as the Creative Power than as the Beneficent. See also Excursus 1, “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers.” the Ruling one. Here Philo uses ἀρχική rather than βασιλική, which he uses in §§121 and 125. §125. the Existent. See §121 and the comments on the Father of all and His proper name … striving … presented and made known. Philo describes the single-minded worshipper as actively striving, while the other two types are more passively presented and made known to the Deity. single-mindedly towards the honoring of the One. The Greek μοναδικῶς embodies more of a pun than is conveyed by the English “single-mindedly.” Philo seems here to be implying that those who strive directly towards the One (it is unclear whether the genitive ἑνός is intended to be neuter or masculine) are somehow already “monadic” in temperament—that is to say, thoroughly rational, enlightened, and having but one aim, namely, to honor the One. the Father. Philo uses an abstract term (“the One”) to describe the Deity honored by the single-minded worshipper. When speaking about the Deity

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honored by the other two types of people, he uses “Father,” a more relational term. See also §121, with comment on the Father of all, and § 51, with the comments on “For this,” He says, “is my eternal name” and substituting for an absolute title a relative one. §126. What I mean. Philo’s use of the first person may indicate that this interpretation is original to him. Cf. §113, in which he similarly speaks in the first person, with comment ad loc. on at this point … on the pretext of friendship, but in eager pursuit of advantage. People in antiquity were keenly attuned to the difference between a friend and a flatterer. Plutarch (1st–2nd century CE), for example, composed a treatise on how to tell the difference between a flatterer and a friend; see Weitzman 2005, 55–78, esp. 67–75; Sterling 1997. For “advantage,” Philo uses πλεονεξία, which also has the sense of “overreaching.” In The Republic (e.g., 1.343d, 349b; 2.359c), Socrates associates this quality with the unjust person. As a prominent member of the Alexandrian Jewish community, Philo may well be speaking too from personal experience here. bogus flattery and cozening. The collocution κολακεία καὶ τιθασεία does not occur elsewhere in the corpus. The latter term, the rare one of the pair, is a word that generally elsewhere has a positive meaning, “taming,” or “domestication,” e.g., in Migr. 211, where it is paired with the synonym ἡμέρωσις. §127. God … gladly welcomes all who choose to honor Him … This very positive view of God’s acceptance of human worship is not particularly remarkable, but the specifically triadic distinction among motives that Philo sets out here seems unique to this context. (See Excursus 2, “Philo on Motivations for Worship of the Divine.”) It is interesting that Philo uses “God” for the highest being, since this name is also used for the Creative, Beneficent Power. Here Philo attributes God’s openness to His being invulnerable and His deeming it proper not to reject anyone; in §129 Philo also attributes the openness to God’s belief that the people will be improved through worship, however they might come to it. He virtually proclaims. Philo here inserts an imagined speech by God. While the speech suits Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Gen 18:1–15, it has no foundation in the scriptural passage itself, but is simply an instance of Philo’s use of the rhetorical device of προσωποποιία, which he employs elsewhere with varying degrees of relatedness to Scripture; see, e.g., § 71 on Gen 12:1, with the comment on the holy word addresses him, and the Introduction, §9a. For another example, in which God addresses Moses when Moses wishes to see Him, see Spec. 1.41–50 on Exod 33:12–23. For the phrase “all but directly” (μόνον οὐκ ἄντικρυς), see §31 and the comment on proclaiming all but directly.

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to those who have ears in their soul. Philo’s reference to the ears of the soul is noteworthy. For a similar expression that appears together with the preceding words (“He virtually proclaims”; see the previous comment), see Virt. 147, which has ὦτα for “ears” instead of ἀκοαί. In attributing organs of sense to the soul, Philo usually speaks about the eye, or eyes; see, e.g., the comment on the eye of his soul at §58; Conf. 100 (“the eye of the understanding”); Spec. 3.6 (“the eyes of the soul”; our trans.). See also Spec. 1.272, where the “mind” (νοητή) assumes the function of organs of speech—i.e., tongue and lips—to praise God, who alone can hear their thanksgiving with “the divine ear” (οὖς θεῖον; our trans.). §128. highest rewards … the secondary ones. Philo again uses athletic imagery. See e.g., §38, with the comment on the second prize. those who honor me for myself alone. Cf. the saying attributed to Antigonus of Sokho (3rd or 2nd century BCE) in m. Avot 1.3: “Be not like servants who minister to their master upon the condition of receiving a reward; but be like servants who minister to their master without the condition of receiving a reward …” (trans. Hertz 1945, 14–17). See also Excursus 2, “Philo on Motivations for Serving the Divine.” either hoping to gain benefits or looking to find release from punishments. Cf. Spec. 1.299–300, in which, on the basis of Deut 10:12, Philo mentions the motives of love and fear and regards love as superior to fear. In our Abr. passage, Philo adds the impulse to serve God for Himself alone as a third category. On these and other Philonic references to motivations for serving the Divine, see Excursus 2, “Philo on Motivations for Worship of the Divine.” it falls within the precincts of the divine. The expression ἐντὸς εἱλεῖται θείων περιβόλων is not paralleled elsewhere in Philo, περίβολος in other cases having only its literal meaning of “enclosure.” §129. friendship. Cf. §273, in which Philo calls Abraham a friend of God; for additional such “friends,” see Sacr. 130; Migr. 45; Somn. 1.193–196. See too Sterling 1997, esp. 215–218. the one who in fear propitiates my ruling and dominant authority … Here the connection of the Ruling Power with punishment is brought out more explicitly than hitherto. Elsewhere, the whole realm below the moon is given over to this Power, presenting an almost Gnostic scenario, in which two separate realms appear to be governed by two different entities. This is what we find at QG 4.8, for example, where “the kingly (power) (is the cause) of sublunary things, those that (are subject to) change and alteration because they participate in generation and corruption.” By contrast, the Creative Power presides over the heavenly regions. The distinction between the two realms may owe something to the speculations of Xenocrates (cf. Dillon 2003, 123– 128).

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§130. one aim and purpose, to serve me. On Philo’s use of τέλος—“aim,” or “goal”—in relation to the patriarchs, see §49 and the comment on one and the same goal. §131. essentially. We have used this to render δυνάμει, but it is a somewhat peculiar use of the term, so much so that L. Cohn suspects it of being corrupt. However, in Philo’s mind, the three entities are simply “an appearance” (φαντασία) of the reality which is the One, so the usage is appropriate. See also Colson, PLCL 6:68 n. 1. Cf. §81 and the comment there on In the vocalization. not only from the allegorical treatment, but also from the literal text. By quoting from Gen 18:3 and 10, in which Abraham addresses his three visitors in the singular and a singular figure responds, Philo finally makes explicit the peculiarity in the text that led him to postulate his allegory. In this common practice of offering proof-texts, one is given the impression that the interpretation comes first, whereas it is the text that commonly gives rise to the interpretation. For another Philonic use of a proof-text, see § 77 and the comment on “And God was seen by Abraham.” Whatever the original reason for this extraordinary succession of variations between singular and plural references in this chapter of Genesis (amalgamation of two traditions, perhaps?), Philo certainly is presented with an excellent stimulus to allegorization. §132. once again it is a single figure. Here Philo refers to the single figure in Gen 18:10 as proof of his allegorical interpretation that the triple appearance is really one. In his literal interpretation, however, he suggests another possible reason for the singular speaker; see §110 and the comment on the best of them. at this season next year. We may note Philo’s silent alteration of the LXX Gen 18:10 εἰς ὥρας, which is indeed strange Greek for “next year,” to εἰς νέωτα. The LXX is translating the Hebrew idiom, kaʿet ḥayah, which has been understood differently as, e.g., “in due season,” (NRSV), “next year,” (NJPS), “when life would be due.” Speiser, who offers the last translation, comments that the Hebrew phrase literally means “‘at about a life’s interval,’ ” or after the duration of the time of pregnancy (Speiser [1964], 130). In Migr. 126 and QG 4.12 and 18, however, Philo uses the LXX reading εἰς ὥρας; see also Marcus, PLCL suppl. 1:285 n. e at QG 4.12; and the discussion by Royse (2008, 163– 164). Excursus 1: Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers Through his conception of Divine Powers, Philo is able, among other things, to address matters pertaining to divine revelation and divine activity vis-à-vis the created world. Generally speaking, his notions about these Powers are fairly flexible and he adapts his remarks to fit particular exegetical contexts. Thus, in the Abr. passage above (§§119–125), he presents the idea that God has two chief

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Powers in order to account for the scriptural variation between one and three with reference to Abraham’s visitors. He also mentions these two chief Powers, however, in other exegetical contexts (e.g., Cher. 27–28; Mos. 2.97–100; and QE 2.62, regarding the two Cherubim in Exod 25; and Sacr. 59–60 and QG 4.8, regarding Abraham’s instructions to Sarah in Gen 18:6 to take three measures of flour and make ash-cakes). Occasionally he speaks vaguely of several Powers, as in Abr. 59 (cf. Spec. 1.45–50) or mentions other specific numbers, as in Fug. 94–105, where he cites five Powers, which correspond to five cities of refuge (the sixth being the Logos); see Num 35:9–15. Sometimes Philo attributes specific characteristics to each of these Powers, as in our Abr. passage, discussed below, or in Fug. 94–105, but he can also categorize them rather loosely as beneficial or punitive, as in Legat. 6–7. Several points about Philo’s presentation in §§ 119–125 merit closer attention. In §121, Philo refers to the function of each Power as the “Creative,” or ποιητική, and the “Kingly,” or βασιλική, and he associates these functions, respectively, with the two names of God, θεός and κύριος. As Philo explains, the name θεός suits the creative function because of this word’s connection with “to establish” (τίθημι) and κύριος fits the kingly function because of the word’s meaning as “lord” or “master” (cf. Mos. 2.99; Spec. 1.307). In § 124, Philo further speaks of these Powers as the “Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) and the “Ruling” (ἀρχική). Rabbinic sources may offer an important context in which to understand Philo’s associations with the divine names. The rabbis also recognize two sets of divine qualities, or “measures”—in Hebrew, middot—which they too associate with the two divine names. In an earlier Palestinian tradition, just as in Philo, the rabbis identify a beneficent quality—middat tovah—and a punitive one—middat puranut. Later these qualities came to be known as middat haraḥamim, “the measure, or attribute, of mercy,” and middat hadin, “the measure, or attribute, of justice,” and the rabbis associated each measure with one of the divine names. Their association, however, was the reverse of Philo’s—that is, the quality of mercy was linked with the Tetragrammaton—in Greek, κύριος, or “Lord”—and the quality of justice was linked with the name Elohim—in Greek, θεός, or “God.” To add to the intricacy of the issue, Philo too speaks of God and His Powers as “measures”—in Greek, μέτρα (Sacr. 59–60 and QG 4.8). The rabbinic choice of the word middot and Philo’s symbolization of measures in relation to divine attributes may be merely a coincidence. Regarding Opif. 23, however, D. Runia (2004a, 273) offers some interesting and possibly relevant observations, which deserve our consideration. Runia translates the Opif. passage as follows:

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[God] does not confer his blessings in proportion to the size of his own powers of beneficence—for these are indeed without limit and infinitely great—but rather in proportion to the capacities of those who receive them. The fact is that what comes into existence is unable to accommodate those benefits to the extent that God is able to confer them, since God’s powers are overwhelming, whereas the recipient is too weak to sustain the size of them and would collapse were it not that he measured them accordingly, dispensing with fine tuning to each thing its allotted portion. As Runia observes, “What is fascinating about this text is that the notion of divine power is linked to the theme of measurement. If God’s goodness were not measured out, creation would not be able to accommodate it …” (2004a, 273). We cannot know whether or not such a view of God’s power as needing to be measured underlies the rabbinic term middot or Philo’s own use of μέτρα in Sacr. 59–60 and QG 4.8. The notion, however, is certainly intriguing. (To be clear, Runia himself does not explicitly suggest, as we have done, that there may be a connection between these terms and the ideas expressed in Opif. 23.) Despite differences between the rabbinic and Philonic discussions, the similarities between them are notable indeed. As H.A. Wolfson (1982, 1.226) judiciously remarks, “[I]t is not unreasonable to assume that the two classes of ‘powers’ in Philo and the two classes of ‘measures’ in [rabbinic sources] are somehow connected and, if neither of them is dependent upon the other, they may reflect a common tradition.” For more on Philo’s conception of Divine Powers and/or its possible relationship to rabbinic tradition, see Termini 2000; Runia 2003 and 2004a; H.A. Wolfson, 1982, 1:217–226; Dahl and Segal 1978; Marmorstein 1932; G.F. Moore 1971, 1:386–400; Sandmel 1971:20–22. Excursus 2: Philo on Motivations for Serving the Divine Abr. 126–130 is one of several passages in which Philo discusses different motivations for serving God; other passages include Deus 69; Spec. 1.299–300; and QE 2.21. Unlike these other passages, which mention but two motivations, our discussion in Abr. presents three. It is interesting that Philo’s discussions appear at least once in each of his exegetical series; strikingly, moreover, each passage contains a different “trigger” that gives rise to the topic. Below we will consider each of these other passages and briefly compare them to Abr. 126– 130. In Deus 69, Philo concludes a disquisition about two principles related to the Divine: “God is not like a person” (LXX Num 23:19) and “God is like a person,”

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based on Deut 8:5 (“And you will know in your heart that just as if some person should chasten his son, so the Lord your God will chasten you”) (see Deus 53– 54). Philo applies the latter principle to understand threats expressed or anger shown by the Deity as a means of providing discipline through fear to those who require it (Deus 64). In conclusion, Philo writes, And therefore it seems to me that with the two aforesaid maxims, ‘God is as a man,’ and ‘God is not as a man,’ he has linked two other principles closely connected and consequent on them, namely fear and love. For I observe that all the exhortations to piety in the law refer either to our loving or our fearing the Existent. And thus to love Him is the most suitable for those into whose conception of the Existent no thought of human parts or passions enters, who pay Him the honour meet for God for His own sake only. To fear is most suitable to the others. Deus 69; cf. Somn. 1.237, where Deut 8:5 similarly represents obedience to the commandments because of a motive of fear. See also Novick 2009; Kamesar 1998.

Here, Philo names the two motives of love and fear. He also identifies love with those who honor God for Himself alone, a way of thinking that accords with the description in Abr. 128–129 of those who receive the “highest rewards” of “friendship” (φιλία). Although Philo does not specifically cite “love” (ἀγάπη) in Abr., his description in Deus 69 of those who honor God for Himself alone is similar enough that we can regard these motivations as identical. In both passages, moreover, Philo views the motive of love (or the honoring of God for Himself) as superior to the motive of fear. Missing from the Deus passage but present in Abr. is a third motivation of obtaining benefits. Spec. 1.299–300 includes a restatement of LXX Deut 10:12, which reads as follows: “And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you but to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him …” In Spec. 1.299– 300, Philo renders the biblical injunction by saying that what God requires is not difficult but rather “quite simple and easy. And this is just to love Him as a benefactor, or failing this to fear Him at least as a ruler and lord …” Where Deut 10:12 calls for Israel equally to fear and love the Lord, then, in Spec. 1.299–300 Philo places love above fear, as he does in Abr. 126–130. His comments about God as a benefactor and ruler/lord also parallel Philo’s description in our Abr. passage of the two Divine Powers, the Beneficent and the Ruling. Additionally, in Spec. 1.299–300, Philo associates love with God’s beneficence and fear with his rulership. In Abr. 129, however, through God’s imagined proclamation, Philo does not speak about love with regard to the Beneficent Power but instead links the Beneficent Power with the worshipper who hopes for something positive.

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As in Spec. 1.300, though, in Abr. 129 Philo too mentions fear in relation to the Ruling Power. Finally, in QE 2.21, Philo also speaks about the motives of love and fear in the context of interpreting Exod 23:27: Why does He say, ‘Fear will I send to go before thee’? The literal meaning is clear, for a strong force to terrify the enemy is fear, by which more (easily) the force of adversaries is taken and conquered. But as for the deeper meaning, there are two reasons why men honour the Deity, (namely) love and fear, and love is later, being in the elder ones, while fear comes earlier, so that not ineptly is it said that fear is the leader, for love, which comes after, is also acquired later. And may it not be that one who fears does so rightly and properly? For just as imprudence is younger than prudence, so is fear (younger) than love, since fear is born in a worthless man, while love (is born) in a virtuous one. As in the other passages just discussed, in this one too, Philo regards the motive of love more highly than that of fear. Again, he does not mention here the third motivation, found in Abr. 128–129, of gaining benefits. Since elsewhere Philo speaks of only two motivations, love and fear, he seems to have constructed the threefold motivational schema in Abr. specifically—and uniquely—to fit the exegetical context of Abraham’s three visitors in Gen 18. In presenting all of these motivations, Philo may have been reflecting traditional Jewish beliefs, because the rabbis too refer to love and fear as reasons that influence people to worship the Lord and they (the rabbis) also regard love as the higher motive (e.g., Sifrei Deut. 32; b. Sotah 31a; see also G.F. Moore 1971, 2:89–100; Urbach 1987, 400–419; Amir 1965 and 1983). A particularly interesting rabbinic parallel is found in Ethics of the Fathers (m. Avot 1.3), in a saying attributed to Antigonus of Sokho (quoted in part in our comment at §128 on those who worship me for myself alone): “Be not like servants who minister to their master upon the condition of receiving a reward; but be like servants who minister to their master without the condition of receiving a reward; and let the fear of Heaven be upon you” (trans. Hertz, 1945, 14–17). As we have seen, serving God without the condition of receiving a reward—i.e., serving Him for Himself—seems to be equivalent to serving Him out of love. Although the saying attributed to Antigonus mentions only two approaches—serving on condition of being rewarded or not—the passage ends by alluding to fear. One senses, however, that rather than referring to a fear of punishment, the exhortation is instead to an attitude of reverence.

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Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s perception of the Divine shares details and images in common with the fragmentary work De Deo (preserved in Armenian) and with several sections of QG 4. In Deo, interpreting phrases from Gen 18:2 (“when he looked up with his eyes, he saw”; “three men stood above him”), Philo observes that when “Being” (ὁ ὤν or τὸ ὄν) makes an appearance, “it produces a beam without shadow which enlightens the entire soul” (§ 1; Siegert 1998, 4; cf. Abr. 119). Commenting on this description, Siegert cites Spec. 4.192—which also mentions “unclouded rays” (ἄσκιοι αὐγαί) in reference to the high priest’s clear, noetic apprehension of the unseen—and Aet. 86. The latter passage presents Stoic distinctions regarding fire, according to which αὐγή, “the most subtle fire, would be a synonym of God” (Siegert 1998, 9). Philo also remarks on “those whose entire soul is filled as it were with midday light” (§ 2; Siegert 1998, 4; cf. Abr. 119). Later in Deo Philo speaks of Being as surrounded by His Powers, who are “heads of armies and archangels” (§3), but also as situated between two bodyguards called “God” and “Lord,” the former symbolizing the creative and the latter, royal virtues (§4; cf. §12); see also Siegert’s comments on “his two body guards [sic]” (1998, 14; cf. 32). In Deo 5, Philo identifies these with the Powers and the two Cherubim of Exod 25:22 [21]. Significantly, in § 4 when Philo refers to ὁ ὤν, he comments that “this name ‘Being’ is not His own and proper name” (οὐκ ὄνομα … ἴδιον καὶ κύριον, as suggested by Siegert 1998, 12; cf. Terian 2016, 79 n. 5). Since, in Abr. 121, Philo does indeed call this God’s “proper name” (κύριον ὄνομα), Siegert takes this statement in Deo as an indication that in Abr. 121, Philo “was not apparently as far advanced” (1998, 12). It is possible, however, that in Abr. 121, Philo is simply citing Scripture and does not wish to distract from his interpretation of the triple vision. See too the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis in Chapter 5 on §§48–59. For more on Deo, see Siegert 1988; Terian 2016; and Calabi 2008, 73–109. Several passages in QG 4 also include images and themes similar to those in Abr., but consistent with the genre of QGE, these appear in segmented interpretations rather than an integrated whole. In QG 4.1 on Gen 18:1–2 regarding the appearance of God, Philo, using light imagery like that in Abr., maintains that God caused “to shine forth, as it were, a certain radiance” and, further, caused it “to shine around the whole soul.” Moreover, Philo picks up on the detail that the vision occurred at midday when “the light is purer and more luminous” and comments that the rays were “without shadow.” In QG 4.2, concerning the appearance of the three men, Philo remarks that this appearance can be of both one and three because the Divine with His chief Powers, the Creative and Kingly, appear as three to the human mind,

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which “cannot be so keen of sight that it can see Him who is above the powers … distinct from anything else.” Later, when Abraham opened all the eyes of his soul “so that he was altogether an eye,” he perceived “the single appearance … as a triad, and the triad as a unity” (for another reference to this vision see also QG 4.20). In QG 4.4 Philo uses light imagery and mentions the shift from the triadic to the unified vision. He speaks in QG 4.8 of a similar variation in vision but here, in an interpretation of Abraham’s instructions to Sarah to “mix three measures of wheat-flour and make ash-cakes” (LXX Gen 18:6). At the end of QG 4.8, Philo remarks that the ash-cakes signify the hiddenness of the understanding of God and His Powers; cf. QG 4.35. For a similar interpretation of these ash-cakes, see Sacr. 59–60; see too Abr. 108, with the comment on three servings of ash-baked cakes. See also Moreau 2015. In QG 4.30, Philo makes an interesting comparison between Abraham, the perfect man, and his nephew Lot, the progressive one who has a vision of only two angels at evening (Gen 19:1). Thus Lot’s encounter takes place without the “most radiant” midday light and he sees only the two Powers without the Father. Similarly, the angels refuse Lot’s hospitality (Gen 19:2), since he is an imperfect man, but they accept the hospitality of Abraham, the perfect one who is beloved of God (QG 4.33; cf. Abr. 129 regarding φιλία, or “friendship,” between God and His worshippers). Finally in QG 4.12, Philo refers to the reason that the promise of a child was expressed by a singular subject, for “it is not men but the Father of all whom he imagines to have come with His powers” (cf. Abr. 110 and the comments on through one of the three, the best of them, and for it would have been contrary to philosophy). Nachleben Later, Christian interpreters of Abraham’s three visitors as members of a Holy Trinity appear to have been influenced by Philo’s allegorization of these visitors as God and His Powers. In his article “Early Christian Interpretations of the Three Angels in Gen. 18,” L. Thunberg discerns in Christian sources three approaches according to which the three figures were understood as three angels, as God and two angels, or as a trinity of divine figures. According to Thunberg, Philo’s interpretation in Abr. of the three figures may have provided a foundation for this last, trinitarian understanding, which is found in Origen, Cyril of Alexandria, Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, Pseudo-Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Maximus. For further discussion and specific references, see Thunberg 1966, esp. 565–569; Arterbury 2003, 370–371 (on Augustine, Trin. 2.11.20); also Kugel 1998, 342. Although these later writers have specifically

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Christian understandings of the three figures and Philo does not, Philo may have set the pattern of viewing all three as somehow divine. Since we mentioned just above in the Parallel Philonic Exegesis that in QG 4.30, Philo compares the visions received by Abraham and Lot, even though he does not make this comparison in Abr., let us also note here that Origen makes this comparison as well, both with regard to the number of entities seen and the time of day of the vision (Hom. Gen. 4.1). Significantly, the first Jewish reference that we know of to Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s three visitors is found in Azariah de’ Rossi’s Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes), in which he writes: In his works On the Cherubim [27–28], On the Life of Moses [2.99–100], and On Abraham, he states that Abraham’s vision of the three men standing before him signifies the three names of the blessed Lord—i.e., the tetragrammaton which denotes true existence because there is none comparable to Him; Elohim, the name of Godship which denotes that He is the propagator of all created beings; Adonai, the name of Lordship which denotes that it is He who oversees their existence. He makes it very clear, however, that we must believe in the blessed Lord as a complete unity dissociated from any form of corporeality which is what all the children of Israel believe whose ways are perfect. Weinberg 2001, 114–115

(The above references to Cher. and Mos. 2 are actually to interpretations of the Cherubim; see Excursus 1 above on “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers.”)

Chapter 9: The Destruction of the Sodomite Cities, §§ 133–166 a

Literal and Ethical Interpretations, §§133–146 Analysis/General Comments Philo now turns to the tale of the destruction of the Sodomites, as relayed in Gen 18:16–19:29—though with all mention of Lot suppressed (he is reserved for a later section, §§208–224, as an illustration of Abraham’s “love of humanity” [φιλανθρωπία]). More surprising, also suppressed is nearly all mention of Abraham, who boldly endeavors to spare the Sodomites from destruction by bargaining with the Lord (Gen 18:16–33). We will consider possible reasons for these omissions below. In his literal exegesis (§§133–141), Philo dwells at length, in his best diatribe mode, on the wickedness of the Sodomites—a wickedness spawned from the

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very prosperity and good natural resources that they enjoyed in the region of Syria-Palestine of that time (not, of course, the region of Philo’s own time, which bore the marks of its destruction!). Their very prosperity in turn provoked the “greed and lustfulness” (γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία) with which they were afflicted (§§133–134). Indeed this prosperity led to the Sodomites’ casting off the law of nature by indulging in “deep draughts of unmixed wine, luxurious food, and unlawful forms of sex,” which included unions between males (§135). Because of their homosexual acts the Sodomites were unable to procreate, and their behavior was corrupting the bodies and souls of all humanity (§§135–136). To save the human race from extinction, God promoted unions between men and women for the purpose of procreation and those who desired the “unnatural and lawless” unions He punished in the following way (§ 137). He caused a great rain of fire to consume all the land and its produce, structures, cities and their inhabitants, and the very earth itself, so that it became completely barren (§§138–140). Indeed Philo asserts that, in his day, as a “memorial” (μνημεῖον) of what had happened smoke continued to rise from the land and sulfur was mined there. One well-populated and fertile city also remained as a sign of the area’s former prosperity and evidence of the divine judgment (§ 141). Using as his primary sources scattered verses from Genesis 13, 18, and 19, and perhaps some of their subsequent interpretations (see the Detailed Comments), Philo fashions a pointed and dramatic account of the Sodomites’ sins and punishment. In particular, the association of the inhabitants with homosexual behavior is based on LXX Gen 19:5, in which the Sodomites surround Lot’s house and demand that he bring out his guests “that we may be with them” (cf. the Hebrew, which translates, “that we may know them,” and see the comment at §135 on men had intercourse with males). Interestingly, however, Philo’s objections to homosexual acts are rooted in Platonic philosophy rather than the biblical prohibitions (see §136 and the comment on a female disease). For the impact that Philo’s interpretation had on later understandings of the Sodomites’ sin, see again the comment at § 135 on men had intercourse with males and the Nachleben section following the Detailed Comments below. After vividly portraying the disaster that befell the Sodomites, Philo now asserts that such a portrayal was not his primary intention (§ 142); instead he wishes to impart a lesson. Accordingly, the last section of the literal exegesis (§§142–146)—which we have ventured to denominate “ethical,” and which provides a bridge to the “physical,” or allegorical, exegesis proper (see the Introduction, §4)—takes its start from the noteworthy biblical detail that after visiting Abraham, only two of the strangers proceed to Sodom, without the third

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(the Lord himself) (Gen 18:33–19:1). Implicitly alluding to his earlier allegorical interpretation in §§119–132, Philo explains that this third figure is the truly Existent. While He deems it “fitting to bestow good things in person by His own agency,” for some purposes, particularly those which involve imposing punishment, and therefore evils, upon sinful and refractory people, God sends forth his Powers to do, so to speak, the “dirty work”; He Himself, meanwhile, remains aloof so that He might not appear to be the primary cause of anything evil (§143). Interestingly, Philo compares this to the procedure of a king, who reserves to himself the granting of boons, but delegates to subordinates the enforcement of his decrees and punishment for non-compliance (§ 144). One might wonder, in the present circumstances, why there is need of the “Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) Power as well as the “Punitive” (κολαστήριος) Power on such a mission. In fact, though, a benefaction is being bestowed along with the punishment, in that, while four cities are to be destroyed, one of the five is to be spared, so that each Power might attend to each different function (§ 145). The city to be spared, however, while being rather more virtuous than the rest, is not accounted sufficiently worthy to merit the direct attention of the Existent Himself (§146). For Philo’s veiled reference to Lot, see the comments at § 146 on not in possession … and unworthy … In his allegorical interpretation (§§147–166), Philo will find great significance in the city that was spared. At this point, however, perhaps we might inquire as to why he includes this episode in his treatise on Abraham if he omits virtually any mention of the patriarch himself (see, however, § 142 and the comment on of the three …). That Philo sees this episode as somehow part of the preceding section (§§107–132) is clear from his remark in § 167, in which he picks up his account of the patriarch’s life by referring to Abraham’s vision (§§119–132) and hospitality (§§107–118) as if discussion of them came immediately before what he is about to relate. Philo himself gives as one reason for the present section his wish to point out that the truly Existent did not accompany the Powers so that He might delegate the punishment of Sodom and thus avoid being seen as the direct cause of evil (§§142–146). While this reason may account for what we have called his “ethical interpretation,” however, what of the “literal” one that precedes it (§§ 133–141)? In his introduction to the treatise, Philo promises to tell of such sweeping themes as great destruction by fire and water (§1). On a very basic level, then, this episode makes for a dramatic story and helps to show that Moses’s law book, heritage of the Jews, can rival the best of Greek literature. Embedded in the tale as well, however, is a moral lesson about the Sodomites’ unlawful behavior and its aftermath. One theme of Abr.—and indeed of the Exposition as a whole—is that God rewards the good (Runia 2008, esp. 147,

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149–150; Termini 2006, esp. 271). We have already seen, for example, that He rewards Abraham and Sarah in Egypt with the preservation of their marriage (§§90, 98) and again that He rewards Abraham for his hospitality with the promise of a son (§110). If reward of the good is one theme, though, so too is its converse, namely, punishment of the bad. This theme is illustrated earlier when Pharaoh and the Egyptians are struck by a plague for their behavior towards Sarah (§§96–97). The story of the Sodomites provides an opportunity to highlight the punishment theme even more. Thus Philo omits such distracting details as Abraham’s bargaining with the Lord, Lot’s hospitality, and the subsequent saving of him and his daughters, to focus instead on the depravity of the Sodomites and its consequences. Abraham, however, remains implicitly in the background as a counterexample of piety and humanity to the Sodomites’ outrageous impiety and vice. Besides these reasons for Philo’s literal and ethical interpretations, as we shall see in the next section (§§147–166) his inclusion of this episode allows him to introduce the allegorical interpretation of the five cities as the five senses, an interpretation upon which he will build and expand later, in §§ 236– 244. Detailed Comments § 133. With particular clarity and specificity. The superlative adverb διαπονητότατα is remarkable. It is the reading only of some mss. (MGH[v]), with others (AP) prefixing a negative α-, and BEK reading ἀδιαπόνητα. An adjective διαπονητός is not otherwise attested, but it is easily enough formed from the verb διαπονέω (“elaborate”), so that L. Cohn’s proposal ἀδιαπορητότατα (also otherwise unattested) seems superfluous. he discloses in what follows what is being revealed. This transition is somewhat misleading, as it suggests that the biblical narrative that follows the episode about Abraham’s hospitality and that Philo is immediately about to describe contains a clear and elaborate statement of “what is being revealed” (τὸ δηλούμενον). In fact, however, Philo does not turn to this matter until §§ 142– 146. Moreover, there he addresses why only two of Abraham’s guests go on to Sodom without the third (Gen 18:33–19:1), a detail that he actually omits from his preceding “literal” account (§§133–141). Nonetheless Philo’s discussion in §§142–146 is in some way a continuation of what comes earlier because, in addition to the biblical detail, his discussion is also based on his own earlier allegorical interpretation of Abraham’s three visitors (§§ 119–132). Indeed confirmation that Philo does not view §§133–166 as a separate unit but rather as a continuation of and elaboration upon the immediately preceding section is made clear in §167 (see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§ 133–146).

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As with some of Philo’s other uses of the third person singular verb, the subject of “he discloses” (μηνύει) could be Moses or Scripture. The country of the Sodomites. Using this designation apparently to encompass the five cities named in LXX Gen 14:2 and 8 (see also §§ 225–244, esp. § 226), Philo highlights the Sodomites perhaps because their city was the best known (cf. Josephus, J.W. 4.483–484). In the narrative about the destruction in LXX Gen 19, which he is presently interpreting, only three cities—Sodom, Gomorrah, and Segor—are named, with the last being the only one that was spared. In his allegorical interpretation Philo will find significance in all five cities, which he speaks of as a pentapolis (literally, “group of five cities”) in §§ 147 and 165 (see too §229; also the comment at §147 on the group of five cities). In the entire treatise Abr., Philo mentions only Sodom by name (§ 227) but elsewhere he refers—in a biblical quotation, interpretation, or both—to Sodom and Gomorrah (Ebr. 222; Somn. 2.191–192; QG 2.43; 4.23), Segor (QG 4.50), or all three (Somn. 1.85; QG 4.51). (For other references to Sodom alone, see Leg. 3.24, 197, 213; Sacr. 122. See also Conf. 27; Congr. 109; Fug. 144; Mut. 228.) Syria-Palestine. This designation appears as early as Herodotus (4.39), but seems to have come into more regular use only much later, in the second century CE (see Schürer 1973, 1.514 n. 1; A.H.M. Jones et al. 1999, 1464–1465). a myriad of wrongdoings. Genesis does not specify the sins of Sodom and Gomorrah but refers only generally to Sodom’s evil and sinful qualities (Gen 13:13) and the great sins of Sodom and Gomorrah (18:20). Ancient interpreters naturally wondered about the exact nature of these sins and came to understand them in a variety of ways. In this section (§§ 133–141), for example, Philo emphasizes homosexual behavior, but he also mentions gluttony and sexual license (see the next comment). By contrast, in §§ 225–235, esp. § 228, he speaks of the primary sin of the Sodomites as arrogance (see also Josephus, Ant. 1.194– 195). For other interpretations of the sins of Sodom and Gomorrah, see Loader 1990; Kugel 1998, 331–334, 346–350; Ginzberg 2003, 1.207–210; Newman 1998; Noort and Tigchelaar 2004. gluttony and sexual license. The conjunction of γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία is found elsewhere in Philo at Opif. 79, and in the characterization of Caligula at Legat. 14; cf. also Agr. 31–38, where the connection between gluttony and sexual license is dwelt on (though the term λαγνεία is not used). the Judge of all. The phrase δικάστης τῶν ὅλων calls to mind the language of LXX Gen 18:25, in which Abraham pointedly asks the Lord, “You who judge all the earth (ὁ κρίνων πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν), will you not do right?” In this passage, although Philo omits the entire exchange between the Lord and Abraham in which Abraham tries to bargain with Him to save Sodom, he (Philo) here includes this key phrase, which is suggestive of that exchange. For similar char-

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acterizations of God as judge, cf. Her. 271: “until God the arbiter and judge makes a separation between the ill-treated and the ill-treater” (ἄχρις ἂν ὁ βραβευτὴς καὶ δικαστὴς θεὸς διακρίνῃ τὸ κακούμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦντος); also Opif. 155. §134. the unremitting abundance of their resources. According to LXX Gen 13:10, the area around Sodom was “all watered … like the garden of the Lord and the land of Egypt …” Apparently on the basis of this description, Philo and other ancient exegetes inferred that the land of the Sodomites was lush and fertile. Genesis itself does not make a connection between their great natural resources and their licentiousness. Three verses after LXX Gen 13:10, however, it says that the people of Sodom were “evil, and exceedingly sinful before God” (LXX Gen 13:13). Perhaps on the basis of these closely placed observations, interpreters linked the abundance of Sodom with its sinful character. See, e.g., Ezek 16:49; Josephus, Ant. 1.194; Pirqe Rabbi Eliezer 25 (which quotes the Ezekiel passage); b. Sanh. 109a. On the exact nature of their sins, see the comment at §133 on a myriad of wrongdoings. For ἀφθονία (“abundance”) as a source of license, cf., e.g., Agr. 34, 101; Prov. 2.12. In §92 above, Philo remarks on the prosperity of Egypt and portrays its ruler as licentious (§ 90), but he stops short there of attributing the king’s licentiousness specifically to the richness of the land. “the greatest source of evils.” This is a quotation from Menander (frag. 724; Kock 1976, 3:2:206): The greatest source of evils among men, my good fellow, is a superfluity of goods. Philo quotes the last phrase of this saying as well in Mos. 2.13. For other quotations from Menander’s works, see Her. 5 and QG 4.120; also Lincicum 2013b, 156. §135. gamboling like frisky beasts … For this combination of “leap” or “bound” (σκιρτάω) and “shake off” (ἀπαυχενίζω), cf. Agr. 34: “… they break loose and become unruly” (trans. adapted from Geljon and Runia 2013, 51 of ἀπαυχενίζει τε καὶ σκιρτᾷ); Her. 245; Spec. 1.304. Philo seems to be the first to use the verb σκιρτάω in this sense. the law of nature. Believing that sex was meant for procreation, Philo understands homosexual acts (and perhaps other “unlawful forms of sex”) to be against the law of nature (see, e.g., §137). in their lust for women. The verb θηλυμανέω seems to occur first in Philo, though the adjective θηλυμανής is to be found at LXX Jer 5:8, which may have been an inspiration for Philo, as it was for many Church Fathers after him.

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men had intercourse with males. The biblical basis for associating Sodomites with homosexuality is their demand that Lot bring out his guests “so that we may be with them” (ἵνα συγγενώμεθα αὐτοῖς; LXX Gen 19:5). Cf. the Hebrew, which translates, “so that we may know [venadʿa] them.” Wevers (1993, 268) observes that “both the Greek and the Hebrew verbs mean ‘to become acquainted with in carnal fashion, to have sexual relations.’” According to the English translation of the Armenian, in QG 4.37 Philo cites the relevant phrase from Gen 19:5 as “that we may know them.” Marcus (PLCL suppl. 1:311 n. g) remarks that “Philo, like the Arm. O.T., holds more literally to the Heb. ‘that we may know them.’” One wonders, however, whether the Armenian translator may have modified Philo’s original quotation. Other Jewish exegetes also identified the sins of Sodom as sexual and even homosexual (e.g., Jub. 16:5– 6, 20:5–6; 2 En. 10:4; Josephus, Ant. 1.200). Philo’s interpretation, though— particularly in Abr. 134–136, “which owes nothing to Genesis, however largely it may be indebted to the social underworld of first-century Alexandria … depicted in even more lurid detail by Petronius and Juvenal”—had a lasting impact (D.S. Bailey 1955, 22). According to B. Fone (2000, 91), “Philo invented Sodom as we now know it; his retelling of the Sodom story forecasts all later interpretations of both the sin and its punishment.” See also Carden 2004, 61– 70 and the section on Nachleben below, following the Detailed Comments on §§133–146. a seed that could not come to fruition. Just as their unlawful behavior led to the inability of the Sodomites to reproduce, God punished them by rendering their plentiful land barren. See §137 with the comment on punished and § 140 with the comment on reducing it to utter infertility. such exposure … was of no help to them. Philo seems to mean that the consequence of not being able to beget children was not enough to change the behavior of the Sodomites because their desires were too great. The word ἠλέγχοντο, here translated as “they were exposed,” also carries the meaning of “being refuted (in argument)” or of “being convicted (of a crime),” and Philo occasionally uses the word ἔλεγχος to mean “conscience” (LSJ, s.v. ἐλέγχω, several meanings under II; and ἔλεγχος, IIIB). Perhaps, then, he means here that the Sodomites’ desires were greater than either their conscience or the shame of their inability to conceive children and thus they could not change their behavior. §136. a female disease. Philo here, interestingly, seems to adopt the more traditional Greek objection to passive homosexuality, rather than the biblical concept of its being “an abomination” (Lev 18:22; 20:13), namely that it (i.e., passive homosexuality) softens and degenerates the bodies and souls of those involved—thus making them virtually useless in the battle-line—and, if pursued extensively, tends to reduce the birth-rate; cf. Plato, Leg. 8.836a–e, for an unusually firm statement on this topic.

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an evil hard to combat. For the expression “an evil hard to combat” (κακὸν δύσμαχον), cf. Legat. 190 (referring to Caligula: “And youth coupled with absolute authority is subject to unrestrainable impulses, a formidable power for evil” [νεότης δὲ μετ᾽ ἐξουσίας αὐτοκρατοῦς ὁρμαῖς ἀκαθέκτοις χρωμένη κακὸν δύσμαχον]). This phrase sounds like a quotation from some source, but the nearest extant analogy seems to be Plato’s Leg. 9.863b, where “anger” (θυμός) is described as a “contentious and hard to combat possession” (δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα) within the soul. Greeks and barbarians. Philo uses this common phrase several times to denote all people (e.g., Opif. 128; Ebr. 193; Ios. 30). Here (§ 136) he claims that the homosexual behavior of the Sodomites had the potential to corrupt all humanity (i.e., Greeks and barbarians) and to endanger its survival. (As for where the Jews fit into these designations, see Birnbaum 2001; Berthelot 2011a.) §137. inasmuch as He is savior and benefactor of humanity. For the φιλανθρωπία of God (“benefactor of humanity” here is φιλάνθρωπος), cf. Cher. 99. For God as “savior and benefactor” (σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης), cf., e.g., Opif. 169; Leg. 2.56. fostered to the maximum the natural unions of men and women. As a component of the divine reaction to the Sodomites’ homosexual behavior, Philo understands that God promoted “as much as possible” (ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα) heterosexual unions for procreative purposes. According to Gen 19:30–38, after the regional destruction, the daughters of Lot had intercourse with him with the specific purpose of reproducing. Although such unions between fathers and daughters were later prohibited (Lev 18:6), the Genesis account expresses no judgment, but instead records that through these unions Lot and his daughters became ancestors of the Moabite and Ammonite peoples. It would appear that Philo is obliquely referring here (§137) to these subsequently forbidden, incestuous unions as part of God’s plan to preserve the race. In QG 4.56, he explicitly acknowledges that these unions later became unlawful. Cf. his treatment in Post. 175–178, discussed below in the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis. See also Josephus, Ant. 1.205 and the section on Nachleben following these Detailed Comments on §§133–146. the unnatural and lawless ones. For the collocution ἔκφύλοι καὶ ἔκθέσμοι, cf. Det. 61: “everyone who thinks that anything escapes the eye of God is an outlaw and an outcast” (ἔκθεσμος δὲ καὶ ἔκφυλος πᾶς ὁ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν οἰόμενός τι παρορᾶν). punished. This passage makes clear that Philo understands the destruction of the Sodomites’ cities as a punishment specifically for their homosexual acts. Nonetheless he also views their sinful behavior as encompassing other iniquities; see the comment at §133 on a myriad of wrongdoings.

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§138. a copious rain, not of water, but of fire. Cf. LXX Gen 19:24: “And the Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire” (καὶ κύριος ἔβρεξεν ἐπὶ Σοδομα καὶ Γομορρα θεῖον καὶ πῦρ). See also the comment at § 1 on great destruction … by fire and water. consumed the fields … consumed the plain … consumed also the mountain forests … Note the anaphora in §138: ἐκαίοντο … ἐκαίετο … ἐκαίετο. Philo here begins with the destruction of crops and vegetation, proceeds to the creations of humankind (§139), and then reverts to the burning of the very earth itself (§140). In typical diatribe mode, which is manifested in the larger passage more in the general subject-matter than in the stylistic details, we have here a fine run of parallel clausulae (see the Introduction, § 3b). This account greatly elaborates upon LXX Gen 19:25, which succinctly reports that the Lord “overthrew these cities, and all the country round about, and all that dwelt in the cities, and the plants springing out of the ground.” See also QG 4.51. §140. reducing it to utter infertility. Implicitly Philo seems to understand the destruction of the earth’s life-giving power as a measure-for-measure punishment for the Sodomites’ homosexual behavior, which led to a failure to reproduce (cf. §§135–137). More obviously, the destruction of the lush and fertile area strikes at the very cause of the Sodomites’ sins, as Philo had earlier noted that it was their prosperity that led to their sinfulness (§ 134); see also the comment at §134 on “the greatest source of evils”; and Feldman 2001, 189. Elsewhere, e.g., Ebr. 222; Somn. 2.192; and QG 4.23, Philo understands the very name “Sodom” to mean “barrenness”; on the intricacies of this etymology, see Grabbe, 1988, 208. §141. a memorial of the disaster … is the smoke. See also Mos. 2.56. Several other sources attest to this smoke. Like Philo, the Wisdom of Solomon 10:7–8 emphasizes the function of the “smoking wasteland” (NRSV trans.) as evidence of what happened and a memorial of the Sodomites’ foolishness. Josephus too sees the condition of the land as evidence of the “legends” (μυθευόμενα) about Sodom’s destruction ( J.W. 4.483–485). See also Strabo 16.2.44; Tacitus, Hist. 5.7. The closest parallel to Philo’s account about sulfur being mined is Strabo’s observation that people collect asphalt that rises to the surface of the water. Josephus, by contrast, speaks of fruit that dissolves into ashes upon being plucked, while Tacitus claims that all plants “turn black, become sterile, and seem to wither into dust” (C.H. Moore 1931, 187). the one city remaining. That is to say, Tsoʿar (Hebrew); in Greek, Segor. Philo here emphasizes its role as an “indication” (δεῖγμα) of the earlier lushness of the entire area and as “proof” (ἔλεγχος) of the divine judgment. In Genesis, this city was spared for the benefit of Lot (Gen 19:18–22), whom Philo does not mention explicitly in the present account but only alludes to in § 146; see the comments ad loc.

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§142. not for the sake of setting out such mighty and unprecedented misfortunes … but rather … to draw attention … Philo now embarks on what might be regarded as an “ethical” interpretation of the text, still based on the literal interpretation, but deriving ethical and theological conclusions from it. On this feature of Philo’s exegetical strategy, cf. Dillon 1996a, and the Introduction, § 4. Here Philo picks up on the point referred to in § 133 (i.e., “what is being revealed” [δηλούμενον]; see the comment ad loc. on he discloses …). He bases himself both on the biblical record that only two angels continued to Sodom (Gen 19:1) and on his allegorical interpretation in §§ 119–132, in which he understands Abraham and Sarah’s three visitors as the Existent and His two Powers. Since in §§133–141, Philo goes into such detail about the destruction, it is interesting that he now denies that this was his purpose—a rhetorical technique somewhat similar to (though not precisely the same as) παράλειψις—the act of calling attention to something and thereby suggesting that it has greater significance but saying very little about it. (The technique may resemble other rhetorical approaches too, but no one term exactly describes what Philo is doing here.) See also the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§ 133–146. of the three entities that appeared as men to the sage. Gen 18:1–15; see §§107–132. Philo’s reference here to the “sage” (σοφός) is his only allusion to Abraham in this entire section (§§133–166). The characterization of Abraham as a sage is made by Philo and not found in Genesis. See the comment at § 68 on a wise man. the oracles say that only two proceeded … whereas the third deemed it right not to go. Genesis 19:1 mentions two angels but says nothing about the third or what he thought. The immediately preceding verse, LXX Gen 18:33, however, notes that “the Lord departed when He finished speaking to Abraham.” §143. the truly Existent. In Greek, ὁ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὤν. For a neuter version of the same phrase, τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄν, cf. Abr. 80 above; and Mos. 2.67. See also the comments at §76 on the beams pouring out from the Existent and at § 121 on His proper name … fitting to bestow good things in person by His own agency. In § 110 Philo makes a point of noting that the promise of a son to Abraham and Sarah was made by only one of the three visitors. This point may be related to the present observation that the truly Existent “considered it to be fitting to bestow good things in person by His own agency.” See also the following two comments and the comments at §110 on for it would have been contrary to philosophy and at § 176 on God the savior … the cause of good things only. A reference here, perhaps, to the famous passage of Plato’s Tim. 29e: “He was good (ἀγαθὸς ἦν), and in the good no begrudgery concerning anything ever arises.”

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but not primarily the cause of anything evil. The qualification “primarily” (or “directly,” προηγουμένως) reflects that Philo believes God to be omnipotent and ultimately the cause of all things. For discussion of other examples in which God involves assistants for similar purposes, see Opif. 72–75; Conf. 168–182, esp. 180; Fug. 65–70. See too Lam. Rab. 2:1:3 and Tanḥ. Tazria 9 on Ps 5:5. The delegation of punitive measures to the Powers also bears some analogy to the demiurge’s delegation of the fashioning of the “mortal” parts of the soul to the young gods in Plato’s Tim. 41b–d; see also Tim. 42d–e; Resp. 2.379a–380d. §144. those kings who imitate the divine nature. Since Philo was now living under Roman rule, one wonders which kings he had in mind. Perhaps these were the Ptolemies, of whom he writes positively (Mos. 2.30) and who he acknowledges were regarded as divine (Legat. 138). Philo’s observation may also be related to his theory of kingship; cf. Mos. 2.4: “It is a king’s duty to command what is right and forbid what is wrong. But to command what should be done and to forbid what should not be done is the peculiar function of law; so that it follows at once that the king is a living law (νόμος ἔμψυχος), and the law a just king.” The comparison here (§144), admittedly, is rather of the good king with God rather than with law, but the laws envisaged by Philo are those of nature, and so of God. For more on Philo’s conceptions about kingship, see Barraclough 1984, 518–520; Martens 2003, 53–66. §145. the one is beneficent, the other, punitive. Here Philo distinguishes between the “Beneficent” (εὐεργέτις) and the “Punitive” (κολαστήριος) Powers of God, but elsewhere he characterizes them differently as, e.g., the “Creative” (ποιητική) and the “Kingly” (βασιλική); cf. Cher. 27–28; Somn. 1.162–163; Mos. 2.99; and Spec. 1.307. See also §§124–125 and Chapter 8, Excursus 1 on “Aspects of Philo’s Conception of the Divine Powers.” Josephus likewise sees Abraham and Sarah’s visitors as having different functions (Ant. 1.198). He (Josephus), however, distinguishes only between (1) the announcement of good news to Abraham and Sarah about the birth of a son and (2) the destruction of Sodom. Accordingly he understands both angels that went to Sodom as agents of destruction instead of viewing—as Philo does here—one as an agent of destruction and the other, of preservation. For a rabbinic perspective on the different functions of the angels who came to Sodom, see Gen. Rab. 50:2, b. B. Meṣ. 86b, Tanḥ. Vayera 8. of the five finest cities. These are named in Gen 14:2 and 8. See the comment at §133 on The country of the Sodomites. one was to be left safe. That is Segor (Greek; in Hebrew, Tsoʿar); see Gen 19:20–22 and the comment above at §141 on the one city remaining. §146. not in possession of virtues that were whole and complete. For these epithets of virtue (ὁλόκληροι καὶ παντελεῖς), cf. Sacr. 57. Since the city was saved

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on account of Lot (Gen 19:20–22), the observation about falling short of whole and all-perfect virtues would seem to apply to him rather than the city; see also QG 4.47; Mos. 2.58; Abr. 212; and the following comment. unworthy to have … a vision of Himself directly. The implied comparison is to the vision that Abraham received of the Existent (and His two Powers), according to Philo’s allegorical interpretation in §§ 119–132. As observed in the previous comment, although Philo is ostensibly speaking about the “part (μέρος) that was saved” as being unworthy, he seems to have in mind Lot specifically. For another comparison between Abraham and Lot, see QG 4.30 and the discussion of Parallel Philonic Exegesis at the end of §§ 119–132. Parallel Philonic Exegesis In Genesis (18:16–19:38), the tale of the destruction of the Sodomite cities encompasses several components. These include Abraham’s bargaining with the Lord to spare the sinful city for the sake of the righteous; Lot’s reception of the two visitors; the confrontation with the men of Sodom; the instruction of the angels to Lot to flee with his family; Lot and his family’s escape to Segor; the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah; the transformation of Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt; Abraham’s survey of the aftermath of the destruction; and Lot’s daughters’ inebriating him, having intercourse with him, and giving birth to Moab and Ammon. In Abr. 133–146, Philo addresses only some of these components—or elements of these components—directly or implicitly: the sinfulness of Sodom, the unions between Lot and his daughters, the destruction and its aftermath, the sparing of Segor, and the number of individuals that went to Sodom. In QG 4.20–58, Philo considers many aspects of the Genesis narrative about Sodom that he does not address in Abr. as well as aspects that he does address. Below we mention some of the different interpretations as examples, but readers are encouraged to consult QG 4 for more of Philo’s contrasting treatment of the tale. Despite the differences, QG 4 does have a few parallels with Abr. In QG 4.37–38, for instance, Philo acknowledges that the Sodomites were pederasts. In QG 4.51, among the points that he discusses concerning the destruction, Philo notes that sulfur and fire, being light substances, should naturally move upward. The description that they came down shows that “the cause of the seasons and annual times is not heaven or the sun or the processions and revolutions of the other stars but the power of the Father, who presides over the whole world as over a winged chariot, and guides it as He thinks best and most useful.” In the same passage, Philo questions why God destroyed not only the inhabitants “but also overturned and burned down cities and homes and all the buildings.” He replies that “where wise men dwell there are

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places called venerable and honourable … But where licentious, intemperate, impious, and unrighteous men (dwell), there are defiled, polluted and impure (places) …” The honorable place flourishes and endures, while “the place of unrestraint is overturned, overthrown and destroyed with its resident men and populace.” As in Abr. 137 (see the comment there on fostered to the maximum …), in QG 4.56 Philo takes a sympathetic view of Lot’s daughters engaging in what later became prohibited intercourse with their father, in order to preserve the human race. By contrast in Post. 175–178, Philo interprets these daughters negatively as representing the belief that mind rather than God can give children, and he notes that the daughters were able to succeed in having intercourse with their father only by getting him completely drunk (cf. Ebr. 162–170). For a parallel account of the destruction of Sodom and sparing of Segor, see Mos. 2.53, 55–58. In that passage, Philo alludes to the continuing fiery evidence, in his own day, of the destruction (Mos. 2.56; cf. Abr. 141) and to Lot’s reward of being saved despite his less than perfect nature (Mos. 2.57–58; cf. Abr. 146, with the comments on not in possession … and unworthy …). See also the discussion of QG 4.47 in the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis below, following the Detailed Comments on §§147–166. Nachleben Despite his understanding of the sins of Sodom as many and varied, Philo’s specific identification of homosexuality as its sin and the reason for its destruction appears to have had a strong and lasting influence on later Christian writers (Fone 2000, 89–92). In Paed. 3.8, Clement, acknowledging the generally lustful behavior of the Sodomites, writes that they having, through much luxury, fallen into uncleanness, practising adultery shamelessly, and burning with insane love for boys; the All-seeing Word … cast His eye on them … [and] ordered Sodom to be burned, pouring forth a little of the sagacious fire on licentiousness; lest lust, through want of punishment, should throw wide the gates to those that were rushing into voluptuousness. Coxe 1994, 282

An understanding of the measure-for-measure aspect of the punishment for their homosexual behavior (see the comment at § 140 on reducing it to utter infertility) is prominent in the following remark of John Chrysostom (Stat. 19.7): “… the very nature of the punishment was a pattern of the nature of the sin. Even as [the Sodomites] devised a barren coitus, not having for its end the pro-

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creation of children, so did God bring on them such a punishment as made the womb of the land for ever barren and destitute of all fruits” (quoted by D.S. Bailey 1955, 25; see also Chrysostom’s Hom. Gen. 42.21, cited by Carden 2004, 142). The notion that Sodomite practices were against nature (cf. § 135) is reflected in the Apostolic Constitutions (7.2): “‘Thou shalt not corrupt boys’: for this wickedness is contrary to nature and arose from Sodom” (quoted by D.S. Bailey 1955, 26). Apparently, however, it was primarily with Augustine that the association became firmly entrenched between the sin of Sodom and homosexuality. In Civ. 16.30 he refers to Sodom as “the wicked city [that] was reduced to ashes— that place where homosexual practices among males had become as prevalent as any other actions that enjoy the customary sanction of the laws” (Sanford and Green 1965, 145; see also Loader 1990, 134–136, 140). Besides the Sodomite sin of homosexuality, some Christian sources also express in common with Philo differing views—sympathetic and condemnatory—regarding the actions of Lot’s daughters; see, e.g., Origen, Hom. Gen. 5.4; Didymus, In Gen. 137–138 (on Gen. 4:17); and Ambrose, Abr. 1.6.56. For further discussion, with references, on the interpretation of Sodom in early Christian writings, see Loader 1990, 118–138; D.S. Bailey 1955, 25–27; Fone 2004, 93–107; and Carden 2004, 116–154. b

Allegorical Interpretation (§§147–166) Analysis/General Comments We turn now to the passage’s allegorical exegesis, which Philo declares is suited to the few, unlike the narrative’s obvious level, which he deems appropriate for the many. Here (§§147–166) the fact that the number of the biblical cities is five, with one being spared, induces Philo to postulate that what are being depicted are the nature and workings of the five senses, four being sunk in materiality, while the fifth is decidedly more spiritual. After acknowledging that all five senses are conduits of pleasure, Philo begins by distinguishing between the lower three—taste, smell, and touch—which minister rather to those natural impulses that we share with the rest of the animal kingdom, and the higher two, hearing and sight, which have a link with rationality and philosophy. Even between these two, however, Philo wishes to establish a distinction, hearing being the more “sluggish and feminine” (βραδύτερα … καὶ θηλύτερα; § 150) so that a special precedence is to be given to sight (§§ 147–150). As we shall see in § 165, this special role reserved for sight fits well with the circumstance reported in Gen 19:18–22 that of the five cities, only one is preserved by God–Tsoʿar (Hebrew); in Greek, Segor—in which Lot takes refuge.

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Philo at this point (§151) launches, as he so readily does, into a diatribestyle encomium of the eyes and the sense of sight, a three-part discourse which extends all the way to §166, as follows: (1) First (§§151–153), he extols the way in which the eyes reflect such mental states as grief, joy, fear, anger, consideration, relaxation, reactions to a friend and an enemy, boldness, and modesty, and he concludes that “sight has been crafted as an image of the soul” (§ 153). (2) Second (§§154–155), he praises the ceaseless activity of the eyes as long as the subject is awake, in contrast to the other senses, which are quiescent when not immediately stimulated. In this constant activity the eyes resemble the soul, which, by contrast with the eyes, remains active both day and night. (3) Third and last (§§156–166), Philo turns to the most important function of sight, its stimulation of the mind to reasoning and philosophical insight. Making the point that sight employs the God-given gift of light to apprehend the universe, he proceeds to survey the contents of the universe and to marvel at the range of objects that sight can perceive (§§156–159). He then considers hearing as a sense connected to reason, but, unlike the far-ranging ability of sight, the power of hearing is limited (§§160–161). Stimulated by visual observations, the mind turns to consider the chief questions of philosophy. These pertain to the origin or eternity of the world, its finitude or infinity, its singularity or plurality, the number of elements, and the question of a divine element, if indeed there is one. The mind queries further too about the possible existence, nature, purpose, and current occupation of a Creator (§§ 162–163). It is in view of this faculty of sight—which, when properly employed, provokes us to raise such philosophical concerns—that Philo explains the hidden meaning of the fact that just one of the five cities was saved: “So then it was right and proper for one out of, as it were, the Pentapolis of the five senses—sight—to gain this special boon of continuing in existence after the others had been destroyed, because it does not confine itself only to mortal things as do they, but deems it worthwhile to betake itself to the realm of imperishable natures, rejoicing in the contemplation of these” (§§164–165). Taking as a statement Lot’s question (“Is it not small?”) in LXX Gen 19:20 so that Lot appears to say both that the city is small and not small, Philo is then also able to account for how Segor can indeed be said to be both small and not small. Based on this different reading of the text (see the comment at §166 on Hence indeed it is very apt …),

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he explains that “it is said to be ‘small,’ because it is just a little part of the totality of which we are made up, but ‘great,’ because it strives for great things, in yearning to contemplate the whole heaven and the cosmos together.” Philo seems to be the first—and he may be the only—interpreter to allegorize the five Sodomite cities as the five senses, an allegorization upon which he will build in §§236–244. For his high estimation of sight as the sense that leads to philosophical inquiry, however, and for his understanding of how vision works, he is heavily influenced by Plato, especially Tim. 47a–c and 45b–d (see the comments at §150 on the eyes … take the initiative … and the queen of the other senses). Philo’s portrayal of the eyes as not only looking outward but also reflecting internal states of mind is particularly noteworthy; see the comments at § 152 on the organ of sight … and §153 on reveals … a visible nature … Detailed Comments § 147. This is the account on the obvious level … This formula of transition to the allegorical level of commentary—“the obvious level” (ἐν φανερῷ), which can be grasped by “the many” (οἱ πολλοί), being contrasted with “the hidden level” (ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ), accessible only to the few—seems not to be paralleled elsewhere in Philo. The more usual distinction, as at § 119 above, is between “the literal exegesis” (ἡ ῥητὴ ἀπόδοσις) and “the allegorical” (ἡ δι᾽ ὑπονοιῶν), the former concerning human beings and their actions, the latter, types of soul (see the next comment). At Leg. 2.14, the distinction is between “literal” (ῥητή) and “symbolic” (τροπική); cf. also Ios. 125, which has the comparative form of τροπική. Philo does of course accept that only an elite few will be able to access the “soul,” as opposed to the “body,” of the text, and he refers to these elite with various expressions that often pertain to the ability to see (e.g., §§ 200, 236; Plant. 36; Somn. 1.39; QG 4.2). Nonetheless he does not believe that the deeper meaning of the text must be kept secret from the many (see, e.g., Spec. 3.6) but rather that only some are capable of grasping this meaning. Philo is keenly aware that people have different spiritual and intellectual capabilities; see, e.g., his interpretation in §§119–130 of the different kinds of vision of the Divine that correspond to the different capacities of the recipient. See also H.A. Wolfson 1982, 1:43–73, regarding Philo’s use of mystery language and his attitude about different kinds of interpretations. features of soul. Philo speaks about “features of the soul” or “types of soul” (τρόποι ψυχῆς) similarly in §§47 and 52. Cf., however, §§ 99 and 212, in which τρόπος seems to describe mood or state of mind rather than, more broadly, characteristics of the soul. See Schur 1991, 85 n. 46 and 94 n. 87.

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the group of five cities. In Greek, πεντάπολις. Genesis mentions all five cities together only in the account of the war between the kings (14:2 and 8), but the destruction account refers explicitly to only three of these cities: Sodom (LXX Gen. 18:22 26; 19:1), Sodom and Gomorrah together (LXX Gen 18:16, 20; 19:24, 28), and Segor (LXX Gen 19:22, 23, 30), the last being the only city to be spared. According to LXX Deut 29:23 (or 22), however, besides Sodom and Gomorrah, Adama and Seboim were also destroyed (see also Gen. Rab. 51:4). The Wisdom of Solomon 10:6 likewise speaks of this afflicted region as a πεντάπολις, as do the (probably) fourth century CE Egyptian magical papyri in Papyri Osloenses 1.299–300 (Eitrem 1925, 15). For instances in which πεντάπολις refers to other groups of five cities, see, e.g., Strabo 6.2.4; Pliny, Nat. 5.31; cf. Herodotus 1.144. See also the comment at § 133 on The country of the Sodomites. the five senses. Philo uses the senses as symbols in various ways. For a similar understanding of the senses as instruments of pleasure, cf. Leg. 3.67–68: in the allegorization of Eden, Eve is sense-perception, which can be good or evil; the snake is pleasure, which is always evil. By contrast, at the beginning of Migr., à propos the exegesis of LXX Gen 12:1: “Depart from your land and your kinsfolk and your father’s house …,” Philo indulges in a tirade against the senses, which he identifies with the “kinsfolk”; cf., esp., Migr. 10–11. See also Abr. 72–76, in which Harran, because of its etymological meaning as “holes,” represents the senses. Philo will again pick up on his allegorization of the five Sodomite cities as the five senses in §§236–244, in which he understands the war between the kings of these five cities and the four opposing kings of the East as a struggle between the five senses and the four passions. §148. For we derive pleasure. All the five senses are run through here, from the “highest,” sight, to the “lowest,” touch, and all are presented as conduits for the acquisition of pleasures. §149. the most animal-like and slavish. The three lower senses, taste, smell, and touch, are now separated off as the “most animal-like” (ζωωδέσταται) and “the most slavish” (ἀνδραποδωδέσταται). Beasts are presented as concerned only with food and sex—leaving aside the fact that beasts also use sight and hearing for these purposes! Philo occasionally varies in his evaluation and categorization of the senses, but he always considers sight and hearing to be superior. See, e.g., QG 3.5 and the next two comments; cf. §241, with the comment on the eyes and ears … See also Reydams-Schils 2008, 179 §B9. §150. imbued with philosophy and suited to leadership. Philo seems to be the first extant author to employ the compound “imbued with philosophy” (ἐμφιλόσοφος), which he uses only here, and to use the feminine “suited to leadership” (ἡγεμονίς) in a metaphorical sense, as referring to hearing and sight (see

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also Mos. 2.211; Spec. 1.29) and to the virtues (see, e.g., Leg. 1.65; Post. 128). See also the comment at §27 on justice, the leader among the virtues. the ears are … more sluggish and feminine than the eyes. Influenced by ancient—especially, Platonic—theories about sight, Philo depicts the eyes as actively meeting objects of vision (see the next comment). By contrast, because of their passive receptivity, Philo describes the ears as “more sluggish and feminine.” For other discussions of sight and hearing, cf. Conf. 72, where Israel is presented as symbolizing sight, and Jacob, hearing (cf. also ibid. 148); and Fug. 208, in which, on the basis of their etymologies, Ishmael symbolizes hearing and Israel, sight. Often, sight and hearing are linked closely together, occasionally by contrast with the “lower” senses; e.g., Mos. 2.211; Spec. 1.337–339; Migr. 103–104—though at such passages as Migr. 46–49 and Fug. 208 hearing, as here (§150), is subordinated to sight. In Fug. 208, it is specified that hearing can be deceptive, sight not. Cf. Heraclitus, frag. 6, Marcovich (cited by Lincicum 2013b, 147). Philo finds other reasons too for subordinating hearing to sight; see, e.g., the comment at §160 on hearing. See also Runia 1986, 270. the eyes … take the initiative with the objects of sight, and … go out in advance to meet them. Philo reflects ideas about vision and light found in some of Plato’s works (e.g., Tim. 45b–d; Resp. 6.507c–508d). It was believed, for example, that both the eyes and objects of vision emitted rays of some kind and that, aided by light, vision took place. The notion that the eyes emitted rays, an idea that has come to be known as extramission, was accepted by some but discounted by Aristotle and others. See Lindberg 1976, esp. 3–6; and van Hoorn 1972, esp. 42–107. let hearing … take second rank. As several comments in this section demonstrate, Philo’s regard for sight as superior to all other senses is consistent with many Greek thinkers. In Jewish tradition, there has been some debate about the relative value placed on seeing and hearing. Although some writers have emphasized the value of hearing—expressed, for example, in the recitation of the Shema prayer, which begins (as translated), “Hear, O Israel” (Deut 6:4)— other writers have recognized that vision also plays a significant role (see, e.g., Boman 1970, esp., 58–69, 200–208; E.R. Wolfson 1994, 13–51). the queen of the other senses … See also §164, with the comment on that leader among the senses. Philo’s encomium on sight—here connected with his allegorical understanding of Segor, the city that was saved—has parallels in other Philonic works, where the encomia appear in different exegetical contexts. That is, Philo offers similar praises of sight but in contexts unrelated to the sparing of Segor. Although Abr. 150–166 is the longest and most detailed of these passages, others include Opif. 53–54 (in connection with “the light-

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bearing heavenly bodies” on the fourth day of creation; Gen 1:14–19); Spec. 3.184–194 (in connection with the law in Exod 21:26 that if one knocks out the eye of a male or female servant he must let the servant go free); and QG 2.34 (in connection with the window of the ark that Noah opened; Gen 8:6). For more on these encomia and their relationship to themes in Plato’s Timaeus, especially 47a–c and occasionally 28c, see Runia 1986, 270–276. by situating it … in a citadel. Ἀκρόπολις, or “citadel,” is, more precisely, a higher, or upper, city. Philo finds significance in the placement of sight in the eyes because they are the uppermost sensory receptors, situated in the head above such other receptors as the ears, nose, and mouth. See also Spec. 3.184. most akin to soul. As evidence of this claim, Philo follows with a meditation on the ability of the eyes to reflect a variety of emotions and states of mind (§§151–153). One might have thought that such a degree of sensitivity to passions and emotions might militate against sight’s being a particularly philosophical or soul-oriented sense, but that is plainly not uppermost in Philo’s mind here; what he is emphasizing is rather its sensitivity and quickness to reflect states of soul. As he declares, “In sum, one could say that the faculty of sight has been crafted as an image of the soul …” (§ 153). Cf. Matt 6:22–23 and Luke 11:34–36 on the eyes as “the lamp (λύχνος) of the body.” See also the comment at §152 on the organ of sight … §151. the various states of the soul. Among the τροπαί of the soul, in §§ 151– 153 Philo names a mix of elements that include two of the Stoic passions, grief and fear (cf. §236); one of the Stoic “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι), joy (cf. § 201); as well as anger, reasoning and consideration, relief and relaxation, different reactions to a friend and an enemy, boldness, and modesty. §152. the organ of sight seeming almost to be matching itself with the intellect. This is a striking inversion of Philo’s more usual contention that by observing the external, physical universe the eyes lead the mind to philosophical vision or understanding (see below §§156–166). By contrast, here Philo’s point is not that the eyes look outward but instead that they reflect internal, emotional states. Accordingly, just as he attributes metaphorical sight to the soul, here he seems to attribute metaphorical soul to the eyes! See also Spec. 3.192– 194, in which Philo writes that sight “is more closely akin to the soul than the other senses” (Spec. 3.192). As D. Lincicum has shown, both passages should be considered within the context of the Greek and Roman tradition of physiognomy, or “the art of discerning the character of the soul from features of the body” (2013a, 58). §153. the feeling of goodwill. In Greek, τὸ τῆς εὐνοίας πάθος. Although Philo often uses πάθος in a negative sense, here the term carries a positive nuance.

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by its bright and peaceful glance. Philo is fond of the collocution εὔδιος καὶ γαληνός, particularly to characterize “life” (βίος); cf. Conf. 43; Her. 285; Mos. 1.214; and above, §30. reveals … a visible nature as a mirror-like image of something which does not have this nature. Again, this is an interesting contrast to Philo’s usual claim that through observation of the external, visible universe the eyes lead the invisible mind to philosophical understanding, or vision. Indeed here Philo illustrates the conventional “physiognomic wisdom” that “the eyes are a window of the soul” (Lincicum 2013a, 57–58). See also the comment at § 152 on the organ of sight … §154. the activity of the eyes … is continuous and uninterrupted. The next point (§§154–155, picking up on §150) is the contrast of the activity of sight with the relative passivity of all the other senses, which require some specific stimulus to be activated. The eyes’ activity also provides an analogy to the activity of the soul, except that the soul is constantly active, while sight is active only when the body is awake. For the collocution “continuous and uninterrupted” (συνεχεῖς καὶ ἀδιάστατοι), cf. Leg. 3.92, where it is applied to memory as opposed to “recollection” (ἀνάμνησις); and Post. 12, where the terms join with “constant” or “continuous” (ἐπάλληλος) to describe the constancy of “the concord and union that comes through making God our own.” On the notion that sight is active, see the comment at §150 on the eyes … take the initiative … §155. both by day and by night. The doctrine of the constant activity of the soul is derived ultimately from Plato, Phaedr. 245c. Philo characterizes the soul as “in perpetual motion” (ἀεικίνητος) elsewhere at Leg. 3.234; Sacr. 127; cf. Aet. 84; while the “mind” (διάνοια) is thus characterized below at § 162. The reference to “by night” (νύκτωρ) here is presumably an allusion to the soul’s continued activity even while the body is asleep. §156. it is only for sight … that God caused light to arise. Philo now claims (§§156–159) that light, “the fairest of existent things,” was created for the sake of sight. The connection of the sense of sight with light is dwelt on also at, e.g., Opif. 53; Spec. 1.339; QG 2.34. In these other passages, however, Philo stops short of emphasizing, as he does here, that the very purpose of light is to enable sight. See also §158 and the comment on For to what end … first in the sacred scriptures to be called “good.” LXX Gen 1:4. As God’s first creation, light is also the first that He called “good” (καλός). §157. the nature of light is twofold. For the distinction between two types of light, cf. Her. 136. See also Mos. 1.124; 2.148, 155–158. This is a Stoic distinction (cf. SVF 1.120 [Zeno]; 1.504 [Cleanthes]), but it goes back to Plato, Tim. 45b and 58c.

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as from ever-flowing springs. The image of an ever-flowing spring or springs, often with reference to the virtues, the grace of God, or the Logos, is muchfavored by Philo (22 examples), and seems not to occur before him in extant literature; cf., e.g., Opif. 168; Cher. 123; Plant. 122; Virt. 10, 79. it reaches out to the objects of vision. See the comment at § 150 on the eyes … take the initiative … §158. For to what end … if not to facilitate the activity of the eyes. This extended meditation (§§158–159) on the role of light in introducing the individual to the world through the eyes seems to owe some at least of its inspiration to Plato’s praise of sight at Tim. 47a–c. See also Resp. 6.507c–509b and Aristotle, De Anima 2.7.418b. According to Runia, however, in claiming that God created light for the sake of the eyes, Philo “shows an unashamedly anthropocentric tendency which goes further than Plato would allow (cf. Laws 903c)” (Runia 1986, 274, #6). See also Opif. 77. §159. the finest of all gifts. Although he has already noted that light is “the fairest of existing things” (§156; cf. Opif. 53), Philo’s calling light here a “gift” (δωρεά), which implies a recipient, underscores his anthropocentric approach (see the previous comment). To be sure, the rest of the animal kingdom as well as the plant world also benefit from light, but Philo focuses here on how vision, aided by light, leads humanity to ponder philosophical questions. the surgings of the seas … For comparable details about sources of water, see § 42. a cosmos within a cosmos. As Philo observes in Aet. 4, the word κόσμος can denote the entire universe—i.e., heaven and earth—and can also refer to heaven alone. The phrase “a cosmos within a cosmos,” then, appears to combine both meanings of the word. Philo similarly describes heaven in this way in Spec. 3.187; Praem. 41; and Flacc. 169. In a long and erudite note in which he discusses this phrase, V. Nikiprowetzky highlights the reference in Spec. 3.187 to “the host of heaven in all its sacred majesty, a world within a world.” While he regards the origin of the latter phrase (“a world within a world”) as “undoubtedly” Platonic, he also refers to Gen 2:1 and speaks of “a double borrowing.” The (translated) Hebrew of Gen 2:1 refers to “the heaven and earth and all their host (vekhol tsevaʾam),” while the Greek renders this as “the heaven and earth and the whole universe of them (ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν).” Nikiprowetzky speculates that Philo’s reference in Spec. 3.187 may reflect the influence of both Plato and Alexandrian Jewish exegesis related to Gen 2:1. For more details, see Nikiprowetzky 1977, 114 n. 73. In a private communication, D. Runia, who called our attention to the note by Nikiprowetzky, also points to LXX Deut 4:19, which has the phrase “the whole universe of heaven” (πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; cf. the Hebrew, as translated: “the whole host of heaven”).

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Although Plato speaks of “heaven” and “cosmos” synonymously (cf. Tim. 28b, 40a), it appears that he himself does not use the phrase “cosmos within a cosmos” (κόσμος ἐν κόσμῷ). As Nikiprowetzky contends, Plato’s understanding may well have influenced Philo. Regarding the phrase itself, as Runia suggests in the same communication, perhaps one could go even further to “speculate that the phrase is original to Philo and inspired by the LXX.” Nikiprowetzky, however, argues that it is quite probable that Philo’s phrase contains an echo of the exegesis of the phrase in Gen 2:1 in “the Alexandrian Synagogue” (1977, 115 n. 73). §160. leaving aside those senses … That is, taste, smell, and touch. See § 149. that beast which is innate in us. For the concept of the σύμφυτον θρέμμα, cf. Somn. 2.153; at Somn. 2.267, we find “the beast-like creature, sense” (τὸ κτηνῶδες θρέμμα, ἡ αἴσθησις). There is a reminiscence here of Plato, Resp. 9.590a, but Plato does not there use the epithet “innate in us” (σύμφυτον); cf., however, Resp. 10.609a: “the innate evil of each one” (our trans. of τὸ ξύμφυτον κακὸν ἑκάστου). hearing. Hearing poses something of a problem for Philo, since it is often linked with sight against the “lower” three senses, but now for exegetical purposes—only one city, after all, is to be saved—he must differentiate it from sight. He does this by remarking on the limitations of hearing, which even at its best cannot rise above the air that surrounds the earth. By contrast, sight—with its ability to perceive such distant heavenly entities as the sun and stars— ascends in a moment to the boundaries of the universe. See also § 150, with the comment on the ears are … more sluggish … §161. they provoke the mind to contemplate what has appeared to them. This is key to the link between sight and philosophy. For specific philosophical questions see §§162–163 and the comment at § 162 on accepting from the sight … Non-philosophical Jewish sources also recognize that observation of the physical universe can lead to spiritual insights. On Abraham’s discovery of God through observation of the universe, for example, see Jub. 12:16–21; Josephus, Ant. 1.155–156; Gen. Rab. 39:1; and Kugel 1998, 260–261. §162. as being a sleepless and ever-moving entity. For the rather poetical epithet “sleepless” (ἀκοίμητος) (before Philo, attested only in Aeschylus, Prom. 139; Moschus; and Theocritus), cf. Mos. 1.185: “the … unsleeping eye of the soul” (our trans. of τὸ … τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκοίμητον ὄμμα); ibid. 289 (with the plural): τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκοίμητα ὄμματα; Spec. 1.49, 330; 4.139, 201. The phrase “unsleeping eye of God, or Christ” appears occasionally later in the Church Fathers, e.g., Epiphanius, Hom. in laudes Mariae deiparae, PG, vol. 43, p. 489.39–40; p. 497.46–47; John Chrysostom, Fr. in Jeremiam, PG, vol. 64, p. 988.19–20; and the sixth-century hymnographer Romanus the Melodist uses it as a repeated refrain in his Sixth Hymn.

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accepting from the sight stimulations to be able to contemplate intelligible reality. The “mind” (διάνοια) is stimulated especially by sight to scientific and philosophical speculations—again the influence of Tim. 47a–c. Sight leads the intellect to raise all the basic questions of metaphysics (§§ 162–163): 1. Is the physical universe eternal, or does it have a beginning? 2. Is it infinite or finite? 3. Is there one world or many? 4. Are there just four elements, or are the heavens composed of a distinctive, and more divine, fifth element? 5. If the world is created, who is its Creator? 6. What is the essence or quality of the Creator? 7. What was the Creator’s purpose in creating? 8. What does the Creator do now? What sort of life does the Creator enjoy? It is interesting that it is exclusively “physical” (sc. metaphysical) questions that are set out here, though ethical questions could certainly be derived from them. The questions emphasize, however, the primacy of physics in the order of topics which Philo is adopting. Philo proposes the usual Stoic order of topics, physics–ethics–logic, at Agr. 14–15, but he recognizes the (also Stoic) order logic–ethics–physics at Leg. 1.57 and Spec. 1.336. He never, though, adopts the order ethics–physics–logic favored by both Antiochus of Ascalon and Eudorus. Here (§§162–163) Philo focuses on the above metaphysical questions, which— when one considers the possible existence of a Creator—can lead to knowledge of God. Although Philo does not emphasize the link between observation of the universe and knowledge of God, elsewhere he makes this link more explicit; see, e.g., Spec. 3.184–192; Praem. 40–42. See also Runia 1986, 270–276. For an encomium, closely paralleling our Abr. passage, of the sense of sight and its role in stimulating philosophical speculation, cf. Opif. 54, on that occasion provoked by the discussion of the creation of the heavenly bodies (and their light) on the fourth day. See also the comment at § 150 on the queen of the other senses. The larger passage clearly possesses the form of a diatribe, but because of the subject matter the parallelism of the clausulae takes on rather a philosophical than a properly rhetorical coloring. Here in §§ 162–163, we find a succession of clauses beginning, first, with πότερον (which occurs four times), and then with various forms of τίς (which occur five times). Between them, these clauses cover all aspects of cosmology and cosmogony. In § 165 the clauses are then followed by a personification of the sense of sight, which suitably rounds off the encomium. §164. that leader among the senses, sight. For other characterizations of sight as “leader” (ἡγεμονίς) of the other senses, see Mos. 1.124; while at Spec.

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1.29, both sight and hearing are characterized as the “leaders” (ἡγεμονίδες) of the senses. Cf. also above, §150, in which Philo calls sight “the queen (βασιλίς) of the other senses,” and the comment there on imbued with philosophy. Philo uses the term “leader” (ἡγεμονίς) frequently elsewhere to characterize justice and/or piety as “leaders” of the virtues, and seems to be the first to use this feminine form in a metaphorical sense. the only one … that God preserved. All this has been leading up to the explanation of why God preserves just one city (Gen 19:21–22) and destroys the other four. All the other senses, even hearing, are essentially earth-bound, while only sight transcends the boundaries of the physical universe, and leads us upwards to the spiritual realm. See also the comment below at § 165 on because it does not confine itself to mortal things. the land of the body. This phrase, usually reserved for Egypt, in a singular exception here describes “the country of the Sodomites”; see Pearce 2007, 100– 101. §165. because it does not confine itself to mortal things. Although Philo’s reasoning for the preservation of Segor suits his allegorical interpretation, it is worth remembering that according to Gen 19:18–22, the Lord preserves this city in response to Lot, who feared that he would not be able to escape to the mountains in time before the destruction. §166. Hence indeed it is very apt … This is a nice example of a creative exegesis by Philo that is apparently based on a different reading of the text from what we have. In LXX Gen 19:20, Lot says to the angels: “Behold, this city, which is small, is near for me to flee there and there I will be saved. Is it not small? And my soul will live” (some mss. add: “because of you”). Perhaps Lot’s reasoning— and emphasis, through his question, on the city’s little size—is that if the city were to be spared, it would be too small to wreak much evil. Philo, however, takes the parenthetical phrase—οὐ μικρά ἐστιν; in the LXX version—as a statement that the city is not small rather than as a question, and thus creates a paradoxical contradiction of Lot’s first characterization of the city as small. Philo’s understanding of the phrase as a statement then allows him to discern a higher meaning in the text: sight is both small in respect of the proportion of our physical bulk that it takes up, but great in its aspirations and its importance in our total makeup. It may be, as J. Royse suggests (2008, 164–165), that Philo’s text had no punctuation and, because he was probably unable to consult the Hebrew—in which the phrase is clearly a question—he construed the words as a statement. Cf. his citation of the passage in QG 4.47: “Behold this city is near to escape to, which is small and it is not small. Thereto I will escape and my soul will live.” In the Hebrew Bible, the etymology of Tsoʿar is explained in connection with the very word that Lot uses for “small” (mitsʿar; see Gen 19:20,

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22). Philo, however, who follows the Greek Bible in calling the city Segor, does not associate Lot’s words with the etymology. Cf. QG 4.50; see also Grabbe 1988, 204–205; Josephus, Ant. 1.204. On different place names associated with Segor (and the Pentapolis area in general), see Eusebius’s geographical work Onom. (Περὶ τῶν τοπικῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ [Klostermann 1966; cited by Loader 1990, 134]). the whole heaven and cosmos together. See the comment at § 159 on a cosmos within a cosmos. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo’s allegorical exegesis of the five Sodomite cities as symbolic of the five senses has its closest parallel, interestingly, later in this treatise. Interpreting the war between the kings (Gen 14) in §§236–244, Philo understands the kings of the five Sodomite cities to represent the five senses and the four opposing kings to represent the passions. In this later section of the treatise, then, Philo adapts and further develops the allegorical interpretation that he initially presents here. In connection with his reference to Segor as “small” and “not small,” when Philo cites Gen 19:20 in QG 4.47, he again construes the characterization of the city as “small” and “not small,” as if the verse contained two statements rather than a question toward the end (see the comment at § 166 on Hence indeed it is very apt …). In the QG passage, however, Philo offers a very different interpretation pertaining to Lot as the “progressive man,” who is still small and not yet ready to go as far from his city toward “the security of quiet” as the wise man. See QG 4.47 for other, additional interpretations. Finally, for parallels to Philo’s encomium on sight, which he includes elsewhere in different exegetical contexts, see the comment at § 150 on the queen of the other senses. Nachleben Like Philo, Origen (Hom. Gen. 5.5–6) appears to understand the question about Segor in LXX Gen 19:20 as a statement (see the comment at § 166 on Hence indeed it is very apt …). It is not clear, however, that Origen was influenced in this regard by Philo. See the comments by Royse (2008, 165, esp. n. 38). In his work Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes), the Renaissance Jewish author Azariah de’ Rossi mentions Philo’s interpretation in Abr. of the five cities of Sodom as one of his “beautiful allegories” (see Weinberg 2001, 119).

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Chapter 10: The Sacrifice of Isaac, §§167–207 a

Literal Interpretation, §§167–177 Analysis/General Comments We now turn to what Philo declares to be the most significant of Abraham’s deeds (§167), the (aborted) sacrifice of his son Isaac. After mentioning the excellence of body and soul of Abraham’s “much-loved and only” son, Philo reports on the unexpected oracle telling Abraham to sacrifice this son at a designated spot away from the city (§§168–169). Despite his great love for Isaac, Abraham showed no physical or emotional reaction. Instead, impelled by his love of God, he proceeded to follow the command as if he were carrying on his usual routine (§170). When the place came into sight, Abraham gave his son the wood and fire to carry as a suitable, light task of piety for the prospective victim (§171). After continuing at an equal pace, of mind rather than body, father and son arrived at the prescribed location (§172). As Abraham was building the altar, Isaac inquired, “See here, Father, there is fire and there is wood, but where is the sacrificial victim?” (§173). While someone else might have reacted with emotion, Abraham persisted in his steady demeanor and assured Isaac that God, for whom “all things are possible,” would find the victim for Himself (§§ 174– 175). Quickly Abraham then placed his son on the altar and drew his knife. As he was about to strike his son, God, calling Abraham twice by name, ordered him to stop (§176). Isaac was thus spared through God’s “returning the gift.” Philo tells us that Abraham’s deed, though not followed through to the end, was “complete and perfect,” and has left both an established record in the holy books and a powerful impression on their readers (§ 177). As has often been observed, the biblical narrative on which Philo bases his account (Gen 22:1–19) is extremely spare and offers minimal background details (see, esp., Auerbach 1957, 1–20). In his presentation, however, Philo adds and omits details in order to both increase the pathos and highlight Abraham’s absolute obedience to God. Thus, he stresses, on one hand, Isaac’s moral and physical excellence as well as his father’s great affection for him (§ 168), and, on the other hand, Abraham’s equanimity in response to God’s command, with descriptions reminiscent of the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια (§§ 170, 174–175). As is true in most of this treatise, Philo refers neither to Abraham nor to Isaac by name. Although this episode receives no further attention in the Jewish Bible, during the Second Temple period, Abraham’s near sacrifice of his son appears to have grown in importance, an observation supported by Philo’s reference to this act as Abraham’s “greatest deed” (§167; see the comment ad loc. on this

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phrase) and to the deep impression the story has made upon its readers (§ 177; see the comment ad loc. on is inscribed and immortalized …). Interpreters both earlier and later than Philo developed the tale in different ways and with various emphases. Their treatments include linking the story to Passover and/or temple sacrifice; viewing Isaac as a willing victim and/or martyr, who was actually sacrificed; and understanding Isaac as a type for Jesus and the story as a prefiguring of his crucifixion. In his present discussion, however, for Philo this story is primarily about Abraham and his piety and devotion to God. The reason for this focus will become clear when Philo turns immediately to what we have been calling his ethical interpretation of the tale (§§ 178–199; because of the length of this latter section, we will discuss it separately). Further analyses of Philo’s account are provided by Sandmel, who detects mystical hints in Philo’s retelling (1971, 124–130), and Feldman (2002), who considers several aspects of Philo’s narration and also compares it with that of Josephus. Studies of the history of interpretation of this story include Vermes 1973, 193–227; Levenson 1993, esp. 173–232; Daly 1977; Davies and Chilton 1978; Kugel 1998, esp. 295–326; Segal 1987, 109–130; Spiegel 1993; and Harl 1986b. Detailed Comments § 167. I have now given as accurate an account … This section is a bridgepassage introducing what in Philo’s overall plan is the crowning illustration of Abraham’s “piety” (εὐσέβεια), the account of which—covering his obedience to the call to leave his homeland, his sojourn in Egypt, and his entertainment of the three strangers at Mambre—had begun at § 60. the vision that was manifested to him. A reference to Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Gen 18:1–15 (see §§119–132). That Philo mentions this vision and the occasion for hospitality as if these appeared right before the present section is a way for him to return now to Abraham, whom he largely omits from the immediately preceding section about Sodom (§§ 133–166). This reference supports the view that Philo considers this section on Sodom as an extension of or addendum to what came before (see §133 with the comment on he discloses what is being revealed …). those notable and excellent acts of hospitality. Philo speaks of hospitality in the plural (ξενίαι) perhaps because, as he explains, although Abraham appeared to entertain, he himself was the recipient of hospitality. Implicitly the latter hospitality seems to refer both to his guests’ visiting Abraham’s household in the first place (see §§114–118) and to their rewarding his hospitality with the promise of a son (§110). Philo’s emphasis on Abraham’s merely appearing to entertain is consistent with his belief that the angelic guests did not in fact eat (§§110, 116, 118).

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his greatest deed. Philo aims to present as impressively as possible Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his only, beloved son so that he can later argue against those who question the greatness of Abraham’s action (§§ 178–199). His calling this Abraham’s “greatest deed” also attests to a growing recognition of the importance of this episode during the Second Temple period. In the Jewish Bible, Abraham’s near-sacrifice of Isaac is not explicitly mentioned again. Nonetheless seeds of the tale’s later significance are found in at least two points in the biblical account itself: Gen 22:1, which says that “God tested Abraham,” and Gen 22:16–18, in which the angel, in a second address to Abraham after he was stopped from performing the sacrifice, links the very blessings about Abraham’s offspring to his willingness to sacrifice his son. The later import of these two passages is reflected, for example, in Ben Sira’s statement about Abraham that “when … tested he was found loyal” and thus merited God’s blessing for his descendants (44:20–21; RSV trans.). Other noteworthy references to this episode in Second Temple literature include Jub. 17:15–18:19; 1 Macc 2:52; Wis 10:5; Pseudo-Philo, LAB 18:5, 32:1–4, 40:2; Josephus, Ant. 1.222– 236; and 4Macc 7:11–14, 13:10–12. For further details and perspectives, see Daly 1977; Levenson, 1993; and other sources listed above, in the Analysis/General Comments on §§167–177. Philo himself does not call this episode a test, but in introducing this treatise’s larger section on Abraham’s piety (§§ 60–207), he (Philo) presents the various episodes as “proofs” of this piety, a locution that suggests—if not that Abraham passed a series of “tests”—certainly that he had several opportunities to prove his faith. See § 61 with the comment on the clearest proofs of his piety. Philo also omits the blessings conferred upon Abraham in Gen 22:16–18, as he does in this treatise’s account of Abraham’s departure from Chaldea (§§60–67 on Gen 12:1–3; see also the Introduction, § 5d). Instead, Philo reports that God reciprocates the honor that Abraham showed Him by “returning the gift” of his son; see § 176 and the comment on God the savior … worth the telling. Literally, “worthy of hearing” (ἀξία ἀκοῆς). all God-beloved acts. Or, all God-loving acts. Abraham’s deed was not only dear to God but also reflects Abraham’s own profound love of the Divine. §168. a son of legitimate lineage. Genesis does not distinguish explicitly between Isaac—born of Abraham’s wife, Sarah—as legitimate and Ishmael— born of the concubine Hagar—as illegitimate. These labels may, however, reflect Roman categorizations (see Niehoff 2001, 17–33). Philo often uses these categories and even applies them to intangible values; see the comments at § 25 on bastard types of rule … and §110 on a legitimate son. a much-loved and only son. The Hebrew of Gen 22:2 has, as translated, “Take your son, your only one, whom you have loved, Isaac …” Out of recognition

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perhaps that Abraham in fact had another son, Ishmael, and that Isaac was therefore not the only one, the Greek, by contrast, has, as translated, “Take your son, the beloved, the one whom you have loved, Isaac …” The obvious impact of the Greek is to underscore that Isaac was much-loved. By speaking of him as both “beloved and only” (ἀγαπητὸς καὶ μόνος), Philo may reflect familiarity with either the Hebrew version or a different Greek version (see, e.g., Harl 1986a, 192, note ad loc.). See also Levenson 1993, 27–31, on the meaning of yeḥid as “only” or “beloved.” supremely fair of body and excellent of soul. In asserting the supreme physical beauty of Isaac, as well as his excellence of soul, Philo is going beyond what is stated in Genesis. This embellishment shows Isaac to be worthy of Abraham’s great devotion and heightens our appreciation of the extraordinary challenge posed to the loving father. As regards Isaac’s excellence of soul, the fact that Philo understands Isaac as a symbol of virtue acquired through “natural ability” (φύσις; cf. §§52–54 above and the next comment) would make his excellence of soul a reasonable presumption, but the matching physical beauty seems brought in here for rhetorical purposes, so that Philo may set up a sequence of balanced clausulae. virtues of greater perfection than warranted by his age. In the triad of patriarchs, who represent teaching, nature, and practice (§§ 52–54), Isaac is associated with nature apparently on the basis of Gen 21:8, which says that he “grew and was weaned.” Philo understands this verse to signify that Isaac had no need of “baby food” but instead from an early age was ready for adult nourishment (see Somn. 2.10 and the Excursus in Chapter 5 on “Philo’s Association of Abraham with Learning, Isaac with Nature, and Jacob with Practice”; also Birnbaum 2010, 82–86). Here, as elsewhere (e.g., Migr. 29), Philo translates this detail about Isaac’s advanced nutritional maturity to the moral realm. Josephus likewise portrays Isaac as an exemplar of virtue, filial obedience, and piety (Ant. 1.222). as a judge of morals. For the image of reason or conscience as an inner judge, cf. Opif. 128; Det. 23; Deus 50, 183. §169. an oracle such as he never expected. The divine command to sacrifice his only son is indeed introduced abruptly in Genesis (22:1–2), though that is hardly unusual for the narrative technique of that work. The verse presenting the command begins, “And it came to pass after these things (Hebrew, devarim; Greek, ῥήματα).” In both Hebrew and Greek, the word for “things” can also be understood as “words.” Because it is unclear what “these things” or “these words” are, some early exegetes considered different possibilities; see, e.g., Jub. 17:15–18; b. Sanh. 89b; also Kugel 1998, 301–302. In reporting the oracle, Philo omits the dramatic, direct quotations in which God calls Abraham by name (in

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the Hebrew, once; in the Greek, twice); Abraham replies (LXX Gen 22:2), “Here I am!” and God commands, “Take your son, the beloved, the one whom you have loved, Isaac …” on a certain lofty hill. The Hebrew command (Gen 22:2) specifies that Abraham go to “the land of Moriah”; cf. the Greek, “the high land.” J.W. Wevers suggests that the translation may reflect “an understanding of [Moriah] as related to the root [RVM, which means, to be high], i.e., with the two graphemes transposed” (1993, 316–317). For other speculations on the meaning of Moriah, see Gen. Rab. 55:7. According to 2Chron 3:1, Moriah was the site of Solomon’s Temple (see also Josephus, Ant. 1.226; Kugel 1998, 320–322). As Levenson has observed, one implication of the identification of Moriah with the Temple Mount is that “the slaughter that [Abraham] showed himself prepared to carry out was the first of innumerable sacrifices to be performed on that site.” The identification further carries the implicit hope among later worshippers that “just as Abraham’s intention met with divine favor and secured a rich blessing on his descendants, so would their own acts of service in the Temple prove acceptable to God and merit his continued good will toward them” (1993, 174). at a great distance from the city. The accusative ἀποστάντα is, no doubt, as suggested by Colson, a scribal error for the genitive ἀποστάντος, agreeing with “hill”; it cannot be taken to agree with “son.” Interestingly, Philo portrays Abraham as living in a city (see also Sandmel 1971, 125 n. 109). being a journey of three days. Philo anticipates the information offered in Gen 22:3–4 that Abraham and his party arrived at their destination on the third day. §170. neither changed his complexion nor weakened his soul. This would seem to indicate “freedom from passion” (ἀπάθεια) on Abraham’s part (see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§167–177), but Philo may not intend this to be interpreted too strictly. Instead his primary aim seems to be to highlight Abraham’s immediate and unflinching readiness to obey; see also § 192; and the comments of Lévy 2009, 160–161. with a mind unyielding and unwavering. The collocution ἀνένδοτος καὶ ἀρρεπής does not seem to occur elsewhere in Philo—his preferred companion adjective to “unwavering” (ἀρρεπής) is “unbowed” (ἀκλινής), which appears here separately to describe Abraham himself. Cf. Deus 23; Conf. 30 (the “sage” [σοφός] acquires from God a power which is ἀκλινὴς καὶ ἀρρεπής); Mut. 87; but we find “unyielding” (ἀνένδοτος) linked with “unbowed” (ἀκλινής) at Fug. 47. On Abraham’s steadfast obedience, see also §192. Overpowered by love of God. Unlike Genesis, Philo inserts Abraham’s motive, which will be significant in his (Philo’s) ethical interpretation of the tale (§§178–199).

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telling the divine message to no one within the household. Another added detail; cf. Josephus Ant. 1.225; and below, §189. the oldest and most devoted to himself. Once again, Philo is elaborating on the Genesis account, which merely specifies “two lads or servants” (LXX Gen 22:3: δύο παῖδες; Hebrew, shnei neʿarayw). Although both the Greek and the Hebrew words connote young boys, Philo presents them as older servants. as if to perform some one of the regular rituals. It is curious that Philo adds this detail, not included in Genesis, and one wonders how he envisioned such “regular rituals” before the written Mosaic laws specified what these were. §171. as from a lookout … Philo may have borrowed the phrase ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπιᾶς from Plato, Resp. 4.445c, but if so, it would be a purely verbal reminiscence. He uses it again, however, in a significantly autobiographical context at the beginning of the third treatise on Special Laws (Spec. 3:2). gave to his son the fire and wood. We may note, by the way, that in Genesis (22:6) Abraham gives Isaac only the wood but not the fire. The usual and reasonable understanding of LXX Gen 22:6 is that Isaac carried the wood, which Abraham placed on him, and Abraham carried the fire and the knife. In fact, however, the subject, a pronoun, describing who carried the fire and the knife can be seen as ambiguous: “And Abraham took the wood of the whole-burntoffering, and laid it on Isaac his son, and he took into his hands both the fire and the knife …” Philo omits mention of the “knife” or “sword” (ξίφος), until § 176 and is silent about what Abraham himself carries. for nothing is freer from toil than piety. For the idea of virtue being “painless” (ἄπονος), cf. Leg. 3.135; Mut. 258. For freedom from effort as associated with the naturally gifted (of whom Isaac is, of course, the paradigm), cf. Praem. 50. §172. with equal speed, not so much in body, but rather in mental attitude. From LXX Gen 22:6 and 8, both of which state that father and son walked “together” (ἅμα), Philo derives the notion that Abraham and Isaac walked with equal speed. Between these two verses (LXX Gen 22:7), Isaac asks where the sheep is for the sacrifice and Abraham responds that “God will provide” the sheep. Because Scripture repeats that the two walked together after this exchange, some ancient exegetes understood implicitly that Isaac may have grasped what was in store for him and that father and son proceeded with similar purpose, faith, and conviction, and not just with a similar pace (see Kugel 1998, 305–306). Elsewhere, Philo understands the two walking together to signify that virtues acquired by training (symbolized by Abraham) and natural ability (symbolized by Isaac) have the same value. Cf. Migr. 166–167, where Philo considerably elaborates, as follows:

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When the mind, having such trainers as these [sc. Eshkol and Aunan, representing respectively natural ability and contemplation], omits nothing that will make for its training, it runs by the side of perfect sound sense (φρόνησις), neither getting in front nor dropping behind, but taking strides of the same length and strength. This is manifest from the plain statement of the oracle (τὸ λόγιον) that they ‘both journeyed and came together to the place of which God had told him’ (Gen xxii.8). There is indeed an extraordinary equality in virtues, when labour (πόνος) has vied with natural fitness (εὐεξία), and acquired skill (τέχνη) with self-tutored nature (αὐτοδίδακτος φύσις), and the pair have proved capable of carrying off virtue’s prizes in equal measure. This, of course, is an allegorizing interpretation, which would be inappropriate to a literal exegesis of the text, such as we have here; but when he turns in this treatise to the allegorical interpretation (§§ 200–207), Philo, interestingly, does not concern himself with this verse (Gen 22:8) but instead focuses on the significance of Isaac, symbolic of joy, as a sacrificial offering. Philo’s statement here that father and son proceeded with the same intention is as far as Philo goes in this account to comment on Isaac’s attitude. In Praem. 31–34, however, he may provide another hint about Isaac’s reaction. There Philo writes that the Isaac-soul rejoices in the actions of the Father and Maker, or nature, “even though they do not conduce to its own pleasure, … because they are done for good and serve to preserve all that exists.” The implication is that Isaac recognizes the greater value of actions that may not be pleasant for him personally. Because the focus in Abr. is obviously on Abraham, it is understandable that Philo would restrict his remarks in this treatise about Isaac’s reaction. Later commentators, however, portrayed Isaac as a willing and even eager victim. See, e.g., Josephus, Ant. 1.232; 4 Macc 13:12, 16:20; Pseudo-Philo, LAB 32:2–3; 1Clement 31:3; Kugel 1998, 304–305; Levenson 1993, 187–199; and other sources listed above in the Analysis/General Comments on §§ 167–177. that brief road, whose end is piety. For the concept of the road leading to “piety” (ὁσιότης), cf. Virt. 51, where “humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) is a “high road” (ὁδὸς λεωφόρος) leading to piety. For the road to wisdom in general, cf. Plant. 97– 98. “End” (τέλος) carries the sense of both a geographical end to the road and an ultimate goal in life (see §49, with the comment on one and the same goal). §173. as the father set about collecting stones in order to construct an altar. Cf. the succinctness of LXX Gen 22:9: “and there Abraham built the altar.” “where is the sacrificial victim?” Philo postpones Isaac’s question to the point when all else is ready for the sacrifice, whereas according to LXX Gen 22:7, Isaac inquires about the victim on the way, before he and Abraham arrive

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at the spot for the sacrifice (see the comment at § 172 on with equal speed …). Cf. Josephus (Ant. 1.227), who similarly postpones the question, but has Isaac building the altar, a modification consonant with his later depiction of Isaac as a willing victim (Ant. 1.232). On other portrayals of Isaac as a willing victim, see again the comment at §172 on with equal speed … In his rendition of Isaac’s question, Philo quotes some words, moves πάτερ (“father”) to a different position, and introduces the word ἱερεῖον (“sacrificial victim”), among other changes; see further Royse 2008, 165. §175. with steadfast gaze and steadfast resolve. A further indication here of Abraham’s piety and apparent “freedom from passion” (ἀπάθεια) (see also §§170, 192). For “steadfast” (σταθερός) as an attribute of virtuous life and conduct, cf. Abr. 27 above, as well as Fug. 45–47. “God will see.” In his rendition of Abraham’s answer in Gen 22:8, Philo moves τέκνον (“child”) to the beginning of the sentence and inserts ἱερεῖον (“sacrificial victim”) between “God will see” (ὁ θεὸς ὄψεται) and “for himself” (ἑαυτῷ). The rest of the answer is Philo’s own invention. even in this vast wilderness. Another added detail, which underscores the challenge of finding a sacrificial victim under the circumstances; see also § 190. all things are possible for God. For a similar thought, see § 112; Opif. 46; Somn. 1.87; Virt. 26; also Feldman 2002, 81 n. 28. §176. he snatched up his son, placed him on the altar. Philo omits that Abraham bound (vayaʿaqod, in Hebrew) his son (Gen 22:9; LXX specifies that Abraham bound Isaac’s feet; see, however, Deus 4; also Pseudo-Philo, LAB 32:4). This act has given rise in Jewish tradition to the episode’s being called the ʿaqedah (“binding”). See Kugel 1998, 322; Davies and Chilton 1978; Spiegel 1993; Harl 1986b. God, the savior … calling on the father twice by name … Philo modifies this scene in several ways. In LXX Gen 22:11 and 15, it is the angel of the Lord who calls Abraham; in Gen 22:11, the angel calls Abraham twice by name, while Gen 22:15 simply reports that “an angel of the Lord called Abraham the second time from heaven.” Philo presents God instead of the angel as the one to stop Abraham’s sacrifice and “return the gift” (§177), perhaps because he (Philo) believes that God alone bestows the most important benefits (see, e.g., § 143; also Leg. 3.177; Conf. 180; Fug. 66; and Feldman 2002, 83–84). It is worth noting, however, that in God’s original charge to the patriarch in LXX Gen 22:1 God Himself calls on Abraham twice by name, but Philo does not refer to that direct address in this Abr. passage. Philo also omits the announcement of Abraham’s reward, which includes God’s blessing of him and his descendants (Gen 22:16– 18), introduced with the words, “‘By myself I have sworn,’ says the Lord.” In § 273, however, Philo quotes this verse and mentions that God confirms “through an

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oath … the gifts which He had promised him.” (On Gen 22:16–18, see also Leg. 3.203–210.) Finally, Philo omits the ram that appears and is substituted for Isaac as a sacrificial victim; on this omission, see Sandmel 1971, 127 n. 128. Since Philo’s chief interest is in Abraham’s readiness to offer Isaac, he (Philo) may not have found Abraham’s subsequent sacrifice of a ram to be germane. Cf. Josephus, Ant. 1.233–236, who likewise has God rather than the angel calling out to Abraham. Unlike Philo, however, Josephus does report on the content of the two messages conveyed by the angel and he also mentions the ram. §177. through God returning the gift. In one sense this refers to Abraham’s intended gift to God of his son Isaac but originally and ultimately Isaac is God’s gift to Abraham (see §§203, 273). the deed, complete and perfect, even though not brought to a conclusion. The idea seems to be that Abraham’s intention and willingness to sacrifice his son were as important as the deed itself; see the next comment. is inscribed and immortalized … For the expression ἀνάγραπτος ἐστηλίτευται, cf. Mos. 2.108, where Philo is speaking of the sacrifices performed by the virtuous and pure of heart: “The thank-offering of such a soul receives immortality, and is inscribed [firmly (ἀνάγραπτον στηλιτεύεται); our addition] in the records of God, sharing the eternal life of the sun and moon and the whole universe.” This parallel is especially apt, because in both passages, Philo underscores the pious intention of the offeror, even if the sacrifice does not take place. Thus in Mos. 2.107, he writes that if the offeror lacks “kindly feeling or justice” the sacrifices are desecrated, becoming null and void, but if the offeror is “pure of heart and just, the sacrifice stands firm, though the flesh is consumed, or rather, even if no victim at all is brought to the altar” (Mos. 2.108, emphasis added). Cf. also Virt. 95. In our Abr. passage, Philo claims in addition that the record is fixed firmly not only in Scripture but also in the minds of its readers, an attestation to the powerful grip this story has held upon readers for centuries. Indeed to this day it is included in the daily Jewish liturgy and is also the Torah reading for the second day of Rosh ha-Shanah (New Year); it merits as well a reference in the musaf (additional) service of both days of Rosh ha-Shanah (see, e.g., Vermes 1973, 211–218). On the growing importance of this episode in Jewish tradition during the Second Temple period and later and on the significance and transformation of this episode in Christian sources, see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§167–177. Parallel Philonic Exegesis In several places in the Allegorical Commentary, Philo addresses specific details of the Genesis narrative that he also mentions in our Abr. passage (§§ 167–177), but he treats these details rather differently. Thus, as in Abr. 168, in Deus 4 Philo

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also describes Isaac as “much-loved,” “only,” and “legitimate” (ἀγαπητός, μόνος, and γνήσιος), but he (Philo) allegorizes Isaac as an offspring of the soul, an offspring that Abraham brings as a “fitting thank-offering.” In this Deus passage, Philo also mentions that Abraham binds the feet, a feature that he omits in Abr. (see the comment at §176 on he snatched up his son …), and he likewise provides symbolic explanations for this detail. In Migr. 140, Philo refers to Abraham’s sacrifice of his “beloved” (ἀγαπητός) son—“no human being (for the wise man is not a slayer of his offspring), but the male progeny of the rich and fertile soul …” (In the PLCL translation, ἀγαπητός is incorrectly translated as “only.”) In Somn. 1.194, Philo refers to Isaac as Abraham’s “beloved and only (ἀγαπητὸς καὶ μόνος) son” but in Somn. 1.195, quoting God’s command from LXX Gen 22:2, Philo does not mention Isaac as an only child—“your beloved son, whom you have loved, Isaac …” (our trans.; see the comment at § 168 on a much-loved and only son.) In §169, Philo comments in passing that the hill where Abraham was commanded to sacrifice was a journey of three days and in § 171 that Abraham saw the place from afar. In Migr. 139 and 154, Philo also picks up on the detail of three days and views the three as representing the divisions of time (Migr. 139)—specified in Migr. 154 as past, present, and future. In Post. 17–20 and Somn. 1.64–67, Philo understands that Abraham’s seeing the place from afar signifies the limits of our ability to discern God Himself. In Migr. 166–167, Philo comments on the observation in LXX Gen 22:8 that father and son “ ‘both journeyed and came together to the place of which God had told him’ ”; see the comment at §172 on with equal speed, where we quote and remark on this Migr. passage. In Fug. 132–136, Philo discusses LXX Gen 22:7, 8, and 13, in which Isaac, acknowledging the fire and the wood, asks where the sacrificial victim is (LXX Gen 22:7). Abraham replies that “‘God will see for Himself a sheep for a whole burnt-offering …’” (LXX Gen 22:8; PLCL trans.). Philo gives several examples of two factors that require a third to complete the action and concludes that Abraham’s reply signifies that this third factor is “God’s special work” (Fug. 135) and that “God will see” signifies that “[t]o Him all things are known” (Fug. 136). In Abr. 173 and 175, respectively, Isaac inquires about the sacrificial victim and Abraham replies, but does not mention the ram. Another detail that Philo explores elsewhere is that God addresses Abraham directly. Thus, in Somn. 1.195, Philo uses some exchanges from Gen 22 (verses 1, 2, and 11–12) to illustrate the observation that God first calls his friends by name before He conveys His message. In Abr. 176, however, Philo mentions only that God called on Abraham “twice by name”; see the comment ad loc. on God the savior …

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Nachleben We have not found significant parallels to Philo’s account in later, Christian literature. It is worth noting, however, that PCW (4:170) cites Ambrose, Abr. 1.8.68 (and part of §69) in connection with Abr. 170. The passage from Ambrose translates as follows: The aged Abraham, rich in cattle and owning many slaves, did not take with him the multitude of his retinue; he himself split the wood and did not neglect to perform greater obediences with his own efforts … So he set out as the third man, with two companions, leading his victim, and came to the place of sacrifice on the third day. Tomkinson 2000, 34–35

Here the parallels with Philo include the observations that Abraham had many servants and that he set out with two others in addition to his son. Ambrose provides more details than Philo about Abraham’s wealth and notes that Abraham is the third person, leading his victim, while Philo describes him as the fourth after his son. In our opinion, these comparisons are not significant enough to indicate a reliance by Ambrose on Philo’s account. b

Ethical Interpretation, §§178–199 Analysis/General Comments After running through the narrative of the near-sacrifice of Isaac up to § 178, Philo now turns to a protracted defense against certain critics “who love to carp and snipe at everything” (οἱ φιλαπεχθήμονες καὶ πάντα διαβάλλοντες). These critics, however, are not—as we, with our modern sensibility, might expect— expressing horror and astonishment at God’s demand for human sacrifice, and in particular the sacrifice of a son by a father. Instead the critics are concerned, on one hand, to downplay the significance of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice and, on the other hand, especially, to pour scorn on the high regard accorded to the patriarch for his behavior. Philo’s response to these critics falls into four parts: 1) First, he summarizes their arguments in which they provide examples of what they think are similar sacrifices (§§178–183). 2) Second, he identifies the motivations behind the sacrifices in these examples (§§184–187). 3) Third, he demonstrates that Abraham had none of the same motivations (§§188–191a). 4) Fourth, he shows why Abraham’s act indeed deserves praise, motivated as it was by a genuine and thoroughgoing piety (§§ 191b–199).

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What we have termed Philo’s “ethical interpretation” is an integral part of his “literal and obvious” interpretation that begins in § 167 (see § 200). Though couched in the form of a response to criticism, this passage (§§ 178–199) constitutes an ethical reflection upon the narrative, such as we have encountered before this (see, e.g., §§114–118, 142–146, and the Introduction, § 4). Philo himself does not flag these ethical reflections as such, but we have found it helpful to do so because they are identifiably separate from his account of the narrative itself. Because his reflection on Abraham’s near-sacrifice is so lengthy (22 sections) we have also found it helpful to deal with these remarks in a separate unit, even as we recognize their essential connection with what precedes. 1) To return to our summary, according to Philo the critics point out that many men have sacrificed their offspring to secure victory in battle; to avert droughts, pestilences, or other natural disasters; or else to exhibit a false kind of piety (§179). Among the Hellenes, for example, even kings have thought little of offering their children (§ 180). The critics go on to adduce certain non-Hellenic nations that have a tradition of childsacrifice, such as we know was the case with the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and neighboring peoples of the Israelites. Indeed Moses explicitly condemns the practices of these peoples in Deut 12:31, which Philo here cites (§181). The critics also bring to bear the example of the self-immolation of the Gymnosophists in India, and the practice of suttee in that country (§§182–183). 2) In the next two sections (§§184–187 and 188–191a), Philo replies to this polemic point by point. Thus he declares that in the examples adduced by the critics, the sacrificers may be regarded as acting (a) in obedience to “tradition” (ἔθος), so that their deed is more natural than extraordinary (§185); (b) through “fear” (δέος) of a greater power—implicitly of a tyrant or of the people—so that the deed cannot be considered voluntary (§186); or (c) through desire for “glory” (δόξα), in a quest to gain respect or posthumous fame, so that the sacrificer deserves blame for purchasing an honor through the life of his children instead of insuring their safety (§187). 3) None of these motives, Philo argues, can be imputed to Abraham. First of all, there was no such practice in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, or Chaldea, where Abraham spent most of his life, so he would not be following any familiar custom (§188). Next, Abraham had nothing to fear from any human threat or potential communal misfortune (§ 189). Finally, he could

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not benefit from any praise, since he had no witnesses to his actions (§190). 4) After disclaiming that Abraham was motivated by any of the above factors, Philo now turns to the positive reasons why the patriarch is indeed deserving of admiration (§191b). For one thing, he had long been fully obedient to God regardless of the difficulty of His demands (§ 192). Next, since human sacrifice was not an established custom, he would have been the first to introduce this terrible act, something far from what comes naturally (§193). In addition, Abraham’s assent is all the more remarkable in that Isaac was his only, legitimate, and late-born son, and he could have no hope of any other. It would be less extraordinary for someone to offer a child from a large family since the other children would be able to provide solace, but to sacrifice one’s only son shows how completely that person is devoted to God (§§194–196). Furthermore, Abraham did not stay home, absent himself from the altar, or look away when this sacrifice was to be carried out, as was the case with other fathers who gave up their offspring for sacrifice. Indeed he was prepared to perform the sacrifice himself— and even to cut up his son limb by limb if necessary, as would have been required if a burnt offering were called for (§§ 197–198). Abraham’s action is therefore not to be compared with the other examples adduced, and is wholly admirable precisely because it was pure and simple piety that motivated him (§§199). This whole digression may come across to a modern reader as alien and peculiar, if not somewhat jarring. With our contemporary sensibilities, we might expect, on one hand, criticism to be leveled at God’s action in making such a seemingly appalling demand and, on the other hand, some resultant embarrassment on Philo’s part about the whole episode. Instead what we have from the critics is an apparently casual dismissal of the notion of child sacrifice as utterly unremarkable. Philo’s task, then, is not to defend God’s demand or Abraham’s willingness to comply but rather to differentiate Abraham from all the other examples marshalled by the critics. This Philo accomplishes by focusing upon the different motivations of all these sacrificers. Once we recognize that Philo’s essential task is to distinguish Abraham from the other examples, certain difficulties with the passage disappear. At first glance, for instance, some of the critics’ examples—such as the Indian Gymnosophists’ self-immolation or the widows’ self-sacrifice on the pyre with their dead husbands—seem somewhat off the point (see the comments at § 180 on among the Greeks … and at §182 on among the Indians …). The critics are presenting these examples, however, as a category that encompasses seemingly voluntary acts of destructive behavior to oneself or members of one’s family—

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a category in which they class Abraham’s apparently similar deed. Likewise, when Philo discusses, without any evident reservations about child sacrifice, the possibility of Abraham’s offering Isaac, we can understand his approach as a tactical stance that serves his purpose in setting Abraham apart from all the others (see the comments at §196 on to surrender up … and § 198 on in accordance with the law …; see also Niehoff 2001, 171–174; Feldman 2002, 70; D.R. Schwartz 2004, esp. 86–87). A central question to be determined is the very identity of the critics, a matter of some debate (see, e.g., Feldman 2002, 70–75). Compounding the difficulty is that we do not know whether the criticism was written or verbal. A potentially helpful approach might be to examine Philo’s other uses of words—like “fond of stirring up quarrels” (φιλαπεχθήμων) and “to slander” (διαβάλλω)— with which he describes these critics. Unfortunately, however, Philo applies these expressions to a wide variety of individuals and groups (see § 178 and the comment on those who love to carp and snipe at everything). One possibility is that the critics are non-Jews. In support of this suggestion is that Philo uses “fond of stirring up quarrels” (φιλαπεχθήμων) to describe nonJewish Alexandrians who set up statues in the city’s synagogues (Flacc. 52). These trouble-makers, though, may have had a range of social and political complaints against the Jews that did not necessarily include so specific an intellectual criticism as we have here. In his Against Apion, Josephus names several hostile non-Jewish writers who negatively portray people that appear to be the ancestors of the Jews in their departure from Egypt. (On the complexities of the evidence, see, e.g., Barclay 2007, esp. 341–349.) None of these writers, however, mentions Abraham’s near-sacrifice of Isaac, though it is possible that they or others like them did express criticisms that have simply not come down to us. The two references to this event that we have from non-Jewish, pagan writers— Alexander Polyhistor in Eusebius, Praep. ev. 9.19, and Alexander of Lycopolis, Contra Manichaei Opiniones Disputatio 24 (both cited by Feldman 2002, 73– 74)—express no judgment about Abraham. According to Feldman, moreover, “All the other references to Abraham in extant classical literature are positive or neutral” (ibid., 74). Another possibility is that the critics are Jews—whether, as Samuel Sandmel (1971, 128) has suggested, “assimilationist Jews” or, in Maren Niehoff’s view, Jews with a different approach to Scripture (2011a, 99–103). In Mut. 60–62, for example, Philo cites similar belittlers of the Abraham story, who question the significance of his change of name (for more details, see the comment at § 178 on those who love to carp …). It would certainly make sense that such close readers of Scripture might be Jews, and their familiarity with examples from Greek and other cultures would attest to their broader engagement with the world.

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(For another passage in which Philo mentions critics of Scripture, whose precise identity is again debatable but who would appear to be Jews, see Conf. 2–14, regarding the Tower of Babel; also Niehoff 2011a, 77–92. For the likely Jewish identity of these critics, see Conf. 2.) Contributing to the argument that the critics are Jews is the reference in §181 to LXX Deut 12:31. While it is possible that Philo himself introduces this reference, it appears in his summary of the opponents’ criticisms and so may reflect their own familiarity with Scripture. A further intriguing possibility is that the critics are apostates, whose complaints about the Abraham story are indicative of their disaffection from the tradition. Philo seems to have been familiar with such groups. Indeed in one passage, Virt. 182, for example, he uses “those fond of stirring up quarrels” (φιλαπεχθήμονες) to describe the “rebels against the holy laws” (οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων ἀποστάντες); cf. Spec. 4.182; Praem. 152; see also H.A. Wolfson 1982, 1.73–85. According to Josephus, moreover, Philo’s own nephew Tiberius Julius Alexander abandoned the Jewish ancestral practices (Ant. 20.100). (For other perspectives on Tiberius Julius Alexander, however, see Étienne 2000; Schimanowski 2007.) The fact that two of Philo’s treatises (Prov. 1–2 and Anim.) appear to be dialogues with this very nephew suggests that he is an example of someone who was indeed interested in debating intellectual matters. That a member of Philo’s own family may have been among the critics whom he cites here might also account for his particular animus against them (e.g., in §§ 178, 184, 191, 199). On one hand, it is possible that in these passages, Philo is simply engaging in rhetorical flourish. On the other hand, as Sandmel suggests, “These are not the calm words of a detached and remote mystic, but the angry words of a man provoked by some real situation” (1971, 128). While each of the above suggestions about the identity of the critics seems possible, without further evidence unfortunately this identity can remain only speculative. Nonetheless it is worth keeping in mind that, even though Philo may have composed this section with these critics in mind, it is likely that his intended audience both here and for the treatise as a whole extends more broadly (see the Introduction, §3d). Detailed Comments § 178. those who love to carp and snipe at everything. Philo now turns to the refutation of an ill-natured downplaying of Abraham’s great deed (see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§178–199). For this use of “loving to carp” (lit., “fond of stirring up quarrels”; φιλαπεχθήμων), cf. Mut. 60–62, where there again seems to be a reference to critics of the Bible (see also QG 3.43). What is more, in the Mut. passage, Philo mentions these critics, “who wish to attach

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blame to the blameless” (our trans.) in the context of another aspect of the Abraham story. He singles out one individual in particular who downplayed the significance of the change of Abram’s name to “Abraham” by the mere doubling of an alpha and similarly, the change of Sarai/Sara’s name to “Sarah/Sarra” by the mere doubling of the rho (see §81 with the comment on In the vocalization … and §99 with the comment on her name being in Chaldean “Sarah”). (According to Philo [Mut. 62], the same individual ended up hanging himself for “a slight and trivial cause”!) It thus seems that there was a group of “quarrelsome critics” (§178, PLCL trans.) who scoffed at what was held in high regard in the books of Moses. For various attempts to identify these people, see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§178–199; also Niehoff 2011a, esp. 122– 129 on Mut. 60–62. Elsewhere Philo also uses “loving to carp” (φιλαπεχθήμων) to describe non-Jews (Mos. 1.248 [Edomites]; Virt. 34 [Midianites]; and Flacc. 52 [non-Jewish Alexandrians]); apostates (Virt. 182); and unspecified ill-natured people (Fug. 5; Ios. 226; Spec. 1.241 [though the reference here is probably to Jews]; and Spec. 4.20). In seven passages in which the verb “snipe” (διαβάλλω) is used in the sense of “to slander,” the agents and objects of this slandering vary. Although some of these passages are not pertinent (e.g., Conf. 48; Fug. 20; Ios. 80; Flacc. 141), in three (Virt. 141; Legat. 215, 241), the slander is directed toward the Jews, whose attackers remain unspecified. to promote blame above praise. See the comments at § 14 on praiseworthy … blameworthy and at §186 on praise is recorded … Cf. Mut. 60 for a similar observation about critics of another part of the Abraham story (see also the previous comment). as we conceive it to be. It is interesting to speculate about whom Philo is referring to here with his use of the first person plural pronoun. While this is likely an “editorial we,” Philo may also have in mind a circle of like-minded exegetes or perhaps a wider community of Jews. A key question is whether Philo is addressing this circle, the wider community, the critics, or all the above and perhaps others as well. On the question of Philo’s audience(s), see the Introduction, § 3d and the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§ 178–199. §179. For they claim … The arguments of the critics extend from here through §183. In §184, Philo replies to arguments that “they themselves stated” (see the comment ad loc. on But I will reply …). §180. among the Greeks, very well-regarded figures … It is not quite clear whom the critics have in mind here. The instance of Agamemnon, king of Argos, allowing the sacrifice of his daughter Iphigeneia to appease the goddess Artemis so that the Greeks may sail for Troy readily springs to mind (see, e.g., Aeschylus, Agamemnon; Euripides, Iphigeneia at Aulis). Indeed Philo’s later remark in §197 that some fathers avert their glance from the sacrifice practi-

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cally confirms this as one of the cases put forth (see the comment ad loc. on For other men …). Another possibility is the example of Demophon, King of Athens, sacrificing Makaria, as portrayed in Euripides’s The Children of Heracles. This is not quite apposite, though, since Makaria, who volunteers herself for sacrifice to defeat the Argive army, is not the daughter of Demophon (he refuses to countenance the sacrifice of his own daughter), but of Heracles. We may also think of Andromeda, daughter of the Ethiopian king Cepheus, who is presented as a sacrifice to a sea-monster because of an insult to Poseidon, but is in fact rescued by the hero Perseus (Apollodorus 2.4.3). All these examples from Greek myth, we may further note, involve daughters; examples of the sacrifice of a son are lacking. Even though the critics may not offer precise parallels, however, it would seem that their aim is to establish a category of behavior in which to classify Abraham. Such a category appears to encompass intended acts of destruction to oneself or members of one’s family (see further the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§178–199). §181. while as for barbarian peoples, they have long accepted the slaughter of children as a holy and God-loving action. The Hebrew Bible refers to several instances of child sacrifice among non-Israelites. See, e.g., 2 Kings 3:27 (MT), with reference to the King of Moab; and 2Kings 16:3 (MT), with reference to nations that God had dispossessed before the Israelites. Complicating the matter, however, is that the Israelites too are chastised for performing such sacrifices; see again, e.g., 2Kings 16:3 (MT); Jer. 7:31; 19:5–6 (MT; LXX 19:4–5). Indeed the very prohibition that Philo quotes here from LXX Deut 12:31 (see the next comment) suggests that it was necessary to address possible instances of the practice among the Israelites. See also Lev 20:2–5; 2 Kings 23:10 (MT), according to which Josiah defiled Topheth in the valley of Ben-hinnom so that no one “might consign his son or daughter to the fire of Molech.” Philo may also be alluding in this passage to the Phoenician (and later, Carthaginian) custom of sacrificing first-born children. On the complicated question of child sacrifice in biblical Israel and in other instances in antiquity, see Levenson 1993, esp. 1–52. Among the Romans, reference to this practice among their vanquished enemies the Carthaginians would no doubt have elicited scorn. an outrage that is mentioned, indeed, by the most holy Moses. The reference is to LXX Deut 12:31, which Philo quotes here in part. Since he is summarizing the arguments of the critics, however, it would seem that they are the ones who point to this biblical reference (see also the Analysis General Comments above, on §§178–199). For another passage in Philo’s works that cites this verse, cf. Spec. 1.312–313: “So if we are victorious over our enemies, let us not affect their impious ways, in which they think to show their piety by burning their sons and daughters to their gods.” Interestingly, in this Spec. 1 passage, Philo

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denies that all foreigners literally engage in child sacrifice; instead he interprets the practice symbolically as their destroying their children’s souls by failing to raise them with the proper concept of the true God. Although Philo observes that Moses regards child sacrifice as an outrage and a pollution, Philo himself does not emphasize this aspect of the divine command to Abraham but focuses instead on the patriarch’s unquestioning readiness to fulfill the command. For Philo, then, the crucial, essential difference is the context of the offering: other nations perform child sacrifice with the wrong motives (and implicitly to the wrong deity). Abraham is differentiated from their example by his willingness to sacrifice his son to the one true God out of piety in response to His command. In quoting Deut 12:31, Philo omits αὐτῶν (“their”) after θυγατέρας (“daughters”) and ἐν πυρί (“in fire”) after κατακαίουσι (“they burn”; in the biblical verse, this verb ends in ‘ν’ preceding the prepositional phrase just mentioned). §182. among the Indians, … the Naked Sophists … At this stage, the illnatured critics would seem to be descending into irrelevance, since the examples given here are surely to a large extent beside the point. Sages approaching a debilitating old age immolating themselves, and faithful wives committing suttee (or, sati) on the pyres of their dead husbands, seem to be only dimly comparable with fathers sacrificing their children for a (perceived) noble cause. Nonetheless, the critics appear to categorize this type of behavior with chosen acts of either self-destruction or destruction of members of one’s family, and by this logic these acts of the Indians qualify as comparable to Abraham’s behavior (see also the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§ 178–199). As regards a source for this information, although Philo seems to be taking this data from the unnamed critics, he may also be familiar with other accounts about India and the Gymnosophists (or, “Naked Sophists,” according to the etymology), who are mentioned in various Greek sources; see, e.g., Strabo 15.1.59–66; 16.2.39; Plutarch, Alexander, 64–65; Lucian, Fug. 7; Porphyry, Abst. 4.17. Indeed Philo elsewhere refers to other aspects of the Gymnosophists. In Prob., for example, he speaks admiringly of them, together with the Persian Magi (§ 74; cf. Strabo 16.2.39), and also of the Gymnosophist Calanus (§ 93; cf. Strabo 15.1.64, 68; Plutarch, Alexander, 65, 69). See too Somn. 2.56, in which he refers to the Gymnosophist practice of sleeping on the ground (cf. Strabo 15.1.59). The term “Gymnosophists” may have been a general designation for people who followed a particular lifestyle (see Colson’s note on Prob. 74 in PLCL 9:513; Patillon and Segonds, 1995, 3:88 n. 259; Niehoff 2011a, 108). even now. So far most of the examples provided by the critics seem to be from the distant past, such as the Greek kings or the people condemned by Moses in Deut 12:31. Although the barbarian nations are said to have “long” accepted child sacrifice, the critics may have viewed the Indian practice of

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self-immolation and suttee as especially strong illustrations, since the custom persisted into their own times (see also Schur 1991, 106 n. 139). the womenfolk … hasten gladly to the same pyre. Philo may have known of this practice of suttee from various sources; see, e.g., Strabo 15.1.30, 62; Diodorus Siculus 19.33–34; and Colson’s note on this passage in PLCL 6:598. §183. these one might well marvel at … It is hard to discern whether Philo himself is acknowledging that it is possible to admire the courage of these women in the face of death or whether he is reporting on admiration expressed by the critics. as the initiator of an inherently original deed. As Philo presents their objections, the critics believe that Abraham is highly regarded for performing a new kind of action rather than for the motivation behind the action; cf. § 193. Philo recognizes that other countries perform human sacrifices, but for him Abraham’s motivation is the key distinguishing factor. §184. But I will reply to their malignity and bitterness. Speaking in the first person singular (see §178 and the comment on as we conceive it to be), Philo now begins his response, running through § 199. First he establishes the motives reflected in the critics’ examples (§§184–187) and then denies that these motives are applicable to Abraham (§§188–191a). Finally, he concludes by offering positive reasons why Abraham’s act deserves praise (§§ 191b–199). as they themselves stated. Philo notes that the critics themselves pointed out that it was customary for non-Greeks to sacrifice their children; see § 181. §185. long-standing custom often becomes the equivalent of nature. For the idea that “long-standing custom” (ἐγχρονίζον ἔθος) takes on the force of “nature” (φύσις), cf. Decal. 137: “long-ingrained custom is more powerful than nature” (our trans.); and Ios. 83: “Custom has a wonderful power of forcing everything into the likeness of nature.” The Emperor Julian, at Misopogon 353a, quotes the saying “custom is a second nature” (ἔθος δευτέρη φύσις), without indicating its source. See also §193 with the comment on “it is a hard task …” difficult to endure or bear. Both these adjectives, δυσυπομόνητος and δυσκαρτέρητος, seem to occur first in Philo. Since they are found in later authors as well, though—Soranus for the former, Plutarch and others for the latter—who may not be familiar with Philo, the terms are presumably not Philonic coinages. §186. those who make the offering out of fear. The argument here (§§ 186– 187) seems somewhat tendentious. If our inferences are correct about the examples under consideration (see the comments at § 180 on among the Greeks … and §181 on while as for barbarian peoples …), the sacrifices do not, after all, involve being ordered, say, by a tyrant to kill one’s children, but are motivated rather by the “fear” (δέος) of losing a battle or aborting an expedition, unless one makes a sacrifice of one’s child. Such a sacrifice will supposedly

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bring “fame” or “glory” (δόξα, τιμή; §§184, 187), in the form of the gratitude of one’s subjects or fellow-citizens, but it is misleading to suggest, as Philo does in §187, that anyone would embark on such a course of action solely for “glory” (δόξα), without the constraint of some dire necessity. So Philo’s contrast between “fame”/“glory” (δόξα/τιμή) and “fear” (δέος) as separate motives seems forced. However, it could be maintained that by using such inexact arguments he is merely paying the critics back in their own coin, since the examples are theirs. praise is recorded in the case of voluntary achievements. Cf. Deus 47: a person receives praise “for good actions which he performs voluntarily” (our trans. of ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἑκὼν κατορθοῖ), This seems to be an adaptation of a Stoic definition of praise (and blame) arising from their doctrine of action, within the context of their doctrine of determinism; cf. SVF 2.1002–1003 (both from Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato). Philo obviously regards a sacrifice motivated by fear to be involuntary. §187. in a quest for glory. See the comment at § 186 on those who make the offering out of fear. §188. custom or honor or fear. Philo now proceeds to eliminate each of three motives that he has isolated, following the order “custom”-“fear”-“honor” (ἔθος, δέος, τιμή) as he did in §§184–187, despite the order that he lists in this passage. Babylon and Mesopotamia and the nation of the Chaldeans. Philo’s awareness of these nations’ customs (or lack thereof) is noteworthy. §189. for no one knew. See §170 and the comment on telling the divine message to no one … §190. in the midst of a wilderness. See §175 and the comment on even in this vast wilderness. so that he should not seem to be taking pride. According to Gen 22:5, Abraham tells his servants to wait behind, a detail that Philo reports in § 171. With our contemporary sensibility, we might understand that Abraham asked his servants to stay behind because he did not want them to witness the terrifying sacrifice of his son. By explaining that Abraham did not want to show off his piety, however, Philo ascribes to him a rather unexpected motivation! Indeed this explanation reflects how thoroughly impressed Philo is—or wishes his readers to be—by Abraham’s piety. §191. their unbridled and evil-speaking mouths. Philo here makes use of a phrase borrowed from Euripides’s Bacchae 386: condemning reckless critics of divinity, “with unbridled mouths” (ἀχάλινα στομάτα), and amplifies it with the adjective “evil-speaking” (κακήγορος), possibly embodying a reminiscence of Plato, Phaedr. 254e, where the phrase refers to the unruly horse of the soul— with perhaps a hint also of Pindar, Ol. 1.53, where slanderers of the gods are

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referred to as meeting an evil end. The verb “speak evil” (κακολογέω), however, is used in LXX Exod 21:16, in connection with abuse of parents and the punishment for that, and Philo quotes this verse in Fug. 83, where he uses κακηγορέω instead. The adjectives “unbridled” (ἀχάλινος) and “evil-speaking” (κακήγορος) are also found together at Somn. 2.132; cf. Mos. 2.198. the envy within them that rejects goodness. For other instances of the adjective “hating the good” (μισόκαλος), of which Philo seems to be the first attested user, cf. above §21, where it is used to categorize the bad person: “for the bad person is by nature a malicious creature, a hater of good and a lover of evil” (βάσκανον γὰρ καὶ μισόκαλον καὶ φιλοπόνηρον ὁ φαῦλος φύσει). As an epithet of “envy” (φθόνος), it is to be found at Migr. 183 and Spec. 3.3. In the latter passage, Philo blames envy for his being drawn into public affairs and in Flacc. 29, he associates envy (without a modifier) with the Egyptian nature. See also Mos. 2.27, in which Philo cites envy as the reason why the Mosaic laws were briefly out of public awareness. For different perspectives on envy in classical antiquity, see Konstan and Rutter 2003. worthy of praise and love. After denying other motives, Philo now turns to positive reasons why Abraham’s deed should be admired and appreciated. §192. so as never to disregard any of the commands given to him. Cf. LXX Gen 26:5: “Because Abraham your father obeyed my voice and kept my injunctions and my commandments and my ordinances and my statutes.” See also Philo’s reference to this verse in §275 and the comment below on even if they were filled with labors and pains. without any show of ill-grace or displeasure. Cf. § 170, with the comments on neither changed his complexion … and with a mind unyielding and unwavering …; and §175, with the comment on with steadfast gaze and steadfast resolve. even if they were filled with labors and pains. Philo’s characterization here implicitly calls to mind God’s command to Abraham to leave his country, an act whose difficulty Philo himself had earlier emphasized (see §§ 62–67; cf. §§ 85– 87). The notion that God’s commands to Abraham were fraught with challenges is also suggestive of the tradition that Abraham was tested several times (see § 61, with the comment on the clearest proofs of his piety). §193. to perform human sacrifice. The verb ἀνθρωποθυτέω is attested first in Philo, and only here, though the noun ἀνθρωποθυσία is found in Strabo 4.4.5 and Plutarch, Moralia 857a, 417c. “it is a hard task to fight against nature.” The dictum φύσει ἔργον μάχεσθαι, of unknown origin, is quoted in full much later by the Emperor Julian, and completes the quotation begun above, at §185 (see the comment ad loc. on long-standing custom …). Philo’s point is that it would not be natural to make a sacrifice of a human being; implicitly, this observation applies all the more to

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one’s offspring. It is interesting that in §185 the saying is used to equate nature with “long-standing” custom, while here nature would be opposed to the establishment of a new custom. §194. only this one legitimate son. Because Abraham had another son, namely, Ishmael, perhaps Philo uses the qualification “legitimate” (γνήσιος) so that he can characterize Isaac as Abraham’s only legitimate son. Philo also observes that for this legitimate son Abraham necessarily had “a legitimate feeling of love” (τὸ πάθος ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τῆς εὐνοίας γνήσιον). See too § 168, with the comments on a son of legitimate lineage and a much-loved and only son; and Schur 1991, 108 n. 141. chaste forms of love. The principle of σώφρων ἔρως is identified by Philo’s contemporary Arius Didymus (ap. Stobaeus, Anth. 2.7.24) as a Platonic ideal, and is viewed by the Neoplatonist commentator Hermeias as being exemplified in Plato’s Phaedrus (cf., e.g., In Phaedr., Couvreur 1901, 42, 10; 43, 30; 47, 27). Cf. Libanius, Orations 64.48.6 (Lincicum 2013b, 161). much-vaunted friendships. Lit., “friendships as much as they became so through reputation.” The expression δι᾽ ὀνόματος to mean “notable” or “much talked-of,” though hardly exotic, one would think, does not seem to be attested before Philo. It seems to appear elsewhere only in Athenaeus (fl. c. 200 CE), who uses it twice, once to qualify certain parasites, and once to qualify eels! §195. a most compelling love-inducement. Philo likes to use the term “lovecharm or potion” (φίλτρον) for the power of pleasure (e.g. Ebr. 50; Post. 135; both in relation to Rachel), but also for that of kinship (cf. § 63 above and Spec. 1.137). Here as the “compelling love-inducement” Philo offers two insightful reasons why parents are particularly attached to late-born children: either these children were long-awaited and hoped for or they represent the last of the parents’ reproductive powers. On Abraham and Sarah’s advanced age when Isaac was born, see Gen 17:17; 18:11–12; 21:5, 7. §196. to surrender up … as a sort of first-fruit of one’s children would be in no way outlandish. It is somewhat startling to find Philo taking seriously the possibility of human sacrifice, especially in light of such biblical passages as Exod 13:11–15; 34:20; and Num 18:15–16, which explicitly prohibit human sacrifice and call instead for the firstborn son to be “redeemed” (with money). On the other hand, Exod 22:28, in which God commands, “The firstborn of your sons you shall give to me,” does not mention replacement by money, and there is some debate about whether this verse may possibly reflect the actual practice of child sacrifice in ancient Israel (see Levenson 1993, 1–52). Philo does, however, recognize the substitution of money for human sacrifice in Spec. 1.137–140. It is helpful to bear in mind that in the present context, Philo’s purpose is to highlight Abraham’s piety in following God’s command and to this end, he (Philo)

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does not focus on complexities associated with this command. Instead, accepting that God indeed directs Abraham to offer his son, Philo sets forth the best arguments that he can to showcase what he considers to be the patriarch’s exemplary response. “Outlandish” translates παράδοξος, lit., “contrary to expectation.” granting nothing to natural feelings of affinity. In several other instances, Philo presents different values as trumping ties of kinship; see, e.g., Abr. 31, 235; Mos. 2.171; Spec. 1.317; 2.73. This observation is especially true about his discussions of proselytes in, e.g., Spec. 1.51–52; Virt. 102–104, 179; cf. Virt. 189 and 198; see also Birnbaum 1996, 203, 213–215. leaning with all his weight. This use of ταλαντεύω to mean “weigh out” or “measure out” (as opposed to “balance,” “sway to and fro”) does not seem to occur elsewhere before Alciphron (1.8), in the 2nd or 3rd century CE. §197. For other men … if they happen to be present, avert their eyes … while others do the slaughtering. According to Euripides (Iphigeneia at Aulis 1543–1601), Agamemnon, his brother, and the whole army stood looking at the ground while Calchas performed the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. It is interesting to note that, in this play, Iphigeneia is presented by Euripides as spirited away by the goddess Artemis, who substitutes for her a deer! (Cf. Iphigeneia’s opening address in Iphigeneia among the Taurians.) §198. the sacrifice. The term used here, ἱερουργία, is hardly attested before Philo (two notable exceptions include Herodotus 5.83, where the word appears without the epsilon, and Plato, Leg. 6.774e), though it is common enough in the Neoplatonic period. The corresponding verb ἱερουργέω is even rarer before Philo, occurring only in an inscription (IG I2 4.4.8); but cf. Paul at Rom 15:16: “in the priestly service of the gospel of God” (ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ). in accordance with the law of burnt offerings. See, e.g., Lev 1:6 and 12. Philo’s discussing Abraham’s prospective sacrifice of Isaac within the context of the prescribed, lawful burnt offerings of animals is, again, somewhat jarring. See, however, the comment at §196 on to surrender up … Cf. Gen. Rab. 56:9, in which Abraham is said to have prayed that God look upon the segments of the substitute ram’s sacrifice as parts of Isaac’s body. In Sacr. 110, Philo similarly refers to Isaac as an example of a “whole burnt offering” (ὁλοκαύτωμα, the word used in our Abr. passage). In LXX Gen 22:2, God commands Abraham to offer Isaac as a “whole burnt offering” (ὁλοκάρπωσις, which is a synonym of ὁλοκαύτωμα, both of which translate the Hebrew ʿolah). with minimal regard for ties of blood-kinship. See the comment at § 196 on granting nothing … §199. begrudger and troublemaker. Philo ends his refutation of the critics on a fine rhetorical note. For the collocution βάσκανος καὶ φιλοπόνηρος, cf. § 21

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above. On the question whether this remark and others (e.g., §§ 178, 184, 191) reflect mere rhetoric or something more, see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§178–199. though surely no deed of the sage is trifling. The dictum βραχὺ δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔργον σοφοῦ is central to Philo’s interpretation; for a similar general observation, about the household of the sage, see §109. Parallel Philonic Exegesis We have not found substantial parallels in Philo’s other works to the specific refutation of critics and defense of Abraham regarding the sacrifice of Isaac. In the Detailed Comments above, however, we have noted other Philonic passages either with exegesis of the same biblical verses that he cites in this section or with comments that resonate with some of his brief observations. Thus, in Spec. 1.312–313, for example, Philo alludes to LXX Deut 12:29–31, which he partially quotes in Abr. 181; see the comment ad loc. on an outrage … Regarding Philo’s characterization of God’s commands as “filled with labors and pains,” see the comment on this phrase at §192. As in § 198, in Sacr. 110, Philo similarly refers to Isaac as a “whole burnt-offering” (ὁλοκαύτωμα); see the comment at §198 on in accordance with the law of burnt offerings. Finally, regarding passages where Philo similarly addresses hostile critics, but on other matters, see the Analysis/General Comments at the beginning of this section (§§ 178–199). Nachleben We have not found parallels to this passage in later, Christian literature. As Feldman (2002, 73–74) points out, however, in a later, pagan critique of Manichaean doctrines, Alexander of Lycopolis sees similarities between Jesus’s crucifixion, the near-sacrifice of Abraham’s son, and Greek tales about “people giving themselves up in order to save their cities.” The translated passage reads as follows: … to say in accordance with the doctrine of the Church that he gave himself up for the remission of our sins has a certain plausibility in the eyes of the many because of historical parallels: in Greek history, where we often read about people giving themselves up in order to save their cities; also Jewish history, which prepares the son of Abraham for being sacrificed to God, contains an example of such a tale. However, to have Christ submit to his passion to make something manifest is utter foolishness, when words are sufficient for the teaching and the knowledge of what is. Contra Manichaei Opiniones Disputatio 24; van der Horst and Mansfeld 1974, 94

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This passage, which questions belief in the necessity of the crucifixion for Jesus to have conveyed his message, shows that, like the critics whom Philo cites (§§179–180), others also saw parallels between Abraham’s deed and Greek tales of human sacrifice. It is not clear, however, whether Alexander derived the idea of such parallels from Philo or recognition of these parallels was commonly shared in antiquity. c

Allegorical Interpretation, §§200–207 Analysis/General Comments After Philo’s defense in §§178–199 of the uniqueness and piety of Abraham’s act there follows a brief allegorical exegesis of the episode, which, however, contains much of interest. Philo allegorizes Isaac in accordance with the etymology of his name—based on LXX Gen 21:3 and 6—as “laughter.” This Philo chooses to interpret as representing, not the “passion” (πάθος) of pleasure, but rather the corresponding “equable state” (εὐπάθεια)—in Stoic terminology—of “joy” (χαρά) (§§200–201). Building upon earlier notions, Philo offers a most interesting exposition of the Stoic theory of “freedom from the passions” (ἀπάθεια), such as is to be striven for by all, but which is enjoyed as much as possible by the perfected sage—and also, as it emerges, according to Philo, in its purest form only by God Himself (§202; see below). In Stoic theory, though the sage is free from passions, he may experience their rational equivalents (εὐπάθειαι), with the proviso that there was considered to be no rational equivalent of “grief” or “distress” (λυπή). Thus there are three “rational emotions” (εὐπάθειαι) (“joy” [χαρά]; “will” [βούλησις]; and “caution” [εὐλάβεια]) to match, respectively, the remaining three traditional “passions” (πάθη) (“pleasure” [ἡδονή]; “desire” [ἐπιθυμία]; and “fear” [φόβος]; cf. SVF 3.431–433, 438; Dillon 1996b, 151–152). According to the scenario set out here, then, the sage, in recognition of the fact that joy is most proper to God alone, makes a sacrifice to God of his own joy (represented by Isaac). Unlike God, humans cannot experience this kind of perfect joy because they are “beset by grief and prone to fears” (§ 202). God, however, out of His goodness and “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία), returns to the sage this gift of joy, in so far as the sage is capable of receiving it (§ 203). At this point, through a fabricated speech attributed to God (§ 204), Philo introduces the interesting idea, mentioned above, that joy in its purest form is proper to God alone. Moreover, it is attainable even by the best of souls in the sublunary world only in a somewhat diluted or “contaminated” form, even as the pure light of the sun reaches us only in a somewhat diluted mode, “blended with misty air” (§205). We seem here to be faced with an implicit theory of levels of equable states and virtue, since Philo links the two concepts closely (cf. the end of § 204; Sacr.

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103; Mut. 167; Praem. 160; also H.A. Wolfson 1982, 2.275–276). Accordingly God Himself enjoys some sort of paradigmatic version of both qualities; the perfected sage achieves a somewhat diminished form of these; and by inference the rest of humanity experiences a lower form again, wherein passions grip the soul, and virtue consists in their “moderation” (μετριοπάθεια), rather than their “extirpation” (ἀπάθεια). Philo is in fact the only thinker on record to treat the ideals of “extirpation” (ἀπάθεια) and “moderation” (μετριοπάθεια), not as exclusive alternatives (as between Stoics and Peripatetics), but as points on a sliding scale. At one end of this scale is the level attained by the perfected sage, symbolized elsewhere by Moses (e.g., Leg. 3.129–131), and here by Abraham—though cf. §§256–257 below, where Abraham seems to be commended rather for his “moderation” (μετριοπάθεια). Further down the scale is the level attained by the person who is still “improving,” the προκόπτων, symbolized by Aaron (cf. again Leg. 3.129–132). Although Philo does not spell out all the details of this theory in his brief allegorization here, these notions seem to underlie his interpretation. (See Winston 1995b, 821–824; 2008.) Finally, at §206, Philo also finds in some of these notions an explanation for Sarah’s laughter, and then her repudiation of her laughter out of fear (Gen 18:12 and 15). Discussed by Philo earlier, at §112, without any attribution of a “higher” meaning to it, this episode is now adduced to reinforce the point that the sage (here, Sarah) does not wish to claim the essentially divine quality of “joy” (χαρά) for herself. Although Sarah’s laughter, denial, and fear—when taken literally—might be understood to reflect negatively upon her, Philo’s interpretation presents her reactions in a positive light (see the comment at § 206 on denied her laughter). Moreover he construes God’s response—which in Genesis (18:13–14) appears to be a rebuke—as reassurance that He does not wish the human race to remain sunk in griefs, but He is pleased to bestow upon it at least the possibility of attaining the joy to be derived from the contemplation of the wonders of the universe (§207). Detailed Comments § 200. the literal and obvious account … Philo uses “literal” (ῥητός) and “obvious” (φανερός) singly and together to characterize the literal level of exegesis. For ῥητός, cf., e.g., §§68, with the comment on the literal level of the text; 88; 119; and 131 above; and 217 and 236 below; for φανερός, see § 147; cf. also, e.g., Sobr. 33: “the literal and obvious explanations in the laws” (our trans. of αἱ ῥηταὶ καὶ πρόχειροι ἀποδόσεις ἐν τοῖς νόμοις). Philo alludes implicitly in this Abr. passage to several distinctions that we have previously encountered: “Literal” and “obvious” implicitly contrast with allegorical and hidden, respectively; “the many” implicitly contrasts with the few. The Platonic distinction between intelligible

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and sensible realms runs throughout Philo’s works. For more on some of these characterizations and “those who are able to see,” see the comment at § 147 on This is the account … On Philo’s use of ῥητός generally, see also Excursus 1 in the Introduction, §4. §201. called in Chaldean “Isaac,” but in Greek the word is translated as “laughter.” On Philo’s use of “Chaldean” to mean “Hebrew,” see the comment at §8 on for the Chaldean word for “human” is “Enos.” Isaac’s name and its etymology are given in LXX Gen 21:3 and 6 but laughter is also associated with his birth in LXX Gen 17:17 and 18:12–15. See also Gen 17:19 and § 112. this “laughter” is not … that which rises in the body from childish play. Philo dissociates Isaac’s name (and thereby implicitly Isaac himself) from both the body and childish play. Elsewhere Philo also dissociates Isaac from children’s nourishment; see the comment at §168 on virtues of greater perfection … See also §48 and Cher. 8 with notes ad loc. in Colson and Whitaker, PLCL 2:12 and 482. from that equable state that arises in the mind, namely, joy. On the Stoic notion of “equable states” (εὐπάθειαι), see the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§200–207. See also the comment below at § 204 on passions … equable states. For the linking of the “laughter” that is the etymology of “Isaac” with “joy” (χαρά), the Stoic εὐπάθεια corresponding to “pleasure” (ἡδονή), cf., e.g., Det. 123–124 (also with reference to Sarah’s laughter); Mut. 131, 156–157; Praem. 31. Besides an obvious connection between laughter and joy, the Greek Bible provides additional support for this association. According to LXX Gen 21:6, Sarah said, “The Lord has made laughter (γέλως) for me, for whoever will hear will rejoice with me (συγχαρεῖταί μοι).” By contrast, the Hebrew for Sarah’s words (Gen 21:6) conveys the play on Isaac’s name (in Hebrew, yitsḥak): “God has made laughter (tseḥok) for me; everyone who hears will laugh for me ( yitsḥak li).” (The word li can also be translated as “with me” or “on my account.”) See also Grabbe 1988, 171–172. §202. thus indicating symbolically that to rejoice is most proper to God alone. Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice Isaac, or laughter, becomes the sage’s readiness to acknowledge that true joy belongs to God alone. For this latter thought, cf., e.g., Cher. 86: God alone “feasts” (ἑορτάζει) and “is happy” (γήθει) and “joyous” (χαίρει); Spec. 2.54; QG 4.19. See also the comment at § 204 on the genus of joy and of rejoicing. beset by grief and prone to fears. For the collocution ἐπίλυπος καὶ περιδεής, cf. Spec. 2.52: “the sorrowful and terror-stricken condition of our race” (τὸ … ἐπίλυπον καὶ περιδεὲς τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους) is relieved by the feasts of the Lord, as relayed to Moses at Num 28; cf. QG 4.19. It is notable that of the four passions, Philo mentions only grief and fear in this context (see also § 207). He ignores

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the πάθη of pleasure and desire, presumably to accentuate as much as possible the contrast between divine joy and human misery. On fear and grief, see Det. 119, in which Philo calls these the more painful of the four passions. alone partakes in happiness and complete blessedness. On the “happiness” (εὐδαιμονία) of God and on God as “happy” (εὐδαίμων), see Runia 2002, esp. 149– 152. §203. this true acknowledgment. That is, that complete joy belongs to God alone. having banished envy far from Himself. For analogies to this thought, borrowed ultimately from Plato (Tim. 29e and Phaedr. 247a), cf. QG 1.55; Spec. 2.249; and Prob. 13 (the latter two passages quoting Phaedr. 247a). See also Runia 1986, 136; 2001, 145, the comment at Opif. 21 on He did not begrudge; and Herrmann 2003. C. Kraus Reggiani (1979, 250 n. 84) suggests that Philo wishes intentionally to contrast the one true God who is free of envy with the pagan concept of an envious divinity such as one finds in the writings of Herodotus (e.g., 1.32), with whom Philo was surely familiar (see Earp PLCL 10:457, under “Herodotus”; also Lincicum 2013b, esp. 154–155). In this Abr. passage the idea seems to be that because God is not envious of humanity, He can bestow gifts upon them in a way that will benefit them the most instead of burdening them with too much or depriving them with too little. On human envy, see the comment at § 191 on the envy within them … quite fittingly returns the favor of the gift. God returns to Abraham what was His gift originally—namely, Isaac—who then becomes Abraham’s gift to God. See the comment at §177 on through God returning the gift. in so far as the recipient is capable of receiving it. For the concept of the limited capacity of the recipient, which becomes a basic principle in Neoplatonism, cf. Opif. 23; Post. 142–145; Spec. 1.43–44; also Runia 2001, 146–147, the comment at Opif. 23 on in proportion to the capacities … He virtually proclaims this. Here we have another imaginary speech inserted by Philo. See, e.g., §127 with the comment on He virtually proclaims. §204. the genus of joy and of rejoicing. On the philosophical significance of “genus” (γένος), and its superiority to “species” (εἶδος), see Tobin 1983, 112–119; Birnbaum 1996, 56–58. Here Philo does not mention the “species” (εἶδος) of joy but instead explains that human joy—or indeed any joy in the created world— is mixed in some way (see §205). Thus the γένος of joy, which belongs to God alone, is clearly superior, implicitly as it would be to the εἶδος of joy experienced by His creation. See also Spec. 2.55. passions … equable states. For the contrast here between πάθη and εὐπάθειαι, cf. in particular QG 2.57, and Dillon and Terian 1976–1977. See also Conf. 91; Her. 77; and the Analysis/General Comments above, on §§ 200–207. Referring to joy

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as “the best of the equable states” (ἡ εὐπαθειῶν ἀρίστη χαρά in, e.g., Migr. 157 and Congr. 36), Philo speaks about “joy” (χαρά) much more than the other “equable states” (εὐπάθειαι). §205. in the same way too, light … Here Philo uses light as an analogy to joy to explain the differences between the heavenly and earthly forms of both. See also Opif. 30–31 and Runia 2001, 53 and 167, the comment at § 30 (2b) on exceedingly beautiful. See further, Nikiprowetzky 1989. §206. the eponym of virtue, Sarah. Philo associates Sarah with virtue through the etymology of her name, which he understands to be “one who rules” (ἄρχουσα, f.). As he explains in §99, according to an interpretation that he had heard, Abraham’s wife represents virtue because “there is nothing more dominant and authoritative than virtue.” See also Cher. 8; Mut. 77–80; and the comment at §99 on her name being in Chaldean “Sarah” …; also Earp, PLCL 10:413–419, under “Sarah.” denied her laughter. According to LXX Gen 18:12–15, upon hearing news of the forthcoming birth, Sarah laughed because of her apparent disbelief that such a birth would be possible. The Lord then asked Abraham why Sarah laughed and added, “Is anything impossible for God?” (LXX Gen 18:14). Thereafter Sarah denied that she laughed, because she was afraid. In reply, “[H]e said to her, ‘No, but you did laugh.’” (On the ambiguity of the speaker here, see the comment below on the holy word …) In this brief exchange, Sarah and the Lord might be viewed less than positively: Sarah laughed because she initially disbelieved in the possibility of the future birth and then out of fear she denied that she laughed. Her fear suggests that she perceived the Lord as intimidating. The Lord, meanwhile, appeared to take offense and to rebuke Sarah and thereby lent some credibility to her evident perception of Him. In our present Abr. passage, however, Philo presents all of these apparently uncomplimentary aspects in a favorable light by giving new meaning to Sarah’s laughter, fear, and denial and to the response that she receives. See the next two comments and the comment at §112 on feeling ashamed. fearing lest she was claiming for herself joy. According to Gen 18:15, Sarah denied her laughter because she was afraid. Implicitly it would seem that she feared some kind of negative reaction from the Lord. Philo, however, understands Sarah’s fear to pertain to the possibility that she had overreached in her expectations of joy. Philo may also mean to suggest that Sarah does not wish to claim the essentially divine quality of joy for herself unless it is bestowed by God. She could actually be said to recognize God’s bestowal of joy later, at LXX Gen 21:6, when she remarks, “The Lord has made laughter for me.” Philo finds great significance in this verse; see, e.g., Leg. 3.219; Det. 123–124; and the discussion in Birnbaum 2010, 85–86.

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the holy word says, by way of encouraging her. In LXX Gen 18:15, the identity of the speaker who responds to Sarah with the words, “No, but you did laugh,” is unclear; see the comment at §112 on when they said. Perhaps because of this ambiguity, Philo attributes the response here vaguely to “the holy word.” According to the plain sense of the biblical verse, the comment would appear to be a reprimand. Understanding Sarah’s fear as related to her possibly claiming too much joy for herself, however, Philo instead sees the response as an encouragement to Sarah to confirm that she is indeed able to partake in joy, albeit of a mixed kind. Cf. QG 4.17, in which Philo understands the ostensible rebuke as praise. §207. griefs and pains and incurable woes. See the comment at § 202 on beset by grief and prone to fears. enjoy relaxation and calm. The collocution εὐδιάσαι καὶ γαληνιάσαι is not found elsewhere, but the corresponding nouns, εὐδία and γαλήνη, are found conjoined frequently; cf. Opif. 63; Deus 129; Spec. 1.224; 3.5; 4.154; Praem. 116. rejoice and take pleasure in the spectacles provided by the universe. For the pleasure associated with this kind of contemplation, cf. §§ 164–166 above, and Opif. 77; Her. 274; Fug. 37; Spec. 2.52; 3.1; Contempl. 90. Parallel Philonic Exegesis Several elements in the above allegorical interpretation have parallels elsewhere in Philo’s writings; these elements include Isaac’s name as meaning “laughter,” which connotes joy (§201); Sarah as representing the “eponym of virtue” (§206); and Sarah’s denial of her laughter as signifying the recognition that unlike divine joy, human joy is mixed (§§206–207). For other references to the etymology of “Isaac” as “laughter,” which links him with the equable state of joy, see Leg. 3.87; Mut. 157–161; Praem. 31; QG 3.38 (in some of these references, the identification of joy as an equable state can be found in a nearby passage). Additional references are found in Earp PLCL 10:324; see also Grabbe 1988, 171– 172. On the connection between the meaning of Sarah’s name and virtue, see § 99, with the comment on her name being in Chaldean “Sarah …” For parallels and additional discussion, see the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis in Chapter 7 on §§99–106. Earlier in this treatise, Philo mentions Sarah’s denial of her laughter (LXX Gen 18:15) and gives this denial a different interpretation (see § 112, with the comment on feeling ashamed). Regarding his interpretation in our present section, Philo offers the same explanation about divine and human joy in Spec. 2.54–55 and QG 4.19. In Det. 124, Philo similarly explains the difference between divine and human joy—not, however, in relation to Sarah’s denial of her laugh-

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ter but rather in connection with LXX Gen 21:6, in which Sarah exclaims, “The Lord has made laughter for me.” Nachleben Like Philo, several patristic writers recognize the etymology of Isaac as “laughter” (§201). See, e.g., Origen, Cels. 5.45; Ambrose, Isaac 1.1; Jerome, Nom. hebr. 7.15; Qu. hebr. Gen. 28.7. (These citations are from Grabbe [1988, 171], who includes others as well.) In Hom. Gen. 8.10, Origen further associates Isaac with joy (cf. Philo, Abr. 201) and Sarah with virtue (cf. Philo, Abr. 206). In an imaginary address to Abraham, Origen emphasizes that “when you have approached God joyfully, he again gives back to you what you have offered and says to you: ‘You will see me again, and your heart shall rejoice, and no man shall take your joy from you’” (Heine 1981, 146–147). Philo similarly connects Abraham’s sacrifice with joy and understands that God returns the gift (Abr. 203–204) but unlike Origen, Philo explains that the sacrifice and God’s return of it pertain to the acknowledgment that “to rejoice is most proper to God” (§202). Regarding Sarah’s laughter (LXX Gen 18:12 and 15), Ambrose explains, similarly to Philo, that her laughter does not signify disbelief: “For she laughed, although she still did not know why she laughed, because in Isaac she would give birth to universal joy [cf. Genesis 21:5–6]. Therefore, she denied that she laughed [cf. Genesis 18:15] because she did not understand; therefore, she laughed because she prophesied” (Abr. 1.5.43; Tomkinson 2000, 23; bracketed entries are hers). While Philo contrasts divine and human joy and Ambrose does not, the two writers share the idea that Sarah’s laughter pertains to her joy in the news (Philo) or to her giving birth to joy in the future (Ambrose). For observations about the link between Sarah and virtue in later, Christian literature, see the Nachleben section at the end of Chapter 7 (on §§ 99– 106). Finally, in his work Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes), the Renaissance Jewish author Azariah de’ Rossi mentions as one of Philo’s “beautiful allegories” his interpretation in Abr. of the binding of Isaac (see Weinberg 2001, 119).

b

The Humanity of Abraham, §§208–261 Chapter 11: The Dispute with Lot, §§208–224 a

Literal Interpretation, §§208–216 Analysis/General Comments Philo now turns from the examination of Abraham’s “piety” (εὐσέβεια)—his relations with God—which has concerned him since § 60, to the topic of his relations with his fellow humans, (his φιλανθρωπία; cf., φιλάνθρωπος, § 208). This quality is initially described, however, as his “constructive dealings”— one might almost say, his “adroitness”—with people (πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεξιότης; see the comment at §208 on his constructive dealings). As his first illustration, Philo discusses Abraham’s successful and benign management of an unfortunate dispute that arose with his nephew Lot—or, more specifically, between their respective servants—when they were both encamped near Bethel. This presentation involves Philo’s turning back, in the narrative of Genesis, from chapter 22, which describes the sacrifice of Isaac (discussed in the preceding section, §§167–207) to chapter 13, which immediately follows Abraham and Sarah’s departure from Egypt (Gen 12:10–20, discussed much earlier in §§ 89– 106). (On our use of “Abraham” and “Sarah” here instead of “Abram” and “Sara,” see the Introduction, §12.) Basing himself on LXX Gen 13:2 and 5–11, Philo manipulates the biblical tale to suit his own purposes. Whereas Gen 13:2 merely states that “Abram was very rich in cattle, in silver, and in gold,” Philo remarks not only that the patriarch’s wealth rivalled that of the most established native residents but also that he was nonetheless admired rather than resented by them (§ 209). Before turning to the domestic dispute involving Abraham’s own servants and those of Lot, Philo first emphasizes that whenever any conflict arose between Abraham’s servants and “others” (ἕτεροι), he tried to achieve resolution in a gentle manner (§210). Thus Philo begins by generalizing the theme of “adroitness” (δεξιότης), drawing perhaps to some extent on his own family’s experience in the alien environment of Alexandria. Having had a considerable presence in Alexandria for centuries, the Jews there were, admittedly, not really much more “resident aliens” than the Greeks, but that was not how things were viewed by the GrecoRoman establishment (see, e.g., Flacc. 53–54), and Philo is plainly conscious of the importance of, especially, a rich alien family cultivating good relations with the locals.

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In §211, he goes on to observe that one should not be surprised by Abraham’s peaceable behavior toward those more powerful than he, since he likewise applied gentleness in dealing with members of his own household over whom he “had the advantage” (πλεονεκτεῖν). Philo now introduces the dispute between Abraham’s servants and those of Lot, whom Philo describes—most likely on the basis of an etymology of Lot’s name—as “an unstable and rather ambivalent fellow” (§212; see the comment on this phrase ad loc.). According to LXX Gen 13:6, “the land was not large enough for them to live together because their possessions were great.” Although LXX Gen 13:7 then simply states that “there was strife between the herdsmen of Abram’s cattle and the herdsmen of Lot’s cattle,” Philo, observing that each set of servants possessed the qualities of their respective masters, pins the blame for the dispute squarely upon the servants of Lot (§213). After a serious battle erupted, despite his having the stronger side, Abraham settled the matter diplomatically (§214). Knowing that the two parties could not continue to dwell together, for the sake of peace he offered his nephew the option to choose the better region (§215). At the end of his account, Philo acknowledges Abraham’s peacemaking abilities and, implicitly, his justice and righteousness. “[W]ho else,” asks Philo, “would have yielded in any respect to the weaker, when he himself was the stronger?” (§ 216). In Philo’s literal rendition, then, what is in Genesis originally an account of a territorial dispute with his nephew Lot alone (or, more precisely, with the servants of Abraham and Lot) is generalized into a commendation of Abraham for achieving universal popularity with his host nation despite his conspicuous prosperity. Abraham’s conduct towards Lot becomes merely a particular case of the patriarch’s extraordinary qualities. Special emphasis is laid on Abraham’s wisdom and forbearance in striving for a peaceful solution through negotiations in a situation where he could have prevailed easily by force, and in settling for a less than best option by allowing Lot to make his choice of territory in which to reside. Abraham’s model of human interaction is thus the opposite of “aggrandizement” (πλεονεξία)—the ideal of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, or of Callicles in the Gorgias (see also the comments at § 211 on when he could have had the advantage and at §216 on who else would have yielded …?). With his stated intention of highlighting Abraham’s “constructive dealings with people,” Philo omits references from Gen 13 to the patriarch’s travels, his calling upon “the name of the Lord,” and his later building an altar to Him (13:1, 3–4, 18). Consistent too with his general approach to the divine promises of land and multiple offspring, Philo similarly leaves out God’s address to Abraham in Gen 13:14–17, which features these promises. Finally, Philo does not comment here on the verses regarding Lot and Sodom (13:10–13) but the depiction of

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Sodom in these verses figures prominently in his two other sections about the region (§§133–166, 225–244). While different episodes in Abraham’s life—such as his departure from Chaldea or his readiness to sacrifice Isaac—have received ample attention from a range of early Jewish and Christian interpreters, Philo appears to be one of the few exegetes of his time to provide a sustained discussion—both in his literal and allegorical interpretations—of the quarrel between Abraham and Lot’s servants. Compare, for example, Jub. 13:17–18; Josephus, Ant. 1.169– 170; Genesis Apocryphon 21:5–7; Pseudo-Philo, LAB 8:2. Note, however, the later Gen. Rab. 41:3–8 and interpretations of Ambrose in his work on Abraham (see the Nachleben sections in this chapter following discussions of Philo’s literal and allegorical interpretations). Detailed Comments § 208. Let so much be said, then … Note the formula of transition, indicating Philo’s passing on from his exposition of Abraham’s “piety” (εὐσέβεια) to that of his “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία). Here he uses a conventional praeteritio— i.e., the rhetorical device of calling attention to something by saying that one will not mention it—to let us know that many other examples might have been adduced. his constructive dealings. The word δεξιότης, related to “right” (δεξιός) and to our word “dexterity,” can also denote “kindliness.” See the note on Fug. 31 (PLCL 5:583 and the Analysis/General Comments above, on the present section [§§208–216]). Philo’s use of this word is especially interesting when considered in relation to Abraham’s address to Lot in LXX Gen 13:9, in which Abraham says, “[I]f you go to the left I will go to the right and if you go to the right, I will go to the left” (see §224 and the comment on on the right … on the left). See also Mos. 2.151, in which Philo makes an explicit connection between “right” (δεξιός), and a “dexterous spirit” (δεξιότης). for it is characteristic of the same nature to be both pious and humane, and one may observe in the same person … holiness in relation to God, justice in relation to people. In Philo’s setting forth the connection between piety and love of humanity, we see a variant of the so-called “Canon of Two Virtues,” or Zweitugendlehre, identified by Albrecht Dihle in his article entitled “Der Kanon der zwei Tugenden” (1968). This two-part notion is recognizable already in Plato’s Euthyphro (12c–e), where “holiness” (τὸ ὅσιον) is made one division of “justice” (τὸ δίκαιον), the other division not being explicitly named (as φιλανθρωπία), but indicated at 12e as “that part (of Justice) which has to do with the service (θεραπεία) of people.” Philo shows that he has the Euthyphro well in mind by the echoes of Euthyph. 13a–14b in Det. 55–56, but he would be aware

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of more recent uses of the dual formulation as well. Dihle himself suggests that this formulation was reintroduced into philosophical discourse by Posidonius, and this suggestion is not improbable. Philo presents “piety” (εύσέβεια or ὁσιότης) as “the queen of the virtues” at Spec. 4.135, and ranks “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) as the twin of piety at Virt. 51. There is also, of course, a large section on “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) as the counterpart of “piety” (εύσέβεια) at Virt. 51–174, where it is emphasized that these two virtues are complementary and belong to the same nature (see, e.g., Virt. 51, 76, 95 and Wilson 2011, esp. 55–77, 157–357). We also find the conjunction of “piety” (ὁσιότης) and “justice” or “righteousness” (δικαιοσύνη) at Spec. 1.304 and Virt. 47 and “wisdom” (φρόνησις), conjoined to both qualities at Spec. 2.12 and Praem. 66. Philo’s organization of his treatise on Abraham into sections on “piety” (εὐσέβεια) and “love of humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) parallels his discussion of the Decalogue in which he observes that the first set of five commandments pertains to dealings with God, while the second set pertains to dealings with humans (Decal. 50– 51, 106–110, 121). See Termini 2006, 285–287; 2004b. On the connection between this structure and Philo’s understanding of Abraham as an unwritten law, see the Introduction, §3c; and the Analysis/General Comments in Chapter 14 (on §§262–276). two or three. From here until §261, Philo presents Abraham’s dealings with Lot (§§208–224, based on Gen 13:2, 5–11); Abraham’s intervention in the war between the kings (§§225–244, based on Gen 14); and Abraham’s grieving for his wife, Sarah (§§255–261, based on Gen 23:1–6). In these episodes, Philo shows that, among other virtues, Abraham exhibited the four cardinal ones: justice in his dealings with Lot (§§208, 225); courage in the war between the kings (§225), and wisdom and moderation in mourning for his wife (esp. §§257–258; see also the comment at §217 on an encomium and § 219, with the comment on wisdom and self-control and justice and courage). In §§ 245–254, Philo describes the virtues of Sarah, the very wife whom Abraham mourns, and in §§262–276, Philo concludes the treatise with reflections on Abraham’s faith. For more on the structure of the treatise, see the Introduction, § 4; also Sandmel 1971, 130–138. §209. exceedingly rich in silver and gold. The collocution πολυάργυρος καὶ πολύχρυσος recurs at Fug. 25, but there the adjectives describe the characteristics of the unjust man. Here, of course, despite Abraham’s great wealth, it is precisely his eminent justice that averts the envy of his indigenous neighbors. Abraham’s wealth in silver and gold is mentioned in Gen 13:2; cf. 24:35. See also the next comment. possessing abundant herds of many animals. According to Gen 12:16, when Abraham and Sarah were in Egypt, before discovering that Abraham was

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Sarah’s husband and not her brother the Egyptians enriched Abraham with flocks and servants. His abundance of animals is also mentioned in Gen 13:2 and 24:35. an immigrant. The description of Abraham as an “immigrant” (here, μέτοικος) may be based on LXX Gen 23:4, in which Abraham refers to himself as “a sojourner and a stranger”; in Greek, πάροικος καὶ παρεπίδημος; in Hebrew, ger vetoshav. Philo may also have in mind LXX Gen 14:13, which speaks of Abraham as a περάτης, a translation of the Hebrew, avram haʿivri (“Abram, the Hebrew”; see below §231 and the comment on a foreigner and a sojourner). The word μέτοικος, appearing here (in §209), has the sense of a “resident alien” and was used especially to describe settlers in ancient Athens who were not citizens. Philo also refers to Abraham as a μέτοικος in §§231 and 252. Although these passages may likewise be based on LXX Gen 23:4 or 14:13, the Genesis narrative clearly portrays Abraham as an immigrant, whether a specific word is used for this or not. As in the present context, Abr. 252 similarly refers to Abraham and Sarah’s success when compared with native inhabitants; see the comment ad loc. on resident aliens … natives; also the Introduction, § 6e. not the target of criticism from any of his hosts. Philo’s emphasis on Abraham’s unlikely success as an immigrant and the lack of resentment or criticism from native-born neighbors may have been inspired by the situation of his own family—and perhaps other Jews—in Alexandria. (See also the Analysis/General Comments above on this section [§§208–216].) On the basis of his reports about violence against the Jews in 38CE, however, one might wonder whether his comments here reflect a yearning for an ideal rather than the actual situation. We do not know how Philo himself fared during the uprising, but it is not unreasonable to surmise that some wealthy and successful Jews were indeed harmed (see, e.g., Flacc. 76–77). §210. some conflict or dispute in relation to others. By contrast with Gen 13:6–7—which refers only to the tensions caused by Abraham and Lot’s possessions and herdsmen—before mentioning the quarrels between these herdsmen Philo first establishes a pattern of Abraham’s behavior with others, i.e., outsiders, during instances of conflict. Again, this amplification may have been influenced by Philo’s own situation in Alexandria (see the previous comment and the Analysis/General Comments above on this section [§§ 208–216]). with gentle manners. Here we prefer to accept Mangey’s emendation “with gentle manners” (πρᾳοτέρῳ ἤθει) for the “with harsh manners” (βαρυτέρῳ ἤθει) of the mss. The manuscript reading is translatable at a pinch (e.g., Colson’s “by means of his greater dignity of character”), but it is not the most natural meaning of βαρύς, which one would expect to mean, rather, “grim,” or “heavy-handed” (cf. “with a heavier and more powerful hand” [βαρυτέρᾳ καὶ δυνατωτέρᾳ χειρί]

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just below, §211). By contrast, “gentle” (πραΰς), is just what the context calls for; see, e.g., §213, in which Philo refers to Abraham’s “gentle nature” (πραϋπάθεια). all symptoms of contention and disturbance and civil strife. Philo tends to associate φιλονεικία, ταραχή, and στάσις with polities which he would characterize as “mob-rule” (ὀχλοκρατία); e.g., Agr. 45. As in the latter passage, in which Philo speaks of these qualities in the context of the soul, here there is no such political implication, though these epithets implicitly refer to members of the servant class. See Geljon and Runia 2013, 143, the comment at § 45 on disturbances and uproar and civil strife; cf. also Philo’s allegorical interpretation of Gen. 13:5–11 below, in §§217–224. §211. it is no wonder. Because of his prolixity, Philo’s logic here is somewhat hard to follow. His point, as Sandmel (1971, 131) concisely states, is that one should not be surprised that Abraham acted in a conciliatory way “with strangers who might be stronger than he” because he acted that way “even with those weaker, such as relatives, related by blood but not in morals.” when they found themselves desolate and alone. Besides Abraham, Lot had no other family in Canaan (see Gen 11:28–32). Philo may also be alluding here to Lot’s subsequent situation in the war between the kings, during which he was carried away and Abraham entered the battle to save him (Gen 14, esp. verses 12–16; see also §§225–244, esp. §§229–234). when he could have had the advantage. Here Philo uses the verbal form πλεονεκτεῖν, “to have, or to take, advantage.” On the concept of “overreaching” (πλεονεξία), see also the comment at §126 on on the pretext of friendship …; § 216 and the comment on who else would have yielded …?; and the Analysis/General Comments above on this section (§§208–216). In The Republic Plato’s definition of justice as a kind of “minding one’s own business” (4.443c–e) is the opposite of behavior motivated by “overreaching” (πλεονεξία) and he speaks of πλεονεξία as characteristic of the unjust person. Philo’s description of Abraham in terms of his avoidance of πλεονεξία thus buttresses his portrayal of Abraham’s “justice” (δικαιοσύνη). See also the comment above at §208 on two or three. §212. a nephew, who came along with him when he departed from his native land. See Gen 12:4 and compare §66, in which Philo states that Abraham left “with a few companions or even alone,” along with the comment ad loc. on the same phrase. On Lot, son of Arrhan (Greek; in Hebrew, Haran), see too Gen 11:27 and 31. Consistent with his approach throughout this treatise Philo does not mention Lot by name. Elsewhere, however, he finds meaning in this name; see the next comment. an unstable and rather ambivalent fellow … A powerful description of the character of Lot, which accords with and is probably related to Philo’s under-

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standing of the etymology of “Lot” as “the one that inclines” (τὸ κλινόμενον, Migr. 13; our trans.) or “turning away” (ἀπόκλισις, Migr. 148). In the former passage, the inclining is toward sense-perception, while in the latter, Philo writes that “[t]he mind ‘inclines,’ sometimes turning away from what is good, sometimes from what is bad.” In our Abr. passage, Lot’s inconsistency pertains to his behavior towards his uncle. On Philo’s etymology, see Grabbe 1988, 179–180. Often in QG 4.31–58, Philo similarly characterizes Lot as one who is progressing; see esp. QG 4.47. For more on Lot in Philo’s other works, see Earp, PLCL 10:370– 372 and the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis following this discussion of Philo’s literal interpretation (§§208–216). See also Kugel 1998, 328–331. At Mos. 2.248, à propos the king of Egypt, the “character” (διάθεσις) of bad people is described as ἀβέβαιος, the word used here for “unstable,” while the rare compound “somewhat ambivalent” (ὑπαμφίβολος), not attested elsewhere than in Philo, is found again at Spec. 3.57, where it is applied, rather bizarrely, to barley, as suited to the trial of a woman suspected of adultery, because it is a food “of somewhat doubtful merit.” Although Philo’s interpretation of Lot as unstable can be supported by passages about him in Genesis, the biblical narrative itself does not explicitly describe or evaluate Lot’s character. now fawning upon him … Προσσαίνω, “to fawn,” is a poetical compound, first attested in Aeschylus, Ag. 1665, where the Chorus are defying Aegisthus; cf. Somn. 2.51; and the following passages in which Philo associates this behavior with dogs: Gig. 35 (of pleasures, which fawn like dogs and then turn against us); Praem. 89; Prob. 90. now rebelling and breaking off with him. The collocution ἀφηνιάζων καὶ ἀπαυχενίζων does not seem to occur elsewhere in Philo, though each of these verbs is popular with him, the former being employed fully 34 times, the latter on 13 occasions. §213. his household servants were quarrelsome and unruly. Cf. Agr. 159, where “contentious tumult” (δύσερις ταραχή) is associated with the contests of sophists, who are concerned to adulterate the truth. It is interesting that in the cases of both Lot and Abraham, Philo attributes the character of the servants to the character of their masters (cf. Pesiqta Rabbati, Bayyom ha-shemini 3, cited by Kugel 1998, 331). Unlike Philo, Genesis does not describe the character of the herdsmen and does not distinguish between those of Abraham and Lot. Instead it simply reports that there was “strife between the herdsmen of Abram’s cattle, and the herdsmen of Lot’s cattle” (LXX Gen 13:7). By contrast, in the Abr. passage Philo embellishes considerably on the nature of the two sets of servants. this was especially true of his herdsmen, who lived at a distance from their master. Genesis does not provide a basis for the observation that Lot’s herds-

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men were more quarrelsome than his other servants or that they lived at a distance. One might infer from the nature of their work, however, that they were often away from their master’s home. the gentle nature … The noun πραϋπάθεια is first attested in Philo, and might be suspected of being a coinage of his, except that in turns up in 1 Tim 6:11, as the culmination of a list of virtues, though in the form πραϋπαθία. The adjective occurs at Spec. 4.93, where the “intellect” (νοῦς) is described as rendering “the spirited part” (θυμός), “gentle” (πραϋπαθής); and at Legat. 335 (in the superlative). The verb “to be gentle” (πραϋπαθέω) occurs at Fug. 6. See also the comment at §210 on with gentle manners. Genesis does not specify that Abraham had a gentle nature, but Philo presumably infers this from his behavior toward Lot. On gentleness as a virtue, see Rodrigue 2014. §214. the counter-attack. The noun ἀντεφόρμησις is very rare, attested before Philo only in Thucydides 2.91 and after Philo only in Heliodorus 8.16. (Another reading of Thucydides, however, has the noun as ἀντεξόρμησις, “sailing against,” with a xi instead of a phi.) knowing that his own party was more substantial. Philo fills in several details about Abraham’s motivation and reasoning that are not found in Genesis. Besides the claim that Abraham knew that he had a more powerful group, these details include that he did not allow the quarrel to reach the point of victory so as not to distress his nephew and, in §215, that he realized that if he and Lot were to continue to dwell together the squabbles would persist. with proposals for agreement. Or, perhaps, “peaceable words.” For the expression συμβατήριοι λόγοι, cf. Leg. 3.134, where the “progressor” (ὁ προκόπτων, Leg. 3.132), symbolized by Aaron, who is still at the stage of “moderation of the passions” (μετριοπάθεια), extends a “proposal for agreement” (συμβατήριος λόγος) to these passions in order to rein them in—a scenario of peacemaking not that different from what we are presented with here, albeit here on a literal level, with Abraham trying to rein in the different sets of servants. §215. continue to strive in obstinate contention … Cf. Congr. 53, where it is made clear that “to contend in battles of argument” (γνωσιμαχεῖν) is characteristic of philosophical quibblers, who care only about word-play, not the improvement of life, such as should be the purpose of philosophical activity. See also the note ad loc. in PLCL 4:577. the better land. According to Gen 13:10–12, Lot chose the well-watered area around the Jordan and settled in Sodom while Abraham lived in Canaan. Philo does not specify these details here, but he refers prominently to the abundant resources of the Sodomites earlier, in §§133–146, and in the very next section, §§225–244, esp. §§226–229.

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the greatest of advantages, peace. For other such characterizations of peace, cf. Mos. 1.304, “the greatest good, peace” (ὁ μέγιστος ἀγαθός, εἰρήνη; our trans.), which God grants to Phinehas; Fug. 174. §216. who else would have yielded …? A fine rhetorical flourish with which to end his literal interpretation, driving home the moral of restraint where one could exert one’s superior power to achieve domination and “aggrandizement” (πλεονεξία), in order to secure “a life free from discord” (ἀστασίαστος βίος). This passage offers a striking contrast to the principle enunciated by the Athenians in the Melian dialogue as reported by Thucydides (5.89; Crawley 1998, 352) that “‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’”! Parallel Philonic Exegesis Philo’s depiction of Lot as “an unstable and rather ambivalent fellow, veering this way and that” (§212) has parallels in Post. 175; Migr. 13, 148–149, 175; and Somn. 1.85–86. In Migr. 13 and 148, Philo explicitly presents the etymology of “Lot” as “the one that inclines” (τὸ κλινόμενον; Migr. 13) or “turning aside” (ἀπόκλισις; Migr. 148). The quality of inconsistency is conveyed in Post. 175, which describes Lot as “having been impelled upwards, wavered and went downwards through weakness of soul.” Similarly, in Migr. 148–149, Philo develops the notion that Lot sometimes inclines toward the good and sometimes toward the bad. Although he accompanied the lover of wisdom (i.e., Abraham, Gen 12:4), Lot created obstacles for his uncle, who eventually had to establish separate dwelling places for each of them. Later, in Migr. 175, Philo refers to Lot as having been “severed from [Abraham’s] company, for he bent aside his soul which had the capacity to grow up straight and unswerving.” Regarding Lot’s entering Segor as the sun rose (LXX Gen 19:23), in Somn. 1.85–86, Philo understands Lot positively to be among “those who are akin to virtue and turn away to her.” Finally, at several points in QG 4.31–58, as someone who progresses, Lot is portrayed as being pulled in different directions (see, e.g., QG 4.31, 34, 35, 38, 46, 47, 51, 54). For symbolic interpretations of what Lot inclines toward or away from, see further the section on Parallel Philonic Exegesis following discussion of Philo’s allegorical interpretation below (§§217–224). Nachleben Later evidence of Philo’s etymology of “Lot” as “inclining” or “turning aside” (see the Parallel Philonic Exegesis section just above) seems to be found only in two Latin sources: Ambrose, Abr. 1.3.14; 2.2.6; and 2.6.25 (declinatio); and Jerome, Nom. hebr. 8.5–6 (declinatio); 65.6 and 73.3 (declinans).

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Like Philo, Ambrose presents Abraham as the stronger figure and Lot as the weaker. Ambrose also praises Abraham for recognizing that the two could not continue to live together and for giving Lot the choice of where to live (Abr. 1.3.10–11, 13). Similarly, in describing Lot’s choice to live in Sodom, Ambrose explains the meaning of Lot’s name as “deviation” (declinatio) “because he who deviates from virtue and turns away from fairness chooses vices” (Abr. 1.2.14; Tomkinson 2000, 8). For Ambrose’s symbolic interpretations of Lot that bear resemblances to those of Philo, see the Nachleben section below following Philo’s allegorical interpretation (§§217–224). Like Philo, Origen too portrays Lot as someone who falls between good and bad. In Hom. Gen. 5.1, Origen describes him as “somewhere in the middle between the perfect and the doomed.” Although Lot was spared from Sodom, “he was not so perfect that, immediately on departing from Sodom, he could ascend the mountain” (Heine 1981, 113, 112; cf. LXX Gen 19:19; Philo, QG 4.46–47). b

Allegorical Interpretation, §§217–224 Analysis/General Comments We now turn, as usual, to the “higher” interpretation of the passage, which concerns, not relations between human individuals, but rather between “types of soul” (τρόποι ψυχῆς; §217) and eventually between tendencies within the same soul (§§223–224). Philo appears to be using this expression “types of soul” in a fairly broad sense, since he declares that there are myriads of such τρόποι— perhaps “mind-sets,” or “life-styles”?—but he is concerned here with just two: the “older” type, which honors the goods of the soul, that is, the virtues, and the “younger” type, which honors those subordinate goods that are ranked “lowest” (ἐν ἐσχατιαῖς)—“external” goods, such as wealth, good reputation, the holding of public office, and noble ancestry (§§218–220). Philo is here making use of the traditional tripartite classification of goods, initiated by Plato, but adopted by both Peripatetics and Stoics, of goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods. In various passages throughout his works, Philo evinces different attitudes towards these goods. In such passages as Her. 285–286; Praem. 79–126; or QG 3.16, for example, the three classes of goods are given due recognition, though those of the soul are privileged (the usual Platonist position). We may note also that in Det. 7, Joseph is criticized for accepting all three classes of good as essential components of happiness (the Peripatetic view), rather than holding the lower two to be mere accessories to virtue. Finally, the Stoic view, which Philo appears to support in this allegorical interpretation (see below, regarding §§221–224), is that only the goods of the soul are really goods, while the lower two categories are merely “preferred indifferents.”

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In Philo’s present discussion (§§217–224), for the purpose of setting up a strong contrast between the “Abraham soul” and the “Lot soul,” the median class of “goods of the body,” such as health, strength, or beauty, is passed over, with only the two extreme life-styles (involving goods of the soul and external goods) being highlighted (§§218–220). We may note, however, that, despite the contrast between the “flocks and herds” proper to each type of soul—where those of the lower type are external goods and those of the higher type are the “doctrines (δόγματα) proper to each virtue and theoretical principles (θεωρήματα) of wisdom itself” (§220)—the wealthy Abraham is actually also much better supplied with the “flocks and herds” of the lower type of good than is Lot, as Philo states earlier (§§209, 211, 214). Even this stance, though, is not necessarily discordant with Platonist philosophical principles: there is nothing to prevent the virtuous man from possessing both bodily and external goods—of which, indeed, only he will know how to make proper use. In §221, Philo remarks that the “herdsmen” of each type of character favor different kinds of goods: the herdsmen of those who prefer the external favor such goods as wealth, glory, and power, while the herdsmen of those concerned with the soul love the true goods of nobility and virtue. Because of these different values, conflict arises (§222). At this point, however, Philo shifts from describing the conflict as one that takes place between distinct types of soul to understanding it instead as a conflict between two tendencies battling within the same soul. This conflict lasts only until the soul can prevail and remove from itself its own tendency toward external goods (§ 223). In an address modeled upon Abraham’s words to Lot in LXX Gen 13:9, the soul declares to this tendency that the two cannot dwell together and must separate (§ 224). By acknowledging Abraham’s wealth in his literal interpretation, then, Philo would seem to affirm the value of all kinds of goods and thereby to embrace a Platonist or Peripatetic stance. Despite this, however, in his allegorical interpretation, it is plain from §§221–224 that he is advocating a thoroughly Stoicizing position. Analogous to his contrast between Aaron as the type of the “progressor” (ὁ προκόπτων) and Moses as the achieved sage (cf. Leg. 3.129–132), Philo portrays the progress within the single Abraham-soul as similar to that from “moderation of the passions” (μετριοπάθεια) to “elimination of the passions” (ἀπάθεια), as it casts off or separates from itself any attachment to external things. For possible connections between Philo’s interpretation of Abraham’s dispute with Lot and Philo’s personal circumstances with his own nephew, see the Introduction, §2b.

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Detailed Comments § 217. an encomium. The Genesis narrative itself is not an encomium on Abraham but Philo’s interpretation renders it as such, especially with his presentation of how Abraham’s life illustrates the four cardinal virtues. Some have used “encomium” to describe the very genre of this treatise (see the Introduction, § 3). It is noteworthy, however, that Philo limits this characterization only to the literal level regarding the man. When one assigns this treatise to a particular genre, it is important to remember that Philo also intersperses his encomia on Abraham with ethical and allegorical interpretations. from the literal to the intelligible level. The turn to the allegorical interpretation is, as so often, described as a progression from “the literal” (τὰ ῥητά, τὸ ῥητόν) to a higher level of meaning, but the term “the intelligible” (τὰ νοητά) for the latter does not seem to be used by Philo elsewhere. types of soul. Philo talks of τρόποι ψυχῆς (or simply τρόποι, referring to the soul) in many places, e.g., Deus 112 (where all listed are bad!); Her. 81; Spec. 3.208; 4.114. At §47 above, the earlier triad of figures—Enos, Enoch, and Noah—form a scale of “types” (τρόποι), ascending from the defective (the “hoper”), through the “progressor,” or “transferred one,” to the perfected sage, while just below that passage, at §52, we find the three patriarchs of the higher triad—Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—representing three perfect “types” (τρόποι), differentiated as arising from instruction, nature, and practice, respectively. See also the comment at §147 on features of the soul. §218. the older … the younger. Although Genesis does not address the relative ages of Abraham and Lot, it makes sense that Abraham, the uncle, would be older in years than his nephew Lot. Here, however, Philo associates these qualities with types of soul. See also LXX Gen 24:1, in which Abraham is described as “old,” with the comparative form πρεσβύτερος, and cf. below, §§ 270–271. primary and dominant … subordinate and ranked in the lowest place. On “primary” (πρῶτος), see below, §§271–272 and the comments at § 271 on a term corresponding to “primary” … and at §272 on For in truth the sage has a primary status … For the contrast between “dominant” (ἡγεμονικά) and “subordinate” (ὑπήκοα), cf. Praem. 1, referring to the immortal and mortal elements in the cosmos. On “ranked in the lowest place” (ἐν ἐσχατιαῖς), see § 274, with the comment on elder and primary … younger and last. §219. wisdom and self-control and justice and courage. The four cardinal virtues; see, e.g., Plato, Resp. 4.427e–434c. wealth and fame and rule and noble birth … Cf. §§ 263–265. On noble birth, see the whole section of the treatise On Virtues that is devoted to εὐγένεια (§§187–227), where the distinction between true nobility of birth and the popular view of it is elaborated on at length; see also Wilson 2011, esp. 83–89, 381–418.

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the third rank … which is naturally the last. Following Plato (e.g., Leg. 3.697b; 5.743e) and Aristotle (e.g., Eth. nic. 1.8.1098b), Philo identifies three classes of goods: those of the soul, those of the body, and external goods. See also below, §§263–269; H.A. Wolfson 1982, 2.297–303; and the Analysis/General Comments above on this section (§§217–224). §220. warships. Specifically, “triremes” or, in Greek, τριήρεις. These vessels are believed to have had three tiers of oars on each side, with a bronze ram at the prow. Used especially by Athens in the 5th century BCE during the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, these ships remained in use for centuries and were prominent in Roman fleets despite the existence of even more sophisticated warships. See, e.g., de Sousa 1999; Morrison, Coates, and Rankov 2000; Starr 1960. See also Conf. 45; Spec. 1.121 (some mss.); Prob. 33. doctrines … theoretical principles. It is not clear whether any substantive distinction between δόγματα and θεωρήματα is intended here. Certainly they are conjoined in other passages, e.g., Post. 130, where Hagar, symbolic of “incomplete education,” pours them upon the soul called “child” (see Gen 21:19) and her son therefore grows up to be a sophist; Mut. 5, where the eye of the intellect, with its own genuine and not false light, uninterruptedly beholds doctrines and theoretical principles; and Spec. 4.75, where they are used to cultivate the soul, so as to attain true wealth, which is “moral excellence” (καλοκἀγαθία). Besides the instances of the dual phrase mentioned here, N.G. Cohen (1995, 203 n. 3) lists the following: Leg. 3.84; Det. 66; Plant. 52; Congr. 35, 142; Fug. 200; Somn. 1.50; Abr. 243; Spec. 4.107, 141; Virt. 8. Although she understands the phrase to signify “the entire gamut of Torah commandments—i.e., practice visà-vis theory” (203), such an interpretation is not warranted by the evidence. In our present passage (Abr. 220), the doctrines and theoretical principles correspond to the “flocks and herds” of the older type of soul, whereby the doctrines pertain to each virtue and theoretical principles are “of wisdom itself.” See also § 243 with the comment on the virtues and the doctrines … §221. The champions and managers … Philo continues his analogy between the flocks and herds of the older and the younger types of soul; the “champions and managers” correspond to the herdsmen. The collocution προστάται καὶ ἐπιμεληταί occurs again at Prob. 45, though in reverse order, as characteristic of the guiding and protective laws of cities that are free, in contrast to cities subject to oligarchy and tyranny, which are enslaved by “cruel and severe masters.” not false goods over true ones. The “false”-“true” (νόθος–γνήσιος) contrast is found also at Fug. 152–153, where, according to Philo’s interpretation of Gen 38:20–23, preference of the bastard goods to the genuine would render Tamar unworthy of the kid sent by Judah; and Deus 151, where “genuine and immor-

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tal” goods are contrasted with “temporary and false.” The contrast goes back ultimately to Resp. 7.535c–536a; cf. 6.496a. See also § 25 and the comment on bastard types of rule … §222. the most essential issue in life. The use of the adjective συνεκτικός in the sense of “important” or “essential,” is attested no earlier than the late Hellenistic period. Philo uses it quite frequently–21 times in all. what things are truly good. For this expression, cf. Ios. 112. In his allegorization of the dispute between the herdsmen, Philo understands differing judgments about what is truly good to be the very source of the quarrel. §223. the soul was at war with itself … not yet being thoroughly purified. Here a contrast is being set up, not, as one might have anticipated, between the soul of “the one who is progressing” (ὁ προκόπτων)—i.e., Lot—who is still having to moderate his passions, or his attachment to external goods, and the purified soul of the sage, or Abraham. Instead, the contrast is between forces within the same soul. On Philo’s depiction of Lot as one who is progressing, a description that he does not use explicitly in Abr., see esp. QG 4.47. See also § 146, in which Philo seems to refer to Lot indirectly by mentioning virtues that are not “whole and complete,” and the comment ad loc. on not in possession of virtues … On purity and the overcoming of passions, see Yli-Karjanmaa 2015, 97. prevailed over. This use of παρευημερεύω for “prevail over” is distinctive. Philo uses the word 21 times in all: 12 times in the active, 3 in the passive, and 6 in the middle or passive. becoming winged. In Greek, πτερυξαμένη. Philo effectively applies the metaphor of wings to the soul and matters of the spirit. See also, e.g., Praem. 62; cf. Spec. 2.45 and 3.5. By contrast to these positive developments in the soul, in Mos. 1.26 he uses the verb to describe the awakening of passion. The image of the wingedness of the soul may well be borrowed ultimately from Plato’s Phaedrus—where, however, the emphasis is rather on the loss of wings by the soul in its fall into embodiment (cf. 246c; 248b–c). The wings are provoked to grow again, however, by the experience of a noble love; cf. 251a–c. it cuts off … and separates … The tense changes here from aorist to present, perhaps to increase the immediacy of the imagery in building up to the concluding προσωποποιία (“imaginary speech”). conversing with it as if with a person. In §224, rendering Abraham’s words to Lot in LXX Gen 13:8–9 as an internal declaration, Philo thus ends with a little diatribe-style apostrophe, where the soul addresses its own attachment to external goods. Cf. his literal treatment of the same verses in § 215. See also Migr. 13. §224. a common dwelling-place and political relations. Of the collocution ὁμοδίαιτος καὶ ὁμόσπονδος, the former adjective is attested before Philo (who

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uses it 12 times) only in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Nicolaus of Damascus, while the latter adjective, which Philo uses only here, is attested from Classical authors (Herodotus, Demosthenes, Dinarchus). on the right … on the left … These words are an allusion to LXX Gen 13:9, in which Abraham tells Lot to separate himself from Abraham: “if you go to the left (εἰς ἀριστερά) I will go to the right (εἰς δεξιά); if you go to the right (εἰς δεξιά), I will go to the left (εἰς ἀριστερά).” The designations “right” (δεξιός) and “left” (ἀριστερός), which in LXX Gen 13:9 are merely descriptive, are here given moral overtones. Philo, moreover, uses two different words for “left”; of these, the first, εὐώνυμος, has no negative connotation in everyday language (it is actually a euphemism = “of good name”), whereas the second, σκαιός, does carry negative associations, e.g., with bad luck, awkwardness, or stupidity. It is interesting that LXX Gen 13:9 itself uses yet another euphemism for “left,” namely, ἀριστερά, lit., “more excellent.” Because unlucky omens were thought to come from the left, in Greek such euphemisms to indicate this direction were necessary (LSJ, s.v. ἀριστερός, #3; also s.v. εὐώνυμος, #III). Parallel Philonic Exegesis In our Abr. passage, while Lot represents the type of soul or the part of the soul that values external goods, in Migr. 13, he symbolizes “that part of the soul which inclines to the province of sense-perception.” In that passage, Philo is interpreting the charge to Abraham in LXX Gen 12:1 to depart from his land, kindred, and father’s house, and he understands these three entities to represent body, sense-perception, and speech, respectively. Quoting part of Abraham’s address to Lot—“Separate yourself from me” (LXX Gen 13:9)—Philo remarks in Migr. 13 that “it is impossible for one who is possessed by love for all that is incorporeal and incorruptible to dwell together with one who leans towards the objects of sense-perception doomed to die.” See also the Parallel Philonic Exegesis section following Philo’s literal interpretation above in §§ 208–216. Nachleben Like Philo, Ambrose too understands Abraham and Lot to represent abstract values, albeit somewhat different from those that Philo assigns these figures here. Ambrose also views the quarrel between the two sides as an interior struggle within the soul. Thus, in Abr. 2.6.26, he interprets Gen 13:6—“The land was not large enough for them”—to refer to the soul of Lot, whose “diverse emotions [were] naturally at odds with each other.” Interpreting Gen 13:7 regarding “the herdsmen of cattle,” Ambrose declares that “the discourse does not pertain to the visible” and understands the herdsmen to be “teachers and guides” who “apply the reins of reason” to curb the senses (Abr. 2.6.27). In Abr. 2.6.28,

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Ambrose repeats that the narrative pertains to a “single soul.” In Abr. 2.6.32, quoting Gen 13:9 (“If you go to the left, I will go to the right,” etc.), Ambrose observes that “[t]he things of the body are to the right for the foolish man,” while for the wise man, “[g]race of gaining immortality … is on the right” (Tomkinson 2000, 60–62, 65). Finally, in connection with Gen 13:10, in which Lot looks at the country around the Jordan in making his choice of where to live, Ambrose associates the country with matter that is third, or last, in order— wealth, power, homeland, friends, and honor, e.g., what Philo classifies as the external goods. Ambrose also notes that these things are preceded first by goods of the soul and, second, by goods of the body (Abr. 2.6.33). Centuries later, the Renaissance Jewish author Azariah de’ Rossi comments in Meʾor Enayim (The Light of the Eyes) that “[i]n his work On Abraham, [Philo] wrote beautiful allegories on … the stories about Abraham, Lot and the four and five kings …” (see Weinberg 2001, 119). It is not clear from this reference whether de’ Rossi means to include the allegorization in the above section of Abr. or only the allegorization of the war between the four and five kings (see the next chapter), in which Lot, however, is not explicitly mentioned.

Chapter 12: Abraham’s Victory over the Kings, §§ 225–244 a

Literal Interpretation, §§225–235 Analysis/General Comments After illustrating Abraham’s skillful dealings with people through his handling of the dispute between his and his nephew’s servants, Philo now provides, as a second example, Abraham’s involvement in the war between the kings—an episode, Philo claims, that demonstrates the patriarch’s courage (§ 225). Where Gen 14 sets forth a baffling jumble of details about this conflict, Philo presents an engaging tale of insolence and rebellion, on one hand, and, on the other, of Abraham’s courageous entry into battle and his triumphant victory accomplished with the help of God. To begin, Philo helpfully sets the scene by telling us that four great kings in the east ruled over a vast territory whose inhabitants peacefully rendered them tribute. Among the subjects, however, the Sodomites conceived a plan to revolt (§226). Living in an exceptionally prosperous country, its five kings, sated with their abundant resources, began a rebellion and attacked their masters (§§ 227– 228). These masters, in turn, easily defeated the five kings and in the process, inflicted great slaughter, captured many prisoners, and took along with them much booty. Among the prisoners was Abraham’s nephew, Lot (whom Philo himself does not name; §229).

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Hearing about his nephew’s capture, Abraham was greatly distressed and grieved for him “more keenly than if he had learned of his death,” for whereas death ends all ills, myriad troubles await the living (§ 230). As an immigrant, Abraham had no allies and was at a great disadvantage (§ 231). Nonetheless he divided his home-born slaves into three groups of a hundred each, even as he trusted not in them but in God (§232). Emboldened by his “confidence of soul” and hastening toward the enemy, he attacked at night. He killed some in their beds and prevailed mightily over others who engaged him in battle (§ 233). When he had destroyed the entire army including the kings, Abraham “left them strewn in front of the camp” and returned in a triumphant procession with his nephew as well as horses, other animals, and much booty (§ 234). Beholding Abraham’s great success, “the high priest of the greatest God” recognized that divine support underlay the victory and, hands uplifted, welcomed Abraham back with prayers, sacrifices, and a great feast for all the combatants. Indeed he fittingly rejoiced as if the victory were his own since, according to the saying, friends share the same concerns—a saying especially true of the good, whose one goal is to be well-pleasing to God (§235). A comparison between this retelling and the biblical source itself showcases Philo’s considerable adroitness as a biblical exegete. Not only does Gen 14 present a bewildering cluster of names, places, and other details but the use of ambiguous pronouns and choppy quality of the account further hinder our ability to understand the unfolding of events (see Birnbaum 2015). In addition, this chapter is generally recognized by modern scholars as having a distinctive character that sets it apart from the surrounding biblical material. As one commentator observes, “The setting is international, the approach impersonal, and the narration notable for its unusual style and vocabulary” (Speiser [1964], 105; see also Emerton 1971a and b; and Granerød 2010). Also striking is that Abraham “is depicted as a resolute and powerful chieftain rather than as an unworldly patriarch” (Speiser [1964], 108). In verse 13 he is called a “Hebrew” (though not in the Greek; see the comment at §231 on a foreigner and a sojourner). Since this designation is usually applied to Israelites by outsiders, it further sets the narrative apart and suggests that it may have had a different origin from the surrounding sections. Despite these various challenges, Philo renders the story not just understandable but dramatic as well and he also integrates it with other biblical material. To accomplish these transformations, he omits unnecessary and distracting details (especially from Gen 14:5–10, 17, and 21–24); recounts the progression of developments in a logical order; and embellishes the tale by including character traits, rationales for behavior, and emotional reactions. He also fills in information about—and thereby clarifies—certain particulars. Where

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LXX Gen 14:4, for example, tells us merely that the five kings “served” Chodollogomor (one of the four kings), Philo specifies that this service involved payment of taxes (see the comment at §228 on the prescribed tribute). Especially impressive, although the Genesis chapter would appear to stand apart, Philo incorporates information from elsewhere in the Bible both to portray the character of the Sodomites and provide a motive for their rebellion. Thus he remarks that the richness of the Sodomite region (as reported in Gen 13:10) led to the arrogance of its rulers. Other early exegetes likewise make this connection between the land and the prideful character of its inhabitants (see § 228 and the comment on satiety begot insolence). Philo, however, goes one step further to link the arrogance of the rulers with their refusal to pay their taxes and thus with the very source of the war. In so doing he may be the only exegete—whether ancient or modern—to find a connection between Gen 14 and the surrounding narrative. Finally, Philo makes explicit earlier in his narrative what is expressed by Melchizedek only toward the end of the Genesis tale—namely, that Abraham recognized that his victory was accomplished with divine assistance. Philo’s account thus shows the patriarch to be not only courageous but also pious. For more specific ways in which Philo adds to and omits from the narrative in Gen 14 to craft his own compelling version, see the Detailed Comments below. The present section (§§225–244) is Philo’s second discussion of the Sodomites in Abr.; for the first—about the destruction of four of the five Sodomite cities—see §§133–166. Both treatments suggest that the biblical narratives about this region had given rise in antiquity to rich exegetical elaborations (see, e.g., Loader 1990 and the comment at §133 on a myriad of wrongdoings). Although Philo’s linking of the wealth of the land with the Sodomite character and then with the cause of the war appears to originate with him, it is difficult to identify which other aspects of his account are similarly original and which may be influenced by other traditions. In Genesis, the war narrated in chapter 14 follows closely after the separation between Abraham and Lot in chapter 13, which Philo addresses in the immediately preceding section of our treatise (§§ 208–224). Philo presents the other episode about Sodom, however, out of order: he discusses its destruction (Gen 19) immediately after the section on Abraham’s hospitality (Gen 18; see §§107–132 and then §§133–166). Because the episode regarding Abraham’s hospitality illustrates the patriarch’s piety, Philo places this episode earlier in the tre