Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil: Governor of New France, 1703-1725 9780773595422

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Table of Contents
Foreword
List of Maps
Chapter One: The Origins of Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil
Chapter Two: The Rise to the Summit, 1687 - 1703
Chapter Three: Problems of a New Era, 1703
Chapter Four: Uncertain Beginnings, 1703 - 1705
Chapter Five: Gaining the Upper Hand, 1706 - 1708
Chapter Six: Years of Crisis, 1709 - 1711
Chapter Seven: Turmoil Among the Tribes, 1711-1712
Chapter Eight: A New Kind of War, 1713 - 1716
Chapter Nine: Shoring up the Frontiers, 1717-1720
Chapter Ten: The Height of Power, 1721 - 1723
Chapter Eleven: They Shall Not Pass, 1723 - 1725
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

PHILIPPE DE RIGAUD DE VAUDREUIL: GOVERN OR OF NEW FRANCE

1703-1725

With a foreword by W . J. Eccles

B y Y v e s

F .

Z o l t v a n y

The Carleton Library N o. 80

M cClelland and Stewart Limited

IfO C e'fQ Q tfoQ l- S 7 2T H E C A R L E T O N L IB R A R Y A series o f original w orks, reprints and new collections o f source m aterial relating to C anada, issued under the editorial supervision o f th e Institute o f C anadian Studies o f C arleton U niversity, O ttaw a. D IR E C T O R

O F T H E IN ST IT U T E

D avidson D unton G E N E R A L E D IT O R

M ichael G . G narow ski

EX E C U T IV E

E D IT O R

Jam es H . M arsh ED IT O R IA L

3?/

vSS

BO ARD

B. C arm an B ickerton ( H istory ) z '■ D ennis Forcese (Sociology) D avid B. K night ( Geography) J. G eo rg e N euspiel (Law) T hom as K . R ym es ( Economics) D erek G . Sm ith ( Anthropology ) M ichael S. W hittington (Political Science) M aps for this volum e w ere draw n by R od M aclean.

© M cC lelland and S tew a rt L im ited , 1974 A L L

R IG H T S

R ESER V E D

The Canadian Publishers M cC lelland and Stew art L im ited 25 H ollinger R oad, T oronto Printed an d bound in C anada

TABLE OF CO N TEN TS

Foreword by W . J. Eccles 6 List of M aps 8 Chapter One: The Origins of Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil 9 Chapter Two: The Rise to the Summit, 1687 - 1703 17 Chapter Three: Problems of a New Era, 1703 33 Chapter Four: Uncertain Beginnings, 1703 - 1705 45 C hapter Five: Gaining the Upper Hand, 1706 - 1708 71 Years of Crisis, 1709 - 1711 94 Chapter Six: C hapter Seven: Turmoil Among the Tribes, 1711-1712 116 Chapter Eight: A New Kind of W ar, 1713 - 1716 130 Chapter Nine: Shoring up the Frontiers, 1717-1720 156 C hapter Ten: The Height of Power, 1721 - 1723 174 Chapter Eleven: They Shall N ot Pass, 1723 - 1725 189 Conclusion 213 Bibliography 221 Index 235

FOREW ORD

In this age o f th e com puter, th e quantification o f d ata has opened up new fields for th e historian to investigate. Q uestions th at could n ot be asked before can now be answ ered, and m uch new light throw n on th e past. A m uch better understanding can be gained o f w hat life was like in the past, and why things turned o u t as they did. B ut the course o f hum an events is not determ ined by econom ic, or dem ographic, factors alone. C ounting heads, o r bushels o f w heat, will not provide all the answ ers. H um an relationships, failings,’ stre n g th s, in ad eq u acies, m isco n cep tio n s, all play a p a rt in the h um an saga. Such unaccountable things as ethics, m anners, spite, jealousy, vanity, courage, honour, superstition - to m ention a few o f th e intangibles - also have an im portant bearing on th e institu­ tions an d actions th at govern o u r lives and the destinies o f peoples. T h u s b io g rap h y still has c o n sid e rab le v alue in th e h isto ria n ’s attem pt to recreate the past. In th e case o f C anada during th e seventeenth an d eighteenth centuries the biography o f a governor general has particular signifi­ cance because he was personally responsible for so m uch. A lthough he w as under strict orders not to interfere w ith the subordinate officials in th e perform ance o f th eir functions, he w as required to ensure th at they discharged th eir duties in a satisfactory m anner. T his could necessitate his intervention, but he had subsequently to justify his action to th e M inister o f M arine. If th e colonists reported abuses to the M inister, the g overnor general was prom ptly asked to explain w hat steps he had taken to rectify th e situation. H e had to navigate betw een Scylla and C harybdis. T he defence o f the colony in tim e o f w ar, and external relations w ith both th e Indian nations and th e adjacent English colonies w ere his sole responsibility. W ere he to be found w anting in these vital areas th e consequences could be disastrous for th e colonists, an d for F rench im perial pow er in N orth A m erica. T his was particularly true during the crucial years 1703-1725 that Philippe d e R igaud de V audreuil held office. He w as responsible for th e security o f th e colony during th e W ar o f the Spanish Succession and subsequently he had to cope w ith th e d an ­ gerous legacy o f th e T reaty o f U trecht. T hese w ere years o f eco­ nom ic depression, ol rapid expansion, and o f very involved negotia­ tions w ith the pow erful Indian tribes w hose hostility could spell

Forword 1 disaster. O n several occasions luck w as w ith V audreuil. It is with him again today in th e person o f his biographer. O ne great m erit o f this book is th at the au th o r has scrupulously avoided th e all to o com m on failing o f th e biographer, th at o f serv­ ing as advocate rath er than ju d ge for his subject. Professor Zoltvany’s assessm ent is detached, balanced, an d judicious. V audreuil s failings and frailties are neither ignored nor excused, his strength o f character and his basic honesty are revealed through his actions and his reactions to people and events. H e thus em erges as a very real hum an being w hose m otives and decisions are alw ays com prehensi­ ble, if not com m endable on occasion. As a consequence o f this the reader is given to u nderstand, to a far greater extent th an was possi­ ble before, not only w hat h appened during th e first q uarter o f the eighteenth century, b u t w hy events turned out as they did. A n o th e r sig n ifican t fe atu re o f th e b o o k is th a t th e In d ian nations, both in th e east and th e w est, are show n as having played a far m ore im portant role in th e history of th e period than they are usually given credit for. In this connection Professor Z oltvany has raised m ore questions than he could be expected to answ er w ithin th e scope o f th e present w ork. H ow ever, he has opened for further investigation a field which has been neglected too long, and has, at th e sam e tim e provided a sound base for studies in greater depth. T o sum up, this w ork is a sound piece o f scholarship; o ne in w hich an im portant and interesting figure is fairly depicted. It is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand a vital period in th e history o f N o rth A m erica. W . J. Eccles

List of Maps

The Five N ations Iroquois Confederacy

47

Some New England Villages and Hamlets Attacked by French and Indian W ar Parties, 1703 - 1711 50 The New England Borderlands 133 The G reat Lakes and Mississippi Valley Regions Towards 1725 159

CH A PTER ONE:

THE O RIGIN S O F PH ILIPPE DE RIGAUD DE VAU DREUIL

T he origins o f th e house o f R igaud de V audreuil are lost in the m ists o f th e early M iddle Ages. T h e nam e R igaud first appears in history in th e year 879 and genealogists can trace th e fam ily descendants uninterruptedly from 1249 o nw ards.1 T he barony of V audreuille, located in the senechaussee2 o f m ountainous Lauragais som e thirty m iles south o f T oulouse, cam e into their posses­ sion in th e year 1189 when the fief thus nam ed w as donated to Bernard R igaud by his wife A nne A dh em ar.3 T he acquisition of this dom ain o f 2,620 acres laid the cornerstone o f th e family fortunes. T he R igauds becam e th e m ost pow erful fam ily o f Lauragais, a position they retained until the R evolution o f 1789. A.s they acquired m ore dom ains through purchase and m arriage alli­ ances th eir reputation spread beyond the lim its o f th eir province. By th e early fifteenth century, w hen Alzeas R igaud was lieutenant-general o f D au p hin e and seigneur of som e tw enty estates, the fam ily h ad reached th e apex o f its pow er. But his descendants relinquished ow nership o f m any o f these estates and the R igauds entered a long period o f decline. A lthough they w ere not im pov­ erish e d , by th e m id d le o f th e sev en tee n th ce n tu ry th ey h ad long ceased to play a role on th e national scene. But they could still take pride in th eir regional prestige and m ost o f all in their nam e, one o f th e oldest in th e Province o f L anguedoc. It w as in this fam ily o f ancient provincial nobility th at Philippe w as born tow ards 16474, o ne o f twelve children and th e youngest o f five sons. H is father was Jean -L o uis d e R igaud, baron o f V au­ dreuille, A uriac, C abanial and F aget, and his m o th er M arie d e C hate au v e rd u n , d a u g h te r o f n o b le m an F ran g o is d e C h a te au v e rd u n , seigneur o f La R azerie. Jean -L o uis de R igaud seem s to have spent his life in his native region tending to his estates and to have taken but slight interest in m ilitary affairs. T he only com m ission he held w as th a t o f co rn e t-c o m m a n d a n t o f th e a rriere-ba n o f his se n e ­ chaussee. In o th er w ords he was either a stan d ard bearer o r cavalry ensign in the feudal levy o f his district. T he im portance o f th e ban and arriere-ban had been great in th e M iddle Ages but declined

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P h ilip p e d e R igau d d e Vaudreuil

sharply by th e seventeenth century when professional arm ies had displaced th e feudal m usters as the chief instrum ent o f w arfare. T he seventeenth century w as a difficult period for the feudal nobility to which the R igauds belonged. T he incom e this class derived from its landed estates w as no longer ad equ ate to m ake ends m eet in a w orld transform ed by the price revolution. Indeed it m ay well have been th e need for liquid assets th at obliged the R igauds like num erous o th er noble fam ilies in this period to part w ith so m any o f their properties. T hose years were also difficult ones politically. D uring th e sixteenth century wars o f religion, following the death o f H enri iv in 1610, and during the Fronde! the civil w ar th at rent F rance in th e 1640s and 1650s, the nobility had risen against th e m onarchy an d now th e latter was ousting it from positions conferring political pow er. Positions in th e central governm ent an d the provincial ad m inistration w ere increasingly filled by m em bers o f the bourgeoisie, persons w ho ow ed their preem inence to th e royal will an d w ho could be relied upon to serve it faithfully and well. Begun by F rancis i and accelerated by C ardinal R ichelieu th e process o f transform ing F rance from a feudal into a bureaucratic state was brought to a successful con­ clusion by Louis xiv . A lthough o ne o f th e principal effects o f this process was to deprive the feudal nobility o f th e political im por­ tance it had form erly enjoyed, this class continued to play an im portant role in national life. Louis x iv considered it his duty to m aintain in th eir im m unities and privileges th e groups and classes that m ade up the n ation ’s sharply hierarchized society. Thus, w hile the feudal nobility w as no longer represented in th e king’s council, now dom inated by m en like M ichel Le Tellier d e Louvois, the m inister o f w ar, an d Jean-B aptiste C olbert, th e m inister o f m ar­ ine, it acquired a virtual m onopoly o f positions in the arm y an d the C hurch. H ow ever, since all arm y com m issions had to be bought for sum s o f m oney th at increased w ith th e rank, m em bers o f the provin­ cial squirearchy like th e V audreuils often found it difficult to gain prom otions. H ie position o f the feudal nobility w as further com plicated by the laws governing inheritance. A s a result o f th e droit d ’ainesse, o r prim ogeniture, a family estate was transm itted alm ost in its entirety to the eldest son. T he younger children received only a small fraction o f it called th e legitim e.5 T his practice reduced them to a sorry plight. U nlike th eir counterparts in England they could not engage in com m erce, business o r industry w ithout forfeiting their noble status. By education they were prepared for little outside o f w aging w ar. M any o f these im poverished noble­ m en drifted to Paris w here they lived on credit in hand-to-m outh

The O rigins o f P h ilip p e d e R igau d d e Vaudreuil

11

fashion. It was n o t uncom m on for th e sw arm o f cadets dwelling in th e capital to resort to fraud in th eir d esperate search for funds. T he situation there g o t so bad in 1624 th at the parlem ent o f Paris prohibited th e lending o f m oney to m em bers o f this g ro up .6 W hen th e grave problem s facing the feudal nobility in the seventeenth century are considered it becom es evident th at P hi­ lip p e d e R ig au d d e V au d reu il w as n o t b o m u n d e r fav o u rab le auspices. H e belonged to th e provincial squirearchy, one o f its least favoured groups, and he w as also a cadet, o r younger son. C reating a satisfactory career for him self under such circum ­ stances w as bound to prove difficult. Because o f lack o f docum ents nothing m ore th an a vague sketch can be draw n o f V audreuiPs p re-C anadian years. From evidence available after his arrival in th e colony it can be inferred th at he received little education. C ertainly, th e one autograph letter by him w hich is know n to exist is not very elegant for its handw riting and spelling.7 H e read very little. Only five books w ere found am ong his belongings following his death in 1725. a prayer book, a description o f France, a universal geography, and tw o adventure stories, including th e life o f R obinson C ru so e.8 In 1709 th e intendant Jacques R au d o t described V audreuil as a m an w ho w as know ledgeable in m ilitary m atters and little else besides.9 A lthough this rem ark w as form ulated in a m om ent o f anger there is no reason to d ou bt its accuracy. V audreuil always rem ained essentially a rath er rough hew n soldier. In this respect he w as largely typical o f his class although he does com pare unfavourably w ith F ro nten ac an d C alliere, his tw o predecessors in the office o f governor-general o f N ew France. In 1672, w hen he was approxim ately tw enty-five, Philippe decided to follow a m ilitary career. T w o o f his brothers at that tim e w ere already serving in the arm y. A rn au d, th e eldest,^ was captain o f a com pany o f the king’s light cavalry, th e chevau-legers, o ne o f th e crack regim ents o f the royal h ousehold.10 Philippe i" , after serving for som e years w ith th e M usketeers, had ju st becom e a lie u te n a n t in th e F rench G u a rd s, a n o th e r h o u seh o ld reg im en t, in w hich he ev entu ally b ecam e a c a p ta in . A n to in e and Frangois-A im e, th e next tw o brothers by o rd er o f age, o pted for th e C hurch and held m inor benefices in th e region o f T oulouse. Philippe chose to serve w ith th e M usketeers, the m ost fam ous o f the royal household regim ents if only th e fourth in rank after th e bodyguard (the gardes-du-corps), th e m en at arm s (the gen­ darm es) and the light cavalry. T he first com pany, the one in which V audreuil served, had been created by Louis xm in 1622

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P h ilip p e d e R ig a u d d e Vaudreuil

and th e second by Louis x iv at th e beginning o f his reign. Each com pany w as com m anded by a lieutenant cap tain — th e king him ­ self was the cap tain — and num bered 500 m en, “ all handpicked noblem en, adorned by th eir youth and handsom eness,” enthused Le T hueux, o ne o f the old regim e historians o f th e regim ent. The M usketeers served as p art o f the royal escort in tim e o f peace, as elite co m b at troops in tim e o f w ar, and also as a sort o f m ilitary school w here young noblem en learned the art o f w arfare. Louis x iv w as especially fond o f h is M u sk etee rs an d freq uently bestow ed his favours upon th e m .12 W ar with H olland was ju st breaking o u t w hen V audreuil jo in ed th eir ranks. T he tw o com panies w ere dispatched to Flan­ ders w here they figured prom inently in m ost o f the m ajor battles o f the w ar. T hey participated in th e siege o f M aestricht in 1673, o f Besangon in 1674, o f C onde in 1676, and experienced their finest h ou r at V alenciennes in 1677 w here th eir reckless charge turned th e tide o f battle in favour o f F rance. A ccording to Iran go is-X av ier de C harlevoix, th e Jesuit historian w ho taught at the C ollege o f Q uebec from 1705 to 1709, it was th e p art V au­ dreuil played in the attack on V alenciennes th at w on him the king’s favo u r.13 Follow ing this action the M usketeers in quick succession fought a t M ontcassel, C am bray, S aint-O m er and, in M arch 1678, at Y pres. In his description o f th e fighting a t Ypres, N oeufville, th e eighteenth-century historian o f the F rench arm y’ m entions, th e courage displayed by “ M . le chevalier de V aubreui’l [w c],” w ho sin g leh an d ed ly cleared th e enem y from th e citadel g ate .14 T he trea tie s o f N im w eg en (1 6 78 -1 67 9 ) en d ed th e D u tch w ar, but no sooner was it over th an the reunions began. F rench special courts called “ cham bers o f reun io n ” sat at Breisach, Besangon and T ournay and adjudged num erous areas to Louis x iv as dependencies o f the territories he had gained by th e treaties of W estphalia in 1648 and N im w egen. T he decisions o f these tri­ bunals w ere enforced by F rench troops. D uring this period V au­ dreuil served in the G erm an R hineland as aide-de-cam p15 w here the reunion to F rance o f such im p o rtant places as Strasbourg, L uxem bourg, Z w eibrucken and Saarbrucken was carried o ut. Everything indicates that during the fifteen years he spent with the M usketeers V audreuil upheld th e regim ental tradition by serv­ ing bravely and a t tim es w ith great distinction. But prom otions did not com e rapidly, o r to speak m ore accurately they did not com e a t all. T he highest echelon he attained was th at o f brigadier, th e least elevated o f the cavalry ran k s.16 M erit, as already seen! w as not enough to win pro m otion s in th e F rench arm y o f th e Old

The O rigins o f P h ilip p e d e R igau d d e Vaudreuil

13

Regim e; one also needed a good deal o f w ealth. V audreuil, unfortunately, w as w ithout m eans. N ot th at th e V audreuils w ere destitute. O n th e contrary, the fam ily fortune w as quite substantial but by virtue o f prim ogeni­ tu re the bulk o f it w as inherited by A rnaud, the first-born son. W ith these resources he purchased his cap tain ’s com m ission in the king’s light cavalry and it m ay have been to live in a style befitting his social station th at he began to spend lavishly. By the 1670s seizures w ere being executed on som e o f his properties;17 by th e 1680s som e o f th e im portant estates o f the house of V audreuil w ere in th e possession o f a dam e T alon, a H uguenot w ho resided in H o llan d .18 T o keep in his fam ily w hat rem ained o f his patrim ony A rnaud resorted to a subterfuge. O n Septem ber 8, 1677, he transferred to Philippe I th e title to his properties. A round th e sam e tim e, probably for m uch th e sam e reason, the three o th er brothers surrendered to Philippe I the right to their legitim es.l9 But th e subterfuge backfired. A rnaud was separated from his wife, A ntoinette de C olom bet, and this lady had for som e tim e been living in Paris w ith Philippe i. O n Ju n e 15, 1678, before the notaries o f th e Paris C hatelet court, she and her brother-in-law concluded a don m u tu el.20 In the advent th at she survived Phi­ lippe I she w ould becom e heir to th e V audreuil estate; in the advent th a t Philippe I survived her he w ould receive 115,000 livres, m ade up o f her dow ry and som e o th er sum s o f w hich she had recovered possession at the tim e o f her separation from A rn au d. But Philippe i m ust also have derived som e im m ediate benefits from this transaction. In 1678, for 90,000 livres, he purchased his cap tain ’s com m ission in the F rench G u ard s.21 P hilippe’s bitterness against his sister-in-law after the p erp etra­ tion o f this trickery is not difficult to im agine. She w as, he charged in a legal d ocum ent draw n up against her around 1705, nothing but a fortune hunter and base seducer. H er m arriage to A rnaud had b rought a curse dow n upon the house o f V audreuil.22 T he fragm entary evidence available adm ittedly does not m ake A n to in e tte a p p e a r in a very fa v o u rab le lig h t, b u t even if th e picture Philippe drew o f her is true to life she was not chiefly responsible for the problem s that beset his fam ily in the 1670s and 1680s. T hese w ere caused by inheritance laws, by the scram ­ ble fo r funds to p u rch ase p ro m o tio n s, by th e lavish life style im posed on m ilitary officers living at th e ro y al co u rt. A t w orst, A ntoinette took advantage o f a set o f circum stances to serve her own ends. But Philippe was too m uch th e noblem an to perceive th at his personal p redicam ent w as in reality the predicam ent of

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P h ilip p e d e R ig a u d d e Vaudreuil

his social class. W hen he drew up his own testam ent m any years later he too left virtually his entire estate to his eldest son and only legitim es to his o th er children. H ow ever, unlike Jean-L ouis de R igaud w ho lived obscurely on his seigneuries an d was unable to do anything for his younger sons, Philippe had political influ­ ence w hich grew w ith the years and he exercised it constantly and successfully to secure the advancem ent o f his cadets in the royal service. W hen V audreuil considered his prospects in the m id-1680s he m ust have seen nothing but bleakness ahead. H e had surrendered his legitim e, his sister-in-law had m anoeuvered herself into the position o f universal legatee, and he seem ed destined to go on serving forever as a m inor cavalry officer. W hat m ade him select C anada as the place for a fresh start is not know n and probably never will be but th e follow ing reconstruction o f events appears plausible. Probably h e asked his superior officers to m ention his m ilitary record as well as his plight to Louis xiv . A rnaud also probably intervened on his behalf, for he w as definitely interested in th e career o f his youngest b ro th er. Louis x iv , as already m entioned, had special affection for the M usketeers. H e m ust have soon seen how he could launch this veteran o f several o f the great battles o f his reign upon a new career w hile putting his experience to good use. In C anada th e Iroquois w ar was taking on alarm ing p ro p o r­ tions and several new m ilitary com panies w ere being sent to the colony to help contain these Indians. T o m aintain this grow ing body o f soldiers in good discipline and drill them regularly, a new position, th at o f com m ander o f th e troops, had ju st been created. Indeed, according to one historian, it had been created specially for V audreuil.23 A dm ittedly the salary was sm all, only 1,500 livres p er y ear,-4 but th e position had one im portant com pensating feature. It seem ed to be a stepping stone to greater things. On M arch 30, 1687, G ov erno r D enonville was instructed to choose either V audreuil o r H ector de C alliere, th e governor o f M ontreal, to co m m an d in th e colony in case o f his ow n ab sen ce .25 V au­ dreuil had not yet set foot in C an ad a but already he was on the threshold o f th e governm ent establishm ent. H is com m ission as com m ander o f th e troops bears th e date M arch 17, 1687.26 In m id-A pril he sailed for C anada ab o ard the A rc-en-C iel w ith a new future before him .

T h e O rigins o f P h ilipp e d e R igaud d e Vaudreuil

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REFERENCES 1. F or the history of the V audreuil family from earliest tim es see De La C henaye-D esbois et Badier, Diclionnaire de la noblesse (Paris, 1872), vol. 17, pp. 78-91; L. P. d ’H ozier, Armorial general de France (Paris, 1736-1768), vol. 6, under Vaudreuil. 2. T he senechaussee w as one o f the earliest French adm inistrative districts. It first appeared in the thirteenth century. 3. L. D util, La Haute-Garonne et sa region, geographie hislorique (T oulouse, 1929), vol. 2, p. 286. 4. V audreuil’s exact year of birth rem ains an unsolved puzzle. I he parish registers o f the com m une o f V audreuille begin in 1648. Since Philippe’s baptism al certificate has not been found, he m ust have been born before that date. But there is reason to believe that he was born later than 1643*the year given in his dossier individuel (Archives de la m arine [henceforth A M ], serie C 7, vol. 340) and the one traditionally accepted by historians. “ I was as young as m y eldest son [Louis-Philippe] when I entered the M usketeers," w rote Vaudreuil to Jerom e de Pontchartrain, the m inister of m ar­ ine, in 1704. In that year Louis-Philippe was 13 years old. Since his father entered the M usketeers in 1672 this would m ean that he was born tow ards 1659. But V audreuil m ade this statem ent when he was seeking a captain’s com m ission for Louis-Philippe in the C anadian troops, the troupes de la marine. H e m ay therefore have been lying about his own age in order to im prove his son’s chances o f getting the com m ission. A m ore im portant piece of evidence is a docum ent in the Q uebec N ational Archives draw n up by a legal official of the seigneury of V audreuille in N ovem ber 1659. Present on this occasion w ere Philippe’s four brothers and one of his sisters, “ tous m ajeurs de quatorze ans.” This seem s to suggest by im plication that Philippe was not yet 14 in 1659. One is therefore left with 1646 and 1647 as the m ost likely years of his birth. 5. See p. 219 footnote 4 for an explanation of how the legitime was calculated. 6. R . M androu, Introduction a la France moderne (1500-1640). Essai de psychologie historique (Paris, 1961), p. 148. 7. V audreuil a Pontchartrain, 26 decem bre 1698, Paris, Bibliotheque nationale [henceforth BN ], collection C lairam bault, vol. 873, ff. 359-36°. . , . 8. Inventaire et description [ . . . ] de la succession de feu le haut et puissant seigneur Philippe de R igaud m arquis de V audreuil [ . . . ] 19 juin 1726, Rapport de I'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec [henceforth R A P Q ] 1921-1922, p. 248. 9. J. R audot a Pontchartrain, 20 septem bre 1709, Paris, Archives nationales, colonies [henceforth A N C ol.], serie C " A , vol. 30, f. 206. , , 10. Called regiments de la maison du Roi, they were the ki ngs personal troops. This tie to the royal person set them apart from the regim ents of regular troops that were com m anded and frequently ow ned by their chief officer.

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Ph ilip p e d e R igau d d e Vaudreuil

11. Tw o o f the five brothers were christened Philippe. To avoid con­ fusing the governor o f New France with his older brother the latter t0 as Philippe i. G iving the sam e nam e to two or m ore children was not an unusual practice in noble families. 12. This description of the M usketeers is based on S. Lam oral le Pippre de Noeufville, Abrege chronologique et hislorique de I'ori-

gine, du progres et de I’etat actuel de la maison du R oy et de toutes les troupes de France (Liege, 1734), vol. 2, pp. 129-274, supplem ented by M . Boullier, Histoire des divers corps de la maison militaire des rois de France (Paris, 1818), and “ Le T hueux , Essais hisloriques sur les deux compagnies de mousquetaires du Roi de France supprimees le ler janvier 1776 (L a Haye, 1778) 13. F . X . d e C harlevoix, H istoire et description generate de la Nouvelle France (Paris, 1744), vol. 2, p. 288. 14. Noeufville, vol. 2, p. 273. 15. Com m ission de capitaine de vaisseau pour le sr. de Vaudreuil 5 m ai 1695, A N Col., serie B, vol. 17, f. 242. 16. Rolles des officiers qui servent en C anada avec le tem ps de leur service, n.d., A N Col., serie D-'C, vol. 47, ff. 51, 58, 85, 90, 152. 17. Factum poursuivant la m ise en vente des terres saisies sur A rnaud de R igaud, baron de V audreuil, n.d., Archives departem entales du T am (A lbi), serie E, vol. 299, f. 375. 18. I-actum pour Philippe de Rigaud contre A rnaud de R igaud et A ntoinette de C olom bet, n.d., BN, C lairam bault, vol. 1 103 f 145 19. Ibid., f. 146. 20. A gift taking effect at the death o f one of the contractors. 21. D onation m utuelle entre A ntoinette de Colom bet et Philippe de Rigaud de V audreuil, 21 juin 1678, A N , serie Y, vol 234 ff 4 13v-414. 22. 1-actum pour Philippe de Rigaud contre A rnaud de R igaud et A ntoinette de C olom bet, n.d., B N , C lairam bault, vol. 1103, f. 145. 23. G . Fregault, Le Grand Marquis. Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane (M ontreal, 1952), p. 51. 24 M mPigny ^ SeigneIay’ 5 novem brc l687’ A N Col., C " A, vol. 9, 25. SeigneIay a D enonville, 30 m ars 1686[5/c], A N Col., B, vol. 13, f. 26. T he com m ission has not been found but is m entioned in “ Inventaire et description [ . . . ] de la succession de feu haut et puissant seigneur Philippe de R igaud m arquis de Vaudreuil, R A P Q 1921-

CH A PTER TWO!

TH E RISE TO THE SU M M IT 1687-1703

N ew F rance in 1687 w as entering one o f th e darkest decades of her history. A long her southern flank, in present-day N ew Y ork S tate, dw elt the Five N ation Iroquois C onfederacy. Like other N o rth A m erican aborigines w ho had m ade contact w ith the E uropeans the Iroquois regarded guns, pow der, duffles, stroud and iron im plem ents as basic necessities o f life. T hey obtained these w ares from the D utch and English m erchants o f A lbany in return for furs, particularly beaver pelts. U nfortunately for the Iroquois, the great breeding grounds o f the west w ere occupied by tribes in th e F rench interest. T h e G reat Lakes country was held by th e O ttaw as w ho acted as m iddlem en betw een N ew France and rem ote tribes like th e Sioux, C rees and M onsonis. F o r a tim e the Iroquois could still look to the M ississippi Valley w here dw elt the Illinois and th e M iam is. But in 1678, by m eans o f his new ly-built F o rt S aint-L ouis, C avelier d e La Salle began to engross th e trade o f these tw o peoples. Flem m ed in on every side, th e Iroquois had no choice except go to w ar. In 1680 som e 600 o f th eir w arriors invaded th e Illinois country as th e first step in a cam paign designed to conquer th e principal w estern tribes and drive th e French from the interior. Initially, th e Iroquois lim ited their acts o f hostility to N ew F rance’s native allies and the French traders they happened to encounter. Beginning in th e late 1680s, how ever, they turned against th e colony itself. Statistics convey b etter th an w ords the devastating results o f th eir attacks. T he population fell from 10,725 in 1685 to 10,303 in 1688. In 1692 it w as only 11,075. T he num ber o f houses declined from 1,861 in 1685 to 1,721 in 1688; th e num ber o f arpents* under cultivation, from 28,663 in 1688 to 26,669 in 1692.' V audreuil’s C anadian career, how ever, began on a bright note. It w as n o t uncom m on for vessels to take tw o m onths o r m ore to cross th e A tlantic in the seventeenth century. But / 'A rc-en-C iel, ab o ard w hich he had taken passage, perform ed th e crossing from * T he arpent was an ancient French m easure of surface equal roughly to one acre.

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R ochefort to Q uebec in the rem arkable tim e o f thirty-three days.2 In th e last days o f M ay, w ith three o th er vessels follow ing close behind bearing 800 recruits for th e colonial troops, it cast anchor before C ap T ourm ente and V audreuil travelled th e rest o f the w ay in a ligh t b o a t. H e arriv e d b efo re th e cap ital ju s t as Intendan t B ochart de C ham pigny was leaving for M ontreal to jo in the arm y o f 2,000 m en which D enonville was ab o u t to lead against the Senecas, th e w esternm ost o f the Iroquois nations. V audreuil was w eary from the ocean voyage, his baggage had not y et been b rought ashore, but it w ould have taken m ore than considerations like these to keep him out o f th e im pending cam paign. H e had com e to C anada to better his situation. It was not likely th at he w ould succeed in this by sitting in Q uebec w hile a m ajor m ilitary operation w as in progress at th e colony’s o th er extrem ity. He insisted on accom panying the in ten d an t.3 W hen he arrived in M ontreal in th e first days o f Jun e, D enonville initially thought it best to leave him behind to oversee the building o f redoubts and to guard th e colony against surprise attacks,4 but V audreuil would have none o f this. H e had com e to fight and he had his way. W hen th e arm y m obilized on Ju n e 11, th e chevalier accom panied it at th e head o f 832 troupes d e la m arine. T he expedition provided V audreuil w ith a vivid introduction to N orth A m erican w arfare. H e struggled against the rapids o f the St. Law rence and m arched through dense forest in oppressive sum m er heat. A t Irondequat Bay the arm y was jo in ed by La D urantaye, D ulhut an d N icolas P errot a t the head o f 500 w estern Indians. F or the first tim e V audreuil beheld N ew F ran ce’s savage allies an d he m ust have been startled by th e sight. M ost o f them w ore nothing but horns on th eir heads and the tails o f beasts b eh in d th e ir backs. T heir faces w ere painted red o r green, with black o r w hite spots. T heir ears an d noses w ere hung w ith orna­ m en ts o f iro n , an d th e ir n ak ed b o d ies w ere d au b e d w ith figures o f various anim als.5 U nfortunately, the expedition provided few opportunities for heroism . A t a point near th eir settlem ents the Senecas attem pted to am bush th e advancing arm y but th e m anoeuver was badly executed and th e Iroquois abandoned the field, leaving m any dead behind. Still, th e w ar screeches and gunfire o f an enem y w hom th e dense forest rendered invisible badly unnerved the F rench. H ow ever, bravely seconded by C alliere, V audreuil, and o th er officers, D enonville quickly regained control o f the situa­ tion. T his w as th e only action o f the cam paign. Follow ing the e n c o u n ter, th e arm y ad v an ced u n o p p o sed in to Seneca te rrito ry w hich it system atically laid w aste.6

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Back in Q uebec an exhausted D enonville inform ed th e m inis­ try th a t this had been th e m ost punishing cam paign o f his thirty-year career. H ad V audreuil and C alliere not been there to second him it w ould have proven to o m uch for h im .7 V audreuil, w hose appetite for action seem ed insatiable, w as now com m and­ ing a flying squadron o f 120 coureurs de bois w hose assignm ent was to cover th e island o f M o ntreal during th e w inter m onths.* “ H e is a cadet o f quality from G ascony,” D enonville rem arked o f the new com er, “ w ho will not often send for letters o f exchange unless you give him th e m eans to do so.” 9 T he governor hoped th at th e court w ould g ran t him these m eans for, w ith his salary of 1.500 livres, th e com m ander o f th e troops could not m eet his social obligations, chief am ong w hich was keeping open house for th e officers w ho called on him on official business. T he court re sp o n d ed to th is req u est, w hich In te n d a n t C h am p ig n y strongly sup po rted , by granting V audreuil an annual gratuity of 500 livres. '1 In 1688, V audreuil was given his first opportunity to prove his talents as an adm inistrator. C alliere was in F rance to p ro m o te a plan to conquer N ew Y ork by com bined land and sea operations and V audreuil replaced him as governor o f M ontreal. T he posi­ tion w as one o f g reat responsibility, for the district o f M ontreal w as th e p art o f th e colony m ost exposed to Iroquois attack . But in m id su m m er 1689, th ere b ein g a lull in h o stilities, V au d reu il allow ed th e h abitants o f th e outlying areas to return to their dwellings instead o f obliging them to rem ain close to th e redoubts for p ro tectio n .12 T he consequences were catastrophic. D uring the night betw een A ugust 4 and 5, u nd er cover o f a violent hailstorm , 1.500 Iroquois crossed L ake S aint-L ouis and threw them selves on th e settlem ent o f Lachine. T he houses w ere b urnt and m en, w om en and children indiscrim inately butchered. H ad V audreuil n ot relaxed C alliere’s strict security m easures this frightful m assa­ cre could have been avoided. Late on th e afternoon o f A ugust 5, A uger d e Subercase arrived at L achine w ith 200 regulars w ho had been garrisoned near M ontreal. H e learned that th e Iroquois w ere encam ped a mile and a h alf farther o n , behind a patch o f forest, and th at m ost w ere helplessly d ru n k on brandy taken from th e houses o f the settlers. Subercase, w hose force had been strengthened by troops from the L achine area, decided to attack them . H e was ab o ut to enter th e w oods w ith his m en w hen th e o rder to halt rang out from th e rear. It was V audreuil, ju st arrived from M ontreal with orders from D enonville “ th at no chances be taken and everyone rem ain on th e defensive.” 13 Subercase was furious but he had to

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P h ilip p e d e R igau d d e Vaudreuil

lead his m en back to F ort R olland, one o f three stockades build near L achine. V audreuil now had 500 regulars and m ilitia under his com ­ m and at F o rt R olland. T he follow ing day, eighty m en under R abeyre attem pted to jo in them from F ort R em y; b u t they were intercepted in th eir dash by the Iroquois, w ho had recovered from their orgy, an d cut to pieces. T he action was clearly visible from F ort R olland, although it to o k place o u t o f m usket range, and a g ro up o f officers asked fo r perm ission to rescue R abeyre and possibly catch th e Iroquois in a crossfire. O nce again V audreuil refused, “ held back by his o rd ers.” '4 A s a result, th e garrison stood by passively while R ab ey re’s m en w ere either slain o r taken into captivity. T he orders to rem ain on th e defensive, by which V audreuil considered him self bound, had been issued by D enonville within m om ents o f receiving news o f the m assacre, when M ontreal was wild w ith terro r. N o one knew w hat th e Iroquois w ould do next; perhaps they w ould launch an attack on the town itself. W hen V audreuil arrived at L achine he m ust have realized w hat D enon­ ville could not foresee, th at he had a unique opp ortu nity to counterattack and perhaps free th e ninety odd prisoners in Iro­ quois hands. A nd yet he did not grasp it. His failure to d o so is not so m uch a com m entary on his lack o f intelligence15 as on his lack o f preparedness for coping w ith such a situation. H e had sp e n t fifteen y ears in F ra n c e as a su b o rd in a te officer. In th at capacity he had been trained to execute orders. H e m ight have reacted differently h ad he been accustom ed to m aking decisions and assum ing responsibility for them . M any years w ould go by following the tragic events o f 1689 before V audreuil was again thrust into a position o f adm inistra­ tive responsibility. N o t th at his superiors w ere dissatisfied with his perform ance as acting-governor o f M ontreal. It excited no com m entary, either adverse o r favorable, except from th e abbe B elm ont, th e superior o f th e Sem inary o f S aint Sulpice, w ho in a history o f N ew F rance w ritten m any years later com m ented bit­ terly on the chevalier’s conduct at L achine. It was sim ply that, with the return o f C alliere from France and o f F rontenac for a second term as governor-general, a clear delineation o f responsi­ bilities was established. F ro nten ac spent m ost o f his tim e in Q uebec w here he concerned him self with the overall planning of th e w ar. T he able C alliere looked after the defense o f M ontreal, and V audreuil com m anded detachm ents sent in pursuit o f Iro­ quois w ar parties. W hile serving in this purely m ilitary capacity he show ed once again th at he was a brave and able soldier.

T he R ise to the Sum m it, 168 7-1703

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Tw ice, in 1691 at R epentigny an d in 1692 at the Long Sault, he decisively defeated large bands o f m arauding Iroquois. T hese two victories stood o u t all th e m ore for com ing w hen th e fortunes of N ew F rance w ere at th eir lowest e b b .16 M eantim e, on N ovem ber 21, 1690, during th e period o f festiv­ ities th at followed th e defeat o f Phips before Q uebec, V audreuil w as m arried. His wife was seventeen-year-old L ouise-Elizabeth de Joybert. T he m arriage contract was signed in Q uebec on N ovem ­ ber 19 in the presence o f F rontenac. By th e term s o f this docu­ m ent V audreuil endow ed his wife w ith a douaire p re fix o f 12,000 Hivres, th at is to say, should she survive her husband, she would be entitled to a life pension consisting o f th e proceeds from a portion valued at 12,000 livres o f her h usband ’s p ro p res.'1 T he douaire w as a standard feature o f all m arriage contracts draw n up under th e C ustom o f Paris and related civil codes. O ne o f 12,000 livres m ay have been m odest by th e standards o f F rance for a m an o f V audreuil’s standing but it was very substantial by those o f C an ad a. T he com m ander o f th e troops m ay n o t have been affluent b u t he was not entirely im pecunious. L ouise-Elizabeth w as the daughter o f Pierre Joybert an d M arie-Frangoise C hartier, fam ilies th at belonged to th e provincial nobility o f old F rance and had becom e rooted in th e new . Jo y ­ bert had com e to C an ad a in 1665 as a lieutenant in the regim ent o f C arignan-Salieres and m oved to A cadia in 1672 w hen Jean T alon granted him a seigneury on th e St. Joh n R iver. W hen he died in 1678,18 one year after having been nam ed adm inistrator o f A cadia, his w idow m oved to Q uebec w here her fam ily was prom inently established. H er father, L ouis-T heandre C hartier de L otbiniere, had arrived in C anada in 1651 and becom e a council­ lor o f th e Sovereign C ouncil w hen this institution was created in 1 6 6 3 -* • uV audreuil’s m arriage was one o f th e fundam ental rforces in his career. H e had united his fortunes to those o f an extrem ely am bitious and able w om an w ho w ould later w ork tirelessly and m ost successfully to p ro m ote th e interests o f h er husband an d her sons. Equally im portant, th e chevalier had becom e associated w ith a clan which form ed p art o f th e ruling class o f N ew France.

* H e resigned the position in 1677 and was succeeded in it by his son R ene-L ouis. T he elder L otbiniere had m arried Elizabeth D am ours and thus becom e linked to a family that, like his ow n, figured prom inently in the early history of New France. M athieu D am our de Chauffours, his brother-in-law , was town m ajor of Q uebec, a m em ber o f the Sover­ eign Council, and seigneur o f M atane.

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Its m em bers ow ned land in th e colony, occupied political posi­ tions there, and held com m issions in its troops. As a result strong bonds grew up betw een V audreuil and C an ad a. T hese presented som e disadvantages, for the court, in o rd er to m ake it easier for her colonial adm inistrators to rule im partially, preferred choosing m etropolitan Frenchm en w ho had no ties w ith the country w here they received their posting. It was because o f his C anadian connections th at som e years later Louis x iv had m isgivings about nam ing V audreuil governor in 1703; and afterw ards Jero m e de P ontchartrain, the m inister o f m arine, frequently w arned V au­ dreuil ab o ut th e fatal consequences o f favouritism .19 V audreuil’s enem ies understood o f course th at his relationship w ith the L otbi­ niere clan was his political A chilles’ heel an d this is th e point w here they frequently attacked when attem pting to discredit the governor. Strong ties w ere grow ing up betw een V audreuil and C anada, but P rance and his native L anguedoc w ere not forgotten. The barony o f V audreuille had been in th e possession o f his fam ily for over a half-m ilennium . Som e fifteen generations had dw elt on it. W hen he left for N ew F rance in 1687, how ever, the ancestral fief was in very sorry shape. C reditors had liens on it.20 T he m unici­ pal a u th o ritie s o f th e tow n o f R evel, w hich to u ch ed u p o n the estate, w ere taxing its inhabitants at a ruinous rate.21 V audreuil considered th at the taxes w ere illegal, notw ithstanding a deed o f 1518 joining th e barony to R evel, and fully intended contesting the m atter. F o r the m om ent, how ever, A ntoinette de C olom bet w as th e chief threat. She could n o t avail herself o f her claim as universal legatee as long as Philippe i lived, b u t the latter w as far from well. Ill health had obliged him to sell his captaincy in the French G uard s for 78,000 livres in 1689 and to retire to his estates. T hese fam ily problem s weighed so heavily upon V au­ dreuil th at he m ade three voyages to F rance in the 1690s, and his wife one. H e undertook the first in th e fall o f 1692 upon receiving the news o f his m o th er’s d eath .22 H e saw Philippe i w ho m ay have regretted jeopardizing the fam ily title to the fief o f V audreuille for in M arch, 1693, he b equeathed the fief to the children o f his youngest b ro th er.23 H opes o f perpetuating the fam ily n am e rested entirely w ith them since the four o th er brothers w ere childless, unm arried, o r dead. O n Ju n e 5, Philippe i died. T his set off furious litigation betw een P hilippe, A ntoinette de C olom bet, and the fam ily creditors. T he com m ander o f the troops, w ho had returned to C anada in 1693, left again for F rance in the fall of 1694.24 and rem ained there until the follow ing spring. In 1696,

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his wife crossed th e ocean to attend to his interests. Since His M ajesty is pleased w ith [V audreuil] who is a good officer,” P ontchartrain w rote to Basville, th e intendant o f L anguedoc, “ he w ishes you to give her all the protection she will need to term i­ nate this affair.” 25 T he recom m endation availed nothing. L itiga­ tion continued an d V audreuil w ent to F rance yet another tim e in 1697.26 Even after this third voyage there was no settlem ent in sight. W hile his fam ily interests w ere being th reaten ed , his career in C anada w as going from strength to strength. H e did not neglect attending to his professional interests during his voyages to F rance and in this dom ain his efforts w ere crow ned w ith success. In 1695, h e com plained to th e m inistry ab o ut being unranked in th e navy w hen som e o f th e personnel serving under him held com m issions as m idshipm en and ensigns. T he court responded by granting him a com m ission o f capitaine de vaisseau.11 Back in C anada th e following year h e served w ith considerable distinction in th e great cam paign against th e O nondagas that b ro ke the fighting spirit o f th e Five N atio ns. On A ugust 4, th e French arm y o f 2,200 m en pitched cam p' on th e site o f th e chief O n o n ­ daga stronghold w hose occupants had fled w ithout offering resist­ ance. T he neighbouring trib e o f th e O neidas sent a m essenger to beg peace. F ro nten ac replied th at he w ould g ran t it on condition th at they all m igrate to C anada an d settle th ere. V audreuil, with 700 m en, was sent to enforce the dem and. T he chevalier acquit­ ted him self o f th e assignm ent in a m anner th at w ould have p leased L ouvois. A t th e h ead o f h is d eta ch m en t h e m o ved w ith great speed across forty-tw o m iles o f rugged country, destroyed O neida, ravaged th e cornfields, seized a num ber o f chiefs as hostages for the fulfillm ent o f th e governor’s dem ands, an d was back at th e m ain cam p in th ree d ays.28 F rontenac m arvelled a t his sw iftness;29 “ b u t,” w rote C harles de M onseignat in his annual Relation o f th e M o st R em a rkab le Canadian H appenings, “ we have grow n so accustom ed in C an ad a to his gallant deeds and he has th e K ing’s service so m uch a t heart th at those w ho know him will not w onder at this latest exploit, rem arkable as it is.” 30 T his exploit confirm ed V audreuil’s m ilitary reputation. In 1697, large-scale o perations w ere scheduled to take place against the English colonies. A fleet under th e m arquis de N esm ond was to rendezvous w ith an arm y o f 1,500 m en at Pentagouet and th e two forces w ould then ravage the N ew England coast and attack B oston. T he expedition failed to m aterialize b u t the co u rt’s choice o f a leader for th e land force is indicative o f the high esteem in

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which it held V audreuil. T h e com m and w ent to F ro nten ac, but should he be unable to exercise it - and well he m ight not because o f his advanced a g e -V a u d re u il should replace him .31 T he follow­ ing year, th e chevalier received yet an o th er m ark o f distinction: th e coveted C ross o f S aint-L ouis for his distinguished service in th e Iroquois w ar.3- T his was th e greatest h on ou r o f his career up to th at tim e. A s V audreuil’s stature grew so did his am bitions. By 1698 he aspired at nothing less th an th e governor-generalship o f New F rance. C alliere, he m ust have realized, was a far stronger candi­ date for th e position. H e h ad received th e C ross o f S aint-L ouis in 1696, fully tw o years before V audreuil, stood well above him in the adm inistrative hierarchy, and had pow erful support at the court in th e person o f his bro th er, F rancois, a diplom at o f note and one o f th e king’s four private secretaries. T he tw o brothers w ere in regular correspondence, and Francois frequently exercised his considerable influence on behalf o f H ector in C an ad a.33 C al­ liere, how ever, had o n e g re a t liab ility : his w retch ed s ta te o f health. “ H e is in bed all year, stricken w ith gout and another infirm ity which prevents him from sitting,” 34 w rote L e R oy de La Potherie, th e com ptroller o f m arine. C alliere’s physique w as so underm ined by his various ailm ents th at he looked 10 years older th an his real age.3-' His gout had been so painful in 1696 that a horse had to be specially transported for him from M ontreal on a fiatboat to enable him to participate in the cam paign against the Iroquois. C alliere’s physical decrepitude w as clearly th e strongest card V au­ dreuil held in his hand. F rontenac died on N ovem ber 28, 1698. R egulations stipulated th at w hen a governor-general died in office, th e governor o f M ontreal replaced him until a successor was appointed. C ham pigny therefore sent Le G ard e u r de C ourtem anche to M ontreal to inform C alliere o f F ro nten ac’s dem ise. C alliere suspected that V audreuil w ould m ake a bid for the vacant post and he acted quickly. H e instructed C ourtem anche to slip into the English colonies instead o f returning to Q uebec an d sail for France ab o ard th e first available vessel. U pon his arrival he should go straight to F rancois de C alliere with the news o f F ro n ten ac’s death. M eantim e, in Q uebec, V audreuil and his ally C ham pigny w ere aw aiting C ou rtem anche’s return w ith grow ing trepidation an d som e tim e elap sed b efo re they u n d ersto o d w h at had occurred. T here was now n o tim e to be lost. H astily, V audreuil scribbled a dispatch to P ontchartrain. H e had m et th e m inister o f m arine during one o f his voyages to F rance an d already regarded him som ew hat as his protector. This m issive - the only one in

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V audreuil’s hand w hich is know n to e x is t-w a s clearly th at o f a m an m o re accu stom ed to h old in g th e sw o rd th an th e p en . T he calligraphy w as aw kw ard, the spelling phonetic, and the m essage blunt. T he com m ander o f the troops gave th e nam es o f som e officers u nd er w hom he had served in F rance as references, stated that he could lead an arm y into Iroquoia and ravage it from end to end should this becom e necessary, and stressed th at only he could endure th e hardships o f such a cam paign. “ I am not questioning the m erits o f M . de C alliere, but he is incapacitated by his infirm ities.” 36 T his letter was placed in th e hands o f A m yot de V incelotte with enough m oney to enable him to charter a fast craft at th e first N ew E ngland p ort. T he race across th e A tlantic w as on. D espite his considerable head start, C ourtem anche arrived a t Versailles only a few hours before V audreuil’s em issary. T hese sufficed to allow him to see F rancois de C alliere w ho th en hurried to Louis xiv. V incelotte had gone to P on tchartrain, but w hen the m inister approached the king w ith th e new s o f F ro nten ac’s death he was told th at H is M ajesty was already aw are o f th e developm ent and had granted th e vacant post to F rancois d e C alliere for his bro th er.37 A s a consolation, V audreuil w as nam ed G ov erno r of M ontreal and received a com m ission to act as governor-general in C alliere’s absence.38 Political m anoeuvres ap art, th e ap p ointm en t was a good one. Calliere had show n th at h e was an able ad m in istrato r as governor o f M ontreal and proved him self to be an accom plished diplom at as governor-general by negotiating, betw een som e thirty different tribes, th e treaty o f 1701 th at ended th e second Iroquois w ar. Still, w ith his abrasive disposition and inflated feeling o f selfim p o rta n c e, he w as n o t p o p u la r w ith his co lleagu es in th e gov­ ernm ent establishm ent. By his behaviour during th e w inter of 1698-9, w hen he was still only acting-govem or, he m anaged to exasperate every one o f them . A ccording to La Potherie, his m ost consistent critic, he behaved “ as if he had been som e divinity of this N ew W orld.” 39 H e required o f the Sovereign C ouncil th at it register his letters o f provision as acting-governor.40 A t a review o f th e troops held in M ontreal he dem anded th e general salute, a distinction reserved for m arshalls o f France. V audreuil refused to give th e necessary orders on the grounds th at C alliere w as not entitled to such an honour. An argum ent betw een th e tw o men en su ed , an d g ru d g in g ly , th e c o m m an d er o f th e tro o p s w as obliged to give in.41 T he events o f th at w inter w ere not o f the kind th at en d ear two m en to each other. Soon after receiving his perm anent com m is­

26

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sion, C alliere rubbed salt into his rival’s w ound by refusing to recognize his com m ission as acting governor. V audreuil prom ptly com plained to P ontchartrain, w ho instructed C alliere to g ran t him th is re c o g n itio n .42 B ut, alth o u g h v in d icated on th is sco re, th e fears o f th e new governor o f M ontreal w ere aroused. H e had risen in th e adm inistrative hierarchy on th e strength o f th e good reports o f his superiors an d o f his m ilitary prow ess. M ight not C alliere attem pt to block his further ascent by speaking disparag­ ingly o f him in his dispatches and by refusing to g ran t him the com m and o f m ilitary expeditions, expeditions th at m ight soon becom e necessary since w ar betw een F rance and E ngland was again threatening? T hese fears did cross his m ind4J but they were groundless. C alliere, once he had enjoyed his little revenge, was too m uch th e king’s servant to allow personal anim osities to w arp his sense o f duty. But V audreuil could not be convinced o f this. P ontchartrain m ight assure him th at there was no trace o f an i­ m osity tow ards him to be found in th e governor’s dispatches,44 V audreuil rem ained convinced th at his new superior w ould try to injure his career. In 1702, the W ar o f th e Spanish Succession broke o u t in E u ro p e. Im m ed iately u p o n receiving th e new s V au d reu il tra v ­ elled to Q uebec to receive th e g overnor’s instructions. H e was told to rem ain strictly on th e defensive until he received orders to th e contrary. V audreuil im m ediately protested to th e court. He claim ed th at in w aiting for C alltere’s orders to arrive from Q uebec he w ould lose excellent opportunities to strike at the enem y. H is own strategy consisted o f launching a surprise attack on A lbany w ith an arm y o f 1,500 m en. T his, he felt, would perm anently subdue th e Iroquois w ho w ould definitively w ith­ draw from th e English alliance once A lbany was destroyed and th e surrounding countryside ravaged. C alliere, he alleged, had vetoed this plan not because it was unsound but because he was to o ill to lead the expedition in person and did not w ant his sub ordinate to reap all the glory. T o g et around this troublesom e governor he asked P ontchartrain to send him the king’s orders directly.45 T his tim e V audreuil had gone too far. Pointedly, he was told th at since C alliere was briefed by the king him self he m ust refrain from any enterprise which th e governor had not authorized. As for an expedition against A lbany, far from subduing the Iroquois, it m ight incite them to renew the w ar against N ew France. “ T hus, be very careful not to undertake it w ithout o rd ers.” 4b This w hole episode show s V audreuil in a rath er p oo r light. H is plan for an attack on A lbany w as essentially unsound. It conflicted

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directly w ith th e policy o f neutrality w ith N ew Y ork to which C alliere was gradually w inning th e court and which V audreuil him self w ould ad o p t as soon as he succeeded him . O nly th e hope o f discrediting th e ailing g overnor can have m ade him propose such an expedition. T he district o f M ontreal o f w hich V audreuil had becom e gov­ ern o r w as the m ost vulnerable p art o f N ew F rance. N o other area o f th e colony was so exposed to Iroquois attack. T he tow n itself w as the m etropolis o f the fur trade and the seat o f a large m erchant com m unity. T he chief responsibilities o f th e local gover­ nor grew out o f this situation. H e was expected to m ake p eriod i­ cal inspection tours o f his district to ascertain th at the stockades w ere in good condition and to prevent th e m ilitary from h a ra s s ­ ing th e population as often happened in th e garrison tow ns of F rance. H e was also responsible for enforcing the royal ordi­ nances, particularly those relative to th e sale o f brandy to the Indians and to th e d ep artu re o f canoes for the west. T he im por­ tance o f the office had been great when C alliere occupied it because o f th e Iroquois w ar b u t declined som ew hat w hen V audruil succeeded him . N ow th a t peace had been concluded w ith the Five N ations, th e duties o f th e incum bent w ere essentially those of an inspector, policem an, an d executor o f royal ordinances. R es­ ponsibilities like these provided few opportunities for distinction but they required industry and vigilance - “ zele p ou r le service,” to use th e contem porary expression. V audreuil m ust have acquit­ ted him self well o f his duties for P ontchartrain declared his satis­ faction w ith him .47 T he people o f M ontreal also w ere satisfied w ith th eir governor. “ H e is generally liked th ro u gh ou t C an ad a,” w rote L a P otherie,48 and Saint-C astin in faraw ay A cadia echoed this statem ent.49 T here w ere m any reasons for this. H e m ust have been popular w ith the ordinary habitants for the gentle way in w hich he exercised authority as well as for his hum anitarianism . H e show ed concern for the poor, and his wife, despite the great risks involved, helped to nurse th e sick during th e terrible epidem ic of sm allpox th at claim ed 2,000 lives in 1702.5° H e m ust have found favour w ith th e m erchants for taking up their grievances against th e new ly-founded colony o f L ouisiana to which several coureurs de bois w ere running off w ith the trade goods o f th eir em ployers. In 1701, at V audreuiPs request, Pontchartrain agreed to oblige, o r a t least a tte m p t to o b lig e, th ese co u reurs to settle th e ir ac­ co u n ts w ith th e C an ad ia n m e rc h a n ts.51 F in ally , h e w as certain ly pop ular w ith th e religious orders for taking a firm stand against th e sale o f brandy to th e Indians52 an d w ith the fashionable

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society o f M ontreal and his colleagues for living up to his social obligations. H e w ould hardly have been referred to as “ very gallant” and “a gentlem an o f quality and m erit” had he not entertained often and w ell.53 H is role as one o f M o ntreal’s leading socialites, to say nothing o f the cost o f bringing up a fam ily that num bered seven sons and one daughter by 1703, and the extensive renovations he was carrying out on his house, leased from D aniel G reysolon D ulhut for 400 livres annually,54 placed his finances under heavy strain. H is incom e as governor o f M ontreal was rath er m odest. H e had a basic salary o f 3,000 livres an d an annual gratuity o f 2,000 livres.55 O n tw o occasions he also received special gratuities of 1,000 livres to help cover th e cost o f th e w ork being done on his hom e. 6 T hen, on O ctober 23, 1702, he becam e a seigneur. C alliere and the intendant F rancois de B eauharnois granted him the territory located ju st across the w estern tip o f M ontreal Island, including th e little lie aux T ourtres in the O ttaw a R iver.57 T he seigneury was nothing m ore than a w ilderness tract, but its ideal location for th e Indian trade m ade it a valuable piece o f real esta te . H ow ever, V au d reu il only b egan to d raw in co m e from it on July 26, 1703, w hen h e leased it to P ie rre L am o u reu x , dit S aint-G erm ain, a M ontreal m erchant, for three years at 1,000 livres annually.58 By th at d ate his fortunes h ad changed dram atically. O n M ay 26, 1703, C alliere died, a few days after being stricken by a haem orrhage w hile attending high m ass in the Q uebec cathedral. V audreuil prom ptly w ent to Q uebec to assum e interim com m and o f th e colony an d w rote to P ontchartrain to ask for the perm anent com m ission. H is letter, o f which only an a b stra c t survives, stressed his n o b le b irth , his th irty -fiv e y ears in the service o f th e king, his know ledge o f th e country and robust constitu tio n .59 T his bid for the governorship carried infinitely m ore w eight than th e clum sy o ne o f 1698. N o t only w as Vaud reu il’s reputation as a soldier solidly established but his years as g overnor o f M ontreal enabled him to acquire the adm inistrative experience he lacked. M oreover, his candidacy was energetically supported by the intendant B eauharnois60 and th e abbe Lechassier, superior o f th e Sem inary o f Saint-Sulpice in Paris. This cleric played a key role in obtaining th e position for V audreuil. O ne o f his letters to him provides an interesting account o f the lobbying th at w ent on at Versailles on th e C hevalier’s behalf: As soon as I received y ou r letter I w rote to M onsieur le com te de Pontchartrain and inform ed him th at th e ecclesiastics and th e in h ab ita n ts o f M o n trea l ard e n tly d esired you as

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governor-general, th at y ou r valour had carried th e w eight o f w ar in years past, th at y ou r charity and th at o f M adam e la gouvernante h ad been m anifest last w inter w hen you visited and nursed th e sick, finally th at no one was m ore qualified th an you to m anage th e F rench an d th e Indians an d w as m ore able to preserve peace and repulse the enem y. M onsieur de B elm ont will be able to give you a m ore exact account o f the contents o f m y letter. I show ed it to M onsieur, your brother [A rnaud]. I began by addressing m yself to the m inister to r 1 was told th at this was th e route one had to follow. I have not yet been able to find o u t his decision. H e did not m ention th e subject to a person w ho spoke to him yesterday an d I did not d are delay w riting to you for fear o f m issing th e ships. A lthough I initially addressed m yself to M onsieur d e P ontchartrain I did not neg­ lect soliciting M onsieur le cardinal de N oailles [the cardinalarchbishop o f Paris] so th at h e m ay engage M onsieur le M arechal his b ro th er to act strongly on this m atter which I regard as m ine and th e success o f which seem s to m e very im portant and very advantageous for th e w hole country.61 T he m om ent o f truth cam e betw een July 23 and 31 w hen Pontch­ artrain approached Louis xiv an d recom m ended V audreuil as C alliere’s successor. T h e m onarch w avered because o f V audreuil’s C anadian ties, but P ontchartrain insisted. H e described his candi­ date not only as a person w ho could m aintain o rder b u t also elim inate th e abuses which had crept into th e adm inistration u n d er p rev io u s g o v ern o rs."2 F in ally L ouis x iv y ielded, an d on A ugust 1, 1703, Philippe de R igaud de V audreuil becam e gover­ nor o f N ew F rance.63 REFEREN CES 1. C ensus of C an a d a , 1871, vol. iv, pp. 16-29. 2. M em oire du voyage pour l’entreprise de M . le m arquis de D enon­ ville contre les T sonnontouans, octobre 1687, A N Col., C " A , vol.

3. Cham pigny a Seignelay, 16 juillet 1687, A N Col., C " A , vol. 9, ff. 4. D enonville a Seignelay, 8juin 1687, A N Col., C " A, vol. 9, f..2 8 . 5. F. Parkm an, Frontenac and New France Under Louis X IV (Bos­ ton, 1884), p. 149. 6. Ibid., pp. 149-156 7. Denonville h Seignelay, 25 aout 1687, A N Col., C " A , vol. 9, f. 68

30

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8. Id. a Id., 28 octobre 1687, A N C ol., C " A , vol. 9, f. 147 9. Ibid. 10 ^ 7 ^ * SeigneIay’ 5 novem bre 1687, A N Col., C " A , vol. 9 11. Extrait des reponses aux lettres regues de C anada A N C ol C "A vol. 10, f. 18. 12. G edeon de Catalogne, Recueil de ce qui s’est passe au C anada au sujet de la guerre tan t des Anglois que des Iroquois depuis I’annee In • LeBlant, ed., Historie de !a Nouvelle France. Les sources narratives au debut du X V Ilie siecle. (D ax, n.d.), p. 199 [henceforth Catalogne] 13. Ibid., p. 201. 14. O bservation sur 1‘estat des affaires du C anada au depart des vaisseux le 18 novem bre 1689, A N Col, C " A , vol. 10, f. 321. 15. As suggested by W . J. Eccles, Frontenac. the Courtier Governor (T oronto, 1959), p. 193. 16. C atalogne, pp. 220-222; Bacqueville de La Potherie, Histoire de t'Am erique septentrionale (Paris, 1753), vol. 3, pp. 1 5 9 -1 6 1 ; Frontenac & Pontchartrain, 15 septem bre 1692 A N Col C " A vol. 12, f. 25. 17. C o n trat d e m ariag e e n tre P h ilippe de R igaud de V audreuil et L ouise-E lizabeth d e Jo y b e rt, Q uebec, A rchives n ationales du Q uebec, greffe de Francois G enaple, 19 novem bre 1690. 18. “ Pierre d e Joybert de Soulanges et de M arson” in G . W . Brown, ed., Dictionary o f Canadian Biography (T oronto, 1967), vol f pp. 3 9 8 -4 0 0 . ‘ ’ 19. Pontchartrain a V audreuil, 17 juin 1705, A N Col., B, vol. 27 f. 74; Pontchartrain h M adam e de V audreuil, Ibid., f. 271; Pontchar­ train h V audreuil, 9 ju in 1706, Ib id . , ff. 2 2 4 -2 2 5 ; P o n tch ar­ train i L otbiniere, Ibid. , f. 277. 20. Factum p our Philippe de R igaud contre A rnaud de R igaud et A ntoinette de C olom bet, n.d., BN, C lairam bault, vol. 1103, f. 145 passim; Vaudreuil k Pontchartrain, 7 novem bre 1701 A N Col C 1'A , vol. 19, ff. 8 3 -8 4 . 21. D em ande que M adam e de M arson faisant pour M ’r. le m arquis de V audreuil & la com m une de Revel, n.d., n.p., Toulouse, A rchive d ep artem en tales d e la H a u te-G a ro n n e [henceforth A D H G ] serie 2E 608. 22. Cham pigny a Pontchartrain, 21 septem bre 1692, A N Col., C "A vol. 12, f. 70. 23. F actum p o u r P hilippe de R igaud . . . , B N , C lairam b au lt, vol 1103, f. 149. 24. M em oire du Roi a Frontenac et C ham pigny, n.d., A N Col B vol. 17, f. 76. 25. Pontchartrain a Basville, 12 septem bre 1696, A M , B-, vol 117 ff 644 - 645. 26. M em oire du roi & Frontenac et Cham pigny, 19 octobre 1697 fs ic l A N Col., B, vol. 20, f. 73. 27. M em oire des officiers qui dem andent & Sa M ajeste leur avance-

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m ent ou conge de passer en France, n.d., A N Col., D :C, vol. 47, f. 63; com m ission de capitaine de vaisseau pour le sr. de V au­ dreuil, com m andant les troupes en C anada, 5 m ai 1695, A N Col., B, vol. 17, f. 242. 28. F. Parkm an, op. cit., pp. 4 1 3 -4 1 4 . 29. Frontenac a Pontchartrain, 25 octobre 1696, A N Col., C " A , vol. 13, f. 149. 30. Relation de ce qui s’est passe de plus rem arquable en C anada dcpuis de depart des vaisseux de 1695 [ . . . ] , A N Col., C " A, vol. 14, f. 59. 31. Pontchartrain a Frontenac, 6 m ars 1697, A N C ol., B, vol. 19, f. 166; Id., a V audreuil, 21 avril 1697, Ibid., ff. 228-229. 32. A. Fauteux, Les Chevaliers de Saint-Louis en Canada (M ontreal, 1940), pp. 92-93. 33. P o n tch artrain a F rangois de C alliere, 8 m ai 1697, A M , B \ vol. 13, f. 205; Id a Id., 1 decem bre 1700, Ibid., vol. 149, f. 321. 34. La Potherie a Pontchartrain, n.d., A N Col., F J, vol. 2, f. 255. 35. C alliere was born on N ovem ber 12, 1648, (See “ L ouis-H ector de C alliere” in D .M . H ayne, ed.. Dictionary o f Canadian Biography (T oronto, 1969), vol. 2, p. 112). H e was therefore not quite 55 when he died on M ay 26, 1703 instead of 64 as stated in his burial certificate, given in P .G . Roy, La Ville de Quebec sous le regime franfais (Q uebec, 1930), vol. 2, p. 430. 36. V audreuil k Pontchartrain, 26 decem bre 1698, BN, C lairam bault, vol. 873, ff. 359-360. 37. C atalogne, pp. 242-243. 38 Provisions de gouverneur de l’ile de M ontreal pour M . le Chevalier de V audreuil, 28 m ai 1699, A N C ol., B, vol. 20, ff. 242-243; Pontchartran a V audreuil, 30 m ai 1699, Ibid., ff. 250-251. 39. Q uoted in F . P arkm an, op. cit., p. 439. 40. La Potherie k Pontchartrain, 2 ju in 1699, A N C ol., C " A , 17, t.

.

112

41. La T ouche a Pontchartrain, 3 juin 1699, A N Col., C MA , vol. 17 f. 105; V audreuil et La Potherie a id.. Ibid., f. 110. 42. V audreuil a Pontchartrain, 24 octobre 1700, A N Col., C " A , vol. 18, f. 45; P o n tc h artrain a C alliere, 31 m ai 1701, A N C o l., B, vol. 22, f. 223. 43. V audreuil a Pontchartrain, 1 octobre 1701, A N Col., C " A , vol. 19, f. 227. 44. Pontchartrain k V audreuil, 31 m ai 1701, A N Col., B, vol. 22, f. 45. V audreuil k Pontchartrain, 4 novem bre 1702, A N Col., C " A , vol. 20, f. 214; Id. a Id., 20 novem bre 1702, Ibid., ff. 122-123. 46. Pontchartrain a V audreuil, 20 juin 1703, A N Col., B, vol. 23, f. 243. 47. Pontchartrain k V audreuil, 6 m ai 1702, A N C ol., B, vol. 23, f. 91; Id. a Id., 20 ju in 1703, Ibid., f. 242. 48. La Potherie a Pontchartrain, n .d., A N C ol., F !, vol. 2, f. 259. 49. Saint-C astin, M em oire sur l'expedition contre Boston, 1702, in

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Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, memoires el autres documents historiques relatifs a la Nouvelle-France [henceforth Coll. M ss. N .F.J (Q uebec, 1882-1885), vol. 2, p. 398. 50. Lechassier a Pontchartrain, 20 juillet 1703, Paris, Archives du Sem inaire de Saint-Sulpice [henceforth A SStSl f. 299' Id k Vau­ dreuil, 30 juillet 1703, Ibid., f. 295. 51. Pontchartrain a V audreuil, 31 m ai 1701, A N Col.. B, vol. 22, f. 52. Le Chassier a V audreuil, 30 juillet 1703, ASStS, f. 295; Ram czay et Begon au Conseil de la M arine, 7 novem bre 1715, A M , B1, vol. 8, f. 269. 53. La Potherie k Pontchartrain, n.d., A N C ol., FJ, vol. 2, f. 259; C ham pigny a Pontchartrain, 7 novem bre 1701, A N Col' C 'A vol. 19, f. 152. 54. Bail du 29 septem bre 1709 renouvellant celui du 25 juin 1701 M ontreal, Archives nationales de Q uebec, greffe A ntoine Adhem ar. 55. [D ocum ent sans titre], m ai 1699, A N Col., D^C, vol. 49, f. 57. 56. Vaudreuil a Pontchartrain, 20 novem bre 1702, A N Col., C "A , vol. 20, f. 124; Pontchartrain k C ham pigny, 6 m ai 1702 A N Col B, vol. 23, f. 77. 57. Concession a M . le m arquis de V audreuil, 12 octobre 1702 A N Col. C " G , vol. 8, fT. 137-138. 58. R .-L . S eguin, “ L 'lle aux T o u rtre s, a v an t-p o ste d e p e u p le m en t” flevue d ' H istoire de I'A m erique frangaise vol. 8 (1954-55): p. V audreuil k Pontchartrain, n.d., A N C ol., C " A , vol. 21, ff. 4 3 -4 4 . Beauharnois k Pontchartrain, n.d., A N Col., C " A , vol 21 f 46 Lechassier k V audreuil, 23 juillet 1703, A SStS, f. 297. " Pontchartrain k V audreuil, 17 juin 1705, A N Col., B, vol 27 f 75; Id. a k M adam e de V audreuil, 9 juin 1706, Ibid', f.2 7 1 . 63. This is the date borne by V audreuil’s provisions of governorgeneral. W . B. Lindsay, ed., Edits, ordonnances royaux. declara' '^ S S 59°' ^ R0‘ c0nccrnanl le Canada (Quebec, 1856), vol. 3, 59. 60. 61. 62.

C H A PTE R THREE:

PR O B LE M S O F A NEW ERA 1703

T he situation which greeted V audreuil w hen he succeeded C al­ liere in th e late spring o f 1703 was not encouraging. In 1702 after only four years o f respite, w ar had once m ore erupted betw een F rance an d England over th e question o f Louis xiv s Spanish policy an d o f his sup po rt o f Stuart claim s to the English th ro n e T he outbreak o f hostilities could hardly have com e at a w orse m om ent for N ew France, w hich was then experiencing the bitter results o f m any years o f reckless overtrading in beaver. T he m arket w as satu rated , prices w ere falling, and the econom y seem ed on th e verge o f collapse.1 N o t only th at, but th e crisis also threatened to erode the colony’s netw ork o f Indian alliances. Since the natives could only obtain E uropean w ares in return for their furs, a large p ro po rtion o f them beaver pelts, the condition o f th e C anadian m arket m ight well drive them to A lbany in to the arm s o f th e English. T h e entire system o f Indian alliances was in jeopardy. Because o f this critical situation th e colony needed the support o f the m o th er country m ore th an ever before, but not m uch assistance w as forthcom ing from th at quarter. T he continental w ar w as devouring F rance’s financial resources and leaving very little for th e m inistry o f m arine. But even had Pontchartrain disposed o f m ore capital he w ould probably have thought twice before com m itting an appreciable p art o f it to C an ad a for he had grow n disenchanted w ith th at b arren colony. In 1706, w hen the intendant Jacques R au d ot w rote gratefully th at royal expenditures w ere w hat enabled th e C anadian inhabitants to subsist, P ontchar­ train co m m en ted im pulsively: “ [L o uis xiv ] h as en ough alm s to give.” A nd when the intendant expressed th e h op e th at eventually C anada w ould prove useful to F rance, the m inister reacted w ith a weary: “ th a t’s been said for 100 years.” 2 T hese tw o fa c to rs-la c k o f funds and P on tchartrain ’s low opinion o f C a n a d a -re su lte d in an austerity program th at aggravated the colonial crisis. In his dispatches to the intendants, the m inister repeatedly em phasized the need to econom ize.3 T o com plicate m atters further, the n u m ­ ber o f troupes de la m arine serving in th e colony had fallen from

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1,453 in 1696 to 822 in 1703, as a result o f the decision m ade following the treaty o f Rysw ick to reduce the size o f th e tw entyeight com panies from fifty to thirty m en.4 W hen w ar b ro ke out again four years later these com panies w ere not bro ug ht back to strength. All o f this placed V audreuil in a difficult position but it at least m ade his task clear. T he colony was in no condition to sustain a w ar effort, particularly against N ew Y ork and the Iroquois. Som e safeguard had to be found against attack from these quarters. T he solution to this problem lay in the peace treaty o f 1701 concluded betw een the F rench, th eir w estern allies, and the Five N ations. If V audreuil could keep this treaty operative despite th e outbreak o f w ar, C anada w ould not only gain im m unity against th e attacks o f th e Iroquois but also against those o f N ew Y ork, since it was m ost unlikely that this colony w ould attem p t anything w ithout the full support o f its allies. T he treaty o f 1701 was a very sim ple one. It stipulated th at if an Indian nation violated th e peace, w hoever had been w ronged w ould not strike back but tak e his grievance to the g overnor who w ould obtain ap p ro priate reparation. If the culprits refused to offer this reparation the F rench w ould jo in up w ith th e injured party to inflict punishm ent on them.* T hree principal factors had m ade this settlem ent possible. T he first w as the dw indling Iro ­ quois fighting force. F rom 2,800 in the late 1680s th e n um b er o f their w arriors, according to G ov erno r B ellom ont o f N ew Y ork, had fallen to 1,400 by 1697.5 T h e second w as the Iroquois fear| w hich grew as th eir num bers declined, o f the com bined striking pow er o f th e F rench and th eir .western allies. T he last w as the English failure to g ran t the Iroquois active support against these external threats. H ad they enjoyed such support they m ight not have com e to term w ith N ew F rance. In 1700, they told Bello­ m o nt th at if th e K ing o f E ngland w ould support them against th eir enem ies, th e “ F arr N atio n s,” they w ould break o ff all correspondence w ith the F rench.7 Even after th e conclusion o f the treaty o f 1701 the Iroquois rem ained essentially English allies F o r the tim e being, how ever, they had been neutralized, and, m ore im portant still, th e French had inserted them selves as m ediators betw een them an d th e w estern Indians. If the peace o f 1701 w ere violated, only the g overnor o f N ew F rance could p rovide redress. P ontchartrain was feeling belligerent when the W ar o f the Spanish Succession broke o ut. H e asked C alliere if the treaty o f 1701 could not be transform ed into an offensive alliance against th e English and also authorized his g overnor to strike “ a consider­

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able blow ” against th e English settlem ents.8 C alliere, how ever, did not share this aggressive m ood. Boston was reportedly fitting o ut a fleet to attack som e p art o f French N o rth A m erica an d this m ade th e concentration o f a large num ber o f m en at Q uebec necessary. T he colonial budget, in his opinion, w ould have to be substantially increased to finance a large-scale m ilitary operatio n. M ore im portant still, an attack against N ew Y ork w ould alm ost certainly provoke th e Five N ations to w ar. F o r th e tim e being the governor stressed th at th eir neutrality was all th a t could be hoped for.9 ,. . . T he m inister was quite easily w on to this p oint of view . His next dispatch indicates th a t he had discarded th e idea o f w inning active Iroquois support against th e English and was now satisfied w ith th eir neutrality which protected both th e F rench an d their w estern allies from a tta c k .'0 T he Iroquois them selves w ere well aw are o f th e advantages o f a peace th at enabled them to supple­ m ent th eir trade a t A lbany w ith a very useful one at M ontreal w here th e best grades o f gunpow der w ere available. Soon after 1701, a F ranco-Iroquois rapprochem ent took place. C om m ercial ties w ere established betw een C an ad a and th e F ive N ation C on ­ federacy. T h e n , in th e su m m er o f 1702, th e O n o n d a g a s and Senecas asked th at m issionaries b e settled am ong them . C alliere was only to o happy to oblige. F ath er L am berville, a lay brother, and a blacksm ith w ere sent back w ith th e O nondagas, and F athers G arn ier an d V aillant w ith the S enecas." Strategical rath er th an religious m otives dictated this Iroquois request. Fearful o f th e vastly m ore num erous w estern tribes, the Iroquois w ere turning to the F rench for th e protection they could n ot obtain from th e English. T his p ro-F rench o rientation , how ­ ever, w as not equally pronounced am ong all the Five N ations but varied according to th e geographical location o f each one. It was w eak am ong th e easternm ost M ohaw ks, the nation lying closest to th e English, and strong am ong th e w esternm ost Senecas, the o ne lying closest to th e w estern tribes. A n independent Iroquois policy h ad the best chances o f em erging am ong th e O nondagas, th e m iddle nation, and it was in their principal village th a t the great annual council o f th e C onfederacy was always held. As tor the C ayugas and O neidas they w ere the least num erous and were seldom represented in th e num erous delegations th at visited C an ­ ad a. T hey appear to have been trib utary to the O nondagas and to have followed th eir lead in everything. T hese various tendencies shed som e light on w hat the Iroquois had in m ind w hen they requested m issionaries. T he Senecas m ay have expected th at th e great prestige these m en enjoyed w ould p ro ­

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vide them w ith som e p ro tec tio n ag ain st th e u p p er n a tio n s, th eir ancestral enem ies.* T he O nondagas, w ithout overlooking this fun­ dam ental aim , m ay also have been intrigued by th e possibility o f playing one side o ff against th e other. By apparently surrendering to French influence, they m ight m anage to frighten th e English into being m ore m indful o f them than in th e past. T hen, by pretending to w aver in th eir resolve o f keeping th e m issionaries, they m ight panic the French into further concessions.12 T his was Iroquois fin esse at its best, but it should not be allow ed to obscure the basic policy o f th e w hole C o n fed eracy , w ith th e p ossible ex cep tio n o f th e M ohaw ks. S hould th e Iro q u o is succeed in o b tain in g p ro tec tio n from the English, o r find a way to elim inate th e m enace o f the west­ ern tribes, they w ould regain m uch freedom o f action vis-a-vis N ew F rance. C onversely, so long as th e w estern Indians threatened their security an d the English refused them th e protection they required, they w ould be obliged to cultivate the French goodwill. N ew Y ork was fam iliar w ith the m ainsprings o f Iroquois pol­ icy after 1701 but w as slow to m ove, even though her governors had developed a com prehensive strategy designed to bolster her influence over th e Five N ations. T his strategy called fo r the settling o f P rotestant m inisters am ong these Indians and for the building o f forts in th eir villages, which w ould be garrisoned by English soldiers.13 T he m ain purpose o f this plan, besides preserv­ ing the Iroquois in the English interest, was n o t to drive them to w ar. N ew Y ork was as w ar-w eary as N ew F rance and not obtaining a great deal m ore from her m o th er country in m aterial h elp .1-* R ather, it aim ed to solve th e m ost pressing problem facing New Y ork in the early eighteenth c e n tu r y - a declining fur trade. T he losses suffered by th e Iroquois during the previous w ar had not only m ade them less form idable m ilitarily but also im paired th eir efficiency as hunters an d m iddlem en. In one y ear o f D utch rule, for instance, 66,000 beaver pelts had been exported from A lbany. In 1699, exports had dw indled to 15,241 pelts. “ T ’is a sign that o ur Five N ations are m ightily dim inished,” 15 reflected B ellom ont. A lternate sources o f supply had to be found an d the governors o f N ew Y ork w ere hoping th at, by follow ing the policy ju st outlined, they m ight pressure the Iroquois into allow ing the w estern Indians to com e to A lbany. H ad this plan gone into effect English pressure on the west w ould have begun precisely w hen N ew F rance, as will presently be explained, w as relaxing its grip on th at region. F urtherm ore, the presence o f English soldiers T h e M iam is, O ttaw as an d Illinois, to m ention only th e principal ones.

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am o n g th e Iro q u o is w ou ld h av e g reatly red u ced th e m en ace o f the w estern Indians, w ithout which th e treaty o f 1701 was hardly w orth th e pap er it w as w ritten on. New F rance’s position w ould have becom e very precarious. A lbany’s inertia seem s to explain w hy this policy did not go into effect. T o m eet th eir fur needs th e m erchants o f th at town preferred a course o f action less expensive than one which involved building forts and m aintaining garrisons. T hey lacked beaver w hen a huge surplus w as available in C anada on account o f the saturation o f th e French m arket. C on trab an d betw een the tw o colonies had begun as early as the 1670s. U nd er these new conditions it increased enorm ously and proved a pow erful d eter­ rent to w ar betw een N ew Y ork an d N ew F ran ce.16 T o sum up, th e problem posed by the Iroquois w hen V audreuil took office differed substantially from w hat it had been during the seventeenth century. Preserving their exclusive position in the N ew Y ork fur trade w as no longer th e key to Iroquois policy. N eutralizing the m enace o f th e w estern tribes was and V audreuil had to find ways o f thw arting this aim . T en o r fifteen years before th e task w ould not have been too difficult. T he boom ing beaver trad e then m ade it profitable for the w estern tribes to be allied w ith N ew F rance an d th e presence in th e west o f garrisoned posts and conge * holders kept them under constant F rench survei lance. By 1703 th e situation had gravely d eteriorated. T h e eco­ nom ic basis o f th e alliance betw een N ew F rance and the western trib es h ad b een ero d ed by th e b a n k ru p t co n d itio n o f th e beaver tra d e an d th e F ren ch presen ce in th e w est all b u t elim in ated by P ontchartrain’s restrictive system . T his restrictive system had com e into existence on M ay 21, 1696, as a suprem e effort by th e h om e authorities to curb exces­ sive trading in beaver. T h e tw enty-five conges w ere abolished and the garrisons ordered to w ithdraw from M ichilim ackinac, SaintJoseph-des-M iam is, and F ort F ro n ten ac.17 Im m ediately upon learning o f this decision, the colonial adm inistrators pointed out th at these posts had to be retained to preserve the w estern Indi­ ans in th e French interest and m ake them live in harm ony together. T he m inistry o f m arine accepted this recom m endation. By an edict o f A pril 28, 1697, it authorized th e retention o f the three posts, but strictly forbade th e garrisons to trade w ith the Indians.18 Because o f this restriction the second edict rem ained a * T he conges were trading perm its issued by the governor and counter­ signed by the intendant authorizing the recipients to send a canoe to trade with the Indians in the western country. Twenty-five o f these conges were used every year.

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dead letter. T he soldiers found it im possible to subsist w ithout trade, o r so they alleged, and returned to the colony.19 T he west was not com pletely abandoned, how ever. T he Jesuits kept th eir m issions at M ichilim ackinac, Saint-Joseph-des-M iam is, G reen Bay, and in th e Illinois country. Several coureurs de boi's rem ained in th e west in defiance o f the edict. Som e posts also subsisted, notably Le S ueur’s on the U pper M ississippi, H enri de T onti s in the Illinois country, and F ort F rontenac which it was finally decided to retain as a trading dep ot for the benefit o f the Iro q u o is. B ut even w ith th ese re m ain in g p o ck ets o f influence, French control o f th e west had been dealt a crippling blow by the new restrictive system . T he renegade coureurs de bois occasionally played a useful diplom atic role b u t m ost o f th e tim e w ere a cause o f disorder am ong the tribes. T he Jesuits alone could not control th e native allies. H ow ever, by rem oving F rench civil authority from the interior, the edict initially enhanced th e influence o f the m issionaries in that area and for th e next several years they would doggedly oppose th e revival o f th e posts and conges. T he surviv­ ing posts, finally, w ere neglible factors. T hey had no garrison, with th e exception o f F ort F rontenac, and did not com m and the key w estern points. Such w as th e situation created in th e w est by the edict o f 1696 W ithin five years, how ever, it had been substantially m odified by the foundation o f D etroit. D etro it was the brainchild o f A ntoine L aum et, w ho is better know n under his noble alias o f de L am othe C adillac. A native of G ascony, he was ab o ut tw enty-five years old when he landed in A cadia in 1683 as an obscure im m igrant. H e resided there for eig h t y ears, serv in g o ccasion ally u n d e r th e p riv atee r F rancois G u io n , engaging in the Indian trade, and fighting w ith G overnor M enneval w ho once described him as “ th e m ost m alicious m an in th e w orld, [ . . . ] a rattle-headed fellow, driven out o f F rance for I know not w hat crim es.” In 1691, the year after his house near P ort R oyal had been destroyed by W illiam Phips, C adillac m oved to Q u eb ec. H e w on th e frien d sh ip o f F ro n te n a c , w as p rom oted to the rank o f captain in th e troupes de !a m arine and in 1694 given com m and o f M ichilim ackinac. H e proved a failure as a co m m andant but very ad ro it as a fur trad er W hen he arrived at M ichilim ackinac late in 1694, his only assets consisted ol his cap tain ’s pay o f 1,080 livres annually. T hree years later he sent to France letters o f exchange valued at 27,596 livres. The edict o f 1696 cut this lucrative career short an d obliged C adillac to return to th e colony. T w o years later he sailed for F rance to

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present to th e court a new program for th e w est centering on the colonization o f D etro it.20 H e p resen te d a p ersu asiv e case. L o u isia n a w as a b o u t to be founded in 1698 and F rance was in an im perialistic m ood. C adil­ lac capitalized on those feelings by pointing o u t th at D etro it was ideally located to prevent English w estw ard expansion in the G reat Lakes region. T he Iroquois w ar had ju st ended although no peace treaty had yet been signed. D etroit, C adillac m ain­ tained, w ould be a guarantee o f peace in years to com e. From th at convenient location the F rench could sw oop dow n upon the Five N atio ns an d destroy them at a m om ent’s notice. T o attain these objectives, how ever, D etro it w ould have to be m ore than a conventional post. It w ould have to be a regular colony w here a co n sid e rab le body o f F re n c h m e n , civilians an d so ld iers, w ould settle an d w here all th e w estern allies w ould regroup. T he latter alone, C adillac estim ated, w ould form an arm y o f 4,000 to 5,0UU m en, poised to strike a ham m er blow at th e Iroquois. T hese argum ents by them selves carried w eight but C adillac had others in store designed to appeal to tw o long standing aim s of F rench colonial policy: civilizing th e Indians and curbing the coureurs de bois. A large w hite settlem ent com plete w ith U rsuhne convent a t the centre o f th e continent w ould facilitate the Frenchification o f th e w estern tribes. F urth erm o re, once all th e Indi­ an s w ere assem bled at D e tro it, it w ould b e u n p ro fitab le fo r th e French to roam th e w oods in search o f furs. T h e new settlem ent w ould becom e the great clearing house o f th e trade w here tran s­ actions w ith th e Indians w ould be easily controlled by a civil and m ilitary personnel and purged o f th eir im m oral overtones T hese argum ents w ere im pressive but they m ight still b e nulli­ fied if it appeared possible th at D etroit w ould stim ulate the beaver trad e and thereby defeat th e w hole purpose o f the edict ol 1696. C adillac understood th a t this w as a basic obstacle and he carefully explained how the new settlem ent w ould not produce such an undesirable effect. In th e first place, no beaver pelts w ould reach th e colony from 1700 to 1702. D u n n g th.s p en o d the Indians w ould be far to o busy m oving to their new hom e from scattered points in th e west to find tim e for hunting. Sec­ ondly, w hile C adillac asked for th e revival o f th e tw enty-five conge's, he specified th at they should all be m ade out on D etroit for a period o f tw o years. T his restriction, and the w ork to be d on e at th e new settlem ent, w ould prevent the holders from returning to C an ad a before 1702. T hus, far from stim ulating the beaver trad e, D etroit w ould help to slow it dow n. Finally, accord­

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ing to C adillac, D etroit, unlike M ichilim ackinac, was located in an area w here m enues pelleteries* rath er th an beaver ab o un d ed A settlem e n t th ere seem ed to hold fo rth th e allu rin g p o ssib ility o f reco n stru ctin g th e e n tire co lo n ial eco no m y a ro u n d th is ty p e o f p elt.21 A lthough C adillac’s argum ents appeared convincing, th e colo­ nial authorities w ho w ere asked by P ontchartrain to study his project gave it only qualified support. C ham pigny ridiculed the idea o f establishing U rsuline nuns in th e m iddle o f the wilderness and observed th at assem bling all the L ake tribes in one place w ould be o f no advantage to th e colony since ancestral rivalries w ould soon cause them to fly at each others’ th ro ats.22 C alliere thought th at the project had m uch to recom m end it, b u t did detect tw o grave w eaknesses in it. F irst, the Iroquois m ight be of tended by a settlem ent built on territory which they regarded as th eir hunting grounds and renew th eir w ar on N ew France. Second, and here C alliere uncovered a basic flaw, D etro it would draw the w estern allies very close to the cantons o f th e Five N ations. Such proxim ity w ould facilitate the grow th o f trade relations betw een them and econom ic intercourse m ight eventu­ ally serve as the basis for a political connection. C adillac’s policy in o th er w ords, m ight further w eaken th e w estern alliance which w as already endangered by the crisis o f the French beaver trade A m uch sounder policy, he thought, consisted o f the reoccupation of the ancient posts and the reestablishm ent o f th e conges. D esp ite th e co n d itio n o f th e b ea v e r tra d e , he th o u g h t th a t it w ould be p o o r p olitics to a b a n d o n th e n u m ero u s trib es o f the w est “ N o b o d y can d isa g ree ,” he w arn ed , “ th a t so o n e r o r later o ur Indians will fall under the dom ination o f His M ajesty or under th at o f the K ing o f E ngland.” 23 In spite o f C alliere’s and C ham pigny’s w ords o f caution P ontchartrain decided to proceed with the foundation o f D etroit but w ithout th e tw enty-five conges. In th e dispatches o f 1700 the g o v ern o r an d in te n d an t w ere to ld th a t th e p ro ject w as to be im plem ented unless “ insurm ountable obstacles” w ere discovered. N ew F rance w ould thereby strengthen her grip on the G reat Lakes; the English, w ho seem ed on th e verge o f founding their own settlem ent in th e area, w ould be held back; the friendship o f th e Indians w ould be preserved; and th e coureurs de bois would be b ro u g h t to h ee l.24 T h e m in iste r, in b rief, ex p ected D e tro it to * T he fur of the fox, lynx, m arten, deer, m ink, and sundry anim als. These were used chiefly to trim the robes o f civil and religious offi­ cials and were in steady dem and in France.

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fit perfectly into F rance’s new im perial policy as L ouisiana s northern counterpart. By m eans o f these tw o settlem ents the French w ould be in a position to close b oth th e Low er M issis­ sippi and the G reat Lakes regions to the English. B ecause this prospect was so appealing, P ontchartrain’s failure to heed th e w arnings issued by Calliere and C ham pigny can be u nderstood. Perhaps also for th e sam e reason, the m inister did n ot perceive th at C adillac was planning to use D etro it to becom e th e m aster o f th e northw est. T his very objective m anifested itself soon after his arrival there in th e sum m er o f 1701 w hen he began a cam paign to have all C anadians but him self and his own people expelled from th e G re at Lakes country. H e urged P ontchartrain to abolish the Jesuit m ission at M ichilim ackinac on the grounds th at it w as im peding th e m igration o f the O ttaw a tribes to his p ost.25 H e tried to discredit th e C om pany o f the C olony, a corporation o f C anadian m erchants which had been granted ow n­ ership o f D etro it.25 Finally, on several occasions, he asked th at his settlem ent be separated from C an ad a and endow ed w ith its own governm ent. T his, h e claim ed, was necessary to forestall his enem ies w ho w ere searching for ways to bring ab o ut the failure of his pro ject.27 . . . . . . T he condition o f th e beaver trad e, which had such an im por­ tant bearing on Iroquois affairs and on w estern policy, also affected in a m ajor way N ew F rance’s relations w ith N ew Eng­ land. H ere again th e loyalty o f an Indian n ation , th e A benakis of the M ain e w ilderness, was at stake. T hese A benakis had trad i­ tionally sided w ith N ew F rance during th e w ars o f th e seven­ teenth century. In fact, they w ere perhaps th e m ost faithful of all th e F rench allies. U nlike th e w estern Indians, w hose ties w ith the French ap p ear a t tim es to have been principally econom ic, those o f the A benakis w ere largely religious and th e Jesuits as a result enjoyed enorm ous ascendancy over them . W illiam D udley, the governor o f M assachusetts, was aw are o f this. W hen w ar broke out in 1702 he personally visited the A benaki settlem ents in the hope o f persuading those Indians to abide by th e term s o f the treaty they had concluded w ith th e English in 1699. H e assured them “ o f trade and everything they w ant if they will keep off from o ur English settlem ents during the w ar.” D udley was satis­ fied w ith the outcom e o f these m eetings. “ N othing b u t the French priests am ongst them will put them out o f tem per tow ards us,” he ju d g ed .28 Still, the A benakis appeared prepared to overlook the m aterial advantages o f peace w ith th e English. As soon as w ar b ro ke out several o f their deputies appeared at Q uebec, eagerly asking Cal-

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liere for directives. They apologized for having listened to D udley but assured th e French governor th at their heart was not in the prom ises they had m ade to him . Callifcre w as the only o ne they w ished to obey. T he latter told them in reply th at since the French and the English w ere now at w ar they w ere free to attack N ew E ng land an d could co u n t on his su p p o rt. By m eans o f French am m unition and the booty o f th eir raids he expressed the hope th at they w ould live m ore com fortably than in peace tim e. H e com plim ented them on th eir zeal for C atholicism , “ th e only religion th at can lead you to eternal bliss” , and rem inded them th at it should alw ays keep them loyal to N ew F rance.39 T he A benakis had appeared well disposed tow ards th e French during this visit to Q uebec but they soon began to w aver in their resolve o f w arring on th e English. In D ecem ber, 1702, Jacqueshrangois d e B rouillan, th e g overnor o f A cadia, reported th at the A benakis had deserted the F rench alliance. A lthough this was an exaggeration, th e A benakis w ere grow ing cool tow ards th eir trad i­ tional allies. A t first Brouillan blam ed the m issionaries for this feeling perhaps that they w ere n o t prom oting the w ar w ith suffi­ cient vigour.30 T he follow ing year, how ever, he explained in a different w ay th e changing A benaki sentim ents. “ T hese Indians” he reported, “ are not disposed to m ake w ar on the English and they seem to intend rem aining neutral because the F rench cannot supply them w ith th eir needs and no longer seek th eir peltries w hich are their sole resource.” 3' It devolved upon V audreuil to discover som e w ay o f counterbalancing the m aterial advantages o f he English alliance which th e collapse o f the C anadian beaver trade had m agnified. Such was th e situation facing the new governor in 1703. On th e eastern frontier he h ad to m aintain the A benakis in the French ^ e r e s t. In th e west, he had to prevent th e O ttaw as, llhnois M iam is, and num erous other great tribes from falling U? le/ n r gLISh co n tro >. a task enorm ously com plicated by th e edict of 1696, th e founding o f D etroit, and th e great influence C adillac had gained over m atters o f w estern policy. Finally, along th e New York frontier, he had to m aintain th e dreaded Iroquois in the state o f neutrality w hich they had accepted in 1701. V audreuil in brief, had his w ork cut out for him .

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R E FE R E N C ES 1. G . Fregault, Le X V IH e siecle canadien, etudes (M ontreal, 1968), pp. 243-246. 2. J. R audot a Pontchartrain, [abstract] 30 avril, 30 octobre, 2 et 5 novem bre 1706, A N col., C " A , vol. 24, f. 121. 3. M em ore pour servir d ’instruction au sr. de Beauharnois, 6 m ai 1702, A N Col., B, vol. 23, f. 82; Pontchartrain a J. e t A . D . R audot, 30 juin 1707, A N C o., B, vol. 29, f. 66. 4. M em oire du Roi k C alliere et Cham pigny, [1700], A N C ol., B vol 22 f 100* V audreuil et Beauharnois a Pontchartrain, 15 novem bre 1703, A N Col., C » A , vol. 21, f. 12; Soldats qui servent dans la colonie, A N CoL, D 2C , vol. 47, ff. 101, 188, 208, [irregular pagination] 5. F or this treaty see A N Col., C " A , vol. 19 ff. 41-44^ 6. Bellom ont to the Lords of T rade, O ctober 24, 1700. E. B. O C al­ laghan and J. R . Broadhead, eds.. Documents Relative to the Colonial H istory o f the State o f New York [henceforth N Y C D ] (A lbany, 1853-87), vol. 4, p. 768.

I'. M em oire du R oi & C alliere et C ham pigny, 31 m ai 1701. A N Col., B, vol. 22, ff. 241-242; Pontchartrain & Calliere, 6 m ai 1702, Ibid., vol. 23, f. 73; Id. a Id., 10 m ai 1702, Ibid., f. 105. 9. C alliere a Pontchartrain, 4 novem bre 1702, A N Col., C " A , col. 10. Pontchartrain a Calliere, 20 juin 1703, A N Col., B, vol. 23, f. 210. 11. Calliere a Pontchartrain, 4 novem bre 1702, A N Col., C " A , vol. 20, f. 156. , ,, . 12. O bservation sur la lettre de Ram ezay at Begon, 13 septem bre 1715, A M , B>, vol. 8, f. 255. _ 13. Conference o f Earl Bellom ont w ith the Five N ations, A ugust 26, 1700, A'YCD. vol. 4, pp. 727-734. 14 C om bury to the Council o f T rade and Plantations, Septem ber 9 1703, in C . H eadlam , ed., Calendar o f State Papers. Colonial Series, America and West Indies [henceforth C SPA ] 1702-1703. 15. Bellom ont to the Lords of T rade, N ovem ber 28, 1700, N Y C D vol. 789-question of contraband see J. L unn, The Illegal1 IThur 16 4. OnP- the T rade out of New France, 1713-1760" Canadian Historical Asso­

ciation Reports (\939), pp. 6\-16.

17. D eclaration du Roi, A N Col., F \ vol. 7, ff. 387-388; W . J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis X IV . 1663-1701 (T oronto, 1964) pp. 202-203. , ^ 18. O rdonnance pour la conservation des postes de Frontenac, de M issilim ackinac et de Saint-Joseph-des-M iam is au C anada, 28 avril 1697, A N Col., B, vol. 19, f. 264; O rdonnance du Roi portant defense a tous officiers et autrcs de faire la traite avec les

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sauvages dans la profondeur des bois, 28 avril 1697, A N Col P vol. 8, f. 25. " ’ 19. Frontenac h Pontchartrain, 15 octobre 1697, in R A P Q 1928-1929 ?£oo34-1' 3l 2: M 6m oire du Roi a Frontenac et Cham pigny, 21 mai 1698, in ibid. , p . 356; observation sur la guerre des R enards, n d A M , B1, vol. 8, f. 250. 20. “ A ntoine Laum et, dit de Lam othe C adillac” in Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, vol. 2, pp. 351-353. 21. Projet du sr. de Lam othe C adillac p our le C anada, 1699 A N Col., O 'E , vol. 14, ff. 34-36; m em oire de M . de L am othe Cadil.-7CJ 0U, ? ! n t, i n labllSSement du D6troit de Quebec, 14 novem bre 1704 Ibid., 169; M em orandum of M . de Lam othe C adillac concern­ ing the establishm ent of D etroit from Q uebec, N ovem ber 19 1904) v o n f p ' M O ''°neer Qnd HiS‘0riCal C ol,eclio^ (L ansing’ 22. Extrait du m em oire de L am othe C adillac avec les annotations de Cham pigny, 20 octobre 1699, A N Col., C " E , vol. 17, ff. 101-103 23. M em oire de Callifcre pour repondre a celui de Lam othe Cadillac, n.d., A N Col., C " E , vol. 14, ff. 53-54. 24. M em oire^du R oi & Calliere et Cham pigny, n d „ A N Col., B, vol. 25. L am othe C adillac a Pontchartrain, 25 septem bre 1702 A N Col C " E , vol. 14, f. 122. ’ ’’ 26. Id. h id., 31 aout 1703, Ibid., f. 142. 27. Projet de L am othe C adillac pour le C anada, 1699, Ibid., f. 3 5 L am othe C adillac h Pontchartrain, 20 octobre 1705 A N Col C " A , vol. 23, f. 150 28‘ ? b u t th e delegates pointed o u t th at this chief was connected with so m any tribes th at it m ight prove to be extrem ely difficult to bring him to th e colony. F urth erm o re, these tribes w ould cer­ tainly seek vengeance w ere any harm done to him . R ather than m eet w ith a refusal o r accept th e offer o f Jean Le Blanc w ho offered him self in place o f Le Pesant, V audreuil prudently adopted another strategy. H e ordered the O ttaw as to return to D etro it and show th eir repentance by m aking a public subm ission to C adillac. Le Pesant, how ever, was excluded from this reconcilation, and, V audreuil w arned th e O ttaw as, should they ever a g a in ’raise their han d against th e F rench, he w ould not forgive them until th e guilty ones had been delivered to him .64 Such a m ethod o f arbitration was cautious as well as effective. It w ould preserve peace, transform Le P esant into an outcast, and increase the prestige o f C adillac am ong th e Indians. In fact, th e governor hoped th at C adillac w ould see in it the p ro of o f his good inten­ tions tow ards him and his settlem ent.65 A lthough V audreuil asked C adillac to avoid harshness in his dealings with the O ttaw as,66 th e co m m andant o f D etro it had o th er plans. H e had decided to obtain Le Pesant in o rd er to succeed w here th e governor had failed and thus prove him selt superior to him . T he younger R au d ot, w hose perceptive dis­ patches m ake him o ne o f th e m ost valuable com m entators on the events o f the period, th o ug ht th at C adillac also expected Le Pesant’s num erous kinsm en and allies to follow him to D etroit,

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thereby increasing th e population and com m erce o f the p o s t67 A lter m uch deliberation th e O ttaw as agreed to kill Le P esant if he refused to com e to D etroit w ith them .68 C adillac realized the seriousness o f his blunder soon after Le P esant s arrival. T he H urons and M iam is grew so enraged at the sight o f th e O ttaw a chief th at C adillac was obliged to let him escape from th e fort. (It seem s unlikely th at this chief, w ho was both elderly an d overw eight - he derived his nam e from his conu .Cr^ le,ug lrtu _COUld have sca,ed the high Palisade w ithout inside help.) W hen he returned a second tim e th eir furv increased Thev decided to w reck the settlem ent and kill all the Occupants, French an d O ttaw a alike. T he plot was uncovered before it could be carried o ut, but the M iam is subsequently vented th eir rage by killing three French settlers and a cow ow ned by C adillac. T he oss o f the cow m ay have grieved the com m andant far m ore than th at ol th e settlers; he received im m ediate com pensation for the anim al w hile agreeing to defer until a later d ate the arrest o f the m urderers W hen the M iam is gave no sign o f fulfilling their prom ise three weeks after th e d ate had passed, C adillac decided to m arch against them . A t th e head o f 400 m en he stum bled upon th e In d ian s w ho h ad fo rtified th em selve in a flim sy sto c k ­ ade hastily p u t together w ith sticks and branches. Ragged firing broke out on both sides w hile C adillac surveyed the progress o f th e battle from behind a thick tree. V audreuil expressed total disgust with his conduct. “ T he sieur de L am othe could have taken th at fort sw ord in hand as a good sergeant w ith sixty men behind him w ould have d o n e.” T he encounter, how ever, was a short one. T he M iam is surrendered and gave C adillac three hos­ tages and furs w orth 1,000 ecus.69 T hese successive outbursts constituted am ple p ro o f o f th e fail­ ure o f C adillac’s Indian policy. T hey also confirm ed a prediction m ade by C ham pigny in 1700 and often repeated since th at it was im possible for so m any different tribes to live together a t close quarters and rem ain at peace. B ut, even before the failure o f the experim ent had becom e fully evident, disenchantm ent had begun 3tr S ' 00" 1* A fter reading the abstract o f V audreuil’s dispatches ot I /(Jo the m inister realized th at the latter was following instruc­ tions w hile C adillac was creating difficulties.70 M oreover, it had never been P on tchartrain ’s intention to pay the salaries o f the D etro it personnel and shoulder th e cost o f the equipm ent as the co m m andant had obliged V audreuil and R au d ot to do before setting o u t in 1706. H e accordingly inform ed him th at these expenses were his responsibility and th at the king w ould not contribute a single livre tow ards th em .71 P ontchartrain was partic­

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ularly disturbed by V audreuil’s com plaints ab o u t C adillac’s insub­ o rd in a tio n an d arro g a n c e. H e m ay o r m ay n o t h av e b eg u n to suspect th a t the latter was com plaining in o rd er to discredit tne governor and gain a free hand at D etroit. But he certainly under­ stood th a t by so greatly am plifying his pow ers h e had badly underm ined V audreuil’s position an d placed him in an im possible situation. Sternly, h e inform ed C adillac th at “ if you do not render him [V audreuil] his due as your superior, His M ajesty will know how to p u t you in your place.” 72 So th at the governor m ight know w here he stood he was told o f how C adillac had been w ritten to .73 . . P ontchartrain did not lim it him self to using strong language. T he first reports o f th e O ttaw a attack on th e M iam is arrived at co u rt late in 1706. A ccording to C adillac, the O ttaw as had been incited to this action by his personal enem ies. H e com plained of Jon caire w ho h ad prevented th e Iroquois from lending him assist­ ance. H e accused A lphonse de T on ti o f selling all the am m unition to th e Indians to m ake F rench resistance im possible.74 V audreuil, w ho knew th at the m ost dangerous accusations being m ade against him concerned his alleged w eakness, w rote a lengthy report to justify his peace policy. In o rder to clear th e air once an d fo r all, th e m in iste r ap p o in te d F ra n c o is C la ira m b a u lt d ’A igrem ont, a form er com m issaire de la m arine* an d now Raud o t’s secretary, to investigate conditions in th e west and at D etro it in particular. T he m inister fam iliarized him w ith the nature o f the differences th at b rought V audreuil an d C adillac into conflict an d asked him to elucidate the truth by personal investi­ gation and th e questioning o f w itnesses. T he im portance o f his m ission was em phasized: “ H is M ajesty will base his decision regarding th e w estern posts on th e report you will sub m it.” 75 T he m inister’s changing tem per should have m ade C adillac aw are o f the need to ad o pt a m ore conciliatory course. C uriously, it h ad exactly th e o p p o site effect. H is ac tio n s grew m o re v io ­ lent, his accusations m ore virulent, his vocabulary m ore extrava­ gant. All V audreuil had to do was sit back, bring sam ples of C adillac’s irresponsible behaviour to P on tchartrain ’s attention, and let the co m m andant o f D etro it hang him self. On one occa­ sio n , in th e p resen ce o f th e In d ian s, C ad illac laun ch ed in to a tirade against th e Jesu its.76 O n o th er occasions, despite P ontchar­ train ’s orders to show the governor m ore respect, he affected greater independence than ever, pushing it to the p oint o f om it­ ting to subm it reports on th e condition o f his post, refusing to * A governm ent official who in C anada served as the intendant’s chief assistant.

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execute th e g overnor’s orders, and styling him self th e O nontio o f th e w est in his speeches to th e In d ian s.” V audreuil protested strongly against such behaviour: It is o f th e last consequence, M y L ord, th at th e sr. de L am othe exercise m ore restraint w hen speaking o f these m issionaries. It is also o f th e last consequence th at he show m ore respect w hen speaking o f m e. A lthough I despise him enough not to fear anything he m ay say, he could still alienate the people from the respect they owe m e.78 P ontchartrain by now had taken ju st ab o ut all he could stand. C om m ents like “ m auvais raisonnem ent” , “ m al et tres m al” , which ap p ear m ore frequently in the m argin o f C adillac’s dis­ patches reflect his grow ing im patience. Indeed, the violence o f the com m andant o f D etroit was fast turning against him . W hen he pointed to the presence o f 120 French dwellings and 1,200 Indi­ ans at his post as p ro of th at it was strong enough for independ­ ence, the m inister noted: “ W ait [ . . . ] and since he is so opposed to subordination w hen he is only a com m andant, w hat w ould he be like as a governor?” ” In a scathing dispatch Pontchartrain inform ed C adillac th at V audreuil and R au d ot w ere executing the court s orders and trying th eir best to cooperate with him . It was therefore up to him to m end his w ays.80 T hen and there C adillac m ay have realized th at his strategy had been defeated. D ’Aigrem o n t’s m om entous report subm itted in N ovem ber, 1708, turned this defeat into a rout. D A igrem ont s conclusions can be briefly sum m arized as a crushing indictm ent o f D etroit as a m enace to French control o f the w est and o f C adillac as a petty tyrant and profiteer. H e began by pointing o u t that D etro it w as far from being as solidly estab­ lished as its founder w ould have th e m inister believe. T here were but sixty-three F rench settlers there and 353 arpenis u nd er culti­ vation, 157 o f which belonged to C adillac. O ver this dom ain he exercised a tyrannical rule w hich had w on him th e hatred of w hite and red m an alike. Inhabitants had to pay him large sum s for the right to ply their trade. A p o i o f brandy which cost from two to four livres in C anada sold for tw enty at D etro it.81 T he m ost striking passages o f the report dealt w ith the effect D etroit had on F rench com m erce and diplom acy. D ’A igrem ont claim ed th at C adillac had know n th at his plans w ere prejudicial to F rench interests since they had shifted the w estern axis d anger­ ously close to th e English and Iroquois settlem ents. W ith the beaver trade as depressed as it was, D etroit had rapidly com e u nder English influence and practically been transform ed into a

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satellite o f N ew Y ork ’s trading system .82 O nly 700 livres o f beaver h ad com e to C an ad a from this post in 1707, while M ichilim ackinac, shorn o f its garrison and w eakened by th e m igration o f m any o f its Indians had m anaged to produce a quantity valued at 40,000 livres. T he rest o f th e D etroit crop had gone to the English, and, D ’A igrem ont pointed o ut, th e m ore Indians settled there th e greater this trade w ith the English w ould becom e. M ichilim ackinac, during its period as a garrisoned post, h ad also served as a counterw eight to the English H ud son ’s Bay C om pany; D etro it w as situated too far sou th to play such a role. The changes in w estern policy w hich had occurred betw een 1696 and 1701 had therefore presented the English w ith an o pportunity to extend th eir o perations in th e northw est an d th e French were th ereb y fo rfeitin g a te rrito ry th a t w as rich in p rim e b eav er pelts an d m en u es p e lle te rie s. B ecause o f th e m o re so u th erly la titu d e, those o f D etroit w ere o f a m arkedly inferior quality.83 T he report also drew attention to som e interesting changes in Iroquois policy. As already seen, th e m ain concern o f th e Five N ations during the early eighteenth century was to secure their w estern flank. T hey could n o t possibly hope to achieve this so long as they opposed th e passage o f th e w estern Indians to A lbany. They therefore allow ed them to share in the N ew York trade and w ere gradually w inning th e F rench allies to th eir side. T he H urons traded alm ost daily w ith th e English an d th e M iam is fol­ lowed th eir exam ple. T he latter h ad even concluded an alliance with th e Iroquois.84 “ T his show s th at th e Iroquois have used D etro it to attract o u r Indians so as to have them on th eir side in case o f w ar, w hich w ould inevitably h ap pen.” 85 “ All this show s, M y L o rd ,” concluded D ’A igrem ont, “ that D etroit is a great liability th at will utterly ruin C an ad a if we continue to support it.” 86 But w ould not the English seize D etroit if the French w ithdrew from it? D ’A igrem ont did not think so. A lthough the Iroquois no longer diverted the w estern Indians to M ontreal, he thought th at they could still prevent English w est­ w ard expansion.87 T he au th o r o f the report could not know that in a not too d istan t future th e English w ould be breaking through th e territories o f the Five N ations to plant a trading post on the shore o f L ake O ntario . O n th at date th e Iroquois barrier, the m ost im portant factor in th e trading system o f the seventeenth century, w ould be pierced in both directions and an era w ould com e to an end. T o replace it th e F rench w ould build th eir own chain o f posts on L ake O ntario and a new and m ore bitter struggle w ould begin with the English for th e m astery o f the w estern country.

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C adillac held talks w ith D ’A igrem ont during his stay at D etro it an d he suspected th at th e report P on tchartrain ’s investiga­ to r was preparing w ould be unfavourable. H e therefore tried to parry th e blow. D ’A igrem ont, claim ed C adillac, had not spent sufficient tim e at D etroit fully to acquaint him self w ith the situa­ tion there. T he various sum s he requested from th e settlers were necessary to com pensate him for the loss o f revenue he had incurred by granting them h alf the com m erce o f his post.88 C adil­ lac also hurled fresh accusations at his enem ies in C anada, not all o f which should be dism issed as the rantings o f an unbalanced m ind. T he o ne m ade against V audreuil and the C anadian m er­ chants reveal econom ic rivalries running as strong undercurrents in the entire dispute: T he great project o f th e C anadian people is to establish M ichilim ackinac with th e conges and th e coureurs d e bois. T hese are w hat m ake th e governor-general the m aster o f the trade. W ithout M ichilim ackinac th e Indians will stop com ­ ing to M ontreal and th e governor will lose the presents he obtain ed from them . All C an ad a regards D etro it as an obstacle to th e reestablishm ent o f th e conges.*9 F rench control o f the w est had been th e principal issue in the conflict now ab o u t to end with a resounding victory for V au­ dreuil, but it had not been the only issue. W ho should profit from this control had also been at stake. It was im possible for P ontchartrain to go on supporting Cadila