Philip II (Seminar Studies) [1 ed.] 0582072328, 9780582072329

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Dedication
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
Part One: The Background
1 CHARLES V’S LEGACY
2 PHILIP II’S CHARACTER
Part Two: Descriptive Analysis
3 GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
The nature of Philip II’s government
Conciliar administration
The Council of State
Castilian administration
The Castilian Cortes
Navarre, Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon
Naples, Sicily, Milan and Sardinia
Burgundy and Franche-Comté
4 FINANCES
Sources of revenue
Expenditure
Solutions
5 THE ECONOMY
Population
Agriculture
Trade and commerce
Industry
6 RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
The Spanish Church in 1556
Philip’s reforms
Heterodoxy and the Inquisition
Papal relations
7 DOMESTIC REBELLIONS
The Revolt of the Moriscos, 1568-70
The Revolt of the Netherlands
8 FOREIGN POLICY
Aims
France
Turkey
Portugal
England
Part Three: Assessment
9 HOW ABSOLUTE WAS PHILIP II?
10 SUCCESS OR FAILURE? SPAIN IN THE 1590S
Part Four: Documents
GENEALOGY: PHILIP II’S FAMILY
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

SEMINAR STUDIES IN HISTORY

Philip II Geoffrey Woodward

First published 1992 by Pearson Education Limited Published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X 14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1992, Taylor & Francis. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter o f products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. ISBN 13: 978-0-582-07232-9 (pbk)

British library Cataloguing in Publication Data Woodward, Geoffrey Philip II. —(Seminar studies in history) I. Title II. Series 946.04092 Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Woodward, Geoffrey. Philip II/Geoffrey Woodward. p. cm. - (Seminar studies in history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-582-07232-8 1. Spain - History - Philip II, 1556-1598. 2. Philip II, King of Spain, 1527-1598. I. Title. II. Series. DP178.W66 1992 946*.043 - dc20 Set in 10/11 point Baskerville (Linotron)

91-29579 CIP

Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES Part One: The Background

1 CHARLES V’S LEGACY 2 PHILIP II’S CHARACTER

Part Two: Descriptive Analysis

3 GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

The nature of Philip II’s government Conciliar administration The Council of State Castilian administration The Castilian Cortes Navarre, Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon Naples, Sicily, Milan and Sardinia Burgundy and Franche-Comte

4 FINANCES

Sources of revenue Expenditure Solutions

5 THE ECONOMY

Population Agriculture Trade and commerce Industry

6 RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

The Spanish Church in 1556 Philip’s reforms Heterodoxy and the Inquisition Papal relations

vi vii 1

1 4

9 9 9 12

13 16 18 20

23 25 26 26 31 33 39 39 41 41 45 48 48 49 51 55 iii

Contents

7

DOM ESTIC REBELLIONS

T h e R evolt o f the M oriscos, 1568-70 T h e R evolt o f the N eth erlan d s 8

9 10

Aim s F ran ce T u rk ey P o rtugal E n g lan d

72 72 73 77 80 81

FOREIGN POLICY

P a rt T hree: A ssessm ent

91

HOW ABSOLUTE WAS PH IL IP II?

91

SUCCESS O R FAILURE? SPAIN IN TH E 1590S

96

P a rt Four: D ocum ents

99

GENEALOGY: PH IL IP I I ’S FAMILY GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

iv

58 58 61

114 115 120 129

A note on currency

In Philip’s reign, accounts were kept in maravedts and id ducats. Exchange rates fluctuated and values of currencies varied ried from decade to decade but the most common valuations and the ones used in this book are: 375 maravedis = 1 ducat =

6j

8d [33p]

v

To Clare, Susan and Helen

vi

Sem inar Studies in History

In tro d u ctio n The Seminar Studies series was conceived by Patrick Richardson, whose experience of teaching history persuaded him of the need for something more substantial than a textbook chapter but less for­ midable than the specialised full-length academic work. He was also convinced that such studies, although limited in length, should pro­ vide an up-to-date and authoritative introduction to the topic under discussion as well as a selection of relevant documents and a com­ prehensive bibliography. Patrick Richardson died in 1979, but by that time the Seminar Studies series was firmly established, and it continues to fulfil the role he intended for it. This book, like others in the series, is there­ fore a living tribute to a gifted and original teacher. Note on the System o f References:

A bold number in round brackets (5) in the text refers the reader to the corresponding entry in the Bibliography section at the end of the book. A bold number in square brackets, preceded by ‘doc.’ [doc. 6] refers the reader to the corresponding item in the section of Documents, which follows the main text. A word followed by an asterisk, for example, ‘Inquisition*’, indicates that the term is defined in the Glossary.

vii

0

250

500 km

H Spanish possessions in 1558

The monarquia of Philip I

Part One:

The Background

1 Charles V ’s Legacy

O n 16 J a n u a ry 1556 E m p ero r C h arles V ab d icated as K in g o f Spain and form ally tran sferred the last o f his possessions to his only son Philip. T h e in h eritan c e was im pressive by any stan d ard s. T h e Ib e rian kingdom s o f C astile, A ragon, C atalo n ia, V alen cia and N av arre h ad been b ro u g h t to g eth er by the union o f Isa b ella and F erd in an d , ‘th e C ath o lic K in g s’, a n d secured by th eir g ran d so n C harles. In effect, P h ilip ’s S pain w as a dyn astic union ra th e r th an a unified co u n try , a geographical expression ra th e r th an a n atio n state. E ach d o m inion was au tonom ous an d eq ual, d istinguished by its own law s, lan g u ag e a n d custom s, so th a t subjects identified th em ­ selves m ore read ily w ith th eir pais* th an w ith th eir m o n arch . N ot until the 1590s d id C astilian s refer to the ‘S p an ish E m p ire’; even the term ‘espahol’ w as im p o rted from Provence (82). N a tio n al con­ sciousness w as slow to develop p artly because A ragon w as o riented m ore tow ards th e B alearics, S ard in ia, Sicily a n d N aples a n d the recently ac q u ired D uchy o f M ilan, b u t also because C astile’s m an tle o f im perialism stretch ed south an d west tow ards N o rth A frica, the C arib b ean , an d C en tral an d S outh A m erica. T o these two areas o f divergent in terests a th ird had been ad d ed w hich altered th e entire configuration o f H a b sb u rg Spain. In 1555 C h arles tran sferred his B u rg u n d ian territo ries from the H o u se of A u stria to P hilip a n d Spain (40, 80, 153). In reality B urgundy h ad little in com m on w ith the S p an ish H a b sb u rg s. T ow n councils, provincial assem blies a n d stadholders* th ro u g h o u t the seventeen D u tch provinces h ad resisted earlier a ttem p ts by C h arles to im pose a m ore centralised a d m in istra ­ tion. O n ly the nobility rem ain ed o u tw ard ly loyal, m ainly because their R egent, M a ry o f H u n g ary , h ad h ad the good sense to include them in the C ouncil o f S tate an d to respect th eir chivalric O rd e r of the G olden Fleece (61). U nless it was carefully h an d led , P h ilip ’s B u rg u n d ian in h eritan c e w ould prove m ore o f a liability th a n a n asset (see pp. 6 1 -7 1 ). Political a n d geographical d isunity w as, how ever, offset by a com ­ m on strain o f C atholicism w hich p erm eated the S panish c h a rac te r and created a pow erful sp iritu al bonding. Since th e beg in n in g o f the

1

The Background Reconquista*, C h ristia n S p an iard s believed th eir destiny w as to expel the M oors from the m ain lan d a n d to purge S p ain o f this religious and cu ltu ra l blight. It was the M o st C atholic K in g ’s d u ty to defend the in terests o f G od a n d H is C h u rch bo th in S pain a n d beyond, a responsibility w hich C h arles h ad taken very seriously. H e h ad en­ couraged th e In q u isitio n * to a rre st the grow th o f Illum inism * in the 1520s a n d E rasm ianism * in the 1530s an d , alth o u g h th ere w ere iso­ lated pockets o f heresy discovered subsequently, his prin cip al concern h ad been th e ex ternal th re a t o f the T u rk s a n d their suspected links w ith fifth-colum nist M oriscos* in S pain. As the em ­ pires o f S uleim an, the T u rk ish S u ltan , an d C h arles ex p an d ed in the M ed iterran ean a n d C en tral E urope, clashes o ccurred a t the periphery like th e in teractio n o f co n tin en tal plates, b u t n eith er side was stro n g enough to inflict a decisive defeat. C h arles’s p reo ccu p a­ tion w ith F ren ch an d G erm an problem s in th e 1550s, allied to his d eterio ratin g h ealth , saw the in itiativ e pass to the O tto m an s who seized T rip o li, P eñón d e Vêlez a n d Bougie. T h e T u rk ish th re a t to m ainland S pain, h er M e d iterran ea n possessions a n d rem ain in g o u t­ posts in N o rth A frica w as th e m ost serious challenge facing Philip at his accession (38) (see pp. 7 7 -8 0 ). H is g reatest dom estic problem in 1556 w as financial, a direct legacy o f the political a n d im p erial achievem ents o f the C atholic K ings an d C h arles V. In 1554 th e R egent J o a n n a , C h arles’s sister, inform ed him th a t revenues h ad alread y been pledged for th e next six years a n d she could not see how the ad m in istratio n could con­ tinue to su p p o rt his w ars. T w o years later Philip in h erited a state d eb t o f som e 36 m illion ducats a n d an an n u a l deficit o f 1 m illion ducats. In fact, C h arles h ad financed his im perial com m itm ents by a series o f expedients w ith o u t ever tackling the fu n d am en tal issues. T h e w ealthiest sectors o f society w ere exem pt from pay in g direct taxation a n d the b u rd e n fell on th e poorer groups. A lthough m ost ord in ary revenue cam e from in d irect taxation, th e system w as u n ­ equal an d in need o f reform ; b u t the lan d ed , clerical an d m erch an t classes resisted an y atte m p t to in tro d u ce new taxes o r extend existing ones. O u tsid e C astile, the provincial Cortes* proved even m ore u n ­ willing to defray th e crow n’s costs, arg u in g th a t taxes sh ould be spent w here they w ere raised. Increasingly the Low C o u n tries cam e to subsidise C h a rle s’s w ars an d in 1555 w ere supplying over 3 m il­ lion ducats a y ear (141). A lthough th ere was som e m erit in C h arles’s claim th a t ‘I can n o t be su stain ed except by m y realm s o f S p ain ’, he m eant in effect C astile an d the N eth erlan d s. F o rtu n ately the volum e of gold a n d silver from th e S p an ish Indies h ad also been steadily 2

Charles V’s Legacy grow ing, b u t m uch o f this m oney was already earm ark ed to p ay off crown d ebts. Isa b ella an d F erd in an d h ad in tro d u ced the practice of issuing juros* (cred it bonds) to b ankers, thereby m ortgaging fu ture state incom e. By 1556, 68 p er cent o f o rd in ary revenue w as con­ sum ed in servicing an d rep ay m en t o f these juros. F a r w orse w as the practice o f g ra n tin g asientos* (advanced contracts) to foreign an d Spanish financiers w hereby the crow n received a loan in re tu rn for bills o f exchange. Asiento rep ay m en ts cam e to over 14 m illion ducats in 1556 an d th e Cortes regularly com plained o f the vice-like grip foreign b an k ers h a d on S p ain ’s finances (17) (see pp. 3 3 -8 ). C harles in tro d u ce d no fu n d am en tal changes to the financial a d ­ m in istratio n b u t in stead allow ed the bu reau cracy to m ultiply an d the level o f ex p en d itu re to increase accordingly. A d m itted ly he was not helped by th e stead y rise in inflation w hich saw prices in S pain double betw een 1500 an d 1550, b u t his response w as to raise d irect and in d irect tax atio n an d resort to a variety o f m oney-raising schem es. C ro w n lan d w as leased a t favourable term s, rents farm ed ou t an d lan d sold off, an d public offices, privileges an d m onopolies gran ted to those w ho could pay. In this w ay m an y royal salt, silver and m ercury m ines h ad been p riv atised an d th e rig h t to ad m in ister the lan d belonging to th e Maestrazgos* (M ilitary O rd ers) h ad been g ran ted to the Fuggers, the A u g sb u rg bankers, in 1525 (7 0 ). Philip inherited m an y serious financial difficulties from his fath er and would have been well advised to apply C h arles’s advice: ‘A tten d closely to finances an d learn to u n d e rsta n d the problem s involved.’ R egrettably, n e ith e r C harles n or P hilip paid m uch a tten tio n to this aphorism .

3

2

Philip I I ’s C haracter

P hilip was bo rn in V alladolid on 21 M ay 1527, the eldest son o f C harles V an d Isab ella o f P o rtu g al (see G enealogical T ab le, p. 114). In m ore ways th a n one he w as the p ro d u c t o f his p arents: short in sta tu re w ith a n u p rig h t posture, his m ost striking features were his larg e blue eyes set in an egg-shell com plexion, his reddish h air an d his d isp ro p o rtio n ate u p p e r ja w a n d lip [doc. 1]. H e h ad neith er a stro n g p h ysique n o r good health, an d w ith in tw enty years his body h a d becom e rounded, his h a ir an d b eard tu rn e d w h ite and his eyes w ere bloodshot w ith fatigue. P h ilip ’s early ed u catio n fell to M artin ez Siliceo an d B artolom é de C a rra n z a an d a variety of specialist scholars. H e soon developed a liking for m ath em atics an d arch itectu re b u t show ed no flair for foreign languages a n d only felt com fortable w hen speaking C astilian , w hich p artly explains his self-consciousness in th e com pany o f for­ eigners an d his relu ctan ce to travel outside S pain. D on J u a n de Z uniga w as p u t in charge o f physical activities, b u t it soon becam e clear th a t th e prince m uch preferred walking, d an cin g , m usic, play­ ing p iq u et, chess an d reading books on n a tu ra l history to ro b u st activities. P hilip w as an aesthete, not an ath lete. C h arles recognised the value o f P hilip acq u irin g political experience as soon as pos­ sible: a t the age o f twelve he atten d e d council m eetings, a t sixteen becam e R egent o f S pain an d in his tw enties travelled to M ilan, the E m pire, the N e th erlan d s and E n g land. B ut it was not P h ilip ’s wish to be aw ay from Spain. ‘T rav ellin g ab o u t o n e’s kingdom s is n eith er useful n o r d ec en t,’ h e once inform ed his son, an d after 1559 he never left th e Ib e ria n pen in su la (123). P h ilip ’s devotion to the C ath o lic faith owed m u ch to his m other. Isab ella o f P o rtu g al sp en t m any hours each day in p ray er, a n d in his infancy P hilip was su rro u n d ed by clerics w hom he was tau g h t to revere. T h ro u g h o u t his life, he atten d e d M ass daily, h ea rd ser­ m ons weekly an d received C o m m union q u arterly . Pious and orthodox in his devotion to th e C atholic C h u rch , he endow ed m onasteries an d shrines, kept religious books at his bedside an d saw 4

Philip IP s Character evidence o f divine in tervention in all affairs. G od was om niscient; H is cause w as P h ilip ’s cause. T ra d itio n ally , Philip has been seen as hostile to occult philosophy, yet recen t research clearly contrad icts this view. H e is know n to have acquired m ore th a n 200 books on m agic, kept a horoscope p rep ared by M a tth ia s H acu s, received frequent advice from astrologers, ordered all ex tan t works by the m edieval M ajo rcan philosopher R am ón L ull to be b ro u g h t to the Escorial, an d p atro n ised alchem ists like D iego d e S antiago (50, 136, 143). T h ro u g h o u t his life he developed an in terest in m ath em atics, science an d technology. In 1583 he founded an A cadem y o f M ath em atics an d Science and established four chairs u n d er the directo rsh ip o f J u a n H e rre ra to ed u cate S panish stu d en ts in m ilitary engineering, arch itectu re, n avigation an d m athem atics. H e financed inventions such as G iacom o de F ran cisco ’s secret m ethod o f careening sh ip s’ bottom s an d A ntonio M a rin ’s w ar m achine w hich ‘fires shot a n d d a rts w ith m uch im petus an d effect, an d w ith o u t expense in pow der o r d an g er o f fire’ (51, p. 134). P h ilip ’s m ind w as never closed o r n arro w , and his thirst for know ledge was in satiab le - p artic u la rly if it w ould give him a m ilitary ad v an tag e o r benefit him personally. From an early age he h ad been a n avid collector o f m an u scrip ts, books an d w orks o f art. Pliny, D a n te and P etrarch nestled alongside A esop’s Fables an d w ritings by E rasm u s a n d T eresa o f A vila. T h e P rad o cam e to possess the p aintings o f Bosch, B rueghel an d T itia n w hom he p artic u la rly liked, as well as the works o f S p an iard s like Pacheco a n d C oello w hom he disliked (4, 168). A t his d e a th his palaces h o used m ore th a n 700 pain tin g s an d the larg est p riv ate lib rary in E u rope. Philip used his know ledge o f arch itectu re to design an d oversee personally th e building o f several palaces. E ach possessed a distinctive feature: a t C asa de C am p o , m ock sea-battles were perform ed on artificial lakes an d fountains; A ran ju ez becam e the p rin cip al repository o f th o u san d s o f varieties o f trees, p lan ts an d herbs; C a sa an d A ranjuez housed elephants, rhinos an d lions, an d at El B osque a royal gam e reserve was b u ilt to provide d eer an d p h ea san t for h u n tin g . U n d o u b ted ly the E scorial is th e greatest m o n u m en t to P h ilip ’s love o f arch itectu re, m ath em atics an d sp iritu al devotion. I t w as designed by B au tista an d co m pleted by H e rrera, an d P hilip chose its site 48 km from M a d rid an d 1,000 m etres above sea level on the foothills o f the G u a d a rra m o s (86 ). P art palace w here Philip resided m ost sp rin g a n d su m m er m o n th s from 1566, p a rt m ausoleum w here he housed his d ead relatives, an d p a rt Jero n im ite m onastery, the Escorial em bodied P h ilip ’s tem p eram en t. 5

The Background In it he w as isolated from his councillors an d subjects a t large; it was his u ltim ate defence against an intrusive w orld. T h e re am id the dark, n arro w corridors an d secret passages, in au stere cells b u ilt of grey g ra n ite blocks, he occupied a sm all room overlooking the m onastic ch u rch o f S an Lorenzo. As th e seasons changed so the co u rt progressed from one palace to an o th er, a n d if its ethos was n o t as lively an d resp len d en t as u n der C harles, it w as far from dull. D ancers, acro b ats, buffoons a n d m ore th an tw enty dw arfs, including several from the Z arag o za lu natic asylum , e n tertain ed the royal household, an d a p a rtic u la r favourite was the re ta rd e d M ag d a le n a R uiz who could be relied u p o n to act the fool. M o re serious en tertain m e n t was provided by th e co u rt com ­ poser T o m ás Luis V ito ria, the org an ist A ntonio de C ab ezó n and chorister P h ilippe R ogier, w ho to gether w ith 150 m usicians fulfilled the K in g ’s love o f m usic, even if he disdained the innovative m usical ch ants o f P alestrin a in favour o f trad itio n al plainsong. D ram atists and w riters like Lope de V ega, Lipsius, M o n tan o an d V elasco were p atro n ised by the crow n, an d the poet J u a n Rufo received a 500ducat subsidy tow ards the cost o f pu b lish in g his Austriada, an epic poem a b o u t the H a b sb u rg s (4). P h ilip ’s relatio n sh ip w ith people was deceptive an d h as deceived m any h isto rian s m ainly because he developed an iron self-control to m ask his feelings in public. O u tw ard ly he ap p eared reserved and courteous, perform ing his daily routine in a grave an d dignified m an n er. A n a rc h -b u re a u c ra t dedicated to the endless task o f a d ­ m in istratin g his monarquía*, he sp en t nine hours a d ay every day reading an d an n o tatin g p ap ers, listening to advice an d taking decisions. M en w ho knew him , like C ard in al G ranvelle, view ed him as a p ro c ra stin a to r an d claim ed th a t ‘in all his affairs, his sole decision consisted in rem aining eternally indecisive’. A lth o u g h there is m uch tru th in this rem ark, Professor P ark er has rem in d ed his­ torians th a t P hilip only ap p ears h esitan t an d u n ce rtain in tim es of crisis because a g reat am o u n t o f d o cu m en tary evidence w ritten by the K in g a t such m om ents has survived (123). G iven the chan g in g n atu re o f in te rn a tio n a l affairs an d th e slowness o f com m unications, it was often w iser to be cautious an d p ru d e n t (116, 117). Y et once Philip h ad taken a decision he kept to it in an inflexible, d eterm in ed m anner. C. G. B ratli suggests th a t ‘history should list this stead fast­ ness o f p u rp o se — w hich people so often term in to leran ce and fanaticism —as th e m ost striking q u ality o f th at K in g ’, b u t to Philip ap p earan ce was everything an d a com prom ise o r re tractio n w as a sign o f w eakness even w hen he w as w rong (11, p. 129). I t is this 6

Philip IP s Character ju x tap o sitio n o f irresolution an d constancy, o f w eak- a n d h ig h ­ m indedness w hich m akes him such a p arad o x (36, 97). O f course, he was n o t above deceit a n d could be as ruthless as the nex t prince, b u t to lab el h im a ‘system atic liar an d h y p o crite’, ‘th e g re at father o f lies w ho sat in the E scorial’, as som e historians have done, throw s m ore light on th em th an on him (118, 121). P hilip’s p riv ate life functioned aro u n d his p u b lic duties; th e one rarely in te rru p te d the other. A t p re-determ ined tim es he w as avail­ able for his fam ily - at 10 a.m . before M ass, after d in n e r a t 9 p.m . and ju s t before b ed - b u t for m ost of the day he w as alone. ‘Being by him self is his g reatest p leasu re,’ com m ented the V e n etia n am ­ bassador, w ho for once m ay have been right. T h e K in g regarded m arriag e as a d y n astic an d d iplom atic obligation, b u t m isfortune necessitated his m arry in g four tim es. M aria o f P o rtu g al (1543-45) died giving b irth to D on C arlos; M ary T u d o r (1554—58), w ith w hom he sp en t seventeen m onths, died childless; E lizab eth o f Valois (1560-68) pro d u ced tw o d au g h ters, b u t th e sudden d e a th o f the Q ueen an d D on C arlos w ithin ten weeks o f each o th er obliged Philip to m arry again. ‘I very m uch desire to rem ain as I a m ,’ he candidly inform ed his fu tu re m other-in-law , b u t his final m arria g e w as a suc­ cess: A n n e o f A u stria (1570—80) provided him w ith five children, although only D on Philip survived puberty. T h e K in g ’s relatio n sh ip w ith his children has been the subject of m uch discussion even if too m an y historians have co n cen trated on the fate o f his eldest son, D on C arlos, an d too readily believed the allegations su rro u n d in g his d ea th (16, 118, 179). W illiam of O ran g e claim ed in 1580 th a t the prince h ad been m u rd ered , and A ntonio Pérez —w ho was in a position to know, yet b iased w hen he gave his version o f events - confirm ed in 1594 th a t he h ad been poisoned. P hilip show ed little love or affection for his psychotic son, whose m an ic o u tb u rsts convinced h im th a t he m u st be p laced u n d er restrain t. B u t if C arlo s’s su b seq u en t treatm en t seem s cold an d h e a rt­ less —he w as kep t in solitary confinem ent, his household d isb an d ed , his n am e erased from all prayers; an d w hen he died in J u ly Philip did n o t a tte n d the funeral - it does n o t follow th a t th e K in g was responsible for his d ea th or felt no grief. N evertheless, it rem ains clear th a t P hilip w as far m ore attac h ed to his two d au g h ters, Isab ella and C a ta lin a , as his letters w ritten w hilst he w as in P ortugal d em o n strate (43) [doc. 2]. In the 1580s he spent u p to fo u r hours each evening read in g state p ap ers to his eldest d au g h ter, an d his y ounger d a u g h te r received 127 letters w hen she m oved to Savoy with h er h u sb a n d in 1585. 7

The Background. P hilip could never be a p o p u lar king because he isolated him self from his subjects, restricted his ap p earan ces in p u b lic an d , following two attack s on his life in the early 1580s, travelled in a sealed coach. R espected, feared b u t never loved by his people, he possessed m any of the q u alities th a t S p an iard s ad m ired an d all th a t his enem ies despised. T o C astilian s he was m odest, pious, h andsom e, ju st, benevolent, absolute, ‘El P ru d e n te ’. T o his critics, he w as arro g an t, hypocritical, bigoted, sadistic a n d ty ran n ical, ‘the sp id er K in g . . . the w eaver o f p lo ts’.

8

Part Two: 3

Descriptive Analysis

Governm ent and A dm inistration

T h e n a tu re o f Philip I I ’s governm ent In an age o f personal m o narchy Philip II epitom ised its stren g th s and w eaknesses. M ore th an any o th er E u ro p ean ru ler he assum ed total responsibility for governing his subjects an d saw it as his d u ty to G od to fulfil this obligation. T h e task he set h im self w as far greater th an it needed to be b u t his devotion to th e C ath o lic faith and obedience to his fa th e r’s testam en t shaped the destiny o f S panish history. In 1543 C h arles V h ad exhorted his son to ‘dep en d on no-one but yourself. M ake sure o f all b u t rely exclusively on none. In your perplexities tru st alw ays in your M aker. H ave no care b u t for h im ’ (10). Philip ap plied this advice w ith exactitude, developing an in ­ veterate d istru st for his m inisters an d never d o u b tin g th a t he alone should take all decisions in m atters of governm ent. A slow th in k er and extrem ely cautious, Philip alw ays preferred to ad m in ister by paper. I t was, he contended, m ore discreet an d secure th a n listening to suggestions, b u t it is m ore p ro b ab le th at he felt uneasy in councils, w here he m ight have to m ake an in stan t decision. E verything an d any th in g fell w ith in his com pass: from investigating the cost of soldiers’ clothing in B russels to determ in in g the ed u catio n of M exican children, from allocating the sailors’ b erth s on the A rm ad a to processing ap p licatio n s for the export o f A n d alu cian horses. F in d ­ ing it nearly im possible to delegate, he lacked the political ju d g em en t to discrim in ate quickly betw een the im p o rta n t a n d the trivial. As the reign progressed so the volum e o f ad m in istratio n m ul­ tiplied: in 1571 he was read in g an d an n o tatin g an average of forty m em o ran d a a day, an d on one occasion he read over 400 papers. G rad u ally his h ealth began to give way. ‘T hose devils, m y p ap e rs’ were repo rted ly giving him severe headaches an d eye-strain in the 1570s an d at tim es he d espaired how he could continue. In 1577 he told his secretary: ‘I have ju s t been given this o th er packet o f papers from you. I have n eith er the tim e n o r the stren g th to look a t it, and so I will not open it u n til tom orrow . It is alread y p ast 10 o ’clock and I have n o t yet d in e d ’ (123). 9

Descriptive Analysis In ad d itio n to th e daily routine, petitions a n d letters required answ ering. A d m in istratio n was a tim e-consum ing business and before any decisions w ere taken, m any in term ed iaries w ere con­ sulted, som etim es on several occasions, a n d secretaries sp en t hours w ith th e K in g achieving the exact w ording he req u ired . T h e b u re au cratic m ach in ery tu rn ed over at its ow n m easured pace. ‘I f d eath cam e from S pain, I should be im m o rtal,’ said G ranvelle; G on­ zalo Pérez expressed the sam e feeling m ore p o ig n an tly w hen he com plained, ‘D ecisions are taken so slowly th a t even a cripple could keep u p w ith th em ’. P a rt o f the problem w as th e slow a n d u n certain com m unications. P h ilip ’s postal service, organised by G ab riel de T assis, w as one o f the best in Europe: letters took four days to reach M ad rid from Lisbon, ten from Brussels, fourteen from M ilan and tw enty-six from R om e, b u t adverse conditions caused delays an d the inevitable result was fru stratio n all ro und. C ouncillors, viceroys, governors an d generals aw aitin g orders could only guess at th e cause of delay, an d by the tim e they h ad received a reply to an u rg en t request, the circum stances h ad changed a n d fu rth e r instructions were required. Som e councillors circum vented the long delay by taking decisions w ith o u t o b tain in g royal assent, b u t this only ad ded to the a ir o f d istru st, an d once Philip suspected som eone of su b ter­ fuge he set o u t to tra p them by delib erate duplicity. I t was ap p a re n t to Pérez as early as 1565 th a t ‘H is M ajesty m akes m istakes a n d will continue to m ake m istakes in m any m atters because he discusses them w ith different people, som etim es w ith one, som etim es w ith an o th er, concealing som ething from one m in ister an d revealing it to a n o th e r’ (70, p. 145). In the opinion o f Professor K oenigsberger, the result was ‘ad m in istrativ e ch ao s’ in th e E m p ire an d political in trigue in M ad rid (83, p. 81). P hilip was never sh o rt o f advice. In fact, he p ro b ab ly received too m uch a n d could not readily digest it. M u ch o f the ro u tin e a d ­ m in istratio n was delegated to his m ore tru stw o rth y officers, b u t m inistries w ere short-lived an d unsettled because he was eternally suspicious. O n e of th e m ost sp ectacu lar dism issals was th a t o f C a r­ dinal E spinosa who, according to the K ing, was th e ablest o f all his servants b u t nevertheless fell from pow er w hen he assum ed too m uch responsibility. H is fall paved the w ay for M ateo V ázq u ez to rise to prom inence as P h ilip ’s p riv ate secretary a n d confessor betw een 1573 and 1591, an d he provided the continuity o f g o v ern m en t w hich fac­ tional rivalry an d P h ilip ’s intrig u in g did so m u ch to fru strate (98). V ázquez suggested th a t he should read the K in g ’s p riv ate cor­ respondence, m em orials an d consultas*, a n d th en d raft the 10

Government and Administration ap p ro p riate reco m m endations w hich P hilip w ould ap p ro v e by initialling. P hilip agreed a n d took his advice on m any issues. I t was p ro b ab ly V ázquez w ho urged him to ad o p t the ad hoc com m ittees know n as juntas* in the 1580s as the best m eth o d o f digesting advice. O nly V ázquez knew the secret contents o f each consulta a n d Philip only knew as m u ch as he was told. V ázq u ez’s long ten u re in office owed m uch to his skill at playing dow n his ow n im p o rtan ce in the ad m in istratio n a n d n o t giving any cause to suspect or d istru st him . I t w as a sin g u lar achievem ent. T h re e consistent traits are a p p a re n t in P h ilip ’s ad m in istratio n . F irst, he generally preferred C astilians to all o th er subjects. M en like E spinosa, O v an d o , V ázquez, Z ú ñ ig a a n d the G u zm án , M en ­ doza, E nriq u ez a n d T oledo families d o m in ated cen tral governm ent, and only a few outside the charm ed court circle received p rincipal ap p o in tm en ts a n d rew ards. W hile it is tru e th a t advisers such as G óm ez de Silva an d M o u ra were P ortuguese, Id iáq u e z a B asque, R equesens a C a ta la n , G ranvelle a F ranche-C om tois a n d F arnese an Italian , co n tem p o rary evidence suggests th a t ap p o in tm en ts were biased a n d caused resen tm en t. ‘T h e C astilians w a n t everything, and I suspect they will end up by losing ev erything,’ confided G ranvelle to M a rg a re t o f P arm a. Second, the K in g ’s desire to be well inform ed led to m inisters atten d in g several councils and juntas, w hereby each acq u ired ju s t enough know ledge to keep the others in check b u t never enough to be om n ip o ten t. F rancisco de E raso was secretary to six councils and a m em b er o f two m ore in 1559, an d C ard in al E sp in o sa served as P resid en t o f th e C ouncils o f C astile and the Indies, an d also as In q u isito r-G en eral. C ouncils also regularly interfered in one a n o th er’s dom ains: the C ouncil o f F inance au d ited o th er councils’ accounts, the C ouncil o f the In q u isitio n in terp o sed in the C ouncil o f A rag o n ’s affairs, a n d the C ouncil of State arg u ed w ith the C ouncil o f Italy. A th ird distinctive feature o f P hilip’s cen tral ad m in istratio n was the p re p o n d eran ce o f legally train ed b u reau crats, p ro d u cts o f the ex p an d in g university system (65). T hese letrados*, like the equivalent ojficiers in F rance, cam e increasingly from the m iddle and u rb a n classes, a n d it was they who consistently occupied the p rincipal ad m in istrativ e offices. All th irty -n in e councillors ap p o in ted to the C ouncil of the In d ies, for instance, w ere train e d in th e law, a n d none o f P h ilip ’s p ersonal secretaries was o f noble b irth . O f course, as the ad m in istratio n ex p anded an d P hilip sought to increase state control, so he req u ired m ore law yers th an grandees a n d nobles. As a result, 11

Descriptive Analysis personal q u arrels betw een grandees an d letrados* w ere never far from the surface, a n d m inisters, secretaries an d officials w ere always ready to cu t the g ro u n d from one a n o th er’s feet.

C onciliar ad m in istratio n P hilip’s decision in 1561 to establish his cap ital in M ad rid ra th e r th an in T oledo o r V alladolid ensured th a t he w ould be su rro u n d ed by his cen tral councils w hich, by the end of his reign, n u m b ered fourteen. E ach exercised executive, legislative a n d ju d ic ia l func­ tions, an d alth o u g h Philip was kept inform ed on a daily basis, considerable pow er rested w ith each o f the presid en ts a n d their secretaries. D espite its ap p earan ce o f cen tralisation, the ad m in is­ tratio n w as really an ad hoc system o f councils w ith the K in g a t the centre. Six councils w ere territorial. T h e C ouncil o f C astile, the highest council in the realm , acted as the su p rem e co u rt o f law, dispensing ju stice, h earin g appeals an d m aking reco m m en d atio n s to the K ing. T h e C ouncil o f A ragon was the prin cip al o rg an o f com ­ m u n icatio n betw een the K in g an d A ragon, C atalo n ia, V alen cia, the B alearic Isles an d S ard in ia. A cting as the suprem e co u rt o f ju stic e for all b u t A ragon a n d C atalo n ia, w here the audiencia (ap p eal courts) h eard cases, it also h an d led all Ita lia n affairs, b u t from 1559 a new C ouncil o f Italy w as set up to ad m in ister N aples, Sicily a n d M ilan. T his m easu re w as disliked by th e A ragonese, w ho correctly en­ visaged a red u ctio n in th eir au th o rity a n d p atro n ag e, an d by the Italian s, w ho w ere suspicious o f all reform s from M ad rid . Philip tried to reassu re them by insisting th a t three o f the six councillors would be Ita lia n , b u t he nevertheless en sured th a t the prin cip al offices o f p resid en t a n d trea su rer w ere reserved for C astilian nobles and p relates such as m em bers o f th e C a b re ra an d P erren o t families. T h e C o u n cil o f th e In d ies was responsible for th e in tern a l affairs of the N ew W orld w hich from 1580 included th e ex-Portuguese ter­ ritories. Staffed by ju rists an d theologians ra th e r th a n by colonial experts, th e council issued th o u san d s o f edicts to th e viceroys in M exico a n d P eru b u t exercised little real control over the govern­ m ent o f th e In d ies a n d the welfare o f the natives. T w o new councils were created in th e 1580s: the C ouncil o f P o rtu g al in 1582, th ro u g h w hich P hilip co rresponded w ith his viceroy in L isbon, a n d in 1588 the C ouncil o f F lan d ers. Since 1559 Philip h ad ad m in istered the N eth erlan d s a n d F ran ch e-C o m te th ro u g h secretaries a t the co u rt in M ad rid w ho corresp o n d ed w ith th e governor-general a n d privy council in Brussels. T h e new C ouncil o f F lan d ers w as designed to 12

Government and Administration achieve g re ater efficiency an d regularity o f p ro ced u re b u t it is ques­ tionable how far royal ad m in istratio n was im proved. In ad d itio n to th e territo rial councils, there w ere eight d e p a rtm e n ­ tal councils w hich d ealt w ith p artic u la r aspects o f g overnm ent. T h e C ouncil o f th e In q u isitio n was responsible for tw enty-one trib u n als th ro u g h o u t the monarquia*, and its ability to interfere in secu lar m at­ ters in the n am e o f religion m ade it a valuable p illar o f the state. T h e C ouncil o f M ilitary O rd ers w as largely re d u n d a n t in P h ilip ’s reign, as w as the C ouncil o f the C ru sad e whose m ain function of ad m in istratin g th e cruzada* h ad been taken over by th e C ouncil o f F inance. C h arles V h a d seen the w isdom o f setting u p a Camara (or C h am b er) to control patro n ag e an d royal ap p o in tm en ts in C astile, w hich Philip reform ed seventy years later, as well as a C ouncil of State to supervise foreign affairs, a C ouncil o f W ar, a C ouncil of F inance an d a Junta des Obrasy Bosques to ad m in ister royal buildings, g ardens, lakes an d forests. P hilip m ade no a tte m p t to unify these councils b u t in stead treated them as sep arate satellites responding to his com m ands. In this way he hoped to know all aspects o f a problem anyw here in his E m pire a t any given m om ent. In practice, how ever, his know ledge was frag m en tary an d at tim es inaccu rate, an d as he never travelled outside the p en in su la after 1559, he h ad no ready way o f v alid atin g w h at he h ad been told.

T he C ouncil o f S tate In so far as an y one council can be said to have influenced P hilip in his policy m aking, the C ouncil o f S tate an d later the C ouncil o f W ar were by far the m ost im p o rtan t, sim ply because foreign policy oc­ cupied so m u ch o f his w orking d ay and he w as at w ar for all b u t seven years o f his reign (167). At first the com position o f th e C ouncil o f S tate reflected C h arles’s cosm opolitan outlook. H ow ever, on his re tu rn to S pain in 1559 Philip altered its com plexion, w hich set the tone for the next tw enty years: C ard in al G ranvelle rem ain ed in the N eth erlan d s, the D uke o f Savoy an d A n d rea D o ria o f G en o a w ent hom e to Italy , a n d a p a rt from G onzalo Perez, the K in g ’s personal secretary betw een 1543 an d 1566, only R uy G om ez de Silva (the Prince o f E boli), the D uke o f A lva, J u a n M an riq u e de L a ra and A ntonio de T oledo rem ained. T h e vacancies were quickly filled by the clients a n d proteges o f Eboli an d Alva, w hose p erso n al rivalry characterised this first ad m in istratio n . T ra d itio n ally , h istorians have claim ed th a t the m ain difference betw een these factions was A lva’s love o f w a r an d E b o li’s belief in peaceful diplom acy, b u t m ore 13

Descriptive Analysis recently this view has been criticised —firstly by H en ry K am en, who suggests th a t such d istinctions are unwise since n eith er faction held fixed views on foreign affairs an d b o th regularly shifted th eir g round according to prevailing w inds; an d secondly by D r Lovett, w ho believes th a t the key issue dividing them was w h eth er S pain should have a cen tralist or federal ad m in istratio n (70, 97, 104). I t is likely th a t Philip actively encouraged this factionalism , th ereb y ensuring th at n eith er group becam e d o m in an t while a t th e sam e tim e he was supplied w ith a read y source o f inform ation. T h e key figure in this m inistry w as p ro b ab ly G onzalo Pérez. As secretary to the council he was able to sp eak p rivately w ith the K in g an d assist in sh ap in g his a ttitu d e to m atters u n d er discussion; m oreover, it was he w ho relayed the K in g ’s responses to the councillors’ recom m endations. T he im p o rtan ce o f his office was revealed a t his d ea th , w hen Eboli and A lva pressed P hilip to a p p o in t th eir respective clients, A ntonio Pérez an d G ab riel de Z ayas. T ypically, P hilip com prom ised and divided the p ost betw een them . T h e deep rivalry, n o t unlike th a t o f Leicester an d B urghley a t the E nglish court, survived the d e a th o f Eboli in 1573 b ecause Pérez h a d eclipsed A lva as P h ilip ’s p rin cip al adviser following the g en eral’s failure in the N eth erlan d s. In 1579, however, this ‘first’ m inistry su ddenly cam e to an en d w ith the dis­ grace o f b o th A lva a n d Pérez. In the early 1570s Philip suspected th a t his h alf-b ro th er, D on Jo h n , w an ted to establish a kingdom for him self, possibly in N o rth Africa or E n g lan d , an d so needed careful w atching. Pérez suggested th at an in fo rm an t at the p rin ce’s court w as needed, an d for three years one o f his protégés, J u a n de Escobedo, fulfilled this role, b u t Philip never liked h im an d found his incessant d em an d s for rew ards increasingly tiresom e. Escobedo believed Pérez h ad altered cor­ respondence betw een D on J o h n an d Philip to m ake it look as if D on J o h n w as beh av in g treaso n ab ly and to en su re th a t his ideas concerning the N e th erlan d s were not ad o p ted . W hen Escobedo unexpectedly arriv ed in M a d rid in 1578 to find o u t w h at h ad been going on, he began to get his own back by sp read in g ru m o u rs th a t Pérez was hav in g an affair w ith the singularly attra ctiv e one-eyed Princess o f Eboli, th a t he received paym ents from G enoese bankers, and was selling state secrets. B oth Philip an d Pérez agreed th at E scobedo h ad to be silenced, an d on 31 M arch 1578 he w as m urd e re d iti a stree t in M ad rid . Significantly, no en q u iry took place for several m onths, a n d the assassins were never found, b u t Pérez h im ­ self now becam e a security risk (see p. 22). In th e spring o f 1579, V ázquez show ed P hilip the personal p ap ers o f the recently deceased 14

Government and Administration Don J o h n w hich clearly proved th a t Pérez h ad w ithheld certain letters. His arrest followed on 28 Ju ly when he refused to accept a new post in far-aw ay V enice (109). W hile this in trig u e w as unfolding, Philip decided to rem ove A lva from the council. H e discovered th at th e g en eral’s son h ad m arried w ith o u t royal assent an d used this m inor im perfection to b an ish A lva to his estates. T h e very day Pérez was arrested , the sixty-tw o-year-old C ard in al G ranvelle arriv ed from R om e to head the council. H ow far he was a stop-gap is a d eb a ta b le point. Seven o f P h ilip ’s m ost tru sted a d ­ visers h ad died betw een 1575 an d 1578, an d w ith A lva an d Pérez in disgrace an d the K in g p re p arin g to leave for P ortugal, G ran v elle’s presence in tro d u ced a m uch-needed steadying influence. H e a n d his assistant, D on J u a n de Id iáq u ez, com plem ented each o th er’s abilities very well, even if they w ere resented by the C astilian co u n ­ cillors. T h e K in g ’s re tu rn in A pril 1583 an d the arriv al o f J u a n de Z ú ñ ig a y R equeséns ended G ran v elle’s In d ia n sum m er. Z ú ñ ig a’s beliefs differed from G ranvelle’s in m atters o f em phasis, not policy. B oth recognised th e im p o rtan ce o f bringing the D u tch R evolt to a speedy conclusion an d agreed th a t E ngland m u st be stopped from interfering, b u t w hereas G ranvelle saw the N eth erlan d s as his m ain priority, Z ú ñ ig a struck a chord w ith the C astilian s in seeing the defence o f the pen in su la as equally im p o rtan t. G ranvelle rem ained on the council u n til his d eath in 1586, b u t by then he h ad been eclipsed by Z úñiga, Id iáq u ez and D on C ristó b al de M o u ra, who h ad com e to P h ilip ’s atten tio n in P ortugal. It is p ro b ab le th a t Philip would have allow ed these m en an d th eir aristo cratic co u n terp arts to continue to function th ro u g h the C ouncil o f S tate, b u t in O cto b er 1585 he an d V ázq u ez w ere taken ill, and, upon recovering, a m ajor reform was in troduced. In stea d o f convening a full com plem ent of councillors o f state, the m ost im p o rtan t business cam e to be con­ d u cted in secret by a select g ro u p o f three or four close advisers in the com pany o f the K in g ’s personal secretary. T his Junta de Noche, so called because it m et each evening before d in n er, com prised Z úñiga (until his d e a th in 1586), Id iáq u ez, M o u ra, occasionally the C o u n t o f C h in ch ó n , an d always V ázquez. M ost historians regard this inform al advisory junta as the w ork of V ázquez, who saw the m erits o f a sm all an d experienced com m ittee w hich could pass its recom m endations directly to the K ing, alth o u g h it has also been suggested th a t juntas m ay have been form ed because th eir m em bers had little confidence in the other, m ore aristo cratic councillors of state (97, 123, 136). T h e C ouncil o f S tate never recovered its form er a u th o rity even 15

Descriptive Analysis though, like o th er cen tral councils, it co ntinued to function. By 1593 th e Junta de Noche h a d developed clear areas o f responsibility: M o u ra oversaw financial affairs an d P ortugal; Id iáq u e z directed foreign, m ilitary an d n av al affairs; C h in ch ó n becam e an expert on A ragon an d Italy , an d V ázquez acted as general co-ordinator. Philip d ep ended heavily u p o n these in tim ate advisers, b u t th eir n arro w range o f vision a n d lack o f field expertise w ere weaknesses w hich he h ad com e to recognise by 1591. H e therefore m ad e increasing use o f the Junta Grande, com prising eight to ten o f his m ost experienced councillors, to review m em o ran d a before sending th eir recom m en­ datio n s to the Junta de Noche for evaluation. H ow ever, his d istru st o f this clique caused him to tu rn to the Junta de Gobierno (G overning C om m ittee) com prising Id iáq u ez, M o u ra, C h in ch ó n , A rchduke A lb ert a n d the relatively inexperienced h eir to the throne, Prince Philip. I t was M o u ra a n d not th e K in g ’s new personal secretary Id iáq u e z w ho re p o rted th e reco m m en d atio n s o f th e Junta de Noche to the K ing. H ow ever, P hilip, w ho w as teach in g his son th e a rt o f governm ent, h ad no w ish to com prom ise h im w ith a n o m n ip o ten t junta d o m in ated by eith er the Id iáq u e z fam ily or M oura. In 1595, therefore, w hen A lb ert left M a d rid to becom e ca p tain -g en eral o f the arm y o f F lan d ers, effective responsibility for gov ern m en t passed to the Prince, who h ad to m ake do w ith th e advice o f elderly, in su lar ministers. Not until his father died did Philip II I jettison this ‘second’ m inistry an d tu rn to his viceroy in V alen cia, th e D uke o f L erm a.

C astilian ad m in istratio n T h e ad m in istratio n o f each of P h ilip ’s dom inions largely d ep ended upon viceroys, governors an d royal servants, m ost o f w hom he never m et a n d whose a u th o rity varied enorm ously. T h e ir activities w ere w atched over by p erm a n en t in stitu tio n s such as the audiencias and occasionally by royal inform ers a n d secret agents. T h e system was one o f checks a n d balances: the viceroy was m o nitored by the audien­ cia, the audiencia by the viceroy, a n d b oth w ere scrutinised by the council in M ad rid , w hich was an sw erable to the K ing. O n ly in C astile was any real a tte m p t m ad e to centralise th e a d ­ m in istratio n , a n d even here effective control o f the tow ns and countryside fell to the grandees an d nobility. T h ey defended the country a n d supplied the local m ilitia, w hile th e crow n exem pted them from direct tax atio n an d accorded them th eir desired social an d political pre-em inence in th eir pais*. As they alread y controlled th o u san d s o f m en, h ad the capital to raise, pay a n d supply an arm y 16

Government and Administration quickly a n d h a d a vested in terest in m ain tain in g law an d order, captain s-g en eral such as the M arq u is o f M o n d éjar in G ra n a d a and the D uke o f M ed in a Sidonia in A n d alu cía possessed im m ense pow er. T h e cro w n ’s p rin cip al servant in local governm ent was the cor­ regidor* (49). T ra in e d in the law a n d ap p o in ted by the councils in M ad rid , som e sixty-six corregidores presided over town councils and exercised considerable political, ad m in istrativ e and ju d icial a u th o rity [d o c . 3 ]. A lthough in theory the office was held for one y ear w ith the possibility o f extension to two, in the later years of P h ilip ’s reign, periods o f three, four a n d five years w ere not un co m ­ m on. T h e ir m ain political function w as to m an ag e th eir local council an d influence the ap p o in tm en t o f the procuradores* (local re p re­ sentatives) to th e Cortes* to ensure th a t they w ere w illing servants of th e crown ra th e r th a n tools o f th eir constituents. T h is was never an easy task, as becam e evident in 1566. Philip in stru cted all corregidores to secure th e re tu rn o f deputies w ho w ere ready to g ra n t the servicio* u nconditionally [d o c . 4], M ost o f the local councils strongly resisted this infringem ent o f th eir custom ary rights an d there was little the corregidores could do to stop them . T h e corregidores also exercised full ju risd ictio n in crim in al and civil m atters, alth o u g h appeals ag ain st th eir ju d g e m e n t could be taken to a regional co u rt an d , if necessary, before the K in g ’s C ouncil. A dm inistratively, the corregidor an d his assistant, the teniente, o r his ap p o in tee to n earb y towns, the alcalde mayor*, w ere responsible for the enforcem ent o f all royal laws. O nce a year th e corregidores conducted a visita o f th e d istrict o f th e city to d eterm in e the effectiveness o f ju stic e an d governm ent, a n d to p u t right an y m isdem eanours. A nalogous to th e E lizab eth an J P s , th eir duties ran g ed from m ain tain in g p u blic w orks a n d buildings to in ­ specting w eights an d m easures, inns, brothels, jails an d m arkets; from assessing a n d collecting tax atio n to securing sufficient supplies o f food for the towns. In times of w ar the corregidor h ad to m arsh al citizens, provision towns an d , in association w ith the prin cip al local grandee, organise th eir defence. In M u rcia, L orca an d C artag en a, for exam ple, the corregidor a n d tow n council m u stered an d arm ed the troops w hich th e M arq u is o f Los Vélez co m m anded in the field (21). W ar was a severe test o f P hilip’s ad m in istratio n , and in th e 1580s the corregidores w ere struggling to keep control. Low salaries for all senior ad m in istrativ e arm y officers m ean t th a t venality, peculation a n d absenteeism w ere rife. T h e p ay m aste r o f the fortification works in C adiz, for exam ple, earn ed 35 ducats a year, w hich was no m ore th a n a soldier’s w age, a n d like o th er crow n servants he d ep u ted his work in o rd er th a t he could acq u ire a su p p lem en tary source of 17

Descriptive Analysis incom e. In creasingly, corregidores were expected to coerce town councils into pro v id in g m ore m oney, m en a n d m aterials for the w ar effort, b u t they too proved re lu c tan t to co-operate a n d m an y b la ta n t­ ly ignored royal directives. In 1588 V alladolid w ould n o t d raw up a m u ster list; in 1590 Seville ignored requests to raise troops; a n d in M u rcia u n p o p u la r crow n nom inees w ere rejected in favour o f tra ­ ditional cap tain s. T h e crow n w as powerless to act, an d a t tim es it ap p ears th a t even the corregidores colluded w ith the local nobles to exercise as m u ch independence as was m u tu ally convenient. T h e m ain m un icip al office o f m ag istrate, the regidor*, exem plified the problem . As early as 1558 it h ad been available to anyone w ho could pay the going ra te o f 10,000 ducats, and alth o u g h the official salary was ju s t a few ducats, co n stan t w arfare p resented th e o p p o rtu n ity of m aking co n sid erab le sum s o f m oney th ro u g h bribes, fees, gifts and personal co n tracts. Loyalty to th e crow n existed b u t it was not so com pelling as th e o p portunities o f self-advancem ent, a n d all royal servants knew th a t official enquiries could easily be hoodw inked.

T he C astilian Cortes* E ach o f P h ilip ’s dom inions h ad its own represen tativ e assem bly: the Cortes in S pain, p arliam en ts in Italy , an d S tates-G en eral in the N eth erlan d s. E ach was d eterm in ed to resist an y en cro ach m en t on its trad itio n al rig h ts an d privileges an d p resented real obstacles to a g o v ern m en t in ten t on cen tralisation. Philip exercised m ost control over th e C astilian Cortes. By 1556 ju s t eighteen tow ns, m ainly in O ld C astile, w ere rep resen ted by the thirty-six procuradores* w ho were chosen by lot. I t was once believed th a t th e Cortes h ad been steadily declining since th e fo urteenth cen tu ry b u t this view has recently been challenged by C harles J a g o (36, 6 2 ). H e has arg u ed th a t until P h ilip ’s reign th e crow n experienced little trouble; no p arlia m e n ta ry g ran t w as w ithheld or reduced in size, an d in 1560 th e Cortes even consented to an increase in the price o f the alcabala*. T h ereafter, in response to a series of irritatin g new custom s a n d excise d u ties and taxes on the p ro d u ctio n and sale o f salt, it began to insist on redress before supply. P hilip an ticip ated tro u b le in 1566 an d o rd ered his cor­ regidores to m ake sure th a t future procuradores w ere n o t u n d er o ath to th eir local council w hich w ould h ave restricted th eir pow er to g ran t him a servicio* [d o c . 4 ], Some cities, like B urgos, co-operated im m e­ diately a n d gave th eir procuradores full au th o rity to act as they saw fit, b u t the m ajo rity o f m unicipalities w an ted im p o rta n t m atters referred back to th em before a vote was taken. T h is Cortes was one 18

Government and Administration of the m ost fractious P hilip h ad to face. From the ou tset it attem p ted to get the recen t taxes repealed an d ex tract an assu ran ce th a t no new tax o r d u ty w ould be in tro d u ced w ith o u t its consent, an d it held out for these d em an d s by th reaten in g to w ithhold the o rd in ary ser­ vicio an d th en th e ex trao rd in ary servicio. A m atter o f p rin cip le was at stake. Philip n ever yielded to this political blackm ail, b u t he did offer a n u m b e r o f vague g u aran tees o f fu tu re co n su ltatio n if both servicios w ere v oted. A fter m uch p ressure the Cortes backed dow n an d approved th e g ra n t, b u t w hen it su bsequently drafted its grievances an d req u ests in 1567, Philip eith er rejected them o r replied evasively [doc. 5]. W hile som e h isto rian s like Pierson an d Griffiths believe th a t the K ing ‘w on a m ajo r b attle in m aking the Cortes o f C astile th e su b ser­ vient tool o f m o n arch ical g o v ern m en t’, others, like C h arles J a g o , see this episode as an im p o rtan t preced en t in w hich th e prin cip le of ‘w ithholding th e servicios h ad been estab lish ed ’ (54, p. 36; 63, p. 107; 136). H e cites the su b seq u en t objections o f th e 1571 an d 1573 Cortes an d the refusal of the cities an d towns to collect a triple encabezamiento general* in 1575—76. T h e ir in structions to th eir proctors a t the 1576 Cortes to seek redress by w ithholding the no rm al p a r­ liam en tary su p p ly was a defiant gesture w hich P hilip could not ignore. Several cities drew up p etitions for th eir dep u ties to subm it to the K ing. B urgos requested exem ption from th e servicios an d the w ithdraw al o f p rice controls on grain, and com plained a b o u t the sale o f m u n icip al offices and señoríos. T h e ald erm en o f M u rcia claim ed th a t if they approved the servicio they w ould be ‘sto n ed by the people’. In A ugust Philip offered a com prom ise. I f the proctors g ran ted an o rd in ary servicio then he w ould listen to the com plaints ab o u t th e encabezamiento before asking them to ap p ro v e the ex trao r­ d in ary servicio. T h e Cortes accepted, an d on 11 O c to b e r voted the subsidy. T h e en su in g discussions lasted several m o n th s an d led to Philip red u cin g the encabezamiento from 2.5 to 1.5 m illion ducats, w hich w as a rem ark ab le defeat for the crown. T h e procuradores even pressed for it to be halved again, b u t Philip had conceded enough. By N ovem ber 1577 the Cortes h ad approved the second p a r t o f the servicio an d , its w ork com pleted, it was dissolved on 13 D ecem ber 1577 (63). P hilip’s atte m p ts betw een 1578 an d 1588 to im pose new taxes and increase existing ones w ere baulked by the Cortes as long as th e crow n w ould n o t concede th e principle o f redress before supply. D eadlock was only ended w hen the defeat o f the A rm ad a forced h im into rebuilding his fleet an d the cities were m ad e aw are o f the 19

Descriptive Analysis vu ln erab ility o f th eir coastline. T h e su b seq u en t solution re p ­ resented a com prom ise for the crow n an d a victory for the Cortes. A new tax, the millones*, w as in troduced in 1590, b u t only after Philip agreed in ad v an ce to accept over one h u n d re d conditions. M oreover, each m unicipality w as allowed to raise its sh are o f the subsidy how ever it liked u n d er the general supervision o f th e Cortes. T h e principle o f p rio r redress w as therefore established, although P hilip insisted th a t the conditions should be discussed only after the overall sum to be g ran ted h a d been agreed in o u tlin e, an d this rem ain ed the p ractice u n til the reign of C h arles II. W hen th e mil­ lones was d u e for renew al in 1596, the Cortes form ally declared: ‘this service is g ra n te d by the K in g d o m for as long as the conditions of this co n tract are observed, an d if any o f these are broken it shall ipso facto cease, an d the K in g d o m will have no o b ligation to con­ tinue w ith it’. T h ereafter, the relationship betw een the crow n and the Cortes w as p u t onto a co n tra ctu al basis w hich could n o t easily be dism issed by eith er p arty . In the course o f his reign Philip h ad faced an increasingly in tra c ­ table Cortes. H e h ad tried to m an ag e them by a ltern atin g th reats w ith douceurs an d , alth o u g h he retain ed the u p p er h an d , he h a d to m ake concessions. I. A. A. T h o m p so n has suggested th a t as the crow n’s financial condition deterio rated , it becam e m ore d ep en d en t upon p a rlia m e n ta ry g ran ts an d o f necessity convened m ore sessions. Between 1556 an d 1572 five Cortes had m et for an average o f 74 days a year, b u t this in creased to 265 days a y ear for th e seven Cortes held between 1572 an d 1598. A t th e sam e tim e the servicio* rose from less th an 25 p er cent o f the royal revenue to nearly 40 p er cent (165). It seems th a t th e m ore the Cortes m et, the m ore o u tspoken it becam e. By the 1590s it was openly criticising P hilip’s im perial policies: ‘W as the w ar really necessary?’ it asked. ‘C ould C astile co n tin u e to afford it?’ ‘It is n o t for C astile alone to b ear the cost,’ said one procurador* in 1593. In 1597 the Cortes show ed how far it h ad ch anged w hen it w ould n o t agree to the new millones to be levied on sisas*, and by 1598 only ten o u t o f eighteen towns h ad assented (63) (see p. 27).

N avarre, C atalo n ia, V alencia and A ragon T h e situ atio n outside C astile was far worse for a variety o f reasons. T h e Cortes o f th e kingdom o f N a v arre h ad th irty -fo u r d ep uties rep ­ resenting th e lead in g tow ns an d country estates, each in te n t upo n g u ard in g the su b jects’ liberties in the face o f in cip ien t centralism 20

Government and Administration and refusing to listen sy m p ath etically to P hilip’s fiscal requests. Sim ilarly, the C atalo n ian Cortes fiercely defended its jueros* (tra d i­ tional privileges), an d in exchange for subsidies the crow n was obliged to m ak e legal an d ad m in istrativ e concessions. H ow ever, C atalo n ia rem ain ed nom inally obed ien t because effective pow er rested w ith th e nobles, whose a ttitu d e was basically conservative (37). In V alen cia th e m ain ten an ce o f law an d o rd er w as a serious problem as the nobles seem ed to be m ore in terested in retain in g th eir feudal pow er th a n in n atio n al security, w hich m ean t th a t corsair p irates could a tta c k coastal tow ns w ith im punity. Philip recognised th a t A ragon w as the key to the problem . It was nom inally responsible for these su b o rd in ate kingdom s b u t resented any a tte m p t by M ad rid to interfere in its affairs. T h e nobles con­ trolled society. T h ey d o m in ated the Diputación*, a stan d in g com m ittee o f eight deputies w hich m et in th e absence o f a Cortes. T hey kept p riv ate arm ies, a n d they w ielded the pow er o f life and d ea th over th eir ten an try . T h e K in g was only allowed to ap p o in t the viceroy; the office o f Justiciar* was trad itio n ally in the native house o f L an u z a, an d all o th er officials were elected by the A ragonese. A n u nsavoury episode occurred at the ou tset o f P hilip’s reign w hen th e viceroy, the D uke o f F rancavila, executed a m an accused o f com plicity w ith b an dits. Riots an d d istu rb an ces broke o u t in 1556 in Z arag o za as th e people claim ed th a t a C astilian could n o t o rd er the execution o f an A ragonese irrespective o f his office or offence. W hen F ran cav ila fled th e kingdom a co n stitutional impasse arose. O n ly th e K in g could call a Cortes to restore o rder, b u t Philip h ad n o t yet been crow ned in A ragon an d technically th e ailing C harles V w as still th eir m o narch. T h e C astilian R egent, J o a n n a , dared not in terv en e for fear o f escalating violence, an d w hen leading nobles called an illegal m eeting o f the Cortes in 1559, arg u m en ts broke o u t an d th e assem bly fell a p a rt. N orm ality only re tu rn e d w hen Philip ap p o in ted J o a n n a as su p erin ten d en t an d governor o f A ragon an d p rom ised to visit the kingdom as soon as possible. For the n ex t tw enty years Philip largely left A ragon alone, b u t governm ent steadily d eterio rated an d in the 1580s he decided to in ­ tervene. T h ere w ere increasing rep o rts o f d istu rb an ces betw een seigneurial lords a n d vassals, an d ju stice seem ed to have broken dow n in the co u n ty o f R ibagorza. A t C odo a C h ristia n sheep farm er was m u rd ered by M oriscos* in 1585 an d m inor acts o f vengeance led to a m ajo r co u n ter-rep risal in 1588. C odo an d the n earb y village o f Pina w ere sacked an d 300 in h a b ita n ts killed by a g an g o f farm ers an d b an d its. T h is latest episode o f law lessness, coupled w ith b an d its 21

Descriptive Analysis seizing a silver convoy in C atalo n ia, sh arp en ed P h ilip ’s resolve to act. In 1588 he assum ed control o f R ib ag o rza by buying its fief from the D uke o f V illaherm osa, an d followed it u p by ap p o in tin g the C o u n t o f A lm enara, a C astilian , as the new viceroy. T h is was g u aran teed to ruffle a few A ragonese feathers. T ro u b le broke o u t in 1590. A lm en ara an n o u n ced th a t governm ent troops w ould soon be arriving to b u ttress the F ren ch b o rd er and prev en t H u g u en o ts from enterin g S pain, b u t A ragonese nobles sensed th a t th eir freedom was in jeo p ard y an d began a m in o r revolt in Z arag o za. A p a rt from V illaherm osa a n d the C o u n t o f A ran d a, few su p p o rted it, b u t the unexpected arriv al o f A ntonio Pérez tra n s­ form ed the situ atio n . In A pril he h ad escaped from M a d rid , w here he was aw aitin g execution, an d fled across the b o rd e r to A ragon w here, as a native, he w ished to stan d trial an d clear his nam e. F or twelve m o n th s P hilip did n o th in g while Pérez revealed evidence before the Justiciar* o f the K in g ’s com plicity in E scobedo’s m u rd er. By M ay 1591, how ever, Philip h a d h ad enough a n d ord ered Pérez to be m oved to the In q u isitio n ’s cells - allegedly because he w as a heretic, b u t m ore p ro b ab ly so th a t he could be p erm a n en tly silenced. T o th e A ragonese nobles this w as an infringem ent o f th eir liberties, and Gil d e M esa an d V illaherm osa o rganised p o p u la r d em on­ stratio n s w hich p red ictab ly got o u t o f h an d . A lm en ara was m u rd ered , th e In q u isitio n ’s h ea d q u arters w ere b u rn e d dow n, and Pérez was rescued an d re tu rn ed to the su p rem e court. P h ilip realised he h ad to restore law an d o rd er quickly if A ragon w as n o t to tu rn into an o th er N eth erlan d s. F o u rteen th o u san d troops w ere m oved to the C astilian —A ragonese b o rd e r an d the Justiciar w as ord ered to h an d Pérez back to the In q u isitio n by 24 S ep tem b er 1591. T h a t day an o th er rio t broke o u t an d in the mêlée Pérez escaped, never to be recap tu red . In N ovem ber the Diputación* called upo n all A ragonese to declare w a r on Philip, b u t o u tsid e Z aragoza few nobles su p p o rted Pérez. W ith in two weeks the arm y h ad suppressed th e revolt an d in the ensuing reprisals tw enty-tw o rebels w ere executed, V illaherm osa an d A ra n d a were sentenced to life im p riso n m en t, a n d th e In q u i­ sition b u rn e d m ore th an eighty heretics (70). T h e defence o f royal au th o rity h ad ju stified sending in a C astilian arm y, a n d P hilip now h ad the o p p o rtu n ity to enforce his ru le either m ilitarily o r constitutionally. H e decided up o n the la tte r, calling a Cortes at T a ra z o n a an d personally atten d in g its final session in 1592. H e an n o u n ced th a t he h ad no in ten tio n o f revoking th e A ragonese C h a rte r b u t in stead w ould in tro d u ce som e m odifications. As a result, the crow n could rem ove the Justiciar at will, ap p o in t 22

Government and Administration foreigners, ex tra d ite prisoners seeking san ctu ary , d eterm in e the use o f financial g ra n ts w ith o u t the Cortes’ consent, in tro d u ce legislation by a m ajo rity vote in all b u t fiscal m atters, an d an n u l the rig h t o f individual m em bers to veto a proposal. A rg u ab ly P hilip show ed his p ru d en ce a n d m o d eratio n in this settlem ent: a m inim um o f force h ad been used to resto re control, an d royal pow er in A ragon w as now m uch m ore effective.

N aples, Sicily, M ilan an d S ardinia Philip reg ard ed his Ita lia n dom inions as his front-line defence ag ain st the T u rk s. T h e ir m ilitary, naval an d financial resources enabled him to re b u t the O tto m an challenge an d to defend other vulnerable areas o f his em pire. In 1572, 80 p er cent o f his M ed iter­ ra n ean fleet w as Italian , the p rin cip al galleys com ing from G enoa, N aples an d Sicily, while M ilan, w hich was strategically situ ated betw een N aples an d th e Low C o untries, supplied him w ith m ercenaries an d m oney. H is policy tow ards the Ita lia n states was one o f cautious control exercised th ro u g h his viceroys, each o f w hom upon taking office w as rem inded o f his d u ty to respect the local laws, custom s an d privileges. T h e m ain obligation o f th e viceroy of N aples was to preserve the long coastline from T u rk ish attacks. H e assum ed responsibility for six fortresses in T u scan y , know n as the ‘States o f the P residios’, w hich p ro tected th e lan d route from N aples to M ilan, w hile the n a ­ tive lan d o w n ers recruited troops, financed garrisons an d provided their ow n defence. L arge, populous an d w ith a docile P arliam en t th at ap p ro v ed a donativo* on average every two years, N aples was p o ten tially the m ost tax ab le o f P h ilip ’s Ita lia n dom inions b u t it was also extrem ely poof. Food riots an d b an d itry were com m onplace, yet n o th in g su rp assed the d istu rb an ces o f M ay 1585 w hen news of a su d d en rise in the price o f b read was an n o u n ced . T h e m iddle classes jo in ed the p easan try an d u rb a n poor, all fuelled by prophecies o f m essianic deliverance. T h e viceroy, the D uke of O su n a, panicked, lost control o f the city, a n d only h ad his au th o rity restored w hen th e n ativ e aristocracy sided w ith the g o v ern m en t an d S panish troops arrived. Philip condoned the fierce rep risals w hich followed. O f 820 w ho faced trial, 31 were executed, 71 w ent to the galleys an d 300 w ere exiled, while an estim ated 12,000 fled the city in fear. A lthough th ere w ere no m ore m ajor riots for an o th e r sixty years, S p ain ’s relatio n sh ip w ith N aples h a d been seriously d am ag ed

(178). 23

Descriptive Analysis Sicily h a d been u n d er A ragonese rule since 1282 a n d w as m uch m ore sub serv ien t. Its P arliam en t, com posed o f three estates called bracci*, w as su m m o n ed every th ree years to vote a donativo*, payable by all subjects. O n ten occasions Philip called an e x tra o rd in ary P ar­ liam ent to raise ad d itio n al revenue, an d despite (or p erh ap s because of) pleas o f p overty the bracci responded favourably. A lth o u g h P ar­ liam ent w as n o t a political cipher - it in itiated m ost o f the legislation, atta c h e d extensive conditions to the financial g ra n ts, and held m an y privileges - it functioned in effect by proxy. In 1556 only one o u t o f nine bishops an d seventeen out o f seventy-tw o nobles a t­ tended, since the u p p er clergy an d m agnates w ere w illing to forgo the p a rlia m e n ta ry a ren a as long as the viceroy did n o t interfere w ith their co n tro l o f th eir estates a n d vassals. I f he d id , they were p rep ared to resist. W hen Philip tried to reform th e G re a t C o u rt of Sicily w hich co n tain ed m any powerful nobles, he w as b aulked, and his p ro posal th a t S panish ju rists should be eligible for legal offices in Sicily w as rejected by the P arliam en t. F action w as rife in M essina, and the success o f a viceroy largely depended u p o n his ability to play off one fam ily ag ain st an o th er, bribe the p rev alen t force and avoid im posing u n accep tab le policies. ‘I t w as’, in Professor K o en ig sb erg er’s w ords, ‘not so m uch a system o f go v ern m en t by consent as a system o f c u t-th ro a t politics functioning w ith in tacitly agreed b u t strict lim its’ (83, p. 44; 78). ‘In Sicily the S p an iard s nibbled, in N aples they ate a n d in M ilan they d ev o u red ,’ ra n a con tem p o rary saying. M ilan w as th e m ost recent o f S p ain ’s Ita lia n possessions and h ad no g eneral rep re­ sentative assem bly, only a S enate o f twelve m en a p p o in ted for life th rough w hom P h ilip ’s governor controlled the duchy. As they ratified all edicts a n d ap p o in tm en ts an d nine o f them w ere M ilanese, it w as essential th a t the governor co-operated w ith them . M ore pro b lem atical seem s to have been A rchbishop B orrom eo (1564-84) w ho saw h im self as the ch am p io n o f M ilanese independence. Ac­ cording to Luis de R equesens, G overnor-G eneral from 1571 to 1573, he was m ore dan g ero u s to P h ilip ’s rule th an ‘an arm y o f 100,000 F ren ch m en at the g ates’. In effect, M ilan posed no problem s for Philip a n d rem ain ed the m ost peaceful of his Ita lia n lan d s. M uch the sam e can be said ab o u t S ard in ia, b u t for a different reason. It w as a poor, u n d er-p o p u lated island which, a p a rt from its value in M ed iterran ea n com m unications, was o f lim ited significance to Spain. R eal pow er lay w ith the privileged landow ners, w ho blocked any m easures designed to w eaken their social a n d political grip.

24

Government and. Administration H ow ever, they readily approved royal requests for tax atio n in the know ledge th a t pay m en ts w ould be passed on to th eir vassals (111).

B urgundy an d F ranche-C om te T h e seventeen provinces co n stitu tin g the Low C o u n tries w ere the m ost re cen t acq uisition o f the S panish H ab sb u rg s. C reated in 1548 they rem ain ed u n d er im perial ru le until 1555 w hen C h arles tra n s­ ferred th em to P hilip as heir to the S panish throne; in 1558 F ran ch e-C o m te w as ad d ed to com plete his B u rg u n d ian possessions. I t is clear th a t P hilip in tended increasing royal control over the D u tch , p artly to ta p th eir financial resources effectively b u t also to elim inate P ro te sta n t heresy w hich his father had seen fit to ignore. E qually evident was the d eterm in atio n o f the S tates-G en eral to resist him . T h e d ep u ties stuck firm ly to th eir p ractice o f referring back to their provinces before reaching any decision, an d it only required the o p position o f one province to a proposal to block th e consent of the whole assem bly. M u ch d istru st existed betw een th e provinces, each o f w hich earnestly g u ard ed its privileges, an d betw een the towns, nobility an d clergy w ithin the estates, b u t P hilip could not effectively exploit it an d steadily lost control. T h e m ore in tran sig en t the D u tch becam e, the m ore irresistible was his desire to overcom e them . T h e re su lt w as the m ost serious rebellion ever to confront the S panish H a b sb u rg s —one th a t destroyed all hopes o f stren g th en in g their control over the Low C o u n tries an d of establishing absolutism in S pain (see pp. 61—6).

25

4

Finances

I f it is axiom atic th a t the political stren g th o f a kingdom is a reflec­ tion o f its fiscal an d econom ic pow er, it is one o f the parad o x es of the reign o f P hilip II th a t he should have presided over the m ost pow erful o f em pires a n d the m ost in co m p eten t o f financial a d ­ m inistrations. A healthy financial condition w as a ra rity in early m odern E urope, an d , alth o u g h S pain experienced a ‘G olden A ge’ and w as rich er th a n an y o th er sixteenth-century state, its w ealth was illusory an d concealed in trin sic fiscal problem s (71).

Sources o f revenue At his accession, P hilip received an an n u al revenue o f app ro x im ately 3.1 m illion ducats, com prising 1.3 m illion in o rd in ary an d 1.8 m illion in ex tra o rd in ary revenue. O rd in a ry rents w ere a m ore stable and consistent source o f incom e b u t th eir po ten tial for expansion was lim ited. Table 4.1

The crown’s ordinary revenue

Sources o f ordinary revenue (in ducats', e = estimated Alcabala* and tercias* Puertos secos* Almojarifazgo major* Almojarifazgo de Indias* Servicio y montazgo* Seda de G ranada* Salinas* Total

1556 938,600 56,000 101,300 66,600 42,600 66,600 37,300 1,309,000

1575

1598

3,090,600 133,700 426,600 162,600 55,400 117,300 285,300 (e)

2,700,000 156,000 480,000 261,300 (e) 77,000 101,300 301,300

4,271,500

4,076,900

T h e p rin cip al yield cam e from a 10 per-cent sales tax, the alcabala*, w hich w as levied m ainly on C astile, whose Cortes* w as least able to resist it. Since 1534 a fixed re tu rn h ad been agreed w hich enabled cities to pay a lu m p sum o r encabezamiento* th a t was usually collected 26

Finances w ith the crow n’s tercias* (tithes). In 1556 it yielded 938,600 ducats and increased to over 3 m illion in 1574. As the actu al value of the yield was low er th a n 10 p er cent, the crown attem p ted to increase it fu rth er in 1577, b u t the Cortes resisted and actually cu t the an n u al p ay m en t to 2.7 m illion ducats. T h e rem aining cu sto m ary ren ts were m odest in com parison. C ustom s duties collected at the fro n tier posts o f A ragon, N a v arre an d P o rtu g al (known as puertos secos*) tripled, an d those collected in Seville (the almojarifazgo major*) an d from the Indies trad e (the almojarifazgo de Indias*) show ed a fourfold increase. Sim ilarly, the trad itio n al taxes on flocks o f sheep, G ra n a d a silk and salt, w hich h it the poor ra th e r th a n the w ealthy landow ners, in ­ creased significantly. T h e salt tax in p artic u la r owed its sp ectacu lar rise to the fact th a t the crow n com pulsorily seq u estrated privately ow ned m ines a n d regained control of its collection from tax farm ers in the 1560s. O rd in a ry revenue h ad therefore increased threefold betw een 1556 an d 1598, b u t because tw o-thirds cam e from the alcabala* an d tercias the overall level of o rd in ary revenue fell in the second h a lf of the reign. Philip recognised th a t he could n o t afford to push th e C astilian tax payers too h ard (170). E x trao rd in ary revenue was by definition irre g u la r a n d u n p re ­ dictable b u t in general gave a m uch higher yield. Significantly, the only direct tax, the servicio*, w hich com prised an o rd in ary subsidy o f 800,000 ducats pay ab le over th ree years an d an ex trao rd in ary su b ­ sidy o f 400,000 pay ab le a t once, was n either regularly requested by the crow n n o r au to m atically ap p roved by the Cortes. In 1558, 1567, 1573, 1576, 1586 an d 1592 the C astilian Cortes proved uncooperative alth o u g h on six o th er occasions it voted both servicios w ith o u t oppo­ sition. B ecause the o th er Cortes proved less tractab le a n d the clergy and nobility w ere exem pt, it was the m iddle an d low er classes in the p rincipal tow ns w ho generally bore the b u rd en o f the lan d tax. For exam ple, in 1571 the four largest C astilian tow ns o f Seville, T rujillo, S alam an ca an d B urgos, co n trib u ted 30 per cent of the to tal servicio. In 1590 the C astilian Cortes begrudgingly consented to a new indirect tax, th e millones*, on m eat, wine, oil and vinegar. A lthough it was a once-only tax designed to raise 8 m illion ducats sp read over six years, it rem ain ed very u n p o p u lar because it affected basic foods, a n d th ere w ere m ore com plaints in 1596 w hen a sisa* tax was in tro ­ duced on o th er foodstuffs to raise 9.3 m illion ducats over six years (see pp. 18-20). P hilip expected his o th er dom inions to increase th eir im p erial con­ trib u tio n s b u t he m et w ith little success: the A ragonese kingdom s voted five servicios th ro u g h o u t his reign an d the N eap o litan an d 27

Descriptive Analysis S ard in ian p arliam en ts co ntinued to offer sm all subsidies in keeping w ith th eir w eak econom ies. By 1589 he w as so d esp erate th a t even Sicily, arg u ab ly th e poorest of his Ita lia n lan d s, was prevailed upon for th e first tim e to help finance areas o th er th a n its ow n dom ain. T h e K in g claim ed w ith som e justification: ‘All are in m y charge, and since in the defence o f one all are preserved it is ju s t th a t I should call on a ll’ (83, p. 83). F rom the o u tset Philip h a d m ore th an called upon the Low C o u n tries to un d erw rite his E m pire. D u rin g his visit to B russels in 1557 he h ad been singularly im pressed by their w ealth. W ritin g to E m m an u el P h ilib ert, he claim ed, ‘th ere is nobody in S pain w ho has got the m oney to b uy these cities, for the whole kingdom is so poor, m uch poorer th a n the N e th e rlan d s’ (84, p. 113). A ccordingly, he welcom ed the D u tch ‘aid e’ o f 3,600,000 ducats in 1557, even if it was sp read over nine years, an d a su b ­ sequent co n trib u tio n o f 750,000 ducats in 1566—67. U p o n the o u tb reak o f trouble, he d ictated th a t there should be collected a ‘fixed, certain an d p erm a n en t revenue from those provinces for their m ain ten an ce and defence’ an d attem p ted to im pose a series of g rad u ated levels o f tax atio n (125, p. 114). T h e H u n d re d th Penny tax o f 1569 was relu ctan tly accepted by th e D u tch S tates-G eneral because it was a tem p o rary d u ty, b u t the proposed T e n th an d T w e n ­ tieth Pennies w hich w ere to be p erm a n en t sales taxes w ere flatly rejected. Significantly, revenue fell d ram atically from 4.4 m illion ducats in 1570-71 to u n d er 900,000 ducats in 1572—73, w hile the costs of com bating the revolt exceeded 3.5 m illion (125). By forcing the Low C o u n tries to pay taxation a t an u n p reced en ted level Philip h ad cooked his own goose; after 1572 they ceased to be a financial asset and in stead becam e his m ajor source of ex p en d itu re (see p. 32). T h e S panish laity m ay have been sorely strain ed by taxable d em ands b u t in m any respects the clergy suffered even m ore. O f­ ficially exem pt from d irect taxation, the C h u rch was expected to pay reg u lar im positions as well as ex trao rd in ary gran ts. T h e principal tax cam e from C h u rch tithes first g ran ted to the crow n in the th ir­ teenth century, w hich provided an incom e in excess of 1 million ducats in th e 1590s. A sim ilar levy on episcopal incom es, the pen­ siones*, was regularly collected by Philip, re tu rn in g ab o u t 270,000 ducats a year, an d he was not averse to d raw in g revenue from v acan t sees —as he d em o n strated at T oledo d u rin g A rch b ish o p C a rra n z a ’s long im p riso n m en t. T h e three M ilitary O rd e rs o f C astile, the Maestrazgos*, enjoyed ecclesiastical statu s a n d supplied the crow n w ith an an n u a l 240,000 ducats in 1556. As the ad m in istratio n o f th eir lands h ad alread y been g ran ted to th e Fuggers, p o ten tial 28

Finances exploitation w as lim ited, b u t in 1558 Philip d id ab so rb the p ro p erty o f the A ragonese O rd e r o f M o n tesa w hich b ro u g h t in an ad d itio n al 130,000 ducats a y ea r (1 8 6 ). T h ree fu rth er clerical im positions w ere regularly collected: th e cruzada* was a p ap a l bull periodically sold by the C h u rch to help finance th e T u rk ish crusades, an d u n d er Philip its an n u a l yield doubled to over 200,000 ducats by the 1590s. T h e P ap acy also allow ed a subsidio*, an occasional clerical tax on lands, ren ts and em olum ents, b u t a t his accession the hisp an o p h o b ic Paul IV suspended perm ission to collect both the cruzada an d the subsidio, an d not until 1561 was th e situ atio n norm alised by a new pontiff, Pius V. T h ereafte r the subsidio becam e a reg u lar levy - Philip received five in all — w ith its value fixed in 1562 at 420,000 ducats. T h e final tax, the excusado*, w hich w as in tro d u ced w ith the P ope’s app ro v al in 1567, w as a levy on the m ost v alu ab le piece o f C h u rch p ro p erty in every C astilian p arish a n d provided an an n u a l 270,000 ducats. T o g eth er w ith the subsidio an d cruzada, these ‘T h re e G races’ yielded over 1.4 m illion ducats a year in the 1590s, a fourfold increase in the course o f the reign. H en ry K am en has calculated th a t the C h u rch was providing th ro u g h these and o th er g ran ts over 20 per cent o f S p ain ’s revenue, w hich illu strates not only P h ilip ’s control over ecclesiastical incom e b u t ‘the extent to w hich a nom inally taxexem pt in stitu tio n was u n d erw ritin g state finance’ (70, p. 165). F u rth erm o re, by the m id-1570s n eith er the cruzada, w hich h ad been d esignated to m ain tain som e o f the frontier posts an d A frican g a r­ risons, n or the subsidio, w hich was assigned to pay for the galleys, was being used for these purposes. B oth clerical co n trib u tio n s h ad been diverted to cover advances from bankers an d to m eet o th er m ore pressing expenses (164). A p art from the ‘e x tra o rd in a ry ’ incom e from lay an d clerical taxes, Philip resorted to a variety o f m oney-raising schem es. T h e diversity an d frequency o f these m easures reveal the g o v ern m en t’s increasing desp eratio n as it lim ped from crisis to c ris is . T h e selling o f public offices h ad begun in 1545, an d Philip, like C h arles, encouraged it according to his needs. It usually raised less th a n 50,000 ducats a year, b u t occasionally, as in 1567, it was exploited rem orselessly and some 269,000 ducats w ere received. In m ost cases, the sales w ere at a local level, w here regidores* and juradurías* w ere keenly com peted for by w ealthy fam ilies. P aten ts confirm ing noble statu s (hidalguía*) could also be p u rch ased from the crow n. Sales peaked in 1567, yield­ ing 74,600 ducats, b u t as fewer th an seventy g ran ts w ere m ade in the course of P h ilip ’s reign, it seems th a t the asp ira n t nobility found o th er, m ore attra ctiv e ways of becom ing a hidalgo. Sales o f baldíos* 29

Descriptive Analysis proved m uch m ore po p u lar. T h ese com m unal w aste lan d s lying m ainly in the so u th o f C astile w ere at the disposal o f th e crow n but h ad barely been touched by C harles: Philip began selling as soon as he ascended the thro n e. T re asu ry receipts reveal th at, alth o u g h sales were initially m odest, they m ultiplied as S pain p re p are d for the A r­ m ad a an d yielded an astonishing 357,000 ducats in 1587 (1 7 3 ). By the end o f the reign, ab o u t 4.8 m illion ducats h ad been received not ju s t from baldíos b u t also from the lu crative sale o f C h u rch lan d s and towns into ju risd ictio n s or señoríos*. T his p ractice was an attractiv e proposition to rich grandees like the D uke o f A lcalá, w ho in 1559 bought 1,500 vassals in Seville for 150,000 ducats, an d th e w ealthy m erch an t J u a n A ntonio C orzo of C orsica, w ho b o u g h t the tow n of C an tilla n a for 150,000 ducats in 1575 (120). In ad d itio n to these ir­ reg u lar pay m en ts the K in g also asked his clerical a n d noble subjects for forced loans a n d interest-free gifts know n as donativos*. As these requests w ere exceptional, the crow n did not expect anyone to hesitate or refuse, b u t m ost donors would have been o u t o f pocket as a consequence —the D uke of In fan tad o , for exam ple, h an d ed over 88,000 ducats betw een 1589 and 1591. A lthough histo rian s are divided over the effects o f th e im p o rts of A m erican silver a n d the Indies trad e on Spain and E urope, all are agreed th a t w ith o u t it Philip w ould not have been able to lau n ch his sea an d lan d enterprises or wage co n tinual w ar. T h e crow n was en­ titled to a quinto o r fifth o f all precious m etal an d stones; to an y seized co n tra b an d - w hich could be p articu larly large (400,000 ducats was taken in 1566); a n d to profits from the A m erican cruzada*, custom s duties a n d alcabala*. A ccording to the m ost recent estim ate, these sources co n trib u ted 372,350 ducats in 1556, q u a d ru p le d in th e 1560s and, d esp ite several lean years in the 1570s, averaged n early 3 m il­ lion ducats a y ear in the 1590s (95, p. 253). W h a t w as so v ital ab o u t this heavenly source — an d Philip believed th a t G od spoke S panish — was the reg u larity o f its supply an d occasional sp ectacu lar surprises: in 1587 it totalled 4.4 m illion and in 1595 an am azing 5.7 m illion ducats. Lorenzo Sanz has calculated th a t betw een 1555 and 1600 the crow n received over 63 m illion ducats in gold an d silver alone, an d o f course it w as the stren g th o f this collateral th a t enabled Philip to spend lavishly an d borrow recklessly (95). A fu rth e r expedient resulting from the im p o rtatio n o f gold and silver b ars was th e in tro d u ctio n o f seigniorage (a tax) on those m er­ ch an ts w ho w ished to convert bullion into coins; from 1566 th e m ints at Seville, T oledo an d Segovia charged seigniorage at a ra te o f 25 maravedís for each p o u n d o f silver coined an d 200 maravedís for each 30

Finances pound o f gold. In 1595 alone the crow n received 200,000 ducats from this source (1 7 1 ). T h e A m erican mines also acted as a stim u lu s for finding an d developing silver and m ercury in the Ib e ria n pen in su la itself. W hen deposits o f silver were discovered at G u a d aca n al n ear Seville in 1555, th e C ouncil o f F inance ap p o in ted A gustín d e Z árate to d irect o p eratio n s. E arly reports th at its h igh-grade silver was su b ­ stan tial seem ed ju stified w hen crow n profits exceeded 1.6 m illion ducats by 1563, b u t its initial success was short-lived an d as su b ­ sequent profits began to fall so it becam e uneconom ic to keep open. T en years later it was closed dow n (51). T h e m ercury m ines at A lm adén proved m ore rew arding. A lthough C h arles V h ad leased them to the Fuggers, Philip declared in 1559 th a t all m ercury exports were a royal m onopoly an d proceeded to negotiate a new deal w ith them w hereby he w ould buy m ercury at 25 ducats a quintal* a n d then sell it to the silver m iners in New S pain at 100 ducats a quintal. By the 1590s, A lm ad én was pro d u cin g 3,000 quintales a year (1 1 4 ). O verall, betw een 1556 an d 1577 total incom e from re g u la r and irreg u lar sources rose by 180 p er cent, from 3.1 to 8.7 m illion ducats, b u t from 1577 to 1598 by only 48 per cent, to 12.9 m illion ducats, according to th e T re asu ry accounts. R ising inflation caused real in­ come to stag n ate a t a b o u t the level reached in 1580, w hich was precisely the m o m en t w hen Philip began to em bark on his greatest schem es, th ereby m aking retren ch m en t and careful m an ag em en t of his ex p en d itu re all the m ore essential.

E xpenditure It was a sine qua non o f sixteenth-century politics th a t w ar w as the single m ost expensive item o f the sta te ’s b u d g etary req u irem en ts. G iven P h ilip ’s im perial legacy, R. A. S trad lin g has suggested th at ‘it was inevitable th a t such an all-em bracing political u n ity should be in a p e rm a n e n t condition o f w a r’ (159, p. 30). T h is view, of course, assum es th a t from the o utset Philip rejected peaceful diplom acy in fav o u r o f force. In 1556, however, policy decisions had still to be m ade, an d alth o u g h it was likely th a t m u ch o f P h ilip ’s fiscal, econom ic an d m ilitary resources w ould be d ev oted to the defence o f his E m pire, w h at was u n certain w as how far he w ould consistently p u rsu e his objectives an d a t w h at point, if a t all, he was w illing to com prom ise. O rd in a ry , peacetim e expenditure w ent on ru n n in g th e household, adm in isterin g -central an d local governm ent, funding the central courts o f ju stice, financing the fleet an d arm y, an d servicing the 31

Descriptive Analysis national debt. Philip spent very frugally on his court and household, which was tightly controlled by his mayor domo*, the D uke of Alva, until his d e a th in 1582. A n n u al costs varied from year to year be­ cause each m em ber o f the royal fam ily had his o r h er ow n household, b u t the total ex p en d itu re rarely exceeded 450,000 ducats a year. Costs peaked in 1567—68 at 510,000 ducats, b u t the d eath s o f D on C arlos an d Q u een E lizabeth reduced the total by som e 162,000 ducats — th e Prince alone h ad som e 762 servants in his em ploym ent - an d thereafter co u rt expenses for the 1,500 p erm an en t m em bers ran to a little over 400,000 ducats a y ear (1 7 0 ). R am ón C a ra n d e has argued th a t P hilip applied strict econom ies at the court, b u t acknow ­ ledges th a t a tru e ev alu atio n o f w h at the K in g sp ent is very h a rd to achieve because th ere was no clear d istinction betw een his private and public ex p en d itu re (17). H e did, how ever, sp en d lavishly on building palaces an d filling th em w ith expensive artefacts. T h e value of his collections has been p u t at 7 million ducats an d the palaces and gardens a t over 14 m illion; the E scorial alone cost an estim ated 5.5 m illion ducats to bu ild (123). A d m in istrativ e costs w ere com paratively sm all. As in E ngland and F ran ce, the m ajor office-holders were g randees an d nobles an d were largely self-financing. T h e D uke o f A lva claim ed he sp en t over 500,000 ducats in the K in g ’s service. Some councillors, ju stices and royal secretaries were salaried, in o rd er to m inim ise the incidence of co rru p tio n , b u t the sixty-six C astilian corregidores* an d p erh ap s 500 senior letrados* w ere on low salaries to keep ad m in istrativ e costs down. F in an cin g the arm y an d navy was the g reatest source o f royal expenditure, an d w ent h an d in h an d w ith m ain tain in g the paym ents to bankers for the m oney borrow ed to pay for the arm ed forces in the first place. In the first decad e o f his reign, P hilip kept his costs u n d er reaso n ab le control. W a r w ith F rance ended in 1559 an d the next five years were the m ost peaceful an d least costly o f his reign: the total ex p en d itu re was below 4 m illion ducats a year. T h ereafter, his difficulties escalated: the defence of M alta (1565), the onset of trouble in th e N eth erlan d s (1566), the M orisco rebellion (1568-70), the cam paigns o f the H oly L eague (see p. 78) cu lm in atin g in L epanto (1571), an d the explosion of the D u tch Revolt (1572) threw Spanish finances into a p erm a n en t tail-spin. M ilitary expenses in Spain, F lan d ers an d the N eth erlan d s doubled from 2 m illion ducats in the 1560s to 4 m illion in the 1570s. In A pril 1574 J u a n de O v a n ­ do, P h ilip ’s p rin cip al financial adviser, calculated th a t the state d eb t had risen to 74 m illion ducats, fourteen tim es th e an n u a l revenue, 32

Finances and alth o u g h this figure m ay have been exaggerated - Geoffrey Parker p u ts the to tal at 60 m illion — the im pending financial crisis was u n m istak ab le. In 1575 the A rm y o f F lan d ers was costing 700,000 ducats a m o n th an d the M ed iterran ea n fleet 60,000 ducats', by S ep tem b er the T re a su ry was em pty. A m erican bullion, G enoese loans an d the an n ex atio n o f P o rtu g al proved to be P h ilip ’s life-line and enabled h im after a b rief respite to carry on fighting in defence o f his monarquía*. F rom 1582 he started to finance the C ath o lic cause in F ran ce on a m odest scale, b u t th e decade after 1585 saw his con­ trib u tio n s rise to over 8 m illion ducats, as well as sm aller subsidies to the D uke o f Savoy an d the P arisian garriso n (see p. 76). T h e French G u ises’ gain w as the Flem ish arm y ’s loss, for as P hilip tem ­ porarily tran sferred his prio rity to F rance, so he scaled dow n his arm y ’s b u d g et from 9 to 7 to 2 m illion ducats in 1590, 1591 an d 1592. W ar w ith E n g lan d ad d ed to the overall state o f financial m isery: the A rm ad a cost 10 m illion ducats an d the dam ag e inflicted by E nglish privateers on A tlan tic sh ip p in g an d coastal fortresses on the Ib e rian p eninsula in creased the an n u al o rd in ary expenses o f w a r from 1 m il­ lion to over 3.5 m illion ducats in the 1590s (1 6 4 ). T h u s, by 1598 it was estim ated th a t som e 10 m illion ducats w ere needed to m ain tain S pain’s arm ed forces, a fivefold increase upon the 1560s. T h e in ­ evitable corollary to this u n p reced en ted scale o f w arfare was an ever-spiralling n atio n al debt: in 1598 it stood a t 85 m illion ducats an d carried in tere st p ay m en ts w hich alone accounted for 40 p er cent o f the total incom e.

Solutions T h e only w ay P hilip could bridge the g ap betw een revenue an d ex­ p en d itu re an d still m ain tain a high profile in his im p erial an d foreign affairs was to b o rrow m oney. Deficit financing w as n o th in g new to E uro p ean states in the sixteenth century, b u t the scale o f P h ilip ’s com m itm ents an d the frequency o f state b an k ru p tcies w ere u n p rece­ d ented. G enoese, A n tw erp an d A ugsburg bankers rarely ad v an ced loans for m ore th an th ree years or accepted rep ay m en ts from the yield o f a tax for four or m ore years in the future, an d periodically they d em an d ed all c u rre n t revenues in rep ay m en t for p a st loans w ithout g u aran teein g any fu rth er credit. Philip w as faced w ith a lim ited choice o f options. E ith er he could d eclare a state o f b an k ru p tcy , by w hich he w ould suspend all financial obligations before in tro d u cin g a revised stru ctu re o f d eb t rep ay m en ts; o r he could create new taxes and try to m ake the old financial m achinery 33

Descriptive Analysis m ore cost-effective. B oth courses of action p ro d u ced fu rth er problem s, and in keeping w ith his p ro crastin atin g tem p eram en t, Philip oscillated betw een them w ith o u t ever g etting to grips w ith the root of th e problem . A t his accession the Cortes* rem in d ed him of th e serious d am ag e the foreign financiers w ere inflicting upon the C astilian econom y, and alth o u g h he needed th eir loans to w age w ar on F rance, w hen they d em u rred he seized the initiative. O n 1 J a n u a ry 1557 he suspended all rep ay m en ts an d on 10 J u n e decreed th a t n eith er cap i­ tal n or in terest was to be repaid to his creditors; in stead , the floating deb t in asientos* o f som e 7 m illion ducats w ould be converted into redeem able juros* a t a fixed and reduced ra te o f in terest o f 5 p er cent. For the first tim e the crow n h ad cracked th e w hip an d it h u rt. Shock waves rev erb erated aro u n d the com m ercial centres o f E u ro p e as bankers as far aw ay as N aples an d A u gsburg felt th e squeeze. T h e Fuggers claim ed they suffered irre p ara b le losses, b u t som e financial houses, especially in G enoa, w ere w illing a n d able to deal w ith the crow n a n d took th eir o p p o rtu n ity to eclipse the o ld er b anking families. H ow ever, Philip needed still m ore m oney if he w as to con­ clude his w ar w ith F rance successfully, a n d before long he was g ra n tin g jaraf to fund the long-term consolidated d e b t a n d asientos at m uch h ig h er in terest rates, in o rd e r to reduce the sh o rt-term floating d eb t [doc. 6]. T h e fatal connection betw een the S p an ish H ab sb u rg s and the G enoese m erch an ts h ad been forged. B etw een 1557 a n d 1559, as the situ atio n d eterio rated , the R egent was forced to sell titles, offices a n d crow n lan d , to in tro d u ce a forced loan a n d to seize the Indies fleet in three successive years. U p o n his retu rn from the N e th erlan d s P hilip tried again to rem edy the situ ­ ation; it was to prove his last real chance. T o o b tain a large volum e o f ready cash, he issued a decree in N ovem ber 1560 w hich reduced some o f his sh o rt-term rep aym ents a n d im m ediately freed future revenue. H e also au th o rised the selling o f titles, ju risd ictio n s and ecclesiastical p ro p erty a n d o rdered econom ies in state expenditure. T h e m ost prom ising reform concerned th e Casa de Contratación* in Seville. Since all A m erican bullion was registered th ere before being transferred to th e T re asu ry in M ad rid , he proposed th a t creditors should receive th eir paym ents directly from th e Casa, thereby elim inating several interm ediaries. In this w ay a cen tral fund w ould be created in Seville w hich w ould act as a state ban k an d consider­ ably ease m any o f the crow n’s fiscal problem s. U n fo rtu n ately , ratio n alisatio n was the last th in g th a t officials at the T re a su ry a n d a t the Casa desired, a n d they o b stru cted the p roposed changes, 34

Finances alth o u g h the unexpectedly low volum e o f In d ies silver betw een 1561 and 1565, n o t to m ention the crow n’s practice o f raid in g the funds for its ow n purposes, p ro b ab ly d id m ore to u n d erm in e investors’ confidence, an d the initiative consequently foundered (129, 154). P hilip also ap p ears to have considered reform ing the C ouncil of F inance in the 1560s. Since 1556 it h ad been w ithout a p resid en t to co-ordinate th e functions o f the th ree d ep artm en ts. As a result, the Contaduría de Hacienda*, w hich d ealt w ith the d ay -to -d ay ru n n in g of the E xchequer, a n d the Consejo de Hacienda*, w hich w as concerned w ith raising m oney and policy recom m endations, lacked cohesion and direction, w hile the Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas*, w hich checked the accounts a n d h ad the pow er to prosecute, rarely d id so. T h e ap p o in tm en t o f Diego de E spinosa as P resident in 1568 reflected P hilip’s desire to reform the financial ad m in istratio n an d , according to A. W. Lovett, E spinosa w as one o f the few m en w ho could have b ro u g h t o rd e r in to the ru n n in g o f the E x chequer (101). L ittle changed, how ever, because even he could n o t overcom e th e selfin terest an d co rru p tio n o f m any leading officials, w ho con tin u ed to offer advice w hich a t tim es was far from altru istic. T w o m em bers o f th e C ouncil o f F inance, the M arq u is o f A uñon an d F ern in Lopez del C am p o w ere b o th bankers; a n o th er councillor, F ran cisco de G arnica, was a friend o f the M ed in a del C am p o b an k er Sim ón Ruiz; an d M elchior de H e rrera, the T reasu re r-G e n era l in 1568, w as a close associate o f th e G enoese m erch an ts. T hese councillors advised the crow n to g ra n t m ore juros* an d asientos*, an d from 1566 it foolishly agreed to allow royal creditors n o t only lan d s an d ren ts as collateral for th eir loans b u t also th e rig h t to sell this security on the open m arket. As th e cap ital received w as offset ag ain st the value of the loan, the cred ito r w as protected from the w orst effects o f any futu re b an k ru p tcy . In its d esp eratio n to secure m ore m oney, th e crow n h ad taken a n o th e r retrogressive step. W h en P hilip inform ed E spinosa in 1570 th a t ‘W e have no m oney’, the consensus ad v o cated the g ra n t­ ing o f m ore asientos. C ash w ould be raised m ore quickly th a n by issuing juros, an d , m ore significantly, they offered a h ig h er ra te of in terest to the banker. T h e 1570s was a critical decade in the history of C astilian finance. T h e dem ise o f E spinosa an d d eath o f his assistan t V elasco in 1572 opened the w ay for one o f P hilip’s m ost talented advisers, J u a n de O van d o , w ho b ecam e the new P resid en t o f the C ouncil o f F inance a t the age o f fifty-six. H e thoroughly investigated all sources of revenue, the ru n n in g costs o f governm ent, the floating an d long-term debts a n d th e reasons for the b u d g et deficit. In 1573 he m ade his 35

Descriptive Analysis recom m endations. F irst, the juros* an d m ortgaging o f crow n rents m ust be term in ated an d existing in terest p aym ents low ered from 5 to 3 p er cent. Second, the Cortes should p ay off 35 m illion ducats and agree to an in crease o f 2.5 m illion ducats for the encabez.amien.to* in re tu rn for tak in g control o f its ad m in istratio n for th irty years. H e calculated th a t th e cap ital value o f the in terest w ould be 80 m illion ducats, w hich w ould enable the crow n to clear its d eb ts. Like m any of O v a n d o ’s ideas, the m erit o f this schem e lay in its in ten t ra th e r th an in its ap p licatio n . W ould th e C astilian Cortes assen t to such a high increase in taxation? H ow w ould th e G enoese a n d Flem ish bankers resp o n d to an o th er suspension o f th eir juros a n d asiento* p ay ­ m ents, especially if they discovered th a t th e crow n h a d no in ten tio n of using th em in th e future? In J u ly 1574 the recently form ed Junta* of the P resid en ts urged P hilip to su spend pay m en ts to his creditors and im p o u n d the Indies silver bullion im m ediately u p o n arriv al, b u t two obstacles stood in his way. In the first place, the Cortes m ad e it clear from th e o u tset th a t it w ould not agree to th e treb lin g o f the alcabala* a n d suggested instead th a t 2 m illion ducats o f royal revenue, earm ark ed for servicing the d eb t, should be resto red on condition th at P hilip pro m ised not to raise th e sales tax for a n o th er forty years. Philip refused to haggle, how ever, and alth o u g h O v a n d o w on the su p p o rt o f th e Sevillian dep u ty , negotiations betw een th e crow n’s advisers an d th e leading procuradores* proved fruitless. Secondly, Philip needed to be certain th a t he was doing th e rig h t thing, an d instead o f tak in g a n im m ediate decision he consulted a w ider range o f expertise b o th in an d outside S pain. N o t only w as v alu ab le tim e and th e elem ent o f secrecy lost b u t also conflicting advice p o u red in. G ranvelle w ro te from N aples an d R equesens from B russels, advising Philip to be resolute, w hereas th e foreign financiers w ho h a d h eard u n p leasa n t ru m o u rs urged him to ab a n d o n th e initiative. T h e K ing, who w as to tally perplexed, was n o t helped by O v a n d o ’s hectoring adm onitions. I n M arch 1575 he rem in d ed Philip: ‘W e could have reform ed th e cen tral trib u n al o f th e E xchequer; o r we could have d ealt w ith m y schem e for raising a large sum to free crow n ren ts, or we could have resorted to “ the decree” . Any of these m easures would have sufficed to rem edy the situ a tio n ’ ( 100 , p. 18). F or m onths P hilip did n o th in g an d then suddenly, on 1 S eptem ber 1575, he d ecided to issue a second decree o f b an k ru p tcy . N o t even O v an d o seem s to have know n in advance of the ann o u n cem en t. W hy did P hilip now do this? T h e S panish h isto rian F. R uiz M artin believes th e K in g was trying to free him self from his G enoese creditors a n d replace them w ith S panish an d Ita lia n b an kers, b u t 36

Finances this view has recently been rejected on the g rounds th a t P hilip an d his advisers h ad n eith er the tim e n o r the expertise to devise such a strategy (156). M oreover, only the G enoese m erch an ts could afford to tie u p im m ense sum s o f m oney for long periods o f tim e an d each year aw ait th e A m erican flota*. In stea d , according to Lovett, the b an k ru p tcy o ccurred because ‘the bankers refused to ad v an ce any m ore m oney, a n d th e K ing, in desp eratio n , resum ed for his own use the revenues assigned to pay royal d eb ts’ (101, p. 911). T h e decision h a d m om entous consequences. T h e A rm y o f F lan d ers, u n ­ paid for two years, m u tinied in N ovem ber 1576, sacked A ntw erp and so ru in ed any possibility o f Flem ish bankers d isplacing the Genoese. S p an ish , F lorentine an d L o m b ard m erch an ts tried in vain to help P hilip over the new crisis b u t did n o t have th e cap ital and in tern atio n al resources to supply sufficiently large loans a t com peti­ tive rates o f in terest, n o r w ere they helped by G enoese financiers p u ttin g an em b arg o on bills o f exchange an d gold. O n c e m ore Philip appealed to fhe Cortes to vote b o th servicios* before redressing its grievances over th e encabezamiento*. In O c to b e r 1577, after several m onths o f h a rd barg ain in g , it grudgingly agreed, b u t on condition t h a r t h e sales tax w ould be reduced by 1 m illion ducats. H ow ever, the K in g still needed m oney an d , as established b ankers like E spinosa a n d M o rg a in Seville crashed, he was ag ain forced to negotiate w ith S panish-dom iciled G enoese bankers su ch as Niccolò G rim aldi a n d L orenzo Spinola (139). In D ecem ber 1577 a com ­ prom ise know n as the ‘medio general*’ was an n o u n ced by the T reasu rer-G en eral, Francisco G utiérrez de C uéllar. P hilip agreed to resum e pay m en ts on existing juros* a n d sell m ore juros, ju risd ictio n s and asientos*, th o u g h at low er rates o f interest, in re tu rn for fu rth er loans o f 5 m illion ducats payable in Italy in 1578 an d 1579. In m any ways 1577 m arks a tu rn in g -p o in t in the financial affairs o f Spain. T h ereafter, as ex p en d itu re ex panded faster th a n revenue, Philip b e­ cam e totally d ep e n d en t on A m erican bullion, juros a n d asientos. In 1580 he can d id ly told his secretary: ‘I have never b een able to get this business o f loans and interests into m y h ead. I have never m anaged to u n d ersta n d it’ (123). O v a n d o ’s d e a th in 1575 saw V ázquez, the royal secretary, gain the K in g ’s ea r from 1578 to 1591. H e p ragm atically urg ed Philip to cu t back on his im perial com m itm ents, b u t as this w as rejected o u t of h an d all th a t V ázquez could do was to ensure th a t every en terprise w as m eticulously costed. Special com m ittees drew u p d etailed plans and financiers w ere ap p ro ach ed in advance. In F e b ru a ry 1587, for exam ple, tw o m em bers o f the A rm a d a junta, J u a n F ern án d ez de 37

Descriptive Analysis Espinosa a n d R odrigo V ázquez, rep o rted th a t th e crow n could a n ­ ticipate 7 m illion ducats for th a t financial year: they h ad calculated the yield expected from the In d ies flota* an d h ad n egotiated loans from A g u stín Spinola, th e Fuggers an d the M arq u is o f A uñon. T h e 1580s a n d 1590s saw th e practice o f assigning reg u lar revenues to finance specific aspects o f naval an d m ilitary ex p en d itu re, a proce­ d ure know n as consignación*. O ne o f the best know n asentistas* was J u a n P ascu al, a M a d rid b anker w ho w as ap p o in ted p ay m aste r of the G u a rd s o f C astile in 1587 in re tu rn for an asiento w orth 13,000 ducats, a n d in the 1590s b o u g h t the asientos for th e A rtillery, S panish galleys an d m ost o f the L an d Forces, w orth a total o f over 1 m illion ducats (1 6 4 ). In N o v em b er 1596 P hilip tried once m ore to b reak the G enoese stran g leh o ld on his finances w hen for the th ird tim e he issued a decree o f b an k ru p tc y an d suspended all rep ay m en ts. W h e th e r he was seeking m ore com petitive rates from the Ita lia n s or w as g enu­ inely h o p in g th a t P ortuguese financiers w ould d isplace th em is not known, b u t as in 1575 the an n o u n cem en t w as en tirely unexpected and, as in 1577, the outcom e equally p red ictab le. O n e year later, on 29 D ecem b er 1597, an o th er ‘medio generar* w as an n o u n ced by which juros w o rth 7 m illion ducats w ere sold in re tu rn for fu rth e r loans at rates o f in terest red u ced from 60 p er cent to 10 p e r cent. N o d o u b t Philip felt he h ad stru ck a good deal, b u t the real beneficiaries were the four p rin cip al creditors, Piccam iglio, S pinola an d G rim ald i from G enoa a n d F rancisco de M alu en d a from B urgos (12). T h e K in g sim ply could n o t w in these trials o f stren g th w ith the G enoese bankers. H is sh o rt-term gains carried long-term penalties w hich, like th e ‘E m p ero r’s clothes’, were fully a p p a re n t to those w ho chose to see b u t alw ays eluded the P ru d en t K ing. F inances w ere his blind spot. ‘I c a n n o t tell a good m em orial on the su b ject from a b a d o n e’, he once confessed to V ázquez, ‘and I do n o t w ish to b reak m y b ra in s trying to com p reh en d som ething w hich I do n o t u n d e rsta n d now nor have ever understood in all m y d ay s’ (1 2 3 ). I t was a sad b u t true adm ission.

38

5

T he Economy

Population A g reat deal o f d em o g rap h ic research has been conducted in recent years, a n d d esp ite the un reliab le n a tu re o f the censuses and relaciones* o f P h ilip ’s reign, a discernible if frag m en tary p ictu re has em erged. Since th e fifteenth century S p ain ’s p o p u latio n h ad been steadily rising a n d a t P h ilip ’s accession stood at ab o u t 6.5 m illion. T h e g re atest gro w th o ccurred betw een 1530 a n d 1570, before p eak ­ ing in th e 1580s a n d slowly declining thereafter. In the 1590s S p ain ’s pop u latio n stood a t betw een 7 a n d 8 m illion. T h e resto ratio n o f royal au th o rity by the C ath o lic K ings h ad b ro u g h t in tern a l stab ility an d prosperity to S pain w hich, w hen allied to its w ell-established woollen in d u stry in th e n o rth , the recently acq u ired A m erican trad e in the so u th a n d various im provem ents in lan d cu ltivation in th e east, produced the m id-sixteenth cen tu ry p o p u latio n explosion. T h ere were, how ever, pro n o u n ced regional v ariations w hich boded ill for the future. M ost n o table was C astile’s dem o g rap h ic superiority. In 1530 nearly 75 p er cent of the c o u n try ’s p o p u latio n lived there, com pared w ith 15 p er cent in A ragon, C atalo n ia an d V alencia; sixty years later, m ore th an 80 p er cen t of the n atio n lived in C astile (1 5 5 ). Its p rincipal towns saw d ra m a tic increases betw een 1530 and 1561: C adiz grew from 3,300 to 6,000, Burgos from 8,600 to 21,700, and S alam an ca from 13,400 to 25,200 (3). T h e g reatest grow th took place in n o rth ern C astile. B ilbao, B ur­ gos, S an tan d er, Segovia an d León owed th eir expansion to the flourishing wool trad e w ith F landers an d com m ercial links w ith E n g lan d a n d F rance. As long as trad e p rospered, farm ers p ro duced m ore food to sustain the textile w orkers whose grow ing w ages en ­ couraged financiers to re-invest th eir profits in local trades an d in d u stry , all o f w hich stim u lated a burgeoning society (4 5). T his econom ic p ro sp erity was ab ru p tly halted by th e D u tch R evolt w hich, in the 1580s, em broiled E n g lan d an d F rance. A lthough al­ ternative m arkets to A ntw erp an d B ruges w ere found at N an tes and

39

Descriptive Analysis R ouen, ch anging fashions an d m ore com petitive prices from n o rth ­ ern countries reduced the d em an d for S panish wool. R ecent studies o f the p o p u latio n o f cen tral C astilian tow ns have dem o n strated the im p o rtan ce of P h ilip ’s decision to m ove his cap ital to M ad rid in 1561. V alladolid a n d T oledo and th eir su rro u n d in g villages h ad been steadily grow ing, b u t from 1560 th eir p o p u latio n levels began to fall. In co n trast, by 1591 M a d rid ’s p o p u latio n h ad m ore th a n do u b led , b u t in so doing it d rain ed the n earb y tow ns o f their ag ricu ltu ral an d com m ercial w ealth w ith o u t offering any reciprocal econom ic benefits. As crop yields fell, so infant d ea th rates rose a n d com m unities were ravaged by recu rren t plague. O n ce an area becam e im poverished, it was m ore v u ln erab le to epidem ics and subsistence crises w hich in tu rn increased the incidence o f m o r­ tality. T h u s, in the 1590s V alladolid an d T oledo show ed a fall in the n u m b er o f b irth s, a n d the once-flourishing tow n o f P u en te de D uero was sem i-deserted (6, 150). S p ain ’s leading dem o g rap h ic h istorian, F. R uiz M artin , h as h ig h ­ lighted the stead y drift o f people aw ay from the n o rth a n d centre tow ards the so u th ern provinces, p articu larly A n d alucía. In creasin g tax d em an d s a n d th e effects o f plague, fam ine an d w ar caused m any p easants an d craftsm en to em igrate to the fertile valley o f the G u ad alq u iv ir, w here th e thriving towns o f Seville, C adiz, C ó rd o b a and M álag a h ad been fu rth er enriched by th eir A m erican trad e. H igh levels o f em ploym ent w ere su stained by local ind u stries, agriculture, com m erce a n d trade. By 1591 one-fifth o f all C astilian s lived in A n d alu cía, alth o u g h its p o p u latio n was unevenly dis­ trib u ted . A t C ó rd o b a, for instance, n u m b ers rose from 28,000 in 1530 to over 50,000 in 1571 before startin g to decline; by 1591, its p op u látio n w as 45,000 a n d falling (41). T h e eastern kingdom s reached their greatest ra te o f expansion later th an C astile. A ragon and C atalo n ia h ad poor econom ies and lost m any m en to the exigencies o f w ar and an epidem ic o f 1589—92, although losses w ere com pensated in p a rt by increasing n u m b ers of em igrants from L anguedoc, G ascony an d A uvergne who h ad been attracted by h ig h er wages and com paratively ch eap er lan d prices (177). V alen cia an d M u rcia also show ed a belated increase in the decade after 1580 an d 1586 respectively, b u t w hereas V alen cia began to decline in th e 1590s, following the B arcelona epidem ic of 1586—92, M u rc ia rem ain ed stable well in to the seventeenth cen tu ry (18, 20).

40

The Economy

A g ric u ltu re For m uch of the sixteenth century Spain experienced severe agrarian problems. As the population grew and the dem and for food in­ creased, farmers realised that arable farming would be more profitable than sheep. In theory this was true, and regular crops were grown in the more fertile areas along narrow coastal plains and river valleys. However, most of Spain was not blessed with good fertile soil. O ver one-sixth of the country was above the 1,000-metre level, and the m ountain slopes were only suitable for pasture and woodland. M uch of the M editerranean coast was left untilled for fear of pirate attacks, and large areas of central Spain were arid and unproductive. In practice, perhaps as little as one-third of the land was cultivable ( 12 ). Andalucía was the most prosperous of Spanish provinces, produc­ ing lemons, oranges, olives, grapes, wheat and raw silk (134). Most cereals were grown in Old Castile, and in good years grain was ex­ ported, b ut m any regions struggled to be self-sufficient and some — like Valencia and the Basque provinces - regularly im ported wheat. A series of bad harvests which coincided with a sharp rise in dem and in the 1560s and 1570s saw m any cities im port grain from as far away as the Baltic and the Canaries as well as from their usual sup­ pliers in N orth Africa and Sicily. Governm ent attem pts in 1558 to curb the rising food prices and stem the shortages proved ineffectual. By the 1580s the whole of Spain was importing wheat and making do with bread substitutes. As arable farm ers tried to meet the growing dem and from the towns and cities, so the pastoral farmers struggled to come to terms with their declining woollen industry. The saturation of the Antwerp wool m arket in the 1550s, allied to the sharp rise in grain prices, saw farmers tu rn from pasture to arable. In 1563 the crown tried to protect the Mesta*, which supervised the transhum ance of flocks along the royal sheep-walks, by exempting it from tax increases, but three years later its fate was sealed when foreign bankers gained the right to export silver coins rather than wool-clip. The subsequent drift to the towns of unemployed peasants served to intensify the existing social and economic problems (75, 113). T ra d e a n d c o m m erce Spain’s trade in 1556 was potentially very prosperous. T he north­ west provinces of Galicia, Asturias and the Basque region im ported

41

Descriptive Analysis

food from northern Europe in return for Castilian wool and Biscayan iron and fish; the wealthy north Castilian towns owed their prosperity to the wool trade with Flanders and commercial links with western Europe; the Atlantic trade enriched the southern towns and ports; and the M editerranean coast m aintained its traditional trading links with Italy and the Levant. Although most of Spain’s trade was s'eaborne, wool, cloth, silk, wine, fruit and iron were ex­ tensively traded both within and beyond the peninsula. In addition there was considerable commercial activity. In the 1570s twenty-two fairs operated in New Castile alone; and in the small town of Tendilla the spring fair attracted m erchants from M adrid, Toledo, Cuenca and Segovia as well as Portugal (12). T he growth in popu­ lation dem anded more m anufactures, while the enormous volume of American bullion entering Spain in the second h alf of the sixteenth century stim ulated trade and commerce. Even a t Philip’s accession, however, economic storm clouds were gathering. First, Spain was not an economic unit. Each region was autonom ous and towns sought to be self-sufficient in most basic needs. A poor inland transport network and endemic local banditry ensured there was little trade between regions except for specialised requirem ents by the wealthy and urban classes, and when Aragonese m erchants traded at M edina del Cam po in Castile they found th at they were discrim inated against ‘like foreigners’. Numerous tolls on rivers, roads and bridges further handicapped inland m ovem ent of goods; some forty-six tolls impeded the overland routes to Portugal and thirty-nine customs posts operated on the Castilian frontiers with N avarre, Aragon and Valencia. Second, Castile essentially im ported finished articles and exported raw materials. She received cloth, naval supplies, m etals, cereals and paper from Europe and hides, copper, tobacco, chocolate, sugar, in­ digo, cochineal, gold and silver from America. In contrast she sent wool, iron, salt, wine, olives, oil, fruit and silk to m ost areas of Europe, but only grain, biscuits, wine and oil to the Indies, because that was all their em igrants requested (148). M eanwhile, Genoese, Flemish, G erm an and Italian m erchants used their financial in­ fluence in Spain as an entrée for future trading and commercial ventures. U ntil the sixteenth century raw wool had been the basis of Castile’s commercial prosperity, but in the 1560s the dem and from the great Flemish textile towns began to fall. In 1567 Guicciardini, a Florentine m erchant working in Bruges, wrote that yearly imports from Spain had fallen from 40,000 sacks of wool to 25,000 sacks and

42

The Economy

blamed the decline on changing fashions, foreign competition and the disruptive effects of the Dutch Revolt, which m ade the m arket nervous (135). T he decline of the wool trade had im portant reper­ cussions for central Castilian towns like Burgos and M edina del Campo. In 1494 a Consulado de Mar* had been established to m anage the commercial affairs of Burgalesian m erchants, and its leading members formed a ‘university’ to provide insurance policies for ships and their equipm ent, m erchandise and crews (3). At its height of trading activity between 1565 and 1573 more than 8,000 policies were issued, but as war and taxation drained ships, men and m erchants’ money away from shipping and overseas trade, so Bur­ gos declined. Simón Ruiz’s lam entation in 1570 that ‘the trade of Burgos is almost completely exhausted’ may have been an exagger­ ation but twenty years later it was certainly true (70, p. 227). M edina del Cam po was Spain’s most im portant commercial town. Twice a year it staged an international fair: in the spring, when Spanish retailers bought m aterials and goods, often on credit; and in the autum n, when debts were paid out of the profits made from the harvests. The volume of trade, and the concom itant deposit banking and credit facilities, attracted around 2,000 m erchants and financiers. As there was no state bank the crown borrowed from the same financiers as other m erchants, and any delay in its repaym ents seriously affected their livelihood and created a cash-flow crisis at the fair. T he m oratorium of 1575, for example, shook the confidence of bankers like Simón Ruiz who thereafter diversified his capital by draw ing up bills of exchange in M adrid and Seville to avoid the risk of future postponem ent in M edina. W hen Seville set up an Exchange in 1583 to trade throughout the year, M edina introduced a third fair to bring repaym ent dates nearer to loan contracts. Confidence seems to have been restored until the state bankruptcy decree of 1596 sounded the death-knell of trade fairs in general and M edina del Cam po in particular (88). In contrast to the declining woollen and commercial towns in the north, A ndalucian Seville became Philip’s jewel in the crown. H. and P. C haunu have examined the records of the Casa de Contratación*, the House of T rade, which licensed all vessels, goods and passengers travelling between Spain and the Americas, and their study shows that the total tonnage of m erchandise leaving Seville increased from an annual average of 3,000 in 1555 to 30,000 in 1585. It then fell in the 1590s as a result of the shortage of ships and increases in the price of freight before reaching a record level of 45,000 in 1608 (22). Prim arily the crown viewed the colonies as a

43

Descriptive Analysis

source of bullion and exotic commodities rather than as a m arket for Spanish products. Spanish m erchants were guaranteed an in­ creasing profit from the Indies silver and so were willing to export foreign products rather than low-valued native goods (132). Seville’s prosperity was therefore illusory. Very little Am erican bullion entered its money supply and most of its wealth came from foreign trade. From 1566 its commerce suffered further dam age, since m er­ chants were now allowed to export specie instead of native com­ modities. As a result, in 1570—71 over 7 million ducats in silver entered and left Seville, and in the 1580s each year at least 1 million ducats went to the F ar East in Portuguese ships to settle outstanding trade deficits. It was once argued —most notably by the Am erican historian Earl J. H am ilton — that ‘the abundant mines of America were the prin­ cipal cause of the Price Revolution in Spain’ (56, p. 301). While modern historians agree that Spain experienced'an inflation rate of some 400 per cent in the course of the sixteenth century, N adal Oiler has shown that the annual rate of inflation was 2.8 per cent in 1501— 62 but only 1.3 per cent in 1562—1600 when the full im pact of the American bullion was at its greatest, which suggests that the volume of goods and level of dem and and production were more vital in­ fluences (119). Pierre Vilar has emphasised the im portance of bills of exchange, credit facilities, juros* and censos* which inflated the economy, while Henry Kam en has seen the smuggling, hoarding and illegal export of bullion as crucial causes of price inflation (68,

176) [doc. 7], If most historians no longer believe inflation was such a serious challenge to Spanish trade and commerce in Philip I I ’s reign, they are in no doubt that w ar was. I t disrupted internal trade and transport, deterred potential investors from risking their capital in domestic and foreign enterprises, and presented competitors with the opportunity of seizing commercial markets. M editerranean trade had been declining well before Philip’s reign, largely as a result of the wars between Turkey and Persia in the east, and between France and Spain in the Levant, but also on account of pirates and corsairs preying on Spanish ships in the west. T he subsequent dem and in western Europe for grain, fish, leather, textiles and pepper saw the vacuum in west M editerranean trade filled by m erchants from Poland, Russia, England, France and the N etherlands, who still traded with Spain despite a Spanish embargo of 1586. O ne beneficial result of the D utch Revolt and the predatory activity of English privateers was the strengthening of the size and quality o f the

44

The Economy

Spanish royal navy. Increasing attacks upon the fiota* led to the establishm ent of two royal fleets. By 1587 Philip had 106 ships in his High Seas Fleet, and by 1598 an Armada del M ar Oceano* of sixtyseven galleys and galleons had been created to protect the Indies fleet. These lighter and faster roundships of between 50 and 300 tons proved very effective at warding off privateers, but they came too late to salvage Spain’s commercial supremacy. In d u s try M id-sixteenth-century Spain had a plentiful supply of raw m aterials and seemed well capable of sustaining an industrial base. M ercury, silver, copper, lead, iron and alum mines produced valuable raw materials; leather, hides and woollen textiles were well established in Castile; Seville was noted for its pottery, soap and arm am ents production, Bilbao and Barcelona for shipbuilding, and Valencia and G ranada for silk m aterials. In addition, unlike most agrarian societies whose low income levels and limited dem and for industrial products imposed lim itations on the size of their m arket, the Spanish aristocracy, nobility and bourgeoisie had enough wealth to stim ulate domestic industries and to capitalise on their Am erican monopoly. Against these advantages, Spain was beset by serious difficulties. First, town guilds held privileges which discouraged innovation and initiative and resented attem pts by the crown to regulate or change traditional trades and industries. In Barcelona there were sixty-four guilds in 1600, whose entrenched self-interest m ilitated against state intervention. O nly where industries fell outside the guild system for instance, soap, glass, paper and printing — or where the state exercised a monopoly, as in shipbuilding and the m anufacture of gunpowder and m unitions, was there any significant m odernisation (175). Second, Spain’s industrial platform was fundam entally flawed. Exports had expanded and industries flourished for m uch of the sixteenth century, due in p art to the dem and from overseas m arkets for Castilian raw m aterials and luxury goods like gloves and swords but also to the m oratorium imposed by the governm ent on the export of Spanish bullion, which made more money available for investment in domestic trade and industry. Philip’s decision in 1566 to allow m erchants to export bullion instead of goods led to a drain of potential capital for investment and unfortunately coincided with the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt and subsequent collapse of Antwerp. Third, some of the wealthiest groups showed a lack of business acumen. At a time when they should have been investing

45

Descriptive Analysis

in native m anufacturing industries and trying to meet the dem ands of the Am erican m arket, m erchants preferred to im port quality goods and to re-export foreign finished items or to invest in censos* and juros* rather than risk their capital in industrial projects. This failure on the p art of the bourgeoisie to continue the spirit of enterprise shown by their ancestors has been described as ‘an act of betrayal’ by Fernand Braudel; but other historians suggest that it was not so m uch a case of missed opportunities as of the inability of financiers to build up enough capital to invest confidently in major enterprises. ‘M ore than anything’, writes Pierre V ilar, ‘it is lack of time, for the risks are very great due to the greediness of the foreigner and the sovereign and to the irregularity of the flotas ’ (176, p. 140). Although it is a m yth to suggest that the landowning classes rejected the idea of investing in trade and industry on social grounds, it remains true that governm ent bonds and the public debt offered a more attractive return (47, 138) (see p. 34). Finally, Philip’s defensive and offensive foreign policy accen­ tuated Spain’s existing industrial problems and created several new ones. In essence the crown never had enough arsenals and m unition houses to make, repair and develop its weapons, and most artillery supplies had to be imported. H ungarian copper, English lead and tin, Italian sulphur and gunpowder, G erm an and D utch cannon and arm our, and Portuguese pikes and arquebuses were vital to Spain’s war effort. In 1576 Philip tried to overcome these shortages by prohibiting the export of saltpetre, gunpowder and small arms, regulating their price and quality of production and bringing all in­ dustries related to m unitions under royal control. Yet even though output doubled, there were still grave shortages. In the 1588 Ar­ mada, for example, none of the 2,431 pieces of bronze artillery was made from Spanish copper or tin, and most of the gunpow der and every cannonball had been imported. State shipbuilding was further handicapped by the acute shortage of skilled craftsm en and en­ gineers. T o encourage investors in Bilbao, Philip introduced state subsidies, interest-free loans and exemptions from the alcabala* for owners of ships over 200 tons, and encouraged some twenty-five Italian engineers to work in Spain. However, despite these initiatives there were repeated reports of deficiencies in money, m aterials and expertise (164). As early as 1558 Luiz Ortiz, comptroller of the royal finances, warned Philip of an im pending economic decline if the export of raw m aterials and im port of foreign m anufactures were not stopped. Forty years later, the arbitrista*, M artín González de Cellorigo,

46

The Economy

believed a decline was already under way. ‘Henceforward, we can only expect shortages of everything . . . because of the lack of people to work in the fields and in all the m anufactures the kingdom needs,’ he wrote in 1600 (52). W hile such a prognosis may have been prem ature because some industries like mining, shipbuilding and luxuries were still thriving, observers generally recognised that Spain was experiencing a deceleration in economic growth which would lead to a recession if it was not redressed (see p. 97).

47

6

Religion and Religious Affairs

T h e S p a n ish C h u rc h in 1556 In 1556 the C hurch in Spain was in urgent need of reform. T he spiritual zeal which attended the reign of the C atholic Kings and which did so m uch to improve the monastic orders had not been sustained in the second qu arter of the sixteenth century. M any lower clergy were uneducated and impoverished and the average rectorial stipend of 30 ducats a year only served to encourage pluralism and absenteeism. In the diocese of Barcelona in 1549 only six out of sixty-seven parish priests were resident, and a t Burgos C ardinal M endoza only took up residence fourteen years after acquiring his see. In contrast to the poverty experienced by m ost clerics, a minority was immensely rich, owning castles, estates and vassals, and investing in governm ent and municipal bonds. T he highest of­ fices were the preserve of the noble families and provided most bishops w ith an income of between 15,000 and 30,000 ducats; but none surpassed the wealth of the Archbishop of Toledo, the Prim ate of Spain, whose income exceeded 200,000 ducats. The dioceses were also in need of reorganisation: the small province of Alava, for ex­ ample, had over 400 parishes and there was a confusing overlap of ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Em barrassing disputes regularly arose between the churches, religious and monastic orders, lords, bishops, inquisitors and town authorities. It was clear th at the C hurch’s capacity to contribute to the spirit of reform would be more pro­ ductive if its activities were co-ordinated and areas of spiritual responsibility designated. Heresy was not a serious problem facing Philip at his accession. The presence of the Inquisition had ensured that most Catholics in Spain never came into contact with heretical movements, but because it was preoccupied in the early sixteenth century with monitoring the activities of converted Jews and M oors - that is the Conversos and Moriscos —and countering the challenge posed by Erasm ians and Lutherans, it had largely neglected the spiritual education and developm ent of the laity. As a consequence, many people’s faith lay rooted in pagan festivals, local rituals and super­

48

Religion and Religious Affairs

stitious practices. In parts of N avarre when there was a drought, the priest led a procession to a nearby river where he immersed the statue of St Peter in the belief th at it would bring rain. Coria cathedral in E strem adura was not exceptional in claiming that it held soil from the crib at Bethlehem and M ount Olive, the tablecloth of the Last Supper and Jo h n the B aptist’s jaw bone (23). In the opinion of Jo h n Lynch, the crown’s control over the Church ‘was probably more complete in Spain in the sixteenth cen­ tury than in any other p art of Europe, including Protestant countries with an Erastian system’ (103, p. 24). Philip enjoyed exclusive patronage over the highest ecclesiastical offices and collected 50 per cent of the total clerical revenue, in addition to receiving money from vacant sees. He had the right to register or reject papal decrees, to deny appeals to Rome from either the Councils of Castile or Aragon or the Spanish Inquisition, to publish or withhold papal bulls in Naples and to act as his own papal legate in Sicily. In effect the Church was a departm ent of state, ruled by the King and ad­ ministered by his councils and secretariat; lay representatives sat on diocesan synods whose resolutions had to be sanctioned by the Council of State. P h ilip ’s reform s By far the most im portant influence upon the reforms of the Church in Spain was the long-awaited conclusion to the Council of T rent (64). Spanish bishops had played a prom inent p art in the first two sessions and Philip took a personal interest in the final session be­ tween Ja n u ary 1562 and December 1563. More than one hundred Spanish theologians attended, including the leading Jesuits Lainez and Salmeron, the Dominicans de Soto and Cano, and the Francis­ cans de C astro and de Vega. From the outset it was clear there were fundam ental points of disagreem ent. Philip wanted doctrinal issues discussed and defined, and believed more power should be given to the bishops over their own clergy; the Papacy felt that priority should be' given to clerical abuses and showed no desire to com­ promise its suprem acy over councils and bishops. However, both agreed th at no concessions m ust be made to heterodoxy. According to Henry K am en, the Tridentine Decrees ‘revolutionised Spanish Catholicism ’ (70, p. 181). Episcopal authority was endorsed and increased, which pleased the King: as a result, six provincial synods met in 1565 and twenty seminaries were set up to educate the clergy. Priests had to preach a weekly sermon, give religious instruction, start Sunday schools, and use

49

Descriptive Analysis

the Rom an Missal, Breviary and orthodox liturgy in their services. The Confessional became the most im portant m eans of instructing the laity to abandon their faith in ‘popular religion’ and teaching them the doctrine of free will in both thought and action. Priests were ordered to wear distinctive vestments, separate themselves from the penitent at confessions, and absent themselves from wed­ ding parties and comm unal festivities to minimise their contact with carnal tem ptations. At the same time they were to exercise a more intrusive role in their parishioners’ lives by supervising the white­ washing of churches, censoring paintings, conducting confessions, enforcing sexual propriety and keeping a record of Sunday and Holy Day attendances. For their part, congregations were expected to at­ tend weekly masses, take communion at Easter, and be loyal, obedient and m oral. Philip also implem ented im portant adm inistra­ tive changes. He introduced a new archdiocese at Burgos in 1572, seven new dioceses, six of which were in Aragon, and strengthened his control over the 300 m onastic houses by severing their links with foreign orders. Inefficient and decayed m onasteries were dissolved, some were am algam ated, and a new contem plative O bservant order of Discalced Carmelites was inaugurated by T eresa of Avila in 1562

(146>-

U ndoubtedly, the new spirit of Catholicism was more than a seven-day wonder; the missionary zeal of Jesuits like Pedro de Leon and the quality of spiritual inspiration which characterised writers like Luis de G ranada continued well into the seventeenth century. Philip’s reign witnessed the foundation of twelve Franciscan con­ vents in La M ancha, seventeen monasteries in M adrid, and over eighty Discalced houses throughout Spain. T he im pact of the Catholic Reformation, however, should not be exaggerated, for it varied from province to province according to the personal drive of the bishops, the general quality of their clergy and the condition of the laity. At Barcelona, for example, a seminary was established in 1567, and the ‘Forty H ours’ Devotion in which m em bers of the con­ gregation prayed before the consecrated H ost, was introduced in 1580. C ardinal Q uiroga brought about im portant changes in his diocese of Toledo in spite of the low level of literacy, while in V alen­ cia Archbishop J u a n de Ribera began a financial scheme to raise his priests’ stipends, helped found a seminary as well as a college for the education of Moriscos*, and for forty-three years devoted himself to the reformation of the Church. In contrast, inquisitors and missionaries regularly reported widespread spiritual backwardness and indifference. M ost cases of

50

Religion and Religious Affairs

sexual m isconduct brought before the Inquisition were not, they claimed, attributable to heresy but to ‘stupidity and ignorance’, and in 1572 one inquisitor claimed that Galicia ‘has no priests or lettered persons or impressive churches or people who are used to going to mass and hearing sermons. . . . They are superstitious and the benefices so poor that as a result there are not enough clergy.’ Rec­ torial wages were still inadequate, clerical offices vacant and Moors unconverted. Com m unities rem ained closely attached to their local customs, saints, processions, Caridades*, carnivals and plays, and were determ ined to defy official orders to ban them . The continuing veneration of profane images in parish churches was the subject of diocesan synods held at G ranada in 1573 and Pam plona in 1591, and the Inquisition continued to bem oan the low level of Christian understanding expressed by m any Spaniards in the 1590s (7). Therefore, the condition of the Spanish C hurch appears to have been largely unreform ed at the end of the century. H e te ro d o x y a n d th e In q u is itio n In 1566 Philip rem inded Pius V that ‘rather than suffer the least dam age to religion and the service of God, I would lose all my states and a hundred lives, if I had them; for I do not propose nor desire to be the ruler of heretics’ (123, p. 53). Behind this diplom atic hy­ perbole lay a basic truism: Philip knew it was his duty as a Christian and as the M ost Catholic King to extirpate all brands of heterodoxy from his dominions. Despite their apparent insignificance, mystics and hum anists continued to be suspected of deviant beliefs and were harassed by the Inquisition. Luis de León, for example, an Augustinian friar and w riter of mystic prose, was arrested in 1572 and imprisoned for five years pending an investigation into his opinions on predestination and grace. The Valencian hum anist Fadrique Furió Ceriol had lived in the Netherlands since 1549 but was viewed with alarm by Philip when he learned of his advocating universal religious toleration. Alonso del C anto, a contador* in the Army of Flanders, was employed by the crown to hunt him down and return him to Spain, which he successfully accomplished (169). Protestantism had never taken root in Charles V ’s reign, and the discovery of several groups of Protestants in 1557—58 and in 1559—62 in Burgos, Valladolid, Salam anca and Seville brought such frenzied activity from the Inquisition that some historians have suggested it was stage-m anaged by the Inquisitor-G eneral, Fernando de Valdes, in an attem pt to ingratiate himself with the new m onarch. T he large num bers arrested confirm that the Inquisition was not lacking in

51

Descriptive Analysis

keenness, and the testim ony of the accused clearly shows th at many were active Protestants. Six autos de fe* took place at Seville and Valladolid between 1559 and 1562 at which 278 people were prosecuted and 77 put to death. O n returning to Spain Philip at­ tended the auto de f e at Valladolid on 8 O ctober 1559 where an Italian, Carlos de Seso, and four nuns were the star attractions. The King found the experience most exhilarating and w ent on to preside Over four more ceremonies in 1560, 1564, 1582 and 1591 (69). By 1562 Protestantism in Spain had been elfectively eradicated, but this did not m ean th at Philip and the Inquisition could rest. W hilst in the N etherlands in 1558 he had been horrified to discover Spanish students at Louvain University studying Protestant works. T here followed two decrees: the first in Septem ber 1558 forbade the intro­ duction of books into the country and the circulation of literature w ithout a licence, and the second in November 1559 ordered the m ajority of students and teachers living abroad to return home within four m onths [doc. 8], The activities of the fifteen tribunals in Spain varied from region to region, but a lot of their time was spent investigating reports of lapsed Moriscos* and Conversos*. In G ranada, for example, 88 per cent of the victims condemned between 1563 and 1569 were M oris­ cos, but following the expulsion of all Moriscos in 1570 the num ber of cases fell, until by the 1590s they am ounted to less than 10 per cent. In contrast, the Valencian and Sevillian Inquisitions went into overdrive in the 1570s and 1580s, following the arrival of thousands of M oriscos (44) (see p. 61). The belief in limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood) saw rigorous enquiries m ade into the ethnic backgrounds of all groups and led to the social and political ostracisation of Conversos, which further increased when Portuguese Jew s and Conversos flooded into Spain. Following the annexation of Portugal, which contained a large num ber of Jews, a new inquisitor was ap­ pointed in 1586 to effect a more vigorous persecution. As a result some 3,200 cases were heard by 50 autos de//b e tw e e n 1580 and 1600, an increase of nearly 50 per cent upon the previous thirty years. In neighbouring Castile, the Inquisition once again found more and more Jew s being brought before its tribunals: the 1591 Toledo auto, for instance, dealt with twenty-seven cases; that at G ranada in 1593 with at least seventy-five; and one at Seville in 1595 with over eightynine Jew s (33, 89). H enry K am en suggests that the Spanish Inquisition’s main contribution in Philip’s reign was not the persecution of heretics but the reconversion of Spaniards. Regional studies of the tribunals in-

52

Religion and Religious Affairs

dicate that they were prim arily concerned with enforcing m oral and Christian standards w ithin the laity: one-third of those arrested by the Toledo Inquisition and over half by the Zaragoza and Valencia tribunals in 1576-90 were ordinary Catholics accused of blasphem y, sacrilege, soliciting, bigamy and sexual activities outside m arriage

(69). An im portant aspect of the Inquisition’s work was its censorship of heretical works. Unlike other Catholic states, Spain did not recog­ nise the Rom an Index of censored writings but instead compiled and enforced its own. The Inquisitor-G eneral Valdes composed the first vernacular Index* in 1559, based on lists which he had edited since 1551 (14). 0 f 6 7 0 prohibited works most were foreign books alleged­ ly containing heretical ideas. Among them were fourteen editions of the Bible, sixteen works by Erasmus, and Spanish editions of Boc­ caccio as well as of a small num ber of Castilian authors such as Luis de G ranada and St J u a n de Avila who wrote on liturgical themes. The C hurch and the state worked together in imposing religious cen­ sorship: the Inquisition decided w hat should be banned and the Council of Castile, by issuing licences to printers, controlled w hat should be published. T he Index was revised and greatly enlarged in 1583—84 by G aspar de Q uiroga, the third Inquisitor-G eneral, with the aid of the theology faculty of Salam anca University, which proscribed not only heretical works but anything else it disliked. O f the 33,000 prohibited or expurgated titles, most were by foreigners and of a classical nature; for example Abelard, Rabelais, O ckham , Savonarola, M achiavelli and D ante were all censored. Few m ath ­ ematical or scientific works were proscribed, and although titles on magic were banned, benign astrological works were perm itted, con­ trary to a papal bull of 1585. It has been argued th at this censorship greatly contributed to the cultural isolation of Spain from the rest of Europe, as freedom of speech and thought were stifled and writers were forced to conform or suffer the penalties. However, D r K am en suggests that although it denied Spaniards access to foreign m aterial, it had little im pact on literature and even less on science. The investigation of witchcraft also occupied only a small am ount of the Inquisition’s time. In the 1590s such cases accounted for less than 5 per cent of its business, which was in m arked contrast to the rest of Europe. Overall, K am en believes there was considerable freedom and th at the Inquisition did not inhibit the developm ent of Spanish culture (69). H istorians continue to debate the precise role and significance of the Spanish Inquisition (130). Some believe that it was prim arily

53

Descriptive Analysis

an instrum ent to eradicate heresy and enforce a uniform faith; others, th at its m ain purpose was to strengthen the political arm of the state. Certainly, there was a strong secular element to its ad­ m inistration: the officials were royal councillors, and every state except Naples and M ilan had a tribunal which was presided over by the Inquisitor-G eneral and the Suprema* in M adrid. Each of the twenty-one tribunals kept Philip regularly informed on secular as well as ecclesiastical business, without which he would have found running his monarquia* so m uch more difficult. As he explained to Espinosa in 1574: ‘I shall always favour and assist the affairs of the Inquisition because I know the reasons and obligations which exist for doing so, and for me more than anyone.’ It was, however, neither conceived nor used by Philip as an instrum ent of royal power. Only on one occasion, in 1591, when he was trying to apprehend and silence Perez, did he mobilise its machinery for a blatantly political purpose, and significantly this attem pt proved unsuccessful (see P · 22)·

There is no doubt that if contemporaries accepted its necessity, they never particularly liked the Inquisition. An aura of suspicion and a fear of denunciation surrounded its proceedings: the onus al­ ways lay with the accused to prove their innocence, the inquisitors were never identified, and although torture was probably applied in only 10 per cent of the cases, m any victims were flogged, sent to the galleys, or imprisoned for long periods of time. Even the 2 per cent who were acquitted never erased the social stigm a of having at one time been suspects (5). In Castile, where the Inquisition was regarded as an alien institution and an obstacle to racial harm ony, the Cortes* regularly complained about the intrusive conduct of in­ quisitors, bishops resented its interference into their ecclesiastical domain, and the network of familiars (paid informers) was par­ ticularly despised in close rural communities. In Aragon complaints by the Cortes of M onzon that tribunals were interfering in criminal and civil cases as well as heretical affairs led to the publication of a Concordia in 1568 regulating the future conduct of the Valencian Inquisition [doc. 9], In all it has been estimated that the Inquisition dealt with about 40,000 cases in Philip’s reign, most of them involving ordinary Catholics accused of religious or moral deviation. Fewer than 250 victims were burned at the stake, which confirms the view that this particular punishm ent was reserved for people who either refused to repent or who had recanted once before. In fact, the Inquisition was an instrum ent of terror directing a clandestine apparatus of social

54

Religion and Religious Affairs

and political control and a very effective way of enforcing a code of religious instruction and m oral ethics upon a largely uneducated and backward society (140). Its success varied from tribunal to tribunal: the Galician inquisitors m ade little impression on the rural and m ountainous communities, whereas the Toledo tribunal in the 1590s reported a m arked im provem ent in the people’s basic faith and religious knowledge (32). Overall, the Inquisition played an im port­ ant part in increasing the num ber of orthodox Catholics in Spain and strengthening their Christian education. P a p a l re la tio n s In spite of his autonom y over the Spanish C hurch, Philip realised it was preferable to have the Papacy on his side in order to support and finance his religious campaigns. The V atican, on the other hand, recognised that it needed Philip to organise, finance and pro­ vide the m anpow er for the crusades against the Protestant heretics and Turkish infidel. Philip’s enemies were the enemies of the Church: on th at they were agreed. W here clashes occurred between Spain and the Papacy, they reflected three main areas of controver­ sy, each of which was highlighted by the varying personalities of the pontiffs. These areas covered the extent of Philip’s control of the C hurch in his dominions, the activity of the Spanish Jesuits and the conduct of his foreign affairs. Philip always defended his royal rights over the Spanish Church and periodically showed his independence. In 1559 he refused to let C arranza, Archbishop of Toledo, be tried in Rome on charges of heresy and only gave way in 1566 when Pius V withheld assent to the renewal of the cruzada*. Before publishing the Tridentine Decrees in Ju ly 1564, Philip instructed his lawyers to ensure that they con­ tained nothing th at m ight alter or reduce his authority or the powers of the Spanish Inquisition. Three years later, when Pius V issued an edict banning bull-fights and excommunicated all participants, Philip disregarded it. In 1572 he denied his subjects the right of appeal to Rome, a m easure designed to reaffirm royal sovereignty rather than extend it. A second source of conflict was the Society of Jesus. Philip realised that the Jesuits had an im portant evangelical role to play in the Catholic revival and he initially endorsed their activities in Spain. In 1558 over 70 per cent of the General Congregation of the Jesuits was Spanish, as were its first three generals, Loyola, Lainez and Borja. However, the appointm ent of two non-Spaniards, M ercurian (1573-81) and Aquaviva (1581-1615), convinced the K ing that the

55

Descriptive Analysis

Jesuits were really papal agents. T heir arch-rivals, the Dominicans, led by C ardinal Siliceo, shared this view. Siliceo feared their in­ fluence, resented their privileges and challenged their metaphysical and theological beliefs. Trouble came to a head during the pontifi­ cate of Sixtus V (1585—90). In 1586 the Dom inican-controlled Spanish Inquisition denounced Antonio M arceu, the Jesuit prin­ cipal of the Toledo T ribunal, for not reporting a case of another Jesu it accused of m aking im proper advances to wom en and for ex­ pelling the informer of this offence from the Society. M arceu was arrested, docum ents were seized by the Inquisition, and Philip called upon the Pope to revise the Society’s constitution and so reduce the authority of its Italian general. Sixtus refused, ordered M arceu’s release and the return of Jesu it papers, and rejected Philip’s request that the Spanish provinces should be visited by a non-Jesuit. W hen in 1593 Pope Clement V III actually succeeded in getting a full investigation of the Jesu its’ activities, the outcome was most unsatisfactory as far as Philip was concerned. Aquaviva nom inated the commissions of enquiry which confirmed his authority; he defeated the proposal that most of his power should be controlled by regular General Congregations; and he expelled those Spanish Jesuits who had proved so troublesom e to him on the grounds that they were ‘false sons’ of Jew ish or M oorish descent (158). Philip’s relationship with the Papacy was m ost strained in the dom ain of foreign affairs. Each side suspected the other of pursuing its own interests, and to a great extent this was true. Although their objectives were essentially the same, they had different priorities. M oreover, the King saw himself as G od’s representative on earth and not as an agent of the Pope. At times the Papacy and the Spanish crown were openly opposed. The N eapolitan Paul IV was the m ainspring of the anti-Spanish concord with H enry II of France, and of negotiations with Germ an Protestant princes in 1556. In the 1560s Pius IV and Pius V clashed with Philip as to whether or not the D utch rebels should be branded as heretics and Elizabeth I should be excomm unicated. Philip advised against the formal deposition of Elizabeth, but his views were abruptly overridden in 1570 when Pius V, w ithout any warning, issued the bull Regnans in Excelsis. Relations improved in 1571 as a result of the Spanish tri­ um ph at Lepanto, but Philip’s unwillingness to follow it up, and the announcem ent in 1578 of a truce with the Turks, elicited the w rath of Gregory X III. T he C uria’s view that the M ost Catholic K ing was seeking to serve his own ends and not those of the Catholic C hurch

56

Religion and Religious Affairs

was given more currency when Spain annexed Portugal in 1580 and ignored the papal endorsem ent given to a rival claim ant. However, any problem s Philip had previously had with the Papacy paled into insignificance after the accession of Sixtus V in 1585. Neither m an liked or respected the other, but although this spiced their relation­ ship their conflict was far more than a clash of personalities. Since the outbreak of the French W ars of Religion the Papacy had suspected that Philip was trying to strengthen H absburg power at France’s expense and in so doing was consciously or unwittingly weakening the unity of the Catholic Church. In Sixtus’s opinion the country in greatest need of restoration to the Catholic fold was England, and he felt it was Philip’s duty to launch an invasion as soon as possible. Philip responded by rebuking Sixtus for failing to condemn H enry of N avarre as a heretic, and for not denouncing his claim to the French throne or excomm unicating his supporters. The subsequent failure of the A rm ada and death of Henry I I I brought m atters to a head in the autum n of 1589, and com m unications be­ tween Philip and Sixtus during the course of the next year were particularly fractious [doc. 10]. The King requested that the Pope hand over 1 million ducats, which had been agreed in 1587 as his contribution towards the cost of the A rm ada. Sixtus refused, claim­ ing that the subsidy was payable only in the event of a successful invasion, and then complained about Philip’s im perialistic am bi­ tions. Philip, in reply, rem inded the Pope that ‘there are many reasons why His Holiness should believe me, adm it my obser­ vations, and listen to my counsel with the attention and deference which his predecessors have shown mine on sim ilar occasions’. As Spanish troops ominously mobilised in Italy, and Sixtus responded by threatening to excommunicate Philip, an open break seemed in­ evitable. It was only averted by the unexpected death of the Pope in August 1590. T he election of two pro-Spanish Popes, U rban V II (1590) and Gregory X IV (1590—91), improved relations, but a t­ tempts to secure another hispanophile failed with the election first of Innocent IX (1591—92) and then of Clem ent V III (1592—1605), who sided with France and formally recognised Henry of N avarre as its K ing.'Philip’s hum iliation was complete. Spanish—papal relations had been at best uneasy and at times hos­ tile. In effect, Philip resented the C uria’s persistent hectoring and interference in his affairs, and he felt he was fully entitled to tell the Pope w hat to do and if necessary to do it for him. For its part, the Papacy believed Philip had confused w hat was best for the Church with w hat was best for Spain.

57

7

Domestic Rebellions

T h e R e v o lt o f th e M oriscos, 1 568-70 In 1556 some 400,000 Moriscos* lived in Spain. Although they made up only 6 per cent of the country’s total population, they were con­ centrated in Aragon, Valencia and particularly G ranada, where they constituted more than half the people. It was here that a serious uprising began on Christm as Eve 1568 (34, 90). T he causes are not difficult to discern. First, in the 1550s and 1560s M oriscos all over Spain experienced economic difficulties as the governm ent deliberately attacked the silk industry, their prin­ cipal source of livelihood. Exports were banned, heavy taxes imposed, and in 1561 raw silk from M urcia undercut their trade. As their income fell the Moriscos had further reason to resent a decree of 1560 which prohibited them from employing slaves and initiated a program m e that investigated their landholding rights. Be­ tween 1559 and 1568 the crown resumed control of over 100,000 hectares from those who failed to provide satisfactory proof of owner­ ship. T he collapse of the harvest in 1567 brought them to the brink of revolt. The second cause was the failure of the Moriscos to be assim ilated into Spanish society and the resentm ent shown by orthodox Catholics towards them. According to a decree of 1526, all mud'ejares* had to abandon their M uslim dress, customs and faith and become practising Christians. Patently this had not happened, due in part to the failure of preachers to enforce conversion and of the state to provide enough schools and teachers to re-educate Morisco children. In addition, there was the determ ination of m any M oriscos to uphold their cultural and religious beliefs, allied with the protection afforded them by Catholic landowning nobles who needed them as tenants. In 1526 the Aragonese Moriscos had also obtained from the crown a forty-year Concordia by which they were freed from the operations of the Inquisition in return for a paym ent of 40,000 ducats and acceptance of baptism . In G ranada similar agreem ents had been m ade, but the crown had reneged on these in 1559, and in the

58

Domestic Rebellions

wake of the Council of T ren t there was growing pressure from the Inquisition and the episcopate to enforce the original decrees more effectively. T he result was the royal decree published on 1 Ja n u ary 1567 which banned M oorish literature, songs, dances and costumes, and m any traditional customs. As the Inquisition set to work in 1567, the M arquis of M ondejar, C aptain-G eneral of G ranada and a major employer of Moriscos, tried in vain to safeguard them from a vicious racist campaign. A third factor was the widespread belief that the Moriscos were fifth-columnists, secretly in contact with the Turks in N orth Africa and the Barbary corsairs, both of whom openly preyed on Spanish coasts and shipping. The notion that the Moriscos were a security risk was not at all far-fetched. N orth African M uslims retained links with M oorish communities in Spain and looked for assistance from the O ttom an court and the Barbary states (57). Attem pts to disarm Moriscos in 1563 had proved difficult to enforce and did nothing to allay popular fears, which were further fuelled by the C hurch in Spain calling for a crusade to free the country of its spiritual and political cancer. T he call was taken up by the G ranadan bishops and obeyed by m any patriotic Catholics (66) [doc. 11]. Com plaints of theft and m urder testified to the growing disorder; even priests were accused of exploitation. In one Morisco village the bishop was begged either to remove the incum bent or to m arry him off because ‘all our children are born with eyes as blue as his’ (12). W hen M ondejar warned Philip of the im pending crisis he was told to hand control to the audiencia*, Inquisition and militia, which gave Espinosa unfettered power to enforce the edicts. By December 1568 the Moriscos had had enough. News of the revolt brought M ondejar back into favour, and within a few weeks he had recaptured 182 villages centred upon the Lecrin valley and the A lpujarras m ountains. However, trouble quickly flared up again when it was learned that Espinosa intended deport­ ing all Moriscos from G ranada, that the M arquis of los Velez had engineered M ondejar’s dismissal, and that the new suprem e com­ m ander was Don Jo h n of Austria. He had at his disposal a rag-bag of undisciplined, low-paid, unreliable troops who proceeded to rape, rob and m urder their victims. By 1570 the revolt had become a bloody civil w ar as nearly 30,000 rebels, including volunteers from other parts of the M uslim world, inflicted brutal atrocities on the Christian population. At M anena, for example, the curate was filled with gunpowder and blown up; and at Guecijo, A ugustinian monks were thrown into cauldrons of burning oil. Don Jo h n more than

59

Descriptive Analysis

reciprocated. In February 1570 he ordered the entire population of Galera - some 2,500 men, women and children - to be put to the sword and their town razed. W hen Philip visited Córdoba in M arch he realised his policy of outright conquest had failed and at once rescinded the deportation orders. T he Moriscos were now to be dis­ persed throughout Spain and a free pardon granted to everyone who immediately surrendered. This wise strategy broke the back of the rebellion, and its leader, Abenhum eya, subm itted. Although his decision was not universally applauded - he was throttled by his own guards in O ctober 1570 - and internal quarrels persisted into 1571, the m ain areas of unrest died down. As is often the case in history, the results of the revolt were far more significant than the events which occasioned it. First, it ex­ posed Spain’s serious m ilitary weaknesses. Don Jo h n had had only 20,000 low-quality troops at his disposal, Castile had no effective militia and the coasts had been ill-defended. Inadequate resources were accom panied by blatant corruption which resulted in at least thirty-two captains being cashiered for fraud. The uprising shocked Philip not because it was a threat to his regime but because it was the first serious protest he had faced and he had failed to suppress it quickly. M oreover, it had cost some 60,000 Spanish lives and 3 million ducats. Philip’s vulnerability was realised by W illiam of Orange, who comm ented laconically: ‘It is an example to us, in that the Moors are able to resist for so long even though they are people of no more substance than a flock of sheep. W hat, then, m ight the people of the Low Countries be able to do?’ Philip believed the entire episode was a national disgrace which must never be repeated. He ordered eighty-four new forts to be built in G ranada and alerted the authorities for signs of future disturbances. The revolt could have been far worse. The Aragonese and Valencian Moriscos had not risen nor had the Barbary states given much support; but the Turks had captured Tunis in 1570 and there was some evidence that they had considered how they m ight further ex­ ploit Philip’s problems elsewhere. Vizierial letters of 1574 addressed to Andalucían Moriscos, G erm an Lutherans and D utch Huguenots suggest that the O ttom an Sultan was still contem plating a co­ ordinated attack on Spain’s dominions. For the rem ainder of Philip’s reign, the Inquisition busied itself investigating letters and reports of collusion between the Moriscos, Turks and H enry of Navarre. Finally, the G ranadan Moriscos were compulsorily ex­ pelled to Castile, Andalucía and Estrem adura, with alarm ing social and economic effects. M ore than 100,000 emigrants were deported

60

Domestic Rebellions

between 1570 and 1573 and some 20,000 died in transit. Philip in­ tended that the Moriscos should be assimilated into their new environm ent and in 1573 set up a Com m ittee for the Religious In­ struction of the Valencian Moriscos to ensure that each diocese appointed twelve Arabic-speaking missionaries to teach the C hris­ tian faith. However, lack of enthusiasm and insufficient funds thw arted such plans, and once again Moriscos resorted to paying out 2,500 ducats a year in protection money to the Inquisition. Else­ where racial tension heightened. T he arrival of 4,000 Moriscos in Córdoba and 1,000 at Avila in 1572 necessitated civil protection, and where they did settle they found their farm ing knowledge less in dem and, while professional and commercial skills were generally beyond them. Barred from the Church and the arm y, hounded by the civil authorities, m any became muleteers and pedlars or joined the growing bands of gypsies and bandits (46). G ranada itself suffered irretrievably. Fifty thousand O ld C hris­ tians from northern Spain moved in and occupied the lands and homes of some 259 vacated communities, but one-third of settle­ ments rem ained empty and the population fell by over a quarter. The A lpujarras region suffered even more: according to censuses of 1561 and 1587 the num ber of families living there fell from 5,848 to 1,811 (123). Some Moriscos seem to have returned to their lands or escaped the deportation order; in the 1570s investigations into their activities m ade up 66 per cent of the cases brought before the In ­ quisition. T heir growing num bers continued to worry Philip. In 1582 he considered expelling them all, but two years later he opted instead for a further round of deportations. This seems to have stifled the flow of G ranadan Moriscos, as is indicated by the fact that cases brought before the Inquisition in the 1590s fell to ju st 9 per cent, but the problem had not been solved. In 1590 the King again came close to agreeing to their total expulsion. Once again he drew back, and the final decision was deferred until the reign of Philip I II (26). T h e R evolt o f th e N e th e rla n d s Its origins, 1555—67

Between O ctober 1555 and August 1559, Philip spent all but three months in the N etherlands and was fully aware of several difficulties. The States-G eneral in 1556 refused his request for a 1 per-cent tax on real estate and a 2 per-cent tax on movables, claiming that they had already contributed over 7 million Flemish pounds towards his

61

Descriptive Analysis

wars in N orth Italy and France. Only after seventeen m onths’ w ran­ gling did they approve a reduced grant, and then only on condition that they supervised its collection and distribution. W hen Philip recalled them one m onth later in August 1557 to dem and another subsidy, there was uproar. B rabant led the opposition, but other provinces dem anded a review of their tax quotas and responded by stalling and vetoing proposals. Only in Ja n u ary 1559 did the as­ sembly vote a ‘Nine Years’ Aid’ of 3,600,000 ducats, subject to their controlling its adm inistration. This was an unpleasant experience for the young King. Philip was convinced that the D utch nobles needed firmer hand­ ling. H e was prepared to conciliate them by increasing their authority, but if the K ing’s power was not to be eroded, then a strong Regent was imperative. Em m anuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, had been his lieutenant-general since 1555, but a more sensitive and reliable Regent was required. He settled upon his half-sister, M ar­ garet of Parm a, although she was not his first choice. She possessed little adm inistrative or diplom atic experience and even less intel­ ligence but she had been born in the N etherlands and had no close contact with the nobles. Above all, Philip knew her limitations and detailed her duties before he left for Spain: she would have a garrison of 3,000 troops and a council of very able advisers, but decisions on all significant m atters would be taken by Philip him self (153). Religion was not a m ajor issue in 1556, but by 1559 it was begin­ ning to surface again. The laissez-faire attitude of Charles V and M ary of H ungary and the unwillingness of many civil authorities to co-operate with the Inquisition encouraged a steady growth in the num ber of Lutherans, Calvinists and A nabaptists. Such tolerance was anathem a to Philip, who began by instructing the Delft in­ quisitor in 1557 to step up the rate of arrests. W hen the King expressed his intention in 1559 to re-structure the dioceses and in­ troduce more inquisitors there was an imm ediate outcry from the States-General. O n leaving the N etherlands, he was aware of its un­ stable condition, promised to treat it favourably and return as soon as possible. T h at he never came back and proceeded to implem ent unpalatable policies goes a long way towards explaining why within ten years he was facing the most serious rebellion of his reign. Philip pursued consistent aims in his rule of the N etherlands. He wanted to establish greater religious conformity, reduce the StatesGeneral and the Dutch grandees to political subordination and ensure that his Dutch subjects rem ained internally peaceful and prosperous so that they would continue to fund his Em pire (145).

62

Domestic Rebellions

Although he may have wanted to achieve a more centralised govern­ ment by gaining greater control of the political and ecclesiasti­ cal institutions, it is unlikely that he intended establishing an absolutism. H e knew all too well that the N etherlanders had experienced immense financial hardship in the 1550s and were in urgent need of peace. M oreover, the end of H absburg-V alois hos­ tilities in 1559 and growing attacks by the Turks in N orth Africa shifted Philip’s priorities to the M editerranean; for the next twenty years, no m atter w hat happened in the N etherlands, he would al­ ways keep one eye firmly focused on the Turks. If this emphasis was quite intelligible to all Spaniards, the Netherlanders saw it as a dereliction of duty, and historians have subsequently argued th at it was a serious political miscalculation (128). Orange, Egm ont, Berlaymont, Viglius, Glajon and Perrenot were appointed M argaret’s m ajor advisers in 1559. Principal am ong these councillors was Antoine Perrenot, Bishop of Arras and from 1561 Cardinal Granvelle, who was responsible for keeping the King fully informed. Greedy, haughty and nepotistic, Granvelle sought to ac­ celerate the persecution of herelics, augm ent the K ing’s authority to the detrim ent of the States-General, and above all further his own career at the expense of the Dutch grandees. By putting his trust in Granvelle and allowing him in effect to run the governm ent of the N etherlands, Philip committed another serious error of judgem ent (84). G randees like Lam oral, Count of Egmont, and Philippe de M ontm orency, Count Hornes, were outraged by the C ardinal’s high-handed behaviour and virtual monopoly of royal patronage. William, Prince of Orange, in particular expected more political power in Philip’s absence; after all, had not the ailing Em peror rested on his shoulder at the abdication ceremony in 1555, and as well as being the most recent K night of the O rder of the Golden Fleece was he not also the foremost landow ner in the country? W il­ liam suspected Granvelle of underm ining his reputation in M adrid by insinuating that he wanted to gain control of the governm ent (162). To an extent this was true, but then Granvelle equally wished to monopolise political patronage. Philip could ill afford diversionary problems as the crisis in the M editerranean deepened. Consequently, between 1559 and 1564, he began to make concessions. In 1560 he planned to garrison the 3,000 tercios* along the southern border of the N etherlands, allegedly to defend it from a possible French attack, but the m unicipal authorities refused to release any funds to pay the soldiers and ten­ sion rose as unpaid Spanish troops clashed with the local militia.

63

Descriptive Analysis

M argaret pleaded with Philip to remove the tercios, and in spite of Granvelle’s perceptive warning that ‘there will be trouble here sooner or later on some other pretext’, the King agreed. O n 10 January 1561 the troops embarked from Zealand. A more serious concession occurred in 1561, at least as far as Granvelle was con­ cerned, when O range and Egmont opposed the proposal to appoint more Spanish nobles to the Council of State. Not only did Philip abandon this plan, but he also found it prudent to appoint native nobles as stadholders*. For instance, O range received the stadholdership of Holland, Zealand, U trecht and Franche-Com te. Perhaps more than any other episode, the hostile reception that greeted Philip’s program m e of episcopal reforms announced in 1561 dem onstrated the strength of the anti-Granvelle faction. In M ay 1559 Philip and the Pope had agreed to reform the ecclesiastical adm inistration of the Netherlands: fourteen new bishoprics and three archbishoprics controlled by a prim ate would reduce the in­ fluence of foreign bishops and com bat heresy more effectively. Each bishop would be university-trained, have two inquisitors as assist­ ants and be financed out of locally annexed abbeys. Such proposals, if outwardly well-intentioned, proved to be extremely provocative: the abbots resented the new abbot-bishops, the grandees suspected that their political power would be diminished and the nobles believed that their younger sons would have this traditional ec­ clesiastical career-prospect foreclosed since they were unlikely to attain the qualifications prescribed by the T ridentine regulations on Church appointm ents. Above all, everyone feared that an enlarged Inquisition would result in a Spanish invasion of political and spiritual life. It certainly looks as if Philip intended reducing the power of the abbots and nobles, especially those of B rabant, which was the staunchest defender of D utch liberties and whose boundaries fell within the new archbishopric of Mechelen. W hen it was an­ nounced that Granvelle would hold this office there was a howl of protest. T he C ardinal was later to confide to a friend: ‘W ould to God the creation o f these bishoprics had never been thought o f (133, p. 212). But it was too late. In M arch 1563 O range, Egm ont and Hornes sent an ultim atum to Philip: they would resign from the Council of State if Granvelle was not dismissed. B rabant put further pressure on M argaret by refusing to collect taxes. She charac­ teristically informed Philip and he began to receive reports from his spies in Brussels, Alonso del Canto, Cristobal de Castellanos and Lorenzo de Villavicencio that Granvelle was acting leniently towards heretics. T he C ardinal’s enemies in M adrid, Eraso and

64

Domestic Rebellions

Eboli, fine-tuned these allegations to convince Philip that he m ust be removed (87). As Turkish problems multiplied and the possibility emerged that the French civil w ar m ight spill into his dominions, Philip knew that Granvelle must be sacrificed. In Ja n u ary 1564 Philip informed him: ‘I deem it best that you should leave the Low Countries for some days and go to Burgundy to see your m other, with the consent of the Duchess of Parma. In this way, both my authority and your reputation will be preserved.’ Two months later Granvelle resigned, and in July Philip dropped his entire ecclesias­ tical reform program me. In spite (or perhaps because) of these concessions, the K ing had no intention of letting the Dutch nobility control policy making. From his vantage point in M adrid their desire to restore the tradi­ tional style of adm inistration smacked of insubordination and threatened his centralisation plans. M oreover, their links with the Huguenots and factious nobles in France began to worry him —the Hornes and Egm onts were related to the M ontm orencies and M ontigny’s cousin was the Constable of France. As the grandees began to tighten their grip on the Council of State, he came to suspect that M argaret sympathised with them and would have great difficulty refusing their dem ands for a relaxation of the heresy laws

(77). In February 1565 Egm ont unexpectedly arrived in M adrid to ask for religious concessions and more political power for the nobles. This greatly em barrassed the King, and he kept Egm ont waiting for six weeks before giving him the guarded reply that although he would not stop the punishm ent of heretics he was prepared to examine the ‘m ethods’ of persecution. Upon returning to Brussels, Egmont encouraged the Council of State to modify the heresy laws and was nonplussed when in Ju n e further letters arrived from M adrid rebutting his interpretation of the meeting (87). M argaret asked for clarification but Philip dem urred until he had more re­ assuring news from the M editerranean. Repeated ‘headaches’ stayed his hand until 17 O ctober when, having heard of the relief of M alta, he sent six documents known as the ‘Letters from the Segovia W oods’, categorically rejecting Egm ont’s proposals (42). Four hundred lesser nobles, led by Philip of M arnix, Louis of Nas­ sau and H enry de Brederode, immediately responded by draw ing up a petition known as the ‘Compromise of the N obility’ in which they pledged themselves to resist the Inquisition and disobey Philip’s orders. Four m onths later, on 5 April 1566, 300 arm ed con­ federates led by Brederode forced M argaret to rescind the heresy

65

Descriptive Analysis

laws and ban inquisitorial activities. The grandees conveniently withdrew to their estates; they would neither condone the nobility’s actions nor support the crown in enforcing the heresy edicts (180). She was therefore forced to make further concessions and allow the Baron of M ontigny and the M arquis of Bergen to visit M adrid to obtain Philip’s approval. From his position of weakness the King agreed on 31 Ju ly 1566 to abolish the Inquisition and pardon the rebels, b ut because he signed under duress and his signature was witnessed by a notary, he could later claim that he was not obliged to honour the agreement. W hile M argaret and the Council of State awaited his reply, which did not arrive until 3 O ctober, popular disturbances broke out in the southern and western provinces. In August and Septem ber M argaret perm itted limited toleration in an attem pt to subdue the religious violence, and with the support of the grandees she slowly restored public order^B ut her succession of alarm ist letters, which spoke of 200,000 in open revolt, convinced Philip that the situation could only be remedied by despatching a large Spanish army. The decision was probably taken after a crucial council debate on 29 O ctober 1566 when Philip accepted that the situation was too volatile for him to visit the N etherlands and that instead Alva should be sent with 72,000 troops (128). Arguably he overreacted to a situation which M argaret was beginning to get under control. Indeed, by M ay 1567, following successes at Tournai, Oosterweel and Valenciennes, the first revolt had been suppressed. However, the King did not know this nor could he have acted differently, claims H elm ut Koenigsberger, ‘when faced with the double opposition of the high nobility . . . and a revolutionary religious movement with a m ilitary organization’ (77, p. 234). Alva, Requesens and Don John, 1567—78

Alva entered Brussels on 22 August 1567 and at once assumed con­ trol, even though M argaret rem ained Regent. She disapproved of his billeting of Spanish troops in loyalist towns and the creation of the Council of Troubles, set up to outflank ineffectual law courts and to prosecute the leading protagonists, and on 8 Septem ber, three days after the arrest of Egm ont and Hornes, she resigned (107). Alva received the titles of Governor-General and Regent. He was the first Regent not to be a Prince of the Blood, a point of protocol not lost on the N etherlanders. It was Alva’s intention to cow ‘the men of b utter’, and the Council of Troubles certainly did this. Between 1567 and 1573, 12,302 people were arrested, at least 9,000 had their goods confiscated and

66

Domestic Rebellions

1,105 were executed in what most contem poraries claimed and m any historians have confirmed was a reign of terror (16, 48, 118). Among the more celebrated victims were Berghes, Brederode, Egmont and Hornes. Even M ontigny, who was still in Spain, did not escape, for he was arrested and in O ctober 1570 strangled in Simancas on the K ing’s orders (see p. 92). W illiam of O range had for­ tuitously evaded Alva’s clutches, but his estates were seized and his son arrested (163). By endorsing Alva’s strong-arm methods of dubious legality Philip had irredeem ably alienated his Catholic and aristocratic sub­ jects, the very people who had stood by him in 1566. As further tales of Spanish outrages and news that Alva was beginning to implement the postponed ecclesiastical reforms reached O range in his exile in Cleves, he organised an invasion in 1568, calling upon the N ether­ la n d e r to take up arm s not as ‘rebels’ but as ‘liberators’. Not a single town rose in support and in November O range again found himself in exile, this time in France. His abortive uprising should have heralded the end of Dutch resistance, but the opposite oc­ curred. O range learned from his mistakes and saw the necessity of acquiring foreign aid, whereas Alva persuaded Philip not to visit the Netherlands. W hile domestic circumstances may have convinced the King that he should not go that year, he would, as it happened, never again have a better opportunity, and arguably the postpone­ ment cost Spain the N etherlands (53). In addition, the cost of keeping such a large arm y in the field had to be faced and Philip made it clear this m ust fall on the N etherlanders. T he StatesGeneral’s response was to vote a non-perm anent levy of 1 per cent and 4 million florins spread over two years, but it flatly refused Alva’s request for a perm anent Tw entieth Penny (5 per-cent) tax on the sales of landed property and a T enth Penny (10 per-cent) tax on all other sales. For two years Alva bided his time, but on 31 Ju ly 1571 he declared that he would collect the two new taxes with or without the States-G eneral’s consent. Predictably a tax strike ensued and Artois, Flanders, H ainaut and B rabant sent a deputation to protest to the King. Philip was unimpressed and failed to see that Alva had brought the N etherlands to the brink of another revolt. The seizure of Brill and Flushing by de la M arck and his ‘Sea Beggars’ in April 1572 caught everyone by surprise and sparked off a wave of spontaneous insurrections in the west and north while O range took his opportunity to invade from the east. Alva sprang into action, and by December only Holland and Zealand rem ained in revolt, but O range was still at large. More seriously, the war had

67

Descriptive Analysis

become one o f sieges which Spain was unlikely to win (127, 131). It took six m onths to capture Mons in 1572 and H aarlem eight months in 1572—73. Alva had neither enough m en nor money at his disposal and, it transpired, the knives in M adrid were being sharp­ ened for his sacrifice. In 1572 M edina Celi, who was no devotee of the Duke, arrived in Brussels to keep Philip informed and reported back that Alva was the principal reason for the revolt. T he King decided he m ust be replaced. O n 30 Ja n u a ry 1573 Don Luis de Requesens was surprised to hear that he was to take Alva’s place (99). Philip presented his new governor with an impossible task: he expected him to bring about a reconciliation with the rebels through m oderation rather than force, but ordered him not to yield to their dem ands for religious toleration and the restoration of their ‘ancient privileges and liberty’. These had first been requested by W illiam in 1573 and would be insisted on at future peace talks at Breda in 1575, at St G eertruidenberg in 1577 and a t Cologne in 1579. As long as the D utch insisted and Spain resisted, there would be stalemate. It appears that between 1573 and 1577 genuine attem pts were m ade by the Spanish court to find a diplom atic solution (70). Granvelle urged Philip to pay a state visit, M ontano called for a compromise which safeguarded Spain’s reputation, Furio believed concessions subject to D utch guarantees would work, and Requesens rem inded Philip that ‘no treasury in the world would be equal to the cost of this w ar’. Yet the K ing still believed that any concession would be detrim ental to Spain and the Catholic faith, and so the war continued. T he enforced suspension of fiscal payments in Septem ber 1575 and the sudden death of Requesens six m onths later added to the K ing’s predicam ent, but in Ju ly 1576 he received an unexpected fillip when Zieriksee in Zealand surrendered. T his piece of good news stiffened his resolve to fight on, and in Septem ber he appointed Don J o h n as his new governor. It is ironic th at on 3 November 1576, the very day on which Don Jo h n entered Luxem bourg bearing royal instructions to im plem ent tem porary concessions, Spanish troops m utinied in B rabant and Flanders and totally destroyed the peace initiative. Antwerp got the worst of it: 1,000 houses were looted and 8,000 people died (124). This so-called ‘Spanish Fury’ and the K ing’s refusal to let the states meet to decide how to defend themselves united Catholic and Calvinist nobles who now took the unprecedented step of convening a States-G eneral in Brussels w ithout his permission. All but Holland and Zealand attended and agreed to expel the Spanish troops, establish religious freedom and

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Domestic Rebellions

restore their political privileges, objectives embodied in the Pacifi­ cation of Ghent in Novem ber 1576 (185). Don Jo h n accepted the terms of the Pacification when he signed the Perpetual Edict in February 1577, and on 28 April the Spanish troops departed for Italy. M ost D utchm en rejoiced, but W illiam believed the governor was as untrustw orthy as the King and suspected that when his fortunes improved he would ‘wish to extir­ pate us and we do not wish to be extirpated’. O range’s refusal to trust or co-operate with Don Jo h n caused the latter so much frus­ tration that he soon discarded his conciliatory m antle and requested the troops’ recall. In July Philip agreed to renew the m ilitary cam ­ paign. T he Spanish army, now led by Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parm a, quickly advanced into Artois and W alloon Flanders, causing the States-G eneral to panic and flee north to Antwerp. T heir ability to survive would again be put to the test. Success and failure, 1578—98

As well as being an outstanding soldier, Parm a was a talented diplom at and adm inistrator, who empathised with the D utch cause in a way which previous generals had not. As the K ing’s nephew, he was ideally placed to succeed Don Jo h n when the GovernorGeneral unexpectedly died of plague on 1 O ctober 1578. P arm a’s task was clear: he m ust m aintain control of the obedient provinces, mainly in the south and east, and win back the rem ainder, by diplomacy if possible but by force if necessary. O f all the GovernorsGeneral since 1559, Parm a started in the most auspicious circumstances. Spain’s long conflict with the Porte was draw ing to a close, Portugal was about to be annexed, and the Indies were yielding increasing levels of silver. In two respects, however, the situation was more challenging. After a decade of duplicity and betrayal, few N etherlanders were prepared to trust the Spaniards, and as long as O range led the resistance a diplom atic solution seemed as elusive as ever. More significantly, by 1578 the Dutch Revolt had become an international conflict, with G erm an, French and English mercenaries fishing in Spain’s troubled waters, a factor which was to determ ine its eventual result (183, 184). In 1579—80 a m ixture of skilful diplomacy and covert bribery began to win over m any m oderate and anti-Calvinist nobles: Montigny, Lalaing, Aerschot and Rennenberg all went over to the Duke of Parm a. He further treatied with the six Catholic states in the Union of Arras (1579) by agreeing to w ithdraw his troops in April 1580, appointing native grandees to the Council of State, leaving

69

Descriptive Analysis

town oligarchs and rural elites undisturbed, and restoring the laws, liberties and taxes which had operated in Charles V ’s reign. It was all that the obedient provinces could have wished. Parm a’s success encouraged Philip, egged on by Granvelle, to outlaw O range in M arch 1580 and press on for victory. The King believed that without O range’s leadership the revolt would probably collapse, and Granvelle suggested that a price should be put on his head (162). O range’s reply in December, known as the Apology, and the StatesGeneral’s Act of A bjuration signed on 22 Ju ly 1581, which was agreed to by ten provinces, denied Philip his sovereignty and drew up the battle lines for the rem ainder of the revolt (93) [doc. 12]. The recourse to violence prom pted the W alloon estates at the end of 1581 to ask Parm a to recall his troops to defend them and recon­ quer the northern provinces. By 1582, 60,000 troops had arrived and by selecting specific towns, besieging them and offering peace terms which (unlike Alva) he kept to, he soon re-captured M aastricht, Dunkirk, Ypres, Bruges, Ghent, O stend, Brussels and Antwerp (93). By 1585 only Holland and Zealand rem ained outside his control, and O range was no longer their leader: in Ju ly 1584 he was the victim of an assassin’s bullet. Victory now seemed certain to Philip, who characteristically ordered Parm a not to make any religious concessions. ‘They are all to embrace the Rom an Catholic faith and the exercise of that alone is to be perm itted,’ he declared (123, p. 223). In A ugust 1585, when Philip least needed it, England concluded the T reaty of Nonsuch and officially entered the fray. His reaction was understandable: w ar was declared and invasion plans set in mo­ tion. Parm a was less than pleased, because he could see th at Spain’s resources would be both diversified and stretched beyond Philip’s realisation. However, the King and the Junta de Noche* ignored his objections, and in 1587 Parm a was w ithdrawn from the Dutch cam ­ paigns and told to wait at Dunkirk for the ill-fated A rm ada. O n his return, late in 1588, he encountered stiffer resistance from M aurice of Nassau, suffered his first defeat by failing to take Bergen-opZoom, and experienced the first of many mutinies. By 1589 the prevailing view in M adrid was that Spain had to bring the w ar to an end and that this could only be achieved by diplomacy. Parm a urged the K ing to grant specific Calvinist towns their toleration, but this was rejected. Instead, he was sent back to France in 1590 to assist the Catholic League, and in his absence the States-G eneral recaptured Breda, Zutphen, Deventer and Nijmegen. Ignoring or­ ders to stay in Paris, Parm a returned to the N etherlands in 1591,

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Domestic Rebellions

but when Philip heard of this he insisted that Parm a should return to France, where he died in 1592 (see p. 76). For the next two years Spanish affairs were mism anaged by C ount Mansfelt, the 75-year-old governor, and C ount Fuentes, the acting comm ander, who shared power and hated each other. In 1594 Philip decided upon a new policy, perhaps upon Idiaquez’s recom men­ dation (136). The N etherlands would become a separate, sem i-independent state, governed jointly by Isabella, Philip’s daughter, and Archduke Ernst of Austria, her projected husband. Ernst arrived in Brussels in 1594 but died in February 1595, and Philip thereupon turned to E rnst’s brother, the C ardinal Archduke Albert, who became the new Governor-General. A third royal bankruptcy in 1596 left Spanish troops unpaid and further disrupted Philip’s plans, and although a financial settlem ent in December 1597 gave him renewed hope, it was clear that the Army of Flanders was a spent force and that total victory would elude him. In 1598 Philip willed that Isabella should m arry Albert, with the N ether­ lands as her dowry; together they would govern the obedient provinces, while sovereignty rested with the King of Spain. W ithout having to deal with the rebels, Philip had arranged a settlem ent which he believed would prove m utually acceptable. He was too proud a m onarch to acknowledge that they had beaten him. The seven northern provinces had in all but nam e defeated Spain by 1598 prim arily because of Philip’s commitments elsewhere —his initial preoccupation with the Turks in the M editerranean and his subsequent decisions to attack England and to intervene in France. Financial difficulties helped to create num erous m utinies in the large Spanish arm y, and fighting a long war of attrition over 1,000 km from Spain added to the logistical problems. C ertainly the Dutch determ ination to resist Spanish rule and to preserve their religious and civil liberties, allied to their skilful deploym ent of naval and land tactics, frustrated successive Spanish generals, yet the respon­ sibility for causing the revolt and failing to suppress it lay with the King. H e had acted provocatively in his policies and appointm ents and denied his adm inistrators and generals the financial means and political freedom to achieve an acceptable solution. T he N etherlands was a microcosm of his imperial problems, and one which he failed to solve (153).

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8

Foreign Policy

A im s The aims and motives behind Philip’s foreign policy have long perplexed historians, as they did contem poraries. Leopold von Ranke, writing in 1843, believed Philip ‘came to regard the progress of his own power and the progress of religion as identical, and to behold the latter in the form er’; R. T. Davies claimed that Philip’s ultimate objective was ‘the dom ination of the British Isles and France by means of intervention in their religious struggle’; while Geoffrey Parker suggests th at religion was the m ainspring of his foreign policy (30, p. 136; 123, 147, p. 33). In contrast, Peter Pier­ son argues that Philip was motivated more by personal obligations than by reasons of state, which accounts for his inconsistent policies (136). Spain’s enemies were convinced that he wished to expand his lands, exterm inate heretics and establish a E uropean hegemony. ‘The King of Spain, as a tem poral sovereign, is anxious above all to safeguard and to increase his dom inions,’ claimed Pope Sixtus V in 1589 (104, p. 273). The papal nuncio in M adrid wrote in a similar vein: ‘He says he does not w ant the property of others, but the chances of the occasion, the penchant for dom ination which is innate in men, unforeseen incidents, could end in the establishm ent of a universal m onarchy.’ The medieval ideal of a peaceful and united C hristian Europe had been the declared objective of Charles V ’s advisers, Alfonso de Valdes and M ercurino de G attinara, but it rem ained an elusive dream (110, 122). M ost m en believed God held a design for the universe, and Spaniards were certain they were appointed by their superior culture, language, faith and wealth to fulfil it. In practice, however, Philip was no visionary and recognised that despite his apparent power, he had insufficient resources to pur­ sue such global ambitions. Philip’s monarquxa was far-flung and basically indefensible, only held together by the collective will of Genoese m erchants, Flemish bankers, Italian and Germ an soldiers, Portuguese and Italian sailors, American miners and Spanish officials (67). For most of his

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reign he could count on the Italian states to support his policies actively; Genoa, Savoy-Piedmont, Parm a and Tuscany were reliable allies, while the Spanish possessions of Naples, Sicily and M ilan watched over more independently-m inded states such as the Vatican, Florence and Venice. T he A ustrian H absburgs also gave Philip m uch of w hat he wanted: at best their support and at worst neutrality. Ferdinand I (1558-64) was Philip’s brother, M axim ilian II (1564-76) his son-in-law, and Rudolf II (1576-1612) M axim ilian’s son. Yet, if family ties were an asset, little love was lost between Philip and Ferdinand, and both M axim ilian and Rudolf could, at least in his opinion, have offered him more assist­ ance in his struggle with the N etherlands (151). Philip’s prim e aim was to defend his dominions and not to give offence. His intention to preserve and secure his lands, people and faith by peaceful diplom acy was noted by Suriano, the Venetian am bassador, when he claimed in 1559 that Philip did not intend ‘to wage war so that he can add to his kingdoms but to wage peace so that he can keep the lands he has’ (31, 70, p. 129). If aggression was required, then it m ust be a ‘ju s t’ war; this would not only en­ hance his reputation but also secure papal support. Philip’s enemies, of course, perceived him as an out-and-out aggressor. H istorians are inclined to take an interm ediate position. They acknowledge that Philip may have regarded attack as the best form of defence, but they also recognise that acts of apparent provocation occurred in the second half of his reign, and they identify his acquisition of Portugal as a turning-point in his foreign policy (81). F ra n c e Antonio Pérez once informed Philip: ‘T he heart of the. Spanish Em­ pire is France.’ In 1556 and for much of his reign this was most certainly the case. Henry II of France was eager to gain lands in Piedmont and M ilan which he regarded as the weak link in the H absburg chain; Charles V ’s ailing m ental and physical condition since 1553, wedded to Philip’s raw inexperience, only served to whet his appetite. T he advent of the francophile Pope Paul IV in 1555 strengthened the anti-Spanish alliance, and French victories at Casale, Ivrea and Volpiano convinced Philip that the Italian cam ­ paign m ust be concluded if he was to save M ilan. To his surprise, France agreed to a five-year truce at Vaucelles in February 1556; she too was in dire financial straits. Paul IV, a N eapolitan, was far from pleased. H e at once urged

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Descriptive Analysis

H enry II to join him in an invasion of Naples. Philip decided upon a pre-emptive strike, which was to prove financially expensive and morally provocative, but he knew his credibility was at stake. If Naples fell by default, which Spanish dom inion would be next? The viceroy, the Duke of Alva, with an arm y of 12,000, m arched into the Papal States in Septem ber 1556 and encam ped 40 km from Rome. News that Francis, Duke of Guise, had invaded M ilan and was speeding towards Naples brought only false hopes, as his sub­ sequent failure to capture Civitella led to his retreat back to France in August 1557. Philip treated the Papacy with generosity and made no territorial or financial demands in return for his offer of peace. He thereby earned a reputation for clemency which won him the support of all the m ajor states in Italy (153). T he Italian cam paign of 1557 was in fact a side-show to the m ain event. To prove he was at least equal to H enry II, Philip first con­ cluded an alliance with England to secure control of the Channel and then launched a m ajor offensive against St Q uentin in northern France. O n 10 August the Duke of Savoy with 70,000 imperial and Spanish troops crushed the French army, killing 3,000 and captur­ ing 7,000. Philip arrived in time to see the town fall and lead his troops in a trium phal entry. The expected reaction from H enry came in D ecem ber when 27,000 troops besieged the English town and en­ virons of Calais. T he English were taken by surprise and on 7 Ja n u ary 1558 surrendered (29). Philip - who by this time was King of England as well as Spain —was furious. Not only had Calais been lost by default; H enry had received a new lease of life, and launched further attacks on towns in the N etherlands. Only in July did Spain retaliate when C ount Egm ont killed 1,500 and captured 3,000 French troops at Gravelines (144). Already Franco-Spanish peace talks were well under way at Cateau-Cam bresis, since neither Philip nor H enry could afford to carry on fighting. Both kings desired a good and lasting peace but not at any price; although they accepted the need for territorial con­ cessions, they were determ ined to safeguard their respective reputations. T he two key issues - the fate of Savoy and Calais were resolved when France declared she would concede all claims to Italy on condition that she retained Calais. Finally, a double m arriage was concluded between Philip and Elizabeth, H enry’s daughter, and between Em manuel Philibert of Savoy and M argaret, H enry’s sister. Philip was delighted with the treaty signed on 3 April 1559. His reputation had been established and Italy would not again be contested by France until 1797.

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Foreign Policy

Philip’s policy towards France after 1559 was to keep it politically divided and religiously united in so far as this was possible. From time to time he expressed his concern to C atherine de Medici a t the growth of H uguenotism but, with the exception of 1563, 1567 and 1569, when he gave her minor assistance, he wisely stayed out of French affairs (76) [doc. 13]. M uch has been m ade of a secret meeting at Bayonne in Ju n e 1565 when Alva pressed Catherine to act against the French Huguenots and join in an attack upon heretics in the N etherlands and France. Proposals were also m ade for m ar­ riages between C atherine’s daughter, M arguerite, and Philip’s son, Don Carlos, and between C atherine’s son, Charles IX of France, and the Em peror’s daughter. In fact these discussions rem ained in­ conclusive except in the fertile m inds of contem porary Protestants. Franco-Spanish relations took a turn for the worse in 1568. First, family ties were broken when Philip’s French wife died and he turned down her sister, M arguerite, in favour of Anne of Austria. It was a double blow to Catherine, who had hoped her son would m arry the H absburg princess. Charles IX responded by encourag­ ing Cosimo de M edici to cause trouble in the duchy of Lorraine, whose ruler was Philip’s cousin, and by openly befriending Coligny, the leader of the Huguenots. Second, Philip suspected that France was starting to probe his weaknesses. In 1570 H uguenots besieged Perpignan in Spanish N avarre and in 1571 he learned that Coligny had persuaded Charles to invade the N etherlands. It was apparently their intention to partition it between France, England and the Em ­ pire, but at the last m inute Catherine vetoed the scheme and Charles withdrew his support (160). Philip was delighted when he heard of the massacre of St Bartholomew in August 1572; Coligny was dead, some 12,000 H uguenots had been slaughtered, and France was again a t war with itself. T he defence of N avarre and the N etherlands was pivotal to Philip’s thinking after 1572. The rising star in the French galaxy was H enry Bourbon, King of Navarre, who, as well as having a claim to the throne of both France and Spanish Navarre, was also the leader of the Huguenots. O f equal concern to Philip was the behaviour of Francis, Duke of Anjou, brother of H enry III, who ascended the French throne upon C harles’s death in 1574. Anjou was a maverick, restless for real power and aware that he was less than welcome at his brother’s court. For six years he tried to assist the D utch rebels until he died of tuberculosis in 1584. His death m ade H enry of N avarre heir presumptive, but it was now in the m u­ tual interest of Philip, French Catholics and particularly the Guises

75

Descriptive Analysis

to prevent him from ever becoming king. In Septem ber the Duke of Guise, his two brothers and two nobles formed a C atholic League to keep H enry of N avarre off the French throne, and in December 1584, at Joinville, Philip joined them. ‘In tru th we have been moved to negotiate this because it seems to be the only way to remedy m atters of religion in that kingdom ,’ Philip wrote to Idiaquez (123). H e com m itted troops and 50,000 crowns a m onth to the League in return for C am brai and a promise of French neutrality in the event of a w ar with England, but in practice he had little control over the Guises, who seemed to be more adept at spending his money than advancing his cause. Moreover, the presence of Spanish troops began to cause resentm ent among Frenchm en of all creeds and persuasions. M atters were going badly wrong for Philip. H enry III skilfully kept Parm a’s arm y out of France in 1588 by evading Spanish requests for the A rm ada to have use of a deep-water Channel port. T hen in December, heartened by the news of the A rm ada’s defeat, the French King ordered the assassination of Guise and his brother, the C ardinal of Lorraine. Philip now became the leading protagonist of a debilitated Catholic League, and upon hearing that H enry I II had been assassinated in A ugust 1589, there­ by opening the way to H enry of N avarre’s accession, he was convinced that he m ust intervene directly. ‘T he affairs of France are at this m om ent the principal thing,’ he informed Parm a (70, p. 134). Three million ducats were sent to the surviving m em bers of the League, and Parm a was ordered to leave Brussels and help defend Paris from H enry of Navarre. The year 1590 saw Parm a invade the French capital, the Duke of Savoy occupy eastern France and Spanish troops land in Brittany. Henry of N avarre’s days appeared to be num bered, and when his elderly uncle, the C ardinal of Bourbon, who had a claim to the throne, died on 9 M ay, this opened up the possibility of Philip’s daughter, Isabella, becoming the next m onarch. Philip’s motives are as hard to discern now as they were then. T he French suspected he was seeking to extend his Em pire at their expense, and Pope Clement V III, believing that Philip wished to establish a universal monarchy, rejected his claims to be the protector of French Catholics. In April 1592 Parm a successfully relieved Rouen, but eight m onths later died from wounds sustained in the defence of Amiens. T his was a bitter blow to Spanish ambitions, and when Henry of N avarre declared his conversion to the C atholic faith in 1593, Philip’s cause became hopeless. Yet he foolishly persisted in challenging H enry IV ’s right to the throne even after the Catholic

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Foreign Policy

nobles, the people of France and the Papacy had been won over. Already the Spanish am bassador in Paris, the Duke of Feria, had informed the Estates-G eneral th at Isabella was to be proclaimed Queen of France and would m arry Ernst, heir presum ptive to the imperial throne, but that if the people preferred a French husband, then Charles, Duke of Guise, would be acceptable to Philip. This piece of Spanish im pertinence united the French nation far more effectively than anything Henry IV could have said. In February 1594 he was crowned King and less than a year later he declared war on Spain. T he wheel had come full circle. Philip was again fight­ ing France but in circumstances far less propitious than at the beginning of his reign. In 1596 France formed a triple alliance with England and the U nited Provinces, and in spite of Spanish victories at Calais (April 1596) and Amiens (M arch 1597), a decree of bankruptcy (Novem ber 1596) and the loss of Amiens (Septem ber 1597) convinced Philip that an honourable peace m ust be concluded. The resulting T reaty of Vervins of May 1598 has been viewed by some historians as a Spanish trium ph (133). France recovered Calais, B rittany and Languedoc, but she was bankrupt and still sur­ rounded by H absburg dominions. Geoffrey Parker, however, has argued that the peace treaty ‘represented a considerable victory’ for France, given her long period of civil war, especially as Spain was by now in a precarious condition (123, p. 195). O n balance, this seems a more perceptive judgem ent. T urkey Most Spaniards regarded the M editerranean as the true sphere of royal influence in the mid-sixteenth century. The 1550s saw Tripoli, Peñón de Vélez and Bougie fall to the Turks, leaving Spain in pos­ session of M ers-el-Kebir, O rán, Melilla and la G oletta, a fortress overlooking Tunis (59). Philip knew that if the coast of N orth Africa became Turkish, communications with Naples and Sicily would be seriously threatened, but until 1559 his priority was his w ar with France. As soon as the Peace of Cáteau-Cam brésis was concluded, he was freed from his northern commitments and the likelihood of a future Franco-Turkish alliance. Peace talks with Suleim an I were cancelled and plans went ahead for a Spanish attack on Tripoli. Philip considered that m inimum forces would be sufficient if they could surprise the Turks, but his comm ander, M edina Celi, the Viceroy of Sicily, disagreed. He perceived the cam paign in larger and more expensive terms, fearing that a small fleet m ight not

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Descriptive Analysis

achieve its objective. It was not therefore until 1560, six months later, that the fleet occupied the island of D jerba as a prelude to Tripoli. However, D ragut, leader of the Barbary corsairs, was lying in wait and, in a surprise attack, captured 10,000 men and eight galleys, as well as the island, in M ay 1560. This disaster struck home. Philip’s reputation had to be restored, but this could only be done with an enlarged navy, and this would not be ready until 1564. M eanwhile, further Turkish raids occurred. Sometimes the corsairs operated on their own —as at la H arradura in 1561, when Dragut sank seven galleys; occasionally they acted in consort with the Porte when, for example, O ran was assailed in 1563. Fortunately for Philip, the Turks only attacked in strength in 1565, partly due to fears that Persia was preparing to assault their eastern flank and partly due to internal rivalry between Selim and Bayazid, the Sultan’s sons, and Ali Pasha, the new G rand Vizier. Better planning and attention to detail brought Philip success in 1564 when thirtythree galleys launched an attack on Morocco and recaptured Penon de Velez. T he K ing was elated, declaring, ‘El Papa esta a la m ira’ (The Pope is watching us). From 1560 to 1565 the Knights of St Jo h n had launched counter­ attacks from M alta against O ttom an ships and the B arbary coast. Retaliation was inevitable and came in M ay 1565 when 180 Turkish warships besieged their island base (9). The Knights held out until September, when Don García de Toledo, Viceroy of Naples, arrived from Sicily and scattered the besiegers. The relief of M alta enhanced Philip’s prestige, saved Sicily, and m arked the lim it of O ttom an in­ fluence in the western M editerranean, but Turkish power was far from extinguished. Each sum m er Christians held their breath to see where the Turks were next going to strike. In 1570 Venice was the reported target, but instead Algerian troops captured Tunis and threatened la Goletta. Cyprus, a wealthy V enetian colony, was also invaded, and Nicosia and Cyrenia fell in September. As Italians quaked with anticipation, Pius V took the initiative by inviting Spain to join Venice, Genoa and a num ber of other Italian states, including the Papacy, in a Holy League. Although the Papacy of­ fered to rem it Spanish clerical taxes worth 1 million ducats, Philip was unenthusiastic. Spain would not be in charge of the campaign, nor even the dom inant partner, since Venice would supply most of the ships and troops, and with limited finances he was far more in­ terested in re-capturing Tunis and Algiers than in defending Venice. Even after he had agreed to join the League he gave it so little chance of success th at in Ja n u ary 1571 he considered withdrawing, and only

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Foreign Policy

decided not to do so because, as he candidly rem arked, ‘our prestige will certainly suffer if we do not provide w hat we prom ised’. Nine months later, at Lepanto in the G ulf of Corinth, a C hristian fleet led by Philip’s half-brother, Don Jo h n of Austria, captured more than half the Turkish ships and killed 30,000 Turks including their admiral, Ali Pasha. T he O ttom an fleet had suffered its worst defeat since 1402, and although Philip had only contributed 79 ships he enjoyed the kudos of victory. As Venice celebrated for a week and the Pope ordered a Te Deum, Philip commissioned Titian to paint ‘Spain Com ing to the Aid of Religion’ on a particularly large canvas. Traditionally historians have viewed Lepanto as a seminal event, claiming that after it the M editerranean no longer held centre stage in Europe, that it ended the long conflict between M uslims and Christians, and m arked the beginning of Turkish naval decline (12, 13, 36, 85). T he extant evidence in the Turkish archives simply does not bear out this retrospective judgem ent. Selim’s response to the defeat was to rebuild his fleet and double his resolve to control N orth Africa and the sea routes via M alta and Sicily (58). Moreover, the C hristian victory was not followed up by Spain for a num ber of reasons. The victors had suffered heavy losses — 8,000 dead, 15,000 wounded and twenty ships lost — and the Venetians were unreliable allies. In addition, Don Jo h n was so unpredictable that he m ight risk and lose everything, and the cam paigning season was already well advanced. Finally, Philip believed that the sting in the Turkish tail had only been partially draw n. His caution was justified. Only weeks after Lepanto the Turks captured Cyprus, a salutary rem inder that their potential to inflict a serious blow was still formidable. In 1574, 300 galleys led by Euldj Ali recaptured Tunis and la G oletta and threatened Sicily. However, ju st when it seemed that the Turks were recovering the initiative, Selim died in 1575 and news of the death of the Persian Shah led to a renewal of internecine w ar in the M iddle East. Since 1575 Philip had taken secret soundings about the possibility of a truce with the Porte. Negotiations were complicated by Portugal’s attack on Morocco in 1578, but it was significant that when the flower of the Portuguese nobility was killed at Alcazarquivir, neither Philip nor M urad responded (58). Both had serious dom estic problems and realised that their M editerranean conflict was a w ar neither could win. A truce was concluded in 1578 by Philip’s agent in Constantinople, Giovanni M argliani, which served as the basis of a treaty signed in August 1580 and renewed in 1581 for three years. The Venetians felt betrayed, the Pope was

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Descriptive Analysis

mortified, and even the Spanish clergy called for the annulm ent of the cruzada* and excusado*. Philip, however, was unmoved. Unlike his father, he was not a crusader; on the contrary, he saw it to be his C hristian duty to reach an honourable peace with the Porte. The benefits were m utual. As the Turks expanded towards the Caspian Sea, engaging the Persians in war between 1578 and 1590 and threatening the Portuguese trade in the Indian O cean, Philip could again turn his attention to northern Europe and entertain grandiose schemes involving England and France. Nevertheless, if the O t­ toman threat to the Iberian possessions had receded in the course of his reign, Spain had lost almost all of her N orth African outposts. At best Philip’s policy had been defiant and honourable, but for the most p art he had been on the defensive. T he Cross could contain but not expunge the Crescent (187). P o rtu g a l Portugal was ruled by Sebastian I (1557-78), until his ill-fated decision to lead a crusade against the Turks saw his disappearance and assum ed death at Alcazarquivir in Morocco. T he heir was his great-uncle Henry, a deaf, half-blind, toothless, sixty-six-year-old cardinal who was far from well when he surprisingly m arried the thirteen-year-old daughter of the Duchess of Braganga. On 31 J a n u a ry 1580 H enry died and a succession dispute erupted (28). Philip was well prepared, having already set up a Portuguese com­ mittee in 1579 to facilitate his claim. O n paper he was the best male claimant, through his m other Isabella, daughter of Em m anuel I of Portugal, but he was challenged by Don Antonio, an illegitimate son of H enry’s brother, and by C atalina, Duchess of Bragan^a, whose son was in prison in Seville. Philip responded decisively. He sent the Duke of O suna and Cristobal de M oura to Lisbon to offer inducem ents to nobles and influential m em bers of the Cortes*. He promised to pay the ransom of nobles captured in 1578, and won over the Bragan^as by granting them land and titles and agreeing to release their son. Lisbon m erchants realised that union with Spain would bring commercial advantages, and the Portuguese clergy were prepared to welcome Philip as their new ruler. O nly the townspeople rem ained sceptical and some, fearing Spanish subjugation, found their possible saviour in Don Antonio. By Ju n e 1580 supporters had raised his flag in Santarem , O porto, Lisbon and Setubal, prom pting Spain to invade with 37,000 troops. It was a well-planned and skilfully executed campaign and, although Antonio escaped, his

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forces were beaten and by August Philip was in control of Portugal

(25). Between December 1580 and February 1583 Philip resided in Lis­ bon and displayed his political wisdom. He wore Portuguese-style clothes, cut his beard according to their fashion and learned their language. In April 1581 the T om ar Cortes* recognised him as King, and in 1582 he sensibly let the Portuguese retain their own customs, coinage, language and laws. A Council of Portugal was set up, the Cortes was to meet as before, and all adm inistrative offices were reserved for nationals. Philip’s viceroy was to be Portuguese or a m em ber of the H absburg royal family; the first was the twenty-threeyear-old Archduke Albert of Austria (1583-93) and he was succeeded by leading Portuguese nobles. The annexation of Portugal brought several advantages to Spain. H er empire comprised Brazil, W est Africa, the Spice Islands and the Azores, an im portant base for the Indies fleet. H er navy con­ tained galleasses as well as galleons and gave Philip greater security in the west of Spain and the opportunity to reach the N etherlands, England and France by sea. H er crown brought Philip enormous prestige. For the first time since the Roman occupation the Iberian peninsula was under one Christian ruler which, in the opinion of Peter Pierson, was ‘the greatest trium ph of his reign’ (136, p. 147). Certainly, as ruler of 40 million people he was the most powerful man in the world and, according to his court historian C abrera Cordoba, it was in the 1580s that he began to call h im self‘King of Spain’. But unification also brought problems. Portugal’s long At­ lantic coastline was vulnerable to attack and a prim e target for interlopers in search of the East and West Indies trade ships (8). Antonio also continued to plague Philip. In 1582 France assisted him in an abortive attem pt to seize the Azores, and the English twice tried to restore him to the Portuguese throne. It was as well for Philip that France and England only regarded him as an ancillary weapon in their w ar against Spain and that he died in exile in 1595 (see p. 84). E n g la n d Friendship and co-operation 1554—67

Philip’s m arriage to M ary T udor in 1554 was not m ade in heaven but in Brussels by Charles V ’s councillors. In the sum m er of 1553, as Charles lay ill, they planned to contain the growing power of France and facilitate Spain’s control of the N etherlands in the face

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Descriptive Analysis

of rival claims from their A ustrian cousins, by creating a new north­ ern state out of England and the Netherlands which would be inherited by Philip and M ary’s heirs. Philip was not consulted and M ary first heard of the plan from the imperial am bassador in England, Simon R enard (94, 153). Philip visited England on two occasions: from Ju ly 1554 to August 1555, and from M arch to Ju ly 1557 when he came to enlist England’s support in his war against France. He viewed England as a valuable counterweight to the Guises in France and Scotland that could make a telling contribution at a critical m om ent in the H absburg—Valois struggle in northern France. He did his best to court the English by distributing largesse and even drinking beer, but there was evident antipathy towards the Spaniards who were deemed arrogant, aggressive and excessively num erous. AntiSpanish literature like A supplicacyon to the Queues Majestic and A warnyng fo r Englande heightened the tension. O nly w ith great diffi­ culty did Philip and M ary persuade the Council to agree to go to war with France in 1557. Its reluctance was justified. O nce w ar was declared, Spain refused to break off relations with Scotland, ignored suggestions th at the H anseatic League should have fewer privileges in England, and in the opinion of the Council allowed Calais to be lost. M oreover, M ary was saddened by Philip’s lengthy absences and her unrequited love. The Spaniards were equally disenchanted with the English. In Philip’s estimation, they were ungrateful, un­ trustw orthy and fractious, had been conspicuous by their absence in the defence of Calais, and contributed next to nothing in the en­ suing campaigns. Philip shed few tears at the death of M ary in Novem ber 1558, but he showed concern at the effect it might have on the peace negoti­ ations currently under way at C ateau-Cam bresis. E ngland’s alliance must be retained to offset the Guises’s influence in Scotland, but Queen Elizabeth flatly refused to acknowledge the loss of Calais. The Spanish am bassador in London, the Duke of Feria, keenly ad­ vocated a m arriage between Elizabeth and Philip, which seemed to offer benefits to both parties. Elizabeth was regarded as illegitimate by the Papacy and needed Philip’s protective arm not only to save her from the missives of the V atican but also to w ard off threats from the am bitious Guises. For his part, the possibility of helping Elizabeth return England to the Catholic faith and frustrating French am bitions in Scotland would more than offset the expected French pique when they discovered he was not going to m arry Henry I I ’s daughter. Yet, in truth, Philip did not find Elizabeth T udor at

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all attractive, and when he affirmed his offer of m arriage in Ja n u ary 1559, he likened his position to that of ‘a m an under sentence of death’. In fact, she turned him down and he wisely m arried Elizabeth of Valois instead. Between 1559 and 1567 Anglo-Spanish relations were sound but never particularly good, because they rested upon personal relation­ ships and m utual opposition to the Guises rather than on trade and m arital ties. T he Protestant religious settlement of 1559 disturbed Philip, although he took the pragm atic view that it was neither propitious to intervene in English affairs nor wise to jeopardise the goodwill of Elizabeth. ‘T he evil that is taking place in that kingdom’, he informed Feria, ‘has caused me the anger and con­ fusion I have m entioned . . . but we must try to remedy it without involving me or any of my vassals in a declaration of w ar until we have enjoyed the benefits of peace’ (112, p. 84). He personally per­ suaded the Papacy not to excommunicate Elizabeth, fearing such an action might trigger off a Catholic revolt in England which France would exploit. Neither a m inor trade war in 1563—65 nor the Dutch Revolt disturbed the diplom atic harm ony, although m uch of the cordiality was due to the Spanish ambassador, G uzm an de Silva (1564—68), who was popular with the Queen and adept at pouring oil on troubled waters. Years o f estrangement: 1567—85

The year 1567 was a turning-point in Philip’s relationship with Elizabeth, the key to which lay in the N etherlands (35), (see p. 66). Alva’s arm y was seeking to establish Spanish rule at the expense of Dutch political and religious liberty, and if he succeeded it might encourage Philip to try and regain England for the Catholic faith. Elizabeth had not sufficient military, naval or fiscal strength to stop Alva, but by seizing Spanish silver bound ultimately for the Army of Flanders she could bleed his supply lines. Perhaps the three voyages of Jo h n Hawkins to West Africa in the 1560s and the selling of cloth and slaves in Spanish America, forbidden by the T reaty of Tordesillas, were politically as well as commercially inspired (142). The Spanish gave an unequivocal reaction when they seized ten of Haw kins’ ships at San J u a n de U lua in Septem ber 1567. It was this event which sparked off a wave of anti-Spanish pam phleteering and spawned the English m yth that Philip was an agent of evil (108). Elizabeth responded in 1568 by comm andeering five Genoese sil­ ver ships carrying £40,000 of bullion bound for the N etherlands when they sought refuge from Channel pirates (182). T he new

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Descriptive Analysis

Spanish am bassador, De Spes, alerted Alva who imposed an em­ bargo on Anglo-Dutch trade in Jan u ary . W hen the Q ueen retaliated by seizing forty Spanish ships in English Waters, Philip ordered all English ships in Spanish ports to be held. T rade was only nor­ malised in 1573 when Elizabeth signed the Convention of Nijmegen and agreed to compensate the Genoese bankers. Although eleven m ajor English expeditions to Spanish America took place between 1572 and 1577, Elizabeth claimed these were unofficial, and she specifically disowned all responsibility for D rake’s attack on Nombre de Dios in 1573 and for his lucrative circum navigation of the globe between 1577 and 1580 (1, 2). Philip had doubts about Elizabeth’s innocence, and these were strengthened when he learned in 1584 that Raleigh and Grenville had tried to establish a settlem ent in Roanoke, Virginia which directly threatened Spanish shipping routes. A decree of 19 M ay 1585 ordered the confiscation of all English goods and shipping in Iberian waters, but this prom pted Elizabeth to issue letters of m arque to m erchants, allowing them to recuperate any losses they had sustained at Spanish hands by plundering Spanish ships. Elizabeth also provoked Spain in Europe. First, she financed the Portuguese pretender, Don Antonio, in 1583, and when he was driven out of the Azores gave him tem porary exile at her court. Second, and far more damaging, was her intervention in the N ether­ lands, though this was long delayed. In M arch 1572 she ordered the expulsion of the D utch privateer William, Baron of Lumey de la M arck, from Dover, thereby triggering a m ajor uprising in Brill and Flushing, which in effect inaugurated the D utch war of inde­ pendence. T he Spaniards regarded Elizabeth’s action as deliberate provocation, but there is no evidence that she anticipated or in­ fluenced the consequences. Indeed, for the next thirteen years she followed Burghley’s advice to keep out of involvement in the N ether­ lands (105, 161, 181, 184). It was the deaths of Anjou and William of O range in 1584 and the fall of Antwerp in 1585, leaving Holland and Zealand exposed, which brought m atters to a head. Since Henry III of France showed no desire to challenge Spain, Elizabeth com­ m itted herself militarily to the Dutch cause. By the T reaty of Nonsuch, signed on 20 August 1585, she agreed to send £126,000 and 6,000 m en under the leadership of the Earl of Leicester to aid the rebels, in return for Flushing, Brill and Rammekens. Leicester and W alsingham were convinced that unless Spain was stopped, England would be next to fall, but there is no extant evidence in the Spanish archives to corroborate their analysis of Philip’s intentions.

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Elizabeth’s attem pt to justify this provocative act, expounded in A Declaration o f the Causes Moving the Queen o f England to give aid to the Defence o f the People afflicted and oppressed in the Lowe Countries, fooled no one — least of all Philip. Upon hearing in O ctober th at Drake had attacked Vigo and Bayona in Galicia, the King took the decision to launch the A rm ada. English troops had invaded his territory, oc­ cupied his fortresses and challenged his sovereignty. They m ust be removed and his reputation avenged. The breakdown in Anglo-Spanish relations cannot be attributed solely to Elizabeth, for Philip also acted provocatively. C entral to Spain’s m achinations was M ary, Q ueen of Scots. In 1568 she had sought political exile in England, but as she had a claim to the throne and was a Catholic, she was put under house arrest. The Pope was outraged and called upon Philip to rescue her, but the K ing had no wish to antagonise Elizabeth at this time or jeopardise the welfare of English Catholics, and in any case he was not sure that he could trust the judgem ent of his resident am bassadors, who claimed the country was in a state of incipient rebellion (116). In 1569 he only gave moral encouragem ent to the rebellion of the N orthern Earls and to the M unster uprising in Ireland. In 1570 he even reprim anded Pius V for excommunicating Elizabeth without consulting him. Philip’s first overt provocative act came in 1571, at the time of the Ridolfi Plot, when he approved the Council of S tate’s recom m endation to send a small fleet of warships to gain control of the N orth Sea and ordered Alva to transport 10,000 troops to help M ary secure the throne. T he general seems to have had doubts about the viability of this plan from the outset, but Philip re-affirmed his order in August, even after Ridolfi’s arrest. ‘I am so keen to achieve the consum m ation of this enterprise’, he in­ formed Alva, ‘I am so attached to it in my heart, and I am so con­ vinced th at God our saviour m ust embrace it as his own cause that I cannot be dissuaded from putting it into operation’ (123, p. 53). Even so, as it became increasingly obvious that the enterprise was doomed to fail, Philip changed his mind and cancelled his orders. Philip rem ained uneasy at the growing persecution of Catholic missionaries and Jesuits in England in the 1580s. Although these priests were nominally apolitical, such was their zeal that the possi­ bility of Catholic-inspired plots on the Q ueen’s life could never be ruled out. At one time Philip had opposed the idea of putting M ary Stuart on the English throne, but now he regarded it as a desirable objective. H e had hopes that she could become a Spanish puppet, perhaps even ‘his agent in a policy for the general unification of

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Descriptive Analysis

Christendom under Spanish presidency’ (27, p. 202). In October 1580 Philip despatched a fleet to Smerwick in Ireland and landed 800 Spanish and Italian troops in the hope of instigating a general uprising centred upon M unster. Prom pt action by an English naval squadron forced the rebels to surrender and all but fifteen were m as­ sacred. T hree years later the Throckm orton Plot was hatched, in which Jesuits, M ary and M endoza, the Spanish am bassador, planned to assassinate Elizabeth and orchestrate a Catholic uprising in preparation for an invasion by the French Guises and Spanish troops. U pon interrogation M endoza adm itted his involvement and Philip’s complicity. T o Elizabeth, Philip was dangerous and un­ trustw orthy; to Philip, Elizabeth was the Protestant Jezebel who had exhausted his patience. It was his duty as the M ost Catholic King to teach her a lesson. The Armada and its aftermath: 1585—98

H istorians are agreed that Philip may have had several aims in send­ ing the A rm ada but that his prime objective was to stop the English from interfering in the Netherlands. The English navy impeded his control of the sea and without it he would not recover the disobedient D utch provinces. A projected attack on England would tie down E lizabeth’s fleet, commit her to heavy defence expenditure, and possibly bring her to sue for peace. Philip was perhaps mindful of the V enetian am bassador’s comment that ‘vigorous preparations for w ar are the surest way to secure favourable term s of peace’. Ideally Philip would have welcomed the conversion of England to Catholicism , and there is no reason to doubt that religion was a genuine motive, even if a secondary one. After all, 180 clerics ac­ com panied the fleet, twenty-four Jesuits waited in Flanders, and C ardinal Allen, an English-born missionary, was ready to take over the spiritual direction of the new Catholic state. Philip instructed Parm a in April 1588 that even if the invasion was only partially successful, he m ust dem and toleration for Catholics [doc. 15]. But the A rm ada was not prim arily a religious crusade, for Philip was a realist, not a visionary. He doubted the strength of English Catholicism and its potential to rise up in support o f an invasion, and there is no evidence that he intended the conquest of England or even believed that it was possible. At best he hoped to secure the south-east, between M argate and London, as a bargaining counter with which to accomplish his more pragm atic objectives of peace, compensation and toleration for English Catholics. T he plan to launch an A rm ada was first mooted in August 1583

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by Santa Cruz, Captain-G eneral of the Ocean Sea. In Ja n u ary 1586 he again outlined his requirem ents: 560 ships and 94,000 troops would be needed to enable a decoy strike force to attack southern Ireland while the m ain fleet landed on the south coast of England directly from Lisbon. T he total cost was estim ated at 3.5 million ducats. Parm a doubted w hether such a task force would be powerful enough to win a sea battle as well as a land battle, and in Ju n e suggested an alternative strategy. H e would transport 30,000 troops from Bergen-op-Zoom to M argate in eight to twelve hours and m arch on London. As he would be travelling in light, shallow boats which were vulnerable to attack, Santa Cruz m ust clear the Channel of enemy ships. Philip found the plan very attractive: it was prac­ ticable and would only cost an estimated 150,000 ducats a month. Speed and secrecy were of course essential, yet an invasion in 1586 was ruled out since the cam paigning season was already well ad­ vanced and in early 1587 Philip was still trying to persuade Sixtus V that the contem plated action would benefit religion [doc. 14]. News of M ary S tuart’s execution finally convinced the Pope, and in July 1587 he agreed to donate 1 million ducats but only after ‘the arm y has been put on land’ and provided it landed before the end of the year. T here is no truth in the claim that M ary’s death played a decisive p art in actuating Philip, since he had already decided to attack England; but it did enable him to com m and the moral high ground and secure papal support. At some stage in 1586, probably in July, the Council of W ar proposed combining Parm a’s and Santa C ruz’s plans, but no decision was taken until August 1587 when news th at Parm a had captured Sluys convinced Philip that a Spanish fleet could join the Army of Flanders at O stend and invade England simultaneously (163). T o achieve this, the King decided to drop the Irish diversion and to increase the size of the Arm ada. Parm a opposed this hastily am ended plan. He disliked its timing, knew that at present he could not exit past D utch ships at Flushing, and feared that it would leave the N etherlands totally defenceless. Santa Cruz also had objections but of a more personal nature: he wanted sole com m and, but unfor­ tunately he died in February 1588. Philip’s appointm ent of the Duke of M edina Sidonia as his new com m ander has been viewed critically by m any historians, although contem poraries were not at all surprised (60, 91, 115). Devout, af­ fable, loyal, very rich and the first grandee in Castile, M edina Sidonia would com m and respect, help pay for the day-to-day costs and follow Philip’s instructions to the letter. Although he had never

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Descriptive Analysis

fought at sea, he had m ilitary experience and above all was an expert in naval adm inistration and the re-fitting of ships. Philip knew that the A rm ada m ust set sail as quickly as possible and believed that M edina Sidonia was the best m an to accomplish this (137, 166). M edina Sidonia initially turned down the offer of com m and, on the grounds that he possessed ‘neither aptitude, ability, health nor for­ tune for the expedition’ (39, p. 101). W hen Philip ignored his protests, he insisted that he could not set sail until he had more ships, men and supplies. Perhaps he hoped that this ill-fated ex­ pedition would be called off. Certainly, when 130 ships carrying 30,000 m en did leave Lisbon on 28 M ay and im m ediately ran into a storm off the coast of Finisterre, he urged the K ing to cancel it [doc. 16]. Five ships were missing and urgent repairs required. Philip characteristically replied that God wished it to continue. The King m ay have doubted the outcome but Spain’s reputation was in question and the eyes of the world were upon him. ‘T o leave our fleet bottled up and ineffective’, he contended, ‘would be a dis­ grace.’ T he adm inistrative organisation which lay behind the A rm ada was a rem arkable achievement which only Spain’s bureaucracy and Philip’s meticulous eye for detail could have accomplished. He planned everything from the crew’s rations to the rules governing their m oral conduct, from grand strategy to the precise terms of naval engagem ent (152). As the A rm ada sailed through the C han­ nel, it was perm itted to defend itself but not to initiate any attacks, and M edina Sidonia stuck rigidly to his orders. In the course of nine days only three ships were lost, of which the most celebrated was the Nuestra Señora del Rosario due to the recklessness of its captain, Don Pedro de Valdés. T he fleet of 122 ships reached Calais on 6 August, yet Parm a was 48 km away and unaw are of the A rm ada’s arrival until the following day. H e needed forty-eight hours to effect his em barkation, but contrary winds delayed his departure, and by the time he was ready the A rm ada had been scattered by English fireships. Parm a kept his men on a war footing until 31 August, but by then he had learned that the A rm ada had been m auled off the coast of Gravelines, had cut its anchors, and was now at the mercy of wind and weather. O ver the next two m onths one-third of the rem aining ships were lost at sea or wrecked off the Scottish and Irish coasts (72). Could the A rm ada have succeeded? Historians have long argued about its feasibility. M attingly claimed ‘it was a good plan’; Geyl saw it as ‘a m ad enterprise’; while Fernández-Armes to believed its

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chances of success were ‘evenly balanced’ (39, 48, 115). C ontem ­ poraries were far less confident. Alva always said it would fail; M edina Sidonia and Parm a expressed doubts as soon as the plans were modified; and Parisian bookmakers offered odds of 6 to 1 against it surviving the Channel. Philip attributed the A rm ada’s defeat to divine intervention, but sensibly ordered an enquiry. Of­ ficially, only Diego Flores de Valdes, the chief nautical adviser, was held responsible. He had advised the abandonm ent of the Rosario and ordered all cables to be cut when fireships entered Calais. Arrested on his return to Spain, he was sentenced to a year’s im prisonm ent in Burgos jail. Yet if one person was to blame, it was Philip. Geoffrey Parker has claimed with some justification that the prime weakness was the K ing’s ‘arm chair strategy’: ‘Philip II failed to conquer England, not because of defective supply, but through unsound strategy and faulty tactics’ (126, p. 29). No definite arrangem ents had been m ade for the junction of the A rm ada and Parm a’s land forces. Moreover, Santa Cruz had originally called for forty or fifty galleys to accompany the galleons, but only four left Lisbon and none sailed up the Channel, which was, in the opinion of Don Francisco de Bobadilla, a fatal mistake (17). T he K ing also knew that in com bat his galleons could only fire one salvo and that the fleet was vulnerable to ‘low firing’ by the English, yet he still informed his adm iral that if he had the opportunity he m ust ‘attack and close with them, ready for hand-to-hand com bat’ (126, p. 33). This proved disastrous at Gravelines, and if it had been attem pted in the Channel, the A rm ada would not have reached Calais. T he A rm ada may have failed but it was not a total failure, and Philip seemed even more determined to succeed. The fleet was rebuilt and included twelve new 1,000-ton galleons christened the ‘Twelve Apostles’. Further arm adas were planned and two set sail in 1596 and 1597 only to be destroyed by severe gales. Given the logistical difficulties of launching and co-ordinating the largest seaborne arm y in history and how close it came to fulfilling its objective, the A rm ada may be seen as ‘a Spanish trium ph of organization over adverse circumstances’ (39, p. 11). However, a question-m ark now hung over Spain’s image of invincibility and some historians regard the defeat as a turning-point in her history (112). It weakened P arm a’s hand in the N etherlands and en­ couraged the D utch and English to counter-attack. In 1589 Drake and Norris sailed to Corunna, burned ships in Lisbon and attacked the Azores, and between 1589 and 1598 Elizabeth endorsed over one hundred private expeditions. Attack and counter-attack continued 89

Descriptive Analysis

through the 1590s as the war dragged on: Spanish ships assailed Pembroke in 1595 while H ow ard and Essex sacked Cadiz in 1596. Both Philip and Elizabeth were too proud to adm it th at they could not win the w ar or bring themselves to reach a compromise. It re­ quired new leaders and a fresh appraisal of their countries’ affairs before peace would result in 1604.

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Part Three: 9

Assessment

How Absolute was Philip II?

The prevailing view in the sixteenth century was that the Spanish m onarchy was absolute, even if this was far from true in practice. Royal pageantry and the mystical coronation ceremony hedged the King with a divinity th at surpassed popular understanding and, as G od’s sovereign ruler, he was the suprem e law-giver. It was his prerogative to take all decisions, to interpret and when necessary override the laws, which in theory rendered his authority ‘ab solutus’, free from control of the laws. Such power was needed for those rare occasions when natural justice required his intervention, but this did not give him the right to flout the law. Like his subjects, Philip was under the rule of divine and natural law, but whereas they had to answer to the K ing’s judges, he was answerable to God alone. Con­ tem porary scholars and jurists like Luis de M olina (d. 1600) and Francisco Suarez (d. 1617) were generally agreed that all men, in­ cluding the King, were subject to natural law, but that even if the King acted outside the law or imposed unjust laws upon his subjects, it remained their duty to obey him (55). Few writers were as radical as Ju a n de M ariana (d. 1624), whose views anticipated the Social Contract doctrine of the late seventeenth century. H e averred that subjects could depose a ruler if it was in their interest to do so since ‘the K ing m ust be subject to the laws laid down by the state, whose authority is greater than that of the K ing’ (92, p. 296) [doc. 18]. Such opinions had no place in Philip’s philosophy although, of course, this does not necessarily m ean that he harboured ideas of becoming an absolute king. The m aintenance and enforcement of law and order was the prime duty of all sixteenth-century m onarchs and a bench-m ark against which suggestions of royal absolutism may be measured; w ithout justice, governm ent was neither respected nor effective. Philip’s strategy was to be resolute and fair, which was in line with his father’s advice to im part justice ‘in such a m anner th at the wicked find him terrible and the good find him benign’. Philip inherited a system of hierarchical law courts which appears to have operated impartially and w ithout excessive royal interference (149). He 91

Assessment

established more audiencias*, codified the Castilian laws in 1567, and did his best to ensure that no favouritism was shown to members of the nobility. For example, in 1582 the Adm iral of Castile was ar­ rested on a m urder charge, tried, found guilty and executed. T he aristocracy were taught that they were not above the law. Indeed, Castillo de Bobadilla could claim in 1597 that Philip had suppressed them so successfully that ‘there is no judge now who cannot act against them and take their silver and horses’. C ontem poraries cer­ tainly regarded Philip as ‘the justest of rulers’. Philip only intervened in the law when he felt th at natural justice could be or had been perverted, where his own ministers who were directly answerable to him were concerned, and when the security of the state was threatened. In 1593, for example, he used his prerogative to dispense with the law when he insisted that Toledo convicts who were transferred from serving on galleys to the m ercury mines at Alm adén m ust be released as soon as they had served their sentences. ‘Although galley labour may be harder than the m ine’, said Philip, ‘it is not my wish that they be harm ed’ (51, p. 94). And a subsequent enquiry into convicts’ treatm ent suggests that his in­ structions were carried out. Sometimes the crown intervened for reasons which were far from equitable or altruistic, and it is on ac­ count of these occasions that charges of absolutism and tyranny have been laid against the King. It was commonplace in all countries for men to be arrested, held indefinitely w ithout trial and tortured. Spanish prisons were full of such victims. Philip was not above the authorisation of state m urders, as the deaths of Escobedo and M ontigny testify, and an open verdict m ust rem ain as to how Don Carlos died (see p. 7). Rebellion was a sin against God and an act of treason punishable by death, yet the D utch Revolt produced some of the most vitriolic attacks against Philip, adm ittedly mainly from Protestant and Dutch writers in defence of the victims. In his Apology of 1580 W illiam of O range condemned Alva’s brutality and Philip’s despotism, assert­ ing, ‘this tyrant ought not to be endured on this earth ’, an opinion reiterated 300 years later by the American historian J . L. Motley (118). Between 1567 and 1573, more than 1,000 people were ex­ ecuted, including Counts Egmont and Hornes. W hile it is true that customarily Knights of the O rder of the Golden Fleece could only be tried by their C hapter, whereas both Egm ont and Hornes had been found guilty by a special tribunal, Philip regarded them as rebels in arms. Alva’s comment that ‘everyone m ust be m ade to live in constant fear of the roof breaking down over his head’ should 92

H ow Absolute w as P h ilip II?

be seen therefore in the context of a serious military problem rather than —as one historian has suggested - a ‘ghoulish maxim which links sixteenth-century absolutism with twentieth-century dictatorship’ (73, p. 71). Anyone who betrayed the m onarch’s trust was dealt with summ arily. The Justiciar of Aragon and two of his associates were executed without trial in 1590 as a result of their complicity in a revolt which had directly challenged Philip’s authority. ‘It is preferable that all take heed from the public punish­ ment of the few,’ Philip once said, and there is little doubt that he would have executed Pérez after 1591 if he could have laid hands on him. Pérez, in his Relaciones of 1591, went some way towards adum brat­ ing the Protestant view that Philip was a cruel, m urderous, absolute King. T he Black Legend*, the belief that in time Spain would subordinate its dominions and deprive its subjects of their freedom, had its origins in fifteenth-century Italy but assum ed a more inter­ national currency in Philip’s reign as first the Dutch and then the English reviled the K ing (108, 163). Criticisms of Philip even came from the pens of a m inority of Spaniards like Iñigo Ibánez de Santa Cruz, who in his Anatomy o f Spain in 1598 accused him of being ‘a great hypocrite, incestuous King, accursed m urderer, unjust usur­ per, detestable tyrant and m onster’. M any Protestant historians have concurred. T he nineteenth-century historian Robert W atson believed Philip com m itted ‘the most odious and shocking crim es’; J . L. Motley claimed that Spain had been governed ‘by an estab­ lished despotism ’; and in 1947 C .J . Cadoux declared that Philip was a ‘m onstrous ty ran t’ (16, 118, 179). In recent years historians have modified their views of Philip’s alleged crimes and the m yth of the Black Legend has been debunked, but the question of absolutism rem ains a live issue. In 1971 the Spanish historian A. Dominguez O rtiz claimed th at ‘royal absolutism was a reality under Philip I I ’, a view shared by Sir Charles Petrie and Philip’s m ost recent biogra­ pher, Peter Pierson (33, p. 10: 133, 136). In 1981 Jo h n Lynch a t­ tem pted to square the circle by suggesting th at while the m onarchy was absolute, ‘its absolutism was qualified by conditions and its power was less imposing in practice than it was in theory’ (104, p. 208). A more sensible approach to the question of royal power is to view Philip as an autocrat whose principal aim in governm ent was to con­ tinue the work of his predecessors in pursuit of greater unity and conformity rather than absolutism (70, 159). In his adm inistration of the Church, he cam e to control all clerical appointm ents, disposed 93

Assessment

of ecclesiastical wealth and mobilised the Inquisition as an instru­ ment of royal authority. In secular affairs, the 1560s saw a reassertion of royal claims to salt deposits, m ining rights and cus­ toms revenues; M adrid was established as the adm inistrative and political capital and reforms were m ade to the Council of Finance and Casa de Contratación*. Above all, there was a restoration of direct royal control over m ilitary and naval adm inistration. This increase in centralisation was accom panied by an expansion in the num ber of crown servants, consisting mainly of nobles seeking to recover or retain their declining political status and middle-class bureaucrats and letrados* eager to acquire a more elevated social position. Yet both groups hindered the nascent centralised state and worked against the developm ent of royal absolutism, for low salaries and the declining purchasing power of money encouraged dishonesty and incompetence which further diluted the effectiveness of Philip’s rule. Thus, even if he had wanted to be absolute, Philip lacked the means to accomplish it. T he further from the capital of his Em pire, the less effective was his authority. T he lack of a centralised adm inistration, or even of a police force, outside M adrid, and the lim ited strength and efficacy of the standing arm y, m eant th at Philip did not have the means to do as he might have liked. Spain under Philip II had achieved, in the words of J . Viçens Vives, ‘a m axim um concentra­ tion of power at the apex and its minimal diffusion towards the base’ (174, p. 5). T he vastness of his possessions and the tim e required to obtain reliable information —w hat Braudel called the ‘space—time factor’ - further reduced the effectiveness of Philip’s adm inistration. W hen in 1590 he ordered his lieutenant in M ilan to expel all Jews living in Lom bardy, nothing happened. T he order was repeated in 1595 and twice again in 1596 with the warning: ‘If this is not done at once, it will be necessary to send someone from here to do it.’ No one stirred. Finally, in Ja n u ary 1597 Philip threatened to ‘seek out and punish whoever has caused these delays’ if the expulsion was not effected immediately. And, a t last, it was (123, p. 194). In reality the Iberian peninsula consisted of a series of individual autonom ous kingdoms, each with its own laws, languages, customs and economic barriers, which would not experience political unity until the eighteenth century and then w ithout the presence of Por­ tugal. H enry K am en has shown that in the province of Salam anca 63 per cent of the lands were under noble jurisdiction and 6 per cent under C hurch control, more than half of C atalonia was covered by sem i-independent franchises where the K ing’s writ only indirectly reached his subjects, and in Valencia a mere 73 out of 300 towns 94

H ow Absolute w as P h ilip II?

were under royal control (70). T he Basque provinces only recog­ nised Philip as their feudal lord; the Navarrese Cortes* prevented him from imposing taxes on them; and both Aragon and Portugal in­ sisted that he respect their traditional rights, or jueros*. T he Italian parliam ents sim ilarly cherished their liberties and only regarded the King of Spain as ‘first among equals’, while M ilan and Naples suc­ cessfully resisted attem pts to introduce the Spanish Inquisition. Finally, Philip’s B urgundian subjects amply dem onstrated w hat could happen if their traditional representative assemblies were ig­ nored, and ju st how far they were prepared to go to defend their concept of sovereignty. Philip had to accept that each kingdom and duchy was at a different stage of political, economic and social evolu­ tion and th at any attem pt to impose his will on them would be vigorously opposed. T he King was the only element of union in a loose federation m ade up of states, each of which regarded him ex­ clusively as its own ruler. X enophobia ran deep and surfaced at all levels of society: C hristians’ abhorrence of M oors and Jew s, C as­ tilian scorn for Aragonese, and Italian and Flemish resentm ent of Spanish dom ination intensified the differences within and between the dominions. O nly in Castile was there any degree of centralis­ ation, but even here effective governm ent rested on the co-operation of local elites, town guilds and traditional landowners. I. A. A. Thom pson has shown that the onset of continuous w ar from 1566 put such a trem endous strain on the crown’s resources th at its centralist policies collapsed and real power passed to the local municipalities (164). Philip exercised a good deal less than total control. In theory his power was unlim ited, but it is a historical myth to say th at he was an absolute king. Indeed it is probable that he never had any aspir­ ations in that direction at all, although it is easy to see how this judgem ent has been formed. T he size of Spain’s Em pire, the scale of her resources, the resolute determ ination of her King, and the state’s apparently omniscient and om nipotent adm inistration appeared to contem poraries as the hallmarks of a threatening monolith. In practice, however, Philip’s arm ed forces were insuffi­ cient to defend his empire or impose his wishes on this or anyone else’s subjects; his adm inistration exercised ineffectual control over the Castilian towns and over the provinces outside Castile; and his annual revenue fell well short of budgetary requirem ents. As Thom pson pertinently suggests: ‘Absolute M onarchy is to be judged not by w hat it looked like but by how it worked’ (164, p. 286).

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10

Success or Failure? Spain in the 1590s

To most contem porary Spaniards, and on balance to most m odern historians, Philip was a successful king. Sir Charles Petrie claimed that his m ain achievements were the banishm ent of the T urks from the western M editerranean and the unification of the Iberian penin­ sula, a feat unparalleled by Charles V (133). H elm ut Koenigsberger has adopted an equally positive stance towards Philip, suggesting that if Vervins was nothing m ore than a restoration of C ateauCambresis, at least Spain gained an honourable peace; that if the A rm ada failed, at least Elizabeth could not afford to leave her sub­ jects undefended nor could she commit huge sums in helping the Dutch; and that if the U nited Provinces rem ained disobedient, the southern states were still firmly under Spanish control. Koenigsberger writes: U ndoubtedly he failed in his highest aims: in the complete recon­ quest of the N etherlands, in the conquest o f England and in the acquisition of the French crown. . . . But there is no evidence that, when he lay on his deathbed, in the sum m er of 1598, either he or the great m ajority of his contem poraries thought his reign as a whole had been a failure (83, p. 95). Philip had defended his monarquia* and his faith by cham pioning the Catholic Counter-Reform ation. H e had not lost any of his patrim ony but had instead expanded his dominions to make the Spanish Em ­ pire the largest and richest in the world. Some historians have been less wholehearted with their praise, arguing th a t the m ajor reversals in the last quarter of Philip’s reign left Spain in a weak and vulnerable position. Peter Pierson believes that the year 1585 was the high-w ater mark. Portugal was secure; only three of the N etherlands’ provinces - H olland, Zealand and U trecht — were still in revolt; the peace with Turkey was holding; the Indies’ wealth continued to pour in; and only England and France were of m ajor concern. Thereafter, however, m atters started to go seriously wrong (136). H enry Kam en concurs, although he prefers to put the height of Spanish imperialism at 1580 and sees 96

Success or Failure? Spain in the 1590s

indications of its decline from 1588, when Philip’s enterprises proved too extensive for his resources and for his highly personal direction of affairs (70). Both historians stress that in the 1590s Spain, like most west European states, was undergoing a serious domestic crisis. H er outw ard display of dynastic power, m aterial wealth and spiritual fulfilment had only been achieved at enorm ous costs and masked serious weaknesses. Philip’s Empire was far-flung, difficult to adm inister and defend, and viewed by his non-Castilian subjects as more Spanish than imperial. Portugal, his most recent acquisi­ tion, found her trade, shipping and coastline constantly attacked after 1580 and she was paying increasing taxation for the privilege of being ruled by Spain. As seeds of revolt germ inated, all eyes were on the ‘disobedient’ Dutch whose rebellion continued to sap Spain’s strength (19, 74). Politically, the state was more centralised by 1598, but ad ­ m inistration was interm inably slow, inefficient and corrupt. Governm ent m inisters were draw n more from the lower ranks than in 1556, but this only served to oblige the crown to appoint the gran­ dees to viceroyalties, military comm ands and am bassadorships. The K ing’s omniscience had acted like a strait-jacket at all levels of decision making. In 1600, following Philip’s death, a grandee claimed acrimoniously that the world ‘would see w hat the Spanish were worth now that they have a free hand, and are no longer sub­ ject to a single brain that thought it knew all that could be known and treated everyone else as a blockhead’. Independent thought was equally threatened by the Inquisition, which impeded the free flow of European ideas and tried to control the social, m oral and intel­ lectual climate of Spain. If the country was largely free from heresy in 1598, religious uniformity had not been achieved and the Catholic Church was fundam entally unreformed. T he M oriscos rem ained a Trojan horse, Jew s were growing in num ber, and native Spaniards clung tenaciously to their pagan beliefs despite the Tridentine Decrees and the reformed Catholic orders. Economically, some arbitristas* believed Spain was already in decline. Plague, famine, depopulation, inflation, declining agricul­ ture and industry, and an adverse balance of trade, were inescapable problems in the 1590s. ‘The Kingdom is wasted and destroyed’, claimed the Cortes* in 1594, ‘for there is hardly a m an in it th at enjoys any fortune or credit.’ Such a jerem iad may well be overdrawn, but the sentiments behind this cri de coeur were sincere. T he w ealth from the New W orld continued to flow in, but ju st as rapidly flowed out, giving Spain the appearance of being enormously rich whereas in 97

Assessment

reality there was more shadow than substance. The alcabala* had tripled in Philip’s reign, more than one-third of the average C astilian peasant’s income was taken away in taxation, and there was a marked growth in poverty at most levels of society. Even the crown, in real terms, was far worse off in 1598 than in 1556. Any assessment of Philip II assumes the appearance of a paradox. He was rich yet poor, kind but cruel, strong and weak, determ ined yet irresolute; he recoiled at the sight of blood but was universally condemned as a m urderer; a firm upholder of the law, he was seen by m any as the archetypal tyrant. Theoretically he possessed enor­ mous power but in practice he was hemmed in by constraints. Having first studied everything in m inute detail, he proceeded to execute his designs on a massive scale. Inevitably, his successes and failures ran in tandem; spectacular enterprises yielded m onum ental results, for it was not in his nature to compromise. As H ugh TrevorRoper astutely claimed: ‘W henever he m ade a bid, it was always a shut-out bid’ (168, p. 57).

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Part Four:

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docum ent 1 A description o f Philip II by the Venetian ambassador, Paolo Tiepolo, in 1563 The K ing was born of the Empress Isabella, daughter of the King of Portugal, on M ay 21, 1527. He is slight of stature and roundfaced, with very pale blue eyes, somewhat prom inent lips, and pink skin, but his overall appearance is very attractive. His tem peram ent is very phlegm atic and his condition weak and delicate; he often takes to his bed, sometimes with chest pains and shortness of breath and sometimes, others say, with more serious illnesses. I have heard doctors say th at it is unlikely he will live for long. Like other Spaniards he sleeps a great deal; not only does he take a long siesta after dinner, but he does not get out of bed in the m orning in any season of the year until two and a half hours before noon. As soon as he rises he hears mass, and then he has little time for anything else before dinner —in fact, usually alone, since he rarely eats with his wife, child, and sister, and others are not considered worthy to be at his table. His meals are very simple, with no more than fifteen different dishes. He eats very little and only safe, substantial foods - hardly any kind of fruit and no fish at all. He dresses very taste­ fully, and everything that he does is courteous and gracious. He preserves his kingly dignity, but with all comers he is very natural and cordial - especially by Spanish standards. J . C. Davis (31), pp. 81-2.

docum ent 2 Philip II writes to his children, 1582 From 1581 to 1583 Philip was in Lisbon, away from his fam ily, but he main­ tained regular contact with his two daughters, Isabella and Catalina. In this letter he describes the safe arrival o f a galleon from the E ast Indies and shows his concern at Prince D iego’s health. The boy died later in 1582.

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I only know that the ship carried an elephant, which has been sent to your brother by the viceroy whom I sent to the Indies . . . who has already arrived there, and he arrived at a good time too because the one who was there already —I m ean the viceroy who was there already - was dead. Tell your brother about the elephant, and tell him that I have a book in Portuguese to send him to help him to learn to read the language. It would be very good if he knew how to speak it already. Don Antonio de Castro has come back very pleased w ith the words the prince said to him in Portuguese —which was very good if he really did say them! This is already a very long letter for someone who is convalescent and weak. God keep you as I desire: your loving father. L. P. G achard (43), p. 184.

docum ent 3 A practical handbook for Corregidores, 1597 Castillo de Bobadilla was a jurist with considerable legal and political ex­ perience, having been President o f the Council o f Castile and corregidor* fo r Badajoz, Soria and Guadalajara.

The corregidor is your m agistrate and royal official who exercises the greatest jurisdiction throughout the empire in towns and provinces, where doubtful trades are removed, crimes punished and beneficial acts of governm ent enforced. T he proof of your authority is the lordship and office which you exercise: it is subject only to the Prince of the Republic. W herever you rule the judicial functions of all other officials are suspended, all of which is more fully shown in the status and terms of your office. You can enquire into any business even though there are particular m agistrates like the Alcaldes de Sacas, A duanas, M estas, H erm andad, Prior and Consuls, and others to do this. T ranslated from Política para corregidores, Book 1, C hapter 2, num ber 31, cited in (21, pp. 223-4).

docum ent 4 Royal instructions for the corregidor o f Burgos, 1566 In November 1566 the King was anxious fo r the Castilian Cortes* to vote him a servicio* without delay. Each o f eighteen corregidores* received

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instructions to secure the appointment o f co-operative procuradores* who would return to M adrid with sufficient powers to approve a subsidy.

The King, to Don J u a n Delgadillo, our corregidor in the city of Burgos, or your lieutenant. We have decided to order Cortes generales of these kingdoms to be held for the reasons contained in the letter-patent which will be given to you with this letter, and, as you will see from it, we have written to order the chapter and rulers of your city to elect their procuradores and give them sufficient power for the business which has to be dis­ cussed and concluded there. We order you to have this publicly proclaimed and to order procuradores to be elected according to the said letter-patent and according to custom ary usage; let the procuradores be appropriately qualified and be zealous for our service and for the public good of these kingdoms and lordships, and in the election do not perm it any canvassing or bribes or the purchase of the position of procurador or anything else prohibited by the laws of these kingdoms concerning such m atters. According to the custom followed in previous Cortes, in order that the proxy granted to the procuradores m ay be suitable and without any defect, a draft of it will be sent w ith this letter, and sim ilar drafts are being sent to the other cities and towns which have the right to be represented in the Cortes, so that all may come in the same way without differences among them. You will ensure, using whatever means you see fit, and remov­ ing any difficulty that may arise, that your city grants to its procuradores the powers which should be given according to the aforesaid draft, which is in common form, without any limitations or conditions, and that they present themselves by the appointed time, as befits our service; and will advise us of w hat is done in order to serve us. Dated M adrid, 6 November 1566. I the King. A uthorized by Eraso. Signed by M enchaca y Velasco. G. Griffiths (54), p. 36.

docum ent 5 The Cortes’s petition against new taxes and the crown’s reply, 1567 A t the conclusion o f the 1567 Cortes, a summary o f its petitions and the crown’s rejoinder were published in a C uaderno or Book o f Law s, recorded

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in this extract by Baltasar de Hinestrosa, chief scribe to the Cortes. Petition I I I was the most contentious issue o f a particularly quarrelsome Cortes.

Philip, by the grace of God, King of Castile, León, Aragón . . . to the most serene prince Charles, our most dear and well-beloved son, and to the princes, prelates, dukes . . . squires, officials and good men, and any other subjects of ours, whatever their status, condition and dignity, of all the cities, towns and villages of our kingdoms and lordships, present and future, and to each and every one of you in your places and authority to whom this letter of ours m ay be shown, or any copy of it authorized by a public scribe, and anyone of you who m ay come to know of it in any manner: greetings and favour. Know that in the Cortes which we ordered to be held in the town of M adrid, beginning last year, 1566, and finishing this year, 1567, we were given certain petitions and articles by the procuradores de Cortes of the cities and towns of our kingdoms which m et together by our com m and, and we answered these petitions in agreement with our Council. These petitions and articles and our answers were as follows: T H E C O R T E S O F M A D RID , 1567 Y O U R C A T H O L IC ROYAL MAJESTY: We who have come by Your M ajesty’s com m and as procuradores to the Cortes which you ordered to be celebrated in this town of M adrid, beg Y our M ajesty in the name of these kingdoms and for the sake of their good governm ent, for the following favours, and we entreat Your M ajesty to answer these requests before the Cortes is dissolved: P E T IT IO N I II M oreover we say that Your M ajesty’s royal predecessors of glorious memory ordered by laws made in the Cortes that no new taxes, imposts, dues or other tributes, particular or general, should be created or collected without the kingdom’s m eeting in Cortes and conceding them, as it says in the law of the ordinance of King Al­ fonso; but recently, because of certain needs which Your M ajesty has incurred, in despite of this order, some new taxes and dues have been created and imposed and others have been increased, such as the taxes on salt, customs, wool, new ports and other things, which have caused such a great shortage of the necessities of life in these kingdoms that very few can now live without great labour, since these new taxes brought greater dam age than profit. We beg Your 102

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M ajesty therefore to consider this with your usual clemency and to relieve your kingdoms of these new and increased taxes and in future to grant them the favour of keeping the ancient custom as laid down by law, for it is right that, when Y our M ajesty’s subjects have to meet your needs, they should be informed of them and should choose the least inconvenient means of meeting them , and they will certain­ ly do this in accordance with the love and ancient loyalty with which they have served and do serve Your Majesty. O ur answ er to this is that, as you already know and have been told m any times, because of the great and urgent needs and wars and enterprises which have been confronted by my lord the KingEm peror who is in glory [i.e. Charles V] and by m yself in defence of the public cause of religion and Christendom and these kingdoms and our other states, our own patrim ony and the ancient royal rents have been so swallowed up that, finding ourselves w ithout any other means of providing w hat was necessary to m aintain our royal state, we have been unable to avoid imposing the m ethods and the im ­ posed taxes and increases to which you refer in your petition, but when those necessities cease or we find better means of providing for them, we shall be delighted to relieve these kingdoms and to show them in this and in all m atters the favour which we wish and which we realise is right. W ith regard to w hat you say next, we shall always be pleased in our difficulties to have the advice of the kingdom and to make use of it, since we are certain, as you say, that they will serve us with the same ancient loyalty and love which they have always shown in our service and that of our royal predecessors. W ith respect to the salt which you mention in your petition among other things, we have annexed to our Crown and royal patrim ony the saltings which some knights, councils and other private in­ dividuals held in these kingdoms, and we have ordered ju st compensation to be m ade for them. M oreover, we have imposed a tax on the salt which is im ported from Portugal, and th at exported from Andalucia, and th at sold in its saltings, and we have done all this, apart from the aforesaid necessities and causes, using our right as owner, since the salt and its dues belong to us and our Crown and royal patrim ony by the laws and ancient right of these kingdoms, and are intended to sup­ port the m onarchy and its dependants; therefore we have allotted the income from salt to pay for the guards, councils and ministers of justice, and other necessary expenses; but with respect to the price of the salt and the tax, in order to favour these kingdoms, we intend 103

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not to have it increase and we shall not increase it, but shall rather order an investigation to be m ade to see w hether the price can be m oderated in certain districts and provinces. . . . And so that all the above may be of public knowledge, we order, this cuaderno of laws to be publicly proclaimed in this our court so that it m ay come to the notice of everyone, and no one can plead ignorance; and we order it to be kept and put into execution in our court after fifteen days, and outside our court forty days after its publication. Given in M adrid, 7 Ju ly 1567. I the King. I, Francisco de Eraso, secretary of his royal majesty, had it written by his command. The graduate Diego de Espinosa. The graduate M enchaca. D r Velasco. Registered, M artin de Vergara. M artin de Vergara, for the chancellor. G. Griffiths (54), pp. 63-6.

docum ent 6 An asiento* made between N iccolo Grimaldi and Philip II, 22 May 1558 In 1558 Philip negotiated this asiento with Grimaldi, a Genoese banker, in Valladolid. The loan o f 1 million crowns was accompanied by particularly severe terms, a reflection o f the K in g ’s financial straits.

The said Niccolo Grim aldi undertakes to pay in Flanders 800,000 crowns at 72 grooten [Flemish groats] per crown, and in the following m anner: 300,000 when the first ships arrive from Peru, 250,000 at the end of Novem ber and the rem aining 250,000 crowns a t the end of December of this year 1558. A nother 200,000 crowns he under­ takes to pay at M ilan, at 11 reals to the crown, in the course of November and Decem ber of this year, half in each month. His M ajesty will repay the said million in Spain at 400 maravedis per crown and in the following m anner: 300,000 immediately from the money which is at Laredo, 300,000 from the gold and silver arriving by the first ships from Peru and in the event that the pay­ ments are not m ade in O ctober of this year, the said Grim aldi will not be obliged to make his paym ents at the end of Novem ber and December, either in Flanders or in Milan; 300,000 crowns from the servicios of Castile in 1559 and bills of exchange w ithout interest will be delivered to him; the rem aining 166,666 crowns of the 400 million maravedis to be payable in annuities at 10 per cent. H e will be repaid 104

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540.000 crowns of outstanding debts as follows: 110,000 in annuities at 10 per cent, 135,000 at 12 per cent, 170,000 at 14 per cent and 125.000 assigned on the mines. T he interest on this sum will be reckoned up to the end of 1556 at 14 per cent and for the year 1557 at 8 per cent. He is also granted permission to export 1 million in gold from Spain. F. Braudel (12), pp. 960-1.

docum ent 7 A view o f Spain’s econom ic ills in 1600 In his Memorial o f 1600, the Valladolid arbitrista*, M artin Gonzalez de Cellorigo, blamed the economic recession not on inflation but on censos* and

juros*. It is likewise an error to suppose th at in good politics the wealth of a kingdom is increased or diminished because the quantity of money in circulation is larger or smaller. Since money is only the instrum ent of exchange, a small circulation has as good an effect as a large one, or even better, for instead of clogging the wheels of trade and com­ merce, it makes them run more easily and lightly. . . . Censos are the plague and ruin of Spain. For the sweetness of the sure profit from censos the m erchant leaves his trading, the artisan his employ­ ment, the peasant his farming, the shepherd his flock; and the noble sells his lands so as to exchange the one hundred they bring in for the five hundred the juro brings. . . . W ealth has been and still is riding upon the wind in the form of papers and contracts, censos and bills of exchange, money and silver and gold, instead of in goods that fructify and attract to themselves riches from abroad, thus sus­ taining our people at home. We see, then, that the reason why there is no money, gold or silver in Spain is because there is too much, and Spain is poor because she is rich. T he two things are really contradictory, but although they cannot fittingly be put into a single proposition, yet we m ust hold them both true in our single kingdom of Spain. M. Grice-H utchinson (52), p. 144.

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docum ent 8 A Pragmatica* issued by Regent Joanna, 7 September 1558 We order th at no bookseller, book m erchant or any other person of any state or condition m ay bring, smuggle, have or sell any book, printed or unpublished work which has been prohibited by the prin­ cipal office of the Inquisition in whatever language, form or m aterial that constitutes the book, under penalty of death, the loss of all goods and the public burning of the said books. T ranslated from V. Pinto Crespo (140), p. 97.

docum ent 9 Concordia* o f 1568 restricting the activities o f the Inquisition in Valencia Following complaints by the Cortes* o f Monzon in 1564 that officials and informers were using the Valencian tribunal to protect themselves from the law, a new Concordia was issued in 1568 defining its privileges. The Inquisition subsequently appealed to P hilip against these revisions and he ordered copies o f the Concordia to be seized and future printing stopped.

Article 1: T he num ber of familiars [paid informers] is to be reduced to that provided in 1554, weeding out the least desirable. Article 2: They m ust present themselves with their commissions to the local m agistrates in order to be entered on the lists w ithout which they forfeit their exemption. Article 3: In future the servants of officials m ust really bp servants living with them and receiving regular wages in order to be protected by the inquisitors. Article 4: Inquisitors are not to interfere, at the petition of an official or familiar, with the regulations of the college of surgeons. Article 5: O utside of cases of heresy, inquisitors m ust not interfere with the execution of justice by the royal judges under pretext that culprits have com m itted offences pertaining to them , but in such cases the judges shall be notified and allowed to execute justice, after which the inquisitors can inflict punishm ent. In case of heresy, however, a prisoner can be dem anded, to be returned after trial, provided he is not sentenced to relaxation [i.e. the court 106

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could give a more lenient sentence if the accused adm itted his guilt]. Article 6: Fam iliars are not to be protected in the violation of municipal regulations, nor during pestilence, in the refusal to ob­ serve the regulations for the avoidance of contagion; they m ust submit for inspection the goods which they bring in and the royal judges shall not be prevented from imposing the penalties provided in the royal pragma tica. Article 7: Inquisitors are no longer to defend familiars in m atters of the apportionm ent of irrigating waters, injuries to harvests, vineyards, pastures, forests, furnishing of lights, licences for build­ ing, street-cleaning, road-m ending and furnishing provisions. Article 8: Inquisitors are not to publish edicts with excom m unication for the discovery of debts, thefts or other hidden offences committed against officials and familiars, nor such edicts against any delin­ quents save in cases of heresy. Article 9: Persons arrested, except for heresy, are not to be confined in the secret prison but in the public one, where they can confer with their counsel and procurators, and they are to be allowed to hear mass and receive the sacraments. Article 10: Inquisitors shall not give safe-conducts to persons out­ lawed or banished by the royal judges, except in cases of faith [heresy] and then only for the time necessary to appear before them. H. C. Lea (89), vol. 1, pp. 443-4.

docum ent 10 Philip II’s anger is vented against the Pope, 1589 Nothing has surprised me more than to see Your Holiness, after an act inspired by God [the Bull against Henry IV] leaving time to the heretics to take root in France, without even ordering that the Catholic partisans o f ‘the Béarnais’ [i.e. H enry IV] should separate from his cause. T he C hurch is on the eve of losing one of its m em ­ bers; Christendom is on the point of being set on fire by the united heretics; Italy runs the greatest danger, and in the presence of the enemy we look on and we temporise! And the blam e is put upon me because, looking a t those interests as if they were my own, I hasten to Your Holiness as to a father whom I love and respect, and as a good son rem ind him of the duties of the Holy See! By G od’s mercy, 107

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where have you found in the whole course of my life reasons for thinking of me as you tell me men think of me, and by w hat right do you tell it me? God and the whole world know my love for the Holy See, and nothing will ever make me deviate from it, not even Your Holiness by the great injustice you do me in writing such things to me. But the greater my devotion the less I shall consent to your failing in your duty towards God and towards the Church, who have given you the m eans of acting; and, at the risk of being im portunate to Your Holiness and displeasing you, I shall insist on your setting to the task. Letter to Pope Sixtus V, 1589, J . Lynch (104), pp. 285—6.

docum ent 11 Maltreatment o f Moriscos* in Granada, 1569 A report written in 1569 to Philip I I ’s secretary, Gabriel de Zayas, by Frances de Alava, Spanish ambassador in Paris, after his visit to Granada

I was utterly shocked to see that the priests did not treat those people in the gentle way they should have done; I frequently witnessed the clergy turning around in the very middle of the consecration, be­ tween the host and the chalice, to see if the Moriscos and their women were on their knees, and from that position subjecting them to such horrifying and arrogant abuse, a thing so contrary to the worship of God, that my blood ran cold; and after mass the priests would walk through the town with an attitude of m enacing contem pt towards the Moriscos. Cited in H. K am en ( 66 ), p. 209.

docum ent 12 An extract from W illiam o f Orange’s Apology, 1580 In March 1580 Philip outlawed W illiam, declaring him to be a traitor. Orange replied with his Apology in which he defended his views and actions and launched a vitriolic attack on Spain in general and P hilip in particular, charg­ ing him with being a tyrant and a murderer.

For there is not, I am persuaded, a nation or prince in Europe, by whom it will not be thought dishonourable and barbarous, thus publicly to authorise and encourage m urder; except the Spaniards, 108

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and their King, who have long been estranged from every sentim ent of honour and hum anity. In having recourse to private assassina­ tions against a declared and open enemy, does not this mighty m onarch confess his despair of being able to subdue me by force of arms? Cited in J . C. Rule and J . J . TePaske (157), p. 9.

document 13 Philip II’s concern at the growth o f H uguenotism in France, 15 July 1562 A bout the affairs of France there is nothing more to say . . . except that they are causing me as m uch concern as is to be expected, seeing the way things are going, both in the m atter of the service of God and in everything else; and therefore I cannot omit to help the Catholics although the expense is coming at a very bad time . . . for it seems to me certain that neither the service of God, which is the most im portant service, nor my own and the welfare of my states will allow me to neglect helping the Catholics. I know well that something will be risked in this, but certainly m uch more will be risked in allowing the heretics to prevail; for if they do, we may be certain that all their endeavours will be directed against me and my states, so that they will be like them: a result which I will never accept nor overlook, even if it should cost me a hundred lives, if I had them. Letter to M argaret of Parm a, L. P. G achard (42), pp. lxii—lxiii.

document 14 Diplomatic manoeuvres preparatory to the Spanish Armada, 1587 Having gained the Pope’s blessing to invade England, P hilip was anxious to secure a g ift o f 1 million ducats and papal approval in support o f his claim to the English throne without appearing to be an imperialist. He instructed his ambassador in Rome accordingly.

You will cautiously approach his Holiness, and in such terms as you think fit endeavour to obtain from him a second brief declaring that, failing the Queen of Scotland, the right to the English crown falls to me. My claim, as you are aware, rests upon my descent from the 109

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House of Lancaster, and upon the will m ade by the Q ueen of Scot­ land, and m entioned in a letter from her of which the copy is enclosed herewith. You will impress upon his Holiness th at I cannot undertake a w ar in England for the purpose merely of placing upon that throne a young heretic like the King of Scotland who, indeed, is by his heresy incapacitated to succeed. His Holiness m ust, how­ ever, be assured that I have no intention of adding England to my dominions, but to settle the crown upon my daughter the Infanta. Letter to the M arquis de Olivares, 11 February 1587, S. Usherwood (172), pp. 26-7.

docum ent 15 Philip II outlines the Armada’s objectives, 1588 If the A rm ada succeeds, either by means of fighting or in conse­ quence of the unreadiness of the enemy, you will, when the forces from here have arrived to assure your passage across, go over in God’s name and carry out the task assigned to you. But if (which God forbid) the result be not so prosperous that our arms shall be able to settle m atters, nor, on the other hand, so con­ trary that the enemy shall be relieved of anxiety on our account (which God, surely, will not perm it) and affairs be so counter­ balanced that peace may not be altogether undesirable, you will endeavour to avail yourself as m uch as possible of the prestige of the A rm ada and other circumstances, bearing in m ind that, in addition to the ordinary conditions which are usually inserted in treaties of peace, there are three principal points upon which you m ust fix your attention. The first is that in England the free use and exercise of our holy Catholic faith shall be perm itted to all Catholics, native and foreign, and that those who are in exile shall be perm itted to return. The second is that all the places in my N etherlands which the English hold shall be restored to me; and the third is that they [the English] shall recompense me for the injury they have done to me, my dominions, and my subjects, which will am ount to an exceedingly great sum. W ith regard to the free exercise of Catholicism , you may point out to them that since freedom of worship is allowed to the Huguenots in France, there will be no sacrifice of dignity in allowing the same privilege to Catholics in England. If they retort that I do not allow the same toleration in Flanders as exists in France, you 110

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may tell them that their country is in a different position, and point out to them how conducive to their tranquillity it would be to satisfy the Catholics in this way, and how largely it would increase the trade of England and their profits, since, as soon as toleration was brought about, people from all Christendom would flock thither in the assurance of safety. If the principal design should fall throdgh, it would be very in­ fluential in bringing them to these, or the best conditions possible, if the A rm ada were to take possession of the Isle of Wight. If this be once captured, it would be held, and would afford a shelter for the A rm ada, whilst the possession of it would enable us to hold our own against the enemy. This m atter has also been laid before the Duke [M edina Sidonia], so that in case of failure, and if nothing else can be done, you may jointly with him discuss and decide with regard to it. T he King Letter to the Duke of Parm a, April 1588, S. Usherwood (172), pp. 70-1.

docum ent 16 Medina Sidonia implores Philip to postpone the Armada, 24 June 1588 Having experienced severe storms which dispersed the Armada within a fe w days o f setting sail, and sensing that the expedition was ill-fated, Medina Sidonia wrote to the King from Corunna urging him to call it o f f

To undertake so great a task with forces equal to those of the enemy would be inadvisable, but to do so with an inferior force, as ours is now, with our men lacking in experience, would be still more un­ wise. I am bound to confess that I see very few, or hardly any, of those on the A rm ada with any knowledge of or ability to perform the duties entrusted to them. I have tested and watched this point very carefully, and your Majesty may believe me when I assure you that we are very weak. . . . The opportunity m ight be taken, and the difficulties avoided, by making some honourable terms with the enemy. Your M ajesty’s necessities also make it desirable that you should ponder beforehand w hat you are undertaking, with so many envious rivals of your greatness. Letter cited in C. M artin and G. Parker (112), p. 191. Ill

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docum ent 17 A Spanish opinion why the Armada failed Don Francisco de Bobadilla was the general in charge o f the Arm ada’s military on board the San M artin. When he wrote this letter on 20 August 1588from somewhere in the North Sea, he expressed his own theories why the Armada had fa iled to rendezvous with Parm a’s army.

I don’t know who had the idea that we could join forces in a place with such powerful currents, with a shore so open and liable to crosswinds, and with so m any sandbanks. . . . But I believe it is impossible to control all the things that m ust be concerted a t the same time, in order to bring together forces that are so separated, unless one has a different sort of ship from those we brought, in the place we were instructed to join. Letter to Don J u a n de Idiaquez, C. M artin and G. Parker (112), p. 268.

docum ent 18 The power o f kings and their subjects: a contemporary view Juan de M ariana (1535—1624) was a Jesuit historian who expounded his views on royal authority in De Rege et Regis Institutione in 1599. Intended as a guide fo r P hilip I I I , the treatise maintained that the King must respect the fundamental laws o f the land. I f he did not, the people could depose him.

The regal power, if it is lawful, ever has its source from the citizens; by their grant the first kings were placed in each state on the seat of suprem e authority. T h at authority they hedged about with laws and obligations, lest it puff itself up too much, run riot, result in the ruin of the subjects, and degenerate into tyranny. . . . T he authority of the comm onwealth is greater than that of the kings. Otherw ise how would it be possible, unless it were greater, to restrain the power of the kings and to resist their will? Kings will be perm itted when circumstances require to ask for new laws, and to interpret and lessen the severity of old ones; to make adequate provision, if any eventuality is not covered by the law. However, the king should believe that it is the distinguishing mark of a tyrant to lack reverence for the customs and institutions of the fathers, to overturn the laws at his own whim, to refer to his 112

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own licence and convenience everything that he does. N or is it con­ sistent that lawful princes so conduct themselves that they seem to possess and use a power untram m elled by law. Since indeed divine and hum an law and right are expressed by the laws in every phase of life, it is unavoidable that he who violates the laws thereby departs from justice and uprightness. W hat is con­ ceded to no one is perm itted still less to the king. From J u a n de M ariana, De Rege et Regis Institutione, I, cited by G. Lewy (92).

113

114 m.

Carlos Lorenzo (1573-75) x

Joanna m. John of Portugal (1535-73) (1537-54)

Don John (1547-78)

Maria (1580-83) x

x

Sebastian I (1557-78) x Ernst Wenceslas Albert (1553-95) (1558-78) (1559-1621) X Rudolf x x x (1552-1612) Maximilian x (1558-1618) x Matthias (1557-1619)

Philip III (1578-1621)

m. Charles Philibert of Savoy (1562-1630)

Diego (1575-82) x

Catalina (1567-97)

Ferdinand (1529-30) x m. Maximilian II Marla of Habsburg (1528-1603) (1527-76)

(3) Elizabeth Valois (4) Anne of Austria (m. 1560-68) (m. 1570-80)

Note: A broken line — denotes illegitimacy; x = died without issue.

Ferdinand (1571-78) x

m. Albert of Habsburg (1559-1621) x

(2) Mary Tudor (m. 1554-58) x Don Carlos (1545-68) x Isabella (1566-1633) x

( 1 ) Maria of Portugal (m. 1543-45)

Alexander Farnese (1545-92)

Philip II (1527-98)

Margaret of Parma (1522-86)

Charles V m. Isabella of Portugal (1500-58) (1503-39)

Genealogy: Philip IPs Family

Glossary

A 10 per-cent sales tax.

Alcabala

Alcalde mayor

A chief m agistrate.

Almojarifazgos de Indias Almojarifazgos major

Customs duties from the Indies trade.

Customs duties collected in Seville.

A writer who drew up arbitrios or recom m endations for economic and political reform.

Arbitrista

C reated in the 1580s, comprising 106 ships in 1587 which patrolled the Atlantic, the fleet was rebuilt after the A rm ada, nam ed the A rm ada of the Ocean Sea in 1594 and by 1598 totalled 67 ships.

Armada del M a r Océano

T he holder of an asiento (see below).

Asentista

A contract or bill of exchange between the crown and finan­ ciers which enabled them to recover their cash at a set time and place and at interest rates that increased according to dem and.

Asiento

A Castilian high court of appeal.

Audiencia

A ceremony or ‘act of faith’ at which penitents were en­ couraged by the Inquisition to abjure their beliefs before receiving sentence. Only a minority of convicted heretics were burned at the stake.

Auto de f'e

Baldíos

Com m on land technically owned by the crown.

‘La Leyenda negra’: the belief which began in Italy in the late fifteenth century and spread to the N etherlands and England in Philip’s reign that Spain wanted to rule the world.

Black Legend

Parliam entary dominions.

Bracci

estates

in

the

non-Castilian

Spanish

Caridades Feast days when entire communities took a vow to secure protection against evil forces.

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Glossary

Casa de Contratación A House of T rade established in 1503 which controlled all vessels, commerce and passengers travelling between Spain and America. Censo

An annuity draw n from loans m ade to the crown.

Concordia

An agreement.

Consejo de Hacienda

T he Council of Finance.

Consignación T he consigning of revenue to finance specific aspects of state expenditure, especially in the navy and army. Consulado de M a r A body of m erchants in Burgos who exercised a monopoly of Castilian trade with the Low Countries and Italy from 1494. A sim ilar monopoly was later granted to Bilbao and Seville. Consulta Sum m ary of a Council meeting forwarded to the K ing for consideration. Contador

An accountant or purser in the arm ed forces.

Contaduría de Hacienda The T reasury’s accounting office where taxes were collected and adm inistered. Contaduría M ayor de Cuentas

T he principal accounting office.

Conversos O riginally Jew s who were converted to Christianity, but from the sixteenth century it could also apply to converted Moors. Corregidor O ne of sixty-six crown representatives serving the major Castilian towns in a judicial, adm inistrative and political capacity. Cortes An assembly in each of the Iberian states convened by the crown usually to approve a subsidy. After 1538, the Castilian Cortes consisted of one Estate representing eighteen towns and cities. The Aragonese Cortes consisted of four Estates and m et less frequently. Cruzada Papal subsidy originally granted to finance Spain’s war with the infidel. Cuaderno

A statute or law.

A committee of eight representatives from the Aragonese Estates which had the power to meet independently of the Cortes.

Diputación

M oney given by the nobles and clergy to the crown upon request; it was also a subsidy voted by the parliam ents of Naples and Sicily.

Donativo

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Glossary

A tax approved by a region which determ ined its assessment and m ethod of collection.

Encabezamiento

T he ideas of Erasm us, a Dutch hum anist, who had exposed clerical abuses and urged the Catholic C hurch to reform them; the best-known Spanish hum anist was Ju a n Luis Vives. Erasmianism

A tax on clerical property introduced in 1567 and usually paid as a lum p sum by the Church.

Excusado Flota

A fleet carrying bullion from the Indies to Seville.

Fueros

Laws and privileges of the non-Castilian Spanish provinces.

T he lowest level of noble status, eagerly sought after as it exempted the hidalgo from taxation.

Hidalguía

‘Enlightened’ mystics, also known as alumbrados, who re­ assessed the Catholic faith and rejected those aspects which they could not uphold.

Illuminists

A list of prohibited works (670 in 1559) which was enlarged to more than 2,500 books in 1583-84.

Index

An organisation established in 1478 in Castile by papal decree to extirpate heresy and ensure that conversos conformed to the Catholic faith. In Philip’s reign it investigated all suspected heresies and unchristian activities. T he crown had full jurisdiction over the 21 tribunals in the monarquía.

Inquisition

A small committee of advisers formed c. 1585. T he most im ­ portant was the Junta de Noche, which met in the evening until it was superseded by the Junta de Gobierno (Governing Com m ittee).

Junta

Juraduría

A royal councillor.

C redit bonds paid annually to crown bankers out of state revenue. These increased the crown’s debts and provided an attrac­ tive form of public investment.

Juros

Aragonese law officer in charge of courts and justice, ap­ pointed by the crown for life.

Justiciar Letrado

A lawyer.

‘Purity of blood’. This reflects the concern that Spaniards m ust be free of Jew ish blood, but it was not a controver­ sial issue in Philip’s reign.

Limpieza de sangre

117

Glossary

Maestrazgos T here were three Castilian M ilitary O rders or Maestrazgos — Santiago, C alatrava and A lcántara —which had been

vested in the crown since 1523. A christianised Jew.

Marrano

M ajordom o or stew ard of the royal household.

Mayor domo Medio general

T he conversion of crown debts into juros.

A sheepowners’ guild established in 1273 to control the three royal sheepwalks or cañadas between Barcelona and Navarre; V alen­ cia and M edina del Campo; M álaga/Alicante and Seville. Mesta

An indirect excise tax introduced in 1590.

Millones

The dominions of the Spanish crown.

Monarquía Morisco

A M oor who had been converted to C hristianity.

Mudejar A M uslim living in Christian Spain. Officially after Ja n u ary 1526 all Mudejares became Moriscos. País

A country or region.

Pechero

An ordinary taxpayer.

Pensiones

A clerical tax on episcopal income.

Placards

Edicts against heretical faiths and practices.

Pragmatica

A decree.

Procurador O ne of thirty-six delegates in the Castilian Cortes elected or chosen to represent the eighteen towns of Avila, Burgos, Córdoba, Cuenca, G ranada, G uadalajara, Jaén , León, M adrid, M urcia, Salam anca, Segovia, Seville, Soria, Toledo, Toro, Valladolid and Zamora.

Castilian customs duties collected at the borders with Aragon, N avarre and Portugal.

Puertos secos Quintal

A weight of ju st over 100 lbs.

Quinto 20 per-cent duty levied on all American taxes, customs duties and minerals, especially gold and silver.

T he ‘Reconquest’ by which the Moors were expelled from Spain; it began in the eleventh century and ended in 1492 with the capture of the last M oorish state of G ranada. Reconquista

118

Glossary

Town councillors.

Regidores

Analyses or accounts of events.

Relaciones Salinas

A tax on salt.

Seda de Granada

A tax on G ranadan silk.

A lordship or sovereignty over an area of land or community.

Señorío

A ‘service’ or grant of taxation m ade by the Cortes. The ordinary servicio was payable over three years and an extraordinary servicio payable at once. Servicio

Servicio y montazgo Sisa

A tax on flocks of sheep.

A tax on food, first introduced in 1596.

M ilitary and political leaders of the D utch States ap­ pointed by the crown.

Stadholders

A general parliam ent of the N etherlands, convened by the Regent or Governor-General in Brussels, and attended by delegates from the seventeen states. All proposals had to be unani­ mously approved by the delegates, who first had to consult their local assemblies (staten ).

States-General

Subsidio

A clerical tax introduced in 1519 and regularly levied after

1561. The Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisición was a royal council established in 1483 to supervise the inquisitions throughout the Spanish monarquía.

Suprema

Tercias C hurch tithes payable to the crown and usually assessed and collected with the alcabala as a lump sum. Tercios

T h e Spanish infantry.

119

Bibliography

The place of publication is London, unless otherwise stated. 1 Adam s, S., The Armada Campaign o f 1588, Historical Associ­ ation, New Appreciations in History, 13, 1988. 2 Andrews, K. R., D rake’s Voyages, 1967. 3 Basas Fernández, M ., E l Consulado de Burgos en el siglo X V I, M adrid, 1963. 4 Bennassar, P., Un siecle d ’or espagnol, Paris, 1982. 5 Bennassar, P., L ’Inquisition espagnole, X V —X V I siecles, Paris, 1979. 6 Bennassar, P., Valladolid au siecle d ’or, Paris, 1967. 7 Bossy, J ., Christianity in the West, 1400—1700, Oxford, 1985. 8 Boxer, C. R., From Lisbon to Goa, 1500—1750: Studies in Portuguese M aritime Expansion, 1984. 9 Bradford, E., The Great Siege: M alta 1565, 1961. 10 Brandi, K., The Emperor Charles V, 1939. 11 Bratli, C. G., Philippe II, roi d ’Espagne, Paris, 1912. 12 Braudel, F., The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age o f Philip II , 1972. 13 Brice, K., ‘Philip II: the M editerranean’, in J . Lotherington (ed.), Years o f Renewal: European History, 1470—1600, 1988. 14 Bujanda, J . M. de, Index de Tlnquisition Espagnole, Geneva, 1984. 15 C abrera de Córdoba, L., Felipe Segundo, Rey de España, 4 vols, M adrid, 1876. 16 Cadoux, C. J ., Philip o f Spain and the Netherlands, 1947. 17 C arande, R., Carlos V y sus banqueros, vol. i, M adrid, 1943. 18 Casey, J ., The Kingdom o f Valencia in the Seventeenth Century, Cam bridge, 1979. 19 Casey, J ., ‘Spain: A Failed T ransition’, in P. Clark (ed.), The European Crisis o f the 1590s, 1985. 20 Chacón Jim énez, F., Murcia en la centuria del quinientos, M urcia, 1980. 21 Cham berlain, R. S., ‘T he Corregidor in Castile in the Sixteenth 120

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Century and the Residencia as Applied to the Corregidor’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 23, 1943. C haunu, H. and P., Seville et VAtlantique, 1504—1650, vol. viii, Paris, 1959.

23 Christian, W. A., Local Religion in Sixteenth Century Spain, Princeton, NJ, 1981.

24 Cipolla, C. M ., (ed.), The Fontana Economic History o f Europe, 1974.

25 Clissold, S., ‘T he Shotgun M arriage: Spain’s Annexation of Portugal, 1580’, History Today, 1980. 26 C ontreras, J ., ‘La Inquisición de Aragon: estructura e oposición 1550-1700’, Estudios de Historia Social, i, M adrid, 1977. 27 Crowson, P., Tudor Foreign Policy, 1973. 28 Danvila, A., Felipe I I y la sucesión de Portugal, M adrid, 1956. 29 Davies, C. S. L., ‘England and the French W ar, 1557—59’ in J . Loach and R. T ittler (eds), The M id-Tudor Policy, c. 15401560, 1980. 30 Davies, R. T., The Golden Century o f Spain, 1501—1621, 1937. 31 Davis, J . C., (ed.), Pursuit o f Power: Venetian Ambassadors — Reports on Spain, Turkey and France in the Age o f Philip II , 1560— 1600, New York, 1970.

32 Dedieu, J . P., ‘Les causes de foi de l’inquisition de Tolède (1483—1820)’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez, 14, Paris, 1978.

33 Dominguez O rtiz, A., The Golden Age o f Spain, 1516—1659, 1971.

34 Domínguez O rtiz, A., and Vincent, B., Historia de los Moriscos, M adrid, 1978.

35 Doran, S., England and Europe, 1485—1603, Sem inar Studies in History, London and New York, 1986.

36 Elliott, J . H ., Imperial Spain, 1469—1716, 1963. 37 Elliott, J . H ., Spain and its World, 1500—1700, New Haven, Conn, 1989.

38 Fernández Alvarez, M ., La política mundial de Carlos V y Felipe I I , M adrid, 1966.

39 Fernández-Armesto, F., The Spanish Armada, Oxford, 1988. 40 Fichtner, P. S., Ferdinand I o f Austria, 1982. 41 Fortea Pérez, J . I., Córdoba en el Siglo X V I, las bases demográficas y económicas de una expansión urbana, Córdoba, 1981.

42 G achard, L. P., (éd.), Correspondance de Marguerite d ’Autriche, duchesse de Parme, avec Philippe II, vol ii, Brussels, 1870.

43 G achard, L. P., (éd.), Lettres de Philippe I I a ses filles, les infantes 121

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Isabelle et Catherine écrites pendant son Voyage en Portugal (1581—83),

Paris, 1884. G arcía Cárcel, R., Herejía y sociedad en siglo X V I. La Inquisición en Valencia 1530-1609, Barcelona, 1980. 45 G arcía Sanz, A., Desarrollo y Crisis del Antiguo Régimen en Castilla

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la Vieja. Economía y Sociedad en Tierras de Segovia, 1500—1814,

M adrid, 1977.

46 G arcía M artínez, S., Bandolerismo, pirateria y control de moriscos en Valencia durante el reinado de Felipe II, Valencia, 1977.

47 Gentil da Silva, J., En Espagne: développement économique, subsis­ tance, déclin, Paris, 1965.

48 Geyl, P., The Revolt o f the Netherlands, 1555—1609, 1958. 49 González Alonso, B., E l corregidor castellano 1348—1808, M adrid, 1970.

50 Goodm an, D. C., ‘Philip I I ’s Patronage of Science and Engineering’, British Journal fo r the History o f Science, 16, 1983.

51 Goodm an, D. C., Power and Penury: Government, Technology and Science in Philip I I ’s Spain, Cam bridge, 1988.

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128

Index A benhum eya, 60 A bjuration, A ct of (1581), 70 A bsolutism , 25, 191-5, 112-13 Aerschot, Philippe de Croy, Duke of, 69 Africa, N orth, 1-2, 14, 29, 41, 59, 63, 77-80 Álava, 48; Frances de, 108 A lbert, A rchduke o f A ustria, Viceroy of Portugal, 81; ruler o f the N etherlands, 16, 71 Alcabala, 18, 26-7, 30, 36, 46, 97, 115, 119 Alcalá, Duke of, 30 A lcázarquivir, B attle of (1578), 79-80 Ali Pasha, T urkish G rand Vizier, 78-9 Allen, C ardinal W illiam, 86 Alm adén, 31, 92 Almenara, C ount of, 22 Almojarifazgos de Indias, 26-7, 115 Almojarifazgos major, 26-7, 115 Alonso del C anto, 51, 64 A lpujarros, 59, 61 Alva, Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of, 13-15, 32, 66-8, 70, 74-5, 83-5, 89, 92 A m bassadors, Im perial, 82; Spanish, 77, 82—4, 86, 108-10; V enetian, 7, 73, 86, 99 Am ericas, see New W orld Amiens, 76-7 A nabaptists, 62 A ndalucía, 9, 17, 40, 60-1, 103 Anjou, Francis, Duke of, 75, 84 Anne of Austria, Philip N ’s fourth wife, 7, 75 A ntonio, Don, 80—1, 84 A ntw erp, 37, 39, 41, 45, 68-70, 84 Apology (1580), 70, 92, 108-9 A quaviva, G eneral, 56 Aragon, 1, 12, 16, 21-3, 27, 39, 42, 50, 58, 93, 95, 102, 118; revolt in, 21-3

A randa, C ount of, 22 A ranjuez, 5 Arbitrista, 46, 97, 105, 115 A rm ada, the, 9, 19, 30, 33, 38, 46, 57, 70, 76, 85-90, 96, 109-12, 115 Armada del M ar Océano, 45, 115 A rras, U nion of (1579), 69 A rtois, 67, 69 Asientos, 3, 34—8, 104—5, 115 A sturias, 41 A uñon, M arquis of, 35, 38 A ustria, H ouse of, 71, 73, 82 Autos de fe , 52, 115 Ávila, 61, 118 Ávila, St J u a n de, 53 Ávila, T eresa of, 5, 50 Azores, 81, 84, 89

Baldíos, 29-30, 115 Bankers, 3, 14, 33-8, 41, 84, 104-5, 115, 117; see also Fuggers Barbary Corsairs, 21, 44, 59, 78; States, 60 Barcelona, 40, 45, 48, 50, 118 Basque, 11, 41, 95 Bayona, 85 Bayonne, 75 Bergen-op-Zoom, 70, 87 Berghes (Bergen), Je a n de Glymes, M arquis of, 66-7 Berlaymont, Baron von, 63 Bilbao, 39, 45-6 Black Legend, 83, 93, 95, 115 Bobadilla, Castillo de, 92, 100 Bobadilla, Don Francisco de, 89, 112 Borja, Francis, 55 Borromeo, Carlo, A rchbishop of M ilan, 24 Bougie, 2, 77 Bourbon, C harles, C ardinal of, 76 B rabant, 62, 64, 67-8 Bracci, 24, 115

129

Index Braganga, 80 BraganQa, C atalina, Duchess of, 80 Bratli, C. G., 6 Braudel, F., 46, 94 Breda, 68, 70 Brederode, Henry, Baron de, 65, 67 Brill, 67, 84 Brittany, 76-7 Bruges, 39, 42-3, 70 Brussels, 9, 10, 12, 28, 64-6, 68, 70, 76, 119 Bullion, 2, 30-1, 33-8, 42, 44, 118; see also Flota

Burghley, W illiam Cecil, Lord, 14, 84 Burgos, 18-19, 27, 38-9, 43, 48, 50-1, 89, 100-1, 118 Burgundy, Duchy of, 1, 25, 65, 95; see N etherlands Cabezón, Antonio de, 6 Cadiz, 17, 39-40, 90 Cadoux, C .J ., 93 Calais, 74, 77, 82, 88-9 Cam brai, 76 Cano, Melchor, 49 C arande, R., 32 Caridades, 51, 115 Carlos, Don, son of Philip II, 7, 32, 75, 92 C arranza, Bartolomé de, Archbishop of Toledo, 4, 28, 55 C artagena, 17 C asa de C am po, 5 Casa de Contratación, 34, 43, 94, 116 Castellanos, C ristóbal de, 64 Castile, 1-2, 13, 16, 30, 39, 60, 87, 95, 102, 104; see also C ortes of Castile, C ouncil of Castile, Jo an n a o f Castile C astro, D on A ntonio de, 100 C astro, León de, 49 C atalina, younger daughter of Philip II, 7, 99 C atalonia, 1, 12, 21-2, 39-40, 94 C áteau-C am brésis, Peace of (1559), 74, 77, 82, 96 C atholic kings, 1, 39, 48 C atholic League, 70, 76—7 Censos, 44, 46, 105, 116 C harles V , Em peror, 1-4, 9, 13, 25, 29-30, 6 2 -3 , 81, 102-3

130

C harles IX , K ing o f France, 75 C haunu, H and P., 43 Chinchón, C ount of, 15-16 C lem ent V III, Pope, 5 6 -7 , 76 Coligny, G aspard de, 75 Com m erce, 39, 4 1 -4 , 97 Com prom ise o f the N obility (1565), 65 Concordia, 54, 58, 106-7, 116 Consejo de Hacienda, 35, 116 Consignación, 38, 116 Consulado de M ar, 43, 116 Consultas, 10—11, 116 Contaduría de Hacienda, 35, 116 Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 35, 116

Conversos, 48, 52, 116-17 C órdoba, 40, 60—1, 118 C órdoba, C abrera, court historian, 81 Corregidores, 17-18, 32, 100-1, 116 Corsica, 30 Cortes, o f Aragon, 2 1 -3 , 54, 106, 116; o f Castile, 3, 17-20, 2 6 -7 , 34, 36-7, 54, 97, 100-4, 116, 118-19; of C atalonia, 21; o f N avarre, 20, 95; o f Portugal, 80—1 C orunna, 89, 111 Corzo, J u a n Antonio, 30 Council of Aragon, 11, 12, 49 Council o f Castile, 11, 12, 49, 53, 100 Council of the C rusade, 13 Council o f Finance, 11, 13, 31, 35, 94, 116 Council o f Flanders, 12 Council of the Indies, 11—12 Council of the Inquisition 1, 13, 49 Council o f Italy, 11-12 Council o f M ilitary O rders, 13 Council o f Portugal, 12, 81 Council o f State, 11, 13, 15, 49, 85; Council o f T rent, 49-50, 59 Council o f Troubles, 66-7 Council o f W ar, 13, 87 Cruzada, 13, 29-30, 55, 80, 116 Cuaderno (1567), 101-4, 116 Cuenca, 42, 118 C yprus, 78-9 D ante, 5, 53 Davies, R. T ., 72 De la Marck, W illiam, Baron of Lumey, 67, 84

Index Delgadillo, Don Ju a n , 101 Deventer, 70 Diego, Prince, 99 Diputación, 21-2, 116 Discalced Carm elites, 50 Djerba, 78 Domínguez O rtiz, A, 93 Dominicans 49, 56 Donativo, 23-4, 30, 116 Doria, A ndrea, 13 Dragut, 78 Drake, Francis, 84—5, 89 Dunkirk, 70 Dutch Revolt, see N etherlands Eboli, Prince of, see Gómez de Silva, Ruy; Princess of, 14 Egmont, Lam oral, C ount of, 63-5, 67, 74, 92 Elizabeth I, Q ueen of England, 56, 82-90, 96 Elizabeth o f Valois, third wife of Philip II, 7, 32, 74-5, 83 Emmanuel I, K ing of Portugal, 80 Encabezamiento general, 19, 26, 36-7, 117 England, 4, 14, 44, 57, 70, 74, 77, 81-90, 110-11 Erasm ianism, 2, 5, 48, 53, 117 Eraso, Francisco de, 11, 64, 101, 104 Ernst, Archduke of A ustria, 71, 77 Escobedo, Ju a n de, 14, 22, 92 Escorial, 5—7, 32 Espinosa, Diego de, C ardinal, 10-11, 35, 54, 59, 104 Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of, 90 Estates-General of France, 77 Estrem adura, 49, 60 Euldj Ali, 79 Excusado, 29, 80, 117 Farnese, see Parm a Ferdinand I, Em peror, 73 Ferdinand of Aragon, 1, 3 Feria, Duke of, 77, 82-3 Fernández-Arm esto, F, 88 Fernández de Espinosa, Ju a n , 38 Flanders, 39, 42, 67-9, 86, 104; Army of,. 16, 32-3, 37, 51, 63-71, 83, 89 Flota, 37-8, 45-6, 117 Flushing, 67, 84, 87

Francavila, Duke of, 21 France, 32-3, 40, 44, 62-3, 70, 73-4, 81-2, 107, 109; W ars o f Religion, 57, 65, 75-7 Franche-Com té, 12, 25, 64 Franciscans, 49—50 Francisco, Giacomo de, 5 Fuentes, Count, 71 Fueros, 21, 95, 117 Fuggers, the, 3, 28, 31, 34, 38 Furiò Ceriol, Fadrique, 51, 68 Galicia, 41, 51, 55, 85 G arcia, Don de Toledo, 78 G am ica, Francisco de, 35 Gascony, 40 G attinara, M ercurino de, 72 G enoa, 13, 23, 33—8, 78; see also Bankers Geyl, 88 G hent, 70; Pacification o f (1576), 69 Gómez, Ruy de Silva, Prince of Eboli, I ] , 13-14, 65 González de Cellorigo, M artín, 46-7, 105 G ranada, 17, 26-7, 45, 5 1 -2 , 58-61, 108, 118; G ranada, Luis de, 50, 53 Granvelle, Antoine Perrenot, Bishop of Arras, C ardinal, 6, 10-11, 13, 15, 36, 63-5, 68, 70 Gravelines, 74, 88-9 G regory X I II, Pope, 56 G regory X IV , Pope, 57 Grenville, R ichard, 84 Griffiths, G., 19 Grim aldi, Niccolò, 37-8, 104—5 G uadacanal, 31 G uadalajara, 100, 118 G uadalquivir, 40 G uicciardini, Francesco, 42—3 G uilds, 45, 118 Guise, the, 33, 75-7, 82, 86 Guise, C harles, Duke of, 76—7 Guise, Francis, Duke of, 74 Guise, H enry, Duke of, 76 G utiérrez de C uéllar, Francisco, 37 H aarlem , 68 H acus, M atthias, 5 H ainaut, 67

131

Index H am ilton, E .J ., 44 H anseatic League, 82 Hawkins Jo h n , 83 H enry, K ing of Portugal, 80 H enry II, K ing of France, 56, 73-4, 82 H enry II I, K ing of France, 57, 75—6, 84 H enry IV , K ing of N avarre, K ing of France, 57, 60, 75—7, 107 H errera, J u a n , 5 H errera, M elchior de, 35 Hidalguía, 29, 117 H inestrosa, B altasar de, 102 H olland, 64, 6 7 -8 , 70, 84, 96; see also N etherlands Holy League, 32, 78-9 H ornes, Philippe de M ontm orency, C ount, 6 3 -5 , 92 H uguenotism , 22, 60, 65, 75, 107, 109-10 Ibánez, Iñigo de S anta Cruz, 93 Iberia, see Spain Idiáquez, D on Tuan de, 11, 15-16, 71, 76, 112 Illuminism, 2, 117 Index, 53, 117 Indies, see New W orld Industry, 39, 45-7 Infantado, Duke of, 30 Inflation, 3, 44, 105 Innocent IX , Pope, 57 Inquisition, 22, 48-56, 58-62, 64—6, 94-5, 97, 106-7, 115, 117, 119 Ireland, 86-7 Isabella, elder daughter of Philip II, 7, 71, 76-7, 99, 110 Isabella of Castile, 1, 3 Isabella of Portugal, m other of Philip II, 4, 80, 99 Isle of W ight, 111 Italy, 12-13, 16, 23-4, 28, 42, 62, 72-4, 78, 93, 115 Jago, C., 18-19 Jesuits, 49-50, 55-6, 85-6, 112 Jew s, 52, 94-5, 97, 116-17, see also Conversos Jo an n a of Castile, Regent, 2, 21, 34, 106

132

John of A ustria, Don, half brother of Philip II, 14, 59-60, 68-9, 79 Joinville, T reaty of (1584), 76 Junta, 11, 15-16, 117; Grande, 16; de Gobierno, 16, 117; de Noche, 15-16, 70, 117; des Obras y Bosques, 13; of the Presidents, 36 Juradurías, 29, 117 Juros, 3, 34-8, 44, 46, 105, 117 Justice, 91-3, 106-7, 112-13 K am en, H ., 14, 29, 44, 49, 52-3, 94, 96 Knights of St Jo h n , 78 Koenigsberger, H. G., 10, 24, 66, 96 La Goletta, 77-9 La H arradura, 78 La M ancha, 50 Lainez, Diego, 49, 55 Lalaing, C ount Charles de, 69 Lamoral, see Egmont Languedoc, 40, 77 Lanuza family, 21 Leicester, R obert Dudley, Earl of, 14, 84 León, 39, 102, 118 León, Luis de, 51 León, Pedro de, 50 Lepanto, Battle of (1571), 32, 56, 79 Lerma, Duke of, 16 Letrados, 11-12, 32, 94, 117 Levant, 42, 44 Limpieza de sangre, 52, 117 Lisbon, 10, 80, 87-9, 99 Lopez del Cam po, Fernin, 35 Lorraine, 75 Lorraine, C ardinal of, 76 Louvain University, 52 Lovett, A. W ., 14, 35, 37 Low C ountries, see N etherlands Loyola, St Ignatius, 55 Luis Vives, J u a n , 117 Lull, R am ón, 5 L utheranism , 48, 60, 62 Lynch, J ., 49, 93 M aastricht, 70 M adrid, 5, 10, 12, 14, 16-17, 21, 34, 38, 40, 4 2 -3 , 50, 54, 63-5, 68, 70, 94, 102, 118

Index Maestrazgos (M ilitary O rders), 3,

28-9, 118 M álaga, 40, 118 M alta, 32, 65, 78-9 M aluenda, Francisco de, 38 M anrique de L ara, Ju a n , 13 M ansfelt, C ount, 71 M arceu, A ntonio, 56 M argaret of P arm a, 11, 62-6, 109 M argaret of V alois, 74 M argate, 86-7 M argliani, G iovanni, 79 M arguerite of V alois, 75 M aria o f Portugal, first wife of Philip II, 7 M ariana, J u a n de, 91, 112—13 M arin, A ntonio, 5 M arnix, Philip of, 65 M ary o f H ungary, Regent in the N etherlands, 1, 62 M ary S tuart, Q ueen of Scots, 85-7, 109-10 M ary T udor, second wife of Philip II, 7, 81-2 M attingly, G., 88 M axim ilian II, Em peror, 73 M edici, C atherine de, 75 M edici, Cosim o de, Duke of Lorraine, 75 M edina Celi, Duke of, 68, 77-8 M edina del C am po, 35, 42-3, 118 M edina Sidonia, Duke of, 17, 87-9,111 Medio generale, 37—8, 118 M editerranean Sea, 2, 24, 33, 41-2, 44, 63, 65, 77-80, 96 M endoza, B ernardino de, 86 M endoza, C ardinal, 48 M endoza, family 11 M ercurian, G eneral, 55 M esa, Gil de, 22 M essina, 24 Mesta, 41, 118, Mexico, 9, 12 M ilan, 1, 4, 10, 12, 23-4, 73-4, 94-5, 104 Millones, 20, 27, 118 Mines, 3, 27, 92 M olina, Luis de, 91 Monarquía, 1, 6, 13, 33, 54, 72, 94, 117-19 M ondéjar, M arquis of, 17, 59

M ontano, Benito Arias, 6, 68 M ontigny, Floris de M ontmorency, Baron of, 65—7, 92 Montmorency, see Hornes M onzon, 54, 106 Moors, see Muslims Moriscos, 2, 21, 32,48, 50-2, 58-61, 97, 108, 118 Morocco, 78—9 Motley, S. L., 92-3 M oura, Don C ristóbal de, 11, 15-16, 80 Mudejares, 58, 118 M unster, 85-6 M urad III, Sultan o f Turkey, 79 M urcia, 17-19, 40, 58, 118 Muslims, 2, 58-61, 79, 118 N adal O ller, J ., 44 N antes, 39 Naples, 1, 12, 23, 27, 49, 73-4, 77, 95 N assau, Louis of, 65 Nassau, M aurice of, 70 Nassau, William of, see O range N avarre, 1, 20, 27, 42, 49, 75, 118 Netherlands, 1, 2, 12, 14, 23, 25, 28, 61-7, 69, 75, 77, 82-4, 86, 96, 110, 115; Dutch Revolt, 15, 32, 39, 43-5, 61-71, 83, 92 New World, 1, 2, 26-7, 42-6, see also Bullion, Flota Nijmegen, 70; Convention of (1573), 84 N ombre de Dios, 84 Nonsuch, T reaty of (1585), 70, 84 Norris, Jo h n , 89 N orthern Earls, Rebellion of the, 85 Nuestra Señora del Rosario, 88—9 O bservants, 50 Olivares, M arquis de, 110 Oosterweel, 66 O porto, 80 O rán, 77-8 O range, William of N assau, Prince of, 7, 60, 63-4, 67-70, 84, 92, 108 O rder of the Golden Fleece, 1, 63, 92 O rder of M ontesa, 29 O rtiz, Luiz, 46 O stend, 70, 89 O suna, Duke of, 23, 80 O ttom ans, the, see Turks Ovando, Ju a n de, 11, 32, 35-7

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Index Papacy, 29, 49, 55-7, 64, 72-4, 76, 80, 82-3, 87, 107-10, see also Clem ent V III, Paul IV , Pius IV , Pius V, Gregory X III, Gregory X IV , Innocent IX , Sixtus V, U rban V II Paris, 33, 70, 76-7, 108 Parker, G., 6, 33, 72, 77, 89 Parliam ents, 18, 23-4, see also Cortes, States-General Parm a, 73 Parm a, Alexander Farnese, Prince of, 11, 69-71, 76, 86-9, 111-12 Pascual, Ju a n , 38 Paul IV , Pope, 29, 56, 73-4 Peñón de Vélez, 2, 77-8 Pensiones, 28, 118 Pérez, A ntonio, 7, 14, 22, 54, 73, 93 Pérez, G onzalo, 10, 13-15 Perpetual Edict (1577), 69 Perrenot, see Granvelle Persia, 78—80 Peru, 12, 104 Petrie, C ., 96 Philibert, Charles, Duke of Savoy, 7, 33, 76 Philibert, Em m anuel, Duke of Savoy, 13, 28, 62, 74 Philip, II, K ing of Spain (1556-1598), appearance, 4, 99; character, 4—9, 98; education, 4; family, 7, 74—5, 81-2, 99-100; finances, 2 -3 , 26-38, 62, 67, 104—5; governm ent, 6, 9-25, 93-5, 97; inheritance, 1-3, 25; relations with E ngland, 33, 70, 74, 81—90; France, 32, 72-77; N etherlands, 28, 32-3, 61-71; Portugal, 73, 80—1; Turkey, 77-80 Philip, Don (from 1598—1621, K ing of Spain), 7, 16, 61, 112 Piedm ont, 73 Pierson, P., 19, 72, 81, 93, 96 Pius IV , Pope, 56 Pius V , Pope, 29, 51, 55-6, 78-9, 85 Population, 39-40 Portugal, 7, 15-16, 27, 33, 42, 44, 52, 57, 73, 79-81, 94-7, 103, 118 Prado, 5 Pragmatica, 106—7, 118 Procuradores, 17—20, 36, 101, 118

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Puente de D uero, 40 Puertos secos (customs duties), 26-7, 118

Q uinto, 30, 118 Q uiroga, G asp ar de, C ardinal, 50, 53 Raleigh, W alter, 84 Ram m ekens, 84 Ranke, L. von, 72 Regidores, 18, 29, 119 R enard, Simon, 82 Requeséns, D on Luis de, 11, 24, 36, 68 Ribagorza, 21-2 R ibera, J u a n de, A rchbishop of V alencia, 50 Ridolfi Plot (1571), 85 Roanoke (V irginia), 84 Rogier, Philippe, 6 Rome, 10, 15, 109 Rouen, 40, 76 R udolf II, E m peror, 73 Rufo, J u a n , 6 Ruiz, M agdalena, 6 Ruiz M artín, F., 36, 40 Ruiz, Simón, 35, 43 St Bartholomew, M assacre of (1572), 75 St Q uentin, B attle of (1557), 74 Salam anca, 27, 39, 51, 53, 94, 118 Salinas (salt), 26-7, 100-4, 119 San Ju a n de U lúa, 83 San Martín, 112 Santa Cruz, C aptain-G eneral, 87, 89 Santarem , 80 Santiago, Diego de, 5 Sanz, L., 30 Sardinia, 1, 12, 24 Savoy, 7, 73-4; Duke of, see Philibert Sea Beggars, 67, 84 Sebastian, K ing of Portugal, 80 Seda de Granada (silk), 26-7, 119 Segovia, 30, 39, 42, 118 Segovia Woods, Letters from the (1565), 65 Seigniorage, 30—1 Selim, 78-9 Señoríos, 19, 30, 119 Servicio, 17-20, 27, 37, 100-1, 104, 119 Servicio y montazgo, 26—7, 119

Index Seso, Carlos de, 52 Sétubal, 80 Seville, 18, 27, 30-1, 34, 36-7, 40, 43-5, 51-2, 80, 115, 118 Sicily, 1, 12, 23-4, 28, 41, 49, 73, 77-9 Silíceo, M artínez, 4, 56 Silva, G uzm an de, 83 Sisas, 20, 27, 119 Sixtus V, Pope, 56-7, 72, 87, 107-10 Sluys, 87 Smerwick, 86 Soria, 100, 118 Soto, Domingo de, 49 Spain, 1-4, 31, 33, 80-1, 84, 94, 96-8, 104-5 Spanish, arm y, 17-8, 22-3, 31-3, 46, 60, 62-71, 74-7, 80, 86-7, 110, 119; Church, 48-57; economy, 39-47; Empire, 1, 10, 13, 23, 26, 31, 72-3, 76, 81, 84, 95-7, see also monarquía·, navy, 9, 23, 31-3, 45-6, 78-9, 81, 86-90, 110-12, 115 Spès, G uerau de, 84 Spinola, Agustín, 38 Spinola, Lorenzo, 37 Stadholder, 1, 64, 119 States of the Presidios, 23 States-General of the N etherlands, 18, 25, 28, 61-3, 67-70, 119 Stradling, R. A., 31 Suárez, Francisco, 91 Subsidio, 29, 119 Suleiman I, Sultan, 2, 77-8 Suprema, 54, 119 Suriano, Michele, 73 T arazona, 22 Tassis, Gabriel de, 10 Tendilla, 42 Tercias (tithes), 26-8, 119 T hom pson, I. A. A., 20, 95 Throckm orton Plot (1583), 86 Tiepolo, Paolo, 99 T itian, 5, 79 Toledo, 12, 28, 30, 40, 42, 50, 52-3, 55-6, 92, 118 Toledo, A rchbishop of, 48 Toledo, Antonio de, 13 Toledo, family, 11 Tordesillas, T reaty o f (1494), 83

T ournai, 66 T revor-R oper, H ., 98 T ridentine Decrees, 49—50, 55, 64, 97 T ripoli, 2, 77-8 T rujillo, 27 T unis, 60, 77-9 T urks, 2, 23, 44, 56, 59-61, 63, 77-80, 96 T uscany, 23, 73 U rb an V II, Pope, 57 U trecht, 64, 96 V aldés, Alfonso de, 72 V aldés, Diego Flores de, 89 V aldés, Fernando de, 52-3 Valdés, Pedro de, 88 V alencia, 1, 2, 16, 21, 39, 40-2, 45, 50-4, 58, 60-1, 95, 106, 118 V alenciennes, 66 V alladolid, 4, 12, 18, 40, 51-2, 104-5, 118 Vaucelles, T reaty of (1556), 73 Vázquez, Mateo, 9-11, 14-16, 37-8 Vázquez, Rodrigo, 38 Vega, Lope de, 6, 49 Velasco, 35, 101, 104 Vêlez, M arquis of Los, 17, 59 Venice, 15, 73, 78-9 V ergara, M artin de, 104 Vervins, Peace o f (1598), 77, 96 Viçens Vives, J ., 94 Vigo, 85 Vilar, P., 44, 46 Villahermosa, Duke of, 22 Villavicencio, Lorenzo de, 64 V itoria, Tom ás Luis de, 6 W alsingham , Francis, 84 W atson, R., 93 Ypres, 70 Zaragoza, 6, 21-2, 53 Z arate, Agustín de, 31 Zayas, G abriel de, 14, 108 Zealand, 64, 67-8, 70, 84, 96 Zieriksee, 68 Zúñiga y Requeséns, Ju a n de, 4, II, 15 Z utphen, 70

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