Petrus de Alvernia. Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum: A Critical Edition and Study [Critical ed.] 9789462703186, 9789461664402, 9462703183

Table of contents :
Cover
Table of Contents
Foreword
Part I – Interpretative Study
Introduction
Chapter 1: Authorship
Chapter 2: Date
Chapter 3: The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb
Chapter 4: Sources
Chapter 5: The Structure and Content of the Questiones and the Rationale of its Tabula Quaestionum
Chapter 6: Nachleben
Chapter 7: Introduction to the Critical Editions
Part II – Editions
Bibliography
Indices

Citation preview

. AM P1

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ancient and medieval philosophy · series 1

Marco Toste is a research fellow at the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the University of Coimbra.

LX I

Marco Toste (ed.)

This volume is of interest to scholars of medieval philosophy and the history of political thought and is a reference point for future research on the medieval reception of Aristotle’s Politics and medieval Aristotelian practical philosophy more broadly.

S.1

Petrus de Alvernia Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum

This volume is the first complete critical edition of Peter of ­Auvergne’s  Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum. The  Questiones  was produced at the Faculty of Arts of Paris sometime between late 1291 and 1296 and is the earliest surviving commentary in question form on Aristotle’s Politics. As the introduction explains, the  Questiones  was philosophically innovative and became the most influential question commentary on the Politics in the Middle Ages. The volume also includes a critical edition of an earlier oral report (reportatio) of Peter’s teaching on Books I-II and part of III which became the basis for those sections of the Questiones.

Petrus de Alvernia Questiones super I-VII ­libros Politicorum A Critical Edition and Study by Marco Toste

Leuven University Press

Serie AMP-1 Toste trimbox.indd 1

24-11-2022 14:11

PETRUS DE ALVERNIA QUESTIONES SUPER I-VII LIBROS POLITICORUM

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

DE WULF-MANSION CENTRE Series I

LXI

Editorial Coordinator Russell Friedman

Editorial Board Lisa Devriese Pieter d’Hoine Jan Opsomer Andrea Robiglio Carlos Steel Gerd Van Riel

Advisory Board Brad Inwood, Yale University, USA Jill Kraye, The Warburg Institute, London, United Kingdom John Marenbon, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom Lodi Nauta, University of Groningen, The Netherlands Timothy Noone, The Catholic University of America, USA Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA Martin Pickavé, University of Toronto, Canada Pasquale Porro, Università di Torino, Italy Geert Roskam, KU Leuven, Belgium

The “De Wulf-Mansion Centre” is a research centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance ­philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the ku Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein, 2, b-3000 Leuven (Belgium). It hosts the international project “Aristoteles Latinus” and publishes the “Opera omnia” of Henry of Ghent and the “Opera Philosophica et Theologica” of Francis of Marchia.

PETRUS DE ALVERNIA QUESTIONES SUPER I-VII LIBROS POLITICORUM

A Critical Edition and Study by Marco Toste

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS

© 2022 by the De Wulf-Mansioncentrum – De Wulf-Mansion Centre Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain/ Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat 4, b-3000 Leuven/Louvain (Belgium) All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated data file or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 94 6270 318 6 eISBN 978 94 6166 440 2 https://doi.org/10.11116/9789461664402 D/2022/1869/43 Nur: 732 Cover: Geert de Koning

To Lidia

E ousaram – aventura a mais incrível – Viver a inteireza do possível Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen, Navegações

Table of Contents

Forewordxvii Part I – Interpretative Study1 Introduction3 1. Introducing the Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum and its Significance 3 2. The Place of Peter of Auvergne in Medieval Philosophy 8 3. The Context of the Questiones: Its Institutional Setting 13 4. The Text Commented on: The Latin Translation of Aristotle’s Politics 19 5. The Questiones and the Medieval Reception of the Politics 32 6. The Approach of This Study and Edition 44 Chapter 1 – Authorship49 1. The Questiones and Peter’s Other Works 51 1.1. The Infinite 51 1.2. Privation 62 1.3. Natural Place and Celestial Influence 66 1.4. Teleology 73 2. The Questiones and the Scriptum 76 2.1. The Ruler–Subject Relationship in Terms of the Mover–Moved 77 2.2. Teleology 78 2.3. Hylomorphism 80 2.4. The Definition of Citizen 81 2.5. The Difference between a Free Man and a Slave 85 2.6. The Two Kinds of Multitude 87 2.7. The Question of Ostracism 88 2.8. Optimus Vir vs. Law 90 2.9. Hereditary vs. Elected Ruler 92 2.10. The Subject Matter of the Science of Politics: Book IV, Chapter 1 95 2.11. The Two Kinds of Office 96 2.12. Tyranny as an ‘Involuntary’ Regime 98 2.13. Nobility of Birth and Goodness Transmitted from Parents to Children 99

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2.14. The Naturalness of Agriculture and the Farmers as the ‘Best Multitude’ for Democracy 2.15. Celestial and Environmental Influence on Human Behaviour 2.16. Similar Terminology and Similar Use of the Same Source

102 103 110

Chapter 2 – Date119 1. The Questiones Within Peter’s Output 119 2. The Temporal Priority of the Scriptum over the Questiones 121 3. The Questiones and Views of Theologians at Paris 128 3.1. Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta (1286 and 1288) 128 3.2. James of Viterbo (1291) 130 3.3. Peter’s Quodlibeta and the Criticism of Godfrey of Fontaines (Early 1290s) 132 3.4. Giles of Rome (Late 1291) 139 3.5. Henry of Ghent’s Summa (Between 1281 and 1291) 142 4. Conclusions 143 Chapter 3 – The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb145 1. The Questiones, B and Peter’s Oral Lectures 147 2. Analysis of B 151 2.1. Style and Use of Sources 151 2.2. B is Not an Abbreviatio 157 2.3. B is a Reportatio (Further Evidence) 159 3. The Questions Shared by B and the Questiones: A Reportatio and its Editing 164 4. The Questions Specific to Each Text 182 4.1. The Questions Contained Only in the Questiones 183 4.2. The Questions Contained Only in B 187 5. A Final Note About B: Its Date and Circulation 192 Chapter 4 – Sources195 1. The Nicomachean Ethics 197 2. ‘Eustratius’ 198 3. Proclus and Neoplatonism 202 4. Sextus Empiricus 204 5. Aquinas’ Long Shadow 206 6. Previous Commentaries on the Politics 211 6.1. Albert the Great 211 6.2. Aquinas 215 7. Giles of Rome 217 8. Henry of Ghent 220

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Chapter 5 – The Structure and Content of the Questiones and the Rationale of its Tabula Quaestionum223 1. Book I 228 2. Book II 256 3. Book III 268 4. Book IV 285 5. Book V 291 6. Book VI 302 7. Book VII 306 8. Conclusions 310 Chapter 6 – Nachleben313 Chapter 7 – Introduction to the Critical Editions323 1. Principles of Edition 323 2. P as the Base Manuscript 324 3. Relation between the Manuscripts 326 4. Orthography 328 5. Conjectures and Emendations 332 6. Apparatus 333 7. Apparatus Fontium 334 8. Other Interventions 335 9. The Edition of the Reportatio 335 10. Conspectus Abbreviationum 337 11. Conspectus Signorum 337 Part II – Editions339 Petri de Alvernia Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum341 Prohemium343 Liber I351 1. Circa istum librum primo potest queri de subiecto huius scientie, quia subiectum in scientia primum est in cognitione et ex cognitione eius dependet scientia omnium aliorum que in scientia inquiruntur, et illud est causa omnium. Queritur ergo primo utrum subiectum in hac scientia sit ciuitas ipsa uel bonum agibile ab homine ciuile 351 2. Vtrum scientia speculatiua et practica differant ratione et specie 354 3. Vtrum ista scientia sit speculatiua uel practica 362 4. Vtrum ista scientia sit principalissima aliarum 363

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Vtrum omnis communicatio sit boni gratia 368 Vtrum ciuitas sit gratia principalissimi boni, ut dicit Philosophus 371 Vtrum combinatio maris et femine sit a natura 373 Vtrum mulier possit esse serua 380 Vtrum homo sit animal ciuile a natura 384 Vtrum seruus sit organum 390 Vtrum seruus, id quod est, domini sit 393 Vtrum ubicumque est coniunctio aliquorum in unum sit unum principans natura et aliud seruum et subiectum 395 13. Vtrum aliquis sit seruus a natura 398 14. Vtrum corpora seruorum et liberorum naturaliter sint differentia 403 15. Vtrum ille qui habundat in aliquo bono sit naturaliter dominus eius qui deficit in illo bono 405 16. Vtrum naturaliter bonus generet bonum et seruus seruum, sicut dicit Philosophus407 17. Vtrum serui ad dominum sit amicitia 411 18. Vtrum principatus yconomicus, despoticus et politicus differant specie uel sint idem 413 19. Vtrum ex diuersitate cibi causetur distinctio uitarum 415 20. Vtrum natura faciat omnia animalia et plantas propter hominem 419 21. Vtrum possessiua sit pars yconomice 422 22. Vtrum appetitus diuitiarum naturalium sit infinitus 424 23. Vtrum, sicut dicit Philosophus, cuilibet rei possesse sit duplex usus 426 24. Vtrum multitudo pecuniarum sint uere diuitie 428 25. Vtrum appetitus finis sit infinitus 430 26. Vtrum appetitus diuitiarum artificialium sit infinitus 434 27. Vtrum usus campsorie possit esse secundum ordinem iustitie 435 28. An pro usu pecunie ille qui concedit possit recipere aliquid 439 29. Vtrum serui inquantum talis oportet esse aliquam uirtutem 442 30. An domini et serui sit una uirtus secundum rationem 444 31. Vtrum artificem inquantum huiusmodi oportet habere uirtutem 447 Liber II451 1. Vtrum ciuitas sit una 451 2. Vtrum ciuitatem optimum sit esse quam maxime unam 454 3. Vtrum illud quod est commune minime curetur 456 4. Vtrum expediens sit ciuitati mulieres et pueros esse communes, sicut soluit Plato 458 5. Vtrum commisceri parentibus filios sit turpe secundum naturam et secundum se 462 6. Vtrum possessiones ciuitatis debent esse communes 465

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7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

XI

Vtrum expediat ciuitati mulieres ordinare ad bella 469 Vtrum lex sit aliquid ad rationem pertinens 472 Vtrum lex ordinetur in finem communem 474 Vtrum legislatorem in constituendo legem oportet inspicere ad homines et loca 476 De opinione Fellee, utrum necessarium sit politicum regulare possessiones477 Vtrum expediat ciuitati possessiones esse equales 479 Vtrum magis expediat politico ordinare concupiscentiam quam possessiones482 Vtrum permittendum sit ciues ditari quantumcumque contingit et sine termino 484 Vtrum terminus diuitiarum accipiendus sit in comparatione ad aliquod extrinsecum 486 Vtrum lex sit mutabilis 488 Vtrum lex sit mutanda meliore superueniente 490 Vtrum seruorum sit aliqua disciplina 493 Vtrum exercitium in uita militari sit principium multarum uirtutum 495

Liber III499 1. Vtrum considerantem de politia oportet considerare prius de ciuitate 499 2. Vtrum considerantem de ciuitate oportet prius considerare de ciue, sicut dicit Philosophus 501 3. Vtrum sit ciuis simpliciter qui potest participare principatu consiliatiuo uel iudicatiuo 504 4. Vtrum ciuis unius rationis sit in omni politia 509 5. Vtrum ciuitas a principio usque ad finem maneat eadem numero 510 6. Vtrum ciuis inquantum huiusmodi per se sit aliqua uirtus 517 7. Vtrum ciuis sit una uirtus secundum omnem politiam 520 8. Vtrum ciuis studiosi et uiri optimi sit eadem uirtus 521 9. Vtrum principans in principatu despotico intendat bonum proprium uel bonum commune sibi et seruo 523 10. Vtrum principans in principatu yconomico intendat bonum subditorum 526 11. Vtrum politie distinguantur secundum distinctionem finis 528 12. Vtrum secundum distinctionem principantium conueniat politias distingui529 13. Vtrum politie sint multe 532 14. Vtrum homines ut in pluribus sint praui iudices de se ipsis, ut dicit Philosophus535 15. Vtrum melius sit principari paucos uirtuosos uel multitudinem in ciuitate538

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16. Vtrum oportet multitudinem principari principatu maximo in ciuitate bene ordinata 541 17. Vtrum ciuitati expediat multitudinem eligere et corrigere principem et utrum hoc iustum sit 544 18. Vtrum principatus debeat distribui secundum dignitatem et excellentiam diuitiarum 546 19. Vtrum in distributione principatus debeat attendi ad excellentiam ingenuitatis, ut secundum hoc distribuatur 549 20. Vtrum distribuendus sit principatus secundum excellentiam potentie 551 21. Vtrum aliquis excedens omnes alios in aliquo bono sit ponendus esse non ciuis 554 22. Vtrum melius sit ciuitatem regi optimo uiro uel legibus 559 23. De sufficientia modorum regni quibus distinguitur 562 24. Vtrum, in quibus lex non determinat, melius sit ciuitatem regi pluribus uel uno 563 25. Vtrum melius sit regem uel principem assumi per generationem uel electionem566 26. Vtrum melius sit ciuitatem regi uno uel pluribus 569 Liber IV575 1. Vtrum huius scientie sit considerare que sit optima politia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera 575 2. Vtrum politicus debeat considerare de legibus 578 3. Vtrum tirannis sit pessima politiarum, ut dicit Philosophus 581 4. Vtrum politie distinguantur secundum distinctionem partium ciuitatis 584 5. Vtrum adulari sit uitium 588 6. Vtrum adulatores acceptentur et diligantur apud monarchas et apud populares591 7. Vtrum modus democratie ubi monarchizat totus populus secundum sententiam, et non secundum leges, sit politia simpliciter 593 8. Vtrum possibile sit ciuitatem aliquam uiuere secundum politiam unam et obseruare leges alterius politie 597 9. Vtrum politia, que alio nomine dicitur tymocratia, mixta sit ex democratia et oligarchia 599 10. Vtrum ista politia sit recta et bona 602 11. Vtrum nobilitas sit uirtus 604 12. Vtrum nobilitas sit uirtus generis 607 13. Vtrum nobilitas ab ignobili incipiat 610 14. Vtrum nobilitas quanto magis protenditur sit maior 613

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Liber V617 1. Consequenter queritur circa 5um Politicorum. Et quia ibi intendit Philosophus quod dissensio est corruptio ciuitatis, ideo primo, ad euidentiam seditionis, queritur de opposito eius, scilicet de pace, et queritur utrum pax sit finis ciuitatis 617 2. Vtrum amicitia sit causa pacis 620 3. Vtrum dissensio opponatur paci 623 4. Vtrum appetitus sit causa dissensionis 625 5. Vtrum dissimilitudo sit causa dissensionis 628 6. Vtrum locus sit causa dissensionis 630 7. Vtrum causa saluationis politie sit pax 634 8. Vtrum dissensio inter insignes et maiores ciuitatis de facili inualescat 636 9. De quodam uerbo Philosophi, qui dicit quod communis timor congregat etiam separatissimos; circa quod primo queritur utrum timor sit passio 638 10. Vtrum timor communis aggreget separatissimos 641 11. Vtrum ad recte principandum exigatur scientia in principe 643 12. Vtrum ad perfectionem principantis exigatur amor politie 646 13. Vtrum potentia exigatur ad perfectionem principantis 649 14. Posito quod sint duo, quorum unus sit potens et nequam, alius autem bonus et diligens politiam, quis horum magis eligendus est in principem 650 15. Vtrum tirannis sit politia 652 16. Vtrum tirannis sit politia naturalis 655 17. Vtrum tirannis alicui expediat 658 18. Vtrum tirannis saluetur per contraria, sicut dicit Philosophus 660 Liber VI663 1. Vtrum agricultura sit naturalis 663 2. Vtrum agricolarum multitudo sit optima 665 3. Vtrum multitudo pastoralis sit melior ad politizandum quam multitudo que in ciuitate 668 4. Vtrum uiuere inordinate sit delectabilius multis 671 5. Vtrum oligarchia temperata constituatur ex habentibus mediocrem substantiam676 6. Vtrum aliquis principatus in ciuitate sit necessarius 678 7. Vtrum necesse sit in ciuitate esse plures principatus 679 8. Vtrum in ciuitate sit unus principatus primus 681 9. Vtrum principatus posteriores et inferiores essentialiter ordinati sint sub primo 683

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Liber VII687 1. Consequenter queritur circa 7um Politicorum, ubi Philosophus dicit uel primo inquirit de felicitate ultima hominis, et queritur utrum illa felicitas consistat in bonis exterioribus 687 2. Vtrum felicitas consistat in bonis corporis 691 3. Vtrum felicitas consistat in actu uirtutis per se 693 4. Vtrum eadem sit felicitas unius hominis et totius ciuitatis 697 5. Vtrum in actu uirtutis moralis consistat felicitas hominis, felicitas – inquam – politica 701 6. Vtrum felicitas consistat in actu prudentie qui est principari 705 7. Vtrum felicitas politica potior sit quam speculatiua 710 8. Vtrum ex dispositione regionis aliqui bene uel male politizent 720 9. Vtrum illi qui mediant secundum loca sint optime politizantes 723 Petri de Alvernia Questiones super I-III libros Politicorum (Reportatio)729 Liber I731 1. Vtrum ciuitas sit obiectum in politica 731 2. Vtrum ista scientia sit practica 732 3. Vtrum ista scientia sit principalissima 733 4. Vtrum omnis communitas humana sit instituta propter bonum 735 5. Vtrum ciuitas sit instituta gratia boni principalissimi 736 6. Vtrum combinatio maris et femine sit naturalis 738 7. Vtrum mulier sit natura serua 740 8. Vtrum barbari sint naturaliter serui 741 9. Vtrum ciuitas sit secundum naturam 742 10. Vtrum homo sit animal ciuile et sociale natura 743 11. Vtrum sermo insit homini a natura 746 12. Vtrum seruus sit organum domini 747 13. Vtrum ille qui deficit in aliquo bono sit natura seruus uel subiectus ei qui excedit in illo bono 748 14. Vtrum bonus naturaliter generet bonum 749 15. Vtrum principatus despoticus et yconomicus sint diuersi principatus 750 16. Vtrum uite aliorum animalium ab homine diuersificentur secundum diuersitatem ciborum 751 17. Vtrum plante et animalia alia ab homine sint facta gratia hominis 753 18. Vtrum possessio naturalis sit pars yconomice 755 19. Vtrum diuitie naturales sint infinite uel earum appetitus sit infinitus 756 20. Vtrum cuiuslibet rei possesse ab homine sit duplex usus 757 21. Vtrum inductio pecunie sit necessaria in ciuitate 759 22. Vtrum multitudo pecunie sint uere diuitie 760

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23. Vtrum appetitus finis sit infinitus 24. Vtrum appetitus diuitiarum sit infinitus 25. Vtrum usus campsorie sit contra iustitiam 26. Vtrum accipere aliquid pro usu pecunie accomodate sit contra iustitiam 27. Vtrum serui secundum se oporteat esse aliquam uirtutem 28. Vtrum principantis et serui sit una uirtus secundum rationem 29. Vtrum oporteat artificem habere aliquam uirtutem moralem

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761 763 764 767 768 770 772

Liber II775 1. Queritur utrum ciuitas sit una 775 2. Vtrum optimum sit ciuitatem esse maxime unam 776 3. Vtrum homines magis curent bonum proprium quam commune 778 4. Vtrum bonum sit in ciuitate filios et uxores esse communes 779 5. Vtrum commisceri parentibus carnaliter sit contra naturam 781 6. Habitis autem hiis considerare. Circa istud capitulum queritur utrum expediat ciuitati possessiones esse communes 783 7. Vtrum expediat mulieres ordinari ad bellum 785 8. Vtrum lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem 786 9. Vtrum lex ordinetur in finem communem 787 10. Vtrum legislator instituendo leges debeat inspicere ad homines et loca 789 11. Vtrum necessarium sit politicum regulare possessiones 790 12. Vtrum expediat possessiones ciuibus esse equales 791 13. Vtrum magis expediat ordinare concupiscentias quam possessiones 792 14. Vtrum permittendum sit diuites ditari quantumcumque contingit 794 15. Vtrum terminus diuitiarum sit accipiendus per comparationem ad aliquid extrinsecum 795 16. Vtrum lex sit mutabilis 796 17. Vtrum lex antiqua sit mutanda meliori superueniente 798 18. Vtrum serui sit aliqua disciplina 799 19. Vtrum exercitium in uita militari sit principium multarum uirtutum 800 Liber III803 1. Vtrum considerantem de politia oporteat determinare de ciuitate 803 2. Vtrum considerantem de ciuitate oportet primum de ciue considerare 804 3. Vtrum ciuis sit qui potest uti principatu iudicatiuo et consiliatiuo 805 4. Vtrum ciuis per unam rationem dicatur de omni ciue uel in omni politia 807 5. Vtrum ciuitas remaneat una numero a principio usque ad finem 808 6. Vtrum ciuis secundum quod ciuis sit aliqua uirtus 810 7. Vtrum ciuis secundum omnem politiam sit una uirtus 811 8. Vtrum uiri optimi et ciuis studiosi sit una uirtus 812

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9. Vtrum in principatu despotico dominus intendit bonum commune sui et serui uel bonum proprium 814 10. Vtrum princeps in principatu yconomico intendat per se bonum subditorum815 11. Vtrum politia distinguatur secundum distinctionem finis 817 12. Vtrum politie distinguantur secundum distinctionem principatuum 818 13. Vtrum sint plures politie 820 14. Vtrum aliqui praue iudicent de se ipsis 822 15. Vtrum melius sit multitudinem quam paucos uirtuosos principari 824 16. Vtrum in principatu summo oporteat principari multitudinem 826 17. Vtrum expediat multitudinem attingere ad electionem principis et correctionem828 18. Vtrum principatus sint distribuendi secundum dignitatem diuitiarum 829 19. Vtrum in distributione principatus oporteat inspicere ad ingenuitatem 832 Bibliography835 Manuscripts 835 Primary Printed Sources 836 Secondary Literature 847 Indices865 1. Study 865 Index Codicum Manuscriptorum 865 Index Nominum (– 1800) 867 Index Nominum (1800 –) 870 2. Editions 874 Index Locorum (Questiones)874 Index Locorum (Reportatio)898

Foreword The importance of the Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum has long been acknowledged. In the scholarship devoted to the medieval reception of Aristotle’s Politics, Peter of Auvergne’s Questiones and his literal commentary, the Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum, have been by far the most studied works. The first critical edition of the Scriptum, prepared by Lidia Lanza, has recently been published, and, with the edition of the Questiones offered in this book, the interpretation of the most important medieval commentator on the Politics is finally available to be studied in its entirety. That this edition appears in this prestigious series is an honour and deserves my gratitude to its editorial board, especially to Russell Friedman (who also gave me advice), and to the LUP team, who helped me very much throughout the preparation of this book. I also deeply thank the two reviewers for their insightful comments, generous suggestions and consent to disclose their names, scilicet Griet Galle and Gianfranco Fioravanti. I could not have hoped for two better reviewers. The critical edition was prepared with Classical Text Editor: I owe my gratitude to Stefan Hagel, the creator of this software, for his help in different stages of my work. This book is part of a long-term research project. It is the first of a series of critical editions of medieval question commentaries on the Politics I am currently preparing alone or with Lidia Lanza: these include the commentaries of the Anonymous of Milan, the Vatican Anonymous and the Anonymous of Baltimore. This book is also connected with a monograph I am writing on the medieval commentary tradition on the Politics and with a sourcebook, prepared with Noah Dauber and Lidia Lanza, with translations of texts from medieval commentaries on the Politics, Ethics and Metaphysics. This edition greatly benefited from the work done during the preparation of the sourcebook and for this reason—and also for his advice and friendship—I thank Noah. Like many other critical editions of medieval texts, this book took a very long time to complete. Many people contributed to it in different ways: by providing bibliography, by making unpublished work available to me, by advising and correcting me, by giving a word of encouragement, by supporting applications, affording me, in this way, the funding enabling me to pursue this work, by improving the language of the introduction, by helping me with the publication and so forth. To all the people who helped me along the way or simply in one single moment, my heartfelt thanks. The only way I could reciprocate was by making my best efforts to make this book worthy of being regarded as a good piece of scholarship.

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Petrus de Alvernia

I should include Peter of Auvergne among the people to whom I am deeply indebted. It was partially thanks to the fact that Peter left behind philosophical writings that I came to meet my wife, Lidia. This wonderful journey was taken with her from the very beginning, and she was by my side all the way through in such a way that this book could not even be imagined without her. In the difficult moments, she made me understand the full sense of Charles Bukowski’s poem Roll the Dice, and this is why, riding life straight to perfect laughter, this book is dedicated to her.

Part I – Interpretative Study

Introduction 1.

Introducing the Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum and its Significance

The hitherto unpublished Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum survives in the three following manuscripts: P = Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16089 [s. XIII-XIV], ff. 274ra-319ra:1 it presents a Prohemium and one hundred twenty-six questions (thirty-one on Book I; nineteen on Book II; twenty-five on Book III; fourteen on Book IV; eighteen on Book V; nine on Book VI and nine on Book VII). The last question deals with the passage 1327b20-36 from chapter 7 of Book VII. The name “petro de aluernia” is written in the upper margin of the first folio of the text, the hand of this indication being the same as that of the text.2 F = Frankfurt am Main, Universitätsbibliothek, Praed. 51 [a. 1438-1443], ff. 172ra179rb:3 it contains only the Prohemium and questions 1-17, 20 and 22 of Book I.4 The text does not mention an author. B = Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625 [s. XIV], ff. 68rb-79vb:5 it presents the same text as P from Book III, q. 20 up to Book VII, q. 7 (thus it does not contain the last two questions of P on Book VII). No attribution is made to Peter in the manuscript. In folios 60ra-68rb, this manuscript contains a commentary with sixty-seven questions on Books I-III.13, 1283a33-37 (twenty-nine questions on Book I; nineteen questions on Book II and nineteen questions on Book III). Regarding both content and wording, the text of this first commentary is quite similar to the parallel text of P, though, for the greater part, presented in a more condensed form.

1  A comprehensive description of this manuscript is found in Claude Lafleur, Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: textes critiques et étude historique (Montréal–Paris: Institut d’Études Médiévales–Vrin, 1988), pp. 16-39. 2  The indication regarding Peter of Auvergne’s authorship appears in the ablative (or dative) case. This is because there was more text in the upper line—the lower portion of the letters is still evident—but the upper part of the folio was cut out. 3  A description of this manuscript is found in Gerhardt Powitz, Die Handschriften des Dominika­ nerklosters und des Leonhardstifts in Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1968), pp. 122-125. 4  This manuscript also summarises q. 18 of Book I in one sentence. 5  The manuscript is described in Christoph Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristoteli­ schen “Politica” im späten Mittelalter (Amsterdam–Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner, 1992), 2 vols., I.102-107.

4

Interpretative Study

This book presents the critical edition of the complete text of the Questiones, taking into account the three manuscripts (P, F and B). In addition, it also includes the critical edition of the text contained in B, ff. 60ra-68rb. The Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum represents the earliest extant commentary in question form produced after the complete translation of Aristotle’s Politics into Latin, which occurred around or after 1265 (but not after 1268).6 This text is also the earliest surviving commentary on the Politics that can be related to the teaching carried out at the Arts Faculty of the University of Paris. Given the temporal proximity of the Questiones to the commentaries by Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on the Politics—a little more than twenty years separating them7—and the limited number of surviving commentaries in question form produced over the hundred years immediately following the Latin translation of the Politics, the Questiones super I-VII Politicorum emerges as a unique work and a key text in terms of understanding the initial stages of the medieval reception of the Politics.8 Moreover, since this work is intimately related to the university, its edition and study permits us to grasp more fully how the Politics was initially read and understood within such an institutional setting before it was more broadly dis6  This translation was undertaken by the Flemish Dominican William of Moerbeke. For its date, see Willy Vanhamel, “Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke”, in J. Brams–W. Vanhamel (eds.), Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d’Études à l’occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort (1286) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), pp. 301-383, at 340; Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.15-29. See also Jozef Brams, La riscoperta di Aristotele in Occidente (Milano: Jaca Book, 2003), p. 111. 7  There is no secure date for the commentaries of Albert and Aquinas. Albert’s commentary is most probably the earlier and is to be assigned to the early second half of the 1260s. Aquinas’ commentary is usually dated to his second stay in Paris, that is, sometime between 1269 and 1272. For a discussion of the two commentaries’ dates and for their possible relationship, see Hyacinthe-François Dondaine–Louis-Jacques Bataillon, “Préface”, in Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, ed. Hyacinthe-François Dondaine–Louis-Jacques Bataillon, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita XLVIII (Paris–Roma: ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971), pp. A8-A10; Francis Cheneval, “Considérations presque philosophiques sur les commentaires de la Politique d’Albert le Grand et de Thomas d’Aquin”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 45 (1998), pp. 56-83. For the date of the Questiones, see Chapter 2, below. 8  On this matter, see, in addition to the studies mentioned in the notes to follow, the overviews provided in Gianfranco Fioravanti, “La Politica aristotelica nel Medioevo: linee di una ricezione”, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 52 (1997), pp. 17-29 [French version: “La réception de la Politique d’Aris­ tote au Moyen Age tardif”, in Y.-C. Zarka (ed.), Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne (Paris: PUF, 1999), pp. 9-24]; Roberto Lambertini, “La diffusione della Politica e la definizione di un linguaggio politico aristotelico”, Quaderni Storici 34 (1999), pp. 677-704; Id., “Lo studio e la recezione della Politica tra XIII e XIV secolo”, in C. Dolcini (ed.), Il pensiero politico dell’età antica e medioevale (UTET: Torino, 2000), pp. 145-73; Lidia Lanza, “I commenti medievali alla Politica e la riflessione sullo stato in Francia (secoli XIII-XIV)”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat...”: Aristotele nel pensiero politico medievale (Barcelona: F.I.D.E.M., 2013), pp. 115-137 [first published in G. Fioravanti–C. Leonardi–S. Perfetti (eds.), Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente medievale (secoli XIII-XIV). Atti del Colloquio Firenze–Pisa, 19-22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla S.I.S.M.E.L. e dalla S.I.S.P.M., sotto l’egida della S.I.E.P.M. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), pp. 401-427]. I am currently preparing a monograph on the medieval reception of the Politics and on its commentary tradition, in which I develop some of the views discussed in this introductory study, especially in Chapter 5 (see below).

Introduction

5

seminated. It is indeed likely that the interpretation advanced within the university milieu influenced the reading of the Politics beyond the hallowed halls of Paris.9 The Questiones is also important because it became the standard commentary in question form in the commentary tradition on the Politics. Indeed, all the successive question commentaries on the Politics, until at least the second half of the fourteenth century, are highly influenced by the Questiones, and their lists of questions are largely based on that of the Questiones.10 As Chapter 6 will show, the Questiones had a significant impact in the decades following its appearance, and its influence extends into the fifteenth century and to contexts beyond the commentary tradition on the Politics and even more so beyond the arts faculty. Significantly, the sections of the Questiones that had an arguably greater impact on medieval political thought—for instance, on Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor Pacis—were precisely the sections in which the Questiones presents a more original doctrine, even with regard to the Politics.11 A further relevant feature of the Questiones is that its author, Peter of Auvergne, composed another commentary on the Politics, the Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum. This work was intended as the continuation of the unfinished commentary of Thomas Aquinas, which ends at Book III, chapter 8 (1280a7). The Scriptum, however, starts from the beginning of Book III—not from the point where Aquinas stopped—and survives in almost twenty manuscripts.12 With regard to Books III-VIII, it was the most influential medieval commentary on the Politics until the end of the sixteenth century.13 Its influence is partially due to the fact that 9  Note that the earliest non-university texts that quote passages from the Politics are authored by university masters or by authors who possessed higher education, such as Aquinas (he quotes the Politics in his De regno), Giles of Rome (in his De regimine principum), Ptolemy of Lucca (in the continuation of the De regno), Marsilius of Padua (in the Defensor Pacis) and all the theologians who wrote De potestate papae treatises by the early fourteenth century. The reading of the Politics by less trained people most likely occurred later. The Politics was, therefore, a ‘university text’ at the beginning of its reception. 10  It is for this reason that the analysis of the tabula quaestionum of the Questiones gains great relevance. See Chapter 5, below. 11  On the influence of Peter on Marsilius, see Chapter 6, below. 12  The first critical edition of the complete text of the Scriptum is now available in Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum Aristotelis, ed. Lidia Lanza (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2021). 13  On the influence of the Scriptum, see principally Lidia Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes of its Fortune until the Early Renaissance”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 255-319; Marco Toste, “Evolution within Tradition: The Vernacular Works on Aristotle’s Politics in Sixteenth-Century Italy”, in G. Briguglia–T. Ricklin (eds.), Thinking Politics in the Vernacular: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2011), pp. 189-211. See also the evidence adduced in Peter Biller, The Measure of Multitude. Population in Medieval Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 338-339, 354, 371-372 and 375. For its influence on specific authors and commentators on the Politics, see Jean Dunbabin, “Guido Vernani of Rimini’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics”, Traditio 44 (1988), pp. 373-388; Roberto Lambertini, “Raimundus Acgerii’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. Some Notes”, Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 14-40;

6

Interpretative Study

it was regarded first as a complement to Aquinas’ commentary and, from the late fifteenth century onwards, as a work authored by Aquinas.14 Medieval commentators on the Politics, however, explicitly mentioned Peter by name, thereby clearly distinguishing between Peter’s and Aquinas’ respective interpretations. This is seen in later commentators such as Walter Burley, Nicole Oresme and Peter of Osma– Ferdinand of Roa—all of whom preferred to draw on Peter’s Scriptum rather than on Albert’s commentary.15 Thus, we have the case—quite rare in the Middle Ages—of an author who produced one literal commentary and one question commentary on the same text; moreover—and even rarer—the two commentaries eventually became the standard commentaries of their own commentary tradition.16 The study of the Scriptum has shown that Peter is a highly interesting commentator. He does not limit himself to a mere exposition of Aristotle’s text; Peter also goes on to introduce his own views: he advances arguments in favour of the supremacy of monarchy over all other regimes, regarding the access of the multitude to political power, and delves into the topic of happiness to a greater degree than Aristotle.17 Given that, in the Questiones, Peter was freer to advance his own views (see below), the Questiones can be seen as Peter of Auvergne’s opportunity to develop his interpretation of the Politics or at least to Gianfranco Fioravanti, “Un trattato medievale di eugenetica: il Libellus de ingenio bone nativitatis”, Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos 21 (2002), pp. 89-111, especially 93-95; Catherine Jeffreys, “Traditions and Practices: Some Early References to Aristotle’s Politics in Parisian Writings about Music”, in J. Stoessel (ed.), Identity and Locality in Early European Music, 1028-1740 (Farnham–Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 83-105; Ead., “The Exchange of Ideas about Music in Paris c. 1270-1304: Guy of Saint-Denis, Johannes de Grocheio, and Peter of Auvergne”, in C.J. Mews–J.N. Crossley (eds.), Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe, 1100-1500 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 151-175; Lidia Lanza, “Firenze e la lezione degli antichi: i Trattati di Bartolomeo Cavalcanti”, in G. Briguglia–T. Ricklin (eds.), Thinking Politics in the Vernacular: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2011), pp. 167-187; Roberto Lambertini, “Burley’s Commentary on the Politics: Exegetic Techniques and Political Language”, in A.D. Conti (ed.), A Companion to Walter Burley, Late Mediaeval Logician and Metaphysician (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2013), pp. 347-373; Lidia Lanza, “Diego Pérez de Mesa’s Política o razón de Estado and the Medieval Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s Politics”, Patristica et Mediaevalia 38 (2017), pp. 33-52. Catherine Jeffrey shows that Guy of Saint-Denis drew directly on the Scriptum rather than on the Politics. Although Jeffreys’ studies deal with a very specific topic—music theory—they teach us an important lesson to which the scholarship rarely pays attention, namely that commentaries could replace the Politics, or at least that the Politics was not necessarily read without the help of a commentary. 14  For the transmission of the Scriptum and the changes it underwent through the successive editions, see Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. xxiv-lxvii and lxxxix-cxxii. 15  See Albert Douglas Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques d’Aristote, Published from the Text of the Avranches Manuscript 223, With a Critical Edtion and Notes”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 60 (1970), pp. 1-392, at 26; Lambertini, “Burley’s Commentary on the Politics”, p. 370; Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, p. 277. 16  This is also true with regard to Peter’s two commentaries on the On the heavens (see section 2 herein). Another case is Bartholomew of Bruges’ literal and question commentaries on the Economics. 17  The most thorough analysis of the Scriptum is found in Lidia Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica aristotelica nel XIII secolo: Pietro d’Alvernia”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia consi­ derat…”, pp. 17-71 [it was first published in Studi Medievali 35 (1994), pp. 643-694].

Introduction

7

present it in a more insightful and expanded way than in the Scriptum. It is not that the Questiones is the ultimate expression of Peter’s thoughts—for we shall see that the Questiones and the Scriptum share countless ideas and even ways in which such ideas are articulated—but rather that the Questiones enabled Peter to substantiate in a clearer and more profound way ideas which are also found in the Scriptum. These factors, in and of themselves, demonstrate the historical importance of the Questiones. Taken, however, even in isolation, the Questiones is an interesting philosophical text in which the author goes beyond simply making sense of the Aristotelian text and reiterating its main ideas. The author goes further, attempting to give it a coherent structure and to define the most basic tenets of politics. He does so by rearranging the material of the Politics, connecting it with the Nicomachean Ethics, and by drawing on Aquinas and principally on passages with no political overtones taken from other works of the corpus Aristotelicum. As we shall see, the Questiones dwells on some topics at greater length than the Politics itself, as is evident on issues such as the definitions of slavery, the proper virtue of the citizen and the necessity of a hierarchy among public offices. In some sections, the Questiones strays away from the Politics and provides a new configuration of Aristotle’s ideas. These new configurations are present, for example, in the questions devoted to the fifth book of the Politics, where a non-Aristotelian concept such as peace becomes crucial, and in the questions on happiness in the seventh book, where Peter offers a reflection on political happiness that is absent from Aristotle. One of the most relevant features of the Questiones as a philosophical commentary is Peter’s attempt to substantiate the most important ideas on philosophical grounds by providing the most basic principles. This can be seen, for instance, in his discussion of the naturalness of human association and slavery, which are justified on anthropological grounds: it is the physiological constitution of man that explains his need to associate with his fellow men or to be subordinated to others. Furthermore, the existence of different offices within the political community and the necessity of a hierarchy for the different rulers are explained in Book VI by comparing the community with the metaphysical structure of reality itself. That Peter of Auvergne attempts to explain Aristotle’s stances by going to the heart of the respective questions, and thus beyond the text of the Politics, can be demonstrated by considering five questions. In Book I, the question as to whether the desire for wealth is infinite (q. 26), which is suggested by the Politics 1257b2830, is preceded by the question of whether the desire for a goal is infinite (q. 25), which has no relation to political matters. Second, in Book III, the key question as to whether the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man are one and the same (q. 8), which corresponds to 1276b17-18, is preceded by question 6, on whether there is any virtue proper to the citizen as such—a question that Aristotle does not address. Third, the question of Book III, that is, whether it is better to be ruled by the masses or by a few virtuous men, which has a parallel in 1281a40-41, comes after

8

Interpretative Study

q. 14, that is, whether the majority of men are poor judges of themselves. Fourth, question 6 of Book IV, whether flatterers should be accepted and esteemed among monarchs and rulers in democracy, which is taken from 1292a15-23, is preceded by the question as to whether flattery is a vice, an issue discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics but not in the Politics. Finally, question 10 of Book V, whether common fear brings together the most divided people, a sentence found in 1304b23-24, comes after the question of whether fear is a passion—again, a question that is more related to the Rhetoric. Clearly, in each of these five cases, Peter raises questions that have no correspondent in the Politics and that are not strictly ‘political’; even so, these questions preceding those that do have a correspondent in the Politics allow him to explain Aristotle’s assertion at a more fundamental level: man desires wealth in an infinite quantity because he can desire something infinitely; it is better to be ruled by a few virtuous men than by the multitude, given that the greater part of men are not good judges of themselves, and flatterers should not be accepted among monarchs because flattery is a vice, as stated in the Ethics. It is significant that Peter explains Aristotle’s assertions in the Politics by making use of the broader corpus Aristotelicum. In this, he adopts a procedure already found in Albert and Aquinas, though he uses it to a much greater extent and in ways that Aristotle would have never imagined. The Questiones is a philosophical commentary that can, at times, be quite technical—for instance, Peter uses such notions as actuality and potentiality, motion and rest, mixture (as explained in the On generation and corruption) and the four causes scheme to explain political phenomena. Moreover, it lacks the clarity of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, a work partially based on the Politics and with which the Questiones shares numerous similarities.18 The Questiones conveys, nonetheless, the interpretation of the most influential medieval commentator on the Politics, and it is one of the first testimonies of how the Politics was initially interpreted.

2. The Place of Peter of Auvergne in Medieval Philosophy The fact that Peter’s two commentaries on the Politics went on to become the authoritative texts of the commentary tradition on the Politics demonstrates that Peter of Auvergne is an important medieval commentator. He is arguably one of the most significant (and prolific) Aristotelian commentators of the Middle Ages

18  See chapter 5, below. On this, see Roberto Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes. Egidio Romano lettore ed interprete della Politica nel terzo libro del De regimine principum”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), pp. 277-325, especially pp. 297-304, 310-311, 315, 317-319.

Introduction

9

and, unsurprisingly, he owes his renown mostly to his Aristotelian commentaries, which somewhat overshadow his theological output. The secular master Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304) was one of the most prominent figures at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. While a member of the Arts Faculty, Peter was a contemporary of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and, during his tenure at the Faculty of Theology—where he was a master from 1296 until 1302, when he was appointed bishop of Clermont—he taught alongside Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo. It is conceivable that his teaching activities spanned almost three decades while at the Arts Faculty, from the 1270s to the mid-1290s.19 Such a long career at that faculty was rather unusual, as the arts faculty was generally regarded as a preparatory—and therefore transient—stage on the way to earning a degree in the highest faculties of theology, law and medicine. The fact that Peter spent most of his career as a master of arts may explain why his philosophical output, which consists of Sophismata along with commentaries on Aristotle,20 chiefly, is far greater than his theological production, which is limited to six Quodlibeta.21 Peter commented on the greater part of the corpus Aristotelicum, sometimes with the aim of completing the unfinished commentaries of Thomas Aquinas. This is the case of his literal commentaries on the On the heavens and the Politics, and possibly of his commentaries on some of the treatises of the Parva naturalia—Peter only produced literal commentaries on the texts that Aquinas did not comment on, and, for this reason, they were published in the sixteenth century as complements to Aquinas’ commentaries.22 It could be claimed that Peter’s Nachleben in the Middle Ages owes much to the fact that his name was closely associated with that of Aquinas. Such a claim, however, resembles the conundrum of the chicken and the 19  For Peter’s biography and career, see William J. Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne, Master in Arts and Theology at Paris”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 13-28. It has been an open question whether Peter continued teaching at the faculty of arts while lecturing on the Bible and on the Sentences in the faculty of theology. It would be possible that he stopped teaching in the arts faculty by the end of the 1280s and not in 1296, when he became Master of Theology; cf. Griet Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”: A Critical Edition with an Interpretative Essay (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), pp. 48*-49*. However, as we shall later see in Chapter 2, the Questiones derives from Peter’s teaching at the arts faculty in the 1290s. 20  The exceptions are his commentary on Porphyry and on the On Plants. 21  For an overview of his Quodlibeta, see Chris Schabel, “The Quodlibeta of Peter of Auvergne”, in Id. (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 81-130. Schabel shows that Peter’s Quodlibeta were widely transmitted and quoted during the first decades of the fourteenth century; however, after that, his Quodlibeta disappeared from the scene (ibid., p. 97). In any case, his theological thought never gained as much importance as the work of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. 22  The list of all of Peter’s works, with indications of manuscripts, editions and secondary bibliography, is found in Lidia Lanza–Marco Toste, “A Census of Peter of Auvergne’s Works”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München– Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 415-515.

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Interpretative Study

egg: it is entirely possible that Peter dared—or was requested—to finish Aquinas’ commentaries because he was already considered an important commentator in his own right.23 Moreover, Peter’s Quodlibeta, which are in no way related to Aquinas, are preserved in nearly twenty manuscripts (eleven of which contain the complete text). More importantly, some of Peter’s commentaries were quite influential: for instance, his commentaries on the Metaphysics24 and on the On the heavens.25 Others of his works even went on to become the standard texts in the commentary tradition on their respective subjects: his literal commentaries on the Movement of animals26 and, as previously mentioned, on the Politics. The importance of Peter’s commentaries is also underlined by recalling that some of them were transmitted through the pecia system. In fact, Peter of Auvergne is one of the few medieval authors whose Aristotelian commentaries were transmitted in this way, and, what is more, in this small group, Peter is only surpassed in the number of works transmitted through pecia by Albert the Great, Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas. This is because no fewer than five of Peter’s commentaries enjoyed circulation through pecia: his question commentary on the Metaphysics and his literal commentaries on the Meteorology, the On sleep, the Politics and on 23  Of course, it could also be that Peter was considered as a reliable Thomist or an orthodox commentator. However, taken by themselves, these attributes are not compelling enough to regard him as capable of finishing Aquinas’ commentaries. If someone assigned Peter to take on such a job, then his knowledge of Aristotle and his skills as a commentator (of other Aristotelian texts) surely played a more important role. 24  See Fabrizio Amerini, “Peter of Auvergne on Substance”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 207-254, especially 234-325 and 237-245 for Peter’s influence on Radulphus Brito and possibly on Paul of Venice; Silvia Donati, “English Commentaries before Scotus. A Case Study: The Discussion on the Unity of Being”, in F. Amerini–G. Galluzzo (eds.), A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 137-208, especially 143-144, 176-177, 184-185, for the influence on the Oxford master John Dinsdale (Tytynsale); Sten Ebbesen, “Five Parisian Sets of Questions on the Metaphysics from the 1270s to the 1290s”, in F. Amerini–G. Galluzzo (eds.), A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 277-314, who also underlines Brito’s debt to Peter; Marieke Berkers–Wouter Goris, “The Principle of Identity as the First Theoretical Principle in the Thirteenth-Century Latin West”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 88 (2021), pp. 441-485, for a possible influence on Duns Scotus and Antonius Andreae. Berkers and Gouris provide further evidence regarding Peter’s influence on John Dinsdale (452-455). 25  See Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 87*-89*, where she claims that one version of Peter’s Questions on the On the heavens “seems to have directly or indirectly influenced the selection of the questions that are discussed in the 14th-century quaestiones disputatae on the On the heavens by John of Jandun, John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen” (p. 88*). 26  See Pieter De Leemans, “Medieval Latin Commentaries on Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium. A Contribution to the Corpus Commentariorum Medii Aevi in Aristotelem Latinorum”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 67 (2000), pp. 272-360. On pp. 313 and 315, De Leemans mentions three anonymous commentaries per modum scripti influenced by Peter, whether because they are summaries of his commentary or because they draw on his commentary with respect to vocabulary and structure.

Introduction

11

Books III-IV of the On the heavens.27 It is therefore clear that Peter was considered a major commentator by his contemporaries, especially with regard to distinct works of Aristotle. This also explains, when compared with other contemporary commentaries, the greater number of manuscripts in which some of his commentaries are contained: compare his questions on the Metaphysics, which are transmitted completely or partially in eleven manuscripts,28 with the question commentaries of Siger of Brabant extant in four manuscripts, of Alexander of Alessandria, extant in eight codices, and of Radulphus Brito, surviving in one single manuscript.29 Scholars of medieval philosophy never studied Peter to the extent that they did contemporary authors. For a very long time, he was regarded as a mere ‘disciple’ of Aquinas or as a sort of Doctor continuator who completed Aquinas’ unfinished commentaries and presumably limited himself to the application of the principles laid down by Aquinas. Peter was thus seen as an ‘orthodox’ author and was, therefore, arguably less interesting than some of his other colleagues in the Paris Faculty of Arts, such as Siger of Brabant or Boethius of Dacia, both of whom were viewed as ‘radicals’. Such views have now been overcome: though Peter makes extensive use of Aquinas’ works, he opposes Aquinas in some instances.30 Moreover, in his commentaries, Peter upholds statements condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 127731 as well as views that have long been considered ‘radical’ by the historiography.32 The historiographic picture of Peter has also changed; it is probable that no other medieval philosopher has been the focus of so much publication activity in these 27  For these conclusions, I draw on the repertoire of Giovanna Murano, Opere diffuse per “exemplar” e “pecia” (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 663-669. According to Murano’s catalogue, the other medieval authors to have their works transmitted through pecia are: Adenulph of Anagni, Adam of Buckfield, Alexander of Alexandria, Alexander Magister, the anonymous commentator on the Sophistical Refutations, Augustine of Ancona, Gerald Odonis and Henry of Friemar. However, unlike Peter, all these authors have only one work transmitted through pecia. In addition, four of Roger Bacon’s commentaries bear the sign of pecia, but they survive in the same single manuscript, which limits their importance. See also Christoph Flüeler, “The Influence of the Works of Peter of Auvergne in the Scholastic Philosophy of the 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 391-414, at 406-407. 28  See Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, pp. 430-435. 29  See Ebbesen, “Five Parisian Sets of Questions”, pp. 313-314. 30  See, for instance, Giorgio Pini, Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus. An Interpretation of Aristotle’s “Categories” in the Late Thirteenth Century (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2002), pp. 64-67; Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 111*; Chris Schabel, “Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibetal Questions on Divine Knowledge”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 355-390. 31  See Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 54*-55*, 67*; Ead., “The Relation between the Condemnations of 1277 and Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on De caelo”, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 91 (2015), pp. 223-238. Galle underlines in both her studies that Peter changed his mind regarding a number of views after 1277. 32  See Luca Bianchi, “Peter of Auvergne and the Condemnation of 1277”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 29-50.

12

Interpretative Study

last decades. Numerous critical editions of his works have appeared,33 and this has certainly enhanced the study of his ideas. A few years ago, a collective volume dedicated to his output was published.34 In this volume, Peter is portrayed as a creative and influential commentator in different areas, such as natural philosophy, metaphysics and politics.35 The Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum is, therefore, the work of a promi­ nent medieval author. Though he is not considered as belonging to the ranks of such authors as Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, Peter of Auvergne is, nevertheless, a protagonist in what is arguably the most important period of Scholasticism—the last third of the thirteenth century—and a major author in terms of understanding the reception of Aristotle’s works in the Middle Ages. I intentionally use the word ‘author’. Two of the major features of Peter’s philosophical output are (1) that he sometimes produced both a literal and a question commentary on the same text of Aristotle—on the Politics, the On sleep and the On the heavens—and (2) that some of his texts are found in more than one version: parts of his Sophismata, his questions on the Metaphysics, on the Physics, on the On memory, his two commentaries on the On the heavens (both his literal and his commentaries in question form) and his literal commentary on the Movement of animals.36 Naturally, because some of these texts are likely to stem from oral teaching, it is impossible to ascertain beyond any doubt whether the existence of different versions is due to Peter himself or to different reportatores who wrote down the texts in the classroom without any input from Peter. Even so, given that we know that Peter “took great care in redacting his Quodlibeta”,37 that he, like other authors of his time (such as Henry of Ghent), revised one of his own commentaries—the Scriptum38—and that he produced more than one commentary on 33  Since the mid-1980s, beyond the editions of single questions of his commentaries published in numerous scholarly articles, critical editions of the following commentaries by Peter have been produced: on the Nicomachean Ethics, on the Categories, on the Sense and Sensibilia, on the On sleep and On memory (twice and by two different scholars), on Porphyry, on the On the heavens (three versions by two scholars), on the On plants and on the Politics. 34  C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015). 35  See, for instance, the articles Cecilia Trifogli, “Peter of Auvergne on Place and Natural Place”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin– München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 89-106; Amerini, “Peter of Auvergne on Substance”; Marco Toste, “An Original Way of Commenting on the Fifth Book of Aristotle’s Politics: The Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum of Peter of Auvergne”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 321-353. 36  For an overview of this, see Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, pp. 422-423, 437-442, 455-458. 37  Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, p. 85. 38  In her introduction to the critical edition of the Scriptum, Lidia Lanza shows that the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 777 is the exemplar exemplaris (that is, the manuscript used to prepare the exemplar) and that it bears plentiful traces of authorial

Introduction

13

the same text, it is therefore quite possible that he is responsible for the existence of the different versions of some of his commentaries. In any case, since we have evidence that Peter revised at least one of his texts, we can assume that he viewed himself as an author and hence that his output can be regarded in this way. This assumption is not without its problems, given that medieval notions of authorship and even plagiarism are different from ours.39 Peter did not, of course, try to build up a homogeneous and coherent corpus throughout his career; nevertheless, it is possible to find some reoccurring themes and expressions in his writings,40 which allows us to detect a certain unifying thread running through his writings from his commentaries to the Quodlibeta.

3. The Context of the Questiones: Its Institutional Setting Unlike Albert, Aquinas and Giles of Rome, Peter did not write texts aimed at audiences beyond the university walls (though in some of his quodlibetal questions he addressed contemporary issues). Because his output is completely related to the university—philosophical commentaries and Quodlibeta—it would be mistaken to study his thought outside the context of the university. This holds for the Questiones as well: it is a text authored by a university master and related to his teachings. As a result, it is strictly connected to the context of its origin, namely the medieval university. This situation explains the structure of the text—a commentary (in the form of questions)—at a time when the commentary was the typical expression of philosophical thought, and the university curriculum, in all the faculties, was based on texts that should be lectured and commented on.41 The Questiones is a question commentary, the form of commentary used more frequently in the faculty of arts (where the Politics was taught) from the last quarter of the thirteenth century onwards.42 In this kind of commentary, the commentacorrections, such as corrections of style to render the text smoother, the deletion of repetitions (nouns are replaced with pronouns) and the change of abbreviations to make the reading clearer. 39  See page 49 of Chapter 1, below. 40  On this, see Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, pp. 87-89. 41  Aristotle’s works were not the only texts to be lectured on. In addition to his texts, we can point to Priscian’s Institutiones Grammaticae and Peter of Spain’s Summulae as works that were lectured on in the faculty of arts; the Bible and Peter Lombard’s Sentences in the faculty of theology; Gratian’s Decretum in the faculty of canon law; Avicenna’s Canon and the works of Galen and Hippocrates in the faculty of medicine. 42  On the genres of medieval philosophical commentaries, see Francesco Del Punta, “The Genre of the Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 139-151. See also Olga Weijers, La “disputatio” à la Faculté des arts de Paris (1200-1350 environ) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995), where the two kinds of commentaries—literal and in question form—are studied in relation to the teaching activity at the Parisian Arts Faculty.

14

Interpretative Study

tor was freer to deal with the topic at hand as he wished, since he did not have to follow the text closely and could explore issues arising in it in more depth. As the commentator followed the university method of reasoning with arguments for and against a position, he was not only required to find arguments in support of Aristotle’s claims, but also contrary opinions and arguments to refute these contrary positions as well. This often led to a broader discussion of the issue in question than appeared in the original text or in the literal commentaries. The Questiones represents just such a case. The context also explains the approach employed in the Questiones: Peter was a university master whose curricular path owed more to logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics than to politics and ethics. This becomes evident when taking into account the curriculum of the medieval faculty of arts in the second half of the thirteenth century: being principally based on the corpus Aristotelicum, natural philosophy and logic comprised the lion’s share and marked the learning years of every university student.43 It is therefore unsurprising that Peter overloaded his commentary with syllogisms, mostly in the arguments pro and contra, and grounded key assumptions on ideas taken from natural philosophy and metaphysics as well as on philosophical principles, which were used as true topoi.44 In other words, the Politics was approached in the classroom by men who were not involved in political matters, but rather by professors who were specialists of Aristotelian philosophy and who had to lecture on the Politics, among other works by Aristotle. Naturally, the importance of the Politics within the university was just a consequence of the late medieval ‘scientific paradigm’ in which the works of Aristotle constituted the basis of university teaching. Peter’s approach is thus quite understandable; in fact, towards the beginning of the fourteenth century, Peter’s colleagues at the University of Paris—though not necessarily owing to his influence—dealt with the political question of the relationship between papal and temporal power in quite the same

43  For the Parisian statute of 1255, see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Heinrich De­ nifle–Émile Chatelain (Paris: ex typis Fratrum Delalain, 1889-1897; reprinted: Bruxelles: Culture & Ci­ vilisation, 1964), 4 vols., I.277-279 (nr. 246). This statute represents a shift in the university curriculum, since it is mainly based on Aristotle and, therefore, marks the end of the teaching arranged according to the Trivium and the Quadrivium. On this statute, see Charles Lohr, “The New Aristotle and Science in the Paris Arts Faculty (1255)”, in O. Weijers–L. Holtz (eds.), L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des Arts. (Paris et Oxford, XIII-XV siècles) (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 251-269; and Alain de Libera, “Faculté des arts ou Faculté de philosophie?”, in the same volume, pp. 429-444. 44  What we could label as ‘dialectical approach’, that is, the method of composing a text by using syllogisms and philosophical topoi, was not uncommon in the Middle Ages, given the curriculum of the faculty of arts. For this reason, it is possible to find the same approach in juridical texts. In fact, there were manuals and repertoires of topoi specifically made for legal argumentation; see Hanns Hohmann, “Logic and Rhetoric in Legal Argumentation: Some Medieval Perspectives”, Argumentation 12 (1998), pp. 39-55; Severino Caprioli, “Modi arguendi”: Testi per lo studio della retorica nel sistema del diritto commune (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 2006).

Introduction

15

way, namely by using metaphysics and employing, among other arguments, the Aristotelian scheme of the four causes.45 The Politics played a secondary role in medieval university teaching and never held a prominent place in the curricula of the diverse arts faculties of Europe. This explains the relatively low number of extant commentaries on the Politics (if compared with the number of commentaries produced on other Aristotelian works). The Politics was first taught at the University of Paris. However, it was lectured extraordinarie up to the fourteenth century, which means that these lectures were neither ordinary nor obligatory in the programme of studies.46 By contrast, at Oxford, the Politics was mentioned in the 1313 statute as one of the texts to be lectured on to the bachelors, though the students could choose between the Politics and the De animalibus.47 The situation slightly changed from the end of the fourteenth century onward. At the German and central European universities, it was a required subject matter of lecture in order to earn the Master of Arts degree. This is evident at the University of Prague (according to its statute of 1390), Krakow (the 1404-1406 statute), Leipzig (1409-1410), Erfurt (1412) and Heidelberg since the fifteenth century.48 This explains why the bulk of the extant manuscripts of commentaries on the Politics are found in Germany and central European countries.49 As to Paris, the Politics continued to be of secondary importance: the later statutes of 1366 and 1452 simply state that in order to graduate the student should follow lessons (audiverit) on ‘moral books’ and, for the greater part, on the Ethics.50 Mirroring the arrangement of the corpus Aristotelicum, the Politics and moral philosophy were apparently taught at an advanced level near the end of the student’s path.51 However, it is not clear at how many universities the Politics was taught, and we can even point out university statutes that omitted the Politics: Cologne (1398),

45  On this, see Lidia Lanza–Marco Toste, “The Bridle-Maker and the Pope: The Use of Causality in John of Paris’s De regia potestate et papali and in the Early De potestate papae Treatises”, in C. Jones (ed.), John of Paris: Beyond Royal and Papal Power (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), pp. 309-360. See also Peter Adamson, “Interroga virtutes naturales: Nature in Giles of Rome’s On Ecclesiastical Power”, Vivarium 57 (2019), pp. 22-50 (and the bibliography quoted there), for the ways in which Giles used natural philosophy in the context of a political work. 46  See Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.33-34. 47  James A. Weisheipl, “Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century”, Mediaeval Studies 26 (1964), pp. 143-185 (161). 48  Sönke Lorenz, “Libri ordinarie legendi: Ein Skizze zum Lehrplan der mitteleuropäischen Artistenfakultät um die Wende vom 14. zum 15. Jahrhundert”, in W. Hogrebe (ed.), Argumente und Zeug­ nisse (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985), pp. 204-258. See also David Luscombe, “Commentaries on the Politics: Paris and Oxford, XIII-XVth Centuries”, in O. Weijers–L. Holtz (eds.), L’enseignment des disciplines à la Faculté des Arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles). Actes du colloque international (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 313-327, at 314-315. 49  See the numbers ibid., p. 321, where Luscombe draws on the catalogue of Flüeler. 50 Cf. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, III.145 (nr. 1319) and IV.729 (nr. 2690). 51  See David A. Lines, “Moral Philosophy in the Universities of Medieval and Renaissance Europe”, History of Universities 22 (2005), pp. 38-80, at 42-43.

16

Interpretative Study

Louvain (1427 and 1429) and Vienna (1389).52 Outside the universities, the situation was also quite varied: while the Franciscans showed little interest in the Aristotelian text,53 the Dominicans included the teaching of moral philosophy in the curricula of their provincial schools in 1314, and the General Chapter of Toulouse made the lecture of the Politics a requirement in 1330 for those in their second year of a two-year study dedicated to moral philosophy. However, it has yet to be established whether Dominicans taught moral philosophy on a regular basis.54 Irrespective of the importance of the Politics in medieval curricula, and even admitting that lectures on the Politics were rather limited, it is beyond all doubt that the teaching of political matters at the university level was based on the Politics almost immediately from the time of its translation into Latin until the first half of the seventeenth century. When the first university textbooks appeared toward the end of the sixteenth century, they were chiefly based on the Politics and not on any other text.55 Nonetheless, within the branch of moral philosophy, the Politics 52  There is, however, evidence that the Politics was occasionally taught in Vienna. In a study on the teaching of moral philosophy in Wien, C. Flüeler presents a table with the name of the teachers between 1390 and 1459. It is patent that the Politics was taught in the years 1417-1422, 1424-1425, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1437, 1441, 1443, 1457, 1459, that is, on fewer occasions than the Economics and much less often than the Nicomachean Ethics, which was taught every year and sometimes by more than one professor in the same year; cf. Christoph Flüeler, “Ethica in Wien anno 1438. Die Kommentierung der aristotelischen Ethik an der Wiener Artistenfakultät”, in M. Niesner–F.P. Knapp–J. Miethke (eds.), Schriften im Umkreis mitteleuropäischer Universitäten um 1400. Lateinische und volkssprachige Texte aus Prag, Wien und Heidelberg: Unterschiede, Gemeinsamkeiten, Wechselbeziehungen (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 92-138, at 135-138. 53  Only two Franciscans are listed in Flüeler’s catalogue of the medieval commentaries on the Politics: Raimundus Acgerii and Peter of Castrobol. It would be mistaken to search for traces of distinctive Franciscan political thought in both commentaries, since the former depends highly on Aquinas and Peter and the latter on Albert the Great, a Dominican. For Acgerii’s commentary, see Lambertini, “Raimundus Acgerii’s Commentary”; for Castrobol, see Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 305-306. On the lack of interest by the Franciscans towards the Politics, see Andrea Tabarroni, “Francescanesimo e riflessione politica sino ad Ockham”, in Etica e politica: le teorie dei frati mendicanti nel due e trecento. Atti del XXVI convegno internazionale, Assisi, 15-17 ottobre 1998 (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 1999), pp. 203-230, especially 210-215. Some Franciscans, however, did make considerable use of the Politics in political works, such as William of Sarzano and Enrico del Carretto. On such uses, see Roberto Lambertini, “I Frati Minori e la Politica di Aristotele: lo strano caso di Guglielmo da Sarzano”, in M.G. Del Fuoco (ed.), “Ubi neque aerugo neque tinea demolitur”. Studi in onore di Luigi Pellegrini per i suoi settanta anni (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 2006), pp. 407-423; Id., “Ancora sulla ricezione della Politica: Aristotele, il denaro e la povertà secondo Enrico del Carretto”, in S. Perfetti (ed.), “Scientia, Fides, Theologia”. Studi di filosofia medievale in onore di Gianfranco Fioravanti (Pisa: ETS, 2011), pp. 289-300. 54  Cf. Marian Michèle Mulchahey, First the Bow is Bent in Study: Dominican Education Before 1350 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), pp. 333-336; David A. Lines, Aristotle’s “­Ethics” in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300-1650). The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2002), pp. 84-85, n. 105. 55  On this, see Charles Schmitt, “The Rise of the Philosophical Textbook”, in C.B. Schmitt–Q. Skinner–E. Kessler–J. Kraye (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 792-804. By way of example, we can point to: Johannes Thomas Freigius, Quaestiones oeconomicae et politicae (Basileae: Per Sebastianum Henricpetri, 1578); Balthasar Crosnievicius (Krośniewicsz), In octo libros Politicos Aristotelis introductio: Peripateticis et Rameis studiosis profutura (Noribergae: Lochnerus, 1603); Theophilus Golius, Epitome doctrinae politicae

Introduction

17

always played a less important role than the Nicomachean Ethics.56 This, along with the fact that the Ethics had been fully translated into Latin two decades prior to the Politics, explains the influence that the Ethics exerted over the earliest readings of the Politics. This is absolutely apparent in the Questiones. Arguably, this institutional setting somewhat explains the limited impact of the Politics in medieval political thought. As reading of the Politics was not mandatory, it was quite possible that a medieval university student or even a master could have made an entire career without reading or being acquainted with the Politics. This meant that when he left the university, perhaps to work as a bureaucrat in some court, the arguments with which he was more familiar would be those stemming from metaphysics or natural philosophy. Because the Questiones is a university product, it differs from other political texts of the time; for instance, it does not use classical exempla, it does not draw a list of virtues required of the ruler and it does not aim to intervene in the contemporary political reality. Since the Questiones employs a highly technical language, one can assume that only learned readers would be able to follow its content. For this reason, the influence of the Questiones rests mainly in the commentary tradition on the Politics and in authors who had university training, such as Marsilius of Padua. The curriculum of the faculty of arts is also crucial at another level. An Arts student/master did not read Augustine or Cicero in the classroom, and their works were not part of the curriculum of the Parisian Faculty of Arts by the time Peter was active there.57 Obviously, this did not prevent an Arts student or master from reading these authors or other works absent from the curriculum. As a matter of fact, Peter quotes Proclus and Simplicius in the Questiones, and these authors did not belong to the curriculum. However, it would be surprising if an arts student were to seek out Augustine—an author that he would have become acquainted with only later in the faculty of theology, especially thanks to Peter Lombard’s Sentences—or perhaps to read Cicero, an author of moral philosophy, when this field was less well represented in the curriculum, especially since the topics covered by Cicero could also be found in Aristotle and in a more systematic form.58 ex octo libris Politicorum Aristotelis collecta (Argentorati: Rihelius, 1606); Erycus Puteanus (Eerryk van de Putte), Politicorum libri III primi ad perpetuos reducti aphorismos latine, breviter ac dilucide repraesentantur (Lovanii: Bouvetus, 1627); Arnoldus Verhel, Ideae Aristotelicae. Physica. Metaphysica. Ethica. Politica. Oeconomica (Franckerae: ex officina Ulderici Balck, 1632). 56  See Lines, “Moral Philosophy”. 57  See P. Osmund Lewry, “Rhetoric at Paris and Oxford in the Mid-Thirteenth Century”, Rhetorica 1 (1983), pp. 45-63; John O. Ward, “Rhetoric in the Faculty of Arts at the Universities of Paris and Oxford in the Middle Ages: A Summary of the Evidence”, in O. Weijers–L. Holtz (eds.), L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des Arts, Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles. Actes du colloque international (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 147-182, especially 165-166. 58  Before the translation of the Politics, Cicero was not used at the Arts Faculty of Paris in the first half of the thirteenth century to elaborate political ideas. In fact, Cicero’s De officiis was mostly seen as the book providing the content for economics (i.e., the branch of moral philosophy dealing with

18

Interpretative Study

Finally, there are two further crucial factors related to the institutional and historical context that completely mark the approach of the Questiones. First, unlike other Aristotelian texts, the Politics was translated into Latin without a complementary translation of Greek, Byzantine or Arabic commentaries. The result was that, while a medieval commentator could rely on the commentary of Averroes in terms of understanding the text of the Metaphysics, on Themistius’ paraphrase in reading the On the soul, on Simplicius’ and Averroes’ commentaries in understanding the On the heavens, and on the commentary by ‘Eustratius’ on the Nicomachean Ethics to comment on the Ethics, he had no help in interpreting the Politics. Second, the text of the Politics was approached exclusively in philosophical, not theological, terms. This is because the Questiones was produced after 1272, when the Arts Faculty of Paris established that its masters and bachelors had to take an oath vowing that they would not approach (philosophical) questions in theological terms.59 There is, therefore, no reference in the Questiones to a postlapsarian state and to man’s supernatural end (though there is a short reference to Eve’s originating from Adam’s rib).60 As a result, a university master interested in commenting on the Politics in the last quarter of the thirteenth century was, on the one hand, somewhat limited, since he could not draw on a previous and established commentary tradition in order to construct his argumentation and could not employ theological categories (though he was acquainted with them). On the other hand, this also meant that he was somehow less constrained or bound in his approach to the text, since he was less likely to have been influenced by previous readings and did not have to take account of theological discussions. This helps to explain Peter’s tendency to turn to the corpus Aristotelicum and to make use of notions bearing no relation to the text of the Politics. That the Questiones (and the subsequent commentaries) addresses every issue in strictly philosophical terms, with no reference to grace or man’s fallen condition, the household). On this, see Irene Zavattero, “Éthique et politique à la Faculté des arts à Paris dans la première moitié du XIIIe siècle”, in J. Verger–O. Weijers (eds.), Les débuts de l’enseignement universitaire à Paris (1200-1245 environ) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 205-245, especially 224. Moreover, Cicero (and Seneca) started to be regularly quoted in the Ethics commentaries only in the closing years of the thirteenth century, thus after the composition of the Questiones. For the date of the Questiones, see Chapter 2, below. 59 Cf. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I.499-500 (nr. 441). On this imposition and on the scholarly discussion about it, see Luca Bianchi, Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Université de Paris (XIIIe-XIVe siècles) (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999), pp. 165-201. 60 The Politics commentaries produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris avoided touching on theological issues in the greater part of their questions. By contrast, commentaries produced outside the university, such as those by Nicole Oresme and Guido Vernani of Rimini, could on occasion touch on a theological view. Also, in some commentaries (principally in those produced in the second half of the fourteenth century), one can find occasional references to a postlapsarian state, but the commentators always distinguish between the theological and philosophical levels of argumentation. This is evident in the commentary of the Anonymous of Milan, where, despite references to divine law in one question on incest and another on the relationship between the individual and the common good, the commentator always distinguishes between the realms of divine, natural and positive law.

Introduction

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must not be connected to outdated historiographical views. Underlining this feature of the Questiones is neither a reiteration of the famous Walter Ullmann’s thesis that the translation of Aristotle’s Politics into Latin was a turning point in medieval political thought,61 nor that, following on from Lagarde, it triggered a secular conception of society and politics on the grounds that the Politics transmitted to the Middle Ages the idea that political means and purposes were naturally intrinsic to man.62 Such theses have long since been dismissed.63 Rather, the absence of theological issues in the commentary tradition on the Politics is relevant because it is one of the few ‘places’ in which this occurs during the entire Middle Ages. It would be a mistake to think that the approach itself used in the Questiones would have brought about the secularisation of politics. In fact, it is noteworthy that Peter of Auvergne sticks to philosophy in his two commentaries on the Politics, whereas he quotes the Bible, Augustine and other theological sources when he deals with political issues in his Quodlibeta (see below). Once again, this confirms that the Questiones needs to be seen against its institutional background in order to prevent extrapolations.

4. The Text Commented on: The Latin Translation of Aristotle’s Politics The Questiones can by no means be dissociated from the Latin translation of the Politics. Though not a literal commentary, the Questiones often refers to the text that is being commented on, albeit in a generic way—for instance, “Contra est Philosophus hic”. Many expressions and words, however, are taken verbatim from the Politics. This means that, while commenting on the Politics, Peter depended on the choices made by the translator, the Flemish Dominican William of Moerbeke. As with any other translation, the translator’s choices can be debated. In the case of the Politics, which was just one among many other translations of Aristotelian works, the question is not so much whether in a specific case William might have opted for another Latin term—for instance, civilis instead of politica—but rather to what extent did his choices shape subsequent readings of the Politics and, for our purposes, to which extent the Questiones is determined by those choices.

61  See, for instance, Walter Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 167-84; Id., Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political Ideas (London: Sources of History, 1975), pp. 271-272; Id., Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1978), pp. 231-258. 62  See Georges de Lagarde, La naissance de l’esprit laïque au déclin du Moyen Age (Saint-PaulTrois-Châteaux–Paris: Éditions Béatrice–PUF, 1934-1946), 6 vols. [published later with numerous changes in Louvain–Paris: Béatrice–Nauwelaerts, 1956-1970, 5 vols.]. 63  See, for instance, Francis Oakley, “Celestial Hierarchies Revisited: Walter Ullmann’s Vision of Medieval Politics”, Past and Present 60 (1973), pp. 3-48 [reprinted in Id., Politics and Eternity: Studies in the History of Medieval and Early-Modern Political Thought (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 1999), pp. 25-72].

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Interpretative Study

The difficulties faced by the translator of the Politics are well known. The text is full of references to a political reality that medieval readers were unfamiliar with; more specifically, they could not fully grasp numerous references found in the text. This was the case for the political context of ancient Greece; for Athenian political institutions and offices, such as the phylarchs mentioned in 1301b22-23, and for Aristotle’s discussion of Plato’s views, which they were not familiar with apart from what is said in the Timaeus. Such difficulties, among others, are manifest in one of the translator’s strategies: instead of trying to find an equivalent Latin term, the translator simply transliterated many Greek words into Latin—an approach that did not help the first Latin readers of the Politics. This strategy was principally used in the first Latin translation of the Politics (1260-1264), which stops at Book II, chapter 11 (1273a30), because the translator—probably William of Moerbeke—had not been able to find a manuscript of the entire Greek text.64 The tendency to transliterate terms was also used, albeit to a much lesser extent, in the second translation of the Politics, undoubtedly made by William of Moerbeke in the 1260s. This second translation covers the eight books of the Politics.65 In order to reduce the number of transliterations and to correct some of the choices made in the first translation, this second translation presents a more reader-friendly Latin text and corresponds word for word to the Greek text.66 Of course, this second translation could not remove all of the obstacles, given the fact that Aristotle discussed ancient Greece and its institutions. It is a scholarly commonplace that William’s translation made the text of the Politics extremely difficult for medieval readers to comprehend, and principally that some of his choices heavily influenced the reading of the text. The idea that the Latin version of the Politics was somehow ‘unintelligible’ is not worthy of rebuttal: it suffices to read the first commentaries on the Politics to conclude that 64  This translation is conserved in only three manuscripts and is published in Aristoteles Latinus XXIX.1, Politica (libri I-II.11). Translatio prior imperfecta interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeka (?), ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin (Bruges–Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961). 65  It is published in Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Franz Susemihl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1872). A ‘pragmatic edition’ of Books III-VIII—based on four manuscripts that might have been available to Peter of Auvergne—is found in Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. 5-641. It is possible that William revised this second translation (this is extant in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2014, ff. 67v-147v); cf. Bernd Schneider, “Bemerkungen zum Aristoteles Latinus: Spuren einer Revision der Politikübersetzung”, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles – Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux gewidmet (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987), 2 vols., II.487-497. This, however, requires further investigation. 66  For a comparative analysis of the two translations, though limited to Book I, see Gerard Verbeke, “Moerbeke, traducteur et interprète; un texte et une pensée”, in J. Brams–W. Vanhamel (eds.), Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d’études à l’occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort (1286) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1989), pp. 1-21. A comparative table with terms of the two translations is supplied in Dondaine–Bataillon, “Préface”, pp. A44-A47. See also Eckart Schütrumpf, The Earliest Translations of Aristotle’s “Politics” and the Creation of Political Terminology (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink, 2014), pp. 9-25. This scholar criticises Verbeke stating that William uses “transliterations more at random” than Verbeke had assumed, and that “William does not approach transliteration consistently” (pp. 18-19).

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medieval readers did understand the content of the Politics—exceptions include a few passages regarding very specific points that do not compromise the overall understanding of Aristotle’s ideas—and the doctrines advanced there by Aristotle, no matter how much they read them against their own background. By contrast, the idea that William’s choices shaped the subsequent interpretation deserves more attention, since it is sometimes endorsed in scholarly articles. Such a claim has been advanced in the well-known and often cited study by James Schmidt, who begins his article with the sentence: “Aristotle’s Politics opens with a passage which has had a pervasive influence in the history of political thought”.67 According to Schmidt, the rendering of the Greek word κοινωνία and the expression κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική would prove essential for the successive (mis)reading of the Politics; they were respectively translated as communicatio and communicatio politica by William of Moerbeke and later as civilis societas by Leonardo Bruni. For Schmidt, the choice of the word communicatio68—a term “so equivocal as to be virtually meaningless”69—led to the loss of the “distinction between what was political and what was not”. Moreover, William of Moerbeke did not even attempt to translate the word πολιτικα because “he could not understand” it.70 Some of William’s transliterations surely had some effect on how medieval readers understood specific questions; however, these choices alone did not decisively determine the understanding of the question at stake.71 Only a very small number of his mistakes can be said to have profoundly influenced the reception of the Politics. Scholarship has repeatedly mentioned his mistranslation of I.1, 1252a14-16, which led medieval readers to understand the regimen regale as the regime in which the king’s will prevails and the regimen politicum as the rule according to laws, thereby obliterating the fact that for Aristotle political rule entails the rotation of

67  Cf. James Schmidt, “A Raven with a Halo: The Translation of Aristotle’s Politics”, History of Political Thought 7 (1986), pp. 295-319, at 295. 68  Ibid., p. 312. 69  Ibid., p. 310. 70 Ibid. 71  Cf. Odd Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition, 1200-1350 (Leiden–New York–Köln: Brill, 1992), pp. 177-178. Langholm pointed out the cases of χρηματιστική and καπηλική which were rendered by William of Moerbeke respectively as pecuniativa and campsoria. While in the Politics καπηλική meant the small retail commerce, which already for Aristotle entailed some negative features, William’s choice of the term campsoria, which means the exchange of money for money, would have led, according to Langholm, medieval readers to downplay the importance of retail commerce. Yet, as Lidia Lanza has shown, despite these difficulties—as in the case of the word pecuniativa, which was rather general and entailed more than one meaning—the commentators on the Politics grasped the sense of Aristotle’s doctrines; cf. Lidia Lanza, “Ars acquirendi pecunias. La crematistica nella Politica di Aristotele e nei suoi commenti medievali”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat…”, pp. 205-231, especially 210-214 [article first published in R. Lambertini–L. Sileo (eds.), I beni di questo mondo. Teorie etico-economiche nel laboratorio dell’Europa medievale. Atti del XVI Convegno della S.I.S.P.M. (Porto: F.I.D.E.M., 2010), pp. 37-65].

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offices.72 Yet, apart from this example, historians have failed to point to other significant passages that prevented medieval readers from understanding Aristotle’s ideas. Gianfranco Fioravanti has demonstrated how Albert misread, sometimes with unintended comical effects, several passages in his commentary. While these misinterpretations can be attributed to William’s translation,73 they are primarily confined to anecdotes and historical examples that Albert simply could not comprehend. Thus, the claim that William of Moerbeke’s choices or mistakes greatly influenced the reception of the Politics needs to be qualified. And the same holds for the importance that some scholars assign to William himself. Besides the fact that he made the Politics available in Latin, the importance of William of Moerbeke in the history of terms such as politica and politia is greatly exaggerated. Just as the Politics was not a sort of ‘ground zero’ in terms of medieval political thought, so too the term politica did not appear in Latin just because William of Moerbeke was unable to translate it. The terms politica and politia were far from unknown to medieval authors. Actually, as early as the twelfth century, the word politica was used to denote something related to the public sphere; it is used in this sense in John of Salisbury’s Policraticus74 and in Alan of Lille, who makes use of the notion virtus politica, which is found in Macrobius’ Commentary on Scipio’s Dream.75 In the first half of the thirteenth century, politica was already used to de72  Cf. principally James M. Blythe, “The Mixed Constitution and the Distinction between Regal and Political Power in the Work of Thomas Aquinas”, Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986), pp. 547565; Nicolai Rubinstein, “The History of the Word Politicus in Early-Modern Europe”, in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge et aliae: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 41-56 [reprinted in Id., Studies in Italian History in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. I: Political Thought and the Language of Politics. Art and Politics, ed. Giovanni Ciappelli (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2004), pp. 317-334]; Lambertini, “La diffusione della Politica”, pp. 685-697. 73  Gianfranco Fioravanti, “Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum. Alberto Magno e la Politica aristotelica”, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 9 (1979), pp. 195-246 [republished with slight changes in Id., Da Parigi a San Gimignano. Un itinerario del pensiero filosofico medievale (Roma: Aracne, 2021), pp. 169-229]. 74  See Volker Sellin, “Politik”, in O. Brunner–W. Conzen–R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1997), vols. 8, IV.806 (§ 5); Rubinstein, “The History of the Word Politicus”, p. 41. Besides the studies cited in this and in the following footnotes, see the fundamental study by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, “Tre note alla Monarchia”, in Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi (Firenze: Sansoni, 1955), pp. 503-524 [reprinted in Id., Opuscula: the Latin Aristotle (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972), pp. 277-298 and in Id., Luoghi cruciali in Dante. Ultimi saggi; con un inedito su Boezio e la bibliografia delle opere (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 1993), pp. 51-69]. 75  István Bejczy, “The Concept of Political Virtue in the Thirteenth Century”, in I.P. Bejczy–C.J. Nederman (eds.), Princely Virtue in the Middle Ages 1200-1500 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 9-32. On p. 13 we read: “It is obvious that Alan’s virtutes politicae do not bear a purely political character. All good habits of non-Christians are political virtues in his system, while Christians only dispose of Catholic virtues, even in political life. Still, Alan explained the name virtutes politicae by deriving it from the Greek polis, meaning civitas in Latin, as these virtues took their name secundum usum ciuitatum; he also took its origin from polis in the sense of ‘multitude’ (a corruption of the Greek polus = many) because many people appreciated such virtues. Alan’s twelfth-century followers more explicitly

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note a practical or moral science—this is evident in the works known as Divisiones philosophiae, in the academic compendia intended as introductions to philosophy and in the ‘guides of students’ (guides for the exams at the arts faculty).76 And in the decades after the translation of the Politics, medieval authors had no difficulty in distinguishing political science (politica) from political regime (politia), or political regime in general (politia) from the specific form of government called ‘polity’ or ‘republic’ (politia).77 Schmidt’s view seems to neglect that William of Moerbeke’s activity and, in particular, his translation of the Politics was not a meteor that had suddenly fallen from the sky; instead, it has to be understood against the background of the translations of Aristotelian texts that had been carried out prior to the Flemish translator’s own. Moerbeke was, therefore, not the first translator to opt for the word communicatio or to transliterate politica. In doing so, he was only following Robert Grosseteste, who twenty years earlier, around 1246-47, had translated both the complete text of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as well as the Greek and Byzantine commentaries on each book of the Ethics.78 Moreover, not only was the Ethics considered much linked the political virtues to public life. Some of them stated that the political virtues consisted in a permanent resolution to act in the interests of the state”. 76  On this, see Francisco Bertelloni, “Presupuestos de la recepción de la Política de Aristóteles”, in F. Domínguez–R. Imbach–T. Pindl–P. Walter (eds.), Aristotelica et Lulliana magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti dedicata (Steenbrugge: in Abbatia S. Petri, 1995), pp. 35-54; Id., “Les schèmes de la Philosophia practica antérieurs à 1265: leur vocabulaire concernant la Politique et leur rôle dans la réception de la Politique d’Aristote”, in J. Hamesse–C. Steel (eds.), L’élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Âge. Actes du colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve, 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), pp. 171-202; Alexander Fidora, “Politik, Religion und Philosophie in den Wissenschaftseinteilungen der Artisten im 13. Jahrhundert”, in A. Fidora–J. Fried–M. Lutz-Bachmann–L. Schorn-Schütte (eds.), Politischer Aristotelismus und Religion in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit (Berlin: Akademia Verlag, 2007), pp. 27-36; Zavattero, “Éthique et politique à la Faculté des arts”. 77  I cannot thus agree with Harro Höpfl, “Scholasticism in Quentin Skinner’s Foundations”, in A. Brett–J. Tully–H. Hamilton-Bleakley (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 113-129. Höpfl maintains that the word politia had a weak meaning, stating that politia “seems to have had no settled meaning, and was used equally for regime, form of government or as variant for civitas’ and that “even when the adjective politica was used … it was normally accompanied by an explanatory term: e.g. politica vel civilis (or saecularis)” (p. 121). Höpfl provides no evidence for his statements. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, no medieval text written after the translation of the Politics uses politica in the sense of civitas, or the word politica attached to saecularis; actually, the use of politica as an adjective was so well known that medieval authors did not feel the need to add civilis, at least not after Aquinas. 78  Grosseteste translated the compilation of Greek commentaries/scholia on every book of the Ethics from Greek into Latin; this compilation was assembled together in Constantinople at the end of the twelfth or at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The compilation is formed as follows: the commentaries on Books I and VI were written by Eustratius (the metropolitan bishop of Nicaea at the beginning of the twelfth century); Books V, IX and X were commented by Michael of Ephesus (a professor at Constantinople in the first half of the eleventh century); the commentary on Book VIII was authored by Aspasius (a Peripatetic master in Athens in the second century); the commentary on Book VII was produced by an anonymous author (posterior to Eustratius); finally, Books II, III, IV and V (again) are just anonymous scholia produced probably in the third century. Medieval authors

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more important than the Politics until the seventeenth century—as suggested by the significant number of commentaries on the former—but the reception of the Ethics determined the reception of the Politics at various levels, especially with regard to terminology.79 The words politica and politia (in the sense of political regime) were already being integrated into the philosophical terminology of the time and were given a precise meaning when the Politics was translated into Latin. This can be evidenced by taking into account the commentaries on and translations of the Ethics.80 The commentaries on the first books of the Ethics produced in the first half of the thirteenth century—that is, prior to Grosseteste’s translation of the complete text of the Ethics—still use the term civilis,81 since the first Latin translation of the first were not aware of the authorship of the different commentaries and mentioned Eustratius of Nicaea as the author of this compilation. The importance of this compilation is attested to by the fact that when a medieval author mentions the Commentator in ethical matters, he means ‘Eustratius’ and not Averroes. The Latin translation of the commentaries is available in The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln († 1253). Volume I: Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous Scholia on Books II, III and IV, ed. H. Paul F. Mercken (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973); The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste Bishop of Lincoln († 1253). Volume III: The Anonymous Commentator on Book VII, Aspasius on Book VIII and Michael of Ephesus on Books IX and X, ed. H. Paul F. Mercken (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991). 79  For some examples of this influence, see Roberto Lambertini, “Politische Fragen und politische Terminologie in mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zur Ethica Nicomachea”, in M. Kaufhold (ed.), Politische Reflexion in der Welt des späten Mittelalters (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 109-127. 80  In his classic article on this topic, Rubinstein (“The History of the Word Politicus”) completely neglects both the commentaries on the Ethics and the impact of the Ethics itself. This led him to write that “it was William of Moerbeke’s translation of the Politics, used by St Thomas Aquinas and then by all the Aristotelian political writers until the fifteenth century, which introduced politicus, and its Latin equivalent civilis, into the language of Western political thought” (p. 42). Even with regard to the word civilis, this claim is not correct. 81  I have examined four commentaries, namely the so-called ‘Paris commentary’, dated from 1235-40, and published in René-Antoine Gauthier, “Le cours sur l’Ethica nova d’un maître ès arts de Paris (1235-1240)”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 42 (1975), pp. 71-141; the ‘Naples Commentary’ produced between 1225-1240 and available in Martin J. Tracey, “An Early 13th-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics I, 4-10: The Lectio cum Questionibus of an Arts-Master at Paris in MS Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale VIII G 8, ff.4ra-9vb”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 17 (2006), pp. 22-69; the ‘Pseudo-Peckham Commentary’ dated from 1240-1245 and the prologue of which is published in Valeria A. Buffon, L’idéal éthique des maîtres ès arts de Paris vers 1250, avec édition critique et traduction sélectives du Commentaire sur la “Nouvelle” et la “Vieille Éthique” du Pseudo-Peckham (Québec: Université Laval, 2007; Ph.D. dissertation), pp. 219-371; and the commentary composed around 1245 and attributed to Robert Kilwardby, now published in Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary on the “Ethics” of Aristotle, ed. Anthony J. Celano (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022). I thank Anthony J. Celano for making the transcription of this commentary available to me before its publication. The ‘Paris Commentary’ uses “doctrina ciuilis” (94), “ciuilis sciencia” (97), “in ciuilibus” (100) and “uita ciuilis” (108, 115); the ‘Naples Commentary’ employs “uita ciuilis” (29), “finis ciuilis” (30) and “ars ciuilis” (42); the Pseudo-Peckham uses “doctrina ciuilis” (243), “bonum ciuile” (297); finally, Kilwardby employs the expression “doctrina civilis” (pp. 112, 113) throughout his commentary, but he also uses “civilis sciencia” (114), “civiliter vivens” (114) and writes “Natura enim ciuilis que est ciuitatis et ciuium constitucio”.

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book of the Ethics used that same word.82 By contrast, the commentaries by Albert the Great (composed in 1250-1252) and Aquinas already employed the terms politica and politia,83 precisely because they draw on Grosseteste’s translation of the Ethics and its Greek and Byzantine commentaries. They thus understood that the word politica meant one of the moral sciences84: the word politia a ‘political regime’85 and the word politicus denoted ruler, statesman or a student of politics.86 In any case, the use of the words related to politica became well established shortly after Grosseteste’s translation. Grosseteste was careful enough to add the syntagma ‘id est civilis’ after the word politica in some contexts. This occurs mostly 82  See Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-3.2, Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Antiquissima libr. II-III sive “Ethica Vetus” et Translationis Antiquioris quae supersunt sive “Ethica Nova”, “Hoferiana”, “Borghe­ siana”, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier (Leiden–Bruxelles: E.J. Brill–Desclée de Brouwer, 1972), passim. 83  Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, ed. Wilhelm Kübel, Alberti Magni Opera omnia XIV (Münster: Aschendorff, 1968-1972), 2 vols., VI.7: “Et tales sunt, qui sibi et aliis providere student: dispensativi, idest oeconomici, et politici, habentes regere civitatem” (II.443); IX.12: “architector considerat habitationem civitatis quantum ad formam aedificii … Ad medicum autem pertinet secundum proportionem loci ad sanitatem habitancium … Ad rhetorem autem quantum ad observationem iustitiae … Ad politicum autem quantum ad determinationem numeri inhabitantium” (II.700); X.19: “quamvis politeiae non reducantur in unum per modum univocum, reducuntur tamen in unum secundum analogiam, quia ratio politeiae salvatur per prius in regno et in aliis per posterius” (II.789). For Aquinas, see by way of example, Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Ethicorum, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita XLVII (Romae: ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), 2 vols., X.16: “ad hoc quod homo fiat politicus (alioquin non fierent aliqui magis politici per consuetudinem politicae vitae), et his qui desiderant scire aliquid de politica videtur esse necessaria experientia vitae politicae” (II.606). 84  Just for the sake of illustration, I point to some passages taken from Eustratius’ commentary on Book I (note that in some of these passages the word communicatio also occurs): “Divisa enim et hac [sc. practica] in tres, in ethicam, oeconomicam et politicam … Differunt igitur ad invicem ethica, oeconomica et politica (id est, moralis, dispensativa et civilis)” (The Greek Commentaries … Volume I, p. 1); “Politicae autem civitas subiectum et qui in ipsa communicant habitatione” (ibid., p. 3); “Est autem politica quidem moralis species philosophiae practicae … circa consistentiam et concordiam civitatis et conversantium in civitate occupationem demonstrans” (ibid., p. 4); “Propositum est hic ostendere politicam esse omnibus supereminentem artibus et principalem et dominam omnium quae in humanis communicationibus sunt adinventionum” (ibid., p. 16); “Politica autem opus habet studiosissimum facere cives quales quosdam, id est bonos et operatores bonorum” (ibid., p. 148); see also pp. 29, 47, 99, 101, 104, 175-176. 85  This is apparent in Aspasius’ commentary on Book VIII: “In omni enim communicatio politica est iustum aliquod” (The Greek Commentaries … Volume III, p. 155); “omnis autem communicatio ad politiam reducitur … dividit politiam in tres species, in regnum scilicet et aristocratiam et timocratiam. Est autem regnum unius solius principatus, aristocratia vero principatus optimorum, et timocratia vero est principatus ditiorum … Sunt itaque proprie dictae politiae regnum et aristocratia” (ibid., 159); “regnum, ut dictum est, est optima politiarum … Sic itaque fit transmutatio politiae optimae, quae regnum est, in pessimam, quae est tyrannis” (ibid., p. 161); “tyrannis est pessima transgressio et corruptio politiae … enumeratis politiae speciebus et earum transgressionibus …” (ibid., p. 162). 86  This is clear in Eustratius: “politicus enim homo quasi rex sit. Omnia habet sub propria potestate subiacentia” (The Greek Commentaries … Volume I, p. 26); “Politici enim est determinare duci exercitus qualiter utendum exercitu” (ibid., p. 28); “Politicus autem vir est qui bona et iusta ipse sciens a se ipso et docet in civitatibus et perfectionem in multos inducit” (ibid., pp. 30-31); “in civitatibus habent qui secundum veritatem sunt politici, maxime laborantes circa virtutem, ut bonos cives faciant et oboedientes legibus” (ibid. p. 175). See also pp. 151 and 178.

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in his translation of Eustratius’ commentary on the first book of the Ethics and certainly enabled his readers to grasp the meaning of the word more easily.87 This procedure is also found, though not applied with the same regularity, in the first books of Aquinas’ commentary on the Ethics.88 Grosseteste sometimes uses the term urbanitas to translate the Greek politeia— the political regime89—but he also uses politia.90 However, the choice of urbanitas proved less durable; in fact, in the Latin translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo, made by Bartholomew of Messina around 1258-66, we find the word politia in the same exact sense as we find it in William of Moerbeke’s translation of the Politics.91 Against this background, it is difficult to assign a radical impact to any of William of Moerbeke’s choices. Even terms such as democratia and oligarchia had already been introduced by Grosseteste. Some of his terminological choices became part of the medieval philosophical terminology, but these new terms were integrated with others that were already part of the common practice of the time. This explains, for instance, why Albert, Aquinas and Peter primarily use politia but occasionally civilitas92 for political regime, a word found in Grosseteste’s translation but not in the Latin version of the Politics. Schmidt’s approach is indebted to a scholarly conception in which language and, more specifically, the use of specific terms plays a significant role in political thought. However, the use of a term by more than one medieval author is never normalised and does not imply that all its ‘users’ share the same views. The use of such terms does not conform to fixed standards that leave no space for semantic divergence. It is noteworthy that William of Moerbeke himself preferred politia while translating the Politics but opted for civilitas in his successive translation of 87 See

The Greek Commentaries … Volume I, pp. 28, 30, 47. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Ethicorum, II.3 (I.85) and III.16 (I.169). 89  Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-3.3, Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolni­ ensis sive “Libri Ethicorum”. A. Recensio pura, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier (Leiden–Bruxelles: E.J. Brill– Desclée de Brouwer, 1972), pp. 243 (V.7, 1135a4), 262 (VI.8, 1142a9-10), 315 (VIII.11, 1161a10). 90  Ibid., p. 313 (VIII.10, 1160a31). Curiously, he occasionally adds ciuilitas after the use of politia and urbanitas (see, for Book V, the ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, ff. 98va, 99ra), a term also found (and used in the same way) in the first commentaries on the Politics (see later in this section). 91  Aristoteles Latinus XI.1-2, De mundo. Translationes Bartholomaei et Nicholai, eds. William L. Lorimer–Lorenzo Minio-Paluello (Bruges–Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1965), p. 23, (6, 400b11-15): “In inmobili autem firmatum omnia movet et circum agit, ubi vult et qualiter, in differentibus ydeis et naturis – quemadmodum igitur et civitatis lex, inmobilis existens, in animabus utentium omnia ordinat secundum politiam”. 92  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, ed. Auguste Borgnet, in B. Alberti Magni … Opera Omnia VIII (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vives, 1891), pp. 231 (III.4: “omnium ordo per leges justitiae ad rempublicam vocatur politia sive civilitas”), 238 (III.5: “ad id quod expedit communi nulla transgressio est, sed vera civilitas”), 256 (III.7: “ergo plures pauperes dominari injustum est et contra civilitate”); Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, p. A145 (II.7: “Quidam enim dicebant eam componi ex tribus ciuilitatibus, scilicet ex oligarchia … et monarchia … et democratia”). For Peter, see the edition, below, Liber III, q. 5, ll. 11, 17, 24; q. 18, l. 4; q. 20, l. 61 and q. 21, ll. 54 and 64. 88 

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the Rhetoric.93 William’s preference for civilitas over politica in a later translation seems to suggest that he had changed his mind. However, such a hypothesis does not hold up to scrutiny: in another translation completed in the same years (sometime between 1266 and 1272), he rendered πολιτικός three times as civilis and once as politicus.94 Such an oscillation between terms is not abnormal. As noted earlier, Schmidt holds that William’s choice of the term communicatio blurs the distinction between “what was political and what was not”, and, what is more, on account of this blurring, Aquinas would have failed to discern between being social and being political.95 Moreover, this view contends that William chose communicatio because he was relying on the ‘paradigm’ of Jerome’s translation of the New Testament, a paradigm that “could provide no aid … in translating politikē or any of the other derivatives of the term polis”.96 Yet all this is inaccurate and misleading: in choosing communicatio, William was merely clinging to the choices already made by Grosseteste in the Ethics97 and by Bartholomew of Messina in his translation of the Magna moralia (around 1260).98 Moreover, in his first Ethics commentary, Albert uses communicatio in a context in which he clearly distinguishes between what is public (hence political) and what is private,99 and in the Questiones Peter uses both 93  It was done shortly before 1269; cf. Bernd Schneider, Die mittelalterlichen griechisch-lateinischen Übersetzungen der aristotelischen “Rhetorik” (Berlin–New York: De Gruyter, 1971), p. 12. On the use of the term civilitas in the commentaries on the Politics and beyond, see Irène Rosier-Catach, “Civilitas. De la famille à l’empire universel”, in I. Atucha–D. Calma–C. König-Pralong–I. Zavattero (eds.), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach (Porto: Brepols, 2011), pp. 163-174. 94 See Ptolemy’s “Tetrabiblos” in the Translation of William of Moerbeke. Claudii Ptolemaei Liber Iudicialium, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem–Carlos Steel, with the assistance of Pieter De Leemans (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015), p. 217, l. 500 (II.8), p. 265, l. 874 (III.15), p. 279, l. 79 (IV.3) for ciuilis and p. 270, l. 1022 (III.15) for politicus. 95  Cf. Schmidt, “A Raven with a Halo”, p. 312. 96  Ibid., pp. 299-300. 97  Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-4.3, Ethica Nicomachea … Recensio pura, p. 228 (V.1, 1129b19), where we find politica communicatione for πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. See also Albert’s comment on this passage; cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, V.2 (II.316): “… quod per hoc quod dicit politica communicatione, tangitur ordinationis ratio, qua huiusmodi factiva felicitatis sunt legalia, quia secundum quid per determinationem legis veniunt in communicationem et usum communitatis. Lex autem non est alicuius ad seipsum nec patrisfamilias ad eos qui sunt in domo sua, quia totum, quod est in domo, suum est, nec aliquis possidet nisi suo nomine. Et ideo non dicit communicatione ethica vel oeconomica, sed civili”. 98  Aristoteles Latinus XXVII, Magna Moralia. Translatio Bartholomaei, ed. Christine Pannier, in Aristoteles Latinus Database (ALD). Release 2/2006, moderantibus J. Brams, C. Steel, P. Tombeur, cooperantibus P. De Leemans et E. Gouder (Turnhout: Brepols), 2006, I.34, 1194b24-29: “At vero ex muliere et viro communicatio iustum est prope politicum iustum; peius quidem enim est mulier viro, sed magis proprium et participat equalitate quomodo magis proprium, propter hoc quod prope politice communicationis vita ipsius, quare et iustum muliebre ad virum maxime quodammodo utique aliorum politicum est … Quoniam igitur est iustum quod in politica communicatione est, iustitia et iustus circa politicum iustum utique”. 99  Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, V.4 (I.327): “homo dicitur essentialiter politicus quantum ad hoc quod non potest bene vivere sine communicatione, tamen non quantum ad hoc quod oporteat ipsum circa communia semper operari, cum aliquando etiam circa

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Interpretative Study

syntagmata communicatio civilis and communicatio domestica100 as well as societas domestica and societas politica.101 Finally, the commentators absolutely distinguish between a political and a social dimension: the human species is inclined to associate, but not all members of the political community have the capacity to participate in political life, and not all individual acts fall within the scope of politics. Scholars (mostly German) tend to highlight Bruni’s translation of κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική as societas civilis, given that such a rendition marks an important step towards the modern separation between state and society. This view goes back to Otto Brunner and has been often cited following on Manfred Riedel’s work.102 It is thus no coincidence that the first scholar to be quoted in Schmidt’s article is precisely Riedel. While the discussion of the notion of ‘civil society’ lies beyond the scope of this introduction, it must be stressed that although Bruni coined a new expression— societas civilis—this expression did not entail a new conception of politics—and the same holds for all of Bruni’s renditions. Clear evidence of this is the fact that the commentaries on the Politics made both prior to and after Bruni’s translation did not maintain contrasting ideas regarding society; instead, they still drew on the commentaries of Aquinas and Peter. In any case, Bruni’s translation did not establish a definitive pattern of translation, for not all of the Latin translations of the Politics made in the sixteenth century follow his standards, and even those that do follow his standards do not follow them faithfully.103 Bruni’s translation was indeed influpropria operatur … civilis dicitur a dispositione perfecta civilitatis, quae est in operatione ad alterum in negotiis publicis. Et sic qui non est civilis, sed privatus, est bonus vel malus”. 100  See Prohemium, ll. 108-109. 101  Ibid., ll. 96-97. 102  See principally Manfred Riedel, “Gesellschaft, Bürgerliche”, in O. Brunner–W. Conze–R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1997), 8 vols., II.719-800; Id., “Aristotelismus und Humanismus. Zur frühneuzeitlichen Rezeption der Aristotelischen Politik”, in Id., Metaphysik und Metapolitik. Studien zu Aristoteles und zur politischen Sprache der neuzeitlichen Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), pp. 109-128. 103  Ciuilis societas is found in the translations of the Benedictine Joachim Périon (cf. Aristotelis De republica qui Politicorum dicuntur, libri VIII a Ioachino Perionio Cormoeriaceno nuper latinitate donate, Basileae: per Ioannem Oporinum, 1549; first published 1543), Denis Lambin (1567)—though Lambin also uses the word politica—and Antonio Montecatini (cf. Aristotelis Politicorum, hoc est civi­ lium librorum duo: ab Antonio Montecatino in latina lingua conversus, et partionibus, resolutionibus, scholiis illustrato, Ferrariae: apud Benedictum Mammarellum, 1594, first issued in 1587). By contrast, communio ciuilis occurs in the translations of Louis Jacques d’Estrebay, who follows Erasmus and accepts the specificity of Christian Latin (cf. Aristotelis Politica ab Jacobo Lodoico Strebaeo nomine Joannis Bertrandi conuersa Senatoris Judicisque sapientissimi, Parisiis: Michael Vascosanus, 1542), and of Pietro Vettori (1576), who retains many of Bruni’s choices (for Lambin and Vettori’s translations, see Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo ex Dionisio Lambini et Petro Victorii interpretationibus purissimis Graecolatini. Theodori Zvingeri argumentis atque scholiis, tabulis quinetiam in tres priores libros illustrati: Victorii commentariis perpetuis declarati. Pythagoreorum veterum fragmenta Politica, a Ioanne Spondano conversa et emendata, Basileae: Eusebius Episcopius, 1582). Finally, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda chose ciuilis communitas (cf. Aristotelis De Republica libri VIII, interprete et enarratore Iohanne Genesio Sepulveda Cordubensi, Coloniae Agrippinae: in officina Birckmannica, 1601; first published in 1548) and so did Petrus Ramus (whose translation was probably the fruit of a team effort; cf. APIΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

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ential, and in the fifteenth century even the text of the Aquinas–Peter commentary underwent changes in its terminology in order to comply with Bruni’s ‘Ciceronian’ standards.104 However, after his translation, many political works continued to use the previous terms, and it did not give rise to any new reflection about society. There are no grounds, therefore, for the claim that the conceptions behind the translations of the Politics, whether that of William of Moerbeke or that of Bruni, might have had such a great influence on the political conceptions of their times. There is no evidence that any two medieval and Renaissance authors ever reached “significantly divergent conclusions” just because they relied on these two different translations of the Politics.105 To give but one example: Donato Acciaioli’s commentary on the Politics, which uses Bruni’s translation, draws heavily on Peter’s Scriptum, which was written according to Moerbeke’s translation.106 Political language indeed underwent some alterations in the thirteenth century, also thanks to the translation of the Politics. Yet it seems unlikely that the translation itself—and not the text translated—might have had a tremendous impact. This is not to say that medieval readers did not have issues with the Latin text of the Politics. Apart from William of Moerbeke’s choice of terminology and from the refer­ ences to ancient Greece, they faced another problem: the fact that the quality of the text of the Politics in the manuscript they were using might not be flawless. The manuscript might very well contain some faulty variants and, therefore, render comprehension of a particular passage difficult. However, this does not mean that they did not understand the text. It is worth noting that, while writing their literal commentaries, Albert the Great and Peter of Auvergne relied on more than one manuscript of the Politics (in Peter’s case, possibly three or more). We find references in Peter’s Scriptum and in Albert’s commentary to an alia littera, that is, to the text provided by ‘another manuscript’.107 This occurs in cases where the Latin ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ ΤΑ εὑρισκομενα. Aristotelis Politica a Petro Ramo regio professore latina facta, et dialecti-

cis rerum summis breviter exposita et illustrata, Francofurti: Typis Wechelianis apud Claudium Marnium et haeredes Ioannis Aubrij, 1601). These two last cases are quite significant, because in spite of their major differences—Sepúlveda adopts a Ciceronian and, hence, a Brunian terminology; Ramus retains far more vocabulary stemming from the medieval translations—they use the same exact expression for κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. For an overview of these translations, see Juan J. Valverde Abril, “Las traducciones latinas de la Política de Aristóteles: panorama general”, Calamus Renascens 7 (2006), pp. 197-215. 104  On this, see Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. cix-cxxii. 105  Such claim is advanced in Cary J. Nederman, “The Meaning of Aristotelianism in Medieval Moral and Political Thought”, Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996), pp. 563-585, at 567. Nederman argues, based on Schmidt, that “For depending upon which version of the Politics formed the starting point for inquiry … significantly divergent conclusions were bound to follow”. This statement occurs in a context in which Nederman intends to dismiss Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea that medieval Aristotelianism has a unitary character thanks to a set of core doctrines. Yet, Nederman seems to fall into the same trap as MacIntyre, namely the lack of historical evidence. Nederman’s lack of evidence is also underlined in Lambertini, “La diffusione della Politica”, pp. 678-680. 106  See Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 263-273. 107  See, for instance, Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, pp. 191 and 192 (II.10), 210, 212 (III.1), 222 (III.2), 233 (III.4), 239 and 240 (III.5), 247 (III.7), 277 (III.8), 440 and 443 (V.2), 541 (V.8), 553

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manuscript they had upon their desk presented a defective or unclear text, or simply whenever they came across a textual variant. Such ‘philological diligence’—to use Lidia Lanza’s expression108—reveals that the commentators were not only able to cope with difficulties, but further that they indeed understood the text and hence sought solutions (i.e., textual variants) to help them create a reliable and coherent text. If this had not been the case, then they would not have detected that a specific passage was incomprehensible.109 Clearly, medieval authors transformed some of the doctrines of the Politics. But they did not do so solely on the basis of terminological choices made by William of M ­ oerbeke (or Grosseteste). The realities denoted by Aristotle’s words were surely distinct from the reality familiar to William of Moerbeke and the medieval commentators, even in those cases where William’s translation was faithful. This holds, for instance, for words such as regnum and civitas, which perfectly render the Greek βασιλεία and πόλις, respectively. Of course, medieval readers did not know the Greek polis, but they were perfectly aware that the word civitas (in the Politics) could not simply mean an urban settlement,110 and hence they applied it to any autonomous political reality, including the kingdom (regnum). The Questiones is eloquent in this regard.111 This is not to say that terminology did not play a role. It is likely that the term civitas, used to designate the political community in the text of the Ethics, lurks behind Radulphus Brito’s concern in his Ethics commentary that men who live in monasteries, and hence outside of the city (civitas), can also be included in the definition of man as a social (civile) animal by nature.112 Moreover, William of Moerbeke’s choice to render the excellence (ἀρετὴ) specific to the citizen as virtus—instead of other (V.9), 676 (VII.7), 749 (VII.15), 767 (VIII.2), 786 (VIII.4). For Peter, I take these conclusions from Lidia Lanza’s introduction to Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. cxx-cxxii. Such a procedure is common to many medieval commentators. On how the commentators approached the difficult passages of a Latin translation, see Pieter De Leemans, “Aristotle Transmitted: Reflections on the Transmission of Aristotelian Scientific Thought in the Middle Ages”, International Journal of the Classical Tradition 17 (2010), pp. 325-353, especially 342-345. 108  Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, p. 266. 109  All this can be illustrated with a passage taken from the commentary started by Peter of Osma and finished by Ferdinand of Roa, two Salamancan masters of the second half of the fifteenth century: “Considerandum primo quod aliqui codices habent: Prima vero illa quaestio qua quaeritur an potestas reipublicae magis circa paucos quam circa multos esse debeat. Sed puto illud esse additum ab aliquo insipiente lectore, et non esse de littera, quoniam in antiqua traductione illud non ponitur”; Pedro de Osma y Fernando de Roa, Comentario a la Política de Aristóteles, ed. José Labajos Alonso (Salamanca: Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia, 2006), 2 vols., I.460. Note that while this commentary is based on Bruni’s translation, the commentators do not always stick to it, and sometimes they compare it with William’s version in order to assert which of them has the best text. On this attitude in this commentary, see Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 277-280. 110  On how medieval authors understood the term civitas, see Pierre Michaud-Quantin, “Universitas”. Expressions du mouvement communautaire dans le Moyen-Age latin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970), pp. 111-117. 111  See Liber I, q. 6, ll. 16-23. 112  See Marco Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association in Medieval Political Thought Revisited”, in M. van der Lugt (ed.), La nature comme source de la morale au Moyen Âge (Firenze: S.I.S.M.E.L.–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), pp. 113-188, at 150.

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possible terms such as bonitas, praestantia or even facultas—led Peter to focus on the term virtus in III.4 and to attempt to define it in Aristotelian terms (for this he drew on Aristotle’s definition of virtue, as advanced in the beginning of the second book of the Ethics). But no matter how much certain terms used in William of Moerbeke’s version might have had a misleading effect on the readership, such an effect did not preclude Peter (or any other commentator) from grasping the sense of the ideas advanced in the Politics. And such translation problems can by no means be regarded as having had a greater impact within the medieval reception of the Politics than the interpretations made by the first authors who approached it with a specific background—their own social and political reality—and with their own agendas. Take the case of the terms despota, despoticus and their derivative forms, which seem to be transliterations first made by William of Moerbeke and went on to become important terms in medieval political thought. Certainly, the earliest readers of the Politics had to make some effort to grasp these terms, and William could have chosen the Latin herus/herilis or words derived from dominus. If these terms, however, gained importance in medieval thought within certain discussions, then it was due to the reflections of the commentators on the Politics and the efforts of Ptolemy of Lucca (in his continuation of Aquinas’ De regno), Marsilius of Padua and Ockham, who applied these terms to their own reality and to different ends.113 The adoption of transliterations and the creation of neologisms of Greek roots is not necessarily a sign that the translator did not understand what he was trying to translate; such a practice could be, in William of Moerbeke’s case, “a conscious choice to respect the authority’s text or was inspired by the intention to introduce a new technical vocabulary to the audience”.114 Indeed, as Pieter De Leemans noted, William included in the autograph of his translation of the History of Animals some notes explaining the transliterations,115 and the same occurred in William’s translation of the Politics. And even in cases in which the commentators struggled to understand some of William’s transliterations—for instance, his renderings of animals’ names in Aristotle’s works on animals—the commentators concentrated their analyses on the structure of the text and on its philosophical aspects, relegating the identification of the animal species to a secondary or less important status.116 113  See Richard Koebner, “Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term”, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 14 (1951), pp. 275-302; Claudio Fiocchi–Stefano Simonetta, “Il principatus despoticus nell’aristotelismo bassomedievale”, in D. Felice (ed.), Dispotismo. Genesi e sviluppi di un concetto filosofico-politico (Napoli: Liguori, 2001), 2 vols., I.71-94. 114  De Leemans, “Aristotle Transmitted”, p. 337. 115 Ibid. 116  Ibid., pp. 337-338 and the article quoted there: Pieter Beullens, “Aristotle, His Translators, and the Formation of Ichthyologic Nomenclature”, in M. Goyens–P. De Leemans–A. Smets (eds.), Science Translated. Latin and Vernacular Translations of Scientific Treatises in Medieval Europe (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008), pp. 105-122, at 115.

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The reception of the Politics was less determined by the translator’s choices than by both medieval reality and the novelty and strangeness that aspects of the Politics entailed for its first readers. It was much more the signified than the signifier that shaped the interpretations of the Politics: while such terms as servus, pauper and nobilitas correspond well to δοῦλος, πένης and εὐγένεια, what they meant for Aristotle and his medieval commentators was completely different.117 For this reason, the peculiarities that we find in medieval interpretations of the Politics concerning some specific issues have to be regarded as ‘adaptations’ rather than as ‘misinterpretations’, as Conor Martin suggested more than sixty years ago.118 The influence of the Politics in medieval political thought definitely owes more to the interpretations advanced by different authors with different agendas and backgrounds than to options made by its translator. This is undoubtedly the case of the Questiones.

5. The Questiones and the Medieval Reception of the Politics From a history of ideas point of view, the Questiones and its significance can only be fully understood against the wider background of the medieval reception of the Politics. There has long been a scholarly consensus that the Politics did not give rise to a radical transformation in medieval political thought. Many of the ideas put forward in the Politics could be found elsewhere, too, and prior to the appearance of its Latin translation. This was the case regarding the naturalness of human association, already found in some Church Fathers, in Moises Maimonides and in Avicenna. It also held true for the argument that monarchy was the best political regime and tyranny the worst, along with the principle that the sovereign is not bound by the laws—it suffices to recall the Policraticus and Roman law, where such a principle 117  On how the commentators understood servus, see Gianfranco Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari: interpretazioni medievali della Politica aristotelica”, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 11 (1981), pp. 399-429 [republished with slight changes in Id., Da Parigi a San Gimignano. Un itinerario del pensiero filosofico medievale (Roma: Aracne, 2021), pp. 231-266]. On their views on the poor, see Marco Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues, tantum ydiota quantum studiosus: How Medieval Authors Made Sense of Democracy”, in D. Carron et al. (eds.), Von Natur und Herrschaft. “Natura” und “Dominium” in der politischen Theorie des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt–New York: Campus Verlag, 2018), pp. 281-351, at 293-295. Finally, on their notion of nobility, see Id., “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi: The Role of the Philosopher in the Political Community at the Faculty of Arts in Paris in Late Thirteenth Century”, in J.F. Meirinhos (ed.), Itinéraires de la raison. Études de philosophie médiévale offertes à Maria Cândida Pacheco (Louvain-la-Neuve: F.I.D.E.M., 2005), pp. 269-308, at 274-290. For the broader context of Peter’s thoughts on nobility, see Guido Castelnuovo, Être noble dans la cité. Les noblesses italiennes en quête d’identité (XIIIe-XVe siècle) (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015), especially pp. 144-163. See also Gianluca Briguglia, “Note su nobiltà e cortesia nel De regimine principum di Egidio Romano”, Quaestio 20 (2020), pp. 187-202, for the concept of nobility of birth in Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. 118  Conor Martin, “Some Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Politics”, History. The Journal of the Historical Association 36 (1951), pp. 29-44, at 36.

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is present. And the same can be said for the institution of majority rule in public deliberations, which in the Politics is associated with the assemblies of the populace, but which was also a well-established principle in canon law. Furthermore, some of the major sources that were used prior to the translation of the Politics continued to be used: for instance, Cicero’s De officiis and De inventione, Gratian’s Decretum and the Digest.119 Still, the Politics said nothing (or almost nothing) about questions which were crucial to medieval authors, such as taxation, contracts, jurisdictional ranges, external and internal forum, natural law or ecclesiology (let alone about the papacy, its power and its relationship with the Emperor). The Politics thus coexisted with other sources, which were used in distinct institutional settings, contexts and literary genres. Outside the university, Roman law, Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium and numerous Latin moralist authors, whether directly or through florilegia, were the main sources used—prior and subsequent to the translation of the Politics—in the so-called ‘podestà literature’. Via chronicles intended to legitimise established power and in pieces of eloquence produced within the Italian communal culture, the aim here was to offer normative models for public officers and magistrates.120 A slightly different picture emerges regarding another genre produced outside the university, namely the specula principum.121 While the Politics did have an impact on this genre, and two of the most influential medieval mirrors for princes take the Politics as their main source—Aquinas and Ptolemy of Lucca’s De regno and Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum122—many 119  That the impact of the Politics, and more broadly of Aristotelianism, in medieval political thought should be seen as limited and with a sense of perspective has been argued principally by Cary Nederman in numerous articles assembled in Cary J. Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits: Classical Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy, 12th-15th Centuries (Aldershot–Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1997). 120  It should be noted, however, that Aristotle had some impact on this literature, as attested to by the Trattato de regimine rectoris di Fra Paolino Minorita, which was influenced by Giles of Rome. The scholarly literature on this genre is vast. See, however, Quentin Skinner, “Machiavelli’s Discorsi and the Pre-Humanist Origins of Republican Ideas”, in G. Bock–Q. Skinner–M. Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 121-141, especially 123-134; Stephen J. Milner, “Communication, Consensus and Conflict: Rhetorical Precepts, the ars concionandi, and Social Ordering in Late Medieval Italy”, in V. Cox–J.O. Ward (eds.), The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2006), pp. 365-408; and the numerous and key articles of Enrico Artifoni as, for instance, “Sull’eloquenza politica nel Duecento italiano”, Qua­ derni Medievali 35 (1993), pp. 57-78, published in French in a lengthier version as “L’éloquence politique dans les cités communales (XIIIe siècle)”, in I. Heullant–Donat (ed.), Cultures italiennes (XIIe-XVe siècle) (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2000), pp. 269-296; Id., “Retorica e organizzazione del linguaggio politico nel Duecento italiano”, in P. Cammarosano (ed.), Le forme della propaganda politica nel Due e nel Trecento (Roma: École Française de Rome, 1994), pp. 157-182. 121  On this genre, see among others the articles in Annamaria Pisapia–Angela De Benedictis (eds.), “Specula principum”: riflesso della realtà giuridica (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1999); Frédérique Lachaud–Lydwine Scordia (eds.), Le Prince au miroir de la littérature de l’Antiquité aux Lumières (Mont-Saint-Aignan: Publications des Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2007). 122  On the reception of the De regimine principum, see mainly Charles F. Briggs, Giles of Rome’s “De regimine principum”: Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, c. 1275-c. 1525 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Noëlle-Laetitia Perret, Les traductions françaises du “De

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Interpretative Study

others continued, after the translation of the Politics, to draw on other classical texts in order to provide exempla and on moral works such as William Peraldus’ Summa de virtutibus et vitiis and on John of Salisbury’s Policraticus.123 Within the university, the Politics never became the exclusive source. As we have seen, the Politics was read in the arts faculty; however, in the higher faculty of canon law, the texts to be read were the Decretum along with the Liber extra (which contains the Decretals), the Clementines and the Extravagants,124 while in the faculty of civil law the texts treated were the Digestum Vetus, the Codex, the Infortiatum, the Digestum Novum and the Volumen Parvum.125 The Politics did not replace those texts, and, although some fourteenth-century jurists, such as Bartolus of Sassoferrato and principally Baldus de Ubaldis, made extensive use of notions that can be traced back to the Politics,126 Roman law was still their main source. regimine principum” de Gilles de Rome: parcours matériel, culturel et intellectuel d’un discours sur l’éducation (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 31-193. 123 The Policraticus was indisputably the main source for many specula principum, whether directly or through works such as those of John of Wales. Regarding its influence, see Frédérique Lachaud, “Filiation and Context. The Medieval Afterlife of the Policraticus”, in C. Grellard–F. Lachaud (eds.), A Companion to John of Salisbury (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 377-438 and the bibliography quoted there. 124  The content underwent some adjustments during this time and was not the same in all the universities; further, the texts mentioned in the text did not have the same importance in teaching. For the curriculum of the Bologna Faculty of Canon Law, see Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), 2 vols., I.209; for Oxford, see Leonard E. Boyle, “The Curriculum of the Faculty of Canon Law at Oxford in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century”, in Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 135-162; for Cambridge, see James A. Brundage, “The Canon Law Curriculum in Medieval Cambridge”, in J.A. Bush–A. Wijffels (eds.), Learning the Law. Teaching and the Transmission of English Law, 1150-1900 (London–New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006, 2nd edition), pp. 175-190; for Paris (whose first statutes date from 1370), see Marcel Fournier–Léon Dorez, La faculté de décret de l’Université de Paris au XVe siècle (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1895-1942), 4 vols., I.20-22 (no. 25); for Padua, see Annalisa Belloni, “L’insegnamento giuridico nelle università italiane”, in L. Gargan–O. Limone (eds.), Luoghi e metodi di insegnamento nell’Italia medioevale (secoli XII-XIV). Atti del convegno internazionale di studi, Lecce–Otranto 6-8 ottobre 1986 (Galatina: Congedo Editore, 1989), pp. 141-152. For a broader picture, see James A. Brundage, “The Teaching and Study of Canon Law in the Law Schools”, in W. Hartmann–K. Pennington (eds.), The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140-1234. From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2008), pp. 98-120. 125  Cf. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe, I.208. Some universities had only one faculty for the study of canon and civil law, this being the case of Paris, while some others, such as Cambridge and Oxford, possessed later two distinct faculties. The study of the two laws was thus somewhat interconnected. In addition to the studies mentioned in the previous note, see (for Bologna) Domenico Maffei, “Un trattato di Bonaccorso degli Elisei e i più antichi statuti dello Studio di Bologna nel manoscritto 22 della Robbins Collection”, Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 5 (1975), pp. 73-101 (Maffei published the normes of 1252 in pp. 94-101); Heinrich Denifle, “Die Statuten der Juristen-Universität Bologna vom Jahre 1317-1347, und deren Verhältnis zu jenen Paduas, Perugias, Florenz”, Archiv für die Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 3 (1887), pp. 196-397. For a general overview, see Helmut Coing, “Die juristische Fakultät und ihr Lehrprogramm”, in Id. (ed.), Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur der neueren europäischen Privatrechtgeschichte. Band 1: Mittelalter (1100-1500). Die gelehrten Rechte und die Gesetzgebung (München: Beck, 1973), pp. 39-128. 126  The most striking examples of the use of doctrines taken from the Politics are found in Diego Quaglioni, Politica e diritto nel Trecento italiano. Il “De tyranno” di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314-1357). Con l’edizione critica dei trattati “De Guelphis et Gebellinis”, “De regimine civitatis” e “De tyranno”

Introduction

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What is important to underline here is that context matters. An author who would have received his education at the faculty of law and whose aim was, for instance, to take part in the debate over the supremacy of the Council over the Pope would not draw predominantly on the Politics. By contrast, for a master of arts, the introduction of the Politics meant having for the first time a text in his hands that offered structured views on society and political power. Finally, a theologian probably had a good command of the Politics, as he had previously been an arts student. For such a person, however, it was just one source among others, such as Augustin, canon law and the whole corpus Aristotelicum. Moreover, theologians did not stick to one single interpretation of the Politics; in fact, different theologians used the Politics in different ways, and they were not necessarily bound to Aristotle’s positions.127 Two conclusions can be drawn from the previous paragraphs: first, the appearance of the Politics did not cancel the previous traditions and sources. The Politics came to fill a void in the Arts curriculum, where, prior to its translation, there was no official text designated to the teaching of political matters. It is also very likely that its impact was felt in other contexts as well, as the cases of Bartolus and Baldus show, not to mention the De regimine principum of Giles of Rome. Yet, many other medieval works continued to derive notions from other sources, irrespective of the theories found in the Politics. Second, the use of specific ideas taken from the Politics by any given author does not mean that this author is an unqualified Aristotelian or even an Aristotelian at all. Given the structure of the work itself, the Politics could be used to support different or even opposing positions. For instance, it was used to legitimise the superiority of monarchy over all other regimes, as well as to support the so-called ‘republican’ regime,128 and chapter 11 of Book III was used to maintain that the multitude might have a deliberative role in political life (Marsilius of Padua) but also its opposite (Firenze: Olschki, 1983) and Joseph Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 127  This is perfectly illustrated in Matthew Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 128  Within the commentary tradition, Peter of Auvergne sustained that monarchy was the best regime, while Peter of Osma–Ferdinand of Roa, drawing on Peter, favoured the ‘republican’ regime; cf. Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 295-305. Outside the commentary tradition, such a disagreement can be demonstrated by two Italian fifteenth-century texts, the De republica of the Venetian Lauro Quirini and the De comparatione rei publicae et regni of the Florentine Aurelio Lippo Brandolini. The former is a very short treatise which draws on the Politics to sustain republicanism and the regime based on the middle class; the latter makes use of the arguments advanced in the Politics and principally in Peter’s Scriptum and in Aquinas’ De regno to argue for monar­chy, namely that monarchy resembles the structure of the universe and the animal body, because like them, it has one single principle (this dependence is not acknowledged in the edition). See “Il De republica di Lauro Quirini”, ed. Carlo Seno–Giorgio Ravegnani, in V. Branca (ed.), Lauro Quirini umanista (Firenze: Olschki, 1977), pp. 105-161; Aurelio Lippo Brandolini, Republics and Kingdoms Compared, ed. and transl. James Hankins (Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 2009), especially pp. 240-244.

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(Peter of Auvergne).129 Even a notion such as democracy—for Aristotle, an unjust form of government—could be understood either as the regime of the mob (Conrad of Megenberg and Alfonso de Cartagena) or regarded in positive terms (Engelbert of Admont and Tostado).130 Moreover, some of the ideas of the Politics could be appropriated and used detached from their original context and within a theological framework. As Francis Oakley noted, James of Viterbo—while accepting the Aristotelian view that (secular) political power is founded on man’s natural inclination towards sociability—argued that such power had to be subordinated to a higher spiritual power, namely that of the Pope.131 A further example of this use is found in the context of Conciliarism: John of Segovia used the Politics to maintain that the Church was ruled as an aristocracy, while Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo argued for papal monarchical supremacy, drawing, among other sources, on the Politics.132 The Politics could thus be seen as a mere source, but also as a point of departure, a framework or a language that supplied concepts. As some scholars have maintained in the past decades, we can thus describe the ‘place’ of the Politics and what we might call ‘political Aristotelianism’ in medieval political thought as one ‘political language’ among others. The idea that multiple ‘political languages’ existed concurrently in medieval and early modern political thought has been discussed since John G.A. Pocock. Following Pocock, we can define a ‘political language’ as a system of discourse, possibly based on an authoritative source, used by a “specific community” (such as a “professional corporation”) to discuss “particular themes and problems” and that can be employed—appropriated—for different purposes and even to support contrasting stances.133 Such a definition is particularly fitting regarding the Politics and its commentary tradition, not least because Pocock also referred, by way of example, to “accredited professional exegetes” who employ a language based on “sacred or authoritative books”,134 which we can see as equivalent to the masters of arts dedicated to comment on the Politics. More importantly, the concept of ‘political languages’ permits us to circumscribe the impact of the Poli129  See Marco Toste, “The Parts and the Whole, the Few Wise Men and the Multitude. Consent and Collective Decision Making in Two Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Politics”, Storia del Pensiero Politico 9 (2020), pp. 209-231. 130  See Id., “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 309-337. 131  See Oakley, “Celestial Hierarchies Revisited”. But see also Fioravanti, “La Politica aristotelica nel Medioevo”, pp. 25-28, who also mentions the cases of Giles of Rome and Guido Vernani. 132  See Antony Black, Monarchy and Community. Political Ideas in the Later Conciliar Controversy 1430-1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). 133  These expressions are taken from John G.A. Pocock, “The Concept of a Language and the Métier d’historien: Some Considerations on Practice”, in A. Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge et aliae: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 19-38, especially pp. 23-25 [reprinted in Id., Political Thought and History. Essays on Theory and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 87-105]. See also the introduction of Anthony Pagden to the same volume, especially pp. 1-3 and Melvin Richter, “Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe”, History and Theory 29 (1990), pp. 38-70. 134  Pocock, “The Concept of a Language”, pp. 24-25.

Introduction

37

tics—providing a tool to put the reception of the Politics into perspective—without engaging in an exhaustive discussion about the ways in which it influenced medieval political thought. The idea of ‘political languages’ is not without its problems since these ‘languages’ were not separate islands and established once and for all as transcendental paradigms governing the conditions of every act within the same paradigm. It would have been possible for one author to draw on more than one of these ‘languages’ in the same work—the aforementioned cases of Bartolus and Baldus being quite illustrative instances thereof. In fact, we can point to the case of two canonists who made extensive use of Aristotelian ideas, namely John of Legnano and Johannes Andreas.135 In this regard, Peter of Auvergne is a striking example: as already noted, he produced two commentaries on the Politics in which he clings to Aristotelian philosophy, but in his Quodlibeta, where he deals with questions not related to the Politics, such as taxation, pro patria mori, the notion of iurisdictio and the Pope’s resignation, he makes use of concepts that are in no way Aristotelian.136 As these cases suggest, one of the factors that produced the existence of different ‘languages’ was the division of the medieval university into faculties. Such division involved specialisation and thus specificity of sources (see above), methods and problems addressed. This has led Jürgen Miethke to use the notion of “Leitwissenschaft” (leading science) instead of ‘political language’.137 The ‘leading sciences’ correspond to the arts faculty, the faculty of canon law and the faculty of civil law. If we look more closely at the different ‘political languages’ available in the Middle Ages, Miethke’s suggestion might prove illuminating. Regarding the question as to which exact ‘languages’ can be identified in medieval political thought—a question Pocock did not seem to find particularly crucial—no unanimity is found in the historiography. It is true, however, that no such debate has been carried out. Pocock mentioned “the language of medieval scholastic, of Renaissance emblematic, of biblical exegesis, of common law, of civil law, of classical republicanism, of commonwealth radicalism”.138 By contrast, Anthony Pagden listed “the language of the law of nature and what has come to be called political Aris­ totelianism; the language of classical republicanism; the language of political econ-

135  See Helmut G. Walther, “Canonica sapiencia und civilis sciencia. Die Nutzung des aristotelischen Wissenschaftsbegriff durch den Kanonisten Johannes von Legnano (1320-1383) im Kampf der Disziplinen”, in I. Craemer-Ruegenberg–A. Speer (eds.), “Scientia” und “Ars” im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter (Berlin–New York: De Gruyter, 1994), 2 vols., II.863-876. 136  For an overview of Peter’s quodlibeta related to political matters, see Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. clxxxi-clxxxvii. 137  Jürgen Miethke, “Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert. Zur Einführung”, in Id. (ed.), A. Bühler (assist. ed.), Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), pp. 1-23, at 13-18; Id., “De potestate papae”. Die päpstliche Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis Wilhelm von Ockham (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), pp. 7-24. 138  Pocock, “The Concept of a Language”, p. 23.

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Interpretative Study

omy; and the language of the science of politics”.139 A few years later, Antony Black proposed another list—this one focusing solely on medieval political thought. Black distinguished the theological, the native (or local, since it stems from the customs and juridical orders of the different regions of Europe), the juridical, the Ciceronian and the Aristotelian language (based on the Politics as well as on the Ethics).140 Unlike Pocock and Pagden, Black attempted to identify the specific features of each language. For our purposes, it is worth noticing that Black considered that the Aristotelian language “provided new conceptual tools for the moral evaluation of many different forms of government: kingship, oligarchy, democracy and so on”,141 and that medieval authors “were using Aristotelianism as a language and not as a doctrine”,142 a language that provided medieval readers with “a new panoply of conceptual tools”.143 A similar idea had already been expressed by Conor Martin, for whom the Politics—thanks to “its richness in ideas”—became “a source of ammunition for supporters of a variety of theories about the relation of church and state”.144 If we turn again to Miethke, it is clear that his suggestion of ‘leading sciences’ is more limited than ‘political languages’. However, his view has a great advantage, one that is neglected in Pagden’s and Black’s. By speaking of arts faculty and not of Politics, Miethke’s view points to one important factor, one that will be underlined throughout this study: the Politics was first read by men trained in the corpus Aristotelicum and this aspect tremendously influenced the way in which they interpreted the Politics. It is no coincidence that the De potestate papae works display more citations from the Metaphysics and Physics than from the Politics. That ‘Political Aristotelianism’ was principally a philosophical language, of which the Politics was a part, can never be downplayed, if we want to employ the notion of ‘Aristotelian language’ in the context of medieval politics. The study of the impact of the Politics has been carried out mainly in two separate ways in the course of the past few decades: on the one hand, scholars have attempted 139 

Pagden, “Introduction”, p. 3. Anthony Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250–1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 7-11. For an assessment of Black’s proposal, see Diego Quaglioni, “Il tardo Medioevo: confusione o pluralità dei linguaggi politici?”, Il Pensiero Politico. Rivista di Storia delle Idee Politiche e Sociali 26 (1993), pp. 79-84; Lambertini, “La diffusione della Politica”, pp. 683-685. Lambertini insists that we should not regard these languages or paradigms—a term he also uses—as rigid labels; for instance, Ciceronian terms can be found in Aristotelian discourses. Moreover, Lambertini adds to the five languages proposed by Black the ‘language of poverty’, which is related to Franciscan thought. In another article, Lambertini suggests that we see these ‘languages’ as ‘open paradigms’; cf. Id., “Il re e il filosofo: aspetti della riflessione politica”, in L. Bianchi (ed.), La filosofia nelle università, secoli XIII–XIV (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1997), pp. 345-385, at 347. 141 Black, Political Thought, p. 9. 142  Ibid., p. 10. 143 Ibid. 144  Martin, “Some Medieval Commentaries”, p. 43. Gianfranco Fioravanti calls the Politics a sort of “a reservoir of arguments”, which made it possible to construct lines of reasoning in favour of opposing positions; cf. Fioravanti, “La Politica aristotelica”, p. 24. 140 

Introduction

39

to show that the impact was limited—a consequence of the rebuttal of Ullmann’s thesis that the Politics represented a turning-point in medieval political thought145— and, on the other, part of the research focussed on the commentaries on the Politics and how they understood—occasionally even transformed—Aristotle’s doctrines. These two lines of analysis have seldom been combined; the studies focusing on the impact of the Politics in medieval political thought have downplayed or even ignored the role of the commentaries. Only a handful of studies have brought the commentaries closer to other political texts and have investigated their possible impact on authors outside the commentary tradition, including whether these authors endorsed or rejected the positions advanced by the commentators.146 The studies on the role of the commentaries are crucial because they tell us that medieval authors did not necessarily read the Politics directly or in isolation; they probably read it conjointly with a commentary and were able to adapt it to their own agendas. The most significant text in this regard is Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum. While this text is based on the Ethics and the Politics in such a way as to resemble a commentary on these two works, it draws on the commentaries of Albert and Aquinas on the Politics.147 Moreover, Book IV of Ptolemy of Lucca’s continuation of Aquinas’ De regno can be regarded as a commentary on Book II of the Politics which is, nevertheless, based on Aquinas’ own commentary.148 Significantly, these two authors rely on Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics; nonetheless, both Giles and Ptolemy appropriate some of Aristotle’s notions for their own purposes and, at times, go far beyond the text of the Politics. What is more, they do not subscribe to all of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ ideas.149 When necessary, these two authors bear 145  This is clear in Oakley, “Celestial Hierarchies Revisited”, and in Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits. For a study that displays no interest in Ullmann’s scholarship and focuses only on the impact of the Politics in specific political works, see Jürgen Miethke, “Spätmittelalter: Thomas von Aquin, Aegidius Romanus, Marsilius von Padua”, in C. Horn–A. Neschke-Hentschke (eds.), Politischer Aristotelismus. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen “Politik” von der Antike bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart–Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2008), pp. 77-111 [republished in Id., Politische Scholastik – Spätmittelalterliche Theorien der Politik: Probleme, Traditionen, Positionen – Gesammelte Studien (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2021), pp. 141-174]. 146  Exceptions are Roberto Lambertini, “Wilhelm von Ockham als Leser der Politica. Zur Rezeption der politischen Theorie des Aristoteles in der Ekklesiologie Ockhams”, in J. Miethke–A. Bühler (eds.), Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert (München: Oldenbourg, 1992), pp. 207-224 [Italian version: “Ockham lettore della Politica: a proposito dell’utilizzo di Aristotele nella sua ecclesiologia”, in Id., La povertà pensata. Evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham (Modena: Mucchi Editore, 2000), pp. 269-288]; Id., “Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome and Aristotle’s Politica”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 51-69, and the studies on Peter’s influence on Marsilius mentioned in Chapter 6, below. 147  See Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes”; Id., “Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome”. 148  See Maria Cristina Laurenti, “Tommaso e Tolomeo da Lucca commentatori di Aristotele”, Sandalion: Quaderni di Cultura Classica, Cristiana e Medievale 8-9 (1985-1986), pp. 343-371. 149  For Giles, see Lidia Lanza, “La Politica di Aristotele e il De regimine principum di Egidio Romano”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat…”, pp. 233-292 [the article was first published in:

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out that medieval authors integrated the Politics in dynamic and creative ways, and that Aristotelianism does not have to be seen as a homogeneous and self-contained unit.150 It is indeed noteworthy that two of the most widespread political texts of the Middle Ages rely on commentaries on the Politics.151 If we regard Aristotelianism as a ‘political language’, then we have to assume that the commentaries helped in great measure to shape that language. The commen­ taries were not a minor literary genre whose readership was rather limited; they were as widespread as many other texts that have received far more attention by historians. For the sake of comparison, Peter of Auvergne’s Scriptum is transmitted in more than twenty manuscripts; Albert’s and Walter Burley’s commentaries on the Politics in thirteen and thirty-six, respectively; the Questiones of Nicholas of Vaudémont on the Politics are conserved in seven manuscripts. By contrast, James of Viterbo’s De regimine christiano is contained in thirteen, Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis in nearly forty, Ockham’s Octo quaestiones in fifteen and William Durand the Younger’s Tractatus de modo generalis concilii celebrandi in ten manuscripts.152 The impact of a work or genre is not measurable solely in terms of the number of surviving manuscripts;153 nevertheless, this factor helps us to see the commentary tradition in a different light. Moreover, while the greater part of the manuscripts containing De potestate papae works are dated from later centuries—mainly the fifteenth century—which can be explained by the fact that they were used afterwards as sources in the context of Conciliarism, the Politics commentaries were immediately copied.154 Even the text of the Politics itself was promptly diffused, and almost half of the extant manuscripts of William of Moerbeke’s complete translation were copied until the early fourteenth century (forty-nine out of one hundred eight).155 Medioevo e Rinascimento 15 (2001), pp. 19-75]. There, Lanza shows how Giles rejects the Aristotelian idea that politics is a specific and autonomous scientific field. For Ptolemy, see James M. Blythe, The Worldview and Thought of Tolomeo Fiadoni (Ptolemy of Lucca) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009). 150  While these authors draw on Aristotle and take him as their starting point, they also elaborate on new concepts entirely foreign to him. For precisely this reason, Gianluca Briguglia has stated that these authors worked in a “post-Aristotelian world”; cf. Gianluca Briguglia, Il pensiero politico medievale (Torino: Einaudi, 2018), p. 96. 151 The De regimine is transmitted in approximately three hundred and fifty manuscripts and the continuation of the De regno in more than thirty manuscripts. For the numbers of the De regimine, see Briggs, Giles of Rome, p. 20; for the De regno, see Thomas de Aquino, De regno ad regem Cypri, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita XLIII (Roma: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979), pp. 425-431. 152  The numbers of the Politics commentaries are taken from Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.2, 13, 39, 42. The numbers of the other works are available in Miethke, “De potestate papae”, pp. 312-314. 153  Though regarding classical texts, see the reflections of Jean Stengers about the potential importance of texts handed down in one single manuscript: Jean Stengers, “Réflexions sur le manuscrit unique, ou un aspect du hasard en histoire”, Scriptorium 40 (1986), pp. 54-80. 154  See the case of the Scriptum, which was copied in Cambridge while Peter of Auvergne was still alive; cf. Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 257-258. 155  See Biller, The Measure of Multitude, pp. 302-303. Biller has counted the manuscripts described in the catalogue of Aristoteles Latinus. See also ibid., pp. 303-311, where Biller attempts to depict the dissemination of the Politics in the Middle Ages in different places and contexts.

Introduction

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But beyond the fact that the commentaries were widely read, as the number of their manuscripts suggests, it is important to underline that they contributed original thoughts and ideas to medieval political thought. They transformed concepts found in the Politics and hence shaped the reception of this text. Scholarship has, in fact, already shown that the commentaries changed some doctrines of the Politics, or in some cases delved into some minor issues, bringing them to the forefront. In this way, the commentaries triggered a debate that went far beyond Aristotle’s text and that was more closely connected to their own concerns. One such case is Peter of Auvergne’s famous distinction between a beastlike and a well-ordered multitude, merely suggested by III.4, 1281b18-20; a distinction that Peter employed to dismiss the idea that the plebs, without the guidance of a few wise men, might participate in political life.156 Such a distinction is so important that is still found in the seventeenth-century commentaries on the Politics. This case clearly illustrates that the commentators interpreted the Politics with their own reality in mind: Albert mentions Lombardy as an example of popular rule,157 the Anonymous of Milan equates the right to approve the bishop’s election with the consent given to political rulers,158 Oresme mentions the general assembly of the University of Paris as an example of assembly in which binding deliberations are made,159 Burley refers to the English parliament in his explanation of Book III160 and Giles of Orleans (in his Ethics commentary) and Oresme criticise the jurists, a stance completely foreign to Aristotle.161 The historical context is also apparent in the effort the commentators made to offer arguments founded on metaphysics and natural philosophy in favour of monarchy as the best regime and principally for hereditary over elective 156 

below.

On this distinction, see section 2.6 of Chapter 1 and p. 279, together with note 156 of Chapter 5,

157  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, p. 181 (II.9); 345 (IV.4: Genoa is mentioned as being part of Lombardy); 590 (VI.4). 158  Cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, p. 289. 159  Cf. Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques”, p. 274. 160  S. Harry Thomson, “Walter Burley’s Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle”, in Mélanges Auguste Pelzer. Études d’histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la Scolastique médiévale offertes à Monseigneur Pelzer à l’occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1947), pp. 557-578; Cary J. Nederman, “Kings, Peers and Parliament: Virtue and Corulership in Walter Burley’s Commentarius in VIII libros Politicorum Aristotelis”, Albion 24 (1992), pp. 391-407 [reprinted in Id., Political Aristotelianism and its Limits, item 14]. See also Lambertini, “Burley’s Commentary”, p. 351, where, in opposition to Nederman, Burley’s reference to the parliament is not considered to contrast with the previous commentaries on the Politics. 161  For Giles, see Ferdinand Edward Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory. A Study of the Reception of the “Politics” (Cambridge, MA: PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1938), p. 339. For Oresme, see Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques”, pp. 243-244. The literature on the disputes between theologians and canonists and between philosophers and jurists is vast. For a study on this topic and related to the reception of the Politics, see Gianfranco Fioravanti, “Philosophi contro legistae: un momento dell’autoaffermazione della filosofia nel Medioevo”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 421-427.

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monarchy.162 Further instances of the changes introduced by the commentators, arguably on account of their historical background, are their emphasis on the need for far-reaching commerce, against Aristotle’s idea that commerce should merely serve the self-sufficiency of the polis; their admission that currency exchange is unavoidable;163 their stress on the obedience of the citizens, along with downplaying the system of rotation of public offices, which is crucial in the Politics; and their attempt to define citizenship in terms of virtue.164 Finally, some notions, such as the naturalness of human association and natural slavery underwent a significant transformation. Here, the commentators—Peter above all—explained the existence of servitude by nature, families of noble stock and even men who are unable to live in society by stating that men’s social differences stem from their bodily constitution, which is liable to suffer astrological and climatic influences. In that, the commentators legitimised their own contemporary social stratification.165 But even if we were to admit that the commentaries were limited to just the repetition of what is already written in the Politics (which is simply not the case), then the commentaries would have played an important role in the transmission of new ideas. For instance, unlike what happens in works written before the translation of the Politics, in the commentaries tyranny is no longer a divine punishment but simply one unjust regime among others—this is evident in the final questions of Book V of the Questiones. Furthermore, the causes of upheavals and the strategies to preserve the distinct political regimes are treated as social and political facts. This is not to restate that the Politics triggered the beginning of a secular conception of politics; instead, this instance merely serves to point out that the commentators dealt with the unjust forms of government from a ‘political science’ perspective, admitting that each regime has its own specific justice.166 In doing so, they distanced themselves from the tradition of John of Salisbury and also from the approach of juridical authors, who concentrated more on the issues of the validity of laws enacted by the tyrant and on the obedience due to him (and its limits).167 162 

See p. 282 together with note 170 of Chapter 5, below. Cf. Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools; Lanza, “Ars acquirendi pecunias”. 164  Unlike Aristotle, the commentators engaged in a discussion to establish what the virtue of the good citizen is, since it cannot be a moral virtue. See Marco Toste, “Virtue and the City: The Virtues of the Ruler and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of the Politics”, in I.P. Bejczy–C.J. Nederman (eds.), Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 75-98. 165  On Peter’s treatment of slavery, see the studies mentioned in note 77 of Chapter 5, below. On his concept of nobility, see the studies cited in note 117, above. 166  Cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 298-309. 167  For the treatment of tyranny prior to and after the translation of the Politics, see Lidia Lanza, “Luciferianae pravitatis imago. Il tiranno tra alto e basso Medioevo”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat…”, pp. 139-180. On how juridical authors dealt with tyranny, see Quaglioni, Politica e diritto, pp. 39-55 and Mario Sbriccoli, “Crimen laesae maiestatis”. Il problema del reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna (Giuffrè: Milano, 1974), especially pp. 117-148, where Sbriccoli shows how medieval authors highlighted the obedience owed to the ruler. 163 

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As Fioravanti has remarked, here lies one of the main features of the reception of the Politics: the broadening of the matter at hand.168 Unlike other political treatises that considered only monarchy and its opposite, tyranny, the commentaries also considered aristocracy, polity, oligarchy, democracy and the subspecies of each one of these regimes. As noted earlier, this is precisely the main element that Antony Black assigns to the ‘Aristotelian political language’. The contribution of the commentaries was not limited, however, to statements about the possibility of such regimes, whether they actually existed or to see how such regimes could theoretically fit into their own political reality. On the contrary, the commentators analysed the intrinsic social and political mechanisms of each regime. Their study of the central books of the Politics, that is, Books IV-VI, which are dedicated to unjust regimes (democracy, oligarchy and tyranny), drove them to underscore the advantages of stability in politics and, hence, the means to preserve each of the political regimes.169 This is also quite evident in Book V of the Questiones.170 What led Peter and the subsequent commentators to study those regimes more in depth was the fact that they assigned a scientific status to politics. In this sense, the commentators felt compelled to cover the whole range of political realities described in the Politics. It has been stressed that men like Roger Bacon and Giles of Rome, aware of the existence of an Aristotelian work called the Politics, expected—prior to its translation into Latin—this work to supply medieval readers with the principles of a deductive science of politics, thereby enabling the construction of a detailed legal system. For this reason, Fioravanti spoke of a ‘disappointment’ felt by medieval readers when they finally had the Politics in hand.171 Such a disappointment, however, had disappeared by the time Peter commented on the Politics. In fact, for Peter, politics is a science made through practical syllogisms that provide knowledge with universal validity. While the analysis of how Peter understood the ‘science of politics’ lies outside the scope of this introduction,172 I would like to stress the following: the reception of the Politics brought about a new conception of ‘political science’, a science completely different from that described in the works referred to as divisiones philosophiae devoted to the classification of the branches of science— significantly, these works appeared only a few decades before the Questiones.173 168 

See Fioravanti, “La Politica Aristotelica”, pp. 22-23. On this, see Lidia Lanza, “I commenti medievali alla Politica”, pp. 115-137. 170  See Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 336-348. 171  Fioravanti, “Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum”, pp. 209-220; Id, “La Politica aristotelica”, pp. 20-21. 172  See Chapter 5, below. I analyse in great detail Peter’s conception of political science in the monograph I am preparing. 173  Peter and previous authors, such as Roger Bacon, lived in different worlds as far as the contents of ‘political science’ are concerned. On this, see Roberto Lambertini, “Tota Familia Aristotelis: On Some Sources of Bacon’s Contribution to Medieval Political Discourse”, Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 28 (2021), pp. 125-147. 169 

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This means that ‘political Aristotelianism’ (however we might want to define it) cannot be understood in the same way, whether we apply this label to works written before or after the translation of the Politics. In this sense, and specifically regarding the conception of political science, the Politics (along with the initial chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics) represents a turning point in medieval political thought, precisely because the content of political science as well as its approach changed with the Politics and the Ethics.174 And the same holds for pivotal concepts such as prudence,175 happiness and justice: although the words remained the same, their meaning was completely altered with the reception of Aristotle’s practical philosophy.176 Within this process of change, the Questiones (along with the Scriptum) stands as a major work: suffice it to say that it was the first medieval work to raise questions about the ‘scientificity’ of the politics, to emphasise, in a text devoted to the study of politics, the role of prudence as a political—not a moral—virtue and to explain how the different forms of government may endure.

6. The Approach of This Study and Edition If we were to define the Questiones, we should include the following three aspects: the Questiones is (1) a commentary resulting from the teaching (2) Peter of Auvergne carried out at (3) the Arts Faculty of Paris. These three aspects determine the approach carried out throughout this introductory study and the critical edition: 1) The Questiones is above all a commentary, and a commentary must be understood with reference both to the text commented on and with reference to the commentary tradition of which it is a part. Both the critical edition of the Questiones and the introduction to it take into account the commentaries produced prior to 174  This means that I disagree with Cary Nederman’s approach to the definition of political Aris­ totelianism and his claim that ‘political science’ was already acknowledged prior to the translation of the Politics into Latin. It should be observed that while the appearance of the expression scientia politica is not due to William of Moerbeke’s translation, the content of what scientia politica is considerably changed as a result of that translation. See Cary J. Nederman, “Aristotelianism and the Origins of Political Science in the Twelfth Century”, Journal of the History of Ideas 52 (1991), pp. 179194 [reprinted in Id., Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits, item 11]. See the sections on Book I and Book IV in Chapter 5, below. 175  This is clearly evidenced in Roberto Lambertini, “Tra etica e politica: la prudentia del prin­ cipe nel De regimine di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 3 (1992), pp. 77-144. As Lambertini demonstrated, Giles still wavers between an Aristotelian concept of prudence and another more ‘traditional’, in which prudence was conceived of as a moral virtue and as being closer to the idea of sapientia. Peter is distant from Giles in this regard since he only draws on Aristotle and Aquinas’ Summa theologiae to advance the notion of ‘political prudence’ (which, for Peter, is an intellectual, not a moral, virtue). 176  Needless to say, this is not to imply that there was unanimity in medieval philosophy regarding these concepts, or that some authors could not employ the concepts as understood prior to Aristotle’s reception. It simply means that the reception of Aristotle completely changed the framework and the terms of the discussion. For the sake of illustration, we can point to Duns Scotus’ conception of prudence: although it is not the same as that of Aristotle, it would never been advanced without the reading of the Ethics.

Introduction

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and after the Questiones: the commentaries of Albert and Aquinas are thus taken as the starting point for the study of the Questiones, thereby integrating it into the commentary tradition, and permitting us to assess Peter’s dependence or autonomy with regard to the two previous commentators. My analysis also includes other commentaries, chiefly in question form, which were produced not long after the Questiones: those known as the Vatican Anonymous,177 the Anonymous of Baltimore178 and the Anonymous of Milan.179 These commentaries, however, are shorter than the Questiones: the Vatican Anonymous covers only Book I of the Politics (and not all of it); the Anonymous of Baltimore stops at the beginning of Book III (the last question is on III.6, 1278b32-37) and the Anonymous of Milan ends at Book VII, chapter 2. My use of these commentaries is naturally limited to those books in which I can draw a comparison between the Questiones and these anonymous commentaries. I also sometimes take into consideration the later commentaries by Nicholas of Vaudémont and Vincent Gruner as well as the commentary published under the name of John Versor. Nicholas’ commentary draws on the Questiones on numerous occasions.180 Gruner reproduces parts of the Questiones verbatim and 177  This commentary is extant only in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1030, ff. 14ra-19rb. It is likely that it was produced around the same time as the Anony­mous of Milan and partially covers Book I. For its tabula quaestionum, see Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.119-121; questions 8-11 are edited in ibid., I.256-261. Question 6 is critically edited in Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 174-176. 178  This commentary is preserved in the manuscript Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, ff. 1ra-4rb. The commentary covers up to Book III, chapter 6 of the Politics and is likely contemporary to the commentaries cited in the previous notes. As it survives in a manuscript in which all the other texts are authored by Radulphus Brito, some scholars have tentatively attributed the commentary on the Politics to Brito too; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.100; Iacopo Costa, Le “questiones” di Radulfo Brito sull’“Etica Nicomachea”. Introduzione e testo critico (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. 102, n. 12. A critical edition of q. 5 of Book I is found in Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 177-181. 179  This commentary survives in one single manuscript: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A. 100. inf., ff. 1ra-54vb. The text covers Books I-VII (the last book is not complete), and it was composed after 1295, since it refers to the Latin translation of the Economics. On this commentary, see Achille Zoerle, “Il prologo di un commento anonimo alla Politica di Aristotele”, Rivista di storia della filosofia 42 (1987), pp. 499-517 (the tabula quaestionum is supplied on pp. 502-508 and the prologue is edited on pp. 508-517) and Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.115-116. The list of questions is found in ibid., II.112-119 and seven questions from Book I (namely, qq. 5, 7-10 and 22-23) are transcribed in ibid., I.228-255. Question 6 of Book I is critically edited in Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 181-186; q. 14 of Book III is edited in Id., “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 340-345. 180  See Chapter 6, below. This work is published in Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis (Paris: Jean Petit, 1513; reprint: Frankfurt am Main, 1969). Doubts regarding Buridan’s authorship were first substantially raised in Bernd Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters (Berlin: PhD dissertation, Freie Universität, 1985), 2 vols., II.888-896, and in Ubaldo Staico, Giovanni Buridano e le “Quaestiones” sulla “Politica” di Aristotele (Firenze, 1990). Later, Flüeler assigned the authorship to Nicholas of Vaudémont, a Master of Arts at Paris (cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.150-155). For a more recent attempt to date the commentary and for new elements on Nicholas’ biography, see William J. Courtenay, “A Note on Nicolaus Girardi de Waudemont Pseudo-Johannes Buridanus”, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 46 (2004), pp. 163-168. Courtenay has shown that the

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considers it authoritative, although he attributes its authorship to Giles of Rome (‘Egidius’ in the text).181 Versor (?) does not seem to draw directly on the Questiones; this author nevertheless reproduces, among other texts, Nicholas of Vaudémont’s questions and continues to make use of notions originated in the Questiones.182 Almost all of these commentaries, including those of Peter, Nicholas of Vaudémont, the Anony­mous of Baltimore and the Vatican Anonymous, were produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris.183 Possibly, the commentary of the Anonymous of Milan is also related to Paris, but this must remain an open question.184 The texts thus represent commentary was composed prior to 1379. The list of questions of this commentary, which covers the eight books, is found in Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.121-140. 181  Gruner was a professor at the University of Leipzig in the early fifteenth century. His commentary, which was produced before 1418, deals with the entire Politics and survives in two manuscripts: Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1039 8° (1283), ff. 86r-225r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, ff. 120ra-200rb. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.148-158 provides the list of questions. For the influence of Peter’s Questiones on this commentary, see ibid., I.108-114. 182  Versor’s authorship is far from certain; in all likelihood, the author of this commentary was not John Versor. The commentary was composed prior to 1457; five codices and two incunabula contain the commentary on the eight books; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.32. I have used the edition Questiones venerabilis domini magistri Iohannis Versoris super octo libros Politicorum Arestotelis (sic) (Coloniae: per Henricum Quentell, 1492). The list of questions is found in Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.159-168. This commentary lacks originality in a considerable number of questions: see note 77 of Chapter 4, below, for q. 1 of Book I, and Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 157-159, for q. 3 of Book I. In addition, it can be mentioned that Book I, qq. 2 and 7 are completely based on Nicholas of Vaudémont’s commentary, Book I, qq. 2 and 9, respectively; the doubt at the end of the solutio of Book I, q. 4 of Versor (?) is a reproduction of Book I, q. 6, art. 3 of Nicholas’ commentary. Book III, q. 1 of Versor (?), on universal monarchy, is a copy of Nicholas’ Book VIII, q. 5, which in turn is taken from Okcham’s Dialogus (see note 22 of Chapter 6, below), and part of the solutio of Book III, q. 2 is a slavish reproduction of Peter’s Scriptum, Book I, chaper 1. A section of q. 3 of Book IV, on divination, is a replication of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 95, art. 8. This list of borrowings is not exhaustive. Despite its lack of originality, the commentary published under Versor’s name was discussed, more than once, in the commentary by Pedro de Osma and Ferdinand of Roa, and was still quoted by the late sixteenth century, for instance, in John Case’s Sphaera civitatis. John Versor was a famous Parisian professor of the mid-fifteenth century whose Aristotelian commentaries were well known and influential. On this author, see Pepijn Rutten, “Secundum processum et mentem Versoris: John Versor and his Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered”, Vivarium 43 (2005), pp. 292-336 and the bibliography quoted there. 183  I assume that this last commentary was produced in Paris, since the codex was certainly copied in Paris while its owner was a student there; cf. Dorothea Walz, Die historischen und philosophischen Handschriften der Codices Palatini Latini in der Vatikanischen Bibliothek (Cod. Pal. Lat. 921-1078) (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1999), p. 177. 184  In a passage from q. 20 of Book I, the text reads as follows: “… uerbi gratia, si aliquis uelet, existens in Anglia, cambire dublicos Parisienses cum sterlingi, plus ualerent (cod.: ualerens) quam duplices Parisienses, ille qui plus reciperet de duplicibus quam de sterlingis secundum proportionem geometricam …” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 9rb). It could be claimed that the master who illustrated his idea with this example was either at Paris or in England. In favour of the former, there is the fact that the author uses the Questiones as its model and follows a plethora of Peter’s views—which were certainly well known at Paris, but not necessarily so in England—and seems to draw on Henry of Ghent in one question. However, in favour of the latter, speaks the fact that Peter’s Scriptum was already circulating in England while he was alive (see note 154, above) and, principally, the fact that the other text transmitted in this manuscript is the Ethics commentary of Richard Kilvington, which suggests that the two texts are to be ascribed to the Oxford milieu. Note that

Introduction

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a homogeneous set of commentaries and, on many occasions, can be considered together. As noted below in Chapter 7, these commentaries were helpful in establishing numerous passages of the text of the Questiones. 2) The Questiones is one text among others authored by Peter. Typically, in the study of medieval philosophy, and especially in the study of the Aristotelian commentaries, a single commentary by an author is usually discussed without taking his other commentaries into consideration. In Peter’s case, I examine two of his commentaries—one literal and one in question form—on the same Aristotelian work. I also compare the Questiones with other works by Peter, such as his commentaries on the Metaphysics, Physics, On the heavens, Movement of animals and his Quodlibeta. Such a procedure does not mean following the outdated approach which sought to explain an author’s stance in politics by means of his views on metaphysics.185 Instead, it recognises that Peter was an author who repeated some of his ideas in more than one work, without necessarily attempting to create a ‘philosophical system’. Here, it should be noted that he rarely refers to his other works in his texts.186 By comparing the Questiones with Peter’s other writings, I aim to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Peter is the author of the Questiones and provide further evidence that he is also the author of the set of questions on the Physics published under Siger of Brabant’s name by Philippe Delhaye in 1941.187 3) The Questiones is intrinsically related to the Arts Faculty of Paris. It is one of the numerous Aristotelian commentaries produced there in the last third of the thirteenth century. As we shall see in the following chapters, the main features of the Questiones—from its sources to its format—reveal how much it is shaped by its institutional setting. While the Questiones is a commentary, it is also a product of teaching—it bears indeed strong traces of orality. But this work is connected to the Arts Faculty even more so by its ideas; some of the views found in the Questiones were, in fact, shared by all or the greater part of the contemporary commentaries produced there. This holds true, for example, for the criteria chosen in determining whether politics possesses scientific status and whether it is a practical or theoretical science, for Peter’s elitism and scorn for the lower social groupings and for

some of the other manuscripts containing Kilvington’s commentary also contain works from Oxford authors, such as John of Rodington, Burley and Monachus Niger; cf. Monika Michałowska, Richard Kilvington’s “Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum” (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2016), pp. 19-26. 185  For instance, Ockham’s idea on subjective rights would be explained on account of his ‘nominalism’. For the rebuttal of such approach, see Charles Zuckerman, “The Relationship of Theories of Universals to Theories of Church Government in the Middle Ages: A Critique of Previous Views”, Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1975), pp. 579-594. 186 The Questiones is an exception in this regard, since there Peter apparently refers to his commentary on the Metaphysics. See Chapter 2, below. 187  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique” d’Aristote, ed. Philippe Delhaye (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1941).

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his discussion of whether it is preferable to lead a contemplative or practical life.188 The Questiones also owes a great deal to the milieu of the University of Paris in that Peter relies heavily on Aquinas’ Summa theologiae. Peter is not exceptional in this regard; his approach was common at the Arts Faculty, as demonstrated by the strong influence of the Summa on the contemporary commentaries on the Ethics, both in their ideas and in their tabulae quaestionum, which owe much to the arrangement of the Ia-IIae and of the IIa-IIae of the Summa. Perhaps, though, the trait of the Questiones connecting it intimately with the Arts Faculty of Paris is its doctrinal framework, since Peter tries to substantiate his views on philosophical grounds and by drawing principally on the corpus Aristotelicum, after all the basis of the Arts Faculty’s curriculum and teaching. The main aim of this study is to present the Questiones. A secondary aim is to provide a case-study that may help us understand how a philosophical commentary on an Aristotelian work was produced in the late thirteenth century. This explains the structure of this study. In the first three chapters to follow, I demonstrate that the Questiones results from Peter’s oral teaching carried out at the arts faculty and that he is, in this sense, its author, that the text transmitted in B is a copy of a reportatio, while the text of P is the copy of an editing of the text of the reportatio made sometime between 1291 and 1296. In Chapter 4, I give an account of the way in which Peter used his sources, also assessing the weight of each throughout the Questiones. In Chapter 5, I describe the structure and content of the Questiones; there, I also draw attention to the scholarship devoted to the Questiones. In the same chapter, I also explain the rationale behind the list of questions of the Questiones, for its tabula quaestionum is not merely an a priori that shapes Peter’s treatment of the Politics; on the contrary, it results from Peter’s decisions regarding what to highlight from the Politics as well as what to comment on, and what to leave aside. Finally, in the last chapter, I provide evidence regarding the impact of the Questiones, which will serve as a springboard for further research on this work.

188  For a comparison between the Questiones and contemporary Ethics commentaries in terms of the discussion of happiness, see Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 295-301. For a scholarly review of historiographical labels related to the subject of happiness—as understood by the masters of arts at Paris—and ‘intellectual aristocratism’, see also Gianfranco Fioravanti, “La felicità intellettuale: storiografia e precisazioni”, in M. Bettetini–F.D. Paparella (eds.), Le felicità nel Medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Milano, 12-13 settembre 2003 (Louvain-la-Neuve: F.I.D.E.M., 2005), pp. 1-12 and Luca Bianchi, “Felicità intellettuale, ascetismo e arabismo: nota sul De summo bono di Boezio di Dacia”, in the same volume on pp. 13-34.

Chapter 1

Authorship Apart from Odd Langholm,1 no scholar has ever raised doubts regarding Peter’s authorship of the Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum. On the other hand, no scholar has ever undertaken systematically to establish Peter’s authorship either.2 The fact that the manuscript P bears the name of Peter in the upper margin of the first folio of the Questiones has been accepted as evidence enough that Peter was indeed the author. Peter’s authorship of the Questiones, whether as the person who composed the text or as the master who gave the lectures from which the notes that eventually became the Questiones originated, can be demonstrated in two different ways: either by comparing some doctrinal positions advanced in the Questiones with similar stances found in other texts ascribed to Peter, principally commentaries on other Aristotelian works, or by comparing the Questiones with Peter’s literal commentary on the Politics, the Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum. In either case, this methodology presupposes both the centrality of the figure of the author and the coherence of an author’s output with reference to a time period, the Middle Ages, in which the notion of authorship and intellectual property were rather different from our current conception. It suffices, in fact, to recall the am­ bivalent attitude of scholastics towards plagiarism and ‘intellectual borrowing’.3 This is all the more apparent in philosophical and theological works, wherein authors often reproduced ideas, sentences and entire sections without acknowledging that they were doing so, let alone citing the sources. Even so, appropriation—explicit or not—is one thing, while authorship is quite another: the fact that one person practiced the former does not exclude the possibility of considering that person an author. It was common for medieval authors to draw heavily on another author or work, and they rearranged the material in their own way and for their own purposes. As we shall see, this holds for Peter of Auvergne. 1  See Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, p. 401. Langholm maintained that the attribution to Peter in the upper margin of P means that the commentary in question was made in accordance with the commentary tradition initiated by Peter. 2  The exception is Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.116-119, but his treatment is limited to the comparison of three passages in the Questiones with three parallel passages in the Scriptum. 3  On the question of plagiarism in medieval philosophical and theological writings and the ambivalence of medieval authors with regard to this practice, see Zenon Kaluza, “Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 312-320; Monica Brînzei Calma, “Plagium”, in I. Atucha–D. Calma–C. König-Pralong–I. Zavattero (eds.), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach (Porto: F.I.D.E.M., 2011), pp. 559-568.

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Against the background of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ body of work, Peter makes use of the corpus Aristotelicum and of Aquinas in a way that suits his own needs, sometimes in contexts completely different from those in which Aristotle or Aquinas had expressed their ideas. The fact that, in two or more of his works, Peter uses a specific thesis taken from Aristotle or Aquinas in a novel context may suggest that he is the author of those works. At the same time, it would be misguided to think less of Peter as an auctor, as a mere assembler of ideas taken from others. This, rather, simply means that he was a typical medieval author: he draws on auctoritates to build up works of his own. There are recurrent ideas and quotations used in similar contexts throughout his textual corpus. Chris Schabel has already called attention to the fact that Peter repeats himself in different places of his Quodlibeta.4 This repetition, however, extends to the entirety of Peter’s philosophical output and lays the groundwork for the approach used in the coming pages.5 Both the vocabulary and phrasing used in the Questiones are found in his other works.6 This does not presuppose, however, that Peter had his own manuscripts at the ready to be copied. Peter had a comprehensive knowledge of Aristotle’s works as well as of his own. It was this broad knowledge base that enabled him to use the same topic or ideas in two different works. 4 

Cf. Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, pp. 87-89. The same approach, i.e., comparing different works attributed to Peter in order to establish his authorship of a text, has been carried out by other scholars. This holds for the commentary on the Physics originally attributed to Siger of Brabant and now to Peter thanks to a detailed comparison of it with his other works (see notes 27, 28 and 30 of this chapter). Using the same approach, Bernando Bazán and Silvia Donati rejected Peter’s authorship of a commentary on the On the soul and a commentary on the On generation and corruption; cf. Bernardo Bazán, “Un commentaire anti-averroïste du traité de l’âme (Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16.170, f. 42-52)”, in M. Giele–F. Van Steenberghen–B. Bazán, Trois commentaires anonymes sur le “Traité de l’âme” d’Aristote (Louvain–Paris: Publications Universitaires–Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), pp. 349-517, especially 377-385; Silvia Donati, “An Anonymous Commentary on the De Generatione et Corruptione from the Years Before the Paris Condemnations of 1277 (Mss. Erlangen, UB, 213, Kassel, Stadtund Landesbibl., Phys. 2° 11)”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 65 (1998), pp. 194-247. 6  While many examples can be adduced, I trust that one example taken from the beginning of the Questiones and from the initial questions of his commentary on the Metaphysics will suffice. In both places Peter is dealing with the subject of the science he is studying: Questiones, Liber I, q. 1, ll. 26-34: “Dicendum ergo quod primum subiectum huius scientie est bonum agibile ab homine ciuile … quia uniuersaliter hoc est subiectum in scientia quod primo occurrit intellectui et sub ratione cuius omnia cognoscuntur, sicut in sensu primum obiectum sensus est quod primo occurrit sensui illi et sub cuius ratione omnia alia cognoscuntur, ut color respectu uisiue uirtutis, et sic de aliis sensibus respectu suorum obiectorum; modo subiectum rationem habet obiecti respectu scientie; ergo illud est primum subiectum quod primo , et cetera”; Arthur Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Petri de Alvernia”, in J.R. O’Donnell (ed.), Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts (Toronto: P.I.M.S., 1955), pp. 145-181, at p. 156: “Subjectum in scientia est sub cujus ratione considerantur omnia quae cadunt in scientia illa, et cujus ratio primo occurrit intellectui, et quod est notissimum intellectui, et ex cujus cognitione proceditur ad cognitionem aliorum in scientia” (I, q. 3); ibid.: “Subiectum se habet ad scientiam sicut obiectum ad habitum vel potentiam. Objectum autem alicujus potentiae est sub cujus ratione cadunt omnia alia quae movent potentiam illam, sicut objectum visus est illud sub cujus ratione videntur quae videntur a virtute visiva, puta si illud sit coloratum vel luminosum. Similiter visio, quae est actus per quem aliquis videt, determinatur per illud primum in cujus virtute movetur potentia visiva” (I, q. 1). 5 

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1. The Questiones and Peter’s Other Works Peter approaches the text of the Politics not as a political thinker but as a master of arts who has to comment on an Aristotelian text and whose education is rooted principally in knowledge of the corpus Aristotelicum—above all on logic, meta­ physics and natural philosophy. As we shall see in Chapter 5, these domains of philosophy pervade the Questiones to such an extent that Peter, in some questions, bases his conclusions on metaphysics and physics, and it is precisely in these questions in which physics and metaphysics are evoked that we find doctrinal and textual connections between the Questiones and Peter’s other works. In the following pages, I focus on some topics that Peter addressed in more than one work.

1.1. The Infinite One of the most striking examples of textual correspondence with Peter’s other works occurs in q. 25 of Book I of the Questiones. In this question, in order to establish whether man’s desire for an end can be unlimited or infinite, Peter engages in a definition of the infinite. He begins by arguing that the infinite is the privation of the finite, the finite being that which has a limit. In support of this, Peter quotes Book V of the Metaphysics: “we call a limit the last point of each thing, i.e., the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, and the first point within which every part is” (V.17, 1022a4-5). He then distinguishes conceptually between ‘the infinite according to quantity’ and ‘the infinite according to its reason or substance’. The former kind of infinite is also of two sorts: the infinite that is not limited in its quantity—and this cannot occur in nature, as all bodies must have a finite magnitude—and the infinite that always contains some potentiality (actus permixtus potentie), such as in the case of the line, which, because it may be continually divided into further fractions, is potentially infinitely divisible. As to the infinite according to its substance, Peter defines it as something that can be determined or limited neither a priori nor a posteriori. To illustrate this, Peter draws on the Liber De causis to provide an example: the immaterial substances (intelligentie) are infinite insofar as they do not consist of matter; they are, however, finite a parte ante, as they depend on a previous cause to which they owe their existence.7 Peter does not linger on this issue. Nevertheless, it is clear that, with regard to the infinite according to its substance, he distinguishes between an absolute infinite, which lacks a limit both a priori and a posteriori, and a relative infinite, which lacks a limit only a posteriori (for immaterial substances are not limited a posteriori, as they are not determined by matter). The issue of the infinite is debated in other Aristotelian works commented on by Peter. One such case occurs in his commentary in question form on the Metaphysics. 7 

Cf. Petrus, Questiones, I, q. 25, ll. 40-47.

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In q. 28 of Book II, whether the infinite may be understood by the human intellect,8 Peter addresses the definition of the infinite. There, we find the same argumentative steps as in the Questiones: the infinite is the privation of the finite; the notion of privation can only be known through the notion of finite, it being the finite that has a limit. Peter then puts forward the same quote from Book V of the Metaphysics found in the Questiones, though here with no explicit mention of the Metaphysics. Peter considers the limit (terminus) of a thing to be its form. The form can be said to be infinite—Peter calls it infinitum in forma—in two ways: infinite simpliciter or infinite secundum quid. Form that is infinite simpliciter is not determined by anything else and does not derive its causa essendi from any other being. Form that is infinite secundum quid, by contrast, is infinite because it is not determined by matter, as its form is not related to matter, but it is also not infinite in an absolute sense because it owes its existence to another being. Peter then goes on to distinguish between two kinds of infinite according to matter (infinitum secundum materiam): the infinite which is not limited (terminatus), which cannot exist in nature since no being can have an infinite extension, and the infinite which can be endlessly divided, as in the case of the line. Peter refers to this second kind of infinite as infinitum in actu permixto potentie. The parallelism between the distinctions made in the Questiones and those advanced in Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics is remarkable, even though the order in which they are presented in the Questiones is inverted in the Metaphysics commentary. The infinite in quantity, which is the first type of infinite in the Questiones, corresponds to the second type of infinite in Peter’s Metaphysics commentary, that is, the infinite according to matter (or, as he also says, the infinite in quantity). The infinite according to its substance or reason in the Questiones, which is the second type of infinite, is equivalent to the infinite in form (infinitum in forma) in Peter’s Metaphysics, where it is first defined. In addition to this, the subdivisions of these two sorts of infinite match in the two commentaries: it suffices to recall the infinite according to quantity (Questiones) or according to matter (Meta­physics commentary), which is divided into the infinite which is not limited in its quantity—and cannot exist in nature—and the infinite in actu permixto potentie. The line of reasoning is more concise in the Questiones. This is completely understandable given that the commentator is interpreting the Politics and not a text specifically dealing with metaphysical issues. Peter is not tackling the issue of the 8  Vtrum infinitum possit comprehendi ab intellectu nostro. I used the manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 117ra-224vb. For the tabula quaestionum of this manuscript, see Albert Zimmermann, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur “Metaphysik” und “Physik” des Aristoteles. Aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350 (Leiden–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1971), pp. 80-88, and for the tabula of Book X of Peter’s commentary, which is not transmitted by this manuscript, see Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, p. 440, n. 40. Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics had a complex manuscript diffusion; for an overview see ibid., pp. 430436, with indication of manuscripts and further bibliography. See also Berkers–Goris, “The Principle of Identity”, pp. 461-469, which provides both an overview of the current state of research and new insights.

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infinite in itself and whether it is comprehensible to the human mind; instead, he is only using a theory about the infinite to define more precisely his approach to the question of whether the desire for an end can be infinite. In any case, the wording and the divisions advanced in the two commentaries are very similar, as we can see in the following passages. The words or parts of words that are identical in the two texts have been italicised: Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber I, q. 25, ll. 25-47

Petrus, Questiones Metaphisicorum, Liber II, q. 289

Sed notandum quod infinitum dicitur quod est priuatio finiti; priuatio noscitur per habitum. Finitum autem est habens terminum infra quem sunt omnia rei et extra eum nichil, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice.

Intelligendum quod infinitum, cum sit priuatio finiti, et priuatio non cognoscitur nisi per suum habitum, infinitum cognosci habet per rationem finiti, finitum autem per rationem finis, quia finitum est quod est habens finem uel terminum. Et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquid possit cognosci de infinito, oportet precognoscere quid est terminus et quid finitum, et secundum quot modos dicitur utrumque. Terminus autem dicitur uniuscuiusque rei ultimum, extra quod nichil est primi et intra quod omnia primi, et ista ratio termini primo reperitur in magnitudine, postea in causa finali et substantia Et primo terminus inuenitur in quantitate et rei, que dicitur quid erat esse. Vnde et postea in substantia, unde et diffinitio dicitur rationem seu diffinitionem, que indicat quid est terminus rei. res, dicimus esse terminum, quia terminat rem. Constat autem quod quid erat esse, seu quod quid est, principaliter sumitur a forma, et ideo formam dicimus terminum rei cuius est … Et isti duo modi ad duos uadunt, quia ultimum Dicitur autem forma esse infinita dupliciter: potest dupliciter accipi: uel secundum quantiuel simpliciter uel secundum quid. Forma tatem uel secundum rationem et substantiam. uero infinita simpliciter dicitur que ad nullum Et ideo finitum et infinitum hiis duobus modis aliorum determinata est, nec per aliquid in quo dicuntur: aliquod enim est infinitum secundum recipitur tanquam in materia terminante ipquantitatem uel secundum substantiam. sam, nec per aliquid agens dans sibi esse, immo Si secundum quantitatem, hoc dicitur dupliciter: ipsa talis est quod ante eam non est accipere uel secundum actum primum termino quanaliam a qua dependet in suo esse uel fieri, sed titatis carens – et hoc est impossibile in rerum omnia dependent ab ipsa. Sic igitur infinitum natura, ut dicitur 3º Phisicorum –, uel secundum in forma simpliciter est quod non recipitur in actum permixtum potentie – et hoc est possialiquo determinante ipsum, nec aliud aliquid bile, sicut linea est diuisibilis in infinitum –. Et est sibi causa essendi. Infinitum autem in forma istis duobus modis desiderium infinitum non est, secundum quid est quod habet esse ab alio, quia isti modi infinite potentie sunt quantitates; non tamen receptum est in aliquo terminante desiderium autem quantitatem non habet. ipsum, et hoc modo substantie alie a prima sunt infinite non habentes formas, que nate sunt recipi in materia, per quam terminetur earum infinitas … 9  I used the manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 144rb-va, checked against Città del Va­ ticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1059, f. 8ra; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 845, f. 174va-b; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16158, f. 179va-b. In Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, p. 432 it is mistakenly asserted that Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics in Vat. lat. 845 begins on f. 136ra. In fact, it is on 156ra.

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Alio modo dicitur aliquid infinitum secundum substantiam et rationem, et tale est quod non determinatur secundum suam rationem, nec a priori nec a posteriori conterminari uel determinari contingit. Isto autem modo intelligentie sunt finite a parte ante, quia a priori dependent; sed a parte ante, quia non determinantur ab aliquo posteriori – uel forma uel accidens – ipsis, et hoc est quod dicitur in Libro De Causis. Materia autem et forma in inferioribus sunt, quare alterutrum et a priori et a posteriori , et etiam subiectum accidente.

Aliud est infinitum quod est infinitum secundum materiam,10 cuius infinitum est infinitum in quantitate, et istud duobus modis dicitur: uno modo dicitur quantum aliquod non terminatum, alio modo dicitur quod est in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem actum. Infinitum autem primo modo nec est nec esse potest in rerum natura, ut patet ex 3º Phisicorum et 1º Celi et Mundi, et ideo per se rationem entis non habet, sed negationis magis, quia uero rationem entis non habet per se; ideo intelligi non potest … Alio modo dicitur infinitum quod est in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem actum, et secundum hunc modum linea dicitur esse infinita secundum diuisionem. Tale autem infinitum possibile est esse in natura, et re­ peritur in continuis11 secundum diuisionem, in numeris uero secundum appositionem. Quod etiam distinguitur a Philosopho, 3º Phisicorum, sic, quod infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid sumere extra. Quantumcumque enim diuidatur aliqua linea secundum actum, semper contingit reperiri potentiam ad ulteriorem diuisionem. Et ideo linea secundum istum modum est infinita. Similiter etiam de appositione in numeris.

One cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the two texts draw on a common source. It exceeds the scope of this present study, however, to analyse all of Peter’s contemporary commentaries on the Metaphysics. Nevertheless, the line of reasoning on the infinite, including the distinctions between the different kinds of infinite, does not seem to be present in other commentaries. In the case of later commentaries on the Politics, all of which rely on the Questiones, two commentaries do not pose the question of whether the desire for the end may be infinite.12 The only commentary taking up this question—the one by the Anonymous of Milan—introduces distinctions regarding two sorts of infinite but without further subdivisions. Its phraseology is very different from that of the Questiones.13 10 natura

sed corr. in marg. sed del. et corr. in marg. 12  The commentaries that do not take up this question were written by the Anonymous of Baltimore and the Vatican Anonymous. The former commentary contains only the questions utrum diuicie naturales procedant in infinitum (Book I, q. 20) and utrum appetitus pecuniarum procedat in infinitum (q. 22), cf. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 2va. The latter commentary presents the questions utrum appetitus diuiciarum naturalium procedat in infinitum (q. 22) and utrum appetitus diuiciarum artificialium uel nomismatum sit infinitus (q. 24); cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.119-121. 13  Anonymus Mediolanensis, Questiones super I-VII Politicorum, I, q. 19: “… sic etiam infinitum dicitur dupliciter: uno modo quia eius essentia non est determinata ad aliquam (aliquem cod.) naturam, 11 continens

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As to other late thirteenth-century commentaries on the Metaphysics in which the question of whether the infinite can be known (whether by the human or by the divine intellect) is discussed, no other commentary seems to use his divisions and phrasing. None of the different versions of Siger of Brabant’s commentary contains such divisions. The only similarity between this commentary and the Questiones is a brief distinction of the infinite which can be understood either as sub privatione finis or as sub quantitate partis acceptae, though with no further explanation.14 The same holds for the commentaries by Henry of Brussels15 and the anonymous author who draws on Boethius of Dacia.16 Peter debates the infinite at greater length in his question commentary on Aris­ totle’s On the Heavens, in the version known as WP.17 In q. 18 of Book I, Peter addresses the infinite according to its substance. There, too, he quotes Book V of the Metaphysics in a manner very similar to what is seen in the Questiones.18 More importantly, just as in the Questiones, but in far clearer terms, Peter distinguishes between the infinite according to its substance—which is infinite simpliciter, as it is determined neither a priori nor a posteriori, being thus obviously identified with the prime substance, God—and the infinite which is so only secundum quid because, though not limited by matter, it is limited in that it owes its existence to another being. As he does in the Questiones, Peter identifies the infinite that is not absolute with immaterial substances. Furthermore, as in Peter’s questions on the Metaphysics, the infinite that is in no way determined is referred to as the infinite simpliciter, and the infinite that derives from another being is referred to as infinite secundum quid.19 Let us compare this doctrine in the three commentaries: Peter’s et tale est finis, quia non dependet ex alio in bonitate, ymo, alia sunt bona inquantum participant eius bonitatem. Infinitum autem secundo modo est quod non habet determinatam quantitatem, et tale non est ponere in actu, ut patet 3º Phisicorum et 1º Celi et mundi; sed bene tale infinitum contingit ponere in potentia secundum [con]diuisionem continui, que semper uadit infinitum; per appositionem, . Sic continuum procedit in infinitum per diuisionem in potentia propinquam actui” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 8va). 14  See Sigerus de Brabantia, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. William Dunphy (Louvain-LaNeuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1981), Liber I, q. 15, p. 76, ll. 11-15. See also Id., Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. Armand A. Maurer (Louvain-La-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1983), Liber I, qq. 21-22, pp. 67-70. 15  The question utrum intellectus divinus possit intelligere infinita is edited in Martin Grabmann, Die Aristoteleskommentare des Heinrich von Brüssel und der Einfluss Alberts des Grossen auf die mittelalterliche Aristoteleserklärung (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1944), pp. 76-81. 16  Cf. Anonymus Boethio Daco usus, Quaestiones metaphysicae, ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti (København: apud Librarium Universitatis Austro-Danicae, 2009), Liber II, q. 16, pp. 222-224. 17  This version is published in Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 5-376. Galle offers a comprehensive analysis of Peter’s concept of the infinite; cf. ibid., pp. 291*-300*. 18  Ibid., p. 102, ll. 53-56: “Sed intelligendum est quod caret termino, quia non habet finem. Finis autem et terminus idem. Terminus autem est cuius nihil extra est et citra quae omnia primi continentur, ut patet V Metaphysicae”. 19  This distinction is obviously taken from Aquinas’ Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 7, art. 2.

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Questiones, his commentary on the Metaphysics and his commentary on the On the Heavens: Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber I, q. 25, ll. 40-47

Petrus, Questiones Meta­ phisicorum, Liber II, q. 28

Petrus, Quaestiones in De caelo, Liber I, q. 1820

Alio modo dicitur aliquid infinitum secundum substantiam et rationem, et tale est quod non determinatur secundum suam rationem, nec a priori nec a posteriori conterminari uel determinari contingit. Isto autem modo intelligentie sunt finite a parte ante, quia a priori dependent; sed a parte ante, quia non determinantur ab aliquo posteriori – uel forma uel accidens – ipsis, et hoc est quod dicitur in Libro De Causis. Materia autem et forma in inferioribus sunt, quare alterutrum et a priori et a posteriori , et etiam subiectum accidente.

Dicitur autem forma esse infinita dupliciter: uel simpliciter uel secundum quid. Forma uero infinita simpliciter dicitur que ad nullum aliorum determinata est, nec per aliquid in quo recipitur tanquam in materia terminante ipsam, nec per aliquid agens dans sibi esse, immo ipsa talis est quod ante eam non est accipere aliam a qua dependet in suo esse uel fieri, sed omnia dependent ab ipsa. Sic igitur infinitum in forma simpli­ citer est quod non recipitur in aliquo determinante ipsum, nec aliud aliquid est sibi causa essendi. Infinitum autem in forma secundum quid est quod habet esse ab alio, non tamen receptum est in aliquo terminante ipsum, et hoc modo substantie alie a prima sunt infinite non habentes formas, que nate sunt recipi in materia, per quam terminetur earum infinitas. Hoc etiam modo et uniuersalia possunt dici infinito …

Item aliquid terminatur quia recipitur in materia terminata. Materia autem terminatur per formam quam recipit. Unde materiae terminus forma est … Primum autem vel prima substantia nullis istis modis terminatur. Non enim est materia. Item nec est forma ens in materia, immo forma pura, ut dicit Philosophus. Item esse suum ab alio non recipit, sed esse et aliis influit; nec ordinatur ad alia, sed omnia propter ipsum dicuntur ordinata. Igitur non terminatur, sed infinita est. Dicuntur autem aliae substantiae immateriales infinitae secundum quid, quia inquantum non terminantur per materia nec sunt entia in materia, infinita sunt. Inquantum tamen ordinantur ad aliud et suum esse suscipiunt ab alio, finitatem et terminationem habent, quia ab alio sunt.

Later in the same commentary on the On the Heavens, in q. 21 of Book I, Peter addresses the infinite according to quantity. Within this class of infinite, he distinguishes between the infinite that is so because it is not demarcated by a limit and the infinite that is not infinite in actuality but rather in potentiality. The former cannot arise in nature. The latter is infinite with respect to its divisibility or additivity, as the division of a line or numbers demonstrates. This sort of infinite is never totally present or actual; it is instead always potential in that such acts of division or addition can be carried out infinitely. It is therefore an actus permixtus potentie. Again, the Questiones bears a great deal of similarity to Peter’s questions on the Metaphysics and on the On the Heavens.

20 Galle,

Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 102-103, ll. 62-64, 66-75.

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Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber I, q. 25, ll. 34-39

Petrus, Questiones Meta­ phisicorum, Liber II, q. 28

Petrus, Quaestiones in De caelo, Liber I, q. 2121

Si secundum quantitatem, hoc dicitur dupliciter: uel secundum actum primum termino quantitatis carens – et hoc est impossibile in rerum natura, ut dicitur 3º Phisicorum –, uel secundum actum permixtum potentie – et hoc est possibile, sicut linea est diuisibilis in infinitum –. Et istis duobus modis desiderium infinitum non est, quia isti modi infinite potentie sunt quantitates; desiderium autem quantitatem non habet.

Aliud est infinitum quod est infinitum secundum materiam,22 cuius infinitum est infinitum in quantitate, et istud duobus modis dicitur: uno modo dicitur quantum aliquod non terminatum, alio modo dicitur quod est in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem actum. Infinitum autem primo modo nec est nec esse potest in rerum natura, ut patet ex 3º Phisicorum et 1º Celi et Mundi, et ideo per se rationem entis non habet, sed negationis magis. Quia uero rationem entis non habet per se, ideo intelligi non potest … Alio modo dicitur infinitum quod est in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem actum, et secundum hunc modum linea dicitur esse infinita secundum diuisionem. Tale autem infinitum possibile est esse in natura, et reperitur in continuis23 secundum diuisionem, in numeris uero secundum appositionem. Quod etiam distinguitur a Philosopho 3º Phisicorum sic, quod infinitum est cuius quantitatem acci­ pientibus semper est aliquid sumere extra: quantumcumque enim diuidatur aliqua linea secundum actum, semper contingit reperiri potentiam ad ulteriorem diuisionem; et ideo linea secundum istum modum est infinita. Similiter etiam de appositione in numeris.

Si autem loquamur de infinito secundum quantitatem, hoc est dupliciter: est enim infinitum quoddam secundum quantitatem quod est quantum actu non terminatum. Est autem aliud infinitum secundum quantitatem quod non est infinitum actu, sed potentia. Si loquamur de infinito actu secundum quantitatem quod est quantum non terminatum actu, dicendum quod tale infinitum nec est , nec possibile est esse in rerum natura … Si loquamur de infinito in potentia secundum quantitatem, hoc est dupliciter: quoddam est infinitum secundum divisionem, ut in continuis, et quoddam secundum appositionem, ut in discretis, et tale non est infinitum actu simpliciter, sed in actu permixto potentiae ad ulteriorem actum, ita quod quantumcumque fiat divisio vel appositio, adhuc semper remanet potentia ad ulteriorem actum.

The same doctrine is found in another question commentary on the On the Heavens attributed to Peter, which is commonly known as CEK-version.24 In q. 23 of Book I, 21 

Ibid., pp. 115-116, ll. 32-39 and 46-55. sed corr. in marg. 23 continens sed del. et corr. in marg. 24  The critical edition is found in Cesare A. Musatti, Pietro d’Alvernia e le “Quaestiones super librum De caelo et mundo” contenute nei manoscritti di Cremona, Erlangen e Kassen: edizione del testo e analisi dottrinale (Catania: Università degli Studi di Catania, 2000; PhD dissertation). 22 natura

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Peter introduces the same divisions regarding the different sorts of infinite, the terminology being closer to the Questiones and to his other On the Heavens commentary than to his commentary on the Metaphysics.25 It is apparent that Peter repeats his presentation of the different kinds of infinite throughout his textual output. The infinite is also examined in Aristotle’s Physics. Scholars have long debated the authorship of a commentary on Books I-IV of the Physics contained in one manuscript and published by Philippe Delhaye under the name of Siger of Brabant.26 Since Charles Ermatinger discovered that this commentary was partly transmitted in another anonymous manuscript,27 other scholars, principally William Dunphy, but also Pieter De Leemans,28 have highlighted the similarities between this commentary on the Physics and Peter’s other commentaries. In fact, the texts are so similar that the Physics is no longer attributed to Siger and is now studied as another of Peter’s works.29 The question of authorship regarding this commentary is, however, a bit more complex. The commentary survives in two manuscripts: Erfurt, Universitätsbiblio­ thek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349, ff. 1ra-68vb and München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 9559, ff. 18ra-39vb. The former contains a commentary on Books I-VIII and the latter a commentary on Books I-IV and VIII (which was published under Siger’s name). The following sections of the text are the same in the two manuscripts: I, q. 23-IV, q. 30 of Munich corresponds to I, q. 18, 22-IV, q. 30 of Erfurt (with a few 25  Ibid., pp. 61-62, ll. 20-36: “Ad hoc dicitur quod infinitum priuatio finis est. Finis autem multipliciter dicitur: uno modo dicitur finis terminus substancie rei, et secundum hoc a fine dicitur diffinitio rei que determinat substanciam rei, unde et diffinitio multotiens ab Aristotile terminus rei dicitur, eo quod est ultimum ad quod terminatur cognitio rei diffinite. Alio modo dicitur finis terminus siue ultimum in quantitate. Infinitum igitur quod priuationem finis dicit, [uel] potest priuari finem primo modo dictum, et sic dicitur aliquid infinitum secundum substanciam suam: cuiusmodi est tantum substancia prima, que est ipsum esse et forma pura non recepta in alio; et in hoc, rationem infiniti et indeterminati habet respectu formarum materialium, que sunt recepte in alio ad quod sunt determinate. Item substancia prima nichil recipit ab alio, et rationem infiniti habet respectu aliarum for­ marum inmaterialium, que saltem suum esse recipiunt a substancia prima, et in hoc finite, quia principium sui esse habent: sic igitur substancia prima secundum substanciam suam est infinita, et ideo diffinitionem non habet. Si autem infinitum dicat priuationem finis siue termini in quantitate, sic dicitur infinitum secundum quantitatem, et hoc dupliciter: aut enim est quantum actu interminatum, aut est quantum infinitum in actu permixto potencie ad ulteriorem actum”. 26  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, pp. 19-235. 27  Charles Ermatinger, “A Second Copy of a Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics Attributed to Siger of Brabant”, Manuscripta 5 (1961), pp. 41-49. 28  William Dunphy, “The Similarity between Certain Questions of Peter of Auvergne’s Commentary on the Metaphysics and the Anonymous Commentary on the Physics Attributed to Siger of Brabant”, Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953), pp. 159-168; Pieter De Leemans, “Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle’s De motu animalium and the MS Merton College, Oxford, 275”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 71 (2004), pp. 129-202, at 183-184. 29  Cf. Dragos Calma–Emanuele Coccia, “Un commentaire inédit de Siger de Brabant sur la Physique d’Aristote (MS. Paris, BNF, Lat. 16297)”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 73 (2006), pp. 283-349, at 287-288. Cecilia Trifogli has studied this Physics commentary without even taking into consideration that it might not be authored by Peter; cf. Trifogli, “Peter of Auvergne on Place”, pp. 89-106.

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exceptions).30 It is the part shared by the two manuscripts that has been attributed to Peter. Until now, scholars have maintained that Book VIII of the Munich manuscript was clearly not authored by Peter, but they have been cautious regarding the authorship of Books V-VIII of the Erfurt manuscript. In this section and in section 1.3 of this chapter, I shall provide further evidence in support of attributing, beyond any doubt, Books I-IV to Peter as well as, with some caution, Books V-VIII in the version transmitted by the Erfurt manuscript.31 The similarities that the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name bear with some of Peter’s other commentaries also extend to Peter’s Questiones on the Politics. In q. 25 of Book I, devoted to whether the infinite is known to the human intellect, the author of the commentary on the Physics quotes the same passage of the Metaphysics and establishes the exact same distinctions regarding the different kinds of infinite already found in Peter’s other commentaries. The text is so similar to Peter’s commentaries that it is worth quoting it at some length: Et dicendum quod infinitum dicitur multipliciter, sicut finis. Finis autem dicitur de termino quantitatis, et hoc proprie; alio modo, dicitur de substantia rei, secundum quod dicit Aristoteles quinto Metaphysicae quod definitio terminus dicitur, quia extra eam nihil est de re. Et similiter dicitur infinitum secundum quod dicit privationem finis, infinitum secundum quantitatem et secundum substantiam. Infinitum secundum substantiam est cuius substantia non terminatur per aliud et quia non recepta est in aliquo: et sic Primum est infinitum. Infinitum autem secundum quantitatem duobus modis dicitur: uno modo quantum interminatum, alio modo quantum finitum quod est potentia ad aliquid in infinitum, sicut continuum est divisibile in infinitum. Infinitum autem primo modo non est, nec esse potest in rerum natura, nec tantum est privatio termini, immo simpliciter negatio, quia est non ens, et tale ab intellectu non potest intelligi, et de hoc dicit Aristoteles hic quod infinitum secundum quantitatem ignotum est. Secundum quantitatem tamen secundo modo, infinitum est in actu permixto potentiae, quia semper est in potentia ad ulteriorem actum, ut in continuis ad divisionem, et in discretis per appositionem, et illud egreditur ab intellectu; in eo enim sunt duo, scilicet aliquis actus et potentia ad ulteriorem actum, et ista potentia formalis est infinito secundum quod infinitum, et ideo non intelligitur secundum quod infinitum et in potentia sed ut finitum aliquid. Infinitum autem secundum substantiam nullo modo potest intelligi ab intellectu nostro, et ideo simpliciter est ignotum. 32

These similarities strengthen the case for attributing the Physics commentary to Peter. Such an attribution matches the information provided by the author of the CEK commentary on the On the Heavens, in which he tells the reader that he does

30  Cf. Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, p. 437 and the bibliography quoted there. For a detailed study of the commentary contained in the Erfurt manuscript and its relationship with other Physics commentaries, see Silvia Donati, “Commenti parigini alla Fisica degli anni 1270-1300 ca.”, in A. Speer (ed.), Die Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), pp. 136-256, at 148-175 and 220-227 (for the tabula quaestionum). 31  This caution is justified for one main reason: I only consider two questions of the Erfurt manuscript (one from Book VI and another from Book VIII). 32  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, p. 55.

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not deal at length with the infinite there because he has already done so in his commentary on the Physics.33 Not many commentaries on the Physics produced around the same time contain a question on whether the infinite is known to the human intellect, and the commentaries which do contain such a question present very different formulations about the kinds of infinite.34 More important still, the Erfurt manuscript contains a further question on the infinite, namely whether there can be an infinite magnitude (Book VI, q. 16).35 In this question, the commentator deals only with the infinite according to quantity, leaving aside the infinite according to substance, which, as we have seen, refers to God and the immaterial substances. Nonetheless, the commentator presents the usual distinction between the infinite which is an unlimited magnitude (and thus cannot exist in nature) and the infinite in actu permixto potentie. The wording in this text resembles that of Peter’s Metaphysics commentary, quoted in the first example above: Et dicendum quod infinitum dupliciter dicitur: uno modo quantum interminatum infinitum secundum extensionem in actu; alio uero modo quantum infinitum quod medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, quod est in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem, sicut est infinitum 33 

Cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 291*. See the anonymous commentary transmitted in the manuscript Leipzig, Universitätsbiblio­ thek, 1386, ff. 41ra-76ra, which contains on f. 45va-b the question utrum infinitum possit cognosci (Book I, q. 25), the commentary attributed to Siger of Brabant, edited in Calma–Coccia, “Un commentaire inédit”, p. 331 (utrum infinitum secundum quantitatem sit incognitum), and Boethius of Dacia’s commentary, cf. Boethius Dacus, Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, ed. Géza Sajó, in Boethii Daci opera V.2 (København: apud Librarium G.E.C.GAD, 1974), pp. 162-164, but also 292-297 (where in the question utrum de infinito possit esse scientia naturalis, Boethius draws a distinction between extensive and intensive kinds of infinite). For the commentary found in the Leipzig manuscript, see Donati, “Commenti parigini”, pp. 136-256, especially 150-175 and 240-245 (for the list of questions). Donati dates this commentary to sometime between 1270 and 1277. I was unable to consult the anonymous commentary contained in Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349, ff. 75ra-117rb, which has a question on this matter (f. 81rb-va). The commentary transmitted in the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698, ff. 83ra-129Ar has a question in its third book, utrum sit ponere magnitudinem actu infinitam (f. 98vb-99ra: Book III, q. 10), where the author draws a distinction between two kinds of infinite, but it bears no resemblance to Peter’s terminology. Finally, the commentary contained in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6758, ff. 1ra-43vb includes the question utrum de infinito possit esse scientia (f. 18va-b: Book III, q. 7). This is the commentary that more closely resembles the terminology of Peter (though it does not quote neither the Metaphysics nor the Liber de causis): “Et dicendum quod infinitum dicitur multipliciter: dicitur enim uno modo infinitum aliquod extensum sine termino, et tale esse non potest in natura; de tali autem infinito non est scientia … Alio modo dicitur infinitum secundum additionem aut secundum diuisionem: secundum additionem, ut in numeris; secundum autem diuisionem, ut in magnitudinibus mathematicis … Quantumcumque enim diuidatur magnitudo, aliquid adhuc remanet diuidendum et non cessat diuisio … et de tali infinito est scientia, unde de tali infinito contingit scire quod ipsum est, non in actu puro nec in potentia pura, sed in actu permixto potentie”. The commentaries contained in the Vatican and Paris manuscripts were produced in the 1270s. On these two commentaries, see Donati, “Commenti parigini”, pp. 138, 143-145, 176-218, 249-256 (for the list of questions of the Vatican manuscript). 35  A question with this title appears in other Physics commentaries in relation to Book III of the Physics; it is only in this commentary that such a question is raised with respect to Book VI. 34 

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secundum diuisionem in continuis et secundum appositionem in discretis. Si autem queritur utrum sit possibile (sit add.) magnitudinem esse infinitam secundo modo, dicendum quod non tantum potest esse talis magnitudo, sed etiam est omnis magnitudo infinita, quia omnis magnitudo, cum sit continua, diuisibilis est in infinitum. Si uero queritur utrum possibile sit esse magnitudinem infinitam primo modo quantum ad terminatum actum existens, dicendum quod non est talis magnitudo nec possibile esset. 36

These divisions regarding the infinite were so embedded in Peter’s mind that he repeated them, in very similar terms, at the end of his professorship in theology, that is, in the first question of his sixth and final Quodlibet (Vtrum Deus possit producere in esse quicquid extra se intelligit), probably delivered during Advent of 1301: … est intelligendum quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum substantiam, alio modo secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim per priuationem uel negationem finis uel termini. Terminus autem est cuiuslibet rei ultimum, extra quod nichil est accipere primi et cuius infra omnia primi. 37 Et dicitur uno modo de ultimo secundum quantitatem; alio modo de ultimo secundum substantiam et quod quid erat esse, quod est cognitionis terminus, si autem cognitionis, et rei, secundum Philosophum, 5º Metaphisice. 38 Quare infinitum dicitur uno modo per negationem uel priuationem termini secundum substantiam, alio modo per negationem uel priuationem termini secundum quantitatem. Infinitum autem secundum quantitatem dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum quantitatem continuam, alio modo secundum discretam, et utroque modo duobus modis: uno quidem modo secundum actum perfectum, puta quantum interminatum uel multitudo interminata (terminata B) in actu; alio modo (om. B) in actu permixto potentie ad ulteriorem actum in infinitum, sicut continuum diuisum in actu, secundum quod (quem B) est in potentia ad ulteriorem diuisionem in infinitum, infinitum dicitur, et numerus quicumque, secundum quod est in potentia ad additionem post quamcumque additionem, similiter. Et hoc est infinitum secundum quid, quoniam ratio eius consistit in ratione potentie, que non habet rationem entis simpliciter. Infinitum uero secundum substantiam dicitur quod non habet finem uel terminum secundum substantiam simpliciter, et hoc duobus modis: uno modo secundum perfectionem substantie, et sic Deus est infinitus; alio modo secundum multitudinem substantiarum, uel secundum speciem uel secundum numerum, quemadmodum (quod admodum BZ) dicunt quidam (quidem B) species substantiarum posse esse infinitas uel indiuidua sub una specie. 39

Since Peter’s quodlibetal question together with all the commentaries—the questions on the Politics, on the Metaphysics, on the On the Heavens (in its two versions) and on the Physics—share the same doctrine and use almost the same wording, we 36 

Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349, f. 44ra. Metaphysics, V.17, 1022a4. 38  Ibid., 1022a10. 39  The text is transcribed from Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 85vb (= B), checked against Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 932, ff. 161vb-162ra; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 14562, f. 75rb; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15841, f. 44ra and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15851, f. 69vb (= Z). See also the first question of his first Quodlibet, edited in Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, pp. 124-130, more specifically on p. 124, l. 20-p. 127, l. 16. There, however, Peter is much more succinct. Peter also uses a similar line of reasoning, though without drawing the distinctions about kinds of infinite, in his sixth Sophisma; cf. Sten Ebbesen, “Three 13th-Century Sophismata about Beginning and Ceasing”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin 59 (1989), pp. 121-180, at 172. 37 See

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have a strong basis for asserting that they were all produced by the same author. That Peter—and not Siger—is the author of this Physics commentary is further demonstrated in the next section.

1.2. Privation In q. 2 of Book V of the Questiones, Peter addresses the subject of privation by making use of the Aristotelian theory of the four causes. In this question, with the title whether friendship is the cause of peace, Peter establishes that political peace is caused by the ‘union of wills’ of the citizens and by their agreement as to the aim of the political community. Even so, since, in the previous question of the fifth book, Peter equated peace with a state of rest (quies)—more precisely, as the absence of motion—he now attempts to ascertain how a state of absence, i.e., peace, can be produced by an active cause.40 Peter’s view that the state of rest is the privation of motion is based on the ­Physics. He then analyses each one of the four Aristotelian causes in order to establish whether a state of privation can have a cause. As Peter admits, privation cannot have—to use his own terms—a positive cause, i.e., a formal or efficient cause. If it did, then privation would not be conceived of as a state in which the subject is deprived of something. Moreover, privation cannot have a final cause, as no goal can be purposeless or, to put it differently, nothing can include its own nullification. To illustrate his point, Peter provides the example of blindness, which is conceived of as the privation of vision. Blindness cannot be its own cause: neither an efficient cause, as it does not cause sight, nor a final cause, since the aim of the eye is vision and not blindness. That said, as blindness is related to the matter and can only exist in matter (the eye), it follows that every privation requires a subject, that is, a material cause in which it may occur. Likewise, peace, being a state of absence, cannot have a formal, an efficient or a final cause, but only a material one. Peter identifies this material cause with the agreement of the citizens regarding the aim of the regime.41 A very similar theory, though with no reference to political matters, is found in Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics. In q. 25 of the seventh book, where Peter addresses the cause of individuation, his wording is analogous to that used in the Questiones. Here, again, privation does not include a formal, an efficient or a final cause but always requires a material one instead:

40 

For an analysis of these questions, see Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 334-336. This can be better understood if we recall that Peter equates the citizens with matter and the political regime with the form of the political community. See section 2.3 of this chapter. 41 

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Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber V, q. 2, ll. 21-37

Petrus, Questiones Metaphisicorum, Liber VII, q. 2542

Quietatio autem priuatio est motus, ut patet 8º Phisicorum et 3º. Priuatio autem causam positiuam non habet, et ideo non habet causam formalem, nisi tunc ipsam carentiam formam priuationis dicamus, sicut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Et item priuatio non habet causam actiuam per se, ergo nec finalem, quia finis et agens proportionantur – cecitatis enim nulla est causa per se –, ut patet 1º et 2º Phisicorum; et ideo pacis, cum sit priuatio, non est causa efficiens nec finalis per se. Sed potest esse causa efficiens et finalis per accidens, ut cecitatis bene est causa per accidens, ut illa que est excitatiua , que cecitatem – cum de se sit priuatio et malum – intendit, secundum aliquem alium effectum cui coniuncta est cecitas. Priuationis tamen est aliqua causa positiua materialis. Priuatio enim uult habere subiectum in quo sit, et ideo sic pax causam habet materialem subiectum, in quo primo modo radicatur; hoc autem est ordo ciuium in finem, non absolute, sed ordo ille cum unione participantium ordinem secundum intentionem finis: hoc enim est subiectum pacis, scilicet multitudo aliquorum unitorum in appetitu finis et eorum que sunt ad finem, quia ista causa posita, ponitur pax, et ea remota, remouetur pax.

Privatio autem omnis causam materialem habet per se, alias autem non nisi per accidens. Quod autem causam materialem per se habeat manifestum est; nam privatio vult habere naturam subjectam de qua dicatur. Cum enim non sit nata esse per se, exigit aliud in quo sit. Unde est in subjecto apto nato, ut voluit Philosophus quinto hujus. Illud autem in quo est ipsa privatio dicimus causam materialem. Et ideo privationis est aliqua causa materialis per se. Ejus tamen non est causa formalis per se, quoniam omnis privatio, cum sit privatio alicujus perfectionis, est privatio formae, quoniam forma et perfectio rei sunt idem. Nullius ergo privationis est causa formalis per se. Hoc etiam apparet de causa activa, quoniam, secundum quod dicit Algazel, privationis non est causa efficiens, sed magis deficiens. Tertio hoc apparet de causa finali. Sicut enim aliquid se habet ad causam activam, sic et ad finem; nam agens comparatur ad finem, et sunt sibi invicem causae. Si igitur privationis non sit causa activa per se, manifestum est quod nec finis.

Similar wording is also used in Peter’s Quodlibet II, q. 543 and again in the question commentary on the Physics published under the name Siger of Brabant. The parallelism between the Questiones and this Physics commentary is clearly remarkable. In q. 2 of Book V, immediately following the passage just quoted in the left-hand column above, Peter asserts that peace has a material cause, that is, the citizens’ agreement as to the aim of the political regime. Once such an agreement is established, there is peace in the community. By contrast, if this agreement ends, peace will cease to exist as well. In this sense, since peace is brought about by the union of the citizens, Peter concedes that peace has an ‘effective cause’, even though this cause is only per accidens. 42  This question is published in Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam”, pp. 170-171. It was first published in Edgar Hocedez, “Une question inédite de Pierre d’Auvergne sur l’individuation”, Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934), pp. 355-386, at 379-386. 43  This question is published in ibid., pp. 370-379. The relevant passage is found on p. 371: “Privationis autem non est per se activum principium, sed privativum tantum; cuius autem non est principium activum, nec finis, quia finis et agens sibi invicem correspondent et consequuntur se. Propter quod individui, secundum quod individuum, non est formale principium, cum sit privatio, nec principium activum, nec etiam finale. Privationis autem est principium materiale: privatio enim vult habere natu­ ram subiectam”.

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A similar line of argumentation is advanced in q. 2 of Book II of the Physics commentary, although with respect to motion. The title of the question is whether nature is the principle of rest (utrum natura sit principium quietis). There, the commentator argues that the state of rest is a privation and hence cannot have a positive cause (the expression causa positiva occurs in the two commentaries). This privation nevertheless requires a substrate in which it may occur (though the expression is not used in this question, the commentator is obviously referring here to a material cause). According to the commentator, the state of rest can be understood in one of two ways: either as the privation of motion or as the terminus to which the motion leads. If considered in the second way, the state of rest involves perfection because the terminus of the motion that led to said terminus is the achievement and thus the perfection of that same motion. In this sense, the state of rest (just as peace) has an efficient cause, albeit per accidens. Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber V, q. 2, ll. 18-20, 29-40

Petrus (?), Quaestiones Physicorum, Liber II, q. 244

Quietatio autem priuatio est motus, ut patet 8º Phisicorum et 3º. Priuatio autem causam positiuam non habet … Priuationis tamen est aliqua causa positiua materialis. Priuatio enim uult habere subiectum in quo sit, et ideo sic pax causam habet materialem subiectum, in quo primo modo radicatur; hoc autem est ordo ciuium in finem, non absolute, sed ordo ille cum unione participantium ordinem secundum intentionem finis: hoc enim est subiectum pacis, scilicet multitudo aliquorum unitorum in appetitu finis et eorum que sunt ad finem, quia ista causa posita, ponitur pax, et ea remota, remouetur pax. Et ideo pax etiam habet causam effectiuam, per accidens tamen, quia dum aliqui uniuntur in appetitu unius finis secundum uoluntatem, tunc fit unio, et tunc, cum hoc sit, pax erit; et ideo, quidquid est effectiuum illius unionis, hoc erit causa pacis, per accidens tamen.

… quies et immobilitatio et privatio quaedam est. Et ideo dicendum quod quies per se non habet aliquam causam per se efficientem sed privatio vult habere naturam subiectam de qua dicatur, ut dicitur Decimo Metaphysicae; quare quies habet per se causam sicut subiectum, ita quod quies per se causam efficientem non habet …

Est tamen intelligendum quod quies habet causam positivam secundum accidens. Quies enim est privatio motus in mobili quando est in termino ad quem, ita quod in quiete est duo considerare: privationem motus et perfectionem mobilis per terminum ad quem. Nunc autem, per eandem naturam per quam aliquid movetur ad illud terminum, perficitur per istum, ut, si movetur ad ubi, perficitur per ubi per eandem naturam per quam movetur; si ad formam, perficitur per eam. Et ideo quies habet causam efficientem per accidens in eo quod ipsa sequitur illud quod habet causam positivam.

The only question commentaries on the Physics produced at Paris that include a question on whether nature is the principle of rest are Boethius of Dacia’s and the anonymous commentary contained in Leipzig, Universätsbibliothek, 1386, ff. 41ra44 

Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, p. 83.

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76ra. While Boethius’ text is very different from the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name,45 the anonymous text presents the same views as those found in both Peter’s Metaphysics commentary and the Physics commentary previously attributed to Siger. Its wording is also very similar to that of the two texts.46 However, as Silvia Donati maintained, this commentary is most likely based on the commentary published under Siger’s name, at least in which concerns the greater part of Book II, Book III (qq. 1-3) and Books IV-VI.47 In fact, at least once, the text in the Leipzig manuscript apparently refers to the author of the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name as Expositor.48 This reinforces the hypothesis that the notion that privation requires a material cause, as well as an efficient cause per accidens, was advanced in a specific way by one specific author: Peter of Auvergne. It also tells us that Peter was regarded as an important Aristotelian commentator, for another commentator indicated him as Expositor, a title applied to only a few authors during the Middle Ages. If the authors of these three commentaries—Politics, Metaphysics and Physics— are in fact one and the same person, then it is clear that Peter of Auvergne advances a specific idea in one commentary and then employs it in a completely different context in another of his works. The way in which Peter defines privation runs throughout his works in much the same way as his definition of kinds of infinite. In the Questiones, Peter uses the notion that privation always requires a subject in which it can occur in his discussion of peace in Book V, just as he uses it in his treatment of rest (in his Physics commentary) and individuation (in his commentary on the Metaphysics and in one of his Quodlibeta). What is more, he also uses it in another place in the Questiones, namely in the question on whether the political 45  See Boethius Dacus, Quaestiones de generatione et corruptione. Quaestiones super libros Physi­ corum, II, q. 3, pp. 205-208. 46  Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, f. 48ra-b: “Dicendum quod uidendum primo quid sit quies et que causa eius, utrum habeat efficientem et finalem. Illud autem dicimus quiescere quod est aptum natum moueri et ubi aptum est moueri et quando, et tamen non mouetur, ut dicit Aristoteles 5º huius [V.2, 226b12-16; V.6, 229b25-26], et illud quod non mouetur, et tamen aptum natum moueri, illud est priuatum, quare quies est priuatio ipsius motus in mobili, inquantum mobile est aptum natum ad motum. Secundo intelligendum quod non (s.l.) habet causam efficientem positiuam, quia omne tale – cum ‘causa positiua est per se causa positiui’, tum ‘effectus debet assimilari cause, forma et uirtute’, et quies sit priuatio – non habet causam positiuam; unde sequitur quod quies habet causam materialem, quia differentia est inter negationem et priuationem, quia negatio nullum subiectum requirit, sed priuatio est negatio in natura subiecta apta nata, ergo habet naturam subiectam, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice [IV.2, 1004a14-16]. Similiter quies non est quecumque priuatio, sed priuatio in natura mobili, ergo mobile est subiectum quietis. Tertio intelligendum quod quies habet causam efficientem per accidens, quia quies est priuatio motus mobilis in termino ad quem, unde in quiete duo oportet considerare, scilicet priuationem motus mobilis in termino ad quem et perfectionem mobilis per terminum ad quem, quia quando quiescit habet ubi. Vlterius per eandem naturam per quam aliquid mouetur, perficitur quando uenit ad illud. Vnde quando mouetur ad formam perficitur per formam, unde illius quod sequitur quietem ut ipsius perfectionis causa efficiens est natura mouens, et ideo ipsius quietis est causa efficiens per accidens”. 47  Cf. Donati, “Commenti parigini”, pp. 162-173. 48  Ibid., pp. 166-167.

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community should be as unified as possible (Book II, q. 2) and in his sixth So­phisma, precisely where he deals with unity. The two texts proceed along the same lines, associating unity with indivisibility and privation: Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber II, q. 2, ll. 16-21

Petrus, Sophisma VI49

Dicendum quod unum uniuersaliter indiuisionem aliquam dicit. Indiuisio autem, cum sit diuisionis priuatio, necessario requirit subiectum; et ideo unum habere subiectum uel in natura uel in arte; cum autem sit indiuisio quedam, ideo, secundum distinctionem indiuisionis, distinguetur et unum. Modo aliquid est indiuisum quantitate, ut punctus; aliquid ratione, ut species; aliud numero, ut unitas.

In ratione autem unitas ponitur privatio: est enim unitas indivisio, sed non quaecumque sed in natura aliqua; nihil enim est indivisum si non est unum; privatio enim vult habere naturam subiectam de qua dicatur, sicut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae; et ideo unitas est indivisio in aliqua natura, ut unitas in genere indivisio in natura generis, unitas in specie indivisio in natura speciei, unitas in numero in natura materiae.

1.3. Natural Place and Celestial Influence Question 6 of Book V of the Questiones bears the title whether place is the cause of dissention (Peter is referring here to the place in which the city, i.e., the political community, is located). He begins his discussion of this question by stating that the place of a body is the limit of the container of that body and that the place is set at a specific distance in relation to the celestial orb (in tanta distantia ad orbem). The first part of this statement is found in the Physics (IV.2, 209a32-b5), while the reference to the celestial orb is not present in Aristotle’s works—Peter drew it from Albert the Great’s De natura loci.50 Peter argues that, by springing into action, the celestial orb triggers the disposition (dispositio) of a given place to preserve the body located in it. For Peter, the place is ‘natural’ insofar as it possesses this natural quality of preserving the contained body. He then states that the place can be considered in one of two ways, namely, according to its quantitative or its qualitative disposition. For Peter, the place where the city lies, by virtue of its qualitative disposition, may either preserve the city or cause sedition within it. How, then, does this happen? As the place exerts influence on the body contained in it, namely the civitas, then such an influence also extends to the citizens’ bodies. Since human sensory organs are made of matter, if the matter is affected on account of the qualitative disposition of the place where it is located, then the perception resulting from the sensory 49 

Ebbesen, “Three 13th-Century Sophismata”, p. 162. Albertus Magnus, De natura loci. De causis proprietatum elementorum. De generatione et corruptione, ed. Paul Hossfeld, Alberti Magni Opera omnia V.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), I.4, p. 6, ll. 38-44: “Et ideo cum Avicenna et quibusdam philosophis peripateticis dici oportet, quod locus naturalis, qui virtutes habet inducendi formas in materiam corporum simplicium, est superficies continentis corporis cum distantia sui ab orbe; haec enim distantia causat calidum et frigidum et umidum et siccum, quae sunt virtutes naturales elementorum”. 50 

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organs will be affected as well. Moreover, the images ( fantasmata) produced by the imagination after sensory perception has occurred will be conditioned accordingly, which, in turn, will have an effect on the intellect. The thoughts and the will of the citizens are thus liable to change according to the qualitative disposition of the place in which the civitas is located and its relation to the celestial orb. Finally, the celestial orb exerts its influence because of the motion of the stars.51 These ideas are also found in the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name. Aristotle’s theory of place is discussed at great length in this commentary; in fact, the first twenty-one questions of Book IV of this commentary are devoted to it. In q. 4, on whether place has the virtue to preserve the located body, the commentator advances the idea that the place holds some natural virtue by which it preserves the body contained in it. This virtue is derived (influxa) from the celestial orb. The influence of the containing place on the body thus depends on the distance that place has with respect to the celestial orb. Later, in q. 8, the commentator adds that the place is not the limit per se of the containing body itself, but rather a property (passio) caused by a celestial virtue in said limit according to the distance it is from the centre of the world. It is this passio that lends the place the power to preserve the body.52 Cecilia Trifogli has argued that this commentary on the Physics is “an attempt to transform Aristotle’s general theory into a theory of natural place”, and she considers the idea of the passio of the limit of the containing body as the property that enables the preservation of the body to be “very original”.53 In fact, it is not found in other late thirteenth-century commentaries, such as those by Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Boethius of Dacia and in three anonymous commentaries produced in Paris in the 1270s.54

51  As we shall see, both the idea of celestial influence on man and the anthropological approach to explain certain social and political phenomena (slavery, nobility of birth, hermitic life and the incapacity of individual men to associate with his fellows, political upheavals) are two dominant features of Peter’s Questiones and Scriptum. 52  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, p. 155: “locus per se non est ultimum corporis continentis sed est passio ultimi continentis, passio, dico, causata in ultimo continentis per virtutem supracaelestem secundum distantiam debitam a primo locante et ab ultimo locato quod est centrum mundi, ita ut ista passio ultimi continentis sit illud quo locus virtutem conservandi habet, passio per talem respectum et in quo habet virtutem generandi locatum et etiam quo locatum unigeneitatem habet in loco suo”. 53  See Trifogli, “Peter of Auvergne on Place”, pp. 99-100. Peter also deals with natural place in Book IV, q. 4 of his question commentary (WP) on the On the heavens, however his approach there is not relevant for my purposes here; cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 263*-264* (for the analysis of the question) and 343-345 (for the text of the question). 54  These are contained in the manuscripts Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 6758, ff. 1ra-43vb; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, ff. 77vb-91ra and Paris, B.n.F., lat. 14698, ff. 83ra-129Ar. The question utrum in loco sit uirtus conseruatiua locati is found in Vat. lat. 6758, f. 21vb; the question utrum in loco sit potentia naturalis et uirtus conseruativa loci is found in Leipzig, 1383, f. 83rb and the question utrum in loco sit uirtus et potentia saluatiua locati is contained in lat. 14698, ff. 100va-101ra.

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While the term passio is absent from q. 6 of Book V of the Questiones, both the Questiones and the Physics commentary contain the very same distinction regarding the place’s qualitative and quantitative dispositions and the same idea that a natural virtue springs forth from the celestial orb permitting it to preserve the body in its natural place. Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber V, q. 6, ll. 12-32

Petrus (?), Quaestiones Physicorum, Liber IV, q. 455

Dicendum quod locus, ut dicitur 4º Phisicorum, est ultimum continentis immobile et in tanta distantia ad orbem; et sic ab illo orbe infit quedam dispositio loci, per quam est locus conseruatiuus locati et per quam agit in locatum conseruando ipsum; et ab ista qualitate locus dicitur aliquid naturale. Locus autem per se est quedam superficies, cum sit ultimum continentis.

… manifestum est locum habere virtutem conservandi locatum … … de loco … aut potest considerari secundum virtutem eius qualitativam quam quidem reci­pit a corpore caelesti, et sic virtutem conservandi locatum habet: sic enim dicitur locus naturalis.

Potest ergo locus dupliciter considerari: uel quantum ad dispositionem quantitatiuam uel quantum ad dispositionem qualitatiuam. Si quantum ad qualitatiuam, sic locus natus est saluare ciuitatem, et diuersitas loci secundum istam dispositionem est factiua seditionis.56 Cuius ratio est quia locus secundum istam qua­ litatem agit in locatum, et sic in ciues secundum corpora eorum, et per consequens immutat sensitiuos appetitus, et iterum, per consequens, immutat intellectum, qui non intelligit nisi ex fantasmatibus. Et per hoc uariabuntur uoluntates ciuium per accidens: non per se, quia locus, nec etiam aliqua uirtus naturalis attingit ad intellectum, ita quod in eum agere possit; sed per consequens bene fit, inquantum seditio­ nis causa est diuersitas loci secundum istam dispositionem. Vel etiam transpositio loci idem faceret, quia iam ciues in alia situatione aliam influentiam loci reciperent, et iterum orietur seditio, ita quod illa seditio reduceretur in locum uel loci alterationem, hec autem ulterius in figuram aliquam celi et per consequens, isto modo, seditio ciuitatis reducetur in figuram celi nouam et alteram.

Est etiam considerare in loco duo: naturam quantitativam et mensurativam ipsum locatum, secundum quam habet tantum continere locatum; aut quantum ad aliquid additum naturae quantitatis, ut quantum ad aliquam virtutem per quam habet conservare suum locatum, et sic manifestum est quod virtutem naturalem habet conservandi suum locatum. Sed a quo habet istam virtutem? Dicendum quod non videtur esse ista virtus nisi influxa a corpore caelesti in ipso. Unde sciendum quod ipsa virtus quae est in corpore continente non est corporis continentis secundum quod huiusmodi sed est ipsius secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, quia, si quaeratur quare transmutatur talis materia in talem formam, dicendum est quia est in tali distantia ab ipso orbe, ita quod ignis conservat aerem et est locus eius, sed ista virtus non est igni secundum quod ignis, sed secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, et sic de aliis.

We can establish an even closer connection between the two commentaries. The Physics commentary contains a question not found in many of the other Physics commentaries of the late thirteenth century and with the title whether the mixed 55  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, pp. 150-151. The texts presented in this column are not in the order in which they appear in the Physics commentary. 56 See apparatus fontium to ll. 19-20.

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body has some natural place (Book IV, q. 15). There it is explained how the natural place of a body has an influence on the body located in it. The appropriate place of a natural body is also the place of its generation, which is made of three elements: air, water and earth. The body’s constituent element drives it to its natural place. Accordingly, in the case of a mixed body, which is composed of the mixture of the four elements (air, water, earth and fire), its natural place depends upon the element which predominates in the mixture that composes it: if this prevalent element is earth, the body will tend downward to earth. Every mixed body thus originates from and is preserved in its natural place according to its prevalent element and to the distance of that place with regard to the celestial orb, which gives the generative and conservative virtue to said place.57 The commentator then adds that the natural place of a mixed body is determined in two ways. The first is its locus communis, which is akin to the various kinds of climate. Since each climate requires a specific complexion (complexio),58 every living being, whether an animal or a plant, can grow and flourish only in a specific and appropriate climate. The second is its locus magis proprie, that is, the location that contains the body at a given distance both with regard to the celestial orb and to all other parts of the world. It is because of the position of the stars and their relation to a given place that astronomers can foretell the future of a newborn.59 57  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, p. 164: “Dicendum quod corpus mixtum habet locum naturalem sibi, et hoc quia movetur motu naturali. Dicendum est ergo quod corpora mixta habent locum naturalem et quod locus ipsorum est locus generationis ipsorum. Locus autem gene­ rationis ipsorum est ubi se contingunt tria elementa, scilicet aer, aqua, terra … Cuius ratio est quia eodem modo attribuitur alicui locus, sicut ipsi attribuitur motus: si enim non esset transmutatio secundum locum non quaereretur locus, sicut dicit Aristoteles. Cum igitur corpus mixtum componatur ex quatuor elementis, cum ista quatuor non sint de ipso mixto secundum actualitates suas, quia tunc corpus mixtum non esset unum sed plura, sed se habent secundum actualitates elementi dominantis in ipso composito: habet enim composito quolibet unum elementum praedominium (ed.: perdominium) unum, et corpora mixta sequuntur motum elementi dominanti in ipsis. Nunc autem ipsum mixtum, aut sequitur motum terrae, aut aquae, et ideo locus erit in superficie terrae vel aquae. Unde sicut est dare locum istorum simplicium, siclicet quod continet ea in tanta distantia ab orbe, ita similiter est dare locum corporum mixtorum. Et ideo ultimum tale non est ultimum terrae vel aquae vel aeris, sed locus ipsorum est ultimum continens ipsa in tanta distantia in quo est virtus generativa mixtorum et etiam conservativa, sive fuerit ultimum aquae, sive ultimum terrae, sive ultimum aeris”. 58  In medieval philosophy and medicine, the complexio was the mixture of the four basic qualities: hot, cold, moist and dry. The literature on this notion is vast. For its use in medieval Aristotelian commentaries, see Theodor W. Köhler, “Homo animal nobilissimum”. Konturen des spezifisch Menschlichen in der naturphilosophischen Aristoteleskommentierung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2008-2014), 2 vols., I.305-340 and the bibliography quoted there. 59  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, pp. 164-165: “Sciendum tamen quod locus mixtorum duobus modis potest dici. Uno modo dicitur locus communis ut videlicet una habitatio sive unum clima; quod clima dicitur in quo omnino (ed.: non; corrected according to the manuscript Universitätsbibliothek, Erfurt, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349, f. 24va) discernitur complexio sive alia talis proprietas … Hoc etiam patet de quibusdam plantis quae crescunt in quibusdam locis et etiam fructificant, et si tollantur a locis illis non crescunt … Alio modo dicitur locus magis proprie illud quod continet ipsa corpora mixta in tali distantia ab orbe et ad reliquas partes mundi … et secundum talem locum dicitur quod quidam astronomi in nativitate alicuius pronosticant de illis quae sunt sibi ventura et etiam sibi

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In Book VII of the Questiones, Peter once again takes up the issue of the location of the political community and the influence exerted by the stars. There Peter raises two questions: first, whether, given the disposition of the region where the city is located, some communities are more likely to lead either a good or a bad political life (q. 8); and second, whether the communities located in the middle region (i.e., between North and South) are more apt to lead the best political life (q. 9). There are no directly corresponding passages in Book VII of the Politics, where Aristotle limits himself to disserting on the suitable geographical conditions for the ideal city and to proclaiming in Chapter 7 the superiority of the Greek over both northern European and Asian peoples. Because of the colder climate, the former are high-spirited but lack intelligence, which means they are inclined towards freedom. The hotter region means that the latter are intelligent but deprived of spirit, which makes them prone to subjection and despotic regimes. Peter attempts to support these claims by establishing a general doctrine grounded on the different climates of the Earth in order to account for why some peoples in some specific regions are disposed to specific political regimes. Peter starts his solution to q. 8 by distinguishing two meanings of the term ‘place’ (locus) with regard to the city: the locus communis, the point where the city is located with respect to the configuration of the heavens ( figura celi), and the locus proprius, where the city is located with respect to the farthest limit of the Earth. For Peter, the locus communis influences the locus proprius of the civitas: because the configuration of the heavens changes owing to the motion of the stars, this change affects the sublunary elements, such as earth and air, of the locus proprius. Basing himself on the idea advanced in Aristotle’s Physics that the place affects the bodies located in it, Peter then argues that the citizens’ bodies, being located within the civitas, may be subject to some influence from the motion of the heavenly bodies by means of the changes produced in the air and earth of the locus proprius. The human body is made up of a mixture of the four elements (air, earth, water and fire) with the four qualities—the complexion. As a result, the body is susceptible to such variations and influences on account of both the quality that predominates in the human body and in the surrounding environment—those variations determining how the sensory organs function and thus the intellective capacities of the inhabi­ tants. Peter underlines that the changes caused by the locus communis and the locus proprius affect the citizens’ intellect, not in a deterministic way but rather in the form of a predisposition (secundum inclinationem … per accidens).60 contingentia; et hoc dicunt propter aliquas stellas quae quidem respectum habent ad locum istum in quo aliquis natus est”. 60  Cf. Liber VII, q. 8, ll. 22-55. The idea that the climate influences the human complexio and, in this way, the mores of the peoples of Asia and Europe is also found in three texts: the Scriptum (but not the distinction between locus communis and locus proprius), earlier in Albert’s commentary (cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, VIII.5, pp. 663-664) and later in Ptolemy of Lucca’s continuation of Aquinas’ De regno (IV.8.3). More than either Albert or Peter (in the Scriptum), Ptolemy emphasises

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We can, thus, say that, for Peter, every political community has a ‘natural place’. It is noteworthy that both commentaries—the Questiones on the Politics and the Physics commentary—make use of the distinction between locus communis and locus proprius. What is more, both conceive of the locus communis as a region with a specific climate in which its inhabitants possess the appropriate complexion. It would seem, however, that the Questiones emphasises to a greater extent than the Physics commentary the role of the stars on the earthly bodies. This does not hold, however, if we take into account q. 20 of Book II of the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name (utrum corpora superiora imponent necessitate vo­ luntati et intellectui nostro) and one of the questions contained in Book VIII of the Physics commentary contained in the Erfurt manuscript: q. 12, whether the celestial bodies move—i.e., have any influence on—the lower bodies in such a way that they move the human intellect (utrum superiora moueant ista inferiora ita quod moueant intelligentias nostras). In q. 20 of Book II, the commentator argues that the celestial bodies influence the human intellect through the images (phantasmata) without which the intellect cannot operate. Such influence, however, occurs only per accidens.61 Later, in q. 12 of Book VIII, the commentator explains in detail that the celestial bodies affect man’s intellectual capacities by changing the air surrounding the human body and thus the body itself. Since the body undergoes some change, it causes a change in the organ of the imagination (organum fantasie), which, in turn, alters the image ( fantasma) by which the human intellect operates. The influence of the celestial bodies on the human mind occurs, the commentator stresses, per accidens.62 the idea of a specific locus. For example, Ptolemy maintains that, if a Gaul moves to Sicily, he will behave like a Sicilian after a while. He uses the notion of the influence exerted by the configuration of the heavens, a notion used only by Peter in Book VII of the Scriptum and the Questiones, but not by Albert commenting on Book VII. It is also worth noting that Albert makes reference here to his De natura loci, which, as we have seen, was a source Peter drew upon. 61  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, p. 116: “Tamen per accidens sunt necessitantia intellectum nostrum, quia intellectus noster non considerat nisi in phantasmatibus corporeis, et ideo, quia corpora superiora agunt et disponunt phantasmata, per accidens, sicut diceremus quod qui transmutaret speculum vel disponeret, quod ipse faceret visum quia facit imaginem apparere in eo, similiter in intellectu nostro est: corpora superiora agunt in intellectum per accidens in quantum intellectus accipit ex phantasmate, et phantasma disponitur ex corporibus superioribus, et ita per accidens intellectus”. 62  Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349, f. 61ra: “… corpora superiora agunt in corpora nostra alterando ipsa uel saltim alterando ipsum aerem continentem corpora nostra, et corpus alteratum alterat organum fantasie et, organo fantasie, alterat ipsum fantasma. Sic alico modo alteratur ipse intellectus et secundum istam materiam corpora superiora disponunt corpora inferiora ad bene intelligendum uel male. Et sic etiam dicimus molles carne aptos mente ex dispositione stellarum in natiuitate alicuius coniecturamus de eo qualis erit et secundum hoc dicit Ptolomeus (cod.: Philomenus) in Centilogo quod, cum fuerit Mercurius in aliqua domorum Saturni, et fuerit fortis, hoc est habuit aliam stellam consimilis uirtutis coniunctam sibi causabit intelligentiam bonam (249b50-250b7), ut ipse dicit, possunt etiam corpora superiora alterare intellectum alterando ipsum spiritum et ideo non agit per se intellectum nostrum, sed per accidens … Visum est quod motus corporum superiorum non agit per se in intellectu nostro, agit tamen per accidens inquantum alterat res ipsas ex (add. in

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No other commentary on Book II of the Physics contains a similar question. As to the question from Book VIII, the words used there are almost a verbatim reproduction of the Summa contra Gentiles, Book III, chapter 84 (as we shall see, Peter was heavily influenced by Aquinas).63 I have found no trace of this use of the Summa contra Gentiles in a similar question in other late thirteenth-century Physics commentaries. The only exception is the commentary conserved in Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, ff. 41ra-76ra, which includes a question with a title and text very similar to that of the Erfurt manuscript.64 However, as noted above, in some parts this commentary is based on the commentary of the Erfurt manuscript—the author of the former refers to the author of the latter as Expositor. In any case, while the Questiones and the Physics commentary do not use the exact same wording, their ideas are almost identical.65 A more striking similarity marg.) quibus fiunt ipsa fantasmata et, per consequens, alterat ipsum intellectum, quia alterato ipso fantasmate, alteratur quoquomodo intellectus ipse”. 63  It is noteworthy that here the commentator drew on the Summa contra Gentiles, which was much less used than the Summa theologiae at the Arts Faculty of Paris. For the question of the influence of celestial bodies, the commentator might have drawn on the Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 9, art. 5. 64  The question utrum corpora superiora possunt mouere intellectum nostrum (Book VIII, q. 6) is found on f. 72rb-va. 65  The idea that the motion of the stars exerts a certain influence on the human bodily complexion was by no means unique to Peter, and medieval authors often invoked Aristotle’s Meteorology, I.2, 339a21-23 in support of this idea. The remarkable similarity between these two commentaries rests on the equivalent distinctions they make. In many of his works, Peter stresses the influence of the stars over men’s behaviour. I shall return to this topic in the next section of this chapter. Here, in order to help to understand how the influence of the stars work, according to Peter, I quote a stretch from lectio 2 of his commentary on Aristotle’s On Dreams (I used the manuscript Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1418, ff. 129vb-130ra, checked against Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16158, ff. 104vb-105ra and Oxford, Balliol College, 104, ff. 164vb-165ra): “Aristoteles uero principia accidentium et passio[P 105ra]num naturalium (naturalem L) – que fiunt in hoc mundo sensibili secundum cursum communem nature – materialia dixit esse ignem, aerem et aquam et terram, ex quibus componuntur corpora mixta; causam uero, unde principium motus siue agentem, dixit esse uirtutem corporum superius motorum, sicut apparet 1º Metheororum, que non per defluxum alicuius de substantia eorum existentis sunt principium eorum que fiunt et corrumpuntur, uel uniuersaliter alterantur uel mouentur, sed per quandam alterationem qua [L 130ra] alteratur primo pars mundi propinquior illis (illi L), et mediante illa alia, usque ad ultimum alteratum. Hic diuersa autem gene­ rant secundum diuersas figuras quas contrahunt astra ex motibus suis respectu loci generationis, et quia respectu alterius et alterius puncti in terra habent aliam et aliam figuram in alio et alio puncto, aliud et aliud nata sunt facere; ad hoc et facit diuersa dispositio materie que secundum aliam et aliam dispositionem, aliter et aliter recipit alterationem a uirtute stellarum ipsarum et ad aliud et aliud transmutatur, sicut uidemus quod alicubi causatur ab ista uirtute caliditas intensa, alibi autem remissa, alibi autem remissior. Adhuc similiter in qualitatibus causatis ex commixtione istarum et omnibus aliis dispositionibus naturalibus”. A list of the manuscripts of this commentary is supplied in Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, pp. 448-449. On how some medieval scholastic authors, including Peter, understood the influence of the stars on the earthly world, see John D. North, “Celestial Influence: The Major Premiss of Astrology”, in P. Zambelli (ed.), “Astrologi hallucinati”. Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp. 45-100 [republished in Id., Stars, Minds and Fate: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Cosmology (London–Ronceverte: The

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would be difficult to imagine. After all, if the author of the two commentaries is the same person—as the previous pages have provided strong evidence for—we should not forget that he was commenting on two very different texts in two different (and possibly distant) academic years and thus using two different approaches.

1.4. Teleology Peter makes use of teleological arguments on many occasions in the Questiones.66 One such case is found in the key question whether every political community exists for the sake of a good (Book I, q. 5). There, Peter argues that political association is something more than the outcome of a mere natural inclination, for it is a work of human reason and will. In order to substantiate this view, Peter explicitly quotes from the second book of the Physics the idea that every agent acts for the sake of an end and from the second book of the Metaphysics the statement that a human intellect always acts for a purpose. The first quotation corresponds to the idea of natural activity—or activity of a ‘natural agent’, such as fire—while the second represents the notion of intellectual activity, that of an ‘agent that operates through the intellect’. In both kinds of activity, any action is for the sake of an end; however, in the case of the latter the end aimed for is taken as the principle of action. Though with no reference to the political community and with different phrasing, a similar line of reasoning is found in Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics, in q. 25 of Book II (utrum omne agens agat intendendo aliquem finem). Both the Questiones and this commentary distinguish between natural and intellectual activity. What is more, both refer to Book II of the Physics with respect to natural activity and Book II of the Metaphysics with regard to intellectual activity. A very similar question to that of the Metaphysics commentary is found in the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name. This is q. 11 of Book II, which bears the title utrum omne agens agat propter finem. As the table below shows, the text of this commentary employs the same analogies as those found in the Metaphysics commentary—health is the physician’s purpose and the heat heats by means of its form—and, like the Metaphysics commentary, states that an error (peccatum) of a natural agent is to be understood as a deviation from the agent’s proper end:

Hambledon Press, 1987), pp. 243-298]; H. Darrel Rutkin, “Sapientia Astrologica”: Astrology, Magic and Natural Knowledge, ca. 1250-1800. I. Medieval Structures (1250-1500): Conceptual, Institutional, Socio-Political, Theological-Religious and Cultural (Cham: Springer, 2019). For an exhaustive study of this topic in the Sentences commentaries, see Maria Sorokina, Les sphères, les astres et les théologiens. L’influence céleste entre science et foi dans les commentaires des “Sentences” (v. 1220-1340) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021). 66  See section 2.2 of this chapter, below.

74 Petrus, Questiones Politicorum, Liber I, q. 5, ll. 18-26

Dicendum ergo quod omnis talis est in bonum, cuius ratio est quia omne agens agit propter finem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, et ibi explicatur manifeste de agente naturali.

Hoc etiam patet de agente secundum intellectum, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice, et arguitur ratione, quia agens secundum intellectum agit per rationem. Modo ratio una est contra­ riorum, unde ad hoc ut unum illorum determinate agat, necessario habet determinari a uoluntate, uoluntas autem a bono apprehenso; hoc autem bonum est finis – bonum, dico, primum –; et ideo sequitur quod omne agens secundum intellectum agit alicuius finis uel boni gratia.

Interpretative Study Petrus, Questiones Metaphisicorum, Liber II, q. 2567

Petrus (?), Quaestiones Physicorum, Liber II, q. 1168

Oppositum patet per Commentatorem et etiam 2º Phisicorum …

Oppositum tamen vult Aristoteles inferius et Secundo Metaphysicae, et Commentator … Et dicendum quod omne agens, praeter Primum, agit propter finem, quia, in illis quae manifeste agunt propter finem, illud est finis ad quod terminatur motus et impetus agentis, ut in medicina sanitas. Sed motus vel impetus cuiuslibet agentis terminatur ad determinatum, ut impetus caloris caliditas et frigidi frigiditas: non enim quodlibet agit quodlibet sed determinatum agit determinatum. Quare est aliquis finis determinatus uniuscuiusque …

Intelligendum quod omne agens per se agit propter aliquem finem per se, et agens per accidens agit propter aliquem finem per accidens. Primum patet quia illud dicimus finem ultimum alicuius agentis, in quod tendit impetus agentis, sicut id in quod tendit impetus medici dicitur esse finis medici, causare scilicet sanitatem; sed in actione cuiuslibet agentis est ponere aliquid in quod tendit impetus illius secundum modum forme sue, sicut calefaciens in calefacere, frigefaciens etiam in frigefacere per formam suam; ideo et cetera … Item, cum duplex sit agens, scilicet agens per intellectum et cognitionem et agens per naturam, utrumque agit propter finem aliquem, ut Philosophus dicit 2º Phisicorum [143ra] … Agens autem per cognitionem agit propter finem, ut Commentator dicit hic, et ratio est quoniam principium actiuum in agente per cognitionem est ratio finis, principium enim in operabi­ libus dicitur esse finis. Vnde etiam, cum prudentia proprie sit in hiis que agunt ex cognitione et deliberatione rationis, prima principia prudentie ex fine sumuntur; finis igitur mouet agens per intellectum et cognitionem; hoc autem non est nisi quia intenditur per se a tali agente.

67  I used the manuscript Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 142vb-143ra, checked against Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16158, ff. 177vb-178ra. 68  Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la “Physique”, pp. 97-99.

Authorship Item, etiam agens per naturam agit propter finem aliquem, quoniam, in quibuscumque contingit recte et non recte agere, non contingit sic agere, nisi per intentionem finis, ut patet per Philosophum 2º Phisicorum … Item, in actionibus agentium naturalium contingit esse peccatum, peccatum autem non est nisi respectu finis: peccatum enim est illius quod propter aliquid est, ut Philosophus dicit 2º Phisicorum, unde peccatum non est nisi ex deuiatione a fine; agentia ergo per naturam agunt propter aliquid sicut propter finem.

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Item, alia ratio Aristotelis, quia error non est nisi peccatum respectu finis. Si enim non esset aliquis finis, quare peccaret magis quam non peccaret? Quare peccatum non est aliud nisi deviatio a fine.

One could object that these three texts, especially the commentaries on the Meta­ physics and Physics, sourced their ideas from Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles, Book III, chapter 2, where one finds the analogies of health and heat, and that they, therefore, could have been written by different authors drawing on the same source. That being the case, one should reply that, in that chapter, Aquinas does not mention the second book of the Physics, does not use the term deviatio and the syntagm “peccatum … non est nisi respectu finis”, and that, while he does refer to the second book of the Metaphysics, he does so in regard to another passage (i.e., 994a5-8) and not the passage meant by these three texts (994b14-16). Moreover, the commentaries on the Metaphysics and Physics contemporary to Peter do not contain questions with a similar title,69 which reinforces the view that these two commentaries are connected one to the other. Therefore, given that the Questiones and the Metaphysics commentary are authored by Peter of Auvergne and that, in this excerpt, the Metaphysics commentary shares some features with the Questiones and others with the Physics commentary, we can definitively conclude that the Physics commentary published under Siger’s name (Books I-IV) is the work of Peter of Auvergne.

69  The exceptions are, once again, the first Physics commentary contained in Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, at f. 51ra-b (the text is very similar to the text presented in the right column of the table) and the Metaphysics commentary conserved in Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 290ra-321vb (Book III, q. 3, ff. 299vb-300ra), which, however, I was unable to consult.

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2. The Questiones and the Scriptum We are fortunate enough to possess two commentaries—one literal and one in question form—on the same Aristotelian work by the same author, but we are also somewhat unfortunate, as one of the commentaries, the Scriptum, begins only in the third book of the Politics, and the other, the Questiones, stops at the beginning of the seventh. Even with this limitation, this means that a comparison of the two commentaries is possible and needs not be restricted to just the books covered in both texts, i.e., Books III-VII of the Politics. On the contrary, since passages from one book of the Scriptum are on occasion found in a different book of the Questiones and vice-versa, we can extend the comparison of the two works to their entirety. The two works share numerous parallels. While commenting on the same passage of the Politics, they occasionally mention the same source, and the wording of expressions and entire sentences is either nearly identical (see section 2.16) or very similar. Even more important is that both commentaries base their explanations of Aristotle on the same basic tenets, such as teleology and hylomorphism. Even so, beyond the similar lines of reasoning expressed in analogous, albeit not always identical, forms, the most relevant indication that the two commentaries share the same author is the fact that the same notions and interpretations are advanced while explaining different books of the Politics. Had these works been written by two distinct authors, and assuming that one had plagiarised or taken ideas from the other, then the similarities would occur while explaining the exact same sections of the Politics. This, at least, was the case with later commentators on the Politics who drew on the Scriptum, such as Guido Vernani, Burley, Raimundus Acgerii, Oresme and Peter of Osma–Ferdinand of Roa, and the same holds for the question commentaries influenced by the Questiones: whenever the Anonymous of Milan, the Anonymous of Baltimore and Nicholas of Vaudémont appropriate an idea from the Questiones, they do it in the same question. The resemblances between the Questiones and the Scriptum are numerous, and, to avoid a cumbersome and complex chain of evidence and argumentation, the following presentation is limited to the most manifest cases.70 As the text samples demonstrate, the Scriptum conveys its ideas in a clearer fashion, in a more elaborated Latin and lingers more on the point discussed than does the Questiones, wherein, more often than not, arguments are elaborated in a strictly syllogistic form. However, whenever the topic at hand is related to metaphysics or natural philosophy, the explanation of ideas in the Questiones tends to be longer than in the Scriptum. The text sections in the pages that follow bring to light not only lexical similarities but also—and principally—those between views and interpretations (which occur most notably in the explanation of Book III of the Politics). This section, moreover, thus serves to present some of the main tenets of Peter’s commentaries on the Politics. In 70 

Further parallels between the two works are indicated in the apparatus fontium of the edition.

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this sense, it also serves to underscore that, contrary to a long-established scholarly commonplace, literal commentaries did contain innovative interpretations. Peter’s views on the Politics are found in his two commentaries, not only in his question commentary.

2.1. The Ruler–Subject Relationship in Terms of the Mover–Moved As it will be seen in Chapter 5, Peter understands the relationship between ruler and subject in terms of actuality and potentiality whereby the ruler moves the subjects towards an end. This analogy is often reiterated throughout the Scriptum and (to a much greater extent) the Questiones. It can also be found in Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics71 and in one of his quodlibetal questions in terms very similar to those used in the Scriptum and in the Questiones.72 In contrast, this relationship is not evident in Albert’s and Aquinas’ commentaries on the Politics, and, although Peter certainly drew this analogy from Aquinas’ Summa theologiae,73 the way (and 71  Griet Galle, “Peter of Auvergne on the Celestial Movers. Edition and Discussion of his Questions 8-11 on Metaphysica XII”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 157-205, at 201, ll. 158-160: “Similiter in civitate est aliquis principans et imperans, scilicet cuius voluntate moventur ea que moventur in civitate, ad cuius etiam operationem ordinantur operationes omnium civium”. 72  Petrus de Alvernia, Quodlibet VI, q. 10 (Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 95rb): “Omnis autem huiusmodi communitas est communicatio principum et subiectorum, ut apparet 1º Politice. Est autem quedam politica liberorum, quedam autem domini et seruorum, que dicitur despotica apud Grecos … Principis autem secundum quod princeps (cod.: principis) est mouere et dirigere subditos in finem, dicente Philosopho, 5º Metaphisice, principatus est secundum cuius preuoluntatem mouentur alia in principatu, subditi autem ut subditus est moueri a principante et sequi motum ipsius … utrum autem libertas, qua aliquis potest agere recte et qua potest pati recte uel dirigi in finem, sit unius rationis uel non, dicendum quod non, sicut enim potentia actiua et passiua non sunt unius rationis, sed diuersarum, per attributionem unius (iter.) ad alterum. Primo enim et principaliter dicta potentia actiua dicitur, passiua autem per attributionem ad ipsam”. Compare this passage with both Questiones, Liber V, q. 8, ll. 32-33, where the same reference to Book V of the Metaphysics occurs, and with the footnote that follows. 73  See, for instance, Thomas de Aquino, Pars Prima Summae theologiae a quaestione L ad quaestionem CXIX, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita V (Roma: ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1889), Ia, q. 82, art. 4, p. 303: “Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt”; Id., Secunda secundae Summae theologiae a quaestione I ad quaestionem LVI, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita VIII (Roma: ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1895), IIa-IIae, q. 50, art. 2, p. 375: “dicendum quod servus per imperium movetur a domino et subditus a principante, aliter tamen quam irrationalia et inanimata moveantur a suis motoribus. Nam inanimata et irrationalia aguntur solum ab alio, non autem ipsa agunt seipsa quia non habent dominium sui actus per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo rectitudo regiminis ipsorum non est in ipsis, sed solum in motoribus”; Id., Secunda secundae Summae theologiae a quaestione LVII ad quaestionem CXXII, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita IX (Roma: ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1897), IIa-IIae, q. 102, art. 2, p. 376: “Gubernare autem est movere aliquos in debitum finem: sicut nauta gubernat navem ducendo eam ad portum. Omne autem movens habet excellentiam quandam et virtutem supra id quod movetur”. The notion that the ruler moves his subjects and subordinates soon became commonplace and is found as an incidental remark in other works, such as Henry of Ghent’s Summa; cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae): art. I-V, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XXI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), art. IV, q. 1, p. 270, ll. 28-29:

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frequency with which) he uses it makes it his own: it becomes a distinctive trait of his interpretation of the Politics. This ‘spatial conception’ of political authority is the roter Faden of the Questiones: Questiones, Liber I, q. 12, ll. 38-47

Scriptum, Liber VII, cap. 10

Vlterius aduertendum quod, cum ratio principantis et subiecti sequatur rationem eius quod est unum esse ex pluribus, ut iam patuit, oportet quod, sicut diuersificatur ratio illius quod fit unum ex pluribus, sic etiam diuersificetur ratio istorum. Modo in illis que faciunt unum aliquando ita est quod ex duobus componentibus fit una essentia, ut ex potentia et actu: cum istorum unum sit esse, nullum eorum alteri principabitur, quia una est istorum operatio et actus, et essentia et esse; quia tamen unum istorum est actus et aliud subiectum eius, ideo prima radix principantis et subiecti ex istis accipitur, scilicet actu et potentia.

… principans se habet ad subiectum sicut agens ad passum et mouens ad motum: principantis enim est mouere et dirigere subiectum, subiecti uero moueri et dirigi secundum quod huiusmodi. Mouens autem et agens secundum quod tale excellentius est passo et moto secundum quod huiusmodi, quia illud est in actu, hoc autem in potentia. (ed. Lanza, p. 535, ll. 334-339)

2.2. Teleology It is impossible to overstate the importance teleology plays in both the Questiones and the Scriptum. This comes as no surprise, since in the realm of practical reason, the action takes its principle from the good aimed for.74 What is remarkable is the frequency and variety of contexts in which Peter applies teleological arguments. Numerous questions, definitions and notabilia are settled in the two commentaries by framing the matter at hand in teleological terms—and this is quite often associated with a mention of the relationship represented by the mover–moved dyad. Whenever this occurs with respect to the same passage of the Politics, the two commentaries use very similar wording, as illustrated by these passages, a few among many: Questiones, Liber III, q. 15, ll. 25-28

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 11

Dicendum quod ratio principantis inquantum huiusmodi per se et primo ex fine sumitur; finis autem principatus recti est recte dirigere et mouere ciues ad felicitatem; ergo princeps secundum rationem suam erit qui potest recte dirigere et mouere.

Manifestum enim est quod ratio principatus ex fine sumitur: finis uero politie recte est feliciter uiuere, ideo ex hoc debet sumi ratio principatus. (ed. Lanza, p. 91, ll. 150-152)

A similar argument is found again in Book V, with respect to 1309a30-b3, where Aristotle raises doubt as to whom should be preferred for an office: a powerful but “Similiter rex qui intendit bonum regni movet barones et ballivos qui intendunt bonum provinciarum aut civitatum quarundam”. 74  On this, see Chapter 5, below.

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wicked man, or a good and loyal man. The answer comes down to determining which of the two is more capable of moving subjects towards the ultimate ends of the political regime. Questiones, Liber V, q. 14, ll. 17-20

Scriptum, Liber V, cap. 7

… quod patet: oportet enim rationem eorum que sunt in finem ex fine sumere; princeps autem ad finem ordinatur etiam immediate; ergo ille potius erit princeps et magis assumendus est in principem qui magis potest dirigere in finem politie secundum quod huiusmodi.

Et ratio huius est quia principatus rationem sumit ex fine, et ea que sunt ad finem rationem sumunt ex fine. Et ideo ille est assumendus in principem qui habet illud secundum quod possunt magis pertingere ad finem politie. (ed. Lanza, p. 317, ll. 395-399)

One striking similarity between the two commentaries is found in the interpretation of the Politics IV.5, 1292b11-21, where Aristotle states that a regime may be ruled in the mode of another regime, that is, an oligarchy may be ruled democratically, even though the laws in force are oligarchic. The Questiones present one question related to this passage, the solutio being based chiefly on teleology: while a political community cannot aim for two different ends, that is, it cannot adopt concomitantly two forms of government, it is nonetheless possible for a community to have one form of government and abide by the laws of another. The Questiones frame the solutio in terms of simpliciter–secundum quid. As the next passage demonstrates, the Scriptum advances exactly the same argument (using very similar wording) as the Questiones: Questiones, Liber IV, q. 8, ll. 15-23, 29-33

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 5

Dicendum quod tenere leges secundum aliquam politiam est uiuere secundum illam politiam, quia tenere leges est facere ea que intendit lex ad politiam ordinata. Ergo querere utrum aliqua ciuitas possit uiuere secundum unam politiam et tenere leges alterius sicut quereretur utrum posset uiuere secundum politias diuersas, et hec duo non differunt. Et ideo dicendum ad hoc quod contraria simpliciter et secundum actum perfectum simul eidem non possunt inesse; contraria autem ambo secundum quid, uel unum simpliciter et aliud secundum quid, eidem inesse bene est possibile … unitas enim finis est ex unitate ordinis, unitas autem ordinis attenditur ex unitate primi in illo, quare impossibile est unam ciuitatem intendere simpliciter duos fines. Secundum quid autem possibile est, uel alterum secundum quid, quia sic bene contingit contraria eidem simul inesse …

… si aliqui uiuant secundum unam politiam et regantur per leges alterius politie, simul et semel intendunt diuersos fines, uel eadem politia tendit in diuersos fines. Sed hoc est inpossibile, quare non uidetur esse possibile quod aliqui uiuant secundum unam politiam et leges sint alterius politie. Dicendum quod non est possibile quod aliqui simpliciter uiuant secundum unam politiam et simpliciter leges in illa sint secundum aliam, quia simul tenderent in diuersos fines simpliciter, quod non est possibile. Sed possibile est quod aliqui secundum quid uiuant secundum unam politiam et secundum quid regantur legibus alterius politie, uel simpliciter quidem uiuant secundum unam politiam, regantur autem in aliquibus legibus alterius, uel econtrario. (ed. Lanza, p. 176, ll. 10-20)

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2.3. Hylomorphism Alongside teleology, hylomorphism represents a cornerstone of Peter’s interpretation of the Politics. When reading the Questiones, one sometimes has the impression that it is more a commentary on the Physics or on the Metaphysics with a few political digressions than it is a commentary on the Politics framed in metaphysical terms. One striking instance of Peter’s use of hylomorphism occurs in Book IV. In chapter 3 of Book IV of the Politics, Aristotle explains that there are many forms of government because the parts that constitute each political community vary. In other words, the form of government depends, for instance, on which part of the community has the upper hand—the wealthy, the poor or the citizens of middle standing. The arrangement of the public offices thus depends accordingly on the weight given to particular elements within the community: a community where agriculture (and hence farmers) plays an important role will have offices different from one where trade is predominant. In relation to this chapter, Peter raises the question of whether the forms of government are distinguished according to the distinction of the parts of the political community (q. 4). In his answer, Peter argues that the forms of government are distinguished insofar as there is a distinction between the rulers. While this view agrees with the ‘spirit’ of the Politics IV.3, the way Peter substantiates it bears no resemblance to Aristotle’s text: he conceives of the political community as a composite of matter and form and, based on the Physics, argues that, while matter exists for the sake of form, form is individuated by matter.75 He then applies this same conceptual structure to politics: the form of government (politia) represents the form and the civitas the matter. This means that the various politiae are distinguished from one another in terms of their matter, i.e., by the parts of the civitas. However, Peter underlines that not every material part of the civitas is relevant in terms of the distinction of the form, just as not every kind of matter is relevant in defining a circle. Only those kinds of matter are relevant, as, without them, the form cannot exist, that is, the matter which is a distinctive part of a given species. In this sense, whether a circle is made of gold or copper is completely irrelevant to its definition; the matter that defines a circle is its surface and quantity.76 Likewise, what distinguishes the politiae is the matter without which any political community cannot exist, that is, its rulers. The same reasoning appears in the Scriptum, though in a much more straightforward fashion. There, Peter uses the example of the animal to illustrate his point: 75  Peter does not deal with the principle of individuation here; instead, he just states that form receives “a certain distinction” from matter without giving details about how matter can individuate form. 76  Peter has in mind here the ‘intelligible matter’ which permits us to think of objects such as those used in mathematics; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.10, 1036a10-12.

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parts like flesh and bones are essential parts of the forma rei, which does not hold for body hair and nails, because animal species are distinguished by their respective kinds of flesh and bones, not according to their nails and body hair. As we can see, the views in the two commentaries are identical, for both argue that it is only on account of the main part of the civitas—the rulers—that the regimes are distinguishable one from the other: Questiones, Liber IV, q. 4, ll. 12-14, 25-42

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 2

Contra est Philosophus, qui dicit quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem principantium; sed principantes sunt partes ciuitatis; ergo politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem partium ciuitatis … et ideo materia principalem rationem habebit a forma, forma autem econuerso aliqualem distinctionem recipit ex materia. Et ideo, cum politia comparetur ad partes ciuitatis sicut forma ad materiam, ideo secundum distinctionem illarum partium erit aliqualiter distinctio politiarum. Sed intelligendum quod materia dupliciter inue­ nitur: quedam sine qua impossibile est formam reperire, sicut materia que primo et principaliter recipit formam, et ista dicitur materia pertinens ad speciem; alia autem est materia non pertinens ad speciem. Sicut in circulo aliqua est materia circuli remota, sine qua non potest inueniri circulus, ut quantum uel superficies; alia autem est materia circuli sine qua materia potest inueniri circulus, ut aurum uel cuprum. Et quia forma recipit distinctionem a materia, ideo a materia que est subiectum speciei per accidens forma recipit distinctionem per accidens, et ab illa materia que est subiectum speciei per se recipit distinctionem per se. Et ideo politia per accidens recipit distinctionem a partibus ciuitatis per accidens, et de illis nichil ad presens; a partibus autem per se ciuitatis recipit distinctionem per se. Hee autem sunt partes principales.

Et dicit quod manifestum est quod necesse est esse plures politias differentes adinuicem secundum speciem, quia distinctio politiarum secundum speciem est secundum distinctionem partium principalium. Quamuis enim diuersitas secundum speciem non sit propter diuersitatem partium materialium, tamen ad diuersitatem partium materialium sequitur diuersitas forme. Sed partium ciuitatis quedam differunt specie adinuicem etiam pertinentium ad speciem: plures igitur erunt politie. Et est intelligendum ad euidentiam dicti quod, sicut partium animalis quedam sunt que non pertinent ad speciem – sicut hec caro, hec ossa –, quedam que pertinent ad ipsam – sicut caro et ossa absolute –, et sicut sunt quedam que non attingunt ad formam rei – sicut pili et ungues –, quedam que attingunt – sicut cor et epar –, et secundum distinctionem istarum secundum speciem diuersificantur animalia secundum speciem, non autem secundum primarum distinctionem, que non attingunt ad formam nec pertinent ad speciem, sic ciuitatis sunt quedam partes que non attingunt ad ciuilitatem nec pertinent ad formam eius, alie sunt partes principales ipsius – et secundum distinctionem istarum distinguntur politie –, cuiusmodi sunt ille secundum quas distinguntur principatus. (ed. Lanza, p. 152, ll. 63-80)

2.4. The Definition of Citizen There is possibly no better place to compare Peter’s two commentaries than at the beginning of Book III: on the one hand, citizenship is one of the topics that Peter discusses in greater detail, and, on the other, we can compare both of Peter’s commentaries with those of Albert and Aquinas. Aristotle begins the third book of the Politics precisely with the question “Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term?” (1275a1-2). Just a few lines before, he had justified the necessity of this inquiry by arguing that, since the political community is “composite, like any other whole made up of many parts” (1274b39-40),

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it is then necessary to begin such an inquiry by defining the parts of the political community, that is, the citizenry. Albert and Aquinas limit themselves to reiterating Aristotle’s statement that the community can be compared with a whole composed of parts, the citizens being its parts.77 Lidia Lanza has underlined that, with respect to the common parts of the Scriptum and Aquinas’ commentary (the first six chapters of Book III of the Politics), Peter is far more prolix than Aquinas; for instance, by providing a more thorough explanation of the Aristotelian text, substantiating his explanations with philosophical principles even when there is no need. This can be ascribed to the fact that the Scriptum does not cover Books I-II. What is more, Peter intended Book III to be the introduction to the principles of the science of politics.78 This is clear in the first two chapters of Book III, where Peter engages in an explanation of the text that goes far beyond the Politics and is based on metaphysical principles. Let us follow his argument step by step, since each step in the development of the Scriptum has a correspondent in the first three questions of the Questiones. The two commentaries begin with the claim that one cannot have knowledge of the whole without first knowing its parts. Questiones, Liber III, q. 2, ll. 11-16

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 1

Contra est Philosophus, et arguitur quia consi­ derantem de composito oportet prius conside­ rare de simplici. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut esse compositi est ex simplicibus, ita et cognitio, quia sicut se habet aliquid ad esse, ita et ad esse uerum, sicut dicitur 2º Metaphisice; sed ciuis se habet ad ciuitatem sicut simplex ad compositum; ergo oportet ipsum prius considerari.

In prima dicit debentem considerare de toto oportet considerare de partibus: sicut enim esse totius est ex esse partium, sic cognitio totius est ex cognitione partium, quare debentem considerare de toto oportet considerare de partibus. Sed ciuitas est quoddam totum; constat enim ex pluribus partibus, sicut quodlibet aliud totum: est enim ciuitas multitudo quedam ciuium. Quare manifestum est quod debentem considerare de ciuitate oportet inuestigare quid sit ciuis et quem oportet uocare ciuem. (ed. Lanza, p. 8, ll. 35-42)

The two texts then go on to argue that, like any given being (ens), a citizen is defined by his activity (operatio), which must be related to the form of the whole of which he forms part. The form in question is the political regime of the civitas. While the wording is not quite the same in the two texts, both, nevertheless, refer to Politics I.1, 1253a20-25, where Aristotle states that the individual is as “a part in relation to the whole”:

77  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.1, pp. 208-209; Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, III.1, pp. A186-A187. 78  Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, pp. 33-34.

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Questiones, Liber III, q. 3, ll. 17-28

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 1

… et ideo esse et rationem habet a toto, quia unumquodque habet esse et rationem secundum speciem, ergo ciuis per habitudinem ad totum; ciuis autem est pars ciuitatis; ergo ciuis inquantum huiusmodi non determinatur nisi per formam ciuitatis. Ciuitas autem determinatur in quam potest, ut dicit Philosophus in 1º, ubi dicit quod omnium est operatio aliqua in quam, cum possunt, hec dicantur maxime, cum autem non possunt, non dicuntur amplius talia nisi equiuoce; ciuitas autem maxime determinatur istis operationibus principalibus, que sunt consiliari et principari; ergo in istis consistet ratio ciuitatis: determinata enim sunt ciuitatis et forme eius. Ergo et ciuem, cum sit pars ciuitatis, per eadem determinare oportet, quare simpliciter erit ciuis qui potest participare principatu consiliatiuo uel iudicatiuo.

Vlterius intelligendum est quod unumquodque entium determinatur aliqua operatione, in quam, cum potest, ; cum uero non potest non dicitur, nisi equiuoce, sicut dicitur in 1º huius. Ciuis autem est aliquod ens; ergo habet aliquam operationem in quam, cum potest, dicitur ciuis, cum autem non potest, non dicitur, per quam diffinitur. Et ideo Philosophus, uolens dare diffinitionem ciuis, diffinit ipsum per operationem eius secundum quod ciuis est. Operatio autem eius secundum quam ciuis est est operatio que conuenit ei per formam ciuitatis, quia pars, secundum quod huiusmodi, non habet operationem nisi uirtute forme totius. Forma autem principalis ciuitatis est politia … Dicit igitur quod ciuis simpliciter nullo alio magis determinatur quam per parti­ cipare iudicio et attingere ad principatum. (ed. Lanza, pp. 9, l. 205-p. 10, l. 115 and ll. 119-121)

The two texts proceed by establishing the distinction between a ‘citizen strictly speaking’ (simpliciter)—whoever can hold public office—and a ‘citizen in a qualified sense’ (secundum quid), such as children, women and other inhabitants barred from holding office. This distinction is already found in Albert and Aquinas.79 For Peter, however, simply restating the distinction is not enough. In order to clarify his idea, he makes an analogy between the community and an animal: in both cases, there are parts which participate in the activity of the whole and those which do not contribute to the activity, which parts are nevertheless necessary to the whole.80 In the Questiones, more time is spent, in this instance, dwelling on this topic than is done in the Scriptum, this with examples of different parts of the animal being provided: some parts participate in the animal’s activity, such as the hands and the eyes; other parts participate only potentially, among which is blood; still others lose their function and do not participate in any activity—paralysed limbs, for example—and finally, other parts yet are part of the animal, such as the nails and the body hair, but they do not play any part in the activity of the animal as a whole.81 Peter finds a correspondent in the political community for each of the four parts of the animal.82 79  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.1, p. 209; Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politi­ corum, III.1, p. A187, ll. 84-115. 80  The activity as addressed here is understood in terms of political activity—counselling and judging—and not any other forms of activity or labour contributing to the proper functioning of the community. 81  This stretch of text from the Questiones is problematic. See the apparatus fontium of Liber III, q. 3, ll. 41-49, regarding the examples of the heart, the hand, the hair and the nails. 82  The parallel presented here is also found in Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.118. To avoid any misunderstanding, Peter is referring in this passage principally to the activity of the animal and thus to the parts that contribute to such activity. Peter, again, enlists the analogy of the community

84

Interpretative Study

Questiones, Liber III, q. 3, ll. 39-51

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 1

Et est uidere simile in natura, quia oportet ciuitatem bene legibus ordinatam intelligere sicut animal, ut econuerso dicit Philosophus in libro De Motibus Animalium. In animali autem sunt quedam partes participantes formam totius et speciem et operationem, ut cor et manus: hec enim sunt animata, et hec dicuntur partes pertinentes ad speciem. Alie sunt que non participant illam nisi tantum in potentia, ut sanguis, et talia non sunt partes animate nisi in potentia. Et alie, propter nimiam exsiccationem, fiunt aliquando mortue, ut in membro paralitico, et iste sunt partes mortue; alie autem que ad motum attingunt, scilicet generationem, non tamen ad formam, ut ungues et pili. Et iste omnes non sunt partes simpliciter. Ita et in ciuitate ciues simpliciter dicuntur qui attingunt ad principales operationes; qui autem ad illas non attingunt non dicuntur ciues nisi secundum quid.

Sicut enim nos uidemus in animali quod illa est pars simpliciter ipsius que attingit ad formam animalis et operationem, sic ciuis est ille qui attingit ad formam ciuitatis et operationem; et sicut in animali sunt quedam partes que non attingunt ad formam animalis nec ad operationem, sunt tamen necessarie, sic in ciuitate sunt quidam qui non possunt attingere ad operationem ciuitatis, sunt tamen necessarii. (ed. Lanza, p. 10, ll. 122-127)

The two texts then state, using similar wording, that there are two ways in which one can take part in political activity: on the one hand, by being appointed to an office and, on the other, by complying with a judicial decision, through participation in an election or by consenting to an election/appointment. The Questiones, however, characterise these ways as active and passive, respectively: Questiones, Liber III, q. 3, ll. 52-55

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 1

Sed intelligendum quod attingere ad consilia tantum uel iudicationes dicitur dupliciter: uel actiue, ita quod personaliter ad talia eligatur aliquis, uel passiue, ita quod iudicanti obediat uel eligat uel saltim electioni consentiat.

Sed est intelligendum quod attingere ad principatum contingit dicere multipliciter: uno modo ita quod principetur, et sic non omnes ciues attingunt; alio modo est attingere ad principatum quia attingit ad iudicium uel quia eligit principantem uel habet uocem in eligendo illum qui eligit. (ed. Lanza, p. 11, ll. 147-151)

No such distinction is found in Albert and Aquinas. Instead, both commentators limit themselves to stating, in accordance with Aristotle (1275a24-26), that there are two kinds of office: namely, those with term limits and those without.83 The Questiones and the Scriptum agree to such an extent at the beginning of Book III that they could almost be said to be as one.

and an animal in Book IV of the Scriptum; however, because he is concerned with the parts that are essential to the definition of the animal, the analogy is a little different from the one employed here. See Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, IV.2, p. 152, ll. 70-80 and IV.3, p. 158, l. 22-p. 159, l. 59. 83  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.1, p. 209; Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, III.1, p. A187, ll. 129-154.

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2.5. The Difference between a Free Man and a Slave Peter’s definitions of master (i.e., a free man) and slave are also framed in metaphysical terms (see, for instance, qq. 10 and 13 of Book I). Peter defines the slave as whoever cannot move himself alone but requires someone else to direct and put him in motion; conversely, the free man is defined as whoever is himself the dri­ving force of his own motion. In Book IV of the Questiones, while dealing with the definition of nobility of birth, he again offers a definition of a free man. There, Peter draws on the Metaphysics, though he uses the aphorisms taken from the Physics and the Metaphysics in the form found in the florilegium Parvi flores: “finis proportionatur agenti” and “homo liber dicitur qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est”.84 These two sayings are also found in Book VII of the Scriptum, where Peter deals with happiness and incidentally defines what a free man and a slave are. Questiones, Liber IV, q. 12, ll. 39-50

Scriptum, Liber VII, cap. 2

Et ideo liber est qui potest per se esse principium suorum motuum. Et quia finis proportionatur agenti, ideo, cum talis se moueat per se, ipse etiam erit et operabitur propter se, et ipse non est propter alium. Ratio ergo liberi est posse mouere se gratia sui ipsius, et per hoc differt a seruo, qui non potest mouere se, et item operatur que operatur gratia alterius, ut gratia domini. Dominatiua autem est bona dispositio corporis et materie, ex quocumque sit, siue a multis seu ab uno: dispositio – inquam – ad bene preuidendum sibi et aliis et ad mouendum se propter se et etiam alios propter se. Et per hoc differt a libero, qui propter se mouet se solum, non alios inquantum huiusmodi; et similiter a seruo, qui nullo modo nec se nec alios mouere potest.

homo liber dicitur qui per uirtutem intellectualem existentem in eo operatur, non accipiens ab alio rationem operandi nec impedimentum habens ex parte materie, et qui operatur ad finem qui debetur ei secundum naturam predictam … Econtrario autem, homo seruus dicitur qui non est natus operari secundum uirtutem intellectus proprii, sed uirtutem et rationem operandi accipiens ab alio, obediens, operatur. Et quia finis correspondet agenti, seruus etiam est qui operatur principaliter ad finem alterius. Et ideo, sicut liber homo est qui est sui ipsius causa, et in ratione finis et agentis, ita seruus qui neutro istorum modorum est principaliter sibi causa, et hoc uel propter inperfectionem intellectus in eo secundum se uel ex indispositione materie. Et ita uita liberi dicitur uita secundum rationem propriam, serui autem secundum rationem alienam. (ed. Lanza, p. 457, ll. 307-310, 314-323)

As noted earlier, because the Scriptum begins in Book III and does not cover Books I-II of the Politics there, Peter may have taken the beginning of Book III as an occasion to set forth the principles of politics, dawdling over definitions even when it might be superfluous. This same attitude is, however, also noticeable in the other books of the Politics, for sometimes Peter takes a paragraph to offer his own thoughts regarding notions previously covered—though by Aquinas—in Books I and II. This might well be the reason why he provided definitions for free men and slaves in Book VII, as we have just seen, and again in Book VIII of the Scriptum. 84 

On the role of this florilegium in the Questiones, see Chapter 3, below.

86

Interpretative Study

The terms in which Peter defines free men and slaves here are quite similar to those found in Book I of the Questiones. That said, the context in which each text defines what a free man and a slave are differs. In the Questiones, Book I is precisely the place where it is apt for such a definition to be made, while, in the Scriptum, Peter makes it while commenting on the passage in which Aristotle states that a free man should not partake in physical labour because it deforms the body (VIII.2, 1337b515). Although the texts in the passages below are not identical, the ideas they convey are: the free man moves himself on account of his reason, while the slave needs to be moved by someone else and, to carry out his tasks, he needs to be physically strong: Questiones, Liber I, q. 13, ll. 27-29, 32-52

Scriptum, Liber VIII, cap. 1

… ad considerandum qui sunt liberi a natura et qui serui, oportet respicere ad primam radicem principatus et seruitus: hoc autem est actus et potentia … Modo ratio actus est quod sit principium essendi et mouendi, quia est id quo res est, et iterum est forma, cuius est mouere. Qui ergo in hominibus inuenitur potens esse princi­ pium esse et salutis domus, et hoc per prudentiam, et etiam principium mouendi et operandi singula in domo per preuidentiam, iste erit loco digniori, sicut est actus, et accipiet rationem principantis; et hoc etiam erit per formam suam, licet per consequens, quia per bonam dispositionem rationis. Ratio autem potentie est recipere esse ab alio et moueri ab alio et non mouere nisi secundum quod mouetur, quod etiam pertinet ad rationem materie et imperfecti. Qui ergo, inter homines, se habet secundum materiam taliter ut nec ad salutem esse sui sibi sufficiat – propter defectum prudentie –, et etiam non per se aliquid operari possit nisi ductus et iussus ab alio – propter defectum preuidendi –, iste, ex istis dispositionibus sue materie sibi ista bona auferentibus, naturaliter erit seruus. Sed ulterius necessarium est ei ut, quia de se moueri non potest nisi ab alio moueatur, ut habeat per quod aptus sit recipere uirtutem et formam primi mouentis, que est impressio consilii, et ideo oportet esse animatum. Nec hoc sufficit, sed oportet ut, inquantum talis, ad bonum domini ordinetur, a quo consequitur suum optimum inquantum seruus, et ideo oportet quod possit exequi quod dominus per iussum mandat, et ideo oportet corpore robustum esse. Tales igitur et hii sunt domini et serui.

Circa primum est intelligendum quod homo liber est qui est sui ipsius causa, et in ratione cause mouentis et in ratione finis … In ratione quidem mouentis quando ab illo per quod est homo et quod est principale in eo, puta ab intellectu, mouetur, preiudicando et ordinando modum et rationem agendi; in ratione autem finis cum mouetur ad bonum et finem ipsius secundum illud idem quod principale est in eo, secundum intellectum; et tanto magis liber est secundum naturam quanto magis natus est moueri ab eo quod principalissimum est in eo et ad finem et bonum eius secundum illud idem. Homo autem seruus dicitur qui non est natus moueri, propter indispositionem materie, ab intellectu proprio, per quem determinatur, sed ab intellectu et ratione alterius, nec etiam operatur sui gratia, sed gratia illius alterius; et quanto minus natus est moueri a se et magis ab alio et ad finem alterius, tanto magis seruus est. Ad hoc autem quod moueatur ab alio et agat ad finem alterius, requiritur robur corporale; et hoc rationabiliter accidit, quia, ubi deficit uirtus intellectus et forme, excedit uirtus corporis et materie. Et ideo dixit Aristoteles in 1º huius quod uigentes intellectu, et si deficiant corpore, sunt naturaliter aliorum domini; robusti autem corpore, deficientes intellectu, sunt naturaliter serui. (ed. Lanza, pp. 590, l. 123-p. 591, l. 141)

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2.6. The Two Kinds of Multitude The distinction between two kinds of multitudes occurs when Peter is commenting on Politics III.11, 1281b18-20, where Aristotle, addressing whether the multitude can participate in power, remarks: “Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible to apply [i.e., that the multitude can share in power]; for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes?” Albert takes this remark to mean that some multitudes can be beastlike,85 and Robert Grosseteste had already equated the plebs with an animal in one of his additions to Aspasius’ commentary on Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics.86 It was Peter, however, who first formulated the distinction between the two kinds of multitude—a distinction that would be repeated by every successive commentator. For Peter, there are two kinds of multitude: ‘well-ordered’ and a ‘beastlike’. The former consists of a few wise and prudent men who guide a multitude (i.e., the populace), which is open to reason and persuasion; the latter consists of nothing but the multitude and is not inclined to prudence or reason. He describes it as follows in his two commentaries (in this case, the Scriptum is much clearer, if wordier): Questiones, Liber III, q. 15, ll. 35-38

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 8

Intelligendum ergo quod quedam est multitudo erronea non persuabilis, et hec est multitudo bestialis et nata subesse principatu dispotico; alia autem multitudo bene persuasibilis, mixta ex sapientibus et ex uolgaribus bene persuabilibus.

Est enim quedam multitudo bestialis, cuius homines inclinantur ad actus bestiales et parum rationis habent, et in tali multitudine non est uerum quod ex illis hominibus possit fieri aliquid uirtuosum, si conueniant in unum. Alia est multitudo in qua quilibet habet aliquid uirtutis et prudentie et inclinatur ad actum uirtutis, et in tali uerum est quod illud quod fit ex istis, cum conueniunt in unum, est aliquid uirtuosum. (ed. Lanza, p. 68, ll. 193-199) Liber III, cap. 9 … duplex est multitudo: una quidem bestialis, in qua nullus habet rationem uel modicum, sed inclinatur ad bestiales actus, et manifestum est quod istam non expedit dominari aliquo modo, quia sine ratione est, et coniunctim et diuisim; alia est multitudo ubi omnes aliquid habent rationis et inclinantur ad prudentiam, et bene suasibiles sunt a ratione, et talem expedit magis dominari quam paucos uirtuosos. (ed. Lanza, p. 71, ll. 8-13).

85  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.7, p. 258: “Unde ostendit quod in aliqua multitudine hoc non est manifestum, eo quod nihil unitatis micat in ea, sed tota est bestialis”. 86  The Greek Commentaries … Volume III, VIII.11, p. 166: “Rex enim, in quantum rex est, rationem solam sequitur et ea sola in omnibus agendis ad populum utitur. Plebs vero magis sequitur motus animales et sensuales”.

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Interpretative Study

For Peter, only the ‘well-ordered multitude’ can take part in politics, namely by electing and—if need be—correcting the ruler. While the few wise men (who can also be wealthy, as the Scriptum remarks) provide guidance on account of their prudence, the multitude contributes its strength (potentia) should the ruler need to be corrected or forced to accept the office to which he has been appointed. Questiones, Liber III, q. 17, ll. 13-21, 24-29

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 11

Dicendum quod multitudinem uilem et bestialem non expedit ad ista attingere; multitudinem tamen mixtam et ordinatam iustum est attingere ad ista: ad electionem quidem, quia electio principis duo requirit, scilicet consilium de principe bono inuestigando et potentiam ad cogendum electum ut repiciat honus … Illud ergo maxime expedit eligere quod in se habet consilium et potestatem; sed hoc est multitudo, quia per sapientes, pars sui, habet prudentiam, per se autem potentiam.

Possibile enim est in multitudine esse aliquos uiros sapientes et prudentes et aliquos ualde diuites, ipsos autem et alios populares bene suasibiles a ratione et obedibiles; talem autem multitudinem melius est principari quam paucos, quia ad principandum duo requiruntur: scire recte regere et potentia. Sed in multitudine tali ista duo reperiuntur: quia sapientes habet et prudentes, scit regere; quia multitudo est, habet potentiam cohercendi et repellendi inimicos. (ed. Lanza, p. 93, ll. 211-217)

… hoc autem conuenit multitudini, quia sapientes penam discernit, per populum autem eam infligere potest. Et neutrum istorum per se posset utrumque, sed sapientes haberent discretionem de magnitudine pene, tamen potentia carent, populus ergo econuerso, habens potentiam, quantitatem pene non discerneret …

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 9 magis expedit totam multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo quam paucos: et uocat hic multitudinem aggregatum ex sapientibus, maioribus et prudentibus, et mediocribus et populo: istam totam multitudinem talem magis expedit dominari quam paucos, uilem tamen multitudinem non expedit … quia duo exiguntur in regimine politie: unum est ratio recta – hoc autem habet ista multitudo per illos sapientes –, aliud est potentia, ut possit cohercere et punire malos – hoc autem habet per populum –. (ibid., p. 77, ll. 208-212 and p. 78, ll. 214-217)

Peter’s distinction between two kinds of multitude runs throughout the entire commentary tradition on the Politics: it is still found as late as the early seventeenth century in, among other texts, John Case’s Sphaera civitatis (published in 1588)87 and Philipp Scherb’s commentary on the Politics (1610).88

2.7. The Question of Ostracism Peter begins his examination of kingship with q. 21 of Book III, about whether anyone exceeding all others in some good should be expelled from the political 87  Ioannes Casus, Sphaera civitatis; hoc est reipublicae recte ac pie secundum leges administrandae ratio (Francofurdi: apud Ioannem Wechelum, 1589), III.7, distinctio tertia quaestionis, p. 144. 88  Philippus Scherbius, Discursus politici in Aristotelis de Republica (Francofurti: praelo Bringer, impensis Schönwet, 1610), III.8, p. 150: “distinctio prima adhibenda est inter populum beluinum et bene moratum”.

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community. As we shall see in Chapter 5, in this question, Peter applies Aristotle’s theory of friendship to the political context, namely that friendship requires a kind of likeness (similitudo) and equality (equalitas) or, at the very least, a certain proportion thereof between the two friends.89 The use of Aristotle’s Ethics to frame the question of ostracism is unique to the Questiones, as it is absent from the Scriptum and from Albert’s commentary.90 Nevertheless, both the wording and arguments used in the Questiones and the Scriptum are strikingly similar. In the Questiones, Peter begins the Contra with a sentence that is almost identical to the one found in the Scriptum, right where he discusses ostracism. This sentence is relevant, as neither politia nor civitas is defined in this way elsewhere in these two or any other commentaries. Questiones, Liber III, q. 21, l. 10

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 12

Contra: ciuitas est communicatio similium et equalium …

… illud est intelligendum ubi est politia equalium et similium (ed. Lanza, p. 103, ll. 235-236)

Following on from Aristotle, Peter states that, if a man truly exceeds all others when it comes to virtue—in the case of a good regime—then the rest of the citizenry should choose him to rule them perpetually. However, in a corrupt regime, where the greater part of the citizenry lacks the necessary virtue(s), the exceptional individual ought to be expelled because of the unbalance such a man causes in the community. In the Questiones, Peter argues that, within the political community, such a man would be like the First Cause in the universe and so must not be expelled. This is a mere reference to the medieval topos of monarchy as the best regime on the grounds that it is the regime that most resembles the arrangement of the universe. Its origins, along with other argumentative topoi used in favour of monarchy, such as the comparison of the civitas with an animal, in which there is always a main organ (i.e., the heart), can be traced back to Albert’s first commentary on the Ethics.91 However, the way Peter uses this topos in his commentaries is very distinctive. While discussing the issue of ostracism, he uses the topos only in the Scriptum:

89  Cf., e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.2, 1155a33, VIII.3, 1156a19-20 and 1156b7-23; VIII.6, 1158b1-11. The term used in the Latin version of the Ethics is similitudo; cf., e.g., Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-4.4, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 521, ll. 9-10. 90  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.8, pp. 280-281. While Albert makes reference to the Ethics, he does so to state that monarchy is the best political regime and that the most virtuous men are self-sufficient and thus work for the sake of the others. 91  On this, see Roberto Lambertini, “La monarchia prima della Monarchia: le ragioni del regnum nella ricezione medievale di Aristotele”, in B. Pinchard–C. Trottmann (eds.), Pour Dante. Dante et l’Apocalypse. Lectures humanistes de Dante (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2001), pp. 39-75.

90

Interpretative Study

Questiones, Liber III, q. 21, ll. 74-76

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 12

Item, talis se habet in politia bona sicut prima causa in toto uniuerso; hec autem non est eicienda ab uniuerso propter excessum suum; ergo nec iste.

… illum oportet magis principari qui magis accedit ad principatum naturalem et ad principatum uniuersi; sed iste, qui sic excedit omnes alios in uirtute est huiusmodi … Iterum, in uniuerso est unus princeps; principatus autem uniuersi unus et optimus est. Quare ille in ciuitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus uniuersi et naturalis; ergo ille principatus erit melior, in quo erit unus princeps. (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 222-225, 228-231)

The text in the left-hand column seems only vaguely related to that on the right. This impression dissipates if we compare the text in the right-hand column with a text passage from q. 26 of Book III of the Questiones, where he addresses the question of whether it is better to be ruled by one or by many. The last four lines of each column are strikingly similar: Questiones, Liber III, q. 26, ll. 33-39

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 12

In natura autem uidemus quod semper unum est principale, ut in animalibus principatur unum membrum, scilicet cor, et in partibus anime principatur una potentia, et in plantis illud quod est medium inferioris et superioris, et similiter in uniuerso est unum principans primum; quare ille principatus qui magis assimilatur principatui primo in natura, ille est melior. Talis autem est principatus unius; quare melius est unum principari …

Maior propositio apparet in animali: pars enim que principatur cor est; cor autem unum est et principale, a quo deriuatur uirtus ad singulas partes corporis. Iterum, in uniuerso est unus princeps: principatus autem uniuersi unus et optimus est. Quare ille in ciuitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus uniuersi et naturalis; ergo ille principatu erit melior, in quo erit unus princeps. (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 226-231)

This cannot be a case of plagiarism; instead, it is the work of an author who tends to use the same or related words to express the same idea at different moments in time.

2.8. Optimus Vir vs. Law The question raised in Book III as to whether it is better to be ruled by the best man (optimus vir) or by the law became topical in Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, being addressed in quodlibetal questions, in Ethics commentaries and in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum.92 Much like the title of other questions in the Questiones, the title of this question was taken directly from the Politics, where Aristotle poses this exact question in the text (III.15, 1286a8-9). The lines of reasoning contained in this question were soon widely adopted in Paris, which makes it possible to compare, on the one hand, the Questiones and the Scrip92 

See Chapter 5, below.

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tum with each other, and, on the other, these two works with other contemporary texts addressing this topic. The Questiones offers two arguments against the solution. The first of them, arguing against the view that it is preferable to be ruled by the best man, reasons that it is always better to be ruled by that which has no passion, i.e., the law. While the Questiones and the Scriptum share a very similar wording, what is remarkable is that this argument occurs twice in the Scriptum—first while Peter is explaining III.10, 1281a34 and second while explaining III.15, 1286a8-9—and the wording that more closely approximates the Questiones is in the passage in which Peter addresses the topic for the first time, that is, in III.10, 1281a34, where Aristotle tackles the question of who should have the supreme power in the political community: Questiones, Liber III, q. 22, ll. 3-11

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 8

Arguitur quod legibus, quia melius est eo regi ciuitatem quod est sine passionibus coniunctis quam quod est passionibus coniunctum; passio enim peruertit iudicium et per consequens politiam et prudentiam: 6º Ethicorum. Lex autem non habet passiones sibi coniunctas, uir autem optimus adhuc habebit passiones coniunctas, quia difficile uel omnino impossibile est humanam animam separare a passionibus, ut hic dictum est. Lex autem non habet passiones, tum quia non habet appetitum, tum quia est uni­ uersalis; passiones autem sunt circa singularia; ergo melius est ciuitatem regi legibus quam uiro bono.

In prima dicit quod prauum et iniustum est hominem principari et non legem, quia homo habet passiones sibi coniunctas; passiones autem distrahunt uoluntatem et faciunt deuiare a recto fine, et per consequens peruertunt iudicium rationis. Lex autem nullas habet passiones; quare per legem non contingit deuiare a recto iudicio rationis. Cum igitur melius et iustius sit illum principari qui non potest deuiare a fine recto quam illum qui potest, et homo potest deuiare a fine recto, lex uero non, manifestum est quod iustum est legem dominari, non hominem. (ed. Lanza, p. 65, l. 94-p. 66, l. 101) Liber III, cap. 14 melius est ciuitatem regi ab eo qui non habet passiones coniunctas quam ab eo qui natura­ liter habet eas, quia passiones peruertunt iudicium rationis … Sed lex non habet passiones coniunctas, homo autem habet. (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 42-45)

In Paris, the authors who dealt with this question resolved it in much the same way: while the law is less susceptible to the passions than a man, regardless of how virtuous and rational he may be, only a man is able to cope with the particular cases not anticipated by the law, which, by definition, is universal. Moreover, given that man is the origin of law, this owing to his prudence, the law depends on man’s reason. In this regard, Peter’s question is not distinctive, but if we look at the wording and sources used, then the similarities between the Scriptum and the Questiones emerge. Two examples are sufficient to illustrate this point. In the first, once again, the passage from the Scriptum, which although similar to the one in the Questiones, is found in a different place in Book III. Here, the similarities are seen in the wording

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and in the unstated reference to the Physics, that is, to the definition of virtue found in that work. In the second example, the two texts draw on the same source, namely Eustratius, and, though not explicitly acknowledged as such, they are nonetheless his words: passio est motus appetitus sub fantasia boni uel mali. This second case is found in the same place in both the Scriptum and the Questiones, that is, while discussing whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or by the best law: Questiones, Liber III, q. 22, ll. 22-26 and 29-31

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 3

Dicendum quod uir bonus dicitur a uirtute, que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit. Ergo uir optimus dicetur ab optima uirtute. Hec autem est prudentia politica, cui coherent ne­ cessario omnes uirtutes morales, et uir optimus dicetur ille qui, habens prudentiam politicam, habet etiam omnes alias uirtutes.

… bonus uir dicitur aliquis a uirtute: uirtus enim est que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit; ergo ab ea que principalis est inter eas dicetur uir simpliciter bonus. (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 56-58)

Appetitus autem possibilis est ad passiones, quia passio est motus appetitus sub fantasia boni uel mali. Et ideo uir optimus, quantumcumque sit perfectus, tamen possibilis est ad passiones.

Liber III, cap. 14 Est enim passio motus appetitus sub fantasia boni uel mali. Sed lex non habet passiones coniunctas, homo autem habet. (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 44-45)

No such statements or references are found in those Ethics commentaries which include this question, that is, those authored by Giles of Orleans and Radulphus Brito.93 The same holds for Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, in which he frames the question in terms of natural law–positive law,94 and for James of Viterbo’s quodlibetal question on this topic, where the question is outlined with reference to positive, natural and divine law.95 The arrangement of the question in different layers—natural and positive law—is completely alien to Peter’s exploration of the question.

2.9. Hereditary vs. Elected Ruler Question 25 of Book III on whether it is better for the political community to adopt the ruler through hereditary succession or by election is another question that became topical in quodlibetal questions and in political treatises, such as Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum and Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis. This question thus represents another excellent opportunity to compare the Questiones and the Scriptum and also those two works with other contemporary writings. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, Peter consulted the De regimine while working 93  Giles’ question is edited in Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory, pp. 336-340. For Brito, see Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 455-457. 94  Cf. Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum Libri III, per Fr. Hieronymum Samaritanium (Romae: apud Bartholomaeum Zannettum, 1607), III/2.30, pp. 531-534. 95  Cf. Jacobus de Viterbo, Disputatio quarta de Quolibet, ed. Eelco Ypma (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1975), Quodlibet IV, q. 30, pp. 107-110.

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on the Questiones. This is evident in q. 25 of Book III, where Peter uses the term via when referring to each of the alternatives connected with the question at hand, namely hereditary succession versus election. Peter never uses this term in the solutio of other questions, whereas Giles frequently arranges the chapters of the De regimine into three or four viae which constitute the main arguments he advances. Peter’s arguments are not all that different from those of Giles. In absolute terms, election is the best solution; however, given the risks that an election involves, hereditary succession is, in a qualified sense (per accidens), the superior route.96 Moreover, as Aristotle states in Book II of the Politics, men care more for what is their own. If a king conceives of the kingdom in terms of a “bonum proprium” (Giles writes) or as “quasi proprium” (Peter), then a king will care more for the kingdom if his own son will succeed him. From the point of view of the people, custom (consuetudo) plays a great role: the people are already accustomed to the father and will thus, with all ease, become accustomed to the son. To substantiate this position, Peter quotes the sentence consueta delectant, insueta contristant (Metaphysics II.3 and Rhetoric I.11) while Giles makes use of the more commonly cited consuetudo est quasi altera natura (a saying found in several of Aristotle’s works). Finally, and in contrast to hereditary succession, elections always create a power vacuum, which is dangerous for the stability of the political community. However, despite the resemblance between Peter’s and Giles’ arguments, the Questiones is much closer to the Scriptum than to the De regimine. The idea that the son is “idem patri” (Questiones) or an “alter pater” (Scriptum) is not present in the De regimine: Questiones, Liber III, q. 25, ll. 17-19

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 14

… filius autem, licet non in numero sit idem patri, tamen in consuetudinibus et moribus plurium similis est; ergo melius est principem assumi per uiam successionis generis quam per electionem.

… filius autem est sicut alter pater, et ideo, sicut pater plus diligit se quam quemcumque alium, sic post se plus naturaliter diligit naturalem filium quam quemlibet alium, quare citius dimittet sibi regnum quam alicui alii. Et est intelligendum quod per se semper melius est assumi regem per electionem quam per successionem, sed per successionem melius est per accidens. (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 188-193)

Unlike the De regimine, the Questiones and the Scriptum offer an argument in favour of election. Both commentaries argue that, in an election, the best candidate will always be chosen. Significantly, both commentaries base the argument on the double meaning of the Latin term electio, which means both election and choice

96  Giles does not use the expression per accidens; instead, he uses experimentaliter; cf. Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes”, pp. 317-318.

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by deliberation, according to the Latin translation of the Nicomachean Ethics (III.3, 1112a15-16). Questiones, Liber III, q. 25, ll. 21-29

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 14

Per illam ergo uiam melius est assumi principem per quam semper potest melior assumi: sic enim magis accedet ad principatum primum, ubi semper principatur optimus. Sed electio est talis uia; et ideo, quantum est de se et de ratione uie, sic semper melius est assumi principem per electionem. Cuius ratio est quia electio est appetitus preconsiliatus, et ideo de ratione electionis est esse secundum rationem deliberantem; sic autem contingit per se, inquantum est talis, semper per eam inueniri meliorem; ergo melius est per se assumi principem per electionem quam per successionem.

… melius est assumi principantem illo modo quo per se contingit ipsum accipi meliorem; sed per electionem contingit assumi meliorem quam per successionem generis, quia melior, ut in pluribus inuenitur in tota multitudine quam sit unus, et electio per se est appetitus ratione determinatus. (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 194-197)

Finally, both the Questiones and the Scriptum argue, in very similar terms, that the people are less likely to obey (according to the Questiones) or that it will be difficult and bewildering for them (according to the Scriptum) to see a man who today is one of them and tomorrow their ruler. Questiones, Liber III, q. 25, ll. 40-42

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 14

Sed in electione, per oppositum, si ille qui hodie est equalis cras eligendus sit in principem, minus consueti, ei obedient minus.

Item ualde durum et extraneum est quod ille qui est hodie equalis alicui cras dominetur et sit princeps illi. Et ideo, per accidens, melius est principantem assumi per successionem generis quam per electionem. (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 204-206)

No such argument is found in Giles’ nor in the Pseudo-Rigauld’s quodlibetal question on this topic, which is based on Giles’ text.97

97 See Quodlibet V, q. 30 in Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, f. 28vb. On the nine Quodlibeta attributed in this manuscript to Raymond Rigauld (or Rigaud), see Sylvain Piron, “Franciscan Quodlibeta in Southern Studia and at Paris (1280-1300)”, in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological “Quodlibeta” in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 403-438, at 423-427; Béatrice Delaurenti, “Les Franciscains et le pouvoir du regard (1277-1295). Une question quodlibétique attribué à Raymond Rigauld”, Études Franciscaines 9 (2016), pp. 147-187, especially 153-155. I subscribe to Delaurenti’s claim that there are no solid grounds for attributing these Quodlibeta to Raymond Rigauld and to date them to 1285-1292. Their author could also be Jacques de Quesnoy, a theologian at Paris in 1290-1292 and who remained in there until 1303. For this reason, I follow her in referring to the author of the Quodlibeta as Pseudo-Rigauld.

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2.10. The Subject Matter of the Science of Politics: Book IV, Chapter 1 Thirteenth-century commentaries typically start with a set of questions on the subject matter of the science related to the text under consideration. Because, however, Peter’s Scriptum starts at the beginning of Book III, his literal commentary does not open with an exposition on the subject matter of the science of politics. This is most likely the reason why he dwells so much on the first chapter of Book IV. A key chapter of the Politics, Aristotle argues there that the science of politics must examine all forms of government with the aim of ascertaining not just the best form of government in absolute terms, but also the form best suited to a given set of circumstances. The title of the first question of Book IV of the Questiones asks whether this science should consider the best regime. The resemblance between this question and the first chapter of Book IV of the Scriptum is truly remarkable. Nothing comparable is found in Albert’s commentary, the source of which is the Nicomachean Ethics.98 Both the Scriptum and the Questiones begin with the argument—based on Metaphysics IV.2—that every science investigates a subject as well as its parts (i.e., those matters stemming from the subject) and its properties (passiones). In some sciences, the subject is univocal, i.e., it is a common notion, while, in others, the subject is analogous—in this case, the properties are stated first and primarily in relation to a single thing and, by analogy, with respect to all the others. Questiones, Liber IV, q. 1, ll. 19-31

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 1

Cuius ratio est quia omnis scientia considerat subiectum aliquod et partes et passiones illius subiecti, quia, supponens quid est subiectum et quia est, ex hoc assignat causas passionum et rationes partium. Tale autem subiectum aliquando est unum ratione ad omnia determinata in scientia: hoc autem rarissime et forte nunquam contingit; sepius autem est anologum, nunquam autem equiuocum. Sed si subiectum est unius rationis, et passiones erunt unius rationis. Alie autem sunt scientie in quibus subiectum est aliquod primum quod primo cadit in consi­ deratione scientie, alia autem per attributionem ad illud, ut dicitur 4º Metaphisice; et ideo similiter passiones primo conuenient illi primo et per prius de eo dicentur, per posterius autem dicentur de aliis, ita quod primo subiecto inerit passio prima, subiecto autem per attributionem passio consimilis.

… scientie omnes aliquod subiectum consi­ derant, sed in quibusdam contingit esse illud uniuocum, in aliis non uniuocum, sed anologum, dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod prius inter illa. Et sicut est in speculatiuis, sic etiam est in actiuis et factiuis, quod sunt quedam scientie actiue et factiue consi­derantes aliquod unum dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod primum. Et in talibus proponit suam propositionem maiorem. Et dicit quod in omnibus artibus factiuis et scientiis actiuis que non considerant particulare aliquod, sed considerant aliquod unum commune pluribus, secundum analogiam perfecte considerantibus illud commune, unius est considerare que et qualis est dispositio uniuscuiusque illorum habentium attributionem ad primum et qualis est optima dispositio que competit illi primo, ad quod alia habent attributionem. (ed. Lanza, p. 142, ll. 24-35)

98 

Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, IV.1, pp. 317-322.

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Both texts then continue by claiming that, if one science investigates one subject, it must investigate its properties as well, and thus, if it investigates the analogous subject, it then investigates its analogous properties by extension: Questiones, Liber IV, q. 1, ll. 31-35

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 1

Tunc arguitur: cuius est considerare subiectum, eius erit et considerare passionem, et cuius est considerare subiectum per attributionem, eius est considerare passiones per attributionem, ita quod primo et principaliter considerabit subiectum primum et eius per se passionem.

Et ratio huius est quoniam, si aliqua scientia considerat aliquam naturam, considerat passiones illius; considerat etiam omnia illa que habent attributionem ad illam naturam, item passiones illorum attributorum. Sed passio primi in scientia est optima dispositio eius; passiones eorum que attribuuntur sunt quales illis congruunt. (ed. Lanza, p. 142, l. 52-p. 143, l. 56)

Both texts arrive at the same conclusion in much the same way: the science of politics not only attempts to identify the best possible regime, but also investigates the possibility that the other regimes, though imperfect, vis-à-vis the best regime, might themselves, in some circumstances, actually be the superior form of government. This science must, therefore, consider regimes such as democracy and oligarchy. Questiones, Liber IV, q. 1, ll. 42-52

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 1

Item, scientia que considerat subiectum et passionem, non solum considerat illam passionem secundum perfectum esse, sed etiam secundum esse imperfectum, sicut scientia considerans album non solum considerat ipsum sub esse perfectissimo, sed et sub esse imperfecto, propter quod comparat ipsum minus uel magis album. Similiter ista scientia non solum considerabit aristocratia, sed etiam democratiam, et iterum non solum democratiam perfectam, sed etiam deficientem. Et ideo adhuc ei pertinet non solum considerare optimam simpliciter, sed etiam politiam optimam ex suppositione alicuius , ut democratiam; et non solum optimam ex suppositione, sed absolute politiam ex suppositione.

… politicus considerat politiam simpliciter. Sicut enim dictum est, considerans aliquam naturam, considerat que est optima dispositio eius; et ideo, considerans politiam, considerat eam que est optima; sed politicus de politia considerat, quare manifestum est quod politicus et legislator considerant de optima politia. Item, ad ipsum pertinet considerare que est politia optima ex suppositione. (ed. Lanza, p. 143, ll. 72-77)

2.11. The Two Kinds of Office The distinction between superior and inferior offices within the political community was a common and obvious assumption in medieval political and juridical thought, long before the translation of the Politics into Latin, but the way in which Peter establishes the existence of two kinds of office is unique. In q. 12 of Book III of the Questiones, regarding whether the forms of government should be distinguished according to their kind of ruler, Peter makes a distinction between rulers

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who are “under others” (sub alio) and those who have no superiors. The latter can be further divided into two categories: either as “taking part in the form of government” (participans in politia) or as “movers in accordance with the form of government” (inquantum movens per formam politie). Forms of government are distinguished only with regard to the second kind of ruler.99 Peter justifies this claim as follows: if the forms of government are first distinguished according to the ultimate end—oligarchy aims for wealth, democracy for freedom and so forth—and if, according to the Physics, the agent and the ultimate end are correlated one with the other, then it is also on account of the ‘movers’ moving towards an ultimate end that political regimes are to be distinguished. Peter returns to this matter in Book VI, q. 7, regarding whether it is necessary for the political community to have more than one office, but, there, he distinguishes between offices that move towards the common end of the regime and those with specific and near ends ( fines particulares proprii magis et propinqui). In Book IV of the Scriptum, Peter raises almost the exact opposite question to the one posed in q. 12 of Book III of the Questiones, namely whether the offices are distinguished according to the distinction of the forms of government. Here too, Peter bases his argument on teleology, but, more importantly, he distinguishes between offices which are related to the common end of the regime ( finis remotus) and, as in the Questiones, those moving towards a near end (propinquus). A correspondence can be drawn, on the one hand, between the offices with a finis propinquus and offices held by those who “take part in the form of government” as it is put in the Questiones, and, on the other, hand, between the offices aiming for a finis remotus and the offices, the incumbents of which are “movers in accordance with the form of government”. Questiones, Liber III, q. 12, ll. 16-29

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 13

Dicendum quod politie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem principantium. Sed intelligendum quod principans duplex est: quidam est qui sub nullo alio priori et alius qui est sub alio.

… utrum principatus distinguantur secundum distinctionem politiarum … intelligendum est quod principatus distinguuntur sicut alia naturalia, scilicet et secundum formam et secundum materiam.

99  Peter is not clear about what this distinction means, but we can interpret it as distinguishing between rulers who take part in the regime by holding secondary offices and main rulers who are intimately related to the kind of regime over which they rule. Following this line of thinking, the former do not define the regime—a secondary office, e.g. a military leader or a judge, can be the same whether in an oligarchy or in a democracy—while the latter actually define their respective regimes. The main rulers of an oligarchy are fundamentally different from those of a monarchy or a democracy.

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Modo dico quod secundum distinctionem principantium contentorum sub alio non est necesse distingui ciuitatem, sed secundum distinctionem principantis primi, qui potest considerari dupliciter: uel inquantum parti­ cipans uel inquantum mouens per formam politie. Et hoc secundo modo, secundum distinctionem eius distinguuntur politie, quoniam politie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem finis; finis autem correspondet agenti, quoniam sunt sibi inuicem cause agens et finis: nam finis est causa agentis et econuerso, uniuersalis uniuersalis et determinatus determinati, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, et ideo per se proportionantur; ergo, si politie ­d istinguantur secundum distinctionem finis, necesse est et distingui secundum distinctionem ­agentis, qui illi fini proportionatur. Liber VI, q. 7, ll. 10-20 Dicendum quod de necessitate ciuitatis est esse plures principatus; cuius ratio est quia politia est ordo habitantium; ordo autem sumitur ex fine sicut ex primo principio. Finis autem correspondet et proportionatur agenti; cuius ratio est quia finis et agens sunt sibi concause, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Et hoc arguitur: ita debet esse in agentibus sicut est in finibus proportionaliter; sed in ciuitate necesse est esse unum finem communem ultimum et adhuc, preter illum, alios fines particulares proprios magis et propinquos; ergo ita erit ex parte agentis, qui est principans qui mouet ad illum, ita quod preter primum principantem summum, qui respondet fini ultimo, oportet esse etiam alios principantes ad particulares fines mouentes et dirigentes.

Forma uero et ratio principatus uirtus aliqua uel potentia est: est enim principatus potestas quedam uel uirtus; uirtus autem attenditur in ordine ad finem: ergo secundum distinctionem finis distinguuntur principatus. Finis autem principatus duplex est: quidam scilicet est remotus, quidam uero propinquus: remotus, sicut finis politie, ad quem ordinantur ultimo omnes principatus, et maxime et immediate principalis principatus; propinquus est sicut finis ducatus exercitus uictoria, pretorii iudicare de subortis. Distinguitur igitur principatus primo secundum distinctionem finis remoti. Cum igitur fines politiarum sint diuersi, principatus diuersarum politiarum erunt diuersi … Et per hoc soluitur tertia questio, cum querebatur utrum principatus distingueretur secundum distinctionem politiarum: apparet enim quod sic, secundum distinctionem finis ultimi. Finis autem propinquus ciuitatis diuersus est in qualibet politia, sicut ducatus exercitus uictoria, pretorii iudicium. Secundum uero distinctionem huius finis distinguitur principatus. (ed. Lanza, p. 233, l. 141, l. 148-p. 234, l. 158 and ll. 161-166)

2.12. Tyranny as an ‘Involuntary’ Regime In Book V, Peter raises a question that has no correspondent in the Politics, namely whether tyranny is a natural political regime (q. 16).100 In the preceding question of Book V on whether tyranny is a political regime, Peter affirmed that, while tyranny is indeed a political regime, it is such only secundum quid because it is the corrupt form of monarchy. In q. 16, Peter further clarifies his thoughts by approaching the question in terms of form and matter in a way that resonates with Book I of the Questiones. In the first part of the solution, he considers whether tyranny can be natural to man either a parte forme or a parte materie. For Peter, 100  Peter took inspiration from Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/2.7, p. 469. See also Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 323-324.

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tyranny is unnatural in both cases: if it were natural a parte forme, then tyranny would occur in every political community; if it were natural a parte materie, then it would be so because of a ‘material disposition’. In the latter case, however, this would only hold for slaves by nature and never for free men, who Peter has on several occasions defined as those who, on account of their rationality, can move themselves and reach their own end. The point Peter is trying to make is that tyranny is always established against the citizens’ will and is a regime ‘against reason’. If one wished to live under tyranny, then one chooses to be like a slave. This person would be set in motion by someone else, and the movement would be solely for the sake of the master/tyrant, for the purpose of tyranny is the good of the tyrant. While there are clearly differences between the two texts—in the Questiones, Peter lays stress on reason, and, in Book IV of the Scriptum, the emphasis is on virtue and ‘bene dispositus’—both nevertheless express the same concept: Questiones, Liber V, q. 16, ll. 33-45

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 9

Primo modo tirannis non est naturalis, quia tunc inclinaret in operationem rationis, quod falsum est. Secundo autem modo dicendum quod tirannis nullo modo est naturalis subditis ipsis, cuius ratio est quia, ad quod aliquis naturaliter inclinatur, hoc est uoluntarium inquantum huiusmodi, quia naturale est uoluntarium; sed tirannis eo ipso contingit tirannis dicitur, quia principatus est contra uoluntatem, et ideo illis quorum uoluntas est, scilicet subditis, non est naturalis. Est tamen isto modo naturalis principanti, cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis inclinatur naturaliter in finem, inclinatur etiam in ea que ad illum finem faciunt, quia natura, sicut non habundat superfluis, ita non deficit necessariis; sed finis tirannidis, ut delicie uel utilitas propria, talis est quod in eam aliquis inclinatur naturaliter isto modo; ergo et aliquis inclinabitur naturaliter, ille idem, in ea que talem finem inducunt.

Ex quo sequitur quod iste principatus non est uoluntarius, quia nullus liber uoluntarie subicitur tali principatui. Et ratio huius est quia nullus qui est bene dispositus secundum naturam et inclinatur ad uirtutem uult subici ei qui principatur non secundum uirtutem, sed propter bonum proprium, immo magis inclinatur ad principandum simpliciter quam subiciendum; nunc autem liber bene dispositus est secundum naturam et inclinatur ad uirtutem; ergo manifestum est quod non uult subici ei qui non principatur secundum uirtutem, sed inclinatur magis ad principandum. Sed tyrannus principatur non secundum uirtutem; quare manifestum est quod principatus iste inuoluntarius est. (ed. Lanza, p. 196, l. 54-p. 197, l. 64)

2.13. Nobility of Birth and Goodness Transmitted from Parents to Children We shall see in Chapter 5 the level of attention Peter pays to the topic of nobility of birth in Book IV of the Questiones. He conceives of nobility as a natural and hereditary predisposition to a morally good life, and this idea is also found in a long digression in chapter 11 of Book III of the Scriptum. It is remarkable that the discussion of nobility in the Scriptum is more similar to the discussion found in Book I of the Questiones than to its counterpart in Book IV.

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After having established that there is such a thing as slaves by nature—which is based on man’s bodily constitution, i.e., man’s ‘material disposition’ (q. 13)—and that the bodies of free men and slaves are therefore different (q. 14), Peter asks in Book I whether a good man naturally begets another good man and a slave another slave (q. 16). In this question, Peter lays the groundwork for substantiating that certain characteristics are passed from parents to their offspring. To this end, as well as to avoid any determinism, he distinguishes between a ‘perfect act’ (actus perfectus) and an inclination. Peter makes use of this distinction several times in the Questiones.101 In each instance, he uses it to support the idea that something can be said to be ‘by nature’—either as a fully developed act or as an inclination that lies latent in man and is brought to fruition by means of voluntary acts. This distinction is derived from the Nicomachean Ethics (II.1 and VI.13), where Aristotle explains how both the naturalness of moral virtues and the inclination towards good deeds that man is born with are to be understood. Distinctive in Peter’s approach is that he uses it to argue that certain inclinations—nobility and slavery—are hereditary, and he uses the On generation and corruption to substantiate that such inclinations are passed through the sperm in the moment of reproduction. Questiones, Liber I, q. 16, ll. 28-69

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 11

… homo bonus potest dici dupliciter: uel secundum actum perfectum uel secundum inclinationem ad bonum. Primo modo non necessario bonus generat bonum, nec malus malum; cuius ratio est quia illa que simpliciter et omnino fiunt a ratione et electione, ista non fiunt a natura. Bonus autem ista bonitate, scilicet in actu perfecto, fit a ratione dirigente et electione inclinante; ideo hec bonitas non fit a natura, quia, sicut cause distinguuntur, ita et effectus, ideo nec una causa habet potestatem super effectum alterius. Et ideo natura non potest facere tale bonum, ideo non generatur nec propagatur talis bonitas a bono in bonum. Secundo tamen modo, bonus bene contingerit quod, saltim per accidens, bonum illo modo generet. Cuius ratio est quia inclinatio ad bonum sequitur uel naturam forme secundum se et absolute, uel sequitur naturam eius secundum dispositionem forme in materia.

… bonus dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum perfectum, et sic bonus non generat bonum, quia bonus est secundum intellectum et secundum electionem et exercitationem; non ergo fit bonus aliquis secundum actum perfectum a parentibus. Alio modo dicitur bonus secundum inclinationem ad uirtutem perfectam, et sic bonus uult bonum generare, quia uirtus existens in semine intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen, secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere uirtus generatiua; attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales, que inclinant ad dispositiones uoluntatis et intellectus; et ideo intendit generare sibi simile, secundum omnes dispositiones inclinantes siue in bonum siue in malum; propter quod inclinatio ad uirtutem est aliqualiter ex paren­ tibus. Bonus igitur isto modo generat, ut in pluribus, bonum; si autem quandoque accidit contrarium, hoc est per accidens. (ed. Lanza, p. 89, l. 87-p. 90, l. 99).

101 

See p. 208 of Chapter 5, below.

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Quod contingit ex hoc, quia ratio, in qua est bonitas secundo modo dicta, capit ex sensu, et ideo bona dispositio sensus promouet actum rationis, saltim secundum obiectum; bona autem dispositio sensus est ex dispositione bona tactus; bona autem dispositio tactus est ex bona dispositione qualitatum primarum complexio­ nalium; ergo a primo ad ultimum bona proportio complexionalium qualitatum proficit ad bonum rationis; unde, 2º De Anima, molles carne habiles mente esse credimus. Modo generans particulare intendit generare simile sibi secundum dispositionem complexi­ onalem corporis. Cuius ratio est quia illud agens particulare agit mediante semine, in quo uirtus existens generat et format simile primo gene­ ranti. Cuius ratio est quia sperma est superfluum nutrimenti, quod in propinqua dispositione fluit ad membra singula, ideo, saltim habitu, habet dispositiones omnium membrorum. Virtus ergo formatiua in ipso existens ex illo producet simile primo generanti secundum dispositiones corporales, quas habet semen in potentia. Vnde Philosophus, 2º De Generatione Animalium, di­ cit quod non differt dicere quod sperma generat hominem uel homo. Agens autem illud, cum agat per naturam, est impedibile in materia, que est eadem contrari­ orum, et ideo, si nichil in materia sibi resistet, tunc faciet omnino simile; si autem impediatur, hoc est per accidens. Ideo sic inclinatio ad bonum sequitur dispositiones corporis et agens particulare agit dispositionem similem corporis. Tunc, si est bonum in actu, ad quam bonitatem inclinabant sue dispositiones corporales, tunc generabit bonum illo modo, scilicet inclinantem. Aliquando tamen deficit, et ideo etiam bene dicit Philosophus quod natura uult hoc, si non impediatur. Etiam isto modo dicit Philosophus, 6º Ethicorum, quod aliqualiter uirtutes quedam innate sunt nobis, saltim secundum inclinationem, sicut naturaliter insit aliquibus a natiuitate.

Both passages share a further distinction, that between the free man and the nobleman. Both have an inclination towards the moral virtues which stems from their ‘material dispositions’, but only in the case of the nobleman is this inclination transmitted from his parents:

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Questiones, Liber IV, q. 12, ll. 35-40

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 11

Et ex hoc apparet differentia nobilitatis ad libertatem et uirtutem dominatiuam. Libertas enim est dispositio materialis a patre uel a casu, uel etiam secundum unum solum patrem uel nullum, innata filio: dispositio – inquam – ad prompte exequendum opera precepta a uoluntate, cuius est se mouere per se. Et ideo liber est qui potest per se esse principium suorum motuum.

… liber autem dicitur qui mente potest preuidere que agenda sunt et inclinatur ad uirtutem; similiter ingenuus. Sed differunt, quia ingenuus dicitur qui habet huiusmodi inclinationem secundum uirtutem perfectam a parentibus, et illi ab aliis, et illi ab aliis, et sic secundum quamdam antiquitatem, liber autem qui habet undecumque (ed. Lanza, p. 88, l. 70-p. 89, l. 75)

2.14. The Naturalness of Agriculture and the Farmers as the ‘Best Multitude’ for Democracy In chapter 4 of Book VI of the Politics, Aristotle argues that farmers are the ‘best material’ for a democracy. He reasons that “being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and having the necessaries of life they are always at work and do not covet the property of others” (1318b9-16). Peter raises two questions related to this passage of the Politics: first, whether agriculture is natural (q. 1), and second, whether the multitude of farmers is best (q. 2). The notion that agriculture is natural to man is found neither in the Politics nor in Albert’s commentary.102 It is, however, incidentally mentioned in the Scriptum103 and more fully developed in an entire question in the Questiones. Where the Scriptum and the Questiones are truly in agreement, however, is in the wording and arguments in favour of the suitability of farmers for democracy. While Aristotle stresses that the farmers are always busy—and thus cannot attend the public assemblies—and do not “covet the property of others”, the Questiones and the Scriptum underline that farmers are busy and therefore have neither the time to plot nor are as ambitious as other multitudes (such as craftsmen, for instance).104 It is worth noting that the two commentaries use the same verb (machinari) and adjective (ambitiosa) with regard to the multitude of farmers:105

102 

Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, VI.6, pp. 575-579. Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, VI.4, p. 395, l. 21-p. 396, l. 23: “Ista autem est antiquissima omnium democratiarum: antiquior enim multitudo et magis naturalis est agricultiua”. 104  This was first highlighted in Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”, p. 414. 105  The Latin translation states (Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, p. 466, ll. 10-13): “propterea quidem enim quod non multam substantiam habet, non vacans, ut non saepe congregationes faciat: propterea autem quod non habent necessaria, circa opera immorantur et aliena non concupiscunt”. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.117 remarks, following on from Fioravanti, that the Questiones and the Scriptum share the verb machinari in this passage. 103 

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Questiones, Liber VI, q. 2, ll. 11-17

Scriptum, Liber VI, cap. 4

Contra est Philosophus, et arguitur quia multitudo que minime malum machinatur et que minus inuidet minus ambiciosa est, talis melior est ad politizandum, talis autem in minus iniuriatur; sed talis est multitudo agricolarum; ergo melior. Minor patet quia, minus uacans congregationibus, non potest machinari malitiose; et quia necessaria uite habet, ideo modicum inuidet; quia autem honores non consueuit, non ambitiosa est.

… agricultiua multitudo est optima quia non est machinatiua … non est concupiscitiua … non est ambitiosa … multitudo agricultiua, quia non habet diuitias multas, non multum potest uacare ab operationibus exterioribus, sed necesse est intendere ad culturam terre, ex qua sustentatur, et ad alia necessaria. Et quia non potest uacare ab exterioribus, non appetit facere congregationes, et ideo minus machinari potest … Et quia minus machinatiua est, melior est ad politizandum. (ed. Lanza, p. 396, ll. 39-46, 48-49)

2.15. Celestial and Environmental Influence on Human Behaviour We have already seen in 1.3 of the present chapter how Peter understood the influence exerted by the movements of stars on human ‘material dispositions’ and by extension on human intellectual capacities. The belief that the movements of the stars have an effect on human behaviour is obviously not unique to Peter. Despite the many attempts to refute and even to condemn officially the notion of astral determinism,106 it was commonly accepted in the Middle Ages that the stars were the cause of earthly events and determined the complexions and bodily dispositions of human beings, whether at the moment of birth or over the course of their lives.107 In Peter’s case, however, this belief runs throughout his entire corpus and is used to explain a variety of topics: the origin of nobility of birth advanced in Book IV of the Questiones; the theory of a ‘natural place’ for mixed bodies in his Physics commentary; the assumption that ‘astrological images’ can have some effect on natural bodies, discussed in his Quodlibeta;108 and the idea that political upheavals are related to the movement of the stars, as argued in Book V of the Scriptum. 106  Astral determinism is censured in articles 141, 142 and 207 of the condemnation of 219 doctrinal articles carried out by the Bishop of Paris Étienne Tempier in 1277; cf. La condamnation parisienne de 1277, ed. David Piché, avec la collaboration de Claude Lafleur (Paris: Vrin, 1999), pp. 122 and 142. See also Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain–Paris: Publications universitaires–Vander-Oyez, 1977), pp. 173-175. 107  See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, Pars Prima Summae Theologiae, Ia, q. 96, art. 3, p. 498: “Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati”. See also Albertus Magnus, De natura loci, I.5, pp. 8-9. Note that article 207 of the 1277 condemnation states that the idea that the ‘superior causes’ may influence inferior bodies, including the human body and hence the soul, is acceptable provided that this influence is understood with respect to the bodily dispositions. 108 See Quodlibet I, q. 14 (Vtrum imagines que fiunt per astrologos, secundum illorum scientiam habeant efficaciam in naturalibus, puta an annuli obliuionis quos Moyses dicitur fecisse habebant virtutem obliuioni inducendi) (ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, ff. 11va-12ra): “Principium autem huius forme et dispositionis per se consequentis est materia, ex qua fiunt dispositiue per se, et ipsum generans, propter quod uirtus agendi inest ei et ex materia ex qua generatur … Dispositio autem continentis in hora infusionis uel impressionis est figura celestis, propter quod uirtus agendi

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One instance where he explains in great detail how this influence materialises is found in his explanation of the Politics, VII.7. There, Peter links the influence of the stars to the influence exerted by the environment. In this respect as well, Peter was not particularly original, for medieval authors had elaborated on the different kinds of peoples and climates thanks to sources available prior to the translation of Aristotle’s works, sources such as Galen’s On the complexions, Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos, Hippocrates’ Air, Waters and Places and Qusta ibn Luqa (Costa ben Luca)’s On the difference between the Spirit and the Soul, the latter forming part of the Paris Arts Faculty curriculum from 1255 onward.109 What is more, some of the ideas and even wording found in the Questiones and in the Scriptum are reminiscent of some statements advanced by Roger Bacon and by Albert the Great in his works of natural philosophy,110 but the way in which Peter constructs his own theory of celestial and environmental influence is somewhat peculiar. He tries to explain it down to the minutest detail—from the stars to the human intellect—all the while eschewing determinism. In 1.3, I compared qq. 8-9 of Book VII of the Questiones with Peter’s Physics commentary. Here, I shall extend this comparison to the parallel chapter in the Scriptum, taking into account Albert’s commentary as well. Peter’s interpretation of the Politics VII.7 in the Questiones and in the Scriptum does not completely coincide. Apart from one slight difference with regard to a distinction, however, the two texts share the same doctrine. As seen above, in q. 8 of the Questiones, Peter distinguishes between a locus communis and a locus proprius of the civitas. According to him, the locus communis influences the locus proprius because the movements of the stars cause a change in the celestial configuration ( figura celi) and therefore alter the air and earth of the locus proprius. In the Scriptum, however, he advances a distinction between two kinds of ‘celestial dispositions’ (dispositio celestis): one that influences the sublunary ymaginis a materia quid est dispositiue, a figura autem celesti effectiue magis, et hoc rationabiliter, quoniam agens omne in agendo assimilat sibi passum secundum quod possibile est … Si igitur figura celestis mediante continente agit in illud cui imprimitur, ymago dat ei quodammodo (aliquo modo sed corr.) uirtutem ipsius, quamuis aliquo modo deficientem, quare si figura celestis habet determinatam uirtutem in agendo in hec et inferiora corporalia sibi subiecta, et ymago impressa sub illa aliqua participatione uirtutis eiusdem habebit … Sed uirtus figure celestis per se se extendit ad corpora inferiora et dispositiones eorum … Dico autem per se, quia per accidens et indirecte possunt aliquid agere per modum dispositionis in eam, inquantum operatio intellectus et uoluntatis dependet ex operatione uirtutum corporearum, scilicet ymaginatiue (ymaginem sed corr.) et cognitiue et memoratiue. Et propterea, quia impediuntur huius uirtutum operationes, impeditur quandoque operatio intellectus et, cum bene disponuntur in se, faciunt ad bonitatem intellectus”. On this question, see Nicolas Weill-Parot, Les “images astrologiques” au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance. Spéculations intellectuelles et pratiques magiques (XIIe-XVe siècle) (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002), pp. 350-358. 109  Cf. Lohr, “The New Aristotle”, p. 257. 110 Cf. The “Opus Majus” of Roger Bacon. Volume I, ed. John Henry Bridges (London et aliae: ­William and Norgate), p. 393. For Albert, see later in this section. On this topic, see Benoît Grevin, “De la rhétorique des nations à la théorie des races. L’influence des théories scientifiques sur la pensée des stéréotypes nationaux à partir du XIIIe siècle”, available at http://gas.ehess.fr/docannexe/fichier/107/ grevin.pdf (last retrieved on 18.05. 2022).

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bodies on account of their proximity to the sun’s orbit (causing the bodies to be hot, cold or moderate), and another that influences a place (civitas or region) as the result of a particular configuration of the stars ( figura stellarum) and their movement on a given region of earth at a given point in time. The change in stellar configurations over time is the reason, according to Peter, that the Greeks, the Chaldeans and the Romans all achieved a good political order and ruled over others; their respective periods of good rule and prosperity coincided with a favourable configuration of the stars in their region. Although the two commentaries do not present the same exact point, they clearly share the principle whereby the configuration of the stars influences the place where the civitas is located and, in this way, the material dispositions of its inhabitants. Moreover, we have seen in the Physics commentary that the locus communis denotes specific climates in different regions of the earth, which seems to mirror the first of the two ‘celestial dispositions’ of the Scriptum. Questiones, Liber VII, q. 8, ll. 24-39

Scriptum, Liber VII, cap. 5

Locus autem regionis uel alicuius ciuitatis potest accipi dupliciter: uel figura celi, que est locus communis, uel etiam terre, quod est locus proprius, et ideo situs ciuitatis est ordinatio eius in regione per comparationem ad figuram celi et ad locum terre. Dico ergo quod, saltim materia­ liter, disponitur ciuitas a dispositione loci. Quod patet: cum enim ciuitas comparationem habeat ad figuram celi, et figura celi sit mutabilis et secundum motum suum diuersam dispositionem habeat, influat in locum proprium ciuitatis. Contingit quod ulterius etiam diuersimode disponantur corpora ciuium propter diuersitatem figure celi, que est locus communis, mediante diuersificatione aeris et terre, que sunt locus proprius ciuitatis; locus enim naturaliter influit locato et agit in eo dispositionem suam: sic ergo ex diuersitate regionis in comparatione ad figuram celi, causatur noua et diuersa dispositio in ciuibus, saltim secundum materiam et corporaliter, ut in humiditate, siccitate, caliditate, frigiditate.

Dispositio autem celestis, per comparationem ad ea que sunt hic, duplex est. Vna communis, que attenditur secundum propinquitatem uel remotionem a uia solis, qui maxime mouet ista inferiora. Et, secundum hoc, quidam hic existentes sunt calidi, quidam frigidi, quidam temperati, et inclinantur ad ea ad que ista disponunt … Alia autem est dispositio celestis, in ordine ad ea que sunt hic, que attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad se inuicem et ad fixas et in ordine ad ea que sunt hic. Et ista dispositio uel ista figura continue alia et alia est aliquo modo, quamuis non sensibiliter hoc appareat, et respectu alterius et alterius loci alia et alia, ita quod, si respectu huius regionis sit nunc talis figura celestis, consequenter in alio tempore erit alia, et si respectu huius regionis sit talis, respectu alterius erit alia. Si igitur aliqua dispositio insit alicui ciuitati uel regioni ex tali figura celesti, durante figura, inerit dispositio illa naturaliter. Et secundum hunc modum potest dici quod Greci, ex figura celesti tali, aliquando nati fuerunt bene politizare et principari aliis, aliquando autem alii, puta Caldei uel Romani, et si ista figura non permanet nunc, nunc non sunt nati ad eadem sed ad alia, secundum exigentiam figure nunc existentis. (ed. Lanza, p. 485, ll. 100-104, 110-122)

Despite this obvious difference, the successive argumentative steps are more closely related, even if the arguments are presented in a different order. In the Scriptum,

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Peter proceeds by stating that the civitas or region has a ‘natural disposition’, and this disposition has to be considered not only with regard to the configuration of the stars in an absolute sense, but also with respect to its geographical situation.111 This would come about, for instance, when a civitas located in a hot region, i.e., on account of the first kind of ‘celestial disposition’, is, in fact, cold owing to its proximity to mountains, the sea or even swamps. As a result, the inhabitants of these civitates will behave in a way uncharacteristic to what would be expected in their region. This same idea, which enables Peter to avoid any determinism, is also found in the Questiones, though only at the end of q. 9 (and not in q. 8). Questiones, Liber VII, q. 9, ll. 70-81

Scriptum, Liber VII, cap. 5

Si tamen sit aliqua dispositio regionis particularis, ut forte si ciuitas aliqua in illa media regione sit situata in ualle profunda, propter repercussionem radiorum uel etiam ex propinquitate maris potest ibi aer nimis calefieri, et tunc illi accedent ad proprietatem eorum qui in calidis regionibus sunt. Similiter intellige etiam oppositum: in calidis enim regionibus, si ciuitas sit sita in alto monte, potest frigidum, quod propter montem est, temperare calidum communem regionis et tunc, propter dispositionem particularem, erunt medio modo se habentes. Sic etiam, si in frigidis regionibus aliqua ciuitas sit omnino in ualle uel iuxta mare, temperabitur frigidus regionis calore maris uel ex repercussione radiorum, et illi iterum accedent ad rationem mediorum. Sed quod prius dictum est, intelligendum est secundum dispositionem communem regionis.

Vlterius etiam intelligendum est quod dispositio ciuitatis uel regionis naturalis non tantum consideratur ex figura celesti absolute, sed etiam ex dispositione partium regionis uel ciuitatis secundum habitudinem quam habet ad montes uel mare uel loca paludosa uel munda. Virtus enim figure celestis non recipitur in contento nisi mediante continente proximo. Et secundum hoc potest contingere quod, quamuis aliqua ciuitas uel regio sit frigida naturaliter et inclinetur ad ea ad que disponit frigidum quantum est ex dispositione figure celestis communis, tamen secundum dispositionem regionis per comparationem ad montes uel mare contingit eam esse calidam excellenter aut etiam temperatam, uel econtrario. Ex quo contingit quod, quamuis existentes in aliqua regione non inclinentur ad politizandum bene ex figura celesti communi, tamen, ex speciali dispositione ipsius, hoc potest ei contingere. (ed. Lanza, p. 485, ll. 123-135)

When it comes to the question as to how the two kinds of ‘celestial disposition’ influence the human mind, both texts argue that the configuration of the heavens acts on man’s complexio, i.e., his material dispositions. If this configuration ­changes, then so too the spirits (spiritus).112 The spirits, in turn, influence the sensorial o ­ rgans 111  We can equate this statement, namely that the civitas has a ‘natural disposition’ and that its geography must be taken into consideration, with the locus proprius in the Questiones (see above). 112  Spiritus was a key notion in medieval philosophy and medicine. It was broadly conceived of as a medium between the body and the soul, i.e., between the physical and the incorporeal. For medieval authors, the spirit, which was comprised of a very subtle matter, runs through the animal’s body and connects the senses with the intellect. On this notion, see James J. Bono, “Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life”, Traditio 40 (1984), pp. 91-130; Daniel P. Walker, “Medical Spirits and God and the Soul”, in M. Fattori–M. Bianchi (eds.), Spiritus. IV Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 7-9 gennaio 1983 (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1984), pp. 223-244; Danielle Jacquart, “La notion philosophico-médicale de spiritus dans l’Avicenne latin”, in G. Gubbini (ed.), Body and Spirit in the Middle Ages. Literature, Philosophy, Medicine (Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 13-33.

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and thereby the sensory impressions produced—the species sensibilis—in the human soul. This also produces a change in the image ( fantasma) with which the intellect operates. Both texts, however, emphasise that the influence exerted on the intellect happens only per accidens. Within this context of this elaborate process, a decisive step occurs when the spirits change: they become either thick or subtle, which affects the sensory impressions produced. If the spirits are subtle, then the representation of the external objects is also clear in the human soul. If, however, they are thick, then the perception is dull. Both commentaries offer further explanations as to how this process occurs in hot and cold regions. In hot regions, the heat causes the pores to expand, thus enabling the internal heat and moisture to escape. The result is that people living in such regions have less heat inside and consequently fewer spirits; the spirits, however, are clear and neat, and men in hot regions therefore possess good intellectual capacities. That said, having fewer spirits also means that such people become fearful and lack courage, which means they are more inclined to serve and to be subjugated. In cold regions, in contrast, the pores shrink, thus preventing the internal heat from escaping. Men in these regions therefore have more and thicker spirits meaning that they have lesser intellectual capacities than the inhabitants of hot regions. They are, however, more courageous and so more apt to take on their enemies and thereby be more inclined to freedom. Finally, the inhabitants of the region located between the hot regions (equated with Asia) and the cold regions (Europe) represent a middle ground between these two extremes. The ideas expressed in the two commentaries are exactly the same, and, for this very reason, it is worth presenting their interpretations in their entirety: Questiones, Liber VII, q. 8, ll. 16-21 and 49-55

Scriptum, Liber VII, cap. 5

… quia per dispositionem regionis disponuntur corpora communibus qualitatibus, ulterius qualificantur specie et organa sensuum, et per hoc diuersificantur receptiones sensuum; ulterius, quia intelligere est ex fantasmatibus, diuersimode per hoc se habent secundum intellectum. Ergo, saltim per accidens, secundum dispositionem regionis diuersificatur operatio intellectus, et ita politizare … diuersificatio loci in comparatione ad figuram celi immutat corpora hominum secundum dispositiones materiales:

… est intelligendum quod uirtus celestis, cum sit materialis et corporea, intellectus autem immaterialis et separatus, non agit per se in ipsum, sed tantum per accidens, in quantum dependet ex sensu. Et ideo intellectus et uoluntas non necessitantur in operationibus suis a uirtute celesti per se … (ed. Lanza, p. 486, ll. 136-139)

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… est intelligendum quod, quamuis intellectus per se non communicet corpori in operatione sua, communicat tamen communicanti corpori, secundum Commentatorem libro De anima: quidquid enim intelligit, in fantasmatibus sensibilibus intelligit, quia cum speculatur, necesse est simul fantasma aliquod speculari. Fantasmata autem in actu sensibilia sunt in actu, sicut dicitur 3º De anima; sensibile uero in actu et sensus in actu sunt unum in actu; et ideo, secundum diuersam dispositionem sensus hiis autem diuersificatis, uariantur spiritus in actu, diuersimode disponitur intellectus ad secundum uariationem complexionis et contiintelligendum. Sensus autem in actu diuernentis, quod influit suam dispositionem locato; simode disponitur secundum diuersitatem spiritibus autem uariatis, aliter disponitur orgaorgani et specialiter spiritus, in subtilitate et num sensitiuum, et ad hoc sequitur diuersificatio grossitie, in quo primo uidentur sigillari forme sensuum et specierum sensibilium; ad hoc autem sensibilium. Et ideo, secundum diuersitatem ulterius sequitur uariatio intellectus, saltim per spiritus in grossitie et subtilitate et aliis accidens. huiusmodi, diuersimode disponitur intellectus ad intelligendum, ita ut, qui habent spiritus subtiles et claros, bene representatiuos forma­ rum sensibilium, bene nati sunt intelligere; qui autem grossos et turbidos, praue. Multitudo etiam spiritus naturalis et sanguinis, et per consequens caliditatis, facit homines robustos: robur enim facit spiritus, secundum Philosophum libro De sompno, et multitudo calidi Liber VII, q. 9, ll. 33-65 animosos et excessiuos, quia calidum maxime Nunc ita est, quod habitantes in regionibus actiuum est inter qualitates. Habitantes autem frigidis, propter frigus circumstans, habent in regionibus calidis, caliditate regionis poros calorem naturalem inclusum et circumstatum a aperiente, exalat humidum, trahens secum frigido exteriori. Calor autem inclusus, fortis ex- calidum intrinsecum, et ideo sunt pauci sanistens, multos generat spiritus circa cor qui, moti guinis et caliditatis; spiritus autem, et si paucos uehementer, disponunt ad animositatem: faciunt habeant, claros tamen et mundos habent, et enim representari fantasmata sub ymagine ideo bene intellectiui sunt. Habitantes autem in uincibili, et ideo tales ualde animosi et audaces frigidis, frigiditate extrinseca poros conclusunt. Sed ex eadem causa deficiunt intellectu et dente, fortificatur calidum interius: et sunt ratione; nam, propter multitudinem caloris, spi­ fortis digestionis et pluri indigent cibo; spiritus ritus multiplicantur, ex repercussione calidi non autem multos habent, propter multitudinem potentis exalare, et ideo reflectitur calidum et in- calidi, grossos tamen, propter grossitiem et grossantur spiritus et uehementer mouentur, ita multitu­d inem alimenti et propter exalationem quod, propter motum, non possunt figi ymagines minorem; et ideo, propter habundantiam in organo fantasie, sed, propter ingrossationem, caliditatis et sanguinis, animosi sunt, propter non facile recepti sunt nec munde representagrossitiem autem spirituum et turbulentiam, tiui ymaginum. Et ideo tales non bene possunt minus intellectiui. Qui autem habitant in tempreuidere rectum finem uel consiliari bene de peratis regionibus, medio modo se habent inter agibilibus in finem, et ideo isti, deficientes sic in istos, mediocriter dispositi ad animositatem et prudentia, non bene possunt politizare sibi nec ad operationem intellectus. aliis, tum quia nec finem preuidere nec ea que in finem preconsiliari possunt, tum quia, ex defectu rationis, animositatem inordinatam habent que nec eos aliis inter se sinit principari.

Authorship Illi autem qui sunt in calidis regionibus directe in conuerso se habent. Calidum enim circumstans ipsos aperit poros et facit calidum et spi­ ritus eorum exalare, et ideo etiam paucos habent spiritus et modicum de sanguine et parum de calore, quod facit eis quodlibet apparere sub ymagine inuincibili. Et ideo isti timidi ualde sunt propter eandem autem causam: spiritus paucos et ualde subtiles habent et non ingrossatos, et ideo mundos et bene mobiles, propter quod rationem non impeditam habent; unde et finem preuidere et uias in finem bene inuenire possunt, unde et subtilitates et astutias multas etiam inueniunt, et doli machinatores sunt quando se ad malum uertunt. Et ideo, quoad hoc quod bene finem preuident et uiarum subtiles inuentores sunt, de facili aliis principarentur, sed deficiunt animositate. Et ideo secundum communem dispositionem regionis, nec isti nec illi principari possunt optime. Ergo relinquitur quod medii secundum regionem optime omnium politizare possunt, quia eo ipso quod medii sunt, participant rationem utriusque extremi per abnegationem superhabundantie.

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Hoc supposito, dicit quod habitantes in regionibus frigidis et circa Europam, que est regio protensa ad Aquilonem, in parte remota a uia solis, sunt naturaliter animosi propter habundantiam sanguinis et caliditatis, propter causam dictam; in intellectu autem, speculatiuo scilicet, et arte, hoc est intellectu factiuo, inueniuntur deficientes magis. Et ideo, quia animosi sunt et potentes, libere uiuunt in regionibus propriis, potentes et audentes repellere insultus insurgentium; non sunt autem bene nati politizare nec principari uicinis, propter defectum intellectus et prudentie, que requiruntur ad bene politizandum et principandum recte. Habitantes autem in regionibus calidis et circa Asiam, que est regio protensa ad meridiem prope uiam solis, bene intellectiui sunt et artificiosi multum secundum animam, propter subtilitatem et munditiam spirituum in eis, causa predicta; tamen timidi et sine animositate sunt, propter defectum sanguinis et caliditatis naturalis, et ideo subiecti sunt et seruiunt aliis, non audentes nec potentes repellere debellantes, nisi forte quandoque per fraudem et dolum excogitata per intellectum, quem habent subtilem. Deinde cum dicit Genus autem Grecorum, declarat qui sunt magis apti, dicens quod illi qui medium locum tenent inter predictas regiones, Europam et Asiam, sicut genus Grecorum, sicut medium tenent secundum locum, ita et secundum dispositiones. (ibid., p. 482, ll. 18-p. 484, l. 68)

While each text lingers more on certain details, their similarity is unambiguous. Truth be told, Albert’s commentary is the main source for Peter’s interpretation, even though—compared with Peter—Albert’s explanation of this chapter of the Politics seems rather brief. The brevity of his discourse has to do with the fact that he simply opts to cross-reference his De natura loci, where he discusses celestial influence on different regions (in his commentary on the Politics, he is silent on that aspect). Like Peter, Albert explains the differences in the mores of southern and northern peoples by making use of the notions of complexio and spiritus, which are absent from the Politics.113 Nevertheless, Albert’s wording differs from that of both 113  One other possible source for Peter’s explanation of this chapter might be the On the difference between the Spirit and the Soul of Qusta ibn Luqa. See, for instance: “Spiritus autem qui est in eo spatio, id est, in uentriculo medio est in hominibus diuersus. In quibusdam enim est subtilis et clarus, et hic erit rationalis, cogitans, dispositor, et bonae cognitionis. In quibusdam uero erit econtrario, eritque hic talis amens et irrationalis, leuis atque stultus”, in De differentia spiritus et animae, in Constantinus Africanus Opera. Vol. 1 (Basileae: apud Henricum Petrum, 1537), p. 310.

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the Questiones and the Scriptum, and he does not provide the same level of detail as Peter with respect to the means by which the cold and heat influence the human intellect.114 Moreover, unlike Peter, Albert does not state that the influence of the stars and the different climates on the human intellect occurs only per accidens, nor does he argue that the geographical location of the civitas may alter the specific climate of the region.

2.16. Similar Terminology and Similar Use of the Same Source As demonstrated in the pages above, the Questiones and the Scriptum share the same interpretation of specific passages of the Politics. Because, however, Peter introduced notions which are absent from the Politics and had an impact that lasted for centuries—the Scriptum having been read at least until the beginning of the early seventeenth century—we can also point to a few cases in which the Scriptum and the Questiones shaped the terminology used in the interpretation of the Politics. I shall additionally highlight some cases in which the two commentaries share similar wording and, at the same time, draw on the same source. Apart from the distinction between the two kinds of multitude mentioned earlier in this chapter, the most notable case of Peter’s terminological impact has to do with his explanation of Book V. There, Aristotle states that changes in political regimes can happen in one of two ways: either by means of a change in the form of government—e.g. from oligarchy into democracy—or by means of a change in the way a regime is governed, but which leaves the regime itself intact—e.g. an oligarchy “may become more or less oligarchic” (cf. 1301b6-17). Aristotle stresses that this 114  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, VII.5, p. 663: “… quales oportet esse secundum na­ turam complexionis qui bene politizent, oportet considerare ex situ civitatum Grecorum et Gentium in toto orbe. Et oportet hic revocare ad memoriam ea quae in libro de Natura locorum et locatorum dicta sunt a nobis. Qui enim habitant in frigidis regionibus, sicut circa Europam, propter circumstans frigidum, intus aestuant, sicut et ventres calidiores sunt in hyeme quam in aestate: et ideo tales gentes sunt plenae animositate, et de intellectu parum habent. Cujus ratio est, quia circumstans frigidum, quod ad interiora reprimit calorem, nimis fortificat calidum, et ignit et inspissat spiritum animalem, et facit calorem circa cor, et accendit sanguinem, et facit evaporationem fellis, quae sunt causae animo­ sitatis et audaciae omnibus: et eumdem spiritum qui defert formas ad intellectum ad mediam cellulam capitis, quae logistica dicitur, inspissat, obscurat, et ex calido commiscet operationes ejus: propter quod in intellectu et arte deficiunt, et non sunt subtiles, licet pleni sint animositate. Et ex hoc concludit, quod habitantes in istis regionibus liberi quidem perseverant et invincibiles propter animositatem, sed politizare et principari vicinis nesciunt propter defectus intellectus … Qui ergo habitant civitates ultra Asiam, propter hoc quod parum distant a via solis, et sol bis in anno transit super capita eorum, propter multum calorem climatis sui corpora habent evanida, spiritu naturali destituta, habent tamen spiritus intellectivos lucidos, tenues formas intellectivas optime repraesentantes: propter quod sunt intellectivi et artificiosi, timidi et dolosi: et ideo quia timidi sunt, subjiciuntur aliis et perseverant servientes et non possunt politizare”. Most probably, Albert did not dwell as much as Peter in the influence of environment over human behaviour, as he had already done it in his Quaestiones super De animalibus; cf. Albertus Magnus, De natura et origine animae. De principiis motus processivi, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Quaestiones super De animalibus, ed. Ephrem Filthaut, in Alberti Magni Opera omnia XII (Münster: Aschendorff, 1955), q. 28, pp. 183-184.

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is ‘a question of degree’. Throughout Book V of the Questiones and the Scriptum, Peter uses the terms intensio and remissio whenever he wants to explain that a given form of government may be intensified or slackened.115 While these terms are absent from the Latin version of Book V and from Albert’s commentary, they nevertheless proved very influential. They were used by successive commentators and even as late as the sixteenth century, for instance, by Antonio Riccoboni in his commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric.116 Another significant case is found in Peter’s interpretation of the Politics V.9, 1309a14-18, where he establishes the three attributes the ruler must possess: ‘amor politie’ (in the Questiones) or ‘amor principatus’ (in the Scriptum), ‘potentia’ and ‘virtus et iustitia’.117 In both commentaries, Peter associates the ‘amor politie’ and the ‘virtus’ with prudence. In the Questiones, he devotes two questions to the topic (qq. 11-12) and deals with this point at much greater length there than in the Scriptum. Even so, the fact remains that the two commentaries use both the same reasoning and wording. Their argumentative steps are exactly the same, especially with regard to the need for ‘amor politie’ and prudence. In both commentaries, Peter argues that the ruler needs to possess prudence in order to reach the end aimed at by the political regime—for prudence is the virtue that deliberates in practical matters on the right means for reaching an end. The ruler cannot, however, have prudence if he does not first have a right desire for the end to be pursued (rectus appetitus finis), and a right desire cannot, in turn, be if one does not prize (diligit) the end: Questiones, Liber V, q. 11, ll. 19-24

Scriptum, Liber V, cap. 7

… quia mouens, si debet mouere, oportet habere principium, quia agens agit per principium agendi existens in ipso; sed principium per quod agit et mouet princeps est scientia, que est forma et ratio agendi. Vnde, per quod differt prudentia et ars, quia prudentia est ratio agibilium, ars autem factibilium; ambe tamen conueniunt in hoc quod sunt scientie operandi …

In prima dicit quod debentem perfecte principari principali principatu tria oportet habere. Primum est amor principatus: oportet enim, si perfecte debeat principari, quod diligat principatum.

115  For the Questiones, see Liber V, q. 4, l. 49 and q. 18, ll. 7-8. For the Scriptum, where these two terms are widely used, see (just for the sake of illustration) chapter 1: “Et dicit quod iterum fit transmutatio politie non quod politia transmutetur in aliam, nec etiam quantum ad principatus per se, sed fit quia eadem politia mutatur in eandem magis intensam uel remissam, sicut oligarchia transmutatur in oligarchiam magis intensam uel remissam, uel democratia in democratiam magis uel minus intensam. Similiter est in aliis politiis ut fiat transmutatio politie eiusdem in eandem secundum intensionem et remissionem” (ed. Lanza, p. 250, ll. 118-124). 116  Antonius Riccobonus, Paraphrasis in Rhetoricam Aristotelis, interjecta rerum difficiliorum explicatione (Oxonii: e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1819), I.4, p. 79. See the case of Guido Vernani in Toste, “An Original Way”, p. 325. 117  I shall deal in more detail with this in Chapter 5, below.

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Liber V, q. 12, ll. 13-27 Dicendum quod ad principantem in magno principatu exigitur dilectio politie. Cuius ratio est quia ad perfectionem principantis, si debet recte principari, exigitur perfectio prudentie; hec autem non est in non habente primum principium prudentie, quod est rectus appetitus finis; ergo ille rectus appetitus finis necessario exigetur ad perfetionem principantis. Rectus autem appetitus finis politie non est sine dilectione politie et consistentie eius, quia nullus recte bonum et finem illius appetit quod non di­ ligit, sed potius uult malum illius quam bonum. Et ideo dilectio politie necessario principi est. Item, prudentia est recta ratio eorum in finem et recta electio illorum secundum rationem sumptam ex fine. Non contingit autem bona eligere circa illud et illi quod non diligimus; et ideo, si finem debemus diligere, necessario eligemus ea que in finem et ea diligemus. In hiis autem est consistentia politie: hec enim causatur ex unione uoluntatum in finem et eis que in finem sunt; ergo et cetera.

Et ratio huius est quia perfecte principans debet habere prudentiam, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium: princeps autem, cum habeat regere alios, oportet quod habeat rectam rationem de agibilibus, quare oportet quod habeat prudentiam perfectam. Sed prudentiam non potest habere, nisi habeat appetitum rectum ad finem; hoc autem non potest esse nisi diligat finem et ea que sunt ad finem, secundum quod huiusmodi. Principatus autem principium est eorum que ordinantur ad finem politie. Quare manifestum est quod bene principantem oportet habere amorem ad principatum et politiam … Oportet enim principantem habere prudentiam; hoc autem non est nisi habeat appetitum rectum, sed rectitudo appetitus est per uirtutem moralem. (ed. Lanza, p. 315, l. 351p. 316, l. 362 and ll. 370-372)

It is difficult to conceive of either one of these texts as being a reproduction of the other. On the contrary, it would appear that the same author expressed the same idea at different moments in time. In this passage from the Politics, Aristotle makes no mention of prudence, this being a mark of Peter. It is thus on these grounds that we can assert that Marsilius of Padua drew on Peter in this respect, as, in the Defensor pacis (Dictio I, chapter 14), Marsilius sets forth that any ruler needs three qualities: ‘prudencia et moralis virtus’, ‘amor seu benevolentia ad policiam’ and ‘potentia’.118 Peter’s reading of the Politics is marked by his attempt to validate kingship as the best political regime. This is noticeable even in passages in which the Politics does not make any reference to kingship. One case in point is Peter’s interpretation of the Politics IV.4, 1292a30-37, where Aristotle casts doubt on whether the worst kind of democracy, where the people, lacking any semblance of law, rule solely by means of decrees, can even be called a form of government, given that it does not abide by laws. At first glance, this passage would not raise problems for a medieval reader. Nevertheless, because Peter had argued in Book III that an outstandingly virtuous man should be made king and therefore not be bound by laws,119 Aristotle’s statement might suggest an association between the worst kind of democracy and 118  See Marsilius von Padua, Defensor pacis, ed. Richard Scholz (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1933), I.14, pp. 78-84. Note that, in this chapter, Marsilius puts the emphasis principally on prudence. On this, see Marco Toste, “The Early Politics Commentaries as the Missing Link Between Marsilius and Aristotle”, in S. Masolini–A. Mulieri–J. Pelletier (eds.), Marsilius of Padua between History, Politics and Philosophy (Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming). 119 Cf. Questiones, III, q. 21, ll. 16-20 and 71-85; Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, III.12, pp. 96-98.

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monarchy, reasoning that, in both regimes, the law was not supreme. In an attempt to avoid just such a pitfall, Peter stresses that any regime must have a rule (regula) by which it is bound, irrespective of whether such a rule is external and explicit or resides in the mind of the ruler. Because this second option means that the ruler follows reason (i.e., prudence), it enables Peter to claim that kingship is a regime in which the law reigns supreme. In both commentaries, the argument is nearly the same: Questiones, Liber IV, q. 7, ll. 10-14

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 4

… oportet in omni politia, si debet saluari, esse aliquam regulam que sit principium regendi, quia aliter ad finem debitum non perueniretur, nisi esset aliqua regula ab illo fine sumpta apud principantem existens, uel intra per prudentiam suam uel extra per legem explicita.

… in omni politia principatur aliquis secundum aliquam regulam, quam dicimus legem. Sed in quibusdam illa regula est interior existens in uoluntate et ratione, in quibusdam est extra in scripto. (ed. Lanza, p. 172, ll. 193-196)

The interpretation that both texts advance on the worst kind of democracy demonstrates an extraordinary similarity. In a move that discloses Peter’s contempt for democracy, both texts take the worst kind of democracy for democracy itself. Such a synecdoche is justified on the grounds that the worst kind is the most well-known kind of democracy in that it is the one that most often occurs: Questiones, Liber IV, q. 7, ll. 52-59

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 4

Sed intelligendum quod nomina eis imponimus que magis nota sunt: significare enim sequitur intelligere, 4º Metaphisice. Et quia ultimus democratie magis notus fuit apud quosdam, ut apud orientales, et quia magis innotuit propter maiorem distantiam a politiis rectis, ideo, licet in re sit ultimus et pessimus eorum que sub nomine significantur, primo tamen significatur per nomen. Similiter in tirannide ultimus modus secundum rem oportet, eorum que sunt sub nomine, primo significari per nomen.

Dixit enim prius quod primus modus democratie maxime est democraticus, et quintus modus – de quo nunc loquitur, dicens quod non est democratia – est idem cum ipso: ergo uidetur quod contradicat sibi. Dicendum quod non est idem quod primo significatur per nomen et primum eorum que sunt secundum rem sub nomine, sicut patet de hoc nomine ‘natura’, quod primo significat nascentiam, deinde autem formam, tamen forma prius est secundum rem quam nascentia. Sic autem est in proposito, quod ultimus modus democratie, de quo hic loquitur Aristoteles, primo cadit sub nomine democratie, quia magis notus est; secundus tamen et tertius magis sunt democratici secundum rem, et priores natura, et minus recedunt ab optima politia. (ed. Lanza, p. 173, ll. 208-218)

Further instances of small but significant coincidences between the Questiones and the Scriptum can be adduced. I shall limit myself to six final cases here. That contemplative happiness involves a detachment from the body and its sensory reality is an idea articulated in a similar fashion in the two texts, for they both mention Eustratius:

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Questiones, Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 146-148, 150-152

Scriptum, Liber VIII, cap. 2

… felicitas politica est in operatione prudentie, que est circa exteriora agibilia, que sunt cum motu. Motus autem est alicuius imperfecti in ordine ad perfectionem … speculatiua autem felicitas consistit in operatione intellectus speculatiui, que est separata a motu et a tempore, ut dicitur in commento super 1um Ethicorum.

Vocat autem uitam contemplatiuam absolutam et peregrinam … que non potest esse sine sedatione motuum et perturbationum, sine quibus non est uita ciuilis: et ideo oportet ipsam esse absolutam a communicatione ciuili … Et propter hoc dicit Eustratius supra 1um Ethicorum, quod speculatiuus separatus est a corpore et sensibilibus secundum electionem, quamuis non secundum rem. (ed. Lanza, p. 448, l. 37-p. 449, l. 41 and ll. 43-46)

In Book IV, commenting on Aristotle’s claim that “the laws are, and ought to be, framed with a view to the” political regime and not the political regime to the laws (IV.1, 1289a13-15), the Scriptum makes use of terminology quite close to that found in Book II of the Questiones. The verb diuersificare and the syntagm diuersitatem finium are used, neither of which is found in the corresponding sentence of the Politics or in Albert’s commentary:120 Questiones, Liber II, q. 9, ll. 21-25

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 1

Et propter hoc lex rationem habet ex fine, tunc, secundum diuersitatem finium, oportet diuersificari leges; et quia diuerse politie diuersos fines eligunt – ut quedam diuitias, alie delicias, alie uirtutes, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum –, ideo habent diuersas leges …

Leges enim differunt secundum diuersitatem finium, democratice autem et oligarchice non est idem finis … si enim sunt multe, aliqualiter diuersos fines habent. Leges uero diuersificantur secundum diuersitatem finium. (ed. Lanza, p. 145, ll. 148-149, 152-153)

Question 14 of Book III of the Questiones is devoted to explaining an incidental remark made by Aristotle, namely that “most people are bad judges in their own case” (III.9, 1280a15-16). Peter’s two commentaries present the same wording and line of reasoning, quite distinct from that of Albert,121 who refers to the fifth and not to the sixth book of the Ethics:

120 Cf. Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, p. 376, ll. 6-7; Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, IV.1, p. 321. 121  Cf. ibid., III.6, p. 245.

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Questiones, Liber III, q. 14, ll. 13-16, 24-29

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 7

Contra: ad iudicium requiritur recta estimatio; sed quilibet non habet rectam estimationem de se; ergo non bene iudicat de se, ut in pluribus, dico. Minor patet quia homines, ut in pluribus, prauum habent appetitum ad se ipsos … Si de agibilibus, tunc homines multotiens male de se iudicant, quia ad recte iudicandum oportet habere prudentiam: prudentis enim opus est iudicare, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Ad prudentiam autem pro principio exigitur recta estimatio finis respectu sui et rectus appetitus illius. Contingit autem, in pluribus, homines respectu sui inordinatum appetitum habere …

Fere autem plures prauum iudicium dant de se ipsis. Et ratio huius est quia ad iudicium requiritur prudentia; prudentia autem presupponit appetitum rectum per uirtutem moralem: quod ergo peruertit appetitum, peruertit iudicium rationis. Iudicium autem de se ipso peruertit appetitus malus et peruersus; homo autem, ut in pluribus, peruersum habet appetitum respectu sui ipsius. (ed. Lanza, p. 54, ll. 54-59)

That one needs prudence in order to judge and that possessing prudence requires a proper appraisal of the end is one of Peter’s tropes. It occurs frequently in the Questiones. No other commentator from the Arts Faculty of Paris lays so much emphasis on prudence. Suffice it to compare the passage above with a very similar question in Boethius of Dacia’s commentary on the Topics, namely q. 26 of Book II (utrum mali homines sint ut in pluribus), where the words prudentia, estimatio and finis do not even appear.122 In addition, another of Peter’s peculiarities is the use of natural philosophy to explain passages of the Politics. In Book I of the Questiones, Peter advances a curious argument taken from Avicenna: when one power or faculty grows stronger, another power becomes weaker. This serves to establish that the slave is physically strong but feeble-minded. In the Scriptum, by contrast, this idea is used in Book VIII to comment on Aristotle’s sentence that “men ought not to labour at the same time with their minds and with their bodies; for the two kinds of labour are opposed to one another; the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body” (VIII.4, 1339a7-10). Both texts, however, use the well-known principle Omnis uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa: Questiones, Liber I, q. 13, ll. 53-65

Scriptum, Liber VIII, cap. 1

Sed circa hoc quereret aliquis: unde hoc, quod qui deficit ratione robustus sit corpore et ualidus mente debilis sit corpore? Dicendum, sicut dicit Philosophus, omnis uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa.

Sed cauendum est quod simul non exerceantur in eis que pertinent ad bonam dispositionem intellectus et ad bonam corporis per se: contrariantur enim sibi inuicem et contraria ope­ rantur, et labor in exercitio corporali inpedit intellectum, et labor in hiis que ad intellectum dispositionem corporis.

122  See Boethius Dacus, Topica. Opuscula. Quaestiones super librum Topicorum, ed. Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen–Jan Pinborg, in Boethii Daci opera VI.1 (København: apud Librarium G.E.C.GAD, 1976), p. 155.

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Et ex hoc infert Avicenna, 6º Naturalium, quod in quacumque natura, due diuerse potentie sint coniuncte, semper, si una augetur, alia minuitur: que enim augetur, ad hanc magis congregatur uirtus naturalis et ab alia deficit, se conuertendo ad istam que debet augeri. Hoc autem est quia augmentum oportet fieri ex pluri uirtute. Modo potentia intellectus et corporis due diuerse potentie sunt coniuncte in homine; et ideo, si una earum intendatur secundum operationes suas, necessario natura fortius circa illam operatur – hoc autem non fit nisi ex congregatione uirtutis ad illam – et diminuitur alia ex subtractione uirtutis. Et ideo, si quis multum crescat corpore, naturaliter et ut in pluribus contingit illum debilitari mente, et econuerso …

Cuius ratio est, quia quandocumque alique due potentie fundantur in aliqua substantia una, intensio in actu unius remittit operationem alterius, quia omnis uirtus diuisa minor est se ipsa unita; potentia autem ad operationem corporalem – puta ad augmentationem et nutritionem – et potentia intellectiua ad unam substantiam pertinent; et ideo intensio in actu alterius inpedit aliam. (ed. Lanza, p. 603, l. 552-p. 604, l. 561)

Question 9 of Book V of the Questiones on whether fear is a passion takes as its starting point the sentence “a common danger unites even the bitterest enemies” (communis timor congregat etiam separatissimos; 1304b23-24). This question is more closely related to the second book of the Rhetoric than to the Politics; in fact, the Contra is limited to the sentence “Contra est Philosophus 2º Rhetorice”. At the end of the solutio, Peter establishes a typology of which passions are related to the present, the past and the future. He quotes the definition of fear found in the ­Rhetoric (II.5, 1382a21-22). Although he does not mention the Rhetoric in the Scriptum, the definition he gives of fear is nevertheless the same: Questiones, Liber V, q. 9, ll. 49-51

Scriptum, Liber V, cap. 4

Vnde timor est motus partis appetitiue sub fantasia mali futuri uincibilis, ut dicitur 2º Rhetorice.

… timor communis congregat et adunat illos qui ualde sunt separati. Et ratio huius est quia timor est tristitia uel turbatio propter fantasiam futuri mali, et ideo ille qui timet inquirit uias per quas possit uitare malum opinatum futurum; si ergo extimet quod hoc faciet si coniungat se cum inimico, coniungit se cum illo. (ed. Lanza, p. 227, ll. 29-34)

Even though less striking from a lexical point of view, one final example is extremely relevant when it comes to the doctrinal relationship between the Questiones and the Scriptum. In Book V of the Politics, Aristotle states that the main cause of revolution is inequality—whether real or perceived. Expressing in somewhat different terms, he states that it is “the desire for equality when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves” (V.2, 1302a24-26). The Latin version uses the term appetentes in this passage, and, a few lines later, in 1302a29, it says appetere iuste. That being so, Aristotle emphasises in Book V the social and psychological aspects—such as fear, contempt, honour and election contests—as possible causes

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for revolution more than what the citizens and rulers may ‘desire’ or ‘will’. Peter is the one who, in the Scriptum, overemphasises the role of will, and he does so to such an extent that he, on more than one occasion, states that the disagreement between the citizens’ wills is the “root of sedition” (radix seditionis).123 He does, nevertheless, feel not only compelled to state this, but also to demonstrate how will is at the heart of revolutions. Explaining the passage in which Aristotle states that “everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution … and always it is the desire for equality which rises in rebellion” (V.1, 1301b26-29), Peter states: Vniuersaliter igitur existimantes se debere habere equale et non habentes, seditiones mouent in politia. Et est intelligendum quod inmediatum principium ipsorum agibilium est electio. Electio autem est appetitus preconsiliatus; ad consilium autem requiritur intellectus practicus; quare intellectus practicus est principium agibilium. Principium autem intellectus practici est uoluntas recti finis, et ideo adhuc principium agibilium. (ed. Lanza, p. 252, ll. 160-164)

The decision to launch a rebellion involves an act of deliberation, which is an operation of the practical intellect. In turn, the practical intellect requires that the will wishes the ‘right end’, the will thus being the true principle of action. This short stretch of the Scriptum explains why the will (appetitus) is at the core of Peter’s interpretation of Book V in the Questiones124 and, more specifically, why it is found in the title of q. 4: utrum appetitus sit causa dissensionis. The Questiones thus dwells upon and deepens points made, albeit briefly, in the Scriptum, and this is indeed how we must understand the relationship between these two works by the same author. This will be clearer in the next chapter, where evidence is provided as to the temporal priority of the Scriptum over the Questiones.

123  See Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, V.1, p. 261, ll. 119-120, 133-134: “… alii habent contrarias uoluntates; ergo dissident uoluntates: sed dissensio uoluntatum radix est seditionis … Tunc enim dissident uoluntates; hoc autem est radix seditionis”. 124  See Chapter 5, below.

Chapter 2

Date

In the Questiones, Peter makes no mention of contemporary events; moreover, he makes hardly any cross-references that we can identify as pertaining to one of his other works. While there is no textual carbon dating, so to speak, of the Questiones such that we can know when, exactly, it came into existence, we can date it with a reasonable amount of certainty to within a narrow time frame. The Questiones is undoubtedly linked to the Arts Faculty of Paris, as Peter makes three references to what was taught “in the other Faculty” (in alia Facultate), which has to have been the faculty of theology or the faculty of law, depending on the mention.1 Using this as our starting point, we can establish the terminus ante quem of the Questiones as 1296, for, in (or by) that year, Peter had become a doctor of theology2 and presumably stopped teaching in the arts faculty. When it comes to the terminus post quem, things become a little more complicated. The Questiones, however, offers a few hints as to the years in which it was produced. We can be certain that the Questiones postdates both Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics and the Scriptum and that it can be dated to the years in which Peter was studying theology.

1. The Questiones Within Peter’s Output In q. 9 of Book VI, Peter makes a cross-reference to a commentary on the Metaphysics (Book II) and to a commentary on the Liber De causis (the first proposition): Dicendum quod omnes principatus posteriores essentialiter ordinati sunt ad primum. Cuius ratio est quia mouentia seu agentia dicuntur essentialiter ordinata quando mouens posterius non mouet nisi in uirtute primi mouentis et simul agente ei primo, ut dicitur in commento super 2um Metaphisice et in commento super primam propositionem De Causis: nam ibi dicitur quod causa secunda substantiam et agere habet a causa prima. 3

Although this could be a cross-reference to Averroes’ commentary on the Metaphysics, or even to Albert the Great’s or Aquinas’ commentaries, considered authoritative commentaries on the Metaphysics by later commentators, it seems more plausible that it is actually a reference to what Peter states in q. 18 of Book II of his own commentary on the Metaphysics. First, because Peter also quotes the first 1  Cf. Liber I, q. 8, ll. 45-46: “Et ideo etiam in alia Facultate dicitur quod sumpta est a latere uiri”; Liber III, q. 14, ll. 37-38: “Et ideo in alia Facultate recte ordinatum est ne quis in causa propria uel amici sit iudex”; Liber III, q. 21, ll. 3-4: “ut dicitur in alia Facultate, nemo de bono suo debet reportare incommodum”. 2  Cf. Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne”, p. 24. 3  Cf. Liber VI, q. 9, ll. 9-14.

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proposition of the Liber De causis in his commentary (and none of the aforementioned commentators do so); second, because it is only Peter who underlines the idea that the cause and the effect are both at once in actuality: … si tunc causa inferior virtutem agendi accipit a causa priori, similiter accipiet ab ea substantiam suam secundum quam actu est et operatur. Quod autem sic se habeant causae essentialiter ordinatae, patet ex prima propositione De Causis, ubi dicitur quod, omnis causa primaria, etc. Et manifestius patet ex septuagesima septima propositione Procli, ubi dicitur quod causa secundaria substantiam et quo operatur primo accipit ex causa prima uniuersali. Ex quo sequitur quod causa secunda non operatur nisi simul operetur prima. Si enim uirtus et substantia causae secundae sit a causa prima, et substantia sua sit id quo ipsa operatur, manifestum quod non operatur nisi prima cooperante. Et ulterius, cum causa secunda sit causatum causae uniuersalis primae, et effectus in actu et causa in actu sint simul, manifestum quod esse in actu causae secundae non erit nisi per esse in actu causae primae.4

The question is thornier with regard to the reference to a commentary on the Liber De causis. While it may indeed be to Peter’s commentary,5 it could just as easily refer to that of Aquinas (or even to the Summa theologiae).6 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Peter used notions such as infinite, privation and natural place to elaborate some of his views in the Questiones. What is striking is that Peter used these notions—and, in the case of the infinite, discussed it at some length—in a commentary on the Politics, since a commentary on this work was not the ‘natural place’ to address such notions. Instead, the 4  Cf. William Dunphy, The Doctrine of Causality in the “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam” of Peter of Auvergne (Toronto: PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 1953), Part II, pp. 13-14. 5  A commentary in question form is attributed to Peter in the manuscript Wien, Österrei­ chische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330, ff. 107ra-109vb. It is also transmitted in two other manuscripts, one of which belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines. This commentary is now edited in Mihai Maga, “Remarques sur le commentaire au Liber de causis attribué à Pierre d’Auvergne”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on “Liber de causis” (ca. 1250-1350) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), pp. 53-135, at 72-135. Maga argues that the commentary was probably not authored by Peter on the grounds that the attribution in the Wien manuscript was made by a later hand and because the other two manuscripts bear no attribution at all. While both are fairly strong arguments, they are by no means sufficient, and further research is needed. As we shall see later in this section, Godfrey owned at least one manuscript containing another of Peter’s texts, which suggests that he was interested in Peter’s works. Moreover, this commentary on the De causis draws on Aquinas’ commentary, which was very characteristic of Peter’s texts. If the commentary edited by Maga was indeed authored by Peter, then the cross-reference made in the Questiones might be to the following passage: “… intelligendum est quod primarium et secundarium nomina sunt ordinis. Differunt autem primaria causa a secundaria. Primo, quia causa secundaria accipit substantiam et per consequens virtutem et dispositionem per quam agit a causa prima, vel ad minus virtutem et dispositionem per quam agit, et sic causa secunda est instrumentum cause prime … Dicitur autem universaliter causa primaria quia prior. Prius autem dicitur quod propinquius alicui (ed.: aliqui) principio, secundum Aristotelem V Metaphysice, ita quod causa primaria dicitur que est propinquior cause prime, et sic patet ratio cause etiam secundarie … Propositio autem prima huius libri intelligenda est in ordine causarum que per se ordinate sunt et essentialiter. Dicuntur autem cause essentialiter ordinate ad effectum aliquem que necessario omnes requiruntur ad effectum” (ibid., p. 76, ll. 4-8, 10-13 and 29-32). 6 Cf. apparatus fontium of Liber VI, q. 9, ll. 10-12.

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most appropriate place to deal with them in depth was in commentaries on the Metaphysics, Physics and On the heavens, precisely where Aristotle expounds on them. The most plausible explanation is that Peter had already lectured on those three works all the while elaborating on these notions, and later used them incidentally in the Questiones. It can hardly be presumed that Peter first dealt with these questions in a Politics commentary, since he did not really delve into an examination of these notions therein but used them to substantiate a specific view related to the Politics—that peace needs a material cause, that one can desire something infinitely and that the location of the civitas influences the citizens’ mores. In the case of his question commentary on the On the heavens (WP-version), we can be sure that it predates the Questiones.7 Given that this commentary was probably “composed between 1277 and 1289”8 and that his questions on the Metaphysics “do not appear to be a beginner’s product” and are thus most probably dated to the 1280s,9 the Questiones has to be seen as a later work of Peter. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of the Questiones as a work of a young master of arts on account of the proficiency Peter demonstrates in commenting on the Politics, as attested to by his interpretation of Book V.10

2. The Temporal Priority of the Scriptum over the Questiones In the previous chapter, we have seen the extent to which the Questiones and the Scriptum resemble each other. In this section, I offer evidence that the Scriptum 7  In the prologue to this commentary, Peter presents a division of sciences in which he claims that “dicitur monostica a monus, unus, et ycos, scientia, quasi scientia docens se ipsum in actionibus suis regulare” and where he conceives the “politica … scientia, ut sciat aliquis se et bona communitatis civitatis regere” (Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 12, ll. 126-128, 130-132). The etymology of monostica is taken (not necessarily directly) from Arnulfus Provincialis’ Divisio scientiarum, a work not so much used by the end of the thirteenth century, and, moreover, the definition of political science clearly reveals that Peter was not yet familiar with the content of the Politics. 8  Ibid., p. 63*. 9  Ebbesen, “Five Parisian Sets of Questions”, p. 280. Ebbesen assumes that Peter did not continue lecturing at the faculty of arts while studying theology, claiming that “by 1290 he probably had nothing but divinity in his head” (ibid.). This leads Ebbesen to date Peter’s questions on the Metaphysics to the “late 1270s or early 1280s” (ibid.). However, as Griet Galle has argued, Peter might well have taught at the faculty of arts while studying in the faculty of theology; cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De caelo”, pp. 48*-49* and 79*-80*. The following pages will confirm Galle’s view. Before Ebbesen, other scholars had already maintained that Peter’s Metaphysics commentary should be dated to the late 1270s or early 1280s; cf. Silvia Donati, “A New Witness to the Radical Aristotelianism Condemned by Étienne Tempier in 1277”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 371-382, at 381. 10  See Toste, “An Original Way” and Chapter 5, below.

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precedes the Questiones on the grounds that Peter makes a cross-reference to the Politics which can be taken as a refence to the Scriptum and, principally, on the grounds that the wording of several titles of questions is drawn from the Scriptum and not from the Politics.11 The reference to the Scriptum is found in the Contra of q. 8 of Book V (ll. 14-16). It contains the following text: Contra est Philosophus, et arguitur ratione eius, quoniam error paruus in principiis, in magnum crescit in principiatis; sed principes sunt principia politie, ut dicitur in hoc 5º et etiam patet per notabilia.

This is the only point in the Questiones where a reference to notabilia is made. Aristotle does not write that the rulers are the ‘principles’ of the political regime. It is instead in a parallel passage of the Scriptum—where Peter explains in a notabile Aristotle’s sentence that “an error at the beginning (principia), though quite small, bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts”—that one finds something resembling the idea expressed in the Questiones. To understand this passage fully, we need to recall that the animal’s heart is always equated with the ruler throughout the Questiones and that Peter’s use of the terms principium and principantes is a play on words: … dissensio que accidit inter maiores et principantes est peccatum in principio; principium autem est dimidium totius, quia principium continet se et principiatum uirtute; et ideo resistendum est peccato in principio. Nam peccatum in principio proportionaliter se habet ad ea peccata que fiunt in partibus animalium principalibus: utrobique est in primis. Videmus autem quod, modica facta diuersitate in parte principali in animali, scilicet in corde, magna fit diuersitas in aliis partibus. Similiter, modica existente diuersitate in semine, fit magna diuersitas in eo quod fit ex semine, quia ex modica differentia calidi et frigidi in eo causatur differentia maris et femine. Similiter, facta modica transpositione in gubernaculo nauis, tota nauis transmutatur. (ed. Lanza, p. 270, ll. 22-32)

This passage from the Scriptum matches the reference made in the Questiones. In any case, if we reject that on this point, the Questiones is referring to the Scriptum, then it would become difficult to conjecture that to which the text refers. A few titles of questions in the Questiones bear great resemblance to the paral­ lel passage of the Scriptum. These cases provide even more striking evidence that the Scriptum precedes the Questiones. It is more reasonable to suppose that Peter glanced at or even carefully read the parallel passage of his own literal commentary while selecting passages from the Politics to focus on (in order to raise a correspon­

11  Two such cases are briefly indicated in Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.116. They regard qq. 15 and 17 of Book III. On the very same grounds, Flüeler also maintains that the Questiones depend on the Scriptum. Since I compare them with Albert’s commentary and Moerbeke’s translation, see below for more regarding these two questions.

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dent question) than to believe that he looked at the title of a question and reproduced it in the middle of a sentence while writing the Scriptum. Seven such cases can be mentioned. The first case occurs precisely at the point where the two commentaries start covering the same passage of the Politics, that is, the beginning of Book III. The titles of the first two questions of the Questiones on Book III are Consequenter queritur circa 3um Politicorum utrum considerantem de politia oportet considerare prius de ciuitate and utrum considerantem de ciuitate oportet prius considerare de ciue, sicut dicit Philosophus. Let us make a comparison with the Latin translation of the Politics (the opening lines of Book III), with the Scriptum and with Albert’s and Aquinas’ commentaries. Moerbeke’s translation

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 1

Albert, Liber III, cap. 1

Aquinas, Liber III, cap. 1

Ei qui de politia consi­ derat, quae sit una­ quaeque et qualis quae, prima consideratio est de civitate videre, quid quidem sit civitas (ed. Susemihl, p. 150, ll. 7-9)

primo probat quod debentem considera­ re de politia oportet considerare de ciuitate prius; secundo ostendit quod debentem considerare de ciuitate oportet considerare de ciue … (ed. Lanza, p. 7, ll. 6-8)

Primo ergo ordinans et distinguens tractatum dicit sic: Ei qui de politia considerat, id est, considerare vult, quid sit unaquaeque, scilicet secundum speciem, et quot sunt numero, et qualis, secundum bonum statum civitatis, prima consideratio est de civitate videre, quid sit civitas (ed. Borgnet, p. 207)

Dicit ergo primo quod ille qui uult considera­ re de politia que una­ queque sit secundum propriam rationem … necesse est quod primo consideret quid sit ciuitas (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A186, ll. 24-28)

The Scriptum is undoubtedly the source of the two titles, for it has the same syntagm oportet considerare found in the two questions and is the only text that expresses the idea, like the titles of the questions, with a present participle in the accusative case: considerantem/debentem. What is more, the title of the second question matches the end of the sentence of the Scriptum in the passage above. Another similar case occurs with regard to q. 5 of Book III: utrum ciuitas a principio usque ad finem maneat eadem numero (III.3, 1276a17-19 and 1276a34-b1). A comparison of the Latin translation of the Politics and the three commentaries reveals a close similarity between the Questiones and the Scriptum. Although Aquinas’ commentary includes, like the Questiones and the Scriptum, the notion that the civitas does not remain the same numerically, the Scriptum uses the same verb (manere) twice and the same subject (civitas) as found in the Questiones.

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Moerbeke’s translation

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 2

Albert, Liber III, cap. 1

Aquinas, Liber III, cap. 2

Sed eisdem habi­ tantibus eundem locum, utrum, donec utique sit genus idem habitantium, dicendum eandem esse civitatem, quamvis semper hiis quidem corruptis, hiis autem generatis … aut homines dicendum esse eosdem propter talem caussam, civitatem autem alteram? (ed. Susemihl, p. 150, ll. 7-9)

… supposito quod idem homines eundem locum habitent, adhuc est dubitatio utrum ciuitas maneat eadem quandiu manet idem genus hominum … dicit quod, quibusdam morientibus, quibusdam succedentibus in ciuitate, homines manent idem secundum speciem, non secundum numerum. (ed. Lanza, p. 20, ll. 157-159, 164-166)

Sed iisdem habitantibus eumdem locum, supple, queritur, utrum donec utique sit genus idem habitantium, dicendum eamdem esse civitatem. Et ponit rationem in contrarium, ibi, Quamvis semper iis quidem corruptis, iis autem generatis, supple, fiat successio diversorum. (ed. Borgnet, p. 213)

… inquirit de alia ratione unitatis: utrum scilicet hominibus remanentibus in eodem loco, sit dicenda ciuitas eadem propter idem genus inhabitantium … quamuis non sint idem homines numero … (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A190, ll. 94-99)

A further case concerns the title of q. 15 of Book III of the Questiones: utrum melius sit principari paucos uirtuosos uel multitudinem in ciuitate. This title is not all that different from the corresponding passage of the Politics (III.11, 1281a40-41), but, when we compare this title with the parallel passage found in the Scriptum, a striking similarity emerges:12 Moerbeke’s translation

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 8

De aliis quidem igitur sit aliqua altera ratio: quod autem oportet dominans esse magis multitudinem quam optimos quidem, paucos autem. (ed. Susemihl, p. 191, ll. 7-9)

… utrum magis expediat multitudinem aut paucos uirtuosos dominari … utrum multitudinem magis expediat dominari quam uirtuosos paucos tantum. (ed. Lanza, p. 66, ll. 111-112, 117-118)

An even more striking case occurs two questions later, in q. 17 of Book III, utrum ciuitati expediat multitudinem eligere et corrigere principem et utrum hoc iustum sit. There is no doubt that the Scriptum—and not the Politics III.11, 1281b21-25—is the source of the title because, throughout the same chapter of the Scriptum, the turn of phrase eligere et corrigere (or eligendo et corrigendo) occurs no fewer than thirteenth times.

12  Given that Albert simply repeats what is said in the Politics, there is no point quoting him here; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.7, p. 257.

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Moerbeke’s translation

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 9

Albert, Liber III, cap. 7

… Propter quod et prius dictam dubitationem solvet utique quis per haec et habitam ipsi, quorum oportet dominos esse liberos et multitudinem civium. Tales autem sunt quicumque neque dignitatem habent virtutis nullam. (ed. Susemihl, p. 193, ll. 7-11)

Poterit etiam per hoc solui questio alia consequenter se habens ad illam, scilicet utrum oporteat multitudem et liberos dominos eligere et eos corrigere, et quorum expedit eos esse dominos, si expediat. (ed. Lanza, p. 71, ll. 17-19)

Consequens autem dubitatio est … quis sit optimus judex in regimisne [sic] politiarum. Et explanat, ibi, Quorum oportet dominos esse liberos et multitudinem civium, tales autem (scilicet quod sint cives secundum superius inductam civis diffinitionem, id est, per ἀυταρκειαν sibi suficientes communicantes principatu consiliativo et judicativo) sunt quicumque, supple, civium neque dignitatem habent virtutis nullam (altera negatio superfluit). (ed. Borgnet, p. 259)

Question 24 of Book III is extremely telling in that the corresponding sentence in the Politics is a question; it is therefore to be expected that the title of the question in the Questiones should replicate the wording of the Politics. Here too, however, the title utrum in quibus lex non determinat melius sit ciuitatem regi pluribus uel uno is far closer to that of the Scriptum than to either the Latin translation or Albert’s commentary, for, in the Scriptum, we find de quibus non potest lex bene determinare: Moerbeke’s translation … quaecumque non possibile legem iudicare vel omnino vel bene, utrum unum optimum oportet principari vel omnes? (ed. Susemihl, p. 221, l. 6-p. 222, l. 2)

Scriptum, Liber III, cap. 14

Albert, Liber III, cap. 10

Et tunc est dubitatio utrum in isto casu magis oporteat unum principari, in iudicando de particularibus de quibus non potest lex bene determinare, uel multos. (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 62-64)

Et circa hanc determinationem statim movet dubium, utrum melius sit hoc committere communitati civitatis, vel uni alicui … (ed. Borgnet, p. 201)

Another remarkable case occurs at the beginning of Book IV. The title of question 2 is utrum politicus debeat considerare de legibus. Let us compare the parallel passage in Moerbeke’s version, in the Scriptum and in Albert’s text: Moerbeke’s translation

Scriptum, Liber IV, cap. 1

Albert, Liber IV, cap. 1

… cum eadem autem hac prudentia et leges optimas videre et eas, quae unicuique politiarum congruunt. (ed. Susemihl, p. 376, ll. 4-6)

Consequenter, cum dicit Cum eadem, declarat quod oportet ipsum considerare de differentiis legum, dicens quod … oportet considerare de legibus. (ed. Lanza, p. 145, ll. 131-133)

Deinde cum dicit, Cum autem eadem hac prudentia, etc. ostendit quod oportet cognoscere quae leges cui politiae conveniant, et dicit:

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Interpretative Study Cum eadem autem hac prudentia et leges optimas videre, supple, oportet politiarum, et eas, scilicet leges, quae unicuique politiarum congruunt: quia aliter ad particulare non congrueret sermo. (ed. Borgnet, p. 321)

Aristotle states clearly in this passage that, in politics, one must examine “which laws are the best and which are suited to different” political regimes (1289a11-12). He does not, however, state that one must examine the laws tout court, which is exactly the object of q. 2 of Book IV of the Questiones. A comparison of the three text passages in the columns above leaves no doubt that the title of the question perfectly matches the sentence of the Scriptum. The final example has already been mentioned in the previous chapter (in section 2.2). Question 8 of Book IV bears the title utrum possibile sit ciuitatem aliquam uiuere secundum politiam unam et obseruare leges alterius politie. The assumption that one political community may ‘live’ (vivere) according to one form of government is not found in the corresponding passage of the Politics.13 Only in the Scriptum do we read “si aliqui uiuant secundum unam politiam et regantur per leges alterius politie”.14 Peter clearly used the Scriptum while preparing the Questiones. One might, however, suppose that being so closely related one to the other, the Scriptum and the Questiones, they could have originated at the same time, for instance, in the classroom. In this case, Peter would have first introduced the passage of the Politics at hand to his audience, explaining it step by step, and, afterwards, would have raised a question related to it. These two moments would correspond respectively to the Scriptum—a ‘literal commentary’—and to the Questiones—a question commentary. In this sense, the two texts would be simultaneous, as it were. This would not be an exceptional case in the Middle Ages: Albert’s Super Ethica and the Ethics commentaries of Henry of Friemar and Gerald Odonis are, in fact, literal commentaries supplemented with questions (expositio cum quaestionibus). There are three hints, however, that suggest that the Scriptum and the Questiones were not produced at the same time. First, their manuscript tradition is not related: each work enjoyed an autonomous circulation.15 Second, if they had been produced 13 Cf.

Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, p. 399, l. 5-p. 400, l. 2 (IV.5, 1292b11-21). Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, IV.5, p. 176, ll. 10-11. 15  For the manuscript tradition of the Scriptum, see the introduction to Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. xvii-lxvii. In no manuscript do we find the Questiones and the Scriptum together, as is the case of Buridan’s literal and question commentaries on the Metaphysics; cf. Christoph Flüeler, “From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan’s Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, in S. Ebbesen–R.L. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium: 14 

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together, then it would be difficult to understand why, in certain parts such as at the beginning of the third and fourth books, the two commentaries explain the Politics in much the same way.16 The same holds for some of the topics mentioned in the previous chapter: the two kinds of multitude, hereditary vs. elected ruler and optimus vir vs. law, on which, in both commentaries, Peter advances the exact same arguments, with similar wording. This kind of repetition is not found in the Ethics commentaries mentioned above; in fact, in the chapters of these commentaries that include questions there are no notabilia reiterating what is stated in the question. Third, it would not explain why the same ideas couched in similar terms occur in different books of the two commentaries. This last aspect may, however, suggest temporal proximity between the two works. This is because some passages from Books VII and VIII of the Scriptum bear great resemblance to certain questions of Book I of the Questiones.17 In this sense, Peter might have started lecturing on the Politics—which would later result in the Questiones—while redacting Books VII-VIII of the Scriptum. This, however, is just a postulate; it serves merely to stress that, while there was no great temporal gap between the composition of the two works, they were not produced at the same time. If the Questiones follows the Scriptum, then the earliest terminus post quem must be March 1274, when Aquinas died, this based on the assumption that the Scriptum cannot have been started before Aquinas’ death. We should avoid presuming that Peter wrote the Scriptum shortly after Aquinas’ death. As noted in the introduction, Peter finished (or supplemented) some of Aquinas’ commentaries—On the heavens, some of the treatises of the Parva naturalia and the Politics—and we have no reason to suppose that he started with the Politics. What is more, that Peter engaged in such a task, either ex motu proprio or possibly entrusted with by the Dominicans, means that he had already made a name for himself by that point or else that he was acknowledged by his peers as an authority. The idea that a young Peter would have dared or was charged with the task of finishing Aquinas’ commentaries is misguided, even if we were to suppose that Peter was a fidelissimus discipulus of Aquinas.18 Hypothetically possible thought it may be, it would still be prudent to push back the date of Peter’s interpretation of The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999), pp. 497-522, especially 509-510 and 517. 16  See Chapter 1, sections 2.4 and 2.10, above. 17  See the examples provided in sections 2.1, 2.5 and 2.16 of Chapter 1, above. 18  Both well known and often repeated by scholars, Ptolemy of Lucca described Peter in the following terms: “Scripsit etiam [Thomas Aquinas] super physicam, et super de celo, et super de genera­ tione sed non complevit; et similiter politicam, sed hos libros complevit magister Petrus de Alvernia, fidelissimus eius discipulus, magister in theologia et magnus philosophus et demum episcopus Claromontensis”. Quoted in Antoine Dondaine, “Les opuscula fratris Thomae chez Ptolémée de Lucques”, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 31 (1961), pp. 142-203, at 152; Ptolomaeus de Lucca, Historia ecclesiastica, in Ludovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum Italicarum scriptores (Mediolani: ex typographia Societatis Palatinae, 1723-1751), 25 tomes, tomus XI, Liber XXIII, cap. 11, p. 1170.

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the Politics by several decades. Indeed, the Questiones also must be dated to a far later point in time.

3. The Questiones and Views of Theologians at Paris Throughout the Questiones, Peter almost never criticises other views and even less so views that can be traced back to specific authors. Three of such instances, however, prove useful for our purposes (though more the third than the first two).

3.1. Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta (1286 and 1288) The first case is found in Book IV, q. 14, on whether the older a family of noble stock is, the nobler it will be. Peter’s lines or reasoning in this question are broadly similar to Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet IX, q. 18.19 At a certain point of the solutio, Peter remarks that: Pro alia autem parte, quia antiquitas uidetur esse de ratione nobilitatis, cum nobilitas sit uirtus generis deriuata, et propter hoc quibusdam uidetur uniuersaliter filios esse nobiliores.20

This has to be taken as the typical scholastic reference to ‘certain’ authors/masters, and indeed Henry’s quodlibetal question fits perfectly as the target of Peter’s remark, as Henry maintains that “filii nobilium semper sunt nobiliores parentibus, nisi degenerent, et tanto nobiliores quanto magis recedunt a primis radicibus”.21 Henry’s “semper sunt” is equivalent to Peter’s “universaliter”. Peter’s critique is not crucial to the solutio; it merely aims to specify in which sense children can be said to be nobler than their parents—their lineage is longer than that of their parents— and in which sense the reverse is also true—unlike in children, nobility is fully developed in the parents. This being so, Henry’s statement would have appeared to Peter as incomplete and, therefore, requiring some qualification.22 As Henry’s quodlibetal question was discussed during Lent of 1286, we can put forward this period as a preliminary terminus post quem for the composition of the Questiones. The second case is found in Book VII, q. 7, where Peter takes issue with a view first advanced by Albert the Great on the relationship between contemplative and practical happiness, namely that, while contemplative happiness is superior to practical happiness, the latter is more useful.23 For Peter, to hold that one is more useful (utilior) than the other implies a comparison between two terms, meaning then 19 

See Chapter 4, section 7, below. Liber IV, q. 14, ll. 25-27. 21  Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, ed. Raymond Macken, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XIII (Leuven–Leiden: Leuven University Press–E.J. Brill, 1983), q. 18, p. 291, l. 90-p. 292, l. 92. 22  For further evidence that, in this question, Peter relied on Henry of Ghent, see section 7 of Chapter 4, below. 23  See the apparatus fontium of Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 153-155. 20 

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that both terms share the condition of usefulness. This, in Peter’s words, is absurd, as contemplative happiness must be understood as man’s ultimate end and not as something which can be useful, because that would mean that it might serve as a means to a further end: Quod autem quidam dicunt, quod bene uerum est quod speculatiua est melior quam politica, politica tamen est utilior quam speculatiua, erroneum est et absurdum. Quod patet quia, si una earum utilior alia, tunc necessario ambe erunt utiles, quia comparatiuus presupponit positiuum. Si ergo politica est utilior, tunc contemplatiua etiam erit utilis. Hoc autem est omnino inconueniens dicere quia, cum utile sit quod conferens est ad finem, tunc necessario felicitas contemplatiua esset conferens ad aliquid aliud ulterius tanquam ad finem; et tunc alterius gratia appeteretur, et iterum ipsa non esset finis, nec optimum, nec ultimum.

Peter’s target could be Albert and/or one of the few masters of arts who shared such a view at Paris in commentaries on the Ethics. This cannot be excluded, but it seems more probable that Peter has Henry of Ghent in mind here. Although Albert and the Ethics commentators held this view in specific questions on Books I and X of their commentaries,24 Henry arranged an entire quodlibetal question around the comparison between the two kinds of happiness or, to be more precise, around the two kinds of life related to the two kinds of happiness. Throughout his question, Henry compares the active and the contemplative life quoad substantiam and quoad usum under different perspectives,25 an approach neither Albert nor the Ethics commentaries took before the Questiones. What makes Henry Peter’s most likely target is the stress he lays on the fact that even the contemplative life can be evaluated from the perspective of its usefulness, whether for those who carry out such a life or for those who might be under the rule of such a person. Henry goes as far as stating that in this life, contemplation is only enjoyable secundum usum, since it is for the sake of the afterlife contemplation. Henry’s question certainly had some impact at Paris: some years later, Godfrey of Fontaines felt the need to criticise Henry’s view in another quodlibetal question—in his question, there is no trace of Albert’s Ethics commentary26—and Radulphus Brito, in his Ethics commentary dated to the 1290s, 24  Ibid. On this, see Iacopo Costa, “Vita activa e vita contemplativa tra Alberto Magno e Goffredo di Fontaines”, Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 117 (2005), pp. 53-81; Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 295-297. 25  See Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet XI, quaestiones 1-30, ed. Jos Decorte, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XVI (Leuven–Leiden: Leuven University Press–E.J. Brill, 1987), q. 28, pp. 164-188. For a detailed analysis of this question, see Pasquale Porro, “La (parziale) rivincita di Marta: vita attiva e vita contemplativa in Enrico di Gand”, in C. Trottmann (ed.), Vie active et vie contemplative au Moyen Âge et au seuil de la Renaissance (Roma: École Française de Rome, 2009), pp. 155-172. See also Costa, “Vita activa e vita contemplativa”, pp. 69-72; Marialucrezia Leone, “Moral Philosophy in Henry of Ghent”, in G.A. Wilson (ed.), A Companion to Henry of Ghent (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2011), pp. 275-314, at 278-281. 26 See Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines (texte inédit), ed. Jean Hoffmans (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1932), Quodlibet XI, q. 6, pp. 32-37. Godfrey also addresses the topic of active and contemplative life in Quodlibet V, q. 16. On these two questions of Godfrey, see Iacopo Costa, “La doctrine de Godefroid de Fontaines sur la vie active et la vie contemplative”, in C. Trottmann (ed.), Vie active et vie contemplative au Moyen Âge et au seuil de la Renaissance

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underlines that, while he subscribes to Albert’s view that practical happiness is more useful than contemplative happiness, he leaves it up the theologians to settle which of the two lives is of greater merit.27 The question of the merit of each kind of life was at the heart of Henry’s question, but Albert did not mentioned it. Henry’s question (Quodlibet XII, q. 28) was delivered during Advent of 1288. It seems perhaps odd that a master of arts would dispute a theologian’s view, and there is no certainty whether Peter was criticising Henry or merely his fellow masters of arts. However, as we shall see below, Peter did criticise other theologians in the Questiones.

3.2. James of Viterbo (1291) The third instance in which Peter criticises someone occurs in Book VII, q. 7, ll. 73-92: Hec enim tria essentialiter se consequuntur: quando enim intellectus intelligit aliquid sub ratione boni, statim in illud fertur uoluntas et appetit illud, et ad illius adeptionem summa sequitur delectatio, ita quod in illius intellectus operatione est considerare tria perfectissima in generibus suis, scilicet apprehensionem, desiderium et delectationem. Quidam autem in hiis equaliter putabant consistere felicitatem, ignorantes quod in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, siue sit in habitibus siue in obiectis siue in actibus. Alii autem credunt felicitatem consistere in delectatione tali ratione, quia felicitas debet consistere in perfectissimo; sed delectatio, inter tria predicta, est perfectissimum: quod probant, quia ultima secundum generationem sunt perfectiora; sed delectatio est ultima istorum, ergo est perfectissimam; ergo in ipsa consistit felicitas. Hec sententia non ualet, quia uniuersaliter causa potior est causato; sed operatio intellectus, que est apprehensio uel appetitus, causa est delectationis; ergo illa dignior, et ideo in illo potius consistit felicitas. Minor patet quia ex eo quod bonum apprehensum est sub ratione boni et unitum est , et ex apprehensione talis unionis causatur delectatio.

In this passage, Peter is criticising two sorts of unnamed authors: those who “considered” that happiness consists equally in three acts—apprehension, desire and pleasure—and those who maintain that happiness consists in pleasure (delectatio), reasoning that pleasure is the last and hence most perfect of the three successive acts involved in happiness, namely apprehension, desire and pleasure. The target of the first criticism is most likely Bonaventure. In distinction 49 of Book IV of his Sentences commentary, Bonaventure asserts that three acts are required for the state of glory: … dicendum, quod omnes vires, quae habent per gratiam actum in Deum, habebunt per gloriam actus perfectos, evacuatis imperfectis. Vnde rationalis, cuius est modo credere per fidem, tunc videbit aperte; concupiscibilis, cuius est amare, diliget tunc perfecte; irascibilis, cuius est erigi et inniti per spem, tunc tenebit continue et certe. Unde secundum hos tres actus distinguuntur tres dotes, scilicet visio, dilectio, comprehensio sive tentio sive fruitio per appropriationem; nam fruitio

(Roma: École Française de Rome, 2009), pp. 265-288, especially 279-288. See also Id., “Vita activa e vita contemplativa”, pp. 78-79. 27  See Costa, Le “questiones”, p. 224, ll. 24-29 and p. 557, ll. 25-35.

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ista tria complectitur … isti tres actus sunt omnino coniuncti et connexi; unde qui perfecte videt perfecte amat et habet.28

Bonaventure’s wording is not exactly the same as Peter’s. Nonetheless, both authors list the rational act of understanding, desire (or love) and pleasure (or enjoyment). What is more, Bonaventure states that these three acts are entirely united and connected, which corresponds to Peter’s critique that some authors believed that happiness consists in the three acts alike. That Peter is not criticising one of his contemporary fellow masters is evidenced by his use of the imperfect tense, and, as noted, Bonaventure died in 1274. Peter clearly states that the target of his second criticism is not the same as the target of his first: “alii autem credunt”. John Peckham might be the target now, since, in qq. 5-6 of his first Quodlibet, entitled utrum in beatitudine principalior sit visio aut delectatio, he maintains that “delectatio est principalior in beatitudine quam visio” and, in the reply to the second argument, he reasons that “cognitio est causa quasi efficiens eius delectationis, sed delectatio est finis cognitionis, et ideo principalior est”.29 However, it is more probable that Peter has James of Viterbo in mind, whose reasoning in q. 8 of his first Quodlibet (utrum beatitudo principalius consistat in actu intellectus quam in actu voluntatis) closely matches the formulation in the Questiones: … solet distingui communiter triplex actus voluntatis, scilicet amare, desiderare et delectari. Inter quos amor se habet sicut principium motus, desiderare autem sicut motus, delectari vero sicut quies et terminus motus … Unde, secundum hunc modum, potest intelligi et verificari quod amor sit principium desiderii, secundum quod amor accipitur pro delectatione quadam imperfecta. Sicut enim cognitio imperfecta principium est tendendi ad cognitionem perfectam per doctrinam, sic delectatio imperfecta principium est tendendi ad perfectam per desiderium … beatitudo consistit in amore habiti, qui est delectatio sive fruitio. Et hoc, licet sit actus voluntatis, dicitur quies quaedam, quia, secundum quod huiusmodi est, non est ad alium actum ordinatus, sicut desiderare: quia ad alium actum ordinatur, dicitur motus … Si vero est beatitudo perfecta, cuiusmodi est beatitudo patriae, et delectatio est perfecta; ex qua non procedit ulterius desiderium … In eadem enim re illa potentia quae est posterior origine, est prior perfectione. Sed voluntas est posterior intellectu secundum originem. Quare prior est intellectum secundum perfectionem … Nam, respectum eiusdem obiecti, delectatio non est propter operationem quam consequitur, sed econverso, cum delectatio perficiat operationem, non sicut accidens perficit subiectum, vel sicut actus potentiam, sed sicut operatio perfectior dicitur perficere minus perfectam, in quantum reddit perfectiorem ipsum operantem. 30 28  Bonaventura de Balneoregio, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi. In quartum librum Sententiarum, in Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia IV (Ad Claras Aquas [Quaracchi]: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventura, 1889), p. 1009. 29  Ioannes Pecham, Quodlibeta quatuor, ed. Ferdinand Delorme–Girard Etzkorn (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1989), p. 20, l. 193. See the apparatus fontium of the edition of the Questiones, Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 81-86. 30  Jacobus de Viterbio, Disputatio prima de Quolibet, ed. Eelco Ypma (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1968), p. 115, ll. 111-114, p. 116, ll. 133-137, 140-142 and 146-148, p. 119, ll. 247-250 and p. 127, ll. 529-534. See, though, as well James’ eighth question of his second Quodlibet (utrum operatio sit appetenda propter delectationem, vel econverso delectatio propter operationem), where he writes that “cognitio est propter delectationem, eo modo quo una operatio animae est propter aliam, sicut

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The distinction between the three successive acts in which happiness consists— apprehension, desire and pleasure—is not contained in the Ethics commentaries contemporary to Peter. James’ quodlibetal question was produced during the Lent session 1291, that is, while Peter was studying theology and after he became a bachelor of theology. This would confirm the claim made by Griet Galle and William Courtenay that Peter continued teaching at the Arts Faculty of Paris while studying at the Faculty of Theology.31

3.3. Peter’s Quodlibeta and the Criticism of Godfrey of Fontaines (Early 1290s) Peter does not censure other views tied to a text with an exact date, though he does advance a very specific theory that could be traced to his years as a student of theology, which reinforces the claim that the Questiones was produced in the early 1290s. In the same question of the Questiones in which Peter criticises James of Viterbo, i.e., Book VII, q. 7, he establishes a relation of priority and posteriority among the powers involved in happiness: the speculative intellect precedes the will, and the will, in turn, precedes the practical intellect.32 This is one of the reasons behind the hierarchy of the two kinds of happiness: the practical is inferior to contemplative happiness on the grounds that the practical intellect requires the speculative intellect and the will to operate, but the reverse is not so.33 Previously, in q. 5 of Book VII, Peter had already identified the first object of the will with the ens perfectum and not with the object already desired as such (ut volutum), since the object as desired follows the inclination of the will. However, for the ens perfectum to be conceived under the aspect of the perfect good (sub ratione boni perfecti acceptum), which is the end of the will’s act, the will needs a successive act by the practical intellect.34

imperfectior propter perfectiorem, ut sentire propter intelligere … Hoc autem quod dictum est de delectatione veritatem habet, tam de delectatione quae est in appetitu sensitivo, quam de illa quae est in appetitu intellectivo”: Jacobus de Viterbio, Disputatio secunda de Quolibet, ed. Eelco Ypma (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1969), p. 114, ll. 42-44, p. 115, ll. 77-79. 31  For Galle, see Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De caelo”, pp. 48*-49*. Galle maintains that Peter received the bachelor’s degree in theology in ca. 1289. See also Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne”, p. 22. 32  Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 132-139: “… in essentialiter ordinatis perfectio posterioris ordinatur in perfectionem prioris et dignioris, quia, sicut perfectibile ad perfectibile, ita perfectio ad perfectionem; sed intellectus practicus est posterior uoluntate et intellectu speculatiuo, sicut principiatum posterius est principio; ergo perfectio seu felicitas intellectus practici, scilicet politica felicitas, posterior erit et ordinatur in perfectionem intellectus speculatiui, scilicet felicitatem speculatiuam, sicut in primum et nobilius eo”. 33  Ibid., ll. 110-113: “… politica felicitas est in intellectu practico, contemplatiua autem in uoluntate uel intellectu speculatiuo: hec autem ambo presupponuntur ab intellectu practico sicut principia et esse eius per se, et sine quibus non perficitur eius operatio”. 34  See Liber VII, q. 5, ll. 86-95.

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It is not simply an incidental remark that Peter makes here, since, in Book I, q. 2, he had already asserted it in much the same terms, adding, however, the reference to the choice (electio) as the step which follows the act of the practical intellect.35 If we turn to Peter’s other works, an interesting picture emerges. In his question commentary on the Ethics, which has been dated to the early 1280s,36 Peter raises a question about the will and the intellect, more specifically which of these two powers takes priority over the other. The presence of this question in an Ethics commentary is rather striking, since no similar question is present in any of the other contemporary Ethics commentaries,37 suggesting Peter’s personal interest in this question. In the solutio, Peter maintains that being is the object of the intellect and good is the object of the will. Given that being precedes good—a being is an entity unto itself, while a good is so insofar as it has goodness—the intellect’s act precedes that of the will, but, because the intellect is dependent on the will for its ‘exercise’, that is, one has to wish to use his intellect, Peter concludes that, while the intellect is by nature and essentially prior to the will, it nevertheless follows the will secundum accidens.38 This is not the same as what Peter asserts in the Questiones. In the Scriptum, written prior to the Questiones, we find another formulation of this matter. In Book VII, chapter 2, devoted to the matter of happiness, Peter argues quite briefly that the practical intellect requires the will as its principle, which means that it depends on the will to act; the act of the speculative intellect, on the other hand, is prior to the act of the will.39 This is indeed quite close to the Questiones. If we now turn to Peter’s Quodlibeta, written after the Questiones, a similar theory surfaces. Peter devoted the ninth question of his second Quodlibet specifically to this matter: utrum uoluntas sit principalior intellectu (probably discussed in the

35  Liber I, q. 2, ll. 109-111: “intellectus speculatiuus est prior uoluntate, uoluntas prior intellectu practico, practicus intellectus est prior electione, electio autem operatione”. 36  See Iacopo Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri. Questiones super Librum Ethicorum Aristotelis (Paris, BnF, lat. 14698) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), p. 92. 37  It is not found in any of the following: in Brito, in the anonymous commentary published in the volume quoted in the previous footnote, in Giles of Orleans, in the Anonymous of Erlangen, in the Anonymous of Erfurt (Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13, ff. 85ra-118va) or in the Anonymous of Paris (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16110, ff. 236ra-276ra). For the list of questions of Giles and the Anonymous of Erlangen, see Iacopo Costa, “Autour de deux commentaires inédits sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque: Gilles d’Orléans et l’Anonyme d’Erfurt”, in L. Bianchi (ed.), Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 211-272, on 257-272. 38  Cf. Anthony J. Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions on Books I and II of the Ethica Nicomachea. A Study and Critical Edition”, Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986), pp. 1-110, Liber I, q. 7, p. 43. 39  Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, VII.2, p. 462, ll. 477-484: “Intellectus enim practicus, qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus, supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis, et rectus appetitus finis non est sine rectitudine uoluntatis; rectitudo uero uoluntatis supponit rectitudinem intellectus bonum uel finem ostendentis, siquidem uoluntas nihil uult quod non sit intellectum prius, sicut dicitur 1º Rhetorice. Iste autem intellectus est intellectus non practicus, sed speculatiuus, si practicus per se dependet a uoluntate, iste autem non”.

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Advent session 1297).40 The arguments there are much more elaborate, but Peter reiterates that the first object of the will and of the speculative intellect is the same— here, he calls it ens primum—and that the act of the practical intellect follows the act of the will and is thus inferior to it. The object of the practical intellect is love (dilectio). Peter presents his position as a quasi via media.41 This topic apparently remained so important to Peter that, later in the Advent session 1299, in his fourth Quodlibet, he addressed the question utrum actus intellectus secundum ordine nature precedat omnem actum uoluntatis (q. 13). Once more, Peter argues that the act of the practical intellect follows the act of the will, which, in turn, follows the act of the speculative intellect. Moreover, the object of the practical intellect is the object as loved or desired, the reasoning being that, in practical matters, the principle is taken from the end of the action.42 40  For the dates of Peter’s Quodlibeta, see Giuseppina Cannizzo, “I Quodlibeta di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle Quaestiones de verbo 1296, 1300. I: Gli intendimenti fondamentali dell’edizione delle Quaestiones de verbo”, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 56 (1964), pp. 486-500, at 494-495; Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, pp. 84-85. 41  Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 29rb-vb: “… est intelligendum quod de hac questione sunt opiniones oppositae magnorum, quibusdam dicentibus intellectum esse principaliorem simpliciter, aliis autem ipsam uoluntatem. Mihi autem ad presens uidetur esse dicendum quasi uia media quodam modo quod, cum in intellectu sit considerare speculatiuum et practicum, intellectus secundum quod speculatiuus principalior est uoluntate, uoluntas autem simpliciter principalior est intellectu practico seu actiuo … quando alique due potentie feruntur in idem obiectum re, illa que immediatius fertur in illud obiectum est principalior quam illa que fertur in illud mediante actu primo: cum enim perfectio potentie sit ex obiecto primo eius, illa que immediatius respicit obiectum perfectior uidetur esse quam ea que per medium. Cum igitur perfectissimum obiectum intellectus et uoluntatis sit idem re, scilicet ens primum, cum intellectus feratur in ipsum sine medio, uoluntas uero mediante actu intellectus – non enim fertur uoluntas in bonum nisi apprehensum, bonum enim apprehensum (bonum … apprehensum] om. per hom. B; supplevi ex Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15841, f. 16ra) sub ratione boni est primum obiectum uoluntatis –, igitur intellectus speculatiuus est potentia principalior uoluntate. Secundum declaratur quod uoluntas sit principalior intellectu practico simpliciter, primo quoniam illa potentia principalior est alia, cuius actus secundum quod huiusmodi est principalior actu illius alterius, quoniam potentia determinatur per actum, et principalior est cuius actus est principalior; sed actus uoluntatis principalior est quam actus intellectus practici primus, quoniam actus intellectus practici ordine nature posterior est actu uoluntatis, cum rationem sumat ex eo, et actus uoluntatis propinquior sit perfectissimo actui in anima, scilicet actui intellectus speculatiui, et quod est propinquius primo perfecto perfectius est; igitur uoluntas est principalior quam intellectus secundum quod practicus. Secundo quoniam potentia illa principalior est, cuius obiectum primum est principalius, quoniam ratio potentie et perfectio primo est ex obiecto; sed obiectum uoluntatis primum est finis ultimus secundum quod huiusmodi, obiectum autem intellectus practici est eius dilectio uel desiderium: bonum enim dilectum primum obiectum est intellectus practici, ut alias fuit determinatum, propter quod primum mandatum est dilectio Dei … igitur uoluntas est principalior intellectu secundum quod practicus, et propter hoc contingit quod ex actu uoluntatis sumitur ratio omnium agibilium, quorum principium est intellectus practicus, et ideo uoluntas est principium motus uniuersaliter in agibilibus et dominium habet in eis. Sic ergo uidetur esse dicendum quod intellectus secundum quod speculatiuus principalior est uoluntate; uoluntas autem principalior est intellectu secundum quod practicus”. 42  Ibid., ff. 66vb-67ra: “… actus intellectus est duplex: quidam scilicet intellectus speculatiui et quidam autem practici. Actus autem intellectus speculatiui est quo considerat ens quod est pri­ mum obiectum eius et ex ratione eius ueritatem in aliis. Actus uero intellectus practici quo considerat

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It therefore seems that, by the late 1290s, Peter was proclaiming a theory he had briefly asserted in the Questiones—produced after 1291—but not in his Ethics commentary. Peter’s interest in the will is not extraordinary, since free will and the relationship between intellect and the will were two of the most debated topics in Paris from the 1270s through the 1290s.43 For our purposes, however, it is relevant that he touches on this topic in a commentary on the Politics. What was said earlier regarding the use of the notions of infinite and privation in the Questiones can be extended to the case of the will, since a lengthy discussion on the relationship between the intellect and the will is out of place in a commentary on the Politics. It therefore seems more reasonable to suppose that Peter had elaborated such a theory while discussing theological matters. One cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that Peter formulated the theory while commenting on the Politics in the arts faculty and then developed it years later while in the faculty of theology. Then again, just as in the case of the notions of infinite and privation, it makes more sense to think that, since free will and the relationship between the intellect and the will were topics widely debated elsewhere, i.e., in theology, Peter came up with it while engaged in his theological writings and briefly made note of it in a commentary on the Politics. His criticism of James of Viterbo points in this direction: Peter notes bonum non secundum quod bonum absolute, sed secundum quod desideratum uel amatum … actus uoluntatis, que est appetitus intellectualis, sequitur apprehensionem intellectualem. Preterea, sicut obiectum primum uoluntatis se habet ad obiectum primum intellectus, ita actus huius ad actum illius et potentia hec ad illam, quia potentiae determinantur per actus et actus per obiecta, ut dicitur 2º De anima; sed obiectum uoluntatis primum, quod est bonum per se, ita se habet ad obiectum intellectus primum, quod est ens per se, quod supponit ipsum ordine nature et resoluitur in ipsum, ut manifestum est; igitur ita se habet actus uoluntatis ad actum per se intellectus, quod ordine nature supponit eum, et ita sequitur eum secundum ordinem nature … Preterea, amor uel dilectio finis est primus actus uoluntatis: primus enim actus uoluntatis est qui causatur ab obiecto primo in ipsa; hoc autem est amor seu dilectio. Sed actus dilectionis posterior est actu intellectus … igitur actus uoluntatis ordine nature sequitur actum intellectus speculatiui … Secundo dicendum quod actus intellectus practici sequitur ordine nature actum uoluntatis, quoniam actus intellectus practici se habet ad actum uoluntatis sicut obiectum eius per se ad (obiectum … ad] om. per hom. B; supplevi ex Paris, B.n.F., Lat. 15841, f. 34va) obiectum illius, quoniam actus determinantur per obiecta per se; obiectum autem uoluntatis est bonum per se uel finis, obiectum intellectus practici est bonum per se seu finis, non secundum quod huiusmodi, sed secundum amata uel desiderata, quoniam primum (om. B; supplevi ex Paris, B.n.F., Lat. 15841, f. 34va) obiectum intellectus practici seu actiui est quod est ratio et principium omnium agibilium, quod primo contingit fini ut amatus uel desideratus. Et dicit Philosophus, 3º De anima, illud cuius est appetitus primo est obiectum intellectus practici, et manifestum est quod bonum per se seu finis ut amatus seu desideratus sunt posterius secundum naturam bono per se seu fine; igitur actus intellectus practici seu actiui posterior est ordine nature actu uoluntatis primo. Sic igitur apparet quod actus intellectus speculatiui simpliciter precedit ordine nature actum uoluntatis; actus tamen uoluntatis precedit intellectum practicum”. 43  The literature on this topic is vast. See, among others, François-Xavier Putallaz, Insolente liberté. Controverse et condamnations au XIIIe siècle (Fribourg: Cerf–Éditions Universitaries de Fribourg, 1995), and the articles gathered in Tobias Hoffmann–Jörn Müller–Matthias Perkams (eds.), Das Problem der Willensschwäche in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie / The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006); Odile Gilon–Christian Brouwer (eds.), Liberté au Moyen Âge (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2017).

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that “some” have been defending that happiness consists in pleasure (delectatio) and criticises this position in a few lines.44 We can, however, presume that, if he discussed this matter while at the faculty of theology, then he did so in great detail. Given what we know about Peter, he seems to have been known in the early fourteenth century as a theologian who maintained that “fruitio est amor et delectatio simul, quia idem sunt realiter, etsi differant ratione”,45 which unambiguously tells us that Peter did in fact discuss the matter of happiness and pleasure at greater length while at the faculty of theology. This, in turn, means that the reference to the relationship between happiness and pleasure in the Questiones is merely incidental. In any event, it is important to stress here that the Questiones maintains a view quite close to that found in Peter’s Quodlibeta, which suggests a temporal proximity. A further question needs to be addressed. Is it possible that Peter took this theory from another theologian? If we entertain this idea, then the Questiones could have been produced earlier. Just like any master of arts, such as Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito, Peter could have taken ideas from theological works. This is, however, not the case. As Edgar Hocedez noted in 1935, a stretch of text from Peter’s Quodlibet II, q. 9 is reproduced verbatim in q. 10 of Godfrey of Fontaines’ Quodlibet VI. Godfrey does so in order to criticise Peter’s view, though, following standard medieval practice, he does not mention Peter by name, stating only “videtur aliquibus”.46 Moreover, in his Quodlibet X, q. 11, Godfrey reasons in terms similar, albeit not identical, to those used by Peter in Book I, q. 2 of the Questiones (see above), stating that the act of the practical intellect follows the act of the will but precedes that of choice (electio).47 44 

See Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 82-103. Cf. Peter Aureoli, Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, ed. Eloi M. Buytaert (Saint Bonaventure, NY–Louvain–Paderborn: The Franciscan Institute–E. Nauwelaerts–F. Shöningh, 1952-1956), 2 vols., dist. 1, q. 7, art. 1, nr. 43, I.386 and 392. This position is not found in Peter’s Quodlibeta, but it was later mentioned by Duns Scotus and Ockham, neither of whom, contrary to Peter Auriol, links this position to Peter. 46  Cf. Edgar Hocedez, “La philosophie des Quodlibets de Pierre d’Auvergne”, in A. Lang–J. Lechner–M. Schmaus (eds.), Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet (Münster: Aschendorfsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1935), 2 vols., II.779-791, at 787. Compare the text in note 41 (the words in italics copied by Godfrey) with the following: Les Quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines (texte inédit), ed. Maurice De Wulf–Jean Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 1914), pp. 205-206: “… videtur aliquibus quod talis actus voluntatis sit nobilior tali actu intellectus; et secundum hoc actus voluntatis dicetur nobilior actu intellectus practici proprie dicti. Et hoc scilicet quod voluntas sit principalior intellectu practico arguitur sic, quoniam illa potentia principalior est alia cuius actus secundum quod huiusmodi est principalior, et cuius objectum primum est principalius. Sed actus voluntatis est principalior quam actus intellectus practici, quoniam actus intellectus practici ordine naturae posterior est actu voluntatis, cum rationem sumat ex eo. Item, obiectum voluntatis est principalius obiecto intellectus practici, quia obiectum voluntatis primum est finis ultimus; obiectum autem intellectus practici est eius dilectio vel desiderium; bonum enim dilectum est primum obiectum intellectus practici. Ergo voluntas est principalior intellectu secundum quod practicus est”. 47  Le huitième quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines (texte inédit), ed. Jean Hoffmans (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 1914), p. 352: “Et sic actus intellectus practici est 45 

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While this is significant, it also raises a further problem: Godfrey’s Quodlibeta VI and X are dated to Christmas 1289 and 1294-95 respectively,48 while Peter’s Quodlibeta II and IV are dated to 1297 and 1299 (see above). Is it possible that Godfrey is referring to an author other than Peter and, furthermore, that Peter copied from that author? Apart from the fact that it seems odd that Peter should have copied from an author whom Godfrey had criticised a few years earlier, we should need to find the author who held this view.49 While the search for this phantom author exceeds the scope of this study, my research has uncovered no trace of an author more or less a contemporary to Peter in Paris, such as Giles of Rome, Bernard of Trilia, Thomas Sutton and Bernard of Auvergne, who, like Peter, might have followed Aquinas’ view regarding the superiority of the intellect over the will.50 There is, however, a clue that strongly suggests this view was formulated by Peter. In two of the main manuscripts that contain Godfrey’s Quodlibeta and that bear signs of pecia, we can read on the outer margin of the folio, precisely at the spot where Godfrey reproduces Peter’s words, the following: “opinio p. de aluernia”.51 Just as with all the other margin notes in the two manuscripts that refer to other authors criticised by Godfrey, such as Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome and Aquinas, the note regarding Peter was written by a second hand. It does, however, tell us that, by the posterior actu voluntatis qui est respectu finis, et dicitur voluntas cum rationem sumat ex eo, quia desiderium finis sive finis desideratus secundum quod huiusmodi est obiectum primum intellectus practici in quantum ex eiusmodi apprehensio sumit intellectus practicus principium in suo processu syllogistico. Sed actus intellectus practici prior est quam actus voluntatis qui dicitur electio. Actus etiam intellectus speculativi praecedit actum intellectus practici; et pro tanto etiam intellectus spe­ culativus est prior practico”. 48  The discussion regarding the dates of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta is found in James F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. xxii-xxviii. 49  Hocedez remarked that it was a “chose étrange” (p. 787, n. 43) that Godfrey refuted an opinion found in Peter, but he did not dwell on this aspect. 50  For Bernard of Trilia, I checked his Quaestiones disputatae de cognitione animae separatae, ed. Pius Künzle (Bern: Francke, 1969) but not his quodlibetal questions utrum beatitudo consistat in intellectu uel affectu (III, q. 31) and utrum intellectu existente in actu, uoluntas sit semper in actu suo (III, q. 47) contained in the manuscript Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.3.1153, ff. 61va-62vb and 71va-72vb, respectively. For the list of questions in Bernard’s Quodlibeta, see Russell L. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330”, in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 401-491, at 477-480. For Thomas Sutton, I have checked utrum in beatitudine principalior actus sit actus intellectus quam voluntatis (II, q. 15) in Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, ed. Michael Schmaus–Maria González-Haba (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969). For Bernard of Auvergne, I have consulted his anti-Quodlibeta directed against Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo transmitted in the manuscript Città del Vaticano, BAV, Borgh. 298, ff. 24rb-26ra (where he attacks Godfrey’s Quodlibet VI, q. 10), 88rb-89va (where he takes issue with Godfrey’s Quodlibet X, q. 11) and 170rb-172vb (in which he deals with James’ Quodlibet I, q. 8). 51  Cf. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14311, f. 88va and Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 1032, f. 72rb. On these manuscripts, see August Pelzer, “Godefroid de Fontaines. Les manuscrits de ses Quolibets conservés à la Vaticane et dans quelques autres biblio­ thèques. (Suite et fin)”, Revue Philosophique de Louvain 80 (1913), pp. 491-532, at 498-510. Pelzer, however, did not notice these specific notes regarding Peter.

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late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, this view was associated with Peter. We can also be sure that this theory remained an isolated case in the centuries that followed and was, therefore, unique: although the passage from Peter’s Quodlibet II, q. 9 reproduced verbatim by Godfrey also occurs in Walter Burley’s commentary on the On the Soul,52 Peter’s view appeared so out of place to the Salamancan masters Peter of Osma and Ferdinand of Roa that they criticised Peter for it in their commentary on the Politics.53 Two hypotheses explaining this situation can be formulated: either Godfrey revised his quodlibetal question at a later date, or Peter had already maintained this view while at the faculty of theology, for instance, in a disputed question or in lectures on the Sentences—which have not come down to us54— then restating it later despite Godfrey’s criticism. The first hypothesis appears more probable for two reasons. First, the manuscript Paris, B.n.F., lat. 15350, which contains questions from Peter’s Quodlibeta I-II in abbreviated form, was owned by Godfrey, who could thus consult it easily and copy parts of it while writing his own text.55 Second, sixty years ago, Giuseppina Cannizzo discovered that a section of Peter’s Quodlibet I, q. 21 is reproduced almost verbatim in Godfrey’s Quodlibet X, q. 12, this for the purpose of criticism. On the basis of this discovery, she proposed that the dates of Godfrey’s Quodlibeta should be reconsidered.56 Although Cannizzo’s position was later rejected by James Wippel, this scholar conceded that “one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that Godfrey may have retouched some of his Quodlibets at a later point in his career”.57 Even so, in his study on the Vatican manuscripts containing Godfrey’s Quodlibeta, August Pelzer argued that Godfrey had “mis en circulation 52 See Questions on the “De anima” of Aristotle by Magister Adam Burley & Dominus Walter Burley, ed. Edward A. Synan (Leiden–New York–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 129, nr. 4.23. 53  See Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 293-294. 54  The manuscript Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A.913, ff. 1ra-v, 3va-b, 4va-b, 5rb-va, 6vb, 7rb, 8ra-b, 8va-b, 12ra-b, contains nine questions on the first book of the Sentences, but none related to this matter. The questions are attributed to Peter in the outer margin beside the title of each question. Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne”, p. 24 has cast doubt on this attribution, advancing instead the possibility that the author of these questions may be another ‘Peter of Auvergne’ active in Paris in the early fourteenth century. Nonetheless, there are resemblances between this set of questions and the Questiones, which explains why I have inserted some sentences from this commentary into the apparatus fontium of the edition in cases in which I have noticed those resemblances. 55 Peter’s Quodlibet II, q. 9, occurs at f. 345va-b. For a description of this manuscript, see Raymond Macken, Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo. 1, Introduction. Catalogue A-P in Henrici de Gandavo opera omnia I (Leuven–Leiden: Leuven University Press–E.J. Brill, 1979), pp. 577-588. 56  Cf. Giuseppina Cannizzo, “La dottrina del Verbum mentis in Pietro d’Auvergne. Contributo alla storia del concetto di intenzionalità”, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 53 (1961), pp. 152-168, at 168; Ead., “I Quodlibeta di Pietro d’Alvernia”, p. 495; Ead., “I Quodlibeta di Pietro d’Auvergne. Problemi di storia letteraria e dottrinale. La tradizione manoscritta. Testo critico delle Quaestiones de verbo 1296, 1300. III: Cenni sui rapporti storici di alcune opinioni dottrinali di Pietro d’Auvergne”, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 57 (1965), pp. 67-89, at 68. 57  Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought, p. xxvi, n. 51. Rather than presenting arguments refuting Cannizzo’s position, Wippel simply states that “we are not completely convinced that Godfrey is here following Peter’s Quodlibet 1, q. 21, as Cannizzo claims”.

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d’une année à l’autre ou d’une discussion quodlibétique à l’autre, un manuscrit qui contenait seulement un quolibet, exception faite des groups V-VI et XI-XII qui ont probablement formé d’emblée, chacun un seul manuscrit indépendant”.58 It is thus quite possible that his Quodlibet VI, where he criticises Peter’s view, was not necessarily circulated immediately after Godfrey’s oral discussion, but rather that it was redacted or reviewed years later—or perhaps the oral discussion occurred later than has been assumed.59 To summarise: in the Questiones, Peter deals briefly with points that were discussed at the Faculty of Theology of Paris, as his criticism of James of Viterbo attests. He also advances a rather brief version of a very specific theory in the Questiones, the full elaboration of which is found in his Quodlibeta (and this theory was associated with his name in Paris). It then follows that the Questiones was almost certainly produced while Peter was studying theology in the early 1290s, more precisely after James of Viterbo’s 1291 Quodlibet and not long before the discussion of his second Quodlibet in 1297.60

3.4. Giles of Rome (Late 1291) A further indication along these lines comes from the implicit use Peter makes of Giles of Rome’s commentary on the Liber De causis. This is noticeable in one passage of the Questiones. In q. 24 of Book I (utrum multitudo pecuniarium sint uere diuitie), which is posed in relation to Politics I.9, 1257b5-17, Peter sets forth a very peculiar thesis, at least in the context of an interpretation of the Politics, on what it means to be wealthy. These are the opening lines of the solutio: Dicendum quod, ad sciendum que sit uera ratio diuitiarum, inspiciendum est ad rationem diuitis. Diues autem est per se sufficiens sibi, ut apparet ex consequenti illius propositionis Primum est diues per se, in Libro De Causis. Et hoc patet ex propositione Procli, ubi dicit quod omne diuinum est simplex, ergo sufficiens et diues; ergo maxime sufficiens maxime erit diues. Modo diues denotatur a diuitiis, ergo diuitie erunt hoc per quod aliquis est sufficiens sibi per se; illud autem per quod aliquis debet esse sufficiens sibi per se oportet quod sit tale quod possit supplere defectum per se; ergo uere diuitie, et per se et simpliciter, sunt quibus defectus nature per se suppleri potest. Tales autem diuitie naturales, ergo ille sunt uere et simpliciter et per se diuitie. Artificiales autem, cum non sint nate per se supplere defectum nature, ipse non erunt diuitie simpliciter et per se …61

58 

Pelzer, “Godefroid de Fontaines”, p. 510. Given that the University of Paris stationer’s taxation list indicates 1304, we take this to be the terminus ante quem for Godfrey’s redaction of his Quodlibeta. This also suggests that the scholarly common knowledge that Peter was a disciple of Godfrey should be revised. 60  At the end of the previous chapter, I have shown the degree to which Peter stresses the role of the will in Book V of the Scriptum. Given the similarity between the Questiones and the Scriptum, which, arguably, implies a temporal proximity in the redaction of the two works, and given the importance of the debates on the will during the 1280s, we could also hypothetically assume that the Scriptum might date to the late 1280s, or even later. 61  Liber I, q. 24, ll. 13-25. 59 

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As indicated in the apparatus fontium, the two references, one from the De causis and one from Proclus’ Elementatio theologica, are also found together in Aquinas’ commentary on the De causis, precisely where Aquinas expounds on that pro­ position of the De causis. Even so, these two citations together (though without explicit mention of Proclus) also appear in Giles of Rome’s commentary on the De causis, more specifically in his explanation of proposition 20: Primum est diues per seipsum et est diues maius. More important still is that, at this particular point, Giles not only connects Politics I.9, 1257b5-17, with the metaphysical notion that the first being is self-sufficient, as Peter does, but he also distinguishes between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial riches’ in terms quite similar to those used by Peter and which are not found, at least not in the same way, in the parallel passage of the Politics commentaries of Albert and Aquinas.62 For Giles, as for Peter, ‘natural riches’ are the goods that satisfy human need (indigentia) per se, while ‘artificial riches’ do so only indirectly: Dubitaret forte aliquis quid sit esse diues. Dicendum quod secundum Phylosophum, in Politicis, nomen diuitiarum sumptum est ab abundantia vel etiam a non indigentia sumitur … Ille ergo est diues qui non indiget sed abundat et inde est quod, cum sint duo genera diuitiarum, quaedam naturales, sicut frumentum, vinum et caetera terra nascentiae, quae subueniunt indigentiae nostrae, quaedam autem sunt diuitiae artificiales, sicut aurum et argentum et nummismata, quae per artificium hominum inuenta sunt ad satisfaciendum indigentiae nostrae, magis merentur dici diuitiae quam artificiales, quia magis satisfaciunt indigentiae nostrae … Naturales vero diuitiae satisfaciunt nobis directe et per se. Differentia ergo quae est inter diuitias naturales et artificiales sufficienter declarat quod diuitem esse non est non indigere, sed esse sufficientem. Hoc idem declaratur per id quod Phylosophus in Politicis dicit … quod quicquid indiget est aliquo modo compositum, illud autem quod est omnino simplex nullo indigere potest.63

While the distinction between natural and artificial riches is found in the Summa theologiae and in Giles’ De regimine as well,64 in neither case does one find a connection between it and the De causis nor any emphasis on self-sufficiency. Moreover, even though, in his commentary on the De causis, Albert refers to the Politics and states that a wealthy man does not lack anything, he does not distinguish between natural and artificial riches, and his wording is very different from that of Giles and 62  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, I.6, p. 46: “Quod verae divitiae sint ex iis quae dicta sunt, scilicet possessionibus agriculturae, et animalium … et ideo sufficientia est talis possessionis ad bonam vitam”; Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, I.6, p. A99, ll. 239-243: “Et dicit quod uere diuitie sunt ex huiusmodi rebus qui subuenitur necessitati nature … quia possunt tollere indigentiam et facere sufficientiam habenti eas, ut scilicet homo sit sibi sufficiens ad bene uiuendum. Sunt autem quedam alie diuitie quarum possessio est infinita”; I.7, p. A103, ll. 207-209, 231-234: “non sunt uere diuitie ille que uariata hominum dispositione nullam dignitatem neque utilitatem habent ad necessitatem uite … Sunt enim quedam diuitie secundum naturam, scilicet de rebus necessariis ad uitam”. 63  Aegidius Romanus, Opus super authorem De causis (Venetiis: apud Iacobum Zoppinum, 1550), ff. 70v-71r. 64 Cf. Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 1 and IIa-IIae, q. 117, art. 2; Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, I/I.7, pp. 20-22.

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Peter.65 The passages in the Questiones and in Giles’ commentary are, therefore, stylistically and doctrinally more closely related to each other than either is to Albert’s and Aquinas’ texts. Giles’ commentary on the De causis was composed between 1289 and September 1291 in Bayeux,66 enjoying an immediate and considerable influence, perhaps as much as the commentaries on the De causis authored by Albert the Great and Aquinas.67 It could be argued that it was Giles who drew on the Questiones, but such an assumption appears much less probable than the opposite. Three reasons can be given for this. First, Peter was not yet a master of theology when he lectured on the Politics and typically, as the well-studied cases of Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito suggest, masters of arts drew on theologians (what Giles indeed was), not the other way round. Second, since the commentary was composed at Bayeux, it seems implausible that Giles would have had access there to a commentary on the Politics made by a master of arts, whereas, given Giles’ prominence, it was likely that the work was already circulating in Paris a few months after its composition. Third, throughout the Questiones, Peter uses ‘metaphysical arguments’ countless times, and it therefore seems likely that, once he stumbled across Giles’ use of the Politics in a metaphysical work, he decided to employ Giles’ line of reasoning in his lectures on the Politics in much the same way as he used Aquinas’ commentary on the On generation and corruption in Book III, q. 5: there, Peter engages in a lengthy discussion taking as a starting point Aquinas’ analogy of an animal’s body, the flesh of which is continuously renewed through food, with a city that remains the same, while its inhabitants are born and pass away continuously.68 On the other hand, it seems improbable that, commenting on the De causis, Giles would have sourced an idea from a commentary on the Politics, since, in his commentary, Giles makes analogies with political matters only twice: in this passage and at the end of the page previous to the excerpt quoted above. While it was common practice to employ ideas from logics, metaphysics and natural philosophy in works of practical philosophy, as this mirrored the training received at the university, the reverse was absolutely inexistent in medieval philosophy (apart from a few analogies scattered about the texts). 65  Cf. Albertus Magnus, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. Winfried Fauser, Alberti Magni Opera omnia XVII.2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1993), Liber II, tractatus 4, cap. 5, p. 160, ll. 12-22. 66  Cf. Francesco Del Punta–Silvia Donati–Concetta Luna, “Egidio Romano”, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Vol. 42. Dugoni-Enza (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993), pp. 319341, at 331. On Giles’ commentary, see Giulia Battagliero, “Egidio Romano, Proclo e il Liber de causis”, Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 24 (2017), pp. 117-137. 67  Cf. Dragos Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovery Corpus of Texts”, in Id. (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on “Liber de Causis” (ca. 1250-1350) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), pp. 11-52, at 36-37. 68  On this question, see Chapter 4, section 5 and Chapter 5, section 3, below.

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3.5. Henry of Ghent’s Summa (Between 1281 and 1291) A final hint that the Questiones was composed in the 1290s is found in Book VI, q. 4. After quoting Aristotle’s definition of pleasure found in the first book of the Rhetoric—“Supponatur autem nobis esse delectationem motum quendam anime et constitutionem simul totam et sensibilem in existentem naturam”69—Peter states that this definition has been interpreted in two ways. In the first interpretation, the elements found in this definition—namely ‘motus’ on the one hand and ‘constitutio’ and ‘simul tota’ on the other—are understood as the two causes of the pleasure an individual feels: the ‘movement’ in the soul towards something which is sensed as suitable or connatural and the condition (constitutio) resulting from the conjunction with what is suitable. According to the second interpretation, the ‘motus’ and the ‘constitutio’ are one and the same thing and are thus the primary cause of pleasure, while the apprehension by which the individual is aware of the conjunction is its secondary cause.70 The second interpretation chimes with Henry of Ghent’s explanation of the Aristotelian definition of pleasure found in art. 50 of his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. According to Henry, the ‘movement’ in the soul towards what is connatural and the condition that follows the conjunction with what is connatural are not two different aspects. Indeed, Henry says that the coordinating conjunction ‘et’, which connects ‘motus’ and ‘constitutio’ in the text of Aristotle, should rather be read as ‘id est’.71 The composition of Henry’s Summa is related to his teaching at the faculty of theology, specifically, art. 50 “was composed … sometime between 1281 and Christmas of 1282”.72 Even so, this work started to be distributed and was circulating at the University of Paris one decade later, that is, “some time just prior to 1292”.73 For our purposes, the relevant question is whether Peter might have had access to Henry’s lectures before 1292, for instance, by consulting the manuscript containing Henry’s lectures, the so-called liber magistri.74 As has been noted, Henry’s Summa started to be explicitly quoted by other masters at Paris only in the early 1290s.75 Therefore, 69  See Liber VI, q. 4, ll. 29-31; Aristoteles Latinus XXXI.1-2, Rhetorica. Translatio Anonyma sive Vetus et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Bernd Schneider (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), p. 199, ll. 3-5 (1369b33-35). 70  Cf. Liber VI, q. 4, ll. 29-41. 71  Cf. ibid., the apparatus fontium to ll. 37-40. 72  Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae). Art. XLVII-LII, ed. Markus Führer, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XXI (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007), p. xiv. 73  Ibid., p. xv, which draws on Henricus de Gandavo, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae). Art. XXXV-XL, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XXVIII (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994), p. xxii. 74  On this, see ibid., p. xxii, n. 12 and the bibliography quoted there. 75  Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae). Art. XXXI-XXXIV, ed. Raymond Macken–Ludwig Hödl, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia XXVII (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991), p. xxvii; Id., Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae). Art. XXXV-XL, pp. xxii-xxvi.

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while Peter might have accessed Henry’s Summa in the 1280s, it seems more likely that, like his fellow masters, he did so in the 1290s. Be that is as it may, Peter’s use of Henry’s Summa proves, once again, that the Questiones was not composed in the 1270s and provides further evidence to date it to the 1290s.

4. Conclusions The evidence presented all through this chapter therefore permits us to conclude that, in all probability, the Questiones was produced sometime between late 1291 and 1296. It is thus a work of Peter’s maturity. The objection might be raised that this date is too late for the earliest commentary on the Politics produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris, since it would have been nearly thirty years after the translation of the Politics in its entirety. This would, however, mean not taking into account that the extant commentaries on the Ethics related to the Arts Faculty—and which cover the ten books of the Ethics—are also dated to the 1280s and 1290s, that is, some thirty and more years after the translation of the complete text of the Ethics into Latin.76 The attention of most masters of arts turned to practical philosophy probably quite late, only in the 1280s. This also corresponds with what happened in the faculty of theology, where political matters started being paid more attention in quodlibetal questions at the beginning of the 1280s and steadily garnered more attention over time, especially in the 1290s, thanks to theologians such as Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo.77

76  For the dates of the Ethics commentaries produced at Paris, see Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 154155; Id., Anonymi Artium Magistri, pp. 91-115. 77  For an overview of quodlibetal questions related to political issues, see Roberto Lambertini, “Political Quodlibeta”, in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 429-474.

Chapter 3

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb As noted on the first page of this study, ff. 60ra-68rb of manuscript B contain an anonymous commentary on Books I-III.13 of the Politics, which commentary presents a very similar text to that of the Questiones (though, for the most part, in a shortened and raw form). This similarity, together with the fact that, in the successive folios (ff. 68rb-79vb), B contains the same text as P,1 induces us immediately to assume a direct connection between the first part of B and the Questiones. This being the case, it raises the question as to how the two texts are related: is B a first draft of the Questiones, perhaps a reportatio made by a student in the classroom? Is B an abridgement of the Questiones made later by a student for his personal use, or is B a commentary undertaken by another master of arts and therefore a source for the Questiones, which Peter used to construct his own commentary? In this last case, the centrality of the Questiones would certainly be lessened, for an earlier commentary would have advanced many of the ideas we tend to regard as distinctive of Peter’s interpretation. Unlike the Questiones, B2 has no Prohemium. In Book I, the text has 29 questions as opposed to 31 in the Questiones. The greater part of the questions in the first book of the two texts is virtually the same, but each of the texts contains questions absent from the other. The Questiones contain six questions absent from B—qq. 2, 11-14 and 17—while B poses four questions lacking from the Questiones: qq. 8, 9, 11 and 21. In terms of the other books, the matter is simpler: in Book II, B poses the same 19 questions as the Questiones, with the titles being very similar; likewise, in Book III, B and the Questiones have the same first 19 questions.3 Few scholars have examined the relationship between the Questiones and B. The first, albeit quite briefly, was Ferdinand Cranz in 1938. Taking into consideration the argument drawn from Sextus Empiricus in Book II, q. 5 of both texts,4 which is, however, quoted explicitly and at length only in the Questiones, Cranz argued that the similarity could only be explained either by “mutual dependence upon some common source or by the dependence of the Bologna manuscript upon” the Questiones. For Cranz, however, the second hypothesis was “most probable”, since the Questiones could not have taken the details of Sextus Empiricus’ quotation 1 

That is, from Book III, q. 20 up to Book VII, q. 7 of the Questiones. To be clear, in this section, when I refer to B, I mean the commentary on the first three books of the Politics contained in ff. 60ra-68rb of the manuscript Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625. 3  As we shall see, their texts are not completely the same. 4  See Liber II, q. 5, ll. 8-12 and, for B, Liber II, q. 5, ll. 7-9. 2 

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from B.5 Moreover, Cranz attributed B to Annibaldo di Ceccano,6 who was a master of arts in Paris between 1307 and 1322,7 since, on ff. 60r and 79v, Cranz read “questiones politicorum secundum expositionem domini anibaldi”. Over fifty years later, Christoph Flüeler showed that Annibaldo di Ceccano was not the author of B, since the two folios of B actually bear the annotation “questiones politicorum secundum exemplar domini anibaldi”, this sentence becoming visible under a quartz lamp.8 More importantly, Flüeler maintained that the Questiones is the ‘original’ commentary on the Politics, reasoning that they are transmitted in two manuscripts (P and F) and that q. 8 of Book I in B (which is absent from the Questiones) is only a paraphrasing of the parallel section of Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics, thus lacking the “übliche Eigenständigkeit” that Peter shows in his approach to the Politics. B was thus the work of an anonymous author and, as Flüeler labelled it, an abbreviatio of the Questiones. Flüeler also maintained that the four questions in B absent from the Questiones resulted from a later addition to the text.9 Ten years after the publication of Flüeler’s book, Griet Galle rejected his position. Galle did not carry out a comparison between P and B, but rather based her view on the similar case of Peter’s question commentaries on the On the heavens, in which one of the versions is a compilation and contains several questions taken from Albert’s commentary. Owing to this, she claimed that the case of B and the Questiones could be similar to that of the versions on the On the heavens and, therefore, that B could “partly depend on another, shorter reportatio of the same or similar lectures” as the Questiones.10 Moreover, while subscribing to Flüeler’s view that the four questions in B were later additions, Galle considered that Flüeler had not adequately explained why B contains those questions. None of these examinations constituted a thorough analysis of the content of B by way of a comparison of it with other commentaries beyond the Questiones. They drew their conclusions on the basis of a limited number of questions or merely proposed a hypothesis without a full examination of B. The aim of this chapter is thus 5 Cranz,

Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory, p. 304. Ibid., pp. 280-281. 7  See Marc Dykmans, “Le cardinal Annibal de Ceccano (vers 1282-1350). Étude biographique et testament du 17 juin 1348”, Bulletin de l’Institut Historique Belge de Rome 43 (1973), pp. 145-344, especially 158-171. 8  Cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.104. 9  Ibid., pp. 103-104. 10  Griet Galle, “The Set of Questions on De caelo in the Mss Leipzig, Universitätsbibl. 1386, ff. 91va-102vb and Praha, Knihovny Metropolitní 1320 (L. LXXIV), ff. 43rb-52vb Attributed to Peter of Auvergne. Its Authorship, Date and Relation to Other Sets of Questions Attributed to Peter of Auvergne”, in G. Fioravanti–C. Leonardi–S. Perfetti (eds.), Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente medievale (secoli XIII-XIV). Atti del Colloquio Firenze–Pisa, 19-22 ottobre 2000, organizzato dalla S.I.S.M.E.L. e dalla S.I.S.P.M., sotto l’egida della S.I.E.P.M. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), pp. 253-309, at 275-276. 6 

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to compare the questions shared by the Questiones and B and afterwards to attempt to explain the reasons for the absence of some questions from each of the texts. By way of illustrating how much these two texts are similar and even more so when compared with other commentaries, in the following pages, when I compare the Questiones with B, I quote in the footnotes the other commentators, i.e., Anony­ mous of Milan, Vatican Anonymous and Anonymous of Baltimore. This will also help demonstrate, if necessary, that the ‘author’ of the Questiones and B is the same and that the two texts form a unity. As both the Questiones and B are to a great extent determined by their origin, this chapter begins precisely by examining how each text came to be. This will permit us to understand the relationship between the two texts better.

1. The Questiones, B and Peter’s Oral Lectures There can be no doubt that the Questiones and B are rooted in orality. That being said, none of the three manuscripts containing the Questiones, whether partially or in its entirety, is directly derived from the notes of a student or scribe in a classroom. This is evident because all three manuscripts are written in a polished, rather than a rough and hasty script, and all of them present omissions per homoioteleuton,11 indicating that they were copied from another manuscript. Moreover, unlike in so many medieval philosophical and theological texts, there is no indication either at the beginning or at the end that the scribe wrote it in the classroom (reportata/ reportatum), and there are no temporal references, such as to what was said in previous lessons (lectiones) or to what was about to be discussed in following lessons. Proving that a medieval text is a reportatio, i.e., the written transcription of the oral lectures of a master, or that it is derived from one is not an easy task when it is not explicitly stated in the manuscript or in the text that it is so.12 Scholars often dwell on certain indications, taking as granted that they show in and of themselves that a particular text is derived from an oral presentation. Examples of this are the use of the second person, the presence of certain abbreviations in the manuscript and the repetition of a conjunction, adverb or a word, before and after a subordinate or parenthetical clause. These characteristics, however, also occur in texts with no

11 

On this, see Chapter 7, sections 2 and 3, below. Scholarly literature on this topic, especially with regard to sermons, is vast. For enlightening case-studies of reportationes of medieval theological and philosophical texts, see Jean-Pierre Muller, “Les reportations des deux premiers livres du Commentaire sur les Sentences de Jean Quidort de Paris O.P.”, Angelicum 33 (1956), pp. 361-414; Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 60*-63*; William O. Duba, The Forge of Doctrine: The Academic Year 1330-31 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), pp. 29-41. See also Jacqueline Hamesse, “La technique de la reportation”, in O. Weijers–L. Holtz (eds.), L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles). Actes du colloque international (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), pp. 405-421, and the bibliography quoted there. 12 

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origins in orality.13 The case of the repetition of a word before and after the parenthetical clause is even more telling: it does not represent a sign of orality, but rather the fact that the manuscripts containing this kind of text had no punctuation and therefore required a clear indication to the reader that there was a parenthetical clause. Such a repetition avoided any misunderstanding and can be seen not only in the Questiones14 and in B,15 but also in Peter’s Scriptum, which was most probably revised by Peter himself and does not appear to result from oral lectures.16 This said, we can find traces of orality in the Questiones and in B. None of these traces alone represents conclusive proof that either of these two texts—or any given text—is derived from spoken performance, but, in their ensemble, they are indications allowing us to conclude that these texts in their current form result from a previous reportatio (though, as we shall see, each in a different way). In the case of the Questiones, we can point to the presence of the ‘discourse marker’ ‘modo’, a word with which numerous sentences start (though this is much more frequent in the first three books);17 the overwhelming use of performative formulas;18 the 13  The use of the pronoun tu and verbs in the second person is found in countless texts. See, for instance, Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus I-III, ed. Simone Van Riet (Louvain–Leiden: E. Peeters–E.J. Brill, 1972), Pars 1, cap. 5, p. 81: “tu autem postea scies differentiam inter animam sensibilem et vim movendi” and Pars secunda, cap. 4, p. 153: “tu postea disces in geometria causas elongationum propter quas videtur magis et magis”; see also ibid., pp. 37, 41, 55, 56, 45, 67, 152, 164. Even in a reportatio the use of the second person singular might mean only, as Griet Galle maintained, “an imaginary opponent”; cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 92*. Regarding the use of certain abbreviations, it is possible that a scribe might use some specific abbreviations easier to make and which could speed up his work, but, if we compare the abbreviations of reportationes with those of texts not related to orality, we find no differences. 14  Cf. Liber I, q. 13, ll. 46-48: “Sed ulterius necessarium est ei ut, quia de se moueri non potest nisi ab alio moueatur, ut habeat per quod aptus sit recipere uirtutem et formam primi mouentis”; Liber III, q. 13, ll. 48-51: “Sic ergo distinctis politiis rectis, transgresse, cum sint quasi priuationes illarum – et priuatio distinguitur secundum distinctionem habitus, a quo etiam accipit rationem –, ipse transgresse simili modo et eodem distinguuntur”. 15  B, Liber I, q. 24, ll. 8-12: “Et sic, quia desiderium eorum que sunt ad finem ex fine determinationem sumit, quia tantum desideratur quantum est utile ad finem, ideo, cum pauce diuitie sufficiunt necessitati humane, ideo, sic considerando appetitus earum non potest esse infinitus”; B, Liber I, q. 28, ll. 28-29: “Item, uidemus in partibus anime quod semper, in illis que nate sunt obedire et principari, semper est alia uirtus”. 16  On this, see the introduction of Lidia Lanza to Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum. Since these repetitions are parts of the original text, they cannot be eliminated from the edition. 17  By way of illustration, in Book I, there are almost fifty clauses starting with ‘modo’, and this also occurs several times in Book II. Peter uses the term ‘modo’ for argumentative segmentation. In the Scriptum, Peter starts a sentence with this word only four times. This is telling as the Scriptum is much lengthier than the Questiones. We can assume that the word ‘modo’ is a significant trace of orality by looking into one of the few texts which is commonly viewed as being a reportatio (owing to its hastily written script), that is, Buridan’s commentary on the Metaphysics; cf. Flüeler, “From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries”. Two questions of Buridan’s commentary are edited in Jean Celeyrette, “Une reportatio de l’enseignement de Buridan sur la métaphysique des accidents”, Przegląd Tomistyczny 24 (2018), pp. 69-90, at 77-90. In just two questions, Buridan begins a sentence or a clause with the word ‘modo’ no fewer than nine times. 18  It is true that words such as ‘dico’, ‘inquam’ and ‘respondeo’ also appear in texts with no relation to orality, but the incidence of these words in the Questiones is extremely high if compared, for instance,

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occurrence of an anacoluthon,19 and syntactic constructions more usual in the spoken language20 in addition to shifts from the singular to the plural and from present to future tense during the same line of reasoning.21 B, too, presents relevant indications of orality: apart from the shift in grammatical number22 and the presence of the ‘discourse markers’ ‘modo’23 and ‘nunc autem’24 at the beginning of clauses, we can indicate, for instance, the repetition of the with the Scriptum. By way of example, ‘dico’ occurs much more often in the Questiones: fourteen times in Book III of the Questiones as opposed to six in Book III of the Scriptum; nine against three in Book IV; five against three in Book V and four as opposed to one in Book VI. It is only in Book VII that ‘dico’ has the same number of occurrences in both works: five each. It should, however, be noted that each book of the Scriptum is much lengthier than the corresponding book of the Questiones, which makes the number of occurrences in the latter far more significant. The use of ‘inquam’ is even more enlightening, since, in the Scriptum, it occurs only three times (Books III-VIII), whereas, in the Questiones, fourteen times (Books III-VII). Again, for the sake of illustration, in Buridan’s commentary on the Metaphysics (quoted in the previous note), the word ‘dico’ has twenty-one occurrences in only two questions. 19  Liber I, q. 2, ll. 16-18: “Si tu autem dicas quod finis practice est operatio, ut dicit 1º Ethicorum, contra: scientia quelibet, certum est quod prosequitur finem suum sillogizando”; Liber IV, q. 3, ll. 23-25: “Minor patet quia homo, cum sit uoluntatem et rationem habens, maxime ei contrariatur alteri omnino subici et ad bonum illius; ergo et cetera”. 20  See, for example, the direct question in Liber I, q. 9, ll. 32-33: “… ergo et ciuile esse erit a natura homini. Sed que est ista natura?” (this, of course, is just an indication and not sufficient evidence of orality); the case in Liber III, q. 14, ll. 42-43, of the verb of the subordinate clause referring to the closest element to the relative pronoun and not, as it should, to the subject of the main clause: “iudicium est resoluere in prima principia, que ab appetitu peruerso non impediuntur per se” (it is the ‘iudicium’ which is hindered, not the first principles); the use of the pronoun ‘hoc’ instead of the more appropriate ‘aliud’ in Liber I, q. 12, ll. 6-8: “… in quibus est principans et subiectum, necessario unum natum est moueri ut subiectum et aliud mouere ut principans, et unum dirigere, hoc autem dirigi”; the use of the nominative instead of the genitive (although here we cannot exclude a mistake made by the copyist) in Liber IV, q. 3, ll. 18-19: “tirannidis autem et democratie est unus mos, et similiter oligarchia, ut dicitur in illo capitulo …”. 21  See Liber I, q. 9, ll. 80-92: “Et propter hoc aptissimus erit ad speculandum, non indigens societate ad illam suam potissimam operationem, potens etiam illa carere propter moderamen passionum corporalium. Et ille tunc disponitur ad corpus sicut ad inimicum, sicut dicit Eustratius, et habebit uirtutem heroycam, et eliget uitam solitariam ad speculandum altissima; et hoc accidit eis ex diuina consuetudine morali uel ex natura propria uel etiam ex supranaturali causa secundum theologos, que omnia accidunt nature speciei. Et ideo illi fiunt inciuiles: ciuitate enim non indigent nec ad defensionem, quia corpus non curant, nec ad necessitatem corporis, quia illius sunt inimici, nec propter consuetudines bonas, quia de se habent excessum uirtutum, ut iam patuit, nec plura sunt opera ciuitatis; ergo isti, quasi per se sufficientes ad speculandum, quod summe intendunt, erunt iterum inciuiles”. 22  See Liber I, q. 7, ll. 13-18: “Mulier autem ex naturali sua complexione est frigida et humida multum, et hoc impedit operationes sensus et intellectus; et ideo possunt mente preuidere, propter quod querunt semper consilium aliunde, et iste defectus est causa multorum accidentium que sunt in eis. Quia igitur deficit ratione et aliqualiter attingit ad rationem, nata est obedire rationi”; Liber II, q. 17, ll. 11-13: “Dicendum quod lex mutanda est per se meliori superueniente, et per accidens non est mutanda. Per se mutande sunt, quia priores fuerunt rudes et inordinationem permiserunt in ciuitate”; Liber III, q. 6, ll. 27-29: “Virtus autem ista est prudentia politica, per quam ali­ quis dirigit operationes suas in finem communem, et iustitia legalis, que non sunt uirtutes sine uirtute morali”; Liber III, q. 17, ll. 4-5: “sed multitudo deficit prudentia, quia imprudentes sunt ut in pluribus”. 23  It occurs eight times in Book I and three times in Book III. These occurrences represent a lower figure with respect to the Questiones; however, the text of B is far shorter than that of the Questiones. 24  It is found ten times in Book I, twice in Book II and four times in Book III of B. By contrast, it is found only three times in the first three books of the Questiones.

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demonstrative adjective ‘talis’ (or derived) in a stretch of text,25 the fact that in one passage the deictic ‘hac’ is used instead of the more appropriate ‘ista’,26 the very infrequent use of the future tense, the repetition of a syntagm in the same sentence,27 the lack of syntactic consistency28 and the sentence “Sunt etiam in homine alii inciuiles propter indispositionem et corruptionem nature”,29 in which the syntagm ‘in homine’ means the human species. However, its most significant trait is that numerous questions present a rather telegraphic text, which makes it difficult to conceive of B as a simple product of writing.30 In fact, with regard to B, it is not easy to determine in every case whether the traces of orality are simply so or whether they are to be understood as ‘simplifications’ of the discourse due to the person who was taking down the notes. Whatever the case may be, there remains no doubt that B did not result from a master of arts sitting at his desk composing a written work. Since both texts bear traces of orality and both are commentaries on a text from the corpus Aristotelicum—the basis of the curriculum at the arts faculty—we can draw a first conclusion: they must be related to Peter’s oral lectures given in a classroom. The two texts cover several books of the Politics—B three incomplete books and the Questiones partially seven—following the order of the text commented on, sometimes chapter by chapter and in great detail.31 We can thus also assume that at least the Questiones represents an entire course on the Politics and that the original lectures given by Peter were neither scattered lectures on parts of an Aristotelian text, nor disputed questions on specific topics of the Politics—as is the case for Johannes Vath’s quodlibetal questions on subjects related to the Politics32 and probably for Siger of Brabant’s question on whether it is better to be ruled by an outstanding man or by the law.33 Given the lack of evidence—no manuscript of the Questiones contains references to lectiones—it is impossible to ascertain what kind of course it was—probably Peter read extraordinarie the Politics—and how much time Peter took to lecture on the 25  See Liber II, q. 16, ll. 11-15: “Et talium enuntiationum sunt duo genera, sicut in speculatiuis, ita et in agibilibus. Vnde quedam est in qua predicatum per se inest subiecto, et ubi etiam sunt per se noti; et talis nullum latet, sed omnibus nota est, ut ‘nulli iniuste nocendum’, et talis dicitur naturalis: et talis est immutabilis per se”. 26  See Liber I, q. 25, ll. 54-57: “Sic est de pecunia, quia fit commutatio pecunie unius ciuitatis pro pecunia alterius ciuitatis que non habet usum in hac ciuitate, et ideo minus ualet in hac ciuitate quam in propria”. The use of ‘hac’ here is understandable by assuming that it was used to emphasise that the point regards this city which he was talking about (possibly accompanied by gesticulation). 27  See Liber III, q. 5, ll. 14-17: “In ciuitate autem muri et edificia non sunt de essentia ciuitatis, sed magis comparantur ad esse, sicut locus ad locatum; et non sunt de essentia ciuitatis, sicut nec locus deorsum de essentia grauis”. 28  See Liber III, q. 6, ll. 20-21: “Et ideo, cum ciuis sit talis operatio, scilicet consilium et iudicare, eius est aliqua uirtus”, where one would expect consiliare instead of consilium. 29  Liber I, q. 10, ll. 46-47. 30  For this aspect of B, see the next pages. 31  On this, see Chapter 5, below. 32  They are edited in Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 293-294, n. 51 and n. 57. 33  On this, see p. 225, below.

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Politics. We can, however, estimate it based on an anonymous Ethics commentary dated to the late 1270s.34 This commentary contains one hundred and nine questions on Books I-V of the Ethics (the fifth book is incomplete) and is divided into thirty-eight lectiones. While this figure gives an average of 2,86 questions by lesson, its editor notes that the number of questions for lesson varies: “d’un minimum d’une seule question … à un maximum de six questions … les lectiones formées de la réunion de deux questions sont les plus fréquentes (15 sur 18)”.35 The number of questions by lesson does not depend on the length of the questions posed in each lesson. It would be, thus, misguided to tally the exact number of lectiones solely based on the number of questions of a commentary. In any case, since the Questiones has one hundred and twenty-six questions and assuming that in each lectio Peter would deal with two questions, the Questiones would correspond to sixty-three lessons. Instead, if he had posed three questions, then he would have read the Politics in forty-two lessons. For the sake of comparison, the four books of the Sentences were read in one academic year in roughly one hundred and thirty lectiones.36 Be that as it may, since both the Questiones and B appear to be derived from orality as well as from teaching, the main question to be answered is what the relationship between these two texts is.

2. Analysis of B It cannot be ruled out a priori that B and the Questiones result from two reportationes of the same lectures. At first sight, however, this is very unlikely:37 for each parallel question, the Questiones is always longer38 and presents a more polished Latin, while B is shorter and has a raw text. This being the case, the most probable explanations are either that B represents a primordial stage of the Questiones, perhaps a reportatio, or that B is an abridgement of the Questiones. Since B has a more schematic, shorter text, let us start this analysis by considering its main features and what makes it distinct from the Questiones.

2.1. Style and Use of Sources The bulk of the questions found in B present a succinct text and both the arguments contra and the replies to them are usually pared to the bone. The initial arguments contra are arranged into only one syllogism, and, in the greatest part of the argu-

34 

It is published in Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri. Questiones super Librum Ethicorum. Ibid., p. 18. 36  Cf. William Duba–Chris Schabel, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 84 (2017), pp. 143-179, especially 175-177. 37  Later in this chapter I shall provide evidence to invalidate this hypothesis. 38  The only exception is q. 2 of Book I of B (= q. 3 of Book I of the Questiones). 35 

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ments contra, there is no reference to sources.39 Moreover, almost no argument contra contains the typical explanation of the major and/or minor premise of the main syllogism (maior/minor patet): the explanation of the major premise occurs only in two questions and the same goes for the minor—it is explained only in two questions out of the sixty-seven constituting B.40 Just for the sake of comparison, the explanation of the major and the minor premises of the main syllogism of the argument contra is found in almost every question of the Questiones. In some instances, the oppositum in B consists of one brief and hastily-written sentence which is nothing more than a reference to the text being commented on, i.e., the Politics.41 This is, in fact, one main characteristic of B, the number of refer­ ences to the littera—typically “Philosophus dicit in littera” or “dicitur in littera”— higher than in the Questiones. In Book I, the expression in littera occurs ten times in B and not once in the Questiones; in Book II, it occurs three times in B and once in the Questiones, while, in Book III, B contains this expression four times, against two in the Questiones. Obviously, the more a text refers to the littera of Aristotle, the less elaborate its explanation must be. This, together with the absence of the explanation of the major and minor premises, is an indication that B resulted from an attempt to record the essential and basic details of an argumentation, whereas the Questiones was intended as a text presenting a more elaborate stage of the same argumentation. There is, however, a criterion that makes it possible to grasp the purpose that underlay the composition of B: the way in which B quotes the sources.42 As the apparatus fontium of the edition of B indicates, almost all of the literal citations and explicit references are either from the text of the Politics or are found in the florilegium known as Parvi flores.43 Other quotations, which are not in the Parvi 39  By way of illustration, Liber I of B has eighty-two arguments contra. Only fourteen thereof contain an explicit reference to a source. 40  The major is explained in Liber I, q. 2 and Liber II, q. 18. The minor is explained in Liber I, qq. 2 and 27. 41  Here the list of all the contra that provide no argument, being limited to the reference to the Politics: “Oppositum uult/dicit Philosophus in littera” (Liber I, qq. 7, 12; Liber II, q. 11); “Oppositum dicit Philosophus in isto 1º Politice” (Liber I, q. 23); “Oppositum dicit Philosophus fine 1º huius” (Liber I, q. 29); “Oppositum dicit Philosophus” (Liber II, qq. 3, 10, 12); “Oppositum dicit hic Philosophus” (Liber II, q. 5); “Oppositum dicitur in littera” (Liber II, qq. 15, 19); “Oppositum dicit Philosophus et 1º huius” (Liber II, q. 18); “Oppositum dicit Philosophus” (Liber III, qq. 3, 5, 17); “Contrarium dicit hic Philosophus” (Liber III, q. 9); “Oppositum dicit Aristoteles” (Liber III, q. 12); “Contrarium dicit Philosophus in littera” (Liber III, q. 14). The same happens in the Questiones, but slightly less than in B: cf. Liber I, qq. 8, 10, 11, 17, 23; Liber II, qq. 5, 10, 11, 12, 18; Book III, qq. 3 and 17. In addition, the contra is lacking from Liber I, q. 23 and Liber III, q. 13. However, in the Questiones the contra is typically 4-5 lines long (sometimes even more). 42  Although it is a study on literature, I draw here on Arthur George Rigg, “The Long or the Short of it? Amplification or Abbreviation”, The Journal of Medieval Latin 10 (2000), pp. 46-73. Rigg claims that “the most straightforward clue” in deciding the priority of two texts, one long and one short, “is often the use of sources” (p. 48). The next pages bear out this view. See also the reflections on the quotations in reportationes offered in Jacqueline Hamesse, “La méthode de travail des reportateurs”, Medioevo e Rinascimento 3 (1989), pp. 51-67, at 56-58. 43 The Parvi flores was assembled after the Questiones; they in fact contain some sentences taken from the Scriptum. The Parvi flores, however, drew on previous florilegia which Peter certainly knew,

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flores, are nevertheless catchphrases, and we can presume that they might be part of other florilegia circulating by that time in Paris or at least that students were familiar with them. This holds for the sentences consuetudo audiendi falsa facit credere falsa from Averroes’ commentary on the second book of the Metaphysics,44 for difficile est sine virtute pati bonas fortunas from the fourth book of the Ethics45 and for uenus furatur intellectum spisse sapientis from the seventh book of the Ethics.46 I have shown elsewhere that Peter did not have upon his desk any florilegium while composing his works or lecturing on Aristotle, but rather that he knew by heart the greater part of the dicta found in the Parvi flores, which, in turn, had been created from florilegia consisting of Aristotelian sentences. It would indeed be unreasonable to suppose that a master of arts well versed in the corpus Aristotelicum, a true specialist in Aristotle, would seek an Aristotelian aphorism in a florilegium—even more so where the commentator quotes a sentence from the work he is commenting on and he quotes it in the form fixed in a florilegium.47 Florilegia were intended not for advanced students, but rather circulated more in non-university milieus such as Franciscan studia. When they were used at the university, they were most probably the first step for a student at the faculty of arts, their contents thus absorbed and committed to memory for life as with other matters learnt at a very young age—grammar rules, languages and algebra.48 Any master of arts knew by heart those dicta, or at least the most significant from a philosophical point of view, since he quotes many turns of phrase from the form found in the Parvi flores. In its current form, the Parvi flores dates to 1296; cf. Jacqueline Hamesse, “Des Parvi flores aux Auctoritates Aristotelis”, in J. Hamesse–J.F. Meirinhos (eds.), Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, leur utilisation et leur influence chez les auteurs médiévaux (Barcelona: F.I.D.E.M., 2015), pp. 1-15, on 6 and 14. 44  It is quoted in Liber II, q. 17. This sentence finds a similar formulation in the Parvi flores; cf. Jacqueline Hamesse, Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”. Un florilège médiéval. Étude historique et édition critique (Louvain–Paris: Publications Universitaires–Béatrice-Nauwelearts, 1974), p. 120, nr. 67. It is, however, the form in which it is cited in B that was more used in the Middle Ages; cf. Marsilius von Padua, Defensor pacis, II.1, § 1, p. 138, and Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Texte inédit de la reportation de Cambridge, Liber II, q. 23, p. 71. 45  It is quoted in Liber II, q. 12. This dictum was widely mentioned; cf. Les Quodlibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de Fontaines (texte inédit), ed. Jean Hoffmans (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1932), Quodlibet XIII, q. 9, p. 254. 46  It is quoted in Liber II, q. 4. This sentence was taken literally from the Ethics and is found in many works—for instance, in John of Jandun’s Tractatus de laudibus Parisius, published in Paris et ses historiens aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Documents et écrits originaux, ed. Antoine J.V. Le Roux de Lincy–Lazare Maurice Tisserand (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1867), pp. 32-79, at 56; Le Traité de Pierre d’Ailly sur la Consolation de Boèce, Qu. 1, ed. Marguerite Chappuis (Amsterdam–Philadephia: B.R. Grüner, 1993), p. 8; Gerard Odonis’ commentary on Book IV of the Sentences quoted in Antoni Mruk, “Duae opiniones heterodoxae circa honestatem usus matrimonii vigentes initio saeculi XIV”, Periodica de Re Morali Canonica Liturgica 52 (1963), pp. 19-53, at 29, n. 32. 47  This is in fact noticeable in Peter’s commentary on the On the Heavens; cf. Griet Galle, “The Use of the Auctoritates Aristotelis in Peter of Auvergne’s Questiones on De caelo”, in J. Hamesse–J.F. Mei­ rinhos (eds.), Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, leur utilisation et leur influence chez les auteurs médiévaux (Barcelona: F.I.D.E.M., 2015), pp. 87-113, especially 91-94. 48  Cf. Marco Toste, “Parvi flores and philosophia practica: Medieval Florilegia and Their Use in Aristotelian Commentaries of the Arts Faculty”, in J. Hamesse–J.F. Meirinhos (eds.), Les “Auctoritates

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and used them in his lectures, as they often couched the Aristotelian idea in much clearer and more vivid terms than the Aristotelian text itself.49 The fact, therefore, that B reports verbatim quotations found almost exclusively in florilegia tells us that the person who was retaining the oral teaching, i.e., the reportator, inserted in the reportatio only the most well-known quotations, that is, the ones he could easily recognise. In the Middle Ages, it was a common practice that, while taking down notes on the oral lectures, the reportator left a blank space in the parchment for the quotations, which was filled in after the class ended.50 This probably happened in B too,51 but, in its case, the reportator made the insertions while still in the classroom taking down his notes, the references and, most importantly, the literal quotations he knew well in order to save time. The objection could be raised to this reconstruction that an abbreviator would proceed in the same exact way, selecting from the text he was abbreviating only the sentences he recognised, but this does not hold because he would find other literal citations in that text and not only those he could recognise, and thus the question would not be one of recognition of sentences, but rather of which ones would be important to copy in order to retain the structure of the reasoning he was trying to condense. By contrast, the Questiones contains a profusion of quotations clearly showing that, despite containing traces of orality, they result from a reworking of a reportatio.52 At one point Peter makes a reference to a florilegium and in such a way so as Aristotelis”, leur utilisation et leur influence chez les auteurs médiévaux (Barcelona: F.I.D.E.M., 2015), pp. 73-107. 49  Two examples suffice to prove this. First, every medieval author quoted the beginning of Book X of the Metaphysics in the way in which it is formulated in the Parvi flores—In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et minimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere—and never as it appears in the Metaphysics: “Maxime uero in eo quod est metrum esse primum uniuscuiusque generis et maxime proprie quantitatis; hinc enim ad alia uenit … In omnibus autem hiis metrum et principium unum aliquid et indiuisibile”; cf. Hamesse, “Les Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 135, nr. 239; Aristoteles Latinus XXV 3, Metaphysica. Lib. I-XIV. Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden–New York–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 196-197, ll. 42-44 and 58-59. Second, the famous sentence from the Liber de causis is always quoted in the form fixed in the Parvi flores: Omnis virtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa (cf. Hamesse, “Les Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 232, nr. 13). For the Liber de causis, see Adriaan Pattin, “Le Liber de Causis. Edition établie à l’aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966), pp. 90-203, at 83, ll. 15-16, XVI (XVII) 138: “Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata”; p. 84, ll. 22-24 and 26-28, 140: “Quod est quia virtus, quando incipit multiplicari, tunc destruitur unitas eius, et, quando destruitur eius unitas, destruitur eius infinitas … Et illius quidem significatio est virtus divisa, et quod ipsa quanto magis aggregatur et unitur, magnificatur et vehementior fit …”. 50  On this, see Hamesse, “La technique de la reportation”, pp. 410-411. See also Muller, “Les reportations”, p. 396, n. 1. 51  See, e.g., the quotation from Michael of Ephesus in Book III, q. 8, ll. 18-20: given its accuracy and length, it is unlikely that the reportator wrote it down when Peter pronounced it. I shall deal with this citation later in this chapter. 52  I shall return to this aspect later, but I need to clarify at this point that, living in a culture marked by orality, medieval authors and readers had no special interest in eliminating the ‘oral residue’ from their texts. I take this notion from Walter J. Ong, “Oral Residue in Tudor Prose Style”, Publications of the Modern-Language Association of America 80 (1965), pp. 145-154 [reprinted in Id., Rhetoric,

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to leave it clear that his readership/audience knew what he meant.53 What is more, numerous sentences from the Parvi flores are found throughout the Questiones, but the quantity and quality of citations scattered through the text make it clear that the Questiones underwent a process of editing and that the sources used go beyond simple florilegia. A few samples help us to understand how the Questiones and B display the same references:54 B, Liber I, q. 4, ll. 11-13

Questiones, Liber I, q. 5, ll. 18-22

Dico quod omne agens agit propter finem: de natura ostendit Philosophus 2º Phisicorum; de agente per intellectum patet, quoniam tale agens agit per rationem, que est in intellectu …

… cuius ratio est quia omne agens agit propter finem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, et ibi explicatur manifeste de agente naturali. Hoc etiam patet de agente secundum intellectum, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice, et arguitur ratione, quia agens secundum intellectum agit per rationem.55

As we shall see in the samples provided on the next pages, the great difference between the Questiones and B as regards the sources hinges on the fact that, every time B makes a reference or a short—but always very recognisable—citation (found in the Parvi flores), the Questiones makes explicit use of all the sources available to a master of arts to explain the same line of reasoning (in Italics the words matching the words of the source): B, Liber II, q. 18, ll. 10-14

Questiones, Liber II, q. 18, ll. 16-25

… et ideo, cum ordinetur in finem domini, naturaliter oportet quod habeat per que faciliter operetur et attingat finem, quia natura non deficit necessariis. Illud autem per quod faciliter potest actum exequi est habitus, et ita, si seruus inclinatur natura ad operationem suam, et ad habitum per quem operatur.

Cuius ratio est quia, cuius aliqua operatio uel finis, illum oportet habere quo possit faciliter attingere ad finem illum: natura enim nichil facit frustra, unde natura non inclinat in aliquid nisi etiam simul inclinet in illud per quod acquiratur, quia non deficit in necessariis, sicut dicit libro Celi et Mundi.

Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca, NY–London: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 23-47]. 53  See Liber I, q. 7, ll. 37-38: “… ut dicitur 2º De Anima in auctoritate illa: Naturalissimum, et cetera”. This sentence is found in the Parvi flores: “Naturalissimum enim operum est in omnibus viventibus quaecumque perfecta sunt et non orbata et quae generationem non habent spontaneam generare sibi simile ut esse divinum et immortale participant secundum id quod possunt” (Hamesse, Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 179, nr. 57). 54  Beyond the samples provided on this page and the next, see also the other samples in this section, as it is evident all through the Questiones the abundance of quotations when compared with B. 55  These two references are absent from the Anonymous of Milan (Liber I, q. 2: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf, f. 2rb). The Vatican Anonymous and the Anonymous of Baltimore do not raise the correspondent question, that is, on whether every community is for the sake of some good.

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Interpretative Study Sed serui est aliqua operatio, scilicet exequi preceptum domini; hoc autem bene potest sine habitu, unde et Auerroys, super 3um De Anima, dicit quod habitus est quo aliquis operatur cum uult; ergo simul seruus habebit inclinationem in talem habitum, per quem faciliter operetur, et hoc secundum naturam suam inquantum huiusmodi.56

What in B is a (very identifiable) syntagm which makes up part of the text’s flow, turns, in the Questiones, into an explicit source which is paired with another, thus substantiating the statement. This is noticeable more than once: B, Liber III, q. 14, ll. 24-26

Questiones, Liber III, q. 14, ll. 35-40

… et ideo male iudicant de se et de amicis, quia amicus est alter ipse. Si autem sit prudens et bonus, bene potest recte de se iudicare.

Ex hoc sequitur quod etiam male iudicant de amicis: amicus enim est alter ipse, ut dicitur 9º Ethicorum. Et ideo in alia Facultate recte ordinatum est ne quis in causa propria uel amici sit iudex. Bonus autem, quia rectum appetitum habet, bene de se iudicat, et per consequens de omnibus aliis. In pluribus autem non est hoc, quia mali ut in pluribus, boni aut ut in paucioribus, 2º Thopicorum.57

This is so not only with regard to the solutio and views maintained by Peter, but also regarding the arguments contra. B almost always displays a minimalist reference to the sources, while the Questiones makes a complete reference, and, what is more, it makes literal citations:

56  The Anonymous of Milan does not ask this question. The Anonymous of Baltimore does so, but he makes no references to any source (Liber II, q. 14: Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3vb). 57  In this question (III, q. 12) the Anonymous of Milan repeats these same quotations, but in different places of the solutio. Moreover, the words are different from those of the Questiones: “… sed homines ut in pluribus habent inordinatas affectiones ad se ipsos, ut apparet 8º Ethicorum, quia ami­ citia que est ad alterum prouenit ex amicitia que est ad se ipsum, ut ibidem dicitur, et Eustratius, 1º Ethicorum, uult quod quilibet est sui ipsius insanus et occultus amator [ad 1095b21-22]; et ideo passio affectionis ad se ipsum facit hominem male iudicare de propriis, quia homo reputat amicum (cod.: amicus) quasi (add. amicus quia) se ipsum, est alter ipse, ut apparet 9º Ethicorum … Boni autem uiri et uirtuosi non sumunt turbationem passionum in appetitu, sed passiones regulatas et moderatas; ideo bene iudicant de se ipsis et de aliis, quia non habent appetitum deordinatum qui iudicium impediat. Sed quia boni ut in paucioribus et mali ut in pluribus, ut dicitur in Thopicis, ideo homines ut in pluribus male iudicant de se ipsis et per consequens de propriis” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 25vb).

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B, Liber III, q. 18, ll. 3-8

Questiones, Liber III, q. 18, ll. 3-13

Arguitur quod sic, quod ad illud oportet inspicere in distributione principatus per quod multa expediuntur in ciuitate; sed diuitie et amici sunt huiusmodi, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera.

Arguitur quod sic, quia illud debet inspicere distribuens principatum per quod multa in ciuilitate expediuntur; sed hoc sunt diuitie; ergo secundum illarum dignitatem debet distribui principatus. Maior patet quia hoc est officium principantis, expedire ea que in ciuitate. Minor patet quia, ut dicit Philosophus, 1º Ethicorum, multi multa operati sunt per diuitias et amicos et per ciuilem potentiam. Item, secundum illud debet distribui principatus per quod possunt haberi omnia alia, quia ciuitas est ad per se sufficientia; sed per diuitias omnia possunt haberi: dicit enim Philosophus, 2º Rhetorice, quod diuitie sunt pretium et dignitas omnium aliorum, et idem testatur 5º Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod denarius est communis fideiussor.58

Item, ad illud oportet inspicere per quod habentur omnia; diuitie sunt huiusmodi, quia, 2º Rhetorice, dicitur quod diuitie uidentur esse quoddam omnium pretium; quare et cetera.

These samples already show us that Cranz’s hypothesis has no grounds. B does not depend on the Questiones, but rather represents a first stage of the text. It is not, as Cranz argued, that mentioning a source—such as Sextus Empiricus—has to occur in a detailed form in the earliest text; on the contrary, the details are introduced at a later stage, and this becomes even clearer if one considers that these texts stemmed from orality. Cranz’s hypothesis is akin to presuming that nowadays footnotes are written before the main text.

2.2. B is Not an Abbreviatio These samples also tell us that B cannot be, to use Flüeler’s term, an abbreviatio of the Questiones (or of any other commentary). If B were an abridgement, it is difficult to imagine that an abbreviator would keep only well-known quotations found in florilegia, discarding others that could be more relevant to the argument. That B cannot be an abridgement of the Questiones is also evident from its style: if it were an abridgement, it would reproduce entire sentences verbatim, skipping over others, and one would find word-for-word parallels between B and the Questiones, given that such a process would be simpler and less time consuming than rephrasing the 58  In these two arguments, the Anonymous of Milan draws heavily on the Questiones. Cf. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 28va: “ Arguitur quod sic, quia secundum excellentiam illius debent distribui principatus per quod multa expediuntur in ciuitate; sed diuitie sunt huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet quia princeps quantum potest debet intendere expeditionem bonorum communitatis. Minor declaratur quia Philosophus, 1º Ethicorum, uult quod multa fiunt in ciuitate per diuitias et amicos et ciuilem potentiam, et cetera. Item, secundum excellentiam illius debent distribui principatus per (add. hoc) quod habentur omnia; et diuitie sunt huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet. Minor declaratur quia Philosophus dicit, 2º Rhetoricorum, quod peccunia est pretium omnium, et 6º Ethicorum dicit Philosophus quod nummisma est pro paupere fidelis fideiusor et satis apparet ex 1º huius; ideo et cetera”.

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Questiones in order to condense the ideas found therein. Such a procedure was indeed the one followed by Godfrey of Fontaines in his abridgements of Boethius of Dacia’s writings,59 but, as the samples of the preceding pages show (and even more so those I shall present in the next pages), although the Questiones and B have similar wording, the phrasing is different from one to the other. Abridgements of question commentaries, whether of theological or philosophical texts produced around the same time, typically eliminate the arguments pro and contra and reproduce or (occasionally) condense the solutio. This is the case in some of Godfrey of Fontaines’ abridgements, such as the ones he made of Peter’s Quodlibeta I-II, of Boethius of Dacia’s commentary on the Topics and of Giles of Rome’s commentary on Book II of the Sentences.60 The same pattern—i.e., removing the arguments pro and contra and abridging only the solutio—is noticeable also in William of Rothwell’s abbreviation of Peter of Tarentaise’s Sentences commentary (around 1270-80)61 and in Étienne Gaudet’s abridgements of Nicholas Aston’s and Richard Brinkley’s Sentences commentaries (1360s).62 When it comes to B, it lacks some arguments and responses to them.63 However, the lack of some arguments can be explained not as a mistake—a copyist missing some lines—but rather because those arguments had probably not been transcribed in the original, such being in59  This is evident in his abridgement of the De summo bono, where Godfrey only changes a very few words; cf. Boethius Dacus, Opuscula. De aeternitate mundi. De summo bono. De somnis, ed. Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, in Boethii Daci opera VI.2 (København: apud Librarium G.E.C.GAD, 1976), pp. 443-446. In his abridgement of the De aeternitate mundi, Godfrey condenses the text more freely and changes the order of the arguments, but he never goes as far as to rephrase entire sentences and completely change the wording; cf. James F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century”, in J.A. Aertsen–K. Emery–A. Speer (eds.), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), pp. 359-389, at 369-370. In this article, Wippel examines Godfrey’s attitude as abbreviator. See also Paul Wilpert, “Ein Compendium des 13. Jahrhunderts (Gottfried von Fontaines als Abbreviator)”, Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch 2 (1965), pp. 165-180. 60  See Boethius Dacus, Opuscula, pp. 393-431. On Godfrey’s abridgement of Giles, see Concetta Luna, “Problemi di reportatio: Goffredo di Fontaines e la lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro II delle Sentenze”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), Les problèmes posés par l’édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux (Louvain-la-Neuve: Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1992), pp. 237-290, at 240-241. 61  Cf. Kent Emery, Jr., “The Sentences Abbreviation of William de Rothwell, O.P. University of Pennsylvania, Lat. MS. 32”, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 51 (1984), pp. 69-135, especially 80. 62  Cf. Zénon Kaluza, Études doctrinales sur le XIVe siècle. Théologie, logique, philosophie (Paris: Vrin, 2013), pp. 53-189 [first published as Id., “L’œuvre théologique de Nicolas Aston (problèmes du texte)”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 45 (1978), pp. 45-82; Id., “L’œuvre théologique de Richard Brinkley, OFM”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 56 (1989), pp. 169-273]. 63  The following arguments and responses to them are missing from B: Book I, q. 9 (the reply to the second argument), q. 13 (the replies to the arguments); in Book II, q. 11 (the reply to the second argument), q. 14 (the third argument contra); in Book III, q. 16 (the second argument contra). The oppositum is missing from q. 1 of Book II. By contrast, in the Questiones the replies to the first argument of Book II, q. 3 and to the third argument of Book III, q. 26 are missing.

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dicative of a reportatio. If all the arguments and replies were missing from one given question or even more so in every question, then we could speak of a criterion behind the lack of the arguments, as it happens in the aforementioned abridgements. Moreover, if B were an abridgement, perhaps a higher number of questions would be missing, not just a few in Book I, and possibly there would be a criterion behind the lack of those questions;64 some questions would have the same text in the two versions65 or there would be a blending of two, three or several questions into one, as is the case with one of the abbreviated versions of Siger of Brabant’s commentary on the Metaphysics.66 Instead, B has almost the same questions as the Questiones67 and presents its lines of reasoning in its own phraseology, even when its wording is very similar to that of the Questiones, as will be demonstrated in the following pages. Finally, medieval abridgements tend to present a text of good quality and sometimes even a text of superior quality with respect to the original.68 This is far from being the case of B, in which the text is, on some occasions, so condensed it compromises comprehensibility, and, on others, faulty and in need of editorial intervention to make it intelligible.69

2.3. B is a Reportatio (Further Evidence) Apart from the way in which sources are quoted in B, there is another kind of evidence which establishes that the text of B results from a reportatio. As will be 64  For instance, in Godfrey’s abridgement of Boethius of Dacia’s commentary on the Topics, roughly twenty questions on Books I-IV were eliminated: the reason is that they were all more related to the Ethics than to the Topics; cf. Luca Bianchi, “Boèce de Dacie et l’Éthique à Nicomaque”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 17 (2006), pp. 231-248, at 236-237. 65  This is, for instance, what happens in the abridgement of Radulphus Brito’s Ethics commentary transmitted in the manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15106, ff. 2ra-75ra; cf. René-Antoine Gauthier, “Trois commentaires averroïstes sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 16 (1947-1948), pp. 187-336, at 209-213; Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 93-96. 66  The so-called reportatio of Paris condenses the first six questions of the reportationes known as Cambridge and Munich into one single passage, which runs for two and a half pages in the edition. On this, see Luna, “Problemi di reportatio”, p. 252, n. 21, restated in Aegidius Romanus, Reportatio lecturae super libros I-IV Sententiarum. Reportatio Monacensis. Excerpta Godefridi de Fontibus, ed. Concetta Luna, in Aegidii Romani Opera omnia III.2 (Firenze: S.I.S.M.E.L.–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2003), p. 33, n. 52. 67  See later in this chapter. 68  For one such case, intended to serve as a student’s preparation for an oral examination, see Olga Weijers, “Les raisons de la réécriture dans les textes universitaires: quelques exemples”, in J. Hamesse–O. Weijers (eds.), Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux: volume d’hommage offert à Colette Sirat (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 445-463 [republished with slight changes in Ead., Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les universités médiévales: Recueil d’articles (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 271-290]. The abridgement of Brito’s Ethics commentary also presents a text of good quality. 69  See, by way of example, the solutio of Book II, q. 1; Book III, q. 8 and the reply to the first argument of Book III, q. 14 (this is a clear case in which the mistake cannot be ascribed to the copyist of B).

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noted in Chapter 7, section 5, in the critical edition of both the Questiones and B, emendations and conjectures in one text were often made with the help of the other text. While the text of the Questiones was improved in thirty-one passages by using B, it was possible to correct or effect integrations into the text of B by using the Questiones on one hundred and seventeen occasions. These figures tell us that, while the Questiones tends to present a good quality text, B requires much more intervention. Many of the omissions found in B cannot be explained as transmission errors but rather caused by the need, typical of the modus operandi of a reportator, to record the essentials of the argument and write down the main lines of reasoning, thereby passing over some of the argumentative steps. At the same time, analysis of these omissions reinforces the view that B cannot be an abridgement, for some of these omissions cannot be explained as the work of an abbreviator. A few examples taken from Book III suffice to demonstrate this claim. At the end of the solutio of q. 3 of Book III, ll. 52-57, the Questiones distinguishes between two ways in which a citizen can participate in political life: one active— when a citizen is appointed to a public office—and another passive—when a citizen takes part in an election or gives his consent to an appointment. The solutio of B is very similar to the solutio of Questiones; there is a corresponding distinction— nonetheless, between mediate and immediate, that is, between those who are able to elect the rulers and those who rule. However, in the last sentence of the question, the text has “Et ideo bene diffinitur ciuis per potentiam iudicandi actiue uel passiue”, even though nowhere in the question can we find such a definition. This omission is more understandable by assuming that the reportator had no time to write down the definition—probably there were two distinctions, active-passive and mediate-immediate—than by presuming that an abbreviator neglected such a significant piece of information, when he later refers to the definition he omitted. In the same question, B has a portion of text which is understandable only with the help of integrations (the text supplied here between angle brackets is based on the parallel passage of the Questiones) and by taking into account the wider context of the question, where Peter compares the parts of the civitas with the parts of an animal. Its clumsy style suggests it was hastily written down in an attempt to retain the backbone of the argument, which could later be taken as a starting point for a reworking of the text: B, Liber III, q. 3, ll. 34-37: Similiter in ciuitate qui attingunt ad operationes principales ciuitatis dicuntur ciues simpliciter; ciues sunt in potentia, pueri; desiccati sunt depositi. Et sic de aliis.

The same is noticeable in the second argument of Book III, q. 12. There, while in the Questiones the minor of the syllogism has “sed principans est pars materialis politie, quia politia est ordo principantium et subiectorum” (ll. 9-10), B has “sed

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principans est pars materie politie, quoniam politia est ordo eorum” (ll. 7-8). The dictum politia est ordo habitantium in ciuitate is often quoted throughout the Questiones and the Scriptum, being found in the Parvi flores as well (“Politia est ordo quidam inhabitantium civitatem in subjicendo et principando”).70 Clearly, the pronoun eorum instead of principantium et subiectorum permits a savings in time without risk of losing the information. This is not the only passage in which a pronoun replaces two nouns, even though the result makes the text sound slightly cryptic. In Book III, q. 8, the text has horum instead of principans and vir optimus: B, Liber III, q. 8, ll. 15-18: et optimi uiri est una uirtus, quia principans in optima politia est qui dirigit operationes suas in optimum finem, et hec prudentia politica; talis aut est uiri optimi, quare horum est una uirtus.

There is one passage of B in which we can presume that the faulty text was caused by the repetition of the same words and a profusion of information in a very short period of time. It is found in Book II, q. 1. Comparison with the text of the Questiones shows that the reportator tried to condense in short sentences the several distinctions, as though he were making a list. In fact, the omission of information causes an anaphora (which is a typical oral trait): B, Liber II, q. 1, ll. 8-15

Questiones, Liber II, q. 1, ll. 13-25

Dicendum quod ciuitas est una, quia habet unum finem ad quem ordinatur.

Dicendum quod ciuitatem oportet esse unam quodammodo, quia cuius est unus finis, ipsum est unum, saltim unitate ordinationis circa finem. Modo ciuitas est unus finis, cuius ratio est quia unum est agens ciuitatis, scilicet intellectus et ratio politica; agens autem proportionatur fini, et econuerso; ergo ciuitas erit aliquo modo una. Modo agens agit unum effectum in ordine ad unum finem; ergo ciuitas erit una unitate ordinationis in unum finem. Vnum autem multipliciter dicitur, quia aut unum indiuisibilitate, sicut unitas uel punctus; aut unum continuitate, sicut linea dicitur una; aut unum ratione, ut illa quorum est una species et ratio. Modo ciuitas primo modo non est una, sicut patet: diuiditur enim in uicos et domos, et ultimo dominum et seruum, et similiter in principantem et subiectum, que omnia ei per se conueniunt. Non etiam secundo modo, quia ciuitas non est continuorum, sed discretorum.

Sed aliquid dicitur unum indiuisibilitate, et sic non est una; aliquid continuitate: quia non est unum continuum, non est sic una; aliquid dicitur unum ratione, quia unam formam naturalem nominat repertam in pluribus unitate, sicut species: sic non est una; aliquid dicitur unum unitate mixtionis, et sic non est una. unitate ordinis, et est ibi ordo, quia procedit ab uno mouente et reducitur in unum finem, sicut in finem principantis.

70 Hamesse,

Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 255, nr. 52.

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The aim of the reportator was to retain the main point, sometimes the key words, so that later, when polishing the text, the information which was not recorded could be easily retrieved. This explains, as noted in 2.1 above, the absence of the typical explanations of the major and/or minor premise of the main syllogism contained in the arguments contra. Such a procedure is also noticeable in some replies to the arguments. Three examples suffice. For each, I present the argument, the reply without integrations and, finally, the reply as it appears in the critical edition of B: B, Liber III, q. 11, ll. 3-4 and 25-27: Videtur quod non, quia nichil distinguitur per id quod est posterius eo; sed finis est posterior hiis que sunt ad finem; quare et cetera. Ad argumentum primum dico quod tamen ipse prius ratione, unde res distinguuntur. Ad argumentum primum dico quod, , tamen ipse prius ratione, unde res distinguuntur. B, Liber III, q. 6, ll. 3-5 and 30-32: Arguitur quod non, quia, si ciuis per se esset aliqua uirtus, iam esset cuiuslibet ciuis; sed hoc est falsum, cum plures sint ydiote; quare et cetera. Ad argumentum dico quod omnis ciuis est uirtus aliqua secundum inclinationem, et ydiota inclinatur; secundum actum non quilibet habet. Ad argumentum dico quod omnis ciuis est uirtus aliqua secundum inclinationem, et ydiota inclinatur; secundum actum non quilibet habet. B, Liber II, q. 6, ll. 7-8 and 44-46: Item, si sint proprie, maior est sollicitudo circa ea, et per hoc impediuntur ab opere secundum uirtutem; quare et cetera. Item, non semper in ciuitate, sed melius est possibile, sicut natura facit non melius simpliciter, sed melius sibi possibile. Item, non semper in ciuitate , sed melius possibile, sicut natura facit non melius simpliciter, sed melius sibi possibile.

The replies to the arguments are also relevant for another reason. On six occasions, the reply to one argument appears in one of the following brief ways: “Per idem patet”; “Ad secundam dicendum est similiter”; “Et similiter per idem ad secundum”; “Ad illud per idem”; “Ad secundum similiter patet per solutio iam dicta” and “Per idem ad secundum”.71 These formulations are not the same as the typical “Rationes procedunt suis uiis” found in many commentaries (including in the Questiones and in B). Rather, they denote a very schematic reference to (not even a summarising of) the discussion and underlying doctrine. These kind of formulations are not found throughout the Questiones. In fact, in the parallel questions of the Questiones where B has the abovementioned formulations, the Questiones contains either a full elaborate reply to the argument or a combination of the reply to the argument with the reply to another argument instead. If B were an abbreviatio, it is hard to conceive 71 

See Liber I, qq. 1, 5, 14, 20, 23 and Liber II, q. 9.

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that the abbreviator would have summarised the replies to the arguments in such a way. What would be the point in writing “Ad illud per idem”? It would be more reasonable not to write the replies (and, for that matter, the arguments contra, too) as Godfrey of Fontaines and others did. Given the unambiguous ‘oral residue’ running through B and the signs of note-taking that its text denotes, we can firmly conclude that B results from a reportatio. Still, could this reportatio have resulted from a private dictation bearing no relation to the classroom and thus to teaching? The evidence suggests the opposite. First, if that were the case, then the dictation would presumably be very slow, allowing time for the recorder to write down all the information and not just its kernel, as is the case with the arguments contra and their replies, and with a few questions—see, for instance, qq. 14 and 22 of Book I and qq. 11-12 of Book II. Second, B gives us some hints that Peter’s lectures involved not only posing questions about the Politics—what is recorded in B—but also reading (possibly aloud) the Politics. This makes more sense if we presume it was done in a classroom. In section 2.1 above, it was noted that in B the expression in littera occurs numerous times, far more than in the Questiones. The reference to the littera indicates a closer relationship between the commentator and the text being commented on, for it is a sign that the commentator is actually analysing a precise stretch of text. This is evident in the first argument and the solutio of Book I, q. 27 of B (utrum serui secundum se oporteat esse aliquam uirtutem). In italics the words taken from Politics I.13: B, Liber I, q. 27, ll. 3-5, 21-23: Videtur quod non: uirtus est habitus electiuus, qui non est sine consilio; sed seruus non habet consiliatiuum, ut dicitur in littera; ergo et cetera. … quare oportet seruum habere uirtutem, et hoc dicitur in littera quod oportet seruum habere uirtutem tantam, quod non diminuat operari propter intemperantiam neque propter timiditatem.

These two references to the littera are absent from the Questiones. While the argument contra has a parallel in the Questiones (I, q. 29), the sentence quoted in the solutio finds no correspondent there. B is thus much more related to the source-text than the Questiones and we can thus infer that B, unlike the Questiones, records a moment in which the master was explaining the text and setting forth its philo­ sophical principles, probably immediately after having read that part of the text in the classroom. The title of q. 6 of Book II in the two works points us in the same direction: its title in B starts with a lemma, which corresponds to the opening sentence of chapter 5 of Book II of the Politics: “Habitis autem hiis considerare”. Circa istud capitulum queritur utrum expediat ciuitati possessiones esse communes. In the Questiones, the title is simply Consequenter queritur utrum possessiones ciuitatis debent esse communes. This is noteworthy because the sentence Habitis autem hiis considerare is a reference to the chapter of the text which is going to be commented on; it does not represent a philosophical stance, like, for instance, the one that serves as the source for the title of the first question of Book IV of the

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Questiones: Consequenter queritur circa 4um Politicorum utrum huius scientie sit considerare que sit optima politia, ut dicit Philosophus in littera.72 To conclude, B results from a reportatio made in a classroom.

3. The Questions Shared by B and the Questiones: A Reportatio and its Editing Established that B represents an early stage of the text, it is thus necessary to determine the relationship between B and the Questiones. A few examples will suffice to illustrate that the Questiones and B cannot be two different reportationes of the same oral lectures. On the contrary, the Questiones corresponds to a later stage and is a text submitted to a robust process of editing, which extends not only to the sources (as already noted) but to every detail of every question. Every time the two texts coincide, the Questiones displays a more refined Latin and a more sophisticated argumentation, while B presents many more traits of orality. The first example is taken from the solutio of q. 10 of Book III, on whether the ruler of the household pursues the good of his subjects (in italics the words or parts of words shared by the two texts): B, Liber III, q. 10, ll. 23-42

Questiones, Liber III, q. 10, ll. 33-59

Tunc ad questionem dicendum quod principans se habet ad subiectum sicut mouens ad motum,

Tunc dicendum ad questionem quod principans et subiectum se habent sicut mouens et motum et sicut agens et passum; sed mouentis et moti est idem finis in re, ut dictum est, ratione tamen differens; ergo principantis et subiecti erit idem finis secundum rem, ratione tamen differens. Iste autem finis est motus quo iste agit et ille patitur, sicut dicitur 3º Phisicorum; differt autem ratione, ita quod inquantum est finis principantis dicitur mouere, inquantum est finis subiecti dicitur moueri. Principantis ergo secundum quod huiusmodi finis est recte mouere secundum rectam rationem; et hoc est opus quod conuenit ei secundum propriam uirtutem, et hoc est quod intenditur ab ipso primo. Principans ergo in yconomico principatu intendit finem istum ut proprius est eius, quia omne agens secundum aliquam formam primo intendit finem in quem per illam formam primo inclinatur;

quare istorum est motus unus finis secundum rem, differens ratione. Iste finis est motus quo iste bene mouet uel agit et ille bene patitur. Sed ratione differt, quia finis principantis, secundum quod princeps, est recte mouere et agere secundum rationem rectam, et hoc est opus secundum uirtutem, et hoc intendit; ita principans principatu yconomico intendit finem secundum quod proprium est eius, quoniam omne agens per formam intendit bonum primo ad quod per illam formam inclinatur.

72  The same holds for qq. 9-10 of Book V of the Questiones. Although their titles reveal a close connection to the source-text, they do not refer to a chapter, only a specific sentence of the Politics which must be assessed.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb Yconomus autem intendit operari ut eius fini proportionetur primo, et ideo primo intendit recte dirigere et dispensare; secundo intendit bonum eius qui dirigitur, ita quod subditus mouetur secundum rationem, et hoc est bonum subditi; tertio, ex consequenti, intendit bonum sibi utile quia, cum sit unus de illis qui sunt in domo, dispensatur et exercitatur. Sic ergo primo intendit bonum proprium secundum uirtutem, secundo bonum subditorum, tertio bonum suum utile, sicut medicus debet primo intendere recte agere circa istum ad sanitatem, secundo sanitatem istius circa quem agit, tertio utilitatem – sicut pecuniam, quamuis pecuniam uideantur per se intendere –, sicut rhetor primo intendere debet bene agere ad persuadendum, secundo persuasionem iudicis, tertio utilitatem sui.

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et ideo primo inclinatur in illum finem ut est sibi bonum proprium, quare primo intendit recte dispensare et agere. Sed quia hoc non est sine bono eius qui dirigitur, qui est subditus, ideo secundo intendit bonum subditorum. Vlterius autem yconomicus intendit bonum utile sibi, quia, cum ipse sit unus eorum qui in domo, ideo ad dispensationem eius, quod primo intendebat, sequitur bonum utile sibi, sicut etiam in factiuis: medicus enim primo intendit secundum formam propriam medicine sanare et recte secundum artem agere ad sanitatem; secundo, quia illud non est sine bono eius qui sanatur, ideo secundo intendit bonum per se ipsius sanati, ulterius autem intendit bonum utile sibi. Similiter primo rhetor intendit secundum artem et formam artis rhetorice, ut dicitur 1º Rhetorice, persuadere; et quia illud non est sine per se bono ipsius clientuli, ideo secundo intendit bonum per se clientuli, tertio autem utile bonum sibi. Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod yconomicus intendit per se bonum subditorum, ex consequenti autem bonum proprium, utile, supple.73

73  In this question (III, q. 9) the text of the Anonymous of Milan is much longer and rather different from the Questiones, including some of the sources its author cites. Because it draws on the Questiones being nonetheless somewhat different from it, this text shows us how much B and the Questiones are close one to another: “Ex hoc arguitur, sicut uult Philosophus, 3º Politicorum et 3º De anima, agentis inquantum agens et patientis inquantum patiens est idem actus; sed principans in principatu yconomico inquantum huius est agens et subditi inquantum huiusmodi sunt patientes; ergo principantis in principatu yconomico inquantum huius et subditorum inquantum huiusmodi est idem actus. Tunc ulterius arguitur: sicut apparet 2º Celi et Mundi, operatio et actus uniuscuiusque est bonum eius ut in finem debitum ordinatur; sed directio subditorum in finem debitum est ope­ ratio ipsorum; ergo illa directio subditorum in finem debitum erit operatio principantis inquantum huiusmodi. Cum sint sicut agens et patiens subditi et principans, ut dictum est, ergo in principatu yconomico principatur per se principans propter bonum subditorum, cum eorum sit idem actus et eadem operatio, ut dictum est. Item, hoc detur sic, quia Philosophus ponit tale simile: sicut se habet medicus ad introducendum sanitatem aliquam in infirmum, sic (cod.: sicut) principans in principatu yconomico se habet respectu subditorum; sed sanitas introducta non est bonum per se medici, sed est bonum eius per accidens inquantum, scilicet ipse medicus (cod.: medicut) infirmatur et se ipsum potest curare; hoc tamen est per accidens, et ideo dicit Philosophus quod, quando aliquis medicus infirmatur, non accipit curam de se ipso, ymmo curam suam comittit alteri medico [23va] … in principatu yconomico bonum proprium, licet per [23vb] se et secundario intendit bonum subditorum, sicut maxime apparet de gubernatore nauis: ipse enim gubernator per se gubernat nauem, propter (add. bonum) eorum salutem que sunt in naue; primo tamen intendit salutem proprium (sic)” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 23rb-vb).

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The text in the left column is more schematic. It also has two significant traits which betrays its orality: it presents the goals pursued in each of the three activities by enumerating them—lists are more used in orality—and inverts the order of words. Instead of “ratione tamen differens”, B has “differens ratione”, much more natural in French—Peter’s mother tongue—than in Latin. Instead of “rectam rationem”, B reads “rationem rectam”. The placement of the adjective before the noun is far more common in written Latin. This is telling because, in some instances, B and the Questiones have the same syntagm, but it is in the Questiones that more often we find the more appropriate form.74 Let us examine another sample, this one taken from the question of whether children and wives should be held in common: B, Liber II, q. 4, ll. 14-25

Questiones, Liber II, q. 4, ll. 20-41

Dicendum quod magis expedit ciuitati quod uxores filii sint proprii et determinati quam communes. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est quod illud dicitur expediens quod fini congruit,

Dicendum quod ciuitati plus expedit uxores et pueros esse proprios et certos quam communes et confusos. Cuius ratio accipienda est ex fine ciuitatis; nam expediens omne dicitur conue­ niens, ita finis; ideo, quod aliquid sit expediens, considerari habet ex fine uel aliquibus sine quibus non potest esse finis.

sicut sine quo finis non potest haberi, et illud magis expediens per quod facilius habetur. Nunc autem, cum felicitas practica sit operari secundum uirtutem perfectissimam politicam, que est prudentia, finis ciuitatis

operatio secundum rectam rationem, et multa sunt necessaria ciuitati ad hoc quod iste finis sit, sicut conseruatio ciuitatis et pax et concordia,

id ergo quod magis impedit ad operationem rectam et amicitiam et conseruationem

ciuitatis minus expedit:

Finis autem ciuitatis bene ordinate est operatio secundum perfectissimam uirtutem politicam, que est prudentia politica, sicut etiam finis unius hominis secundum se est operatio secundum perfectam uirtutem; monostica autem est prudentia absolute. Modo operatio prudentie politice est operatio secundum rationem rectam simpliciter. Ad hoc autem necessaria est ciuium amicitia quia, si non sit amicitia, non sequitur finis ille, nec etiam uoluntates ciuium uni uoluntati principis secundum rationem finis regulate adherebunt, sed in diuersum iam fluent, et peribit ordo ciuitatis. Ergo quod impedit amicitiam ciuium, hoc non est expediens ciuitati. Item, ad esse et continuationem ciuitatis et salutem, quam omnia appetunt, necessaria est educatio et nutritio et eruditio filiorum. Si ergo hoc est finis ciuitatis, tunc quod magis impedit rectam rationem uel operationem secundum rationem rectam, hoc minus ciuitati expedit.

74  For instance, where B has “Tamen per accidens”, the Questiones has “Per accidens tamen” (Book III, q. 18); where B has “quod est posterius eo”, the Questiones has “quod posterius est eo” (Book III, q. 11). It goes without saying that this is not a rule set in stone and that it is sometimes in the Questiones that we find the adjective after the noun, as the sample on this page attests to, where the Questiones has “rationem rectam”.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb et hoc est uxores esse communes, quia tunc unus potest ad multas accedere, et ex tali commixtione fiunt intemperantie, et per hoc sequitur declinatio a recta ratione.

167

Hoc autem est communitas uxorum et filiorum quia, si uxores essent communes, potest unus ad multas accedere et eis improhibite commi­ sceri, et tunc ibi surget uitium intemperantie, ad cuius usum sequitur peruersitas rationis …75

While the first sentence of the text in the left column includes a clause with a subjunctive, the Questiones presents the same idea through an infinitive with an accusative, a form much more used in written expression. What, however, is more revealing in this sample is that the notions of prudence and civic friendship are mentioned but briefly in B, whereas, in the Questiones, they are explained. Herein lies the great difference between the two texts: what is mentioned briefly in B is fully explained and substantiated in the Questiones. One clear instance occurs in q. 19 of Book III, on whether one ought to take into account nobility of birth as a criterion for the allocation of offices. B argues that this ought to be so per accidens, for nobility is an inclination towards virtue, and the allocation of offices has to take account of the recipient’s moral virtue and merit. The entire argument is far clearer in the Questiones: B, Liber III, q. 19, ll. 16-28

Questiones, Liber III, q. 19, ll. 35-53

Tamen per accidens inspiciendum est;

Per accidens tamen potest fieri respectus ad ingenuitatem et ex consequenti. Cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis intendit ali­ quem finem, intendere debet ad ea que in finem sunt et per que extollitur ille finis et augetur;

cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis per se intendit aliquem finem, et per consequens intendit illud per quod potest augmentari ille finis, sicut, quia homo potest melius operari sanus, intendens illud opus, consequenter intendit sanitatem. Sed ille qui distribuit per se intendit bonum uirtutis; sed istud bonum augetur per nobilitatem; ergo et cetera. Probatio minoris est quia nobilitas est inclinatio ad uirtutem, sed per illam inclinationem augetur uirtus.

sed distributio principatus primo et per se intendit uirtutem in actu, quam nata est condecorare nobilitas et augmentare, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; et ideo per consequens ad ingenuitatem est inspiciendum. Minor etiam declaratur per

75  In this question (II, q. 3) the Anonymous of Milan presents a distinct argumentation in the solutio, which, given the straight link between B and the Questiones, is once again a hint that B and the Questiones stand as a unity against the other commentaries. Suffice it to quote the beginning of the solutio to realise the difference between the Anonymous and Peter: “Ad istam (cod.: aliam) questionem dico per distinctionem quoniam aut (add. quo) querit utrum mulieres debeant esse communes in ciuitate secundum ius nature, aut secundum ius morale, aut secundum ius positiuum et legale, aut[em] secundum ius diuinum” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 12rb). The Anonymous of Baltimore merges the question about the community of wives and children with the question as to possessions should be held in common, which in the Questiones and in B are two distinct questions, 4 and 6. In any case, the anonymous does not mention prudence in his solutio (cf. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3ra: II, q. 3).

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Et ideo dicit Philosophus in Magnis Moralibus, 1º libro, quod si aliquis eligit esse optimus, sed bonus, quia non est ita dispositus quod possit optime operari.

Sed nobilitas ad hoc disponit, ut dictum est, et ideo, per accidens, ad eam inspiciendum est. Et loquor de nobilitate que seruat uirtutem generis, quia aliqui bene degenerant.

Philosophum, 1º Magnorum Moralium, ubi dicit quod non omnis qui eligit esse sanus est sanus, sed oportet ut ad hoc naturalem dispositionem et inclinationem habeat; et tunc, si eligat, et cum hoc naturaliter sit ad hoc dispositus, perfecte erit sanus. Similiter est a parte : non omnis enim qui eligit esse uirtuosus propter hoc est uirtuosus, sed oportet ut ad hoc naturali­ ter inclinetur. Nam, cum ipse naturaliter dispositus ad uirtutem, si eligat esse uirtuosus, necesse est eum fieri optimum. Nam ex inclinatione naturali habet potentiam et ex electione actum, et talis inclinatio nobilitas; ergo ipsa augmentat uirtutem et promouet, et ideo intantum ad eam inspiciendum est. Hoc autem est ex consequenti et per accidens, quia non est necessarium sic semper dispositum fieri uirtuosum; quod enim est per accidens non est necessarium, ut dicitur 8º Phisicorum.76

Given the greater amount of sources mentioned in the Questiones—which, unlike in B, are often presented through literal citations—and the more sophisticated argumentation, not to mention the higher linguist level of this text, we can exclude that the Questiones is a simple reportatio. Further evidence can be given to support this claim. In Book II, q. 2, on whether the community should be as unified as possible, the Questiones presents a much longer text than B.77 Comparison of 76  The Anonymous of Milan presents a very different text: “Hoc uiso, dicendum est quod secundum excellentiam in ingenuitate et etiam nobilitate non debent per se et primo distribui principatus; per accidens tamen aliquando bene secundum excellentiam in ingenuitate debent distribui principatus. Primum potest declarari sic: primo quia secundum excellentiam in illo non debent distribui principatus per se et primo quo non contingit bene et recte agere; sed ingenuitas est huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet, quia, sicut dictum est prius, principatus debent distribui per se et primo secundum excellentiam in prudentia et uirtute morali. Prudentia autem et uirtute morali non contingit non bene et recte (cod.: in directe) agere, cum prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, ut apparet 6º Ethicorum; et ibidem dicitur quod qui habet prudentiam habet alias uirtutes; ideo et cetera. Minor patet, quia ingenuitas non est uirtus perfecta, sed inclinatio ad uirtutem, ut uisum est; ideo et cetera. Item, ingenuitas nichil est quam naturalis potentia ad operandum secundum uirtutem; sed naturali potentia contingit mali uti … Secundum declaratur, scilicet quod secundum excellentiam in genuitate per accidens debeant distribui principatus, supposita prudentia cum ingenuitate. Cuius ratio est, quia intendens per se aliquem finem, aliquo modo debet intendere illud quod facit ad bonitatem finis communicationis ciuilis et appetere (cod.: appetet); ideo et cetera. Et si sic, secundum excellentiam in ingenuitate aliquo modo debent distribui principatus. Maior patet de se. Minor declaratur, quia 1º Ethicorum quod ingenuitas est augmentatiua (cod.: incognitiua) felicitatis et etiam uirtutum; ideo et cetera” (Liber III, q. 16: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 30ra). 77 The Questiones delves into the different ways in which ‘indivisibility’ can be understood—this takes up seventeen lines of the edition. B settles the matter in just three. The Questiones then explains how the unity of the political community can be reached—by means of every citizen striving for the

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb

169

parts of the two texts unveil the more unrefined state of B against the detail and care of the Questiones. The latter is arranged into a perfect syllogistic form; there are no redundancies, and it always provides further information as against B. Its text has a strictly consequential structure and presents a richer vocabulary—for instance, “insurgunt seditiones”, as opposed to “seditiones fiant” in B, and the use of the pluperfect subjunctive (“intellexisset”) versus the perfect indicative in B. By contrast, in B there is no variety of prepositions: ‘quod’ is used as a causal and consecutive preposition alike, while, in the Questiones, ‘ut’, ‘quod’ and ‘quo’ are all to be found. Moreover, the analogy of the city with an animal is clearly presented only in the Questiones: B, Liber II, q. 2, ll. 7-10, 25-36

Questiones, Liber II, q. 2, ll. 6-11, 51-69

Item, optimum est ipsam ita esse unam quod nulle seditiones fiant in ciuitate; sed sic est si sit maxime una, quia est unio principantium et subditorum, et nullus dicere potest “hoc est meum”, per quod seditiones fiunt; ergo et cetera.

Item, optimum est ciuitatem esse eo modo ut nulle insurgunt seditiones; sed hoc fit si sit quam maxime una; ergo optimum est eam esse quam maxime unam. Maior patet quia optimum rei est quod tollit corruptionem rei; ciuitatis autem corruptio est seditio. Minor patet quia tunc nulla erit omnino dissensio: nullus enim sibi poterit ali­quid appropriare de communibus; ergo et cetera. … … Item, expedit sic ciuitatem esse unam quod Item, maxime bonum est ciuitatem esse unam possit saluari; sed hoc est maxime quando est eo modo quo potest saluari. Hoc autem est si sit maximus ordo, quia tunc est pax in ciuitate et una secundum ordinem: fit enim tunc maxima amicitia, per quod saluatur maxime; quare et amicitia singulorum ad singulos et pax; ami­ cetera. citia autem est que maxime conseruat ciuitates, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum. Et si sic intellexisset Plato unitatem ciuitatis, Philosophus eum non reprobaret, nec rationes Philosophi hoc negant. Sed sic non intellexit Plato, sed intantum amSed ipse intellexit aliter: intantum enim amplipliauit quod non esset ciuitas: nam auit unitatem ciuitatis, quod ordinem destruxit oportet quod sit ordo parentum ad filios, quod qui est in partibus ciuitatis, scilicet ordinem remouit cum posuerit muliere filios siue filiorum ad parentes in nutriendo, diligendo et pueros esse communes. educando et honorando; et ideo Philosophus eum reprobat. Item, ciuitas debet assimilari inquantum est pos- Item, a simili: maxime bonum est ciuitatem sibile uniuerso, in quo est ordo, quod inferiora esse eo modo unam quo assimilatur maxime reguntur superioribus. ordini et unitati totius uniuersi. Sed hoc fit per unitatem ordinis: nichil enim in uniuerso est quod rectum ordinem non obseruet. Item, Philosophus dicit quod ciuitatem debet Item, libro De Motibus Animalium dicitur quod existimare sicut animal; estimandum est animal esse unum sicut ciuitatem esse unam. Accipiatur autem hoc econuerso hic: sed in animali ratio est regulans et ordinans modo in animali optimum est ipsum animal esse appetitum, unum ordine, salua tamen distinctione partium.

same goal—and deals with this in thirteen lines (ll. 38-50); B reduces this argument to four lines (ll. 21-24).

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et sunt ibi diuerse partes et operationes ordinate in bonum totius; unde non esset bonum quod totum animal esset oculus; quare et cetera.

Nam operatio partium in operationem totius ordinatur, quia pes ita ambulat sicut toti expedit, et auris ita audit. Sic etiam oportet esse ciuitatem unam ut, licet sint partes, operationes tamen singulorum partium in operationem totius ordinentur.78

The same differences are also noticeable in other questions. A significant case occurs in Book II, q. 8: because this question is in no small part based on Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1 and q. 95, art. 2, it would be expected that B and the Questiones should present the same text. This is correct, but, once again, the explanations underpinning a full understanding of the matter appear only in the Questiones—why law cannot be a habitus and the distinction between the two acts of the intellect (in italics, the words or parts of words identical in the two texts): B, Liber II, q. 8, ll. 10-26

Questiones, Liber II, q. 8, ll. 13-45

Dicendum quod lex pertinet ad rationem, quia lex est regula humanorum actuum: sed tale ad rationem pertinet, quoniam primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium illorum que sunt in genere illo; sed ratio est primum regulans in homine; quare et cetera. Et per hoc patet quod pertinet rationi practice, cum regulet actiones

Dicendum quod lex est aliquid secundum rationem. Et hoc patet supponendo unum de lege, quod scilicet lex sit regula humanarum actionum; et si sic, ergo ad rationem pertinet, quoniam primum in unoquoque genere est principium omnium eorum que sunt in illo genere. Primum autem regulans in homine est a ratione, quare omnium humanarum actionum principi­ um est ratio. Et quoniam lex regulat actiones, ad illam partem anime pertinebit, que est regulatiua actionum et principium agibilium; hec autem est ratio practica; ergo lex pertinet ad rationem practicam agibilium, et hec est prudentia, ut patet 6º Ethicorum.

que pertinent practice.

78  No other commentary raises this question, i.e., utrum ciuitatem optimum sit esse quam ma­ xime unam. The Anonymous of Milan does pose a similar sub-question at the end of the solutio of his first question on Book II (utrum ciuitas sit una). This, however, is a very brief question and its arguments bear no resemblance to those advanced in the Questiones: “Secundo dicendum quod, si queratur utrum ciuitas debeat esse maxime una, dico quod non, quia unitas uniuersi non est maxime una, sed est unitas ordinis ad unum. Antecedens est manifestum. Probatio consequentie, quia sicut in toto ordine uniuersi inuenies prioritatem et posteritatem, eminentiam et subiectionem et principem aliquem, sic in ciuitate inuenies omnia illa suo modo; ideo et cetera. Item, illud non debet attribui ciuitati quod corrumpit ciuitatem; sed unitas maxima est huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet quia unicuique debet attribui illud quod conseruat suum esse. Minor declaratur quia, ut dicit Philosophus in isto 2º sicut ipse declarat per simile, (cod.: sicut add.) si in faciendo simphoniam aliquis uellet facere maximam unitatem, sicut omnes tonos equales, destrueret simphoniam et faceret omophoniam. Eodem modo declarat Philosophus per aliud simile: si aliquis faceret maximam unitatem in triangulo, sic ut esset unitas ad unam basem siue lineam, destrueret triangulum. Sic etiam dicit Philosophus: si aliquis uellet facere maximam unitatem in ciuitate, sic quod omnes equaliter participarent bona que sunt in ciuitate, destrueretur ciuitas; ideo et cetera.” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 11vb).

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb Item, non pertinet ei sicut potentia nec sicut habitus, sed sicut actus. Sed sciendum quod, sicut in speculatiuis est duplex actus, unus qui est ipsa operatio – sicut considerare –, alius est aliquid operatum – sicut ipsa propositio uel sillogismus, qui est non ratiocinari, sed est aliquid factum ratio­ cinandi –,

sic rationis practice sunt duo actus: unus ipsum considerare uel considerari, et alius propositio practica formata in agibilibus, et iste actus uel propositio dicitur lex. Et sicut in speculatiuis quedam propositiones que per se et primo sunt note, alie per istas,

sic in practicis est quedam que est per se nota, et ista dicitur lex naturalis, ut ‘neminem ledere’; alia cui statim assentit intellectus nisi per priorem determinetur, et talis potest dici ius positiuum. Et sic patet quod lex pertinet ad rationem sicut ad factum a ratione.

171

Item, pertinet ad rationem practicam non sicut habitus, quia lex non est uirtus intellectualis; omnes autem uirtutes intellectuales sunt habitus rationis; quare aliquid sicut actus. Sed considerandum quod, sicut in operatione artis duo sunt consideranda, ita etiam in opera­ tione speculatiua. In arte autem consideratur ipsa operatio fabri et etiam ipsum opus, scilicet operatum. Similiter in speculatiuo intellectu est duo considerare: operationem, scilicet ipsum intelligere et ipsum constitutum per rationem ex actu aliquo intelligendi – sicut in aliquo actu intelligendi constituitur ‘quod quid erat esse’, sicut docet Philosophus in 2º Posteriorum – et aliquid complexum constitutum in alio actu rationis speculatiue, sicut enuntiatio. Et similiter est in intellectu practico conside­ rare operationem intellectus practici, scilicet ratiocinari de agibilibus, et operatum aliquod constitutum ex operatione illa, et hoc est illa enuntiatio practica: et ista est lex. Vnde lex est pertinens ad rationem practicam non sicut operatio, sed sicut operatum aliquid. Vnde, sicut in speculatiuis enuntiatio uniuersalis est ut principium, per quod potest cognosci aliqua conclusio, sic in practicis lex est. Vnde, sicut in speculatiuis duo sunt genera propositionum – quedam enim sunt secundum se et primo note, quedam autem note ex aliis prioribus –, sic et in practicis est aliqua enuntiatio practica que est secundum se nota; et talis dicitur lex naturalis, ut illa que fit in terminis per se notis, ut ‘nemini esse nocendum’, uel ali­ quid tale; alia autem est cui statim non obedit intellectus, nisi ex aliqua priori; et talis potest dici lex positiua, ut ‘sacrificare Deo capram’. Sic ergo patet quod lex est aliquid pertinens ad rationem ut aliquid compositum uel elicitum per actum intelligendi practici.79

79  Because both the Questiones and the successive commentaries based this question on the Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, all the commentaries share very similar wording and references. Nonetheless, some differences are perceptible—for instance, the Anonymous of Milan quotes a sentence from Isidore, which Aquinas quotes in article 3 and not in article 1 of q. 90. This question is lengthier in the commentary of the Anonymous of Milan; here I quote only the parts which can somehow be compared to the Questiones. Unlike Peter, the Anonymous does not quote the Posterior Analytics, but, like Peter, quotes the Metaphysics and the Ethics. His reference to the hammer is not found in the Questiones: “Dicendum quod lex ad rationem pertinet, et potest declarari supponendo quod lex est regula actionum nostrarum, scilicet humanarum … ideo, cum lex sit regula humanarum actionum, et primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium que sunt post, ideo ad hoc quod uideamus quod lex ad rationem pertineat, primo uidendum est quid est illud quod est primum in actionibus humanis. Primum autem est ratio practica in actionibus humanis … de ratione legis sunt duo, unum est per se, scilicet ordinare et corrigere et regulare actiones humanas ad debitum finem, quod debet esse per prudentiam et pertinet ad

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The same is even more evident in q. 11 of Book II, on whether property should be regulated. Here, the Questiones makes two distinctions, one between two meanings of ‘necessary’ and another between two ways in which ‘possession’ can be considered. In B, the first distinction is merely implied, and the second is assumed without a previous explanation. The fact is: B provides all the content condensed into the idea that possessions ought to be regulated insofar as they are used within the community, but it is in the Questiones that we get a well-structured solutio with the explanation of the concepts. B contains a reference to desire (concupiscentia) absent from the Questiones, but this can be accounted for by recalling that, two questions later, q. 13 deals with the issue of whether the statesman should be more concerned with possessions or with the citizens’ desires, rendering it pointless to introduce at such juncture a reference to a topic to be discussed later. B, Liber II, q. 11, ll. 7-14

Questiones, Liber II, q. 11, ll. 12-30

Dicendum ad hoc quod non est necessarium simpliciter,

Dicendum quod necessarium dicitur dupliciter ad presens: uno quod est impossibile aliter se habere, alio modo ex suppositione finis, sicut hominem esse animal dicimus necessari­ um simpliciter, hominem autem nutriri dicimus esse necessarium ex suppositione, scilicet fine supposito, si debeat animal in uita saluari.

sed est necessarium ex suppositione finis,

rationem practicam; aliud est quod ad legem pertinet per accidens, sicut exerceri circa legem et coercere subditos propter eorum malitiam … et probatur quod lex pertinet ad rationem, quia illud pertinet rationi quo ratio est regulans actiones humanas in debitum finem; sed lex est huiusmodi; ideo . Maior patet, quia illud ad prudentiam pertinet, ut patet 6º Ethicorum; prudentia autem pertinet ad rationem practicam … Est tamen intelligendum quod lex ad rationem pertinet tanquam actus ipsius rationis et pertinet ad rationem sicut aliquod operatum a ratione … sic in agibilibus est duo considerari: unum quod est ratio de agibilibus, quod est operatio; aliud est operatum … Quod autem ad aliquid (cod.: aliquis) pertineat aliqua duo, unum sicut operatio et aliud sicut res operata, apparet manifeste ex intentione Philosophi, 1º Ethicorum. Sicut artis fabrilis est fabricatio tanquam operatio – sicut facere martellum uel aliquid tale – et aliud est operatum ipsius artis fabrilis – sicut est martellus uel aliquid –, sic erit in istis agibilibus inuenire consilia … Est etiam ulterius intelligendum quod, sicut in speculabilibus sunt quedam principia que per suos terminos cognoscuntur, quia habent terminos omnes omnibus notos, sicut prima principia fundata in ente et uno, et alia sunt principia [15ra] que oportet ex eis cognoscere et eorum ueritates per alia manifestare, sicut sunt principia (add. fundata) in scientiis specialibus (in scientiis specialibus] scrips. interns speciebus), sic in agibilibus est suo modo quod quedam sunt que (cod.: qui) ex sua prolatione quietant intellectum et ad que habemus inclinationem naturalem, sicut quod Deus est adorandus et nemini est nocendum, et talibus intellectus de facili assentit … unde enunciatio practica que est secundum se nota dicitur lex naturalis … alia uero enunciatio, cui non statim assentit intellectus nisi manifestetur ex aliqua enunciatione practica priori, dicitur lex (practica add. sed exp.) positiua, sicut sacrificare capram diis” (Liber II, q. 7: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., ff. 14vb-15ra). The Anonymous of Baltimore raises this same question, but this part of the manuscript is unreadable due to damages caused by humidity (Liber II, q. 7: Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3rb). In the undamaged parts, references to the Ethics (Book V), to the Metaphysics (Book II) and to the On the Heavens (Book I) are visible. The line of reasoning of the solutio is, therefore, not exactly the same as in the Questiones and in the Anonymous of Milan.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb

scilicet, si finis debeat contingere, scilicet bonum ciuitatis quod intendit. Cuius ratio est quia que ordinantur in finem debent fini conuenire et ordinari secundum quod fini conuenit. Et ideo pecunie et alia debent distribui ut expedit ciuitati, et hoc impeditur per concupiscentias, quia per hoc multe dissensiones oriuntur in ciuitate. Vnde, licet politicus non consideret diuitias absolute et secundum quod sunt naturales, eas tamen considerat secundum quod ueniunt in usum.

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Modo ordinare possessiones non est necessari­ um primo modo, sed secundo, quia scilicet, si debet attingere ad finem commune et ad finem ciuitatis, necessarium est politicum re­ gulare possessiones. Et ratio eius est primo quia uniuersaliter omnia illa que ordinantur debent ordinari secundum exigentiam finis, ut dicit Philosophus; diuitie autem ordinantur in finem ciuitatis, quare ex illo aliquam rationem debent habere, ita quod sic distribuantur secundum quod est conueniens et expediens ad bonum communitatis. Et ideo, cum politicus intendat bonum commune, manifestum quod necessarium est ei regulare possessiones, quia ex defectu talis regule multe dissensiones accidunt. Sed possessiones possunt dupliciter conside­ rari, scilicet secundum se et absolute uel secundum quod ueniunt in usum humanum: si primo modo, sic sunt res naturales, et sic de illis politicus non considerat; si secundo modo, sic pertinent ad politiam et ueniunt in usum eius, et sic de eis ordinat qualiter ciues se debeant habere ad illas.80

80  In this question, both the Anonymous of Milan and the Anonymous of Baltimore draw on the Questiones. However, both authors put forward arguments found neither in the Questiones nor in B: in the case of the Anonymous of Baltimore, the reference to the Metaphysics, to the animal’s breathing and eating and to peace; in the case of the Milan commentator, the notions that one can desire without limit and that one may work more for the common good than others and receive less: “Dico quod necessarium ad presens dicitur dupliciter, ut patet 5º Metaphisice: uno modo dicitur ne­ cessarium simpliciter, et sic non est necessarium moderare possessiones, quia hoc est in uoluntate hominis, etiam quia possessiones possunt aliter et aliter se habere; alio modo dicitur necessarium non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad finem, sicut necessarium est animal respirare et comedere, si debeat uiuere, et sic necessarium est moderare possessiones propter bonum regimen ciuitatis, quia, nisi possessiones sint bene regulate, non habebunt ciues pacem, et ideo superius, in quadam questione, dictum est quod, licet possessiones quoad proprietates et dominium sint proprie, tamen debent esse communes quoad usum” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3va: II, q. 9); “Ad hoc dicendum quod non est necessarium simpliciter et absolute possessiones (cod.: positiones) ordinari in ciuitate, sed hoc est necessarium ex suppositione, supposito scilicet quod politicus debeat attingere finem suum. Cuius ratio est quia illud est necessarium ordinari in ciuitate ex suppositione, quo posito in ciuitate, multa inconuenientia et dissentiones multe euitantur a ciuitate; sed, posita ordinatione possessionum (cod.: preomam), istud fit; ideo et cetera. Maior patet quia, supposito quod politicus in ciuitate attingat finem quem intendit, necesse est dissensiones et multa talia inconuenientia euitari. Minor patet quia, si ille qui laboraret pro communitate, uideret quod minus haberet de bono communi quam aliquis alius, adhiberetur (cod.: adhiundetur) ad insidias multas et accusationes et ad similia; unde, cum appetitus diuitiarum, que sunt possessiones, sit in infinitum, ut dicitur 1º huius, inordinarentur iste possessiones in ciuitate quilibet ciuis inquireret modum per quem posset hebere istas possessiones in infinitum, et ex hoc sequuntur multa inconuenientia, ut dictum est. Ideo necessarium est possessiones ordinari in ciuitate modo quo dictum est, unde, in finem ciuitatis possessiones que sunt diuitie ordinantur in comparatione ad illum , necesse est politicis possessiones ordinare in ciuitate. Est tamen intelligendum quod possessiones possunt dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum se et absolute, et sic ad finem ciuitatis non ordinantur nec sic ad politicum pertinet; alio modo possunt (cod.: potest) considerari inquantum cadunt (cod.:

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Not all the questions underwent the same amount of editing. The questions of Book I tend to show many more signs of editing than the greater part of the questions of Book II,81 but, even in the case of questions that exhibit minimal editing, the Questiones always presents a smoother and more elegant text than B. One such case is found in the solutio of Book III, q. 11, on whether the forms of government are distinguished according to their ends. Both texts convey the same exact ideas in nearly the same words, though the Questiones presents a more careful text. A few details confirm this: the verb before the noun (“ut probat Proclus” instead of “ut Proclus probat” in B); the future tense after the adverb ‘ergo’; the use of the pronoun ‘illius’ to avoid the repetition of the word ‘finis’; the use of the subjunctive; ‘quecumque’ instead of ‘que’; the syllogism clearly formulated as such and the minor premise explained afterwards; the conclusion of the line of reasoning clearly expressed (while B has the hasty “quare et cetera”) and, finally, the explicit citation of the Physics: B, Liber III, q. 11, ll. 10-24

Questiones, Liber III, q. 11, ll. 12-28

Dicendum quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis, quoniam politia est ordo habitantium ciuitatem, et principum ad inuicem et ad subditos. Ordo autem omnis procedit ab uno et tendit in multitudinem et reducitur in unitatem, ut Proclus probat. Illud ad quod reducitur habet rationem finis, quia de ratione ordinis est habitudo ad finem; quare politia habet habitudinem ad finem de sua ratione, et sic distinguetur distinctione finis. Item, que procedunt ab aliquo uno principio, secundum eius distinctionem distinguuntur; sed principium politie est finis, quoniam instituitur per prudentiam, principium autem prudentie est finis et eius appetitus rectus; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis, quia politia est ordo habi­ tantium et ordo principatus primi. Ordo autem omnis ab uno incipit et tendit in multitudinem et iterum in unam reducitur unitatem, ut probat Proclus. Illud autem ad quod reducitur ordo qui est ­politia est finis, quia de ratione est habere habitudinem in finem in quem reducitur; ergo et politia habebit ad finem aliquam habitudinem; ergo secundum distinctionem illius distinguetur ipsa. Item, quecumque procedunt ab uno principio, oportet quod distinguantur secundum distinctionem principii; principium autem a quo procedit secundum intentionem ordo politie finis est; ergo et cetera. Probatio minor, quia politia est aliquid institutum per prudentiam; prudentie autem principium est appetitus recti finis; ergo finis respectu politie rationem principii habet. Ergo politia distinguitur secundum finem.

cedunt) in usum hominum, et sic pertinent ad politicum et sic habent ordinari in ciuitate” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 15rb: II, q. 8). 81  As I shall argue in the next section of this chapter, while Peter had already commented on Books III-VIII of the Politics and hence knew which parts of those books should be highlighted and commented on, the Questiones represents his first attempt to interpret Books I-II of the Politics. This explains his hesitations in commenting on these initial books.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb Intelligendum tamen quod unumquodque per formam suam distinguitur, sicut habet esse per formam; nunc autem finis est idem forme, sicut forma materie; ideo forma distinguitur secundum rationem finis.

175

Item, intelligendum quod unumquodque distinguitur per illud quod ingreditur essentiam illius, et ideo secundum formam politia distinguitur; forma autem politie rationem capit ex fine, quia forma est propter finem, sicut materia propter formam, 2º Phisicorum.82

We can thus conclude that B and the Questiones are two interrelated texts, distinct from all the other question commentaries on the Politics, and, more importantly, that the Questiones is an ordinatio of B, which in turn is the copy of a reportatio and, as noted above, was copied from a manuscript pertaining to Annibaldo di Ceccano—the exemplar Annibaldi. On the other hand, the Questiones bears traces of orality but, to a much greater extent, shows signs of editing. It must therefore be regarded as a profound revision of the text transmitted in B. The fact that the Questiones is an ordinatio does not stand in contradiction to my claim that it bears traces of orality—and here I return to the notion of ‘oral residue’ that marked medieval culture. There is no evidence against the possibility that a master prepared the ordinatio of his lectures, not by rewriting the text himself, but rather by dictating it to an assistant or secretary. Dictation could actually be the reason behind traces of orality in the Questiones, such as the number of tense shifts and, principally, the recurrence of the word ‘modo’—the high number of recurrences of this word could be explained on the basis that dictation tends to be more repetitive. Further indications along these lines are the fact that the Questiones is structurally characterised by short sentences and that Peter occasionally starts two 82  In this question, the Anonymous of Milan unambiguously draws his lines of reasoning from Peter, but, even in this case, the Questiones and B are more closely related to each other than either is to the Milan commentator: “Primo dicendum est quod secundum distinctionem finium sumitur distinctio politiarum, quia, sicut Philosophus dicit, politia nichil aliud est quam ordo ciuium in debi­ tum finem. Omnis autem ordo, secundum Proclum, ab uno incipit et tendit ad multitudinem, et tandem finaliter ad unum reducitur. Vnde dicit sic: omnis ordo ab unitate incipit sine compositio multorum et, in multitudine reducta, ad eamdem regreditur unitatem; sed unitas et distinctio eorum que sunt ad finem sumitur ex unitate et distinctione finis, cum finis sit causa causalitatis, ut apparet 2º Phisicorum. Ergo, cum politia nichil aliud sit quam ordo ciuium in debitum finem, ut dictum est, distinctio politiarum sumetur ex distinctione finium. Item, distinctio politiarum debet attendi penes distinctionem prudentie ciuilis ipsorum (cod.: imporum) principantium; sed prudentia ciuilis est ipsius finis (cod.: bene) recti et per rationem regulati (cod.: regulanti), ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum, cum prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, ut ibidem dicitur. Rectus autem appetitus est ipsius finis et ordinatorum in finem, licet sub alio sit illorum; ergo de primo ad ultimum distinctio politiarum ex distinctione finium. Est tamen intelligendum quod Philosophus uult, 2º Phisicorum, quod, sicut materia est propter (cod.: sicut) formam, et forma est propter finem; modo materia politie est multitudo ciuium; sed ordo ciuium in debitum finem est causa formalis ipsius politie. Tunc arguitur: sicut est manifestum ex intentione actoris De causis, quid est causa esse est causa causati; sed finis politiarum est causa multitudinis ciuium et ordinis eorum in debitum finem, que sunt causa ipsius politie; ergo finis politiarum est causa et principium politiarum” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 23vb: III, q. 10).

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successive clauses with ‘ergo’,83 with a noun or pronoun plus ‘autem’ (though this is less common)84 and even three successive clauses with ‘nam’.85 This is in complete contrast to the Scriptum, a work that Peter most probably revised by correcting one manuscript.86 There is evidence that Aquinas dictated some of his works87 and that he and Scotus had socii working for them on the preparation of their writings and even source checking. We cannot exclude that the same was done by other Paris masters, even on a lesser scale. This was more common at the faculty of theology, but, since Peter was already a student of theology when he ‘composed’ the Questiones (cf. previous chapter), he could have had some help doing so. There is, however, a further factor that might explain the traces of orality in the Questiones. It cannot be expected that an author should attain the same stylistic standards in an ordinatio—always a revision of a report originating in orality—and in a work created primarily in writing. It being a revision (not a proofreading), the ordinatio hardly eliminated all the issues contained in a reportatio. As Concetta Luna has argued, “la révision d’une reportation n’entraîne pas tout le travail rédactionnel qui caractérise la mise par écrit de la main de l’auteur”.88 This, in fact, explains much of the unembellished style of the Questiones—if compared, for instance, with the Scriptum. However, since the Questiones contains both traces of orality and editing—both to a great extent—what seems to explain the style of the text best is to assume that Peter had before him a copy of the reportatio and dictated the ‘new’ text to a scribe. The following diagram encapsulates what I consider the most probable development of the text:89

83 

See, for instance, Liber I, q. 4, ll. 43-46; q. 16, ll. 5-6 and 18-19. See, for instance, Prohemium, ll. 33-38, 80-82, 91-92; Liber I, q. 2, ll. 61-66 (between lines 62 and 79, almost every clause begins with a noun or pronoun plus either ‘autem’ or ‘enim’). 85  This is found in Liber VII, q. 2, ll. 26-29. 86  On this, see the introduction to Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. xliii-lviii. 87  Cf. Antoine Dondaine, Secrétaires de Saint Thomas (Roma: Editori di S. Tommaso, 1956). 88  Concetta Luna, “Fragments d’une reportation du commentaire de Gilles de Rome sur le premier livre des Sentences: les extraits des mss Clm. 8005 et Paris, B.N., Lat. 15819”, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 74 (1990), pp. 205-254, at 231. 89  The dashed lines indicate a change between two steps, while the continuous line represents a direct reproduction. For further arguments explaining this diagram, see section 3 of Chapter 7, below. 84 

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb

177

Peter’s oral lectures

Original reportatio

Ordinatio (= Questiones) P Exemplar Annibaldi90

β

F91

B, I-III.19 (ff. 60ra-68rb)

B, III.20-VII.7 (ff. 68rb-79vb)

Some objections can be raised to this reconstruction: 1) in a few questions, the arguments in B are (slightly) different from those in the Questiones;92 2) in others, B has additional arguments or citations, and 3) in one question, B presents a different solutio while, in another, the same solution as in the Questiones, yet with distinct arguments. In this sense, B and the Questiones could possibly be rooted in different reportationes or might even be derived from lectures given in different academic years. Such a supposition, however, betrays a misguided conception of how medieval authors might compose an ordinatio. An ordinatio is not like a river in spate dragging all the debris from the riverbed and bringing it to the surface. The author selects and discards sentences and references. This is evident in Duns Scotus’ reportationes and ordinatio on Book IV of the Sentences. Not only do Scotus’ reportationes present in some sections a longer text than the ordinatio, they 90 91

90  The information that the text was copied according to the exemplar Annibaldi is found on the first folio of B (60r) and on the last folio of the part containing the Questiones in the Bologna manuscript (79v). Since this information does not occur at the end of B, i.e., at the end of Book III, q. 19 (f. 68rb), we can assume that the exemplar Annibaldi had the same structure as the Bologna manuscript, i.e., the reportatio (I.1-III.19) plus the Questiones (III.20-VII.7). For the date of the exemplar Annibaldi, see section 4.1. of this chapter. 91  The Frankfurt manuscript lies on a lower level in this diagram as it was copied by Siegfried Enemer in Augsburg between 1438 and 1443. Enemer studied at Erfurt and probably at Augsburg. He spent some time at Pavia too. While I shall deal more extensively with this manuscript in Chapter 7, it can be said here that the manuscripts P and F share some accidents, which means that, although F is a late manuscript, its model and P were derived from a common ancestor. 92  For instance, Book I, q. 25; Book II, q. 26, ad primum; Book II, q. 3, ll. 22-31; Book II, q. 6, ad secundum.

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also contain references absent from the definitive text.93 The same also holds true for one reportatio and the ordinatio of Giles of Rome’s commentary on Book I of the Sentences.94 Moreover, Ockham’s razor can be applied here: it is not necessary to suppose different reportationes and different academic years. This is because, on the one hand, the two texts do not have many different questions in the three books, which would arguably be the case if they resulted from two distinct academic years, and, on the other hand, the ideas in and the wording of the two texts are, for the most part, very similar and could well have originated with the same oral lectures (though in different ways). Some of the quotations found in B and absent from the Questiones disappeared from the definitive version precisely because Peter certainly felt they had become superfluous in the later redaction. This can be illustrated with four such instances. In the first, taken from Book III, q. 8, on whether the good citizen and the best man possess the same virtue, B presents a literal quotation from Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, while, in the Questiones, the text makes only a reference to Michael’s commentary.95 Why did this happen? Following on from Aristotle, Peter maintains that, even in the best political regime, the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the good man are not the same, the exception being the ruler, in whom the two virtues coincide. The words taken from Michael of Ephesus in B could thus be confusing, for they seem to imply that the two virtues are distinct only in corrupt regimes. B, Liber III, q. 8, ll. 12-22

Questiones, Liber III, q. 8, ll. 22-35

Item, in optima politia uidetur esse una uirtus ciuis et optimi uiri, quia aliquis est ciuis principans et aliquis subiectus, et istorum est una uirtus, quia uniuersaliter est una uirtus ciuis et optimi uiri est una uirtus, quia principans in optima politia est qui dirigit operationes suas in optimum finem, et hec prudentia politica; talis aut est uiri optimi, quare horum est una uirtus. Et hoc dicit Eustratius supra 5um Ethicorum, quod in bene habentibus urbanitatibus est idem bonus uir et ciuis simpliciter, malis autem non est idem et ciuis simpliciter, quia in istis ciuis uult defendere ciuilitatem malam; sed bonus uir non uult defendere malum; ergo et cetera.

179

Alicuius tamen ciuis in politia bona et uiri optimi est eadem uirtus, quia aliquis est ciuis studiosus in optima politia qui est principans, cuius uirtus est per quam dirigit omnes opera­ tiones, et suas et aliorum, in politiam rectam et perfectam per rationem sumptam ex fine ultimo. Et talis est prudentia politica simplici­ ter, que etiam est uirtus uiri optimi; ergo illius ciuis, scilicet principantis in optima politia, et uiri optimi est eadem uirtus, unde Eustratius, super 5um Ethicorum, ubi tangit Philosophus istam questionem, recte eodem modo ipsam determinat.96

In the second case, taken from Book I, q. 14, on whether the bodies of the slaves and of the freemen are naturally different, the Questiones merges arguments contra 2 and 3 of B into one. What is more, what, in the second argument of B, is a literal quotation from the text Peter is commenting on in the classroom turns in the polished version into a mere reference to the Politics, which comes after three quotations from three different works—Metaphysics, Physiognomics and Liber sex principiorum. These quotations serve to substantiate the argument much better than in B: B, Liber I, q. 14, ll. 2-9

Questiones, Liber I, q. 16, ll. 3-13

Arguitur quod sic, quoniam unumquodque naturaliter generat sibi simile, ut calidum facit calidum; quare et cetera. Item, dicit hic Philosophus quod dignificant antiqui quemadmodum ex bestiis bestiam et ex homine hominem, ita ex bono bonum.

Arguitur quod sic, quia unumquodque tale natum est agere tale, ut calidum agit calidum; ergo similiter bonus generabit bonum. Item, bonus generat sibi similem in corpore; ergo et in anima similem generabit; ergo bonus generabit bonum. Antecedens patet quia agens particulare agit sibi secundum omnem dispositionem, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice. Consequentia patet quia ad dispositionem corporis sequitur, saltim inclinatiue, bona dispositio mentis, unde phisionomi per dispositionem corporalem, anime qualitates inuestigant. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, in principio Phisionomie sue, quod anima sequitur corpus, et Actor Sex Principiorum: anima coniuncta corpori complexiones corporis imitatur. Et hoc etiam dicit Philosophus hic.97

Item, bonus secundum corpus generat bonum secundum corpus, ut patet in pluribus; quare bonus secundum animam generat bonum secundum animam. Consequentia patet, quoniam anima sequitur corporis dispositionem.

96  In this question (III, q. 7) the Anonymous of Milan does not cite Michael of Ephesus; cf. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 22rb. 97  In q. 13 of the Vatican Anonymous the arguments go as follows: “ Arguitur quod sic, quia unumquodque quale est generat; (add. sed) si ergo est bonus, bonum generabit. Maior patet 1º De generatione et corruptione. Item, bonus secundum corpus generat bonum secundum corpus; ideo eodem modo bonus secundum animam bonum secundum animam; ideo et cetera. Maior patet: bonus in membris exterioribus generat bonum in membris exterioribus. Minor patet in textu” (Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030, f. 17ra). In q. 11, the Anonymous of Milan has: “… uidetur quod bonus

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In the third case, Peter decided to eliminate one question, i.e., q. 21 of Book I of B, and to integrate part of it into another question, i.e., q. 23 of Book I of the Questiones, on whether of anything we possess there are two uses, which in turn he completely reformulated (even though the conclusions are the same in B and in the Questiones). In B, the question (q. 20) whether of anything we possess there are two uses is very simple; the only remarkable aspect of this question is that therein Peter begins the solutio by distinguishing three meanings of the expression ‘use of a thing’ (usus rei).98 In fact, in B the third is very close to the first meaning and, what is more, Aristotle—though Albert and Aquinas as well—speaks of just two meanings. This explains why, in the Questiones, Peter refers to two meanings only. Here, he also provides a much clearer explanation for how anything can be said to have a double use or activity—for instance, by virtue of his animality, man feels, and through his rationality, he thinks.99 As to the elimination of q. 21 of Book I of B, we shall see in the next section of this chapter the reason behind it. Finally, in q. 19 of Book II, devoted to the question as to whether warfare can lead to a virtuous life, both texts mention the case of the moral virtue of courage. B includes words taken from the Nicomachean Ethics—words that recall a dictum from the Parvi flores—but which do not appear in the Questiones, which gives instead the full definition of an act of the virtue of courage (as it was elaborated in the Middle Ages), namely, that it is an act facing the greatest dangers carried out for the sake of the common good.100 While the words “maxima terribilia” had a mnemonic function and assisted the reportator in retaining the necessary information, in the final version it was more important to indicate the three characteristics that make an act of courage to be such: fearlessness, readiness to face a deadly danger and doing so for the sake of the common good. generet bonum, quia unumquodque agens generat sibi simile; ergo, si generans sit bonus, et generatus et bonus. Maior patet siue consequentia (sic) de se. Antecedens est manifestum ex intentione Philosophi, 2º De generatione et 1º et 2º De anima. Item, quando materia est disposita ad receptionem forme, easdem dispositiones corporales generatum recipit a generante; ergo et easdem dispostiones formales et, si sic, cum bonitas se teneat ex parte forme, bonus generabit bonum. Antecedens mani­ festum est de se. Probatio consequentie, quia agens agit per formam; ideo, si easdem dispositiones (add. naturales sed del.) corporales recipiat materia a generante, etiam et formales” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 5va). Finally, in his q. 11, the Anonymous of Baltimore has: “ Arguitur quod sic: sicut est in naturalibus, ita est in moralibus a simili; sed in naturalibus ita est, quod simile generat sibi simile, ut planta plantam, animal animal: 1º De generatione et 2º De anima; ergo et cetera. . Item, sicut est in dispositionibus corporis, sic est in dispositionibus anime: 2º Ethicorum; sed in dispositionibus corporis ita est, quod mancus generat mancum et robustus robustum; ideo et cetera. Item, nobilis generat nobilem, dicitur 1º Rethorice et 5º huius et 4º, ubi dicitur quod nobilitas est uirtus quedam cum diuitiis antiquis; ergo a simili bonus generat bonum” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 2ra). It is absolutely remarkable that none of these commentaries quotes the first book of the Politics—this only happens in B and in the Questiones; in the Vatican Anonymous the reference appears only in the explanation of the major premise. 98  Cf. B, Liber I, q. 20, ll. 11-15. 99  Liber I, q. 23, ll. 13-22. 100  On this, see the apparatus fontium of the Questiones, Liber II, q. 19, ll. 26-27.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb

181

B, Liber II, q. 19, ll. 16-18

Questiones, Liber II, q. 19, ll. 24-27

… nam qui propter bonum commune se exercet, se in operibus fortitudinis, que sunt circa maxima terribilia.101

… qui enim se in illo bello secundum uitam militarem exercent, primo exercent se propter bonum commune, et iterum in actibus fortitudinis se exercent, mortem in periculis non timentes pro bono communi.102

Of course, it is impossible to attempt to justify every difference found between the two texts, for countless motives lost in time may lie behind the author’s decision to change a part of his text while revising his lectures. This applies to the case of q. 17 of Book III of the two texts as well as for q. 10 of Book I of B. As to the former, on whether it is expedient and just for the multitude to elect and correct a ruler, the arguments contra are very similar in the two texts, but B and the Questiones differ in the second part of the solutio. The differences lie mainly in the style and not in the doctrinal point of view, which suggests a more in-depth re-editing of this question. Nevertheless, B presents one short argument absent from the Questiones: that whenever the ruler might disregard or show contempt for the law, the governed may then correct him (ll. 33-37). Peter most probably dropped this argument, as, in the context of this question, it might have opened the door to a view whereby the governed could correct the ruler whenever they so wished. The case of q. 10 of Book I, on whether man is by nature a political and social animal, is somehow different. It is structurally different from q. 9 of the Questiones which bears a similar title: in the Questiones, the solutio is arranged into a lengthy consideration on the nature of the human species and on man’s individual bodily nature (ll. 33-99) which finds no parallel in B. By contrast, B is not so much concerned with proving that man is naturally a social being—which is done in the first third of the solutio—but rather with discussing the exceptional case of the outstanding men who are devoted to philosophical speculation but prefer to live in solitude and, therefore, how these men can be said to be social ex parte corporis— because of the necessities of life—while asocial ex parte animae, for they devote themselves to philosophical speculation, which is essentially a solitary activity. Such a distinction is absent from the passage of the Questiones where Peter deals with the case of these outstanding men. It being impossible to ascertain the underlying reason for the change between the time in which Peter gave his lectures and produced the Questiones, it is possible that he felt that he had not substantiated adequately 101  The sentence in the Parvi flores runs as follows (Hamesse, Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 236, nr. 57): “Fortitudo est aggressio terribilium ubi mors imminet propter bonum salvandum”. 102  The Anonymous of Milan has a text very close to the Questiones: “… qui enim in illo bello se secundum uitam militarem exercet, prius (cod.: post) exercet se propter bonum commune, et iterum, quia in actibus fortitudinis se exercet, non timeret mortem exponendo se periculis pro bono communi; et talis est uirtuosus” (Liber II, q. 18: Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 18va). By contrast, the Anonymous of Baltimore does not raise this question.

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the main topic in his oral lectures and that the case of the outstanding men, while important, was not the core of the question.103 The conclusion that can be drawn is that B, ff. 60ra-68rb, and the Questiones are two texts tied together with respect to their structure and contents, and to such a great extent that they stand in contrast to the other commentaries on the Politics produced by the turn of the fourteenth century. However, the way in which B refers to its sources along with its condensed style shows that it is a reportatio—or, better said, the text contained in the manuscript of Bologna is a copy of a reportatio. In contrast, the Questiones, contained completely in P and partially in F and B, ff. 68rb-79vb, presents a text that underwent a process of revision, but which is based on the original reportatio. This being so, the Questiones is a full-fledged text in which Peter’s views are completely elaborated: it is an ordinatio. As noted in Chapter 1, Peter revised some of his works—his Quodlibeta and the Scriptum, for instance—so it comes as no surprise that he might have done the same with the Questiones.104

4. The Questions Specific to Each Text Given that B predates the Questiones, the most logical explanation for the absence of some questions from each of the texts is that, just as with quotations and lines of reasoning, those questions were added (in the case of questions present only in the Questiones) or dropped (in the case of questions present only in B) during the composition of the Questiones. While this was most probably the case, caution is advisable, as there is not necessarily a single reason behind the absence of each of the questions lacking from B and from the Questiones. Below is the list of questions specific to each of the texts: 103  In the study, Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 171-173, I offered a critical edition of q. 10 of B under the heading Anonymous Bononiensis, since I followed Flüeler’s thesis that B results from an anonymous rearrangement of the Questiones. It cannot be completely excluded that this question might be taken from another commentary (see section 4 of this chapter), but this seems very unlikely. In fact, the idea that one can undertake philosophical speculation alone, provided one has the basic necessities of life, is suggested in Peter’s Metaphysics commentary; cf. Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam”, p. 150: “… omnes indigent necessariis ad vitam, ut dicitur quarto Ethicorum. Sed largitis necessariis ad vitam, sapiens per se speculari potest. Non sic autem justus vel liberalis; justus enim, etsi habeat necessaria ad vitam, indiget tamen aliis per quae exerceat opera justitiae; liberalis autem per quae exerceat opera liberalitatis. Sed inventis solum necessariis ad vitam, sapientia perfectissime haberi potest et acquiri, ut patet ex prooemio hujus; est enim inventa praeexistentibus necessariis ad vitam”. 104  Although the ordinatio seems to have been a much more common practice at the faculty of theology, we should probably regard at least some of the numerous cases of Aristotelian commentaries preserved in two versions—one long and one short—as early drafts and revisions and not simply as short and long versions. In this sense, see the case-study offered in Iacopo Costa, “Plurality of Redactions and Access to the Original: Editing John of Jandun’s Questions on Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, in S. Boodts–P. De Leemans (†)–S. Schorn (eds.), “Sicut dicit”: Editing Ancient and Medieval Commentaries on Authoritative Texts (Turnhout: Brepols, 2019), pp. 25-46.

The Relationship between the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb Questions contained only in B 8. Vtrum barbari sint naturaliter serui 9. Vtrum ciuitas sit secundum naturam 11. Vtrum sermo insit homini a natura 21. Vtrum inductio pecunie sit necessaria in ciuitate

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Questions contained only in the Questiones Prohemium 2. Vtrum scientia speculatiua et pratica diffe­ rant ratione et specie 11. Vtrum seruus, id quod est, domini sit 12. Vtrum ubicumque est coniunctio aliquorum in unum sit unum principans natura et aliud seruum et subiectum 13. Vtrum aliquis sit seruus a natura 14. Vtrum corpora seruorum et liberorum naturaliter sint diuersa 17. Vtrum serui ad dominum sit amicitia

In the pages to follow, I shall try to provide an explanation—or different possible explanations—for the presence or absence of each of these questions in or from the two texts. Whenever I advance more than one explanation, I shall attempt to assess each of them. The questions I shall try to answer are the following two: why each of these questions is absent from the other text and why each is present in the text in which it is found, that is, why such a question was raised at all.

4.1. The Questions Contained Only in the Questiones The Prohemium is a singular case: given its elaborate style as well as the profusion of citations contained in it, it certainly did not form part of the oral lectures. Question 2 of the Questiones is lengthy and addresses the difference between speculative and practical sciences. It is a question not found in B or in any other successive commentary on the Politics. It is followed by the brief q. 3, on whether politics is a speculative or a practical science, which corresponds to q. 2 in B—this question is found only in B and in the Questiones. The most likely reason why the successive commentaries do not have these two questions is that the commentators subsequent to the Questiones felt that it was more appropriate to discuss this matter in a commentary on the Ethics, since this work begins by covering the kind of knowledge acquired in practical sciences. In fact, the question as to whether moral science is practical or speculative came in the commentaries on the Ethics.105 It thus appears to be significant that B and the Questiones share one question absent from the rest of the commentary tradition. As we have seen in the introduction and shall later revisit in Chapter 5, on several occasions in the Questiones, Peter raises a question (with no relation to the Politics) as a lead-in to the question to follow, which, in turn, is related to a specific passage 105  See, for instance, Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 39-40; Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 181-182; Id., Anonymi Artium Magistri, pp. 139-140; Id., “Autour de deux commentaires”, pp. 257 (Giles of Orleans) and 265 (Anonymous of Erfurt); Taki Suto, “Anonymous of Worcester’s Quaestiones super librum Ethicorum”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 82 (2015), pp. 317389, at 332 (John of Dinsdale).

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of the Politics. Thus, with respect to the absence of q. 2 from B, Peter will have, in all likelihood, decided to add the question of the difference between speculative and practical sciences (q. 2) to serve as the groundwork for the issue discussed in q. 3, i.e., whether politics is a speculative or practical science. This would explain why q. 2 is lengthy—indeed one of the longest of the Questiones—and q. 3 is very short—in fact, the second shortest. Question 3 (= q. 2 of B) follows a similar argumentative structure to that in the correspondent question in the Ethics commentaries: it states that this science is practical (i.e., political/moral science) because it is for the sake not only of knowledge, but, beyond that, also for the sake of acting; moreover, its subject is the object of the practical intellect, namely the bonum agibile uolutum.106 Peter’s most probable position will have been that such an answer is inadequate, for the assertion that the bonum agibile is the object of the practical intellect does not say anything about how the practical intellect operates, how its operation is different from that of the speculative intellect and why the bonum agibile is its object—this is indeed the core of q. 2 of the Questiones. Question 2 was thus added during the preparation of the Questiones. This is also borne out by its more sophisticated style and by the length of the lines of reasoning: for instance, the second argument contra runs through twenty lines. The case of qq. 11-14 and 17 is different. They consider the topic of slavery and appear in later commentaries such as the Vatican Anonymous, the Anonymous of Milan and the Anonymous of Baltimore.107 B therefore stands as a text with fewer questions devoted to slavery than the Questiones or any of the successive commentaries. Two hypotheses can be formed: first, Peter realised that he had not given due consideration to the topic of slavery in his oral lectures—in fact, B left aside natural slavery, except for the solutio of q. 13, and never so much as tried to substantiate the existence of slavery. Second, the scribe behind the composition of B (or behind the composition of the exemplar Annibaldi) had little interest in the topic of slavery and decided to exclude these questions from his copy. Beyond the fact that almost all the missing questions are related to this issue (qq. 11-14 and 17), the three questions in B dealing with slavery (qq. 12-14) are rather short, thirty-two, twenty-seven and twenty-six lines, respectively. Even so, there remains the matter of explaining this lack of interest in slavery. A suggestive hypothesis can be proposed: 106  Cf. Liber I, q. 3, ll. 7-13. For the Ethics commentaries, see Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 39-40; Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 181-182 (Brito states that moral science is “de entibus a nobis operatis”); Id., Anonymi Artium Magistri Questiones, pp. 139-140. For the unpublished commentaries, see Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 48 va (Liber I, q. 5); Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13, f. 85ra (q. 3); Giles of Orleans (q. 3; cf. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, ff. 195vb-196ra). All these commentaries present very similar formulations in this question and all refer to the distinction between practical and poietic acts. 107  See Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.113 and 120. In the Anonymous of Milan, these questions have the numbers 8-12 and in the Vatican Anonymous the numbers 9-13 and 16. In the Anonymous of Baltimore (whose list of questions is not found in Flüeler’s book), these questions are qq. 8-11 and 13.

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B, in the form as we have it today, was produced in the third decade of the fourteenth century, after Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol had limited the impact of Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery.108 This hypothesis is strengthened if we take into account that all the texts (except the last one) contained in the Bologna manuscript were composed in the first two decades of the fourteenth century: ff. 1ra-59va: Guido Terreni’s commentary on the Ethics (ca. 1313);109 ff. 80ra-113ra: Bartholomew of Bruges’ questions and literal commentary on the Economics (1309);110 ff. 114ra-142vb: John of Jandun’s commentary on the Rhetoric (between 1321 and 1326);111 ff. 144ra-167vb: Radulphus Brito’s commentary on the third book of the On the soul (1290s)112 and ff. 168ra-189vb: Ferrandus de Hispania’s commentary on De substantia orbis (of uncertain date, sometime between 1290 and 1320).113 Moreover, the commentaries by Bartholomew of Bruges and Jandun were dedicated to Annibaldo di Ceccano, who was the owner of the manuscript from which B was copied. All this implies that the Bologna manuscript was produced in the 1320s—Annibaldo left Paris in 1325114 and presumably took his manuscript with him—and that the text of B in its current form was, as with other texts in the manuscript, most probably copied in a period not very far removed from that time. Annibaldo became a master of theology in 1321 or 1322.115 Thus, it is likely that his interest in a commentary on the Politics occurred in the 1310s, when he was a master of arts at Paris (or even earlier, when he was just a student of arts). 108  For Scotus and John of Bassol, see Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.72-85; Roberto Lambertini, “Questioni etico-politiche e tradizione francescana in Giovanni Duns Scoto”, in Id., La povertà pensata. Evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham (Modena: Mucchi Editore, 2000), pp. 111-139, especially 123-128. See also Id., “Il matrimonio dei servi. Approcci alla servitus nei teologi del Duecento”, in A. Antonelli–M. Giansante (eds.), Il “Liber Paradisus” e le liberazioni collettive nel XIII secolo. Cento anni di studi (1906-2008) (Venezia: Marsilio, 2008), pp. 237-246. For Auriol, see Mario Grignaschi, “Le problème du contrat social et de l’origine de la civitas dans la Scolastique”, Ancien Pays et Assemblées d’Etats 22 (1961), pp. 67-85, on 77 and Chapter 6, below. 109  Cf. Iacopo Costa, “Gui Terrena Commentateur de l’Éthique à Nicomaque”, in A. Fidora (ed.), Guido Terreni, O. Carm. (†1342): Studies and Texts (Barcelona–Madrid: F.I.D.E.M., 2015), pp. 3-17, on p. 3. 110  See Pavel Blažek, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe: von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (1246/1247–1309) (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 199, 205. 111  See Ludwig Schmugge, Johannes von Jandun (1285/89-1328). Untersuchungen zur Biographie und Sozialtheorie eines Lateinischen Averroisten (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1966), pp. 135-139. 112  See Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 104-126 and 154-155. Costa determines only that Brito’s Ethics commentary was produced sometime between 1289 and 1299. However, since in this commentary Brito refers to his commentary on the On the soul, this must be dated to the 1290s, if not earlier. 113  See Ivana B. Zimmermann, “Kommentare zu der Schrift des Averroes De substantia orbis in der Bibliotheca Amploniana”, in A. Speer (ed.), Die Bibliotheca Amploniana. Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus (Berlin–Boston: Walter de Gruyter), pp. 122-126 and the bibliography quoted there. 114  Dykmans, “Le cardinal Annibal de Ceccano”, p. 170. 115  Ibid., pp. 157, 164.

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That Scotus’ and Auriol’s views on natural slavery probably had some effect on later commentaries on the Politics is also suggested by the fact that, in his literal commentary, produced between 1324 and 1330, Guido Vernani states that natural slavery is against Christian doctrine,116 and, a few decades later, Oresme and Nicholas of Vaudémont limit the existence of natural slavery to the current post-lapsarian condition.117 While tempting, the hypothesis that B underwent a process of ‘censorship’, however, faces a major obstacle: the copyist would have also censored and dropped qq. 12-14 of B and especially q. 13, where the text addresses, albeit briefly, slavery by nature. As things stand, it appears more probable that the questions on slavery absent from B were added during the preparation of the Questiones and that they were not part of the original lectures given by Peter. Peter possibly felt that more questions were needed and, indeed, qq. 11-14—all of which absent from B—strive to substantiate in great detail slavery and the existence of one who commands and one who obeys. We can never emphasise enough how much Peter introduces questions with the end of creating the philosophical backbone of the successive questions. In fact, questions 11-13 provide the basis for the questions which have a counterpart in B, since, there, Peter expounds in great detail on the relationship between master and slave and on how the physiological constitution of the slave makes him what he is. The view advanced in the previous pages could be countered through reasoning that the Prohemium and the questions absent from B might have been added to the text at an early stage of the transmission of the Questiones, that is, to a manuscript from which P and F are derived. That a question or several questions from another commentary could be integrated into another was common practice in the Middle Ages, and it happened with others of Peter’s texts.118 This is impossible, however, with regard to these questions. The Prohemium and q. 2 share the same philosophical views—their author is the same—and, as the apparatus fontium evinces, both share lines of reasoning and expressions with Peter’s Metaphysics commentary and Quodlibeta. Moreover, in qq. 11-14 (and especially in qq. 12 and 13), we find some of the main theses running all through the Questiones: that the master–slave and ruler–subject relationship are framed in terms of mover–moved and actuality–potentiality and that ‘material dispositions’ of an individual determine one’s intellectual ability and therefore the capacity (or the lack thereof) to participate

116 

Cf. Dunbabin, “Guido Vernani”, p. 384. Cf. Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme”, pp. 59-60; Buridanus, Quaestiones, I, q. 6, ff. 7rb-9rb. Oresme is an interesting case, as he feels obliged to justify how natural slavery originated and how it is connected to the ius gentium. 118  Cf. Galle, “The Set of Questions on De caelo in the Mss Leipzig”; Cesare A. Musatti, “Peter of Auvergne and the Quaestiones on De caelo in the Ms. Escorial, Biblioteca del Monasterio h. II 1, ff. 106ra-129vb”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 135-156. 117 

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in political life. Denying that these questions were ‘authored’ by Peter would be equivalent to rejecting that Peter is the author of the Questiones.

4.2. The Questions Contained Only in B Let us now turn to the four questions of B absent from the Questiones (qq. 8-9, 11 and 21 of Book I). These questions deal with the subjects of whether barbarians are slaves (q. 8) and of the naturalness of human association (qq. 9 and 11) along with the necessity of introducing money in the political community (q. 21). These specific questions are not found in later commentaries, at least not exactly in the same way as they appear in B. The reason behind the absence of these questions from the Questiones lies, with all probability, in the decisions made by Peter when he edited his reportatio, though the specific reasons for the absence of each of the four questions may vary. We can conjecture either that 1) these four questions bear no relation to the original lectures from which the Questiones stemmed, or that 2) provided the Questiones and B were produced at different times and their ‘author’ is the same, Peter might have changed his mind. As noted above, it was a usual procedure to take questions from one commentary and insert them into another. This implies an active role for the scribe (of B or of the exemplar Annibaldi), but, as argued above, this seems not to be the reason behind the absence from B of the questions dedicated to slavery. On the other hand, that Peter might have changed his mind would not be an exceptional instance in his career. By way of example, Peter reconsidered his view on individuation between the time in which he lectured on the Metaphysics and when he composed his Quodlibeta.119 In this sense, B could represent the work of a younger Peter, which might explain why, as Flüeler noted, in q. 8 of Book I Peter does not show his ‘usual independence’ as a commentator on the Politics. Let us examine each of the four questions. To begin with, q. 8 is indeed largely based on Aquinas, as the apparatus fontium of this question demonstrates.120 Even so, we should not rule out that Peter is the author of this question: if we were to discard a question just because it does not bear signs of Peter’s ‘usual independence’, then, by the same token, we should have to view as inauthentic, for instance, the questions of Book II on law, which are based completely on the Summa theologiae. Therefore, if we look past what in this very short question is taken from Aquinas, we realise that the main tenets are that barbarians are equated with slaves by nature and that a slave by nature is a man who, being physically strong, executes 119 

Cf. Hocedez, “Une question inédite”, pp. 359-363. Question 8 of B is not found in any other question commentary, at least with the same ­title (u­t rum barbari sint serui). However, the commentaries of the Anonymous of Baltimore and the Vatican Anony­mous contain a similar question, advancing the same conclusions as B, though the title of their questions is different: utrum aliquis uictus in bello debet esse iuste seruus (in the Vatican commentary) and utrum uictus in bello sit seruus iuste (in the Anonymous of Baltimore). 120 

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the commands given by his master, the one possessing foresight—the latter can wage ‘just war’ against the former on account of his superior intellectual abilities. On the one hand, the definition of barbarian—as well as that of just war—was of secondary importance to Peter’s purposes in interpreting Book I of the Politics.121 On the other hand, this notion of slave is reiterated in several questions of the Questiones: in fact, Peter dedicates one entire question (i.e., q. 13) to the definition of slave by nature—this question is absent from B. Moreover, in q. 15, ll. 34-41, Peter distinguishes between servus simpliciter and servus secundum quid, the latter being a condition resulting from violence and not being innate, which mirrors what is said in q. 8 of B. Finally, in q. 17—another question absent from B—Peter distinguishes between servitus a natura and servitus bellica, which again reflects q. 8 of B. All this therefore renders plausible that q. 8 of B is absent from the Questiones, because Peter realised that what was advanced there was worthless (i.e., the definition of barbarian) or that it could be included in other questions. As to questions 9 (utrum ciuitas sit secundum naturam) and 11 (utrum sermo insit homini a natura), they are very brief—just like q. 8—and convey the same idea: the human being is born with the natural inclination to live in society and to speech, but these inclinations require an act of reason to be brought into being (a natura inclinante et ratione perficiente). These two questions are absent from the Questiones and from other later commentaries; they are, therefore, outliers in the commentary tradition.122 The reason behind this absence is easily explained: the commentators certainly felt that one question—q. 10 in B (utrum homo sit animal ciuile et sociale a natura)—was sufficient to explain the inclination to live in society, and indeed what B maintains in qq. 9 and 11 is advanced in all the other commentaries in the question of whether man is by nature a social and political being (= q. 9 of the Questiones) and also in the question of whether the civitas exists for the sake of the highest good (= q. 6 of the Questiones).123 There is, however, a major factor that may explain the presence of qq. 9 and 11 in B and its absence from the Questiones. Together with q. 10, these questions form an autonomous set of questions on the naturalness of human association: q. 9 addresses the naturalness of the civitas, q. 10 asks whether man is naturally a social and political being and q. 11 deals with the naturalness of human language. This mirrors almost perfectly the structure of III/1.4 of the De regimine principum: the first part of the chapter is dedicated to demonstrating that the civitas is the final and highest stage of a natural process, while, in the second part, Giles first 121 

See more on this in Chapter 5, section 2, below. This question somewhat finds correspondence in the Anonymous of Baltimore (q. 6: utrum ciuitas sit prior domo) and in the Vatican Anonymous (q. 7: utrum ciuitas sit prior domo), even though the lines of reasoning of B are not totally coincident with those of the two anonymous, who concentrate on the relationship part–whole. 123  On this, see Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”. 122 

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determines that language is natural to man and, afterwards, that man is a social being on account of a natural inclination to live with others. It will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 that Peter took from the De regimine the title of some questions of Books I-III of the Questiones, with qq. 9 and 11 therefore also possibly taking their inspiration from the De regimine. What is more, as noted earlier, the solutio of q. 10 of B is quite different from that of q. 9 of the Questiones and, as indicated in the apparatus fontium of q. 10, it bears some signs of having been influenced by Giles’ De regimine. This being so, Peter might have turned to the De regimine not only in q. 10, but also in qq. 9 and 11. As I argue elsewhere in this study,124 Peter was most likely the first master to lecture on the Politics in Paris and, as noted earlier in the Introduction, he could not have relied on many works or previous commentaries for assistance in his interpretation of the Politics. He had already produced a literal commentary on the Politics, but this commentary does not cover Book I. In such case, he probably baulked at the choices regarding which passages of the Politics he should comment on, and he will certainly have looked at Aquinas’ Politics commentary and Giles’ De regimine, a work with chapters that find a correspondent in chapters of Politics I-III. Later, while editing the reportatio of his lectures, he might have realised that the questions found only in B were repetitive in a commentary on the Politics or did not add significant insights. This was probably the case with qq. 9 and 11. We can perhaps gain a better perspective on the absence of qq. 9-11 from the Questiones if we also take into account q. 10 of B, since the three questions constitute a unity in themselves. As just noted, this question is very different from q. 9 of the Questiones, which is a sign of a profound revision between the time in which B was produced and the time in which the Questiones was composed. It is thus most likely that Peter was not satisfied with the set of questions dedicated to the naturalness of human association (i.e., qq. 9-11 of B) and decided to cut the three questions down to one and, concurrently, to reformulate completely the central question on whether man is by nature a political and social being. This seems the most plausible explanation; otherwise, we need to explain the coincidence consisting in the absence of qq. 9 and 11 from the Questiones in addition to the profound reformulation of q. 10 (this kind of revision is extremely rare throughout the Questiones). Question 11 deserves a further remark. A question with the title utrum sermo insit homini a natura may well have sounded extraneous in a commentary on the Politics and, in fact, it often appears in commentaries on Aristotle’s On the soul, Sophistical refutations, On interpretation and On sense and the sensible.125 No other 124 

See the Introduction, above and the first pages of Chapter 5, below. See Köhler, “Homo animal nobilissimum”, II/2.429-462. A similar question is found in some Aristotelian commentaries; cf. Sten Ebbesen, “Does Language Acquisition Depend on Hearing a Language? A Text Corpus”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 2017 (86), pp. 138-215 and, in addition to the texts edited by Ebbesen, in Petrus Hispanus, Questiones super libro “De a ­ nimalibus” 125 

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Politics commentary contains a question such as this. I have compared this question in B with the same question in Peter’s commentary on the On sense and the sensible and with other commentaries, B presenting a text closer to that of the Anonymous Mertonian than to Peter’s.126 This might lead us to conclude that this question was taken from another commentary and that it bears no relation to Peter’s oral lectures. It should, however, be noted that, as Sten Ebbesen remarked, the Anonymous Mertonian “is very similar” to Peter’s question in terms of views (though not in terms of wording).127 Of course, given the striking resemblance between q. 11 of B and the Anonymous Mertonian, it cannot be excluded that Peter and the Anonymous Mertonian are the same person. While such a question exceeds the scope of this study,128 there remains that the presence of q. 11 in B is extremely odd. A tentative explanation can be devised through considering the entirety of the Questiones: as I demonstrate in Chapter 5 (but also in Chapter 1) some questions are more related to metaphysical and natural philosophy subjects than to the Politics. Suffice it to mention qq. 20 and 25 of Book I. Furthermore, we have seen in Chapter 1 that Peter repeated himself and that, in the Questiones, he used arguments he had already advanced in his commentaries on the Metaphysics, On the heavens and Physics. In this way, during his oral lectures, it is possible that Peter drew on his previous teaching experience, repeating what he had already said while lecturing on other Aris­totelis. Critical Edition with Introduction, ed. Francisca Navarro Sánchez (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015), IV, q. 4.2, pp. 212-213, and in Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibeta revisa, correcta et varie illustrata (Lovanii: typis Hieronymi Nempaei, 1646), Quodlibet I, q. 16, pp. 33-35. 126  See the apparatus fontium of q. 11. Peter’s question is edited in Kevin White, Two Studies Related to St. Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s “De sensu et sensato”, together with an Edition of Peter of Auvergne’s “Quaestiones super Parva Naturalia” (Ottawa: PhD dissertation, University of Ottawa, 1986), 2 vols., II.30-32; Ebbesen, “Does Language Acquisition”, pp. 154-155. 127  Ibid., p. 156. 128  The question utrum sermo sit naturalis homini found in the commentary on the On sense and the sensible attributed to Peter draws on Giles’ De regimine. Ebbesen, “Does Language Acquisition”, p. 152, maintains that this commentary was composed “in the 1270s, or at the latest in the 1280s”, but the texts quoted here below make it clear that it was composed after 1280, that is, after the composition of the De regimine principum. Compare the text of this commentary with that of Giles: “Verum est quod natura quibusdam animalibus dedit arma defensionis, sicut cornua et huiusmodi; homini autem non haec dedit, sed aliquid nobilius, ut intellectum et manum, quae est organum organorum, ita quod homo haec habens potest sibi facere omnia arma. Sic etiam natura dedit animalibus illis voces significativas naturaliter; homini autem non hoc dedit” (White, Two Studies, II.30; Ebbesen, “Does Language Acquisition”, p. 155); “Sed natura homini, tanquam excellentiori animalium, non dedit ad sui tuitionem cornua vel ungues: sed dedit ei manum, quae secundum Philosophum 3. de Anima, est organum organorum. Nam per manum omnia organa, et quicquid ad defensionem facit, fabricare valemus … ex quo natura dedit homini sermonem, quem non dedit animalibus aliis” (II/1.1, ed. Romae 1607, p. 217). David Bloch cast doubt that q. 11 of B and the question contained in the commentary on the On sense and the sensible pertain to the same author; cf. David Bloch, “Peter of Auvergne on Memory. An Edition of the Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscentia”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Âge Grec et Latin 78 (2008), pp. 51-110, at 54. However, although the wording is different, the views expressed in the two questions are exactly the same: while the ability to speak is natural to man as an inclination, the way in which it is enacted is ad placitum (it is voluntary), or as B puts it, ab intellectu et voluntate, which implies variety and multiple idioms.

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works of Aristotle—this is, in fact, what seems to have happened in other of his commentaries.129 This may well explain why he decided to raise q. 11 (along with the fact that he was using the De regimine as a model). Thus, while giving his lectures, Peter raised q. 11 since it reflected his interest in natural philosophy, and he simply took the lines of reasoning from a commentary he had previously made on the On interpretation or on the On sense and the sensible. However, when he later edited the reportatio, he realised that this question had no relevance to the interpretation of Book I (unlike qq. 20 and 25 of Book I which continued to be relevant, since they laid the groundwork for the question that comes immediately after, as I show in Chapter 5). This hypothesis is further strengthened by examining q. 21 of Book I of B: utrum inductio pecunie sit necessaria in ciuitate. This question is very peculiar. I have noted earlier that it was partially integrated into another question, namely q. 23 of the Questiones (utrum cuiuslibet rei possesse sit duplex usus),130 where Peter briefly explains the reason why money came into use. Like q. 11, question 21 of B is not addressed in any other question commentary on the Politics. The reason is simple: a question with a similar title was typically raised in commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, with respect to Book V, chapter 5.131 Naturally, there was nothing preventing Peter from deciding to raise such a question in a commentary on the Politics; after all, he raised questions more related to the Ethics than to the Politics later in the Questiones (e.g., q. 5 of Book IV and qq. 1-3 of Book VII). Nonetheless, comparison of the text of q. 21 of B with its contemporary Ethics commentaries reveals that B shares the same exact solutio with the Ethics commentaries: it begins with the distinction of two meanings of the term ‘necessary’, then it states that fungible goods are not always easily transportable from one region to another, and it therefore became necessary to invent money for exchanges. Finally, money must have the following characteristics: to be made of a lasting and precious material (such as silver and gold); to be divisible into small quantities so that small things can be exchanged; to possess a given weight and to have a mark (of a king). It seems difficult to conceive that B influenced all the Ethics commentaries; quite the contrary, as is well known, the late thirteenth-century Ethics commentaries present a great homogeneity since, most likely, all of them depend on an ‘archetypal

129  Griet Galle noted similarities between two questions of Peter’s question commentary on the On the heavens (WP, which is a reportatio) and two questions of his commentary on the Sense and Sensibilia; cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 85*. 130  See ll. 31-36 in the edition. 131  See Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 452-455 for Radulphus Brito; Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 216ra-b for Giles of Orleans; Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 67ra-b for the Anonymous of Erlangen; see Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13, f. 105va-b (106va-b) for the Anonymous of Erfurt and Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16110, f. 262ra-b for the Anonymous of Paris.

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commentary’ possibly originating in the 1270s.132 For this reason, the most plausible assumption with regard to q. 21 is that, in his lectures on the Politics, Peter drew on his previous lectures on the Ethics, in which he certainly also addressed this question, and in the same manner as his contemporary Ethics commentaries.133 Later, while revising his lectures, he dropped this question, feeling that it was useless in a Politics commentary. This said, we cannot exclude that the scribe of B (or of the exemplar Annibaldi) might have taken this question from an Ethics commentary considering that it enriched the content of the commentary he was transcribing. This is, however, less likely: if that were the case, the scribe would have done so more than once. For instance, in Book II where Peter poses questions related to law, the scribe would have taken questions on law from a commentary on Book V of the Ethics; moreover, q. 21 also bears traces (albeit minor) of reliance on Giles’ De regimine, which, as noted earlier, can also be seen in other questions of B. We can thus conclude: given that B represents an early stage of the Questiones, that q. 8 appears as of secondary importance, that q. 9 does not add any new insight, that qq. 11 and 21 are rather connected to other works of Aristotle, on which Peter commented, and that, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, Peter ‘recycled’ material from his other commentaries to use in the Questiones, it seems plausible that these four questions were part of the original lectures given by Peter, when he possibly ­dithered about which questions he should address, and were later eliminated during the editing of the text resulting from those lectures, when he had an overall picture of his lectures on the Politics.

5. A Final Note About B: Its Date and Circulation Since some of the arguments found in B (but not in the Questiones) are also found in later commentaries,134 it is certain that the reportatio had an autonomous circulation. This also explains why Annibaldo di Ceccano possessed a copy of it. We can thus conclude that there was a space of time between the reportatio and its revision, that is, between the time in which Peter gave his oral lectures and the composition of the Questiones. That space of time was presumably short, for it would be easier for Peter to fill in the gaps in the text and to recall the references he had in mind when he gave his lectures. On the other hand, there is no evidence excluding the possibility that B had been produced several years earlier and that, at 132  Gauthier was the first scholar to advance the hypothesis of the ‘archetypal commentary’ in Gauthier, “Trois commentaires”. For further developments of this thesis, see Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 143-154; Id., “L’Éthique à Nicomaque à la Faculté des Arts de Paris avant et après 1277”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 79 (2012), pp. 71-114. 133  The lectures given by Peter survive in two manuscripts. The text covered by Peter stops at Ethics II.2, 1109a1-2. For manuscripts and bibliography, see Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, pp. 458-459. 134  See the apparatus fontium of B in Liber I, q. 3, ad secundum; Liber I, q. 20, ll. 11-15; Liber II, q. 13, ll. 15-20 and the apparatus of Liber II, q. 6, l. 13. See also the remarks on Torquemada as well as notes 9 and 10 of Chapter 6, below.

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some point, Peter, seeing that manuscripts containing his unrevised lectures given some years earlier were circulating in Paris (possibly without his consent), may well have decided to revise them in order to replace B with an edited version, i.e., the Questiones.135 Because B draws on Giles’ De regimine principum for the title of many questions136 and even takes arguments from it,137 we can conclude that Peter’s oral lectures could not have been given before 1280.138 Based, however, on the evidence presented in Chapter 2, we can be sure that B is the work of a mature Peter. The oral lectures were delivered after September 1291, since, in q. 22 of Book I, Peter already draws on Giles of Rome’s commentary on the Liber De causis.139 In light of this, both Peter’s oral lectures and the composition of the Questiones took place in the years between 1291 and 1296. In addition, the analysis of the questions present only either in B or in the Questiones shows that, because B includes questions not found in other commentaries and, conversely, does not touch upon issues addressed in them, it was the list of questions in the Questiones that was followed by the successive commentators, not the one found in B, and that the questions in B therefore stand out as a singular case in the commentary tradition. As a result, the Questiones (and not B) was used as the model for the establishment of the standard tabula quaestionum of the early commentary tradition on the Politics.

135  This conjecture is based on the fact that this happened with other masters. For instance, Durand of Saint-Pourçain complained that reportationes of his lectures on the Sentences were circulating without his consent or his revision. That reportationes made by students might lack quality is confirmed by John of Paris’ justification that some of his presumed doctrinal errors voiced in his lectures on the Sentences were due to the ineptitude of the reportator. For Durand, see William J. Courtenay, “Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century”, in J. Hamesse (ed.), Manuels, programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 septembre 1993) (Louvainla-Neuve: Publications de l’Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1994), pp. 325-350, at 343, n. 37. For John of Paris, see Palémon Glorieux, “Un mémoire justificatif de Bernard de Trilia: sa carrière à l’Université de Paris (1279-1287)”, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 17 (1928), pp. 405-426, at 424. 136  See Chapter 5, below, on Books I and II. 137  See the apparatus fontium of B, Liber I, qq. 10 and 21, and Liber II, q. 2. 138 The De regimine was produced some time between 1277 and 1282, but most likely before 1281; cf. Del Punta–Donati–Luna, “Egidio Romano”, pp. 319-341. 139  Cf. B, Liber I, q. 22, ll. 12-14 together with the apparatus fontium to ll. 13-25 of Book I, q. 24 of the Questiones, and Chapter 2, section 3.4, above.

Chapter 4

Sources Medieval scholastic texts abound with references and literal citations. This is not because medieval philosophy was the quintessential period of argument from authority,1 but rather because the bulk of those texts were produced in connection with university teaching (or its equivalent). In this sense, the abundance of references in those texts somewhat corresponds to footnotes in current academic works: the main text cannot stand alone, and the footnotes serve to support the author’s claims. There are, however, major differences: in medieval texts, authors and works were used not as sources in our modern sense, but rather as a means of sanctioning arguments,2 and aphorisms could be used in contexts completely different from those in which they originated (see below). But perhaps the most significant characteristic of how medieval scholastic authors made use of sources is silence: prior to the fourteenth century, adversaries and previous authors on whom they draw were not cited by name.3 The exceptions—in the case of commentaries produced at the arts faculty—were the authors regarded as authorities: Aristotle, of course, but also Plato and Greek and Arabic Aristotelian commentators; Albert (since the last quarter of the thirteenth century) and Aquinas (a little late, at the turn of the century). The explicit quotations and references found in a thirteenth-century text comprise only a part of all the sources used by the author, and they are often second-hand, as the use of the Parvi flores in the Questiones shows. The role of an editor of a medieval text is, along with establishing the text itself, to render such silence audible. It is not a question of circumscribing an author’s originality—assuming that the axiom ‘the more one takes silently from other medieval authors, the less original one is’ is true—but rather of making the context in which the text was created clear, thus revealing the modus operandi of philosophy in the Middle Ages.

1  On the process that caused Scholasticism to be long regarded as a philosophy based on authority, see Luca Bianchi, “Aristotele fu un uomo e poté errare: sulle origini medievali della critica al principio di autorità”, in Id. (ed.), Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi (Louvain-la-Neuve: FIDEM, 1994), pp. 509-533 [reprinted in: Id., Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rina­ scimento (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2003), pp. 101-133]. See also Riccardo Quinto, “Scholastica”. Storia di un concetto (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2001), where he argued that one of the main features of scholastic philosophy was the understanding of the authoritative text as holding an objective truth which could be the source of science. 2  Cf. Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 33-34. 3  On how fourteenth-century theologians made quotations and used their sources, see Chris Schabel, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th-Century Scholasticism”, in I. Taifacos (ed.), The Origins of European Scholarship. The Cyprus Millennium Conference (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), pp. 163-175.

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The Questiones is a commentary on an Aristotelian work produced by a master of arts in a period when the corpus Aristotelicum was the basis of the arts faculty curriculum. Unsurprisingly then, Aristotle’s works are the background against which the Questiones is to be understood, and they are Peter’s main source. This, however, does not mean that Peter always draws on Aristotle directly: Aristotle and Aquinas are jointly the most important authors for Peter, and it is with the help of Aquinas’ works—principally the Summa theologiae and his Aristotelian commentaries—that Peter establishes his interpretation of the Politics. The range of sources used by Peter is not very wide. Within the corpus Aristotelicum, and aside from the Politics, the most quoted works are the Ethics, Metaphysics, Physics, On the soul and On generation and corruption. Beyond Aristotle, Peter explicitly mentions Averroes’ commentaries on the Physics, On generation and corruption, Metaphysics and On the soul (all these works sometimes through the Parvi flores), Avicenna’s Metaphysics and the Liber de anima, Themistius’ commentary on the On the soul (once), Simplicius’ commentary on the On the heavens (once), Proclus (see below), ‘Eustratius’ (see below) and Cicero (twice and two famous sentences).4 He also cites juridical principles, such as Quod principi placuit legis habet uigorem, Nemo de bono suo debet reportare incommodum and Nemo iudex in causa propria,5 but these were all well known in the Middle Ages and cannot be taken as a sign that Peter had any special expertise in juridical matters beyond the standard knowledge that a theology student of the era might have of canon law.6 In any case, two out of these three quotations are taken from the Summa theologiae. The absence of certain sources is relevant. This holds for Seneca, Cicero (firsthand) and Valerius Maximus, for they were first cited in late thirteenth-century Ethics commentaries,7 chiefly as a result of the work of John of Wales.8 It is also worth noting that, in q. 5 of Book III, Peter dismisses the notion of radical moisture, 4  For Cicero, see Prohemium, ll. 99-100 (a sentence present in numerous florilegia and in John of Wales’ works); Liber II, q. 1, ll. 7-9 (Peter quotes Cicero through Augustine). 5  Cf. Liber II, q. 8, ll. 4-5; Liber III, q. 21, ll. 3-4; Liber III, q. 14, ll. 37-38. 6  Late thirteenth-century theologians quoted Gratian with some frequency despite their criticism of canonists. 7  The earliest commentaries on the entire Nicomachean Ethics produced at the Paris Arts Faculty (dated from the 1270s and the 1280s) do not draw directly on the works of any of these classical authors and the few references are second-hand via the Summa theologiae. By contrast, later authors such as Radulphus Brito quote these authors more often; cf. Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri, pp. 53-54. This is also borne out by their interpretations of Books VIII-IX of the Ethics, which are devoted to friendship (and benefits): Cicero’s De amicitia and Seneca’s De beneficientia are almost absent from the commentaries; cf. Marco Toste, “Utrum felix indigeat amicis. The Reception of the Aristotelian Theory of Friendship at the Arts Faculty of Paris”, in I.P. Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, 1200-1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 173-195, at 190. 8  The Franciscan John of Wales was active in Paris during the 1270s and 1280s; cf. Jenny Swanson, John of Wales. A Study of the Works and Ideas of a Thirteenth-Century Friar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 4-5. John of Wales was the main protagonist in the revival of classical culture within the University of Paris in the late thirteenth century. It was thanks to his popularising works of classical sources that Valerius Maximus’ Facta et dicta memorabilia became well known in medieval

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used principally by authors of medicine and that he does not draw on medical sources. This chimes with his commentary on Aristotle’s On length and shortness of life, since, as Michael Dunne has remarked, Peter is one of the first commentators “to exclude medical authors from his consideration”.9 Sources do not all have the same weight, for their presence in an argument contra is quite one thing, while, in the solutio or in the oppositum, it is altogether different. Moreover, some literal citations cannot be regarded as evidence that a given source was actually used: some sentences taken from the Topics (but also from other Aris­ totelian works) are used in different contexts in the Questiones as argumentative topoi. This is the case of dicta such as Sicut simpliciter ad simpliciter, magis ad magis, maximum ad maximum (used five times throughout the Questiones), Sicut propositum in proposito, sic oppositum in opposito (three times), Agens proportionatur fini (eight times), materia est propter formam (five times), In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et minimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere (seven times) and Propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis (three times and once in B). All these sentences are included in the Parvi flores,10 but, more importantly, they are nothing else than argumentative tools used in different contexts. That Peter regarded these sentences in such a way is borne out by the fact that, at least once, he refers to the axiom Sicut simpliciter ad simpliciter as a ‘regula’.11 This chapter, therefore, focuses on the most relevant sources—whether explicit or not—used by Peter and on sources to which historiography has paid attention on account of their use in the Questiones, sources such as Proclus and Sextus Empiricus.

1. The Nicomachean Ethics In Chapters 1 and 5 of this study, it is emphasised how much Peter makes use of notions from metaphysics and natural philosophy to advance his interpretation of the Politics. However, despite his interest in those fields, the Nicomachean Ethics is, after the Politics, the most important work for Peter’s explanation of the Politics. Throughout the Questiones, Peter quotes or refers explicitly to the Ethics over one hundred eighty times (this gives an average of ca. 1,5 times for question). The extensive use of the Ethics in a commentary on the Politics cannot come as a surprise. Any commentator on the Politics in any age would have drawn on the culture; cf. Marjorie A. Berlincourt, “The Relationship of Some Fourteenth-Century Commentaries on Valerius Maximus”, Mediaeval Studies 34 (1972), pp. 361-387. 9  Michael Dunne, “Thirteenth and Fourteenth-Century Commentaries on the De longitudine et brevitate vitae”, Early Science and Medicine 8 (2003), pp. 320-335, at 331. 10  On these quotations and their use in the Questiones, see Toste, “Parvi flores and philosophia practica”, pp. 77-82. 11  Cf. Liber II, q. 14, ll. 10-12 and B, Liber II, q. 14, ll. 6-7.

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Ethics—as a matter of fact, the Ethics is the most often cited work in the Scriptum. The reason for this is that the key concepts used in the Politics, such as distributive justice, friendship, prudence, happiness and even ‘political science’, can only be fully understood by referring to the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, where they are defined. Accordingly, Peter quotes abundantly from the Ethics and to such an extent that he bases the solutio of some questions on the Ethics and not on the Politics. Just to mention a few: q. 3, 17, 27-28 of Book I, qq. 4, 12 and 19 of Book II, qq. 14 and 21 of Book III, qq. 5-6 of Book IV and qq. 1-2 of Book VII. In numerous opposita, he cites to an even greater extent the Ethics as the source for his position: for instance, in qq. 18, 20 of Book III; qq. 6 and 11 of Book IV; qq. 1-2 and 10-12 of Book V and qq. 1, 3, 7 of Book VII. On some occasions, Peter’s use of the Ethics is quite inventive and not at all predictable. This is evident in the solutio of some important questions, such as Book II, q. 3, where self-love as defined in Ethics IX.8 serves to justify private ownership; Book III, q. 6, in which the notions of habitus and virtue are used to define the virtue of the citizen; and Book III, q. 21, where Peter explains Aristotle’s notion that a most excellent man should be made ruler and the lawfulness of ostracism in unjust political regimes on the basis of the theory of friendship advanced in Book VIII of the Ethics. Peter uses so often notions related to the Ethics and to its medieval reception, such as habitus, virtus, electio, appetitus, delectatio and prudentia, that it is fair to state that he commented on the Politics through the prism of the Ethics. Such an approach is alien to Aristotle. This confirms what was argued in the introduction to this study, namely that the medieval reception of the Ethics shaped that of the Politics.12

2. ‘Eustratius’ For medieval authors, Eustratius of Nicaea was the only author of the compilation of Byzantine commentaries on the ten books of the Ethics translated from the Greek into Latin by Robert Grosseteste. For this reason, they referred to ‘the’ author of this compilation under the name of ‘Eustratius’.13 The importance of ‘Eustratius’ for medieval ethics can hardly be overestimated, as authors mentioned him—not Averroes—as the Commentator on moral subjects. Luca Bianchi has shown how much the ideal of an ascetical life devoted to philosophical speculation owes to Eus­ 12  This will be evident in the chapter to follow. The case of the Rhetoric deserves a short mention here. Peter does use it and three questions are closely related to its text, namely q. 5 of Book IV, q. 9 of Book V and q. 4 of Book VI, but in the greater part of the Questiones the use of the Rhetoric is limited to a few sentences employed (and repeated) as commonplaces. This is the case of I.5, 1361a20-22 (where Aristotle defines ownership), II.4, 1380b35-36 (where he defines ‘friendly feeling’), II.15, 1390b16-17, 19-20 (where Aristotle describes the character of noblemen) and II.16, 1390b32-1391a1 (where Aristotle depicts the ‘typical’ behaviour of wealthy men). 13  See note 78 of the Introduction, above.

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tratius of Nicaea’s commentary on Book I of the Ethics and to Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Book X.14 Although Bianchi concentrates on Boethius of Dacia’s De summo bono, his conclusions can be extended to late thirteenth-century commentators on the Ethics and to the Questiones. Peter does not refer to ‘Eustratius’ (or to the Commentator) very often—thirteen times throughout the Questiones—and those references correspond to Eustratius of Nicaea (Books I and VI), the Anonymous on Book II and Michael of Ephesus on Book V. Eustratius is quoted twice in the opening questions of the Questiones dealing with the subject matter and the scientific status of politics, but this occurs in two arguments contra.15 He is also quoted in Book IV just to support the claim that the study of politics includes that of law.16 This does not, however, mean that Peter made use of Eustratius for more ‘political’ views. In fact, Peter took from Eustratius innocuous remarks, such as an ugly man not being easily obeyed, which is quoted twice.17 In this sense, two citations, one taken from Eustratius—nulli volenti et ut oportet studenti impossibilis est possessio boni18—and another from the Anonymous commentator on Book II—passio est motus partis appetitive sub fantasia boni vel mali19—are telling, since they are catchy. They were often quoted in the Middle Ages in the same form as found in the Questiones and were therefore in all probability part of a florilegium.20 14  Cf. Bianchi, “Felicità intellettuale”. Hopefully, this article has put an end to the lasting historiographical myth of an ‘ethical Averroism’, that is, that late thirteenth-century masters of arts drew on Averroes to maintain the ideal of a life dedicated to the achievement of contemplative happiness. 15  Cf. Liber I, q. 1, ll. 13-14 and q. 2, ll. 7-9. 16  Cf. Liber IV, q. 2, ll. 25-26. 17  Liber III, q. 20, ll. 66-68 and Liber VII, q. 1, ll. 58-60. 18  Liber III, q. 6, ll. 62-63. 19  Cf. Liber V, q. 9, ll. 40-41. 20  The sentence nulli volenti et ut oportet studenti impossibilis est possessio boni is quoted in the Ethics commentaries of Giles of Orleans and Buridan. For Giles, see Gauthier, “Trois commentaires”, p. 272, n. 1; for Buridan, see Johannes Buridanus, Questiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Parisiis, 1513), V, q. 26, f. 102vb. See also Radulphus Brito’s commentary in Costa, Le “questiones”, p. 388, ll. 8-9. It is also quoted in Henricus Bate, Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium. Parts 13-16: On Thinking and Happiness, ed. Guy Guldentops (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), p. 269, and in Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum, ed. Sten Ebbesen et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), Prooemium, p. 25. The sentence passio est motus partis appetitiue sub fantasia boni uel mali was cited by Peter several times: in the Scriptum III.14, in his Ethics commentary (cf. Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 95-96, ll. 8-9); in his Quodlibet VI, q. 10 (cf. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 94rb) and in Quodlibet VI, q. 16 (cf. Frank Hentschel, “Der verjagte Dämon. Mittelalterliche Gedanken zur Wirkung der Musik aus der Zeit um 1300. Mit einer Edition der Quaestiones 16. und 17. aus Quodlibet VI des Petrus d’Auvergne”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer [eds.], Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert [Berlin–New York: Walter De Gruyter, 2000], pp. 395-421, at 413-414). It is also quoted in Pseudo-Thomas Aquinas, “Expositio in Boethii De consolatione philosophiae”, in Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula alia dubia. Volumen tertium, in Thomas Aquinas Opera omnia XXIV (Parmae: Fiaccadori, 1869), I, prosa 6, p. 30; in John of Pouilly’s Quodlibet IV, q. 10 (cf. Thomas Graf, De subjecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad medium saeculum XIV, Pars prima: De subiecto virtutum cardinalium II [Romae: Herder, 1935],

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None, however, of these quotations is crucial to Peter’s interpretation of the Politics. The importance of ‘Eustratius’ in the Questiones rests on three ideas. First, the model of the philosopher withdrawn from society who chose to lead an ascetical and superhuman life eschewing bodily pleasures and dedicated to philosophical speculation—in fact, Peter mentions Eustratius when he expresses this ideal of life and states that man needs to overcome his passions in order to devote himself to philosophy.21 Second, the identification of prudence as the virtue through which man can attain practical (or political) happiness—by the time Peter composed the Questiones, this identification was becoming part of the philosophical mainstream thanks to authors such as Albert and Giles of Rome, even though it was not unanimously shared by every Aristotelian commentator.22 It is, however, noteworthy that, in the contra of the question where Peter asks whether political happiness is attained by means of an act of moral virtue, he chooses to mention Eustratius as the author who maintained that prudence is the most perfect virtue in the realm of practical action.23 Third—and in direct connection with the above—the clear distinction between practical and contemplative happiness: such a distinction is only suggested in the Nicomachean Ethics X.8, although Aristotle mentions there two distinct ways to live. Eustratius alludes to two kinds of happiness, but it was Michael of Ephesus who, influenced by Neoplatonism, formulated the existence of two distinct kinds of happiness, according to which political happiness is inferior to and for the sake of contemplative happiness.24 Moreover, Peter states in Book VII that, unlike contemplative happiness, p. 74*); in John of Jandun’s commentary on the Rhetoric, Liber II, q. 2 (cf. transcription by Bernadette Preben-Hansen, p. 66) and in Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 22, art. 3, although Aquinas attributes it to John of Damascus. In effect, similar sentences are found in John of Damascus and Nemesius; cf. the apparatus fontium of Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Ethicorum, II, lectio 3, I.84, ll. 76-78. 21  Cf. Liber I, q. 9, ll. 83-84. Eustratius is also quoted in the Scriptum for the same idea; cf. apparatus fontium Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 132-138. As Michele Trizio has shown, Eustratius uses Neoplatonic and Christian authors (Proclus, Maximus the Confessor and Theodore the Studite) to affirm a monastic ideal of life in an Aristotelian commentary. Note also that Eustratius distinguishes between two models of contemplative life, one Aristotelian and another monastic; cf. Michele Trizio, Il neoplatonismo di Eustrazio di Nicea (Bari: Edizioni di Pagina, 2016), pp. 199-223. Peter merges these two models; cf. Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 138-140. 22  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, I.11, p. 59, ll. 3-5; Aegidius Romanus, Rhetorica Aristotelis cum … Egidii de Roma luculentissimis commentariis (Venetiis: mandato et impensis haeredum Octavani Scoti, 1515), f. 4va. On Albert, see Jörn Müller, “Felicitas civilis und felicitas contemplativa: Zur Verhältnisbestimmung der beiden aristotelischen Glücksformen in den Ethikkommentaren des Albertus Magnus”, in L. Honnefelder–H. Möhle–S. Bullido del Barrio (eds.), Via Alberti: Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2009), pp. 295-322. In his commentary, Radulphus Brito does not say that practical happiness is achieved through an act of prudence, but rather through the moral virtues; cf. Costa, Le “questiones”, p. 557, l. 34. Brito seems to understand practical happiness yet according to the model of Macrobius, who saw the role of ‘political virtues’ in leading man as one of self-restraint and controlling one’s passions. On the notion of political virtue in the Middle Ages, see Bejczy, “The Concept of Political Virtue” and note 75 of the Introduction, above. 23  Cf. Liber VII, q. 5, l. 13. 24  For Eustratius, see The Greek Commentaries … Volume I, p. 99, ll. 46-47. For Michael of Ephesus, see The Greek Commentaries … Volume III, p. 408, ll. 54-63; p. 410, ll. 17-18; pp. 411, l. 54-412, l. 75; p. 414, ll. 15-21; p. 415, ll. 56-60; p. 417, ll. 4-7; p. 420, ll. 86-95; p. 437, ll. 31-32; p. 444, ll. 26-29. On

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political happiness contains sadness and disturbance—this is an idea advanced by Michael of Ephesus, even though Peter does not mention ‘Eustratius’ in this point of the text.25 Again, the idea that there are two kinds of happiness was already a common doctrine when Peter gave his oral lectures, but its source was Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Book X of the Ethics. More importantly, Peter’s claim that political activity involves sadness and disturbance is taken directly from Michael of Ephesus—Albert does not place the same emphasis on it as Peter does. Peter most probably read Michael of Ephesus (or any other of the Greek commentators) first-hand and not necessarily through Albert or Aquinas: in at least one passage of the Questiones, there is a strong similarity between Peter’s and Michael’s reasoning.26 This is also clear in the references Peter makes in the questions of Book III devoted to the difference between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man.27 As noted in the previous chapter, B includes a literal quotation of Michael of Ephesus precisely in Book III, q. 8, which addresses this matter.28 Albert and Aquinas do not quote Michael of Ephesus on the matter in their commentaries on the Politics.29 Albert does quote Michael of Ephesus in both of his commentaries on the Ethics,30 but the way in which he explains the difference between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man is different from how Peter explains it, which appears to exclude any likelihood that Peter had read Michael of Ephesus via Albert. Furthermore, in two other parts of the Questiones, Peter quotes the sentence bonus non est qui vult manere malum,31 which is taken from the section in which Michael of Ephesus deals with the issue of the virtue of the citizen and the good man.32 This is thus a stark indication that Peter had first-hand knowledge of Michael’s commentary on Book V of the Ethics. the distinction Michael makes between two kinds of happiness, see Dominic J. O’Meara, “Spätantike und Byzanz: Neuplatonische Rezeption–Michael von Ephesos”, in C. Horn–A. Neschke-Hentschke (eds.), Politischer Aristotelismus. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Politik von der Antike biz zum 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart–Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2008), pp. 43-52, at 48-49; Katerina Ierodiakonou, “Some Observations on Michael of Ephesus’ Comments on Nicomachean Ethics X”, in C. Barber–D. Jenkins (eds.), Medieval Greek Commentaries on the “Nicomachean Ethics” (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 185-201, especially 194-199. 25  Cf. Liber VII, q. 6, ad secundum with the apparatus fontium. 26  Cf. Liber I, q. 28, ll. 17-20 with the apparatus fontium. This similarity is significant, for, in this question, Peter draws to a great extent on the Summa theologiae, wherein no trace of Michael’s commentary is to be found. 27  Cf. Liber III, q. 6, ll. 7-9 and q. 8, ll. 34-35. 28  See B, Liber III, q. 8, ll. 18-21. 29  Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.2, pp. 217-222; Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, III.3, pp. A193-A196. 30  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et questiones, V.4, pp. 326-327; Id., Ethicorum lib. X, ed. Auguste Borgnet, in B. Alberti Magni … Opera Omnia VII (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vives, 1891), V.2.2, p. 342. 31  Liber III, q. 21, ll. 60-61 and Liber V, q. 12, ll. 5-6. 32  Cf. Michael Ephesius, Enarrationes in V Aristotelis Moralium, cap. 5 (Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va-b; checked against Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 17832, f. 113r and Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 222, f. 85va): “Non enim bonus uir iam et ciuis

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3. Proclus and Neoplatonism Peter frames numerous topics in metaphysical terms. In some sections of the Questiones where a Proclus/Neoplatonism dynamic is found, Proclus’ Elementatio theologica and the Liber de causis are quoted as important sources, usually in the contra or at the beginning of the solutio. This may well denote a strong presence of Neoplatonic sources in the Questiones: they are indeed found in twelve questions. This is also in line with Peter’s philosophical and theological output: Griet Galle has underlined the influence of Neoplatonism on Peter’s questions on the On the heavens (WP-version)33 and Chris Schabel has remarked “Peter’s preference for Proclus” in his Quodlibeta.34 What is more, according to Schabel’s list of the explicit sources cited by Peter in his six Quodlibeta, Proclus is mentioned no fewer than forty-five times, being thus the fourth most quoted author in Peter’s Quodlibeta, surpassed only by Aristotle, Augustine and Averroes.35 Figures, however, do not tell the whole story, and, in the case of the Questiones, they are misleading. In a short article devoted to studying the presence of Proclus in medieval political thought, Francis Cheneval demonstrated that medieval authors largely limited their use of Proclus to two very similar propositions of the Elementatio theologica, namely propositions 5 (omnis multitudo secunda est ab uno) and 21 (omnis ordo ab unitate incipiens procedit in multitudinem unitati coelementalem, et omnis ordinis multitudo ad unam reducitur unitatem),36 which they drew on in maintaining various views, from the idea that monarchy is the best regime, as there is one single ruler, to the claim that the different lay rulers are to be subordinate to one single authority, that of the Pope.37 As Cheneval acknowledged, his article appeared following a study by Loris Sturlese on the reception of Proclus in the bonus. In bonis quidem enim et bene habentibus urbanitatibus bonus uir et ciuis bonus est, in malis autem et male habentibus neque bonus uir et bonus ciuis est, neque in illis bonus ciuis bonus est uir, in bonis (in bonis] scrips. bone codd.) quidem enim et bene habentibus urbanitatibus et ciuis bonus. Quia enim non simpliciter bonum, sed ciuem bonum illum dicimus qui secundum omnem modum facit ea que ad salutem urbanitatis conferunt manifestum, quoniam, que ad constitutionem et permanentiam et salutem bone ciuitatis festinans facere, et bonus est simpliciter et ciuis bonus; qui autem que ad constitutionem male et omnino praue habentis urbanitatis studet, ciuis quidem bonus est, simpliciter autem bonus non est. Non enim saluare festinaret malam urbanitatem si bonus simpliciter esset: nullus enim amat bonum et manere uult praua. Quare simpliciter bonus in praua urbanitate ciuis bonus non est, contempnens ipsam et non secundum ipsam conuersans”. 33  See Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, pp. 98*-102*. See also Henryk Anzulewicz, “Peter of Auvergne and Albert the Great as Interpreters of Aristotle’s De caelo”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin– München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 107-134, at 121-122. 34  Schabel, “Peter of Auvergne’s Quodlibetal Questions”, pp. 357-359. 35  Cf. Id., “The Quodlibeta”, p. 92. 36 Proclus, Elementatio theologica translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca, ed. Helmut Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 5 and 14. 37  Francis Cheneval, “Proclus politisé: La réception politique de Proclus au Moyen Âge tardif”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 78 (1996), pp. 11-26.

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Middle Ages. For Sturlese, such a reception consisted in a “stilizzazione delle tesi dell’Elementatio theologica a pochi luoghi comuni”.38 Cheneval’s and Sturlese’s conclusions fit the Questiones like a glove. Despite the number of citations of Proclus in the Questiones, they are by and large limited to propositions 5 and 21 of the Elementatio theologica—in some instances they are even mentioned together.39 In addition, Peter refers to propositions 95, 127 and apparently to proposition 128 (together with 145), each once.40 Turning now to citations from the De causis, which, for Peter, was authored by Proclus, the situation is slightly different. Peter quotes three times the famous pro­ position 16 from the De causis—virtus unita fortior est—but this is not relevant, for he knew it from the Parvi flores, too.41 Moreover, in three different questions, Peter refers to three other propositions from the De causis, but two of them are found in the Parvi flores (which suggests that they were well known), and, in any case, Peter took them from Aquinas’ and Giles of Rome’s commentaries on the De causis;42 as to the third reference, it rather is to a commentary on the De causis, either one authored by Peter (more likely) or Aquinas’ commentary.43 Neoplatonism thus appears to be rather limited in the Questiones. Cheneval, who includes the Questiones in his study, argues that Proclus is used in a framework of a reductio ad unum, which fulfilled “une fonction de légitimation politique”.44 Then again, this is not the whole story. Peter makes a pragmatic use of propositions 5 and 21 of the Elementatio theologica and of the axiom virtus unita fortior est: insofar as interpreting the Politics is concerned, these propositions have a neutral value for him in that they have a purely instrumental role, and this is why he uses them in a vast array of contexts. Peter uses Proclus’ proposition 21 to argue that, in every aggregate, one should command and another obey, just as Aquinas uses Politics I.5, 1254a28-31 to maintain exactly the same. However, he also uses the principle virtus unita fortior est in just the same way as Aquinas did to claim in 38  Loris Sturlese, “II dibattito sul Proclo latino nel medioevo fra l’università di Parigi e lo Studium di Colonia”, in G. Boss–G. Seel (eds.), Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel juin 1985 (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), pp. 261-285, at 261. This sentence is quoted in Cheneval, “Proclus politisé”, p. 13, from where I have taken it. The great exceptions to this standard reception of Proclus were the German Dominican authors. 39  See Liber I, q. 12 (propositions 21 and 5); Liber II, q. 1 (proposition 21); Liber III, q. 11 (pro­ position 21); Liber III, q. 13 (proposition 21); Liber III, q. 26 (proposition 5; this proposition is used in the parallel chapter of the De regimine principum); Liber IV, q. 4 (proposition 21) and Liber VII, q. 5 (proposition 5). 40  Cf. Liber IV, q. 3, ll. 36-37; Liber I, q. 24, ll. 16-18 and Liber III, q. 13, ll. 29-31, respectively. Proposition 127 is cited together with proposition 20 of the De causis, but, as demonstrated at the end of Chapter 2, these quotations were second-hand, via Giles of Rome’s commentary on the De causis. 41  Cf. Liber I, q. 13; Liber II, q. 4; Liber IV, q. 3 and Liber V, q. 10; Hamesse, Les “Auctoritates Aristotelis”, p. 232, n. 13. 42  Liber I, q. 24, ll. 13-25 with the apparatus fontium; Liber IV, q. 3, ll. 36-37 with the apparatus fontium. See also, Toste, “Parvi flores and philosophia practica”, p. 72. 43  Liber VI, q. 9, ll. 10-12 with the apparatus fontium. But see Chapter 2, above. 44  Cheneval, “Proclus politisé”, p. 25.

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the De regno that tyranny is the worst political regime, as all power is held by one single man who can thereby be more harmful to the community.45 In this case, we cannot say that Neoplatonism fulfils the function of legitimation. Moreover, Peter uses Proclus to argue that different offices must be hierarchically subordinated to one main office.46 In this sense, and despite the number of citations, Proclus is for Peter just one source among others, which he can even use in a rather peculiar way, at least for a twenty-first-century reader: Peter draws (via Giles of Rome) from the De causis the proposition primum est dives per se to argue that a rich person (dives) is by definition one who is self-sufficient and that one can only be self-sufficient by means of possessing natural riches.47 To conclude: we can thus say that, in medieval political thought, Proclus is as much ‘politicised’ as Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics.48

4. Sextus Empiricus In the second and third arguments contra of q. 5 of Book II on whether incest is filthy according to human nature and in itself, Peter includes two citations apparently from Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism (he does not, however, mention Sextus Empiricus, but rather a certain ‘Pirronius’ of indeterminate identity). Even though this is the only place in the Questiones where Sextus Empiricus is quoted, this reference has long been noted by scholars interested in the Questiones,49 as it is the earliest known reference to the Outlines of Pyrrhonism in medieval Latin Europe. Its Latin translation survives in three fourteenth-century manuscripts50 and was, in all likelihood, undertaken by Bartholomew of Messina.51 The fact that 45  Liber IV, q. 3, ll. 34-42; cf. Thomas de Aquino, De regno ad regem Cypri, I.3, p. 452, ll. 11-14. Later in chapter 5 Aquinas reverses this opinion claiming that democracy is worse than tyranny for tyranny does not obliterate the citizens’ private good; cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 321-323. 46  Liber IV, q. 4, ll. 43-49. 47  Liber I, q. 24, ll. 13-25. See section 3.4 of Chapter 2, above. 48  See, for instance, the study Lanza–Toste, “The Bridle-Maker and the Pope”, where the authors show how the Aristotelian four causes were used in political treatises. 49 Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory, pp. 303-304; Conor Martin, The Commentaries on the “Politics” of Aristotle in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, with Reference to the Thought and Political Life of the Time (Oxford: PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 1949), p. 124; Christoph Flüeler, “Politischer Aristotelismus im Mittelalter. Einleitung”, Vivarium 40 (2002), pp. 1-13, at 9-10. 50  On the medieval reception of this work, see Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus. The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 63-70 and 79-80 (for the translation of the Against the Mathematicians); Roland Wittwer, “Zur lateinischen Überlieferung von Sextus Empiricus ΠΥΡΡΩΝΕΙΟΙ ΥΠΟΤΥΠΟΣΕΙΣ”, Rheinisches Museum (145) 2002, pp. 366-373. For the reception of Greek scepticism in the Middle Ages, see Pasquale Porro, “Il Sextus Empiricus e l’immagine dello scetticismo antico nel Medioevo”, Elenchos 15 (1994), pp. 229-253. See also the overview provided in Henrik Lagerlund, Skepticism in Philosophy: A Comprehensive, Historical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2020). 51  For the attribution of the translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the Against the Mathematicians to Bartholomew, see Pieter Beullens, A Methodological Approach to Anonymously Transmit-

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a master of arts at Paris quotes this work in the late thirteenth century is problematic: even though the Latin translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism precedes the Questiones by more than twenty-five years,52 Peter’s use of this work seems to be an isolated case, and so the question arises as to whether he read it directly or second-hand. The only full analysis of the occurrence of these two citations in the Questiones has been undertaken by Roland Wittwer,53 who focuses on the problematic feature of Peter’s reference to Sextus Empiricus, for the Questiones has “Pirronius in sexta decima narrat quod Zeno quidam Philosophus…”. The reference ‘sexta decima’ is odd, since it finds no correspondent in the textual divisions of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Sextus Empiricus’ other work, the Against the Mathematicians, has a stretch of text in its Book XI which is quite similar to the two arguments contra of the Questiones, but no Latin translation of this work covering Book XI has, to date, been found.54 Wittwer cautiously leaves the question open as to whether Peter had direct knowledge of the work or had gleaned it through another source. Certainly, no successive commentator made direct use of the same source as Peter: the Anony­ mous of Milan does not raise any question on incest and, while the Anonymous of Baltimore does pose a question on this topic, he clearly takes the information from the Questiones.55 Given the rather limited array of sources used by Peter and the fact that this citation is an isolated case, it seems more likely that he drew on an intermediary source. A collection prepared by Giovanni Grasso of Otranto entitled Pyrrhonia was available in the early thirteenth century, although it is now lost.56 It is possible ted Medieval Translations of Philosophical and Scientific Texts. The Case of Bartholomew of Messina (Leuven: PhD dissertation, Leuven University, 2020), pp. 122-143. I am grateful to the author for sharing these pages of his dissertation with me. 52  Bartholomew of Messina died in 1266 and, as seen in Chapter 2, the Questiones was composed between 1291 and 1296. 53  Roland Wittwer, “Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the Middle Ages”, Vivarium 54 (2016), pp. 255-285, especially 279-285. 54  Cf. ibid., p. 284. 55  The question bears the title utrum iustum sit et licitum sicut [lectio incerta] patrem com­ misceri cum sua filia et matrem cum suo filio, et sic de aliis gradibus consanguineitatis (II.4). The third and fourth arguments go as follows: “Item, istud idem fuit ordinatum in lege Neronis, quod quilibet potest cohire cum qualibet uel sorore uel matre et cetera; quare et cetera. Item, Nero et similes dicunt quod sicut licita est commistio patris cum filia in aliis membris, sicut in manu et pede, ita etiam commistio sexuum eorum uidetur esse licita; ideo et cetera” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3ra). The mistaken reference to Nero also appears in the Questiones (cf. apparatus ll. 7 and 9), but not in B. Clearly, the Anonymous of Baltimore could not grasp the references found in the Questiones, such as “Pirronius in sexta decima narrat quod Zeno” and “ordinauit Crisippus in ciuitate”, and introduced the reference “fuit ordinatum in lege Neronis” in order to make a comprehensible argument. Note that P has the readings Nereon and Neronis instead of Zenon and Zenonis. 56  Cf. Johannes M. Hoeck–Raimund J. Loenertz, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto Abt von Casole. Beiträge zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen unter Innozenz III. und Friedrich II. (Ettal: Buch-Kunstverlag, 1965), p. 126, n. 37.

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that Peter might have stumbled on a collection of this kind. The fact, however, remains that the wording of the citation in the Questiones is very close to the Latin translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (see the apparatus fontium of the edition). In any case, the references in the Questiones, though derived, in one way or another, from Sextus Empiricus, play no role in Peter’s interpretation of the Politics since they appear in two arguments contra and are therefore later refuted. In fact, Peter does not assign an authoritative status to philosophers Sextus Empiricus mentions—Zeno and Chrysippus—and does not even try to reconcile this source with Aristotle.57

5. Aquinas’ Long Shadow It is well known that Aquinas’ writings made a tremendous impact in the Paris Arts Faculty in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Suffice it to recall the letter the Paris masters of arts sent, less than two months after Aquinas’ death, to the Dominicans assembled in Lyons in which the masters asked to be given some of Aquinas’ philosophical commentaries they had no access to in Paris.58 Both Aquinas’ Summa theologiae and his commentaries on Aristotle were a main source for the commentaries produced by the masters of arts, at least until the early decades of the fourteenth century, from the Metaphysics to the Ethics.59 The Ethics commentaries are an illuminating case in point, as all of the commentaries in question form seem to be derived from an ‘archetypal commentary’, now lost, which was in turn based on the Summa theologiae—the list of questions of the commentaries (and presumably of the archetypal commentary) reproduces for the greater part the titles of questions and articles of the Ia-IIae and IIa-IIae, and countless arguments are taken from the corresponding articles of the Summa, with a difference, however: in the commentaries all the theological references and arguments were eliminated.60 Such an approach is also perceptible in Peter’s works. In his commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Physics, Peter takes ideas and lines of reasoning from the Summa theologiae and the Summa contra Gentiles, eliminating all theological overtones.61 For Peter and his fellow masters of arts, such a procedure did not represent a 57  Note that some medieval authors, such as Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, tried to reconcile Plato’s idea of the community of wives with Christianism. See p. 262 of Chapter 5, below. 58 Cf. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I.504-505, nr. 447. Obviously, this does not mean that every master of arts endorsed Aquinas’ views. 59  On the use of Aquinas’ Metaphysics commentary by commentators from the Arts Faculty, see Ebbesen, “Five Parisian Sets of Questiones”, pp. 282, 284-285. Ebbesen shows that the commentators (including Peter) could also be critical of Aquinas. 60  For bibliography, see note 132 of Chapter 3, above. 61  Cf. William Dunphy, “The quinque viae and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy”, in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974), 2 vols., I.73-104, at 79-80.

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rejection of theology, but rather the necessity of adhering to a strictly philosophical approach, first imposed on the magistri artium in 1272.62 Peter is an interesting case in this respect: as seen in Chapter 2, he most probably composed the Questiones while he was a student of theology and concurrently taught at the Arts Faculty. Throughout the Questiones, Peter shows an awareness of the institutional division between philosophy and theology, as he refers once to what “theologians say” and, as previously noted, three times to what is said “in another Faculty”.63 The use Peter makes of Aquinas’ works has, therefore, to be seen against this institutional backdrop. Such use is nothing distinctive in itself, since other masters of arts, such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, made silent but abundant use of Aquinas in their works.64 What is perhaps more interesting in Peter’s case is that he seems to be very familiar with the works of Aquinas and does not merely use Aquinas’ ideas in the same context in which Aquinas elaborated his own—for instance, Boethius of Dacia uses the Summa theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 95, art. 6, on divination, to develop his short work on divination by dreams.65 For his part, however, Peter uses Aquinas’ notions in a creative way and in contexts quite different from those in which they originally appeared.66 The chapter to follow will demonstrate how much Peter draws on the Summa theologiae: the questions devoted to law in Book II are taken from the De legibus and a part of Book V owes to the section on charity in the IIa-IIae. That said, even in questions wherein the title and structure bear no relation to the Summa, one can find lines of reasoning inspired by the Summa or by Aquinas’ philosophical commentaries. This happens in q. 20 of Book I, on whether nature made all the animals and plants for the sake of man, where a part of the solutio is inspired by the Summa theologiae Ia, q. 96, art. 1, and IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 1, and also in q. 5 of Book II, on incest, which is based on IIa-IIae, q. 154, art. 9. Perhaps the most important idea Peter takes from Aquinas is the distinction between two meanings of ‘nature’: either as a ‘perfect act’, that is, something brought unto completion and having reached perfection, or as something possessing the potential to develop, thus being a disposition. Peter employs this distinction in a wide range of contexts: discussing the propensity of men and 62  The statute of 1272 forbade the masters to address theological issues in their lectures in the Arts Faculty of Paris. For the historiographical interpretations of this statute, see Bianchi, Censure et liberté intellectuelle, pp. 165-201. 63  See Chapter 2, above. For Peter’s reference to theologians, see Liber I, q. 9, l. 86. 64  Note that using Aquinas’ views is one thing and adhering to those same views is another. The former does not imply the latter. 65  Cf. Gianfranco Fioravanti, “La scientia sompnialis di Boezio di Dacia”, Atti dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino. II. Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche 101 (1966-1967), pp. 329-369 [republished with slight changes in Id., Da Parigi a San Gimignano. Un itinerario del pensiero filosofico medievale (Roma: Aracne, 2021), pp. 77-111]. 66  A case in point is his use of the notion of concord and peace taken from the Summa theologiae, where these notions are discussed within the virtue of charity. See Toste, “An Original Way”.

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women to unite (I.7), the nobility of birth (IV.11), the naturalness of agriculture (VI.1) and the effect of climates and of the movements of the stars on human behaviour (VII.8). This is an idea with Aristotelian roots—suffice it to mention how Aristotle describes in Ethics II and VI how the virtues are natural to man— but Peter clearly takes it from Aquinas’ commentary on the Sentences, where he discusses marriage.67 Another key concept for the Questiones that Peter takes from the Summa theologiae is prudence. Peter was clearly familiar with the Nicomachean Ethics VI.5, 8 and 12, but the section of the Summa devoted to prudence (IIa-IIae, qq. 47-56), and more specifically qq. 47 and 50, supplied him with a thoroughly systematic theory on prudence. Aquinas’ model of prudence is at the heart of Peter’s interpretation of the Politics, and traces of it are highly evident in Book III, qq. 6-8 and Book VII, q. 6.68 Peter’s knowledge of Aquinas’ works is truly remarkable. However, unlike Peter’s use of the Parvi flores, it is undisputable that Peter did not rely on his memory alone but that he consulted precise parts of Aquinas’ works before composing the Questiones. This is evident in the questions on law in Book II, in q. 28 of Book I on usury and in the initial questions of Book VII, on happiness: all of them—from the title to their arguments—are based on articles of the Summa theologiae. In other questions, however, it seems that Peter looked up a passage from Aquinas and applied it to a new argumentative context in the Questiones, as he only uses some sentences or ideas taken from Aquinas. In such cases, Peter works as a weaver inserting Aquinas’ sentences in precise spots where he deems it appropriate to do so in order to bolster his argument. This is noticeable in the solutio of q. 27 of Book I, where Peter remarks that the value of a thing need not be considered according to the substantia rei, but rather according to the use it has been given in society: in this sense, while, from the point of view of nature, a fly is worthier than gold, for it is a living thing, it is not so in the use it has for the community—this comparison is taken from Aquinas’ commentary on the Ethics.69 The same happens in q. 23 of Book I, where Peter apparently draws ideas from two different works of Aquinas (in the sample below I also provide Aristotle’s text such that one can assess how much the Questiones depends on Aquinas’ texts in comparison with the Ethics, which is the only text to which Peter refers):

67  Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Super Sententiis, in Thomas Aquinas Opera omnia VII.2 (Parmae: Fiaccadori, 1857), Liber IV, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1, resp., p. 918. 68  See Toste, “Virtue and the City”, pp. 83, 87-88. 69  See Liber I, q. 27, ll. 55-59 with the apparatus fontium.

Sources Nicomachean Ethics

Questiones, Liber I, q. 23, ll. 32-42

Si enim nichil indigerent … vel non eadem indigencia que puta propter commutacionem necessitatis nummisma factum est secundum composicionem … (AL XXVI.1-4.4, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 463, ll. 12-15) Pro futura autem commutacione si nunc nichil indiget, quoniam erit si indigeat nummisma, fideiussor est nobis … (ibid., p. 464, ll. 1-2)

Et talis est pecunia uel denarius, qui secundum rationem suam propriam ad talem est institutus, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum: condixerunt enim communiter homines ut afferenti denarium detur quo indiget, propter quod et communis fideiussor dicitur, uel est mensura communis omnium commutabilium. Et in isto denario habet istantiam dicta propositio. Tamen, si isto modo accipiatur ut dictum est hec propositio, instantia locum non habebit, eo quod denarius in sustentationem nature per se non ordinatur. Est tamen intelligendum quod, saltim per accidens, potest denarii esse secundus usus, qui fit quando alicui traditur in pignore: hoc enim est ei propter ualorem materie, non inquantum denarius est.

209 Aquinas

… est enim condictum inter homines quod afferenti denarium detur id quo indigent (Thomas, Sent. Ethic. V, cap. 9, ed. Leon. XLVII/2, p. 295, ll. 69-71)

pecunie autem e conuerso principalis usus est commutatio, propter hanc enim pecunia facta est; secundarius autem usus pecunie potest esse quicumque alius, puta quod ponatur in pignore uel quod ostentetur. (Questiones disputate de malo, q. 13, art. 4, ad 15, ed. Leon. XXIII, p. 257, ll. 407-411)

This sample also provides further evidence that the Questiones cannot be a simple oral derived text, unless we assume that Peter learnt this part of Aquinas’ Ethics commentary by heart. It seems plausible that, before the oral lecture (and even more so during the revision of the reportatio), Peter consulted a work of Aquinas and painstakingly sought out a passage that could be of help regarding the question he was going to address or, even more plausibly, that he prepared lecture notes which included excerpts from Aquinas related to the topic under discussion.70 One example of this procedure can be found in q. 30 of Book I of the Questiones (= q. 28 of B). In this question, as to whether the virtue of the master and that of the slave are of the same nature, Peter argues that, although two habits/virtues can be related to the same end—in this case, the household—they may differ on account of the way in which they tend to such an end. To illustrate this, Peter gives the example of two sciences which study the same subject but in different ways: both the natural philosopher and the astronomer prove that the earth is round, though the former proves it by demonstrating that the earth is the centre towards which the 70  It cannot come as a surprise that Peter prepared his lectures in advance. More than once in B it is clear that Peter draws on Aquinas (and even on Giles of Rome) and not directly on the Politics. See, for instance, Liber II, q. 2, ll. 9 and 35-36, and Liber II, q. 4, ll. 34-35 with the apparatus fontium.

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heavy bodies tend, while the latter does so through the relation of the earth to the stars.71 The argument that two sciences considering the same subject are different because each studies it in a different way is derived from Physics II.3, but the use of this argument within a discussion of the differentiation of moral habits is found in Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 2, ad 2. It is thus likely that Peter read this article of the Summa before preparing his question. It is truly remarkable that Peter did not merely consult the Summa theologiae. Other passages of the Questiones bear great resemblance to others of Aquinas’ works. For instance, the reply to the second argument in q. 5 of Book I is very similar to a passage from the Quaestiones disputatae de malo (even though the same passage is also found in Aquinas’ Sentences commentary and in the Summa contra Gentiles, making it impossible to establish with certainty from which of these works Peter took the idea).72 Moreover, the beginning of the solutio of Book VI, q. 8, on whether there must be a main office in the political community, is taken from the Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 7, art. 2, ad 10.73 As noted above, Peter used the Liber de causis through Aquinas’ commentary on that work, and the same holds for Peter’s reading of the corpus Aristotelicum: of course, Peter accessed the works of Aristotle directly, but, on some occasions, he did it with the help of Aquinas’ Aristotelian commentaries. A case in point can be seen in q. 12 of Book I, where Peter quotes Metaphysics VII.7, more specifically the passage in which Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of wholes, one like a heap and another in which the whole—say a syllable—consists of something more than its elements (i.e., the letters), as there is a principle in it that binds the whole together. As an example of the first kind of whole, Peter gives an aggregation of humans, this same example being found in Aquinas’ explanation of this passage of the Metaphysics.74 The most curious instance of Peter’s use of Aquinas’ commentaries is found in Book III, q. 5, ad 2, where he makes a long digression on the notion of radical moisture. This digression is much longer than the solutio: ninety-eight lines against twenty-two, which demonstrates that, for Peter, the discussion of radical moisture is more important than the question itself. In the argument contra, Peter compares the city with an animal, but, in the reply to the argument, he invalidates such a comparison, reasoning that, while an animal has the same form for its entire life, a city has neither an immutable form—the form of government may change—nor do the citizens remain the same numerically, since some die and others are born. The comparison (along with some of the arguments advanced) is taken from Aquinas’ commentary on the On generation and corruption, where he makes that compari-

71 

Liber I, q. 30, ll. 34-37. Cf. Liber I, q. 5, ll. 53-57 with the apparatus fontium. 73  Cf. Liber VI, q. 8, ll. 8-16 with the apparatus fontium. 74  Cf. Liber I, q. 12, ll. 18-19 with the apparatus fontium. 72 

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son, stating that the people within the city do not remain the same.75 It is clear that Peter checked Aquinas’ commentary before he composed this question and used it in a context completely alien to the On generation and corruption. The entire corpus Thomisticum was thus, for Peter, a sort of container out of which he took ideas and lines of reasoning (irrespective of the context in which Aquinas had elaborated them). It is in this sense that we might use Ptolemy of Lucca’s words, that Peter was a fidelissimus discipulus of Aquinas. The great outlier to this overall picture is the lack of any trace of the De regno in the Questiones. If the De regno influenced the Questiones, this happened most probably by means of Giles’ De regimine principum. This seems to be the case of the arguments in favour of monarchy as the best form of government and of tyranny as the worst regime of all.76 Unlike the De regimine, the De regno does not follow the structure of the Politics in any of its sections and does not have chapters corresponding to specific chapters of the Politics. It adopts on occasion a moralising and exhortatory tone—for instance, in the second part of Book I—and its sources go far beyond the philosophical ones used extensively by Peter and Giles: the Bible most of all, but also Sallust and Cicero. For all these reasons, the De regno would have appeared useless to Peter as a source for a work intended to establish the contents of the science of politics, and all the more when he had at his disposal a work such as the De regimine.

6. Previous Commentaries on the Politics Apart from the Scriptum, the only two commentaries that precede the Questiones (or at least that have come down to us) are the commentaries by Albert and Aquinas, the two major Aristotelian commentators of the thirteenth century. It would have been extremely strange if Peter had not taken ideas from them, but the ways in which he drew on each one of the two works are completely different.

6.1. Albert the Great Compared with Aquinas, Albert’s presence in the Questiones is negligible (as it is in the entire commentary tradition on the Politics). In Chapter 1, section 1.15, I pointed out the dependence of Peter on Albert’s interpretation of Politics VII.7, more specifically how Peter follows Albert in using notions such as spiritus and complexio to explain the influence of the climate on men’s mores. It is worth recalling it here, for it epitomises how Albert’s commentary was used in the Questiones (as well as in the commentary tradition on the Politics): Albert’s commentary is rarely used by the commentators, and, when it is, this is mostly due to Albert’s views on topics 75 

Cf. Liber III, q. 5, ll. 38-139 with the apparatus fontium. See Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere tres rationes”, pp. 296-297, 308-313; Id., “La monarchia prima della Monarchia”, pp. 55-56; Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 321-324. 76 

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related to natural philosophy and, even more so, to his explanations of etymologies and historical events mentioned in the Politics rather than to his interpretation of Aristotle’s views. It is instead Albert’s first commentary on the Ethics (i.e., the Super Ethica) that the commentators on the Politics quote when they seek out more substantial views in the domain of practical philosophy.77 The impact of Albert’s commentary on the Politics was undoubtedly limited. This is because, on many occasions in his commentary Albert limits himself to mere paraphrasing of the Politics; he quite often misses the point of Aristotle’s remarks and tends to linger over details of erudition at the expenses of the philosophical interpretation of the text.78 Even so, Albert’s commentary was read. It was used silently in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum79 and in William of Sarzano’s De excellentia principatus monarchici et Regalis,80 and, when it comes to commentators on the Politics, Oresme in the fourteenth century, Peter of Osma–Ferdinand of Roa and Peter of Castrobol in the second half of the fifteenth century all drew on Albert, even though Oresme (who quotes Albert by name) and Osma–Roa were rather critical of his views.81 One can also point out the Cracow professor, Paul of Worczyn, who, in 1416, produced a short commentary on the first two books of the Politics which drew deeply on Albert’s commentary.82 The cases of Osma–Roa, Castrobol and Paul of Worczyn are significant, for they were all active in the fifteenth century. An examination of the list made by Winfried Fauser of the thirteen manuscripts containing Albert’s commentary in its entirety draws immediate attention to the fact that more than half, that is, seven manuscripts, are dated to the fifteenth century and one to the sixteenth.83 This 77  See, for instance, the Anonymous of Milan (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 2rb), Liber I, q. 2: “… secundum Albertum multe artes sunt cauende et expellende a ciuitatibus, sicut lenocinium et taxillatoria, et sic de multis aliis; ideo et cetera. Item, illud quod est malum non ordinatur ad bonum; sed alique communicationes humane sunt huiusmodi secundum Albertum, 1º Ethicorum; ideo et cetera”. This is a reference to Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones, I.2, I.11. The first question of Book I of the commentary on the Politics published under Versor’s name depends in part on the first chapter of the Super Ethica, though, for the most part, it is based on Aquinas’ commentary on the Ethics and on Giles of Rome’s De regimine; cf. Questiones … Iohannis Versoris, ff. 1ra-2rb. 78  On this, see Fioravanti, “Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum”. 79  See Lambertini, “Peter of Auvergne, Giles of Rome, pp. 57-61. Lambertini defines Giles’ use of Albert as “parsimonious” (p. 57). 80  Cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 301-302. On this author’s use of the Politics, see Lambertini, “I Frati Minori e la Politica di Aristotele, pp. 407-423. 81  See Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme”, p. 26, who notes that Oresme “cites Albertus Magnus’ commentary forty-five times, almost always to reject its purport”. See also Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 260, 277-306. 82  It is published in Paulus de Worczyn, Glossa in Politicam, ed. Wanda Bajor (Warszawa: National Centre for Culture, 2016). 83  Winfried Fauser, Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in ihrer Handschriftlichen Überlieferung. Teil I: Die Echten Werke. Codices manuscripti operum Alberti Magni. Pars I: Opera genuina (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1982), pp. 184-186.

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somewhat bears out the late circulation of his commentary, which chimes with the more frequent references to it found in the commentaries of Osma–Roa, Castrobol and Paul of Worczyn. It is true that Albert’s commentary is preserved in one manuscript from the late thirteenth century and two from the early fourteenth century, and, what is more, two of these three manuscripts bear signs of pecia, thus denoting circulation within the University of Paris.84 If, however, we compare these figures with those of Peter of Auvergne’s Scriptum, the far greater diffusion of the Scriptum with respect to Albert’s text is manifest. The manuscript transmission of Peter’s commentary on Books III-VIII was different from the transmission of Aquinas’ commentary on Books I-III in some respects.85 The Scriptum appears in twenty-two manuscripts: three from the late thirteenth century; ten from the fourteenth century; and ten from the fifteenth. That said, four out of the ten fourteenth-century manuscripts are dated from the early decades of the century, such that, if we concentrate on the first stages of the spread of Albert’s and Peter’s commentaries, the figures favour Peter’s Scriptum even more: seven manuscripts as against three of Albert’s commentary. Moreover, three manuscripts of the Scriptum bear signs of pecia, and another manuscript is the origin of the exemplar of the University of Paris, from which all the manuscripts are derived.86 Albert’s commentary is definitely far from being one of the most relevant works in the commentary tradition on the Politics. Peter was certainly familiar with it, and, apart from the interpretation of Politics VII.7, on at least two points in the Questiones, he drew on Albert’s commentary—but, in these cases, the use is not relevant from a doctrinal point of view. In the first passage,87 Peter uses Albert to embellish the text, and this is significant because later commentators used Albert in the exact same way.88 In the second passage, Peter takes from Albert the view 84  The thirteenth-century manuscript is Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 723. The fourteenth-century codices are Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Lat. 879 and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6457. The manuscripts in Vatican and Paris contain marks of pecia. 85  See the introduction to Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. xxiv-xxvii. 86  Ibid., pp. xxvii-lxvii. 87  Cf. Liber I, q. 29, ll. 16-18 (with the apparatus fontium): “Etiam Plato in 2º Thimei dicit quod creator nulli creature denegauit per quod potest in beatitudinem ordinari, nec seruo uirtutem que ordinat in felicitatem”. See also the next note. 88  A striking case in point is the Anonymous of Milan, who often uses Albert as a repository of quotations and etymologies. This author quotes Albert more often than Peter does and, unlike Peter, mentions Albert by name: “… aliud est quod ad legem pertinet per accidens, sicut exerceri circa legem et coercere subditos propter eorum malitiam, sicut dicit Albertus auctoritate Platonis. Vnde, dicit, sic ait Plato quod, licet (ex add.) coatiuam uirtutem habeat ad malos, tamen totalis legis intentio est beatos efficere ciues, quod sine uirtutum actu fieri non potest” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100. inf., f. 14vb, Liber II, q. 17; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, II.7, p. 160); “politia aligarchica (sic) que secundum Albertum dicitur ab olon, quod est paucum, et archos, quod est principatus, quasi principatus in quo pauci propter diuitias suas finaliter ordinantur” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 25ra, Liber III, q. 11; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, II.3, p. 128); “… sicut dicit Albertus in 4º huius, in Ecclesiastico dicitur noli fieri princeps nisi uirtute et potentia ualens prorupere in correctionem subditorum” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 30rb, Liber

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that different animals seek different kinds of food according to their complexio, a view more related to natural than to practical philosophy.89 It is also possible that Peter took some ideas from Albert. As noted earlier in Chapter 1, section 1.2, Albert was the first commentator to employ hylomorphism in the explanation of the Politics, and Peter might have taken the inspiration to use it from Albert. A more probable instance of Peter’s dependence on Albert has, however, to do with the use of the category of ‘relative’ within the discussion of slavery—in q. 11 of Book I, Peter argues that the slave and the master are so called given that they are relative one to the other. Although Peter might have recalled a similar passage in the Categories (6b28-30 and 7a28-b7), it is true that Albert states this same idea in the first book of his commentary.90 Finally, the idea that some men may live withdrawn from the political community to devote themselves to philosophical speculation appears first in Albert’s commentary, but, in this case, it is more difficult to ascertain whether Peter really took it from Albert, as Peter might have taken this suggestion from Aquinas or Giles of Rome.91 Albert’s commentary was clearly a less important source for Peter, and, in the remainder of the III, q. 16; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, III.10, p. 303); “Item, sicut est in principatu naturali, sic est in principatu politico, quia ars imitatur naturam inquantum potest, ut apparet 2º Phisicorum; et Albertus in 2º huius dicit, auctoritate Tulli, quod ordo politie est sicut ordo partium animalis perfecti et maxime hominum. Modo sic est in principatu naturali et in regimine totius uniuersi, quod omnia uno maxime et conuenientissime reguntur” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 34vb, Liber III, q. 21; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, II.3, pp. 122-123); “… et Albertus etiam hic addit quod Nabugodonosor amisit regnum suum quia … credidit adulatoribus quod precepit se adorari tanquam deum, et propter hoc Deus fecit per septennium (cod.: septinnum) nihil comedere nisi fenum, ut dicit Albertus” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 37rb, Liber IV, q. 4; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, IV.4, p. 345). See also Liber I, q. 22, where the Milan commentator quotes the same passage as Peter (see previous note herein), but, unlike Peter, attributes it to Albert: “Et Albertus dicit quod Plato in Thymeo, in secunda parte Thymei, vult quod creator omnium nulli negavit illud per quod potest attingere finem suum et felicitatem suam” (Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.246; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, I.9, p. 77). Nicholas of Vaudémont also mentions Albert by name, and he is also a relevant case of how Albert was used, since his references to Albert bear no relationship to views on political subjects. See, for instance, Buridanus, Quaestiones, Liber I, q. 8, f. 11rb: “… arguitur auctoritate Alberti dicentis quod monstrum in corpore est monstrum in anima” (on this citation, which is found in various of Albert’s works, see Köhler, “Homo animal nobilissimum”, I.401402). In other cases, the references seem to be to Albert’s commentary on the Ethics; cf., for instance, Buridanus, Quaestiones, Liber II, q. 14, f. 22va; Liber III, q. 18, f. 43va; Liber IV, q. 5, f. 53vb, Liber IV, q. 14, f. 59ra; Liber IV, q. 20, f. 63ra. Finally, the Anonymous of Baltimore quotes Albert explicitly, but then again on a point related to natural philosophy: “Item, uidemus quod robustus in brachiis generat fortem in brachiis, sicut fabri et robusti in cruribus robustum in cruribus, sicut fulones, ut patet 4º De generatione animalium, et hoc tractat diffuse Albertus” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 2a). 89  Cf. Liber I, q. 19, ll. 35-36 with the apparatus fontium for the text of Albert. 90  Cf. Liber I, q. 11, ll. 27-31 with the apparatus fontium for the text of Albert. 91  Cf. Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 123-124, 142-144; Christian Kaiser, “Omnis civitas natura est (Politics I.2): Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas Commenting on the Naturalness of the Political Community”, in D. Carron–M. Lutz-Bachmann–A. Spindler–M. Toste (eds.), Von Natur und Herrschaft: “Natura” und “Dominium” in der politischen Theorie des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2018), pp. 93-122.

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Questiones, there is almost no trace of Albert’s commentary. It is, however, relevant to underline the scant presence of Albert in the Questiones, since the Questiones establishes a trend that was followed in the successive commentaries.

6.2. Aquinas The presence of Aquinas’ commentary in the Questiones is never explicit, and, even though it is of primary importance for the Questiones, it never equals the importance it has in q. 8 of Book I of B, since, there, the solutio is based entirely on the parallel passage of Aquinas’ commentary.92 What is more, it does not hold the same weight as the Summa theologiae for the Questiones. The impact of Aquinas’ commentary on the Questiones is limited for two simple reasons: first, it ends at the beginning of Book III; second, it is a literal commentary. By contrast, the Summa has the same structure as the Questiones, that is, it is arranged into questions with arguments pro and con. This made it easy to reproduce its arguments in a commentary in question form. For Peter, Aquinas’ commentary has one main function: it serves as a guide to interpreting the Politics. The Prohemium of the Questiones draws heavily on the prologue of Aquinas’ commentary, which comes as no surprise given that the same happens in some of Peter’s other commentaries: Peter’s prologues to his commentaries on the Metaphysics, Ethics and Sense and Sensibilia are based on Aquinas’ prologues to the same works.93 However, for the remainder of the Questiones, the influence of Aquinas’ commentary remains at a lower, albeit crucial, level. Peter takes from Aquinas’ commentary details, references and small hints, which can make for a clearer explanation of the Politics in addition to making his argument smoother. Albert’s commentary could not have served this function. A telling case of this procedure is found in q. 11 of Book I. Aristotle’s statement that a slave, just like any other possession, is said to be not only a part of his owner, but wholly belonging to him (I.4, 1254a9-12), is explained by Aquinas with the help of an analogy, namely that the slave is to his master as a hand to a man, for the hand is said to be not merely part of a man, but completely belongs to his person as a whole. This same analogy is reproduced in the Questiones.94 Further examples of this procedure are found in Book I, q. 7, where Peter makes a literal citation of Aristotle’s On the soul to corroborate Politics I.1, 1252b30, even though the idea contained in the On the soul is already suggested by Aquinas, and any medieval reader would have recognised

92 

See Chapter 3, above. Cf. Arthur Monahan, “The Subject of Metaphysics for Peter of Auvergne”, Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954), pp. 118-130, at 122; Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 6-7, 32-34; Kevin White, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Prologue to Peter of Auvergne’s Quaestiones super De sensu et sensato”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 1 (1990), pp. 427-456. 94  Cf. Liber I, q. 11, ll. 20-25 with the apparatus fontium for the text of Aquinas. 93 

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that Aquinas was implicitly drawing on the On the soul;95 in q. 24 of Book I, where Peter refers to the fifth book of the Ethics, though his source is actually Aquinas,96 and in Book II, q. 19, where he mentions the Problems, but such a reference is taken either from Albert’s or from Aquinas’ commentary.97 By times, Aquinas’ commentary acquires more importance in the Questiones than the Politics itself. On such occasions, when Peter refers to Aristotle, his source is actually Aquinas. This is evident in Book II, q. 4, where Peter quotes the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics, although his source is Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics: Aristotle

Questiones, II, q. 4, ll. 51-59

Aquinas, II, cap. 3

Politics, II.4, 1262b17-18: Sicut enim modicum dulce in multam aquam mixtum insensibilem facit mixtionem … (ed. Susemihl, p. 70, ll. 8-9)

Et ideo, sicut gutta mellis infusa multitudini aque saltim perdit uigorem saporis, sic amicitia ad plures distincta, ut dicit Philosophus in hoc 2º … Sed ex parte filiorum etiam alia causa est, quia ad dilectionem facit multum notitia moris, que non fit sine longa conuersatione et etiam certitudo, propter quod et matres magis diligunt filios et precipue primogenitos, quia diutius cum istis conuersate sunt et quia magis certe sunt, ut dicitur 9º Ethicorum.

… sicut cum parum de melle imponitur in multa aqua, nichil sentitur de dulcedine mellis …

Eth. Nic., IX.7, 1168a24-26: Propter hoc autem et matres amatrices magis filiorum; laboriosior enim generacio, et magis sciunt quam ipsarum. (ed. AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 554, ll. 2-4)

sicut uidemus quod etiam parentes magis diligunt filios unigenitos quam si multos habeant, quasi amor diminuatur per communicationem ad multos. (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A129, ll. 137-140 and ll. 157-160)

On some occasions, Peter prefers following Aquinas’ interpretation to the Politics, even though Aquinas is mistaken. This occurs in Book II, q. 17 of the Questiones. The Politics contains the following text: “ferrum enim portabant tunc Graeci et uxores emebant ab invicem”, that is, the Ancient Greeks “went about armed and bought their brides from each other”.98 Aquinas explains this passage stating that the Greeks bought their brides from each other carrying iron to the act of purchasing the brides, “perhaps because other metals were not in use”.99 Following on from him, Peter states that, in olden times, people used to buy brides with iron.100

95 

Cf. Liber I, q. 7, ll. 52-57 with the apparatus fontium for the reference to Aquinas. Cf. Liber I, q. 24, ll. 25-26 with the apparatus fontium. 97  Cf. Liber II, q. 19, l. 7 with the apparatus fontium. 98  Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, p. 112, ll. 8-9 (1268b40-41). For the English text, see Aristotle, The Politics, p. 49. 99  Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, II.3, p. A160, ll. 67-69. For the English text, see Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Politics”, translated by Richard J. Regan (Indianapolis–Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), p. 142. 100  Cf. Liber II, q. 17, ll. 9-10. 96 

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However, we risk missing the importance of Aquinas’ commentary in the Questiones (and in the commentary tradition on the Politics) if we highlight only the specific passages in which Peter drew on Aquinas. Aquinas’ commentary stands out in part for its clarity and succinctness, but principally for the way in which its author makes the text of the Politics intelligible. It thus became the means of accessing the Politics, and it was on this basis that Peter used it. In other words, the influence of Aquinas’ commentary pervades the first two books of the Questiones in a manner completely different from all the other sources Peter draws on from Proclus to Albert the Great. Aquinas’ commentary is, on some points, the foundation on which Peter builds the Questiones. A case in point is found in qq. 10 and 11 of Book I, that is, the first two questions dealing with slavery.101 Aristotle introduces this matter in Politics I.4, where he attempts to give definitions of ‘slave’ and ‘possession’. Commenting on this chapter, Aquinas ends his explanation with a paragraph in which he systematises Aristotle’s ideas, listing the five characteristics the slave has: Vnde potest talis diffinitio serui concludi: seruus est organum animatum actiuum separatum alterius homo existens. In qua quidem diffinitione organum ponitur tamquam genus; et adduntur quinque differentie. Per hoc enim quod dicitur ‘animatum’, distinguitur ab instrumentis inanimatis; per hoc autem quod dicitur ‘actiuum’ distinguitur a ministro artificis, qui est organum animatum factiuum; per hoc autem quod dicitur ‘alterius existens’ distinguitur a libero, qui quandoque ministrat in domo, non sicut res possessa sed sponte uel mercede conductus; per hoc autem quod dicitur ‘separatum’ distinguitur a parte que est alterius non separata, sicut manus; per hoc quod dicitur ‘homo existens’ distinguitur a brutis animalibus que sunt res possesse separate.102

This list is almost perfectly mirrored in the structure of q. 10 of Book I of the Questiones, where the solutio is arranged into four argumentative steps which successively begin as follows: “Dicendum quod seruus est oganum domini”, “­V lterius est aduertendum quod est organum animatum”, “Seruus est organum separatum” and “Vlterius est organum actiuum”. As to “alterius existens”, it is the subject of q. 11: utrum seruus, id quod est, domini sit. This does not diminish the originality of the Questiones, for the way in which Peter defines each of the five characteristics listed by Aquinas is unique to the Questiones. It does, however, tell us that Aquinas’ commentary is the work that shaped the reading of the first books of the Politics in the Middle Ages.

7.

Giles of Rome

An examination of the impact of Giles’ ideas on the commentaries produced in the Arts Faculty is still to be carried out. There is evidence, however, that the De

101  Question 8, as to whether a woman is a slave, also deals with slavery, but, there, the focus is on the role of the woman in the household and on how she differs from a slave. 102  Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, I.2, p. A84, ll. 216-231.

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regimine principum was used in Radulphus Brito’s Ethics commentary103 and in fifteenth-century commentaries on the Politics, namely those by Versor (?) and Osma–Roa.104 In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that Peter took the titles of some questions of Books I-III from the De regimine principum, which makes him one of the first (if not the first) author(s) to have used the De regimine in the context of the Arts Faculty of Paris. Moreover, in Chapter 1, section 2.9, I demonstrated that Peter extracted from the De regimine some arguments for the question as to whether the ruler should accede by virtue of hereditary succession or as a result of election. That said, I have also stressed that, while Peter took inspiration from Giles to raise his questions on the Politics, he advanced his own arguments, often not identical to those of Giles, and this even when both authors shared the same point of view (see, for instance, Chapter 1, section 2.8). The question is, therefore, to what extent Peter drew on Giles. As seen in Chapter 2, Peter made use of Giles’ commentary on the De causis on at least one occasion. Another passage from the same work presents an argument very similar to what Peter maintains in Book I, q. 2 and Book V, q. 5, namely that the legislator (the ruler in Peter’s text) must induce the community to peace and unity, but not so much unity that it suppresses the differences among the citizens with respect to merit and to what each deserves.105 In this case, however, it is more difficult to ascertain whether Peter took the idea from Giles, or whether they both follow the same line of reasoning, since the topos that the ruler leads the community to peace and unity is also found in Aquinas’ De regno, and the idea of distributive justice is obviously Aristotelian common ground. Peter also makes use of Giles’ commentary on the Rhetoric. This happens in q. 4 of Book VI, where Peter deals with the definition of pleasure supplied by Aristotle in the Rhetoric and implicitly refers to Giles (“uno modo … exponitur”),106 but this is as far as Peter goes in references to Giles. When it comes to the De regimine, the situation is more complex. Roberto Lambertini, who compared three questions of the Questiones with three parallel chapters of the De regimine, demonstrated that, while, in two cases, there is a striking

103 

Cf. Gauthier, “Trois commentaires”, pp. 214, 219, 324 (n. 1); Costa, Le “questiones”, p. 142. For Versor (?), see Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 157-158. For Peter of Osma, see Lanza, “The Scriptum super III-VIII libros Politicorum: Some Episodes”, pp. 302-305. 105  Aegidius Romanus, Opus super authorem De causis, f. 70r: “Notandum autem quod intentio legislatoris debet esse inducere politiam ad vnitatem et pacem, numquam autem est tanta vnitas in politia nec tanta pax sicut si legislator, quantum est de se, se habeat ad omnes uniformiter. Diuersitas autem fit (ed.: sit) solum ex parte ciuium, vt quod illi qui sunt maioris meriti et qui plus laborant pro republica, plus honorentur. Si ergo legislator, quantum est de se, uniformiter se habet et solum respicit ad diuersitatem ciuium et prout videt eos maioris vel minoris meriti, sic magis vel minus eos honorat, tunc tale regimen est valde decorum, qui tunc ibi nulla est tortuositas neque ulla obliquitas, sed cuilibet prouidetur secundum suum meritum”. 106  Cf. Liber VI, q. 4, ll. 19-37 with the apparatus fontium. 104 

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similarity, in the third case this is not so.107 Lambertini thus prefers to speak of “family resemblances” between the two works. This family resemblance is also strengthened by the fact that the two works draw on Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics. Peter clearly drew on Giles in some questions. For instance, in Book I, q. 15, on whether one who possesses an abundance of a good is naturally the master of one who is deficient in that good, Peter centres the discussion around the distinction between goods of the soul and bodily goods, the former being called goods simpli­ citer and the latter secundum quid. Although such a distinction was widely quoted in scholastic texts,108 it is in the De regimine that this distinction is advanced within the discussion on natural slavery (just as it is in the Questiones).109 Moreover, in q. 26 of Book III, which asks whether it is better for the community to be ruled by one or by many, the arguments in favour of monarchy are nearly identical in the two works, and both quote Proclus’ proposition that omnis multitudo secunda est ab uno.110 Even so, in other questions, such as those in which he examines Plato’s communism, Peter tends not to borrow many arguments from Giles. This can perhaps be explained by considering the approach each author took: the different readerships of the two works notwithstanding—university for the Questiones and a courtly and learned milieu in the case of the De regimine—Peter lays out his questions with numerous references to philosophical notions, takes lines of reasoning principally from Aristotle (at least explicitly) and strives to substantiate everything on philosophical grounds.111 By contrast, Giles often makes references to what happens in reality, that is, to ‘practical experience’, and on occasion quotes Valerius Maximus and examples from his historical reality.112 References to practical experience are not very common in the Questiones, and there is no trace of Valerius Maximus; this is arguably because Peter was more interested in producing a ‘scientific’ work, that is, one that would meet the criterion of science as it is presented in the Posterior Analytics, and so be as universal as possible.113

107  Lambertini has compared the questions I have dealt with in Chapter 1, sections 2.8 and 2.9, along with q. 7 of Book II of the Questiones; cf. Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere”, pp. 299-304. 108  Cf. Liber I, q. 15, ll. 22-25 with the apparatus fontium. 109  Cf. Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, II/3.14, pp. 383-384. 110  Cf. Liber III, q. 26, l. 40; Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/2.3, p. 457. 111  Just for the sake of illustration: throughout the entire De regimine, Giles explicitly quotes Aristotle’s Physics six times and the Metaphysics on eleven occasions. The Questiones contains twenty-two explicit references to the Physics and sixteen to the Metaphysics, just in the first book. 112  See, for instance, the reference to what typically happens with brothers who fight over their inheritance as an argument against Plato’s communism (ibid., III/1.11, p. 429) or the reference to Italian cities (III/2.2., p. 455). For citations of Valerius Maximus, see ibid., II/1.8, p. 241; II/1.19, p. 273; II/I.21, p. 279; III/II.17, p. 499. 113  Giles, instead, was not interested in a ‘scientific’ approach. On this, see Lanza, “La Politica di Aristotele e il De regimine principum”, pp. 277, n. 99 and 283-292.

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Perhaps nowhere is the difference between Peter’s and Giles’ approaches more evident than in q. 12 of Book I, which corresponds to De regimine II/3.13. Giles explains Aristotle’s idea that some men are naturally inclined to rule while others to obey by drawing four comparisons: 1) in a choir and in a mixed body there is always a predominant voice and a ruling element: 2) just like the body obeys the soul, men with lesser intellectual ability ought to be commanded by wiser men; 3) the same idea is reiterated by making an analogy of man and animals, which are tamed by man and 4) by mentioning the hierarchical relationship between man and woman.114 Giles draws here on Aquinas’ Politics commentary, and his text is straightforward, not to say shallow; it is clearly directed at a wider audience. By contrast, Peter sets forth an entire reasoning, framed completely in metaphysical terms, to explain that in certain kinds of whole, there must always be a ruling and a subject element, that is, an element that represents actuality (and form) and another that embodies potentiality (and matter). Commenting on the Politics, Peter wants to display his wider knowledge of Aristotle and to explain the Politics strictly philosophically—or, in other words, he also aims to emerge as an authoritative Aristotelian commentator—and, for that purpose, it is doubtful that the De regimine would have been of assistance. The De regimine was indeed a major source for Peter, but, as we shall see in the next chapter, this holds true principally for the selection of the passages of the Politics that were worth being explained, and, for this reason, some questions of the Questiones find a correspondent in chapters of the De regimine.

8. Henry of Ghent That Henry of Ghent might have influenced Peter’s metaphysics, more specifically his views on individuation and on the subject of metaphysics, has long been acknowledged in the literature.115 This led to Peter being viewed as a disciple of Henry, though this view has since been discarded, and, more recently, William Courtenay has suggested that Peter studied under Peter of Limoges at the faculty of theology, and not as a student of Henry.116 Be that as it may, in the Questiones, 114 

Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, II/3.13, pp. 380-382. Cf. chiefly Hocedez, “Une question inédite”; Martin Pickavé, Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft: Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2007), especially pp. 115-118. Given the uncertainty regarding the date of Peter’s Metaphysics commentary, Pickavé is cautious and avoids speaking of influence of Henry on Peter; cf. ibid., p. 116, n. 112. The similarity between Henry’s and Peter’s discussions of the subject matter of metaphysics is extended to Peter’s discussion of the subject matter of politics, since certain lines of reasoning found in the opening questions of the Questiones bear some resemblance to Peter’s Metaphysics commentary and thus to Henry’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. 116  Cf. Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne”, pp. 22-23. Courtenay’s claim, however, requires further research. In any case, given the output of Peter of Limoges, it is difficult to ascertain what influence he might have had on Peter of Auvergne. At least on the topic of whether it is possible to determine the date of the Antichrist’s coming, the two authors had contrasting positions. 115 

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Peter derived some ideas from Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta and possibly from his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. As noted in Chapter 2, section 3.1, at least on two occasions Peter seems to criticise Henry. Nonetheless, the occasions on which he makes use of Henry’s ideas are more numerous. Peter was, however, very selective in what he took from Henry. For instance, commenting on Book II, he did not draw on Henry regarding the question on whether property should be held in common, discussed by Henry in q. 20 of his fourth Quodlibet, and regarding the topic of the relationship between private and common good, addressed by Henry in q. 19 of Quodlibet IX.117 By contrast, Peter clearly relied on Henry on three occasions. First, in Book I, q. 27, on the validity of currency exchange (campsoria), Peter comes close to Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet VI, q. 22 (utrum commutatio campsoria sit licita), discussed in 1281 or 1282.118 The two texts share, with very similar wording, the first argument contra and even more so the core of the solutio: both texts stress the need for the preservation of equality in currency exchange—speaking absolutely, one cannot receive more than one gives, though this may happen on account of the work (labor) involved in the activity of currency exchange—and both texts draw the distinction between substantia rei and valor (usus humanus and usus communis, in Peter), conceding that the latter may be more relevant in economic terms. While Aquinas’ Ethics commentary is also a source for Peter in this question, the main source appears to be Henry’s quodlibetal question. Comparison of Peter’s question with another quodlibetal question with a similar title,119 authored by Servais of Guez (or of Mont Saint Eloi) in the 1280s,120 shows that Servais was not a source for Peter. Servais dedicates most of his question to usury at the expense of currency exchange and himself draws on Henry, using the same example of Paris and Tours to illustrate how money exchange occurs. Second, in the question immediately after, i.e., q. 28 of Book I, on usury, Peter presents the arguments in a different order, but the solutio is based completely on Henry’s Quodlibet I, q. 39. Peter might have also looked at Summa theologiae, IIa-­ IIae, q. 78, art. 1, but the use of the distinctions per se/per accidens and substantia rei/usus leaves no doubt as to which his source was. It cannot be excluded either that Peter used the De regimine principum in this question, since Giles based his 117  This second case is remarkable, because the Anonymous of Milan apparently draws on Henry when dealing with the question of how the private individual good relates to the common good; cf. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., ff. 11vb-12rb (utrum magis homo debeat curare de proprio quam de communi). I discuss this question in chapter 3 of the monograph I am currently preparing. 118  Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet VI, ed. Gordon A. Wilson, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia X (Leuven–Leiden: Leuven University Press–E.J. Brill, 1987), q. 22, pp. 203-210. 119  Cf. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15350, ff. 274vb-275ra (utrum campsoria sit licita). 120  On the Quodlibet of this author, see Thomas Sullivan, “The Quodlibeta of the Canons Regular and the Monks”, in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 359-400, at 363-369 and the bibliography quoted there.

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chapter on usury on Henry’s question, and, at least in one case, Peter’s wording is closer to Giles than to Henry.121 Even so, Giles does not employ the expressions per se and per accidens, and, what is more, Peter illustrates the case of a thing in which ownership and use are distinct with the example of a horse, which is also one of the instances mentioned by Henry.122 Third, within the set of four questions which Peter devotes to the topic of nobility of birth at the end of Book IV, q. 13 (utrum nobilitas ab ignobili incipiat) and q. 14 (utrum nobilitas quanto magis protenditur sit maior) find a correspondent in Henry’s Quodlibet IX, q. 18 (utrum nobilitas generis ab initio processerit ab ignobili).123 It could be expected that Peter might have drawn on Giles’ De regimine, since, Giles, like Peter (and Henry), distinguishes between a nobility of birth and a moral nobility stemming from good deeds.124 However, unlike Peter and Henry, Giles does not ground nobility of birth on bodily ‘material dispositions’ which are passed from parents to children. Henry of Ghent is Peter’s source, since Peter’s main tenets on nobility are already present in Henry, namely that nobility of birth is a virtue stemming from ‘material dispositions’ transmitted through numerous generations, though Peter adds, with great emphasis, that such dispositions are influenced by the movements of the stars. Moreover, Henry’s view that, while nobility may have an ignoble principle, there must have been a first nobleman who was so insofar as he morally surpassed the other men, is endorsed in q. 13, and his point that the older a family of noble stock is, the nobler it will be and, therefore, the children of a noble family are nobler than their parents since their antiquity is greater than that of their parents, is repeated by Peter in q. 14.125 Neither of these three questions is central for Peter’s interpretation of the Politics. They are important for another crucial reason. If seen together with Peter’s use of Giles’ commentary on the De causis and with what was said earlier in section 4 of this chapter, they reveal two of Peter’s features while preparing his lectures: first, seeking to obtain ideas from authoritative sources, such as Aquinas, Giles and Henry, to use them, sometimes in totally different contexts from those in which they had been stated; second, attempting to obtain fresh material for his lectures so that they would be up to date. In doing so, Peter was just following the same path as his fellow masters of arts Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia.

121 

See the apparatus fontium of ll. 28-31. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, ed. Raymond Macken, in Henricus de Gandavo Opera omnia V (Leuven–Leiden: Leuven University Press–E.J. Brill, 1979), q. 39, p. 212, l. 70. 123 Id., Quodlibet IX, q. 18, pp. 288-292. 124  See Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, II/3.18, pp. 391-394. On this, see Briguglia, “Note su nobiltà”, pp. 190-198. 125  On this, see also p. 128, above. 122 

Chapter 5

The Structure and Content of the Questiones and the Rationaleof its Tabula Quaestionum The analysis of any given medieval Aristotelian commentary needs to take the ­tabula quaestionum of the commentary as its starting point. The list of questions is not an a priori condition of the commentary; instead, it results from choices and follows criteria determined by the commentator (and possibly by the previous commentators on whom he draws). In choosing which parts of the source-text he wants to comment on and which parts he leaves out, a commentator—and even more if he is at the beginning of a commentary tradition—has an intention and does something and, in doing so, determines the reading of the text on which he is commenting. The aim of this chapter is to further the understanding of such an intention1 and to uncover the rationale behind Peter’s choices, thus providing an account of the doctrinal content of the Questiones—highlighting the most important questions—and, at the same time, presenting the scholarly literature on Peter’s views. A commentator’s reasons or motivations for raising certain questions to the exclusion of others in a medieval Aristotelian commentary are not always clear. A master at the arts faculty, i.e., a commentator, selected sections from the text to be commented on that fell within his fields of interest and/or that he considered to be the main principles of the relevant Aristotelian work. Moreover, the length of the text to be commented on and the limitations imposed by what could realistically be covered over the course of the academic year were additional factors that a commentator had to take into consideration when selecting sections of text for discussion. Additionally, commenting on a text meant that a commentator was also engaging with an entire commentary tradition. This tradition and body of work had already established which passages were the most important and which topics in the text should be commented on—a point underpinned by the reoccurrence of the same questions in many works belonging to the same tradition. More influential medieval authors also served as standards of reference for later commentators: for instance, the list of questions dealt with in the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century commentaries on the Ethics produced in Paris owes much to the arrangement of the Ia-IIae and IIa-IIae of Aquinas’ Summa theologiae.2 1  I draw here on Quentin Skinner, “Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts”, in Id., Visions of Politics. Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 103-127. 2  Cf. René-Antoine Gauthier, Aristote. L’Éthique à Nicomaque. Tome I–Première partie. Introduction, (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters–Nauwelaerts, 2002), p. 131. See the table presented in Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 157-158, for the textual correspondence between Brito’s questions on the Ethics and the articles of the Summa theologiae.

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The Questiones is an interesting case in this regard. In preparing his commentary on the Politics, Peter was unable to draw on either the Summa theologiae—which has no set of questions strictly connected to the Politics3—or on any other previous commentary in question form. Instead, he could only turn to the literal commen­ taries on the Politics by Albert and Aquinas in order to ascertain which sections of the Politics the two commentators had devoted more attention to and made notabilia and notanda.4 Though possibly of some use, Albert’s commentary will most probably not have been of great help to Peter, for it is too literal in its approach and often engages in unimportant discussions.5 Aquinas’ commentary was a main source for Peter, but it ends at the beginning of Book III and thus could not have been of any particular assistance for the remainder of the Politics. Moreover, the approach of a question commentary differs from that of a literal commentary: the connection with the text commented on is not as strong in a question commentary since the commentator is not expected to address every paragraph (much less sentence) of the text, the focus being instead a discussion of the topic at hand. Following this line of argumentation, it might have been the case that Peter, as the first master ever to produce a question commentary on the Politics, was more interested in presenting the main ideas of the text rather than explaining the meaning of its passages, a task more fitting for a literal commentary. The questions Peter raises are not simply intended to elucidate the content of the source-text; some, though, hinted at in the text, go far beyond the Politics. The Questiones is in line with its contemporary commentaries per modum quaestionum, as described by Olga Weijers,6 but, if the Questiones is compared with other commentaries—for instance, Ethics commentaries—it is obvious that it is far more independent from the text it comments on than the common standard of the Arts Faculty of Paris. For instance, while commenting on the fifth book of the Politics, Peter does not follow the structure of the text, that is, he does not present Aristotle’s list of both the causes of revolutions and the means to prevent them. Instead, he discusses the subject matter of the fifth book—how to preserve political regimes and avoid upheavals—presenting what he considers to be the main principles to that end: concord and political friendship, two notions touched on in the Ethics but not in the Politics. 3 

Peter did, however, make use of the Summa to formulate some of his questions, as we shall see. notabilia and the notanda present in literal commentaries can be defined as sections in which a commentator calls attention to what should be taken note of (the literal meaning of notandum) and/or contributes his own thoughts regarding the topic he is commenting on. In this way, they denote those sections of the text commented on that the commentator considers more important. The same holds for the dubitanda in which the commentator raises a doubt related to the source-text. 5  On the approach used by Albert while commenting on the Politics, see Fioravanti, “Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum”, and Chapter 4, section 6.1, above. 6  Weijers distinguished between two kinds of question commentaries: the first is more literal, which aims to explain the text, and the other is less dependent on the authoritative text. The Questiones is of the second kind. Cf. Weijers, La “disputatio” à la Faculté des arts, p. 29. 4 The

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225

This does not however mean that Peter did not draw on other works in selecting the passages from the Politics on which he concentrated. While the list of questions of the entire Questiones is a work that we can attribute to Peter alone, he most probably took the title of some questions from other works available to him. As we shall see, some of the titles are actually taken from Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum,7 while others are also found in Ethics commentaries written by Peter’s contemporaries, in the Summa theologiae and in quodlibetal questions produced in the two decades prior to the Questiones. In any case, the De regimine served as the primary source when drafting the list of questions addressed in the Questiones. Because the De regimine was written prior to the Questiones, Giles of Rome might very well have been the first author to select the topics or chapters of the Politics that warranted further examination. Even so, since Giles chose topics particularly from Books I-II of the Politics and constructed a few chapters related to some specific chapters of Book III and V, his selection did not cover the greater part of the Politics. This left Peter with a great deal of freedom to be creative while preparing his list of questions on the Politics. It is assumed here that the Questiones is the earliest question commentary on the Politics produced in Paris. There remains, however, the possibility that Siger of Brabant might have commented on the Politics in the 1270s and thus prior to Peter. In his De recuperatione Terre Sancte, Pierre Dubois states that, while he was studying in Paris, “super Polytica Aristotelis determinavit … magister Sigerus de Brabancia, videlicet quod: Longe melius est civitatem regi legibus rectis quam probis viris”.8 This is an obvious reference to the Politics III.15, 1286a8-9, and the Questiones has a question specifically about this passage in Book III: utrum melius sit ciuitatem regi optimo uiro uel legibus (q. 22). Dubois’ statement has long been interpreted as evidence that Siger commented on the Politics,9 which would probably make him the earliest at the Arts Faculty of Paris so to do. We should, however, not forget that Dubois only indicates that Siger ‘determined’ this question, not that he produced a commentary on the Politics (a possibility we cannot, of course, exclude). As is well known, there were quodlibetal questions at the arts faculty related to the Politics, such as those dealt with by Johannes Vath, and so Dubois’ reference could point to Siger determining a quodlibetal question. As we have seen in Chapter 1, section 2.8, this same question (utrum melius sit ciuitatem regi optimo uiro uel legibus) appeared in more than one quodlibetal question produced at the Faculty of Theology of Paris. It was thus a topical question at that time in Paris. What is more, one manuscript contains five questions on the Nicomachean Ethics which are attributed 7  This by no means diminishes Peter: while the titles are the same, the lines of reasoning in the two works are often different. 8  Cf. Pierre Dubois, “De recuperatione Terre Sancte”. Dalla “Respublica Christiana” ai primi nazionalismi e alla politica antimeditteranea, ed. Angelo Diotti (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1977), p. 205. 9  See, for instance, Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.98.

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to Siger,10 but the fact that Siger addressed five questions on the Ethics—and questions which are also found in Ethics commentaries—has not led a single scholar to conclude that he produced a commentary on the Ethics (and the same can be said of Vath, since no one has ever assumed that he commented on the Politics). This being the case and until further evidence is found, we should refrain from stating that Siger commented on the Politics and should thus regard the Questiones as the earliest question commentary on the Politics produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris. In any case, given the close similarity between the Questiones and the other more or less contemporary commentaries that have been handed down to us— Anony­mous of Milan, Vatican Anonymous and the Anonymous of Baltimore—it can safely be assumed that, even if the Questiones does not represent the earliest commentary in question form, the list of questions of any earlier commentary would not be significantly different and the reflections I advance in the following pages would equally apply to it. We should however note that the sections of the Politics that are highlighted in the Questiones are the same as those to which Peter pays more attention in the Scriptum.11 Perhaps, assuming the Questiones was not the first-ever question commentary on the Politics, we may speculate that a possible previous commentary would have fewer questions related to metaphysics and natural philosophy, which is a distinctive feature of Peter’s writing while commenting on the Politics. The analysis of the list of questions of the Questiones provides both an overview of Peter’s approach as commentator and indications as to his main concerns: the focus on certain topics and the omission of others is certainly telling in this sense. The books of the Politics to which Peter pays more attention are Book I (31 questions) and Book III (26 questions). They are followed by Book II (with 19 questions), Book V (18 questions), Book IV (14 questions) and then Book VI and Book VII (9 questions each, though Book VII is not complete).12 The books of the Politics are not represented proportionally in the Questiones: Book I, which is the third shortest (after Books VIII and VI), is the lengthiest book of the Questiones; Book V is the longest of the Politics, while, in the Questiones, it is only the fourth longest. By contrast, Peter assigns due weight to Book III, which is one of the lengthiest and most crucial books in the Politics. That Peter considers 10  Siger’s questions are available in Siger de Brabant, Écrits de logique, de morale et de physique, ed. Bernardo Bazán–Albert Zimmerman (Louvain–Paris: Publications Universitaires–Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), pp. 98-105. See also Iacopo Costa, “Nota sulla seconda Questio moralis di Sigeri di Brabante”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 53 (2006), pp. 236-250. 11  See Chapter 1, section 2, above and Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. cxxxix-clxxxvii. 12 The Questiones comes to an end at chapter 7 of Book VII. It is impossible to ascertain whether Peter commented on the remainder of Book VII—there is no manuscript evidence for it—or whether he deliberately concluded his commentary there. If he commented on the whole of Book VII, then this book would very likely have been one of the lengthiest of the Questiones, just as it occurs in the Scriptum, where Book VII is the longest.

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Book III crucial is attested to by the fact that it is the second longest book in the Scriptum, surpassed only by Book VII, which, in turn, is not commented on in its entirety in the Questiones. The reason Book I is so long in the Questiones is explained by three factors.13 First, in many other Aristotelian commentaries, the first book is often the longest arguably because it was regarded as an introduction to the science under discussion. The remaining books were probably shorter owing to the limitation imposed by the academic calendar, the constraints of which on lectures probably only being felt by the master later in the year.14 Second, Peter uses Book I to advance some of the general principles on politics (e.g., qq. 12 and 15) and to set forth his ‘anthropology’ (qq. 9, 14 and 16), which plays a determinant role throughout the Questiones. Third, the Scriptum does not cover Books I and II: if we concede that the Scriptum was written prior to the Questiones,15 it would seem reasonable that Peter might have wished to devote more attention to the two books on which he had not yet commented. Books II and IV are shorter in the Questiones than in the Politics. This has to do with the fact that Peter leaves aside many of the historical issues discussed in those books. He does not touch on the criticism made by Aristotle in Book II directed at Hippodamus of Miletus and at the Spartan, Cretan and Carthaginian regimes. Moreover, he does not take into consideration Aristotle’s reflections on oligarchy, democracy and aristocracy dealt with in Book IV.16 Peter just skips over the final three chapters of Book IV on magistracies and offices. The same holds for the final chapters of Book VI, where Aristotle advances the means by which oligarchies and democracies can be preserved: such topics are totally absent from the Questiones. He probably did so because he felt that a literal commentary would be more suited to clarifying those passages in detail (and, if he indeed wrote the Scriptum first, then this argument is even more convincing). Scholars have long underlined that, in his literal commentary, Walter Burley intentionally refrained from making any reference to the events of Greek history mentioned in the Politics, for, according to Burley, such historical discussions had 13  In truth, Book I could be said to consist of 27 questions—and not 31—since, as with many other medieval Aristotelian commentaries, the initial questions—four in the Questiones—are devoted to defining the subject matter of the science at hand and whether it can be scientifically analysed, and thus they find no correspondent in the text to be commented on. We might, therefore, refer to these questions as extra litteram, as some editors do. It should be noted, however, that, for medieval commentators—and Peter too—questions of this kind were simply part of the first book of the work they were commenting on. 14  The same view is held by Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 25*. 15  See Chapter 2, above. 16  Peter’s lack of interest in these forms of government was shared by Albert, Aquinas and Giles of Rome; cf. Jean Dunbabin, “Aristotle in the Schools”, in B. Smalley (ed.), Trends in Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), pp. 65-85. Moreover, as Dunbabin remarks, “the list of Quodlibetic questions for the period indicate a far deeper concern with monarchy than with any other form of government” (p. 68).

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no bearing on understanding the text.17 In fact, Peter was the first commentator to avoid addressing such historical matters. In the Questiones, the Politics turns into a set of doctrines and principles with no relation to Greek history. Since these principles are, one might say, timeless, they do not require historical context and include the following topics: what the natural inclination to associate is; what defines a citizen; why there are different offices in the community; what the purpose of political life is and what the characteristics required of the rulers are.18 Lidia Lanza has stated that, unlike the literal commentaries, the question commentaries on the Politics drop its empirical and descriptive elements and shift their approach to a normative level.19 Analysis of the structure of the Questiones confirms this view. The arrangement of each book of the Questiones provides further insight into Peter’s interests. In each book, distinctive sets of questions can be identified, and such sets correspond to the most important themes of the Questiones. The next pages examine each of these books.

1.

Book I

The first book of the Questiones is as lengthy as Books IV-VI taken together. This alone tells us the weight Peter attaches to this book, but also that he downplays Aristotle’s reflections on oligarchies, democracies and the mixed regimes put forth in Books IV-VI. Peter undoubtedly saw the first book of the Questiones as the opportunity to lay down the fundamentals of the science of politics and what he understood to be the origins of political life. For this reason, the weight Peter lent to the first book is reflected in this account. This book of the Questiones can be divided into five sets of questions. The first group includes qq. 1-4, which, along with the Prohemium, are dedicated to the definition of the science of politics and to its place in the general outlook of the sciences. The second group focuses on the end for which the civitas is instituted (qq. 5-6) and on the naturalness of human association (qq. 7-9). The third and longest 17  Martin, “Some Medieval Commentaries”, pp.  37-38; Lambertini, “Burley’s Commentary”, pp. 364-365; Toste, “An Original Way”, p. 323. Gualterus Burley, Expositio super librum Politicorum, Città del Vaticano,Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 129, f. 75vb: “Intelligendum quod in omnibus predictis modis transmutationis politiarum Philosophus exemplificat in factis particularibus que satis patent in textu et aliquando adducit multa exempla ad idem, et hoc quia doctrina bona moralis manifestatur in particulari; tamen, quia exempla de factis Grecorum et nationum remotarum non sunt nobis nota, et exempla ponimus propter noticiam habendam, non curam ponere exempla sua per que non poterimus melius cognitionem habere”. 18  This, however, does not block Peter from adapting the Politics to fit his own reality. This is evident in many places of the Questiones: for instance, even though Aristotle does not devote even a single chapter to the role of nobility in the community, Peter raises four questions on nobility of birth in Book IV with the purpose of establishing it as a structural element of the political community. 19  Lanza, “I commenti medievali alla Politica”, pp. 129-130.

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group consists of qq. 10-17 and deals with slavery (servitus).20 It is the third topic to which Peter devotes more questions, but this also somewhat corresponds to the weight given to it in the Politics: four chapters (chapters 3-6 of Book I). Following the order of the Politics (I.8), the fourth group addresses the management of the household and economic issues related to it, namely the acquisition of wealth and topics related to the exchange of money (qq. 18-28). The fifth and final group includes three questions (qq. 29-31) on the virtues required of the slave and of the craftsman, which have to be seen in connection with the set formed by qq. 10-17. The first group of questions, which establish the subject matter of the science under discussion, whether it can be examined from a scientific point of view and whether it should be characterised as a practical or theoretical science, was typical of all the Aristotelian commentaries made in the late thirteenth century (these kinds of questions tended to disappear in the fourteenth-century commentaries). The same holds for qq. 5-6, based on the first sentence of the Politics, since it was quite common to focus on Aristotle’s opening statement in a given work. This holds true for both the Nicomachean Ethics (“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good”) and the Metaphysics (“All men by nature desire to know”), the opening sentences of which were addressed in the commentaries on these works.21 These first questions are, therefore, not indicative of Peter’s interests while commenting on the Politics (though q. 2 reveals Peter’s particular approach in that he substantiates in a unique way the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences). If we look at the opening questions of late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century commentaries on the Ethics and Politics produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris an interesting picture emerges: while the Ethics commentaries tackle the question 20  The English translation of the words servitus and servus—the terms used by William of Moerbeke for the Greek δουλεία and δούλοϛ—are not unproblematic. ‘Slavery’ and ‘slave’, the words typically used in the English translations of the Politics, might be somewhat misleading in the medieval context. ‘Servitude’ and ‘servant’, on the other hand, seem to reflect the medieval condition of serfdom better; in fact, Oresme used serf (instead of esclave) throughout his translation and commentary; see, e.g., Menut, “Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le livre de Politiques”, p. 46. It should be noted, however, that the practice of serfdom was in a state of decline when Peter was commenting on the Politics; as a result, the use of ‘servitude’ and ‘servant’ would not solve the problem of the syntagm servus a natura, because in this case ‘servant by nature’ was no longer as appropriate as it had previously been. Moreover, since I am dealing with a medieval commentary on Aristotle which prioritises the discussion of philosophic principles over any direct reference to its own historical reality, I shall henceforth use the terms ‘slavery’ and ‘slave’. This option has also the advantage of keeping to the Aristotelian terminology. Needless to say, this is not meant to imply that I believe Peter and Aristotle shared the same concept of slave. As I have noted elsewhere, the same holds for other terms such as ‘poor’ and ‘middle class’; cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, p. 293, n. 23 and Chapter 1, p. 32, above. 21  Book I of Peter’s commentary on the Metaphysics begins precisely with a question about this sentence; cf. Albert Zimmermann, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur “Metaphysik” und “Physik” des Aristoteles. Aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350 (Leiden–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1971), p. 80. Questions 9-11 of his commentary on the Ethics take inspiration from the opening sentence of the work; cf. Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 45-48.

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of the subject matter of ethics and the questions as to whether moral philosophy can be a science and, if so, whether it is a practical or theoretical one, the Politics commentaries address the question of the subject matter of political science and the question as to which is the main science within the practical sciences. There is a division of labour, so to speak: the Ethics commentaries served to discuss the ‘scientific status’ of practical philosophy and the kind of knowledge acquired in this branch of philosophy, while the Politics commentaries were seen as the occasion to discuss the relationship and hierarchy among the three moral sciences: ethics, economics and politics. As noted in section 4.1 of Chapter 3, the Questiones is the only Politics commentary containing a question on whether political science is a theoretical or practical science and the only commentary whether on the Ethics or on the Politics to include a question on how theoretical and practical sciences differ (q. 2). Clearly, for Peter, it is not enough to justify that the science of politics pertains to the branch of practical sciences, which examine the voluntary actions of human beings and that may contribute to their moral betterment; his purpose is to address the kernel of the argument, that is, to explain what a practical science is and, principally, in which way it provides scientific knowledge.22 Peter begins the Questiones with a Prohemium manifestly influenced by Aquinas’ prologue to his Politics commentary. The main difference between Aquinas and Peter is that Peter underscores the role of the will in human action much more. Like Aquinas, Peter grounds the division of theoretical and practical sciences on the human mind and how it relates to the external reality. Following on from Aquinas too, he states that the subjects of ethics and economics stand in relation to the subject of politics as parts to the whole, and that politics is a superior science with respect to the other two. He identifies the range of moral philosophy with the good made by man (aliquid bonum operatum ab homine). There are three forms of man’s good, each of these being studied by one science: the bonum agibile ab homine quod est finis eius—this is the subject of ethics or monostica23 and it studies man in itself (secundum se)—the bonum agibile of man insofar as he is part of the household— this pertains to economics—and the bonum agibile of man insofar as he is part of the political community—this is the subject of politics. Towards the end of the Prohemium, Peter states that the subject of the Politics is the bonum agibile ciuile, which is per se a good related to the will (obiectum uoluntatis).24

22  I examine in detail the opening questions of the Questiones in Chapter 2 of the monograph I am currently preparing on the medieval commentary tradition on the Politics. For this reason, in the pages to follow, my account is somewhat limited and aimed at presenting the main lines of reasoning of each question. 23  On the term monostica or monastica and how medieval authors explained its etymology, see Alessandra Petrina, “The Use of the Word Monastica in the Division of Moral Philosophy in Thirteenth-Century Paris and Fifteenth-Century England”, Studia Neophilologica 76 (2004), pp. 165-175. 24  Prohemium, ll. 104-109 and 115-116.

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The first question of the Questiones thus serves to deepen further the question on the subject matter of the science of politics. To begin with, Peter rejects Eustratius’ view that the civitas is the subject matter of this science.25 His argument echoes the argumentative structure used in q. 3 of Book I of his Metaphysics commentary, on the subject matter of metaphysics,26 in that in both works, Peter begins the solutio by drawing an equivalence between the subject matter of any given science and the first object of perception. Just as colour is to sight—there can be no visual perception of an object unless it is coloured—so too the subject matter of a science has to be the primordial notion accessible to the intellect and under which all other notions are included. For instance, in metaphysics, being is the primordial notion accessible to the human intellect: if God were the subject of metaphysics, then there would be no place for the study of other substances and accidents. And if substance were its subject matter, then privation, negation and matter would be excluded from metaphysics.27 Peter’s view is taken from Avicenna and from the Posterior Analytics I.7 and I.28, where Aristotle argues that a science can only be rightly called one if the non-demonstrable principles and all the things demonstrated in that science are of one and the same genus. Aristotle refers to it as the ‘γένος ὑποκείμενον’ of a science, which in Latin turned into the ‘genus subiectum’. In other words, the subject matter of one science has to be as general as possible—but limited to one genus—so that it comprehends every object studied in that science. When it comes to the science of politics, this means that the civitas cannot be the subject matter of this science: since the civitas is made up of parts, i.e., the citizens, it cannot be the simplest notion in politics. Moreover, if the civitas were the subject of politics, then it would not include the study of political happiness, political virtue and the different political regimes, since these notions are not of the same genus as civitas. For Peter, the subject matter of politics is the bonum agibile ciuile. Peter, nevertheless, does not completely play down the importance of the civitas in this science, since he asserts that the civitas is the materia of politics. The view he advances draws on a distinction quite common in theological works of the period, namely one between the subiectum and the materia of a science.28 This distinction makes it possible to maintain that while the bonum agibile ab homine ciuile is the subiectum of politics, since it is the simplest and most comprehensive notion 25 

See Liber I, q. 1, ll. 13-14 with the apparatus fontium. Cf. Monahan, “Quaestiones in Metaphysicam”, pp. 156-157. 27  Ibid., pp. 152-157 (Liber I, qq. 1-3). But see also Albert Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), pp. 260-267; Silvia Donati, “La discussione sull’unità del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della Fisica: commenti parigini degli anni 1270-1315 ca.”, in M. Pickavé (ed.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 60-139, at 96-98. 28  See the texts, among others, of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent quoted in the apparatus fontium, Liber I, q. 1, ll. 26-27. 26 

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accessible to the practical intellect when considering the political phenomena, the civitas is the materia of politics, because its existence enables the preservation of the bonum agibile.29 This solution has a further advantage: since the subject of each of three practical sciences is the bonum agibile, it also permits to maintain the unity between the three practical sciences (even though each of them has a specific materia). There remains, however, the question of how the bonum agibile ciuile can be the first notion that occurs to the intellect and thus how it can be the subiectum of this science. This is so because when the human intellect turns to the investigation of politics, it first attempts to grasp a notion that will enable it to understand that field of research in its entirety, that is, a notion that encompasses all that is studied in that science and, principally, what gives unity to that science, in pretty much the same way that motion is the first notion (and therefore the subject matter) of physics and size the first notion of geometry. In the case of politics, said notion must imply that politics deals with a good—since an evil is the privation of good and no investigation can take privation as its starting point—which results from practical actions—neither productive nor theoretical—carried out within a civitas, neither in the household nor by one human being alone. In other words, said notion is the bonum agibile ciuile. In the very brief q. 3, Peter maintains this science is practical because it is for the sake not only of knowing but also of acting—this view, though with regard to the ethics, was common ground in the Aristotelian commentaries. It is, however, in the previous question (q. 2), on whether theoretical and practical sciences are different by nature (ratio) and species, that Peter sets forth his understanding of how the science of politics grants scientific knowledge. In this question he uses the term science, not in the sense of a field of knowledge with its specific principles, but primarily—and more rigorously—as the intellectual virtue Aristotle discusses in Nicomachean Ethics VI.3. In that chapter Aristotle presents the dianoetic virtue of ἐπιστήμη, i.e., scientific knowledge, stating that it is a disposition (ἓξις) to demonstrate (1139b31-32). Grosseteste translated this sentence as “sciencia quidem ergo est habitus demonstrativus”.30 According to Aristotle, this disposition results either from induction or from deductive syllogistic reasoning. Aristotle undoubtedly had theoretical science in mind, since he not only refers to the Posterior Analytics there (in 1139b32-33), but he also states that the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity, of “things not even capable of being otherwise” (non contingere aliter habere: 1139b20-21). Both Albert and Aquinas understood that this chapter of the Ethics deals only with the theoretical sciences.31 29 

Cf. Liber I, q. 1, ll. 26-27 and principally ll. 58-60. Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-4.4, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 480, ll. 25-26. 31  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et questiones, VI.5 (II.420-428); Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Ethicorum, VI.3 (II.340-341). 30 

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Peter, however, broadens the range of Ethics VI.3. He begins the solutio of q. 2 by showing how the scientific habit develops in the mind, but he explicitly states that he means the habit of scientific theoretical knowledge as well as that of scientific practical knowledge. The two are habits related to syllogistic reasoning (habitus alicuius sillogismi). In the case of theoretical science, this habit results from the conclusions achieved by means of demonstrative syllogisms. Such conclusions are necessary and cannot be otherwise. The principles of syllogisms are the principles of science, and these are, in turn, derived from the first principles, which themselves draw on the first universal principle: being qua being. By contrast, the habit of practical science results from the conclusion of practical syllogisms. The aim of a practical syllogism lies in action (ad opus). For this reason, its first principle is not being qua being, but the end of the action.32 Such an end appears to the intellect only after the apprehension of the good to be pursued. This means that, unlike the demonstrative syllogism, the practical syllogism does not take a universal principle (i.e., being) as a starting point—which in the case of the practical intellect might be the universal idea of good—because the notion of good in and of itself does not prompt one to action. The starting point of a practical syllogism is the good insofar as it is desired by the will. The process through which the mind reaches a conclusion in practical matters, according to Peter, occurs as follows: first, the speculative intellect apprehends an object and considers it as good, which is the first proposition of the syllogism. Second, the will desires this object. Third, once an object is desired, the speculative intellect gives way to the practical intellect, which then reasons about the means to reach the end and provides a conclusion about what should be done. Fourth, there is a choice (electio) based on the conclusion of the syllogism, and it is this choice that gives rise to the action itself.33 Peter’s argument holds three consequences. First, any practical science does not have a principle at its basis as universal as the first principle of a theoretical science. Peter does not tackle the question about the kind of knowledge acquired in practical science, which in the Ethics (and in medieval commentaries) is described as grosse et figuraliter (1094b19-22).34 For Aristotle, it is impossible to reach perfect certitude in moral matters on account of the inherent variability in human mores. But while Peter does not directly tackle this matter, his theory of the practical syllogism 32  To avoid any misunderstandings, the term ‘end’ refers here to both the purpose and the final outcome achieved by the action or motion. 33  Cf. Liber I, q. 2, ll. 61-98. 34  Cf. Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-4.4, Ethica Nicomachea, p. 376, ll. 24-26. See also Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum quaestiones, I.2 (I.12, ll. 58-61) and Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Ethicorum, I.3 (I.11, ll. 49-54, 59-61). Albert and Aquinas do not coincide on the interpretation of this passage of the Ethics. On Albert’s concept of practical science, see the works of Jörn Müller, principally the monograph Natürliche Moral und philosophische Ethik bei Albert Magnus (Münster: Aschendorff, 2001), pp. 256-297. For an overview of medieval views on ethics as a science, see Lines, Aristotle’s “Ethics”, pp. 123-157.

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reaches the same conclusion as the Ethics commentaries: the knowledge acquired in the practical sciences cannot be universal as in metaphysics, since the major of the syllogism refers to a particular good. Second, Peter is nevertheless claiming that this science is an intellectual habit, that is, that the political phenomena can be rationally understood and explained. It is true that the will plays a role in this field of knowledge, but this is precisely what Peter seems to claim: that political science includes in its analysis the role played by the human will. The objects studied in this science—and which are part of the bonum agibile ab homine ciuile—are objects intrinsically yoked to human volition: political happiness, political decision-making by rulers and citizens, and the institution of political regimes. All of the objects of political science are not immutable and necessary objects, but instead result from human action. Peter does not conceal the importance of human will for politics.35 Third and most significantly, Peter is not stating that the role of political science— and so of the practical syllogism—is to motivate people to action. The practical science—politics—is not to be confused with the virtue of prudence. Although the two are dianoetic virtues (described in the sixth book of the Ethics), it is prudence that is related to action. The Questiones is thus intended as a ‘scientific’ work carrying out an analysis of political matters, not as a pragmatic text attempting to counsel and intervene in reality. Peter never conflates the two levels in the Questiones: rulers and citizens use the dianoetic virtue of prudence, but the description and analysis of how rulers and citizens use prudence belongs to the dianoetic virtue of (practical) science. This does not prevent this form of science from contributing to man’s betterment—a point that is underlined by Peter’s use of the famous quote from the Ethics at the end of this question that the aim of ethics is “ut boni fiamus”.36 For Peter (just as for Aristotle), the analysis of politics is not detached from a hierarchy of values and, given its principles, it is not merely descriptive, but also normative. Peter’s view is not unproblematic. Reading his description of how a practical syllogism is carried out, one has the impression that he is describing two processes at the same time: the practical syllogism which involves acquiring scientific knowledge as well as the process by which prudence operates with regard to particular actions.37 The second argument contra and the reply to it elucidate this point. In the argument contra it is argued that the practical and theoretical sciences do not differ, for their end—the cognition of truth—is the same. In both cases the sciences achieve their ends by means of syllogisms: this also holds for the practical syllogism because it reaches a conclusion which is not an action itself (est non operabilis). The action only takes place after the choice (electio)—an act which is carried out by the will—and is therefore not part of the practical syllogism. This being so, there would 35 

See the section on Book V, below. See Liber I, q. 2, ll. 130-131. 37  On this, see Chapter 2 of my monograph. 36 

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be no difference between practical and theoretical syllogisms (and sciences). In order to reject this view, Peter distinguishes between two ends of a syllogism: one immediatus, which he also terms finis operis, and another mediatus, which is the finis intentionis. In the former, the ends of the syllogisms connected with the two kinds of sciences are the same, i.e., the cognition of truth. In the latter, this does not hold, since in the practical sciences the finis intentionis is action. If we look past this scholastic jargon, Peter is unequivocally telling his audience that practical science is made through syllogisms whose conclusions are true and this does not lead to action (just like a theoretical syllogism).38 However, when the practical syllogism is followed by choice (electio), then it entails action. Peter does not delve into the kind of truth related to either case. Arguably, we can interpret it as follows: practical sciences examine the principles of action and attempt to establish what is good in each field—in the case of politics, how the ‘political good’ can be achieved. At the same time, the propositions produced in political science are true and bear a certain character of universality. For instance, it is a condition per se that oligarchy is the best regime for wealthy people.39 On the other hand, in the case of a practical syllogism involving choice and then action, its truth depends on its intrinsic morality, i.e., the agreement of the will and right reason. Significantly, Peter states in the argument contra that among the intellectual habits mentioned in the sixth book of the Ethics Aristotle “lists prudence which can be said in a broad sense practical science” (inter illa nominat prudentia, que large potest dici scientia practica).40 Thus, Peter is acutely aware of the fact that he is going beyond Aristotle, because—and this needs to be stressed—he wishes to distinguish between a scientific knowledge about politics (i.e., practical science) and political action (i.e., the role of prudence strictly speaking).41 As Peter claims in his commentary on the Metaphysics, the practical sciences are also theoretical for they also seek the truth and comprise philosophical speculation.42 Peter’s concept of political science is absolutely striking: it goes beyond Aristotle, but it does so within a framework which we can term as Aristotelian, for it draws on elements taken from the corpus Aristotelicum. The same occurs in q. 4 of Book I, on whether politics is the main (principalissima) science within the genus of practical philosophy. There, too, Peter distinguishes between two genera of sciences, namely theoretical and practical. His arguments for the superiority of the theoretical are ex obiecto and ex fine (although he does not use these expressions): the theoretical sciences deal with being qua being, which requires only an act of the intellect, while 38 

If the conclusion is false, then there is no possibility of acquiring the habit of science. For Peter’s understanding of universality, see later in this chapter, on Book IV, q. 1. 40  Cf. Liber I, q. 2, ll. 14-16. 41  This arguably also explains why he refrains from using the term prudence in these initial questions of the Questiones. 42  See the text quoted in note 47 herein. 39 

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the practical sciences deal with the good as desired, which further presupposes an act of the will. Accordingly, the practical sciences are posterior in time and inferior to the theoretical sciences. As Peter notes in his Ethics commentary, while being is clearly not determined by anything else, something is said to be good insofar as its being is determined by goodness, and for this reason being precedes the good.43 The end of the theoretical sciences is also superior to that of the practical sciences, for it is the bonum separatum, i.e., God.44 For Peter, politics is the main science within the genus of the practical sciences for two reasons. First, the good of the civitas is superior to both the good of the individual person and the good of the household. Second, its end includes the end of ethics and economics.45 Here Peter’s debt to Aquinas is evident. In this question Peter also repeats a standard argument found in the Ethics commentaries, including his own. Aristotle states in the Ethics I.2, 1094a28-b7 that the ‘architectonic’ science establishes which sciences should be studied and who should learn them. Since it is the architectonic science, politics can thus ‘use’ the other sciences for the sake of the political community. Peter and other medieval commentators felt the need to ensure that this statement in no way compromises the superiority of the theoretical over the practical sciences, since it regards only the ‘use’ of the theoretical sciences within the civitas, not their content, which remains outside the reach of politics.46 Like his fellow masters of arts, Peter is unable to conceive of metaphysics as subordinate to politics, and it thus comes as no surprise that he advances the same ideas in a similar question contained in his commentary on the Metaphysics.47 The end of 43 

Cf. Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, p. 43, ll. 34-35. Cf. Liber I, q. 4, ll. 40-45. 45  Ibid., ll. 46-61. 46  Ibid, the first argument and the reply to it. For the interpretation of this passage in the Anony­ mous of Baltimore (but also in the Vatican Anonymous, who shares the same lines of reasoning with the former), see Roberto Lambertini, “Principalior aliis scientiis? La politica e gli studi secondo il Commento dell’Anonimo di Baltimora alla Politica di Aristotele”, in L. Bianchi–O. Grassi–C. Panti (eds.), Edizioni, traduzioni e tradizioni filosofiche (secoli XII-XVI). Studi per Pietro B. Rossi (Canterano: Aracne, 2018), pp. 305-314. For the Ethics commentaries, see Lines, Aristotle’s “Ethics”, pp. 146-147. For Peter, see Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 54-56. 47  This occurs in q. 9 of Book I of his commentary (utrum istius scientie sit ordinare alias uel ab aliis ordinari), where Peter maintains that metaphysics is the architectonic science of all sciences, including the practical sciences, which are also somewhat theoretical. It is interesting to note that in this question of his commentary on the Metaphysics, Peter quotes the Politics on more than one occasion: “Intelligendum ad hoc quod scientie quedam sunt practice et quedam speculatiue. Speculatiue autem sunt propter ueritatem, ita quod ueritas finis speculatiuarum est; practice autem sunt propter operationem, que est finaliter propter ueritatem, quia (quod C) in omni scientia practica aliquid speculationis admiscetur, cuius finis est ueritas. Tunc ergo dicendum est quod ista scientia regulat omnes speculatiuas, inquantum ipsa speculatiua est, et etiam omnes scientias practicas ut ueri sunt speculatiuas, quod potest manifestari ex duobus. Primo sic: nam, sicut scribitur 1º Politice, in omnibus ordinatis ex quibus pluribus, ut diuisa sunt, fit aliquid coniunctum, (et add. C) uel ex quibus coniunctis fit aliquid diuisum, est unum primum, quod est regula siue perfectio omnium aliorum ordine succedentium. Sed in scientiis anime ipsam animam perficientibus est ordo, ita quod multe unam consummatam intellectus faciunt perfectionem, quare in intellectu est una prima scientia que est causa et regula omnium aliarum. Vnde 44 

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metaphysics is, absolutely speaking, superior to the end of politics. As we shall see later, this has a further implication, namely that the speculative happiness of one single man is superior to the political happiness of the entire political community.48 Questions 5, on whether every community exists for the sake of a good, and 6, on whether the civitas is instituted for the sake of the highest good, are crucial in terms of understanding the approach of the entire Questiones and merit more attention here.49 Peter begins the solution of q. 5 by stating that no natural inclination is w ­ icked. At a first glance, this seems a banal claim, since the notion that every being aims for good was an axiom in medieval philosophy. Indeed, Aquinas considers it to be the first principle of natural law in Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2. Moreover, for both Christianity and Aristotle, evil in and of itself does not exist—otherwise, it would be a parallel principle of the universe—and, therefore, inclination towards evil per se is meaningless.50 In the context of the Politics, however, Peter’s claim carries with it an important implication: as no natural inclination is wicked, neither is any political association, springing, as it does, from the natural inclination to live with others. This means that, even though some political regimes are deviated, they nevertheless possess some measure of goodness. dicitur, 1º Politice, quod homines uigentes intellectu sunt domini et dominantur naturaliter, qui autem sunt (om. C) corpore robusti, intellectu non uigentes, naturaliter serui, et ideo illius scientie est alias regulare, [C 123rb] que maxime intellectualis est et maxima intellectus perfectio: talis autem est que maxime (maxima CW) intelligibilia considerat; sed ista scientia maxime intelligibilia considerat, puta causas primas et altissimas, sicut patet in processu libri; quare ista maxime intellectualis est, et per consequens aliarum maxime ordinatiua … Iterum, dat principia consequendi illum finem; cuius ratio est quia finis imponit necessitatem eis que sunt ad finem; si igitur finis innotescit in illa scientia per conclusionem (considerationem CW) in scientia, et innotescet per principia in scientia tradita, quia conclusionis proprie sunt propria principia, igitur ista scientia est ordinatiua omnium scientiarum, cum sit speculatiua. Et ideo, quia practice quodammodo (quoquomodo CW) sunt speculatiue, ideo, quantum ad hoc, sub ista scientia cadunt et ab ista ordinantur practice, cum scientie considerant uerum in ordine ad operationem directam a uoluntate, cuius obiectum est (transp. post boni C) bonum sub ratione boni, propter quod illa scientia dicitur ordinatiua scientiarum operatiuarum siue practicarum, que summum (omnium add. C) bonum, ut a nobis operabile est, considerat. Nam illa constitutiua est ultimi finis in operabilibus; iterum dat principia prosequendi illum [W 62rb] finem ex ratione finis in practicis complexa, puta quod bonum unde bonum est appetendum et malum fugiendum. Siue igitur illa scientia politica dicatur siue ciuilis, que ordinat bonum ut subiacet uoluntati, non curo. Ista tamen aliarum est ordinatiua quantum ad hoc, quod ratio boni sub ratione operabilis se extendit, et hoc uolebat Philosophus 1º Politice sue significare, dicens quod talis scientia ordinat quid quisquam audire debeat et usque ad quod tempus, et ideo talis non solum est ordinatiua scientiarum practicarum particularium, sed etiam speculatiuarum quantum ad actus exercitium. Apparet igitur que scientia est ordinatiua aliarum et que non et qualiter” (Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, f. 123ra-b, checked against Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330, f. 62ra-b). Other manuscripts contain a slightly different and shorter text; cf. Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1059, f. 3ra; Città del Vaticano, BAV, Vat. lat. 845, f. 161rb-va; Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16158, f. 168ra. 48  See on Book VII in this chapter. 49  See also Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 126-127; Id., “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, p. 303. 50  On how Peter and other medieval masters of arts conceived of evil in their commentaries on the Metaphysics, see Gianfranco Fioravanti, “Il problema del male in alcuni maestri delle arti nel XIII secolo”, Doctor Seraphicus 38 (1991), pp. 37-55.

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Peter starts the solutio with the sentence “Dicendum quod communicatio humana est que competit homini secundum quod homo”.51 For medieval philosophers, man is defined first and foremost by his reason—the men who are able to make the most of their intellectual capacities, that is, their intellect, have realised their humanity in the fullest sense.52 Peter is not, at this point, advancing this position, but the notion of man qua man refers to the doctrine that man is primarily reason and that it is through reason that he perfects himself. In fact, in the following sentence, Peter states that political association “fit per rationem, et talis est communicatio instituta ab homine secundum rationem, et de ista est questio. Dicendum ergo quod omnis talis est in bonum”.53 Human association is thus a work of reason and not a mere natural inclination that cannot be curbed; what is more, it is good. Peter then draws from the Physics the notion that every agent acts for the sake of an end, this occurring in natural and intellectual activity alike. In the case of intellectual activity, the agent’s action is not necessary and predetermined, but rather dependent on his will alone. As seen in Chapter 2, according to Peter, in practical matters, the intellect operates by considering an object through the prism of its existing as a good already desired by the will. Moreover, that object is the goal to be pursued, and this is why the end aimed for is taken as the principle of action. Peter uses these ideas here to conclude that every agent acts for the sake of some end or good. Since the agent acts for the sake of a goal, then his goal and the outcome of his action will be identical. By way of example, a house is both the goal of an architect and the result of his action. All human association is thus a goal and an action at the same time, and, according to Peter, it does not matter whether we mean a main or a secondary and instrumental agent because the end of both the main and the instrumental agents will be the same.54 With these words, Peter argues that human communities (and, even more so, political community) are a continuous process geared towards a goal and that, in such a process, the main agent (i.e., the ruler) and the secondary agent (i.e., the citizens) partake in the same goal. The outcome of this process stems from the action of different agents—some more active, others more passive—and all crucial to the outcome. Peter then concludes that human political association (communicatio) is something brought about by reason, and its result is therefore a rational effect. In this specific regard, whether that result is good or bad is somewhat secondary. In either case, it is a work of reason. This can be inferred from the final part of the solutio: 51 

Cf. Liber I, q. 5, ll. 15-16. On this, see Luca Bianchi, “Filosofi, uomini e bruti: Note per la storia di un’antropologia averroista”, Rinascimento 32 (1992), pp. 185-201 [reprinted in Id., Studi sull’aristotelismo del Rinascimento, pp. 41-61]; Theodor W. Köhler, Grundlagen des philosophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses im dreizehnten Jahrhundert: die Erkenntnisbemühung um den Menschen im zeitgenössischen Verständnis (Leiden–Boston–Köln: Brill, 2000), pp. 584-624. 53  Cf. Liber I, q. 5, ll. 16-18. 54  Ibid., ll. 27-35. 52 

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it makes no difference whether the intellect apprehends the object as though it were a true good or an apparent good (bonum apparens), which, in truth, is bad. In either case, the agent acts to achieve an end and perceives it as good. In other words, some political regimes are good according to reason—such as monarchy and aristocracy—while others are not—such as democracy and oligarchy. The former aim for true good (virtue), while the latter strive for apparent good (freedom and wealth).55 Peter presents here an optimistic view of politics, since, for him, every political community—except tyranny—is instituted for the sake of a good, whether such good is a true or an apparent good, and thus includes the communities ruled by a deviated form of government.56 It is true that Peter speaks of regimes that are not in accordance with ‘right reason’: they are, nonetheless, acts of reason, and they possess some measure of goodness. As it will be shown later in this chapter, Peter uses the theory of analogy with respect to political regimes. The use of such theory also permits him to state that even the lowest form of political regime is not completely devoid of goodness, since it is related to the best form of government—monarchy. Question 6 follows the same line of reasoning as q. 5, although Peter now qualifies his view. Because the political community (civitas) is the community (communicatio) that contains all the other smaller communities, its aim embraces that of all the others as well such that the political community is constituted for the sake of the highest good (principalissimum bonum).57 While all this is Aristotelian, Peter then introduces a remark of his own: the civitas can be understood as either a congregation of the inhabitants of one location or as the community containing the smaller human associations—households, farms and hamlets—which class of community is constituted for the sake of self-sufficiency. If, however, taken in this second sense, the civitas has then to be identified with a kingdom (regnum), since a kingdom embraces the other communities and is the only entity capable of securing self-sufficiency.58 Historiography has long underlined that medieval authors tended to equate the Aristotelian πόλις–civitas with the medieval regnum and to understand civitas as a smaller territorial unity. This is true for authors such as Giles of Rome, John of Paris, James of Viterbo, Engelbert of Admont and Dante.59 On the other hand, we should not lose sight of the fact that they used the term regnum at the beginning of 55 

Ibid., ll. 40-52. Similar views are found in Aquinas’ commentary and in the parallel chapter of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, neither, though, as elaborate as that put forth in the Questiones; cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, I.1/a, p. A72, ll. 21-26; Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/1.1, p. 402. 57  Cf. Liber I, q. 6, ll. 11-15. 58  Cf. ibid., ll. 16-23. 59  See the quotations taken from works by these authors in Susan M. Babbit, “Oresme’s Livre de Politiques and the France of Charles V”, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 75 (1985), pp. 1-157, at 45-46, n. 73. On this aspect, see Ulrich Meier, Mensch und Bürger. Die Stadt im Denken spätmittelalterlicher Theologen, Philosophen und Juristen (München: Oldenbourg, 1994), pp. 35-47. 56 

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their texts when they presented the different forms of human association and that, although their mental representation of the Aristotelian civitas was a regnum, they preferred therein after the term civitas when referring to the political community in and of itself.60 The word regnum was thus used predominately in reference to the monarchical regime. Likewise, all through the Questiones, Peter prefers the term civitas to regnum to refer to the political community.61 For Peter, only the civitas in the sense of a community for the sake of self-sufficiency can attain the highest end. Nonetheless, no more than advance this conclusion, he hastens to qualify the highest end that the civitas can attain. Since, as stated in the Physics, every agent and its end must be related one to the other and, moreover, the political community stems from an act of the intellect (ciuitas est actum ab intellectu), the end proper to the civitas has, then, to be related to the activity of the practical, not the speculative, intellect. Such an end is practical happiness which is attained by means of the virtue of political prudence.62 As a result, the end of the civitas is the highest end (principalissimus) only insofar as it relates to the genus of the practical ends. Indirectly, however, speaking in absolutes, the civitas is for the sake of the highest end, i.e., contemplative happiness, since political happiness is for the sake of contemplative happiness.63 After the preliminary questions related to the opening lines of the Politics, the Questiones has a group of questions on the naturalness of human association. The main question in this group is naturally q. 9, whether man is by nature a political 60  This is clear in all the commentaries on the Politics. A case in point is Versor (?), who discusses at length the different meanings of the word civitas and concludes that, while it is sometimes used as a synonym of regnum and to refer to a specific city, such as Paris or Rome, it is understood “pro ordine ciuium in unum finem politicum tendentium. Vnde ciuitas sic accepta ab Aristotele sic diffinitur: ciuitas est multitudo ciuium sufficiens ad autarchiam uite, id est, ad per se sufficientiam” (Versor [?] nevertheless admits that, if one keeps to Aristotle’s definition, then it is “difficile inuenire unam ciuitatem uel regionem que per omnem modum sit per se ipsam sufficiens, sic quod non indigeat aliis”; cf. Questiones … Iohannis Versoris, Liber III, q. 2, f. 39ra). A similar semantic ambivalence regarding the word civitas is found in medieval jurists (though, with these authors, the ambivalence is slightly different from that found in medieval philosophers); cf. Diego Quaglioni, “Civitas: appunti per una riflessione sull’idea di città nel pensiero politico dei giuristi medievali”, in V. Conti (ed.), Le ideologie della città europea dall’Umanesimo al Romanticismo (Firenze: Olschki, 1993), pp. 59-76. 61  The fact that Peter uses regnum only in this question to refer to the highest community, as Giles does, represents evidence that he drew on Giles in this specific question. See note 63, below. 62  Cf. Liber I, q. 6, ll. 23-36. See later herein for Peter’s definition of practical prudence. 63  Ibid., ll. 36-45. In the parallel chapter of the De regimine, Giles, too, qualifies the notion of principalissima with regard to the civitas, but he does so differently from Peter, since, for Giles, the civitas is principalissima only with respect to the household and village, not with the regnum. See Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/1.1, pp. 402-403: “Advertendum communitatem ciuitatis esse principalissimam non simpliciter et per omnem modum, sed respectu communitatis domus et vici (ed.: vicio). Est autem alia communitas principalior ea, cuiusmodi est communitas regni”. It is worth noting that the two authors—both writing for a French audience—recognise the kingdom as the highest community. Peter, however, is much more concerned with delimitating the sphere of the end attained by political activity and with stressing its inferiority with regard to contemplative happiness. This is a trademark view found through the Questiones.

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animal, and the previous questions help to prepare the fundamentals to state that man has a natural inclination to associate with his fellow human beings. Peter obviously follows the order of the text he is commenting on and, thus, these questions are related to chapter 2 of Book I of the Politics; we can, however, see that Peter establishes a coherent order in the questions he raises: having established that the political community exists for the sake of the highest practical good, Peter goes on to demonstrate in which sense attaining such a good is intrinsic to human nature. Question 7, on whether the union of man and woman is natural, is rooted in the distinction between a ‘perfect act’ and an ‘imperfect act’, that is, between a natural disposition fully developed and which has reached its state of perfection and a natural inclination which remains in potentiality. Unlike the imperfect act, (a predisposition, which is innate and does not involve any deliberation), the perfect act requires the exercise of reason and will in order to be brought into being. Peter’s use of such distinction has a twofold aim: on the one hand, preventing a ‘Pavlovian’ conception of a human natural inclination towards sociability in which the principles of practical reason would play no role64 and, on the other hand, eschewing a view according to which men who do not associate with women fall into an unnatural condition. Peter’s Christian cultural background looms large here: religious men living in monasteries are a reality to be taken into account when formulating a view on the human natural inclination towards living in society.65 The starting point of q. 7 is Aristotle’s statement that, in every species (including the human species), male and female join together in order to secure the continuation of the species and because of “a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves” (1252a29-30). Peter begins the solutio with the distinction between perfect and imperfect acts (ll. 18-27). As is evident on more than one occasion, he attaches great importance to the distinction, given that, exactly as with the notion of habit and virtue, it can be used to support the statement than an act stems from human nature—it is a drive man is born with but only in an inceptive way—and that, at the same time, it entails an intentional act of reason and will—man has to desire it and deliberate about it in order to bring it into being. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Peter should devote a significant portion of the solutio (ll. 3357) to justifying from a natural philosophy point of view why animals and plants 64  We can thus dismiss out of hand Cary Nederman’s view according to which, for medieval Aristotelians, “no factor could pre-empt man’s impulse to associate, since society in general and political society in particular represented the fulfilment of the range of man’s physical and spiritual needs” and that therefore the impulse to associate was “essentially beyond human volition or control”; cf. Cary J. Nederman, “Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought”, Journal of the History of Ideas 49 (1988), pp. 3-26, at 4-5 [republished in Id., Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits, item 2]. For a different perspective from Nederman’s, see Meier, Mensch und Bürger, pp. 65-73; Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”; Id., “La socievolezza umana nel Defensor pacis di Marsilio da Padova”, Philosophical Readings 12 (2020), pp. 22-34. 65  On this, see Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 145-151.

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reproduce, his sources being Generation of Animals, On generation and corruption and, principally, On the soul II.4, in which Aristotle states that, by leaving behind a son, human beings continue their existence and “partake in the eternal and divine”. The lion’s share of the solutio, however, is dedicated to maintaining that man and woman are to remain together for life—and not only for the duration of the act of procreation (ll. 61-129).66 This question stands out for two further reasons. First, because in a commentary on the Politics Peter’s attention is drawn to explain the ‘metaphysical’ principles of procreation—it requires an active and a passive principle and it is the means by which every living species, plants and animals alike, can remain in being. He tersely states that the purpose of the household is self-sufficiency (ll. 33-34), though he spends more than twenty lines (ll. 34-57) justifying procreation. Second, because, unlike Aristotle, Peter tries to explain philosophically the motifs why a couple must remain together throughout life—such a need to substantiate the causes of a social ‘institution’ is found again in Book II, q. 5, where Peter explains why incest is against nature. Having established the sense in which the union of a man and a woman is a natural predisposition—and thus how the domus can be said to be natural—Peter addresses in q. 9 whether human beings are naturally social.67 Here, he does not draw on the distinction between a perfect and an imperfect act, but the beginning of the solutio echoes that distinction: man is a social animal by dint of natural inclination, but it is reason that determines the way in which such inclination is fulfilled. Because it is reason that influences how the natural tendency develops, there will be variation in the way it takes form (“est ciuilis a ratione quantum ad determinationem, puta quod in illa ciuitate uel in illa, uel sic uel sic uiuat”, ll. 1315). Following on in the same vein, just as with how different people will develop a moral habit in accordance with their training and with the frequency they perform an act related to a specific habit, so too will human association be varied because of how different people use their reason. Peter makes use of Aristotle’s statement that “Nature … makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech” (1253a9-11) to stress again the role of reason and will: speech (sermo significativus) is natural to man as an inclination but is determined by reason and will (ll. 24-26). Peter is not saying anything distinctive in this regard: Aristotelian commentaries on the On interpretation and on Sense and Sensibilia discussed the naturalness of human language and the origin of languages in these exact same terms. Referring to a passage in the On interpretation where Aristotle states “By a 66  On this question, see also Chapter 6, below, and Pavel Blažek, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie der Ehe: von Robert Grosseteste bis Bartholomäus von Brügge (1246/1247–1309) (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 315-332. Blažek examines in great detail Peter together with Bartholomew of Bruges’ Economics commentary and Radulphus Brito’s Ethics commentary. 67  On this question, see Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 129-148. In Chapter 3 of the monograph I am preparing, I examine this question against the background of medieval Aris­ totelianism and assess in more detail Peter’s originality. I also provide an account of Peter’s sources.

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noun we mean a sound significant by convention” (2, 16a19), the thirteenth-century commentators assert, based on Averroes’ commentary on the Ethics, that, while the ability to speak is natural to man as an inclination—for not all men speak—the way in which it is enacted is ad placitum (it is voluntary), which implies variety.68 Since language is not then entirely determined by nature, the commentators stress that the institution of a particular language depends on the consent (consensus or concordia) given by those who speak it. Then, however, again, for Peter, this kind of arguments is inadequate, it being just the start of the question, for it does not touch upon the heart of the matter. Peter goes on to delve further into the issue: given that possessing a language and being social are natural to man, one then needs to ask “what this nature is” (Sed que est ista natura?). From this point of the solutio onwards, Peter presents a singular viewpoint, which attests to his originality as a medieval Aristotelian commentator. Peter starts this second part of the solutio (ll. 33-99) by drawing a distinction with regard to the term ‘nature’: it can mean either that of the human species or the nature, consisting of a material disposition, of the individual man. Contrary to what one might expect, Peter does not state in an unqualified way that the human species is absolutely and intrinsically social. In Peter’s view, being social is not part of the substantial definition of the human species. To understand this, suffice it to consider the typical medieval definition of man, that is, “homo est animal rationale mortale”: clearly, man’s quiddity involves terms such as animal, corporeal and rational. Drawing on the fifth book of the Topics, we can say that social is neither an essential nor permanent property of the human species considered in and of itself; indeed, it does not distinguish man from other animals and it does not extend to every member of the human species. This does not mean that being social is a property that can be predicated of man merely as an accident; rather, it does pertain to the human species, though only as a consequence, insofar as man is a composite of form and matter. Man’s soul, i.e., his form, is eternal, while his matter is corruptible. It is because man is made of matter that he is insufficient and unable to remain eternally in being as a material being; the human species cannot continue to exist unless its individuals join together and procreate, and it is the political community (civitas) that makes this possible.69 If man consisted exclusively of form (soul) and were thus a purely intellectual being, then he would not need to be social. Peter is not, however, maintaining here that mankind is by nature asocial, for no human being can exist unless constituted of body and soul (man qua man is 68  Cf. Izumi Sekizawa, Le naturalisme linguistique de Boèce de Dacie: enjeux et discussions (­Paris: PhD dissertation, Université de Paris-Diderot [Paris 7], 2010), pp. 250-313, 335-337; Köhler, “Homo animal nobilissimum”, I.429-453, and especially 421-428; Sten Ebbesen, “Psammetichus’s Experiment and the Scholastics: Is Language Innate?”, in J. Pelletier–M. Roques (eds.), The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Claude Panaccio (Cham: Springer, 2018), pp. 287-302. 69  Cf. Liber I, q. 9, ll. 33-49.

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made of body and soul). Peter’s assertions can possibly be understood against the backdrop of medieval theology: authors of the age identified man’s ultimate end as union with God, an act which in itself implies neither the body nor other human beings. While Peter states that the human species is social on account of its matter, he also leaves room for exceptions to the standard constituted by sociability, for he refers implicitly to Physics II.5 and 8 in order to argue that what is ‘by nature’ is that which happens in most cases and not exclusively what always happens. This becomes clearer as soon as Peter deals with the nature of the individual man. Quite surprisingly, Peter states that man is not naturally a social animal in which concerns the nature, consisting of one’s material disposition, of the individual. Since the material disposition is not the same in every man—each man has his own individual bodily constitution—then man’s individual nature cannot be the cause of what happens in most cases. The individual nature, however, influences man’s sociability. Instead of describing the way in which man’s bodily properties make one a social animal, Peter illustrates the two extreme cases of asocial individuals. The halfway point between these two extremes—medius modus, in Peter’s words—is the state of being social. On the one hand, some men are asocial owing to an incapacity for sociability. This happens because too much moisture or heat in their body dulls their sensory organs, which disturbs their sensory representations ( fantasmata) and thereby their intellectual capacities. Peter specifies that this kind of man is by nature social but becomes asocial as a result of bodily properties. On the other hand, the primary qualities of other men are in perfect balance,70 which causes their sensory organs to be subtle and clear. Their sensory representations are therefore clear, thus allowing for passions to be moderate. As a result, these men are perfectly able to dedicate their life to intellectual pursuits, that is, to philosophical speculation, and, for this reason, they do not care for bodily necessities and may additionally withdraw from society.71 Peter ends the solutio by stressing once again that the human species, speaking absolutely, is not social. Human beings are social only because of their matter and, ultimately, its inadequacy in terms of allowing them to remain perpetually in being.72 Peter’s justification of the naturalness of human association far outstrips Aristotle. Arguably, the most important features of Peter’s view are the following: first, along with the role assigned to bodily properties—Aristotle justifies differences between the sexes in the same way, but not sociability—there is the heed Peter pays to the exceptions to sociability—while Aristotle might concede the existence of some asocial men on account of a natural incapacity to be social, he 70 

Cf. section 2.15 of Chapter 1, above. Cf. Liber I, q. 9, ll. 63-92. 72  Ibid., ll. 96-99. 71 

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never postulated that the philosopher might live apart from society.73 The result is that for Peter sociability is more contingent than it was for Aristotle. Second, given the influence of Aquinas on Peter, it could well be expected that Peter would emphasise natural law, since Aquinas expressly states that the preservation of one’s own being (and thereby living in society) is the most basic precept of natural law (Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2). Instead, Peter mentions the preservation of the species, but not that of one’s own being, and emphasises the insufficiency of man’s ‘materiality’.74 Third, in this question, Peter completely ignores the issue of the origins of political authority; he is only concerned with laying the foundations for human sociability. Fourth, sociability is not associated with the highest degree of rationality: philosophers and religious men in a state of perfection may prefer to live outside the civitas, and the inclination to associate rests upon purposes not intrinsically related to reason. In this way, sociability is not equated with citizenship; it is indeed distinguished from political life, since the latter pursues a good—as stated in q. 5 of Book I—and involves the notion of order, which in turn implies reason and will—see on Book II, q. 1, later. Fifth, there is the stress laid on man’s shortcomings. He makes no reference to a postlapsarian condition, but Peter’s emphasis on matter and on the fact that man is social because he is made of matter is striking. It has been argued that medieval authors’ stressing that man’s insufficiencies are the cause of sociability is due to the influence of Avicenna. This may well hold true for Giles of Rome,75 but it seems not to be the case with Peter, as he does not underscore—at least in the Questiones—as did Avicenna (and Giles for that matter), that man associates for want of the necessities of life, i.e., food and security.76 In any case, Peter’s line of reasoning is completely different from that found at the beginning of the fifth part of Avicenna’s Liber de anima. Between q. 7 and 9, Peter introduces the question on whether woman is a slave by nature. While this question would seem out of place in the context of the discussion of sociability, it nevertheless serves two functions: it explains on natural grounds not only the reason why women cannot naturally be slaves—and a woman can thus 73  Cf. Jean-Louis Labarrière, “L’homme apolitique: pesseia, polis et apolis – Pol. I.2, 1253a1-7”, in E. Bermon–V. Laurand–J. Terrel (eds.), L’excellence politique chez Aristote (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2017), pp. 51-82. 74  This is not to suggest that Peter disagreed with Aquinas, but rather that natural law is simply left in the background of his argumentation. 75  See Irène Rosier-Catach, “Civilitas”, pp. 169-170; Ead., “Communauté politique et communauté linguistique”, in J.-F. Genet (ed.), La légitimité implicite. Le pouvoir symbolique en Occident (1300-1640) (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2015), 2 vols., I.225-243, at 228. 76  Obviously, there is not a sharp difference between stating that man is social on account of his materiality and maintaining that he is so because of the necessities of life. The question is rather about emphasis. Albert merges the two ideas (and in such a way to resemble Peter’s argument here, though much less elaborate); cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et questiones, X.13 (II.761, ll. 77-82): “homo est politicum naturaliter quantum ad inferiorem sui partem, secundum quam indiget necessariis, sed non quamum ad intellectum, neque politicum neque coniugale, secundum quem tamen est illud quod est hominis, inquantum est homo”.

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form the first community with a male—but also why they are unable to be citizens, being however part of the civitas. A woman’s bodily constitution diminishes her intellectual capacities while at the same time causes her to lack the physical strength inherent to the slave. The following set of questions (qq. 10-17) is related to the previous one, since Peter addresses the slave’s bodily constitution in at least three questions: qq. 13 (whether someone is by nature a slave), 14 (whether the bodies of the slaves and of the free men are naturally different) and 16 (whether a good man naturally begets another good man and a slave another slave). Peter bases the naturalness of slavery on the bodily constitution of certain individuals and, more specifically, on the influence of that constitution on cognitive abilities. If slavery were natural on account of some other factor, common to every man, then there would be two different species of human beings. The most important questions of this third group are nevertheless qq. 10-12 and 15. As noted in 6.2 of the previous chapter, Peter took inspiration from Aquinas’ Politics commentary in drawing up qq. 10-11, but the way in which he deals with the topic of slavery stands out for its approach embedded in metaphysics and natural philosophy. The translation of the Politics into Latin brought with it the idea of natural slavery, which contrasts with the previous Patristic tradition where slavery was understood as a postlapsarian condition and discussed in legal terms. The Questiones is thus one of the first works in late medieval Europe to attempt to justify natural slavery philosophically. This explains why this section of the Questiones has gained so much scholarly attention.77 Since this section has been the object of several studies, my presentation here is rather limited. While this set of questions somehow stands apart from the remainder of the Questiones, Peter advances here some of the main principles of his interpretation of the Politics. In this respect, the most important question is q. 12, the title of which is wherever there is a conjunction of something in one unified thing, whether there must be by nature a ruler and a slave or subject. Here, Peter substantiates in metaphysical terms Aristotle’s assertion (I.5, 1244a28-31) about the need in every aggregate—animate or inanimate—for one who commands and one who obeys. He frames the entire question by making an analogy based on the Aristotelian concept 77  On Peter’s treatment of slavery, see Martin, “Some Medieval Commentaries”, pp. 42-43; Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”; Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.50-71; Lidia Lanza, “La servitus naturalis in alcuni commenti medievali alla Politica di Aristotele”, I Quaderni del M.AE.S. 4 (2001), pp. 7-25; Toste, “Virtue and the City”, pp. 80-82; Claudio Fiocchi, Dispotismo e libertà nel pensiero politico medievale. Riflessioni all’ombra di Aristotele (sec. XIII-XIV) (Bergamo: Lubrina Editore, 2007), pp. 57-60; Theodor W. Köhler, “Gleiche Menschennatur – naturgegebene soziale Unterschiede. Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Lehre vom physei doulos”, in A. Fidora–J. Fried–M. Lutz-Bachmann–L. Schorn-Schütte (eds.), Politischer Aristotelismus und Religion in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit (­Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), pp. 47-64. A broader treatment of this topic is found in Id., “Homo animal nobilissimum”, I.709-778.

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of motion. What is inferior is equated with potentiality, while what is superior with actuality: in this sense, being in potentiality, the inferior can only be brought into actuality and set in motion by what is already in actuality.78 This idea is thus applied to the household: the one who is unable to move himself alone (i.e., the slave) because is not in a state of actuality is moved by someone who, in turn, can move himself alone (i.e., the master) and, therefore, the former has to obey the one who can move him. Later, starting with Book II, q. 1, Peter extends this analogy to the relationship between citizens and rulers and uses it in countless questions of the Questiones. By contrast, the other argument Peter uses in this section, i.e., in q. 11, to establish the slave’s dependence on his master—the slave is said to be a part of his master—does not apply to the citizens–rulers relationship. These questions lay the groundwork for justifying the existence in human society of those who command and others who are commanded. Peter, however, does not conflate the ruler–subject and the master–slave relationships: while the former is based solely on will (secundum uoluntatem), the latter is a mid-term between what is according to nature (secundum naturam) and according to will—the slave is naturally inferior to his master in intellectual terms and he also needs the will to perform his tasks. This means that only the first relationship is political in that it does not stem from a natural and compulsory condition, but rather requires consent and assent to the ruler’s command. Peter did not elaborate on the origins of political authority or on whether this resulted from an original agreement—he seems content to demonstrate that political authority exists within a relationship based on will.79 Medieval scholastic authors did not delve into the definition of political liberty.80 In Peter’s case, this is borne out by his definitions of the free man as whoever is able to move by himself alone towards an end and whoever is the cause of himself (liber est causa sui), that is, whoever is able to be the cause of his own actions, these definitions sourced from the Metaphysics rather than from the Ethics and the Politics.81 78  On this, see Christoph Flüeler, “Ontologie und Politik: Quod racio principantis sumitur ex racione actus et potencie”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41 (1994), pp. 445-462. 79  On this, see Chapter 3 of the monograph I am preparing. For the importance of consent in the Questiones, see Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 336-348. 80  See, however, Jürgen Miethke, “Selbstbewußtsein und Freiheit in der politischen Theorie der Scholastik”, in G. Mensching (ed.), Selbstbewußtsein und Person im Mittelalter. Symposium des Philo­ sophischen Seminars der Universität Hannover vom 24. bis 26. Februar 2004 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), pp. 153-171. 81  See, for instance, Liber IV, q. 12, ll. 39-40, 42: “liber est qui potest per se esse principium suorum motuum … Ratio ergo liberi est posse mouere se gratia sui ipsius”, and the Scriptum, III.11: “liber autem dicitur qui mente potest preuidere que agenda sunt et inclinatur ad uirtutem” (ed. Lanza, p. 88, ll. 70-71); V.7: “… secundum quod uult Philosophus, liberum est quod est causa sui, uel in genere cause agentis uel finalis. Vnumquodque autem maxime dicitur illud quod est principale in eo. In homine uero principale est intellectus, et ideo homo est maxime intellectus uel operatur secundum intellectum; ergo homo maxime dicitur liber cum operatur secundum intellectum et rationem et ad bonum sui secundum intellectum et ratione” (ibid., p. 321, ll. 549-555) and VII.2: “… sicut Philosophus dicit in 1º Metaphisice, liber est qui est sui ipsius causa, quod non potest intelligi sic quod aliquis sit causa sui ipsius primo – nichil enim est causa sui –, sed est intelligendum quod liber sit ille qui, secundum

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Peter equates freedom with the full possession of rationality and, when it comes to political matters, with the voluntary conformity to the principles of ‘political life’.82 As noted above (cf. q. 5), both the civitas and political actions stem from human reason and will and, therefore, by abiding to the rules an agent does not lose his freedom. For Peter, in terms of practical action, freedom is embodied principally in the virtue of prudence: whoever has prudence may attain his own goal and that of the political community, namely political happiness. No one can be a master, i.e., a free man, unless he possesses the ability to foresee (preuidere) the end (of a task). Without the capacity to reach an end and thus without having within himself the quality of moving, no one can move others. A slave needs to be moved by someone else because he is unable to achieve his outcome on his own. A remarkable feature of Peter’s treatment of this topic is that he underlines, on the one hand, that a slave possesses will and somewhat the moral virtues, and, on the other hand, that a slave completely lacks any sense of rational autonomy—this is the core of q. 10, on whether a slave is an instrument (of the master). Peter never fails to distinguish between slave qua man and slave qua slave, which is discussed in q. 11: whether a slave insofar as he is such belongs to his master. Since he wants to eschew the pitfall of establishing a specific difference within the human species, which would imply that there might be two kinds of human beings—free men and slaves—in q. 13 (on whether someone is a slave by nature), he bases the notion of ‘slave by nature’ not only on the lack of autonomous rationality but also on the bodily constitution of some human beings. Slavery is thus primarily a question of man’s individual nature. Peter is so concerned with avoiding the view that slavery may be understood as a characteristic of the whole human species that half of q. 13 aliquid proprium sibi, est causa sibi operandi. Et tunc ueritatem habet quod liber est sui ipsius causa in duplici genere cause: et in ratione agentis et in ratione finis. In ratione agentis, in quantum per aliquod principium quod est principale in eo operatur; in ratione autem finis, in quantum operatur ad finem sibi debitum secundum principium illud. Et quia homo maxime in esse constituitur per intellectum – est enim intellectus, uel maxime est secundum intellectum, secundum Aristotelem in 10º Ethicorum –, ideo homo liber dicitur qui per uirtutem intellectualem existentem in eo operatur, non accipiens ab alio rationem operandi nec inpedimentum habens ex parte materie, et qui operatur ad finem qui debetur ei secundum naturam predictam” (ibid., p. 456, ll. 296-p. 457, l. 310). The axiom Liber est causa sui is taken from the Metaphysics I.2, 982b25-26. It is also found in Thomas de Aquino, De regno ad regem Cypri I.1 p. 450, ll. 107-109: “nam liber est qui sui causa est, seruus autem est qui id quod est alterius est”. 82  See Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, V.7, p. 321, ll. 547-549, 553-557: “Et dicit quod non est opinandum seruitutem esse uiuere secundum politiam, immo libertatem et salutem … homo maxime dicitur liber cum operatur secundum intellectum et rationem et ad bonum sui secundum intellectum et ratione. Cum autem uiuit secundum politiam operatur secundum rationem; ergo uiuere secundum politiam non est esse in seruitute, sed libertate magis”. Peter reiterates this idea in q. 7 of his second Quodlibet: “… non enim est contra rationem libertatis moueri ab alio primo: etenim angeli, sancti et beatorum anime in quolibet actu suo mouentur a Deo, et tamen libere; subiecti etiam in politia liberorum mouentur a principante, et tamen libere, quia uoluntarie; et Philosophus, 5º Politice sue, dicit non oportet seruitutem ponere secundum rationem uiuere uel operari, propter quod, si uoluntas in actu suo sequitur rationem rectam, non est serua in hoc, sed libera magis” (Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 27va).

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(ll. 53-109) is devoted to arguing that the bodily constitution of an individual man influences his intellectual capacities. The structure of his argument is very similar to that of q. 9, where Peter demonstrates why the ‘bestial’ men cannot carry out a social life, and that of Book VII, qq. 8-9, where Peter addresses the influence of the heavenly bodies and climates on men’s mores:83 an unbalanced complexio influ­ences the bodily constitution and therefore the sensory organs, which in turn affects perception and thereby man’s intellectual capacities. For Peter, a human being is a slave on account of both his intellectual limits and physical strength (the latter distinguishes him from women). A slave, therefore, requires someone else who deliberates for him and directs him to perform his task—in Peter’s terms, someone who enables the slave to receive the “impressio consilii”.84 Peter’s emphasis on man’s bodily constitution explains why he raises the short q. 14, whether the bodies of slaves and free men are naturally different. Although this question is inspired by a remark in the Politics (I.5, 1254b27-31), wherein Aristotle says that the bodies of free men and slaves tend naturally to differ one to the other, Peter uses this question to underline that what distinguishes free men and slave cannot rest on a general specific feature. To put it in scholastic jargon: since man is a composite of matter and form, the distinctive trait of slavery has to reside in the matter of man’s individual nature. Throughout the Questiones, whenever Peter wants to avoid a conclusion that leaves no room for exceptions, he always employs one of the two argumentative strategies (and on occasion both together): either by emphasising man’s material dispositions, which influence his intellect per accidens, or by using the distinction between ‘perfect act’ and ‘imperfect act’. This is noticeable in the questions devoted to slavery and especially in q. 16, whether a good man naturally begets another good man and a slave another slave. The answer must obviously be negative; otherwise, as Peter says in the contra, one would be naturally good and not as a result of one’s choice and will. Despite this, by using the distinction between ‘perfect act’ and ‘imperfect act’ in the solutio, he can conclude that in the second way—as an imperfect act, i.e., as a mere natural inclination not yet fulfilled—individual behavioural characteristics, such as the inclination towards certain moral virtues like fortitude and temperance, can be naturally transmitted from father to son. Here too, however, Peter states that the balance of the complexio determines the good or bad disposition of the sensorial organs and influences one’s intellectual capacities. In part of the solutio of q. 16 (ll. 49-69), Peter also draws on Aristotle’s natural philosophy to explain how individual characteristics pass from father to son through the sperm. The counterpart to this question resides in the final four questions of Book IV, where Peter establishes the existence of nobility of birth as a hereditary inclination 83 

84 

See Chapter 1, sections 1.3 and 2.15, above. Liber I, q. 13, ll. 46-48.

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to virtue (see below). While not very relevant to understanding Peter’s views on politics, they reveal Peter’s approach to the Politics, one in which he sometimes gets carried away by his interests in natural philosophy. Moreover, they are not the result of an extravagant commentator on the Politics, but they have to be seen against the backdrop of the Arts Faculty of Paris, where the subject of heredity garnered the attention of the masters of arts.85 While the greater part of the questions of this group underscores the ‘material’ aspect of slavery, qq. 15 and 17 bring to the fore another side of the topic. Question 16, whether one who possesses an abundance of a good is naturally the master of one who is deficient in that good, expounds on Aristotle’s distinction, advanced in Politics I.6, between a slavery found where there is a superiority of one over another in terms of intellectual excellence and a slavery resulting from any other kind of superiority, be it a superiority in terms of physical prowess or wealth. Drawing on the distinction found in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics between three kinds of goods—goods of the soul, goods of the body and external goods—Peter maintains that only the first kind of slavery is just, since it follows from a distinction based on a good without qualification, while the others are good only in a qualified sense. This question has a main purpose: by defining man essentially by means of reason and intellect (ll. 28-29), Peter sets the main criterion by which he will assess every aspect of political life. In view of this, whoever is able to maximise his intellectual capacities deserves to be politically above the others. This premise is put into play in the questions of Book III dedicated to monarchy (see later herein). The last question in this group (q. 17: whether friendship exists between a master and a slave) is based on a short sentence by Aristotle (I.6, 1255b12-13), and Peter uses this question to distinguish ‘slavery by nature’—where there is a common interest between the slave and the master—from ‘violent slavery’, namely when a prisoner of war is forced into slavery. Note that Peter had not raised this distinction in q. 13 (whether someone is slave by nature). Peter tries to cover all aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of slavery, and his approach as a natural philosopher may well have taken some inspiration from the Politics itself—for instance, the analogy of the body and soul applied to the slave and the master (I.5, 1254b4-5). Peter does, however, clearly leave aside an extended discussion on slavery stemming from war. While arguably not the most critical topic of discussion for a thirteenth-century author, it may also have been the case that a commentary on the Politics was not seen as the right context in which to

85  On this, see the collective volume (and especially the introduction to the volume written by the editors) Maaike van der Lugt–Charles de Miramon (eds.), L’hérédité entre Moyen Âge et Époque moderne. Perspectives historiques (Firenze: S.I.S.M.E.L.–Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008).

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discuss war,86 especially given that Aristotle seldom addresses the relationship between different states in his work.87 Since Peter did not live in a slave-owning society, one might ask why he devoted so many questions to this issue. Arguably, he uses this section to lay down some of the guiding principles of his views on political phenomena and on society—Fioravanti noted how much Peter seems to have in mind farmers and craftsmen whenever he touches on slavery, though he never equates these two groups with slaves.88 In this sense, the more interesting feature of this set of questions is Peter’s use of this section of the Politics (chapters 3-7 of Book I) to present one of his leitmotifs throughout the Questiones—that the subject is always moved towards an end by the ruler—and his ‘anthropology’, according to which the bodily constitution of each individual human being affects his sensory and intellectual capacities and thus (to a certain extent) his behaviour. The fourth group of questions (qq. 18-28) covers chapters 7-11 of the Politics. Peter begins his exposition of this part by drawing attention to the initial sentence of chapter 7, where Aristotle recalls, in opposition to Plato, the idea maintained in chapter 1 that household rule is of a different kind from political rule. In the first question of this group (q. 18: whether household, despotic and political rule differ in kind), Peter argues that these forms of rule naturally differ in respect to the aims pursued: the end of despotic rule is the conservation of the household; the end of household rule is education and the end of political rule is self-sufficiency for the inhabitants of the civitas. The core of the solutio concentrates on arguing that, in each form, the ruler moves the subjects towards a specific end. Question 18 helps delineate the subject matter of the questions that come after it. Following the order of the Politics, we might expect the next question, i.e., q. 19, to concentrate on the sentence in chapter 8 discussing whether the art of household management and the art of acquiring wealth are the same (1256a3-5 and 13-14). While Peter does address this question, he does so later in q. 21.89 Between 86  There is, however, a brief presentation of the theory of just war in Book II, q. 19, ll. 13-22, though related to slavery. For a study on the link between just war and slavery in the Politics commentaries, especially those by Peter and Nicholas of Vaudémont, see Lidia Lanza, “Guerra e pace in Aristotele: alcune riflessioni sui commenti medievali alla Politica”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat …”, pp. 181-203, especially 186-193 [first published in Pace e guerra nel basso Medioevo. Atti del XL Convegno storico internazionale del Centro Italiano di Studi sul Basso Medioevo e dell’Accademia tudertina (Todi, 12-15 ottobre 2003) (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 2004), pp. 53-77]. Among the earliest question commentaries on the Politics, only the Vatican Anonymous and the Anonymous of Baltimore pose a question on the kind of slavery stemming from war: Vtrum aliquis uicto in bello debet esse iuste seruus (Liber I, q. 15 of the Vatican Anonymous) and Vtrum uictus in bello sit seruus iuste (Liber I, q. 12 of the Baltimore Anonymous). These questions are, however, very short and depend on Aquinas’ Politics commentary. 87  Peter refers to the relationship between different political communities in Book II, q. 15 and to some extent in Book II, q. 6, ll. 42-44. 88  See Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”. 89  There Peter establishes that the art of acquiring (possessiva) is subordinated to economics (yconomica).

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questions 18 and 21, he introduces two further questions suggested by a few lines of the Politics: I.8, 1256a19-22 and 1256b16-17. The fact that he highlights these lines signals his interests and approach in commenting on the Politics. The questions are: whether the distinction between kinds of lives results from the differences in the way of getting food (q. 19, which corresponds to 1256a19-22) and whether nature made every animal and plant for the sake of man (q. 20, which is taken from 1256b16‑17). The answer to both is affirmative. Regarding q. 20, Peter also draws on Avicenna’s Metaphysics90 and principally on the Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 96, art. 1, and IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 1. It may seem odd for Peter to raise these two questions here, for they seem unrelated to the household or to political topics, but he is pursuing two aims. First, by underlining the ‘naturalness’ of the acquisition of the ‘necessities of life’ and that, in feeding himself from plants and animals, man is acting in accordance with nature and the arrangement of the universe, Peter lays the groundwork for a defence, later in the Questiones, of the moral superiority of the acquisition of what is given by nature, such as food, over the acquisition of wealth through commerce and money exchange. Second, this ‘natural criterion’ allows him, in Book VI, to maintain the superiority, politically speaking, of the farmers and shepherds over craftsmen and merchants. Because farmers depend directly on nature for their survival and self-sufficiency—and self-sufficiency is what defines a political community—they are superior to other lower classes as far as political activity is concerned. Peter raises still another question related to chapter 8 of Book I: q. 22, on whether the desire for natural riches is unlimited (1256b31-37). This has to be seen in connection with the questions based on chapter 9, namely qq. 24 (whether riches in coin are true riches), 25 (whether desire for an end is unlimited) and 26 (whether the desire for artificial riches is unlimited). Question 22 is also inspired by the Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 1. Like Aquinas, Peter considers that any unlimited desire for things which are limited is wicked in itself. However, the main theme running through these questions—and also through q. 23, whether of anything we possess there are two uses—is that the notion of ‘nature’ works as the criterion for assessing the justness of an act. Whatever comes from ‘nature’ and is used within the boundaries of a natural purpose is deemed superior to what is derived from a human institution and that potentially can be used for more than its original purpose. This is because, as Peter remarks in q. 24 following on from the Nicomachean 90  It is interesting that Peter uses Avicenna in this question framed in metaphysical terms, as scholars have long remarked on the importance of Avicenna for Peter’s metaphysics. See, for instance, Sten Ebbesen, “The Logical Writings of Peter of Auvergne”, in C. Flüeler–L. Lanza–M. Toste (eds.), Peter of Auvergne. University Master of the 13th Century (Berlin–München–Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 71-88, at 83-88 and Amerini, “Peter of Auvergne on Substance”. Avicenna is not widely used in the Questiones, though he is an important source in the opening questions dedicated to the scientific status of politics.

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Ethics, what is natural is not changeable and is always necessary for man to stay alive, while the ‘artificial’ is liable to be changed since it depends on men’s will. As previously noted,91 q. 25 has no parallel in the text of the Politics and is raised in preparation for q. 26. It is the longest question in this group, being devoted to the definition of infinite and to the ways in which it can be conceived. This question reveals two of Peter’s main idiosyncrasies as a commentator on the Politics: he occasionally approaches the text more as a metaphysician and natural philosopher than as a commentator dealing with practical philosophy, and he attempts to provide a rationale for some of Aristotle’s claims that go far beyond the text of the Politics: such cases include the naturalness of human association, which Peter bases on bodily constitution; the justification that animals and plants were made for the sake of man (see above on qq. 19-20) and the definition of the virtue of the citizen (see below on Book III). Here, in q. 25, Peter uses Aristotle’s sentence that “in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end” (1257b28-30) as his starting point in addressing the question of whether man can desire an end infinitely. Despite his extensive use of ‘metaphysical arguments’ (cf. the solution of q. 24, where he draws on the Liber De causis to define ‘true wealth’), Peter follows the text of the Politics in these questions strictly, and his position remains faithful to the ideas put forth in the Politics I.9. By contrast, Peter is less faithful to Aristotle in the last two questions in this group. They deal with chapters 10-11 of Book I: q. 27, on whether the use of money-exchange (campsoria) can be made in accordance with justice, and q. 28, on whether one who lends money can take profit from it. While Peter follows Aristotle in rejecting usury (q. 28), he makes use of Henry of Ghent’s arguments found in two different quodlibetal questions92 and admits that money-exchange can be useful in large-scale trade.93 Question 27 is also interesting for another reason: it displays an argumentative strategy found in other questions of the Questiones, namely that an act may be unjust in absolute terms, while, given the circumstances, just per accidens. In Peter’s view, money was invented for the sake of acquiring the necessities of life and, therefore, the exchange of money for the sake of acquiring more money is unjust—it subverts the ‘natural’ purpose of money; instead of being a means, money turns into an end in and of itself. Moreover, if in the act of necessary money exchange—for instance, in the trade between people from different regions—one receives more than he gives, this is not according to arithmetical proportion; therefore, it does not respect the principles of commutative justice. 91 

See section 1 of the Introduction, above. See Chapter 4, section 7, above. 93  On this, see Lanza, “Ars acquirendi pecunias”, pp. 210-214. On the set of questions of the Questiones dealing with economic issues, see also the very brief account in Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. 400-402. 92 

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Taking as granted these premises in the first part of the solutio (ll. 21-52), Peter spends the second part (ll. 53-79) arguing that in a qualified sense (secundum accidens), one may receive more than he gives. This may happen on account of the value of the goods exchanged—this value may also depend on the standards and practices used in a given region—on account of the work the money changer has and on account of the value and usefulness of a currency in a given region. In this way, Peter qualifies the first part of the solutio. The questions related to economic topics take up only three chapters of Book I of the Politics (9-11), but they represent roughly one-fourth of the number of questions on Book I of the Questiones (and even more so if one excludes the first four questions on political science). This shows the importance Peter assigned to this topic. Moreover, none of the successive commentaries includes a question equivalent to q. 25 of the Questiones (on infinite), which is an indication that, unlike Peter, successive commentators refrained from dealing with topics not closely related to the Politics. The final questions of Book I cover the final chapter of Book I of the Politics (i.e., chapter 13), which tackles the question of how each member of the household possesses moral virtues. Peter formulates three questions that represent appropriately the content of this chapter: q. 29 (whether it is fitting that the slave qua slave has any virtue), q. 30 (whether the virtue of the master and of the slave is of the same kind) and q. 31 (whether it is fitting that the craftsman qua craftsman possesses a specific virtue). He returns to the ideas advanced earlier in Book I, though, here, the master is equated with activity and the slave with passivity (in the previous questions, Peter preferred the dyad mover–moved). Furthermore, Peter associates the notion of craftsman more closely with that of slave, something that helps to explain the exclusion of craftsmen from political activity advanced later in Book III.94 Once again, Peter dedicates three questions to a subject—slavery—which would seem secondary for a medieval author. Even so, these questions serve to introduce the notion of prudence, which, as we shall see, is crucial in the Questiones, principally in Books III, V and VII. Though in the previous questions dedicated to slavery Peter underlined the slave’s lack of rationality, now, in q. 29, he concedes that a slave needs prudence and the moral virtues, that is, what enables one to perform an action. Without prudence and the moral virtues, a slave would be dominated by his vices—he would not refrain from any wicked inclination—and he would be unable to obey and understand that he is required to carry out the task he was assigned and, in this way, reach the end of his action. This view is, however, qualified in the reply to the first argument, where Peter says that even though a slave has the capacity to deliberate and choose, such capacity is provided by the master, and in the successive question, where Peter clarifies that the prudence and virtues of the master and of 94  On this, see Martin, “Some Medieval Commentaries”, p. 43 and principally Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”.

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the slave are different in kind (“secundum rationem et speciem”). While the virtues of both aim for the same end, they are carried out in distinct ways: one actively and by directing, the other passively and by being directed. As Peter maintains in his reply to the second argument, while the moral virtues are the same for every individual of the human species, they do not develop in exactly the same way in each man but follow one’s individual characteristics—the way of being courageous and just cannot be the same in a slave and in a free man, for while a slave might be courageous in a battlefield, his action would necessarily follow the deliberation and command of his master. The emphasis Peter puts on prudence, in these questions, finds no parallel in the Politics. Book I of the Politics is far better covered in the Questiones than some of its other books, and all of its chapters are represented by at least one question in the Questiones, which does not hold for other books (for instance, Books IV and VI). Topics related to slavery and the household are therefore better represented in this commentary than themes related to the dynamics of political regimes. However, if we compare the list of questions on Book I with some chapters of Book II of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, which draw heavily on Book I of the Politics (read with the help of Aquinas’ commentary on it)95 and have some parallels in the Questiones, it becomes obvious that Peter pays less attention to Book I than Giles. The entire first part of Book II of the De regimine—24 chapters—addresses the household and specifically the relationship between husband and wife.96 Moreover, some chapters of the third part of its Book II touch on property, commerce and usury (chapters 7-12) as well as slavery (chapters 13-14). Giles delves more deeply into the role of each member of the household than does Peter, and Peter focuses more on slavery (qq. 10-17, 29-30) than does Giles. More importantly, what Giles takes no fewer than 12 chapters to address (chapters 1-11), Peter concentrates into just two long questions, namely 7 and 9: the substantiation of the naturalness of both the household (i.e., the union of man and woman) and society.97 These differences in emphasis between the two works can be accounted for by the aim of each author. The De regimine principum is a medieval mirror for princes addressed to a king: in the context of the king’s wife and sons being relevant figures in the kingdom, even from a political point of view, it is understandable that Giles allots more chapters to the household and its members. On the other hand, with a medieval king not being 95 

Cf. Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere”. Not all of the chapters are strictly related to the text of the Politics. 97  As we shall see in the pages to follow dedicated to Book II, the titles of some questions of Book II of the Questiones have a very similar wording to that of some chapters of Book III, Part 1, of the De regimine. This is not the case of Book I of the Questiones. It is possible, however, to find some parallelism between the following questions of Book I and chapters of the De regimine: Questiones I, q. 8–De reg. II/1.23; Questiones I, q. 12–De reg. II/3.13; Questiones I, q. 19–De reg. II/3.7; Questiones I, q. 20–De reg. II/3.5; Questiones I, q. 22–De reg. II/3.8; Questiones I, q. 27–De reg. II/3.10 and Questiones I, q. 28–De reg. II/3.11. 96 

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meant to own slaves, this particular issue was sensed as falling beyond the scope of the work. In contrast, the Questiones is an interpretation of the Politics, Book I of which deals more extensively with slavery than with the other relationships inside the household.

2. Book II Unlike in Book I, Peter does not attempt to cover all twelve chapters of Book II. The last chapters are all but ignored, for there are no questions related to chapters 10-12, and even chapter 9, which is fairly long, is almost completely overlooked. Peter simply drops the analysis of the Cretan, the Lacedaemon and the Carthaginian regimes as well as the ideas proposed by Solon and other Greek lawgivers (which Aristotle touched on briefly in chapter 12). Only the last question—on military life—can be related to Sparta. Peter was obviously uninterested in certain historical institutions mentioned by Aristotle; in a question commentary, it would not be pertinent to explain what the Ephorates, the ‘council of elders’ of the Lacedaemonian regime and the Helots and the Cosmi of the Cretan regime were or to discuss the importance of the common meals of Crete. What is more, some of the topics discussed in the last chapters of Book II are analysed more extensively by Aristotle in successive books: for instance, the way in which a king should be elected (merely touched on here in 1271a20-23 and 1272b37-1273a2 and discussed in greater detail in Book III) and the references to ‘deflections from oligarchy’ and from polity and democracy made in chapter 11, which are better illuminated by an examination of Books IV-V. The lack of interest in Greek history and the fact that the following books of the Politics examine oligarchy and democracy in more detail thus explain the absence of the final chapters of Book II of the Politics from the Questiones, precisely where references to these two regimes occur. By contrast, one-third of the questions on Book II (qq. 1-7) concentrate on Aris­ totle’s criticism of Plato’s political proposals, which are found in chapters 2-6 of Book II of the Politics. Like Albert and Aquinas, Peter was not familiar with Plato’s Republic and Laws, though he might have been aware, through the Timaeus, of Plato’s idea that wives and children were to be held in common.98 In any case, Peter neither brings the Timaeus into the discussion nor does he assess the justness of Aristotle’s criticism. More precisely, Peter does not even discuss the Laws; in fact, he raises two questions taken from chapter 6—where Aristotle deals with the Laws—but his discussion ignores what Aristotle says about it. These are ques98  Peter does indeed mention the Timaeus, but he does so in q. 29 of Book I. However, he takes the quotation from Albert’s commentary on the Politics; see the apparatus fontium to ll. 16-17 of that question. On this quotation, see section 6.1 of Chapter 4. As in his question commentary (WP) on the On the heavens Peter seems to draw on Aquinas and Simplicius for all information regarding the Timaeus, it can be inferred that he only had second-hand knowledge of this work; cf. Galle, Peter of Auvergne. Questions on Aristotle’s “De Caelo”, p. 114*.

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tions 7 (whether women should be trained in warfare) and 10 (whether the lawgiver ought to take the people and the location of the city into account when legislating). These two questions are based on incidental remarks made by Aristotle in chapter 6 (1264b37-38 and 1265a18-20), though q. 7 corresponds to one chapter of the De regimine principum (see later herein). It would also be misleading to state that Peter discusses the Republic or even how Aristotle portrays it; for instance, he simply passes over Aristotle’s criticism regarding specific points of Socrates’ proposals in the last part of chapter 5 (1264a11-b23). The only part Peter carries over from the chapters of the Politics dedicated to Plato’s Republic is the community of wives, children and property held in common, that is, the two main topics discussed by Aristotle in chapters 3-5. The way in which Peter handles this section of the Politics is somewhat surprising. He begins Book II with two questions: whether the political community is unified (q. 1) and whether the political community should be as unified as possible (q. 2). There, he defines the sort of unity that the political community must possess. These two questions are suggested by the Politics II.2, 1261a15-17: “I am speaking of the supposition from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, that it is best for the whole state to be as unified as possible” (this sentence corresponds to the Republic V.462). That said, while Aristotle rejects such unity, reasoning that, possessing the highest level thereof, the state would become a family, which would, in turn, dissolve the differences within the community, Peter engages here in a discussion on the notions of unity and indivisibility, which is more influenced by the Metaphysics than by the Politics. It is striking that Peter takes the title of q. 2 from Giles’ De regimine principum (III/1.8) and adds a previous question, and, while Giles frames the need for unity in every political community in terms of self-sufficiency, Peter structures the two questions around the notions of unity, motion and ordo. It would not be an overstatement to claim that the first two questions of Book II of the Questiones are among the questions that form the cornerstone of Peter’s understanding of politics, and, for this reason, they deserve to be presented here in more detail. In q. 1, Peter establishes that the civitas must have a ‘unity of order’ (unitas ordinis), that is, the kind of unity that takes place when the elements of an aggregate are distinct among themselves and, nevertheless, form a whole whose order is good in itself. Peter’s source is Metaphysics XII.10 (most probably in tandem with Aquinas’ commentary), where Aristotle illustrates this idea with the example of the army whose good depends more on the leader than vice versa—the idea being that the army possesses order insofar as its leader has a purpose. In these kinds of aggregates, the order is established for the sake of an end (victory in the case

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of an army).99 When it comes to the civitas, Peter conceives of its ‘order’ as one that has its origins in the ruler and, more specifically, in his relationship with the citizens, which is followed by the relationship the citizens establish towards the end aimed at by the ruler.100 To understand this particular view, we need to recall that Peter understands the ruler–citizen relationship as a mover–moved one. In fact, a few lines below, Peter states that, insofar as the ruler moves and the citizens are moved, they must do so as a single unit.101 Their unity is, however, not granted a priori, but rather it results from the fact that they have a common purpose, that is, to use Peter’s terms, from the fact that their common motion is for the sake of a single common end. Beyond this rather peculiar ‘spatial conception’ of political organisation, what Peter means is that, without a common purpose, there can be no relationship between the ruler and the citizens—they would merely be an aggregate of people. Since the ‘order’ of the civitas begins with the ruler, one might conclude that it is the ruler who imposes the end on the citizens, but this is not what Peter says. On the contrary, he states that both elements move and are moved per uoluntatem.102 In other words, there must be an agreement between the citizens and the rulers regarding the end to be pursued, that is, about the kind of political regime under which the community will live.103 Peter lists four kinds of orders that exist in the civitas: 1) the ruler towards the end; 2) the ruler towards the citizens; 3) the citizens among themselves; 4) the citizens towards aliens (though, for Peter, this last order is less important). All these orders are related to an end, which assures the ‘unity of order’ of the entire civitas. So, as long as the citizens cling to the same end they have chosen together with the rulers, the political community will remain unchanged; but, once the end is altered, the community and its order will change as well.104 In q. 2, Peter reiterates these ideas but introduces here the analogy between the community and the animal body and the universe, which reappears several times throughout the Questiones. Just as in the animal the activity of a limb is directed 99  This view taken from the Metaphysics was later quoted by authors of De potestate papae treatises to argue in favour of the supremacy of the pope over the whole body of the Church; cf. Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 157-158. 100  Cf. Liber II, q. 1, ll. 36-38. For the sake of clarity, it must be stressed that when Peter speaks of ruler, he means indistinctly ruler and rulers (who, in his view, rule as one). His reasoning applies to every political regime. 101  Cf. Liber II, q. 1, ll. 40-44. 102  Cf. ibid., ll. 42-43. 103  We should not lose sight of the fact that Aristotle had already stated that every form of government aims at an end (Politics IV.1, 1289a17). 104  Cf. Liber II, q. 1, ll. 56-58. On the role of consensus in the Questiones, see Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 336-348; Id., “The Parts and the Whole”; Lidia Lanza, “Comprendere il consenso esaminando il dissenso. Aristotele e i commenti alla Politica di Pietro d’Alvernia”, Storia del Pensiero Politico 9 (2020), pp. 233-251.

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towards the activity of the whole—the feet move and the ears hear in a manner that is beneficial for the whole animal—so too, in the civitas, the activity of every citizen must be directed towards the good of the whole.105 The activity of the whole does not obliterate the specific activity of each member—Peter will reiterate this in q. 5 of Book V. Throughout the remainder of the Questiones, Peter repeatedly stresses the necessity for a civitas to strive for a single end and for each form of government to pursue a specific aim. It is, however, in Book V that Peter again takes up the question of the order of the civitas and its end. Later commentators on the Politics tended to separate Book I from the other books, reasoning that the first book rather belonged to economics, the discipline related to the household, and that it was only with Book II that Aristotle began to deal with politics. Seen in this light, the first two questions of Book II of the Questiones provide the occasion for Peter to expound on the political principles that a civitas should adhere to—pursuing one single goal without cancelling out the differences between citizens. On a deeper level, however, these questions allow Peter to present his understanding of what a civitas is. If we were to select the keywords of qq. 1-2, they would be chiefly finis and ordo, but also uoluntas, principans and ciues. In q. 12 of Book I, Peter argued that in every aggregate constituting a unity per se, there must be one who commands and one who obeys. There, he clearly distinguished between aggregates per se and aggregates that are only so per accidens, such as a heap of stones or a multitude of people. Finally, he emphasised that the relationship between one who commands and one who obeys has a volitional foundation—it is established secundum uoluntatem. Now, by using the notions of finis and ordo in q. 1 of Book II, Peter further broadens his view: what distinguishes a civitas from a mere aggregate of people is that in the former, there is an ‘order’ resulting from an agreed-upon purpose, which in turn implies that, to reach said purpose, there must be rulers and subjects/citizens. To put it in Peter’s terms, an aggregate of people with neither a common purpose nor ruler is nothing more than matter—it requires a form to become a civitas. The form is named politia, which, as Peter repeats throughout the Questiones, is an ‘order’. As Peter will state in Book III, q. 12 and Book VI, q. 6, said order involves the arrangement of public offices within the political community, and it varies in accordance with the form of government. The notions of finis and ordo represent something more than commanding and being commanded because they suggest a structure in which its elements are properly disposed towards each other and towards the whole of which they are a part. These notions also warrant rules and cooperation (even if hierarchically). This stands in opposition to a mere power relationship or the assembling of social animals in a geographic location. On this account, finis and ordo also imply a rational 105 

Cf. Liber II, q. 2, ll. 63-69.

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act—deliberation about the means to attain the pursued end, i.e., about which kind of ‘order’ the civitas must have—as well as a volitional one—the choice made by the citizens to continuously engage in the pursuit of such an end, in accordance with the chosen order. Finally, an order involves defined roles and structured relationships: between rulers and citizens and between the citizens one to another. Peter draws on these ideas—absent from the Politics—to frame his interpretation of the Politics in the Questiones. The following questions address the community of wives, children and property. They are quite interesting, as they reveal one significant feature of the Questiones: to go far beyond the Politics whenever Peter feels the need to substantiate an idea on anthropological grounds.106 This is evident in almost every question of the group of questions related to Plato’s communism. Peter is undoubtedly faithful to Aristotle, but the way in which he invalidates communism is distinctive to himself. He also makes use in these questions of two notions that would play a crucial role in the Questiones, namely political prudence (in Books III, V and VII) and political friendship (in Book V). Question 3, on whether what is in common is cared for the least, serves as the introduction to this group of questions. It is inspired by the Politics II.3, 1261b33-35 (“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it”) and there Peter provides a philosophical substantiation for private ownership. Peter uses Aristotle’s idea of virtuous self-love advanced in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, that the virtuous man wishes to secure for himself the highest moral and intellectual goods and that every kind of love starts with self-love, to state that men care most for their own things. In II.5, 1263a41-b5, Aristotle does state that a man feels pleasure in ownership, as self-love is natural, but he does not connect ownership directly with the virtuous self-love of the Ethics, which looks at immaterial, not material, goods. As is his wont, Peter is not content with Aristotle’s explanation for the fact that one cares less for what is common. Indeed, he ends the solutio by drawing first on Book II of the On the Soul to argue that what is suitable to something is somehow similar to it and that our own things are more similar to us, and secondly on Book III of the same work, where Aristotle states that the will cannot desire an object unless the intellect regards it as suitable and pleasurable. In this way, Aristotle’s statement that we care more for what is our own is rooted in the very structure of the human mind, as human beings naturally seek what is ‘more subitable’ to them—owned things are precisely that. Peter’s need to substantiate the claims of the Politics in a much deeper way is also clear in q. 5, where he deals with incest. Aristotle’s criticism of Plato is essentially centred on the consequences arising from the community of wives and children. 106  Unlike what happens in Book I, Peter does not mention here the notion of individual bodily constitution. The expression ‘anthropological grounds’ means human behaviours that can be understood as general traits of human beings.

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While Aristotle does not base the moral wrongdoing of incest on human nature, Peter thinks it is necessary to establish that it is unnatural, and this is why he introduces a question on this issue. His arguments here are taken from the Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 154, art. 9. As we shall see, the presence of the Summa in Book II of the Questiones extends to more questions. Question 4, on whether it is expedient for the political community that wives and children should be held in common, is relevant for the remainder of the Questiones, as here Peter uses the notions of political prudence and political friendship. Throughout the Questiones, political prudence is consistently distinguished from prudence in general: Peter uses it whenever he refers to the virtue through which a man relates to the common good and attains practical happiness. Instead, he reserves the notion of ‘prudence’ (sometimes prudentia monostica) to refer to individual prudence; that is, the virtue through which one individual qua individual (and not qua citizen) deliberates on the means of his actions not related to the common good.107 Roberto Lambertini has demonstrated that the notion of prudentia politica was derived from Eustratius’ interpretation of the Ethics VI.8, but that this notion became important in the Middle Ages on account of the section of the Summa theologiae IIa-IIae on prudence.108 There, Aquinas distinguishes between prudence (related to the actions of the moral agent in his sphere) and political prudence (related to the common good), the latter being further subdivided into a prudentia regnativa—specific to the ruler—and a prudentia politica simplici­ ter—specific to the citizens.109 Aquinas is Peter’s source, though theirs views do not completely coincide.110 As to the notion of political friendship, Peter takes it from the Nicomachean Ethics (see later herein on Book V). In the specific context of q. 4, the notion of political prudence serves to stress the necessity that each citizen relates to the common good and to the purpose of the civitas in accordance with right reason—the vice of intemperance that would follow from women being held 107 For prudentia politica, see, for instance, Liber I, q. 6, ll. 35-36; Liber II, q. 4, ll. 24-25; q. 6, ll. 62-63, q. 8, ll. 53-54. For prudentia, see Liber I, q. 13, ll. 33-35; q. 29, ll. 31-32; Liber II, q. 3, ll. 14-20, 22-24; q. 18, ll. 33-43. 108  Cf. Roberto Lambertini, “Est autem et politica et prudencia, idem quidem habitus: appunti sul rapporto tra prudentia e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro dell’Ethica Nicomachea (da Alberto Magno a Buridano)”, Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics 2 (2002) available at (last accessed on 18.05.2022): https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/5492/1/Lambertini_E%26P_IV_2002_2. pdf; Id., “Political Prudence in Some Medieval Commentaries on the Sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics”, in I.P. Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, 1200-1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 223-246, especially pp. 226-235. Lambertini underscores that, while Aquinas takes some ideas from Eustratius, his position is not totally coincident with Eus­ tratius’. 109  Thomas de Aquino, Secunda secundae Summae theologiae a quaestione I ad quaestionem LVI, q. 48, art. 1, p. 366: “… prudentia quae est multitudinis regitiva dividitur in diversas species secundum diversas species multitudinis … et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est in principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta”. 110  See Toste, “Virtue and the City”.

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in common would pervert reason.111 By contrast, political friendship is used here to argue that, without strong ties binding the citizens and a shared common purpose, the civitas cannot endure—this is be the main theme of Book V of the Questiones. While the use of prudence and teleology in these initial questions of Book II is remarkable, as the Politics makes no allusion to either notion here, the same cannot be said about the need for friendship. Peter mentions friendship in qq. 2 and 4, obviously having in mind Politics II.4, 1267b7-9 (“for friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions”) and Ethics VIII.1, 1155a22-23 (“Friendship seems too to hold states together”).112 He ends his examination of the chapters dedicated to Plato’s communism with q. 6, on whether possessions should be held in common, and q. 7, on whether women should take part in warfare. In q. 6 Peter follows Aristotle view that “property should be private, but the use of it common” (II.5, 1262b39-40), because men feel pleasure both in possessing things of their own—which justifies private property— and in giving to their friends, which is possible only if the use of fungible goods is common (if property were held in common, men would not practise the virtue of liberality). Peter tries to justify the pleasure felt in either case by turning to the Ethics.113 Significantly, he never refers to natural law in these questions114 and, unlike Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, does not claim that Plato’s communism should be understood only with regard to man’s condition before the Fall.115 Finally, in q.

111  While the idea that the community of wives would cause intemperance is taken from the Politics II.5, 1263b7-9, the notions of right reason and prudence are obviously specific to Peter here. 112  Question 4—but also q. 3 and 6 of Book II—reveals another major feature of the Questiones: the need to justify many of Aristotle’s assertions by turning (sometimes freely) to the Nicomachean Ethics; cf. Chapter 4, above. This question is indeed a case in point (see also the next footnote): in addition to Peter’s references to prudence and political friendship, in q. 4 he also quotes Ethics VIII.4, 11158a10-12 (“one cannot be a friend to many people” for “love is a sort of excess”) and Ethics IX.7, 1168a24-26 (“These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder of their children than fathers … and they know better that children are their own”) to invalidate Plato’s community of wives and children. This is remarkable, since Aristotle does not make such cross-references in this section of the Politics. 113  Aristotle’s reference to pleasure triggers Peter to mention the Ethics X.5 to explain that, by feeling pleasure, one increases an activity, and the Ethics II.1 to argue that men take pleasure from that to which they are more accostumed—the activity of the moral virtues is pleasurable because it results from both nature and habit. The pleasure associated with ownership is thus grounded in human nature. 114  This was not the case of Nicholas of Vaudémont’s questions on the Politics; cf. Buridanus, Questiones, II, q. 2, ff. 26rb-28va. 115  For Giles, see Fioravanti, “Politiae Orientalium et Aegyptiorum”, p. 222; Lambertini, “Philosophus videtur tangere”, pp. 313-316 (who deals also with Henry of Ghent); Lanza, “La Politica di Aristotele e il De regimine principum di Egidio Romano”, pp. 289-292. On qq. 4 and 6, see also Jessica Rosenfeld, “Arts of Love and Justice: Property, Women and Golden Age Politics in Le Roman de la Rose”, in A. Butterfield–I. Johnson–A. Kraebel (eds.), Literary Theory and Criticism in the Later Middle Ages: Interpretation, Invention, Imagination. Essays in Honour of Alastair Minnis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022). Rosenfeld draws relevant parallels between the Questiones, Aquinas’ Politics commentary and the Roman de la Rose on the matter of the desire involved in ownership.

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7, Peter disapproves of the participation of women in warfare for the reason that their physiology is inadequate. After q. 7, the Questiones has three questions on law, two of which are taken from the Summa theologiae: q. 8 (whether law is something that pertains to reason), q. 9 (whether law is directed to the common good) and q. 10 (whether the lawgiver ought to take the people and the city location into account when legislating). Questions 8 and 9 bear no relationship with the Politics; instead, their source is the Summa theologiae, and they correspond exactly to Ia-IIae, q. 90, articles 1 and 2, respectively, both with regard to their titles and contents. Question 10, on the other hand, is suggested by the text of the Politics (II.6, 1265a18-20). Peter frames the solution to this question in teleological terms: drawing on the Aristotelian idea that, in morals, the purpose/end of an action is the principle of that action, Peter argues that the law has to be related to the ‘common end’ aimed for by the political community. The idea of a connection between law and end is reminiscent of Aquinas (Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2). From this, it becomes clear that Peter raises qq. 8-9, which are alien to the Politics, to serve as the foundation for q. 10, which is actually related to the Politics. Despite its brevity, q. 10 is key to understanding Peter’s interpretation of the Politics. This is because Peter establishes therein that the lawgiver must not enact the best laws in absolute terms, but rather laws that are appropriate to the characteristics and moral abilities of his fellow citizens, which means that, under certain circumstances, good laws secundum quid may be more suitable than the best laws simpliciter, such as in the case in which a given people is not prepared to abide by laws that foster the highest degree of moral virtue.116 Peter’s procedure of drawing on the Summa to pose a question that prepares the ground for the subsequent question is found later again in qq. 16-17 of Book II: question 17, on whether the law should be changed if another law supersedes it, is preceded by the question as to whether the law is to be changed. The two questions have counterparts in Politics II.8, 1268b26-28, though Aristotle addresses this matter only briefly. In truth, Peter emphasises the problems arising from changes to the law because he has in mind Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1-2, the titles of which are very close to those of the qq. 16-17 of the Questiones. Here Peter follows Aquinas completely: he once again makes use of an opportunity offered by the text of the Politics to raise questions taken from the Summa theologiae. Since Peter takes the title of four questions from the De legibus section of Aquinas’ Summa (qq. 8-9 and 16-17), one might ask why he limited himself to precisely these questions, which address only positive law, and did not raise any question related to natural law. Three reasons can be advanced: first, Aristotle also does not 116  On this, see Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 304-307, where it is underlined that Marsilius of Padua follows this view.

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deal with natural law in the Politics; second, natural law was typically discussed in the commentaries on Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics; third, natural law was associated with moral principles, while the scope of politics was understood as falling within the more limited field of positive law. The organisation of the civitas and its offices, the forms of government and their changes, citizenship and political happiness: all these topics are only indirectly related to natural law. This is also the reason for the absence of a detailed exploration of natural law in the Defensor pacis and other works influenced by the Politics. A further group of questions in Book II is formed by qq. 11-15. Taking Phaleas of Chalcedon’s opinion that the citizens should have equal possessions (reported in Politics II.7, 1266a39-40) as his point of departure, Peter dedicates no fewer than five (albeit brief) questions to the discussion of the regulation of property in the political community. It is worth noting that these five questions are related to one single chapter of the Politics, and more importantly, this topic—the regulation of property and the setting of limits to the accumulation of wealth by individual citizens—is thus the most discussed theme in Book II of the Questiones (six questions as against five on law).117 The weight Peter assigns to this subject is easily explained if we take into account his arrangement of Book V: there, instead of commenting one by one on Aristotle’s causes of revolution, Peter attempts to lay down the principles that would enable a community to avoid upheavals and any given regime to endure. The fact that he completely rearranges Book V—but no other book—indicates that one of his main concerns in the Questiones is the formulation of the principles for avoiding discord so that any political regime, except tyranny, might endure. Aristotle (and Peter) maintains in Book V that inequality (in property or income), or better said, the “desire for equality”—along with the misconception of equality—are the main cause of rebellion (V.1, 1301b26-27 and V.2, 1302a22-32). Here, in Book II, Peter already employs the distinction, explained in Book V of the Ethics, between numerical and proportional equality (1301b29-30). Bearing in mind what Peter does in Book V, it quickly becomes evident that he dedicates so much attention to the regulation of property in Book II precisely because he is already concerned with the political means of averting discord. In fact, in q. 12 (whether it is expedient for the community that possessions should be equal), he argues that numerical equality causes quarrels.118 That this group of questions of Book II of the Questiones is closely related to Book V is made even more evinced through Peter’s use of expressions such as ‘unio ciuium’ and peace in the solution of q. 14. ‘Vnio ciuium’ and peace are precisely the two main expressions that mark Peter’s interpretation of Book V (see below). 117  The question of private property is also discussed in q. 6, but this takes place in relation to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato. 118  See Liber II, q. 12, ll. 35-43 and ad 2.

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Questions 14 (on whether it ought to be allowed for citizens to acquire as much wealth as possible and without limits) and 15 (on whether the limit of wealth should be observed with respect to something external to the civitas) are also telling, since they reveal how much Peter’s approach differ from Aristotle’s. Peter leaves aside the practical examples of Aristotle and approaches the issue of regulation of property in teleological terms: whatever is allowed in the political community must relate to the specific end pursued by the community. However, as Peter underlined in Book I, seeking unlimited wealth constitutes an end in and of itself and so it bears no relation to the end of the community. It thus paves the way for the existence of two different ends in the community and, thus, to dissension. It is remarkable how much, throughout the Questiones, Peter tends to ‘reduce’ numerous issues found in the Politics to a question of basic tenets and to reiterate his idea that the civitas must aim for one single end agreed upon by the citizens.119 It is in questions such as these that one fully understands that in the Questiones Peter is undertaking a ‘scientific’ examination, one that lays down the fundamentals of politics. The two final questions of Book II are dedicated to slavery (q. 18: whether there is some discipline regarding slaves) and to military life (q. 19: whether the exercise of warfare is the cause of the development of many moral virtues). While the former relates to one of the topics Peter emphasises in Book I, i.e., slavery, and repeats what already said there, the second remains an isolated case in the Questiones. One can explain the presence of this topic here by recalling the importance of both warfare and knightly aristocracy in Peter’s contemporary society. Note that q. 7 of Book II is also dedicated to warfare (whether women may take part in warfare; see above). While this question is of little importance in the Politics, both Peter and Giles of Rome dedicate a great deal of time to it.120 It is therefore important for him to underline that military life implies a virtuous behaviour (insofar as it is related to the common good and within a just war). This is so important that, in the second part of the solutio of q. 19 (ll. 27-55), Peter demonstrates the way in which the act of one moral virtue (say, courage) encompasses the other virtues too. We can thus discern three main groups in Peter’s layout of Book II: qq. 1-7 are related to Plato’s communism; qq. 11-15 address property and its regulation; qq. 8-10 and 16-17 are dedicated to positive law. The list of questions of Book II gives rise to a difficulty. Up to this point in my account, I have assumed that such a list was Peter’s own creation. However, a comparison of the list of questions of Book II of the Questiones with the list of chapters of the first part of Book III of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum reveals a striking similarity—one even more remarkable than with regard to Book I, because 119 

See Liber II, q. 14, ll. 28-40. On this, see James Blythe, “Women in the Military: Scholastic Arguments and Medieval Images of Female Warriors”, History of Political Thought 22 (2001), pp. 242-269. 120 

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the titles of the questions of Book II have almost the same wording as the titles of Giles’ chapters.121 Here is the list of the common questions: Questiones Liber II

De regimine principum Liber III, Pars I

q. 2

=

chapter 8

q. 3

=

chapter 9

q. 4

=

chapter 10

q. 6

=

chapter 11

q. 7

=

chapter 12

q. 11

=

chapter 16

q. 12

=

chapter 17

q. 13

=

chapter 18

Almost half of the questions of Book II have a correspondent chapter in the De regimine principum. It is noteworthy that Book II of the Politics attracted the attention of Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca. The latter dedicated almost an entire book—Book IV—of his continuation of Aquinas’ De regno to the political regimes examined in Book II of the Politics.122 It is somewhat surprising that medieval authors spent so much time examining the regimes of Hippodamus of Miletus, Crete and Sparta. Giles of Rome takes so much interest in Book II of the Politics that he reserves the last two chapters (19-20) of the first part of Book III of the De regimine for an account of the regime proposed by Hippodamus. As we have seen, Peter does not mention Hippodamus’ regime; he touches only on the question posed by Aristotle in chapter 9—devoted to Hippodamus—on whether it is expedient to make changes in the law. Thus, assuming that Peter used the De regimine to draw up his list of questions on Book II, we need to ask why he did not also include chapters 19-20 of the De regimine on Hippodamus. One answer might be that, since the chapter on Hippodamus covers at length the threefold division of citizens into artisans, husbandmen and warriors (1268a16-b4) as well as arbitration (1268b4-25), Peter may have thought that the following books of the Politics were more suitable contexts for addressing these two topics. In fact, the parts or social groups that constitute the community are discussed in the Politics IV.4 (1290b24-1291b11) and in VII.8 (1328a41-b23), and arbitration is tackled in III.15 (1286a24-b7). This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that Peter discusses IV.4

121 

The lines of reasoning of each work are, however, distinct. As already noted, Ptolemy draws heavily on Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics (Book II) to write Book IV of his section of the De regno; in fact, this book by Ptolemy resembles a commentary on the Politics. See the study mentioned in note 148 of the Introduction. 122 

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in q. 4 of Book IV and III.15 in q. 24 of Book III (see later herein).123 Moreover, a discussion on warriors, as found in the chapter on Hippodamus of Book II of the Politics, seems more expedient in a work such as the De regimine intended for princes and with a readership including noblemen than in a university commentary on the Politics. The audience of Giles’ and Ptolemy’s works, being found outside the university milieu, is indeed what explains their attention to the historical political regimes described in the Politics. Conversely, Peter’s aim in lecturing on the Politics was not one of moralising his audience and reforming its behaviour—in fact, there are no historical exempla in the Questiones—but rather of constructing a ‘scientific’ theory about political phenomena. The historical material in Book II of the Politics is thus of little use to him. While Peter used the De regimine to arrange his interpretation of Book II, he was quite selective about what he appropriated from it.124 He clearly made use of Giles when it came to the questions related to Plato and Phaleas, but he went beyond Giles’ approach when dealing with the regime of Phaleas, for he raised two more questions (qq. 14-15) with no correspondent in the De regimine. On the other hand, he did not include in the Questiones chapters 13-15 of the first part of Book III of the De regimine. Since these chapters still deal with Plato’s communism, it is probable that Peter considered five questions on Plato (which correspond to chapters 8-12 of the De regimine) sufficient for a commentary on the Politics—indeed, throughout the Questiones Peter rarely dedicates more than two or three questions to a chapter of the Politics. Certainly, Peter and Giles had different aims with respect to Book II. Unlike Giles, Peter downplayed the analysis of the regimes presented by Aristotle, and he also took this book as the occasion to advance Aquinas’ concept of law. The five questions he devotes to law here serve as the stepping stone for what comes next: qq. 8-9 permit an understanding of the emphasis running all through Book III on prudence and on the law as something pertaining to practical reason; q. 10 is the first formulation of a basic idea of the Politics, namely that every political regime has to be adapted to the citizens and circumstances in order to endure; qq. 16-17 articulate the idea that marks the other books of the Politics, and especially Book V, that, in politics, changes (of laws and even more so of regimes) should be avoided. The list of questions of Book II of the Questiones is interesting for another reason. As noted earlier, masters of the Arts Faculty of Paris used other works to arrange the list of questions of their commentaries, the use of the Summa theologiae in the 123  As already noted, the Questiones comes to an end before Politics VII.8. I am obviously assuming here that Peter already knew the content of the successive books of the Politics while commenting on Book II. Surprising as it may seem, not all commentators had read the entire work before starting their commentaries. This seems to have been the case regarding Albert the Great’s commentary; cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 316-321. 124  The same regards Book I of the Questiones.

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Ethics commentaries being perhaps the most notable case. In Book II, Peter used the same strategy of his fellow masters: he arranged Book II by drawing on the Summa and on the De regimine.

3. Book III This book of the Questiones can be easily divided into six very well-defined topics: qq. 1-8 are dedicated to the definition of a citizen; qq. 9-10 deal with the distinction between despotic and domestic rule; qq. 11-13 explain how political regimes are differentiated (as we shall see, these two groups can be dealt with together); qq. 14-17 examine the legitimacy of the access of the multitude to public offices and w ­ hether they can have lordship; qq. 18-20 cover the criteria for the allocation of public offices; and, finally, qq. 21-26 are broadly dedicated to monarchy and to justifying its superiority over the other political regimes. Seven of the twenty-six questions are related to the topic of citizenship,125 which means that more than one-fourth of Book III of the Questiones is dedicated to it. The second most discussed topic is kingship, closely followed by the access of the multitude to power. The Questiones accurately reflects the structure and the main discussions of Book III of the Politics. It is somewhat surprising, however, that Peter does not focus more on chapter 9, which addresses the topic of what constitutes a political community as well as the need for both a common purpose for society and political friendship. Later commentators in fact posed just such a question on the main topic of chapter 9—whether living according to political virtue is the purpose of the political community.126 Peter probably felt that such a question was superfluous, since he touches on political friendship in Book V (see later) and on happiness—the ultimate purpose of political life—all throughout the Questiones and especially in Book VII. Significantly, the only sentence from chapter 9 that draws Peter’s attention is that “most people are bad judges in their own case” (1280a15-16), the subject matter of q. 14. Peter sets aside seven questions for the topic of citizenship. They form a coherent, progressive series of questions: whether, in studying the political regime (politia), we should first study the political community (civitas), which is the title of q. 1, followed by whether, in studying the political community (civitas), we should first consider the citizen (i.e., q. 2). These two questions serve as an introduction to Book III, and, in them, Peter’s thoughts revolve around the dyads form–matter and part– whole, which correspond to the dyads political regime–citizens and citizen–city, 125  Although the first eight questions of Book III are dedicated to citizenship, q. 5 stands as an isolated case within this group (see later herein). This is the reason I mention only seven (not eight) questions here. 126  See q. 8 of Book III of the Anonymous of Munich and of the Anonymous of Stuttgart, q. 17 of Vincent Gruner and q. 7 of the Anonymous of Basel; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.144, 147, 150, 155.

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respectively. While Aristotle explicitly formulates the latter (III.1, 1274b39-41), he only suggests the former (III.3, 1274a30-b13).127 After these two preliminary questions, taken from the initial lines of Book III, chapter 1 (1274b32-38), Peter raises two further questions related to chapter 1: whether a citizen is strictly speaking whoever can participate in consultative and judicial offices (q. 3), and whether the definition of citizen is the same with respect to every political regime (q. 4). After q. 5, on whether the city always remains the same numerically, Peter dedicates no fewer than three questions (qq. 6-8) to the crucial topic of chapter 4, whether the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the good man are one and the same, which shows the importance Peter assigns to it. As he does on other occasions, here again Peter introduces an initial question with no counterpart in the Politics but which question is expressly aimed at further delving into the topic at hand: this is q. 6, whether there exists some virtue of the citizen qua citizen per se. Clearly, by defining what kind of virtue the virtue of the citizen is, Peter lays the groundwork for q. 7 (whether the virtue of the citizen is the same with respect to every political regime) and establishes that the virtue of the good man and that of the citizen—which Aristotle never really defined—are not the same. Peter’s views on citizenship advanced in these first questions on Book III and in the Scriptum are one of the most studied aspects of his interpretation of the Politics. Scholars have not only examined his definition of citizen, but, principally, how influenced he was by medieval social stratification. This influence is clear in Peter’s endeavours to provide arguments, on the one hand, in favour of an understanding of the nobility by birth as the most fitting class to hold public offices and, on the other, against the political participation (at least in just political regimes) of the lower classes such as the craftsmen (bannausi), traders (negotiatores), sailors, farmers, shepherds and the poor.128 Another aspect of Peter’s interpretation of citizenship that has been studied is his assessment of the distinction between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man.129 127  The dyad form–matter possesses an importance in the Questiones that has no parallel in the Politics; Peter uses it in qq. 1, 5, 11 and 12. And even the dyad part–whole undergoes an important change in q. 4 of Book VII of the Questiones. 128  See Grignaschi, “La définition du civis dans la Scolastique”, Anciens Pays et Assemblées d’Etats 35 (1966), pp. 71-100; Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”; Meier, Mensch und Bürger, pp. 84-96; Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 274-290; Lanza, “Ars acquirendi pecunias”, pp. 216-223; Patrick Gilli, “Cité et citoyens dans la pensée politique italienne et française (fin XIIIe-fin XIVe siècle). Unité et diversité des lectures d’Aristote”, in A. Lemonde–I. Taddei (eds.), Circulation des idées et des pratiques politiques. France et Italie (XIIIe-XVIe siècles) (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2013), pp. 33-57; Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 288-298. 129  See Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, pp. 32-48; Ead., “Il finis hominis nell’Etica e nella Politica di Aristotele. Note su alcuni commenti del secolo XIII”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat …”, pp. 73-114, at 104-114 [first published, in a slightly different version, in Medioevo e Rinascimento 12 (1998), pp. 143-181]; Toste, “Virtue and the City”, pp. 85-93. See also chapter 3 of my monograph on the medieval commentary tradition on the Politics.

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Each of the questions that form this first set of questions of Book III is interesting for a specific reason. The first two questions denote Peter’s typical approach of using other texts of the corpus Aristotelicum to interpret the Politics. Peter begins by addressing Aristotle’s remark at the beginning of Book III of the Politics that, since the political community is a “whole made up of many parts—these are the citizens” (1274b39-40), the examination of the different forms of government must commence with the definition of ‘citizen’, that is, with the parts that constitute the whole. In q. 1, on whether, when examining a political regime (politia), one ought to begin with the civitas, Peter bases the solutio on the opening lines of the Physics, which state that any investigation must begin with that which is simplest and with things more familiar to us, and argues that the concept of civitas is more familiar to us than the notion of a political regime (politia). This is because civitas stands to politia as animal to animalness i.e., as what is material to what is abstract. Then, in q. 2, on whether who considers the civitas should first consider what a citizen is, Peter draws again on the beginning of the Physics and explains in a lengthy solutio (almost fifty lines in the edition) the process by which we gain knowledge of a whole and its parts. Following on from Aristotle, Peter states that we first achieve an approximate cognition of the parts followed by cognition of the whole and, finally, of the parts in a complete way. In the case at hand, in which the civitas is a whole which, while made of different parts that together constitute an ‘order’, exists prior to its parts, it means that the citizens are what we first are aware through our sensory experience. That said, we can fully comprehend what a citizen is only after we have understood what a civitas is. After these methodological explanations, Peter addresses the definition of cit­ izen in q. 3, on whether the citizen strictly speaking is he who is capable of participating in the counselling and judicial offices. This question is related to the Politics III.1, 1275b18-20, where Aristotle states that whoever takes part in deliberative and judicial offices is considered a citizen. Here, Peter draws two important distinctions. First, because the citizen is a part of a whole, he must be defined according to the form of the whole. If one is able, through one’s activity, to participate in the activity of the whole, then one is a citizen simpliciter. Otherwise, one is only a citizen secundum quid—this is the case of women, children, old people, convicts, exiles and slaves. More importantly, however, the activity conferring full citizenship consists in three acts: counselling (consiliari), judging (iudicare) and commanding (precipere, though Aristotle does not mention this last activity). The second distinction is in regard to the citizen simpliciter: one can take part in counselling and judging either actively, as when one holds an office, or passively, as when one complies with a judicial decision, participates in an election or consents to an appointment.130

130 

Liber III, q. 3, ll. 52-57.

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While the distinction between citizens simpliciter and secundum quid is suggested in the Politics at 1275a14-24, the distinction between active and passive participation is unique to Peter. It draws a clear-cut distinction between, on the one hand, citizens who command, rule and hold offices, and, on the other, those who participate by consenting to the acts of the former. Such a distinction is appropriate to the French monarchy under which Peter lived.131 That Peter is constructing a view of political participation that is more fitting to monarchy than to regimes such as polity and democracy is even clearer if we consider that he is silent on Aristotle’s distinction, presented in III.1, 1275a24-26, between two kinds of public office: a fixed-term office and one with no time limit. What is more, by adding the act of commanding (precipere) to the two acts that, according to Aristotle, define the citizen (counselling and judging), Peter emphasises that some acts are specific only to rulers. The monarchy also casts its shadow, as it were, over q. 4 of Book III, on whether the citizen’s nature (ratio) is the same in every political regime. In line with Aristotle’s point of view, Peter argues in the first part of the solutio that, since a citizen is defined in relation to the political regime and there are different regimes, there can, therefore, be no univocal definition of a citizen which can be equally applied to all regimes. However, while Aristotle considers the necessary qualifications, such as property holding, to name but one, to be a citizen in different regimes, which qualifications are not the same in an oligarchy and a democracy, Peter shapes his view in teleological terms and turns to the Ethics to substantiate his interpretation. As the citizen is defined as the man who can perform the acts of counselling (consiliari) and judging (iudicare), Peter connects this idea with the Ethics III.3, 1112b11-15, where Aristotle states that “We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end”. Grosseteste used the word consilium (and the verb consiliari) throughout this chapter of the Ethics to denote the Greek βούλευσις.132 Drawing on this chapter of the Ethics and on the notion that people deliberate on the means to reach an end, Peter argues that, since counselling is related to an end and different forms of government aim for different ends, the citizen’s activity i.e., to counsel and judge, will have to change according to the aim of each form of government.133 It is in the second part of the solutio that Peter avows his preference for the monarchy (ignoring the fact that he completely skews Aristotle’s account). While 131  It is fascinating that the distinction between active and passive with respect to citizens, which is also found in Peter’s Scriptum, resonates in another French author who received scholastic training, the abbé Sieyès, though Sieyès’ distinction between active and passive citizenship is formulated in terms of rights and somewhat resembles more the distinction between citizens simpliciter and secundum quid. The abbé Seyes influenced Kant in this matter. 132  Cf. Aristoteles Latinus XXVI.1-4.4, Ethica Nicomachea, pp. 416-417. 133  Cf. Liber III, q. 4, ll. 10-20.

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Aristotle states that some forms of government “are prior and … others are posterior” (1275a38-b4) without identifying which is the prior regime in absolute terms, Peter claims that the term ‘political regime’ (politia) is primarily related to monarchy and by analogy to the other regimes.134 Peter is aware that his construction is, in fact, somewhat rickety: while he now states that monarchy is the best form of government, in the previous question, Peter had distinguished between active and passive participation in political life. In a monarchy, defined as the rule of one who is morally superior to all the citizens, it would seem that only the king would participate actively in political life. All other citizens being passive, monarchy would come dangerously close to a despotic rule or tyranny. To avoid such a conclusion, Peter clarifies that, although in a monarchy there is the main ruler, there are other minor offices which can be held by other citizens.135 Before we proceed, a little more needs to be said about q. 5; it is, after all, the third longest question of the entire Questiones. This is the most revealing question in terms of understanding Peter’s approach as an interpreter of the Politics. In chapter 3, Aristotle discusses whether a political community remains the same when there is a change in the form of government; this discussion enables him to state that it is the form of government that gives unity to the community and not merely the fact that a mass of inhabitants dwells in the same place. It is noteworthy that Peter takes inspiration for the title of q. 5 from Aristotle’s indirect question as to whether the city always remains the same, while its citizens continually pass away with new ones being born, this in the same way that “we call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and more coming” (1276a34-36). One might presume that Peter would focus here on the issue of changes in the forms of government, and indeed he does so: he employs the Aristotelian hylomorphism to state that, while men are the matter of the community, the political regime is its form, and the change of the form is the only relevant change when it comes to determine whether the civitas remains always the same. What is remarkable, however, is that he uses the greater part of the question to dismiss the validity of the analogy of the city with the animal body in this particular context. Such an analogy is advanced in the second argument of the question—that, as with an animal, the city too remains always the same—and, in the reply, Peter opens a sub-question on whether the animal remains the same from the beginning until the end of its life. In this sub-question, which is three times longer than the main question, Peter engages in a discussion on the notion of radical moisture (humidum radicale). Once again, he pays more attention to a problem of natural philosophy, which, at 134  Cf. ibid., ll. 21-29. Albert already advanced this idea prior to the translation of the Politics, in his first commentary on the Ethics; cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica commentum et questiones, X.19, II.789: “quamvis politeiae non reducantur in unum per modum univocum, reducuntur tamen in unum secundum analogiam, quia ratio politeiae salvatur per prius in regno et in aliis per posterius”. 135  Cf. Liber III, q. 4, ll. 30-36.

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the arts faculty, was typically discussed in commentaries on the On generation and corruption,136 rather than in a question related to the Politics and practical philosophy. The successive question commentaries devoted far less attention to this question,137 and, in later commentaries, the question simply disappears (the exception being Vincent Gruner’s commentary),138 which demonstrates that this focus on questions of natural philosophy is distinctive to Peter of Auvergne as a commentator on the Politics. The three subsequent questions (i.e., qq. 6-8) are devoted to chapter 4, on the distinction between the virtue of the citizen and that of the good man. As noted for other sections of the Questiones, here too Peter first asks a question with no correspondent in the Politics, the aim of which is to lay the groundwork for the subsequent questions. This is q. 6, on whether there exists some virtue of the citizen qua citizen per se. A more detailed account of this question is worth giving, as it reveals quite unambiguously Peter’s way of explaining the Politics.139 Peter starts q. 6 by connecting the virtue specific to the citizen with the necessity of a corresponding habit (habitus). As Peter puts it, whoever can do something well must have a habit through which he does so. This also holds for the citizen: he needs a virtue in order to perform his activity well and to reach his purpose, namely political happiness.140 Peter fashions the virtue of the citizen after the concept of an Aristotelian virtue. The sources he quotes to substantiate the affirmation that there is a virtue specific to the citizen were the most widely used definitions of virtue during the Middle Ages: the Ethics II.5, 1106a15-17 and 22-24 (“every virtue both brings into good condition the thing to which it is the virtue and makes the work of that thing be done well … the virtue of a man also will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well”) and the Physics VII.3, 246a13 (“virtue is a perfection, for when anything acquires its proper virtue we call it perfect”).141 We should not get the wrong idea: Peter’s model is Aristotle’s notion of virtue, but he does not claim that the virtue of the citizen is a moral virtue. For Peter, the virtue of the citizen is “determined in relation to something else”, since the citizen qua citizen is, by definition, a part of a whole. There can be no citizen without a civitas and even more so without a politia, and thus the actions of the citizen are always related to the latter. Peter’s language is quite suggestive: the 136  On this, see Chiara Crisciani, “Aspetti del dibattito sull’umido radicale nella cultura del tardo Medioevo (secoli XIII-XV)”, Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics 23-24 (2005), pp. 333-380. 137  This question is much shorter in the Anonymous of Milan and in the Anonymous of Baltimore; cf. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana A.100.inf., ff. 20rb-21ra (where the radical moisture is touched upon very briefly) and Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 4ra (a very short question with no trace of discussion on natural philosophy). 138  Cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.150. 139  For a more detailed analysis of this question, see Toste, “Virtue and the City”, pp. 85-93 and chapter 3 of the monograph I am currently preparing. 140  Cf. Liber III, q. 6, ll. 11-15. 141  Ibid., ll. 15-18.

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citizen is defined according to the second kind of relatives listed in Book V of the Metaphysics, that is, a relationship between what is passive and what is active, or, according to Aristotle’s example, between “that which can heat to that which can be heated”.142 The citizen is understood to be passive insofar as his acts are determined by the whole of which he is a part—he is ‘heated’ by virtue of the heat present, as it were, in the form of the government. The acts proper to the citizen relative to the politia are, as we have seen, counselling and judging. One might expect that, since counselling and judging are acts involving rightfulness of mind, Peter would conceive of this virtue as a moral one or at least one connected with the moral virtues. Nonetheless, he rejects such a possibility: the acts of the moral virtues do not make one a citizen, and, in fact, one can be a citizen without possessing moral virtue, as happens in unjust regimes.143 Peter then identifies the virtue of the citizen with ‘political prudence’ (prudentia politica), which is the virtue by which one can attain political happiness.144 As on other occasions in the Questiones, Peter employs here the distinction between a perfect and imperfect act: the virtue of the citizen is a natural inclination that man has. This inclination is not, of course, to be confused with a leaning towards sociability, since it is an inclination related to a whole—the political regime—which has a purpose and an ‘order’, and for this reason it outstrips the inclination towards sociability. Peter does not elaborate on how this inclination is brought into being, but we may assume that it stems from the habit formed by living under a given political regime, that is, by abiding by the norms of the regime and by carrying out the acts of counselling and judging following the criteria that govern the regime. What is striking in these questions is not so much that Peter distinguishes between a political and a moral sphere—he is, after all, following on Aristotle’s views in chapter 4—but that he feels the need to define a concept he finds in the Politics, that of the ‘virtue of the citizen’, and turns to the Ethics and Metaphysics to substantiate his view. Peter ends q. 6 by reiterating that the virtue of the citizen is ‘political prudence’ and that it is related to the common good and, more importantly, by recalling that the citizen also possesses a moral virtue that is related to the common good, namely 142  Ibid., ll. 19-23. As noted in chapter 3, section 2, Peter Auriol criticised the theory of slavery advanced in the commentaries on the Politics. We can be certain that Auriol criticises Peter (or a commentator reproducing Peter’s ideas and words very closely) since he refers to the second kind of relatives, just like Peter does here in Book III, q. 6. Cf. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum librum Sententiarum. Pars prima (Romae: ex typographia Vaticana, 1596), I, dist. 30, q. 52, art. 3, p. 671b: “De dominio vero et servitute, de quibus dicunt aliqui quod pertinent ad secundum modum relationis, potest etiam apparere quod non sunt habitudines in re extra: aut enim dominium et seruitus dicunt habitudinem fundatam super potentiam actiuam et passiuam … aut dicunt habitudinem cum hoc exigentem mutuam obligationem ad huiusmodi opera”. 143  Cf. Liber III, q. 6, ll. 25-27. 144  On this, see Toste, “Virtue and the City” and Lambertini, “Political Prudence in Some Medieval Commentaries”.

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universal justice.145 Peter’s notion of political prudence is not the same kind of prudence as Aristotle describes in Ethics VI.13, that is, prudence as the intellectual virtue that is necessarily connected to the moral virtues. When Peter mentions prudentia politica, he means the virtue of the citizen. As previously noted, he takes this notion from Aquinas.146 If the virtue of the citizen were connected with the moral virtues, Peter would face a significant issue. The virtue of the citizen is relative to the political regime and its acts consist of counselling and judging. Therefore, a citizen counsels and judges following the kind of justice existing in that regime, although that might be not just in an unqualified way since in regimes such as democracy and oligarchy there is justice only secundum quid. Deliberations in these regimes are not necessarily good from a moral point of view, but they are still effective, and if one wishes to be a good citizen, then he must adjust his deliberations to the justice pursued in that regime. The point is that if, for Peter, the virtue of the citizen is connected with the moral virtues, it is difficult to grasp how prudence could deliberate and find the rightful means of an action which pursues an unjust aim, such as those actions carried out for the sake of the preservation of an unjust political regime. In that case, if prudence would either deliberate about wicked means or was related to a wicked purpose, then it would no longer be a virtue, but one of its opposing vices.147 However, Peter never states in the Questiones that the virtue of the citizen changes into a vice in unjust regimes. It is still a virtue, a habit to ‘do well’ in that regime because it is related to that regime. This is further borne out in q. 7, which asks whether the virtue of the citizen is the same in every political regime. Peter states that it is not: there is not a single virtue for every political regime. Once again, Peter does not state that in some regimes the habit specific to the citizen is a virtue, while in others it is a vice. The virtue changes according to the regime. However, there is more: for Peter, as for Aristotle, there is not a single virtue of the citizen, even in the same regime. This is because rulers 145  Cf. Liber III, q. 6, ll. 50-55. This last remark might lead an inattentive reader to conclude that Peter is, after all, equating the virtue of the citizen with a moral virtue (i.e., justice). This is not the case, for these virtues are on different levels. According to the Ethics V.1, universal or general virtue is the virtue of the member of a political community which stems from his law-abiding acts related to the common good. This virtue is thus equated with lawfulness. By obeying the law, a moral agent develops this virtue, for, as Aristotle states, ‘all lawful acts are in a sense just acts’ (1129b12-13). However, because not all the acts of the moral agent are performed for the common good, this virtue is distinguished from particular justice; that is, the virtue that springs from acts performed towards other members of the community. Peter’s reference to universal justice does not mean, therefore, that he is implying that the virtue of the citizen is a moral virtue but merely that by repeatedly obeying the law the citizen develops ipso facto a specific moral virtue, that of universal justice. It is true that in the contra of Summa theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 58, art. 6, Aquinas identifies the virtue of the citizen with universal justice, but Peter does not. 146  See the section on Book II, more specifically on q. 4 of Book II, in this chapter. 147  The vices against prudence are dealt with in Summa theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 13 and qq. 53-55.

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and subjects do not share the same virtue: they are required to have prudence and moral virtues of different kinds. Finally, in q. 8, Peter asks whether the good citizen and the best man (optimus vir) possess the same virtue. He reiterates Aristotle’s view that, while the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the good man are distinct for a subject, these two virtues coincide in a ruler. What is striking is that he now identifies the virtue of the good man with prudentia politica simpliciter. He adopts Aquinas’ terminology here, for the prudentia politica simpliciter is the prudence every man—ruler and subject alike—employs regarding the common good. Then again, Peter does not confuse between the prudentia politica simpliciter (i.e., the virtue of the good man) and the prudentia politica, which is the virtue of the citizen. All through the solutio, he underlines that the prudentia politica simpliciter is not the virtue of the citizen. The virtue of the citizen may preserve an unjust regime (“uirtus ciuis illius est per quam saluat malam politiam”),148 but the virtue of the good man does not pursue such an aim. Peter could not be clearer on this: the virtue of the citizen has no moral connotation. In a good regime, the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the good man converge, but they remain on different levels: the former is never subsumed under the latter. Peter returns to the question of the prudence required of the ruler in three questions of Book V. It is, however, in these central questions on the virtue of the citizen that we can situate the core of his interpretation of the Politics. The substantial part of his views on the virtue of the citizen is the same as found in the Scriptum. The great difference is that here Peter delves into the definition of virtue of the citizen, that is, on how such a virtue is to be understood. As Lidia Lanza has noted with regard to this topic in the Scriptum, Peter’s views entail a certain autonomy of politics with regards to ethics.149 That Peter understood ethics and politics as two distinct self-coherent domains of human action (and concurrently as two domains studied by two autonomous sciences) should come as no surprise. Suffice it to recall one of Peter’s contemporary masters of arts, Boethius of Dacia. Scholars have long noted that in Boethius’ conception of science, each science has its distinct principles and its inquiry and conclusions are independent of the approaches and results of other sciences. Therefore, the results of the different sciences are all legitimate and true within their domain, irrespective of whether they oppose one another.150 It would be mistaken to expect that Peter would have intertwined ethics and politics: the Questiones was intended as a ‘scientific work’ as well as ‘Aristotelian’. I have mentioned 148 

Liber III, q. 8, l. 18. See Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, pp. 32-48. 150  On Boethius’ conception of science, see Sten Ebbesen, “Boethius of Dacia: Science is a Serious Game”, Theoria 66 (2000), pp. 145-158; Id., “The Man Who Loved Every. Boethius of Dacia on Logic and Metaphysics”, The Modern Schoolman 82 (2005), pp. 235-250 [the two articles were republished in Id., Topics in Latin Philosophy, pp. 153-162, 163-177]. 149 

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above the Aristotelian notion of ‘genus subiectum’, according to which a science is one if its principles and demonstrations belong to the same genus. Linked to that notion, Aristotle formulated in Posterior Analytics I.7 the ‘prohibition of μετάβασις’, that is, the prohibition that one science draws on the principles of another science to make a demonstration: a scientific demonstration cannot cross the boundaries of its domain. For instance, geometry cannot make use of arithmetical demonstrations. Peter was, therefore, being faithful to what he argued in the opening questions of the Questiones: political science has its principles and it is the scientia principa­ lissima within the genus of the practical sciences; therefore, it cannot follow the principles of ethics. Peter skips over chapter 5, where Aristotle bars the lower classes from citizenship and from holding public offices,151 and raises two questions about chapter 6 (qq. 9-10), more specifically on despotic and household rules. Just as put forth in the corresponding passage of the Politics, he maintains that these two kinds of rule can be distinguished by their respective aims: despotic rule is for the sake of the master, while household rule is for the common good of the members of the household. Because these two questions are framed in teleological terms and emphasise the interest of the ruler (principans), they also serve to prepare the ground for successive questions, namely q. 11 (whether political regimes are distinguished on account of their ends) and q. 12 (whether political regimes are distinguished on account of their rulers). We find in these questions part of Peter’s theoretical framework: the importance he assigns to teleology and his conception of the ruler in terms of agency and motion (the ruler is someone who moves the others). The argumentative strategy of these two questions revolves around the notion of final cause and, therefore, these questions can be related to q. 5 of Book I (see above). Peter’s argument in q. 11 is simple: as in practical matters, the end aimed for is taken as the principle of action, then the aim of a form of government is taken as the principle of all the deliberations to be made in that form of government. Peter repeatedly states this argument throughout the Questiones, but here it works as the first criterion to establish the differences between the forms of government, the object of q. 13. As the aim/end of the form of government is pursued principally by its main ruler, then, Peter argues in q. 12, the forms of government must also be distinguished on account of their main rulers, since, as suggested in Physics II.3, the final cause and the efficient cause must correspond one to the other.152 Chapters 7 and 8 of Book III of the Politics are represented by q. 13, whether political regimes are many, which is the concluding question of this group. It serves as the occasion to present the six main political regimes and how they are to be distinguished. To distinguish between the various forms of rule, Peter again underlines 151  Peter does not cover this chapter, not because of some disagreement with Aristotle, but rather because he has already tackled the exclusion of the lower classes from citizenship in qq. 3-4. 152  On this question, see Chapter 1, section 2.11, above.

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both teleology—the different aims of the regimes—and the ruler—the ways (i.e., the number of chief rulers)153 used to achieve their respective ends. For Peter, teleology is nevertheless more important than the number of rulers in terms of distinguishing between political regimes, since the rulers—through political prudence—need to pursue an end which serves as their principle.154 In these three questions, Peter quotes the Physics (and Proclus) much more often than the Politics: the latter gives Peter the information about the different forms of government, and the Physics is used to frame the entire argument. Questions 11 and 12 find a correspondent in the Politics, namely in III.6, 1279a17-21 and III.7, 1279a25-31, but while in these passages Aristotle tells us that what distinguishes just from unjust forms of government is whether they regard the common or the private good, and further adds that the number of rulers is one main criterion to distinguish the forms of government, Peter’s main interest is to establish, based on notions such as form, matter, end and agent, that the final and efficient causes determine the difference between forms of government. For Peter, the Physics is the tool that provides an explanation for what lies behind the surface of the Politics. Chapters 10-12 of Book III of the Politics are devoted to the oligarchic and demo­ cratic conceptions of justice and, accordingly, to the participation of the broader citizenry in the main offices in democratic regimes. As we shall note with regard to Books IV-VI, Peter is not so much interested in describing the arrangements and dynamics of oligarchic and democratic regimes; he, therefore, tackles these chapters of Book III by asking three questions: q. 15, whether it is better to be ruled by a few virtuous men or by the many (multitudo); q. 16, whether the multitude should participate in the main office of a well-ruled community; and q. 17, whether it is expedient and just for the multitude to elect and correct a ruler. Peter introduces here the famous distinction between a ‘well-ordered’ and a ‘beastlike multitude’, a distinction he also uses in the Scriptum.155 This distinction, along with Peter’s emphatic claim that a well-ordered multitude is difficult to find, serves as the ground for restricting the access of the multitude of free men to public office. In other words, the right of the many to participate in power without further qualification is far from Peter’s mind. He emphatically assigns entirely to the few wise men the role of decision making in political affairs, as they possess prudence and moral virtue. The multitude, on the other hand, lacks these two attributes, and so it contributes only strength (potentia), which is of help whenever it is necessary to impose the decisions taken by the few wise men. When it comes to the election/appointment and correction of rulers, the deliberation is exclusively due to the few wise men. Finally, Peter restricts the possibility that the citizens may correct and punish a ruler to the extreme case in which the very existence of the community is at stake 153 

See Liber III, q. 13, ll. 59-68. Ibid., ll. 69-75. 155  See Chapter 1, section 2.6, above. 154 

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and the citizens are in danger of being annihilated by the ruler. It is thus more a case of self-defence inscribed in natural law than in positive law. For Peter, there is no such thing as a standing possibility of correcting the actions of the ruler. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, these three questions were a source for and a target of Marsilius of Padua in chapter 12-13 of Dictio I of the Defensor pacis.156 Peter identifies the multitude which does not include the few wise men with the populus, that is, the lower social groupings incapable of elevating themselves to a virtuous life. It is significant that, before these three questions on the multitude, Peter raises a preliminary question, that is, q. 14, on whether the majority of men are poor judges in their own affairs. Peter answers in the affirmative based on the theory of virtuous egoism advanced in Book IX of the Ethics. What needs to be underlined here is that the sentence from which Peter takes the title of the question is found in Politics III.9. As noted earlier, this is a central chapter in Book III, but what draws Peter’s attention is a less important passage at the beginning of the chapter. By formulating a question out of Aristotle’s remark that “most people are bad judges in their own affairs”, Peter is already preparing the three questions in which he restricts the role of the multitude within the political community. At the same time, by stressing throughout qq. 15-17 that the multitude necessarily requires the few prudent men—for Peter, the multitude is set ‘in motion’ by the prudent men who alone possess the ‘principle of movement’, i.e., reason157—Peter sets up the last group of questions of Book III, wherein he argues that kingship is the best form of government. Question 14 is also relevant to understanding Peter’s view on unjust political regimes. While he states that the majority of men are poor judges in their own affairs, he does not reject that a wicked man may correctly judge and counsel about numerous matters, for instance, in an oligarchy. This is, indeed, the sense of the long reply to the second argument, where Peter maintains that the vices are not as much 156  Toste, “The Parts and the Whole”, pp. 209-226. On the role of the multitude in both the Questiones and the Scriptum, see also Jean Dunbabin, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics”, in N. Kretzmann–A. Kenny–J. Pinborg (eds.) and E. Stump (assist. ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 723-737, at 726-727; James M. Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 80-81; Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, pp. 52-56; Meier, Mensch und Bür­ ger, pp. 92-96; Stefano Simonetta, “Rimescolare le carte: il tema del governo misto in Tommaso d’Aquino e nella riflessione politica tardomedievale”, Montesquieu.it: Biblioteca Elettronica su Montesquieu e Dintorni 1 (2009), pp. 1-30, especially 12-18, available only in pdf format at the following address: http://www.montesquieu.it/files/Riviste/numero1.pdf (last retrieved on 13.03.2022); Id., “Searching for an Uneasy Synthesis between Aristotelian Political Language and Christian Political Theology”, in L. Bianchi (ed.), Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), pp. 273-285, especially 274-279; Martin Ossikovski, “Some Medieval Readings of Aristotle’s Argument for the Collective Superiority of ‘the Many’”, Studia Neoaristotelica. A Journal of Analytical Scholasticism 9 (2012), pp. 135-153. 157  See Liber III, q. 16, ll. 20-33.

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connected as the moral virtues, therefore one may lack the virtue of temperance and, nonetheless, he may judge correctly about liberality, and even more so one may be illiberal in matters which concerns the act of receiving but not in respect to giving.158 The following group of questions is made up of three questions (qq. 18-20) inspired by chapters 12 and 13 (first part) of Book III of the Politics, where Aristotle lays out the criteria for the distribution of offices and how to understand equality.159 Each of Peter’s questions deals with a specific criterion: whether the offices should be distributed according to the amount of dignity and riches possessed (q. 18), whether such a distribution should take into account good birth (q. 19) and whether superiority of strength (potentia) should be a consideration (q. 20). Peter establishes moral virtue and prudence as the main criterion for allocating goods and offices within the political community, reasoning that, unlike riches and strength, the moral virtues and prudence cannot be wrongly used.160 As to nobility of birth, it being only an inclination towards good deeds, Peter associates it with ‘virtue in potentiality’. It has, therefore, to be inferior to the moral virtues, since they are in a state of actuality.161 Furthermore, deprived of prudence, no ruler can lead his political regime towards the aim pursued by that regime and, therefore, prudence stands as the necessary requisite of any ruler, while other conditions, such as riches and strength/power (potentia), are subsidiary requisites, for they only help (or increase) the action carried out according to prudence.162 Peter reiterates in the three questions that virtue per se is the main criterion, but he also admits that each of the criteria may serve, ex consequenti, as an appropriate means of selection under certain circumstances and for certain offices. That Peter spends three rather long questions on this topic is a sign that in his contemporary society, wealth, nobility of birth and strength (potentia) were key factors in political life, especially in regard to access to public offices. This certainly explains why he does not rule out any of these secondary criteria: riches may be necessary in an office that is not self-sufficient in financial terms (though Peter does not give an example of such an office), people of noble stock have a natural inclination towards virtue—therefore they are naturally more fitting for public offices—and strength (or power) is necessary in order to coerce disobedient subjects or to repel enemies. Perhaps surprising, given Peter’s scorn for the poor, is the answer he gives to the sub-question he raises in q. 18: whether in the case of there being two equally virtuous men—one rich and the other poor—which of them should be appointed to 158 

Cf. ibid., q. 14, ll. 58-82. Interestingly, Peter does not quote Aristotle’s analogy of the flute-players here (III.12, 1282b271283a3). However, this has to do with the fact that he already used it in Book II, q. 12, which again shows that Peter knew the Politics very well when he produced the Questiones. 160  Cf. ibid., q. 18, ll. 23-31 and q. 20, ll. 14-21. 161  Cf. the entire solutio of Liber III, q. 19. On nobility of birth, see later on Book IV in this chapter. 162  Cf. Liber III, q. 20, the whole reply to the first argument. 159 

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the office. Peter favours the poor man inferring that, because he needs the benefits and honour associated with the office more than the rich man, he will be more diligent and dedicated to his job.163 Not all the successive commentators followed this solution.164 The last group of questions covers chapters 13 (second part)-16 of Book III of the Politics, where Aristotle analyses kingship. While only one question makes explicit reference to kingship in its title (q. 23, on the different kinds of monarchy), all of the questions in this group are related to this topic and attempt to provide reasons for its superiority over all the other regimes. To begin with, and following on from Aristotle, Peter links the reflection on the practice of ostracism with kingship. Ostracism, or, more specifically, the exclusion of an outstanding citizen from the community, occupies the second half of chapter 13, while kingship is discussed in chapters 14-17. Aristotle is the one who connects the question of the outstanding man with kingship, reasoning that, because such a man exceeds all the other citizens as far as moral virtue is concerned, the citizens in a good regime should make him king (1284b25-35). Peter, however, places even more emphasis on this connection; in the Scriptum and in q. 21, he associates the outstanding man with a king and therefore monarchy with the best political regime, for it is so on moral grounds.165 In the Scriptum, Peter connects the notion of the outstanding man who is made king with that of heroic virtue found in the seventh book of the Ethics.166 This is a far-fetched move and, in fact, in the Ethics commentaries produced at the Arts Faculty of Paris, this virtue is conceived of as a disposition of the will towards philosophical speculation about God and the immaterial substances.167 Probably because in Book I, q. 9, Peter used the notion of heroic virtue in his description of the solitary men devoted to philosophical speculation,168 he refrained from employing it in q. 21 of Book III with regard to a king. Though Peter does not use the notion of heroic virtue in q. 21, he still draws very much on the Ethics: the sentence, taken from IV.8, 1128a32, that a well-bred man is “as it were a law to himself” is used in the contra to maintain that an outstanding virtuous man is above the law. This sets the tone for the successive questions on kingship. Moreover, the solutio builds essentially on a theory from the Ethics. 163 

Cf. ibid., q. 18, ll. 57-79. See Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 294-295. 165  On this, see Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, pp. 57-71. 166  Cf. Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, III.12, p. 97, ll. 63-71. On the heroic virtue in Book III of the Scriptum, see Biörn Tjällén, “Aristotle’s Heroic Virtue and Medieval Theories of Monarchy”, in S. Fogelberg Rota–A. Hellerstedt (eds.), Shaping Heroic Virtue. Studies in the Art and Politics of Supereminence in Europe and Scandinavia (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 55-66, on 59-62. 167  Cf. Iacopo Costa, “Heroic Virtue in the Commentary Tradition on the Nicomachean Ethics in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century”, in I. Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics”, 1200-1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 153-172, at 166-171. 168  See Liber I, q. 9, ll. 83-84. On this, see Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 139141. 164 

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For Aristotle, a man who excels all the others in a corrupt regime should be ostracised because he would otherwise serve as a cause of imbalance within the community—a man too rich would be too powerful, for instance. To justify his point, Peter draws on the On generation and corruption (I.10), in order to state that the form of any given mixture can only be maintained if its parts are proportionate, and principally on the Nicomachean Ethics (VIII.7 and IX.1), where Aristotle writes that friendship requires a certain proportionality between two friends—a too virtuous man cannot be friends with another far lesser virtuous. Once again, Peter uses arguments found in other Aristotelian texts, in completely different argumentative contexts, to explain a specific passage of the Politics. The remaining questions reflect to a greater or lesser extent the topics of chapters 13-16 of Book III of the Politics: q. 22, on whether it is preferable to be ruled by an outstanding man or by the law (= chapter 15, 1286a8-24); q. 23, on the types of monarchy (= chapter 14); q. 24, on whether in those matters not settled by law, it is preferable to be ruled by more than one or by an individual virtuous man (= chapter 15, 1286a24-b7);169 q. 25, on whether the king or the ruler should accede to power by election or through hereditary succession (= chapter 15, 1286b22-27); q. 26, on whether it is better to be ruled by one or by many (= chapter 16, 1287a8-12). Aristotle arranged chapters 15 and 16 as a dialectic discussion, presenting arguments for and against the rule of the many, which surely helped Peter in his own arrangement of the text. The only question that goes into even more detail in the Questiones with respect to the Politics is q. 25: while Aristotle remarks only incidentally that one should address this difficulty when dealing with the issues of kingship, such a question was of far greater importance for medieval authors. This set of questions, and more specifically the way in which Peter in both the Questiones and the Scriptum favours a kind of hereditary monarchy that can be assimilated into that of his contemporary France, has long been studied. Scholars have also underlined that Peter’s arguments in favour of monarchy as the best form of government were shared by other contemporary authors, making it possible to speak of a common stock of such arguments, which are based on analogies taken from metaphysics and natural philosophy and which can be traced back to Aspasius’ and Albert the Great’s commentaries on Book VIII of the Ethics.170 In fact, as has 169  On q. 24, see Toste, “The Parts and the Whole”, pp. 226-230, where I show the extent to which Peter draws on the Ethics here. 170  See Lambertini, “La monarchia prima della Monarchia”, especially pp. 53, 55-57 for Peter. On Peter’s arguments in favour of monarchy, see Blythe, Ideal Government, pp. 82-90; Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 290-295; Elsa Marmursztejn, “Élections et légitimité politique dans la pensée scolastique au tournant du XIIIe et du XIVe siècle”, in C. Péneau (ed.), Élections et pouvoirs politiques du VIIe au XVIIe siècle. Actes du colloque réuni à Paris 12, du 30 novembre au 2 décembre 2006 (Pompignac: Bière, 2008), pp. 143-164; Lanza, “I commenti medievali alla Politica”, pp. 132-135. For a broad examination of the arguments in favour of monarchy in the commentaries on the Politics, on the Ethics and in the works known as De potestate papae, see, in addition to Lambertini’s article quoted in this footnote, Dunbabin, “Aristotle in the Schools”, pp. 67-72; Roberto Lambertini, “Governo ideale e

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been pointed out, some of these questions on kingship also appear in other works: qq. 22, 25 and 26 are also found in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum;171 q. 22 is found in some commentaries on the Ethics and in one quodlibetal question;172 and q. 25 is addressed in three quodlibetal questions produced later than the Questiones.173 It is possible that a standardised selection of questions related to kingship that took their origin from the section of the Politics devoted to kingship already existed in Paris by the time Peter lectured on the Politics. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that Peter might have contributed to the establishment of just such a selection, since almost all the extant texts that transmit these questions probably came later than the Questiones (except the De regimine principum). In any event, as underlined in Chapter 1, sections 2.8 and 2.9, while Peter certainly drew on Giles, he advanced arguments of his own in q. 22 and q. 25. That his view on kingship remained important is borne out by the fact that Peter is one of the targets of Marsilius in his criticism of hereditary monarchy.174 Later commentaries devoted fewer questions to kingship and introduced one question related to chapter 17, which deals with the correspondence between the political regime and the kind of society to which it is applied.175 Peter did not dedicate any question to this chapter, since he maintains this idea—that the regime must be attuned to the society—in numerous places throughout the Questiones (for instance, in q. 10 of Book II). riflessione politica dei frati mendicanti nella prima metà del Trecento”, in Etica e politica: le teorie dei frati mendicanti nel Due e Trecento. Atti del XXVI convegno internazionale Assisi, 15-17 ottobre 1998 (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 1999), pp. 231-277, especially 235-253. As Lambertini has stressed, one of the main arguments that made monarchy preferable to the other regimes consisted in the notion that unity in leadership produces peace more easily and avoids discord, so preventing the appearance of factions. Such a line of reasoning was also used by some authors to argue that democracy is worse than tyranny. On this, see Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 314-327. 171  Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/2.30, 5 and 3, respectively. 172  For instance, in Radulphus Brito’s and Giles of Orleans’ commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Their questions are respectively published in Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 455-457 and Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory, pp. 336-340. For an overview of this question in different texts, see Thomas Renna, “Aristotle and the French Monarchy, 1260-1303”, Viator 9 (1978), pp. 309-324. 173  See the Pseudo-Rigauld, Quodlibet III, q. 30: utrum regnum sit melius per successionem uel per electionem (I have used the manuscript Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, f. 28vb); Johannes de Neapoli, Quodlibet I, q. 20: utrum melius sit habere regem per successionem quam per electionem, uel e conuerso (I have used the manuscript Tortosa, Archivo Capitular, 244, ff. 5vb-6ra); Henricus de Alemannia, Quodlibet I, q. 20: utrum magis expediat reipublice habere regem per electionem quam per successionem (extant in the manuscript Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 662, which I have not consulted; the question is partially transcribed in Clemens Stroick, Heinrich von Friemar: Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologische Stellung in der Scholastik [Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder, 1954], pp. 245-246). The Pseudo-Rigaud’s question was discussed in the 1290s or later; John of Naples’ question is to be situated in the second decade of the fourteenth century; finally, the question of Henry presumably dates to 1306. 174  See Chapter 6, below. 175  For instance, the last question of Book III of the commentaries of the Anonymous of Munich and the Anonymous of Stuttgart, entitled respectively utrum omnis multitudo sit regnabilis and utrum omnis multitudo sit regalis; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.144, 147.

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In this last set of questions of Book III, Peter constructs an ideal of kingly office, one according to which the king must act by following right reason and prudence without being unduly influenced by emotion.176 Reading these questions, however, one cannot but conclude that Peter conflates a normative level—how the king must behave—with his intent to legitimate the political reality in which he lived. It is true that, at one point in the Questiones, Peter distinguishes between a ruler considered in and of himself and this particular ruler and states that only with regard to the former can we employ the rule Quod principi placuit legis habet uigorem, since the latter can be influenced by his emotion.177 His view of monarchy is nonetheless highly positive, and Peter is, therefore, not concerned with establishing limits to kingly power. This is clear if one contrasts these questions with the Summa theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 105, art. 1, where Aquinas conceives of the best political regime as the combination of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, in which aristocracy is represented by the king’s counsellors and democracy by the people, as the people can elect their rulers (not necessarily the king, but other office holders). Aquinas’ idea—itself inspired by Book II of the Politics—proved influential and is found in many later authors. The mixture of three forms of governments denotes the possibility that different social classes can take part in power, though not all in the same way, and conveys the idea of ‘limited’ or ‘tempered monarchy’, as aristocracy and democracy ‘temper’ kingly power. Peter echoes Aquinas, as he ends Book III of the Questiones by stating that monarchy, being the best regime, virtually contains the other regimes: aristocracy by virtue of the king’s counsellors, oligarchy by means of “some notables and noblemen”, who receive some honours, and the plebs, who obtain some undefined honour (perhaps to give consent to some major decisions or appointments, as suggested earlier in Book III).178 Peter, however, does not reiterate Aquinas’ statement found in the same article of the Summa, and often repeated throughout the Middle Ages, that a non-tempered monarchy can easily degenerate, for the power is overly concentrated in one man’s hands. For Peter, monarchy is, by definition, the regime in which an outstanding virtuous man rules179 and thus we find in the Questiones neither the noted distinction between regimen politicum and regimen regale nor the idea that kingly power must be limited. In the Questiones, the notion of a ‘mixed regime’ is not associated with restrains on kingly power, but rather with the necessity that, in a political community, there must be more than one office.180 176  For this reason, these questions can be associated with qq. 11-13 of Book V, where Peter deals with the attributes required of the ruler (see later herein). 177  Cf. Liber II, q. 8, ll. 51-57. 178  Cf. Liber III, q. 26, ll. 68-79. 179  The best analysis of Peter’s concept of monarchy, though with regard to the Scriptum, is found in Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politia”, pp. 48-71. 180  On Peter’s idea of a monarchy blended with other regimes, see Blythe, Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution, pp. 77-91, though some of Blythe’s claims are disputable.

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4. Book IV Peter’s approach to Books IV-VI is quite distinctive. He does not follow the order of the Politics closely and disregards many of the topics discussed therein. In Book IV, Aristotle focuses on the forms of government that are suitable for the greater part of men and cities (or that most often occur), given that the majority of men fall short of virtue. He thus concentrates on polity, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, and on the different species of each of these forms of government (chapters 9-10). The final chapters are dedicated to public offices and to how they should be allocated (chapters 14-16). Aristotle also deals with the devices used by oligarchies to deceive people (chapter 13). Throughout this book, Aristotle stresses the importance of the middle class, favouring its participation in government (chapters 11-12). Polity—the political system based chiefly on the citizens of the middling sort—is for him the most suitable regime for the greater portion of cities. Given all this material, Peter’s approach to Book IV is quite surprising. He simply ignores chapters 9-16 and, we shall later see, devotes four questions (out of the fourteen that constitute Book IV of the Questiones) to a marginal topic in the Politics: nobility of birth. Nonetheless, the first two questions of Book IV of the Questiones reflect chapter 1 of Book IV of the Politics: Peter subscribes to Aristotle’s view that the science of politics has to consider all kinds of political regimes, and not just the best regime, (q. 1) as well as the laws enacted by a given political regime (q. 2).181 Considering Aristotle’s view, found in Chapter 1 of Book IV, that in politics we need to take into account not only the best political regime absolutely speaking, but also what is possible and what may best apply under a given set of circumstances or for the majority of men, Peter offers some further insights on his concept of political science. He begins q. 1 of Book IV, on whether this science should ascertain the best form of government, by drawing on Posterior Analytics I.5, more specifically on the notion that every science considers its subject matter and its parts and properties (passiones), and on Metaphysics IV.2, where Aristotle states that one science investigates one common notion and the things related to that common notion, though the science “deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend” (1003b17-18). Peter adds here a reference to analogy: what is said to be the first is said analogically of all the others in the same genus. Unsurprisingly, Peter connects this with the passage of the Politics in which Aristotle states that his classification of political regimes involves priority and posteriority and that the good regimes are prior to the corrupt ones (III.1, 1275a38-b3)—this claim is based on the view that the privation or negation of a thing is known only after we have knowledge of that thing.182 According to Peter, the best regime is thus the common 181 

On these two questions, see Chapter 2 of the monograph I am currently preparing. In the Metaphysics Aristotle maintains that the better is always prior to the worse (III.3, 999a13-14). See William W. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle on Prior and Posterior, Correct and Mistaken Con182 

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notion political science must initially pursue, which is then followed by the study of the corrupt regimes (these are said to be regimes by analogy to the best regime). One science studies both what is perfect and what is imperfect: in the case of politics, this means that it studies the best regime in absolute terms, the best given within certain circumstances (ex suppositione) and finally the regimes which are no good regardless of circumstance.183 Despite the metaphysical garb Peter uses to dress up the solutio, beneath it we find the same view as held by Aristotle. But this question tells us two things: first, that this is a completely different ‘scientia politica’ from whatever ‘scientia politica’ might have been formulated prior to the reception of the Politics, when political reflection was limited to monarchy and tyranny. Second, although from a political point of view there is a best absolutely speaking, what is best may vary according to the circumstances (a view that Peter had already advanced in Book II, q. 10). As noted above, in the opening questions of Book I, Peter does not address the issue of the kind of knowledge that this science provides. The question of how knowledge of what is singular and contingent is possible was typically addressed in Ethics commentaries. However, in the replies to the arguments contra of this question, Peter offers several hints as to how this might work. In the ad primum Peter stresses that this science considers which regime is suitable for different kinds of people and different social groups, but these people and groups are understood in a very general sense (sub ratione eorum in uniuersali). It follows from this that politics does not consider the best regime for a specific group of farmers or for a particular group of wealthy people (non huic diuiti vel illi). Again, political science is not to be mistaken with the virtue of prudence,184 since it is rather prudence that considers what might be best for a particular group of wealthy people. In the ad secundum Peter takes up the objection stated in Metaphysics VI.2 that no science considers what happens by accident and therefore politics should not take account of what is best or beneficial, since these are accidental properties to the definition of a political regime. This does not hold, Peter replies, if what happens by accident can be in some respect considered per se: that a given political regime is beneficial to someone is by accident, but that oligarchy is beneficial to wealthy people is a condition that per se belongs to oligarchy. In these two arguments Peter does not refer to the theory of abstraction or to the notion that moral science can study the quiddity of singular and particular actions, nevertheless his view is the same as the one found in his contemporary commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Thus, Peter is the first author in the Middle Ages to present a structured view on the stitutions”, in D. Keyt–F.D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s “Politics” (Oxford–Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 226-237 [republished in Id., Aristotle’s Practical Side. On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 265-277]. 183  Cf. Liber IV, q. 1, ll. 46-54. 184  See on Book I, q. 2, above.

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science of politics, from its place within the system of sciences to the way in which this science grants knowledge about a field of investigation where human will the determining factor. In chapter 2 of Book IV, Aristotle presents the six different political regimes. Since he had already done so in the Politics III.7 and one question had already been dedicated to this matter (q. 13 of Book III of the Questiones), Peter certainly considered this chapter to be a repetition. He then concentrates on just one sentence of the chapter, namely that tyranny “is the worst of governments” (1289b2-3). This is precisely the title of q. 3, on whether tyranny is the worst of all the forms of government. In Book V, Peter devotes a set of four questions to tyranny, but, here, he is only concerned with establishing that tyranny is worse than the other unjust regimes (democracy and oligarchy). We have seen that, in Book III, Peter focuses on monarchy and attempts to legitimise it as the best regime—arguably because he was only thinking in terms of his social and political reality. Against this backdrop, the amount of attention he pays to tyranny here in Book IV seems more plausible, as oligarchies and, above all, democracies were more distant realities for a Frenchman like Peter than were kinship and its perversion. The main argument Peter uses to state that tyranny is worse than oligarchy and democracy is the Neoplatonic principle that omnis uirtus unia fortior est se ipsa dispersa, which, applied in this context, means that the power concentrated in the hands of a single ruler can be more harmful, as it is more powerful and efficient, than when shared by multiple rulers. The use of this principle in the discussion of tyranny is also found in Aquinas’ De regno and in Giles’ De regimine principum.185 The use of principles from natural philosophy and metaphysics is indeed a hallmark of Peter’s interpretation of Book IV. This is evident in the following question (q. 4), which addresses the opening line of Politics IV.3: “The reason why there are many forms of government is that every state contains many elements” (1289b2728). While Aristotle reasons in terms of differences of wealth, this being what differentiates the ‘parts’ and groups of the city, Peter engages in a fairly lengthy discussion related to Aristotelian hylomorphism,186 which leads him to conclude that the forms (of government) are distinguished on account of the distinctions in the material parts of the community. His approach here is very close to that found in qq. 11-12 of Book III of the Questiones.187 Unlike the previous books, Book IV of the Questiones does not have major thematic groups of questions except for the sets formed by qq. 5-7 and qq. 11-14. The first set touches on democracy, and it does so in such a way that Peter’s own concerns are made evident: the presence of q. 5, on whether flattery is a vice, is surprising given that this topic was typically dealt with in commentaries on Book 185 

Cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 321-324. On this question, see Chapter 2, section 2.3, above. 187  See also Chapter 2, section 2.11, above. 186 

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IV of the Ethics.188 In this work (IV.6, 1127a8-10), Aristotle defines flattery as the vice opposed to the moral virtue which medieval authors after Aquinas referred to as affabilitas.189 Question 5 serves, however, as an introduction to q. 6, on whether flatterers ought to be accepted among monarchs and popular rulers. The idea from which this question is derived is taken from Politics IV.4, 1292a15-23, where Aristotle states that flatterers are held in high esteem and are influential in the worst kind of democracy, that is, one in which the multitude rules by decree and not in accordance with established laws. Note that Aristotle is presenting the worst kind of democracy here and only mentions the flatterers in passing, whereas Peter prefers to concentrate on the admissibility of flatterers rather than on the analysis of this kind of democracy. Obviously, flattery was a far more crucial issue for Peter than a democracy where the multitude rules by decree, which, for him, existed either only theoretically or was embodied by the Italian cities (again, a distant reality for a Frenchman). Peter does indeed raise a question regarding democracy (q. 7) in relation to Politics IV.4 (1292a30-37), but it is striking that he focuses exclusively on the worst kind of democracy (out of the five different kinds) as though this were synonymous with democracy itself.190 Question 7 is also important in the Questiones because Peter stresses there one of the axioms of this text, namely that a political regime is such only insofar as it abides by the law. If a regime does not abide by the law, then it can only be characterised as a political regime secundum quid. This point is pursued in the following question (q. 8), taken from the second paragraph of chapter 5 (1292b11-21). Its title is whether a city may ‘live’ in accordance with a given political regime and yet observe the laws of another. For Aristotle, this question concerns democracy and oligarchy, that is, whether a democracy can be governed in an oligarchical way and vice versa. Peter, on the other hand, treats it as a more general question framed in teleological terms—one that goes beyond the strict discussion of Aristotle in this stretch of text— and concludes, once again, that a regime cannot pursue more than one specific end. Peter returns to this idea in Book V and maintains that, whenever parts or factions within the city pursue different ends, dissension will inevitably arise. Peter passes over chapters 6 and 7 in which Aristotle presents the different kinds of democracy, oligarchy and aristocracy.191 He only spends time on chapter 8, 188 

See, for instance, the question in Brito’s commentary; cf. Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 411-413. Cf. Toste, “Utrum felix indigeat amicis”, p. 189. 190  Such a synecdoche is found in successive medieval authors as well; cf. Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 291-292 and Chapter 1, section 2.16, above. 191  This is quite telling because, commenting on Book III, Peter did dedicate one question (i.e., q. 23) to a brief description of the different kinds of monarchy. He does not devote anywhere near the amount of attention to the other regimes that he pays to monarchy (and its perversion, tyranny) in the Questiones. The same occurs in Book IV of Peter’s Scriptum, where, as Lidia Lanza has remarked, “la maggior parte delle digressioni, delle precisazioni e delle sottolineature che l’Alverniate inserisce, ampliando il testo aristotelico, coincidono, direttamente o indirettamente, con osservazioni riguardanti il regno”; cf. Lanza, “Aspetti della ricezione della Politica”, p. 49. 189 

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which was devoted to polity, or timocracy, as it was referred to in the Nicomachean ­Ethics.192 With respect to this chapter, Peter raises two questions: whether timocracy is made up of democracy and oligarchy (q. 9) and whether this is a just and good regime (q. 10). It was only in the fourteenth century (and to an even greater extent in the fifteenth century) that the mixed regime became an important issue within the political discourse.193 Along with the Scriptum, the Questiones is thus one of the earliest works to spend some time explaining this form of government. Question 9 is approached by taking into consideration Aristotle’s theory of the mixture of elements found in the On generation and corruption I.10 (though through the lens of Aquinas).194 Whenever a mixture is generated, the substantial forms of its elements are taken away; what remains of the elements are just their ‘middle qualities’. Likewise, a timocracy, which is a mixed regime made out of oligarchy and democracy, keeps only the qualities of these two forms of government. The problem with the application of the theory of the mixture of elements to the forms of government is that it must explain how the blending of two unjust regimes—oligarchy and democracy—results in a just regime, namely timocracy. This is what Peter does in the reply to the first argument of q. 10: there, Peter maintains that oligarchy and democracy are present in the mixed regime, not by means of their actual form, i.e., as having the character of an evil (rationem mali habent), but as a halfway point (quidam modus medius) and insofar as this halfway point has the character of a good. To put it simply, timocracy takes what is good from those regimes. Peter then renders this theory in political terms. In an oligarchy, the criterion to participate in political power is wealth, while in a democracy it is freedom; therefore, an oligarchy is ruled by the rich for the sake of the rich and democracy by the poor, since they comprise the majority of the citizenry, and thus rule for their own sake. Combined in a timocracy, the characteristics of these two forms of government result in a halfway point: both the rich and the poor (with a certain 192  This political regime was first referred to as timocracy after the Ethics was translated into Latin. It was only after Aquinas’ commentary on the Ethics that authors more often started using the term ‘polity’ for this regime. On this, see Lambertini, “Politische Fragen”, pp. 113-116. 193  Cf. Marco Toste, “Government, Renaissance Forms of”, in M. Sgarbi (ed.), Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy (Dordrecht et al.: Springer, 2022), available on-line in https://link.springer. com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-02848-4_607-1 (last retrieved on 18.05.2022). 194  As previously stressed, Peter was not the first commentator on the Politics to use concepts from natural philosophy for the interpretation of passages of the Politics. For instance, Albert explains V.6, 1306a9-10 (“But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is not easily destroyed from within”) by employing the theory of complexionalia: “Hoc dicit, quia ex causa extrinseca corrumpitur: quia sicut seditionale est corruptibile rei, ita concors ex se ad conservationem facit. Sic est forte sicut in corpore humano: quia quando concordant complexionantia in medium, et componentia in harmoniam, non dissolvitur nec complexionatum, nec compositio” (Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, V.4, p. 467). And Aquinas explains I.5, 1454a28-30 (“for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts … a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light”) by referring to the Aristotelian notion of mixed body (cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sententia libri Politicorum, I.3, p. A87, ll. 113-116).

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qualification of property, however), as well as the citizens of the middling sort, can be appointed to public offices, provided they are virtuous, and rule for the sake of the two main social groups, namely the poor and the rich. Timocracy is a just form of government because it pursues the common good—not only the good of one faction—and gives a role to virtue. As Peter states in the reply to the second argument of q. 10, in this regime the public offices are allocated to virtuous men or, at least, to those more inclined towards virtue. While Giles of Rome identifies timocracy (or polity) with the government of Italian city-states, this form of government was surely a distant reality for Peter. The interest in these two questions lies in the fact that Peter accounts for this regime through a rather creative use of the corpus Aristotelicum. For instance, he states, in lines ll. 20-24 of q. 9, that a timocracy is halfway between two extremes in much the same way as a virtue is halfway between two vices, a comparison already present in the Politics (IV.9, 1294b2-3), but he also uses the idea of virtue to explain how a timocracy can result from the blending of two unjust regimes. For Peter, virtue can be understood not only as a halfway point but also as a mixture of two vices—the matter of a virtue and its opposing vices is the same, though not their form; for instance, while the matter of courage and its vices, recklessness and cowardice, is the fighting in a battlefield, their ‘form’, i.e., what distinguishes each of their acts, must be different. In this sense, timocracy is made up of the matter of the other regimes but constitutes a distinct and just form (of government). The interpretation of Book IV concludes with a set of questions on the definition of nobility of birth (qq. 11-14), and, here, too, Peter devotes four questions to a very marginal topic of the Politics—Aristotle offers a definition of good birth (as an aside) within the context of a discussion focused on discerning the criteria that can be used in the distribution of offices in a polity (IV.8, 1294a21-22). Peter then engages in a lengthy discussion as to whether nobility is a hereditary virtue—one that enables those who possess such a virtue to be more inclined by nature to be virtuous (qq. 11-12). These two questions are followed by another two on the origins of nobility of birth and whether it (nobility) increases over time (qq. 13-14).195 William Courtenay has argued that Peter was probably a nobleman,196 and the attention he devotes to the topic only serves to strengthen this assumption. Once again, it is striking how Peter uses ideas from Aristotle to justify philosophically the existence of nobility of birth. He employs again the distinction between ‘perfect act’ and inclination already used in Book I, q. 7, as well as the idea that one’s bodily constitution influences one’s character, an idea present in several questions of Book I. But not content with giving arguments in favour of the existence of nobility of birth as a natural event, Peter goes so far as to explain, in q. 13, how nobility of 195 

196 

On this group of questions on nobility, see Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 274-290. Courtenay, “Peter of Auvergne”, pp. 15-16.

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birth came into existence and, principally, in which way natural causes may hinder some members of a lineage to become virtuous, despite being born with the inclination to be so. His argument for the existence of a first noble is very straightforward: given that mankind is not eternal, but had a beginning, similarly, there must have been a first noble, who, though not of noble stock himself, nevertheless excelled morally and gave rise to a lineage. As to the motif of why some members of a lineage are not morally virtuous, Peter locates the cause in the movement of some stars, which influences the bodily constitution and thus the intellectual capacities of the members of a noble stock. Finally, in q. 14, he claims that the sons of noblemen are nobler than their parents, reasoning that in the children the lineage is older—and thus nobler—than in the parents. Since nobility is defined by its antiquity—to be so it has to come from numerous generations—and by its natural inclination towards good moral behaviour, then there is a continuous improvement of the lineage and, in this way, of nobility of birth. Peter was not alone in maintaining the existence of nobility of birth. Henry of Ghent, the Pseudo-Rigauld, Johannes Vath, John of Jandun and Buridan advanced the theory as well. Among all of these authors, he is, however, the one more interested in explaining it as a natural event. It is significant that Peter devotes two questions to flattery and four to nobility of birth, while he ignores other much more important topics. Peter’s approach to Book IV was certainly viewed as insufficient. In fact, later commentators in the fifteenth century, such as Gruner and Versor (?), expanded the analysis on Book IV: both have more questions on oligarchy, democracy and public offices, which are dealt with in the last chapters of Book IV.197 At the same time, they eliminated the questions on nobility of birth.198

5. Book V It is in Book V of the Questiones that this commentary is at its furthest remove from its source-text, and a partial list of the questions on this book is evidence enough to demonstrate this departure.199 The first four questions, along with q. 7, have no corresponding section in Aristotle’s text, and even q. 6 sounds quite bizarre (whether the location of the civitas is the cause of dissension),200 if we think of all the possible questions that could be posed on the text of Book V. We should 197 

See Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.151-152 and 162-163. Nicholas of Vaudémont and Versor (?) touch on nobility in Book I, q. 9 and Book I, q. 7, respectively (which corresponds to q. 16 of Book I of the Questiones). This is because in Politics I.6, 1255a31-34, Aristotle states that “for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility”. As mentioned in note 182 of the Introduction, in the question on nobility, Versor (?) draws extensively on Nicholas’ commentary. 199  I have already carried out a full analysis of the list of questions of Book V of the Questiones; cf. Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 330-332. See also Lanza, “Guerra e pace in Aristotele”, pp. 197-199. 200  On this question, see Chapter 1, section 1.3, above. 198 

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almost certainly expect questions such as whether it is licit to deceive the citizens in order to preserve an unjust political regime, whether one should obey the tyrant or even whether Aristotle’s list of the wicked means to preserve unjust regimes is politically acceptable. As these hypothetical questions show, Book V poses some crucial problems for a commentator, since, in this book, Aristotle demonstrates the strategies—not necessarily morally good—by which unjust regimes and rulers, including tyrants, may endure and even consolidate their power. The fifth book of the Politics is in fact devoted to listing, by means of historical illustrations, both the causes of revolution (chapters 5-8) and the means of preserving the different kinds of regime (chapters 9-11). Peter simply ignores Aristotle’s lists: he probably felt that a literal commentary was a more fitting context in which to deal with the lists contained in Book V. No reference is made in the Questiones to the list of the ten causes of revolutions in chapter 3 (1302b6-1303b14) nor to the devices used by the tyrants to reinforce or to moderate their power, which are mentioned in chapter 10. It is in this sense that the Questiones shifts from an approach of describing the fifth book—which is expected of literal commentaries on the Politics—to a normative one. An analysis of the list of questions of the fifth book makes it obvious that Peter is attempting to offer in this book, by going beyond the text of the Politics, the most general and basic principles of how to preserve the political community—irrespective of the political regime in power—and avoid upheavals. The titles of the questions are telling in this regard. The questions are laid out in a very coherent sequence. Peter first asks whether peace is the purpose of the political community (q. 1). Since the true political end is happiness, and peace is only related to this end, his answer is thus negative. He then asks whether friendship is the cause of peace (q. 2), to which his answer is affirmative. In q. 3, Peter defines the opposite of peace, that is, dissension. Then, he raises three questions (qq. 4-6), asking separately whether desire (appetitus), unlikeness (dissimilitudo) and location (of the civitas) are causes of dissension—of which only the last two are found to be causes. Finally, q. 7 returns to the notion of peace and asks whether the cause of the preservation of any given regime is peace. Peter’s solution is that the ‘union of wills’ (unio uoluntatum) of the citizens, and not peace, preserves political regimes. Except for qq. 5-6, the other questions have no correspondent in the Politics. The notion of peace is central in this set of questions, though it is absent from the Politics. Peter takes inspiration from the Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 29, on peace, especially articles 1 and 3, but he employs Aquinas’ theological ideas—some of them already taken from Book IX of the Ethics—within a strictly philosophical context. Peter asks whether peace is an effect (q. 1) or a cause (q. 7), and then he goes on to define its opposite (q. 3). Since peace is not a cause, Peter tries to determine its cause (q. 2) as well as the causes of the opposite of peace (qq. 4-6). It is no coincidence that Peter lays so much stress on causes here. Book V of the Politics is

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indeed dedicated to establishing the causes of revolutions and the causes of political stability. However, instead of addressing the causes of revolution and stability of each of the political regimes, he preferred to use the Questiones to establish the causes of political stability in a very broad sense. Note that Peter does not refer to any specific political regime neither in the titles of the questions nor in the text. Peter assigns great importance to peace and tranquillity in the initial questions of Book V, but, unlike other medieval authors, he does not see peace as the end and purpose of political activity. In keeping with Aristotle, happiness, to Peter’s way of thinking, is that purpose, peace being instead a condition that assures it. As noted in Chapter 1, section 1.2, Peter equates peace with the absence of motion. By contrast, happiness is an activity and, it being political activity conceived by Peter as a movement towards an end, peace can never be the purpose of politics. It is crucial to underline that, while Peter ‘rearranges’ Book V of the Politics, he does so by framing it in Aristotelian terms (even though, in some cases, by drawing on Aquinas as well). Peter’s view in q. 2 that peace is privation of motion but nevertheless requires a material cause to exist, in much the same way as blindness, though privation of sight, comes to be only because there is an actual eye, means that peace cannot be sought for the sake of itself; peace is an incidental outcome of an activity, the aim of which lies elsewhere. For Peter, peace results from friendship and the union of the citizen’s wills towards an end. Political life is thus completely based upon a continuous agreement. That Peter associates the purpose of political life with happiness and not with peace means that politics cannot be adequately characterised in terms of what the citizens and the ruler aim to avoid—if that were the case, citizens might prefer to live alone. On the contrary, politics is a permanent, though contingent, activity which entails a defined and agreed upon purpose. These first seven questions are not, however, completely detached from the text of the Politics. Peter’s arguments are in line with Aristotle’s main idea expressed in chapter 1 of Book V, namely that ‘the desire for equality’—and how equality is conceived of—is the primary cause of revolutions (1301a25-35 and 1301b26-1302a8). Even so, while, for Aristotle, the crux of the matter is the way in which equality is conceived of, that is, whether numerically or proportionally, meaning that he focuses on distributive justice, Peter emphasises the role of ‘desire’ or ‘will’ and the need for equality. Peter does not underplay the importance of distributive justice—indeed, he anticipated the discussion of distributive justice in Book II, q. 12 (whether it is expedient for the political community that all possessions should be equal). The point is that here, in Book V, he is concerned with how the whole body of citizens, irrespective of the differences among them, can be united and ‘desirous’ of pursuing a single end so that the political regime may endure. What Peter does is to change the arrangement of the analysis—unlike Aristotle in the Politics V.3, Peter does not enumerate the causes of revolution—and to focus instead on concord and political friendship, two notions related to ‘equality’. In Book IX, chapter 6

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of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines concord as a broad agreement as to the principles of government adopted in the community and political friendship as a social bond resulting from the sharing of common interests based on mutual trust. In the Politics (II.4 and III.9), he furthermore stresses that it is friendship that prevents revolutions and binds the members of society together. Peter’s use of these two notions thus means that he is attempting to advance throughout this set of questions a general theory of how political agreement comes to be. Peter never uses the term concord, to be exact, and gives much more weight to the notion of ‘union of wills’ (unio uoluntatum) instead of that of friendship, which, in q. 2, he conceives of as the cause of such union of wills. While this notion is taken from the Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 37, art. 1, where it is identified with concord, an effect of charity, Peter employs it in a political context: in the Questiones the union of wills is equated with the agreement by which the citizens must abide with respect to both the end the political regime must pursue and the means of reaching such an end. The statement found in the contra of q. 2, that friendship causes the union of wills regarding the end means that the citizens share the same political values, which gives rise to an agreement that, in turn, brings about peace. Whenever the citizens agree about the end of the political regime—i.e., the form of government under which they should live—there will be peace. In the solutio Peter avows that the “order with respect to the end” (ordo ciuium in finem) must be understood as an “order embracing the union of the participants in that order according to their intention of the end” (ordo ille cum unione participantium ordinem secundum intentionem finis).201 While in q. 1 of Book II, Peter stressed the ruler’s role—he moves the citizens towards an end—here Peter makes no mention of the ruler. The agreement is made by the citizens, i.e., by those who participate in the order, irrespective of whether they participate ‘actively’ or ‘passively’ in the regime. Peter does not explain, at least not in this question, how such an agreement is reached, but it is clear that he understands such agreement to be a continuous process, not a particular moment in time. Since Peter concedes that such agreement may stop and in such case the form of government changes, his view here cannot be understood as a theory about the origins of society and an original agreement which transferred authority from the citizens to the ruler. Moreover, as a continuous process, this agreement cannot be confused with peace itself, which consists in the absence of activity. In q. 4, on whether desire (appetitus) is a cause of dissension,202 Peter further explains how agreement and disagreement occur. There can be agreement (and disagreement) about either the end of the regime or ‘the things that lead to the end’. If there is disagreement as to the end, then the form of government changes, while, if 201 

Cf. Liber V, q. 2, ll. 35-36. In these questions, Peter does not distinguish the terms will and desire, i.e., voluntas and appetitus. Suffice it to quote l. 8 of his question: “hec est uoluntas uel appetitus”. 202 

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there is only disagreement over the means to reach the end, the form of government remains unchanged, being only ‘softened’ or ‘intensified’—for instance, a democracy may become more ‘democratic’ or may begin to exhibit characteristics more typical of an oligarchy. The idea that political regimes can change in two different ways is taken from Politics V.1, 1301b5-26 (although Aristotle refers neither to the end nor to the means to reach the end). Of course, disagreement among the citizens is not sufficient to cause a change in the political regime. The part of the citizens willing to change the regime has to be able to impose its will on the part opposing that change.203 In the Latin translation of the Politics, the part of the citizens able to impose its will to the rest of the citizens is called the ‘weightier part’ (valentior pars) (IV.12, 1296b14-16). In the Questiones, Peter never uses the term, but, following the Politics more closely in the Scriptum, he does so there on a number of occasions.204 In this question, however, he states that the regime changes when one part becomes sufficiently strong and thwarts all attempts by the opposing part,205 which clearly corresponds to the (vague) notion of ‘weightier part’ found in the Politics. Peter does not elaborate on this notion in either of his commentaries. His main purpose is to show how stability and the lack thereof take place in the political community. Peter does not offer details on the process leading to any political agreement or on how regime change occurs. He does not touch on matters such as political representation, majority rule (so relevant in the Middle Ages), or the organisation of assemblies because he is not considering a specific regime—and the way in which an assembly is organised varies in accordance with the regime—and is not proposing solutions regarding the legislative and deliberative processes. What Peter has in mind here is rather the way in which the citizens continuously relate to each other, that is, how they establish political friendship—which, for Aristotle, is the factor that prevents upheavals—and even more so how the whole body of citizens relates to the end of the political regime, that is, whether they recognise themselves as part of the ‘movement’ leading to that end. The part of the citizens able to impose its will is not always the same. It varies in accordance with the interplay of forces in the civitas. As Aristotle states, it may be the wealthy citizens, and, in this case, they would establish an oligarchy; it may be the plebs imposing a democracy; it may be a few virtuous men who are able to establish an aristocracy, and so on. Peter is perfectly faithful to Aristotle’s idea of concord as outlined in Ethics IX.6, in the sense that the broad agreement regards only the end, or simply put, the principles of the form of government adopted in the civitas. This is clearer in q. 5, 203  A more detailed account of Peter’s explanation of Book V can be found in Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 339-349 and in Chapter 4 of the monograph I am preparing. See also Lanza, “Guerra e pace in Aristotele”, pp. 196-203; Ead., “Comprendere il consenso”, especially pp. 243-247, where qq. 3-4 and 6 are analysed. 204  On this, see Toste, ‘An Original Way’, pp. 328-329 and 341-342, n. 60. 205  Cf. Liber V, q. 4, ll. 43-46.

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whether unlikeness (dissimilitudo) is a cause of dissension. Invoking again the analogy of the city and an animal, Peter argues that while the animal’s parts have varied characteristics, they have a “unity of order with respect to the end” (unitas in ordine ad finem) and with respect to a ruling principle, which is the heart. Likewise, in the political community there is a kind of difference (dissimilitudo) among the citizens which is necessary to the community, since it results from geometric proportion. Distributive justice varies according to the political regime: in a good regime, the goods of the community are allocated according to differences in the merit and virtue of the recipients; in unjust regimes according to different criteria (wealth in oligarchy, freedom in democracy).206 For Peter, this kind of dissimilitudo, which regards the qualities of the citizens that have to be considered for the allocation of offices, does not jeopardise the community, because it is essential to it. There is, however, another kind of dissimilitudo, i.e., when different citizens aim at different ends. As one regime cannot aim concurrently at different ends, this dissimilitudo causes sedition.207 Question 6 deserves a short remark here. In chapter 3, Aristotle enumerates the causes of revolution in general. Among others, he lists disputes related to honour and dishonour (1302b10-21), fear (1302b6-10), elections (1303a13-16) and the lack of ethnic unity in the city (1303a25-1303b3). If Peter were to raise a question on the causes of revolution, then one might expect it to be on one of the aforementioned causes. Quite on the contrary, Peter’s attention turns to the closing paragraph of chapter 3, where Aristotle states that the location “of cities is a cause of revolution when the country is not naturally adapted to preserving the unity of the state” (1303b7-8). Aristotle offers an example to illustrate his point: there was a disagreement in the city of Clazomenae between those who lived on the mainland and those who lived on the island. It is apparent from the Scriptum that Peter clearly understands this passage,208 but, in the Questiones, he uses Aristotle’s remark to ask whether the location of the civitas is a cause of dissension. He tries to show that both the location of the city—applying the Aristotelian theory of ‘natural place’—and the bodies of the citizens are susceptible to astral influence and that dissension depends on such an influence. Once again, it is absolutely remarkable that Peter should attend to matters of natural philosophy while commenting on the Politics. The reverse never occurs: Peter does not deal with politics in his other Aristotelian commentaries. As noted earlier, as a master of arts, Peter of Auvergne approached 206 

Peter deals with this matter in Book II, q. 12 and in Book III, qq. 18-20. That Peter’s lesson was well understood is borne out by the main ideas of the Defensor pacis: one civitas cannot aim at two ends and a good regime depends on the will of its citizens. For Peter, even unjust regimes depend on the will of the citizens. He has thus a broader conception of consensus than Marsilius, for whom only monarchy, aristocracy and polity involve consensus. 208  Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, V.2, p. 267, ll. 317-321: “… sicut accidit in Clazoneis ciuitate: illi enim qui inhabitabant in Chito, que est una pars ciuitatis, erant contra illos qui habitabant in insula, scilicet in alia parte ciuitatis, et uolebant facere diuersas politias et ciuitatem principalem in sua parte”. 207 

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the Politics as someone far more acquainted with and trained in metaphysics and natural philosophy. Question 6 provides clear evidence of this. The Questiones reconnects with the text of the Politics in q. 8 (whether dissension among the notables and the greatest citizens readily grows stronger), which corresponds to the main topic of chapter 4. This question comes as no surprise, given the political weight of noblemen and the consequences of quarrels among them in medieval society. What is more surprising is that Peter uses the famous quote from On generation and corruption, namely that all things “are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents” (II.8, 335a10-11), to argue that sedition is caused in the same manner as insults and slights, and, beyond that, it is nourished by and grows because of them. He additionally uses Metaphysics V.1, where Aristotle also states “by whose choice that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e.g., the magistracies in cities … are called origins” (1013a10-11). Peter uses this sentence to argue, once again, that, when the ruler sets himself in motion, his movement extends to the citizens as well, and, if two rulers (i.e., two notable citizens) disagree, then their opposing movements will have an effect on (the movements of) different groups of citizens, which, in turn, leads to a strong division amongst the citizenry. We cannot stress enough the degree to which Peter approaches the Politics as a natural philosopher and metaphysician. It was arguably this feature that made the Questiones inaccessible to readers interested in this work but who did not possess the same philosophical training as Peter. Peter does not raise further questions related to chapter 4. Later commentaries produced at German universities, however, include questions on the last part of this chapter where Aristotle states that revolutions can be created “by force and by fraud” (1304b7-8),209 but, just as Peter was not interested in dissecting one by one the causes of revolution, he also skips over the ways in which revolutions can be generated. The remaining questions of Book V of the Questiones constitute three distinct groups: the first group deals with an aside made in chapter 5, namely that “a common fear assembles even the most divided people” (1304b23-24).210 Peter raises one question about this casual remark (q. 10), which is preceded by another asking whether fear (timor) is a passion (q. 9). As was the case with flattery in Book IV, where Peter posed a preliminary question as to whether flattery is a vice, the question whether fear is a passion serves as the springboard for q. 10. Question 9, which is based on Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1, bears no relation to the Politics. As to q. 10, here too, Peter explains why a common fear brings together even bitter enemies by using other views found in the corpus Aristotelicum: the idea from 209  See, for instance, q. 7 of the Anonymous of Munich, q. 6 of the Anonymous of Stuttgart and q. 9 of Vincent Gruner’s Disputata; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.145, 148 and 152. 210  “Congregat enim etiam separatissimos communis timor” in William of Moerbeke’s translation, cf. Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, p. 518.

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Book VIII of the Ethics that likeness leads to friendship—fear represents such a likeness—the statement taken from Rhetoric II.8 that we feel pity for other people whose misfortune and condition are more closely related to our own; finally, the notion, found in Book IX of the Ethics, that those benefited love their benefactors is used by Peter to state that two bitter enemies concerned with the same fear help each other, reasoning that each will benefit from the other’s action to bring the cause of fear to an end. As we have seen above regarding qq. 4-6 of Book II, Peter looks (principally) at the Nicomachean Ethics as the source that helps to explain human behaviour. The second group of questions (qq. 11-14) takes its inspiration from the beginning of chapter 9 of Book V, where Aristotle says that “There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the highest offices—first of all, loyalty to the established constitution and then the greatest administrative capacity and, finally, excellence and justice of the kind proper to each form of government” (1309a14-18). These three qualifications were rendered respectively in William of Moerbeke’s translation as “amor ad consistentem politiam”, “potentia” and “virtus et iustitia”.211 As noted earlier in Chapter 1, section 2.16, in the Questiones, Peter renders the first as “amor politie” or “dilectio politie”, while, in the Scriptum, he uses “amor principatus”; yet, in both of his commentaries, he relates it as the ‘love’ for or ‘devotion’ to the end aimed for by the form of government which the ruler must have. Such a ‘devotion’ to the end requires, according to Peter, the intellectual virtue that relates the means to the end, that is, prudence. Peter also identifies the third qualification— virtue—as prudence. As a result, the questions that he raises here do not exactly correspond to the three qualifications in Aristotle’s text; instead, what we find is Peter’s reinterpretation of them. We have thus q. 11, on whether science is required for the ruler in order to rule correctly;212 q. 12, on whether devotion (amor) to the polity is required for the ruler’s perfection, and q. 13, on whether power (potentia) is required for the ruler’s perfection. In q. 11, Peter argues in his typical manner that the ruler needs to possess the principle of action (principium agendi) to move the others towards an end—such a principle is prudence. However, he then adds that, since different political regimes aim at different ends and action is principled on the end to be reached, there will have to be different kinds of prudence according to the different ends. In good regimes, the ruler has prudentia simpliciter, while in deviated regimes he has a prudentia secundum quid.213 211 

Cf. ibid., p. 548. Here, Peter is only referring to practical science (“Hec autem scientia est prudentia”) in a broad sense; cf. Liber V, q. 11, l. 35 and the apparatus fontium. Peter does distinguish between prudence as a dianoetic virtue related to particular actions and practical science as a scientific habit based on universal knowledge; on this, see Chapter 2 of the monograph I am preparing. 213  Cf. Liber V, q. 11, ll. 44-52. 212 

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In q. 12, Peter connects the loyalty to the principles of the political regime (amor politie) to the need for prudence. On the one hand, a ruler needs prudence to deliberate on the means to reach an end, and, to do so, he must possess a correct desire for the end to be pursued; this, in turn, is only possible through devotion (dilectio) to the end to be reached. No one can desire something one does not prize (diligit). On the other hand, since a ruler needs to care for the regime, he must possess prudence to direct his subjects towards the end proper to his political regime. Peter applies his reasoning to every kind of regime (except tyranny). One might think that Peter would limit this view to just political regimes. This is not so: in the first argument contra, Peter raises the objection that devotion (i.e., loyalty) to a regime is in and of itself evil since some forms of government are bad. His reply is eloquent: although to have devotion for a deviated regime is bad in itself, it is nevertheless good ex suppositione, that is, granted that the subjects and rulers abide by the principles of that regime.214 Finally, in q. 13, Peter states that the ruler must have coercive power (potentia ciuilis) in order to punish the lawbreakers. Such power, however, cannot be absolute—here, Peter quotes Politics III.15, 1286b34-38. More importantly, unlike the other qualifications, power is required of the ruler only ex consequenti—a statement that resonates what Peter already said in Book III, q. 15 and 20 (see above). In fact, power is subordinated to prudence and must be ‘regulated’ by it. What needs to be stressed here is that Peter does not restrict the attributes required of a ruler to rulers of a good regime; even in an unjust regime, such as oligarchy, the rulers should be loyal, i.e., they should have a devotion to that regime and possess the sort of prudence necessary to attain that regime’s end.215 By raising three questions on the qualifications required of the ruler, Peter comes closer to the mirrors for princes, a kind of work dedicated principally to enumerating kingly virtues; but, by arguing that prudence is the virtue of the ruler—and by formulating the idea of a prudentia secundum quid detached from the moral virtues—in these questions, Peter settles the Questiones in a perspective radically different from that of his contemporary mirrors for princes.216 This set of questions ends with q. 14, which corresponds to a doubt raised in the Politics itself (V.9, 1309a39-b3). Peter renders this doubt as follows: if one man is powerful and vile and the other good and cares for the political regime, which of them should be elected ruler? Peter takes it for granted that the best man should be appointed ruler: since he is good insofar as he possesses prudence, then, by means of prudence, he has the capacity to lead the subjects towards the purpose aimed for by the political regime. The exception to this answer concerns military offices, in which case Peter favours experience over virtue. 214 

Cf. Liber V, q. 12, ll. 47-52. On this, see Toste, “Virtue and the City”, pp. 95-99. 216  Ibid.; see also Lambertini, “Tra etica e politica”. 215 

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The third and final group of questions—four to be exact—of Book V deals with tyranny. The significant weight given to tyranny is explained by recalling that chapters 10-11 of Book V analyse both the causes that lead to the destruction of kingly rule and the means of preserving monarchy and more specifically tyranny. It is absolutely worth noting that Peter does not raise even a single question in this book of the Questiones about democracy, oligarchy or aristocracy, which are analysed in chapters 5-8 of Book V of the Politics (and note that chapter 5 is only represented in the Questiones on account of an aside related to fear), while he presents four questions on tyranny, discussed in chapters 10-11 of the Politics. It is, therefore, clear that questions related to tyranny are much more significant to Peter than other matters. Once again, Peter’s own political reality determines the approach he takes in the Questiones. Among the four questions that constitute this final group, only one is taken from the Politics. The first two concentrate on whether tyranny can be considered a political regime at all and whether men can be naturally inclined towards it (qq. 15-16). These are then followed by a question on whether tyranny can be useful to anyone (q. 17) and by the final question of Book V, on whether tyranny can be preserved in two opposing ways, an idea put forth in 1313a34-35 and which Aristotle elaborates on throughout chapter 11. This final question is interesting because the statement that tyranny can be preserved in two opposite ways means that the tyrant can preserve his power either by intensifying it—making it ‘more tyrannical’ (1314a33)—or by softening it and thus bringing it closer to the kind of power used in kingship. In this same chapter (11), Aristotle presents the devices by means of which a ruthless tyrant may preserve his power—medieval commentators, in the wake of Albert, referred to such devices as cautelae.217 While medieval authors devoted a fair amount of attention to Aristotle’s enumeration of such devices—for instance, Giles of Rome dedicates two chapters of his De regimine principum to the cautelae tyrannicae218—Peter drops this sort of ‘political advice’ from his Questiones (but not from the Scriptum). It is clear that, for Peter, the aim of a question commentary is to establish the primary idea and to substantiate it—in this case, that tyranny can be preserved in two opposite ways—while the purpose of a literal commentary is to explain by which means those two opposite ways are achieved. This set of questions on tyranny is also relevant for another reason. Apart from the fact that Peter completely leaves out any reference to tyranny as a divine punishment for the citizens or the rulers’ sins, he presents here one of the earliest philosophical accounts in the Middle Ages attempting to explain the injustice of 217  See the overview in Claudio Fiocchi, “L’arte del tiranno: letture delle cautelae tyrannicae tra Duecento e Trecento”, in S. Simonetta (ed.), Potere sovrano: simboli, limiti, abusi (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 235-269, especially 256-260 for Peter’s Scriptum; Id., “Mala potestas”. La tirannia nel pensiero politico medievale (Bergamo: Lubrina Editore, 2004), pp. 90-93. 218  Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/2.10-11, pp. 477-481.

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tyranny on the grounds that it is against human nature.219 Peter takes inspiration from Giles of Rome,220 but his substantiation is more elaborate: it is a highly scholastic reasoning based on hylomorphism. He begins the solutio by distinguishing between two senses of ‘natural’ with respect to a composite of matter and form: the term can be used either with respect to the composite in and of itself or in reference to the elements forming the composite, i.e., matter and form. In this second case, Peter introduces a further division: one composite can be called natural either on account of its form (a parte forme) or because of its matter (a parte materie). Peter illustrates these two cases: fire moves upwards by virtue of its form, while man has a downwards tendency because of his body.221 No political regime can be said to be natural a parte forme; otherwise, there would be the same regime everywhere because it would be suitable for everyone in the same way. Eating, feeling and moving are part of an animal’s essential activities, and it is in this sense that something is natural to an animal a parte forme. The regimes have, therefore, to be natural a parte materie, that is, in accordance with some qualities of the matter, and this can happen in two ways: some quality (dispositio) present in the matter brings man either closer to the form or towards the opposite of the form. Peter then goes on to clarify this idea: the inclination towards the form corresponds to man’s inclination towards reason, such being the activity specific to a free man, while the inclination towards its opposite is proper to a slave. Tyranny can, therefore, by no means be natural: if man is inclined towards reason, tyranny is unnatural, since it obliterates man’s freedom, which Peter equates with man’s rationality. But what is more, tyranny is not natural even if man is inclined towards the opposite of reason: this is because a natural inclination (in the context of politics) implies a voluntary act, or, as Peter puts it, “naturale est uoluntarium”, and no citizen can be naturally inclined to will tyranny, since that would be equivalent to being a slave.222 Peter’s stance is more clearly understood if we recall the way in which involuntary acts are dealt with in the Nicomachean Ethics III.1, where Aristotle defines involuntary acts as those in which the agent is not the moving principle of the action: the agent’s action is driven exclusively by a cause external to him, such as compulsion or ignorance. In this sense, tyranny is furthered by means of compulsory acts which 219  It is needless to recall here that tyranny had long been regarded as a divine punishment inflicted because of the sins committed either by the ruler or by the subjects. This view continued to be held even after the Questiones, but tended to fade away over time. For a study showing how the reception of the Politics contributed to the change of views regarding tyranny in the Middle Ages, see Fiocchi, “Mala potestas”; Lidia Lanza, “Luciferianae pravitatis imago. Il tiranno tra alto e basso Medioevo”, in Ead., “Ei autem qui de politia considerat…”, pp. 139-180. 220  Cf. Aegidius Romanus, De regimine principum, III/2.7, p. 469. See also Toste, “Tantum pauper quantum diues”, pp. 323-324. 221  Cf. Liber V, q. 16, ll. 16-22. 222  Cf. ibid., ll. 35-37.

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contradict the citizens’ natural inclinations. In all the other regimes—monarchy, aristocracy, polity, democracy and oligarchy—the acts are voluntary and can thus result in a ‘union of wills’ (an expression he does not, however, use here). While Peter does not develop here a contractualist theory, he clearly underlines the role of the citizens’ will in political life all through Book V of the Questiones.

6. Book VI The relationship between Book VI of the Questiones and Book VI of the Politics is rather loose. Peter, however, does not rearrange the arguments of this book of the Politics the way he did for Book V, and the approach he takes here reveals the full extent of his distance from both Aristotle and us. Aristotle devotes Book VI to the analysis of democratic and oligarchic regimes. Since Peter was not particularly familiar with either,223 he certainly would not have had much interest in or feel comfortable explaining this book in great detail. For instance, the fact that Aristotle speaks in chapter 4 of how farmers and shepherds may take part in a democratic government would certainly have sounded odd to Peter, and, since Aristotle lists in chapter 5 the means of making democracy endure in a way quite similar to that of Book V, Peter certainly thought it pointless to deal with this chapter. (In fact, it is hard to imagine what kind of questions, with arguments both pro and contra, a commentator could make regarding this chapter, unless he chose to concentrate on one specific item of Aristotle’s list). Moreover, chapter 7, on the organisation of military forces in an oligarchy, would have been uninteresting in the context of a question commentary. Peter leaves aside the reflections on democracy and oligarchy—he completely ignores the first three chapters of Book VI—and concentrates first on Aristotle’s sentence in 1318b10, that people devoted to agriculture and cattle are the best suited to democracy. Questions 2 and 3 are therefore dedicated to determining which mass of people, one made up of farmers (q. 2) or one made up of shepherds (q. 3), is the best in terms of political participation, but, prior to q. 2, on the multitude of farmers, Peter raises q. 1, on whether agriculture is natural to man (in the same sense as whether being political is natural). He employs therein the same distinction he used in q. 7 of Book I: ‘by nature’ can be understood either as a complete and fully developed act or as a disposition to do something. The claim that agriculture is natural to man, advanced in q. 1, makes it possible to understand one of the arguments of q. 2: Peter considers farmers (but also shepherds) more virtuous than craftsmen and merchants and therefore better suited to leading a correct political life; this 223  He certainly had knowledge of German and Italian political realities. Albert the Great, in his commentary on the Politics, made explicit references to Lombardy; cf. Albertus Magnus, Politicorum lib. VIII, II.9, p. 181; IV.4, p. 345 and VI.4, p. 590. Giles of Rome, too, mentioned the case of Italian cities in the De regimine principum, for instance, in III/2.2. Having read the Politics in Paris, for Peter those realities were of secondary importance.

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has to do with the fact that they take their sustenance directly from nature, which means they are self-sufficient.224 Once again, as in Book I of the Questiones, a direct derivation from ‘nature’ works as a criterion to argue for a moral superiority over what comes from human industry, that is, that made by craftsmen and merchants. Regarding the shepherds (q. 3), they are more fitting for political life (though less so than farmers), because they are used to care and protect their herd in the same way as a statesman does. Question 4 signals both Peter’s lack of interest in what Aristotle says about democracy and, at the same time, his disdain for the lower social groups. He completely neglects Aristotle’s exposition on the forms of democracy in chapter 4 and highlights only the last sentence of the chapter, which corresponds to the title of q. 4: whether to live in a disorderly manner is pleasurable to many men. This question can be linked to q. 14 of Book III and, as in that question, here too Peter answers in the affirmative, maintaining that the greater part of men is unfit for carrying out a virtuous life. Although he does not state it here, we can easily assume that Peter raises this question here—where Aristotle deals with democracy—precisely to emphasise the difficulties associated with popular rule. Question 4 is the longest of Book VI of the Questiones, and, once again, two main features of Peter as a commentator come to the fore: the need to substantiate an idea by pursuing it as deep as its roots go—in this case, how can one define pleasure and why the greater part of men desires to pursue sensory pleasures—and engaging in a discussion unrelated to the Politics (but in this case connected with Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Physics). Peter obviously puts the accent on the distinctions between intellectual and sensory pleasure and the ensuing distinction between living according to ‘right reason’ and following one’s sensitive appetite. However, besides this, one of his main concerns is to demonstrate in which sense the sentence from the Politics on which the question’s title is based—to live in a disorderly manner is pleasurable to many men—can be understood. Since to lead that kind of life is equivalent to an evil, and no one can desire that which has the nature of an evil, Peter contends that, just as an intemperate person does not seek inordinateness (inordinatio) per se, but seeks simply sensorial pleasure, so too no one seeks to live in a disorderly manner per se, but only per accidens, insofar as one pursues sensorial pleasures, and this then leads to a ‘disorderly life’.225 Moreover, Aristotle’s sentence can be understood with respect to ‘many men’ not because the greater part of men takes pleasure in a disorderly life, but insofar as many men do not possess “true cognition” and therefore take pleasure in what is suitable to them.226 In view of this, we may add, many men favour democracy, not because democracy is per se the best form of government for the greater part of men, but because many men perceive that the kind of life carried 224 

On these questions, see Fioravanti, “Servi, rustici, barbari”, pp. 412-413, 417-422. Cf. Liber VI, q. 4, ll. 61-79. 226  Ibid., ll. 91-98. 225 

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out within that form of government, where freedom is identified with the power to do as one pleases, is suitable to them. Following this, Peter raises a short question on oligarchy, which is related to chapter 6 of Book VI of the Politics. In this question, Peter limits himself to the list of the four kinds of oligarchy and to stating that the oligarchy made up of the middle class is the best of the four kinds. The last four questions of Book VI constitute a unit unto itself. The titles of these questions have correspondents in the Politics, but it is Peter’s selection that is absolutely remarkable. He focuses on the first lines of chapter 8, devoted to the offices that are necessary in the political community, and overlooks the rest of the chapter. Furthermore, he approaches these four questions in completely metaphysical terms and in such a way that the arguments found in these questions bear no relation to Politics VI.8. In order to offer a sense of Peter’s procedure, I reproduce the text of the Politics (VI.8, 1321b3-12) below, indicating the corresponding question of the Questiones in parentheses: Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. No state can exist not having the necessary offices (= q. 6), and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked, there must not be many of them (= q. 7), but in larger there must be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated. First among necessary offices (= qq. 8-9) is that which has the care of the market.227

Let us compare this section with the titles of the questions in Peter’s Questiones: whether offices are necessary in the political community (q. 6); whether the existence of more than one office is necessary within the political community (q. 7); whether there is a main office within the political community (q. 8), and whether subsequent and inferior offices are necessarily arranged under the first office (q. 9).228 It is striking that Peter should concentrate on a very short passage of the Politics in which Aristotle simply introduces a subject matter of no major significance—the offices of the political community—and that he should raise four questions which have a very coherent structure: he starts with the assertion as to the necessity of offices, then he establishes the necessity of distinct offices and a hierarchy among them and finally he ascertains the need for one main office which commands all 227  In Moerbeke’s translation, this passage runs as follows (Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo, pp. 484-485): “Consequens autem dictis est diuidere bene que circa principatus, quot et qui et quorum, sicut dictum est et prius. Sine necessariis quidem enim principatibus impossibile est esse ciuitatem, sine hiis autem qui ad bonum ordinem et ornatum impossibile habitari bene. Adhuc autem necessarium in paruis quidem pauciores esse principatus, in magnis autem plures, sicut existit prius dictum: quales igitur congruit simul ducere et quales separare, oportet non latere. Primo quidem igitur cura necessariorum que circa forum”. 228  I have translated principatus here as ‘office’, but, in the context of these questions, principatus also means ‘rule’.

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the inferior offices. As in Books II, IV and V, here too Peter leaves aside Aristotle’s considerations on the different political regimes and attempts to give philosophical grounds for some basic tenets of the politics; in this case, the existence of different offices in the political community, something which was entirely evident for Aristotle. These four questions can be related to the two first questions of Book II, since, in both cases, Peter lends extreme importance to the notion of order (ordo): this is, indeed, the notion that, for Peter, best defines form of government or political regime (politia), given that he often defines the form of government as the order according to which the rulers and the subjects relate one to another and according to which the subjects relate to each other. In this respect, public offices must be an essential part of the civitas; otherwise, no order can be imposed upon it—this is the core of q. 6. Since one political regime can aim for one end only, then there must be a supreme office able to lead the civitas towards such an end—this is the main conclusion of q. 8. However, just as on a ship, where there are different specific roles, such as rower and pilot, so too there are different functions in the civitas. Moreover, not all men attain the same degree of virtue and so the way in which the citizens contribute to the end of the civitas cannot be the same for each of them. For these reasons, a civitas requires different public offices—this is the point of q. 7. Finally, in q. 9, Peter concludes that the different offices in the civitas must be subordinate to a supreme office which provides unity to them and makes it possible for the civitas to reach its end. Peter frames each of these questions in terms of metaphysics and natural philosophy, referring to the Physics and Metaphysics more often than to the Politics. Indeed, more than once, he compares the civitas with the animal body and the universe. Moreover, he bases much of his argument on the idea, taken from the second book of the Physics, that the agent of an action and its end must be related one to the other. This set of questions on political offices is completely absent from later commentaries. While these questions are reduced to just two questions in the commentary of the Anonymous of Milan, in Nicholas of Vaudémont’s and in the Anonymous of Munich’s commentaries no question deals with the necessity of offices in the political community.229 These questions, principally qq. 8 and 9, had, however, impact outside the commentary tradition on the Politics: as, in q. 8, Peter states that the main office has a ‘numerical unity’ under which all the other subordinate offices are arranged and compares the community with the animal body, this question is undoubtedly the source of chapter 17 of Dictio I of Marsilius’ Defensor pacis.230

229 

230 

Cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.119, 136, 146. See also Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 350-351.

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Book VII

Only two topics are dealt with in this book of the Questiones: happiness (qq. 1-7) and the influence of the climate on the mores of the citizens (qq. 8-9). Aristotle devotes the first three chapters of Book VII to happiness, and Peter truly concentrates on this topic. Moreover, q. 7 (whether political happiness is to be preferred to contemplative happiness) is the longest question of the entire Questiones, and q. 4 (whether the happiness of an individual man and that of the entire city are the same) and q. 5 (whether political happiness consists in an act of a moral virtue) are two of the lengthiest questions. This illustrates the importance that the topic of happiness holds in the Questiones; this is not all that surprising if we bear in mind that, all throughout the Questiones, Peter solves numerous questions in teleological terms. Additionally, in the Scriptum as well, this exposition on happiness is the lengthiest of the entire work. Peter follows the order of the corresponding text of the Politics. His argument is formulated in a very structured way: first, he states that happiness does not consist in external goods (q. 1) and then that happiness cannot be a bodily good (q. 2). Since happiness is related to the soul, it has to consist in a virtue, but not a moral virtue. Here, Peter distinguishes between political and contemplative happiness, the latter being superior (q. 3). The titles of these three questions are taken from the second paragraph of Book VII, where Aristotle points to the “partition of the goods which separates them into three classes, viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul” (VII.1, 1323a25-27). Peter’s source, however, is also the Summa theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 2, articles 1, 5 and 7, the titles of which are almost the same as Peter’s questions here. Note that these three questions, and others that are similar, also appear in Book I of Ethics commentaries produced in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century.231 Question 3 serves to prepare the ground for q. 4, on whether the happiness of the individual and that of the community are the same, the title of which is taken from the initial sentence of Politics VII.2 (1324a4-6). Aristotle deals with this issue in chapters 2 and 3, though Peter apparently does not take Aristotle’s arguments into account. Peter further deepens the question by drawing a distinction between the two ends pursued by the political community and by the individual man, namely a finis propinquus and a finis remotus, and by considering the individual from two perspectives, i.e., as man considered as a citizen—thus as a part of the civitas—and as man qua man. While the fines remoti of both the political community and the 231  See, by way of example, the Ethics commentaries by Peter (cf. Celano, “Peter of Auvergne’s Questions”, pp. 58-62); Radulphus Brito (in Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 203-215); Giles of Orleans and the Anonymous of Erfurt (cf. Costa, “Autour de deux commentaires”, pp. 257 and 266) and the Anonymous of Worcester and John Dinsdale (Suto, “Anonymous of Worcester’s Quaestiones”, pp. 330 and 332). All these commentaries have questions such as utrum felicitas consistat in voluptatibus; utrum felicitas consistat in honoribus; utrum felicitas humana consistat in divitiis.

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individual are the same, whether man is considered as a man or insofar as he is a citizen, the finis propinquus is different. Insofar as a man is a citizen, he has an immediate purpose ( finis propinquus) which is distinct from the immediate purpose of the whole civitas, for his individual actions are distinct from the actions of the whole, just as the actions and functions of rowers and pilots are not the same as the actions accomplished by the ship as a whole. The only exception is with regard to the individual who is also a ruler, since in this case his actions are the same as the whole—for this reason, later, in q. 6 of Book VII, Peter ascertains that the political happiness of the civitas consists in the ruler’s actions carried out in accordance with prudence.232 When it comes to a man considered as a man, his finis propinquus is distinct from that of the civitas because the end pursued by a man qua man is contemplative happiness, not political happiness (the latter is for the sake of the former). As a result, the contemplative happiness of one single man, given its absolute excellence, cannot be subsumed into the political happiness of the entire community, as the end of philosophical speculation lies outside the range of political activity.233 It is likely that, in this particular question, Peter was influenced by Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, who maintained that the individual temporal good can be included in (and sacrificed for the sake of) the common temporal good, while they denied the same kind of inclusion with regard to the individual spiritual good—individual salvation can never be sacrificed for the sake of the spiritual good of the whole community.234 Peter does not state this, but his view is in line with those of Aquinas and Henry of Ghent: a superior good cannot be included in a lower good, such as the political happiness of the civitas. This view represents a strong affirmation of the philosopher’s unique role within the community and, to a certain extent, a downplay of political life. Nevertheless, because Peter states that the finis remotus of a man qua man and the civitas is the same on the grounds that it is by means of the intellect that both carry out their actions, this view does not represent a total philosophical devaluation of politics; in fact, it can be connected with what Peter previously maintained in q. 5 of Book I, i.e., that political life is a rational activity. At this point, Peter moves away from the Politics. While, in chapter 4, Aristotle begins to discuss the best regime—how its population and territory ought to be— Peter simply ignores this topic and raises three further questions on happiness: q. 5 (whether political happiness consists in an act of the moral virtues), q. 6 (whether 232 

Cf. Liber VII, q. 6, ll. 30-39. On this, see Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 295-306; Id., “Pro patria mori: The Debate in the Medieval Aristotelian Tradition”, in Il bene comune. Forme di governo e gerarchie sociali nel basso medioevo. Atti del XLVIII convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 9-12 de Outubro de 2011 (Spoleto: C.I.S.A.M., 2012), pp. 391-418, at 398-402. See also chapter 3 of the monograph I am preparing, and, for an account of Peter’s exploration of hapiness, see Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, pp. clxxix-clxxxi. 234  On this, see Kempshall, The Common Good, pp. 157-178. 233 

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political happiness consists in the specific act of prudence which consists in ruling) and q. 7 (whether political happiness is preferable to contemplative happiness). At no point in the Politics does Aristotle explicitly deal with these three questions, and he never gave any hints as to the second of them. Once again, Peter’s source is the Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 181, art. 2, for q. 5, and IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 8, and IIa-IIae, q. 50, art. 1, for q. 6. This section ends with q. 7, on the comparison between political and contemplative happiness, a question that echoes the questions found in the Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 182 and in Peter’s contemporary commentaries on the Ethics, which, in their Books I and X, convey more or less the same thoughts.235 Like the bulk of the Ethics commentators, Peter argues that political happiness consists in an act of the intellectual virtue of prudence (he does so in q. 5). Like Aquinas, he maintains that the main act of prudence is to command (q. 6). This last position enables him to maintain that whoever commands—the ruler— achieves political happiness in the highest degree, and, therefore, a citizen does not attain the same degree of happiness as the ruler.236 The idea that political happiness consists principally in the act of commanding was also maintained by John of Jandun in his commentary on the Metaphysics, written some decades after the Questiones. For Jandun, however, the act of the ruler in which consists political happiness is to command his subjects to acquire the knowledge of God and to love Him.237 This idea is foreign to Peter, as he believes that God falls outside the range of both political science and political action (see above on Book I, q. 6). 235  For a comparison between the Questiones and its contemporary Ethics commentaries regarding the relationship between contemplative and political happiness, see Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, pp. 295-302. 236  The idea that prudence is more necessary in the ruler than in the subjects is taken from Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 12 (utrum prudentia sit in subditis, an solum in principibus). Nonetheless, Aquinas does not relate this idea to happiness. 237  Ioannes de Ianduno, In duodecim libros Metaphysicae (Venetiis: apud Hieronymum Scottum, 1560), Liber I, q. 18, cols. 70-71: “felicitas practica consistit in actu prudentiae, quae est in principe, cum virtus principis debeat excellere omnes alios; sed proprius actus principis est praecipere … actus atomus et specialissimus in quo consistit felicitas politica est praecipue (ed.: praecipere) operari ad cognitionem et ad dilectionem Dei”. On Jandun’s political views, including his notion of political happiness, see Roberto Lambertini, “Felicitas politica und speculatio. Die Idee der Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Politik nach Johannes von Jandun”, in J.A. Aertsen–A. Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l’Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt (Berlin–New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 984-990, Id., “Jandun’s Question-Commentary on Aristotle’s Meta­ physics”, in F. Amerini–G. Galluzzo (eds.), A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 385-411, at 401-402. Prior to Jandun, Giles of Rome had mentioned the love for God in relation to the happiness attained by the ruler. However, for Giles, the ruler’s happiness consists in an act of prudence guided by the virtue of charity. And while Jandun considers the love for God as an aim to be reached, Giles sees it as the imperative that drives the king to govern his subjects; cf. Roberto Lambertini, “Il filosofo, il principe e la virtù. Note sulla ricezione e l’uso dell’Etica Nicomachea nel De regimine principum di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 2 (1991), pp. 239-279, at 270-271.

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Finally, in q. 7, on the comparison between the two kinds of happiness, he states unequivocally that contemplative is superior to political happiness. This means that the philosopher—the one who attains contemplative happiness—is ranked as superior to the ruler, who only reaches political happiness. Some of Peter’s arguments in favour of the superiority of contemplative happiness over political happiness are also found in his contemporary Ethics commentaries, though he presents a more extreme view, as he criticises the view, advanced from Albert onwards, that political happiness is ‘more useful’ than contemplative happiness.238 As noted in Chapter 2, Peter enunciates in q. 7 a theory that he most likely developed in his theological works, and, as noted in Chapter 4, here he makes direct use of Michael of Ephesus, which was not so common at the Arts Faculty of Paris. Clearly, for Peter, this group of questions on happiness, together with his thoughts on happiness in the Scriptum and in his Ethics commentary, represents the core of his practical philosophy. Above all, this group is the earliest attempt in the Middle Ages to advance an elaborate theory of political happiness.239 Peter remained rather vague about what political happiness consists in: it is an activity of the intellectual virtue of prudence related to the common good and that helps to preserve the arrangement (ordo) of the political regime. The vagueness of this definition, however, does not diminish the importance of these questions. The last two questions (8-9) are similar to chapter 5 of the Scriptum and correspond to the Politics VII.7. These questions attest, once again, to Peter’s interest in natural philosophy. As noted in Chapter 1, sections 1.3 and 2.15, Peter reiterates here ideas found in the Scriptum and his Physics commentary and attempts to substantiate Aristotle’s idea that men’s mores are conditioned by geography, for instance, that northerners and southerners as well as Europeans and Asians do not behave in the same way. We can link Peter’s approach here to the ideas he advanced in Book I of the Questiones, where he contends that man’s bodily constitution exerts an influence on his character and thus on political activity. Here, in Book VII, but also in q. 6 of Book V (see above), Peter discusses how the movement of the celestial bodies exerts an influence on the bodies and the sensorial organs of the citizens and on the location of the city, and thus on the intellectual abilities of its inhabitants. Following on from Aristotle, Peter maintains that northern and southern Europeans cannot have the same forms of government. In Peter’s hands, Book VII turns into a treatise on happiness. The question of the best political regime—the subject of Book VII of the Politics—simply disappears. Clearly, we cannot know how Peter would have proceeded in his interpretation of Book VII. In the Scriptum, he lingers much longer on the initial chapters of Book 238 

See 3.1 of Chapter 2, above. In the Ethics commentaries, political or practical happiness is always secondary, as the attention of the commentators goes to contemplative happiness. 239 

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VII on happiness than on the remainder of the book, and so we may assume that, in the Questiones, he would have done much the same.240

8. Conclusions It emerges from this account of the content of the Questiones that Peter did not slavishly follow the Politics and that he was capable of rearranging its content in such a fashion that he could make it mirror his own reality. In such a rearrangement, he also draws to a great extent on the Summa theologiae and the Nicomachean Ethics. In addition, his personal interests in metaphysics and natural philosophy run throughout the Questiones and somewhat determine his approach to the Politics—this is a characteristic unique to Peter, not found in the Ethics commentaries contemporary with the Questiones and in the subsequent question commentaries on the Politics (or at least not to the same extent as in Peter). Even so, in raising questions related to the text he is commenting on, he exhibits full awareness of which sections of the Politics are significant in terms of acquiring a firm grip on the text and are worth exploring in detail. It is true that Peter overlooks the sections on polity, democracy and oligarchy, but he disregarded those forms of government because he was interested in advancing an interpretation that would fit the reality before his eyes—i.e., medieval France—and, at the same time, one which might validate the notion that hereditary monarchy was the best form of government (though not the only legitimate form). While we may dispute Peter’s explanation of and even his approach to the text of Aristotle, it is unquestionable that he constructed a coherent interpretation of the Politics. If philosophy is meant to be an inquiry into the causes of a thing—and Peter clearly understood philosophy in this way—then the Questiones is a true expression of philosophical thought. Peter’s maniacal obsession with explanations rooted in the basic qualities of human beings—how the intellect operates and how the body determines the intellect—and his metaphysical approach are a true effort—one of the earliest attempts in medieval Europe—to explain the fundamentals of political phenomena in strictly philosophical terms; the fact that it was the institutional setting in which the Questiones originated that imposed this approach does not diminish its importance. It is remarkable how Peter tries to rationalise every detail by framing it in puris naturalibus—an expression he never uses—since the whole of this work is written in the context of ‘pure nature’, and so there is no reason for him 240  If, however, we want to glimpse the sort of questions Peter might possibly have raised had the Questiones covered the entirety of Book VII, then we need look no further than the questions raised by Vincent Gruner in his commentary; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, II.153-154. As noted earlier, Gruner drew heavily on the Questiones, and his commentary has almost the same list of questions as Peter’s Questiones. Flüeler notes, however, that, in the second part of Book VII, Gruner stops quoting ‘Egidius’ (that is, Peter; see the introduction, above), which he takes as evidence that most likely Peter did not cover the entirety of Book VII; cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.113.

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explicitly to make the contrast with the theological level. He explains everything in this way, that is, as a natural event, from the human inclination to associate to the purpose for which the political community is instituted, from incest to slavery and nobility of birth, from the existence of law to the need for political authority. It is because Peter bases all his interpretations of the Politics on human nature alone that he constructs a view of politics that is relevant, one in which practical reason and will are determinant. Using an anachronism, we might say that, for Peter, practical reason and will are the ‘transcendental conditions’ of political life. Here lies one of the major differences between the Questiones and the Politics: the notion of ‘recta ratio’ and rational order that owes more to Aquinas than to Aristotle and the emphasis on the role of the will in politics. Irrespective of the long scholarly debate on whether Aristotle possessed the notion of will, we would search in vain for this notion in the Politics. On the contrary, it is greatly present in the Questiones, from Book I—for instance, in the opening questions, in q. 5 on whether the civitas is instituted for the sake of a good and in q. 12 where Peter states that political authority is secundum uoluntatem—to Book V—in which the ‘union of wills’ is a key notion—and to Book VII, where Peter deals with happiness. Peter’s emphasis on the will, however, can only be understood if we consider his attention to anthropology—that is, his views about the influences human beings can be subject to—and even more so to the individual, be it the man dedicated to philosophical speculation or the citizen who uses his prudence, i.e., deliberates and chooses in accordance with the political regime. Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the Questiones is its ‘scientific’ approach, in that Peter tries to lay down the general principles and ‘universal truths’ of political life: how a citizen acts, how dissension takes place in the civitas, what is the role of the masses and the few wise men, why the bulk of men wants democracy and so forth. Moreover, Peter is the first medieval author to attempt to explain the way in which the knowledge acquired through the practice of ‘political science’ is scientific and the first to describe the process to gain such knowledge. Here is one of the instances in which Peter best displays his creativity as an Aristotelian commentator: Aristotle discusses the practical syllogism in the context of incontinence (Ethics VII), of the motion of animals and in Book III of the On the soul, where in chapter 10 he deals with the practical intellect. However, Aristotle never conceives of the practical syllogism as equivalent to a deductive syllogism and does not list it among the kinds of syllogisms. Instead, Aristotle understands the expression ‘practical syllogism’ to mean practical reasoning involving deliberation about the means and he views it as synonymous with being goal-oriented. Still, it is not aimed at a scientific causal explanation (except in the case of the motion of animals). Peter thus transforms this notion into the basis of a scientific habit along (but far beyond) the lines of Ethics VI.3. Thus, the Questiones is a telling example of how a medieval philosophical commentary was elaborated: using the entire corpus Aristotelicum

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to explain one of Aristotle’s texts, even taking notions out of their original context and thereby transforming them. Also worthy of particular attention is his justification of the variety inherent in politics: all of the forms of government are good by analogy—they participate in the goodness of monarchy—and all of them (except tyranny) pursue an end which is somewhat good. In other words, all of the forms of government (except tyranny) are acceptable in certain circumstances, all are legitimate and all of them, including tyranny, are part of the reality of human association and must be considered as such. For Peter, politics possesses a specificity of its own and cannot be reduced to other domains of human activity, whether ethics or theology. Finally, the Questiones is an attempt to explain what politics is and how communities of human beings with different intellectual capacities and opposing wills may endure. The Questiones also reflects the medieval worldview and is an endeavour to express it: man is a rational being who acknowledges the (social and political) order in which he plays a specific role on account of his condition in that same order. At the same time, the Questiones already brings something new to that order. Although Peter stresses that political happiness is the end of political activity, he is not truly interested in elaborating how political happiness is to be understood. He is much more concerned with explaining that the end of politics, whatever it may be, can be attained not in one simple and best way, but in varied ways. In both the Questiones and the Scriptum, Peter proves himself a highly original Aristotelian commentator. That commentators and medieval authors writing on political subjects looked to the Questiones as an important source and held Peter’s view of the Politics in high esteem is demonstrated in the chapter to follow.

Chapter 6

Nachleben The Questiones survives in three manuscripts: one containing numerous university texts from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries (P), one from the early fourteenth century, probably produced in the 1320s (B),1 and one from the first half of the fifteenth century (F). Although the number of manuscripts is limited, it is in line with the bulk of commentaries in question form on Aristotle produced in Paris at the time the Questiones was composed. Many commentaries have come down to us in only one single manuscript—this includes the greater part of the Ethics, Physics and Metaphysics commentaries produced in the Arts Faculty of Paris until the early fourteenth century. In any case, the Questiones is the only commentary in question form on the Politics (previous to Nicholas of Vaudémont’s commentary) which survives in more than one manuscript,2 and it was still regarded worthy of being copied as late as the first half of the fifteenth century (as noted in Chapter 3, F was copied between 1438 and 1443). There can be no doubt that the Questiones made a strong impact in Paris. The text is contained in P, one of the most important testimonies of the intellectual life of Paris in the late thirteenth century. This manuscript soon became part of the Sorbonne library in the Middle Ages (its former shelf mark was Sorbonne, cod. 841).3 More importantly, the Questiones became the model for the subsequent commentaries in question form, which follow its tabula quaestionum and countless arguments. It lost readership only when the commentary of Nicholas of Vaudémont, composed prior to 1379, appeared on the scene. Even so, the Questiones was still the basis for the early fifteenth-century commentary by Vincent Gruner, though he refers to Peter as ‘Egidius’.4 1 

See Chapter 3, section 4.1, above. The Anonymous of Milan, the Anonymous of Baltimore and the Vatican Anonymous are all extant in one manuscript alone. 3  See the description of this manuscript in Lafleur, Quatre introductions, pp. 16-39, already quoted in the first note of the Introduction. P is a miscellaneous manuscript that contains almost seventy different works, many of which are linked to the teaching carried out at the Arts Faculty of Paris in the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century. It contains commentaries on the Ethics, Metaphysics, Problems, Poetics, Physiognomics, as well as sophismata and quodlibeta conducted at the Arts Faculty. 4  See page 46 of the introduction, above. In Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.108-114, this scholar examines how the Questiones was used in Gruner’s commentary. It would not be an overstatement to claim that this commentary on certain occasions bears a relationship to the Questiones that we could define as that of a super-commentary. Each question is arranged into the typical arguments pro and con plus the solutio, but the second half of the solutio often begins with the words (or similar) “dicit Egidius”, which consists in a report (sometimes verbatim) of the correspondent question of the Questiones. Gruner is so familiar with the Questiones that in question 7 of Book I of his commentary he makes a cross-reference to a question of Book VII of the Questiones: “Egidius tunc, septimum 2 

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Gruner was not the only commentator to have assigned an erroneous name to the author of the Questiones. In reality, the association of Peter with the Questiones was obliterated quite early: the text is anonymous in B and in F, and the Anony­mous of Milan, who is so much dependent on the Questiones, attributes views he indisputably took from it to Albert.5 As far as my examination of medieval commentaries on the Politics in question form has uncovered, no commentator ever quoted Peter by name when drawing on the Questiones. Peter is quoted by name by Burley, Oresme and Peter of Osma–Ferdinand of Roa, but, as noted in the introduction, these authors were referring to the Scriptum. By the late fourteenth century, Nicholas of Vaudémont’s questions on the Politics had apparently superseded the Questiones as the standard question commentary on the Politics. This is borne out by its seven manuscripts and by the fact that the commentary published under Versor’s name draws heavily on Nicholas and very little on the Questiones (if Versor [?] knew the Questiones first-hand at all).6 Even so, Peter’s ideas did not peter out after Nicholas. This is because Nicholas used many of Peter’s lines of reasoning in his commentary, and Versor (?), whether first-hand or second, still took ideas that can be traced back to the Questiones.7 In the case of Nicholas, numerous examples could be adduced in questions bearing the same title in the two works. Jean Dunbabin demonstrated that, in the question on whether the multitude can elect and correct the ruler, Nicholas merely reproduces Peter’s arguments8 and, following on from her, Flüeler remarked that in this question Nicholas takes one argument which is found only in B.9 It is worth Politicorum, dicit quod in hac uita non est possibilis uita humana sine tristitia, quia semper operatio uoluntatis et operatio appetitus sensitiui sunt discrepantes, et operationes intellectus et sensus contrariantur” (Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1039 8° [1283], f. 92v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 123va). This is a reference to the reply to the third argument of Book VII, q. 6 of the Questiones. 5  See, for instance, q. 7 of Book II: “… ponere legem est in uoluntate principis, quia illud (cod.: illa), secundum quod dicit Albertus, quod (cod.: que) placet principi, legis habet uigorem; ideo et cetera” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf. f. 14va), clearly taken from the Questiones (II, q. 8, ll. 4-5); q. 13 of Book III: “et ideo dicit Albertus hic quod principem et dominum in ciuitate oportet habere prudentiam, quam impossibile est esse sine uirtute morali, ut apparet 6º Ethicorum, et hoc per se requiritur ad principem” (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf. f. 26va) and q. 7 of Book V: “sed prudentia est ratio agendi qua aliquis perfecte dirit se et suos subditos in finem debitum politie, ut dictum est, et Philosophus hic satis innuit, 6º Ethicorum, et Albertus etiam in isto 4º hoc uult, et etiam Philosophus; ideo et cetera” (ibid., f. 44rb). Note that it is Peter (never Albert) who lays stress on the necessity of prudence. See also q. 9 of Book IV (ibid., f. 39v) on nobility of birth, which is based on q. 14 of Book IV of the Questiones, though the anonymous author mentions Albert as his source (Albert does not deal with the origin of nobility of birth in his commentary). 6  See note 182 of the Introduction, above. 7  An evident case occurs in q. 8 of Book III, where Versor (?) argues that the man outstanding all the other citizens ought to be banished from the community, reasoning that such a man does not keep the proportion required for the city to be preserved in peace (Questiones … Iohannis Versoris, f. 49rb). This is based on Book III, q. 21 of the Questiones, where Peter uses the idea of proportionality in friendship advanced in Book VIII of the Ethics (see Chapter 5 and 2.7 in Chapter 1, above). 8  Dunbabin, “The Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics”, pp. 735-737. 9 Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.160-161.

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noting that the same occurs in Book I, q. 10.10 More recently, Lidia Lanza showed, in two articles, the similarity between Peter and Nicholas with regard to the set of questions of Book I on chrematistics and to the first questions of Book V, dedicated to the topic of peace.11 In addition, one can point Peter’s distinction between a perfect act and a disposition, which is reiterated by Nicholas in the same argumentative context.12 The idea that the lawmaker has to attune the laws to the mores and degree of virtue of the citizens, the object of Peter’s question 10 of Book II, is found in Nicholas’ commentary.13 The same holds for the distinction between two kinds of multitude,14 for the theory that a city’s location may be a cause of dissention, a question in which Nicholas reproduces the Questiones verbatim,15 and for the questions of Book VII about the influence of the climates on man’s behaviour.16 In fact, Nicholas’ relies on more works and, for this reason, Flüeler described his approach as one of a ‘compilator’.17 Nicholas draws on Bartholomew of Bruges’ Economics commentary,18 Oresme’s De moneta,19 Buridan’s Ethics commentary,20 Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta21 and Ockham’s Dialogus.22 Nicholas’ commentary may be a patchwork made up of different texts, but, since it became the reference question commentary on the Politics in the late fourteenth century, it must be regarded as instrumental in extending the influence of the Questiones. It is also possible to track the use of the Questiones beyond the commentary tradition on the Politics. One such case can be seen in the commentaries on the Ethics. I have demonstrated elsewhere that, while commenting on Book IX, the Anonymous of Erlangen refers to the fifth book of the Politics but using words very

10  Cf. Buridanus, Questiones, I, q. 10, f. 14ra: “… et sic capit Aristoteles quinto Ethicorum dicens quod illud quod aliquis maxime appetit dicetur vita sua. Et exemplificat: sicut venator appetit venari, et philosophus philosophari”; B, I, q. 16, ll. 15-17: “… secundum quod ostendit Aristoteles, 9º Ethicorum, quod illud quod maxime appetit et prosequitur reputat uitam suam, ut uenator uenari, philosophus philosophari”. 11  Lanza, “Ars acquirendi pecunias”, pp. 226-230; Ead., “Guerra e pace in Aristotele”, pp. 199-200. 12  Cf. Buridanus, Questiones, I, q. 8, f. 11ra. 13  Ibid., II, q. 3, f. 29rb. 14  Ibid., III, q. 12, f. 40ra. 15  Ibid., V, q. 5, f. 70rb-vb; cf. Chapter 1, section 1.3, above. 16  Ibid., VII, qq. 6-7, ff. 100va-101vb. 17  Cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.161. 18  Ibid., pp. 161-165. 19  Ibid., pp. 156-159 and the bibliography quoted there. 20  Ibid., pp. 159 and 166 (together with the bibliography quoted there); Toste, “Pro patria mori”, pp. 415-417. 21  Ibid., p. 416 22  This happens in q. 5 of Book VIII on universal monarchy. See Arthur S. McGrade, “Ethics and Politics as Practical Sciences”, in M. Asztalos–J.E. Murdoch–I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.). Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. Vol. I (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland, 1990), pp. 198-220, at 205.

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similar to those of the fifth book of the Questiones.23 I have also suggested that, in his Ethics commentary, Henry of Friemar might have drawn on Peter’s criticism of Albert’s view on the relationship between practical and contemplative happiness.24 A more extensive use is found in Radulphus Brito’s Ethics commentary and in Bartholomew of Bruges’ Economics commentary. This is evident in two questions. First, in the fifth book, Brito raises the question as to whether man and woman join by nature (utrum combinatio maris cum femella in ciuitate sit naturalis). The title echoes that of q. 7 of the Questiones: utrum combinatio maris et femine sit a natura. To my knowledge, this is the only Ethics commentary contemporary with Peter to include a question on this matter—Brito begins the contra stating that “Oppositum apparet primo intentione Philosophi I Politicorum”, which provides evidence that this matter is more fitting to be dealt with in a commentary on the Politics than in one on the Ethics. It is, however, the way in which Brito structures that solutio that leaves no doubt that he took the backbone of the solutio from the Questiones. Brito removes almost all the quotations Peter introduces in his text and leaves aside some philosophical principles (e.g., the distinction between a perfect act and disposition), but his text boils down to the same ideas as Peter’s. Even the sequence of the arguments is the same as in the Questiones. Both texts draw from Aristotle’s On the soul the notion that every being, including man, partakes of what is eternal by reproducing another being like itself, thus continuing its existence as a species, although not as an individual. Then, both texts argue that the male and the female must remain together for their entire lives, since they join not only to procreate, but also to feed and bring up their children until they are fully grown and reach maturity with respect to both body and soul. Finally, both texts maintain that such a process lasts almost an entire lifetime and that, once their children are grown up, the couple remains together as the male and the female have grown old and are unable to live each one alone (for Peter, they then need the help of their children, 23  Toste, “An Original Way”, p. 351, n. 89. Compare the text of Erlangen (Liber VIII, q. 1) with that of the Questiones: “politicus habet considerare saluationem ciuitatis, ut dicitur 5º Politicorum. Sed amicitia est generatiua concordie et unionis uoluntatum in finem et in ea que in finem ordinantur, que unio inter ciues est causa salutis politie (cod.: politice)” (Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 75va); Liber V, q. 3, l. 38: “… concordia est unio uoluntatum secundum ordinem in finem” and q. 7, ll. 27-31: “… continuitas unionis uoluntatum aliquorum in finem et in eis que ad finem est causa per se saluationis politie. Et quecumque ulterius hanc unionem inducunt, per consequens nata sunt saluare politiam, ut amicitia inquantum huiusmodi, et ulterius omnia inductiua amicitie”. Nowhere in the Politics does Aristotle speak of ‘unio uoluntatis’, a syntagm that occurs over and over in Book V of the Questiones. Iacopo Costa dates the Erlangen commentary to the early 1280s (cf. Costa, Anonymi Artium Magistri, pp. 102-106), which means that it would predate the Questiones. While Costa’s arguments are persuasive, they are not definitive. One might, of course, conjecture that Peter and the Erlangen commentary drew on the same common source—for instance, Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, qq. 29 and 37—but this seems unlikely, since the expressions used in this strecht of text of the Erlangen commentary are very specific to Book V of the Questiones, where ‘unio uoluntatum in finem’ and ‘unio uoluntatum in ea que finem’ convey a very specific point (cf. Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 343-344). 24  Cf. Toste, “Nobiles, optimi viri, philosophi”, p. 301.

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while Brito states that, over time, they have developed a friendship and are tied by mutual assistance).25 These same lines of reasoning are found in Bartholomew of Bruges’ question commentary on the Economics, even though Bartholomew adds some extra arguments.26 Second, the presence of the Questiones is also noticeable in other parts of Brito’s and Bartholomew’s commentaries. Nevertheless, in those places, these authors use the Questiones to construct only an argument or line of reasoning and not the entire question. This holds for one argument regarding the comparison between practical and contemplative happiness27 and principally for the definition of the subject matter of practical philosophy. I shall address this topic in a coming publication, but, here, I can put forward that, while the greater part of the late thirteenth-century Ethics commentaries follow Aquinas and identify the subject matters of ethics with the bonum humanum uel operatio hominis in finem ordinata,28 Brito draws on Book I, q. 1 of the Questiones, equating it with the bonum agibile.29 The same expression also appears in the commentary in question form on the Economics by Bartholomew of Bruges, who takes several lines of reasoning from the Questiones to grant a scientific status to economics.30 The expression bonum agibile was not widely used, but it does occur in Peter’s Scriptum and, there too, it is identified with the object of the practical intellect.31 That Brito took ideas from Peter is not surprising, since he did so in other works, such as in his Metaphysics commentary and possibly in his Categories commentary.32 By contrast, it is surprising that ideas from the Questiones are echoed in theological works, that is, produced outside the Arts Faculty of Paris. We have already seen that Auriol considered it worth criticising Peter’s ideas on slavery,33 25 Compare

Questiones, I, q. 7 with Costa, Le “questiones”, pp. 463-464. For an analysis of this question in these three authors, namely Peter, Brito and Bartholomew, see Blažek, Die mittelalterliche Rezeption, pp. 315-332. See also Toste, “The Naturalness of Human Association”, pp. 129-134 for Peter and Brito. 27  See the apparatus fontium of Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 165-173. 28  This holds for Giles of Orleans (cf. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 195vb), the Anonymous of Erfurt (Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13, f. 85vb: actiones humane in finem ordinate) and the Anonymous of Erlangen (Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 48rb: bonum humanum uel operatio humana in finem ordinata). 29  Cf. Costa, Le “questiones”, p. 184. Throughout his question on the subject matter of ethics, Brito uses bonum agibile, including in the title. 30  The following excerpt is taken from the transcription of this commentary made by Pavel Blazek, who is preparing the critical edition of Bartholomew’s question commentary (cf. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 218va; Liber I, q. 5: quid sit subiectum in yconomica): “Demum ostenditur quod bonum agibile ab homine, ut est pars communitatis domestice est ibi subiectum”. 31  Petrus de Alvernia, Scriptum, VII.11, p. 545, ll. 98-100. 32  Cf. Ebbesen, “Five Parisian Sets of Questions on the Metaphysics”, p. 280; Giorgio Pini, “The Transcendentals of Logic: Thirteenth-Century Discussions on the Subject Matter of Aristotle’s Categories”, in M. Pickavé (ed.), Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 140-159, at 150-151. 33  See Chapters 3 and 5, above. 26 

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which means that the Questiones found some readership at the Faculty of Theology of Paris. In addition, we can point two cases in which the Questiones was most likely used as a source. The first regards the case of Hervaeus Natalis’ Quodlibet X, q. 13, where Hervaeus asks the question of whether the slave qua slave possesses moral virtues, a question Peter touches upon in several questions of Book I (principally in q. 29, but also in q. 30 and, to some extent, in q. 10). It is not certain that Hervaeus draws on Peter or even on a commentary on the Politics, since similar ideas are found in Summa theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 50, art. 2. However, like Peter (and unlike Aquinas), Hervaeus maintains that the slave needs moral virtues and ‘right reason’ (prudence in Peter) to take and execute instruction (praeceptum) from the master, and, more significantly, like Peter (and Aquinas), too, he views the relationship between master and slave as one of mover and moved.34 The second concerns two quodlibetal questions of the Pseudo-Rigauld. A very similar question to q. 14 of Book IV of the Questiones, including the lines of reasoning and quotations, is found in the Pseudo-Rigauld’s Quodlibet VI, q. 16 (utrum nobilitas intendatur ex successione).35 The date of the Pseudo-Rigauld’s question is unknown and it can be dated to either the late 1280s or to the 1290s, or even to the early years of the fourteenth century.36 It may, therefore, predate the Questiones or come after it. If the former, it would represent a crucial source for Peter; if the latter, then it is a further witness to the earliest reception of the Questiones at Paris. While further research is needed, it seems more plausible to consider the Pseudo-Rigauld’s question as produced after the Questiones. A hint in this direction is given by Quodlibet VI, q. 15 (utrum nobilis generet nobilem), where the Pseudo-Rigauld maintains the following: Ex quo apparet differentia nobilitatis, libertatis, dominatiui, quia nobilitas est quedam dispositio naturalis deriuata a progenitoribus, per quam homo naturaliter inclinatur ad faciendum opera uirtutis. Libertas uero est dispositio naturalis, uel a patre uno uel pluribus, uel ex se absque patre, ad prompte exequendum opera rationis imperata a uoluntate; ratio igitur liberi est posse se mouere sui gratia, non propter alium, sicut seruus. Dominatiuum uero est dispositio naturalis, ex quocumque sit, ad preuidendum opera rationis et ad mouendum et ad prosequendum ea se et alios propter se. 37

This is exactly the same as what Peter holds in different passages of the Scriptum and the Questiones.38 These ideas—that the master sets in motion the slave and 34  Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibeta (Venetiis: per Georgium Arrivabenum, 1513), Quodlibet X, q. 11, f. 177vb. The authorship of Hervaeus with respect to his Quodlibeta V-XI has been long disputed, but it seems safe to attribute Quodlibet X to him; cf. Friedman, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature”, pp. 438-445. 35  Cf. the apparatus fontium of Liber IV, q. 14, ll. 28-43. 36  See note 95 of Chapter 1, above. 37  Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, ff. 5ra, 38rb. 38  Cf., for instance, Liber IV, q. 12, ll. 35-50 with the apparatus fontium.

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the difference between free man and nobleman—are so important to Peter, and repeated so often in his works, including in a Quodlibet, that it seems unlikely that he had lifted them from an obscure quodlibetal question, where they are advanced in relation to the topic whether nobility is a hereditary attribute. Whenever Peter took a specific idea from another work, he typically limited the use of that idea to one single question or section of the Questiones, as the cases of Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent suggest.39 On the contrary, if the Pseudo-Rigault’s Quodlibet is dated to the (late) 1290s or to the 1300s, when Peter was an authoritative author and his works were part of the texts transmitted by the stationarius of the University of Paris, then it would be ‘natural’ that his ideas were repeated in quodlibeta. As noted in Chapter 1, the Pseudo-Rigauld draws on the De regimine principum in another question; therefore, it seems more plausible that it also drew on the Questiones. If the Questiones is the source of Hervaeus and the Pseudo-Rigauld, then it acquired an important status at the University of Paris only a few years after its composition. Even more surprising is the use of the Questiones (or, more precisely, of B) in Juan de Torquemada’s commentary on Gratian’s Decretum. Commenting on distinction 4 of the first part of the Decretum, Torquemada opens a section on law, which is partially based on the Summa theologiae: two questions correspond to Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2, and q. 96, art. 3. Between these two questions, he raises the question utrum legislator instituendo leges debeat inspicere ad homines et ad loca et ad tempora, which is taken from q. 10 of Book II of B (utrum legislatorem in constituendo legem oportet inspicere ad homines et loca).40 Torquemada’s commentary was finished in 1464, which would indicate that Peter was still read more than one and a half centuries after its composition. As this part of Torquemada’s text is reproduced in the work of the jurist Sebastiano Medici, published in 1586,41 at least one particular view of Peter was still followed in the late sixteenth century. Torquemada’s use of Peter is relevant for two further reasons: like the Anonymous of Milan, he attributes Peter’s views to Albert—which suggests that perhaps the Questiones (and B) circulated under Albert’s name—and, like Nicholas of Vaudémont, Torquemada draws on B, which shows once again that B had an autonomous circulation. The most important use of the Questiones in the Middle Ages, however, is found in Dictio I of Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis. Ferdinand Cranz was the first scholar to establish an affinity between the Questiones and the Defensor pacis, doing so through an examination of the questions as to whether it is better to be ruled by the best man or by the best law (Questiones III.22 = Defensor I.11), whether it is 39 

See the last two sections of Chapter 4, above. Ioannes a Turrecremata, In Gratiani Decretorum primam doctissimi commentarii. Tomus primus (Venetiis: apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti, 1578), Pars I, dist. 4, cap. 2, ad 4, p. 61. 41  Sebastianus Medices Florentinus, Repetitio in cap. Erit, distinctio IV, in Id., Tractatus, I (Venetiis: apud Bernardum Iuntam, 1586), p. 219. 40 

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better for the ruler to be appointed by election or through hereditary succession (Questiones III.25 = Defensor I.16) and whether the multitude should have a share in power (Questiones III.15-17 = Defensor I.12-13).42 Cranz was followed by Alan Gewirth, who focused to a large extent on the same topics,43 and later by Christoph Flüeler, who narrowed the focus to the question on election vs. hereditary succession.44 More recently, I have argued that Marsilius’ use of the analogy of the city as an animal and of notions such as peace, tranquillity, concord and numerical unity of public offices (Defensor I.17) stems largely from the Questiones, or at least from the tradition initiated by the Questiones.45 I have also stressed that the way in which Marsilius conceived of sociability and the origin of the political community can only be understood with the Questiones and other similar commentaries on the Politics as a backdrop.46 Finally, I have demonstrated how much Marsilius draws on Peter (and possibly the Anonymous of Milan) and, at the same time, opposes him on the role that the multitude and the few wise men play in the legislative process and in political power.47 What these studies have demonstrated is that chapters 2-5, 7-9, 11-19 of Dictio I of the Defensor pacis—that is, the bulk of Dictio I—are in one way or another related to views advanced in the commentary tradition of the Politics. Marsilius’ use of the Questiones (or possibly of any other commentary on the Politics influenced by Peter) is twofold. On the one hand, he openly criticises Peter’s interpretation, Peter, beyond any doubt, being identifiable as one of his targets and as one of the quidam to whom Marsilius refers in Dictio I. In this sense, Marsilius’ aim is to assume the role of a major interpreter of Aristotle, which enables him to present his own views as ‘Aristotelian’ and, therefore, in line with one of the most established authorities on the political thought of his time. On the other hand, Marsilius draws on the Questiones (or on a commentary influenced by it) to advance some of the most important notions of the Defensor pacis. In both cases, he remains silent as to his sources, but it is important to underline that—apart from 42 

Cf. Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory, pp. 319-363. Cf. Alan Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua. The Defender of Peace. Volume I: Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy (New York–London: Columbia University Press, 1951). 44  Cf. Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation, I.120-131. The chapter devoted to the question on election vs. hereditary succession is the longest of Dictio I and is arranged as a scholastic question with arguments contra and replies to those arguments. There Marsilius avows that he intends to discuss the matter against the opinion of certain (quidam) authors. To this aim he lists and presents the views of his adversaries. Cranz preferred to see Giles of Rome and the Anonymous of Milan as Marsilius’ direct targets, while Flüeler added Peter to these two authors. Flüeler examined the arguments contra 1-6 and 11. We can also add argument 10, for it is undisputable that Marsilius takes issue with the Questiones there; cf. Toste, “The Early Commentaries on the Politics”. 45  See the previous Chapter, on Book VI, and Toste, “An Original Way”, pp. 348-353; Id., “The Early Politics Commentaries”. 46  Cf. Toste, “La socievolezza umana”. 47  Toste, “The Parts and the Whole”. But see also Vasileos Syros, “The Sovereignty of the Multitude in the Works of Marsilius of Padua, Peter of Auvergne and Some Other Aristotelian Commentators”, in G. Moreno-Riaño (ed.), The World of Marsilius of Padua: The Life and Work of a Medieval Political Theorist (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp. 227-248. 43 

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any historiographical discussion as to whether we can classify the Defensor pacis as an Aristotelian work—Marsilius’ Aristotelianism does not imply in and of itself that Marsilius relied on every occasion solely on the Politics and that he did not seek the interpretation offered by the commentators. In Chapter 1, section 2.16, I provided evidence that, in Dictio I, chapter 14, Marsilius drew the three attributes required of the ruler from the Questiones and not directly from the Politics.48 As noted in the introduction, that numerous medieval authors often relied on a commentary—in this case the Questiones—and not on the Aristotelian work they were referring to is something that historians often fail to bear in mind. The Questiones did not enjoy the same diffusion as the Scriptum, but, as this short section attempts to demonstrate, it was read in different institutional and discursive contexts and for a long period of time. Not many works produced by thirteenth-century masters of arts enjoyed such a circulation. A conclusion can be drawn from the evidence adduced here: the Questiones was used by the Anonymous of Erlangen, Brito and Bartholomew of Bruges as well as, in all probability, by Henry of Friemar, authors (all of them) active at the turn of the fourteenth century or in its first decade, when Marsilius was studying in Paris. All this suggests that the Questiones had a strong impact in Paris in the first two or three decades after its appearance. When the Questiones started circulating in Paris, Peter was already an advanced student in the Faculty of Theology and was quite probably regarded an authority and a major interpreter of Aristotle by younger masters of arts, such as Brito and Bartholomew of Bruges, and it was for this reason that Marsilius and Auriol in different contexts took the trouble to criticise Peter’s interpretation of the Politics. It had immediately become the standard interpretation. Peter had a tremendous impact in the medieval and Renaissance interpretation of the Politics. Two examples suffice: the application of hylomorphism to politics was still to be found in two much later works, Donato Giannotti’s Repubblica fio­ rentina and Thomas Smith’s De republica Anglorum.49 And his interpretation of the central books of the Politics—III to V—was widely used in the works belonging

48 

See also Toste, “The Early Commentaries on the Politics”. Donato Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, ed. Giovanni Silvano (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1990), p. 77, ll. 22-30: “È, adunque, il subiettto nostro la città di Firenze tale quale è nella quale vogliamo introdurre una forma di republica conveniente a ciascuna città, ma solamente quella la quale puote in tale città lungo tempo durare. Percioché, si come il corpo prende vita dall’anima, così la città dalla forma della republica. Talché se non è convenienza tra loro è ragionevole che l’una e l’altra si corrompa et guasti si come averrebbe se un’anima umana fusse con uno corpo di bestia congiunta o un’anima di besti con uno corpo umano”; Thomas Smith, De republica Anglorum. The maner of gouernement or policie of the realme of England (London: Henrie Midleton, 1583), I.15, p. 17: “And as all these iii. kindes of common wealthes are naturall, so when to ech partie or espece and kinde of the people that is applied which best agreeth like a garmēt to the bodie or shoe to the foote, then the bodie politique is in quiet, & findeth ease, pleasure and profit. But if a contrary forme be giuen to a contrary maner of people, as when the shoe is too litle or too great for the foote, it doth hurt and encomber the conuenient vse thereof”. 49 

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to the genre of ‘reason of state’.50 Of course, Peter’s influence was due more to the Scriptum than to the Questiones, but as I have shown in Chapter 1, the two works are intimately connected. Peter’s interpretation of the Politics was of far more than academic interest. Yet, the merit of the Questiones—its original way of substantiating Aristotelian doctrines by using the corpus Aristotelicum in a way Aristotle never imagined—was also its limit: outside the university few people could fully understand its contents. But this, of course, holds true for numerous medieval political works which did not originate in the university.51

50 The Scriptum is a source for the works of, among others, Federico Bonaventura, Ludovico Settala and Diego Pérez de Mesa; cf. Lanza, “Diego Pérez de Mesa’s Política o razón de Estado”. 51  Referring to Marsilius’ Defensor pacis, Dante’s Monarchy and Ockham’s Dialogus, Jürgen ­Miethke wrote that these “texts were not composed for the university, and yet they demanded a stan­ dard of knowledge that could only be provided by the university”: Jürgen Miethke, “Political Theory and the Fourteenth-Century University”, in J. Van Engen (ed.), Learning Institutionalized. Teaching in the Medieval University (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), pp. 257-277, at 268. See also Id., “Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert”, p. 12.

Chapter 7

Introduction to the Critical Editions 1.

Principles of Edition

The guidelines of this critical edition can be summarised according to the words of Arthur George Rigg: “Above all, I feel that we have some obligation to produce a text which would have been recognizable by its author”.1 Such an aim is not straightforward in a work such as the Questiones, which stems from oral teaching and which depends somewhat on a reportator. Rigg’s words have to be understood not as an imperative to recover the ur-text of the Questiones, which is impossible to do, but rather as an attempt to frame the work in its own time and context.2 Trying to establish a text that is somehow able to reflect the context in which the author composed it does not mean that there will not be artificiality in the final text. Establishing a text always gives rise to a slight air of artificiality, for instance in the punctuation, in the choice of variants, in filling in missing words and gaps in the text and in the correction of misspelt words. No critical edition provides an unadulterated nat­ ural text, and no edition of a medieval text can be labelled ne varietur—all critical editions are constructions, for they result from choices the editor, not the author, made. For this reason, in cases such as the Questiones, which, in a considerable part of its text, is transmitted in one single manuscript—the manuscript on which the edition is based—need not be fetishised: the style of the copyist and his idiosyncrasies ought not to be assumed as the only criterion, even though that manuscript serves as a frame for its editor. The following pages provide arguments for the options made in the critical edition of the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb. However, irrespective of the choices made, the main criterion in the establishment of the text is intelligibility. The Questiones is a philosophical text, and philosophy can only be passed on when intelligible. A further option must be justified: as noted in Chapter 3, the reportatio, i.e., B, ff. 60ra-68rb, has a text of inferior quality compared with the Questiones and it does not cover a part of Book III and Books IV-VII. For this reason, the edition of B is offered as an appendix and not side-by-side with the edition of the Questiones.

1  George Rigg, “Medieval Latin”, in Id. (ed.), Editing Medieval Texts: English, French, and Latin written in England. Papers given at the Twelfth Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, University of Toronto, 5-6 November 1976 (New York–London: Garland Publishing, 1977), pp. 107-122, at 119. 2  See also ibid., p. 121.

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2. P as the Base Manuscript The text of the critical edition was established by using P as the base manuscript whenever possible. Strong arguments can be advanced for this option. P contains the text of the Questiones in its entirety and therefore provides unity to the whole text; it is the oldest of the three manuscripts3 and, most importantly, it presents a higher quality text than both F (with respect to Book I, qq. 1-17, 20 and 22) and B (for Books III, q. 20–Book VII, q. 7). The first indicator that P has a text superior to that of F and B is the frequency of omissions per homoioteleuton in the three manuscripts. The figures are striking: in Book I, P has three omissions per homoioteleuton as opposed to thirteen in F; in Book III, qq. 20-26, P has five against eight in B; in Book IV, P contains six against seventeen in B; in Book V, P has three against fifteen in B; in Book VI, P has three against six in B and, finally, in Book VII, P has only two omissions per homoioteleuton as opposed to the sixteen in B. F presents a very faulty text and to the extent that it would be impossible to undertake an edition of the Questiones based solely on it. Its scribe makes mistakes of declension, and he often understands neither the words he is copying nor how to decipher the abbreviations he finds in the manuscript he is reproducing: in these cases, he ‘invents’ words4 or, alternatively, writes an abbreviation which has no meaning, being sometimes an array of letters not even strung together.5 To avoid overloading the apparatus, these cases are not indicated as variants (except where they were helpful for a conjecture). For the most part, the variants in F were adopted 3  Cf. Lafleur, Quatre introductions, pp. 16-39, who indicates that the manuscript bears the dates 1295, 1308, 1309 and 1310 in different places. For the dates of B and F, see Chapter 3, above. 4  Prohemium, ll. 26 and 32: reducitur] redet; ibid., l. 32: unumquodque] numque; ibid., ll. 66-67: est practica] de peracticis; ibid., l. 70: cuiusmodi] dei; ibid., l. 113: assignari] dissignari; Liber I, q. 1, l. 13: Eustratium] austratium; ibid., l. 14: dicentem] inuocentem (?); ibid., l. 32: obiectorum] demorum; q. 2, l. 89: uniuersaliter] isse; ibid., l. 96: ratiocinabitur] rationabus; ibid., l. 126: mediatus] mentus; q. 4, l. 26: omnes] entie (?) add.; q. 6, ll. 7 and 12: principalioris] principioris; ibid., l. 21: tutelam] inbellam; q. 7, l. 56: eadem] in edem; ibid., l. 97: mitti ad] mira dicti; q. 8, l. 14: uigorem] uigeorum; ibid., l. 16: natus] iatus; ibid., l. 47: a pede] apude; ibid., l. 50: serui] seruuem; q. 9, l. 3: indiuiduis] diuiduis; ibid., l. 14: determinationem] determinatem; ibid., l. 46: appetant] appetuorum; ibid., l. 65: fantasmata] pantasmata; ibid., l. 94: concordabit] esse cordabit; ibid., l. 98: saluationem] saluatium; q. 10, l. 6: mouente] meco; ibid., l. 7: fistula] sistilla; ibid., l. 7: melodiam] melodium; q. 12, l. 1: ubicumque] ubicum; ibid., l. 12: Proclus] protius; ibid., l. 18: aceruus] aterius; ibid., l. 21: cumulus] cunusius; q. 13, l. 90: rectum] remum; ibid., l. 90: puros] pures; ibid., l. 101: nimis] ninis; q. 15, l. 37: subiectus] subiectius; ibid., l. 41: uiolenta] mohibentes; ibid., l. 43: uiolentum] mohibitum; ibid., l. 44: uiolenta] mohibita; ibid., l. 46: uiolentam] mohibita; q. 16, l. 12: Principiorum] principior; ibid., l. 33: dirigente] dirignone; q. 17, l. 12: preconsiliari] preconsolari; ibid., l. 32: uxorem] uporem; q. 20, l. 40: uegetabilis] uegetas; ibid., l. 60: uegetatiua] regniua; ibid., l. 62: principalioris] principioris; q. 22, l. 13: recuperat] reciperat; ibid., l. 22: contenta] contantos. 5  Liber I, q. 2, l. 6: actu] acoli; q. 3, l. 3: de ciuitate] denute; q. 4, l. 50: De Anima] aai li; ibid., l. 72: etiam metaphisica] raneta; q. 7, l. 105: duplicabitur] duplior; ibid., l. 114: perficienda] perficita; q. 8, l. 31: mulieris] in lrum; q. 9, l. 64: acuta] amta; q. 10, l. 32: calor] ta lior; q. 12, l. 50: moti] mct; q. 13, l. 23: finem] sicc; q. 17, l. 7: boniuolentia] bunichia.

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only when some word is missing in P and its variant renders the text intelligible. That said, a variant present in F was adopted when it is of undoubtedly higher quality than the reading in P. On some occasions, F and B present better readings than P, and, on others, their variants make the text ‘smoother’ or make for an easier read. In the first case, I selected passages from F and B, as they conveyed the sense of the text more precisely. In the second case, however, I followed P to avoid establishing a hybrid text. Some examples illustrate why this option was consistent: in P, the references to Aristotle’s works are usually made without a preposition (e.g., ‘VI Ethicorum’ and not ‘in VI Ethicorum’), while F and B almost always have the preposition (though it is not strictly necessary). Other cases are concerned with the syntagm ‘ut dicitur’, which B occasionally adds before a reference to an Aristotelian work (but which is absent from P); ‘arguitur ratione quia’, which B and F prefer, while P has in many instances simply ‘arguitur quia’, and ‘et arguitur’, a variant present in F and B at the beginning of many questions, while P often starts the question without the conjunction. A substantial part of the text of the Questiones is transmitted only in P (almost a third of Book I, Book II in its entirety and two thirds of Book III). The adoption of these ‘stylistic betterments’ supplied through readings of F and B for the part of the Questiones transmitted in more than one manuscript (but not for the part in which P is the only manuscript) would, therefore, have produced a hybrid text more elegant and polished in some parts while rougher in others. The same reason explains the choice regarding inversions of words: unless it made it difficult to read, I preferred to follow P. This same criterion is behind the decision to discard many variant passages of B. In B, there are numerous instances of wrong declensions, but its scribe (or the manuscript he was copying) tended to add words not essential to understanding the text, but rather which make it flow better. While the absence of these words in P may require a more attentive reading, the additions in B make sentences immediately comprehensible. To avoid overloading this chapter with examples, a few taken from Book V are sufficient. In none of these cases have I adopted the variant of B (the words added in B are in bold): q. 12, ll. 34-36: Et ideo ad principantem exigitur et dilectio politie et uirtus, ad minus uirtus condependens prudentie tali, siue sit uirtus moralis seu alia ibid., ll. 37-41: Circa duo igitur est amor, scilicet circa bonum uolutum et circa eum cui uult bonum – uoluntas autem amantis per prius fertur in bonum quod uult quam in eum cui uult –; et ideo dilectio dicitur complacentia in eo bono quod uult uel in illo cui illud bonum uult q. 13, ll. 13-15: Si autem consideretur potentia naturalis, illa est que est per corporis fortitudinem, et si de hac queritur, dicendum quod non est necessaria principi q. 16, ll. 25-28: Ergo erit naturalis ex parte materie, inquantum est ex inclinatione alicuius dispositionis materie. Hec autem est dupliciter adhuc: enim aliqua dispositio materie inclinat in operationem forme, et ab ista non dicitur tirannis esse politia naturalis

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q. 17, ll. 20-23: Finis autem hominis aliquis est rectus, secundum ueritatem bonus, ut operari secundum rationem rectam, alius est finis eius bonus tantum secundum apparentiam, ut uoluptas uel diuitie ibid., ll. 24-26: aliquid est simpliciter et secundum ueritatem expediens, aliud autem est expediens non simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid et quoad finem positum q. 18, ll. 15-16: Et ideo intelligendum est quod tirannis dupliciter est: una est in qua aliquis principatur ad utilitatem suam et contra uoluntatem subditorum

This might suggest that the scribe of B was well acquainted with the content he was reproducing. This is often not the case. For instance, in q. 16 of Book V, the word despoticus occurs five times: in four instances, B presents dispositus and, in one, depositus, which bears out that he was not familiar with the doctrine of the Politics.6

3. Relation Between the Manuscripts No manuscript containing the Questiones was copied one from the other. In the case of the relation between F and P, which is limited to the Prohemium and qq. 1-17, 20 and 22 of Book I, we can be certain that F was not copied directly from P since it contains the portions of text that permit supplement the homoioteleuta in P. By contrast, F was produced in the fifteenth century and, thus, P cannot have been derived from F; however, it cannot have been derived from the model of F either, since it contains the text which in F is absent due to homoioteleuta. As noted above, F contains too many scribal errors and, therefore, amongst so many errors, it is possible that an error shared by F and P might just be a coincidence. This being so, there are a few shared accidents in P and F. Here are the most significant: Liber I, q. 2, l. 31: sumit] praem. non PF Liber I, q. 2, ll. 95-96: comprehenduntur] complete P complectuntur F Liber I, q. 4, l. 10: practicis] subiecto add. PF Liber I, q. 5, l. 37: operati] qui P quo F Liber I, q. 6, l. 25: proportionantur] appropriantur PF Liber I, q. 6, l. 42: speculatiuam] practicam PF Liber l, q. 6, l. 43: mediatus] immediatus P in medius F Liber I, q. 7, l. 68: nutritionem] generationem PF Liber I, q. 7, l. 86: appetit] appetebat P appetat F Liber I, q. 13, l. 60: corporis] roboris PF Liber I, q. 15, l. 45: seruitutem] seruitutibus PF

The number of these shared accidents is low, even more so if compared with the high number of specific readings present in F. Given this last feature, F cannot have been derived directly from the same ancestor as P. Most likely, however, given the

6 

On other occasions, however, he wrote the word correctly throughout q. 9 of Book III.

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shared accidents in F and P, the model of F (or the model of its model) and P have been derived from a common source. When it comes to the relationship between the part shared by P and B, which extends from Book III, q. 20 up to Book VII, q. 7, things are even clearer. Neither was P copied from the exemplar Annibaldi—the model of B—nor the other way around: each text has omissions owing to homoioteleuton, which can be corrected thanks to the other manuscript. Nevertheless, P and B are closely related, and we can easily conclude that the two manuscripts have a common ancestor. This is because the number of distinct readings of each manuscript is quite low and, principally, the two manuscripts share a considerable number of accidents. Here is a list of the most significant:7 Liber III, q. 21, l. 21: usurpat] usurpant PB Liber III, q. 21, l. 39: in amiticia] praem. in uirtute PB Liber III, q. 21, l. 45: hic] licet PB Liber III, q. 21, l. 80: sunt] sui PB Liber III, q. 23, l. 13: modus] praem. primus PB Liber III, q. 24, l. 43: fit] fiat PB Liber III, q. 25, l. 39: sciuerint] sciuerunt PB Liber IV, q. 1, l. 39: quales] tales PB Liber IV, q. 1, l. 50: alicuius] aliquarum PB Liber IV, q. 1, l. 51: democratiam] democratiua PB Liber IV, q. 4, l. 7: accipiet distinctionem] inv. PB Liber IV, q. 5, l. 22: tristia] tristitia PB Liber IV, q. 5, l. 35: exercendam] exercendas PB Liber IV, q. 7, l. 47: peiores] unus add. P minus add. B Liber IV, q. 7, l. 52: ultimus] ulterius PB Liber IV, q. 7, ll. 57-58: significari] significatur PB Liber IV, q. 11, l. 45: imperfectionis] que add. PB Liber V, q. 4, l. 27: seditio] seditionem PB Liber V, q. 4, l. 52: nec] post primo transp. PB Liber V, q. 5, l. 4: ciuitas] ciuitatis PB Liber V, q. 6, l. 64: diuersitas] facit add. sed exp. P facit add. B Liber V, q. 7, l. 5: hoc] quod PB Liber V, q. 8, l. 50: tantum] ante P aut B Liber V, q. 9, l. 40: passio] appetitus PB Liber V, q. 10, l. 15: omnis] idem PB Liber V, q. 10, l. 39: timoris] terribilis PB Liber V, q. 12, l. 35: condependens] compendens PB Liber V, q. 15, l. 25: imponit] impedit PB Liber V, q. 15, l. 35: secundum] quod add. PB Liber V, q. 16, l. 4: dixit] duxit PB Liber VI, q. 4, l. 12: pauci] ergo add. PB Liber VI, q. 4, l. 19: est] ut add. PB Liber VI, q. 4, l. 38: scilicet1] si PB Liber VI, q. 4, l. 70: inordinationem] ordinationem PB 7  I do not indicate here shared mistakes such as book numbers (e.g., “2º Phisicorum”) and a work’s title (e.g., “Ethicorum” instead of “Phisicorum”), since we cannot exclude that these mistakes were already found in the original.

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Liber VI, q. 7, l. 24: naute] nauta PB Liber VI, q. 7, l. 24: prorarius] scrips. proranus PB Liber VI, q. 7, l. 39: primo] quo PB Liber VII, q. 1, l. 64: malus] malis PB Liber VII, q. 3, l. 50: ultime] ultima sed corr. P ultima B Liber VII, q. 3, l. 66: quod] post Ethicorum transp. PB Liber VII, q. 4, l. 51: animalis] anime PB Liber VII, q. 4, l. 57: propinquus] proprius PB Liber VII, q. 4, l. 70: propinquus] proprius PB Liber VII, q. 4, l. 84: propinquum] proprium PB Liber VII, q. 5, l. 83: sic] sicut PB Liber VII, q. 6, l. 19: precipue] precipua PB Liber VII, q. 6, l. 61: depurationem] deplorationem PB Liber VII, q. 7, ll. 10-11: scientia] sicut in P sicut B Liber VII, q. 7, l. 68: quidem] quod add. PB Liber VII, q. 7, l. 80: quod] quia PB Liber VII, q. 7, l. 121: sapientie] post speculatiua felicitas est transp. PB

Some of these accidents could already have been present in the original. However, given the good quality of the text in P—it can be assumed that it is very close to the original ordinatio—the short time lag between the production of P and B—only two or three decades—the small number of specific variant readings and, finally, presuming that the exemplar Annibaldi had fewer errors than B, the scribe of which was not extremely competent, we can conclude that P and the exemplar Annibaldi had the same model. In this way, as indicated in the diagram on p. 177, the three extant manuscripts containing the Questiones have been derived, in different ways, from a common ancestor.

4. Orthography I did not adopt the classical Latin standard, but rather the medieval spelling without diphthongs. There is a main reason for this option: the Questiones results from oral lectures given by a master of arts in the late thirteenth century, when no scholastic author used classical Latin, and, more importantly, neither Peter nor his readers would have recognised a text edited in classicising orthography. Adopting classical Latin betrays an essentialist conception of the Latin language. As with any other language, Latin underwent numerous changes over the centuries and had its own evolution and regional variations. This is not the place to deal with the perennis quaestio of whether medieval philosophical texts ought to be edited according to a normalised classical or medieval Latin. Arguments have been given for either option, though, in my opinion, there are much stronger arguments in favour of opting for medieval Latin.8 The Questiones is, in any case, a commentary 8  See Rigg, “Medieval Latin”, pp. 118-122. For the case of philosophical texts, see Roland Hissette, “Averrois ou mystice plutôt qu’Averroys ou mistice? À propos des graphies dans les éditions des textes scolastiques latins”, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 40 (1998), pp. 77-90; Adriano Oliva, Les débuts de

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on the Politics, a text which, along with the Ethics, introduced neologisms into medieval Latin—politia, bannausus, oligarchia, democratia, yconomia, campsoria, chrematistica and so on.9 Establishing a text in accordance with the medieval orthography—or better put, orthographies or even ‘poligraphies’, as this is one of the main features of medieval Latin10—permits us to respect the peculiarities of the Latin of that age, such as the grammar ‘mistakes’, which are incorrect only from the classical Latin point of view.11 A case in point is the ‘mistaken’ use of sibi instead of ei and sui in place of eius—both noticeable in Peter’s works. Another case is the

l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la “Sacra doctrina”. Avec l’édition du Prologue de son Commentaire des “Sentences” (Paris: Vrin, 2006), pp. 289-298. For an opposing perspective, see R. James Long, “Scholastic Texts and Orthography: A Response to Roland Hissette”, Bulletin de Philoso­ phie Médiévale 41 (1999), pp. 149-151. Long’s arguments are just brief replies to Hissette’s article. Long takes Hissette’s positions to extremes: this is the case in the example of an edition containing the same word with multiple spellings in the same stretch of text—Long seems to suggest that this is the norm in editions that have adopted medieval Latin. Moreover, Long equates the changes in orthography and in punctuation, arguing that, if the former should be sacralised, then the latter should be as well. These, however, are different questions: while medieval philosophical texts preserved in manuscript have their own orthography, they either have almost no punctuation (the editor having, therefore, to introduce it) or they have one that almost corresponds to ours (cf. Louis-Jacques Bataillon, “Graphie et ponctuation chez quelques maîtres universitaires du XIIIe siècle”, in A. Maierù [ed.], Grafia e interpunzione del latino nel Medioevo. Seminario internazionale, Roma, 27-29 settembre 1984 [Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1987], pp. 153-165). Finally, Long argues that “fidelity to the manuscripts … carried to its logical conclusion … would mean not expanding the abbreviations … because this was after all what the scribe wrote and what the medieval reader saw and (usually) correctly interpreted”. This can be easily dismissed: while the scribe wrote an abbreviation, he and the reader understood the whole word (without diphthongs), and it is this that allows an editor to make it a complete word. Long draws on Gedeon Gál to suggest that medieval philosophical and theological texts should be edited according to classical spelling because their importance lies in their content, not in their linguistic features, and they are intended to be used by historians of philosophy, not by philologists. Then again, one should ask whether there is any text in which its importance does not reside primarily in its content, be it a poem, a papal bull or a notarial document. Therefore, if we maintain that medieval philosophical texts are to be edited according to classical spelling on the basis that content takes precedence, then, by the same token, we must extend this to the edition of every medieval written document. 9  The two main sources of the Questiones are the corpus Aristotelicum and the corpus Thomisticum: the critical editions of the works belonging to these corpora in the series Aristoteles Latinus and Editio Leonina were produced using medieval Latin spelling (the latter since 1971 with the edition of Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics, which represents a landmark in terms of adopting Medieval Latin spelling). This is a further argument for adopting this spelling in the edition of the Questiones. 10  On the medieval use of multiple orthographies and the lack of uniformity, see Paul Tombeur, “De polygraphia”, in A. Maierù (ed.), Grafia e interpunzione del latino nel Medioevo. Seminario internazionale, Roma, 27-29 settembre 1984 (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1987), pp. 69-102. 11  This is not to suggest that medieval Latin presented an unlimited variety of peculiarities, to such an extent that would make it a distinct language with respect to classical Latin. I do not think that the specificities of medieval Latin were infinite or that medieval Latin lacked all coherence and standardisation—as this would betray a ‘nominalist’ view of language. Neither do I believe that medieval Latin should be understood as a ‘language’ in itself, as this, in turn, would betray a conception of language as much essentialist as the one that adopts classical Latin for medieval texts. Medieval Latin—or for our purposes, medieval scholastic Latin—was a ‘part’, a ‘variant’ of the Latin language that still abided by almost the same rules as classical Latin.

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use of a deponent verb with passive sense—for instance, adipiscor12—and the use of the ablative: the Questiones reads ab homine ciuile instead of ab homine ciuili, and the ‘error’ was never corrected, as, for medieval authors, it was not wrong. I also kept the use of the medieval article li, which Peter uses.13 It would indeed be a contradiction in terms to adopt classical Latin and then accept the ‘intrusion’ of the article li into the text.14 Perhaps the strongest argument against adopting classical Latin in this edition is the fact that the Questiones and B are related to orality. As traces of orality can by no means be obliterated from the texts,15 since the editor must keep the shifts in grammatical number and the deictics as much as possible, adopting classical Latin would mean to establish a hybrid text, one with diphthongs and at the same time with traces of an orality which was not spoken when the texts were produced. This having been said, intelligibility was never sacrificed in order to preserve the style of the text. This justifies all the integrations and corrections made to the reportatio transmitted by B, ff. 60ra-68rb. Whenever two words are written in two different forms throughout the Questiones, I made them uniform: The criteria for choosing which spelling to adopt were as follows: 1) P is the main manuscript, 2) the frequency with which one spelling was used as opposed to the other and 3) the standard use of the word. This third criterion merits explanation: various words occur only once or very few times in the entire text, and they are written in a peculiar way—for instance, with only one consonant even though, throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, they were more usually written with double consonants. We come across such spellings as acomodate (B), aquiro (B), aquisitio (P), agrego (P), aplicabilis (P), aporto (P), commito (P), deffensio (B), defficio (B), efluo (P), intromito (P), guta (P), ocultus (P and B), permito (P) and suplere (P). Adopting these forms simply because they occur once or twice in the entire text would mean bowing to the idiosyncrasies of the scribe. There are 12  In the case of the Questiones, see Liber I, q. 7, l. 132. See also Henricus de Gandavo, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae), art. XLVII-LII, art. XLIX, q. 6, p. 141, l. 392. 13  Cf. Liber IV, q. 4, l. 19. On the use of this article by medieval theologians, see Martin Morard, “Le petit li des scolastiques: assimilation de l’article vulgaire dans le latin des théologiens médiévaux”, Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome. Moyen Âge 117 (2005), pp. 531-593. 14  One could object that orthography is one thing, the introduction of neologisms is another and that there is no contradiction in adopting classical Latin while integrating medieval neologisms. Apart from the fact that this means an atemporal text is produced in a linguistic ‘variant’ that nobody ever used, such a view would disregard that spelling, just as any other element of a language, evolves and reflects a specific period of a language. The point in choosing medieval or classical spelling is precisely whether the editor wishes to consider some historical specificities of the text and its context as relevant or not. Again, the words of George Rigg are helpful; cf. Rigg, “Medieval Latin”, p. 122: “I am asking for more respect for the scribe and for each individual manuscript: we should accept the scribe’s orthography, and not dismiss him as someone who, by the misfortune of living in the Middle Ages, was incapable of spelling properly. We should accept his carefully produced texts, not as pieces of evidence from which to restore something else, or as misleading and unreliable witnesses to a badly remembered story, like a game of Chinese Whispers, but as the product of a creative and intelligent craftsman”. 15  On this, see Chapter 3, above.

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cases, however, in which the standard form was not adopted, for example in the case of words such as anologia, transquillitas and volgaris. They are almost always used throughout the text in these forms; moreover, in the case of the first two, they are found in these manuscripts just as they were in other medieval texts. In this sense, the most important case in which the ‘medieval form’ of a word was adopted is with regard to the word uolutus instead of uolitus. The former is consistently used throughout P (except once in which uolitus is found) and B, while F alternates between the two forms. Although the adoption of the medieval form might appear misleading, since, in classical Latin, it was the past participle of volvo, scholastic authors used it as the past participle for volo.16 I furthermore respected the medieval lack of distinction between u and v in the text, except when this letter is capitalised. In such cases, I adopted V. As to the distinction between c and t, given the lack of consistence in the manuscripts—we find uicium but also uitiosus and politia as well as democracia—and the fact that words finishing in -tia are in general abbreviated—such as scientia and prudentia—I preferred to follow the procedure of the editors of Aquinas’ commentary on the Politics (followed in turn by the editor of Peter’s Scriptum) and, therefore, I adopted the forms with a t.17 Graphic variants were not indicated in the apparatus. Below, I present a list of this kind of variants to which I am referring (apart from the above-mentioned spellings with one consonant). The presence of one word in the list below should not be taken as an indication that said word is always written in that form in the manuscript, but rather that it occurs at least once in that form. The words are indicated in the nominative and infinitive (except for distinguantur): absens] ausens F agricultiua] agricoltiua B adeptio] ademptio B admixtus] admistus P amoueo] ammoueo B auctoritas] actoritas BP Auerrois] Auerroys P caput] capud P democraticus] democrathicus B despoticus] dispoticus PBF distinguantur] distingantur P dissensio] dissentio B eedem] heedem P ethica] ethyca P 16  See, for instance, Jean-François Genest, Prédétermination et liberté crée à Oxford au XIVe siècle: Buckingham contre Bradwardine. Avec le texte latin de la “Determinatio de contingentia futurorum” de Thomas Buckingham (Paris: Vrin, 1992), pp. 233, 262, 267, 283; Thomas Bradwardinus, De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum (Londini: apud Ioannem Billium, 1618), pp. 299, 310, 346, 363, 667, 767. 17  Cf. Dondaine–Bataillon, “Préface”, p. A65.

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exequor] exsequor P executio] exequtio B exsiccatio] exsicatio P fantasia] fanthasia F Habraham] Abraham B heroycus] heroicus F immo] ymmo PB melancolicus] melencolicus B Meteora] Metheora P monostica] monestica P monastica PB oligarchia] obligarchia BF oligarcia P paraliticus] paraleticus B politia] pollitia B politica] pollitica F Problemata] Probleumata B saltim] saltem PFB sufficienter] suficienter F summo] sommo B sustentans] substentans B transquillitas] tranquillitas PB Tullius] Tulius F tymocratia] timocratia, tymogratia B tirannis] tyrannis PB tirannus] tyrannus PB Thopica] Topica B uolgaris] uulgaris B uolutus] uolitus PF

Additionally, in the apparatus, I did not indicate three variants that occur quite often. One such case is the variant qui and que (and quidam/quedam, quilibet/ quelibet): the copyist of B too often confuses the two forms and, though to a lesser extent, the copyists of P and F make this same error a few times as well. The second case concerns the variants aliquo and alico in P and F: I adopted aliquo and aliqua. The third case is with regard to the confusion of ista with illa and isto with illo coming about when the scribe expanded the abbreviations ia and io. As a result, even when the manuscript has the word illa written out in full, but the context clearly shows that the correct form is ista, I changed the text and adopted ista; and conversely illa in place of ista. The same regards illud and istud. Since these are deictic pronouns, to do otherwise would have mean to be faithful to the manuscripts at the expense of intelligibility.

5. Conjectures and Emendations None of the manuscripts presents a flawless text. Moreover, throughout the Questiones, the number of manuscripts available for use in establishing the text is slim—P and F for the greater part of Book I and P and B for part of Book III and Books IV-VII. Beyond that, for part of Books I and III and for Book II in its entire-

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ty, we have P alone. The principle adopted for both conjectures and emendations is a sort of ‘grafting technique’. It was carried out in four ways: first, through a contextual approach, that is, by adding/replacing a word (or words) occurring in the same question (a few lines above or below) or in other questions dealing with the same matter and which might have the same terms and expressions. This was possible because Peter often reiterates notions and expressions. Second, as the Questiones and B, ff. 60ra-68rb, are two texts with a direct link one to the other, I emended one text with the other, specifically, the first three books. Third, whenever this was not possible—for instance, when the Questiones has a sentence which has no correspondent in B or when, in Books III-VII, both B and P contain a faulty passage—I consulted other commentaries on the Politics in question form, namely the Anonymous of Milan, the Anonymous of Baltimore, the Vatican Anonymous and Vincent Gruner, since these texts all depend on the Questiones and reproduce (sometimes verbatim) numerous sentences and expressions therefrom. Fourth, I made use of the sources cited by Peter: for instance, in Book I, q. 6, l. 26, both P and F have appropriantur where it is clear that proportionantur must be meant, since it is a quotation from the Physics (“finis et agens proportionantur”). In the apparatus, I indicate as far as possible the source for the conjecture and/or emendation. This having been said, whenever I found no textual basis for an emendation or conjecture, a conjecture has to be seen for what it is: a conjecture. Editors usually do not correct mistaken references to books of Aristotle’s works, preferring instead to note in the apparatus fontium the correct locus of the citation or reference. Since my guiding principle was to make an edition ‘recognisable by its author’, I decided to correct mistaken references in the text. Peter read, taught and commented on the corpus Aristotelicum for decades; his knowledge of Aristotle’s works was far superior to ours. I would not have made justice to such knowledge by leaving the mistaken references in the text.

6. Apparatus The apparatus is negative. All the editor’s notes are supplied in Latin—it would be inconsistent to use Latin abbreviations for standard notations (e.g., add., exp., iter. and so on) while, at the same time, writing notes in English. Given the reduced number of manuscripts, I opted to indicate almost all the variant readings even when they are not important from a doctrinal point of view. Nevertheless, beyond the exceptions listed above in section 4, I also cut off parts of words or letters which the scribe deleted and rewrote correctly immediately afterwards (e.g., in a case such as ‘dc dicitur’, I did not indicate the deleted word).

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7.

Apparatus Fontium

I attempted insofar as possible to identify all the sources used by Peter. These include the explicit quotations and references he makes as well as the implicit sources upon which he draws. My aim in the apparatus fontium was double: to indicate the ­sources Peter used and to facilitate the readers’ understanding of the context in which the Questiones was produced. For this reason, the apparatus by times includes references to works which Peter certainly did not use for the composition of the Questiones; their inclusion, however, helps the reader to grasp a specific sentence in the Questiones—this explains the inclusion of works by Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome in the apparatus of Book I, q. 1, since their works spell out (much more clearly than the Questiones) the difference between subiectum and materia of a science. Because many of the quotations Peter makes are taken from a florilegium—we have seen in Chapter 3 the importance florilegia had for the composition of the reportatio—I referred to the edition of the Parvi flores, known since its incunabulum edition as Auctoritates Aristotelis. The heavy influence of a previous form of this florilegium in the Questiones will be plain to any reader. Whenever Peter’s words are similar to the formulation found in this florilegium, I mention first this florilegium and afterwards Aristotle’s text; otherwise, precedence is given to Aristotle’s works. I also included Peter’s other works when a specific passage of the Questiones is similar to another passage from others of Peter’s texts. As stressed throughout this study, Peter repeated himself quite often, and so the reference to his other works serves to provide a broader spectrum of his output. Wherever a passage of the Questiones is not totally comprehensible, I provided the parallel text from another commentary on the Politics influenced by the Questiones, the text of which commentary being clearer in that specific part. Some of the sources Peter used remain available only in manuscript form. In these cases, the excerpts quoted in the apparatus are taken from the manuscript containing the best version. This holds for Peter’s Quodlibeta—the manuscript used is Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, ff. 1ra-100rb18—for Peter’s Meta­physics commentary—Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 117ra-224vb19—and for the Latin version of the anonymous scholia and Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on the fifth book of the Ethics—Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, which is one of the four best witnesses.20 I also used the unpublished editions of Peter’s questions on the On the 18 

See Schabel, “The Quodlibeta”, p. 104, where this manuscript is considered “the best text of all”. See Lanza–Toste, “A Census”, pp. 430-435 and the studies quoted there. It is difficult to ascertain whether this is the best witness. It is surely, however, one of the most important manuscripts of the ‘university tradition’ of Peter’s questions on the Metaphysics and for this reason it has been one of the most used in the literature. I thank Adriano Oliva of the Commissio Leonina for lending me the microfilm of this manuscript. 20 Cf. The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics … Volume I, p. 126*; The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics … Volume III, pp. 57*-58*. 19 

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heavens (version CEK) by Cesare Musatti and of the Latin translation of Eustratius’ commentary on Book VI of the Ethics by Michele Trizio.21

8. Other Interventions The arguments contra and their replies are numbered. Words included in literal quotations appear in italics whenever they match the words of the source used by Peter. Quotation marks in the replies to the arguments are used quite freely, not as literal citations (since the Questiones and B resulted from orality), but rather as an indication of direct speech, i.e., of what was said or meant previously in the argument.

9. The Edition of the Reportatio From a history of ideas point of view, the text of B is far less interesting and important than the Questiones. It deserves, however, to be published for two main reasons: first, it represents a reportatio, giving us hints about medieval teaching and about the ways in which a medieval author transformed the notes of his oral lectures into a ‘published’ work; second, since it contains a few arguments absent from the Questiones which were used in later commentaries, the publication of this text sheds further light on the medieval reception of the Politics. B is a copy of a reportatio, of which the Questiones is the ordinatio. Since the two texts are closely connected, their respective editions must be connected too. The principles of edition adopted for the Questiones are thus extended to the edition of B. In the establishment of the text, it was not always easy to find a balance between two aims: on the one hand, the need to present the text as it came down to us and thereby keeping its main feature, namely that it results from notes taken down by someone who was trying to record the words of the master in the classroom; on the other hand, the need to have a perfectly understandable text in its entirety, sentence after sentence, and therefore the need to have a grammatically correct text, one that also mirrors the logical sequence of Peter’s arguments. In this sense, it would be meaningless to present the critical edition of an uncorrected text reasoning that it would better represent the original reportatio. This explains the numerous integrations and corrections throughout the critical edition. For instance, in Book III, q. 14, ll. 41-42, without the integration (taken from the Questiones), there would be a leap in the argument. Conversely, bearing in mind that this text is a reportatio, the integrations were limited as far as possible. For instance, in the following passage I preferred not to integrate before the last word, i.e., diuersitatem: Liber III, q. 2, ll. 21-22: sicut patet in littera quod Aristoteles, ex diuersitate politiarum, docet inquirere naturam ciuium et diuersitatem 21  See the final bibliography. I am deeply grateful to both scholars for kindly sending me their editions.

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I chose to do the same with a passage from Book III. There, the words ‘in ista’ refer to politia. I could have integrated , but that would disrespect the ‘oral residue’ of the text: Liber III, q. 12, ll. 16-20: Sed non est necesse politiam distingui secundum distinctionem principantis sub alio existentis … Sed notandum quod principans potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum quod participans in ista uel secundum quod mouens in ista, quod est per formam politie …

In some other cases, the integrations, while not strictly necessary, were made in order to establish an unambiguous and grammatically correct text. For instance, in the cases of shifts from singular to plural: Liber I, q. 7, ll. 13-16: Mulier autem ex naturali sua complexione est frigida et humida multum, et hoc impedit operationes sensus et intellectus; et ideo possunt mente preuidere, propter quod querunt semper consilium aliunde, et iste defectus est causa multorum accidentium que sunt in eis. Liber II, q. 17, ll. 10-12: Dicendum quod lex mutanda est per se meliori superueniente, et per accidens non est mutanda. Per se mutande sunt, quia priores fuerunt rudes et inordinationem permiserunt in ciuitate …

Moreover, I did not correct some cases in which the text presents readings that, while perhaps resulting from the process of reproduction, could very likely be already in the original reportatio. One such case concerns the word quod in Book III, q. 3, l. 44. At first sight, one might think that this quod is a relative pronoun referring to virtuosus and, this being so, it should be corrected with qui (perhaps adding est). It is, however, a causal proposition. Now, it could be argued that it would be better to change it into a quia, reasoning that this quod resulted from a copyist’s error and to prevent any confusion generated by the fact that there is another quod in the same line. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that here, just as in other passages of B and the Questiones, Peter used quod as a causal proposition:22 Liber III, q. 3, ll. 44-46: Vel dicendum quod ciuis non tantum dicitur quod uirtuosus, sed dicitur ciuis quia habet auctoritatem iudicandi uel consiliandi, si uirtutem habeat.

The text of B as it is now published is still raw, but it is readable in itself, and for the greater part of the text it is not necessary to check the Questiones to understand it.23 That B could be read as an autonomous text, somewhat independent from the Questiones—which was produced after B—was behind the choice of indicating its sources in the apparatus fontium (also because, as noted in Chapter 3, B contains some references absent from the Questiones). 22  See, for instance, the following cases found in Book II: q. 3, l. 10; q. 5, l. 37; q. 13, l. 25 and q. 14, l. 21. 23  In those few cases, I made a cross-reference to the Questiones. See, for instance, the note to Book III, q. 3, ll. 47-50.

Introduction to the Critical Editions

10. Conspectus Abbreviationum add. = addidit adn. = adnotatio/adnotationes arg. = argumentum art. = articulum cap. = capitulum cf. = confer coni. = conieci corr. = correxit del. = delevit dist. = distinctio div. = divisio ed./edd. = editio/editiones exp. = expunxit f. = folium hom. = homoioteleuton i.e. = id est inf. = inferior inv. = invertit iter. = iteravit l./ll. = linea/lineae lac. = lacuna loc. parall. = locus parallelus marg. = in margine

11. Conspectus Signorum [ ] = delendum esse puto † = verba corrupta esse puto < > = addendum esse puto = lacuna quam sanare non potui (?) = lectio incerta

ms. = manuscriptum nr./nnr. = numerus/numeri om. = omisit praec. = praecedens praem. = praemisit prol. = prologus prop. = propositio q./qq. = quaestio/quaestiones qc. = quaestiuncula r = recto resp. = responsio s.l. = supra lineam scrips. = scripsit sec. = sectio seq./seqq. =sequens/sequentes sup. = superior suppl. = supplevi tit. = titulus tract. = tractatus transl. = translatio transp. = transposuit v = verso

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Petri de Alvernia Questiones super I-VII libros Politicorum

< PR OH E M IU M > PHILOSOPHUS in 2º De Generatione Animalium dicit quod quecumque P 274ra fiunt arte uel natura, fiunt ab actu existente potentia tali. Quorum primi | F 172ra ratio est quia, quecumque fiunt arte uel natura, oportet quod fiant ab aliquo habente uirtutem operandi, quia aliter non fierent. Sed quecumque 5 habent uirtutem operandi aliquid, habent hoc per formam inexistentem sibi: forma enim est principium operandi; nichil enim mouet nisi secundum quod ens in actu; nichil autem est ens in actu nisi per formam, unde nichil operatur nisi secundum quod est ens in actu, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice. Et sic patet primum, scilicet quod quidquid fit ab arte uel natura, fit ab 10 aliquo existente in actu per formam. Ratio secundi est, scilicet illius quod dictum est “potentia tali”, quia omne quod fit ex alio, oportet quod illud ex quo fit uel sit potentia tale uel non: si dicas quod non, tunc fit quod impossibile est fieri; si dicas quod sic, habetur propositum. Sic patet quod omne quod fit arte uel natura, fit ab 15 aliquo existente in actu potentia tali. Modo homo fit intelligens actu per intellectum: non enim semper intelligit, quod ostendit transmutatio ad intelligendum; ergo oportet de necessitate quod fiat intelligens ab actu existente potentia tali, per propositionem predeterminatam. Oportet igitur quod intellectus se ita habeat 20 quod sit in eo aliquid quod fiat actu tale et possit fieri tale, et hoc est intellectus agens, qui facit intellectum possibilem esse actu tale; intellectus autem possibilis est potentia talis, scilicet intellectus. Et hoc est quod uult PHILOSOPHUS, 3º De Anima, quod sicut est in natura, ita et in intellectu, ita quod in intellectu est omnia fieri et etiam omnia facere, et hoc secundum

0 Prohemium] in marg. sup. add. petro de aluernia; verba aliqua praecedunt, quae propter caesuram folii legi non possunt P 0 ,1 quecumque] quedam F 2 tali] tale F 3 fiunt] om. F fiant] fiat P 4 Sed] si P 7 ens1…actu1] est ens F | autem] aliquid F 8 dicitur 9º] dicit 4 F 9 fit1] fiat F 1 0 aliquo] arte F 1 1 tali] talem F 1 2 uel1] quod F 1 3 si2] non add. sed exp. P quod sic] sic ergo F 1 4 propositum] proportionatum P propositionem et F 15 aliquo] arte F actu] actum F 16 homo] secundo tertio F | intelligens] in tali F | per] secundum F 17 ostendit transmutatio] concursus F 1 8 quod] de add. sed exp. P 19 predeterminatam] primo declarata F | se] om. P | habeat] habet F 20 et1] quod add. F | hoc] hic F 2 1 intellectus1] intelligit F | tale] talem P 2 2 possibilis] possibile F | intellectus] intelligens F 2 3 intellectu] praem. anima sed exp. P 2 4 in intellectu] intellectus F | etiam] om. F | secundum] est F 0 ,1 quecumque…2 tali] Arist., De Gen. An. II.1, 734b20-22 6 forma…operandi] cf. Arist., Phys. II.1, 193b3-5 8 nichil…actu] Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1049b24-25 23 sicut…25 agentem] Arist., De An. III.5, 430a10-17; cf. Auct. Arist., De An. III (149), p. 186

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intellectum possibilem et agentem. Modo ita est quod in omni genere, illud quod reducitur de potentia ad actum, oportet quod reducatur ad hunc per aliquid sui generis, unde determinatum semper ducitur ad determinatum. Modo intellectus agens se habet ad possibilem sicut actiuum ad passiuum, uel determinatum actiuum ad determinatum passiuum; et ita intellectus possibilis reducitur ad actum per intellectum agentem et, cum ille sit sui generis, manifestum quod reducitur ad actum per aliquid sui generis. Et per illud unumquodque habet formam per quod ad actum reducitur; ergo intellectus possibilis formam recipit ab agente. Hec autem forma est species intelligibilis, quam educit intellectus agens ex fantasmatibus, unde COMMENTATOR, super 1um De Anima, dicit quod intellectus est qui facit uniuersalitatem in rebus. Hec autem species aliquorum est ratio intelligendi tantum et non faciendi, aliquorum autem simul principium agendi. Et sicut in naturalibus forma est principium agendi secundum naturam, ita in intellectu forma est principium agendi secundum intellectum. Est ergo principium cognoscendi illa, inquantum per illud contingit ea intelligere; est autem principium agendi uel faciendi, inquantum est ratio operationis exterioris, et sic principium faciendi. Hoc uult PHILOSOPHUS, 7º et 9º Metaphisice, cum dicit quod principia transmutationis sunt in animatis et rationabilibus; et ideo contingit quod artes que sunt in anima sint potentie operandi, ut dicitur 7º quod artes sunt species factibilium in anima.

25 ita] om. F 27 semper ducitur] dicitur semper F | ducitur] coni.: dicitur P | determinatum2] terminatum F 28 actiuum] actuum F 29 uel] sed P | determinatum1] determinat F | determinatum2] definiat F | passiuum] dicitur add. P | ita] cum add. F | intellectus…30 possibilis] intelligit possibile F 3 0 reducitur] de potentia ad actum, oportet quod reducatur add. F 3 1 manifestum…reducitur] om. F | per…generis2] om. F 33 intellectus possibilis] intelligit possibile F 3 4 intellectus] intelligit F 3 5 super] sunt F | 1um] 3 PF 36 uniuersalitatem] utilitatem F | aliquorum est] inv. F 37 et non] uim F 3 9 naturam…secundum] om. per hom. F 4 0 cognoscendi] agendi F | per] ea contingit add. sed exp. P 42 operationis exterioris] operantis exteriorum F | et] quod add. F 43 7º…9º] 4 et 7 F 44 et2…contingit] non dicit F 4 5 in…sint] om. P 46 factibilium] rationabilium F 25 ita…29 passiuum] cf. Petrum, In De Caelo IV.2: “... si in compositis effectus ad quem motus per se est aliquid unum et determinatum, oportet causam proximam in unoquoque genere causae esse unam et determinatam ... Si aliquis enim consideret, mobile ad motum dicitur, et passivum ad activum, sicut dicitur in quinto Metaphysicae. Et ideo unum ad unum, et determinatum ad determinatum” (ed. Parisiis 1875, p. 251) | in…27 generis] cf. Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1049b28-29 3 5 intellectus…36 rebus] Auct. Arist. (Averroes), In De An. I (27), p. 176; cf. Averroem, In De An. I, comm. 8 (ed. Crawford, p. 12, ll. 25-26) 4 3 principia…44 rationabilibus] Arist., Metaph. VII.7, 1032a26-28; Arist., Metaph. IX.2, 1046a36-b4 45 artes…46 anima] Arist., Metaph. VII.7, 1032a32-b2

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Modo ita est quod scientia est habitus quo intellectus per speciem intelligit et cognoscit, et etiam quo operatur illud cuius speciem habet, et ideo, secundum duplex principium, oportet esse duplicem habitum scien50 tie: unum quo dirigatur in cognitione ueritatis, alium quo dirigatur in operatione et cognitione simul. Et isti habitus sic differunt, quia differentia eorum que sunt in finem a fine sumitur, eo quod et ratio illorum ex fine sumitur. Sed fines istarum scientiarum differunt: scientia enim que ordinatur in cognitione ueritatis, que est habitus intellectus prout habet 55 principium | intelligendi, dicitur scientia speculatiua; illa uero que ordina- P 274rb tur ad operationem ulterius, secundum speciem operabilium, dicitur practica. Et hoc est quod dicitur 2º Metaphisice, quod finis speculatiue est ueritas, practice autem opus. 60

De speculatiuis ad presens nichil, sed de practicis intendimus. Cum autem practicarum finis sit operatio hominis, secundum distinctionem finis sui distingui habet. Operationem autem humanam quidam sic distinguunt, quod operationum sunt quedam que transeunt in materiam exteriorem, alie uero non, et utrarumque principium est scientia, ratione autem differunt. Nam dicitur, | 1º Ethicorum, quod quidam fines sunt F 172rb

4 7 intellectus] quo add. F 4 8 cognoscit] agnoscat F | etiam] om. F | illud] om. F 4 9 habitum] praem. uirtutem sed exp. P 5 0 cognitione…in2] om. per hom. F 5 1 operatione] operationem F | cognitione] agnitionem F | simul…54 cognitionem] om. per hom. F 53 que ordinatur] coni. ex infra, ll. 55-56: quod eidem P 54 ueritatis que] uirtutis F 5 5 illa] alia F | ordinatur] operatur F 5 6 ulterius] uirtutis F | operabilium] agibilium F 5 7 dicitur] dicit F 5 8 autem] uero F 59 speculatiuis] speculabilibus uero F | intendimus] post nichil transp. F 60 practicarum] practicorum PF | sit operatio] inv. F | hominis] finis P 62 sunt…que] quedam F 6 3 exteriorem] existentem F | et…64 1º] etiam utriusque est principium scientia ratio autem differens ideo dicitur illo F 6 4 quidam…65 extra] quedam fines sunt operata F 4 7 scientia…habitus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.2, 1139b31-32: “sciencia quidem ergo est habitus demonstrativus” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 480, ll. 25-26) 5 2 eorum…53 sumitur] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a14-21 et Thomam, In Phys. II.4: “Eiusdem scientiae est considerare finem et ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc ideo quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, a fine sumitur” (ed. Maggiòlo, p. 87, nr. 172) 57 finis…58 opus] Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (39), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.1, 993b20-21 61 Operationem…63 non] cf. Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a30-b1; Auct. Arist., Metaph. IX (226), p. 134. Iam Thomas in prologo ad suum commentarium usus est hac distinctione, cuius gratia distinguuntur artes factivae et artes activae; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A70, ll. 81-92) 64 quidam…65 se] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a3-5; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.1, ubi Thomas istam distinctionem finium cum loco ex IX Metaphysicae supra allato iungit: “duplex est operatio, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicae: una quae manet in ipso operante, sicut videre, velle et intelligere, et huiusmodi operatio proprie dicitur actio; alia autem est operatio transiens in exteriorem materiam, quae proprie dicitur factio ... Prima igitur et secunda harum operationum non habent aliquid operatum quod sit finis, sed utraque earum est finis; prima tamen nobilior est quam secunda, in quantum manet in ipso operante” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 6, ll. 193-198 et 204-208)

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operata quedam extra, alii sunt ipsa opera secundum se, et per hoc diffe- 65 runt scientie practice: nam de operatione transeunte in operatum est practica factiua, que dicitur mechanica; de operatione autem manente in operante, que dicitur operatio uirtutum, est practica actiua uel moralis. Aliter possunt distingui, quia aliqua est operatio cuius totale principium est intellectus et non appetitus nec electio, cuiusmodi sunt operationes 70 mechanice: ad hoc enim quod edificator edificet non exigitur quod sit bonus uel malus secundum morem; alia est operatio, cuius principium non solum est intellectus, sed exigitur etiam appetitus et electio, siue illa operatio maneat siue non; et de tali est scientia moralis et actiua. Et hoc est quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 6º Metaphisice, quod scientia factiua 75 est cuius principium est intellectus solus, scientia actiua cuius principium est intellectus et electio. Et de secunda scientia actiua est presens intentio. Et quia ista scientia est de operatione, cuius principium est uoluntas cum intellectu, ideo secundum diuisionem obiecti eius ipsa habet distingui. Hoc autem obiec- 80 tum uoluntatis et electionis primum est finis, quem primo uolumus. Finis 65 ipsa] ipso F | se] et per hoc differunt secundum se add. F 66 nam] non sunt F 6 7 mechanica] mathematica P | autem…68 operante] remote in operatione F 6 9 possunt] possint F aliqua] alia F 7 0 et] om. F 7 1 quod1…edificet] edificatio edificationem F 7 2 cuius] opus F 7 3 etiam appetitus] cum intellectu appetit F 7 4 maneat] manet F | in operante] suppl. ex supra, ll. 67-68 7 8 de] dico F | scientia1] scilicet add. F 7 9 uoluntas] necessitas F 8 0 obiecti eius] inv. F | obiectum] abiectum F 81 primum] principium F | primo] primus F | primo uolumus] inv. sed corr. P 65 et…68 moralis] Petrus (?), In I Sent., dist. 1: “Philosophus distinguit scientiam in actiuam, factiuam et speculatiuam. Et dicit quod factiua est cuius principium est in faciente et transit operatio in materiam extra, qualis est scientia mechanica ... Actiue scientie sunt que considerant principaliter ea quibus homo fit bonus, quales sunt scientie morales” (ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 913, f. 3va) 7 5 scientia…77 electio] Arist., Metaph. VI.1, 1025b21-24; cf. Thomam, In Metaph. VI.1: “Differunt enim agere et facere: nam agere est secundum operationem manentem in ipso agente, sicut est eligere, intelligere et huiusmodi: unde scientiae activae dicuntur scientiae morales. Facere autem est secundum operationem, quae transit exterius ad materiae transmutationem, sicut secare, urere, et huiusmodi: unde scientiae factivae dicuntur artes mechanicae ... principium scientiarum factivarum est in faciente, non in facto, quod est artificiatum ... Hoc autem principium rerum artificialium, quod est in faciente, est primo intellectus, qui primo artem adinvenit; et secundo ars, quae est habitus intellectus; et tertio aliqua potentia exequens, sicut potentia motiva, per quam artifex exequitur conceptionem artis ... Nam principium activarum scientiarum est in agente, non in ipsis actionibus, sive moribus. Hoc autem principium est ‘prohaeresis’, idest electio. Idem enim est agibile et eligibile” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 459) 81 Finis…85 separatus] de hac distinctione inter duos fines cf. Arist., Metaph. XII.7, 1072b1-3; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a30-36; Arist., De An. II.4, 415b2-3, 20-21 (Auct. Arist., De An. II [82], p. 181). Saepe ea Petrus utitur in operibus suis, fere una cum hoc exemplo finis gravis; cf. infra, VII, q. 7, ll. 49-55, sed etiam Petrum, QQ. De Caelo IV, q. 4 (ed. Galle, pp. 344-345, ll. 47-57); Petrum, In De Caelo IV.2 (ed. Parisiis 1875, pp. 251-252); Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, qq. 10 (ed. Celano, p. 47, ll. 15-26), 16 (ibid., p. 54, ll. 10-14), 25

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autem duplex est: propinquus et remotus. Remotus quidem secundum esse posterior est, secundum intentionem tamen prior, ut locus deorsum est finis grauis, est etiam finis eius primus, sed esse deorsum est finis remotus 85 et posterior: et iste potest dici finis separatus, propinquus autem potest uocari coniunctus, unde PHILOSOPHUS, 9º Metaphisice, dicit quod finis separatus magis habet rationem finis quam coniunctus. Sic etiam uoluntatis humane duplex est finis. Et ideo dicit PHILOSO1º Ethicorum, quod finis coniunctus est aliquid bonum operatum ab 90 homine, et ideo, per distinctionem istius, distingui habet scientia actiua uel moralis. Hic autem finis distinguitur secundum diuersos status hominum. Homo autem est aliquid secundum se et etiam est aliquid sociale, ut probabit PHILOSOPHUS sufficienter: nam, societate carens, aut melior aut peior est. Indiget enim homo societate ad esse, uel uiuere uiuentibus est esse: 95 nam indiget prohibentibus nociua et procurantibus necessaria, que non sunt ei nisi ex societate. Est autem duplex societas, scilicet domestica, que necessaria est ad esse et ad uitam, et politica, que necessaria est ad per se PHUS,

82 et] uel F | Remotus quidem] et remotius quodem F | esse] rem F 84 est1] et F | sed] secundum F | finis3] eius add. F 8 5 dici…separatus] de forma operatus F 8 6 dicit] post philosophus transp. F 8 7 finis] coni.: om. P rationi F | quam] quia F 8 8 etiam] et F 89 quod] est add. F | coniunctus] coniunctius F | operatum] praem. separatum sed exp. P 9 0 et] om. F 91 autem] bonum add. P 9 2 est2] om. F | probabit] probat F 93 aut1] an F aut2] an F 9 4 est1] s.l. et add. homine F | uel] uerum quia F 9 5 prohibentibus] proihibitio F 9 6 scilicet] uel F | que] qua F 97 et1] uel F | ad3] ideo F (ibid., p. 65, ll. 12-15), 28 (ibid., p. 68, ll. 11-18); Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, qq. 8 et 10 (ed. Delhaye, pp. 93 et 97); Petrum, QQ. Metaph. XII, q. 9: “sicut Philosophus hic dicit et idem innuit 2º De anima, finis dicitur duobus modis. Aliquando enim finis dicitur quod preexistit ei quod est ad finem, separatum ab eo, nec inducitur per motum, sed preexistit motui et termino motus: hoc autem modo locus deorsum est finis grauium. Aliquando autem dicitur finis aliqua perfectio eius quod ordinatur ad finem in ordine ad finem primo modo dictum, sicut motus ad locum deorsum est finis grauium et eius perfectio attenditur in ordine ad finem primo modo dictum. Et hoc est quod dicitur, 2º De Anima, quod finis est duplex: finis cuius et finis quo, finis separatus et finis coniunctus” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 224va); Petrum, Quodl. I, q. 7 (Vtrum Deus possit facere quod creatura uideat essentiam Dei nudam et non sit beata): “De primo intelligendum quod beatitudo rationalis nature est ultimus finis ipsius; ultimus autem finis est propter quem appetimus alia, ipsum uero propter se, secundum Augustinum XIX De ciuitate cap. 1, et Philosophus I Ethicorum. Finis autem ultimus dupliciter dicitur: uno modo ultimum rei extra ad quod per operationem attingit, sicut finis grauis dicitur locus deorsum, et finis hoc modo dicitur obiectum et est ratio prima finis; alio modo dicti et omnium eorum que ordinantur ad ipsum, siue antecedenter siue consequenter, et hoc modo Deus est ultimus finis creature rationalis” (ed. Jeschke, p. 630, ll. 38- 46) 86 finis…87 coniunctus] cf. Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a17-21 8 9 finis…90 homine] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a18-22; I.2, 1096b32-34; I.4, 1098a16-18 92 Homo…sociale] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a2-3; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (3), p. 252 | Homo…94 est1] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a27-29; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (8), p. 252 9 4 uiuere…esse2] Arist. De An. II.4, 415b13

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sufficientiam, quam enim una domus non omnino perficit. Et ideo homo duplicem appetit ciuilitatem, unde dicit TULLIUS quod non solum nobis nati sumus, sed partem ortus nostri sibi uendicant amici et partem ciuitas. 100

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Et secundum triplicem hunc statum triplex est bonum hominis. Omnis enim operatio et communicatio aliquod bonum intendit, et similiter operans et communicans, ut dicitur principio huius Politice et 1º Ethicorum. Et ideo triplex bonum agibile ab homine, quod est finis eius, et secundum hoc triplex bonum hominis est triplex scientia actiua moralis: 105 de primo bono agibili ab homine est monostica, quod est bonum unius hominis secundum se; de alio bono hominis, secundum quod est pars communicationis domestice, est yconomica; de tertio autem bono, secundum quod homo est pars communicationis ciuilis, est politica. Et sicut unum illorum bonorum ad aliud ordinatur, | ita et scientie, et eodem modo 110 distinguuntur secundum fines.

9 8 sufficientiam] sufficiendum F | enim…domus] in una domo F | perficit] proficit F 99 nobis…100 sumus] nos sumus nati F 1 00 uendicant amici] uendicat ciuitati F 1 01 triplicem hunc] inv. F | Omnis] eius F 10 2 communicatio…similiter] determinato bonum aliquid intendit ergo F 10 3 principio huius] primo F 10 5 bonum…106 agibili] om. P | triplex2] duplex F 10 6 bono] om. F | unius] praem. unus sed exp. P 1 10 aliud] ergo F | modo…111 distinguuntur] distinguitur F 9 9 non…100 ciuitas] Cicero, De Off. I.22 1 0 1 Omnis…103 communicans] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a1-2; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a1-3 1 0 4 Et…109 politica] verbum ‘monosticus’ (vel ‘monasticus’) tantum occurrit in Aristotele Latino in Arist., Pol. II.6, 1265a22 (“oportet civitatem vivere vitam politicam non monosticam”, ed. Susemihl, p. 87, ll. 21-22), ubi significat ‘solitarius’. Hoc verbo saepe scholastici utebantur ad significandum vitam unius ut oppositam vitae familiari (sc. ‘oeconomica’) aut vitae multitudinis (sc. ‘politica’), quam ob rem scientia ethica saepe appellari solebat ‘monostica’; cf. Petrum, QQ. De Caelo, prooemium: “Est unum bonum hominis in se et absolute et de illo determinatur in illa scientia morali sive in illa parte scientiae moralis quae dicitur monostica vel monosticalis. Et dicitur monostica a monos, unus, et ycos, scientia, quasi scientia docens se ipsum in actionibus suis regulare. Dicitur autem aliud bonum quod est respectu familiae et tale bonum docetur in parte alia quae dicitur oeconomica. Tertium autem bonum est quod docetur in tertia parte quae dicitur politica a polis, pluralitas, et ycos, scientia, ut sciat aliquis se et bona communitatis civitatis regere” (ed. Galle, p. 12, ll. 123-132); cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 16: “... ad civilem doctrinam vel monasticam ... Voco autem civilem doctrinam que est de operacionibus hominis, sive sit monastica sive politica sive civilis ...” (ed. Celano, p. 54, ll. 15-16 et 19-20); cf. etiam, e.g., Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.1: “Et inde est quod moralis philosophia in tres partes dividitur, quarum prima considerat operationes unius hominis ordinatas ad finem quae vocatur monostica, secunda autem considerat operationes multitudinis domesticae quae vocatur yconomica, tertia autem considerat operationes multitudinis civilis quae vocatur politica” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 4, ll. 99-106), Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 11, contra: “diversae scientiae sunt politica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis; et oeconomica, quae est de his quae pertinent ad bonum commune domus vel familiae; et monastica, quae est de his quae pertinent ad bonum unius personae” (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 359)

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Ex dictis patet quid sit subiectum in hoc libro, quoniam bonum agibile ciuile, et ex hoc subiecto possunt | assignari cause multarum operationum F 172va et passionum determinatarum. Patet etiam qualis sit scientia ista, quia 115 practica et ulterius actiua, quia considerat bonum agibile ab homine, quod est per se obiectum uoluntatis; unde uoluntas etiam est eius principium. Item, apparet preeminentia huius scientie ad alias. Quod patet, quia sicut obiectum se habet ad obiectum, ita scientia ad scientiam, quia ratio potentie ex obiecto sumitur; sed obiectum istius scientie principalius est 120 aliis obiectis practicarum, quia omnia in ipsum ordinantur sicut partes ad totum; ergo et scientia principalior erit aliis actiuis. Item, hoc patet ex fine eius, quia finis eius principalior; ergo et scientia. Item, apparet ordo eius ad alias, quia ipsa prior est illis dignitate et natura, eo quod considerat subiectum prius secundum naturam: ciuitas 125 enim prior est unoquoque nostrum, ut dicetur post. Vnde, sicut metaphisica se habet ad speculatiuas, ita ista ad practicas, quia sicut illa considerat principia prima et finem ultimum speculabilium, sic ista respectu agibilium, quia principium in agibilibus est finis ultimus: finis enim est principium operabilium. Alie tamen sunt priores quoad nos et uia doctrine: 130 cuius ratio est quia oportet nos procedere ab incertioribus nature et posterioribus in certiora nature et notiora, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum, et ideo, tam in speculatiuis quam in practicis, a magis sensibilibus et posterioribus incipere oportet doctrinam; et ideo, ista uia, monostica et yconomica sunt priores politica, simpliciter tamen est econuerso.

11 2 quid] quod F | agibile] agile F 11 3 subiecto] scientie F | multarum] multorum F 1 1 4 Patet etiam] hoc patet de F | ista] ita F 1 16 obiectum] bonum P | unde…eius] et ideo omnium principium F 1 17 apparet] patet F | preeminentia] penitentia P 11 8 ita] sicut F 11 9 principalius est] inv. F 1 2 0 omnia] om. F 1 2 1 et] om. F | principalior erit] est principalior F Item] om. P 12 2 eius2] est add. F 12 3 alias] alia P | quia] quod F | illis] aliis F 1 25 prior est] inv. F | post] prius F 12 6 speculatiuas] praem. scientias F 12 7 principia prima] principium primum F | speculabilium] speculatiuarum F | sic ista] ita F | agibilium] accidentalium P 12 8 principium1] primum add. F | enim est] nostre F 1 29 operabilium] agibilium F | Alie] agibile F 1 30 quia…procedere] om. F 1 31 notiora] certiora P 1 32 in1] om. P | in2] om. P a] et F | sensibilibus] conseruabimus F 1 3 3 et2] om. F 13 4 simpliciter…econuerso] dicendum est simpliciter ergo F 11 9 obiectum…122 scientia] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse a Thomae Sent. Pol., Prologus (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A70, ll. 93-108). Sed vide etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.1 (ed. ciuitas…125 nostrum] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a18-19 Leon. XLVII.1, p. 4, ll. 78-106) 1 24 13 0 oportet…131 notiora] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a16-18

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C i rc a i s t u m l i b r u m p r i m o p o t e s t q u e r i d e s u b i e c t o h u i u s s c i e n t i e , q u i a su bie ctum in s ci enti a p rimu m e st in co gn itione, e t ex cogn ition e eiu s de p end et sci entia omn iu m alior um q ue in sci entia in qu ir untu r, e t i l l u d e s t c a u s a o m n i u m . Q u e r i tu r e r g o p r i m o u t r u m s u b i e c t u m i n h a c 5 s c i e n t i a s i t c i u i t a s i p s a u e l b on u m a g i b i le a b h o m i n e c i u i l e Et quod ciuitas arguitur: illud est subiectum in scientia de quo et de cuius partibus scientia considerat, 1º Posteriorum; ciuitas hic est huiusmodi; ergo est subiectum. 10

Item, illud ex cuius cognitione dependent omnia alia et cuius cognitio est prima, hoc est subiectum in scientia; ciuitas est huiusmodi hic; ideo et cetera. Minor patet quia PHILOSOPHUS incipit librum suum a ciuitate cum dicit Quoniam autem omnem civitatem. Item, hoc patet per EUSTRATIUM, super librum Ethicorum, hoc manifeste dicentem.

Contra arguitur, quia ita se habet ciuitas in ista scientia sicut unus homo in monostica uel sicut domus in yconomica; modo non dicimus unum hominem esse subiectum monostice, nec domum yconomice, ergo nec ciuitatem politice, immo operabile bonum ab homine secundum se dicimus subiectum monostice; ergo bonum agibile ab homine in ordine 20 communicationis ciuilis erit subiectum hic. 15

1, 1 primo…queri] queri potest F | scientie] primo add. F 2 est…cognitione1] et cognoscere F 3 dependet…omnium] diuenitur in cognitionem F 4 illud] illo F 6 arguitur] dicitur quia F 7 scientia considerat] considerantur in scientia sicut (?) dicitur F | hic] om. P 9 illud] est subiectum add. F | dependent] om. P | omnia] ciuilia F 1 0 prima] practica F | ciuitas…hic] secundum talis est hic ciuitas F 11 ideo] ergo F | Minor] maior P | incipit] post suum transp. F 12 omnem] om. F 13 Ethicorum] in commento add. F 1 5 Contra] oppositum F | quia] quoniam F 17 monostice…18 ciuitatem] om. P 1 8 politice] om. F | immo…homine] in omni operatione bona F 1, 6 illud…7 considerat] cf. Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (5), p. 311; Arist., An. Post. I.1, 71a11-16 12 Quoniam…civitatem] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a1 1 3 hoc1…14 dicentem] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. prologus: “Politicae autem ciuitas subiectum et qui in ipsa communicant habitatione” (ed. Mercken, p. 3, ll. 53-54)

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Dicendum quod, sicut recitat COMMENTATOR super 3um De Anima, Plato uoluit quod sermo in principiis debet esse longus, quia paruus error in principiis maximus est in principiatis, ut dicitur 1º Celi et Mundi; sed subiectum in scientia est principium omnium aliorum; ergo circa illud 25 multum est insistendum. Dicendum ergo quod primum subiectum huius scientie est bonum agibile ab homine ciuile, sed ciuitas magis habet rationem materie, quia uniuersaliter hoc est subiectum in scientia quod primo occurrit intellectui

21 recitat] dicit F 2 2 principiis] principio F | paruus] paruum F 2 3 est] erit F | principiatis] principiis F 2 4 in…aliorum] est principium in scientia F | ergo] et cetera add. sed exp. P 25 multum est] inv. F 2 7 sed] s.l. P 22 Plato…longus] Averroes, In De An. III, comm. 4 (ed. Crawford, p. 384, ll. 31-32); Auct. Arist. (Averroes), In De An. III (183), p. 189 | paruus…23 principiatis] Auct. Arist., De Caelo I 26 primum…27 materie] distinctio haec (19), p. 161; Arist., De Caelo I.5, 271b8-9, 12-13 inter subiectum et materiam alicuius scientiae, quam hic Petrus tantum breviter tangit, ex Averroe originem trahit (cf. Averroem, In Metaph. VIII, comm. 2: “... substantia dicitur primo modo de illo quod est existens per se, quod est subiectum aliis praedicamentis et est compositum ex materia et forma, et dicitur alio modo de materia istius substantiae. Et dico materiam illud quod non est in actu aliquod demonstratum et est in potentia illius”, ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 210v, H); saepe ea invenitur in operibus theologicis et philosophicis s. XIII, in locis illis ubi de unitate scientiae agitur. Cf., e.g., Aegidium Romanum, In I Sent. prol., q. 3: “... et quia secundum Commentatorem in VIII Metaphysice hec est differentia inter materiam et subiectum, quia materia dicit quid in potentia, subiectum dicit quid in actu, cum potentia ad formam substantialem sit potentia simpliciter, potentia ad formam accidentalem non sit potentia simpliciter sed potentia cum actu, potentia illa sive susceptibile in quo habet esse forma substantialis debet dici materia; illud autem in quo habet esse forma accidentalis, per se loquendo debet dici subiectum ... Et quia istas ... differentias habebat subiectum in natura respectu materie quas habet obiectum principale respectu secundarii, dicetur in scientia obiectum principale subiectum, et secundarium materia” (ed. Venetiis 1521, f. 3r-v, F-I); cf. Henricum de Gandavo, Summa QQ. Ord. art. XIX, q. 2: “Et differunt in hoc materia et subiectum, quod subiectum est illud quod primo cadit in notitia scientiae tamquam eius per se obiectum, et cuius notitia principaliter intendit. Materia vero generaliter est omne illud praeter subiectum quod in scientia consideratur propter aliquam attributionem ad ipsum subiectum sub ratione qua subiectum est” (ed. Parisiis 1520, ff. 116v-117r). Vide etiam Remigium Florentinum, De subiecto theologie cap. 1 (ed. Panella, p. 37, ll. 4-9 cum adn.), Iohannem Quidort, In I Sent., q. 1 (ed. Müller, p. 4, ll. 10-14), Iohannem de Neapoli, Quaestiones variae disputatae, q. 20 (ed. Neapoli 1618, p. 173, C) 2 8 uniuersaliter…intellectui] cf. Avicennam, Liber de Philosophia Prima I.5: “Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt statim quod imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se, sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia, ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et est alia ab eis, sed propter ea” (ed. Van Riet, pp. 31-32, ll. 2-5) | uniuersaliter…29 cognoscuntur] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 3: “Subjectum in scientia est sub cujus ratione considerantur omnia quae cadunt in scientia illa, et cujus ratio primo occurrit intellectui, et quod est notissimum intellectui, et ex cujus cognitione proceditur ad cognitionem aliorum in scientia” (ed. Monahan, p. 156) et q. 1 (ibid., p. 152)

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et sub ratione cuius omnia cognoscuntur, sicut in sensu primum obiectum sensus est quod primo occurrit sensui illi et sub cuius ratione omnia alia cognoscuntur, ut color respectu uisiue uirtutis, et sic de aliis sensibus respectu suorum obiectorum; modo subiectum rationem habet obiecti respectu scientie; ergo illud est primum subiectum quod primo , et cetera.

Item, hoc patet alia ratione, quia illud in quo resoluuntur omnia determinata in scientia et quod non resoluitur | in alia, hoc est primo P 274vb notum et primo occurrit intellectui; subiectum est tale; ergo et cetera. Maior patet inducendo, quia conclusiones reducuntur in principia; principia autem, si sint mediata, reducuntur in immediata; hec autem in predica40 tum et subiectum. Et sic subiectum semper est primo notum, unde, quidquid est subiectum, est principium cognoscendi omnia determinata in scientia. 35

Item, aduertendum quod, quando aliquid est obiectum alicuius potentie, illud est subiectum habitus illius potentie | sub eadem ratione uel sub F 172vb 45 ratione magis determinata; tertio est accipiendum quod obiectum intellectus practici est bonum agibile a nobis. Ex hiis apparet quod bonum agibile ab homine est subiectum huius scientie. Hoc enim apparet ex prima et secunda suppositione determinata. Nam ex prima propositione, “illud quod est principium cognoscendi alia et 50 quod primo occurrit intellectui”, et per secundam, “in quod resoluuntur omnia que sunt in scientia et ipsum non in alia”, hoc est subiectum primum illius scientie. Modo obiectum intellectus practici in illa scientia est 2 9 sensu] sensuali F | primum…31 ut] om. F 30 sensus] sensui P 3 1 respectu] ratio F uisiue uirtutis] lac. P 3 3 ergo] et cetera add. F 3 5 quia…quo] quod illud est subiectum in scientia in quod F | resoluuntur] resoluitur F 36 quod] ipsum F | resoluitur] resoluuntur P 3 8 reducuntur] reducibiles F | in…39 autem1] lac. F 39 mediata] immediata P | reducuntur] reducitur F | autem2] est add. F | predicatum] practicum F 4 1 principium] agendi add. F cognoscendi] alia add. F 4 3 Item aduertendum] secundo ad idem est F | quando] om. P alicuius potentie] inv. sed corr. P 4 4 habitus] s.l. P | sub1…66 agibile] om. F | eadem ratione] inv. sed corr. P 2 9 sicut…33 scientie] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 1: “Subiectum se habet ad scientiam sicut obiectum ad habitum vel potentiam. Objectum autem alicujus potentiae est sub cujus ratione cadunt omnia alia quae movent potentiam illam, sicut objectum visus est illud sub cujus ratione videntur quae videntur a virtute visiva, puta si illud sit coloratum vel luminosum. Similiter visio, quae est actus per quem aliquis videt, determinatur per illud primum in cujus virtute movetur potentia visiva” (ed. Monahan, p. 153) 35 illud…42 scientia] cf. Arist., An. Post. I.28, 87a38-b4 4 5 obiectum…46 nobis] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.11: “Sed obiectum intellectus speculatiui magis habet rationem intelligibilis quam obiectum intellectus practici: huius enim obiectum est bonum agibile” (ed. Lanza, p. 545, ll. 97-99) 4 9 illud…50 intellectui] cf. supra, ll. 28-29 5 0 in…51 alia] cf. supra, ll. 35-36

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tale. Ergo, per tertiam propositionem, “ intellectus practici, scilicet bonum agibile ab homine”, erit subiectum huius scientie practice, que est habitus illius intellectus, “et hoc sub ratione magis determinata”, 55 sic sumendo bonum agibile ab homine ciuile. Ergo bonum agibile ciuile erit primum et per se obiectum huius scientie. Ciuitas autem non; sed, quia in ciuitate habet saluari illud bonum, ideo ciuitas dicitur proprie materia istius scientie, quia materiam scientie dicimus in qua saluatur eius obiectum primum. Et hoc est materia propria, 60 sicut obiectum primum et per se uisus est color, materia autem uisus est ipsa superficies in qua natus est saluari color. Ciuitas igitur non est subiectum huius scientie, sed materia hoc modo sumpta.

Ad rationes dicendum quod de ciuitate hic determinatur, et incipit Philosophus non ut de subiecto, sed ut de prima materia sui 65 primi et per se obiecti, quod est bonum agibile. < Q UE S T I O 2 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s c i e n t i a s p e c u l a t i u a e t p r a c t i c a d i f f e r a n t r at i o n e e t s p e c i e Arguitur quod non, quia quarum potentiarum operationes non differunt specie, nec ipse differunt; sed operationes istarum potentiarum uel habituum non differunt specie; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia habitus 5 rationem sumit ex actu et distinctionem. Minor patet quia intelligere est actus utriusque scientie, et practice et speculatiue; sed intellectus practicus et speculatiuus non differunt ratione, sed solum officio, ut dicit COMMENTATOR super 6um Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. 2, 1 differant] differeunt F 2 specie] contrariorum add. F 3 Arguitur] praem. et F | quia quarum] contrariorum F | potentiarum operationes] inv. F 4 ipse] non F | istarum] ipsarum F 6 sumit] sunt F | intelligere] intelligibile F 7 utriusque] sicut est P | intellectus] intelligit F 8 Commentator] secundum F 9 6um] quintum F 5 3 obiectum…55 determinata] cf. supra, ll. 45- 46 61 sicut…62 color] cf. Arist., De An. II.7, 418a26-27 et II.6, 418a11-12 2 , 1 Consequenter…2 specie] de hoc etiam agitur in Petri Quodl. III, q. 8: Vtrum scientia speculatiua et practica sint una (ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, ff. 45rb- 46rb) 7 intellectus…8 officio] cf. Eustratium, In VI Mor. Arist. cap. 3, ad 1139a17-20: “Intellectus autem, simpliciter quidem assumptus, in contingentia et in necessaria sui ipsius partitur operationem, agens quidem circa contingentia, speculans autem artificialiter quidem sciet circa contingentia, scientifice autem circa necessaria et firma” (ed. Trizio, p. 31, ll. 19-23)

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Item, quorum finis est idem, et ipsa sunt eadem, quia ex fine sumitur ratio omnium que in finem; modo finis istarum scientiarum est idem; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia finis utriusque est cognitio ueritatis, quod de speculatiua patet ex 1º Posteriorum, de practica autem ex 6º Ethicorum, ubi PHILOSOPHUS dicit quod quinque sunt quibus uerum dicit 15 anima: inter illa nominat prudentiam, que large potest dici scientia practica. Si tu autem dicas quod finis practice est operatio, ut dicit 1º Ethicorum, contra: scientia quelibet, certum est quod prosequitur finem suum sillogizando, cum sit habitus ratiocinatiuus; sillogismi autem finis est conclusio. Modo uidetur quod sillogismus practicus non concludat operationem; 20 cuius ratio est quia principia et conclusiones sunt unigenee nature: si ergo principia non sunt operabilia, nec conclusio, ergo ambo conueniunt in ratione conclusionis, que est non operabilis. Sed conclusio est dicens aliquid de operabili: nam operatio preexigit electionem, electio autem sequitur ad conclusionem sillogismi practici ad habitum conclusionis, ut 25 patet ex 3º Ethicorum. Ergo, cum illa conclusio sit cognitio ueri, licet sit in ordine ad opus – eo quod ad ipsam immediate sequitur electio, electionem autem operatio –, hoc est per accidens, sicut posterius accidit

10

11 que] sunt add. F | scientiarum] non differunt sed add. F 1 3 ex1] om. F | autem] s.l. P 14 ubi…16 Ethicorum] om. per hom. P | uerum] usum F 1 5 anima] alia F 1 7 contra] sequitur (?) F | quod prosequitur] consequitur F 1 8 ratiocinatiuus] rationalis F | sillogismi… conclusio] finis autem conclusio sillogismi F 20 principia] principali F | unigenee] unigenie F 2 1 ambo conueniunt] ambe sunt F 2 2 dicens] om. F 23 operatio preexigit] inv. F 2 4 practici] practica et F 2 5 3º] primo F 2 6 immediate] immediata F 2 7 autem] non add. F | hoc] sequitur lac. P | est per] tamen est propter F 10 quorum…eadem] idem argumentum etiam invenitur in Thomae QQ. disp. de anima, q. 7, arg. 10: “Quorum est idem finis videtur esse eadem species, nam unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per suam formam, que est principium speciei” (ed. Leon. XXIV.1, p. 55, ll. 70-73); cf. Bonaventuram, Super Sent. II, dist. 1, pars 2, art. 3, q. 1: “quorum differentia ultimo completiva est specie una, ipsa sunt specie unum” (ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, vol. II, p. 47); cf. etiam Arist., Pol. VIII.1, 1337a21-23 | ex…11 finem] cf. supra, Prohemium, ll. 52-53 cum adn. 1 2 finis…14 Ethicorum] Arist., An. Post. I.2, 71b18-20; Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27, 29-31 et b12 1 4 quinque…15 prudentiam] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (108), p. 240; Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.2, 1139b15-17 1 6 finis…operatio] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a18-24; I.2, 1095a14-16; sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.1: “subiectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana ordinata in finem vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 4, ll. 51-54) 1 7 scientia…18 ratiocinatiuus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.2, 1139b31-34 19 sillogismus…24 conclusionis] cf. Petrum, Sent. De Mot. An., lectio 5: “in syllogismo practico conclusio immediata non est operatio, quia ratiocinatio est motus quidam rationis. Oportet autem motum esse eiusdem speciei cum termino ad quem, sed ratiocinatio practica non est de genere operationum, et ideo finis illius non debet esse operatio, sed cognitio alicuius operabilis, quod etiam per aliud patet: quia operatio non fit nisi propter appetitum eius quod debet fieri; appetitus autem alicuius non nisi propter cognitionem illius appetibilis; quare immediata conclusio est cognitio, non autem operatio” (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 39rb) 2 3 electio…24 conclusionis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112a15-16

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priori; tamen absolute est cognitio ueri, et ideo in fine conuenit cum scientia speculatiua; ergo sunt eedem. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS 6º Ethicorum: distinguens prudentiam a 30 scientia, sumit scientiam pro scientia speculatiua, prudentiam autem pro scientia practica. Et etiam contra hoc est 1º Metaphisice.

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Dicendum quod scientia speculatiua et practica in aliquo uno conueniunt, siue sit unum secundum rationem siue secundum attributionem. Vtraque enim est habitus, | et habitus non alicuius incomplexi, sed com- 35 plexi, scilicet conclusionis, et non ex quibuscumque, sed ex principiis uel etiam per relationem ad illa. Et ideo dicimus utramque esse habitum alicuius sillogismi, ita quod practica est habitus sillogismi practici, scientia autem speculatiua habitus sillogismi speculatiui. Sed differunt in hoc, quod speculatiua est habitus conclusionis quam impossibile est aliter se habere, 40 non similitudinarie scientia, sed uere, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum, et est per se, non secundum accidens, ut dicitur 1º Posteriorum: utrobique enim PHILOSOPHUS dicit quod illud quod scire arbitramur, opinamur impossibile esse illud aliter se habere. Cum autem talis conclusio necessaria sit per se, non secundum accidens, scita et etiam uere, oportet eam sciri, secundum quod 45 dicitur 2º Phisicorum, ex principiis talibus uel etiam magis talibus; et ideo impossibile est aliter illa se habere, et necessario erunt per se et impossibilia aliter se habere, et inter se et respectu ad conclusionem. Et sic est

28 ideo] dicit add. F | conuenit] om. F 30 Contra] in oppositum F | Philosophus] in add. F 3 1 sumit] praem. non PF | scientiam] scientias F 3 2 etiam contra] dicitur F | 1º] in principio F 3 4 siue2] unum add. F 3 5 Vtraque] utrumque P | habitus1] nostre add. F | sed complexi] om. F 36 conclusionis] conclusiones P | et non] autem F | quibuscumque] coni.: quibus tantum P quibus debet F | sed] secundum autem F 37 dicimus] dicens F | utramque] utrumque P uerumque F 39 hoc] hiis F | quod…40 speculatiua] quia speculatiuum F 4 1 non] om. P | similitudinarie…uere] clarius iterum scripsit in marg., sed scrips. homo loco uere F | est] cetera F 42 non secundum] et non per F | dicitur] ethicorum add. F | utrobique] uterque F 43 illud] id F | scire] scientie F | arbitramur] arbitramus P om. F 45 accidens] est add. F | scita] scientia F | et etiam] secundum F | eam sciri] cum fieri F 4 6 etiam] ex F 4 7 aliter illa] inv. F | necessario] necessarie F 48 respectu] inter se F 3 0 Philosophus…32 practica] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140a33-b4 3 2 contra…Metaphisice] cf. Arist., Metaph. I.1, 981b27-982a1; I.2, 982b11-12, 19-21; cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. I (17), p. 116 40 speculatiua…41 uere] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.2, 1139b18-23; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.3 (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 340, ll. 47-56) et Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (109), p. 240 4 1 est…44 habere] Arist., An. Post. I.2, 71b9-16; Auct. Arist., An. Post. I. (7), (8) et (9), p. 311 4 4 Cum…46 talibus2] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-24 4 8 sic…49 demonstratiui] Arist., An. Post. I.2, 71b17-25; I.4, 73a21-25; I.8, 75b21-30

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scientia sillogismi demonstratiui, ut dicitur 1º Posteriorium. Ratio autem sillogismi est ex ratione principiorum, ratio autem principiorum ex ratione primi principii, ratio autem primi principii ex ratione ad primum principium incomplexum, quod est ens absolute. Ens enim primum principium: principium cognitionis, secundum quod dicit AVICENNA, est enim absolutissimum et simplicissimum uel ens uniuersale, si scientia sit uni55 uersalis, ut metaphisica; uel etiam ens particulare uel contractum, si sit

50

51 primi principii1] inv. F | ratio autem] et ideo F | principium] om. F | principium…54 simplicissimum] autem complexum absolute P 5 3 Avicenna] auicennam F 5 4 absolutissimum et] absolutissimus in F 5 5 uel etiam] secundum F | particulare…contractum] contractum uel particulare F 4 9 Ratio…52 absolute] Petrus (?), In I Sent. , dist. 1: “conclusiones enim intelliguntur per principia, principia autem complexa omnia intelliguntur per unum incomplexum, quod necesse est in omni ( cod.: omnia) scientia ponere primum subiectum in scientia; ergo subiectum in scientia dicimus primo intellectum in ea sub cuius ratione uel per quod intelliguntur omnia alia, et hoc est primum” ( ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 913, f. 1ra) | Ratio…54 uniuersale] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. I, q. 6: “Intelligendum quod ens et unum sunt notissima intellectui et primo nota ... cognitionem aliorum accipit intellectus ex cognitione entis: rationes enim omnium aliorum ultimo resolvuntur in rationem entis: rationem enim conclusionum resolvuntur in rationes principiorum; rationes principiorum, in rationes terminorum primorum ... ergo id universale quod accipitur ex isto particulari indeterminato, magis erit notissimum intellectui, et hoc est ens, ut dicit Avicenna” (ed. Delhaye, pp. 26-27) | Ratio…56 genere2] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 13: “... primum principium est enuntiatio simplicissima, et enuntiatio simplicissima est primum principium ... Concessum est enim quod prima principia complexa causantur ex complexione terminorum communium, et primum principium simpliciter ex ratione terminorum primorum simpliciter. Primus autem terminus est ens ... Et sicut nos intelligimus quod primum complexum simpliciter in terminis entis est primum simpliciter, simpliciter ei et in omni genere est, ut quod est complexione primi incomplexi in illo genere est primum principium. Sicut in geometria magnitudo est primus terminus, et ideo complexum ex magnitudine est primum principium simpliciter in illa, sic dicendo ‘magnitudo est magnitu51 ratio…53 principium] cf. Petrum, QQ. do’” (ed. Berkers-Goris, pp. 477, 479 et 481) Metaph. I, q. 3: “Item, ens primo occurrit intellectui, ut dicit Avicenna ... Item, ex cognitione entis proceditur in cognitionem aliorum. Unde et principia simpliciter prima formantur in terminis entis” (ed. Monahan, p. 156) 5 2 Ens…principium] Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima I.2: “ens, inquantum est ens, est commune omnibus his” (ed. Van Riet, p. 12, ll. 30-31) Ens…56 genere2] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur ex Henrico de Gandavo, Summa QQ. Ord. art. XIX, q. 2, ad 1 (ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 117v), ubi tamen valde magis dissertum invenitur 5 3 principium…56 genere2] vide locum ex Avicenna in praec. q. allato, l. 28 et Avicennam, Liber de Philosophia Prima I.2 (ed. Van Riet, p. 12, l. 30-p. 16, l. 99); cf. etiam Averroem, In Metaph. VI, comm. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 144v, G-H) et Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 3: “Hoc etiam patet ... ratione Avicennae ... Quaelibet scientia particularis considerat ens aliquod determinatum, ut medicina corpus sanabile secundum quod sanabile, et nihil considerat de sanabili secundum quod ens. Similiter naturalis considerat de ente mobili secundum quod mobile, non secundum quod ens; ita quod nulla scientia particularis considerat de ente secundum quod ens. Ens autem universaliter cadit in ratione omnium entium particularium. Si ergo ens universaliter non consideretur hic , remanebit inconsideratum” (ed. Monahan, p. 156)

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scientia particularis; uel ens in genere, si scientia in genere. Vnde breuiter scientie speculatiue diffinitio potest esse quod scientia speculatiua est habitus conclusionis sillogismi speculatiui rationem capiens ex principiis entis, et sillogismi – inquam – scire facientis, et ulterius ordinata in specu60 lationem entis secundum quod huiusmodi.

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Scientia autem practica est habitus conclusionis sillogismi practici, qui etiam ex suis principiis rationem accipit. Principium autem talis sillogismi sumitur a primo principio operationum incomplexo, quod est primum obiectum intellectus practici. Hoc autem non est ens secundum quod ens, sed est finis, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum: hic enim mouet operantem et 65 proximum, id est operationem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Hic autem finis est idem in quod tendit ratio practica postquam ipsum apprehendit | et in respectu ad quod elicit prima principia sui sillogismi, ut est bonum esse operandum. Principium enim sillogismi practici complexum sumitur a principio primo incomplexo, quod est per se obiectum intellectus practici 70 5 6 si] uel F 5 7 diffinitio] ante scientie speculatiue transp. F 5 9 sillogismi] qui add. F 61 conclusionis] post practici transp. F 6 3 sumitur] sumit F | principio] philosopho F est] om. P 6 4 intellectus] autem add. F 6 5 operantem] operante F 6 6 proximum…est] primum ex et sequitur lac. F | dicitur] in add. F 67 idem] illud F | quod] quem F | ipsum] ipsam F | et] tendit in idem add. F 6 9 operandum] operandi F | complexum] opus (?) F a…70 primo] primo a principio F 5 9 sillogismi…facientis] cf. Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (11), p. 312; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 71b17-19 61 Scientia…71 huiusmodi] Petrus (?), In I Sent., dist. 1: “finis scientie speculatiue est cognitio ueritatis, ideo dicit Philosophus, 2º Metaphisice, quod speculatiue finis est ueritas. Obiectum autem siue subiectum scientie practice non est ens inquantum huiusmodi uel uerum secundum quod huiusmodi, sed bonum sub ratione qua uolitum, quia omnes conclusiones sillogismi practici sunt hoc esse operandum uel non operandum. Et quia ratio boni mouet ad operandum, ideo bonum in agibilibus est finis; unde Philosophus, 2º Phisicorum, dicit quod, sicut finis se habet in agibilibus, ita quod quid est in demonstratiuis, et ideo, sicut quod quid est in demonstrabilibus est principium cognoscendi, ita in agibilibus finis est principium operandi” (ms. Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A. 913, f. 3va) | Scientia…77 uoluntate] eadem comparatio inter sillogismum intellectus speculativi et practici invenitur in Petro, Sent. De Mot. An., lectio 5: “Sicut enim intellectus speculatiuus in speculabilibus omnis reducit ad ens, et ex ratione entis syllogizat, sic practicus omnia reducit ad bonum, et ex ratione boni syllogizat. Et sicut in speculabilibus est deuenire ad vnum complexum, ad quod alia reducuntur, scilicet de eodem non verificatur simul esse et non esse, ita in agibilibus est deuenire ad vnum complexum ad quod alia reducuntur, sicut finis est appetendus. Et sicut intellectus speculatiuus, cum arguit, primo accipit vnam propositionem vniuersalem, postmodum et aliam sub illa, et ex illis concludit, sic practicus primo accipit vnam propositionem indeterminatam, et sub ista accipit vnam particularem, et ex illis concludit ... intellectus speculatiui finis est consideratio siue cognitio ... sed finis intellectus practici est operatio. Cum enim intellectus practicus accipit duas propositiones, non concludit conclusionem, sed opus ... sicut enim in speculatiuis omnes propositiones determinantur per rationem entis, similiter in practicis omnia determinantur per bonum, quod est primum in genere, et ad illud reducuntur” (ed. Venetiis 1507, ff. 38vb-39ra) 63 primum…65 finis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27 et 31-33 6 5 hic…66 operationem] cf. Arist., Phys. II.8, 199a8-9

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secundum quod huiusmodi. Hoc autem obiectum non est ens secundum quod ens nec bonum secundum quod bonum, quia intellectus bene ratiocinatur et considerat bonum, nichil considerando de prosequibili uel fugibili, et ideo tale non est obiectum intellectus practici, quia tale non mouet ipsum intellectum practicum ad suum actum, qui est persuadere. Oportet enim ut intellectus, ab obiecto suo motus, moueat; hoc autem non est bonum sub ratione absolute, sed bonum prout est uolutum a uoluntate: a tali enim mouetur intellectus practicus, et mouet ulterius ratiocinando de agendis; et tunc ad conclusionem sillogismi practici consiliatur, et persuadens fertur in operabile electio, eligens ea que sunt ad finem, ex quibus incipit operari, ita quod primum obiectum intellectus practici est bonum uel uolutum omnino, ita quod precedit intellectus speculatiuus bonum apprehendendo et iudicando esse bonum, ita quod ille intellectus ex isto talem elicit propositionem, quoniam hoc est bonum. Ex tali autem principio nichil contingit persuadere: quamuis enim aliquid sciatur bonum, tamen illud non facit ipsum esse bonum operabile: nichil enim per nos operamur nisi quod uolumus, ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum. Sed magis persuasio sillogismi speculatiui est in uniuersali; ratio autem uniuersalis non mouet: dicere enim uniuersaliter “bonum debe operari”, hoc uel hoc esse bonum indeterminate, ita quod non addatur uoluntas appetens illud, nichil mouet ad opus. | Sillogismus autem practicus debet mouere ad opus: hic enim est P 275rb finis eius inquantum talis. Ergo oportet ad hoc, ut consequatur finem suum proprium, quod precedat ratiocinationem suam uoluntas, ita quod bonum comprehensum primo ab intellectu speculatiuo statim a uoluntate capiatur, et tunc erit obiectum intellectus practici primum, ex quo comprehenduntur principia prima, et tunc ratiocinabitur de eis operabilibus que ad 7 1 huiusmodi] philosophus F 72 quia] s.l. F | intellectus] practici add. F 73 considerat] consideratur F | bonum nichil] inv. F | considerando] considero F | fugibili] fundamentali F 7 4 intellectus] sillogismi P 76 ut] quod F 77 sub] sua F | absolute] absoluta F | est uolutum] uolitum a uolitum F | a2] de F 7 8 mouetur] mouet F | mouet] om. F | de…79 et1] et agens F 7 9 consiliatur…persuadens] consiliantes et persuadentes P 8 0 operabile] operationem F ea] om. F | ex] om. F 8 2 uel] om. F 8 3 apprehendendo…esse] apprehendi et in iudiciis F iudicando] indicando P | bonum] est add. F | ita] om. P 8 4 hoc] autem add. F 8 5 contingit] sic dicit F | persuadere] persuaderi F | aliquid] aliud F 8 6 illud] id F | facit] facimus sed corr. P ipsum…bonum] om. F 87 ut dicitur] om. F | persuasio] persuasit F 8 9 dicere] determinate F bonum1] esse add. sed exp. P | debe] debere F | hoc uel] et F 90 uoluntas] uoluntarius F 9 1 opus1] hoc enim est finis eius add. sed exp. P | Sillogismus autem] sed nullus F 9 2 ut consequatur] quod consequitur F 93 precedat ratiocinationem] procedit ratiocinatus F | quod2] non P non add. F 94 ab] ad sed corr. F 95 erit] eius F | primum] om. F | comprehenduntur] coni.: complete P complectuntur F 9 6 de…operabilibus] scrips. deis principiis F | que] sunt add. F 86 nichil…87 uolumus] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.1, 1110a15-18; III.6, 1113b7- 8

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finem uolutum contendunt; ad hoc autem sequitur electio eorum que conclusio eius dicit esse operanda, et tunc mouetur ad opus. Sic igitur patet quod primum principium intellectus practici complexum est ex obiecto eius, quod est bonum non secundum se, sed uolutum, 100 et hoc obiectum complexum est ex obiecto intellectus speculatiui, quod est bonum, et obiecto uoluntatis, quod est uolutum; et hoc rationabiliter, quia ad opus hominis necessario preexigitur apprehensio et appetitus: hec enim duo in hominibus motum faciunt. Et hoc est quod uult PHILOSOPHUS, 3º De Anima, quod bonum ipsius uoluntatis est obiectum intellectus practici, 105 et 6º Ethicorum dicitur quod obiectum intellectus practici est ueritas confesse se habens ad opus; hoc autem est inquantum uoluntas in illud fertur: aliter enim non operatur homo ex principio intrinseco, nisi uelit. Ex quo manifestum quod intellectus speculatiuus est prior uoluntate, uoluntas prior intellectu practico, practicus intellectus est prior electione, 110 electio autem operatione. Et quia scientie ordinantur secundum rationem 9 7 uolutum contendunt] uolitum contendimus F | electio] obiectum F | que] quod F 9 8 operanda] operabilia F | mouetur] mouet F 1 00 sed uolutum] uolitum F 1 0 1 obiectum…102 hoc] om. per hom. et est add. F | complexum] competitum P 1 03 necessario] necessarium F | preexigitur] preexigatur F 1 04 duo] dupliciter F | motum] mouenti F 10 5 De] dicit F | bonum] bonus F | uoluntatis…obiectum] om. F 1 06 obiectum] bonus F 10 7 inquantum] nostrorum F 1 0 8 homo] om. F 1 0 9 manifestum] est add. F | est prior] inv. F 1 10 uoluntas] autem add. F | intellectu practico] intellectum practici F | practicus] autem add. F | est] om. F | electione] elicere F 11 1 Et] om. F | ordinantur] ordinatur F 10 5 bonum…practici] Arist., De An. III.10, 433a13-29 1 0 6 obiectum…107 opus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a29-31 1 0 9 Ex…111 operatione] utrum intellectus sit prior voluntate aut econverso et de modo quo alter in alteram agat (et econverso), cf. infra, VII, q. 5, ll. 81-99 et praesertim q. 7, ll. 178-192. Vide etiam Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 7: Queritur, cum duo sunt partes intellectus, velle et intelligere, quod istorum sit primum vel prius secundum naturam (ed. Celano, pp. 42- 44) et I, q. 45: Vtrum imperare vel ordinare motum sit actus racionis vel voluntatis (ibid., pp. 85- 87); cf. Petrum, Quodl. II, q. 9 (Vtrum voluntas sit principalior intellectu): “intellectus igitur speculatiuus est principalior uoluntate ... actus uoluntatis mensuratur et habet boni rationem in habitudine ad actum intellectus: actus enim uoluntatis bonus est secundum quod concordat rationi recte, malus autem secundum quod declinat ab ea, non autem econtrario ... Sed actus uoluntatis principalior est quam actus intellectus practici primus, quoniam actus intellectus practici ordine nature posterior est actu uoluntatis, cum rationem sumat ex eo et actus uoluntatis propinquior sit perfectissimo actui in anima, scilicet actui intellectus speculatiui, et quod est propinquius primo perfecto perfectius est” (ex ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 29rb-va) et IV, q. 13 (Vtrum actus intellectus secundum ordinem nature precedat omnem actum uoluntatis): “Et dicit Philosophus, 3º De Anima, illud cuius est appetitus primo est obiectum intellectus practici, et manifestum est quod bonum per se seu finis, ut amatus seu desideratus, sunt posterius secundum naturam bono per se seu fine. Igitur actus intellectus practici seu actiui posterior est ordine nature actu uoluntatis primo. Sic igitur apparet quod actus intellectus speculatiui simpliciter precedit ordine nature actum uoluntatis; actus tamen uoluntatis precedit intellectum practicum” (ibid., f. 67ra)

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obiecti, oportet omnem speculatiuam precedere omnem practicam. Et sic manifestum quod fines istarum scientiarum et obiecta ratione et specie differunt, ergo et scientie. Vnde ratio speculatiue est que prius dicta est, 115 ratio autem practice est quod ipsa est habitus sillogismi practici rationem capiens ex bono uoluto et in opus ordinata. Et ex istis sigillatim possunt formari rationes. Sic ergo speculatiua et practica ratione et specie differunt, ratione – inquam – sumpta ex fine, obiecto et principiis earum.

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Ad rationes in oppositum dicendum quod intellectus practicus et speculatiuus conueniunt in actu communi et remoto, tamen in proprio et propinquo, qui determinatur fine et obiecto, non conueniunt.

Ad aliam dicendum quod finis dicitur dupliciter: uel finis immediatus, qui est finis operis, et sic bene istorum sillogismorum et scientia125 rum idem est finis, scilicet conclusio uel cognitio | ueritatis; alius autem est F 173rb finis mediatus et intentionis, et iste est principalis in eo quod finis, eo quod ipse maxime et primo mouet operabilia. Et in isto fine non conueniunt, immo finis speculatiue est speculatio entis secundum se et ueritatis cognitio absolute, finis uero practice cognitio ueritatis non absolute nec secun130 dum se, sed operatio ipsa; unde dicitur 2º Ethicorum quod finis ethice est non speculatio, sed operatio qua boni fiamus.

11 2 precedere] procedere F | Et sic] nec F 113 fines] finis P | obiecta] obiecto P obiecti F 114 speculatiue est] inv. et et practica ratione et specie differunt ratione inquam sumpta add. sed exp. F | prius dicta] ipsius dicto F 115 habitus] om. F | practici] id est add. F 116 uoluto] uolito F 11 7 Et] modo restat respondere F | possunt] possent PF | Sic] si F 119 obiecto et] et obiecto et ex F 120 in…dicendum] dicendum in oppositum respondendo F | practicus…121 speculatiuus] speculatiuus et practicus F 1 21 actu communi] accidentali quoniam F 1 23 immediatus] in medius F 1 2 4 finis] om. F 12 5 scilicet] et F | cognitio] cognitum P | ueritatis] internis F 1 2 6 iste] finis add. F 127 in…fine] ideo finem F 128 immo] uno F | speculatiue] speculatio P | ueritatis cognitio] conclusio ueritatis F 1 29 practice] est add. F 1 30 dicitur] dicit F | finis] est add. F 1 31 speculatio] speculatiuus F 12 9 finis…130 ipsa] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1095a6 1 3 0 finis…131 fiamus] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.2, 1103b26-29

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< Q UE S T I O 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i s t a s c i e n t i a s i t s p e c u l at i u a u e l p r a c t i c a Arguitur quod speculatiua, quia scientia eorum que sunt a natura est speculatiua; scientia ista est scientia de ciuitate, que est a natura, ut dicitur 1º capitulo; ergo est speculatiua. Contra: ipsa tendit ad opus, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum, quia finis 5 est non cognitio, sed operatio.

Dicendum quod est practica, quia scientia speciem habet ex obiecto, ergo scientia considerans obiectum intellectus practici est practica; hec considerat illud, scilicet bonum agibile uolutum; ergo est practica. Item, scientia cuius finis est ueritas non secundum se, sed secundum 10 ordinem ad opus, est practica. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 6º Ethicorum, quod finis practice est ueritas habens confesse se ad opus; et sic est ista scientia.

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Ad rationem dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid est naturale: uel secundum actum perfectum, ut homo; aliud secundum actum imperfec- 15 tum et inclinationem, ut uirtutes, que potentia sunt a natura, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum, actu autem perfecto sunt consuetudine. Et ideo scientia que de eis est | practica: uirtutes enim generantur ex simili operatione, ut dicitur fine 1i Ethicorum.

3 ,1 Consequenter] om. F | ista] om. F 2 Arguitur] et dicitur F | quod] sit add. F | que] debet sed corr. F 3 scientia1…est2] sed ista F 5 tendit] intendit F | quia] quod F 6 est] cum add. F 7 est] om. F 10 secundum2] habet F 1 1 est practica] om. F 14 rationem] rationes sed corr. F aliquid] aliud F 1 5 secundum1] iter. F | actum2] quocumque F 16 et] sed secundum F | que] cum add. F | 2º] libro P 1 7 actu…perfecto] accidentia autem perfecta similiter F | sunt] a add. F 1 8 uirtutes] uirtutis F | generantur] operantis sed corr. in operantur F 19 fine] finem F 3 ,1 Consequenter…practica] cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 5: Vtrum ista sciencia sit practica vel speculativa (ed. Celano, pp. 39- 40) 3 ciuitate…natura] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30 et 1253a2 5 ipsa…6 operatio] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099b29-32 1 2 finis…opus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a29-31 1 4 uel…16 inclinationem] haec distinctio, hic primum occurrens, saepe in seqq. qq. iteratur (cf., e.g., infra, I, q. 7, ll. 18-22; III, q. 6, ll. 40-42; IV, q. 11, ll. 15-21; VI, q. 1, ll. 24-28; VII, q. 8, ll. 40-44 et 61-63) 16 uirtutes…17 consuetudine] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a23-26 18 uirtutes…operatione] re vera non invenitur in fine Ii libri Ethicae, sed in principio IIi; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103b6-9, et praecipue 21-22: “ex similibus operationes habitus fiunt” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 397, ll. 14-15)

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i s t a s c i e n ti a s i t p r i n c i p a l i s s i m a a l i a r u m Arguitur quod sic, quia scientia que aliis precipit est principalior illis; sed ista scientia precipit omnibus aliis; ergo est principalissima. Maior patet 1º Metaphisice, ubi dicitur quod scientia architectonica habet preci5 pere aliis. Minor patet ex principio Ethicorum, ubi dicitur quod politica preordinat quas scientias et usquequo oportet unumquemque addiscere et utitur aliis: precipit enim studium astronomie ad utilitatem boni ciuilis. Item, scientia que considerat ultimum finem est principalissima, 1º Metaphisice; ista est talis; ergo et cetera. Minor patet ex 1º Ethicorum,

4 ,1 Consequenter] deinde F 2 Arguitur] praem. et F | est] principalissima add. sed exp. P 4 patet] ex add. F 5 ubi dicitur] om. F 6 preordinat] ponderat F | et1] om. F | oportet unumquemque] portat unum uidelicet F | addiscere] addicere P scrips. adictere F | et2…7 utitur] uidetur F 7 boni] homo F 9 1º1] praem. ut dicitur F | ista] praem. sed F 4 ,1 Consequenter…aliarum] in Petri QQ. in Metaphysicam (I, q. 9), cum quaeritur utrum istius scientiae sit ordinare alias uel ab aliis ordinari, Petrus asserit quod scientia metaphisica superior est quam politica; ista tamen superior habetur inter alias scientias practicas: “... illa constitutiua est ultimi finis in operabilibus; iterum dat principia prosequendi illum finem ex ratione finis in practicis complexa, puta quod bonum ut (cod.: unde) bonum est appetendum et malum fugiendum. Siue igitur illa scientia politica dicatur siue ciuilis, que ordinat bonum ut subiacet uoluntati, non curo. Ista tamen (cod.: tam) aliarum est ordinatiua quantum ad hoc quod ratio boni sub ratione operabilis se extendit, et hoc uolebat Philosophus 1º Politice sue significare, dicens quod talis scientia ordinat quid quisquam audire debeat et usque ad quod tempus, et ideo talis non solum est ordinatiua scientiarum practicarum particularium, sed etiam speculatiuarum quantum ad actus exercitium” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 123rb). Quod hic dicitur ex Politica sumptum, re vera invenitur in Ethica I.1, 1094a26-b2: talis error loci, quo non recte verba ista Politicae assignabantur, frequenter invenitur in operibus Facultatis Artis Parisiensis; cf., e.g., Anonymum Boethio Daco usum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 13 (ed. Fioravanti, p. 211, ll. 8-10 cum adn.) 4 scientia…5 aliis] cf. Arist., Metaph. I.1, 981a30-b1 et b29-982a1, ubi Aristoteles affirmat quod “architectores circa quodlibet honorabiliores et magis scire manu artificibus putamus et sapientiores, quia factorum causas sunt” (ed. AL XXV.3.2, p. 13, ll. 48-50). Sed locus a Petro allatus invenitur in Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a14-15: “In omnibus itaque architectonicarum fines, omnibus sunt desiderabiliores hiis que sunt sub ipsis” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 375, ll. 17-18). Vide etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.13, 1152b1-3 et Anonymum, In VII Arist. Mor. cap. 15, ad 1152b1: “Architecton autem dicitur, qui praecipit de omnibus. Et politicus vir praecipit; hos quidem iuvenum oportet fieri musicos, ut aptos existentes ad ipsam, hos autem milites” (ed. Mercken, p. 73, ll. 24-26) 5 politica…7 aliis] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a27-b2; cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 17: Vtrum expediens sit quemlibet ignorantem quamlibet scienciam in 8 scientia… quolibet tempore et in qualibet civitate addiscere (ed. Celano, pp. 54-56) principalissima] Arist., Metaph. I.2, 982b4-6; cf. Thomam, In Metaph. I.2: “Illa scientia se habet ad alias ut principalis, sive ut architectonica ad servilem sive ad famulantem, quae considerat causam finalem” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 254)

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ubi dicitur quod bonum ciuitatis preclarius est bono unius hominis et 10 bono familie; et hoc est finis istius scientie et subiectum: finis enim et subiectum in practicis idem sunt. Contra: nulla scientia practica est principalior quam speculatiua; sed est practica; ergo et cetera. Maior patet 1º Metaphisice; practice enim sunt bone et appetibiles propter aliud, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum, 15 speculatiue autem honorabiliores propter se.

Ad questionem dicendum: cum queritur utrum ista scientia sit principalior aliis, queritur de eius comparatione. Sed comparatio est duplex. Vna est eorum que sunt eius nature et speciei, de qua loquitur PHILOSOPHUS, 7º Phisicorum, et isto modo est comparatio in genere: sic autem se 20 habent scientie practice, inter quas ista est principalior. Alia est comparatio non eorum que sunt unius rationis, sed eorum que se habent ad unum primum, et comparatio istorum est secundum approximationem et elongationem ab illo primo et sicut unum ens est perfectius alio: sic autem comparatio est extra genus, et hoc modo ista scientia comparatur ad 25 omnes speculatiuas scientias, et sic non est principalior. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut principia ad principia, ita scientia ad scientiam, cum ratio scientie sit ex principiis, et maxime primis; sicut ergo principia istius scientie ad principia speculatiuarum, sic ipsa se habet ad illas. Sed principia istius accipiuntur a bono agibili uoluto, quod est finis eius: principium 30 enim practicarum a fine est, speculatiuarum autem principia sunt ab ente inquantum est ens, et etiam sunt de uero. Que ergo est proportio boni

10 ubi] unde F | preclarius] scrips. preclauus P pretiarius F 1 1 istius] huius F 12 practicis] subiecto add. PF 1 3 Contra] dicitur enim philosophus F | principalior] principalioris F 14 est] hoc F | patet] ex add. F 15 bone] bonorum F | appetibiles] appositiones F | ut] etiam omnium add. F | 1º] 2 PF 16 honorabiliores] honorabilior P 1 7 dicendum] om. F 1 8 comparatione] compositione F | est] conclusio add. F 1 9 eiusdem nature] actio necessario F 20 7º] 2 F 2 1 est2] autem P 2 2 rationis] generis F | se habent] sunt F 2 4 ab illo] at ille F | et] om. F | ens] om. F 2 5 est] om. P 2 6 speculatiuas scientias] inv. F 27 ita] sic F 2 9 principia1] istarum add. P | ipsa] prima F | illas] alias F 3 0 uoluto] uolito F | eius] omni F 3 2 etiam] om. F | ergo…boni] exemplo proponi homini F 10 bonum…11 familie] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b9-10; cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233 14 Maior…Metaphisice] Arist., Metaph. I.1, 981b29-982a1 | practice…15 aliud] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a14-16 18 Vna…20 genere] Arist., Phys. VII.4, 248b6-249a8

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agibilis uoluti ad ens et uerum, hec est et scientiarum; modo ens prius est bono sic dicto et principalius, tum quia ens dicitur absolute, bonum autem 35 illud in ordine ad uoluntatem, tum quia ens non presupponit actum uoluntatis, sicut facit illud bonum: bonum enim agibile dicitur secundum quod in ipsum fertur uoluntas determinata per illud ad agendum; ergo | scientie F 173va speculatiue priores et principaliores sunt ista. Item, scientia cuius finis est principalior, ipsa est principalior; sed finis speculatiuarum est principalior; ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex 1º Ethicorum. Minor patet quia bonum separatum, quod est finis speculatiuarum, magis habet rationem boni et entis et etiam rationem scibilis, secundum naturam suam, quam bonum agibile, quod est finis practicarum. Ergo speculatiue principaliores sunt quam practice, et per consequens principa45 liores quam scientia ista; ergo, respectu speculatiuarum, hec scientia est posterior et minus principalis.

40

Si autem comparatur ista scientia comparatione primo modo, scilicet comparatione in genere, scilicet ad practicas scientias, sic ipsa est principalior. Cuius ratio patet quia scientia nobilioris subiecti et obiecti est princi50 palior, ut patet 1º De Anima. Modo subiectum istius scientie, scilicet 3 3 uoluti] uoliti F | ens1] legi non potest P | et1] om. F | est et] erit P 3 4 bono…et] bonum sicut dictum est F 3 5 uoluntatem] ueritatem F | ens] omnis F | uoluntatis] uoluntas F 3 6 bonum2] om. F | dicitur] est F | quod…37 in] quid F 3 7 ipsum] potentiam P 39 est1] om. F | principalior2] principium F 4 0 principalior] principium F | patet] om. P 4 1 separatum] separatur P scrips. temporarum F 4 2 boni] bonum F | etiam] om. F | secundum…43 suam] secundam F 43 naturam suam] coni. ex textibus Petri allatis: amt P 4 4 principaliores1] priores F | quam] om. F | principaliores2] om. F | principaliores2…45 quam] quid F 4 5 scientia ista] inv. F | respectu] illud F | hec] ista F 4 6 posterior] dignior P | et…principalis] hoc unius principalior F 47 comparatur] comparetur F 4 9 principalior] principium F 5 0 patet] ex add. F 3 3 ens2…38 ista] argumentum valde simile invenitur in Petri QQ. Eth. I, q. 7: “Obiectum autem intellectus est ens, obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum, et ens precedit bonum naturaliter, quia dicitur aliquid ens secundum entitatem suam absolute, dicitur autem aliquid bonum inquantum determinatur eius esse per bonitatem. Unde racioni entis addit accidens quod determinatur per aliud. Et ideo operacio intelligendi natura precedit operacionem voluntatis” (ed. Celano, p. 43, ll. 33-37) 40 Maior…Ethicorum] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a3-16 4 1 bonum…43 agibile] cf. Petrum, Quodl. VI, q. 9: “illud quod est perfectius et uerius in esse est magis intelligibile secundum naturam suam, quoniam illud quod habet esse perfectius et uerius est propinquius secundum quod huiusmodi primo principio perfectissimo et uerissimo, quod est Deus; sed illud quod est propinquius in natura sibi est magis intelligibile secundum naturam suam ... igitur quod est perfectius et uerius secundum se est magis intelligibile secundum naturam” (ex ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 93va) et Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 1: “Quamvis enim Deus sit maxime scibilis et intelligibilis secundum naturam suam, nobis tamen minime” (ed. Monahan, p. 153) 4 9 scientia…principalior] Auct. Arist., De An. I (2), p. 174; Arist., De An. I.1, 402a1- 4; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Top. VII (115), p. 330; Arist., Top. VII.1, 157a9-10

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politice, precellit alia: quod patet quia subiectum eius est bonum ciuitatis, subiectum autem yconomice bonum domus, subiectum autem ethice bonum unius hominis; modo bonum ciuile omnia ista complectitur, ut etiam dicit PHILOSOPHUS in hoc libro; ergo scientia ista est principalior 55 omnibus aliis practicis. Item, hoc arguitur eodem modo per finem. Finis enim et obiectum in practicis idem sunt: prout enim est ultimum in operatione, sic dicitur finis, prout autem primum intentionis et exemplar, sic est subiectum. Item, ipsa utitur aliis scientiis et finibus earum ad finem suum.

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Item, omnes fines aliarum scientiarum practicarum ordinantur in 60 finem istius sicut bonum partis in bonum totius, et hoc eodem modo probat PHILOSOPHUS, 1º Ethicorum, | auctoritate sua ex 1º De Anima. Vnde, sicut scientia diuina nobilior est inter scientias speculatiuas propter principalitatem obiecti et finis, sic ista scientia respectu practicarum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod preceptum, proprie loquendo, non 65 fit nisi per ordinem ad uoluntatem. Voluntas autem proprie est eius qui 5 2 yconomice] est add. F | ethice] monostice est F 5 4 scientia ista] inv. F | est] om. P 5 5 practicis] om. F 56 eodem modo] inv. F | et obiectum] est subiectum F 5 7 prout] probat F | enim…58 prout] iter. F 5 8 autem] est add. F | intentionis] inceptionis P | subiectum] obiectum F 5 9 finem suum] inv. F 6 1 istius] huius scientie F | et] om. F 6 3 inter…speculatiuas] aliis speculatiuiis F 6 5 rationem] rationes F 6 6 fit…ordinem] sit nisi in ordine F | est] om. F 5 3 bonum2…complectitur] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a3-7 6 0 omnes…62 Anima] quod pars ordinata sit ad totum asseritur in Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a9-16. Non invenitur in De Anima haec assertio, saltim non istis quidem ipsis verbis, nisi velimus accipere, ut locum hic allatum, illum ubi Aristoteles asserit quod anima est causa unitatis et, ut talis, non indiget partibus: cf. De An. I.5, 411b6-18. Sed forsan hic Petrus significare vult non cap. 1 libri Ii Ethicae Nicomacheae, sed locum illum eiusdem operis (Eth. Nic. I.8, 1102a18-33) ubi Aristoteles – se revocans ad scriptos suos exotericos – affirmat quod politica superior est medicina quoniam totum noscit, medicina contra tantum partem illius toti. Thomas enim haec verba consideravit ut significantia locum ex De Anima; sic probabiliter, iuxta Thomae interpretationem, Petri sententia “eodem modo probat Philosophus 1º Ethicorum auctoritate sua ex 1º De Anima” significat locum illum in Aristotelis Ethica ubi locus ex De anima memoratur. Cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.19: “Sic ergo se habet politicus ad considerandum de anima cuius virtutem quaerit, sicut medicus ad considerandum de corpore cuius sanitatem inquirit. Unde manifestum est quod oportet politicum aliqualiter cognoscere ea quae pertinent ad animam, sicut medicus qui curat oculos et totum corpus oportet quod consideret de oculis et de toto corpore, et tanto magis hoc pertinet ad politicam ut consideret animam, cuius virtutem inquirit, quanto est melior ipsa quam scientia medicinae ... Dicit ergo primo quod de anima sufficienter quaedam sunt dicta in libro De anima, quem vocat exteriores sermones ... His autem quae ibi dicta sunt hic est utendum, puta quod quaedam pars animae est rationalis, quaedam irrationalis, ut dicitur in III De anima” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, pp. 68-69, ll. 58- 67 et 94-104)

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potest exequi et non exequi. Modo speculatiue scientie non dependent a uoluntate aliquo ordine – dico secundum rationem earum absolute et secundum se, et secundum quod sunt habitus conclusionum demonstrati70 uus –, sed bene dependent a uoluntate secundum usum earum. Vnde dicit, 2º De Anima, quod intelligimus cum uolumus: est enim usus intelligendi in potestate nostra. Vnde etiam metaphisica non proprie precipit naturali secundum se, sed secundum usum eius; unde dico quod ista scientia non precipit speculatiuis quantum ad id quod pertinet ad rationem earum, et 75 secundum se absolute et secundum quod sunt habitus, quia isto modo nequaquam a uoluntate dependent, sed forte secundum usum earum, et hoc est eis per accidens: usus enim accidit habitui scientie sicut omnis actus secundus accidit actui primo. Et ideo non concludit ratio nisi principalitatem eius quantum ad usum speculatiuarum. Ad secundam dicendum quod hec scientia non considerat ultimum finem. Vltimum enim dicitur dupliciter: uel extra genus et uniuersaliter, et sic non considerat ultimum finem, sed potius illum considerant speculatiue scientie; aliud autem ultimum est in genere finium moralium, et adhuc ibi non omnino ultimum considerat: est enim duplex finis, scilicet 85 felicitas speculatiua, que est bonum separatum, et istum etiam non considerat ipsa; alia autem felicitas practica est coniuncta operationibus uirtutum moralium, et istum considerat. Et ideo est principalior practicis secundum istum finem; secundum alium autem finem separatum non habet eis comparari, quia nec ipsa nec ille hunc considerant, nisi forte 90 secundum hoc quod finis eius propinquior est fini illi quam finis aliarum, et hoc modo iterum est principalior illis.

80

6 7 exequi1] consequi P | scientie] om. F | a] ad F 69 demonstratiuus] demonstratiuum PF 71 2º] 3 P in primo F | intelligimus cum] intellectus tamen F 72 precipit] precipitur F 73 secundum se] intellectum F 74 precipit] precipitur F | id] illud F 76 sed…secundum] secundum forte P | earum] eorum F 7 7 est] s.l. P | sicut] sic F 78 actui primo] inv. F | concludit ratio] contingit positio F | principalitatem] propter simplicitatem F 80 secundam] secundum F | non] om. P 8 1 et] uel F 83 autem] om. F | ultimum est] inv. F | finium] principalissimum et F 84 adhuc] non forte natura F | ibi] illum finem F | omnino ultimum] om. F | enim] autem sed corr. s.l. F 85 separatum] temperatum F | istum etiam] id F 86 autem] est F | est] et F 8 7 Et ideo] non F 88 finem2] om. F 89 comparari] operari P | ille] alia F | considerant] considerat P 90 propinquior] principalior F | aliarum] animarum F 91 principalior] correxi ex supra, ll. 2, 13, 17-18, 21, 26, 48-49, 54 et 87: propinquior P principium F 6 9 secundum2…demonstratiuus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.2, 1139b31-32 7 1 intelligimus…uolumus] Arist., De An. II.5, 417b24

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< Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m o m n i s c o m m u n i c a t i o s i t b o n i g r at i a

F 173vb

Arguitur quod non, quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum; sed aliqua est communicatio mala, ut latronum; ergo communicatio non omnis est gratia boni. | Maior patet quia unum contrariorum non ordinatur in reliquum, sed potius destruit illud quam inducat. 5 Item, illud quod est preter rationem non ordinatur in bonum; aliqua communicatio est preter rationem; ergo non omnis, et cetera. Maior patet quia ordinatio in bonum proprie est a ratione. Minor patet in communicatione tirannidis, ubi preter rationem aliquis dominatur, ut est 10 communicatio oligarchica uel democratica; ergo et cetera. Contra: nulla inclinatio naturalis est ad malum; omnis communicatio est naturalis, ut in 1º probat PHILOSOPHUS; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia natura inclinat ad modum scientie; nulla autem scientia est malorum, ut dicitur in Magnis Moralibus; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod communicatio humana est que competit homini 15 secundum quod homo; hec autem est que fit per rationem, et talis est communicatio instituta ab homine secundum rationem. Et de ista est questio. Dicendum ergo quod omnis talis est in bonum, cuius ratio est quia

5 ,1 Consequenter] deinde F | sit] propter bonum secundum add. F 2 Arguitur] praem. et F 3 communicatio2] conueniente F 5 inducat] indicat F 6 illud] om. F 8 quia] om. F | a ratione] artem F | patet2] quia add. P 9 tirannidis] tyrannicis P tirannitatis F | ubi] non P aliquis] aliquid F 1 0 oligarchica] obligarchice F | uel] et F 11 malum] sed add. F 1 2 est] et F naturalis] ergo add. F 1 5 quod] quid F | humana] iter. F | competit] contingit P 1 6 est1] om. P 1 7 ista] que add. P 5 ,1 Consequenter…gratia] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a1-2 1 1 omnis…12 naturalis] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30 et 1253a2 13 nulla…malorum] Arist., Mag. Mor. I.1, 1182a34-35 1 8 cuius…38 gratia] cf. Thomam, ScG III.3 (Quod omne agens agit propter bonum): “Agens per intellectum agit propter finem sicut determinans sibi finem: agens autem per naturam, licet agat propter finem ... non tamen determinat sibi finem ... Agens autem per intellectum non determinat sibi finem nisi sub ratione boni: intelligibile enim non movet nisi sub ratione boni, quod est obiectum voluntatis ... Item. Omne quod movetur ducitur ad terminum motus a movente et agente. Oportet igitur movens et motum ad idem tendere ... Ergo et movens et agens semper in movendo et agendo intendit bonum” (ed. Leon. XIV, p. 9)

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omne agens agit propter finem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, et ibi explicatur manifeste de agente naturali. Hoc etiam patet de agente secundum intellectum, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice, et arguitur ratione, quia agens secundum intellectum agit per rationem. Modo ratio una est contrariorum, unde ad hoc ut unum illorum determinate agat, necessario habet determinari a uoluntate, uoluntas autem a bono apprehenso; hoc autem bonum est finis 25 – bonum, dico, primum –; et ideo sequitur quod omne agens secundum intellectum agit alicuius finis uel boni gratia.

20

Modo finis idem est operantis et operati: obiectum enim est operantis et finis operati; est enim ultimum operationis et est in operante, ut forma domus est finis et carpentarii et etiam ipsius fabrice, et istorum ratio est 30 quia idem finis proprie est agentis. Modo instrumentale agens et principale sunt quasi idem, saltim respectu effectus et finis; ergo eorum est idem finis – scilicet propter quem aliquid est operatum et propter quem operans facit illud, et propter quem mouens mouet et mobile mouetur –, aliter enim non in eodem actu simul esset. Actio enim principalis agentis et passio 35 | instrumentalis agentis idem motus sunt, ut dicitur 3º Phisicorum. P 276ra Modo communicatio est aliquid operatum a ratione, ergo eius erit idem finis operati et operantis per rationem; hoc autem est bonum; ergo ipsa est boni gratia. Nec refert ad propositum utrum sit bonum secundum ueritatem uel uideatur bonum: utroque enim modo fit opus, ut dicitur 2º Phisi40 corum. Huius autem ratio est quia agens per rationem, ut dictum est, 19 explicatur] exitatur F 2 0 manifeste] lac. P | de agente2] om. P 21 quia] quod F 2 2 per] secundum F 23 ut] quod F 2 5 dico] dicitur F 2 6 finis] gratia add. F | boni gratia] inv. F 2 7 et] s.l. F 2 8 et finis] om. F | operante] operato P 2 9 et1] in F | etiam] om. F 3 0 idem] illud F 3 1 quasi…respectu] illud ratio saltem F | eorum] earum F | idem2] om. F 3 2 aliquid] aliud F | quem2] quam F 33 et1] om. F | mouet] motum P om. F 34 in] s.l. P | eodem] modo add. sed exp. P | simul] similis F | enim principalis] hoc principio F 35 3º] 2 F 3 6 aliquid] aliud F 3 7 operati] correxi ex supra, l. 28: qui P quo F 39 utroque] utrum P 19 omne…finem] Arist., Phys. II.5, 196b17-22 | omne…21 Metaphisice] sic etiam in Petro QQ. Phys. II, q. 10: “agens non agit nisi motus a fine, nec agens natura, nec agens secundum intellectum, ut patet ex Secundo Metaphysicae” (ed. Delhaye, p. 96) et QQ. Metaph. II, q. 25: “... cum duplex sit agens, scilicet agens per intellectum et cognitionem et agens per naturam, utrumque agit propter finem aliquem, ut Philosophus dicit 2º Phisicorum” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 142vb). Vide etiam Thomam, ScG III.2 (ed. Leon. XIV, p. 6) 2 0 Hoc…22 rationem] Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b14-16; cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (50), p. 119 2 2 ratio…contrariorum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (93), p. 122; Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1004a9-10; 27 finis…operati] cf. Auct. Auct. Arist., Top. VI (95), p. 329; Arist., Top. VI.4, 142a9-11 Arist., Phys. II (85), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27 34 Actio…35 sunt] Auct. Arist., Phys. III (101), p. 148; Arist., Phys. III.3, 202b5-22 3 8 Nec…45 operationem] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 8, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. VI, p. 68) utrum…39 opus] Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a25-26 4 0 agens…41 apprehensionem] cf. supra, ll. 21-24

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determinatur uoluntate, uoluntas autem sequitur apprehensionem. Modo nichil differt aliquid apprehendi sub ratione boni, siue sit bonum secundum ueritatem siue secundum apparentiam solum – et tale potest esse malum secundum ueritatem –, et ideo per consequens nichil differt ad 45 operationem. Sciendum tamen quod quedam communicationes sunt a ratione recta, quedam autem a ratione non recta. Et prime sunt gratia boni secundum ueritatem; cuius ratio est quia recta ratio dicitur a uoluntate recta, uoluntas autem recta a fine recto: et talis est communicatio regni uel aristocratia. Secunde autem sunt gratia boni secundum apparentiam tantum; cuius 50 ratio est eadem per oppositum sumpta, quia ratio non recta est a uoluntate non recta, hec autem est mali quod apparet bonum: et talis est oligarchia.

Ad rationem dicendum quod unum contrarium non ordinatur in aliud per se, sed bene per accidens. Frigidum enim bene calefacit ambiendo euaporationem, uel etiam calidum bene infrigidat, ut in libro Meteoro- 55 rum patet. Sic etiam malum ordinatur in bonum per accidens: accidit enim malo ut appareat bonum.

4 1 determinatur] a add. F 4 2 nichil] non F | sub] sunt F 4 6 communicationes] communitates F 47 prime] primo F 4 8 cuius] tertia P | cuius…50 tantum] om. per hom. F | recta1] coni.: tota P 5 1 sumpta] cuius ratio est add. sed exp. P om. F 5 2 oligarchia] obligarchica F 5 3 rationem] rationes F 54 calefacit] tale facit F | ambiendo] ambigendo P 55 etiam] econuerso F | calidum…infrigidat] talium infrigidati F 5 6 etiam malum] et malis F | per] quia sed corr. F 5 7 malo] om. F 4 2 nichil…45 operationem] cf. Petrus, Sent. De Mot. An., lectio 4: “Et quia aliquis posset dicere quod bonum quod mouet semper est bonum secundum ueritatem, dicit quod istud ponendum est, quod bonum non mouet nisi secundum quod apprehensum et secundum quod huiusmodi apparens, et huius appetitus fertur in illud quod apprehensum est sub ratione boni; et quia illud quod non est bonum potest apprehendi sub ratione boni et per consequens apparere bonum, bonum apparens bonum, ipsum potest mouere” (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 38va) 4 6 Sciendum…52 oligarchia] cf. infra, III, q. 13, ll. 19-27 et 36-58 53 unum…57 bonum] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae QQ. disp. de malo q. I, art. 3, ad 4: “... dicendum quod oppositum non est causa sui oppositi per se, set per accidens nichil prohibet: frigidum enim est causa calidi conuersum ‘quodammodo et ambiens’, ut dicitur in VIII Phisicorum” (ed. Leon. XXIII, p. 16, ll. 311-316) vel Thomae Super Sent. II, dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3: “... dicendum, quod unum contrariorum non est causa alterius per se, sed per accidens esse nihil prohibet, sicut frigidum calefacit, ut in VIII Physicorum, textus 8, dicitur” (ed. Mandonnet, p. 924) vel Thomae ScG III.10: “Cum autem malum et bonum sint opposita; unum autem oppositorum non potest esse causa alterius nisi per accidens, sicut frigidum calefacit, ut dicitur in VIII Physicorum: sequitur quod bonum non possit esse causa activa mali nisi per accidens” (ed. Leon. XIV, p. 25) 5 4 Frigidum…55 infrigidat] cf. Arist., Meteor. IV.5, 382b8-10

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Ad secundum dicendum quod oligarchia non omnino est preter rationem, sed omnino preter rationem rectam, que bene est boni apparen60 tis, ut uisum est. Patet ergo quod omnis communicatio est gratia boni.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i t a s s i t g r a ti a p r i n c i p a l i s s i m i b o n i , u t di c i t P h i l o s o ph u s Arguitur quod non, quia principalissimum bonum est summa felicitas: hec autem est felicitas speculatiua; ciuitas autem non ordinatur ad 5 felicitatem | speculatiuam, sed practicam; ergo non est gratia boni princi- F 174ra palissimi. Item, principalior communicatio est gratia principalioris boni; sed regnum uel regalis communicatio est principalior quam communicatio ciuitatis, cum ipsam complectatur, ergo est principalioris boni quam 10 ciuitas; non ergo ciuitas est gratia principalissimi boni. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia communicatio que omnes complectitur est gratia principalioris boni; talis est communicatio ciuilis; ergo ipsa est gratia principalioris finis. Maior patet quia omnis communicatio est gratia boni; sed omnes communicationes complectens est princi15 palior aliis in eo quod communicatio; ergo est principalioris boni.

58 Ad secundum] aliud est F | est] om. P 59 omnino] om. F | que bene] quia bonum F 60 ut 6, 1 ciuitas sit] inv. F | principalissimi] sit principium sed del. sit F uisum] nec usum F 2 Philosophus] om. P 3 principalissimum] principium F | summa…4 felicitas1] inv. F 4 est] s.l. P 5 principalissimi] principium F 7 principalior] principium F 8 communicatio1] combinatio F 10 gratia] om. P | principalissimi] principium F 11 Contra] in oppositum F arguitur] ratione add. F 1 2 est2] om. P a sed corr. s.l. F 1 3 finis] praem. boni sed exp. F 14 complectens] complectiones P 1 5 aliis] ergo add. F 58 oligarchia…60 est1] cf. supra, ll. 50-52 6 ,1 Consequenter…2 Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a4-7; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.1 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 401- 403) 1 1 Contra…12 boni] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a4-7

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Dicendum quod ciuitas dicitur dupliciter: uno modo congregatio habitantium in uno loco, et hec est ciuitas partialiter; alio modo dicitur ciuitas communicatio plurium – non solum domorum, sed etiam uicorum et uillarum – ordinata ad per se sufficientiam uite, quia non solum homines unius uille, que partialiter dicitur ciuitas, sibi omnino sufficiunt ad 20 necessaria et tutelam sufficientem, sed oportet ad hoc esse regnum: et hec isto modo dicitur ciuitas in communi, prout se extendit ad omnes communicationes politie. Et isto modo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, primo modo non. Dicendum ergo quod ciuitas secundo modo est gratia boni principalissimi in genere. Cuius ratio est: finis et agens proportionantur et ad se 25 inuicem dicuntur, quia mouent se inuicem et sunt semper eiusdem gradus quodlibet in suo genere: si enim finis principalis est inter fines, et agens principale erit inter agentia; et si uniuersaliter, uniuersaliter, si autem in genere, et in genere. Cuius ratio est quia actiuum et passiuum, et actiuum in actu et passiuum in actu, ad se dicuntur, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice; modo 30 ciuitas est actum ab intellectu; ergo ipsa proportionabitur fini intellectus. Modo ipsa ciuitas hoc modo dicta complectitur omnes communicationes personarum, domorum, uicorum et uillarum, ergo et finis ciuitatis hoc modo dicte complectetur fines omnium communicationum; et iste 17 partialiter] correxi ex infra, l. 20 : partialis PF 1 8 domorum] bonorum demorum F 20 que] quam P | partialiter] particularis F | sibi omnino] aut omnia F 21 oportet] conclusio F 22 in] ille F 23 Et isto] secundo F | modo2] om. F 2 4 boni principalissimi] principalioris boni F 2 5 proportionantur] correxi ex fonte allata et ex infra, l. 31: appropriantur PF | et2] om. P 26 semper] per F 28 erit] et F | uniuersaliter2] om. F 3 0 9º] 7 PF 3 1 proportionabitur] proportionabilior F 3 2 ipsa] om. F | communicationes] combinationes F 33 ciuitatis] ciuitas F 3 4 complectetur] complectitur F | omnium] combinationum uel add. F | iste] ita F 16 ciuitas…21 sufficientem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.2: “Potest enim ciuitas dici dupliciter: uno modo locus in quo habitabant ciues, uel communitas hominum” (ed. Lanza, p. 19, ll. 110-111) | ciuitas…21 regnum] cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.1: “Aduertendum tamen, communitatem ciuitatis esse principalissimam non simpliciter et per omnem modum, sed respectu communitatis domus et vici (ed.: vicio). Est autem alia communitas principalior ea, cuiusmodi est communitas regni ... Videtur enim suo modo communitas regni se habere ad communitatem ciuitatis, sicut haec communitas se habet ad domum et vicum ... communitas regni circumplectitur communitatem ciuitatis et est multo perfectior et magis sufficiens in vita quam communitas illa” (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 402- 403). Vide etiam III/1.5 (ibid., pp. 412- 413). De duplici modo quo ‘principalissimum’ dici debeat Aegidius aliter intellegit quam Petrus infra, ll. 38- 41 2 5 finis…26 dicuntur] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (73), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195b21-28; Auct. Arist., Phys. (85), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9; Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27; Auct. Arist., An. Post. II (110), p. 320; Arist., An. Post. II.12, 95a10-14; Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (124), p. 125. Vide etiam Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146 29 actiuum1…30 dicuntur] Arist., Metaph. IX.1, 1046a19-22 34 iste…36 politica] cf. infra, VII, q. 3, ll. 36-51 et q. 5, ll. 12-18, 33-36, 50-53 et 59

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est felicitas practica, que consistit in operatione principalis uirtutis practice, que dicitur prudentia politica; ergo ciuitas erit gratia principalissimi boni.

Principalissimum autem dicitur dupliciter: uel in genere uel extra genus. Modo finis ciuitatis principalissimus est in genere finium practico40 rum – non autem est principalissimus extra genus –, et omnino ad hunc finem immediate est ciuitas. Et ulterius, quia ista felicitas ordinatur in felicitatem speculatiuam, ergo ciuitas ordinabitur, mediate saltim, etiam in summum omnino et uniuersaliter | finem. Et iste finis mediatus est princi- P 276rb pium scientie politice, cum sit practica, ita quod, et saltim mediate, princi45 pium eius erit felicitas speculatiua; felicitas tamen practica principium eius est immediatum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod ciuitas est ad principalissimum in genere immediate, mediate tamen potest esse ad principalissimum extra genus, ut uisum est. 50

Ad secundam dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur ciuitas, ut uisum est, et primo modo tu arguis; secundo modo intendit Philosophus, et isto modo ciuitas non differt a regno, et ideo idem est eorum finis.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c o m b i n at i o m a r i s e t f e m i n e s i t a n at u r a Arguitur quod non, quia quod est ex electione non est a natura; ista autem combinatio est ex electione; ergo non a natura. Maior patet quia electio et placitum contra naturam distinguuntur. Minor patet quia uide-

3 5 felicitas] felicitates que P | consistit] exit F | principalis uirtutis] inv. F 36 politica] politia P uel potentia F | erit] est F | principalissimi] principium F 38 Principalissimum] principium F 39 ciuitatis…40 est] om. P 40 omnino] et add. F 41 est] et F 4 2 speculatiuam] practicam PF | ergo] felicitas add. sed exp. P | mediate] immediate P | etiam] om. F 4 3 omnino] omnia F | mediatus] immediatus P in medius F 4 5 erit] et F | tamen] autem F 47 rationem] rationes F | principalissimum] principium PF 48 principalissimum] principium P 50 Ad… 51 est] om. per hom. F | dupliciter dicitur] inv. sed corr. et iter. dicitur P | ciuitas] et add. sed exp. P 7, 2 Arguitur] et uidetur F 3 non] est add. F 4 patet] declaratur F 4 8 mediate…49 est] cf. supra, ll. 38-46 5 0 dupliciter…51 est] cf. supra, ll. 16-23 7, 1 Consequenter…natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a26-30

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mus nullos combinari | nisi sic preeligunt: electio enim est causa operatio- 5 num. Item, quod est a natura eodem modo est in omnibus indiuiduis speciei; sed combinatio ista non est eodem modo in omnibus hominibus; ergo nec est a natura. Minor patet quia nec omnes hoc intendunt nec, 10 etiam intendentes, intendunt hoc eodem modo. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione quia, si finis aliquorum est naturalis, et ea que in finem erunt a natura. Cuius ratio est quia natura non dat finem nisi etiam det ea quibus finis adipiscitur: non enim deficit in necessariis; sed per se sufficit , que est finis combinationis maris et femine, ut dicit COMMENTATOR super 8um Ethicorum. Est ibi a 15 natura: omnes enim in illam inclinantur, ut hic dicit Philosophus; igitur et ipsa combinatio erit a natura.

Dicendum quod aliquid esse a natura dicitur dupliciter: aut secundum actum perfectum primum et secundum – et sic est a natura homo et equus et talia –; aliud autem est a natura tantum secundum potentiam uel 20 habitum, qui est imperfectus, et tale tantum est a natura quia natura dat inclinationem ad illud. Actum autem perfectum dat ei aliud aliquid, sicut aliqua opera, sicut est de uirtute. Vnde dicitur, 2º et 1º Ethicorum: uirtus enim nobis omnibus inest a natura, id est inclinatio ad uirtutes; actus tamen perfectus uirtutum fit nobis per consuetudinem, ut ibi dicitur. 25 5 combinari] combinare F | nisi sic] sic non P 8 ista] om. F | hominibus] om. F 9 hoc] s.l. F 10 intendentes intendunt] intentiones inuocunt F 11 Contra] in oppositum F | si] om. F 13 quibus] que P | quibus…adipiscitur] adipiscere F 14 sed] semper F | sufficit] sufficientia F 15 Ethicorum] ad generationem] suppl. ex infra, ll. 42, 50-52, 75-76 et ex fonte allata phisicorum P | ibi] om. F 1 6 hic dicit] inv. F | igitur et] ergo F 1 7 erit] est F 18 dicitur] illud est F | aut] dicit F 1 9 primum] principium F | et3] uel F 2 0 et…autem] talia cum ergo F 21 est1] actus add. F 2 2 ad illud] additus F | sicut] si quid sint F 2 3 Vnde] ut F | 2º…1º] primo et secundo F 2 4 nobis] non F 2 5 fit…per] insit in non per se F 11 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a26-30 | si…12 natura1] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-24 1 2 natura2…14 necessariis] Auct. Arist., De An. III (168), p. 188; Arist., De An. III.9, 432b21-23; cf. etiam Arist., De Caelo II.8, 290a29-35; II.11, 291b13-14 14 per…15 femine] Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12 (ed. Mercken, p. 183, ll. 56-58, 67-68) 18 Dicendum…22 illud] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae Super Sent. IV, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1, resp. (ed. Fiaccadori VII.2, p. 918) 19 actum…secundum] quod actus primus, qui est forma, distinguatur ab actu secundo, qui est operatio ex forma consequens, clare asseritur in quibusdam locis ex Thomae et etiam Petri scriptis desumptis. Cf., e.g., Thomam, STh Ia, q. 48, art. 5 (ed. Leon. IV, p. 496) et Petrum, QQ. Phys. III, q. 7 (ed. Delhaye, p. 136) 23 uirtus…24 uirtutes] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a23-26; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099b15-16, 18-20 24 actus…25 consuetudinem] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a16-18, 25-26 et b14-25

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Dicendum ergo consequenter, utrum hec combinatio maris et femine sit a natura, quod est a natura secundo modo, non autem primo. Cuius ratio est quia, quando finis per se est a natura, tunc etiam ea que per se sunt in finem erunt a natura; aliter enim natura deficeret in necessariis, quibus 30 etiam idem finis necessitatem imponit, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Et iterum dicitur, 2º Celi et Mundi, quod si natura dedisset stellis motum processiuum, dedisset etiam eis pedes sicut animalibus. Modo finis istius combinationis est per se sufficientia etiam personarum in domo; hoc autem non est nisi sit continuatio. Ratio ipsius 35 quod esse omnia appetunt, ut dicitur 2º De Anima et 1º Ethicorum; modo sunt quedam quorum esse in numero non potest continuari nec manere unum, sed solum specie, ut dicitur 2º De Anima in auctoritate illa: Naturalissimum, et cetera. Hec autem continuatio in specie non fit nisi per generationem, que renouat eadem in numero, et per hoc saluatur continuatio 40 speciei. Et ideo illa necessario habent naturalissimum appetitum, qui scilicet est in ordine ad ipsum esse, quod naturalissime omnia appetunt: hunc – inquam – habent ad generationem, sine qua illud continuari non potest. Hec autem generatio non est nisi per combinationem principii actiui et passiui, que necessario in ea requiritur esse approximata, quia 45 aliter non agerent, cum sint mouentia corporea, ut dicitur 8º Phisicorum. Hec autem principia natura quibusdam dedit coniunctim, ut plantis, que

2 6 consequenter] tum determinatur F 28 etiam] et F 30 etiam…finis] in finis idem F | ut] prout F | Phisicorum] ethicorum F 3 1 2º] primo P 3 2 dedisset etiam] et F 3 3 etiam] et F 3 4 continuatio Ratio] communicatio F 35 quod] om. F | 2º] primo P 3 6 sunt quedam] inv. F 3 7 auctoritate] a uoluntate F 3 8 et…autem] dicit F | fit] sit F 3 9 saluatur continuatio] saluat per continuationem F 4 0 naturalissimum…41 ordine] lac. F 4 2 hunc] habent F inquam…illud] lac. F 4 3 generatio] generatione F | combinationem] continuitatem F principii…44 passiui] om. F 4 5 non…mouentia] lac. F | corporea] corporata F | dicitur] om. F 4 6 quibusdam…plantis] diuidit coniunctum F 28 quando…30 imponit] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a14-20 3 1 si…32 animalibus] Arist., De Caelo II.8, 290a29-35 3 5 esse…appetunt] Arist., De An. II.4, 415b1-2; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (1), p. 232; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a2-3, ubi tamen asseritur “bonum quod omnia appetunt” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 375, ll. 5- 6) 3 6 sunt…37 specie] Auct. 3 7 Naturalissimum…38 cetera] Arist., De An. II (58), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415b3-7 Auct. Arist., De An. II (57), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a26-b1 4 3 generatio…44 passiui] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. I.2, 716a4-7; I.20, 729a28-31 4 4 necessario…45 corporea] Arist., Phys. VIII.1, 251b1-5; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I (14), p. 168; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.6, 322b23-24 et I.8, 326b1-2 4 6 Hec…48 sunt] Arist., De Gen. An. I.23, 730b33-731a4 et IV.1, 763b21-26; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A73, l. 188-p. A74, l. 198) Hec…50 alio] cf. Petrum, Sent. De Veg. et Pl.: “.... masculus secundum rationem suam .... generat se habens per modum agentis in generatione. Feminum est quod suscipiens semen alicuius individui suae speciei in se generat habendo per modum patientis. Sed considerando pertinentia

376

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sic semper se habent in se et ad se ipsas sicut mas et femina in hora coitus; in animalibus autem, saltim perfectis, ista distincta sunt, scilicet mas possibilis agere et facere aliud simile sibi in alio, et femina potens simile facere ex alio. Et ideo talia animalia, ad hoc ut fiat generatio, sine qua esse 50 non possunt, necessario appetunt combinationem maris et femine, sine qua non fieret generatio. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º De Anima: naturalissimum autem operum est omnibus natura uiuentibus et non orbatis, et que generationem spontaneam non habent, generare | aliud tale quale ipsum est, ut ipso diuino esse et immortali participent quantum possunt; 55 non autem possunt participare manentia eadem numero, sed solum specie, et ideo appetunt generationem esse speciei continuantem. | Et ex hiis patet solutio questionis quantum ad quesitum: dictum est enim quod combinatio maris et femine est a natura inclinante, saltim 60 propter appetitum continuandi ipsum esse speciei. Sed ulterius aduertendum est quod agens secundum talem naturalem appetitum non solum intendit aliud derelinquere simile sibi, sed etiam derelinquere illud perfectum, quia naturale est unicuique non solum derelinquere simile specie et substantia, sed etiam equale in statu perfectionis, quantum potest. Perfectio autem fetus generati fit per nutritionem; 65 tunc necessario generata appetunt nutritionem. Modo nutritio in quibusdam animalibus completur sufficienter per femellam solam, et ideo ad 4 7 in se] om. F | ipsas] ipsos F | mas…femina] malis et famella F 48 autem] om. F | distincta] disiuncta F 50 generatio] genere F 5 1 possunt] potest F | combinationem] combinatio F maris] mari F 53 autem] enim F 5 4 quale] contrarie F 55 ut] nisi P 57 continuantem] continuitate F 5 8 solutio questionis] solum consequentis F 60 appetitum continuandi] appetunt continuande F | continuandi] esse add. sed del. F 61 Sed…est] dicitur ulterius aduertentia F 6 2 derelinquere] post sibi transp. F 6 3 unicuique] uterque F 6 4 simile] sibi in add. F | etiam] om. F 6 5 quantum] quam F | generati] generari F 6 6 tunc] lectio incerta F 67 completur] scrips. complectur P complectitur F tunc…nutritionem] om. per hom. P sufficienter] sufficientia F | ad] sed corr. in aliud F huic rationi sexuum secundum Philosophum, primo De animalibus, nihil tale reperitur in planta, quia quaelibet planta generat in se et ex se” (ed. Poortman, p. 33, ll. 20-26) mas…50 alio] Auct. Arist., De Animalibus XII (183), p. 223; Arist., De Gen. An. I.2, 48 716a13-15, 22-25. Cf. etiam Arist., De Hist. An. I.3, 489a11-12 5 2 naturalissimum…57 continuantem] Auct. Arist., De An. II (57) et (58), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a26-b1 et b3-7; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A73, ll. 183-187) 61 agens…62 sibi] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a28-30; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a: “omnibus enim hiis inest naturalis appetitus ut post se derelinquat alterum tale quale ipsum est” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A73, ll. 183-185) | agens…65 potest] cf. Arist., Meteor. IV.3, 380a12-15: “Quoniam autem digestio perfectio, tunc pepansis perfecta est, quando semina que in pericarpio possunt efficere tale alterum quale ipsum. Et enim in aliis perfectum sic dicimus” (AL X.2, p. 109, ll. 101-104)

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fetus sui nutritionem non oportet ambo commanere, sicut patet in canibus et equis et huiusmodi. In aliis autem animalibus nutritio non completur a 70 femella sola, sed exigitur ulterius masculus, ut patebit, et ideo necesse est ut commaneant ambo usque ad perfectam nutritionem fetus, sicut patet in pluribus auibus. Et similiter homo est huius conditionis, et ideo oportet et marem et feminam tamdiu commanere donec perfecte nutriatur puer. Nam necesse habet femina masculo tuente et necessaria ad lactandum 75 preuidente et procurante, et ideo isti, ultra generationem et combinationem in generatione, ulterius appetunt naturaliter commanere ad tempus nutritionis. Vlterius homo est homo per rationem bene se habentem et non peruersam, ideo, secundum istam naturam, intendit derelinquere post se simile 80 sibi quantum ad hoc, scilicet perfectum quantum ad doctrinam; ideo hec specialis et ultima natura hominis inclinat ad eruditionem perfectam prolis. Ad hanc autem mulier sola non sufficit, quia inualidum consilium habet, ut dicetur in posterioribus; ideo uirum ei oportet commanere, non solum ad perfectionem corporis generati et nutritionem, sed etiam ad 85 perfectionem secundum rationem et doctrinam; et tunc post generatum perfecte simile derelinquitur a generante. Hoc autem naturaliter appetit omne uiuens; ergo commansionem maris et femine naturaliter homines appetunt ad saluationem speciei in simili omnino, simile – inquam – et secundum quod est animal et secundum quod est homo.

6 8 fetus] secundum add. F | nutritionem] coni.: generationem PF | canibus] animalibus F 6 9 aliis…animalibus] animalibus aut aliis F | nutritio] post completur transp. F | completur] complectitur PF 7 1 perfectam] perfectionem P | fetus] forus P 7 2 et2] om. F 7 8 peruersam] et add. F 80 quantum1] quam F 81 ultima natura] natura ultimo F 8 2 prolis] esse add. F | quia] quod F 83 dicetur] dicitur F | posterioribus] hoc libro et F | ei oportet] inv. F 84 generati] generari F 85 perfectionem] perfectum F | post generatum] primo generatur F 8 6 derelinquitur] delerinquere F | appetit] appetebat P appetat F 8 7 maris] uiri F 7 8 Vlterius…86 generante] Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12: “Et cum homo sit animal rationale, ratio autem non perversa intendit optimum, non solum intendit generans homo procreare prolem, sed et procreatam educare et educando provehere usque ad perfectionem, non solum in bonis corporis sed et in bonis animae, quae sunt virtutes et scientiae. Non est autem solus vir generans neque sola mulier, sed ambo simul sunt unum generans. Oportet igitur quod ambo simul intendant una communi intentione prolis procreationem et educationem et provectionem usque ad perfectum” (ed. Mercken, p. 183, ll. 70-77) 82 mulier…83 habet] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (30), p. 254; Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12-14; cf. q. seq.

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Si autem requiratur de tempore quamdiu debeant commanere, patebit 90 ex 7º huius, ubi PHILOSOPHUS intendit quod per totam uitam. Cuius ratio est quia iam uisum est quod naturaliter parentes appetunt perfectionem fetus. Modo perfectio non solum exigitur in substantia, sed etiam in uirtute, ut scilicet et illud generatum possit aliud generare, quia natura intendit perfectionem. Iuuenes autem non perficiuntur quantum ad hoc ante 95 tempus determinatum, quia, si antea contingat in aliqua ciuitate iuuenes mitti ad coniugium, dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod ciuitas illa periclitabitur: nam adhuc educare pueros non nouerint. Perficiuntur autem ad hoc femina circa uicesimum, uir autem circa tricesimum | septimum uel etiam circa quadragesimum annum; tunc enim secundum naturam apti sunt ad com- 100 binationem perfectam: tunc enim possunt fetum generare, nutrire et erudire perfecte. Modo, si parentes ante generationem eorum tanto tempore expectauerint et tanto tempore ad filiorum educationem commanere debent, sequitur quod tempus predictum in parentibus duplicabitur etiam respectu 105

9 0 patebit] patet F 9 1 7º] 8 PF 9 2 appetunt] intendunt F 9 3 fetus] fontis P | perfectio… solum] autem solum perfectio non F | etiam] solum P 9 5 autem] om. P | ante] quando add. F 9 7 periclitabitur] periclitatur F 9 8 educare pueros] inv. F | nouerint] nouerunt PF autem] aut F 9 9 circa3] tota 10 0 ad] aliud F 1 01 enim] primo add. P 1 03 tempore] tempus F | expectauerint] expectauerant P | expectauerint…104 tempore] om. F 10 4 debent] dicunt F 1 05 tempus…etiam] ipse in parentibus duplicior predictum et F 9 0 Si…91 uitam] de coniunctione nuptiali Aristoteles disserit in libro VII.16; non asserit tamen ibi talem coniunctionem esse per totam vitam; cf. Arist., Pol. VII.16, 1335b38-1336a2. Hoc potius asseritur in Petri Scripto VII.12: “communicatio maris et femine per totam uitam ad perfectionem prolis est a natura inclinante” (ed. Lanza, p. 573, ll. 525-526). Nihil simile invenitur apud Alberti commentarium; cf. Albertum, Pol. VII.12 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 741) 9 5 Iuuenes…97 periclitabitur] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.16, 1335a11-27, ubi tamen re vera Aristoteles tantum asserit quod “in quibuscunque enim civitatum lexatur iuvenes coniugari et iuvenculas, imperfecti et parvi corporibus sunt” (ed. Susemihl, p. 318, ll. 2-4) et quod “adhuc autem et ad temperantiam expedit coitus facere senioribus: intemperatiores enim videntur iuvenculae, quae usae fuerunt coitibus” (ibid., ll. 8-10). Ista affirmatio potius invenitur in Petri Scripto VII.12: “quoniam in quibuscumque ciuitatibus seu regionibus permittuntur iuuenes et iuuencule coniugari ... generantur parui et imperfecti secundum corpus, et per consequens minus utiles ad opera bellica” (ed. Lanza, p. 563, ll. 203-205) 9 8 Perficiuntur…100 annum] Arist., Pol. VII.16, 1335a28-29; Auct. Arist., Pol. VII (127), p. 261 10 3 Modo…108 morientur] argumentum valde simile invenitur in Petri Scripto VII.12: “ideo oportet quod uniantur ad hoc per consensum mutuum, non per aliquod paruum tempus, sed usque ad perfectionem prolis secundum corpus et secundum animam, quod erit, si incipiant generare in tempore determinato a Philosopho, circa finem uite eorum: puer enim, si fuerit masculus, non perficitur usque ad 37um annum uel circa; et si isti 37 adiungantur 37 annis patris generantis antequam generaret, erunt 74, quando inpotens erit naturaliter ad generandum et circa finem uite” (ed. Lanza, p. 573, ll. 518-524)

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primorum filiorum, et tunc erit mulier forsan quinquaginta annorum uel ultra, uir autem octoginta. Talis autem etatis homines iam ulterius generare non possunt, uel forsan etiam omnino morientur. Communis enim terminus omnium talis est – licet in aliquibus excedat –, in quibus naturale 110 est ut commaneant ut a propriis filiis sustententur; ideoque naturali desiderio homines inquantum tales commanere nituntur et inclinantur per totam uitam. Et quia oportet parentes taliter et propter talia commanere, ideo dicit COMMENTATOR, 8º Ethicorum, quod oportet ipsos primo combinari ex perfecta intentione ad omnia perficienda, et 115 propter hoc habet requiri consensus eorum de combinatione. Ex quo patet quod, cum talis combinatio | cum predictis circumstantiis sit naturalis, P 276vb omne peccatum quod fit contra eam, hoc fit contra naturam. Est ergo talis combinatio secundum naturam, id est naturalem inclinationem: natura enim dat inclinationem ad hoc. Actus autem perfectus illius 120 est a ratione recta, que predictam inclinationem regit et moderatur, aliquando determinando, ut quod per totam uitam delectabiliter commaneant et quod requiratur consensus, uel alia huiusmodi apponendo; aliquando autem reprimendo, ut in illis qui, propter excellentiorem finem, illud dimittunt; aliquando autem extendendo, ut fiat secundum ritus et 125 consuetudines diuersas. Et quia ista sunt a ratione, ideo ista determinantur

10 6 quinquaginta…108 etiam] om. F 1 07 homines] hominis P 1 0 8 non] nam P | etiam] iter. sed corr. P | morientur] moriuntur F | enim…109 est] omni hominum terminus et talis F 10 9 excedat] exterminat F | naturale] etiam adhuc connaturale F 1 1 0 ut1] adhuc add. sed exp. P | ut2] nec F 1 11 commanere] permanere F 11 4 omnia] natura F 11 5 habet] habent P de combinatione] ad combinationem F 116 cum1…combinatio] combinatio talis F 11 7 omne] esse F | contra1] qua P | hoc fit] haberent P 118 Est…119 hoc] om. F 11 9 Actus] natus P illius] alius F 120 est] om. P | moderatur] moderat F 1 21 quod] autem P 122 requiratur] regulatur F | alia] aliud F | apponendo] coni.: appado P oppnaa F 123 in illis] alias F | excellentiorem] excellentem F 124 extendendo] ex mouendo F 1 25 quia] om. P | ideo] et F 106 mulier…108 generare] cf. Auct. Arist., Pol. VII (126), p. 261; Arist., Pol. VII.16, 1335a7-11, ubi asseritur: “quoniam enim determinatus est finis generationis, ut ad plurimum est dicere, viris quidem numerus septuaginta annorum ultimus, quinquaginta autem mulieribus ...” (ed. Susemihl, p. 317, ll. 7-10) 1 1 3 oportet…115 combinatione] Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12 (ed. Mercken, p. 183, l. 77-p. 184, l. 81). Eadem opinio, sed sine allegatione fontis (i.e. Commentator), invenitur in Petri Scripto VII.12: “oportet quod uniantur ad hoc per consensum mutuum” (ed. Lanza, p. 573, ll. 518-519) Ex…117 naturam] Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12: 11 5 “... patet et quod matrimonium est naturale et quod omnis commixtio extra matrimonium peccatum est et transgreditur legem naturae” (ed. Mercken, p. 184, ll. 87- 89) 1 16 talis…119 hoc] cf. Petri Scriptum VII.12: “Et ideo communicatio maris et femine per totam uitam ad perfectionem prolis est a natura inclinante, et omnis commixtio que fit preter huiusmodi communicationem innaturalis est” (ed. Lanza, p. 573, ll. 524-525)

380

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lege et pertinent ad ius positiuum, et ideo peccata contra istas circumstantias sunt peccata contra legem solum. Sic ergo patet quod combinatio maris et femine quantum ad inclinationem est a natura, quantum autem ad actum perfectum est ab electione et ratione determinante et dirigente.

Ad rationes. Dicendum ad primam quod non est a natura comple- 130 te, sed solum secundum inclinationem; et ideo nichil prohibet ipsam esse ab electione quantum ad perfectionem, quia hec est diuersimode. Ad secundam dicendum quod maior falsa est: natura enim non solum est causa eorum que fiunt semper, sed que fiunt frequenter, quia per accidens contingit eam aliquando impediri, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Vel 135 dicendum quod, quantum ad inclinationem, est eodem modo in omnibus, et quantum ad hoc quod est a natura; sed quantum ad hoc quod est a ratione, scilicet quantum ad perfectionem et ritum, potest diuersificari aliquam dispositionem accidentalem. Vel possemus dicere quod ipsa combinatio semper est eodem modo, dico si natura in qua est sit eodem 140 modo, que, si uarietur, uariabitur et ipsa. Sic etiam dictum est in 5º Ethicorum de iusto naturali. < Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q ue n t e r q u e r i t ur u t r um m u l i e r p o s s i t e s s e s e r u a Arguitur quod sic, quia quod non est in potestate propria est seruum; mulier non est in potestate propria; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia seruus, id quod est, domini est, ergo non est in potestate propria. 12 6 lege] praem. a F | pertinent] pertinet F | ideo] illo F | istas circumstantias] scrips. ista institutiones F 127 solum] solam F | quod] om. P 12 8 inclinationem] nutritionem F 1 29 dirigente] dignificante F 13 0 Ad rationes] om. F | non] ratio F 131 ipsam] ipsum F 132 perfectionem] perfectam P | diuersimode] esse aliud add. sed exp. aliud F 1 33 secundam] secundum F | falsa est] est falsus F 13 4 causa eorum] tantorum F | semper…fiunt2] om. per hom. F 13 5 eam] cum F 1 3 6 quod quantum] quantum ad perfectionem minimo (?) potest diuersificari per aliquam dispositionem accidentalem uel possemus dicere add. sed del. adhibito signo ‘uacat’ F | est…modo] eodem modo etiam F 1 3 7 et] s.l. F | hoc1] secundum add. PF 13 8 quantum] quod P | et ritum] mutatio F 1 3 9 per] suppl. ex lectione alia quae supra relata est, in apparatu ad l. 136 “quod quantum” | dicere] a ratione F 1 41 Sic] sicut F | in] om. F 14 2 naturali] et cetera (?) add. F 8 , 1 serua] seruatur F 2 est2…3 seruum] hoc est seruum multipliciter F 4 quia] quod F 13 3 natura…135 impediri] cf. Arist., Phys. II.5, 196b21-24; II.8, 198b34-36 et 199a9-11 14 0 si…142 naturali] Arist. Eth. Nic. V.7, 1134b29 et b33-35 8, 1 Consequenter…serua] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a34-b1

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Minor patet quia mulier non potest alienare nec uendere, nec aliquid talium facere circa res domus.| F 175ra Item, qui non potest preuidere conferentia et nociua mente, iste est seruus; mulier non preuidet, quia inualidum consilium habet; ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex 1º huius.

10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod mulier non potest esse serua uel ministra in domo. Cuius ratio est primo ex consideratione rationis serui. Ratio autem serui ex ratione domini dependet. Nunc autem ratio domini est ut preuideat et ordinet de domo per uigorem intellectus, cum non possit exequi; per 15 contrarium autem seruus est qui non potest preuidere mente, sed bene natus est obedire et exequi, et hoc per robur corporis; et ideo robusti corpore et mente rudes naturaliter sunt serui. Si quis autem in utroque deficiat, pessimum est, nec nomen habet. 20

Mulier autem eadem specie est uiro, quia ex eodem semine, aliter passo, generantur utrique. Est autem frigidior et magis humida, humiditate 7 iste] et sic add. F 10 Contra] in oppositum F 1 1 ministra] minister F 12 rationis] om. P 13 domini1] autem F | preuideat…14 de] prouidat et ordinat in F 14 possit] potest F | exequi] consequi P 15 autem] aut F | preuidere] prouidere F 1 6 robur] rebus F 1 7 et] om. F rudes] fides F | naturaliter] nec aliter P 2 0 generantur utrique] generatur F 7 qui…8 seruus] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a31-34; sed cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, ll. 206-209) 8 mulier…habet] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (30), p. 254; Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12-14 10 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a34-b5 13 ratio…17 serui] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a: “ille est naturaliter principans et dominans qui suo intellectu potest preuidere ea que congruunt saluti, puta consequendo proficua et repellendo nociua. Ille autem qui potest per fortitudinem corporis implere opere quod sapiens mente preuiderit, est naturaliter subiectus et seruus ... ille enim qui propter sapientiam potest mente preuidere, interdum saluari non posset deficientibus uiribus corporis nisi haberet seruum qui exequeretur, nec ille qui habundat uiribus corporibus posset saluari nisi alterius prudentia regeretur” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, ll. 206-212 et 214-219) 1 5 seruus…mente] cf. supra, adn. ad ll. 7- 8 19 Mulier…20 utrique] cf. Arist., Metaph. VII.9, 1034a34-b4 20 Est…22 recta] cf. Arist., De Long. et Brev. 4, 466b15-16; Arist., De Gen. An. IV.1, 765b16-17; IV.6, 775a7- 8 et 14-15: “in hominibus multum differt masculinum a feminino caliditate pura ... imbecilliora enim sunt et humidiora secundum naturam feminina” (AL XVII.2.V, p. 146, ll. 9-10 et 19); cf. etiam Auct. Arist., De Animalibus XV (231), p. 227; Arist., De Part. An. II.2, 648a10-14: “Optima autem calidum habentia et subtilem et purum; simul enim ad virilitatem talia et ad prudentiam habent bene. Propter quod et superiores partes ad inferiores hanc habent differentiam, et ad femellam masculus” | Est…25 spirituum] cf. Costa Ben Luca, De Diff. Spir. et An.: “Cuius vero complexio membrorum in quibus fuerit in propria temperatione fuerit minus perfecta, imperfectus erit spiritus, in hoc quod debetur ex subtilitate, et imperfectiores erunt actus animae, hac de causa. Et ideo sunt virtutes animae in pueris imperfectae, et in mulieribus debiliores” (ed. Basileae 1537, p. 316)

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aquosa et grossa, que per motum suum nata est impedire organa fantasmatum, ex quibus intellectus considerat, et ideo mulier deficit ratione recta. Et ulterius, quia humidum debile et multum passiuum est, ideo ipsa debilis est corpore: robur enim corporis est a calore dante multitudinem et 25 fortitudinem spirituum. Cum ergo queritur utrum mulier possit esse serua, dico quod non: licet enim non sit sua omnino et nata sit obedire, nec possit preuidere, tamen in ultima serui conditione deficit, que est exequi mandata domini, ad quod requiritur robur corporale. Et ex hoc posset formari ratio.

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Si autem dicatur quod forsan ita parua haberet opera exequi quod bene 30 robur eius, saltim alicuius mulieris, sufficeret, huic obuiat PHILOSOPHUS cum dicit quod natura unum organum solet ordinare ad unam operationem: sic enim optime perficiet | unamquamque suam operationem. Modo natura ordinauit mulierem ad generationem, ergo non seruiet , quia unum organum in unam ordinatur operationem, nisi 35 forte due operationes non in se inuicem impedirent, sicut lingua in gustum et loquelam. Sic non est hic: continui enim labores mulierem impedirent a bona nutritione pueri; et ideo mulier non debet esse serua: naturalis enim ordo repugnat. Considerandum autem quod nec est domina. Cuius ratio est quia non 40 potest preuidere, quod est opus domini. Magis tamen contra naturam 22 quibus] quo F 2 3 et] om. F | multum] multa F | ideo] de add. sed exp. P | debilis] est abilis F 24 enim] autem scilicet sed scilicet lectio incerta P | corporis] om. F 25 fortitudinem spirituum] fortiorem spiritum F 2 7 enim] om. F | nata] natura F 2 8 mandata] mandato F 3 0 haberet opera] inv. F 3 1 robur] rebus F | huic] hinc F 3 2 organum] orgat F | solet 33 optime…unamquamque] ut obtie perficit unumordinare] post operationem transp. F quodque F 3 5 unam] et eadem add. F | nisi] si P 36 in1] om. F 3 7 loquelam] loquebatur F mulierem] mulier enim F 4 1 naturam] est add. sed exp. P 3 2 natura…33 operationem] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (2), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b1-5 3 4 natura…37 hic] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae Sententia Pol. I.1/a: “femina non deputatur a natura ad seruiendum, set ad generandum: sic enim optime fient omnia quando unum instrumentum non deseruit multis operibus, set uni tantum. Set hoc est intelligendum quando accideret impedimentum in utroque uel altero duorum operum quibus idem instrumentum attribueretur, ut puta si oporteret utrumque opus frequenter simul exercere; si autem per uices diuersa opera exerceantur, nullum impedimentum sequitur si unum instrumentum pluribus operibus accommodetur. Vnde et lingua congruit in duo opera nature, scilicet in gustum et locutionem, ut dicitur in III De anima; non enim hec duo opera secundum idem tempus sibi inuicem coincidunt” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, ll. 240-255). Quod lingua congruat et in gustum et in locutionem etiam asseritur in Arist., De An. II.8, 420b17-18; Arist., De Part. An. II.16, 659b35-660a1; Arist., De Resp. 17, 476a17-22; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., De An. II (79), p. 180 3 5 unum…operationem2] Auct. Arist., De Resp. (134), p. 207; Arist., De Resp. 10, 476a11-13

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mulieris est eam esse dominam in domo et principantem quam seruam, quia secundum illud quod formale est in ea, scilicet ratio debilis, repugnat rationi domini; secundum illud quod materiale est in ea repugnat rationi 45 serui, scilicet secundum debilitatem corporis. Et ideo etiam in alia Facultate dicitur quod sumpta est a latere uiri: non a capite, quia naturaliter non debet dominari, nec a pede, quia naturaliter non debet seruire – que enim sunt circa pedes, sunt seruilia –, sed sumpta est a latere, quod coassumpta ad integritatem domus. Ipsa enim uiro iungitur ad generationem, nec est 50 distincta ab eo secundum rationem domini uel serui.| F 175rb

Ad rationem dicendum quod non esse in potestate propria non facit seruum, nisi ulterius dicatur “id quod est domini sit” et etiam “possit exequi”; aliter enim ciues sub principe essent serui, quod non est uerum. Hoc autem non est in muliere. 55

Ad secundam dicendum quod diffinitio procedit: non enim requiritur ad seruum non posse preuidere, sed etiam posse exequi; hoc autem non potest mulier; ergo et cetera.

4 2 est] om. F 43 illud] id F | formale est] inv. F | scilicet] est P | repugnat] expugnat F 4 4 illud] id F | ea] quod add. F 45 corporis] corporalia F | etiam] om. F | Facultate] facilitate F 46 est] om. F 4 7 debet1] dicitur F | naturaliter] materialiter F | debet 2] dicitur F 4 8 sunt2] secundum F | quod] cum F 4 9 est…50 eo] ab ipso diffinitur F 50 serui] seruitus P scrips. seruuem F 51 Ad rationem] lac. F | non2] potest add. F 5 2 nisi…dicatur] om. F | et] om. F possit] possint F 5 3 essent] erant F | serui] secundum P | est] esse F 5 4 non] om. F | in muliere] est intelligere P 5 5 diffinitio] coni.: lac. P dimittere F 5 6 requiritur] quod add. sed exp. P | preuidere] prouidere F 4 5 in…49 domus] quod introducitur locutione ‘in alia Facultate’ refertur ad locum quemdam ex Petri Lombardi Sententiis (II, dist. 18, cap. 2); sed hoc argumentum potius desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia, q. 92, art. 3, resp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem, ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis coniunctio. Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum, et ideo non est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subiecta: et ideo non est formata de pedibus” (ed. Leon. V, p. 398)

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< Q UE S T I O 9 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m h o m o s i t a n i m a l c i u i l e a n a tu r a Arguitur quod non, quia quod secundum naturam est, eodem modo in omnibus indiuiduis illius nature inuenitur; sed esse ciuile nec in omnibus nec eodem modo inuenitur; ergo esse ciuile non est homini a 5 natura. Item, nichil inclinatur ad corruptionem eius ad quod sua natura inclinat; sed multi homines inclinantur ad destructionem ciuitatis, ut tiranni; ergo et cetera. Contra: quandocumque illud a quo aliquid dicitur tale est a natura, et ipsum erit tale a natura; sed ciuitas est a natura, a qua homo dicitur ciuilis; 10 ergo homo dicetur ciuilis a natura.

Dicendum quod homo est animal ciuile a natura, id est naturali inclinatione, ut etiam prius dicebatur de ciuitate, sed est ciuilis a ratione quantum ad determinationem, puta quod in illa ciuitate uel in illa, uel sic uel sic 15 uiuat. Primum patet quia, quando illud per quod ordinatur res in finem est a natura, tunc etiam finis erit a natura, quia, si natura dedisset illud per quod uenitur in finem et non dedisset finem, tunc dedisset aliquid quod natum esset includere aliud quod tamen non includeret, et tunc operaretur frus20 tra, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum.

9 , 1 a] om. P 2 Arguitur] praem. et F 3 in1] est ex F | sed…4 inuenitur] om. per hom. F 4 homini] ergo add. F 6 sua natura] inv. F 7 sed] se F | ut…8 tiranni] et nostram F 9 illud] id F 10 tale] erit add. F | a1] om. P 11 ergo…ciuilis] om. per hom. F | a] om. P 1 2 a…est2] natura P 1 3 est] etiam F 1 4 illa2] alia F 1 6 quia] quod F | ordinatur res] inv. F | finem] fine F 1 7 etiam] et F | erit] est F | dedisset] aliud add. F 1 8 aliquid] ad add. F 1 9 esset] esse F includere] aliquem finem add. F | non] om. P | includeret] includit F 9 , 1 Consequenter…natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a2-3 9 illud…11 natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30-1253a3 1 2 homo…13 ciuitate] cf. supra, q. 3, l. 3 et q. 5, ll. 11-12, ubi Petrus affirmat quod civitas vel communicatio humana sunt naturales; in q. 3, ll. 14-17 et q. 7, ll. 18-22 explicat quomodo aliquid sit naturale secundum inclinationem 1 7 si…20 frustra] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (82), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.6, 197b22-27; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/b: “Dicimus enim quod natura nichil facit frustra, quia semper operatur ad finem determinatum; unde si natura attribuit alicui rei aliquid quod de se est ordinatum ad aliquem finem, sequitur quod ille finis detur illi rei a natura” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A78, ll. 115-120)

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Item, eadem est inclinatio ad finem et ad ea que in finem. Si ergo homo habet illud per quod ordinatur in finem, qui est esse ciuilem, et hoc ex natura, tunc etiam ciuilis erit a natura. Hec est ratio PHILOSOPHI. Minor patet quia homo habet uocem natura, immo sermonem, qui ulterius est 25 significatiuus quam uox aliorum animalium: est enim sermo a natura dante potentiam et a uoluntate et ratione determinante eam, et propter hoc etiam est iusti et iniusti; sermo autem ordinatur in finem ciuitatis, quod patet ex iam dictis, quia iustum et iniustum cadunt in communicatione ciuili. Ergo sermo significatiuus horum ordinatur ad ciuitatem, quia ibi 30 incidit communicatio mutua ista significandum, nec aliter posset commanere ciuitas nisi posset talia inuicem significari. Si ergo sermo a natura, ergo et ciuile esse erit a natura homini. Sed que est ista natura? Dicendum quod homo potest considerari dupliciter: uel secundum speciei naturam uel secundum naturam indiui2 2 illud] id F | ordinatur] ordinatum sed corr. F | qui est] quo F | et] potest enim ex F 2 3 ciuilis erit] est (s.l.) ciuilis F | Hec] praem. et F 2 4 habet] et add. F | sermonem] secundum mouere F | ulterius est] inv. F 2 5 significatiuus] sangantiuus (sic) horum ordinatur sed exp. horum ordinatur P | quam uox] communia uocis F | a natura] om. F 2 6 potentiam] penam F 2 7 est] sermo add. F | iusti…iniusti] iustis et iniustis F | autem] dicitur add. sed exp. P 2 8 cadunt] eadem F 29 Ergo] iter. F | significatiuus] scrips. sagantiuus P | quia] et add. P 3 0 mutua] mutuo P mutualia F | significandum] significandi P 3 1 inuicem] in uocem F 3 3 considerari…34 dupliciter] inv. F 34 secundum1…naturam1] secundam naturam speciei F 2 1 Si…23 Philosophi] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b34-1253a3: “adhuc quod cuius gratia et finis optimum, persesufficientia autem finis et optimum, ex hiis igitur manifestum, quod eorum quae natura civitas est, et quod homo natura civile animal est” (ed. Susemihl, p. 7, ll. 4-7) 2 4 homo…25 animalium] cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.4: “... ex parte sermonis ostendere possumus hominem esse naturaliter animal politicum et civile, ex eo quod vox humana, quae dicitur sermo, est aliter significativa quam vox brutorum” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 409) | homo…32 homini] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a9-19 | sermonem…25 animalium] Arist., De Int. 2, 16a19: “Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum” (transl. Boethii, AL II.1-2, p. 6, l. 4). Vide etiam Arist., De An. II.8, 420b29-33: “Non enim omnis animalis sonus est uox, sicut diximus: est enim et lingua sonare et sicut tussientes. Set oportet animatum esse uerberans et cum ymaginatione aliqua; significatiuus enim quidam sonus est uox, et non respirati aeris sicut tussis, set isto uerberat eum qui est in arteria ad ipsam”; Arist., De Sensu 1, 437a9-15: “Auditus vero crepitus tantum differentias, in paucis vero animalibus et vocis. Secundum vero accidens ad sapientiam auditus multum confert; sermo enim audibilis existens causa est discipline, non secundum se sed secundum accidens; ex nominibus enim constat; nominum vero unumquodque simbolum est” 2 5 est…26 eam] cf. loc. parall. B I, q. 11, ll. 13-16 et Petrum, QQ. De Int. q. 10: “... nomina significant naturaliter et etiam ad placitum, diuersum tamen ... nec est hoc inconueniens quod aliquid sit uno modo a natura et alio a uoluntate, quod patet in motu: quod enim aliquid moueatur, hoc est a natura, quod autem moueatur saltando uel alio tali modo uel sic, hoc est a uoluntate” (ex ms. Paris, B.n.F, lat. 16170, f. 102rb; vide etiam Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.III.20, f. 121ra) 3 3 Sed…62 ciuile] Thomas quoque distinxit inter naturam speciei et naturam individui, quae est aliqua dispositio materialis ; cf. Thomam, STh, Ia-IIae, q. 63, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. VI, pp. 496- 497)

386

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dui, que est aliqua dispositio materialis. Vtrumque enim dicimus esse 35 naturam hominis, sed secundum primam naturam homo non est ciuilis a natura, dico primo et secundum se et absolute, quia homo, secundum id quod est et inquantum homo, habet quod sit animal et corpus et cetera, et quod sit rationalis. Quod autem sit imperfectus | uel insufficiens, hoc non habet inquantum est homo et ex natura speciei absolute et secundum se, 40 sed habet hoc ex natura illa considerata secundum esse suum respectu materie. Cuius ratio est quia forma de se est continuabilis semper et perpetua, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS 1º De Anima; sed in respectu ad materiam, cum qua constituit unum esse, non potest continuari in esse suo idem manens in numero, ut ibidem | dicitur, sed unum potest manere idem specie. 45 Ergo, cum omnia esse appetant naturaliter, saltim eo modo quo possunt, et etiam continuationem, ut dicitur 2º De Anima et 9º Ethicorum, necessario et naturaliter appetent id per quod magis saluari et continuari possunt in illo esse: hoc autem est ciuitas. Ergo per naturam speciei isto modo consideratam, scilicet in respectu 50 materie secundum suum esse, secundum quod etiam habet quod sit insufficiens ad salutem et continuationem sui esse, propter quod et necessario appetit id per quod possit sibi sufficere, per istam – inquam – naturam erit homo ciuilis natura. Ergo et hoc omnibus hominibus aliquo modo per illam naturam contingit, uel saltim pluribus, ut supra dictum est: “natura 55 enim non solum causa eorum que semper”, et cetera. Si autem homo consideretur secundum naturam que est dispositio materialis aliqua, que dicitur natura indiuidui, tunc ex hac non habet ut sit ciuile, quia illa differens est in omnibus, ideo non erit causa 3 5 materialis] naturalis F 36 naturam1] natura P | naturam2] rationem F 3 7 dico] dicitur F secundum1] secundo F | quia] quod F 38 est] homo add. F | inquantum] est add. F | cetera] enim huiusmodi F 39 autem] aut F 40 et1] om. F | absolute] sumpta add. F 41 sed] om. F 4 2 materie] nature F | Cuius…est1] tertia ratione sed tertia lectio incerta F | de se] post continuabilis transp. F | semper] om. F 4 3 1º…Anima] et dico a natura F 45 unum] materia P 46 Ergo] om. F | naturaliter] tunc naturaliter eo modo sed exp. eo modo F 4 7 etiam continuationem] continuatio est F | 9º] 4 P 48 appetent] om. F 5 0 naturam] ciuitatis add. F consideratam] continuatam F | scilicet] si P 51 suum esse] inv. F | etiam] est F 5 3 istam] illa P 54 natura] naturaliter F 5 5 naturam] om. F | pluribus] prohibet F | ut] inter et F | est] et F 5 7 dispositio] naturalis add. F 58 que…natura] non dicitur F 59 differens] om. P | erit] est F 4 2 forma…perpetua] mentio ista ad Ium librum De Anima referri posset ad locum illum ubi Aristoteles affirmat quod corpus sine anima expirat et marcescit : De An. I.5, 411b7-10; cf. tamen potius Arist., De An. III.5, 430a21-22 (Auct. Arist., De An. III [151], p. 187), ubi asseritur quod intellectus est immortalis et perpetuus 43 in…45 numero] Auct. Arist., De An. II (57), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415b3-7 4 6 omnia…47 continuationem] Arist., De An. II.4, 415b1-2; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.10, 1170a25-27 5 5 supra…56 semper] cf. supra, q. 7, ll. 133-134

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alicuius proprietatis que insit pluribus, sed ex hac habet diuersificationem illius proprietatis; et ideo diuersi homines singulares diuersimode disponuntur ad predictam proprietatem, scilicet esse ciuile.

Si autem contingat quod aliquis homo sic disponatur a natura ut, uel ex multa humiditate uel ex acuta caliditate, habeat sensus ebetes et motus 65 multos turbantes fantasmata, tunc ille homo male disponetur secundum intellectum, non quantum ad substantiam intellectus, sed propter impedimentum organorum ex quibus capit ratio et intellectus, et ideo patietur defectum rationis, et per consequens non erit habilis obedire rationi, et tunc sequitur uitam bestialem, sequens omnino appetitum sensitiuum. Et 70 ille erit inciuilis omnino, et de illo dicit poeta quod erit insocialis et sceleratus. Et ideo, licet secundum quod consequens naturam speciei, scilicet ex parte ipsius esse in ordine ad materiam, ordinetur in esse ciuile, tamen secundum naturam suam magis propinquam, scilicet dispositionem sue materie, magis inclinatur in oppositum. Si autem econuerso contingat ut aliquis homo sic disponatur a natura ut sit temperate complexionis in qualitatibus primis, et ideo sensus habeat subtiles et puros, et cum hoc fantasiam lucidam et quietam, et inde habeat passiones bene moderatas, tunc optime ex natura sua disponetur ad rationem, propter bonam dispositionem organorum ex quibus capere 80 habet ratio. Et propter hoc aptissimus erit ad speculandum, non indigens 75

6 1 diuersimode] diuersitate P 62 esse] omne P 63 Si autem] sed enim F | ut] s.l. P 6 4 ex] om. F | motus…65 multos] scrips. multes motus F 6 5 homo] erit add. sed exp. P 67 capit] capitur F | patietur] partem F 6 8 habilis] mentalis F 69 omnino] omnis F 7 0 inciuilis omnino] ciuilis omnis F | quod] quantum F 71 ideo licet] inv. F | quod] quoddam F 72 ordine] ordinate F 7 3 dispositionem] dispositioni P 74 materie] s.l. F | materie magis] modo P 7 5 econuerso] eodem modo F 76 complexionis] cognitionis P | qualitatibus] qualibet F 7 7 inde] ibidem F 78 tunc optime] modo a passione F | disponetur] disponitur F 7 9 rationem] rationi F | dispositionem] dispositam F 80 erit] om. F | indigens] indigentis P 6 3 Si…92 inciuiles] quod homo possit esse incivilis sive defectu rationis sive, contra, optima dispositione naturae suae ad rationem, etiam asserunt Albertus, Pol. I.1 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 15); Thomas, Sent. Pol. I.1/b (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A78, ll. 92-111); Aegidius Romanus, De Reg. Princ. III/1.3 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 407), qui tamen ad hoc explicandum usi non sunt argumentis ad dispositionem materialem aliquam individui relatis. Mentio ista de duobus contrariis quae a communiore statu discendunt – unum propter maiorem eius perfectionem, alterum propter defectum – clare originem sumitur ex Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a27-30, ubi asseritur quod qui non sunt partes civitatis sunt “aut bestia aut Deus” (ed. Susemihl, p. 10, l. 5) 7 0 de…sceleratus] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a5

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societate ad illam suam potissimam operationem, potens etiam illa carere propter moderamen passionum corporalium. Et ille tunc disponitur ad corpus sicut ad inimicum, sicut dicit EUSTRATIUS, et habebit uirtutem heroycam, et eliget uitam solitariam ad speculandum altissima; et hoc accidit eis ex diuina consuetudine morali uel ex natura propria uel | etiam 85 ex supranaturali causa secundum theologos, que omnia accidunt nature speciei. Et ideo illi fiunt inciuiles: ciuitate enim non indigent nec ad defensionem, quia corpus non curant, nec ad necessitatem corporis, quia illius sunt inimici, nec propter consuetudines bonas, quia de se habent excessum uirtutum, ut iam patuit, nec plura sunt opera ciuitatis; ergo isti, quasi per 90 se sufficientes ad speculandum, quod summe intendunt, erunt iterum inciuiles. 8 1 potissimam] potentissimam P | etiam] est F 8 2 corporalium] corporum F | ille tunc] inv. F 83 sicut2] ut F 84 heroycam] scrips. homicam P | eliget] eligens F 85 eis] uel add. F 8 6 supranaturali] supernaturali F | que] tamen add. F | accidunt] accidit F 87 ideo illi] isti non F 88 quia1] quare P | nec] uel F 8 9 consuetudines bonas] beatas consuetudines F 9 0 ut iam] non autem sed corr. in marg. P | nec] et F 9 1 summe] per se F | iterum] item F 8 1 potens…84 altissima] cf. Eustratium, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 8: “Purgativus autem et contemplativus, quia omnino eas quae in medio exercitationes abnegavit et eam quae super hominem est elegit vitam et secundum electionem separatus est a corpore et intellectum pennis aptavit, ut inferioribus omnino superferatur et omnia dimittat quaecumque sub tempus et primum motum et ad Deum reducatur et relevetur, habet autem corporis vinculum studium prohibens et sursum evolationem intellectus impediens, ut ad inimicam carnem disponitur et inimicum suscitat ad ipsam bellum, omnimodam tribulationem adinveniens, ut utique caro decidens impotenter habeat adversus intellectum se erigere ... Ita igitur habere felicitatem contemplativus desiderans, qualiter habebit curam sanitatis corporis et secundum naturam constitutionis ipsius sanitatis, supernaturaliter habens curam operationis et repromissionis?” (ed. Mercken, pp. 99-100, ll. 54-64, 69-72). Licet de virtute heroica Eustratius in ista sententia non agat, communiter eam afferre solebant commentatores in Aristotelis Ethicam cum disserebant de quaestione de heroica virtute, quam Aristoteles egit in initio libri VIIi Ethicae suae: sententiam istam comprehendebant ut esset definitio quaedam istius virtutis, gratia cuius speculatio fieri potest; cf., e.g., Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. VII, q. 2 (ed. Costa, pp. 523-524, ll. 37- 41), Anonymum Erlangensem, QQ. Eth. VII, q. 2: “Item, Eustachius (sic) dicit quod uirtus heroyca est uirtus perfecta uel quoddam summum uirtutum, quia in 1º huius dixit quod, si aliquis uelit ad summum statum uirtutis perfecte , debet totaliter niti ad mortificationem passionum” (ex ms. Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek 213, f. 72rb) et Iohannem Buridanum, QQ. Eth. VII, q. 2 (ed. Paris 1513, f. 140va). Quod hic ex Eustratio sumitur de mortificatione passionum et quod de speculatione altissima, quae fieri potest mortificatione ista habita, etiam inveniuntur, et inter se eodem modo coaherentia, in Petri QQ. Metaph. I, q. 5 (Vtrum ista scientia sit prima): “Item, et legenda est post scientias morales, quoniam hec ordinatur ad cognitionem substantiarum immaterialium, ad quam multum ordinat ordinatio appetitus et mortificatio passionum, ut uult Eustratius; mortificatio non est nisi per uirtutes morales; ideo et cetera” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 119vb et 131rb) 86 ex…theologos] cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 159, art. 2, ad 1: “... sed superexcellentiori virtuti, quam Philosophus vocat heroicam vel divinam, quae secundum nos videtur pertinere ad dona Spiritus Sancti” (ed. Leon. X, p. 287)

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Si autem ita contingat quod natura indiuidui medio modo istorum duorum se habeat, tunc concordabit cum natura speciei, et tunc ad idem 95 illa inclinabit, et tunc homo erit ciuilis. Et sic patet quod a natura speciei absolute non est homo ciuilis, sed ab ea secundum consequens quoddam, scilicet secundum quod est insufficiens ad saluationem et continuationem esse sui, et hoc est in ordine ad materiam.

Ad rationes dicendum quod maior falsa est, quia etiam in illis que sunt a natura actu perfecto contingit aliquando aliter se habere; ideo multo magis potest in eis que sunt a natura tantum secundum inclinationem: diuerse enim dispositiones indiuidui, et etiam ratio determinans, diuersimode possunt illud uariare quod a naturali inclinatione inditum est, quia 105 “natura causa est”, et cetera.

100

Ad aliam dicendum quod illi destructores non inclinantur ad destructionem illa eadem natura, sed secundum accidens, ut secundum malos mores, sicut et accidit in naturalibus quod terra secundum naturam suam et secundum quod consequens suam naturam uult esse rotunda, 110 tamen, propter motum corporum celestium et ex | attractione, contingit P 277va eam fieri angularem, et hoc est ei per accidens. 9 3 ita] om. F | indiuidui] est add. F | medio] om. F 9 4 duorum] modorum add. F | concordabit] commentator dabit P scrips. esse cordabit F | idem] cum add. P in add. F 95 erit] est F 9 7 ea] eo P 1 0 0 rationes] rationem F | falsa est] inv. F | etiam] om. F 1 01 actu…contingit] actuali perfecte sic F | aliter] dicitur F 1 0 3 etiam] om. F 10 4 possunt] potest P | illud] id F quia] tamen F 10 5 causa est] finalis tamen ergo F 10 6 Ad aliam] lac. F | illi destructores] ille destructiones P 10 7 accidens] actum F 1 08 et] que F | quod] natura add. sed exp. P | terra] circa F 1 09 quod] quoddam existens F 1 1 0 propter] quod add. P | attractione contingit] actione contingere F 1 1 1 angularem] triangularem F | est…per] ei secundum F 9 3 natura…94 habeat] iam Thomas dixerat de quodam ‘medio modo’ inter statum bestialem atque illorum qui habent virtutem heroicam, nullam tamen mentionem de sociabilitate fecerat; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. VII.1: “Dicit ... quod bestialitati congruenter dicitur opponi quaedam virtus, quae communem hominum modum excedit et potest vocari heroica vel divina ... ita enim se habet rerum ordo ut medium ex diversis partibus attingat utrumque extremum, unde et in humana natura est aliquid quod attingit ad id quod est superius, aliquid vero quod coniungitur inferiori, aliquid vero quod medio modo se habet” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 381, ll. 84- 87 et 102-107). Iste ‘medius modus’ congruens videtur cum ‘modo humano’ qui in Aegidii Romani De Reg. Princ. invenitur; vel etiam verisimiliter quod hic asseritur de modo isto desumptum est ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/1.1: “Quare si sic naturale est hominem esse animal sociale, recusantes societatem et nolentes ciuiliter viuere ... quasi non viuunt vt homines. Vel ergo hoc contingit eis, quia deficiunt a modo humano et tunc sunt quasi bestiae, vel quia modum humanum excedunt, cuiusmodi sunt viri contemplatiui, et tunc sunt quasi dij” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 218) 1 05 natura…est] cf. supra, q. 7, ll. 133-135 cum adn.

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< Q UE S T I O 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s e r u u s s i t o rg a n u m Arguitur quod non, quia organum de se uirtutem mouendi non habet; seruus autem habet illam; ergo non est organum. Minor patet quia seruus habet uoluntatem et rationem, que sunt principia motus, ut dicitur 5 3º De Anima. Item, organum non mouet nisi simul mouente agente principali, ut fistula non facit melodiam sine fistulatore, nec securis secat nisi carpentatore simul operante, 8º Phisicorum; sed seruus aliquando operatur absente domino; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

10

Dicendum quod seruus est organum domini, cuius ratio est accipienda ex proprietate serui et ratione organi. Ratio autem organi est quod organum est quod non solum mouet, sed mouetur; iterum, non omne mouens motum, sed quod, intantum mouet, inquantum natum est ab alio moueri. Seruus autem est qui potest exercere aliquod opus, et non nisi motus ab 15 alio. Cuius ratio est quia, cum deficiat ratione, id est usu rationis, ut supra dictum est, ex hoc patet quod de se non potest mouere; sed motus potest mouere quia, cum sit animatus sensum habens, potest recipere impressionem uirtutis principalis agentis, sine qua non moueret ipse. Illa autem uirtus, per quam dominus primo mouet, est posse preuidere et 20 consiliari: persuasionem aut consilium ipse seruus sensu recipere potest a

10 , 1 Consequenter] deinde F 2 Arguitur quod] et arguitur F 3 quia] om. F 4 que] om. P motus] enim add. F 6 agente principali] inv. F 7 carpentatore] carpentario F 8 operante] agente ut dicitur F 9 domino] et cetera add. F 10 Contra] in oppositum F 12 quod] quia P 13 mouetur] mouet F | iterum] praem. et F 14 quod intantum] tale quod inquantum tantum F 16 id est] et F 17 patet] habet F | motus] nullus F 1 8 recipere] requirere F 2 0 est] tunc F 21 consiliari] considerari F | aut] autem P | aut consilium] dicit considerari F 10 , 1 Consequenter…organum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b32 4 uoluntatem…motus] Arist., De An. III.10, 433a22-30; cf. etiam Arist., De An. I.3, 406b24-25 6 organum…8 operante] Arist., Phys. VIII.5, 256a8-13; cf. Thomam, QQ. disp. de veritate q. 24, art. 1, ad 5: “instrumentum dupliciter dicitur: uno modo proprie, quando scilicet aliquid ita ab altero movetur quod non confertur ei a movente aliquod principium talis motus, sicut serra movetur a carpentario, et tale instrumentum est expers libertatis; alio modo dicitur instrumentum magis communiter quicquid est movens ab alio motum, sive sit in ipso principium sui motus sive non” (ed. Leon. XXII.3, pp. 681- 682, ll. 352-361) 1 0 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b31-33 1 6 deficiat…17 est] cf. supra, q. 8, l. 15

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domino, et tunc operatur non de se, sed quia motus | est ab alio, scilicet a F 176ra forma rationis a domino sibi impressa. Ex hoc patet quod seruus est organum, sed non uniuscuiusque, sed illius, a quo motus, potest mouere; hic 25 autem est dominus; ergo ulterius est organum domini. Vlterius est aduertendum quod est organum animatum. Cuius necessitas est quia, si debet mouere motus a domino, oportet quod sit aptum natum recipere uirtutem et principium mouendi ab illo: hec autem uirtus est forma rationis et uoluntatis. Hanc autem nullum inanimatum separa30 tum a principali mouente potest recipere, ita ut per illam moueat: et dico separatum, quia coniunctum bene mouet secundum impressionem illius forme, ut calor naturalis mouet semen. quia est coniunctus uoluntati et rationi, et etiam mouet sic motus processiuus; seruus est organum separatum; ergo, si debet recipere illam uirtutem principalis agentis, 35 scilicet domini, que est forma uoluntatis et rationis, oportet ut saltim sit animatus: tunc etiam recipit impressionem uoluntatis determinate a ratione. Ideo est organum animatum separatum. Vlterius est organum actiuum. Cuius causa est quia ratio organi a fine accipitur ut ab obiecto a quo operatio et potentia determinari habet, ut 40 dicitur 2º De Anima. Seruus autem ordinatur ad finem, qui est uita; uita

2 2 et] om. F | quia] inquantum F | a] cum P 25 ulterius…organum] ultimum organum est F 2 6 est aduertendum] inv. F | necessitas] necessitans F 2 7 quia] quod F | quod] om. P 2 8 recipere] a domino add. F | illo] om. F 2 9 est] modi add. F | autem] dant P 30 principali] agente uel add. F | ut] nisi P 31 quia] om. P | secundum] sed P 3 2 semen] sensum F 3 3 etiam] om. F | motus] motum F | processiuus] processiuos P processionis F | seruus] autem add. F 3 5 scilicet] formam add. F | ut] quod F 36 recipit] recipiet intentionem siue F 3 8 causa] ratio F 3 2 calor…semen] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. I.5, 717b24-25 et cf. potius ibid., II.3, 736b33-35 | ***] verisimiliter aliquid deest hic. Cum postea Petrus concludat servum esse organum separatum, probabiliter asserere hic vult quod non oportet eum esse coniunctum domino ad recipiendum ab eo virtutem movendi, quia ad se movendum habet potentiam, quam ob causam habere debet ad hoc virtutem et voluntatem, sicut asserit infra, I, qq. 30-31 3 9 ab…habet] Auct. Arist., De An. II (56), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a16-21; cf. etiam Arist., De An. I.1, 402b14-16 4 0 uita2…41 quedam] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a7. Ex Thoma et inde postea, vita saepe considerata est eadem atque conversatio domestica; non sic apud Albertum; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.2: “Set uita, id est conuersatio domestica, non est factio set actio” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A83, ll. 183-184) et Albertum, Pol. I.2: “Est enim vita, ut dicitur in libro de motu cordis, motus continuus ab ente quieto. Et Avicenna dicit, quod vita est actus continuus animae in corpus” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 22). Vide etiam Anonymum Medionalensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 7: “illud est organum actiuum quod requiritur ad uitam et conuersationem (cod.: conseruationem) domesticam ... uita et conuersatio (cod.: conseruatio) domestica est quedam actio, ut dicit Philosophus in 1º huius” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 4ra)

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autem est actio quedam; ergo seruus erit organum actiuum. Et per hoc differt a ministro, qui non solum ordinatur ad operationem, sed etiam ad opus quoddam uel in operationem respectu operati. Ex hoc patet quod seruus est organum animatum, separatum, actiuum.

Ad rationes dicendum quod “seruus uirtutem mouendi habet”, 45 uerum est: motus naturales, sed non rationales. Primi ratio est quia, quantum ad illos , non est seruus, eo quod illi motus non sunt nati obedire rationi, ut digestio et talia. Iterum potest etiam mouere aliquos motus sensus, sed non rationis, quia eius bonum, secundum naturam indiuidui, est mouere secundum quod motus est ab 50 alio, licet a natura speciei habeat mouere de se: hoc tamen impedit natura indiuidui. Ideo dicendum quod non mouet motus uoluntatis qui sunt ad utilitatem domus nisi motus a domino, eo quod non potest preuidere utilia domui, et ideo uoluntas in nichil fertur nisi quod ei prius a ratione apprehensum fuerit ut bonum. Nichil enim appetit uoluntas 55 nisi quod ratio bonum esse dictauit, cum sint eadem secundum substantiam, differentia tamen ratione. Ideo uoluntas non est principium motus nisi precedente ratione; hac autem caret seruus; ergo et cetera. Ad secundam dicendum quod principale agens potest esse presens 60 ipsi organo dupliciter: uel secundum substantiam et uirtutem simul, ut manus baculo, uel secundum uirtutem tantum, ut manus lapidi proiecto. Secundo modo dominus semper presens est ipsi seruo, relinquendo in eo impressionem uirtutis per quam mouet, scilicet formam uoluntatis et 65 rationis. 4 1 est] post quedam transp. F | ergo] et add. F | erit] est F 43 patet] om. F 4 4 animatum] om. F 45 rationes] secundum F | uirtutem] uirtutum F 4 7 non1] ratio F 4 9 rationis] rationes P 5 1 habeat] haberet F | natura2] impeditum natura add. F 5 2 uoluntatis] uel add. F 5 3 utilitatem] inclinantem P | motus] post domino transp. F 5 4 domui] correxi ex supra, l. 53: domini PF | ideo] iterum F | uoluntas] nisi quod ratio bonum esse dictauit cum sint eadem secundum substantiam unde differentia ratione ideo add. sed exp. F | ei…55 prius] inv. F 5 6 ratio1] om. F 5 7 differentia tamen] unde differentia F | non] enim F 6 0 dicendum] cum dicitur F 6 1 ipsi] sibi P 6 3 dominus…seruo] seruo semper dominus est presens F | eo] ipso F 4 1 per…43 operati] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.2: “per hoc autem quod dicitur ‘actiuum’ distinguitur a ministro artificis, qui est organum animatum factiuum; per hoc autem quod dicitur ‘alterius existens’ distinguitur a libero, qui quandoque ministrat in domo non sicut res possessa set sponte uel mercede conductus” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A84, ll. 224-227) et etiam infra, q. 31 4 4 seruus…actiuum] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a16-17 6 0 principale…65 rationis] sic similiter in Petro, Sent. De Mot. An., lectio 9: “Sic autem videmus in ciuitate quod, quando ordo politie semel bene stabilitus est per legem vel consuetudinem, non oportet quod in operatione cuiuslibet ciuis sit semper presens monarcha secundum substantiam, sed quilibet facit que ad ipsum pertinent et secundum quod ordinatum est” (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 42rb)

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< Q U E S TIO 1 1 > C ons eq ue nter qu er itur u tr um s er uu s , id qu od est , domi ni s it Arguitur quod non, quia seruus, id quod est, | substantia est; sed F 176rb substantia non dicitur ad alterum; ergo nec seruus secundum id quod est. Item, seruus non dicitur ad dominum secundum id quod est; ergo 5 nec sic erit ipsius domini. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod seruus naturaliter est homo alterius. Tamen homo, secundum quod est homo, non est alterius. Cuius ratio est quia substantia non dicitur alterius; sed homo, secundum quod homo, est substantia; | P 277vb 10 ergo homo, secundum quod homo, non erit alterius, eo quod substantia est ens per se, non alterius, ideo nec seruus, secundum quod homo, erit alterius. Sed, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, seruus, secundum quod huiusmodi, est possessio domini. Cuius ratio est quia, quo aliquis utitur qualiter et quando 15 uult et illud alienare potest cum uult, hoc est huius possessio, ut dicitur 1º Rhetorice; sed dominus sic utitur seruo; ergo seruus est possessio domini. Possessio autem, secundum id quod est, domini est, quia possessio est ut pars domini et pars substantie domini: est enim possessio ordinata ad nutrimentum domini; nutrimentum autem est futura pars domini. Ergo 20 seruus, secundum quod est possessio, est domini et pars domini; pars autem, non solum secundum quod huiusmodi, sed id quod est, totius est; ergo seruus, id quod est, domini est, ut manus non solum pars est hominis, 11 ,2 Arguitur] praem. et F 5 erit] eadem F 6 Contra] in contrarium F 8 est1] om. F 10 erit] est F | eo] ea P 11 ideo] sed F | erit] est F 1 3 huiusmodi] homo P 1 4 quo] quod F 15 huius] etiam cuius sed etiam del. F 16 dominus] domini F | utitur] utatur F | seruus] om. P 17 autem] dominum add. sed exp. F | secundum] om. F 2 0 possessio…22 ergo] om. F 11,1 Consequenter…sit] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a14-15 3 substantia…alterum] cf. Arist., Cat. 5, 2a11-14; Arist., Metaph. V.8, 1017b13-14; VII.11, 1037b3-4 6 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a8-15; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (12), p. 252 1 3 seruus…14 domini] cf. etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1134b10-11 14 quo…15 possessio] Arist., Rhet. I.5, 1361a20-22 2 0 seruus…25 pars] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae Sent. Pol. I.2: “Et dicit quod eadem est comparatio rei possesse ad possessorem et partis ad totum, quantum ad hoc quod pars non dicitur solum pars totius set etiam dicitur simpliciter esse totius, sicut dicimus manum hominis et non solum dicimus quod sit pars hominis; et similiter res possessa, puta uestis, non solum dicitur quod sit possessio hominis set quod simpliciter est huius hominis” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A83, ll. 188-196)

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sed etiam manus hominis. Sic non solum seruus inquantum seruus est domini, sed etiam est homo domini; et hoc est inquantum est possessio et pars, quorum ratio est non solum dici ad aliud secundum quod huiusmodi, 25 sed secundum id quod sunt, et differunt iste rationes due serui et domini: differunt quia dicitur seruus domini inquantum est relatus domino; est autem homo domini inquantum pars et possessio domini – hoc autem est dici ad dominum etiam secundum id quod est –. Econuerso autem est de domino, quia dominus est respectu serui sicut totum respectu 30 partis; modo totum non, secundum id quod est, partis est; ita etiam dominus dominus serui est, non autem, secundum id quod est, serui est, nec est possessio serui, sicut nec totum est possessio partis.

Ad rationem dicendum quod seruus, id quod est, dupliciter potest considerari: uel inquantum homo uel inquantum pars et possessio. Primo 35 modo seruus non est domini, secundum id quod est primo modo, scilicet inquantum homo. Sed secundo modo seruus est domini, secundum id quod est secundo modo, scilicet secundum quod possessio. Et similiter ad secundam.

23 sed…hominis] om. F | inquantum] est add. F 2 4 est possessio] inv. F | et2] s.l. F 26 iste rationes] nature due relationes F | serui] secundum F 2 7 domini2] om. F | relatus] a add. P regulatus est a F 2 8 autem] om. P | domini1] om. P 29 etiam] et F 3 1 non] om. F | id] illud P etiam] et F 3 2 secundum] est P | est2] om. P 3 4 rationem] rationes F | est] seruus add. F 3 6 non…quod] ut est dominus illud autem P | domini] dominus F 3 7 Sed] om. F | domini] dominus F 27 dicitur…31 partis1] cf. Arist., Cat. 7, 6b28-30 et 7a28-b7; cf. Albertum, Pol. I.2: “... quod quidem enim pars est, supple, sub ratione partis, non solum alterius est per relationem, sed etiam simpliciter est: est enim membrum in toto: similiter res possessa simpliciter est: propter quod cum despotes sive dominus dicatur relative ad servum, ad convertentiam relativa dicendo, per eundem casum dicetur quidem dominus servi dominus solum” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 22)

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< Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m u b i c u m q u e e s t co n i u n c t i o a l i q u o r u m i n u n u m s i t u n u m p r i n c i p a n s n at u r a e t a l i u d s e r u u m e t s u b i e c t u m Arguitur quod non, quia inter ea que sunt unius habitudinis et rationis non est unum principans natura et aliud subiectum, sed talia sunt 5 omogenea facientia unum; ergo in illis non est principans et subiectum. Item, in quibus est principans et subiectum, necessario unum natum est moueri ut subiectum et aliud mouere ut principans, et unum dirigere, hoc autem dirigi; sed in compositis ex materia et forma substantiali neutrum mouet uel mouetur ab alio; ergo in eis non est principans et 10 subiectum. Contra arguitur: omnis multitudo necessario reducitur ad unum, quia omnis multitudo secunda est ab uno, ut dicit PROCLUS. Item, primum in unoquoque genere est causa omnium aliorum; | sed F 176va hoc non potest fieri nisi aliquid ibi sit principans et subiectum; 15 ergo et cetera.

12 ,2 principans] principium F 3 Arguitur] praem. et F 4 unum principans] principium unum de principationis F | talia] terminum F 5 unum] scrips. multipliciter F 7 ut2] et F 8 dirigere] diligere F | dirigi] diligit F 9 neutrum] neutrus F | mouetur] mouet F | est] om. P principans] principium F | et] om. P 1 1 Contra] in oppositum F | reducitur] om. F 1 2 secunda] ad F 1 3 primum] principium F | genere] om. P 1 4 aliquid] aliud F | ibi sit] sit in F 12 ,1 Consequenter…2 subiectum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a28-31 3 Arguitur…5 subiectum] hoc argumento Petrus totum quod ex principante et subiecto componitur cum illo toto quod resultat ex partibus homogeneis et indistinctis confert. Hoc plenius comprehenditur si considerentur quae in loc. parall. aliorum commentariorum in Politicam asseruntur; cf., e.g., Anonymum Vaticanum, QQ. Pol. I, q. 10: “que unius rationis sunt, unum non est principans et aliud subiectum. Minor patet quia illa ex quibus fit unum sunt homogenea, et talia sunt unius rationis” (ms. Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030, f. 18va) et Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 11: “quando aliquid est compositum ex partibus omiomeris, unum non est sicut principans et aliud sicut subiectum, quia partes ille omiomere sunt eiusdem rationis. Modo multa sunt composita ex partibus omiomeris sicut ignis et terra, et talia huiusmodi” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 1vb) 11 omnis…unum] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese, p. 14) | omnis…14 subiectum] isti duo loci iterum adferuntur infra, VII, q. 5, ll. 23-30 et in Petro, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 11 (ed. Berkers-Goris, p. 458, n. 36) 12 omnis…uno] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 5 (ed. Boese, p. 4) 13 primum…aliorum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19, 31-32; cf. etiam Arist., Metaph. II.1, 993b24-26; II.2, 994a12-13; V.10, 1018b9-10 et Averroem, In Metaph. VIII, comm. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 251v, I-K)

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Dicendum quod in omnibus ex quibus coniunctis fit unum per se, non secundum accidens, in illis aliud est principans et aliud subiectum. Et dico per accidens, ut aceruus lapidum: ibi enim non oportet aliquid principalius esse altero, et similiter in aggregatione uolgari. Ratio primi est ex 7º Metaphisice, ubi dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod, si ex pluribus fit unum, non 20 sicut cumulus, sed per se, ibi, preter partes materiales, est ponere aliquid ea continens, ut patet in sillaba et in carne. In sillaba enim non solum sunt sole littere, sed aliquid preter eas, scilicet ipsa natura sillabe et forma eius; quod patet quia, corrupta sillaba, adhuc manent littere, quod est signum quod primo non sole littere ibi fuerunt. Item, corrupta carne, 25 manent elementa, quod non fieret nisi in carne aliquid aliud formale fuisset preter illas partes materiales: hoc autem est forma, et natura se habet ut principans, et dicitur armonia partium. Et ita est in omnibus: illud enim quod dicit principium essendi totius, hoc erit principantis rationem habens. Ergo in omnibus que faciunt unum per se oportet esse 30 principans et subiectum.

16 se] et add. F 1 7 aliud est] inv. F 1 8 aliquid] aliud F 2 0 ubi] ut P | si] om. F 2 1 aliquid] aliud F 22 solum…23 sunt] om. F 2 3 sole] solo F | aliquid] aliud F 2 5 primo] modo add. sed exp. P | sole] solo F | ibi] post signum quod transp. F | Item] subiectum F 2 6 elementa] obiecta F | fieret] fierent F 2 7 est] om. F 28 et] ut F 29 erit…30 habens] est habens rationem principalioris F 3 0 oportet] unum add. F 16 Dicendum…54 subiecti] cf. Petrum, Quodl. III, q. 14 (ed. Brown, pp. 585-586) | in…17 subiectum] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a28-31 1 8 per…19 uolgari] cf. Boethium, De Arith. Prooemium: “Essentiae autem geminae partes sunt, una continua et suis partibus iuncta nec ullis finibus distributa, ut est arbor lapis et omnia mundi huius corpora, quae proprie magnitudines appellantur. Alia vero disiuncta a se et determinata partibus et quasi acervatim in unum redacta concilium, ut grex populus chorus acervus et quicquid, quorum partes propriis extremitatibus terminantur et ab alterius fine discretae sunt. His proprium nomen est multitudo” (ed. Friedlein, p. 8, ll. 15-23). Hac distinctione, una cum exemplis in ea allatis, usus est Thomas in commentario ad VII librum Metaphysicae; forsan ab hoc loco Thomae commentarii motus, in quo sequitur Petrus ad hunc ipsum librum Aristotelis Metaphysicae recurrit, bis ut fontem allatum; cf. Thomam, In Metaph. VII.17: “compositum quandoque sortitur speciem ab aliquo uno, quod est vel forma, ut patet in corpore mixto, vel compositio, ut patet in domo, vel ordo, ut patet in syllaba et numero. Et tunc oportet quod totum compositum sit unum simpliciter. Quandoque vero compositum sortitur speciem ab ipsa multitudine partium collectarum, ut patet in acervo et populo, et aliis huiusmodi: et in talibus totum compositum non est unum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 511) 20 si…25 fuerunt] Arist., Metaph. VII.17, 1041b11-19 2 5 corrupta…27 forma] cf. Arist., Metaph. VII.17, 1041b14-15, 25-28 27 natura…28 partium] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a31-33 et Thomas, Sent. Pol. I.3: “potest etiam intelligi de armonia elementorum in corpore mixto, in quo semper unum elementorum est predominans” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A87, ll. 113-116)

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Item, in eodem 7º dicit quod ex pluribus entibus in actu non fit totum; ex pluribus autem entibus in potentia nichil fit; ergo oportet omne unum ex pluribus factum per se esse compositum ex potentia et actu. Nunc 35 autem ratio actus facit rationem principantis et potentia rationem subiecti; ergo in omnibus compositis ex pluribus per se oportet illa duo esse. Istas autem propositiones PHILOSOPHUS ibi determinat inductione sufficienti. Vlterius aduertendum quod, cum ratio principantis et subiecti sequatur rationem eius quod est unum esse ex pluribus, ut iam patuit, oportet quod, 40 sicut diuersificatur ratio illius quod fit unum ex pluribus, sic etiam diuersificetur ratio istorum. Modo in illis que faciunt unum aliquando ita est quod ex duobus componentibus fit una essentia, ut ex potentia et actu: cum istorum unum sit esse, nullum eorum alteri principabitur, quia una est istorum | operatio P 278ra 45 et actus, et essentia et esse; quia tamen unum istorum est actus et aliud subiectum eius, ideo prima radix principantis et subiecti ex istis accipitur, scilicet actu et potentia. Aliquando autem ita est quod fit unum ex pluribus habentibus se in potentia respectu forme, tamen in ordine ad operationem unum magis se 50 habet in ratione actus et mouentis, aliud autem in ratione moti, ut ex corde et aliis membris, que omnia sunt materialia respectu anime, tamen in ordine ad operationem anime, scilicet ad mouere, cor plus se habet in actu. Et ideo in illis ab illis sumitur amplior ratio principantis et subiecti. 55

Aliquando autem in aliis sunt illa – mouens et motum – separata, et quanto plus sunt separata, tanto plus se habent ad unum agere et aliud pati, et ideo in illis est uerissima ratio principantis et subiecti, ut in primo 3 2 eodem] in add. F | dicit] dicitur F | totum] totus F 3 3 fit] potest F | omne] esse F 3 6 illa duo] ista dic F 37 determinat] declarat F 3 8 aduertendum] notandum F 39 ut iam] quod F 4 0 diuersificatur] diuersificatio F | diuersificetur] diuersitatem F 4 3 componentibus] comparationibus F | actu] accidentia F 44 principabitur] principatur F | operatio] comparatio P 45 essentia] essentie F | istorum] om. F 4 6 eius] est F | prima] potentia F 4 9 operationem] compositionem P 50 ratione1] alterius add. F 5 1 que] quia F 52 operationem] compositionem P | scilicet] si P 5 3 ideo] om. F | illis1] et add. F | illis2] aliis F | amplior] an propter F 5 7 est…ratio] et ratio principantis uerissima non F 3 2 ex…totum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. VII (186), p. 130; Arist., Metaph. VII.13, 1039a4-5 3 8 Vlterius…47 potentia] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.10: “principans se habet ad subiectum sicut agens ad passum et mouens ad motum: principantis enim est mouere et dirigere subiectum, subiecti uero moueri et dirigi secundum quod huiusmodi. Mouens autem et agens secundum quod tale excellentius est passo et moto secundum quod huiusmodi, quia illud est in actu, hoc autem in potentia” (ed. Lanza, p. 535, ll. 334-339)

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mobili et speris inferioribus. Et ex ista ratione | proprie sumitur ratio serui et domini. Adhuc aliter diuersificatur ratio istorum, scilicet actus et potentie, quia 60 in aliquibus tantum inuenitur ista ratio secundum naturam, ut materia est in potentia respectu forme, et in talibus non est ratio principantis et subiecti ut nos sumimus hic. In aliis autem secundum uoluntatem, ut in intellectu et appetitu, et hoc uerior est ratio principantis et subiecti, sed non complete adhuc. In aliis autem medio modo se habet, et sic est seruus 65 et dominus. Et sic diuersificari habet ratio principantis et subiecti secundum diuersam rationem actus et potentie.

Ad rationem dicendum quod in composito ex pluribus partibus omogeneis non est diuersa ratio et habitudo partium, et ideo non est ibi principans et subiectum secundum rationem illam et inter partes illas 70 secundum se. Est tamen ibi ratio principantis et subiecti secundum formam: nam illa adhuc est ibi preter illas partes, et hec rationem principantis sibi uendicat, cum det partibus esse et perfectionem. Ad secundam: ad maiorem, quod est ut sic et ut non, quia in illis in quibus ita reperitur ratio principantis et subiecti quod unum perficit et 75 aliud perficitur, ibi non est unum natum mouere et aliud moueri. In quibus autem ista sunt distincta, bene hoc contingit. De primis autem tu arguis. < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C ons eq ue nter qu er itur u tr um ali qu is s it ser u u s a natura Arguitur quod non, quia quorum est natura una, illos natura non inclinat ad diuersos status; modo omnes homines sunt unius nature; ergo unus non erit principans et alius subiectus natura. 5 8 ex] om. F | sumitur] accipitur F | serui…59 domini] domini et serui F 6 0 Adhuc] autem add. F | aliter…istorum] diuersificatur alter istorum ratio F | potentie] potentia F 6 1 aliquibus] omnibus F | tantum…62 non] om. F 6 2 non] ut P | principantis] principanti P 6 3 in] om. F 6 4 est ratio] inv. F 6 5 adhuc] ante non complete transp. F 68 rationem] rationes F 69 non1] ut P | non2] natura F 7 0 principans…subiectum] ratio principantis et subiecti et F | rationem…et2] illam rationem F secundum] formam nam illum adhuc add. sed exp. P 7 1 Est…72 hec] om. F 7 4 secundam] rationem dicendum F | et] est add. F 77 ista sunt] inv. F 13,1 Consequenter] deinde F | aliquis] aliud F | a natura] om. F 2 Arguitur] praem. et F 4 unus…erit] non unius est F 13 , 1 Consequenter…natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a17-18

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399

Item, omnis impotentia et defectus est preter naturam, 2º Celi et Mundi; sed seruitus est defectus quidam; ergo seruitus non est a natura.

Contra: si finis naturalis, et illud quod in finem est naturale erit; sed finis seruitutis et libertatis est a natura; ergo et ipsa erunt a natura. Minor patet quia finis istorum est communicatio humana, ut dictum est prius; 10 hoc autem est a natura, ut etiam prius declaratum est; ergo et cetera.

Ad intellectum istius questionis tria oportet uidere: primo, utrum aliquis sit seruus a natura et alius sit a natura dominus; secundo uidendum quis sit natura seruus et quis liber natura; tertio, ex qua natura isti tales sunt. De primo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Philosophus, aliquis est a natura seruus et alius est a natura dominus. Cuius ratio est quam ponit PHILOSOPHUS, quia in omnibus ex quibus coniunctis uel diuisis habet fieri unum per se, ut patuit, in illis est reperire aliquid principans natura et aliud subiectum, quia aliter non facerent unum; sed hominibus per se fit unum 20 tale, ut communicatio domus uel yconomia; ergo in ipsis necessario a natura aliquid est principans et aliud subiectum. 15

Item, “si finis naturalis, et id quod in finem ...”: si enim natura daret finem et non ea que in finem, tunc deficeret in necessariis, quibus necessitatem imponit ille finis; sed finis istorum est naturalis, quia est ad saluatio25 nem, esse et necessitatem uite; ergo naturaliter aliquis est seruus et aliquis naturaliter dominus. De secundo dicendum quod, ad considerandum qui sunt liberi a natura et qui serui, oportet respicere ad primam radicem principatus et seruitu5 defectus] distinctius F | 2º] praem. ut dicitur F 6 seruitus1] seruus F | defectus quidam] quoddam defectus F | seruitus2] seruus F 7 est naturale] naturalem F 8 seruitutis…libertatis] libertatis et seruitutis F 10 declaratum est] inv. F 12 seruus] om. P 13 quis1] quid P | sit natura] inv. F 14 sunt] sint F 15 Philosophus] quod add. F | est…natura] a natura est F 16 est1] om. F 1 8 principans natura] inv. F 19 sed] ex add. F | per…20 tale] fit tale per se unum F 21 aliquid] aliud F 2 3 ea] om. F | tunc] tamen F | quibus] praem. in F 2 5 est] om. P 2 7 sunt] sint F 5 omnis…naturam] Auct. Arist., De Caelo II (59), p. 164; Arist., De Caelo II.6, 288b14; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., De Caelo II (57), p. 164: “Natura ex possibilibus facit semper quod optimum est”; Arist. De Caelo II.5, 288a2-3 9 finis…prius] cf. supra, q. 5, ll. 15-16 1 0 hoc…est2] cf. supra, q. 9 1 7 in…19 unum 1] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a28-31; cf. q. praec., ll. 16-31 et Petrum, Scriptum, VII.10: “omnis ciuitas composita est ex principantibus et subiectis. In omnibus enim que ex pluribus constituta sunt, siue natura uel arte, ex quibus est unum aliquod commune, siue ex coniunctis, siue ex diuisis, uidetur esse aliquid principans et aliquid subiectum” (ed. Lanza, p. 534, ll. 312-315) 2 2 si1…finem] cf. supra, l. 7 | si2…24 finis1] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a14-21; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147

400 F 177ra

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s: hoc autem est actus et potentia, ut prius patuit; ideo ex ratione | istorum, per additionem et cum determinatione aliqua, oportet trahere 30 rationem illorum. Modo ratio actus est quod sit principium essendi et mouendi, quia est id quo res est, et iterum est forma, cuius est mouere. Qui ergo in hominibus inuenitur potens esse principium esse et | salutis domus, et hoc per prudentiam, et etiam principium mouendi et operandi singula in domo per 35 preuidentiam, iste erit loco digniori, sicut est actus, et accipiet rationem principantis; et hoc etiam erit per formam suam, licet per consequens, quia per bonam dispositionem rationis. Ratio autem potentie est recipere esse ab alio et moueri ab alio et non mouere nisi secundum quod mouetur, quod etiam pertinet ad rationem 40 materie et imperfecti. Qui ergo, inter homines, se habet secundum materiam taliter ut nec ad salutem esse sui sibi sufficiat – propter defectum prudentie –, et etiam non per se aliquid operari possit nisi ductus et iussus ab alio – propter defectum preuidendi –, iste, ex istis dispositionibus sue 45 materie sibi ista bona auferentibus, naturaliter erit seruus. Sed ulterius necessarium est ei ut, quia de se moueri non potest nisi ab alio moueatur, ut habeat per quod aptus sit recipere uirtutem et formam primi mouentis, que est impressio consilii, et ideo oportet esse animatum. Nec hoc sufficit, sed oportet ut, inquantum talis, ad bonum domini ordinetur, a quo consequitur suum optimum inquantum seruus, et ideo oportet 50 ut possit exequi quod dominus per iussum mandat, et ideo oportet corpore robustum esse. Tales igitur et hii sunt domini et serui.

3 0 determinatione aliqua] inv. F 3 1 rationem illorum] inv. F 32 est2…33 quo] res id quod F 3 3 et iterum] om. F 3 4 inuenitur] post ergo transp. F | esse1] et add. F | esse2] om. F 3 5 etiam] om. F 3 6 preuidentiam] preuisionem P | erit…digniori] est locus dignioris F actus] om. P 37 etiam erit] est F | consequens] accidens F 3 8 per] om. P 4 0 mouetur quod] mouet que F 4 3 etiam] om. F | ductus] de eius F 44 preuidendi] preuidens F 45 erit] est F 4 7 ut…quod] et P 4 8 primi] ipsum F | que] quod F | consilii] consilium P | oportet] debet F 5 0 ideo] enim F 5 1 ut] quod F | per iussum] preuisum P 52 robustum] robustam F 29 hoc…patuit] cf. supra, q. 12, ll. 32-36 et 42- 47 3 9 Ratio…40 mouetur] cf. Arist., Metaph. V.12, 1019a15-19

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401

Sed circa hoc quereret aliquis: unde hoc, quod qui deficit ratione robustus sit corpore et ualidus mente debilis sit corpore? Dicendum, sicut dicit 55 PHILOSOPHUS, omnis uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa. Et ex hoc infert AVICENNA, 6º Naturalium, quod in quacumque natura, due diuerse potentie sunt coniuncte, semper, si una augetur, alia minuitur: que enim augetur, ad hanc magis congregatur uirtus naturalis et ab alia deficit, se conuertendo ad istam que debet augeri. Hoc autem est quia augmentum 60 oportet fieri ex pluri uirtute. Modo potentia intellectus et corporis due diuerse potentie sunt coniuncte in homine; et ideo, si una earum intendatur secundum operationes suas, necessario natura fortius circa illam operatur – hoc autem non fit nisi ex congregatione uirtutis ad illam – et diminuitur alia ex subtractione uirtutis. Et ideo, si quis multum crescat corpore, 65 naturaliter et ut in pluribus contingit illum debilitari mente, et econuerso; et ideo etiam est quod oculus monoculi uigorosius uidet quam oculus habentis duos. De tertio uidendum quod aliquem esse dominum et alium seruum non est a natura speciei absolute, nec est in comparatione ad opus suum, quia 70 tam natura speciei quam opus suum secundum se in omnibus idem est illius speciei indiuiduis: et ideo, quantum ad istam naturam, bene dictum est seruum non esse a natura. Et ideo dicendum quod, preter istam naturam speciei, est in quolibet homine adhuc alia natura, que est dispositio materialis indiuidui, uel secundum materiam uel etiam secundum formam, 53 hoc quereret] queretur F | hoc2] communi sed corr. F 5 4 sit corpore2] om. F 5 6 Avicenna] alius F 5 7 sunt] sint F 5 8 augetur] minuitur P | et] om. F 59 se] sed F | debet] dicitur F 6 0 pluri] plura F | potentia] potest F | corporis] correxi ex infra, ll. 53-54 et 64-65: roboris PF 6 1 sunt] post due transp. F | earum] om. F 6 4 multum crescat] crescat multum in F 6 5 ut] om. P 6 6 uigorosius] uigorosus F 6 7 duos] oculos add. F 6 8 tertio uidendum] illo dicendum F | aliquem esse] aliquam F | alium] aliter F | seruum] om. P | non…70 suum] om. F 7 1 dictum…72 est] dicunt P 7 2 preter] propter P 7 4 materialis] om. F | materiam] in naturam F 53 Sed…59 augeri] sic similiter in Scripto, eisdem duobus fontibus quae hic afferuntur additis; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VIII.1: “Sed cauendum est quod simul non exerceantur in eis que pertinent ad bonam dispositionem intellectus et ad bonam corporis per se: contrariantur enim sibi inuicem et contraria operantur, et labor in exercitio corporali inpedit intellectum, et labor in hiis que ad intellectum dispositionem corporis. Cuius ratio est quia, quandocumque alique due potentie fundantur in aliqua substantia una, intensio in actu unius remittit operationem alterius, quia omnis uirtus diuisa minor est se ipsa unita; potentia autem ad operationem corporalem – puta ad augmentationem et nutritionem – et potentia intellectiua ad unam substantiam pertinent; et ideo intensio in actu alterius inpedit aliam” (ed. Lanza, p. 603, l. 55 omnis…dispersa] Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (13), p. 232; Liber de 552-p. 604, l. 561) Causis XVI (XVII) 138 (ed. Pattin, p. 83, ll. 15-16) 5 6 in…59 augeri] cf. Avicennam, Liber De An. Pars 4, cap. 2 (ed. Van Riet, p. 14, l. 85-p. 15, l. 101); Pars 5, cap. 2 (ibid., p. 99, l. 65-p. 100, l. 71); Pars 5, cap. 7 (ibid., p. 158, l. 98-p. 159, l. 106)

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per consequens: dispositio autem per quam aliquis disponitur corpore, et 75 anima per consequens, ad bene preuidendum, ista faciet eum esse dominum; dispositio autem per quam aliquis | disponitur corpore et anima ad non posse preuidere et posse bene exequi, ista naturaliter facit eum esse seruum. De primo uidendum que sit ista dispositio. Hoc autem uidetur esse 80 accipiendum ex fine ipsius domini et principantis: hic autem finis est intelligere et bene preuidere. Modo hoc non fit sine bona dispositione fantasmatum, hec autem non est sine bona dispositione organorum sensibilium, ulterius ista ex bona dispositione tactus, qui est primus sensuum et etiam quasi est omnis sensus: per ipsum enim animal 85 est animal, unde omnis sensus animalis ex isto quodammodo dependet; bona autem dispositio tactus est ex bona dispositione qualitatum tangibilium, et precipue calidi et humidi. Hec autem, conuerso ordine, primo faciunt bonam dispositionem extrinsecam corporis, scilicet corpus agile et rectum et bene commensuratum, per posterius autem faciunt sensus puros 90 et fantasiam lucidam et, per consequens, bonum usum rationis. Et hic potest principari et preuidere et regere, et esse debet dominus.

P 278va

Econuerso dispositio materialis serui debet accipi ex ratione finis, que est non posse preuidere – hoc autem causatur ex indispositione sensuum, indispositio autem sensuum ex indispositione tactus, | indispositio tactus 95 ex improportione qualitatum tangibilium: et ex isto causatur grossitudo et ineptitudo corporis –, et etiam ex hoc, quia finis eius – seruus – est exequi: hoc autem non fit nisi ex fortitudine et robore corporis, robur 7 5 quam] quas F | et] in add. P 7 6 bene] tantum F | faciet eum] faciunt F 78 bene exequi] inv. sed corr. P 8 0 Hoc autem] et F 82 fit] facit F 8 3 autem] om. P | est] om. F sensibilium] sensuum F 84 tactus] aliquomodo add. sed exp. F 85 etiam] om. F 86 quodammodo] aliquo modo F 8 7 est] om. P 89 agile] agibile F 9 2 et3] hic add. F | esse debet] inv. F 93 Econuerso] et econuerso autem F | finis] sui add. F 9 5 indispositio1] dispositio P 9 6 qualitatum] quantitatum F 9 7 ineptitudo] in et sequitur lac. P | etiam] om. F | eius] est F seruus] sensus P 8 4 tactus…86 dependet] cf. Auct. Arist., De An. II (48), p. 178; Arist., De An. II.2, 413b1-5; II.3, 415a4-7; Auct. Arist., De An. III (176) et (178), p. 189; Arist., De An. III.12, 434b21-24 et III.13, 435b27; Arist., De Part. An. II.8, 653b22-24 | tactus…88 humidi] Petrus, QQ. De Sensu qq. 9-10: “sensus tactus est necessarius animali quia animal est animal propter sensum ... Sensus tactus est necessarius animali propter finem. Animal enim est compositum mixtum ex calido, frigido, humido et sicco; et ei necessaria est commensuratio calidi et frigidi, et excellens calidum vel frigidum corrumpit animal” (ed. White, p. 23, ll. 18-19, 22-26) 87 bona1…tangibilium] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 7: “... bonitas tactus consistit in media ratione qualitatum tangibilium, secundum quam attenditur bonitas complexionis; et ideo, ubi complexio melior inuenitur, ibi est tactus melior. Hoc autem est in homine” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 120rb)

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autem ex habundantia humidi grossi et calidi multi; et hec faciunt eum inhabilem corpore et inepte stature, et hoc quantum ad dispositionem exteriorem; faciunt autem eum esse multi motus ex humido et calido nimis mouente organa sensuum et fantasie. Et ex hoc sequitur impedimentum et defectus rationis, non secundum substantiam intellectus, sed secundum operationem suam; et ideo non potest preuidere ex indispositione interiori; 105 potest autem exequi, et hoc ex dispositione exteriori. Et talis est naturaliter seruus, et istius optimum consistit, inquantum est seruus, in seruire domino, quia optimum uniuscuiusque est consequi ad quod est naturaliter ordinatus. 100

Ad rationem dicendum quod seruus et dominus sunt unius nature 110 secundum speciem, non tamen unius nature indiuidui et proxime, et tales possunt ordinari ad diuersos status. De prima autem natura arguis. Ad secundam dicendum quod defectus est preter naturam speciei et forme, ita et hic; tamen, secundum naturam indiuidui, potest dici defectus et impotentia esse ex natura. < Q U E S TIO 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c o r p o r a s e r u o r u m e t l i b er o r u m n a tu r a l i t e r s i n t d i f f e r e n t i a Arguitur quod non, quia differentia membrorum non est nisi ex differentia forme interioris; sed in istis est una natura interior, scilicet 5 natura | speciei; ergo in istis erit idem modus dispositionis membrorum F 177va exteriorum. Maior patet ex COMMENTATORE super 1um De Anima, quod membra leonis non differunt a membris cerui nisi quia anima differt ab anima. 9 9 calidi multi] inv. F 1 0 1 nimis] unius P scrips. ninis F 1 0 2 ex] scrips. lex P 10 3 non] ut P 10 4 potest] possunt F 1 05 potest] possunt F | dispositione] correxi ex supra, ll. 100-101: indispositione PF | est naturaliter] inv. F 1 06 in] ut P 1 0 8 ordinatus] ordinatum F 11 0 proxime] proxima P proximo F 11 1 natura] s.l. P 1 13 tamen] tantum F | dici] de F 1 14 esse] om. P 1 4, 1 Consequenter] deinde F | liberorum] librorum F 3 Arguitur] praem. et F | nisi] om. F 4 interioris] interiorum PF | natura] nam add. F 7 cerui] serui P | differt…8 anima] ab anima dicit differunt sed exp. dicit F 10 7 optimum…108 ordinatus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b32-1253a1 1 4, 1 Consequenter…2 differentia] cf. Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254b27-31 7 membra…8 anima] Auct. Arist. (Averroes), In De An. I (29), p. 176; Averroes, In De An. I, comm. 53 (ed. Crawford, p. 75, ll. 17-19)

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Item, quod est natura inuenitur in omnibus indiuiduis eodem modo. Modo differentia istorum in corpore non inuenitur in omnibus eis, 10 quia non omnes liberi sunt bene figurati nec omnes serui male. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia, quorum natura interior proxima differt, et ipsa differunt; sed natura domini et serui proxima differt; ergo et corpora, quia interior natura causat dispositionem exteriorem.

Dicendum quod natura uult corpora istorum differentia facere. Cuius 15 ratio est quia natura, intendens aliquid sicut finem, intendit etiam ea que in illum finem sunt, et principaliter illa que magis in finem et melius finem inducunt, quia nichil facit frustra; modo forma est propter operationem, materia autem propter formam; ergo natura, intendens operationem, fecit formam, et ulterius partes materie ad formam. Si ergo diuersam intendit 20 operationem, diuersam formam et materiam faciet; modo in seruis intendit operationem que est exequi, in liberis autem preuidere; ergo sic disponet corpora istorum secundum quod ad hoc uel ad hoc ordinantur. Modo corpora grossa et fortia faciunt ad exequi, agibilia autem et bene disposita ad precipere et principari; et istorum ratio dicta est prius in precedenti 25 questione.

Ad rationem dicendum quod quedam sunt partes materie que pertinent ad dispositionem et naturam speciei ut membra principalia, ut epar, caput et genitalia, alie que pertinent ad naturam indiuidui, ut fortis 9 natura] praem. a F | eodem…10 corpore] inest dicitur istorum in eodem F 10 eis] ei F 11 bene] om. F 12 Contra] in oppositum F | arguitur] ratione add. F 1 3 proxima differt1] ratione differt a proxima F 14 corpora quia] corpus et F 1 6 intendens] infundens F | etiam ea] illa F 1 7 illum finem] inv. F | illa] ea F | magis…melius] in fine melius et magis F 18 operationem] et add. F 19 fecit] facit F 2 0 et] om. P | Si] sed F 2 1 formam…materiam] materiam et formam F | in seruis] et seruus F 2 2 liberis] scrips. liberia F | disponet] dispositiones F 2 4 et fortia] om. F 2 5 ad…et1] et precipere etiam F | istorum ratio] ideo istorum F 28 dispositionem] speciem P | naturam] natura F 2 9 alie] om. P aliud F | que] autem F 1 2 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254b27-31 1 8 nichil…frustra] Auct. Arist., De Caelo I (18), p. 161; Arist., De Caelo I.4, 271a33; Arist., De Caelo II.8, 290a29-35; Arist., De Caelo II.11, 291b13-14; Auct. Arist., De An. III (168), p. 188; Arist., De An. III.9, 432 b21-23; Auct. Arist., De Resp. (135), p. 207; Arist., De Resp. 10, 476a12-13; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (4), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a9; I.8, 1256b21 | modo…22 preuidere] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.3: “quia cum corpus sit naturaliter propter animam, natura intendit formare tale corpus quale sit conueniens anime, et ideo intendit hiis qui habent animas liberorum dare corpora liberorum, et similiter de seruis” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A88, ll. 296-300) | forma…operationem] cf. Arist., De Caelo II.3, 286a8-9 19 materia…formam] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (61), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a27-28 25 et2…26 questione] cf. q. praec., ll. 80-108

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manus. Dico ergo: quorum est natura una, istorum sunt membra principalia eadem, ut etiam loquitur COMMENTATOR; in aliis autem, propter diuersam dispositionem indiuidui, possunt esse diuersa membra alia hominum eorundem specie. Ad secundam dicendum quod in omnibus liberis eadem est dispositio interior et etiam sepe exterior, ad minus in pluribus; in aliis autem sepe fallit exterioribus, et hoc propter aliquam dispositionem materie impedientem naturam interiorem, quia natura in effectibus suis aliquando impeditur: non enim solum est causa eorum que sunt semper, sed sepe, eorum que in pluribus et frequenter sunt. < Q U E S TIO 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i l l e q u i h ab u n d a t i n a l i q u o b o n o s i t n a tu r a l i te r d o m i n u s e i u s q u i d e f i c i t i n i l l o b o n o

Arguitur quod sic, quia deficiens ita se habet ad habundantem sicut | passiuum ad actiuum; sed ab istis accipitur ratio domini et serui, P 278vb 5 quia dominus agit mouendo seruum, seruus autem patitur obediendo illi; ergo habundans erit dominus deficientis. Item, qui priuatur aliquo bono naturaliter et natus est recipere illud ab alio, naturaliter uidetur esse seruus illius, quia seruus est qui eo caret quod a domino recipit, scilicet motum per se. 10

Contra: si deficiens in aliquo bono naturaliter est seruus habundantis, | F 177vb tunc, cum contingat aliquando hominem uigentem ratione deficere in exterioribus bonis et econuerso deficiens in ratione habundet aliquando in exterioribus, ergo ratione carens naturaliter esset dominus habundantis in 3 0 ergo] quod add. F | natura una] inv. F 34 secundam dicendum] aliud F | eadem est] inv. F 3 5 etiam] om. F | exterior] interior P 37 materie] manere P | in] om. P 3 9 sed] se sed et F frequenter sunt] secundum frequenter P 1 5, 1 ille] illa F 3 Arguitur] praem. et F | habundantem] habundans ideo F 4 ad] iter. F | et] ratio add. F 5 dominus] om. P | illi] illum F 6 erit] est F 8 illud] id F | ab alio] om. F | quia] quod F | est] om. F 1 0 habundantis] habundans F 1 1 contingat] contingit F 1 2 econuerso] hic add. F | habundet] om. P | in2] om. F 13 esset] esse P | esset dominus] dominus est F | habundantis] habundans P 34 in…39 sunt] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.3: “Et quamuis natura habeat inclinationem ad predictam differentiam corporum causandam, tamen quandoque deficit in hoc, sicut etiam in omnibus aliis que generantur et corrumpuntur consequitur natura effectum suum ut in pluribus, deficit uero in paucioribus” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A88, ll. 285-290) 3 7 natura…39 sunt] cf. Arist., Phys. II.5, 196b21-24; II.8, 198b34-36 et 199a9-11 1 5, 1 Consequenter…2 bono] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a13-16

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ratione, quod est inconueniens, cum ratio domini ex eminenti usu intellec15 tus habeat capi.

Dicendum quod habundans in aliquo bono, saltim quoad ‘quid est’, dominus deficientis in illo, sicut materia subiecta est forme, cum recipiat esse ab ea. Item, passiuum est subiectum actiui, cum recipiat formam ab agente, qua prius caruit. Sic et in proposito, quorum ratio omnium est quia omne deficiens in aliquo est subiectum et indignius 20 respectu eius a quo natum est recipere illud in quo deficit. Et intelligendum quod triplex est bonum, scilicet bonum exterius, ut amici et diuitie; aliud est bonum interius, et hoc duplex: uel enim est bonum hominis secundum corpus, ut robur et sanitas, aliud est secundum animam, ut uirtus et prudentia. Prima bona sunt imperfecta et sunt bona 25 secundum quid, nec denominatur ab eis homo bonus, quia a nullo denominatur homo bonus nisi a bonitate que est ei secundum id quod est homo. Ista autem bona non conueniunt homini secundum id quod est homo, id est a parte rationis et intellectus; ergo non dicitur ab eis aliquis bonus homo, sed forte dicetur talis uel diues uel potens. Ab ultimo autem bono, 30 quod est perfectissimum, cum insit homini secundum partem perfectissimam, dicitur homo bonus, quia conuenit homini ea parte qua est homo, scilicet secundum rationem. Dicendum ergo quod omne perfectionem recipiens ab alio quod potest illam ei dare est subiectum respectu illius et, si simpliciter est perfectio, erit 35 simpliciter subiectum illius; propter quod et seruus naturaliter dicitur homo alterius, eo quod est ei subiectus respectu boni simpliciter. Si autem sit bonum et perfectio secundum quid, tunc dicetur subiectus secundum quid, ut forte sunt pecunie uel honor uel talia, cum deficiens in istis non erit simpliciter seruus habundantis, unde ista seruitus est secundum quid et uiolenta. Ad quam inspicientes, antiqui a secundum quid simpliciter procedebant, dicentes nullam seruitutem esse a natura. Arguebant enim sic: quidquid est uiolentum non est a natura; omnis seruitus est uiolenta; ergo nulla seruitus est a natura. Minorem 45 probabant inducendo in predictis seruitutem secundum quid, et ex hoc concludebant seruitutem esse simpliciter uiolentam.

40

Ad rationes dicendum quod procedunt suis uiis: probant enim bene quod deficiens in bono sit seruus habundantis, sed non concludunt quod deficiens in quocumque bono sit omnibus modis seruus habundantis. < Q U E S TIO 1 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m n a t u r a l i t e r b o n u s g e n e r e t b o n u m e t s e r u u s s e r u u m , s i c u t d i c i t P h i l o s o p hu s Arguitur quod sic, quia unumquodque tale natum est agere tale, ut F 178ra calidum agit calidum; ergo similiter bonus generabit bonum.| 3 9 talia] similia F | deficiens] deficient P 4 0 habundantis] habundatis F | seruitus] seruus autem F 4 1 quam] quod F | a] ad PF 42 quid] et add. F | procedebant dicentes] inv. F 4 4 est uiolenta] inv. F | seruitus2] seruus F 4 5 probabant] probant F | inducendo] indiuiduando F | seruitutem] seruitutibus PF 4 6 seruitutem] seruitia F | esse simpliciter] inv. F 4 9 bono] om. F | sit] in add. F 1 6, 1 Consequenter] deinde 3 Arguitur] praem. et F tale1…agere] natum est F 4 calidum1…calidum2] talium talium F | bonus] om. F 4 1 Ad…46 uiolentam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a3-12, ubi tamen dicitur: “quod autem et qui contraria dicunt secundum modum aliquem dicunt recte, non difficile videre. Dupliciter enim dicitur servire et servus. Est enim aliquis secundum legem servus et serviens: lex enim promulgatio quaedam est, in qua in bello superata praevalentium esse dicunt, hoc itaque iustum multi eorum qui in legibus quemadmodum rhetora scribunt iniquorum, tanquam durum, si vim inferre potentis et secundum potentiam melioris erit servum et subiectum quod violentiam passum est. Et hiis quidem sic videtur, hiis autem illo modo, etiam sapientum” (ed. Susemihl, p. 21, l. 7-p. 22, l. 4). Cum locum istum interpretatus est, Thomas intellexit verbum ‘rethora’ ut significantem sapientes quosdam antiquos qui opinabantur servitutem iniquam esse; verisimiliter hanc ob causam Petrus hic loquitur de quibusdam antiquis; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.4: “Dicit ergo primo quod multi qui intromiserunt se de legibus scribendis scripserunt quod iustum predicte legis est de numero iniquorum. Et introducit quendam qui uocabatur Rethora, cui durum uidebatur si ille qui est passus uiolentiam sit seruus et subiectus ei qui potuit uiolentiam inferre, et non est melior nisi quia est potentior” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A91, ll. 27-34). Aliter Albertus, qui igitur esse non potest fons a qua Petrus sumit : “proprium nomen est philosophi legistae”; cf. Albertum, Pol. I.4 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 32) 16 ,1 Consequenter…2 Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2 3 unumquodque…4 calidum2] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.1, 993b24-26

408

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Item, bonus generat sibi similem in corpore; ergo et in anima 5 similem generabit; ergo bonus generabit bonum. Antecedens patet quia agens particulare agit sibi secundum omnem dispositionem, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice. Consequentia patet quia ad dispositionem corporis sequitur, saltim inclinatiue, bona dispositio mentis, unde phisionomi, per dispositionem corporalem, anime qualitates inuestigant. 10 Et ideo dicit ARISTOTELES, in principio Phisionomie sue, quod anima sequitur corpus, et ACTOR Sex Principiorum: anima coniuncta corpori complexiones corporis imitatur. Et hoc etiam dicit PHILOSOPHUS hic.| Contra: si homo generaret bonum naturaliter, tunc aliquis esset bonus a natura et sic non ex electione et uoluntate, quod est contra dicta in 3º 15 Ethicorum. Item, secundum id quod inest nobis a natura non laudamur nec uituperamur, sed a bonitate laudamur; ergo bonitas non erit a natura; ergo non generabit bonus bonum.

Dicendum quod bonitas hominis secundum quod homo attenditur 20 secundum id quod conuenit homini inquantum homo; et quia homo est homo per rationem, ideo bonitas hominis est bonitas secundum rationem et intellectum, et ideo ex ista bonitate denominatur homo bonus. Nam hec bonitas inest homini secundum id quod principalius et formalius est in eo, a quo omnia denominari iustum est. Ex aliis autem bonitatibus, que non 25 conueniunt homini secundum quod homo, non dicitur homo bonus, sed uel diues uel potens uel nobilis.

5 generat] generare F | sibi similem] inv. F | ergo] om. F 9 corporis] om. P | inclinatiue] inclinatio F 1 1 principio…sue] primo sue phisionomie F 12 Actor] auctoritatem F | corpori] om. F 1 3 Philosophus hic] inv. F 1 4 naturaliter] generaliter P 1 7 secundum] quod add. P nobis] naturaliter F | non laudamur] nec laudantur F | uituperamur] uituperantur F 18 erit] est F 20 secundum…22 hominis] om. per hom. F 2 4 inest] est F | id] om. F 2 6 sed] om. P 7 agens…dispositionem] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a25-26 1 1 anima…12 corpus] Pseudo-Arist., Physiogn. 1, 805a1 1 2 anima…13 imitatur] Auct. Arist. (Gilbertus), Sex Princ. (13), p. 307; Gilbertus Porretanus, Sex Princ. IV.46 1 3 Et…hic] Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2 aliquis…16 Ethicorum] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.1, 1110b9-11; III.4, 1112b31-33; III.6, 14 1113b5-21 et 1114a31-b25 1 7 secundum…uituperamur] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (35), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.4, 1105b28-1106a2 et 7-10 2 0 bonitas…23 bonus] cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 20: “illud est summum bonum hominis quod maxime appetitur ab homine secundum quod homo; et istud est maximum bonum uniuscuiusque quod maxime appetit unusquisque. Et debemus dicere quod illud est bonum hominis quod convenit homini et appetit homo secundum quod homo. Et hoc est secundum intellectum, quia sic differt ab aliis” (ed. Celano, p. 59, ll. 35- 40); cf. etiam I, q. 23 (ibid., p. 62, ll. 24-27)

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Tunc intelligendum quod, secundum supra tactum modum, homo bonus potest dici dupliciter: uel secundum actum perfectum uel secundum 30 inclinationem ad bonum. Primo modo non necessario bonus generat bonum, nec malus malum; cuius ratio est quia illa que simpliciter et omnino fiunt a ratione et electione, ista non fiunt a natura. Bonus autem ista bonitate, scilicet in actu perfecto, fit a ratione dirigente et electione inclinante; ideo hec bonitas non fit a natura, quia, sicut cause distinguun35 tur, ita et effectus, ideo nec una causa habet potestatem super effectum alterius. Et ideo natura non potest facere talem bonum, ideo non generatur nec propagatur talis bonitas a bono in bonum. Secundo tamen modo, bonus bene contingerit quod, saltim per accidens, bonum illo modo generet. Cuius ratio est quia inclinatio ad bonum 40 sequitur uel naturam forme secundum se et absolute, uel sequitur naturam eius secundum dispositionem forme in materia. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia ratio, in qua est bonitas secundo modo dicta, capit ex sensu, et ideo bona dispositio sensus promouet actum rationis, saltim secundum obiectum; bona autem dispositio sensus est ex bona dispositione tactus; bona 45 autem dispositio tactus est ex bona dispositione qualitatum primarum complexionalium; ergo a primo ad ultimum bona proportio complexiona-

2 8 Tunc] item F | quod] si add. F | modum] mouet F 3 1 simpliciter…32 ratione] omnino et simpliciter a ratione fiunt F 3 3 fit] sit F 3 4 fit] facit F | quia] om. F | cause] esse F 35 ita] illa F 3 6 Et] om. F | ideo1] nec add. sed exp. P | talem] tale P 3 7 bonum] bono F 3 8 tamen…bonus] cum bonus modus P | contingerit] conuenit F 39 ad bonum] post forme transp. sed exp. P 4 1 Quod] autem P 4 2 secundo] secundum F 4 4 bona dispositione] inv. sed corr. P | tactus] om. F 45 dispositio tactus] inv. F | primarum] particularium F 4 6 bona] complexio siue bona add. F | complexionalium2] complexionum F 2 8 Tunc…69 natiuitate] sic similiter in Petri Scripto III.11: “Sed intelligendum circa hoc quod dicit, quod meliores ex melioribus generantur, quod bonus dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum perfectum, et sic bonus non generat bonum, quia bonus est secundum intellectum et secundum electionem et exercitationem; non ergo fit bonus aliquis secundum actum perfectum a parentibus. Alio modo dicitur bonus secundum inclinationem ad uirtutem perfectam, et sic bonus uult bonum generare, quia uirtus existens in semine intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen, secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere uirtus generatiua; attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales, que inclinant ad dispositiones uoluntatis et intellectus; et ideo intendit generare sibi simile, secundum omnes dispositiones inclinantes siue in bonum siue in malum; propter quod inclinatio ad uirtutem est aliqualiter ex parentibus. Bonus igitur isto modo generat, ut in pluribus, bonum; si autem quandoque accidit contrarium, hoc est per accidens” (ed. Lanza, p. 89, l. 86-p. 90, l. 99); cf. infra, IV, qq. 11 et 12 | secundum…30 bonum] cf. supra, q. 3, ll. 14-16 cum adn. 4 4 bona1…46 complexionalium] cf. supra, q. 13, ll. 82-92

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lium qualitatum proficit ad bonum rationis; unde, 2º De Anima, molles carne habiles mente esse credimus.

F 178rb

P 279rb

Modo generans particulare intendit generare simile sibi secundum dispositionem complexionalem corporis. Cuius ratio est quia illud agens 50 particulare agit mediante | semine, in quo uirtus existens generat et format simile primo generanti. Cuius ratio est quia sperma est superfluum nutrimenti, quod in propinqua dispositione fuit ad membra singula, ideo, saltim habitu, habet dispositiones omnium membrorum. Virtus ergo formatiua in ipso existens ex illo producet simile primo generanti secun- 55 dum dispositiones corporales, quas habet semen in potentia. Vnde PHILOSOPHUS, 2º De Generatione Animalium, dicit quod non differt dicere quod sperma generat hominem uel homo. Agens autem illud, cum agat per naturam, est impedibile in materia, que est eadem contrariorum, et ideo, si nichil in materia sibi resistet, tunc 60 faciet omnino simile; si autem impediatur, hoc est per accidens. Ideo sic inclinatio ad bonum sequitur dispositiones corporis et agens particulare agit dispositionem similem corporis. Tunc, si est | bonum in actu, ad quam bonitatem inclinabant sue dispositiones corporales, tunc generabit bonum illo modo, scilicet inclinantem. Aliquando tamen deficit, 65 et ideo etiam bene dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod natura uult hoc, si non impe-

4 7 unde] dicitur add. F | Anima] quod add. F 49 Modo] unde sed exp. et corr. s.l. P | simile sibi] inv. F 50 complexionalem] complexionum F 5 1 existens] existat F 52 simile] om. F 5 3 fuit] facit F | membra] membrum F | ideo] et ideo F 54 habitu] homini habitum F 5 5 producet] producit F 56 corporales] secundum add. F 5 7 Animalium dicit] inv. F 5 9 Agens autem] ad agens F | impedibile] impedimento et F 60 materia] membro F | tunc] om. F 6 1 omnino] omnia F | est] om. F | Ideo sic] non si F 6 3 dispositionem similem] inv. F 64 actu] accidentali F 6 5 bonum] s.l. P et bonum add. F | scilicet] om. F | tamen] bene P 66 etiam bene] om. F | quod] si F | uult…non] om. F 4 7 molles…48 credimus] Auct. Arist., De An. II (99), p. 182; Arist., De An. II.9, 421a25-26 4 9 generans…sibi] cf. Auct. Arist., De An. II (57), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a26-b1 5 0 illud…52 generanti] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. IV.3, 767b29-34 5 2 sperma…56 potentia] Auct. Arist., De Animalibus XII (177), p. 223; Arist., De Gen. An. I.18, 724a17-19, 725a21-28 et 726a26-27; I.19, 726b10 et 14-19; II.3, 736b26-27 et 33-34; IV.1, 766b7-8 et IV.3, 769a8-15; cf. etiam Petrum, In De Long. et Brev. Vite lectio 4: “sperma est superfluum tercie digestionis ... et ex illo generatur quandoque simile generanti quia illud semen quasi de substancia generantis erat et quia natum erat statim conuerti in substanciam rei alende” (ed. Dunne, p. 192) 5 7 non…58 homo] Arist., De Gen. An. II.1, 734b7-8 59 materia…60 contrariorum] Auct. Arist., Phys. IV (135), p. 151; Arist., Phys. IV.9, 217a22; Auct. Arist., De Caelo II (51), p. 163; Arist., De Caelo II.3, 286a25 6 6 natura…impediatur] Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b2-3

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diatur. Etiam isto modo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 6º Ethicorum, quod aliqualiter uirtutes quedam innate sunt nobis, saltim secundum inclinationem, sicut naturaliter insit aliquibus a natiuitate.

70

Ad rationes dicendum quod agens generat sibi simile secundum quod potest, scilicet secundum inclinationem, non autem secundum actum perfectum. Et ideo etiam ratio secunda non est contra propositum: hec enim procedit de bonitate secundum actum perfectum, de qua non intendimus hic. < Q U E S TIO 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s e r u i a d d o m i n u m s i t a m i c i t i a Arguitur quod non, quia amicitia est similium, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum; seruus autem et dominus non sunt similes inquantum huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.

5

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

6 7 Etiam isto] et illo F 6 8 inclinationem] sed etiam add. F 6 9 mos…uirtutis] suppl. ex fonte allata | a natiuitate] coni. ex fonte allata: lac. P demota F 70 rationes] rationem F 7 1 potest] capit F | secundum1] om. P 72 actum perfectum] perfectionem P 1 7,1 utrum] an add. F 2 Arguitur] et uidetur F | 8º] 9 F 5 Contra] in contrarium F 6 7 aliqualiter…69 natiuitate] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144b4-6: “Omnibus enim videtur singulos morum existere natura aliqualiter; et enim iusti et temperati et fortes et alia habemus confestim a nativitate” (ed. AL XXVI.1.3.4, p. 492, ll. 4-6); cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.11: “Et quod sit aliqua virtus naturalis quae praesupponitur morali, patet per hoc quod singuli mores virtutum vel vitiorum videntur aliqualiter existere aliquibus hominibus naturaliter; statim enim quidam homines a sua nativitate videntur esse iusti, vel temperati vel fortes propter naturalem dispositionem qua inclinantur ad opera virtutum” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 375, ll. 22-29) 1 7, 1 Consequenter…amicitia] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b12-13 2 amicitia…similium] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (141), p. 242; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.2, 1155a32-b8; VIII.3, 1156b19-21; VIII.5, 5 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b12-13; vide etiam Arist., Eth. 1159b2- 4 Nic. VIII.6, 1161a32-35, ubi tamen asseritur: “In quibus enim nichil commune est imperanti et imperato, neque amicicia, neque enim iustum, set velud artifici ad organum et anime ad corpus et domino ad servum” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 536, ll. 11-13)

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Dicendum quod inter eos est amicitia naturalis. Cuius ratio est quia amicitia est boniuolentia mutua non latens uel secundum quam aliquis amat alterum, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum; amare autem alium est uelle illi bona et propter ipsum, et ad hoc operamur bonum illi; ergo, quorum unus uult et operatur bonum alterius, isti erunt amici. Modo amicitia est serui ad dominum, quia seruus uult bonum domini: optat enim dominum posse preuidere et preconsiliari, quod est bonum domini inquantum talis, et ad hoc operatur ipse seruus exequendo preceptum. Similiter econuerso dominus uult bonum serui, quia uult ut seruus possit bene exequi, quod est bonum serui inquantum talis, et ad hoc operatur precipiendo et persuadendo. Et iterum esse utriusque non est saluabile sine istis utrorumque actionibus mutuis; et ideo, si esse naturaliter diligunt, et se inuicem diligent, ut dictum est prius. F

178va

10

15

Item, in omni communicatione necessario est amicitia et armonia, et in naturali communicatione naturalis amicitia. Ex hiis patet | amicitiam esse 20 inter dominum et seruum, et intelligitur de domino et seruo secundum naturam dictis. Illi enim qui ex conditione tales, non se inuicem diligunt,

6 eos] istos F 9 ipsum] om. F | operamur bonum] operari F 1 1 bonum domini] inv. F 12 preuidere] prouidere P 1 3 preceptum] precepit F | econuerso] eius F 1 4 bonum serui] dominus bona F | ut] quod F | bene] om. F 1 6 saluabile] scrips. sauabile P 1 7 si] se F 19 Item] iterum F | necessario] necessarium F | amicitia] a natura F 20 esse] s.l. F 2 1 et3] s.l. P 22 Illi] illis P | tales] similes sunt F | non] in add. P 6 amicitia naturalis] ista locutione usus est Aspasius ad relationes designandum inter virum et uxorem et inter fratres, sed non inter servum et dominum; cf. Aspasium, Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12: “Non enim amicitia est talibus propter communicationem, sed a natura. Naturaliter enim cognati cognatos diligunt ... Non enim secundum confessionem amant ad invicem cognati neque hetairi, sed, ut dictum est, a natura praeducti” (ed. Mercken, p. 176, ll. 00- 01 et p. 177, ll. 8-10); Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), ibid.: “In hac igitur amicitia naturali quae, ut iam patet, est propter bonum naturale et magnum bonum” (ed. Mercken, p. 184, ll. 90-91). Locutio ista invenitur postea in Alberti Super Ethica VIII.12 (753): “Aristoteles nominat hic naturalem amicitiam, quae habet sufficiens principium in natura, sicut in amicitia paterna patet, in qua ipsa naturae propagatio sufficit ad amicitiam, etiam si nulla sit communicatio in operibus” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.2, p. 639, ll. 17-22), necnon in omnibus commentariis Alberti commentaria in Aristotelis Ethicam subsequentibus 7 amicitia…latens] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (142), p. 242; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.2, 1155b33-34 8 amare…9 ipsum] cf. Arist., Rhet. II.4, 1380b35-36, sed cf. etiam Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 26, art. 4: “amare est velle alicui bonum” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 190) 1 7 et1…18 prius] cf. supra, ll. 6-10 19 in1…armonia] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1159b26-27; VIII.7, 1161b11 22 Illi…23 alteri] in Eth. Nic. VIII.2-3, 1155b17-1156b32 Aristoteles distinguit tres species amicitiae, scilicet amicitia bona, delectabilis et utilis: haec duo tantum secundum accidens definiuntur amicitiae (1156a17); omnes autem aut in aequalitate aut certe in proportionalitate quadam consistunt ; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.4, 1158b1-5 et VIII.5, 1158b23-35

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nisi forte per accidens amicitia utili, inquantum uterque utilis est alteri, ut in seruitute bellica: seruus enim ibi diligit dominum, quia conseruatus est 25 in esse per illum; dominus autem seruum, quia utilitatem suam procurat. Et quia naturalia magis possunt esse continua, ideo amicitia illorum continuatur magis quam istorum: istorum enim amicitia est propter utile, quare, dissoluto utili, dissoluitur et amicitia utilis, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum.

30

Ad rationem dicendum quod similitudo est duplex: uel similitudo qualitatis et conditionis uel similitudo proportionis. Primo modo est amicitia equalium, ut sociorum. Non tamen omnis amicitia est talium, sicut amicitia patris ad filium, uiri ad uxorem, inter quos est amicitia que est similitudo secundum proportionem. < Q U E S TIO 1 8 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a t u s y c o n o m i c u s , d e s p o t i c u s e t p o l i t i c u s d i f f e r a n t s p e c i e u el s i n t i d e m

Arguitur quod sint idem, quia quecumque sola materia differunt sunt eadem specie; sed isti principatus sunt huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. 5 Maior patet quia, que sola materia differunt, | non differunt specie, quia a P 279va forma sumitur species. Sed isti principatus differunt sola materia; cuius ratio est quia differunt sola multitudine et paucitate, que pertinent ad materiam, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum: despoticus enim principatus est ubi unus uni principatur seruo, yconomicus ubi unus toti domui, politicus ubi 10 unus principatur pluribus, quia toti ciuitati. 2 3 uterque] interest P | alteri] alterius P | ut] et F 2 4 seruitute] seruitutem sed corr. F | ibi] in F 2 8 et] om. F 29 rationem] rationes F | similitudo2…30 qualitatis] qualitas uel F 3 0 uel] etiam P 32 patris] ipsos F | quos] quas F | que] in F 33 secundum] que P | proportionem] et est etiam similium secundum proportionem add. F 18 ,1 Consequenter…32 obiectorum] haec pars quaestionis invenitur abbreviata ut sequitur: intelligendum quod principatum despontum (sic) yconomicus et politicus differunt specie et hec ratio est illa: illa differunt specie quorum diuersi sunt fines F 5 materia] non add. P | specie] forma P 9 domui] domini P 10 pluribus] praem. multo P 2 8 dissoluto…utilis] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.3, 1156a22-23 2 9 similitudo1…30 proportionis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.5, 1158b23-35 et 1159a33-b4; VIII.7, 1162a34-b4; IX.1, 1163b32-33 3 1 Non…33 proportionem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1161a20-25; VIII.7, 1162a4-9 18 ,1 Consequenter…2 idem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.7, 1255b15-18 3 quecumque…4 specie] Arist., Metaph. X.9, 1058b1-3; Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (251), p. 136 7 multitudine…8 materiam] cf. Arist., Phys. I.4, 187b35-37

414

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Item, quorum fines sunt idem, et ipsa sunt eadem; sed istorum principatuum est idem finis; ergo et ipsi sunt idem. Minor patet quia omnes ordinantur ad per se sufficientiam ut ad finem primum et maxime mouentem: nam primum mouens magis mouet, ut dicitur 8º Phisicorum. Contra: diuersorum secundum naturam diuersi sunt principatus secun- 15 dum naturam. Sed isti principatus sunt diuersorum secundum naturam: mulier natura differt a seruo, ergo principatus eorum et similiter improportionate; diuerse enim naturales inclinationes sunt ad diuersas communicationes istorum principatuum; ergo et ipsi diuersi sunt natura et 20 specie.

Dico quod isti principatus diuersi sunt specie. Cuius ratio est quia principans est secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur alia; uoluntas autem non mouet nisi mota ex fine; ergo principans est qui mouet secundum rationem sumptam a fine. Si ergo diuersi fines, diuersi erunt principantes; cuius ratio est quia, si diuersa sunt principia motiua, et fines – uel omnino 25 uel etiam sola ratione, ut si forte unus in alium ordinetur – distinguuntur; cum differant ratione, semper diuersi erunt principantes per diuersas uoluntates, sicut in speculatiuis: diuersorum enim uniuersalium, licet inuicem ordinentur, tamen, quia ratione differunt, diuersi sunt intellectus quorum sunt obiecta, sicut finis obiectum est uoluntatis. Ergo, si sunt 30 diuersi fines, diuersas constituent uoluntates, ut potentie distinguuntur distinctione obiectorum. Istorum autem principatuum diuersi sunt fines, quod patet quia communicationum quarum sunt principatus diuersi sunt fines: idem enim est finis operantis et operati, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Modo communicationis que est inter dominum et seruum, quorum princi- 35 patus est despoticus, finis est esse et conseruatio; communicationis autem que est inter eos qui in domo est finis salus et disciplinatio, et ibi est yconomicus; communicationis autem eorum qui in ciuitate finis est per se sufficientia, et ibi est principatus politicus. Ergo, cum fines isti 25 si] s.l. P 3 2 Istorum…principatuum] sed istorum F | diuersi sunt] inv. F 3 3 quia] quod F 3 4 enim est] et F | operantis] operans F 36 finis est] iter. F | conseruatio] coni. ex q. praec., ll. 24-25: generatio PF 3 7 que] quod F | disciplinatio…ibi] disciplina nisi F 38 finis] eorum add. F 3 9 et ibi] ut P | Ergo…41 diuersi] specie sunt diuersi et per hoc potest solui conclusio illa que fit utrum principatus yconomicus politicus et dispoticus differunt specie F 13 omnes…sufficientiam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b12-16 et 27-29 14 primum…mouet] Auct. Arist., Phys. VIII (209), p. 157; Arist., Phys. VIII.5, 256a8-10 17 mulier…seruo] cf. supra, q. 8, ll. 11-39 22 principans…alia] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 31 potentie…32 obiectorum] cf. Auct. Arist., De An. II (56), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a16-21 34 idem…operati] cf. Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (85), p. 147

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sunt principatuum istorum et sunt diuersi specie et ratione, ut patet manifeste, et ipsi principatus specie sunt diuersi.

Ad rationem dicendum quod non sola materia differunt, sed primo et principaliter differunt specie et ratione sumpta ex fine eorum diuerso.

45

Ad secundam dicendum quod istorum principatuum sunt fines diuersi proprii et proximi, ideo et ipsi diuersi; tamen forte unus est finis communis et remotus: iste autem non impedit diuersitatem nec causat unitatem principatuum. < Q U E S TIO 1 9 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x d i u e r s i t a t e c i b i c a u s e tu r di s t i n c t i o u i t a r u m

Arguitur quod non, quia prius secundum rationem non distinguitur secundum distinctionem posterioris secundum rationem, cuius ratio 5 est quia distinctio secundum rationem prima est; et iterum, idem est causa unitatis et distinctionis, quia per idem unumquodque est unum in se et diuersum ab alio. Modo posterius | secundum rationem non est causa P 279vb unitatis prioris secundum rationem, immo potius diuidit unitatem prioris ipsum posterius; ergo nec erit causa distinctionis eius. Si sic, tunc, cum uita 10 sit prior ratione quam ipsum nutrimentum uel cibus, ipsa uita non distinguetur distinctione cibi. Minor patet quia prius ratione est a quo non conuertitur consequentia; modo sic est hic: si enim nutritur, ergo uiuit; sed non sequitur econuerso: si uiuit, ergo nutritur. Ergo uita non distinguetur distinctione cibi. 15

Item, id quod est in potentia non distinguitur distinctione actus; sed uita est in potentia respectu cibi; ergo et cetera.

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur quod distinctio potentiarum est ex obiectis; modo alimentum est obiectum uite, ad minus nutritiue, ut dicitur 2º De Anima; ergo uita, saltim nutritiua, distinguitur distinctione 20 cibi. 19 ,1 Consequenter…58 propositum] tota haec quaestio deest in codice F 7 non] ut P 8 potius] post P 18 nutritiue] nutrire P 19 ,1 Consequenter…2 uitarum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a19-22 1 1 prius…12 consequentia] Arist., Cat. 12, 14a35-36 1 7 distinctio…18 obiectis] Auct. Arist., De An. II (56), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a16-21 18 alimentum…nutritiue] cf. Arist., De An. II.1, 412a14

416

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Dicendum quod uita habet distingui distinctione cibi. Ad cuius euidentiam notandum quod uita dicitur tripliciter: uno modo uita dicitur principium uiuendi, secundum quod dicimus animam esse uitam animalis, sicut forma dicitur natura. Secundo modo dicitur uita operatio procedens ab illo principio, ut intelligere, sentire, moueri et uegetari, quas uitas distinguit 25 PHILOSOPHUS 2º De Anima. Tertio modo dicitur uita modus se habendi circa huiusmodi operationes, sicut aliquem conuersantem in operatione intelligendi ducere uitam contemplatiuam; et similiter de nutritiua, ergo modus se habendi circa uegetationem et nutritionem acquirendo uel procurando dicitur uita, quod illi uite hoc modo dicte cibus 30 est finis: ipsa enim intendit acquisitionem nutrimenti et cibi. est autem obiectum uite secundo modo dicte. Ex hoc arguitur: potentie distinguuntur ab obiectis, et similiter ea que in finem distinguuntur distinctione finium; sed uita tertio modo dicta se habet ad cibum ut ad finem; ergo distinctione cibi distinguitur illa uita. Et propter hoc etiam ea 35

26 2º] 3 P 2 7 conuersantem] conseruantem P 30 uita] illius add. P 31 Cibus] suppl. ex fonte allata 32 primo et] suppl. ex fonte allata 3 4 distinctione] distinctionem P 22 uita1…29 nutritiua] sic similiter in Petri Scripto V.7: “intelligendum est quod uita uno modo dicitur anima, que est principium operationis, secundum quod dicimus: anima et uita sunt idem; alio modo dicitur uita operatio, cuius anima per se est principium; tertio modo dicitur conuersatio in qua aliquis assuetus est et que delectat ipsum, et sic accipit hic Philosophus uitam” (ed. Lanza, p. 311, ll. 215-219) et VII.1: “Dicitur enim uita uno modo de hoc quod est principium motus ex se, sicut dicitur quod anima et uita sunt idem; consequenter autem dicitur de operatione procedente ab huiusmodi principio intrinseco, sicut dicimus quod sentire et intelligere sunt uite quedam. Et secundum hoc eligibilissimum hominis est uita optima uel actio eius secundum excellentiorem anime potentiam” (ibid., p. 437, ll. 18-23) | uita2…23 animalis] cf. Arist., De An. II.2, 413b1-2 2 4 forma…natura] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (55), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.1, 193a28-31 et b6- 8 | dicitur2…25 uegetari] Auct. Arist., De An. II (46), p. 178; Arist., De An. II.2, 413a21-23 3 1 Cibus…32 dicte] quod cibus sit obiectum vitae secundo, sed etiam primo modo dictae, confirmari potest etiam ex quo asseritur in Anonymi Vaticani QQ. Pol. I, q. 19: “ex dictis ad questionem quod uita primo modo et secundo dicta sumunt distinctione ex cibo, et etiam uita tertio modo dicta magis distinguitur adhuc ex cibo, de qua loquitur hic Aristoteles. Quod autem uita primo modo et secundo dicta sumunt distinctionem ex cibo patet, quia potentia ex obiecto distinguitur; sed cibus est obiectum uite primo modo et secundo dicte; ideo et cetera” (ms. Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030, f. 18ra) et in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol I, q. 14: “Primum est quod, accipiendo primo et secundo modo, quod diuersitas ciborum facit diuersitatem uite et animalium. Cuius ratio est quia diuersitas et distinctio potentiarum est ex obiectis suis; sed cibus est obiectum uite primo et secundo modo dicte; ideo et cetera” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 6vb) 3 5 distinctione…36 querunt] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Alberto, Pol. I.6: “Cibus autem variat complexionem, complexio autem mores et modos vivendi animalium: complexio enim simile appetit, et in simili delectatur” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 44)

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que sunt diuerse complexionis diuersum cibum querunt: ex eisdem enim sumus et nutrimur, 2º De Generatione. Sed ulterius notandum quod non solum ex fine distinguuntur ea que in finem secundum substantiam, sed et secundum diuersos modos se habendi 40 , sicut in speculatiuis, secundum diuersum modum considerandi idem subiectum, sunt diuerse scientie. Ideo non solum ad diuersitatem finium in substantia sequitur diuersitas uitarum querentium , sed etiam secundum diuersum modum acquirendi cibum diuersificantur uite. Et ideo quedam querentia cibum gregatim diuersam habent uitam a que45 rentibus cibum disiunctim, et ideo diuersimode uiuunt et conuersantur: nam, si possunt cibum multum inuenire in uno loco, multotiens et ubique, tunc gregatim cibum, ut apes; si autem , tunc disiunctim, ut lupi. Similiter, in hominibus, ex diuersitate cibi distinguitur uita tertio modo dicta, cuius finis est alimentum. Ideo, sicut distinguitur alimentum, 50 distinguitur et uita hominum; modo alimentum homini non est elementum simpliciter † nec metallum propter frigiditatem †; ideo oportet aliter

3 6 complexionis] complexiones P 4 2 querentium] querentia P | sed] et P 44 querentia] sequitur lac. P | a] cum P 45 disiunctim] disiunctum P 4 7 si] scrips. sin P | raro] suppl. ex fontibus allatis 36 ex…37 nutrimur] Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II (36), p. 170; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.8, 335a10-11 4 6 nam…48 lupi] cf. quo modo eadem tractantur in B I, q. 16, ll. 27-32 et in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol I, q. 14: “Est tamen intelligendum quod quedam quorum cibus habetur in magna habundantia, et talia animalia non molestant se inquirendo cibum et uiuunt congregatim, sicut sunt columbe et talia animalia. Alia sunt animalia quorum cibus raro cum difficultate quadam reperibilis, et talia molestant se in acquirendo suum cibum, sicut sunt animalia rapacia, et talia solitarie uiuunt, sicut lupi, leones, et alia animalia et quedam aues” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 6vb). Ubi diversificant animalium vitas modis quibus ea procurant sibi cibum, aliqualiter aliae sunt interpretationes Alberti et Thomae, et magis cum Aristotelis textu consentientes (1256a23-25): “bestiarum enim haec quidem gregalia, haec autem dispersa sunt, utro modo expedit ad cibum ipsis propter haec quidem animalifaga, haec autem fructifaga, haec autem omnifaga ipsorum esse” (ed. Susemihl, p. 29, l. 9-p. 30, l. 1); cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “Videmus enim quod quedam bestie uiuunt congregata in multitudine, et quedam uiuunt dispersa et separata secundum quod expedit ad cibum ipsorum: quedam enim ipsorum sunt animalifaga, id est comedentia animalia, fagi enim in Greco idem est quod comedere; quedam uero comedunt fructus, quedam uero comedunt indifferenter omnia. Vnde natura distinxit uitas eorum secundum cibos quos eligunt naturaliter; et secundum quod uiuunt in desidia uel in pugna, nam ea que comedunt animalia alia oportet esse pugnatiua et quod dispersa uiuant, aliter enim non possent cibum inuenire: set animalia que comedunt cibum qui de facili potest inueniri, uiuunt simul” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A98, ll. 111-125); Albertus, Pol. I.6: “et ideo bestiarum sive animalium quaedam sunt animaliphaga, id est, animalia comedentia (φάγω enim est comedo) ut lupi, leones, et accipitres, et hujusmodi rapacia animalia. Quaedam autem sunt fructiphaga, id est, fructus comedentia et semina, et illa habent sollicitudines et industrias inveniendi fructus et semina” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 44)

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hominis esse corpus mixtum. Hoc autem distinguitur: si enim sit de terre nascentibus, sic est | uita que dicitur agricultura, que est uita prima et iustissima, ut innuit PHILOSOPHUS. Si autem sit de generatione animalium, aut est domesticum, , et totidem etiam numero 55 distingui habet uita hominis tertio modo dicta.

Ad rationes dicendum quod procedunt de uita primo modo dicta uel secundo, et ideo non concludunt contra propositum.

5 5 numero] numerus P 52 de…53 nascentibus] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “ex hiis que nascuntur in terra” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A98, l. 154) 5 3 agricultura…54 iustissima] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1318b8-10; 5 5 ***] quod hic asseritur similiter Auct. Arist., Pol. VI (105), p. 259; cf. infra, VI, q. 2 invenitur in loc. parall. operum hic deinceps allatis; ex istis ergo, quod hic deest – de vita quae est a nutrimento quod est ex animalibus – sumi aliqualiter potest: praeter vitam quae dicitur pascualis, in qua nutrimentum est a domesticis animalibus, est alia vita, scilicet praedativa, quae esse potest furativa, piscativa, venativa; cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a30-40: “multis enim differunt horum vitae. qui quidem enim otiosissimi, pascuales sunt (qui enim a domesticis animalibus cibus sine labore fit vacantibus ...): alii autem ex praeda vivunt, et praedas alii alias, puta hii quidem a latrocinio, hii autem a piscatione, quicunque circa stagna et paludes et fluvios et mare tale habitant, hii autem ex avibus aut bestiis silvestribus: plurimum autem genus hominum ex terra vivit et domesticis fructibus” (ed. Susemihl, p. 30, l. 5-p. 31, l. 1); cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “et dicit quod etiam secundum diversitatem ciborum in multis differunt uite hominum. Tripliciter enim acquirunt aliqui nutrimentum. Quidam enim acquirunt cibum, neque laborant, neque depredant: et isti sunt otiosissimi, scilicet pastores, quia cibus qui fit a domesticis animalibus, puta ab ouibus, absque labore fit hominibus uiuentibus in otio ... Alii uero sumunt nutrimentum ex preda, uel quam acquirunt ab hominibus, sicut latrones; uel quam acquirunt ex aquis stagnorum, paludum, fluuiorum et in aliis, sicut piscatores; uel ex agris et siluis, sicut uenatores auium et bestiarum. Tertium genus uiuendi est quod pluribus hominum conuenit, quod uiuunt ex hiis que nascuntur in terra et ex domesticis fructibus: et isti habent cibum elaboratum. Hee igitur sunt plurimum uite hominum. Preter eos enim qui habent cibum elaboratum et qui uiuunt de negotiatione, de quo infra agetur, sunt quatuor uite simplices: scilicet pascualis, furatiua, piscatiua et uenatiua, ut ex dictis patet. Set cum uita hominum sit deficientissima eo quod multis indiget, quidam ad hoc quod per se sibi sufficiant in omnibus miscent predictas uitas, et ita delectabiliter uiuunt supplentes sibi ex una quod deest sibi ex altera: sicut quidam exercent simul uitam pascualem et furatiuam, quidam simul agricultiuam et uenatiuam, et similiter alias uitas secundum quod unicuique est oportunum” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A98, ll. 135-169). Vide etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/3.7 (ed. Romae, pp. 363-365) et Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 14: “Est tamen intelligendum quod aliqua sunt animalia ratione et intellectu utentia, cuiusmodi sunt homines. De numero illorum quidam uiuunt animalibus priuatis et domesticis, sicut gallis, caponibus et talibus tanquam cibo; alii uiuut tanquam cibo animalibus siluestribus per uenationem; alii autem uiuunt piscatione et multis aliis modis, ut Philosophus dicit” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 7ra)

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< Q U E S TIO 2 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m n at u r a f a c i at o m n i a a n i m a l i a e t p l a n t a s p r o p te r h o m i n e m Et arguitur quod non, quia natura non fecit animalia propter alios , sed propter finem ipsorum animalium; modo homo non est finis 5 animalium; ergo natura non fecit animalia propter hominem, et similiter de plantis. Maior patet quia idem est finis operantis et operati. Minor patet quia finis animalium et plantarum et omnium natura constantium est operatio propria eorum; hic autem non est homo. Item, natura nichil facit propter malum illius eiusdem ; sed malum animalium et plantarum est uenire in usum hominis; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia natura operatur propter finem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum; finis autem, cum idem sit bono, non est malum. Minor patet quia per hoc quod ista ueniunt in usum hominis, uel consumuntur uel omnino corrumpuntur. 15

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quod natura facit omnia propter finem; sed finis animalium et omnium generabilium et corruptibilium est homo: dicitur enim, 2º Phisicorum, quod nos sumus finis omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; ergo natura facit animalia et plantas propter hominem.

2 0, 1 faciat…plantas] omnia alia animalia et plantas fecerit F 2 propter…6 plantis] om. per hom. P 4 sed] et F 6 quia] quod F 7 est] s.l. P 8 operatio] operatione F | operatio…eorum] compositio P | homo] hoc P 9 propter malum] ipsum lectio incerta F 10 malum] sed add. F 11 propter] ipsum F 12 2º] 3 P | malum] malis F 13 hominis] om. F 1 5 Contra] in oppositum F | arguitur] ratione add. F | quod] quia F 16 generabilium] generalium F 17 enim] om. F 18 facit…plantas] fecit aliam et planta F 2 0, 1 Consequenter…2 hominem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b16-17 6 idem…operati] cf. Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (85), p. 147 11 natura…finem] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (89), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.8, 198b10-11 1 2 finis…bono] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. III (73), p. 121; Arist., Metaph. III.2, 996a23-24 16 finis…19 hominem] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.5: “Ideo ait Philosophus primo Polit. quod haec, idest res a quibus nutrimentum accipimus, datae sunt nobis a natura ... quia natura produxit huiusmodi sensibilia propter hominem. Sumus enim quodammodo nos finis omnium, vt dicitur secundo Physicorum” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 360) 17 nos…18 corruptibilium] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (63), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a34-35

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F 178vb

Dicendum quod natura facit illa propter hominem. Cuius ratio est quia 20 in omni genere imperfectum est propter perfectum, cuius causa est quia primum in omni genere est causa omnium aliorum, ut dicitur 10º Metaphisice; quorum autem unum est primum, | horum unus est finis, quia finis dicitur ad agentem sicut materia ad formam; ideo, sicut unum primum in omni genere, ita et unus finis, et maxime id quod est magis 25 bonum. Perfectum autem est magis bonum, cum magis actum attingat: si ergo in omni genere perfectum est finis aliorum, in omni genere imperfecta erunt propter perfecta; homo autem est perfectum magis in genere generabilium et corruptibilium, quia homo attingit ad ultimum et sum30 mum opus nature. Item, homo habet excellentiorem formam; propter formam autem semper operatur natura; et ideo etiam dicit THEMISTIUS, super 3um De Anima, quod intellectus in actu est perfectio ultima cui natura subiectum imperauit. Item, natura nichil facit frustra. Facit autem hominem imperfectum: 35 quia sub tali esse frustra esset, ergo dabit ei per que perficiatur; hec autem sunt alimenta; ergo natura homini alimentum preparat. Ideo omnia que possunt esse alimentum homini ordinata sunt homini a natura; hec autem sunt omnia uegetalem animam participantia, quia homo nutritur inquantum uegetabilis – ex eisdem autem sumus et nutrimur –: sed talia sunt 40 plante et animalia; ergo natura homini plantas et animalia in cibum ordinat. Et ideo omnia in hominem ordinauit uel mediate uel immediate, uel 20 facit] fecit F 22 est] finis et add. F | 10º] 11 F 23 unum est] inv. F | horum…est2] eorum est unus F 25 et1] om. F | et2] om. F | id] illud F 26 est] post bonum transp. F | cum] in F actum] autem add. F | attingat] attingunt P attingens F 2 7 est finis] inv. F | in2…imperfecta] imperfecta omnia in omni genere F 31 autem] om. F 3 3 in actu] innatum F | cui] a F 3 5 Facit autem] om. F | hominem] hominum F 3 6 quia] qui F 37 homini] hominum P hominis F | preparat] coni.: imperat P scrips. properat F 38 homini1] hominum F | homini2] omnia F 3 9 omnia…animam] omnium natura uegetalem F | quia] nam F | nutritur] nutritum F 4 1 animalia2] aliam F 42 in] etiam F 20 Dicendum…30 nature] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse a Thomae STh Ia, q. 96, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. V, p. 426) et IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. IX, p. 67) vel a Thomae QQ. Disp. De Potentia q. 5, art. 9, resp. (ed. Pession, p. 154). Invenitur etiam in Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.5 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 360) | natura…hominem] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b16-17; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (25), p. 253 22 primum…aliorum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X. 1052b18-19 et 31-32 3 3 intellectus…34 imperauit] cf. Themistium, Paraphrasis In De Anima VI (ed. Verbeke, p. 229, ll. 88-91) 3 5 natura… 40 ex…nutrimur] Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II frustra] cf. supra, q. 14, l. 18 cum adn. (36), p. 170; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.8, 335a10-11

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ad uictum uel ad uestem; et si qua uideantur esse que non sint immediate utilia homini, ut serpentes et talia, tamen uel immediate uel mediate, 45 saltim in ea que homini sunt utilia, ordinantur. Et notandum quod natura est duplex. Vna specialis, et hec est forma uel materia rei; et ista non ordinat animalia uel plantas in hominem, quia ista intendit esse rei cuius est, et non corruptionem que fit per talem ordinem. Alia autem est uniuersalis, que potest dici aliqua uirtus superior alicuius 50 substantie separate uel etiam prime cause: et ista intendit finaliter esse et conseruationem totius et, si sic, ergo principalius intendit bonum principalioris partis. Sed homo, inter inferiora | generabilia et corruptibilia, est P 280rb principalior; ergo natura principalius intendit bonum et esse hominis. Si autem cum illo bono aliquando stet malum alterius partis non ita principa55 lis, ut forte auis uel piscis, hoc est ei per accidens intentum: per se enim intendit esse hominis, et quia illud non est sine cibo, ideo ordinat cibum homini; et quia ille non est sine corruptione alicuius uegetabilium, ideo, ex consequenti et per accidens, hoc intendit, eo quod coniunctum est intento per se, sicut uidemus apud nos quod natura manus inquantum manus

4 3 ad uictum] adiunctum F | ad2] om. P | qua] que F | sint] sunt F | immediate] post homini transp. sed corr. P 4 4 tamen] cum P | immediate…mediate] mediate uel immediate sed uel del. F 4 5 homini sunt] sunt hominum F 4 8 que] quia F 49 aliqua uirtus] inv. sed corr. P 50 intendit finaliter] inv. F | esse…51 conseruationem] saluationem et esse F 5 2 inter] nutriret P | generabilia] genitalia F 54 cum] est F 5 5 piscis] scrips. picis F 56 ordinat] post homini transp. F 5 8 coniunctum] coniuncta P conuenienter F | intento] intentio F 4 6 natura…51 totius] cf. Avicennam, Liber de Philosophia Prima VI.5, ubi distinguuntur duae naturae: “Prima igitur intentio naturae est ut permaneat natura humana et alia huiusmodi vel individuum perpetuum non designatum, et illa intentio est causa perfectiva actionis naturae universalis ... Item individuum quod inducit ad aliud individuum et deinde at tertium et quartum, non est ipsum finis naturae universalis, sed naturae particularis. Postquam autem haec sunt finis naturae particulari, tunc post illum nihil aliud praeter illum erit intentio et finis illi naturae particulari quae sunt eius finis. Intelligo autem per naturam particularem virtutem propriam regiminis unius individui, et intelligo per naturam universalem virtutem infusam in substantias caelorum, quasi unam rem et gubernantem universitatem generationum” (ed. Van Riet, p. 334, ll. 38- 40 et p. 335, ll. 50-58). Eadem distinctione utitur Petrus, QQ. De Caelo II, q. 19 (ed. Galle, p. 202, l. 16-p. 203, l. 45) et eam tangit etiam in Petri Sent. De Veg. et Pl.: “Sed animal non est propter plantam, quia planta non nutritur ex animali, ut sit notandum quod planta est propter animal. Sed hic finis non est causa particularis, sed universalis, sicut femina propter masculum et non propter se ipsam secundum universalem ordinem universi; sicut portarius in civitate non est propter bonum suum simpliciter, sed propter bonum civitatis” (ed. Poortman, p. 41, ll. 2- 8) 49 Alia…53 hominis] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse a Thomae STh Ia, q. 96, art. 1, resp.: “Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius gubernationi alia animalia subduntur” (ed. Leon. V, p. 426)

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semper appetit esse ipsius manus; uirtus autem uegetatiua totius corporis, 60 que intendit bonum totius, intendit bonum principalium partium principalius; et ideo, si cum bono totius uel alicuius partis | principalioris quam sit manus stet malum et corruptio ipsius manus, tunc illa natura communis per accidens intendet malum ipsius manus, ut incisio, si sit ueneno percussa.

Quod ergo dictum est, quod natura ordinauit omnia animalia 65 ad utilitatem et ad commodum hominis, intelligendum est de natura communi, que principalius intendit salutem principalioris partis. Rationes autem concludunt de natura speciali. < Q UE S T I O 2 1 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r ut r u m p o s s e s s i u a s i t p a r s y c o n o m i c e Arguitur quod sic, auctoritate PHILOSOPHI, qui hoc dicit. Item, sicut finis se habet ad finem, ita scientia ad scientiam, maxime in scientiis actiuis uel factiuis, quarum principium est finis; sed finis possessiue naturalis est usus diuitiarum naturalium: hic autem usus 5 pars est illius usus generaliter omnium in domo, qui est finis yconomice; ergo possessio naturalis erit pars yconomice. Contra: scientia que est parans instrumentum non est pars scientie usiue illo instrumento, ut pectinifactiua non est pars texilis; sed sic est possessiua naturalis respectu yconomice; ergo non est eius pars. Minor 10 patet quia possessiua naturalis preparat organum yconomice: acquirit enim diuitias naturales, quibus utitur yconomus; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod possessiua naturalis nec est eadem cum yconomica nec pars eius, sed est subseruiens illi. Non est eadem, quia ille scientie non sunt eedem quarum obiecta non sunt eadem et non est unus modus 15 60 autem] tamen F 61 totius…bonum2] om. per hom. F 63 manus1] hoc add. F | malum] manus F | ipsius manus] inv. F 64 incisio] infractionem F 65 ordinauit] ordinat F | animalia] alia F 66 ad2] om. F 6 7 intendit] om. F 21 ,1 Consequenter…39 usum] haec quaestio deest in codice F | possessiua] possessiue P 8 parans] apparens P 21 ,1 Consequenter…yconomice] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a3-5 et 13-14 2 auctoritate…dicit] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b27-28 5 diuitiarum naturalium] de distinctione inter divitias naturales et artificiales vide infra, q. 24, ll. 21-25 8 scientia…10 yconomice] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a3-13

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considerandi: si ergo uel obiecta scientiarum sint diuersa uel obiectum idem, modus autem considerandi alius, semper scientie erunt diuerse; modo obiectum possessionis naturalis est acquisitio possessionum naturalium, obiectum autem yconomice est usus earum; ergo ipse non sunt 20 eedem. Minor patet: hic est finis earum; finis autem et obiectum in scientiis actiuis concurrunt; ergo possessio naturalis non est eadem yconomice, nec etiam pars per idem medium, quia obiectum possessionis, scilicet acquisitio, non est pars obiecti yconomice. Cuius ratio est quia scientia preparatiua est eorum quibus utitur alia scientia est subseruiens illi, 25 quia pectinifactiua est subseruiens textili; modo possessio naturalis preparat organum quo utitur yconomica, scilicet acquirendo diuitias naturales, quibus utitur yconomica nutriendo; ergo possessio erit subseruiens yconomice.

Ad rationem dicendum quod Philosophus large loquitur ponens 30 partem pro ministratiua. Ad secundam dicendum quod finis istarum remotus et communis est | idem, finis autem proprius et propinquus non est idem. Finis enim P 280va possessiue est diuitie naturales, finis autem yconomice est usus illarum, qui usus accidit illis diuitiis. Et ideo possessiua naturalis non ordinat illas 35 diuitias ad usum, sicut nec nauisfactiua nauem ad motum uel translationem; sed hoc ei accidit , sicut et naui ; ideo oportet superiorem scientiam ordinare, sicut naualem: sic et hic yconomica ordinat diuitias illas ad usum.

2 3 non] ut P 2 4 scientia] iter. sed corr. P | illi] illius P 36 translationem] coni.: transforationem P | per1…37 yconomicam] suppl. ex infra, ll. 38-39 3 7 motus…naualem] suppl. ex ll. 33-34 et 38 2 3 scientia…28 yconomice] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse a Thomae Sent. Pol. I.6 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A97, ll. 57- 64) 3 5 nec…36 translationem] haec mentio navifactivae invenitur in Thomae Sent. Pol. I.6 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A97, ll. 59-60)

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< Q UE S T I O 2 2 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m ap p e t i t u s d i u i t i a r u m n at u r a l i u m s it in f init u s Arguitur quod sic quia, si appetitus illius quod in aliud ordinatur sit infinitus, et appetitus illius in quod ordinatur erit infinitus; modo appetitus diuitiarum artificialium, que in naturales ordinantur, est infinitus; 5 ergo et appetitus naturalium. Maior patet quia semper finis ampliori desiderio appetitur quam ea que in finem. Item, illius desiderium est infinitum quod, quanto plus habetur, tanto plus appetitur; sic est de diuitiis naturalibus, ut patet ad sensum; ergo 10 et cetera.

Dicendum quod diuitie naturales dicuntur ex quibus natura per se sustentatur et recuperat defectus suos. Et iste possunt dupliciter accipi: ipse enim sunt possessiones, quia sunt possessorum, naturales, quia in sustentationem nature per se ordinantur. Hec ergo istis duobus modis 15 possunt considerari: uel inquantum possessiones uel inquantum naturales. Si secundo modo, sic necessario non in infinitum appetuntur. Cuius ratio est quia ea que in finem ordinantur, intantum appetuntur, inquantum sunt utilia ad illum et in ordine ad eum; sed iste diuitie, sic considerate, ordinantur in finem, qui est uita eorum qui in domo; ergo intantum appetun- 20 tur, inquantum sunt utiles ad uitam. Sed isto modo non sunt in infinitum: non enim necessitas uite infinita requirit, sed et modicis contenta est; ergo non appetuntur in infinitum. Item, ea que in finem intantum appetuntur, inquantum inducunt finem; sed si diuitie essent infinite, non possent finem suum inducere, sed 25

22 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et F 4 erit] est F 6 ampliori] maiori F 8 infinitum] quia add. F habetur] mente add. F 9 sic] sed si F 12 per se] om. P 1 4 quia1…possessorum] naturales possidentes (?) F 1 6 considerari] continuari F 1 7 in…appetuntur] est infinitus appetitus F 18 in] post est quia transp. F | ordinantur intantum] correxi ex infra, ll. 20-21 et 24: inv. P iterum F 1 9 utilia…21 sunt1] om. per hom. F 2 1 in] om. F 2 2 necessitas] in infinitum add. F et] etiam F 24 que] sunt add. F 22 ,1 Consequenter…2 infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b31-37 6 semper…7 finem] cf. Auct. Arist., Top. III (44), p. 324; Arist., Top. III.1, 116b22-23 1 1 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1256b34-37

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semper ad illum mouerent, nec terminaretur motus earum, quia infinitorum motus infinitus est, ut dicitur 7º Phisicorum; ergo et cetera. Si autem considerantur primo modo, sic in infinitum appetuntur et quia quidam fines: possessio enim finis est possessoris acquirentis; 30 finis autem non appetitur ab aliqua arte sub ratione determinata, sed semper sub perfectiori statu et in infinitum, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS; ergo, si quis diuitias naturales consideret ut possessiones et quosdam fines, eas appetet in infinitum propter defectum rationis: non enim ordinat eas sicut natura ordinauit.

Ad rationem dicendum quod etiam diuitie artificiales possunt illis duobus modis considerari: uel inquantum ordinantur ad naturalium acquisitionem, sic non in infinitum appetuntur; si autem secundum quod possessiones sunt, sic sunt quasi fines, et sic non ordinantur in naturales, et ideo sic earum appetitus est infinitus et non naturalium, quia isto modo 40 naturales non sunt finis artificialium.| P 280vb 35

Ad secundam dicendum per distinctionem premissam: quod diuitie | naturales “quanto plus habentur, tanto plus appetuntur”, hoc est F 179rb secundum quod sunt quasi fines quidam et possessiones, non autem inquantum sunt naturales ad necessitatem uite ordinate: natura enim, 45 cum consistat in quadam armonia, non est nata infinitis indigere.

2 6 terminaretur] terminarentur F | earum] eorum F 2 7 est] om. F | 7º] 6 PF | ergo…cetera] om. F 28 considerantur] considerentur F | sic] sicut F 29 finis est] inv. F 3 0 ab] sub P 3 1 sub perfectiori] ad perfectionum F | in] om. P 3 2 quis] aliquis P 35 rationem] rationes F etiam] om. P | artificiales] uel add. P | artificiales…36 modis] dupliciter possunt F 38 sunt1] om. F | quasi] om. F 3 9 naturalium] naturales F 41 per] quod F | premissam] premissarum P 4 4 inquantum] in quorum F | uite] nature P | enim…45 cum] inv. P 45 cum] est F | nata] nota P 2 6 infinitorum…27 est] cf. Arist., Phys. VII.1, 242b13-14, 28-29 et adhuc magis Thomam, In Phys. VII.2: “Ex dictis autem patet, quod in eodem tempore in quo movetur A, movetur et B, et omnia alia: ergo motus omnium, qui est EZIT, est in tempore finito. Sed iste motus est infinitus, cum sit infinitorum. Ergo sequetur quod motus infinitus sit in tempore finito; quod est impossibile” (ed. Maggiòlo, p. 456) 3 0 finis…31 infinitum] Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b25-31

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< Q UE S T I O 2 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m , s i c u t < d i c i t > P h i l o s o p hu s , c u i u s l i b e t r e i p o s s e s s e s i t d u p l e x u s us Arguitur quod non, quia usus rei possesse est eius finis; sed unius rei unus est finis; ergo unus usus. Maior patet quia finis proportionatur 5 nature et rationi, et ideo unius rei in natura et ratione est unus finis. Item, unius est una operatio; sed usus est operatio; ergo et cetera. Item, instantia huius propositionis est , cuius usus unus est solus, scilicet commutatio. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

10

Dicendum quod hec propositio non est uniuersaliter nisi sic dicamus, quod cuilibet rei possesse, que talis est quod per eam natura humana sustentari habet, duplex usus. Cuius ratio est quia, secundum diuersas rationes, cuiuslibet rei est duplex operatio, ut hominis una operatio est secundum rationem generis et alia secundum rationem 15 differentie: per animalitatem enim sentit, per rationalitatem intelligit, et ideo sunt duo fines hominis secundum istas duas rationes. Ergo eiusdem rei secundum rationes differentes, per modum subiecti et accidentis, multo magis erit duplex operatio et finis. Hee autem due rationes in tali re ‘possessio’ possunt inueniri: potest enim talis res considerari uel inquantum est 20 23 ,1 Consequenter…utrum] his verbis desinit ex abrupto textus traditus in F 8 denarius] suppl. ex quo postea asseritur, ll. 36-39; cf. etiam loc. parall. B I, q. 20, ll. 7-8 et Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol., q. 18, ubi sic asseritur: “nummisma est una res, et cum est propter unum usum, sicut propter commutationem; ideo et cetera” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 8ra) | cuius] unus est add. sed exp. P 17 ideo] coni.: eadem P | sunt duo] inv. sed corr. P 23 ,1 Consequenter…2 usus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a6-7 10 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a6-9 19 Hee…27 calciatio] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “Est enim uniuscuiusque rei duplex usus, et conueniunt in hoc quod uterque est secundum se et non per accidens; differunt autem in hoc quod unus eorum est proprius usus rei, alius autem non est proprius set communis. Sicut duplex est usus calceamenti: unus quidem proprius, scilicet calciatio, ad hunc enim usum factum est calciamentum; alius autem non est proprius, scilicet commutatio, non enim ad hoc est factum calciamentum ut homo commutet ipsum. Set tamen homo sic potest uti calceamento ut commutet ipsum uel pro pane uel pro cibo; et quamuis commutatio non sit proprius usus calceamenti, est tamen usus eius per se et non secundum accidens, quia ille qui commutat ipsum utitur eo secundum ualorem suum. Et sicut dictum est de calceamento, ita intelligendum est de omnibus aliis rebus quae ab homine possideri possunt” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A101, ll. 39-57)

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possessio, uel inquantum est hec possessio: utrumque enim istorum potest dici de tali re. Et primo modo, inquantum est possessio, secundum istam rationem usus eius est per se: secundum enim id quod est possessio 25 est illa res et est usus eius communis, sicut et aliarum possessionum. Si autem secundum quod est hec et talis possessio, ut si sit calceus, sic usus eius et operatio, uel finis alicuius per se et proprius, est calciatio. Si autem sit aliqua possessio non in nature sustentationem per se ordinata, sed uel intellectu uel a natura fuerit instituta ad omnem usum 30 omnium possessionum, scilicet ad commutationem, et ille sibi sit proprius, eo quod illa, secundum id quod est, ad hoc inuenta sit, tunc in illa re isti duo usus non different nisi ratione sola. Et talis est pecunia uel denarius, qui secundum rationem suam propriam ad talem est institutus, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum: condixerunt enim communiter homines ut afferenti 35 denarium detur quo indiget, propter quod et communis fideiussor dicitur, uel est mensura communis omnium commutabilium. Et in isto denario habet instantiam dicta propositio. Tamen, si illo modo accipiatur ut dictum est hec propositio, instantia locum non habebit, eo quod denarius in sustentationem nature per se non ordinatur. Est tamen intelligendum 40 quod, saltim per accidens, potest denarii esse secundus usus, qui fit quando alicui traditur in pignore: hoc enim est ei propter ualorem materie, non inquantum denarius est.

Ad rationes dicendum quod unius rei unus est finis et operatio uere secundum unam rationem, sed secundum | rationes diuersas P 281ra 45 potest esse duplex et diuersus eius usus. 2 3 est…24 sed] aliquid add. in marg. sed, ligatura abscondito, legi potest tantum est; reliqua suppl. ex Thomae Sent. Pol. I.7: “... et quamuis commutatio non sit proprius usus calciamenti, est tamen usus eius per se et non secundum accidens” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A101, ll. 51-53). Vide etiam apparatum fontium 2 7 operatio] est add. P 3 4 condixerunt] correxi ex fonte allata: cum dixerint P 3 2 pecunia…36 commutabilium] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133a19-21, 25-29 et b10-20; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. V (95), p. 239. Vide etiam Albertum, Pol. I.7: “... eo quod de facili vehitur et revehitur numisma, et est mensura valoris omnium et fidejussor futurae necessitatis” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 55) 3 4 condixerunt…35 indiget] haec sententia sumpta videtur esse ex Thomae Sent. Ethic. V.9: “est enim condictum inter homines quod afferenti denarium detur id quo indigent” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 295, ll. 69-71) 3 7 si…38 propositio] cf. supra, ll. 8-9 4 0 saltim…41 pignore] cf. infra, q. 28, ll. 21-24 et Thomam, QQ. disp. de malo q. 13, art. 4, ad 15: “pecunie autem e conuerso principalis usus est commutatio, propter hanc enim pecunia facta est; secundarius autem usus pecunie potest esse quicumque alius, puta quod ponatur in pignore uel quod ostentetur” (ed. Leon. XXIII, p. 257, ll. 407- 411)

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Ad tertiam patet quod non ualet instantia. < Q UE S T I O 2 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m m u l ti tu d o p e c u n i a r u m s i n t u e r e d i u i t i e Arguitur quod sic, quia illa sunt uere diuitie quibus homo potest habere quid et quando et ubi uoluerit, indiguerit; sed talia sunt multitudo pecuniarum; ergo ille sunt uere diuitie. Minor patet quia dicitur, 5º Ethicorum, quod denarius est communis fideiussor, ut apportanti illum 5 detur quo indiget. Et hoc etiam dicitur 1º Rhetorice. Item, illa ad que homines maxime inclinantur sunt uere diuitie; sed homines maxime inclinantur ad multitudinem pecuniarum; ergo multitudo pecuniarum sunt uere diuitie. Contra: inconueniens est tales esse diuitias quibus habundans fame 10 perit; sed tales sunt multitudo pecuniarum; ergo inconueniens est eas dicere ueras diuitias.

Dicendum quod, ad sciendum que sit uera ratio diuitiarum, inspiciendum est ad rationem diuitis. Diues autem est per se sufficiens sibi, ut 24 ,6 1º] 2 P 24 ,1 Consequenter…diuitie] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b5-7 5 denarius…6 indiget] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133b10-12; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. V (95), p. 239; cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 34-35 cum adn. 6 Et…Rhetorice] cf. Arist., Rhet. I.5, 1361a12-24 1 0 inconueniens…11 perit] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b14-17: “... numismate dives multotiens indigebit necessario cibo, quamvis inconveniens tales esse divitias, quibus abundans fame periet, quemadmodum et Midam illum fabulose dicunt propter insatiabilitatem desideri omnibus sibi factis exhibitis aureis” (ed. Susemihl, p. 38, ll. 5-8) 1 3 Dicendum…18 diues1] cf. Thomam, In Librum De Causis 21: “Primum est dives propter seipsum et est dives magis. Ad cuius evidentiam accipiatur propositio CXXVIIa Procli, quae talis est: Omne divinum simplex prime est et maxime, et propter hoc maxime per se sufficiens” (ed. Saffrey, p. 112, ll. 11-14) | Dicendum…25 se] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidii Romani commentarium ad prop. 21am Libri De Causis: “Dubitaret forte aliquis quid sit esse diues. Dicendum quod secundum Phylosophum, in Politicis, nomen diuitiarum sumptum est ab abundantia vel etiam a non indigentia sumitur … Ille ergo est diues qui non indiget sed abundat et inde est quod, cum sint duo genera diuitiarum, quaedam naturales, sicut frumentum, vinum et caetera terra nascentiae, quae subueniunt indigentiae nostrae, quaedam autem sunt diuitiae artificiales, sicut aurum et argentum et nummismata, quae per artificium hominum inuenta sunt ad satisfaciendum indigentiae nostrae, magis merentur dici diuitiae quam artificiales, quia magis satisfaciunt indigentiae nostrae ... Naturales vero diuitiae satisfaciunt nobis directe et per se. Differentia ergo quae est inter diuitias naturales et artificiales sufficienter declarat quod diuitem esse non est non indigere, sed esse sufficientem. Hoc idem declaratur per id quod Phylosophus in

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apparet ex consequenti illius propositionis Primum est diues per se, in Libro De Causis. Et hoc patet ex propositione PROCLI, ubi dicit quod omne diuinum est simplex, ergo sufficiens et diues; ergo maxime sufficiens maxime erit diues. Modo diues denotatur a diuitiis, ergo diuitie erunt hoc per quod aliquis est sufficiens sibi per se; illud autem per quod aliquis 20 debet esse sufficiens sibi per se oportet quod sit tale quod possit supplere defectum per se; ergo uere diuitie, et per se et simpliciter, sunt quibus defectus nature per se suppleri potest. Tales autem diuitie naturales, ergo ille sunt uere et simpliciter et per se diuitie. Artificiales autem, cum non sint nate per se supplere defectum nature, ipse non erunt diuitie 25 simpliciter et per se, et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod illud quod est a lege non sunt uere diuitie, quia potest mutari uoluntate hominum, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum: naturales enim non possunt mutari, quin semper ualeant ad suppletionem defectuum et usum hominum; iste tamen sunt quodammodo diuitie, quia per eas, saltim mediate et per acci30 dens, inquantum commutantur pro naturalibus, suppletur defectus nature. 15

Ad rationem dicendum quod per istas artificiales diuitias non semper potest haberi quod homo uult, immo aliquando deficit; et si non deficiat, adhuc habentur necessaria nature per illas, secundum accidens et mediate. Et ideo ratio non concludit, quia uere diuitie, et simpliciter per se 35 et immediate, debent supplere defectum . Ad secundam dicendum eodem modo appetuntur propter generalitatem commutandi pro supplentibus defectum nature, tamen hoc est per accidens et mediantibus diuitiis naturalibus. 16 propositione…ubi] coni. (cf. fontes allatas): corpore philosophi ut P 17 sufficiens1] sufficientem P 1 9 aliquis1] aliquid P 2 1 simpliciter] coni. ex infra, ll. 22-23: naturales P 29 quodammodo] uere add. sed exp. P 36 multitudo pecuniarum] suppl. ex supra, l. 8 Politicis dicit ... quod quicquid indiget est aliquo modo compositum, illud autem quod est omnino simplex nullo indigere potest” (ed. Venetiis 1550, ff. 70v-71r) 15 Primum…se] Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (16), p. 232; Liber De Causis XX (XXI) 162 (ed. Pattin, p. 92, ll. 48- 49) 16 omne…18 diues1] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 127 (ed. Boese, p. 64). Haec sententia, “omne diuinum est simplex”, etiam invenitur in Arist., Metaph. XII.7, 1072a31-34 2 1 uere…23 diuitie] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “uere diuitie sunt ex huiusmodi rebus quibus subuenitur necessitati nature; ideo autem iste sunt uere diuitie quia possunt tollere indigentiam et facere sufficientiam habenti eas” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A99, ll. 239-242) 2 5 illud…26 hominum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b10-13, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “non sunt uere diuitie ille que uariata hominum dispositione nullam dignitatem neque utilitatem habent ad necessitatem uite” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A103, ll. 207-209)

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< Q UE S T I O 2 5 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a p p e t i t u s f i n i s s i t i n f i n i t u s

P 281rb

Arguitur quod non, quia inclinatio sequens determinatam et finitam naturam non potest esse infinita; sed omnis appetitus, uel sensitiuus uel intellectiuus, sequitur determinatam naturam hominis; ergo non est infinitus. Maior patet quia inclinatio illa, cum sit a natura et sequatur 5 eam, mensurabitur secundum mensuram nature, cui primo et | per se sequitur. Item, hoc arguitur ex obiecto, quia appetitus qui est ad determinatam naturam non est infinitus; sed appetitus finis est in determinatam naturam; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia obiectum determinat potentiam. 10 Minor patet quia felicitas, que est finis hominis, est aliquod ens determinatum. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur quia, si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis et maxime ad maxime, quia processus tenet in eis que sunt per se; modo finis simpliciter appetitur per se; ergo magis sumptus, 15 magis appetitur, et sic in infinitum.

Dicendum quod desiderium finis absolute aliqualiter est infinitus: hoc enim ad finem se habet sicut actio ad agentem, quia agens et actio mutuo se respiciunt; sicut ergo se habet agens ad actionem, ita finis ad appetitum. Modo ita est quod actio procedens ab agente indeterminate respectu illius 20 actionis est infinita, ut est actio Primi, qua aliquid agit ex non ente; similiter desiderium se habet respectu finis, quia finis, secundum quod finis, non determinatus per ordinationem in alium finem, agit desiderium; ergo illud desiderium erit infinitum.

25 ,3 sed] scilicet P 5 sequatur] sequitur P 8 quia] quare P 1 9 actionem] praem. agentem et sed et exp. P 25 ,1 Consequenter…infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b40-1258a2 13 si…14 maxime2] Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264, Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22

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35

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Sed notandum quod infinitum dicitur quod est priuatio finiti; priuatio noscitur per habitum. Finitum autem est habens terminum infra quem sunt omnia rei et extra eum nichil, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice. Et primo terminus inuenitur in quantitate et postea in substantia, unde et diffinitio dicitur terminus rei. Et isti duo modi ad duos uadunt, quia ultimum potest dupliciter accipi: uel secundum quantitatem uel secundum rationem et substantiam. Et ideo finitum et infinitum hiis duobus modis dicuntur: aliquod enim est infinitum secundum quantitatem uel secundum substantiam. Si secundum quantitatem, hoc dicitur dupliciter: uel secundum actum primum termino quantitatis carens – et hoc est impossibile in rerum natura, ut dicitur 3º Phisicorum –, uel secundum actum permixtum potentie – et hoc est possibile, sicut linea est diuisibilis in infinitum –. Et istis duobus modis desiderium infinitum non est, quia isti modi infinite potentie sunt quantitates; desiderium autem quantitatem non habet. Alio modo dicitur aliquid infinitum secundum substantiam et rationem, et tale est quod non determinatur secundum suam rationem, nec a

2 6 terminum] extra quam quem add. sed exp. P | infra] correxi ex fonte allata: intra P 2 8 substantia] correxi ex quo infra, ll. 29-33, ex Petri QQ. Metaph. II, q. 28: “et ista ratio termini primo reperitur in magnitudine, postea in causa finali et substantia rei, que dicitur quid erat esse” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 144rb) et ex Petri QQ. Phys. I, q. 25: “Finis autem dicitur de termino quantitatis, et hoc proprie; alio modo, dicitur de substantia rei, secundum quod dicit Aristoteles quinto Metaphysicae quod definitio terminus dicitur, quia extra eam nihil est de re” (ed. Delhaye, p. 55): aliis P 32 substantiam] subiectum P 3 6 Phisicorum] praem. de anima sed exp. P 3 7 possibile] impossibile P 25 Sed…42 contingit] pars ista, una cum distinctione specierum infiniti et fontibus huic allatis, verbis utitur valde similibus illis quibus Petrus utitur in aliis operibus suis ; cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. II, q. 28 (ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 144rb-va), Petrum, QQ. Phys. I, q. 25 (ed. Delhaye, pp. 55-56), Petrum, QQ. De Caelo I, qq. 18 (ed. Galle, p. 102, ll. 53-58) et 21 (ibid., pp. 114-116, ll. 16-26, 32-39, 47-52), Petrum (?), QQ. De Caelo I, q. 23 (ed. Musatti, pp. 60-62) et Petrum, Quodl. VI, q. 1 ( Vtrum Deus possit producere in esse quicquid extra se intelligit , ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 85vb). Vide etiam Petrum, Quodl. I, q. 1 (ed. Schabel, p. 124, l. 20-p. 127, l. 16) | infinitum…finiti] cf. Arist., Phys. III.7, 207b35-208a1 | priuatio2…26 habitum] Auct. Arist., De An. III (154), p. 187; Arist., De An. III.6, 430b21-23 2 6 Finitum…27 nichil] Arist., Metaph. V.17, 1022a4-5: “Terminus dicitur quod est cuiuslibet ultimum et cuius extra nichil est accipere primi et cuius infra omnia primi” (ed. AL XXV.3.2, p. 115, ll. 657- 658) 2 8 diffinitio…29 rei] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b16-18 3 4 secundum2…36 natura] Arist., Phys. III.5, 204a20-28 3 6 secundum…37 infinitum] cf. Arist., Phys. III.6, 206a17-18

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priori nec a posteriori conterminari uel determinari contingit. Isto autem modo intelligentie sunt finite a parte ante, quia a priori dependent; sed a parte ante, quia non determinantur ab aliquo posteriori – uel forma uel accidens – ipsis, et hoc est quod dicitur in Libro De Causis. 45 Materia autem et forma in inferioribus sunt, quare alterutrum et a priori et a posteriori , et etiam subiectum accidente.

P 281va

Modo, sicut est de entitate, ita et de bonitate; finis autem et bonum idem; ille ergo finis qui non determinatur alio posteriori in quem ordinetur, a parte illa infinitus secundum rationem bonitatis; , quia quantum ad hoc nec ex aliquo priori dependet accipiendo bonum, nec a posteriori, in quem ordinatur, determinatur. Et addendum quod ad esse finem sufficit ut uideatur bonum, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, quia utrumque accidit bono comprehenso, scilicet uel uere esse bonum uideri bonum et 55 esse bonum solum apparenter; | bonum autem comprehensum per se est finis. Dicendum ergo quod desiderium potest considerari secundum naturam, a qua primo et per se est. Et si illa est infinita, et ipsum erit infinitum, ut desiderium Dei siue aliquod bonum fertur a parte subiecti 60 erit infinitum. Si autem natura sit finita, ut in homine, tunc desiderium etiam erit finitum, quia oportet effectum commensurari sue cause. Si autem secundum obiectum consideretur, sic est ut sic et est ut non, quia, si consideretur desiderium humanum secundum quod actu fertur in 65 4 6 quare] quia P | et3] uel P 5 2 bonum] boni P 5 3 ordinatur] stet, etsi exp. et scrips. ordinatum P 55 uideri] esse add. sed exp. P 5 6 bonum2] iter. sed corr. P 58 considerari] add. uel P 6 1 erit] esset P 4 2 Isto…45 ipsis] Liber De Causis IV 45 (ed. Pattin, p. 56, ll. 68-74); cf. etiam XV (XVI) 131 (ibid., p. 81, ll. 79- 85), sed cf. potius Thomam, In Librum De Causis 16: “... sed est infinita solum inferius, non superius. Dicitur quidem inferius infinita virtus intelligentiae quia non comprehenditur ab hiis quae sunt infra ipsam; non est autem infinita superius quia exceditur a suo superiori cuius comprehensione finitur ... quia ... a seipso unumquodque et a superioribus circumscribitur et terminatur, ab inferioribus autem circumscribi non potest” (ed. Saffrey, p. 95, ll. 16-20 et 22-24). Vide etiam Petrum, QQ. De Caelo I, q. 18: “Dicuntur autem aliae substantiae immateriales infinitae secundum quid, quia inquantum non terminantur per materiam nec sunt entia in materia, infinita sunt. Inquantum tamen ordinantur ad aliud et suum esse suscipiunt ab alio, finitatem et terminationem habent, quia ab alio sunt” (ed. Galle, p. 103, ll. 71-75) et Thomam, STh Ia, q. 7, art. 2, resp. (ed. Leon. IV, p. 74) ubi tamen angeli ut exemplum adducuntur 5 3 ad…56 apparenter] Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a24-26 62 oportet…63 cause] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (73), p. 146, Arist., Phys. II.3, 195b21-28; Auct. Arist., An. Post. II (110), p. 320; Arist., An. Post. II.12, 95a10-14; Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (124), p. 125

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finem, etiam qui sit ultimus, sic non est infinitum, quia non potest simili actu ferri in obiectum infinitum, cum sit a subiecto finito, immo hoc esset impossibile. Et ideo, sic considerando, desiderium finitum est propter finitatem nature ex qua est, que non permittit simul in actu inclinationem 70 esse infinitam, quia natura non inclinat in actu in aliquod infinitum, quia natura non inclinat nisi ad bonum apprehensum: infinitum autem actu non est comprehendere nec sensu nec intellectu, qui ex sensibus cedit. 75

80

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Si autem consideretur illud desiderium secundum potentiam quam inuenit in obiecto, : obiectum enim ex se potentiam habet ad ulteriorem et perfectiorem rationem bonitatis quam sit illa sub qua actu comprehensum est, et ideo ex illa potentia obiecti ad ulteriorem appetitum quam sit ille quo iam actu appetebat. Et hec est multiplicitas non in actu, sed in potentia permixta actui et proportionaliter ad infinitum in quantitate, , quia in linea, que quantum est de se habet potentiam in infinitum diuidendi, hec tamen potentia non est in diuidente, sed in linea primo; diuisio ergo linee : quodcumque enim diuidens diuidat in actu, remanet adhuc potentia in linea ad ulteriorem diuisionem. Sic et hoc desiderium finis est in infinitum a parte finis, quia sub quocumque gradu bonitatis appetens ipsum desideret, adhuc remanet in fine ulterior gradus bonitatis. Si ergo considerando desiderium finis, est infinitum secundum rationem bonitatis, non in actu, sed potentia que in eo. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod appetitus finis est infinitus, notabiliter dicendo finis, quia non loquitur de fine qui in alium ordinetur – sic enim non esset finis finis.

Si autem aliquis obiciat sic: si appetitus finis ex subiecto sit finitus in actu, ergo quando homo appetit finem secundum ultimam potentiam hominis, iam non contingit eum amplius appetere, quia omnis operatio rei naturalis determinata est – 2º De Anima super illud uerbum omnium 95 natura constantium –, dico quod potentia desiderandi finem in infinitum non est a parte appetentis, ut iam dictum est, sed est ex parte finis potentia 6 7 finito] infinito P 6 9 permittit] permittitur P 8 3 remanet] praem. cum P 8 6 ulterior] ulteriori sed corr. P | gradus] correxi ex l. praec.: ideo P | Sic] corr. ex supra, l. 68 7 7 et…84 diuisionem] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. II, q. 28: “Sed illud infinitum, cum sit, non est in actu simpliciter puro, sed in permixto potentie ad intellectum ulteriorem, ita quod sicut ratio infiniti in linea est quod, facta diuisione, in nouo signo remaneat potentia ad 8 8 appetidiuisionem in aliis signis ...” ( ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 144va) tus…89 infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b26 9 4 omnium…95 constantium] cf. Arist., De An. II.4, 416a16-17; Auct. Arist., De An. II (87), p. 181 9 5 potentia…96 appetentis] cf. supra, ll. 61- 63

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illa ad ulterius, sicut prius ostensum fuit per simile in continuis; summa ratio bonitatis per se est in fine; ideo contingit ire in infinitum ratio bonitatis in eis que in finem, et non potest attingere gradum bonitatis finalis, et 100 ideo bonitas eorum finalitas. Item, ratio infiniti est non excedi ab alio.

Ad rationes dicendum simul quod appetitus, qui est determinata natura et in determinatam naturam, in actu non est infinitus; potentia tamen potest esse infinitus – potentia, inquam, remanente in obiecto illo secundum se –. < Q UE S T I O 2 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m a p p e t i tu s d i u i t i a r u m a r t i f i c i a l i u m s it in f init u s

P 281vb

Arguitur quod non, quia appetitus eius quod in aliud ordinatur non est infinitus; modo diuitie artificiales in aliud ordinantur, quia in naturales; ergo | earum non est infinitus appetitus. Maior patet quia appe- 5 titum illius quod in alium ordinatur ut in finem contingit excedi ab appetitu illius finis. Hoc autem contra rationem infiniti. Contra: desiderium quod, quanto plus habetur, tanto plus diligitur, est infinitum; tales sunt diuitie artificiales; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod diuitie artificiales uel pecunia potest considerari 10 dupliciter: uel secundum quod ordinatur ad necessaria uite uel secundum se, prout queritur ab aliquo per se et sicut finis. Si primo modo, sic est appetitus pecunie infinitus, quia appetitus eius quod in finem commensuratur ipsi fini, et intantum illud appetitur inquantum est utile in finem; sed non est in infinitum utile, ergo non infinitum appetitum eius contingit 15 esse. Ideo diuitie artificiales, secundum quod ad uitam ordinantur, non possunt appeti in infinitum, quia non sunt utiles ad uitam, et hoc in infinitum. Si autem considerentur secundo modo, prout aliquis eas querit ut

10 3 tamen potest] inv. sed corr. P 26 ,9 infinitum] infinitus P 1 5 non1] ut P 9 7 sicut…continuis] cf. supra, ll. 78- 84 2 6, 1 Consequenter…2 infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b25-34 10 Dicendum…20 infinitus] cf. Thomam STh Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3 (ed. Leon. VI, pp. 17-18)

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finem per se, sic earum desiderium est in infinitum; cuius ratio ex predictis patet, quia appetitus finis secundum quod finis est infinitus.

Vnde dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod diuitie commutatiue in diuitias sunt appetibiles in infinitum. Cuius ratio est quia illud est maxime infinitum in quo idem est in ratione principii et finis. Propter hoc etiam PHILOSOPHUS, 8º Phisicorum, motum circularem probat esse infinitum. Sed sic est de 25 pecunia commutatim: si pecunia ibi enim secunda est ex prima et , sic infinite sunt, quia semper pecunia in pecuniam commutatur, et ideo appetitus eius illo modo est infinitus. Item, dicit adhuc PHILOSOPHUS post quod omnis appetitus illius ad quod, cum peruentum fuerit, adhuc amplius desideratur, infinitus. 30 Sic est de pecunia: irreplebilis enim concupiscentia hominum, ut postea dicet; et ideo appetitus pecunie est infinitus. Cuius ratio est quia omnis delectatio secundum sensum est cum priuatione perfectionis alicuius, et ideo, in quocumque fertur appetitus sensitiuus ut in finem, illud in infinitum appetitur. Et sic de pecunia, unde talium deus est pecunia. Et ideo, 35 secundum rationem finis, in infinitum appetitur.

Vnde ad rationem dicendum quod procedit sua uia. < Q U E S TIO 2 7 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m u s u s c a m p s o r i e p o s s i t e s s e s e c u n d um o r d i n e m i u s t i t i e Arguitur quod non, quia illud quod uituperatur iuste est secundum ordinem iustitie, quia uituperium iustum de iusto non est; sed 5 usus campsorie uituperatur iuste, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS; ergo et cetera. 2 5 pecunia2] pecunias P 2 8 omnis] omnia P 2 7 ,3 illud] uel P 2 1 diuitie…22 infinitum1] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b28-30 2 4 motum…infinitum] Arist., Phys. VIII.8, 262b27-28 et 264b9-265a2 28 omnis…29 infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1258a1-2 3 0 irreplebilis…hominum] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a41-b5 27 ,1 Consequenter…2 iustitie] cf. Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258a38-b4; eadem quaestio etiam invenitur in Henrico de Gandavo, Quodl. VI, q. 22 (ed. Wilson, pp. 203-210) 3 Arguitur…5 cetera] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Henrico de Gandavo, Quodl. VI, q. 22: “Et arguitur quod non, quia dicit Philosophus in Iº Politicae quod est ‘iuste vituperata’. Non autem vituperatur iuste commutatio, nisi sit illicita” (ed. Wilson, p. 203, ll. 6- 8) 5 usus…iuste] Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258a40-b1

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Item, nichil quod est preter naturam est secundum ordinem iustitie; sed usus istius est huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet quia quod est preter naturam est uiolentum; nullum autem uiolentum iustum, 1º huius. Minor patet quia naturaliter pecunia debet commutari pro diuitiis 10 naturalibus; hoc autem non facit campsoria. Item, nulla commutatio in qua plus recipitur quam detur, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum, potest esse secundum ordinem iustitie; talis est que fit secundum usum campsorie; ergo et cetera. Contra: nichil quod est necessarium ad communicationem ciuilem est contra iustitiam; usus campsorie est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Maior 15 patet: intantum unumquodque iustum est inquantum communicationi ciuili utile est, 5º Ethicorum. Minor patet quia campsoria utilis est propter egrinos et aduenas. Item, nullus accipiens id quod est alterius non preter uoluntatem eius 20 iniuste accipit, quia iniustificare est campsor; ergo et cetera.

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282ra

Dicendum quod questio potest querere duo: uel utrum usus campsorie absolute sumptus possit esse iustus, uel utrum plus | accipiens possit esse iustus. Si primo modo queritur, distingue sicut prius, quia uel ordinat illam commutationem ad diuitias naturales uel solum ad pecuniam. Si primo 25 modo, sic bene potest esse secundum ordinem iustitie, ceteris saluis; cuius ratio est quia aliquid ordinare uel ordinando in illud in quod naturaliter < re> > non est iniustum. Si autem sit solum propter pecuordinatur exerce< nias, sic non est secundum ordinem iustitie. Cuius ratio est quia nullus actus ex cuius exercitio generatur habitus contrarius iustitie potest esse 30 secundum ordinem iustitie, quia similes habitus ex similibus operationibus

7 quod…8 uiolentum1] cf. Arist., Phys. V.6, 230a29-30; Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1370a9 8 nullum…iustum] Arist., Pol. I.3, 1253b22-23 1 1 nulla…12 iustitie] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5- 6, 1133 b17-18 et 31-32 1 6 intantum…17 est1] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.1, 1129b17-19 20 iniustificare] iniustum et iniustificatio differunt: alterum – iniustum – est quod natura vel lege tale; alterum – iniustificatio – significat tale iniustum quando operatum est, ideo voluntarium: sic in Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1135a8-11 et V.8, 1135a19-23. Cf. Arist., Rhet. I.13, 1373b27-28: “Est autem iniustificare a voluntariis iniustia pati; iniustificare vero diffinitum est prius voluntarium esse” (AL XXXI.1-2, p. 55, ll. 19-21). Vide etiam loc. parall. B I, q. 25, ll. 13-17 ubi clare profertur quod campsoria est aliquid ad voluntatem pertinens 24 distingue…25 pecuniam] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 10-12 31 similes…32 fiunt] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103b21-22

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fiunt, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum; ex usu autem talis commutationis potest fieri habitus qui erit causa multorum uitiorum et malorum, ut post dicit PHILOSOPHUS; ergo talis usus campsorie non potest esse secundum ordinem iustitie.

Item, actus intendens aliquid ut finem ultimum, quod non est uere finis, nec potest esse iustus nec uirtuosus; sed talis est usus campsorie sic acceptus: eligit enim diuitias et pecuniam ut finem ultimum, et ideo isto modo iuste uituperatur ipsa campsoria, quia non commutat pecunias ad 40 illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur commutatio eorum, sed inuicem pecuniam pro pecunia commutat. Si autem secundo modo querat questio, tunc dico quod per se non debet plus accipere secundum iustitiam; cuius ratio est quia iustitia est per quam uolumus et operamur iusta et equalia, uel secundum proportionem 45 geometricam uel arismeticam: nam arismetica proportio debet esse in commutatione, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum, ut dans tantum debet recipere quantum capit, ad hoc ut maneat ciuitas, quia si plus uel minus caperet, tunc substantia unius deficeret. Substantia autem deficiente, deficeret et commutatio; si autem communi50 catio et ciuitas; ideo, si debet reseruari ciuitas, oportet ut non plus recipiat commutans inquantum huiusmodi et per se, et ideo isto modo, si plus recipit, iniuste agit. Secundum accidens tamen potest plus recipere. Hoc autem contingit uidere ex dignitate rei commutabilis, que dignitas accidit commutationi. 55 Hec autem dignitas considerari debet non ex substantia rei et natura – 3 2 fiunt] praem. facit sed exp. P | 2º] primo P 3 7 iustus] quia add. P | sic] sicut P 4 0 ordinatur] s.l. P 4 9 commutatio2…destrueretur] suppl. ex ll. 16-20 q. seq. et ex fonte ibi allata 3 2 ex…34 Philosophus] re vera ante; cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b40-1258a12 4 3 iustitia…45 | iustitia…47 capit] cf. Henricum de arismeticam] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.6, 1134a25-28 Gandavo, Quodl. I, q. 39 (ed. Macken, p. 211, l. 55-p. 212, l. 62) 4 5 arismetica…46 commuta5 5 Hec…59 humanum] cf. Henricum de tione] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133a5-16, 19-26 Gandavo, Quodl. VI, q. 22: “... sciendum quod in rebus naturalibus, quae in commutativa naturali inter se debent commutari, duo est considerare, scilicet rei substantiam et eius valorem, non in gradu et natura rei sed ad usum hominum, quemadmodum, licet in natura et essentia rei plus valet morbidus equus quam robustus asinus, ad usum tamen plus valet robustus asinus quam morbidus equus. Cum igitur in commutatione vult aliquis dare vel accipere rem pro re vel pro pecunia, non tam debet inspici ad rei vel rerum substantiam quantum ad valorem: aliter enim aequitas non observaretur” (ed. Wilson, p. 207, ll. 4-12). Vide etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. V.9: “Et dicit, quod ideo possunt omnia adaequari, quia omnia possunt commensurari per aliquid unum, ut dictum est. Hoc autem unum quod omnia mensurat, secundum rei veritatem est indigentia, quae continet omnia commutabilia, in quantum scilicet omnia referuntur ad humanam indigentiam; non enim appretiantur res secundum dignitatem naturae ipsorum; alioquin unus mus, quod est animal sensibile, maioris

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quia tunc unus pretisior esset omni auro, quia nobilior est secundum naturam, eo quod attingit gradum entium animatorum –, sed debet attendi in ordinem ad alterum et secundum quod uenit in usum humanum; et non solum secundum usum communicantis uel recipientis, sed secundum usum communem ciuitatis uel regionis, quia forte aliquando, propter indigentiam recipientis uel dilectionem dantis, pretiosius estimaretur quam esset. Cuius ratio est quia hoc aliter attenditur secundum communem usum regionis et ciuitatis et secundum ordinem in bonum commune: ad hoc enim respicit communicatio omnium, et ideo dignitas et ualor rei commutabilis debet attendi secundum communem usum. A parte tamen commutantis debet attendi labor eius, quia ille dans ad laborandum in re commutabili ex lege iustitie non compellitur. Et ideo contingit aliquando quod res ista melior est illa secundum substantiam suam, secundum tamen usum regionis istius sit melior, ut patet de denario translato; et ideo fit commutatio pecunie unius regionis ad pecuniam alterius ita quod dans plus recipit, et hoc, pensando | laborem suum et uilitatem pecunie quam recipit, que uilior est in illa regione quam in propria, non tamen pensando indigentiam recipientis, bene iuste plus recipit quam det; hoc tamen est per accidens, quia pensare ista, et laborem et ualorem, accidit pecunie utrique et accidit commutationi; et ideo per accidens iustum. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod multi faciunt iniusta, non tamen sunt iniusti, 5º Ethicorum. Et sic est hic, quia secundum dignitatem rei per se non debet plus recipere, secundum dignitatem tamen per accidens potest plus recipere.

60

65

70

75

Ad rationes dicendum: ad primas duas quod campsoria, si 80 commutat propter ipsas pecunias, iniusta et uitiosa et uituperabilis iuste

5 6 mus] suppl. ex Thomae textu in apparatu fontium allatu, ll. 55-59 5 7 naturam] ut add. sed exp. P 6 5 dignitas] rei cum add. sed exp. P 6 9 usum] tamen add. P pretii esset quam una margarita, quae est res inanimata; sed rebus pretia imponuntur secundum quod homines indigent eis ad suum usum” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, pp. 294-295, ll. 49- 60) 68 contingit…70 translato] cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/3.10: “quodlibet enim numisma (per se loquendo) plus valet in propria regione. Accidit ergo forte aliquos habere aliqua numismata, quae non multum appretiabantur in regione sua, eo quod non esse propria regioni illi” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 372) 7 3 bene…76 iustum] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Henrico de Gandavo, Quodl. VI, q. 22: “... nullo modo licet accipere amplius, nisi quatenus sua interest pro labore computandi et custodiendi numismata et cetera quae pertinent ad curam eius, dum tamen hoc faciat bona fide: alias autem nullo modo licet” (ed. Wilson, p. 209, ll. 74-77) 7 6 multi…77 iniusti] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.6, 1134a32-33

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est. Si autem propter naturales diuitias, bene potest esse iusta, ceteris conditionibus modo dictis saluatis. 85

Ad tertiam dicendum quod commutatio in qua plus recipitur quam detur per se est iniusta, per accidens tamen potest, secundum ordinem iustitie, esse iusta. < Q U E S TIO 2 8 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r a n p r o u s u p e c u n i e i l l e q u i c o n c e d i t p o s s i t re c i p e re al iqu id

Arguitur quod sic, quia accipere quod non est contra uoluntatem dantis est secundum ordinem iustitie; sed usurarius accipit non contra 5 uoluntatem dantis; ergo non agit iniuste plus accipiendo. Maior patet quia iniuste agere est preter uoluntatem passi, 5º Ethicorum. Item, monetatum non differt a monetato secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum rationem, ergo, si pro usu unius accipit, ergo pro usu alterius accipit; modo ita est quod, secundum ordinem iustitie, 10 aliquis potest accipere pro usu metalli non monetati, ut ciphi et anuli; ergo similiter iuste potest aliquid accipere pro usu numismatis. Contra: quod est maxime iustitie et quod corrumpit communicationem ciuitatis, super quam fundata est iustitia, illud non potest esse secundum ordinem iustitie; sed hoc facit acceptio alicuius pro 15 usu pecunie; ergo accipere sic est contra ordinem iustitie. Minor patet quia accipere aliquid pro usu pecunie est plus accipere quam dederit. Qui autem plus accipit quam dederit, substantiam alterius destruit; substantia autem unius destructa, destruitur commutatio que fit per illam; commuta-

84 tertiam] secundam P 8 5 tamen] per add. sed exp. P | potest] esse add. P 2 8, 4 dantis] non add. P 2 8, 1 Consequenter…2 aliquid] cf. Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258b2- 8 6 iniuste…passi] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.9, 1136b6, 13-14 7 Item…11 numismatis] hoc argumentum sumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, arg. 6 (ed. Leon. IX, p. 155) 1 7 substantia…20 ciuitas] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133b14-16, sed cf. potius Michaelem Ephesium, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 8: “Communicatio est quia commutamus, commutamus autem propter equalitatem, equalia autem fiunt propter commensurationem, commensuratio autem propter numisma; quare, non existente numismate, commensuratio non erit. Commensuratione autem non existente, neque commutatio; commutatione autem deficiente, deficiet et communicatio” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 107ra)

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tione autem destructa, destruitur communicatio; communicatione des20 tructa, non manet ciuitas, 5º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera.

P 282va

Dicendum quod usus pecunie duplex est: uel usus per se uel per accidens. Primus est commutatio, ad quem pecunia ex sua inuentione ordinatur, 5º Ethicorum et hic; usus autem eius per accidens est ponderatio uel ostentatio uel ornatus uel etiam commutatio eius pro alia pecunia. Tamen naturaliter ad commutationem pro diuitiis naturalibus sic ordinata. 25 Si ergo loquamur de usu pecunie primo modo, dicendum quod aliquid recipere pro usu eius est simpliciter contra ordinem iustitie, quia ipsa naturaliter ad hoc est inuenta, ut sit medium in commutatione, et ideo qui concedit eius usum, concedit et substantiam: ipsa enim secundum rationem eius substantialem ad hoc est ordinata; et econuerso, qui concedit 30 substantiam, concedere debet et usum. Talis enim usus est actus eius proprius et finis in quem naturaliter ordinatur, et ideo non potest aliquis concedere alii pecuniam nisi transferat dominium pecunie a se in illum, eo quod dominium respicit actum rei que est in suo dominio. Et ideo, cum aliquis concedat pecuniam, | et hoc non possit nisi etiam simul concedat et 35 usum, ut dictum est, necessario concedens pecuniam transfert dominium; et econuerso, si concedit dominium, concedet et usum et substantiam. 21 Dicendum…24 pecunia] cf. Henricum de Gandavo, Quodl. I, q. 39: “Philosophus enim distinguit duplicem rei usum: unum ad quem est per se, alium ad quem est per accidens ... sic nummi usus per se est translatio sua, per accidens autem usus eius potest esse pompa et apparentia” (ed. Macken, p. 213, ll.92-97). Sic etiam, et eisdem fere verbis, in Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.11 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 375). Thomas autem, Vum librum Ethicae proferens, sic ut Petrus, sic distinguit pecuniae usum: STh IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, resp. et ad 6: “Pecunia autem, secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic. et in I Polit., principaliter est inventa ad commutationes faciendas: et ita proprius et principalis pecuniae usus est ipsius consumptio sive distractio, secundum quod in commutationes expenditur ... potest esse aliquis alius secundarius usus pecuniae argenteae: ut puta si quis concederet pecuniam signatam ad ostentationem, vel ad ponendum loco pignoris” (ed. Leon. IX, p. 156) 22 Primus…ordinatur] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133a28-29; Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a31-41 26 Si…62 commune] tota ista solutio desumpta videtur esse ab Henrico de Gandavo, Quodl. I, q. 39 (ed. Macken, p. 212, l. 63-p. 214, l. 5), ubi, ad hoc defendendum, Henricus asserit quod usus pecuniae, cum translationis gratia sit, per se quaerit alienationem eius substantiae. Henrici argumento etiam usi sunt Aegidius Romanus (verbis utens similioribus his, quae in Petri textu inveniuntur; cf. De Reg. Princ. II/3.11, ed. Romae 1607, p. 375) et Thomas Aquinas; cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. IX, p. 155); Super Sent. III, dist. 37, art. 6, q. 1, resp. (ed. Moos, pp. 1255-1256); Quodl. III, q. 7, art. 2, resp. (ed. Leon. XXV.2, pp. 275-276, ll. 14-57) 2 8 qui…31 usum] eisdem fere verbis etiam inveniuntur in Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.11: “usus proprius denariorum est expendere et alienare denarios; nunquam ergo potest concedi usus proprius denarij, nisi concedatur eius substantia ... quia concedendo usum denarij, concedit substantiam eius: concedendo uero substantiam, non ulterius spectat ad ipsum usus eius” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 375)

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: ergo, cum aliquis in tali concessione ad usum , ipsi concessori commanere substantia, sicut bene fieret in concessione equi, quia aliquis bene potest uti equo ad proprium usum eius, scilicet equitare, ita tamen quod reseruat substantiam. Sed denarium non potest concedere ad usum, qui est commutatio, nisi transferat substantiam: denarii enim substantia in commutatione uel concessione omnino alienatur; ideo pro usu denarii aliquis accipiens usuram peccat contra iustitiam. Cuius ratio est ex predictis: quia aliquid accipere pro re, que eius non est, est contra ordinem iustitie; sed denarius concessus iam amplius concessoris non est, quia transtulit usum, 50 qui non defertur sine translatione et alienatione substantie, quia usus eius est commutatio et alienatio per se; ergo aliquid recipere pro usu pecunie est contra ordinem iustitie omnino. Et est simile sicut, si aliquis concedat usum pulmenti, quod conuerti habet in substantiam, necessarium est ut substantiam concedat, quia non est pulmento uti sine alienatione omnimo55 da substantie; ergo qui concedit pulmenti usum, et uniuersaliter usum cuiuscumque rei qua nullus potest uti sine translatione substantie omnino, ille facit iniuste: sic enim accipit aliquid pro re que eius non est. Nam, si transtulit substantiam, transtulerit et usum, et econuerso, et ideo quodcumque horum concedat pro alio, nichil iuste potest accipere, et ideo non 60 debet plus petere quam secundum dignitatem rei, ut supra dictum est – secundum dignitatem, inquam, ordine ad usum communem et bonum commune –. 45

Ad rationes dicendum quod uoluntarium dicitur dupliciter sicut necessarium, quia uoluntarium simpliciter uel ex suppositione. Sed iste 65 usurarius accipit ab illo uoluntarie secundo modo, non primo. Vnde, si iste daret plus uoluntarie primo modo, non peccaret recipiens; sed ipse dat uoluntarie secundo modo, scilicet ex suppositione et in tali casu, et ideo recipiens peccat contra iustitiam. 4 1 equi] equus sed corr. P 45 denarii] denarium P 4 9 transtulit] scrips. transulum P 50 defertur] coni.: differtur P 5 4 est] in add. P 5 6 qua] quia P 5 7 enim] non sed corr. P 59 nichil] uel sed corr. s.l. P | iuste] uel iniuste add. sed exp. P 59 non…62 commune] cf. supra, q. 27, ll. 53- 62 63 uoluntarium…64 suppositione] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 199b34-200b15; Arist., Metaph. V.5, 1015a20-b9, ubi ‘necessarium’ secundum diversas acceptiones distinguitur

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Ad secundam dicendum quod non est simile, quia ciphus non per se ordinatur commutationem uel alium usum in quo habeat alienari 70 substantia eius, sed ad alium usum et talem in quo non oportet alienari substantiam. Et ideo, reseruata , potest aliquid recipere concedens pro usu rei. Sed pecunie usus fit cum alienatione . < Q UE S T I O 2 9 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s e r u i i n q u a n t u m t a l i s o p o r t e t e s s e a l i q u a m u i r t u te m Videtur quod non, quia uirtus est habitus electiuus, electio autem est habitus preconsiliatus; seruus autem caret consilio, quia non potest preuidere, ut dicitur; ergo nec habebit electionem, et per consequens nec 5 uirtutem.

P 282vb

Item, illius non est uirtus, in cuius uoluntate non est operari cum uult; sed in uoluntate serui non est operari cum uult; ergo serui non erit aliqua uirtus. Maior patet quia uirtus est laudabilis; nichil enim laudatur nisi uoluntarium; ergo uirtus uoluntarie, cum etiam sit ex electione, 10 ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum. Minor patet quia seruus non mouet ad opus nisi inquantum mouetur a domino, | ut hic dicitur, quod est organum. Contra: qui attingit ad operationem secundum uirtutem, attingit et ad uirtutem; sed seruus attingit ad operationem secundum uirtutem: sequitur enim preceptum domini in opere uirtuoso; ergo et habebit aliquam uirtu- 15

29 ,1 talis] tales sed corr. P 15 uirtuoso] et add. sed exp. P 29 ,1 Consequenter…2 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b21-23 3 electio…4 preconsiliatus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-23 et III.4, 1112a15-16: “Voluntarium autem non omne eligibile, set certe preconsiliatum. Eleccio enim cum racione et intellectu”, sed communius ista sententia invenitur modo quo Petrus eam tradidit; sic, e.g., apud Guillelmum Altissiodorensem, Summa aurea II, tract. II, cap. 1, q. 2: “Licet enim dicat Ethicus [hic est Aristoteles in Ethica vetere] quod eligere est appetitus consiliati ...” (ed. 1500, f. 63va; sic in editione Gauthier: Thomas, Sent. Eth. VI.2, ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 338, in apparatu ad ll. 224-225) 4 seruus…consilio] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12 | non…5 preuidere] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a31-34; cf. supra, q. 8, ll. 7-8 et 15 9 uirtus2…10 uoluntarium] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.7, 1101b14-16 et 31-32; II.4, 1106a1-2 et 7-10; III.1, 1109b30-32; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (35), p. 235 10 uirtus…electione] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1111b4-5; III.6, 1113b3-7 1 1 seruus…12 organum] cf. supra, q. 10, ll. 11-25

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tem. Etiam PLATO in 2º Thimei dicit quod creator nulli creature denegauit per quod potest in beatitudinem ordinari, nec seruo uirtutem que ordinat in felicitatem.

Dicendum quod, si seruus attingat ad aliquam operationem, oportet ut habeat uirtutem. Cuius ratio est quia, debentem operari, necessarium est habere id per quod in finem ordinat; sed seruus debet aliquid operari, ut hic patet; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia omnis operans necesse habet ordinare operationem in finem. Ordinare autem non potest sine uirtute, quia non fit debitus ordo nisi remoueantur impedientia et nisi uoluntas 25 dirigatur in estimatione debiti finis; uirtus autem remouet impedientia habeat estimationem et ordinem: hec enim sunt uitia diuersa et concupiscentie, que non tolluntur nisi per uirtutes; ergo oportet seruum habere aliquas uirtutes. Et hoc dictum est in generali.

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In speciali autem sic est uidere idem, quia ad hoc quod aliquis sotiatur actionem, necesse est habere principium actionis, quia actio non est sine suo principio. Sed principium actionis bone est prudentia, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum; sed seruus attingit ad actionem, ut patuit in hoc 1º, quia seruus est organum animatum actiuum; ergo oportet quod habeat principium actionis, quod est prudentia. Sed prudentia non est sine uirtute omni, quia 19 attingat] attingant sed corr. P 2 6 uitia] correxi ex Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. I, q. 22: “... requiritur quod cognoscat impedimenta et uitia que impediunt uirtutem” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 10rb): initia P 16 creator…17 ordinari] forsitan Plato, Thimaeus 47B, sed haec mentio etiam invenitur in Alberti Pol. I.9: “Dicit enim Plato in secunda parte Timaei, quod creator nulli negavit aliquid eorum quae sunt ad beatitudinem utilia et commoda” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 77); cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 22: “Et Albertus dicit quod Plato in Thymeo, in secunda parte Thymei, uult quod creator omnium nulli negauit illud per quod potest attingere finem suum et felicitatem suam, ut patet 10º Ethicorum” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 10rb). Vide etiam Thomam, QQ. Disp. De Potentia q. 3, art. 17, arg. 2: “Deus non denegavit alicui creaturae id cuius est capax secundum suam naturam” (ed. Pession, p. 90) 19 Dicendum…20 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a33-36 31 principium…prudentia] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b4-6, 16-21; Thomas, Sent. Eth. VI.4: “principia prudentiae sunt fines, circa quos conservatur rectitudo iudicii per virtutes morales” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 347, ll. 156-158) 3 2 seruus1…33 actiuum] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a16-17; cf. supra, q. 10, ll. 38- 41 3 4 prudentia2…41 morales] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1144a7-9 et 1145a1- 6; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.10: “Duo enim sunt necessaria in opere virtutis, [scilicet] quorum unum est ut homo habeat rectam intentionem de fine, quod quidem facit virtus moralis, in quantum inclinat appetitum in debitum finem; aliud autem est quod homo bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc facit prudentia, quae est bene consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 372, ll. 151-158); VI.11: “... propter prudentiae unitatem omnes virtutes morales sunt sibi connexae ... virtus moralis ordinat ad finem, prudentia autem dirigit circa ea quae sunt ad finem” (ibid., p. 377, ll. 162-164, 179-181)

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in prudentia omnes uirtutes sunt connexe, eo quod ad prudentiam haben- 35 dam oportet prius principiis operabilium obedire habendo rectam estimationem de fine. In hoc enim consistit principium operabilium, quia principium praxis est recta estimatio de fine, que non fit nisi per appetitum rectum; rectus autem non est appetitus nisi directus sit uirtutibus moralibus; ergo, si debet habere principium operabilium et prudentiam, necesse 40 est habere uirtutes omnes morales.

Ad rationem dicendum quod habere aliquid in se est dupliciter: uel in se simul et a se; uel in se, non autem a se, id est a ratione sua, sed a ratione domini. Et simile : graue enim habet principium mouendi deorsum in se; non tamen a se, sed a generante, ut patet 8º 45 Phisicorum. Ad secundam dicendum quod non operatur seruus simpliciter cum uult, sed ex suppositione, scilicet si sibi demandatum sit hoc quod est operandum: tunc enim operatur quando uoluerit, nisi impediatur. Et ideo 50 ad hoc oportet habere uirtutem per quam preceptum bene exequatur. < Q UE S T I O 3 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r a n d o m i n i e t s er u i s i t u n a u i r t u s s e c u n du m r a t i o n e m Arguitur quod sic, primo ex parte subiecti, quoniam eorundem secundum speciem et rationem est una uirtus secundum rationem et speciem; sed seruus et dominus sunt unum specie et ratione; ergo eorum 5 est uirtus unius rationis. Item, ex parte obiecti finis: quorum unus est finis secundum rationem, eorum est una operatio et uirtus secundum rationem; sed

4 3 in2] a sed corr. s.l. P 4 5 mouendi] mouens sed corr. P 3 0, 1 una] bona P 4 4 graue…45 generante] Arist., Phys. VIII.4, 255b35-256a2; Auct. Arist., Phys. VIII (208), p. 157; cf. etiam Thomam, In Phys. VIII.8: “quaedam etiam sunt quae moventur secundum naturam, non tamen a seipsis, sicut gravia et levia, et haec etiam ab aliquo moventur ... (quia aut moventur per se a generante, quod facit ea esse gravia et levia; aut moventur per accidens ab eo quod solvit, idest removet, ea quae impediunt vel removent naturalem motum)” (ed. Maggiòlo, p. 542) 30 , 1 Consequenter…2 rationem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b26-27 et 32-36 7 ex…8 rationem2] cf. supra, q. 2, arg. 2

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domini et serui unus est finis secundum rationem, quia felicitas yconomica; ergo et cetera. Contra: si eorum esset uirtus una secundum rationem, tunc unus non differret palitate ab alio, quia principalitas inter istos | secundum P 283ra uirtutem attenditur. Si esset una uirtus, tunc esset secundum rationem equales, quod est inconueniens.

Dicendum quod domini et serui non est una uirtus secundum rationem et speciem. Et ratio Philosophi ad hoc est quia diuersorum secundum rationem oportet esse uirtutes diuersas secundum rationem, quia uirtus sequitur naturam rei inquantum talis. Sed dominus et seruus specie differunt inquantum tales; sunt ad unum secundum speciem 20 relationis; ergo eorum non est una uirtus ratione. Nec potest dici quod tantum differant uirtutes horum secundum magis et minus, quia magis et minus non diuersificant speciem: ergo ad hoc, si solum sic differunt, diuersorum secundum speciem et rationem erit una uirtus secundum speciem et rationem. 15

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Item, nec penitus diuerse sunt, quia saltim habitudinem habent uirtutes utriusque ad unum aliquid. Nam uirtus serui ordinata ad uirtutem et bonum domini: utriusque enim unus est finis, scilicet yconomica communicatio, ideo, saltim attributione, eedem sunt, licet differant specie et ratione.

Sed qualiter accipiatur ista attributio non est manifestum multum. Et ideo ad hoc dicendum quod, sicut habet in habitibus speculatiuis, ita et in practicis. Sed in speculatiuis non solum distinguuntur scientie secundum diuersitatem obiecti, sed etiam secundum diuersum modum considerandi idem, sicut patet: nam, quod terra sit sperica, considerat et naturalis 35 et astronomus, qui sunt scientes diuersi; sed unus, scilicet naturalis, hoc considerat ex grauitate terre undique equaliter ad centrum concedente, astronomus autem ex dispositione stellarum. Ergo similiter erit in practi-

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12 principalitate] palitate sed praem. lac. P 1 9 unum] unus P 11 Contra…14 inconueniens] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b26-28 1 8 dominus…20 relationis] cf. Arist., Cat. 7, 6b28-30, 7a28-b7 20 Nec…22 speciem] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b36-38, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.10: “Nec potest dici quod uirtus principantis et subiecti differant secundum magis et minus; magis enim et minus non uariant speciem, set principari et subici differunt speciem” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A114, ll. 173-177); Auct. Arist., Pol. I (29), p. 254, ubi tamen invenitur assertio contraria 3 4 quod…37 stellarum] cf. Arist., Phys. II.2, 193b25-30, sed hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae In An. Post. I.41 (ed. Leon. I*2, p. 156, ll. 369-372 cum adn.) et STh Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 2, arg. 2 et ad 2 (ed. Leon. VI, pp. 342-343)

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cis, ita quod, licet duo secundum uirtutes duas tendant in unum finem, si tamen illum finem non eodem modo, sed differenter intendant, adhuc diuerse eorum uirtutes. Sic autem est de domino et seruo, quia 40 dominus se habet ad operationem felicitatis secundum rationem ut dirigens, seruus autem ut directus et exequens. Et ideo habitus eorum, secundum ista operantur, aliqualiter , different tamen ratione, quia unus est sicut directiuus, alius sicut directus et executus, unde differunt secundum rationes actiui et passiui. Et ideo prudentia serui 45 differt a prudentia domini secundum speciem. Item, uirtus est habitus secundum quem aliquis recte operatur. Operatio ergo cum sit obiectum uirtutis, secundum distinctionem operationis contingit distingui uirtutes; modo alia est operatio domini ab operatione serui, ut dictum ; ergo et uirtutes erunt altere secundum rationem. 50 Secundum attributionem tamen est una eorum uirtus, quia omnium subiectorum uirtus et operatio in operationem et uirtutem principantis sicut in finem proximum ordinantur et reducuntur.

P

283rb

Ad rationem dicendum quod uirtus moralis est una ab unitate nature, quam immediate et per se | sequitur. Sed in istis uirtus moralis non 55 sequitur naturam hominis secundum rationem, sed naturam serui inquantum seruus est et domini inquantum dominus; et ideo, sicut isti differunt, et uirtutes eorum differunt. Si tamen sit aliqua que immediate sequitur naturam hominis, hec in istis erit una; hec autem non est nisi uirtus moralis. Ad secundam dicendum quod, licet finis istorum sit idem subiec- 60 to, non tamen secundum rationem omnino; et ideo non est una uirtus eorum; ergo et cetera. 3 9 modo] s.l. P 4 7 quem] quam P 5 0 altere] iter. sed corr. P 5 6 sed] et P 4 0 Sic…45 passiui] cf. Petrum, Quodl. VI, q. 10: “Omnis autem huiusmodi communitas est communicatio principum et subiectorum, ut apparet 1º Politice. Est autem quedam politica liberorum, quedam autem domini et seruorum, que dicitur despotica apud Grecos ... Principis autem, secundum quod princeps (cod.: principis), est mouere et dirigere subditos in finem, dicente Philosopho, 5º Metaphisice, principans (cod. principatus) est secundum cuius preuoluntatem mouentur alia in principatu, subditi autem, ut subditus, est moueri a principante et sequi motum ipsius ... utrum autem libertas, qua aliquis potest agere recte et qua potest pati recte uel dirigi in finem, sit unius rationis uel non, dicendum quod non, sicut enim potentia actiua et passiua non sunt unius rationis sed diuersarum, per attributionem unius ad alterum: primo enim et principaliter dicta potentia actiua dicitur, passiua autem per attributionem ad ipsam” (ex ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 95rb) 47 uirtus…operatur] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 56, art. 3, resp.: “virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 356) 4 9 alia…50 est] cf. supra, ll. 40- 45

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< Q U E S TIO 3 1 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a r t i f i c e m i n q u a n t u m hu i u s m o d i o p o r t e t h ab e r e u i r t u t e m Arguitur quod sic, quia cuiuscumque est aliqua operatio, oportet ad illam habere remouentia impediens et promouentia conferens; sed 5 artificis est aliqua operatio; ergo oportet eum habere aliquid quod sit prohibens impedimenta illius operationis: hoc autem est uirtus. Cuius ratio est quia ipse artifex contingit per passiones, ut per timorem uel per intemperantiam; sed ista non prohibentur nisi uirtute; ergo oportet artificem habere ad operationem suam uirtutem. 10

Item, omnem operantem oportet habere illud per quod ordinat operationem in finem; sed hoc est uirtus; ergo et cetera. , quia finis artificis non est simpliciter et absolute opus, sed ulterius felicitas ex operatione consecuta.

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit de ministro quod non oportet minis15 trum ad operationem suam habere uirtutem.

Dicendum quod artificem inquantum huiusmodi ad operationem ipsam per se non oportet habere uirtutem; per accidens tamen oportet. Ratio primi quia principium artificiatorum uel factibilium est ars 3 1, 8 intemperantiam] correxi ex infra, l. 61, ex loc. parall. B I, q. 29, l. 4 et ex fonte allata: increpantiam P 1 0 illud] idem P 1 8 ars] aliis P 3 1, 1 Consequenter…2 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a36-38 7 ipse…8 intemperantiam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a33-36 et praecipue 38-39: “artifices oportebit habere virtutem: multotiens enim propter intemperantiam deficiunt ab operibus” (ed. Susemihl, p. 55, ll. 9-11); cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.11: “oportet seruum habere quandam uirtutem ne propter intemperantiam aut timorem deficiat ab operibus, pari ratione uidebitur quod artifices ad hoc quod sint boni artifices oporteat habere aliquam uirtutem; cum multotiens contingat quod propter intemperantiam uel alia uitia defectum faciant in suis operibus” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A117, ll. 9-15) 1 4 Contra…15 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a39-b2: “servus quidem enim particeps vitae, hic autem remotius, et tantum immittit virtutis, quantum et servitutis: banausus enim artifex determinatam quandam habet servitutem, et servus quidem eorum quae natura, coriarius autem nullus neque aliorum artificum” (ed. Susemihl, p. 55. l. 11-p. 56, l. 3); cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.11: “aliquis dicitur bonus artifex, ut puta bonus faber, ex hoc quod sciat et potest facere bonos cultellos, etiam si male utatur uel negligenter sua arte” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A118, ll. 32-35) 1 8 principium…19 artifice] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.3, 1140a13-14 et Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.3: “principium generationis artificialium operum est in solo faciente quasi extrinsecum ab eis” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 342, ll. 195-198). Vide etiam Arist., Metaph. VI.1, 1025b22-24; VII.7, 1032a26-28 et 1032a32-b1 et Thomam, In Metaph. VI.1: “principium scientiarum factivarum est in faciente, non in facto, quod est artificiatum; sed principium motus rerum naturalium est in ipsis rebus naturalibus. Hoc autem principium rerum artificialium, quod est in faciente, est primo intellectus, qui

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existens in artifice; artis autem principium est ratio et finis sicut conceptus, sed non uoluntas uel electio, quia ars est habitus uera ratione factiuus. Sed 20 agibilium principium est prudentia; prudentie autem principium est uoluntas recta et ratio non simpliciter et secundum se, sed ratio alicuius ut uoluti et desiderati, quia prudentia est habitus uera ratione actiuus; et ideo eius principium est uoluntas et electio, et uoluntas recti finis.

P 283va

Ex hiis patet quod, cum ad esse uniuscuiusque effectus simpliciter non exigatur nisi eius principium per se, quod ad opus ipsum per se , quod est effectus artis non oportet habere uirtutem moralem, sed solum rationem, quia hec sola est principium artis et operationis per se; omnia autem alia accidunt operi inquantum est opus et artificiatum. Ad actionem autem oportet habere uoluntatem rectam; finis autem non est sine uirtute morali: uoluntas enim non est principium recte actionis nisi per estimationem recti finis, hoc autem non est sine uirtute morali, 6º Ethicorum. Et ideo oportet seruum, cum sit actiuus, habere uirtutem aliquam que sit principium recte agendi; ministrum autem non oportet ad operationem suam per se habere uirtutem, sed solum rationem uel artem. Per accidens tamen potest indigere uirtute, | quod patet quia uirtus accidit operationi secundum se. Vsus enim et exercitium talis operationis nichil aliud est quam nunc uel tunc, uel sic uel ad hunc finem operari: uti enim operatione nichil aliud quam sic uel sic operari; hoc autem accidit operationi secundum se; et ideo, licet opus secundum se non pendeat ex uoluntate, usus tamen et exercitium pendet ex illa, que moueat uirtutes ad operandum et etiam appetitum informet ad finem operationis. Et ideo, si recte debet exerceri operatio aliqua, necesse est ut ad usum eius concurrat uirtus, modum et finem rectum illi determinans; uoluntas autem circa modum et finem nec dirigitur nisi per uirtutem; oportet ergo ad usum operationis, qui pendet ex uoluntate, habere uirtutem determinantem. 19 ratio] illegibile, coni. ex infra., ll. 28-29 et loc. parall. B I, q. 29, l. 11 2 0 uera] correxi ex fonte allata et infra, l. 23: natura P 2 4 ut…estimationi] suppl. ex infra, ll. 32-33 29 per] secundum sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 37 uirtute] uel add. P 41 licet] habet P 42 pendet] pendeat P primo artem adinvenit; et secundo ars, quae est habitus intellectus; et tertio aliqua potentia exequens, sicut potentia motiva, per quam artifex exequitur conceptionem artis” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 549) 20 ars…factiuus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.3, 1140a10 et 21-22; cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (111), p. 240 23 prudentia…actiuus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b4-6 et 20-21; sed cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.4: “Et dicit quod, ex quo prudentia ... non est ars, quae est habitus cum ratione factivus, reliquintur quod prudentia sit habitus cum vera ratione activus” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 345, l. 72-p. 346, l. 78); Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (112), p. 240 32 estimationem…33 morali] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a7-9 et 20; VI.10, 1145a4- 6 4 5 uoluntas…46 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.6, 1113b3-7

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Et ideo competenter dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod quantum immittat seruitutis in ministrum, id est inquantum ad operationem assumit artifex uel 50 minister modum serui, intantum indiget uirtute, id est pro quanto uoluntas incipit esse principium sue operationis. Hoc autem est solum secundum usum, ergo solum secundum usum operationis indiget uirtute, et hoc est per accidens. Et similiter est sicut de intellectu speculatiuo, qui ad speculationem ipsam per se solum indiget habitu speculatiuo, qui est 55 principium speculandi; secundum tamen usum, qui est nunc , uel sic uel ad hunc finem speculari, indiget uoluntate recta et uirtute.

Ad rationem dicendum quod in operatione artificis est duo considerare: uel ipsam operationem per se, ut fabricare, uel etiam usum eius, que ratione differunt. Fabricare enim differt ab uti fabricatione, et 60 primi principium est sola ars, secundi autem ars a uoluntate recta determinante ea, que usus addit super operationem. Et intemperantia impedit operationem non per se et primo modo, sed secundum usum et secundo modo; et sic arguis: hoc autem accidit artifici, unde artifex est; sed potest ei contingere, unde bonus homo est. 65

Ad secundam dicendum quod ordinare operationem in finem talem uel illum accidit artifici inquantum huiusmodi, et cetera.

55 uel tunc] suppl. ex supra, l. 39 5 8 considerare] quia add. P 6 4 contingere] conuenire P 4 8 quantum…50 uirtute] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a40- 41 53 sicut…56 uirtute] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 57, art. 3, resp.: “Et ideo eo modo ars habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi: inquantum scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 366) 5 9 Fabricare…64 est] cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. II.6: “virtus est melior quam ars, quia per artem est homo potens facere bonum opus, non tamen ex arte est ei quod faciat bonum opus, potest enim pravum opus agere, quia ars non inclinat ad bonum usum artis, sicut grammaticus potest incongrue loqui; sed per virtutem fit aliquis non solum potens bene operari, sed etiam bene operans, quia virtus inclinat ad bonam operationem sicut et natura, ars autem facit solam cognitionem bonae operationis” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 96, ll. 155-164); cf. etiam VI.4: “circa artem requiritur virtus moralis, quae scilicet rectificet usum eius; potest enim esse quod aliquis habet habitum artis quo potest bonam domum aedificare, tamen non vult propter aliquam malitiam; sed virtus moralis, puta iustitia, facit quod artifex recte arte sua utetur” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 346, ll. 149-154); cf. etiam Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 57, art. 3, ad 2 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 366)

< L I B E R SE C U N D US>

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r c i r c a 2 u m P o li t i c o r u m u t r u m c i u i t a s s i t u n a Arguitur quod non, quia unum est in se indiuisum; sed ciuitas non est in se indiuisa; ergo non est una. Minor patet quia ciuitas per se diuidi habet in principantia et subiecta. 5

Item, ciuitas non est ipse domus uel uici, sed hec accidunt ciuitati: sunt loca ciuitatis, ut post dicet PHILOSOPHUS. Ciuitas autem proprie est multitudo hominum et populus; populus autem, ut dicit TULLIUS, est cetus multitudinis iuris consensu et uoluntate communitatis sociatus: hoc autem repugnat unitati; ergo et cetera.

10

Contra: quod habet unam operationem, ipsum est unum; ciuitas habet aliquam operationem, puta defendere suos uel per se sufficere; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod ciuitatem oportet esse unam quodammodo, quia cuius est unus finis, ipsum est unum, saltim unitate ordinationis circa finem. 15 Modo ciuitas est unus finis, cuius ratio est quia unum est agens ciuitatis, scilicet intellectus et ratio politica; agens autem proportionatur fini, et econuerso; ergo ciuitas | erit aliquo modo una. Modo agens agit unum P 283vb effectum in ordine ad unum finem; ergo ciuitas erit una unitate ordinationis in unum finem. Vnum autem multipliciter dicitur, quia aut unum 20 indiuisibilitate, sicut unitas uel punctus; aut unum continuitate, sicut linea dicitur una; aut unum ratione, ut illa quorum est una species et ratio.

1, 8 uoluntate] uoluntatem P 15 unum] una P 1, 1 Consequenter…una] cf. Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261a14-18 5 ciuitas…6 ciuitatis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.3, 1276a19-29 7 populus2…9 sociatus] Cicero, De Re Publ. [1, 25] XXV (39) sed per Augustinum, De Civ. Dei II.21 (ed. Dombart–Kalb, CCSL XLVII, p. 53, ll. 50-51), XIX.21 (ed. Dombart–Kalb, CCSL XLVIII, p. 687, l. 8-p. 688, l. 10) et XIX.24 (ibid., p. 695, ll. 2-3) et Macrobium, In Somnium Scipionis I.8.13 (ed. Willis, p. 39, ll. 27-28) 1 0 quod…unum] cf. Thomam, QQ. Disp. De Anima q. 1, arg. 18 (ed. Leon. XXIV.1, p. 7, ll. 168-169) 1 6 agens…17 econuerso] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26 1 7 agens…18 finem] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b12-16; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a1-2, II.8, 199a8-33; cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. II, q. 25 (ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, ff. 142vb-143ra) et Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, qq. 10-11 (ed. Delhaye, pp. 95-99) 19 Vnum…21 ratio] Arist., Metaph. V.6, 1015b36-1016b32, sed praesertim 1016b23-32; X.1, 1052a19-34

452

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Modo ciuitas primo modo non est una, sicut patet: diuiditur enim in uicos et domos, et ultimo dominum et seruum, et similiter in principantem et subiectum, que omnia ei per se conueniunt. Non etiam secundo modo, quia ciuitas non est continuorum, sed discretorum. Et ideo relinquitur 25 quod tertio modo dicatur una, scilicet unitate rationis. Hec autem unitas adhuc dicitur : aliquando enim ex unitate rationis, et forme et nature, ut plures homines sunt unus homo forma et natura et specie; aliquando enim ex compositione, ut mixta corpora ex elementis composita; aliquando autem ex unitate ordinis, et isto modo ponitur 8º Methaphi- 30 sice. Ciuitas autem est una ratione, unitate secundum ordinem. Modo omnis ordo ab uno incipit, ut dicit PROCLUS in De Causis. Ea que sunt unum ratione, unitate que est ab ordine, talia sunt ut eorum sit principium unum et eo descendant illa plura, et iterum in id unum uel in finem 35 illius ordinantur reflexim. Sic autem est in ciuitate: ciuitatis enim ordo primo incipit a principe ad ciues multos et ulterius a ciuibus in bonum finem illius principantis, quem ipse intendit inquantum princeps, reflexim ordinatur; et ideo unitas ciuitatis est secundum unitatem rationis sumpte ex bono fine; hoc autem est ordo et unitas rationis secundum ordinem. Hic ordo consistit, et unitas 40 huius ordinis, in ratione principantis et subiecti, et ideo, secundum quod mouent et mouentur, sic sunt unum. Mouent autem et mouentur per uoluntatem; uoluntas autem est finis; et ideo ratio unitatis ordinabilis a fine sumitur. 22 diuiditur] dicitur P 34 unum2] finem add. P 38 reflexim] reflexam P 30 aliquando…Methaphisice] cf. Arist., Metaph. VIII.6, 1045a8-14, sed de unitate ordinis 32 omnis…incipit] Proclus, Elem. magis agitur in Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a13-15 Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese p. 14); cf. Librum De Causis I 1 (ed. Pattin, p. 46, ll. 1-2) 3 6 ciuitatis…42 unum] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a1323, ubi tamen ordo qui est in exercitu tantum ex duce pendet, et non etiam ex militibus. Petrus contra hic rationem ordinis et ex principe et ex civibus pendere facit. Vide etiam Thomam, In Metaph. XII.12: “Sicut videmus in exercitu: nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus, et in duce, qui exercitui praesidet: sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis potior est in bonitate his quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in victoriae consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis. Et, quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, sumitur ex fine, ideo necesse est quod non solum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem, sed etiam quod a duce sit ordo exercitus, cum ordo exercitus sit propter ducem. Ita etiam bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, est melius bonum bono ordinis, quod est in universo. Totus enim ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicatur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet, quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 632). Vide etiam Thomam, Super Sent. I, dist. 44, q. 1, art. 2, resp. (ed. Mandonnet, p. 1019)

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Est autem in ciuitate considerare quadruplicem uel triplicem ordinem: primo, ordinem principantis ad finem; secundo, principantis ad ciues; tertio, ciuium inter se, quod quilibet uel moueatur solum uel moueat et moueatur, et hoc secundum rationem acceptam a principante; et ultimo, ciuium ad extraneos. Omnes autem isti ordines dependent . 50 Et ratio est simile: sicut in uniuerso est considerare ordinem primi ad finem, id est ad se ipsum prout est in ratione finis, et secundo ordinem eius ad orbes et uniuersum, tertio uniuersi partium inter se, et omnes isti ordines ab uno fine et principio rationem sumunt, ita in ciuitate est unitas rationis secundum ordinem ad unum finem – rationis, inquam, sumpte ab 55 illo fine –, qui necessitatem dat omnibus qui illi attendunt. Et ideo contingit quod, quamdiu ciues illi fini inherent uni, manet ciuitas in statu suo primo; mutato autem fine, mutatur et ciuitas et consuetudo et ordo ciuium. 45

60

65

Ad rationem dicendum quod ciuitas est una ratione unius ordinis indiuisi secundum rationem ciuitatis, quia, si non erit ille ordo, non erit ciuitas. Et indiuisibiliter ratio ciuitatis in illo ordine consistit, licet materialiter in partes ipsa diuidatur. Vel dicendum quod hec ratio procedit de uno | secundum indiuisibilitatem; sic autem dictum ciuitatem non esse P 284ra unam. Ad aliam dicendum quod ciuitas materialiter est multitudo diuisibilis; forma tamen ratio eius consistit in dicto ordine, quem non est diuidere, si debeat saluari ciuitas; et ideo ciuitas formaliter est multitudo sic ordinata.

4 9 ab…fine] suppl. ex infra, l. 53 5 0 ratio] et add. P 65 ciuitas] ciuitatis P 6 3 sic…64 unam] cf. supra, ll. 19-24

454

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

< Q UE S T I O 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m c i u i t a te m o p t i m u m s i t e s s e q u a m m a xi m e u n a m Arguitur quod sic, quia in hiis que per se dicuntur, si simpliciter ad simpliciter, ergo magis ad magis; modo ciuitatem esse unam 5 bonum per se; ergo ciuitatem esse maxime unam est optimum. Item, optimum est ciuitatem esse eo modo ut nulle insurgant seditiones; sed hoc fit si sit quam maxime una; ergo optimum est eam esse quam maxime unam. Maior patet quia optimum rei est quod tollit corruptionem rei; ciuitatis autem corruptio est seditio. Minor patet quia tunc nulla erit omnino dissensio: nullus enim sibi poterit aliquid appropriare de 10 communibus; ergo et cetera. Contra: maxime unum est indiuisibile. Si ergo optimum est ciuitatem esse quam maxime unam, optimum erit eam esse indiuisibilem, quod falsum, immo tunc differretur ciuitas: iam enim non esset pluralitas 15 hominum et personarum, quod non conuenit.

Dicendum quod unum uniuersaliter indiuisionem aliquam dicit. Indiuisio autem, cum sit diuisionis priuatio, necessario requirit subiectum; et ideo unum habere subiectum uel in natura uel in arte; cum autem sit indiuisio quedam, ideo, secundum distinctionem indiuisionis, distinguetur et unum. Modo aliquid est indiuisum quantitate, ut punctus; 20 aliquid ratione, ut species; aliud numero, ut unitas. Contingit preterea ut aliquid fit uno istorum modorum indiuisibile, alio tamen modo diuisibile, sicut punctus secundum quantitatem est indiuisibilis, secundum rationem tamen dicitur. Aliquando etiam contingit quod aliquid sit diuisibile uno modo et indiuisibile pluribus modis. Aliquando autem etiam, 25

2, 13 eam] unam P 1 6 quod] autem P 18 oportet] lac. P 2, 1 Consequenter…2 unam] cf. Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261a12-22 ( i.e., idem locus ex quo verba tituli q. praec. sumuntur ); cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.8 (ed. 3 simpliciter…4 magis 2] Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Romae 1607, pp. 419- 421) Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22 8 optimum…9 rei] cf. Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261b9 9 ciuitatis…seditio] cf. Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301a19-35 et infra, V, q. 1 16 Dicendum…21 unitas] eadem asseruntur in Petri Sophismate VI (ed. Ebbesen, p. 162) 17 priuatio…subiectum] cf. Algazel, Metaph. pars I, tract. I, div. 3 (ed. Muckle, p. 34, ll. 9-24) 20 aliquid…21 unitas] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 19-21

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quanto aliquid pluribus modis est diuisibile quam indiuisibile, illud est eo minus unum; quanto autem pluribus modis est indiuisibile quam diuisibile, tanto plus est unum. Vnum autem ordine pluribus modis est diuisibile quam indiuisibile, quia et numero et quantitate diuidi habet, ut totum 30 uniuersum; sola autem ratione, que est secundum ordinem, est indiuisibile, quia ad unum finem et ab uno principio est, et ideo est unum tantum secundum quid. Dicendum ergo ad questionem quod ciuitas non debet esse una simpliciter, quia tunc ciuitatem contingeret destrui, si deberet redigi ad talem 35 diuisionem, cum sit composita ex partibus materialibus – domibus et uicis – et etiam formalibus, scilicet principe et ciuibus. Et sic procedunt rationes Philosophi contra. Si autem queritur ultimo modo, utrum oportet eam esse unam maxime unitate secundum quid, que est unitas secundum ordinem et rationem, 40 tunc dico quod optimum est esse unam isto modo. Cuius ratio est quia optimum est illam esse unam eo modo quo maxime potest attingere finem propter quem est; quod patet quia eo aliquid est quo est unum. Ad finem autem suum ciuitas maxime attinget si sit maxime una, scilicet isto ordine, scilicet ut uoluntas principis recte ordinetur in finem et subditi recte ad 45 illum finem moueantur, et secundum uoluntatem principis et rationem sumptam ex fine. | Si enim unus eorum non obseruet hunc ordinem, tunc P 284rb erit dissensio, scilicet si habeat se male ad principem, uel etiam male ad finem, uel ad conciues uel ad extraneos, alicuius quod secundum rationem sumptam ex fine, tunc corrumpetur ciuitas. Ergo 50 optimum est ciuitati isto modo eam esse quam maxime unam. Item, maxime bonum est ciuitatem esse unam eo modo quo potest saluari. Hoc autem est si sit una secundum ordinem: fit enim tunc maxima amicitia singulorum ad singulos et pax; amicitia autem est que maxime conseruat ciuitates, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum. Et si sic intellexisset Plato 55 unitatem ciuitatis, Philosophus eum non reprobaret, nec rationes Philosophi hoc negant. Sed ipse intellexit aliter: intantum enim ampliauit unitatem ciuitatis, quod ordinem destruxit qui est in partibus ciuitatis, scilicet ordinem filiorum ad parentes in nutriendo, diligendo et educando et honorando; et ideo Philosophus eum reprobat. 2 6 diuisibile] pluribus modis add. P 4 3 isto] modo add. P 4 4 ad] in sed corr. s.l. P 48 quod] quam P 5 6 unitatem] ordinem sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 53 amicitia2…54 ciuitates] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-23

456

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Item, a simili: maxime bonum est ciuitatem esse eo modo unam quo 60 assimilatur maxime ordini et unitati totius uniuersi. Sed hoc fit per unitatem ordinis: nichil enim in uniuerso est quod rectum ordinem non obseruet. Item, libro De Motibus Animalium dicitur quod estimandum est animal esse unum sicut ciuitatem esse unam. Accipiatur autem hoc econuerso hic: modo in animali optimum est ipsum animal esse unum ordine, 65 salua tamen distinctione partium. Nam operatio partium in operationem totius ordinatur, quia pes ita ambulat sicut toti expedit, et auris ita audit. Sic etiam oportet esse ciuitatem unam ut, licet sint partes, operationes tamen singulorum partium in operationem totius ordinentur.

Ad rationes dicendum quod procedunt suis uiis de diuersis 70 unitatibus. < Q UE S T I O 3 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i l l u d q u o d e s t co m m u n e m i n i m e c ur e t u r Arguitur quod non, quia illud magis curatur quod magis diligitur; modo bonum commune magis diligitur; ergo magis curatur. Probatio minoris, quia magis bonum magis diligitur; commune magis bonum est; 5 ergo et cetera. Item, magis curatur finis quam ea que in finem, quia etiam magis diligitur; sed commune bonum est finis propriorum, ut principio huius et principio Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur quod commune magis negligitur, 10 quia cura negligentie opponitur. Antecedens patet experiendo in seruitiis ministrorum, ubi propter confidentiam omnes idem negligunt. 3 ,3 non] sic P 1 2 negligunt] negligens P 60 maxime…62 obseruet] Auct. Arist., Metaph. XII (277), p. 138; Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a11-21 6 3 estimandum…64 unam] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De 3 ,1 Consequenter…2 curetur] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261 Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32, 36-37 b33-35; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Pol. II (33), p. 254 5 commune…est] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b7-10 7 magis1…finem] Auct. Arist., Top. III (44), p. 324; Arist., Top. III.1, 116b22-23 8 commune…propriorum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a1-7; I.2, 1252b27-1253a1; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a14-16 1 0 Contra…12 negligunt] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-38

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15

20

25

30

35

Dicendum quod cura est quedam ordinatio uel sollicitudo ordinandi. Ordinatio autem proprie pertinet eis que in finem, proprie, secundum rationem uocabuli: ordinare enim est in finem suum aliquid dirigere secundum rationem sumptam ex illo fine. Hoc autem proprium est prudentie, et ideo dicitur, 1º Metaphisicorum, quod sapientis, id est prudentis, opus est ordinare. Et ideo cura est sollicitudo ordinationis secundum prudentiam, per quam aliquis per rationem sumptam ex fine inuenit promouentia et preuidet impedientia ad finem. Sed aliquando aliquis dicitur curare eum cui ordinat aliqua promouentia et bona, aliquando dicitur curare bona que illi ordinat: et ideo cura potest dici actus prudentie quo aliquis alicui preordinat bona. Prudentia autem | presupponit bonum P 284va appetitum finis – et hoc ad saluationem principii prudentie – et ulterius uoluntatem rectam respectu illius, cuius bonum intendit. Et ideo dicitur, 2º Rhetorice, amare est uelle illi bona et ad hoc cooperari; ergo, que quis magis diligit, ea magis curat, ex quo ad curam requiritur dilectio eius cuius bonum per curam ordinatur, et si magis dilecta, magis curantur; bona autem communia discurabimus; ergo de propriis magis curabimus. Minoris probatio est quia in omni amicitia attenditur profunda dilectio sui ipsius secundum partem principalem, scilicet rationalem, quod est uelle sibi ipsi maxima bona, ut dicitur bene 9º Ethicorum. Si ergo in omni dilectione presupponitur dilectio sui, ergo dilectio sui erit precipua; et si sic, tunc, cum propria nobis sunt propinquiora, magis naturaliter diliguntur propria. Item, uoluntas fertur in bonum conueniens, ergo magis in magis conueniens; proprium autem magis est conueniens, cuius ratio est quia 17 1º Metaphisicorum] 6 ethicorum P 1 8 ordinationis] praem. operationis sed exp. P 2 6 amare] aliquem P 2 9 communia] propria P 3 0 dilectio] praem. mentio P 13 Dicendum…20 finem] quod cura et sollicitudo opponantur negligentiae et una cum prudentia considerandae sint, desumptum esse videtur ex Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 9: Vtrum sollicitudo pertineat ad prudentiam (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 357) et IIa-IIae, q. 54, art. 2: Vtrum negligentia opponatur prudentiae (ed. Leon. VIII, pp. 395-396) 1 7 sapientis…18 ordinare] 2 3 Prudentia…25 Auct. Arist., Metaph. I (13), p. 116; Arist., Metaph. I.2, 982a17-19 intendit] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27, 31-36; cf. etiam Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Intellectus enim practicus, qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus, supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis” (ed. Lanza, p. 462, ll. 477-479) 2 6 amare…bona] Arist., Rhet. II.4, 1380b35-36; cf. supra, I, q. 17, ll. 8-9 cum adn. 30 in…32 bona] Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.8, 1168b28-31 et 1168b34-1169a3 32 Si…35 propria] ordo dilectionis, secundum quem unusquisque primum diligere debeat seipsum, deinde propinquiores suos, saepius asseritur in Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 26 (ed. Leon. VIII, pp. 209-223)

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458

conueniens est aliquo modo simile, 2º De Anima; propria autem nobis sunt similiora. Maior patet quia uoluntas non fertur in bonum absolute, ideo dicitur, 3º De Anima, quod intellectus speculatiuus bene speculatur de 40 bono, tamen non mouet uoluntatem ad hoc appetendum nisi ulterius comprehendat hoc sub ratione conuenientis et delectabilis.

Ad rationem dicendum quod de fine non est cura nec ordinatio nec uoluntas, sicut nec primorum principiorum in speculatiuis est ratio 45 nec demonstratio, et ideo non concludit.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x p e d i e n s s i t c i u i t a t i m u l i e re s e t p u e r o s e s s e c o m mu n e s , s i c u t s o l u i t P l a t o Arguitur quod sic, quia inductiuum maioris amicitie inter ciues, hoc est expediens ciuitati; sed hoc est communitas uxorum et puerorum; ergo illa est expediens. Maior patet quia amicitia ciuium con- 5 seruat ciuitates, 8º Ethicorum. Minor patet quia, cum sint ista communia, 3 8 modo] idem add. sed exp. P 3 8 conueniens…simile] cf. Arist., De An. II.4, 416b6-7 et II.5, 417a17-21 3 9 uoluntas…absolute] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.5, 1113a23-24 4 0 intellectus…42 delectabilis] Arist., De An. III.10, 433a14-20 et 27-31; Auct. Arist., De An. III (158), p. 187 4 3 ***] deest responsio ad hoc argumentum. Verisimiliter aliquid simile exstare debebat illo quod in Vincentii Gruner Disputata Pol. II, q. 3 traditur: hic enim Vincentius eadem refert quae in Petri textu, et verbatim; argumentum quoque, cui hic responsio quae deest dirigi deberet, etiam invenitur, eisdem verbis, in Vincentii textu: “... et dicitur quod sic. Contra: quod magis diligitur magis curatur; sed illud quod commune est magis diligitur; igitur. Minor probatur: illud quod magis bonum est magis diligitur; sed illud quod commune est, magis est bonum quam proprium ... Ad primam rationem negetur minor. Ad probationem ‘magis bonum magis diligitur’, dicendum: non oportet quod semper magis bonum magis diligatur, sicut nec oportet quod semper magis bonum preeligatur. Patet exemplum, quia (om. W) uita speculatiua et religiosa est melior quam (om. W) secularis siue practica (siue practica om. T), non tamen oportet quod a quolibet preeligatur, quia non quilibet (non quilibet] aliquis non W) potest sufferre. Verum tamen est quod magis bonum est magis diligibile, id est, habens plures rationes et motiua dilectionis” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 120r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, ff. 140va-141ra) 4 5 nec2…46 demonstra4,1 Consetio] Auct. Arist., An. Post. II (125), p. 321; Arist., An. Post. II.19, 100b3-5, 13-14 quenter…2 Plato] cf. Arist., Pol. II.1, 1261a2-8; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.10 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 425-427) 5 amicitia…6 ciuitates] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-23

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tunc equaliter omnes circa ea afficientur et, si equalis fuerit affectus, equalis erit amicitia; ergo et cetera. 10

Item, per quod remouetur omnis occasio litigii, hoc est maxime expediens ciuitati; sed hoc fit per communitatem; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia omne litigium oritur super propriis, uel quia impetuntur ab alio uel quia a suo domino deffenduntur. Item, optimum est ciuitatem esse quam maxime unam; sed hoc fit per communitatem omnium; ergo et cetera.

15

Contra: ex quo sequuntur indecentissima, hoc non est expediens ciuitati; sed indecentissima sequuntur ex istorum communitate; ergo ipsa ciuitati non expedit. Minor patet quia tunc, per ignorantiam et incertitudinem, filiis erit indecens cum matribus commixtio, et uulnera et opprobria parentibus, que omnia naturaliter sunt uitiosa.

Dicendum quod ciuitati plus expedit uxores et pueros esse proprios et certos quam communes et confusos. Cuius ratio accipienda est ex fine ciuitatis; nam expediens | omne dicitur conueniens, ita finis; ideo, quod P 284vb aliquid sit expediens, considerari habet ex fine uel aliquibus sine quibus non potest esse finis. Finis autem ciuitatis bene ordinate est operatio 25 secundum perfectissimam uirtutem politicam, que est prudentia politica, sicut etiam finis unius hominis secundum se est operatio secundum perfectam uirtutem; monostica autem est prudentia absolute. Modo operatio prudentie politice est operatio secundum rationem rectam simpliciter. Ad hoc autem necessaria est ciuium amicitia quia, si non sit amicitia, non 30 sequitur finis ille, nec etiam uoluntates ciuium uni uoluntati principis secundum rationem finis regulate adherebunt, sed in diuersum iam fluent, et peribit ordo ciuitatis. Ergo quod impedit amicitiam ciuium, hoc non est expediens ciuitati. 20

35

Item, ad esse et continuationem ciuitatis et salutem, quam omnia appetunt, necessaria est educatio et nutritio et eruditio filiorum. Si ergo hoc est finis ciuitatis, tunc quod magis impedit rectam rationem uel operationem secundum rationem rectam, hoc minus ciuitati expedit. Hoc autem est communitas uxorum et filiorum quia, si uxores essent communes,

4 ,7 ea] eas P | afficientur] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 4, l. 4: efficientur P 2 3 sit] fit P 2 4 Finis…27 absolute] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur ex Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 11 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 359) 3 8 si…40 intemperantie] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263b7-9

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potest unus ad multas accedere et eis improhibite commisceri, et tunc ibi surget uitium intemperantie, ad cuius usum sequitur peruersitas rationis, 40 ad minus secundum inclinationem ad operationem, quia uenus furatur intellectum spisse sapientis, 7º Ethicorum. Et COMMENTATOR, super 7um Phisicorum, dicit quod inter omnes uirtutes nulla ita bene facit se habere rationem sicut castitas. Si ergo communitas uxorum hoc impedit, scilicet operationem secundum rectam rationem, que est finis ciuitatis, necessario 45 erit expediens ciuitati. Item, si debet saluari ciuitas, oportet esse amicitiam; communitas autem istorum illam impedit. Cuius ratio est quia uirtus dispersa remittitur et fit debilior se ipsa unita. Sic amicitia extensa ad plures magis tepet; et ideo dicitur, 8º Ethicorum, quod amicitia perfecta non potest esse ad 50 plures, importat quandam superhabundantiam. Et ideo, sicut gutta mellis infusa multitudini aque statim perdit uigorem saporis, sic amicitia ad plures distincta, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in hoc 2º. Hec autem corrumpitur communitate uxorum, quia tunc, communes, negligentur, sine amore relicto. Sed ex parte filiorum etiam alia causa est, quia ad dilectionem facit 55 multum notitia moris, que non fit sine longa conuersatione et etiam certitudo, propter quod et matres magis diligunt filios et precipue primogenitos, quia diutius cum istis conuersate sunt et quia magis certe sunt, ut

3 9 accedere] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 4, l. 24: attendere P 4 2 7º] 6 P 43 nulla] correxi ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. II, q. 4: “... ut dicit Commentator supra 7um Phisicorum, inter omnes uirtutes nulla ita bene est que facit rationem se bene habere sicut castitas” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], ff. 120v-121r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 141rb): nichil P 5 2 statim] coni.: saltem P 5 5 relicto] relicti P 5 8 diutius] diuitius sed corr. P 4 1 uenus…42 sapientis] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.6, 1149b15-18 4 3 inter…44 castitas] Averroes, In Phys. VII, comm. 20: “exercitium enim largitur naturae hominis praeparationem, quae in ea non erat ante, et non est remotum vt virtus, scilicet moralis operetur in hoc, et maxime castitas” (ed. Venetiis, 1562-1574, vol. IV, f. 323r, C) 48 uirtus…49 unita] cf. Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (13), p. 232; Liber De Causis XVI (XVII) 138 et 140 (ed. Pattin, p. 83, ll. 15-16 et p. 84, ll. 22-23) 50 amicitia…51 superhabundantiam] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (151), p. 243; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.4, 1158a10-12 5 1 sicut…53 distincta] Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262b17-18, sed potius ex Thomae Sent. Pol. II.3: “... sicut cum parum de melle imponitur in multa aqua, nichil sentitur de dulcedine mellis” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A129, ll. 137-140) 5 7 matres…58 sunt2] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.7, 1168a24-26 ( ubi tamen asseritur: “... matres amatrices magis filiorum; laboriosior enim generacio, et magis sciunt quam ipsarum”, ed. AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 554, ll. 2- 4). Quod Petrus hic affirmat desumptum videtur esse potius ex Thoma, qui tamen non de primogenitis, sed de unigenitis loquitur ; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.3: “... sicut uidemus quod etiam parentes magis diligunt filios unigenitos quam si multos habeant, quasi amor diminuatur per communicationem ad multos” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A129, ll. 157-160)

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dicitur 9º Ethicorum. Hec autem conuersatio destruitur et simul certitudo, ut PHILOSOPHUS hic dicit, quod filii, si sint communes, recepti ad principatum aliorum ciuium, iam non uocentur neque uocabuntur filii; ergo et cetera.

Item, ad esse ciuitatis et saluationem | eius in ordinem ad finem suum, P 285ra necesse est filios generari et enutriri et erudiri, sicut dictum est in 1º huius: 65 hii enim futura pars ciuitatis sunt, et omnino. Et dictum est in 1º quod non parum differt ad salutem ciuitatis mulieres et pueros esse studiosos; eruditio autem et nutritio non fit nisi per diligentem curam; ergo quod impedit curam istorum, impediet et bonum ciuitatis et erit inexpediens ciuitati. Hoc autem est communitas filiorum et uxorum: communia enim minus 70 curantur, ut dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS; ergo et cetera. Item, ciuitatem oportet ymaginari sicut animal ordinatum; in illo autem sunt multe partes propriam habentes operationem, licet ultimo in unum finem ordinentur, et etiam habent distinctum nutrimentum; ergo similiter debet esse in ciuitate. Hoc autem est per appropriationem filiorum et 75 uxorum: , licet per posterius in unum finem, secundum uoluntatem principis directam a ratione sumpta ex illo fine, mediate uel immediate ordinentur; ergo filios et uxores esse communes est inexpediens ciuitati.

Ad rationes dicendum quod minor est amicitia et dilectio commu80 nium quam propriorum, tum propter diuisionem, tum etiam propter incertitudinem. Et cum dicit “omnes equaliter diligent”, dicendum quod non: numerus diligentior diligentium uel dilectorum facit maiorem amicitiam, sed econuerso minorem. 85

Ad secundam dicendum quod per communitatem nec etiam per proprietatem istorum neutro modo omnino possunt remoueri litigia. Tamen per quod magis remouentur, hoc magis erit conueniens et propter diuersitatem uoluntatis et naturarum expediens. Sed hoc est

6 1 uocabuntur filii] inv. P 6 4 1º] principio P 6 6 parum differt] inv. sed corr. P 6 9 enim] coni.: autem P 75 sunt…76 operationem] suppl. ex supra, l. 72 8 1 cum] quia P 59 conuersatio…61 filii] Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262b24-34 6 4 necesse…huius] cf. supra, I, q. 7, ll. 101-102 65 non…66 studiosos] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260b16-18 6 9 communia…70 curantur] Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-35; Auct. Arist., Pol. II (33), p. 254 7 1 ciuitatem…ordinatum] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32, 36-37 82 numerus…83 minorem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.11, 1170b33-1171a17

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appropriatio uxorum et filiorum, quia circa communia minus crescunt amicitie, circa propria autem magis; et ideo minus fit litigium circa ipsa. Ad tertiam dicendum quod non simpliciter debet ciuitas esse una, 90 sed ordine solum. Vnitas autem impeditur per istam communitatem et non promouetur. < Q UE S T I O 5 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m co m m i s c e r i p a r e n t i b u s f i l i o s s i t tu r p e s e c u n d u m n a tu r a m e t s e c u n d u m s e Arguitur quod non, quia quod inuenitur in natura et etiam indiuiduis eiusdem nature, hoc non est turpe secundum se et secundum naturam; modo talis commixtio inuenitur, saltim in brutis, et etiam in 5 quibusdam hominibus; ergo non est turpis secundum naturam et secundum se. Item, PIRRONIUS in sexta decima narrat quod Zeno quidam philosophus dixerit illam commixtionem non esse inconuenientem, et ratio Zenonis fuit quia ita est de muliebri coitu sicut de aliis membris; sed licita 10 est confricatio aliorum membrorum inter parentes et prolem, ergo et communicatio istorum; ergo et cetera. Item, quod est contra naturam, hoc a nullo prudente ordinatur fieri; sed talem commixtionem ordinauit Crisippus in ciuitate, scilicet ut 9 1 solum] sola P 5 ,8 Zeno] correxi ex fonte allata et ex loc. parall. B II, q. 5, l. 7: nereon P 10 Zenonis] neronis P 1 1 confricatio] correxi ex fonte allata et ex loc. parall. B II, q. 5, l. 9: concertatio P | et2] s.l. P 14 Crisippus] correxi ex fonte allata: crisitus P 9 0 non…91 solum] cf. supra II, q. 1, ll. 31, 38-41 et q. 2, ll. 38- 40 5, 1 Consequenter…2 se] cf. Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262a32-37 8 Pirronius…12 istorum] Sextus Empiricus, Pirr. Inf. III.205: “Sed etiam Citieus Zeno dixit non inconueniens esse membrum matris suo membro confricare, quemadmodum nec aliam quandam partem corporis eius cum manu fricare prauum utique quis dicat esse” (transl. latina: ex ms. Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat.X.267 [3460], f. 42vb); cf. etiam Sextum Empiricum, Adv. Math. XI.191. Nescitur quod “in sexta decima” significet: agitur forsitan de quadam distinctione textus quo Petrus usus est 14 sed…15 conciperent] Sextus Empiricus, Pirr. Inf. III.205: “Et Crisippus autem in Politica dogmatizat patrem quoque ex filia pueros procreare et matrem ex filio et fratrem ex sorore” (transl. latina: ex ms. Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat.X.267 [3460], f. 42vb); cf. etiam Pirr. Inf. III.245-246: “... his autem consonat et Crisippus. In Politia enim dicit ‘uidetur autem mihi et hec ita pertransire, quemadmodum et nunc non male a pluribus consuetum est, ut et matrem ex filio pueros procreare et patrem a filia et couterinum a couterina’” (ibid., f. 45ra). Haec opinio Crisippi etiam memorata est in Diogenis Laertii De Vit. et Mor. Phil. VII.188 et VII.131

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parentes ex filiabus generarent et matres ex filiis conciperent; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS et omnium dicta philosophantium de moriP 285rb bus, et etiam dicta omnium modernorum.|

Dicendum quod non debet presumi aliquem unquam, recta ratione utentem, talia licita esse enuntiasse uel etiam ordinasse, sed forte aliquem auersum a ratione talia sompniasse, quia, propter malam dispositionem corporis secundum commixtionem turpem uel orbitatem uel infirmitatem, ratio impedimentum patitur; et ideo omnes recte sapientes communiter hoc negant. In assignando tamen causam Plato fuit insufficiens: nam hoc 25 dixit non debere fieri propter euitationem concupiscentie, cuius ratio est quia concupiscentia, tanto magis, quanto amplior est amor. Modo secundum se magnus est amor filiorum ad parentes; si ergo incipiant amare se amore, eros , et illicito, nimis augebitur concupiscentia, et tunc impedietur opus rationis quia, duarum naturalium potentiarum, 30 unius augmentum alterius operationem impedit, ut dicit AVICENNA 6º Naturalium. Hec autem causa non sufficit, immo ulterius dicendum quod ex ipsa ratione parentum et filiorum et natura inquantum sunt huiusmodi, hoc prohibitum est. Filius enim eo dicitur filius, quia esse et nutritionem cum eruditione habet a parentibus, et per eos manet idem 35 specie illa; inquantum autem esse et substantiam a patre accipit, ipse patris est, et ideo que sunt eius, etiam sunt patris. Modo in communicatione

20

2 1 auersum] peruersum P 2 5 euitationem] sequitur lac. P 26 tanto…quanto] quanto magis tanto P 28 eros] correxi ex Aspasii Enarr. in VIII Arist. Moral.: “... amore qui eros dicitur” (ed. Mercken, p. 149, l. 43) et “amor, qui eros dicitur” (ibidem, l. 50): eneos P 32 natura] naturam P | eorum] suppl. ex infra, l. 54 3 5 substantiam] subiectum P 17 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262a32-40 24 In…25 concupiscentie] cf. Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262a32-37, sed potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.3: “Et sumitur hec ratio ex inconuenientibus que sequntur ex concupiscentia libidinum ... Socrates igitur presentiens hoc inconueniens uoluit ipsum uitare tali statuto ut per principes ciuitates impediretur coitus filii cum matre ... Set hoc statutum Socratis Philosophus impugnat dupliciter. Primo quidem quia hoc statutum uidetur esse insufficiens: prohibebat enim filio solum coitum matris, non autem prohibebat ei amorem libidinosum” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A128, ll. 41-42, 52-54 et 60-64). Vide etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.10 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 427) 2 9 duarum…30 impedit] cf. Avicennam, Liber De An. Pars 4, cap. 2 (ed. Van Riet, p. 14, l. 85-p. 15, l. 101); Pars 5, cap. 2 (ibid., p. 99, l. 65-p. 100, l. 71); Pars 5, cap. 7 (ibid., p. 158, l. 98-p. 159, l. 106) 33 Filius…35 illa] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (158), p. 244; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1161a15-17 3 6 Modo…49 patris] quod de honore hic dicitur desumptum videtur esse a loco illo Summae ubi Thomas loquitur de incesto; cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 154, art. 9, ad 3 (ed. Leon. X, p. 238) | in…38 patri1] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.2, 1164b31-33 et 1165a21-27

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oportet recipientem datori recompensare, ergo et filius retribuere tenetur patri. Modo per ea que sunt non potest patri retribuere, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum, quia nullus potest alii retribuere per bona que eius sunt; et ideo, si oportet retribuere, oportet quod retribuat saltim maiora que potest, cum sufficientia non possit: hec autem sunt honor et reuerentia; et ideo pater, licet se dignum sciat maioribus, tamen ista equanimiter recipit, ut dicitur de magnanimo 4º Ethicorum. Et ideo omne quod est contra honorem matris, hoc est contra rationem filii, cum ratio filii includat matris honorationem. Sed hoc est uti matre ad actum illum turpissimum, ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum, quia in illa concupiscentia cum brutis animalibus, et iterum, quia maxime absorbet rationem hominis; ergo illud erit omnino contra rationem filii et naturam eius inquantum huiusmodi, et similiter est de filia respectu patris. Ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod amor ille illicitus, etiam si nunquam perueniat ad actum, tamen, quia in ordine ad illum actum est, non perhaberi debet inter patrem et filiam uel matrem et filium uel inter fratrem et sororem. Et hoc solum propter intensionem nimiam concupiscentie, ut uitetur, sed etiam ulterius eo ipso, quod tales sunt ratio et natura illorum inquantum huiusmodi, obstari debet. Et ideo etiam in aliis gradibus prohibitum est in ordine ad istos et propter hanc causam. Vnde narrat PHILOSOPHUS in De Hystoriis Animalium quod quidam equus, matre tecta, coiuit cum illa, sed post, sentiens matrem | suam fuisse, precipitauit se in lacum.

40

45

50

55

Sic ergo patet quod commixtio parentum et est mala et est 60 contra naturam, non solum propter intensionem concupiscentie, sed etiam propter ipsas rationes patris et filie uel matris et filii, et ideo est contra 3 8 eius] suppl. ex supra, l. 36 3 9 scilicet…40 etiam] suppl. ex supra, ll. 35-36 43 recipit] recipiat P 44 omne] alie P 55 obstari] obstare P | cognationum] suppl. ex infra, l. 65 5 7 tecta] correxi ex fonte allata: recta P 62 ipsas] istas P 3 8 Modo…42 reuerentia] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.8, 1163b12-27 42 licet…43 magnanimo] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b22-24 et 1124a4-9 4 5 hoc…46 turpissimum] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.1, 1110a22-23 et 27-29, ubi tamen loquitur de occisione matris: “Turpissima enim sufferre pro nullo bono vel modico, pravi ... Et enim Eucipedis Almeona derisoria videntur cogencia matrem occidere” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 411, ll. 3-4 et 7-8); cf. etiam Anonymum, In III Arist. Mor. cap. 2: “Amphiarao puerum hunc aiunt, cui pater occidere matrem praecipit. Si autem non, erit patrem tristans” (ed. Mercken, p. 240, ll. 19-20) et etiam ibid. ( ibid ., p. 240, l. 19-p. 241, l. 33, cum Roberti Grosseteste additionibus ). Vide etiam editoris notam ad hunc ipsum locum in Thomae Sent. Eth. (III.2, ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 122, ll. 58- 63) 5 7 quidam…59 lacum] Arist., De Hist. An. VIII (Bekker IX).47, 631a1-7, sed in Aristotelis textu equus precipitauit se non in lacum, sed in locum praeruptum. Iste locus memoratur etiam in Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 154, art. 9, ad 3 (ed. Leon. X, p. 238)

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naturam istorum inquantum huiusmodi; non autem est contra naturam simpliciter et omnino: forte enim non est contra naturam eorum inquan65 tum sunt animalia. Et ideo etiam in aliis gradibus cognationum prohibitur, in ordine et per respectum ad rationes istorum. Quantum tamen et in quo gradu debet sistere prohibitio, hoc pertinet ad legislatorem.

Ad rationem dicendum quod, si inueniatur in aliquibus hominibus, hoc est per accidens, per aliquem casum in quo natura est impedibilis, 70 quia non semper tenet processus nature. Et si inuenitur in brutis, dicendum est quod in illis non est natura patris et filii et ratio eadem que in hominibus, sed equiuoce inest patri a patre in hominibus. Modo autem dictum quod est contra rationem et naturam patris, et dicti inter homines. Ad secundam et tertiam dicendum quod auctoritati Zenonis et Crisippi non est credendum in moralibus, quia, ut dicitur 10º Ethicorum, boni mores et opera faciunt ad hoc ut credatur, et econuerso mali mores. Istos autem estimandum est fuisse morum peruersorum. Et ad rationem Zenonis dicendum quod non est eiusdem rationis communicatio 80 aliorum membrorum, quia illa non est ad actum qui dicitur uilissimus, ut supra patuit, nec contingit etiam inhonorare alium in illa communicatione aliorum membrorum sicut hic. 75

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o s s e s s i o n e s c i u i t a t i s d eb e n t e s s e co m m u n e s Arguitur quod sic, quia illud expedit ciuitati per quod remouentur litigia et fit amicitia; sed hoc possessionibus existentibus communi5 bus; ergo debent et expedit esse communes. Minor patet quia tunc, equalibus existentibus affectibus, minus litigabunt, et quia etiam omnis lis est circa propria. 6 6 quo…67 gradu] inv. P 7 5 auctoritati] auctoritate P | Zenonis] neronis P 76 Crisippi] crisici P 7 7 econuerso] s.l. P 7 8 mores] et econuerso add. sed exp. P 7 9 Zenonis] neronis P 81 in] hora add. sed exp. P 6 , 3 quod2] fit add. sed exp. P 7 7 boni…78 mores] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.1, 1172a34-b7 6 , 1 Consequenter…2 communes] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1262b39- 40; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.11 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 428- 431)

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Item, minus expedit ciuitati per quod impeditur propria operatio ciuium et perfecta, quia illa operatio est finis ciuitatis; sed hoc fit si erunt possessiones proprie, propter maiorem singulorum curam et 10 sollicitudinem circa multa propria: tunc enim nichil cogitabit de bono ciuitatis; ergo magis expedit esse communes quam proprias. Contra: non expedit uxores esse communes, ut prius uisum est; ergo nec possessiones. Consequentia patet quia eadem ratio est de usu et 15 dominio utrisque.

P 285vb

Dicendum quod possessa res est illa qua aliquis utitur ad quod uult et quando et qualiter uult, ut dicitur 1º Rhetorice. Vsus autem illius est proprie ad sustentationem nature, ut patuit ex 1º huius, uel mediate uel immediate; et sic, cum ordinetur possessio ad alimentum, sine quo non sustentatur natura ipsa futura, est pars possessoris. Ergo, cum pars et totum 20 eiusdem sint nature, sicut est possessoribus, ita et de possessionibus iudicandum est. Modo ciuis possessor est et aliquid sui | et aliquid ciuitatis: potest enim considerari uel secundum se uel inquantum est pars ciuitatis, propter quod † nimia facto condicitur uel unitur †, ut dicitur 5º Ethico17 1º] 2 P 2 2 aliquid2] aliquem P 1 3 non…est] cf. supra, II, q. 4 16 possessa…17 uult] Arist., Rhet. I.5, 1361a20-22 17 Vsus…19 immediate] cf. supra, I, q. 24, ll. 18-25 et 28-30. Cf. etiam Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a6-9 22 Modo…25 Ethicorum] haec pars partim corrupta est, quamobrem prodest loc. parall. adducere ex Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 6: “Intelligendum est quod, sicut apparet 1º Rhetoricorum, possessio est qua aliquis utitur quando uult et ut uult, et sic de aliis conditionibus. Sed illa possessio ordinatur ad conseruationem nature humane uel immediate, sicut sunt diuitie naturales, uel mediate, sicut sunt artificiales, ut dictum est prius. Et ideo dicit in 2º huius quod possessio est pars futura hominis sicut (cod.: siue) alimentum magis. Ideo ad hoc, uidemus utrum possessiones debeant esse communes uel proprie, debemus loqui de homine. Modo homo potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut est pars ciuitatis, et sic, qui forefacit homini forefacit ciuitati, et ideo dicitur, 5º Ethicorum, quod homo non debet se interficere, immo quod tales qui se interficiunt suspenduntur et trahuntur, et uidemus etiam quod, si aliquis forefacit alicui homini, dato quo satisfaceret parti aduerse, non est ex toto quitus, nisi cum hoc emendauerit communitati, sicut si aliquis interficeret uel aliquid tale. Alio modo potest considerari homo secundum se et absolute, non ut est pars ciuitatis nec alicuius communitatis. Et secundum hoc duplex est possessio hominis: quedam est hominis inquantum homo secundum se et absolute … alia est possessio hominis inquantum est pars communitatis et ciuitatis” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 14rb). Quod ex libro Ethicorum in ambobus sumitur, referri videtur ad V.11, 1138a9-14, ubi legi potest: “Qui autem propter iram se ipsum occidit volens hoc operatur preter rectam legem, quod non sinit lex. Iniustum facit ergo. Set cui, vel civitati, sibi ipsi autem non. Volens enim patitur. Iniustum autem patitur nullus volens. Propter quod et civitas damnificat et quedam inhonoracio adest se ipsum corrumpenti, ut civitati iniustum facienti” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 475, ll. 16-21)

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rum. Ergo et sic oportet possessionem estimare, ita quod in possessione duo sunt: est enim in ipsa possessio secundum se et etiam usus. Primo modo ipsa pertinet ciui primo modo considerato; secundo modo pertinet ciui secundo modo considerato. Primo ergo modo erit propria secundum dominium; secundo autem modo erit communis secundum usum et ex 30 uirtute ciuilitatis, que est communicatio politica. Et hoc modo se habere expedit ciuitati, scilicet quod secundum dominium sint proprie. Cuius ratio est ex tribus: primo, quia possessiones necessarie sunt ciuitati, quia ciues sine alimento perirent; sed non sunt necessarie nisi propter fructum. Hunc autem non contingit ex possessionibus elici sine 35 diligenti circa substantiam possessionum; et ideo modus ille expedit ciuitati secundum quem maior cura circa substantiam possessionum. Sed hoc est si ponantur proprie: magis enim curant homines propria. Ergo, quod sint proprie secundum dominium substantie, hoc magis expedit. 25

Item, ille modus proprie et melius expedit ciuitati, quo posito, minores fiunt dissensiones in ciuitate. Sed hoc fit positis propriis: tunc nulle possunt fieri contentiones, nisi forte ex malo zelo et propter cupiditatem. Positis autem communibus, etiam bono zelo possunt fieri contentiones, accidit de terrarum confinibus: ibi enim uterque princeps se credit 45 habere ius propter hoc, quia utrique terrarum continentia sunt confinia. Iterum, circa communia contingit aliquem aliquando negligere aliquid et alios sibi iuste offendi; uel etiam, propter nimium usum communium, receptum ab aliquo forte, et non mala intentione, iterum contingit alios iuste contedere cum illo et ei offendi, quod non fieret ex negligentia uel 50 usu propriorum. Ergo, quod sint proprie secundum substantiam, hoc est melius. Iterum propter hoc, quod difficillimum est eos iuste et equaliter uti communibus. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS in simili quod peregrinantes, communibus aliquando utentes, occasiones rixarum inueniunt, et ideo etiam famulis quibus communius et sepius utimur et cohabitamus, 55 sepius et offendimur; propter quod, cum longa cohabitatio et frequens in multis communicatio occasionem tribuat offendendi, etiam non multum communicandum est amico. Et iterum, propter inequalitatem laboris et dominii, contingeret in tali ciuitate sepius seditio. Et ideo, hec

40

3 8 quod sint] correxi ex infra, l. 50: est sicut P 3 9 expedit] expediendum P 5 1 eos] eis sed corr. s.l. P 5 7 Et] s.l. P 3 7 magis…propria] cf. supra, II, q. 3 1263a17-21

5 2 peregrinantes…55 offendimur] Arist., Pol. II.5,

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omnia in propriis locum non habeant, et precipue hoc quod est dissentire iuste, magis expediet ciuitatis possessiones esse proprias quam communes. 60

P 286ra

Item, delectatio adauget operationem felicem, 10º Ethicorum. Sed homines magis delectantur in propriis, quia magis ea diligunt et quia magis sunt eis conuenientia. Ideo, cum ciuitas intendit operationem felicem secundum prudentiam politicam, et proprietas | faciat ad delectationem promouentem illam operationem, ergo et cetera. Ipse tamen possessiones secundum alium modum debent esse communes, scilicet secundum usum earum, quia secundum usum possessiones sic se debent habere quod maior ex usu earum fiat amicitia. Hoc autem fit si communes sint secundum usum, dum tamen proprie sint secundum substantiam, quia magis amici fimus ei qui uoluntarie de suis propriis nobis usum communicat. Item, isto modo erit maior delectatio; ergo magis expedit, quia delectationem per se querimus. Antecedens patet quia in actu uirtutum summa est delectatio, cuius causa est quia unumquodque delectatur in actu habitus connaturalis; uirtutes autem sunt habitus connaturales ex consuetudine, 2º Ethicorum, et ideo quidam sic diffiniunt delectationem quod est gaudium in actu potentie naturalis, ut dicitur 10º Ethicorum. Modo, si sic sint communes, exercentur opera uirtutum ut liberalitatis et magnificentie. Ergo ille modus, ut proprie secundum substantiam, communes tamen secundum usum uirtuosum, erit maxime expediens ciuitati. Modus autem quo et quando communicari debeant, legispositori pertinet determinare: sunt enim quidam , propter liberalitatem, nimis se ab hoc retrahunt, et hii sunt cogendi, prodigi autem restringendi, liberales autem et magnifici dirigendi.

65

70

75

80

Ad rationem dicendum quod minor falsa est, immo ex propriis minora fiunt litigia iuste. Si enim per communia aliquando maior fiat 85 amicitia, tamen per propria fit possibilior et uirtuosior, et hoc propter incuriam hominum circa communia. Et ideo, sicut natura non semper tendit ad uniuersaliter melius, sed ad bonum possibilius, etiam sic debet 7 0 amici fimus] amicimus P 7 2 actu] actum P 7 3 delectatur] delectantur P 86 possibilior] passibilior P 61 delectatio…felicem] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.5, 1174b23 6 8 Hoc…70 communicat] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263a27-30 74 uirtutes…consuetudine] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a25-26 75 quidam…76 naturalis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.4, 1174b7-11 ubi Aristoteles refert doctrinam Speusippi 7 6 si… 77 magnificentie] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263b7-14 7 8 Ergo…80 determinare] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263a37- 40

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ciuitas ad amicitiam attendere, autem ex propriis, est possibilior, magis quam ad eam que ex communibus, forte aliquando maior.

Ad secundam dicendum quod duplex est felicitas et operatio felicitatis, scilicet uel contemplatiua, uel practica uel politica. Secunda autem, scilicet practica et politica, pertinet ciuibus, et ad istam non impe95 diuntur per propria. Sed prima eis non pertinet; et ideo, si cura illam impediat, hoc non prohibet ciues curam habere.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x p e d i a t c i u i t a t i mu l i e r e s o r di n a r e a d b e l l a Arguitur quod sic, quia sic est in hominibus sicut in aliis animalibus; sed femelle aliorum animalium pugnant pro cibis et uenereis; ergo et 5 hominum. Item, ad quod inclinat natura, hoc expedit ciuitati; sed natura inclinat feminas ad pugnam; ergo et cetera. Minor patet: sicut animal omne appetit cibum sumere quiete, ita etiam appetit remouere impediens ipsum; sed mulieres possunt impediri; ergo naturaliter appetunt pugnam 10 cum impedientibus, ad repellendum illa.

9 0 possibilior] passibilior P 95 propria] correxi ex quo supra concluditur, ll. 60-67; cf. etiam loc. parall. hic deinceps, in apparatu fontium allatum: communia P | circa…96 propria] suppl. ex supra, l. 11 et ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis et Vincentii Gruner in apparatu fontium allatis 9 2 Ad…97 habere] ad hoc plenius intelligendum cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 6: “duplex est operatio hominis: una est speculatiua ... et talis operatio impeditur per possessiones (cod.: operationes) proprias; alia est que est circa actum prudentie ... et talis operatio non impeditur per possessiones proprias” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 14va) et Vincentium Gruner, Disputata Pol. II, q. 5: “felicitas est duplex, speculatiua et politica. Speculatiua consistit in actu (actibus TW) sapientie, que est speculatio uel contemplatio, et ad illam non tenentur nec ordinantur (diriguntur T) ciues; sed politica felicitas consist in actu prudentie. Modo prima felicitas impeditur (bene add. W) per curas propriarum possessionum, sed non secunda” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 122r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, 142ra) | duplex…93 politica] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b12-15 et infra, VII, q. 7 7 , 1 Consequenter…2 bella] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1264b37-38; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.12 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 431- 432)

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur quia natura non ordinat unum organum ad plura opera se impedientia, sicut patuit in 1º; sed mulierem ordinauit ad nutritionem, quam impediret pugna; ergo et cetera.

P 286rb

Dicendum quod mulier non debet ordinari ad pugnam per se. Cuius ratio est quia ad bellum necessaria preconsiliatio cum quo, et qualiter, et 15 per quos sit pugnandum; | sed mulier debilem habet consiliationem, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in 1º; ergo, cum deficiat ratione, non debet ordinari ad bellum. Item, ad bellum necessaria est animositas, quia ibi necesse est aggredi terribilia, etiam mortis. Sed hoc pertinet ad magnanimum; et ideo dicitur, 20 4º Ethicorum, quod magnanimus est megalokindinos, id est magna etiam in mortem aggrediens cum ratione, non timens. Sed mulier est timida propter frigiditatem, que inclinat ad timorem, propter quod etiam melancolici semper timidi sunt; ergo et cetera. Item, robur corporis ad bellum semper exigitur, in quo deficit mulier, 25 tum propter frigiditatem, tum propter humiditatem nimiam grossam et aquosam. Robur autem fit ex multitudine spirituum, ut dicitur in De

7 , 22 non timens] correxi ex fonte allata: ut tinens P 2 3 inclinat] moliat P 11 natura…12 impedientia] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b1-5; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (2), p. 252 16 mulier…consiliationem] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12-14 19 ad…24 sunt] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. III/1.12: “Secunda via ad investigandum hoc idem sumitur ex virilitate et animositate, quae requiritur in bellantibus: nam, ut dicitur 3. Ethic., finis et terminus omnium terribilium est mors. Opera ergo bellica requirunt hominem inpavidum et animosum, eo quod bellantes opponant se periculis mortis. Mulieres autem communiter sunt pavidae et inviriles, quod contingit eis tam ex fragilitate corporis quam ex frigiditate complexionis: nam ... frigiditas viam timori praeparat: frigidi enim est constringere et retrahere; animosi vero et virilis est ad alia se extendere, calor enim reddit habentem animosum et virilem, frigiditas vero timidum et pusillanimum” (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 431- 432) 21 magnanimus…22 timens] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1124b6-9: “Megalokindinos autem, et cum periclitetur non parcens vite, ut non dignum existens omnino vivere” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 441, ll. 21-22). Magnanimi etiam est non timere; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. IV.10: “est autem magnanimus megalokindinus, id est pro magnis periclitans, exponit se quibuscumque periculis pro magnis rebus, puta pro salute communi, pro iustitia, pro cultu divino et alii huiusmodi ... timor autem magnanimitati repugnat” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 233, ll. 35-39 et p. 235, ll. 150-151) 2 5 robur…26 frigiditatem] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. III/1.12: “Tertia via sumitur ex parte fortitudinis corporalis ... mulieres igitur, eo quod habent carnes molles et deficiunt a fortitudine corporali, ad opera bellica ordinari non debent” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 432). Vide etiam Albertum, Pol. II.3: “Sed uxores quidem existimat, Socrates scilicet, oportere simul bellare cum viris, cum tamen hoc sit contra timiditatem sexus foeminei” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 123) 27 Robur…spirituum] Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a9-10; cf. etiam Arist., De Som. et Vig. 2, 456a15

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Motibus Animalium; spiritus autem est aliquid calidum et humidum; ideo mulier, quia frigida, deficit spiritibus, ideo non, et cetera. Per accidens 30 tamen potest ordinari in bellum, si forte, errore nature, contrario modo disponatur, uel etiam in aliquo casu.

Ad rationem dicendum quod in brutis hoc accidit, ideo, quia bruta, propter carentiam rationis, masculos non preordinant ad sui defensionem, et iterum, quia animosa sunt in excessu et audacia propter immo35 deratam complexionem. Et item in robore non tantum deficiunt a uiris, quia non ita diu fetus suos nutriunt. Et item, quia bellum in brutis solum est motu appetitus sensitiui et propter obiecta sensuum, in hominibus autem debet esse ex motu rationis et propter iusta uel iniusta. Ad secundam per interemptionem maioris, quia non est ordinata 40 mulier ad omnia ad que natura eam inclinat: natura enim inclinat eam ad loquacitatem et continentiam, que ciuitati non expediunt; et sic forte etiam inclinatur ad bellum brutale; secundum tamen naturam bene se habent, ad talia non inclinatur. Et si de illa natura intelligatur, illa maioris, tunc dicendum ad minorem quod mulier inclinatur ad 45 remotionem prohibentis, non tamen ut per eam remoueatur, sed ipsa naturaliter appetit defendi per masculum, et ideo etiam plerumque querunt auxilia a masculis. Et isto modo licet eam ordinare ad bellum, scilicet per uirum, non tamen per se, et sic etiam dictum fuit.

3 3 carentiam] coni.: caronam P 3 6 uiris] et item add. P | quia1] s.l. P | ita] quia add. sed exp. P 4 6 plerumque] pluricumque P 4 7 eam] eque P 3 9 Ad…48 fuit] ut clarius haec ratio intelligatur, cf. Vincentium Gruner, Disputata Pol. II, q. 6: “Ad primam respondet Egidius uno modo sic, quod mulier non debet ordinari ad omnia ad que eam natura inclinat, quia naturaliter inclinatur ad loquacitatem et incontinentiam (inclinat ... incontinentiam om. T); sed talia non expediunt ciuitati ... Secundo soluit specialiter, et dicit, ad confirmationem, quod mulier appetit remouere impedientia ipsam in quiete quacumque per sibi datum naturale auxilium, quod est uir uel masculus, et ergo plerumque et quasi omnes querunt auxilium a masculis. De secunda ratione dicit Egidius quod non est simile de femellis brutorum et hominum, quia natura ipsis non preordinauit masculos ad defensionem sicut mulieribus hominum; etiam quia bruta naturaliter sunt animosiora femellis hominum, etiam in excessu audacie propter immoderatam complexionem, etiam femelle brutorum non tantum deficiunt in robore corporis a masculis, sicut femelle hominum uel sicut fit in hominibus” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 123r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, 142va)

472

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< Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m le x s i t a l i q u i d a d r a t i o n e m p e r t i n e n s Arguitur quod non, quia illud quod est a uoluntate et cuius est principium uoluntas non pertinet ad rationem; lex est huiusmodi, secundum quod dicit ille iurisconsultus quod principi placuit legis habet uigo5 rem; ergo lex est a uoluntate et non a ratione. Item, quod pertinet ad rationem uel est actus uel habitus uel potentia; sed lex non est potentia anime, nec etiam habitus, quia non est uirtus intellectualis, nec etiam actus, quia tunc, non operantibus hominibus, non esset lex, quod falsum est; ergo lex non est a ratione. Contra: cuius operatio pertinet ad rationem, illud est a ratione; sed legis 10 operatio pertinet ad rationem; ergo est a ratione. Minor patet quia legis est ordinare; ordinare autem pertinet rationi.

P 286va

Dicendum | quod lex est aliquid secundum rationem. Et hoc patet supponendo unum de lege, quod scilicet lex sit regula humanarum actionum; et si sic, ergo ad rationem pertinet, quoniam primum in unoquoque 15 genere est principium omnium eorum que sunt in illo genere. Primum autem regulans in homine est a ratione, quare omnium humanarum actionum principium est ratio. Et quoniam lex regulat actiones, ad illam partem anime pertinebit, que est regulatiua actionum et principium agibilium; hec autem est ratio practica; ergo lex pertinet ad rationem 20 practicam agibilium, et hec est prudentia, ut patet 6º Ethicorum. Item, pertinet ad rationem practicam non sicut habitus, quia lex non est uirtus intellectualis; omnes autem uirtutes intellectuales sunt habitus rationis; quare aliquid sicut actus. Sed considerandum quod, sicut in operatione artis duo sunt consideranda, ita etiam in operatione speculati- 25 8 ,4 placuit] patuit P praem. et P

1 5 rationem] actionem P

1 6 est] causa add. sed exp. P

2 4 quare]

8 ,1 Consequenter…pertinens] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, pp. 149-150) 2 Arguitur…5 ratione] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, arg. 3 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 149) 4 quod 2…uigorem] Dig. 1.4.1 6 Item…9 ratione] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, arg. 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 149) 1 5 primum…16 genere2] cf. supra, I, q. 12, l. 13 cum adn.; idem locus 20 ratioetiam affertur in Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 149) nem…21 prudentia] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (112), p. 240; Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b20-21 23 omnes…24 rationis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139b12-13 24 Sed…35 lex1] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, ad 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 149)

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35

40

45

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ua. In arte autem consideratur ipsa operatio fabri et etiam ipsum opus, scilicet operatum. Similiter in speculatiuo intellectu est duo considerare: operationem, scilicet ipsum intelligere et ipsum constitutum per rationem ex actu aliquo intelligendi – sicut in aliquo actu intelligendi constituitur ‘quod quid erat esse’, sicut docet PHILOSOPHUS in 2º Posteriorum – et aliquid complexum constitutum in alio actu rationis speculatiue, sicut enuntiatio. Et similiter est in intellectu practico considerare operationem intellectus practici, scilicet ratiocinari de agibilibus, et operatum aliquod constitutum ex operatione illa, et hoc est illa enuntiatio practica: et ista est lex. Vnde lex est pertinens ad rationem practicam non sicut operatio, sed sicut operatum aliquid. Vnde, sicut in speculatiuis enuntiatio uniuersalis est ut principium, per quod potest cognosci aliqua conclusio, sic in practicis lex est. Vnde, sicut in speculatiuis duo sunt genera propositionum – quedam enim sunt secundum se et primo note, quedam autem note ex aliis prioribus –, sic et in practicis est aliqua enuntiatio practica que est secundum se nota; et talis dicitur lex naturalis, ut illa que fit in terminis per se notis, ut ‘nemini esse nocendum’ uel aliquid tale; alia autem est cui statim non obedit intellectus, nisi ex aliqua priori; et talis potest dici lex positiua, ut ‘sacrificare Deo capram’. Sic ergo patet quod lex est aliquid pertinens ad rationem ut aliquid compositum uel elicitum per actum intelligendi practici.

Ad rationes dicendum quod maior est falsa. Contingit enim uoluntatem principium capere a ratione. Est enim uoluntas finis que precedit intellectum practicum et est alia uoluntas eius quod in finem, scilicet electio, et ista sequitur intellectum speculatiuum. Et ideo, licet lex 50 sit a uoluntate, hoc tamen non prohibet quin formaliter sit a ratione, uel saltim effectiue. Et cum dicit in minori quod ita seruandum est sicut

3 1 aliquid] praem. ad P 32 Et…34 practica] add. in marg. inf. P 3 8 speculatiuis] practicis P 4 0 practicis] prioribus P 4 2 statim] probare add. P 2 9 in…32 enuntiatio] Arist., An. Post. II.4, 91a25-32 4 3 ut…44 capram] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 4 6 Contingit…49 speculatiuum] cf. supra, I, q. 2, ll. 92-111; cf. etiam Petrum, 1134b22 Quodl. IV, q. 13 (Vtrum actus intellectus secundum ordinem nature precedat omnem actum uoluntatis), ubi asseritur: “actus intellectus practici sequitur ordine nature actum uoluntatis, quoniam actus intellectus practici se habet ad actum uoluntatis sicut obiectum illius, quoniam actus determinatur per obiecta per se; obiectum autem uoluntatis est bonum per se uel finis ... sic igitur apparet quod actus intellectus speculatiui simpliciter precedit ordine nature actum uoluntatis; actus tamen uoluntatis precedit intellectum practicum” (ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 67ra)

474

P 286vb

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

“placuit principi”, dico quod princeps potest considerari dupliciter: uel secundum se princeps, et sic dicitur a prudentia politica, per quam principatur, et sic uerum et iustum est seruari que sibi placent, quia illa sunt a ratione. Si autem consideretur secundum quod hic princeps, sic non est 55 uerum: sic enim, inquantum est homo particularis, aliqua secundum passionem possent ei placere que | non essent simpliciter iusta. Ad secundam dicendum quod lex non est potentia nec habitus anime, sed est actus. Ad id quod obicitur, dicendum quod actus dicitur dupliciter: uel operatio uel operatum. Secundo modo ipsa lex potest dici 60 actus, scilicet per reductionem, secundum quod operatum dicitur actus. < Q UE S T I O 9 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l e x o r d i n e t u r i n f i n e m c o m mu n e m Arguitur quod non, quia lex debet ordinari in finem agibilium; sed finis humanorum agibilium est aliquid determinatum; ergo et lex ordinatur in finem determinatum et non communem. Item, finis legis uidetur esse operatio legis; sed hoc uidetur esse 5 aliquid determinatum; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione eius in 5º Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod lex precipit de omnibus actibus uirtutum; harum autem est finis communis; ergo et legis.

Dicendum quod lex rationem habet ex fine uniuersali, quod lex est 10 recta regula agibilium secundum quod agibilia, ideo rationem legis oportet sumi ex primo principio agibilium, quia primum in omni genere est causa et mensura omnium aliorum, 10º Metaphisicorum, quia minimum quantitate est; hoc autem principium est rectus appetitus finis; ergo oportet 5 4 que] sic add. P 9, 10 uniuersali] sequitur lac. P 1 3 10º Metaphisicorum] 8 ethicorum P 52 princeps…57 iusta] eadem distinctio etiam invenitur in Petri Scripto III.15: “ille qui principatur duobus modis potest considerari: uel secundum quod principis uel secundum quod homo talis” (ed. Lanza, p. 131, ll. 272-273) 9 ,1 Consequenter…communem] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2 et q. 96, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, pp. 150-151 et 180-181) 8 lex…uirtutum] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.1, 1129b19-24; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 3 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 182) 12 primum…13 aliorum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1, ad 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 180)

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sumere rationem legis ex fine quem primo lex intendit. Quod autem primum est intentione est ultimum in executione; in tale autem, scilicet in ultimum, ordinatur unumquodque; ergo lex in finem ordinatur.

Item, finis ex quo aliquid sumit rationem oportet proportionari eis que in finem; lex autem est enuntiatio uniuersalis, ergo oportet rationem 20 sumere ex fine uniuersali; ergo etiam ordinatur in finem uniuersalem. Et hoc intelligendum est de lege simpliciter et non priuata. Et propter hoc lex rationem habet ex fine, tunc, secundum diuersitatem finium, oportet diuersificari leges; et quia diuerse politie diuersos fines eligunt – ut quedam diuitias, alie delicias, alie uirtutes, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum –, ideo 25 habent diuersas leges et, quanto ex perfectiori fine sunt, tanto perfectiores leges sunt. Que autem ex fine indeterminato sunt, forsan illi politie bone sunt, simpliciter tamen nec bone nec ordinate sunt, ut leges in tirannide.

Ad rationes dicendum quod finis humanorum actuum est uniuer30 salis in se et non particularis, nisi per subsumptionem. Sicut in speculatiuis uniuersalis propositio non determinatur ad conclusionem particularem nisi per subsumptionem, similiter hec lex est propositio uniuersalis continens totum in se, et ad talem per se et primo ordinatur lex; sed si in finem particularem, hoc est per subsumptionem, ut lex dicit “depositum est 35 reddendum”; sed hoc est depositum; ergo hoc est reddendum.

16 executione] scrips. ex cuiusatione P 23 diuersos] diuersas P 2 7 simpliciter] causa add. sed exp. P 30 particularis] particulariter P | subsumptionem] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 9, ll. 22 et 24 et ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. II, q. 8: “De tertio dicit Egidius quod finis agibilium humanorum in se consideratus est uniuersalis, nisi per subsumptionem determinetur ad aliquod particulare” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 125r; Wrocław, 3 2 subsumptionem] Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 143vb): sumptionem sub P sumptionem sub P 34 subsumptionem] sumptionem sub P 15 Quod…16 executione] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. III (49), p. 236; Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112 b23-24 1 8 finis…26 sunt1] cf. infra, IV, q. 2, ll. 12-18 2 2 secundum…25 leges] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1289a13-25; cf. etiam Petrum, Scriptum IV.1: “Leges enim differunt secundum diuersitatem finium, democratice autem et oligarchice non est idem finis; nec etiam eedem leges competunt omnibus modis democratie, similiter nec omnibus modis oligarchie, si nos supponamus quod non sit democratia una tantum, nec oligarchia una tantum, sed multe; si enim sunt multe, aliqualiter diuersos fines habent. Leges uero diuersificantur secundum diuersitatem finium” (ed. Lanza, p. 145, ll. 148-153) et VII.2: “Differentiam tamen quandam oportet esse huiusmodi statutorum legalium. Primo quidem, secundum diuersitatem finium et uite: ad alium et ad alium enim finem alias et alias oportet ordinare leges” (ibid., p. 455, ll. 249-252) 23 diuersos…24 uirtutes] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.2, 1095a22-23

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Ad secundum dicendum quod “finis legis est operatio”, uerum est, ultima , et hoc non primo, sed secundum modum prius dictum; immo operatio omnium uirtutum est finis eius. < Q UE S T I O 1 0 > P 287ra

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l e g i s l at o r e m i n c o n s t i t u e n d o l e g e m o p o r te t | i n s p i c e r e a d h o m i n e s e t l o c a Arguitur quod non, quia non oportet legislatorem inspicere ad ea que non sunt principia legis; modo lex ex homine non sumit rationem, nec ex loco, sed ex fine; ergo ad ista non oportet legislatorem in constituendo 5 legem inspicere. Item, PHILOSOPHUS, 2º : quod est habens rationem forme non sumit rationem ab eo quod est habens rationem materie; modo homines habent rationem materie respectu legis, ergo lex ab eis rationem 10 non sumit; ergo et cetera. Contra est hic PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod legislatorem oportet inspicere ad finem communem ultimum. Non tamen omnino inspicit ad finem illum simpliciter et absolute, sed secundum quod applicabilis est eis que ordinantur in finem communem, quia finis est principium operabilium eis que ordinantur in finem, 15 et ideo oportet ut proportionetur illis, sicut uidetur in natura quod natura non semper intendit quod melius est, sed quod possibilius; unde natura in materia musce non inducit formam humanam, sed illius quod est possibilius et proportionalius tali materie. Similiter in agibilibus legislator, in 3 7 prius] primum P 10 , 5 ergo] et cetera add. P correxi ex loc parall. B II, q. 10, l. 7: sicut habens P

7 2º] secundum P

9 homines habent]

3 7 secundum…dictum] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 24-35 1 0 , 1 Consequenter…2 loca] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1265a18-20 7 quod…8 materie] cf. Arist., Phys. II.1, 193a36-b3, b17-18 et II.2, 194b8-9 1 1 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. II.6, 1265a18-20 1 6 in…17 possibilius] Arist., Phys. VIII.6, 259a11-12 | natura2…21 istis] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, q. 26: “Et cum arguitur quod natura semper agit quod melius est, dicendum quod non semper melius simpliciter sed melius et possibilius ... melius enim esset sibi agere ad finem intentum, tamen, cum non potest, non agit melius sibi sed agit melius quod potest fieri sic: melius enim est facere quatuor digitos quam nullum: unde hoc est melius, licet non simpliciter sibi” (ed. Delhaye, p. 125)

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constituendo legem, inspicit ad finem optimum non absolute, sed optimum istis: nam aliter princeps ordinatur in finem et aliter seruus, et ideo, ad considerandum illam proportionem, oportet legislatorem inspicere ad dispositionem hominum, non omnium, sed hominum existentium in illa regione, unde oportet, ubi homines magis remoti sunt a recto usu rationis, 25 leges minus remissas habere. Et iterum oportet inspicere ad loca et ad diuersam habitudinem ciuitatis ad loca uicinorum, et etiam ad ipsorum loca, secundum quod diuerse consuetudines sunt in diuersis locis. Vnde postea dicet quod alie leges contente sunt essent septentrionalibus et eis qui in meridie.

20

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Ad rationem dicendum quod lex secundum se et absolute, in uniuersali sumpta, non sumit rationem ex hominibus, sed secundum quod est applicabilis.

Et per idem ad secundam: quod formale non sumit rationem a materiali simpliciter et absolute, sed secundum quod materiale in finem 35 aliquem ordinatur. Sic enim determinatur ei forma et in ordine ad finem illum. < Q U E S TIO 1 1 > C ons e qu enter qu eri tu r d e op in ione Felle e, u tru m n eces sari um si t p o l i t i c um r e g u l a r e p o s s e s s i o n e s | P 287rb

5

Arguitur quod non, quia necessarium est quod impossibile aliter se habere; sed regulationem possessionum non est impossibile aliter se habere; ergo et cetera. 2 5 minus] magis P 2 6 ad2] secundum P 1 1, 2 possessiones] habere add. sed exp. P 2 8 postea…29 meridie] etsi textus corruptus sit, patet tamen hic Petrum aliqua referre de vi quam, iuxta Aristotelem, caelum et natura loci habent supra mores hominum et de necessitate instituendi politias et regulandi populos congruenter cum ista vi; cf. Arist., Pol. VII.7, 1327b20-36 et infra, VII, qq. 8-9. In aliis commentariis enim, ad locum istum Aristotelis probandum, adducitur doctrina de convenientia inter humores et aërem diversarum regionum; cf. Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 9 (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3va) et Vincentium Gruner, Disputata Pol. II, q. 9 (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 126r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 144rb) 1 1 ,1 Consequenter…2 possessiones] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a36-38, sed re vera opinio Phaleae refertur in q. seq. 3 necessarium…4 habere] Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (102), p. 123; Arist., Metaph. IV.5, 1010b28-29; Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (127), p. 125; Arist., Metaph. V.5, 1015a33-35

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478

Item, nichil est necessarium etiam politico regulari quod non est natum a ratione regulari. Ideo uult PHILOSOPHUS in De Anima quod partes anime nutritiue non regulantur ratione, quia non sunt nate ab illa ordinari, cum sint inanimate; sed possessiones non sunt nate a ratione 10 regulari, quia inanimate sunt; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod necessarium dicitur dupliciter ad presens: uno quod est impossibile aliter se habere, alio modo ex suppositione finis, sicut hominem esse animal dicimus necessarium simpliciter, hominem autem nutriri dicimus esse necessarium ex suppositione, scilicet fine supposito, si debeat animal in uita saluari. Modo ordinare possessiones non est necessarium primo modo, sed secundo, quia scilicet, si debet attingere ad finem commune et ad finem ciuitatis, necessarium est politicum regulare possessiones. Et ratio eius est primo quia uniuersaliter omnia illa que ordinantur debent ordinari secundum exigentiam finis, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS; diuitie autem ordinantur in finem ciuitatis; quare ex illo aliquam rationem debent habere, ita quod sic distribuantur secundum quod est conueniens et expediens ad bonum communitatis. Et ideo, cum politicus intendat bonum commune, manifestum quod necessarium est ei regulare possessiones, quia ex defectu talis regule multe dissensiones accidunt. Sed possessiones possunt dupliciter considerari, scilicet secundum se et absolute uel secundum quod ueniunt in usum humanum: si primo modo, sic sunt res naturales, et sic de illis politicus non considerat; si secundo modo, sic pertinent ad politiam et ueniunt in usum eius, et sic de eis ordinat qualiter ciues se debeant habere ad illas. 9 sicut res] suppl. ex quo asseritur in Thomae textu infra allato 1 2 dicitur] ad add. sed exp. P 16 supposito] qui add. P 7 partes…9 inanimate] non invenitur, nec consonare videtur cum doctrina Aristotelis in De Anima asserta, quia revera partes animae nutritivae non sunt inanimatae; forsan hic Petrus significat aliquid simile illo quod Thomas Aquinas defendit in commentario in libros Metaphysicorum IX.2: “Nam partes animae nutritivae et sensitivae, impulsu naturae operantur. Sola autem pars animae rationalis est domina sui actus: in quo differt a rebus inanimatis” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 531). Quod “vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis” asseritur in STh Ia-IIae, q. 50, art. 3, ad 1 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 319), ubi Thomas memorat Arist., Eth. Nic. I.8 1102b11-12 1 1 Contra…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a39- 40 1 2 necessarium…16 saluari] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 199b34-200a30; sed cf. etiam Arist., Metaph. V.5, 1015a34-b9; Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (127), p. 125. Hoc argumentum probabiliter desumptum est ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 3, arg. 4 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 177) 1 9 uniuersaliter…20 finis] cf. Arist., Phys. II.2, 194b7-8; II.8, 199a8-15 25 ex…26 accidunt] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a38-39

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Ad rationes dicendum quod necessarium simpliciter est quod simpliciter impossibile est aliter se habere, et necessarium ex suppositione est quod ex suppositione impossibile est aliter se habere; et talis est regulatio possessionum quia, supposito tali fine, impossibile est aliter se habere. 35

Ad secundam dicendum quod possessiones secundum se non sunt nate regulari a ratione, sed prout ueniunt in usum homini et politie.| P 287va < Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m ex p e d i a t c i u i t a t i p o s s e s s i o n e s ess e e qu al es

Arguitur quod sic, quia dicitur in 4º huius quod ciuitas optima est que est ex mediis constituta uniuersaliter et, quanto ciues magis ad equali5 tatem reducuntur, tanto melior ciuitas efficitur; sed, positis possessionibus equalibus, magis ciues ad equalitatem et medium reducuntur; ergo hoc ciuitati expedit. Item, illud per quod reouentur litigia et accusationes in ciuitate expedit ciuitati; sed hoc fit positis possessionibus equalibus; ergo et 10 cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod possessiones esse equales est dupliciter: primo modo secundum quantitatem et proportionem arismeticam, alio modo secundum geometricam. Si primo modo, ut scilicet equales sint secundum 12 ,2 esse] communes add. sed exp. P 5 positis] correxi ex infra, l. 9: politia P 9 equalibus] equales P 12 ,1 Consequenter…2 equales] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a39- 40; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.17 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 441-442) 3 ciuitas…4 uniuersaliter] Arist., Pol. IV.11, 1295b25-28; Petrus, Scriptum IV.10: “ciuitas optima est que est ex mediis” (ed. Lanza, p. 204, ll. 131-132); cf. infra, IV, qq. 9-10 1 1 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b8-14 et 24-28 1 2 possessiones…14 geometricam] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.3- 4, 1131a29-1132b20. Haec distinctio inter duas species aequalitatum totam hanc quaestionem conformat; invenitur etiam in Alberti commentario ad loc. parall. (cf. Albertum, Pol. II.4, ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 137). Ea utitur etiam Petrus in Scripto, ubi tamen sumitur ex Aristotelis locis ibi allatis: Petrus, Scriptum III.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 53, ll. 25-p. 54, l. 48) et V.1 (ibid., p. 252, l. 175-p. 253, l. 187)

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proportionem arismeticam, ut quantum unus habet tantum omnino alius habeat, sic intellixit Felleas, et sic non expedit possessiones esse equales. Cuius ratio est quia instrumenta oportet esse proportionata agentibus et fini uel operationi, unde tot oportet esse fistulas quot et quales expediunt huic fistulatori et ad finem eius. Agens enim accipit rationem ex fine, et ideo oportet ei proportionatum esse instrumentum uel organum quod natum est exerceri in tali operatione; diuitie autem sunt instrumentum et organum hominis ad uitam et operationem; et ideo diuitias oportet proportionari secundum quantitatem et qualitatem illis qui utuntur ipsis etiam fini. Modo manifestum quod de ratione ciuitatis non est quod ciues sint equales omnino, quia oportet inesse principantes et subiectos, et ordo quidam est inter principantes et subiectos: non enim omnes ciues attingunt ad uirtutem, et ideo, secundum quod diuersificantur in habitibus, secundum hoc melius uel peius ad finem disponuntur. Quare oportet possessiones hoc modo esse equales secundum proportionem geometricam, ita quod ille qui attingit ad uirtutem plus habeat de possessionibus, qui autem non attingit non habeat possessiones aliquas, et si forsan habeat aliquas, paucas tamen aut nullas habeat, unde PHILOSOPHUS, 4º Ethicorum, quod difficile est sine uirtute pati bonas fortunas. Ideo, quia ciues non sunt equales in dignitate, etiam non erunt ad bonum commune siue finem ciuitatis equaliter se habentes et, per consequens, non sunt eodem

15 tantum] unus add. sed exp. P 1 9 enim] non P 2 7 quod] hoc P 3 1 attingit] ad uirtutem add. sed exp. P 3 4 erunt] equaliter add. P

28 Quare] qualiter P

15 ut…16 Felleas] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a36-b5 1 7 instrumenta…18 operationi] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (73), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195b21-28; Auct. Arist., An. Post. II (110), p. 320; Arist., An. Post. II.12, 95a10-14 2 5 oportet…subiectos] cf. Auct. Arist., Pol. I (14), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a28-31 | ordo…26 subiectos] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 2 6 non…32 habeat] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.10: “In huiusmodi uero distributione oportet esse aliquam mensuram secundum quam dirigantur in distributione: huiusmodi autem mensura finis est, ita quod, secundum quod aliquis plus accedit uel minus ad finem, secundum hoc plus uel minus debet ei distribui de communibus bonis; ita et qui equaliter attingunt ad huiusmodi dignitatem in ordine ad finem, equaliter debent recipere” (ed. Lanza, p. 82, ll. 24-29) 33 difficile…fortunas] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1124a28-29. Loco illo sui Scripti, ubi mentionem proportionis geometricae facit, Petrus hunc eumdem locum ex Aristotelis Ethica memorat; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7: “... quia ciuitates, propter huiusmodi excellentias preter proportionem, corrumpuntur. Item, non omnes possunt ferre bonam fortunam: hoc enim est uirtuosi; sicut enim dicit Philosophus in 4º Ethicorum, sine uirtute non est facile ferre moderate bonas fortunas. Et ideo, si dentur alicui non uirtuoso honores preter proportionem ad alios et dignitatem ipsius, grauabit eos, et destruent ciuitatem” (ed. Lanza, p. 310, l. 193-p. 311, l. 198)

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modo ordinandi ad finem illum, sicut patet de fistulis, quod nec eedem nec tot debent dari malo fistulatori et bono. Et ex hoc sequitur ratio PHILOSOPHI, que est quod, si equales habent diuitias, inequales existentes in uirtute, indignatio erit, quia unus reputabit se plus debere habere quam 40 alius, quia scit se esse digniorem alio et ad bonum commune utiliorem, et ex hoc orietur indignatio et seditio ciuitatis. Et sic patet quod non expedit possessiones esse equales simpliciter, hoc est secundum proportionem arismeticam; sed secundum quod ciues utuntur organis ad finem et diuersimode | se habent ad bonum commune, oportet quod secundum eandem P 287vb 45 proportionem dentur possessiones.

Ad rationem dicendum quod medium dicitur dupliciter, scilicet secundum rationem uel secundum quantitatem. Dicitur autem medium secundum quantitatem quod oportet inueniri in iustitia, et tale est medium secundum rem et semper est inter duo extrema. Aliud autem est medium 50 secundum rationem et tale quod expedit secundum rectam rationem, et hoc medium aliquando contingit esse ultimum extremorum, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 4º Ethicorum, capitulo de magnanimitate; et dicitur quod magnanimus simpliciter operatur maxima: operatur ultra quod non contingit magis operari et est extremum secundum ueritatem, medium 55 tamen secundum rationem rectam. Ad aliud dicendum quod plura contingent litigia positis possessionibus equalibus primo modo, secundum proportionem arismeticam: tunc enim secundum rectam rationem et per se et cum iustitia potest dignior litigare propter hoc quod non habet plures diuitias, et etiam potest se 60 subtrahere a maiori utilitate facienda pro communi, cum nichil ex hoc

4 3 ciues] ante diuersimode transp. P 5 3 quod] quem P 5 5 tamen] tantum sed corr. P 3 6 sicut…37 bono] cf. Arist., Pol. III.12, 1282b30-1283a1; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.10: “fistule non dantur nisi propter opus fistulandi, ergo non debent dari nisi ei qui aptus est ad fistulandum; quare plures et meliores debent dari ei qui magis est aptus et melius scit fistulare” (ed. Lanza, p. 83, ll. 61-63) 3 7 ratio…41 ciuitatis] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a37-41; cf. etiam 1266 b34-1267a1 et V.1, 1301a25-35 4 7 Dicitur…49 extrema] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.3, 1131a10-24 53 magnanimus…55 rectam] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b13-15, sed potius cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. IV.8: “Unde dicit quod magnanimus quidem quantum ad magna quibus se ipsum dignificat in extremo consistit, sed in quantum hoc facit secundum quod oportet, consistit in medio, quia scilicet se ipsum dignificat magnis secundum suam dignitatem (medium enim virtutis non attenditur secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum rationem rectam; unde, quantumcumque sit opus quod homo faciat, dummodo a ratione recta non recedat, non propter hoc est extra medium virtutis)” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 227, ll. 87-97)

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percipiat; et preterea etiam possunt fieri litigia per accidens, scilicet per auaritiam, ut si malus uelit plus exigere. Si autem ponantur equales secundo modo, tunc secundum rectam rationem et per se non fient litigia, quia quilibet habet quod iuste habere debet, sed solum possunt fieri per dementem auaritiam malorum. Hoc autem est per accidens, et ideo primo modo 65 non expedit possessiones esse equales, uel saltim minus expedit quam secundo modo, et cetera. < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m m a g i s e x p e d i a t p o l i t i c o o r d i n a r e c o n c u p i s ce n t i a m q u a m p o s s e s s i o n e s Arguitur quod magis possessiones, quia magis expedit ordinari quod habet rationem principii quam principiati; sed diuitie sunt principium concupiscentie, cuius ratio est quia se habent sicut obiectum illius: 5 obiectum autem inquantum huiusmodi principium est potentie; ergo politico magis expedit ordinare possessiones. Item, magis expedit illud ordinari ex quo sequuntur plura litigia; sed ex possessionibus sequuntur plura litigia quam ex concupiscentia. Et probatio huius est quia concupiscentia est in appetitu, cuius inordinatio se 10 ad pauca extendit, ut solum forte ad delectationes gustus et tactus; diuitie autem se ad plura extendunt inconuenientia, unde, 2º Rhetorice, dicitur quod diuites sunt contumeliosi, iactatiui et elati, contra patientes a possessione diuitiarum; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod magis regulandum est illud 15 cuius inordinatio principium est inordinationis alterius; sed inordinatio concupiscentie causa est inordinationis diuitiarum; ergo concupiscentie magis sunt regulande, quare magis expedit politico regulare concupiscentias quam possessiones.

61 possunt] post P 6 3 rectam] et add. sed exp. P 6 6 quam] quod P 13,3 ordinari] hic add. P 10 inordinatio] concupiscentie add. P 13 , 1 Consequenter…2 possessiones] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b29-30; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.18 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 443-444) 6 obiectum…potentie] cf. Arist., De An. II (56), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a16-21; cf. etiam Arist., De An. I.1, 402b14-16 1 3 diui1 5 magis…16 alterius] Arist., Pol. tes…14 diuitiarum] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a1 II.7, 1266b29-30 et 1267b5-9

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Item, illud quo ordinato ordinatur, hoc oportet magis regulari; sed ordinato appetitu et concupiscentia, in aliis nulla erit inordinatio; ergo et cetera. Et ideo dicitur, fine 1º huius, quod | magis debent curare P 288ra politici de eo quod est magis propinquum, unde magis curant de uxoribus quam de seruis, et de se magis quam de liberis. Et ideo magis curandum et 25 regulandum est quod est propinquius sibi quam quod est remotius; sed concupiscentia est propinquior nobis et appetitus sensitiuus quam possessiones; ergo magis curandum regulare appetitum sensitiuum quam possessiones.

20

Ad rationes dicendum quod diuitie non sunt principium concupiscentie, nec proprie sunt obiectum illius, sed sunt in ratione materie. Vnde obiectum uirtutis naturaliter dicitur uirtus illa perfectissima uel operatio eius perfectissima simpliciter, appetitu autem perfecto. Similiter diuitie nec sunt eius obiectum neque bona exteriora, quare sunt obiectum uoluntatis simpliciter, sed sub ratione determinata aliqua. Iterum, si 35 possessiones necessitarent uoluntatem, uideretur ratio concludere, sed hoc non est uerum: non enim uoluntas necessitatur per illas.

30

Ad aliud dicendum quod delectationes gustus et tactus sunt in quas solum fertur concupiscentia proprie sumpta pro appetitu sensitiuo. Si autem accipiatur pro omni actione peruersa, tunc ad plura se extendet 40 quam diuitie, et ideo tunc ex ea possunt plures inordinationes prouenire quam ex diuitiis.

2 0 alia] suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Baltimorensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 11: “... magis expedit regulare concupiscentias quam possessiones, quia melius est ordinare illa ex quorum ordinatione alia ordinantur” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3va) et Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 10: “illud est necessarium regulare in ciuitate quo ordinato omnia alia sunt ordinata” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 16ra) 2 6 et] concupiscentia est add. sed exp. P | sensitiuus] sensitiui P | possessiones] passiones P 3 5 uideretur] uideatur P 39 actione] et add. P 2 2 magis…24 liberis] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b18-21 STh Ia-IIae, q. 55, art. 1, ad 1 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 349)

3 0 Vnde…32 perfecto] cf. Thomam,

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< Q UE S T I O 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m p e r m i t t e n d u m s i t c i u e s d i t a r i q u a n t u m c o n t i n g i t e t s i n e t e r m i n o Arguitur quod sic, quia sic sunt diuitie quoddam bonum hominis, sicut robur corporis et pulcritudo; sed legislator permittit pulcritudinem et fortitudinem quantamcumque; ergo uidetur quod et diuitias quantascum- 5 que debet permittere. Item, thesaurizatio necessaria est ad uitam, ergo maior thesaurizatio magis necessaria, et maxima thesaurizatio maxime necessaria. Quod autem necessarium est ad uitam, hoc est permittendum. Modo diuitie sunt per se necessarie ad uitam, et maxime diuitie maxime necessarie: nam, si 10 simpliciter ad simpliciter et magis ad magis, que regula tenet in eis dicuntur per se; quod autem est maxime, necessarium est infinitum. Item, illud debet permitti thesaurizari augmentari in infinitum quod contingit ordinari in bonum commune; ; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia, sicut ciuis est aliquid ciuitatis, et 15 ita diuitie, et sic in bonum commune ciuitatis ordinantur.

P 288rb

Contra: sicut se habet in aliis artibus, ita suo modo et in politiis. Sed in aliis artibus non permittitur quicumque artifex habere instrumenta quantacumque uult: in fistulatiua ordinat enim legislator non quantascumque oportet illum fistulas habere, sed quantis indiget et ad operandum et fistulandum. Et sic recte est de diuitiis: cum sint quedam organa et instrumenta ad uitam, non permittuntur haberi quantas quis uult, sed quante faciunt | ad finem illius suo modo.

14 , 8 maxima] maxime P 1 4 sed…huiusmodi] suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 11: “Item, illud est permittendum in ciuitate quod cadit (cod.: cedit) in bonum commune ciuitatis; sed diuitie sunt huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, quia sicut ciuis est aliqua pars ciuitatis, sic etiam diuitie” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 16rb) 1 6 in] s.l. P 18 permittitur] scrips. permitatur P | quantacumque] quocumque P 14 , 1 Consequenter…2 termino] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b5- 8, sed potius 17-19 3 sic2…4 pulcritudo] cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. I.12: “Primo quidem dividendo bona humana in tria, quorum quaedam sunt exteriora, sicut divitiae, honores, amici et alia huiusmodi, quaedam vero sunt interiora; et haec rursus dividuntur in duo genera, quia quaedam eorum pertinent ad corpora, sicut robur corporis, pulcritudo et sanitas” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 42, ll. 47-53) 10 si…11 magis2] Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22 1 7 in3…19 uult] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b34-36

20

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25

Dicendum quod non est permittendum aliquem ciuium ditari sine termino diuitiarum. Et ratio huius duplex est, quoniam qui intendit aliquem finem per se, intendit etiam ea que necessaria sunt ad illum finem et etiam intendit remouere prohibentia.

Item, permittit illa que, etsi bonitatem in se non habeant, tamen utilitatem habent in finem; et ideo ordinat illa quecumque sunt 30 utilia et secundum quod utilia in finem. Politicus autem rectam rationem sumit ex fine quem intendit: hoc autem est bonum commune, et omnia que sunt utilia in finem ciuitatis permittit et ordinat in illum finem. Sed diuitie quantecumque sine termino non sunt utiles quia, inquantum sunt sine termino, magis 35 habent rationem finis; unde et appetitus finis infinitus est, et appetitus solus finis in infinitum, non autem eorum que in finem. Et ideo diuitie, eo ipso quod infinite sunt et sine termino esse ponuntur, iam non sunt utiles ad finem, sed magis sunt fines. Si ergo legislator nichil permittit nisi quod est utile, diuitie autem illo modo non sunt utiles, ergo isto modo non 40 permittet diuitias augeri, scilicet in infinitum. Item, legislator non solum intendit finem ciuitatis, sed et ciuium unionem et pacem in ciuitate. Vnio autem consistit in proportione, ut uisum est prius, unde oportet legislatorem unionem et pacem ciuium intendere, et nichil debet inter ciues permittere ex quo ciuium unio destruatur. Sed 45 illorum unio destruetur si permittantur ciues augere diuitias in infinitum, et hoc sequeretur seditio in ciuitate. Vnde dicitur, 2º Rhetorice, quod homines multa patiuntur a possessionibus: superbi enim fiunt et elati et inuidi, et huiusmodi multa, et quanto plus habent, tanto magis sunt elati, et sic uolent alios excedere. Et si permittat hoc, legislator permittit aliquid 50 ex quo sequitur destructio et corruptio politie uel ciuitatis. Et si aliquis dicat quod non uidemus quod aliquo modo prohibeat hoc, dico quod forte hoc est quia plus permittuntur habere quam habeant; aliquibus 2 5 huius] post duplex est transp. P 2 8 legislator] suppl. ex infra, l. 38 3 1 rationem2…finem] suppl. ex Prohemium, ll. 52-53; I, q. 2, ll. 10-11; II, q. 9, ll. 18-19; q. 15, ll. 13-14; III, q. 20, ll. 44-45; IV, q. 2, ll. 14-15; V, q. 14, ll. 17-18 32 bonum commune] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 14, l. 12: finis P 36 eorum] ea P | Et] ea add. sed exp. P 3 8 permittit] scrips. permititur P 4 1 unionem…42 et] in mouere sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 4 3 unde] bene P 4 9 excedere] extendere P 51 prohibeat] prohibeant P 3 3 diuitie…36 finem] cf. supra, I, q. 22, ll. 15-23 et 28-34 41 legislator…42 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a23-26 sed potius infra, V, qq. 1-2 4 2 Vnio…43 prius] cf. supra, II, q. 12 4 7 homines…48 inuidi] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a1

486

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autem uidemus permitti propter inordinationem appetitus. Item, hoc uidemus aliquando latenter fieri, et inhibentur aliquando illis connubia puerorum ne grauent ciuitatem, et etiam propter frequentia dampna que 55 sequuntur.

P 288va

Ad rationem dicendum quod non est in potestate cuiuslibet legislatoris , sed hiis que a uoluntate dependet. Et quia pulcritudo a uoluntate non dependet, non determinat de pulcritudine: ista tamen, scilicet pulcritudo et robur, determi- 60 nata | sunt a naturali dispositione et commensuratione membrorum. Ad secundam dicendum quod maxima thesaurizatio est non infinita, sed finita, et illa dicitur finita que potest facere ad bonum commune ciuitatis. Et cum dicit quod “thesaurizatio maxima infinita”, non accipit de ista thesaurizatione que propter necessaria ad uitam: hec enim 65 semper finita est. Sed si sit thesaurizatio querens pecuniam non ad necessitatem uite, sed ut finem ultimum, hec potest esse infinita, ut patet ex 1º. Ad tertiam dicendum quod, eo modo quo diuitie sunt utiles ad finem ciuitatis, debent permitti. Hoc autem non est secundum quod sunt 70 infinite: sic enim, nunquam inducendo finem, non essent utiles ad illum. < Q UE S T I O 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m t e r m i n u s d i u i t i a r u m a cc i p i e n d u s s i t i n c o m p a r at i o n e a d a l i q u o d e x t r i n s e c u m Arguitur quod non, quia terminus debet accipi ex aliquo secundum quod illud pertinet ad rationem rei; sed nichil extrinsecus ciuitati 5 6 sequuntur] coni.: pliciuntur P 58 determinare…natura] suppl. ex. ll. 59-60, ex loc. parall. B II, q. 14, ll. 24-25 et ex Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 11, ad 1: “dicendum quod non est simile de robore, pulcritudine (cod: plane) et de diuitiis, quia robur et pulcritudo sunt a natura, sed diuitie non sunt a natura sed ab arte” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 16va) 6 2 non] ut P 6 6 est] sit P 1 5 ,2 comparatione] correxi ex infra, l. 5 et loc. parall. B II, q. 15, l. 2: compositione P 5 3 hoc…56 sequuntur] hic probabiliter Petrus significat quod in Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b8-14 asseritur; ibi tamen Philosophus nullam mentionem facit connubiorum, sed potius monet ut multitudo divitiarum et possessionum multitudini filiorum adaptetur: multa mala enim fieri possunt si numerus filiorum excedat multitudinem divitiarum quas aliquis possidet ; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.3 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A148, ll. 66-96) 6 6 si…67 infinita] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b23-34 et supra, I, q. 22 15 ,1 Consequenter…2 extrinsecum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a21-27

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pertinet ad rationem ciuitatis; ergo terminus diuitiarum non debet accipi per comparationem ad aliquod extrinsecum. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod oportet diuitias ciuitatis esse tantas ne uicine ciuitates contra eam insurgant et tantas ne alie ei indignentur.

Dicendum quod terminus diuitiarum debet accipi ex parte finis, unde terminum rei oportet accipi ex ratione finis. Et cum diuitie ordinentur in finem ciuitatis et ad bonum commune, manifestum quod terminus earum debet sumi ex ratione finis. Sed ratio eorum que sunt in finem sumitur a fine, secundum quod est applicabilis hiis que ordinantur in finem, unde 15 natura non semper facit quod melius, sed quod applicabilius eis que ad finem. Vnde terminus diuitiarum sumendus est ex bono communi, secundum quod applicabile est huic , secundum quod pars ciuitatis, diuersimode diuersis applicabilis secundum diuersas consuetudines: ideo oportet terminum diuitiarum extendi secundum diuersas habitudines 20 et secundum diuersas consuetudines, unde unicuique tante sunt permittende diuitie, quante sufficiunt et possunt esse utiles ad consequendum finem ciuitatis. Et quia diuersificantur fines ciuitatis ex comparatione iacentes ciuitates, ex consequenti oportet accipi terminum diuitiarum ex hiis et ex adiacentibus. Vnde PHILOSOPHUS dicit quod oportet inspicere 25 adiacentes ciuitates ne, si paucas habeant, alie eas inuadant, si uero multas | habeant, insurgant contra alias de leui, et sic ex consequenti ad exteriores P 288vb ciuitates est respiciendum.

10

Ad rationem dicendum quod alie ciuitates sunt secundum se extrinsece ad ciuitatem aliquam, tamen habitudinem habent ad finem 30 ciuitatis et ad operationem eius.

8 uicine] coni.: in ciue P 1 3 eorum] earum P 1 4 fine] quandoque add. P 16 ex] fine add. sed exp. P 17 ciui] suppl. ex loc. parall. B II, q. 15, l. 11 | pars] partes sed. corr. P 22 comparatione] compositione P 2 3 ex consequenti] s.l. P | accipi] ex add. sed exp. P 25 habeant] diuitias add. sed exp. P | inuadant] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 15, l. 16: mandauit P 7 Contra…9 indignentur] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a21-31 13 ratio…14 fine] cf. supra, Prohemium, ll. 52-53 cum adn. 24 oportet…27 respiciendum] cf. supra, adn. ad ll. 7-9

488

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

< Q UE S T I O 1 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l ex s i t m u t a b i l i s Arguitur quod non, quia quod est a natura immutabile, ut dicit BOETHIUS libro Thopicorum et PHILOSOPHUS 5º Ethicorum; sed leges naturaliter sunt inuente a natura; ergo non sunt mutabiles. Item, in principio Phisicorum dicitur quod principia oportet manere; sed lex habet rationem principii in agibilibus; ergo et cetera.

5

Item, 5º Ethicorum, dicitur quod mensuram aliquorum oportet esse certam et manere, unde dicitur ibi quod oportet nummisma, cum sit mensura commutabilium, permanentius et durabilius esse aliis; sed lex est regula humanorum actuum; ergo et cetera. 10 Contra: lex est opinio plurium; sed opinio plurium est mutabilis; ergo lex est mutabilis.

Dicendum quod lex est quedam enuntiatio uniuersalis operabilium directiua agibilium secundum quod huiusmodi. Et ideo, sicut in speculatiuis duo sunt genera enuntiationum – quedam enim sunt propositiones per 15 se note, et tales sunt in quibus predicatum per se inest subiecto; per aliquod medium, et hee notificantur ex aliis –, sic etiam in agibilibus sunt quedam leges uniuersales primo et per se secundum mores note, ut ‘nemi-

16 , 9 durabilius] dubitabilius P 16 quedam…17 subiecto] suppl. ex loc. parall. B II, q. 16, ll. 17-18 et ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. II, q. 14: “Sed est notandum secundum Egidium ... alie sunt propositiones quarum ueritates non sunt per se note, sed quarum notificationes sumuntur per aliquod medium” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 130v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 146ra-b) 1 8 notificantur] notificentur P 16 , 1 Consequenter…mutabilis] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 189) 2 Arguitur…4 mutabiles] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, arg. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 189) quod2…immutabile] forsan ex Boethio, In Topica Ciceronis 1152C-D; Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1134b25-26 5 principia…6 manere] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (21), p. 141; Arist., Phys. I.6, 189a19-20 7 Item…10 cetera] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, arg. 2: “Praeterea, sicut Philosophus dicit, in V Ethicorum, mensura maxime debet esse permanens. Sed lex humana est mensura humanorum actuum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo debet immobiliter permanere” (ed. Leon. VII, p. 189) | mensuram…9 aliis] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133a19-21 et 1133b10-16 1 3 Dicendum…23 positiua] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 3, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 155); Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2, resp. (ibid., pp. 169-170); Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 2, resp. (ibid., p. 175); cf. etiam Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, ad 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 149)

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER II 20

25

489

ni esse nocendum’: et hec dicitur lex naturalis, quasi naturali indagatione uel saltim inclinatione nota; alia autem que per se non auditur, sed per aliquid prius licet notificari per determinationem rationis, ut malefactores tales taliter esse puniendos: et talis dicitur lex positiua. Dico ergo ad questionem quod, si loquamur de lege naturali, ipsa est inuariabilis, sicut illa circa que est sunt inuariabilia: uniuersalia enim semper manent, quamuis in particulari aliquo contingat reperiri ; per accidens tamen uariabilia, ut per aliquod particulare.

Si uero loquamur de lege positiua, dico quod ista lex est mutabilis, quia primum principium huius est mutabile. Principium autem primum legis 30 positiue est uoluntas ipsa, unde primo oportet esse finem, deinde ratiocinare de eis que sunt ad finem. Voluntas enim et electio humana uariabilis est, quare et lex, cuius sunt principium. Et hoc tangebat | PHILOSOPHUS 1º P 289ra huius, qui dixit: quod sola uoluntate positum est, mutabile est; quare lex ista, cum sit sola uoluntate posita, ipsa erit mutabilis. Sed potest esse mutabilis dupliciter: uno modo ex parte rationis legem determinantis, aliter ex parte eorum quibus datur lex. Ex parte rationis, et ratio procedit de potentia ad actum, ideo procedit a notioribus ad ignota, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum; et ideo, secundum proprietatem intellectus nostri, prius apprehendimus minus intelligibilia et indetermina40 ta, secundo magis intelligibilia et determinata. Et hoc patet 1º Phisicorum, quia omnes pueri primo appellant uiros patres, et cetera, postea uero determinant unumquodque horum. Quare, sicut in ratione speculatiua, ita et in practica: et ratio primo inuenit aliqua indeterminata et confusa secundum naturam, posterius ab hiis ad magis determinata proce45 dit et certiora; quare in ordinatione legis erit ita, quod erit primo ordinare leges rudes, postea uero magis determinari et perfici. 35

2 0 lex] uniuersalis add. sed exp. P 2 5 illa] que add. P | uniuersalia…26 ***] add. in marg. inf.; 28 mutabilis] sequitur pars quae deleta est propter caesuram folii, igitur legi non potest coni.: principium P 2 9 principium] est add. sed exp. P 3 7 actum] et add. sed exp. P 4 4 posterius] quare add. P 2 1 alia…auditur] de modo quo ‘auditur’ intelligi debeat, vide Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 13: “... sicut intellectus in speculatiuis primis principiis auditis, statim eis consentit” (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3vb) 2 4 Dico…27 particulare] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 5, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 172) 2 9 Principium…30 ipsa] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 3, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 191) 3 3 sola…est2] non inveni 3 5 Sed…52 leges2] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 189) 37 procedit2…38 ignota] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a16-18 4 1 omnes…42 horum] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (5), p. 140; Arist., Phys. I.1, 184b12-14

490

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Item, hoc patet ex parte hominum, quia oportet legislatores ordinare leges secundum dispositionem hominum; unde oportet fieri legem secundum quod est applicabilis fini; sed lex diuersimode applicabilis est fini secundum diuersitatem hominum: conuenit enim hominibus habentibus 50 rectam rationis dispositionem melius , et ideo conuenit leges mutari in meliores leges.

Ad rationes quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de principiis rerum naturalium intrinsecis, et dicit quod oportet manere unum non numero, sed genere uel specie; similiter lex manebit eadem 55 secundum speciem uel proportionem. Vel dicendum quod oportet manere principia, sed non uniuersaliter, sed secundum quod possibile est ea manere. Sed lex et regula: debet manere secundum quod est possibile, non tamen oportet quod omnino et uniuersaliter maneat semper. < Q UE S T I O 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m l e x s i t m u t a n d a m e l i o r e s u p e r u e n i e n te

P 289rb

Arguitur quod sic ratione PHILOSOPHI quia, sicut se habet circa artes factiuas, sic circa actiuas; sed in factiuis uidemus quod, que prius inuenta sunt, melioribus superuenientibus mutantur, ut patet in medicina et etiam in sutoria, ut 1º Metaphisice et 2º Elenchorum; ergo | sic est in 5 legislatiua: si aliqua lex fuerit rudis, hec est mutanda. Item, illud quo posito sequitur inconueniens non est sustinendum in ciuitate; sed multa inconuentia sequuntur, posito quod alique leges

4 8 secundum1] uel P 49 fini2] scrips. finii P 57 secundum…est] post manere principia transp. et iter. possibile est P 17 ,5 sutoria] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 17, l. 4: speculatiuis P est] ei P 6 hec] quod P 17 , 1 Consequenter…superueniente] cf. Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b26-28; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 190) et etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.31 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 537-541) 2 Arguitur…6 mutanda] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, arg. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 190) | ratione…3 actiuas] cf. Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b31-38 3 in…5 sutoria] cf. Arist., Metaph. I.2, 982b11-17; I.3, 984b8-11; Auct. Arist., Soph. El. II (29), p. 334; Arist., Soph. El. 33, 183b22-26 (hunc locum etiam allegavit Albertus Magnus in suo commentario; cf. loc. huic parall.: Albertus, Pol. II.6, ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 153) 7 Item…11 mutande] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, arg. 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 190)

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491

maneant: habebant enim antiqui legem quod emebant mulieres ferro, et alia lex erat quod cognatus interfecti fugiens reus esset homicidii; quecumque habeant inconuenientia multa sequentia erunt mutande.

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, quia non uniuersaliter mutande sunt leges paterne. Et ratio sua est quia illud ex quo sequitur detrimentum legis non est faciendum; sed ex mutatione legis sequitur minor efficacia legis; quare 15 non omnino sunt mutande leges. Minor patet quia lex efficaciam habet ex consuetudine, et qui tollit consuetudinem tollit legis efficaciam; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod leges per se sunt mutande, per accidens tamen mutande sunt aliquando, aliquando non. Primum patet quia quedam leges aliquam inordinationem habent et alie posteriores sunt meliores et magis ordinate. Tunc per se, ad faciendum id quod est melius ciuitati et quantum ad utilitatem ciuium, peiores mutande sunt; per accidens autem non, quia ex mutatione legis prioris accidit quod ciuis non assuescat ad obediendum legi et principi, quod ex 25 utroque istorum habet esse, et ex consuetudine et ex principe. Et, cum

20

9 ferro] correxi ex fonte allata: ferto P 1 0 homicidii] scrips. homodoii P 11 erunt] erant P 2 1 sunt] s.l. P 2 4 ciuis] diues P | principi] legis add. P 9 habebant…10 homicidii] cf. Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b39-1269a3: “ferrum enim portabant tunc Graeci et uxores emebant ab invicem ... in Come circa homicidia lex est, si multitudo quaedam testium astiterit persequens homicidium qui suorum cognatorum, reum esse homicidi fugientem” (ed. Susemihl, pp. 112-113). Sed cf. etiam Thomae interpretationem, quae aliqualiter differt ab Aristotelis textu: Thomas, Sent. Pol. II.3: “... ab antiquo erat lex apud Grecos quod emebant uxores ad inuicem, portantes ad talem emptionem ferrum, quia forte alia metalla non erant in usu. Et similiter uidemus quod si que leges adhuc remanent de antiquis, sunt omnia stulta; sicut in quadam terra erat talis lex circa homicidia quod si aliquis de cognatis occisi persequeretur homicidam et ille fugeret presente multitudine testium, quod ille reputaretur reus homicidii (et ab hinc uidetur introducta consuetudo duellorum)” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A160, ll. 67-76). Prima pars huius exempli (i.e., de ferro quod Greci portabant) ab Alberto interpretata est metaphorice; cf. Albertum, Pol. II.6 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 154). Utraque exempla etiam inveniuntur in Aegidii Romani De Reg. Princ. III/2.31 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 538) 1 2 Contra…16 efficaciam] cf. Arist., Pol. II.8, 1269a14-24; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, resp. (ed. Leon. VII, p. 190) 2 5 Et…28 ueritatem] Arist., Metaph. II.3, 995a1-3; cf. etiam Averroem, In Phys. I, comm. 60: “... homo ... cum fuerit assuetus credere sermones falsos a pueritia, erit illa consuetudo causa ad negandum verum manifestum” (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. IV, f. 36r, D); et cf. etiam Thomam, In Metaph. II.5: “Dicit ergo primo, quod auditiones contingunt in hominibus de his quae sunt secundum consuetudines. Ea enim, quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. Dignum enim videtur nobis, ut ita dicatur de quocumque, sicut consuevimus audire. Et si qua dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a ratione, propter

492

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PETRI DE ALVERNIA

assuefacti fuerint in aliquibus peioribus, adhuc reputabunt , facilius assuefacti in peiori quam in meliori, et facilius uidetur secundum ueritatem, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS 2º Metaphisice. Et ideo leges noue, cum fuerint nocumentum per accidens ordinationi ciuitatis, , que accidit 30 ex lege antiqua, , quia maior est ex hoc, quod leges alique in ciuitate mutantur, ad dampnum in ciuitate accidit, scilicet consuetudo non obediendi legi. Et ideo ista sunt conferenda | inuicem quod eorum sit peius: si enim et istud dampnum per accidens, id est consuetudo non obediendi, sit peius et maius 35 ciuitati quam perseuerentia antique legis, tunc non debet mutare legem ipse legislator; si autem econuerso, tunc debet mutare. Et hoc prudentie legislatoris committendum, quia non est hoc ratione uniuersali uidere, sed secundum experientiam casuum particularium, in quibus ad ipsum perti40 net iudicare.

Ad rationes dicendum quod in factiuis bene potest prius mutari, quia nichil est ibi propter quod per accidens, si debeat mutari, , quod non oportet ibi timeri de inobedientia, que est uoluntatis; uoluntas autem ad factiua non pertinet. Iterum in speculatiuis potest aliquid mutari, quia scientia ibi fit non ex consuetudine, sicut mores 45 in actiuis. Ad secundam dicendum quod “quo posito sequuntur multa inconuenientia, est prohibendum”, uerum est, nisi ex prohibitione illius sequentur plura et maiora , sicut forsan in proposito, et hoc committitur prudentie legislatoris. Si autem ex prohibitione non sequun- 50 tur plura uel maiora, tunc necessarium est lex mutanda in meliorem. 26 fuerint] fuerunt P | peioribus] correxi ex loc. parall. B II, q. 17, l. 19: prioribus P | ea…27 consuetudinem] suppl. ex fonte allata et etiam ex loc. parall. B II, q. 17, ll. 19-20 2 9 fuerint] fuerunt P 32 est] quod add. P 34 conferenda] conferendo P 4 1 inuenta] suppl. ex supra, l. 4 42 mutari1] iter. P 44 pertinet] ad add. P 47 secundam] iter. sed corr. P 48 est1] s.l. P 4 9 et hoc] ut P 5 1 necessarium] uterque P hoc quod sunt inconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum, est nobis magis notum” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 306a), Sigerum de Brabantia, QQ. Metaph. II, q. 23: “Illa enim quae in legibus humanis consueta sunt audiri, quamvis fabulosa et falsa, magis applicabilia sunt animo quam suae veritates. Ratio quare in legibus humanis traduntur aliquando falsa et fabulosa est quia legislator non semper ponit secundum quod opinatur de primis principiis, sed secundum quod magis potest aptare cives ad moros bonos” (reportatio Cantabrigensis, ed. Maurer, p. 71, ll. 18-23) 4 1 Ad…46 actiuis] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.12 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A161, ll. 154-164)

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< Q U E S TIO 1 8 > C o n s e q ue n t e r q u e r i t ur u t r um s e r uo r um s i t a l i q u a d i s c i p l i n a Arguitur quod non, quia cuius non est ratio, eius non est disciplina aliqua, quia disciplina est habitus secundum rationem; sed serui non est ratio, quia seruus dicitur qui non potest preuidere mente et deficit ratione 5 et potest exequi, dominus uero qui potest preuidere; ergo seruorum nulla est disciplina. Item, eius qui solum mouetur ab alio non est aliqua disciplina, quia disciplina est ad dirigendum et mouendum; sed serui est moueri a domino et non mouere; ergo et cetera. 10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS in 1º et hic.

Dicendum quod serui, inquantum seruus est, est aliqua disciplina. Cuius ratio est quia seruus secundum PHILOSOPHUM est qui non potest preuidere mente, deficiens ratione, et ulterius potest exequi secundum corpus; et ideo ille est seruus secundum naturam qui non potest preuidere 15 mente, et hoc secundum naturam; dominus uero econtrario. Tali autem seruo necessaria est aliqua disciplina. | Cuius ratio est quia, cuius P 289vb aliqua operatio uel finis, illum oportet habere quo possit faciliter attingere ad finem illum: natura enim nichil facit frustra, unde natura non inclinat in aliquid nisi etiam simul inclinet in illud per quod acquiratur, quia non 20 deficit in necessariis, sicut dicit libro Celi et Mundi. Sed serui est aliqua operatio, scilicet exequi preceptum domini; hoc autem bene potest sine habitu, unde et AVERROYS, super 3um De Anima, dicit quod habitus est quo aliquis operatur cum uult; ergo simul seruus habebit inclinationem in talem habitum, per quem faciliter operetur, et hoc secundum naturam 25 suam inquantum huiusmodi. Hic autem habitus est disciplina regulans

18 ,2 5 habitus est] inv. P sed correxi ex infra, ll. 29-30 et ex loc. parall. B II, q. 18, l. 13 18 ,1 Consequenter…disciplina] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1269b7-12 4 seruus…5 preuidere] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a31-34; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a: “principans secundum naturam est qui potest mente preuidere, seruus autem qui potest corpore exequi” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A75, ll. 305-307) 8 serui…9 mouere] cf. supra, I, q. 10, ll. 11-25 et q. 13, ll. 39- 45 1 0 Contra… hic] Arist., Pol. I.7, 1255b22-35 et II.9, 1269b7-12 1 2 seruus…15 econtrario] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a31-34; cf. supra, I, q. 13 1 8 natura1…20 necessariis] cf. supra, I, q. 14, l. 18 cum adn. 2 2 habitus…23 uult] Auct. Arist. (Averroes), De An. III (190), p. 190; Averroes, In De An. III, comm. 18 (ed. Crawford, p. 438, ll. 25-28)

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hominem in obediendo; ergo habebit inclinationem in disciplinam per quam attingat ad operationem suam. Secundo uidendum que sit ista disciplina. Hoc autem conuenit accipere ex fine, qui in agibilibus rationem habet primi obiecti. Ideo ratio istius habitus, scilicet discipline, erit ex ratione finis et operatione serui, que est 30 actio, quia seruus est organum actiuum, ut dicitur 1º huius. Actio autem est operatio cuius uoluntas per se principium, factionis aut ars, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum; habitus autem est principium actionis, et iste habitus est prudentia, que est habitus uera ratione actiuus; et ideo, cum serui sit actio, oportet quod inclinetur in habitum talem qui 35 sit principium illius actionis, scilicet prudentiam. Prudentia autem non existit sine aliis uirtutibus, ut probatur 6º Ethicorum: si enim debet esse prudentia, oportet preexistere appetitum recti finis, qui est per se principium prudentie; appetitus autem non est rectus sine uirtute morali; et ideo oportet seruum non solum habere prudentiam ad agendum, sed etiam 40 uirtutem moralem ad appetendum rectum finem ut sit conueniens domino. Qualiter autem se habeat prudentia et uirtus serui secundum proportionem ad prudentiam et uirtutem domini, dictum est in 1º.

Ad rationes dicendum quod non omnino deficit a ratione, cum sit homo, sed deficit solum respectu rationis domini, qui preuidet. Seruus 45 autem preuidere non potest, sed preceptis et premissis obedire potest exequendo, sicut in speculatiuis aliqui non possunt inuenire, sed inuentis consentire.

3 4 actiuus] correxi ex fonte allata et ex loc. parall. B II, q. 18, ll. 18-21: factiuus P 3 1 seruus…actiuum] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b32-33, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.2 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A83, ll. 137-139 et 163) | Actio…33 ars] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a31; VI.3, 1140a3-6, 10-14, 16-17 et VI.4, 1140b3- 4; cf. etiam loc. parall. B II, q. 18, ll. 17-19 et supra, I, q. 31, ll. 18-19 cum adn. 3 4 prudentia…actiuus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b4-6 et 20-21; sed cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.4: “Et dicit quod, ex quo prudentia ... non est ars, quae est habitus cum ratione factivus, reliquintur quod prudentia sit habitus cum vera ratione activus” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 345, l. 72-p. 346, l. 78) 3 6 Prudentia…37 uirtutibus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a31-37; VI.10, 1144b30-32 et 1145a2- 6; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.10 (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 372, ll. 172-207) et VI.4 ( ibid., p. 347, ll. 156-160) 3 7 si…39 morali] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a7-9 et 1144a29-37 4 0 oportet…42 domino] cf. supra, I, q. 29, ll. 19- 41 42 Qualiter…43 1º] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a39-b2; cf. supra, I, q. 30, ll. 15-53

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Ad aliam dicendum quod aliquid mouetur ab alio dupliciter: uel ita quod nunquam moueatur alio mouente simul moto, et talia mouentur | uiolenter; et talia non oportet habere aliquod principium P 290ra motus in se. Sed alio modo aliquid mouetur ab alio ita quod recipit principium motus ab alio, et tunc ulterius ex illo principio mouet se sine mouente, sicut grauia mouentur ab alio inquantum formam 55 grauitatis, que est principium motus deorsum, deinde mouentur secundum formam illam sibi inditam. Sic seruus mouetur ab ipso domino, quia principium actionis recipit a domino et, recepto illo principio, potest secundum uoluntatem suam agere, presens qui eum infomet.

50

< Q U E S TIO 1 9 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m ex e r c i t i u m i n u i t a m i l i t a r i s i t p r i n c i p i u m m u l t a r u m u i r tu t u m Arguitur quod non, quia quod inclinat ad hoc quod est preter rationem et turpe secundum naturam, illud non est exercitium ad uirtutes; 5 sed hoc facit uita militaris: inclinat enim ad uenerea multum et ad peccatum contra naturam, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera; ergo et cetera. Et idem etiam dicit libro De Problematibus.

4 9 Ad…58 informet] cf. supra, I, q. 10, ll. 11-23, 60-65 et q. 29, ll. 42- 46. Ut melius comprehendi possit quod hic asseritur vide etiam Anonymi Baltimorensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 14: “... dico quod non moueri nisi ab alio potest esse dupliciter: uno modo quod non moueatur nisi quamdiu aliud mouet[ur], sicut organum artificiale non mouetur nisi quamdiu mouet artifex ... uel aliquid potest non moueri nisi ab alio, quia et, licet non moueatur nisi aliquid sit prius motum, tamen potest moueri cessante uirtute et motu premouentis, sicut seruus non mouetur nisi dominus prius aliquid preceperit, et tamen mouetur post cessante motu domini, ut compleat mandata domini” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3vb) 5 8 presens…informet] cf. supra, I, q. 10, ll. 60- 65, ubi ratio redditur de isto modo quo dominus praesens sit 1 9 , 1 Consequenter…2 uirtutum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1270a4-6 5 uita…6 naturam] Arist., Pol. II.9, 1269b25-31 7 idem…Problematibus] Pseudo-Arist., Probl. IV.11, 877b14-19, sed probabiliter mediante Thoma sive Alberto; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.3: “Dicitur enim in libro De problematibus quod equitantes continue luxuriosi magis fiunt, quia propter caliditatem et motum hoc patiuntur quod accidit in coitu” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A164, ll. 149-152); cf. Albertum, Pol. II.7: “Cujus ratio est in quodam libro de Problematibus quibusdam ... Et dicit ibi, quod militares et bellicosi propter hoc quod continue sedent in equis, propter confricationem genitalium et dorsa equorum, magis quam titillantur ad coitum” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 163)

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Item, exercitium in eis que, statim nominata, mala sunt, non est principium uirtutum; sed tale est exercitium in uita militari: nam illi 10 exercent se in mutilationibus et homicidiis; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod Lacedemonii obediunt principantibus in uita militari, que multas habet partes uirtutis.

Dicendum quod duplex est bellum, scilicet iustum et iniustum. Bellum iustum et naturale est quando aliqui naturaliter serui existentes – uel propter regionem, ut barbari, ut dicitur 1º huius, uel propter egritudi- 15 nem et malam naturam, uel propter consuetudinem in turpibus –, alii autem sunt naturaliter illorum domini propter uirtutis insignia; tunc illi seruire, isti autem dominari iuste debent; et ideo, si rebelles sint illi ad seruiendum, iuste surgit bellum contra eos: faciunt enim illi contra iustitiam naturalem. Aliud autem est bellum iniustum, quod exercet 20 contra innocentes et non iniuriantes. Bellum autem iustum necessario ad finem ordinatur: non enim querimus bellum propter bellum, sed propter finem bonum, ut propter pacem, 10º Ethicorum. Et tale bellum est exercitium ad multas et fere omnes uirtutes. Cuius ratio est: qui enim se in illo bello secundum uitam militarem exercent, primo exercent se propter 25 bonum commune, et iterum in actibus fortitudinis se exercent, mortem in periculis non timentes pro bono communi.

19 , 10 mutilationibus] militationibus P 17 insignia] insignium P 2 1 necessario] quid add. sed exp. P 2 2 rectum] suppl. ex loc. parall. B II, q. 19, l. 15 2 6 iterum] quod add. sed del. P 8 exercitium…9 uirtutum] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1107a9-12 1 1 Lacedemonii…12 uirtutis] Arist., Pol. II.9, 1270a4- 6 1 3 Bellum…15 barbari] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a22-25 sed re vera, quoad bellum iustum et iniustum, agitur de interpretatione Thomae; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.4: “Dicit ergo primo quod propter predictum inconueniens uitandum non uolunt homines dicere quod nobiles homines quando capiuntur in bello fiant serui; set solum barbari cum capiuntur fiunt serui” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A92, ll. 157-161) 22 non…23 pacem] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b4- 6 2 3 Et…43 omnibus] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.7: “Bellicum etiam oportet habere uirtutem per quam sit agressiuus terribilium, et per consequens prudentiam aliquam ad hoc necessariam et alias aliqualiter uirtutes; unde dicebat prius Philosophus, in 2º huius, quod militaris uita multas habet partes uirtutis; et ideo bellici et consiliatiui simpliciter determinantur uirtute” (ed. Lanza, p. 498, ll. 80-84) 2 6 in1…27 communi] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a26-32; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. III (57), p. 236; sed, quod fortitudo tantum pertineat ad pericula quae pro bono communi aggrediuntur, potius affirmatur in anonymis scholiis ad Ethicam Nicomacheam et in commentariis Alberti et Thomae: Anonymus, In III Arist. Mor. cap. 9, ad 1115a33-34: “Cum bono autem in bello mortes et pericula, sive pro salute patriae, legum, amicorum, familiarium, libertatis” (ed. Mercken, p. 278, ll. 64-65); Albertus, Super Ethica III.8 (198 et 203) (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 179, ll. 84- 88 et p. 183, ll. 19-29); Thomas, Sent. Eth. III.14 (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 161, ll. 143-146 et 154-156, p. 163, ll. 206-208)

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Item, quia intendens aliquem finem, necessario intendit promouentia et conseruantia illum, ideo per consequens illi exercent se in operationibus 30 temperantie et continentie, quia expeditus usus armorum non esset nisi essent iste due uirtutes, et ideo etiam in illis exercent se; et per | conse- P 290rb quens credo quod in omnibus uirtutibus se exercere habeant, sicut in obedientia. Nam transgressores in bello grauius puniuntur et , ita etiam in omnibus aliis uirtuti35 bus. Cuius ratio est quia in actibus aliquibus non generatur uirtus nisi regulentur ratione, 2º Ethicorum. Causa autem regulationis in agibilibus sumitur ex fine ultimo, et ideo ex illo fine ultimo operationes regulate non inducunt inclinationem in aliquid contrarium illi fini, sed inducunt ad remotionem omnis rei contrarie illi fini. Modo ita est quod 40 unaqueque malitia contraria est et impeditiua boni et illius finis et etiam appetitus illius; et ideo actus unius uirtutis, quantum potest, remouet malitias, ne suum principium impediatur, et ideo, exercens se in una uirtute, per consequens exercet se fere in omnibus. Item, operatio uenit ex consuetudine, consuetudo ex ratione, ratio 45 autem ex primo principio, quod sumitur in agibilibus ex fine ultimo; modo omnis malitia freret illud principium, scilicet appetitum finis illius; ergo oportet abesse malitiam ab actu cuiuscumque uirtutis. Item, hoc ostendit colligantia actuum uirtuosorum. Videmus enim quod liberalis, dando cui oportet, et quando et quantum, exercet se in 50 operibus temperantie quia, sic dando, alienat se intenso appetitu

2 9 illi] illum P 3 3 propter…34 obedientia] suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 15, qui in hac quaestione fere litteraliter secutus est Petri textum: “Nam transgressores in bello grauius puniuntur et [hoc] propter hoc sunt multum exercitati in obedientia et ita etiam in omnibus aliis uirtutibus” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 18va) 3 5 generatur] grauatur P 3 6 regulationis actus] correxi et suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 15, qui, eisdem Petri verbis utens, asserit ut sequitur: “Causa autem regulationis actus a fine ultimo accipitur in agibilibus, et ideo ex illo fine ultimo operationes regulate (cod.: regulare) non inducunt inclinationem in aliquid contrarium illi fini, sed inducunt ad remotionem omnis habitus contrarii illi fini” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 18va): rationis P 39 est] s.l. P 46 frenaret] lectio incerta; quod hic significare velit ‘frenare’ sive ‘impedire’, sumi potest ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 15, cuius textus hic omnino idem est atque Petri textus: ”Item, operatio uenit consuetudine, consuetudo ex ratione, ratio autem ex primo principio, quod sumitur in agibilibus ex fine ultimo; modo, si esset aliqua malitia, impediret illud principium, scilicet appetitum illius finis” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 18va): frenet P 3 2 credo…33 obedientia] mentio de oboedientia desumpta videtur ex Thoma Sent. Pol. II.13 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A165, ll. 193-197) 35 in…36 ratione] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.3, 1105a28-33, II.5, 1106b36-1107a2, sed cf. etiam VI.10, 1144b26-28

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pecunie. Et ideo, sicut uirtutes, cum sunt secundum actum perfectum, sunt connexe in aliquo primo principio, ita et actus uirtutum connexi sunt ex consequenti. Sic igitur exercitium in uita militari contingit esse exercitium in multis uirtutibus, unde et politiam illorum PHILOSOPHUS in sequentibus 55 magis commendat.

Ad rationem dicendum quod inclinare ad uenerea accidit uite militari: nam propter confricationem genitalium accidit resolutio multa humorum et multiplicatio spirituum. Et per se autem est ad salutem patrie uel pacem; unde et in bene exercitatis in militia non hec passio accidit, uel saltim non tanta. Illud autem quod alicui accidit non 60 reddit ipsum uitiosum, sed quod inest ei per se. Ad secundam dicendum quod interficere uel mutilare aduersarios, licet secundum se sit malum, tamen secundum quid, scilicet in bello iusto, bonum est necessarium propter pacem, et cetera.

5 4 multis] operibus add. sed exp. P | politiam] politicam P 5 6 per accidens] suppl. ex Vincentii Gruner textu infra, in apparatu fontium, allato et ex loc. parall. B II, q. 19, ll. 5 7 genitalium] correxi ex Anonymi Mediolanensis et Vincentii Gruner textibus 33-34 5 8 autem] correxi ex Vincentii Gruner infra, in apparatu fontium, allatis : gentilium P 5 9 pacem] pacis P | in1…exercitatis] correxi ex Anonymi textu infra allato: quam P Mediolanensis textu infra allato: inbenetricis P 5 4 politiam…55 commendat] scilicet Lacedemoniorum; cf. Arist., Pol. VII.14, 1333b12-14, ubi tamen Aristoteles non suam profert opinionem, sed rationes refert aliorum, qui laudaverunt Lacedaemoniorum politiam 56 Ad…61 se] textus huius argumenti valde corruptus est; propter hoc decrevi loc. parall. ex commentariis Vincentii Gruner et Anonymi Mediolanensis allegare. Vincentius Gruner, Disputata Pol. II, q. 16: “Ad primam dicit Egidius quod inclinari ad uenerea per accidens contingit (conuenit TW) uite militari, et hoc dicit (fit T) propter confricationem genitalium ex frequenti equitatione, ex qua fit multorum humorum resolutio et spirituum multiplicatio, que sunt incitatiua uenereorum (uenereis W); de per se autem uita militaris est ad pacem et ad salutem et ad bonum communem” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 132v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 148ra); Anonymus Mediolanensis, QQ. Pol. II, q. 15: “... si exercitium in arte militari inclinet[ur] ad uenerea, (cod.: uenam) et si ad (aliqua sed forsan corr.) que sunt contra rationem, hoc non est per se sed per accidens, quia, sicut Philosophus dicit in De Problematibus, in exercitio artis militaris fit confricatio membrorum genitalium ad dorsa equorum, et quia in tali exercitatio fit magnus motus spirituum et humorum, et sic ad uasa genitalia descendunt multi humores. Et sic per accidens homines, propter tale exercitium, inclinantur ad actus uenereorum, et sic de aliis. Et (sic add.) illud accidit hominibus in principio utendi armis; postquam tamen certi sunt in arte militari, sunt omnino temperati et continentes et uirtuosi. Per se tamen nunquam inclinant ad talia. Modo illud quod inest alicui per accidens non facit ipsum uiciosum, sed illud quod inest sibi per se” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 18vb)

< L I B E R T E RT I U S >

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r c i r c a 3 u m P o l i t i c o r u m u t r u m c o n s i d e r a n t e m d e p o l i t i a o p o r t e t c o n s i de r a r e p r i u s de c i u i t a t e Arguitur quod non, quia considerantem de forma non oportet considerare de materia, quia ratio forme non dependet a materia, sed 5 econuerso: materia enim est propter formam sicut propter finem, 2º Phisicorum; sed ciuitas est materia politie; ergo et cetera.| P 290va Item, considerantem finem non oportet preconsiderare ea que in finem, quia ratio finis non dependet a ratione eorum que in finem, sed magis econuerso; politia est finis ciuitatis; ergo et cetera. 10

Contra: considerantem de politia oportet considerare ea de quibus dubitatur in politia, aliter enim imperfecte de eis determinaret; sed in politia dubia multa sunt de ciuitate, ut dicitur in littera; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod considerantem de politia oportet aliqualiter considerare de ciuitate. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dicitur 1º Phisicorum, innata est 15 nobis uia a notioribus nobis ad notiora simpliciter; sed nobis sunt certa et

1, 8 quia] et add. P 10 Contra] praem. item P 1 1 enim] de add. sed exp. P 15 sed] notiora add. P | certa] correxi ex fonte ad ll. 14-16 allata: tota P 1, 1 Consequenter…2 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b30-34; cf. etiam Petrum, Scriptum III.1 (ed. Lanza, p. 7, ll. 6- 8) 5 materia…finem] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (61), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a27-28 8 ratio…9 econuerso] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-24 10 considerantem…11 politia] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.1: “Et dicit quod de illo oportet considerare in politia, de quo dubitatur in ipsa” (ed. Lanza, p. 8, ll. 44- 45) 1 1 in2…12 littera] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b34 1 4 innata…16 magis] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a16-21: “Innata autem est ex notioribus nobis via et certioribus, in certiora naturae et notiora. Non enim eadem nobis nota et simpliciter. Unde quidem necesse secundum modum hunc procedere ex incertioribus naturae, nobis autem certioribus, in certiora naturae et notiora. Sunt autem primum nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis”; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Phys. I (3), p. 140 15 nobis3…21 intellectui] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. I, q. 6: “... quidquid intelligit intellectus, accepit ex sensu, et ideo, sicut est processus in cognitione sensitiva, sic erit processus in cognitione intellectiva sumpta ex cognitione sensitiva; illud ergo quod primum notum est intellectui sumptum est ex eo quod est primo notum secundum sensum. Sed in cognitione sensitiva, sensibile commune magis et particulare magis indeterminatum notissimum est nobis secundum sensum: prius enim percipit aliquis de aliquo a longe quod sit hoc ens quam hoc animal; ergo id universale quod accipitur ex isto particulari indeterminato, magis erit notissimum intellectui” (ed. Delhaye, pp. 26-27)

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confusa magis, quia cognitio intellectus nostri pendet ex sensu, ut dicitur 3º De Anima. Ideo illa que secundum unam rationem secundum sensum sunt primo nota, secundum aliam rationem sunt etiam primo nota intellectui: oportet enim ut primo intellectus ex sensu accipiatur, ex quo fantasmata intelligimus; et ideo, quod in particulari primo innotescit sensui, hoc in uniuersali primo fit notum intellectui. Modo ita est quod totum primo sensu capiatur: aqua enim non sentitur quia partes sentiantur, sed econuerso magis; et aggregatum ex subiecto et accidente non sentitur quia illa primo sentiantur, sed totum econuerso. Ergo, saltim in aliquibus, totum magis notum sensui quam partes; ergo similiter in illis totum est prius notum intellectui quam pars.

20

25

Sed politia sic se habet sicut pars respectu ciuitatis – politia enim est ordo quidam ciuium; ciuitas autem dicit totum aggregatum ex subiectis, scilicet ciuibus, et ex illo fine –, quia ciuitas sic se habet ad politiam sicut animalia ad animalitatem, et ideo notior est nobis primo ciuitas quam 30 politia. Et ideo, cum nobis innata sit uia et cetera, oportet prius secundum uiam nostre cognitionis considerare de ciuitate quam de politia.

Ad rationes dicendum quod minor falsa est, immo ciuitas se habet ad politiam sicut album ad albedinem; et ideo, sicut album prius notum est quam albedo, fit secundum sensum et uiam cognitio- 35 nis nostre, licet secundum rationem econuerso sit, sic etiam ciuitas prius est nota quam politia. Ad aliam dicendum quod ciuitas non ordinatur ad albedinem, sed ambo ad aliquod aliud; et ideo politia non 40 est finis ciuitatis, sed per se sufficientia est finis utriusque, et cetera.

16 manifesta] suppl. ex fonte allata | cognitio] scrips. 9nto P 1 9 ex] primo add. P 29 ciuibus] tribus P | ciuitas…politiam] coni. (cf. infra, ll. 33-34): politia sic se habet ad ciuitatem 33 ciuitas] praem. politia sed exp. P 38 politiam…39 ad1] suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 1, ll. 24-25 16 cognitio…17 sensu] Arist., De An. III.3, 427b14-16; III.7, 431a14-17 1 7 illa…19 intellectui] cf. Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (16), p. 312; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 72a1- 4 25 in…partes] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a24-25 27 politia2…28 ciuium] Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38; Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255 2 8 ciuitas…29 ciuibus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b39- 41 3 1 nobis…cetera] cf. supra, ll. 14-16 cum adn.

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c o n s i d e r a n te m d e c i u i t a t e o p o r t e t p r i u s c o n s i d e r a r e d e c i u e , s i c u t d i c i t P h i l o s o p hu s Arguitur quod non, quia considerantem de priori non oportet considerare de posteriori: prius enim contingit absoluere a posteriori; sed 5 ciuis posterior est ciuitate, ut dicitur 1º huius; ergo et cetera. Item, si sic, tunc erit circulus, quia, si considerantem de ciuitate oportet considerare de ciue, et econuerso considerantem de ciue oportet | P 290vb considerare de ciuitate. Cuius ratio est quia ad cognitionem partis oportet precognoscere totum: sicut enim pars esse habet a toto, ita et cognitionem; 10 ergo redibit circulariter. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia considerantem de composito oportet prius considerare de simplici. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut esse compositi est ex simplicibus, ita et cognitio, quia sicut se habet aliquid ad esse, ita et ad esse uerum, sicut dicitur 2º Metaphisice; sed ciuis se habet ad 15 ciuitatem sicut simplex ad compositum; ergo oportet ipsum prius considerari.

Dicendum quod per idem principium innata est nobis uia a notioribus nobis ad notiora nature et simpliciter, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum, notiora 2 ,5 ciuitate] ergo add. sed exp. P 10 processus] suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis, de quo vide adn. ad ll. 8-10 1 4 uerum] correxi ex fonte allata: unum P 2 ,1 Consequenter…2 Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b40-41 5 ciuis…ciuitate] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a18-19 et 25-26 8 ad…10 circulariter] idem argumentum etiam invenitur in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 2: “Item, si determinantem de ciuitate necesse esset determinare de ciue, tunc, cum determinantem de ciue necesse sit determinare de ciuitate, in tali determinatione esset demonstratio et processus circularis, quia esset ab eodem in idem; sed talis processus reprobatus est a Philosopho, 1º Posteriorum; ideo et cetera” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 19rb). Locus Philosophi hic memoratus est Arist., An. Post. I.3, 72b25-27 1 1 Contra…12 simplici] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a18-21; III.1, 1274b39- 41; vide etiam Arist., Phys. I.4, 187b11-13 | Contra…16 considerari] idem argumentum, in nexu inter partem et totum consistens, etiam invenitur, sed brevius, in Petri Scripto III.1: “In prima dicit debentem considerare de toto oportet considerare de partibus: sicut enim esse totius est ex esse partium, sic cognitio totius est ex cognitione partium, quare debentem considerare de toto oportet considerare de partibus. Sed ciuitas est quoddam totum; constat enim ex pluribus partibus, sicut quodlibet aliud totum: est enim ciuitas multitudo quedam ciuium. Quare manifestum est quod debentem considerare de ciuitate oportet inuestigare quid sit ciuis et quem oportet uocare ciuem” (ed. Lanza, p. 8, ll. 35- 42) 1 3 sicut…14 uerum] Arist., Metaph. II.1, 993b30-31; Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (42), p. 118 1 7 innata…18 simpliciter] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a16-21; Auct. Arist., Phys. I (3), p. 140

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secundum intellectum sunt que secundum sensum, licet sub alia ratione primo nota sunt. Sed talia sunt partes in aliquibus, in quibus non 20 sentitur totum nisi quia sentitur pars, econuerso illius quod prius dictum est. Nam in aliquibus pars non sentitur nisi quia sentitur totum, et ibi totum est prius notum sensui; in aliis autem sentitur totum nisi quia sentitur pars, et in istis pars est notior toto secundum sensum, sicut in illis ex quibus diuisis efficitur unum ordine: ibi enim cognitio totius fit ex 25 cognitione partium, ut in exercitu, et similiter est in artificiatis, ut in mellicrato. Et ideo in illis totis, in quibus ex pluribus diuisis constituitur unum ordine, pars prior est nota est secundum sensum. Et tale totum est ciuitas, et ciuis est pars eius; ideo ciuis est magis nobis notus secundum sensum, propter quod prius considerandum, secundum nostre 30 cognitionis ordinem, de ciue quam de ciuitate. Sed intelligendum quod totum simpliciter prius est parte, secundum naturam. Cuius ratio est quia partes non sunt nisi in toto et per totum, secundum quod partes, et ideo nec rationem habent secundum se nisi secundum rationem totius. Et ideo simpliciter totum prius est, etiam 35 secundum rationem, ipsis partibus; quoad nos, ad dictum ‘secundum quid’, pars prior est et prius potest nosci quam totum, scilicet secundum quod prius sensu apprehenditur quam totum. Et ideo, quia prius noscimus partem cognitione secundum quid, ideo ex cognitione partis noscimus etiam totum secundum quid. Ex tali autem cognitione secundum quid, 40 scilicet a partibus habita, intellectus, secundum motum suum, complete inuestigat naturam totius, et tunc noscit ipsum simpliciter, ratiocinando. Et ideo sic facit Philosophus in Posterioribus, ubi, cum in 1º libro dedit uiam demonstrandi per ipsum ‘quod quid ’, in 2º docet inuestigare ipsum ‘quod quid est’; ultimo enim intellectus, cognito ipso ‘quod quid est’ 45 secundum quid, inquirit eius totalem naturam, et similiter intellectus, per partes ipsius ‘quod quid est’ secundum quid cognitas, et etiam ipso ‘quod 28 et prius] suppl. ex infra, l. 37 30 sensum] et nobis add. P 46 inquirit] inquiret P 21 econuerso…22 est] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 21-25 25 ibi…28 sensum] cf. Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a13-15, ubi Aristoteles, ad notionem ordinis explicandam, in exemplum exercitum adducit et huius bonum cum bono partis eius principalis exaequit 32 Sed…38 totum] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. VII, q. 26: “Totum uero diffinitum, ex quo est aliquid in actu, perfectum est, et etiam prius omnibus suis partibus, et ideo, secundum quod partes sunt in actu, totum diffinitum est notius suis partibus; quamuis partes diffinitionis sunt minus note secundum quod partes, tamen, secundum quod sunt partes diffinitionis, sunt notiores, non secundum quod sunt partes diffiniti, sicut si dicimus quod ignis, aer, aqua terra, posteriores sunt secundum quod sunt partes mixti, priores tamen secundum per se” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 205ra)

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quid est’ secundum quid cognito, per eas ipse, ratiocinando, totum ‘quod quid est’ inuestigat. Sic similiter est de ciuitate. Primo | enim secundum quid oportet P 291ra inuestigare ciuitatem per ciuem; postea, habita illa cognitione secundum quid, intellectus deuenit tandem in totalem cognitionem et perfectam ipsius naturam et diffinitionem, et tunc econuerso perfecte ex hoc concludet ‘quod quid est’ ciuis simpliciter. Quoad nos, aggregatum prius noscitur 55 secundum quid; deinde, ex hac cognitione totius aggregati secundum quid, noscitur id quod est formale etiam secundum quid, et econuerso ultimo intellectus, inueniens perfectam et simpliciter naturam forme, ad completam naturam ipsius aggregati regreditur. Similiter est de substantia et accidente: substantia enim est prior accidente diffinitione, perfectione et 60 tempore, ut dicitur 7º Metaphisice, tamen quoad nos accidens prius noscitur secundum quid, et ex hac cognitione accidentis deuenitur in cognitionem substantie secundum quid, cuius natura simpliciter, inquisita per ratiocinationem, econuerso natura accidentis, est ‘quod quid est’, complete poterit 65 inueniri. Ad hoc intendens PHILOSOPHUS, 1º De Anima, dixit quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est: dant enim principium fantasie, ut ibi dicitur. 50

Ad rationes dicendum quod prius dicitur dupliciter: uel uia generationis uel uia perfectionis. Item, secundum cognitionem, aliquid prius est 70 nobis notum et secundum quid et uia generationis, aliud autem per se et simpliciter secundum naturam et uia perfectionis. Vnde considerantem de ciuitate, que prior est simpliciter, bene possibile est considerare de ciue, qui posterior simpliciter, nobis tamen prior. 75

Ad secundam dicendum quod considerantem de ciuitate oportet precognoscere ciuem cognitione secundum quid; econuerso autem cognitione simpliciter, et sic non secundum idem; et ita non est circulus.

4 8 eas] quas P 4 9 inuestigat] similiter add. sed exp. P 59 substantia…60 tempore] Arist., Metaph. VII.1, 1028a32-33; Auct. Arist. (sub nomine Commentatoris), Metaph. VI (159), p. 128 65 accidentia…67 fantasie] Auct. Arist., De An. I (7), p. 174; Arist., De An. I.1, 402b21-23 68 prius…69 perfectionis] cf. Arist., Cat. 12, 14a26-27 et b3-5; Arist., De Gen. An. II.6, 742a19-22; Arist., Metaph. V.11, 1018b9, 14-15 et 1019a2-3; Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a4- 6; hac distinctione utitur Petrus, QQ. De Caelo I, q. 24 (ed. Galle, p. 124, ll. 82-90), ubi tamen eam magis disserit

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< Q UE S T I O 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m s i t c i u i s s i m p l i c i t e r q u i p o t e s t p a r t i c i p a re p r i n c i p a t u c o n s i l i a t i u o u e l i u d i c a t i u o Arguitur quod non, quia, si ciuis sic diffinitur, oportet hoc omni ciui conuenire, quia diffinitio conuenit omni contento sub diffinito; sed ista diffinitio non conuenit omni ciui: ignorantes enim et uitiosi, cum sint 5 ciues, non possunt participare istis principatibus, ut post dicetur; ergo hic non est ciuis simpliciter diffinitus. Item, ciuis non debet diffiniri per accidens suum, quia accidens non ingreditur diffinitionem rei; sed posse participare principatibus istis accidit ciui – sed quedam potentia accidit ei, cuius est potentia –; ergo hec 10 non est bona diffinitio. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod ciuis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter et absolute, alio modo secundum determinationem uel adiectionem diminuentem. Et si primo modo, tunc ciuis qui istis potest communicare 15 principatibus. Cuius ratio est quia pars, id quod est et inquantum pars, est alterius – 1º huius –, et ideo esse et rationem habet a toto, quia unumquo-

3 ,1 Consequenter…2 iudicatiuo] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a19-b20 4 diffinitio…diffinito] cf. Arist., Top. VI.1, 139a26-27 5 ignorantes…6 dicetur] cf. Arist., Pol. III.5, 1278a6-35 10 quedam…potentia2] Auct. Arist., De Som. et Vig. (70), p. 201; Arist., De Som. et Vig. 1, 454a8 1 2 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275b18-20 1 6 pars1…17 alterius] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a8-10; cf. etiam supra, I, q. 11 1 7 unumquodque…28 iudicatiuo] idem argumentum, his ipsis verbis, una cum eadem mentione ad Ium Politicae, rursum invenitur in Petri Scripto III.1: “Vlterius intelligendum est quod unumquodque entium determinatur aliqua operatione, in quam, cum potest, ; cum uero non potest non dicitur, nisi equiuoce, sicut dicitur in 1º huius. Ciuis autem est aliquod ens; ergo habet aliquam operationem in quam, cum potest, dicitur ciuis, cum autem non potest, non dicitur, per quam diffinitur. Et ideo Philosophus, uolens dare diffinitionem ciuis, diffinit ipsum per operationem eius secundum quam ciuis est. Operatio autem eius secundum quam ciuis est est operatio que conuenit ei per formam ciuitatis, quia pars, secundum quod huiusmodi, non habet operationem nisi uirtute forme totius. Forma autem principalis ciuitatis est politia ... Dicit igitur quod ciuis simpliciter nullo alio magis determinatur quam per participare iudicio et attingere ad principatum” (ed. Lanza, p. 9, l. 105-p. 10, ll. 115 et 119-121). Non autem invenitur idem argumentum in Alberti (cf. Pol. III.1, ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 209) et Thomae (cf. Sent. Pol. III.1, ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A187) commentariis. Cf. etiam Petrum, Scriptum VII.3: “... est intelligendum quod, sicut dicitur in 1º huius, omnia quecumque secundum naturam et artem sunt, diffinita sunt uirtute quadam et operatione, in quam, cum possunt, dicuntur, cum autem non possunt, non dicuntur, nisi equiuoce. Ciuitas uero est aliquid eorum que secundum aliquid

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dque habet esse et rationem secundum speciem, ergo ciuis per habitudinem ad totum; ciuis autem est pars ciuitatis; ergo ciuis inquantum huius20 modi non determinatur nisi per formam ciuitatis. Ciuitas | autem determi- P 291rb natur in quam potest, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in 1º, ubi dicit quod omnium est operatio aliqua in quam, cum possunt, hec dicantur maxime, cum autem non possunt, non dicuntur amplius talia nisi equiuoce; ciuitas autem maxime determinatur istis operationibus principalibus, 25 que sunt consiliari et principari; ergo in istis consistet ratio ciuitatis: determinata enim sunt ciuitatis et forme eius. Ergo et ciuem, cum sit pars ciuitatis, per eadem determinare oportet, quare simpliciter erit ciuis qui potest participare principatu consiliatiuo uel iudicatiuo. Alio modo dicitur ciuis, cum adiectione diminuente rationem eius, qui 30 deficit a predictis, sed quandam solum habitudinem ad illa habet et ordinem. Et hoc contingit multipliciter: uel secundum potentiam, ut pueri dicuntur ciues imperfecti, quia adhuc non attingunt ad predicta, alii autem dicuntur ciues ultra prouecti, ut senes, qui etiam a predictis deficiunt, propter debilitatem nature et uirtutum naturalium; alii autem ex eo quod,

3 ,2 1 aliqua operatione] suppl. ex fontibus allatis | in quam] correxi ex infra, l. 22 et ex fontibus allatis: inquantum s.l. P | potest] s.l. P 25 ciuitatis] per add. sed exp. P 30 illa] illum P 33 prouecti] proiecti P est a natura et secundum aliquid ab arte; et ideo operationem determinatam habet, in quam cum potest dicitur ciuitas, cum autem non potest, non dicitur” (ed. Lanza, p. 471, ll. 197-203) 2 2 omnium…24 equiuoce] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a20-29, sed cf. potius Auct. Arist., Meteor. IV (26), p. 173; Arist., Meteor. IV.12, 390a10-12: in aliis enim commentariis in Politicam, ubi eadem quaestio ponitur, semper citatur locus ille ex IVº Meteororum ubi hoc asseritur: cf. loc. parall. B III, q. 3, ll. 15-17 cum adn.; cf. etiam Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. III, q. 3: “Modo, secundum quod habetur 4º Metheororum et 1º huius, unumquodque ens habet propriam operationem in qua, cum potest, est illud, cum autem non potest, non est illud nisi equiuoce” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 19va-b) et Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. III, q. 2: “... patet, quia unicuique rei debetur una operatio quam, quantum potest, dicitur illud, cum autem non potest non dicitur illud nisi equiuoce, 1º huius, 2º De anima, 4º Metheororum” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 4ra) 3 0 sed…36 serui] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a7-19; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.1: “In prima excludit quattuor modos ... Non enim potest dici ciuis aliquis per hoc quod inhabitat ciuitatem, quia contingit aduenas et seruos habitare in ciuitate, et tamen aduena et seruus ciues non sunt ... Alii dixerunt quod illi dicuntur ciues, qui recipiunt iustitiam in ciuitate, ut qui sententiam optinent et illi contra quos sententia fertur, sicut illi qui iudicantur. Sed istud non est uerum ... Aliqualiter tamen possunt dici ciues, non simpliciter et ualde, sed secundum quid et secundum appositionem, ut puer dicatur ciuis quia in potentia est ut sit ciuis, uel dicatur ciuis inperfectus, senex autem dicitur ciuis ultra prouectus, id est magis quam perfectus communiter uel secundum aliquem alium modum ... Viles enim et profugi et condempnati possunt dici ciues non simpliciter, sed secundum quid et cum appositione” (ed. Lanza, p. 8, ll. 67- 68 et p. 9, ll. 71-77, 90-94, 97-98)

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saltim passiue, istis participant, ut ciues iustitiati, alii ciues expulsi, alii 35 ciues obedientes, ut serui. Ciuis ergo simpliciter qui potest attingere ad predicta, ciuis autem secundum quid qui aliquam habet habitudinem ad ciuem simpliciter et primo modo dictum. Et est uidere simile in natura, quia oportet ciuitatem bene legibus ordinatam intelligere sicut animal, ut econuerso 40 dicit PHILOSOPHUS in libro De Motibus Animalium. In animali autem sunt 3 5 istis] iste P 39 oportet…40 econuerso] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 4 1 In…49 simpliciter1] hoc argumentum valde similiter etiam invenitur in 703a29-32 Petri Scripto III.1: “Sicut enim nos uidemus in animali quod illa est pars simpliciter ipsius que attingit ad formam animalis et operationem, sic ciuis est ille qui attingit ad formam ciuitatis et operationem; et sicut in animali sunt quedam partes que non attingunt ad formam animalis nec ad operationem, sunt tamen necessarie, sic in ciuitate sunt quidam qui non possunt attingere ad operationem ciuitatis, sunt tamen necessarii” (ed. Lanza, p. 10, ll. 122-127). Invenitur etiam in Scripto idem fere argumentum de partibus animalis pertinentibus ad eius speciem sive ad eius formam attingentibus; cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.2: “sicut partium animalis quedam sunt que non pertinent ad speciem – sicut hec caro, hec ossa –, quedam que pertinent ad ipsam – sicut caro et ossa absolute –, et sicut sunt quedam que non attingunt ad formam rei – sicut pili et ungues –, quedam que attingunt – sicut cor et epar – ...” (ibid., p. 152, ll. 70-74) et IV.3: “partium materialium quedam sunt que pertinent ad speciem, quedam autem non. Partes pertinentes ad ipsam sunt sine quibus species non potest esse, sicut caro et os pertinent ad speciem hominis, quia sine hiis non potest esse homo. Partes materiales non pertinentes ad speciem sunt sine quibus species potest reperiri, sicut ista ossa et istae carnes non pertinent ad speciem humanam, quia sine istis potest esse homo” (ibid., p. 158, ll. 23-29). Cf. etiam Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. III.3., q. 3: “Modo animalis quedam sunt partes que actu et per se possunt in proprias operationes et debitas totius, sicut manus et oculus ... Alie sunt partes solum in potentia, sicut sanguis ... Alie sunt partes que non sunt necessarie ad esse animalis, coniunguntur tamen sibi in esse, sicut unges et pili, et tales partes ex superfluis animalium causantur. Alie sunt partes corupte que non possunt in proprias operationes, sicut manus paraletici que per infirmitatem est amissa, sic quod non potest in operationem suam” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 19vb) et Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. III, q. 2: “quedam sunt partes animalium principaliores, que excercent principaliores operationes, sicut cerebrum, cor et manus et cetera, quedam sunt partes minus principales, sicut pili, ungues et ossa” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 4ra). Quoad ‘caro’ pro ‘cor’: sic decrevi mutandum, quia in aliis commentariis aliae partes animalium adducuntur ut exempla partium participantium formam totius et speciem et operationem, et rectius interdum, ut mihi videtur. Probabilis ratio huius discrepantiae est quia aliud et aliud momentum in istis locis ex istis operibus assignatur formae sive speciei sive operationi partium, sive separatim sive coniunctim consideratae. Operatio autem videtur hic maioris momenti, quam ob rem probabiliter rectius est ‘cor’ vel etiam esset ‘oculus’ loco ‘caro’ corrigere. Cf. Petri Scriptum et etiam Anonymi Baltimorensis et Anonymi Mediolanensis commentaria. De partibus participantibus formam et operationem totius cf. etiam locum illum Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 6, ubi clarius asseritur quod “in animalibus (cod.: naturalibus) quelibet (cod.: qualibet) pars participat formam totius et operationem et, si sic, pars organica totius habet aliquam uirtutem qua potest in operationem totius (cod.:

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quedam partes participantes formam totius et speciem et operationem, ut cor et manus: hec enim sunt animata, et hec dicuntur partes pertinentes ad speciem. Alie sunt que non participant illam nisi tantum in potentia, ut 45 sanguis, et talia non sunt partes animate nisi in potentia. Et alie, propter nimiam exsiccationem, fiunt aliquando mortue, ut in membro paralitico, et iste sunt partes mortue; alie autem que ad motum attingunt, scilicet generationem, non tamen ad formam, ut ungues et pili. Et iste omnes non sunt partes simpliciter. Ita et in ciuitate ciues simpliciter dicun50 tur qui attingunt ad principales operationes; qui autem ad illas non attingunt non dicuntur ciues nisi secundum quid. Sed intelligendum quod attingere ad consilia tantum uel iudicationes dicitur dupliciter: uel actiue, ita quod personaliter ad talia eligatur aliquis, uel passiue, ita quod iudicanti obediat uel eligat uel saltim electioni con55 sentiat. Et primo modo attingunt ad principatus hos ciues simpliciter,

4 3 cor] correxi ex loc. parall. Anonymi Baltimorensis QQ. Pol. III., q. 2: “sicut cerebrum, cor et manus” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 4ra) et ex aliis fontibus allatis: caro P 4 4 illam] illum P 45 animate] animati P 46 aliquando] correxi ex loc. parall. B III, q. 3, ll. 31-32: quidem P 4 8 ungues] correxi ex loc. parall. B III, q. 3, l. 33, ex Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 3: “ sicut unges et pili” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 19vb) et ex Petri Scripto IV.2: “sicut pili et ungues” (ed. Lanza, p. 152, ll. 73-74): ossa P 51 non] ut sed corr. P 52 iudicationes] iudicationi P totum), sicut oculus habet uisiuam qua potest animal uidere et pedem quo potest calcare et manum qua potest palpare, et sic de aliis partibus” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 21rb). Quoad ‘ungues et pili’: non ‘ossa’ (ut in ms. invenitur), sed ‘ungues’ hic videtur accipiendum, ut in B et in aliis commentariis – excepto Anonymo Baltimorensi, ubi ‘ossa’, una cum ‘pili et ungues’ tamen, invenimus –. Clare enim in istis operibus asseritur quod ossa pertinent ad speciem et ungues non attingunt ad formam rei. Cf. praesertim Petrum, Scriptum IV.2 (p. 152, ll. 70-74)

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secundo autem modo ciues secundum quid dicti .

Ad rationes dicendum quod saltim secundo modo omnis ciuis ad ista attingit, licet non primo modo omnis.

P 291va

Ad secundam dicendum quod ista sunt de ratione essentiali ciuis 60 inquantum ciuis. Ciuis enim uel princeps uel dominus uel seruus non determinantur aliquo absolute, sed aliqua relatione fundata | super actione, ut dicitur 5º huius. Vnde ciuis qui natus est illo modo mouere et agere consilium et iudicia. Natum autem esse mouere est posse mouere, et ideo sic de ratione ciuis inquantum huiusmodi est potentia ad principatus 65 istos. 5 6 adhuc…57 dicti] suppl. ex quo asseritur in fontibus allatis 5 6 adhuc…57 dicti] sine istis quae addenda decrevi, textus hic manifeste contradiceret quod supra, ll. 29-39 asseritur: ducere enim deberetur, sine hoc quod addidi, quod pueri et servi, qui sunt cives secundum quid, possent eligere. Sed re vera tantum potest eligere civis simpliciter, ut in Scripto clare asseritur et etiam in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ.; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.1: “Sed est intelligendum quod attingere ad principatum contingit dicere multipliciter: uno modo ita quod principetur, et sic non omnes ciues attingunt; alio modo est attingere ad principatum quia attingit ad iudicium uel quia eligit principantem uel habet uocem in eligendo illum qui eligit. Et iste est ciuis simpliciter. Terminus igitur et ratio diffinitiua que congruit omnibus qui dicuntur ciues, si qua est, maxime hec est” (ed. Lanza, p. 11, ll. 147-153). Unum est dicere quod civis sit talis simpliciter aut secundum quid, aliud quod sit talis passive aut active: civis simpliciter (sive proprie dictus) potest esse sive active sive passive talis; cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem (QQ. Pol III, q. 3), qui hoc idem clarius exponit; eius argumenta comprobant quod oportet hic Petri textum supplere, quia in aliquo deficit: “Intelligendum etiam est quod ciues possunt participare principatu, consilio et iudicio dupliciter: uno modo actiue, ita quod ad talem principatum aliqui eliguntur personaliter, et sic non est necessarie quemlibet ciuem esse principem, ad minus principatu regali, licet aliquo modo principatu actiue principetur; alio modo possunt participare principatu illo passiue, ita quod iudicanti obediant uel iudicantem eligant uel electioni consentiant uel consilium eligendi dent, et omnes ciues proprie dicti principantur tali principatu” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., ff. 19vb-20ra) 58 saltim…modo] scilicet passive: cf. supra, ll. 52-55 et q. seq., ll. 32-35 61 Ciuis…63 actione] non inveni; verisimiliter mentio ista ad librum Vum (“5º huius”) recta non est. Si sic, recta mentio potius esse posset ad locum illum libri Ii QQ. ubi Petrus definit nexus inter servum et dominum atque inter principantem et subiectum ut relationes inter activum et passivum sive inter actum et potentiam (cf. supra, I, q. 11, ll. 27-29 et adhuc magis I, q. 12, ll. 32- 67). Si autem tantum consideretur falsum “huius”, salvo “5º”, forsan locus ille Vi Metaphysicae afferretur ubi Aristoteles hoc asserit: “Actiua uero et passiua secundum potentiam actiuam et passiuam sunt et actiones potentiarum ... Sic enim pater filii dicitur pater; hoc quidem enim fecit, illud autem passum quid est” (Arist., Metaph. V.15, 1021a14-16 et 23-25; AL XXV.3.2, p. 113, ll. 599-600 et 607-608). Quod hic mentio sit potius ad Vum Metaphysicae quam ad Vum huius probabilius videtur si considetur loc. huic parall. in B III, q. 3, ll. 48-50, ubi, ad illustrandum quod asseritur, exemplum affertur relationis inter patrem et filium

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s u n i u s r a t i o n i s s i t i n o m n i p o l i t i a Arguitur quod sic, quia cuius est una diffinitio, eius est una ratio. Item, ratio ciuis debet attendi secundum rationem principantis et consiliatiui; in omni politia istorum est una ratio; ergo et ciuis erit ubicum5 que una ratio. Minor patet quia princeps secundum omnem politiam est qui potest mouere secundum uoluntatem suam omnia, 5º Metaphisice, capitulo de principio. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione sua, quia ciuis dicitur ad politiam; ergo si politie diuerse, et ciuis erit diuersus.

Dicendum quod ciuis simpliciter dictus non est idem secundum rationem, sed secundum attributionem uel aliquo alio modo. Cuius ratio est quia ratio ciuis debet attendi secundum rationem principantis et consiliatiui, et per ista diffinitur ciuis; ergo secundum rationem diuersam istorum erit diuersa ratio ciuis. Sed istorum erit diuersa ratio in diuersis politiis, 15 quod patet quia ratio consilii est secundum rationem finis: non enim consilium est de fine, sed de eis que ad finem sumpta ex fine. Modo in diuersis politiis est diuersus finis, et similiter princeps erit diuersus, quia principans est secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur alia. † Hoc est consilium idem finis. † Ergo, si principatium differens est ratione in 20 diuersis politiis, ergo et ratio ciuis altera erit in illis. 10

Item, notandum quod ciuis non omnino est diuersarum rationum in diuersis politiis, sed secundum anologiam. Sed de quo dicatur per prius et 4 ,1 9 ratione] praem. secundum rationem, sed rationem exp. P 4 ,1 Consequenter…politia] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a34-b5 5 princeps…6 omnia] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 8 Contra…9 diuersus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275b3-5 et III.4, 1276b30-33 1 5 ratio…16 fine2] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. III (48), p. 236; Arist., Eth. Nic., III.4, 1112b11-12; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (13), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.6, 1362a18-19 18 principans…alia] cf. supra, ll. 5- 6 cum adn. | Hoc…19 finis] locus corruptus, ut videtur: aliquid deest, quod ad nexum inter voluntatem et finem pertinere debebat, ut in loc. parall. B III, q. 4, ll. 16-18 2 1 notandum…25 prius2] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.1: “in rebus in quibus supposita differunt specie, et unum est naturaliter prius, aliud posterius ... Nunc est ita quod politie specie differunt, et quedam sunt priores, quedam posteriores. Politie enim que sunt ordinate secundum rectam rationem priores sunt aliis que sunt uitiate et transgrediuntur rectam rationem ... Cum igitur ciuis diffiniatur per se habere ad politiam et ciuitatem aliquo modo, manifestum est quod ciuis non dicitur uniuoce de ciue secundum unamquamque politiam” (ed. Lanza, p. 11, ll. 158-159 et 161-167)

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de quo per posterius, hoc conuenit uidere secundum rationem et ordinem politie. Vnde, de qua politia per prius dicitur politia, de illis ciuibus per prius dicetur ciuis: sicut de bene ordinatis dicitur politia per prius, ergo et 25 similiter ciuis de ciuibus in politiis bene ordinatis, ut de ciuibus in politia regali et aristocratica, et democratica et tirannica, de quibus etiam dicitur politia per posterius, ut dicitur in littera. Sed posset obici quod non omnis simpliciter dictus sub regno 30 poterit participare principatu: non enim potest participare nisi qui secundum genus et propagationem successerit. Dicendum quod in regno non solum est principatus regandi, ad quem attingit unus, sed et multi alii, ad quos potest quilibet ciuis simpliciter dictus attingere; et iterum quilibet, licet non actiue, saltim passiue, ut prius dictum est. Sic ergo secundum 35 anologiam dicitur ciuis in diuersis politiis.

P

291vb

Ad rationem dicendum quod “cuius est una diffinitio, eius est una ratio”, uerum est, si non sit diffinitio anologa. Si autem sit | diffinitio anologa, tunc et ratio erit anologa, et sic est hic: principatus enim consilia40 tiuus et iudicatiuus in diuersis politiis dicitur secundum anologiam. Ad secundam dicendum quod principantis ratio undique est una non uniuoce, sed anologice; et sic ciuis, et cetera. < Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m c i u i t a s a p r i n c i p i o u s q u e a d f i n e m m ane at e ad e m nu me ro Arguitur quod sic, quia muri, qui sunt de natura ciuitatis, manent idem; ergo et ciuitas. Item, oportet estimare ciuitatem bene ordinatam esse sicut animal, 5 ut econuerso dicitur in De Motibus Animalium; sed animal manet unum quamdiu est; ergo et ciuitas a principio sui usque ad finem manet eadem.

26 similiter] et add. sed exp. P 3 4 dictus] stet, sed dictus corr. in dictum P 27 democratica…28 posterius] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a38-b5 3 4 quilibet2…35 est] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 52-55 5 ,1 Consequenter…2 numero] cf. Arist., Pol. III.3, 1276a17-19 et 34-b1 5 oportet…6 econuerso] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32

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Contra: cuius nec materia nec forma manet eadem, nec specie; ; ergo nec ciuitas. Minor patet quia 10 homines, qui sunt materia ciuitatis, non manent idem numero, ut dicitur 2º De Anima; iterum nec ciuilitas uel politia, que est forma ciuitatis, manet eadem; ergo et cetera.

Ad hoc dicendum quod unum dicitur indiuisum. Cum unum sit priuatio, ut dicitur 4º Metaphisice, requirit subiectum uel naturam subiectam. 15 Ergo in natura composita unum potest dicere diuisionem uel ex parte materie uel forme. Ciuitas autem in se uidetur habere tria, scilicet muros, homines et ciuilitatem, quorum primum penitus est extrinsecum a natura ciuitatis proprie dicta. Muri enim sunt locus ciuitatis: locus enim est de essentia locati, 20 sicut nec locus deorsum est de essentia grauis; sic etiam nec murus est de essentia ciuitatis, nisi equiuoce; et ideo ab unitate murorum non dicitur ciuitas una nisi equiuoce. Homines autem sunt de essentia ciuitatis: sunt enim materia eius; ciuilitas siue politia est forma eius. Ergo unum dicit indiuisionem uel 25 materie ciuitatis uel forme, et econuerso multitudo dicit diuisionem alterutrius istorum. Si autem dicatur unitas secundum materiam, tunc ciuitas debet dici esse una secundum materiam; si autem secundum formam, una secundum formam; si autem in utraque, tunc ciuitas dicetur una in utraque. Si ergo ista a principio usque ad finem maneant eadem, tunc tamdiu 30 ciuitas dicetur eadem et secundum numerum et secundum speciem. Si autem maneat eadem secundum materiam et mutetur secundum ordinem, tunc dicetur una numero, specie tamen diuersa. Si autem manet una secundum ordinem et politiam et mutetur secundum materiam, tunc diuersa numero, specie tamen et forma eadem. Si autem ambo mutentur, 35 tunc penitus erit diuersa. 5, 8 nec1] s.l. P | nec numero] suppl. ex infra, ll. 10, 30, 32 et 34 9 sed…huiusmodi] suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 5, ll. 8-9 1 4 4º] 5 sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 1 5 unum] correxi ex infra, l. 24 et ex loc. parall. B III, q. 5, ll. 13-14: uel P 19 non] suppl. ex fonte allata 2 5 diuisionem] indiuisionem P 2 6 ciuitas] unitas P 3 3 secundum2] ordinem add. sed exp. P 8 cuius…12 eadem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.2: “homines manent idem secundum speciem, non secundum numerum. Et ideo ciuitas secundum materiam non est eadem; si autem 1 0 homipolitia manet eadem, et ciuitas, et si non, non” (ed. Lanza, p. 20, ll. 165-167) nes…numero] Auct. Arist., De An. II (58), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415b3-7 1 3 unum1…14 19 locus2…locati] cf. Arist., Phys. IV.3, 210 subiectam] Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1004a11-16 b17-18 et IV.4, 210b34-211a1

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Ad rationes dicendum quod illa unitas non inest ciuitati nisi equiuoce, eo quod muri ad essentiam et naturam ciuitatis non pertinent. Ad secundam dicendum quod non est simile, et hec ratio: utrum enim animal a principio uite usque ad finem idem maneat, de hoc est 40 alteratio apud philosophos.

3 8 ratio] sequitur lac. P 3 8 Ad…139 cetera] haec digressio, qua ratio redditur secundi argumenti, initium ducit ex Thomae commentario in De Gen. et Corr., I.15, ubi Thomas aequat populum civitatis, qui semper manet idem secundum speciem, quibusdam morientibus et quibusdam eis succedentibus, cum animali, quod manet idem, mutatis eius partibus: “Idem etiam apparet in populo civitatis, qui semper manet idem secundum illud quod est speciei, quamvis hominum ex quibus constituitur populus, quidam moriantur et quidam succedant. Et sic semper manet id quod pertinet ad speciem carnis, licet materia in qua talis species fundatur, paulatim consumatur per actionem caloris, et alia de novo adveniat per nutrimentum” (Thomas, In De Gen. et Corr. I.15, ed. Leon. III, p. 316). Hac comparatione Thomas utitur etiam in Quodl. VIII, q. 3: “Sicut enim in aliqua re publica diuersi homines numero ad communitatem pertinent, quibusdam morientibus et aliis in locum eorum succedentibus, et sic non manet una res publica secundum materiam, quia sunt alii et alii homines, manet tamen una numero quantum ad speciem siue formam propter ordinis unitatem in officiis distinctis” (ed. Leon., vol. XXV.1, p. 64, ll. 231-238) et Super Sent. IV, dist. 44, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Piana VII.2, f. 207vb, E3-9). Ut postea videbitur, e Thomae commentario in De Generatione etiam sumuntur alia argumenta et alii loci hic allati

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QUIDAM enim dicunt quod in animali est duplex humidum, scilicet radicale et seminale: et ex isto generantur quedam partes, ut principales, scilicet cor et genitalia et cerebrum; et iste partes dicuntur partes secundum speciem, et iste semper in uita animalis manent | eedem. Aliud autem P 292ra 45 humidum nutrimentale: ex isto generantur alie partes, ut caro et sanguis; et iste dicuntur partes secundum materiam, et iste non manent eedem. Hec autem positio non est secundum PHILOSOPHUM. Ipse enim dicit, 1º Celi et Mundi, quod unumquodque habentium speciem in materia dicitur dupliciter: uel secundum speciem uel secundum materiam. Ergo et ille 50 partes quas isti dicunt esse eadem et partes esse secundum speciem, dicentur istis duobus modis; et dicte secundum materiam corrumpentur, quia omne habens materiam, saltim inferiorem, corrumpitur.

4 2 generantur] correxi ex infra, l. 45 et ex Thomae In De Gen. et Corr. infra in apparatu allato: geminantur P | ut] non P 5 0 et] dici add. P 4 1 Quidam…52 corrumpitur] distinctio inter plura genera humidi in animali existentia originem trahit ex Avicenna, Liber Canonis I, fen I, doctr. 4, cap. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 4va-b) et IV, fen I, tract. 3, cap. 1 (ibid., f. 413va-b). Hic tamen Petrus significat Alexandri Aphrodisiensis doctrinam, quam novit mediante Averroe: iuxta istam doctrinam, altera est caro quae eadem permanet in specie, altera est quae mutat secundum materiam; cf. Averroem, Comm. medium in De Gen. et Corr. I, comm. 38 (ed. Fobes, pp. 48- 49). Quoad hoc, Albertus Magnus Avicennam secutus est; ideo, una cum Avicenna, Albertus esse potest ex quibusbam, contra quos hic Petrus disputat, quia non recte intellexerunt positionem Philosophi; cf., e.g., Albertum, De Gen. et Corr. I, tract. 3, cap. 8 (ed. Hossfeld, Opera Omnia V.2, p. 147, ll. 10-33) et Id., De morte et vita, tract. 2, cap. 6 (ed. Borgnet IX, pp. 359-360). Advertendum tamen quod hic Petrus resumit quod invenit in Thoma, In De Gen. et Corr. I.15: “Hoc autem quidam sic intellexerunt, quod alia caro signata esset quae est secundum materiam, et alia quae est secundum speciem. Dicunt enim quod caro et os et quidquid est huiusmodi, dicitur esse secundum speciem, ex eo quod est generatum ex primo humido seminali, in quo primo fuit virtus speciei: caro autem et os secundum materiam dicitur, ex eo quod generatur ex humido nutrimentali; quod quidem advenit primo humido seminali sicut materia quaedam eius, prout primum humidum extenditur per alia membra, admixto sibi secundo humido, ad hoc ut compleatur quantitas rei viventis et omnium partium eius. Et haec fuit opinio Alexandri, ut dicit Averroes in expositione huius loci, quem plures postmodum secuti sunt. Sed hoc non potest stare cum verbis Aristotelis, quae hic dicuntur. Dicit enim quod caro et os et unaquaeque talium partium, est duplex, quemadmodum et aliorum in materia speciem habentium ... Et ideo dicendum est quod, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, eadem caro dicitur secundum speciem, prout in ea consideratur illud quod pertinet ad speciem carnis; et secundum materiam, prout in ea consideratur illud quod est materiae” (ed. Leon. III, p. 315) 48 unumquodque…49 materiam] re vera Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.5, 321b20-21; idem locus etiam affertur in: Thomas, In De Gen. et Corr. I.15 (ed. Leon. III, p. 315) et Quodl. VIII, q. 3 (ed. Leon. XXV.1, p. 64, ll. 262-266)

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Item, iste partes, cum sint partes mixti, erunt composite ex contrariis; contraria autem impossibile est non agere; ergo per mutuam actionem 55 eorum contingit illas corrumpi. Item, agente et patiente dispositis et approximatis, necesse est ea agere. Modo nutrimentum est primo contrarium, ut dicit COMMENTATOR super 2um De Anima, ergo ipsum, approximatum illis partibus, necessario patietur ab eis et corrumpetur, quod ille agent in ipsum; omne autem agens naturale in agendo repatitur, propter habere materiam; ergo etiam ipse a 60 nutrimento aliquid patientur et corrumpentur. Et propter hoc ALII dicebant quod in animali oportet necessario manere aliquod humidum, siue sit caro siue sanguis, quod fuit generatum ex semine, et illud semper saluatur idem per nutrimentum adueniens. Et ponunt exemplum de humido lampadis: ibi enim est duplex humidum, 65 scilicet humidum licinii et humidum olei, et humidum licinii est primum subiectum flamme et calidi, et est omnino primum, humidum autem olei prohibet consumptionem illius inquantum potest. Hec iterum sententia est secundum intentionem Philosophi, et conuenit ei reprobare per eadem que prius: hoc enim humidum, cum 70 dupliciter dicatur, sicut omnia habentia speciem in materia, secundum materiam corrumpetur et patietur. Item, humidum dispositum erit aliquibus qualitatibus complexionalibus, secundum quas continget ei contrariari nutrimentum: totum enim quod nutritur, secundum omnem partem uniuersaliter nutritur; ergo etiam 75 secundum omnem partem aget in nutrimentum dissimile – aget, inquam, secundum suam formam et secundum materiam – ab eodem patietur econtra. Et non potes dicere quod adhuc minor pars est, quia etiam

5 8 2um] correxi ex fonte allata: primum P 5 9 corrumpetur] alia add. P 5 3 iste…55 corrumpi] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.7, 323b29-324a10 et I.10, 328a31-33 5 6 agente…agere] cf. Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I (14), p. 168; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.6, 322b23-24 5 7 nutrimentum…contrarium] re vera haec est sententia Aristotelis, De An. II.4, 416b4-9. Cf. tamen Averroem, In De An. II, comm. 45: “Nutrimentum enim non digestum, quod est nutrimentum in potentia, potest dici vere contrarium; nutriens enim non agit in ipsum nisi secundum quod est contrarium” (ed. Crawford, p. 200, ll. 58- 60) 5 9 omne…60 repatitur] Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I (12), p. 168; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.7, 324b9-10; cf. etiam Arist., Phys. III.1, 201a23 6 2 alii…68 potest] cf. Avicennam, Liber Canonis I, fen III, doctr. 3, cap. 1 (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 53ra) et IV, fen I, tract. 3, cap. 1 (ibid., f. 413vb). Albertus quoque ista similitudine usus est in operibus suis; cf., e.g., Albertum, De Gen. et Corr. I, tract. 3, cap. 8 (ed. Hossfeld, Opera Omnia V.2, p. 147, ll. 34-72) et Id., De morte et vita, tract. 2, cap. 6 (ed. Borgnet IX, pp. 359-360)

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minima pars in corpore naturali secundum formam illam ibi aget et secundum materiam patietur: non enim est dare quod in animali procedat diuisio in minima in infinitum – natura enim constantium positus est terminus et cetera, 2º De Anima –, et iterum contingat dare minimam carnem qua est dare minorem, 1º Phisicorum; et illa adhuc, cum participet formam animati, participabit etiam actionem in nutrimentum 85 et, secundum materiam, passionem et corruptionem.

80

90

95

100

105

110

Et ideo, secundum intentionem Philosophi, uidetur esse dicendum quod animal idem manet numero per totam uitam, omnes tamen partes eius transmutantur; cuius ratio est quia, alimentum conuertitur substantialiter per naturalem generationem, idem omnino fit secundum numerum; et ideo dicitur, in De Generatione, et conuersio, qua mutatur alimentum in substantiam membri, est generatio in alio. Alimentum enim non generatur in aliquid ab ipso membro, sed in substantia membri; et ideo illud quod prius contrarium et dissimile et aliud fuit a membro, per nutritionem et mutuam actionem generatur in substantia membri, que est alia ipso nutrimento sub ratione prima considerato. Sic etiam est in augmento, ita quod quelibet pars augetur, non tamen ita quod aliquid adiungatur priori parti extrinsece, sicut una manus complicata | alii, sed P 292rb omnis pars, minima, per aggenerationem augmentantis in se maior efficitur, ita quod quelibet pars post augmentationem manet eadem propter unitatem materie et forme; sicut si ymaginemur sinistram manum aggenerari in substantiam dextre et sic augmentare illam: tunc enim ymaginabilium non plures fieri digitos propter appositionem aliorum, nec si maiorem pro sinistra apponatur dextre, uel in contrario uel in connexo applicata, sed quia tota toti undique, etiam secundum partes minimas est aggenerata. Et similiter est de decremento, quod fit non ita quod una pars totius effuit uel quod cuiuslibet partis aliqua partialis portio determinata effluat, sed quia a toto et qualibet parte secundum materiam aliquid consumitur, nulla parte, etiam minima, integra et in quantitate prior manente, sicut etiam semen non deciditur sicut una pars a nutrimento, sed a toto nutrimento totum effluit: cuius signum est

83 qua] non add. P 9 2 aliud] suppl. ex infra, l. 93 9 5 ipso] ipsi P | Sic] sicut P 98 pars] alii add. P | etiam] suppl. ex infra, l. 108 1 03 si] sic P 1 09 manente] manere P 1 10 nutrimento2] sed add. P 81 natura…82 terminus] Arist., De An. II.4, 416a15-16 8 2 contingat…83 minorem] Arist., Phys. I.4, 187b20-21 et b35-188a2 90 et2…105 aggenerata] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.5, 321b22-322a4 et 16-28 10 9 semen…110 nutrimento2] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. I.19, 726b9-11

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quia, sicut totum nutrimentum, et non una pars eius, fuit in potentia ad omnia membra, ita et ipsum semen, propter quod etiam generantur ex eo omnes partes animalis. Et hoc plenius uidetur in De Generatione, ubi etiam ponitur exemplum istius in aqua, ubi nulla pars aque manet immobilis aliis fluentibus, sed tota 115 effluit et tota aduenit. Quod tamen exemplum non omnino est ad propositum, nisi in communi pro tanto, quia sicut aque, que iam hic erat, nulla pars manet aliis recedentibus, sic etiam in animali nulla pars manet in sua quantitate priori, aliis diminutis; sed tamen uniuersaliter est simile, quia aqua que aduenit alii non omnino fit eadem cum illa 120 in numero, immo aliquid eius manet extra, aliquid alterius effluetur; sic non est in animali: nulla enim pars est nutrimenti que substantialiter non aggeneretur alicui parti animalis et que non fiat omnino eadem in numero cum aliqua parte animalis, immo totum cum toto, etiam quelibet pars 125 cum aliqua parte fit substantialiter eadem in numero. Et ad rationem illorum qui dixerunt secundo modo per simile in oleo et licinio, dicendum quod non est simile de illis humidum, quia non ita inuicem sibi humida, immo separatim humidum olei est ex quo generatur illud siccum quod est in flamma. Vtrumque autem humidum, et olei et licinii, est subiectum ipsius flamme, et sic non totum oleum conuer- 130 titur in humidum licinii, sed solum loco coniunguntur in animali, quod nutrimentum conuertitur in substantiam animalis et pars in substantiam partis. Vnde ad rationem principalem dicendum quod non est simile de ciuitate et animali, quia in ciuitate ciues aduenientes non sunt nec fiunt idem in 135 numero cum preexistentibus sicut illic, nec etiam est forma semper manens, scilicet politia, que est quoddam procedens a uoluntate et electione, ideo contingit mutari. Forma autem animalis necessario manet una per totam uitam, et cetera.

11 5 aqua] praem. aliqua sed exp. P | nulla] correxi ex infra, ll. 117-118 et 122: una P 1 21 effluetur] effluentur P | sic] sicut P 1 2 8 sunt] lac. P 11 1 sicut…112 semen] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. I.19, 726b11-19 11 4 ubi…116 aduenit] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.5, 321b22-28; cf. Thomam, In De Gen. et Corr. I.15 (ed. Leon. III, p. 316) 1 34 non…139 cetera] haec contra sunt ei quod asseruit Thomas, In De Gen et Corr., de quo cf. adn. ad ll. 38-139

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C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s i n q u a n t u m hu i u s m o d i p e r s e s i t a l i q u a u i r tu s Arguitur quod non, quia per se supponit de omni, 1º Posteriorum; sed non omnis ciuis est uirtuosus nec studiosus, ergo ciuis per se inquan5 tum huiusmodi non est uirtuosus; ergo ciuis per se et inquantum huiusmodi non est aliqua uirtus.| P 292va Item, si ciuis per se esset aliqua uirtus, hoc esset in ordine ad salutem ciuitatis, quia per hoc dicitur ciuis, ut dicit EUSTRATIUS super 5um Ethicorum; modo non omnis ciuis saluat ciuitatem; ergo non omnis ciuis 10 est uirtuosus, ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia, cuius est aliqua operatio secundum quam contingit bene agere, eius oportet esse aliquem habitum per quem recte agat et bene. Cuius ratio est quia bene agere non est nisi ab habitu, actus autem a potentia. Modo actus est ab habitu; sed ciuis est 15 aliqua talis operatio, ut felicitas politia; ergo eius erit aliquis habitus rectificans in bene agendo. Hic autem habitus est uirtus, quia uirtus est que habente perficit et opus bonum reddit, 2º Ethicorum, 7º Phisicorum dicitur quod uirtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum.

20

Dicendum quod ciuis, cum sit pars ciuitatis, non determinatur ab aliqua forma aliter inquantum huiusmodi, sed determinatur per ordinem ad aliquid aliud secundum relationem fundatam super actionem uel passionem, que secundus modus relatiuorum, ut patet 5º Metaphisice. Hoc autem est principatus consiliatiuus et iudicatiuus: hi enim sunt

6 ,2 1 uel] praem. et sed exp. P 22 5º] 2 P 6 ,1 Consequenter…2 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b17-20 3 per…omni] Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (42), p. 314; Arist., An. Post. I.4, 73b25-26 8 salutem…ciuis] Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1130b29: “Quia enim non simpliciter bonum, sed ciuem bonum illum dicimus qui secundum omnem modum facit ea que ad salutem urbanitatis conferunt, manifestum quoniam que ad constitutionem et permanentiam et salutem bone ciuitatis festinans facere et bonus est simpliciter et ciuis bonus” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va-b) 11 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b30-31 | cuius…13 bene1] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103b6-14 1 6 uirtus2…17 reddit] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (37), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106a15-17 et 22-24 1 8 uirtus…optimum] Auct. Arist., Phys. VII (186), p. 155; Arist., Phys. VII.3, 246a13 20 determinatur…22 relatiuorum] cf. Arist., Metaph. V.15, 1020b28-- 30 et 1021a14-25

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proprii actus partium ciuitatis, et ideo ciuis dicitur qui potest determinari istis principatibus. Modo uirtus moralis non facit eum ciuem simpliciter, 25 immo potest esse talis sine uirtute morali, saltim in politiis transgressis, ubi isti principatus sunt sine uirtute morali, et ideo etiam ciuis ipsarum. Tamen ciuis secundum se est necessario aliqua uirtus, propter rationem predictam: cum enim sit ipsius aliqua operatio propria, ut iudicare, secundum diffinitionem eius necessario habebit habitum per quem bene iudicet 30 et consilietur, quia hoc naturaliter appetit; et ille habitus existens, dispositio ciuis ad suum optimum, inquantum est ciuis, erit eius uirtus per se. Item, hoc probatur aliter, quia quandocumque aliquid secundum naturam inclinatur in finem, necessario per eandem naturam inclinabit in illud per quod attingitur finis ille, quia natura, sicut non habundat 35 in superfluis, ita non deficit in necessariis. Sed ciuis naturaliter inclinatur per naturam eius inquantum huiusmodi in finem, qui est felicitas politica, ergo et per eandem suam naturam inclinabitur in ea per que deuenitur ad illam; hoc autem est prudentia politica; ergo ista erit ciuis per se inquantum huiusmodi. Et dico quod hec uirtus ei inest per naturam non 40 secundum actum perfectum, qui fit ex consuetudine et operatione, sed solum per inclinationem et appetitum quendam proprium. Et notandum ulterius quod, cum uirtus sit per quam quis bene se habet circa operationem, ita quod operatio est tanquam finis uirtutis, ut patet 2º Ethicorum, tunc uirtus ciuis erit in ordine ad operationem ciuis; hec autem 45 operatio ciuis inquantum huiusmodi est iudicare; ergo, per quod aliquis bene nouit de communibus iudicare, hec erit uirtus ciuis. Hec autem est prudentia politica: prudentis est enim iudicare, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Ergo prudentia politica erit uirtus ciuis inquantum huiusmodi, dirigens eius propriam operationem in bonum commune. Et ideo dixit 50

24 determinari] determinare P 2 7 ipsarum] ipsius P 35 attingitur] antiqui P 3 5 natura…36 necessariis] Auct. Arist., De An. III (168), p. 188; Arist., De An. III.9, 432b21-23 3 9 hoc…politica] cf. infra, VII, q. 3, ll. 26-46, ubi Petrus definit prudentiam politicam ut virtus quae ducit ad felicitatem practicam 40 hec…42 proprium] de hac distinctione inter actum perfectum et actum secundum inclinationem vide supra, I, q. 3, ll. 14-16 cum adn. 44 operatio…uirtutis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.2, 1104b27-28 et 1105a13-16 48 prudentis…iudicare] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.8, 1143a16-17 et 29-31; cf. etiam VI.4, 1140a25-26 ubi tamen asseritur “Videtur autem prudentis esse, posse bene consiliari” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 481, ll. 24-25)

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PHILOSOPHUS hic quod uirtus ciuis est in ordine ad politiam, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Ergo ciuis etiam per consequens erit uirtus moralis in ordine ad bonum commune. Hec autem est iustitia uniuersalis, | qua P 292vb omnes operationes uirtutum in bonum commune ordinantur, ut dicitur 5º 55 Ethicorum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod omnium ciuium est uirtus aliqua, licet non secundum actum perfectum, tamen secundum inclinationem, que tamen in aliquibus impeditur propter unum trium, scilicet uel propter 51 uirtus…politiam] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b30-31 | ***…52 Ethicorum] verisimile est aliquid deesse hic, ubi locus ex Ethica mentionatur. Duo coniecturari possunt: aut sumendum quod hic nihil deest – si ita, Petrus hic memorat quod asseritur in Politica et in loco illo Ethicae ubi Aristoteles affirmat quod homo esse non potest “sine ykonomia neque sine urbanitate”; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.6, 1142a9-10 (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 485, ll. 23-24); Eustratius enim commentavit hunc ipsum locum asserendo quod agitur de quadam necessitate naturali quam homo habet dirigendi virtutem suam ad civitatem, Eustratius, In VI Mor. Arist. cap. 9, ad 1142a8-10: “... quia communicativum homo natura et sociale, sequens Philosophus talis naturae hominis ait quod non utique dicemus prudentem secundum se ipsum virtutem dirigere proprium pertranseuntem bonum, neque in domo facientem directionem, neque in civitate, sed secundum se ipsum degentem et incommunicantem hominibus existentem” (ed. Trizio, p. 70, ll. 26-31) –. Aliter coniecturari potest hic homoioteleuton occurrisse, quam ob rem supponi oportet quod locus quidam ex Ethica hic allatus amissus est. Perpensis praecedentibus, ubi asseritur quod prudentia politica est virtus civis et concluditur quod igitur civis est aliqua virtus moralis, conici potest quod hic deest locus ipse ex libro VIo Ethicae saepe a Petro memoratus, ubi dicitur quod prudentia requirit virtutes morales (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a31-37; VI.10, 1144b30-32 et 1145a2-6) aut locus ille eiusdem libri ubi asseritur quod prudentia est virtus intellectualis (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b24-26, sed etiam magis Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.4, ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 347, ll. 182-189). Quod hic desit locus ille ubi asseritur quod prudentia est virtus intellectualis, corroborari potest si affertur loc. parall. Vincentii Gruner Disputata Pol. III, q. 9, qui fere ad verbum secutus est Petri textum, ut quod sequitur plane manifestum facit: “Ideo uirtus ciuis est prudentia politica per quam suam propriam operationem ordinat in salutem communem; sed prudentia est uirtus intellectualis; dicitur ergo ad argumentum quod uirtus bonis ciuis est uirtus intellectualis, scilicet prudentia” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], ff. 141v-142r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 153rb) 5 3 iustitia…54 ordinantur] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.1, 1129b17-19, 1129b25-1130a10 et V.2, 1130b18-20; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.11: “duplex est iustitia: una particularis, per quam aliquis bene se habet in operatione ad alterum uel in hiis que ordinantur in bonum alterius; alia uero iustitia uniuersalis est, per quam aliquis bene se habet in opere quod est ad alterum in ordine ad bonum commune, unde per iustitiam uniuersalem aliquis recte utitur omni uirtute et actu cuiusque uirtutis in ordine ad bonum commune, et sic includit omnem uirtutem. Tale uero quod includit omnem uirtutem maxime saluatiuum est ciuitatis” (ed. Lanza, p. 90, ll. 119-125). De hac distinctione, eisdem fere verbis expressa, cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 58, art. 5 (ed. Leon. IX, p. 13) 5 8 in…60 turpi] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.5, 1148b17-18. Cf. etiam Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. III, q. 6: “... propter indispositionem regionis in qua sunt uel propter malitiam sue proprie complexionis uel propter superhabundantiam praue consuetudinis” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 21vb)

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malitiam regionis uel propter peruersam naturam uel ex consuetudine turpi, ut dicitur 7º Ethicorum. Et ideo dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS quod impos- 60 sibile est omnes ciues esse studiosos, intelligens equaliter, quia aliter contradiceret EUSTRATIO super 1um Ethicorum dicenti quod nulli uolenti ut oportet operanti impossibilis est possessio boni. Ad secundam per idem, quod hoc est propter impedimentum tale. < Q UE S T I O 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s s i t u n a u i r tu s s e c u n d u m o mne m p o l i t iam Arguitur quod sic, quia unius speciei una est uirtus consequens illam speciem; sed omnes ciues sunt eiusdem speciei, quia homines; ergo 5 istorum erit una uirtus. Contra: principantis et subiecti non est una uirtus, ut dicitur hic et in 1º; sed uterque istorum est ciuis; ergo ciuis non erit uirtus, etiam nec in una politia.

Dicendum quod non omnis ciuis nec secundum omnem politiam est una uirtus. Cuius ratio est quia diuersorum in natura oportet esse diuersas 10 uirtutes consequentes illam naturam; quod patet quia in fine 1i, propter hanc causam, PHILOSOPHUS dixit domini et subiecti non esse eandem naturam. Sed in diuersis politiis ciues differunt specie et natura inquantum tales propter differentiam politiarum, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Ergo uirtus ciuium secundum quod ciues non erit una; ergo eorum erit una 15 prudentia et nec uirtus moralis.

62 contradiceret] contradicent P 7, 9 est] et sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 60 impossibile…61 equaliter] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b37-1277a1; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “... inpossibile est omnes ciues esse equaliter uirtuosos” (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 67- 68) 62 nulli…63 boni] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 13, ad 1099b18-20 (ed. Mercken, p. 145, ll. 22-23) 7 , 1 Consequenter…2 politiam] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b30-33 6 principantis…uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b32-1260a4 (cf. supra, I, q. 30); Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a23-24; 1277b13 et 25-29 12 domini…13 naturam] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a2-4 1 3 in…14 politiarum] Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a34-b5; cf. III.4, 1276b31-33 15 ergo…16 moralis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277b16-20 et 25-29

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Item, diuersitas prudentie est ex diuersitate finium, quia finis ultimus positus est primum principium prudentie; sed ciuium diuersorum necessario sunt diuersi fines, sicut et diuersarum politiarum: ex hoc enim distin20 guuntur politie; ergo talium ciuium non erit una uirtus. Vlterius nec omnis ciuis in ea politia est una uirtus, quia in eadem politia alter ciuium est principans et alter subiectus, et in utroque saluatur ratio ciuis; sed principantis et subiecti non est una uirtus, ut determinauit PHILOSOPHUS in fine 1i; et ideo nec eadem prudentia nec 25 uirtus moralis est ciuis cuiuslibet etiam in eadem politia, et multo minus in diuersis politiis.

Ad rationem dicendum quod eorumdem in specie secundum quod huiusmodi est una uirtus et in ordine ad unum finem; et ideo, si ciuium esset aliqua uirtus inquantum sunt homines, illa in omnibus esset una. Sed 30 secundum quod ciues sunt, et inquantum principantes sunt uel subiecti, nullo modo est eorum una et eadem uirtus, quia nec finis idem; et per consequens nec operatio eadem, et per consequens nec uirtus.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s s t u d i o s i e t u i r i o p t i m i s i t e a de m u i r t u s Arguitur quod sic, quia quorum est unus finis, eorum est una uirtus; sed istorum duorum est unus finis, scilicet felicitas politica; ergo 5 istorum erit una uirtus. Contra: uiri optimi est uirtus principalis et uirtus principantis; nam hic debet iuste principari. Sed uirtus boni est indeterminate principantis et subiecti, quia ciuis bonus se extendit ad utrosque: potest enim | P 293ra quilibet eorum in suo statu esse bonus ciuis; ergo istorum non est una 10 uirtus. 2 1 una] eadem sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 2 3 principantis…uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b32-1260a4 8, 1 Consequenter…2 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b17-18 6 Contra…10 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a20-22 et 25-29 uiri…principantis] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “Quod autem boni uiri simpliciter sit una uirtus principalis patet ex hoc, quia bonus uir dicitur aliquis a uirtute ... ergo ab ea que principalis est inter eas dicetur uir simpliciter bonus” (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 55-58)

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Dicendum quod ciuis uirtus est per quam recte se habet in operatione in ordine ad bonum politie. Virtus autem uiri optimi uel uiri boni simpliciter est secundum quam dicitur bonus uel optimus, et ista est uirtus que est prudentia politica simpliciter. Dicendum ergo ciuis studiosi secundum quamlibet politiam et 15 uiri optimi non est una uirtus. Cuius ratio est quia uirtus ciuis studiosi est per quam dirigit operationes in salutem politie. Est autem aliqua politia mala, ergo uirtus ciuis illius est per quam saluat malam politiam; hec autem non est prudentia politica simpliciter, que est uirtus boni uiri simpliciter; ergo istorum non erit eadem uirtus, unde non est eadem uirtus 20 studiosi ciuis in democratia uel oligarchia et uiri boni uel optimi. Vlterius nec in eadem politia, etiam bona, est eadem uirtus ciuis studiosi et uiri optimi, quia subiectus in illa politia meretur nomen ciuis studiosi. Virtus autem subiecti ciuis est per , motus ab alio, mouet ulterius ad salutem ciuitatis; hec autem non est prudentia politica simpliciter, que 25 est uirtus uiri optimi; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia prudentie politice simpliciter est mouere et non moueri ab alio nisi a fine ultimo optimo.

Alicuius tamen ciuis in politia bona et uiri optimi est eadem uirtus, quia aliquis est ciuis studiosus in optima politia qui est principans, cuius uirtus est per quam dirigit omnes operationes, et suas et aliorum, in politiam rectam et perfectam per rationem sumptam ex fine ultimo. Et 8 ,1 7 quam] quem P | aliqua] uirtus add. sed exp. P 2 1 democratia] scrips. democrita P 12 Virtus…14 simpliciter] in Eth. Nic. VI.4 Aristoteles asserit quod prudentia est habitus qui facit deliberare circa bona et mala hominis (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b4-6) et distinguit prudentiam a politica (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.6, 1141b23-26). Petrus autem asserit quod prudentia politica se ad finem civitatis refert et ducit ad felicitatem politicam sive practicam, qua re differt a prudentia monostica, quae est ad finem unius hominis secundum se (cf. I, q. 6, ll. 34-36; II, q. 4, ll. 24-28; II, q. 6, ll. 63- 64 et VII, q. 3, ll. 36-38 cum adn.). Quod prudentia politica simpliciter sit virtus viri boni, ubi referatur ad bonum commune, desumitur a Thoma, qui asserit quod prudentia ista est virtus civis et opponitur prudentiae regnativae, quae est prudentia principis; cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 48, resp. (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 366) et q. 50, art. 2, ad 1 (ibid., p. 375). Vide etiam Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “bonus uir est secundum unam uirtutem perfectam, scilicet prudentiam simpliciter” (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 52-53) 1 6 uirtus2…17 politie] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b27-31 28 Alicuius…34 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a13-16 et 20-24: “sed forte erit alicuius eadem virtus ciuis studiosi et viri studiosi. Dicimus itaque principem studiosum esse bonum et prudentem, politicum autem necessarium esse prudentem ... Si itaque eadem principis boni et uiri boni, ciuis autem est et qui subditus, non eadem utique erit simpliciter ciuis et uiri, alicuius tamen, scilicet potentis principari solius ciuis: non enim eadem principis et ciuis” (ed. Susemihl, p. 164, ll. 7-9 et p. 165, ll. 1-5)

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talis est prudentia politica simpliciter, que etiam est uirtus uiri optimi; ergo illius ciuis, scilicet principantis in optima politia, et uiri optimi est eadem uirtus, unde EUSTRATIUS, super 5um Ethicorum, ubi tangit PHILOSOPHUS 35 istam questionem, recte eodem modo ipsam determinat.

Ad rationem dicendum quod “quorum est unus finis, eorum est una uirtus”, uerum est, si eodem modo illum finem intendant et inquirant, sicut in speculatiuis scientia differt non solum propter diuersitatem subiecti, et propter diuersitatem modi considerandi illum. Dico ergo quod 40 ciuis in omni politia et uiri boni non est eadem uirtus, propter diuersitatem finium. Item, ciuis in eadem politia optima et uiri optimi absolute non eadem uirtus, propter diuersum modum quibus ciues intendunt et operantur ad illum finem. Sed alicuius ciuis et uiri boni, scilicet ciuis principantis in optima politia, est eadem uirtus simpliciter.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a n s i n p r i n c i p a t u d e s p o t i c o i n t e n d a t b o n u m p r o p r i u m u e l b o n u m c o m mu n e s i b i e t s e r u o | P 293rb Arguitur quod bonum commune, quia omne agens secundum aliquam formam intendit bonum illud ad quod inclinatur secundum 5 formam illam. Sed in communicatione domini et serui dominus agit per formam communionis. Probatio, quia pars non agit in uirtute totius; dominus autem, secundum quod dominus, pars est illius communionis serui ad dominum; ergo, si agat inquantum dominus, uidetur agere per formam communionis. Manifestum autem quod secundum illam formam

3 3 optima] s.l. P 3 6 rationem] rationes P 9 ,1 despotico] scrips. depote P 3 4 Eustratius…35 determinat] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.2, 1130b29; Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5: “Non enim bonus uir iam et ciuis bonus. In bonis quidem enim et bene habentibus urbanitatibus bonus uir et ciuis bonus est, in malis autem et male habentibus neque bonus uir et bonus ciuis est, neque in illis bonus ciuis, bonus est uir ... Quare simpliciter bonus in praua urbanitate ciuis bonus non est, contempnens ipsam et non secundum ipsam conuersans. Si autem hoc non semper idem et unus bonus est et ciuis bonus, sed aliquando in bene uidelicet habente urbanitate, propter hoc et ipse sic dixit: non enim forte idem et uiro bono esse et ciui” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va-b). Quoad Michaelis Ephesii argumentum, cf. tamen quod supra, p. 178 asserui 9 , 1 Consequenter…2 seruo] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b32-37

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inclinatur in bonum commune; ergo agendo intendit bonum commune et 10 non proprium. Item, dominus se habet ad seruum sicut anima ad corpus, ut dicitur 1º huius, quia etiam anima principatur corpori principatu despotico. Sed anima intendit bonum commune sibi et corpori, quod patet quia anima intendit operationem; omnis autem operatio communis 15 corpori et anime: nam dicitur 1º De Anima quod, si dicamus animam intelligere, nichil aliud est quam dicere eam texere uel edificare; et si intendit operationem communem, necessario etiam intendit bonum commune; ergo et similiter dominus. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione, quia agens principale, in 20 actione quam agit per instrumentum, per se et primo non intendit bonum instrumenti, ut secans non intendit primo bonum ipsius securis – cuius signum est quia, si sine illa posset operari, non utetur ea –, sed intendit bonum suum; modo seruus est instrumentum domini, ut dicitur 1º huius; ergo dominus in actione sua, quam agit per seruum sicut per instru- 25 mentum, non intendit bonum serui primo et per se, sed bonum proprium.

Dicendum quod seruus est organum animatum alterius homo existens, et quia est alterius est possessio alterius, ergo seruus est possessio domini; possessio autem, ad id cuius est possessio, comparatur ut pars, ut dicitur 1º huius; ergo similiter seruus, cum sit possessio, est pars domini animata 30 separata, et hoc est dictum etiam in 1º. Modo, hoc supposito, dico quod dominus, in mouendo seruum, intendit bonum proprium per se et primo, bonum autem serui per accidens. Ratio primi est quia omne totum in actione sua intendit bonum ad quod inclinatur per formam secundum quam agit. Dominus autem agit in 35 seruum per formam qua est dominus. Forma autem ista rationem totius habet, quia dominus sic habet ad seruum sicut totus homo ad ma16 1º] 3 P 3 4 totum] correxi ex loc. parall. B III, q. 9, l. 23: bonum P 12 dominus…14 despotico] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a34-39 et b4-8; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (15) et (16), p. 253 1 6 si…17 edificare] Auct. Arist., De An. I (14), p. 175; Arist., De An. I.4, 408b11-13 20 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b32-37 24 seruus…domini] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b32 27 seruus…28 alterius2] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a14-17 et etiam 1253b31-33; cf. supra, I, qq. 10 et 11 2 9 possessio1…pars] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a8-10 3 0 seruus…31 separata] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a16-17 3 2 dominus…33 accidens] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b34-36; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.5 (ed. Lanza, p. 43, ll. 108-120) 3 7 dominus…manum] cf. supra, I, q. 11, ll. 20-25 cum adn.

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num; totum autem per formam totius inclinatur in bonum totius; ergo dominus per formam domini inclinatur in bonum domini, ergo, in agendo, 40 illud bonum per se intendit inquantum mouet sicut dominus. Per accidens autem intendit bonum serui, cuius ratio est quia, quod dominus agat per seruum, hoc non potest esse nisi saluetur seruus inquantum seruus | in P 293va obediendo domino et in operando que debet respectu domini; et ideo dominus, ex consequenti et per accidens, intendit bonum serui et bonam 45 dispositionem , quia destructo uno relatiuorum destruitur reliquum, in Predicamentis. Et sic est in omni principatu qui proportionatur principatui domini ad seruum, quod semper principans talis intenditur per se et primo bonum proprium, per consequens autem et per accidens bonum subditi.

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Ad rationem dicendum quod dominus non agit per formam communionis, sed per formam domini , inquantum talis, se habet sicut totum respectu serui, sicut homo agit per formam hominis mediante manu, ad quam se habet ratio hominis sicut ratio totius ad partem, quia homo per formam hominis agit mediante instrumento manus.

Ad secundam dicendum quod est simile et est dissimile. Simile – inquam – quia, sicut anima mouet corpus, ita dominus seruum, et sicut corpus motum non habet nisi ab anima, ita nec seruus motum habet a domino. Sed dissimile est in hoc, quod anima non est aliquid separatum a corpore; et ideo agit secundum corpus et actio sua est actio totius aggrega60 ti, et per consequens actionis animalis est finis aggregati, quia agens et finis proportionantur. Sic autem non est dominus: dominus enim est separatus a seruo, et ideo actio domini non intendit nisi bonum domini et non serui, nisi per accidens. 55

4 7 domini] et add. P 5 1 inquantum] in quem P | talis] qui add. P 56 inquam] inquantum P

5 3 quam] quem P

4 1 dominus…45 eius] eadem fere verba in Petri Scripto III.5: “principatus despoticus non posset saluari nisi saluato seruo: si enim seruus corrumperetur, per consequens corrumperetur bonum domini. Cum ergo dominus intendat bonum suum, quod non potest esse sine seruo, ex consequenti et per accidens intendit bonum serui” (ed. Lanza, p. 43, ll. 117-120). Notandum quod hic Albertus et Thomas locutione “ex consequenti” non utuntur; cf. Albertum, Pol. III.4 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 232) et Thomam, Sent. Pol. III.5 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A201, ll. 99-102) 4 5 destructo…reliquum] Arist., Cat. 7, 7b19-23 60 agens…61 proportionantur] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26

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< Q UE S T I O 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a n s < i n > p r i n c i p at u y c o n o m i c o i n t e n d a t b o n u m s u b d i t o r um Arguitur quod non, quia secundum formam aliquam intendit bonum in quod inclinatur secundum formam illam; sed yconomus in disponendo subditos agit per formam propriam; ergo inten- 5 dit bonum ad quod inclinat forma propria. Sed manifestum est quod illa non inclinat nisi in bonum proprium; ergo intendit bonum proprium. Item, quamuis omnia bonum appetunt, unum tamen per se intendit bonum proprium, quia unumquodque appetit illud bonum in quod inclinatur secundum naturam propriam; hoc autem est bonum 10 proprium; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic, et arguitur ratione sua quia, sicut est in artibus factiuis, ita et in actiuis. Sed in factiuis uidemus quod intendit bonum illius in quod agit, sicut medicus per se intendit sanitatem – hec autem est bonum ipsius egri et sanati –, et similiter in exercitio 15 attenditur bona dispositio generata in exercitato. Ergo similiter in actiuis yconomus intendet bonum eius qui dirigitur ab eo, postea uero bonum per accidens et bonum subditorum per se – et hoc est difficile propter primam rationem in contrarium adductam –.

P 293vb

Dicendum: intelligendum primo quod actiui et passiui est finis unus 20 secundum substantiam et in re, differens solum ratione; finis autem actiui est actio uel res acta, passiui passio uel ipsum passum. Modo actio et passio sunt unum in re, et ideo actiui et passiui est idem finis secundum rem, differens tamen ratione, | quia finium ratio diuersificatur secundum 10 , 3 omne agens] suppl. ex q. praec., l. 3 et infra, ll. 43- 44 5 yconomus] yconomicus P 13 quod…14 intendit1] quod intendit iter. P | agens] suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 10, l. 10 18 utile sibi] suppl. ex infra, ll. 48-50 et 54 20 intelligendum] intelligendo P 10 , 1 Consequenter…2 subditorum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b37-1279a2 8 omnia…appetunt] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (1), p. 232; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a2-3; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (14), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.6, 1362a23; Arist., Top. III (38), p. 324; Arist., Top. III.1, 116a19-20 12 Contra…18 se] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b37-1279a8 | sicut…16 exercitato] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.5: “Sicut enim est in artibus, sic in isto principatu. Sed sic est in artibus, quod artifex primo intendit bonum rei facte et ex consequenti bonum suum: medicus enim primo intendit sanitatem infirmi, ex consequenti intendit bonum suum” (ed. Lanza, p. 43, ll. 126-129) 2 0 actiui…21 ratione] cf. Arist., Phys. III.3, 202a15-20

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35

40

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diuersam rationem eorum quorum primo est finis ille; modo actiuum et passiuum, quorum primo est finis ille, differunt ratione; ergo et ille finis alterius erit rationis secundum quod est ab agente et alterius secundum quod recipitur in patiente. Et notandum quod agentis primo et principaliter est finis. Cuius ratio est quia intendere est actus uoluntatis; eius autem est intendere finem, cuius est mouere. Voluntas autem est ipsius finis, et intendere finem primo pertinet agenti, et ideo per consequens intendere illud quod est ad finem. Tunc dicendum ad questionem quod principans et subiectum se habent sicut mouens et motum et sicut agens et passum; sed mouentis et moti est idem finis in re, ut dictum est, ratione tamen differens; ergo principantis et subiecti erit idem finis secundum rem, ratione tamen differens. Iste autem finis est motus quo iste agit et ille patitur, sicut dicitur 3º Phisicorum; differt autem ratione, ita quod inquantum est finis principantis dicitur mouere, inquantum est finis subiecti dicitur moueri. Principantis ergo secundum quod huiusmodi finis est recte mouere secundum rectam rationem; et hoc est opus quod conuenit ei secundum propriam uirtutem, et hoc est quod intenditur ab ipso primo. Principans ergo in yconomico principatu intendit finem istum ut proprius est eius, quia omne agens secundum aliquam formam primo intendit finem in quem per illam formam primo inclinatur; et ideo primo inclinatur in illum finem ut est sibi bonum proprium, quare primo intendit recte dispensare et agere. Sed quia hoc non est sine bono eius qui dirigitur, qui est subditus, ideo secundo intendit bonum subditorum. Vlterius autem yconomus intendit bonum utile sibi, quia, cum ipse sit unus eorum qui in domo, ideo ad dispensationem eius, quod primo intendebat, sequitur bonum utile sibi, sicut etiam in factiuis: medicus enim primo intendit secundum formam propriam medicine sanare et recte secundum artem agere ad sanitatem; secundo, quia illud non est sine bono eius qui sanatur, ideo secundo intendit bonum per se ipsius sanati, ulterius autem intendit bonum utile sibi. Similiter primo rhetor intendit secundum artem et formam artis rhetorice, ut dicitur 1º 3 7 motus quo] inv.; correxi ex loc. parall. B III, q. 10, l. 25 P 44 quem] quam P 48 yconomus] yconomicus P 5 0 quod] quam sed corr. P 51 enim] s.l. P 55 rhetor] rector P 3 0 quia…31 mouere] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1111b26 et III.5, 1113a15 3 3 principans…39 moueri] cf. supra, I, q. 30, ll. 37- 45 34 mouentis…35 differens] cf. supra, ll. 20-24 3 7 Iste… patitur] cf. Arist., Phys. III.3, 202a17-21 4 5 primo2…48 subditorum] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.5: “... primo intendit finem suum, qui est dirigere; et quia istud non est nisi alius regatur, secundo intendit quod alius regatur, et sic secundo intendit bonum alterius” (ed. Lanza, p. 44, ll. 138-141)

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Rhetorice, persuadere; et quia illud non est sine per se bono ipsius clientuli, ideo secundo intendit bonum per se clientuli, tertio autem utile bonum sibi. Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod yconomus intendit per se bonum subditorum, ex consequenti autem bonum proprium, utile, supple.

Ad rationes dicendum quod procedunt suis uiis.

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< Q UE S T I O 1 1 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o l i ti e d i s t i n g u a n t u r s e c u n d u m d is t inc t i o ne m f in is Arguitur quod non, quia nichil distinguitur per illud quod posterius est eo; sed finis secundum esse posterior est quam politia: ex hac enim 5 finis dicitur; ergo secundum distinctionem eius non distinguitur politia. P 294ra

Item, | nichil distinguitur essentialiter per illud quod pertinet ad propriam eius speciem; sed finis non pertinet ad essentiam politie; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia secundum illud distinguuntur agibilia a quo habent rationem essentialem; sed hoc est finis; ergo secun- 10 dum ipsum omnia distinguuntur, et similiter politia.

Dicendum quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis, quia politia est ordo habitantium et ordo principatus primi. Ordo autem omnis ab uno incipit et tendit in multitudinem et iterum in unam reducitur unitatem, ut probat PROCLUS. Illud autem ad quod reducitur ordo qui est politia est finis, quia de ratione est habere habitudinem in finem in quem reducitur; ergo et politia habebit ad finem aliquam habitudinem; ergo secundum distinctionem illius distinguetur ipsa.

11 , 5 dicitur] quia add. sed exp. P 16 quia] quare P | ordinis] suppl. ex loco parall. B III, q. 11, l. 14 5 6 persuadere…57 clientuli] cf. Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (5), p. 263; Arist., Rhet. I.1, 1355a20-22 11 , 1 Consequenter…2 finis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1279a17-21 3 nichil…4 eo] cf. Auct. Arist., Top. VI (91), p. 328; Arist., Top. VI.4, 141a23-31 9 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1279a17-21 13 politia…habitantium] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 Ordo…15 unitatem] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese, p. 14)

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Item, quecumque procedunt ab uno principio, oportet quod distinguantur secundum distinctionem principii; principium autem a quo procedit secundum intentionem ordo politie finis est; ergo et cetera. Probatio minor, quia politia est aliquid institutum per prudentiam; prudentie autem principium est appetitus recti finis; ergo finis respectu politie rationem principii habet. Ergo politia distinguitur secundum finem. Item, intelligendum quod unumquodque distinguitur per illud quod ingreditur essentiam illius, et ideo secundum formam politia distinguitur; forma autem politie rationem capit ex fine, quia forma est propter finem, sicut materia propter formam, 2º Phisicorum.

30

Ad rationes dicendum quod posterius secundum esse nichil prohibet esse prius secundum rationem; et tale aliquid est finis, et ideo politia secundum illud distingui habet.

Ad secundam dicendum quod nichil distinguitur essentialiter nisi per illud quod ingreditur essentiam eius uel per aliquid a quo dependet ratio eius quod ingreditur essentiam. Sic est hic, quia politia distinguitur 35 secundum formam suam; quia aut ratio forme tota dependet ex fine, ideo, a primo et ad ultimum, secundum proprium finem precipue politie habent distingui. < Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s e c u n d u m d i s ti n c t i o n e m p r i n c i p a n t i u m co n u e n i a t p o l i t i a s d i s ti n g u i Arguitur quod non, quia, si distinguerentur secundum distinctionem principantium, tunc ubi essent plures principatus, ibi essent plures 5 politie; sed uidemus quod in una politia contingit reperiri plures principatus, ut in aristocratica; ergo non distinguuntur politie secundum distinctionem principatuum.

2 8 2º] primo P 36 proprium] primum P 1 2, 1 utrum] s.l. P 4 principantium] principatuum sed corr. P | ibi] s.l. P 2 2 prudentie…23 finis1] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27, 31-36 28 sicut…formam] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (61), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a27-28 1 2 ,1 Consequenter…2 distingui] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a25-31

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Item, nichil distinguitur per illud quod est materia eius, quia omnis distinctio est per formam; sed principans est pars materialis politie, 10 quia politia est ordo principantium et subiectorum; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia, sicut artifex se habet ad artificiata, sic instituens politiam ad ipsam. Sed uidemus quod secundum distinctionem artificum distinguuntur artificiata, ergo secundum distinctionem instituentium ciuitatem distinguetur politia; talis autem est princi15 pans; ergo et cetera.

P 294rb

Dicendum quod politie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem principantium. Sed intelligendum quod principans duplex est: quidam est qui sub nullo alio priori et alius qui est sub alio. Modo dico | quod secundum distinctionem principantium contentorum sub alio non est necesse distingui ciuitatem, sed secundum distinctionem principantis primi, qui potest 20 20 principantis] principatus P 10 politia…subiectorum] cf. Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38, ubi tamen non mentionantur principantes et subiecti, sed tantum dicitur quod politia est ordo. Re vera mentio de principantibus et subiectis invenitur in Auctoritatibus Aristotelis 1 1 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a25-31 1 6 Dicendum…29 proportionatur] sic etiam, et valde similiter, in Petri Scripto IV.13: “utrum principatus distinguantur secundum distinctionem politiarum ... Circa primam intelligendum est quod principatus distinguuntur sicut alia naturalia, scilicet et secundum formam et secundum materiam. Forma uero et ratio principatus uirtus aliqua uel potentia est: est enim principatus potestas quedam uel uirtus; uirtus autem attenditur in ordine ad finem; ergo secundum distinctionem finis distinguuntur principatus. Finis autem principatus duplex est: quidam scilicet est remotus, quidam uero propinquus: remotus, sicut finis politie, ad quem ordinantur ultimo omnes principatus, et maxime et immediate principalis principatus; propinquus est sicut finis ducatus exercitus uictoria, pretorii iudicare de subortis. Distinguitur igitur principatus primo secundum distinctionem finis remoti. Cum igitur fines politiarum sint diuersi, principatus diuersarum politiarum erunt diuersi; et sicut politie omnes attributionem habent ad unam primam, sic principatus politiarum posteriorum ad principatum in politia prima et simpliciter dicta attributionem habent. Et per hoc soluitur tertia questio, cum querebatur utrum principatus distingueretur secundum distinctionem politiarum: apparet enim quod sic, secundum distinctionem finis ultimi. Finis autem propinquus ciuitatis diuersus est in qualibet politia, sicut ducatus exercitus uictoria, pretorii iudicium. Secundum uero distinctionem huius finis distinguitur principatus. Et hoc dupliciter: uno modo secundum distinctionem ipsius finis secundum se, et sic diuersi sunt principatus ducatus exercitus et pretorium; alio modo distinguitur principatus per hoc quod homines diuersimode se habent ad finem illum, ita quod finis potest esse unus secundum rem, sed quia homines aliter se habent ad illum finem, principatus distinguitur ... Et per hoc soluitur secunda questio, cum querebatur utrum distinctio principatus esset secundum homines uel rem, quia et est secundum rem – ut quando distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis propinqui secundum se –, et secundum homines – quando homines diuersimode se habent ad finem principatus –.” (ed. Lanza, p. 233, l. 141 et l. 147-p. 234, l. 170 et ll. 174-179)

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considerari dupliciter: uel inquantum participans uel inquantum mouens per formam politie. Et hoc secundo modo, secundum distinctionem eius distinguuntur politie, quoniam politie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem finis; finis autem correspondet agenti, quoniam sunt 25 sibi inuicem cause agens et finis: nam finis est causa agentis et econuerso, uniuersalis uniuersalis et determinatus determinati, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum, et ideo per se proportionantur; ergo, si politie distinguantur secundum distinctionem finis, necesse est et distingui secundum distinctionem agentis, qui illi fini proportionatur. Item, operator necessario proportionatur operationi secundum quam constituitur in esse: operatio enim se habet ad operantem sicut finis et primo procedens ab aliquo agente, et ideo necesse operatum proportionari primo agenti; sed primum agens uel instituens ciuitatem est ipse principans; ergo secundum distinctionem principantium necesse est 35 politias distingui.

30

Ad rationes dicendum quod ubi essent plures principantes primi, ibi essent politie plures. Vbi tamen plures sunt principantes habentes ordinem ad unum primum non oportet, et sic est in aristocratia: ibi enim sunt principantes plures primi, sed multi in unum primum ordine 40 quodam reducti, et hoc non impedit unitatem politie. Ad secundam dicendum quod principans potest dupliciter accipi: uel inquantum pars ciuitatis – et sic est ut materia, et sic secundum eum non distinguitur ciuitas uel politia –, uel sicut mouens per formam et per rationem sumptam ex fine – et sic magis forme rationem habet, et sic 45 secundum distinctionem eius distinguitur ciuitas uel politia –, et cetera.

2 1 considerari] considerare P | participans…politia] correxi et suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 12, ll. 19-20: principans P 2 6 uniuersalis1] uniuersale P 30 quam] quod P 35 politias] politicos P 4 3 uel1] secundum add. sed exp. P 2 4 sunt…25 finis1] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9 25 finis2…27 proportionantur] Cf. adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26

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< Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o l i t i e s i n t mu l t e Arguitur quod non, quia, sicut politia est una communicatio, ita et yconomia; sed yconomia non distinguitur; ergo nec politia. Sed quod sint plures quam PHILOSOPHUS enumerat hic, secundo potest argui, quia utrumque est contra opinionem Philosophi. Sic in 2º 5 dictum est quod quedam politia est mixta, sicut Platonis, quam etiam PHILOSOPHUS ibi commendauit. Ergo plures sunt quam sex quas Philosophus enumerat: iste enim omnes sunt simplices.

Dicendum quod politie sunt sex, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Cuius ratio est quia ea que sunt ad finem essentialiter secundum finem distinguuntur, 10 a quo habent rationem. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: uel propter diuersitatem ipsius finis secundum se uel propter diuersum modum se habendi ad illum finem, sicut prius dicebatur de principante et subiecto, qui, licet habeant eundem finem, tamen, quia diuersimode se habent ad illum, ideo distinguuntur, sicut in speculatiuis non solum distinguuntur scientie 15 propter diuersitatem subiecti, et propter diuersum modum considerandi illud subiectum. Modo finis se habet in agibilibus sicut subiectum in speculatiuis. P 294va

Si ergo politie est aliquis finis, tunc continget eam secundum illum finem distingui istis duobus modis. Finis autem politie est bonum | ulti- 20 mum in politia intentum: hoc autem in aliquibus est simpliciter et uere bonum, in aliis autem est bonum alicui tantum secundum apparentiam solum, et isti fines distinguuntur a se inuicem, ut patet 7º Ethicorum. Ideo prima distinctio politiarum ita , quod quedam intendunt bonum simpliciter et secundum ueritatem – et iste dicuntur recte –, alie autem 25 bonum secundum quid, scilicet alicui secundum apparentiam solum – et iste uocantur politie transgresse –.

13 , 1 Consequenter…multe] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a22-23 4 Philosophus…hic] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a34-b6 5 in…7 commendauit] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1266a1-5 9 politie…sex] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a34-b6 13 prius…subiecto] cf. supra, III, q. 8, ll. 37- 43 et q. 10, ll. 33-37 17 finis…18 speculatiuis] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (91), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a15-16 23 isti…inuicem] non inveni

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Recte autem distinguuntur ulterius: nam politia est quidam ordo, et ideo, quod diuersimode ordinantur in illum finem, sic distinguuntur. In 30 ordinatis autem oportet ultima reduci in primum per media, sicut etiam per ista ab ipso processerunt, sicut probat PROCLUS: nam omnis ordo ab unitate incipit et procedit ad multitudinem, et iterum reciprocatur in unum; ergo in politia oportet infimos reduci in finem per media aliqua, scilicet per principantes, quorum ratione subditi in finem ultimum redu35 cuntur. Modo contingit quod in aliqua ciuitate multitudo sit multum deficiens et unus solus emergat inter illos, qui sit simpliciter bonus; et tunc iste per rationem propriam per se nullo medio in finem dirigitur, tota autem multitudo mediante illo: et talis politia dicitur regnum. 40

Item, contingit quod in aliqua ciuitate multi sunt imperfecti et pauci perfecti, et multitudo reducitur per illos paucos in finem suum: et ista politia dicitur aristocratia, ubi pauci uirtuosi dominantur.

Tertio contingit quod in alia sint multi imperfecti et multi etiam perfecti; et iterum illi imperfecti per ipsos perfectos ratione et prudentia in 45 finem reducuntur, perfecti autem immediatius respiciunt finem in quem ex se et per se diriguntur: et talis politia dicitur politia nomine appropriato, et est in qua multi uirtuosi principantur. Sic ergo distinctis politiis rectis, transgresse, cum sint quasi priuationes illarum – et priuatio distinguitur secundum distinctionem habitus, a quo 50 etiam accipit rationem –, ipse transgresse simili modo et eodem distinguuntur, ita quod aliqua transgressa erit in qua intenditur finis bonus secundum quid, et eodem modo ciuitas in illum reducitur sicut regnum per regem: et ista uocatur tirannis, et est in qua multitudo per unum tirannum in finem talem ordinatur. 55

Contra autem, que opponitur suo modo aristocratie, que dicitur oligarchia, in qua pauci diuites propter diuitias principantur.

13 ,4 1 et1] in add. sed exp. P pauci] boni P

4 8 quasi] princeps illarum add. sed exp. P

56 qua] quam P

2 9 In…31 processerunt] cf. Proclum, Elem. Theol. prop. 128 et prop. 145 (ed. Boese, p. 64 et p. 72, ll. 14-19) 31 omnis…32 multitudinem] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese, p. 14) 4 6 talis…appropriato] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a38-39: “vocatur communi nomine omnium politiarum politia” (ed. Susemihl, p. 179, ll. 3- 4) 49 priuatio…habitus] cf. Auct. Arist., De An. III (154), p. 187; Arist., De An. III.6, 430b21-23

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Et tertia opponitur politie proprie dicte, et hec uocatur democratia, in qua multi pauperes propter libertatem principantur.

P 294vb

Et ita politie prima distinctione distinguuntur secundum fines, secundario autem distinguuntur secundum diuersum modum se habendi ad 60 illum finem. Adhuc autem et contingit politias secundum principantium distinctionem distingui, et hoc intelligendum est – ‘secundum principantes’ – primo | et summo principatu, summo – dico – in illa politia. Aut ergo principatur unus uel plures. Si unus: aut propter bonum simpliciter et commune, si est regnum, aut unus propter bonum proprium principa- 65 tur, et sic est tirannus. Si autem plures, aut pauci aut multi. Si pauci: uel uirtuosi – et sic est aristocratia –, uel diuites, si oligarchia. Si multi, aut uirtuosi, sic politia, uel pauperes propter libertatem, sic democratia. Hec autem distinctio est reducibilis ad primam. Cuius ratio est quia ista est secundum distinctionem principantis inquantum principans: hoc 70 autem est inquantum habet uirtutem; uirtus autem principantis est prudentia politica, que respicit finem sicut primum principium suum, et in illum ordinat politiam sicut in ultimum; et ideo distinctio que est secundum principantes reducitur ad illam que est secundum fines quos inten75 dunt principantes. Item, agens et finis sunt sibi inuicem cause, ergo secundum distinctionem unius distinguitur reliquum; sed principans est primus agens ordinem ciuitatis propter talem finem; ergo ista, cum distinguuntur, etsi sit eadem, erit utriusque distinctio. Sic ergo patet numerus et distinctio politiarum 80 simplicium. Si que tamen sint mixte, de illis non intendit Philosophus.

Ad rationem dicendum quod yconomia dicitur, 8º Ethicorum: pater enim principatur filiis principatu regali, ergo tenentur filii ; uir autem et uxor – hoc quod dicitur 3º Politicorum, ante illud capitulum Forte autem bene habet – principatu aristocratico

5 8 qua] quam P 6 5 principatur] principatum P 8 4 habet] et uxor add. P 7 6 agens…cause] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9 7 7 primus…78 8 1 yconomia…82 ciuitatis] quod ordo incipiat a principe asseritur supra, II, q. 1, ll. 36-38 regali] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1160b24-25 83 uir…85 familie] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1160 b32-33 84 Forte…habet] Arist., Pol. III.14, 1284b35. Re vera non “ante illud capitulum”, sed potius in illo eodem capitulo, ubi Aristoteles distinguit species monarchiarum. Ex istis, quinta species est “ordinata secundum yconomicam” (ibid., 1285b29-33, et praesertim b29-30, ed. Susemihl, p. 219, ll. 3- 4)

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principantur familie; pater autem cum uxore et filiis principantur aliis in domo principatu politico. Et hoc totum, si ordinent in bonum simpliciter, ; si autem non, sed in bonum secundum quid, tunc isti principatus essent transgressi. Ad secundam dicendum quod de mixtis PHILOSOPHUS non loquitur separatim. < Q U E S TIO 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m h o m i n e s u t i n p l u r i b u s s i n t p r a u i i u d i ce s d e s e i p s i s , u t d i c i t P h i l o s o p h u s

Arguitur quod non, quia unusquisque bene iudicat que nouit, et horum est bonus , ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; sed quilibet bene et 5 melius noscit se ipsum; ergo de se melius iudicat. Item, ad recte iudicandum requiritur cognitio et appetitus; ; ergo, sicut est de dilectione et appetitu, ita est de iudicio. Modo quilibet diligit alium propter hoc quod diligit se, ut dicitur 10 9º Ethicorum; ergo quilibet bene primo iudicabit de se, et per hoc de aliis; et hec ratio querit causam quare homines mali in se aliquando bene iudicent de aliis. Contra: ad iudicium requiritur recta estimatio; sed quilibet non habet rectam estimationem de se; ergo non bene iudicat de se, ut in pluribus, 85 pater] patri P 1 4 ,6 rectitudo] suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 14, ll. 4-5 suppl. ex loc. parall. B III, q. 14, ll. 5- 6

7 sed…8 dilectio]

85 pater…86 politico] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1161a3- 4, ubi tamen principatus timocraticus, qui idem est atque principatus politicus (cf. infra, IV, q. 9), dicitur tantum inter fratres esse. In B autem quod asseritur magis congruit cum textu Ethicae; cf. B III, q. 13, ll. 50-52 14 ,1 Consequenter…2 Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.9, 1280a15-16 3 unusquisque…4 iudex] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (3), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b27-28 6 cognitio] quod hic intendi debeat cognitio cum certitudine plane apparet si consideretur quod asseritur in loc. parall. B III, q. 14, l. 4 et in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 12: “Ad hoc intelligendum quod iudicium est sententia cum certitudine et iudicare est cum certitudine intelligere et cognoscere res” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 25va) 9 quilibet…se] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (176), p. 245; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.4, 1166a1-2 et b1-2 1 3 ad…16 ipsos] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.7: “Fere autem plures prauum iudicium dant de se ipsis. Et ratio huius est quia ad iudicium requiritur prudentia; prudentia autem presupponit appetitum rectum per uirtutem moralem: quod ergo peruertit appetitum, peruertit iudicium rationis. Iudicium autem de se ipso peruertit appetitus malus et peruersus; homo autem, ut in pluribus, peruersum habet appetitum respectu sui ipsius” (ed. Lanza, p. 54, ll. 54-59)

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dico. Minor patet quia homines, ut in pluribus, prauum habent appetitum 15 ad se ipsos.

P 295ra

Dicendum quod iudicium est sententia cum certitudine, ergo iudicare est aliquid intelligere cum certitudine. Certitudo autem non est nisi per resolutionem in prima | principia, et ideo iudicium est sententia cum resolutione in prima principia, cuius signum est quod scientie resolutorie 20 iudicatiue dicuntur. Intelligendum ergo quod iudicium potest esse uel de agibilibus uel de speculabilibus. Si de agibilibus, tunc homines multotiens male de se iudicant, quia ad recte iudicandum oportet habere prudentiam: prudentis enim opus est 25 iudicare, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Ad prudentiam autem pro principio exigitur recta estimatio finis respectu sui et rectus appetitus illius. Contingit autem, in pluribus, homines respectu sui inordinatum appetitum habere, quia omnis dilectio alterius oritur ex dilectione sui; et ideo contingit quod homines diligant se preter rationem, scilicet secundum sensum et 30 secundum corpus. Diligere enim se maxime secundum intellectum et animam, hoc est proprium uirtuosi, et hoc non est malum; diligere autem maxime secundum sensum et corpus, hoc est uolgarium et uitiosorum; et ideo homines, ut in pluribus, talem affectum immoderatum ad se ipsos habentes, non bene iudicant de se ipsis. Ex hoc sequitur quod etiam 35 male iudicant de amicis: amicus enim est alter ipse, ut dicitur 9º Ethicorum; et ideo in alia Facultate recte ordinatum est ne quis in causa propria uel amici sit iudex. Bonus autem, quia rectum appetitum habet, bene de se 19 cum] certitudine add. sed exp. P 3 3 uolgarium] scrips. colgarium P 17 iudicium…21 dicuntur] cf. Thomam, In An. Post. I.1: “Pars autem logice que primo deseruit processui pars iudicatiua dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientie; et, quia iudicium certum de effectibus haberi non potest nisi resoluendo in prima principia, ideo pars hec analetica uocatur, id est resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii que per resolutionem habetur est uel ipsa forma sillogismi tantum ... uel etiam cum hoc ex materia, quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessarie” (ed. Leon. I*2, pp. 5-6, ll. 75-82 et 84-85) 2 5 prudentis…26 iudicare] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.8, 1143a16-17, 19-20 et praesertim 29-31 2 6 Ad…27 illius] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a7-11, 17-20, 34-37 et VI.10, 1145a4- 6 29 omnis…sui] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (176), p. 245; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.4, 1166a1-2 et b1-2 3 1 Diligere…32 uirtuosi] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.8, 1168b28-1169a3 3 6 amicus…ipse] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (177), p. 245; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.4, 1166a30-32 3 7 in1…38 iudex] pro ‘alia Facultate’ intelligatur hic Facultas Theologiae sive Facultas Iuris Canonici, ubi legebatur Digestum; cf. Digestum 5.1.17; Codex Iustiniani III, tit. 5, v. ‘Generali lege’ (ed. Kruger, vol. 2, p. 125a), ubi invenitur principium istud

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iudicat, et per consequens de omnibus aliis. In pluribus autem non est hoc, quia mali ut in pluribus, boni aut ut in paucioribus, 2º Thopicorum.

In speculabilibus autem quilibet bene iudicat, dummodo cognitionem habeat; cuius ratio est quia iudicium est resoluere in prima principia, que ab appetitu peruerso non impediuntur per se, nisi per accidens, ut scilicet per peruersum appetitum aliquis inclinetur in finem malum, in quem non 45 tendit speculatio ueritatis. Et hoc uult PHILOSOPHUS 6º Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod malitia non corrumpit quamcumque estimationem – non enim illam que est: “quicumque triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis” –, sed tantum eam que est circa finem agibilium. Cuius ratio est quia bene iudicantem circa agibilia oportet credere principiis primis, ut hoc esse 50 optimum et in hoc omnia debere ordinari; hoc autem impeditur per malitiam; ergo malitia in moribus uel appetitu impedit rectum iudicium de agibilibus.

Ad rationem dicendum quod quilibet magis se noscit secundum speculabilia, non autem secundum agibilia, quia ad istam cognitionem 55 requiritur rectitudo appetitus respectu sui et cognitio secundum ueritatem eius quod sibi sit bonum uel malum in ueritate, et inclinari in hoc. Hoc autem, ut in pluribus, non contingit. Ad aliam, que querit quare mali aliquando bene iudicant de aliis, dicendum quod hoc est quia nullus naturaliter malus in omnibus: non 60 enim uitia sunt connexa sicut uirtutes. Cuius ratio est quia uitia aliquando sunt contraria magis sibi quam uirtuti, et ideo nullus simul habet omnes malitias, sed habens unam malitiam inclinatur in opera | illius, aliam P 295rb autem non habens non inclinatur in opera illius. Et ideo, habens unum uitium secundum 65 eandem circumstantiam, cum, si aliquis sit intemperatus, forte non est illiberalis, et ideo ille bene de liberalitate iudicat. Et iterum, habens unum uitium secundum unam circumstantiam et non secundum aliam, ut aliquis habens uitium illiberalitatis quantum ad hoc quod est non accipere et non secundum id quod est non dare, peruersum tantum 4 2 iudicium] est illud add. sed exp. est P 4 7 quicumque triangulus] quandocumque etiam angulus P 5 6 eius quod] quam P 6 0 sunt] que add. sed exp. P 63 non inclinatur] iter. sed corr. P 68 non2] s.l. P 6 9 tantum] coni.: autem P 4 0 mali…paucioribus] Auct. Arist., Top. II (30), p. 324; Arist., Top. II.6, 112b11-12 42 iudicium…principia] cf. supra, ll. 17-21 cum adn. 46 malitia…48 agibilium] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b14-17 4 8 bene…52 agibilibus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b17-20

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circa hoc quod non accipere, et ideo ipse de eodem uitio secundum 70 illam circumstantiam, scilicet non dare, circa quam rectum appetitum habet, bene iudicat et de se, et peruersum habet appetitum, qui impedit rectum de agibilibus iudicium. Vlterius quereret aliquis quare aliquando uitiosi secundum aliam circumstantiam, uel eandem etiam, corripiunt alios. Dicendum quod, sicut 75 dicit PHILOSOPHUS 7º Ethicorum, posse uerba dicere non est signum scientie, sicut aliquem dicere difficilia uerba Empedoclis nullum signum est quod illa intelligat; contingit enim aliquem bene apprehendere dicta que tamen non intelligit funditus: hoc enim indiget longo tempore, ut ibi dicitur. Et similiter estimandum est de isto quod ipse, corripiendo alium, 80 uerba quidem dicit, corde aliud sentit; et ideo, cum opera eius a uerbis dissentiant, decredere facit hoc suis sermonibus, ut dicitur 10º Ethicorum. Ad rationes patet solutio, quia in speculabilibus quilibet se bene cognoscit et in illis etiam bene de se iudicat; in agibilibus autem non, propter peruersitatem appetitus, et ideo in illis nequaquam recte iudicat, 85 nec de se nec de aliis. < Q UE S T I O 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m m e l i u s s i t p r i n c i p a r i p au c o s u i r t u o s o s u el m u l t i t u d i n e m i n c i u i t a t e Et quod melius sit paucos uirtuosos principari arguitur, quia melius est eos principari qui excedunt alios in eo per quod ciuitas ordinatur in finem: hoc enim est de ratione principantis, ordinare ciues in finem; 5 sed pauci uirtuosi sunt tales: uirtus enim est qua ciues perueniunt ad finem ciuitatis, dico, bene ordinare; ergo melius est paucos uirtuosos principari.

7 0 uitio] uico P | secundum…71 illam] per eandem sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 74 aliam] aliquam P 7 6 posse…79 tempore] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.3, 1147a18-24 8 1 cum…82 sermonibus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.1, 1172a34-b1 et Thomam, Sent. Eth. X.1 (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 553, ll. 93-99) 15 , 1 Consequenter…2 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281a40-41; sed haec verba magis similia sunt illis quibus Petrus usus est in Scripto III.8: “... utrum magis expediat multitudinem aut paucos uirtuosos dominari ... utrum multitudinem magis expediat dominari quam uirtuosos paucos tantum” (ed. Lanza, p. 66, ll. 111-112)

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Item, quanto principatus magis accedit ad principatum optimum, tanto est melior; sed talis est principatus paucorum; accedit enim magis ad 10 principatum optimum quam si multitudo principatur: optimus enim principatus est regnum, in quo unus principatur. Et iterum, magis accedit ad principatum naturalem, secundum quem cor principatur aliis membris et unum primum, scilicet Deus, toti uniuerso: ad unitatem enim magis accedunt pauci quam multi; ergo melius est paucos principari. Contra: melius est prudentiores dominari; sed multitudo prudentior est paucis; ergo ipsam melius est principari. Minor patet quia, sicut in multitudine sunt multe et | oculi multi, ita et intellectus multi; intellectus P 295va autem multi magis possunt ratiocinari, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum, saltim efficacius, inquantum simul aggregant inter se obedientes sue rationi, quod 20 non esset inter paucos prudentes. 15

Item, in multitudine attenditur bonum commune; ergo magis debet principari. Antecendens patet quia, si unusquisque de multitudine intendat bonum proprium, tunc omnes, simul consiliando, intendent bonum commune omnibus, quod non ita uniuersaliter fieret in paucis.

25

Dicendum quod ratio principantis inquantum huiusmodi per se et primo ex fine sumitur; finis autem principatus recti est recte dirigere et mouere ciues ad felicitatem; ergo princeps secundum rationem suam erit qui potest recte dirigere et mouere. Hoc autem non potest fieri sine pru15 , 8 accedit] correxi ex infra, ll. 9, 11 et 14: attendit P 11 principatur] principatus P 17 aures] suppl. ex fonte allata 1 9 efficacius] scilicet add. sed exp. P 2 2 principari] quia add. sed exp. P 8 quanto…9 melior] cf. Auct. Arist., Top. III (45), p. 324; Arist., Top. III.1, 116b27; Auct. Arist., Top. III (50), p. 325; Arist., Top. III.2, 117b21 1 0 optimus…14 multi] hoc argumentum et haec verba valde similia sunt illis quibus Petrus usus est in Scripto ad ostendendum quod optima politia est in qua summus principatus assignatur alicui qui excedit omnes alios in virtute; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12: “illum oportet magis principari qui magis accedit ad principatum naturalem et ad principatum uniuersi; sed iste, qui sic excedit omnes alios in uirtute, est huiusmodi: ergo expedit ipsum solum principari. Maior propositio apparet in animali: pars enim que principatur cor est; cor autem unum est et principale, a quo deriuatur uirtus ad singulas partes corporis. Iterum in uniuerso est unus princeps: principatus autem uniuersi unus et optimus est. Quare ille in ciuitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus uniuersi et naturalis; ergo ille principatus erit melior, in quo erit 16 in…17 multi 2] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, unus princeps” (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 223-231) 1281a42-b9 et III.16, 1287b25-31 1 7 intellectus2…19 efficacius] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (136), p. 242; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a15-16 2 5 ratio…27 felicitatem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.11: “ratio principatus ex fine sumitur: finis uero politie recte est feliciter uiuere, ideo ex hoc debet sumi ratio principatus” (ed. Lanza, p. 91, ll. 151-152)

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dentia et uirtute, quam per se supponit prudentia; ideo principans per se debet esse prudens et uirtuosus. Vlterius, quia oportet ut ciues ei sicut 30 domino obediant, oportet autem ut potestatem ex consequenti habeat subditos, rebelles fuerint, cohercendi et aduersarios expugnandi. Et ideo eum per se et primo habere prudentiam et uirtutem, potentiam autem per accidens et ex consequenti. Intelligendum ergo quod quedam est multitudo erronea, non persua- 35 bilis, et hec est multitudo bestialis et nata subesse principatu despotico; alia autem multitudo bene persuasibilis, mixta ex sapientibus et ex uolgaribus bene persuabilibus. Si ergo queratur de prima multitudine, dico quod omnino non est digna principari nec hoc expedit, immo seruire debet despotico principatu, 40 tum quia non habet uirtutem et prudentiam, tum , licet habeat potentiam, habet cum hoc impetum freneticum et est impersuasibilis. Si autem intelligatur questio de secunda multitudine, dicendum quod expedit illam magis principari quam paucos uirtuosos. Cuius ratio est quia, 3 0 ut] s.l. P 3 5 non] ut P 44 Cuius] tamen P 3 3 eum…34 consequenti] cf. infra, V, qq. 11 et 13, ubi Petrus affirmat prudentiam et potentiam principem oportet habere 3 5 quedam…38 persuasibilibus] haec distinctio invenitur in textu Aristotelis tantum in nuce, sed non penitus disserta: cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b18-20, ubi Aristoteles exaequat multitudinem bestiis. Eisdem fere verbis potius invenitur in Petri Scripto III.8: “Est enim quedam multitudo bestialis, cuius homines inclinantur ad actus bestiales et parum rationis habent, et in tali multitudine non est uerum quod ex illis hominibus possit fieri aliquid uirtuosum, si conueniant in unum. Alia est multitudo in qua quilibet habet aliquid uirtutis et prudentie et inclinatur ad actum uirtutis, et in tali uerum est quod illud quod fit ex istis, cum conueniunt in unum, est aliquid uirtuosum” (ed. Lanza, p. 68, ll. 193-199); III.9: “duplex est multitudo: una quidem bestialis, in qua nullus habet rationem uel modicum, sed inclinatur ad bestiales actus, et manifestum est quod istam non expedit dominari aliquo modo, quia sine ratione est, et coniunctim et diuisim; alia est multitudo ubi omnes aliquid habent rationis et inclinantur ad prudentiam, et bene suasibiles sunt a ratione, et talem expedit magis dominari quam paucos uirtuosos” (ibid., p. 71, ll. 8-13); III.11: “Possibile enim est in multitudine esse aliquos uiros sapientes et prudentes et aliquos ualde diuites, ipsos autem et alios populares bene suasibiles a ratione et obedibiles; talem autem multitudinem melius est principari quam paucos, quia ad principandum duo requiruntur: scire recte regere et potentia. Sed in multitudine tali ista duo reperiuntur: quia sapientes habet et prudentes, scit regere; quia multitudo est, habet potentiam cohercendi et repellendi inimicos. Quare rationabiliter arguet multitudo contra illos quod melius est eam principari: aggregat enim multitudo et diuites et nobiles, uirtuosos et populi potentiam, et ideo uidetur rationabilius totam multitudinem, que aggregat omnia ista, debere principari, ubi possibile erit inuenire talem multitudinem, sed multitudinem uilem et non persuasibilem non” (ibid., p. 93, ll. 211-222). Albertus quoque asseruerat aliquam multitudinem bestialem esse, sed hanc non ita clare distinguit a multitudine bene ordinata ut Petrus; cf. Albertum, Pol. III.7 (ed. Borgnet VIII, pp. 258-259). Vide etiam Aspasium, Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 9: “Plebs vero magis sequitur motus animales et sensuales” (ed. Mercken, p. 166, ll. 43- 44)

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sicut iam patuit, illud magis expedit principari quod attingit simul ad illa tria que exiguntur ad principantem quam illud quod solum attingit ad duo. Sed hoc est ista multitudo: inquantum enim in ea sunt prudentes, habet prudentiam et uirtutem, inquantum autem multi, habet potentiam; pauci autem ad prima duo tantum attingunt; et ideo magis expedit multitudinem 50 talem dominari quam paucos et uirtuosos. 45

Item, melius est principari quod habet omnia que habet aliud et aliquid ultra necessarium ad principatum; talis est multitudo: habet enim et illa que habent pauci uirtuosi, scilicet prudentiam et uirtutem et, ulterius, potentiam necessariam ad principatum; ergo et cetera.

55

Ad rationem dicendum quod pauci ad uirtutem attingunt, in alio autem deficiunt quod habet multitudo, quod est potentia; multitudo autem non deficit in aliquo quod habent pauci et uirtuosi. Ad secundam dicendum quod ille due rationes querunt aliam P 295vb difficultatem que iam sequentibus questionibus explicabitur.| < Q U E S TIO 1 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m o p o r t e t mu l t i t u d i n e m p r i n c i p a r i p r i n c i pa t u m a x i m o i n c i u i t a t e b e n e o r d i n a t a

Arguitur quod sic, quia multitudini inest per se quod debeat principari, ut iam patuit; ergo, si per se expedit multitudinem principari, 5 ergo principari maximo principatu maxime expedit, quia si simpliciter ad simpliciter et magis ad magis et maxime ad maxime; si ergo principatus expedit multitudini, maximus principatus maxime ei expedit, quia iste processus tenet in eis que dicuntur per se. Item, principatum maximum oportet habere potestatem et pru10 dentiam; sed hec duo habet sola multitudo; ergo et cetera.

16 ,3 multitudini] multitudo P 4 5 sicut…46 duo] cf. supra, ll. 27-34 16 ,1 Consequenter…2 ordinata] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b21-25 3 multitudini…4 patuit] cf. q. praec., ll. 15-24 et 43-54 5 simpliciter…6 maxime2] Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264, Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod multitudinem principari principatu maximo est insecurum; et arguitur ratione eius, quia multitudo, deficiens a uirtute, sepe inclinabitur in superbiam iniuriando.

Dicendum quod multitudinem uilem et bestialem, que nata est seruire despotico principatu, expedit nullo principatu principari. Sed neque adhuc hoc expediet multitudini mixte ex sapientibus et populo. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut predictum est, duo exiguntur ad principatum, scilicet prudentia et uirtus, que unum sunt, et ista per se et primo; per accidens autem et ex consequenti potentia. Modo ratio uniuscuiusque magis attenditur secundum id quod per se ei contingit quam secundum illud quod per accidens; et ideo similiter ratio principis, qui est secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur omnia, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice, capitulo de principio, ita quod primus princeps et summus qui ex se rationem et uirtutem mouendi habet, et alii ab ipso. Ex hoc arguitur: illud non oportet principari principatu maximo quod rationem mouendi non habet ex se et primo et per se, sed eam ab alio accipit. Et talis est multitudo, que ex primo inquantum huiusmodi rationem mouendi non habet, sed accipit ex alio, scilicet a sapientibus, qui sunt pars eius; pars autem magis est diuersa a toto quam sit eadem, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum. Et hec ratio assimilatur rationi PHILOSOPHI, principio 7º Phisicorum, ubi probat quod omne quod mouetur ab alio mouetur; et ideo, si secundum illam rationem quod mouetur mouetur ab alio, quia partes animalis a corde mouentur, similiter et ista ratio ualebit in proposito.

15

20

25

30

Item, illud magis expedit principari principatu maximo, ad cuius rationem reducuntur principatus aliorum; hoc autem est unus ex intellectu 35

11 multitudinem] multitudo P 15 expedit] etiam add. P 21 cuius] secundum add. P 26 se 2 7 rationem] rectam add. P 31 mouetur3] et] suppl. ex supra, ll. 18, 25 et infra, l. 50 moueatur P 3 5 reducuntur] reducantur P 11 multitudinem…13 iniuriando] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b25-28; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.9: “... et propter inprudentiam deficient a recte iudicando, et propter iniustitiam inclinabuntur ad opera iniusta. Et ideo sequetur quod multa mala facient quantum ad se ipsos et multa iniusta quantum ad alios, eis iniuriando et molestando. Hoc autem est periculosum” (ed. Lanza, p. 71, ll. 29-33) 1 7 sicut…19 potentia] cf. q. praec., ll. 27-34 2 1 ratio…22 omnia] 2 8 pars 2…29 eadem] cf. Arist., Phys. I.3, 185b11-16 Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 3 0 omne…31 mouetur 1] Auct. Arist., Phys. VII (183), p. 155; Arist., Phys. VII.1, 241b24 3 2 partes…mouentur] cf. Auct. Arist., De An. III (172), p. 188; Arist., De An. III.10, 433b14-19; Auct. Arist., De Som. et Vig. (75), p. 202; Arist., De Som. et Vig. 2, 456a5- 6; Arist., De Mot. An. (9), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a14

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prudens, quod patet quia multitudo non potest principari nisi inquantum participat rationem unius in consentiendo. Item, nec pauci possunt principari nisi inquantum consentiunt in unum; ergo magis expedit principari unum principatu maximo et non 40 multitudinem. Sed prius dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod expedit multitudinem principatu aliquo principari: intelligendum est secundum aliquem modum attingendo ad principatum, scilicet eligendo et corrigendo principem, ut iam patebit. Simpliciter autem primo principatu principari multitudinem non expedit, quia ei primo ratio non expedit, sed ex consequenti.

Ad rationem dicendum quod “simpliciter ad simpliciter”, et cetera, hec propositio uera est in | eis que dicuntur per se et assumendo secun- P 296ra dum unam rationem: sic autem non assumitur in proposito quia, quod multitudinem per se expedit principari, uerum est secundum unam rationem, scilicet eligendo et corrigendo, sed non secundum illam rationem a 50 qua sumitur principatus primus: hoc enim est habere ex se et primo mouere et per se; hoc autem multitudini non contingit; ergo non ualet consequentia. Sed bene teneret quod principari eam maxime secundum illam eandem rationem, scilicet eligendo et corrigendo, maxime expedit, non autem principari maxime secundum rationem primi et summi principatus. 45

Ad secundam dicendum quod unus unanimiter electus ad summum principatum omnia ista habet: per se enim habet ea que per se ad principatum exiguntur, scilicet uirtutem et prudentiam. Ex consequenti autem habet illud quod ex consequenti ad principatum requiritur, scilicet potentiam: nam ad esse principem sequitur ut subditi ei obediant et electo60 res, et sic ex consequenti habet per illos potentiam; et ideo recte sic ipse habet potentiam sicut ipsa ad principatum requiritur, hoc est ex consequenti. Et ulterius etiam ex hoc patet quod multitudo per se habet potentiam inquantum multa: sic autem non conuenit potentia principatui summo nec conuenit multitudini primus principatus. 55

4 7 quia] uerum est add. P 5 5 unanimiter] unanimitus P 62 habet] habeat P 63 conuenit] conueniat P 4 0 expedit…41 principari] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b28-31 infra, q. seq.

41 secundum…43 patebit] cf.

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< Q UE S T I O 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i t a t i e x p e d i a t m u l t i t u d i n e m el i g e r e e t c o r r i g e r e p r i n c i p e m e t u t r u m h o c i u s t um s i t Arguitur quod non, quia sapientis est eligere et corrigere; multitudo autem, ut in pluribus, imprudens est; ergo ista non pertinebunt multitudini. Maior patet quia eius est corrigere, cuius est iudicare: hoc autem est 5 prudentis, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Item, eius est eligere, cuius est consiliari et conferre: sed hoc est sapientis, 3º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. Minor patet per PHILOSOPHUM in hoc 3º. Item, prius dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod periculosum est multitudinem facere dominam maximorum bonorum in ciuitate; sed hec uidentur 10 esse electio et correctio principis; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS et dictum est prius.

Dicendum quod multitudinem uilem et bestialem non expedit ad ista attingere; multitudinem tamen mixtam et ordinatam iustum est attingere ad ista: ad electionem quidem, quia electio principis duo requirit, scilicet 15 consilium de principe bono inuestigando et potentiam ad cogendum electum ut recipiat honus, precipue in eis principatibus in quibus est plus honeris quam honoris, ut est setentia homicidalium. Illud ergo maxime expedit eligere quod in se habet consilium et potestatem; sed hoc est

17 , 3 non] correxi ex loc. parall. B III, q. 17, l. 3 et Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 14 (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 27vb): sic P | sapientis] sapiens P 17 , 1 Consequenter…2 sit] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b30-34 5 hoc…6 prudentis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.8, 1143a16-17, 19-20 et praesertim 29-31 7 hoc…sapientis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112a19-21 | Minor…8 3º] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b39-1282a7 9 periculosum…10 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b25-28; cf. q. praec. 12 Contra…prius] cf. q. praec., ll. 40-44 et 47-54 1 3 Dicendum…21 potentiam] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.9: “Si enim sit multitudo non uilis siue bestialis, sed aliquid habens rationis et uirtutis, bene etiam suasibilis, habens sapientes a quibus recte suadeatur, talem multitudinem, simul sumptam, bene expedit habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo principem. Et si unusquisque illorum non habeat sufficienter rationem et uirtutem per quam possit recte eligere et corrigere, tamen omnes simul habent, et constitutum ex omnibus, cum conueniunt, uirtuosum est simpliciter” (ed. Lanza, p. 75, ll. 134-141). Quod in Scripto aliqualiter aliud videtur quam hoc quod Petrus asserit in his Quaestionibus; in Scripto enim manifeste asserit quod est aliqua politia ubi multitudinem, etiamsi bene ordinata sit, non expedit habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo: “in aliqua politia non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo, sicut in regno” (ibid., ll. 143-145) 1 7 est…18 homicidalium] cf. loc. parall. B III, q. 17, ll. 13-14 cum adn.

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multitudo, quia per sapientes, pars sui, habet prudentiam, per se autem potentiam. Et iterum, homines diligunt sua opera ut filios, ut 9º Ethicorum, et multitudo principi quem elegit magis obediet.

Item, ad correctionem, dum princeps peccauerit, exigitur discretio penam inueniendi et potentiam eam infligendi; hoc autem conuenit 25 multitudini, quia sapientes penam discernit, per populum | autem P 296rb eam infligere potest. Et neutrum istorum per se posset utrumque, sed sapientes haberent discretionem de magnitudine pene, tamen potentia carent, populus ergo, econuerso, habens potentiam, quantitatem pene non discerneret; et ideo, si expedit ciuitati principem corrigere – sicut expedit, 30 alioquin ordo ciuitatis saluetur, successiue enim princeps ciues destrueret –, tunc hoc expedit fieri per communitatem istam mixtam. Et intelligo de ciuitate que non est sub alia constituta: ibi enim correctio principis spectat ad superiorem. Item, per illud magis expedit principem corrigere, post cuius correctio35 nem correctus minus potest odire corrigentes; sed hoc fit si multitudo eum corrigat: tunc enim non habebit singulare odium contra aliquos.

Ad rationem dicendum quod sapientes deficiunt in potentia, et ideo melius est, etiam propter minus odium, ut iam patuit, quod multitudo corrigat. 40

Ad secundam dicendum quod hoc intelligitur de multitudine bestiali impersuasibili, de qua prius dixit Philosophus quod nata est seruire principatu despotico, et cetera.

2 0 qui…pars] suppl. et correxi ex q. praec., l. 28: partes P 21 9º] 5 sed corr. P 2 1 homines…filios] Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.7, 1167b33-34 24 hoc…29 discerneret] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.9: “magis expedit totam multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo quam paucos: et uocat hic multitudinem aggregatum ex sapientibus, maioribus et prudentibus, et mediocribus et populo: istam totam multitudinem talem magis expedit dominari quam paucos, uilem tamen multitudinem non expedit ... quia duo exiguntur in regimine politie: unum est ratio recta – hoc autem habet ista multitudo per illos sapientes –, aliud est potentia, ut possit cohercere et punire malos – hoc autem habet per populum –” (ed. Lanza, p. 77, ll. 208-212 et p. 78, ll. 214-217) 3 8 propter…patuit] cf. supra, ll. 34-36 4 0 multitudine…42 despotico] re vera ipse Petrus, et non Aristoteles, hoc prius dixit; cf. supra, III, q. 15, ll. 35-37 et 39- 40; q. 16, ll. 14-15

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< Q UE S T I O 1 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a t u s d eb e a t d i s t r i b u i s e c u n d u m d i g n i t at e m e t e x c e l l e n t i a m d i u i t i a r u m Arguitur quod sic, quia illud debet inspicere distribuens principatum per quod multa in ciuilitate expediuntur; sed hoc sunt diuitie; ergo secundum illarum dignitatem debet distribui principatus. Maior patet quia 5 hoc est officium principantis, expedire ea que in ciuitate. Minor patet quia, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 1º Ethicorum, multi multa operati sunt per diuitias et amicos et per ciuilem potentiam. Item, secundum illud debet distribui principatus per quod possunt haberi omnia alia, quia ciuitas est ad per se sufficientia; sed per diuitias 10 omnia possunt haberi: dicit enim PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, quod diuitie sunt pretium et dignitas omnium aliorum, et idem testatur 5º Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod denarius est communis fideiussor. Contra: ad illud uel ad dignitatem illius non est inspiciendum per quod inclinantur homines in contumelias et elationes; sed hoc pecunia; 15 ergo non est distribuendus principatus secundum pecuniam uel diuitias. Maior patet quia ista destruunt equalitatem, qua non existente perit ciuitas, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum. Elatio enim inclinat ad iniuriandum: dicit enim PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, quod diuites, passi a diuitiis, contumeliosi fiunt et elati, estimantes, quia habent diuitias, habere se omnia; et tunc 20 subdit uerbum illud allegatum, quod diuitie sunt commune pretium aliorum.

Dicendum quod in distributione principatus per se et primo non est inspiciendum ad diuitias; per accidens hoc contingit. Cuius ratio est quia

18 , 20 quia] praem. quod P 18 , 1 Consequenter…2 diuitiarum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.12, 1283a14-15 et III.13, 1283a31-33; haec quaestio et huic sequaens etiam inveniuntur in Scripto, sed mutato ordine: ibi enim Petrus antea considerat de distributione principatus secundum ingenuitatem; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.11 (ed. Lanza, p. 88, l. 68-p. 90, l. 106) 7 multi…8 potentiam] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a33-b2 1 0 ciuitas…sufficientia] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a27-30 et 1252b34-1253a1; 11 diuitie…12 aliorum] Arist., Rhet. III.9, 1280b32-35 et 1280b40-1281a1; VII.4, 1326b3 II.16, 1391a1-2 1 3 denarius…fideiussor] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. V (95), p. 239; Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1133a20-21 et 1133b10-12 17 equalitatem…ciuitas] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1132b31-34 19 diuites…20 omnia] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a2

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diuitie, prout ueniunt in usum humanum, sunt quoddam utile in finem, ut dicitur 1º huius; utilibus autem contingit et bene et male uti. Ex hoc arguitur: secundum illud precipue debet distribui principatus, quo non contingit male uti; cuius probatio | est quia per illud debet distribui principatus P 296va per quod per se in finem ciuitatis deuenitur, ut sunt prudentia et uirtus, 30 quibus non est uti male; sed diuitiis uti contingit male; ergo secundum illarum dignitatem non debet principatus distribui. 25

Item, hoc probat ratio PHILOSOPHI posita in 2º, ubi dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod malum est quod principatus in ciuitate fiat uenalis, quia tunc ciues fient auari. Quod patet: omnes enim homines appetunt honorem, ut 35 dicitur 1º Ethicorum et 4º; principatus autem quidam honor est; ergo omnes appetunt principatum. Omnis enim appetens aliquid ut finem, appetit etiam ea per que in illum finem deuenitur; sed si fuerit principatus uenalis et distribuitur secundum dignitatem diuitiarum, tunc ciues appetent diuitias, per quas poterunt attingere principatum, et hoc faciet ciues 40 esse auaros et illiberales et totam ciuitatem uitiosam; ergo non est inspiciendum ad diuitias per se in distributione principatuum. Per accidens tamen potest fieri inspectus ad eas in distributione principatus, supposito in eo quod per se exigitur est prudentia et uirtus. Contingit enim aliquando quod principatus non sit per se sufficiens ad 45 omnia opera principatus illius facienda bene, et in tali principatu inspiciendum est per accidens ad diuitias, ita tamen quod prudentia et uirtus, que per se sunt necessaria principatui, presupponantur. Cuius ratio est quia intendenti finem aliquem, necessarie est intendere illud sine quo non bene fit finis ille. Et ideo intendenti principatum talem, scilicet non sibi suffi50 cientem, oportet inspicere ad hoc sine quo non bene fit principatus ille uel opera eius; hoc autem sunt diuitie; ergo ibi oportet ad eas inspicere per accidens et ex consequenti, primo tamen et per se inspectione facta ad prudentiam et uirtutem. In sufficienti autem principatu nec per se inspici2 8 distribui] ciuitas add. sed exp. P 3 5 honor] horror P 4 3 exigitur] non add. P 4 4 non] ut P 2 5 diuitie…finem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b27-30 26 utilibus…30 male2] cf. Augustinum, De Lib. Arb. II.18 (nr. 50): “Nam neque prudentia neque fortitudine neque temperantia male quis utitur ... Recta autem ratione male uti nemo potest” (ed. Green–Daur, CCCL XXIX, p. 271, ll. 88- 89, 91-92) et II.19 “Virtutibus nemo male utitur; ceteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non solum bene sed etiam male quisque uti potest” (ibid., ll. 8-11) 3 3 malum…34 auari] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267b5-9 ubi tamen Aristoteles mentionem de principatu non facit 3 4 omnes…honorem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.2, 1095b26-27; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b19-21 et 1124a17-19 35 principatus…est] cf. Arist., Pol. III.10, 1281a31: “honores enim dicimus esse principatus” (ed. Susemihl, p. 190, l. 13)

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tur ad diuitias, propter rationes predictas, nec per accidens, cum iste principatus sibi per se sufficiat. Non autem contingit ad diuitias per acci- 55 dens inspici nisi propter insufficientiam principatus secundum se. Sed ponatur quod aliquis sit principatus sibi sufficiens ad opus, et ponantur duo, uirtuosi equaliter et equales ad principandum, quorum unus sit diues, alius autem sit pauper: tunc queritur quis istorum potius 60 assumendus sit ad principatum.

P 296vb

Dicendum quod ARISTOTELIS intentio est quod pauper potius assumendus est. Dixit enim, in 2º huius, quod melius faceret legislator si ad pauperem epyeikem inspiceret distribuens principatus. Cuius ratio esse uidetur quod ad principatum, ut apparebit posterius, a PHILOSOPHO requiruntur tria, scilicet uirtus, potentia et dilectio principatus; precipue tamen exigitur 65 dilectio quia, licet assumptus uirtuosus sit et potens, tamen, si non diligat principatum, nunquam diligenter exercebit ista in operibus | principatus: nam dictum est, in 2º huius, quod duo sunt que maxime faciunt curare, proprium scilicet et dilectum. Ille ergo magis assumendus est in principem qui magis diligit principatum; sed pauper magis diligit eum; 70 ergo et cetera. Minor patet: beneficiatus enim benefactorem diligit, et hec dilectio mensuratur a quantitate beneficii et secundum indigentiam beneficiati. Ille ergo plus diligit principatum qui magis indiget utilitate et honore proueniente ex illo, et respectu cuius etiam hec maiora sunt; sed hic est ipse pauper, quia et magis illis, et etiam illa sunt et uidentur ei 75 maiora quam essent, ut patet in proportione additi ad preexistentia; et ideo uidetur quod, si principatus sit sibi per se sufficiens, tunc, duobus entibus equalibus secundum uirtutem ad principandum, magis ex eis est eligendus pauper quam diues. Sic ergo patet quod uniuersaliter per se non est inspiciendum ad digni- 80 tatem diuitiarum in distributione principatuum, nisi forte per accidens, propter insufficientiam alicuius principatus.

68 2º] primo P 71 enim] autem P 7 4 et] hec dilectio mensuratur add. sed exp. P 7 5 indiget] suppl. ex supra, l. 73 | uidentur] uidemur P 8 0 ad] diuitias add. sed exp. P 62 melius…63 principatus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.11, 1273b6-7 6 4 ad…65 principatus] cf. Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-37; cf. infra, V, qq. 11-13 6 5 precipue…67 principatus] cf. Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309b8-14; cf. infra, V, q. 14 68 duo…69 dilectum] Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262b22-23 71 beneficiatus…73 beneficiati] sed advertendum quod Aristoteles oppositum asserit: benefactor praesertim diligit beneficiatum, et non e contrario; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.7, 1167b17-20

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Ad rationem dicendum quod illa multa operabilia in principatu aliquando sunt in principatu sufficiente ad ea per se, et tunc nullo modo 85 inspiciendum ad diuitias; si autem principatus sit insufficiens ad illa, tunc potest fieri respectus ad eas. Ad secundam dicendum quod inspiciendum est per se ad hoc quod habentur omnia per se necessaria ad principatum; sed per diuitias non habentur ista, immo solum uenalia et commutabilia, quorum 90 nichil per se pertinet ad principatum. Et quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, quod habentur omnia, intelligit de uenalibus; uel, si hoc intelligat uniuersaliter, tunc dicendum quod hic loquitur secundum opinionem diuitum: dicit enim quod diuites fiunt elati, estimantes se habere omnia, quia per diuitias habentur omnia, ita secundum eorum 95 opinionem, et cetera. < Q U E S TIO 1 9 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i n d i s t r i b u t i o n e p r i n c i p a t u s d e b e a t attend i ad excellentiam i ngenu itatis , u t se cu nd u m hoc d is tribu atur Arguitur quod sic, quia principatus sunt distribuendi secundum uirtutis excellentiam, ut patet ex predictis; sed ingenuitas est uirtus, ut 5 dicitur hic et in 2º Rhetorice; ergo secundum eius excellentiam debet distribui principatus. Item, in distributione principatus, cum sit quidam honor, oportet inspicere ad honorabilitatem; sed ingenuitas est apud omnes honorabilis; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia uerisimile est meliores esse a melioribus 10 genitos, ut dicitur 1º huius.

88 per1] suppl. ex supra, l. 9 91 per diuitias] suppl. ex supra, ll. 10-11 1 9 ,7 honor] horror P 8 inspicere] inspici P 9 0 quod…91 omnia] cf. supra, ll. 10-12 1 9 , 1 Consequenter…2 distribuatur] cf. Arist., Pol. III.12, 1283a14-15 et III.13, 1283a33-37 3 principatus…4 predictis] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 27-30 4 ingenuitas…uirtus] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (63), p. 256; Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283a37 ( in editione Susemihl perperam “virtus gentis”); Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-19 et 22; Auct. Arist., Rhet. II (49), p. 266 9 uerisimile…10 genitos] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (21), p. 253; Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2 sed verba ista potius consonant cum Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283a36-37

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Contra: per illud non debet distribui principatus, per quod aliquis inclinatur ad ambitionem honoris et contemptum aliorum; sed hoc est nobilitas: dicitur enim, 2º Rhetorice, quod nobiles appetunt honorem et despectiui sunt; ergo et cetera.

P

297ra

Dicendum | quod, sicut dictum est de diuitiis, per se non debet inspici 15 ad ingenuitatem in distributione principatus. Cuius ratio est quia secundum dignitatem illius debet distribui principatus per quod aliquis potest recte operari: hoc enim est opus principis precipue; hoc autem est uirtus in actu, et non uirtus in potentia et secundum inclinationem tantum. Sed nobilitas non est uirtus nisi solum secundum inclinationem: sicut enim 20 iracundia descendit a patribus, ut dicitur 7º Ethicorum, ita et nobilitas. Dictum enim est in 1º quod bonus non generat sibi similem in actu uirtutis, sed solum secundum dispositiones corporales generans naturale assimilat sibi genitum. Et, cum ille solum sint ut instrumenta uel organa operationum uirtuosorum et habeant se sicut quedam inclinationes ad 25 opera, ideo bonus secundum uirtutem in actu generat uirtuosum solum in potentia; actu autem non, quia actus uirtutum fit ex operatione et consuetudine, que non propagantur a patribus in filios nisi in potentia et inclinatione quadam. Oportet autem principem perfectam habere uirtutem moralem, ut 30 dictum est in hoc libro; perfectum autem non est nisi in actu; ergo in distributione principatus non debet attendi per se nisi ad uirtutem in actu. Sed nobilitas est tantum uirtus in potentia; ergo per se non debet distribui principatus secundum ingenuitatem. Per accidens tamen potest fieri respectus ad ingenuitatem et ex conse- 35 quenti. Cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis intendit aliquem finem, intendere debet ad ea que in finem sunt et per que extollitur ille finis et augetur; sed distributio principatus primo et per se intendit uirtutem in actu, quam nata est condecorare nobilitas et augmentare, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; et ideo per consequens ad ingenuitatem est inspiciendum. Minor etiam 40

23 naturale] naturales P 40 ad] in P 13 nobiles…14 sunt] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b16-17 et 19-21 1 5 sicut…diuitiis] cf. q. praec. 20 nobilitas…inclinationem] cf. infra, IV, qq. 11-12 2 1 iracundia…patribus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.6, 1149b8-13 22 Dictum…24 genitum] cf. supra, I, q. 16, ll. 38- 69 30 Oportet…moralem] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (55), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277b25-26; cf. supra, III, q. 8, ll. 27-34 3 8 uirtutem…39 augmentare] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.5, 1100b26-27; cf. etiam I.4, 1099a31-b4

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declaratur per PHILOSOPHUM, 1º Magnorum Moralium, ubi dicit quod non omnis qui eligit esse sanus est sanus, sed oportet ut ad hoc naturalem dispositionem et inclinationem habeat; et tunc, si eligat, et cum hoc naturaliter sit ad hoc dispositus, perfecte erit sanus. Similiter est a parte : non omnis enim qui eligit esse uirtuosus propter hoc est uirtuosus, sed oportet ut ad hoc naturaliter inclinetur. Nam, cum ipse naturaliter dispositus ad uirtutem, si eligat esse uirtuosus necesse est eum fieri optimum. Nam ex inclinatione naturali habet potentiam et ex electione actum, et talis inclinatio nobilitas; ergo ipsa augmentat uirtutem et 50 promouet, et ideo intantum ad eam inspiciendum est. Hoc autem est ex consequenti et per accidens, quia non est necessarium semper sic dispositum fieri uirtuosum: quod enim est per accidens non est necessarium, ut dicitur 8º Phisicorum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod per se debet inspici ad uirtutem in | P 297rb 55 actu; et ideo, cum nobilitas sit uirtus tantum in potentia, non debet ad eam inspici nisi per accidens. Ad secundam dicendum quod oportet inspicere ad honorabilitatem que est secundum excellentiam uirtutis in actu; ingenuitas autem honorabilis est non propter uirtutem in actu, sed tantum propter uirtutem 60 in potentia, ut uisum est. < Q U E S TIO 2 0 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m d i s t r i b u e n d u s s i t p r i n c i p a t u s s e c u n d u m excellentiam p otentie Arguitur quod sic, quia secundum hoc et ad hoc inspiciendo debet distribui principatus sine quo non contingit recte principari; sed sine 5 potentia non contingit bene principari; ergo ad potentiam inspiciendum est et secundum eam debet distribui principatus. Minor patet quia non est 4 1 declaratur] primo add. sed exp. P 5 1 semper sic] inv. sed corr. P 5 3 Phisicorum] ethicorum P 2 0 ,1 Consequenter] deinde B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | inspiciendo] inspiciendum B 4 sed…5 principari] iter. B 6 est2] om. B 4 1 non…42 sanus2] Arist., Mag. Mor. I.17, 1189a8-10, ubi tamen asseritur: “nullus eligit sanus esse, sed secundum sanitatem eligimus ambulare, currere; volumus autem fines: sani esse 5 2 quod…necessarium] Auct. Arist., Phys. VIII (212), p. 157; Arist., Phys. enim volumus” VIII.5, 256b9-10 2 0 ,1 Consequenter…2 potentie] cf. Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283b20-23

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bene principari nisi coherceantur inobedientes et prohibeantur impugnantes; hoc autem fit per potentiam. Contra: ad illud non debet inspici in distributione principatus quod est principium mouendi secundum impetum et sine uirtute; sed potentia est 10 tale principium; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia potentia assimilatur habitibus naturalibus, de quibus dicitur, 6º Ethicorum, quod impetuose mouent se.

Dicendum, sicut de prioribus sepe dictum est, quod per se non est inspiciendum ad potentiam. Cuius ratio est quia ad illud primo et per se 15 inspiciendum est in distributione principatus per quod princeps per se et primo recte operatur, quia illud est finis, scilicet recte operari. Per uirtutes autem primo et per se aliquis bene et recte operatur, quibus non contingit male uti, per potentiam autem non, nisi tunc potentia per uirtutes fuerit regulata, quod tamen est ipsi ex consequenti et per accidens; ergo non 20 inspiciendum ad potentiam per se et primo. Item, ad illud non est inspiciendum quo contingit non bene uti, sed per se inspiciendum ad illud quo nullo modo contingit male uti: per hoc enim aliquis per se recte operatur et primo, quia quod per se inest alicui, hoc non contingit aliter se habere; sed potentia est uti ad contrarium, ut dicitur 25 1º huius; ergo non est ad eam inspiciendum per se. B 68va

Per accidens tamen possibile est inspici | ad eam. Cuius ratio est quia, intendens finem, necessario cointendit et ea sine quibus non bene est finis, sicut natura non inclinat in finem nisi simul inclinet in ea per que finis natus est haberi uel disponi; sed non contingit principari bene nisi coher- 30 ceantur inobedientes et aduersarii repellantur; ergo, cum hoc fiat per

13 mouent] secundum add. B 1 8 aliquis] per add. sed exp. P 2 0 non] est add. B 22 est] ibi add. B | contingit non] inv. sed corr. P 23 illud] quod add. sed exp. P | illud quo] quod B 24 primo] et add. P | inest alicui] inv. B 28 necessario] om. B | ea sine] illa fine B | quibus] est add. sed exp. P 3 0 nisi] ubi P non B 11 potentia…13 se] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1144b4-14 14 sicut…est1] cf., qq. praec., e.g., q. 18, ll. 23-31, 36-41, 53-56, 80- 82 et q. 19, ll. 15-20, 33-34 1 7 Per…19 uti] cf. supra, III, q. 18, ll. 26-30 cum adn. 2 5 potentia…contrarium] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a33-35, ubi tamen asseritur: “saevissima enim iniustitia habens arma: homo autem habens arma nascitur prudentia et virtute, quibus ad contraria est uti maxime” (ed. Susemihl, p. 10, ll. 9-11) 2 9 natura…30 disponi] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-21; Arist., De Part. An. I.1, 639b24- 640a1

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potentiam, ad eam inspiciendum est. Sed quia hoc non fit bene per potentiam per se et absolute, nisi per rationem et uirtutem reguletur, quod ei accidit, ideo dicendum quod inspiciendum est ad eam per accidens et ex 35 consequenti. Et hoc intelligendum est ubi principatus non sibi sufficit in potentia ad ista; si enim sufficeret, tunc nullo modo inspicere oporteret | P 297va ad potentiam.

Ad rationem dicendum quod ad illud sine quo non potest principari inspiciendum est sicut ad aliud sine quo non bene fit finis: hoc autem 40 est inspicere per accidens et ex consequenti. Et aduertendum quia, sicut dictum est, ad uirtutem et prudentiam per se et primo inspiciendum est; cuius ratio est quia, intendentibus finem, per se et primo inspiciendum est ad ea que per se et primo sunt principia ad illum finem ducentia, quod probatur quia a fine sumitur ratio et necessitas 45 eorum que ad finem. Sed in electione principis et distributione principatus intenditur finis ille qui est recta operatio secundum rationem: hoc enim appetunt eligentes, ut princeps recte operetur. Recta autem operatio principis est recte dirigere subditos in finem principatus uel politie, et ista operatio non fit sine prudentia et uirtute politica: ista enim sunt que per se 50 necessario illum finem inducunt, propter quod etiam non contingit ea ad alium finem ducere nec uti. Et ideo, secundum rationem sumptam ex fine, ex quo appetitur ille finis, scilicet recte operari, tunc per se et primo non contingit ad alia inspicere quam ad prudentiam et uirtutem. Ad alia autem inspiciendum est per consequens et per accidens, scilicet 55 inquantum illa proficiunt ad istam operationem uel subseruiunt; hoc enim accidit illis per uirtutem, scilicet regulari: hoc enim eis aduenit ab extrinseco, et iterum eorum usum restringit et non permittit eis uti secundum se in toto suo modo. Hec autem subseruiunt ad hanc principis operationem uel

3 6 enim] sibi add. B 3 8 non] bene add. B 3 9 aliud] illud B 4 0 inspicere] scrips. inspince P 4 2 cuius…43 est] om. per hom. P | intendentibus] incidentibus B 47 operetur] operatur P Recta autem] ita B 48 in] etiam B 50 etiam] et B 5 2 appetitur] apponitur B | finis] ad alia add. B 55 illa] alia B 5 6 accidit illis] illi accidit B | eis] accidit add. sed exp. B | aduenit] scilicet add. B 5 8 operationem] om. B 3 2 quia…35 consequenti] cf. Boethium Dacum, QQ. Top. III, q. 19 ( Vtrum potestas sine prudentia sit eligenda): “sublata prudentia potestas actionis non est regulata. Ex potentia autem per prudentiam non regulata causantur mala” (ed. Green-Pedersen–Pinborg, p. 193, ll. 10-12) 4 1 sicut…42 est1] cf. supra, III, q. 15, ll. 33--34 et q. 18, ll. 28-30 4 4 a…45 finem] cf. supra, Prohemium, ll. 52-53 cum adn.

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ad habitum – ut nobilitas, que augmentat habitum uirtutis et firmat – uel quantum ad actum – ut diuitie et potentia, per que multa expediuntur in 60 ciuilitate, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum –. Et ideo, per consequens et per accidens, inspiciendum est ad ista et uniuersaliter ad omnia que meliorem faciunt uirtutem et que condecoratum sunt felicitatis, ut sunt pulcritudo et robur. Ad pulcritudinem quidem, quia princeps per pulcritudinem plus erit gratiosus et per consequens magis dilectus; hoc autem faciet ei ciues 65 magis obedire; dicit enim EUSTRATIUS, super 1um Ethicorum: sic specie turpissimo non facile homines obediunt, accipiunt enim fidem ab exterioribus, ut foris turpem non facile credent anima esse bonum. Ad robur autem, inquantum per hoc ad bellica magis disponitur, ita ut ab errantibus timeatur. 70 < Q UE S T I O 2 1 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a l i q u i s e x ce d e n s o m n e s a l i o s i n a l i q u o b o no si t p o ne nd u s e ss e no n c iu is Arguitur quod non, quia, ut dicitur in alia Facultate, nemo de bono suo debet reportare incommodum; sed excedere in bonis est bonum 5 et illi et aliis; ergo propter hoc non debet priuari ciuilitate. P 297vb

Item, si eo ipso quod aliquis excedit in bonis propter excessum debet poni non ciuis, tunc | econtrario propter defectum aliquis deficiens merebitur esse ciuis: nam, si oppositum in opposito, et cetera; consequens est falsum; ergo et antecedens. 5 9 augmentat…uirtutis] augmentum uirtutis augmentat P 6 3 condecoratum] condecoratam B 64 plus] post B 6 5 ciues] eo add. B 6 6 dicit] ut B 6 7 turpissimo] turpissimus B | non] autem P 68 non] nec B 69 per…bellica] ad bellum B 2 1 ,1 omnes] om. P 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | ut dicitur] om. B 4 sed] si P | bonis] hominis B 5 et2] om. B 7 debet poni] inv. B | tunc…propter] sunt contrario et propter B | aliquis] aliquid B 8 merebitur] uidebitur P consequens] autem add. B 60 diuitie…61 ciuilitate] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a33-b1 6 3 que…64 robur] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.5, 1100b26-27; cf. etiam I.4, 1099a31-b4 66 sic…68 bonum] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 12, ad 1099b2-6 (ed. Mercken, p. 142, ll. 19-22 et 29-33) 21 ,1 Consequenter…2 ciuis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.13, 1284a3- 8; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12: “ideo intendit inquirere, si inueniretur unus uel plures in ciuitate, qui excederent omnes alios in uirtute, utrum expediret istum uel istos dominari” (ed. Lanza, p. 96, ll. 31-33) 3 nemo…4 incommodum] significatur, istis verbis, regula iuris quae valde nota erat. Cf. etiam Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 73, art. 10, arg. 1: “nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare” (ed. Leon. VII, p. 34) 8 oppositum…cetera] Auct. Arist., Top. IV (60), p. 326; Arist., Top. IV.3, 124a9

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Contra: ciuitas est communicatio similium et equalium, saltim secundum aliquem modum et in eo quod ciues. Si ergo sit aliquis longe dissimilis aliis, ille non erit ciuis illius ciuitatis; sed talis est excedens alios in bonis, ut uel in diuitiis uel potentia uel uirtute; hec enim faciunt eum esse dissimilem in eo quod ciuis: semper enim uel plus ualet uel debebit habere de 15 principatu.

10

Item, nullus est ciuis qui non subest legi; sed excedens non subest legi; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia excedens, secundum uirtutem saltim, non subest legi, immo ultra legem: sapiens enim lex est sibi ipsi, ut dicitur libro Ethicorum, et esse ultra legem, hoc meretur talis iuste qui est excedens in 20 uirtute. Aliquando autem excedens, scilicet in diuitiis uel potentia, hoc uiolenter sibi usurpat. Et ideo, qualitercumque aliquis sit supra legem, B 68vb semper non erit ciuis illius | ciuitatis.

Dicendum quod excedens in aliquo bono principali omnes alios non debet esse ciuis illius ciuitatis. Cuius ratio est quia, quando species et ratio 25 aliquorum consistit in quadam proportione, si aliquid fuerit quod excedat illam proportionem, illud non attinget ad formam et speciem illam. Quod patet: nam forma mixti consistit in quadam proportione miscibilium, et ideo, si aliquod illorum excedat illam proportionem, ut ignis, iam non in illis saluabitur ratio et species illius mixti, ut animalis uel plante, unde et

12 aliis] et add. B | illius…bonis] om. P | alios] aliquid B 13 faciunt] facient B 1 6 non1] est add. P | non2] ut P 18 immo] est add. B 1 9 legem] sapiens enim lex add. sed forsan exp. B 2 0 Aliquando] alii B | in diuitiis] om. B 2 1 usurpat] usurpant PB 2 2 semper non] similiter illud P | ciuitatis] ciuis sed corr. P 2 3 Dicendum…24 ciuitatis] om. per hom. P 2 6 et] ad add. B | illam2] om. P 2 8 aliquod] aliquis P | ut] non B 29 ratio…species] et ratio B | mixti] non add. B 10 ciuitas…equalium] verbis valde his similibus utitur Petrus in loco illo Scripti ubi loquitur 17 excedens…20 de relegatione: cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12 (ed. Lanza, p. 103, l. 236) uirtute] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12: “Sed talibus, qui sic excedunt alios in uirtute, non datur lex: ipsi enim sunt sibi lex” (ed. Lanza, p. 98, ll. 78-79) 18 sapiens…ipsi] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.8, 1128a32 2 7 forma…29 plante] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 328a25-31. Clarius argumentum huic simile invenitur in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 17: “... patet quia, quod mixtum quodcumque consistat in quadam proportione quatuor elementorum ad inuicem, illud quod excellit proportionem debitam illorum non dicitur mixtum, sed magis corpus (cod.: corpore) aliquod simplex et, cum unumquodque elementorum consistat in debita proportione primarum qualitatum, sicut aqua consistit in debita proportione humidi et frigidi, et ignis in debita proportione calidi et sicci, et aer in debita proportione calidi et humidi, et terra in debita proportione frigidi et sicci, illud quod excellit proportionem illarum primarum qualitatum ad inuicem non participat essentiam nec rationem elementi alicuius” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 30vb)

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tamdiu manet mixtum et forma saluatur quamdiu proportio illa non 30 corrumpitur; hoc autem fieret si unum eorum excederet. Forma autem ciuis in ordine et proportione quadam existit, scilicet ciuium inter se et etiam ad principantem: dicitur enim ratio ciuis non absolute, sed in respectu ad politiam. Politia autem ordo quidam est quorundam proportionem certam habentium. Ergo, si aliquis fuerit hanc proportionem propter habundantiam alicuius boni excedens, hic iam non erit ciuis illius politie: ut, si in diuitiis excedat, amplius non est ciuis in oligarchia, si in uirtute non iam erit ciuis in aristocratia, sicut in simili dicimus in amicitia. Amicitia enim consistit in quadam proportione et similitudine aliquorum ad inuicem, 8º Ethicorum, et manente similitudine eorum, saltim secundum hoc secundum quod est amicitia, manet et amicitia, si autem aliquis illorum excedat illam proportionem, non amplius durabit amicitia. Vnde dicitur, 8º Ethicorum, quod amicus non debet uelle amico maxima bona, tunc enim destrueretur amicitia, etiam si excederet in uirtute: hic enim excedens ad excedentem se haberet in alia habitudine, ut forte cui prius exhibuit fauorabilem et equalem amorem, modo exhibere habeat reuerentiam et inequalem honorem, ideo dissoluitur amicitia et, saltim prioris amicitie modo, non manet amicus. Similiter dicendum est de ciue: et sic patet quod multum excedens aliquis alios ciues non est ponendus esse ciuis. P 298ra

35

40

45

50

Si autem queratur ulterius utrum talis a ciuitate sit expellendus, dicendum quod in politiis | transgressis expellendus est in quocumque excedat, et hoc dico attendendo ad bonam saluationem illius politie. Cuius ratio est quia ille est expellendus a ciuitate, qui manens, corrumperet ciuilitatem; sed talis est potens ualde in democratia, uel excedens in diuitiis in oligar- 55

3 0 non] om. P 31 fieret] fient B 3 2 ciuis] et ratio add. B 3 3 ratio] finis add. sed exp. P scrips. nic B 3 5 si] certe add. P | hanc] habeat B 37 non…ciuis2] om. B 39 in amicitia] praem. in uirtute PB 4 0 8º] praem. ut dicitur B | similitudine2] aliquorum add. B 4 1 saltim] scilicet illam B 4 3 dicitur] in add. B | 8º] 9 PB 4 5 hic] licet PB | excedentem] praem. ex B 4 6 cui] ciui P | exhibuit] inhibuit P 4 7 amorem…inequalem] om. per hom. B 4 9 aliquis] aliquos B 5 1 expellendus] repellendus B | dicendum] est add. B 5 3 bonam saluationem] bonum saluatorum B 54 corrumperet] corrumpet B 32 Forma…33 principantem] de hoc quod hic asseritur de ordine civium inter se et ad principantem cf. supra, II, q. 1, ll. 36-38, 45- 48 et infra, VI, q. 7, ll. 10-26. Vide etiam V, q. 7, ll. 22-24 3 3 dicitur…34 politiam] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b30-31; cf. etiam supra, III, q. 4, ll. 8-9 et q. 6, ll. 50-51 3 4 Politia…est] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 39 Amicitia…43 amicitia] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.5, 1158b23-35; cf. etiam IX.1, 1163b32-33 43 amicus…44 amicitia] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.5, 1159a7-12

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chia. Tales enim, cum uirtute non regulentur, necessario illas politias destruerent: uellent enim omnibus principari ad bonum proprium, non commune, cum principatus ibi attendatur secundum potentiam uel diuitias. Si autem excederet in uirtute, iterum uellet eas politias destruere, 60 quia dicit EUSTRATIUS, 5º Ethicorum, quod bonus non est qui uult manere mala, et ideo, uirtute habundans, niteretur dissipare illas politias, cum sint male. Et ideo talis a ciuitate illa eiciendus esset. In rectis autem politiis excedens in diuitiis uel potentia eadem ratione expellendus est, quia corrumperet ciuilitatem bene ordinatam; et ideo dixit 65 PHILOSOPHUS, in 2º, quod in ciuilitate bene ordinata non est permittendum ciuem ditari quantumcumque contingit. Si autem excedat in uirtute non est expellendus a politia bene ordinata. Cuius ratio est quia in bona politia non debet expelli ille qui est regula totius politie: bene enim regulati finis est politie bene ordinate; uirtuosus autem ualde regula est totius 70 politie; ergo et cetera. Item, non est expellendus a politia qui intendit salutem politie; sed uirtuosus ualde precipue intendet salutem politie, immo ad hoc operabitur eam dirigendo; ergo ut amicus attrahendus est, non expellendus. 75

Item, talis se habet in politia bona sicut prima causa in toto uniuerso; hec autem non est eicienda ab uniuerso propter excessum suum; ergo nec iste. Intelligendum tamen quod rationem ciuis subiecti habere non debet. Ergo, cum nullus sit ciuis nisi uel subiectus uel princeps, sequitur quod erit

56 Tales] talis P | regulentur] reguletur P 5 8 cum] tum B 59 diuitias] praem. potentias sed exp. B | eas] illas B | destruere] destrueretur B 6 0 5º] 2 PB | non] est ut P 6 2 ideo] terminum add. B 6 3 uel] in B 64 ordinatam…65 bene] om. per hom. B 6 7 est1] om. B 6 8 ille] illi B 7 1 Item] iterum B 72 salutem] bone add. B 7 4 Item] iterum B 75 hec…uniuerso] om. per hom. B 7 6 iste] iuste B 77 tamen] est add. B 60 bonus…61 mala] Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1130b29: “Nullus enim amat bonum et manere uult praua” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va-b) 6 5 in2…66 contingit] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a21-27 sed etiam 1266b17-19; cf. supra, II, q. 14 7 4 talis…76 iste] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12: “illum oportet magis principari qui magis accedit ad principatum naturalem et ad principatum uniuersi; sed iste, qui sic excedit omnes alios in uirtute est huiusmodi ... Iterum in uniuerso est unus princeps: principatus autem uniuersi unus et optimus est. Quare ille in ciuitate qui magis unus et melior est accedit magis ad similitudinem principatus uniuersi et naturalis” (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 223-225, 228-231)

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princeps, quia excedit. Insuper erit princeps perpetuus. Cuius ratio est quia causa quare sunt ciues aliquando principes et aliquando non, est imperfec- 80 tio eorum; unde tunc et tamdiu aliquis principatur ex ciuibus, quando et quamdiu est perfectior aliis secundum statum talis negotii. Ergo, si aliquis est perfectissimus, secundum perpetuum et firmum habitum | uirtutis excedens omnes alios, hoc erit talis ut principetur: aptus natus enim est ut omnes ei letanter obediant et princeps sit perpetuus ciuitatis. 85

Ad rationes dicendum quod excedentem in bonis aliquibus non esse conciuem minorum et inequalium non est eius incommodum, sed commodum et utile: sic enim non oportet ipsum subesse legibus inferiorum.

P 298rb

Ad secundam dicendum quod in moralibus, cum ambo extrema sunt mala, in ipsis non tenebit locus iste “si oppositum | in opposito” et 90 cetera, ita ut, si unum sit malum, quod reliquum extremum bonum: ambo enim sunt mala, sed bene tenet inter unum eorum et uirtutem. Et notandum quod adhuc magis ille qui deficeret posset esse ciuis quam qui excedit: excessus enim magis opponitur medio ciuilitatis quam defectus; defectus enim non per se corrumptiuus est ordinis sicut 95 excessus, et ideo potius eiciendus est excedens quam deficiens.

7 9 ratio] causa sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 80 sunt] sui PB | imperfectio] perfectio B 8 4 principetur] princeps P 8 5 ei letanter] enim loquantur B 8 7 conciuem] continere B 90 sunt] sint B 9 1 extremum] sit add. B 9 3 Et] ut add. B 9 4 excedit] excederet B 95 non] ut P 9 6 quam] quod P 7 9 Cuius…85 ciuitatis] verbis similibus, hoc etiam invenitur in Petri Scripto III.12: “iterum, non est assumendus ad principatum sicut alii, ut quandoque principetur quandoque non: simile enim esset ac si uellemus principari Iouem aliquando et aliquando non: hoc enim derisorium est. Et ideo relinquitur quod, cum talis sit optimus, quod dignum et iustum est quod omnes sibi letanter obediant et ut sit rex uel, si sint tales plures, quod sint reges et principantes, non aliquando sic aliquando non, sed semper” (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 210-216); cf. etiam VII.10: “Et ideo si inueniatur aliquis unus in ciuitate uel regno qui omnibus istis superexcellat alios, iustum est ipsum principari solum, quamdiu est talis ... manifestum est quod melius est semper eosdem in tota uita, hos quidem esse principantes – scilicet excellentiores –, hos autem esse subiectos – scilicet deficientes –. Excellentius enim et perfectius, quamdiu est huiusmodi, natum est principari ei quod deficit secundum naturam respectu illius” (ibid., p. 536, ll. 356-358, 370-374) 84 aptus…85 ciuitatis] Arist., Pol. III.13, 1284b32-34

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< Q U E S TIO 2 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u tr u m m e l i u s s i t c i u i t a te m r e g i o p t i m o u i r o u e l l e g ib u s Arguitur quod legibus, quia melius est eo regi ciuitatem quod est sine passionibus coniunctis quam quod est passionibus coniunctum; passio 5 enim peruertit iudicium et per consequens politiam et prudentiam: 6º Ethicorum. Lex autem non habet passiones sibi coniunctas, uir autem optimus adhuc habebit passiones coniunctas, quia difficile uel omnino impossibile est humanam animam separare a passionibus, ut hic dictum est. Lex autem non habet passiones, tum quia non habet appetitum, tum 10 quia est uniuersalis; passiones autem sunt circa singularia; ergo melius est ciuitatem regi legibus quam uiro bono. Item, melius est eo regi ciuitatem quod non corrumpitur quam eo quod corrumpitur; modo lex non corrumpitur, nec potestate nec pretio, uir autem bonus adhuc possibilis est corrumpi; ergo et cetera. 15

Contra: melius est eo regi ciuitatem quod per se attingit ad rationem rectam magis, quam eo quod minus attingit et per accidens; uir autem optimus per se et magis attingit ad rationem rectam quam lex: lex enim non attingit nisi per accidens, inquantum participat rationem ab instituente.

Item, melius est eo regi ciuitatem qui uniuersaliter de omnibus iudicat; 20 talis est uir optimus, lex autem non: particularia enim lege non determinantur; ergo et cetera. 2 2, 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | est1] et add. B | eo] correxi ex infra, ll. 12, 15 et 19: om. P et B 4 coniunctis] communitatis P | passionibus2] passioni P 5 prudentiam] ut add. B 6 uir…7 coniunctas] om. per hom. P 1 0 sunt] om. B 1 4 possibilis] possibile B 1 6 et1] suppl. ex ll. 16-17 et 37-39 1 7 rationem rectam] inv. B | lex2…18 attingit] non autem attingit lex B 1 9 qui] quod B 2 2, 1 Consequenter…2 legibus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286a8-9; cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.29 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 531-534) 3 Arguitur…11 bono] verbis similibus hoc etiam invenitur in Scripto; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “melius est ciuitatem regi ab eo qui non habet passiones coniunctas quam ab eo qui naturaliter habet eas, quia passiones peruertunt iudicium rationis ... Sed lex non habet passiones coniunctas, homo autem habet” (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 42- 45) 4 passio…5 prudentiam] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b13-16 7 difficile…8 passionibus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286a16-20; eadem verba ex Aristotelis Politica inveniuntur in quaestione quadam Radulphi Britonis, ad eadem defendenda quae hic Petrus statuit; cf. Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. V, q. 17 (ed. Costa, p. 457, ll. 52-53) 19 melius…21 determinantur] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “ab eo melius est ciuitatem regi qui potest terminare casus omnes emergentes. Sed hoc non potest lex, quia lex non dicit nisi uniuersale, nihil autem de particulari: particularia autem infinita sunt et non possunt apprehendi. Item lex non ordinat quod dicit ad ea que emergunt” (ed. Lanza, p. 115, ll. 18-22)

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Dicendum quod uir bonus dicitur a uirtute, que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit. Ergo uir optimus dicetur ab optima uirtute. Hec autem est prudentia politica, cui coherent necessario omnes uirtutes morales, et uir optimus dicetur ille qui, habens prudentiam politicam, habet etiam omnes alias uirtutes. Habens autem illas, adhuc remanet possibilis ad passionem, quia necessario oportet ei sensum inesse, aliter non intelligeret nec homo esset; et si sensum necesse, et erit ei inesse appetitum. Appetitus autem possibilis est ad passiones, quia passio est motus appetitus sub fantasia boni uel mali. Et ideo uir optimus, quantumcumque sit perfectus, tamen possibilis est ad passiones. P 298va

25

30

Lex autem | est propositio quedam uniuersalis de hiis que ordinantur in finem, secundum rationem finis ordinata. Hic autem ordo de agibilibus necessario est secundum rationem rectam politicam prudentiam simpliciter. Et ideo aliqualiter per idem determinantur uir optimus et lex, 35 scilicet a ratione recta optima et a prudentia politica. Sed est differentia, quia homo bonus perfectius et magis attingit ad illam prudentiam politicam et essentialiter, lex autem mediante institutore et per accidens et minus. Et iterum homo bonus per rationem rectam et prudentiam potest bene iudicare de omnibus, uniuersalibus et particularibus: potest enim 40 applicare rationem ad x particulares casus; lex autem, cum sit propositio uniuersalis, hoc non potest, immo solum uniuersalia iudicat secundum rationem finis uniuersalis; particularia autem relinquit prudentie iudicis determinanda.

22 et…23 opus] inv. P 2 5 habens] hominis B 26 remanet] manet B 2 8 necesse et] necessarie etiam B 3 2 quedam] quodam B | uniuersalis] que add. P 3 3 autem] est add. B 3 4 et] suppl. ex infra, l. 36 | politicam] autem add. P que add. B 39 potest…40 bene] inv. B 4 4 determinanda] determinata P 22 Dicendum…26 uirtutes] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “bonus uir dicitur aliquis a uirtute: uirtus enim est que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit; ergo ab ea que principalis est inter eas dicetur uir simpliciter bonus” (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 19-22); III.14: “sed hoc potest facere optimus uir per prudentiam suam: habet enim rectum iudicium de agibilibus et appetitum rectum per uirtutem moralem” (ibid., p. 115, ll. 22-24) | uirtute…23 reddit] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (37), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106a15-24 24 prudentia…25 morales] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1144b30-32 et 1145a1- 6 2 9 passio…30 mali] Anonymus, In II Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1105b19-1106a4 (ed. Mercken, p. 212, ll. 5-7); eadem fons in loco illo Scripti eodem argumento dicato affertur; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “Est enim passio motus appetitus sub fantasia boni uel mali. Sed lex non habet passiones coniunctas, homo autem habet” (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 44-45) 3 2 Lex…33 ordinata] cf. supra, II, q. 9, ll. 18-20

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Cum ergo queritur utrum melius sit ciuitatem regi lege uel uiro optimo, dico quod, si loquamur de eis de quibus lex determinat, tunc melius per se est regi ciuitatem uiro optimo quam legibus. Et hoc dico per se. Cuius ratio est quia per se melius est regi ciuitatem eo quod per se ad rationem rectam et prudentiam attingit quam quod non, cum regimen et iudicium per se 50 sint a ratione; sed uir optimus per se et essentialiter ad prudentiam attingit, lex autem non, nisi per accidens; ergo et cetera. 45

Per accidens tamen melius est eam regi legibus. Cuius ratio est quia melius est per accidens eo regi ciuitatem quod omnino caret passione quam quod, saltim per accidens, habet sibi passiones coniunctas. Bonus 55 autem uir possibilis est ad passionem, lex autem non, tum quia non habet appetitum, tum | etiam quia est circa uniuersalia solum; passio autem est B 69rb singularium, ut dicitur 7º Ethicorum. Si uero loquamur de eis que lex non determinat, scilicet de singularibus, tunc omnino necesse est regi eam uiro bono et non lege. Cuius ratio 60 est quia oportet illo regi ciuitatem in singularibus casibus qui iudicare potest de illis: hoc autem potest uir bonus et non lex, et ideo oportet uiro bono regi in illis. Et non est dicere quod melius sit regi ‘tunc’ uiro bono quam legibus, quia sic dicendo relinqueretur quod aliquo modo bonum esset regi ciuitatem lege in talibus casibus, quia comparabilia conueniunt 65 in eo in quo comparantur, ad minus in specie illius. Nunc autem legi omnino hoc non contingit, et ideo nullo modo bonum est ‘tunc’ regi ciuitatem lege, | propter quod nulla omnino est comparatio legis et uiri boni in P 298vb talibus casibus. Et ideo etiam lex de illis nullo modo determinat.

70

Ad rationes patet solutio, quia prime rationes ostendunt bene quod in eis que lege determinant, per accidens melius est ciuitatem regi legibus quam uiro bono; secunde autem quia per se melius sit in illis 4 7 uiro optimo] inv. B 48 eo] et P | se2] ad rationem et cetera add. P 4 9 cum] causa B regimen] regimine B 5 0 sint] sic B 52 eam] causa B 5 4 passiones] sibi add. P | coniunctas] om. B 5 5 tum] om. P 5 6 etiam] om. B 5 7 ut dicitur] om. P 60 illo regi] ille B 6 1 hoc…62 illis] post oportet illo regi l. 60 transp., sed non totidem verbis: hoc uir bonus et non lex et ideo oportet uiro bono regi in illis P 62 melius] cum add. B 63 relinqueretur] requireretur P 6 4 quia] quod B 66 omnino…non] hoc non omnino B | ideo] om. P 6 7 lege] om. P omnino] anima B | comparatio] operatio B 68 de illis] post modo transp. B 7 1 secunde…73 bono] om. per hom. B | per se] s.l. P 56 passio…57 singularium] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.3, 1147b13-17 64 comparabilia…65 illius] cf. Arist., Phys. VII.4, 248b6-10 6 9 prime rationes] cf. supra, ll. 52-57 7 1 secunde] cf. supra, ll. 45-51

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regi ciuitatem uiro bono; et nulla rationum se intromittit de eo utrum melius sit regi lege uel uiro bono in illis que lege non determinantur, quia nulla est ibi comparatio omnino. < Q UE S T I O 2 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q ue r i t ur d e s u f f i c i e n t i a m o d o r u m r e g n i q ui b u s d i s t i n g u i t u r Et dicendum quod regnum est politia uoluntaria ubi unus principatur pluribus uoluntarie. Aut ergo principatur ad utilitatem suam uel ad utilita5 tem communem. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter, quia uel tunc secundum successionem generis uel secundum electionem. Si secundum successionem, sic est secundus modus, quo utebantur quidam barbari; si autem secundum electionem, sic tertius modus, quo utebantur Mitilenii, et uocabatur uni10 uersaliter tirannis. Si autem principetur ad utilitatem communem, hoc est dupliciter: uel enim est dominus uniuersaliter eorum que sunt intra et extra ciuitatem uel solum eorum que extra. Si secundo modo, sic est modus quo utebantur Laconii. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter: uel secundum uoluntatem suam in omnibus principabitur uel non in omnibus secundum uoluntatem 15

7 3 illis] hiis B | quia] quod P 2 3 ,2 distinguitur] coni.: differentie P dicitur B 6 quia uel] inv. B 8 quidam…9 utebantur] om. per hom. B 9 Mitilenii] mitileini P | et uocabatur] om. P 13 modus] praem. primus PB 1 4 Si] autem add. B 15 non] ut P 23 ,1 Consequenter…2 distinguitur] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1284b35-1285b33. De modis regni plenius Petrus agit in Scripto III.13 (ed. Lanza, p. 106, l. 18-p. 112, l. 193). Cf. etiam ibid. , ubi reducit modos supra adductos ad duos principales, prae quibus omnes alii medii sunt seu privationes eorum (ibid., p. 112, ll. 194-212) 6 hoc…7 electionem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285a15-16, ubi agitur de ducatu exercitus 7 secundum2…8 barbari] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285a16-24 et b23-25. Partim aliter in Scripto III.13, ubi Petrus asserit quod secundum istum modum “aliqui principabantur barbaris; et in isto principatu principabatur rex secundum successionem generis et secundum legem, et est principatus despoticus” (ed. Lanza, p. 111, ll. 176-178) 8 secundum…10 tirannis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285a29-b3 et 1285b25-26 1 3 secundo…14 Laconii] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285a1- 6 ubi tamen asseritur “qui enim in Laconica politia videtur quidem esse regnum maxime eorum quae secundum legem, non est autem dominans omnium, sed quando exierit regionem, dux est eorum quae ad bellum” (ed. Susemihl, p. 213, ll. 9-12) et 1285b26-28

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suam. Si secundo modo, sic est regnum heroycum. Si primo modo, sic est monarchia regalis primo et proprie accepta, de qua Philosophus hic intendit uel determinat. < Q U E S TIO 2 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m , i n q u i b u s le x n o n d e t e r m i n a t , m e l i u s s i t c i u i t at e m r e g i p l u r i b u s u e l u n o Arguitur quod uno, quia melius est eo regi ciuitatem qui minus dissentit; sed minus dissentit nec etiam omnino dissentit sibi, nisi 5 forte secundum diuersas partes anime, plures autem sibi dissentiunt; ergo melius est eam regi uno quam pluribus. Item, melius est unumquodque quanto magis accedit ad primum in illo genere, ergo melius est eum iudicare et regere qui magis accedit ad primum regens et iudicans; sed talis est unus; ergo et cetera: hic enim 10 magis accedit ad primam politiam, que est regnum, et ad primum regens totius uniuersi. Contra: illi magis est committendum iudicium qui magis est indifferens; sed plures sunt indifferentes magis quam unus; ergo plures | debent P 299ra 17 accepta] coni.: ecclesia P scrips. acca B | hic] om. P 2 4 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 sed… dissentit2] om. per hom. P 6 eam regi] inv. B 8 accedit] excedit B 1 0 accedit] accedet B 13 indifferentes magis] inv. B 16 secundo…heroycum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285b4-19 et 21-23. Vide etiam Petrum, Scriptum III.13, ubi asseritur quod quarta species monarchiae est secundum uirtutem heroycam: “in ista uero monarchia principabatur princeps uolentibus subditis; erat autem dominus in quibusdam determinatis, non in omnibus” (ed. Lanza, p. 111, ll. 171-173) | primo…18 determinat] cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285b29-33; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.13: “quinta species monarchie regalis est in qua est dominus omnium principans” (ed. Lanza, p. 112, ll. 186-187) 2 4, 1 Consequenter…2 uno] cf. Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286a24-25, sed potius Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “est dubitatio utrum in isto casu magis oporteat unum principari, in iudicando de particularibus de quibus non potest lex bene determinare, uel multos” (ed. Lanza, p. 116, ll. 62-64) 7 melius…8 genere] Auct. Arist., Top. III (50), p. 325; Arist., Top. III.2, 117b21; cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19, 31-32. Vide etiam Thomam, In Metaph. X.3: “Unde si in quolibet genere est unum id quod est primum, oportet quod album sit unum in genere colorum, et quasi mensura aliorum colorum; quia unusquisque color tanto perfectior est, quanto magis accedit ad album” (ed. Fiaccadori XX, p. 159) 1 2 illi…13 unus] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “per illum debet fieri iudicium, in tali casu qui non terminatur per legem, qui magis indifferens est respectu passionum; sed plures sunt magis indifferentes respectu passionum quam unus” (ed. Lanza, p. 117, ll. 97-100)

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regere. Maior patet quia, per hoc quod iudex magis fauet uni parti quam alii, peruertitur iudicium. Minor patet per similitudinem, quia multa aqua 15 indifferentius fluit ad omnes partes quam pauca. Item, melius est eum iudicare qui minus est corruptibilis; sed plures minus sunt corruptibiles uno; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod ad iudicium rectum exigitur consilium rectum secundum prudentiam, quia quilibet bene iudicat de eis que nouit, ut dicitur 1º 20 Ethicorum; secundo exigitur rectus appetitus, quem presupponit prudentia; et ideo ad iudicium duo requiruntur principaliter, scilicet recta cognitio et rectus appetitus circa iudicabilia. Hec autem duo difficile est habere iudicem, tum quia particularia sunt de quibus est iudicium – de particularibus autem non bene cognoscit ratio, intelligit enim illa non nisi per 25 conuersionem ad fantasmata, 3º De Anima –, tum quia mutabilia et indeterminata sunt: omne autem tale non proponitur iudicio rationis. Similiter difficile est de talibus habere rectum appetitum, quia passiones sunt circa particularia, 7º Ethicorum, et ideo dicitur, 2º Rhetorice, quod ira et gaudium et talia sunt circa particularia. Et hoc indiget experimento, 30 et ideo magis experti et magis indeterminatum habentes appetitum equaliter et iustius iudicant. Plures autem magis experti sunt, non ita quod singuli secundum se, sed omnes aggregati magis experti sunt experientia

15 similitudinem] in aliqua add. B 1 6 indifferentius] differentius P 1 7 eum] cum B 18 sunt corruptibiles] inv. B 19 rectum1] rationis B | rectum2] et rationem B 2 0 nouit] philosophus add. P 2 1 quem] qui P 2 2 principaliter] principia B | cognitio] coniunctio B 2 3 habere…24 iudicem] inv. B 2 6 conuersionem] conclusionem P | ad] super B | 3º] praem. ut dicitur B quia] particularia add. B 28 rectum] ratione B 29 7º] praem. ut dicitur B | dicitur] et add. B 3 0 Et] ideo add. P 3 3 experientia…34 sunt] om. per hom. B 15 multa…16 pauca] cf. Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286a32-33, sed etiam Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “plures magis sunt indifferentes respectu passionum turbantium et peruertentium iudicium rectum quam unus siue pauci, sicut aqua maior et amplior magis est indifferens ut 2 0 quilibet…nouit] Auct. fluat ad multa loca quam parua” (ed. Lanza, p. 117, ll. 86-89) 22 ad…23 iudicabilia] hoc Arist., Eth. Nic. I (3), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b27-28 argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh IIa-IIae, q. 60, art. 1, ad 1: “In omnibus tamen ad rectum iudicium duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ipsa virtus proferens iudicium. Et sic iudicium est actus rationis: dicere enim vel definire aliquid rationis est. Aliud autem est dispositio iudicantis, ex qua habet idoneitatem ad recte iudicandum ... Sic ergo iudicium est quidam actus iustitiae sicut inclinantis ad recte iudicandum: prudentiae autem sicut iudicium proferentis. Unde et synesis, ad prudentiam pertinens, dicitur bene iudicativa” (ed. Leon. IX, p. 25) 2 5 intelligit…26 fantasmata] Arist., De An. III.7, 431a17; III.8, 432a8-10 28 passiones…29 particularia] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.3, 1147b13-17 3 0 ira…particularia] cf. Arist., Rhet. II.2, 1378a30-34

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aggregata, et item magis indifferentes appetitu et minus corruptibiles sunt; propter quod, quia experientia cognitionem rectam eis tribuit, indifferentia autem appetitum ministrat rectum, ideo isti melius iudicant de particularibus in quibus lex non determinauit. Iudicium tamen horum, cum sit unanime, est in ordine ad unum, cuius ratio est quia iudicare est actus unius, et ideo oportet quod sit ab uno; ideo, si plures | iudicent uno iudicio, B 69va 40 hoc oportet esse inquantum sortiuntur rationem unius; hoc autem est si uno proferente hoc alii determinent, uel saltim in una sententia, tanquam ab uno proposita, consentiant. Sed quia in determinatione eorum dissensio fit, ut aliquando contingit, oportet ut concordentur dicta eorum, et ideo oportet unum ordinare et elicere ex dictis omnium iudicium unum. 45 Et ideo in hoc assimilantur iudicio, et ideo adhuc melius est iudicium committere pluribus quam uni, ubi lex non determinat. 35

Ad rationem dicendum quod unum non contingit sibi proprie dissentire nisi forte secundum partes anime diuersas, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum, | multos tamen contingit. Et licet in hoc unus multos excellat, multi P 299rb 50 tamen excellunt unum in maioribus, sicut in cognitione particularium per experimentum et in appetitu recto per indifferentiam. Hec autem essentialiter ad iudicium pertinent, et maius esset in defectu istorum periculum quam in dissensione, eo quod uerisimilius est plures in bono consentire quam dissentire: in agibilibus autem eligenda sunt illa in quibus pauciora 55 sunt pericula. Ad secundam dicendum quod plures, licet in deliberando et preconsiliando sint ut plures, tamen in proferendo iudicium tanquam unus fiunt per consensum, et ideo uni equipollent.

3 5 cognitionem] coniunctionem B 36 ideo] praem. et P 37 cum…38 unanime] causa sit inanime B 3 9 unius] unus B | quod] ut add. B | uno1] si add. sed exp. B 4 1 proferente] preferente B | determinent] determinant B 4 3 fit] fiat PB 4 5 iudicio] primi add. B 4 9 unus] om. P 50 excellunt] excellant P | cognitione] coniunctione B 5 1 in] inde B 53 uerisimilius] scrips. iñ similius B 5 6 secundam] rationem add. B 5 7 unus] minus B 5 8 consensum] sensum P 4 7 unum…48 diuersas] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.11, 1138b10-11

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< Q UE S T I O 2 5 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m m e l i u s s i t r e g e m u e l p r i n c i p e m a s s u m i p e r g e n e r at i o n e m u e l e l e c t i o n e m Arguitur quod per electionem, quia oportet principem esse optimum; oportet enim ipsum perfectam habere uirtutem moralem, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum. Per illam ergo uiam melius est assumi principem per quam 5 contingit semper meliorem inueniri; sed hec uia est electio: electio enim est diu deliberatiua, et ideo querit optimum; ergo melius est principem assumi per electionem quam per generis successionem. Item, dicitur quod maxima committere fortune periculosum est, sed principatus est maximum, ergo eum committere fortune periculosum 10 est; hoc autem fit si assumatur semper princeps per successionem generis; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia a casu est, nec est necessarium semper bonum succedere bono. Contra: melius est per illam uiam assumi principem per quam contingit illum uniformius assumi principatui primo; sed hoc est si per successio- 15 nem assumatur. Quod patet: in primo enim principatu est semper unus et idem; filius autem, licet non in numero sit idem patri, tamen in consuetudinibus et moribus plurium similis est; ergo melius est principem assumi per uiam successionis generis quam per electionem.

25 ,2 electionem] Egidius tenet quod per add. in marg., probabiliter alia manus; aliqua desunt: folio reciso, tantum hoc legi potest P 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 7 querit] queritur B 15 principatui] principatu B | successionem] semper add. B 1 6 est…unus] semper est unus finis B 18 moribus] mor debet B 1 9 successionis] om. P 25 , 1 Consequenter…2 electionem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286b22-27; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.5 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 461- 465) 3 oportet…4 moralem] iunguntur hic loci distincti Vi libri, id est ille ubi princeps definitur custos iusti (“est autem princeps custos iusti”, Arist., Eth. Nic. V.6, 1134b1-2; AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 466, l. 8) et ille ubi asseritur quod iustitia est virtus perfecta (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.1, 1129b25-33) 1 7 filius…19 electionem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “filius autem est sicut alter pater, et ideo, sicut pater plus diligit se quam quemcumque alium, sic post se plus naturaliter diligit naturalem filium quam quemlibet alium, quare citius dimittet sibi regnum quam alicui alii. Et est intelligendum quod per se semper melius est assumi regem per electionem quam per successionem, sed per successionem melius est per accidens” (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 188-193)

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Dicendum quod principem oportet esse optimum; hoc autem est prudentia et uirtute. Per illam ergo uiam melius est assumi principem per quam semper potest melior assumi: sic enim magis accedet ad principatum primum, ubi semper principatur optimus; sed electio est talis uia; et ideo, quantum est de se et de ratione uie, sic semper melius est assumi princi25 pem per electionem. Cuius ratio est quia electio est appetitus preconsiliatus, et ideo de ratione electionis est esse secundum rationem deliberantem: sic autem contingit per se, inquantum est talis, semper per eam | inueniri P 299va meliorem; ergo melius est per se assumi principem per electionem quam per successionem.

20

Per accidens tamen melius est per successionem assumi. Et hoc patet considerando pericula utriusque. Primo ex parte successionis et in patre: nam, sicut dictum est 2º huius, proprium magis diligitur et magis sortitur cura. Modo pater, cum credit filium sibi in regno succedere, iam estimat regnum quasi proprium, quia proprium erit eius qui est pars eius, 35 et per consequens magis diliget et curabit regnum et bonum illius amplius operabitur.

30

Item, quod aliquis subiciatur alicui, ad hoc multum facit consuetudo, quia consueta delectant, insueta contristant, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice et 1º 2 3 primum] om. B 25 electio] om. B 30 tamen] autem B 3 1 pericula] particula B 32 est] in add. B | 2º] 3º PB 33 credit] curat B 3 4 quasi] quod P 3 8 delectant insueta] dilectant inconsueta autem B 2 1 Per…29 successionem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “melius est assumi principantem illo modo quo per se contingit ipsum accipi meliorem; sed per electionem contingit assumi meliorem quam per successionem generis, quia melior, ut in pluribus, inuenitur in tota multitudine quam sit unus, et electio per se est appetitus ratione determinatus” (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 194-197) 25 electio…preconsiliatus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112a15-16 et supra, I, q. 29, ll. 3- 4 cum adn. 3 1 ex…36 operabitur] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. III/2.5: “... naturaliter autem quilibet habet amicitiam ad seipsum: naturale est igitur tanto regem magis solicitari circa bonum regni, quanto credit ipsum regnum magis esse bonum suum et bonum proprium; quare si rex videat debere se principari super regnum non solum ad vitam, sed etiam per haereditatem in propriis filiis, magis reputabit bonum regni esse bonum suum, et ardentius solicitabitur circa tale bonum” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 462) 3 2 proprium…33 curam] Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-35; 3 7 Item…40 subici] hoc argumentum Auct. Arist., Pol. II (33), p. 254; cf. supra, II, q. 3 desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. III/2.5: “Tertia via sumitur ex parte populi qui debet per tale regimen gubernari. Nam consuetudo est quasi altera natura: propter quod regimina ex consuetudine efficiuntur quasi naturalia. Populus ergo, si per diuturnam consuetudinem obedivit patribus, filiis et filiorum filiis, quasi naturaliter inclinantur ut voluntarie obediant; quare, cum omne voluntarium sit minus onerosum et difficile, ut libentius et facilius obediat populus mandatis regis, expedit regiae dignitati per

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Rhetorice. Si ergo, patre regnante, ciues sciuerint filium debere regnare post patrem, iam illi assuescent subici. Sed in electione, per oppositum, si 40 ille qui hodie est equalis cras eligendus sit in principem, minus consueti, ei obedient minus. Et iterum, aliquis de infimo gradu uehementer eleuatus, ut per electionem, magis superbit quam si de excellenti gradu aliquis in excellentiorem extollatur et quasi de propinquissima potentia ad actum assumatur, quod fit in successione. Superbia autem principis magnum 45 regno periculum est. Item, in electione aliquando uacat regnum, quia necesse est conuocare eligentes, quod non fit statim; in successione autem non. Item, dissensione facta inter eligentes, uel non erit princeps uel, si erit, 50 possibile est malum fieri propter corruptionem eligentium.

B 69vb

Et ideo plura et maiora pericula accidunt in uia electionis quam successionis secundum genus. Maius enim quod ibi fit in successione est quod contingat aliquando fieri malum; | sed ad hoc dicendum quod hoc est contra naturam quod bonus generet malum, et ideo ut rarius contingit: natura enim est causa eorum que semper uel frequentius fiunt, 55

3 9 Si] scilicet P | sciuerint] sciuerunt PB 40 Sed] si B | si] om. P 41 est] om. P 4 2 obedient] obediant P | de] om. P 43 ut] potest P | superbit] superbi P | in] inde B 44 quasi] appropinquatur add. sed exp. P 47 Item] om. B | uacat] uocat B 4 8 non2] oportet add. B 50 corruptionem eligentium] corruptione numerum P 5 5 fiunt] fuerit B haereditatem succedere” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 463) 3 8 consueta…contristant] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.3, 995a1- 6; Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1370a16-18 4 0 in…42 minus] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “Item, ualde durum et extraneum est quod ille qui est hodie equalis alicui cras dominetur et sit princeps illi. Et ideo, per accidens, melius est principantem assumi per successionem generis quam per electionem” (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 204-206) 42 aliquis…46 est] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. III/2.5: “Secunda via ad investigandum hoc idem sumitur ex parte filii, ad quem spectat suscipere curam regni. Nam sicut mores nuper ditatorum ut plurimum peiores sunt moribus eorum, qui fuerunt divites ab antiquo, sic mores nuper potentum et de novi elevatorum per adeptionem civilis potentiae, peiores (ed. peiore) sunt moribus aliorum: nesciunt enim tales fortunas ferre, nuper enim esse exaltatum in regem est quasi quaedam ineruditio regiae dignitatis. Tales quidem ut plurimum tyrannizant et inflati corde et inerudite regnant” (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 462- 463) 49 Item…50 eligentium] cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.5: “multotiens inter eligentes dissensiones oriuntur propter electionem principis, propter quod turbatur pax regni” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 463) | dissensione…52 genus] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.14: “in electione contingit esse dissensionem inter eligentes; item, quandoque eligentes mali sunt, et ideo contingit quod eligant malum: utrumque autem istorum malum est in ciuitate” (ed. Lanza, p. 120, ll. 199-201) 5 5 natura…fiunt] cf. Arist., Phys. II.5, 196b21-24; II.8, 198b34-36 et 199a9-11

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ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. Et ideo magis naturale est semper bonum succedere bono; minus autem naturale semper bonum eligere: nam bonus succedentem sibi aliquamdiu iam moribus bonis exercitauit, etiam preter naturalem dispositionem quam sibi aggenerauit. Eligentes autem neutrum 60 horum faciunt in electo. Et ideo per accidens, inspiciendo ad pericula utriusque uie, melius est assumi principem per generis successionem quam per electionem.

Ad rationem dicendum quod per se, et quantum est de ratione uie electionis secundum se, melius est per electionem assumi. Per accidens 65 tamen contingit esse peius: contingit enim aliquando quod nunquam etiam incipiatur illa uia et item, si incipiatur, contingit aliquando magis in ea per passionem quam per rationem procedere. Ad secundam dicendum quod, licet casus possibilis sit in successione, tamen, quia naturalior uia est et minora pericula sustinet, et etiam 70 rarius ibi casus accidit; ideo et cetera.| P 299vb < Q U E S TIO 2 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m m e l i u s s i t c i u i t a t e m r e g i u n o u el p l u r i b u s Arguitur quod pluribus, quia melius est eos principari qui melius possunt preuidere et consiliari et iudicare; sed hoc possunt plures melius; 5 ergo eos melius est principari.

58 bonis] bonus B | exercitauit] excitauit P 60 electo] electio B | pericula] particula B 6 1 utriusque uie] utrique P 65 tamen] cum B | nunquam] unquam P | nunquam etiam] et nunquam B 6 6 incipiatur2] accipiatur B | per] om. B 2 6, 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | pluribus] plures B | quia] s.l. P 4 melius] om. B 56 magis…59 aggenerauit] ut hoc melius comprehendi possit, cf. quod, eisdem fere verbis, invenitur in Vincentii Gruner Disputata Pol. III, q. 29: “... declarat Egidius quod via eligendi regem (regis T; eligendi regem om. W) per generis successionem est naturalior tali modo (medio W), quia bonus rex eum (cum W) quem reputat sibi successorem sui generis, istum aliquandiu exercitauit in bonis moribus (bonis moribus exercitauit T), qua (quam lectio incerta T quam W) exercitatione (exercitationem T om. W) addit sibi ultra naturalem inclinationem ad virtutem” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 164r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 165va) 26 ,1 Consequenter…2 pluribus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.16, 1287a8-12; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.3 et 4 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 456- 460)

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Item, melius est eos principari qui minus sunt corruptibiles; tales sunt plures: minus enim possunt corrumpi quam unus. Item, ciuitas est communicatio plurium equalium et similium secundum naturam et uirtutem, et istorum est eadem dignitas; ergo bonum est eos attingere ad eundem honorem. Si autem unus principatur, 10 non omnes ad eundem honorem attingunt; ergo non est iustum unum talibus principari. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod ille principatus est optimus ubi principatur unus. Item, ille principatus dicitur optimus qui magis attingit ad ordinem 15 uniuersi; talis autem est ille ubi principatur unus, sicut in uniuerso unum est primum omnium; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod melius est principari unum quam plures. Secundo dico quod non est melius principari unumquemque. Tertio dico quod hoc non 20 contingit in quacumque regione uel ciuitate. Probatio primi est dupliciter. Primo, quia principans in ciuitate intendit saluationem ciuitatis; nam, si non intendat illam, tunc princeps non est. Prius enim ciuis determinatus est in ordine ad politiam; politia autem, cum consistat in ordine et proportione, non saluatur nisi per ordinem et pro-

6 minus] magis sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 9 naturam…uirtutem] uirtutem et naturam B 10 attingere] ad eos attingere add. B | Si] om. P 11 non1] ideo P 14 principatur] principetur B 1 9 hoc] om. P 21 Primo] quidem add. B 2 2 intendat] intendit B 23 ciuis] ciues B cum…24 consistat] consistit P 24 non…proportionem] om. per hom. P 8 ciuitas…11 attingunt] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.15: “Dicimus enim quod iustum est equale; ergo, quorum est eadem uirtus et dispositio naturalis, idem est iustum et dignitas, quia, quorum est eadem uirtus, et dignitas, quia dignitas attenditur secundum uirtutem, et quorum non est eadem uirtus, nec dignitas eadem nec iustum idem. Si igitur ponamus quod aliqui sint similes in uirtute, eorum erit eadem dignitas et iustum; quare non expedit aliquem unum dominari secundum uoluntatem istis, quia non inesset eis eadem dignitas” (ed. Lanza, p. 124, ll. 35- 42) 1 3 ille…14 unus] re vera Aristoteles hoc non asserit; in hoc IIIº libro tantum asserit quod optimum virum ut regem regnare oportet; cf. Arist., Pol. III.13, 1284b32-34; cf. etiam IV.2, 1289a38-b1, ubi monarchia dicitur optima et divinissima politia. Cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.12: “ergo ille principatus erit melior, in quo erit unus princeps. Et illum magis expedit principari, qui unus existens optimus est” (ed. Lanza, p. 102, ll. 231-232) 15 ille…17 omnium] cf. supra, III, q. 21, ll. 74-76 cum adn. 2 3 Prius…politiam] cf. supra, III, q. 4, ll. 8-9 et q. 6, ll. 50-51; cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b30-31

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portionem. Hic autem ordo est pax uel amicitia ciuium, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum, quare illum melius est principari qui melius potest facere pacem in ciuitate. Sed unus hoc melius potest facere quam plures, quia propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis; sed plures non custodiunt pacem ciuitatis nisi conueniant et concordent ad modum unius; ergo 30 melius est principari unum quam plures. 25

Item, que fiunt secundum artem et scientiam assimilantur eis que fiunt secundum naturam, et ideo in artificialibus illud uidetur esse perfectius quod magis accedit ad similitudinem naturalium; in natura autem uidemus quod semper unum est principale, ut in animalibus principatur unum 35 membrum, scilicet cor, et in partibus anime principatur una potentia, et in plantis illud quod est medium inferioris et superioris, et similiter in uniuerso est unum principans primum; quare ille principatus qui magis assimilatur principatui primo in natura, ille est melior. Talis autem est principatus unius; quare melius est unum principari, unde dicit PROCLUS quod 40 omnis multitudo secunda est ab uno. Secundi ratio est, scilicet, quod non sit melius principari unumquemque, sed unum optimum, quia, sicut dictum est, melius est principari illum qui potest saluare pacem ciuitatis magis. Magis autem potest hoc facere unus optimus: ex eo enim quod optimus appetitum rectum habebit, et sic 45 erit prudens; ex eo quod prudens erit et appetitum rectum habens,

2 7 hoc melius] inv. B 2 9 concordent] concordant B 3 3 accedit] accidet P 3 4 semper] super P | unum est] inv. B | ut] non B 35 membrum] naturalium B 39 unius] unus B | est] om. B 42 unum optimum] inv. sed corr. P 4 1 unumquemque…42 principari] om. per hom. B 4 4 unus] iter. B | optimus2] est add. B | rectum] rationem B 4 5 erit2] est sed corr. P est B | et] om. B | rectum] om. P rationum B 2 5 Hic…ciuium] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-23 ubi tamen Aristoteles mentionem de pace non facit. Vide infra, V, qq. 1-5 et 7, ubi Petrus asserit quod amicitia causa pacis est et necessaria ad conservandam civitatem | Hic…30 plures] hoc argumentum, una cum eisdem fontibus allatis – altera ex Ethica Nicomachea, altera ex Analyticis Posterioribus –, valde simile est illo quod invenitur in Aegidii Romani De Reg. Princ. III/2.3: “Nam pax et unitas ciuium debent esse finaliter intenta a legislatore ... hanc autem unitatem et concordiam magis efficere potest quod est per se vnum ... Immo cum plures principantur, nunquam potest esse pax in huiusmodi principatu, nisi illi plures sint vniti et concordes. Et propter quod autem vnumquodque, et illud magis” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 456) 2 8 propter…magis] Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (29), p. 313; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 72a27-32 3 3 in…39 principari] cf. supra, III, q. 21, ll. 74-76 cum adn.; cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.3 ubi ista tria – cor, partes 40 omanimae et universum – allegantur ad eadem probanda (ed. Romae 1607, p. 457) nis…uno] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 5 (ed. Boese, p. 4); eadem fons etiam allegatur in: Aegidius Romanus, De Reg. Princ. III/2.3 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 457) 42 sicut…43 magis] cf. supra, ll. 25-30

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manifestum quod melius reget; | quare melius est principari unum optimum et non quemcumque. Item, in natura et in primo principatu meliora sunt illa que principantur quam ea quibus principantur, sicut cor melius aliis membris et prima causa 50 omnibus entibus; et ideo similiter in ciuitate debet principari optimum.

B 70ra

Tertii declaratio est, scilicet, quod non est melius semper unum principari cuicumque multitudini: non enim melius eum principari multitudini composite ex similibus et equalibus, sed ibi melius est plures principari; alia autem est multitudo que non attingit ad uirtutem, et si attingat, hoc tamen est | parum, et preterea inter tales potest melior inueniri. Et in tali 55 multitudine melius est principari unum; in prima autem non est melius, quia, cum illi sint equales secundum uirtutem, iustum est eos attingere ad eandem dignitatem, et per consequens ad principatum equaliter omnes attingere. In multitudine autem que non equaliter attingit ad uirtutem expedit principari unum optimum, cuius ratio est quia illud quod excedit 60 alia secundum uirtutem expedit illi quod deficit respectu illius; sed talis multitudo, ut suppositum est, deficit a uirtute; et ideo melius est illi multitudini unum optimum principari.

Ad rationes dicendum quod unus ita bene potest operari opera principatus, cum sit optimus sicut plures, et forte melius quam plures. Vel 65 aliter dicendum quod ista ratio non probat simpliciter quod melius sit principari plures quam unum, sed, si sit unus, sub illo possunt plures principari, qui uideant et iudicent: unus enim non potest uacare omnibus. Et ideo hec ratio querere uidetur utrum sub tali uno sint plures qui iudicent: oportet enim, cum ad omnia non possit uacare et intendere, quod 70 sub ipso sint aliqui, ut consiliarii, qui iudicent; et hoc est regnum in uirtute aristocratie. Item, oportet quod politia sub regno maneat oligarchia: si enim sint aliqui insignes et nobiles, a rege obtineant aliquam dignitatem, et similiter oportet quod populus ad aliquam dignitatem 75 attingat. Et sic contingit quod monarchia regalis quasi uirtute contineat

4 6 quare] quam B 4 9 ea] om. P 51 semper unum] inv. B 54 non] est add. sed exp. B 5 6 in] autem B 5 7 illi] ille P | eos] eas PB 5 9 attingit] attigit B 6 0 unum…61 expedit] om. B 64 unus] om. P | ita bene] inv. B 6 5 plures1…forte] scrips. pulcrus forte et B 6 7 plures2…68 principari] inv. B 6 9 querere uidetur] inv. B 7 0 oportet…71 iudicent] om. per hom. B 7 5 aliquam] aliquem B 7 6 monarchia] praem. oligarchia P

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omnes alias politias: non dico secundum excellentiam et excessum earum, sed secundum aliquid aliud. Ad secundam patet quia talis, cum sit optimus, etiam minus est 80 corruptibilis quam plures, et cetera.

7 7 secundum] uirtutem add. sed exp. P 7 8 aliquid] ad B 81 ***] deest responsio ad tertium argumentum. Si tamen consideretur quod tertium argumentum huius quaestionis valde simile est illo quod in Quaestionum Anonymi Mediolanensis loc. parall. invenitur, conici potest quod hic deficit aliquid simile responsioni Anonymi Mediolanensis; quam ob rem utile videtur hic proferre et tertium argumentum et responsionem ad illud quae ibi inveniuntur; cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol III, q. 21: “Item, sicut apparet in isto 3º, ciuitas est communicatio ciuium equalium et similium secundum rationem et naturam. Ex hoc arguitur sic: illud melius est principari in optima politia quod magis equalitatem ciuium conseruat quia, sicut apparet 5º Ethicorum, istud est quedam species iustitie distributiue; sed plures sunt huiusmodi et non unus solus ... ideo et cetera ... Ad aliam, cum dicitur quod ‘ciuitas est communicatio ciuium equalium et similium’ et cetera, dicendum quod istud uerum est in aliis principatibus a regali; et dato quod hoc intelligatur in regno, hoc uerum est de subditis et non de principante, et quia hoc arguitur de principante, ideo non ualet” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., ff. 34va et 35rb)

< LI BER Q UA RT US >

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r c i rc a 4 u m P o l i t i c o r u m u t r u m h u i u s s c i e n t i e s i t co n s i d e r a r e q u e s i t o p t i m a p o l i t i a , u t d i c i t P h i l o s o p h u s i n l i t te r a Arguitur quod non, quia scientie non est considerare illud quod secundum intellectum indeterminatum est, quia tale non contingit intelli5 gere; sed | que sit optima politia et qualis quali conueniat non est determi- P 300rb natum nec contingit determinare bene per intellectum; ergo non est istius scientie hoc considerare. Minor patet quia qualis quali conueniat, hoc non est determinare nisi per particulares proprietates, que intellectu non apprehenduntur, sed potius a sensu. 10

15

Item, nulla scientia considerat illud quod est per accidens, 6º Metaphisice; sed expediens uel optimum sunt accidentia politie; ergo de istis ista scientia non considerabit. Minor patet: ista enim non sunt necessaria. Contra: sicut est in scientiis factiuis, ita debet esse suo modo in actiuis; sed in scientiis factiuis consideratur quid optimum et quale quali conueniat: fistulatiua enim considerat que sit optima fistula et qualis quali conueniat iuxta modum et mensuram artis; ergo similiter in actiuis.

Dicendum quod istius scientie est considerare que sit optima politia et qualis quali conueniat, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Cuius ratio est quia omnis 1, 1 queritur] utrum add. sed exp. B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 5 sed] om. B 6 contingit] oportet P 7 hoc considerare] inv. B 8 proprietates] illarum add. PB | que] in add. B 9 apprehenduntur] comprehendentur B 1 0 illud] id B | accidens] ut dicitur add. B 1 5 quid] quod B 1 6 fistulatiua…17 conueniat] om. per hom. B 1 7 iuxta] iusta P | in] aliis add. P 1, 1 Consequenter…2 littera] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1288b21-22 10 nulla…accidens] Auct. 14 sicut…17 actiuis] cf. Arist., Metaph. VI (151), p. 127; Arist., Metaph. VI.2, 1026b3- 4 Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1288b10-19 ubi tamen hoc idem exemplum ad exercitationem corporis spectat 18 istius…19 conueniat] Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1288b21-22 1 9 omnis…22 partium] cf. Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (5), p. 311; Arist., An. Post. I.1, 71a11-16 | omnis…31 consimilis] sic similiter in Petri Scripto IV.1: “... scientie omnes aliquod subiectum considerant, sed in quibusdam contingit esse illud uniuocum, in aliis non uniuocum, sed analogum, dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod prius inter illa. Et sicut est in speculatiuis, sic etiam est in actiuis et factiuis, quod sunt quedam scientie actiue et factiue considerantes aliquod unum dictum de pluribus per attributionem ad aliquod primum. Et in talibus proponit suam

576

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scientia considerat subiectum aliquod et partes et passiones illius subiecti, quia, supponens quid est subiectum et quia est, ex hoc assignat causas passionum et rationes partium. Tale autem subiectum aliquando est unum ratione ad omnia determinata in scientia: hoc autem rarissime, et forte nunquam contingit; sepius autem est anologum, nunquam autem equiuocum. Sed si subiectum est unius rationis, et passiones erunt unius rationis. Alie autem sunt scientie in quibus subiectum est aliquod primum quod primo cadit in consideratione scientie, alia autem per attributionem ad illud, ut dicitur 4º Metaphisice; et ideo similiter passiones primo conuenient illi primo et per prius de eo dicentur, per posterius autem dicentur de aliis, ita quod primo subiecto inerit passio prima, subiecto autem per attributionem passio consimilis. Tunc arguitur: cuius est considerare subiectum, eius erit et considerare passionem, et cuius est considerare subiectum per attributionem, eius est considerare passiones per attributionem, ita quod primo et principaliter considerabit subiectum primum et eius per se passionem; talis autem est illa scientia cuius subiectum non est unum ratione, sed per attributionem; et ideo eius est considerare illud quod primo est subiectum cum passionibus illius. Hoc autem est optima 21 est1] sit B 2 4 nunquam2] unquam P 2 5 et…rationis2] om. per hom. B 2 6 in quibus] om. B 29 primo] om. B 32 eius…33 subiectum] om. per hom. P 3 3 est] et add. B 3 4 quod] om. B subiectum] obiectum B 35 est1] om. B 3 6 eius est] inv. B 37 subiectum] non est unum ratione sed per attributionem add. sed del., adhibito signo ‘uacat’ B propositionem maiorem. Et dicit quod in omnibus artibus factiuis et scientiis actiuis que non considerant particulare aliquod, sed considerant aliquod unum commune pluribus, secundum analogiam perfecte considerantibus illud commune, unius est considerare que et qualis est dispositio uniuscuiusque illorum habentium attributionem ad primum et qualis est optima dispositio que competit illi primo, ad quod alia habent attributionem” (ed. Lanza, p. 142, ll. 24-35) 26 Alie…28 illud] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (88), p. 122; Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1003a33-34 3 1 Tunc…35 passionem] sic similiter in Petri Scripto IV.1: “Et ratio huius est quoniam, si aliqua scientia considerat aliquam naturam, considerat passiones illius; considerat etiam omnia illa que habent attributionem ad illam naturam, item passiones illorum attributorum. Sed passio primi in scientia est optima dispositio eius; passiones eorum que attribuuntur sunt quales illis congruunt” (ed. Lanza, p. 142, l. 52-p. 143, l. 56) | cuius…37 illius] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. IV, q. 4: “... intelligendum quod ratio scientie est ex ratione subiecti, et ideo ista scientia habet ex obiecto illa que sibi conueniunt secundum propriam speciem, propter quod, si obiectum scientie sit unum per attributionem, inquantum ipsum dicitur de pluribus que attribuuntur alicui primo, similiter scientia que est de tali obiecto dicetur esse una per attributionem, inquantum scientie que sunt de posterioribus ordinem et attributionem habent ad scientiam que est de priori, in quo primo reperitur” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152, f. 157rb) 3 7 Hoc…41 bone] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a38-b3; de his quae dicuntur per attributionem plene agitur infra, IV, q. 7, ll. 16-34 et V, q. 15, ll. 16- 44. Vide etiam supra, III, q. 4, ll. 21-29

20

25

30

35

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER IV

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politia; ab hac autem quedam dicuntur per attributionem, ut politie posteriores et earum dispositiones, et has uocat “quales qualibus conuenire”: nam hee non sunt politie simpliciter, sed tantum politie alicui bone, et ideo de istis etiam considerabit ista scientia. Item, scientia que considerat subiectum et passionem, non solum considerat illam passionem secundum perfectum esse, sed etiam secundum esse imperfectum, sicut scientia considerans album non solum 45 considerat ipsum sub esse perfectissimo, sed et sub esse imperfecto, propter quod comparat ipsum minus uel magis album. | Similiter ista scientia P 300va non solum considerabit aristocratia, sed etiam democratiam, et iterum non solum democratiam perfectam, sed etiam deficientem. Et ideo adhuc ei pertinet non solum considerare optimam simpliciter, sed etiam

3 8 ut] s.l. B 39 quales] correxi ex textu Politicae ad ll. 39-40 allato: tales PB | qualibus] qualibet P 4 0 tantum] tamen B 4 1 bone] bono B 42 scientia] om. P 45 perfectissimo] perfectissima B 47 considerabit] ante non solum transp. sed corr. P | democratiam] democratiua P 48 democratiam] democratiuam P 3 9 has…40 conuenire] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1288b22-24: “... eiusdem scientie est politiam optimam considerare, que est et qualis quedam utique existens maxime erit secundum uotum ... et que quibus congruens” (ed. Susemihl, p. 373, ll. 7-10); verba valde similia etiam inveniuntur in Petri Scripto IV.1: “... istius scientie est considerare de politia optima, que et qualis sit, et quibus et qualibus congruit ... Quare ipsius est considerare que politia est optima et que politia quibus conuenit ... politica scientia considerat que politia quibus conuenit: sunt enim multi qui non possunt attingere ad optimam que illis competat, sed ad illam que illis 40 hee…41 scientia] cf. congruit” (ed. Lanza, p. 141, ll. 11-12, 20-21 et p. 143, ll. 63- 65) Petrum, Scriptum IV.1: “ad politicum pertinet considerare politiam que ex suppositione, non ex suppositione simpliciter, sed ex suppositione alicuius quod non est bonum simpliciter” 4 2 scientia…52 suppositione] sic similiter in Petri Scripto (ed. Lanza, p. 143, ll. 79- 81) IV.1: “... politicus considerat politiam simpliciter. Sicut enim dictum est, considerans aliquam naturam, considerat que est optima dispositio eius; et ideo, considerans politiam, considerat eam que est optima; sed politicus de politia considerat, quare manifestum est quod politicus et legislator considerant de optima politia. Item, ad ipsum pertinet considerare que 4 9 ei…52 suppositione] est politia optima ex suppositione” (ed. Lanza, p. 143, ll. 72-77) iidem tres modi quibus, iuxta Aristotelem, politicus considerare debet politiam (Politica IV.1, 1288b22 et 25-28: “... eiusdem scientiae est politiam optimam considerare ... quare optimam simpliciter et eam quae ex suppositis optimam ... adhuc autem tertiam eam quae ex suppositione”, ed. Susemihl, p. 373, ll. 7 et 10-p. 374, l. 3), etiam inveniuntur in Petri Scripto IV.1, eisdem fere verbis, sed mutato ordine secundae et tertiae politiarum: “considerans politiam, considerat eam que est optima … Item, ad ipsum pertinet considerare que est politia optima ex suppositione. Si enim in ciuitate aliqua sint plures uirtuosi excedentes alios in uirtute et populus inclinetur ad uirtutem, hiis suppositis, optima politia reguntur isti. Item, ad politicum pertinet considerare politiam que est ex suppositione, non ex suppositione simpliciter, sed ex suppositione alicuius quod non est bonum simpliciter ... si enim aliqua ciuitas non regeretur optima politia simpliciter, nec etiam sufficienti in per se necessariis, nec etiam optima ex suppositione, que ei contingere potest, sed quadam alia politia peiori, ista est ex

578

B 70rb

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

politiam optimam ex suppositione alicuius , ut democratiam; et non solum optimam ex suppositione, | sed absolute politiam ex suppositione. Et propter hoc postea considerabitur de quadam democratia que nec est optima democratia nec politia, sed et absolute non est politia nec etiam democratia, nisi solum ex suppositione.

Ad rationem dicendum quod qualis quali conueniat, istud bene 55 potest determinari ab intellectu: possum enim illa considerare sub ratione eorum in uniuersali, ut qualis politia conueniat diuitibus in uniuersali, non huic diuiti uel illi, et etiam qualis agricultoribus in communi. Et sic considerat hic PHILOSOPHUS, in uniuersali uidelicet, non in particulari. Ad secundam dicendum quod duplex est per accidens: quoddam 60 quod nullo modo dicendi per se inest, et tale nulla considerat scientia; et hoc, quod per accidens expedit omnino, ita quod nullo modo expedit per se, hoc non considerat scientia. Si autem sit aliquod per accidens, quod tamen aliquo modo dicendi per se sit, hoc bene considerat scientia, sicut est de expedienti politia: licet enim politia per accidens expediat, tamen 65 hec politia istis per se potest expedire, ut diuitibus oligarchia. Et sic Philosophus considerat qualis quali expediat. < Q UE S T I O 2 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o l i t i c u s d e b e at c o n s i d e r a re d e l e g i b u s Arguitur quod non, quia, si considerare de legibus pertineret isti scientie, tunc institutio et correctio legum pertineret ad istam scientiam et

5 0 alicuius] aliquarum PB | quod…simpliciter] suppl. ex fonte infra, in adn. allata 5 1 democratiam] democratiua PB 5 5 bene] om. P 5 7 conueniat diuitibus] inv. B 61 inest…62 modo] om. B 6 2 per2…63 se] om. B 6 3 non] ut B | scientia] scientia autem add. sed exp. P 64 hoc] om. P | sicut] om. B 66 ut] ex B 2 ,1 legibus] que pertinent isti scientie add. B 2 quia…3 scientie] om. B 3 pertineret] pertinent B suppositione non simpliciter, sed alicuius quod non est simpliciter bonum” (ed. Lanza, p. 143, ll. 74, 76-81, 83- 87) 2, 1 Consequenter…legibus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1289a11-12: “cum eadem autem hac prudentia et leges optimas videre et eas, quae unicuique politiarum congruunt” (ed. Susemihl, p. 376, ll. 4-6); sed haec verba magis congruunt cum his que inveniuntur in Petri Scripto IV.1: “Consequenter cum dicit Cum eadem, declarat quod oportet ipsum considerare de differentiis legum, dicens quod ... oportet considerare de legibus” (ed. Lanza, p. 145, ll. 131-133)

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER IV

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579

ad scientes eam; nos autem uidemus quod multi corrigunt et instituunt leges, qui ignorant hanc scientiam; ergo non pertinet ad istam scientiam considerare de legibus.

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia, cuius est considerare finem, eius est considerare ea que in finem ordinantur et secundum quod in finem ordinantur; sed politicus secundum istam scientiam considerat 10 finem ciuilitatis, qui est politia, lex autem ordinata est in finem politie, ergo rationem accipit ex illo; et ideo politici erit considerare leges.

Dicendum quod hic considerandum est de legibus. Cuius ratio est quia lex est enuntiatio uniuersalis, et non de quibuscumque, sed de agibilibus et ordinatis in finem. Quecumque autem sunt ordinata ad finem, rationem et 15 necessitatem sumunt ex fine ad quem ordinantur; et ideo necesse est leges accipere rationem ex fine politie, ad quem ordinantur ea que lege instituuntur. Ad eandem autem scientiam pertinet considerare finem | et illa P 300vb que per se sunt ad illum finem; sed finis legum est politia, quam ista scientia considerat; ergo et leges considerabit. Item, politia est ordo habitantium in ciuitate et modus se habendi principem ad subditos et illos inter se; omnia autem ista lege determinantur; ergo lex per se est determinatiua eorum que pertinent ad politiam. Ad eandem autem scientiam pertinet finis et hoc quod determinat ea que in finem. Ergo, si ista scientia considerat de politia, ipsa etiam 25 considerare debet de legibus; et ideo EUSTRATIUS, in commento super librum Ethicorum, inter politias enumerat legislatiuam.

20

4 nos] non B 7 arguitur] ratione add. B 8 eius] etiam add. B 1 0 ciuilitatis] ciuitatis B 11 erit] etiam est B 1 6 lege] per legem B 17 considerare] om. B 2 2 ergo] et add. B 2 5 ideo] dicit B 2 6 scientias] suppl. ex fontibus allatis et ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. IV, q. 1: “et ideo Eustratius in libro Ethicorum inter scientias politicas enumerat legislatiuam” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 166v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 167rb) | legislatiuam] leges latiuam B 10 lex…politie] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1289a13-15; cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.1: “Leges enim differunt secundum diuersitatem finium” (ed. Lanza, p. 145, l. 148) 13 lex…uniuersalis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1135a8 | lex…14 finem1] cf. supra, II, q. 9, ll. 19-20 14 Quecumque…15 ordinantur] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-24; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147 2 0 politia…21 se] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 26 inter…legislatiuam] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. prologus: “Quattuor autem sunt omnes urbanitatis partes: legis positiva, iudicativa, exercitativa et medicinalis” (ed. Mercken, pp. 3- 4, ll. 75-76); Michael Ephesius, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 12, ad 1180b23: “Iste igitur est politicus, idem autem et legis positivus. Pars enim legis positiva politicae” (ed. Mercken, p. 470, ll. 83- 84)

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Considerat autem hec scientia de legibus quantum ad tria, scilicet quantum ad constitutionem legum, secundo quantum ad directionem et tertio quantum ad correctionem illarum. Primum patet quia, cuius est considerare principium, eius est etiam 30 considerare quod per se principiatur ex illo. Sed ista scientia considerat politiam, que est finis legum; finis autem est principium eorum que in finem, et ideo politia est principium a quo sumitur ratio instituendi leges; ergo istius scientie est considerare leges quantum ad institutionem illarum. Si autem pertinet ad eam instituere legem, ergo et uti legibus: cuius ratio 35 est quia, sicut dictum est 3º huius, cuius est instituere, eius est et de instituto iudicare – nam cuius medicari, eius est de sanitate iudicare –, et ideo etiam eius erit leges corrigere. Et ideo ratio instituendi legem est prudentia politica, que hic docetur; ergo et cetera. Nam ad illum pertinet instituere et dirigere et corrigere aliquid, qui rectam rationem et 40 finem illius cognoscit; sed talis est politicus respectu legum; ergo et cetera. Sed notandum quod in institutione, directione et correctione legum duo est considerare. Primo, ratio secundum quam hoc per se potest fieri; et quia ulterius non est utile ponere leges nisi obediatur legibus, ut dicitur in hoc 4º, ideo institutorem legum oportet habere uirtutem coactiuam ad 45 rebelles. Et primum istorum pertinet ad scientiam istam per se, aliud autem non, quia primum est principium illorum trium per se, secundum autem tantum ex consequenti. Princeps qui fert leges habet illa duo simul, scilicet prudentiam et potentiam.

28 directionem] rationem P 2 9 correctionem] constitutionem P correptionem B 3 0 est etiam] inv. B 3 1 considerare] illud add. B | principiatur] principatur P | illo] illa B 3 3 instituendi] instituti B 37 instituto…de] om. per hom. P | iudicare2] medicare B 38 etiam eius] inv. B | ideo2] iterum B | est] et B 39 politica] politia B | illum] illud B 42 in] om. P 4 3 ratio] est add. sed exp. B | se] hoc add. P 44 utile] uelle B 4 6 scientiam…se] istam scientiam P 48 simul] om. B 4 9 potentiam] praem. politiam B 3 6 cuius…38 corrigere] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b40- 42: “utique eiusdem esse iudicare, quis recte medicatus est, cuius quidem et medicari et facere sanum laborantem ab aegritudine praesente: iste autem est medicus” (ed. Susemihl, p. 194, l. 11-p. 195, l. 1), sed cf. potius Petrum, Scriptum III.9: “cuius est aliquem medicari et sanare ab egritudine presente, eius est iudicare quis recte sanatus est: hoc autem facit medicus. Et ratio propositionis est, quia cuius est aliquid facere per deductionem ex causis et principiis, eius est resoluere ipsum usque ad primas causas, considerando ex quibus et qualibus est et habet esse; hoc autem est iudicare; ergo eiusdem est aliquid constituere et iudicare de ipso” (ed. Lanza, p. 73, l. 95-p. 74, l. 101) 44 non…legibus] Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a3-4 48 Princeps…49 potentiam] cf. infra, V, qq. 11 et 13

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Ad rationem dicendum quod habere aliquam scientiam est dupliciter: uel per artem et doctrinam, et sic soli istam scientiam scientes sunt politici; alii autem sciunt aliquam scientiam per usum. Dico ergo quod nulli artificialiter instituunt legem nisi qui sciunt hanc scientiam. Si autem aliqui alii instituant, hoc non est habita perfecta ratione, et ita artificialiter, 55 sed est solum usualiter; ideo et cetera.

50

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m t i r a n n i s s i t p e s s i m a p o li t i a r u m , u t d i c i t P h i l o s o p h u s Arguitur quod non, quia quod est pessimum | nichil habet boni in P 301ra illo genere; | sed tirannis aliquid habet boni in genere politiarum: attingit B 70va 5 enim ad speciem et ad perfectionem, saltim essentialem, politie, quod est bonum politie; ergo aliquid boni habet in genere politie, et sic non erit pessima. Item, tirannus aduersarios uehementer reprimit; ergo aliquid boni politia sua habet. Item, illud est peius quod aggregat plura mala quam quod pauciora. Aliqua autem politia plura mala in se aggregat quam tirannis, scilicet democratia et oligarchia, quia plures mali peiores sunt uno malo; ergo et plures mali principes sunt peiores uno malo, sicut prius dicebatur quod multitudo collecta ex insipientibus et aliquibus prudentibus prudentior est 15 uno solo prudente. Ergo ille politie peiores sunt quam tirannis. Et si sic, ipsa non erit pessima.

10

52 aliquam] aliam sed corr. s.l. P | ergo] om. B 5 3 nulli] ciuili B 5 4 est] om. P 55 ideo] om. P 3 ,1 Consequenter] deinde B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 habet] om. P | politiarum] ergo add. B 5 quod…6 politie1] om. per hom. B 6 boni] in genere add. sed exp. P | non erit] iter. B 7 pessima] pessimum B 1 1 autem] aut B 50 habere…55 usualiter] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Arist., Eth. Nic. X.14, 1180b28-1181b12 et Michaele Ephesio, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 12, ad 1180b28 (ed. Mercken, p. 472, l. 37- 477, l. 57); de distinctione inter artem et experientiam vide etiam Arist., Metaph. I.1, 981a15-17 et a30-b6 3 , 1 Consequenter…2 Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.2, 1289b2-3 14 multitudo…15 prudente] cf. supra, III, q. 24, ll. 19-27; cf. etiam III, q. 15, ll. 45-49

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Item, quorum est unus mos, unum non est pessimum respectu alterius; tirannidis autem et democratie est unus mos, et similiter oligarchia, ut dicitur in illo capitulo: Quot autem sunt democratie; ergo tirannis 20 non est peior aliis. Contra: illud est pessimum quod maxime est contra inclinationem hominis; sed tirannis maxime est contra inclinationem hominis; ergo est pessima. Minor patet quia homo, cum sit uoluntatem et rationem habens, maxime ei contrariatur alteri omnino subici et ad bonum illius; ergo et 25 cetera. Item, illa politia in qua contingit fieri plura mala est peior omnibus aliis; sed tirannis plura, immo omnia mala in ciuitate facit, ut dicetur in 5º: sicut enim ibi dicetur, excellentes perimit, studia destruit, amicitias ciuium dissoluit et uniuersaliter potestatem omnem et excellentiam a ciuitate euellit. Democratia autem permittit bene aliquos excellentes, dummodo 30 non multum excellant; similiter et scientes, non tamen excellenter; similiter oligarchia permittit aliquos uirtuosos et potentes. Ergo tirannis est pessima omnium politiarum.

Dicendum quod est pessima. Cuius ratio est quia omnis uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa, ut patet in calore incluso in nube. Et ratio huius 35 propositionis est, sicut innuit PROCLUS, quia, quanto aliquid propinquius primo in illo genere, tanto est magis rationem illius participans; in genere autem potentium primum potens est unum; ergo omnis uirtus, quanto magis est una, tanto potentior est. Sed uirtus tirannica est unita magis

20 est] erit B 2 7 facit] om. B 29 potestatem omnem] inv. sed corr. P | et2] om. P 32 permittit] perimit B 3 6 sicut] sic B | quia] quod B 37 illius] generis add. B 3 8 quanto] quam P 3 9 magis est] inv. B 19 Quot…democratie] Arist., Pol. IV.6, 1292b22, ubi textus sic incipit: “quod autem sint tot species democratiae et oligarchiae ...” (ed. Susemihl, p. 400, l. 3) 2 7 tirannis…facit] cf. Arist., Pol. V.10, 1310b2-7 2 8 excellentes…29 dissoluit] Arist., Pol. V.11, 1313a39-b4 34 omnis…35 dispersa] Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (13), p. 232; Liber De Causis XVI (XVII) 138 et 140 (ed. Pattin, p. 83, ll. 15-16 et p. 84, ll. 22-23); quod postea asseritur de calore incluso in nube probabiliter desumptum est ex Thoma, In Librum De Causis 17: “... sicut tota domus a magno igne aggregato calefit, quod fieri non potest si ignis dividatur per diversas partes domus” (ed. Saffrey, p. 99, ll. 24-26) 3 6 quanto…37 participans] cf. Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 95 (ed. Boese, p. 48) et etiam prop. 60 (ibid., p. 33, ll. 9-11); Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (11), p. 232; Liber de Causis IX (X) 95-96 (ed. Pattin, p. 71, ll. 24-33); cf. etiam Thomam, In Librum De Causis 17: “quanto virtus propinquior fuit illi primae virtuti, tanto magis participet de eius infinitate” (ed. Saffrey, p. 99, ll. 3-5)

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quam democratica; ergo potentior est ad nocendum. In illis, scilicet | P 301rb democratia oligarchia, uirtus principantium nociuorum consistit in pluribus; hic autem consistit in uno tantum; ergo efficacius potest nocere.

Item, illa politia que magis declinat ab eo quod intenditur in politia bene ordinata est pessima: quanto enim aliquid magis distat ab optimo, 45 tanto peius est. Sed talis est tirannis, quia in politia recte ordinata intenditur bonum optimum commune; ab ista autem intentione maxime declinat tirannis: intendit enim solum bonum unius. Et oligarchia autem et democratia non tantum declinant: tanto enim quod quilibet principantium in illis politiis intendat bonum proprium, illa tamen bona constituunt unum 50 bonum, quod propinquius est bono communi quam bonum unius solius tiranni sit; et ideo illa est pessima. Item, hoc patet ratione PHILOSOPHI, que in idem respondit: illa politia est pessima, que priuatio est optime; sed talis est tirannis: est enim priuatio regni, quod est optima politia; ergo tirannis est pessima, non quia nullum 55 bonum in genere politiarum sibi habeat coniunctum, sed quia plura mala sibi habet coniuncta.

Et per hoc patet ad primam rationem. Ad secundam dicendum quod tirannis reprimit aduersarios, et hoc est bonum; tamen, quia hoc non bene facit ei, quod non ad utilitatem 60 subditorum sed suam, ideo hoc non dat ei bonitatem aliquam. Ad tertiam dicendum quod oligarchia uel democratia non aggregat in se plura mala . Et tu dicis quod immo, quia plures mali ibi principantur, et hoc est maius malum quam si unus principatur, dico quod aliquos principes malos esse in ciuitate est dupliciter. Vel 65 diuisim, ita quod quilibet secundum uoluntatem suam regat ad bonum suum, et sic peius esset plures malos principari: hoc autem non fit in illis politiis. Alio modo potest hoc esse coniunctim, ut omnes secundum uoluntatem communem et coniunctim, secundum legem uel alio modo, princi4 0 democratica] democratia B 45 est1] om. B | quia] que B 4 8 quod] om. P 5 0 quod] om. B 51 est] om. P 5 2 in] ibi B | respondit] redit B 58 reprimit] respuit B 6 1 tertiam] rationem add. B | oligarchia…democratia] democratia etiam oligarchia B 62 quam tirannis] suppl. ex supra, ll. 11 et 15 6 5 quilibet] qualibet B 6 7 politiis] dictis add. B | ut omnes] non omnia B 4 4 quanto…45 est1] cf. Arist., Top. III.2, 117b19-21: “Rursus in duobus si hoc quidem meliori illud autem peiori sit similius, erit melius quod meliori est similius” (transl. Boethii, AL V.1-3, p. 55, ll. 5-7); Auct. Arist., Top. III (50), p. 325 52 illa…53 optime] Arist., Pol., IV.2, 1289a39-41

584

B 70vb

P 301va

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pentur: tunc non sequitur quod sit peius quam unum principari malum, quia illi plures adhuc non principantur nisi sub ratione unius, inquantum 70 consentiunt. Hoc enim melius est, quia iam uirtus nocendi erit dispersa; et ideo, sicut multitudo secunda est ab uno et dependet eorum principatus a ratione principatus unius, ita et malitia in eos deriuatur | ab illo, et in illo est per prius et maior. Ad quartam dicendum quod, si simpliciter et omnino sit idem 75 mos, uerum est. Si autem sit secundum quid, ut solum in oppressione excellentium, | tunc non sequitur, quia adhuc tirannis potest alias habere conditiones peiores, et ideo esse peior illis; et ideo adhuc tirannis remanet pessima politiarum. < Q UE S T I O 4 > C onse qu enter q u er itu r u tru m p olitie d isti ng ua ntu r s e c u n d u m d i s t i n c t i on e m p a r t i u m c i u i t a t i s Arguitur quod non, quia materia est propter formam et non econuerso: materia enim ordinem habet ex forma, ut dicitur fine 1i Phisicorum, ergo illud quod habet rationem materie habebit rationem suam ex 5 ratione , et non econuerso; partes autem ciuitatis rationem materie habent respectu politie; ergo politia non accipiet distinctionem ab illis, sed potius econuerso. Item, cum partes ciuitatis indeterminate et infinite sint quoad nos, uidetur etiam quod politie sic deberent esse infinite, quod est inconue- 10 niens.

7 0 quia] uel add. B | plures] scrips. pul B 7 1 iam] ideo B 7 2 sicut] eorum add. B | secunda] secundum B 7 3 deriuatur] deriuantur B 7 6 sit] fit B 77 quia] quod B | alias habere] inv. B 7 8 esse] om. B 4 ,1 Consequenter] deinde B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | materia] correxi ex Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. IV, q. 3: “Arguitur quod non, quia materia est propter formam et non econuerso, ut apparet 2º Phisicorum” (ms. Milano, Bibl. Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 36va): ista P om. B 4 ordinem habet] inv. B | ex] et B 7 respectu] respectum B politia] potentia B | accipiet distinctionem] inv. PB 8 potius] potentia B 1 0 deberent] debent B 4 ,1 Consequenter…2 ciuitatis] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.3, 1289b27-28 4 materia…forma] cf. Arist., Phys. I.9, 192a22-23; Auct. Arist., Phys. I (32), p. 142

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem principantium; sed principantes sunt partes ciuitatis; ergo politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem partium ciuitatis.

Dicendum, sicut in arguendo dicebatur, quod materia est propter formam, sicut imperfectum in unoquoque genere est propter perfectum. Materia autem perfectibilis est, forma autem est perfectio, unde et materia appetit formam sicut mulier uirum, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum. Forma uero principaliter non est propter materiam, cum enim dicimus quod li ‘prop20 ter’ dicit circumstantiam cause finalis; et hoc modo forma non propter materiam sed econuerso, quia materia est causa forme aliqualiter – quia forma et materia inuicem sunt sibi cause, 2º Phisicorum –. Et COMMENTATOR dicit quod forma est causa materie sicut dans esse, materia autem causa forme sicut sustentans eam; et licet materia non sit principalis 25 causa forme, est tamen causa eius sicut sustentans, et ideo materia principalem rationem habebit a forma, forma autem econuerso aliqualem distinctionem recipit ex materia. Et ideo, cum politia comparetur ad partes ciuitatis sicut forma ad materiam, ideo secundum distinctionem illarum partium erit aliqualiter distinctio politiarum. 15

15 arguendo] augendo B | est] iter. P 1 7 autem1] uero B | autem2…18 formam] om. per hom. B 18 uirum] uiro B 2 2 forma…materia] materia et forma B | cause] ut dicitur add. B 2 4 autem] est add. B | sit] erit B 26 rationem] simpliciter add. B | aliqualem] aliqua ideo B 2 8 secundum] sicut sed corr. P 29 erit] est B 12 politia…13 principantium] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.3, 1290a5-13, praesertim 11-12: “necessarium ergo politias esse tot, quot quidem ordines secundum excellentias sunt” (ed. Susemihl, p. 382, ll. 11-12). Sed cf. potius Petrum, Scriptum IV.2: “alie sunt partes principales ipsius – et secundum distinctionem istarum distinguuntur politie –, cuiusmodi sunt ille secundum quas distinguuntur principatus ... dicit quod politia est ordo principatuum; ergo secundum distinctionem principatuum est distinctio politiarum. Sed distinctio principatuum est secundum distinctionem huiusmodi partium” (ed. Lanza, p. 152, l. 78-p. 153, l. 83) 16 imperfectum…perfectum] cf. Auct. Arist. (Boethius), De Cons. Phil. III (48), p. 290; Boethius, De Cons. Phil. III.P10.4 1 7 materia…18 uirum] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (32), p. 142; Arist., Phys. I.9, 192a22-23 2 2 forma…cause] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (85), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9 2 3 forma…24 eam] Averroes, In Phys. I, comm. 70 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. IV, f. 41r, D-E)

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Sed intelligendum quod materia dupliciter inuenitur: quedam sine qua 30 impossibile est formam reperire, sicut materia que primo et principaliter recipit formam, et ista dicitur materia pertinens ad speciem; alia autem est materia non pertinens ad speciem. Sicut in circulo aliqua est materia circuli remota, sine qua non potest inueniri circulus, ut quantum uel superficies; alia autem est materia circuli sine qua materia potest inueniri 35 circulus, ut aurum uel cuprum. Et quia forma recipit distinctionem a materia, ideo a materia que est subiectum speciei per accidens forma recipit distinctionem per accidens, et ab illa materia que est subiectum speciei per se recipit distinctionem per se. Et ideo politia per accidens recipit distinctionem a partibus ciuitatis per accidens, et de illis nichil ad 40 presens; a partibus autem per se ciuitatis recipit distinctionem per se. Hee autem sunt partes principales.

P 301vb

Si autem queritur que sint ille, dicendum quod, eorum que sunt in ordine quodam, oportet esse aliquod primum in quo inueniatur principium | illius ordinis. Et hoc dicit PROCLUS cum dicit quod omnis multitudo 45 ab uno incipit et in multitudinem procedit sibi coelementarem, et tandem ad unam reuertitur unitatem. Et hoc patet sic: ordo enim est habitudo prioris et posterioris inuicem; et ubi est reperire prius et posterius, ibi est reperire primum, et ideo ubi est ordo oportet esse aliquid primum, sicut in animali uidemus: sed si consideremus naturam animalis secundum corpus, 50

3 0 qua] alia B 32 autem] quod P 3 4 remota] remoto B 3 6 cuprum] scrips. capm B | quia] quod P 3 7 que] om. P 3 9 speciei] specie P 4 3 queritur] queratur B | sint] sunt B 4 4 aliquod] aliquid B 46 et1] om. P | coelementarem] scrips. coelementatem B 47 enim] non P 4 9 aliquid primum] alius P 5 0 sed] om. B 3 0 materia…36 cuprum] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.3: “partium materialium quedam sunt que pertinent ad speciem, quedam autem non. Partes pertinentes ad ipsam sunt sine quibus species non potest esse, sicut caro et os pertinent ad speciem hominis, quia sine hiis non potest esse homo. Partes materiales non pertinentes ad speciem sunt sine quibus species potest reperiri, sicut ista ossa et iste carnes non pertinent ad speciem humanam, quia sine istis potest esse homo. Secundum igitur distinctionem partium pertinentium ad speciem distinguitur forma, quamuis distinctio forme non sit propter distinctionem materie” (ed. Lanza, p. 158, ll. 23-31) 43 Si…57 politia] cf. infra, VI, q. 6 | eorum…45 ordinis] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (43), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a1-11; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19 et 31-32 | eorum…49 primum2] argumentum valde simile invenitur in Petri QQ. Metaph. XII, q. 6: “in quibuscumque est ponere aliqua plura habentia ordinem ad se invicem, in eis est ponere aliquod unum principium. Omnis enim ordinatio ab uno incipit et secundum unitatem terminatur sibi coelementarem, ut probat Proclus. Sed ordo est in entibus. Omnia enim ordinata sunt ... Ergo est unum primum ordinans ea. Illud autem non intelligimus esse nisi primum principium” (ed. Dunphy, p. 101) 4 5 omnis…47 unitatem] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese, p. 14)

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tunc natura eius consistit in ordine ad aliquod primum, ut ad cor. Similiter in plantis et anime partibus hoc patet. Forma autem ciuitatis est politia uel ordo quidam habitantium ciuitatem uel principantium, et ideo oportet quod in ciuitate inueniatur aliqua pars prima, et ista est in qua inuenitur 55 prima ratio ordinis et principium: hoc autem est ipse principans in ciuitate; et ideo secundum distinctionem principantis necessario distinguitur politia. Distinctio autem principantium est secundum distinctionem finium, et ideo Philosophus distinctionem politiarum aliquando accipit distinctionem principantium, aliquando a distinctione 60 finium, et hoc est propterea quod ratio politie per se fundatur super rationem finis. Sed quia contingit quod aliquando principatus distinguatur secundum diuitias, aliquando secundum potestates uel secundum libertates uel aliquid huius, ideo secundum distinctionem istorum consueuimus distinguere politias, quia ex talibus aliquis diuersimode in finem ciuitatis 65 inclinatur. Et ideo distinctio secundum ista reducitur ad distinctionem secundum partes ciuitatis, ut uisum est 2º et 3º huius.

Ad rationes dicendum quod forma non distinguitur a materia principaliter, sed econuerso; tamen forma potest distingui secundum materiam aliqualiter, inquantum materia est quodammodo causa forme 70 sicut | sustentans; et sic politia potest distingui secundum distinctionem B 71ra partium ciuitatis. Ad secundam dicendum quod uerum esset si politia distingueretur secundum distinctionem quarumcumque partium: hoc autem non contingit, sed solum secundum distinctionem partium principalium. Et quia ille 75 non sunt infinite, ideo non oportet politias esse infinitas, et cetera.

51 aliquod] aliquid B 5 2 hoc] autem add. B 5 4 est] om. B | inuenitur] inueniatur PB 58 Philosophus] post politiarum transp. B 59 a] autem P 64 quia] quod B 65 inclinatur] om. B 68 principaliter] praem. simpliciter sed exp. P 69 aliqualiter] sed econuerso tamen forma add. sed exp. P 72 uerum] iterum PB 73 quarumcumque] quamcumque B 7 4 sed] om. B 52 Forma…53 principantium] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 6 5 distinctio…66 huius] cf. supra, II, q. 2 et III, q. 13

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< Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a d u l a r i s i t u i t i u m Arguitur quod non, quia illud quod per se est inductiuum amicitie non est uitium; sed adulatio facit amicitiam inter se et illum cui adulatur; ergo non est uitium. Maior patet quia effectiuum uirtutis uel alicuius effectus consequentis uirtutem non est uitium; amicitia autem uel uirtus 5 est uel effectus uirtutem consequens, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. Item, quod per se est principium boni, hoc non est uitium; adulatio est talis, adulator enim famat et elucidat bona illius cui adulatur, certum etiam facit illum de bonitate sua: ista omnia sunt bona; ergo et 10 cetera. P

302ra

Contra: adulator, inquantum huiusmodi, non est bonus; ergo nec adulatio. Antecedens patet quia, qui apparet esse | talis qualis non est, ille non est bonus ; adulator autem est apparens amicus non existens, ut dici15 tur 1º Rhetorice; ergo adulatio erit uitium.

Dicendum quod est uitium. Et ad hoc uidendum quid uocatur nomine adulationis. Intelligendum , sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 4º Ethicorum, in colloquiis et in conuiuere aliqui tripliciter se habent, ita 5 ,1 Consequenter queritur] inv. B 2 Arguitur] et uidetur B 3 sed…4 uitium] om. per hom. B 6 uel] om. P | effectus] secundum add. P 1 4 autem] enim B | est apparens] apparet esse B existens] autem add. B 1 5 1º] 2 PB | erit] est B 1 6 quod] non add. B 18 conuiuere] commune B | aliqui] aliquid B 5 ,5 amicitia…6 consequens] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a1-2; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. VIII.1: “amicitia autem est quaedam virtus, in quantum scilicet est habitus electivus ... et reducitur ad genus iustitiae, in quantum exhibet proportionale ... vel saltem est cum virtute, in quantum 1 4 adulascilicet virtus est causa verae amicitiae” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 442, ll. 21-26) 1 8 in1…23 cetera] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.6, tor…existens] Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1371a23-24 1126b11-20: “In colloquiis autem et convivere et rebus communicare, hii quidem placidi videntur esse, omnia ad delectationem laudantes et nichil contratendentes, set existimantes oportere sine tristicia quibuscumque esse. Qui autem contrario hiis, ad omnia contrariantes et eius quod est contristare neque quodcumque curantes, discoli et litigiosi vocantur. Quoniam quidem igitur dicti habitus vituperabiles sunt, non inmanifestum, et quoniam medius horum laudabilis secundum quem recipiet que oportet, et ut oportet, similiter autem et ut spernet. Nomen autem non redditur ipsi aliquod; assimilatur autem maxime amicicie” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 446, l. 20-p. 447, l. 1); etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. II.6, 1108a26-30: “Circa reliquum autem delectabile quod in vita, qui quidem ut oportet delectabilis est, amicus, et medietas

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quod quidam colloquuntur et dicunt et operantur que credunt placere, nichil dicentes nec facientes quod inductiuum sit tristitie; aliqui autem econuerso quod nichil dicunt uel operantur tale, sed omnia ad tristitiam faciunt et dicunt; tertii autem qui aliqua tristia dicunt et similiter aliqua delectabilia, et hoc ubi oportet et quando et cetera, et isti dicuntur eutrapeli. Primi autem dicuntur adulatores, nisi quod differunt 25 quia ille dicens omnia que placent, uel facit hoc propter delectationem suam et aliorum, et tunc adulator dicitur, uel facit propter aliquam utilitatem ab auditoribus consequendam, et tunc, ab illo fine denominationem recipiens, auarus dicitur. Et ideo adulator est ille qui omnia dicta uel facta refert et ordinat ad complacentiam auditoris, et hoc siue bona siue mala; et

20

2 0 quod] que B 21 ita…habent] suppl. ex supra, l. 18 | sed] ad add. B 2 2 autem] quod P aliqua] alique B | tristia] tristitia PB 2 5 dicens] domus B 26 facit] hoc add. B amicicia. Qui autem superhabundat, si quidem nullius gracia, placidus; si autem utilitatis alicuius sui, blanditor. Qui autem deficit et in omnibus indelectabilis, litigiosus quis et discolus” (ibid., p. 407, ll. 1-5). In IV.6, Aristoteles considerat virtutem quae circa delectationem in colloquia humana, quae similis est amicitiae; post Thomam vero, haec virtus vocatur ‘affabilitas’, ut distingui possit ab amicitia, de qua agitur in libris VIIIº et IXº. Vitia affabilitati contraria sunt, iuxta Thomam, adulatio et litigium. Versio Latina non continet verba ‘affabilitas’ et ‘adulatio’; cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. IV.14: “talis est medius habitus, cum tamen sit innominatus, licet apud nos possit affabilitas nominari ... Primo determinat de vitio quod pertinet ad superabundantiam delectationis. Et dicit quod ille qui superabundat in condelectando, si hoc non facit propter aliud, vocatur placidus; si autem hoc faciat vel propter adipiscendam pecuniam vel quicquid aliud pecunia aestimari potest, vocatur blanditor sive adulator” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, pp. 248-249, ll. 139-141 et 144-150); cf. etiam Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 114, prologus: “Deinde considerandum est de amicitia quae affabilitas dicitur; et de vitiis oppositis, quae sunt adulatio et litigium” (ed. Leon. IX, p. 441), et etiam Ia-IIae, q. 60, art. 5: “hoc pertinet ad quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici affabilitas” (ibid., p. 391) 2 3 isti…24 eutrapeli] confunduntur hic eutrapeli cum illis “qui aliqua tristia dicunt et similiter aliqua delectabilia”. Hic error probabiliter accidit quia eutrapelia, sicut veritas et amicitia, est circa delectabile (sed re vera circa delectabile in ludo) et de ea agitur una cum istis duobus virtutibus; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic., II.6, 1108a19-30 et IV.6- 8, 1126b11-1128b9 24 Primi…28 dicitur] rursum miscetur hic aliquid quod distinguendum erat: adulator enim consideratur similis placido, et non illo qui agit propter lucrum, ut in Thoma; insuper avarus, potius quam adulator, describitur ut ille qui omnia ad utilitatem refert. Avaritiae vitium re vera contrariatur non virtuti amicitiae, sed liberalitatis; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.6, 1127a7-10: “Condelectantis autem qui quidem eius quod est delectabile esse coniectativus, non propter aliquid aliud, placidus; qui autem ut utilitas aliqua ipsi fiat in pecuniis, et quecumque per pecunias, blanditor” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 447, ll. 23-25); cf. textum Thomae (Sent. Eth. IV.14) supra, ad ll. 18-23 allatum. Cf. etiam Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 115, art. 1, resp.: “Et si quidem hoc faciat sola intentione delectandi, vocatur placidus, secundum Philosophum: si autem hoc faciat intentione alicuius lucri consequendi, vocatur blanditor sive adulator. Communiter tamen nomen adulationis solet attribui omnibus qui supra debitum modum virtutis volunt alios verbis vel factis delectare in communi conversatione” (ed. Leon. IX, p. 444)

590

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ideo, cum unusquisque complaceat uel delectetur in eo quod bona sua famantur et mala que in eo diminuuntur, ideo ipse similiter mala diminuit, bona autem ampliat et magnificat. Et ideo, si sic, quod ad aliqua inclinatur ex habitu, illa adulator profert, uel si auditor naturaliter uel qualitercumque ad aliqua inclinetur, sicut ad conuiuia facienda uel ad commessationes celebrantes uel libertatem exercendam uel rumores audiendos, semper talia accipit narranda. Et quia homines libenter ad mirabilia audienda , ideo tales continue narrant fabulas, et hii sunt de quibus dicitur, 3º Ethicorum, quod fabularum narratores, de contingentibus conterentes dies, garrulos uocamus. Et ideo talis adulator sic se adaptat et assimilat uoluntati audientis, ideo dicitur amicus apparens: amicorum enim est eadem uoluntas. Et quia adulatio dicitur ab adulatore uel econuerso, ideo, si hoc faciat ex habitu, possumus dicere quod adulatio est habitus quo aliquis eligit et uult dicere et operari talia in quibus scit delectari alium, ut placeat ei. Omnis autem habitus inclinans ad ea que sunt contra rationem rectam habitus malus est et uitium, et iterum omnis habitus ordinatus in malum finem et non rectum est uitium; et talis est adulatio; ergo, inquantum dicitur habitus, uitium est.|

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Item, pro altera parte: inquantum est actus quidam est uitiosus, et hoc patet ex obiecto: est enim operatio eorum que turpia sunt secundum se, ut mendacium, quod secundum se turpe est, ut dicitur 4º Ethicorum; et 50 iterum est operatio extremi in superhabundantia: est enim omnium dictorum enuntiatio ad complacendum, et ideo est actus uitiosus.

Ad rationes dicendum quod illud quod est inductiuum amicitie honeste et uere, hoc non est uitium, et de illa obicis. Sed cum assumis quod adulatio inducit amicitiam, dico quod non ueram amicitiam, 55 secundum quid, et iterum, amicitiam utilem uel delectabilem.

3 0 unusquisque] cui B | uel delectetur] et delectentur B 3 1 similiter] semper B 3 2 quod] om. B 34 ad3…35 commessationes] scrips. comensationes B 35 exercendam] exercendas PB rumores] in mores sed corr. s.l. P 38 3º] 2 PB 4 0 adaptat] aptat B 43 eligit] eligat B 4 5 et2…46 uitium] om. per hom. B 5 2 complacendum] contemplandum P 55 inducit] inducis P | dico…amicitiam2] om. per hom. B 3 8 fabularum…39 uocamus] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.9, 1117b33-1118a1 4 1 amicorum…uoluntas] cf. Arist., Rhet. II.4, 1381a1-10; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.4, 1166a6-8 5 0 mendacium…est] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.7, 1127a29 et b5- 6

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Ad secundam dicendum quod aliqua sunt bona, que tamen in superhabundantia facta sunt; sic autem dicit et facit bona ipse adulator, et adhuc non ad rectum finem, et cetera.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a d u l a t o r e s a c c e p t e n t u r e t d i l i g a n t u r a p u d m o n a r c h a s e t ap u d p o p u l a r e s | B 71rb Arguitur quod non, quia nullus acceptat illum quem estimat esse malum; sed monarche sciunt adulatores esse malos; ergo non sunt eis 5 adulatores accepti. Maior patet quia nullus diligit quod malum esse scit. Minor patet quia monarche, cum se ipsos cognoscant, sciunt bene mendacium adulatoris. Contra: amicus acceptatur ab eo cui est amicus, quia non facile decredit amicus de amico, quem tamen sepe probauit, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum; sed 10 adulator est amicus eius cui adulatur; ergo apud illum acceptatur.

Dicendum quod principantium quidam sunt studiosi et disciplinati, quidam autem non. Primi principantur secundum uirtutem et prudentiam, et apud istos non acceptantur adulatores per se. Cuius ratio est quia isti, cum habeant prudentiam, ut dicitur 3º huius et etiam 6º Ethicorum, pos15 sunt per illam discernere quid utile, quid nociuum, quid bonum, quid malum, quid uerum, quid apparens: de talibus autem nichil uolunt audire nisi secundum rationem, et ideo adulatorem per se, inquantum mentiretur, audire non uolunt. Item, quia prudentes sunt, sciunt quod adulator, licet in 5 7 bona] secundum se add. B 5 8 sic] sicut B 6 , 1 Consequenter queritur] inv. B | acceptentur] acceptantur B | diligantur] diligentur P 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | quem] quam B 5 adulatores accepti] inv. B 6 quia] quod P 7 adulatoris] adulatores B 8 decredit] scrips. decretit P 1 1 quidam] qui P 14 dicitur] om. P | 3º] primo PB | 6º] om. P 5 B 1 6 uolunt] nolunt B 17 mentiretur] uideretur P 1 8 adulator] adulatores sed corr. P 6 ,1 Consequenter…2 populares] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.4, 1292a15-23 8 non…9 probauit] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.4, 1157a21-22: “Non enim facile nulli credere de eo qui in multo tempore ab ipso probatus est” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 526, ll. 1-2) 1 3 isti…14 prudentiam] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a14-16: “dicimus itaque principem studiosum esse bonum et prudentem, politicum autem necessarium esse prudentem” (ed. Susemihl, p. 164, ll. 8-9); cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b7-11: “Propter hoc Periclea et tales prudentes existimamus esse, quoniam ipsis bona et aliis possunt speculari; esse autem tales existimamus dispensativos et politicos” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 482, ll. 12-14)

592

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

manifesto amicus appareat, in se tamen amicus non est; ideo tales non acceptant. 20

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Qui autem sunt non studiosi principes et imprudentes, hii adulatorem acceptant. Cuius ratio est quia quilibet inclinatur ad hoc quod est sibi delectabile et illud acceptat. Prauo autem delectabilia sunt praua, quia dicitur, 4º Ethicorum, quod unusquisque qualis est talia eligit et hoc operatur. Similiter, in 1º eiusdem, dicitur quod unicuique dicitur delectabile ad quod dicitur amicus, et ideo praui principes inclinantur ad audiendum talia, que non sunt bona nec uera. Talia autem proponuntur | ab adulatore, et ideo ipsi diligunt audire adulatorem, et ideo acceptant illum et diligunt. Et ideo apud tales monarchas uel tirannos acceptatur adulator. Et similiter, ubi monarchizat populus, ibi accepti sunt adulatores. Et ratio omnium istorum est quia tam ille quam isti, corruptum habentes ad se appetitum, nesciunt bene iudicare de se; et ideo quidquid boni dicitur de se, hoc credunt et in illo complacent, quia tantum illud credunt esse, quantum dicit illud esse adulator. De malo autem, quod ille diminuit, similiter credunt. Et iterum, quia habent talem appetitum non moderatum uirtute, ideo talia mendacia immoderate audire uolunt et, quia uirtute carent, ideo tales prodigo modo ditant et fouent, ut dicitur 4º Ethicorum. Similiter, quia non habent prudentiam, nesciunt distinguere inter falsum et uerum, et bonum et malum, et honestum et uituperabile, et apparens et occultum. Et signum imprudentis et mali est libenter audire adulatorem.

Ad rationem dicendum quod malus princeps non bene iudicat de se ipso, et ideo non percipit mendacium adulatoris; et quia imprudens est, non cognoscit eius malitiam et apparentiam. Et simile est intelligendum de populo monarchizante, et cetera. 19 manifesto] immanifeste P 2 1 principes] princeps P 2 2 acceptant] acceptat B 2 4 4º] 3 PB 27 uera] uerba P 2 8 ideo ipsi] inv. B | et2…diligunt2] iter. B 2 9 uel] ubi P 3 0 monarchizat] monarchias B 3 1 corruptum] est add. sed exp. B | ad se] s.l. P 3 3 in illo] ideo B | illud] illo P 3 6 carent] caret B 3 7 tales] tale P 4 2 est] et P 4 3 est] om. P 22 Cuius…25 operatur] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.4: “Cuius ratio est quia adulator est qui dicit et operatur ea que opinatur placere, in nullo uolens contristari. Vnusquisque autem diligit suam excellentiam et uult esse certus de ipsa” (ed. Lanza, p. 170, l. 131-p. 171, l. 133) 24 unusquisque…operatur] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV (75), p. 237; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.7, 1127a27-28; cf. etiam III.6, 1114a32-b1 2 5 unicuique…26 amicus] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a8-9 3 1 tam…32 se1] cf. supra, III, q. 14 3 6 uirtute…37 fouent] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.6, 1127a7-10 40 signum…adulatorem] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.4: “et ideo libenter audit ipsam et illum qui testatur de ea” (ed. Lanza, p. 171, ll. 133-134)

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m m o d u s d e m o c r a t i e u b i m o n a r c h i z a t to t u s p o p u l u s s e c u n d u m s e n t e n t i a m , e t n o n s e c u n d u m l e g e s , s i t p o l i t i a s i m pl i c i t e r

5

Arguitur quod sic, quia pessima oligarchia et pessima tirannis magis remote sunt a politia simpliciter quam democratia, et ille sunt politie; ergo et omnes modi democratie erunt politie. Item, politia est ordo principantium; hec est talis ordo; ergo est politia.

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, tali ratione: ubi non principatur aliquis secundum legem aliquam, ibi non est politia, quia oportet in omni politia, si debet saluari, esse aliquam regulam que sit principium regendi, quia aliter ad finem debitum non perueniretur, nisi esset aliqua regula ab illo fine sumpta apud principantem existens, uel intra per prudentiam suam uel extra per legem explicita; sed hic est neutra lex; ergo non est politia 15 simpliciter.

10

Dicendum quod in omni genere est aliquod primum quod est metrum et causa omnium aliorum que in illo genere sunt, 10º Metaphisice; ergo in genere politiarum erit aliqua prima: hec autem est que primo et principaliter politia dicitur, scilicet , ubi unus secundum uoluntatem suam 20 et rationem optimam principatur | aliis uoluntarie; ergo oportet omnes P 302vb

7 ,1 Consequenter queritur] inv. B | democratie] praem. monarchie sed exp. P 4 Arguitur] praem. et B 6 politie1] politia P politia sed corr. B 10 politia2] om. P 13 principantem] principalitatem B | suam] add. in marg. P 1 7 omnium] om. B | 10º] ut dicitur 4 B 1 8 que] om. B 1 9 ubi] nisi B 20 oportet] oportebit B 7 ,1 Consequenter…3 simpliciter] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.4, 1292a30-37 et 1292a4-7 ubi definitur haec species democratiae 7 politia…principantium] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 9 ubi…11 regendi] Arist., Pol. IV.4, 1292a32-34 10 in…14 explicita] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.4: “in omni politia principatur aliquis secundum aliquam regulam, quam dicimus legem. Sed in quibusdam illa regula est interior existens in uoluntate et ratione, in quibusdam est extra in scripto” (ed. Lanza, p. 172, ll. 193-196) 1 6 Dicendum…19 regnum] idem argumentum invenitur in Petri Scripto III.13: “inter politias rectas, regnum est optima et rectissima politiarum, et ideo regula et mensura aliarum: optimum enim perfectissimum in unoquoque genere mensura est omnium aliorum, propter quod primo dicendum est de regno” (ed. Lanza, p. 105, ll. 10-13) | in…17 sunt] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19, 31-32 19 regnum…20 uoluntarie] cf. supra, III, q. 23, ll. 3-4

594

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PETRI DE ALVERNIA

alias ab ista mensurari et aliqualiter ab ista deficere, sicut principiatum a principio. Aristocratia autem | conuenit cum ista in unitate finis, licet in uia ad illum finem differat ab ea propter pluritatem principantium. Item, politia differt ab illa, non multum autem. Et quia quod prope est ad esse uidetur, ideo iste due, cum parum declinent a 25 rectissima politia, reputantur adhuc politie recte, aliqualiter tamen sunt uitiate, ut dicitur hic. Alie autem, ut transgresse, deficiunt ab illa prima uel ab aliqua earum que illi prime prope sunt, et hoc ex parte finis qui est principalis; et ideo, quia in principali , ideo non dicuntur politie absolute, sed cum 30 determinatione diminuente, unde dicuntur politie transgresse, quia quando aliquid dicitur de uno per prius et de alio per posterius, tunc ipsum absolute, per se sumptum, dicitur de illo cui primo conuenit, de aliis autem non dicitur nisi per additionem quandam. Et quia democratia ab illis deficit multum secundum finem, ideo non est politia simpliciter, sed 35 politia secundum quid. Sed sicut est ordo in politiis, ita est ordo in modis et speciebus earum, et ideo in modis democratie, quia quidem, secundum 24 prope] proprie B 2 5 nichil…differre] suppl. ex fonte allata 28 ut] non B 2 9 prope] om. B et hoc] om. P uel add. PB 3 3 absolute] et add. B | cui] qui B 3 5 deficit multum] multitudo deficit B 3 6 ita] et add. B 24 quod…25 uidetur] inveni haec verba – forsan locus quidam sunt ex aliqua auctoritate – in cap. 20 tractatus De Natura Generis Thomae de Sutton. Id ipsum dicunt quod Petrus asserere vult, ut opinor, quamobrem eis usus sum ad explendum quod mihi deesse videtur; cf. Thomam de Sutton, De natura generis cap. 20: “... quando est in toto, actu esse dicitur, quia quod prope est ad esse, nihil ab esse differre videtur” (ed. Fiaccadori XVII, p. 22) 2 5 iste…27 hic] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1293b24-27; cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.7: “politia et quedam species aristocratie prius assignate aliquo modo transgressiones sunt primarum politiarum, aliquo modo non. Simpliciter quidem non sunt transgressiones; secundum quid autem sunt, quia omnes politie alie ab optima et rectissima deficiunt ab ipsa” (ed. Lanza, p. 188, ll. 11-15) 3 1 unde…34 quandam] cf. supra, III, q. 4, ll. 21-29 37 in…42 lege] Aristoteles bis enumerat democratiae species: primum in cap. 4, ubi enumerat quinque species; cf. Arist., Pol. IV.4, 1291b30-1292a7: “democratia igitur est prima quidem quae dicitur maxime secundum aequale ... alia autem, quod principatus sint ab honorabilitatibus et brevibus hiis existentibus ... altera species democratiae participare omnes cives, quicunque utique dirigibiles, principari autem legem; altera autem species democratiae alia quidem esse eadem principatuum, si solum sit ciuis, principari autem legem; altera autem species democratie alia quidem esse eadem, dominans autem esse multitudinem et non legem, hec autem fit, quando sententie fuerint domine, sed non lex” (ed. Susemihl, p. 394, l. 4-p. 395, l. 9); cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.4 (ed. Lanza, p. 168, l. 50-p. 169, l. 102). Deinde, in cap. 6 eiusdem libri, ubi enumerat quattuor democratiae species; cf. Arist., Pol. IV.6, 1292b22-1293a10: “Quando quidem igitur quod agricultivum et quod possidet mediocrem substantiam fuerint dominans politiae, politizant secundum leges ... Haec quidem igitur una species democratiae ... altera autem species propter consequentem electionem ... propter quod quidem in tali democratia leges principan-

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rem et ueritatem, est primus omnium, ubi principantur aliqui secundum aliquam dignitatem et secundum leges; secundus, ubi omnes, saltim 40 dirigibiles, principantur secundum leges; tertius autem, ubi tota multitudo secundum legem; quartus, qui est pessimus, ubi principatur tota multitudo indifferenter et sine omni lege. Dicendum ergo quod iste quartus modus, de quo est questio, nec est politia, propter rationem predictam, absolute, nec est democratia absolute, 45 quia non attingit ad leges, que sunt de ratione democratie primo modo dicte. Similiter est in modis oligarchie quedam anologia et in modis tirannidis, ita quod, saltim peiores istarum, nec sunt politie simpliciter nec sunt oligarchie simpliciter nec tirannides simpliciter. Et ideo omnes isti modi sunt proportionales, sed differunt, quia pessimus modus democratie minus 50 distat a politia quam modus oligarchie ultimus, et maxime distat ab illa modus ultimus tirannidis.

3 8 ubi] nisi B 39 et] hoc add. B | secundus] secundum B | ubi] nisi B | saltim] om. B 4 1 principatur] principantur B 4 2 et] etiam B 43 est2] om. P 45 quia…leges] om. B 4 6 oligarchie] oligarchia B 47 peiores] unus add. P minus add. B | nec2…48 simpliciter2] om. per hom. B 5 0 politia] primo modo dicta add. B tur ... tertia autem species omnibus licere, quicunque utique liberi fuerint, participare politia, non tamen participare propter predictam caussam, quare necessarium et in hac principari legem: quarta autem species democratiae ... participant quidem omnes politia propter excessum multitudinis, communicant autem et politizant ... fit multitudo egenorum dominans politiae, sed non leges” (ed. Susemihl, p. 400, l. 3-p. 402, l. 7); cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.5 (ed. Lanza, p. 177, l. 41-p. 179, l. 101). Modi democratiae ut hic inveniuntur, ex mixtione duarum enumerationum quae nunc memoratae sunt consequuntur, ut sequitur: primus modus idem est atque prima species democratiae ex secunda enumeratione Aristotelis textus; secundus modus idem est atque tertia species ex prima enumeratione Aristotelis; tertius modus idem est atque quarta species ex prima enumeratione et tertia species ex secunda enumeratione Aristotelis; quartus modus idem est atque quinta species ex prima enumeratione et quarta species ex secunda Aristotelis 3 8 primus…39 leges] sic similiter in Petri Scripto IV.5: “et quia ... oportet aliquos quandoque assumi ad principatum, ordinatur quod principentur secundum leges. Alii etiam, qui habent aliquam dignitatem ... secundum legem possunt assumi ad principatum” (ed. Lanza, p. 177, ll. 50-54). Loco verbi ‘dignitatem’, Aristotelis textus habet “honorabilitatem” (“... eum possideant honorabilitatem ...”: IV.6, 1292b30, ed. Susemihl, p. 400, l. 11); idem in Alberti Pol. IV.5 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 352) 46 Similiter…51 tirannidis] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.5, 1292b5-10: “quarta autem, quando extiterit quod nunc dictum est et principetur non lex, sed principes, et est convertibilis haec in oligarchiis sicut tyrannis in monarchiis et, de qua diximus, ultima democratia in democratiis: et vocant autem talem oligarchiam potentatum” (ed. Susemihl, p. 398, l. 13-p. 399, l. 4)

596

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Sed intelligendum quod nomina eis imponimus que magis nota sunt: significare enim sequitur intelligere, 4º Metaphisice. Et quia ultimus democratie magis notus fuit apud quosdam, ut apud orientales, et quia magis innotuit propter maiorem distantiam a politiis rectis, ideo, 55 licet in re sit ultimus et pessimus eorum que sub nomine significantur, primo tamen significatur per nomen. Similiter in | tirannide ultimus modus secundum rem oportet, eorum que sunt sub nomine, primo significari per nomen.

Ad rationes dicendum quod nec illi modi, de quibus obicis, dicun- 60 tur politie absolute: sunt enim peiores isto quia, sicut oligarchia et tirannis peiores sunt quam democratia, ita pessimus modus illarum peior est pessimo modo democratie. Ad secundam dicendum quod ordo est a ratione, et ideo sapientis est ordinare, ut dicitur 1º Metaphisice. Et ideo, sicut in rebus nature aliquid est primum inter ordinata, ita etiam in rebus rationis ordinatis erit aliquod primum, a quo et per comparationem ad quod omnia denominationem accipiunt que sunt in genere et, per remotionem ab eo, nomine generis et natura priuantur, ita quod non conuenit eis simpliciter, sed tantum cum determinatione diminuente et secundum quid, et cetera.

5 2 imponimus] in peius B | magis] nobis B 53 significare] significate B | intelligere] ut dicitur add. B | ultimus] ulterius PB 5 4 ut] non B 5 5 innotuit] scrips. innotuet P 5 7 Similiter] per add. B | Similiter…59 nomen] iter. B 58 modus] om. P | eorum] earum P | significari] significatur PB 6 1 absolute] alte B 6 6 etiam] et B | ordinatis] ordinatio B 6 7 comparationem] compositionem B 6 9 priuantur] priuatur P 5 3 significare…intelligere] cf. Arist., Metaph. IV.4, 1006b10-11 | Et…57 nomen] eadem asseruntur in Petri Scripto IV.4: “… non est idem quod primo significatur per nomen et primum eorum que sunt secundum rem sub nomine … ultimus modus democratie, de quo hic loquitur Aristoteles, primo cadit sub nomine democratie, quia magis notus est; secundus tamen et tertius magis sunt democratici secundum rem, et priores natura, et minus recedunt ab optima politia” (ed. Lanza, p. 173, ll. 211-212 et 215-218) 64 sapientis…65 ordinare] Auct. Arist., Metaph. I (13), p. 116; Arist., Metaph. I.2, 982a17-19

65

70

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C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o s s i b i l e s i t c i u i t a t e m a l i q u a m u i u er e s e c u n d u m p o l i t i a m u n a m e t o b s e r u a r e l e g e s a l te r i u s p o l i t i e Arguitur quod non, quia impossibile est ciuitatem unam existentem uiuere modis contrariis uel oppositis; sed hoc fieret si 5 uiuerent secundum unum modum et tenerent leges oppositas, quia lex est enuntiatio quedam uniuersalis significans modum uiuendi. Item, impossibile est ciuitatem unam existentem intendere diuersos fines; sed talis ciuitas intenderet diuersos fines; quare hoc est impossibile. 10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia minus uidetur quod una ciuitas possit conuersari secundum politias diuersas quam uiuere secundum unam et tenere leges alterius, eo quod politia magis uidetur opponi politie quam politia legi; nunc autem alique ciuitates uiuunt simul secundum diuersas politias; ergo et illud magis possibile est uel saltim uidetur.

15

Dicendum quod tenere leges secundum aliquam politiam est uiuere secundum illam politiam, quia tenere leges est facere ea que intendit lex ad politiam ordinata. Ergo querere utrum aliqua ciuitas possit uiuere secundum unam politiam et tenere leges alterius sicut quereretur utrum posset uiuere secundum politias diuersas, et hec duo non differunt.

8, 1 Consequenter queritur] inv. B | possibile] politie B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | ciuitatem unam] inv. B 5 unum modum] modum bonum P 6 enuntiatio quedam] inv. B 7 ciuitatem unam] inv. B 8 quare] quia B 10 quia] quod B 1 4 et illud] istud B | est] om. P 16 est] et P 18 quereretur] queritur B 8, 1 Consequenter…2 politie] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.5, 1292b11-21; verba huius tituli valde similia sunt illis quae inveniuntur in Petri Scripto IV.5: “si aliqui uiuant secundum unam politiam et regantur per leges alterius politie” (ed. Lanza, p. 176, ll. 10-11) 5 lex…6 uiuendi] cf. supra, II, q. 9, ll. 19-20 et Petrum, Scriptum IV.1: “Leges enim separate, seorsum accepte, sunt enuntiationes de agibilibus significantes predictum ordinem” (ed. Lanza, p. 145, ll. 141-142) 7 impossibile…9 impossibile] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.5: “si aliqui uiuant secundum unam politiam et regantur per leges alterius politie, simul et semel intendunt diuersos fines, uel eadem politia tendit in diuersos fines. Sed hoc est inpossibile” (ed. Lanza, p. 176, ll. 10-13)

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Et ideo dicendum ad hoc quod contraria simpliciter et secundum actum 20 perfectum simul eidem non possunt inesse; contraria tamen ambo secundum quid, uel unum simpliciter et aliud secundum quid, eidem inesse bene est possibile. B 71vb

P 303rb

Vnde dicendum quod ciuitatem | unam existentem impossibile est regi diuersis politiis, et similiter impossibile est uiuere secundum unam poli- 25 tiam et tenere leges alterius, quod idem est. Et huius ratio est per rationes predictas. Primo, quia impossibile est contraria eidem simul inesse; et iterum, quia impossibile est ciuitatem unam existentem intendere diuersos fines: unitas enim finis est ex unitate ordinis, unitas autem ordinis attenditur ex unitate primi in illo, quare impossibile est unam ciuitatem intendere 30 simpliciter duos fines. Secundum quid autem possibile est, uel | alterum secundum quid, quia sic bene contingit contraria eidem simul inesse, sicut in politiis mixtis, ubi unius politie modus seruatur in uno, modus autem alterius in alio; in eodem autem impossibile est 35 modum utriusque simpliciter seruari.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad rationes utriusque partis.

21 non…22 eidem] om. per hom. B | tamen] cum P 2 4 impossibile] impossibili B 27 contraria…28 est] om. per hom. P 2 8 intendere] extendere sed corr. B 3 0 quare] quia B | est] om. P 31 autem…32 quid] om. per hom. B | unum…32 et] suppl. ex supra, l. 22 3 2 sic] sicut B 3 3 sicut] patet add. B | ubi] nisi B 3 5 simpliciter] om. P 20 dicendum…23 possibile] eadem ipsa solutio proponitur in Petri Scripto IV.5: “Dicendum quod non est possibile quod aliqui simpliciter uiuant secundum unam politiam et simpliciter leges in illa sint secundum aliam, quia simul tenderent in diuersos fines simpliciter, quod non est possibile. Sed possibile est quod aliqui secundum quid uiuant secundum unam politiam, et secundum quid regantur legibus alterius politie, uel simpliciter quidem uiuant secundum unam politiam, regantur autem in aliquibus legibus alterius, uel econtrario” (ed. Lanza, p. 176, ll. 14-20) 2 7 impossibile…inesse] Arist., Metaph. IV.6, 1011b15-18 29 unitas2…30 illo] Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a13-15; cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. XII (278), p. 138

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o l i t i a , q u e a l i o n o m i n e d i c i t u r t y m o c r at i a , m i x t a s i t e x d e m o c r at i a e t o l i g a r c h i a Arguitur quod non, quia mixta dicuntur que sunt composita ex talibus que sunt actiua et passiua; sed neutra istarum agit in aliam; ergo ex 5 eis non potest aliquid dici mixtum. Item, si ista sit mixta ex illis, tunc oportet uel illas manere uel corrumpi. Si autem manent, tunc non erit magis mixta quam prius; si corrumpuntur, tunc erit aliqua noua ab illis generata, et tunc ista non erit mixta: mixtum enim uult esse ex aliqualiter remanentibus. 10

Contra: quidquid habet proprietates medias inter proprietates aliquorum duorum, illud est mixtum ex illis duobus; sed ista habet proprietates medias; et cetera.

Dicendum quod mixtio primo inuenitur in naturalibus, et ibi mixtio dicitur miscibilium alteratorum unio. Talia miscibilia sunt que sunt mutuo 15 actiua et passiua bene separabilia, ut dicitur in De Generatione. Et ideo breuiter ad mixtum uidentur tria concurrere: primo, quod sit una eorum materia, et ideo simplicium et compositorum dicimus esse unam mate-

9 ,1 Consequenter queritur] inv. B | dicitur] uocatur B 2 tymocratia] scrips. mocratia B | sit] et add. B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 actiua…passiua] actio et passio B | aliam] alia B 8 aliqua] alia B 9 mixta] om. B 10 quidquid habet] quod habent B | medias…proprietates2] om. per hom. B 1 1 habet] habent B 13 in] animalibus add. sed exp. B 1 4 unio] om. B | sunt que] autem B 1 6 uidentur] uidetur B 9 ,1 Consequenter…2 oligarchia] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1293b33-34; tymocratia est nomen quod huic politiae etiam assignatur in Ethica; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1160a33-36; cf. Aspasium, Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 2: “... dividit politiam in tres species, in regnum scilicet et aristocratiam et timocratiam ... Etsi illam consueverunt plures vocare politiam, non est tamen omnino proprie dicta politia” (ed. Mercken, p. 159, ll. 33-34 et 42-43) 3 mixta…4 passiua] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 328b20-21 6 si…9 mixta] hoc argumentum desumptum esse videtur ex Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 327a34-b4 1 0 quidquid…12 medias] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.7: “politia simpliciter, ut est dicere, mixta est ex oligarchia et democratia – quia in politia actu et simpliciter non manent ratio oligarchie et democratie, sed tantum uirtute, sicut miscibilia manent in eo quod componitur ex eis – hoc autem habet rationem medii. Ratio autem medii cognoscitur ex rationibus extremorum; quare manifestum est quod politia cognoscitur per rationes oligarchie et democratie” (ed. Lanza, p. 185, ll. 39- 45) 1 3 mixtio2…14 unio] Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I (18), p. 168; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 328b22 1 4 Talia…15 separabilia] Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 327b27-29 et 328b20-21

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riam; secundo, quod mixtum formam aliam habeat a formis illorum miscibilium; tertio, quod miscibilia aliqualiter in mixto maneant. Et in eis que sunt secundum rationem, proportionaliter ad ista dicitur 20 esse mixtio, sicut dicimus uirtutem esse mixtam ex uitiis, quia una est eorum materia et diuersa forma, et quia alique operationes extremorum uitiorum aliqualiter manet in medio uirtutis. Similiter, in proposito, politia dicitur esse mixta ex democratia et oligarchia. Primo, quia una est materia eius et illarum: sicut enim ille sunt ex 25 diuitibus et pauperibus, sic ista. Secundo, quia forma eius alia est a formis illarum. Cuius ratio est quia fines diuersi: finis enim, cum consequatur naturam, distinguit formam et rationem rei quam consequitur; modo finis politie est bonum commune omnium, tam pauperum quam diuitum; illarum autem 30 fines sunt speciales: democratie enim finis est bonum pauperum tantum, oligarchie autem bonum diuitum tantum. Tertio, quia proprietates illarum manent aliqualiter in ista, quod contingit uidere tripliciter et quantum ad tria. Primo quidem, quantum ad assumptionem personarum ad principatum: in democratia enim tantum 35 assumuntur pauperes secundum libertatem, in oligarchia autem diuites 29 consequitur] consequatur B 3 0 autem] enim finis P 3 1 bonum] in marg. P 3 3 manent aliqualiter] aliquarum manent B 34 tripliciter] om. B | quantum2] quoniam P 36 assumuntur] assumunt B 21 dicimus…23 uirtutis] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (38), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106a2829 et b14-16; cf. etiam Petrum, QQ. Eth. II, q. 16, ad 2: “Et cum dicitur quod virtus sit composita ex extremis, verum est quod habitus compositus ex extremis, sed non secundum quod extrema manent sub racionibus propriis, sicut si aliquis argueret tepidum esse medium inter calidum et frigidum quia est compositum ex illis. Non valent saltim secundum quod ista manent sub racionibus propriis” (ed. Celano, p. 106, l. 34-p. 107, l. 1) 3 4 quantum1…42 utrosque] termini sive principia mixtionis ex qua consequitur haec politia tantum memorata sunt in Latina translatione ut sequitur: “sunt autem termini tres compositionis et mixtionis” (IV.9, 1294a35-36, ed. Susemihl, p. 410, l. 12). Eisdem ipsis verbis Petrus utitur in Scripto, ubi exponit eumdem Aristotelis textum; cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.8: “circa principatum tria est considerare ... secundum hoc ista pars diuiditur in tres partes: in prima declarat terminum et rationem mixtionis politie ex ipsis quantum ad actus principantium; secundo quantum ad personas que debent assumi ad principatum ... tertio quantum ad institutionem ipsorum ... et una ratio est quantum ad actum principantium qui est iudicare ... quantum ad personas que debent assumi ad principatum ... in hoc consistit ratio politie, quod scilicet accipiatur princeps secundum mediam honorabilitatem ... quantum ad institutionem personarum que debent assumi ad principatum” (ed. Lanza, p. 191, ll. 17, 19-23, 25 et p. 192, ll. 56-60). Eadem etiam est interpretatio quae in utroque textu invenitur, sed in Scripto Petrus magis eam disserit. Hic autem semper addit virtutem ut conditionem assumptioni ad principatum

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secundum honorabilitatem; in ista autem medii uel utrique secundum uirtutem. Secundo, quantum ad modum eligendi principes, quia in oligarchia | eliguntur inspiciendo ad diuitias, in democratia autem ad libertatem; P 303va 40 hic autem inspiciendo in utrumque istorum, et cum hoc principaliter ad bonum uirtutis. Tertio, quantum ad actum principantium, quia oligarchia solos diuites saluat, democratia autem pauperes, politia autem utrosque. Et ideo politia uel tymocratia dicitur mixta ex illis, secundum proportionem et similitudinem mixtionis in naturalibus.

Per hoc patet ad rationem primam, quia illa procedit de mixtis secundum ueritatem et rem, ista autem mixta est solum secundum similitudinem. Vel dicendum quod, licet oligarchia et democratia inuicem se non corrumpantur, tamen ciues participantes has inuicem se opprimunt, propter diuersitatem et contrarietatem appetituum et uoluntatum, et per 50 consequens ordinationum: in oligarchia enim, ubi principantur diuites, opprimuntur pauperes et democratia econuerso. 45

Ad secundam dicendum quod miscibilia nec corrumpuntur omnino nec simpliciter manent in actu perfecto in mixto, sed medio modo: secundum aliquid enim corrumpuntur et secundum aliquid ma-

3 7 utrique] scrips. utrinque B 41 actum] actus B 4 2 diuites] diues B | saluat] salua P 4 5 patet] transp. ante Per hoc B 46 rem] ideo B | est] s.l. P 4 8 corrumpantur] corrumpat P corrumpitur B | tamen] cum P | se] sibi B 5 0 ubi] nisi B 5 3 nec…perfecto] om. P 54 et…58 corrumpuntur] om. per hom. P 54 secundum1…62 aliqualiter] cf. Petrum, QQ. De Sensu q. 38 (Vtrum forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus): “dicendum quod elementa miscentur quantum ad qualitates per quas agunt et patiuntur, et non miscentur quantum ad formas substantiales ita quod recipiant magis et minus; immo dicendum quod formae substantiales elementorum sunt corruptae in mixto et non manent ibi nisi virtute, sed formae vel qualitates accidentales sunt ibi admixtae” (ed. White, p. 73); cf. Petrum, QQ. De Caelo I, q. 10 (ed. Galle, pp. 61-62, ll. 18-29); cf. Thomam, De Mixt. Elem.: “impossibile est formas substantiales elementorum suscipere magis et minus ... Ex contrariis autem qualitatibus que recipiunt magis et minus, constitui potest media qualitas que sapiat utriusque extremi naturam ... Sic igitur remissis excellentiis qualitatum elementarium, constituitur ex hiis quedam qualitas media que est propria qualitas corporis mixti, differens tamen in diuersis secundum diuersam mixtionis proportionem; et hec quidem qualitas est propria dispositio ad formam corporis mixti, sicut qualitas simplex ad formam corporis simplicis. Sicut igitur extrema inueniuntur in medio quod participat naturam utriusque, sic qualitates simplicium corporum inueniuntur in propria qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autem simplicis corporis est quidem aliud a forma substantiali ipsius, agit tamen in uirtute forme substantialis; alioquin calor calefaceret tantum, non autem per eius actionem forma substantialis educeretur in actum, cum nichil agat ultra

602

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nent, non intelligendo istam intensionem uel remissionem uel istum 55 medium modum secundum formas substantiales – siquid iste non recipiunt magis et minus –, sed intelligendo sic: secundum formas substantiales omnino corrumpuntur et generatur ex eis noua forma mixti, quam, | cum sit generata ex illis ambabus, consequuntur; nec proprietates solum unius nec alterius solum , sed proprietates medie, et ita 60 proprietates illorum miscibilium, per participationem illius noue proprietatis medie, dicuntur remanere ambe aliqualiter. Et similiter est in proposito, quia nec manet democratia nec oligarchia, nec earum proprietates perfecte et secundum se, sed generatur noua forma politie, quam consequuntur proprietates medie inter illas, et per participationem illius dicun- 65 tur proprietates priores secundum aliquid remanere, et cetera. < Q UE S T I O 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m i s t a p o l i t i a s i t r e c t a e t b o n a Arguitur quod non, quia quod componitur ex prauis non est bonum; sed ipsa componitur ex prauis, ut dictum est; ergo non est bona.

5 5 intelligendo] in colligendo B | intensionem] intentionem B 5 8 generatur] generantur B 5 9 consequuntur] consequitur B 6 0 manent] suppl. ex ll. 53 et 63 6 4 generatur] generantur in B 66 aliquid] quid P 10 ,1 recta…bona] bona et recta B 2 Arguitur] praem. et B suam speciem. Sic igitur uirtutes formarum substantialium simplicium corporum in corporibus mixtis saluantur” (ed. Leon. XLIII, pp. 156-157, ll. 90-91, 125-128, 130-147) 56 formas…57 minus] cf. Arist., Cat. 5, 3b33-34; Auct. Arist., Metaph. VIII (205), p. 132; Arist., Metaph. VIII.3, 1044a9-10 6 2 similiter…66 remanere] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.8: “Hoc enim contingit quia mixta est ex illis. In mixto enim manent miscibilia aliqualiter, et in medio extrema: medium enim, comparatum ad utrumque extremorum, apparet esse utrumque. Tunc igitur bene mixta est politia ex oligarchia et democratia quando in politia apparet oligarchia et democratia” (ed. Lanza, pp. 193, ll. 83-87); IV.8: “in politia bene mixta ex democratia et oligarchia oportet quod utrumque extremorum esse uideatur et neutrum. Oportet quidem quod utrumque uideatur, quia in mixto manent aliquo modo miscibilia; quare, si bene fuerit mixta politia ex illis, oportet quod in politia aliquo modo appareat oligarchia et democratia. Item, oportet quod neutrum uideatur, scilicet secundum actum: nam in mixto non saluantur miscibilia secundum actus proprios; et ideo in politia non debet apparere oligarchia simpliciter et secundum actum suum; similiter, nec democratia” (ibid., p. 195, ll. 110-117); IV.11: “... qualiter politia sit miscenda ex oligarchia et democratia. Et dicit quod manifestum est ex dictis qualiter politia miscenda est ex illis: mixtum enim debet aliqualiter habere miscibilia et aliqualiter non; et ideo, si recte fiat mixtio ex istis, oportet accipere ea que pertinent utrisque secundum partem” (ibid., p. 216, ll. 183-186). Notandum est quod Albertus numquam hac doctrina utitur ubi interpretat eosdem Aristotelis locos; cf. Albertum, Pol. IV.7 (ed. Borgnet VIII, pp. 366-368) et IV.10 (ibid., p. 389) 10 ,3 ipsa…est1] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 20-24

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Item, illa politia non est recta in qua non attenditur bonus finis, qui est operatio secundum rationem; sed in ista non attenditur finis secundum rationem; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia operatio secundum rationem non attenditur in illa politia ubi principatus non distribuitur secundum dignitatem uirtutis, sed secundum aliqua alia; sed hoc fit in ista, ut prius uisum est in isto capitulo, quia dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod democratia 10 distribuit principatus secundum libertatem, oligarchia autem secundum diuitias, politia autem secundum utrumque: neutrum autem istorum est uirtus; ergo et cetera. 5

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Et dicendum est quod ista politia, que appropriato nomine politia uel tymocratia dicitur, est recta. Cuius ratio est quia politia est ordo habitantium in ciuitate; ordo autem habitudinem habet ad primum in ordine, ut prius patuit, et ideo bonum ordinis conuenit considerare ex duobus, scilicet uel ex bonitate sui ipsius in se et in bonitate etiam illius primi in ordine. Ex hoc arguitur: illa politia que intendit bonum finem, qui est primi 20 in ordine eorum que in finem, | et secundum se bene ad illum finem est P 303vb ordinata, est bona, ut dicetur 7º huius; sed talis est ista; ergo est bona et recta. Probatio minoris: bonum enim commune finis rectus et bonus, immo optimus est, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; hoc autem politia uel tymocratia intendit per se, ut dictum est in 3º. 15

25

Item, ipsa bene ordinata est ad illum finem, quod apparet ex dictis: ipsa enim ordinationem suam accipit mediam inter ordinationes duarum

4 bonus…5 attenditur] om. per hom. P 8 secundum] solus B | in] scrips. ia B 9 est] om. P 10 libertatem] aliquam add. B 1 4 que] est add. B 15 est1] et P 20 eorum] illorum B secundum] in B | est] om. P 2 1 dicetur] in add. B 2 2 commune] sequitur B 2 3 hoc] habent P | politia] id est add. B 8 hoc…11 utrumque] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 34-42 et Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a9-11; cf. etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. V.3, 1131a25-29 13 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1293b23-27; cf. etiam IV.2, 1289a26-28 et III.7, 1279a37-39 15 politia…16 ciuitate] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 16 ordo…17 patuit] cf. supra, IV, q. 4, ll. 43-49 17 bonum…20 finem1] de hoc argumento cf. quod asseritur in Thomae textu supra allato, in adn. ad II, q. 1, ll. 36- 42 19 illa…21 bona1] hic indicare videtur totum librum VIIum, ubi agitur de optima politia 22 bonum…23 est] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b7-10; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233 2 3 hoc…24 se] cf. supra, III, q. 13, ll. 43- 47; Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a37-39

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politiarum; medium autem rationem boni habet, ut dicitur in 2º Ethicorum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod compositum “ex prauis non est bonum” uerum est, si illa mala remaneant actualiter in eo. Si autem non 30 remaneant actualiter secundum quod rationem mali habent, sed quodam modo medio, secundum quod rationem boni participant, tunc compositum ex illis erit bonum propter eandem causam, quia accipit medium duorum, quod rationem boni habet. Ad secundam dicendum quod in ista politia intenditur rectus finis, 35 scilicet bonum commune secundum proportionem. Ad improbationem dicendum quod principatus in ea distribuitur mediis, qui uel uirtuosi sunt uel magis ad uirtutem inquantum tales inclinantur, et cetera. < Q UE S T I O 1 1 > C o n s e q u en t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m n o b i l i t a s s i t u i r t u s Arguitur quod non, quia nulla uirtus inest nobis a natura, sed per assuefactionem in operibus bonis, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum; nobilitas autem inest nobis a natura, et a generante in filium per naturam deriuatur; ergo 5 non est uirtus. Minor patet: propter hoc enim dicitur uirtus generis. Item, illud quod per se inclinat ad malum non est uirtus; sed nobilitas per se inclinat ad malum; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia nullum bonum per se appetit suum oppositum malum et nullus habitus bonus inclinat per se in operationem malam. Minor patet quia dicitur, 2º Rheto10 rice, quod nobiles despectiui sunt et ambitiosi honorum.

27 autem] quod P | in] om. B 3 0 uerum est] uere PB | in eo] om. B | non] om. P 32 medio] medium P | rationem] ipsum B 3 5 Ad secundam] solutionem B | rectus finis] inv. B 11 , 2 Arguitur] praem. et B 5 patet] quia add. B | enim] om. B 8 bonum] om. B 27 medium…habet] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106b26-27; II.4, 1105b27-28; II.6, 1108a15; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (45), p. 235 1 1, 1 Consequenter…uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a21-22 2 nulla…3 bonis] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a18-20 et 23-26 5 dicitur…generis] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (63), p. 256; Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283a37 (perperam “virtus gentis” in editione Susemihl); Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-19 et 22; Auct. Arist., Rhet. II (49), p. 266 1 0 nobiles…honorum] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b16-17 et 19-21

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione, quia uirtus est que habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit; sed nobilitas est talis, quia, sicut dicitur in 1º et 3º huius, uerisimile est ex bonis genitos esse bonos et sic perfectos per nobilitatem; ergo ipsa est uirtus.

Dicendum quod uirtus dupliciter dicitur: uel secundum actum perfectum, et talis non insit nobis nisi per rationem et electionem, ut patet 2º et 3º 6º Ethicorum; alia autem est uirtus dicta secundum inclinationem tantum ad bonam dispositionem uirtutis, et sic etiam tangit PHILOSOPHUS, 6º Ethicorum, quod tales quidem 20 insunt nobis a natura, et in 2º, cum dicit quod statim nati aliqui sunt temperati, alii liberales. Primo modo nobilitas non est uirtus; cuius ratio est quia nobilitatem non precedunt illa que sunt factiua uirtutis illo modo dicte, scilicet ratio, electio et assuetudo, sed statim natis inest nobilitas, si 15

17 patet] om. P | et1] om. B | alia…18 inclinationem] om. P 18 sic] sicut P 19 tales] talis B quidem] quedam P 2 3 dicte] dicto B | inest] tota B 11 uirtus…12 reddit] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (37), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1106a15-17 et 22-24 13 uerisimile…14 nobilitatem] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (21), p. 253; Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2; Auct. Arist., Pol. III (63), p. 256; Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283a36-37; cf. supra, I, q. 16 15 uirtus…18 uirtutis] saepe Petrus hac distinctione utitur; cf. supra, I, q. 3, ll. 14-16 cum adn. Bis ea utitur etiam in Scripto, ubi agit omnia quae ad nobilitatem pertinent; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.11: “Sed intelligendum circa hoc quod dicit, quod meliores ex melioribus generantur, quod bonus dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum actum perfectum, et sic bonus non generat bonum, quia bonus est secundum intellectum et secundum electionem et exercitationem: non ergo fit bonus aliquis secundum actum perfectum a parentibus. Alio modo dicitur bonus secundum inclinationem ad uirtutem perfectam, et sic bonus uult bonum generare, quia uirtus existens in semine intendit per se generare simile ei a quo est ipsum semen, secundum omnes dispositiones ad quas potest attingere uirtus generatiua; attingit autem ad omnes dispositiones materiales, que inclinant ad dispositiones uoluntatis et intellectus ... de hoc quod dicit, quod ingenuitas est uirtus, intelligendum quod uirtus dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum actum perfectum, et sic nobilitas non est uirtus, sed in ordine ad ipsam dicitur; alio modo dicitur uirtus incohatio quedam et dispositio siue inclinatio ad uirtutem perfectam: isto modo dicitur uirtus nobilitas, si proueniat ex parentibus et illis ex aliis, et sic secundum quandam antiquitatem; si autem proueniat ex quacumque causa, facit liberum” (ed. Lanza, p. 89, ll. 86-95 et p. 90, ll. 99-106). Haec distinctio etiam invenitur in: Pseudo-Rigauld, Quodl. VI, q. 15: Vtrum nobilis generet nobilem (ms. Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, ff. 4vb-5ra et 38ra-b) 16 talis…electionem] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (42), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106b36-1107a2. Vide etiam III.4, 1112a13-16; III.6, 1114b30-1115a3 et VI.9, 1144a17-22 19 tales…21 liberales] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1144b2-6: “Omnibus enim videtur singulos morum existere natura aliqualiter; et enim iusti et temperati et fortes et alia habemus confestim a nativitate” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 492. ll. 4-6); II.7, 1109b1-3: “Intendere autem oportet et ad que et ipsi facile mobiles sumus; alii enim ad alia apti nati sumus” (ibid., p. 409, ll. 9-10)

606 P 304ra

B 72rb

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

sint nati a bonis; et ideo | nobilitas non est uirtus secundum actum perfectum et primo modo. Secundo tamen modo, scilicet secundum quod dicitur 25 uirtus secundum inclinationem ad opera uirtutis, sic nobilitas est uirtus; cuius ratio | est quia dispositiones que inclinant primo et principaliter ad rationem rectam, et per consequens ad operandum operationes uirtutis, et hoc secundum conditiones materie influxas a generante, ille dicuntur uirtutes, saltim secundum inclinationem, ut dictum est. Sed talis est nobili- 30 tas: statim enim nati, nobiles secundum corpus dispositi sunt ad obediendum eis que sunt rationis et ad exercendum opera secundum rationem, et hoc dico secundum dispositiones materiales. Et ideo nobilitas illo modo est uirtus, scilicet secundum inclinationem ad opera uirtutis secundum ratio35 nem.

Ad rationem dicendum per predicta quod nulla uirtus secundum actum perfectum inest nobis a natura; uirtus tamen secundum inclinationem nobis bene inest, ut patet per 2º Ethicorum et 6º. Ad secundam, per idem, quod nulla uirtus existens habitus perfectus in actu inclinat ad malum; uirtus tamen secundum inclinationem 40 solum dicta bene inclinat in aliquid tale. Quod est sic uidere: in tali enim inclinatione naturali est duo considerare, unum quod est inclinatio ad opera uirtutis, aliud quod est imperfectio et defectus eiusdem inclinationis a uirtute perfecta. Ratione primi non inclinat in aliquid malum: est enim sic per se ad uirtutem dispositiuum. Ratione autem sue imperfectionis, 45 cum sit quedam priuatio perfecti – et omnis priuatio est per se causa mali 26 sic] sicut B 2 7 que] om. B 2 8 et2…32 rationem] om. per hom. B 30 Sed] nobilitas add. sed exp. P 3 9 secundam] dicendum add. B 4 4 a] cum P 4 5 imperfectionis] que add. PB 25 Secundo…30 inclinationem] cf. Henricum de Gandavo, Quodl. IX, q. 18: “mores boni et nobiles informant nobiliter virtutem imaginativam, quae hora conceptus, cum habetur affectio ad prolem generandam, in tenerem materiam imprimit secundum conditionem imaginationis dispositionem ad procreandum fetum secundum naturalem dispositionem respondentem nobilitati generantium” (ed. Macken, p. 290, ll. 43- 48) 29 ille…30 est1] cf. supra, ll. 17-21 36 nulla…38 inest] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a19-20; VI.10, 1144b4-6 4 6 omnis…47 defectus] re vera in libro IIo super De caelo et mundo Simplicius tantum loquitur de privatione ubi interpretatur II.3, 286a25 textus Aristotelis: ibi tamen sententia hic a Petro allata inveniri non potest. Cf. potius locum illum libri Ii eiusdem operis, ubi Simplicius loquitur de necessitate privationis ut opposita bono; cf. Simplicium, In De Caelo I.12: “... et privatio speciei necessario facta est, ut subcontrarium aliquid bono fieret extremo, quod secundum privationem ipsius consideratur. Quod si hoc non esset, neque oppositum sibi extremum esset bonum, neque deus omnis utique esset bonitatis causa” (ed. Bossier, p. 510, ll. 81- 85)

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et defectus, ut dicit SIMPLICIUS super 2um De Celo et Mundo –, ipsa potest inclinare in aliquid malum et imperfectum. Nam, inquantum est inclinatio ad uirtutem, sic nobilitas appetit honorem sicut signum et premium 50 uirtutis, ut dicitur 4º Ethicorum; inquantum autem est imperfecta uirtus et deficiens a formali actu ipsius habitus, qui est moderamen rationis, ideo immoderate et non bono modo appetit honorem, et cetera. < Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m n o b i l i t a s s i t u i r t u s g e n e r i s Arguitur quod non, quia ad illud quod est aliquid generis attingit uirtus generatiua; sed hec non attingit ad nobilitatem; ergo nobilitas non est aliquid generis, ergo nec uirtus generis. Minor patet quia nobilitas est 5 dispositio ad uirtutem. Virtus autem generatiua nec ad uirtutem attingit, ut sensu patet, nec ad dispositionem uirtutis. Cuius ratio est quia dispositio uirtutis est in intellectu: cuius enim est potentia per se, eius est actus et econuerso, ut dicitur in De Sompno; sed in intellectu est uirtus, ad minus respectu uirtutis formaliter; ergo et dispositio ad uirtutem erit in intellectu. 10 Et si sic, tunc uirtus generatiua ad illam non attinget, ergo nec ad nobilitatem. Item, si oppositum in opposito, et cetera, et similiter destructiue; nunc autem ignobilitatem non dicimus esse malitiam generis; ergo nec P 304rb nobilitatem dicemus | uirtutem generis. 15

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod nobilitas est dispositio ad uirtutem. Hec autem dispositio non est a parte forme hominis, quia, cum forma sit una in omnibus 4 7 super] supra B 52 bono modo] bene B | et cetera] om. B 12 ,2 quod2] politia potentia add. sed politia del. B | attingit…3 uirtus] om. B 4 est1] om. P 6 ut] nec P nisi B 7 est3] et add. B 1 0 attinget] attingit B 12 et cetera] et propositum in proposito B 1 3 esse] destructiuam add. sed exp. B 14 dicemus] dices B 1 6 ad…dispositio2] om. per hom. B 1 7 est] om. B quia] sicut add. P sic add. B 4 9 honorem…50 uirtutis] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV (68), p. 237; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b35 12 ,1 Consequenter…generis] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a21-22 7 cuius…actus] Auct. Arist., De 1 2 oppositum…opposito] Auct. Som. et Vig. (70), p. 201; Arist., De Som. et Vig. 1, 454a8 Arist., Top. IV (60), p. 326; Arist., Top. IV.3, 124a7-9 15 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a21-22; cf. etiam Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-19 et 22

608

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indiuiduis et unius rationis, hec autem dispositio non est unius rationis in omnibus nec eadem. Item, hec dispositio est naturalis et a natura innata; sed natura non attingit ad formam hominis, que est intellectus; ergo hec 20 dispositio non consequitur formam ipsam. Et ideo est dispositio habentis formam, non autem per formam, ergo per materiam. Modo ita est quod omnes dispositiones materie consequuntur primam dispositionem primarum qualitatum in mixto. Iste autem dispositiones aliquando sunt in generato, non tamen a generante, et tunc 25 dispositio eas consequens non dicetur nobilitas; aliquando autem sunt in generato ita quod a generante, in quo preexistebant. Et tunc quidem, si ab uno solo progenitore descendunt in filium, adhuc non erit nobilitas; si autem multis, secundum totam generis propagationem, tunc talis dispositio, a progenitoribus multis filio innata per longam successionem 30 propagationis, dicitur nobilitas perfecta, et est quedam dispostio materialis a patre et auo et proauo, et sic a multis, in filium deriuata: dispositio – inquam – per quam homo secundum materiam inclinatur ad faciendum opera uirtutis et ad obediendum rationi. Et ex hoc apparet differentia nobilitatis ad libertatem et uirtutem 35 dominatiuam. Libertas enim est dispositio materialis a patre uel a casu, uel etiam secundum unum solum patrem uel nullum, innata filio: dispositio – inquam – ad prompte exequendum opera precepta a uoluntate, cuius est se mouere per se. Et ideo liber est qui potest per se esse principium suo19 omnibus] hominibus add. B 20 que] quia B | intellectus] uirtus B 22 autem] quod P 23 Modo] alio B | omnes] omnis sed corr. P 2 4 in…25 generato] om. B 2 7 preexistebant] 2 8 descendunt] descenderunt B 2 9 generis] genere B preexistente P preexistebat B 3 3 inquam] in quid B 3 8 inquam] inquantum P 39 se mouere] inv. B 19 hec…27 preexistebant] cf. supra, I, q. 16 2 3 omnes…24 mixto] cf. Petrum, QQ. De Caelo I, q. 10: “Et sicut dico de commixtione calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci, similiter de commixtione gravis et levis, quae consequitur aliquam commixtionem primarum qualitatum” (ed. Galle, p. 62, ll. 34-37) 3 5 Et…40 motuum] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.11: “liber autem dicitur qui mente potest preuidere que agenda sunt et inclinatur ad uirtutem; similiter ingenuus. Sed differunt, quia ingenuus dicitur qui habet huiusmodi inclinationem secundum uirtutem perfectam a parentibus, et illi ab aliis, et illi ab aliis, et sic secundum quandam antiquitatem, liber autem qui habet undecumque” (ed. Lanza, p. 88, l. 70-p. 89, l. 75) 3 9 liber…50 potest] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “homo liber dicitur qui per uirtutem intellectualem existentem in eo operatur, non accipiens ab alio rationem operandi nec inpedimentum habens ex parte materie, et qui operatur ad finem qui debetur ei secundum naturam predictam ... Econtrario autem, homo seruus dicitur qui non est natus operari secundum uirtutem intellectus proprii, sed uirtutem et rationem operandi accipiens ab alio, obediens, operatur. Et quia finis correspondet agenti, seruus etiam est qui operatur principaliter ad finem alterius. Et ideo, sicut liber homo est qui est sui ipsius causa, et in ratione finis et agentis, ita seruus qui

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER IV 40

609

rum motuum. Et quia finis proportionatur agenti, ideo, cum talis se moueat per se, ipse etiam erit et operabitur propter se, et ipse non est propter alium. Ratio ergo liberi est posse mouere se gratia sui ipsius, et per hoc differt a seruo, qui non potest mouere se, et item operatur que operatur gratia alterius, ut gratia domini.

Dominatiua autem est bona dispositio corporis et materie, ex quocumque sit, siue a multis seu ab uno: dispositio – inquam – ad bene preuidendum sibi et aliis et ad mouendum se propter se et etiam alios propter se. Et per hoc differt a libero, qui propter se mouet se solum, non alios inquantum huiusmodi; et similiter a seruo, qui nullo modo nec se nec 50 alios mouere potest. 45

Ex hiis patet quod nobilitas, cum sit bona dispositio materie uel compositi ex parte materie, natura autem possit supra materiam et dispositiones | materie primas qualitates consequentes, ipsa nobilitas erit uirtus B 72va innata; et quia a multis progenitoribus uult | esse, ideo dicitur uirtus gene- P 304va 55 ris totius.

Ad rationem dicendum quod potentia ad uirtutes, ad minus potentia et dispositio passiua de qua loquimur hic, potius est ex parte materie quam forme; et ideo minor est falsa, uel saltim non ad propositum. Cum dicit quod potentia ad uirtutem est in intellectu, uerum est, potentia formalis et actiua a ratione: est enim mensura et principium operationum uirtutis. Hoc tamen adhuc forte est dubium: cum intellectus, quantum est de se, semper in actu sit, et cum dicit quod “cuius

4 2 gratia] ergo P | sui] etiam add. B 4 3 item] iterum B 46 sit] est sic B | seu] siue B inquam] inquantum P 47 et3…se3] om. per hom. B 49 alios] om. P 5 1 hiis] ergo add. B 54 uult] uniuersaliter B 5 6 ad2…57 potentia] om. B 5 7 loquimur hic] inv. B | potius] potentia P 5 9 uirtutem] uirtutes B | uerum est] ibi inest P | uerum…63 intellectu] iter. B ad2…60 minus] suppl. ex supra, l. 56 61 uirtutis] uirtutum B neutro istorum modorum est principaliter sibi causa, et hoc uel propter inperfectionem intellectus in eo secundum se uel ex indispositione materie. Et ita uita liberi dicitur uita secundum rationem propriam, serui autem secundum rationem alienam” (ed. Lanza, p. 457, ll. 307-310, 314-323) 4 0 finis…agenti] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26 4 2 Ratio…44 domini] cf. supra, I, q. 10, ll. 11-25; q. 12, ll. 48-54 et q. 13, ll. 27-52 | liberi…ipsius] Auct. Arist., Metaph. I (22), p. 116; Arist., Metaph. I.2, 982b25-26

610

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

est potentia” et cetera, dico quod actus uirtutis non solum est in intellectu, immo uerius in appetitu sensitiuo, ut patet 2º Ethicorum; ratione 65 autem sicut in principio actiuo et regulatiuo. Ad secundam dicendum quod minor est falsa, que dicit quod “ignobilitatem non dicimus esse malitiam generis”: immo, dicimus hoc. < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r ut r u m n o b i l i t a s a b i g n o b i l i i n c i p i a t Arguitur quod non, quia, si incipiat ab ignobili, tunc nullus erit nobilis in illo genere. Probatio consequentie, quia nobilitas est ex antiquitate generis a multis progenitoribus descendens, et sic, ex quo ille esset nobilis, tunc filius eius per rationem istam non esset nobilis, nec item 5 filius illius, quia non nisi ab uno deuenisset ad eum nobilitas; et sic, cum iste secundus filius non esset nobilis, propter istam causam eius filius item non esset nobilis, quia pater non, et sic de omnibus; ergo nullus ibi esset nobilis. Item, non dicimus ignobilitatem oriri ex aliquo nobili; ergo nec 10 nobilitatem ex ignobili. Contra: si nobilitas non incipit ab uno ignobili, tunc sequitur quod in aliquo erit nobilitas in actu infinita. Probatio consequentie supponendo primo, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, quod mundus sit eternus, ut patet ex 8º Phisicorum secundum opinionem Philosophi; secundo accipiendo uerbum 15 eius, quod ipse dicit, 2º Rhetorice, quod filii nobiliores sunt progenitoribus. 63 uirtutis] uirtutum B 64 ratione] ratio P 6 7 esse] om. B 13 ,2 Arguitur] praem. et B 5 item] iterum B 6 deuenisset] descendisset B 8 omnibus] aliis add. B | ibi esset] inv. B 12 uno] in add. B 1 3 erit] est B 1 4 ex…15 Phisicorum] 4 ethicorum B 1 6 nobiliores sunt] inv. B 63 actus…65 regulatiuo] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106b24-1107a2, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Eth. II.3: “pertinet enim ad bonum rationis ut reguletur per eam appetitus sensitivus cuius motus sunt passiones” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 85, ll. 122-124); cf. Petrum, Quodl. V, q. 11: Vtrum virtutes morales sint in appetitu sensitivo an in voluntate seu in appetitu intellectivo sicut in subjecto (ed. Graf, pp. 21*-25*), ubi tamen asseritur quod virtutes morales sunt et in appetitu sensitivo et in voluntate 1 3 , 1 Consequenter…incipiat] eadem quaestio etiam invenitur in Henrico de Gandavo, Quodl. IX, q. 18 (ed. Macken, pp. 288-292) 14 mundus…eternus] cf. Arist., Phys. VIII.1, 251a9-252a4; cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. VIII (202), p. 156 1 6 filii…progenitoribus] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b19-21, ubi tamen asseritur: “Et despectivum etiam similium progenitoribus ipsorum, quia longe hec magis quam prope facta honorabilia et magis iactitabilia” (AL XXXI.1-2, p. 250, ll. 29-31)

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Modo accipiam ergo unum nobilem: iste nobilior est patre, et ille pater suo patre, et ille suo, et sic in infinitum propter infinitatem predecessorum; ergo iste primo acceptus nobilitate excedet infinitos; hoc autem esse non 20 potest, nisi habeat nobilitatem infinitam. Hoc autem est falsum et impossibile, ergo et antecedens.

Dicendum quod, si nobilitas est uirtus generis non per unam generationem, sed per plures ad aliquem deuoluta, tunc necesse est eam ab uno primo ignobili procedere. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dicitur 2º Rhetorice, 25 nos uidemus nobilitatem aliquando in aliquo genere corrumpi, et sic nobilitas secundum eum corrumpitur per successionem generis et nature; quod | autem corrumpitur per naturam, necesse est quod generabile sit per P 304vb naturam: hoc autem nunquam negauit aliquis philosophorum, licet econuerso bene negetur. Si ergo nobilitas corrumpitur per naturam, et genera30 bitur per naturam et, si sic, tunc necessario habebit principium et, cum principium ex quo fit aliquid necessario habeat priuationem istius admixtam sibi, ut dicitur 7º Phisicorum, tunc illud principium erit habens ignobilitatem: et sic ab ignobili incipiet nobilitas.

17 accipiam ergo] inv. B 18 infinitum propter] om. B 22 Dicendum…non] om. B | generationem] rationem P 2 3 eam] unam B 2 8 autem] enim B | negauit aliquis] inv. B 2 9 Si] om. B 3 0 cum] tamen B 2 5 nos…corrumpi] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b23-24 3 1 principium…32 sibi] non inveni in VIIº Physicorum. Si tamen consideretur quod Petrus hic disserit de dispositionibus materialibus, tunc possibile est quod potius indicare velit Arist., Phys. I.9, 192a25-28, ubi agitur de privatione quae materiae inhaeret. Ad hanc coniecturam corroborandam, cf. etiam locum illum Henrici Bate Speculi ubi verba valde similia ad idem asserendum utuntur: Henricus Bate, Speculum Divinorum et Quorundam Naturalium Pars IV, cap. 10: “Non posset enim materia semper esse in potentia nisi privationem sibi admixtam haberet” (ed. Steel, p. 20, ll. 66- 68)

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Item, omnes dispositiones materiales inferiorum reduci habent ad motum superiorum, ut dicitur 1º Meteororum; sed ingenuitas est disposi- 35 tio materialis in genere; ergo oportet ipsam reduci ad motum aliquem superiorum. Non autem potest reduci ad motum uniformem, quia tunc semper eodem modo incorrumpibiliter se haberet et equaliter omnibus inesset, quod falsum est. Ergo oportet eam reduci ad aliquam dispositionem uariabilem superiorum. Non autem potest reduci ad motum stelle 40 alicuius planete, quia tunc, secundum accessum et recessum illius planete, uariaretur nobilitas. Ergo de necessitate oportet eam reduci ad aliquam figuram stellarum, aliquando per motum ad talem figuram concurrentium. Hec autem principium et finem necessario sui motus habebit, ex quo noua est, et ideo nobilitas, secundum illam uariabilis, habebit principium; hoc 45 autem non potest esse nobile, ut prius patuit; ergo et cetera.

Ad rationem dicendum quod consequentia non ualet, et ad probationem dicendum quod erit ponere primum nobile. In nobilitate enim duo 3 9 ad] om. P 4 3 aliquando…concurrentium] conturbantium P 4 8 primum nobile] nobilem B | nobile] mobile sed corr. P 3 4 omnes…35 superiorum] Auct. Arist., Meteor. I (2), p. 171; Arist., Meteor. I.2, 339a21-24 omnes…43 concurrentium] saepe in suis operibus Petrus agit de figura caelesti et de vi quam habet supra homines; cf. infra, V, q. 6 et praesertim VII, q. 8, sed etiam Petrum, Scriptum VII.4 (ed. Lanza, p. 474, l. 22-p. 475, l. 26) et, adhuc magis, VII.5: “dispositiones naturales rerum naturalium que sunt hic reducuntur in dispositionem celestem, sicut dicit Philosophus in 1º Metheororum ... Dispositio autem celestis per comparationem ad ea que sunt hic, duplex est. Vna communis, que attenditur secundum propinquitatem uel remotionem a uia solis, qui maxime mouet ista inferiora ... Alia autem est dispositio celestis, in ordine ad ea que sunt hic, que attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad se inuicem et ad fixas, et in ordine ad ea que sunt hic. Et ista dispositio uel ista figura continue alia et alia est aliquo modo, quamuis non sensibiliter hoc appareat, et respectu alterius et alterius loci alia et alia, ita quod, si respectu huius regionis sit nunc talis figura celestis, consequenter in alio tempore erit alia, et si respectu huius regionis sit talis, respectu alterius erit alia” (ibid., p. 484, ll. 95-97 et p. 485, ll. 100-103, 110-116); cf. etiam Petrum, QQ. Phys. IV, q. 4 (ed. Delhaye, pp. 150-151) 4 2 Ergo…43 concurrentium] probabiliter agitur hic de secunda forma dispositionis caelestis, de qua cf. locum ex Scripto in nota praec. allatum (“dispositio celestis, in ordine ad ea que sunt hic, que attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad se inuicem et ad fixas, et in ordine ad ea que sunt hic”). Ad hoc intelligendum, cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. IV, q. 8, ubi tamen haec assertio perperam Alberto Magno assignatur: “... ergo corpus celeste erit causa nobilitatis secundum dispositionem et figuram alicuius astri, et istud etiam uult Albertus hic; tunc ergo secundum accessum et recessum secundum magis et minus ad influentiam inclinationis ad operationes (cod.: comparationes) uirtuosas factam a corpore celesti secundum dispositionem et figuram alicuius astri, sicut Saturni uel Lune uel alicuius alterius astri ...” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 39va) 4 5 hoc…46 patuit] cf. supra, ll. 29-33

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sunt: unum scilicet, quod est ipsa dispositio materialis ad uirtutes, et hoc magis est nobilitas secundum rem et in potentia; aliud autem, quod est illam | nobilitatem descendisse a patribus multis, et hoc est formale in B 72vb nobilitate et magis secundum rationem eius in actu. Dico ergo quod, quantum ad primum, contingit esse primum nobilem secundum dispositionem ad uirtutem, que tamen ei non est innata a patre in quo prius 55 exstiterit, sed forsan a casu; nobilitas tamen quantum ad secundum ei non inerit secundum actum, quia non recipit illam dispositionem a multis antecessoribus deriuatam, et ideo sic nec filius eius adhuc erit nobilis secundum perfectam rationem et actum nobilitatis; nepos autem magis adhuc attinget ad rationem nobilitatis, et ideo est quod dicit Philosophus, 60 2º Rhetorice, quod filii nobiliores sunt parentibus. 50

< Q U E S TIO 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m n o b i l i t a s q u a n t o m a g i s p r o t e n d i tu r s it maio r Arguitur quod non quia, cum primum in unoquoque genere sit causa omnium aliorum in illo genere, tunc illud quod magis elongatur a 5 primo minus erit tale, ut dicitur 10º Metaphisice; sed posteriores | in P 305ra genere sunt remotiores a primo principio nobilitatis; ergo erunt minus nobiles, et sic nobilitas, magis protensa, minus erit nobilitas. Item, quanto aliquid propinquius est termino et declinationi a primo, tanto minus est tale; sic sunt filii posteriores. 10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic et 2º Rhetorice, qui dicit quod nobilitas maior est in filiis quam in parentibus; et ideo filii contemptiui sunt aliorum et etiam progenitorum, quia reputant se nobiliores parentibus. 4 9 uirtutes] uirtutem B 52 nobilitate] nobilitatem P | quod] om. B 5 3 contingit…primum2] om. P 54 ei] om. P 5 5 exstiterit] extiterit B | tamen] sed P 5 7 sic nec] ut B 5 8 magis…59 adhuc] inv. B 1 4, 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 genere] quod add. sed exp. P 5 10º] 4 PB 7 magis] praem. minus sed exp. P 8 termino] a primo P 9 posteriores] lac. B 1 0 et] in add. B 11 in2] om. B 12 et] om. B 6 0 filii…parentibus] cf. adn. ad l. 16 1 4 , 1 Consequenter…2 maior] eadem quaestio etiam invenitur in: Pseudo-Raymundus Rigauld, Quodl. VI, q. 16: Vtrum nobilitas intendatur ex successione (ms. Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, ff. 5ra et 38rb). Vide etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. I/4.5 (ed. Romae 1607, p. 205) 3 primum…4 genere] cf. supra, I, q. 12, l. 13 cum adn. 1 0 nobilitas…12 parentibus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.8, 1294a21-22 (ubi tamen tantum asseritur: “ingenuitas est virtus et divitiae antiquae”, ed. Susemihl, p. 409, ll. 10-11); Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-21

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Item arguitur ratione, quia antiquitas uidetur esse de ratione nobilitatis; sed filii antiquiores sunt parentibus; ergo nobiliores.

Dicendum quod duo sunt que faciunt hic dubitare.

15

Primo, pro una parte, quia nobilitas dicitur dispositio naturalis: omnis autem dispositio acquisita per naturam debilior est in principio quam in statu, post statum autem declinat ad corruptionem. Et ideo uidetur quod similiter medii, qui sunt in statu nobilitatis, nobiliores sunt, et ideo quod ante statum filii nobiliores sunt parentibus, cuius ratio est quia filii illorum, 20 qui ante statum sunt, magis accedunt ad culmen nobilitatis, quod est in statu, quam patres; sed post statum uidentur patres nobiliores esse filiis per eandem rationem, quia illi patres propinquiores sunt excellentie nobilitatis. Pro alia autem parte, quia antiquitas uidetur esse de ratione nobilitatis, 25 cum nobilitas sit uirtus generis deriuata, et propter hoc QUIBUSDAM uidetur uniuersaliter filios esse nobiliores. Potest tamen dici quod in nobilitate essentialiter duo sunt: scilicet dispositio naturalis ad uirtutem, secundum est antiquitas uel deriuatio dispositionis illius innate. Si consideretur nobilitas secundum id 30

16 naturalis…17 dispositio] om. per hom. B 1 9 et ideo] ergo B | ideo] et cetera add. PB 20 ante] antequam P | quia] quoniam B 2 2 nobiliores…23 patres] om. per hom. B | filiis] correxi ex infra, l. 33: parentibus P 2 5 Pro…nobilitatis] om. per hom. P 3 0 id] illud B 26 quibusdam…27 nobiliores] cf. Henricum de Gandavo, Quodl. IX, q. 18, qui hoc asserit ut universaliter valens: “filii nobilium semper sunt nobiliores parentibus, nisi degenerent, et tanto nobiliores quanto magis recedunt a primis radicibus” (ed. Macken, p. 291, l. 90-p. 292, l. 92) 2 8 in…43 est] cf. Pseudo-Raymundum Rigauld, Quodl. VI, q. 16 (Vtrum nobilitas intendatur ex successione): “in nobilitate includuntur duo, scilicet dispositio naturalis innata unita ad uirtutem et deriuatio innate dispositionis secundum conditionem deriuationis. Et sic uniuersaliter filii nobiliores, tum quia in nobilitate antiquiores ac per hoc, cum nobilitas sit uirtus generis, tum quia uirtute assuefactiores ac per hoc ad operandum secundum uirtutem paratiores, cum consuetudo sit altera natura maxime que est obseruatione diuturna. Et sic dicit Philosophus, 2º Rhetoricorum, quod nobilitas maior est in filiis quam in parentibus, et quod filii sunt appetitiui honoris et iactatiui et contemptiui progenitorum, quia nobiliores se reputant secundum conditionem dispositionis. Sic considerandum quod nobilitas habet ascensum, descensum, statum, sicut est in etate hominis. In statu igitur parentes simpliciter nobiliores, cum sint in summo perfectionis et in illis sit status et terminus crescentis dispositionis. In ascensu autem tanto filii parentibus nobiliores quanto statui nobilitatis proxiores. In descensu autem eadem ratione parentes sunt filiis uniuersaliter nobiliores propter maiorem approximationem ad statum et remotiorem elongationem a casu et minorem debilitatem ad habitum” (ex ms. Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98, ff. 5ra et 38rb)

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quod est dispositio ad uirtutem naturalis, sic illi qui in statu sunt, nobiliores sunt; et ante statum filii nobiliores sunt, post statum autem parentes nobiliores sunt filiis, ut probat illa ratio iam dicta. Si autem consideretur secundum id quod est antiquitas uel deriuatio illius dispositionis, sic 35 uniuersaliter filii nobiliores sunt parentibus: cuius ratio est quia antiquiores, et iterum quia, quantum ad illud, nobilitas uidetur esse quasi quedam consuetudo operandi uirtutem a progenitoribus indita. Et tunc, sicut consuetudo est altera natura, ut dicitur in De Memoria, sic consuetudo, quanto diutius obseruata, tanto naturalior esse uidetur, cum natura sit 40 causa eorum que ut in pluribus sunt, et ita, quanto in pluribus patribus firmitatem accepit et processum, tanto efficacius uidetur filio innasci: et ideo filii, quantum ad illud, nobiliores sunt parentibus. Et secundum hoc dixit P 305rb PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, quod nobilitas | magis protensa maior est.

Ad rationem dicendum quod primum dicitur dupliciter: uia 45 generationis uel uia perfectionis. Propositio autem inducta non habet ueritatem de primo uia generationis, quia quod illi primo est propinquius, hoc est minus tale, quia quod est propinquius materie, hoc est imperfectius et minus pertingens ad speciem: materia autem est primum uia generationis. Sed uera est de primo uia perfectionis. Dico ergo quod, si considere50 mus nobilitatem prout est dispositio naturalis ad uirtutes, tunc filii ante statum propinquiores sunt primo secundum uiam perfectionis quam parentes, et ideo dictum est quod sunt nobiliores; sed post statum sunt remotiores a primo secundum perfectionem et magis propinqui primo secundum uiam generationis, quia corruptio tendit ad materiam, et ideo 55 sunt minus nobiles: et hoc dico quantum ad dispostionem ad uirtutem, que iam declinauit a perfecto. Si autem loquamur de nobilitate quantum ad propagationem eius, tunc dico quod uniuersaliter filii magis remoti sunt a 3 1 naturalis] naturalem B 3 2 post…33 sunt] om. per hom. B 3 3 ut] non P 3 4 id] illud B 3 7 indita] inditam B | tunc] consuetudo est add. B 4 1 uidetur] est ut B 42 sunt] iter. P | hoc] quod B 4 8 pertingens] aut add. B 49 uera] natura B | si] tunc add. B 55 quantum] quo B 38 consuetudo1…natura] Auct. Arist., De Mem. et Rem. (64), p. 200; Arist., De Mem. et Rem. 2, 452a27-28; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VII (125), p. 241; Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.12, 1152a29-30; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (23), p. 265; Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1370a6-7; Pseudo-Arist., Probl. IV.26, 880a3-4 3 9 natura…40 sunt] cf. Arist., Phys. II.8, 198b34-36 et 199a9-11 4 3 nobilitas…est] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-21 4 4 uia…45 perfectionis] cf. Arist., Cat. 12, 14a26-27 et b3-5; Arist., De Part. An. II.1, 646a25-b6; Arist., De Gen. An. II.6, 742a19-22; Arist., Metaph. V.11, 54 corruptio…materiam] cf. 1018b9, 14-15 et 1019a2-3; Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a4- 6 Arist., Phys. I.9, 192a26-27

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primo secundum uiam generationis et magis propinqui ei quod est primum uia perfectionis, scilicet antiquitati: et ideo, quantum ad hoc, nobilio60 res sunt filii uniuersaliter parentibus.

< L IB E R QU I N T U S>

C ons e qu enter qu eritu r circ a 5um Politicor um . Et q ui a ibi intend it | B 73ra P h i l o s o p hu s q u o d d i s s e n s i o e s t c o r r u p t i o c i u i t a t i s , i d e o p r i m o , a d e u i d e n t i a m s e d i t i o n i s , q u e r i t u r d e o p p o s i t o e i u s , s c i l i ce t d e p a c e , e t q ue r i t u r ut r u m p a x s i t f i n i s c i u i t a t i s 5

Arguitur quod sic, quia illud est finis propter quod omnia aguntur et ipsum non propter aliud: illud enim communiter finis dicitur; sed talis est pax in ciuitate; ergo pax est finis ciuitatis. Probatio minoris quia omnia, etiam periculosa et magna, ut guerre et compugnationes, fiunt propter pacem, ut dicitur 10º Ethicorum.

10

Item, in unoquoque ultimo secundum generationem est finis: ultimus enim terminus motus finis est in quo quiescit mobile – quies enim finis motus est –; sed pax est quietatio et ultimum omnium que fiunt in ciuitate; ergo et cetera.

15

Contra: finis ciuitatis est eius felicitas. Sed pax non est felicitas, quia felicitas non queritur propter aliud, sed pax queritur propter aliud: ad hoc enim querunt ciues transquillitatem ut possint bene operari, ut dicitur 10º Ethicorum. Item, felicitas est quedam operatio, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; pax autem P 305va non, sed potius | quietatio; ergo pax non erit finis ciuitatis. 1, 1 ibi] in P 3 queritur] queratur B 5 Arguitur] praem. et B 8 fiunt] post pacem transp. B 9 10º] 4 B 1 1 est] om. P 1 4 Sed…15 felicitas] om. per hom. B 16 possint] possunt P 18 Item…Ethicorum] om. per hom. B 1 9 erit] est B 1, 2 dissensio…ciuitatis] cf. Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301a19-35 5 illud…6 dicitur] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur ex Thoma, Super Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, arg. 3: “illud quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus et propter quod alia aguntur, videtur esse hominis beatitudo. Sed pacem omnes desiderant, et propter ipsam agunt ... Ergo pax est ipsa beatitudo” (ed. Fiaccadori VII.2, p. 1187); cf. etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a15-24 8 guerre…9 pacem] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b4- 6 1 0 in…12 quietatio] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur ex Thoma, Super Sent., IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, arg. 4: “... pax quietem quandam importat. Sed omnis mutationis finis est quies ... Ergo totius vitae nostrae mutabilis finis est pax; et sic pax est idem quod beatitudo” (ed. Fiaccadori VII.2, p. 1187) 14 finis…felicitas1] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a4-7; III.9, 1280b29-1281a8; VII.1, 1323b40-1324a2 15 felicitas…aliud1] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a34-b1; X.7, 1176b3-5 1 6 querunt…operari] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b4- 6; cf. Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177b4 (ed. Mercken, p. 421, ll. 9-13) 18 felicitas…operatio] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.8, 1102a5-6, sed etiam I.4, 1098a16-18

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Dicendum quod pax est quedam quietatio et transquillitas. Pacem enim dicimus quietationem a perturbatione, sed et non a quacumque perturbatione, sed a perturbatione ordinis appetitus in finem. Sic enim et in brutis et in hominibus pacem dicimus, quia dum bruta in ordine ad bonum uolutum non turbantur nec impediuntur, tunc dicuntur pacifice uiuere. Similiter in hominibus: quando enim idem homo respectu sui ipsius a se ipso non turbatur nec impeditur secundum diuersas anime potentias ab ordine in finem sibi uolutum, tunc dicetur pacem habere secum et sibi non dessidere. Similiter, quando ad alium ita se habet quod ad inuicem non turbantur ab ordine in finem, sed unanimiter in illum finem proficiunt, tunc dicuntur pacifice uiuere. Et ideo pax est quietatio ciuium a perturbatione ordinis in finem ciuitatis, et hoc tam intrinsecis quam extrinsecis. Finis autem est quod queritur propter se et non propter aliud, sed omnia alia propter ipsum; et ideo finis ciuitatis est illud quod a ciuibus communiter queritur propter se et non propter aliud; hoc autem, ut dictum est in 3º, est recte uiuere, et hoc uel secundum ueritatem uel secundum apparentiam, ut in politiis transgressis, ut patuit in 3º.

20

25

30

35

Dicendum ergo quod pax non est finis ciuitatis. Cuius ratio est quia pax est quietatio ordinis: ordo autem non est finis, immo in omni ordine est aliquod primum, scilicet finis, et illud primo et per se attenditur; ex consequenti autem ordo est post finem, et ideo secundo intenditur; ultimo 40 autem pax, propter ordinem. Et ideo pax non est finis, sed est aliquid ordinatum mediante ordine, cuius est quietatio in finem. Sed quoniam finis non est sine eis que illum finem inducunt, ut patet ex 2º Phisicorum, et ideo finis ciuitatis, qui est felicitas politie, non est sine

21 sed…22 perturbatione] om. per hom. B 24 impediuntur] impediunt P 27 dicetur] dicitur B 28 dessidere] desistere B | habet] habent B | ad2] om. P 3 6 ut2] totum add. B 37 pax1…finis] finis non est pax B 3 9 se] principaliter B 42 ordinatum] sed aliquid add. P | in finem] om. P 4 3 2º] et add. sed exp. P 4 4 et] om. B 20 Dicendum…31 extrinsecis] cf. Augustinum, De Civ. Dei, XIX.13 (ed. Dombart–Kalb, CCSL XLVIII, p. 678, l. 1-p. 679, l. 12) sed per Thomam, Super Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, resp. (ed. Fiaccadori VII.2, p. 1189). Vide etiam Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 2 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 237) | pax…transquillitas] cf. etiam Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177b6-7: “pax autem vacatio quaedam est” (ed. Mercken, p. 423, l. 67) 3 2 Finis…aliud] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097b1 3 4 hoc…35 uiuere] Arist., Pol. III.9, 1280a31-32, 1280b33-35, 1280b39-40 3 5 hoc…36 transgressis] cf. supra, III, q. 13, ll. 19-27 38 ordo…40 intenditur] cf. Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a11-15 4 3 finis…inducunt] Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-21; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a7-10

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619

ordine in illum finem; et ulterius, quia ordo non procedit nisi habeatur pax, ideo, ex consequenti, felicitas ciuitatis non est sine pace. Et ideo, si ciuitas debet attingere ad finem suum, qui est felicitas, oportebit pacem esse. Vnde pax est aliquid coniunctum fini ciuitatis; unde pax proportionaliter est in ciuitate sicut transquillitas in mari et serenitas in aere.

Ad rationem dicendum quod pacem non querimus propter se, sed propter aliud. Sed quod ciues dicantur querere pacem propter se, hoc dicitur quia non possunt attingere illud quod querunt sine pace; et iterum querunt pacem ut, ea existente, melius possint operari, sicut etiam delectationem dicimur querere non propter se, sed quia melius operabimur habita 55 delectatione: delectatio que est a studere magis facit studere, ut dicitur 7º Ethicorum.

50

Ad secundam dicendum quod non omne ultimum est finis, sed ultimum et optimum, | ut dicitur libro Phisicorum. Et similiter, 2º Phisico- P 305vb rum, dicitur quod poete derisorie apponunt dicere finem optimum. Vnde 60 non oportet finem esse simpliciter ultimum secundum esse, sed bene aliqua eum consequuntur secundum esse. Vnde dicitur, 1º Ethicorum, quod finis est propter quem omnia fiunt, et antecedentia et consequentia, et ideo delectationem querimus non ut finem, que tamen consequitur ipsam felicitatem, que est operatio uirtutis perfecte, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum.

4 5 procedit] precedit B 4 6 ciuitatis] om. B 47 suum] om. B 4 8 proportionaliter] proportionatum B 51 Sed] secundum B | dicantur] dicuntur P 5 3 etiam] dictum add. sed exp. P 55 delectatio] enim add. B | a] ad B 58 dicitur] in add. B | Phisicorum1] thopicorum PB | 2º] 1 P in B | Phisicorum2] ethicorum PB 5 9 poete] poeta P | finem optimum] fini optimi P fini B 6 0 simpliciter] semper B | sed…61 esse] om. per hom. P 6 2 quem omnia] quod non B 6 3 que tamen] qui tantum B | ipsam] illam B 64 1º] 2 PB 4 5 ordo…47 esse] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 3, art. 4, ad 1: “pax pertinet ad ultimum hominis finem, non quasi essentialiter sit ipsa beatitudo; sed quia antecedenter et consequenter se habet ad ipsam” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 29) 4 9 sicut…aere] Arist., Top . I.17, 108a11-12 5 5 delectatio… 5 7 non…58 optimum] Auct. Arist., Phys. II studere2] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.14, 1153a20-23 (62), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a31-32 5 9 poete…optimum] Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a30-32 6 2 finis…consequentia] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a21-22 6 4 felicitatem…perfecte] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.8, 1102a5- 6; sed etiam I.4, 1098a16-18

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< Q UE S T I O 2 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a m i c i t i a s i t c a u s a p a c i s Et arguitur quod non, quia, si oppositum est causa oppositi, et propositum erit causa propositi; si ergo amicitia fuerit causa pacis, tunc inimicitia erit causa dissensionis; hoc est falsum, ergo et primum. Minor patet quia dissensio per se est causa inimicitie, ergo non econuerso.

B 73rb

5

Item, idem non est causa contrariorum; sed amicitia est causa dissensionis; ergo non erit causa pacis. Minor patet quia ex hoc aliquis turbat alium et ei inimicatur, quia aliquid aliud diligit plus quam illum: nisi enim illud uehementer intenderet, | nunquam istius amorem dissolueret. Item, si amicitia est causa pacis, aut hoc erit sicut subiectum et 10 causa materialis, aut efficiens, aut formalis, aut finalis. Sed nullo istorum modorum est causa pacis; probatio: accidens enim non est subiectum accidentis, ut dicitur 4º Metaphisice uel 6º; ergo non est causa eius sicut subiectum. Item nec sicut causa formalis, nec sicut efficiens, nec sicut finalis, quia iste sunt cause positiue; priuationis autem non est causa posi- 15 tiua. Contra: illud quod est causa unionis uoluntatum, illud est causa pacis. Ciues enim unam habentes uoluntatem in finem suum non turbant se nec impediunt ab ordine in finem suum; sed amicitia est causa unionis uolun20 tatum, ut plane dicitur 8º Ethicorum; ergo est causa pacis.

2, 2 Et…non] om. P 3 si ergo] inv. B | tunc] om. B 4 hoc] praem. sed B 5 per…est] est per se B 6 idem] illud sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 9 illud] illum P | dissolueret] dissoluet P 10 aut] uel B 1 2 accidens] antecedens B | subiectum] causa sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 1 3 4º] 5 PB 14 Item] iterum B | causa] om. B | sicut3] om. B 19 uoluntatum] uoluatur B 2, 2 oppositum…3 propositi] Auct. Arist., Top. IV (60), p. 326; cf. Arist., Top. IV.3, 124a7-9 6 idem…contrariorum] Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II (42), p. 170; cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.10, 336a30-31 | idem…7 pacis] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thoma, STh Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 3, arg. 1 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 194) 1 2 accidens…13 accidentis] Arist., Metaph. IV.4, 1007b2-3; VI.3, 1027b12-14 1 5 priuationis…positiua] cf. Algazel, Metaph. Pars I, tract. I, div. 3 (ed. Muckle, p. 34, ll. 9-24) 1 9 amicitia…uoluntatum] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a24-28; sed etiam Thomas, Super Sent. II, dist. 11, q. 2, art. 5, ad 1 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 293); III, dist. 27, q. 2, art. 1, contra (ed. Moos, p. 873); STh IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, ad 2 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 236)

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Dicendum quod pax est quietatio ordinis ciuium in suum finem. Quietatio autem priuatio est motus, ut patet 8º Phisicorum et 3º. Priuatio autem causam positiuam non habet, et ideo non habet causam formalem, nisi tunc ipsam carentiam formam priuationis dicamus, sicut dicitur 2º Phisi25 corum. Et item priuatio non habet causam actiuam per se, ergo nec finalem, quia finis et agens proportionantur – cecitatis enim nulla est causa per se –, ut patet 1º et 2º Phisicorum; et ideo pacis, cum sit priuatio, non est causa efficiens nec finalis per se. 30

Sed potest esse causa efficiens et finalis per accidens, ut cecitatis bene est causa per accidens, ut illa que est excitatiua , que cecitatem – cum de se sit priuatio et malum – intendit, secundum aliquem alium effectum cui coniuncta est cecitas. Priuationis tamen est aliqua causa positiua materialis. Priuatio enim uult habere subiectum in quo sit, et ideo 2 1 suum finem] inv. B 22 8º] 7 PB | autem2] ad B 25 item] tunc B 2 7 non] nec B 3 0 cecitatem] non est cecitatio B 31 secundum] sed P 3 2 cui] an B 2 1 Quietatio…22 motus] Arist. Phys. VIII.1, 251a26-27 et III.2, 202a3-5; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Phys. V (161), p. 153; Arist., Phys. V.6, 229b25 | Quietatio…43 tamen] quod hic asseritur de quattuor causis invenitur etiam in Petri QQ. Metaph. VII, q. 25, ubi tamen agitur de individuatione: “Privatio autem omnis causam materialem habet per se, alias autem non nisi per accidens. Quod autem causam materialem per se habeat manifestum est; nam privatio vult habere naturam subjectam de qua dicatur. Cum enim non sit nata esse per se, exigit aliud in quo sit. Unde est in subjecto apto nato, ut voluit Philosophus quinto hujus. Illud autem in quo est ipsa privatio dicimus causam materialem. Et ideo privationis est aliqua causa materialis per se. Ejus tamen non est causa formalis per se, quoniam omnis privatio, cum sit privatio alicujus perfectionis, est privatio formae, quoniam forma et perfectio rei sunt idem. Nullius ergo privationis est causa formalis per se. Hoc etiam apparet de causa activa, quoniam, secundum quod dicit Algazel, privationis non est causa efficiens, sed magis deficiens. Tertio hoc apparet de causa finali. Sicut enim aliquid se habet ad causam activam, sic et ad finem; nam agens comparatur ad finem, et sunt sibi invicem causae. Si igitur privationis non sit causa activa per se, manifestum est quod nec finis” (ed. Monahan, pp. 170-171); cf. etiam Petrum, Quodl. II, q. 5: “Privationis autem non est per se activum principium, sed privativum tantum; cuius autem non est principium activum, nec finis, quia finis et agens sibi invicem correspondent et consequuntur se. Propter quod individui, secundum quod individuum, non est formale principium, cum sit privatio, nec principium activum, nec etiam finale. Privationis autem est principium materiale: privatio enim vult habere naturam subiectam” (ed. Hocedez, p. 371) et Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, q. 2: “... quies et immobilitatio et privatio quaedam est. Et ideo dicendum quod quies per se non habet aliquam causam per se efficientem sed privatio vult habere naturam subiectam de qua dicatur, ut dicitur Decimo Metaphysicae; quare quies habet per se causam sicut subiectum, ita quod quies per se causam efficientem non habet. Est tamen intelligendum quod quies habet causam positivam secundum accidens” (ed. Delhaye, p. 83) 2 2 Priuatio…23 habet1] cf. supra, ll. 15-16 cum adn. 2 4 ipsam…dicamus] Arist., Phys. II.1, 193b19-20 26 finis…proportionantur] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26 33 Priuatio… sit] Arist., Metaph. X.4, 1055b7-8; IV.2, 1004a15-16

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sic | pax causam habet materialem subiectum, in quo primo radicatur; hoc autem est ordo ciuium in finem, non absolute, sed ordo ille 35 cum unione participantium ordinem secundum intentionem finis: hoc enim est subiectum pacis, scilicet multitudo aliquorum unitorum in appetitu finis et eorum que sunt ad finem, quia ista causa posita, ponitur pax, et ea remota, remouetur pax. Et ideo pax etiam habet causam effectiuam, per accidens tamen, quia dum aliqui uniuntur in appetitu unius finis secun- 40 dum uoluntatem, tunc fit unio, et tunc, cum hoc sit, pax erit; et ideo, quidquid est effectiuum illius unionis, hoc erit causa pacis, per accidens tamen. Talis autem est amicitia, quia ex hoc quod aliquis per amicitiam uult alii bonum secundum uoluntantem finis unius et eorum que in finem illum, ex hoc oritur talis unio. Si ergo pax immediate sequitur illam unio- 45 nem, amicitia erit causa effectiua pacis. Et per contrarium, quidquid destruit illam unionem, pacem corrumpit, ut dissensio in fine uel in eis que sunt ad finem.

Ad rationem dicendum quod nichil prohibet idem esse causam et effectum secundum diuersam rationem, quia ex hoc finis et agens mutuo 50 sunt sibi cause, et materia et forma. Modo sic amicitia, que est inductiua unionis uoluntatum, est causa dissensionis et guerre. Vel dicendum quod inimicitia est causa guerre per se et absolute, econuerso autem guerra est causa inimicitie tantum secundum augmentationem: dissensio enim auget 55 inimicitiam. Ad secundam dicendum quod idem genere potest esse causa contrariorum, quia contraria sunt eadem in genere, sed non in specie. Vnde dilectio boni alterius est causa pacis; dilectio autem boni quod non est bonum illi alteri, sed sibi soli, uel tale aliquid quod non est bonum ciui nec est bonum ordinis ciuilis, illa dilectio, eadem existens illi in genere, est 60 causa guerre et dissensionis.

3 4 primo] modo add. P 3 6 participantium] partium B 40 dum] om. B 4 1 tunc2] ideo B hoc] homo B 45 unio] om. B | illam] illa P 46 contrarium] consequens B 5 0 rationem] esse add. B | ex hoc] hoc modo B | mutuo] post sunt sibi transp. sed corr. P 5 1 sic] sicut PB 5 2 uoluntatum] uoluntatis B 5 3 inimicitia] in amicitia P | est1] om. B 54 enim] autem B 5 7 quia] et B | non] idem add. B 6 0 eadem existens] inv. B 5 6 idem…57 specie] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (243), p. 135; cf. Arist., Metaph. X.4, 1055a25-29

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Ad tertiam dicendum quod amicitia nullo modo est causa per se pacis; est tamen causa effectiua per accidens pacis, ut uisum est.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m d i s s e n s i o o p p o n a tu r p a c i Arguitur quod non, quia unum uni opponitur uno genere oppositionis, ut dicitur 1º Thopicorum; sed guerra opponitur paci; ergo non opponetur ei dissensio. Maior patet quia etiam dicitur 10º Metaphisice. 5 Minor patet: guerra enim sonat turbationem exteriorem, dissensio interiorem; ista autem non sunt unum; ergo non possunt opponi uni, paci.

10

Item, per idem medium arguitur, alio modo sumendo “sicut unum opponitur non nisi uni”; sed dissensio opponitur concor|die, quia dissensio P 306rb est idem quod discordia, que directe opponitur concordie; ergo non opponitur paci. Contra: quietatio opponitur motui, saltim priuatiue; sed dissensio est turbatio, pax autem quietatio; ergo ista sibi opponentur.

Dicendum quod pax est transquillitas ordinis uoluntatis in finem; transquillitas autem, cum sit quietatio, opponitur alicui motui ut priuatio habitui, et ille motus erit nichil aliud quam turbatio ordinis politie, qualitercumque illa turbatio eneuiat. Hoc autem aliquando contingit turbatione interiori secundum uoluntatum contrarietatem, aliquando turbatione | B 73va exteriori secundum motum actuum contrariorum in ciuibus, aliquando 20 autem ex turbatione interiori inquantum ordinatur in motus exteriores 15

6 2 causa] post per se transp. B 6 3 causa] om. B 3, 2 Arguitur] praem. et B | uno] modo add. sed exp. P 3 1º] 2 PB 4 ei] eis B 5 dissensio] dissensionum P | interiorem…6 uni] om. P 8 medium] menbrum B 12 opponitur] om. P | motui] ergo add. sed exp. P | saltim] quieta add. B 1 3 opponentur] opponuntur B 16 erit] ostendit B 17 eneuiat] deueniat P | contingit] propter add. B 18 uoluntatum] uoluntatem PB 19 secundum motum] sermo B | actuum] actiuum P 6 3 causa…est2] cf. supra, ll. 39-46 3 , 2 unum…oppositionis] Arist., Top. I.15, 106b10 4 etiam …Metaphisice] Auct. Arist. Metaph. X (245), p. 136; Arist., Metaph. X.5, 1055b30 8 unum…9 uni] cf. Auct. Arist., De Int. (14), p. 305; Arist., De Int. 7, 18a8-9 14 pax…ordinis] Augustinus, De Civ. Dei, XIX.13 (ed. Dombart–Kalb, CCSL XLVIII, p. 679, ll. 10-11) sed per Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, ad 1 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 236)

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occulte. Et secundum hoc turbatio diuersis nominibus appellatur. Ipsa ergo turbatio in uniuersali sumpta, per se et primo opponitur paci; sed secundum species suas non opponitur ei nisi per accidens et ex consequenti: quantum enim ad turbationem interiorem, dicitur dissensio; quantum autem ad turbationem exteriorem, dicitur guerra; quantum ad turbatio- 25 nem interiorem prout ordinatur ad exteriorem latenter et malitiose, sic dicitur seditio. Et ideo ad questionem dicendum quod, si dissensio consideretur secundum rationem sui generis, quod est turbatio ordinis in finem uoluntatum, sic opponitur paci per se. Si autem consideretur secundum rationem 30 specialem eius, sic non primo nec per se ei opponitur, sed per accidens.

Ad rationem dicendum quod guerra non opponitur paci primo et per se, et sic non dissensio. Vnum autem opponi pluribus uel econuerso, et hoc non per se nec primo, non est inconueniens; unde illa propositio 35 “unum uni opponitur” intelligitur primo et per se. Ad secundam dicendum quod dissensio non opponitur concordie, sed est consequens ad discordiam, sicut pax sequitur ad concordiam: nam concordia est unio uoluntatum secundum ordinem in finem, et hanc unionem immediate sequitur pax. Similiter discordia est diuisio uoluntatum et hanc sequitur dissensio, et ideo dissensio non aliter opponitur illi 40 concordie quam sicut aliquid consequens ad oppositum concordie. Vel dicendum quod dissensio duo dicit: uel ipsam diuisionem uoluntatum, et sic de ea non est questio, si autem opponitur concordie, unde nichil ad propositum; uel dicit ipsam turbationem unionis uel ordinis, et sic queritur 21 diuersis nominibus] a diuersis B 2 4 dicitur dissensio] inv. B 2 5 autem] uero B 3 1 ei opponitur] inv. B 33 sic] si P 34 unde…35 se] om. P 3 7 sicut…concordiam] om. B sequitur] s.l. P 4 0 ideo dissensio] om. P 4 4 uel2] om. P | ordinis] respectu add. P 24 quantum2…27 seditio] cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 42, art. 1: “... bellum proprie est contra extraneos et hostes ... seditio autem proprie est inter partes unius multitudinis inter se dissentientes, puta cum una pars civitatis exercitatur in tumultum contra aliam. Et ideo seditio ... habet speciale bonum cui opponitur, scilicet unitatem et pacem mulitudinis ... Peccatum autem seditionis ... est ... etiam in eis qui inordinate ab invicem dissentiunt” (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 320) 3 3 Vnum…35 se] cf. Petrum, QQ. De Int. q. 34: “... utrum tantum unum uni opponatur, dicendum quod sic – in uno genere oppositionis; in diversis autem generibus oppositionis multa possunt opponi uni, sc. per accidens ... bene probant quod multa possint uni opponi per accidens” (ed. Ebbesen, pp. 162-164) 3 8 concordia…finem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.6, 1167a22-b16, sed diffinitio potius sumpta est a Thoma, STh IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, arg. 2: “concordia est quaedam unio voluntatum” (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 236)

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de ea: sic autem non opponitur concordie, et ideo adhuc potest opponi paci, licet non primo, nec per se et per rationem eius propriam.| P 306va

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a p p e t i t u s s i t c au s a d i s s e n s i o n i s

Arguitur quod sic, quia quod est causa proxima omnium agibilium, hoc est causa dissensionis, quia dissensio uel seditio est quoddam agibile; sed appetitus est causa omnium agibilium; ergo et cetera. Minor 5 patet quia agibilia sunt quorum principium est uoluntas, ut dicitur 6º Metaphisice. Item, determinatiuum cause communis respectu seditionis est causa proxima et prima seditionis; sed hoc est uoluntas uel appetitus, quia causa uniuersalis agibilium uidetur esse potentia apprehensiua, ut ratio uel 10 sensus, que ex se non determinatur ad hoc uel illud agibile nisi per appetitum, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice. Contra: effectus determinatus non procedit a causa indeterminata, quia effectus proportionatur cause: causa enim uniuersalis est habens effectum uniuersalem et causa singularis singularem, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum; sed 15 appetitus, cum sit causa omnium agilibilium, ut patet per auctoritatem in prima ratione allegatam, et ita est causa indeterminata respectu seditionis, que est effectus determinatus; ergo appetitus, ut sic sumitur, non erit causa ipsius seditionis.

4 ,2 Arguitur] praem. et B | agibilium] generalium sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 4 cetera] erit causa seditionis B 7 determinatiuum] debet add. sed exp. P | cause communis] esse communius P 9 potentia] lac. P 10 illud] praem. ad B | nisi] nec B 1 2 determinatus] determinans B 13 est] om. B 1 5 patet] post auctoritatem transp. B 1 7 sic] supra B 4 ,1 Consequenter…dissensionis] cf. Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301b28-29 et V.2, 1302a22-32; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.1 (ed. Lanza, p. 248, l. 28-p. 249, l. 74; p. 251, l. 149-p. 253, l. 197) et praesertim V.2 (ibid., p. 258, ll. 26-43), ubi Petrus, magis quam Aristoteles, assignat causas movendi seditionum non solum aequalitati sive inaequalitati, quam homines considerant secundum suas existimationes, sed etiam eorum appetui aequalis et inaequalis. In eodem capitulo haec asserit: “Alii habent contrarias uoluntates; ergo dissident uoluntates: sed dissensio uoluntatum radix est seditionis ... tunc enim dissident uoluntates. Hoc autem est radix seditionis” (ibid., p. 261, ll. 119-120 et 133-135) 5 agibilia…uoluntas] Arist., Metaph. VI.1, 1025b23-24 9 potentia…11 appetitum] Arist., Metaph. IX.5, 1048a10-16 1 3 causa…14 singularem] Arist., Phys . II.3, 195b25-27; cf. Auct. Arist., Phys . II (73), p. 146

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P 306vb

Dicendum quod uoluntas per se est causa seditionis, ut probat prima ratio inducta prius. Sed tamen uoluntas non est causa seditionis proxima sine determinatione, et hoc sufficienter probat ratio in oppositum adducta. Oportet ergo quod seditio procedat a uoluntate, ex quo uoluntas est per se causa agibilium; a uoluntate tamen non indeterminata, sed determinata per respectum ad seditionem, ita ut dicatur quod uoluntas equalis secundum dignitatem seditionis causa est. Sed adhuc non proxima, quia, posita causa proxima in actu, ponitur effectus; posita autem uoluntate equalis secundum dignitatem, non est necesse seditio, immo hec causa, et talis uoluntas, stat bene cum opposito illius effectus, scilicet cum pace. Oportet igitur adhuc magis determinari illam causam: quia ergo oppositorum opposite sunt cause, et causa pacis est unio uoluntatum respectu finis et eorum que in finem, ergo seditionis causa erit diuisio uoluntatum uel respectu finis uel respectu eorum que sunt in finem, quia unum illorum deficiens sufficit ad seditionem; ergo ad pacem utraque simul requirebantur. Et tunc uoluntas habendi equale secundum dignitatem, secundum quod illi uoluntati contrariatur uoluntas alterius primo et per se, proxima causa erit seditionis. Nam, posita illa causa, necessario ponitur seditio et, remota, remouetur seditio, ita quod, sicut in pace ex | unione uoluntatis in finem et eis que in finem sequitur pax, ita hic, ex diuisione illarum uoluntatum in alterutro illorum, uel in finem uel in eis que sunt ad finem, per modum illum qui dictus est, fit dissensio et seditio in ciuitate. Ex quo etiam apparet ratio cuiusdam alterius quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS, scilicet

19 est] uoluta add. sed exp. P 20 proxima] propria B 2 3 a] ac B 2 6 causa] om. B 2 7 seditio] seditionem PB | immo] cum add. sed exp. P 2 9 igitur] ergo B | quia] cognitio add. sed exp. B 3 0 uoluntatum respectu] uoluntatis respectus B 3 1 causa erit] est causa B | uoluntatum] uoluntatis B 3 2 in] ad B 3 3 ergo] ex quo B 34 equale] equalem P 3 5 se] et add. P 3 6 seditionis] seditio P 3 7 sicut] sic P 3 8 finem1] fine B | que] om. P | ita hic] inv. P 3 9 finem1] fine P 24 uoluntas…25 est] Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301b28-39; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.1: “Vniuersaliter igitur existimantes se debere habere equale et non habentes, seditiones mouent in politia. Et est intelligendum quod inmediatum principium ipsorum agibilium est electio. Electio autem est appetitus preconsiliatus” (ed. Lanza, p. 252, ll. 160-163). Vide etiam Arist., Pol. III.9, 29 oppositorum…30 1280a11-31; III.12, 1282b18-30; Arist., Eth. Nic. V.3, 1131a10-b24 cause] Auct. Arist., Meteor. IV (20), p. 173; Arist., Meteor. IV.7, 384b2-3; Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II (42), p. 170; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.10, 336a30-31

20

25

30

35

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quod aliquando fit mutatio politie in aliam omnino, et hoc per seditionem, et | hoc est quando est uoluntatum diuisio circa finem: tunc enim unus, B 73vb impediendo uoluntatem alterius circa finem, si inualuerit, ducet politiam 45 ad finem alium, et tunc necesse est politiam fieri aliam, quia alterius politie alter est finis, et econuerso necessario. Si autem fiat diuisio uoluntatum circa ea que in finem sunt, tunc qui inualuerit mutabit non politiam ipsam, quia de fine non dissentiunt, sed mutabit aliquem modum politie, et hoc secundum intensionem et remissionem politie uel secundum aliquid tale.

50

Ad rationem dicendum quod uoluntas non est causa proxima nisi determinetur aliquo agibili, ut dicendo “uoluntas habendi equale” et cetera, ut prius patuit; et ideo adhuc uoluntas non est nec per se nec primo proxima causa seditionis.

Ad secundam dicendum quod contingit aliquando causam secundam, que determinat primam, adhuc etiam esse indeterminatam respectu illius effectus, et ideo indiget determinante ulteriori; et sic est de uoluntate que, licet determinet rationem uel potentiam apprehensiuam, hoc non est nisi determinate respectu agibilis in communi, non autem respectu huius uel huius agibilis. Et ideo uoluntas secundum se accepta non est causa 60 proxima seditionis, sed cum determinatione predicta. Omnes alie cause seditionis quas ponit PHILOSOPHUS reducuntur aliqualiter ad istam causam primariam: omnes enim intendunt habere equale secundum dignitatem prout contrariatur uoluntas alterius. 55

4 3 circa] ea que sunt in add. P | enim] om. B 4 4 impediendo] impedimento P 4 5 alium] illum B 4 6 necessario] necesse B 4 7 tunc] om. P | mutabit non] om. P 48 hoc] licet add. P 4 9 et] uel B 5 0 rationem] totum B 52 prius patuit] inv. B | uoluntas] nobilitas P | non est] inv. B | nec1] post primo transp. PB 5 5 primam] om. B | primam adhuc] inv. B 5 6 ulteriori] interiori B 5 8 determinate] determinare P | in…59 agibilis] om. per hom. B 6 0 predicta] et add. B 62 enim] equaliter add. B 6 3 prout] est add. sed exp. B 4 2 aliquando…49 tale] cf. Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301b5-26; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.1, ubi, ipsis verbis utens, Petrus asserit: “transmutatio politie eiusdem in eandem secundum intensionem et 51 uoluntas…52 patuit] cf. supra, ll. 34-36 remissionem” (ed. Lanza, p. 250, ll. 123-124) 6 0 Omnes…63 alterius] cf. Arist., Pol. V.1, 1301b26-29 et V.2, 1302a22-32

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< Q UE S T I O 5 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r ut r u m d i s s i m i l i t u d o s i t c a u s a d i s s e n s i o n i s Arguitur quod non, quia quod per se est de necessitate ciuitatis, hoc non est causa seditionis; sed dissimilitudo est de necessitate ciuitatis; ergo et cetera. Probatio minoris, quia ciuitas per se est ex dissimilibus, ut 5 dicitur in 3º.

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Item, si dissimilitudo esset causa dissensionis, tunc similitudo esset causa pacis; hoc est falsum. Probatio quoniam, si similitudo per se esset causa pacis, tunc maior similitudo esset magis causa pacis, et maxima maxime. Hoc autem non est uerum, immo tanta potest in ciuitate esse unitas | et similitudo quod etiam non amplius erit ciuitas, ut dicit PHILOSO- 10 PHUS in 2º contra Platonem. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, quia amicitia, que est similitudo, est causa pacis in ciuitate, ut prius patuit; ergo et dissimilitudo erit causa seditionis.

Dicendum quod similitudo rerum differentium eadem qualitas, ut dicit BOETHIUS, et dissimilitudo erit rerum differentium diuersa qualitas 15 uel dispositio. Dispositio autem diuersa diuersorum potest esse dupliciter: uel inter se et etiam in ordine ad fines diuersos, uel etiam potest esse diuersa dispositio diuersorum inter se solum, ita quod tamen sit unitas in ordine ad unum finem, sicut patet in partibus animalis, est diuersa dispositio diuersorum membrorum, tamen est unitas in ordine ad finem 20 uel ad unum principium, ut ad cor; sed diuersorum animalium est diuersa dispositio et inter se et in ordine ad principium uel finem illius principii. 5 ,2 quod2] s.l. P 3 hoc…dissimilitudo] seditionis B 4 ciuitas] ciuitatis PB 6 dissensionis] seditionis B 7 hoc] autem add. B | si] om. P 9 esse] ante in ciuitate transp. B 1 3 dissimilitudo] similitudo P 1 4 similitudo] dissimilitudo P 1 5 dissimilitudo] similitudo P 17 etiam2] om. B 18 tamen] cum B 1 9 unum finem] inv. B 2 0 diuersorum membrorum] inv. B 5 ,1 Consequenter…dissensionis] cf. Arist. Pol. V.3, 1302b33-1303a13; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.2: “... dicit quod alia causa seditionis est dissimilitudo” (ed. Lanza, p. 265, ll. 263-264) 4 ciuitas…dissimilibus] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a5- 6 8 et…9 maxime] cf. Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22 9 tanta…10 ciuitas] Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261a12-22; cf. supra, II, q. 1 1 2 amicitia… similitudo] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (141), p. 242; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.2, 1155a32-b8; VIII.3, 1156b19-21; VIII.4, 1157b36-1158a1; VIII.5, 1159b2- 4 | amicitia…13 patuit] cf. supra, V, q. 2, ll. 19-20 et 43- 46 1 4 similitudo…16 dispositio] Boethius, De Diff. Top. III.3 (ed. Nikitas, p. 52, ll. 17-18) 1 9 in…22 principii] Arist., De Part. An. III.4, 665b1- 4, 14-25

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Similiter autem oportet estimare in ciuitate sicut in animali, sicut econuerso dicitur in De Motibus Animalium. Ergo et in ciuitate potest esse dissimilitudo: uel ita quod sit diuersa dispositio ciuium inter se et etiam in ordine ad finem diuersum, et ista diuersitas et dissimilitudo est causa seditionis; alia autem potest esse diuersitas inter ciues, que tamen stet cum unitate ordinis in unum finem, et ista dissimilitudo est de necessitate ciuitatis, quia ista dissimilitudo est unitas secundum proportionem, que necessario est in ciuitate, ut patuit in 2º, et secundum etiam hoc est causa conseruationis politie. Prima autem dissimilitudo, que est diuersa dispositio ciuium inter se et etiam in ordine ad diuersos fines, ista est causa seditionis ciuitatis; cuius ratio est quia causa pacis per se est unio ciuium in ordine ad unum finem; ergo, per oppositum, causa seditionis per se est diuersitas ciuium in ordine illo. Nam diuersi fines non sunt unius politie, et ideo, si diuersos fines intendant, necessario orietur seditio in ciuitate. Hec autem diuersitas est dissimilitudo primo modo dicta, et ideo dissimilitudo illo modo est causa seditionis. Hec autem dissimilitudo quandoque contingit ex diuersa natura qua alius in iracundiam, alius in mansuetudinem inclinatur, aliquando autem ex diuersitate consuetudinum, que inclinant ad modum nature, aliquando autem ex diuersitate habituum qua aliquis in disciplina habituatus est, alius autem in distorsione.

Dico ergo quod dissimilitudo inter se et etiam | in ordine ad finem est P 307rb causa seditionis, sed dissimilitudo solum inter se, que simul stat cum 45 unitate ordinis in unum finem, est causa pacis, et sic de necessitate ciuitatis.

Ad rationes patet, quia procedunt suis uiis.

2 3 ciuitate] esse add. B | econuerso…24 dicitur] in equo P 27 tamen stet] constet B 28 de… 29 est] om. per hom. P 30 necessario] necessaria B 3 2 etiam] om. B 3 9 qua] quam PB 4 0 aliquando autem] aut aliquando B 41 qua] que P 44 stat] stant PB 4 5 unitate] ciuitate P 4 7 suis uiis] inv. B 2 3 Similiter…econuerso] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32, 36-37 2 4 in2…27 seditionis] cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.2: “illi qui habent diuersos mores inclinantur ad diuersos fines. Ex hoc autem sequitur diuisio uoluntatis; hoc autem est causa dissensionis; quare manifestum est quod dissimilitudo causa est seditionis” (ed. 2 8 ista…30 ciuitate] Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261a22-24 et Lanza, p. 265, l. 267-p. 266, l. 269) 29-32; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.1 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A122, ll. 205-264), et etiam II.3 (ibid., p. A128, ll. 85-102) 29 ista…30 2º] cf. supra, II, q. 12, solutio

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< Q UE S T I O 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l o c u s s i t c a u s a d i s s e n s i o n i s

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Arguitur quod non, quia quod est causa esse et conseruationis, illud non est causa seditionis; sed locus est causa esse et conseruationis, sicut pater causa generationis, ut dicit PORPHIRIUS, et sicut est in generatis, ita et in omnibus locatis; ergo etiam locus | erit principium conseruationis 5 ciuitatis. Item, arguitur quod nec diuersitas loci sit causa corruptionis, quia quod pertinet ad esse et ad necessitatem optime politie, hoc non est causa seditionis; sed hoc est diuersitas loci, quia dicetur in 7º quod in ciuitate 10 bene ordinata locus ciuium debet distingui, ut ibi patebit; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic.

Dicendum quod locus, ut dicitur 4º Phisicorum, est ultimum continentis immobile et in tanta distantia ad orbem; et sic ab illo orbe infit quedam dispositio loci, per quam est locus conseruatiuus locati et per quam agit in locatum conseruando ipsum; et ab ista qualitate locus dicitur aliquid

6, 5 erit] est B | conseruationis] om. P 8 ad2] om. B | hoc] est add. sed exp. P | non] idem P 12 4º] lac. B 13 in tanta] iteratum B | sic] sicut B 1 4 loci] loco B | quam1] quodam sed exp. et corr. s.l. B | est locus] om. B 6, 1 Consequenter…dissensionis] cf. Arist., Pol. V.3, 1303b7-8; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.2: “Deinde cum dicit Seditiones autem sustinent, tangit causam seditionis accidentalem magis. Et dicit quod in aliquibus ciuitatibus fiunt seditiones propter dispositionem loci” (ed. Lanza, p. 267, ll. 311-313) 4 pater…generationis] Porphyrius, Isag. 2 (transl. Boethii, AL I.6-7, p. 6, ll. 13-14) in 2…10 distingui] Arist., Pol. VII.10, 1330a9-16 et praesertim VII.12, 1331a18-b18; cf. 9 Petrum, Scriptum VII.8 (ed. Lanza, p. 517, l. 212-p. 520, l. 318) 1 1 Contra…hic] cf. Arist. Pol. V.3, 1303b7-12 1 2 Dicendum…16 naturale] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. IV, q. 4: “... manifestum est locum habere virtutem conservandi locatum ... Dicendum quod non videtur esse ista virtus nisi influxa a corpore caelesti in ipso. Unde sciendum quod ipsa virtus quae est in corpore continente non est corporis continentis secundum quod huiusmodi sed est ipsius secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, quia, si quaeratur quare transmutatur talis materia in talem formam, dicendum est quia est in tali distantia ab ipso orbe, ita quod ignis conservat aerem et est locus eius, sed ista virtus non est igni secundum quod ignis, sed secundum quod est in tanta distantia ab orbe, et sic de aliis” (ed. Delhaye, pp. 150-151) et q. 8: “locus per se non est ultimum corporis continentis sed est passio ultimi continentis, passio, dico, causata in ultimo continentis per virtutem supracaelestem secundum distantiam debitam a primo locante et ab ultimo locato quod est centrum mundi, ita ut ista passio ultimi continentis sit illud quo locus virtutem conservandi habet” (ibid., p. 155) | locus…13 immobile] Auct. Arist., Phys. IV (120), p. 149, Arist., Phys. IV.2, 209a32-b5

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naturale. Locus autem per se est quedam superficies, cum sit ultimum continentis. Potest ergo locus dupliciter considerari: uel quantum ad dispositionem quantitatiuam uel quantum ad dispositionem qualitatiuam. 20

Si quantum ad qualitatiuam, sic locus natus est saluare ciuitatem, et diuersitas loci secundum istam dispositionem est factiua seditionis. Cuius ratio est quia locus secundum istam qualitatem agit in locatum, et sic in ciues secundum corpora eorum, et per consequens immutat sensitiuos

18 uel…19 qualitatiuam] om. per hom. B 1 9 et] om. B 17 Potest…32 alteram] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. IV, q. 4: “Est etiam considerare in loco duo: naturam quantitativam et mensurativam ipsum locatum, secundum quam habet tantum continere locatum; aut quantum ad aliquid additum naturae quantitatis, ut quantum ad aliquam virtutem per quam habet conservare suum locatum, et sic manifestum est quod virtutem naturalem habet conservandi suum locatum. Sed a quo habet istam virtutem? Dicendum quod non videtur esse ista virtus nisi influxa a corpore caelesti in ipso” (ed. Delhaye, pp. 150-151); cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “Alia autem est dispositio celestis, in ordine ad ea que sunt hic, que attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad se inuicem et ad fixas et in ordine ad ea que sunt hic. Et ista dispositio uel ista figura continue alia et alia est aliquo modo, quamuis non sensibiliter hoc appareat, et respectu alterius et alterius loci alia et alia, ita quod si respectu huius regionis sit nunc talis figura celestis, consequenter in alio tempore erit alia, et si respectu huius regionis sit talis, respectu alterius erit alia. Si igitur aliqua dispositio insit alicui ciuitati uel regioni ex tali figura celesti, durante figura, inerit dispositio illa naturaliter” (ed. Lanza, p. 485, ll. 110-118). In variis locis suorum 1 9 Si…20 operum Petrus de doctrina de figura caelesti agit; cf. adn. ad IV, q. 13, ll. 34-43 seditionis] aliquid hic deesse videtur. Si enim tantum consideretur quod hic asseritur, videri posset quod, secundum eius dispositionem qualitativam, locus natus non sit salvare civitatem: tantum enim explicatur ratio (ll. 19-32) qua locus agit in locatum et id multipliciter immutat. Ad hoc tamen intelligendum, advertendum est quod locus salvat locatum (et ideo civitatem) dispositione eius qualitativa manente eodem modo, ut clare Petrus declarat infra, ll. 54-58. Quod sic intelligendum sit, confirmari potest ex loc. parall. commentariorum in Pol. quae a Petri QQ. dependent. Ex his, cf. praesertim Disputata Pol. (V, q. 7) Vincentii Gruner, qui Petri verba fere ad litteram refert: “... locus secundum sui ydemptitatem non est causa dissensionis, sed secundum sui uariationem et diuersitatem. De secundo dicit Egidius quod locus est saluatiuus sui locati ratione qualitatis per influxum celi indirectum (ibi directum T indirectam W); et secundum illam qualitatem secundum quam est conseruatiuus non est ipsius dissolutiuus, sed si uariatur eadem dispositio et eadem uirtus et idem influxus, tunc uariabitur talis saluatio” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 181v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 176vb). Vide etiam Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. V, q. 4, ubi tamen dispositio qualitatiua dicitur locus formalis: “Dicendum est quod locus formalis sumptus est per se causa conseruationis et salutis politie et ciuitatis ... diuersitas loci conseruantis locatum est causa diuersitatis inclinationis naturalium” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 42rb) et Nicolaum de Waudemont, QQ. Pol. V, q. 5: “... locus potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum dispositionem qualitatiuam, alio modo secundum dispositionem quantitatiuam. Vnde dispositio qualitatiua loci attenditur penes hoc quod locus recipit dispositiones a celo, secundum quas agit in ipsum locatum ipsum conseruando” (Parisiis 1513, f. 70va)

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appetitus, et iterum, per consequens, immutat intellectum, qui non intelligit nisi ex fantasmatibus. Et per hoc uariabuntur uoluntates ciuium per accidens: non per se, quia locus, nec etiam aliqua uirtus naturalis 25 attingit ad intellectum, ita quod in eum agere possit; sed per consequens bene fit, inquantum seditionis causa est diuersitas loci secundum istam dispositionem. Vel etiam transpositio loci idem faceret, quia iam ciues in alia situatione aliam influentiam loci reciperent, et iterum oriretur seditio, ita | quod illa seditio reduceretur in locum uel loci alterationem, hec autem 30 ulterius in figuram aliquam celi et per consequens, isto modo, seditio ciuitatis reducetur in figuram celi nouam et alteram. Si autem consideretur locus secundum dispositionem quantitatiuam, sic dico quod, illarum dispositionum situalium loci, aliqua faciet pacem, aliqua autem seditionem ciuitatis. Quod sic patet: nam diuersa situatio 35 partium ciuitatis, in habitudine tamen ad unum locum principantium, est causa unitatis et conseruationis ciuitatis. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS in 7º quod, si loca ciuium sic situentur sub loco principali sicut ciues sub principantibus, et hoc secundum equale proportionale, tunc erit bona dispositio ciuitatis. Diuersitas autem locorum non 40 23 iterum] et add. B | intellectum] om. B 2 7 inquantum] inquam B | seditionis] est add. P 29 situatione] seruatione B | aliam] aliquam B | oriretur] orietur P | seditio] om. B 3 0 uel loci] s.l. P 31 celi] iter. P 34 quod] sequitur lac. B | situalium] scrips. serualium B 36 unum] illum B | principalem…37 locus] suppl. ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. V, q. 7: “... quando diuersitas situum est simili habitudine uel sub debita habitudine in ordine ad unum locum principalem, qui ut plurimum est ipsorum principantium ...” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 181v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 176va). Cf. etiam infra, ll. 61 et 63-64 3 8 situentur] erunt add. sed del. B 4 0 ciuitatis] diuersitatis B 23 intellectum…24 fantasmatibus] Arist., De An. III.7, 431a17 et III.8, 432a8-10 3 8 si…40 ciuitatis] re vera haec verba non inveniuntur in Politica; possibile est quod hic Petrus aliquos locos significare velit ubi Aristoteles affirmat quod expediens est habitationes in civitate sic disponere ut ostendant maiorem sive minorem excellentiam et virtutem eorum qui in ea; cf. Arist., Pol. VII.12, 1331b13-18, sed cf. potius Petrum, Scriptum VII.9: “oportet edes et habitacula disposita et distributa esse secundum ordinationem proportionalem ei que in ciuitate. Sunt enim in ipsa principes ... quos oportet habere habitacula conuenientia principatui ipsorum” (ed. Lanza, p. 520, ll. 320-324); cf. etiam Arist., Pol. VII.12, 1331a18-30, sed potius Petrum, Scriptum VII.9: “Dicit igitur Philosophus quod habitationes illas que ordinantur ad cultum diuinorum et ad conuiuia principalissima ... expedit habere locum conuenientem et excellentem, ita ut dispositio eius ostendat preeminentiam eius cui exibetur cultus et reuerentiam colentium ad ipsum, et unum et eundem principalem in tota ciuitate ... Locus autem iste conueniens erit, si bene fuerit dispositus quantum ad duo: primo quidem, quod habeat positionem bene se habentem ad apparentiam uirtutis; secundo, quod eminentior sit respectu partium ciuitatis. Ex ipsa enim eminentia situs ostendetur quodammodo eminentia eius qui colitur, et ex apparentia uirtutis dispositio colentium” (ibid., p. 518, ll. 239-244, 250-255)

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solum inter se, sed etiam in habitudine ad locum principantium, facit seditionem in ciuitate, si – inquam – sit contra equale proportionale uel uniuersaliter contra equale quod intendit illa ciuitas. Si enim uolgares remote situentur a loco principali et diuites prope, uolgus ex hoc reputabit 45 se dolose esse diuisum ab occasione principandi; et cum in non habentibus rationem multum noceat aliquando paruus error, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS 10º Ethicorum, capitulo delectatione, in principio libri, tunc populus mouebit seditionem et mouebitur politia. Nam paruus error in principiis, ut dicitur 1º De Celo, et etiam hoc magnam confusionem generat in princi50 piatis; ideo etiam dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 7º huius, quod ad pueros instruendos, qui sunt facilis impressionis, multum oportet cautum esse etiam in picturis, ne picture eos ad alia trahant ab illis in quibus instruendi sunt, propter uehementem apprehensionem illorum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod illud quod est principium conserua55 tionis, illud non est principium corruptionis inquantum huiusmodi. Vnde locus, secundum naturalem dispositionem qualitatiuam, conseruatiuus est locati et ciuitatis, et ideo secundum illam, manente eodem modo, non corrumpetur; si autem alteretur illa dispositio, sic erit causa seditionis. Ad aliam dicendum quod diuersitas locorum in ciuitate potest esse dupliciter: uel partium inter se, ita tamen quod stet cum unitate habitudinis illarum ad locum unum principalem – et ista est de necessitate ciuitatis et saluatio illius –, uel potest esse diuersitas locorum non solum partium inter se, sed etiam diuersitas habitudinis illarum ad locum principalem – et ista diuersitas suspicionem generat aliquibus, et per consequens 65 seditionem –. | Et ideo sic et talis diuersitas est causa seditionis in ciuitate, P 307vb et cetera.

60

4 1 principantium] principatum B 42 inquam] ita add. sed exp. P 4 3 quod] qua P quam B uolgares] u'ga res sed exp. et corr. s.l. P lac. (tantum scripsit -res) B 45 cum] tamen sed exp. et corr. s.l. P tunc add. B 4 6 paruus] peruimus sed corr. P 4 7 10º] 4 P 4 8 seditionem] om. B 4 9 principiatis] principatis P 50 7º] quarto B 5 1 picturis] quia add. sed del. B 5 4 quod2] om. B | principium] principalius B 57 manente] manentem B | non] s.l. P 5 8 erit] est B seditionis] dispositionis P 6 0 se ita] om. P 61 habitudinis] habitudinum B 6 4 diuersitas] habitudinis illarum ad locum principalem add. per hom. B 65 sic] sicut B | diuersitas] facit add. sed exp. P facit add. B 4 5 cum…46 error] non inveni, sed cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.1, 1172b1-3; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. X.1 (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 533, ll. 106-112) 4 8 Nam…50 principiatis] Auct. Arist., De 50 ad…53 illorum] Arist., Pol. Caelo I (19), p. 161; Arist., De Caelo I.5, 271b8-9 et 12-13 VII.17, 1336b13-17 et 3- 8; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Pol. VII (131), p. 262

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< Q UE S T I O 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c a u s a s a l u at i o n i s p o l i t i e s i t p a x Arguitur quod sic, quia contrariorum contrarie sunt cause; sed dissensio, que est contraria paci, est causa corruptionis; ergo et pax erit causa salutis. Item, per quod remouentur contraria corrumpentia ciuitatem, hoc 5 est causa saluationis politie; sed pax remouet omnia corruptiua politie; ergo erit causa saluationis politie. Contra: nichil habens rationem priuationis est causa effectus positiui; sed pax habet rationem priuationis: est enim quietatio quedam, quies autem priuatio est motus; sed saluatio politie est effectus positiuus; ergo 10 pax non erit causa saluationis.

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Dicendum quod illud idem quod est causa esse alicuius per se, hoc etiam, continu|atum, est causa conseruationis eius in esse, et hoc per continuationem suam. Quod patet inducendo: sol enim, quod est causa aeris illuminati per presentiam in emisperio hoc, per continuationem 15 presentie sue in eodem emisperio est causa conseruationis aeris illuminati; similiter ignis, quia per contactum est causa caloris aque, ipse per continuationem suam in tali contactu erit causa durationis calidi in aqua. Eadem autem propositio patet ratione, quia effectus in actu et causa in actu simul sunt, 2º Phisicorum et 5º Metaphisice; ergo per se est 20 causa esse alicuius, illud idem, per sui continuationem, erit causa saluationis illius. Sed causa politie est, ut patebit, unio ciuium secundum uoluntatem unius finis et habitudo inter se et ad principem: politia enim est ordo 7 , 2 Arguitur] praem. et B 3 erit] est B 5 hoc] quod PB 6 politie2] politice B 1 3 continu…est] inv. P 14 sol] soli P 1 5 continuationem] continuitatem B 1 8 durationis] directionis B 1 9 patet ratione] pro patet B 2 0 et] om. P 2 1 esse] om. B | erit] est B 2 3 enim] autem B 7 , 1 Consequenter…pax] cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7: “... quare erit pax et concordia in ciuitate; hec autem sunt causa salutis ciuitatis” (ed. Lanza, p. 314, ll. 296-297) 2 contrariorum…cause] Auct. Arist., Pol. V (91), p. 258; Arist., Pol. V.8, 1307b29 8 nichil…positiui] cf. Algazel, Metaph. Pars I, tract. I, div. 3 (ed. Muckle, p. 34, ll. 9-24) | nichil…10 motus] cf. supra, V, q. 2, ll. 21-28 9 quies…10 motus] Auct. Arist., Phys. V (161), p. 153; Arist., Phys. V.6, 229b25; cf. etiam III.2, 202a3-5; VIII.1, 251a26-27 19 effectus…20 sunt] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (72), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195b16-18; Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (123), p. 125; Arist., Metaph. V.2, 1014a20-22 22 causa…23 principem] re vera hoc iam dixit supra, II, q. 1, ll. 36- 42 et V, q. 4, ll. 30-31

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illorum in illum finem, et inter se ad unum principantem; huius autem ordinis per se causa est unio uoluntatum predicta, et ideo unio illa predicta dicetur causa esse politie; ergo sequitur quod, per continuationem, illa eadem unio erit causa saluationis politie, et ideo continuitas unionis uoluntatum aliquorum in finem et in eis que ad finem est causa per se saluationis politie. Et quecumque ulterius hanc unionem inducunt, 30 per consequens nata sunt saluare politiam, ut amicitia inquantum huiusmodi, et ulterius omnia inductiua amicitie. Et econuerso, quecumque sunt corruptiua illius unionis uoluntatum, illa dicuntur corruptiua politie. Et quia hanc unionem sequitur pax, sicut priuatio sequitur generationem forme contrarie, ideo pax per accidens dicitur causa unionis illius et per 35 consequens causa salutis politie per accidens, inquantum scilicet sequitur causam salutis politie.| P 308ra 25

Ad rationem dicendum quod dissensio non est causa per se corruptionis politie, quia dissensio non nominat diuisionem uoluntatum in fine, sed diuisionem inter se, que sequitur ad diuisionem uoluntatum in 40 fine. Et ideo dissensio non est causa corruptionis politie nisi inquantum sequitur diuisionem uoluntatum in fine – que per se est causa corruptionis, cum per se opponatur unioni uoluntatum in fine –, et sic per accidens: sic etiam concessum est pacem esse causam salutis per accidens, inquantum sequitur causam salutis per se. Et ita utrumque est causa per accidens. Ad secundam dicendum quod pax est causa salutis, sicut obicit, hoc est causa remouens prohibens, et sic causa per accidens: remouens enim prohibens est causa per accidens, ut patet ex 8º Phisicorum. Vel posset dici quod pax non remouet prohibens, sed est ipsa remotio et est sequens ad causam salutis per se: sic ergo pax est causa saluationis politie 50 per accidens, non autem per se, ut patuit. 45

2 5 per se] om. B 26 quod] om. P | continuationem] suam add. B 2 8 aliquorum] aliquarum P et] om. B | est] erit B 3 1 sunt] om. P 3 4 ideo] per add. B | dicitur…35 accidens] om. per hom. B 35 sequitur] om. B 41 corruptionis] etiam add. PB 4 2 sic] etiam add. B 43 acci46 prohibens] prohabens B 48 remouet] non add. B dens…44 per1] om. per hom. B 4 9 sequens] consequens B 4 6 sic…47 accidens] Auct. Arist., Phys. VIII (208), p. 157; Arist., Phys. VIII.4, 255b24-29

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< Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q ue r i t u r u t r u m d i s s e n s i o i n t e r i n s i g n e s e t m a i o r e s c i ui t a t i s d e f a c i l i i n u a l e s c a t Arguitur quod non, quia dissensio inter uirtuosos non de facili inualescit; sed principantes debent esse uirtuosi, et sunt; ergo non inualescit dissensio de facili inter eos. Maior patet: uirtus enim per se remotiua 5 est malitie; dissensionem autem patet esse malum. Minor patet quia princeps determinatur uirtute, ut dicitur 3º huius et fine 1i: principem enim oportet habere uirtutem moralem. Item, si dissensio inter insignes de facili inualescit, tunc dissensio inter uolgus non de facili inualescit, quia si oppositum in opposito, et 10 cetera. Hoc autem est falsum, quia dissensio inter principes non inualescit cito nisi propter populum, ut dicitur in littera, propter quod autem unumquodque tale et ipsum magis. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione eius, quoniam error paruus in principiis, in magnum crescit in principiatis; sed principes sunt

8 ,3 uirtuosos] et add. P 6 dissensionem] dissensio P 8 habere] perfectionem add. P 9 dissensio1] sicut add. B 10 non] post facili transp. B 1 3 ipsum] illud B 1 5 principiatis] principatis P 8 ,1 Consequenter…2 inualescat] cf. Arist., Pol. V.4, 1303b19-21; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.3 (ed. Lanza, p. 270, l. 6-p. 272, l. 84); cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Pol. V (88), p. 258 7 princeps…uirtute] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a14-16; I.13, 1260a17-20 1 0 si…11 cetera] Auct. Arist., Top. IV (60), p. 326; Arist., Top. IV.3, 124a7-9 11 dissensio…12 populum] non invenitur in Aristotelis textu, sed cf. Petri Scriptum V.3, ubi tamen littera aliqualiter alia est: “In prima dicit quod non solum dissensiones principantium multum et cito inualescunt, immo uniuersaliter dissensiones diuitum: ex quo enim diuites sunt, potentiam habent, et manifestum est quod indignantur si non fiat eis secundum quod extimant se excellere alios et faciunt dissensiones, et 12 propter2…13 totam ciuitatem ponunt in dissensione” (ed. Lanza, p. 271, ll. 37- 42) 1 4 error…15 magis] Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (29), p. 313; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 72a27-32 principiatis] Auct. Arist., De Caelo I (19), p. 161; Arist., De Caelo I.5, 271b8-9, 12-13; sed vide Arist., Pol. V.4, 1303b28-31 1 5 principes…16 notabilia] non invenitur in Aristotelis textu, sed cf. Petri Scriptum V.3, ubi, ad explicandum cur parva dissensio inter dominos multum invalescat, aliqua addit notabilia, quibus principantes in civitate aequiparantur partibus principalibus animalium et principiis naturae: “... dissensio que accidit inter maiores et principantes est peccatum in principio ... Nam peccatum in principio proportionaliter se habet ad ea peccata que fiunt in partibus animalium principalibus: utrobique est in primis. Videmus autem quod, modica facta diuersitate in parte principali in animali, scilicet in corde, magna fit diuersitas in aliis partibus. Similiter, modica existente diuersitate in semine, fit magna diuersitas in eo quod fit ex semine, quia ex modica differentia calidi et

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principia politie, ut dicitur in hoc 5º et etiam patet per notabilia; ergo error et dissensio inter illos efficacior et nociuior et uehementior fit quam inter populum.

Dicendum quod dissensio principum inter | se magna est respectu P 308rb 20 aliarum et de facili inualescit. Ratio autem primi est quia, sicut est in naturalibus, ita et in moralibus. Sed in naturalibus ita est, quod res ex eisdem sunt et nutriuntur, 2º De Generatione, et etiam ex eisdem augmentatur, quod patet: ex eodem enim nutrimento aliquid generatur, inquantum nutrimentum est potentia 25 illud, et ex eo augetur, inquantum nutrimentum est potentia quantum. Similiter, in seditione, ex eodem ex quo fit aliquid, ex eodem augmentatur; seditio autem fit ex iniuria uel paruipensione; ergo ex istis nutrietur et augmentabitur. Modo quodlibet istorum maius est respectu principis factum quam respectu alterius alicuius ydiote persone, quia princeps 30 representat multitudinem; ideo etiam eadem iniuria maior est facta principi quam alii persone. Item, princeps est secundum cuius preuoluntatem mouentur omnia alia, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice uel 6º. Si ergo princeps mouet alios, nunc autem dictum est, 7º Phisicorum, quod, moto mouente, mouetur et 35 motum, ergo, moto principe, mouebuntur omnes subditi. Ergo, si duo principantium dissentiant, statim alii simul mouebuntur et erit diuisio inter omnes ciues et ualida dissensio; ergo et erit magna et de facili aug|- B 74va mentabilis respectu aliarum, et hoc propter apprehensionem et coherentiam qua omnes alii coherent in principibus. 16 notabilia] notabilium P 19 se] de se add. B 22 est] om. B | 2º…23 Generatione] praem. ut dicitur B 2 3 et] om. P 2 5 nutrimentum] nutriuntur B | est] om. P 2 7 ex iniuria] lac. B | uel] et B 31 quam] facta add. B 33 ut] praem. nec sed exp. P 3 6 principantium] principum B alii simul] inv. B 3 7 ualida] ualidando P | erit] est P 38 et1] om. P frigidi in eo causatur differentia maris et femine. Similiter, facta modica transpositione in gubernaculo nauis, tota nauis transmutatur” (ed. Lanza, p. 270, ll. 22-23 et 25-32) 2 2 res…nutriuntur] Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.8, 335a10-11 2 3 ex2…26 quantum] Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.5, 322a25-31; cf. Arist., De An. II.4, 416b11-15 2 8 quodlibet…31 persone] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.5, 1132b28-30; cf. Albertum, Super Ethica V.6 (399): “si enim percutitur princeps, laeditur tota communitas, eo quod ipse est persona publica, quod non contingeret, si esset privata persona percussa; et ideo de omni principe simile iudicium” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 338, ll. 68-72) 3 2 princeps…33 alia] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 34 moto…35 motum] Arist., Phys. VII.1, 242a24-25; Auct. Arist., Phys. VII (185), p. 155; Arist., Phys. VII.2, 243a3-6

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Ad rationem dicendum quod, si sit iusta seditio, bene augetur 40 inter uirtuosos uel potius a uirtuosis; et cum dicit quod “principes uirtuosi sunt”, dico quod princeps determinatur potentia inquantum huiusmodi, non autem uirtute – potentia, inquam, cohercendi subditos –, sed bonus princeps inquantum bonus determinatur uirtute. Et ideo de ratione princi45 pis absolute non est uirtus, licet sit de ratione principis boni.

P 308va

Ad aliam dicendum quod inter populum minus crescit dissensio. Hoc enim dicitur in hoc 5º, quia dixit PHILOSOPHUS quod in oligarchia est dissensio duplex, scilicet principum inter se uel populi ad principes; in democratia autem, ubi est solus populus, est solum dissensio solius populi 50 ad principes, et sic uno modo tantum, et sic minime.| < Q UE S T I O 9 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r d e q u o d a m u e r b o P h i l o s o p h i , q u i d i c i t q u o d c o m m u n i s t i m o r c o n g re g a t e t i a m s e p a r a t i s s i m o s ; c i r c a q u o d p r i m o q u e r i tu r u t r u m t i m or s i t p a s s i o Arguitur quod non, quia passio causatur a causa presentialiter agente. Cuius ratio est quia passio est quidam motus, ut dicitur 3º Phisico- 5 rum; motus autem in actu non est nisi a mouente in actu, ut patet 8º eiusdem; ergo passio non est in actu si agens non agat in actu. Sed timor causatur a futuro malo estimato, ergo non est passio. Item, passio anime sensitiue causatur a sensu; sed futuri non est 10 sensus; ergo et cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS 2º Rhetorice. 4 1 dicit] dicitur B 42 determinatur] determinat P 4 5 non] om. B 47 dixit Philosophus] philosophus dixit prius B 4 8 scilicet] uel add. B 50 tantum] coni.: ante P aut B 9 ,1 qui] quod B 2 timor] separat add. sed del. B | congregat] post separatissimos transp. B 4 Arguitur] praem. et B | presentialiter] principaliter B 6 non…actu2] om. per hom. B | ut…7 actu1] om. per hom. P 9 futuri] furari B 1 1 Philosophus] in add. B 47 in2…50 principes] Arist., Pol. V.1, 1302a9-13 9 ,2 communis…separatissimos] Arist., Pol. 3 utrum…passio] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VI, p. V.5, 1304b23-24 272) 4 Arguitur…8 passio] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1, arg. 2 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 272) 5 passio…motus] Arist., Phys. III.3, 202a23-25 6 motus…actu2] Arist., Phys. VIII.4, 255a22-23 et VIII.5, 257b8-10 9 passio…10 cetera] hoc argumentum desumptum esse videtur ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1, arg. 3 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 272) 1 1 Contra…Rhetorice] Arist., Rhet. II.5, 1382a20-22

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Dicendum quod passio dicitur a patin, quod est recipere. Receptio autem est duplex: quedam enim est receptio cum abiectione alicuius nature existentis in recipiente, aliquando autem sine abiectione alicuius. Prima receptio dicitur passio magis sensibilis, et ideo receptio sensibilis primo et principaliter dicitur passio, et hoc dicitur materia. Aliquando autem est transmutatio ab una forma in aliam; aliquando dicitur terminus illius mutationis, unde et qualitates aliquando quasdam dicimus passiones et passibiles qualitates; aliquando autem fit talis receptio cum abiectione 20 aliquorum conuenientium. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, quod miserie contumelie , etiam magis passiones dicuntur, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice, ita quod, magis receptio sensibilis, magis dicitur passio. 15

Secunda autem receptio, que est sine abiectione, hec dicitur passio secundario, quia non est aliud quam exitus de potentia in actum, ut in 25 intellectu; sed quia intellectus nichil agit sine sensu, ideo contingit quod in talibus perfectionibus habeat aliquas alterationes sensuum, et ideo illa receptio intellectus uel perfectio, que magis habet coniunctam talem sensibilem mutationem, magis passio dicitur. Et ideo in intellectu minime est passio, in sensu autem magis; et adhuc in parte sensitiua minus est 30 passio secundum uirtutem apprehensiuam quam secundum appetitiuam uirtutem: cuius ratio est quia receptio que est secundum apprehensionem sensus non est uera alteratio sensibilis, nec ad eam exigitur uera alteratio sensibilis in se uel in obiecto, nisi solum per accidens, sicut forte remouens prohibens.

12 patin] pati B 1 3 duplex] dupliciter B 1 5 Prima] passio add. B 16 dicitur1] om. P 18 aliquando] om. B 21 dicitur] patet B 23 Secunda] si P | passio…24 secundario] inv. B 2 4 ut] non B 25 ideo] praem. et B | contingit] sine sensu add. P 2 7 coniunctam] coniunctum B 3 0 appetitiuam…31 uirtutem] inv. B 32 eam] esse B 1 2 passio…recipere] cf. Thomam, QQ. Disp. De Veritate q. 26, art. 1, resp.: “passio dicitur a patin graeco, quod est recipere” (ed. Leon. XXII.3, p. 747, l. 163) | Receptio…14 alicuius] hoc argumentum desumptum esse videtur ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 22, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VI, p. 168) 17 aliquando…19 qualitates] cf. Arist., Cat. 8, 9a28-10a10 2 1 ***] aliquid deesse videtur hic: si non, et verba ex Rhetorica et mentio Metaphisicae imperfectae essent; illa verba praesertim, “etiam magis passiones dicuntur”, non recte referunt quod in Rhetorica invenitur – ibi enim (Arist., Rhet. II.8, 1385b19-24) asseritur quod miseri et contumeliosi, rationibus contrariis, pati non putant –, nec clare indicant quod ex Metaphisica sumptum esse dicitur 2 2 magis1…passio] cf. Arist., Metaph. V.21, 1022b19-20

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In appetitu autem est talis perfectio cum | motu sensibili, quia ad eas immediate sequitur trasmutatio alicuius partis corporis secundum ueras qualitates sensibiles, unde et per illas partes et motus earum diffiniuntur passiones appetitus; pars autem appetitiua non perficitur de potentia ad actum nisi precedente apprehensione sensus; et ideo dicit EUSTRATIUS, 2º Ethicorum, quod passio est motus partis appetitiue sub fantasia boni uel mali, et dicit ‘motus’, id est perfectio et eductio de potentia ad actum. Et per hoc possunt distingui passiones appetitus, quia si apprehendatur aliquid, aut hoc est sub ratione boni aut mali. Si bonum est, hoc est uel presens, sic est motus et passio appetitus que dicitur gaudium; si autem ut preteritum, sic est letitia; si autem futurum, sic est spes. Si autem comprehenditur ut malum, hoc est tripliciter: uel enim ut presens, sic est tristitia; si preteritum, sic est dolor; si autem futurum, sic est dupliciter: uel enim malum illud apprehenditur ut inuincibile, sic est desperatio; si autem ut uincibile, sic est timor. Vnde timor est motus partis appetitiue sub fantasia mali futuri uincibilis, ut dicitur 2º Rhetorice. Et necesse additur ‘uincibilis’ quia, si non putaret illud malum euadere, tunc non diceretur ipsum timere, cum enim

3 5 est talis] inv. B 36 scilicet perfectiones] suppl. ex supra, ll. 25-28 3 8 diffiniuntur] diffinitur P | pars] lac. B 40 passio] coni. ex fonte allegata: appetitus PB 4 3 aut1…est] ut P 4 4 est1] om. B 4 5 ut…46 autem] om. per hom. B 4 6 spes] species P | comprehenditur] comprehendatur B | tripliciter] dupliciter PB 4 7 est2] om. B 48 inuincibile] immutabile sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 49 ut] non B 5 1 necesse] necessario B | quis] suppl. ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. V, q. 10: “... additur uincibilis, quia, si quis non (om. T) putaret illud malum se posse euadere, non diceretur illud timere” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 184v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 178rb) | putaret] putant B 5 2 se posse] suppl. ex loco in adn. praec. allato | cum…53 timere] post timor transp. et iteravit mortem sic ergo patet quod timor B 4 0 passio…43 mali] Anonymus, In II Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1105b19 (ed. Mercken, p. 212, ll. 5-7) 49 timor2…50 uincibilis] Arist., Rhet. II.5, 1382a21-22; in loco illo Scripti sui ubi commentat eadem verba, Petrus affert eundem locum, absente tamen mentione Aristoteli; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.4: “timor communis congregat et adunat illos qui ualde sunt separati. Et ratio huius est quia timor est tristitia uel turbatio propter fantasiam futuri mali, et ideo ille qui timet inquirit uias per quas possit uitare malum opinatum futurum; si ergo extimet quod hoc faciet si coniungat se cum inimico, coniungit se cum illo” (ed. Lanza, p. 277, ll. 29-34) 5 1 Et…53 mortem] hoc argumentum desumptum est ex Arist., Rhet. II.5, 1382b34-1383a8. Quod ad patibulum ductus non timeat mortem etiam asseritur ab Aegidio Romano, qui de hoc et reddit rationem; cf. Aegidium Romanum, In Rhet. II: “homines non timent qui putant se pertulisse omnia grauia, unde obdurati et quasi desperati ad futurum non timent, sicut non timent qui iam decapitantur: et est ratio quia semper timentibus oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis” (ed. Venetiis 1515, f. 59ra)

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dicimus latronem, cum uadit ad patibulum ligatus, timere mortem. Sic ergo patet quod timor est passio et que uel qualis passio sit.

55

Ad rationes dicendum quod timor causatur a futuro malo, non inquantum futurum, sed inquantum presentialiter est fantasiatum sub ratione contristatiui, et sic in apprehensione presens, licet in re futurum sit. Ipsum autem, ut est in re, non est causa timoris, sed ut est apprehenB 74vb sum: sic autem est presens, et ideo sufficit causare passio|nem in actu.

60

Ad secundam dicendum quod timor causatur a sensu futuri cuius non est sensus exterior et proprius, sed sensus interior et communis, qui ex specie non sensati elicit sensatum. < Q U E S TIO 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m t i m o r c o m m u n i s a g g r e g e t s e p a r at i s s i m o s

Videtur quod non, quia uirtus transmutans aliquid ab una dispositione in contrarium oportet quod sit | maior quam uirtus generatiua illius P 309ra 5 prime dispositionis, ut de calido patet: si enim calidum debeat aliquod frigidum transmutare et inducere illi dispositionem contrariam, necessarium est quod calidum sit fortioris uirtutis quam fuerit illa uirtus que generauit frigidum. Sed uirtus timoris non est maior uirtute que facit aliquos separatissimos: ista enim est maxima uirtus, quod patet quia habet 10 effectum per superhabundantiam dictum. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia, quod facit inimicos et separatos bene consiliari et operari, facit eos coniungi. Quod patet quia, quod facit eos bene consiliari, hoc etiam facit eos agere dictamen rationis. Sed dictamen rationis est eos debere coniungi cum 15 debeant idem operari – omnis enim uirtus unita, et cetera –, sic enim

57 contristatiui] sequitur lac. P | sic] sicut B | presens] est add. B 5 8 ut2] nec B 6 1 proprius] coni.: prius P presens B 1 0, 1 timor communis] inv. B | aggreget] etiam add. B 3 Videtur] et arguitur B 1 5 omnis] correxi ex fonte allata: idem PB 10 ,1 Consequenter…2 separatissimos] cf. Arist., Pol. V.5, 1304b23-24; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.4 (ed. Lanza, p. 277, ll. 29-37) 1 5 omnis…cetera] Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (13), p. 232; Liber De Causis XVI (XVII) 138 (ed. Pattin, p. 83, ll. 15-16)

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melius poterunt in operationem. Sed timor facit aliquos bene consiliari: nam scribitur, 2º Rhetorice, quod timor facit consiliatiuos; ergo timor communis coniungit diuersos et inimicos.

P 309rb

Dicendum quod timor communis aliquando coniungit separatos, aliquando non. Primi ratio est quia similitudo est causa unionis et amicitie, ut dicitur 8º Ethicorum, et ideo omne quod est inductiuum similitudinis, hoc est factiuum unionis; hoc autem est communis timor; ergo et cetera. Maior patet ex tribus: primo quia in eadem passione sunt constituti, et ideo dicitur, 2º Rhetorice, quod idem pati aliquando facit amatiuos. Secundo, quia uniuntur in ordine ad unum finem quia, ex quo premuntur eodem onere, ipsi uolunt et appetunt remotionem eiusdem et minus ut finem: unitas autem uoluntatum in ordine ad finem est causa similitudinis et amicitie. Tertio, quia beneficiatus naturaliter diligit benefactorem, et ideo aliquis, ex hoc quod recipit beneficium, diligit illum a quo recipit; hoc autem contingit inimicis in timore communi: ex hoc enim quod uterque est occupatus eodem malo, uterlibet reputat se recepturum beneficium et iuuamen ab alio, scilicet impugnationem illius quod eos ambos constristat; et ideo timor communis coniungit separatos et inimicos propter estimationem auxilii, et ideo contingit quod aliquando duo inimici fiunt | amici propter tertium inimicum utriusque. Sed hoc non uniuersaliter contingit; cuius ratio est predicta, quia transmutans aliquid necessario oportet maioris uirtutis quam sit illud quod conseruabat ipsum, quia uniuersaliter mutans fortius debet esse mutato. Est ergo intelligen-

16 poterunt] potuit P | timor] minor P | aliquos] aliquod B 1 7 consiliatiuos] consiliationes P 2 0 amicitie] aliqua add., sed nescio quid significent: secundum campedum P competer B 21 Ethicorum] phisicorum B 2 2 factiuum] rationis add. sed exp. P 2 3 Maior] minor P 25 quia1] in ordine add. sed exp. P 2 6 ipsi] quando B | minus] unius B 2 8 similitudinis] multitudinis P 3 1 quod] quia B 35 hoc] tamen B 3 7 illud…38 mutans] om. P 38 debet] debeat B | mutato] unitate P 17 timor1…consiliatiuos] Arist., Rhet. II.5, 1383a7 2 0 similitudo…amicitie] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (141), p. 242; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.2, 1155a32-b8; VIII.3, 1156b19-21; VIII.5, 1159b2- 4 2 4 idem…amatiuos] Arist., Rhet. II.8, 1386a17-18 et 24-29; cf. etiam II.4, 1381a2- 6 28 beneficiatus…30 recipit] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.5, 1167a14-15; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (182), p. 245. Sed vide etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.7, 1167b17-18 ubi tamen asseritur quod benefactor diligit beneficiatum magis quam econtrario 36 cuius…predicta] cf. supra, ll. 3- 8

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dum quod motus inimicitie uel est maior quam motus timoris uel econuerso: et si primo modo sit, inimici non coniungi possunt per timorem communem, quia per fortiorem uirtutem sunt disiuncti; si autem secundo modo, sic uniuntur propter estimationem auxilii illius unituri.

Et per hoc ad rationes, quia procedunt uiis suis. Sed quia primo tangit de superlatiuo, sciendum quod superlatiuus potest dupliciter teneri: 45 uno modo comparatiue respectu omnium aliorum, sic uni contingit; alio modo positiue cum aduerbio ‘ualde’, et sic accipitur hic, ut sit sensus ‘separatissimos’, id est ualde separatos: sic autem bene contingit pluribus, et cetera. < Q U E S TIO 1 1 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a d r e c t e p r i n c i p a n d u m e x i g at u r s c i e n t i a in p ri nc i p e Arguitur quod non, quia quod se habet per indifferentiam respectu boni et mali, hoc non exigitur ad perfectionem principantis, quia tale 5 non uidetur habere rationem boni; et ideo ad bonitatem principantis non exigitur, sed se habet per indifferentiam ad bonum et malum: una scientia enim non potest esse contrariorum, ut gramatica congrui et incongrui, et sic de omni scientia, ut dicitur 4º Metaphisice; ergo scientia non exigitur ad perfectionem recte principantis. 10

Item, ad perfectionem alicuius non exigitur illud quod non habet rationem boni; sed scientia non habet rationem boni, quia ex scientia non 3 9 inimicitie] amicitie P | timoris] correxi ex fonte allata: terribilis PB 42 auxilii…unituri] alius auxilii uniuntur B 4 4 superlatiuo] superlatiua P | sciendum] arguitur B | dupliciter teneri] inv. B 45 omnium aliorum] inv. B 4 7 separatissimos…est] perfectissimos enim P sic] si B 1 1 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 7 esse] et est add. B 8 4º] 2 PB | ergo] non add. sed exp. P 9 recte] ratione B 1 1 non2] ut P 3 9 motus 1…econuerso] Petrus, Scriptum V.4: “... si motus timoris minor fuerit quam motus inimicitie, non coniungetur cum inimico; si autem maior, coniungetur cum eo ad repellendum: semper enim sequitur motum maiorem” (ed. Lanza, p. 277, ll. 34-37) 1 1, 1 Consequenter…2 principe] cf. Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-39; sed potius Petri Scriptum V.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 6 una…7 316, ll. 369-381), ubi Petrus non proprie de scientia loquitur, sed de prudentia incongrui] Petrus Hispanus, Summ. Log. VI.6 (ed. De Rijk, p. 82, ll. 5-9) 7 et2…8 Metaphisice] cf. Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1005a11-12: “... non est geometre speculari quid contrarium ...” 1 1 ex…12 uerus] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (39), p. 118; (AL XXV.3.2, p. 71, ll. 132-135) Arist., Metaph. II.2, 993b20-21

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dicitur intellectus bonus, sed uerus; ergo ad perfectionem principantis non exigitur scientia, cum solum bonum rationem perfecti habeat. Contra: operanti ad regulam necesse est habere illam, cum ad illam operetur; sed princeps secundum quod huiusmodi debet agere secundum 15 scientiam; ergo et cetera.

B 75ra

P 309 va

Dicendum quod ad rationem principantis habere eum scientiam aliquam necessarie, necessitate inquam ex suppositione, scilicet, si bene debet operari. Cuius ratio | est quia mouens, si debet mouere, oportet habere principium, quia agens agit per principium agendi existens 20 in ipso; sed principium per quod agit et mouet princeps est scientia, que est forma | et ratio agendi. Vnde, per quod differt prudentia, et ars, quia prudentia est ratio agibilium, ars autem factibilium; ambe tamen conueniunt in hoc quod sunt scientie operandi, unde dicitur, 1º Metaphisice, quod agibilia sunt quorum principium per se est prudentia et electio, cuius 25 electionis necessario principium est consilium et ratio. Ergo oportet principantem habere scientiam aliquam ut bene agat. Item, ad eius perfectionem ulterius oportet habere perfectionem scientie, cuius ratio est quia ad perfectionem agendi exigitur perfectio principii actionis. Si igitur scientia est aliis principium dirigendi alios, tunc ad 30 regendum perfecte et bene exigitur scientia perfecta in actu, sicut patet in calido per simile: si enim debeat perfecte calefacere aliud, oportet illud habere calorem perfectum in actu. Notandum autem ulterius quod ratio principantis, et eorum que sunt circa principatum, a fine accipitur et ex fine dependet; operatio autem 35 principis est mouere et dirigere alios in finem politie; oportet ergo quod hec directio fiat per rationem supradictam ex fine, et ideo principantem 14 illam2] ipsam B 1 5 operetur] operatur B 1 6 ergo…18 scientiam] om. per hom. B 18 necessarie] necessario B 1 9 quia] si add. sed exp. P 23 factibilium] infactibilium sed corr. P 2 4 1º] 7 P 26 Ergo oportet] inv. B 2 8 perfectionem1] om. B 3 0 alios] alias B 3 1 et] uel P 3 2 si enim] enim aliquid B | illud] om. B 34 autem] om. B 35 principatum] principia B 1 8 necessitate…suppositione] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 199b34-200a15 19 quia…22 agendi] cf. Arist., Metaph. XI.7, 1064b11-15 | mouens…20 principium1] cf. Arist., Phys. II.1, 192b13-14 23 prudentia…agibilium] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (112), p. 240; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b20-21 | ars…factibilium] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (111), p. 240; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.3, 1140a21-22 2 5 agibilia…electio] cf. Arist., Metaph. I.1, 981a12-17 sed potius Thomam, In | electio…26 ratio] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, Metaph. I.1 (ed. Fiaccadori XX, pp. 249 et 251) 1112a15-16

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oportet habere scientiam que est principium ordinandi aliqua in finem. Hec autem scientia est prudentia: sicut ad perfecte operandum opus 40 artificis et etiam ad perfectionem artificum exigitur perfectio scientie non speculatiue, que non ordinatur ad opus, sed practice et factiue, que indendit opus, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice, similiter ad perfectionem principantis exigitur perfectio scientie actiue. Vlterius sciendum quod non cuiuslibet principantis est quelibet prudentia sed, cum ratio principis sumatur ex operatione, ratio autem operationis ex fine, ideo, cum prudentia sit ratio ordinandi et dirigendi in finem, necesse est ad diuersos fines dirigere per diuersas prudentias, ita quod, secundum diuersitatem finis, exigitur diuersa prudentia ad perfectionem principantis: nam in recta politia, cum sit finis simpliciter bonus, exigitur 50 perfectio prudenti simpliciter; in politiis autem transgressis prudentia secundum quid et ex suppositione tantum, secundum diuersitatem et differentiam ipsius finis. 45

Ad rationem dicendum quod aliquid se habere per indifferentiam ad bonum uel malum, hoc est dupliciter: uel per se, et tale est materia uel 55 subiectum, et hoc non exigitur ad perfectionem, cum nullam perfectionem importet secundum quod huiusmodi; alio modo potest aliquid se habere per indifferentiam ad ista, ita quod ad unum istorum se habeat per se, ad | P 309vb aliud autem per accidens, ut calidum per se natum est calefacere, frigefacere autem contingit ipsum calidum per accidens, scilicet circumstando 60 frigus. Similiter est in proposito, unde PHILOSOPHUS uult, 9º Metaphisice, quod licet sit scientia una contrariorum, tamen primo et per se est eius quod habet rationem habitus. 3 8 habere] principantem add. P | aliqua] aliquem B 3 9 scientia] post prudentia (prudentie B) transp. PB 40 artificum] artificis B 4 1 speculatiue] specificatiue B 42 2º] 7 PB 44 principantis] scientis B 4 7 ad] om. B 54 dupliciter] scilicet add. B 5 8 calidum] autem add. P 6 1 una] post licet transp. B 39 Hec…prudentia] cf. Anonymus Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. V, q. 7: “utrum autem ista scientia practica differat a prudentia, ad presens nichil est curandum. Vnde aliqui dicunt quod sic, aliqui dicunt quod non. Determinatio autem ueritatis istius locum habet magis in 7º huius. Ex hoc probatur quod debentem principari necesse est habere scientiam practicam siue prudentiam, non faciendo modo differentiam inter scientiam practicam et prudentiam” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 44ra) 4 0 non…42 opus] Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (39), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.2, 993b20-21 4 5 sed…52 finis] cf. Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 13 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 361) 6 1 licet…62 habitus] Auct. Arist., Metaph. IX (223), p. 134; Arist., Metaph. IX.2, 1046b7-13

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Ad secundam dicendum quod scientia rationem boni habet: est enim ut actus et perfectio respectu facientis. Tamen uerum est quod speculatiua minus habet rationem boni, et ideo ab ea non dicitur aliquis 65 simpliciter bonus, sed bonus speculatiuus. Cuius ratio, quia bonus simpliciter dicitur a perfectione et rectitudine uoluntatis uel eorum que ad istam pertinent; talis autem non est scientia speculatiua inquantum huiusmodi: sic enim est perfectio intellectus, non uoluntatis. A scientia autem practica dicitur aliquis bonus, quia etiam ista preparat uoluntatem et dirigit eam in 70 rectum finem. Et talem, saltim, scientiam practicam oportet habere principaturum bene. < Q UE S T I O 1 2 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a d p e r f e c t i o n e m p r i n c i p a n t i s e x i g a tu r amo r p o l it i e Arguitur quod non, quia ad perfectionem principantis non exigitur aliquod malum; sed amor politie est malus, quia quedam politia est mala: nunc autem bonus non est qui uult manere malum, ut dicit EUSTRA- 5 TIUS supra 5um Ethicorum, ergo amor consistentie et durationis politie non est bonum aliquid, sed malum; ergo ad perfectionem principis non exigitur. Item, amare est uelle bonum alii; sed nullus uult bonum consistentie politie, sed uult illam ut bonum alii; ergo nec eam diligit nec diligere 10 debet. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic.

Dicendum quod ad principantem in magno principatu exigitur dilectio politie. Cuius ratio est quia ad perfectionem principantis, si debet recte

65 speculatiua minus] specificatiua unius B 6 6 ratio] est add. B | simpliciter2] om. B 69 non] ut B 1 2 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 amor] actor sed corr. s.l. B 5 malum] eum B 6 amor] actor sed corr. s.l. B | consistentie] asistentie P | durationis] curationis B 12 , 1 Consequenter…2 politie] cf. Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-35; cf. Petri Scriptum V.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 315, l. 352-p. 316, l. 362) 5 bonus…malum] Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1130b29: “Nullus enim amat bonum et manere uult praua” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100vb) 9 amare…alii] Arist., Rhet. II.4, 1380b35-36; cf. supra, I, q. 17, ll. 8-9 cum adn. 12 Contra…hic] Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-35

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principari, exigitur perfectio prudentie; hec autem non est in non habente primum principium prudentie, quod est rectus appetitus finis; ergo ille rectus appetitus finis necessario exigetur ad perfectionem principantis. Rectus autem appetitus finis | politie non est sine dilectione politie et B 75rb consistentie eius, quia nullus recte bonum et finem illius appetit quod non 20 diligit, sed potius uult malum illius quam bonum. Et ideo dilectio politie necessario principi est. 15

Item, prudentia est recta ratio eorum que in finem et recta electio illorum | secundum rationem sumptam ex fine. Non contingit autem bona P 310ra eligere circa illud et illi quod non diligimus; et ideo, si finem debemus 25 diligere, necessario eligemus ea que in finem et ea diligemus. In hiis autem est consistentia politie: hec enim causatur ex unione uoluntatum in finem et eis que in finem sunt; ergo et cetera. Item, qui non diligit politiam non curat eam, ut dicitur 2º huius: dilectio enim est una causarum sollicitudinis circa aliquid; sed non curare 30 politiam est contra rationem principantis, que est dirigere in finem; ergo et cetera. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod necessario ad principantem rectum et simpliciter, qui utitur prudentia simpliciter, exigitur uirtus que de necessitate connexa est prudentie, circa cuius finem appetitum rectificat uirtus et cui principium ministrat. Et ideo ad principantem exigitur et dilectio

17 exigetur] om. B 2 0 dilectio…21 principi] politie dilectio principi necessaria B 2 2 Item] ulterius add. B 25 eligemus] diligere P 2 6 est] om. P 30 ergo] et ideo add. sed del. B 3 1 rectum] rationem B 3 2 utitur] pari add. B | exigitur] erit B 16 primum…finis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27, 31-36; cf. etiam Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Intellectus enim practicus, qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus, supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis” (ed. Lanza, p. 462, ll. 477- 479) 22 prudentia…23 fine] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a7-9 et etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.10: “... aliud autem est quod homo bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc facit prudentia, quae est bene consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 372, ll. 155-158) 2 8 qui…eam] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-38, sed in littera potius dicitur: “minime enim cura sortitur quod plurimorum est commune: de propriis enim maxime curant, de communibus autem minus quam quantum unicuique attinet” (ed. Susemihl, p. 65, ll. 5-7); cf. supra, II, q. 3 3 2 uirtus…34 ministrat] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1145a1- 6 et etiam Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI.11: “... propter prudentiae unitatem omnes virtutes morales sunt sibi connexae ... virtus moralis ordinat ad finem, prudentia autem dirigit circa ea quae sunt ad finem” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 377, ll. 162-164 et 179-181)

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politie et uirtus, ad minus condependens prudentie tali, siue sit uirtus 35 moralis seu alia. Sed notandum quod amare est uelle bonum alicui. Circa duo igitur est amor, scilicet circa bonum uolutum et circa eum cui uult bonum – uoluntas autem amantis per prius fertur in bonum quod uult quam in eum cui uult –; et ideo dilectio dicitur complacentia in eo bono quod uult uel in illo 40 cui illud uult. Et hoc secundo modo dicitur, et principaliter, amor et dilectio. Et ideo dupliciter dicitur diligere.

Et per hoc patet ad secundam rationem. Nam aliquis non diligit consistentiam politie dilectione primo modo dicta; diligit tamen dilectione secundo modo dicta, et hoc sufficit, inquantum scilicet diligit eum cui uel 45 eos quibus illam uult. Ad primam rationem dicendum quod consistentia male politie, licet sit mala simpliciter, est tamen bona ex suppositione, scilicet illis qui in ea conuersantur principibus; et ideo amor illius exigitur ad perfectionem illorum principum inquantum huiusmodi: licet enim sit amor malus sim- 50 pliciter, est tamen bonus in illo genere principum, et ideo potest esse perfectio eorum.

3 5 minus] uirtus add. B | condependens] correxi ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. V, q. 16: “dicit Egidius quod ad principem requiritur uirtus ... et subdit quod talis uirtus debet esse condependens prudentie, siue sit moralis siue intellectualis” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 179v; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 182va): compendens PB uirtus2] om. B 36 seu] siue B 38 uolutum] uoluntatum P | uult bonum] inv. B 3 9 fertur] fert B | quam…40 uult1] om. per hom. B 40 illo] eo B 4 1 illud] bonum add. B | secundo] primo add. B 42 dicitur] om. P | diligere] eligere B 4 7 primam] om. P | politie] prudentie B 4 9 principibus] om. B 51 est tamen] inv. B 52 eorum] illorum B 3 7 Sed…42 diligere] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 26, art. 4, resp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhetorice, amare est velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit: scilicet in bonum quod quis vult alicui, vel sibi vel alii; et in illud cui vult bonum ... amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter: amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 190); cf. etiam STh Ia, q. 20, art. 1, ad 3 (ed. Leon. IV, p. 253), Petrum, QQ. Metaph. I, q. 3: “intelligendum quod diligere dicitur dupliciter: uno modo proprie, quod est uelle alicui bonum propter se et cooperari ad illud; et iste amor est secundum amicitiam, et isto modo non diliguntur inanimata ... Alio modo dicitur dilectio qualiscumque amatio uel dilectio secundum quam et animata et non animata diligimur, propria et non propria” (ex ms. Cambrdige, Peterhouse, 152, f. 120vb) 47 male…48 suppositione] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.1, 1288b20-35 et supra, IV, q. 1

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< Q U E S TIO 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m p o te n t i a e x i g a tu r a d p e r f e c t i o n e m p r i n c i pa n t i s Arguitur quod non, quia illud non exigitur ad principandum per quod princeps potest multa mala facere subditos opprimendo; ergo poten5 tia mala est et sic ad perfectionem non exigitur. Contra: illud per quod insolentes compescuntur et aduersarii reprimuntur, illud est de perfectione et necessitate principantis inquantum huiusmodi; sed hoc est potentia; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod potentia principantis potest dupliciter intelligi: uel 10 naturalis uel rationalis. Rationalis potentia est que dicitur scientia practica | seu actiua; et si de ista queritur, apparet quod sic, scilicet quod exigitur ad P 310rb perfectionem principantis, quoniam illa est perfectio prudentie, que exigitur ad perfectionem principis, ut dictum est. Si autem consideretur potentia naturalis, illa que est per corporis fortitudinem, et si de hac queritur, 15 dicendum quod non est necessaria principi. Cuius ratio est quia contingit aliquem sine ista perfecte principari; principes autem secundum naturam sunt qui uigent intellectu, etsi sint deficientes robore, ut dicitur 1º huius, et hoc sepius contingit; et ideo sufficit perfecte intelligere intellectu practico ad bene principandum, nec est necesse quod robur corporale exigatur. 20

Si autem queritur de potentia ciuili que est per amicos, dicendum quod ad aliquem principatum exigitur, sicut in principatu militie. Cuius ratio est quia sine potentia ille principatus non posset in finem suum ; per eam autem, scilicet potentiam, attingit finem suum, qui est uictoria. Ad principatum autem maximum non exigitur per se et primo, sicut patet ex

13 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 1 0 naturalis…rationalis] rationalis uel naturalis B 1 1 seu] siue B 14 illa] est add. B | per] pars sed. corr. P 16 aliquem] aliquid B | perfecte] ante sine ista transp. B | principes] princeps sed corr. P 17 sunt] est sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 1 8 hoc] om. B 19 robur corporale] inv. B 2 0 queritur] queratur B 2 1 principatum] principantem B 2 3 potentiam] per se add. B 13 ,1 Consequenter…2 principantis] cf. Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-35; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 316, ll. 362-369) 1 2 perfectio…13 est] cf. supra, V, q. 11, ll. 28-43 1 6 principes…17 robore] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (1), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a30-34

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hoc quod aliquis ea posset uti ad principandum indifferenter; sed ad illum 25 exigitur per se ratio prudentie et primo, ex consequenti autem potentia. Intendit enim legislator eos qui sub se sunt in finem politie ducere per leges et precepta et exercitationes; contingit tamen quod non omnes ei obediant; ideo, si debet eos dirigere in finem, de necessitate indiget poten30 tia, et hoc propter inobedientiam ciuium et malignitatem insidiantium. Et sic necessaria est potentia ciuilis, sed tamen non quecumque potentia ciuilis nec quocumque modo accepta, sed solum commensurata et regulata ratione recta sumpta ex fine. Et ideo, in 3º huius, dictum est quod oportet ciues potentiam dare principanti, mensuratam tamen, ita quod maiorem quam ea que unius, minorem autem quam sit potentia totius 35 populi; expedit enim ut totus populus simul maioris potentie sit quam solus princeps, ne tirannizet.

Ad rationem dicendum quod potentia simpliciter primo et per se non exigitur ad perfectionem principantis, quia per eam sic acceptam possunt fieri multa mala; sed potentia solum determinata ratione recta ex 40 fine exigitur principi, et hec non est causa malorum, sed protectionis et defensionis politie; et ideo talis est principanti necessaria. < Q UE S T I O 1 4 > P

310va

B 75va

C on se qu enter q uer itur, p osi to qu od s int d u o, qu oru m u nu s s it p otens e t n e q u a m , a l i u s au t e m b o n u s e t d i l i g e n s p o l i t i a m , q u i s | h o r u m m a g i s e l i g e n d u s | e s t i n pr i n c i p e m Arguitur quod potens, quia ille magis eligendus est, qui magis potest defendere subditos ab interioribus et exterioribus malis; sed hoc 5

26 primo] et add. B 2 7 eos] om. B 31 potentia1] politia B 33 regulata…recta] recta ratione B 3 5 unius] unus P 36 enim] om. B | simul…sit] sit maioris potentie B 42 politie] populi B 14 , 4 Arguitur] praem. et B | magis2…11 qui] om. per hom. B 25 sed…33 fine] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Expedit autem debentem bene principari habere non solum uirtutem per quam inclinetur in bonum et sciat dirigere actiones subditorum, sed etiam oportet ipsum habere potentiam per quam possit agere cohercendo declinantes a rectitudine rationis” (ed. Lanza, p. 460, ll. 419- 423) 3 4 oportet…37 tirannizet] Arist., Pol. III.15, 1286b34-38 14,1 Consequenter…3 principem] Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a39-b3; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 316, l. 385-p. 317, l. 410)

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potest facere potens non uirtuosus magis quam uirtuosus non potens; ergo potens magis eligendus est. Item, qui per se potest in finem, magis eligendus est; sed habens potentiam sine uirtute magis potest quam uirtuosus sine potentia; ergo et 10 cetera. Contra: ille magis eligendus est qui habet id quod per se exigitur ad principantem quam qui hoc non habet; sed hic est uirtuosus quilibet, licet non potens: uirtus enim per se exigitur ad principatum; ergo uirtuosus, etiam non potens, magis eligendus est.

Dicendum quod uniuersaliter talem oportet eligere in principatum qui possit in finem politie subditos dirigere. Talis autem est qui est melior, quod patet: oportet enim rationem eorum que sunt in finem ex fine sumere; princeps autem ad finem ordinatur etiam immediate; ergo ille potius erit princeps et magis assumendus est in principem qui magis potest 20 dirigere in finem politie secundum quod huiusmodi. 15

Vlterius notandum quod prudentia et uirtutes morales sunt connexe, et ideo, si aliquis habeat unam secundum actum perfectum, profecto habebit aliam uel aliam. Ad questionem ergo dicendum quod considerandum est de qua poten25 tia intendit. Non enim potest intendere de potentia que est robur corporale, quia hec non exigitur ad principatum per se. Nec etiam de potentia rationali, que potest dici prudentia politica, quia de ista non esset dubium: talis enim per se deberet eligi ad principatum. Hoc etiam contra positionem. Suppositum enim quod ille potens sit nequam, hoc autem non potest 30 esse uerum de potente potentia rationali, que est prudentia: hec enim nullum uitium secum compatitur, ut patet 6º Ethicorum. Et ideo uidetur quod intelligat de potentia ciuili cum aliqua ratione prudentie, imperfecta 6 non1] coni.: ut P 11 id] illud B 12 principantem] principandum B | hoc] om. B 1 4 etiam] et B 1 5 oportet] debet B 1 6 est1] om. B 17 eorum] om. P 1 9 est] om. B 21 prudentia] politia P 2 2 profecto] et add. B 2 3 aliam2] alias B 2 5 intendit] intendat B 28 principatum] principantem B 2 9 enim] est add. B 31 secum compatitur] patitur B 3 2 de potentia] om. P 1 7 quod…20 huiusmodi] hoc argumentum valde simile est illo quod in Scripto invenitur; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7: “Et ratio huius est quia principatus rationem sumit ex fine, et ea que sunt ad finem rationem sumunt ex fine. Et ideo ille est assumendus in principem qui habet illud secundum quod possunt magis pertingere ad finem politie” (ed. Lanza, p. 317, ll. 395-399) 2 1 prudentia…23 aliam2] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1144b30-1145a6 30 hec…31 compatitur] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4 1140b19-21 et VI.10, 1144b1-2

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tamen. Et utrum talis eligendus sit, patet in solutione questionis prioris: in militia enim magis eligendus est princeps intendendo ad experientiam; in ducatu autem exercitus magis eligendus est qui habet potentiam cum 35 pauca experientia quam uirtuosus cum experientia, et ideo in tali principatu ducatus exercitus magis eligendus est potens quam uirtuosus; in aliis autem aliquibus econuerso. Et ratio horum omnium sumi debet ex fine politie, inspiciendo ad id quod magis talem finem potest inducere efficaci40 ter et expedite.

P 310vb

Ad rationes patet, quia procedunt secundum media sumpta a diuersis | finibus et politiis; et hoc concedendum est, quod in aliqua politia magis eligendus est potens, et hoc probant prime rationes; in alia autem uirtuosus, ut probat ratio in oppositum. < Q UE S T I O 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m t i r a n n i s s i t p o l i t i a Arguitur quod non, quia propter quod unumquodque tale et ipsum magis; sed democratia ultimo modo dicta dicitur non esse politia propter hoc, quia conuenit cum tirannide, ut dictum est in 4º; ergo nec tirannis dicetur politia esse. Item, omnis politia indiget et utitur legibus, uel interioribus prouisis uel exterioribus scriptis; sed tirannis neutras leges habet; ergo et

3 3 tamen] tam B 3 4 intendendo] intendendum B 3 6 cum experientia] om. B 3 8 sumi debet] sumitur B 3 9 id] illud B 4 0 expedite] expedire B 4 2 et hoc] hoc etiam B | quod] si P 4 3 alia] qua P 1 5 , 1 tirannis] tyrannus P 2 et…3 ipsum] et illud B 3 modo] om. P 4 quia] quod B 3 3 patet…prioris] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 20-30 | in2…37 uirtuosus] cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.7: “... in militia siue ducatu exercitus magis considerandum est ad experientiam quam ad uirtutem, quia per experientiam in armis possunt magis pertingere ad finem politie quam per uirtutem. Virtuosi autem minus experti sunt, ut frequenter, in talibus; sunt tamen meliores multum. Et ideo ad talem principatum magis debet eligi ille qui habet experientiam cum sola prudentia inperfecta quam ille qui habet uirtutem perfectam et non habet experientiam” (ed. Lanza, p. 317, ll. 399- 405) 1 5 , 1 Consequenter…politia] cf. Arist., Pol. V.10, 1310a39, ubi incipit Aristotelis tractatio de tyrannide et de modis conservationis eius 2 propter…3 magis] Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (29), p. 313; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 72a29-30 3 democratia…4 tirannide] Arist., Pol. IV.4, 1292a4-18

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cetera. Minor patet quia principatur ibi malus non secundum legem, sed secundum uoluntatem suam malam, contrariam omnibus legibus. 10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui eam uocat monarchiam et politiam. Item, politia nichil aliud est quam ordo ciuium ad principantem; sed tirannis est talis ordo ad unum principem; ergo et cetera.

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Dicendum quod politia est ordo quidam; ordo autem talis est ordo rationis, qui principium habet finem ultimum estimatum; et ideo politia erit ordo aliquorum ad principem secundum rationem sumptam ex fine ultimo illorum. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod politia, cuius ordinem ratio dictat inspiciendo in finem optimum, dicetur politia optima simpliciter; talis autem est regnum; ideo regnum est optima politia simpliciter. Omnes autem alie deficiunt ab ista aliqualiter secundum magis et minus. Deficere autem ab optimo ordine in finem optimum est dupliciter: uel quantum ad finem ipsum uel quantum ad modum procedendi in illum finem tali ordine. Et primo modo deficiunt a regno ipse politie transgresse, quia simpliciter alium finem et oppositum a fine illius intendunt. Secundo autem modo deficiunt a regno politie alie, scilicet aristocratia et politia. Et quia a fine illius optimo non recedunt, finis autem imponit rationem omnibus que sunt ad finem, ideo adhuc ille, licet ab optima deficiant in modo querendi finem, tamen, quia idem bonum simpliciter intendunt, ideo sortiuntur rationem politie absolute et simpliciter. Alie autem transgresse, quia non solum in modo querendi et in uia, sed etiam in fine et termino deficiunt, immo opponuntur regno secundum quod huiusmodi, ideo nec 13 est1] om. B | est2] post. rationis transp. B 14 estimatum] estimatam B 1 8 est regnum] inv. B | regnum2] regimen sed corr. in regno B 2 1 ipsum] om. B | in] tali add. sed exp. P finem2] per add. sed exp. P 2 2 transgresse] et add. P 23 et…24 deficiunt] om. B | a…illius] illius a fine sed corr. P 2 4 alie] om. B 25 imponit] correxi ex q. 17, l. 19: impedit PB 2 6 in] etiam B 2 9 in1] om. B 10 Philosophus…politiam] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.2, 1289a37-38; IV.10, 1295a1- 4; V.10, 1310a39-b2 11 politia…principantem] cf. Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 1 8 talis…47 simpliciter] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a38-b3; sed de hac doctrina plene agitur in Thomae Sent. Pol. III.1 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A187, l. 155-p. A188, l. 172) et Petri Scripto III.1: “Nunc est ita quod politie specie differunt, et quedam sunt priores, quedam posteriores. Politie enim que sunt ordinate secundum rectam rationem priores sunt aliis que sunt uitiate et transgrediuntur rectam rationem” (ed. Lanza, p. 11, ll. 161-164) et IV.13: “Cum igitur fines politiarum sint diuersi, principatus diuersarum politiarum erunt diuersi; et sicut politie omnes attributionem habent ad unam primam, sic principatus politiarum posteriorum ad principatum in politia prima et simpliciter dicta attributionem habent” (ibid., p. 234, ll. 157-161)

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absolute uel simpliciter politie dici possunt, sed dicuntur politie adiecta determinatione diminuente, unde dicuntur politie transgresse. Cuius ratio est quia, si fines qui primo cadunt in ratione politie sint diuersi, et politie differunt substantialiter; et ulterius, si fines diuersi sunt in conditione boni uel mali, | secundum hoc similiter differunt politie. Tirannis autem deficit a regno quia in finem pessimum pessimo modo ordinatur, regnum autem in finem optimum modo optimo; ergo, et in ratione politie et in conditione, deficiet tirannis a regno. Ideo est alia a regno et est politia non absolute, sed per posterius. Nunc autem, quando aliquod nomen dicitur de pluribus, de uno per prius, de alio per posterius, ipsum absolute potest intelligi de eo de quo per prius dicebatur, et non de posteriori, ut ens absolute dictum intelligitur de substantia, de accidentibus autem non, nisi cum de|terminatione diminuente rationem illam secundum quam de priori dicebatur. Similiter homo per prius dicitur de homine uiuo, de mortuo autem per posterius, propter similitudinem materie et figure, sed tamen de isto non intelligitur nisi cum determinatione diminuente, ut homo mortuus, sed non dicitur homo simpliciter. Similiter tirannis non dicitur politia simpliciter et absolute, propter diuersitatem finis, sed dicitur politia transgressa uel pessima, propter conditionem finis, uel corrupta, propter defectum ab optimo. Dico ergo quod non est politia simpliciter; est tamen politia secundum quid et cum determinatione.

Per hoc ad rationes, et cetera.

3 1 possunt] politie add. B | adiecta…32 diminuente] ad rectam determinationem diminuentem P 33 qui] sui B | sint] sunt B 3 5 secundum] quod add. PB | differunt] differant P etiam demonstrant B 3 6 quia] quare P | pessimo modo] inv. B 3 7 ergo] praem. et sed exp. P | in2] om. P | et2] om. B | conditione] etiam add. B 3 8 Ideo est] et ideo B 39 sed] om. B | Nunc] non B | nomen] natura P 4 0 alio] autem add. B | absolute] sequitur lac. B 4 1 intelligi] intellectus B 4 5 mortuo autem] homine autem mortuo B 4 6 ut] et B 5 1 politia] om. B determinatione] diminutione B 52 hoc] patet add. B 4 1 ens…44 dicebatur] Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (88) et (89), p. 122; Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1003a33-b10 44 homo…47 simpliciter] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a20-25; Arist., Meteor. IV.12, 389b31-390a1; Arist., De An. II.1, 412b20-23; Arist., De Int. 11, 21a21-24; Arist. Metaph. VII.10, 1035b24-25; Arist., De Gen. An. II.1, 735a7- 8

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< Q U E S TIO 1 6 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m t i r a n n i s s i t p o l i t i a n a t ur a l i s Arguitur quod sic, quia ad quod aliquis inclinatur naturaliter, hoc dicitur naturale. Sed aliquis naturaliter inclinatur ad tirannidem, ut ipse tirannus: nam, ut patuit in 3º, quidam tirannus dixit se esurire quando non 5 tirannizabat; sed esuriens appetit cibum naturaliter, propter quod cibus est aliquid naturale; ergo similiter tirannis. Item, dictum est quod tirannis se habet in ciuitate sicut principatus despoticus in domo; sed ad principatum despoticum aliquis inclinatur naturaliter, et ideo despoticus dicitur esse principatus naturalis, ut patuit 10 in 1º; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia PHILOSOPHUS sepe utitur uno pro alio, quia in utroque intendit princeps bonum proprium. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS in fine 3i, ubi dicitur quod omnes transgresse politie sunt preter naturam. Et arguitur quia, ut dicitur 2º Celi et mundi, natura est causa ordinis: quod ergo est contra rectum ordinem est contra 15 naturam; tirannis est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod naturale dicitur dupliciter: uel ipsum compositum uel quod composito inest per naturam, et per materiam uel formam. Primo modo nulla politia est naturalis. Secundo autem dicitur naturale dupliciter adhuc: aut enim illud dicitur naturale quod inest composito a parte forme 20 aut a parte materie. Si primo modo, sic ignis fertur sursum per formam suam, et ideo ferri sursum est ei naturale illo modo; si a parte materie, sic etiam naturale dicitur homini ferri deorsum propter corpus.

16 ,2 Arguitur] praem. et B | ad] hoc add. B | inclinatur naturaliter] inv. B 3 naturale] ille B 4 tirannus1] tyrannis B | tirannus2] tyrannis B | dixit] duxit PB | non] om. B 5 cibus] cibum B 7 dictum] dicendum B | principatus…8 despoticus] principatum dispositum B 8 despoticum] dispositum B 9 despoticus] dispositus B 11 intendit] tendit B | proprium] propinquum add. sed del. B 12 3i] secundi PB 1 3 ut] om. B 1 4 rectum ordinem] rationem ordinis B 18 autem] modo add. B 19 adhuc] om. P 2 0 aut] quod add. B 21 sic] sicut B 16 ,4 quidam…5 tirannizabat] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a24-25 7 dictum…8 domo] cf. supra, III, q. 9 et Arist., Pol. III.8, 1279b16 9 despoticus…naturalis] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254b2-10, sed cf. etiam III.6, 1278b32-34 1 0 Philosophus…11 proprium] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b32-37 et 1279a17-21; III.8, 1279b16; III.14, 1285a16-24, 1285b1-2 et b23-26; IV.4, 1292a15-18; IV.10, 1295a16-17; V.10, 1310b16-20; V.11, 1313a18-23 et 1314a8-9; VII.2, 1324b1-3 1 2 omnes…13 naturam] Arist., Pol. III.16, 1287a39- 41 1 4 natura…ordinis] Arist., De Caelo II.12, 293a2

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Dico ergo quod politia non est naturalis quia insit a parte forme, quia tunc conueniret omnibus suppositis illius forme, | quod est falsum. Ergo erit naturalis ex parte materie, inquantum est ex 25 inclinatione alicuius dispositionis materie. Hec autem est dupliciter adhuc: enim aliqua dispositio inclinat in operationem forme, et ab ista non dicitur tirannis esse politia naturalis, et ab hac inclinatione dicitur aliquis naturaliter liber uel dominus, quia dispositus est secundum corpus ad opus rationis; alia autem dispositio non inclinat in operationem forme, sed potius in 30 oppositum, et ab hac aliquis dicitur naturaliter seruus, quia naturaliter inclinatur in non preuidere, quod est oppositum operationi rationis. Primo modo tirannis non est naturalis, quia tunc inclinaret in operationem rationis, quod falsum est. Secundo autem modo dicendum quod tirannis nullo modo est naturalis subditis ipsis, cuius ratio est quia, ad 35 quod aliquis naturaliter inclinatur, hoc est uoluntarium inquantum huiusmodi, quia naturale est uoluntarium; sed tirannis eo ipso contingit tirannis dicitur, quia principatus est contra uoluntatem, et ideo illis quorum uoluntas est, scilicet subditis, non est naturalis. Est tamen isto modo naturalis principanti, cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis inclinatur natura- 40

23 naturale] suppl. ex supra, ll. 19-22 | composito] suppl. ex supra, l. 19 2 5 est falsum] inv. B inquantum…26 materie] om. per hom. B 2 7 enim aliqua] inv. B | dispositio] materie add. B non] ut P 29 uel] ut B 3 2 in] ibi B | operationi rationis] inv. B 3 3 non] om. P | in operationem] iter. B 3 5 ad] hoc add. B 37 contingit…38 tirannis] om. B 38 illis] illi B 3 9 uoluntas] uoluntatem P | isto] illa B 4 0 naturalis] naturali P 26 adhuc…32 rationis] cf. supra, I, qq. 13, 14 et 16 3 1 seruus…32 preuidere] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a31-34 34 Secundo…44 modo] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.9: “Ex quo sequitur quod iste principatus non est uoluntarius, quia nullus liber uoluntarie subicitur tali principatui. Et ratio huius est quia nullus qui est bene dispositus secundum naturam et inclinatur ad uirtutem uult subici ei qui principatur non secundum uirtutem, sed propter bonum proprium, immo magis inclinatur ad principandum simpliciter quam subiciendum; nunc autem liber bene dispositus est secundum naturam et inclinatur ad uirtutem; ergo manifestum est quod non uult subici ei qui non principatur secundum uirtutem, sed inclinatur magis ad principandum. Sed tyrannus principatur non secundum uirtutem; quare manifestum est quod principatus iste inuoluntarius est” (ed. Lanza, p. 196, l. 54-p. 197, l. 63) 35 tirannis…39 naturalis] quod tyrannidis sit involuntaria et contra naturam etiam declaratur in Aegidii Romani De Reg. Princ. III/2.7: “Nam illa est naturalis operatio erga aliquid quando sic agitur ut est aptum natum agi; quare tunc regnum naturaliter agitur quando homines existentes in ipso sic reguntur ut sunt apti nati regi. Homo autem, quia libero arbitrio et ratione participat, tunc naturaliter regitur et ut est aptus natus regi quando voluntarie servit et libere obedit; quare, quanto dominium aliquorum magis est involuntarium, magis debet dici innaturale (ed.: in naturale); tyrannis igitur est pessima, quia maxime est involuntaria et maxime contra naturam, eo quod sit maxime subditorum afflictiva” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 469)

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liter in finem, inclinatur etiam in ea que ad illum finem faciunt, quia natura, sicut non habundat superfluis, ita non deficit necessariis; sed finis tirannidis, ut delicie uel utilitas propria, talis est quod in eam aliquis inclinatur naturaliter isto modo; ergo et aliquis inclinabitur naturaliter, ille 45 idem, in ea que talem finem inducunt. Talis autem est principatus tirannicus, quo aliquis principans acquirit sibi magis delicias uel utile sibi. Et ideo tirannis isto modo dicitur politia naturalis, non quidem simpliciter naturalis, quia nec est ex parte forme nec ex parte dispositionum materie disponentium operationem forme, sed ex parte dispositionum disponentium ad 50 oppositum operationis forme, quod talibus uidetur naturale: et ideo est naturale secundum quid et non simpliciter. Est etiam naturale per posterius, non autem per prius, quia naturale per prius dicitur quod inest ex parte forme, que primo natura dicitur, ut patet 2º Phisicorum: illud autem merito dicitur naturale per posterius et secundum quid, quod est propter 55 inclinationem in operationem oppositam forme.

Ad rationem dicendum quod illud ad quod aliquis inclinatur natura, dicitur naturale modo quo in illud inclinatur: nam, si ex forma uel ex materia in ordine ad formam et operationem eius ad hoc inclinatur, tunc dicitur naturale simpliciter; si autem ex materia secundum se in 60 ordine ad oppositum , tunc dicitur naturale secundum quid et per posterius. Ad secundam dicendum quod non est simile, quia principatus despoticus magis proportionatur regno, quia in despotico principans principatur primo ad utilitatem suam, ad utilitatem autem serui secunda65 rio, et ideo uoluntarie; non autem tirannis proportionatur inuoluntarie principanti; et ideo non est simile.| P 311va

4 1 inclinatur] om. B 4 3 aliquis] om. P 4 4 inclinabitur] om. B 4 7 non quidem] nisi quid P 4 8 est] om. P 4 9 operationem…disponentium] om. per hom. B 5 0 est] om. B 51 Est] et B 55 operationem] necessario oportet quod sit ei expediens add. sed del. signo ‘uacat’ addito B operationem oppositam] oppositum propositum P 5 6 inclinatur] ex add. B 5 8 operationem] per oppositum B 6 0 operationis forme] suppl. ex supra, l. 50 6 2 secundam] rationem add. B 6 3 despoticus] dispositus B | despotico] deposito B 65 ideo] iterum B | non…67 principanti] om. P | tirannis] tirannidis B 4 1 natura…42 necessariis] Auct. Arist., De An. III (168), p. 188; Arist., De An. III.9, 432 b21-23. Vide etiam adn. ad I, q. 14, l. 18 5 2 naturale…53 dicitur] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (55), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.1, 193a28-31 et 193b6-8

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< Q UE S T I O 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m t i r a n n i s a l i c u i e x p e d i a t

B 76ra

Videtur quod sic, quia quod est naturale alicui expedit illi; sed tirannis est naturalis alicui, ut uisum est; ergo saltim illi expedit. Maior patet quia ad quod aliquis habet | naturalem inclinationem, necessario oportet quod sit ei expediens, uel saltim uideatur ei expediens. 5 Item, principatus despoticus in domo expedit et seruo et domino, ut dictum est in 1º; tirannis autem proportionatur illi; ergo et principi et subditis expediet. Contra: per quod aliquis inclinatur in finem malum et deficit ab eo ad quod ordinatur, hoc ei non expedit; sed huiusmodi est tirannis, que facit 10 hominem deficere ab actu secundum rationem, ad quem ordinatur inquantum . Item, quod est preter naturam, hoc non expedit; sed tirannis est preter naturam, ut dictum est in 3º; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod expediens uno modo dicitur oportunum in finem 15 aliquem, sit bonum siue malum; alio modo dicitur expediens non solum oportunum in finem, sed etiam decens ei cui oportunum est. Primo modo communius accipitur expediens et differt, sicut patet, per finem in quem est oportunum, quia finis imponit necessitatem, et cetera; et ideo ipsum secundum diuersitatem finis diuersificatur. Finis autem 20 hominis aliquis est rectus, secundum ueritatem bonus, ut operari secundum rationem rectam, alius est finis bonus tantum secundum apparentiam, ut uoluptas uel diuitie; et ideo similiter differunt expedientia ad istos fines, ita quod aliquid est simpliciter et secundum ueritatem expediens,

17 , 2 Videtur] et arguitur B | est naturale] inv. B | illi] secundum naturam add. B 3 est2] om. P 5 expediens2] om. P 9 finem] fine B 11 quem] quam B 1 3 preter1] propter B 14 dictum est] dicitur B | in] om. P 1 6 alio…expediens] aliud expediens dicitur B | solum] expediens add. B 17 in finem] om. B 1 9 oportunum] optimum B 2 1 ut] non B 22 finis] eius add. B 23 differunt] differt B 17 , 3 tirannis…est2] cf. supra, V, q. 16, ll. 45-55 6 principatus…domino] Arist., Pol. I.6, 1 3 tirannis…14 1255b8-15; cf. etiam Arist., Pol., III.6, 1278b32-34; cf. supra, III, q. 9 naturam] Arist., Pol. III.17, 1287b39- 40 1 9 finis…cetera] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (90), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a19-21

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aliud autem est expediens non simpliciter, sed secundum quid et quoad finem positum.

Dicendum ergo quod subici tirannidi nulli est expediens. Cuius ratio est quia illud per quod aliquid ordinatur in contrarium eius quod intendit ut finem, uel secundum quid uel simpliciter, hoc ei non expedit. Per hoc 30 autem quod aliquis subicitur tirannidi, declinat et a fine simpliciter et a fine secundum quid. Quod patet: nam quilibet uult finem quem intendit; tirannis autem contrariatur uoluntati subiectorum – nam est contra uoluntatem illorum –; ergo subici tirannidi nulli expedit, nec ad finem simpliciter nec ad finem secundum quid, quia uterque est nolitus ab illo 35 qui eum intendit. Sed tirannis expedit ipsi principanti tirannice, non simpliciter nec ad finem secundum ueritatem, sed secundum quid et ad finem positum. Cuius ratio est quia illud expedit unicuique simpliciter per quod ordinatur in finem hominis simpliciter, et illud non expedit simpliciter per quod aliquis declinat a fine simpliciter; sed tirannus per tirannidem 40 declinat a fine hominis simpliciter; ergo non expedit simpliciter ei. Secundum quid tamen expedit ei: cuius ratio est eodem modo, quia per eam ordinatur tirannus in finem bonum secundum quid, ut ad diuitias uel uoluptates, quas magis potest exequi principando tirannice.

Et per hoc patet ad rationes: expedit enim soli tiranno, et 45 adhuc ei non simpliciter, sed secundum quid; subditis autem nullo modo expedit tirannis.

2 5 est expediens] inv. B | sed] solum add. B 2 8 intendit] intenditur B 2 9 secundum] om. B 3 0 simpliciter] secundum quid B 31 secundum quid] simpliciter B 3 4 illo] eo B 3 6 nec] ut sed corr. P | nec…finem] post ueritatem transp. B 3 8 hominis] homini P 3 9 tirannus] tirannis PB 4 0 hominis simpliciter] inv. B 4 1 ei1] om. P 43 principando] principante B tirannice] tirannide B

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< Q UE S T I O 1 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m t i r a n n i s s a l u e t u r p e r c o n t r a r i a , s i c u t di c i t P h i l o s o ph u s Arguitur quod non, quia contraria sunt cause contrariorum; sed saluatio non est sibi ipsi contraria, sed potius eadem; ergo non habebit 5 contrarias sibi causas. Item, idem effectus non habet causas contrarias. P 311vb

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit eam saluari | secundum modos contrarios, scilicet per intensionem et remissionem.

Dicendum quod tirannis in una specie non est saluabilis per contraria. Cuius ratio est quia ab uno secundum quod unum, sub ratione una, non 10 procedit nisi unum; sed duo contraria non sunt unius rationis; ergo non erunt factiua uel saluatiua unius tirannidis in specie. Sed duarum tirannidum que sunt diuerse secundum speciem, una autem secundum genus, possunt esse contraria saluatiua, quia etiam contraria sunt unum genere. Et ideo intelligendum quod tirannis dupliciter est: una in qua aliquis 15 principatur ad utilitatem suam et contra uoluntatem subditorum; et hec,

18 , 1 per] in P 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | cause] esse B 6 Item…contrarias] om. B 9 in] om. B 1 0 unum] id est add. B | una] contra unum sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 11 unius] om. B 14 saluatiua] om. P 1 5 intelligendum] est add. B | una] est add. B | aliquis…16 principatur] principaliter est B 16 utilitatem] uoluntatem B 18 , 1 tirannis…contraria] cf. Arist., Pol. V.11, 1313a34-35, sed cf. praecipue 1314a31; cf. Petri Scriptum V.11 (ed. Lanza, p. 348, ll. 37- 43, 50-51) et V.12 (ibid., p. 357, ll. 1-18) 3 contraria… contrariorum] Auct. Arist., Pol. V (91), p. 258; Arist., Pol. V.8, 1307b29 7 dicit…8 remissionem] Arist., Pol. V.11, 1313a34-35; sed verbis ‘remissio’ et ‘intensio’ non utuntur nec Aristoteles nec Albertus ubi eadem considerat; utraque tantum inveniuntur in Petri Scripto V.11: “Tyrannis ... Saluatur autem duobus modis: uno modo intendendo ipsam, secundo remittendo. Et secundum hoc diuiditur in duas: in prima prosequitur modum secundum quem saluatur per intensionem; secundo, modum qui est per remissionem” (ed. Lanza, p. 348, ll. 38- 43) 1 0 ab…11 unum] Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima IX.4 (ed. Van Riet, p. 481, ll. 50-51); cf. Averroem, In Metaph. XII, comm. 44 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 327v, I) 12 Sed…14 genere] cf. Arist., Metaph. X.8, 1058a8-16 14 contraria2…genere] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (243), p. 135; cf. Arist., Metaph. X.4, 1055a25-29 1 5 una…21 talium] cf. Arist., Pol. V.11, 1313a39-1314a29 sed praecipue 1314a14-25; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.11: “... reducit istos modos omnes ad tres ... Primum est ut subditi sint ignorantes et pauca scientes ... Secundum est quod discredant sibi inuicem subditi ... Tertium est quod reddat eos inpotentes faciendo eos pauperes” (ed. Lanza, p. 353, ll. 205, 208-209, 214 et 219-220)

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secundum ambo ista, directe opponitur regno, et ideo saluari habet intendendo et recedendo a regno. Nam isto modo principatur aliquis aliquibus uel propter ignorantiam uel propter impotentiam uel propter incredulita20 tem eorum inter se uel similia; ideo saluatur iste modus per omnia factiua ignorantie et impotentie et talium. Alia autem est species tirannidis que media est inter ista et regnum, ubi aliquis non simpliciter ad utilitatem suam, sed etiam ad aliqualem utilitatem, saltim apparentem, subditorum principatur, et etiam non omnino inuoluntarie; et hec saluatur remittendo 25 tirannidem et attendendo ad regnum. Cuius ratio est quia regnum de ratione sua maxime saluabile est; ergo et illa que aliquo modo accedunt ad regnum, quanto magis accedunt ad illud, tanto magis sunt saluabilia.

Ad rationes patet, quia non eiusdem tirannidis in specie, sed eiusdem in genere, diuersarum tamen in specie, contraria sunt 30 saluatiua: eiusdem enim in specie etiam non sunt contrarie cause, sed bene eiusdem in genere, | diuersarum tamen in specie. Et sic est in B 76rb proposito.

18 regno] ideo et cetera add. B | principatur aliquis] inv. B 1 9 impotentiam…propter3] om. per hom. B 22 est] ista add. B 23 saltim] solum B 24 principatur] principatus P 2 8 eiusdem] eius P 2 9 eiusdem] eius P | diuersarum] diuersorum P 3 1 diuersarum] diuersorum B 2 1 Alia…27 saluabilia] cf. Arist., Pol. V.11, 1314a29-1315b10; cf. Petrum, Scriptum V.12 (ed. Lanza, p. 357, ll. 1-19)

< L I B E R S E XT U S >

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a g r i c u l t u r a s i t n a t u r a l i s Arguitur quod non, quia quod est a natura, hoc inuenitur in omnibus eiusdem speciei, quia et natura illa inuenitur in omnibus illis; sed agricultura non inuenitur in omnibus indiuiduis hominis; ergo et cetera. 5

10

Item, que sunt naturalia, in omnibus inueniuntur eodem modo: nam omnis aranea eodem modo telam facit et yrundo eodem modo nidum, sicut dicitur 2º Phisicorum et etiam 5º Ethicorum; agricultura autem non est eodem modo apud omnes; ergo non est naturalis. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS in hoc 6º, et arguitur quia, si totum est naturale, et pars erit naturalis, sicut si totus homo est a natura, et cor eius erit a natura; modo tota ciuitas est a natura, ut patuit 1º huius; ergo et agricultura, que est pars illius.

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Dicendum quod agricultura est naturalis. Cuius ratio est quia, si finis est naturalis, et ea que in finem ordinantur erunt naturalia, quia natura non inclinat in finem nisi etiam pariter inclinet in ea que sunt ad finem: non enim frustra operatur nec deficit necessariis, ut dicitur 2º Celi et Mundi, ubi dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod, si natura indulsisset stellis motum processiuum, dedisset etiam eis instrumenta motui tali congrua; ergo, si natura inclinat in finem, inclinabit etiam in ea que sunt ad finem illum. Sed diuitie, ex quibus per se sustentatur natura, sunt naturalia, et ad eas homo

1, 2 Arguitur] praem. et B 6 eodem modo2] om. B 9 hoc] om. B 1 0 si] om. P | homo] om. B eius] om. B 1 1 et] om. P 15 ad] in B 1 6 Celi…17 Mundi] de celo et mundo B 1 7 ubi] ut B quod] quia B 19 inclinabit] inclinabitur in sed in exp. P 2 0 eas] eos B 1, 5 que…modo] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1134b19; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. V (99), p. 239 6 omnis…nidum] Arist., Phys. II.8, 199a26-30 9 Contra…6º] re vera Aristoteles numquam id asserit in VIº libro; cf. potius Petrum, Scriptum VI.4: “Ista autem est antiquissima omnium democratiarum: antiquior enim multitudo et magis naturalis est agricultiua” (ed. Lanza, p. 395, l. 21-p. 396, l. 23) 1 1 tota…natura2] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30 16 non…18 congrua] Arist., De Caelo II.8, 290a29-35 et Thomas, In De Caelo II.13: “Et dicit quod si stellae moverentur motu progressivo, quasi circulos suos perambulantes, irrationabile videretur quod natura non dedisset eis instrumenta convenientia ad motum localem” (ed. Leon. III, p. 169); cf. etiam Arist., De Caelo II.11, 291b13-14; supra, I, q. 14, l. 18 cum adn.

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naturaliter inclinatur, ut in cibum et potum, ergo et illud per quod talia habentur erit naturale; sed hoc est agricultura; ergo agricultura | erit naturalis. Sed intelligendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse a natura: uel enim secundum actum perfectum, ut homo et alie species, uel secundum inclinationem tantum, sicut uirtutes quedam insunt nobis a natura inclinante, a ratione autem et consuetudine perficiente, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum. Sic isto secundo modo agricultura dicitur naturalis, quia aliqui in eam naturaliter inclinantur, sicut et ciuitas dicitur naturalis. Non autem est naturalis secundum actum perfectum, sed tantum secundum inclinationem, a ratione autem determinante perficitur. Et ideo ulterius notandum quod naturale dicitur quod inest alicui a natura; et quia natura dicitur dupliciter, ideo et naturale dicitur dupliciter. Aliquid enim dicitur naturale quod inest a parte forme, et isto modo agricultura non dicitur naturalis; cuius ratio est quia tunc in omnibus indiuiduis hominis inueniretur, sicut et forma illa, quod falsum est: aliqui enim in agriculturam non inclinantur. Alio modo dicitur naturale quod inest a parte materie. Et hoc dupliciter: uel enim a parte materie in communi et absolute, inquantum scilicet primo et per se proportionatur forme hominis; et tunc isto modo agricultura non est naturalis eadem ratione qua prius, quia illa materia est in omnibus indiuiduis sicut et forma. Alio modo dicitur naturale a parte materie non in communi, sed a parte dispositionum aliquarum materie, sicut sunt calidum, frigidum, humidum et alia complexionalia; et a tali natura agricultura est naturalis, que ad ipsam inclinatur, quia talis natura in ipsam inclinat in aliquo indiuiduo, sicut et seruitus dicitur naturalis a dispositione materie huius indiuidui inclinante in seruitutem. Sic ergo agricultura est naturalis non secundum actum perfectum, sed a natura inclinante, et iterum non ab inclinatione forme nec materie abso-

21 et2] in add. sed exp. P 2 2 naturale] naturalis B 2 4 intelligendum] est add. B | esse] naturale add. sed exp. P 27 2º…28 isto] om. per hom. B 3 2 naturale…quod2] om. per hom. B 3 7 agriculturam] agricultiuam P 40 tunc] item P | naturalis] materialis B 4 4 complexionalia] connaturalia B 4 5 in1] ad B 4 7 seruitutem] seruitum P lac. B 48 Sic] si P 26 uirtutes…27 perficiente] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a14-25 3 4 Aliquid…forme] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (55), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.1, 193a28-31 45 sicut…47 seruitutem] cf. supra, I, q. 13, ll. 93-108 4 8 non…49 inclinante] de hac distinctione vide adn. ad I, q. 3, ll. 14-16

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lute, sed ab inclinatione dispositionis alicuius materie in indiuiduo hoc uel illo.

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Ad rationes dicendum quod, si esset naturalis a forma uel materia communi et absoluta, tunc hoc sequeretur bene. Quia autem est naturalis a dispositione aliqua indiuiduali, que non in omnibus indiuiduis inuenitur, ideo non oportet quod et agricultura insit omnibus, sed solum illis qui talem dispositionem participant. Ad secundam dicendum quod illa que sunt a natura actu perfecto, illa in omnibus eodem modo se habent; que autem tantum inclinatione, et secundum actum perfectum sunt a ratione, non oportet quod sint eodem modo in omnibus, sed possunt aliter se habere, sicut et ratio diuersificatur.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m a g r i co l a r u m m u l t i tu d o s i t o p t i m a Arguitur quod non, quia que magis accedit ad seruitutem non est optima; talis autem est multitudo agricultiua, quia agricolas magis consueuimus dicere seruiles; ergo illa multitudo non est optima.

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Item, minus assueti in actibus ciuilibus minus uidentur apti ad politizandum, et sic non meliores; tales autem sunt agricole; ergo et cetera. Maior patet 1º Ethicorum et 10º, quia moralia oportet infieri per assuetudinem a pueritia. Minor patet | quia agricole necesse habent foris manere, et P 312rb sic manent inexperti actuum ciuilium; qui autem morantur in ciuitate, magis possunt habilitari et experiri de re publica.

53 sequeretur bene] inv. B | autem] quod P | a] aut B 55 et] om. B 5 6 dispositionem] forte add. B 58 inclinatione] inclinantem B 5 9 eodem…60 modo] eedem P 2 , 2 Arguitur] praem. et B 3 autem] ergo B | agricultiua] scrips. agricolatiua B 6 sic] sicut B 7 patet] in add. B | 10º] 9 P 2 ,1 Consequenter…optima] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1318b10; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.4 (ed. Lanza, p. 395, l. 21-p. 399, l. 124) 7 moralia…8 pueritia] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.2, 1095b4-5; X.12, 1180a1-3

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia multitudo que minime malum machinatur et que minus inuidet minus ambiciosa est, talis melior est ad politizandum, talis autem in minus iniuriatur; sed talis est multitudo agricolarum; ergo melior. Minor patet quia, minus uacans congregationibus, non potest machinari malitiose; et quia necessaria uite habet, ideo modicum inuidet; quia autem honores non consueuit, non ambi|tiosa est.

15

Dicendum quod multitudo agricultiua non est optima simpliciter; est tamen optima inter multitudines democraticas. Ratio primi est quia illa est optima multitudo simpliciter, que, secundum quod huiusmodi, magis inclinatur ad uiuere secundum rationem, quia hoc est finis hominis optimus; quanto autem aliquid est propinquius fini, tanto melius, sicut dicitur 3º Thopicorum – idem autem est finis unius hominis et totius multitudinis, ut dicetur in 7º huius –; talis autem est multitudo uirtuosorum, quia uirtus et prudentia per se disponunt ad uiuere secundum rationem, et ab hoc deficit agricultura; ergo multitudo agricultiua non est melior simpliciter.

13 autem] om. B 15 potest] om. P | malitiose] scrips. malerre P malitie B 1 6 non1] suppl. ex fonte allata 1 7 non] s.l. P | ambitiosa] non add. sed exp. P 1 9 optima] operatiua B 23 unius] om. P 2 6 deficit] om. B 11 multitudo…17 est] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1318b11-17: “propterea quidem enim quod non multam substantiam habet, non vacans, ut non saepe congregationes faciat: propterea autem quod non habent necessaria, circa opera immorantur et aliena non concupiscunt” (ed. Susemihl, p. 466, ll. 10-13); Auct. Arist., Pol. VI (106), p. 260; cf. etiam Arist., Pol. IV.6, 1292b25-30, ubi asseritur quod agricolae principantur secundum leges. Verba quae in hoc paragrapho inveniuntur valde similia sunt illis quibus Petrus utitur in Scripto; cf. praesertim verbum ‘machinari’, quod non invenitur in Alberti commentario: Petrus, Scriptum VI.4: “... agricultiua multitudo est optima quia non est machinatiua ... non est concupiscitiua ... non est ambitiosa ... multitudo agricultiua, quia non habet diuitias multas, non multum potest uacare ab operationibus exterioribus, sed necesse est intendere ad culturam terre, ex qua sustentatur, et ad alia necessaria. Et quia non potest uacare ab exterioribus, non appetit facere congregationes, et ideo minus machinari potest ... Et quia minus machinatiua est, melior est ad politizandum. Secundo ... probat quod est optima quia non est concupiscitiua, dicens quod huiusmodi multitudo, propter hoc quod non habet necessaria ad bene uiuendum, necesse habet intendere circa exteriora opera exterius in regione” (ed. Lanza, p. 396, ll. 39-46, 48-53); cf. Albertum, Pol. IV.3 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 575) 22 quanto…23 melius] Arist., Top. III.1, 116b24 2 3 idem…24 multitudinis] Arist. Pol. VII.2, 1324a5-8; cf. infra, VII, q. 4

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Ratio autem secundi est quia illa multitudo que immediatius ordinatur in finem est melior inquantum huiusmodi, quia est propinquior optimo; talis autem est agricultiua, que ordinatur ad acquisitionem illorum ex quibus immediatius sustentatur natura, scilicet ad terre nascentia, que sunt alimentum communius, alia autem multitudo ordinatur ad sustentamentum nature mediate, ut mercenaria uel forensis, scilicet per pecuniam; et ideo prima multitudo melior est istis, quia omnis communicatio ordinatur ad per se sufficientiam. Item, multitudo melius disposita ad uirtutem melior est. Talis autem est agricultiua respectu aliarum, quia multitudo manens in ciuitate aut studet ad astutias aut ad uilia inclinatur magis quam ista, sicut sunt mercenarii et bannausi, et tales iam determinati sunt ad uitia; multitudo autem agricolarum, quantum est de se, indeterminati sunt ad uitia uel uirtutes, et ideo facilius sunt reducibiles ad uirtutem. Item, tales magis exercitati sunt in actibus liberalitatis quantum est ex ratione officii: ipsi enim terram consueuerunt colere et, terre nascentibus P 312va collectis, distribuere aliis, et | ideo magis ydonei ad bene conuiuendum.

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Item, minus mala machinantur uel inuident uel ambitiosi sunt, ut prius patuit.

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Ad rationem dicendum quod agricultiua non accedit ad seruitutem, quod patet: seruus enim est qui non solum robustus est corpore, sed et qui minus potest preuidere ratione; hoc autem minus contingit agricole quam bannauso, et ideo, saltim respectu illorum, agricola melior. Vel dicendum quod multitudo accedens ad seruitutem, uerum est quod non est melior simpliciter, est tamen melior ad politizandum, quia, ut patuit in

2 8 Ratio] praem. ad sed exp. P | illa] om. B 2 9 propinquior] primo add. B 3 2 communius] communis B 3 3 ut] et B 3 4 est] om. B | omnis] communis B 3 6 autem] om. B 38 ad1] aut B 3 9 bannausi] scrips. bannaxi P bannari B | et2] ideo add. B 4 2 exercitati] scrips. eccitati B liberalitatis] libertatis B 4 3 nascentibus] nascentia P 4 7 agricultiua] agricultura B | non] ut P 4 8 est1] om. B 52 est2…melior2] om. P 2 8 Ratio…33 pecuniam] cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.3: “... sunt plures partes ciuitatis. Vna enim est multitudo que amministratiua est alimenti, sicut sunt agricole, et ista est prima pars et necessaria; alimentum enim necessarium est in ciuitate, et ideo necessarii sunt illi qui administrant ipsum. Secunda pars ciuitatis, quantum ad gradum inferiorem, sunt bannausi; et dicuntur bannausi qui in operibus suis maculant corpus, sicut sunt fulones et coriarii et alii huiusmodi artifices, sine quibus non potest ciuitas inhabitari” (ed. Lanza, p. 160, ll. 77-83) 4 5 minus…46 patuit] cf. supra, ll. 11-17 4 8 seruus…49 ratione] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a31-34

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1º, seruus inquantum huiusmodi determinatur uirtute aliqua, ista sic alterius rationis a uirtute liberi; uirtus autem per se ordinatur ad politiam. Artifex autem inquantum huiusmodi non determinatur uirtute aliqua, sed tantum scientia sui operis, quia participat solum factionem, cuius principium est cognitio et ars; seruus autem participat actionem uite, cuius principium est uirtus, ut patet 6º Ethicorum. Et ideo seruus inquantum huiusmodi magis pertinet ad politiam quam artifex, et per consequens multitudo accedens ad seruitutem magis quam multitudo artificum – dico inquantum tales sunt utrique –. Ad secundam dicendum quod exercitati magis in actibus ciuilibus iustis et uirtuosis meliores sunt ad politizandum; exercitati autem in actibus ciuilibus ut in astutiis uel talibus – que etiam non uere dicuntur ciuilia – non sunt meliores. Sed hoc ultimo modo magis exercitata est multitudo incola quam multitudo agricolarum. Et ideo ad hoc illa non est melior, immo peior ea que secundum se indeterminata est ad tales actus; talis est multitudo agricolarum; et ideo respectu aliarum multitudinum omnium democricarum melior est, licet non simpliciter.

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< Q UE S T I O 3 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m m u l t i t u d o p a s t o r a l i s s i t m e l i o r a d p o l i t i z a n d u m q u a m m u l t i t ud o q u e i n c i u i t a t e Arguitur quod non, quia illi qui magis sunt agrestes non sunt meliores ad politizandum; tales sunt pastores; ergo non sunt meliores illis qui sunt in ciuitate uolgaribus. Maior patet quia, foris manendo, magis declinant ab eo quod est uiuere secundum rationem et a bene politizando. 5 3 1º] huius add. B | uirtute aliqua] inv. B | ista…56 aliqua] om. per hom. P 5 7 actionem] actioni B 6 3 iustis] in istis P | autem] om. P 64 actibus] talibus B 66 agricolarum] agricola B ad…68 ideo] om. per hom. P 69 democraticarum] democratia B 3 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 meliores1] magis boni B 5 sunt] om. B | uolgaribus] scrips. ulgalibus B 6 uiuere] quod est add. sed exp. P | a bene] ab non P 5 3 seruus…54 liberi] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b40-1260a2, 1260a8-11, 1260a33-36; cf. supra, I, qq. 29-30 55 Artifex…57 ars] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a36-b2; cf. supra, I, q. 31 5 7 seruus…uite] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a39- 40 | uite…58 uirtus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.10, 1145a2- 6. Cf. etiam VI.4, 1140b16-20 et VI.1, 1139a31-33, ubi loquitur de electione ut principium actus 3 ,1 Consequenter…2 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319a19-21; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.4 (ed. Lanza, p. 400, ll. 162-176)

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Item, illi qui inclinantur ad turpia et ad ea que magis contra naturam non sunt meliores ad politizandum; tales sunt pastores. 10

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia multitudo que propinquior est meliori melior est; sed multitudo pastoralis propinqua est multitudini agricultiue, cui multa similia habet; ergo est melior. Minor patet quia etiam ad ea ordinatur ex quibus sustentatur natura, licet non primo, sed secundario magis.

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Dicendum quod multitudo pastoralis, quantum est de ratione sua inquantum huiusmodi, melior est ad politizandum quam multitudo in ciuitate, melior – inquam – post primam, scilicet | agricultiuam. Cuius P 312vb ratio est quia illa multitudo melior est ad politizandum, que magis disposita est ad uirtutem et ad uiuere secundum rationem; talis est pastoralis respectu negotiatiuarum in ciuitate; ergo est melior illis. Minor patet quia triplex est uiuere secundum rationem: primo, speculari est uiuere secundum rationem; secundo autem, uiuere secundum rationem est ordinare aliqua in finem, quia hoc est proprium opus rationis; tertio, exercere opera uirtutum est uiuere secundum rationem. Et ad quodlibet istorum multitudo pastoralis inquantum huiusmodi magis inclinabilis est quam multitudo incola ciuitatis. Primo quidem, quia a tumultibus et exterioribus turbationibus ciuitatis semota, quibus incole | ciuitatis tota die infestantur, magis potest uacare B 76vb speculationi; et hoc habet de officio et ratione pastorali, unde primi astronomi fuerunt pastores, ut Habraham, Ysaac et Iacob et alii.

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Secundo, quia ordinare ea que in finem magis consueuerunt pastores de ratione officii: nam necesse habent ordinare et dirigere gregem et disponere bene et prouidere necessaria, quod multum assimilatur cure hominum, unde et communiter pastores uocamus eos qui de cura hominum sunt solliciti. Incole autem ciuitatis inquantum huiusmodi nichil habent nisi uendere et emere.

8 tales] autem add. B 9 multitudo] pastoralis add. B 11 agricultiue] agriculture B | ergo est] est enim B 12 ex] et B 1 5 est] om. B 2 1 autem…secundum] om. B 22 aliqua] aliquem B opera] om. P 2 3 Et] om. B 2 7 incole] ciuitate add. P 2 9 et Iacob] om. B 3 2 quod] quam B 9 multitudo…10 est2] Arist., Top. III.2, 117b21; Auct. Arist., Top. III (50), p. 325 1 0 multitudo…11 habet] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319a21-22

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Tertio quia, ad actus bellicos magis exercitati, opera fortitudinis consuescunt: habent enim se sic in defendendo gregem et repellendo animalia nocentia, sicut princeps in custodiendo populum, et ita exercitantur in actibus fortitudinis et aliarum uirtutum moralium. Sic autem non est de multitudine in ciuitate; nam talis, ex ratione sui officii inquantum huiusmodi, non inclinatur ad uirtutes aliquas; potest esse uirtuosa per accidens: hoc autem nichil ad propositum. Multitudo autem pastoralis de ratione sui officii ad talia inclinatur. Sic ergo multitudo pastoralis non est simpliciter melior ad politizandum, sed multitudo uirtuosorum est talis simpliciter; pastoralis autem est melior post agricultiuam inter democraticas multitudines, et est melior multitudinum que in ciuitate. Hoc dico quantum est de ratione utriusque et officio proprio.

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Ad rationes dicendum quod pastores non sunt simpliciter plus agrestes, quia non oportet necessarie quod negotians plus uiuat secundum rationem. Vel dicendum quod possibile est non agrestem magis esse certum in malitiis et astutiis et determinatum sic ad uitia, agrestem autem esse indeterminatum quantum est de se; et sic bene agrestis est melior et ducibilior ad uirtutes. P 313ra

Ad secundam dicendum quod hoc accidit pastoribus eo quod | otiosissimi sunt, ut dicebatur in 1º huius. Et ideo, quando tales se dant speculationibus, maxime speculatiui fiunt et profundissimi, quando autem ad malitias se applicant, excellenter mali fiunt.

3 7 se…in] in se sic B | et] in add. B | animalia] alia P 3 8 exercitantur] scrips. egrecitantur P 4 3 sui] om. B 4 6 agricultiuam] agriculturam B 4 7 respectu] suppl. ex q. praec., l. 68 et supra, l. 19 5 3 indeterminatum] determinatum sed corr. s.l. B 54 ducibilior] post. uirtutes transp. B 5 6 sunt…57 profundissimi] iter. B | quando] quod P 3 6 ad…consuescunt] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319a22-23 5 5 hoc…56 sunt] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a31

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Arguitur quod non quia, quando aliquid contingit alicui per se et secundum se absolute, uidetur quod tum non diuersificetur in comparatione ad aliud, ut, si aliquis dicitur albus simpliciter et absolute, non uidetur dici magis in comparatione ; sed uiuere preter rationem et inordinate simpliciter et absolute est indelectabile secundum se; ergo uidetur quod non debeat dici delectabile respectu alicuius uel multorum. Item, illud quod secundum se est indelectabile, etiam est indelectabile illis qui rectum iudicium habent; sed multi melius iudicant quam pauci, ut dixit PHILOSOPHUS in 3º et 4º, ergo habent rectum iudicium; ergo uiuere inordinate non erit delectabile multis. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur quia illud est pluribus delectabile ad quod plus sunt assueti, quia assueta sunt quasi naturalia: naturalia enim semper fiunt assueta aut sepe, quod autem sepe fit, proprinquum est ei quod fit semper; modo multi, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Rhetorice, assueti sunt in uiuendo preter rationem; ergo hoc est multis delectabilius.

4 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 tum] cui P 5 si] om. P 1 0 illud] om. B | indelectabile1] indulcanle P | etiam…indelectabile2] om. per hom. B | indelectabile2] indulcanle P 1 1 melius iudicant] inv. B 12 pauci] ergo add. PB 1 3 uiuere] om. B | erit] est B 14 pluribus] in aliquibus B 1 6 semper fiunt] inv. B | aut] autem P | aut sepe] om. B | quod autem] et quod B 17 ut…Rhetorice] plus P 18 delectabilius] delectabilibus B 4 ,1 Consequenter…2 multis] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319b30-32; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.5 (ed. Lanza, p. 407, ll. 110-116) 11 multi…12 pauci] Arist., Pol . III.15, 1286a30-31; Auct. Arist., Pol . III (64), p. 256; Arist., Pol. IV.14, 1298b20-21 1 4 illud…15 assueti] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319b30-32; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.5: “multis delectabilius est inordinate uiuere quam temperate et secundum uirtutem. Homines enim, ut in pluribus, a ratione recta deficiunt. Ad defectum autem rationis sequitur uiuere preter rationem et ordinem. Pauci autem sequuntur rationem rectam, et ideo pauci temperate assuescunt uiuere, multi autem inordinate. Et ideo delectabilius est pluribus inordinate uiuere, quia magis assuescunt” (ed. Lanza, p. 407, ll. 110-115) 1 5 assueta…naturalia1] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VII (125), p. 241; Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.12, 1152a30-31; Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (23), p. 265; Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1370a6-7; Auct. Arist., De Mem. et Rem. (64), p. 200; Arist., De Mem. et Rem. 2, 452a27-28 1 7 modo…18 rationem] cf. Arist., naturalia2…17 semper] cf. Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1370a6-8 Rhet. II.5, 1382b9-10: “... ut enim in pluribus iniusta faciunt homines cum possint” (AL XXXI.1-2, p. 232, ll. 2-3)

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Dicendum quod delectatio est ex coniunctione conuenientis cum conuenienti; et non solum exigitur coniunctio, quia tunc inanimata delectarentur, sed ulterius exigitur sensus coniunctionis talis et apprehensio. Et hoc uidetur manifeste quia, si alicui coniungitur aliquid conueniens et ipse apprehendit illam coniunctionem, statim delectatur, et si sensus aliquis apprehendit coniunctionem talem, etiam si non sit secundum ueritatem, dummodo uideatur conueniens, licet non sit, tamen statim delectatur, credens conueniens sibi esse coniunctum. Sed ubi est delectatio secundum ueritatem, ibi sunt hec duo secundum ueritatem necessario, scilicet coniunctio conuenientis cum conuenienti et sensus talis coniunctionis; propter quod PHILOSOPHUS recte diffinit delectationem, 1º Rhetorice, ubi dixit quod delectatio est motus et constitutio tota simul sensibilis in existentem

19 Dicendum quod] om. B | est] ut add. PB 2 0 delectarentur] delectaretur B 2 3 apprehendit] apprehendat B 2 4 coniunctionem] contingit P 2 5 dummodo] cum add. P | tamen] om. B 26 esse] om. B 2 7 ibi…ueritatem2] om. per hom. B 29 Philosophus] huiusmodi P | recte] iterum B | diffinit] diffiniunt P | 1º] 2 PB | dixit] dicit B 30 in] non P 19 Dicendum…37 indiuisibilis] argumenta similia etiam inveniuntur in Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 31, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. VI, p. 215). Quod hic invenitur valde simile est Aegidii Romani assertionibus sequentibus, ubi etiam clare explicatur modum quo delectatio ‘motus’ debeat dici et asseritur quod eius praedicatio est causalis. Cf. Aegidium Romanum, In Rhet. I: “Habet autem huiusmodi delectatio esse ex actione perfecta, ideo dicitur motus quidam, quia sequitur ad motum, large accipiendo motum prout omnis operatio habet quamdam rationem motus; ideo non dicitur simpliciter motus, sed motus anime, qui non est motus ut dicit imperfectionem, sed ut dicit operationem perfectam, non quod sit ipsa operatio, sed quia sequitur ad eam. Nam non est predicatio formalis, sed causalis; et quia delectatio sequitur operationem perfectam, que habet totum suum esse, sequitur delectationem esse quandam constitutionem simul totam, quia non mensuratur tempore et nihil expectat in futurum ut perficiatur” (ed. Venetiis 1515, f. 37ra); cf. etiam Henricum de Gandavo, Summa QQ. Ord. art. L, q. 2: “Per illam enim particulam qua dicitur quod est motus, tangitur eius genus, ut motum largissime accipiamus pro qualitate impressa delectanti ex praesentia delectabilis, quae dicitur motus, non quia sua essentia in motu aut mutatione consistit – hoc enim non est verum –, sed potius consistit in permanentia et perfecto esse quod est totum simul” (ed. Führer, p. 193, ll. 157-162). Quod motus in delectatione sic debeat intendi etiam asseritur in: Petrus, Quodl. VI, q. 10 (Vtrum delectatio sit non-existentis): “... statim una existente apprehensione de bono et conuenienti, sequitur delectatio: non est igitur habitus, erit igitur passio uel actus, non quid actus uel passio qui sint motus proprie dictus, scilicet actus entis in potentia, sed qui est actus entis in actu seu perfectio de potentia in actum, quia motus proprie dictus non est in potentiis anime...” (ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 94ra) delectatio…20 conuenienti] Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima VIII.7 (ed. Van Riet, vol. 2, p. 432, ll. 67- 68) 3 0 delectatio…31 naturam] Arist., Rhet. I.11, 1369b33-35

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naturam, que diffinitio uno modo exponitur ut sit causalis, ut accipiendo duo membra diffinitionis pro duabus causis: nam ‘motus’ sonat in aliquid imperfectum; ‘constitutio’ autem ‘tota simul’ dicit perfectum ‘in existentem naturam’, id est in aliquam perfectionem et dispositionem conuenientem secundum naturam intrinsecam; ‘tota simul’ hic ponitur, quia delectatio sequitur motum non secundum successionem partium, sed simul indiuisibilis. Aliter exponunt QUIDAM, ita quod hoc totum, ‘motus’ et ‘constitutio’ scilicet, accipiatur pro causa prima, scilicet pro coniunctione conuenientis, sed ‘sensibilis’ accipiatur pro causa secunda, que est appre3 1 sit…ut2] sic B 37 Aliter…quidam] alicui expediunt quedam B 3 8 constitutio] totum add. B | scilicet1] si PB 3 1 que…44 modo] quod duo sint modi expondendi definitionem delectationis etiam asseritur, eisdem fere argumentis, in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ Pol. VI, q. 4: “... illa diffinitio solet dupliciter exponi. Vno modo sic: cum dicitur quod est motus, debet sic intelligi, quia sicut apparet in 3º Phisicorum, motus est actus alicuius imperfecti, quia sicut ibi apparet, motus est actus entis in potentia secundum quod in potentia; et ideo, ad denotandum quod delectatio est motus non cuiuscumque entis, sed entis perfecti, additur quod est constitutio tota simul, et cetera. Aliter solet exponi illa diffinitio, et magis ad propositum: delectatio est motus, et per hoc datur intelligi quod delectatio est coniunctio conuenientis cum conuenienti, cum motus semper ad ulteriorem perfectionem tendat, ut apparet 3º Phisicorum . Sed per hoc, cum dicitur quod dicitur constitutio simul tota sensibilis, et cetera, datur intelligi cognitio illius quod habet delectationem causare, et ideo secundum quod aliquid est aliter et aliter cognitum a diuersis, aliter et aliter delectat, et secundum quod diuersimode conueniens est diuersis, quia illa que sunt conuenientia uni complexioni sunt disconuenientia alteri, et que sunt conuenientia quibusdam hominibus sunt disconuenientia et nociua (inv.) aliis, et ideo secundum hoc idem diuersis diuersimode est delectabile et aliis et aliis sunt alia et alia delectabilia, sicut uult Philosophus in De sensu et sensato” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 50va-b) 3 2 motus…33 imperfectum] cf. Arist., Phys. III.2, 201b32 et III.1, 201a9-11 37 Aliter…40 coniunctionis] in Henrici de Gandavo Summa QQ. Ord. art. L, magis quam alibi, invenimus ista duo clare (quoad primum) et pertinaticer (quoad secundum) asserta, licet non dicantur ‘causa prima’ et ‘causa secunda’, ut iuxta Petrum; quam ob rem putare possumus quod forsan mentio ista (“Aliter exponunt aliqui”) nomen Henrici (et Avicennae per Henricum, quoad ‘apprehensio’) celat. Quod ‘motus’ et ‘constitutio’, qui in Aristotelis definitione inveniuntur, considerentur ab Henrico unum totum, clare apparet ubi sic affirmat: “... exponendo quid intellexit per ‘motum’, dixit Philosophus addens ‘et constitutio’, ut legamus ‘et’ pro ‘id est’ ... Exponit se dicens ‘motus et’, pro ‘id est, constitutio’, hoc est res quaedam constituta in esse per illum motum” (p. 193, ll. 166-167 et p. 194, ll. 183-184). Quoad apprehensionem, ex Avicenna Henricus sequentia trahit, ubi clare explicatur quomodo delectatio in apprehensione consistat: “… Avicenna, in IXº Metaphysicae … dicit … Anima rationalis … plus scrutatur apprehensum et plus exspoliat illum ab eis quae sunt in eis accidentaliter et ipsa penetrat interiora apprehensi et exteriora … Idem in fine libri VIIIi: Delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis secundum quod conveniens est; unde sensibilis delectatio est sensibilitas conveniens et intelligibilis delectatio est ut intelligat conveniens. Oportet autem quod apprehensio qua intellectus apprehendit fortior est quam apprehensio qua sentiens apprehendit sensatum, quia … apprehendit illud in quantum est ipsum, non autem id quod apparet de eo” (p. 191, ll. 117-118, 131-134 et p. 192, ll. 136-143)

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hensio illius coniunctionis. Illa ergo que sunt factiua | talis apprehensionis, illa sunt delectabilia. Sed talia sunt conuenientia ipsa. Nunc autem non eadem sunt conuenientia uni et alii, propter diuersitatem naturarum | uel habituum, ita quod unicuique sit delectabile quod sibi est conueniens, uel secundum consuetudinem uel alio modo.

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Cum ergo queritur utrum uiuere inordinate sit delectabile multis, dicendum quod secundum se omnis inordinatio est indelectabilis. Cuius ratio est quia omne quod est preter naturam inquantum huiusmodi est indelectabile secundum se; sed uiuere inordinate est preter naturam; ergo est secundum se indelectabile. Minor patet quia omnis inordinatio est preter naturam, ut dicitur 3º Celi et Mundi, quia natura est principium ordinis. Et ideo uiuere inordinate est indelectabile secundum se, sed uiuere ordinate est secundum se ipsum delectabile, per eandem rationem econuerso sumptam.

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Item, uiuere inordinate simpliciter est indelectabile bene disposito. Cuius ratio est quia illud est indelectabile homini habenti rectam rationem, quod est oppositum inclinationi rationis et inconueniens est illi; tale autem est id quod est inordinatum: ratio enim, sicut et natura, principium est ordinis, et ordo utrique est connaturalis et conueniens est. Item, bene disposito ea sunt delectabilia que secundum naturam sunt delectabilia; tamen male disposito bene sunt delectabilia aliqua peruersa, ut uiuere inordinate. Cuius causa est quia talis iudicat secundum sensum et sequitur appetitum sensitiuum, dimisso iudicio rationis; sed uiuere inordinate aliqualiter delectabile est et conueniens appetitui sensitiuo. Et quia multi magis sequuntur appetitum sensitiuum quam rationem, ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod uiuere preter rationem est delectabilius multis. Hoc tamen non habet omnino ueritatem, quia uiuere inordinate non per se est delectabile multis inquantum huiusmodi. Cuius ratio est quia uiuere inordinate inquantum habet rationem mali; sed nullum ens inclinatur in id quod habet rationem mali per se; ergo nullum ens inclinatur per se in inordinationem. Minor patet quia nichil inclinatur in aliquid

4 3 sit] erit B 4 6 indelectabilis] delectabilis B 47 naturam] hoc add. B | est3] om. B 5 2 ordinate] inordinate B | ipsum] ipsam B 54 simpliciter] similiter B 57 id] illud B 5 8 utrique est] utrumque B 5 9 ea] que add. P 66 omnino] om. B 69 id] illud B 7 0 inordinationem] ordinationem PB 4 9 omnis…51 ordinis] Auct. Arist., De Caelo III (76), p. 165; Arist., De Caelo III.2, 301a4- 6 65 uiuere…multis] Arist., Pol. VI.4, 1319b30-32

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nisi in sibi conueniens et quod sit conueniens secundum naturam. Et ideo, sicut non inclinatur aliquod ens in non esse, ita nec ordinatur in aliquam inordinationem. Et ideo non est uerum quod multi inclinentur per se in uiuere inordinate, sed necessario hoc erit propterea quod talis uita habet sibi aliquid delectabile sensui coniunctum, ratione cuius appetitur ab hominibus sensualibus; unde intemperatus non per se intendit inordinationem, sed intendit delectationem sensualem coniunctam illi inordinationi; unde uiuere inordinate est delectabile multis non per se, sed per accidens inquantum huiusmodi.

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Ad rationem dicendum quod aliquid inesse alicui per se, hoc est dupliciter, scilicet uel absolute et simpliciter, sicut inest triangulo habere tres equales duobus rectis; aliquid autem inest alicui per se in ordine tamen ad aliud, ut esse actiuum uel passiuum, et intelligere de actiuis communicantibus in materia, ut ignis per se dicitur combustiuus, hoc tamen est in ordine ad combustibile. Vnde de primo uerum quod, alicui inest per se absolute, hoc non diuersificatur in comparatione ad aliud, ut habere tres de triangulo. Sed de secundis non tenet: nam | igni per se inest calefacere, non tamen calefacit stellam uel talia que P 313va non communicant in materia cum ipso ; similiter pici per se inest secundo modo per se conglutinare, hoc tamen in comparatione ad humefacta ab ea diuersificatur. Et tunc ad propositum dico quod esse delectabile uel indelectabile sic dicitur contingere alicui per se non absolute, sed in ordine ad delectatum. Et ideo non habet ueritatem quod, cum uiuere inordinate sit per se indelectabile, quod ideo non possit esse delectabile in comparatione ad multos quod est per se indelectabile: per se, inquam, respectu ad habentem cognitionem ueram, sicut in re est. Et ideo, si comparetur ad non habentem ueram cognitionem, potest fieri delectabile; et tales sunt multi; ergo ipsis, et cetera.

7 1 nisi] non B 72 ordinatur] inclinatur B 7 3 inordinationem] ordinationem B | quod] quia B | multi] multa P | inclinentur] inclinantur B 7 4 erit] est B | quod] quia B 75 aliquid] aliquod B | appetitur] appetitus B 76 hominibus] omnibus B | inordinationem…77 intendit] om. per hom. B 8 0 per se] om. B 8 1 habere…82 tres] hominem B 8 2 rectis] om. P aliquid] quicquid B 8 4 actiuis] actibus P 85 de primo] add. in marg. P 8 9 similiter] naturaliter B | pici] pisci P 9 0 conglutinare] scrips. congultinare P 9 1 uel indelectabile] om. B 9 3 delectatum] delectabile B 9 5 respectu] praem. in B 9 6 si] non add. P 97 ueram cognitionem] inv. B

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Ad secundam dicendum quod ‘multi’ dicuntur dupliciter: uel multi sapientes, et de istis uerum est quod melius iudicant; alii magis usitate dicuntur multi, ut imprudentes et stulti – secundum quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Thopicorum, quod boni ut in paucioribus, mali uero ut in pluribus –, et isti malum iudicium rationis habent; et ideo aliquid quod est indelectabile secundum se respectu uere cognoscentium, bene potest esse delectabile istis.

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< Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m o l i g a rc h i a t e m p e r a t a c o n s t i t u a t u r e x h a b e n t i b u s m e d i o c re m s u b s t a n t i a m Arguitur quod non, quia ex talibus constituitur politia proprie dicta; nunc autem diuerse politie non constituuntur ex eisdem. Item, oligarchia semper componitur ex paucis diuitibus; sed habentes mediocres substantias sunt multi in ciuitate; ergo et cetera.

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic. Item, politia que est alii propinqua debet constitui ex eisdem ex quibus illa cui est propinqua; sed oligarchia temperata propinqua est politie proprie dicte, que constituitur ex habentibus mediocres substantias; ergo et illa.

Dicendum quod oligarchia est politia ubi principantur pauci diuites propter diuitiarum excessum. Hec autem habet quatuor species: prima est 10 0 iudicant] et de istis add. B 1 0 1 usitate] uisitare magis B | ut] om. B 5 ,3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 eisdem] esse P 7 hic] om. B 8 eisdem] illis B 1 2 ubi] in qua B | pauci] multi P 13 habet quatuor] inv. B 10 2 boni…103 pluribus] Auct. Arist., Top. II (30), p. 324; Arist., Top. II.6, 112b11-12 5 ,1 Consequenter…2 substantiam] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.6, 1320b16-25; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.6 (ed. Lanza, p. 414, l. 13-p. 415, l. 30) 7 Contra…hic] Arist., Pol. VI.6, 1320b16-25 9 politie…10 substantias] cf. supra, IV, q. 9 1 2 oligarchia…13 excessum] Arist., Pol. III.8, 1279b28-29 1 3 Hec…18 patribus] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.5, 1292a39-b10. Hic Petrum videtur in unum conflare locos duos ex Scripto ubi enumerantur quattuor species oligarchiae; cf. Petrum, Scriptum IV.4: “Deinde cum dicit Oligarchia autem , enumerat modos oligarchie ... una species oligarchie est in qua distribuuntur principatus secundum quandam honorabilitatem, puta diuitiarum uel generis, ita quod egeni non attingant ad ipsos, quamuis sint plures ... alia est species oligarchie, in qua distribuuntur principatus secundum honorabilitates magis excellentes, ut generis uel diuitiarum, et principantes possunt eligere alios consocios suos, si aliqui

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quando pauci diuites principantur secundum legem et principatus sunt eligibiles; secunda est in qua pauci, diuites magis, et principantur secundum legem, principatus | tamen non sunt eligibiles; tertia in qua princi- B 77rb pantur pauciores adhuc et sine lege, et principatus sunt eligibiles; quarta in qua paucissimi sine lege principantur et filii succedunt patribus. Prima ergo istarum maxime est temperata. Cuius ratio est quia illa oligarchia magis est temperata in qua magis attenditur bonum commune; sed in illa oligarchia primo modo dicta attenditur bonum commune magis quam in aliis; ergo illa est magis temperata, ergo magis accedens ad politiam. Politia autem componitur ex habentibus mediocrem substantiam, ergo et illa oligarchia constitueretur ex talibus. Item, illa minus recedit a uirtute; ergo necessario erit ex mediocrem substantiam habentibus. Sed intelligendum quod habentes mediocrem substantiam possunt dupliciter accipi: uel coniunctim, ut pauperes et diuites simul; uel absolute, ut | mediocriter diuites. Primo modo hec oligarchia composita est ex P 313vb 15 est] om. B | principantur] principatur B 1 7 adhuc] om. B | non] suppl. ex Pol. IV.5, 1292b4, ex Petri Scripto (cf. textum infra, in apparatu fontium allatum) et ex Vincentii Gruner Disp. Pol. VI, q. 4: “Tertia species ubi pauci diuites principantur et principatus non sunt eligibiles” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 200r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 186v) 1 9 est1] om. B | Cuius…20 temperata] om. per hom. B 2 2 magis2] om. P 24 illa] om. P | constitueretur] constituentur B 2 5 erit] est B 27 mediocrem substantiam] inv. B 2 8 accipi] om. B 2 9 ut] uel P | modo] om. B deficiant ... tertia species est quando principatus distribuuntur secundum honorabilitatem maiorem adhuc diuitiarum aut generis, et filius in principatu succedit patri et fit princeps pro patre ... quarta species est quando aliqui principantur propter honorabilitatem maximam et filius succedit patri. Et in isto principatu non principatur lex, sed princeps secundum uoluntatem propriam” (ed. Lanza, p. 173, ll. 219, 222-224, 227-230, p. 174, ll. 233-236 et ll. 238-240) et VI.6: “... est intelligendum quod species oligarchie quatuor consequenter se habent secundum ordinem: prima enim est ex ampliori multitudine et minori honorabilitate diuitiarum, et magis secundum rationem et legem ordinata; sequens autem ex pauciori multitudine et maiori habundantia diuitiarum, et minus utens legibus; tertia autem adhuc ex minori et ampliori multitudine diuitiarum; ultima autem et pessima ex quam paucissima multitudine et maxima honorabilitate, et omnino non recta legibus, sed uoluntate principantium” (ibid., p. 415, ll. 34-41) 15 secunda…16 eligibiles] re vera principatus in hac specie sunt eligibiles, ut clare asserunt Aristoteles (Pol. IV.5, 1292b1-2: “ab honorabilitatibus immensis sunt principatus et eligunt ipsi eos qui deficiunt”, ed. Susemihl, p. 398, ll. 9-10) et, eum sequentes, Petrus in Scripto (cf. adn. praec.) et Vincentius Gruner (Disputata Pol. VI, q. 4: “Secunda est ubi principantur diuites sine populo et secundum leges, et iterum principatus sunt eligibiles”, mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 200r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 186v). Sunt tamen ipsi principantes qui eligunt principatus qui deficiunt, qua re forsan Petrus hic considerat rectius hanc speciem oligarchiae eligibilitate principatuum carere

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mediocrem substantiam habentibus; secundo modo ex mediocribus est politia proprie dicta.

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Ad rationes patet per hanc distinctionem: hec enim est differentia inter istam oligarchiam et politiam. Similiter tales mediocres primo modo non dicuntur multos diuites, sed paucos cum pauperibus. < Q UE S T I O 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a l i q u i s p r i n c i p at u s i n c i u i t at e s i t n e ce s s a r i u s Arguitur quod non, quia quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse, quod autem impossibile est non esse, non contingit non esse; principatum autem in ciuitate contingit non esse, quia contingit ciuitatem esse sine principatu ante electionem; ergo non est necessarius principatus in ciuitate. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS 1º huius, et arguitur ratione eius quia, quando aliquid est compositum ex pluribus, oportet unum habere rationem principantis et aliud rationem subiecti, ut patet in mixto, ubi unum elementorum necessario dominatur, aliter enim contingeret mixtum dissolui. Similiter in animali est unum principans, ut anima; similiter inter potentias anime una principalis. Sed ciuitas composita est ex pluribus partibus; ergo necessario oportet ibi esse aliquid principans et aliquid subiectum.

5

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Dicendum quod aliquis principatus in ciuitate est necessarius. Et ideo intelligendum quod necessarium dicitur quod impossibile est aliter se 3 0 modo] est add. sed exp. P 3 4 pauperibus] et cetera add. B 6, 3 Arguitur] praem. et B esse] om. B 8 1º huius] om. B 9 est] om. P 11 enim] autem B 1 3 anime] est add. B composita est] inv. B 1 6 aliter se] post habere transp. B 6, 1 Consequenter…2 necessarius] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.8, 1321b5- 6; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 419, ll. 2-7 et 11-19) 3 quod2…4 esse3] Arist., De int. 13, 22b5-7 8 quando…10 subiecti] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a28-31; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (14), p. 252; cf. supra, I, q. 12 10 ut…11 dissolui] cf. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. I.10, 328a25-31; Arist., De Caelo I.2, 269a1-2 12 Similiter…anima] Arist., De An. II.1, 412a19-20 1 6 necessarium…17 habere] Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (127), p. 125; Arist., Metaph. V.5, 1015a33-35; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (102), p. 123; Arist., Metaph. IV.5, 1010b28-29

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habere. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter, scilicet uel secundum rationem suam absolute uel etiam ex aliqua suppositione. Primo modo principatus est necessarius ciuitati, quia est de ratione politie siue ciuilitatis, sine qua nullo modo est ciuitas. Nam politia est de essentia ciuitatis: politia enim est ordo principantis ad subiectos et subiectorum inter se. Et sic, cum de ratione et essentia politie sit principatus secundum ordinem politie, politia autem sit de essentia ciuitatis, manifestum est quod et principatus erit de ratione ciuitatis; tale autem tali est necessarium; ergo principatus est necessarius ciuitati.

30

Ad rationem dicendum quod non contingit cessare principatum ciuitate manente. Si enim primus princeps decedat, tamen post illum proximus, uacante principatu, habet uirtutem et officium primi. Si autem dicas quod contingit omnes principes deficere, dico quod tunc non erit ciuitas nisi materialiter solum, non autem formaliter, cum deficiat id quod est de ratione formali ciuitatis.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m n e c e s s e s i t i n c i u i t a t e e s s e p l u r e s p r i n c i p a tu s

5

Arguitur quod non, quia oportet ciuitatem existimare sicut animal, sicut econtra dicit PHILOSOPHUS in De Motibus Animalium; sed in animali est tantum unum principans, ut cor, similiter in anima unum, scilicet intellectus, similiter in uniuerso causa prima; ergo et in ciuitate tantum debet esse unus principans. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, qui dicit quod politia est ordo principantium, innuens esse plures. 18 modo] om. B 1 9 quia est] om. B | ciuilitatis] ciuitatis P 23 et] om. B 25 ciuitati] manifestum est quod principatus erit necessarius ciuitati add. B 2 7 Si] et praem. B 28 proximus] in add. B | uirtutem et] om. P 2 9 erit] est B 3 0 autem] om. B | id] illud B 3 1 formali] forme mali B 7, 3 Arguitur] praem. et B | existimare] estimare B 5 principans] participans B similiter] simul B 8 principantium] principatum B 17 Hoc…18 suppositione] cf. Arist., Phys. II.9, 199b34-200a30 2 0 politia2…21 se] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 7, 1 Consequenter…2 principatus] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.8, 1321b8-10; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VI.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 419, ll. 2-7 et 20-24) 3 oportet…5 cor] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32, 36-37 8 Contra…9 plures] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.8, 1321b3-10

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P 314ra

Dicendum quod de necessitate ciuitatis est esse plures principatus; cuius ratio est quia politia est ordo habitantium; ordo autem sumitur ex fine sicut ex primo principio. Finis autem correspondet et proportionatur agenti; cuius ratio est quia finis et agens sunt sibi concause, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum. | Et hoc arguitur: ita debet esse in agentibus sicut est in finibus proportionaliter; sed in ciuitate necesse est esse unum finem communem ultimum et adhuc, preter illum, alios fines particulares proprios magis et propinquos; ergo ita erit ex parte agentis, qui est principans qui mouet ad illum, ita quod, preter primum principantem summum, qui respondet fini ultimo, oportet esse etiam alios principantes ad particulares fines mouentes et dirigentes. Et secundum hanc intentionem dixit PHILOSOPHUS in 3º quod existentium in naui unus est finis ultimus communis, scilicet salus nauis, qui alios habet subalternos sibi fines plures, scilicet prorationem et remigationem et multa alia; et secundum hoc illorum est unus principans, inquantum huius sunt naute, sub quo sunt alii, ut prorarius et remigator. Et ideo necessarii sunt multi principantes, quia non contingit singulos eodem modo attingere finem ultimum. Item, secundum diuersitatem mobilium in specie oportet esse distinctos motores et econuerso; sed in ciuitate sunt diuersa mobilia, scilicet homines diuersorum officiorum, quos non est possibile eodem modo attingere ad uirtutem et operationem uirtutis, propter diuersos actus; ergo ipsorum necessario oportet esse diuersos motores, id est principes, qui singulos dirigant in fines suos proprios mediatos, per quos ad finem ultimum et communem, quem etiam omnes communiter appetunt, attingere ualeant. 10 plures principatus] inv. B 1 1 autem] enim B 1 3 concause] cause B 1 4 hoc] om. B | est] et B 15 proportionaliter] proportionatur B 16 illum] ultimum add. B | alios] illos P proprios magis] magis plures B 1 7 qui1…principans] om. B 1 8 primum] om. B 1 9 esse etiam] inv. B | fines mouentes] inv. B 20 3º] 5 B 21 unus…22 nauis] om. per hom. P 22 subalternos sibi] inv. B | et] om. B 23 unus] una B 2 4 huius] huiusmodi B | sunt1] scilicet add. B | naute] nauta PB | prorarius] scrips. proranus PB 3 2 proprios] scrips. propriatos B 11 politia…habitantium] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 12 Finis…13 agenti] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26 13 finis…concause] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys . II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9 21 existentium…24 remigator] Arist., Pol. III.4, 2 7 secundum…28 econuerso] eadem de diversitate motorum et mobilium 1276b20-27 etiam inveniuntur in Petri QQ. De Caelo II, q. 26: “Si igitur motores non sunt eiusdem speciei, quare nec mobilia; et si sic, non igitur omnes orbes sunt eiusdem speciei; sunt igitur diversarum naturarum et diversarum specierum” (ed. Galle, p. 233, ll. 62- 65) 28 in…30 actus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b37-1277a5

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Ad rationem | dicendum quod uerum est quod non sunt plures B 77va principatus primi, sicut nec in animali plures partes principales, ut cor. Sed tamen, sicut in animali, preter cor, quod est pars principalissima, sunt et alie partes principales et formales, ita et in ciuitate sunt plures principatus sub primo, propter diuersitatem finium, scilicet finis ultimi et mediorum.

Con se qu ente r qu eritu r utr u m in c iu itate s it u nu s pr inci p atu s p rimu s

5

Arguitur quod non, quia primus principatus in ciuitate est qui primo dirigit ciuitatem; sed primi directores in ciuitate sunt plures; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia in aristocratia sunt multi uirtuosi, in democratia multi uolgares, in oligarchia multi diuites sunt primi directores. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Sicut est in animali, ita et in ciuitate; sed in animali est unum primum, et similiter unum in uniuerso; ergo et cetera.

10

Dicendum quod necessario in omni politia est unus principatus primus. Cuius ratio est iam dicta, quia politia est ordo principantium mouentium ad fines; finis autem respondet agenti, et similiter ordo finium respondet ordini agentium; ergo, ubi est inter fines aliquod primum principalissimum, ibi etiam erit inter principantes primum et principalissimum, quia 3 7 in] om. P 3 8 partes] om. B 3 9 primo] quo PB 8, 2 Arguitur] praem. et B 3 primo] om. B 6 est Philosophus] om. B 8 unus] om. B | primus] om. B 9 principantium] principandi B 10 agenti] et cetera add. B | ordo…11 ordini] ordini respondet ordo B 11 ubi] non B 8, 1 Consequenter…primus] cf. Arist., Pol. VI.8, 1322b12-15; Petrus, Scriptum VI.7 (ed. Lanza, p. 431, ll. 254-269) 6 Sicut…7 primum] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32 et 36-37 8 Dicendum…16 ultimum] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thoma, QQ. Disp. De Potentia q. 7, art. 2, ad 10: “... secundum ordinem agentium est ordo finium, ita quod primo agenti respondet finis ultimus, et proportionaliter per ordinem alii fines aliis agentibus. Si enim considerentur rector civitatis et dux exercitus et unus singularis miles, constat quod rector civitatis est prior in ordine agentium, ad cuius imperium dux exercitus ad bellum procedit; et sub eo est miles, qui secundum ordinationem ducis exercitus manibus pugnat ... Esse ergo quod est proprius effectus et finis in operatione primi agentis oportet quod teneat locum ultimi finis. Finis autem licet sit primum in intentione, est tamen postremum in operatione, et est effectus aliarum causarum” (ed. Pession, p. 192) 9 Cuius…10 fines] cf. q. praec., ll. 9-11 1 0 finis…11 agentium] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, q. 10: “semper proprio fini respondet proprium agens; quare secundum ordinem agentium erit ordo in finibus” (ed. Delhaye, p. 96)

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finis ultimus, qui est in intentione, primus dicitur ad agentem primum. Sed unus est finis ultimus ciuitatis, quia aliter non esset ciuitas una; ideo oportet esse in ciuitate aliquem principatum primum mouentem directe in illum finem ultimum.

P 314rb

Sed intelligendum quod unum dicitur dupliciter: uel secundum rationem et formam, uel secundum numerum et materiam. Et ideo, diuersimode combinando, contingit multipliciter inueniri unum primum in aliquo ordine: nam in uniuerso est unum primum secundum rationem et numerum, | in animali similiter. Et in regno; in politiis autem aliis est unus primus principatus, unus – inquam – non secundum numerum et materiam, inquantum plures sunt numero qui ad principatum attingunt, ipse tamen principatus, secundum rationem speciei et forme, unus est. Nam in aristocratia est unus primus principatus qui est custodia legum, in democratia autem unus qui est libertas, in oligarchia uero diuitie uel aliquid tale; et isti omnes principatus secundum rationem et formam et speciem sunt unus in genere suo, secundum materiam tamen et numerum sunt plures, et hoc non impedit unitatem illam que principalior est unitas, que est secundum rationem et formam et speciem.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad rationem, quia illi presules. licet plures sint numero, tamen, inquantum sunt principantes politie, ipsi sunt unus specie; nam secundum eandem in specie rationem principantur.

15 esse] post ciuitate transp. B | principatum] principantem B 23 inquantum] in qua tamen B numero] om. B 2 5 in1] om. P 2 6 uero] non B 3 1 presules] preconsules B | plures…32 sint] inv. B 32 unus] minus B 14 unus…16 ultimum] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. XII, q. 10: “Similiter in civitate est aliquis principans et imperans, scilicet cuius voluntate moventur ea que moventur in civitate, ad cuius etiam operationem ordinantur operationes omnium civium” (ed. Galle, p. 201, ll. 158-160) et supra, II, q. 1 1 7 unum…18 materiam] cf. Arist., Metaph. V.6, 1016b31-35

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C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a t u s p o s t e r i or e s e t i n f e r i o r e s e s s e n t i a l i t e r o r d i n a t i s i n t s ub p r i m o

5

Arguitur quod non quia, in essentialiter ordinatis, si non est primum, non est aliquod posteriorum, ut dicitur 2º Methaphisice; sed rege non existente, adhuc manent principatus alii, saluata politia; ergo et cetera. Contra: per rationem sepe factam in animali et uniuerso, omnia mouentia posteriora ordinata sunt essentialiter ad mouens primum; ergo similiter in ciuitate alii principatus essentialiter ordinati erunt ad primum.

10

Dicendum quod omnes principatus posteriores essentialiter ordinati sunt ad primum. Cuius ratio est quia mouentia seu agentia dicuntur 9 ,2 sint] sunt B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 ut dicitur] om. P 8 ordinati erunt] inv. B 1 0 seu] siue B 9 ,3 in…4 posteriorum] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a12-13; Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (44), p. 118 6 per…uniuerso] cf. supra, VI, q. 6, ll. 12-- 13; q. 7, ll. 35-39; q. 8, ll. 20-21 9 Dicendum…31 huiusmodi] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. II, q. 10: “... cum finis moveat agens, prior finis movet prius agens; quare secundum ordinem agentium erit ordo in finibus. Sed in agentibus necesse est devenire ad ultimum agens in cuius virtute agunt omnia alia ... Quare est in finibus aliquis ultimus propter quem sunt omnes alii ... Quare, cum omnia agant in virtute Primi, omnia agent propter finem propter quem agit Primum. Sed hoc non est nisi ipsum Primum. Quare agens primum est ultimus finis in entibus et omnia ordinantur ad ipsum sicut ad finem. Quare ipsum non agit propter alium finem, quia tunc aliquid esset nobilius eo” (ed. Delhaye, pp. 96-97) 1 0 mouentia…12 primo] cf. Petrum, QQ. Metaph. II, q. 18: “... si tunc causa inferior virtutem agendi accipit a causa priori, similiter accipiet ab ea substantiam suam secundum quam actu est et operatur. Quod autem sic se habeant causae essentialiter ordinatae, patet ex prima propositione De Causis, ubi dicitur quod, omnis causa primaria, etc. Et manifestius patet ex septuagesima septima propositione Procli, ubi dicitur quod causa secundaria substantiam et quo operatur primo accipit ex causa prima uniuersali. Ex quo sequitur quod causa secunda non operatur nisi simul operatur prima. Si enim uirtus et substantia causae secundae sit a causa prima, et substantia sua sit id quo ipsa operatur, manifestum quod non operatur nisi prima cooperante. Et ulterius, cum causa secunda sit causatum causae uniuersalis primae, et effectus in actu et causa in actu sint simul, manifestum quod esse in actu causae secundae non erit nisi per esse in actu causae primae” (ed. Dunphy, pp. 13-14); sed vide etiam Albertum, Metaph. II.6: “Cum igitur omnia media non moveantur et moveant nisi ex aliquo primo et per se movente ... si in toto isto ordine moventium non est aliquid quod sit universaliter movens primum, omnia movens et non motum ab aliquo: sequitur, quod ex toto ordine istorum moventium nulla sit penitus causa movens, quia non existente primo nullum movebit aliorum” (ed. Geyer, Opera Omnia XVI.1, p. 96, l. 79-p. 97, l. 5). Cf. Petrum (?), QQ. De Causis q. 4: “... causa secundaria accipit substantiam et per consequens virtutem et dispositionem per quam agit a causa prima, vel ad minus virtutem et dispositionem per quam agit, et sic causa secunda est instrumentum cause prime ... Proposi-

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essentialiter ordinata quando mouens posterius non mouet nisi in uirtute primi mouentis et simul agente ei primo, ut dicitur in commento super 2um Metaphisice et in commento super primam propositionem De Causis: nam ibi dicitur quod causa secunda substantiam et agere habet a causa prima. Dicendum ergo quod omnes principatus sunt essentialiter ordinati sub primo. Cuius ratio est secundum antedicta, quia ordo agentium est secundum ordinem finium, quia finis ad agentem dicitur et sunt sibi concause; sed fines ciuitatis particulares omnes essentialiter ordinati sunt sub fine ultimo uniuersali; ergo similiter erit de agentibus, id est principantibus. Quod autem fines essentialiter ordinati sint sub ultimo, probatio quia, si non, tunc: da aliquem finem qui non sit sub ultimo essentialiter, et ille tunc uel erit etiam ultimus finis uel etiam ordinabitur item in alium ultimum; et quodcumque dederis, semper non erit unus finis ciuitatis ultimus, et tunc ciuitas non erit una: nam a fine est unitas ciuitatis, sicut ab unitate principii est unitas ordinis. Ergo omnes fines essentialiter sunt ordinati sub primo, ita quod nullus eorum mouebit appetitum inhabitantium nisi in ratione finis ultimi. Ergo similiter erit in principibus quod omnes principantes posteriores, in fines particulares dirigentes, erunt ordinati sub primo, qui dirigitur ad finem ultimum, ita quod nullus particularium principantium mouebitur nisi in uirtute primi et simul dirigente primo secundum quod huiusmodi.

12 simul] similiter B | commento] commentator B 1 3 commento] consequenter B 1 4 secunda] secundum P | habet] habent B 1 7 concause] causa cause B 1 9 erit] est B 2 1 tunc1] tamen B | da] ad B 2 2 etiam2] om. B | item in] inter P 2 7 omnes] om. P 30 mouebitur] mouebit B tio autem prima huius libri intelligenda est in ordine causarum que per se ordinate sunt et essentialiter. Dicuntur autem cause essentialiter ordinate ad effectum aliquem que necessario omnes requiruntur ad effectum” (ed. Maga, p. 76, ll. 5-8, 29-32) et etiam Thomam, In Librum De Causis 1: “Ipsa enim causa prima producit vel movet causam secundo agentem, et sic fit ei causa ut agat” (ed. Saffrey, p. 8, ll. 24-26). Petrus tamen istum argumentum potius sumit ex Thoma STh Ia-IIae, q. 93, art. 3, resp.: “In omnibus autem moventibus ordinatis oportet quod virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute moventis primi: quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum movetur a primo. Unde et in gubernantibus idem videmus, quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante ad secundos derivatur: sicut ratio eorum quae sunt agenda in civitate, derivatur a rege per praeceptum in inferiores administratores” (ed. Leon. VII, p. 164) 14 causa1…prima] Thomas, In Librum De Causis 1 (ed. Saffrey, p. 7, ll. 6-7) 1 6 secundum antedicta] cf. supra, VI, q. 7, ll. 10-20 et q. 8, ll. 8-16 17 finis…concause] Arist., Metaph. V.2, 1013b9-11; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9

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Ad rationem dicendum quod non contingit, saluata politia, deficere primum principem. Nam prius dictum est quod ille non solum est in ipso homine principante, sed et principaliter consistit in ratione secundum quam ille principatur. Vnde, si deficiat ille primus | principatus materiali- P 314va ter, ut decendente rege, tamen adhuc aliquis ciuium uirtutem et rationem illius principatus assumeret, et tunc, saltim uirtute precipua, adhuc manet principatus ille saluatus. Si autem utrolibet modo deficiat, iam non remanebit politia illa, quod tamen supponebat ratio uel argumentum illud.

3 3 principem] principium P | Nam] ut B | quod] quia B 3 4 et] etiam B | ratione] rationem B 3 6 decendente] descendente P 37 assumeret] assumet B 3 3 prius…35 principatur] cf. supra, VI, q. 6, ll. 27-31

< L I B E R S E P T IM US >

|C Con se qu enter qu eritu r circa 7um Politi cor u m, u bi P hilos ophu s d ici t B 77vb u e l p r i m o i n q u i r i t d e f e l i c i t at e u l t i m a h o m i n i s , e t q u e r i t u r u t r u m i l l a f e l i c i t a s c o n s i s t a t i n b o n i s ex t e r i o r i b u s Arguitur quod sic, quia, quorum appetitus est infinitus, in illis 5 consistit felicitas ultima uel finis ultimus; nam dictum est, 1º huius, quod solius finis est appetitus infinitus; sed bonorum exteriorum appetitus in infinitum est, ut ibi dictum est; ergo in illis erit felicitas seu finis ultimus. Item, finis ultimus et felicitas est brauium et premium uirtutum, propter quod fiunt uirtutes; sed quedam exteriora sunt premium uirtutis, 10 ut honor, ut dicitur 4º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. Contra: in quo per se consistit felicitas, illud non est nociuum homini, quia felicitas est per se optimum, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; sed bona exteriora nociua sunt homini, quia iusti propter diuitias perierunt, ut ibi dicitur; ergo in exterioribus bonis non est felicitas. 15

Item, in quo per se consistit felicitas, hoc non indifferenter aduenit bonis et malis, quia, cum felicitas sit optimum, ipsa non compatitur ali1, 5 est] in add. B 6 est…infinitus] appetitus est in infinitum B | exteriorum] sed add. B 7 ibi] ibidem B | erit] est B | seu] siue B 8 premium] primum P 10 ut2] sicut B 1 1 illud…12 felicitas] om. per hom. B 1 5 indifferenter] differenter B 16 non] s.l. B 1, 1 Consequenter…3 exterioribus] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323a24-b10; cf. etiam Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 23: Vtrum felicitas consistat in diviciis (ed. Celano, pp. 61- 62) et I, q. 35: Vtrum bona exteriora, ut divicie, exigantur ad felicitatem (ed. Celano, pp. 77-78) 6 solius…infinitus] cf. supra, I, q. 25 et Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b25-28 | bonorum…7 est1] cf. supra, I, q. 26 et Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b28-30 8 finis…uirtutum] hic verba ex translatione Roberti Grosseteste (recensio recognita) una cum verbis ex translatione Burgundii simul inveniuntur; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099b16-17: “virtutis enim premium et finis” (recensio recognita, AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 387, ll. 19-20) et “virtutis enim bravium et finis” (translatio Burgundii, AL XXVI.1-3.2, p. 83, l. 7); cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (22), p. 234 9 quedam…10 honor] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV (68), p. 237; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b35; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV (66), p. 237; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b20-21 1 2 felicitas…optimum] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a28-30; I.4, 1097b22-23; I.4, 1099a24-25, 29-31, b11-13 et 17-18 1 3 iusti…perierunt] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b18-19 1 6 cum…17 malis] hoc argumentum desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 4, resp.: “cum beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in malis” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 20) vel Thomae ScG III.28: “Summum bonum est perfectum bonum. Perfectum autem bonum non compatitur aliquod malum” (ed. Leon. XIV, p. 84); cf. etiam supra, III, q. 18, ll. 26-30 cum adn.

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quod malum; sed bona exteriora insunt indifferenter bonis et malis; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod felicitas est ultimus et optimus finis hominis; tale autem est cuius gratia omnia alia appetuntur, ipsum autem non propter 20 aliud; ergo felicitas erit cuius gratia omnia appetemus, ipsam autem nullius alterius gratia. Vlterius felicitas est bonum perfectissimum, quia est ultima perfectio hominis in uita. Et ideo est optimum, quia si non, tunc erit ipsa secundum aliquid imperfectum, ergo, habens felicitatem, erit in potentia ad aliam perfectionem, quod est falsum: tunc enim non esset ultima 25 perfectio. Et item, si est bonum perfectissimum, ipsa etiam erit bonum sufficientissimum, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum. Est ergo felicitas bonum ultimum, optimum, perfectissimum et sufficientissimum. Hiis suppositis, dicendum quod felicitas primo et per se non consistit in bonis exterioribus, nec quantum ad ipsa nec quantum ad usum eorum. 30 Cuius ratio est quia felicitatem non querimus propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam; modo diuitias et honores, et uniuersaliter omnia exteriora, querimus propter aliud, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum: nam honorem propter uirtutis certitudinem, diuitias autem propter excellentiam; ergo felicitas 35 non erit in illis. P 314vb

Item, felicitas est bonum perfectissimum; nullum | autem bonorum exteriorum est tale; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia nullum ordinabilium in aliud, uel simpliciter uel in genere, est perfectissimum; sed omnia bona exteriora et usus eorum est ordinabile et ipsa sunt ordinabilia in aliud; ergo 40 et cetera.

20 appetuntur] appetemus B 2 1 erit] est B | autem] que B 2 3 erit] est sed. corr. B 24 in] ulteriori add. PB 2 5 perfectionem] potentiam P 26 est] esset B 3 0 eorum] om. B 3 1 alia] omnia B 3 2 uniuersaliter] uniuersalia P | omnia] propter add. sed del. B 19 felicitas…28 sufficientissimum] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a21-b21; Arist., Eth. Nic. X.7, 1176b1-10; cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 27 (ed. Celano, pp. 66- 67) 2 6 si…27 sufficientissimum] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097b6-8 2 9 felicitas…35 illis] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.10: “felicitas per se non existit in bonis exterioribus, puta in diuitiis, nec etiam in usu earum. In ipsis quidem non existit per se, quia felicitatem nullus querit propter aliquid aliud; diuitias autem querunt propter aliud, uel propter necessitatem uite uel propter operationem uirtutis; ergo in ipsis non existit per se” (ed. Lanza, p. 528, l. 154-p. 529, l. 158) 3 1 felicitatem…32 ipsam] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a34-b1; X.7, 1176b3-5 3 2 diuitias…33 aliud] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a2528; cf. etiam I.2, 1096a6

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Item, felicitas est summum bonum sufficientissimum, ergo in illo debet consistere quod habet rationem boni sufficientis per se; sed exteriora non habent rationem sufficientis: nam unum eorum relinquit indigentiam ad aliud, ut diuitie ad sanitatem; ergo et in istis et in eorum usu per se 45 et primo non consistit felicitas. Quedam tamen eorum, quantum ad suum usum, necessaria sunt ad felicitatem. Cuius ratio est quia felicitas in actu uirtutis: actus autem uirtutis non est sine intellectu; intellectus autem capit ex sensibus, et ideo oportet sensum esse bene dispositum. Hoc autem non est sine bona 50 dispositione corporis; bona autem dispositio corporis non est sine necessariis, ut dicitur 7º et 10º Ethicorum; ergo ad felicitatem necessarius est usus bonorum exteriorum, quibus secundum se sustentatur natura, quia sine illis non est operatio felicitatis. Et similiter usus quorundam bonorum exteriorum est ad bene esse felicitatis. Et quantum ad primum dicit PHILO55 SOPHUS, 1º Ethicorum, quod impossibile est esse felicitatem impotentem tribuere existentem. Quantum autem ad secundum dicit quod quibusdam denudati coinquinant felicitatem, ut nobilitate uel pulcritudine, propter quod dicitur ibi quod specie turpissimus non omnino est felix; et hoc innuit COMMENTATOR ibidem, quod specie turpissimo non facile homines 60 obediunt, ex malitia exteriori arguentes in habitudinem interiorem. Et ideo dicitur post in 1º Ethicorum quod quedam bona exteriora condecorare nata sunt felicitatem.

4 1 bonum] talia autem sunt bona minima hominis ut dicitur primo ethicorum item felicitas est propter bonum add. B 4 3 relinquit] reliquintur P 4 4 et1] om. B 46 suum] om. B 4 7 ratio] respectus P 48 sensibus] sensibilibus P 49 autem] bene add. sed exp. P 5 1 et] om. B 5 2 quibus] que P 5 3 est] felicitas add. sed exp. P | quorundam bonorum] inv. sed corr. P 56 secundum] secundam PB 59 homines] post turpissimo transp. B 60 ex] et B | exteriori] scrips. exterira B | habitudinem] habitantem P | interiorem] exteriorem B 61 dicitur post] dicit philosophus B | 1º] 2 B 6 2 felicitatem] felicem B 4 7 felicitas…48 intellectu] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177a12-17; cf. etiam I.4, 1098a3-b19 5 0 bona…necessariis] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.4, 1147b23-28; X.11, 1178b33-35 5 5 impossibi5 9 specie…60 interiorem] Eustratius, In I le…58 felix] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a31-b4 Arist. Mor. cap. 12, ad 1099b2- 6 (ed. Mercken, p. 142, ll. 29-33) 61 quedam…62 felicitatem] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.5, 1100b26-27

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Ad rationem dicendum quod appetitus bonorum exteriorum infinitus est malus. Vnde sciendum quod appetitum alicuius esse infinitum, hoc est dupliciter. Vel enim hoc est propter hoc quod ipsum sit tale in 65 natura sua, ut sit appetibile in infinitum propter bonitatem eius non esse ordinatam ad aliquod aliud quod appetitum terminet, et tale est finis ultimus; et quod isto modo est, appetibile in infinitum, et in illo consistit felicitas: sic autem bona exteriora non sunt in infinitum appetibilia. Alio modo appetitus alicuius est in infinitum propter errorem et cor- 70 ruptionem appetitus, ut quando aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut finem ultimum et appetit ipsum ut optimum, quod tamen in natura sua tale non est; et tunc quia, corrupta estimatione, putat illud esse finem ultimum et optimum, appetitur illud in infinitum: et taliter appetitus bonorum exteriorum est in infinitum. In eo autem quod solum isto modo appetitur in 75 infinitum non consistit felicitas, sed solum in eo quod primo modo appetibile est in infinitum.

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Ad secundam dicendum quod duplex est premium uirtutis, scilicet per se et essentiale, et tale est operatio ultima perfectissima, et in tali est perfectissima | felicitas; aliud est premium solum in respectu ad 80 alios, ut quia aliquando forte non maius possunt, et sic honor est premium uirtutis, ut dicitur 4º Ethicorum: | est enim premium uirtutis, quia non maius possumus retribuere uirtuoso.

64 malus] malis PB 65 propter hoc] om. B 6 7 appetitum] eius add. B 7 1 apprehendit] apprehendum B 74 appetitur] appetitum P appetitus B | et…75 infinitum] om. per hom. B 7 8 premium] primum P 79 ultima] om. B 8 0 perfectissima] om. B 8 1 maius] magis B | et] om. B 82 4º] 5 B | quia] om. B 63 Ad…77 infinitum] cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 24, ad 2: “Ad aliud dicendum quod illius cuius est appetitus infinitus secundum rectam racionem regulatus, illud circa quod afficitur, in eo dicitur consistere felicitas. Sed dico quod appetitus diviciarum non est regulatus recta racione. Iterum, appetitus diviciarum naturalium non est infinitus, quia parvum est quod natura appetit. Appetitus tamen diviciarum artificialium potest esse infinitus: alter autem est appetitus summi boni et alter diviciarum. Quanto autem aliquis cognoscit summum bonum, tanto magis appetit ipsum; quanto autem aliquis plus cognoscit divicias et congregat, tanto minus appetit eas, si fuerit regulatus racione recta. Et ideo quamvis, ut sic, appetitus sit inordinatus et cum sit infinitus, non oportet quod in eo consistat felicitas hominis” (ed. Celano, p. 62, ll. 31- 40). Eadem, eisdem fere verbis, etiam inveniuntur in quaestione quam huic argumento alia commentaria ex Facultate Artistarum dicaverunt; cf. e.g. Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 18 (ed. Costa, p. 215, ll. 75-83) | appetitus…77 infinitum] cf. supra, I, q. 26, ll. 10-20 et 30-34 8 1 honor…82 uirtutis1] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV (68), p. 237; Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123b35 82 est…83 uirtuoso] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1124a7-8

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C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m f e l i c i t a s co n s i s t a t i n b o n i s co r p o r i s Arguitur quod sic, quia felicitas est bonum desideratissimum; sed bona corporis sunt desideratissima, ut sanitas; ergo in eis consistet felicitas. Minor patet quia dicitur 1º Ethicorum; nam dicitur ibi quod in Delyaca 5 descriptione positum erat ita: optimum est quod iustissimum, desideratissimum autem sanum esse, delectabilissimum uero quo quis optat frui. Item, in bonis corporis maxima est delectatio; ergo in eis consistet felicitas, quia delectatio per se existit felicitati: est enim felicitas delectabilissimum. Antecedens patet quia delectationes sensuales sunt maxime, tum 10 quia plurimi eas sequuntur, tum quia fortius afficiunt et uariant mentem. Contra: in illis non consistit felicitas, quibus inexistentibus, adhuc inest potentia ad ulteriorem perfectionem, quia felicitas est bonum perfectissimum; sed, corporalibus bonis habitis, adhuc inest potentia ad ulteriorem perfectionem, ut ad uirtutem; ergo in ipsis non consistit felicitas. 15

Item, in eo non est felicitas quod indifferenter inest bonis et malis; sed talia sunt bona corporis; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod felicitas non consistit in bono uel perfectione corporis. Cuius ratio est ex predictis, quia in illa perfectione que est in potentia ad ulteriorem perfectionem non est felicitas, quia felicitas est quam non 20 propter aliud, sed omnia propter ipsam eligimus, ipsa etiam est bonum ultimum et perfectissimum; sed omnia bona corporis sunt in potentia ad ulteriorem perfectionem, ut ad perfectionem anime; ergo et cetera. Item, in eo non est felicitas propter quod aliud eligimus, quia felicitas est cuius gratia omnia et non ipsam gratia alterius appetimus. Sed omnia 25 bona corporis eligimus propter aliud, ut propter perfectionem anime.

2 ,2 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 1º…ibi] om. P 8 delectabilissimum] delectatiuum B 9 sensuales] sensibiles B 11 inexistentibus] medium existentibus B 1 7 bono uel] om. P 2 3 propter quod] inv. B | quia…25 anime] om. B 2 4 appetimus] appetitus P 2 ,1 queritur…corporis] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323a24-b10; cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 35: Vtrum bonum corporis exigatur ad felicitatem (ed. Celano, pp. 76-77) 4 in…6 frui] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a25-28 1 5 in…16 corporis] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 16-17 cum adn. 1 9 felicitas2…20 eligimus] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a34-b1; X.7, 1176b1-10

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Nam, sicut corpus est propter animam, ut dicitur principio huius 7º, ita omnes perfectiones corporis eligimus propter perfectiones anime: nam, sicut perfectibile se habet ad perfectibile, ita perfectio ad perfectionem, et econuerso – nam eadem est perfectio principiorum et principiatorum –; sed corpus est propter animam, ut dictum est, quia materia est propter 30 formam, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum; ergo bona et perfectiones corporis ordinantur in bonum anime, ergo in illis non est felicitas ultima.

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Item, felicitas est bonum perfectissimum, sed bona corporis sunt imperfecta. Cuius ratio est quia posteriora secundum generationem sunt perfectiora, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice; sed bonum anime est posterius 35 secundum generationem, et ideo dicitur, in fine 7i huius, quod pueri primo debent informari in imperfectioribus, postea in perfectioribus; ergo in bonis corporis non consistit felicitas ultima. Et per has rationes etiam contingit ostendere quod in nullius alterius potentie actu quam in actu | intellectus consistit felicitas: sunt enim plures potentie anime, quarum 40 necessario aliqua est principalior; nam in omni genere est ibi recipere aliquod primum. Vlterius sciendum quod non est felicitas perfecta sine aliqua perfectione corporis – quia felicitas est operatio intellectus – uel saltim non sine illa; operatio autem intellectus dependet ex sensu; bona autem dispositio 45 sensus causatur ex bona dispositione corporis. Ergo a primo ad ultimum quedam bona corporis necessaria sunt ad felicitatem, sicut sanitas; quedam autem condecorare nata sunt felicitatem, ut nobilitas et pulcritudo, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum.

Ad rationem dicendum quod desideratissimum dicitur dupliciter: 50 uel propter se et ex natura sua, et in tali consistit felicitas – hoc enim est 26 propter] perfectiones anime nam sicut corpus est propter add. B 2 9 perfectio] propositio P 3 4 generationem sunt] rationem P 38 bonis] bonum B 3 9 quod…nullius] om. B | actu1…40 potentie] om. per hom. B 4 1 ibi recipere] inv. B 5 1 hoc] sed P 26 corpus…animam] Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323b18-21 30 materia…31 formam] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (32), p. 142; Arist., Phys. I.9, 192a22-23 34 posteriora…35 perfectiora] Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a4-6 3 5 bonum…36 generationem] cf. Arist., De Gen. An. II.3, 736b8-28 3 6 pueri…37 41 in…42 perfectioribus] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.17, 1336b31-37, sed etiam VII.15, 1334b22-28 primum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (43), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a1-11. Cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1 1052b18-19, 31-32; Arist., Metaph. V.10, 1018b9-10 et Averroem, In Metaph. VIII, comm. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 251v, I-K) 4 5 operatio…46 corporis] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 47-52 47 quedam2…48 felicitatem] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.5, 1100b26-27 et I.4, 1099b2-3

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finis –; uel propter dispositionem appetentis et desiderantis, ut asino delectabilium est nutrimentum et malo delitie, et ideo dicitur quod infirmus eligit sanitatem, miser autem diuitias. Ad secundam dicendum quod operatio intellectus eodem modo est delectabilissima in se ex natura sua, propter nobilitatem potentie et obiecti et immaterialitatem unionis. Sed corporalis est cum motu et materialis, et ideo includens tristitiam; tamen sensualis siue corporalis est quibusdam, peruersum appetitum habentibus, maxime delectabile. Hoc 60 autem nichil concludit. 55

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m f e l i c i t a s c o n s i s t at i n a c t u u i r t u t i s p e r s e Arguitur quod non, quia, si consisteret per se in actu uirtutis, tunc consisteret in actu cuiuslibet uirtutis, quia ‘per se’ supponit de omni. Sed hoc est falsum, tum quia quarundam uirtutum actus sunt imperfecti, tum 5 quia aliquarum uirtutum actus in alium ordinatur, quorum utrumque repugnat felicitati. Item, in operatione que est cum difficultate non est felicitas; sed quarundam uirtutum etiam excellentiorum actus sunt cum difficultate,

53 delectabilium] scrips. delectantiuum B | malo] male B 54 miser] uisus P 5 7 et1] etiam add. B | corporalis] materialis P | materialis] immaterialis sed corr. P 5 8 tamen…siue] seu sensualis seu P | est] ex add. P 3 ,1 per…2 uirtutis] om. per hom. B 3 cuiuslibet uirtutis] inv. B 5 in] uel (?) add. B | utrumque] utriusque P 54 infirmus…diuitias] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 3, arg. 3: “infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitias” (ed. Leon. VI, p. 194) 55 operatio…57 unionis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a24-25, ubi tamen Aristoteles verbum non facit de ista unione ex qua sequitur delectatio; cf. potius Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 31: “felicitas consistit in unione hominis cum bono perfectissimo, et ad hanc unionem consequitur delectatio ... in felicitate sunt duo: est ibi unio, et est considerare id quod pertinet ad eius essenciam, scilicet unionem; item, est considerare delectationem, que est quasi accidens proprium consequens ipsam” (ed. Celano, p. 71, ll. 33-34 et 37-39); I, q. 33: “felicitas consistit in unione hominis cum bono separato ... Cum igitur istud obiectum hominis vel intellectus sit nobilissimum, tunc operacio consequens erit optima, et per consequens delectatio maxima” (ibid., p. 74, ll. 12 et 16-18); I.34: “... felicitas que consistit in cognicione veri racionem habet ex obiecto; ita etiam dicendum est quod nobilitatem habet operacio ex obiecto. Ista autem unio cum bono separato est quod causat delectationem” (ibid., p. 75, ll. 15-18); cf. etiam I, q. 20 (ibid., pp. 58-59) 3, 1 Consequenter…se] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323b21-23

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quia uirtus consistit circa difficile, ut dicitur 4º uel 2º Ethicorum: actus enim fortitudinis est summe difficilis, ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum; ergo et 10 cetera. Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic et in 1º et 10º Ethicorum.

Dicendum quod felicitas consistit in operatione secundum uirtutem, non inquantum uirtus, quia tunc esset in omni actu cuiuslibet uirtutis, sed consistit in actu alicuius uirtutis. Cuius ratio est quia felicitas hominis per 15 se consistit in perfectione que est secundum animam. Quedam autem perfectio secundum animam est prima, et in tali non consistit felicitas; cuius causa est quia illa perfectio ordinatur in aliam ulteriorem et ad illam est in potentia, et ideo in ipsa non est felicitas. Alia autem est perfectio secunda, et ista est uirtus et operatio secundum uirtutem, et in ista 20 consistit felicitas; cuius ratio est quia felicitas est in actu hominis perfectis9 2º] 3 PB | actus…10 Ethicorum] om. per hom. P 12 hic] om. P 1 3 secundum…14 non] om. B 1 4 non] communiter add. sed exp. P 15 alicuius uirtutis] inv. B 1 6 consistit] post hominis transp. B | est] om. B 1 7 secundum…est] est secundum animam B | est] post perfectio transp. B 19 in ipsa] om. B | est3] om. B 9 uirtus…difficile] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1124a3- 4; II.2, 1105a9-10; II.5, 1106b32-33 (cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II [41], p. 235); II.7, 1109a34 | actus…10 difficilis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a24-31 et praesertim III.8, 1117a32-35 12 Contra…Ethicorum] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323b21-23; VII.8, 1328a37-38 (Auct. Arist., Pol. VII [122], p. 261); Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1098a15-17 (Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I [11], p. 233), sed cf. etiam I.4, 1098b30-31; I.4, 1099b15-16 et b26; I.4, 1100a4-5; I.5, 1100b9-10; I.8, 1102a5; X.7, 1176b26-28; X.7, 1177a1-2; X.7- 8, 1177a10-17 et 25-26 1 5 felicitas…21 felicitas1] de hac distinctione perfectionum cf. Averroem, In De An. III, comm. 5 (ed. Crawford, p. 392, ll. 158-165). Vide etiam, e.g., Thomam, STh I, q. 73, art. 1, resp. (ed. Leon. V, p. 186), In De Caelo II.4 (ed. Leon. III, p. 136) et Petrum (?), QQ. De Caelo IV, q. 3: “duplex est perfectio, sicut prima et postrema, sicut distinguit Commentator super tertium De anima. Perfectionem enim primam intelligo esse ipsam formam substantialem rei, qua res est ens in actu; perfectionem autem secundam intelligo esse propriam operationem consequentem formam illam. Aliquid autem habens perfectionem primam non summe perfectum: quod enim est in potentia ad actum ulteriorem, non est summe in actu, nec per consequens summe perfectum. Habens autem formam substantialem que est perfectio prima potest esse ad actum ulteriorem, ut ad operationem per se consequentem formam illam. Cum tamen est actu sub illa operatione, non est in potentia ad actum ulteriorem. Ex quo patet quod operatio illa est perfectio eius postrema” (ed. Musatti, p. 277, l. 23-p. 278, l. 2); cf. insuper Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 29: “... est perfectio triplex hominis: una est ipsius forma; secunda autem est que est ipsius habitus qui est principium operacionis; tercia autem perfectio est operacio. Ultima autem perfectio non consistit in forma, quia ipsa forma est in potentia ad habitum. Item, nec ultima perfectio consistit in habitibus, quia non consistit in eo quod ordinatur ad aliud; sed habitus sunt principia operacionum et ordinantur ad operacionem; quare, sequetur quod felicitas in operacione ultima , quia omnia alia ordinantur ad ipsam, et ipsa ad nichil aliud. Nam tale est felicitas, et ideo in operacione consistit felicitas” (ed. Celano, pp. 68-69, ll. 15-23)

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simo et optimo, ergo consistet in operatione hominis perfectissima. Hec autem est que procedit ab homine inquantum optimus: talis | autem est B 78rb homo inquantum habet uirtutem et secundum illam operatur; ergo felici25 tas consistet in operatione secundum uirtutem. Item, felicitas, cum sit bonum delectabilissimum, debet | consistere in P 315va actu facili, quia aliter esset cum tristitia; talis autem est operatio procedens ab habitu, qualis habitus est uirtus; ergo felicitas erit in operatione secundum uirtutem. Non tamen est in operatione uirtutis inquantum uirtus, sed 30 in aliqua uirtute una. Cuius ratio est quia felicitas una est, ideo oportet eam consistere in uno actu. Et item, quia uirtutum quedam est prima, in cuius actu non consistet, oportet ergo felicitatem ponere in actu supreme uirtutis et, per consequens, felicitatem practicam in actu ultime uirtutis practice. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut uirtus se habet ad uirtutem, ita operatio ad 35 operationem; et ideo, si uirtutes sunt ordinate, ipse etiam operationes ordinate erunt. Si ergo hec ultima uirtus practica sit prudentia politica, que secundum PHILOSOPHUM summa est inter uirtutes practicas et perfectissima, quia est ultima secundum generationem, quia secundum intentio-

2 3 est1] om. B 2 8 erit] felicitas add. B 30 est1] tum add. P | ideo] om. P 31 uno actu] inv. B 3 2 oportet] debet P | felicitatem ponere] inv. B 3 3 in] autem B | uirtutis] uoluntatis B 3 6 prudentia…38 perfectissima] in hoc toto commentario Petrus de prudentia politica loquitur ut de virtute quae ad felicitatem practicam ducit ( cf. supra, I, q. 6, ll. 34-36; II, q. 4, ll. 24-27, ubi prudentia politica distinguitur a monostica, quae est prudentia absolute; III, q. 6, ll. 36- 40). Tamen in Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.6, 1141b23-26 prudentia et politica ab invicem distinguuntur, etsi in 1141b26 Aristoteles mentionem facit alicuius prudentiae politicae. Numquam tamen asserit quod prudentia politica est perfectissima inter practicas (perfectissima enim potius esset prudentia absolute). Ad hoc addendum quod numquam prudentia expressis verbis aequiparatur ab Aristotele virtuti illae quae ad felicitatem practicam ducit (sed cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.9, 1178a9-22 et VI.9, 1144a4-9). Talis aequiparatio potius adscribenda est auctoribus illis qui, post Albertum, commentaverunt Ethicam (Albertus, Super Ethica VI.17 [579]: “Felicitas enim civilis est substantialiter operatio prudentiae”, ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.2, p. 499, ll. 35-36), Eustratium etiam sequentes (cf. Eustratium, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 9, ad 1098a17-20, ed. Mercken, p. 118, ll. 78- 85). Albertus prudentiam politicam dignam maiori consideratione existimat quam prudentiam quae unius, quia pertinet ad bonum commune, quod maius est unius bono; cf. Albertum, Super Ethica VI.11 (547): “Dicendum, quod prudentia, si simpliciter habeatur, dirigit in propriis et in his quae ad communitatem pertinent, quia non est perfecte prudens, qui se et alios regere nescit ... sed secundum quid est prudens, qui tantum scit se habere in propriis ... Tamen inter has duas prudentia principalior est illa quae ordinat bene in his quae sunt communitatis, quae est circa divinius bonum. Tamen etiam qui deficit in altero, non attingit optimum, quod est virtutis” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 469, l. 83-p. 470, l. 7); cf. etiam Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 11, ad 3 (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 358) 3 8 est…generationem] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.6, 1142a11-16

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nem PHILOSOPHI, 6º Ethicorum, futurum prudentem oportet bene se habere circa principium prudentie, quia estimatio finis 40 non inquantum finis, sed inquantum uolutus, talis autem estimatio fit secundum rectum appetitum, talis autem appetitus generatur a uirtute, ergo secundum generationem oportet uirtutes morales preexistere prudentie. Quod autem secundum generationem est ultimum, illud est perfectissimum, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice. Ergo in actu prudentie politice consistet 45 felicitas practica. Item, prudentia hec est regula et mensura omnium uirtutum moralium, quod patet ex diffinitione uirtutis, quia uirtus est habitus recta ratione determinatus; ergo et cetera. Sique inter prudentias sit aliquis ordo, tunc in ultime prudentie actu consistet felicitas, et ideo in summa prudentia 50 politica est felicitas practica. Vlterius autem, ultra uirtutes practicas sunt speculatiue, et ideo in summa illarum consistit felicitas speculatiua. Et ideo uniuersaliter dicendum quod in actu uirtutis consistet felicitas, ita quod in actu summe uirtutis consistet summa felicitas. Siue ergo illa uirtus et operatio uirtutis 55 sit in intellectu speculatiuo uel in uoluntate nichil differt, dummodo sit uirtus suprema. Gradus autem uirtutis et excellentia attendi habet ex ratione potentie et obiecti.

Ad rationem dicendum quod non consistit in actu uirtutis inquan60 tum uirtus, sed in actu supreme alicuius uirtutis; ideo non ualet. Ad secundam dicendum quod aliquam operationem esse difficilem potest fieri propter duo: uel propter materiam ipsam in qua est uirtus illa uel propter imperfectionem agentis. Dico ergo quod in operatione difficili secundo modo non est felicitas, sicut nec uirtus, quia talis operatio potius est uia in perfectionem quam sit perfectio; et ideo isto modo illius 65

4 1 non] s.l. P 4 2 secundum] per P 4 3 uirtutes] uirtutem sed corr. P | prudentie] om. B 4 9 sit] s.l. P si B | in] est B 5 0 ultime] ultima sed corr. P ultima B 54 uirtutis] summe add. B ita…55 felicitas] summa B 5 6 uel] om. P 6 1 difficilem] illud add. B 6 2 materiam] om. B 63 illa] legi non potest P | operatione] comparatione B 65 potius] coni.: post P primo B ideo] om. B | illius] nullius B 3 9 futurum…40 prudentie] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.8, 1143b6-11, sed etiam VI.10, 1144b4-9 4 0 prudentia…41 uolutus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.7, 1142b31-33; VI.10, 1145a4- 6 4 4 Quod… perfectissimum] Arist., Metaph. IX.8, 1050a4- 6 48 uirtus…49 determinatus] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. II (42), p. 235; Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106b36-1107a2; cf. etiam VI.10, 1144b27 57 Gradus…58 obiecti] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. X (208), p. 247; Arist., Eth. Nic. X.7, 1177a5-6

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uirtutis operatio est difficilis, quod, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum, consuetudo facit uirtuosum prompte operari. Sed in operatione difficili primo modo bene est felicitas, et etiam magis est in illa, quia uirtus etiam circa talem materiam maior est: nam fortis operatur operationem difficilem primo 70 modo. Est enim operatio sua circa difficilia, | ut circa pericula mortis, non P 315vb tamen est difficilis secundo modo: fortis enim operatur in stupefactibili, ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e a d e m s i t f e li c i t a s u n i u s h o m i n i s e t t o t iu s c iu it at is Arguitur quod non, quia quorum felicitas non est una, nec est una uirtus; sed unius hominis et totius ciuitatis non est una uirtus; ergo eorum 5 non est una felicitas. Maior patet quia felicitas est operatio secundum uirtutem. Minor patet quia uirtus unius dicitur monostica, uirtus autem totius ciuitatis dicitur politica. Item, si illorum esset unus finis seu felicitas, tunc etiam de eis consideraret una scientia inquantum huiusmodi, quia scientia et ratio 10 moralium ex fine sumitur; sed de moribus unius hominis et totius ciuitatis non est una scientia, quia de primo ethica, de secundo politica; ergo et cetera. Item, differentium specie secundum quod huiusmodi non est unus finis seu felicitas, quia finis sequitur naturam rei; sed unus homo specie 15 differt a tota ciuitate sicut compositum a natura differt ab artificiali; ergo et cetera.

6 6 quod] post Ethicorum transp. PB 6 7 difficili] om. P 6 8 illa] illo B | quia] quam P 6 9 materiam] naturam B 7 0 Est enim] inv. B 7 1 operatur] om. B 4, 1 eadem…felicitas] felicitas sit eadem B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 hominis] om. B 5 est1] erit B 8 seu] siue B de eis] om. P 9 huiusmodi] om. P 15 differt2] dent B 6 6 consuetudo…67 operari] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.1, 1103a26-b1 71 fortis…stupefactibili] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a24-26 4 ,1 Consequenter…2 ciuitatis] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.2, 1324a4-6 5 felicitas2…6 uirtutem] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (11), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1098a15-19; cf. etiam q. praec., adn. ad l. 12 6 uirtus…monostica] cf. supra, Prohemium, ll. 106-109, ubi monostica, oeconomica et politica inter se distinguuntur 9 scientia2…10 sumitur] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (91), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.9, 200a15-16

698

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Contra est PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur quia, quorum est unum esse, eorum est una felicitas; sed unius hominis et totius ciuitatis est unum esse: nam idem est esse totius et partis; ergo ipsorum erit eadem felicitas.

Dicendum quod, cum queritur an unius hominis et totius ciuitatis sit 20 unus finis, oratio est imperfecta et potest perfici sic: unius hominis uel secundum se accepti uel secundum quod est ciuis et totius ciuitatis sit unus finis propinquus et remotus. Et si queratur utrum unius ciuis inquantum huiusmodi et ciuitatis sit idem finis remotus, dicendum quod sic. Cuius ratio est dicta prius, quia 25 quorum unum est esse, illorum est unus finis: a fine enim determinatur esse et uiuere singulorum; sed unius ciuis secundum quod ciuis et totius ciuitatis est unum esse, sicut totius et partis; ergo eorum erit unus finis remotus.

B 78va

Si autem querat questio utrum unius hominis secundum quod ciuis et 30 ciuitatis sit idem finis propinquus, dicendum quod non. Cuius ratio est quia, licet pars et totum secundum esse idem sint, tamen | non sunt eadem primo et per se, quia tunc essent omnino eadem, quod est falsum, ut patet 1º Phisicorum. Sed totum ratione debet differre a parte: totum enim ab una parte accipitur per quod differat ab alia parte secundum rationem. Ex hoc 35 arguitur quia, quorum ratio est diuersa, eorum non potest esse unus finis propinquus secundum quod huiusmodi; sed totius ciuitatis et unius hominis est diuersa ratio; ergo ipsorum non est unus finis. 19 nam] om. B 2 0 quod] om. P 21 est] autem P 24 queratur] querat P | huiusmodi] om. P 28 eorum] om. P 3 0 utrum] om. B 3 1 est] om. P 3 3 est falsum] inv. B 3 4 debet] ante totum ratione transp. B | a parte] om. B 3 5 differat] differunt B | secundum rationem] om. B hoc] etiam add. B 3 7 ciuitatis…38 ratio] est diuersa ratio ergo et unius ciuitatis est diuersa ratio B 3 8 hominis] ciuitatis P 17 Contra…19 felicitas] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.3, 1325b31-33, sed cf. potius Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Omnes igitur confitentur unam esse felicitatem uniuscuiusque seorsum et ciuitatis. Et hoc rationabiliter contingit quoniam, quorum est una natura, eorum est unus ultimus finis; unus autem homo et omnes ciues ciuitatis sunt unius nature speciei; ergo unius et omnium ciuium est unus ultimus finis” (ed. Lanza, p. 448, ll. 22-26) et etiam VII.1: “est intelligendum quod uirtus totius ciuitatis et uirtus uniuscuiusque est eiusdem nature in se et in ordine ad operationem, non differens nisi sicut totum a parte et amplius a minori” (ibid., p. 443, ll. 229-230) 2 5 ratio…26 finis] cf. supra, ll. 17-18 3 2 licet…33 falsum] Arist., Phys. I.2, 185b11-16, 19-25 et 32-34; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Phys. I (11), p. 140 | licet…35 rationem] cf. Petrum, QQ. Phys. I, q. 19: “nec totum simpliciter est idem parti, quoniam, si esset simpliciter idem huic parti et etiam illi, sequeretur quod istae partes essent simpliciter idem et, per consequens, totum esset aliquid indivisibile non habens diversitatem partium” (ed. Delhaye, p. 47)

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Item, quorum operationes sunt diuerse inquantum huiusmodi, eorum non est unus finis propinquus; sed unius ciuis operatio est diuersa ab operatione totius ciuitatis. Quod patet quia, sicut in naui alia est operatio remigatoris et alia prorarii, quarum utraque differt ab operatione totius multitudinis existentis in naui – nam illorum omnium simul est operatio salus nauis, ut dixit PHILOSOPHUS in 3º –, ita et in ciuitate alia est operatio 45 ciuis secundum se propria et alia totius ciuitatis; ergo ipsorum erunt diuersi fines propinqui. Alicuius tamen ciuis et totius ciuitatis | est unus P 316ra finis propinquus; cuius ratio est quia, in ordinatis essentialiter, bonum et operatio totius est bonum et operatio partis principalis, sicut operatio animalis, ut est uidere, alia ab operatione cordis, et bonum animalis. Sed principalis pars ciuitatis aliquando est unus ciuis; ergo eadem erit operatio totius ciuitatis et unius alicuius ciuis, scilicet principantis; et secundum hoc eadem erit felicitas totius ciuitatis et principantis secundum quod huiusmodi.

40

Si autem querat questio utrum sit unus finis unius hominis per se et absolute et totius ciuitatis, dicendum quod istorum est unus finis, saltim remotus et ultimus, licet non proprinquus, ut patet per antedicta. Ratio autem primi est quia, quecumque procedunt ab eodem primo agente, illorum est finis ultimus, quia agens et finis proportionantur sibi; 60 sed unus homo et tota ciuitas processerunt ab uno primo agente, scilicet ab agente per intellectum, saltim unum istorum, mediante alio; ergo unius hominis et ciuitatis erit unus finis ultimus. 55

4 3 est operatio] inv. B 4 4 dixit] dicit B 4 7 ordinatis essentialiter] inv. B | bonum] est add. PB 4 8 sicut] scilicet ut P ut B 4 9 uidere] om. P | sed…50 operatio] suppl. ex infra, q. 6, ll. 28-30. Vide etiam Petrum, Sent. De Morte et Vita, lectio 2: “principalis operatio animalis debet attribui principali agentis, sed principalis operatio in animali est motus cordis” (ed. Venetiis 1507, f. 61ra) 5 1 animalis] anime PB | unus] secundum quod add. B 5 5 sit] si P 57 proprinquus] proprius PB 59 illorum] eorum B | quia…finis2] et agens et quia B 6 1 mediante] immediate sed corr. P 4 1 sicut…44 nauis] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b20-27; cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “quidam enim est remigator ... alius est porrarius, qui partem posteriorem nauis dirigit ... Et manifestum est quod quilibet propriam potentiam et uirtutem habet, per quam diligentissime exercet suam operationem. Cum hoc autem, quod quilibet habet operationem propriam, omnes habent unam communem operationem quam principaliter intendunt, que est salus nauis uel nauigationis; quilibet enim nauta intendit et desiderat salutem nauis uel nauigationis, et ad istum finem omnes dirigunt suas operationes proprias” (ed. Lanza, p. 25, ll. 20-29) 4 7 in…54 huiusmodi] cf. infra, q. 6, ll. 28-36 59 agens…sibi] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 6, ll. 25-26 6 1 ab…intellectum] cf. supra, I, q. 5, ll. 15-26 et 36-38

700

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Item, eorumdem in specie erit unus finis, quia finis sequitur naturam; sed unus homo idem est in specie cum tota ciuitate, accipiendo eam pro multitudine ciuium, non pro ordine – de quo modo non loquimur –, cum 65 unus homo et omnes ciues sunt idem in specie, licet differant accidente et numero; ergo ipsorum erit unus finis et felicitas. Non tamen una est felicitas proxima et finis propinquus; cuius ratio est quia, eorum qui sunt diuersarum rationum inquantum huiusmodi, non 70 potest esse unus finis propinquus. Et ideo oportet, cum eorum fines propinqui sint diuersi, finis autem remotus sit unus, quod uel fines istorum reducantur in aliquem alium tertium separatum a fine utriusque, uel inuicem unus in alium reducatur. Primo modo esse non potest, quia tunc, secundum proportionem ad fines, si fines reducerentur in aliquem separatum, oporteret etiam eorum esse unam naturam communem separatam ab utroque. Et ideo relinquitur quod finis alterutrius istorum in finem alterius reducatur; hoc autem est dupliciter: uel quod finis unius hominis reducatur in finem totius ciuitatis uel econuerso. Et primo quidem modo non potest fieri. Cuius ratio est quia actus superioris potentie et excellentioris non reducitur in actum inferioris potentie; sed finis unius hominis est in actu potentie excellentioris, ut intellectus speculatiui, finis autem primus ciuitatis est in actu potentie inferioris, ut prudentie politice, que est in intellectu practico; ergo finis unius hominis non reducitur in finem propinquum ciuitatis. Et ideo oportet esse econuerso, quod finis propinquus totius ciuitatis ordinatur in finem unius hominis secundum se secundum quod huiusmodi. Nam omnis operatio politica et non-uacatio est finaliter propter uacationem et quietem speculandi, sicut dicitur 10º Ethicorum. Tum ultimus finis, licet idem sit uni homini et ciuitati, tamen differt secundum magis et minus, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum.

63 eorumdem] eorum B | erit] est B 6 5 quo…non2] alio modo B | cum] nam B 6 7 finis] proprius add. B 68 Non…propinquus] om. B | propinquus] proprius P 7 0 propinquus] proprius PB 7 3 uel] quod add. B 75 si fines] om. P 76 communem] om. P | relinquitur] sequitur B 7 7 alterutrius] alterutrum B 7 8 quod] om. P 7 9 fieri] quia add. sed exp. B 8 0 inferioris…81 potentie1] inv. B 8 1 ut] om. P 8 4 propinquum] proprium PB | oportet] debet B 85 quod] quia P | in…86 hominis] om. P 8 8 Tum…90 Ethicorum] om. per hom. B 8 6 omnis…88 speculandi] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b4- 6; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VIII.1: “non88 licet…89 minus] Arist., Eth. uacatio est propter uacationem” (ed. Lanza, p. 594, l. 244) Nic. I.1, 1094b7-10; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233; sed cf. potius Albertus, Super Ethica I.2 (13): “... idem est bonum unius hominis et gentis, sed differt secundum maius et minus” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 11, ll. 67- 68)

75

80

85

90

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Ad rationes in oppositum dicendum quod, quorum non est una uirtus inquantum huiusmodi, eorum non est una felicitas propinqua; remota tamen potest esse eadem, et sic est in proposito. 95

100

Ad secundam dicendum quod, quorum est unus finis, est etiam una scientia eodem modo una sicut finis est unus, scilicet genere uel specie. | Et ideo, cum totius ciuitatis et unius hominis sit unus finis ultimus P 316rb generalis, non tamen specialis, ideo et scientie istorum sic se habent: nam ethica et politica sunt eadem scientia secundum genus, nam sunt morales ambe; non tamen sunt eedem in specie. Ad tertiam dicendum quod diuersorum secundum rationem et speciem non est unus finis propinquus; potest tamen esse unus finis ultimus et summa felicitas.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m i n a c t u u i r t u t i s m o r a l i s co n s i s t a t f el i c i t a s h o m i n i s , f el i c i t a s – i n q u a m – p o l i t i c a

Arguitur quod sic, quia felicitas politica est in optima uirtute politica; sed talis est aliqua uirtus moralis; ergo in actu alicuius moralis 5 uirtutis est felicitas politica. Minor patet quia amicitia est optima uirtus politica, quia ipsa maxime saluat ciuitates, propter quod et legislatores summe eam desiderant. Et idem patet de fortitudine, cum sit circa difficiliora. | Item, in actu illius uirtutis consistit felicitas, cuius obiectum est 10 per se bonum; sed tales sunt uirtutes morales, quarum obiectum est per se bonum, sicut et appetitus in quo sunt; et cetera.

5, 2 inquam] etiam B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 6 et] om. B | legislatores] scrips. legistimatores B 8 difficiliora] diffinita B 9 cuius…12 felicitas] om. per hom. B 5, 6 ipsa…7 desiderant] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-24 Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a24-31 et praesertim III.8, 1117a32-35

8 patet…difficiliora] cf. Arist.,

B 78vb

702

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Contra dicitur, 1º Ethicorum, quod felicitas est in actu uirtutis perfecte; sed ibi dicit EUSTRATIUS quod uirtus politica perfectissima est prudentia, que omnia perficit; ergo in eius actu consistet felicitas politica. Item, in actu uirtutis consequentis potentiam excellentiorem consistit 15 felicitas; sed uirtutes intellectuales sunt consequentes excellentiorem potentiam, scilicet intellectum; ergo in ipsis erit felicitas politica, precipue in prudentia, que est circa agibilia ciuilia. Maior patet quia semper peius et minus bonum ordinatur ad magis bonum. Et ideo, cum felicitas semper sit potius in eo in quod alia ordinantur, quia tale magis habet rationem boni et 20 finis, potius ipsa consistet in actu uirtutis que est in nobiliori potentia.

Dicendum quod inter uirtutes politicas necesse est ponere primam. Cuius ratio est quia omnis multitudo secunda est ab uno, ut PROCLUS probat: multitudo enim nec potest esse prior nec ex equo coordinata uno sicut contraria, quia tunc per unum non potest diffiniri, quod tamen 25 conuenit; ergo necessario est posterior uno. Item, in unoquoque genere necesse est ponere unum primum, quod est principium omnium aliorum et per comparationem ad quod omnia mensurantur et magis uel minus talia dicuntur. Et tale est perfectissimum in illo genere, ut dicitur 2º Metaphisice. Et propter hoc, inter uirtutes politicas, cum sint plures, necessario 30 poneretur una prima, et in illa potissime consistet felicitas politica.

P 316va

Dicendum ergo quod felicitas politica consistit in actu cuiusdam uirtutis intellectualis. Cuius ratio est quia oportet felicitatem politicam, cum sit summum bonum politie, | consistere in actu summe uirtutis politice; sed talis est quedam uirtus intellectualis, scilicet prudentia; ergo in actu illius 35 consistet felicitas politica. Minor patet quia, ut dicitur 9º Metaphisice, 13 dicit] est add. B | politica…est] est politica perfectissima B 1 4 eius actu] inv. B 15 consequentis] lac. B 1 6 sed] om. B 1 8 peius] prius B 20 alia ordinantur] ordinatur P | magis habet] inv. B 23 est1] om. B 24 esse] om. B 25 potest] deberet B 2 6 necessario] necesse B 3 4 politice] politie P 3 5 illius] uirtutis add. B 36 Metaphisice] secundum add. B 12 felicitas…perfecte] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (11), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1098a15-17 1 3 uirtus…14 perficit] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 9, ad 1098a17-20 (ed. Mercken, p. 118, ll. 78-85) 2 3 omnis…26 uno] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 5 (ed. Boese, pp. 4-5, ll. 1-18); cf. etiam prop. 21 (ibid., pp. 14-15); in Quolibet II, q. 14 ( Vtrum principalior in anima sit ipsa uoluntate) Petrus affert ipsum Proclum et ipsam propositionem 21 ut affirmet quod inter potentias animae unam superiorem omnibus aliis esse oportet (cf. ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 29rb) 2 6 in…29 dicuntur] Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1 1052b18-19, 31-32; cf. etiam Arist., Metaph. II.1, 993b24-26; II.2, 994a12-13; V.10, 1018b9-10 et Averroem, In Metaph. VIII, comm. 2 (ed. Venetiis 1562-1574, vol. VIII, f. 251v, I-K) 29 tale…genere] Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (43), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a1-11

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posteriora secundum generationem perfectiora sunt, et econuerso priora secundum generationem imperfectiora sunt; sed prudentia posterior est uirtutibus moralibus secundum generationem; ergo est perfectior. Minor 40 patet quia ad habendum perfecte prudentiam oportet habere primum principium prudentie, quod est rectus appetitus; et ideo oportet habere hunc et credere illi; et hunc faciunt uirtutes morales, quarum, si qua defuerit, deficiet prudentia. Ergo prudentia posterior est illis secundum generationem; ergo secundum essentiam perfectior. Item, uirtus rationem habet ex obiecto, ideo, secundum rationem, posterior est illo. Et ideo, si uirtus determinationem et perfectionem accipit ex obiecto, tunc, cum prudentia illud obiectum ulterius determinet – quod patet ex diffinitione uirtutis: nam uirtus est habitus in medietate consistens determinata ratione recta –, semper autem perfectius et nobi50 lius est illud quo aliquid formaliter determinatur, ergo prudentia perfectior erit uirtutibus moralibus; ergo multo plus in actu eius consistet felicitas. Sed prudentia est uirtus intellectualis; ergo in actu alicuius uirtutis intellectualis est ipsa felicitas. 45

Item, potius est felicitas in actu uirtutis determinantis quam determi55 nate – nam finis est determinare –, et item, quia determinans rationem habet agentis et formalis – forme enim est determinare, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum –, determinatum uero habet rationem materie et passi; sed prudentia est determinans, uirtutes autem morales ut determinatum, quod patet ex parte obiecti earum; ergo in prudentia politica consistet felicitas. Notandum tamen quod, licet in actu prudentie principaliter consistat felicitas ista politica, tamen consistit etiam quodammodo in actu uirtutum moralium, inquantum ille ordinantur et aliquid faciunt ad prudentiam imperando rectum appetitum finis, quem pro primo principio presupponit prudentia. Et iterum, omne quod inexistit primo in aliquo ordine, quo65 dammodo et inest omnibus que ad aliud primum ordinantur.

60

4 1 oportet] s.l. P 43 deficiet] deficit B 44 perfectior] posterior B 45 rationem habet] inv. B ideo…47 obiecto] om. per hom. B 4 8 diffinitione] distinctione B 4 9 perfectius] perfectiuas B 50 illud] alio aliquid a add. B 51 actu eius] inv. B 60 tamen] om. P | prudentie] potentie B 3 7 posteriora…38 sunt] Arist., Metaph. IX.9, 1050a4- 6 3 8 prudentia…51 felicitas] cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. II, q. 2 (ed. Celano, pp. 90-91) 40 ad…41 appetitus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.1, 1139a22-27, 29-31 4 8 uirtus…49 recta] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1106b36-1107a2 5 6 forme…determinare] cf. Arist., Phys. II.1, 193a36-b3

704

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Ad rationem dicendum quod amicitia non est magis conseruatiua ciuitatis, magis – inquam – in comparatione ad prudentiam, nec respectu illius legislatores magis circa eam insudant, sed solum hoc dicitur in respectu et comparatione ad uirtutes morales. Ad secundam dicendum quod fortitudo non est circa difficiliora 70 quam prudentia. Licet enim mori sit ualde difficile, tamen determinare pro quo et quomodo et quando sit moriendum uidetur multo difficilius quantum est de se et secundum rationem, que de hoc iudicare debet, licet insit appetitui difficile.

P 316vb

Ad aliam rationem dicendum quod obiectum primum alicuius 75 uirtutis est illud in quod primo fertur illa uirtus, sicut obiectum uisus est color, in quem primo fertur; non autem primum obiectum uisus est color uisus in actu: nam color uisus in actu in|quantum huiusmodi posterior est uisione; uisio autem posterior est colore, sicut uniuersaliter obiectum prius 80 est potentia. Similiter obiectum primum intellectus est quod quid est uel ipsa ratio entis; ut cognita et intellecta non est primum obiectum intellectus: sic est uerum in actu. Hoc enim posterius est ipsa intellectione; intellectio autem uniuersaliter posterior est suo obiecto primo, scilicet ente 85 uel ipso quod quid est. 67 nec] ut B 68 insudant] insistant B 7 1 determinare] determinate B 73 iudicare] iudicari B 7 5 aliam rationem] rationem secundam P 77 non autem] nam P 78 uisus1] in quem primo fertur B | in2] om. P 8 1 quod quid] quicquid B | est2] causa add. B | ipsa] om. P 82 non] ut P 8 3 sic] sicut PB | ipsa] om. B 84 intellectio] intellecto B | suo] in add. B 8 5 quid] om. B 7 5 dicendum…85 est] eadem etiam affirmantur in Petri Quolibet IV, q. 9 (Vtrum ens simpliciter dictum sit primum obiectum intellectus): “De primo dicendum quod obiectum primum potentie est in quod primo potentia fertur per actum suum primum: potentia enim determinatur per actum primum eius et actus primus per obiectum primum; actus enim sunt preuii potentiis et obiecta ipsis actibus secundum rationem, secundum Philosophum 2º De Anima, sicut primum obiectum uisus est color uel lux, ad que primo terminatur actus uidendi. Et quia primum in unoquoque genere est ratio et principium aliorum que sunt in genere illo, secundum Philosophum 10º Metaphisice, obiectum primum potentie est per quod potentia fertur in omnia alia in que mouetur (cod.: mouentur), sicut uisus per colorem uel lumen fertur in omne illud quod sub actu uideri potest (add. in marg.): nichil enim uidetur nisi inquantum aliquo modo coloratum uel luminosum est. Et quia primum in aliquo genere non pendet ex alio priori in illo, primum obiectum potentie est in quod potentia non fertur per aliud prius. Et ideo manifestum est quod primum obiectum intellectus est in quo primo fertur per actum intelligendi primum et per quod fertur in omnia alia, et in ipsum non propter aliud. Ex quo apparet quod primum obiectum intellectus est aliquid unius rationis quodammodo; plura enim secundum rationem in aliquo genere uel pendent ex aliquo priori in illo uel alterum ex altero” (ex ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 62vb)

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Similiter dico quod obiectum primum uoluntatis est ens perfectum; illud | idem autem ut iam uolutum non est primum obiectum uoluntatis: B 79ra ipsum enim, ut sic, est posterius ipsa inclinatione uoluntatis. Hec autem inclinatio semper posterior est suo obiecto primo, scilicet ente perfecto. 90 Nam ens perfectum primo mouet appetitum; bonum autem, ut uolutum, sic terminat appetitum boni. Ideo obiectum primum uoluntatis est bonum in re et in potentia. Perfectum enim in re, hoc in ordine ad appetitum est bonum; tamen ipsum, sub ratione boni perfecti acceptum, non est primum obiectum uoluntatis, quia sic terminat uoluntatem, sicut nec uerum in actu 95 est primum obiectum intellectus. Dico ergo quod in actu uirtutis illius, cuius obiectum est bonum perfectum in actu, est felicitas; tale autem bonum non est obiectum uoluntatis, sed intellectus practici ex parte prudentie; et ideo felicitas politica consistit in actu prudentie.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m f e l i c i t a s c on s i s t a t i n a c t u p r u d e n t i e qu i e st p rin c ip ar i Arguitur quod non, quia felicitas non debet consistere in illo actu quem non contingit faciliter esse sine iniustitia; sed talis est actus ille 5 prudentie qui est principari; ergo in eo non consistit felicitas. Minor patet per litteram. Item, si felicitas consisteret in hoc actu, tunc, quanto plus aliquis principaretur, tanto esset felicior. Hoc autem est falsum, quia tunc principari omnibus et qualitercumque esset optimum, quod non est uerum.

88 posterius] sua add. sed exp. B | ipsa inclinatione] inv. B 8 9 obiecto primo] inv. B 9 0 primo] om. B | uolutum…91 sic] uolunt si P 91 terminat] determinat B 9 2 ordine] genere B 94 sic] si P | sicut] sic B | uerum] numerum B 9 6 bonum] om. B 9 7 obiectum] bonum B | uoluntatis] sed appetitus add. B 9 8 et…99 prudentie] om. per hom. B 6 , 1 felicitas] s.l. P om. B | consistat] post principari transp. B 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 7 hoc] om. P tunc] om. B 8 felicior] felicius sed corr. B 9 et] etiam B 6 ,5 Minor…6 litteram] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.2, 1324a35-37 ubi tamen asseritur “putant autem hii quidem proximis principari despotice quidem factum cum iniustitia esse maxima, politice autem quod quidem iniustum non habere ...” (ed. Susemihl, p. 247, ll. 1-3); potius est in Petri Scripto VII.2 quod hic locus sic interpretatur: “quidam opinantur quod principari despotice, hoc est principatu domini ad seruum, et alios politicos actus exercere, non potest esse sine iniustitia magna” (ed. Lanza, p. 450, ll. 97-99)

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Maior patet quia, si felicitas consisteret in illo actu, tunc ille actus per se 10 esset bonus. In talibus autem, que per se insunt, sequitur: si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis, et sic ad maximum maxime. Item, felicitas non est in actu qui habet tristitiam admixtam; sed talis est actus principandi; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia felicitati per se debetur delectabile esse. Minor patet quia actus qui est cum motu necessa- 15 rio est cum aliqua imperfectione, que inducet tristitiam. Contra: si felicitas politica per se consistit in actu prudentie, tunc, cum principari sit potior actus prudentie, ipsa felicitas potius consistet in actu principandi. Minor patet per PHILOSOPHUM 1º huius, quia precipue debe20 tur prudentia principanti.

Dicendum quod felicitas politica principaliter consistit in actu principandi; in aliis autem actibus consistit per consequens, inquantum in istum actum ordinantur. Ratio primi est quia in illo actu principalius debet consistere felicitas politica, quo determinantur alii actus prudentie, ipse autem nullo alio; sed talis est actus principandi; ergo in ipso principaliter 25

10 ille] illo P 15 esse] om. B | motu] uoluntario add. sed del. B 16 inducet] inducit B 17 tunc…18 prudentie] om. per hom. B 18 consistet] consistit B 19 principandi] principanti P precipue] precipua PB 21 Dicendum…principandi] om. per hom. B | principandi] principanti P 2 3 ordinantur] ordinatur B | est] om. B 11 simpliciter…12 maxime] Auct. Arist., Top. V (80), p. 327; Arist., Top. V.4, 137b30-31; Auct. 13 felicitas…admixtam] cf. Auct. Arist., Rhet. I (18), p. 264; Arist., Rhet. I.7, 1363b21-22 Arist., Top. I (19), p. 323; Arist., Top. I.15, 106a37-b1 1 9 Minor…20 principanti] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a19-20 ubi tamen asseritur : “propter quod principem quidem perfectam habere oportet moralem virtutem” (ed. Susemihl, p. 54, ll. 2-3). Paulo ante Aristoteles affirmat quod, aliter quam dominus, “servus quidem enim omnino non habet quod consiliativum”, 1260a12 (ibid., p. 53, l. 12), quod secum affert quod principans praecipue prudentiam habere debet. Quod autem prudentia maxime sit principantis potius asseritur in libro IIIº; cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a14-16 et b25-26; Auct. Arist., Pol. III (55), p. 255 21 Dicendum…39 politica] opinio ista, quod felicitas consistit praecipue in actu principandi, non invenitur in Aristotele. Forsan a commentario Michaelis Ephesii eam asserendi exordium capitur; nam, loco ipso ubi Aristoteles affirmat quod felicitas est in parte principali et meliori hominis, id est in intellectu, addit Michael: “Quemadmodum civitas est principaliter et dicitur dominans et principans, puta in democratumena quidem plebs – haec enim in ipsa dominans – et in habente regem civitate rursus rex est et dicitur, et in tyrannizata tyrannus, sic et homo principaliter est qui in nobis intellectus ... quoniam quod in unoquoque principaliter, in unoquoque intellectus est et melius et optimum” (In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1178a2-3, ed. Mercken, p. 429, ll. 32-39)

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erit felicitas politica. Maior patet quia determinare pertinet fini, a quo est ratio eorum que in finem. Minor patet 1º Ethicorum et 1º huius. Item, quando aliquid est | compositum ex aliquibus, tunc bonum totius P 317ra consistit in actu partis principalioris, ut bonum animalis consistit in actu 30 cordis uel anime, similiter bonum anime in bono intellectus; sed politia est aliquid compositum, cuius principalior pars est principans; ergo in actu principantis secundum perfectissimam prudentiam consistet felicitas ciuitatis: sic ergo felicitas politica est in actu prudentie politice, summa autem felicitas politica in summo actu prudentie. Et per antedicta patet 35 quod et ulterius, si sint plures partiales actus ipsius actus principandi, in precipuo illorum consistit felicitas: sunt enim tres actus principandi, scilicet consiliari, iudicare, precipere, quorum ultimus perfectissimus et maxime proportionalis principatui est; et ideo in ipso maxime consistit felicitas politica.

40

Ad rationem dicendum quod actum principandi, absolute accipiendo, uniuersaliter non faciliter contingit esse sine iniustitia, quia multi sunt principatus inter quos difficile est tangere medium, ut dicitur 2º Ethicorum. Si tamen accipiatur actus principandi secundum rationem

2 7 et] etiam add. B 28 aliquibus] pluribus add. B 29 bonum] totius add. B 31 compositum] optimum B 34 autem] uero B | summo actu] inv. B | Et] om. B 35 ulterius] ultimus finis P in] ibi B 36 precipuo] principia P precipua B | consistit] consistet B 3 8 principatui] scrips. principationi P principum B 40 absolute] s.l. P 2 7 Minor…huius] quod asseritur in propositione minori, quod scilicet actus principandi est actus principalior prudentiae, non invenitur nec in Ethica nec in Politica, sed potius inveniri potest in Thoma; cf. infra, adn. ad ll. 36-38. Possibile tamen est quod aliqui loci in Ethica et in Politica exordium istae opinioni dederunt; cf., e.g., Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b7-11, ubi asserit quod politicus est prudens et Periclis exemplum profert, et Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a36b4, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.10 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A115, ll. 191-207): ubi enim Aristoteles asserit quod virtus principantis et virtus subiecti differunt, Thomas mentionat expressis verbis virtutem prudentiae, quae est virtus principantis 2 8 quando…33 ciuitatis] cf. supra, VII, q. 4, ll. 46-54 36 sunt…38 est] hoc argumentum desumptum est ex Thoma, STh IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 8, resp. (Vtrum praecipere sit principalis actus prudentiae): “... oportet quod ille sit praecipuus actus prudentiae qui est praecipuus actus rationis agibilium. Cuius quidem sunt tres actus ... consiliari ... iudicare ... praecipere” (ed. Leon. VIII, p. 356); invenitur etiam in Petri Scripto IV.13: “Operationes autem principatus sunt consiliari de aliquibus, iudicare et precipere. Maxime autem operatio principatus est precipere: precipere enim maxime pertinet ad principatum. Dicit igitur quod maxime et simpliciter, ut est dicere, illi debent dici principatus, quibus competunt isti actus: consiliari, iudicare et precipere. Et ille principatus maxime dicitur principatus, cui competit precipere, quia iste est actus precipuus ipsius principatus” (ed. Lanza, p. 230, l. 55-p. 231, l. 61) 4 2 difficile…medium] Arist., Eth. Nic. II.7, 1109a34

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rectam politicam, ut querit questio, certum est quod bene, immo omnino 45 est sine iniustitia. Ad secundam dicendum quod, si magis excedat secundum id per quod meretur continere felicitatem, tanto magis felix. Verbi gratia: si magis crescat secundum rationem prudentie, tanto felicior. Si autem extendatur non secundum hoc, sed potius secundum materiam et multitudinem subiectorum, non oportet quod tanto felicior: secundum hoc enim non 50 dicebatur in eo consistere felicitas politica. Verum est: quanto magis exercetur actus principandi intensiue secundum formam rationis, tanto felicius, non tamen quanto plus exercetur extensiue uel secundum materiam subiectorum. Ad tertiam dicendum quod in hac uita non existimo aliquam esse 55 omnino felicitatem a tristitia separatam. Cuius ratio est quia motus uoluntatis est cum motu appetitus, et similiter operatio intellectus est cum motu sensus; et ideo nulla felicitas est quin aliquid habeat imperfecti et contristantis. Tamen, quia in actu principandi secundum rationem pru4 4 politicam] rectam add. B 46 id] illud B 47 Verbi] ut P 48 crescat] crescit B | extendatur] excedatur B 49 potius] om. B 52 principandi] om. B 5 3 plus] potius PB | exercetur] extenditur B | extensiue] correxi ex Vincentii Gruner Disputatis Pol. VII, q. 6: “... respondet Egidius: si actus principandi magis extendatur secundum illud per quod meretur continere felicitatem, tunc sic erit princeps secundum ipsum magis felix ... de quanto actus principandi magis extenditur (exceditur W) intensiue secundum formam rationis, de tanto facit hominem feliciorem, non autem extensiue” (mss. Trier, Stadtbibliothek 1038 [1283], f. 208r; Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59, f. 191rb): intensiue PB 5 6 omnino felicitatem] inv. B 5 9 in…61 abstractionem] quod hic asseritur, quod actus principandi maiorem habet abstractionem respectu aliorum actuum politicorum, non invenitur in aliis auctoribus. Probabiliter ad hoc explicandum sufficit considerare quod finis proprius principis universalior est et minus habet considerare quod singulare est: ‘depuratio’ et ‘abstractio’ enim verba sunt recurrentia in textibus mediaevalibus ad significandum quod amovetur a materia et ab eo quod singulare est (cf., e.g., Bonaventuram, Super Sent. I, dist. 39, art. 1, q. 2, ad 2: “singulare non pervenit ad intellectum nisi per istas potentias, et ascensus per has est secundum abstractionem et depurationem, et abstractio facit de singulari universale”, ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, vol. I, p. 689). Ut infra, q. 7, ll. 115-119 dicetur, prudentia inferior est sapientia, quia “est respectu agibilium singularium et effectuum particularium”. Petrus enim opinatur quod obiectum scientiae politicae et intellectus practici aliquid variabile est et maiorem propinquitatem habet materiae quam obiectum intellectus speculativi, ideo minus rationem intelligibilis habet; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.11: “... obiectum intellectus practici: huius enim obiectum est bonum agibile et possibile aliter se habere, quod minus habet rationem intelligibilis propter rationem motus et possibilitatis adiunctorum; obiectum autem intellectus speculatiui est natura entium intransmutabilium aut non secundum quod transmutabilia, que magis rationem intelligibilis habent, sicut remota magis a motu et materia” (ed. Lanza, p. 545, ll. 98-103). Ut supra dicebatur, prudentia politica quae ad bonum commune superior est respectu prudentiae quae ad bonum proprium; sumi igitur potest quod hic Petrus dicere intendit quod actio principantis minus ab eo quod singulare est perturbatur; finis huiusmodi

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dentie minus est conturbari respectu aliorum actuum politicorum propter depurationem et abstractionem, ideo, saltim felicitas politica, in ipso magis consistere dicetur. Sic etiam felicitas speculatiua, que summe est per se delectabilis, dicitur | tamen consistere in actu intellectus speculatiui qui, B 79rb licet minus sit cum tristitia respectu intellectus practici uel respectu appe65 titus, tamen adhuc non omnino est sine tristitia, propter indigere sensu et etiam necessariis corporis. Vnde dicitur, 10º Ethicorum, quod tam speculatiuus quam moralis indiget necessariis; moralis tamen plus, et ideo magis motu turbatur, speculatiuus autem minime omnium.

60

6 0 conturbari] turbari B | aliorum] om. P 61 depurationem] deplorationem PB | in…magis] magis in ipsa P 6 2 Sic] sicut PB | felicitas] om. B | summe] summa P 6 3 qui] tamen add. B 6 4 minus] unus B 6 6 corporis] om. B

actionis enim universalior et minus materiae connexus est: tali opinioni exordium esse potuit ille locus Alberti commentarii ubi prudentia politica comparatur cum prudentia individuali; cf. Albertum, Super Ethica VI.11 (547): “Similiter etiam sunt aliqui qui bene se habent in regimine communitatis, sed in propriis nesciunt seipsos regere, et huius ratio est, vel quia contemnunt propria vel quia propriorum rationes sunt magis particulares et homo pluribus periculis subiacet quam civitas et universale semper facilius est ad sciendum quam particulare” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.2, p. 469, l. 89-p. 470, l. 3). Quod vita politica non sit a tristitia separata invenitur in loco illo Michaelis Ephesii commentarii ubi politica coniuncta singulari dicitur; cf. Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177a25: “Adhuc, quia politicus felix civibus procurat felices esse – hoc autem ipsis facere impossibile est sine conveniente singulis actione et ornatio; haec autem fit in eo quod est hos quidem honorare, hos autem et punire –, contingit autem quandoque et poenitibile accipere et poenitudinem ... speculans autem et naturam entium attendens nequaquam in poenitudine fit quoniam huius alicuius naturam cognovit, quoniam intellectualiter vivit. Immixta quidem igitur et pura in speculari delectatio propter haec, immixta videlicet tristitiae et poenitudini ...” (ed. Mercken, pp. 414- 415, ll. 32- 41). Quod virtus politica non sit a materia et a turbatione separata, quapropter inferior est speculatione, etiam invenitur in Michaelis commentario; cf. Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177b14-15: “... neque politicae separatae sunt a tumultu et turbatione ...” (ed. Mercken, p. 424, l. 92) et ad 1177b30-31 : “Hoc enim est intellectualiter vivere, redire ab ea quae circa materiam turbatione ab intellectualem extremitatem. Et quantum, ait, differt qui in nobis intellectus a composito hoc quod ex anima et corpore, tantum et intellectualis ipsius operatio a politica felicitate. Aliam enim virtutem dixit felicitatem. Si utique divinum intellectus ad hominem, hoc est sine habitudine intellectus et inconvertibilis divinior est eo qui in habitudine et ad materiam inclinante, et vita ipsius, secundum intellectum operatio, divinior humana vita, politica felicitate” (ibid., p. 428, ll. 97-05). Haec etiam inveniuntur in illis ipsis locis Petri Scripti ubi de felicitate disseritur; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “... non potest esse sine sedatione motuum et perturbationum, sine quibus non est uita ciuilis” (ed. Lanza, p. 448, l. 39-p. 499, l. 40) et “... illa que est absoluta a turbatione ciuili et actionibus exterioribus magis, quam dicimus contemplatiuam ...” (ibid., p. 450, ll. 82- 83) 6 6 tam…68 omnium] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177a28-b1, sed cf. praesertim X.10, 1178a24-b7; cf. Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177a28 (ed. Mercken, pp. 415- 417, ll. 61-07) et cap. 9, ad 1178a24 (ibid., pp. 437- 439, ll. 38-90); cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.10: “diuitias igitur, quas necesse est preexistere felicitati ... Maiores tamen exiguntur ad practicam seu politicam quam ad speculatiuam” (ed. Lanza, p. 529, ll. 180 et 182-183)

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< Q UE S T I O 7 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m f e l i c i t a s p o l i t i c a p o t i o r s i t qu am sp e c u l at iu a

P 317rb

Arguitur quod sic, quia illa felicitas est potior que consistit in actu principalioris uirtutis; sed politica felicitas consistit in actu principalioris uirtutis; ergo potior. Minor patet quia felicitas politica consistit in actu 5 prudentie politice, speculatiua autem in actu contemplatiue; modo prudentia politica potior est quam uirtus contemplatiua, quod probatur: nam uniuersaliter uirtus precipiens alii et utens ea ad finem suum est potior et principalior quam illa; talis autem est prudentia politica | respectu contemplatiue. Nam dicitur, 1º Ethicorum, quod scien- 10 tia architectonica semper precipit scientiis subalternis, ut nauigatoria precipit carpentarie et ista dolatorie, et hoc ideo, quia nauigatoria propinquior est fini ultimo quem considerat et, secundum illum, rationem aliis imponit; sed politica precipit scientie contemplatiue, ut dicitur 1º Ethico15 rum; ergo politica potior contemplatiua, et similiter felicitas felicitate. Item, felicitas illa est potior, cuius obiectum magis habet rationem boni; sed obiectum felicitatis politice magis habet rationem boni; ergo ipsa est potior. Maior patet quia felicitas est operatio; operatio autem bonitatem accipit ex obiecto. Minor probatur quia obiectum politice felicitatis, que consistit in actu intellectus practici, est bonum in actu, ut prius uisum 20 est; obiectum autem speculatiue est uerum, quod solum est bonum in potentia. Item, felicitas est potior que est amabilior: hec enim conuertuntur, quia felicitas per se est amabilis; sed politica est amabilior; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum, amabile quidem quod est 25 bonum uni, magis autem amabile quod est bonum genti.

7 , 3 Arguitur] praem. et B 4 principalioris1] principantis B | sed…5 uirtutis] om. per hom. B 5 ergo] est add. B 9 prudentia…10 politica] inv. B 1 0 Nam] sicut add. sed exp. P | scientia] sicut in P sicut B 1 1 scientiis] suis B 1 3 illum] illam B 1 4 ut…15 contemplatiua] om. per hom. B 18 est1] om. B 2 1 est2] primum add. sed exp. P 25 dicitur 1º] uidetur tertio B quod] quoddam B 2 6 bonum1] obiectum sed exp. et corr. s.l. P 7 , 1 Consequenter…2 speculatiua] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.2, 1324a14-17 1 0 scientia…11 subalternis] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a14-16 1 4 politica…contemplatiue] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a26-b7 1 9 obiectum…20 actu2] cf. supra, VII, q. 5, ll. 96-99 2 5 amabile…26 genti] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b7-10

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS, 10º Ethicorum. Et arguitur quia illa felicitas hominis est potior que consistit in eo quod est proprium homini inquantum homo; hec enim necessario magis est conueniens illi et saluatiua 30 nature hominis; sed contemplatiua consistit in intellectu, qui est proprius homini. Licet enim felicitas politica consistat in aliqua operatione intellectus, tamen hec est in ordine ad aliud et ad uoluntatem et opus, contemplatiua autem est in absoluta operatione intellectus secundum se et respectu sui. Ergo contemplatiua felicitas est potior. 35

Item, felicitas magis continua potior; talis enim magis accedit ad rationem perfecti, quod per se inest felicitati; sed contemplatiua magis est continua propter hoc, quia paucioribus indiget et quia separata est a materia; ergo et cetera.

Item, felicitas est potior que est magis per se sufficiens; hoc enim est de ratione felicitatis, quod per se sit sufficiens. Nam dicitur, 10º Ethicorum, quod tam contemplatiuus quam moralis indigent exterioribus bonis, contemplatiuus tamen minus: non enim eis indiget ad operationem suam inquantum huiusmodi, sed solum per accidens, ad sustentationem corporis; moralis uero seu politicus indiget eis non solum per accidens, sed et 45 per se inquantum huiusmodi: ad operationem enim uirtutum quarundam, ut liberalitatis et iustitie, necessario per se sunt exteriora; ad contemplationem uero non, nisi per accidens. Ergo felicitas contemplatiua est potior quam politica.

40

3 3 intellectus] tamen hoc est in ordine add. sed exp. P 35 potior] est add. B 39 hoc…40 sufficiens] om. per hom. P 40 Nam] ut B 4 3 solum] post accidens transp. B 4 4 seu] siue B 4 7 non] om. B 2 7 illa…31 homini] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.9, 1178a5- 8 3 5 felicitas…37 continua] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177a20-22, sed cf. potius Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177a21-22: “Si igitur unum aliquod elementorum felicitatis existit et permanens, permanentius ergo felicius ... Magis continuum autem et diuturnius felicitas speculativa quam politica. Melior ergo et divinior et propter hoc et extrema et perfectissima. Adhuc, si ei quod semper propinquius quod magis continuum, longius autem quod non continue et ad paucum tempus existit, quod autem semper eo quod non semper perfectius et melius, et speculativa ergo felicitas, ut magis continua et diuturnior, proximius est ei quae semper in intellectualibus speculationi; longius autem politica; perfectior ergo speculativa felicitas et optima utique et extrema” (ed. Mercken, pp. 411- 412, ll. 51-52 et 54- 62); cf. etiam Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b24-25 et Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177a24-25 (ibid., p. 427, ll. 62-86); Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.9, 1170a5- 8 3 9 est3…40 sufficiens] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097b20-21 et X.8, 1177a27-28 4 1 tam…42 minus] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177a28-b1 et praesertim X.10, 1178a24-b7; cf. Michaelem Ephesium, In X Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1177a28 (ed. Mercken, pp. 415- 417, ll. 61-07) et cap. 9, ad 1178a24 (ibid., pp. 437- 439, ll. 38-90)

712

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P 317va

B 79va

Dicendum quod finis, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, 12º Metaphisice, duplex est: quidam enim est finis simpliciter ultimus et propter se ipsum bonus; alius autem est finis mediatus, per quem deuenitur in finem ultimum, ut aliqua operatio. Verbi gratia: in naturalibus finis simpliciter et ultimus ipsius grauis est locus deorsum, finis uero propinquus est moueri deorsum, ita quod primus finis est sicut obiectum illius operationis, que est finis medius. Sed felicitas est finis hominis; ergo et felicitas dupliciter dicitur sicut finis, ita quod erit quedam felicitas per se primo intenta, ut forte est hoc quod dico beatum esse uel felicem esse – et de hac felicitate | loquebatur Plato, quam ponit separatam more suo ut ydeam –; alia autem erit felicitas media, per quam in illam uenitur, et hec erit operatio aliqua perfecta. Et isto modo de felicitate loquitur PHILOSOPHUS hic et 1º et 10º Ethicorum. Hec autem felicitas adhuc duplex est: quedam enim est politica et alia contemplatiua, et hoc secundum duas summas uirtutes potentie intellectiue ad optimas duas hominis operationes ducentes, ita quod politica felicitas est in summa uirtute intellectus practici, scilicet in prudentia; contemplatiua uero in summa uirtute intellectus speculatiui, ut forte in sapientia.

50

55

60

65

In hoc autem speculatiuo intellectu est duo considerare, scilicet intellectiuum et uoluntarium. Intellectiuum quidem, in quo summa potentia per summam operationem summum apprehendit intelligibile, | ad quam apprehensionem sequitur uoluntas, in qua, intelligibili prius apprehenso 70 sub ratione boni, summus appetitus secundum summum desiderium summo unitur bono quantum potest; et, tertio, ad istud sequitur delectatio summa, que est quietatio desiderii illius. Hec enim tria essentialiter se consequuntur: quando enim intellectus intelligit aliquid sub ratione boni, statim in illud fertur uoluntas et appetit illud, et ad illius adeptionem 75 summa sequitur delectatio, ita quod in illius intellectus operatione est 4 9 12º] 10 B 50 duplex] dupliciter B 5 2 ut] nec B 5 3 est locus] inv. B 55 dupliciter…56 dicitur] inv. B 58 quam] quem P | ut] secundum B 5 9 erit1] est B | uenitur] inuenitur P 60 loquitur Philosophus] om. B | et1] in add. B 6 1 est1] om. B 6 2 alia] est add. B | potentie] politie B 6 5 uero] est add. B 68 quidem] quod add. PB 69 intelligibile] intellectiue B 7 3 enim] autem B 7 4 consequuntur] sequuntur B 4 9 finis…55 medius] Arist., Metaph. XII.7, 1072b1-3. Haec distinctio saepe invenitur in Petri operibus; cf. supra, Prohemium, ll. 81- 85 cum adn. 57 de…58 ydeam] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.2, 6 0 isto…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.3, 1325a31-34 et 1325b19-23; VII.8, 1096b31-34 1328a37-38; VII.13, 1332a7-10; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1098a16-18 et 1099b15-18; X.7, 1176b1-10; X.8, 1177a12-b4

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER VII

713

considerare tria perfectissima in generibus suis, scilicet apprehensionem, desiderium et delectationem. 80

QUIDAM autem in hiis equaliter putabant consistere felicitatem, ignorantes quod in quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, siue sit in habitibus siue in obiectis siue in actibus. ALII autem credunt felicitatem consistere in delectatione tali ratione, quia felicitas debet consistere in perfectissimo; sed delectatio, inter tria predicta, est perfectissimum: quod probant, quia ultima secundum generationem sunt perfectiora; sed delec-

80 quod] quia PB | unum primum] inv. B | sit] om. B 8 4 sunt perfectiora] inv. B 7 9 Quidam…81 actibus] probabiliter hic Petrus significare vult quod declaratum est in Bonaventura, Super Sent. IV, dist. 49, pars 1, art. 1, q. 5, ubi hoc asseritur : “... dicendum, quod omnes vires, quae habent per gratiam actum in Deum, habebunt per gloriam actus perfectos, evacuatis imperfectis. Vnde rationalis, cuius est modo credere per fidem, tunc videbit aperte; concupiscibilis, cuius est amare, diliget tunc perfecte; irascibilis, cuius est erigi et inniti per spem, tunc tenebit continue et certe. Unde secundum hos tres actus distinguuntur tres dotes, scilicet visio, dilectio, comprehensio sive tentio sive fruitio per appropriationem; nam fruitio ista tria complectitur ... isti tres actus sunt omnino coniuncti et connexi; unde qui perfecte videt perfecte amat et habet” (ed. PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, vol. IV, p. 1009) 8 0 in1…primum] Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (43), p. 118; Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994a1-11; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., Metaph. X (239), p. 135; Arist., Metaph. X.1, 1052b18-19, 31-32; V.10, 1018b9-10 8 1 Alii…86 felicitas] forsan hic Petrus significat quod Iohannes Pecham affirmavit in Quolibet I, qq. 5-6 (Vtrum beatitudo consistat principalius in actu intellectus aut in actu affectus, Vtrum in beatitudine principalior sit visio aut delectatio). Sic enim Pecham: “delectatio est principalior in beatitudine quam visio ... obtenta scientia, perficitur amor et dilectio ... cognitio est causa quasi efficiens eius delectationis, sed delectatio est finis cognitionis, et ideo principalior est” (ed. Delorme-Etzkorn, p. 14, l. 24 et p. 20, ll. 192-193). Sed probabilius significare vult quod Iacobus de Viterbio asseruit in Quolibet I, q. 8 (Vtrum beatitudo principalius consistat in actu intellectus quam in actu voluntatis): “... solet distingui communiter triplex actus voluntatis, scilicet amare, desiderare et delectari. Inter quos amor se habet sicut principium motus, desiderare autem sicut motus, delectari vero sicut quies et terminus motus ... ideo beatitudo, quae est bonum perfectum, consistit in amore habiti, qui est delectatio sive fruitio ... In eadem enim re illa potentia quae est posterior origine, est prior perfectione. Sed voluntas est posterior intellectu secundum originem. Quare prior est intellectum secundum perfectionem ... Nam, respectum eiusdem obiecti, delectatio non est propter operationem quam consequitur, sed econverso, cum delectatio perficiat operationem, non sicut accidens perficit subiectum, vel sicut actus potentiam, sed sicut operatio perfectior dicitur perficere minus perfectam, in quantum reddit perfectiorem ipsum operantem” (ed. Ypma, p. 115, ll. 111-114, p. 116, ll. 138-139, p. 119, ll. 247-250 et p. 127, ll. 529-534). Vide etiam Quodlibet II, q. 8 (Vtrum operatio sit appetenda propter delectationem, vel econverso delectatio propter operationem): “... delectatio est finis propter quem est operatio. Non enim perficit operationem sicut accidens subiectum, sed sicut finis id quod est ad finem ... Quando autem duo sunt in eodem, oportet ut unum eorum sit propter alterum. Non autem delectatio est propter cognitionem, sed econverso ... dicendum est quod beatitudo magis consistit in delectatione, sicut in operatione per quam finis attingitur. In cognitione autem magis consistit, sicut in operatione quae habet rationem finis” (ed. Ypma, p. 116, ll. 91-94, 96, 101-104)

714

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tatio est ultima istorum, ergo est perfectissimum; ergo in ipsa consistit 85 felicitas. Hec sententia non ualet, quia uniuersaliter causa potior est causato; sed operatio intellectus, que est apprehensio uel appetitus, causa est delectationis; ergo illa dignior; et ideo in illo potius consistit felicitas. Minor patet quia ex eo quod bonum apprehensum est sub ratione 90 boni et unitum est , et ex apprehensione talis unionis causatur delectatio. Ad rationem autem eorum dicendum, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, quod non omne ultimum est finis, sed ultimum quod est optimum, quia quedam aliquando secundum esse sequuntur finem ipsum, et tamen, quia appetuntur eadem gratia finis, ideo ipsa non sunt optimum nec sunt finis. Et ideo dicitur, 1º Ethicorum, quod finis est cuius gratia appetuntur omnia, tam precedentia quam sequentia. Et ideo in delectatione non consistit felicitas, sed potius in altero duorum, ut uel in apprehensione uel appetitu intellectus speculatiui. Et non intelligatur quod, licet felicitas dicatur non consistere in delectatione, quod ponatur quod felicitas sit sine delectatione: contingit enim aliqua secundum esse et per accidens esse coniuncta, que tamen secundum intellectum separari possunt.

P 317vb

95

100

Redeundo ergo ad propositum, dicamus quod felicitas speculatiua potior est quam politica. Cuius ratio potest esse ex tribus. Primo quidem, 105 quia illa perfectio necessario est | potior que est in operatione perfectioris potentie et superioris habitus et nobilioris obiecti: ex hiis enim est nobilitas et dignitas perfectionis; sed talis est felicitas contemplatiua respectu politice; ergo contemplatiua felicitas potior est politica. Minor declaratur,

8 5 est1…istorum] istorum aduenit B 87 uniuersaliter] ultima B 8 9 potius] ante in illo transp. B 95 quia] om. B 9 6 ipsa] om. B 9 8 delectatione] delectationem B 10 1 quod1] ideo add. B 10 2 aliqua] aliquam P 10 3 secundum] om. B 1 05 potest esse] inv. sed corr. P 10 9 declaratur] patet B 9 0 ex…92 delectatio] cf. Petrum, QQ. Eth. I, q. 34: “Ista autem unio cum bono separato est quod causat delectacionem; nam ex ista unione sequitur quietacio. Tale autem quietacio est delectacio; quare, bonum in ista delectacione erit propter tale bonum ... Quare, non querimus cognicionem veri propter delectacionem, sed delectacionem propter veri cognicionem” (ed. 94 non…95 ipsum] Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a32-33; Auct. Arist., Celano, pp. 75-76, ll. 17-22) Phys. II (62), p. 145 97 finis…98 sequentia] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.3, 1097a21-22 1 04 felicitas…109 politica] hoc argumentum desumptum est ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 3, art. 5, resp. (ed. Leon. VI, p. 31)

QUESTIONES POLITICORUM LIBER VII 110

715

quia politica felicitas est in intellectu practico, contemplatiua autem in uoluntate uel intellectu speculatiuo: hec autem ambo presupponuntur ab intellectu practico sicut principia et esse eius per se, et sine quibus non perficitur eius operatio.

Iterum, politica est in habitu prudentie, speculatiua autem in habitu sapientie. Sapientia autem dignior est prudentia, tum quia potentia in qua est sapientia naturaliter dignior est quam potentia in qua est prudentia, tum quia sapientia est respectu primorum intelligibilium uniuersalium et causarum summarum, prudentia autem est respectu agibilium singularium et effectuum particularium. Item, obiectum prudentie, in quo consistit 120 felicitas politica, est ordinatio ciuium et bonum ciuitatis, quod est bona habitudo ciuium inter se et principem; obiectum autem sapientie, in quo est speculatiua felicitas, est primum intelligibile et causa altissima, ut per totum patet ex 6º Ethicorum; sed causa prima et etiam alia intellegibilia alta digniora sunt bono et ordinatione ciuili. 115

11 1 ab] om. B 1 15 potentia…117 quia] om. per hom. B 1 1 7 primorum] priorum B 11 9 Item] iterum B 12 1 habitudo] habitu B | sapientie] post speculatiua felicitas est transp. PB 1 2 2 quo] qua B | et] est B | altissima…123 causa] om. per hom. B 12 4 alta] alia B ordinatione] ordinationi PB 11 0 politica…113 operatio] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Intellectus enim practicus, qui dirigit in operationibus exterioribus, supponit, sicut principium, rectum appetitum finis, et rectus appetitus finis non est sine rectitudine uoluntatis; rectitudo uero uoluntatis supponit rectitudinem intellectus bonum uel finem ostendentis, siquidem uoluntas nihil uult quod non sit intellectum prius, sicut dicitur 1º Rhetorice. Iste autem intellectus est intellectus non practicus, sed speculatiuus, si practicus per se dependet a uoluntate, iste autem non” (ed. Lanza, p. 462, ll. 477- 484) 1 1 4 politica…124 ciuili] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “illa perfectio intellectus eligibilior est que est respectu obiecti magis intelligibilis, quia ratio perfectionis sumitur ex obiecto. Talis autem est speculatiua: felicitas enim est perfectio intellectus respectu primi et maxime intelligibilis; felicitas autem practica est perfectio intellectus respectu agibilis ab homine, quod multo deficit a ratione intelligibilis primi; ergo felicitas contemplatiua unius eligibilior est quam felicitas practica” (ed. Lanza, p. 461, ll. 442- 448) et VII.11: “Sed pars anime speculatiua melior et perfectior est natura quam practica, quod quidem apparet ex ratione obiecti: illa enim pars anime intellectualis perfectior et melior est in genere intellectus, cuius obiectum magis habet rationem intelligibilis, quia natura potentie consideratur ex ratione obiecti, et magis intelligibile secundum naturam perfectius est in genere intelligibilium. Sed obiectum intellectus speculatiui magis habet rationem intelligibilis quam obiectum intellectus practici: huius enim obiectum est bonum agibile et possibile aliter se habere, quod minus habet rationem intelligibilis propter rationem motus et possibilitatis adiunctorum; obiectum autem intellectus speculatiui est natura entium intransmutabilium aut non secundum quod transmutabilia, que magis rationem intelligibilis habent, sicut remota magis a motu et materia: ergo pars anime speculatiua excellentior et nobilior erit practica. Sequitur igitur quod operatio ipsius perfectior et eligibilior erit, et magis habens rationem finis” (ibid., p. 545, ll. 92-105) 1 20 ordinatio…121 principem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38; Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255 12 1 obiectum…122 altissima] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.6, 1141a18-20 et 1141b1-2

716

B 79vb

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Item, illa felicitas est potior que est absoluta et nullius alterius gratia quam ea que in aliam ordinatur; sed felicitas contemplatiua absoluta est in nullam aliam ordinata, politica autem ordinatur in contemplationem finaliter; ergo et cetera. Minor patet per PHILOSOPHUM, 10º Ethicorum, qui dicit quod non-uacamus, id est operamur uirtuose, et moraliter et politice, ut uacemus, id est ut postea, in pace existentes, contemplari possimus; contemplatio enim similis est uacationi, quia ipsa non est operatio exterior. Et arguitur ratione, quia in essentialiter ordinatis perfectio posterioris ordinatur in perfectionem prioris et dignioris, quia, sicut perfectibile ad perfectibile, ita perfectio ad | perfectionem; sed intellectus practicus est posterior uoluntate et intellectu speculatiuo, sicut principiatum posterius est principio; ergo perfectio seu felicitas intellectus practici, scilicet politica felicitas, posterior erit et ordinatur in perfectionem intellectus speculatiui, scilicet felicitatem speculatiuam, sicut in primum et nobilius eo. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS in hoc 7º quod corpus et bonum corporis ordinatur in bonum anime, et in Magnis Moralibus quod semper minus bonum in maius bonum ordinatur. Ergo felicitas speculatiua potior est politica.

125

130

135

140

Item, operatio illa in qua est maior delectatio est potior quam illa in qua minor; sed in operatione contemplandi est maior delectatio quam in operatione intellectus practici; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia delectatio 145

12 5 Item] et add. B | est potior] inv. B 1 2 7 contemplationem] contemplationibus B 12 9 non-uacamus] non uocamus P | est] non add. P 13 3 perfectionem] primi add. B 13 6 est] prius add. B | seu] om. B 1 3 7 felicitas] politica B | erit] est B 1 38 scilicet…speculatiuam] om. B 14 1 maius] magis B 1 43 potior] felicitas add. P 12 9 non-uacamus…131 possimus] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.8, 1177b4- 6, sed cf. potius Albertus, Super Ethica X.11 (901): “non-vacamus, una dictio, idest operamur non-vacantes, ut postea vacemus, et bellamus, ut postea pacem habeamus; sed operatio contemplativae sapientiae 1 3 4 intellecmaxime est in vacatione” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.2, p. 755, ll. 73-76) tus…139 eo] idem argumentum iam supra invenitur, I, q. 2, ll. 109-111 cum adn. 1 3 9 corpus…140 anime] Arist., Pol. VII.1, 1323b18-21 1 4 0 semper…141 ordinatur] cf. Arist., Mag. Mor. I.2, 1184a8-14, sed cf. potius Arist., Pol. VII.14, 1333a21-24. Eundem locum ex Magnis Moralibus Petrus memorat etiam in Quolibet III.8 (Vtrum scientia speculatiua et practica sint una scientia), ubi scientia speculativa et activa ad invicem comparantur: “sed finis scientie actiue, que est felicitas practica, est propter finem scientie speculatiue, que est contemplatio ueritatis, sicut probat Philosophus 10º Ethicorum: est enim perfectior contemplatio actione; et in quibus habemus hoc quidem perfectius, illud autem minus perfectum, semper imperfectum habemus gratia magis perfecti, sicut uult Philosophus 1º Magnorum Moralium” (ex ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149, f. 45vb)

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per se inest felicitati. Minor patet quia felicitas politica est in operatione prudentie, que est circa exteriora agibilia, que sunt cum motu. Motus autem est alicuius imperfecti in ordine ad perfectionem: sed ubi est imperfectio aliqua, ibi est tristitia, et ubi tristitia, ibi nulla uel modica delectatio 150 est; speculatiua autem felicitas consistit in operatione intellectus speculatiui, que est separata a motu et a tempore, ut dicitur in commento super 1um Ethicorum; ergo felicitas speculatiua potior est quam felicitas politica.

14 9 ibi2] in P 1 5 1 a2] om. B | commento] commentum B 14 6 felicitas…152 politica] cf. supra, VII, q. 6, ll. 55- 66 et Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Vocat autem uitam contemplatiuam absolutam et peregrinam, quia principaliter consistit in applicatione hominis secundum intellectum ad primum obiectum eius et optimum, que non potest esse sine sedatione motuum et perturbationum, sine quibus non est uita ciuilis: et ideo oportet ipsam esse absolutam a communicatione ciuili ... Et propter hoc dicit Eustratius, supra 1um Ethicorum, quod speculatiuus separatus est a corpore et sensibilibus secundum electionem, quamuis non secundum rem” (ed. Lanza, p. 448, l. 37-p. 449, l. 41, 43- 46). Haec eadem defenduntur in commentariis in Ethicam eodem fere tempore ex Facultate Artistarum Parisiensi, quae Alberti interpretationem sequuntur; cf. Albertum, Super Ethica I.7 (37): “civilis felicitas semper habet admixtionem aliquam paenitudinem, quia operibus virtutum admiscet se aliquis defectus ex omissione alicuius circumstantiae” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 35, ll. 10-12), Aegidium Aurelianensem, QQ. Eth. X, q. 14 (Vtrum felicitas consistit in potestatibus): “in illo quod habet tristitiam sibi admixtam non consistit felicitas” (ms. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 231vb) et X, q. 20: “delectatio que consequitur felicitatem practicam habet contrarium per se. Nam uirtus moralis in qua consistit felicitas practica est circa passiones et operationes exteriores, que in motu sunt. Tale autem quod est in motu contrarium habet; etiam, felicitas practica circa plura negotiari habet, et ex hoc causatur turbatio, ex turbatione autem tristitia; et ideo delectatio consequens felicitatem speculatiuam potior est quam delectatio consequens practicam” (ibid., f. 232vb), Anonymum Erfordiensem, QQ. Eth. X, q. 20: “felicitas practica est secundum uirtutem operatio, sicut secundum prudentiam, et illa habet esse circa agibilia et transmutabilia, et consequenter est circa aliqua que subiciuntur motui et defectui, et sic aliqua tristitia commiscere ibi, quia motus et defectus sunt causa tristitie” (ms. Erfurt, Amplon. F 13, f. 117ra) 1 50 speculatiua…151 tempore] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 8, ad 1097a14-18 (ed. Mercken, p. 99, ll. 54-59)

718

P 318ra

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Quod autem QUIDAM dicunt, quod bene uerum est quod speculatiua est melior quam politica, | politica tamen est utilior quam speculatiua, erroneum est et absurdum. Quod patet quia, si una earum utilior alia, tunc 155 necessario ambe erunt utiles, quia comparatiuus presupponit positiuum. Si ergo politica est utilior, tunc contemplatiua etiam erit utilis. Hoc autem est omnino inconueniens dicere quia, cum utile sit quod conferens est ad finem, tunc necessario felicitas contemplatiua esset conferens ad aliquid aliud ulterius tanquam ad finem; et tunc alterius gratia appeteretur, et 160 iterum ipsa non esset finis, nec optimum, nec ultimum. Intelligendum tamen quod , secundum quod homo, dicitur dupliciter: uel absolute uel secundum quod est pars ciuitatis. Sic etiam duplex est felicitas eius practica, et similiter duplex speculatiua, et hee

15 4 politica2] post utilior transp. B 1 5 7 est2…158 omnino] inv. B 16 3 quod] quid B 1 64 felicitas eius] inv. B | hee] licet esse P

15 8

quia] quod B

15 3 quidam…155 absurdum] quod speculativa melior sit, sed politica utilior, primo asseruit Albertus, qui bis hanc opinionem defendit. Petri iudicium, tamen, potius dirigi videtur adversus Henricum de Gandavo, qui in suo Quolibet XII, q. 28, vitam activam et contemplationem praesentis vitae ad invicem comparat dupliciter: quoad earum substantiam et quoad earum usum. Pro tempore vitae presenti – et non ‘in patria’, i.e. post mortem –, in utraque vita magis meritorius est usus, in quo vita activa praecellit (ed. Decorte, pp. 164-188, et praesertim p. 169, ll. 31-33; p. 170, ll. 52- 64). His ab Henrico assertis adversatur Gaufridus de Fontibus (Quodlibet XI, q. 6, ed. Hoffmans, pp. 32-37), aliter tamen quam Petrus: nulla est – ut opinatur – distinctio inter actum secundum eius substantiam et secundum eius usum. Cf. Albertum, Super Ethica I.7 (37): “Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur melius dupliciter: aut quia est honorabilius, et sic contemplativa melior est ... Aut quia utilior, et sic civilis melior” (ed. Kübel, Opera Omnia XIV.1, p. 35, ll. 31-34) et X.13 (909): “Dicendum, quod felicitas contemplativa et civilis dupliciter possunt considerari: aut secundum dignitatem et honestatem, et sic multo dignior est contemplativa felicitas, quia est secundum id quod optimum est hominis et minus referibilis ad aliud. Aut secundum utilitatem necessitatis vitae, et sic civilis potior est, et hoc est esse potius secundum quid” (ibid., vol. 2, p. 761, ll. 42- 49). Eadem asseruntur in aliquibus commentariis in Ethicam; cf. Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 22 (ed. Costa, p. 224, ll. 24-29) et X, q. 12 (ibid., p. 557, ll. 25-50), Anonymum Parisiensem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 26 (ed. Costa, p. 177, ll. 117-122). Vide etiam Thomam, STh IIa-IIae, q. 182, art. 1, resp.: “Secundum quid tamen, et in casu, magis eligenda vita activa, propter necessitatem praesentis vitae” (ed. Leon. X, p. 441) 1 5 8 utile…159 finem] cf. Eustratium, In I Arist. Mor. cap. 6, ad 1096a5-7 (ed. Mercken, p. 66, ll. 10-12) 1 6 2 homo1…169 unius] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “contemplatiua totius ciuitatis simpliciter eligibilior est contemplatiua que est secundum unum, similiter politica practica que est secundum unum. Et hoc est quod intendebat dicere Aristoteles 1º Ethicorum: si idem est uni et ciuitati, maiusque et perfectius quod ciuitati uidetur et suscipere et saluare ... Et ratio huius potest esse quia contemplatiua et politica ciuitatis comparantur ad contemplatiuam secundum unum sicut totum ad partem: totum autem rationem magis perfecti et maioris boni habet quam pars, et ideo ista quam illa” (ed. Lanza, p. 461, ll. 450- 458)

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differunt secundum multum et paucum. Felicitas autem practica unius comparari habet ad felicitatem plurium practicam, et etiam speculatiua unius ad speculatiuam plurium, et ita quod fiat comparatio in eodem genere felicitatis: tunc enim semper felicitas plurium melior est felicitate unius. Si autem comparetur felicitas politica plurium ad felicitatem specu170 latiuam unius, tunc felicitas plurium non est melior, immo longe peior et inferior felicitate unius. Et ideo PHILOSOPHUS, quando dicit, 1º Ethicorum, quod bonum plurium melius est bono unius, intelligit de bono eiusdem generis.

165

175

Et per hoc patet solutio ad rationem tertiam in oppositum, cum enim arguis ac si PHILOSOPHUS compararet felicitatem practicam plurium ad contemplationem unius; sic autem non facit.

Ad primam dicendum quod ipsa politica non per se precipit speculatiue, sed solum per accidens. Primum patet quia operatio speculandi, quantum est de se absolute, nullo modo indiget nec presuppo180 nit intellectum practicum nec prudentiam politicam: nullum enim principium sue actionis accipit a uoluntate uel intellectu practico, sed potius, econuerso, tam uoluntas quam intellectus practicus per se indiget operatione intellectus speculatiui et hanc presupponit ut principium. Et ideo speculatiua per se precipit practice; practica tamen, id est prudentia 185 politica, precipit speculationi per accidens, scilicet quantum ad usum speculandi, qui consistit in eo quod tunc uel nunc, uel in hac scientia uel in 16 5 practica] praem. speculatiua sed exp. P | unius] minus B 1 6 6 comparari] operari sed corr. B | et etiam] inv. P | speculatiua…167 speculatiuam] speculatiuam et etiam illud speculatiua B 171 ideo] om. B 1 74 rationem tertiam] inv. B 1 75 arguis] arguit B 17 7 primam] rationem add. B 18 0 practicum] practicam B | prudentiam politicam] inv. B 16 5 Felicitas…173 generis] hac conclusione, quae praeceptum observat secundum quod comparatio debet esse inter ea quae sunt eiusdem generis (cf. Arist., Phys. VII.4, 248 b6-249a8), iam usus est Petrus ad superioritatem metaphisicae respectu scientiae politicae comprobandam; cf. supra, I, q. 4, ll. 17-38. Eadem conclusio etiam invenitur, una cum argumentis valde similibus his quibus hic Petrus utitur, in: Radulphus Brito, QQ. Eth. I, q. 22 (ed. Costa, pp. 224-225, ll. 52-70). Vide etiam Aegidium Aurelianensem, QQ. Eth. X, q. 20: “... si accipiatur ex una parte speculatio unius et ex altera per se speculatio plurium, melior est speculatio plurium quam speculatio unius. Et similiter potest dici de operatione prudentie; sed non oportet quod operatio plurium secundum prudentiam sit melior speculatione unius” (ms. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 232vb) et Anonymum Parisiensem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 26: “quod illud quod est bonum uni minus bonum quam illud quod est bonum communitati: uerum est si istud bonum et illud essent in eodem genere” (ed. Costa, p. 177, ll. 112-113) 1 72 bonum…unius] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. I (5), p. 233; Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094b7-10 184 speculatiua…192 entis] cf. supra, I, totam q. 4

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alia aliquis speculetur, que omnia accidunt ipsi speculationi quantum est de se. Et ideo non precipit ei quantum ad hoc quod est speculari, sed quantum ad illud quod est nunc uel tunc speculari. Speculatiua autem per se precipit politice, que est in intellectu practico, quia principia intellectus 190 practici necessario per se et essentialiter presupponunt principia speculatiui, quia ratio boni agibilis per se presupponit rationem entis. Ad secundam dicendum quod, licet obiectum intellectus contemplatiui sit bonum in potentia et obiectum practici bonum in actu, tamen, quia illud bonum in potentia est per se principium istius boni in actu, ideo 195 adhuc felicitas contemplatiua potior est quam felicitas politica. < Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m ex d i s p o s i t i o n e r e g i o n i s a l i q u i b e n e u e l mal e p o l i t iz e nt

P 318rb

Arguitur quod non, quia quod inest aliquibus ex dispositione regionis, hoc inest eis a natura, quia dispositiones loci et locati uel sunt eedem uel propinque: propter hoc enim corpus querit locum ut, propter 5 similitudinem dispositionum, saluetur in illo; sed politizare non est a natura, immo ab arte seu uirtute; ergo ipsum non diuersificabitur ex dispositione regionis.| Item, que insunt alicui ex dispositione regionis, illa uidentur naturalia de necessitate; sed politizare non est a natura neque de necessi- 10 tate, immo a uoluntate seu electione libera; ergo et cetera.

18 8 speculari…189 est] om. per hom. B 1 9 2 se] non add. P 1 9 4 potentia…in2] om. per hom. B 1 96 adhuc] actu P | felicitas2] om. B | politica] sequuntur ista verba, quibus terminat textus codicis Bononiensis: expliciunt questio politicorum 8 ,1 Consequenter…2 politizent] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.5, 1326b26-27 (ubi tamen Aristoteles tantum asserit quod considerabit ea que ad regionem pertinent ut civitas esse possit per se sufficiens, et nihil de dispositione civium. Quod hic quaeritur potius consideratur in: Petrus, Scriptum VII.4: “Regionem igitur talem oportet esse secundum qualitatem quod possit omnia ferre que sunt necessaria ad per se sufficientiam uite: hoc autem potest facere si fuerit temperata secundum qualitates primas – calidum, frigidum, humidum, siccum –, quod conuenit ei per conuenientem habitudinem ad figuram celestem et loci dispositionem”, ed. Lanza, p. 474, ll. 22-26) et praesertim VII.6-7, 1327b16-20. Quaestio ista et seq. inveniuntur in Scripto ordine inverso 5 propter1…6 illo] cf. supra, V, q. 6, ll. 12-16

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS hic. Et arguitur quia, per quod homines disponuntur sic uel sic ad uirtutem, per hoc efficiuntur bene uel male politizantes, quia politizare est per uirtutem; sed per dispositionem regio15 nis disponuntur homines diuersimode ad uirtutem; ergo per illam efficiuntur qualiter politizantes. Minor patet quia per dispositionem regionis disponuntur corpora communibus qualitatibus, ulterius qualificantur specie et organa sensuum, et per hoc diuersificantur receptiones sensuum; ulterius, quia intelligere est ex fantasmatibus, diuersimode per hoc 20 se habent secundum intellectum. Ergo, saltim per accidens, secundum dispositionem regionis diuersificatur operatio intellectus, et ita politizare.

Dicendum quod situs regionis est ordinatio partium regionis in toto et in comparatione ad locum, sicut uniuersaliter situs est ordinatio partium in toto in comparatione ad locum. Locus autem regionis uel alicuius 25 ciuitatis potest accipi dupliciter: uel figura celi, que est locus communis, uel etiam ultimum terre, quod est locus proprius, et ideo situs ciuitatis est ordinatio eius in regione per comparationem ad figuram celi et ad locum terre. Dico ergo quod, saltim materialiter, disponitur ciuitas a dispositione loci. Quod patet: cum enim ciuitas comparationem habeat ad figuram celi, 30 et figura celi sit mutabilis et secundum motum suum diuersam dispositio-

8, 1 7 qualitatibus] qualitatis P 18 species] correxi ex infra, l. 54 27 et] figura celi fit mutabilis et secundum motum suum diuersificat add. sed postea del. per uacat superscr. P 12 Contra…hic] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.6-7, 1327b16-20 16 per…21 politizare] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “quamuis intellectus per se non communicet corpori in operatione sua, communicat tamen communicanti corpori, secundum Commentatorem libro De Anima: quicquid enim intelligit, in fantasmatibus sensibilibus intelligit, quia cum speculatur, necesse est simul fantasma aliquod speculari. Fantasmata autem in actu sensibilia sunt in actu, sicut dicitur 3º De anima; sensibile uero in actu et sensus in actu, sunt unum in actu; et ideo, secundum diuersam dispositionem sensus in actu, diuersimode disponitur intellectus ad intelligendum” (ed. Lanza, p. 482, ll. 19-26) 24 Locus…39 frigiditate] cf. supra, V, q. 6, ll. 17-32 2 9 ciuitas…39 frigiditate] in Scripto Petrus amplius disserit de figura caelesti; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “Dispositio autem celestis, per comparationem ad ea que sunt hic, duplex est. Vna communis, que attenditur secundum propinquitatem uel remotionem a uia solis, qui maxime mouet ista inferiora. Et, secundum hoc, quidam hic existentes sunt calidi, quidam frigidi, quidam temperati, et inclinantur ad ea ad que ista disponunt ... Alia autem est dispositio celestis in ordine ad ea que sunt hic, que attenditur secundum figuram stellarum erraticarum ad se inuicem et ad fixas et in ordine ad ea que sunt hic. Et ista dispositio uel ista figura continue alia et alia est aliquo modo, quamuis non sensibiliter hoc appareat, et respectu alterius et alterius loci alia et alia, ita quod, si respectu huius regionis sit nunc talis figura celestis, consequenter in alio tempore erit alia, et si respectu huius regionis sit talis, respectu alterius erit alia. Si igitur aliqua dispositio insit alicui ciuitati uel regioni ex tali figura celesti, durante figura, inerit dispositio illa naturaliter” (ed. Lanza, p. 485, ll. 100-104 et 110-118)

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nem habeat, influat in locum proprium ciuitatis. Contingit quod ulterius etiam diuersimode disponantur corpora ciuium propter diuersitatem figure celi, que est locus communis, mediante diuersificatione aeris et terre, que sunt locus proprius ciuitatis; locus enim 35 naturaliter influit locato et agit in eo dispositionem suam: sic ergo, ex diuersitate regionis in comparatione ad figuram celi, causatur noua et diuersa dispositio in ciuibus, saltim secundum materiam et corporaliter, ut in humiditate, siccitate, caliditate, frigiditate. Vlterius autem aduertendum quod politizare bene uel male est ab appetitu inclinante et ratione seu habitu determinante; horum autem utrumque ab intellectu est, et ideo ad dispositionem intellectus uariantur ista et, si non secundum actus perfectos uarientur, tamen secundum inclinationem uariantur, sicut etiam per accidens uariatur intellectus. Intellectus enim per se non mutatur nec diuersificatur propter uarietatem loci, et ideo habitus et actus perfectus politizandi, qui per se sunt ad aliquid, intellectu non diuersificantur. Tamen, quantum ad inclinationem, contingit quod diuersificetur politizare. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dictum est, diuersificatio loci in comparatione ad figuram celi immutat corpora hominum secundum dispositiones materiales: hiis autem diuersificatis, uariantur spiritus secundum uariationem complexionis et continentis, quod influit suam dispositionem locato; spiritibus autem uariatis, aliter disponitur organum sensitiuum, et ad hoc sequitur diuersificatio sensuum et specierum sensibilium; ad hoc autem ulterius sequitur uariatio intellectus, saltim per accidens. P 318va

40

45

50

55

Et ideo | sic continget ciues in aliud et aliud inclinari secundum habitudinem intellectus ad appetitum, secundum quod contingit politizare aliter et aliter, ita quod homines diuersimode disponantur ad politizandum ex dispositione regionis, non secundum actum perfectum uel habitum, sed 60 per accidens, secundum inclinationem ex mutatione corporum. 3 1 habeat] stet, etsi in cod. exp. P 3 9 humiditate siccitate] habitudine situate P 4 3 non…44 uariantur] de hac distinctione vide supra, I, q. 3, ll. 14-16 cum adn. 48 sicut…49 est] cf. supra, ll. 33-39 49 diuersificatio…55 accidens] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “Sensus autem in actu diuersimode disponitur secundum diuersitatem organi et specialiter spiritus, in subtilitate et grossitie, in quo primo uidentur sigillari forme sensibilium. Et ideo, secundum diuersitatem spiritus in grossitie et subtilitate et aliis huiusmodi, diuersimode disponitur intellectus ad intelligendum, ita ut, qui habent spiritus subtiles et claros, bene representatiuos formarum sensibilium, bene nati sunt intelligere; qui autem grossos et turbidos, praue” (ed. Lanza, p. 482, l. 26-p. 483, l. 33)

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Ad rationes dicendum quod homines non fiunt politizantes secundum habitum uel secundum actum perfectum a natura; fiunt tamen politizantes a natura quoad inclinationem. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º Ethicorum, quod uirtutes insunt nobis consuetudine et ratione aptis natis 65 tantum. Ad secundam dicendum quod dispositio regionis necessitatem imponit modo politizandi non secundum actum perfectum uel habitum, sed solum secundum inclinationem: hanc enim necessitat dispositio loci, licet non possit necessitare uoluntatem, a qua est actus perfectus politi70 zandi.

C ons e qu enter qu er itur u tru m illi qu i med i ant s ecu n du m lo ca si nt o p t ime p o l it i z ant e s Videtur quod non, quia ad optime politizandum exigitur animositas; sed medii secundum loca non sunt animosi; ergo ipsi non politizant 5 optime. Maior patet quia oportet optime politizantes esse animosos ad repellendum insultus hostium, ut pacem ducant. Minor probatur quia illi qui sunt in frigidis regionibus soli animosi sunt, propter multitudinem spirituum ex inclusione caloris generatam; sed isti medii non habent frigus circumstans ipsos, sed habent aerem temperatum; ergo non sunt animosi. 10

Item, ad optime politizandum requiritur rectitudo rationis, qua sciant preuidere finem et, ratiocinando, inuenire utilia in illum; sed medii non sunt habentes rectitudinem rationis nec uigentes intellectu, sed soli illi qui in calidis regionibus sunt uigentes ratione; ergo soli illi optime politizabunt, et non medii.

15

Item, si medii isti, ex eo quod mediant secundum loca, optime politizarent, et si ex natura, tunc semper optime politizarent, quod est falsum: nam multas recitauit PHILOSOPHUS tirannides et oligarchias illorum qui in Grecia; nam tales sunt medii secundum loca, ut ipse dicit. 6 5 tantum] tamen P 9, 1 5 ex] isto add. sed exp. P 6 4 uirtutes…65 tantum] Arist., Eth. Nic II.1, 1103a19 et 25-26 9 , 1 Consequenter…2 politizantes] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.6-7, 1327b16-20 1 7 multas…18 Grecia] de oligarchiis quae in Graecia cf. Arist., Pol. V.6, 1305a40-b22, 1305b35-1306a5 et 1306a35-b5; de tyrannidibus cf. Arist., Pol. III.14, 1285a29-38; V.6, 1305b35-1306a5; V.10, 1310b25-31; V.11, 1313a34b28; V.12, 1316a29-39

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Contra est PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod medii secundum dispositionem communem regionis 20 optime nati sunt politizare, sed tamen eosdem male politizare propter specialem aliquam dispositionem regionis uel propter malam consuetudinem. Primi ratio est quia ad recte politizandum, cum ponere sit agibile quoddam, necessario requiritur rectitudo prudentie, que recta ratio 25 agibilium, ut patet 6º Ethicorum. Nam oportet preuidere finem politie, et ex illo fine ratiocinari recte et consiliari de eis que sunt utilia ad illum finem, quod est opus prudentie, ut dicitur 6º Ethicorum. Et ideo, ad recte uel optime politizandum, necessaria est rectitudo prudentie. Vlterius autem in optime politizando oportet intendere ad ardua; ideo 30 requiritur necessario magnanimitas, ad quam disponit animositas; et ideo ad recte politizandum duo concurrunt, scilicet prudentia et animositas.

P 318vb

Nunc ita est, quod habitantes in regionibus frigidis, propter frigus circumstans, habent calorem naturalem inclusum et circumstatum a frigido exteriori. Calor autem inclusus, fortis existens, multos | generat 35

19 Contra…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.7, 1327b23-38 25 prudentie…26 agibilium] Auct. 2 7 ex…28 prudentie] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI (112), p. 240; Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b20-21 Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.7, 1142b31-33: “si utique prudencium bene consiliari, eubulia erit utique rectitudo que secundum conferens ad finem, cuius prudencia vera suspicacio est” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 487, l. 28-p. 488, l. 2); cf. etiam VI.1, 1139a29-33 et 35-36; VI.4, 1140a28-30; VI.9, 1144a7-9; VI.10, 1145a4- 6 3 1 magnanimitas…animositas] in Aristotelis descriptione magnanimitatis, nulla mentio invenitur de animositate; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1123a341125a35. Probabiliter Petrus hoc sumit ex affirmatione illa Aristotelis ubi magnanimus dicitur ille qui magna pericula amat; cf. supra, II, q. 7, ll. 21-22 (cum adn.), ubi Petrus dicit 33 Nunc…48 principari] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: quod magnamini est non timere “Habitantes autem in frigidis, frigiditate extrinseca poros concludente, fortificatur calidum interius: et sunt fortis digestionis et pluri indigent cibo; spiritus autem multos habent, propter multitudinem calidi, grossos tamen, propter grossitiem et multitudinem alimenti et propter exalationem minorem; et ideo, propter habundantiam caliditatis et sanguinis, animosi sunt, propter grossitiem autem spirituum et turbulentiam, minus intellectiui ... habitantes in regionibus frigidis et circa Europam, que est regio protensa ad Aquilonem in parte remota a uia solis, sunt naturaliter animosi propter habundantiam sanguinis et caliditatis ... in intellectu ... inueniuntur deficientes magis. Et ideo, quia animosi sunt et potentes, libere uiuunt in regionibus propriis, potentes et audentes repellere insultus insurgentium; non sunt autem bene nati politizare nec principari uicinis, propter defectum intellectus et prudentie, que requiruntur ad bene politizandum et principandum recte” (ed. Lanza, p. 483, ll. 40- 46 et 49-57) | habitantes…36 animositatem] cf. Pseudo-Arist., Probl. XIV.8, 909b9-10, 12-13; XIV.9, 909b28-33; XIV.15, 910a26-33; XIV.16, 910a38-910b8

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spiritus circa cor qui, moti uehementer, disponunt ad animositatem: faciunt enim representari fantasmata sub ymagine uincibili, et ideo tales ualde animosi et audaces sunt. Sed ex eadem causa deficiunt intellectu et ratione; nam, propter multitudinem caloris, spiritus multiplicantur, ex 40 repercussione calidi non potentis exalare, et ideo reflectitur calidum et ingrossantur spiritus et uehementer mouentur, ita quod, propter motum, non possunt figi ymagines in organo fantasie, sed, propter ingrossationem, non facile recepti sunt nec munde representatiui ymaginum. Et ideo tales non bene possunt preuidere rectum finem uel consiliari bene de agibilibus 45 in finem, et ideo isti, deficientes sic in prudentia, non bene possunt politizare sibi nec aliis, tum quia nec finem preuidere nec ea que in finem preconsiliari possunt, tum quia, ex defectu rationis, animositatem inordinatam habent, que nec eos aliis inter se sinit principari. Illi autem qui sunt in calidis regionibus directe in conuerso se habent. 50 Calidum enim circumstans ipsos aperit poros et facit calidum et spiritus eorum exalare, et ideo etiam paucos habent spiritus et modicum de sanguine et parum de calore, quod facit eis quodlibet apparere sub ymagine inuincibili. Et ideo isti timidi ualde sunt propter eandem autem causam: spiritus paucos et ualde subtiles habent et non ingrossatos, et ideo mundos 55 et bene mobiles, propter quod rationem non impeditam habent; unde et finem preuidere et uias in finem bene inuenire possunt, unde et subtilitates et astutias multas etiam inueniunt, et doli machinatores sunt quando se ad malum uertunt. Et ideo, quoad hoc quod bene finem preuident et uiarum

3 6 uehementer] correxi ex infra, l. 41: et uehementes P 5 5 et1] directe add. P | bene mobiles] inv. P | quod] et add. sed exp. P 4 9 Illi…62 optime] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “Habitantes autem in regionibus calidis, caliditate regionis poros aperiente, exalat humidum, trahens secum calidum intrinsecum, et ideo sunt pauci sanguinis et caliditatis; spiritus autem, et si paucos habeant, claros tamen et mundos habent, et ideo bene intellectiui sunt ... Habitantes autem in regionibus calidis et circa Asiam, que est regio protensa ad meridiem prope uiam solis, bene intellectiui sunt et artificiosi multum secundum animam, propter subtilitatem et munditiam spirituum in eis, causa predicta; tamen timidi et sine animositate sunt, propter defectum sanguinis et caliditatis naturalis, et ideo subiecti sunt et seruiunt aliis, non audentes nec potentes repellere debellantes, nisi forte quandoque per fraudem et dolum, excogitata per intellectum, quem habent subtilem” (ed. Lanza, p. 483, ll. 37- 40 et 57-p. 484, l. 64); cf. Albertum, Pol. VII.5: “propter circumstans frigidum … et ideo tales gentes sunt plenae animositate, et de intellectu parum habent. Cujus ratio est, quia circumstans frigidum, quod ad interiora reprimit calorem, nimis fortificat calidum, et ignit et inspissat spiritum animalem, et facit calorem circa cor, et accendit sanguinem, et facit evaporationem fellis … habitantes in istis regionibus liberi quidem perseverant et invincibiles” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 663) 5 0 Calidum…51 exalare] cf. Pseudo-Arist., Probl. XIV.16, 910b3- 8

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subtiles inuentores sunt, de facili aliis principarentur, sed deficiunt animo60 sitate. Et ideo, secundum communem dispositionem regionis, nec isti nec illi principari possunt optime. Ergo relinquitur quod medii secundum regionem optime omnium politizare possunt, quia, eo ipso quod medii sunt, participant rationem utriusque extremi per abnegationem superhabundantie. Et ideo rationem competentem minus dolosam habent, nec animosita- 65 tem effrenatam habent, propter quod optime ualent principari, habentes potentiam utramque; cuius causa ex predictis de facili inuenitur. Sic ergo patet quod medii, quantum est de ratione regionis communi, scilicet inquantum medii, sic optime politizare possunt.

P 319ra

Si tamen sit aliqua dispositio regionis particularis, ut forte si ciuitas 70 aliqua in illa media regione sit situata in ualle profunda, propter repercussionem radiorum uel etiam ex propinquitate maris potest ibi aer nimis calefieri, et tunc illi accedent ad proprietatem eorum qui in calidis regionibus sunt. Similiter intellige etiam oppositum: in calidis enim regionibus, si ciuitas sit sita in alto monte, potest frigidum, quod propter montem est, 75 temperare calidum commune regionis et tunc, propter dispositionem particularem, erunt medio modo se habentes. Sic etiam, si in frigidis regionibus aliqua ciuitas sit omnino in ualle uel iuxta mare, temperabitur frigidus | regionis calore maris uel ex repercussione radiorum, et illi iterum accedent ad rationem mediorum. Sed quod prius dictum est, intelligen- 80 dum est secundum dispositionem communem regionis.

5 9 principarentur] preciparentur P 65 competentem] non add. P 6 6 habentes] rationem add. sed exp. P 73 calidis] frigidis P 7 8 ciuitas] ciuitatis P 8 0 mediorum] correxi ex quo supra, ll. 62-63 et 68-69: mediarum P 7 0 Si…81 regionis] cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.5: “Vlterius etiam intelligendum est quod dispositio ciuitatis uel regionis naturalis non tantum consideratur ex figura celesti absolute, sed etiam ex dispositione partium regionis uel ciuitatis secundum habitudinem quam habet ad montes uel mare uel loca paludosa uel munda. Virtus enim figure celestis non recipitur in contento nisi mediante continente proximo. Et secundum hoc potest contingere quod, quamuis aliqua ciuitas uel regio sit frigida naturaliter et inclinetur ad ea ad que disponit frigidum quantum est ex dispositione figure celestis communis, tamen secundum dispositionem regionis per comparationem ad montes uel mare contingit eam esse calidam excellenter aut etiam temperatam, uel econtrario. Ex quo contingit quod, quamuis existentes in aliqua regione non inclinentur ad politizandum bene ex figura celesti communi, tamen, ex speciali dispositione ipsius, hoc potest ei contingere” (ed. Lanza, p. 485, ll. 123-135); cf. Albertum, Pol. VII.5: “propter multum calorem climatis sui corpora habent evanida, spiritu naturali destituta, tenues formas intellectivas optime repraesentantes: propter quod sunt intellectivi et artificiosi, timidi et dolosi” (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 663)

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Ad rationes dicendum per antedicta, quia illi in frigidis regionibus non habent animositatem moderatam et regulatam ratione. De hac autem intelligitur maior rationis. 85

Ad secundam eodem modo, quia qui in calidis rationem subtilem habent, non tamen habent auxilium animositatis. Sic autem intelligenda est maior, quia rectitudo rationis non sola quocumque modo exigitur ad politizandum, sed ratio animositate fulcita.

Ad tertiam dicendum quod politizare optime contingit mediis secundum naturam loci: politizare – inquam – secundum inclinationem, non secundum actum perfectum, sicut prius dictum est. Et ideo non oportet quod semper actu optime politizent, sed quod semper inclinent ad optime politizandum; et hoc uerum est, sicut dictum est quantum ad dispositionem communem regionis medie inquantum huiusmodi, et 95 cetera.

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Q u e r i tu r u t r u m c i u i t a s s i t o b i e c t u m i n p o l i t i c a Arguitur quod sic, quoniam de ciuitate et de suis partibus et passionibus determinatur in scientia politice; quare et cetera. 5

Item, ciuitas primo occurrit intellectui in politice; tale autem est obiectum in scientia; quare et cetera. Item, quecumque hic considerantur, per attributionem considerantur. Item, EUSTRATIUS super 1um Ethicorum dicit hoc; ergo et cetera.

Oppositum arguitur: sicut se habet homo ad monosticam, ita ciuitas ad 10 politicam; sed homo non est subiectum ad monosticam; quare et cetera.

Dico quod ciuitas non est subiectum. Circa quod notandum quod proprie subiectum dicitur in scientia quod primo occurrit in scientia, et sub cuius ratione omnia alia , et similiter in intellectu et in omnibus aliis sensibus potentiis. 15

20

Item, istud idem patet ex alio, quoniam de subiecto oportet precognoscere quid est et quia est, et hec tota cognitio incomplexi. Et ideo subiectum in scientia est quod primo cognoscitur; alia autem in quibus istud reperitur sunt materia scientie et non subiectum, sicut uacuum infinitum in scientia naturali, et subiectum ens mobile. Secundo notandum est quod primum obiectum intellectus practici est bonum agibile.

Tertio notandum est quod idem est obiectum potentie et habitus perficientis istam potentiam, quoniam potentia non refertur ad obiectum 25 nisi mediante habitu. Et ideo, cum ista scientia sit perfectio intellectus

1, 1 Queritur] in marg sup. add. questio politicorum supra primum B 1 3 cognoscuntur] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 1, ll. 29-31 14 sensibus] scientiis B 16 rationem…17 principii] suppl. ex QQ. I, q. 2, ll. 49-52 et ex textibus in apparatu ibi allegatis 1, 8 Eustratius…hoc] Eustratius, In I Arist. Mor. Prologus (ed. Mercken, p. 3, l. 53) 15 de…16 est2] Auct. Arist., An. Post. I (5), p. 311; Arist., An. Post. I.1, 71a11-16; I.10, 76a31-36

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practici, quia est practica, et obiectum intellectus practici sit bonum agibile ciuile, oportet subiectum in ista scientia. Item, bonum agibile ciuile est quod primo occurrit intellectui in ista scientia, et ideo subiectum. Sed quia bonum ciuile reperitur in 30 ciuitate et partibus ciuitatis, ideo ista sunt materia huius scientie et non subiectum.

Ad argumenta patet solutio. Ad primum dico quod illud de quo et de quibus partibus consideratur in scientia et quod primo occurrit intellectui est subiectum in scientia; sed hoc est bonum agibile ciuile, et per eius 35 rationem consideratur ciuitas. Per idem ad aliud, quoniam ciuitas non considerat, nec hec occurrit intellectui nisi ratione boni agibilis ciuilis. Ad tertium per idem patet. Ad dictum Eustratii, dico quod ipse accipit subiectum pro materia. 40 < Q UE S T I O 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i s t a s c i e n t i a s i t p r a c t i c a Arguitur quod non, quia est de hiis que sunt a natura; et talis scientia non est practica; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia est de ciuitate, que est secundum naturam, ut dicitur in prohemio huius; ergo et cetera. Item, ubi consideratur ueritas non est scientia practica; hic consi- 5 deratur ueritas; quare et cetera. Minor patet quia hic consideratur quid est ciuitas. Oppositum arguo: finis huius scientie est operatio, et talis est practica; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod est practica. Sed notandum quod differentia per se 10 obiecti causat differentiam scientie. Nunc autem uerum potest considerari in scientia secundum quod uerum et in ordine ad intellectum, et est 26 primum] suppl. ex ll. 21 et 29. Vide etiam loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 1, ll. 26-34 3 4 quod] quid B 2, 6 quid] quod B 12 ad] iter. B 2, 3 ciuitate…4 naturam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30 et 1253a2

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subiectum in scientiis speculatiuis; alio modo consideratur uerum non secundum se, sed in ordine ad opus: sic subiectum in scientiis practi15 cis. Vnde in hoc conueniunt omnes scientie, quod considerant uerum. Sed que considerat uerum in ordine ad opus est practica; ista autem est talis; quare et cetera. Item, subiectum huius scientie est bonum agibile; tale autem est obiectum intellectus practici; quare ista scientia est practica.

20

Ad argumenta. Ad primum dico quod aliquid dicitur esse a natura quia natura inclinat ad hoc, et sic ciuitas est a natura; alio modo quia est in actu perfecto a natura, et sic ciuitas non est a natura, sed per artem. Ad aliud dico quod illa scientia que considerat uerum absolute est speculatiua; sed ista considerat uerum in ordine ad opus; quare et cetera.

C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m i s t a s c i e n t i a s i t p r i n c i p a l i s s i m a Arguitur quod sic: que ordinat alias est principalissima et que utitur aliis ad finem suum; hec est talis, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; quare et cetera.

5

Item, illa est principalissima que considerat bonum principalissimum; hec est huiusmodi, quia bonum hominis ut est pars ciuitatis est melius bonum quam bonum eius ut est pars unius ; quare et cetera. Oppositum arguitur: speculatiue sunt nobiliores quam practice.

10

Quod patet primo per rationem principiorum, quoniam illa scientia que considerat principium ex quo pendet principium alterius est principalior. Sed principia practice pendent principiis speculatiue, quoniam principium intellectus practici est bonum agibile, quod est obiectum uoluntatis; modo uoluntas non fertur in illo nisi determinetur ab intellectu 19 practica] politica B 2 0 primum] quod add. B 2 3 quod] quia B 2 4 uerum] absolute est speculatiua add. sed exp. B 3 ,2 sic] sicut B 10 principiorum] principatum B 1 2 practice] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 4, ll. 30-31: pratica B 14 uoluntatis] ciuitatis B | illo] illa B 3 ,2 que1…3 talis] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a27-b2

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uel ratione, cuius obiectum est uerum. Quare rectitudo primi principii 15 scientie practice est ex rectitudine uoluntatis, uoluntas autem rectitudo uoluntatis est | ex ratione uel intellectu, quoniam per intellectum ostenditur sibi bonum, quod est finis uoluntatis; quare patet quod potior est speculatiua quam practica. Iterum, illa est principalior que finem principaliorem considerat: 20 speculatiua est talis, quoniam finis practici ordinatur ad finem speculatiui, ut PHILOSOPHUS uult multis locis. Sed inter practicas ista est principalior que considerat bonum ciuile, ad quod ordinatur bonum hominis et bonum domus; quare et cetera. Et hoc est quod 25 tangitur prohemio Ethicorum.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum: illa scientia que ordinat alias et eis precipit quantum ad usum et quantum ad opus, operandi siue sciendi, est principalior: sed hec est methaphisica. Sed non oportet de illa que precipit alii tantum quantum ad usum; sic autem ista precipit istis aliis 22 inter] intus B 26 que] considerat add. sed del. B | alias] alios B 27 quantum1] et add. B 21 finis…22 speculatiui] re vera Aristoteles hoc non asserit. Quod finis intellectus practici, id est felicitas practica, sit in ordine ad finem speculativi, clarius asseritur in Michaelis Ephesii In Arist. Mor. X cap. 8, ad 1177a12 (ed. Mercken, p. 408, ll. 54- 65 et p. 409, ll. 85-94); cf. praecipue ubi hoc affirmat: “Virtutis quidem enim mensura et finis felicitas politica, politicae autem felicitatis speculativa felicitas” (ibid., p. 409, ll. 88-90) 24 Et…25 Ethicorum] cf. supra, ll. 2-3 2 9 sic…32 subiecto quod hic asseritur, et praesertim verba ista, “quod quis non audiat talem scientiam”, duos locos ex Aristotelis Ethica miscere videntur: Arist., Eth. Nic. I.1, 1094a28-b1, 4- 6 et I.1, 1095a2- 4: in altero loco enim asseritur quod politicae est statuere quales scientiae addiscendae sint in civitate (“quales unumquemque addiscere et usquequo”, AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 376, l. 7), in altero autem quod iuvenes auditores politicae esse non debent. Ista mixtio, quae probabiliter vicissim mixtionem consequitur inter verba ‘addiscere’ et ‘audire’, saepius invenitur in commentariis ex Facultate Artium; cf., e.g., Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 11: “legislator debet ordinare quales scientie debent audiri in ciuitate” (ed. Costa, p. 198, ll. 1-2); cf. etiam adn. ad loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 4, ll. 5-7. Quod autem politica praecipiat aliis scientiis quantum ad usum, sed non quantum ad modum, desumptum videtur esse ex Thomae Sent. Eth. I.2: “Nam practicae scientiae praecipit politica et quantum ad usum eius, ut scilicet operetur vel non operetur, et quantum ad determinationem actus ... Sed scientiae speculativae praecipit civilis solum quantum ad usum, non autem quantum ad determinationem operis; ordinat enim politica quod aliqui doceant vel addiscant geometriam, huiusmodi enim actus in quantum sunt voluntarii pertinent ad materiam moralem et sunt ordinabiles ad finem humanae vitae; non autem praecipit politicus geometrae quid de triangulo concludat, hoc enim non subiacet humanae voluntati nec est ordinabile humanae vitae, sed dependet ex ipsa rerum ratione” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 9, ll. 128-132 et 134-144). Idem argumentum etiam invenitur in aliis commentariis in Politicam; cf. Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 2: “Ad rationes, cum dicitur ‘illa scientia que precipit’ et cetera, dico quod precipit mecanicis, non tamen speculatiuis quantum ad suam operationem: non enim precipit politica quod geometer prohibeat triangulum habere tres uel non habere, et sic de aliis; bene tamen ordinat qui

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speculatiuis, scilicet quantum ad usum, ut quod quis non audiat talem scientiam, sed non precipit ei quantum ad modum, ut quod sic demonstret passionem de tali subiecto.

Ad illud: quod considerat bonum principalissimum secundum quod habet ordinem ad opus et non considerat bonum principalissimum 35 simpliciter non est principalior; sic autem est de politica. Vnde metaphisica bonum principalissimum simpliciter considerat, et ideo est principalissima.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m o m n i s c o m m u n i t a s hu m a n a s i t i n s t i t u t a p r o p t e r b o n um Arguitur quod non, quoniam malum non est institutum propter bonum, quoniam oppositum non est causa oppositi; sed aliqua est commu5 nicatio mala; quare et cetera. Item, aliqua est communicatio instituta contra rectam rationem, sicut communitas tirannidis; quare et cetera. Oppositum arguitur: illud ad cuius institutionem inclinat natura est propter bonum, quoniam natura ordinatur tali ordinate, que non decipitur; 10 sed natura inclinat ad institutionem communitatis; quare et cetera.

Dico quod omne agens agit propter finem: de natura ostendit PHILOSO2º Phisicorum; de agente per intellectum patet , quoniam tale agens agit per rationem, que est in intellectu, que ratio

PHUS

3 3 bonum] totum B 4, 2 propter] prope B 9 ordinatur] a add. B 12 2º Metaphisicorum] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 5, l. 21 debeant audire et qui non” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 1ra); cf. etiam Anonymum Vaticanum, QQ. Pol. I, q. 2: “Ad rationes. Ad primam ... sed ista politica quantum ad usum precipit aliis scientiis, non quantum ad determinationem operis, quoniam non precipit geometre quod habere tres debet demonstrari de triangulo per angulum extrinsecum et cetera, sed bene precipit per quantum tempus debet audire geometram. Etiam quantum ad habitum non precipit aliis scientiis, quia habitus est ex principiis et premissis, sed quantum ad usum precipit aliis” (ms. Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030, f. 14vb) 4 ,1 Consequenter…2 bonum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a1-2 4 oppositum…oppositi] Auct. Arist., Meteor. IV (20), p. 173; Arist., Meteor. IV.7, 384b2-3; Auct. Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II (42), p. 170; Arist., De Gen. et Corr. II.10, 336a30-31 11 omne…natura] Arist., Phys. II.5, 196b17-22 12 de…14 opposita] Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b14-16; cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. II (50), p. 119

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indeterminata est ad opposita, et ideo oportet quod determinetur per uoluntatem. Sed uoluntas non determinat intellectum nisi propter hoc 15 quod tendit in aliam partem sicut in bonum, et ita patet quod agens per intellectum agit propter bonum. Secundo notandum est quod idem est finis agentis et finis rei facte, quoniam primum in intentione est ultimum in executione; tale autem est principium rei facte uel eius perfectio; quare et cetera. 20 Tertio notandum est quod omnis communitas humana est a natura inclinante et ab intellectu perficiente: cum igitur utrumque horum agat propter finem, quod idem est quod bonum, manifestum est quod omnis communitas est instituta propter bonum. Sed non differt utrum sit bonum apparens siue bonum uerum, unde communitas secundum rectam ratio- 25 nem instituta est propter bonum secundum ueritatem, et illa que est instituta a ratione non recta est propter bonum apparens.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum: “unum contrarium non est causa alterius contrarii”, dico quod uerum est per se, tamen per accidens nichil prohibet. Sic est in proposito: non propter bonum 30 apparens, quod est bonum non per se, sed per accidens. Ad aliud dico quod illud quod est a ratione non recta bene est bonum apparens, licet non sit bonum secundum ueritatem. < Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i t a s s i t i n s t i t u t a g r at i a b o ni p rin c ip al i ssim i Arguitur quod non, quia finis ciuitatis est felicitas practica; sed excellentior est felicitas speculatiua; ergo et cetera. Item, nobilior est principatus regnatiuus quam politicus; ergo finis 5 est principalior; quare et cetera.

18 rei] dei B 20 rei] tale add. sed exp. B 22 utrumque] utramque B 25 rationem] rectam est add. B 18 idem…facte] cf. Arist., Phys. II.7, 198a24-27; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (85), p. 147 19 primum…executione] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. III (49), p. 236; Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112b23-24 tale…20 perfectio] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (122), p. 125; Arist., Metaph. V.2, 1013b26 5 ,1 Consequenter…2 principalissimi] cf. Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a4-7

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Oppositum arguitur, quoniam dicit ARISTOTELES, et est sua ratio, quod finis communitatis que continet omnes alias communitates complectitur omnes fines aliarum communitatum; modo ciuitas continet omnes alias 10 communitates; ergo et cetera.

Dico quod communitas ciuilis dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod comprehendit omnes politias, ut regnum, aristocratiam, et sic de aliis; alio modo proprie, scilicet quod diuiditur contra istas politias. Primo modo procedit questio, quia sic loquitur Philosophus de 15 communitate ciuili: nam, secundum quod diuiditur contra regnum, sic non complectitur omnes, sed secundum quod non diuiditur contra alias, sic est gratia boni principalissimi. Quod patet, quoniam agens et finis proportionantur, cum sint cause sibi inuicem, et similiter agens et factum, et ideo oportet factum et finem esse proportionata. Et ideo, sicut se habet commu20 nitas ad communitatem, et finis ad finem: si ergo communitas ciuilis comprehendat omnem communitatem, ut extenso nomine accipitur, ergo finis eius omnes fines aliarum; sed talis | finis, qui omnes B 60va alios comprehendit, est bonum principalissimum; quare et cetera. 25

Non tamen dico quod sit gratia boni principalissimi secundum ueritatem, sed aliqua est propter bonum quod uidetur principalissimum; unde communitas ciuilis instituta secundum rectam rationem est gratia boni principalissimi secundum ueritatem, sed instituta preter rectam rationem est propter bonum principalissimum secundum apparentiam.

Sed bonum principalissimum uno modo est bonum in genere, alio 30 modo supra bonum principalissimum ciuitatis. In genere est felicitas practica, que est in operatione uirtutis perfectissime politice seu practice, et hec prudentia, que omnes alias habet ordinare, sicut iustitiam et liberalitatem, et sic de aliis. Et si hec insunt, necessarium est esse ea que sunt ad uitam, et ideo felicitas practica uel politica est operatio recta cum 35 sufficientia eorum que ad uitam, et hoc est bonum principalissimum in genere. Sed hec felicitas est gratia felicitatis speculatiue, que est bonum principalissimum simpliciter et extra genus; et ideo sequitur quod ciuitas est gratia boni principalissimi quod est felicitas speculatiua.

5, 1 2 aristocratiam] scrips. arumstochiam B 18 sibi] correxi ex fonte allata: que B 33 si] sic B 8 finis…9 communitatum] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a4-7 17 agens…18 inuicem] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9; Auct. Arist., Phys. II (73), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195b21-28. Vide etiam adn. ad QQ. I, q. 6, ll. 25-26

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Ad rationes patet, unde ad primam patet quoniam ciuitas est gratia felicitatis speculatiue; quare et cetera. Vel dicendum quod felicitas 40 practica est bonum principalissimum in genere. Ad secundam dicendum est similiter. < Q UE S T I O 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m co m b i n a t i o m a r i s e t f e m i n e s i t n a tu r a l i s Arguitur quod non, quia illud quod est a uoluntate et electione non est a natura; talis combinatio est huiusmodi; quare et cetera. Iterum, quod est a natura est in omnibus habentibus illam naturam; sed non omnes homines uidemus commisceri, nec ad hoc inclinari; 5 ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit hic ARISTOTELES, unde dicit quod necessarium est hominem et feminam commisceri, non ex electione, sed ex natura.

Dico quod corruptibilia non possunt semper remanere eadem numero, sed tantum eadem specie. Nunc autem naturaliter appetunt esse, et ideo 10 appetunt saluari in suo simili, quare perfecta et que non generantur per putrefactionem naturaliter appetunt generare sibi simile, ut aliqualiter maneant. Hoc patet, quoniam nulla generatio potest esse sine commixtione actiui et passiui, et ideo omnia uiuentia appetunt commixtionem actiui et passiui; sed in quibus idem subiectum continet actiuum et 15 passiuum, ut in plantis; in quibusdam autem sunt separata, ut in animalibus perfectis, ita quod actiuum dicitur masculus, passiuum femella. Et ideo, si omnia appetunt conseruationem, et hoc non est sine generatione et commixtione, manifestum est quod talis commixtio est naturalis. Sed notandum quod uiuentia non tantum intendunt generationem sibi 20 similis, sed nutritionem et perfectionem. Nunc autem in 6, 9 corruptibilia] correxi ex fonte allata: equalia B 12 sibi] omni B 15 subiectum] in subiecto sed in exp. B 6, 1 Consequenter…naturalis] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a26-30 7 Oppositum…8 natura] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a26-30 9 corruptibilia…10 specie] Auct. Arist., De An. II (58), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415b3-7 1 0 naturaliter…13 maneant] Auct. Arist., De An. II (57), p. 179; Arist., De An. II.4, 415a26-b1

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aliquibus femina sufficit ad nutritionem fetus, et in talibus non requiritur quod commorentur simul, nec ad hoc inclinat natura; in aliis uero non sufficit femella ad nutritionem, et in talibus natura non tantum inclinat ad commixtionem, sed ad commansionem cum hoc. Et ideo, cum homo sit perfectum animal, dico quod natura inclinat ad generationem et perfectionem fetus, et hoc quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam, quod est quantum ad uirtutes morales et intellectuales. Et hoc indiget, primo, tempore, et ideo natura inclinat ad combinationem et commansionem per multum tempus. Vnde post uult PHILOSOPHUS quod tempus coniunctionis uiri et mulieris est uiri circa annum tricesimum , femine circa decimum octauum: tunc autem utrumque est in perfecto esse; et postea requiritur tantum tempus ad hoc quod ducatur fetus ad esse perfectum, et ideo requiritur quod maneant simul per tantum tempus uel autem plus, et in tanto tempore ad generandum redduntur impotentes. Et ideo secundum EUSTRATIUM, supra Ethicorum, uir et femina inclinantur ad commorandum non per paruum tempus, sed per tantum quod redduntur impotentes ad generandum, et hoc est per totam uitam. Patet ergo quod a natura inclinante combinatio maris et femelle, id est uiri et mulieris commansio. Sed quod sit secundum talem usum uel talem, et in tali tempore, et sic de aliis circumstantiis, est a ratione.

Per hoc patet ad primum argumentum, quoniam illo modo quo est a natura non est ab electione. Vnde, quantum ad inclinationem naturalem, non est ex electione. 2 8 primo] et add. B 3 1 uiri2] anni B | septimum] suppl. ex fonte allata et loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 7, l. 99 3 4 tantum] tanta B | plus] post B 35 quod] suppl. ex infra, ll. 37-38 36 8um] suppl. ex fonte allata 40 usum] scrips. utum B 2 5 Et…28 intellectuales] sic valde similiter in: Pseudo-Aspasius (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12: “Et cum homo sit animal rationale, ratio autem non perversa intendit optimum, non solum intendit generans homo procreare prolem, sed et procreatam educare et educando provehere usque ad perfectionem, non solum in bonis corporis sed et in bonis animae, quae sunt virtutes et scientiae” (ed. Mercken, p. 183, ll. 70-74) 3 0 tempus2…32 esse] 3 6 uir…38 uitam] cf. Arist., Pol. VII.16, 1335a28-29; Auct. Arist., Pol. VII (127), p. 261 Pseudo-Aspasium (Robertus Grosseteste), Arist. Mor. VIII cap. 12: “Non est autem solus vir generans neque sola mulier, sed ambo simul sunt unum generans. Oportet igitur quod ambo simul intendant una communi intentione prolis procreationemet educationem et provectionem usque ad perfectum ... Non enim esse potest rationalis generantis intentio recta, nisi utrique generantium in vitam consenserint individuam” (ed. Mercken, p. 183, ll. 74-77, 79-p. 184, l. 81). Quod simul commorari debeant per tantum quod redduntur impotentes ad generandum, potius asseritur in Petri Scripto; cf. textum in adn. ad loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 7, ll. 103-108 allatum

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Ad aliud dico quod illud quod est a natura non est uniuersaliter in 45 omnibus, quoniam non est agens de necessitate semper, se in pluribus. Vel dicendum quod omnes naturaliter ad hoc inclinat, sed aliqui per rationem motum impediunt.| < Q UE S T I O 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m mu l i e r s i t n a t u r a s e r u a Arguitur quod sic, quoniam naturaliter est subiecta uiro; et tale uidetur naturaliter seruum; quare et cetera. Item, dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS quod seruus est natura qui non potest preuidere mente; mulier est huiusmodi, quoniam consilium inualidum habet, ut hic dicit PHILOSOPHUS, 2º huius et 1º; quare et cetera.

5

Oppositum uult PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Dicendum quod non, quoniam dominus dicitur natura qui potest mente preuidere que expediunt saluti et inuenire uias ea querendi, licet deficiat uirtus exequendi. Et ideo ille dicitur naturaliter seruus qui habet robur exequendi et non mente preuidere; et ideo, ad hoc quod aliquis sit naturaliter seruus, requiritur quod habeat robur corporale.

10

Mulier autem ex naturali sua complexione est frigida et humida multum, et hoc impedit operationes sensus et intellectus; et ideo possunt mente preuidere, propter quod querunt semper consilium 15 aliunde, et iste defectus est causa multorum accidentium que sunt in eis. Quia igitur deficit ratione et aliqualiter attingit ad rationem, nata est obedire rationi; quia tamen, propter eius frigiditatem, deficit a uirtute exequendi – ad minus in difficilibus –, que requiritur ad hoc quod aliquis sit natura seruus, ideo mulier non est naturaliter serua. Nec ualet si 20 in facilibus potest exequi. Hic enim obuiat ratio PHILOSOPHI, quoniam natura non utitur uno organo ad plura, cum unum impediatur ab alio: sic 4 6 semper] seu per B 7 ,1 1 preuidere] preuideri B 1 5 preuidere] preuideri B 22 sic] sicut B 7 , 1 Consequenter…serua] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a34-b1 4 seruus…5 mente] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a30-34; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, ll. 206-209) 5 mulier…6 habet] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1269b21-23: “... in mulieribus autem neglexit: vivunt enim voluptuose ad omnem intemperantiam et deliciose” (ed. Susemihl, p. 117, ll. 7- 8); Auct. Arist., Pol. I (30), p. 254; Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12-13 7 Oppositum…littera] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252a34-b5 2 2 natura…23 ordinatur] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (2), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b1-5

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enim optime fit unumquodque, cum unum ad unum ordinatur; nunc autem mulier ordinatur ad generationem et nutritionem fetus, que tamen per opera seruilia impediuntur, sicut patet in conceptione et post; et ideo contra naturam est ipsam esse seruam et dominam.

Ad argumentum primum patet solutio, quoniam plus requiritur ad hoc quod aliquis naturaliter seruus quam sit subiectus.

Et ad hoc dico quod seruus est qui non potest mente preuidere, et 30 cum hoc potest exequi que dominus potest preuidere; mulier autem non sic potest exequi in difficilibus; quare non ualet.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m b a r b a r i s i n t n a tu r a l i te r s e r u i Arguitur quod non, quia qui deficit a lingua alterius dicitur barbarus; talis autem non est seruus; quare et cetera. 5

Item, ille qui non uult subesse legi alterius dicitur esse barbarus; talis non est seruus natura; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit : dicit enim quod idem est barbarus et natura seruus.

Dico quod barbarus dicitur, APOSTOLUS, ille qui non communicat cum aliquo in lingua uel litteris; talis autem barbarus est secun8, 8 ille] praem. aliquem B 8, 1 Consequenter…serui] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a28-36 6 dicit2…7 seruus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b7-9: “dicunt poetae, ‘barbaris quidem Graecos principari congrue’, tamquam sit idem natura barbarum et servum” (ed. Susemihl, p. 4, ll. 8-10) 8 barbarus…9 litteris] cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.1/a: “Dicunt enim quidam omnem hominem barbarum esse ei qui linguam eius non intelligit; unde et Apostolus dicit: ‘si nesciero uirtutem uocis, ero ei cui loquar barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus’” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, ll. 264-268). Thomas hic significat Epistolam Pauli ad I Cor. XIV.11 | barbarus…15 preuidere] haec distinctio inter barbarum secundum quid et barbarum simpliciter desumpta videtur esse ex Thomae Sent. Pol. I.1/a: “Et quidem omnia aliqualiter ad ueritatem accedunt. In nomine enim barbari extraneum aliquid intelligitur. Potest enim aliquis homo extraneus dici uel simpliciter, uel quoad aliquem. Simpliciter quidem extraneus uidetur ab humano genere, qui deficit ratione secundum quam homo dicitur: et ideo simpliciter barbari nominantur illi qui ratione deficiunt ... maxime autem homines nati sunt sibi communicare per sermonem, et secundum hoc illi qui suum inuicem sermonem non intelligunt barbari ad seipsos dici possunt. Philosophus autem loquitur hic de his qui sunt simpliciter barbari” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A74, l. 274-p. A75, ll. 282 et 296-301)

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dum quid. Quicumque et talis non est seruus natura, quoniam ali- 10 quando talis potest mente preuidere. Alius autem dicitur barbarus quia deficit a ratione, unde per hoc est extraneus ab homine secundum quod homo, quia homo debet uigere ratione. Et talis dicitur barbarus simpliciter et est natura seruus, si ita sit quod corpore possit exequi illa que alius potest mente preuidere. Et inter 15 tales est iustum bellum; unde natura, dicimus, potest per bellum tales sibi subici et iuste, secundum PHILOSOPHUM. Patet ergo quod barbarus simpliciter est natura seruus, non tamen barbarus secundum quid.

Argumenta procedunt suis uiis. < Q UE S T I O 9 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i t a s s i t s e c u n d u m n a tu r a m Arguitur quod non, quia est ex domibus; domus autem sunt ab arte; quare et cetera. Item, ciuitas ex electione et uoluntate hominum; quare et 5 cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera, eo quod ciuitas est a natura. 10 quid] quod B 1 7 quod…18 simpliciter] iter. B 1 8 quid] quod B 15 Et…16 bellum1] scilicet inter istum, qui potest corpore exequi, et alium qui potest mente preuidere | Et…18 quid] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a21-29, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.4, ubi plane asseritur quod contra barbaros est iustum bellum, quia barbari sunt naturaliter servi: “Illud quod prouenit ex principio iniusto non est simpliciter iustum; set principium bellorum contingit esse iniustum, puta cum aliquis non habet iustam causam assumendi bellum: ergo seruitus que sequitur ex tali bello non est simpliciter iusta ... Contingit per bellum aliquem superari cui indignum est seruire; set nullus potest dicere quod ille quem indignum est seruire iuste sit seruus: ergo non potest dici quod seruitus que est ex bello simpliciter sit iusta. Minorem autem probat: quia si aliquis diceret iuste seruum esse eum quem indignum est seruire, accideret quandoque eos qui sunt de nobilissimo genere esse seruos, si caperentur in bello et si contingeret eos uendi; sequeretur ulterius quod filii eorum essent serui ex seruis nati: quod uidetur esse inconueniens ... Dicit ergo primo quod propter predictum inconueniens uitandum non uolunt homines dicere quod nobiles homines quando capiuntur in bello fiant serui; set solum barbari cum capiuntur fiunt serui” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A92, ll. 131-136, 138-149, 157-161); cf. etiam I.6: “oportet uti et ad bestias que naturaliter sunt subiecte homini, et ad homines barbaros qui sunt naturaliter serui, ut supra dictum est, ac si hoc sit primum iustum bellum secundum naturam” (ibid., p. A99, ll. 218-221) 9 ,1 Con6 dicit…natura] Arist., Pol. I.2, sequenter…naturam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b30 et 1253a2 1252b30 et 1253a2

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Dico ad hoc quod ciuitas est a natura, et ratio PHILOSOPHI est ista: quoniam si ea que sunt ad finem sunt a natura, et finis est a natura. Quod enim ordinatur quod est in finem, non ordinatur propter id in 10 illud nisi secundum quod ordinatur in finem. Modo ciuitas est finis domus et uici et communitatis disposite, quia tale est unumquodque secundum naturam quale est generatione eius perfecta. Sed communitas domus et uici sunt imperfecte, nisi cum attingunt ad communicationem ciuitatis, quoniam communitas ciuilis sibi sufficit quantum ad omnia 15 necessaria uite et omnium que sunt in ciuitate, et non domus nec uicus. Et communicatio ciuilis est finis omnium istarum communitatum; sed omnes ille communicationes sunt naturales; quare communicatio ciuitatis est a natura. Et hoc a natura inclinante, cum intellectus et ratio est principium eius quantum ad actum | et perfectionem, ita quod est a natura B 61ra 20 inclinante et ratione perficiente.

Ad primam rationem dico quod domus uno modo dicitur edificium, et uicus congregatio domorum, et ciuitas multitudo uicorum, et sic ista sunt ab arte; sed isto modo non dicitur ciuitas proprie. Alio modo dicitur ciuitas communicatio habitantium in illis muris, et sic ciuitas est a 25 natura et domus. Sed argumentum bene arguit quod ciuitas est a ratione et electione perficiente, tamen est a natura inclinante.

< Q U E S TIO 1 0 > C ons e qu enter q uer itur u tr um ho mo sit ani mal ciu ile e t s oc iale n atu ra Arguitur quod non, quia quod inest a natura inest omnibus que sunt unius nature; sed non omnes homines sunt ciuiles, quoniam quidam sunt inciuiles propter fortunam, alii propter naturam, et cetera, et tamen 5 omnes homines sunt unius nature; quare et cetera. 9 ,9 id] illud B 1 4 sufficit] sufficeret B | quantum] quam B 22 multitudo] domorum add. sed exp. B 1 0 ,2 quia] non add. B 3 omnes] post sunt transp. B 4 fortunam] correxi ex Thomae Sent. Pol. I.1/b (ed. Leon. XVIII, p. A78, ll. 85-86 et 90-92: “aliqui sunt non ciuiles propter fortunam, utpote quia sunt expulsi de ciuitate ... et alia naturalia aliquando deficiunt propter fortunam, puta cum alicui amputatur manus, uel cum priuatur cibo”): fortitudinem B 8 si…natura2] cf. Auct. Arist., Phys. II (82), p. 147; Arist., Phys. II.6, 197b22-27 1 1 tale…12 perfecta] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b32-34 1 0, 1 Consequenter…natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a2-3

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Item, esse inciuile inest alicui homini per naturam, quia dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod inciuilis secundum naturam aut Deus aut peior bestia; quare oppositum, scilicet ciuile, non erit homini per naturam. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio sua est quia, si ea que sunt ad finem sunt a natura, et finis; modo sermo inest homini a natura, qui est 10 propter communicationem ciuilem; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod dubitatio est in hoc quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS, quod omnis homo est a natura ciuilis et quod aliquis est natura inciuilis. Et ideo dicendum quod, quando aliquid naturaliter inclinatur ad aliquem finem, naturaliter inclinatur ad omnia illa que sunt necessaria ad illum finem et ad 15 repellendum contraria illius finis. Modo finis ultimus ipsius hominis est uiuere secundum rationem: sicut enim uiuentia appetunt uiuere, ita uiuere secundum rationem est finis hominis, ad quem potest attingere in uita humana, et ideo naturaliter ad omnia necessaria isti fini et ad repellendum contraria istius finis. Sed ad hoc quod homo attingat ad hunc 20 finem sunt aliqua necessaria ex parte corporis, sicut cibus, indumentum et talia, unde ista non sunt homini coniuncta natura, sunt tamen sibi necessaria, et ideo oportet quod moueatur ad acquirendum ista, quantumcumque 14 quando aliquid] aliquid quandoque B | aliquem] aliquam B 1 6 ipsius] praem. istius B hominis] homine sed corr. in homini B 1 7 uiuere2] secundum rationem add. B | ita] quod add. B 19 inclinatur] suppl. ex supra, l. 15 23 quantumcumque] quamcumque B 7 inciuilis…bestia] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a26-29; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (8), p. 252; cf. etiam Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a2-3 9 si…10 finis] cf. q. praec., l. 8 cum adn. 1 0 sermo…11 ciuilem] Auct. Arist., Pol. I (6), p. 252; Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a9-10 1 3 omnis…inciuilis] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a2-3 1 4 quando…20 finis] cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/1.1: “Sic enim imaginari debemus quod natura nihil facit frustra; ei ergo quod naturaliter fit, naturalia sunt ea sine quibus non potest bene conseruari in esse. Frustra enim ageret, si res naturales nullo modo conseruarentur in esse, sed statim, postquam essent factae, esse desinerent, quare, cum viuere sit homini naturale, omnia illa quae faciunt ad bene viuere, et sine quibus non potest sibi in vita sufficere, sunt homini naturalia” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 215) 17 uiuentia…uiuere2] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. X.5, 1175a15-16: “Racionabiliter igitur et delectacionem appetunt; perficit enim unicuique vivere, eligibile ens” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 571, ll. 18-19) 21 ex…22 talia] explicatio ista “ex parte corporis”, sicut alia “ex parte animae”, de qua agitur infra, l. 26, non inveniuntur in loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 9. Quod homo indigeat cum aliis convivere “ex parte corporis”, desumptum tamen videtur esse ab Aegidio Romano: ubi reddit rationem de humana sociabilitate, Aegidius asserit quod “homo ultra alia animalia quatuor videtur indigere, ex quibus quadruplici via venari possumus ipsum esse communicatiuum et sociale”. Ex his viis, prima et secunda sunt ‘ex victu’ et ‘ex vestitu’ et aequiparari possunt aliquibus necessariis ‘ex parte corporis’, quae Petrus hic adduci; cf. Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/1.1 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 214-215). Vide etiam Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 6 (ed. Toste, p. 182, l. 30-p. 183, l. 44) et Radulphum Britonem, QQ. Eth. I, q. 23 (ed. Costa, p. 234, ll. 31-37 et 40- 45), qui quoque usi sunt distinctione ista

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30

35

40

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sit speculatiuus. Et si alicui deficiant ista, impeditur ab isto fine: indigentem enim entem impossibile est bene operari, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS 10º Ethicorum. Sed quod requiritur ex parte anime est transquillitas animi, quod fit ex sedatione passionum irrationalium. Et ideo, ad hoc quod uiuat secundum rationem, oportet quod sedentur passiones ire et concupiscentie, et sic de aliis, unde sedando et quiescendo fit anima sciens et prudens: 7º Phisicorum. Et iterum, unus magis potest speculari cum adiutorio alicuius quam per se, et ideo, quia pauci inueniuntur sufficientes ad sedandum passiones per se et ad speculandum, ideo exigitur communicatio, ut unus ab alio iuuetur in istis operationibus anime, quia, secundum communiorem statum, nullus inuenitur in istis operationibus anime sufficiens. Si tamen aliquis sibi sufficiat in istis necessariis a parte anime, ita quod per se possit moderare suas passiones et solus speculari, tunc, quantum ad hoc, non indiget communicatione ciuili. Et hoc habet homo ex aliqua sui perfectione uel ex dispositione superaddita nature humane secundum communem statum, et hoc uel ex natiuitate uel ex regimine uel a causa superiori: et ideo dicitur quod talis est melior quam homo. Licet sit inciuilis respiciendo ad hanc naturam, tamen respiciendo ad necessaria ex parte corporis necessario est ciuilis, quoniam nullus potest sibi sufficere ad necessaria corporis, et ideo uniuersaliter omnes sunt natura ciuiles quantum ad hoc. Et ideo dicitur quod omnes sunt natura ciuiles, tamen, inspiciendo ex parte anime, aliqui sunt sibi sufficientes, et quantum ad hoc sunt natura inciuiles. Sunt etiam in homine alii inciuiles propter indispositionem et corruptionem nature, intantum quod nolunt obedire legi; et qui sic est inciuilis, est natura peior quam homo uel bestia. Tamen, secundum naturam communem, omnes sunt natura ciuiles.

Ad rationes. Ad primam, cum dicitur “que insunt per naturam insunt in omnibus illam naturam necessario”, negandum est, quoniam natura non agit necessario, immo potest impediri; unde inclinatio naturalis aliquando impeditur in aliquibus propter corruptionem nature humane uel propter consuetudinem, sicut nos uidemus quod aliqui istis 55 causis ad opera brutorum inclinantur, alii propter sui perfectionem exce-

50

2 8 sedentur] sedantur B 33 iuuetur] inuenitur B 3 6 moderare] moderate B 3 9 regimine] stet, etsi probabilius hic esset consuetudine; cf. infra, ll. 52-54 et loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 9, ll. 85- 86 43 homines] lac. B 45 tamen] ex add. sed exp. B 4 8 est2] a add. sed exp. B 2 4 indigentem…25 operari] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.11, 1178b33-1179a5; Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. X (216), p. 248 2 9 sedando…prudens] Auct. Arist., Phys. VII (189), p. 155; Arist., Phys. VII.3, 247b9-11 5 5 alii…57 est] cf. supra, ll. 34- 40

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dunt communem statum hominum, sicut qui inclinantur quasi ad uitam angelicam, ut uisum est. Tamen de statu communi omnes sunt natura ciuiles.| Ad aliud dico quod omnis homo, quantum ad naturam hominis unde homo, natura ciuilis et inclinatur ad communicationem 60 ciuilem, quia homo indiget communicatione; tamen aliquis homo, quantum ad aliquid sibi proprium, sicut quia sibi sufficiens per additum nature humane uel corruptus, bene est inciuilis natura. < Q UE S T I O 1 1 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m s e r m o i n s i t h o m i n i a n a tu r a Arguitur quod non, quoniam sermo non est idem apud omnes; quare et cetera. Item, est a uoluntate et beneplacito hominis; quare et cetera. Oppositum arguitur hic, quod homo supra cetera animalia habet 5 sermonem a natura.

Dico quod sermo inest homini a natura inclinante et ab intellectu perficiente. Primum ostenditur quoniam, aliquid naturaliter inclinatur ad aliquem finem, inclinatur naturaliter ad ea que sunt necessaria ad illum finem; sed illud ad quod sermo ordinatur finaliter est expri- 10 mere alii suum conceptum, ad quod homo natura inclinatur, quia per hoc recipit ab aliis necessaria ad uitam et tribuit illi; quare et cetera. Et ideo, 61 quia] unde add. B 63 corruptus] scrips. capratus B 1 1, 8 quando] suppl. ex supra, q. 10, l. 14 12 aliis] alia B | tribuit] scrips. tribuie B 11 , 1 Consequenter…natura] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a9-10; cf. Petrum, QQ. De Sensu q. 14: Vtrum sermo sit naturalis homini (ed. White, pp. 30-31 et ed. Ebbesen, pp. 154-155) 5 homo…6 natura] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a9-10 7 Dico…16 perficiente] solutio ista valde similis est illae quae invenitur in commentario super De sensu et sensato Anonymi Mertoniani, q. 4 (Vtrum sermo sit naturalis homini): “dicendum quod sermo inest homini natura inclinante, sed ab intellectu consummante et perficiente. Primum patet, nam si finis sit naturalis vel inclinatio ad finem sit naturalis, illa quae ordinantur ad finem sunt a natura; sed sermo finaliter inest homini per communicationem, commmunicatio enim est finis sermonis; sed homo naturaliter habet inclinationem ad communicationem; quodammodo est a natura ... unde dicit Philosophus primo Politicorum: qui fugit societatem hominum aut est peior bestia aut melior deo. Et sic patet quod sermo inest homini a natura inclinante. Secundo patet, sc. quod sermo insit homini ab intellectu finaliter” (ed. Ebbesen, pp. 156-157). Vide etiam QQ. I, q. 9, ll. 24-25 cum adn.

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cum talis communicatio sit homini a natura, et sermo similiter, tamen actum et locutionem est ab intellectu et uoluntate, et ideo 15 secundum uoluntatem potest formari diuersimode. Patet ergo quod sermo inest homini a natura inclinante et ab intellectu perficiente.

Rationes procedunt suis uiis. < Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m s e r u u s s i t o r g a n u m d o m i n i Arguitur quod non, quia organum non habet potestatem mouendi nisi ab aliquo, ut in omnibus organis patet; sed seruus habet de se uirtutem mouendi, quia agit uoluntarie; quare et cetera. 5

Item, organum non mouet nisi mediante principali mouente; sed seruus mouet sine domino; quare seruus non organum domini. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Dicendum quod seruus est organum domini. Et hoc patet si uideatur ratio organi: organum enim est quod operatur aliquid, sed non nisi direc10 tum ab alio dirigente. Seruus autem est talis: operatur enim uoluntarie inquantum dirigitur a ratione domini, unde non est sufficiens quod preuideat facienda et ordinet et dirigat in finem secundum suam rationem propriam, sed secundum rationem domini et eius uoluntatem. Quare patet conclusio. 15

Item, est organum animatum, quia non seuit ei nec obedit nisi inquantum apprehendit ea que sunt preuisa a domino; sed apprehendere est per animam; ideo et cetera.

Item, est organum actiuum, quoniam est principium operationis per uoluntatem et electionem et semper dirigitur a domino, et tale est orga20 num actiuum. 13 communicatio] praem. ex B 1 4 locutionem] scrips. lortionem (?) B 12 ,2 mouendi] modi sed corr. B 1 5 seruit] domini add. sed exp. B 1 6 preuisa] premissa B 1 9 et2] ut B 12 ,1 Consequenter…domini] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b31-33 7 Oppositum…littera] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b31-33 1 8 Item…19 domino] aliquid deest hic, ut videtur, quoniam in Politica activum contrariatur factivo et actio factioni. Quod, si nihil deesset, tunc organum animatum et activum non differrent, et habere voluntatem et rationem pertineret ad organum activum; recte autem, hoc pertinet ad animatum; cf. loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 10, ll. 33- 43 et adn. ibi positas

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Est igitur seruus organum animatum, actiuum, alterius homo existens; et per hoc differt a brutis.

Ad argumenta patet solutio quoniam, licet seruus habeat uoluntatem per quam potest mouere ideterminate ad bonum uel ad malum, tamen non habet unde possit determinate mouere ad finem nisi motus ab 25 alio; unde, nisi esset dominus determinans, nesciret per que ueniret in finem determinatum. Ad illud, “organum non mouet nisi mouente agente principali semper presente”, uerum est, nisi sit prius uirtute . Modo sic est de seruo, quod non mouet ad finem determi- 30 natum nisi sit determinatus a domino, ita quod oportet quod moueat ista inclinatio uel dispositio; quare non ualet. < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i l l e q u i d e f i c i t i n a l i q u o b o n o s i t n at u r a s e r uu s u e l s u b i e c t u s e i q ui e x c e d i t i n i l l o b o n o Arguitur quod sic, quoniam, si qui se habet ad alium sicut actiuum ad passiuum , et subditus ei; sed qui deficit in aliquo est sicut passiuum respectu eius qui 5 exedit siue habundat, quoniam recipit ab eo inquantum huiusmodi; quare est eius seruus inquantum huiusmodi. Item, qui alio indiget et ab eo recipere potest, est eius subditus; sed deficiens est talis; quare et cetera. Oppositum patet, quoniam iam uigens ratione esset natura seruus eius 10 qui est diues et potens uiribus corporalibus.

Dicendum quod subditus est ille qui caret aliquo bono et natus est id acquirere ab alio, principans autem est ille qui excellit in bono et potest illud alii conferre. Hoc enim uidemus in natura, quod actiuum, quod potest 22 hoc] s.l. B 2 9 in…impressa] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 10, ll. 63- 64 | per…30 mouet1] suppl. ex eodem loco 3 2 inclinatio] coni.: declinatur B 13 ,2 subiectus] sub actus B 4 est1… est2] suppl. ex ll. 5-6 et 13-17 13 principans] participans B 21 Est…existens] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a14-17 13 ,1 Consequenter…2 bono] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a13-16

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formam dare, primo mouet et principaliter illud passiuum, quod recipit ab eo, et passiuum subicitur simpliciter, quod recipit; unde ex hoc dicitur unum subiectum et aliud dominans.

Nunc autem est in homine bonum fortune, quod est minimum, bonum corporis, quod est maius, et qui in talibus bonis habundat | non B 61va 20 simpliciter excellit, nec excellit inquantum homo. Sed qui excellit in bonis anime, talis simpliciter excellit, quoniam excellit in maximo bono et in eo quod est bonum proprium hominis. Et ita patet quod ille qui deficit in aliquo bono secundum quod huiusmodi est subditus illi qui habet actum illud bonum et a quo potest recipere; non tamen simpliciter 25 subicitur. Sed iste dicitur seruus natura qui deficit in eo quod est bonum simpliciter hominis secundum quod homo; et ideo deficientes ratione sunt simpliciter serui, deficientes autem in aliis bonis sunt serui secundum quid.

< Q U E S TIO 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m b o n u s n at u r a l i t e r g e n e r e t b o n u m Arguitur quod sic, quoniam unumquodque naturaliter generat sibi simile, ut calidum facit calidum; quare et cetera. 5

Item, dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS quod dignificant antiqui quemadmodum ex bestiis bestiam et ex homine hominem, ita ex bono bonum. Item, bonus secundum corpus generat bonum secundum corpus, ut patet in pluribus; quare bonus secundum animam generat bonum secundum animam. Consequentia patet, quoniam anima sequitur corporis dispositionem.

10

Oppositum , quia tunc nullus esset per electionem et assuefactionem.

Dicendum quod bonus potest aliquis dici secundum actum et perfectionem uel secundum inclinationem naturalem. Primo modo nullus est 23 secundum2] suppl. ex infra, q. 14, l. 16 parall. QQ. I, q. 16, l. 14

1 4,6 generat] generet B

10 bonus] suppl. ex loc.

2 8 ***] desunt responsiones ad argumenta, vide loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 15, ll. 47- 49 1 4 , 1 Con2 unumquodque…3 calidum2] cf. Arist., sequenter…bonum] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2 Metaph. II.1, 993b24-26 4 dignificant…5 bonum] Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255b1-2; cf. Auct. Arist., Pol. I (21), p. 253 8 anima…9 dispositionem] cf. Pseudo-Arist., Physiogn. 1, 805a1

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bonus natura, quia talis bonitas non inest homini nisi per illa que operatur uoluntarie et per rationem, ita quod ratio est principium operum per que 15 aliquis fit bonus uel uirtuosus secundum actum. De alia autem bonitate, qua aliquis dicitur bonus quia inclinatur ad hoc, bonus natura generat bonum, nisi deficiat. Quod patet, quoniam diuersitas inclinationis non est ex parte anime, cum sint omnes unius speciei; quod consistit in indiuiduali est ex parte corporis; et ideo ista diuersitas est ex 20 parte dispositionis materie siue corporis.

Sed generans est natum generare sibi simile quantum ad corporis dispositiones, quare et cetera; tamen aliquando deficit, propter aliquod impedimentum uel indispositionem materie. Et similiter per idem ad secundum.

25

Tertium similiter procedit ista uia. < Q UE S T I O 1 5 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m p r i n c i p a tu s d e s p o t i c u s e t y co n o m i c u s s i n t d i u e r s i p r i n c i pa t u s Arguitur quod non, quoniam solum differunt in materia, quia solum secundum multitudinem et paucitatem, que ad materiam pertinent; 5 quare et cetera. Item, istorum est unus finis, et sufficientia uite; ergo sunt unius speciei, quoniam agibilia sortiuntur speciem ex fine. Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELES, 1º huius, et arguitur ratione, quoniam diuersorum natura oportet esse diuersos principatus secundum naturam, quoniam principatus est ex inclinatione nature; sed principatus despoticus 10 et yconomicus sunt diuersorum secundum naturam: despoticus est domini et serui, yconomicus autem patris et filii, maris et femine; quare et cetera. 19 quod] que B 2 0 indiuiduali] sed add. B | parte] anime add. sed exp. B 24 impedimentum] impedimenta B 22 Sed…24 materie] Sic similiter loc. parall. in QQ. I, q. 16, ll. 70-74, quamobrem decrevi hic ponere ista, ut responsio ad primum argumentum considerentur; nescio tamen an potius consideranda sint ut pars ultima solutionis: si sic, primum argumentum deest 15 , 1 Consequenter…2 principatus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.7, 1255b15-18 8 Oppositum…huius] cf. Arist., Pol. I.7, 1255b15-20 et I.1, 1252a7-16

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Dicendum quod isti duo principatus differunt secundum speciem. Nam principans siue dominans est qui sua uoluntate mouet alios; uoluntas 15 autem non mouet nisi quia mota ab alio, sicut a fine; et ideo principans mouet secundum rationem finis. Cuius ratio est quoniam principantis est regere; ratio autem regentis ex fine sumitur; et ideo ratio principatus sumitur ex fine. Illi ergo principatus qui ad diuersos fines proximos ordinantur sunt diuersi. Sed isti sunt huiusmodi, quia finis despotici est usus 20 necessariorum ad uitam: nam ad hoc dominus dirigit seruum et regit, ut per ipsum consequatur necessaria ad uitam; finis autem domus communior: nam ex communicatione domus oportet querere non tantum necessaria uite, sed necessaria ad communicationem domus, sicut doctrinam et disciplinam; sufficientia autem horum omnium est finis yconomici. Et isti 25 fines sunt diuersi, licet unus ad alium ordinetur, et ideo isti principatus differunt specie; et idem dicendum de politico et yconomico.

Ad argumentum primum dico quod, cum hoc quod isti principatus differat, tamen hoc in forma, et ista formalis diuersitas prouenit ex diuersitate finis; quare non ualet. 30

Ad secundum dico quod illa que ordinantur ad unum proximum sunt unius speciei; sed non oportet si ordinentur ad unum finem remotum. < Q U E S TIO 1 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m u i t e a l i o r u m a n i m a l i u m a b h o m i n e d i u e r s i f i c e n t u r s e c u n d u m d i u e r s i t at e m c i b o r u m Arguitur quod non, quia differentia priorum non accipitur ex B 61vb differentia posteriorum; sed uita animalis prior | est cibo; quare et cetera.

5

Item, distinctio alicuius non est ex distinctione eius quod est in potentia tale; sed alimentum est in potentia animal; quare et cetera. 15 ,1 7 regentis] scrips. regins B 1 6 , 5 distinctione] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 19, l. 15 : diffinitione B 6 alimentum] correxi ex infra, ll. 36-37 et ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 19, l. 16 : absolutum B 14 principans…alios] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a19-22

16 , 1 Consequenter…2 ciborum] cf.

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Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio huius est quoniam, secundum diuersitatem eius sine quo impossibile est animal uiuere, necesse est esse distinctionem in uita eorum; cibus est huiusmodi; quare et cetera.

Dico ad hoc quod uno modo dicitur uita principium operationis rerum 10 uiuentium. Alio modo dicitur uita operatio procedens a forma, secundum quod dicit ARISTOTELES quod sentire et intelligere quedam uite sunt. Alio modo dicitur uita inclinatio uel appetitus quem habet aliquid ad necessaria uite, uel communicatio, ad quam inclinatur, ad acquirendum necessaria uite, secundum quod ostendit ARISTOTELES, 9º Ethicorum, quod illud quod 15 aliquis maxime appetit et prosequitur reputat uitam suam, ut uenator uenari, philosophus philosophari. Animalia autem maxime appetunt uiuere, et ideo maxime ea sine quibus non possunt uiuere; tale autem est cibus; ideo maxime appetunt cibum et quietudinem, quia nisi haberent cibum cum transquillitate non possent uiuere, et ideo animalia maxime 20 pugnant pro alimento. Si ergo illud dicitur uita ad quod natura inclinat, manifestum est quod usus alimenti cum transquillitate est quedam uita animalium, et per consequens conuersatio et habitudo in inquirendo necessaria uite ordinantur ad usum alimenti et ad transquillitatem sicut ad finem; et ideo necessario est 25 conuersationem animalium distingui secundum distinctionem cibi, sicut ea que sunt ad finem ex fine distinguuntur. Et ideo contingit quod quedam coniunctim uiuunt, sicut ea que uiuunt ex fructibus et eis que copiose inueniuntur, quia satis inueniunt de cibo, et ideo unum non molestat aliud. Animalia autem que uiuunt ex cibo qui raro inuenitur uiuunt segregratim, 30 9 distinctionem] diffinitionem B 13 quem] quam B 1 5 9º] 4 B | quod2] quia sed corr. B 28 coniunctim] correxi ex infra., l. 31: communio tamen B | fructibus] fluctibus B 29 inueniuntur] ex fluctibus add. sed exp. B | inueniunt] inueniuntur B 7 quoniam…9 huiusmodi] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a21-22; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “cum enim non sit possibile uiuere sine cibo, necesse est quod secundum differentiam ciborum differat modus uiuendi in animalibus” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A98, ll. 108-111) 11 dicitur…12 sunt] Auct. Arist., De An. II (46), p. 178; Arist., De An. II.1, 413a21-23 1 4 uel…15 uite] sic similiter in aliis commentariis, ubi tamen ‘vita’ tertio modo dicta, scilicet conversatio – et non communicatio, ut hic –, dicitur in qua aliquis delectatur; cf. loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 19, ll. 22-29 cum adn. et Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. I, q. 14: “Alio modo potest accipi uita pro modo uiuendi et delectabiliter conuersandi” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 6va) 1 5 quod2…17 philosophari] Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.13, 1172a1-8, sed verba ista desumpta sunt ex Thomae Sent. Eth. I.5: “... sciendum est quod, sicut infra in IX dicetur, unusquisque id ad quod maxime afficitur reputat vitam suam, sicut philosophus philosophari, venator venari et sic de aliis. Et quia homo maxime afficitur ad ultimum finem, necesse est quod vitae diversificentur secundum diversitatem ultimi finis” (ed. Leon. XLVII.1, p. 18, ll. 61-66)

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quoniam coniunctim unum non permitteret aliud uti cibo cum transquillitate, propter hoc quod cibum non inueniretur sufficienter.

Per hoc ad primum argumentum patet solutio, quoniam, licet alimentum sit posterius uita primo modo et secundo dicta, non tamen 35 tertio modo, ideo non ualet. Ad secundum dico per idem. Vel dicendum quod, licet alimentum sit animal in potentia, non tamen usus cibi, sed magis est operatio et actus animalis; et ideo secundum eius distinctionem potest bene uariari uita animalium. < Q U E S TIO 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p l a n t e e t a n i m a l i a a l i a ab h o m i n e s i n t f a c t a g r at i a h o m i n i s Arguitur quod non, quoniam unumquodque fit propter finem suum. Modo finis uniuscuiusque est operatio sua; sed operatio plantarum 5 et brutorum animalium non est usus hominis; ergo et cetera. Item, finis uniuscuiusque est bonum suum; sed malum plante et bruti est quod ueniat in usum hominis, quoniam per hoc consumuntur; quare et cetera. Oppositum dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS et 2º Phisicorum, ubi dicit quod nos 10 sumus finis quodammodo omnium que ueniunt in usum nostrum.

Dico quod plante et bruta sunt propter hominem, qui imperfectum semper ad perfectum ordinatur, unde in quolibet genere est unum primum 3 2 inueniretur] inuenirentur B 17 ,1 Consequenter…2 hominis] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b16-17 3 unumquodque…4 sua] cf. Thomas, In Phys. III.5: “illud quod est opus et finis uniuscuiusque, est actus eius et perfec6 finis…suum] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. V (122), p. 125; Arist., tio” (ed. Maggiòlo, p. 157) Metaph. V.2, 1013b26; sed ista sententia, eisdem ipsis verbis, etiam invenitur in Thomae operibus; cf., e.g., Thomam, In Phys. III.11: “finis est perfectio uniuscuiusque” (ed. Maggiòlo, p. 189); Id., ScG I.1: “finis enim est bonum uniuscuiusque” (ed. Leon. XIII, p. 3); Id., Sent. Eth. VI.4: “finis autem est bonum uniuscuiusque” (ed. Leon. XLVIII.2, p. 346, ll. 95-96); Id., In De Div. Nom. cap. 4, lectio 22: “finis est bonum et perfectio uniuscuiusque” (ed. Pera, p. 216) 9 Oppositum…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b16-17 | nos…10 nostrum] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (63) et (64), p. 145; Arist., Phys. II.2, 194a34-35

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perfectissimum ad quod omnia illius generis ordinantur; modo perfectissimum in genere naturalium est homo; quare et cetera. Item, natura nichil frustra et facit primo homine sub esse 15 imperfecto, et ideo oportet quod natura perficiat ipsum; hoc autem non potest sine alimento; quare oportet quod natura prouideat homini de alimento. Alimentum autem homini sunt plante et quedam animalia mediate, quedam immediate, sicut illa ex quibus nutriuntur et illa que sunt alimentum hominis; quare patet quod plante et bruta sunt gratia hominis. 20 Sciendum tamen est quod multiplex est natura: quedam propria, sicut materia et forma uniuscuiusque, et ista est natura particularis, que tantum intendit bonum et generationem huius rei determinate. Alia est natura communis et uniuersalis, que non tantum mouet ad generationem huius determinati, sed communiter ad generationem omnium naturalium gene- 25 rabilium, et maxime ad generationem maxime perfecti, puta hominis, et hec est natura celestis.

B 62ra

Vtraque istarum naturarum non semper tendit ad idem, sed natura particularis semper intendit bonum particulare, ut natura manus salutem manus, communis natura commune bonum omnium, sicut natura regitiua 30 totius corporis salutem totius et partium simul. Quia cum bono totius aliquando stat malum | partis, ideo uirtus uniuersalis aliquando sustinet malum partis propter bonum totius, ut patet de manu que inciditur aliquando ut defendatur totum corpus. Modo dico quod natura uniuersalis fecit plantas gratia hominis. Et ideo, 35 quia ex bono hominis aliquando sequitur malum istorum, ideo per accidens intendit eorum corruptionem, propter salutem hominis. De natura particulari loquendo plante non sunt gratia hom inis, cum natura particularis tantum intendat bonum proprium.

Per hoc ad rationes, quoniam tantum arguunt de natura 40 particulari et non de natura uniuersali que, licet non intendat per se malum plantarum, intendit tamen per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad bonum hominis. 17 , 19 mediate] immediate B 2 0 gratia] genera B 2 8 Vtraque] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 20, ll. 46-52, Anonymi Mediolanensis, QQ. Pol. I, q. 15 (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 7ra-b) et Anonymi Baltimorensis, QQ. Pol. I, q. 16 (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 2rb); in omnibus enim tantum loquitur de duabus naturis, altera propria, altera universalis: una tertia B 30 commune] communis B 37 corruptionem] horum add. B 4 2 inquantum] in quibus B

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< Q U E S TIO 1 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o s s e s s i o n a t u r a l i s s i t p a r s y c o n o m i ce Arguitur quod sic, quia ARISTOTELES, qui hoc dicit in littera. Item, sicut se habet finis ad finem, ita scientia ad scientiam; sed finis possessiue est pars finis yconomice: nam finis possessiue est usus 5 possessionum yconomice siue est usus possessionum liberorum et seruorum. Contra: illa ars que preparat materiam alterius non est pars alterius, sicut eraria fabrilis; sed possessiua preparat materiam yconomice; quare et cetera.

10

Dicendum quod possessio naturalis non est pars domus siue yconomice, quoniam scientie que sunt diuersorum subiectorum sunt diuerse; sed subiectum possessiue est possessio naturalis, subiectum yconomice sunt partes domus, que sunt serui, liberi, mulier; cum ergo possessio sit diuersa ab istis nec pars huiusmodi, nec possessiua erit pars yconomice.

15

Item, politica non docet hominem facere, sed utitur eo, et natura ei ministrat. Sic yconomica, que utitur possessionibus, non acquirit eas, sed acquirere est alterius; unde possessiua est eorum acquisitiua; ergo et cetera.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum, cum dicitur “possessio, que est finis 20 possessiue, est pars finis yconomice”, dicendum quod non est pars finis eius proximi, a quo fine sumitur distinctio scientie uel conuenientia: nam finis proximus yconomice est gubernatio domus, possessio autem non est pars gubernationis. 25

Ad dictum Philosophi, dico quod multum large loquitur – nam pro tanto dicit eam partem yconomice, quia est ei ministratiua –, quia post determinat quod non est pars. 18 ,5 usus] finis B 7 non] s.l. B 13 sunt] iter. B 20 possessiue] possessione B 18 ,1 Consequenter…yconomice] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a3-5 et 13-14 2 Aristoteles…littera] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b27-28 7 illa…8 yconomice] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256a3-13 et etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.6: “ars dicitur esse pars alterius artis, que considerat partem eius quod considerat alia ars, sicut ars que facit cultellum est ars fabrilis” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A97, ll. 26-28) 1 5 politica…16 ministrat] Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258a21-23, ubi, quoad naturam, asseritur quod politica “sumens a natura utitur ipsis” (ed. Susemihl, p. 42, ll. 3- 4), scilicet hominibus 1 9 Ad1…26 pars] re vera ordo responsionum ad argumenta invertendum est

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< Q UE S T I O 1 9 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m d i u i t i e n a t u r a l e s s i n t i n f i n i t e u el e a r u m ap p e t i t u s s i t i n f i n i t u s Arguitur quod sic, quoniam maius est desiderium finis quam eorum que sunt ad finem; sed pecunia est propter diuitias naturales, et tamen appetitus pecunie est infinitus, ut dicit ARISTOTELES in littera; ergo 5 et cetera. Iterum, desiderium eius quod, tanto plus crescit, quanto plus habetur, est infinitum; sed quanto plures diuitie habentur, tanto plus crescit desiderium, ut dicitur 2º huius; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione eius, quia nulla ars 10 utitur organis infinitis, nec multitudine nec magnitudine; sed diuitie naturales sunt organa yconomice; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod diuitie naturales possunt considerari dupliciter: uel ut sunt quedam possessio uel quantum sunt ordinate ad usum nature. Secundo modo non appetuntur in infinitum, quoniam appetitus earum 15 que sunt ad finem a fine mensuratur: diuitie naturales ordinantur in usum nature; ad sustentationem nature sufficiunt finite; et ideo diuitiarum, ut sic considerantur, est appetitus finitus. Sed si considerentur ut possessio absolute, nichil prohibet eas appeti in infinitum, quia sic possunt appeti ut finis, et appetitus finis est infinitus; 20 quare ponenti finem in diuitiis est earum appetitus infinitus.

Ad primam rationem dicendum est quod pecunia, si consideretur ut ordinatur ad diuitias naturales, non est infinita, nec eius appetitus. Sed aliter potest considerari, ut possessio quedam et ut finis, et sic appetitus eius est infinitus; et sic dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod desiderium pecunie est 25 infinitum.

19,5 infinitus] infinitas B 8 infinitum] infinita B 1 6 mensuratur] mensurant B 19 possessio] sunt add. B 21 quare] quia B 19 , 1 Consequenter…2 infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b31-37 5 appetitus…infinitus] Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b32-34; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (27), p. 253 8 quanto…9 desiderium] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a41-b5 1 0 nulla…11 magnitudine] cf. Arist., Pol. I.8, 1256b34-37

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Ad aliud dicendum est quod, si diuitie considerentur ut possessio et finis, ponendo sic, uerum est quod plus habentur, tanto desiderium crescit, et ideo sic appetitus earum est infinitus. Tamen, 30 considerando eas ut ordinantur in usum nature, non est uerum quod plus appetuntur, quanto plus habentur, et ideo sic non appetuntur in infinitum. < Q U E S TIO 2 0 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m < c u i u s l i b e t > r e i p o s s e s < s e > a b h o m i n e s i t du pl e x u s u s Arguitur quod non, quia usus rei est sua operatio; sed unius rei una est tantum operatio per se; ergo et unus . 5

Item, | unius rei est unus finis; sed usus rei possesse non uidetur B 62rb esse non-ordinatio eius ad finem; ergo et cetera. Item, pecunie non est nisi unus finis, scilicet commutatio, et tamen est res possessa; ergo et cetera.

10

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera, quod rei possesse est duplex usus, per se proprius et alius communis.

Dicendum quod usus rei uno modo est eius operatio, secundum quod dicitur cuius ipsum bonum est, ipsum est bonum; alio modo usus rei dicitur exercitium sui actus, secundum quod dicitur quod usus reddit 2 8 finis] finem B | quanto] suppl. ex supra, ll. 7-8 2 9 plus] suppl. ex supra, ll. 8-9 2 0, 1 cuiuslibet] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 23, l. 1 2 duplex] dubitabilis B 12 finis] suppl. ex fonte allata | ipsum2] impium B 2 0, 1 Consequenter…2 usus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a6-7 9 rei…10 communis] Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a6-9; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “Est enim uniuscuiusque rei duplex usus, et conueniunt in hoc quod uterque est secundum se et non per accidens; differunt autem in hoc quod unus eorum est proprius usus rei, alius autem non est proprius set communis” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A101, ll. 39- 43) 1 1 Dicendum…15 utile] isti tres modi considerandi usum cuiuslibet rei non inveniuntur in loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 23, ll. 11-19 – ubi loquitur de duplici usu –; inveniuntur autem in Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. I, q. 18: “... est intelligendum quod usus ostenditur tripliciter: uno modo idem quod operatio rei; alio modo idem est quod exercitium rei; alio modo idem est quod ordinatio rei in suum finem” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 8ra) 12 cuius…bonum2] Auct. Arist., Top. III (45), p. 324; Arist., Top. III.1, 116b27; cf. etiam Boethium, De Diff. Top. II, 1189B (PL 64) 13 usus…14 promptum] cf. Ciceronem, Pro L. Cornelio Balbo Oratio 45: “... adsiduus usus uni rei deditus et ingenium et artem saepe vincit”. Auctores mediaevales saepe utebantur hoc proverbio, modo quo hic invenitur: cf. Claude Lafleur-Joanne Carrier, “La Philosophia

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promptum artificem; tertio modo dicitur usus rei operatio per quam ordinatur in finem, et isto modo idem est quam utile. Primo modo acci- 15 piendi usum utitur Philosophus hic. Nunc ergo, cum unius rei uno modo considerate non sit nisi una operatio per se nec nisi unus usus, unius tamen rei diuersimode considerate et secundum diuersas naturas possunt esse plures operationes et plures usus. Et ideo quelibet res possessa ab homine, que est instituta propter aliquod 20 opus proprium et aliud quam commutationem, habet duplicem usum. Sic calciamentum, secundum naturam propriam et inquantum huiusmodi, habet usum qui est calciatio; sed inquantum est res possessa habet usum qui est commutatio. Et hic est communis, quia est omnis rei possesse inquantum possessa, quia possessio dicitur, 1º Rhetorice, id quo aliquis 25 potest uti quando uult et quomodo; et ideo omne tale potest commutari.

Per hoc patet ad argumenta. Cum dicitur “unius rei est una operatio”, uerum est secundum idem; tamen eius sub diuersis rationibus bene sunt diuerse operationes, ut dictum est. Ad aliud per idem.

30

Ad tertium dicendum quod non est simile de pecunia et aliis diuitiis naturalibus, quia pecunia non est ordinata ad aliud opus quam ad eius secundum quod possessa, et ideo solum ordinatur ad commutationem et habet tantum usum communem aliarum rerum; sed diuitie naturales institute sunt de natura sua ad aliud opus 35 quam commutatio; non est simile.

15 accipiendi] accipiendo B 22 calciamentum] calciamenta B d’Hervé le Breton (alias Henri le Breton) et le recueil d’introductions à la philosophie du ms. Oxford, Corpus Christi College 283 (Deuxième partie)”, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 62 (1995), pp. 359- 442 (p. 365, n. 11) 21 Sic…25 possessa] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a9-13 25 possessio…26 quomodo] Arist., Rhet. I.5, 1361a20-22 28 tamen…29 est] cf. supra, ll. 17-19

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

759

< Q U EST IO 21> C o n s e q ue n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r um i n d u c t i o p e c u n i e s i t n e c e s s a r i a i n c i u i t a te Arguitur quod non, quia quod est conditum a uoluntate non est necessarium, quia uoluntas potest aliter se habere; sed pecunia est 5 huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. non est necessaria nisi propter commutationem; sed apud aliquos solet fieri commutatio sine pecunia, ut dicit PHILOSOPHUS; ergo et cetera.



Dicendum quod necessarium dicitur multipliciter, ut habetur 5º Metaphisice. Sed uno modo dicitur necessarium sine quo finis non potest bene haberi de facili, et isto modo pecunia est homini necessaria propter commutationem. Et hoc quia aliquando homo unius regionis indiget hiis que habet homo alterius regionis et econuerso; et diuitie naturales non 15 sunt bene portabiles, et ideo oportuit quod institueretur aliquid habens communem commutationem et facilem, quia aliquando homo indiget

10

2 1, 10 5º] primo B 15 oportuit] habere add. B | institueretur] scrips. instituererit B 2 1, 1 Consequenter…2 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a31- 41, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A102, ll. 116-154) et Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/3.9 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 368-371). Aliqua commentaria super Vum Ethicorum, eodem fere tempore, quaestionem eamdem continent. Cf., e.g., Radulphi Britonis q. 16 (ed. Costa, pp. 452- 455) et Aegidii Aurelianensis q. 13 (Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16089, f. 216ra-b); cf. etiam q. 13 ex ms. Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13, f. 105va-b (106va-b); q. 12 ex ms. Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213, f. 67ra-b; q. 13 ex ms. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16110, f. 262ra-b 7 apud 1 0 necessarium…12 facili] Auct. Arist., Metaph. V …pecunia] Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a23-25 (126), p. 125; Arist., Metaph. V.5, 1015a20-26 13 aliquando…14 econuerso] sic similiter in Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.9 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 368-369) | aliquando…23 argento] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a31-38, ubi tamen mentionantur ferrum et argentum; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “Propter istam necessitatem inuentus est usus denariorum, eo quod non poterant de facili portari ea que sunt necessaria secundum naturam ad remotas terras ... et ideo ad huiusmodi commutationes in remotis faciendas ordinauerunt quod aliquid sibi inuicem darent et acciperent quod de facili et expedite portari posset” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A102, ll. 125-128 et 129-132) 14 diuitie…16 facilem] verba valde simila inveniuntur in Aegidio Romano, De Reg. Princ. II/3.9: “Oportuit ergo inuenire aliquod quod esset portabile” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 370), sed quoad divitiarum portabilitatem cf. potius Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a34-37: “ex necessitate numismatis acquisitus est usus. Non enim facile portabile per longa unicuique secundum naturam necessariorum: propter quod ad commutationes tale aliquid composuerunt” (ed. Susemihl, p. 36, l. 13-p. 37, l. 3)

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pluribus, que alius habet, et tamen alius nullo indiget, quod habet plus; et ideo illud debet esse commutabile cum quolibet, ad hoc quod fiat de facili commutatio. Et ideo, quia in commutatione debet recipi equiualens, oportet quod denarius sit pretiose materie, quia artificialia non habent pretiosi- 20 tatem nisi ex materia; et quia recipitur et pro necessariis habendis in tempus remotum, oportet quod sit de materia durabili: et hec duo reperiuntur in auro et argento. Item, oportet quod sit denarius paruus, ut possit esse commutatio minorum. Oportet similiter quod ibi sit signum, quia in principio ponderabant homines, et ideo, propter expeditionem a pondera- 25 tione , positum est signum, quod uocatum est a PHILOSOPHO character. Item, quia mediante ipso habet quidquid uniuersaliter, oportet inesse signum principum uel ciuitatis uel dominantis in terra.

Per hoc patet solutio ad argumenta. < Q UE S T I O 2 2 > Co n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r ut r u m m ul t i t u d o p e c u n i e s i < n > t u e r e d i ui t i e Arguitur quod sic, quia omnes uel plures eas appetunt; et talia sunt uere diuitie, quia impossibile est appetitus omnium uel plurium corrumpi. Item, per eas possunt haberi omnia necessaria ad uitam, ut dicit 5 PHILOSOPHUS, 1º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera.

17 habet2] habeat B | plus] post B 1 8 illud] illa B 2 1 habendis] habentis B 2 2 et] ad B 25 principio] principia B 2 6 absolutam] suppl. ex quo invenitur in fontibus allatis 2 7 character] scrips. caraptum, correxi ex fonte allata B 25 propter…27 character] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a38- 41; cf. etiam Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “... set postea ut homines liberarentur a necessitate mensurandi uel ponderandi impresserunt aliquem characterem, quod imponitur in signum quod metallum sit tante quantitatis, sicut etiam in aliquibus locis imponuntur quedam signa publica ad mensuram uini uel frumenti” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A102, ll. 147-152) et Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. II/3.9: “Sed quia difficile erat in omni emptione vel venditione semper ponderare metalla, ut ementes et vendentes absoluerentur ad huiusmodi pondere, in ipsis metallis sculptum fuit signum aliquod, ut imago principis” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 370) 2 2 , 1 Consequenter…di5 per…uitam] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a31-b2, ubi uitie] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b5-7 tamen asseritur: “Videtur tamen et eorum quae exterius sunt bonorum indigens, quemadmodum diximus. Impossibile enim vel non facile bona operari impotentem tribuere existentem; multa quidem enim operata sunt, quemadmodum diximus, per organa, per amicos, per divitias et civilem potentiam” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 386, l. 31-p. 387, l. 3)

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

761

Oppositum arguitur ratione PHILOSOPHI, quia quod est conditum uoluntate humana non est uere diuitie; pecunia est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. 10

Item, inconueniens est habere ueras diuitias et periri fame; sed possibile est aliquem, multitudinem pecunie habentem, periri fame; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod diues est qui est | per se ad uitam sufficit sibi, et B 62va sic Primum est maxime diues, sicut dicitur in De Causis, quia est sibi sufficientissimum ad uitam suam. Talia autem sunt que sunt hominis 15 nutrimentum et uestimentum, et sic de aliis necessariis ad uitam. Et ideo, quia pecunia non est huiusmodi, ideo est dicendum quod pecunie sint uere diuitie, et hoc per constitutionem hominum, ut dictum est.

Ad argumenta patet solutio. Ad primum dicendum quod non est semper uidendum sicut sapientes; et 20 ideo uere diuitie sunt quas appetunt sapientes per se. Ad secundum patet solutio. Cum dicitur “illa sunt uere diuitie quibus possunt haberi omnia necessaria ad uitam”, falsum est, ut dictum est. < Q U E S TIO 2 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m a p p e t i t u s f i n i s s i t i n f i n i t u s Arguitur quod non, quia inclinatio nature finite non potest esse infinita, quia inclinatio sequitur naturam; sed appetitus finis est alicuius nature finite, sicut hominis; ergo et cetera.

2 2, 13 sic] est add. sed exp. B 1 9 sicut1…sed] suppl. ex supra, l. 2 7 quod…8 diuitie] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b10-13, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.7: “non sunt uere diuitie ille que uariata hominum dispositione nullam dignitatem neque utilitatem habent ad necessitatem uite” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A103, ll. 207-209) 13 Primum…diues] Auct. Arist., Liber De Causis (16), p. 232; Liber de Causis XX (162) (ed. Pattin, p. 92, ll. 48-49) ***] aliquid deest, quod suppleri potest ex loco illo eidem questioni dicato in QQ. I, q. 14 24, ll. 16-22 1 7 hoc…est] deest supra (l. 14) locus ille ubi explicatur quod divitiae naturales valent ad defectum naturae humanae supplendum, et ideo haec verba comprehendi hic plene non possunt; cf. etiam supra, q. 19, ll. 13-17 22 ut…est2] cf. supra, ll. 14-17 23,1 Consequenter…infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b40-1258a2

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Item, aliquis est finis qui est finitus; sed appetitus infinitus non 5 potest esse nisi boni infiniti, quia bonum uel quod bonum appetitur; quare et cetera. Item, quanto aliquid magis desideratur, quando adeptum est, tanto sequitur maior delectatio; sed ex adeptione finis non sequitur delec10 tatio infinita; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in isto 1º Politice.

Dicendum quod infinitum dicitur quod priuatur fine siue termino, quia terminus et finis sunt idem: terminus est ultra quod nichil est et infra quod omnia, ut dicitur in 5º Metaphisice. Sed inuenitur terminus in magnitudine, et similiter in essentia, secundum quod diffinitio dicitur terminus rei; 15 dicitur similiter terminus siue finis, cuius causa fit aliquid. Et omnis terminus reducitur ad aliquem istorum modorum: cum ergo finitum dicatur aliquid a numero, dicitur finitum secundum quantitatem, quod habet terminum in esse, et tertio 20 modo dicitur finitum quod habet finem, cuius est causa. Ergo, per oppositum, infinitum in magnitudine simpliciter quod nullum terminum habet penitus magnitudinis; infinitum secundum quid quod secundum quid non habet terminum, sicut secundum unam partem uel dimensionem tantum. Similiter infinitum in esse simpliciter a nullo terminatur, sicut primum ens, 25 quod in nullo recipitur nec aliquo terminatur nec ab aliquo causatur; infinitum in genere et secundum quid sicut qualitas secundum se considerata, que nullo sui generis terminata est. Similiter tertio modo dicitur aliquid infinitum simpliciter quia non habet finem, cuius causa sit, et illud simpliciter infinitum quod nullius causa; infinitum secundum 30 quia non est propter aliud in suo genere, nec habet finem in isto genere. 23 ,5 qui] non add. B 6 boni] homini B 8 quanto] quando B | aliquid] aliquis B 13 infra] correxi ex fonte allata: intra B 1 6 cuius causa] inv., correxi ex fonte allata B | aliquid] aliud B 18 numero] uero B 23 quid2] quia B 24 dimensionem] scrips. dimentionem B 28 nullo] nulla B 3 0 secundum] sed B 11 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b25-28 13 terminus2…14 omnia] Arist., Metaph. V.17, 1022a4-5: “Terminus dicitur quod est cuiuslibet ultimum et cuius extra nichil est accipere primi et cuius infra omnia primi” (ed. AL XXV.3.2, p. 115, ll. 657- 658) 1 5 diffinitio…rei] cf. Arist., Metaph. II.2, 994b16-18 1 6 terminus1…aliquid] cf. Thomam, In Metaph. V.19: “Tertius modus dicitur terminus, cujus causa fit aliquid; hoc enim est ultimum intentionis, sicut terminus secundo modo dictus est ultimum motus vel operationis” (ed. Cathala, p. 327)

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

763

Tunc dico ad questionem quod appetitus finis potest considerari ex parte appetenti in quo est: si sic consideretur est finitus quia, cum sit 35 appetitus finiti, oportet quod ipse sit finitus. Vel potest considerari per comparationem ad obiectum, et sic dicendum quod non potest dici infinitus secundum magnitudinem, quia tale infinitum esse non potest; sed appetitus ultimi finis simpliciter per comparationem ad obiectum est infinitus secundum esse, inquantum est alicuius 40 infiniti simpliciter. Item, est infinitus tertio modo, quia est finis, ita quod non est propter aliud: et isto tertio modo appetitus finis est infinitus in quocumque ponatur finis, quia appetitus est alicuius propter se et non gratia alterius.

45

Per hoc ad argumenta. Primum bene probat quod appetitus per comparationem ad appetentem est finitus et terminatus, non tamen quin sit infinitus ex parte obiecti, quia non habet finem, sed est ipsius finis. Ad secundum similiter patet solutio per iam dicta. Ad tertium similiter dico quod delectatio eo modo est infinita quo appetitus, quia ex parte obiecti non habet finem, sicut nec appetitus. < Q U E S TIO 2 4 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u tr u m a p p e t i tu s d i u i t i a r u m s i t i n f i n i t u s Arguitur quod non, quia appetitus eius quod ordinatur in alium finem non est infinitus, ut dicitur in littera; sed diuitie ordinantur in aliud; ergo et cetera.

5

Oppositum arguitur quia, 2º huius, dicitur quod, quanto plus habentur pecunie, tanto plus appetuntur; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod pecunia potest considerari secundum quod ordinatur in alium finem, sicut ad necessaria uite humane. Et sic, quia desiderium eorum que sunt ad finem ex fine determinationem sumit, quia tantum 3 5 appetitus] praem. accidens B | subiecti] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 25, ll. 59-62 4 1 est3] eius B 48 delectatio] dilectio B 2 4, 1 Consequenter…infinitus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b25-34 2 appetitus…3 infinitus] Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257b27-28 5 quanto…6 appetuntur] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a41-b5

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desideratur quantum est utile ad finem, ideo, cum pauce diuitie sufficiunt 10 necessitati humane, ideo, sic considerando, appetitus earum non potest esse infinitus. B

62vb

Si autem pecunie appetantur sicut finis, ita quod aliquis ponat ibi finem suum, cum appetitus finis sit infinitus, sic appetitus | pecuniarum est infinitus. Et sic consideratur in campsoria, et hoc ostenditur quia, secun- 15 dum PHILOSOPHUM, illud est infinitum in quo idem est principium et finis, sicut patet de motu primo: hec enim una ratio PHILOSOPHI de perpetuitate motus primi; sed ibi idem est principium et finis, quia principium commutationis in campsoria est pecunia et similiter finis; ergo et cetera. Item, ponens finem in diuitiis, quanto plus habet tanto plus appetit, 20 quia querit perfectam delectationem in eis et nunquam reperit perfectam, sed semper est in motu et in imperfectione ista delectatio. Et ideo semper ultimum appetit eas, ut magis tempor delectetur; unde talis facit diuitias deum suum.

Argumenta procedunt uiis suis.

25

< Q UE S T I O 2 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m u s u s c a m p s o r i e s i t c o n t r a i u s t i t i a m Arguitur quod sic, quia est uituperabilis iuste campsoria, ut dicitur in littera; ergo et cetera. Item, omne quod est preter naturam est iniustum, quia est uiolentum; sed preter naturam pecunie est quod pro eius commutatione acquira- 5 tur pecunia, quia ad hoc non est ordinata, sed ad necessaria uite; ergo et cetera. Item, illa commutatio est iniusta in qua aliquis plus recipit quam det; sic est in proposito, quia aliter campsor non mutaret; quare et cetera. 24 ,1 1 uite] suppl. ex supra, l. 8 | humane] humana B 14 infinitus] sic appetitus finis sit infinitus add. B 2 3 eas] eos B 2 5, 5 pecunie] correxi ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. I, q. 20, arg. 2: “Item, quod est preter naturam non est iustum ... Philosophus uult quod est contra naturam, quia ibi fit commutatio pecunie in pecuniam, quod est contra naturam pecunie” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 9ra): presens B 16 illud…17 primo] cf. Arist., Phys. VIII.8, 264b9-265a2 et VIII.9, 265a13 2 5, 1 Consequenter…iustitiam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258a38-b4 2 est…campsoria] Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258a40b1. Vide etiam adn. ad loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 27, ll. 3-5

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO) 10

765

Oppositum arguitur: illud est iustum quod est necessarium ad communicationem ciuilem; sed usus campsorie est huiusmodi, quia necessarius longe distantibus.

Item, qui accipit quod est alterius, et hoc ex uoluntate eius cuius est, non facit iniustum, quia iniustum pati contra uoluntatem est eius qui 15 patitur, ut dicitur 5º Ethicorum. Sed in campsoria ille qui plus accipit, ex uoluntate alterius, qui uoluntarie facit commutationem; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod ista questio potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo utrum usus campsorie sit contra iustitiam, et hoc siue campsor accipiat 20 plus siue minus. Et sic dico quod, si fiat talis commutatio ordinando eam ad necessitatem uite, ad quam nata est ordinari, sic non est contra iustitiam, quia ordinare aliquid in illud in quod natum est ordinari non est contra iustitiam. Sed si fiat talis commutatio non ordinando eam in necessitatem uite, sed ponendo finem in pecunia, ita quod solum intendatur 25 augmentatio pecunie, sic est contra iustitiam, quia omnis actus ex quo generatur malus habitus est contra iustitiam; sed commutatio pecunie propter talem finem est huiusmodi, quia generatur inordinatus appetitus pecunie et, per consequens, per hoc contingunt plura mala; quare et cetera. Item, iste actus per quem ponitur ultimus finis quod secundum se non 30 habet ratio ultimi est contra legem iustitie; sed hic ponitur pecunia ultimus finis, que non est; ergo et cetera. Et sic utendo campsoria, dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod est uituperabilis. Alio modo potest intelligi questio utrum contra iustitiam sit si campsor minus det quam recipiat. Et dico quod, omnibus pensatis conditionibus, 35 non potest iuste plus accipere quam dare, quia iustitia commutatiua est in equalitate secundum proportione arismeticam, que est in hoc, quod quantum unus dat tantum recipiat, quia, nisi tantum reciperet quantum daret, tum sua substantia sic tandem deficeret, et sic tandem commutatio et communicatio. Et ideo tantum debet aliquis accipere quam dare et, 11 ciuilem] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 27, l. 14, Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. I, q. 20: “In oppositum arguitur quia illud est iustum quod est neccessarium ad communicationem ciuilem” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 9ra) et Anonymi Vaticani QQ. I, q. 25: “Oppositum arguitur: illud quod est necessarium ad communitatem ciuilem ...” (ms. Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 1030, f. 19ra) : uite B 13 qui] quod B 1 6 commutationem] communicationem B 2 5 quia…26 iustitiam] add. per hom. B 38 commutatio…39 communicatio] inv., correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 27, ll. 48-50 B 14 iniustum2…15 patitur] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.9, 1136b6

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omnibus pensatis, si unus daret est contra 40 iustitiam.

B 63ra

Sed sciendum quod ualor rei non debet accipi secundum dignitate rei absolute, quia uilissimum animal preualet auro cuilibet; et ideo dignitas rei in commutatio debet accipi secundum quod uenit in usum humanum. Nec debet attendi quantum ad necessitatem eius qui uendit uel qui emit, quia aliquando plus reputat aliquid quam ualet, sed secundum indigentiam et usum communem, quia iustitia intendit bonum ; et ideo debet attendi indigentia ciuitatis uel regionis, ita quod tantum ualet quantum ualet ad usum et indigentiam ciuitatis. Et ex parte commutantis debet commutari labor cum pecunia, quia ex lege non tenetur commutare , et labor debet uendi secundum usum ciuitatis. Sed aliquando contingit quod res que est melioris ualoris secundum se quam alia que est minoris | ualoris, secundum usum istius ciuitatis, sicut patet de tritico. Sic est de pecunia, quia fit commutatio pecunie unius ciuitatis pro pecunia alterius ciuitatis que non habet usum in hac ciuitate, et ideo minus ualet in hac ciuitate quam in propria, et tamen in ciuitate propria plus ualet quam id quod accipit in hac pro ipsa. Et sic plus potest accipere commutans, uel propter dignitatem laboris secundum quod refertur ad usum ciuitatis uel quia res minus ualet quam in propria ciuitate, et sic licitum est plus accipere quam dare per accidens, ut dictum , sine iniustitia quia, omnibus pensatis, non plus recipit.

45

50

55

60

Ad argumenta patet solutio. Ad primum dico quod Aristoteles intelligit quod campsoria est uituperabilis quando ordinatur ad pecuniam 65 propter se, et non quando ordinatur ad uite necessitatem. Ad secundum similiter dicendum quod isto modo campsoria ordinat pecuniam pre naturam eius, alio modo non. Ad tertium similiter patet quia, omnibus pensatis, non plus dat quam recipiet.

4 0 si] sed B | daret] debet B | minus…hoc] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 27, ll. 46- 47 et 50-52 4 2 secundum] sine B 4 6 reputatur] refutat B | aliquid] aliquis B 52 secundum] scilicet B 5 4 tritico] scrips. turtico B 69 quam] quod B 60 sic…61 est] cf. supra, ll. 42-58

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

767

< Q U E S TIO 2 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m a c c i p e r e a l i q u i d p r o u s u p e c u n i e a c c o m o d at e s i t c o n t r a i u s t i t i a m Arguitur quod non, quia hoc accipere per uoluntatem recipientis, qui ad hoc uoluntarie se obligat; sed facere iniustum est acci5 pere quod est alterius contra eius uoluntatem; ergo et cetera. Item, argentum motatum et conuersum in uas idem secundum substantiam; sed ex usu ciphi potest aliquis recipere iuste pecuniam; ergo et cetera. 10

Oppositum arguitur: illud maxime corrumpit amicitiam, per quam maxime ciuitas conseruatur. Item, tandem per hoc tota substantia hominis, cum sit finita, consumeretur; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod per se est unus usus pecunie, quem proprie ordinatur, et iste usus est commutatio, ut dicit supra PHILOSOPHUS; unde, 15 amota commutatione, ad nichil utilis est, quia non habet alium usum per se. Vsus eius per accidens est ad quem non est ordinata de se quando ad istum ordinatur, ut si ordinetur ad ponderandum. Dico ergo quod accipere aliquid pro usu per se pecunie est iustum, quia qui concedit pecuniam concedit usum pecunie, et qui concedit usum 20 eius necessario concedit eius substantiam, quia usus eius est commutatio. Sed commutatio non potest fieri quin dominium transferatur ad alium, et non potest dominium aliquis habere quin usus rei sit in dominio suo; et ideo qui accipit pro usu pecunie tradite pro usu rei aliene, quod est contrarium . 25

Item, quando traduntur aliqua cuius usus non potest concedi nec potest concedi quin illud conuertatur in substantiam domini, qui simul traditur dominium et usus qui consequitur, sicut bladum et omnia que immediate ordinantur in uitam humanam; et ideo in talibus non potest concedi usus qui concedatur dominium. Et ideo in omnibus 2 6, 1 utrum] aliquid add. sed exp. B 6 argentum] et add. sed exp. B 11 Item] idem B 14 iste] iustus B 1 7 ad] aliquid B 24 contrarium] contrarius B 2 7 qui] quasi B 26,1 Consequenter…2 iustitiam] cf. Arist., Pol. I.10, 1258b2-8 9 amicitiam…10 conseruatur] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-23 14 iste…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.9, 1257a28- 41

768

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

talibus plus accipere quam equale est contrarius , quia 30 non potest aliquid accipere pro usu et res uel substantia rei maneat sua; et ideo pro usu accipere nichil potest, quia dominium rei suum est, ex quo conceditur usus, et ideo ibi est uenditio, ubi equalitas quantitatis conseruari debet.

Ad argumentum primum in oppositum dico quod, licet accipere 35 ad usuram sit uoluntarium sub conditione, ut quando indiget, non tamen simpliciter est uoluntarium, sicut proicere merces in mari , et in tali bene potest alicui fieri iniustum. Ad aliud dico quod, licet argentum monetatum et uas sint idem secundum substantiam, tamen ad alios usus ordinantur, quia uas ordinatur 40 in aliquem usum qui potest alicui concedi sine hoc quod concedatur , et ideo pro isto usu aliquid potest accipi. Sed usus pecunie est commutatio, qui non potest concedi sine dominio. < Q UE S T I O 2 7 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m s e r u i s e c u n d u m s e o p o r te a t e s s e a l i q u a m u i r t u te m Videtur quod non: uirtus est habitus electiuus, qui non est sine consilio; sed seruus non habet consiliatiuum, ut dicitur in littera; ergo et 5 cetera. B 63rb

Item, uirtus est habitus quo aliquis operatur cum uoluerit; ; ergo et cetera. Minor patet quia seruus | non operatur nisi secundum quod directus est a domino. 3 5 quod] quam B 3 6 sit] fit B 37 sicut] siue B | ut…38 nauis] suppl. ex fonte allata 42 substantia] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 28, ll. 71-72 | usu] usum B 2 7, 2 aliquam] aliquem B 6 sed…7 uult] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 29, l. 8 3 5 licet…38 nauis] cf. Thomam, QQ. Disp. de Malo q. 2, art. 3, ad 4: “necessitas coactionis absolute repugnat uoluntario, et talis necessitas omnino excludit culpam. Est tamen quedam necessitas mixta uoluntario, puta cum nauta cogitur merces in mare proicere ut uitet submersionem nauis” (ed. Leon. XXIII, p. 37, ll. 117-122); cf. etiam Thomam, ScG III.5 (ed. Leon. XIV, p. 15, ll. 13-16); Thomam, Super Sent. IV, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2, contra (ed. Fiaccadori VII.2, p. 942); Thomam, Super II Cor. cap. 9, lect. 1 (ed. Cai, p. 515, nr. 331). Idem exemplum etiam invenitur in: Aegidius de Lessinia, De usuris in communi cap. 15 (ed. Fiaccadori XVII, p. 431) 2 7, 1 Consequenter…2 uirtutem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b21-23 4 seruus…consiliatiuum] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

10

769

Oppositum arguitur: cuius est aliqua operatio secundum rationem, oportet quod habeat uirtutem per quam possit operari secundum rationem; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod, si seruus debeat attingere ad operationem que sibi debetur, oportet quod habeat uirtutem, quia, si debeat bene operari, oportet quod habeat per quam potest operari et per quam remo15 ueantur impedimenta. Sed serui est operari rationem, quia oportet quod operetur ea que precipit dominus, et hoc uoluntarie siue secundum uoluntatem. Et seruus non potest ea exequi nec operari nisi habeat persuasionem, nisi habeat rationem. Et sic oportet quod habeat per quod impedimenta amoueantur; sed illud quod impedit ipsum 20 est inordinatus appetitus, et illa indinatio amouetur per uirtutem, que appetitum perficit; quare oportet seruum habere uirtutem, et hoc dicitur in littera quod oportet seruum habere uirtutem tantam, quod non diminuat operari propter intemperantiam neque propter timiditatem. Item, cuius est aliqua operatio secundum quod huiusmodi, oportet quod secundum huiusmodi habeat principium illius operationis. Sed serui est operatio, cuius principium est prudentia, quia seruus est organum actiuum, ita quod seruus inquantum huiusmodi attingit ad actionem uite. Sed principium actionis est prudentia mediante uoluntate; et ideo oportet quod, ad hoc quod seruus attingat ad actionem rectam, ad 30 quam ordinatur secundum quod huiusmodi, quod habeat prudentiam. Sed prudentiam non potest habere sine uirtutibus moralibus, que faciunt appetitum rectum finis; quare et cetera. 25

14 quam2] que B 15 operari] scrips. operaris B 1 6 dominus] domino B 1 9 amoueantur] correxi ex infra, l. 20: amatur B | impedit] impeditur B 3 1 potest] ut B 17 nisi…18 persuasionem] cf. QQ. I, q. 10, ll. 19-23 et q. 17, ll. 14-16 ubi loquitur de persuasione quam servus recipit a domino 22 oportet…23 timiditatem] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a33-36 2 7 seruus…28 uite] reiciendum non est quod hic, ubi dicitur “ad actionem uite”, textus quamdam corruptionem passus sit; si sic, opinandum est potius legendum esse “ad actionem virtutis”, quoniam hic asseritur quod prudentiae, quae est principium actionis, opus est virtute, quae “finem facit operari” (cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.9, 1144a7-9 et VI.10, 1145a5-6). Si, contra, hic textus passus non est corruptione, ‘vita’ hic intelligi debet ut operatio, iuxta significationem de qua cf. supra, ubi dicitur “dicitur uita operatio procedens a forma” et “illud dicitur uita ad quod natura inclinat” ( cf. q. 16, ll. 11 et 22). In QQ. enim sic legitur: “Seruus autem ordinatur ad finem, qui est uita; uita autem est actio quedam; ergo seruus erit organum actiuum”; cf. QQ. I, q. 10, ll. 40- 41

770

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Ad rationem in oppositum dicendum quod uirtus in seruo est habitus preconsiliatus, non consilio quod est in se, sed consilio domini; sed in domino uirtus utitur consilio quod est in eo, et ideo non est uirtus unius 35 rationis. Et ideo seruus se habet ad dominum et puer ad pedagogum quodammodo, sicut uires inferiores ad rationem, in quibus manet uirtus rationis. Ad secundum similiter dico quod illud quod non potest operari cum uult, ostenso quid est operandum, non habet uirtutem; sed quod prius ostenditur a ratione quid est operandum, antequam , per uirtutem operatur. Sic autem seruus operatur quando uult operari, si fuerit sibi ostensum quid est operandum; et ideo non ualet. < Q UE S T I O 2 8 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a n t i s e t s e r u i s i t u n a u i r tu s s e c u n du m r a t i o n e m Arguitur quod sic, quia horum est una uirtus, qui sunt unius speciei, quia uirtus consequitur speciem; sed principans et subiectum sunt 5 huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Item, horum est unus finis; ergo et uirtus, quia finis ordinat appetitum. Oppositum arguitur, quia tunc non esset ratio quare unus magis principetur quam alius; sed unus secundum naturam alii principatur; ergo et 10 cetera.

Dicendum quod istorum non est una uirtus specie, quia diuersorum secundum rationem oportet esse diuersas uirtutes specie; sed seruus et dominus secundum quod huiusmodi differunt specie, sicut actiuum et passiuum; quare et cetera. 3 4 preconsiliatus] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 29, ll. 3-4 cum adn.: preconciliatus B tur] utatur B 4 2 operatur 1] operetur B 2 8 , 8 unus] unius B

3 5 uti-

3 5 non…36 rationis] virtus de qua hic agitur est virtus domini et servi, quae in seq. q. considerabitur 3 6 seruus…38 rationis] ista comparatio desumpta est ex Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a4-11 28,1 Consequenter…2 rationem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b26-27 et 32-36

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO) 15

771

Dicendum quod huiusmodi uirtutes habent quandam anologiam: nam uirtus serui habet habitudinem ad dominum et eius uirtutem, inquantum per eius uirtutem natus est exequi secundum quod ordinatur a domino et secundum electionem domini.

Item, sicut est in speculatiuis, ita est suo modo in practicis. Sed in speculatiuis non solum distinguuntur habitus distinctione obiectorum, sed ex diuerso modo considerandi, sicut patet: astrologia et naturalis rotunditatem terre , sed una per stellas, alia per causas naturales; ergo similiter, si aliquis finis idem diuersimode intendatur, hoc erit diuersis habitibus. Sic est in seruo et domino, quia 25 dominus intendit istum finem sicut dirigens et ordinans, seruus autem per suas uirtutes, sicut exequens et ordinatus ab alio; quare erit alia uirtus huius et illius.

20

Item, uidemus in partibus anime quod semper, in illis que nate sunt obedire et principari, semper est alia uirtus. Ergo et 30 in proposito, et tota ratio erit in hoc, quod uirtus subditi non est motus nisi secundum habitudinem ad uirtutem et rationem domini, et ideo dicitur per anologiam ad istam. Item, PHILOSOPHUS quod seruus non habet consilium et tamen dominus habet, quare prudentia non est eis unius rationis, et sequitur 35 quod nec uirtutes morales; unde uirtutes domini ordinantur ad di|rigen- B 63va dum et principandum, serui autem ad bene seruiendum et exequendum.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum dicendum quod illa que sequuntur dominum et seruum secundum naturam speciei unius rationis sunt; sed non est aliqua uirtus moralis que sequatur hominem secundum quod 40 homo, sed sequitur hominem secundum dispositionem existentem in hoc uel in illo, que non est una in omnibus. Ad aliud dicendum quod, licet serui et domini sit unus finis, tamen non eodem modo acceptus; sed domini est illum finem prestituere et alia in illum dirigere, serui exequi; et ideo non oportet quod propter hoc 45 sit istorum una uirtus per quam appetitus dirigatur in hunc finem.

2 2 considerant] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 30, ll. 34-36 4 5 dirigatur] dominatur B 2 8 uidemus…29 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a4-7

25

ordinans] ordinaris B

772

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

< Q UE S T I O 2 9 > C o n s e q u en t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m o p o r t e a t a r t i f i c e m h a b e r e a l i q u a m u i r t u te m m o r a l e m Arguitur quod sic, quia, si artifex debeat operari, oportet remori illa per que impeditur in operatione, scilicet intemperantiam et 5 timiditatem et alia uitia; ergo et cetera. Item, oportet ipsum habere illa per que ordinatur in ultimum finem; sed hec sunt uirtutes morales; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS fine 1º huius.

Dicendum quod non oportet quod artifex uel principium artificialium 10 est ars existens in artifice, et artis principium est ratio secundum quod concepta est, et non electio uel uoluntas secundum quod huiusmodi; et ideo principium artificialium primum, secundum quod artificialia, non est uoluntas, quia, licet fiant ab artifice propter malum finem, attamen aliquando est bonum artificiatum et bonus artifex. Sed principium agibilium 15 est prudentia et finis uolitus, et non secundum quod apprehensus tantum, et ideo principium agibilium est recta uoluntas; et ideo ad opus artis non exigitur per se aliquid pertinens ad uoluntatem, et ita non oportet quod habeat uirtutes morales, per quas uoluntas ordinetur. Nam recta ratio agibilium non potest haberi sine recta uoluntate, quia inordinata uoluntas 20 talium peruertit iudicium; sed recta ratio factibilium, quod est ars, bene habetur preter uoluntatem rectam, quia uoluntate in talibus non peruertitur iudicium; quare et cetera. Sed per accidens requiruntur uirtutes, scilicet quantum ad usum artis siue ipsorum artificialium, quia, si eis debeat ratione uti et ad 25 bonum finem, et quando oportet et sicut , oportet quod habeat uirtutes morales. Sed hoc non est inquantum artifex, sed inquantum deputatur ad seruiendum, et hoc est quod dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod intan29 ,3 oportet] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 31, ll. 3 et 5: sed B 8 fine] sine B 9 per…10 factibilium] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. I, q. 31, ll. 16-18 1 8 oportet] correxi ex infra, ll. 26-27: habet B 29 ,1 Consequenter…2 moralem] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a36-38 3 artifex…5 timiditatem] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a33-39 8 Oppositum…huius] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a39-b2 2 8 intantum…29 seruitutis] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a40- 41

QUESTIONES – LIBER I (REPORTATIO)

30

773

tum immittit uirtutis quantum et seruitutis. Vnde sic est de ipso sicut de speculante, quia ad speculationem non requiritur uirtus moralis per se; sed quod sic speculetur, quando oportet et sicut et pro quo, est a uoluntate uirtute morali regulata. Sic de artifice, quia ad opus artis non requiritur uirtus, sed ad usum tantum, scilicet quod utatur modo quo oportet.

Ad argumenta patet solutio. Nam intemperantia et timiditas 35 non impediunt artificem nec opus artificis nec artem, que est eius principium, sed usum tantum, ne operetur sicut oportet. Vnde, cum aliquis dicatur bonus artifex, quia habet perfecte principium artificialium, licet non operetur, et hoc possit habere sine uirtutibus, ut dictum est; ideo et cetera. Sed bonus seruus non, quia bonus seruus dicitur per hoc 40 quod est principium agibilium, est prudentia, que non potest haberi sine uirtutibus moralibus. Et sic patet quid dicendum.

3 2 ad] aliud B 3 3 ad] s.l. B | usum] usus sed corr. B | quo] quod B 3 8 hoc…est] cf. supra, ll. 9-15, 21-23 et 32-33

< L I B E R SE C U N D US>

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r c i r c a 2 u m l i b r u m hu i u s , e t p r i m o q u e r i t u r u tr u m c i u i t a s s i t u n a Arguitur quod non, quia unum est quod est indiuisum; ergo quod multa, ratione non est unum; sed ciuitas est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. 5

Item, ciuitas non est muri nec edificia, sed populus; sed populus non est unum quid, quia est cetus multitudinis et iuris consensu in unitate communitatis sociatus, sicut dicit PLATO; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod ciuitas est una, quia habet unum finem ad quem ordinatur. Sed aliquid dicitur unum indiuisibilitate, et sic non est una; aliquid continuitate: quia non est unum continuum, non est sic una; aliquid dicitur unum ratione, quia unam formam naturalem nominat repertam in pluribus unitate, sicut species: sic non est una; aliquid dicitur unum unitate mixtionis, et sic non est una. unitate 15 ordinis, et est ibi ordo, quia procedit ab uno mouente et reducitur in unum finem, sicut in finem principantis. Et iste ordo attenditur quantum ad illud quod est proprium principantis, secundum quod mouet et non mouetur. Et hoc est ex ratione finis, et ideo primus ordo est principantis ad finem; secundus, mouentis 20 ad uoluntates subditorum; tertius, ciuium ad inuicem; quartus, eorum qui sunt in ciuitate ad extrinsecos. Et iste sumitur secun-

10

1, 2 una] liber secundus in marg. B 6 consensu] consensus B 1 1 continuum] continuatus B 16 principantis] presentis B 17 illud] idem B | principantis] coni. (cf. loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 1, ll. 36-37): homini B 18 mouet] mouent B 1 9 primus] primo B | principantis2] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 1, l. 46 2 1 quadruplex ordo] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 1, l. 45 1, 1 Consequenter…2 una] cf. Arist., Pol. II.1, 1261a14-18 6 est2…7 sociatus] sed re vera Cicero, De Re Publ. [1, 25] XXV (39); cf. loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 1, ll. 7-9 cum adn. 8 ***] deest argumentum in oppositum, vide loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 1, ll. 10-12 et Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 1: “Oppositum arguitur quia, quod non est unum, non est ; sed ciuitas est quodam ens; ideo et cetera. Maior patet quia ens et unum conuertuntur (cod.: conuertantur), ut patet 10º Metaphisice. Minor patet de se, et istud uult Philosophus in littera” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 11va) 1 0 aliquid…15 ordinis] Arist., Metaph. V.6, 1015b36-1016b32, sed praesertim 1016b23-32

776

B 63vb

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

dum ordinem principantis ad finem: primus, quia oportet principantem moueri a fine; | secundus, quia oportet subditos moueri ut principans precipit; tertius, quia oportet ciues ad inuicem communicare et conuenire et mouere se; quartus, quia oportet eos ad extrinsecum compugnare. Et 25 ideo, quia primum in ciuitate est finis, mutato fine, mutatur politia, quia omnia ordinantur in illum. Et ideo antiquitus, secundum quod diuersis diuersi fines uidebantur, constituebant diuersas politias et leges, quilibet magis conuenientes suo fini. Sed finis secundum ueritatem est unus.

Ad rationes patet solutio: nam, licet ciuitas non sit indiuisa secun- 30 dum quantitatem uel rationem, tamen est indiuisa secundum ordinem. Ad aliud dico quod ciuitas non est multitudo tantum, sed est multitudo ordinata, unde est populus ordinatus, et ideo est una secundum ordinem. < Q UE S T I O 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m o p t i m u m s i t c i u i t a te m e s s e m a xi m e u n a m Videtur quod sic, quia in hiis que sunt per se, si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis, et cetera; sed simpliciter bonum est per se ciuitatem esse unam; ergo maxime bonum est ipsam esse 5 unam. Item, optimum est ipsam ita esse unam quod nulle seditiones fiant in ciuitate; sed sic est si sit maxime una, quia est unio principantium et subditorum, et nullus dicere potest “hoc est meum”, per quod seditiones fiunt; ergo et cetera. 10 Oppositum arguitur, quia iam esset quid indiuisibile; sed hoc est impossibile, quia oportet in ciuitate esse homines diuersi ordinis et diuersos artifices; quare et cetera. 22 principantem] principare B 2 3 secundus] sensus B 2 7 illum] illud B 2 ,5 maxime2] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 2, l. 5 7 optimum] oppositum B 1 2 diuersi] hominis add. sed del. B 2, 1 Consequenter…2 unam] cf. Arist., Pol. II.1, 1261a12-22 (sicut q. praec.) 9 nullus…meum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b16-20, sed potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.2, ubi eadem sententia invenitur: “Si enim omnia sint communia, nullus potest dicere ‘Hoc est meum’” (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A124, ll. 12-13); cf. etiam Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b17-18 1 2 oportet…13 artifices] cf. Arist., Pol. II.2, 1261a29-30; III.4, 1277a5-11; IV.3, 1289b27-33; IV.4, 1290b37-1291a8

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

777

15

20

25

30

Dicendum quod aliquid dicitur unum quia indiuisum, et ideo quod pluribus modis est indiuisum est magis unum, sicut punctus quam continuum et continuum quam ordine tantum unum. Dico ergo quod non est optimum ciuitatem esse maxime unam punctus, nullam indiuisionem habentem, quia interimeretur ciuitas, cum de ratione sua sit composita ex diuersis partibus secundum rationem et diuersis hominibus et artibus. Sed dico quod optimum est ipsam maxime esse unam ordine, quia, quanto partes melius ordinantur ad se inuicem et ad finem, tanto melius est, quia melius attingere potest ciuitas ad finem ad quem ordinata est; et si partes non sint ordinate, statim deficit a fine; quare et cetera. Item, expedit sic ciuitatem esse unam quod possit saluari; sed hoc est maxime quando est maximus ordo, quia tunc est pax in ciuitate et amicitia, per quod saluatur maxime; quare et cetera. Sed sic non intellexit Plato, sed intantum ampliauit quod non esset ciuitas: nam oportet quod sit ordo parentum ad filios, quod remouit cum posuerit muliere filios siue pueros esse communes. Item, ciuitas debet assimilari inquantum est possibile uniuerso, in quo est ordo, quod inferiora reguntur superioribus.

Item, PHILOSOPHUS dicit quod ciuitatem oportet existimare sicut animal; sed in animali ratio est regulans et ordinans appetitum, et sunt ibi diuerse partes et operationes ordinate in bonum totius; unde non esset 35 bonum quod totum animal esset oculus; quare et cetera.

Rationes procedunt uiis suis.

17 punctus] positus B 27 unitatem] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 2, l. 55 3 2 oportet] debet B 2 5 amicitia…26 maxime] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.1, 1155a22-23 30 ciuitas…31 superioribus] cf. Auct. Arist., Metaph. XII (277), p. 138; Arist., Metaph. XII.10, 1075a11-21 3 2 ciuitatem…33 animal] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32, 36-37 3 4 unde…35 oculus] sic valde similiter in Aegidii Romani De Reg. Princ. III/1.8: “Sicut ergo, si non esset diuersitas in membris corporis, vt si omnia essent oculi, corpus imperfectum esset, quia licet videret, non posset audire, nec ambulare, sic si esset maxima conformitas in ciuitate” (ed. Romae 1607, p. 420)

778

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

< Q UE S T I O 3 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m h o m i n e s m a g i s c u r e n t b o n u m p r o p r i u m q u a m c o m mu n e Videtur quod non, quia magis curant quod magis diligunt; sed magis diligunt bonum commune, quia magis bonum magis diligitur; quare 5 et cetera. Item, magis curatur de fine quam de hiis que sunt ad finem, curantur nisi propter finem; sed bonum proprium est propter commune et ad illud ordinatur; quare et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

B 64ra

Dicendum quod curare dicitur aliquis illud, quod procurat et ea que iuuant ad illud et remouet impedientia, sicut paterfamilias pueris procurat bona et prohibet impedimenta. Et ideo curare est actus prudentie secundum quem aliquis ordinat actus suos et bonum alterius, et secundum quem actum diligit illud, quia prudentia presupponit rectum appetitum finis; quare et cura ordinata, et ideo cura quelibet presupponit uoluntatem huiusmodi ad illud, et hoc non est sine dilectione; unde amicitia est uelle alicui bonum et operari. Et ideo, quod magis diligitur, magis curatur; sed magis diligitur proprium bonum, quia dilectio sui est causa dilectionis alterius, 9º Ethicorum. Vnde maxime homo diligit se secundum illud quod est principale in eo secundum rectam rationem, et hic est intellectus. Et ideo secundum intellectum magis diligit se quam alios, et ideo magis diligimus quod nobis propinquius, et hoc est bonum | proprium magis quam commune, nisi in communi saluetur proprium; quare magis curatur. Vnde bonum non diligitur nisi nobis conueniens et proportionale, et tale est proprium; quare magis curant ipsum homines, et maxime bonum secundum intellectum debent curare; sed istud bonum necessario est commune. Sed licet bonum commune, quod includit pro3 ,3 curant] curent B 7 curantur] causatur B 10 bona] suppl. ex l. seq. et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 3, ll. 21-22 1 3 quem] quod B 1 4 prudentia] prudentiam B 1 9 9º] 4 B 3 ,1 Consequenter…2 commune] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-35 et etiam Auct. Arist., Pol. II (33), p. 254 9 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b33-38 1 2 curare…13 alterius] ad rectius intelligendum quod sit cura et quomodo etiam sit actus quo aliquis alicui 1 8 dilectio…19 alterius] Arist., Eth. Nic. ordinat bona cf. loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 3, ll. 18-23 IX.8, 1168b28-31 et 1168b34-1169a3 1 9 maxime…21 intellectus] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (186), p. 246; cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.8, 1168b31-1169a3

10

15

20

25

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

779

prium, magis debeat curari, tamen aliquando negligitur, uel propter malitiam hominum, uel quia unus expectat se ad alium, sicut exemplificat 30 PHILOSOPHUS ibidem, principio 2º huius, quod plures serui aliquando peius seruiunt quam pauci, sicut est de bono communi.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum dico quod homines magis diligunt bonum sibi conueniens. Vel etiam potest dici quod non semper magis curatur quod magis diligitur, quando expectat se homo quod alius 35 curet de isto, ut dictum est in exemplo de pluribus seruientibus, qui aliquando peius seruiunt. Eodem modo dicendum est ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod non curatur de fine, sed supponitur, et curatur de hiis que sunt ad finem. Vel posset dici quod istud totum prouenit ex malitia hominum, quia magis 40 curant bonum proprium quam commune.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m b o n u m s i t i n c i u i t a te f i l i o s e t u x o r e s e s s e co m m u n e s Videtur quod sic, quia per hoc erit maior amicitia inter ciues, quia tunc non magis afficientur ad unum quam ad alium, et sic erit 5 dilectio ad omnes; quare et cetera. Item, per hoc amouebuntur multa litigia, que per appropriationem horum contingunt ciuitati; quare et cetera. Item, per hoc ciuitas est maxime una, et hoc expedit ciuitati. Oppositum: illud ex quo sequitur indecentia non est conueniens ciui10 tati; sed hoc sequitur si uxores et filii sint communes, quod commixtio filiorum ad parentes et inclinationes filiorum ad proprios parentes, cum hoc ignoret, scilicet qui sint proprii parentes; quare et cetera.

2 8 tamen] cum B 3 0 principio] priuatio B 4, 4 equalis] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 4, l. 7 5 omnes] omnia B 9 conueniens] inconueniens sed corr. B 3 0 plures…31 pauci] cf. Arist., Pol. II.3, 1261b35-38 Arist., Pol. II.1, 1261a2-8

4 ,1

Consequenter…2 communes] cf.

780

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Dicendum quod magis expedit ciuitati quod uxores filii sint proprii et determinati quam communes. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est 15 quod illud dicitur expediens quod fini congruit, sicut sine quo finis non potest haberi, et illud magis expediens per quod facilius habetur. Nunc autem, cum felicitas practica sit operari secundum uirtutem perfectissimam politicam, que est prudentia, finis ciuitatis operatio secundum rectam rationem, et multa sunt necessaria ciuitati ad hoc quod iste finis sit, 20 sicut conseruatio ciuitatis et pax et concordia, id ergo quod magis impedit ad operationem rectam et amicitiam et conseruationem ciuitatis minus expedit: et hoc est uxores esse communes, quia tunc unus potest ad multas accedere, et ex tali commixtione fiunt intemperantie, et per hoc sequitur declinatio a recta ratione. Nam delectatio ueneris furatur intellectum 25 spisse sapientis, 7º Ethicorum dictum est. Et eodem modo de liberis, quod commiscentur cum parentibus indifferenter. Item, cum amicitia sit necessaria ciuitati, illud minus expedit per quod est minor amicitia ciues. Sed minor erit si sic est, quia, quanto aliquid est diuisum in plura, tanto minor est cura de illo, et quia etiam 30 uirtus unita fortior est se ipsa dispersa; ideo amicitia, quanto ad plura se extendit, minor est, ideo, 8º Ethicorum, dicitur quod perfecta amicitia non potest esse ad plures. Sed si filii sint communes, amicitia diffunditur ad multos, et ideo diminuitur amor: sic exemplificat de gutta mellis, mixta multe aque non sentitur, sic nec iste amor 35 dispersus ad omnes. Item, ad amorem facit cognitio dilecti, propter quod matres magis diligunt natos, quia magis certe ; sed per communitatem tollitur certitudo genitorum; quare et cetera. Item, expedit filios esse bene eruditos, unde, 1º Ethicorum, legislator 40 intendit ciues studiosos facere; sed, si filii sint communes, impeditur cura de nutritione et eruditione filiorum, quia incerti sunt; quare et cetera.

24 intemperantie] scrips. in tapte B 26 7º] 5 B 28 ciuitati] ciuitatis B 29 inter] lac. B 32 8º] 9 B 35 multe] correxi ex fonte allata: meliore B 38 primos] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 4, ll. 57-58 23 hoc…24 intemperantie] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263b7-9 25 delectatio…26 sapientis] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.6, 1149b15-18 32 perfecta…33 plures] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII (151), p. 243; Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.4, 1158a10-12 34 sicut…35 aque] Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262b17-18, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.3 : “... sicut cum parum de melle imponitur in multa aqua, nichil sentitur de dulcedine mellis” (ed. Leon. XVLIII, p. A129, ll. 137-140) 4 0 legislator…41 facere] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099b29-32

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

781

Item, oportet ciuitatem esse sicut animal, ut dictum est supra; sed in animali quolibet membrum habet propriam operationem et proprium 45 nutrimentum; ergo similiter in ciuitate quilibet debet habere propriam operationem et determinatam, que oportet esse uxores proprias et filios.

Ad argumentum primum dicendum quod non habetur per hoc maior amicitia, | sed minor: per hoc amicitia est diuisa ad plures, et sic est B 64rb 50 minor. Ad aliud dicendum quod non omnino possunt amoueri actiones contentionum, et hoc est propter diuersitatem uoluntatum. Sed maior est actio omnibus positis communibus, quia, cum plures uolunt ad unam accedere, unus uolet eam sibi appropriare et 55 alius similiter, et sic erunt bella et multa alia inconuenientia que ponuntur. Ad tertium dicendum quod ciuitas debet esse maxime una unitate ordinis et secundum rectam rationem. Nunc autem, licet, omnibus communibus positis, ciuitas sit magis una secundum quid, non tamen secundum ordinem et rationem rectam, quia ratio recta dicit quod unusquisque 60 propriis utatur.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m co m m i s c e r i p a r e n t i b u s c a r n a l i te r s i t c o n t r a n at u r a m Videtur quod non: quod turpe est secundum se et contra naturam nunquam debet inueniri in natura; sed in natura uidemus tales commix5 tiones, saltim in brutis et in hominibus aliquarum regionum; quare et cetera.

51 amoueri] quo moueri B 52 contentionum] contentionem B | uoluntatum] uoluntatem B 54 uolunt] scrips. uelent B | uolet] nolet B 59 unusquisque…60 propriis] unusquosque propria B 5 ,3 et] etiam B 4 3 oportet…supra] cf. supra, II, q. 2, ll. 32-33 5 ,1 Consequenter…2 naturam] cf. Arist., Pol. II.4, 1262a32-37

782

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Item, arguitur ratione Zenonis: nam eadem ratio uidetur esse de membris deputatis ad illud et de aliis; sed non est turpe alia membra matris et filii simul confricari; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS.

10

Dicendum quod nullus nunquam posuit, ratione recta utens, quin hoc sit turpe; tamen aliquis, propter defectum rationis, hoc operatur, sicut accidit in barbaris. Sed Plato hoc dicit tantum esse ne nimis augmentaretur concupiscentia, quia multa est dilectio naturalis parentum ad filios, ideo, si possent commisceri, augeretur concupiscentia, ita quod deficit ratio, et 15 ideo est preter rationem; quare turpe ista ratio Platonis rebus conuenit. Sed tamen non propter hoc tantum est turpe, sed, eo ipso quod pater est uel soror, turpis uel talis commixtio. Sed querenda est huius ratio. Circa quod sciendum quod filius habet esse et nutrimentum et eruditionem a parentibus, et filius, pro quolibet quod habet, debet retribui- 20 tionem patri; etsi daret ei omnia que habet, non esset condigna retributio, 8º Ethicorum, ideo sufficit patri quod sibi retribuat maius quod habet. Hoc autem est honor et reuerentia, et ideo illo modo tenetur filius patri retribuere; et ideo que sunt contra honorem matris, contra honorem filii sunt. Tunc sic arguitur: ad honorationem pertinet maxime quod aliquis 25 utatur ad actum uilissimum honorabili; sed commixtio est actus uilissimus, ut habetur 3º Ethicorum, tum quia communis brutis, tum quia intellectus et ratio per hoc maxime absorbetur; et ideo, ut parentibus in tali actu cedit in honorationem, et similiter inter illos qui sunt propinqui istis, sicut inter fratrem et sororem – sed usque ad quem gra- 30 dum non est presentis speculationis –. Hoc autem est abhominabile aliqui-

8 illud] illum B 1 4 concupiscentia] correxi ex infra, l. 15: concupiscens B 16 rebus conuenit] rerum contingit B 18 prohibita est] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 5, ll. 32-33 20 quolibet] quoque B 2 2 8º] 5 B 2 6 matri] suppl. ex supra, l. 24 et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 5, ll. 45-46 27 uilissimus] scrips. dilissimus B | 3º] 5 B 7 nam…9 confricari] Sextus Empiricus, Pirr. Inf. III.205: “Set etiam Citieus Zeno dixit non inconueniens esse membrum matris suo membro confricare, quemadmodum nec aliam quandam partem corporis eius cum manu fricare prauum utique quis dicat esse” (transl. latina: ex ms. Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, lat.X.267 [3460], f. 42vb); cf. etiam Sextum Empiricum, Adv. Math. XI.191 1 0 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.4, 1 3 Plato…14 concupiscentia] cf. loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 5, ll. 24-25 cum adn. 1262a32- 40 19 filius…21 retributio] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.8, 1163b12-27 2 6 commixtio…27 uilissimus] Arist., Eth. Nic. III.1, 1110a22-23 et 27-29, ubi tamen loquitur de occisione matris . Vide loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 5, ll. 45- 46 cum adn.

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

783

bus brutis, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in De Hystoriis quod elephas commiscuit se matri cooperte, et post, ipsa cognita, precipitauit se.

Ad argumentum primum dico quod hoc non inuenitur in natura 35 humana bene disposita, sed per eius corruptionem. Ad aliud dico quod inuenitur in brutis, quod non habet rationem nec debent sibi reuerentiam. De Zenone dico quod errauit, nec est simile de illis membris et aliis, quia actus illorum est turpior et indecentior quam actus aliorum membrorum.

H a b i t i s a u t e m h i i s c o n s i d e r a re . C i r c a i s t u d c a p i t u l u m q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x p e d i a t c i u i t a t i p o s s e s s i o n e s e s s e co m m u n e s Arguitur quod sic, quia illud expedit ciuitati per quod maxime saluatur amicitia; sed hoc est propter communitatem possessio, 5 quia, ex eo quod communes sunt, ciues equaliter afficiuntur circa eas, et non sunt propter eas seditiones et iniurie; quare et cetera. Item, si sint proprie, maior est sollicitudo circa ea, et per hoc impediuntur ab opere secundum uirtutem; quare et cetera. 10

Oppositum arguitur, quia non expedit pueros et uxores esse communes, ergo neque possessiones. Consequentia patet quia eadem ratio uidetur de omnibus istis.

Dicendum quod ciuis est aliquid secundum se et est aliqui ciuitatis, et ideo qui ei dupliciter punitur. Sic possessiones sunt aliquid huius ciuis et sunt aliquid ciuitatis, et ideo expedit possessiones secundum 15 quid esse communes et secundum quid esse proprias: unde expedit eas 3 2 commiscuit] scrips. commisciuit B 6 , 4 amicitia] antiqua B 8 ciues] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 6, ll. 8-9 9 et] ut B 1 3 forefacit] suppl. ex loc. parall. Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. II, q. 6: “homo potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo ut est pars ciuitatis, et sic qui forefacit homini forefacit ciuitati ... Alio modo potest considerari homo secundum se et absolute, non ut est pars ciuitatis” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 14rb); cf. etiam QQ. II, q. 6, ll. 22-25 cum adn. 3 2 elephas…33 se2] Arist., De Hist. An. VIII (Bekker IX).47, 631a1-7, sed animal de quo agitur in Aristotelis exemplo non est elephas, sed equus; cf. loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 5, ll. 57-59 cum adn. 6 ,1 Habitis…2 communes] Arist., Pol. II.5, 1262b36-37 et 39- 40

784

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

esse proprias quantum ad dominium et proprietatem, sed communes quantum ad usum. Primum patet quia possessiones sunt necessarie ciuitati, et ideo oportet ad hoc apponere curam diligentem; sed cura apponitur si sint proprie et 20 non sint communes; quare et cetera. B 64va

Item, non fit contentio in ciuitate si sint proprie, nisi propter inordinationem appetitus; sed, positis communibus, plures fiunt | accusationes, quia ex hoc quod commune est accidit hoc, ex quo quilibet credit habere ius in illo: sic patet peregrinantibus, qui pugnant per hoc quod in 25 aliquo communi dissentiunt; quare et cetera. Item, oportet ciues semper communicare, et ex hoc fit occasio dissensionis: sic patet quod multotiens est discordia inter nos et seruientes nobis, propter cohabitationem. Secundo esset discordia in distributione, quia qui plus laboraret minus reciperet, sicut agricole minus quam principes, et 30 tamen magis laborarent. Item, delectatio augmentat operationem circa illud, 10º Ethicorum; sed magis delectantur homines in habendo proprium quam commune, et ideo magis curant ; quare et cetera. Secundum patet similiter, scilicet quod expedit eas esse communes quantum ad usum, quia per hoc seruatur maior amicitia inter ciues, que 35 est maxime ciuitati necessaria, quia magis diligimus eum qui dat uoluntarie quam qui necessario; et ideo maior est amicitia si habeat propria et per uirtutem faciat eas communes quantum ad usum. Item, melior est modus habendi ex quo est maior delectatio secundum uirtutem; sed hoc est communicando eas amicis per liberalitatem, quia 40 dando amicis ; quare et cetera.

Ad argumentum primum dico quod esse communes non est principium maioris amicitie; quare non ualet. Item, non semper in ciuitate , sed melius est possibile, sicut natura facit non melius simpliciter, 45 sed melius sibi possibile. Et ideo, cum dicitur quod melius esset si essent 21 fit] sit B | nisi] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 6, l. 42: non B 3 2 proprium…commune] commune quam proprium B 3 8 faciat] faciant B 40 eas] eis B 41 exercentur…uirtutis] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 6, l. 77 44 fit…simpliciter] suppl. ex ll. seqq. et ex infra, q. 10, ll. 11-12 24 de…25 dissentiunt] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1263a17-21 3 1 delectatio…illud] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.5, 1174b23

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

785

communes et non esset cura circa eas, per quam impediuntur ab opere uirtutis, uerum est quod melius esset simpliciter quod non haberetur cura de eis, si esset possibile, sed non est possibile, si debeat ciuitas conser50 uari. Et ideo oportet esse curam secundum rectam rationem, et talis expedit ciuitati.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x p e d i a t mu l i e r e s o r d i n a r i a d b e l l u m Arguitur quod sic, ratione Platonis, quia in brutis natura parat femellas ad bellum sicut masculos; ergo et in hominibus ita erit. Item, illud expedit ciuitati ad quod natura inclinat; sed natura 5 inclinat omnia animalia ad bellum, quia, sicut appetunt uti alimento quiete, ita appetunt repellere prohibentia quietem: sed hoc est per bellum; ideo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Et arguitur ratione, quia natura non utitur uno ad duas operationes; sed natura ordinauit mulierem ad educa10 tionem prolis, ergo non ordinauit eam ad illud per quod istud impediretur; sed hoc esset per bellum.

Dicendum ad hoc quod non expedit, quia ad bellum necessaria est preuisio et prudentia. Et ideo illud non debet ordinari ad bellum quod non habet prudentiam perfectam, sed per se ab ea deficit; mulier est huiusmo15 di, quia habet debile consiliatiuum, ut dicitur 1º huius; ergo et cetera. Item, ad bellum requiritur animositas, quia oportet ibi aggredi terribilia maxime; sed mulier naturaliter est timida, propter frigiditatem: nam et melancolici sunt natura timidi, quia frigidi; quare et cetera.

7 ,1 3 illud] illa B 7 ,1 Consequenter…bellum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1264b37-38 2 ratione…3 erit] cf. Arist., Pol. II.5, 1264b5-7, sed potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. II.5: “... circa mulieres dicit quod Socrates dicebat quod mulieres debebant eadem tractare cum uiris, ut scilicet colerent agros et pugnarent ... et accipiebat parabolam, id est similitudinem, a bestiis in quibus femine similia operantur masculis” (ed. Leon. XVLIII, p. A137, ll. 236-242). Vide etiam Albertum, Pol. II.2 (ed. Borgnet VIII, p. 115) 8 Oppositum…9 operationes] Arist., Pol. I.2, 1252b1-5; 1 4 mulier…15 consiliatiuum] Arist., Pol. I.13, 1260a12-13 Auct. Arist., Pol. I (2), p. 252 16 oportet…17 maxime] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a23-26 et III.8, 1117a29-30

786

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Item, ad bellum requiritur robur corporis; sed mulieres in hoc deficiunt propter frigidum nimium, unde robur facit multitudo spirituum qui sunt 20 calidi et humidi, et mulieres in hoc deficiunt; et sic non habent ordinari ad bellum. Per accidens tamen, si in aliqua muliere inueniantur dispositiones opposite, potest ordinari ad bellum.

Ad argumenta. Ad primum dico quod non est simile de brutis et hominibus, quia ad brutum bellum non requiritur ratio nec animosi- 25 tas et robur; sed bellum hominis debet esse ratione regulatum, et animositate et robore, que deficiunt in muliere. Ad aliud dico quod natura non inclinat mulierem ad bellum propter causas dictas. Et cum tu dicis quod omnia animalia inclinantur ad remouendum impediens alimentum, uerum est, sed mulier non habet 30 inclinationem naturalem quod illud impediens prohibeatur per ipsam, quia natura deficit; ideo naturalem habet inclinationem quod per alium repellatur. Vnde uidemus quod magis requirunt auxilium ab aliis. < Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m l e x s i t a l i q u i d p e r t i n e n s a d r a t i o n e m Videtur quod non, quia illud quod est a uoluntate non pertinet ad rationem; lex est huiusmodi quia, sicut dicit iurisconsultus, quod principi placuit legis habet uigorem. Item, nec est potentia rationalis nec habitus nec actus; quare lex 5 non pertinet ad rationem. Oppositum arguitur, quia illud pertinet ad rationem, cuius actus rationi pertinet; sed actus legis pertinet rationi, quia legis est ordinare; quare et cetera.

B 64vb

Dicendum quod lex pertinet ad rationem, quia lex est regula humano- 10 rum actuum: sed tale ad rationem pertinet, quoniam primum in unoquoque genere | est causa omnium illorum que sunt in genere illo; sed ratio est 24 argumenta] argumentum B 8 ,4 habet] habuit B 8 quia] quare B 8 ,1 Consequenter…rationem] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, pp. 149-150) 3 quod…4 uigorem] Dig. 1.4.1

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

787

primum regulans in homine; quare et cetera. Et per hoc patet quod pertinet rationi practice, cum regulet actiones que pertinent practice. Item, non pertinet ei sicut potentia nec sicut habitus, sed sicut actus. Sed sciendum quod, sicut in speculatiuis est duplex actus, unus qui est ipsa operatio – sicut considerare –, alius est aliquid operatum – sicut ipsa propositio uel sillogismus, qui est non ratiocinari, sed est aliquid factum ratiocinandi –, sic rationis practice sunt duo actus: unus ipsum 20 considerare uel considerari, et alius propositio practica formata in agibilibus, et iste actus uel propositio dicitur lex. Et sicut in speculatiuis quedam propositiones que per se et primo sunt note, alie per istas, sic in practicis est quedam que est per se nota, et ista dicitur lex naturalis, ut ‘neminem ledere’; alia cui statim assentit intellectus nisi per prio25 rem determinetur, et talis potest dici ius positiuum. Et sic patet quod lex pertinet ad rationem sicut ad factum a ratione. 15

Ad primum argumentum dico quod illud quod est a uoluntate regulata ratione bene est a ratione, et sic est de lege. Vnde uoluntas principis, secundum quod princeps, est regulata ratione, quia prudentia facit 30 ipsum habere rationem principium. Ad secundum patet solutio, quia lex est actus rationis non quicumque, sed qui dictus est aliquid factum a ratione.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l e x o r d i n e tu r i n f i n e m c o m m u n e m Arguitur quod non, quia debet ordinari in finem agibilium; sed finis actuum humanorum est aliquid determinatum; quare et cetera. Item, finis legis est operatio legis, et eius operatio est 5 determinatum.

14 regulet] regules B 1 7 alius] aliud B 19 sic] sicut B 22 note] nate B 2 4 neminem] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 8, l. 42: hominem B | priorem] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 8, l. 43: precocem B 25 determinetur] correxi ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 175): delectetur B 28 principis] scrips. prinnis B 9, 3 determinatum] determinata B 9 ,1 Consequenter…communem] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2 et q. 96, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, pp. 150-151 et 180-181)

788

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS: nam, 5º Ethicorum, dicit quod lex precipit omnes actus uirtutum, et istarum est finis communis; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod lex rationem habet ex fine, quia lex est regula agibilium secundum quod agibilia, et ideo oportet quod sumat rationem ab eo 10 quod est primum principium agibilium: et hoc est appetitus finis, quare rationem sumit a fine. Et quod est primum in intentione est ultimum in executione, ut dicitur 3º Ethicorum, quare lex ordinatur in finem. Sed hoc est in finem communem, quia oportet finem proportionari hiis que sunt ad finem, et lex est quedam enuntiatio uniuersalis, quare ordinatur in finem 15 uniuersalem et ab illo sumit rationem – et non loquor de lege priuata –. Et ideo, cum lex rationem sumat ex fine, diuersimode sunt leges in diuersis politiis, secundum quod imponunt sibi diuersos fines; et ideo alique sunt bone ad aliquam politiam que non sunt bone simpliciter.

Propter argumenta sciendum quod, sicut in speculatiuis princi- 20 pium continet uirtute conclusiones et terminus determinatur nisi per sumptionem membri alicuius particularis, sic lex est propositio uniuersalis in agibilibus et finis eius proprius est operatio bona indeterminate; sed per subsumptionem ad particularem determinatur, ut lex ista “omnem depositum est restituendum” habet pro “si 25 depositi restitutio” in communi, sed determinatur adhuc per hoc quod dicitur “hoc est depositum”. Per hoc ad argumenta. Ad primum patet solutio, quia non ordinatur in finem alicuius agibilis determinate, nisi sicut dictum est. Per idem ad secundum.

7 omnes] esse B | istarum] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 9, l. 8: iste B 13 3º Ethicorum] 5 metaphisice B 1 4 quia] quare B 21 terminus] termino B | uniuersalis non] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 9, l. 31 2 2 sic] sicut B 2 4 finem] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 9, ll. 33-34 26 adhuc] ad hoc B 27 argumenta] argumentum B 6 lex…7 uirtutum] Arist., Eth. Nic. V.1, 1129b19-24; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 3 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 182) 1 2 quod…13 executione] Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. III (49), p. 236; Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112b23-24 28 non…29 est] cf. supra, ll. 22-27

30

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

789

< Q U E S TIO 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l e g i s l a to r i n s t i t u e n d o l e g e s d e b e a t i n s p i c e re a d h o m i n e s e t l o c a Videtur quod non, quia non oportet eum inspicere ad illud quod non est principium legis; sed lex rationem non sumit ex homine, sed ex 5 fine; ergo et cetera. Item, forma non sumit rationem ex materia, sed econuerso; sed homines habent rationem materie respectu legis; quare et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum ad hoc quod legislator, qui debet ordinare homines in finem, non debet inspicere in finem absolute, sed in finem prout est applicabilis eis qui ordinantur in finem. Vnde, sicut natura non semper facit quod est melius simpliciter, sed quod melius et possibile, sic legislator quod melius est et possibile intendit, et finem possibilem et applicabilem eis quos ordinat. Et quia diuersimode dispositis lex est diuersimode applicabilis, 15 ideo debet considerare homines quibus legem imponit, et diuersas imponere secundum quod diuersimode dispositi.

10

Iterum, oportet inspicere ad regiones quia, secundum earum diuersitatem, homines diuersimode disponuntur.

Ad argumentum primum dico quod lex non sumit rationem ex 20 fine absolute, sed ex fine ut est applicabilis hominibus; quare non ualet. Ad secundum dico quod materia non absolute, sed secundum quod ordinem habet in fine, bene dat rationem et diuersitatem forma, secundum quod in diuersa materia introducitur alia forma.

10 ,1 4 dispositis] dispositionis B 1 5 homines] hominia B 23 forma] materia B 10 ,1 Consequenter…2 loca] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1265a18-20 8 Oppositum…Philosophus] Arist., Pol. II.6, 1265a18-20 11 natura…12 possibile] Arist., Phys. VIII.6, 259a11-12

790

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

< Q UE S T I O 1 1 > B 65ra

C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m < n e c e s s a r i u m > s i t p o l i t i c u m r e g u l a r e p o sse ssi o ne s| Videtur quod non, quia non sunt nate regulari a ratione, cum non sint animate. Item, possibile est aliter se habere; ergo non est necessarium.

5

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Dicendum ad hoc quod non est necessarium simpliciter, sed est necessarium ex suppositione finis, scilicet, si finis debeat contingere, scilicet bonum ciuitatis quod intendit. Cuius ratio est quia que ordinantur in finem debent fini conuenire et ordinari secundum quod fini 10 conuenit. Et ideo pecunie et alia debent distribui ut expedit ciuitati, et hoc impeditur per concupiscentias, quia per hoc multe dissensiones oriuntur in ciuitate. Vnde, licet politicus non consideret diuitias absolute et secundum quod sunt naturales, eas tamen considerat secundum quod ueniunt in usum.

Ad argumentum dico quod possessiones sunt regulabiles ratione, 15 inquantum appetitu cadunt.

11 , 1 necessarium] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 11, l. 1 et Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a37 2 possessiones] passiones B 9 politicus] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 11, l. 24 et ex infra, l. 13 15 possessiones] passiones B 16 inquantum] in quam B 11 , 1 Consequenter…2 possessiones] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a36-38 6 Oppositum…littera] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a39- 40 17 ***] deest responsio ad argumentum, vide loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 11, ad 1, ll. 31-34

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

791

< Q U E S TIO 1 2 > C o n s e q ue n t e r q u e r i t ur u t r um e x p e d i a t p o s s e s s i o n e s c i ui b u s ess e e qu al es Arguitur quod sic; PHILOSOPHUS, 4º huius, dicit: quanto ciues ad equalitatem reducuntur, melior est ciuitas; quare et 5 cetera. Item, per hoc amouerentur litigia; quare et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum ad hoc quod non expedit eas esse equales secundum quantitatem, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Et ratio huius est quia oportet instrumenta 10 esse proportionata agenti et fini; sed diuitie sunt instrumenta quedam et organa homini ad uitam et operationem; et ideo oportet eas proportionari agenti et operationi. Sed de ratione ciuitatis est quod non omnes sint equales, quia in ea oportet quosdam principari et alios subici, nec omnes attingunt ad uirtutem et, secundum quod melius disponuntur habitibus, 15 melius ordinantur in finem. Quare oportet hoc modo possessiones esse equales, sed secundum proportionem, ita quod non attingens ad uirtutem nullas habeat possessiones aut paucas – nam, 4º Ethicorum, dicitur quod difficile est sine uirtute pati bonas fortunas –, qui uero ad uirtutem attingit oportet habere plures. Quare, cum ciues non sint uirtute 20 equales nec dispositi ad finem equaliter, non est bonum diuitias esse equales, nisi secundum proportionem, sicut plures fistule deberent dari et meliores meliori fistulatori. Et hec est ratio PHILOSOPHI, quod per hoc erunt seditiones, si equales sint, quia melior reputabit se dignum maioribus quam alius, et per hoc indignatus, et cetera.

12 ,1 possessiones] passiones B 3 huius] metaphisice B 4 magis] suppl. ex infra, l. 25 et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 12, l. 4 | tanto] suppl. ex infra, l. 26 et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 12, l. 5 13 quosdam] quedam B 15 Quare] quia B 17 habeat] habent B 19 cum] s.l. B 2 4 indignatus] indignato B 12 ,1 Consequenter…2 equales] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266a39- 40; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.17 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 441- 442) 3 quanto…4 ciuitas] cf. Arist., Pol. IV.11, 1295b25-28 7 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b8-14 et 24-28 8 non…quantitatem] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b24-28 9 oportet…10 fini] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 5, ll. 17-18 1 8 difficile…fortunas] Arist., Eth. Nic. IV.3, 1124a28-29 22 hec…24 cetera] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a37- 41; cf. etiam 1266b34-1267a1 et V.1, 1301a25-35

792

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Ad argumentum primum dico quod, quanto ciues magis reducun- 25 tur ad equalitatem et medium secundum rationem rectam, tanto melior est; non tamen oportet eos reduci ad medium secundum rem. , sed per equalitatem secundum proportionem magis remouetur litigia. < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m m a g i s ex p e d i a t o r d i n a r e c o n c up i s c e n t i a s q u a m p o s s e s s i o n e s Arguitur quod non, quia magis expedit ordinari quod habet rationem principii quam quod habet rationem principiati; sed diuitie sunt principium concupiscentie: habent enim se sicut obiectum eius; quare et 5 cetera. Item, plura litigia sequuntur inordinationem diuitiarum quam concupiscentie; quare et cetera. Probatio assumpte: quia concupiscentia se extendit ad pauca, ut ad delectationes tactus et gustus; diuitie se extendunt ad plura inconuenientia, quia, 2º Rethorice, dicitur quod diuites 10 sunt elati, contumeliosi, iactati, contra patientes a possessione diuitiarum. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio potest esse quia concupiscentie inordinatio est principium inordinationis possessionum.

25 reducuntur] scrips. redicuntur B 28 Ad…quantitatem] suppl., aliquibus mutatis, ex supra, ll. 8-9 et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 12, ll. 56-57 1 3, 11 patientes] scrips. passientes B 13 , 1 Consequenter…2 possessiones] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b29-30; cf. etiam Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/1.18 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 443-444) 1 0 diuites…12 diuitiarum] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a2 13 Oppositum…14 possessionum] Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b29-30 et 1267b5-9

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

793

Dicendum quod magis regulanda est passio quam diuitie, non sint regulande nisi inquantum ueniunt in usum humanum et inquantum est circa eas inordinata; sed propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis: concupiscentie regulantur propter appetitum; ergo et 20 cetera. 15

Item, ordinato appetitu, ordinantur diuitie; ergo et cetera.

Ad primum argumentum dico quod diuitie non sunt principium concupiscentie simpliciter, nec se habent proprie in ratione obiecti, sed magis in ratione materie. Vnde illud dicitur esse obiectum simpliciter 25 uirtutis quod est eius obiectum, sed quod est perfecta optima uirtute et secundum rationem rectam. Sed obiectum concupiscentie non sunt diuitie absolute, sed sub ratione aliqua determinata, scilicet inquantum ordinate sunt in finem. Item, argumentum deficit, quod, licet diuitie sint obiectum uoluntatis, non tamen necessitant uoluntatem, quod argu30 mentum supponit. Ad secundum dicendum quod litigia non sequuntur possessiones inordinatas secundum se, sed quia appetitus inordinate afficitur circa eas;

16 nisi] non B 1 8 magis2…19 que] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 13, ll. 24-28 et ex textibus in adn. allatis 21 ordinato appetitu] ordinata appetito B 2 4 obiectum] scrips. abiectum B 2 6 concupiscentie] ordinate add. B 2 8 ordinate] ordinata B 3 1 possessiones] passiones B 15 Dicendum…20 cetera] cf. Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 10: “Ad cuius euidentiam est intelligendum quod possessio siue diuitie ad politicum non pertinent nisi inquantum cadunt (cod.: cedunt) in usum humanum. Ex hoc arguitur sic: propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis, ut dicitur 1º Posteriorum. Sed diuitias oportet regulare propter appetitum et concupiscentiam, ergo magis necessarium est regulare concupiscentiam quam possessiones siue diuitias” ( ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 16ra) et Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 11: “Dicendum cum Philosopho quod magis expedit regulare concupiscentias quam possessiones, quia melius est ordinare illa ex quorum ordinatione alia oriuntur et non econuerso; sed, regulatis concupiscentiis, regulantur possessiones quia, si concupiscentie bene sint ordinate, homines non appetunt plus quam debent; sed, possessionibus ordinatis, adhuc possunt habere concupiscentias inordinatas; ideo et cetera. Item, propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis, 2º et 10º Metaphisice et 1º Posteriorum; sed possessiones non ordinantur nisi propter concupiscentias, quia possessiones ordinantur ad usum humanum et subiacent concupiscentiis nostris; ideo et cetera. Item, illud homo debet magis sollicite regulare quod est sibi magis intrinsecum ... sed concupiscentie sunt magis intrinsece quam possessiones” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, 1 7 propter…18 magis1] Auct. Arist., An. Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3va) Post. I (29), p. 313; Arist., An. Post. I.2, 72a27-32

794

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

et dico quod appetitus delectationis cuiuslibet ad plura se extendit quam diuitie. < Q UE S T I O 1 4 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p e r m i t t e n d u m s i t d i u i t e s d i t a r i q u a n t u m < c u m q u e > co n t i n g i t

B 65rb

Arguitur quod sic, quia, sicut diuitie sunt bonum ordinatum in finem, | sic robur et pulcritudo; sed legislator permittit pulcritudinem quantumcumque contingit et fortitudinem; ergo et cetera. 5 Item, thesaurizatio est necessaria, et maxima maxime, quia ista regula tenet predicatis per se; quare et cetera. Oppositum uult PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio potest esse quia nulli artifici permittuntur instrumenta uel organa infinita, sed tot quot indiget; sed 10 diuitie sunt organa ordinata ad uitam ciuilem; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod non, quia legislator intendit bonum commune ciuitatis, et intendens finem debet permittere utilia tantum illi fini et remouere impedientia; sed diuitie, quantumcumque sint infinite, non habent rationem utilis, sed magis rationem finis, quia appetitus finis infinitus; et 15 ideo, si diuitie infinite, non sunt utiles ad bonum ciuitatis non debent permitti. Item, per hoc corrumperetur unio ciuitatis, quia unio est in quadam proportione, que destruitur si diuitie sint infinite. Nam, 2º , 14 , 5 ergo] quare sed exp. et corr. s.l. B 10 permittuntur] scrips. permutur B 12 legislator] scrips. locum lator B 1 8 quadam] quedam B 14 , 1 Consequenter…2 contingit] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1266b5- 8 et potius 17-19 6 ista…7 regula] agitur hic de loco illo ex Topicis quod allatum est in loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 14, ll. 10-11 cum adn. 8 ***] deest tertium argumentum, cui tamen respondit: simile esse debebat illo quod QQ. tradunt, quia responsio similis est illae quae in QQ. Cf. ibid. II, q. 14, ll. 13-16 et Anonymum Mediolanensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 11: “Item, illud est permittendum in ciuitate quod cedit in bonum commune ciuitatis; sed diuitie sunt huiusmodi; ideo et cetera. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, quia, sicut ciuis est aliqua pars ciuitatis, sic etiam diuitie” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 16rb) et Anonymum Baltimorensem, QQ. Pol. II, q. 12, arg. 2: “Item, illud quod est utile debet permitti in ciuitate; sed ditari et habere plures diuitias est utile, quia per hoc impediuntur paupertates et fit subuentio in ciuitate; ideo et cetera” (ms. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18, f. 3va)

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO) 20

795

dicitur quod homines multa patiuntur a diuitiis: superbi enim fiunt et elati et inuidi, et sic tantum fierent diuites, quod alios uellent excedere et corrumpere.

Ad primum argumentum dico quod non est simile de pulcritudine et diuitiis, quia pulcritudo est a natura et non a uoluntate, ideo de ea 25 intus mittit se legislator sicut de diuitiis. Ad aliud dico quod thesaurizatio ordinabilis in bonum ciuitatis secundum rationem est necessaria ad uitam, non tamen absolute; et maxima talis est maxime necessaria; sed talis non est infinita, sicut dictum est. 30

Ad aliud dicendum quod non omne bonum ordinabile in finem permittendum, sicut si ex illo sequitur maius malum. Iterum non possunt diuitie infinite ordinari in finem, nec habent rationem utilis, ut dictum est; quare argumentum non ualet. < Q U E S TIO 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m t e r m i n u s d i u i ti a r u m s i t a cc i p i e n d u s p e r co m p a r a ti o n e m a d a l i q u i d e x t r i n s e c u m

Arguitur quod non, quia terminus earum debet accipi ex aliquo quod pertinet ad rationem ciuitatis, quia ex fine ciuitatis; sed nichil extrin5 secum est tale; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicitur in littera.

Dicendum quod terminus diuitiarum debet accipi ex fine, et hoc est bonum commune ciuitatis et non bonum absolute, quia natura, et ars, non semper facit melius simpliciter, sed melius possibile. Et ideo 10 terminus diuitiarum debet accipi ex bono communi secundum quod applicabile est talibus ciuibus. Et ideo secundum diuersitatem consuetudinum et locorum sunt permittende possessiones, et diuersimode apud 2 0 multa] nulla B 25 se] s.l. B 30 omne] esse B | in] ad sed exp. et corr. s.l. B 31 permittendum] permittens B 15,2 comparationem] compositionem B 12 possessiones] passiones B 2 0 homines…21 inuidi] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a2 2 8 talis2…29 est] cf. supra, ll. 12-17 3 1 non…32 est] cf. supra, ll. 14-15 15 ,1 Consequenter…2 extrinsecum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a21-27 6 Oppositum…littera] cf. Arist., Pol. II.7, 1267a21-31

796

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

diuersos, secundum quod diuersimode apud eos applicantur ad bonum ciuitatis. Et quia diuersimode applicantur ad finem suum, mediocriter diuitiis per comparationem ad ciuitates 15 adiacentes, ne eam inuadant si habeat paucas diuitias et ne, si multas habeat, insurgat contra alias de facili.

Ad rationem dicendum quod extrinseca inquantum ad ciuitatem, et quod eis aliquo modo dependet ciuitas et eius bonum, pertinent ad rationem ciuitatis; et sic accipitur terminus diuitia- 20 rum per comparationem ad extrinseca. < Q UE S T I O 1 6 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m l ex s i t m u t a b i l i s Videtur quod non, quia quod est a natura non est mutabile; sed quedam lex est naturalis; ergo et cetera. Item, 1º Phisicorum dicitur quod principia oportet manere; sed habet rationem principii in agibilibus; ergo et cetera. 5 < 3.> > Item, regulam mensuram oportet esse certam; sed lex est regula et mensura agibilium; ergo et cetera. Oppositum: lex est opinio plurium; est mutabilis; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum ad hoc: sicut uisum est supra, lex est quedam enuntiatio 10 uniuersalis directiua agibilium. Et talium enuntiationum sunt duo genera, sicut in speculatiuis, ita et in agibilibus. Vnde quedam est in qua predicatum per se inest subiecto, et ubi etiam sunt per se noti; et talis

13 eos] eas B 15 mediocriter] mediocrum (?) B 1 6 inuadant] scrips. in ira dant B 17 habeat] 16, 6 certam] correxi ex infra, l. 43 et ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 16, l. 8: rectam B hanc B 8 sed…plurium2] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 16, l. 11 13 termini] suppl. ex Thomae STh Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 1, resp.: “ quaedam sunt ... propositiones per se notae communiter omnibus, et huiusmodi sunt illae propositiones quarum termini sunt omnibus noti” (ed. Leon. VII, p. 169) 16 , 1 Consequenter…mutabilis] cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 189) 4 principia…manere] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (21), p. 141; Arist., Phys. I.6, 189a19-20 1 0 sicut…11 agibilium] cf. supra, II, q. 9, ll. 15-16

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

797

nullum latet, sed omnibus nota est, ut ‘nulli iniuste nocendum’, et talis dicitur naturalis: et talis est immutabilis per se, mutabilis tamen per accidens et in aliquo casu, sicut natura est mutabilis per accidens et potest impediri, et hoc dicitur 5º Ethicorum. Alia est lex in qua predicatum concluditur de subiecto per aliquid prius, et hoc est per determinationem rationis, et talis lex positiua, que est determinatio legis naturalis: 20 et talis est uariabilis, quia primum principium huius legis est uariabile, quia huius principium est uoluntas. Nam primo oportet esse appetitum finis, et ex hoc ratiocinari de hiis que sunt ad finem; uoluntas autem et electio humana est uariabilis, quare et lex; unde, quod sola uoluntate positum, est uariabile. 15

Sed dupliciter potest uariari: uno modo ex parte rationis, que procedit de potentia ad actum, et ideo primo intelligimus | in uniuersali et confuse, B 65va unde, 1º Phisicorum, dicitur quod pueri primo uocant omnes uiros patres, post determinant unumquodque; et sic primo contingit ordinari leges rudes et confusas, postea uero melius et eadem perfectas. Secundo 30 potest uariari ex parte hominum: oportet enim leges fore secundum dispositiones hominum, quia lex diuersimode applicatur ad finem qui intenditur secundum dispositiones. Vnde, quando homines melius disponuntur secundum intellectum, possunt leges mutari in meliores. 25

35

Ad argumentum dico quod leges naturales non sunt mutabiles in uniuersali, sed hoc per accidens tamen et in particulari.

Ad aliud dicendum quod principia oportet manere eadem proportione uel specie, sicut de lege est. Vel hec intelligitur de principiis primis, et ideo argumentum tantum concludit de lege naturali, quod 40 conceditur. Vel dicendum quod oportet principia manere secundum quod

19 dicitur] suppl. ex supra, ll. 14-15 2 9 rudes] coni. ex infra, q. seq., ll. 6 et 13 et ex loc. parall.QQ. II, q. 16, l. 46: tristes B 30 secundum] quod B 3 3 mutari] mutare B 14 talis…17 impediri] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. V.7, 1134b29-35, ubi tamen non asseritur quod “natura ... potest impediri”, sed dicitur: “Natura enim deserta melior, quamvis contingit omnes ambidextros fieri” (AL XXVI.1-3.4, p. 467, ll. 12-13). Re vera de impedimento quod natura potest pati loquuntur scholia anonyma in Vº Ethicorum; cf. Anonymum, In Arist. Moral. V cap. 15: “Concedens autem et natura iustum esse transmutabile et contingens et aliter fieri apud aliquos, determinat inuideri tale hiis qui secundum naturam habent” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 89rb) 2 7 pueri…28 unumquodque] Auct. Arist., Phys. I (5), p. 140; Arist., Phys. I.1, 184b12-14

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possibile, sed non est possibile legem manere in quolibet particulari quin habeat instantiam. Similiter dicendum quod regula est certa quantum est possibile, non tamen simpliciter. < Q UE S T I O 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t ur ut r u m l e x a n t i q u a s i t m ut a n d a m e l i o r i s u p e r ue n i e n t e Arguitur quod sic, quia alie artes debent mutari, sicut patet de medicina et sutoria, melioribus superuenientibus; ergo et ista. Item, sequitur inconueniens non mutarentur, quia 5 principio fuerunt leges ualde rudes, sicut una quod mulieres emebant ferro; alia erat quod cognatus interfecti fugiens reus erat homicidii. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio huius est quia lex habet efficaciam ex consuetudine; et ideo qui mutat legem tollit legi efficaciam; quare 10 et cetera.

Dicendum quod lex mutanda est per se meliori superueniente, et per accidens non est mutanda. Per se mutande sunt, quia priores fuerunt rudes et inordinationem permiserunt in ciuitate, magis ordinate et pauciora mala permittunt, ut dictum est in questione precedenti. Et iste magis ordinate , ideo per 15 se meliores; et peiores per se mutande, tamen per accidens non, quia per hoc ciues non sunt assueti in legibus et ad obediendum principi: et leges habent per ista duo efficaciam, scilicet a principante et consuetudine; unde, cum sunt assuefacti in peioribus, uidentur tam meliores propter consuetudinem, sicut dicitur, 2º Metaphisice, quod consuetudo 20 17 , 2 superueniente] siue perueniente B 4 sutoria] siutoria sed corr. B 6 emebant] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 17, l. 9: canebant B 1 3 posteriores…14 et1] lac. sed suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 17, l. 21 B 1 6 meliores] maiores B | peiores] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 17, ll. 22-23: priores B 17 ciues] aues B | et1] ut B 18 principante] principare B 17 , 1 Consequenter…2 superueniente] cf. Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b26-28; cf. Thomam, STh Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2 (ed. Leon. VII, p. 190) et Aegidium Romanum, De Reg. Princ. III/2.31 (ed. Romae 1607, pp. 537-541) 3 alie…4 medicina] Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b34-38 6 princi8 Oppositum…9 efficaciam] cf. Arist., pio…7 homicidii] Arist., Pol. II.8, 1268b38-1269a3 Pol. II.8, 1269a14-24 1 2 priores…15 precedenti] cf. supra, II, q. 16, ll. 28-29 20 consuetudo…21 falsa2] Arist., Metaph. II.3, 995a1-3

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audiendi falsa facit credere falsa. Et ideo, si ex mutatione legis sequetur inobedientia, que plus noceat quam malum quod est in lege antiqua, non debet mutari, ita quod debent comparari illa duo mala et debet fieri illud ad quod sequitur minus malum. Et hoc uidere relinquitur prudentie 25 legislatoris.

Ad primum argumentum dico quod non est simile de legibus et artibus, quia lex efficaciam habet a consuetudine et alie artes , et ideo nullum malum sequitur si mutentur artes. Ad secundum solutio, quia lex est ita mala quod 30 plura mala sequantur eam quam fit inobedientia que est ex eius mutatione, quod debet mutari. < Q U E S TIO 1 8 > C ons eq ue nter qu er itur u tr um s er ui sit aliq u a di sci plin a Videtur quod non, quia non habet rationem nec habitum secundum rationem; tale est disciplina; ergo et cetera. Maior patet quia seruus est qui non potest mente preuidere. 5

Item, eius quod mouetur ab alio non est aliqua uirtus, quia non est nisi ad mouendum; sed seruus mouetur a domino; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS et 1º huius.

Dicendum quod serui est aliquis habitus, quia serui est aliqua operatio, sic corpore exequi quod dominus preuidet; et ideo, cum ordinetur in finem domini, naturaliter oportet quod habeat per que faciliter operetur et attingat finem, quia natura non deficit necessariis. Illud autem per quod faciliter potest actum exequi est habitus, et ita, si seruus inclinatur natura ad operationem suam, et ad habitum per quem operatur. Et hoc est disci15 plina aliqua.

10

2 4 minus] unus B 2 9 lex] scrips. les B 18 , 8 hic] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 18, l. 10 13 natura] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 18, l. 15: notatur B 1 4 operatur] operandum sed forsitan corr. B 18 ,1 Consequenter…disciplina] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1269b7-12 3 seruus…4 preuidere] Arist., Pol. I.1, 1252a30-34 8 Oppositum…huius] Arist., Pol. II.9, 1269b7-12 et I.7, 1255b22-35

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que sit ista disciplina, sciendum est quod, ut dicitur 1º huius, seruus est organum actiuum, et actiones dicuntur quarum principium per se est uoluntas – et hoc dico ad differentiam operationis artis, cuius principium est per se ars, nec ad hoc facit rectitudo uoluntatis –. Quare serui oportet esse disciplinam que sit principium talis actionis: et 20 talis est prudentia, que est habitus uerus ratione actiuus. Et sic oportet seruum instrui in actu prudentie et exercitari in actibus uirtutum moralium, sine quibus non potest esse prudentia. Sed dictum fuit in 1º quod iste uirtutes sunt in seruo imperfecte et in proportione ad uirtutes domini.

B

65vb

Ad argumentum primum dico quod seruus | non deficit penitus 25 ratione, sed intantum quod non potest de se inuenire; sed hic quidem ordinatis ab alio potest consentire. Ad secundum dico quod, licet seruus moueatur a domino, non tamen continue mouetur, sed primo mouet se; et ideo indiget uirtute. Vnde seruus accipit primo a domino cognitionem futurorum, sed 30 post in eius uoluntate est facere uel non facere. < Q UE S T I O 1 9 > C on s e q u e n t e r

q u e r i tu r u t r u m e x e r c i t i u m i n u i t a p r i n c i p i um m u l t a r um u i r t ut u m

mil it ar i

s it

Videtur quod non, quia inclinat ad turpe, sicut ad uenerea, ut dicitur De Problematibus. Item, ad homicidium quod, nominatum, est inuolutum 5 cum malo; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicitur in littera. 16 Ad uidendum] suppl., aliquibus mutatis, ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 18, l. 28 | sit] sint B 17 actiuum] actuum B 2 0 Quare] oportet add. B 2 1 uerus] correxi ex fonte allata: unus B 3 0 futurorum] infinitorum sed corr. in finitorum B 19 ,5 nominatum] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, l. 8 cum adn.: notatum B | inuolutum] inuolitum B 17 seruus…actiuum] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1253b32-33, sed cf. potius Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.2 (ed. 21 prudentia…actiuus] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, Leon. XLVIII, p. A83, ll. 137-139 et 163) 1140b4- 6 et 20-21 2 3 iste…24 domini] cf. supra, I, q. 28, ll. 15-18 et 33-36 1 9 , 1 Conse3 inclinat…uenerea] Pseudo-Arist., quenter…2 uirtutum] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1270a4- 6 Probl. IV.11, 877b14-19. Vide etiam loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, l. 7 cum adn. 5 nominatum…6 malo] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. II.5, 1107a9-12 7 Oppositum…littera] cf. Arist., Pol. II.9, 1270a4- 6

QUESTIONES – LIBER II (REPORTATIO)

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Dicendum quod duplex est bellum, quoddam naturale, quod est ad illos qui, naturaliter 10 , iniuriantur: sunt enim quidam naturaliter serui et alii natura domini, quare, cum illi habeant naturalem inclinationem ad seruiendum dominis, si uoluerint seruire naturaliter, eis iniuriantur; et ideo contra tales et bellum iustum, et tale est huiusmodi, ut dicitur 1º huius. Iniustum bellum fit contra bonos. Ex hoc sic arguitur: ex quo 15 bellum est iustum, ad rectum finem ordinatur; exercitium autem ad bonum finem est exercitium ad multas uirtutes: nam qui propter bonum commune se exercet, se in operibus fortitudinis, que sunt circa maxima terribilia. 20

Item, oportet quod intendat ea sine quibus non potest finem habere suum; sed expeditus usus armorum non potest esse sine abstinentia, et sic retrahitur a uenereis; et sic exercet se in actu temperantie.

Item, est ibi obedientia, et qui non obediunt principanti grauius puniuntur. Et qui in istis exercent se, exercent se in actibus aliarum uirtutum, licet indirecte. Et ratio est quia ex actibus generantur habitus, secundum 25 quod sunt regulati ratione; sed regulantur ratione ex fine, quia finis est eorum que ad finem. Ratio autem ex fine sumpta non inclinat ad aliquid quod sit illi fini contrarium; sed omnis malitia fini recto; quare et cetera. 30

Et etiam patet quia uirtutes sunt connexe, et ideo non potest esse sine alia. Et sic patet quod exercitantes in armis fiunt uirtuosi, et hoc uidemus; et ideo ARISTOTELES, inter omnes politias, eorum commendat.

Ad argumentum, cum dicitur quod “tales inclinantur ad actus uenereorum”, uerum est per accidens, scilicet propter confricationem 8 scilicet…9 iustum] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, ll. 13-14 10 sunt] sicut B 1 5 rectum] rectam B 2 2 obedientia] uenereis add. B | principanti] principari B | grauius] scrips. grauitus B 2 7 contraria est] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, l. 40 2 9 Et] ut B | connexe] scrips. connoxe B 11 cum…13 huiusmodi] cf. Arist., Pol. I.6, 1255a22-25 sed re vera agitur hic de interpretatione Thomae; cf. Thomam, Sent. Pol. I.4 (ed. Leon. XLVIII, p. A92, ll. 157-161). Vide loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, ll. 13-15 cum adn. 1 7 in…18 terribilia] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.7, 1115a23-26 et III.8, 1117a29-30 3 1 Aristoteles…commendat] scilicet Lacedemoniorum; cf. Arist., Pol. VII.14, 1333b12-14, ubi tamen Aristoteles rationes refert quibus aliqui laudaverunt Lacedaemoniorum politiam

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genitalium; sed non est inconueniens idem inclinari ad contrarium per se 35 et ad oppositum per accidens. Ad aliud dico quod homicidia facta in bello iusto non sunt mala nec prohibita, sed in rectum finem ordinata.

3 5 genitalium] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. II, q. 19, l. 57 cum adn.: generalium B

< L I B E R T E RT I U S >

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r c i rc a 3 u m l i b r u m u t r u m c o n s i d e r a n t e m d e p o l i t i a o p o r t e at d e t e r m i n a r e d e c i u i t a t e Arguitur quod non, quia considerantem de forma non oportet considerare de materia; sed ciuitas est materia respectu politie; ergo et 5 cetera. Item, considerantem de fine non oportet considerare que sunt ad finem; politia uidetur finis ciuitatis; ergo et cetera. Oppositum arguitur per PHILOSOPHUM, et ratio huius quia de eo de quo dubitatur in politia oportet determinare in politia; sed de ciuitate 10 dubitatur ibi, ut quid sit ciuitas et quando operatio est ciuitatis; quare et cetera.

Dicendum ad hoc quod considerantem de politia oportet considerare de ciuitate. Et ratio huius est quia semper in cognitione nostra oportet procedere ex nobis notioribus; sed ciuitas est nobis magis nota quam 15 politia; quare oportet primo uidere de ciuitate. Minor patet: nam primo nobis nota sunt confusa magis, ut dicitur 1º Phisicorum, et totum primo notum quam partes; et ideo, sicut uisus primo uidet album quam albedinem, si, cum politia dicat ordinem habitantium ciuitatem et ciuitas aggregatum, sit nobis magis notum quam ordo sicut 20 animal quam , manifestum est quod ciuitas erit magis nota quam politia; quare et cetera.

Ad argumentum dico quod ciuitas non est materia politie, sed dicit totum aggregatum.

1, 1 queritur] utrum add. sed exp. B 3 quia] non add. B 8 de] eodem questione add. sed exp. B 1 4 ex nobis] iter. B 1 5 quare] quod B 1 6 totum] et ideo add. B 2 0 animalitatem] lac., suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 1, l. 30 B 2 2 materia] manifestum B 1, 1 Consequenter…2 ciuitate] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b30-34 8 de…10 ciuitatis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b32-36 et etiam III.3, 1276a7- 8, sed potius Petrum, Scriptum III.1: “Et dicit quod de illo oportet considerare in politia, de quo dubitatur in ipsa” (ed. Lanza, p. 8, ll. 44-45) 15 primo2…17 partes] Arist., Phys. I.1, 184a16-21; Auct. Arist., Phys. I (3), p. 140

804

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Ad secundum dico quod ciuitas non est propter politiam, sicut nec album propter albedinem, sed magis politia propter ciuitatem. Vel dicen- 25 dum maiorem quod qui determinat quomodo aliquis finis acquiritur, oportet cum hoc, non sit nisi per ea que sunt ad finem, determinare. < Q UE S T I O 2 > C on s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m co n s i d e r a n t e m d e c i u i t a t e o p o r t e t p r i mu m d e c i u e c o n s i d e r a r e Videtur quod non, quia ciuis est posterior quam ciuitas, ut dicitur 1º huius; quare et cetera. B 66ra

Item, ciuis est pars ciuitatis, que non cogitur nisi per cogni- 5 tionem ciuitatis, sicut nec pars habet esse nisi per esse totius; | quare cognitio ciuis dependet a cognitione ciuitatis et non econuerso. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio huius quia compositum non cognoscitur nisi per simplicia; ciuitas componitur ex ciuibus; ergo et 10 cetera.

Dicendum ad hoc, sicut iam dictum est, quod semper procedimus ex nobis notioribus. Nunc pars aliquo modo potest esse notior toto et aliquo modo econuerso. Nam in aliquo toto, sicut ex pluribus fit unum coniunctum, ut exercitus, pars primo cognoscitur cognitione imperfecta, et ex ista confusa uenimus in cognitionem confusam totius et, inquirendo, intellectus ab illa confusa uenit in cognitionem perfectam totius, et ex perfecta cognitione totius est perfecta partis: nec est sic circulus, dum confusa cognitione partis deuenitur in perfectam cognitionem ipsius partis. Sic est de ciue, quod primo cognoscitur cognitione confusa et tum, per cognitionem ciuitatis, cognoscitur perfecte ciuis – sicut patet in littera quod ARISTOTELES, ex diuersitate politiarum, docet inquirere naturam ciuium et diuersitatem –, sicut per totum deuenimus in 28 determinare] determinate B 2 ,5 que] quem B 12 pars] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 2, 1 3 in2…quo] suppl., aliquibus mutatis, ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 2, ll. 23-26 ll. 20-24: de B 17 perfecta2] perfectam B 1 8 cognitione] cognitiones B 20 tum] tamen B 2, 1 Consequenter…2 considerare] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b40- 41 11 sicut…12 notioribus] cf. supra, q. praec., ll. 13-14 2 1 Aristoteles…22 ] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275b3-7

15

20

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

805

cognitionem forme et tum, ex cognitione forme, in completam perfectam notitiam totius et, per accidentis cognitionem, in substantie 25 cognitione, et econuerso; et ideo, 1º De Anima, dicitur quod accidens magnam partem confert ad cognoscendum quod quid est.

Ad primum argumentum dico quod ciuitas uno modo est prior ciue, scilicet secundum perfectionem et naturam, non tamen secundum uiam generationis uel prioritate materie; et etiam quoad nos ciuis uno 30 modo prior est, ut dictum est, quare oportet primo de ciue determinare. Ad secundum patet solutio: nam uisum est quod cognitio ciuis est principium cognoscendi ciuitatem et econuerso, nec est circulus.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s s i t q u i p o t e s t u t i p r i n c i p at u iu d ic at iu o e t c o nsi l iat iu o Arguitur quod non, quia solum perfecti et uirtuosi possunt uti principatu et consiliatiuo; sed multi sunt ciues in ciuitate, et 5 qui gaudent de eius libertatibus, qui non sunt uirtuosi; ergo et cetera. Item, ciui accidit hoc quod est posse principari, quare diffinitio illa non est bona. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum quod ciuis simpliciter et sine determinatione diminuente est 10 qui potest uti principatu et consiliatiuo. Et ratio huius est: nam, ut 1º huius dicitur, ciuis est pars ciuitatis et, inquantum ciuis, nichil habet nisi a toto, quia unumquodque habet rationem ab eo a quo habet esse; manifestum est quod ciuis non habet rationem nisi per habitudinem ad ciuitatem et determinatur per formam ciuitatis.

2 3 tum] tamen B | in completam] inv. B 2 4 substantie] subiecti B 3 ,1 2 habet1] prohibet B 2 5 accidens…26 est] Auct. Arist., De An. I (7), p. 174; Arist., De An. I.1, 402b21-22 29 quoad…30 est2] cf. supra, ll. 19-20 3 ,1 Consequenter…2 consiliatiuo] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a19-b20 11 ciuis1…12 toto] cf. Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a8-10

806

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Ciuitatis est autem aliqua operatio determinata. Nam cuilibet est 15 operatio determinata in quam, cum potest, dicitur illud, et cum non potest non dicitur, nisi equiuoce, 1º huius et 4º ; sed operatio secundum quam determinatur ciuitas est maxime uti consiliatiuo et iudicatiuo; quare et ciuis per hoc determinatur. Et sic ciuis est simpliciter 20 qui potest uti consiliatiuo et iudicatiuo. Alius est ciuis secundum quid, et dicitur cum determinatione diminuente, sicut puer dicitur ciuis in potentia, et sic de aliis, sicut sunt senes, qui amplius non possunt uti consiliatiuo. Et sic ciuis simpliciter est qui potest uti principatu consiliatiuo, ciuis secundum quid est qui habet 25 habitudinem ad ciuem simpliciter. Item, hoc patet in simili. Nam, De Motibus Animalium, dicitur quod oportet animal esse sicut ciuitatem bene ordinatam; et tamen melius econuerso diceretur, et ideo est in ciuitate sicut in animali: sunt quedam partes que perfecte attingunt ad formam animalis, et tales ad speciem pertinent; alie tantum in potentia, ut habent res que animate non 30 sunt, et sunt tantum in potentia partes . Item, aliqua pars aliquando est motua, sicut patet in paraliticis; alie que penitus motum non recipiunt ab animali, sicut pili et ungues, et tales non sunt de esse animalis, sed de bene esse. Similiter in ciuitate qui attingunt ad operationes principales ciuitatis dicuntur ciues simpliciter; ciues sunt in potentia, pueri; desiccati sunt depositi. Et sic de aliis. Sed notandum quod ciuis dicitur qui potest uti consilio uel iudicio uel mediate, sicut qui sunt de eligentibus principes, uel immediate, sicut qui 40 per se hoc faciunt.

Ad argumentum primum hoc dicendum, quod multi sunt qui, ciuitatis gaudentes libertate, ciues non sunt, sicut pueri et consimiles. Item, 16 cum1] tamen B 1 7 Meteororum] suppl. ex fonte allata 1 8 consiliatiuo…19 iudicatiuo] consolatiuo et indicatiuo et sed et2 exp. B 19 sic] correxi ex infra, l. 23: sunt B 20 consiliatiuo…iudicatiuo] consolatiuo et indicatiuo B 2 3 consiliatiuo] consolatiuo B 2 4 principatu 3 1 animate] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 3, l. 43 consiliatiuo] principio consolatiuo B 3 4 animalis] correxi ex supra, ll. 27-29: hominis B 35 ciuitatis] ciuitates B 36 sunt1] est B 4 2 ciuitatis] ciuitate B | libertate] et alii qui add. B 15 cuilibet…17 equiuoce] cf. Arist., Pol. I.2, 1253a20-29; Auct. Arist., Meteor. IV (26), p. 173; Arist., Meteor. IV.12, 390a10-12. Vide etiam Arist., Metaph. IV.2, 1003a33-34; Auct. Arist., Metaph. IV (88), p. 122 et adn. ad loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 3, ll. 22-24 27 oportet…ordinatam] Auct. Arist., De Mot. An. (10), p. 208; Arist., De Mot. An. 10, 703a29-32

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

807

aliquando assumitur ad principatum alius quam uirtuosus, quamuis hoc sit contra rationem. Vel dicendum quod ciuis non tantum dicitur quod 45 uirtuosus, sed dicitur ciuis quia habet auctoritatem iudicandi uel consiliandi, si uirtutem habeat. Ad aliud dico quod uti posse consilio non accidit ciui nec est posterius, quia nominat relationem que fundatur super actionem uel passionem, que est mouere uel moueri, sicut dominus et seruus et 50 pater et filius | fundantur super actiones et passiones. Et ideo bene diffini- B 66rb tur ciuis per potentiam iudicandi actiue uel passiue, et cetera.

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s p e r u n a m r at i o n e m d i c a t u r d e o m n i c i ue u e l i n o m n i p o l i t i a Arguitur quod sic, quia una datur eius diffinitio; ergo et cetera. Item, in omni politia est una ratio principantis; nam principans est 5 secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur alii, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice, capitulo de principio; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicitur in littera. Et ratio est quia ciuis est qui potest attingere ad politiam, quia per hoc determinatur ciuis; sed diuerse sunt politie; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod non est ciuis unius rationis in diuersis politiis. Nam ciuis determinatur secundum diuersitatem consilii et principatus, ut dictum est; sed in diuersis politiis est diuersa consideratio rei consiliandi uel principandi; quare et cetera. Minor patet: nam ratio consilii sumitur ex fine, et ideo secundum diuersitatem finis est diuersa ratio consilii. Et 15 similiter ratio principatus: nam principans est secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur alia; uoluntas autem mouet secundum exigentiam finis; quare

10

4 3 alius] illius B 4 5 iudicandi] uidendi habet B 51 ciuis] ciues B | iudicandi] uidendi B 4 ,5 cuius] eius B 6 capitulo] capituli B 15 similiter ratio] inv. B 4 8 nominat…50 passiones] cf. Arist, Metaph. V.15, 1020b14-16 et 23-25. Vide etiam loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 3, ll. 61- 63, cum adn. 50 Et…51 passiue] de modo quo active et passive 4 , 1 Consequenter…2 politia] cf. intendi debeant, vide loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 3, ll. 52-55 Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275a34-b5 4 principans…5 alii] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12 7 Oppositum…littera] cf. Arist., Pol. III.1, 1275b3-5 1 1 ciuis…principatus] cf. supra, ll. 7- 9 et q. praec. , ll. 9-10 et 17-19 15 principans…16 alia] cf. supra, ll. 4-5, cum adn. 16 uoluntas…finis] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.6, 1113b2

808

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secundum diuersitatem finis uariatur principatus. Sed in diuersis politiis est diuersus finis; quare et cetera. Sciendum tamen quod, sicut politie minus recte dicuntur per habitudinem ad rectas, sic ciuis. Et sicut regnum inter rectas est prior politia et alie 20 dicuntur ad regnum, sic in illa politia ciuis est simpliciter et primo dictus ciuis, in aliis per posterius. Et in regno, licet unus tantum possit attingere ad summum et primum principatum, tamen plures attingunt aliquibus principatibus inferioribus, sicut consilio et talibus.

Ad rationes dicendum quod ille rationes uel diffinitiones ciuis 25 et principantis sunt equiuoce. < Q UE S T I O 5 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i t a s r e m a n e a t u n a n u m e ro a pr i n c i pi o u s q u e a d f i n e m Arguitur quod sic, quia muri manent idem numero et edificia, et ista pertinent ad essentiam ciuitatis; ergo et cetera. Item, per totam uitam manet idem numero, licet partes 5 fluant; ergo et ciuitas. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Item, cuius nec materia nec forma manet, nec ipsum manet; ciuitas est huiusmodi, quia homines, qui sunt materia ciuitatis, corrumpuntur et alii generantur; et politia, que est forma ciuitatis, aliquando mutatur; quare et 10 cetera.

Dicendum quod unum dicit indiuisionem in aliqua natura; in composita est duplex, scilicet materia et forma; et ideo unum potest dicere indiuisionem in materia uel in forma. In ciuitate autem muri et edificia non sunt de essentia ciuitatis, sed magis comparantur ad esse, sicut locus 15 19 minus recte] indirecte B 2 0 ad] per B | et…21 politia] iter. B 21 sic] sicut B 2 4 inferioribus] in finibus B 26 principantis] principiis B 5 , 3 muri] numeri B 5 animal] suppl. ex infra, l. 24 9 corrumpuntur] corrumpitur B | et] si B 12 natura2] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, l. 15 1 4 ciuitate] scrips. ciuitata B 5 ,1 Consequenter…2 finem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.3, 1276a17-19 et 34-b1 losophus] Arist., Pol. III.3, 1276b1-9

7 Oppositum…Phi-

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809

ad locatum; et non sunt de essentia ciuitatis, sicut nec locus deorsum de essentia grauis: et sic, per ista, ciuitas nec est una nec plures. Sed, cum ciuitas sit habitatio hominum, homines sunt eius materia, politia eius forma: tunc igitur ciuitas est una secundum materiam tantum quando 20 homines manent iidem et politia uariatur, est una secundum formam tantum quando homines corrumpuntur et politia manet eadem; sed tunc est una simpliciter quando homines et politia manent.

Ad argumentum primum patet solutio. Ad secundum dicendum quod animal non manet unum numero 25 quia, , in animali fit aliquod humidum quod semper manet, quod dicitur pars secundum speciem uel humidum radicale, per quod animal manet idem numero. , quia tale est compositum ex contrariis, quare oportet quod continue corrumpatur. 30

Item, alimentum est ei contrarium, et ideo impossibile est non agere inuicem, quia agens naturale patitur.

Item, dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod omne habens formam in materia habet partes secundum materiam et secundum formam, quare istud humidum, cum habeat formam in materia. Et sic patet quod non est ita 35 parua pars in animali – per istas rationes – que non patiatur. Et ideo aliter dicendum quod animal manet unum numero, quia ex alimento et membro, , fit unum in actu, ita quod nichil unius est actu extra alterum, et per istum modum quelibet toti tota est, quia non est ita parua pars que non 40 maior efficiatur, et similiter que non nutriatur, et ita manet unum numero, quia nichil unius est extra aliquid alterius; et similiter non fluit nisi a toto, ita quod non sunt partes iuxta se posite, nec aliquid potest manere unius quin aliquid alterius maneat, et sic manet animal unum numero.

2 0 uariatur] uariantur B 2 1 quando] quoniam sed corr. B 2 5 ut…dicunt] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, l. 41 2 6 dicitur] dicatur B | speciem] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, l. 44: materiam B 2 7 Hec…Philosophum] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, ll. 47 et seqq. cum adn. 3 5 Et] aliter add. sed exp. B 3 7 quia…membri] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, ll. 88- 89 3 9 pars apposita] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, ll. 102-104 | toti tota] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, l. 104: anoti a nota B 4 3 animal] semper cedit in idem numero add. sed del. B 2 5 ut…27 numero] ad videndum qui sint isti ‘quidam’ cf. loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 5, adn. ad ll. 41-52

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Per hoc ad argumentum. Et patet solutio: nam illud quod aduenit animali, semper cedit in idem numero, quare manet animal idem numero; 45 non sic ciuitas, quia quidam homines corrumpuntur et alii numero generantur. < Q UE S T I O 6 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m c i u i s s e c u n d u m q u o d c i u i s s i t al iqu a u ir t u s B 66va

Arguitur quod non, quia, si ciuis per se esset aliqua uirtus, iam | esset cuiuslibet ciuis; sed hoc est falsum, cum plures sint ydiote; quare et cetera. 5 Item, si ciuis est aliqua uirtus, hec est per ordinem ad politiam, sicut dicit EUSTRATIUS supra 5um Ethicorum. Si igitur ciuis est aliqua uirtus, hec illa per quam seruat ciuitatem; sed multi nituntur eam destruere; quare non omnes sunt uirtuosi. Oppositum uult PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio est quia cuius est aliqua operatio 10 secundum quam contingit bene et male agere, est aliqua uirtus; sed ciuis secundum quod ciuis est huiusmodi ; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod ciuis non dicitur absolute, sed determinatur per respectum quendam, qui respectus fundatur supra potentiam actiuam uel passiuam. Et ideo ciuis dicitur qui potest aliquo modo participare consilia- 15 tiuo, ita quod hoc facit ciuem esse ciuem. Et ideo, cum hoc non sit sine uirtute, ciuis est aliqua uirtus. Nam, in quibus est operatio circa quam contingit bene agere et non bene, est aliqua uirtus per quam

4 6 quidam] quidem B 6 ,7 5um] correxi ex fonte allata et ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 6, ll. 8-9: primum B 12 operatio] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 6, l. 15 1 4 potentiam] politiam B 15 consiliatiuo] consolatiuo B 6, 1 Consequenter…2 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b17-20 6 ciuis…politiam] Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5, ad 1130b29: “Quia enim non simpliciter bonum, sed ciuem bonum illum dicimus qui secundum omnem modum facit ea que ad salutem urbanitatis conferunt, manifestum quoniam que ad constitutionem et permanentiam et salutem bone ciuitatis festinans facere, et bonus est simpliciter et ciuis bonus” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va-b) 10 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b29-31

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

20

811

contingit bene agere. Nam, 2º Ethicorum, uirtus est ordinatio perfecti ad optimum. Et ideo, cum ciuis sit talis operatio, scilicet consilium et iudicare, eius est aliqua uirtus.

Item, quando aliquis inclinatur ad aliquod ex natura, inclinatur ad illa sine quibus illud non potest haberi, aliter natura aliquid faceret frustra, et PHILOSOPHUS hac propositione utitur 1º huius. Sed ciuis secundum quod 25 huiusmodi inclinationem habet ad suam operationem, quare et ad uirtutem sine qua non potest esse eius operatio; similiter ergo inclinatur ad uirtutem, et ista perficitur consuetudine. Virtus autem ista est prudentia politica, per quam aliquis dirigit operationes suas in finem communem, et iustitia legalis, que non sunt uirtutes sine uirtute morali.

30

35

Ad argumentum dico quod omnis ciuis est uirtus aliqua secundum inclinationem, et ydiota inclinatur; secundum actum non quilibet habet. Sed impeditur per multa impedimenta talis inclinatio. Ad aliud dico similiter quod omnes ciues ex naturali inclinatione inclinatur ad saluandum politias, quod faciunt; oppositum est ex aliqua corruptione eorum.

C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m c i u i s s e c u n d u m o m n e m p o l i t i a m s i t u n a u i r tu s Arguitur quod sic, quia eorum quorum est una natura est una uirtus, quia uirtus sequitur naturam; sed omnes ciues sunt unius speciei.

5

Contra: principis et subditi non est una uirtus; sed aliquis ciuis principatur, alius subicitur; ergo et cetera.

2 1 eius] cuius B 3 1 perfectum…32 tamen] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 6, l. 57 7 , 3 quia] una add. B 19 2º…20 optimum] re vera Arist., Phys. VII.3, 246a13; Auct. Arist., Phys. VII (186), p. 155. Ad hunc errorem loci explicandum coniecturari potest quod aliquid hic in textu deest. In loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 6, ll. 16-18, memorantur enim loci duo ex Aristotele – alter ex IIº Ethicorum, alter ex VIIº Physicorum –, qui verisimiliter hic in unum, aliquibus omissis, coniuncti sunt 2 3 natura…frustra] Arist, Pol. I.2, 1253a9 et I.8, 1256b21; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (4), p. 252 7, 1 Consequenter…2 uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.4, 1276b31-33

812

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Dicendum quod non omnis ciuis est una uirtus; nam, ut uisum est, ciuis non est unius rationis in diuersis politiis; quare neque uirtus. Item, uirtutis diuersitas attenditur ex fine ultimo. Nam rationem habent ex fine, unde prudentia rationem habet ex fine. Sed 10 ciuium diuersorum sunt diuersi fines, quia et diuersarum politiarum, cum assint ad diuersos fines. Item, principantis et subiecti non est una uirtus, ut uisum est fine 1º huius; quare et cetera.

Ad argumentum dicendum quod omnes ciues, secundum quod 15 homines, sunt unius nature, et ideo sic omnium est una uirtus. Non tamen secundum quod sunt ciues sunt unius rationis, et ideo eorum non est una uirtus. < Q UE S T I O 8 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t ur ut r um u i r i o p t i m i e t c i u i s s t ud i o s i sit u na u ir t u s Arguitur quod sic, quia quorum est unus finis, est una uirtus; sed horum est unus finis, quia felicitas; ergo et cetera. Contra: uirtus boni uiri est uirtus principantis solum; sed uirtus ciuis 5 studiosi est indifferenter uirtus principantis et subiecti; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod non est una uirtus optimi uiri et ciuis studiosi secundum quamlibet politiam, quia uirtus ciuis est per quam dirigit operationes suas ad saluationem politie. Sed alique sunt politie male ordinate; sed non est prudentia simpliciter per quam saluantur politie male ordinate, et ideo 10 non est una uirtus boni uiri et democratici .

11 politiarum] et diuersorum ciuium add. B 1 3 una] aliqua B 1 6 homines] homo B 8 ,4 felicitas] felicitatis B 11 ciuis] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 8, ll. 20-21 7 ciuis2…8 politiis] cf. supra, III, q. 4, ll. 10-14 13 principantis…uirtus] cf. Arist., Pol. I.13, 1259b32-1260a4 8 ,1 Consequenter…2 uirtus] cf. Arist. Pol. III.4, 1276b17-18

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Item, in optima politia uidetur esse una uirtus ciuis et optimi uiri, quia aliquis est ciuis principans et aliquis subiectus, et istorum est una uirtus, quia uniuersaliter est una uirtus ciuis et optimi uiri est una uirtus, quia principans in optima politia est qui dirigit operationes suas in optimum finem, et hec prudentia politica; talis aut est uiri optimi, quare horum est una uirtus. Et hoc dicit EUSTRATIUS supra 5um Ethicorum, quod in bene habentibus urbanitatibus est idem bonus uir et ciuis simpliciter, 20 malis autem non est idem et ciuis simpliciter, quia in istis ciuis uult defendere ciuilitatem malam; sed bonus uir non uult defendere malum; ergo et cetera.

Ad argumentum potest dici quod non omnis ciuis et uiri optimi est unus finis; item, non solum diuersificatur ex fine, | sed ex diuerso B 66vb 25 modo se habendi ad finem, unde unus se habet aliquando ad illum finem sicut principans et dirigens, alius sicut directus ad istum finem.

12 nec] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 8, l. 22. Cf. etiam textum ex Petri Scripto infra, in adn. allatum 1 3 non] suppl. ex supra, q. praec., l. 13 et ex QQ. III, q. 7, ll. 21-23 1 4 non] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 8, ll. 15-16 et ex Petri Scripto III.3: “uniuersaliter non est una et eadem uirtus boni uiri et ciuis studiosi” (ed. Lanza, p. 25, ll. 44- 45); “si autem loquamur de politia in qua est finis rectus, uniuersaliter non est eadem boni uiri simpliciter uirtus et ciuis studiosi, quia subiectum contingit esse studiosum ciuem” (ibid., p. 28, ll. 121-123); “Si igitur principis boni et boni uiri sit eadem uirtus, ciuis autem qui subditus est et boni uiri non est eadem uirtus, manifestum est quod uniuersaliter boni uiri et ciuis studiosi non est eadem uirtus” (ibidem, ll. 132-134) | et…15 ciuis] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 8, l. 28 cum fonte allata 1 9 uir] uiri sed corr. B 2 1 istis] ista B 12 nec…14 uiri] cf. Petrum, Scriptum III.3: “Et dici quin immo, id est insuper, potest probari non tantum de ciue in diuersis politiis, sed etiam contingit adducere dubitando rationem ad idem de ciue in politia una et optima ... Virtutem autem boni uiri simpliciter non est possibile inesse omnibus ciuibus ... quia non omnes qui sunt in ciuitate studiosa necessarium est esse bonos simpliciter: quare manifestum est quod non est eadem uirtus boni uiri et ciuis simpliciter” (ed. Lanza, p. 26, ll. 65-67 et 80-84) 1 5 Alicuius…16 finem] Arist., Pol. III.4, 1277a13-16 et 20-24 18 horum] scilicet principantis in optima politia et viri optimi, cf. loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 8, ll. 33-34 1 9 in…22 malum] Michael Ephesius, In V Arist. Mor. cap. 5: “Non enim bonus uir iam et ciuis bonus. In bonis quidem enim et bene habentibus urbanitatibus bonus uir et ciuis bonus est, in malis autem et male habentibus neque bonus uir et bonus ciuis est, neque in illis bonus ciuis, bonus est uir ... quia enim non simpliciter bonum, sed ciuem bonum illum dicimus qui secundum omnem modum facit ea que ad salutem urbanitatis conferunt” (ex ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116, f. 100va)

814

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 9 >

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i n p r i n c i p at u d e s p o t i c o d o m i n u s i n t e n d i t b o n u m c o m mu n e s u i e t s e r u i u e l b o n u m p r o p r i u m Arguitur quod commune, quia omnis agens secundum aliquam formam intendit bonum illud ad quod inclinatur secundum formam illam. Sed in communicatio domini et serui dominus agit secundum for- 5 mam communionis. Cuius probatio est quia pars non agit nisi in uirtute totius; dominus autem, inquantum dominus, uidetur esse quedam pars communionis serui et domini, quare per istam formam operatur. Sed manifestum est quod illa forma ducit in commune bonum; quare et cetera. Item, dominus se habet ad seruum sicut anima ad corpus, ut 10 dicitur 1º huius; sed anima intendit bonum totius; ergo et cetera. Minor patet: nam anima intendit operationem communem, est totius coniuncti. Contrarium dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS. Item, agens principale, cum agit per instrumentum, per se et primo non 15 intendit bonum instrumenti. Cuius signum est quia, si sine eo posset operari, non uteretur eo; sed seruus est organum domini, ut 1º huius dicitur; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod seruus est organum animatum alterius homo existens, ut dicitur 1º huius; organum autem possessio; quare seruus est 20 possessio domini. Possessio autem est sicut pars eius cuius est possessio, et ideo seruus est sicut pars domini, et hoc est quod dicitur 1º huius. Tunc arguitur: omne totum, in agendo, intendit illud bonum in quod inclinatur per formam secundum quam agit. Sed dominus agit in seruum per formam qua dominus, et ista forma in ratione totius se habet 25 respectu serui, ut dictum est; totum autem per formam totius intendit 9 , 12 communem] illegibile; coni. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 9, l. 18 B 1 9 Dicendum] praem. dicendum quod seruus est organum animatum ut primo huius dicitur ergo et cetera B 20 quare] quia B 21 possessio1] passio B | Possessio] passio B | possessio2] passio B 23 agendo] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 9, l. 34: modo B 9 , 1 Consequenter…2 proprium] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b32-37 10 dominus…corpus] Arist., Pol. I.5, 1254a34-39 et 1254b4-8; Auct. Arist., Pol. I (15) et (16), p. 253 1 4 Contrarium…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b32-37 17 seruus…domini] Arist., Pol. I.4, 1254a14-17 et etiam 1253b31-33; cf. infra, q. 12 1 9 seruus…existens] cf. eundem locum qui in adn. praec. memoratur 24 dominus…26 serui] cf. supra, ll. 5- 8

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815

bonum totius; quare dominus per formam domini intendit bonum domini. Sed quia hoc bonum non potest saluari sine seruo, quia corrupto seruo corrumpitur dominus, ideo, ex consequenti, intendit bonum serui.

30

Ad argumentum primum dicendum quod dominus non agit per formam communionis, sed per formam domini, que habet rationem totius.

Non de corpore et anima et de seruo domino: primo, quod seruus mouetur a domino sicut corpus ab anima; item, quia seruus non mouetur a se, sed a domino, sicut corpus de se non mouetur. 35 Sed dissimile est , quia non est separata a corpore nec operatur , sed totum coniunctum, ideo intendit bonum coniuncti. Sed dominus est separatus a seruo et habet operationem suam propriam, que non est coniuncti, et ideo intendit bonum proprium. Quare patet quod non est simile. < Q U E S TIO 1 0 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i tu r u t r u m p r i n c e p s i n p r i n c i p a tu y co n o m i c o i n te n d a t p e r s e b o n u m s u b d i t o r u m Arguitur quod non, quia agens per aliquam formam intendit bonum ad quod inclinatur per illam formam; sed yconomus, disponendo 5 subditos, agit per formam propriam eius; quare et cetera. Item, unumquodque intendit, in agendo, bonum aliquod quod ex natura sua inclinatur; sed hoc proprium bonum; ergo et cetera. 10

Oppositum dicitur in littera, et ratio potest esse quia in aliis artibus uidemus quod agens intendit bonum eius in quod agit, sicut medicus per se sanitatem intendit, que bonum est medicati, similiter exercitans intendit per se bonum eorum qui exercitantur. Similiter ergo yconomus intendit primo bonum eius qui dirigitur, et ita subditorum.

3 2 anima] alia B | de seruo] inv. B 33 quia] s.l. B 3 5 dissimile] diuisibile B | in hoc] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 9, l. 58 | a] iter. B 1 0, 4 yconomus] yconomicus B 12 yconomus] yconomicus B 10 ,1 Consequenter…2 subditorum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b37-1279a2 subditorum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1278b37-1279a2

9 Oppositum…13

816

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Intelligendum circa hoc quod idem est finis secundum rem agentis et patientis, differens solum ratione: finis enim actiui est actio uel res acta, 15 finis autem passiui, secundum quod passiuum, est passio uel res passa. Sed actio et passio sunt una res, et similiter res quam agit agens et quam patitur patiens, quia idem finis est agentis et patientis, quia finis est ultimum ad quod perducitur passum et id quod producit agens, et hoc est 20 idem secundum rem; sed ratione differunt, ut uisum est. Item, sciendum quod intendere est actus uoluntatis et operantis, quia uoluntatis est mouere in finem.

B 67ra

Tunc ad questionem dicendum quod principans se habet ad subiectum sicut mouens ad motum, quare istorum est motus unus finis secundum rem, differens ratione. Iste finis est motus quo iste bene mouet 25 uel agit et ille bene patitur. Sed ratione differt, quia finis principantis, secundum quod princeps, est recte mouere et agere secundum rationem rectam, et hoc est opus secundum uirtutem, | et hoc intendit; ita principans principatu yconomico intendit finem secundum quod proprium est eius, quoniam omne agens per formam intendit bonum primo ad quod per 30 illam formam inclinatur. Yconomus autem intendit operari ut eius fini proportionetur primo, et ideo primo intendit recte dirigere et dispensare; secundo intendit bonum eius qui dirigitur, ita quod subditus mouetur secundum rationem, et hoc est bonum subditi; tertio, ex consequenti, intendit bonum sibi utile quia, 35 cum sit unus de illis qui sunt in domo, dispensatur et exercitatur. Sic ergo primo intendit bonum proprium secundum uirtutem, secundo bonum subditorum, tertio bonum suum utile, sicut medicus debet primo intendere recte agere circa istum ad sanitatem, secundo sanitatem istius circa quem agit, tertio utilitatem – sicut pecuniam, quamuis pecuniam 40 uideantur per se intendere –, sicut rhetor primo intendere debet bene agere ad persuadendum, secundo persuasionem iudicis, tertio utilitatem sui.

Per hoc ad argumenta, unde procedunt uiis suis. 14 Intelligendum] quod add. B 2 0 sed] oportet B 2 4 mouens] manens B | et idem] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 10, l. 35 2 9 proprium] proprius B 32 Yconomus] yconomicus B autem] oportet add. B | fini] finis B 33 dispensare] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 10, l. 46: dispensatur B | secundo] praem. ideo B 34 qui] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 10, l. 47: quo B 4 0 quem] quod B 41 uideantur…se] iter. B | rhetor] rector B 4 2 secundo] correxi ex supra, ll. 33, 37 et 39: secundum B | sui] serui B

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817

< Q U E S TIO 1 1 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m p o l i t i a d i s t i n g u a tu r s e c u n d um d i s t i n c t i o n e m f i n i s Videtur quod non, quia nichil distinguitur per id quod est posterius eo; sed finis est posterior hiis que sunt ad finem; quare et cetera. 5

Item, nichil distinguitur essentialiter per id quod non est de essentia sui; finis est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et ratio huius est quoniam secundum id politia distinguitur a quo agibilia habent rationem, cum politia sit de agibilibus; finis est huiusmodi; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod politia distinguitur secundum distinctionem finis, quoniam politia est ordo habitantium ciuitatem, et principum ad inuicem et ad subditos. Ordo autem omnis procedit ab uno et tendit in multitudinem et reducitur in unitatem, ut PROCLUS probat. Illud ad quod reducitur habet rationem finis, quia de ratione ordinis est habitudo ad finem; quare 15 politia habet habitudinem ad finem de sua ratione, et sic distinguetur distinctione finis.

10

Item, que procedunt ab aliquo uno principio, secundum eius distinctionem distinguuntur; sed principium politie est finis, quoniam instituitur per prudentiam, principium autem prudentie est finis et eius 20 appetitus rectus; quare et cetera. Intelligendum tamen quod unumquodque per formam suam distinguitur, sicut habet esse per formam; nunc autem finis est idem forme, sicut forma materie; ideo forma distinguitur secundum rationem finis.

25

Ad argumentum primum dico quod, , tamen ipse prius ratione, unde res distinguuntur. 11 ,3 nichil] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 11, l. 3: nisi B 1 4 quia] quare B 1 8 politia] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 11, l. 23 1 9 per] iter. B 2 5 quod] iter. B 2 6 secundum finem] suppl., aliquibus mutatis, ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 11, ll. 30-31 11 ,1 Consequenter…2 finis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1279a17-21 7 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.6, 1279a17-21 11 politia…ciuitatem] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (52), p. 255; Arist., Pol. III.1, 1274b38 12 Ordo…13 unitatem] Proclus, Elem. Theol. prop. 21 (ed. Boese, p. 14)

818

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Ad secundum dicendum quod nichil distinguitur primo nisi per id quod est de essentia sua, et ideo primo distinguitur per formam; forma autem per finem; quare bene distinguitur per finem ipsa politia. Vel posset 30 dici quod finis est de ratione politie, inquantum politia dicit habitudinem ad finem, ut uisum est. < Q UE S T I O 1 2 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m p o l i ti e d i s t i n g u a n t u r s e c u n d u m d i s t i n c t i on e m p r i n c i p a n t i u m Arguitur quod non, quia, si sic, ubi essent plures politie; sed in una politia sunt plures principatus, ut in 5 aristocratia; ergo et cetera. Item, per materiam suam nichil distinguitur, quia distinctio est per formam; sed principans est pars materie politie, quoniam politia est ordo eorum, ; quare et cetera. Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELES. Item, sicut se habet artifex ad artificiata, sic instituens ciuitatem ad eam 10 uel ad politiam; sed secundum distinctionem artificum, secundum quod artifices sunt, distinguuntur artificiata; ergo secundum distinctionem principantium distinguentur politie, cum principantes fuerint eas instituentes.

Dicendum quod principans : quidam qui sub nullo alio est, 15 alius est sub alio. Sed non est necesse politiam distingui secundum distinctionem principantis sub alio existentis, sed distingui secundum distinctionem principantis primi. Sed notandum quod principans potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum quod participans in ista uel secundum quod mouens in ista, quod est per formam politie. Et isto secundo modo distinguuntur politie secundum distinctionem principantis primi, quoniam politie distinguuntur secundum distinctionem finis; finis autem correspondet agenti, quoniam iste due cause sunt sibi inuicem cause: finis autem est causa agentis et econuerso, et uniuersalis uniuersali 25 et determinatus siue particularis particulari, ut dicitur 2º Phisicorum; necesse est ergo finem et agens proportionari per se. Et si politie distinguuntur distinctione finis, necesse est quod distinguantur distinctione agentis primi, quod est principans.

20

Item, operatum necessario proportionatur operi, quia operatum est finis operis; sed operatio procedens ab aliquo primo et per se proportionatur illi agenti; quare et operatum proportionatur agenti. Sed politia est aliquid constitutum per actionem procedentem ab instituente ciuitatem, quare secundum distinctionem instituentis politiam est distinctio politie; sed instituens ciuitatem secundum quod huiusmodi est principans in 35 ciuitate; quare et cetera.

30

Ad argumentum primum | patet solutio, quia in politia una bene B 67rb sunt plures principatus qui conueniunt in uno, ad quem ordinantur, sed non sunt in uno plures primi; et si essent plures principes primi, tamen sunt unum secundum quod principantur, scilicet ratione politie. 40

Ad aliud dico quod, licet princeps, inquantum est quoddam suppositum ciuitatis, sit pars materialis politie, tamen, ut est mouens et habens prudentiam, per quam mouet alios, habet rationem forme et mouentis. Et modo isto distinguitur politia per principatum, et non primo modo.

2 5 determinatus] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 12, l. 26: det’ B 26 politie] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 12, l. 27: possibile B 27 distinguantur] distinguentur B 3 6 quia] quare B 3 9 politie] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 12, l. 40: prudentie B 2 3 iste…24 cause] Auct. Arist., Phys. II (68), p. 146; Arist., Phys. II.3, 195a8-9 particulari] cf. supra, adn. ad I, q. 5, ll. 17-18

2 4 finis…25

820

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 1 3 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i tu r u t r u m s i n t p l u r e s p o l i t i e

Arguitur quod non, quia communicatio yconomica non distinguitur; ergo nec politia. Item, uidetur quod sint plures quam sex quas ponit ARISTOTELES, quia alique sunt mixte ex simplicibus, sicut Plato dicit suam 5 esse mixtam ex tirannide et oligarchia, 2º huius; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum ad hoc quod sunt sex et non plures. Quod patet primo ex ratione finis: nam, ut uisum est, cum politia importet ordinem in finem, distinguuntur politie ex fine. Sed hoc est dupliciter: uel ex diuersitate finis uel ex diuerso modo se habendi in finem. Sicut obiectum se habet in 10 speculatiuis, sic finis in operabilibus; sed scientie speculatiue distinguuntur distinctione obiecti uel ex diuerso modo se habendi circa idem obiectum; ergo similiter politia distinguetur ex diuerso fine uel ex diuerso modo se habendi ad istum finem. Nunc autem finis politie est bonum quod intenditur in politia; et illud bonum in quibusdam politiis est bonum simpliciter, 15 in aliquibus bonum secundum quid, et isti fines diuersi sunt; et quia , quedam tendunt in bonum simpliciter, quedam in bonum secundum quid. Vlterius politia recte distinguitur, quia politia est ordo habitatium ciuitatem. Nunc autem in ordinatis ad finem oportet posteriora attingere finem per priora, sic priora procedunt in posteriora per media, ut PROCLUS probat; ita oportet quod infimi in ciuitate reducantur in finem mediantibus dignioribus.

20

Nunc autem in aliqua ciuitate est multitudo seruilis et ratione deficiens, tamen repit aliquis unus prudens ibi et uirtuosus; et talis nata est 25 reduci in finem mediante isto uno.

13 , 14 Nunc] non B | bonum] coni. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, l. 20: obiectum B 1 6 sic…17 distinguuntur] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, l. 23 1 9 recte] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, l. 28: recta B 2 0 oportet] quod add. B 2 1 priora2] coni.: post B 13 , 1 Consequenter…politie] cf. Arist., Pol. III.7, 1279a22-23 5 sicut…6 oligarchia] cf. Arist., Pol. II.6, 1266a1-5, ubi tamen asseritur opportunum esse, iuxta Platonem, optimam politiam ex democratia et tyrannide componi 8 nam…9 fine] cf. supra, III, q. 11, ll. 10-16 2 0 Nunc…21 media] cf. Proclum, Elem. Theol. prop. 128 et prop. 145 (ed. Boese, p. 64 et p. 72, ll. 14-19)

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

821

In alia sunt plures , uirtuosi siue prudentes pauci tamen; et mediantibus istis multitudo nata est reduci in finem ultimum. 30

Alia est ciuitas in qua plures sunt uirtuosi et pauci imperfecti, et imperfecti nati sunt reduci mediantibus perfectis.

Prima dicitur regnum, secunda aristocratia, tertia communi nomine politia. Et sic patet quomodo distinguuntur ex diuerso modo se habendi ad finem. Et quia priuatio cognoscitur per habitum, patet quomodo tres transgressiones distinguuntur, quia transgressio prime dicitur tirannis, 35 secunde oligarchia, tertie democratia. Item, distinguitur politia distinctione principatus summi, cum politia sit ordo principatuum. Contingit autem principantem primum esse unum, et si intendit bonum commune dicitur regnum, si bonum proprium tirannis. Si principantes sint plures, pauci tamen, et si intendunt bonum com40 mune, uirtuosi sunt, et est aristocratia; si proprium, sunt diuites, et est oligarchia. Si multi, et intendunt commune bonum, uirtuosi sunt, et dicitur politia; si proprium bonum, sicut multi pauperes, est democratia. Sic igitur sunt sex politie simplices et multe mixte ex illis, sed non intendit Philosophus de istis determinare, nisi inquantum agit de simplici45 bus.

Ad argumentum quod in yconomica reperiuntur diuersi principatus, sicut, cum pater principatur pueris propter eorum bonum, dicitur regnum, si propter bonum proprium tirannis; quando uir et uxor hiis qui in domo sunt principantur propter eorum bonum est 50 aristocratia, sed propter bonum proprium oligarchia; si fratres et sorores principantur aliis qui in domo ad bonum eorum politia, si ad bonum proprium est democratia; et habetur totum 8º Ethicorum. Ad aliud patet solutio, quia non facit Aristoteles tractatum speciale de mixtis.

2 7 imperfecti] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, l. 40 | tamen] cum B 30 in finem] suppl. ex 33 habitum] habitus B supra, ll. 26 et 28 et etiam ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, ll. 44- 46 34 prime] primo B | tirannis] tyrannidis B 35 democratia] scrips. democras B 36 distinctione] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 13, l. 59: diffinitione B 38 tirannis] tyrannidis B 40 aristocratia] scrips. aristochia B 48 tirannis] tyrannidis B 51 principantur] principans B 52 8º] 9 B 3 3 priuatio…habitum] Auct. Arist., De An. III (154), p. 187; Arist., De An. III.6, 430b21-23 4 6 in…52 democratia] Arist., Eth. Nic. VIII.6, 1160b24-25, 32-33 et 1161a3-4

822

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 1 4 > C o n s e q u e n t er q u e r i t u r u t r u m a l i q u i p r a u e i u d i c e n t d e s e i p s i s

Videtur quod non, quia unusquisque, eorum que nouit, est bonus iudex; sed melius cognoscit se unusquisque quam alios; ergo et cetera. Item, ad recte iudicandum requiritur certitudo, prudentia et rectitudo appetitus; appetitum rectum sequitur dilectio, et sic ad iudicium 5 requiritur dilectio; ergo sicut de dilectione, sic est de iudicio. Sed amicitia que ad alterum ortum habet ex amicitia que ad se ipsum, 9º Ethicorum; queritur qui recte iudicat de se ipso. Contrarium dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera. B

67va

10

Item, de quo aliquis rectam estimationem | non habet, non potest recte iudicare; sed homo de se rectam estimationem non habet si sit malus, quia in agibilibus, ad recte iudicandum, oportet habere appetitum rectum; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod iudicium rei fit per eius resolutionem in principia 15 prima rei. Secundo sciendum quod est iudicium in agibilibus et in speculatiuis. Modo in agibilibus dico quod homo est malus iudex sui, quoniam ad hoc requiritur rectitudo prudentie; sed ad prudentiam requiritur rectitudo appetitus finis et, si de se debet iudicare, oportet quod habeat prudentiam 20 et appetitum rectum respectu sui. Sed contingit , ut in pluribus, non habere appetitum rectum respectu sui, quia aliqui se diligunt secundum partem secundum quam se diligere non debent, sicut quantum ad sensum et non quantum ad intellectum, quod est principale in eis; et ideo male iudicant de se et de amicis, quia amicus est alter ipse. Si autem sit 25 prudens et bonus, bene potest recte de se iudicare.

14 , 1 praue] scrips. prarie B 6 requiritur] sequitur B 8 ergo…ideo] suppl., aliquibus mutatis, ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 14, l. 10 14 quare…15 resolutionem] iter. B 20 quod] coni.: de se B 25 male] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 14, l. 36: minus B 14 , 1 Consequenter…ipsis] cf. Arist., Pol. III.9, 1280a15-16 6 amicitia…7 ipsum] cf. Auct. Arist., Eth. Nic. IX (176), p. 245; Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.4, 1166a1-2 et b1-2 1 0 Contrarium…littera] cf. Arist., Pol. III.9, 1280a15-16 19 ad…20 finis] cf. Thomam, Sent. Eth. VI. 4: “ad prudentiam requiritur rectitudo appetitus circa fines” (ed. Leon. XLVII.2, p. 347, ll. 172-173)

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

823

In speculatiuis autem per se homo bene iudicat de se, quia principia speculatiua non dependent ex appetitu; tamen per accidens bene impeditur, inquantum per appetitum inordinatum tendit in alium finem et 30 retrahitur ab actu speculandi. Et hoc uult PHILOSOPHUS 6º Ethicorum, quia malitia non corrumpit estimationem quod triangulus habet tres, sed corrumpit estimationem in agibilibus, quia oportet credere primis principiis, ut “hoc est , quia talis finis bonus”, quia hoc non credit malus propter malitiam suam.

35

Ad argumentum primum in oppositum dicendum quod homo melius nouit que sunt in se quantum ad speculabilia quam alius; non tamen malus melius nouit , quia in eo sunt quantum agibilia. Et uisa est ratio.

Secunda ratio tangit difficultatem quare mali bene iudicant de aliis, de se autem male. Circa quod sciendum est quod nullus est malus uniformiter, quia uitia contraria non possunt esse in eodem, . Et ideo aliquis potest esse intemperatus, non autem illiberalis, uel habere unum uitium quantum ad unam circumstantiam et non quantum ad aliam, sicut quod accipit unumquod45 que et dat tamen alicui. Modo aliquis bene potest iudicare de alio quantum ad circumstantiam uel malitiam quam habet, sicut intemperatus de illiberalitate alterius; non tamen contingit malum recte iudicare de alio quantum ad illam malitiam quam habet, circa talia appetitum rectum. Et si dicas quod illiberales recte iudicant de 50 auaritia alterius, non ualet, quia, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS 7º Ethicorum, dicere uerba que secundum scientiam nullum signum est eius quod est esse scientem; similiter, si auarus iudicet de actibus liberalitatis, non est signum quod sit talis uel quod hoc credat, nec ei credendum est cum faciat oppositum, unde, 10º Ethicorum, dicitur quod magis persuadent exempla 55 quam dicta.

40

2 8 speculatiua] specialium B 2 9 inordinatum] recte add. B 3 3 ut] et B | optimum…ordinari] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 14, ll. 49-50 36 speculabilia] specialia B 4 1 et…42 malitias] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 14, ll. 61- 62 43 non] nunc B 5 3 quod2] quia B 3 1 malitia…34 suam] Arist., Eth. Nic. VI.4, 1140b14-20 5 1 dicere…52 scientem] Arist., Eth. Nic. VII.3, 1147a18-24 5 4 magis…55 dicta] Arist., Eth. Nic. X.1, 1172a34-b1

824

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 1 5 > C o n s e q u e n te r q u e r i t u r u t r u m m e l i u s s i t m u l t i tu d i n e m q u a m p a u co s u i r tu o s o s p r i n c i p a r i

Arguitur quod non, quia melius est principari quod excedit secundum uirtutem; sed pauci uirtuosi excedunt multitudinem in uirtute; ergo 5 et cetera. Item, principatus est melior qui magis assimilatur optimo; sed optimus principatus est monarchia regalis, ut dicitur 7º huius; ergo et cetera. Item, ille principatus est melior qui magis assimilatur principi totius uniuersi et naturali; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione, quia melius est 10 principari prudentiore et magis uirtuosos et potentes quam minus tales; sed multitudo est huiusmodi, quoniam multi intelligentes melius uident quam unus, sicut plures oculi. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod, sicut melius operatur pluribus manibus, sic melius iudicatur pluribus 15 prudentibus. Item, melius est principari quod intendit commune bonum; hoc est multitudo: per hoc quod quilibet intendit bonum proprium, tota multitudo intendit bonum commune, quod comprehendit bonum omnium.

Dicendum quod ratio principatus a fine sumitur principatus, quia ex fine habent ea que ad finem sunt. Finis autem principatus recti est 20 dirigere ciues ad felicitatem: hoc potest facere uirtute que potest preuidere, et hec est prudentia; ita supponit uirtutes morales; quare principans primo et per se debet determinari per prudentiam et uirtutes, et eas habere debet. 15 , 7 ut] nec B 8 assimilatur] optimo sed optimus principatus est monarchia regalis add. sed del., adhibito signo ‘uacat’ B 9 et1] sed B 10 Oppositum] optimum B 1 3 uident] scrips. uidem B 14 sic] sicut B 1 5 prudentibus] prudentiis B 16 Item] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 15, l. 21: quare B | est1] multitudinem add. B 15 , 1 Consequenter…2 principari] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281a40- 42; cf. etiam loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 15, ll. 1-2 cum adn. 6 principatus…7 regalis] re vera hoc non invenitur in VIIº Politicae, sed est potius Petrus qui hoc asserit in Scripto; cf. Petrum, Scriptum VII.2: “Crederet enim aliquis, propter predicta, quod non expediret aliquem unum principari omnibus aliquo modo, sed esset preter naturam: quod est contra regni rationem, quod est optima politia” (ed. Lanza, p. 460, ll. 408-410) 10 Oppositum…18 omnium] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281a42-b9 et III.16, 1287b25-31

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO) 25

825

Item, quia non omnes ciues sunt bene legi obedientes, ideo oportet ipsum habere potentiam, per quam possit eos corrigere et debellare inimicos; et sic requiritur principe uirtus moralis et prudentia et potentia.

Secundo notandum quod est quedam multitudo bestialis et despotica, que non est bene deducibilis ratione; alia est que persuasibilis est quantum ad partem infimam eius, et quantum ad partem supremam participat ratione, et talis est aggregata ex potentibus et diuitibus et multitudine ciuitatis. Modo dico quod non expedit | primam multitudinem principari, B 67vb quia, licet habeat potentiam, tamen uirtute et prudentia deficit, et ideo, 35 propter impetum, multa mala facit ista multitudo si principetur et conuocetur ad iudicandum uel precipiendum. Sed multitudinem que continet diuites et uirtuosos et potentes melius est principari, quia ad principandum exigitur prudentia, uirtus et potentia.

30

Et ideo magis debet principari quod attingit ad hec omnia quam quod 40 ad unum; sed hoc est multitudo, quia, inquantum sunt ibi prudentes, attingit ad uirtutem et prudentiam, inquantum multi, ad potentiam. Et ideo manifestum est quod pauci uirtuosi non habent hec omnia, quia non potentiam, licet habeant prudentiam; quare et cetera.

45

Per hoc patet solutio ad primum, quia talis multitudo attingit ad uirtutem, inquantum includit uirtuosos. Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper in omni materia querendum quod est melius simpliciter; unde aliqui sunt nati regi uno principatu, alii alio. Et de hoc statim queretur.

3 3 principari] priuari B 3 6 precipiendum] coni. ex illo quod asseritur de actibus principalibus principandi in QQ. VII, q. 6, ll. 36-37 cum adn.: prosequendum B 3 6 multitudinem…37 principari] in QQ. – cf. loc. parall. et etiam III, q. 16 – ista multitudo tantum est “ex sapientibus et populo”; hic autem mentio facitur de divitibus et potentibus, ut etiam in Petri Scripto III.13: “Possibile enim est in multitudine esse aliquos uiros sapientes et prudentes et aliquos ualde diuites ... aggregat enim multitudo et diuites et nobiles, uirtuosos et populi potentiam” (ed. Lanza, p. 93, ll. 211-212 et 218-219)

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

826

< Q UE S T I O 1 6 > C on s e q u e n t e r

q u e r i tu r u t r u m i n p r i n c i p a tu p r i n c i p a r i m u l t i t ud i n e m

su mmo

op or teat

Arguitur quod sic, quia, si simpliciter ad simpliciter et magis ad magis, et cetera; sed dictum est prius quod expedit multitudinem per se principari, quare meliori principatu magis expedit et in summo maxime; 5 ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, et arguitur ratione eius: multitudo inclinatur in malum, quia deficit uirtute, et ideo iniuriatur quando princi10 patur; quare et cetera.

Dicendum quod multitudinem bestialem, que nata est regi principatu despotico, non licet attingere ad summum principatum, quia totum destrueret. Sed de hac non est dubitatio, sed de illa que aliqualiter attingit ad uirtutem: et de hac dicendum quod non expedit eam attingere ad summum principatum. Et ratio huius est quia ad principantem requirun- 15 tur duo, scilicet prudentia et uirtus, per que homo per se inclinatur in bonum, et ex consequenti requiritur potentia. Ratio autem uniuscuiusque magis debet attendi secundum illud quod pertinet ad ipsum per se quam quod pertinet ad ipsum per accidens; et ideo ratio principantis magis attenditur secundum prudentiam quam secundum 20 potentiam. Et ratio huius est quoniam principans est secundum cuius uoluntatem mouentur alia, ut dicitur 5º Metaphisice, ita quod princeps est mouens alia secundum uoluntatem suam, non accipiens rationem mouendi ab alio; ideo ille non dicitur princeps qui rationem mouendi accipit ab alio. Et ideo, cum tota multitudo rationem mouendi secundum pruden- 25 tiam accipiat ab alio, quia a sapientibus, que est in ea, que primo mouet, ideo est impossibile totam multitudinem esse primum principans simpliciter. 16 , 9 uirtute] uirtutem sed corr. B 1 2 despotico] despotica B parall. QQ. III, q. 16, l. 28 27 mouet] mouent B

26 qui…pars] suppl. ex loc.

16 , 1 Consequenter…2 multitudinem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b21-25 4 dictum…5 principari] cf. supra, q. praec. 7 ***] secundum argumentum deest; ex responsione autem, que infra profertur, desumi potest quod aliqualiter simile esset illo quod in loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 16, ll. 9-10 invenitur 8 Oppositum…10 principatur] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b25-28 et loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 16, ll. 11-13 cum adn. 2 1 principans…22 alia] Arist., Metaph. V.1, 1013a10-12

QUESTIONES – LIBER III (REPORTATIO)

827

Item, expedit illud in summo principatu principari, ad cuius rationem omnes alii principatus reducuntur; sed hec ratio unius principantis, quoniam multitudo non principatur nisi inquantum unitatem habet ab inuicem, nec pauci similiter principantur nisi in uno consentiant; et ideo omnes principantur inquantum habent rationem unius, quare expedit multitudinem principari. Et quod supra dixit 35 PHILOSOPHUS, quod expedit multitudinem principari, intelligendum est quod aliqualiter attingant ad principatum, non tamen ad primum; sed quantum expediat eam principari uidetur in questione sequenti.

30

Et ideo uidemus quod in omni politia, sicut oligarchia et democratia, eligitur unus primo principans, tamen omnes alii habent ibi dominium in 40 hoc quod eligunt ipsum et corrigunt.

Ad argumentum, cum dicitur “si simpliciter ad simpliciter” et cetera, dicendum quod ad hoc quod propositio sit uera, oportet quod illud simpliciter, et magis et maxime, sit unius rationis. Et cum dicit quod “expedit multitudinem principari”, uerum est principatu qui non unius 45 rationis cum principatu summo; ideo non ualet. Ad aliud dicendum quod unus habet omnes illos qui unanimiter eligunt illum, et habet consilium totius ciuitatis inquantum ocordant cum eo; et ideo habet excellentiam politie et uirtutis per istum modum.

2 9 illud] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 16, l. 34: illis B 3 0 reducuntur] scrips. redicuntur B 3 4 non] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 16, ll. 39-40 et 43-44 3 6 attingant] attingunt B 3 7 quantum] quam B | expediat] expediant B 3 9 unus] unius sed corr. B 46 omnia…habent] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 16, l. 56 3 4 supra…35 principari] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281a40-42 et q. praec.

828

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 1 7 > C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m e x p e d i a t mu l t i t u d i n e m at t i n g e r e a d e l e c t i o n e m pr i n c i pi s e t c o r r e c t i o n e m

Arguitur quod non, quia sapientis est eligere et corrigere, quia eius , cuius est iudicare; sed multitudo deficit prudentia, quia 5 imprudentes sunt ut in pluribus. Item, inconueniens est multitudinem inordinatam facere maxima in ciuitate; ista sunt huiusmodi; ergo et cetera. Oppositum dicit .

Dicendum quod non expedit multitudinem bene ordinatam . Et ratio huius 10 est quia ad electionem, cum sit appetitus preconsiliatus, requiritur prudentia; item, requiritur potentia, que compellat electum ad principatum, precipue ad illum ubi est paruum lucri et periculum magnum, sicut est in principatu quo iudicatur de homicidialibus, ut dicit post PHILOSOPHUS; hec autem sunt in multitudine, quia per sapientes habetur prudentia, per 15 multitudinem potentia; quare et cetera. B 68ra

Item, per hoc magis saluabitur ciuitas, | quia omnes maxime diligunt sua opera, 9º Ethicorum; quare ciues magis se diligent et electum, et erit maior dilectio in ciuitate; quare et cetera. Item, principans habet iudicare, et contingit aliquando ipsum peccare. 20 Peccatum eius oportet corrigi, aliter posset destruere politiam, quia primo posset unum grauare et post reliquos, et sic omnes corrigi; non autem potest a superiori, quia superiorem non 17 , 3 sapientis] sapientia B 4 est corrigere] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 17, l. 5 | cuius] causa B | multitudo] similitudo B 9 bestialem…10 tamen] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 17, ll. 13-14 1 0 iustum est] suppl. ex eodem loco 1 1 appetitus preconsiliatus] correxi ex fonte allata: principatus preconciliatus B 22 grauare] generare B | reliquos] reliquum B | ciues…23 eum] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 17, ll. 29-31 17 , 1 Consequenter…2 correctionem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b30-34 5 imprudentes…pluribus] cf. Auct. Arist., Top. II (30), p. 324; Arist., Top. II.6, 112b11-12 8 Oppositum…Philosophus] cf. Arist., Pol. III.11, 1281b30-34 11 electionem…preconsiliatus] cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. III.4, 1112a15-16 1 3 in…14 homicidialibus] non asseritur, in loco parallelo QQ., quod de principatu quo iudicatur de homicidialibus Aristoteles mentionem facit in Politica. Si vere hoc ex Politica desumptum sit, agitur probabiliter de loco illo ex IVº libro (Arist. Pol. IV.16, 1300b24-32) ubi, ex differentibus speciebus praetoriorum, mentionatur illud quod de homicidialibus 17 omnes…18 opera] Arist., Eth. Nic. IX.7, 1167b33-34

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829

habet, et hoc quando ista ciuitas non est sub alia; et ideo oportet quod corrigatur per aliquos ciuitatis. Sed per paucos sapientes non potest, quia bene possunt sibi dicere et ordinare que tenetur facere, sed non possunt ipsum compellere; sed hoc potest facere tota multitudo; ideo tota multitudo corrigere debet.

Item, hoc pertinet ad pacem ciuitatis, quia contingit eum qui punitur 30 habere odio eum qui punit, et maiorem habet indignationem ad eum si sit unus quam plures; et ideo periculum esset uni uel paucis eum punire, et ideo expedit totam multitudinem punire. Sed notandum quod primus principans principatur secundum leges et, quando iudicat secundum eas, tunc multitudo non debet eum corrigere. 35 Quando non, hoc est uel quia legem contempnit uel ignorat eam, ideo in hoc casu rationem principantis non habet, et subditi, si hoc uideant, debent ipsum corrigere.

Ad argumentum primum dico multitudo ordinata simul iuncta habet maiorem potentiam et prudentiam quam pauci. 40

Ad aliud dico quod multitudinem uilem periculum est fieri dominam maximorum, non tamen multitudinem ordinatam. < Q U E S TIO 1 8 > C o n s e q u e n te r

q u e r i t u r u t r u m p r i n c i p a tu s s i < n > t s e c un d u m d i g n i t a t e m d i u i t i a r um

di s t r i b u e n di

Arguitur quod sic, quod ad illud oportet inspicere in distributione principatus per quod multa expediuntur in ciuitate; sed diuitie et amici 5 sunt huiusmodi, ut dicitur 1º Ethicorum; ergo et cetera. Item, ad illud oportet inspicere per quod habentur omnia; diuitie sunt huiusmodi, quia, 2º Rhetorice, dicitur quod diuitie uidentur esse quoddam omnium pretium; quare et cetera. 10

Oppositum arguitur, quia ad illud non oportet inspicere per quod homo inclinatur ad contumelias et elationem, quia per hoc corrumpitur 2 9 eum] cum B 3 3 principatur] priuatur B 3 9 maiorem] ipsam add. sed exp. B 18 ,1 Consequenter…2 diuitiarum] cf. Arist., Pol. III.12, 1283a14-15 et III.13, 1283a31-33; cf. loc. parall QQ. III, q. 18, ll. 1-2 cum adn. 4 diuitie…5 huiusmodi] Arist., Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a33b2 7 diuitie…8 pretium] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1391a1-2

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ciuitas; sed diuites per diuitias fiunt elati, credentes per diuitias omnia habere, ut dicitur 2º Rhetorice; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod in politia bene ordinata non sunt per se distribuendi principatus secundum dignitatem diuitiarum; debent tamen per accidens. Primum patet primo quia diuitie sunt quoddam bonum naturale, que, 15 secundum quod deuiunt in usum hominis, habent rationem utilis, et bene et male contingit eis uti. Hoc arguitur sic: principatus ordinatur ad feliciter uiuere, ita quod princeps debet alios ordinare ad recte operandum; sed solum uirtutibus aliquis ordinatur ad recte uiuendum, et non per 20 diuitias, cum eis contingit male et cetera. Item, malum est facere principatum uenalem, quia hoc esset ciues inclinare ad auaritiam, quia omnes appetunt honorem; principatus est honor quidam; et sic omnes appetunt principatum, ergo et ea sine quibus non potest haberi. Sed hoc est diuitie: si distribuantur principatus secundum dignitatem diuitiarum, quia nullus principabitur nisi fuerit diues, sic 25 fiunt auari, quod per se malum est; quare et cetera. Tamen per accidens aliquando oportet inspicere ; et ratio est quia contingit esse aliquem principatum in quo principans nichil utilitas habet, et in tali non debet eligi nisi diues. Cuius ratio est quia, intendentem aliquem finem, oportet inspicere necessarium ad illum 30 finem; sed finis principatus non potest haberi sine diuitiis, quia diuitie sunt sicut organa uirtutum et felicitatis; et ita oportet inspicere ad diuitias, per quas iustus se exercet in operibus iustitie. Sed primo in principatu oportet inspicere ad uirtutem, ut ostensum est, secundo ad diuitias. Sed in principatu non oportet inspicere nec per se nec 35 per accidens; sed iste principatus in se habet aliquam utilitatem per quam possit opera uirtutis exerceri. Sed aliquis dubitaret: si in ciuitate sint duo eque uirtuosi, sed unus est pauper, alter est diues, quis eorum debet prius assumi ad principandum? 18 , 13 se] bene add. B 1 5 patet] quia add. sed exp. B 17 Hoc] praem. ex sed exp. B 19 aliquis] aliquid B 20 uti] suppl. ex supra, l. 17 et ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 18, ll. 26 et 30 22 principatus] iter. B 2 3 appetunt] honorem principatus add. sed exp. B 25 nullus] non B | diues] et add. B 26 ciues] suppl. ex supra, ll. 21-22 et ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 18, ll. 33-34 et 39-40 35 per1…sufficienti] suppl. ex infra, l. 40 et ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 18, ll. 49-50 et 53-55 | ad diuitias] suppl. ex eodem loco 3 6 habet] habeat B | quam] quod B 11 diuites…12 habere] Arist., Rhet. II.16, 1390b32-1391a2 3 1 diuitie…32 felicitatis] cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I.4, 1099a33-b2 3 3 primo…34 diuitias] cf. supra, ll. 17-20

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Et hoc in principatu per se sufficienti, et in diuitiis et in aliis. Et hec questio fuit in 2º huius.

Intentio PHILOSOPHI est quod pauper. Nam 5º huius dicitur quod sunt per que principatus conseruatur, scilicet uirtus, potentia, dilectio principatus. Vnde, quod princeps diligit principatum, multum mouet 45 ad bene regendum principatum. Ille ergo magis debet eligi, ceteris conditionibus paribus, qui magis diligit principatum; sed isti sunt pauperes; ergo et cetera. Probatio minoris, quia beneficiatus naturaliter diligit benefactorem suum, et secundum quantitatem beneficii est quantitas amoris. Naturaliter aut quantitas beneficii pensatur non secundum quantitatem 50 dati, sed secundum indigentiam beneficiati: si enim aliquis | debet unum B 68rb indigenti et decem non indigenti, plus reputatur dare indigenti, et ideo beneficiatus indigens plus diligit benefactorem suum quam non indigens. Sed pauper magis indiget principatu tali quam diues, quia prius erat abiectus, non autem diues; item per habet diuitias, quibus indigebat; et 55 ideo magis diligit principatum quam diues electus; quare et cetera.

Ad argumentum primum dicendum quod non oportet inspicere primo ad ea per que multa expediuntur in ciuitate, sicut ad diuitias, sed ad illud per quod dirigitur in exequendo. Sed uerum est quod oportet inspicere ad eas, ex consequenti, in principatu in quo non sunt 60 huiusmodi diuitie; sed in principatu qui habet non oportet ad eas inspicere, nec primo nec ex consequenti. Ad secundum dico quod non omnia habentur per diuitias, sed solum commutabilia, et de illis intelligit Aristoteles cum dicit quod sunt pretium omnium. Vel quod dicit secundum estimationem diuitum, 65 qui credunt omnia habere per diuitias; sed per eas non habentur bona moris; quare non ualet.

4 2 5º] correxi ex fonte allata: quarto B 44 Vnde] bene B 46 diligit] diligunt B 5 7 per que] inv. B 4 2 Intentio…pauper] cf. Arist., Pol. II.11, 1273b6-7 | tria…44 principatus] Arist., Pol. V.9, 1309a33-37 4 4 ***] aliquid deest hic quod, consideratis sequentibus, simile esse debet sententiae illae quae invenitur in loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 18, ll. 65- 69 et Anonymi Mediolanensis QQ. Pol. III, q. 15: “... ad hoc quod aliquis sit princeps in ciuitate requiritur quod principis sit prudentia et potestas et dilectio (cod. : delectio) principatus. Precipue tamen requiritur dilectio quia, licet assumptus uirtuosus et potens, nunquam tamen diligenter exercebit illa in operationibus principatus si non diligat principatum” (ms. Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf., f. 29ra)

832

PETRI DE ALVERNIA < Q UE S T I O 1 9 >

C o n s e q u e n t e r q u e r i t u r u t r u m i n d i s t r i b u t i o n e p r i n c i p at u s o p o r t e a t i n s p i c e re a d i n g e n u i t a t e m Arguitur quod sic, principatus debet distribui secundum uirtutem; sed ingenuitas est uirtus, ut dicitur hic et 2º Rhetorice; quare et 5 cetera. Item, ad honorabilitatem et bonum est inspiciendum; sed apud omnes ingenuitas est bonum honorabile; ergo et cetera. Oppositum arguitur: 2º Rhetorice dicitur quod mos est ingenuos esse despectiuos et iniuriosos; sed tales non debent eligi; ergo et cetera.

Dicendum quod non per se est inspiciendum ad ingenuitatem, tamen 10 per accidens debet conspici; quod patet quia secundum hoc debent distribui , secundum quod aliquis potest recte operari. Hoc autem est uirtus in actu et non in potentia; nobilitas autem non est uirtus in actu, sed quedam inclinatio ad uirtutem et in potentia; et ideo per se non est 15 inspiciendum ad nobilitatem. Tamen per accidens inspiciendum est; cuius ratio est quia, quando aliquis per se intendit aliquem finem, et per consequens intendit illud per quod potest augmentari ille finis, sicut, quia homo potest melius operari sanus, intendens illud opus, consequenter intendit sanitatem. Sed ille qui distribuit per se intendit bonum uirtutis; sed istud bonum 20 augetur per nobilitatem; ergo et cetera. Probatio minoris est quia nobilitas est inclinatio ad uirtutem, sed per istam inclinationem augetur uirtus. Et ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS in Magnis Moralibus, 1º libro, quod si aliquis eligit esse optimus, sed bonus, quia non est ita dispositus quod possit optime 25 19 , 1 distributione] distribuente B 3 principatus] scrips. principatas B 4 hic] correxi ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 19, l. 5 et ex fonte allata: primo B 1 0 ingenuitatem] ingenuitas B 2 0 principatus] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 19, l. 38 2 4 ad…25 fit] suppl. ex loc. parall. QQ. III, q. 19, ll. 42- 43 19 , 1 Consequenter…2 ingenuitatem] cf. Arist., Pol. III.12, 1283a14-15 et III.13, 1283a33-37 4 ingenuitas…uirtus] Auct. Arist., Pol. III (63), p. 256; Arist., Pol. III.13, 1283a37; Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b18-19 et 22; Auct. Arist., Rhet. II (49), p. 266 8 mos…9 iniuriosos] Arist., Rhet. II.15, 1390b16-21 2 3 si…26 operari] Arist., Mag. Mor. I.17, 1189a8-10, ubi tamen asseritur: “nullus eligit sanus esse, sed secundum sanitatem eligimus ambulare, currere; volumus autem fines: sani esse enim volumus”

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operari. Sed nobilitas ad hoc disponit, ut dictum est, et ideo, per accidens, ad eam inspiciendum est. Et loquor de nobilitate que seruat uirtutem generis, quia aliqui bene degenerant.

30

Ad argumentum primum dicendum quod ad uirtutem in actu et per se inspiciendum; sed nobilitas non est uirtus in actu, ut dictum est. Ad secundum similiter dicendum quod inspiciendum ad bonum honorabile secundum uirtutem in actu, et non secundum uirtutem in potentia; sed nobilitas non est honorabilis nisi propter inclinationem ad uirtutem, et ita per accidens; quare non ualet.

2 6 nobilitas…disponit] cf. supra, ll. 13-14 et 21-22 3 0 nobilitas…actu] cf. supra, ll. 13-14

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Indices 1. Study Index Codicum Manuscriptorum1 Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, MSB 18 45n, 54n, 156n, 167n, 172n, 173n, 180n, 205n, 214n, 273n Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Lat. 879 213n Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Magdeb. 149 61n, 77n, 103n, 134n, 199n, 248n, 334 Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio, A.913 138n Cambridge, Peterhouse, 116 26n, 201n, 334 Cambridge, Peterhouse, 152 52n, 53n, 74n, 75n, 334 Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 129 228n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Borgh. 298 137n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1030 45n, 179n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 1059 53n, 237n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Urb. lat. 222 201n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 723 213n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 777 12n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 845 53n, 237n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 932 61n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 1032 137n Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6758 60n, 67n Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Amplon. F 13 133n, 184n, 191n, 317n Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 349 58, 60n, 61n, 69n, 71 Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, 213 184n, 191n, 316n, 317n 1  This index does not include references made to the three manuscripts containing the Questiones.

866

Indices

Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.3.1153 137n Leipzig, Universätsbibliothek, 1386 60n, 64-65, 67n, 72, 75n Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1418 72n Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, A.100.inf. 45n, 46n, 55n, 156n, 157n, 165n, 167n, 168n, 170n, 172n, 174n, 175n, 179n, 180n, 181n, 212n, 213-214n, 221n, 273n, 314n München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 9559 58 Oxford, Balliol College, 104 72n Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, 662 283n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 6457 213n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14311 137n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14562 61n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 14698 60n, 67n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15106 159n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15350 138, 221n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15841 61n, 134n, 135n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15851 61n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16110 133n, 191n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16158 53n, 72n, 74n, 237n Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 17832 201n Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 98 94n, 283n, 318n Tortosa, Archivo Capitular, 244 283n Trier, Stadtbibliothek, 1039 8° (1283) 46n, 314n Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 2330 120n, 237n Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, Milich II 59 46n, 314n

Index Nominum (– 1800)1 Adam Bocfeldius 11 Adenulphus de Anagnia 11n Aegidius Aurelianensis 92, 133, 183n, 184n, 191n, 199n, 283n, 306n, 317n Aegidius Romanus 5n, 8, 10, 12, 13, 32n, 33, 35, 36n, 39, 41, 43, 44n, 46, 67, 90, 92-93, 98n, 137, 139-141, 158, 159n, 178, 188-189, 190n, 192193, 200, 203-204, 206, 209n, 211, 212, 214, 217-222, 225, 231n, 239, 240n, 245, 255, 257, 262, 265-267, 283, 287, 290, 300-301, 302n, 308n, 319, 334 Alanus ab Insulis 22 Albertus Magnus 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16n, 21, 24, 26, 27, 29, 39, 40, 41, 45, 66, 70n, 71n, 77, 8184, 87, 89, 95, 102, 103n, 104, 109-110, 114, 119, 122-126, 128-130, 140-141, 180, 195, 200-201, 211-217, 224, 232, 233n, 256, 267n, 272n, 282, 289n, 300, 302n, 309, 314 Albertus de Saxonia 10n Alexander, Magister 11 Alexander de Alexandria 11 Alfonsus de Cartagena 36 Alfonsus de Madrigal 36 Algazel 63 Anonymus (in II Ethicorum) 23n Anonymus (in III Ethicorum)23n Anonymus (in IV Ethicorum) 23n Anonymus (in V Ethicorum) 23n, 199 Anonymus (in VII Ethicorum) 23n Anonymus (in Sophisticos Elenchos) 11n Anonymus (Liber De causis) 51, 54, 56, 60n, 119120, 139-141, 154n, 175n, 202-204, 210, 253 Anonymus Argentinensis 268n, 283n, 297n Anonymus Baltimorensis 45, 46, 54n, 76, 147, 155n, 156n, 167n, 172n, 173n, 180n, 181n, 184, 187n, 188n, 205, 214n, 226, 236n, 251n, 273n, 313n, 333 Anonymus Basileae 268n Anonymus Erfordiensis 133n, 183n, 184n, 191n, 306n, 317n Anonymus Erlangensis 133n, 184n, 191n, 315316, 317n, 321 Anonymus Lipsiensis (ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, ff. 41ra-76ra) 60n, 64-65, 72 Anonymus Lipsiensis (ms. Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 1386, ff. 77va-91ra) 67n

Anonymus Mediolanensis 18n, 41, 45, 46, 54, 76, 147, 155n, 156n, 157n, 165n, 167n, 168n, 170n, 171n, 172n, 173n, 175n, 179n, 181n, 184, 205, 212n, 213n-214n, 221n, 226, 273n, 305, 313n, 314, 319-320, 333 Anonymus Mertonianus 190 Anonymus Monacensis 268n, 283n, 297n, 305 Anonymus Neapolitanus 24n Anonymus Parisiensis (ed. Costa) 133n, 151, 183n, 184n Anonymus Parisiensis (ed. Gauthier) 24n Anonymus Parisiensis (in Physicam) 60n, 67n Anonymus Parisiensis (ms. Paris, B.n.F., lat. 16110) 133n, 191n Anonymus Vaticanus (in Physicam) 60n, 67n Anonymus Vaticanus (in Politicam) 45, 46, 54n, 147, 155n, 179n, 184, 187n, 188n, 226, 236n, 251n, 313n, 333 Anonymus Worcestriensis 306n Anselmus Cantuariensis 178n Antonius Andreae 10n Antonius Montecatinus 28n Antonius Riccobonus 111 Arnoldus Verhel 17n Arnulfus Provincialis 121n Aspasius 23n, 25n, 87, 282 Auctoritates Aristotelis (Parvi Flores) 85, 152-153, 154n, 155, 161, 180, 181n, 195-197, 203, 208, 334 Augustinus, Aurelius 17, 18, 202 Augustinus de Ancona 11 Aurelius Lippus Brandolinus 35n Averroes 18, 74, 108, 119, 153, 156, 196, 199n, 202, 243 Avicenna 13n, 32, 115, 148n, 196, 231, 245, 252 Baldus de Ubaldis 34, 35, 37 Balthasar Crosnievicius 16n Bartholomaeus de Brugis 6n, 185, 315, 316-317, 321 Bartholomaeus Cavalcantius 6n Bartholomaeus de Messana 26, 27, 204-205 Bartholus de Saxoferrato 34, 35, 37 Bernardus de Alvernia 137 Bernardus de Trilia 137 Boethius de Dacia 9, 11, 48n, 55, 60n, 64-65, 67, 115, 136, 141, 158, 207, 222, 276 Bonaventura de Balneoregio 130-131 Chrysippus 206

1 

Peter of Auvergne and Aristotle are not included in this index.

868

Indices

Cicero, Marcus Tullius 17, 18n, 33, 196, 211 Conradus de Monte Puellarum 36 Costa ben Luca (Qusta Ibn Luqa) 104, 109n Dante Alighieri 239, 322n Didacus Perez de Mesa 6n, 322n Dionysius Lambinus 28n Donatus Acciaiolus 29 Donatus Gianottus 321 Durandus de Sancto Porciano 193n Emmanuel-Josephus Sieyès 271n Engelbertus Admontensis 36, 239 Erasmus Roterodamus 28n Erycus Puteanus 17n ‘Eustratius’ 18, 24n, 196, 198-201 Eustratius de Nicaea 23n, 24n, 25n, 26, 92, 113114, 149n, 156n, 198-199, 231, 261 Federicus Bonaventura 322n Ferdinandus Rhoensis 6, 30n, 35n, 46n, 76, 138, 212, 218, 314 Ferrandus Hispanus 185 Galenus 13n, 104 Galterius Burlaeus 6, 40, 41, 47n, 76, 138, 227, 314 Gaufridus de Fontibus 9, 121n, 129, 136-139, 143, 153n, 158, 163 Gerhardus Odonis 11n, 126, 153n Gervasius de Monte Sancti Eligii 221 Gilbertus Porretanus 179 Gratianus 13n, 33, 196n, 319 Guido Sancti Dionysii Parisiensis 6n Guido Terrena 185 Guido Vernani de Arimino 5n, 18n, 36n, 76, 111n, 186 Guillelmus Duranti iunior 40 Guillelmus de Moerbeke 4n, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24n, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 40, 44n, 122-125, 229n, 297n, 298, 304n Guillelmus de Ockham 31, 40, 46n, 47n, 136n, 315, 322n Guillelmus Peraldus 34 Guillelmus de Rothwell 158 Guillelmus de Sarzano 16n, 212 Hannibaldus de Ceccano 146, 175, 185, 192 Henricus de Alemannia 283n Henricus Bate 199n Henricus de Bruxella 55 Henricus de Careto 16n Henricus de Frimaria senior 11n, 126, 316, 321

Henricus de Gandavo 9, 12, 32, 46n, 77n, 128130, 137, 142-143, 206, 220-222, 231n, 253, 262, 291, 307, 315, 319, 330n, 334 Hervaeus Natalis 318 Hieronymus Stridonius 27 Hippocrates 13n, 104 Hippodamus de Miletus 227, 266 Iacobus de Carceto 94n Iacobus Ludovicus Strebaeus 28n Iacobus de Viterbio 9, 36, 40, 92, 130-131, 135, 139, 143, 239 Immanuel Kant 271n Ioachim Perionius 28n Iohannes Andreas 37 Iohannes de Bassolis 185n Iohannes Buridanus 10n, 45n, 126n, 148n, 149n, 199n, 291, 315 Iohannes Casius 46n, 88 Iohannes Damascenus 200n Iohannes de Dinsdale (Tytynsale) 10n, 183n, 306n Iohannes Duns Scotus 10n, 12, 44n, 136n, 176178, 185-186 Iohannes de Fonte v. Auctoritates Aristotelis Iohannes Guallensis 34, 196 Iohannes Genesius Sepulveda 28n, 29n Iohannes Grassus de Otranto 205 Iohannes de Grocheo 6n Iohannes de Ianduno 10n, 153n, 185, 200n, 291, 308 Iohannes de Lignano 37 Iohannes Neapolitanus 283n Iohannes Pecham 131 Iohannes Pecham [pseudo] 24n Iohannes Quidort Parisiensis 193n, 239 Iohannes de Rodington 47n Iohannes Saresberiensis 22, 34, 42 Iohannes de Segobia 36 Iohannes Thomas Freigius 16n Iohannes de Turrecremata 192n, 319 Iohannes Vath 150, 225, 291 Iohannes Versor (?) 45, 46, 212n, 218, 240n, 291, 314 Laurus Quirinus 35n Leonardus Brunus 21, 28, 29, 30n Ludovicus Settala 322n Macrobius 22 Marsilius de Inghen 10n Marsilius de Padua 5, 17, 31, 35, 39n, 40, 92, 112, 153n, 263n, 279, 283, 296n, 305, 319-321, 322n Maximus Confessor 200n

Index Nominum (– 1800) Michael Ephesius 23n, 154n, 178-179, 199-201, 309 Monachus Niger 47n Moyses Maimonides 32 Nicolaus Astonus 158 Nicolaus Girardi de Waudemonte 40, 45, 46, 76, 186, 214n, 251n, 262n, 291n, 305, 313-315, 319 Nicolaus Oresme 6, 10n, 18n, 41, 186, 212, 229n, 314, 315 Paulinus Minorita 33n Paulus Venetus 10n Paulus de Worczyn 212-213 Petrus de Alliaco 153n Petrus Aureoli 136n, 185-186, 274n Petrus de Bosco 225 Petrus de Castrobol 16n, 212 Petrus Hispanus 13n, 189n Petrus de Lemoviciis 220 Petrus Lombardus 13n, 17 Petrus de Osma 6, 30n, 35n, 46n, 76, 138, 212, 218, 314 Petrus Ramus 28n, 29n Petrus de Tarantasia 158 Petrus Victorius 28n Phaleas de Chalcedonia 264 Philippus Scherbius 88 Plato 20, 169, 195, 206, 213n, 214n, 219, 251, 256, 260, 262, 264n, 267 Porphyrius 9n, 12n Proclus 17, 140, 174, 196-197, 200n, 202-204, 278 Ptolomaeus, Claudius 27n, 71n, 104 Radulphus Brito 10n, 11, 45n, 92, 129, 136, 141, 159n, 185, 191n, 196n, 199n, 200n, 218, 223n, 242n, 283n, 288n, 306n, 316-317, 321 Raimundus Acgerii 5n, 16n, 76 Raimundus Rigauld [pseudo] 94, 283n, 291, 318-319 Richardus Brinkley 158 Richardus Kilvington 46n, 47n Robertus Grosseteste 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 87, 198, 271

869

Robertus Kildwardby 24n Rodericus Sancii de Arevalo 36 Rogerius Bacon 11n, 43, 104 Sallustius 211 Sebastianus Medices 319 Seneca 18, 196 Sextus Empiricus 145, 157, 197, 204 Siegfriedus Enemer 177n Sigerus de Brabantia 9, 11, 47, 50n, 55, 58, 59, 60n, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69n, 71, 74, 136, 141, 150, 153n, 159, 207, 222, 225-226 Simon de Faversham 199n Simplicius 17, 18, 196, 256n Socrates 257 Solon 256 Stephanus Gaudeti 158 Stephanus Tempier 103n Themistius 18, 196 Theodorus Studita 200n Theophilus Golius 16n Tholomaeus de Fiadonis 5n, 31, 33, 39, 70n, 71n, 127n, 211, 266-267 Thomas de Aquino 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16n, 23n, 24n, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 39, 44n, 45, 46n, 48, 50, 55n, 67, 70n, 72, 75, 77, 81-85, 103n, 123-124, 127, 137, 140-141, 171n, 176, 180, 187, 189, 195-196, 200n, 201, 203-204, 206211, 214-218, 221, 223-224, 230, 232, 233n, 236-237, 245-246, 248n, 251n, 252, 255-256, 261, 263, 267, 275-276, 284, 287-288, 289n, 292, 294, 297, 306-308, 310-311, 318 Thomas de Aquino [pseudo] 199n Thomas Smith 321 Thomas de Sutton 137 Valerius Maximus 196, 219 Vincentius Gruner 45, 46n, 268n, 273, 291, 297n, 310n, 313-314, 333 Zeno Citieus 205

Index Nominum (1800 –)1 Adamson, Peter 15n Alonso, José Labajos 30n Amerini, Fabrizio 10n, 12n, 252n Anzulewicz, Henryk 202n Artifoni, Enrico 33n Babbit, Susan M. 239n Bajor, Wanda 212 Bataillon, Louis-Jacques 4n, 20n, 329n, 331n Battagliero, Giulia 141n Bazán, Bernardo 50n, 226n Bejczy, István 22n, 200n Belloni, Annalisa 34n Berkers, Marieke 10n, 52n Berlincourt, Marjorie 197n Bertelloni, Francisco 23n Beullens, Pieter 31n, 204n Bianchi, Luca 11n, 18n, 48n, 159n, 195n, 198, 199n, 207n, 238n Biller, Peter 5n, 40n Black, Antony 36n, 37, 43 Blažek, Pavel 185n, 242n, 317n Bloch, David 190n Blythe, James M. 22n, 40n, 265n, 279n, 282n, 284n Bono, James J. 106n Borgnet, Auguste 26n, 123-126, 201n Boyle, Leonard E. 34n Brams, Jozef 4n Bridges, John Henry 104n Briggs, Charles F. 33n Briguglia, Gianluca 32n, 40n, 222n Brînzei Calma, Monica 49n Brouwer, Christian 135n Brundage, James A. 34n Brunner, Otto 28 Buffon, Valeria A. 24n Calma, Dragos 58n, 60n, 141n Canning, Joseph 35 Cannizzo, Giuseppina 134n, 138 Caprioli, Severino 14 Castelnuovo, Guido 32n Celano, Anthony J. 24n, 133n, 183n, 184n, 199n, 215n, 229n, 236n, 306n Celeyrette, Jean 148n Chappuis, Marguerite 153n Chatelain, Émile 14n Cheneval, François 4n, 202-203 1 

Ciappelli, Giovanni 22n Coccia, Emanuele 58n, 60n Coing, Helmut 34n Costa, Iacopo 45n, 92n, 129n, 130n, 133n, 143n, 151n, 159n, 182n, 183n, 184n, 185n, 190n, 192n, 196n, 199n, 200n, 218n, 223n, 226n, 281n, 283n, 288n, 306n, 316n, 317n Courtenay, William J. 9n, 45n, 119n, 132, 138n, 193n, 220, 290 Cranz, Ferdinand Edward 41n, 145-146, 157, 204n, 283n, 319 Crisciani, Chiara 273n De Benedictis, Angela 33n De Leemans, Pieter 10n, 27n, 30n, 31, 58 De Wulf, Maurice 136n Decorte, Jos 129n Del Punta, Francesco 13n, 141n, 193n Delaurenti, Beatrice 94n Delhaye, Philippe 47, 58 Delorme, Ferdinand 132n Denifle, Heinrich 14n, 34n Diotti, Angelo 225n Donati, Silvia 10n, 50n, 59n, 60n, 65, 121n, 141n, 193n, 231n Dondaine, Antoine 127n, 176n Dondaine, Hyacinthe-François 4n, 20n, 331n Dorez, Léon 34n Duba, William O. 147n, 151n Dunbabin, Jean 5n, 186n, 227n, 279n, 282n, 314 Dunne, Michael 197 Dunphy, William 55n, 58, 120n, 206n Dykmans, Marc 146n, 185n Ebbesen, Sten 10n, 11n, 61n, 66n, 121n, 189n, 190, 199n, 206n, 243n, 252n, 276n, 317n Emery, Jr., Kent 158n Ermatinger, Charles 58 Etzkorn, Gerard 131n Fauser, Winfried 141n, 212 Fidora, Alexander 23n Filthaut, Ephrem 110n Fiocchi, Claudio 31n, 246n, 300n, 301n Fioravanti, Gianfranco 4n, 6n, 22, 32n, 36n, 38n, 41n, 43, 48n, 55n, 102n, 207n, 212n, 224n, 237n, 246n, 251, 254n, 262n, 269n, 303n Floridi, Luciano 204n

Editors of volumes are not included, except where the volume as a whole has been cited.

Index Nominum (1800 –) Flüeler, Christoph 3n, 4n, 11n, 12n, 15n, 16n, 40n, 45n, 46n, 49n, 54n, 83n, 102n, 122n, 126n, 146, 148n, 157, 182n, 184n, 185n, 187, 204n, 214n, 225n, 246n, 247n, 273n, 283n, 291n, 305n, 310n, 313n, 314-315, 320 Fortenbaugh, William W. 285n Fournier, Marcel 34n Friedman, Russell L. 137n, 318n Führer, Markus 142n Gál, Gedeon 329n Galle, Griet 9n, 10n, 11n, 55n, 56n, 60n, 77n, 121n, 132, 146, 147n, 148n, 153n, 186n, 191n, 202, 227n, 256n Gauthier, René-Antoine 24n, 25n, 26n, 159n, 192n, 199n, 218n, 223n Genest, Jean-François 331n Gewirth, Alan 320 Geyer, Bernhard 110n Gilli, Patrick 269n Gilon, Odile 135n Glorieux, Palémon 193n González-Haba, Maria 137n Goris, Wouter 10n, 52n Grabmann, Martin 55n Graft, Thomas 199n Grafton, Anthony 195n Green-Pedersen, Niels Jørgen 115n, 158n Grevin, Benoît 104n Grignaschi, Mario 185n, 269n Guldentops, Guy 199n Hamesse, Jacqueline 147n, 152n, 153n, 154n, 155n, 161n, 181n, 203n Hankins, James 35n Hentschel, Frank 199n Hissette, Roland 103n, 328n-329n Hocedez, Edgar 63n, 136, 137n, 187n, 220n Hoeck, Johannes M. 205n Hödl, Ludwig 142n Höpfl, Harro 23n Hoffmann, Tobias 135n, 136n Hoffmans, Jean 129n, 136n, 153n Hohmann, Hanns 14n Hossfeld, Paul 66n Ierodiakonou, Katerina 201n Jacquart, Danielle 106n Jeffreys, Catherine 6n Kaiser, Christian 214n Kaluza, Zenon 49n, 158n Kempshall, Matthew 35n, 307n

871

Koebner, Richard 31n Köhler, Theodor W. 69n, 189n, 214n, 238n, 243n, 246n Kübel, Wilhelm 25n Künzle, Pius 137n Labarrière, Jean-Louis 245n Lachaud, Frédérique 33n, 34n Lafleur, Claude 3n, 313n, 324n Lagarde, Georges de 19 Lagerlund, Henrik 204n Lambertini, Roberto 4n, 5n, 6n, 8n, 16n, 22n, 24n, 29n, 38n, 39n, 41n, 43n, 44n, 89n, 93n, 143n, 185n, 211n, 212n, 218-219, 228n, 236n, 261, 262n, 274n, 282n, 289n, 308n Langholm, Odd 21n, 42n, 49, 253n Lanza, Lidia 4n, 5n, 6n, 9n, 11n, 12n, 15n, 16n, 21n, 29n, 30, 35n, 39n, 40n, 42n, 43n, 52n, 53n, 59n, 72n, 78-79, 81-96, 98-100, 103, 105-107, 109, 111-117, 122-125, 138n, 148n, 192n, 204n, 212n, 218n, 219n, 228, 246n, 251n, 253n, 258n, 262n, 269n, 276, 279n, 281n, 282n, 284n, 288n, 291n, 295n, 299n, 301n, 315, 322n, 334n Laurenti, Maria Cristina 39n Le Roux de Lincy, Antoine J.V. 153n Leone, Marialucrezia 129n Lewry, P. Osmond 17n Libera, Alain de 14n Lines, David A. 15n, 16n, 17n, 233n, 236n Loenertz, Raimund J. 205n Lohr, Charles 14n Long, R. James 329n Lorenz, Sönke 15n Lorimer, William L. 26n Lugt, Maaike van der 250n Luna, Concetta 141n, 158n, 159n, 176, 193n Luscombe, David 15n MacIntyre, Alasdair 29n Macken, Raymond 128n, 138n, 142n, 222n Maffei, Domenico 34n Maga, Mihai 120n Marmursztejn, Elsa 282n Martin, Conor 32, 38, 204n, 228n, 246n, 254n Maurer, Armand A. 55n McGrade, Arthur S. 315n Meier, Ulrich 239n, 269n, 279n Menut, Albert Douglas 6n, 41n, 186n, 212n, 229n Mercken, H. Paul F. 24n Michael, Bernd 45n Michałowska, Monika 47n Michaud-Quantin, Pierre 20n, 30n Miethke, Jürgen 37, 38, 39n, 40n, 247n, 322n

872 Milner, Stephen J. 33n Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo 22n, 26n Miramon, Charles de 250n Monahan, Arthur 50n, 63n, 180n, 215n Morard, Martin 330n Mruk, Antoni 153n Mulchahey, Marian Michèle 16n Müller, Jörn 135n, 200n, 233n Muller, Jean-Pierre 147n, 154n Murano, Giovanna 11n Musatti, Cesare A. 55n, 186n, 335 Navarro Sánchez, Francisca 190n Nederman, Cary J. 29n, 33n, 41n, 44n, 241n North, John D. 72n Oakley, Francis 19, 36, 39n Oliva, Adriano 328n, 334n O’Meara, Dominic J. 201n Ong, Walter J. 154n Ossikovski, Martin 279n Pagden, Anthony 36n, 37, 38 Pannier, Christine 27n Pattin, Adriaan 154n Pelzer, August 137n, 138-139 Perkams, Matthias 135n Perret, Noëlle-Laetitia 33n Petrina, Alessandra 230n Piché, David 103n Pickavé, Martin 220n Pinborg, Jan 115n Pini, Giorgio 11n, 317n Piron, Sylvain 94n Pisapia, Annamaria 33n Pocock, John G.A. 36-38 Porro, Pasquale 129n, 204n Powitz, Gerhardt 3n Preben-Hansen, Bernardette 200n Punzi, Antonio 178n Putallaz, François-Xavier 135n Quaglioni, Diego 34n, 38n, 42n, 240n Quinto, Riccardo 195n Rashdall, Hastings 34n Ravegnani, Giorgio 35n Regan, Richard J. 216n Renna, Thomas 283n Richter, Melvin 36n Riedel, Manfred 28 Rigg, Arthur George 152n, 323, 328n, 330n Rosenfeld, Jessica 262n Rosier-Catach, Irène 27n, 245n

Indices Rubinstein, Nicolai 22n, 24n Rutkin, H. Darrel 73n Rutten, Pepijn 46n Sajó, Géza 60n Sbriccoli, Mario 42n Schabel, Chris 9n, 11n, 12n, 13n, 50, 61n, 134n, 151n, 195n, 202, 334n Schmaus, Michael 137n Schmidt, James 21, 23, 26, 27, 29n Schmitt, Charles 16n Schmugge, Ludwig 185n Schneider, Bernd 20n, 27n, 142n Scholz, Richard 112n Schütrumpf, Eckart 20n Scordia, Lydwine 33n Sekizawa, Izumi 243n Sellin, Volker 22n Seno, Carlo 35 Silvano, Giovanni 321n Simonetta, Stefano 31n, 279n Skinner, Quentin 33n, 223n Sorokina, Maria 73n Staico, Ubaldo 45n Steel, Carlos 27n Stengers, Jean 40 Stroick, Clemens 283n Sturlese, Loris 202-203 Sullivan, Thomas 221n Susemihl, Franz 20, 123-125 Suto, Taki 183n, 306n Swanson, Jenny 196n Synan, Edward 138n Syros, Vasileos 320n Tabarroni, Andrea 16n Thomson, S. Harry 41n Tisserand, Lazare Maurice 153n Tjällén, Biörn 281n Tracey, Martin J. 24n Trifogli, Cecilia 12n, 58n, Trizio, Michele 200n, 335 Tombeur, Paul 329n Toste, Marco 5n, 9n, 11n, 12n, 15n, 30n, 32n, 36n, 41n, 42n, 43n, 45n, 46n, 48n, 52n, 53n, 59n, 62n, 72n, 98n, 111n, 112n, 121n, 129n, 150n, 153n, 180n, 188n, 192n, 196n, 192n, 200n, 203n, 204n, 207n, 208n, 211n, 212n, 214n, 218n, 228n, 229n, 237n, 241n, 242n, 246n, 247n, 258n, 261n, 263n, 267n, 269n, 273n, 274n, 279n, 281n, 282n, 283n, 287n, 288n, 289n, 290n, 291n, 295n, 299n, 300n, 305n, 307n, 308n, 315n, 316n, 317n, 320n, 321n, 334n

Index Nominum (1800 –) Ullmann, Walter 19, 39 Valverde Abril, Juan J. 29n Vanhamel, Willy 4n Van Riet, Simone 148n Verbeke, Gerard 20n Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun 27n, 154n Walker, Daniel P. 106n Walther, Helmut G. 37 Walz, Dorothea 46n Ward, John O. 17n Weijers, Olga 13n, 159n, 224 Weill-Parot, Nicolas 104n Weisheipl, James A. 15n

White, Kevin 190n, 215n Wilks, Michael 258n Wilpert, Paul 158n Wilson, Gordon A. 75n, 142n, 221n, Wippel, James F. 137n, 138, 158n Wittwer, Roland 204n, 205 Ypma, Eelco 92n, 131n Zavattero, Irene 18n, 23n Zimmermann, Albert 52n, 226n, 229n, 231n Zimmermann, Ivana B. 185n Zoerle, Achille 45n Zuckerman, Charles 47n

873

2. Editions Index Locorum (Questiones)1 Aegidius Aurelianensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum X, q. 14: VII.7, ll. 146-152 X, q. 20: VII.7, ll. 146-152, 165-173 Aegidius Romanus In Rhetoricam Aristotelis I: VI.4, ll. 19-37 II: V.9, ll. 51-53 Super Librum de Causis ad prop. 21: I.24, ll. 13-25 De Regimine Principum I/4.5: IV.14, ll. 1-2 II/1.1: I.9, ll. 93-94 II/3.5: I.20, ll. 16-19, 20-30 II/3.7: I.19, l. 55 II/3.10: I.27, ll. 68-70 II/3.11: I.28, ll. 21-24, 26-62, 28-31 III/1.1: I.6, ll. 1-2, 16-21 III/1.3: I.9, ll. 63-92 III/1.4: I.9, ll. 24-25 III/1.5: I.6, ll. 16-21 III/1.8: II.2, ll. 1-2 III/1.10: II.4, ll. 1-2; II.5, ll. 24-25 III/1.11: II.6, ll. 1-2 III/1.12: II.7, ll. 1-2, 19-24, 25-26 III/1.17: II.12, ll. 1-2 III/1.18: II.13, ll. 1-2 III/2.3: III.26, ll. 1-2, 25-30, 33-39, 40 III/2.4: III.26, ll. 1-2 III/2.5: III.25, ll. 1-2, 31-36, 37-40, 42-46, 49-50 III/2.7: V.16, ll. 35-39 III/2.29: III.22, ll. 1-2 III/2.31: II.17, ll. 1, 9-10 In Primum Sententiarum prol., q. 3: I.1, ll. 26-27 Albertus Magnus In De Generatione et Corruptione I, tract. 3, cap. 8: III.5, ll. 41-52, 62-68 In De Morte et Vita tract. 2, cap. 6: III.5, ll. 41-52, 62-68

In Metaphysicam II.6: VI.9, ll. 10-12 Super Ethica I.2 (13): VII.4, ll. 88-89 I.7 (37): VII.7, ll. 146-152, 153-155 III.8 (198): II.19, ll. 26-27 III.8 (203): II.19, ll. 26-27 V.6 (399): V.8, ll. 28-31 VI.11 (547): VII.3, ll. 36-38; VII.6, ll. 59-61 VI.17 (579): VII.3, ll. 36-38 VIII.12 (753): I.17, l. 6 X.11 (901): VII.7, ll. 129-131 X.13 (909): VII.7, ll. 153-155 Politicorum libri VIII I.1: I.9, ll. 63-92 I.2: I.10, ll. 40-41; I.11, ll. 27-31 I.4: I.15, ll. 41-46 I.6: I.19, ll. 35-36, 46-48 I.7: I.23, ll. 32-36 I.9: I.29, ll. 16-17 II.3: II.7, ll. 25-26 II.4: II.12, ll. 12-14 II.6: II.17, ll. 3-5, 9-10 II.7: II.19, l. 7 III.1: III.3, ll. 17-28 III.4: III.9, ll. 41-45 III.7: III.15, ll. 35-38 IV.3: VI.2, ll. 11-17 IV.5: IV.7, ll. 38-39 IV.7: IV.9, ll. 62-66 IV.10: IV.9, ll. 62-66 VII.5: VII.9, ll. 49-62, 70-81 VII.12: I.7, ll. 90-91 Algazel Metaphysica pars I, tract. I, div. 3: II.2, l. 17; V.2, ll. 1516; V.7, l. 8 Anonymus Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber IIus cap. 5, ad 1105b19-1106a4: III.22, ll. 2930; V.9, ll. 40-43

1  This index includes references found in the text of the Questiones and in the apparatus fontium, but not in the critical apparatus. Explicit references and quotations are in bold.

Index Locorum (Questiones) Anonymus Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber IIIus cap. 2, ad 1110a23-b17: II.5, ll. 45-46 (cum Grosseteste additionibus) cap. 9, ad 1115a33-34: II.19, ll. 26-27 Anonymus Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber VIIus cap. 15, ad 1152b1: I.4, ll. 4-5 Anonymus Baltimorensis Questiones super I-III Libros Politicorum I, q. 11: I.12, ll. 3-5 II, q. 9: II.10, ll. 28-29 II, q. 13: II.16, l. 21 II, q. 14: II.18, ll. 49-58 III, q. 2: III.3, ll. 22-24, 39-40 Anonymus Boethio Daco usus Quaestiones Metaphysicae I, q. 13: I.4, l. 1 Anonymus Erfordiensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum X, q. 20: VII.7, ll. 146-152 Anonymus Erlangensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum VII, q. 2: I.9, ll. 81-84 Anonymus Mediolanensis Questiones super Libros Politicorum I, q. 7: I.10, ll. 40-41 I, q. 14: I.19, ll. 31-32, 46-48, 55 I, q. 22: I.29, ll. 16-17 II, q. 6: II.6, ll. 22-25, 92-97 II, q. 15: II.19, ll. 54-55 III, q. 2: III.2, ll. 8-10 III, q. 3: III.3, ll. 22-24, 39-40, 56-57 III, q. 6: III.3, ll. 39-40; III.6, ll. 58-60 III, q. 12: III.14, l. 6 III, q. 17: III.21, ll. 27-29 III, q. 21: III.26, l. 81 IV, q. 8: IV.13, 42-43 V, q. 4: V.6, ll. 19-20 V, q. 7: V.11, ll. 39 VI, q. 4: VI.4, ll. 31-44 Anonymus Parisiensis Questiones super libros Ethicorum I, q. 26: VII.7, ll. 153-155, 165-173

875

Anonymus Vaticanus Questiones super I Librum Politicorum I, q. 10: I.12, ll. 3-5 I, q. 19: I.19, ll. 31-32 Aristoteles Categoriae 5, 2a11-14: I.11, l. 3 5, 3b33-34: IV.9, ll. 56-57 7, 6b28-30: I.11, ll. 27-31; I.30, ll. 18-20 7, 7a28-b7: I.11, ll. 27-31; I.30, ll. 18-20 7, 7b19-23: III.9, l. 45 8, 9a28-10a10: V.9, ll. 17-19 12, 14a26-27: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45 12, 14a35-36: I.19, ll. 11-12 12, 14b3-5: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45 De Interpretatione 2, 16a19: I.9, ll. 24-25 7, 18a8-9: V.3, ll. 8-9 11, 21a21-24: V.15, ll. 44-47 13, 22b5-7: VI.6, ll. 3-4 Analytica Posteriora I.1, 71a11-16: I.1, ll. 6-7; IV.1, ll. 19-22 I.2, 71b9-16: I.2, ll. 41-44 I.2, 71b17-19: I.2, l. 59 I.2, 71b17-25: I.2, ll. 48-49 I.2, 71b18-20: I.2, ll. 12-14 I.2, 72a1-4: III.1, ll. 17-19 I.2, 72a27-32: III.26, l. 28; V.8, ll. 12-13 I.2, 72a29-30: V.15, ll. 2-3 I.3, 72b25-27: III.2, ll. 8-10 I.4, 73a21-25: I.2, ll. 48-49 I.4, 73b25-26: III.6, l. 3 I.8, 75b21-30: I.2, ll. 48-49 I.28, 87a38-b4: I.1, ll. 35-42 II.4, 91a25-32: II.8, ll. 29-32 II.12, 95a10-14: I.6, ll. 25-26; I.25, ll. 62-63; II.1, l. 16; II.12, ll. 17-18; III.9, ll. 60-61; IV.12, l. 40; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 II.19, 100b3-5: II.3, ll. 45-46 II.19, 100b13-14: II.3, ll. 45-46 Topica I.15, 106a37-b1: VII.6, l. 13 I.15, 106b10: V.3, l. 2 I.17, 108a11-12: V.1, l. 49 II.6, 112b11-12: III.14, l. 40; VI.4, ll. 102103 III.1, 116a19-20: III.10, l. 8 III.1, 116b22-23: I.22, ll. 6-7; II.3, l. 7 III.1, 116b24: VI.2, ll. 22-23 III.1, 116b27: III.15, ll. 8-9 III.2, 117b19-21: IV.3, ll. 44-45

876

Indices III.2, 117b21: III.15, ll. 8-9; III.24, ll. 7-8; VI.3, ll. 9-10 IV.3, 124a7-9: IV.12, l. 12; V.2, ll. 2-3; V.8, ll. 10-11 IV.3, 124a9: III.21, l. 8 V.4, 137b30-31: I.25, ll. 13-14; II.2, ll. 3-4; II.14, ll. 10-11; III.16, ll. 5-6; V.5, ll. 8-9; VII.6, ll. 11-12 VI.1, 139a26-27: III.3, l. 4 VI.4, 141a23-31: III.11, ll. 3-4 VI.4, 142a9-11: I.5, l. 22 VII.1, 157a9-10: I.4, l. 49

De Sophisticis Elenchis 33, 183b22-26: II.17, ll. 3-5 Physica I.1, 184a16-18: Prohemium, ll. 130-131; II.16, ll. 37-38 I.1, 184a16-21: III.1, ll. 14-16; III.2, ll. 17-18 I.1, 184a24-25: III.1, l. 25 I.1, 184b12-14: II.16, ll. 41-42 I.2, 185b11-16: III.16, ll. 28-29; VII.4, ll. 32-33 I.2, 185b19-25: VII.4, ll. 32-33 I.2, 185b32-34: VII.4, ll. 32-33 I.4, 187b11-13: III.2, ll. 11-12 I.4, 187b20-21: III.5, ll. 82-83 I.4, 187b35-37: I.18, ll. 7-8 I.4, 187b35-188a2: III.5, ll. 82-83 I.6, 189a19-20: II.16, ll. 5-6 I.9, 192a22-23: IV.4, ll. 4, 17-18; VII.2, ll. 30-31 I.9, 192a25-28: IV.13, ll. 31-32 I.9, 192a26-27: IV.14, l. 54 II.1, 192b13-14: V.11, ll. 19-20 II.1, 193a28-31: I.19, l. 24; V.16, ll. 52-53; VI.1, l. 34 II.1, 193a36-b3: II.10, ll. 7-8; VII.5, l. 56 II.1, 193b3-5: Prohemium, l. 6 II.1, 193b6-8: I.19, l. 24; V.16, ll. 52-53 II.1, 193b17-18; II.10, 7-8 II.1, 193b19-20: V.2, l. 24 II.2, 193b25-30: I.30, ll. 34-37 II.2, 194a27-28: I.14, l. 19; III.1, l. 5; III.11, l. 28 II.2, 194a30-32: V.1, l. 59 II.2, 194a30-36: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II.2, 194a31-32: V.1, ll. 57-58 II.2, 194a32-33: VII.7, ll. 94-95 II.2, 194a34-35: I.20, ll. 17-18 II.2, 194b7-8; II.11, ll. 19-20 II.2, 194b8-9; II.10, ll. 7-8 II.3, 195a1-2: II.1, ll. 17-18

II.3, 195a8-9: I.6, ll. 25-26; II.1, l. 16; III.9, ll. 60-61; III.12, ll. 24-25; III.13, l. 76; IV.4, l. 22; IV.12, l. 40; V.2, l. 26; V.2, l. 26; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VI.9, l. 17; VII.4, l. 59 II.3, 195a24-26: I.25, ll. 53-56 II.3, 195a25-26: I.5, ll. 38-39 II.3, 195b16-18: V.7, ll. 19-20 II.3, 195b21-28: I.6, ll. 25-26; I.25, ll. 6263; II.1, l. 16; II.12, ll. 17-18; III.9, ll. 6061; III.12, ll. 25-27; IV.12, l. 40; V.2, l. 26; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 II.3, 195b25-27: V.4, ll. 13-14 II.5, 196b17-22: I.5, l. 19 II.5, 196b21-24: I.7, ll. 133-135; I.14, ll. 3739; III.25, l. 55 II.6, 197b22-27: I.9, ll. 17-20 II.7, 198a24-27: I.5, l. 27; I.6, ll. 25-26; I.18, l. 34; I.20, l. 6; II.1, l. 16; III.9, ll. 60-61; IV.4, l. 22; IV.12, l. 40; V.2, l. 26; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 II.8, 198b10-11: I.20, l. 11 II.8, 198b34-36: I.7, ll. 133-135; I.14, ll. 3739; III.25, l. 55; IV.14, ll. 39-40 II.8, 199a8-9: I.2, ll. 65-66 II.8, 199a8-15; II.11, ll. 19-20 II.8, 199a8-33: II.1, ll. 17-18 II.8, 199a9-11: I.7, ll. 133-135; I.14, ll. 3739; III.25, l. 55; IV.14, ll. 39-40 II.8, 199a26-30: VI.1, l. 6 II.9, 199b34-200a15: V.11, l. 18 II.9, 199b34-200a30: II.11, ll. 12-16; VI.6, ll. 17-18 II.9, 199b34-200b8: I.28, ll. 63-64 II.9, 200a7-10: V.1, l. 43 II.9, 200a14-20: I.7, ll. 28-30 II.9, 200a14-21: Prohemium, ll. 52-53; I.2, ll. 10-11; I.13, ll. 22-24; III.20, ll. 44-45 II.9, 200a15-16: III.13, ll. 17-18; VII.4, ll. 9-10 II.9, 200a19-21: III.20, ll. 29-30; V.1, l. 43; V.17, l. 19 II.9, 200a19-24: I.2, ll. 44-46; I.7, ll. 1112; III.1, ll. 8-9; IV.2, ll. 14-15 III.1, 201a9-11: VI.4, ll. 32-33 III.1, 201a23: III.5, ll. 59-60 III.2, 201b32: VI.4, ll. 32-33 III.2, 202a3-5: V.2, ll. 21-22; V.7, ll. 9-10 III.3, 202a15-20: III.10, ll. 20-21 III.3, 202a17-21: III.10, l. 37 III.3, 202a23-25: V.9, l. 5 III.3, 202b5-22: I.5, ll. 34-35 III.5, 204a20-28: I.25, ll. 34-36 III.6, 206a17-18: I.25, ll. 36-37 III.7, 207b35-208a1: I.25, l. 25 IV.2, 209a32-b5: V.6, ll. 12-13

Index Locorum (Questiones) IV.3, 210b17-18: III.5, l. 19 IV.4, 210b34-211a1: III.5, l. 19 IV.9, 217a22: I.16, ll. 59-60 V.6, 229b25: V.2, ll. 21-22; V.7, ll. 9-10 V.6, 230a29-30: I.27, ll. 7-8 VII.1, 241b24: III.16, ll. 30-31 VII.1, 242a24-25: V.8, ll. 34-35 VII.1, 242b13-14: I.22, ll. 26-27 VII.1, 242b28-29: I.22, ll. 26-27 VII.2, 243a3-6: V.8, ll. 34-35 VII.3, 246a13: III.6, l. 18 VII.4, 248b6-10: III.22, ll. 64-65 VII.4, 248b6-249a8: I.4, ll. 18-20; VII.7, ll. 165-173 VIII.1, 251a9-252a4: IV.13, l. 14 VIII.1, 251a26-27: V.2, ll. 21-22; V.7, ll. 9-10 VIII.1, 251b1-5: I.7, ll. 44-45 VIII.4, 255a22-23: V.9, l. 6 VIII.4, 255b24-29: V.7, ll. 46-47 VIII.4, 255b35-256a2: I.29, ll. 44-45 VIII.5, 256a8-10: I.18, l. 14 VIII.5, 256a8-13: I.10, ll. 6-8 VIII.5, 256b9-10: III.19, l. 52 VIII.5, 257b8-10: V.9, l. 6 VIII.6, 259a11-12: II.10, ll. 16-17 VIII.8, 262b27-28: I.26, l. 24 VIII.8, 264b9-265a2: I.26, l. 24 De Generatione et Corruptione I.5, 321b20-21: III.5, ll. 48-49 I.5, 321b22-28: III.5, ll. 114-116 I.5, 321b22-322a4: III.5, ll. 90-105 I.5, 322a16-28: III.5, ll. 90-105 I.5, 322a25-31: V.8, ll. 23-26 I.6, 322b23-24: I.7, ll. 44-45; III.5, l. 56 I.7, 323b29-324a10: III.5, ll. 53-55 I.7, 324b9-10: III.5, ll. 59-60 I.8, 326b1-2: I.7, ll. 44-45 I.10, 327a34-b4: IV.9, ll. 6-9 I.10, 327b27-29: IV.9, ll. 14-15 I.10, 328a25-31: III.21, ll. 27-29; VI.6, ll. 10-11 I.10, 328a31-33: III.5, ll. 53-55 I.10, 328b20-21: IV.9, ll. 3-4, 14-15 I.10, 328b22: IV.9, ll. 13-14 II.8, 335a10-11: I.19, ll. 36-37; I.20, l. 40; V.8, l. 22 II.10, 336a30-31: V.2, l. 6; V.4, ll. 29-30 De Caelo I.2, 269a1-2: VI.6, ll. 10-11 I.4, 271a33: I. 14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 I.5, 271b8-9: I.1, ll. 22-23; V.6, ll. 48-50; V.8, ll. 14-15

877

I.5, 271b12-13: I.1, ll. 22-23; V.6, ll. 48-50; V.8, ll. 14-15 II.3, 286a8-9: I.14, l. 18 II.3, 286a25: I.16, ll. 59-60; IV.11, ll. 46-47 II.5, 288a2-3: I.13, l. 5 II.6, 288b14: I.13, l. 5 II.8, 290a29-35: I.7, ll. 12-14, 31-32; I. 14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18; VI.1, ll. 16-18 II.11, 291b13-14: I.7, ll. 12-14; I. 14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18; VI.1, ll. 16-18 II.12, 293a2: V.16, l. 14 III.2, 301a4-6: VI.4, ll. 49-51 Meteorologica I.2, 339a21-24: IV.13, ll. 34-35 IV.3, 380a12-15: I.7, ll. 61-65 IV.5, 382b8-10: I.5, ll. 54-55 IV.7, 384b2-3: V.4, ll. 29-30 IV.12, 389b31-390a1: V.15, ll. 44-47 IV.12, 390a10-12: III.3, ll. 22-24 De Anima I.1, 402a1-4: I.4, l. 49 I.1, 402b14-16: I.10, l. 39; II.13, l. 6 I.1, 402b21-23: III.2, ll. 65-67 I.3, 406b24-25: I.10, l. 4 I.4, 408b11-13: III.9, ll. 16-17 I.5, 411b6-18: I.4, ll. 60-62 I.5, 411b7-10: I.9, l. 42 II.1, 412a14: I.19, l. 18 II.1, 412a19-20: VI.6, l. 12 II.1, 412b20-23: V.15, ll. 44-47 II.2, 413a21-23: I.19, ll. 24-25 II.2, 413b1-2: I.19, ll. 22-23 II.2, 413b1-5: I.13, ll. 84-86 II.3, 415a4-7: I.13, ll. 84-86 II.4, 415a16-21: I.10, l. 39; I.18, ll. 31-32; I.19, ll. 17-18; II.13, l. 6 II.4, 415a26-b1: I.7, ll. 37-38, 52-57; I.16, l. 49 II.4, 415b1-2: I.7, l. 35; I.9, ll. 46-47 II.4, 415b2-3: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II.4, 415b3-7: I.7, ll. 36-37, 52-57; I.9, ll. 4345; III.5, l. 10 II.4, 415b13: Prohemium, l. 94 II.4, 415b20-21: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II.4, 416a15-16: III.5, ll. 81-82 II.4, 416a16-17: I.25, ll. 94-95 II.4, 416b4-9: III.5, l. 57 II.4, 416b6-7: II.3, l. 38 II.4, 416b11-15: V.8, ll. 23-26 II.5, 417a17-21: II.3, l. 38 II.5, 417b24: I.4, l. 71 II.6, 418a11-12: I.1, ll. 61-62 II.7, 418a26-27: I.1, ll. 61-62 II.8, 420b17-18: I.8, ll. 34-37

878

Indices II.8, 420b29-33: I.9, ll. 24-25 II.9, 421a25-26: I.16, ll. 47-48 III.3, 427b14-16: III.1, ll. 16-17 III.5, 430a10-17: Prohemium, ll. 23-25 III.5, 430a21-22: I.9, l. 42 III.6, 430b21-23: I.25, ll. 25-26; III.13, l. 49 III.7, 431a14-17: III.1, ll. 16-17 III.7, 431a17: III.24, ll. 25-26; V.6, ll. 23-24 III.8, 432a8-10: III.24, ll. 25-26; V.6, ll. 23-24 III.9, 432b21-23: I.7, ll. 12-14; I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18; III.6, ll. 35-36; V.16, ll. 41-42 III.10, 433a13-29: I.2, l. 105 III.10, 433a14-20: II.3, ll. 40-42 III.10, 433a22-30: I.10, l. 4 III.10, 433a27-31: II.3, ll. 40-42 III.10, 433b14-19: III.16, l. 32 III.12, 434b21-24: I.13, ll. 84-86 III.13, 435b27: I.13, ll. 84-86

De Sensu 1, 437a9-15: I.9, ll. 24-25 De Memoria et Reminiscentia 2, 452a27-28: IV.14, l. 38; VI.4, l. 15 De Somno et Vigilia 1, 454a8: III.3, l. 10; IV.12, l. 7 2, 456a5-6: III.16, l. 32 2, 456a15: II.7, l. 27 De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae 4, 466b15-16: I.8, ll. 20-22 De Respiratione 10, 476a11-13: I.8, l. 35 10, 476a12-13: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 17, 476a17-22: I.8, ll. 34-37 Historia Animalium I.3, 489a11-12: I.7,ll. 48-50 VIII (Bekker IX).47, 631a1-7: II.5, ll. 57-59 De Partibus Animalium I.1, 639b24-640a1: III.20, ll. 29-30 II.1, 646a25-b6: IV.14, ll. 44-45 II.2, 648a10-14: I.8, ll. 20-22 II.8, 653b22-24: I.13, ll. 84-86 II.16, 659b35-660a1: I.8, ll. 34-37 III.4, 665b1-4: V.5, ll. 19-22 III.4, 665b14-25: V.5, ll. 19-22 De Motu Animalium 10, 703a9-10: II.7, l. 27 10, 703a14: III.16, l. 32

10, 703a29-32: II.2, ll. 63-64; II.4, l. 71; III.3, ll. 39-40; III.5, ll. 5-6; V.5, l. 23; VI.7, ll. 3-5; VI.8, ll. 6-7 10, 703a36-37: II.2, ll. 63-64; II.4, l. 71; V.5, l. 23; VI.7, ll. 3-5; VI.8, ll. 6-7 De Generatione Animalium I.2, 716a4-7: I.7, ll. 43-44 I.2, 716a13-15: I.7, ll. 48-50 I.2, 716a22-25: I.7, ll. 48-50 I.5, 717b24-25: I.10, l. 32 I.18, 724a17-19: I.16, ll. 52-56 I.18, 725a21-28: I.16, ll. 52-56 I.18, 726a26-27: I.16, ll. 52-56 I.19, 726b10: I.16, 5 ll. 2-56 I.19, 726b14-19: I.16, ll. 52-56 I.19, 726b9-11: III.5, ll. 109-110 I.19, 726b11-19: III.5, ll. 111-112 I.20, 729a28-31: I.7, ll. 43-44 I.23, 730b33-731a4: I.7, ll. 46-48 II.1, 734b7-8: I.16, ll. 57-58 II.1, 734b20-22: Prohemium, ll. 1-2 II.1, 735a7-8: V.15, ll. 44-47 II.3, 736b8-28: VII.2, ll. 35-36 II.3, 736b26-27: I.16, ll. 52-56 II.3, 736b33-34: I.16, ll. 52-56 II.3, 736b33-35: I.10, l. 32 II.6, 742a19-22: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45 IV.1, 763b21-26: I.7, ll. 46-48 IV.1, 765b16-17: I.8, ll. 20-22 IV.1, 766b7-8: I.16, ll. 52-56 IV.3, 767b29-34: I.16, ll. 50-52 IV.3, 769a8-15: I.16, ll. 52-56 IV.6, 775a7-8: I.8, ll. 20-22 IV.6, 775a14-15: I.8, ll. 20-22 Metaphysica I.1, 981a12-17: V.11, l. 25 I.1, 981a15-17: IV.2, ll. 50-55 I.1, 981a30-b1: I.4, ll. 4-5 I.1, 981a30-b6: IV.2, ll. 50-55 I.1, 981b27-982a1: I.2, l. 32 I.1, 981b29-982a1: I.4, ll. 4-5, 14 I.2, 982a17-19: II.3, ll. 17-18; IV.7, ll. 64-65 I.2, 982b4-6: I.4, l. 8 I.2, 982b11-12: I.2, l. 32 I.2, 982b11-17: II.17, ll. 3-5 I.2, 982b19-21: I.2, l. 32 I.2, 982b25-26: IV.12, l. 42 I.3, 984b8-11: II.17, ll. 3-5 II.1, 993b20-21: Prohemium, ll. 57-58; V.11, ll. 11-12, 40-42 II.1, 993b24-26: I.12, l. 13; I.16, ll. 3-4; VII.5, ll. 26-29 II.1, 993b30-31: III.2, ll. 13-14

Index Locorum (Questiones) II.2, 994a1-11: IV.4, ll. 43-45; VII.2, ll. 4142; VII.5, l. 29; VII.7, l. 80 II.2, 994a12-13: I.12, l. 13; VI.9, ll. 3-4; VII.5, ll. 26-29 II.2, 994a25-26: I.16, l. 7 II.2, 994b12-16: II.1, ll. 17-18 II.2, 994b14-16: I.5, ll. 20-22 II.2, 994b16-18: I.25, ll. 28-29 II.3, 995a1-3: II.17, ll. 25-28 II.3, 995a1-6: III.25, l. 38 III.2, 996a23-24: I.20, l. 12 IV.2, 1003a33-34: IV.1, ll. 26-28 IV.2, 1003a33-b10: V.15, ll. 41-44 IV.2, 1004a9-10: I.5, l. 22 IV.2, 1004a11-16: III.5, ll. 13-14 IV.2, 1004a15-16: V.2, l. 33 IV.2, 1005a11-12: V.11, ll. 7-8 IV.4, 1006b10-11: IV.7, l. 53 IV.4, 1007b2-3: V.2, ll. 12-13 IV.5, 1010b28-29: II.11, ll. 3-4; VI.6, ll. 16-17 IV.6, 1011b15-18: IV.8, l. 27 V.1, 1013a10-12: I.18, l. 22; III.4, 5-6; III.16, ll. 21-22; V.8, ll. 32-33 V.2, 1013b9-11: VI.9, l. 17 V.2, 1014a20-22: V.7, ll. 19-20 V.5, 1015a20-b9: I.28, ll. 63-64 V.5, 1015a33-35: II.11, ll. 3-4; VI.6, ll. 16-17 V.5, 1015a34-b9: II.11, ll. 12-16 V.6, 1015b36-1016b32: II.1, ll. 19-21 V.6, 1016b23-32: II.1, ll. 19-21 V.6, 1016b31-35: VI.8, ll. 17-18 V.8, 1017b13-14: I.11, l. 3 V.11, 1018b9-10: I.12, l. 13; III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45; VII.2, ll. 41-42; VII.5, ll. 26-29; VII.7, l. 80 V.11, 1018b14-15: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45 V.11, 1019a2-3: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45 V.12, 1019a15-19: I.13, ll. 39-40 V.15, 1020b28-30: III.6, ll. 20-22 V.15, 1021a14-16: III.3, ll. 61-63 V.15, 1021a14-25: III.6, ll. 20-22 V.15, 1021a23-25: III.3, ll. 61-63 V.17, 1022a4-5: I.25, ll. 26-27 V.21, 1022b19-20: V.9, l. 22 VI.1, 1025b21-24: Prohemium, ll. 75-77 VI.1, 1025b22-24: I.31, ll. 18-19 VI.1, 1025b23-24: V.4, l. 5 VI.2, 1026b3-4: IV.1, l. 10 VI.3, 1027b12-14: V.2, ll. 12-13 VII.1, 1028a32-33: III.2, ll. 59-60 VII.7, 1032a26-28: Prohemium, 43-44; I.31, ll. 18-19

879

VII.7, 1032a32-b2: Prohemium, 45-46; I.31, ll. 18-19 VII.9, 1034a34-b4: I.8, ll. 19-20 VII.10, 1035b24-25: V.15, ll. 44-47 VII.11, 1037b3-4: I.11, l. 3 VII.13, 1039a4-5: I.12, l. 32 VII.17, 1041b11-19: I.12, ll. 20-25 VII.17, 1041b14-15: I.12, ll. 25-27 VII.17, 1041b25-28: I.12, ll. 25-27 VIII.3, 1044a9-10: IV.9, ll. 56-57 VIII.6, 1045a8-14: II.1, ll. 30-31 IX.1, 1046a19-22: I.6, ll. 29-30 IX.2, 1046a36-b4: Prohemium, ll. 43-44 IX.2, 1046b7-13: V.11, ll. 61-62 IX.5, 1048a10-16: V.4, ll. 9-11 IX.8, 1049b24-25: Prohemium, l. 8 IX.8, 1049b28-29: Prohemium, ll. 25-27 IX.8, 1050a4-6: III.2, ll. 68-69; IV.14, ll. 44-45; VII.2, ll. 34-35; VII.3, l. 44; VII.5, ll. 37-38 IX.8, 1050a17-21: Prohemium, ll. 86-87 IX.8, 1050a30-b1: Prohemum, ll. 61-63 X.1, 1052b18-19: I.12, l. 13; I.20, l. 22; II.9, ll. 12-13; III.24, ll. 7-8; IV.4, ll. 43-45; IV.7, ll. 16-17; VII.2, ll. 41-42; VII.5, ll. 26-29; VII.7, l. 80 X.1, 1052a19-34: II.1, ll. 19-21 X.1, 1052b31-32: I.12, l. 13; I.20, l. 22; III.24, ll. 7-8; IV.4, ll. 43-45; IV.7, ll. 1617; VII.2, ll. 41-42; VII.5, ll. 26-29; VII.7, l. 80 X.4, 1055a25-29: V.2, ll. 56-57; V.18, l. 14 X.4, 1055b7-8: V.2, l. 33 X.5, 1055b30: V.3, l. 4 X.8, 1058a8-16: V.18, ll. 12-14 X.9, 1058b1-3: I.18, ll. 3-4 XI.7, 1064b11-15: V.11, ll. 19-22 XII.7, 1072a31-34: I.24, ll. 16-18 XII.7, 1072b1-3: Prohemium, ll. 81-85; VII.7, ll. 49-55 XII.10, 1075a11-15: V.1, ll. 38-40 XII.10, 1075a11-21: II.2, ll. 60-62 XII.10, 1075a13-15: III.2, ll. 25-28; IV.8, ll. 29-30; II.1, ll. 30-31 XII.10, 1075a13-23: II.1, ll. 36-42 Ethica Nicomachea I.1, 1094a1-3: Prohemium, ll. 101-103 I.1, 1094a2-3: I.7, l. 35; III.10, l. 8 I.1, 1094a3-5: Prohemium, ll. 64-65 I.1, 1094a3-16: I.4, l. 40 I.1, 1094a9-16: I.4, ll. 60-62 I.1, 1094a14-15: I.4, ll. 4-5 I.1, 1094a14-16: I.4, ll. 14-15; II.3, l. 8; VII.7, ll. 10-11

880

Indices I.1, 1094a18-22: Prohemium, ll. 89-90 I.1, 1094a18-24: I.2, l. 16 I.1, 1094a26-b2: I.4, l. 1 I.1, 1094a26-b7: VII.7, l. 14 I.1, 1094a27-b2: I.4, ll. 5-7 I.1, 1094b7-10: II.3, l. 5; IV.10, ll. 22-23; VII.4, ll. 88-89; VII.7, ll. 25-26, 172 I.1, 1094b9-10: I.4, ll. 10-11 I.1, 1094b18-19: VII.1, l. 13 I.1, 1094b27-28: III.14, ll. 3-4; III.24, l. 20 I.1, 1095a6: I.2, ll. 129-130 I.2, 1095a14-16: I.2, l. 16 I.2, 1095a22-23: II.9, ll. 23-24 I.2, 1095b4-5: VI.2, ll. 7-8 I.2, 1095b26-27: III.18, l. 34 I.2, 1096a6: VII.1, ll. 19-28 I.2, 1096b31-34: VII.7, ll. 57-58 I.2, 1096b32-34: Prohemium, ll. 89-90 I.3, 1097a15-24: V.1, ll. 5-6 I.3, 1097a21-22: V.1, l. 62; VII.7, ll. 97-98 I.3, 1097a21-b21: VII.1, ll. 19-28 I.3, 1097a25-28: VII.1, ll. 32-33 I.3, 1097a28-30: VII.1, l. 12 I.3, 1097a34-b1: V.1, l. 15; VII.1, ll. 31-32; VII.2, ll. 19-20 I.3, 1097b1: V.1, l. 32 I.3, 1097b6-8: VII.1, ll. 19-28 I.3, 1097b20-21: VII.7, ll. 39-40 I.4, 1097b22-23: VII.1, l. 12 I.4, 1098a3-b19: VII.1, ll. 47-48 I.4, 1098a15-17: VII.3, l. 12; VII.5, l. 12 I.4, 1098a15-19: VII.4, ll. 5-6 I.4, 1098a16-18: Prohemium, ll. 89-90; V.1, ll. 18, 64; VII.7, l. 60 I.4, 1098b12-16: I.15, ll. 22-25 I.4, 1098b30-31: VII.3, l. 12 I.4, 1099a8-9: IV.6, ll. 25-26 I.4, 1099a24-25: VII.1, l. 12; VII.2, ll. 55-57 I.4, 1099a25-28: VII.2, ll. 4-6 I.4, 1099a29-31: VII.1, l. 12 I.4, 1099a31-b4: III.20, ll. 63-64; VII.1, ll. 55-58 I.4, 1099a33-b1: III.20, ll. 60-61 I.4, 1099a33-b2: III.18. ll. 7-8 I.4, 1099b2-3: VII.2, ll. 47-48 I.4, 1099b11-13: VII.1, l. 12 I.4, 1099b15-16: I.7, ll. 23-24; VII.3, l. 12 I.4, 1099b15-18: VII.7, l. 60 I.4, 1099b16-17: VII.1, l. 8 I.4, 1099b17-18: VII.1, l. 12 I.4, 1099b18-20: I.7, ll. 23-24 I.4, 1099b26: VII.3, l. 12 I.4, 1099b29-32: I.3, l. 5 I.4, 1100a4-5: VII.3, l. 12

I.5, 1100b9-10: VII.3, l. 12 I.5, 1100b26-27: III.19, ll. 38-39; III.20, ll. 63-64; VII.1, ll. 61-62; VII.2, ll. 47-48 I.7, 1101b14-16: I.29, ll. 9-10 I.7, 1101b31-32: I.29, ll. 9-10 I.8, 1102a5: VII.3, l. 12 I.8, 1102a5-6: V.1, ll. 18, 64 I.8, 1102a18-33: I.4, ll. 60-62 I.8 1102b11-12: II.11, ll. 7-9 II.1, 1103a14-25: VI.1, ll. 26-27 II.1, 1103a16-18: I.7, ll. 24-25 II.1, 1103a18-20: IV.11, ll. 2-3, 36-38 II.1, 1103a19: VII.8, ll. 64-65 II.1, 1103a19-20: IV.11, ll. 36-38 II.1, 1103a23-26: I.3, ll. 16-17; I.7, ll. 2324; IV.11, ll. 2-3 II.1, 1103a25-26: I.7, ll. 24-25; II.6, l. 74; VII.8, ll. 64-65 II.1, 1103a26-b1: VII.3, ll. 66-67 II.1, 1103b6-9: I.3, l. 18 II.1, 1103b6-14: III.6, ll. 11-13 II.1, 1103b14-25: I.7, ll. 24-25 II.1, 1103b21-22: I.3, l. 18; I.27, ll. 31-32 II.2, 1103b26-29: I.2, ll. 130-131 II.2, 1104b27-28: III.6, l. 44 II.2, 1105a9-10: VII.3, l. 9 II.2, 1105a13-16: III.6, l. 44 II.3, 1105a28-33: II.19, ll. 35-36 II.4, 1105b27-28: IV.10, l. 27 II.4, 1105b28-1106a2: I.16, l. 17 II.4, 1106a1-2: I.29, ll. 9-10 II.4, 1106a7-10: I.16, l. 17; I.29, ll. 9-10 II.5, 1106a15-17: III.6, ll. 16-17; IV.11, ll. 11-12 II.5, 1106a15-24: III.22, ll. 22-23 II.5, 1106a22-24: III.6, ll. 16-17; IV.11, ll. 11-12 II.5, 1106a28-29: IV.9, ll. 21-23 II.5, 1106b14-16: IV.9, ll. 21-23 II.5, 1106b24-1107a2: IV.12, ll. 63-65 II.5, 1106b26-27: IV.10, l. 27 II.5, 1106b32-33: VII.3, l. 9 II.5, 1106b36-1107a2: II.19, ll. 35-36; IV.11, ll. 16-17; VII.3, ll. 48-49; VII.5, ll. 48-49 II.5, 1107a9-12: II.19, ll. 8-9 II.6, 1108a15: IV.10, l. 27 II.6, 1108a19-30: IV.5, ll. 23-24 II.6, 1108a26-30: IV.5, ll. 18-23 II.7, 1109a34: VII.3, l. 9; VII.6, l. 42 II.7, 1109b1-3: IV.11, ll. 19-21 III.1, 1109b30-32: I.29, ll. 9-10 III.1, 1110a15-18: I.2, ll. 86-87 III.1, 1110a22-23: II.5, ll. 45-46

Index Locorum (Questiones) III.1, 1110a27-29: II.5, ll. 45-46 III.1, 1110b9-11: I.16, ll. 14-16 III.4, 1111b4-5: I.29, l. 10 III.4, 1111b26: III.10, ll. 30-31 III.4, 1112a13-16: IV.11, ll. 16-17 III.4, 1112a15-16: I.2, ll. 23-24; I.29, ll. 3-4; III.25, l. 25; V.11, ll. 25-26 III.4, 1112a19-21: III.17, l. 7 III.4, 1112b11-12: III.4, ll. 15-16 III.4, 1112b23-24: II.9, ll. 15-16 III.4, 1112b31-33: I.16, ll. 14-16 III.5, 1113a15: III.10, ll. 30-31 III.5, 1113a23-24: II.3, l. 39 III.6, 1113b3-7: I.31, ll. 45-46; I.29, l. 10 III.6, 1113b5-21: I.16, ll. 14-16 III.6, 1113b7-8: I.2, ll. 86-87 III.6, 1114a31-b25: I.16, ll. 14-16 III.6, 1114a32-b1: IV.6, l. 24 III.6, 1114b30-1115a3: IV.11, ll. 16-17 III.7, 1115a24-26: VII.3, l. 71 III.7, 1115a24-31: VII.3, ll. 9-10; VII.5, l. 8 III.7, 1115a26-32: II.19, ll. 26-27 III.8, 1117a32-35: VII.3, 9-10; VII.5, l. 8 III.9, 1117b33-1118a1: IV.5, ll. 38-39 IV.3, 1123a34-1125a35: VII.9, l. 31 IV.3, 1123b13-15: II.12, ll. 53-55 IV.3, 1123b19-21: III.18, l. 34 IV.3, 1123b20-21: VII.1, ll. 9-10 IV.3, 1123b22-24: II.5, ll. 42-43 IV.3, 1123b35: IV.11, ll. 49-50; VII.1, ll. 9-10, 81-82 IV.3, 1124a3-4: VII.3, l. 9 IV.3, 1124a4-9: II.5, ll. 42-43 IV.3, 1124a7-8: VII.1, ll. 82-83 IV.3, 1124a17-19: III.18, l. 34 IV.3, 1124a28-29: II.12, l. 33 IV.3, 1124b6-9: II.7, ll. 21-22 IV.6, 1126b11-20: IV.5, ll. 18-23 IV.6-8, 1126b11-1128b9: IV.5, ll. 23-24 IV.6, 1127a7-10: IV.5, ll. 24-28; IV.6, ll. 25-26 IV.7, 1127a27-28: IV.6, l. 24 IV.7, 1127a29: IV.5, l. 50 IV.7, 1127b5-6: IV.5, l. 50 IV.8, 1128a32: III.21, l. 18 V.1, 1129b17-19: I.27, ll. 16-17; III.6, ll. 53-54 V.1, 1129b19-24: II.9, l. 8 V.1, 1129b25-33: III.25, ll. 3-4 V.1, 1129b25-1130a10: III.6, ll. 53-54 V.2, 1130b18-20: III.6, ll. 53-54 V.2, 1130b29: III.8, ll. 34-35 V.3, 1131a10-24: II.12, ll. 47-49 V.3, 1131a10-b24: V.4, ll. 24-25 V.3, 1131a25-29: IV.10, ll. 8-11

881

V.3-4, 1131a29-1132b20: II.12, ll. 12-14 V.5, 1132b28-30: V.8, ll. 28-31 V.5, 1132b31-34: III.18, ll. 17-18 V.5, 1133a5-16: I.27, ll. 45-46 V.5, 1133a19-21: I.23, ll. 32-36; II.16, ll. 7-9 V.5, 1133a19-26: I.27, ll. 45-46 V.5, 1133a20-21: III.18, l. 13 V.5, 1133a25-29: I.23, ll. 32-36 V.5, 1133a28-29: I.28, l. 22 V.5, 1133b10-12: I.24, ll. 5-6; III.18, l. 13 V.5, 1133b10-16: II.16, ll. 7-9 V.5, 1133b10-20: I.23, ll. 32-36 V.5, 1133b14-16: I.28, ll. 17-20 V.5, 1133b17-18: I.27, ll. 11-12 V.6, 1133b31-32: I.27, ll. 11-12 V.6, 1134a25-28: I.27, ll. 43-45 V.6, 1134a32-33: I.27, ll. 76-77 V.6, 1134b1-2: III.25, ll. 3-4 V.7, 1134b10-11: I.11, ll. 13-14 V.7, 1134b19: VI.1, l. 5 V.7, 1134b22: II.8, ll. 43-44 V.7, 1134b25-26: II.16, l. 2 V.7, 1134b29: I.7, ll. 140-142 V.7, 1134b33-35: I.7, ll. 140-142 V.7, 1135a8: IV.2, l. 13 V.7, 1135a8-11: I.27, l. 20 V.8, 1135a19-23: I.27, l. 20 V.9, 1136b6: I.28, l. 6 V.9, 1136b13-14: I.28, l. 6 V.11, 1138a9-14: II.6, ll. 22-25 V.11, 1138b10-11: III.24, ll. 47-48 VI.1, 1139a22-23: I.29, ll. 3-4 VI.1, 1139a22-27: I.2, 12-14, 63-65; II.3, ll. 23-25; III.11, ll. 22-23; V.12, l. 16; VII.5, ll. 40-41 VI.1, 1139a29-31: I.2, 12-14, ll. 106-107; I.3, l. 12; VII.5, ll. 40-41 VI.1, 1139a29-33: VII.9, ll. 27-28 VI.1, 1139a31: II.18, ll. 31-33 VI.1, 1139a31-33: I.2, ll. 63-65; VI.2, ll. 57-58 VI.1, 1139a31-36: II.3, ll. 23-25; III.11, ll. 22-23; V.12, l. 16 VI.1, 1139a35-36: VII.9, ll. 27-28 VI.1, 1139b12: I.2, ll. 12-14 VI.1, 1139b12-13: II.8, ll. 23-24 VI.2, 1139b15-17: I.2, ll. 14-15 VI.2, 1139b18-23: I.2, ll. 40-41 VI.2, 1139b31-32: Prohemium, l. 47; I.4, l. 69 VI.2, 1139b31-34: I.2, ll. 17-18 VI.3, 1140a3-6: II.18, ll. 31-33 VI.3, 1140a10: I.31, l. 20 VI.3, 1140a10-14: II.18, ll. 31-33

882

Indices VI.3, 1140a13-14: I.31, ll. 18-19 VI.3, 1140a16-17: II.18, ll. 31-33 VI.3, 1140a21-22: I.31, l. 20; V.11, l. 23 VI.4, 1140a25-26: III.6, l. 48 VI.4, 1140a28-30: VII.9, ll. 27-28 VI.4, 1140a33-b4: I.2, ll. 30-32 VI.4, 1140b3-4: II.18, ll. 31-33 VI.4, 1140b4-6: I.29, l. 31; I.31, l. 23; II.18, l. 34; III.8, ll. 12-14 VI.4, 1140b7-11: IV.6, ll. 13-14; VII.6, l. 27 VI.4, 1140b13-16: III.22, ll. 4-5 VI.4, 1140b14-17: III.14, ll. 46-48 VI.4, 1140b16-20: III.14, ll. 48-52; VI.2, ll. 57-58 VI.4, 1140b16-21: I.29, l. 31 VI.4 1140b19-21: V.14, ll. 30-31 VI.4, 1140b20-21: I.31, l. 23; II.8, ll. 20-21; II.18, l. 34; V.11, l. 23; VII.9, ll. 25-26 VI.4, 1140b24-26: III.6, ll. 51-52 VI.6, 1141a18-20: VII.7, ll. 121-122 VI.6, 1141b1-2: VII.7, ll. 121-122 VI.6, 1141b23-26: III.8, ll. 12-14; VII.3, ll. 36-38 VI.6, 1142a9-10: III.6, ll. 51-52 VI.6, 1142a11-16: VII.3, l. 38 VI.7, 1142b31-33: VII.3, ll. 40-41; VII.9, ll. 27-28 VI.8, 1143a16-17: III.6, l. 48; III.14, ll. 25-26; III.17, ll. 5-6 VI.8, 1143a19-20: III.14, ll. 25-26; III.17, ll. 5-6 VI.8, 1143a29-31: III.6, l. 48; III.14, ll. 25-26; III.17, ll. 5-6 VI.8, 1143b6-11: VII.3, ll. 39-40 VI.9, 1144a4-9: VII.3, ll. 36-38 VI.9, 1144a7-9: I.29, ll. 34-41; I.31, ll. 32-33; II.18, ll. 37-39; V.12, ll. 22-23; VII.9, ll. 27-28 VI.9, 1144a7-11: III.14, ll. 26-27 VI.9, 1144a17-20: III.14, ll. 26-27 VI.9, 1144a17-22: IV.11, ll. 16-17 VI.9, 1144a20: I.31, ll. 32-33 VI.9, 1144a29-37: II.18, ll. 37-39 VI.9, 1144a31-37: II.18, ll. 36-37; III.6, ll. 51-52 VI.9, 1144a34-37: III.14, ll. 26-27 VI.10, 1144b1-2: V.14, ll. 30-31 VI.10, 1144b2-6: IV.11, ll. 19-21 VI.10, 1144b4-6: I.16, ll. 67-69; IV.11, ll. 36-38 VI.10, 1144b4-9: VII.3, ll. 39-40 VI.10, 1144b4-14: III.20, ll. 11-13 VI.10, 1144b26-28: II.19, ll. 35-36 VI.10, 1144b27: VII.3, ll. 48-49

VI.10, 1144b30-32: II.18, ll. 36-37; III.6, ll. 51-52; III.22, ll. 24-25 VI.10, 1144b30-1145a6: V.14, ll. 21-23 VI.10, 1145a1-6: I.29, 34-41; III.22, 24-25; V.12, ll. 32-34 VI.10, 1145a2-6: II.18, ll. 36-37; VI.1, ll. 57-58; III.6, ll. 51-52 VI.10, 1145a4-6: I.31, ll. 32-33; III.14, ll. 26-27; VII.3, ll. 40-41; VII.9, ll. 27-28 VII.3, 1147a18-24: III.14, ll. 76-79 VII.3, 1147b13-17: III.22, ll. 56-57; III.24, ll. 28-29 VII.4, 1147b23-28: VII.1, l. 50 VII.5, 1148b17-18: III.6, ll. 58-60 VII.6, 1149b8-13: III.19, l. 21 VII.6, 1149b15-18: II.4, ll. 41-42 VII.12, 1152a29-30: IV.14, l. 38 VII.12, 1152a30-31: VI.4, l. 15 VII.13, 1152b1-3: I.4, ll. 4-5 VII.14, 1153a20-23: V.1, l. 55 VIII.1, 1155a1-2: IV.5, ll. 5-6 VIII.1, 1155a15-16: III.15, ll. 17-19 VIII.1, 1155a22-23: II.1, ll. 53-54; II.4, ll. 5-6; III.26, l. 25 VIII.1, 1155a22-24: VII.5, ll. 6-7 VIII.1, 1155a23-26: II.14, ll. 41-42 VIII.1, 1155a24-28: V.2, l. 19 VIII.2, 1155a32-b8: I.17, l. 2; V.5, l. 12; V.10, l. 20 VIII.2-3, 1155b17-1156b32: I.17, ll. 22-23 VIII.2, 1155b33-34: I.17, l. 7 VIII.3, 1156a22-23: I.17, l. 28 VIII.3, 1156b19-21: I.17, l. 2; V.5, l. 12; V.10, l. 20 VIII.4, 1157a21-22: IV.6, ll. 8-9 VIII.4, 1157b36-1158a1: V.5, l. 12 VIII.4, 1158a10-12: II.4, ll. 50-51 VIII.4, 1158b1-5: I.17, ll. 22-23 VIII.5, 1158b23-35: I.17, ll. 22-23, 29-30; III.21, ll. 39-43 VIII.5, 1159a7-12: III.21, ll. 43-44 VIII.5, 1159a33-b4: I.17, ll. 29-30 VIII.5, 1159b2-4: I.17, l. 2; V.5, l. 12; V.10, l. 20 VIII.6, 1159b26-27: I.17, l. 19 VIII.6, 1160a33-36: IV.9, ll. 1-2 VIII.6, 1160b24-25: III.13, ll. 81-82 VIII.6, 1160b32-33: III.13, ll. 83-85 VIII.6, 1161a3-4: III.13, ll. 85-86 VIII.6, 1161a15-17: II.5, ll. 33-35 VIII.6, 1161a20-25: I.17, ll. 31-33 VIII.6, 1161a32-35: I.17, l. 5 VIII.7, 1161b11: I.17, l. 19 VIII.7, 1162a4-9: I.17, ll. 31-33

Index Locorum (Questiones) VIII.7, 1162a34-b4: I.17, ll. 29-30 VIII.8, 1163b12-27: II.5, ll. 38-42 IX.1, 1163b32-33: I.17, ll. 29-30; III.21, ll. 39-43 IX.2, 1164b31-33: II.5, ll. 36-38 IX.2, 1165a21-27: II.5, ll. 36-38 IX.4, 1166a1-2: III.14, ll. 9, 29 IX.4, 1166a6-8: IV.5, l. 41 IX.4, 1166a30-32: III.14, l. 36 IX.4, 1166b1-2: III.14, ll. 9, 29 IX.5, 1167a14-15: V.10, ll. 28-30 IX.6, 1167a22-b16: V.3, l. 38 IX.7, 1167b17-18: V.10, ll. 28-30 IX.7, 1167b17-20: III.18, ll. 71-73 IX.7, 1167b33-34: III.17, l. 21 IX.7, 1168a24-26: II.4, ll. 57-58 IX.8, 1168b28-31: II.3, ll. 30-32 IX.8, 1168b28-1169a3: III.14, ll. 31-32 IX.8, 1168b34-1169a3: II.3, ll. 30-32 IX.9, 1170a5-8: VII.7, ll. 35-37 IX.10, 1170a25-27: I.9, ll. 46-47 IX.11, 1170b33-1171a17: II.4, ll. 82-83 X.1, 1172a34-b1: III.14, ll. 81-82 X.1, 1172a34-b7: II.5, ll. 77-78 X.1, 1172b1-3: V.6, ll. 45-46 X.4, 1174b7-11: II.6, ll. 75-76 X.5, 1174b23: II.6, l. 61 X.7, 1176b1-10: VII.1, ll. 19-28; VII.2, ll. 19-20; VII.7, l. 60 X.7, 1176b3-5: V.1, 15; VII.1, ll. 31-32 X.7, 1176b26-28: VII.3, l. 12 X.7, 1177a1-2: VII.3, l. 12 X.7, 1177a5-6: VII.3, ll. 57-58 X.7-8, 1177a10-17: VII.3, l. 12 X.8, 1177a12-17: VII.1, ll. 47-48 X.8, 1177a12-b4: VII.7, l. 60 X.8, 1177a20-22: VII.7, ll. 35-37 X.8, 1177a25-26: VII.3, l. 12 X.8, 1177a27-28: VII.7, ll. 39-40 X.8, 1177a28-b1: VII.6, ll. 66-68; VII.7, ll. 41-42 X.8, 1177b4-6: II.19, ll. 22-23; V.1, ll. 8-9, 16; VII.4, ll. 86-88; VII.7, ll. 129-131 X.8, 1177b12-15: II.6, ll. 92-93 X.8, 1177b24-25: VII.7, ll. 35-37 X.9, 1178a5-8: VII.7, ll. 27-31 X.9, 1178a9-22: VII.3, ll. 36-38 X.10, 1178a24-b7: VII.6, ll. 66-68; VII.7, ll. 41-42 X.11, 1178b33-35: VII.1, l. 50 X.12, 1180a1-3: VI.2, ll. 7-8 X.14, 1180b28-1181b12: IV.2, ll. 50-55 Magna Moralia I.1, 1182a34-35: I.5, l. 13

883

I.2, 1184a8-14: VII.7, ll. 140-141 I.17, 1189a8-10: III.19, ll. 41-42 Politica I.1, 1252a1: I.1, l. 12 I.1, 1252a1-2: Prohemium, 101-103; I.5, l. 1 I.1, 1252a1-7: II.3, l. 8 I.1, 1252a3-7: I.4, l. 53 I.1, 1252a4-7: I.6, ll. 1-2, 11-12; V.1, l. 14 I.1, 1252a18-21: III.2, ll. 11-12 I.2, 1252a26-30: I.7, 1, l. 11 I.2, 1252a28-30: I.7, ll. 61-62 I.2, 1252a30-34: V.13, ll. 16-17 I.2, 1252a31-34: I.8, ll. 7-8; I.29, ll. 4-5; II.18, ll. 4-5, 12-15; V.16, ll. 31-32; VI.2, ll. 48-49 I.2, 1252a34-b1: I.8, l. 1 I.2, 1252a34-b5: I.8, l. 10 I.2, 1252b1-5: I.8, ll. 32-33; II.7, ll. 11-12 I.2, 1252b12-16: I.18, l. 13 I.2, 1252b27-29: I.18, l. 13 I.2, 1252b27-1253a1: II.3, l. 8 I.2, 1252b30: I.3, 3; I.5, ll. 11-12; VI.1, l. 11 I.2, 1252b30-1253a3: I.9, ll. 9-11 I.2, 1252b32-1253a1: I.13, ll. 107-108 I.2, 1252b34-1253a1: III.18, l. 10 I.2, 1252b34-1253a3: I.9, ll. 21-23 I.2, 1253a2: I.3, 3; I.5, ll. 11-12 I.2, 1253a2-3: Prohemium, l. 92; I.9, l. 1 I.2, 1253a5: I.9, l. 70 I.2, 1253a9: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 I.2, 1253a9-19: I.9, ll. 24-32 I.2, 1253a18-19: Prohemium, ll. 124-125; III.2, l. 5 I.2, 1253a20-25: V.15, ll. 44-47 I.2, 1253a20-29: III.3, ll. 22-24 I.2, 1253a25-26: III.2, l. 5 I.2, 1253a27-29: Prohemium, ll. 93-94 I.2, 1253a27-30; I.9, ll. 63-92; III.18, l. 10 I.2, 1253a33-35: III.20, l. 25 I.3, 1253b22-23: I.27, l. 8 I.4, 1253b31-33: I.10, l. 10; III.9, ll. 27-28 I.4, 1253b32: I.10, l. 1; III.9, l. 24 I.4, 1253b32-33: II.18, l. 31 I.4, 1254a7: I.10, ll. 40-41 I.4, 1254a8-10: III.3, ll. 16-17; III.9, l. 29 I.4, 1254a8-15: I.11, l. 6 I.4, 1254a14-15: I.11, l. 1 I.4, 1254a14-17: III.9, ll. 27-28 I.4, 1254a16-17: I.10, l. 44; I.29, ll. 32-33; III.9, ll. 30-31 I.5, 1254a17-18: I.13, l. 1 I.5, 1254a28-31: I.12, ll. 1-2, 16-17; I.13, ll. 17-19; II.12, l. 25; VI.6,ll. 8-10

884

Indices I.5, 1254a31-33: I.12, ll. 27-28 I.5, 1254a34-39: III.9, ll. 12-14 I.5, 1254b2-10: V.16, l. 9 I.5, 1254b4-8: III.9, ll. 12-14 I.5, 1254b27-31: I.14, ll. 1-2, 12 I.6, 1255a3-12: I.15, ll. 41-46 I.6, 1255a13-16: I.15, ll. 1-2 I.6, 1255a22-25: II.19, ll. 13-15 I.6, 1255b1-2: I.16, ll. 1-2, 13; III.19, ll. 9-10; IV.11, ll. 13-14 I.6, 1255b2-3: I.16, l. 66 I.6, 1255b8-15: V.17, l. 6 I.6, 1255b12-13: I.17, 1, l. 5 I.7, 1255b15-18: I.18, ll. 1-2 I.7, 1255b22-35: II.18, l. 10 I.8, 1256a3-5: I.21, l. 1 I.8, 1256a3-13: I.21, ll. 8-10 I.8, 1256a13-14: I.21, l. 1 I.8, 1256a19-22: I.19, ll. 1-2 I.8, 1256a23-25: I.19, ll. 46-48 I.8, 1256a30-40: I.19, l. 55 I.8, 1256a31: VI.3, ll. 55-56 I.8, 1256b16-17: I.20, 1. 20 I.8, 1256b21: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 I.8, 1256b27-28: I.21, l. 2 I.8, 1256b27-30: III.18, l. 25 I.8, 1256b31-37: I.22, ll. 1-2 I.8, 1256b34-36: II.14, ll. 17-19 I.8, 1256b34-37: I.22, l. 11 I.9, 1257a6-7: I.23, ll. 1-2 I.9, 1257a6-9: I.23, l. 10; II.6, ll. 17-19 I.9, 1257a31-41: I.28, l. 22 I.9, 1257b5-7: I.24, l. 1 I.9, 1257b10-13: I.24, ll. 25-26 I.9, 1257b14-17: I.24, ll. 10-11 I.9, 1257b23-34: II.14, ll. 66-67 I.9, 1257b25-28: VII.1, l. 6 I.9, 1257b25-31: I.22, ll. 30-31 I.9, 1257b25-34: I.26, ll. 1-2 I.9, 1257b26: I.25, ll. 88-89 I.9, 1257b28-30: I.26, ll. 21-22; VII.1, ll. 6-7 I.9, 1257b40-1258a2: I.25, l. 1 I.9, 1257b40-1258a12: I.27, ll. 32-34 I.9, 1258a1-2: I.26, ll. 28-29 I.10, 1258a38-b4: I.27, l. 1 I.10, 1258a40-b1: I.17, l. 5 I.10, 1258b2-8: I.28, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1259b18-21: II.13, ll. 22-24 I.13, 1259b21-23: I.29, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1259b26-27: I.30, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1259b26-28: I.30, ll. 11-14 I.13, 1259b32-36: I.30, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1259b32-1260a4: III.7, ll. 6, 23 I.13, 1259b36-38: I.30, ll. 20-22

I.13, 1259b40-1260a2: VI.2, ll. 53-54 I.13, 1260a2-4: III.7, ll. 12-13 I.13, 1260a8-11: VI.2, ll. 53-54 I.13, 1260a12: I.29, l. 4; VII.6, ll. 19-20 I.13, 1260a12-14: I.7, ll. 82-83; I.8, l. 8; II.7, l. 16 I.13, 1260a17-20: V.8, l. 7 I.13, 1260a19-20: VII.6, ll. 19-20 I.13, 1260a33-36: I.29, ll. 19-20; I.31, ll. 7-8; VI.2, ll. 53-54 I.13, 1260a36-38: I.31, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1260a36-b2: VI.2, ll. 55-57 I.13, 1260a36-b4: VII.6, l. 27 I.13, 1260a38-39: I.31, ll. 7-8 I.13, 1260a39-40: VI.2, l. 57 I.13, 1260a39-b2: I.31, ll. 14-15; II.18, ll. 42-43 I.13, 1260a40-41: I.31, ll. 48-50 I.13, 1260b16-18: II.4, ll. 65-66 II.1, 1261a2-8: II.4, ll. 1-2 II.2, 1261a12-22: II.2, ll. 1-2; V.5, ll. 9-10 II.2, 1261a14-18: II.1, l. 1 II.2, 1261a22-24: V.5, ll. 28-30 II.2, 1261a29-32: V.5, ll. 28-30 II.2, 1261b9: II.2, ll. 8-9 II.3, 1261b33-35: II.3, ll. 1-2; II.4, ll. 6970; III.25, ll. 32-33 II.3, 1261b33-38: II.3, ll. 10-12; V.12, l. 28 II.4, 1262a32-37: II.5, ll. 1-2, 24-25 II.4, 1262a32-40: II.5, l. 17 II.4, 1262b17-18: II.4, ll. 51-53 II.4, 1262b22-23: III.18, ll. 68-69 II.4, 1262b24-34: II.4, ll. 59-61 II.5, 1262b39-40: II.6, ll. 1-2 II.5, 1263a17-21: II.6, ll. 52-55 II.5, 1263a27-30: II.6, ll. 68-70 II.5, 1263a37-40: II.6, ll. 78-80 II.5, 1263b7-9: II.4, ll. 38-40 II.5, 1263b7-14: II.6, ll. 76-77 II.6, 1264b37-38: II.7, ll. 1-2 II.6, 1265a18-20: II.10, ll. 1-2, 11 II.6, 1265a22: Prohemium, ll. 104-109 II.6, 1266a1-5: III.13, ll. 5-7 II.7, 1266a36-38: II.11, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266a36-b5: II.12, ll. 15-16 II.7, 1266a38-39: II.11, ll. 25-26 II.7, 1266a39-40: II.11, l. 11; II.12, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266b5-8: II.14, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266b8-14: II.12, l. 11; II.14, ll. 53-56 II.7, 1266b17-19: II.14, ll. 1-2; III.21, ll. 65-66 II.7, 1266b24-28: II.12, l. 11 II.7, 1266b29-30: II.13, ll. 1-2, 15-16 II.7, 1266b34-1267a1: II.12, ll. 37-41

Index Locorum (Questiones) II.7, 1267a21-27: II.15, ll. 1-2; III.21, ll. 65-66 II.7, 1267a21-31: II.15, ll. 7-9 II.7, 1267a37-41: II.12, ll. 37-41 II.7, 1267a41-b5: I.26, l. 30 II.7, 1267b5-9: II.13, ll. 15-16; III.18, ll. 33-34 II.8, 1268b26-28: II.17, l. 1 II.8, 1268b31-38: II.17, ll. 2-3 II.8, 1268b39-1269a3: II.17, ll. 9-10 II.8, 1269a14-24: II.17, ll. 12-16 II.9, 1269b7-12: II.18, ll. 1, 10 II.9, 1269b25-31: II.19, ll. 5-6 II.9, 1270a4-6: II.19, ll. 1-2, 11-12 II.11, 1273b6-7: III.18, ll. 62-63 III.1, 1274b30-34: III.1, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1274b34: III.1, ll. 11-12 III.1, 1274b38: II.12, ll. 25-26; III.1, ll. 2728; III.11, l. 13; III.12, l. 10; III.21, l. 34; IV.2, ll. 20-21; IV.4, ll. 52-53; IV.7, l. 7; IV.10, ll. 11, 15-16; VI.6, ll. 20-21; VI.7, l. 11; VII.7, ll. 120-121 III.1, 1274b39-41: III.1, ll. 28-29; III.2, ll. 11-12 III.1, 1274b40-41: III.2, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1275a7-19: III.3, ll. 30-36 III.1, 1275a19-b20: III.3, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1275a34-b5: III.4, l. 1; III.7, ll. 13-14 III.1, 1275a38-b3: IV.1, ll. 37-41; V.15, ll. 18-47 III.1, 1275a38-b5: III.4, ll. 27-28 III.1, 1275b3-5: III.4, ll. 8-9 III.1, 1275b18-20: III.3, l. 12 III.3, 1276a17-19: III.5, ll. 1-2 III.3, 1276a19-29: II.1, ll. 5-6 III.3, 1276a34-b1: III.5, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1276b17-18: III.8, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1276b17-20: III.6, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1276b20-27: VI.7, ll. 21-24; VII.4, ll. 41-44 III.4, 1276b27-31: III.8, ll. 16-17 III.4, 1276b30-31: III.6, ll. 11, 51; III.21, ll. 33-34; III.26, l. 23 III.4, 1276b30-33: III.4, ll. 8-9; III.7, ll. 1-2, 13-14 III.4, 1276b37-1277a1: III.6, ll. 60-61 III.4, 1276b37-1277a5: VI.7, ll. 28-30 III.4, 1277a5-6: V.5, l. 4 III.4, 1277a13-16: III.8, ll. 28-34 III.4, 1277a14-16: IV.6, ll. 13-14; V.8, l. 7; VII.6, ll. 19-20 III.4, 1277a20-22: III.8, ll. 6-10 III.4, 1277a20-24: III.8, ll. 28-34 III.4, 1277a23-24: III.7, l. 6 III.4, 1277a24-25: V.16, ll. 4-5

885

III.4, 1277a25-29: III.8, ll. 6-10 III.4, 1277b13: III.7, l. 6 III.4, 1277b16-20: III.7, ll. 15-16 III.4, 1277b25-26: III.19, l. 30; VII.6, ll. 19-20 III.4, 1277b25-29: III.7, ll. 6, 15-16 III.5, 1278a6-35: III.3, ll. 5-6 III.6, 1278b32-34: V.16, l. 9; V.17, l. 6 III.6, 1278b32-37: III.9, ll. 1-2, 20; V.16, ll. 10-11 III.6, 1278b34-36: III.9, ll. 32-33 III.6, 1278b37-1279a2: III.10, ll. 1-2 III.6, 1278b37-1279a8: III.10, ll. 12-18 III.6, 1279a17-21: III.11, ll. 1-2, 9; V.16, ll. 10-11 III.7, 1279a22-23: III.13, l. 1 III.7, 1279a25-31: III.12, ll. 1-2, 11 III.7, 1279a34-b6: III.13, ll. 4, 9 III.7, 1279a37-39: IV.10, ll. 13, 23-24 III.7, 1279a38-39: III.13, l. 46 III.8, 1279b16: V.16, ll. 7-8, 10-11 III.8, 1279b28-29: VI.5, ll. 12-13 III.9, 1280a11-31: V.4, ll. 24-25 III.9, 1280a15-16: III.14, ll. 1-2 III.9, 1280a31-32: V.1, ll. 34-35 III.9, 1280b29-1281a8: V.1, l. 14 III.9, 1280b32-35: III.18, l. 10 III.9, 1280b33-35: V.1, ll. 34-35 III.9, 1280b39-40: V.1, ll. 34-35 III.9, 1280b40-1281a1: III.18, l. 10 III.10, 1281a31: III.18, l. 35 III.11, 1281a40-41: III.15, ll. 1-2 III.11, 1281a42-b9: III.15, ll. 16-17 III.11, 1281b18-20: III.15, ll. 35-38 III.11, 1281b21-25: III.16, ll. 1-2 III.11, 1281b25-28: III.16, ll. 11-13; III.17, ll. 9-10 III.11, 1281b28-31: III.16, ll. 40-41 III.11, 1281b30-34: III.17, ll. 1-2 III.11, 1281b39-1282a7: III.17, ll. 7-8 III.11, 1281b40-42: IV.2, ll. 36-38 III.12, 1282b18-30: V.4, ll. 24-25 III.12, 1282b30-1283a1: II.12, ll. 36-37 III.12, 1283a14-15: III.18, ll. 1-2; III.19, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a31-33: III.18, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a33-37:III.19, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a36-37: III.19, ll. 9-10; IV.11, ll. 5, 13-14 III.13, 1283a37: III.19, l. 4 III.13, 1283b20-23: III.20, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1284a3-8: III.21, 1-2 III.13, 1284b32-34: III.21, ll. 84-85; III.26, ll. 13-14 III.14, 1284b35: III.13, l. 84

886

Indices III.14, 1284b35-1285b33: III.23, ll. 1-2 III.14, 1285a1-6: III.23, ll. 13-14 III.14, 1285a15-16: III.23, ll. 6-7 III.14, 1285a16-24: III.23, ll. 7-8; V.16, ll. 10-11 III.14, 1285a29-38: VII.9, ll. 17-18 III.14, 1285a29-b3: III.23, ll. 8-10 III.14, 1285b1-2: V.16, ll. 10-11 III.14, 1285b4-19: III.23, l. 16 III.14, 1285b21-23: III.23, l. 16 III.14, 1285b23-25: III.23, ll. 7-8 III.14, 1285b23-26: V.16, ll. 10-11 III.14, 1285b25-26: III.23, ll. 8-10 III.14, 1285b26-28: III.23, ll. 8-10 III.14, 1285b29-33: III.13, l. 84; III.23, ll. 16-18 III.15, 1286a8-9: III.22, ll. 1-2 III.15, 1286a16-20: III.22, ll. 7-8 III.15, 1286a24-25: III.24, ll. 1-2 III.15, 1286a30-31: VI.4, ll. 11-12 III.15, 1286a32-33: III.24, ll. 15-16 III.15, 1286b22-27: III.25, ll. 1-2 III.15, 1286b34-38: V.13, ll. 34-37 III.16, 1287a8-12: III.26, ll. 1-2 III.16, 1287a39-41: V.16, ll. 12-13 III.16, 1287b25-31: III.15, ll. 16-17 III.17, 1287b39-40: V.17, ll. 13-14 IV.1, 1288b10-19: IV.1, ll. 14-17 IV.1, 1288b20-35: V.12, ll. 47-48 IV.1, 1288b21-22: IV.1, ll. 1-2, 18-19 IV.1, 1288b22: IV.1, ll. 49-52 IV.1, 1288b22-24: IV.1, ll. 39-40 IV.1, 1288b25-28: IV.1, ll. 49-52 IV.1, 1289a11-12: IV.2, l. 1 IV.1, 1289a13-15: IV.2, l. 10 IV.1, 1289a13-25: II.9, ll. 22-25 IV.2, 1289a26-28: IV.10, l. 13 IV.2, 1289a37-38: V.15, l. 10 IV.2, 1289a39-41: IV.3, ll. 52-53 IV.2, 1289b2-3: IV.3, ll. 1-2 IV.3, 1289b27-28: IV.4, ll. 1-2 IV.3, 1290a5-13: IV.4, ll. 12-13 IV.4, 1291b30-1292a7: IV.7, ll. 37-42 IV.4, 1292a4-7: IV.7, ll. 1-3 IV.4, 1292a4-18: V.15, ll. 3-4 IV.4, 1292a15-18: V.16, ll. 10-11 IV.4, 1292a15-23: IV.6, ll. 1-2 IV.4, 1292a30-37: IV.7, ll. 1-3 IV.4, 1292a32-34: IV.7, ll. 9-11 IV.5, 1292a39-b10: VI.5, ll. 13-18 IV.5, 1292b1-2: VI.5, ll. 15-16 IV.5, 1292b5-10: IV.7, ll. 46-51 IV.5, 1292b11-21: IV.8, ll. 1-2 IV.6, 1292b22: IV.3, l. 19 IV.6, 1292b22-1293a10: IV.7, ll. 37-42

IV.6, 1292b25-30: VI.2, ll. 11-17 IV.6, 1292b30: IV.7, ll. 38-39 IV.8, 1293b23-27: IV.10, l. 13 IV.8, 1293b24-27: IV.7, ll. 25-27 IV.8, 1293b33-34: IV.9, ll. 1-2 IV.8, 1294a3-4: IV.2, l. 44 IV.8, 1294a9-11: IV.10, ll. 8-11 IV.8, 1294a21-22: IV.11, l. 1; IV.12, ll. 1, 15; IV.14, ll. 10-12 IV.9, 1294a35-36: IV.9, ll. 34-42 IV.10, 1295a1-4: V.15, l. 10 IV.10, 1295a16-17: V.16, ll. 10-11 IV.11, 1295b25-28: II.12, ll. 3-4 IV.14, 1298b20-21: VI.4, ll. 11-12 V.1, 1301a19-35: II.2, 9; V.1, l. 2 V.1, 1301a25-35: II.12, ll. 37-41 V.1, 1301b5-26: V.4, ll. 42-49 V.1, 1301b26-29: V.4, ll. 60-63 V.1, 1301b28-29: V.4, l. 1 V.1, 1301b28-39: V.4, ll. 24-25 V.1, 1302a9-13: V.8, ll. 47-50 V.2, 1302a22-32: V.4, ll. 1, 60-63 V.3, 1302b33-1303a13: V.5, l. 1 V.3, 1303b7-8: V.6, l. 1 V.3, 1303b7-12: V.6, l. 11 V.4, 1303b19-21: V.8, ll. 1-2 V.4, 1303b28-31: V.8, ll. 14-15 V.5, 1304b23-24: V.9, l. 2; V.10, ll. 1-2 V.6, 1305a40-b22: VII.9, ll. 17-18 V.6, 1305b35-1306a5: VII.9, ll. 17-18 V.6, 1306a35-b5: VII.9, ll. 17-18 V.8, 1307b29: V.7, l. 2; V.18, l. 3 V.9, 1309a33-35: V.12, ll. 1-2, 12; V.13, ll. 1-2 V.9, 1309a33-37: III.18, ll. 64-65 V.9, 1309a33-39: V.11, ll. 1-2 V.9, 1309a39-b3: V.14, ll. 1-3 V.9, 1309b8-14: III.18, ll. 65-67 V.10, 1310a39: V.15, l. 1 V.10, 1310a39-b2: V.15, l. 10 V.10, 1310b2-7: IV.3, l. 27 V.10, 1310b16-20: V.16, ll. 10-11 V.10, 1310b25-31: VII.9, ll. 17-18 V.11, 1313a18-23: V.16, ll. 10-11 V.11, 1313a34-35: V.18, ll. 1, 7-8 V.11, 1313a34-b28: VII.9, ll. 17-18 V.11, 1313a39-b4: IV.3, ll. 28-29 V.11, 1313a39-1314a29: V.18, ll. 15-21 V.11, 1314a8-9: V.16, ll. 10-11 V.11, 1314a14-25: V.18, ll. 15-21 V.11, 1314a29-1315b10: V.18, ll. 21-27 V.11, 1314a31: V.18, l. 1 V.12, 1316a29-39: VII.9, ll. 17-18 VI.4, 1318b8-10: I.19, ll. 53-54 VI.4, 1318b10: VI.2, l. 1

Index Locorum (Questiones) VI.4, 1318b11-17: VI.2, ll. 11-17 VI.4, 1319a19-21: VI.3, ll. 1-2 VI.4, 1319a21-22: VI.3, ll. 10-11 VI.4, 1319a22-23: VI.3, l. 36 VI.4, 1319b30-32: VI.4, ll. 1-2, 14-15, 65 VI.6, 1320b16-25: VI.5, ll. 1-2, 7 VI.8, 1321b3-10: VI.7, ll. 8-9 VI.8, 1321b5-6: VI.6, ll. 1-2 VI.8, 1321b8-10: VI.7, ll. 1-2 VI.8, 1322b12-15: VI.8, l. 1 VII: IV.10, ll. 19-21 VII.1, 1323a24-b10: VII.1, ll. 1-3; VII.2, l. 1 VII.1, 1323b18-21: VII.2, l. 26; VII.7, ll. 139-140 VII.1, 1323b21-23: VII.3, ll. 1, 12 VII.1, 1323b40-1324a2: V.1, l. 14 VII.2, 1324a4-6: VII.4, ll. 1-2 VII.2, 1324a5-8: VI.2, ll. 23-24 VII.2, 1324a14-17: VII.7, ll. 1-2 VII.2, 1324a35-37: VII.6, l. 5 VII.2, 1324b1-3: V.16, ll. 10-11 VII.3, 1325a31-34: VII.7, l. 60 VII.3, 1325b19-23. VII.7, l. 60 VII.3, 1325b31-33: VII.4, ll. 17-19 VII.4, 1326b3: III.18, l. 10 VII.5, 1326b26-27: VII.8, ll. 1-2 VII.6-7, 1327b16-20: VII.8, ll. 1-2, 12; VII.9, ll. 1-2 VII.7, 1327b20-36: II.10, ll. 28-29 VII.7, 1327b23-38: VII.9, l. 19 VII.8, 1328a37-38: VII.3, l. 12; VII.7, l. 60 VII.10, 1330a9-16: V.6, ll. 9-10 VII.12, 1331a18-30: V.6, ll. 38-40 VII.12, 1331a18-b18: V.6, ll. 9-10 VII.12, 1331b13-18: V.6, ll. 38-40 VII.13, 1332a7-10: VII.7, l. 60 VII.14, 1333a21-24: VII.7, ll. 140-141 VII.14, 1333b12-14: II.19, ll. 54-55 VII.15, 1334b22-28: VII.2, ll. 36-37 VII.16, 1335a7-11: I.7, ll. 106-108 VII.16, 1335a11-27: I.7, ll. 95-97 VII.16, 1335a28-29: I.7, ll. 98-100 VII.16, 1335b38-1336a2: I.7, ll. 90-91 VII.17, 1336b3-8: V.6, ll. 50-53 VII.17, 1336b13-17: V.6, ll. 50-53 VII.17, 1336b31-37: VII.2, ll. 36-37 VIII.1, 1337a21-23: I.2, l. 10 Rhetorica I.1, 1355a20-22: III.10, ll. 56-57 I.5, 1361a12-24: I.24, l. 6 I.5, 1361a20-22: I.11, ll. 14-15; II.6, ll. 16-17 I.6, 1362a18-19: III.4, ll. 15-16

887

I.6, 1362a23: III.10, l. 8 I.7, 1363b21-22: I.25, ll. 13-14; II.2, ll. 3-4; II.14, ll. 10-11; III.16, ll. 5-6; V.5, ll. 8-9; VII.6, ll. 11-12 I.11, 1369b33-35: VI.4, ll. 30-31 I.11, 1370a6-7: IV.14, l. 38; VI.4, l. 15 I.11, 1370a6-8: VI.4, l. 15 I.11, 1370a9: I.27, ll. 7-8 I.11, 1370a16-18: III.25, l. 38 I.11, 1371a23-24: IV.5, l. 14 I.13, 1373b27-28: I.27, l. 20 II.2, 1378a30-34: III.24, l. 30 II.4, 1380b35-36: I.17, ll. 8-9; II.3, l. 26; V.12, l. 9 II.4, 1381a1-10: IV.5, l. 41 II.4, 1381a2-6: V.10, l. 24 II.5, 1382a20-22: V.9, l. 11 II.5, 1382a21-22: V.9, ll. 49-50 II.5, 1382b9-10: VI.4, ll. 17-18 II.5, 1382b34-1383a8: V.9, ll. 51-53 II.5, 1383a7: V.10, l. 17 II.8, 1385b19-24: V.9. l. 21 II.8, 1386a17-18: V.10, l. 24 II.8, 1386a24-29: V.10, l. 24 II.15, 1390b16-17: III.19, ll. 13-14; IV.11, l. 10 II.15, 1390b18-19: III.19, l. 4; IV.11, l. 5; IV.12, l. 15 II.15, 1390b18-21: IV.14, ll. 10-12, 43 II.15, 1390b19-21: III.19, ll. 13-14; IV.11, l. 10; IV.13, l. 16 II.15, 1390b22: III.19, l. 4; IV.11, l. 5; IV.12, l. 15 II.15, 1390b23-24: IV.13, l. 25 II.16, 1390b32-1391a1: II.13, ll. 13-14; II.14, ll. 47-48 II.16, 1390b32-1391a2: III.18, ll. 19-20 II.16, 1391a1-2: III.18, ll. 11-12 Aristoteles [pseudo] Physiognomica 1, 805a1: I.16, ll. 11-12 Problemata IV.11, 877b14-19: II.19, l. 7 IV.26, 880a3-4: IV.14, l. 38 XIV.8, 909b9-10: VII.9, ll. 33-36 XIV.8, 909b12-13: VII.9, ll. 33-36 XIV.9, 909b28-33: VII.9, ll. 33-36 XIV.15, 910a26-33 XIV.16, 910a38-910b8: VII.9, ll. 33-36 XIV.16, 910b3-8: VII.9, ll. 50-51

888

Indices

Aspasius [vel pseudo-Aspasius = Robertus Grosseteste] Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber VIIIus cap. 2: IV.9, ll. 1-2 cap. 9: III.15, ll. 35-38 cap. 12: I.7, ll. 14-15, 78-86, 113-115, 115117; I.17, l. 6 Auctoritates Aristotelis Metaphysica I (13), p. 116: II.3, ll. 17-18; IV.7, ll. 64-65 I (17), p. 116: I.2, l. 32 I (22), p. 116: IV.12, l. 42 II (39), p. 118: Prohemium, ll. 57-58; V.11, ll. 11-12, 40-42 II (42), p. 118: III.2, ll. 13-14 II (43), p. 118: IV.4, ll. 43-45; VII.2, ll. 4142; VII.5, l. 29; VII.7, l. 80 II (44), p. 118: VI.9, ll. 3-4 II (50), p. 119: I.5, ll. 20-22 III (73), p. 121: I.20, l. 12: I.25, ll. 62-63 IV (88), p. 122: IV.1, ll. 26-28; V.15, ll. 41-44 IV (89), p. 122: V.15, ll. 41-44 IV (93), p. 122: I.5, l. 22 IV (102), p. 123: II.11, ll. 3-4; VI.6, ll. 16-17 V (123), p. 125: V.7, ll. 19-20 V (124), p. 125: I.6, ll. 25-26; I.25, ll. 62-63; II.1, l. 16; III.9, ll. 60-61; IV.12, l. 40; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 V (127), p. 125: II.11, ll. 3-4, ll. 12-16; VI.6, ll. 16-17 VI (151), p. 127: IV.1, l. 10 VII (186), p. 130: I.12, l. 32 VIII (205), p. 132: IV.9, ll. 56-57 IX (223), p. 134: V.11, ll. 61-62 IX (226), p. 134: Prohemium, ll. 61-63 X (239), p. 135: I.12, l. 13; I.20, l. 22; II.9, ll. 12-13; III.24, ll. 7-8; IV.4, ll. 43-45; IV.7, ll. 16-17; VII.2, ll. 41-42; VII.5, ll. 26-29; VII.7, l. 80 X (243), p. 135: V.2, ll. 56-57; V.18, l. 14 X (245), p. 136: V.3, l. 4 X (251), p. 136: I.18, ll. 3-4 XII (277), p. 138: II.2, ll. 60-62 XII (278), p. 138: IV.8, ll. 29-30 Metaphysica (Averroes) VI (159), p. 128: III.2, ll. 59-60 Physica I (3), p. 140: III.1, ll. 14-16; III.2, ll. 17-18 I (5), p. 140: II.16, ll. 41-42 I (11), p. 140: VII.4, ll. 32-33 I (21), p. 141: II.16, ll. 5-6

I (32), p. 142: IV.4, ll. 4, 17-18; VII.2, ll. 30-31 II (55), p. 145: I.19, l. 24; V.16, ll. 52-53; VI.1, l. 34 II (61), p. 145: I.14, l. 19; III.1, l. 5; III.11, l. 28 II (62), p. 145: V.1, ll. 57-58; VII.7, ll. 94-95 II (63), p. 145: I.20, ll. 17-18 II (68), p. 146: I.6, ll. 25-26; II.1, l. 16; III.9, ll. 60-61; III.12, ll. 24-25; III.13, l. 76; IV.4, l. 22; V.2, l. 26; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VI.7, l. 13; VI.9, l. 17; IV.12, l. 40; VII.4, l. 59 II (72), p. 146: V.7, ll. 19-20 II (73), p. 146: I.6, ll. 25-26; II.1, l. 16; II.12, ll. 17-18; III.9, ll. 60-61; III.12, ll. 2527; IV.12, l. 40; V.2, l. 26; V.4, ll. 13-14; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 II (82), p. 147: I.9, ll. 17-20 II (85), p. 147: I.5, l. 27; I.6, ll. 25-26; I.18, l. 34; I.20, l. 6; II.1, l. 16; III.9, ll. 60-61; IV.4, l. 22; IV.12, l. 40; V.2, l. 26; VI.7, ll. 12-13: VII.4, l. 59 II (89), p. 147: I.20, l. 11 II (90), p. 147: Prohemium, ll. 52-53; I.2, ll. 10-11; I.7, ll. 28-30; I.13, ll. 22-24; III.1, ll. 8-9; III.20, ll. 44-45; IV.2, ll. 14-15; V.1, l. 43; V.17, l. 19 II (91), p. 147: III.13, ll. 17-18; VII.4, ll. 9-10 III (101), p. 148: I.5, ll. 34-35 IV (120), p. 149: V.6, ll. 12-13 IV (135), p. 151: I.16, ll. 59-60 V (161), p. 153: V.2, ll. 21-22; V.7, ll. 9-10 VII (183), p. 155: III.16, ll. 30-31 VII (185), p. 155: V.8, ll. 34-35 VII (186), p. 155: III.6, l. 18 VIII (202), p. 156: IV.13, l. 14 VIII (208), p. 157: I.29, ll. 44-45; V.7, ll. 46-47 VIII (209), p. 157: I.18, l. 14 VIII (212), p. 157: III.19, l. 52 De Caelo et Mundo I (18), p. 161: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 I (19), p. 161: I.1, ll. 22-23; V.6, ll. 48-50; V.8, ll. 14-15 II (51), p. 163: I.16, ll. 59-60 II (57), p. 164: I.13, l. 5 II (59), p. 164: I.13, l. 5 III (76), p. 165: VI.4, ll. 49-51 De Generatione et Corruptione I (12), p. 168: III.5, ll. 59-60 I (14), p. 168: I.7, ll. 44-45; III.5, l. 56 I (18), p. 168: IV.9, ll. 13-14 II (36), p. 170: I.19, ll. 36-37; I.20, l. 40 II (42), p. 170: V.2, l. 6; V.4, ll. 29-30

Index Locorum (Questiones) Meteorologica I (2), p. 171: IV.13, ll. 34-35 IV (20), p. 173: V.4, ll. 29-30 IV (26), p. 173: III.3, ll. 22-24 De Anima I (2), p. 174: I.4, l. 49 I (7), p. 174: III.2, ll. 65-67 I (14), p. 175: III.9, ll. 16-17 II (46), p. 178: I.19, ll. 24-25 II (48), p. 178: I.13, ll. 84-86 II (56), p. 179: I.10, l. 39; I.18, ll. 31-32; I.19, ll. 17-18; II.13, l. 6 II (57), p. 179: I.7, ll. 37-38, 52-57; I.9, ll. 43-45; I.16, l. 49 II (58), p. 179: I.7, ll. 36-37, 52-57; III.5, l. 10 II (79), p. 180: I.8, ll. 34-37 II (82), p. 181: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II (87), p. 181: I.25, ll. 94-95 II (99), p. 182: I.16, ll. 47-48 III (149), p. 186: Prohemium, ll. 23-25 III (151), p. 187: I.9, l. 42 III (154), p. 187: I.25, ll. 25-26: III.13, l. 49 III (158), p. 187: II.3, ll. 40-42 III (168), p. 188: I.7, ll. 12-14; I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18; III.6, ll. 35-36; V.16, ll. 41-42 III (172), p. 188: III.16, l. 32 III (176), p. 189: I.13, ll. 84-86 III (178), p. 189: I.13, ll. 84-86 De Anima (Averroes) I (27), p. 176: Prohemium, ll. 35-36 I (29), p. 176: I.14, ll. 7-8 III (183), p. 189: I.1, l. 22 III (190), p. 190: II.18, ll. 22-23 De Memoria et Reminiscentia (64), p. 200: IV.14, l. 38; VI.4, l. 15 De Somno et Vigilia (70), p. 201: III.3, l. 10; IV.12, l. 7 (75), p. 202: III.16, l. 32 De Respiratione et Inspiratione (134), p. 207: I.8, l. 35 (135), p. 207: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35 De Motu Animalium (9), p. 208: III.16, l. 32 (10), p. 208: II.2, ll. 63-64; II.4, l. 71; III.3, ll. 39-40; III.5, ll. 5-6; V.5, l. 23; VI.7, ll. 3-5; VI.8, ll. 6-7 De Animalibus XII (177), p. 223: I.16, ll. 52-56 XII (183), p. 223: I.7, ll. 48-50 XV (231), p. 227: I.8, ll. 20-22

889

Liber de Causis (11), p. 232: IV.3, ll. 36-37 (13), p. 232: I.13, l. 55; II.4, ll. 48-49; IV.3, ll. 34-35; V.10, l. 15 (16), p. 232: I.24, l. 15 Ethica Nicomachea I (1), p. 232: I.7, l. 35; III.10, l. 8 I (3), p. 233: III.14, ll. 3-4; III.24, l. 20 I (5), p. 233: I.4, ll. 10-11; II.3, l. 5; IV.10, ll. 22-23; VII.4, ll. 88-89; VII.7, ll. 2526, 172 I (11), p. 233: VII.4, ll. 5-6; VII.5, l. 12 I (22), p. 234: VII.1, l. 8 II (35), p. 235: I.16, l. 17 II (37), p. 235: III.6, ll. 16-17; III.22, ll. 2223; IV.11, ll. 11-12 II (38), p. 235: IV.9, ll. 21-23 II (41), p. 235: VII.3, l. 9 II (42), p. 235: IV.11, ll. 16-17; VII.3, ll. 48-49 II (45), p. 235: IV.10, l. 27 III (48), p. 236: III.4, ll. 15-16 III (49), p. 236: II.9, ll. 15-16 III (57), p. 236: II.19, ll. 26-27 IV (66), p. 237: VII.1, ll. 9-10 IV (68), p. 237: IV.11, ll. 49-50; VII.1, ll. 9-10, 81-82 IV (75), p. 237: IV.6, l. 24 V (95), p. 239: I.23, ll. 32-36; I.24, ll. 5-6; III.18, l. 13 V (99), p. 239: VI.1, l. 5 VI (108), p. 240: I.2, ll. 14-15 VI (109), p. 240: I.2, ll. 40-41 VI (111), p. 240: I.31, l. 20; V.11, l. 23 VI (112), p. 240: I.31, l. 23; II.8, ll. 20-21; V.11, l. 23; VII.9, ll. 25-26 VII (125), p. 241: IV.14, l. 38; VI.4, l. 15 VIII (136), p. 242: III.15, ll. 17-19 VIII (141), p. 242: I.17, l. 2; V.5, l. 12; V.10, l. 20 VIII (142), p. 242: I.17, l. 7 VIII (151), p. 243: II.4, ll. 50-51 VIII (158), p. 244: II.5, ll. 33-35 IX (176), p. 245: III.14, ll. 9, 29 IX (177), p. 245: III.14, l. 36 IX (182), p. 245: V.10, ll. 28-30 X (208), p. 247: VII.3, ll. 57-58 Politica I (1), p. 252: V.13, ll. 16-17 I (2), p. 252: I.8, ll. 32-33; II.7, ll. 11-12 I (3), p. 252: Prohemium, l. 92 I (4), p. 252: I.14, l. 18; I.20, l. 35; II.18, l. 18 I (8), p. 252: Prohemium, ll. 93-94 I (12), p. 252: I.11, l. 6

890

Indices I (14), p. 252: II.12, l. 25; VI.6, ll. 8-10 I (15), p. 253: III.9, ll. 12-14 I (16), p. 253: III.9, ll. 12-14 I (21), p. 253: III.19, ll. 9-10; IV.11, ll. 13-14 I (25), p. 253: I.20, l. 20 I (29), p. 254: I.30, ll. 20-22 I (30), p. 254: I.7, ll. 82-83; I.8, l. 8 II (33), p. 254: II.3, ll. 1-2; II.4, ll. 69-70; III.25, ll. 32-33 III (52), p. 255: II.12, ll. 25-26; III.1, ll. 2728; III.11, l. 13; III.12, l. 10; III.21, l. 34; IV.2, ll. 20-21; IV.4, ll. 52-53; IV.7, l. 7; IV.10, ll. 15-16; V.15, l. 11; VI.6, ll. 2021; VI.7, l. 11; VII.7, ll. 120-121 III (55), p. 255: III.19, l. 30; VII.6, ll. 19-20 III (63), p. 256: III.19, l. 4; IV.11, ll. 5, 13-14 III (64), p. 256: VI.4, ll. 11-12 V (88), p. 258: V.8, ll. 1-2 V (91), p. 258: V.7, l. 2; V.18, l. 3 VI (105), p. 259: I.19, ll. 53-54 VI (106), p. 260: VI.2, ll. 11-17 VII (122), p. 261: VII.3, l. 12 VII (126), p. 261: I.7, ll. 106-108 VII (127), p. 261: I.7, ll. 98-100 VII (131), p. 262: V.6, ll. 50-53

Rhetorica I (5), p. 263: III.10, ll. 56-57 I (13), p. 264: III.4, ll. 15-16 I (14), p. 264: III.10, l. 8 I (18), p. 264: I.25, ll. 13-14; II.2, ll. 3-4; II.14, ll. 10-11; III.16, ll. 5-6; V.5, ll. 8-9; VII.6, ll. 11-12 I (23), p. 265: IV.14, l. 38; VI.4, l. 15 II (49), p. 266: III.19, l. 4; IV.11, l. 5 Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae III (48), p. 290: IV.4, l. 16 De Interpretatione (14), p. 305: V.3, ll. 8-9 Gilbertus, Liber Sex Principiorum (13), p. 307: I.16, ll. 12-13 Analytica Posteriora I (5), p. 311: I.1, ll. 6-7; IV.1, ll. 19-22 I (7), p. 311: I.2, ll. 41-44 I (8), p. 311: I.2, ll. 41-44 I (9), p. 311: I.2, ll. 41-44 I (11), p. 312: I.2, l. 59 I (16), p. 312: III.1, ll. 17-19 I (29), p. 313: III.26, l. 28; V.8, ll. 12-13; V.15, ll. 2-3 I (42), p. 314: III.6, l. 3 II (110), p. 320: I.6, ll. 25-26; I.25, ll. 62-63; II.1, l. 16; II.12, ll. 17-18; III.9, ll. 60-61; IV.12, l. 40; VI.7, ll. 12-13; VII.4, l. 59 II (125), p. 321: II.3, ll. 45-46

Topica I (19), p. 323: VII.6, l. 13 II (30), p. 324: III.14, l. 40; VI.4, ll. 102103 III (38), p. 324: III.10, l. 8 III (44), p. 324: I.22, ll. 6-7; II.3, l. 7 III (45), p. 324: III.15, ll. 8-9 III (50), p. 325: III.15, ll. 8-9; III.24, ll. 7-8; IV.3, ll. 44-45; VI.3, ll. 9-10 IV (60), p. 326: III.21, l. 8; IV.12, l. 12; V.2, ll. 2-3; V.8, ll. 10-11 V (80), p. 327: I. 25, ll. 13-14; II.2, ll. 3-4; II.14, ll. 10-11; III.16, ll. 5-6; V.5, ll. 8-9; VII.6, ll. 11-12 VI (91), p. 328: III.11, ll. 3-4 VI (95), p. 329: I.5, l. 22 VII (115), p. 330: I.4, l. 49 De Sophisticis Elenchis II (29), p. 334: II.17, ll. 3-5 Augustinus, Aurelius De Civitate Dei II.21: II.1, ll. 7-9 XIX.13: V.1, ll. 20-31; V.3, l. 14 XIX.21: II.1, ll. 7-9 XIX.24: II.1, ll. 7-9 De Libero Arbitrio II.18: III.18, ll. 26-30 II.19: III.18, ll. 26-30 Averroes In Physicam I, comm. 60: II.17, ll. 25-28 I, comm. 70: IV.4, ll. 23-24 VII, comm. 20: II.4, ll. 43-44 In De Generatione et Corruptione I, comm. 38: III.5, ll. 41-52 In De Anima I, comm. 8: Prohemium, ll. 35-36 I, comm. 53: I.14, ll. 7-8 II, comm. 45: III.5, l. 57 III, comm. 4: I.1, l. 22 III, comm. 5: VII.3, ll. 15-21 III, comm. 18: II.18, ll. 22-23 In Metaphysicam VI, comm. 1: I.2, ll. 53-56 VIII, comm. 2: I.1, ll. 26-27; I.12, l. 13; VII.2, ll. 41-42; VII.5, ll. 26-29 XII, comm. 44: V.18, ll. 10-11 Avicenna Liber Canonis I, fen I, doctr. 4, cap. 1: III.5, ll. 41-52

Index Locorum (Questiones) I, fen III, doctr. 3, cap. 1: III.5, ll. 62-68 IV, fen I, tract. 3, cap. 1: III.5, ll. 41-52, 62-68

Costa Ben Luca De Differentia Spiritus et Animae I.8, ll. 20-25

Liber De Anima (seu Sextus De Naturalibus I-III) pars 4, cap. 2: I.13, ll. 56-59; II.5, ll. 29-30 pars 5, cap. 2: I.13, ll. 56-59; II.5, ll. 29-30 pars 5, cap. 7: I.13, ll. 56-59; II.5, ll. 29-30

Diogenes Laertius De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum VII.131: II.5, ll. 14-15 VII.188: II.5, ll. 14-15

Liber De Philosophia Prima I.2: I.2, ll. 52, 53-56 I.5: I.1, l. 28; I.2, ll. 53-56 VI.5: I.20, ll. 46-51 VIII.7: VI.4, ll. 19-20 IX.4: V.18, ll. 10-11 Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae III.P10.4: IV.4, l. 16 De Differentiis Topicis III.3: V.5, ll. 14-16 De Institutione Arithmetica Prooemium: I.12, ll. 18-19 In Topica Ciceronis 1152C-D: II.16, l. 2 Boethius Dacus Quaestiones super Libros Topicorum III, q. 19; III.20, ll. 32-35 Bonaventura de Balneoregio Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum I, dist. 39, art. 1, q. 2, ad 2: VII.6, ll. 59-61 II, dist. 1, pars 2, art. 3, q. 1: I.2, l. 10 IV, dist. 49, pars 1, art. 1, q. 5: VII.7, ll. 79-81 Cicero, Marcus Tullius De Officiis I.22: Prohemium, ll. 99-100 De Re Publica [1, 25] XXV (39): II.1, ll. 7-9 Corpus Iuris Civilis Digesta 1.4.1: II.8, l. 4 5.1.17: III.14, ll. 37-38 Codex Iustiniani III, tit. 5, v. ‘Generali lege’: III.14, ll. 37-38

891

‘Eustratius’ v. Anonymi (Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Libri IIus, IIIus,VIIus), Aspasius et Michael Ephesius Eustratius de Nicaea Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Ius prologus: I.1, ll. 13-14; IV.2, l. 26 cap. 6, ad 1096a5-7: VII.7, ll. 158-159 cap. 8, ad 1097a14-18: I.9, ll. 81-84; VII.7, ll. 150-151 cap. 9, ad 1098a17-20: VII.3, ll. 36-38; VII.5, ll. 13-14 cap. 12, ad 1099b2-6: III.20, ll. 66-68; VII.1, ll. 59-60 cap. 13, ad 1099b18-20: III.6, ll. 60-61 Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber VIus cap. 3, ad 1139a17-20: I.2, ll. 7-8 cap. 9, ad 1142a8-10: III.6, ll. 51-52 Gaufridus de Fontibus Quodlibeta XI, q. 6: VII.7, ll. 153-155 Gilbertus Porretanus Liber Sex Principiorum IV.46: I.16, ll. 12-13 Guillelmus Altissiodorensis Summa Aurea in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum II, tract. II, cap. 1, q. 2: I.29, ll. 3-4 Henricus Bate Speculum Divinorum et Quorundam Naturalium IV, cap. 10: IV.13, ll. 31-32 Henricus de Gandavo Quodlibeta I, q. 39: I.27, ll. 43-47; I.28, ll. 21-24, 26-62 VI, q. 22: I.27, ll. 3-5, 55-59, 73-76 IX, q. 18: IV.11, ll. 25-30; IV.13, l. 1; IV.14, ll. 26-27

892

Indices XII, q. 28: VII.7, ll. 153-155

Summa (Quaestiones Ordinariae) art. XIX, q. 2, ad 1: I.1, ll. 26-27; I.2, ll. 52-56 art. L, q. 2: VI.4, ll. 19-37, 37-40 Iacobus de Viterbio Quodlibeta I, q. 8: VII.7, ll. 81-86 II, q. 8: VII.7, ll. 81-86 Iohannes Buridanus Quaestiones super Libros Ethicorum VII, q. 2: I.9, ll. 81-84 Iohannes de Neapoli Quaestiones Variae Parisiis Disputatae q. 20: I.1, ll. 26-27 Iohannes Pecham Quodlibeta I, q. 5: VII.7, ll. 81-86 I, q. 6: VII.7, ll. 81-86 Iohannes Quidort Parisiensis In Primum Sententiarum q. 1: I.1, ll. 26-27 Liber de Causis I 1: II.1, l. 32 IV 45: I.25, ll. 42-45 IX (X) 95-96: IV.3, ll. 36-37 XV (XVI) 131: I.25, ll. 42-45 XVI (XVII) 138: I.13, l. 55; II.4, ll. 48-49; IV.3, ll. 34-35; V.10, l. 15 XVI (XVII) 140: II.4, ll. 48-49; IV.3, ll. 34-35 XX (XXI) 162: I.24, l. 15 Macrobium In Somnium Scipionis I.8.13: II.1, ll. 7-9 Michael Ephesius Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Vus cap. 5, ad 1130b29: III.6, l. 8; III.8, ll. 3435; III.21, ll. 60-61; V.12, l. 5 cap. 8, ad 1133b14-16: I.28, ll. 17-20 Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Xus cap. 8, ad 1177a21-22: VII.7, ll. 35-37 cap. 8, ad 1177a24-25: VII.7, ll. 35-37

cap. 8, ad 1177a25: VII.6, ll. 59-61 cap. 8, ad 1177a28: VII.6, ll. 66-68; VII.7, ll. 41-42 cap. 8, ad 1177b4: V.1, l. 16 cap. 8, ad 1177b6-7: V.1, ll. 20-31 cap. 8, ad 1177b14-15: VII.6, ll. 59-61 cap. 8, ad 1177b30-31: VII.6, ll. 59-61 cap. 8, ad 1178a2-3: VII.6, ll. 21-39 cap. 9, ad 1178a24: VII.6, ll. 66-68; VII.7, ll. 41-42 cap. 12, ad 1180b23: IV.2, l. 26 cap. 12, ad 1180b28: IV.2, ll. 50-55 Nicolaus de Waldemonte Quaestiones super Libros Politicorum V, q. 5: V.6, ll. 19-20 Petrus de Alvernia Sophismata VI: II.2, ll. 16-21 Quaestiones super De Interpretatione q. 10: I.9, ll. 25-26 q. 34: V.3, ll. 33-35 Quaestiones super Libros Physicorum I, q. 6: I.2, ll. 49-54; III.1, ll. 15-21 I, q. 19: VII.4, ll. 32-35 I, q. 25: I.25, ll. 25-42 II, q. 2: V.2, ll. 21-43 II, q. 5: V.2, ll. 21-43 II, q. 8: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II, q. 10: Prohemium, ll. 81-85; I.5, ll. 1921; II.1, ll. 17-18; VI.8, ll. 10-11; VI.9, ll. 9-31 II, q. 11: II.1, ll. 17-18 II, q. 26: II.10, ll. 16-21 III, q. 7: I.7, l. 19 IV, q. 4: IV.13, ll. 34-43; V.6, ll. 12-16, 17-32 Expositio in Libros III-IV De Caelo et Mundo IV.2: Prohemium, ll. 25-29, 81-85 Quaestiones super Librum De Caelo et Mundo [versio WP] I, Prooemium: Prohemium, ll. 104-109 I, q. 10: IV.9, ll. 54-62; IV.12, ll. 23-24 I, q. 18: I. 25, ll. 25-42, 42-45 I, q. 21: I. 25, ll. 25-42 I, q. 24: III.2, ll. 68-69 II, q. 19: I.20, ll. 46-51 II, q. 26: VI.7, ll. 27-28 IV, q. 4: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 Quaestiones super Librum De Caelo et Mundo [versio CEK] I, q. 23: I. 25, ll. 25-42

Index Locorum (Questiones) IV, q. 3: VII.3, ll. 15-21 Quaestiones super Librum De Sensu et Sensato q. 9: I.13, ll. 84-88 q. 10: I.13, ll. 84-88 q. 38: IV.9, ll. 54-62 Sententia super Librum De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae lectio 4: I.16, ll. 52-56 Sententia super Librum De Motu Animalium lectio 4: I.5, ll. 42-45 lectio 5: I.2, ll. 19-24, ll. 61-77 lectio 9: I.10, ll. 60-65 Sententia super Librum De Vegetabilibus et Plantis I.7, ll. 46-50 I.20, ll. 46-51 Quaestiones in Metaphysicam I, q. 1: I.1, ll. 29-33; I.4, ll. 41-43 I, q. 3: I.1, ll. 28-29; I.2, ll. 51-53, 53-56; V.12, ll. 37-42 I, q. 5: I.9, ll. 81-84 I, q. 7: I.13, l. 87 I, q. 9: I.4, l. 1 II, q. 18: VI.9, ll. 10-12 II, q. 25: I.5, ll. 19-21; II.1, ll. 17-18 II, q. 28: I.25, ll. 25-42, 77-84 IV, q. 4: IV.1, ll. 31-37 IV, q. 11: I.12, ll. 11-14 IV, q. 13: I.2, ll. 49-56 VII, q. 25: V.2, ll. 21-43 VII, q. 26: III.2, ll. 32-38 XII, q. 6: IV.4, ll. 43-49 XII, q. 9: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 XII, q. 10: VI.8, ll. 14-16 Questiones supra Librum Ethicorum I, q. 5: I.3, l. 1 I, q. 7: I.2, ll. 109-111; I.4, ll. 33-38 I, q. 10: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 I, q. 16: Prohemium, ll. 81-85, 104-109 I, q. 17: I.4, ll. 5-7 I, q. 20: I.16, ll. 20-23; VII.2, ll. 55-57 I, q. 23: I.16, ll. 20-23; VII.1, ll. 1-3 I, q. 24: VII.1, ll. 63-77 I, q. 25: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 I, q. 27: VII.1, ll. 19-28 I, q. 25: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 I, q. 29: VII.3, ll. 15-21 I, q. 31: VII.2, ll. 55-57 I, q. 33: VII.2, ll. 55-57 I, q. 34: VII.7, ll. 90-92

893

I, q. 35: VII.2, l. 1 I, q. 45: I.2, ll. 109-111 II, q. 2: VII.5, ll. 38-51 II, q. 16: IV.9, 21-23 Scriptum super III-VIII Libros Politicorum III.1: III.1, ll. 1-2, 10-11; III.2, ll. 11-16; III.3, ll. 17-28, 30-36, 41-49, 56-57; III.4, ll. 21-25; V.15, ll. 18-47 III.2: I.6, ll. 16-21; III.5, ll. 8-12 III.3: III.6, ll. 60-61; III.8, ll. 6-10, 12-14; III.22, ll. 22-26; VII.4, ll. 41-44 III.5: III.9, ll. 32-33, 41-45; III.10, ll. 12-16, 45-48 III.7: II.12, ll. 12-14; III.14, ll. 13-16 III.8: III.15, ll. 1-2, 35-38 III.9: III.15, ll. 35-38; III.16, ll. 11-13; III.17, ll. 13-21, 24-29; IV.2, ll. 36-38 III.10: II.12, ll. 26-32, 36-37 III.11: I.16, ll. 28-69; III.6, ll. 53-54; III.15, ll. 25-27, 35-38; III.18, ll. 1-2: IV.11, ll. 15-18; IV.12, ll. 35-40 III.12: III.15, ll. 10-14; III.21, ll. 1-2, 10, 17-20, 74-76, 79-85; III.26, ll. 13-14 III.13: III.23, ll. 1-2, 7-8, 16, 16-18; IV.7, ll. 16-19 III.14: III.22, ll. 3-11, 19-21, 22-26, 29-30; III.24, ll. 1-2, 12-13, 15-16; III.25, ll. 1719, 21-29, 40-42, 49-52 III.15: II.8, ll. 52-57; III.26, ll. 8-11 IV.1; II.9, ll. 22-25: IV.1, ll. 19-31, 31-35, 39-40, 40-41, 42-52, 49-52; IV.2, ll. 1, 10; IV.8, ll. 5-6 IV.2: III.3, ll. 41-49; IV.4, ll. 12-13 IV.3: III.3, ll. 41-49; IV.4, ll. 30-36; VI.2, ll. 28-33 IV.4: IV.6, ll. 22-25, 40; IV.7, ll. 10-14, 3742, 53-57; VI.5, ll. 13-18, 15-16 IV.5: IV.7, ll. 37-42, 38-39; IV.8, ll. 1-2, 7-9, 20-23 IV.7: IV.7, ll. 25-27; IV.9, ll. 10-12 IV.8: IV.9, ll. 34-42, 62-66 IV.9: V.16, ll. 34-44 IV.10: II.12, ll. 3-4 IV.11: IV.9, ll. 62-66 IV.13: III.12, ll. 16-29; VII.6, ll. 36-38 V.1: II.12, ll. 12-14; V.4, ll. 1, 24-25, 42-49 V.2: V.4, l. 1; V.5, ll. 1, 24-27; V.6, l. 1 V.3: V.8, ll. 1-2, 11-12, 15-16 V.4: V.9, ll. 49-50; V.10, ll. 1-2, 39 V.5: I.15, ll. 22-25 V.7: I.19, ll. 22-29; II.12, l. 33; V.7, l. 1; V.11, ll. 1-2; V.12, ll. 1-2; V.13, ll. 1-2; V.14, ll. 1-3, 17-20, 33-37 V.11: V.18, ll. 1, 7-8, 15-21

894

Indices V.12: V.18, ll. 1, 21-27 VI.4: VI.1, l. 9; VI.2, ll. 1, 11-17; VI.3, ll. 1-2 VI.5: VI.4, ll. 1-2, 14-15 VI.6: VI.5, ll. 1-2, 13-18 VI.7: VI.6, ll. 1-2; VI.7, ll. 1-2; VI.8, l. 1 VII.1: I.15, ll. 22-25; I.19, ll. 22-29; VII.4, ll. 17-19 VII.2: II.3, ll. 23-25; II.9, ll. 22-25; IV.12, ll. 39-50; V.12, l. 16; V.13, ll. 25-33; VII.4, ll. 17-19; VII.6, ll. 5-6, 59-61; VII.7, ll. 110-113, 114-124, 146-152, 162-169 VII.3: III.3, ll. 17-28 VII.4: IV.13, ll. 34-43; VII.8, ll. 1-2 VII.5: IV.13, ll. 34-43, 42-43; V.6, ll. 17-32; VII.8, ll. 16-21, 29-39, 49-55; VII.9, ll. 33-48, 49-62, 70-81 VII.7: II.19, ll. 23-43 VII.8: V.6, ll. 9-10 VII.9: V.6, ll. 38-40 VII.10: I.12, ll. 38-47; I.13, ll. 17-19; VII.1, ll. 29-35; VII.6, ll. 66-68 VII.11: I.1, ll. 45-46; VII.6, ll. 59-61; VII.7, ll. 110-113 VII.12: I.7, ll. 90-91, 95-97, 103-108, 113115, 115-117 VIII.1: I.13, ll. 53-59; VII.4, ll. 86-88

Questiones super Librum De Causis (?) q. 4: VI.9, ll. 10-12 In Primum Librum Sententiarum (?) dist. 1: Prohemium, ll. 65-68; I.2, ll. 4952, 61-71 Quodlibeta I, q. 1: I.25, ll. 25-42 I, q. 7: Prohemium, ll. 81-85 II, q. 5: V.2, ll. 21-43 II, q. 9: I.2, ll. 109-111 II, q. 14: VII.5, ll. 23-26 III, q. 8: I.2, ll. 1-2; VII.7, ll. 140-141 III, q. 14: I.12, ll. 16-54 IV, q. 9: VII.5, ll. 75-85 IV, q. 13: I.2, ll. 109-111; II.8, ll. 46-49 V, q. 11: IV.12, ll. 63-65 VI, q. 1: I. 25, ll. 25-42 VI, q. 9: I.4, ll. 41-43 VI, q. 10: I.30, ll. 40-45; VI.4, ll. 19-37 Petrus Hispanus Summulae Logicales VI.6: V.11, ll. 6-7 Petrus Lombardus Sententiarum Libri IV II, dist. 18, cap. 2: I.8, ll. 45-49

Plato Thimaeus 47B: I.29, ll. 16-17 Porphyrius Isagoge 2: V.6, l. 4 Proclus Elementatio Theologica prop. 5: I.12, l. 12; III.26, l. 40; VII.5, ll. 23-26 prop. 21: I.12, l. 11; II.1, l. 32; III.11, ll. 13-15; III.13, ll. 31-32; IV.4, ll. 45-47; VII.5, ll. 23-26 prop. 60: IV.3, ll. 36-37 prop. 95: IV.3, ll. 36-37 prop. 127: I.24, ll. 16-18 prop. 128: III.13, ll. 29-31 prop. 145: III.13, ll. 29-31 Radulphus Brito Questiones super Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis I, q. 18: VII.1, ll. 63-77 I, q. 22: VII.7, ll. 153-155, 165-173 V, q. 17: III.22, ll. 7-8 VII, q. 2: I.9, ll. 81-84 X, q. 12: VII.7, ll. 153-155 Raimundus Rigauld [pseudo] Quodlibeta VI, q. 15: IV.11, ll. 15-18 VI, q. 16: IV.14, ll. 1-2, 28-43 Remigius Florentinus De Subiecto Theologie cap. 1: I.1, ll. 26-27 Robertus Grosseteste v. Anonymus (Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber IIIus) Robertus Grosseteste v. Aspasius Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos XI.191: II.5, ll. 8-12 Liber Pirroniarum Informationum III.205: II.5, ll. 8-12, 14-15 III.245-246: II.5, ll. 14-15

Index Locorum (Questiones) Sigerus de Brabantia Quaestiones in Metaphysicam II, q. 23: II.17, ll. 25-28 VII, q. 7: I.15, ll. 22-25 Simplicius In De Caelo I.12: IV.11, ll. 46-47 Themistius In De Anima VI: I.20, ll. 33-34 Thomas de Aquino Expositio Libri Posteriorum Analyticorum I.1: III.14, ll. 17-21 I.41: I.30, ll. 34-37 In Libros Physicorum II.4: Prohemium, ll. 52-53; I.2, ll. 10-11; III.20, ll. 44-45 VIII.8: I.29, ll. 44-45 In Libros De Generatione et Corruptione I.15: III.5, ll. 41-52, 114-116 In De Generatione et Corruptione I.15: III.5, ll. 38-139, 48-49 Expositio in Libros De Caelo et Mundo II.4: VII.3, ll. 15-21 II.13: VI.1, ll. 16-18 Sententia Libri Metaphysicae I.1: V.11, l. 25 I.2: I.4, l. 8 II.5: II.17, ll. 25-28 VI.1: Prohemium, ll. 75-77; I.31, ll. 18-19 VII.17: I.12, ll. 18-19 IX.2: II.11, ll. 7-9 X.3: III.24, ll. 7-8 XII.12: II.1, ll. 36-42 Sententia Libri Ethicorum I.1: Prohemium, ll. 64-65, 104-109, 119122; I.2, l. 16 I.12: II.14, ll. 3-4 I.19: I.4, ll. 60-62 II.3: IV.12, ll. 63-65 II.6: I.31, ll. 59-64 III.2: II.5, ll. 45-46 III.14: II.19, ll. 26-27 IV.8: II.12, ll. 53-55 IV.10: II.7, ll. 21-22 IV.14: IV.5, ll. 18-23, 24-28 V.9: I.23, ll. 34-35; I.27, ll. 55-59 VI.2: I.29, ll. 3-4 VI.3: I.2, ll. 40-41; I.31, ll. 18-19

895

VI.4: I.29, l. 31; I.31, ll. 23, 59-64; II.18, ll. 34, 36-37; III.6, ll. 51-52 VI.10: I.29, ll. 34-41; II.18, ll. 36-37; V.12, ll. 22-23 VI.11: I.16, ll. 67-69; I.29, ll. 34-41; V.12, ll. 32-34 VII.1: I.9, ll. 93-94 VIII.1: IV.5, ll. 5-6 X.1: III.14, ll. 81-82; V.6, ll. 45-46 Sententia libri Politicorum Prologus: Prohemium, ll. 61-63, 119-122 I.1/a: I.7, ll. 46-48, 52-57, 61-62: I.8, ll. 7-8, 13-17, 34-37; II.18, ll. 4-5 I.1/b: I.9, ll. 17-20; I.9, ll. 63-92 I.2: I.10, ll. 40-41, 41-43; I.11, ll. 20-25; II.18, l. 31 I.3: I.12, ll. 27-28; I.14, ll. 18-22, 34-39 I.4: I.15, ll. 41-46; II.19, ll. 13-15 I.6: I.19, ll. 46-48, 52-53, 55; I.21, ll. 23-28, 35-36; I.24, ll. 21-23 I.7: I.23, ll. 19-27; I.24, ll. 25-26 I.10: I.30, ll. 20-22; VII.6, l. 27 I.11: I.31, ll. 7-8, 14-15 II.1: V.5, ll. 28-30 II.3: II.4, ll. 51-53, 57-58; II.5, ll. 24-25; II.14, ll. 53-56; II.17, ll. 9-10; II.19, l. 7; V.5, ll. 28-30 II.12: II.17, ll. 41-46 II.13: II.19, ll. 32-33 III.1: III.3, ll. 17-28; V.15, ll. 18-47 III.5: III.9, ll. 41-45 De mixtione elementorum IV.9, ll. 54-62 Expositio super Librum De Causis ad prop. 1: VI.9, ll. 10-12, 14 ad prop. 16: I.25, ll. 42-45 ad prop. 17: IV.3, ll. 34-35, 36-37 ad prop. 21: I.24, ll. 13-18 Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima q. 1, arg. 18: II.1, l. 10 q. 7, arg. 10: I.2, l. 10 Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo q. 1, art. 3, ad 4: I.5, ll. 53-57 q. 13, art. 4, ad 15: I.23, ll. 40-41 Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia q. 3, art. 17, arg. 2: I.29, ll. 16-17 q. 5, art. 9, resp.: I.20, ll. 20-30 q. 7, art. 2, ad 10: VI.8, ll. 8-16 Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate q. 24, art. 1, ad 5: I.10, ll. 6-8 q. 26, art. 1, resp.: V.9, l. 12

896

Indices

Scriptum super Sententiis I, dist. 44, q. 1, art. 2, resp.: II.1, l. 36-42 II, dist. 11, q. 2, art. 5, ad 1: V.2, l. 19 II, dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3: I.5, ll. 53-57 III, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 3: I.15, ll. 22-25 III, dist. 27, q. 2, art. 1, contra: V.2, l. 19 III, dist. 37, art. 6, q. 1, resp.: I.28, ll. 26-62 IV, dist. 26, q. 1, art. 1, resp.: I.7, ll. 18-22 IV, dist. 44, q. 1, art. 2: III.5, ll. 38-139 IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, arg. 3: V.1, ll. 5-6 IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, arg. 4: V.1, ll. 10-12 IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 4, resp.: V.1, ll. 20-31 Quodlibeta III, q. 7: I.28, ll. 26-62 VIII, q. 3: III.5, ll. 38-139, 48-49 Summa contra Gentiles III.2: I.5, ll. 19-21 III.3: I.5, ll. 18-38 III.10: I.5, ll. 53-57 III.28: VII.1, ll. 16-17 Summa Theologiae Ia, q. 7, art. 2, resp.: I.25, ll. 42-45 Ia, q. 20, art. 1, ad 3: V.12, ll. 37-42 Ia, q. 48, art. 5: I.7, l. 19 I, q. 73, art. 1, resp.: VII.3, ll. 15-21 Ia, q. 92, art. 3, resp.: I.8, ll. 45-49 Ia, q. 96, art. 1, resp.: I.20, ll. 20-30, 49-53 Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3: I.26, ll. 10-20 Ia-IIae, q. 2, art. 4, resp.: VII.1, ll. 16-17 Ia-IIae, q. 3, art. 4, ad 1: V.1, ll. 45-47 Ia-IIae, q. 3, art. 5, resp.: VII.7, ll. 104-109 Ia-IIae, q. 8, art. 1, resp.: I.5, ll. 38-45 Ia-IIae, q. 22, art. 1: V.9, ll. 12-14 Ia-IIae, q. 26, art. 4: I.17, ll. 8-9 Ia-IIae, q. 26, art. 4, resp.: V.12, ll. 37-42 Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 3, arg. 1: V.2, ll. 6-7 Ia-IIae, q. 27, art. 3, arg. 3: VII.2, l. 54 Ia-IIae, q. 31, art. 1, resp.: VI.4, ll. 19-37 Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1: V.9, l. 3 Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1, arg. 2: V.9, ll. 4-8 Ia-IIae, q. 41, art. 1, arg. 3: V.9, ll. 9-10 Ia-IIae, q. 50, art. 3, ad 1: II.11, ll. 7-9 Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 2, arg. 2: I.30, ll. 34-37 Ia-IIae, q. 54, art. 2, arg. 2, ad 2: I.30, ll. 34-37 Ia-IIae, q. 55, art. 1, ad 1: II.13, ll. 30-32 Ia-IIae, q. 56, art. 3, resp.: I.30, l. 47 Ia-IIae, q. 57, art. 3, resp.: I.31, 53-56 Ia-IIae, q. 57, art. 3, ad 2: I.31, ll. 59-64 Ia-IIae, q. 60, art. 5: IV.5, ll. 18-23 Ia-IIae, q. 63, art. 1, resp.: I.9, ll. 33-62

Ia-IIae, q. 73, art. 10, arg. 1: III.21, ll. 3-4 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1: II.8, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, arg. 2: II.8, ll. 6-9 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, arg. 3: II.8, ll. 2-5 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, resp.: II.8, ll. 15-16 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, ad 2: II.8, l. 24; II.16, ll. 13-23 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2: II.9, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 3, resp.: II.16, ll. 13-23 Ia-IIae, q. 93, art. 3, resp.: VI.9, ll. 10-12 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2, resp.: II.16, ll. 13-23 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 5, resp.: II.16, ll. 24-27 Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 2, resp.: II.16, ll. 13-23 Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 3, arg. 4: II.11, ll. 12-16 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1: II.9, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1, ad 2: II.9, ll. 12-13 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 3: II.9, l. 8 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1: II.16, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, arg. 1: II.16, ll. 2-4 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, arg. 2: II.16, ll. 7-10 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1, resp.: II.16, ll. 35-52 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2: II.17, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, arg. 1: II.17, l. 2 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, arg. 2: II.17, ll. 7-11 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2, resp.: II.17, ll. 12-16 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 3, resp.: II.16, ll. 29-30 IIa-IIae, q. 26: II.3, ll. 32-35 IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, arg. 2: V.3, l. 38 IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, ad 1: V.3, l. 14 IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 1, ad 2: V.2, l. 19 IIa-IIae, q. 29, art. 2: V.1, ll. 20-31 IIa-IIae, q. 42, art. 1: V.3, ll. 24-27 IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 8, resp.: VII.6, ll. 36-38 IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 9: II.3, ll. 13-20 IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 11: Prohemium, ll. 104109; II.4, ll. 24-27 IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 11, ad 3: VII.3, ll. 36-38 IIa-IIae, q. 47, art. 13: V.11, ll. 45-52 IIa-IIae, q. 48, resp.: III.8, ll. 12-14 IIa-IIae, q. 50, art. 2, ad 1: III.8, ll. 12-14 IIa-IIae, q. 54, art. 2: II.3, ll. 13-20 IIa-IIae, q. 58, art. 5: III.6, ll. 53-54 IIa-IIae, q. 60, art. 1, ad 1: III.24, ll. 22-23 IIa-IIae, q. 64, art. 1, resp.: I.20, ll. 20-30 IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, arg. 6: I.28, ll. 7-11, 21-24 IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, resp.: I.28, ll. 26-62 IIa-IIae, q. 78, art. 1, ad 6: I.28, ll. 21-24 IIa-IIae, q. 114, prol.: IV.5, ll. 18-23 IIa-IIae, q. 115, art. 1, resp.: IV.5, ll. 24-28 IIa-IIae, q. 154, art. 9, ad 3: II.5, ll. 36-49, 57-59 IIa-IIae, q. 159, art. 2, ad 1: I.9, l. 86 IIa-IIae, q. 182, art. 1, resp.: VII.7, ll. 153155

Index Locorum (Questiones) Thomas de Sutton De natura generis cap. 20: IV.7, ll. 19-20 Vincentius gruner Disputata Librorum Politicorum II, q. 3: II.3, l. 43 II, q. 5: II.6, ll. 92-97 II, q. 6: II.7, ll. 39-48 II, q. 9: II.10, ll. 28-29 II, q. 16: II.19, ll. 54-55 III, q. 9: III.6, ll. 51-52 III, q. 29: III.25, ll. 56-59 V, q. 7: V.6, ll. 19-20 VI, q. 4: VI.5, ll. 15-16

897

Index Locorum (Reportatio) Aegidius Aurelianensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum V, q. 13: I.21, ll. 1-2 Aegidius de Lessinia De Usuris in Communi cap. 15: I.26, ll. 35-38 Aegidius Romanus De Regimine Principum II/1.1; I.10, ll. 14-20, 21-22 II/3.9: I.21, ll. 1-2, 13-14, 14-16, 25-27 III/1.8: II.2, ll. 35-36 III/1.17: II.12, ll. 1-2 III/1.18: II.13, ll. 1-2 III/2.31: II.17, ll. 1-2 Albertus Magnus Politicorum libri VIII II.2: II.7, ll. 2-3 Anonymus Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Vus cap. 15: II.16, ll. 14-17 Anonymus Baltimorensis Questiones super Libros I-III Politicorum I, q. 2: I.3, ll. 29-32 II, q. 11: II.13, ll. 15-20 II, q. 12: II.14, l. 8 Anonymus Erfordiensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum V, q. 13: I.21, ll. 1-2 Anonymus Erlangensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum V, q. 12: I.21, ll. 1-2 Anonymus Mediolanensis Questiones super Libros Politicorum I, q. 6: I.10, ll. 21-22 I, q. 14: I.16, ll. 14-15 I, q. 18: I.20, ll. 11-15 II, q. 1: II.1, l. 8 II, q. 10: II.13, ll. 15-20 II, q. 11: II.14, l. 8 III, q. 15: III.18, l. 44

Anonymus Mertonianus Questiones super Librum De Sensu et Sensato q. 4: I.11, ll. 7-16 Anonymus Parisiensis Questiones super Libros Ethicorum V, q. 13: I.21, ll. 1-2 Anonymus Vaticanus Questiones super Libros Politicorum I, q. 2: I.3, ll. 29-32 Aristoteles Analytica Posteriora I.1, 71a11-16: I.8, ll. 15-16 I.2, 72a27-32: II.13, ll. 17-18 I.10, 76a31-36: I.8, ll. 15-16 Topica II.6, 112b11-12: III.17, l. 5 III.1, 116b27: I.20, l. 12 Physica I.1, 184a16-21: III.1, ll. 15-17 I.1, 184b12-14: II.16, ll. 27-28 I.6, 189a19-20: II.16, l. 4 II.2, 194a34-35: I.17, ll. 9-10 II.3, 195a8-9: I.5, ll. 17-18; III.12, ll. 23-24 II.3, 195b21-28: I.5, ll. 17-18 II.5, 196b17-22: I.4, l. 11 II.6, 197b22-27: I.9, l. 8; I.10, ll. 9-10 II.7, 198a24-27: I.4, l. 18 VII.3, 246a13: III.6, ll. 19-20 VII.3, 247b9-11: I.10, l. 29 VIII.6, 259a11-12: II.10, ll. 11-12 VIII.8, 264b9-265a2: I.24, ll. 16-17 VIII.9, 265a13: I.24, ll. 16-17 De Generatione et Corruptione II.10, 336a30-31: I.4, l. 4 Meteorologica IV.7, 384b2-3: I.4, l. 4 IV.12, 390a10-12: III.3, ll. 15-17 De Anima I.1, 402b21-22: III.2, ll. 25-26 II.1, 413a21-23: I.16, ll. 11-12 II.4, 415a26-b1: I.6, ll. 10-13 II.4, 415b3-7: I.6, ll. 9-10 III.6, 430b21-23: III.13, l. 33

Index Locorum (Reportatio) Historia Animalium VIII (Bekker IX).47, 631a1-7: II.5, ll. 33-34 De Motu Animalium 10, 703a29-32: II.2, ll. 33-34; III.3, l. 27 10, 703a36-37: II.2, ll. 33-34 Metaphysica II.1, 993b24-26: I.14, l. 2-3 II.2, 994b14-16: I.4, ll. 12-14 II.2, 994b16-18: I.23, l. 15 II.3, 995a1-3: II.17, ll. 20-21 IV.2, 1003a33-34: III.3, ll. 15-17 V.1, 1013a10-12: I.15, l. 14; III.4, ll. 4-5; III.16, ll. 21-22 V.2, 1013b26: I.4, 19-20; I.17, l. 6 V.5, 1015a20-26: I.21, ll. 10-12 V.6, 1015b36-1016b32: II.1, ll. 10-15 V.6, 1016b23-32: II.1, ll. 10-15 V.15, 1020b14-16: III.3, ll. 48-50 V.15, 1020b23-25: III.3, ll. 48-50 V.17, 1022a4-5: I.23, ll. 13-14 XII.10, 1075a11-21: II.2, ll. 31-32 Ethica Nicomachea I.1, 1094a27-b2: I.3, ll. 2-3 I.1, 1094a28-b1: I.3, ll. 29-32 I.1, 1094b4-6: I.3, ll. 29-32 I.1, 1095a2-4: I.3, ll. 29-32 I.4, 1099a31-b2: I.22, l. 5 I.4, 1099a33-b2: III.18, ll. 4-5, 33-34 I.4, 1099b29-32: II.4, ll. 40-41 II.5, 1107a9-12: II.19, ll. 5-6 III.1, 1110a22-23: II.5, ll. 27-28 III.1, 1110a27-29: II.5, ll. 27-28 III.4, 1112a15-16: III.17, l. 11 III.4, 1112b23-24: I.4, l. 19; II.9, ll. 12-13 III.6, 1113b2: III.4, l. 16 III.7, 1115a23-26: II.7, ll. 17-18; II.19, ll. 17-18 III.8, 1117a29-30: II.7, ll. 17-18; II.19, ll. 17-18 IV.3, 1124a28-29: II.12, l. 18 V.1, 1129b19-24: II.9, ll. 6-7 V.7, 1134b29-35: II.16, ll. 14-17 V.9, 1136b6: I.25, ll. 14-15 VI.4, 1140b4-6: II.18, l. 21 VI.4, 1140b14-20: III.14, ll. 31-34 VI.4, 1140b20-21: II.18, l. 21 VI.9, 1144a7-9: I.27, ll. 27-28 VI.10, 1145a5-6: I.27, ll. 27-28 VII.3, 1147a18-24: III.14, ll. 51-52 VII.6, 1149b15-18: II.4, ll. 25-26 VIII.1, 1155a22-23: I.26, ll. 9-10; II.2, ll. 26-27 VIII.4, 1158a10-12: II.4, ll. 32-33

899

VIII.6, 1160b24-25: III.13, ll. 46-52 VIII.6, 1160b32-33: III.13, ll. 46-52 VIII.6, 1161a3-4: III.13, ll. 46-52 VIII.8, 1163b12-27: II.5, ll. 20-22 IX.4, 1166a1-2: III.14, ll. 6-7 IX.4, 1166b1-2: III.14, ll. 6-7 IX.7, 1167b33-34: III.17, ll. 17-18 IX.8, 1168b28-31: II.3, ll. 18-19 IX.8, 1168b31-1169a3: II.3, ll. 19-21 IX.8, 1168b34-1169a3: II.3, ll. 18-19 IX.13, 1172a1-8: I.16, ll. 15-17 X.1, 1172a34-b1: III.14, ll. 54-55 X.5, 1174b23: II.6, l. 31 X.5, 1175a15-16: I.10, l. 17 X.11, 1178b33-1179a5: I.10, ll. 24-25 Magna Moralia I.17, 1189a8-10: III.19, ll. 23-26 Politica I.1, 1252a1-2; I.4, ll. 1-2 I.1, 1252a4-7; I.5, ll. 1-2, 8-9 I.1, 1252a7-16: I.15, l. 8 I.1, 1252a26-30: I.6, ll. 1, 7-8 I.1, 1252a30-34: I.7, ll. 4-5; II.18, ll. 3-4 I.2, 1252a34-b1: I.7, l. 1 I.2, 1252a34-b5: I.7, l. 7 I.2, 1252b1-5: I.7, ll. 22-23; II.7, ll. 8-9 I.2, 1252b7-9: I.8, ll. 6-7 I.2, 1252b30: I.2, ll. 3-4; I.9, ll. 1, 6 I.2, 1252b32-34; I.9, ll. 11-12 I.2, 1253a2: I.2, ll. 3-4; I.9, ll. 1, 6 I.2, 1253a2-3: I.10, ll. 1, 7, 13 I.2, 1253a9: III.6, l. 23 I.2, 1253a9-10: I.10, ll. 10-11; I.11, ll. 1, 5-6 I.2, 1253a20-29: III.3, ll. 15-17 I.2, 1253a26-29: I.10, l. 7 I.4, 1253b31-33: I.12, 1, l. 7; III.9, l. 17 I.4, 1253b32-33: II.18, l. 17 I.4, 1254a8-10: III.3, ll. 11-12 I.4, 1254a14-17: I.12, l. 21; III.9, l. 17 I.5, 1254a34-39: III.9, l. 10 I.5, 1254b4-8: III.9, l. 10 I.6, 1255a13-16: I.13, ll. 1-2 I.6, 1255a21-29: I.8, ll. 15-18 I.6, 1255a22-25: II.19, ll. 11-13 I.6, 1255a28-36: I.8, l. 1 I.6, 1255b1-2: I.14, ll. 1, 4-5 I.7, 1255b15-18: I.15, ll. 1-2 I.7, 1255b15-20: I.15, l. 8 I.7, 1255b22-35: II.18, l. 8 I.8, 1256a3-5: I.18, l. 1 I.8, 1256a3-13: I.18, ll. 7-8 I.8, 1256a13-14: I.18, l. 1 I.8, 1256a19-22: I.16, ll. 1-2 I.8, 1256a21-22: I.16, ll. 7-9

900

Indices I.8, 1256b16-17: I.17, ll. 1-2, 9 I.8, 1256b21: III.6, l. 23 I.8, 1256b27-28: I.18, l. 2 I.8, 1256b31-37: I.19, ll. 1-2 I.8, 1256b32-34: I.19, l. 5 I.8, 1256b34-37: I.19, ll. 10-11 I.9, 1257a6-7: I.20, ll. 1-2 I.9, 1257a6-9: I.20, ll. 9-10 I.9, 1257a9-13: I.20, ll. 21-25 I.9, 1257a23-25: I.21, l. 7 I.9, 1257a28-41: I.26, l. 14 I.9, 1257a31-38: I.21, ll. 13-23 I.9, 1257a31-41: I.21, ll. 1-2 I.9, 1257a34-37: I.21, ll. 14-16 I.9, 1257a38-41: I.21, ll. 25-27 I.9, 1257b5-7: I.22, l. 1 I.9, 1257b10-13: I.22, ll. 7-8 I.9, 1257b25-28: I.23, l. 11 I.9, 1257b25-34: I.24, l. 1 I.9, 1257b27-28: I.24, ll. 2-3 I.9, 1257b40-1258a2: I.23, l. 1 I.10, 1258a21-23: I.18, ll. 15-16 I.10, 1258a38-b4: I.25, l. 1 I.10, 1258a40-b1: I.25, l. 2 I.10, 1258b2-8: I.26, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1259b21-23: I.27, l. 1 I.13, 1259b26-27: I.28, l. 1 I.13, 1259b32-36: I.28, l. 1 I.13, 1259b32-1260a4: III.7, l. 13 I.13, 1260a4-7: I.28, ll. 28-29 I.13, 1260a4-11: I.27, ll. 36-38 I.13, 1260a12: I.27, l. 4 I.13, 1260a12-13: I.7, ll. 5-6; II.7, ll. 14-15 I.13, 1260a33-36: I.27, ll. 22-23 I.13, 1260a33-39: I.29, ll. 3-5 I.13, 1260a36-38: I.29, ll. 1-2 I.13, 1260a39-b2: I.29, l. 8 I.13, 1260a40-41: I.29, ll. 28-29 II.1, 1261a2-8: II.4, ll. 1-2 II.1, 1261a12-22: II.2, ll. 1-2 II.1, 1261a14-18: II.1, ll. 1-2 II.2, 1261a29-30: II.2, ll. 12-13 II.3, 1261b16-20: II.1, l. 9 II.3, 1261b17-18: II.1, l. 9 II.3, 1261b33-35: II.3, ll. 1-2 II.3, 1261b33-38: II.3, l. 9 II.3, 1261b35-38: II.3, ll. 30-31 II.4, 1262a32-37: II.5, ll. 1-2 II.4, 1262a32-40: II.5, l. 10 II.4, 1262b17-18: II.4, ll. 34-35 II.5, 1262b36-37: II.6, ll. 1-2 II.5, 1262b39-40: II.6, ll. 1-2 II.5, 1263a17-21: II.6, ll. 24-25 II.5, 1263b7-9: II.4, ll. 23-24 II.5, 1264b5-7: II.7, ll. 2-3

II.6, 1264b37-38: II.7, l. 1 II.6, 1265a18-20: II.10, ll. 1-2, 8 II.6, 1266a1-5: III.13, ll. 5-6 II.7, 1266a36-38: II.11, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266a39-40: II.11, l. 6; II.12, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266b5-8: II.14, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266b8-14: II.12, l. 7 II.7, 1266b17-19: II.14, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1266b24-28: II.12, ll. 7, 8 II.7, 1266b29-30: II.13, ll. 1-2, 13-14 II.7, 1266b34-1267a1: II.12, ll. 22-24 II.7, 1267a21-27: II.15, ll. 1-2 II.7, 1267a21-31: II.15, l. 6 II.7, 1267a37-41: II.12, ll. 22-24 II.7, 1267a41-b5: I.19, ll. 8-9; I.24, ll. 5-6 II.7, 1267b5-9: II.13, ll. 13-14 II.8, 1268b26-28: II.17, ll. 1-2 II.8, 1268b34-38: II.17, ll. 3-4 II.8, 1268b38-1269a3: II.17, ll. 6-7 II.8, 1269a14-24: II.17, ll. 8-9 II.9, 1269b7-12: II.18, ll. 1, 8 II.9, 1269b21-23: I.7, ll. 5-6 II.9, 1270a4-6: II.19, ll. 1-2, 7 II.11, 1273b6-7: III.18, l. 42 III.1, 1274b30-34: III.1, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1274b32-36: III.1, ll. 8-10 III.1, 1274b38: III.11, l. 11 III.1, 1274b40-41: III.2, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1275a19-b20: III.3, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1275a34-b5: III.4, ll. 1-2 III.1, 1275b3-5: III.4, l. 7 III.1, 1275b3-7: III.2, ll. 21-22 III.3, 1276a7-8: III.1, ll. 8-10 III.3, 1276a17-19: III.5, ll. 1-2 III.3, 1276a34-b1: III.5, ll. 1-2 III.3, 1276b1-9: III.5, l. 7 III.4, 1276b17-18: III.8, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1276b17-20: III.6, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1276b29-31: III.6, l. 10 III.4, 1276b31-33: III.7, ll. 1-2 III.4, 1277a5-11: II.2, ll. 12-13 III.4, 1277a13-16: III.8, ll. 15-16 III.4, 1277a20-24: III.8, ll. 15-16 III.6, 1278b32-37: III.9, ll. 1-2, 14 III.6, 1278b37-1279a2: III.10, ll. 1-2, 9-13 III.6, 1279a17-21: III.11, ll. 1-2, 7 III.7, 1279a22-23: III.13, l. 1 III.7, 1279a25-31: III.12, ll. 1-2, 9 III.9, 1280a15-16: III.14, ll. 1, 10 III.11, 1281a40-42: III.15, ll. 1-2; III.16, ll. 34-35 III.11, 1281a42-b9: III.15, ll. 10-18 III.11, 1281b21-25: III.16, ll. 1-2 III.11, 1281b25-28: III.16, ll. 8-10 III.11, 1281b30-34: III.17, ll. 1-2, 8

Index Locorum (Reportatio) III.12, 1283a14-15: III.18, ll. 1-2; III.19, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a31-33: III.18, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a33-37: III.19, ll. 1-2 III.13, 1283a37: III.19, l. 4 III.16, 1287b25-31: III.15, ll. 10-18 IV.3, 1289b27-33: II.2, ll. 12-13 IV.4, 1290b37-1291a8: II.2, ll. 12-13 IV.11, 1295b25-28: II.12, ll. 3-4 IV.16, 1300b24-32: III.17, l. 11 V.1, 1301a25-35: II.12, ll. 22-24 V.9, 1309a33-37: III.18, ll. 42-44 VII.14, 1333b12-14: II.19, l. 31 VII.16, 1335a28-29: I.6, ll. 30-32 Rhetorica I.5, 1361a20-22; I.20, ll. 25-26 II.15, 1390b16-21: III.19, ll. 8-9 II.15, 1390b18-19: III.19, l. 4 II.15, 1390b22: III.19, l. 4 II.16, 1390b32-1391a2: II.13, ll. 10-12; II.14, ll. 20-21; III.18, ll. 11-12 II.16, 1391a1-2: III.18, ll. 7-8 Aristoteles [pseudo] Physiognomica 1, 805a1: I.14, ll. 8-9 Problemata IV.11, 877b14-19: II.19, l. 3 Aspasius [vel pseudo-Aspasius = Robertus Grosseteste] Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber VIIIus cap. 12: I.6, ll. 25-28, 36-38 Auctoritates Aristotelis Metaphysica II (50), p. 119: I.4, ll. 12-14 IV (88), p. 122: III.3, ll. 15-17 V (122), p. 125: I.4, ll. 19-20; I.17, l. 6 V (126), p. 125: I.21, ll. 10-12 XII (277), p. 138: II.2, ll. 31-32 Physica I (3), p. 140: III.1, ll. 15-17 I (5), p. 140: II.16, ll. 27-28 I (21), p. 141: II.16, l. 4 II (63), p. 145: I.17, ll. 9-10 II (64), p. 145: I.17, ll. 9-10 II (68), p. 146: I.5, ll. 17-18; III.12, ll. 23-24 II (73), p. 146: I.5, ll. 17-18 II (82), p. 147: I.9, l. 8; I.10, ll. 9-10 II (85), p. 147: I.4, l. 18 VII (186), p. 155: III.6, ll. 19-20

VII (189), p. 155: I.10, l. 29 De Generatione et Corruptione II (42), p. 170: I.4, l. 4 Meteorologica IV (20), p. 173: I.4, l. 4 IV (26), p. 173: III.3, ll. 15-17 De Anima I (7), p. 174: III.2, ll. 25-26 II (46), p. 178: I.16, ll. 11-12 II (57), p. 179: I.6, ll. 10-13 II (58), p. 179: I.6, ll. 9-10 III (154), p. 187: III.13, l. 33 De Motu Animalium (10), p. 208: II.2, ll. 33-34; III.3, l. 27 Liber De Causis (16), p. 232: I.22, l. 13 Ethica Nicomachea III (49), p. 236: I.4, l. 19; II.9, ll. 12-13 VIII (151), p. 243: II.4, ll. 32-33 IX (176), p. 245: III.14, ll. 6-7 IX (186), p. 246: II.3, ll. 19-21 X (216), p. 248: I.10, ll. 24-25 Politica I (2), p. 252: I.7, 22-23; II.7, ll. 8-9 I (4), p. 252: III.6, l. 23 I (6), p. 252: I.10, ll. 10-11 I (8), p. 252: I.10, l. 7 I (15), p. 253: III.9, l. 10 I (16), p. 253: III.9, l. 10 I (21), p. 253: I.14, ll. 4-5 I (27), p. 253: I.19, l. 5 I (30), p. 254: I.7, ll. 5-6 II (33), p. 254: II.3, ll. 1-2 III (52), p. 255: III.11, l. 11 III (63), p. 256: III.19, l. 4 VII (127), p. 261: I.6, ll. 30-32 Rhetorica II (49), p. 266: III.19, l. 4 Analytica Posteriora I (5), p. 311: I.8, ll. 15-16 I (29), p. 313: II.13, ll. 17-18 Topica II (30), p. 324: III.17, l. 5 III (45), p. 324: I.20, l. 12 Boethius De Differentiis Topicis II, 1189B: I.20, l. 12

901

902

Indices

Cicero De Re Publica [1, 25] XXV (39): II.1, ll. 6-7 Pro L. Cornelio Balbo Oratio 45: I.20, ll. 13-14 Digesta 1.4.1: II.8, ll. 3-4 ‘Eustratius’ v. Anonymus (Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Vus), Aspasius et Michael Ephesius Eustratius de Nicaea Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Ius Prologus: I.1, l. 8 Liber de Causis XX (162): I.22, l. 13 Michael Ephesius Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Vus cap. 5, ad 1130b29: III.6, l. 6; III.8, ll. 19-22 Aristotelis Moralium ad Nicomachum Liber Xus cap. 8, ad 1177a12: I.3, ll. 21-22 Petrus de Alvernia Quaestiones super Librum De Sensu et Sensato q. 14: I.11, l. 1 Scriptum super Libros III-VIII Politicorum Proclus Elementatio Theologica prop. 21: III.11, ll. 12-13 prop. 128: III.13, ll. 20-21 prop. 145: III.13, ll. 20-21 Radulphus Brito Questiones super Librum Ethicorum Aristotelis I, q. 11: I.3, ll. 29-32 I, q. 23: I.10, ll. 21-22 V, q. 16: I.21, ll. 1-2

Robertus Grosseteste v. Aspasius [vel Pseudo-Aspasius] Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos XI.191: II.5, ll. 7-9 Liber Pirroniarum Informationum III.205: II.5, ll. 7-9 Thomas de Aquino In Libros Physicorum III.5: I.17, ll. 3-4 III.11: I.17, l. 6 Sententia Libri Metaphysicae V.19: I.23, l. 16 Sententia Libri Ethicorum I.2: I.3, ll. 29-32 VI.4: I.17, l. 6; III.14, ll. 19-20 Sententia Libri Politicorum I.1/a: I.7, ll. 4-5; I.8, ll. 8-9, 8-15 I.2: II.18, l. 17 I.4: I.8, ll. 15-18; II.19, ll. 11-13 I.6: I.8, ll. 15-18; I.16, ll. 7-9; I.18, ll. 7-8 I.7: I.20, ll. 9-10; I.21, ll. 1-2, 25-27; I.22, ll. 7-8 II.2: II.2, l. 9 II.3: II.4, ll. 34-35 II.5: II.7, ll. 2-3 In Librum B. Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus cap. 4, lectio 22: I.17, l. 6 Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo q. 2, art. 3, ad 4: I.26, ll. 35-38 Scriptum super Sententiis IV, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 2: I.26, ll. 35-38 Summa Contra Gentiles I.1; I.17, l. 6 III.5: I.26, ll. 35-38 Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1: II.8, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 2: II.9, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 1: II.9, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 3: II.9, ll. 6-7 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 1: II.16, l. 1 Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2: II.17, ll. 1-2 Super IIam Epistolam ad Corinthios cap. 9, lectio 1: I.26, ll. 35-38