Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy [1 ed.]

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PERSPECTIVES OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

EDITED BY

T. T. POULOSE

YO UNG ASIA PUBLICATIONS NEW DELHI - STOCKHOLM

© Author

CAT FOB

WAlfi4^ FIRST EDITION • 1978

Rs. 641-

$

12

P rin te d at Reeti Press, 110, N ew O khla In d u s tria l C o m plex, Phase I I N ew D elhi-110010. P u b lish e d by Y oung Asia P u b lica tio n s, 7, A n sa ri R oad, N e w Delhi-110002.

f/£ u n l ÇJ ?H7

I17& CONTENTS

( I A I N

C ontributors Preface 1

D evelopm ent of N uclear E nergy in India 1947-73, 1 R . R am an n a

2

Peaceful N u clear Explosions (PNEs), 16 R . R am anna

3

In d ia and N uclear W eapons, 52 G.G. M irch an d an i

4

In d ia ’s Security Perceptions a n d th e N uclear Issue, 70 Col. R . R a m a R ao (R etd.)

5

In d ia ’s N uclear Policy, 100 T .T . Poulose

6 J a n a ta G overnm ent’s N uclear Policy, 170 Ashok K a p u r 7

In d ia ’s N uclear Policy an d Pakistani Response, 189 J a y ashree J ay agopa 1

8

In d ia 's N uclear Profile, 205 R .R . S u bram anian

9

D ilem a w ithout Anguish : In d ia, M orarji a n d the Bomb, 224 B habani Sen G u p ta

10 A N uclear M unich ?, 240 Col. R . R a m a R ao (R etd) Index, 247

..

Contributors 1.

(former D irector, B habha Atom ic R e­ search Centre) is C hief Scientific Adviser to the M inistry of Defence.

2.

MR. G. G . m i r c h a n d a n i , is the au th o r of India's Nuclear Dilem’na. He is chief of the News Agency, and U .N .I. and also editor of India Backgrounder published from D elhi.

3.

c o l . r . r a m a r a o , (R etd. D irector, Birla Institute of Scientific R esearch, Industrial R esearch Wing) is a defence expert and the au th o r o f several articles and m onographs on science, technology and defence.

4.

d r . T . T . p o u l o s e , is Associate Professor of D isarm am ent Studies, D isarm am ent Studies Division, School of In te r­ national Studies, J a w a h a rla l N ehru University.

d r

. R. r a m a n n a ,

5.

d r

. a s h o k k a p u r , is teaching in W aterloo U niversity, O ntario, C anada. He is the au th o r of India's Nuclear Option : Atomic Diploma y and Decision Making and seve­ ral other research articles in in tern atio n al journals.

6.

m iss j a y a s h r e e

7.

is R esearch Associate in the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi) an d au th o r of a n u m b er o f research papers and a rtic h s on n u clear technology an d arm s control.

8.

is the editor of a new j o u r n a l Perspective. H e is alio the author of several books and articles in well-known international journals. He was form erly the H ead of the D isarm am ent Studies Division, School of In tern atio n al Studies, Ja w a h a rla l N ehru U niversity.

j a y ^ g o p a l , is a R esearch S c h o h r, Dis­ arm am en t Studies Division, School of International Studies, Ja w a h a rla l N nhru U niversity. She is currently taking a course in arm s control in A ustralian N ational U niversity. dr

dr

. r . r . s u b r a m \ n ia n ,

. b h a b a n i sen g u p t a ,

*

I

PREFACE

T h e arm s controller’s school in the W est has been indulging in in tellectu al pettifogging of In d ia since the Pokhran explo­ sion in M ay 1974. T he nuclear w eapon powers are equally irate because they suspect th a t In d ia has also lost her nuclear virginity like them . T he London C lub of n u clear suppliers representing the nuclear haves has been entrusted w ith the unfinished task left by the N on-Proliferation T reaty (N PT ; nam ely form ulating the norm s and beliefs of the bizarre nuclear w orld order based on the dichotom y of the nuclear haves and the n u clear have-nots. W e are indeed back to a new form of feudal society of the nucl a r age in w hich th e entrenched nuclear aristocracy will be exploiting the non-nuclear serfs. A definite trend of nuclear colonialism is evident from the nuclear alignm ents and policies of the nuclear haves. T hese are, or ought to be the perceived dimensions of In d ia ’s n u clear policy. It is unfortunate th at the n u clear debate in In d ia in the past has been following a predesigned though controversial course laid dow n by a sm all b an d of hawkish defense experts. T h eir effort was no doubt to persuade In d ia to go nuclear. W hile such a pro-bom b debate is in itself not totally irrele­ vant, th e mood today is to go beyond this narrow and chauvinistic fram ew ork. Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy aim s to raise the level of the n u clear debate from purely national to th e international issues; from merely ‘going n u ­ c le a r' to m ore fruitful n u clear cooperation am ong developing nations in order to work out a com m on strategy to defeat the designs for technological enslavem ent of the nuclear have-nots. A new n u clear diplom acy should replace the thinking of the nuclear have-nots w hich m ight induce them to refashion

(ii) even their trad itio n al th re a t perceptions based on conventional wisdom w hich thrived on historical rivalries, m u tu al hatred and fear. N uclear cooperation am ong India, Pakistan, Iran , A rgentina, Brazil an d other T h ird W orld countries might succeed in creating a new fram ew ork of regional and inter­ regional cooperation. Peaceful atom m ight be the cem enting force in th e T h ird W orld against any form of atom ic colonia­ lism. T h e lost m eaning of the Atom for Peace program m es m ight be rediscovered in the T h ird W orld, if th eir civilian n u clear technology is geared to a program m e of developm ent, welfare a n d prosperity of th e starving m illions in their countries instead of using it for n u clear weapons. I am grateful to all the contributors w ithout whose coope­ ration this book w ould not have m aterialised. I am particularly obliged to D r. R a m a n n a for perm itting m e to reproduce the following tw o lecture: 1.

India’s Nuclear Developments 1945-73 (D elivered under the auspices of the N ehru M em orial M usesum, New Delhi, in 1974).

2.

On Some New Possibilities >f the Peaceful Uses o f Atomic Energy (Delivered under the auspices of Shri R a m Insti­ tute for Industrial Research, New Delhi in 1975). (This title has bee» changed to Explosions (PNEs) in this book.)

Peaceful Nuclear

I am also thankful to Mr. J a g a n n a t h Sharma, editor, Nuclear Iniia for giving me permission to reproduce Dr. R a m a n n a ’s lecture at the Nehru Memorial Museum. I a m indebted to Col. R a m a R a o (Retd) for his genuine interest and encouragement in the preparation of this book and for going through the entire manuscript patiently. Last but not the least, I a m thankful to Mr. Sagar Ahluwalia with whom I planned this book for publishing ir in record time. M arch 1978

Editor

Chapter 1 DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN INDIA : 1947-73 —

D r. R. Ramanna

In understanding the rap id developm ent of the utilization of n u clear energy in In d ia, it is useful to recall the organisa­ tion of science as it existed in In d ia before Independence. P re-w ar scientific developm ents in In d ia were concentrated, n o t unexpectedly, in universities. T h e biggest im pact of science in our universities cam e from the C alcu tta U niversity an d owes its origin to its g reat V ice-C hancellor, Sir A sutosh M ukherjee. It was due to hi* inspiring organisational genius th a t the country can boast of R am an , Saha and others. H ow ­ ever, th e structure and organisation of those times was essen­ tially for individual scientists to flourish. R esearch on a w ider scale involving industry an d team work ju st did not exist, and we m ay guess, was neither encouraged nor looked upon w ith favour. T here was how ever one exception to this a n d th a t w as the In d ian Institute of Science at Banglore. But even here, the tim e was not ripe for large scale technological research. It is, however, good to recall th a t it was in this In stitu te th at the founder of th e atom ic energy program m e in In d ia , D r. H . J . B habha, did m uch o f his early thinking for a new science structure in the country.

Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy

2

T h a t the organisation of research in universities as it exist­ ed during the pre-w ar period was insufficient was realised by a group of scientists working during the w ar period. Amongst them w ere D r. H . J . B habha and Dr. S. S. B hatnagar. I t was during these years th at D r. B hatnagar dream ed of the chain o f n atio n al laboratories in various disciplines all over In d ia. A t ab o u t the sam e time, D r. B habha was planning a centre of excellence in nuclear science to come up in Bom bay. H e was already aw are of the possibilities of the energy contained in the atom and expressed it in his now famous letter to the then C hairm an of Sir D orabji T a ta T ru st in 1944 in connec­ tion w ith the establishm ent o f T IF R : “ W hen n uclear energy has been successfully applied for pow er production, in say, a couple of decades from now, In d ia will not have to look abroad for its experts, b u t will find them ready at h a n d .” TATA IN STITU TE OF FUNDAM ENTAL RESEARCH R eal developm ent in n uclear science can be said to have started w ith the foundation of the T a ta In stitu te of F u n d a­ m ental R esearch w ith th e funds provided by the Trustees of Sir D orabji T a ta T rust. L ater, the G overnm ent of M ah a­ rash tra (then Govt, of Bombay) put in their contributions and finally the C entral G overnm ent now provides n early 99 per cent of its recurring budget. This Institute started off in a sm all wing in a flat in P eddar R oad, m ainly to provide the necessary facilities for B habha’s own work in cosmic rays and theoretical physics. But w ith the coming of independence, he clearly saw th a t the T IF R could provide the base for a nu­ clear energy program m e an d he w ould have to expand the facilities of the Institute to include other branches of Physics, and disciplines such as Chem istry, Biology and Engineering. At his instance and with the help of S. S. B hatnagar, the A tom ic Energy Commission was formed in August 1948 w ith the following charter : “ (1)

T o take such steps as m ay be necessary from tim e to tim e to protect the interests of the country in con-

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India: 1947-73

3

nection w ith Atom ic E nergy by exercise of the pow ers conferred on the G overnm ent of India by the provisions of the A tom ic Energy A ct ; (2)

T o survey the territories of the In d ian Dominion for the location of useful m inerals in connection w ith A tom ic E nergy ; and

(3)

T o prom ote research in th eir ow n laboratories and to subsidise such research in existing institutions a n d universities. Special Steps will be taken to increase teaching an d research facilities in n u clear physics in the Indian U niversities.”

As can be seen in the chapter, first priority was given for the survey o f n a tu ra l resources, p articu larly m aterials o f in­ terest to the atom ic energy p rogram m e such as U ranium , T horium Beryllium , G raphite etc, A special unit w ith the original nam e of R a re M inerals Division was created a t D elhi w ith the help of late Prof. W adia. T h e next priority was given to the basic sciences, p articu larly Physics, Chem istry and Biology w ith the purpose of providing facilities and train ­ ing of high quality reseach scientists. T h e eventual aim was to set up as early as possible a research reactor. It was reali­ sed th at this by itself w ould not be sufficient for a nuclear program m e unless there was sim ultaneously a program m e for instrum entation, p articu larly in electronics. Dr. B habha clearly realised very early in' the program m e th a t no high q u ality research is possible w ithout good instrum ents and the very act of their being produced in In d ia was itself progress. It is for this purpose th a t a unit, called the Electronics Pro­ duction U nit, was started in the T IF R . T his production unit form ed the nucleus of the large corporation now in H y d era­ bad known as the Electronics C orporation of India Lim ited. T o give a feeling of the atm osphere a t th a t tim e, I m ay be perm itted to quote from my rem iniscences. Considering the num ber of people who have been recruited directly from various train in g centres abroad and some very enthusi­ astic good students from In d ian U niversities themselves, it is

4

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

not easy to explain w hat it is th a t m ade all the people at th a t tim e, work in close team s and discuss their problem s w ith one an o th er w ith absolute freedom . T his was certainly different from the atm osphere th a t existed in other institutions and universities where the tendency was to work in separate com­ p artm ents. It is possible th a t this w as because of Dr. B habha’s quick perception and understanding o f various disciplines and by his talking to people in different sections at all levels. H e used to m ake a know ledgeable assem ent and appreciation of each m an's work and was able to bring them together so as to b uild up a truly cooperative spirit. It was in this w ay th a t a deep foundation was laid for m ulti-disciplinary cooperative w ork even as early as the fifties. T h e necessary spirit and tem po of research was kept up by inviting m any distinguished scientists from abroad an d In d ia an d the W ednesday colloq u ia at T IF R w ere often great in tellectu al events. T he nam es of D irac, Pauli, Bohr come to my m ind. W hile this foundation was being laid for a strong base in p u re science and some work in electronics instrum entation, there was a clam our all over the scientific circles in the coun­ try as to w hether this was indeed leading us to one of the aims o f th e Commission : of setting up a small reactor. I recall D r. S. S. B h atn ag ar bem oaning to D r. B habha m London in 1953 and his very words were “ will I ever see a reactor in In d ia before I die.” U ufortunately our first reactor cam e into operation in 1956 soon after th e d eath of D r. B hatnagar (1955). C H O ICE OF R EA CTO R I o rd er to have a countryw ide discussion on our atom ic energy program m e, p articu larly ab o u t the choice of a reac­ tor, its siting an d the difficulties o f setting up one indige­ nously, P andit N ehru called a conference to w hich distingui­ shed In d ia n scientists were invited. T his was held in D elhi during the w inter of 1954 a t the N ational Physical L abora­ tory. W e, who w ere heading various Divisions, w ere also asked to speak on our subject of speciality. At this conference, I recall the presence of Prof. M . N . Saha, Prof. S. N. Bose,

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India: 1947-73

5

D r. K . S. K rish n an and several o th er distinguished Physicists, Chemists, Engineers and Industrialists from all p arts of India. O n th a t day, one could feel the tension in the air. T he location of the A tom ic E nergy E stablishm ent at Bombay w as being questioned. T h e choice o f the reactor type and the entire program m e o f developing our atom ic energy m aterials cam e u nder criticism . P an d it N ehru carefully listened to all the argum ents, p articu larly to the various proposals on the type of reactor we should try and build by ourselves. W ith a ll our youthful enthusiasm we m ust have m ade an im pres­ sion. C ertainly D r. B habha h ad the en tire discussion under control, b u t it was Prof. K . S. K rishnan, w ho was the last speaker, w ho clinched th e argum ent in his usual humorous style by quoting the story of Jaco b i and his student. I quote it because th e story m ade a big impression th a t d ay : “ Y esterday, I m entioned the instance of a ma,n, a young m an, who had joined for reseach the g reat M athem atician Ja c o b i who was the b rother of the great O rientalist. T h e young m an h ad been w ith him for several m onths w ithout having started an y research work. W hen the teacher asked him about it he said ; ‘I have n o t yet read all the earlier literatu re on the subject’. T h en the Professor turned to him and said, ‘D ear m an, if your father h ad w aited to see all the girls before m arrying one, w here w ould you be ? I would like you to m ake a start somewhere. You can get on w ith the scientific problem s and proceed*. I w ould also say just the sam e thing. Because the subject involves so m any different disciplines, it needs cooperation from all q u arters an d a cer­ tain am oun t o f sym pathy is also necessary.” T his conference should be considered as one o f the most im portant ones on atom ic energy held in In d ia as it consolid­ ated the scientific opinion in the country in support the steps taken by D r. B habha tow ards the fulfilement of our progra­ mme. It was also quite clear th a t P an d it N ehru had given his full support to th e program m e publicy in front of all the scientists, some o f w hom h ad been very critical. D ue to D r. B habha’s close contacts w ith E uropean scienit-

6

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

ists and his influence am ong the leaders of science in Europe, he was in constant touch w ith technological developm ents and possibilities abroad. He h ad m anaged to have an agree­ m ent of cooperation w ith F rance long before such agreem ents existed in this p articu lar field outside the then n u clear coun­ tries. It was w ith the cooperation o f France th a t we learnt a lot about reactor m aterials, reactor control, neutron physics etc. p a rtic u la rly w ith respect to n atu ral u ranium systems. But all this still h a d not p u t us in a position to build a reactor of our own. H ow ever, som etime in 1954, after one o f his fairly frequent tours of Europe, D r. B habha cam e back w ith a pro­ position th a t Sir Jo h n Cockroft h ad offered some enrished u ran iu m fuel elem ents for building a Sw im m ing Pool type reactor and th a t he h ad come to an agreem ens w ith him for the loan o f this fuel. A ll-rou n d E n th u sia sm It was, how ever, to be a challenge in th at we h ad to build the rest o f the reactor, w hich included the civil engineering, design of th e tank, and electronics control systems an d piep are for its utilisation entirely by ourselves. It was also sup­ posed to be built in com petition w ith the Lido reactor at H arw ell to see who w ould com plete it first. I m ay ad d here th at we w ent critical earlier by a few days. Since th e whole project w as a challenge, everybody seemed keyed up and it was one o f those operations w hich was carried out w ith tre­ m endous gusto. T h e reactor building was constructed in less th an an y e a r’s tim e and because of this h u rry it tu rn ed out th a t neither the roof nor the w alls were leak proof against the monsoon. T he Sw im m ing Pool tank was also b u ilt in a re­ cord tim e and by August 1956 the reactor was a c tu a lly ready for criticality trials ; the whole operation having lasted just one year. At the first trials in w hich D r. B habha him self took p art, it becam e difficult to try out various configurations of the u ran iu m fuel in the w ater because the tank was still new and the w ater was not sufficiently tran sp aren t. T h o u g h we worked during the whole of the 2nd night, the reacto r just would not go critical. T his was because we h ad left a very

Development of Nuclear Energy in India: 1947-73

7

big w ater gap in the centre not know ing enough ab o u t such neutron m ultiplying systems. T his was realised on the 3rd d ay an d the whole loading operation was reenacted on the 4th day, and on that 4th afternoon the reactor w ent critical. W e could now claim th a t we h ad a critical reactor, the first in Asia, built entirely by ourselves except for the enriched u ran ­ ium fuel. I also recall th a t w ithin a few m inutes after the reacto r becam e critical, the Prim e M inister, Pandit Ja w a rla l N ehru was inform ed of it over the phone, even as th e monsoon w as flooding the w hole place around us. I have dealt in some detail about thé Apsara criticality b e­ cause it w as the first to have psychological im pact on the country for the developm ent of m odern technology. T hough a lot of equipm ent for the reactor h ad been designed and m ade entirely by ourselves, there were still m any people not willing to believe th a t we could establish a m odern technology in the country by ourselves. T h e country seemed to be covered in a cloak of non self-reliance. People in general felt th a t every thing had to be im ported from abroad, be it ideas or equipm ent. I t seem ed to m any in In d ia th a t nothing w orthw hile was possible by ourselves. W e realised th a t to cash in on the success of Apsara we h ad to take a series of steps to m ake ourselves not only self-suffi­ cient in quality b u t in q u a n tity also. Even before the Apsara went into operation, the Indian R a re E arths L td. was pro­ ducing U ranium and T horium com pounds o f high purity. A decision was taken to build a U ran iu m M etal P lant im m e­ diately, an d this tu rn ed out to be vital in our program m e of self-sufficiency. At the G eneva Conference 1955, D r. Bhabha played a very im p o rtan t role from the point of view of bringing about a discussion about both the im portance of n u clear pow er for developing countries and of th e possibilities of fusion. It was during this conference th at a very generous offer from C an ad a was m ade to us of the gift under the C olom bo Plan of a N R X type reactor, a n a tu ra l uran iu m and heavy w ater system.

8

Perspectives o f India’s Nuclear Policy N R X R e a c to r

I recall the discussions w hich D r. B habha h a d w ith all o f us in Geneva in 1955 on the choice o f the N R X type reactor for T rom bay. W hile all of us including D r. H . N . Sethna, Shri N. B. Prasad, Shri A. S. R ao an d m yself were keen on th e N X R type reactor because it was a n a tu ra l uranium heavy w ater system and therefore a type w hich in principle we could fuel ourselves, for some reasons, D r. B habha seemed to favour the Dido reactor, an enriched u ran iu m heavy w ater system, a type w hich was in operation a t H arw ell. H e m ust have been slightly influenced by the views o f Sir Jo h n Cockroft. As a concession, he said we should have both types o f reactors, but we all im pressed upon him th a t we w ere not sufficiently advanced in m anpow er an d other industrial facili­ ties to have tw o high flux research reactors going. Discussions w ere heated and finally D r. B habha gave in to our views and rightly so, I refer to these discussions to show how decisions w ere taken betw een him self and his younger colleagues and how Dr. B habha was willing to accept suggestions in spite of his ow n trem endous personal reputation. SCIENCE M ANAGEM ENT T he adm inisrtative set up for science m anagem ent exist­ ing in the country; particu larly in G overnm ent, was essentially o f the law an d order type inherited from British days an d was by no m eans suitable for quick im plem entation of im aginative decisions m ade at scienctific levels. It was also quite insensi­ tive to the requirem ents of research scientists. It was D r. B habha who first exam ined the existing structure and set in motion a series o f reforms. T he first and the m ost im portant change was getting the Secretarial in D elhi moved to Bombay itself so that the adm inistrators could be of direct service to the scientists an d also respond to their requirem ents by being on the spot, very unlike the then existing p attern of taking all decisions in far aw ay places quite unconnected w ith the actu al requirem ents. U nfortunately, th e kind o f decision­ m aking w here the decisions are quite at variance w ith th e requirem ents still continue to take place in D elhi. T h a t th e

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India: 1947-73

9

Secretariat is not suprem e and the scientists must have the final say was an o th er innovation. For this purpose, the Trom bay Council and the T ro m b ay Scientific C om m ittee, though they h ad different nam es at th a t tim e, w ere formed. T he joint decisions taken by the scientist were then passed to the ad m in i­ strators for action whose business it was to see th a t they were im plem ented. If, how ever, the decision could not be taken w ithin th e existing fram ew ork studies were carried out as to how the existing fram ew ork itself should be changed. After all there was nothing holy about the existing fram ew ork or so called fundam ental rules that it could not be changed if required. This was an im portant new cancept w hich seemed to shock the adm inistration o f those times. U nfortunately, even now this a ttitu d e th a t th e old rules are unchangeable and everlasting persists an d a quick im plem entation of any prog­ ram m e requires any am ount of juggling to overcom e the m anm ade constraints. I am afraid th a t the right adm inistrative atm osphere still d u d es the country and the traditions of an adm inistrative system really m eant for R evenue, Incom e-tax L aw & O rder is still forced on scientific organisations. It is not just th a t the adm inistrators m ust get on w ith a set of high level scientists th at creates the right atm osphere. It is th a t the adm inistrator must be o f service to the entire com m unity of ‘d en tists working on a project. U nfortunately because of the statutory pow er and traditional authority of adm inistrators, they ten d to treat scientists, p articu larly junior ones, m ore as tradem en from w hom work should be extracted. How different it is to the honoured place scientists have in the W est. T R A IN IN G PR O G R A M M E Since the inception o f T IF R , it was clear to us th a t the training offered by our universities was totally inadequate for the atom ic energy program m e. T hough we had m anaged to get very good people from the universities, w ith the grow ing size and the num ber of universities, it v as getting more and more difficult to locate good people. It was for this purpose

10

Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy

th a t a T rain in g School program m e was started in 1957. I was closely connected in this program m e. T h e foresight, with w hich this training program m e was started has p aid dividents m any times over. I t has provided the base for all over project a n d m any trainees from this school hold im portant positions. In fact, a large num ber o f people who took p a rt in the recent PN E experim ent were from this T rain in g School. T he T ra in ­ ing School provides not only a place for training bright people to get oriented tow ards atom ic research, b u t also gives them the necessary atm osphere to develop a sense of loyalty and team work. It also provides a set-up of b rillian t young m en who behave like question m asters to their senior colleagues an d therefore provide an intellectual background w hich is the only w ay an ageing scientist can rem ain youthful in the field. W hile the BARC T rain in g School was one of the most im por­ ta n t efforts in utilising o u r m anpow er, other training prog­ ram m es including train in g in C an ad a for the C IR U S , reactor an d later the pow er reactors provided th e In d ian atom ic energy program m e w ith the m anpow er base w ithout w hich the rapid developm ent witnessed w ould never have been achieved. D r. B habha quite often used to say th a t we could justify all the expenditure on atom ic energy th a t was being incurred to the public at large only if we could dem onstrate useful electric power generated a t low cost. From the very early days o f atom ic energy, he had set him self the task of costing nuclear pow er, especially in developing countries. His contri­ bution to the G eneva C onference of 1955 shows his absorbing interest in th e need an d cost of n u clear pow er in developing areas. H e h ad to fight a long b attle because his E uropean colleagues were against him on this m atter. W hen it becam e clear th at light w ater enriched system of the BWrR type was already econom ical in com parison w ith th erm al stations u n d er certain circum stances of distance from coal fields, D r. B habha involved him self w ith a series of negotiations w ith the U .S. Atomic E nergy Commission for the establishm ent o f th e T a ra p u r station. T h e station actu ally started giving pow er to the M a h a ra sh tra an d G u jarat grids after his death.

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India: 1947-73

11

W hatever difficulties the T a ra p u r station has been faced w ith, w hich in my view a re very exaggerated because the reactor has behaved no better or no worse th an other nuclear pow er reactors in the w orld, it has provided a source of very im portant pow er for the M ah arash tra-G u jarat grid w ithout w hich industry in the two States w ould have been in a com p­ lete mess. T h e recent decision to m ake fuel elem ents for this reactor from im ported enriched u ran iu m (in U F6 form) is a courageous decision taken in the sam e spirit as the decisions of D r. B habha. O u r close association w ith C an ad a led us to the choice of heavy w ater n a tu ra l uranium pow er reactors (C andu type}, in this choice, I think we can consider ourselves to be lucky as it has led us to the right system and unit size required for the country u nder the present condi­ tions of our industry. T h e Site Selection C om m ittee for the location of n u clear pow er reactor w hich was form ed in A ugust 1961 m ade a series of recom m endations as a result of w hich K ota an d K alpakkam were chosen as loca­ tions for th e first tw o pow er stations. It was clear even at th a t tim e, th a t w hile K ota w ould be built w ith C anadian assittance, K alpakkam would be m ade alm ost entirely from Indian resources. T h e unit size of 200 M W was n aturally dictated by the first C an ad ian pow er station at Douglas Point. It has now been shown th at the unit size of 500 or 1000 M W w ould make electricity m uch cheaper to the extent that it will be com petitive w ith th erm al pow er even at coal pit­ heads. If, however, we have in m ind the size of the present grid systems and th e capability of our industry, 200 M W w ould still be of value for some years to come. 500 M W sta­ tions are in fact being designed by us, but should really come into operation after the N arora reactors. BREEDER REACTO RS It has alw ays been the aim of the In d ian atom ic energy program m e to utilise the large quantities of thorium reserves in the country. U nfortunately, thorium cannot be used as a fuel as it will have to be irrad iated in a reactor to produce

12

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

sufficient quantities of U 233 w hich can then be used as a fuel. T he production of U 233 in norm al reactors is a very slow process. H ow ever, n u clear physics provides a most exci­ ting answ er to this in the sense th a t it is possible to build rea­ ctors using a fast neutron spectrum in w hich more fuel can be produced th an is actu ally b u rn t. Suchr eactors are called breeder reactors. In these reactors if thorium is used as a blanket around the core of the reactor, large quantities of U 233 can be produced. Thei'e are, how ever, m any problem s connected w ith this type of reactor, including the economics o f breeding. T he other problem s referred to are reactor stability, reactor safety and radiation dam age. R eacto r safety in fast breeder systems is particularly im portant in view of the fact th a t sodium is used as the coolant for extracting the pow er inside th e reactor. I w ould say th a t in the plans of D r. B habha’s program m e, the fast breeder reactor was the last big item he h ad envisaged. A fast breeder test reactor is now under construction a t K alpakkam and is just com ing o u t of the ground. It should be operating by 1977-78 and by the early 80’s we will have obtained considerable operating experience on such systems to be able to design a pow er breeder reactor to come up in the late 80’s. A pow er breeder reactor will go a long way to help conserve our fuel supplies for n u clear pow er, since it produces more fuel th an it burns. If the experim ent succeeds, it will have a big im pact on fuel economic. 1 have in this brief sketch of developm ents of atom ic energy not m entioned several other developm ents w hich have gone a long w ay tow ards m aking the In d ian n u clear program m e a self-sufficient one. T h e chain of H eavy W ater Plants w hich has been set up all over the country will m ake us independent of im ports of heavy w ater. T h e U ran iu m C orporation of In d ia set up in O ctober 1967 is responsible for all the m ining an d processing of the available u ran iu m are in the country.

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India : 1947-73

13

NUCLEAR FUEL C O M PL E X T he very large N uclear Fuel Com plex a t H yderabad w hich has been set up entirely by our own scientists an d engineers is som ething the country can be proud of. It m akes several types of sophisticated fuel elem ents for our pow er and research reactors and also produces m aterials of high purity o f immense value to our industy e.g. Z irconium , T itan iu m etc. If, in fact, I am asked to point out a large establishm ent next to BAR.C w hich has led us to a high degree of self-sufficiency in the atom ic pow er program m e, I w ould m ention the N u clear Fuel Complex. An atom ic energy program m e is incom plete w ithout waste handling facilities. This is essentially because atom ic reactors produce hazardous radioactive waste w hich are to be tre a te d and stored very carefully in order to avoid any hazards to the environm ent. P ractically a t every pow er plant, we have a large waste disposal unit to take care of the hazard aspects of the atom ic energy program m e. I have a feeling th a t several countries believe th at we are som ewhat over-cautious in our H ealth Physics and protection program ­ mes, but in the p articu lar case of atom ic energy, I think it is better to be on th e safe side. VARIABLE ENERGY CYCLO TRO N PR O JE C T As a m easure of our self-sufficiency in very sophisticated technology, I w ould like to m ention the com pletly indigenously fabricated atom -sm ashing m achine called the 69 M eV V a ria ­ ble E nergy Cyclotron being set up at C alcu tta. T his has a curious history. For several years, the nuclear scientists h ad been asking D r. B habha for his encourgem ent and support in building a big cyclotron to provide the necessary facilities for the large n u m b er of nuclear physicists available in the coun­ try . For some reasons, he had been very hesitant ab o u t this program m e. H e how ever set up a com m ittee to report on the various types of cyclotrons in existence and th e ir possible uses. A report was p rep ared and a t the same tim e a conference of all nuclear scientists was called at Bombay in A ugust 1964 to m ake a decision on the program m e. A fter hearing the case

14

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

presented by the scientists D r. B habha com pletely tu rn ed in favour of providing such a facility. As a result of this, a very sophisticated variab le energy cyclotron w ith practically all the com ponents m ade in In d ia either at T rom bay or in th e Public Sector like BHEL, Bhopal an d H eavy E lectricals, R an ch i is reaching a stage of com pletion a t the Salt Lake site at C alcutta. T h e m achine is expected to go into operation som etim e early next year. T hough this cyclotron was orginally planned to be a nuclear physics facility, it has now becom e clear to all of us th a t it w ill be one o f the most im portant tools for the study o f radiation dam ages in solids of special value in a fast reactor program m e. Yet, w hen we w ere in the process of trying to convience D r. B habha of the usefulness of this m achine and had alm ost succeeded in doing so, for some unknow n reasons, foreign scientists used to w rite to him dissuading him from giving any encourgem ent for this project. I have never u nder­ stood this negative interference from outside scientists for a program m e w hich w e now know will be of im m ensev alue to Physics and our pu re research program m e. T h e most inexp­ licable p art being th a t these foreign scientists at the same tim e were perm itting their own scientists to build a facility in th eir ow n country. I w ould say th a t the first phase of our atom ic energy p ro ­ gram m e lasts from 1948 to 1956 w hen the Apsara w ent critical the second phase of planning and construction of large faci­ lities lasts from 1956 to 1966 w hen Dr. B habha died. From 1966 to 1974 if the phase of construction of pow er stations an d utilization of large research facilities. I have briefly described the developm ents in atom ic energy in the last 25 years, taking us to the year 1973. T h e re has recently been added interest in our atom ic energy program m e since we carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion on M ay 18, 1974 in the deserts of R ajasthan. I do not have to say th a t this is an experim ent in w hich the design, planning and execution were all done w ith In d ian resources by our own boys. In this p a rtic u la r case, there can be no do ubt about it. I am pretty certain h a d Dr. B habha been

Development o f Nuclear Energy in India : 1947-73

15

alive, he w ould have strongly supported th e aim s of our ex­ perim ent on the 18th M ay and I can say from my long perso­ nal association w ith him th a t he was keen on understanding all aspects of peaceful uses o f atom ic energy, including nuclear explosions. W e have shown th a t at low cost one can carry out a PN E w hich is fully contained. W e have described elsew here its possible uses b u t we still have to carefully study th e behaviour of radioactive substances underground. T h e drilling for getting such inform ation is in full swing. W e m ust recognise th a t all these great achievem ents th a t D r. B habha an d his colleagues were able to fulfil in the last 25 years w ould have been im possible b u t for the firm support and encouragem ent in a scientific sense given by the la te Prim e M inister, P andit J a w a rh a rla l N ehru w ho died just about 10 years ago. His taith in science was im m ense and I hope the scientists in the Atomic E nergy Commission have been w orthy of this confidence. I am happy to say we have received the same support from the present Prim e M inister a n d h er genius for clear a n d w ell-defined decisions have alread y helped us to m ake our contributions to the developm ent of the country in the atom ic field. W hile progress in atom ic energy has reached peaks in our over-all developm ent, I w ould like to see it as an im portant prop to the w hole o f our in d u strial develop­ m ent and structure in the next phase of our activities.

Chapter 2 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNEs) —

Dr. R. Ramanna

IN T R O D U C T IO N T h e age we live in has very rightly been term ed the atom ic age and the w ay it was ushered in and the deep im­ plication it has h a d on th e w orld, has been the most d ram atic in all history. O nly a few months before the discovery of nu clear fission in 1939, several em inent scientists were of the view th at n u clear reactions could never be used for economic energy production a n d yet w ithin three years after this great discovery, a chain reaction h ad been set up in 1942 and an explosive release o f energy of unbelieveable m agnitude had been set off by 1944. It was actually used as a w eapon in 1945. By this tim e it was clear to everybody th a t the economic exploitation of atom ic energy was just a m atter o f tim e, m ainly to establish the economics, find suitable m aterials of construction and standardise on the safety aspects, p articu ­ larly in view of th e associate radioactivity. In In d ia o u r history in this field starts at an equally early tim e, in th a t plans were being m ade to exploit this possible source o f energy as early as 1944 an d n atu rally enough, for o rly peaceful purposes. At th at tim e all th a t we could think

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (P N E s)

17

of, w as training o f personnel an d basic research. At least this was the spirit w ith w hich the T a ta Institute of F undam ental R esearch was initiated by H om i B habha. T h e rest of the history of our atom ic energy developm ent during the last 25 years is know n to most people. T h e overall aim s o f producing electric pow er for industry, the use of isotopes an d radiation in a wide variety of activities, basic research an d the use o f serveral technological fall-outs em anating from the develop­ ments have been fully initiated and as things stand it is now a m a tte r o f consolidating w hat has been done an d o f p lan n in g expansions on all these lines. A special effort is being exerted to move quickly into the field of b reeder reactors, using fast neutron m ultiplying system w ith liquid m etal coolants e. g., sodium, w ith an aim to quickly utilize our vast deposits of T horium . T horium can be converted to U-233, a fissile m aterial having very favourable n u c le a r properties in a breeder process w here it is possible to produce m ore fuel th an one b um s. T h e entire program m e has been based on attaining com plete self-sufficiency, th e im plications of this being a strong training program m e an d a research and developm ent effort of considerable m agnitude. It also m eans m axim um utilization of the public an d private sector facilities, since a self-sufficient atom ic energy program m e autom atically im plies a self-sufficient an d strong indigenous industrial base. All this is m ore or less coming to some sort of fruition except th a t one w ould like to see these happening a little faster so th a t pow er reactors can be got up in India in a m uch shorter tim e than is the case at the present m om ent. A good optim um tim e, in my view, for the setting up of a pow er reacto r is about 5 years. T ables 1 & 2 give a list of the research and pow er reactor already functioning or in an advanced stage of construction in India. T his evening I would like to bring to your attention some new uses of atom ic energy viz. the peaceful use of n u clear explosions. T his aspect has unfortunately becom e associated w ith m ilitary uses so th a t its possibilities have not been fully ap preciated. I t is only recently th a t m ore details o f such uses are being m ade av ailable, so th a t it is now possible to

18

Perspectives qf India's Nuclear Polity

tfcke stock of th e situation m ore com prehensively th an before. T h e fact of the m atter is, that, h a d n u clear explosions not h ad any relations to w eaponry and th e radioactive fallout was not there, it w ould have been an ideal civil engineering tool for m any earthm oving operations, w ithout even considering the serveral possible m ining operations. For the purpose of to -d a y ’s lecture, I will request you to forget its possible uses as a weapon and not refer to any of its political im plications, an d discuss its peaceful uses in the light o f the experience of other countries and our own single experim ent. T h e field is still very new and m uch rem ain to be done from the point of view of research and developm ent but th at applications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) w ould be econom ically favourable can be seen from th e following general consider­ ations. T he cost figures of n u clear explosives as given by U SAEC for peaceful applications varies from $350,000 for a 10 kt fission device to $600,000 for a 2 M t therm o-nuclear device. These charges include the cost of the explosive an d its detonation but do not include em placem ent, stemm ing, cablihg co3ts, etc. O u r expenditure on the recent 12 kt pea­ ceful nuclear explosion exprim ent at R ajasthan was som ewhat less than the corresponding U.S. figure; the am ount of Rs. 32 lakhs spent on the experim ent included the cost of digging the hole. T he cost ©f conventional chem ical explosives is a hundred times more at the lower yield range and very m uch m ore a t the higher yield range. F u rth er, the em placem ent of such large volum es of chem ical explosives at significant depths underground w ould be prohibitively costly and, in fact, im practicable. 2.

STATUS OF TH E PN E TEC H NO LO G Y

T he physical effects on the geological m edium arising from the release of energy from an u nderground nuclear explosion suggest several possible applications. I f the explosive is not buried too deep, the resultant crater (see figure 1) can be used most simply as a w ater reservoir, A large num ber of such expl­ osives, of different yields if necessary, detonated either sequen­ tially or simultaneously can be used to m ake harbours or

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

19

dam s, to build long a n d deep canals, etc. O n the other h an d , th e device m ay be buried so deep th at the explosion does not produce a p erm an en t effect on the ground surface. T he fractu rin g and crushing of the rock in th e im m ediate vicinity of the explosive em place­ ment point m ay then be the m ain effect th at will be utilised, e.g., to increase the perm eability of the rock in a n atu ral gas reservoir, to increase the driving pressure on a n oil reser­ voir, to expose the m etal values in a copper ore body to leach solution, etc. In deeply buried explosions in h a rd rock, the spherical cavity after grow ing to its final size is filled up by the overbearing broken rubble a n d a cylindrical chim ney w ith a height o f several times the cavity diam eter is formed (see figure 2). In plastic rocks like salt, how ever, this kind of collapse m ay be very lim ited or m ay not occur a t all; th e cavity th en m aintains its shape and its void to a substantial extent. Such a situation has been considerd for storing n a tu ra l gas condensates and even radioactive wastes. T hus the physical effects one can produce in different kinds of rocks by varying the depth o f burial and the yield and by using m ultiple detonations are so diverse th a t a fascinating variety of potential applications o f PN E can be conceived of. T he n u m b er of underground explosions carried out so far by various countries as well as the num ber o f PN E exp­ erim ents a re given in T a b le 3. In a few cases, the experim ents have been carried out u n d er in d u strial conditions and in a few o th er cases, the final crater or th e em ergent engineering products have been released for public use. H ow ever, it w ould be correct to say p ractical technologies for most applications w hich could be released for w ide-spread com m ercial use a re yet to emerge. T h e la tte r w ill have to a w ait fu rth er active research an d developm ent for perhaps a decade m ore w hile the phenom enology under different geological conditions countinues to be studied, as in o u r experim ent last year. T h e feasibility of PN E for large-scale projects depends on safety-both seismic an d radiological-and on econom ic considera­ tions. For exam ple, the seismic effects o f high yield explosions

20

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

on building are considered to substantially preclude th eir use in highly populated areas like the British Isles4 an d the Federal R epublic of Germ any^. R adiological safety has also to be g u aran teed in term s . o f exposure o f nearby populations to vented activity in the case o f cratering explosions a n d in term s of radiological contam ination of the em ergent engineering product in other cases. T he sugge­ sted n u clear excavation® of p a rt o f the canal across the Isthmus of K ra in T h ailan d is expected to require tem porary excavation about 200,000 T hais living of in the exclusion are a for about 1§ m onths. T he com m ercial use of nuclear-stim ulated gas in U .S.A . w ould ap p ear to require the reduction o f tritiu m in the gas to acceptable levels7. Nevertheless there are m any scientific studies w hich have shown th a t such seismic and radiological safety can be achieved in m any econom ically attractive projects. Gas an d oil from nuclear-stim ulated reservoirs, copper leached from nuclear-explostve fractured ore bodies, nuclearexplosive excavated interoceanic an d river-linking canals and gas condensates stored in nuclear-explosive produced under­ ground cavities are all bright possibilities in the future. In the four panel meetings on PN E organised by the In te ­ rnational Atomic Energy Agency in V ienna betw een 1970-75, all of w hich India atten d ed as a panel m em ber, several coun­ tries have indicated the fields in w hich th eir interests in PN E applications are focussed at present. T h e m ajor interest of U .S.A . has crystallised in the stim ulation of low -perm eability gas reservoirs and they have already carried out three experi­ m ents in this connection. T hey continue, however, to have a w ide-ranging interest in m any other applications, in p a rti­ cular in-situ recovery of oil from oil shale and in-situ leaching of copper deposits. U .S .S .R . has a m ore broad-based experim ­ ental program m e (see table 3). T hey have carried out tw o spectacular experim ents in w hich they extinguished w idelyb u rn in g gas wells by detonating n u clear explosive in plastic rocks close to the wells, thus pinching off the W'ells. T hey have done one experim ent to create underground reservoirs for gas condensates an d have very recently8 reported carrying

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

21

out a m ultiple cratering experim ent involving three 15kt explosives as a prelim inary step in the excavation o f the Pechora-K am a river canal, proposed to divert th e plentiful w aters in the northern rivers to th e C aspian Sea, whose level is continuosly dropping. F rance has considered the possibility of storing gaseous hydrocarbons in underground reservoirs cre­ a te d by n u clear explosions an d has carried out feasibility studies relating to such an application both on land and u n d er the sea. Studies in U .K . have generally involved a n a ­ lyses of th e experim ents of U .S.A . and other countries. Egypt® has expressed interest in projects involving both sto­ rage of n atu ral gas and the stim ulation of oil and gas reserv­ oirs. V enezuela10 and T h a ila n d 7 have carried out pre-feasibi­ lity studies on large canal construction projects. India is a large country an d m any projects involving m ajor earth-m oving operation like building of inter-river i ca­ nals, harbours and w ater-resource developm ent in arid regions can be conceived of. But it is yet perhaps p rem atu re to carry out feasibility studies for such projects because most of them , if they are to be econom ically viable, m ust be large in scope and would presum ably involve sim ultaneous or sequential detonation of a large n um ber o f explosives oi different yields. O n the other hand, applications like stim ulations of oil reser­ voirs to increase both the production rate an d the ultim ate recovery and the m ining o f non-ferrous m etals, w hich may initially involve detonation o f lower-yield single explosives, are m ore prom ising in the present context. W e shall next review in greater detail some o f the im portant applications of PN E an d shall also exam ine general term s the factor w hich are likely to determ ine the feasibility of p articu lar PNE projects. T ow ards the end of this talk, I shall describe our PNE experim ent of last year. 3.

SOM E IM PO R T A N T APPLICATIO NS OF PNE (a) Gas Stimulation

T h e ra te of flow** of the fluid from a petroleum (natural gas or oil) reservoir to a well is, am ong other factors, directly

22

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

proportional to the reservoir perm eability an d thickness. In th e U nited States, n a tu ra l gas satisfies12 one-third of the energy requirem ents an d th e an n u al dem and for n a tu ra l gas is about 0.62X1012 m 3 at STP. It is known also th a t very large quantities of (gas ab o u t 9.0X 1012m3) exist in low per­ m eability gas reservoirs in the Rocky M ountain region, b u t from w hich the flow of gas to a well is not fast enough for such reservoirs to be exploited com m ercially using conventi­ onal m ethods. T h e detonation of a n u clear explosive in a deep reservoir producing ‘chim ney’ o f broken, rock, as m entio­ ned earlier, and a fractu re zone surrounding it. T h e conse­ quent increase in the perm eability of the reservoir leads to increased flow an d recovery from the reservoir. U .S.A . has carried out th ree field experim ents, the so called Projects Gasbuggy. R ulison an d R io Blanco and has also proposed a fourth experim ent W agon W heel. Some details o f these experim ents are given in T a b le 4. Nordyke7 has stated th a t the cum ulative production from the reentry hole of Gasbuggy (which was original em place­ m ent hole itself) over an 18 m onths period was th ree times the cum ulative production over a 10 year period from the nearest conventional well. It was projected on this basis th a t the 20 years production from the reentry hole w ould be five times that from the conventional well. N ordyke states that several different m ethods used to estim ate the degree of stim ulation produced by the Gasbuggy explosion all indicated a factor in the range 5-8, though Chew and R an d o lp h 15 a n ti­ cipate a dow nw ard revision of the 20-year estim ate of pro­ duction from th e reen try hole based on production tests over a six-month period, M ay-N ovem ber 1973, after a four-year shutdow n. Sim ilar increases in gas production (5-8 fold) have been said to have been observed16 for R ulison also. T he extent of the fracture zone leading to gas stim ulation has been assum ed7 to be 2.5 tim es the cavity radius R c (see T able 4) in a horizontal direction, 4.4 R c in a vertical direc­ tion above the short point and 2.4 R c in a vertical direction below th e shot point. A 100 kt explosive is then assum ed to produce a cylindrical zone o f very high perm eability of radius

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (P N Es)

23

67 m and height 182 m. I f the thickness of the gas-bearing strata is m uch higher than the latter figure, m ultiple deto­ nations in a single em placem ent bore hole m ay become neces­ sary. Project R io Blanco was the first field experim ent to detonate sim ultaneously three explosives in a single well bore (see T a b le 4). T he explosive used in this experim ent17 was the so-called D iam ond explosive, specifically designed for hydrocarbon applications. Based on the M in iata test event16 a t the N evada Test Site on Ju ly 8, 1971, it is designed to survive extrem e tem peratures and pressures and h av e a yield range betw een 20-100 kt while having a diam eter less th an 18 cm an d leaving a residual tritium of 0.1 to 0.2 gm. In the Rio Blanco experim ent, the separation betw een neighbouring explosives was designed so th at th eir fracture regions overlap. But reentry drilling and production tests14,18 carried on upto N ovem ber 1974 have clearly established sur­ prisingly th a t no perm eable connection exists betw een the top a n d the m iddle detonation regions. It would seem th at fract­ uring caused by m ultiple detonations an d the interactions of shock waves are still not well understood. U .S.A . m ay reeva­ luate their project W agon W heel (w hich is based on the anti­ cipated production of a single chim ney about 850 m high) on the basis of further studies on vertical com m unication betw een chim neys in sequential detonations. T he Soviet U nion has also apparently carried out success­ fully a gas stim ulation experim ent19 b u t no details appear to have been m ade available. T hey have also proposed the stim­ ulation of a gas condensate reservoir in a carbonaceous reef deposit. A section betw een 1200 m and 1600 m contains the gas deposits w ith a heavily oxidised oil zone lying betw een 1600 an d 1700 m. Below the oil is a w ater zone. T he detona­ tion of three 40 kt nuclear explosives at 1600 m is expected to produce a fractured zone w ith a radius of about 270 m, i.e. of the order of about 10 cavity radii. Gas production is expec­ ted to im prove 12-fold from 0.25xl06m 3/day to 3 x l0 6m 3/day.

24

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

(b ) Oil Stimulation In this field, U .S.S.R . has successfully carried out19,3,11 tw o experim ents in carbonate-type oil deposits and have p ro ­ posed a third and the following is a sum m ary of these experi­ m ents : ( I ) Field A T his was a solution gas drive reservoir in a limestone reef a t d ep th of 1000-1500 m. T h e deposit is isolated from a press­ urised w ater zone at the bottom by an oxidised or bitum inized layer 25-50 m thick. In seven years of production, the for­ m ation pressure dropped from 137 to 30 kg/cm 2; m axim um norm al recovery capability was estim ated at about 25% of the to tal resource, sam e 8 million tons of oil being left in the reservoir. After n u clear explosion fracturing in the eighth year (in first stage by tw o 2.3 kt devices 200 m eters ap art at d epths of 1378 m and 1348 m fired w ith a 100 millisecond delay perhaps3 in M arch-A pril 1965; the second stage involved the detonation of a single 8 kt device th ree-an d —a h a lf m onths later, 350 m from one of the tw o earlier shot points a t a depth o f 1350 m; see Figure 3), im m ediate increase in yield were evident. O ru d jev 20 is said to have indicated an average of 34% increase in production rate an d a 10% increase in ulti­ m ate recovery. Increased production was reported for 20 wells w ithin 300-470 m of the shot points. Since the experim ent, oil from the reservoir has been analysed an d found not to contain h arm iu l am ounts of radioactivity an d has been in routine g eneral use. (ii) Field B T his was the second oil stim ulation project in a caibonate reef deposit sim ilar to Field A but located a t a depth of 10001200 m . T h e oil reservoir is in porous, fissured limestones and dolom ites upto 100 m thick. T h ere is a w ater bearing form ation below the oil reservoir and the reservoir was being worked by w ater injection. Initial reservoir pressure was 118 atm . but h ad declined to 50-60 atm . due to depletion o f the field.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

25

T o stim ulate the production from this field, two 8 kt nucl­ e a r explosions w ere detonated in the m iddle of the field. T he first explosive was detonated at a depth of 1212 m in limestone an d dolom ite layers and about 30 m below the oil-w ater cont­ act. T h e chim ney should have extended upw ard into the oil bearing form ation. T h e second device was detonated some­ w h at later at a depth of 1208 m , about 1.2 km from the e a rl­ ier shot point. T h e nearest producing well to either of the shots was a t 150 m. T h e oil was p u t into general use a few days after the explosion as the radioactivity in it was insignificant. Seven producing wells in the range from 150-800 m from the em pla­ cem ent wells showed production rate increases of 30-60% in the first year or so o f post-shot operations,. ( iii) Proposed Field C T h e carbonate reef about 100 m thick at a depth of 14001520 m overlies a high pressure lim estone-w ater zone w hich is screened from the oil form ation by dense intercalations. T hree n u clear explosives in the range of 20-30 kt are intended to be d etonated 20-30 m below the oil-w ater contact. T he w ater w ould push through the chim neys and the fracture zones into the oil reservoir an d drive out the oil. T h e Soviet experience in oil stim ulation by n u clear explo­ sions indicates th a t fracturing is the m ain phenom enon w hich increases the effective w ell-bore radius a n d the perm eability o f the reservoir rock (carbonate oil reservoirs have p articu l­ arly low perm eability) and leads to increased production rate. T his production increase can be felt a t even far-aw ay bore holes w hich are, how ever, w ithin, the fracture zone. India can consider the use of this technique to increase both the production rate and the u ltim ate recovery, p articu larly in depleted oil reservoirs in G ujarat. O il exists in various other types of form ations and PN E has also been considered for the exploitation of these oil resou­ rces. T here has been a proposal21 to enhance production of

26

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

petroleum from bitum inous sand form ations in V enezuela a t depths of 1000 m using n u clear explosions to release th e n a tu ­ ral geo therm al heat. W hen a n u clear explosion is com pletely contained, 90—95% of the n uclear energy release rem ains as residual th erm al energy.22 In a recent C anadian proposal23, it seems to be suggested th a t this h e a t could be used to con­ vert the hydrocarbons in heavy oil and ta r sands (in A lberta and Sasketchw an) into gaseous and liquid forms th a t in tu rn heat a n d liquify m ore distant deposits, driving them to the surface o f the earth through peripheral wells. It was estim ated th a t the present 10% long term recovery rate of shale oil could be increased to 50% by use of this technique. A nother a n d m ore prom ising m ethod24 proposed for the recovery of oil from oil shale cells for retorting the latter in situ after breaking the rock w ith underground n u clear explosives. It has been estim ated th a t 640 billion barrels of oil are in reser­ ves in C olorado of suitable thickness and grade for this m eth ­ od to be used. (c) Underground Storage o f Natural Gas I t is convenient to have storage facilities for n a tu ra l gas n ear u rb a n centres of consum ption, so that the efficiency o f the pipe line grids is not affected by fluctuations in d em and. It is possible to use either the void volum e in the chim ney2^,2« produced by a deeply buried contained nuclear explosion in h ard rock or in the standing cavity27 produced in a salt for­ m ation. T ypically26, a 25 kt explosion in dense silicate rock (den­ sity 2.5 gm /cc detonated a t a depth of 600 m is seen to prod­ uce a storage void volum e o f 136,000 m3, the depth o f the storage roof being 350 m. T he am ount of gas th at can be stored in th e chim ney will depend on the m axim um o p erat­ ing pressure an d the tem perature ; assuming the la tte r tw o p aram eters as 100 atm ospheres and 15°c, the m axim um q u an tity o f gas (at STP) th at can be stored works o u t as 8.75 XIO6!»3. A bout 4o% of this has to be retained in th e chim ­ ney as a cushion gas a t the m inim um w orking pressure. O f

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions ( PNEs)

27

course, a dozen or more such storage chim neys w ould be needed near each urban consum ption centre. P arker26 has m ade a d etailed study of com parative costs of this kind of storage against liquified n a tu ra l gas (LNG) storage an d stor­ age in underground salt cavities produced by solution m ini­ ng, i.e. by washing out w ith sea w ater. His conclusions are not very firm b u t he does find a definite economic ad vantage for nuclear chim ney storage in W estern E urope over LN G storage. O n the other hand, salt cavity storage is not econom ­ ically unfavourable b u t it depends on the occurance of suit­ ab le salt beds an d the preferable location n e a r the sea to d u m p the w ashed brine. T h e im portant requirem ents for n u clear chim ney storage are reasonable seismic dam age costi28 (w hich lim it the m axim um yield th at can be used) a n d the integrity of the storage space b u t these seem achie­ vable. R andolph29 has considered a gas storage system (2.83x108m3 (STP) o f working gas) in a 40,000 k m 2 are a o f W est­ ern A rizona in U .S.A to accom m odate a grow th in peak n arket dem and of 7.1X106m3/d (STP). T o increase the cap­ acity of the transm ission system for this purpose was estim at­ ed to require $ 62.5 million. O n the other han d , five 200 kiloton nuclear detonations at a depth of 1700 m were estim ­ ated to provide this storage at a cost of 20 m illion. U .S.S.R . has also done a great deal of work in undergro* u n d storage of n a tu ra l gas an d gas condensates and have carried out three experim ents in salt deposits in this connect­ ion. T hese are listed below: TA BLE 5 : Soviet experiments on storage of natural gas and gas condensates in salt deposits. Expt. 1 Yield D epth of em placem ent C avity volum e

1.1 k t 161,4 m 11,200 m3

Expt. 2

Expt. 3

25 kt

15 kt

590 m

1140 m

140,000 m 3

50,000 m 3

28

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

In industrial testing of the nuclear cavities, the effective volum e was reported27 to be 10% larger th an its geom etrical volume far storing liquified gas condem ate and 24% larger for gas storage, because of the fracture legicn surrounding the cavity. E xperim ent 3 has been tested30 w ith gas an d fluid upto a pressure of 84 atm ospheres. T h e cavity was reported as having been p u t into industrial use as a gas condensate reservoir an d the radioactivity in the condensate stored in the cavity was said to be below applicable radiation levels. (d) In-situ Leaching o f Copper Ores T here are three m ethods31 of utilizing PN E in m ining operations : (a) to remove the overburden w ith excavating explosions an d to expose the ore; (b) to use blockcaving tech­ niques to m ine ore broken by a contained explosions ; an d (c) to crush the ore underground by a contained explosion, foll­ owed by in-situ leaching o f the ore and puir.ping of the m ineral-rich liquor to the suiface. T he third alternative has been considerd an attractive one for oxidised copper ore bodies w hich are considerd to be of too low a grade for economic m inig by conventional methods. T he so-called Project Sloop, proposed in U.S.A. though not yet carried out, was to use sulphuric acid leaching of an enriched oxide ore zone crushed by a 20 kt device. T he pregnant liquor could be pum ped upto the surface by dow nhole pum ps or could be collected from galleries below the chim ney. This m ethod of recovery of copper is circum scribed by the fact th at it is applicable only to oxidized or secondary ore deposits. T h e copper m inerals in all the In d ian ore bodies are essentially the prim ary sulphide ores and for the in-situ lea­ ching of such m inerals, it would be necessary to inject hot acid under pressure, w ith aeration32. Lewis et a l33 have suggested the use of a contained nu­ clear explosion to produce a chim ney o f broken prim ary copper sulphide ore below the w ater tab le (see Figure 4) After the chim ney is filled w ith w ater and reaches hydrostatic

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

29

equilibrium , oxygen is introduced n ear the bottom of chim ney. T h e increase in solubility of oxygen a t high hydro­ static pressure is sufficient to initiate the oxidation o f the p rim ary sulphides-chal-copyrite and pyrite. T h e oxidation and dissolution o f these sulphides produces enough h eat to increase th e tem perature o f the ore and w ater in the chim ney to 100°C. In an econom ic analysis of the m ethod it was estim ated th a t a hypothetical 70-million ton ore body w ith a copper o f 0.45% betw een 400 and 750 m deep w ould require eleven lOOkt expl­ osions. For this 16-years project, the gross cap ital investm ent was estim ated to be $13.1 m illion and the average an n u al sales $ 10.3 m illion at $ 0.95/kg of copper’ An internal rate o f re tu rn on the investm ent of 31% was claim ed. In a m ore recent paper, B raun e t al34 have p rep ard a plan for com m erc­ ialising this chem ical m ining process w hich involves a detona­ tion schedule of 10 chim neys every 3 years by 100 kt explosi­ ons (4.5 m illion tons of ore rubble per explosion) in a deep lying ore body (0.5% grade), a leaching cycle of six years an d an a n n u a l copper production of 40,000 tons. T h e recovery using this m ethod is claim ed to be profitable w hile it w ould be unprofitable by any other m ethod. If successful, such m ethod of m ining using PN E ore likely to increase exploitable reserves of non-ferrous m etals like copper and nickel. (e)

Excavation Applications

A lOOkt explosion a t an optim um depth of b u rial 160-180 m produces an ap p aren t crater w ith a volum e o f 4 —5X106m 3. Such a crater reservoir is well-suited to store w ater in arid regions : using U.S.A. cost estimates, R etief an d K ru g er35 found th at for a wide range of single explosive yields betw een 170 kt and 5 M t, the total nuclear excavation cost varies betw een % 1.4-1.8 million dollars, w hile the storage capacity provided is betw een 6X106m 3 and 20 times th a t value. O th er suggested uses36 of excavating explosions include the constru­ ction of a sheltered h arb o u r at Gape K erau d ren in A ustralia using five 200 kt explosives ; and the use of two 150 kt expl­ osive in a stream bed in the Soviet Union to produce craters whose 30 m eter high lips could be used as dam s to provide storage colum ns of 30-4. X 106m3.

30

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

T he m axim um interest in uses o f nuclear excavation, how ever, continues to be in th e construction of inter-oceanic canals and inter-river w aterw ays and the details of such proposals are given in table 6. As m entioned earlier, U .S .S .R . has carried out a m ultiple cratering experim ent8 as a prelim i­ n ary step in studying the use of nuclear excavation for the P echora-K am a C anal Project. This involved a row of three 15 kt explosives buried at 127 m w ith a spacing of 160-170 m. T h e three explosives detonated sim ultaneously n ear the southern end o f the section proposed for nuclear construction produced a w ater-filled trench of length about 700 m, w idth 340 m and depth 10-15 m. T his trench m ay be used as an integral p a rt of the final canal. T h e slopes of th e crater trench w ere reported to be stable since it was formed. 4.

Radiological Safety and Nature o f the Explosive Device

In PNE experim ents and projects, one has to m ake th a t there is no radiation hazard to public in the areas ounding the PN E site and also th at the product is free radioactive contam ination. In evaluating the feasibility th e cost of a PN E project, this aspect has to be taken account.

sure surr­ from and into

T h e radioactivity produced in a n uclear detonation arises from the fission products, th e isotopes produced by neutron activation of device com ponets and the soil and the residual tritium . Fission products area alw ays present because, a t pres­ ent, fission triggers are needed even in therm onuclear divices though activation products an d tritium will begin to dom inate in the la tte r case. T h e explosive used in the USA gas stim ulation experim ent Gasbuggy (see Section 3a) was apparently a therm onuclear device40 and left behind about 4 gm. or 40,000 curies o f tritium . For this application, as for others involving oil stim ulation or n atu ral gas storage, tritiu m is the im portant radioisotope fVom a contam ination point of view because it exchanges very fast w ith th e hydrogen in the hydrocarbon

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (P N Es)

31

an d then moves w ith it. T h e explosives used in th e R ulison an d Rio Blanco experim ents were pure fission explosives an d they were also surrounded by boron to m inim ise the p ro d u c­ tion of tritiu m by reaction of neutrons w ith the lith iu m in the rock by the reaction L i6 (n, “ ) T . T h e so-called D iam ond explosive referred to earlier is a specially designed p u re fission explosive an d a 100 kt explosive o f this type is said to produce less th a n 2000 curies of tritium w hile a therm onuclear explo­ sive of this yield w ith a low yield fission trigger will leave behind about 2,000,000 curies of tritiu m 41. In a deeply buried “ contained” , explosion, the m olten rock lining the vaporised cavity collects at the bottom an d forms the so-called “ puddle glass” . M ost of th e residual fissile m aterial an d other radioactive species w hich are refra­ ctory, e.g., the fission products (65zr, 95Nb, 144Ce, etc.) and activation products 45Ca, 55Fe, etc. will largely be found in this pud d le glass. O n the other h and, radioactive species w hich a re volatile like 85icr, are trap p ed in the void volum e betw een the ru b b le fragm ents in the chim ney w hile those w hich have volatile precursors like 90Sr and 137Ca are deposited on the surfaces of the chim ney rubble. T he radioactive species w hich emerges w ith the engineering product of interest depends on m any factors including th e process of extraction; e.g, 106Ru is the fission product of im portance in copper m ining by in-situ leac­ hing b u t is not considered to pose a serious problem a n d the pure fission D iam ond explosive is said to be preferred by U.S.A. for this application also.41 In fact tritiu m is again considered the critical nuclide due to potential exposure of chem ical refinery workers. In excavation applications, radioactive clouds a re form ed an d most of the radioactivity in the cloud is deposited in the dow nw ind direction. T h e refractory species a re alm ost com ­ pletely m ixed w ith th e m elted rock. At depths o f b u rial inten­ ded to produce craters o f m axim um volum e, 80 to 95% of the total radioactivity produced by the explosion is retain ed in the im m ediate vicinity o f the crater. T h e rem ain d er is

32

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

distributed betw een the m ain an d base surge clouds42. In excavation applications, one w ould perhaps tend to use th e­ rm onuclear explosives w ith low fission yields to reduce fission product fallouts. In a statem ent on the developm ent o f n u cl­ e a r explosives in U .S.A ., for such applications, H am b u rg er1 stated th at “ we now estim ate th a t for each explosive deto­ n ated in cratering events of useful m agnitude, the sum of fission products airborne in the radioactive cloud and in the fallout can be expected to be as low as th a t am ount of fission products resulting from a p u re fission n u clear explosion hav­ ing an energy yield equivalent to 20 tons o f T N T .” 5. IN D IA ’S PE A C E FU L N U C L E A R E X P L O S IO N E X P E ­ R IM E N T * As a step tow ards studying fracturing effects in rocks, groundm otion, containm ent o f radioactivity a n d the problem s in­ volved in post-shot access o f the shot-point environm ent, an underground peaceful n u clear explosions experim ent was c a rr­ ied out by us last year in the R ajasthan Desert. T he plutonium device was explaced a t a depth o f 107 meters in a cham ber at the end of an L -shaped hole. T h e excavation o f the shaft was done using pneum atic pavem ent breakers an d the m uck was hoisted using a steel ‘A ’ fram e and a diesel-operated w inch. T h e rock surrounding the em ­ placem ent point was thinly-lam inated chocolate-brow n and greenish-grey shale containing m inute bands of silty an d micaceous layers (density 2.45 g/ cc; m elting point 12501300°C) w ith a w ater content o f about 4%. From about 55 m eters above the em placem ent point an d upto 12 m eters from the original ground surface, there are dom inantly a re n a ­ ceous form ations (of lower density about 2.10 g/cc an d lower w ater content) com prising sandstone and siltstone. T h e rocks

*A m ore com plete description of this experim ent has been given in a paper en titled “ Some Studies on I n d ia ’s PNE E x p erim en t” by R . C hi­ d am baram an d R . R a m an n a presented at the M eeting of the T ech n i­ cal'C o m m ittee on PN E , IAEA, V ienna, Ja n u a ry 20-24, 1975,

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PN Es)

33

are highly crushed an d sheared at m any depths in the above tw o zones. T h e first 12 meters consisted of top sandy soil foll­ ow ed by a m ixed zone containing m edium -to-coarse gravel, lum ps and m odules o f kankar, conglom erates, loosely-cement­ ed m edium -to-coarse grained sandstone, etc. T h e cham b er housing the device was effectively sealed to prevent possible en try of sand an d dust at the tim e of stem­ m ing th e hole. T h e adit an d the bottom o f the shaft to a d epth of 6 m eters w ere closely packed w ith sandbags, foll­ ow ed by a layer o f concrete blocks. Loose sand an d exca­ vated m uck collected a t site w ere then gently bulldozed in­ to the shaft. D u rin g the stem m ing operation, the device was continuously m onitored by two television cam eras located in the ch am b er. As an im portant part o f the public and environm ental safety program m e for the experim ent, a netw ork of m eteoro­ logy stations, one o f them very near the Surface G round Zero w ere set up several m onths before th e experim ent. O n th e basis of m eteorological observations an d site topological considerations, the following criteria for tim ing o f the experim ent were arriv ed a t43: (i)

W ind direction from SW to W , preferable W SW

(ii)

W ind speed-m inim um km /hr.

(iii)

A tm ospheric stability-category D for first hour and C ategory C subsequently.

(iv)

W ind direction persistency-2 to 3 hours.

(v)

No inversions.

(vi)

No sandstorm s forecast for next 2 \ hours.

(vii)

15 km /hr.,

m axim um

20

Sky conditions clear.

T hese criteria ensured th at in the unlikely event o f vent­ ing of radioactivity and the form ation of a radioactive cloud, th e dow nw ind direction of cloud travel w ould have been tow ards u n in h ab ited regions in th e E N E sector until the

34

Perspectives o f India’s Nuclear Policy

predicted m axim um radiation exposure due to passage of the cloud and deposition of radioactivity on the ground reduced to insignificant levels. Figure 5 shows th e average wind rises in the area for M ay 1972 and M ay 1973 betw een 0600 and 1200 hours. W ith these criteria in m ind, the experim ent was planned and carried out at 0805 hrs, (1ST) on M ay 18, 1974. At the tim e of the experim ent, the w ind direction was from W SW at a m ean speed o f about 20 km /hr. Extensive radiation m onitoring of the site and analysis o f soil and air samples before an d after the experim ent, as detaild below, showed th a t no radioactivity h a d been released to the atm osphere by the experim ent. A part from two h ealth physics laboratories, one at the central point and ano th er more elaborately equipped some­ w hat farther aw ay, a large num ber of field m onitoring equi­ pm ents were kept ready.44 Facilities for on-the-spot checking of fission product contam ination of w ater, soil and vegetation were also provided. Prior to the experim ent, several hundred deposition trays and therm olum inescent dosim eters were distributed in a radial grid a t various angular and distance intervals. D uring the period preceding and following th e experi­ m ent, all portable m onitors w ere kept on and rad iatio n levels w ere continuously m onitored. No increases in radiation levels above the background level of 0.02 m r/h r were observed in any of the different types o f monitors used. After 30 m inutes, the first reconnoitering health physics team w ent in jeeps with ad eq u ate protection cover and m onitoring instrum ents upto about 135 m etres of the crater lip. T he team returned at 0920 hrs. and cleared the area from a radiation point of view; H ow ever, the team reported observing deep fissures on the ground and cautioned m ovem ent along the p a th . M ean­ while m onitoring inform ation radioed back from the various surveillance cam ps and the helicopter team revealed th a t no change in radiation levels above background was observed

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (P N Es)

35

by an y of these team s. T he m obile surveillance team s were then advised to proceed tow ards the dow n-w ind direction, clearing areas and rem oving road blocks after monitoring. T h e entire sector was cleared for general use by population by this tim e (around 1000 hrs.). M eanw hile, the helicopter team reported moving criss­ cross along the down direction for 20 km and did not observe an y increase in background rad iatio n levels. T h en they pro­ ceeded to the c ra te r area and w ent down to 30 m above Surface G round Zero. H ere also they did not observe any increase over background rad iatio n levels. At about 1000 hrs. a health physics team was sent to the crater a re a for m onit­ oring a n d inspection. This team w ent upto the tip of the c ra te r, m onitoring crevices and fissures on the paths by low ering the probes of G M survey m eters. N o increase in background levels was observed. T h e next day, a h ealth physics team visited the crater site, m onitored the cra te r and collected soil samples from near G round Zero (see Figure 6). T h e radiation levels did not show any increase in background. T he trays and therm o­ lum inescent dosi-meters in 1 km radius zone and the soil sam ples collected from n ear Surface G round Zero did not show any activity. T he personnel dosim eters and film badges also did not show any radiation exposure to personnel. F u r­ th er, the air, milk and deposition, sam ples from our N ational F allout N etw ork- p articu larly in dow nw ind direction, viz. J a ip u r, Bikaner, D elhi - as well as dust samples from dom e­ stic flights, D elhi-Jaipur-A hm edabad and D elhi-Bom bay, did not show any radioactivity above the prevailing background levels. T he experim ent was thus a totally contained one lrom rad io activ ity point of view. Teleseism ic P-w ave signals recorded a t 11 stations of the U.S. Coast and G eodetic Survey’s w orld-w ide standardised seism ograph netw ork45 and six seismic arrays viz. G A U R IB ID A N U R (India), H A G FO R S (Sweden) N O R SA R (N or­ way,) E SK A D A L E -M U IR (S cotland), Y E L L O W K N IFE (C an ad a) and W A R R A M U N G A (A ustralia) lead to an

36

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

average body wave m agnitude, (mb) estim ate of 5.0 on the R ich ter scale. T h e signals reco.ded a t G au rib id an u r Seismic A rray S tation48 a re shown in F igure 7. This m agnitude, assum ing best coupling under h ard rock conditions, w ould fix on the basis of the w idely-accepted yield m agnitude rel­ ation47, the lower bound of yield to be 10 kilotons. M oreover on com parison w ith the global average mb of 5.1 obtained from G asbuggy48 (contained 29 kt PNE gas-stim ulation exp­ erim ent carried out by U.S.A. in shale an d sandstone), the yield would appear to be higher than 10 kilotons. T he am plitude of 120 nanom eters a t the m axim um period of 9 seconds registered at G au rib id an u r (eipcentral distance about 14°) by the vertical com ponent of the R ayleigh w ave leads to a surface w ave m agnitude (Ms) of 2.9 .Follow ing the recom m ended relation4 betw een em pirical yield Y and surface w ave m agnitude, i.e. M s= 1 .3 Log10 Y -[- 1.5, the yield w ould ap p ear to be closer to 12 kilotons. T he form ation of the m ound, its grow th and fall were photographed by several high-speed m ovie cam eras located a t distance betw een 1.5 to 4 km. A few still shots were also obtained, one of w hich taken from near the control point is shown in Fig. 8. T he ground above the em placem ent point rose w ith an initial spall velocity of about 30 m eters/sec to form a dome 170 m eters in diam eter and 34 m eters in height. Slow m ot­ ion runs o f the film taken w ith the high speed movie cam ­ eras clearly showed th a t the m ound was not ruptured by the cavity gases d uring its grow th an d fall, w hich is consistent w ith the fact th a t no radioactivity was released to the atm o­ sphere by the experim ent. T h e ground-level barographs operated at distance of 1.2 km and 6 km from Surface G round Zero gave no pressure signal other th an the ground-coupled air w ave showing th at the experim ent did not give rise to any a ir blast due to cavity gases venting from the m ound. T his is in agreem ent w ith

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (P N Es)

37

the fact th a t no radioactivity w as released to the atm os­ phere by the experim ent. T h e vertical com ponent of Surface A cceleration4®recorded a t 135 m eters from Surface G round Zero (see Figure 9) shows th ree clear positive peaks - the first one corresponding obvious­ ly to th e explosion-produced p rim ary shock, w hile the last one w hich is m uch sharper m ust be attrib u ted to the im p act or slapdow n of the spalled layer. T he interm ediate positive acceleration pulse, arriving about 40 milli-seconds after the initial signal suggests81’52 th a t the most significant spall n u cleated a t about 60 m etres below ground level, assuming th e shock w ave velocity of compressional waves m easured by geophones. T h e slapdow n of this 60-m etre thick spalled layer resul­ ted in a strong secondary seismic signal, w hich followed the first after 2 to 2.5 seconds, as is seen from geophone records at ground range of 4 and 6 km and as reflected in the teleseismic spectra recorded at Hagfors (Sw eden), Stollet (Sweden) an d Y ellow knife A rray (C anada). It is interesting to note th at at about this d ep th the n atu re o f th e geological m edium changes w ith higher density shale below this level and lower density sandstone and siltstone above, as described earlier. T his spalled layer must have retained substantially its integ­ rity during th e spallation and prevented access o f rad io acti­ vity to the atm osphere. T h e experim ent produced a crater, whose photograph is shown in Figure 10. D etailed surveys of th e crater area have been carried out. T h e apparent crater has an average radius of 47 m etres and depth 10 m etres m easured w ith respect to th e preshot ground surface. Figure 11 shows th e scaled ap p aren t cra te r radius versus the scaled depth of b u rst for U .S.A. and U .S.S.R , n uclear creating experim ents in dry, h a rd rock. T he point corresponding to our experim ent53 assum ing a yield o f 12 kt is shown in the sam e figure an d is seen to be in agreem ­ ent w ith the em pirical curve36. Figure 12 is a sim ilar curve showing th e scaled ap p aren t crater depth versus the scaled depth o f burst.

38

Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy

6 . PO ST-SH O T D RILLIN G O PE R A T IO N S A N D PREL­ IM INA RY CALCULATIONS ON PH ENO M ENO LO G Y O F O U R PN E EX PE R IM EN T f.

0

Post-shot drilling operations a t the experim ent site have been carried o u t to define the true crater boundary and the zones of fractured and crushed rocks, to study the dispersal of underground radioactivity an d to obtain core sam ples from various depths an d distances. Necessary health physics survei­ llance and advice has been given during drilling and core reco­ very operations for the com pleted bore holes. A gam m a log of one of the bore holes is shown in Figure 13. It is clear from our bore hole gam m a logs an d radiochem ical m easurem ents on the rock sam ples obtained from the bore holes th a t a ll the residual radioactivity from th e experim ent is b u ried deep underground. No radioactivity has been found closer than 30 m etres to the post-shot ground surface. O ne borehole was drilled a t 45° angle to the horizontal in order to start the drilling from outside the heavily fractured and fissured ground surface. All the other bore holes are ver­ tical.; Several bore holes have been drilled around the Surface G round Zero in order to exam ine the fractures in the rock im m ediately above the em placem ent point. T he drilling of these holes was difficult d u e to heavy , loss of w ater in the crushed and fractured zones an d in these regions th e entire drilling was done by grad u ally lowering the casing as the bore hole advanced in dep th . T he final gam m a logs in the various bore holes and the cores recovered from them are be­ ing analyed now to arrive a t the dimensions of the true crater. *

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r

% -

Sm all piece of h ard radioactive m aterial have been found at distances upto 40 m eters from the em placem ent point. W h ile .X -ra y diffraction patterns of, powdered pre-shot shale, rock from near th e em placem ent point show sharp diffraction peaks corresponding to several m inerals, the h ard radioactive m eterial is mostly am orphous’ (glassy) and has presum ably been derived from2 O M o d erato r Air coolant PuC>2 fuelled, zero P urniraa M ay energy fast reacto r 1972 (3 litre core) ~ N a t.U , R - 5 ....... '1579 D 2 P M oderator and (Scheduled) coolnat FBTR 1978 U O 2 + P u 0 2 sodium (K alpak (Scheduled) coolant kam)

Z erlina

TABLE 1 AT TRO M BA Y

Ja n u a ry 1961

40 M W

6Xl013n/cm2 /sec.

Zero power (100 w atts)

108 n /c m 2 /sec.

Z ero pow er (10 watts)

109 n/cm 2 /sec.

10Ò M W

3X104 n/cm 2 /sec.

42 M W

3X1015n/cm2 /sec.

Uses Isotope production, solid state an d fission physics research w ith neutron beam s. Isotope product on solid state and nuclear physics re­ search w ith neutron beam s, an d nuclear chem istry an d engi­ neering loop experi­ m ents.

Used for studying N at. U , D2 O lattices of interest to In d ia n Atom ic Energy Program m e. Used for studying p lu to n iu m fuelled sm all fast systems. H igh flux reactor for isotope production ajid research in nuclear & solid state physics an d engineering. Irrad ia tio n facility D evelopm ent o f fast for fuel an d struc- breeder an d sodium tu ra l m aterials. technology.

Perspectives of India’s Nuclear Policy

48 TABLE 2

NUCLEAR

POWER

R E A C T O R S

IN

INDIA T

N am e

TAPAS I TAPAS II

RAPS I RA PP II

M A PP I M APP II

N APP I

Location

D ate of C riticality

Power (Electric)

Fuel

Y

M oderator

P

E Coolant

Boiling Light W ater

T a ra p u r (N ear Bombay M aharashtra)

February 1969 February 1969

200 MW 200 M W

Enriched uo2 Enriched

R an ap ratap g arh (N ear K ota, R ajasth an )

August 1972 Ju n e 1976

200 MW

N at.

U 02

d2o

200 MW

N at.

U()2

d2o

K alpakkam (N ear M adras T am il N adu)

Ju n e 1977 Ju n e 1979

235 MW

N ai.

U 02

d2o

235 MW

Nat.

U 02

d2 o

N aro ra (U tta r Pradesh)

M arch 1981

235 M W

N at.

U 02

Boiling Light W ater

uo2

Pressurised d2o Pressurised d2o

Pressurised d2o Pressurised d2o

Pressurised D2 o

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PN Es)

49

U.S.A. U.S.S.R. U .K . FRA N CE C H IN A IN D IA TOTAL * *♦ -f

4- -f

366 129 5 13 1 1 515+

53* 14**

22 4

E xperim ents for develop­ ing special PNE explosives

PNE experi­ ments for studying Phe. nom enology

No. of re­ ported PN E E xperim ents

Total No. of underground explosions

TABLE 3 U N D E R G R O U N D N U C LEA R EX PL O SIO N S AND PNE E X P E R IM E N T S C A R R IED O U T IN V AR IO U S C O U N T R IES U NTIL FEBRUARY 15, 1975

10 —

-----

-----

—

13

13

—

—

—

1 81 + +

1 40

— —

10

Experim ents

for

Specific

C ontrol of W ater C anal R eservoir Excavation R unw ay Gas W ells Design —

—

O il an d G as sti­ m ulation 3 3

—

1

1

PNE A pplications

2

U nder­ Scientific ground gas Experi­ storage ments 18

—

3

—

—

—

—

—

— —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1

— 1

—

—

2

— — —

—

6

—

•

—

—

—

3

18

O f these 10 are m entioned by H am b u rg erl as being com bined PN E an d w eapons tests. An additional 33 contained explosions listed by Higgins2 an d m entioned as being in ten d ed only for (m ilitary ) explosive developm ent are excluded from this total. In addition to these, Nordyke* lists another 19 u n rep o rted Soviet explosions, whose seismic signals w ere recorded till Novem ber 1973, as PN E experim ents, on the basis th a t these w ere n ot carried o ut in known testing site of U SSR. This num ber is based on inform ation draw n from Stockholm In tern a tio n a l Peace R esearch In stitu te (S IP R I) Y ear Book of W orld A rm am ents an d D isarm am ent, In stitu te Defence Studies an d Analysis J o u r. (India). V ol. V I, No.2, O ctober 1973, and t h e d ata available w ith the Seismology Section, BARG. T h e n u m b er o f explosions ro r the last two years could have been underestim ated because of incom plete d ata. O u t o f these, 15 were cratering experim ents. An experim ent involving m u ltip le sequential or sim ultaneous detonations is counted as one experim ent only.

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

50 TABLE

4

GAS—STIM U LA TIO N FIELD EX PE R IM EN T S OF U .S.A .

Gas buggy"?

RulisonlAS

Rio BlancoM

Wagon whed

D ate

Dec. 10, 1967

Sep. 10, 1969

M ay, 17, 1973

Proposed

Explosive yield

29 kt

43 kt

3x34 kt (Sim ultaneous deto­ nations in a single em placem ent hole)

5x34 kt (Sequ en tial detona­ tions in a single em placem ent hole)

D ia. of explosives

45.4 cm

22.9 cm (544 kg)

less th an 18 cm

D epth o f em placem ent

1293 m

2568 m

1780, 1900, 2040 m

2800-3550 m

Location

Northw est New M exico

W estern Colorado

W estern Colorado

W yom ing

R adius of C avity Rc

24.5 m

23.2 m

20 m

C him ney void V olum e

5.8x104 m3

5x104 m3

2.7x104 ra3

R esidual tritiu m in chi­ m ney environm ent

4 gm (40.000 curies)

1 gm (10,000 curies)

ab o u t 0.1 gm (10,000 curies per explosive)

—

— —

51

TABLE 6

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PN Es)

P r o p o se d C anal b y P a r tia l N u c le a r E x ca v a tio n

Location o f proposed C anal an d purpose

T otal length

Length to be excavated by No. of nuclear n u clear explosives & to tal explosives yield

Sea-level canal through the D arien Isthmus of P an am a ^to accom m odate ships upto 250,000 dwt)37 (a^ R o u te 17 in P anam a

78 km

50 km

250 explosives

(b) R oute 25 in Colom bia

160 km

32 km

150 explosives —to tal yield 120 M t 250 explosives

C anal to link Pechora and 112.5 km 65 km K am a R ivers, USSR (fo r the diversion of w aters from the n o rth ern rivers to raise the level of Caspian Sea which is falling by 6-7 cm / year)8,33 C anal to link the O rinoco 62 km 15.5 km an d the Rio Negro rivers V enezuela (for im proving in lan d general cargo tran s­ p o rta tio n ^ C anal across the Isthm us o f 102 km 45 km K ra, T h ailan d , to link the G ulf of T h ailan d w ith the A ndam an Sea (for h an d lin g upto 500,000 dw t vessels)7

Salvo yields & range of individual yields

27 Salvos o f 1 to 11 M t In d iv id u a l yields 100 kt-3 M t

T o ta l c o st= $ 2.9 billion. N uc­ le a r excavation= $ 1,1 billion. E conom ic burden for evacua­ tin g 40,000 p eo p le= $ 0.14 billion. 21 Salvos of 0.9 to 13 T o tal co st= $ 1.9 billion N. Mt« In d iv id u al yields e x c a v a t i o n co st= $ 1*1 100 kt-3 M t billion. Each Salvo upto 3 M t Use o f nuclear excavation is expected to reduce the cost of the canal by a factor of 3 to 3-5.

157 explosives —total yield 1.6 M t 139 explosives —41 M t

Economics of the project

T o tal Cost (N uclear an d Con. v e n tio n a l1evcavation) = U S $ 195 m illion. Each salvo about 5 M t yields from 100 kt-1 M t

T o tal cost using only conven­ tio n al excavation $ 5 6 billion. N uclear excavation saves $ 2 billion 2-4 years in tim e.

Chapter 3 INDIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS —G.

G. M irc h a n d a n i

Questions about In d ia’s n u clear policy once again becam e relevant after the change of governm ent following th e defeat of Mrs. In d ira G andhi’s Congress p arty in the M arch 1977 parliam entary election. T h e J a n a ta G overnm ent w hich dislo­ dged the Congress regime after nearly 30 years of unbroken rule is a new composite party forged on the eve of th e M arch election by the m erger of five disparate political parties with differing ideologies. • Some of the constituents of the J a n a ta p arty have in the past been vociferous supporters of pro­ bom b lobby in India. Most of them have not spoken on the subject since their parties cam e to pow er. A more detailed reference to this aspect is m ade later in this chapter. T o be able to analyse in depth the thinking of the J a n a ta G overnm ent as a whole, it Is relevant to record briefly the ess­ entials o f the debate th a t has raged in In d ia for three decades, b u t more particularly after C hina m ade h er debut into the n uclear club. Both before and after this event, opposition parties, some of whom now form the J a n a ta G overnm ent, w ere in varying degrees o f em phasis outspoken in their d em an d for Indian nuclear weapons.

India and Nuclear Weapons

53

W hen history’s first atom bom bs fell over H iroshim a and N agasaki in August 1945 a wave o f shock swept India. T he In d ian N ational Congress, until m arch 1977 the country’s dom inant political party, was a t th at tim e locked in a fight w ith the British to rid the country of foreign ru 'e . T h e U nited States was know n to have been sym pathetic to the cause of the Indian freedom m ovem ent. T he Indian people regarded A m ericans w ith feelings of friendliness. Against this background, therefore, the shock was the greater that it w as these people who had been responsible for the great mass­ acre a t H iroshim a and Nagasaki. T he In d ian mind rejected the arg u m en t th a t the A m erican atom bombs had in fact help­ ed to end the w ar and had thereby saved m any m ore lives th an w ere lost because of the bombs. T h e crudity of the US action ap p alled a nation w hich had for two decades fought the prov­ erbial British m ight m ainly through non-violent m eans under th e leadership of M ah atm a G andhi. G andhi, the apostle o f non-violence, set the m oral tone for early In d ian thinking on the U. S. action. H e told a British jo u rn alist th a t he regarded the em ploym ent of the atom bom b as the most diabolical use of scince. Ja w a h a rla l N ehru, G an­ d h i’s political heir (as the M ahatm a used fondly to describe him ) discussed this “ awesome developm ent” w ith G andhi. A t the end of the discussion, N ehru recalled in later years, th e M ah atm a G andhi had resolved to m ake it his life’s miss­ ion to fight for the outlaw ing o f the atom bom b. His mission was, how ever, cut short by an assassin’s bullet on J a n u a ry 30, 1948-five and a h a lf m onths after In d ia won her independence. N E H R U ’S CRUSADE M ah atm a G an d h i’s m antle fell on N ehru. In August 1947 N ehru becam e independent In d ia ’s first Prim e M inister as well as the M inister of external Affairs. In 1954, w hen a separate D epartm ent of Atomic Energy was created, N ehru also becam e In d ia’s first Prim e M inister of A tom ic Energy. These three positions he held till he died in m ay 1964. From all three vantage positions he utilised every opportunity, used

54

Perspectives o f India's JVuclear Policy

every platform —in India and a b ro a d —to carry on his crusade against nuclear weapons, to w ean nations aw ay from the p ath of the nuclear suicide, to m ake thoughts of a nuclear w ar a bad dream of the past? Logically, N ehru announced th a t In d ia herself w ould have nothing to do w ith the atom bom b and th at she would develop atom ic energy for peaceful purposes only. U n d er N eh ru ’s leadership the ruling Congress P arty accepted his “ ban-the-bom b” program m e as p a .t of its creed. From the opposition political parties, too, there were no dissident voices for m any a year. N ehru m ade the positicn of the G overnm ent of In d ia clear repeatedly and in categorical term s. Speaking at the inauguration of In d ia ’s (and Asia’s) first nuclear reactor Apsara (celestial dancer) a t T rom bay, near Bombay, on Ja n u ary 20, 1957 he said: “ No m an can prophesy the future. But I should like to say on b eh alf of my G overnm ent—and I th>nk I can say with some assurance on b eh alf of any future Gove­ rnm ent of In d ia —th a t w hatever m ight h appen, w hatever the circum stances, we shall never use this atom ic energy for evil purposes. T here is no condition attached to a this assurance, because once a condition is atteched, the value of such an assurance does not go very far.” W ithin the country, N ehru worked tirelessly to educate his fellow -countrym en on the im m orality of nuclcar-w capons -^ “ these fi ightiul engines of destruction.” . Nine days before he passed aw ay on the M ay 27, 19G4 a physically m uch w eakened N ehru showed th at on his vital issue he rem ained clear-sighted and unshaken. In a television interview screend in New York on may 18, he declared: “ We are determ ined not to use (nuclear) weapons for w ar purposes. W e do not m ake atom bombs. I do not think we w ill.” These were perhaps his last words on the subject before his death, and when he spoke them he knew th at C hina w ould enter the nuclear w eapon field before very long. (The first Chinese explosion cam e five m onths later.)

India and Nuclear Weàpons

55

RUM BLING S O N IN D IA ’S BO R D ER R ight up to the early 1960s, Indian com m ent on the haza­ rds of n u clear w arfare had assumed no direct threat to In d ia —not until there were atom ic rum blings across In d ia’s northern frontier. W hen the news first broke th at M ao T se-tung’s C hina m ight in the not too distant future possess th e atom bomb, the n u clear th reat assum ed a new dim ension in In d ian eyes. For the first tim e In d ia w as directly involved. Even so, the realisa­ tion was slow in coming. T he picture altered radically after the Chinese arm ed a tt­ ack across In d ia’s borders on O ctober 20, 1962. T he im age of a friendly nighbour across the H im alayn border, until then considered im pregnable, turned overnight into one of an untrustw orthy, hostile pow er whose future intentions w ere suspect. T h e two years betw een the Chinese attack on In d ia and th e first Chinese n u clear explosion on october 16, 1964 were in In d ia years o f tortuous uncertainty. Increasing signs of C h in a ’s ostentatious friendship w ith an unfriendly Pakistan served only to provide to the nervous Indian m ind proof th at C h in a’s future intentions were evil. An openly hostile C h in a trying to develop her own n u clear weapons now posed a th re a t w hich no longer seem ed to the average In d ian distant or academ ic. P arliam entary debates showed up a grow ing uneasiness. T he feeling of disquiet w'as also voiced from public platform s and in the columns of new spapers. A pro-bom b lobby started coming into the open even during N eh ru ’s life tim e. Less th a n six weeks after the cease­ fire in the 1962 arm ed conflict w ith C hina, th e B haratiya J a n a Sangh (w hich in the 1967 general elections em erged as the second largest opposition party in the Indian P arliam en t an d is at present an im p o rtan t com ponent o f the five-party J a n a ta Go­ vernm ent) dem anded in a form al resolution the production of nuclear weapons by In d ia as p a rt o f the country’s long-term

56

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

defence effort against C hina. T his was the first time ever th at a major political p arty had form ally voiced such a dem and. SHRILL DEBATE T hereafter, the bom b-for-security lobby slowly gathered m om entum , and its votaries included influential mem bers of the ruling Congress P a rty -N eh ru ’s im placable opposition to the bom b notw ithstanding. W hen the first Chinese explosion cam e less than five months after N ehru’s death, the successor Gove­ rn m en t’s attitu d e showed no outw ard sign of weakening. Im p l­ ications of the Chinese explosion were considered by the Indian C abinet four days after the event, b u t no form al statem ent was issued. O n O ctober 22, 1964, M rs. In d ira G andhi who was then In d ia’s M inister o f Inform ation an d Broadcasting, said in an interveiw on French television in Paris: “ In d ia is in a position to produce the bom b w ithin 18 n o n th s. But I think we should not diviate from our stand and should use atom ic energy for peaceful purposes only.” But in the country as a whole the G reat D ebate was on. O n the public platform , through the Press and inside P arlia­ m ent, opposition parties missed no opportunities to emphasise the increased danger from C hina after she had come into possession of the atom bomb.. In small num bers at first, m em bers of the Congress Party, too, began publicly to join the debate on the side of those who dem anded a change in G overnm ent’s policy. T heir num ber gFew w ith the passage of time and soon individuals in positions of authority lent the weight of their support to the rank and file. BOM B N O T “ AT PR E SE N T ” O n N ovem ber 24, 1964, the Lok Sabha (low er house of Parliam ent) held its first debate on the inernational situation after the Chinese nuclear explosion. Most of the speakers concentrated on issues arising out of the Chinese explosion. N eh ru ’s successor as Prim e M inister, Lai B ahadur Shastri, reiterated his G overnm ent’s decision not to produce the atom

India and Nuclear Weapons

57

bom b for m oral and practical considerations b u t added th a t he shared the concern of .. m em bers over the Chinese blast. H e said th a t G overnm ent’s present stand should not be regarded as a perm anent one. No G overnm ent, he said, could afford to adopt a static approach. This was in m arked contrast to N eh ru ’s uncom prising opposition voiced tirelessly for alm ost 20 years. Shastri spoke in H indi. T h e literal English translation of w hat he said is as follows: “ I cannot say th a t the present policy is deep-rooted, th a t it cannot be set aside, th a t it can never be changed ... an individual m ay have a static policy ... b u t in the political field we cannot do so (have a static policy). H ere situations alter, changes take place, an d we have to m ould our policies accordingly. If there is heed to am end w hat we have said today, then we will say— alright, let us go ahead an d do so” . T h e Prim e M inister’s statem ent was w idely interpreted by parliam entary correspondents as a reflection of the Govern­ m ent’s concern over the strong criticism voiced in the House agaitns w hat the critics described as the G overnm ent’s “ in activity” on the bom b issues. In Ja n u a ry , 1965, speaking at the 69th an n u al session of the Indian N ational Congress, Prim e M inister L ai B ahadur Shastri declared: “ O u r policy is not to m anufacture the atom bom b a t p resent.” A t a press conference soon thereafter he was asked to explain the expression“ at present” . Lai B ahadur S hastri’s reply, taken from an official record, was: “ W hen I say for the present, the present is a very long period. It is not going to be a short one ... I cannot say anything as to w hat m ight happen in the distant future. So long as we are here, our policy is clear th a t we do not w ant th at atom bombs should be m anufactured in In d ia .” In the wake of the Septem ber 1965 arm ed conflict w ith Pakistan, accom panied by m enacing postures by the now nuclear China> the “ m ake-the-bom b” dem and acquired a new ferocity. An increasing num ber of Congress p arty m em bers began to air their thoughts freely in public. Among them were

58

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

a few in positions o f authority, both at the centre and States. A day before the 22-day Indo-Pakistan w ar ab o u t 100 m em bers of P arliam en t belonging to all addressed a letter to the Prim e M inister dem anding an diate decision to develop n u clear weapons.

in the ended, parties im m e­

M RS. G A N DH I : “A SUBTLE CHANG E” Mrs. In d ira G andhi succeeded L ai B ahadur Shastri as Prim e M inister on the latter's death in Ja n u a ry , 1966. C hina exploded her th ird bom b on M ay 9 the same year. T h e next day, a storm broke in the In d ian p arliam en t. T h ere was a renew ed clam our for the Indian bom b. M rs. G andhi h ad a h a rd tim e defending her G overnm ent’s n u clear policy. D uring her speech, Mrs. G andhi answ ered critics (who inclu­ ded m any Congress P arty m em bers) in these words : “ I do not think our policy is at all a negative one ; I think th a t it is a very positive policy. W e are building up our atom ic pow er. O f course, we are using it for peaceful purposes, b u t in the m eantim e, we are increasing our know -how an d other com­ petence. I m yself fail to u n d erstan d how our production of one bom b or tw o bombs will help us. T he belief th a t C hina can attack any country w ith n u clear weapons w ith im punity I think, is a misconceived one.” M any MPs, regardless of P arty distinction, told reporters later th at they detected in the Prim e M inister’s elucidation “ a subtle change” in emphasis from the N ehru G overnm ent’s pronouncem ents. T he special correspondent of the Hindustan Times, N ew D elhi’s largest Englishl anguage new spaper, detec­ ted “ a som ew hat vague indication of a possible shift in the G overnm ent’s nuclear policy.” A ccording to the Moscow-orie­ nted Patriot, there was a “ clear shift in official thinking on nuclear policy.” Based on the Lok S abha discussion of M ay 10, 1966 the Washington Post published an article from its N ew D elhi correspondent in w hich he said: “ ...as pressure on the In d ian G overnm ent to go“ n u c le a r” m ounted further to­ d ay, observers sensed a change in In d ia ’s earlier refusal to exploit her resources to respond to Com m unist C h in a’s nucle­ a r testing.”

India and Nuclear Weapons

59

O P P O S IT IO N CLA M O U R In the sam e week, N .G . G oray, one of In d ia ’s top socialist leaders who is now In d ia ’s H igh Commissioner in London, said a t a press conference in his capacity as chairm an of the PrajaSocialist P arty th a t In d ia should develop nuclear weapons “ at all costs” an d called upon th e people to cheerfully bear any additional tax burden as a result of In d ia going in for n u clear weapons. G oray was president of the integrated Socialist Party at th e tim e of its m erger into th e present ruling J a n a ta P arty in th e 1977 spring. T he fourth general elections held in India in F ebruary 1967 provided to the pclitical parties a fresh opportunity to restate their case on the issue of n u clear weapons. T h e J a n a Sangh in its election m anifesto dem anded a change in the country’s defence au d foreign policies in view of the “ continued aggre­ ssion by C om m unist C hina and Pakistan an d their future desi­ gns.” Am ong the seven steps listed in the manifesto as essential for increasing the n a tio n ’s defence potential was the m anufact­ ure of nuclear weapons and missiles. T he J a n a Sangh Presi­ dent B alraj M adhok, subsequently told a reporter: “ C hina is m ore respected in the w orld because it has nuclear bom bs.” T he P raja Socialist P arty in its manifesto dem anded th a t In d ia m ust try for self-sufficiency in nuclear as well as conv­ entional weapons. W h at was needed at present, it said, was the harnessing of th e atom bom b both for peaceful develop­ m ents as well as for the m anufacture of nuclear weapons “ as a deterrent to the aggressors who th reaten our freedom and soverignty.” G O V E R N M E N T LEADERS Some of. the present senior J a n a ta G overnm ent leaders have f om tim e to tim e expressed themselves on the subject of In d ia’s nuclear weapons, and an analysis of their views would be rew arding. T he Prim e M inister, M oraiji Desai, has for the past q u a rt­ er o f a century or m ore been unflinching in his opposition to

60

Perspectives o f India’s Nuclear Policy

th e idea of India going for n u clear weapons. In J a n u a ry 1965, three months after C h in a’s first n u clear explosion, he said in a new spaper article th a t for In d ia it would be “ suicidal” to m anufacture the n u c le a r bomb. H e argued th a t at the tim e In d ia signed the Moscow T est Ban T reaty in 1963 she knew th at C hina was trying to m anufacture nuclear bombs. T he actual explosion h ad not changed the position. Econom ically, th e m anufacture of the bom b w ould break India. “ O u r peo­ ple will die of poverty and get destroyed even before any dest­ ruction can take place by a bom b throw n by C h in a.” Also, he w arned, by entering into a nuclear race, In d ia w ould scare aw ay the countries w hich were helping in developing and strengthening her conventional arm s. Nobody w ould in future believe in her professions o f m orality. After C hina had exploded her fifth atom bom b Deasi told a reporter: “ I do not think we should ever think of m anufact­ uring atom bombs.” In th e subsequent years Desai has given no evidence of any change in his views on this subject-a subj­ ect on which he has spoken repeatedly since he becam e Prim e M inister in M arch 1977. A m an who has been longest in the C entral C abinet since independence is the present Defence M inister, Ja g jiv a n R am . H e was, however, briefly out of the C abinet from 1963 to Ja n u a ry 1966. O n M arch 31, 1965 a published rep o rt which was not contradicted said th a t Jag jiv an R am had dem anded at a public m eeting in B ihar State (his hom e State) th a t India should develop her own n u clear weapons to safeguard her free­ dom. H owever, at a New D elhi m eeting in 1967, a little over a year after he Jiad rejoined the C entral C abinet, Jag jiv an R a m returned to the subject and toed the. official line. H e declared th at even if C hina continued to m anufacture atom bom bs India should not do so. In subsequent references to the subject, Jagjivan R am has stuck to the official brief. JA NA SANGH’S VIEWS T he Ja n a ta G overnm ent’s present M inister for E xternal Aff­ airs, the sauve A tal Behari V ajpayee, was the President o f the m ilitent political party, the B haratiya J a n a Sangh, from 1968

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to 1973. T he p arty m erged into the ruling J a n a ta P arty on the eve of the M arch 1977 p arliam en tary election. T h e com­ posite J a n a ta P arty won 298 seats, of w hich 94 (nearly onet ’lird) were won by erstw hile J a n a Sangh n e n b ers. In the present C entral C abinet, out of 43 m em bers excluding the Prim e M inister, 11 are former J a n a Sangh m en. Tw o key por­ tfolios of E xternal Affairs and Inform ation a n d Broadcasting are held by A tal Behari V ajpayee an d L ai K ishinchand Advan i, tw o successive presidents respectively of the J a n a Sangh. T he J a n a Sangh ministers an d m em bers of P arliam ent are know n to w ield influence in G overnm ent disproportionate to their num bers. O f the five constituent parties w hich m erged to form the J a n a ta P arty, J a n a Sangh alone had a strong cadre base. T his has been preserved despite the m erger, through its “ front” organisation popularly known as RSS (R ashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh), w hich was banned by M rs. G andhi duri­ ng the Em ergency T h e J a n a Sangh was the first m ajor Indian political p arty w hich d ared during N eh ru ’s life-time openly to ask for the m anufacture of nuclear weapons by In d ia as p a rt of the coun­ try ’s defence effort against C hina. This it did through a form­ al resolution passed in D ecem ber 1962-two m onths after the Chinese arm ed a tta c k on India. In another resolution passed in D ecem ber 1964, after C hi­ n a h ad exploded h er first atom bom b, the J a n a Sangh C en tr­ al W orking C om m ittee deplored the G overnm ent’s “ lack ad ai­ sical” approach to the question of In d ia m anufacturing her ow n n u clear deterrent and accused it of confusing an d m isin­ form ing public opinion on this issue by raising an econom ic bogey, “ to silence the grow ing popular dem and th a t In d ia should build up its own atom bom b.” T he resolution concluded: “ In the context of the harsh reali­ ties of the present w orld and C hina’s unconcealed expansionist am bitions, the G overnm ent of In d ia ’s present policy of nuclear, abnegation can well prove suicidal. T h e W orking C om m ittee therefore, considers it im perative th at an all-out effort be

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m ade to build up an independent nuclear deterrent o f its ow n, an d urges the G overnm ent of In d ia to revise its stand accord­ ingly.” T ill it m erged into the J a n a ta P arty, the J a n a Sangh w as not know n to have revised its views on this subject. U N A N IM ITY O N N PT T he U nited States an d the Soviet U nion jointly p u t forw a­ rd the draft non-proliferation treaty at the G eneva disarm am ­ ent conference on August 24, 1967. D isquiet over the treaty in In d ia was w idespread and this was shared by G overnm ent and opposition parties a like. T he Praja-Socialist P arty leaders dem anded th a t In d ia should not sign the treaty. T h e Sam yuk ta Socialist P arty leader M ad h u L im aye, who is now a gen­ eral secretary o f the ruling J a n a ta P arty, said th a t signing the treaty by the G overnm ent w ould be an “ unpatriotic act.” T he C entral working C om m ittee of the J a n a Sangh said in a resolution: “ I f G overnm ent today is not in a position to take courage in both hands an d decide to produce the atom bom b, the option for India going nuclear m ust not be given u p .” (T he J a n a Sangh President a t th at tim e was A tal B ehari V aj­ payee, who is a t present In d ia ’s M inister for E xternal Affairs.) But the G overnm ent of India needed no such prom pting. M orarji Desai, who was then D eputy Prim e M inister in M rs. G andhi’s C abinet, was in the U nited States in Septem ber 1967. In W ashington, he was reported to have conveyed to R o b ert M cN am ara In d ia ’s strong objection to the proposed treaty, both on grounds of security an d of discrim ination. A form al pronouncem ent cam e from the Defence M inister, S w aran Singh, in the U N G eneral Assembly, Speaking in the w orld body on O ctober 6, he said: “ C ertain non-nuclear cou­ ntries could have produced nuclear w eapons several years ago h ad they so desired, b u t have refrained from doing so. It can scarcely be argued th at this policy o f restraint and self-discipl­ ine should result in their being deprived of the benefits of the developm ent of peaceful n u clear technology, W hile the

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G overnm ent of In d ia continues to be in favour of the non-pro­ liferation of n u clear w eapons, it is equally strongly in favour of the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, an essential m eans by w hich the developing countries can be­ n efit from the best advances of science an d technology in this field .” Four days later, speaking on the draft treaty a t W arsaw d u rin g a state visit, the Prim e M inister, Mrs. G andhi, said: “ W e see danger both in horizontal a n d in vertical proliferat­ ion. W hile seeking agreem ent on the non-proliferation treaty, we should like to em phasise the balance of obligations which m ust prevail for nuclear disarm am ent. T h e stockpiling of arm am ents (by big powers) is a cause for fear and distrust.” T H E PO K H R A N E X PL O SIO N T h e high w ater-m ark of national agreem ent in India in th e nuclear field w as the Pokhran explosion of m ay 18, 1974. This was shrew dly tim ed. It coincided w ith a period of m ounting anti-governm ent ag itatio n by opposition parties, d ir­ ected chiefly against Mcs. G andhi personally. T he agitation h a d adversely affected her and her G overnm ent’s im age at hom e an d abroad. R eaction to the explosion w ithin the country was one of w ild acclaim . “ T h rilled N ation Lauds F eat,” scream ed the Times o f India front page headline. “ M onopoly of Big Five Broken,” boomed the mass circulation Sunday Standard then published sim ultaneously from seven cities. “ India Goes N u­ clear A t L ast,” announced the bitterly anti-M rs. G andhi Motherland, organ of the J a n a Sangh p arty . “ T h e N ation is T h rilled ?” reported the Hindustan Times, w hile the Economic Times com m ented hysterically th at the Indian people now felt “ inches ta lle r.” Among the opposition political leaders who reacted im m e­ diately was C h aran Singh, who is In d ia ’s present M inister o f H om e Affairs an d erstw hile leader of the B hartiya Lok

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D al (BLD), the largest com ponent ©f the composite J a n a ta party. H e described th e explosion as a “ good developm ent” . M orarji Desai, who was then not in M rs. G an d h i’s cabinet, reacted cautiously. H e doubted w hether such explosions were necessary for peace. T he Pokhran explosion, he siaid, would encourage those in In d ia who w ant nuclear weapons, and a large section of the people want them . H e felt that the intentions of the G overnm ent w ere doubted, as the present leaders (m eaning Mrs. G andhi and her colleagues) had lost their credibility. T he most vocal among the opposition parties, the Ja n a Sangh, said in a resolution passed by its C entral working Com m ittee on Ju n e 2 that M ay 18 (the explosion date) was “ a red letter day in Indian history.” T h e p arty saluted the In d ian scientists who had “ placed India on the n u clear m ap of the w orld.” But “ this was not enough.” In line with its earlier consistent stand, the party dem anded the m anufac­ ture of nuclear weapons “ to protect our independence ” T h e J a n a Sangh leader and the present M inister of Exte r­ nal Affairs, Atal Behari V ajpayee, cautioned the G overnm ent against m aking a firm com m itm ent for all time to come th a t nuclear energy would not be used for defence purposes. This, he said, p articu larly im portant in the context of China. T h e Indian Institute of public O pinion, based in Delhi, in a report on Indian public reaction to the explosion published on J u ly 27, 1974 said th a t its m etropolitan poll of adult literates showed th a t 90 percent were proud of the explosion. In D elhi, 99 per cent were “ ex u b eran t.” Roughly the sam e percentage felt that the test had raised In d ia ’s stature in the international com m unity. In a new spaper article published 12 days after the Pokhran explosion, the present M inister of Inform ation and Broadcast­ ing, Lai K. A dvani, who was then the national president of the J a n a Sangh, talked of the “ mood of national election”

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in the country following the explosion. This, he said, “ testi­ fies to a see-change in national thinking on the nuclear q u e stio n /’ A dvani rem arked: “ T he d em and for an atom bom b is no longer confined to a section or sections w hich can be term ed a lobbyi t t is the nation’s dem and.” D ealing with the nuclear policies o f successive In d ia n Prim e M inisters, M r. A dvani said: “ N eh ru ’s ‘No Bomb E v er’ w as reform ulated by L ai B ah ad u r Shastri as ‘No Bomb N ow .’ T h e sam e policy has continued u nder M rs. G andhi. I think it is tim e even this stand is re-exam ined an d m odified.” H e w anted nuclear energy to be developed for peaceful purposes, b u t a t the sam e tim e “ o u r defence arrangem ents must also be given a n u clear diem ension.’, A dvani m ade a new point in his presidential address to the an n u al session of his p a rty held in New D elhi on M arch 3, 1975 H e said: “ T he influence w hich C h in a has come to wield in global m atters owes in no sm all m easure to its nuclear capability. Let us not dilly-dally on this question any longer, a n d unm indful of the annoyance and displeasure o f super powers let us decide to give In d ia ’s defence a n u clear dim en­ sion.” L O O K IN G IN T O FUTURE Should In d ia go nuclear or should she not? T h e G reat D ebate will go on. But the debate is m arkedly subdued after the J a n a ta party cam e into pow er in M arch 1977. M any of the present G overnm ent leaders, w hen they were in the oppo­ sition, clam oured for India going nuclear, Few of them have spoken on th e subject publicly after they cam e into power. •

O nly the Prim e M inister, M orarji Desai, has spoken on the record several times. Less th an a m onth after ta k irg office, Desai said in an interview published in Bonn: “ I will give it to you in w riting th at we will not m anufacture n u clear w eapo­ ns. Even if the w hole world arm s itself with the bombs we w'ill

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not do so.” H e said if the in tern al pressure in In d ia for atom ic weapons becam e too strong, he w ould resign. H ow ever, “ I do not believe my people w ould force me to take such a step.” Desai told a N ew D elhi press conference on September 1, 1977 th at In d ia w ould not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. H e disclosed th a t both the Soviet U nion and the U nited States h ad been “ applying pressure on us for th e last two years” to sign th e N PT. But unless there is a basis of equ­ ality, “ we will not do it, w hatever the consequences,” Desai said. T he form er J a n a Sangh leader, A tal Behari V ajpayee, (M inister of E xternal Affairs) has also spoken several times on the subject, b u t he has stuck to the official brief. Leaders of the five constituents of the J a n a ta Party have accepted the new p a rty ’s discipline, and it can be expected th a t in the present situation there will be no public dem and or even debate of the kind th a t has gone on for two decades. C hina carried out h er twentysecond n u clear explosion in the th ird week of Septem ber 1977, but there was not a ripple on the surface in India. T he fact th a t the political parties w hich in the past voci­ ferously dem anded th at In d ia should go n u clear (notably the J a n a Sangh) are now m em bers of the J a n a ta P arty m ay only m ean th a t there w ill in the forsecable fu tu re be no public articulation of their know n thinking on the subject. T he m ain opposition p arty today, the Congress, is too deeply com m itted to its past no-bom b posture to think of any daring reversal or m arked shift o f its position—such as m ight put the J a n a ta leaders on the defensive. Only drastically changed external cricum stances can pos­ sibly alter this frozen situation. Even in such circum stances, a strong restraining influence will be th a t of the present Prim e M inister, M orarji Desai. His opposition to nuclear weapons is fundam ental, a m atter of deep conviction based both on m oral grounds an d on m ilitary thinking, w hich holds th a t the best safeguard for In d ia ’s security lies through stren­ gth in conventional weapons.

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T heoretically, a situation is not inconcievable w here und­ er the pressure of drastically changed external circum stances the now -dorm ant “ bom b lobby” in the J a n a ta P arty m ay be­ come strong and vocal. In th a t event, it is also not inconciev­ able th a t D esai’s certain exit from the governm ent may come to be accepted by the ran k an d file of at least the p arty ’s do­ m in an t groups as a price th a t m ust regretfully be paid for a change of policy in this field. A dm ittedly, this reasoning a t th e m om ent appears fanciful. W ithin the realm o f (at present distant) possibility is a situ * ationin w hich D esai is n o t on the scene any m ore for reasons , unconnected with “ bom b politics.” D isagreem ent w ith coll­ eagues on other issues could lead to his exit from Prim e M ini­ stership. O r, despite his present good health, sheer age m i­ ght at some stage overcom e D esai’s desire to live or to rem ain healthy. H e is 82, an d has an arduous job to do as Prim e M inister of a country o f over 600 million people. It must a t once be stated th a t all this is strictly in the re a ­ lm of speculation. A t th e sam e tim e, the p regnant fact need not be wished aw ay th a t almost all the erstw hile vocal pro­ bom b elem ents are now either m inisters in M orarji D esai’s cab in et or are am ong influential m em bers of the ruling J a n a ta P arty . C ould not th eir known (and on record) views, now unvoiced because o f cu rren t political restraints, break the barriers in a new , unforseen, set o f circum stances? T he opposite view m ay also be urged. Now th at the pro­ bom b elem ents are in positions of pow er, their old dem and for nuclear w eapons is no longer a m atter of m ere polemics, a stick w ith w hich to beat the ruling Congress governm ent. C onsiderations of cost an d of n ational priorities and the com ­ pulsions o f in tern atio n al relations m ust inject realism into their thinking an d m ake them pause. Let us consider only one external factor w hich is relevant. T h e alm ost certain price of an In d ian nuclear weapons pro­ gram m e w’ould be increased hostility from P akistan. R ealists in the J a n a ta P arty m ust ask: is it w orth paying this price be-

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fore it is seen to be absolutely unavoidable? T here can be on­ ly one answ er. In 1964, after the Chinese gate-crashed into the n u clear aren a, In d ia faced a truly h a rd choice. She m ade her decisi­ on th en , and this did not please m an y Indians. M ercifully for the J a n a ta G overnm ent th ere is no need, a t present to drasti­ cally alter this decision. For th e future, a great deal would depend upon the course of In d ian politics and in ternational events. In any event, a q u alitativ e difference m ay be noted betw ­ een the position in the sixties and now . N eh ru ’s com m itm ent to his no-bom b policy was absolute and unconditional. T he resolve visibly w eakened after his dem ise in M ay 1964. B arring M orarji Desai, no one in the present pow er heirarchy in N ew D elhi is known em otionally to share N eh ru ’s uncom ­ prom ising opposition to w hat to him w as grotesquely evil. M ID D L E -O F -T H E -R O A D E R S As long as the present domestic an d international situation continues, the ranks of the middle-of-the roaders in In d ia are likely to swell. T hey are against In d ia going in for the bom b now or in the foreseeable future, b u t they are a t the sam e tim e em phatically against In d ia surrendering perm anently an d irrevocably, her right to decide w h at is good for her. T his w ould happen if In d ia signs the N PT . T h e m iddle-of-the-roader argues th a t unconditional su rren ­ der o f the country’s right to make th e bom b w ould be short­ sighted. Circum stances could change in an unforeseeable way. In any case, it is not necessary a t th e present stage to take the political decision w hether or not to go in for nuclear w eapons. T h e m iddle o f the roader w ants In d ia to go ahead w ith the building up of an In d ian n u clear technology. T his w ould help to accelerate In d ia ’s developm ent effort, and at th e same tim e reduce the tim e from the m om ent of decision to the mo­ m ent of im plem entation to the very m inim um -should a decisi­ on to go nuclear be m ade in a new set of circumstances.

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N ational pride, too, plays a role. Those who w ould like to see India retain the p o litical option argue w ith some force th a t the irrevocable surrender of this option through signature on the non-proliferation treaty w ould freeze, for a very long tim e to come, a pow er structure in w hich the U .S.A ., the So­ viet Union, C hina, F rance and Britain w ould be the Big Five of the w orld. T hey w ould have the bom b, technological and econom ic superiority an d the veto in the U .N . Security Cou­ ncil. India, along w ith o th er non-nuclear nations, w ould be frozen into second class if not third class pow er status. This is a prospect w hich few Indians can accept w ith equanim ity. At any rate, the m iddle-of-the-roaders urge, the present generation of Indians have no right to arrogate to themselves th e right to fore-close the nuclear option of all future gener­ ations. Given th e present set of national an d international circum ­ stances, it is reasonable to expect th a t w ith the passage of time the m iddle-of-the-road lobby w ould get an increasing num ­ b er of converts w ithin the ranks a n d leadership of the ruling J a n a ta Party. T h e clam orous Indian-bom b-for-security lobby of erstw hile opposition leaders w ould gradually w eaken, an d its protagonists w ould reconcile them selves to the middle-ofthe-road course of action outlined above as one w hich is both patriotic an d practical.

Chapter 4 INDIA'S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. Col. R. Rama Rao (Retd.)

NATIONAL SECURITY : T he past thirty years provide ^mple evidence to support the observation that while some countries, developed and develop­ ing, have tended to be unduly obsessed w ith ideas of national security leading to the creation P T system. We have it from the testim ony of Rosew ell G ilpatric140 who headed the C om m ittee on dangers of proliferation in the late sixties and James Schlessinger141 who was then w ith the R A N D C orpo­ ration th at the U uited States was m uch less concerned about nuclear proliferation th an about N A T O nu clear strategy. / fter having achieved their m ajor goals through the N PT , the arm s controllers started dem ythologising the N th country issue until it was resurrected in the form of a new proliferation wave with the oil crisis in 1973 an d the nu clear explosion by In d ia in 19 4. Now the dogm a of proliferation, like the Bible followed by the sword in the good old colonial days, is being suspected as the forerunner of atom ic colonialism . For the last tw enty years, n u clear weapon pow ers have been evolving certain norm s and beliefs of the nu clcar age. W e have been told th at the Atom for Peace program m e, and In tern atio n al Atomic Energy Agency will accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atom ic energy to peace, health and prosperity; the Ploushare p ro c ram n e will cpen vp new

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vistas of economic abundance and the nuclear reactor techn­ ology will soon solve conventional energy shortage. U nder these norms, every thing th a t they have done so far with atomic energy and everything that they have gained through nuclear technology, both military a n d civilian, looks perfectly legitimate. But now they are changing the same norms, rules an d beliefs from which they benefitted a great deal, because they see in the nuclear future gloomy foreboding about a dangerously proliferated world. Like the strange Moaist logic about nucler weapon danger if only it is in the hands of bourgeois1; and capitalist States, the nuclear weapon power have been moralizing about the virtues of nuclear technology while in the their hands and apprehensive about the abuses'of it if possessed by the developing nations. 'Jesus once told the hypocrites: “ First cast out the beam out of thine eye; an d then shall thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother’s eye.” 142 This aptly applies to the nuclear hypocrites too. But who wants nuclear weapons? It is quite likely th a t Israel and South Africa, the two proteges of the nu clear weapon powers of the West, and the two citadels of sub­ imperialism in Asia and Africa might go nuclear for survival within the next decade. However, CIA leak outs continue to give credence to the version that Israel is already a nuclear weapon power. No nation from the developing nations is likely to oblige the arm s controllers by opting for nuclear weapon status in the foreseeable future. T here is some probability of a n uclear decision by Argentina and Brazil to conduct a few PNE detonations. But more and more developing nations, about 30 to 50 of them , irrevocably committing to nuclear energy for power generation an d accepting every possible safeguards consistent with national sovereignty, against nuclear weapon proliferation is a clear possibility. T he developing nations are watching warily and angrily the sledgehammer m ethod of dealing with them in regard

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to nuclear technology and also about the arms-twisting of In d ia recently in regard to enriched uranium an d heavy w ater supplies. T h e nuclear exports-policy and the in tra ­ supplier diplom acy provide the clue to the most misleading propaganda about the new proliferation wave, which is me­ rely a facade to deprive the developing nations of the extens­ ive use of sensitive nuclear technology so that it will not spread beyond the few who are already having it thereby esta­ blishing a stranglehold over the T hird W orld nuclear market. W h at lies behind the nuclear arms-twisting policy is the vested interest of the multi-billion dollar nuclear business. But can the nuclear suppliers alone control the reactor m a r­ ket for long? If the developing nations form a nuclear consum er’ club, a n d collcctivly decide to boycott all the im ported nuclear technology, until the suppliers retreat from their present position, w hat will happen to the nuclear business? R a tio n a le o f In d ia ’s n u clea r o p tio n In d ia ’s nuclear option is the fulcrum on which would depend the strategy of the developing nations to defeat the conspiracy of the supplier nations. It has m uch wider connotations and hence the tendency in India to treat it as unidimensional, purely for chauvinistic reasons, is to be dis­ carded. India began talking about her technological option from the time of the Brauch Plan. T here are important linkages of it to her domestic and foreign policy requirements. Prim ­ arily it epitomises the will of the nation to decide her national policy. At the international level India h rs been opposed to an international system which is status - quooriented, hierarchical, discriminatory, hegemonial and even m onopol­ istic. India, thertfoie, during the Cold W’ar days rejected the theory of a bipolar world and struggled for a norm ative world order based on equity and rule cf law an ong nations. In d ia’s nuclear diplom acy projected a genuine in age of a country

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committed to nuclear disarm am ent, arm s control and general and complete disarm am ent by unilaterally renouncing n u cl­ ear weapons as an instrum ent of her national policy a n d joining the forces of peace. H er austere view about n u c le a r weapons, and dow ngrading of the prestige attached to n u c le a r weapons in her national policy, soon pushed her into the vortex of a movement for banning nuclear tests and n u c le a r disarm am ent. At one stage, the non-aligned nations led by India earned the reputation of symbolising the conscience of m ankind because of their lofty stand on various issues o f Co d W ar. India had a modest role in ‘bridge b u ild in g ’ between the two power blocs, and tranform ing the age of confrontation to an era o f detente. But the tw o super powers have still very tight control over the distribution of power in the inter­ national system and they are not willing to alter the hierarch­ ical structure of power beyond that of a pentarchy frcm a diarchy which dominated the Cold W ar days. T he military and technological hegemony of the super powers is one of the realities of the present international system. In d ia ’s nuclear option, therefore, should be viewed as a protest if not defiance against the unjust international system and the ruthless m anipulation of norms an d standards by which the few nuclear weapon powers will decide the fate of all other nations and people both technologically a n d militarily. In d ia ’s n u clear option is also symbolic o f the resistance to technological enslavement o f the developing world. She has been an outspoken critic o f the neocolonialist designs of industrialized nations. In fact, the policy of the nuclear suppliers’ club to convert the T h ird W orld into a n u c le a r reactor m arket unilaterally is to be effectively countered by the ‘Group of 77’, at the level of the N oth-South negotiations. A part from reactor sale, reprocessing and enrichm ent a re also multi-billion dollar business. T h e developing nations can frustrate attem pts to impose full scope safeguards on those

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unwilling to accept them. W ithout m utuality and recipro­ city, international inspection will have no meaning. T h e developing nations should have a joint strategy to counter these concerted moves to prevent the dissemination of critical nuclear technology. They can p:>ol th jir technology and scientific skill for the benefit of nuclear development for peaceful purposes and w_>rk out plans for collaborative efforts to set up m ultinational regional centres of the developing nations to which the more advanced among the developing na­ tions should be prepared to offer their expertise and experience and the more affluent among them money. This is indeed a challenging task which requires refashioning o f their old habits cf quarrels, disputes and even security perceptions in order to effect their transition fiom pre-industrial to nuclear age. T he industrialized nations have invested hundreds o f billions of dollars in nuclear industry and without the cooperation of buyers the whole nuclear business can collapse. T h ere is already a glut of nuclear reactors in Europe and A merica. As India's Prirr.e Minister, Morarji states, the developing nations have infinite capacity to suffer without meekingly submitting to all indignities. I f necessary, they should even boycott all nuclear technology until the suppliers mend their ways. In d ia ’s nuclear cption, instead c f being squxndertd aw ay, shall be preserved for crucial bargaining with the n u clear weapon powers. We shall make every use of it to pressurize the nuclear weapon powers to fulfil th^ir commitment to U nited Nations and to agree to the reduction of nuclear * arm am ents, conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty, and b a n the production of fissionable m aterials. If these measu­ res are agreed upon, a nuclear disarm am ent is possible and from these the world will witness these powers agreeing to destroy the existing stockpile of their nuclear arsenal. It is quite possible that they will not agree to disarm and would decide to freeze the status quo. T h en the consequence will be disastrous and they alone will be held responsible for the tu rn in g point in nuclear proliferation. Obviously, India and other developing nations cannot

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expect to be benefitted from policies which they have been condemning for years. W hat we perceive as bad in others cannot be prescribed as good for us. W hen we hold th a t n uclear weapons and nuclear tests constitute a threat to the survival of m ankind, as all sane people all over the world think, a policy through which directly or indirectly we derive any benefit to have nu clear weapons is equally bad. T w o wrongs cannot make one right. In fact this has been the essence of Prime Minister M o raiji’s basic stand. He has succeeded in re-establishing our m oral authority. M orarji has m ade it k n o * n to the critics th at we are as much concer­ ned about our practice as about the precepts regarding n u ­ clear issues. therefore, if the super powers are willing to agree to a m oratorium on P]\Es, we should also go along with them, b u t we should retain our light to have it until they conclude an inteinational agreem ent banning PNEs alto­ gether. T he domestic im plication of our nuclear option is to be understood more seriously than ever before. It has p arti­ cular bearing on self-reliance in science an d technology. It is necessary to have a stock-taking of the peiform ance of o u r scientific establishment. T here is hardly any aspect of o u r nuclear program m e which has not been unduly delayed. T h e nation had been poised lor grt at scientific and technolo­ gical breakthroughs tow ards self-reliance an d indigcnization so long but they have not yet been achieved. 1 he Chinese, despite all the technological a n d scientific encirclement, m ade great strides in indigenization and self-reliance. In fact, in the 1950s and lLlOs we have been boasting that in nuclear science w e av e ahead ef the Chinese. Lut look at where we are now an d where they arc! T he Americans and the Russians a ie all tauniir.g us and dictating teims to us. T h e people have a right to know why In d ia ’s nuclear explosion was conducted w ithout adequate preparation to meet the consequences of our action. W hy did Mrs. G andhi’s G overnment choose the \ e a r 1974 when we have not yet reached total indigenization in legard to the construction of

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our second generation power plants, before completing our plan regarding the production of heavy water, and before acquiring the sensitive equipments for our fast breeder re a ­ ctor programme? W hy did this underground explosion, rum oured from the days of Lai B a'iada; Shastri been delayed for so long? W hat are t h i net gains of this explosion? Why have we decided to abandon it? I t is desirable to have some independent authority on w hom the P a m e Minister can rely for proper advice on nuclear policy and careful scrutiny of the scientific opinion now being filtered through the b u reau cratic channels and reaching him. It is worthwhile to recall that in the Eisenhow er days when there was a lot of confusion about the US nuclear policy because of the deliberate distortion of scientific advice given to the US President by the militaryscientific-industrial complex, President Eisenhower appointed an eminent scientist, Jam es Killian, as his Special Assist­ a n t on Science and Technology for obtaining independent views on nuclear policy. T h e parliam entarians, the press and the general public should be more vigilant ab >ut our nuclear policy so th a t it can be safeguarded against the wilful distortions of the b u re a ­ ucratic an d scientific elites and against the politico- industrial complex in this country. T he national com m itm ent to our nuclear policy should be clearly understood by all an d the G overnm ent should at no stage be allowed to play politics with it as it has happened during Mrs. G andhi’s time by the ill-conceived and clumsily executed nuclear decisions for w hich the nation is paying a heavy price now. T here should also be a drastic revision of our meagre allocations to nuclear development which will enable us to undertake bold collab­ orative nuclear program mes outlined earlier, with other developing nations to defeat the neocolonialist designs of the nuclear suppliers. In d ia ’s nuclear option can be utilized for the common benefit of all her immediate neighbours. Notwithstanding the misgivings of Pakistan about the rationale of our nuclear

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option, we should continue our efforts to convince Pakistan that we have no nuclear designs against her and also pers­ uade her to explore jointly possible fields of nuclear collabo­ ration. Prime Minister Morarji Desai has already indicated that India is willing to have such collaboration but we must vigorously pursue these initiatives at the diplomatic level. Surely India is already playing a dynam ic role in the recent international conferences on nuclear technology on b ehalf of the developing nations. W hat requires urgent con­ sideration, however, is the preparation of a comm on strategy by the T h ird W^orld to deal effectively with the cartelization of nuclear industry. India should not shy aw ay from her responsibilities under the nuclear option, to initiate a move to-convene a conference of the non-nuclear nations, as was done it 1968, at the time of the N P T debate, under the UN asupices as early as possible to finalize the anti-nuclear c a rt­ elization strategy. T h e stability of In d ia ’s nuclear option would depend largely on the kind relations India an d C hina are going to have in the coming years. If C hina becomes a nuclear threat to In d ia or if Pakistan is misguided by C hina in her n u clear policy to the discomfiture of India, it will seriously affect In d ia ’s nuclear option. After the 1962 war, In d ia is vigilant about every Chinese move and the present lull should not make India complacent about her nuclear responsibilities. W hen India herself is unwilling to go nuclear the Chinese an d the Pakistanis should not precipitate a crisis situation which might easily be exploited by the well-entrenched bom b lobby within the G overnm ent and force a reluctant nuclear power to deviate from its long standing peaceful n u c­ lear policy and go nuclear.

REFERENCES 1.

S ie M ira rji’s Press Conference after swearing in as Prime Minister on M i r c h 24, 1977. Hindustan Times (Dslhi), M arch 25, 1977; his exclusive interview with the C anadian Broadcasting Corporation. Statesman (Delhi), M arch 28, 1977; Statem ent in Lok Sabha on J u ly 13, 1977; Times o f India (Delhi), J u ly 14, 1977. Also see Hindustan Times, August 10, 1977. Statem ent in the Lok Sabha, 13 D ecem ber 1977; Hindustan Times, 14 D ecem ber 1977,

2.

Hindustan Times, O ctober 22, 1977.

3.

Patriot (Delhi), M arch 31, 1973.

4.

Leonard Beaton and Jo h n M addox, The Spread o f Nuclear Weapons (London: C hatto Windus, 1962). p. 136.

5.

Idid.

6.

Speech in Parliam ent, 16 M ay 1954.

7.

R K. K aranjia, The Philosophy o f M r. Nehru (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 161-2.

8

Leonard Beaton and Jo h n M addox, op. cit.y p. 147.

9

Resolutions passed by the Bharatiya Karya Samiti o f Bhara­ tiya Jana Sangh, Decem ber 4-6, 1964. Also see, M oha­ m m ed Ali Kishore, Java Sangh and India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi : Associated Publishing House, 1969', pp. 131-35.

10.

See Papers presented at the Seminar on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (6-12 November 1966), organized by the Indian School of Internalional Studies, New Delhi.

11.

Sisir G upta in Alastair Buchan, ed., A World o f Nuclear Powers? (New York : A m erican Assembly, 1966), pp. 56.

12.

A Strategy fo r India fo r a Credible Posture against a Nuclear Adversary (N ew Delhi : Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, I9t;8), pp. 3, 5.

v"

162

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

13.

Nuclear Policy fo r India (A J a n a Sangh Publication, Augaust 1968); “ In d ia ’s N u clear Strategy in 1970s” , (L ecture at the University of California, M ay 26, 1969).

14.

India Quarterly (Delhi), April-June 1965, pp. 135-6.

15.

See G erard Brounthal, “ An A ttitude Survey in In d ia ” , Public Opinion Quarterly, 31, no. 1 (Spring, 1969), p. 81. J a n a Sangh Souvenir (Bombay : J a n a Sangh Publica­ tions, April 1969), p. 79; Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, Indian Institute of Public Opinion, O ctober 1968; Dece­ m ber 1971.

16. J o h n M addox, Prospects fo r Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers No. 113 (London : T h e International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 15. 17.

See Nuclear Weapons (A Compilation prepared by the D e­ partm en t of Atomic Energy, November 1970), p. 64.

18.

“ India Raises Possibility of Joning C lu b ” , Washington Post, November 17, 1965.

19.

India Backgrounder (Delhi), Septem ber 5, 1977, pp 806.

20.

K . S u brahm aniam in R obert M. Law rence and Jo el Larns, Nuclear Proliferation, Phase II (The University Press of Kansas, 1974), p. 115.

803,

20.a Bhabani Sen G upta, “ How Close is India to the Bomb” , in Super Powers in Multinuclear World (ed) by Geoffrey, K em p, R obert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.; U ri R a anan (Massa­ chusetts : Lexicon Books, 1974), p. 109. 21

See Swarajya (M adras), J u n e 8, 1968; August 3, 1968, August 10, 1968, and October 26, 1928 (R ajag o p alach ari w anted India to adhere to the N PT ).

22.

Gandhi Marg (New Delhi), vol. 6, 1962, p. 186.

23.

Ibid.,

24.

M. K. G andhi, For Pacifists (A hm edabad: Publishing House, 1949), pp. 31-84.

p.

191.

N av ajiv an

India’s Nuclear Policy 25.

163

George Q uester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore : T h e J o h n Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 69.

26 R .L .M . Patil, India : Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi : National Publishing House, 1969). M.R. M asani, India Quarterlyt Jan u ary -M arch 1965, pp. 19-26; Lok Sabha Debates, N ovem ber 23, 1964, cols. 1238-40; A. B. Shah, ed., India's Defence and Foreign Policies (Bom­ bay : M anaktalas, 1968), p. 166; F. E. Couper, “ Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of Atom Weapons” , Journal of Developing Areas, J a n u a ry 1969, p. 202. 27.

See Nuclear Weapons : A Compilation prepared by the D epartm ent of Atomic Energy, November 1970, pp. 6568, 74.

28.

A/6858/1967, New York, 1968.

29.

India an d J a p a n : T he Emerging Balance of Power in Asia an d Opportunities for Arms Control, F970-71, vol. IV, (Prepared for the US ACDA by the Southern Asia Institute, East Asia Institute, Colum bia University, A CD A/IR-70, April 1970).

30.

“ In d ia ’s N uclear Explosion and In d ia’s S tcu iity ” , Foreign Affairs Reports (New Delhi), Ju n e 1975, p. 100.

31.

I ewis A. D unn, India, Pakistan, Iran....... ; A Nuclear Proli­ feration Chain? (New York : Hudson Institute, 1976), p. 11; Ashok K apur, India's Nuclear Option : Atomic Diplomacy and Decision M aking (New York : Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 200.

32. V ikram Sarabhai, Atomic Energy and Space Research :A Profile fo r the Decade 1970-1980 (Bombay : Atomic Energy Commission, G overnm ent of India, 1970), p. 3. 33. SIP R I Yearbook 1977 ( Stockholm: Alquivst & Wiksell, 1977 ), p. 39. 34.

V ikram Sarabhai, op. cit.

164 35.

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy See Sethna in U R JA (Delhi), vol. II, No. 3, Septem ber 1977, p. 92.

36. V ikram S arabhai, op. cit. 37.

“ T he H igh Price ~of N uclear Arms Monopoly” , Foreign Policy (New York), Spring 1975, p. 31.

38. “ C an Proliferation Now be Stopped” , Foreign Affairs (New York), O ctober 1974, p. 77. 39 “ T h e Proliferation of N uclear W eapons” , Scientific Ameri­ can {New York), April 1975, pp. 18-33; The Last Chance (New York : T he Free Press, 1976), p. 221. •

40.

N P T : Paradoxes and Problems, Anne W. Marks, ed., (Washington, D. C. : Arms Control Association and C a r­ negie Endow m ent for In tern atio n al Peace, 1975), pp. 19, 36, 47.

42.

SIP R I Yearbook 1977, op. cit., p. 51.

43.

Ibid., p. 43.

44.

See Indian Express, 15 J u ly 1977. It wrote editorially : “ But since at its core the question is of technology an d its development it would be wise not to foreclose In d ia ’s options directly or indirectly............” ; Times o f India, 15 July 1977 ; Statesman, 15 O ctober 1977 ; Hindu, 5 October 1977 ; Patriot (Delhi), 15 Ju ly 1977.

45.

National Herald (Delhi), 10 Novem ber 1977.

46.

India Quarterly, Ja n u a ry -M a rc h 1965, pp. 10-12.

47.

p. 14.

48.

ENDC/PV.

370 ;

49.

ENDC/PV.

370, p. 9.

50.

EN D C /PV .

363, p. 21.

51.

END C/PV .

359, p ara 36-

A/C. 1/PV. 1551, p. 52.

52.

Peking Review, (Peking), 21 J u n e 1968, pp. 17-18,

53.

S/PV.

1430, pp. 26-31.

India’s Nuclear Policy

165

54.

Hedley Bull, “ Rethinking Non-Proliferation” , Internati­ onal Affairs (London), April 1975, pp. 175-89.

55.

See Ashok K a p u r, op. cit., p. 196.

56.

B. Chatterjee, The M ind o f Morarji Desai (Bombay : O rient Longmans, 1969), pp. 90-91.

57.

F. A. Long, “ Peaceful N uclear Explosions,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, O ctober 1976, p. 19.

58. Ibid., p.

20.

59. Ibid., p.

22,

60.

Ibid., p. 26.

61.

Ibid., p.

62.

R ep o rt of the IAEA’s T echnical Comm ittee on Peaceful N uclear Explosions, CCD/445; Annex II, 7 J u ly 1975 ; tJ N Resolution 3261 D (X X IX ).

63.

SIP R I Yearbook 1976, p. 409.

64.

The Nuclear Age (S tockholm : Almqavist a n d Wiksell International, 1974), pp. 109-10.

65.

28.

Nuclear India (Bombay), Ju ly 1974, p. 4.

66. SIP R I Yearbook 1977, pp. 3-6. 67. Ibid., pp. 358, 403. 68. Frederick C. T hayer, “ Proliferation a n d the Future : Destruction or Transformation” , Annals, M arch 1977, p. 135. 69.

“ R ethinking 179.

N u clear

Non-Proliferation” , op. cit., p.

70.

The Balance o f Terror : Strategy fo r the Nuclear Age, (Bos­ ton : H oughton Mifflin Co., 1961), p, 11 3 ; R aym ond Aron, The Great Debate : Theories o f Nuclear Strategy (New York : D oableday & C om pany Inc., 1965), pp. 102, 104-5, 123.

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Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

112. W illiam Epstein, op. cit., p. 43.. 113. H .N . Sethna, op. cit. 114. Ford Foundation sponsored Study, Nuclear power Issues and Choices, op. cit., p. 4; Council on Foreign R elations sponsord 1980’s project Studies, Nuclear proliferation, op. cit., p. 170. 115. Nazli Choucri, op, cit., p. 60. 116. George Quester, Foreign Affairs, O ctober 1974, pp. 77-97. 117. Daniel Yergin, op. cit., pp. 47, 48-49. 118. R o b e rt M. L aw rence Joel Larns, Nuclear proliferationphase I I (Lawrence: T h e University Press of K ansas, 1974). 119. Hedley Bull, “ R ethinking N on-proliferation” , op. cit., p. 175. 120. W illiam Epstein, The Last Chance, op. cit., p. 242. 121. Nuclear power Issues and Choices, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 122. op. cit., p. 81. 123. D aniel Yergin, op. cit., pp. 47-65. 124. Lewis S. D u n n & H e rm a n K ahn, Trends in Nuclear proli­ feration, 1975-1995 (New York: Hudson institute, 1976). 125. Ibid., p. 16. 126. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 127. “ N uclear proliferation and W orld politics” , Annals (430), M arch 1977, pp. 99, 101. 128. Daniel Yergin, op. cit., p. 56. 129. Nuclear proliferation, op. cit., pp. 7, 148-54. 130. Lewis S. D unn an d H erm an K a h n , op. cit., p. 32. 131. Fredrick C. T hayer, op. cit., p. 138. 132. Lewis S. D u n n , India, Pakistan, Iran... A New proliferation Chain? op.cit., p. 20. 133. op. cit., p. 20. 134. Ibid., p. 13.

India's Nuclear Policy

169

135. “ N u clear proliferation in Asia” , Orbis, Fall 1975, p. 926. 136. Yergin, op. cit,, p. 64; N uclear proliferation, op: cit., pp. 30-31, 117; Nuclear power Issues and Choices, op. cit,, pp. 22-23. Lewis D unn, “ N u clear proliferation and W orld politics” , op. cit., pp. 107-9; Lewis A. D unn and H erm an K ah n , Trends in Nuclear proliferation, 1975-1995, op. cit., pp. 140-47. 137. W. Davidson, M. Kalkstein and C. Hohenem ser, T^he Nth Country problem and Arms Control (Washington, D.C., N ational planning Association, 1960). 138. Benett Boskey an d Mason W illrich, Nuclear proliferation: prospects fo r Control (C am bridge, Massachusetts :Dunellen publishing Com pany, Inc., 1970), pp. 43, 50. 139. The Last Chance, op. cit., p. 235. 139A. IA E A Bulletin, April 1977, p. 43. 140. Daniel Yergin, op. c i t , p, 58. 141. W illiam Epstein, The Last Chance, op. cit., p. 242; also see W illiam B. Bader, The United States and the Spread o f Nuclear Weapons (New York: pegasus, 1968). 142. St.

M athew , 7:5.

Chapter 6 INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLITICS AND POLICY: JANATA PARTY'S EVOLVING STANCE —D r. Ashok Kapur

In tr o d u c tio n T he purpose of this presentation is to Study the evolution of the J a n a t a p a rty ’s nuclear policies since the new govern-* m ent came to power in M arch 1977. (For the detailed study of In d ia ’s n u c le a r policy the interested reader is invited to see my work, India's NucUar Optioni Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976) w hich offers an assessment of Indian n u clear diplom acy and in contrast its bureaucratic politics.) H ere the task is first to identify the central points in the official verbal position takefi by the Indian Prime M inister since the new governm ent cam e id power. T hen I propose to examine the implications o f the heavy w ater deal with the U SSR , com paring M orarji’s and V ajpayee’s verbal rejection of discriminatory arrangem ents w ith the acceptance of heavily intrusive international inspe-»

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ction arrangem ents w ithout a public debate. T h ird ly , I propose to exam ine the In d ian position on T a ra p u r in relation to the C arter stance against the plutonium economy a n d the C arter preference for an indefinite delay of reprocessing and fast breeders in return for a promise of a secure US enriched u ran iu m supply. Fourthly, I propose to examine the C arter visit and the implications for the future. T he presentation dwells on the inter-state negotiations and also identifies the role of intra-bureaucratic actors. «

■

T h e C h ap ter analyses events in the recent past and prescri­ bes for the future but no effort is m ade to predict the future. N ames of In d ian politicians, bureaucrats and scientists ate used, recognising th a t in a free and democratic society there is no room for sacred cows and it is time th at civil servants and politicians were called to account by Indian tax papers. Since bureaucrats and politicians have developed the habit of hiding their mistakes under the cloak of secrecy, and secrecy is misused in defence of unstated‘national interests’, I believe th at the onus of proving that national interests would be compromised by the release of information which is freely available a b ro ad rests on the bureaucracy. O n the other hand, unless hard working scholars and intellectuals are willing to question some of the sacred cows in the Indian G overnm ent it will not be possible to have an intelligent public debate. Yet, such a debate is needed in foreign and defence policy matters. M y view is based on the premise that democracy is not something which begins an d ends with elections. It is an ongoing process. It is also implied that the Indian press, with some exceptions, by and large lacks trained m anpow er with guts to offer in-depth investiga­ tive reporting. So the Indian press in my thinking appears as a com m unication channel b u t not as an independent source of fact finding in the policy process. B a ck g ro u n d to th e J a n a ta P a r ty ’s N u c le a r P o lic y It is best to view the evolution of In d ia ’s nuclear policy from the 1960s as the product of a faction-ridden government where careerism, ad hocism and sloganeering arc principal

Perspectives o f India’s Nuclear Policy features of the policy process while verbal positions are garbed in thé form of high principles. In a sense In d ia’s nu clear policy is one of high principles and at times low level politics. T h e foundation o f In d ia ’s n uclear program m e was laid by D r Homi B habha in the late 1940s, an d by early to mid-1960s its m ain outlines w ere clear. At this tim e India h ad acquired the C A N D U technology and had its ow n reprocessing p lan t. V erbally, India had taken a position against atomic a p a r ­ theid. It had accepted the idea of safeguards b u t rejected discrim inatory safeguards. In the mid-1960s India h a d an undem onstrated capacity to explode a peaceful n u c le a r underground explosion. Prior to 1964 N ehru h a d opposed Indian nuclear weapons an d strongly favoured d isarm am en t globally. In d ia ’s contribution in support of the P artial Test Ban is well-known. With regard to In d ia ’s nuclear development in early 1964, according to confidential sources, N ehru's position shifted slightly but significantly. In a note to B habha he spoke a b o u t the ‘built in defence use’ of In d ia ’s nuclear program m e. T h is signalled a change in thinking a t the highest level. Such a c h a ­ nge was confirmed in late 1965 when Prime M inister Shastri openly talked about In d ia’s right to conduct a PNE. In th e m eantim e Ambassador V. C. Trivedi h ad carefully articulated In d ia ’s right to have PNEs along with other arguments. T hree things happened in 1966. B habha an d Shastri died and the m om entum tow ards an Indian PN E a^so collapsed. In the power struggle in the D ep artm en t of Atomic Energy in 1966 after B h ab h a’s d e a th the proponents of an In d ia n PN E lost and the new team of Sarabhai and Sethna shelved PN E project, because In d ira G andhi was domestically w eak an d her understanding of nuclear policy was m arginal o r zero; there was no support at the highest level for an In d ia n PNE or strength in nuclear decision making. T hirdly, given th e vaccum in In d ia’s nuclear science leadership im m edi­ ately after B habha’s death, given the shelving of the P N E project, given Mrs. G a n d h i’s domestic position an d given th e need to educate her first about the ABC of nuclear policy,

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it is rem arkable that Ambassador Trivedi was even able to develop an intellectual position in the Geneva D isarm am ent Debate. Trivedi used the highly visible G eneva forum to concetrate on the dangers of vertical nuclear proliferation. He suggested a need to first end nuclear testing and to pave the way towards n u clear disarm am ent. His call was for international arrangem ents which were universal, com pre­ hensive and non-discriminatory. T rivedi’s contribution to the promotion of the Indian national interest was substantial considering that in 1966 the PNE was off, D epartm ent of Atomic Energy (DAE) was faction-iidden as was the Ministry of E xternal Affairs (M EA ), and Mrs. G andhi was a dud in nuclear m atter. Those who are taken in by Mrs. G andhi’s strong stand against the N PT in 1968 would do well to rem em ber that the first draft of her speech actually favoured acceptance of the N P T . T he points of this background are: there is a contrast betw een w hat the Indian G overnment says and w hat it does. A study of its verbal and public stance tells us little about the inner manoeuvres of the Indian scientists, bureaucrats and politicians and we need to study these to get a real understan­ ding of the policy m aking process. In d ia’s nuclear policy is not a phasal activity w hereby verbal positions once publicly articulated are routinely implem ented. Actually, the nuclear decision makers are less th an half a dozen if th a t m uch (a surprising thing in a population of 600 millions). T here is no public debate before a decision is m ade about positions and agreements which have national implications. Even after an agreem ent is signed it is kept secret. It seems there is one governing proposition w hich appeals to the government and this has become a central part of the official political culture. T h e proposition is th at if the public does not know it cannot h u rt the government. U nfortunately for the government there is an equally relevant b u t opposite proposition. O nce the secret manoeuvres o f In d ia n scientists, bureaucrats and politicians are exposed publically, then these actors tend to be quite touchy because they cannot stand the glare of publicity; this is so because they cannot defend their actions

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publicly. It is my belief th at if som3thing cannot be defended publicly in a dem ocracy - and secrecy should be limited only to m atters within the scope of the Official Secrets Act-then something is quite wrong with the system. T h e J a n a ta P a r ty ’s N u c le a r R e c o r d T h e principal elements underlying the evolution of J a n a t a ’s n uclear policy consists of the follo wing: Prime M inister Morarji DesaiJs statem ents on nuclear policy after Mrs. G andhi’s defeat at the polls in M arch 1977; the secret negotiation or finalization of the Soviet heavy w ater deal during Sum m er 1977, w hen the Prime M inister was speaking against the N P T publicly. During Sum m er 1977 and up to Septem ber 1977 the initiative effectively lay with the DAE an d w ith M EA in the sense that real m ovem ent in nuclear policy lay in the direction of upgrading international safe­ guards on R A PP I and II when the impression being fostered in public statements was th at India did not favour discrimi­ natory arrangem ents. In late Fall and specifically a few days before the C arter visit the Prime M inister received secret briefings from sources not connected w ith DAE and with M EA . These indicated th a t the Prime M inister had been misled by M E A and DAE, they had not offered straight scientific advice to the Prime Minister, while Foreign Minister Vajpayee was busy polishing his personal im a^e an d that of the J a n Sangh by dem onstrating his sense of responsibility an d moderation towards others. By keeping the M EA and DAE attitudes an d recom mendations secret, public channel of communication a n d advice to the political leadership were efftctively blocked. Still it was fortunate that enterprising individuals had establi­ shed channels of communications to political leaders, thereby negating the secret manoeuvres of DAE and M EA. T h e final phase in the evolution of J a n a t a ’s nuclear position is reflected in the tone of the Delhi press for a few days prior to the C arter visit and in the Prime M inister’s plea for nuclear self-sufficiency. T he positions which the Prime M inister has now taken m ark the eclipse of M EA including Foreign Minis­ ter Vajpayee and of H .N . Sethna who has usually w elcomed

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foreign assistance and has thereby in effect increased Indian nuclear dependence on foreign sources. J a n a ta ’s I n itia l V erb a l S ta n ce (1977) M orarji Desai’s 1977 statements included the following positions: —-Indian nuclear weapons were ruled out. — M ore Indian PNEs were ruled out by this government, an d in light of the parliam entary debate it emerged th at this was the position ‘at present’. —‘Canadians were informed that it was a mistake for Mrs. G andhi not to inform them about the 1974 test. — Western governments were told that the 1974 test was immoral. —T h e Prime minister felt th a t Sethna and R a m a n n a had given wrong advice to Mrs. G andhi. — India was against discrim inatory international nuclear arrangem ents. — India believed in fulfilling its contractual obligations and expected others to do the same. — In d ia w anted nuclear disarm am ent. —In d ia would not accept full scope safeguards. T h e S o v ie t H ea v y W a ter D e a l (1977) T h e deal was the first test of the new orientation o f the J a n a t a G overnm ent’s nuclear attitude. T h e circumstances surrounding the deal have not been m ade public and the underlying premises and implications are also hidden from public scrutiny. W h a t follows, therefore, is based on confid­ ential interviews a n d it is for the governm ent to set the record straight. This deal provides for a supply of 200 tons o f heavy w ater u n d er u p g rad ed international safeguards w hich incorporate th e features of the London N uclear Suppliers C lub which In d ia has described as a cartel-like arrangem ent an d which

176

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

India has not joined. This deal has political significance because it was announced bv In d ia after O tta w a m ade perm am ent its ban on nuclear exports to India in M ay 1976 T he deal has several problem atic features for India. It is based on the principle of pursuit and all materials produced by the heavy water, and the equipm ent which uses the heavy w ater is safeguardable. I i effect the safeguards on R A PP I-and I I have been considerably unguarded at a time w hen after the ban of nuclear exports by C an ad a to India, India had an option to term inate the safeguards agreement. It is conceivable th a t contrary to w hat Indian officials are willing to say publicly In d ia ’s dependence on im ported heavy w'ater is so severe th a t India had no choice but to accept the Soviet conditions. But in th at case it is time that the Indian Government stopped p re t­ ending to b ; against discriminatory a;cang.;m jnts F u rth e r­ more, there is the question: since India has been producing the heavy w ater since it est blished the N angal unit in the late 1950s what has DAE bein^ doing in the crucial heavy w ater production field for the past two decades? Lastly, the deal codified the prevalent notion in Western countries th a t under appopriate circumstances In d ia ’s verbal position can be modified if sekct Indians are confronted with negotiating realities and if there are other inducem ents to dilute the policy without altering the principal verbal lhetoric which is fed to the Indian public. In short, a full assessment of the implications of this deal must aw ait a full an d public disclosure of the conditions of supply. For instance, a pertinent question to be asked is: Can India exempt itself ft om the inspection provisions regarding RAPP-I an d I I if an d when it becomes independent in henvv w ater production in the 1980s? T h e T a ra p u r C o n tr o v e r sy an d th e C a r te r V is it 1 he outcom e of the C arter vi>it l as got to be one of the strangest episodes in international diplom acy. Both sides w anted to blur the controversy and yet it ended w ith an indiscretion by President C arter which in effect m ade it a dom inant p a rt of the relationship. Both sides held positions which in effect placed them on a collision course &nd yet

Janata Party's Evolving Stance both sides hoped to persuade the ether to change. two hypotheses are worth considering :

177 At least

First, In d ia ’s willingness to give in to external presure on the Soviet heavy w ater deal gave hope to the US adm inistra­ tion th at India could be induced or forced to accept the dem and for full scope safeguards as the price for T a ra p u r fuel supply. H ere, In d ia’s behaviour in the heavy water deal signalled In d ia ’s willingness to conform to foreign dem ­ ands provided the deal could be kept secret or provided a face saving formula could be offered to justify the deal. Second, the Trojan Horses in the Indian establishment had assured the USA that M oraiji Desai could be n a d e to play into the hands of MEA and of DAE - that is, while Morarji did the talking publicly to show how strong and moral he was, others did the acting by softly selling Indian interests in a covert fashion. In this perpective, the briefings which the Prime Minister received durning Fall 1977 culm inated in an unexpectedly strong position which caught the Trojan Horses by surprise and without a fall back position. For the present it is not my purpose to conclude w hich of these two hypotheses are valid but these are interesting possibilities for further research. T h e strong position which In d ia ’s Prim e Minister took during the C arter visit was a consequence of two perceptions. First, no two scientists in DAE could agree on anything and offer a scientific consensus to the Prime Minister in such a m anner that the advice is not highly politicised. Because S eth n a’s advice is usually regarded as highly politicised he did not carry m uch weight in the inner councils of the Indian Government. Second, neither Foreign Minister Vajpayee nor Foreign Secretary J a g a t M ehta was able to provide sound diplomatic intelligence or good advice before and during the C arter visit. T h e eclipse of V ajpayee during the C arter visit reflects these failures while J a g a t M ehta distinguished himself as a fine P. R. O. for himself. Consequently, new centres of scientific advice and foreign policy advice are needed. R a m a n n a has recently developed some guts in

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speaking publicly after he received a signal to do so b u t until some team spirit prevails in DAE R a m a n n a ’s contribution m ay be an ad hoc one.2 T h e Ministry of E x tern al Affairs is also likely to need the induction of some spine so th a t it does not become a victim of sloppy diplom atic intelligence. T h e problem of Indian diplomatic intelligence is real and it appears now to m ar even the thinking at the highest political level. For instance, the stand of the In d ian Prim e Minister during the C arter visit was to reject ful scope safe­ guards as the price for continued U S supply of enriched u ran iu m for T ara pur. This new public stand occured even though the Desai governm ent had secretly accepted w hat are in effect, and in principle, full scope safeguards, for the R ajasthan reactors (RAPP-I an d II). This stand received applause in the Indian press unanim ously and this a p p eared to reflect the support of the Indian public opinion. But if the verbal stance is politically appealing to nationalist senti­ m ent in India it is by no m eans an irrevocable fram ew ork for In d ia ’s n u clear policy. Ironically, the In d ian Prim e M inister’s concern towards global disarm am ent has become a basis for diluting In d ia ’s nuclear and other national inter­ ests. Instead of the disarm am ent concern em erging as a basis for the evolution of In d ia ’s nu clear policy, it appears to have the potential for erosion of In d ia ’s n uclear program m e a n d the nuclear policy framework. D e s a i’s S h iftin g N n c le a r S tan d Im m ediately after the C arter visit, the In d ian Prim e M inister postulated the following three cardinal principles of In d ia ’s nuclear policy or rath er the pre-conditions for In d ia ’s acceptance of the NPT: 1.

‘T h e y ’ must give up all n uclear testing;

2.

Stop adding to the stockpiles and decide to progressively dismantle their nu clear weapons;

3.

‘T h e y ’ themselves must accept the safeguards they a r e suggesting to others. In this policy statem ent ‘they’ has not been defined.

Does

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this refer to the five n u clear weapon states, i. e. the US, U SSR , C hina, F rance an d U K , or only to US and the U SSR with U K m arginally included in the list? D uring the visit of the British Prime Minister Callaghan, in the light of British press reports which were based presu­ m ably on briefings by British official sources, serious misgiv­ ings arose about Morarji Desai’s stand on the comprehensive test ban. These misgivings have been strengthened by the replies Morarji Desai gave at the press conference held on Ja n u a ry 12, 1978. Referring to the recent Soviet heavy w ater deal whose existence was kept back from the Indian public and which is now perforce admitted after its exposure by other know­ ledgeable sources, Morarji Desai declined to disclose the safeguards he had accepted. T here is no question of security involved in this nor do considerations of security arise because o th er powers, particularly the US and the U K (who act in concert with the USSR in such matters) know th at India has accepted, in effect and in principle, full scope safeguards. This is contrary to the public stance sought to be taken by Morarji Desai against discrimination. In fact, Prime Minister Desai has accepted a position of discrim ination an d his public posture contradicts the actions taken and still being taken by his government. T he stance Prim > Minister Desai adopted at the press conference ( J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1978 ) is that it would be sufficient compliance with his earlier stand if the USA an d the U SSR — the Big Tw o-signed the Comprehensive Tost Ban Treaty bec­ ause, in his view there would be ‘no difficulty about others’. Desai felt that ono had to be practical and this was the commonsense view. No one will dispute the need for being practical as long as there is no surrender and compromise with one’s own principles in the n am e of practicality. But is it common­ sense to say that there will be no difficulty ¿bout others (C hina and France) accepting the Comprehensive Test Ban

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Treaty? Is it commonsense to ignore the imperatives o f geo­ political and geo-strategic considerations? Is it not a fact th at of the Big Five in nuclear m atters, C h in a has refused to participate in the Geneva disarm am ent talks? Is it not a fact that China treats its ow n nuclear and m issile program m e as its ‘defence requirement* an d is not p repared to limit its options at least till it completes its m ititary a n i economic modernisation? Is not Prime Minister Desai concerned w ith nuclear developments in C hina and on the T ibetan land in particular? Morarji Desai has unilaterally foresaken peaceful n u clear explosions and expects even his successors to be bound by his moral stand. It is pertinent to inquire if the US, U S S R or th e U K are prepared, jointly or individually, to come to his rescue in the case o f a nuclear threat across the border It is most unfortunate th a t Mo. a ji Desai is poorly served by hisr intelligence, scientific an d external affairs agencies. It is unrealistic to take a global view of things when regional realities are being ignored. M ora ji Desai would have been on unassailable ground if he h i d m i d e clear to President C arter th at his regional compulsions did not perm it him to sign the N P T unless C hina an d Pakistan also signed the test ban. In fact, C hina and Pakistan have not even accepted the Partial Test Ban T reaty (1963). Pakistan m ay be no im m edi­ ate threat to India but C hina, w ith its interm ediate ran g e ballistic missiles, covering a range of about 1200 miles, places the entire Gangetic p la in —the heartland of I n d ia —is a th re a t which no responsible Indian G overnm ent ought to ignore. This is an argum ent which the A m erican G overnment an d its people or the British G overnm ent or its people could understand and appreciate. M oral posturing of the type we have indulged in has hardly been reported in the A m eri­ can press and is hardly a realstic basis to conduct foreign policy. No one yet knows the final shape of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Is is practical and commonsense to accept füll scope safeguards once the Big T w o sign th e test b an

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treaty, whatever its content is? Is Prime Minister Desai going to be satisfied with the label irrespective of its content? T h e argum ent of the Big Powers gradually reducing their nuclear stockpiles is also fallacious an d imaginery. Do we know, or does anyone else know the content o f the nuclear arsenals of the US and the U SSR? Will they be dum ping their stockpiles u nder the gaze of curious spectators or are Indian inspectors going to be sent to verify the stockpile reduction? Such theoretical exercises may be self-satisfying but are not practical guides to a very com plicated problem. T h e Big Tw o have such a heavy lead in their military technology and arm s stockpiles that a m oratorium on their testing (that is a test ban for a limited time) an d which does not include China, will hardly make a dent on their overall capability. Even if the Big Tw o reduced by 20% or even 50% they could destory the world m any times over. But for the comparatively underdeveloped nuclear countries a brake on their development or full scope inspection based on the principle of pursuit would m ake all the difference. This could cripple In d ia ’s nuclear program m e and its industrial development. T h e Indian Governm ent should flex its m us­ cles not so m uch on the Big Two, who do not at present ap p e a r to pose a m ilitary threat to India, but to forces nearer home. These forces have given no indication of subscribing to an international code of restrictions and they are proceed­ ing undeterred in their nuclear military development and w hom the Big Tw o do not pressurise the way India is being pressurised. U . S. M o tiv a tio n a n d In te r n a tio n a l D e v e lo p m e n ts C urrent official Indian thinking about non-proliferation a n d disarm am ent seems to be based on a mistaken assessment o f the US motivations towards India and towards the nuclear issue. President C a rte r’s anti-proliferation stance is presented in m oral terms and in global terms. It is m eant to make the world safe from the spread of nuclear weapons and the thrust o f American policy since the K ennedy Presidency is

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against horizontal proliferation, i. e. proliferation beyond the present five nuclear weapon states. T he central prem ise is th at the real danger of nuclear w ar is not th at of a w ar between responsible Big Five (US, U SSR , China, F rance a n d U K ) b u t there is real danger of local and regional wars if nuclear arm s pass into the hands of unstable societies in regions of conflict in the T h ird World. C arter’s anti-prolifer­ ation policy is explicitly directed against the further transfer of reprocessing plants an d u ran iu m enrichm ent plants to T h ird W orld societies. W hen the West G erm an-Brazil nuclear deal was announced in 1975 an international cam paign was m ounted by the US to secure the cancellation of this deal on the ground th at it transferred sensitive technology to u n ­ stable societies or potential proliferators in the T h ird W orld. This was odd because the U S pressure came about after the U S business interests h a d failed to secure the contract from Brazil. At the same time pressure w a r brought to bear on the proposed South K orean-French deal for a reprocessing plant on sim ilar grounds. T he South K orean G overnm ent was persuaded to w ithdraw from the deal because the U S threatened to cut off its supplies of co ive itional arm s an d enriched u ran iu m supply to South K n ea. Since South K orea faced this dual dependence the threat was effective. At about t h ; sim e tim e a cam paign was m ounted against the French sale of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan b u t since US leverage on the Bhutto Government was non-existent in conventional arm s supply or economic assistance the B hutto Governm ent did not knuckle und *r an d the French G o v e rn ­ ment took the view, lik'? the West Gorman G overnm ent, th a t it intended to stick to its contractual obligations. T h e re are recent repoits to suggest that the French position has evolved to an extent. Iwen though France a n J West G erm an y opposed the requirem ent of full scope saf guards in the L ondon nuclear Supppliers’ C lub (and consequently this req u irem en t has not been accepted in the Basic Guidelines m ade public recently) France has now started to 1y exp3rience of Indian scientists in re ­ gard to reprocessing technology has itself baen cited by some as an indication that proliferation is inevitable. Such logic does little justice to the In d ia n nuclear efforts which are now three decades old. Besides the plutonium route there is the relatively old “ enrichm ent” route towards nuclear explosives. Such a route was followed by all the other nuclear weapon states (the US, USSR, Britain, France a n d China). U r a n iu m E n r ic h m e n t T e c h n o lo g y I f U-235 is to be used enriched to at least 90 per only 3 to 5 per cent enriched fo the enrichm ent of U-235 listed below :

in a weapons device, it must be cent unlike a reactor which uses fuel. T here are several methods from U-238. Some or these are

(a) Gaseous Diffusion : Gaseous diffusion is one of the oldest techniques used in isotope separation, but it is limited owing to the enormous expenditure of electricity involved. T he Peo­ ple’s R epublic of C hina has been operating a gaseous diffusion plant at L anchow and it speaks of a tremendous potential of its capabilities. (b) Gas Centrifuge : In this technique a high speed cent! i-

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Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

fuge separates the uranium atoms on the basis of their masses. (c) Jet Nozzle Technique : A procedure known as “jet no­ zzle technique,” was developed by Becker and his co-workers in West Germ any. In M arch 1972 attempts were m ade by India to sign a five-year agreem ent with West G erm any for cooperation on the “ nozzle” process of uranium enrichment. But the deal fell through for unknown reasons. Neither was the collabora­ tion with the French for the construction of a gas centrifuge pursued. T here is a modern technique known as ‘laser istope separation” which utilises Neodymium lasers. N edoym ium lasers are under construction at the B habha Atomic Research Centre (see Annual Report of D epartm ent of Atomic Energy 1976-1977). T y p e o f R e a c to r s Pow er reactors vary according to the preferred fuel, mode­ rator materials, and coolant. In commercial operations, three types of reactors are of im portance; these are : (a) Light W ater Reactors : (b) H eavy W ater Reactors ; (c) G raphite M oderated Reactors. (a) Light Water Reactors: In light w ater reactors (L W R ), the preferred fuel is enriched uranium and the m oderator and coolants are ordinary w ater (light w ater). These reactors are very common in the U nited States and are of two varie­ ties : boiling water reactors (BWR) and pressuiised w ater reactors (PW R). At the T a ra p u r Atomic Power P lant (TAPP), which be­ cam e operational in 1969, the U nited States helped In d ia in the: construction and design of a BW R. T he reactor is under

India's Nuclear Profile

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safeguards agreem ents with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (b) Heaiy Water Reactors : In this type of reactors, n a tu ­ ral u ra n iu m is the preferred fuel and heavy w ater is the mode­ rator and coolant. Such reactors have to depend on adequate supplies of heavy w ater which is costly. In the C anadian D euterium U ranium (CANDU) reactor which characterises the twin plants of the R ajasthan Atomic Power Plant (RAPP) in India, n atu ral u ran iu m mined in India is used directly. This reactor was built with C anadian assistance and R A PP-I becam e operational in 1973 and is operating at an electrical capacity o f 220 MWe. T he second unit is expected to be commissioned in 1978. Following In d ia’s explosion in 1974, C anada suspended nuclear aid gradually an d fully in M ay 1976. In October 1976 the U S S R agreed to supply 2C0 tons for use in R A PP-II. T o date only 60 tons have arrived. (c) Graphite Moderated Reactor : These reactors are rela­ tively few a n d have been developed primarily in France and Britain. In these, graphite is used as the moderator a n d the coolant is a gas, usually carbon dioxide. T here is little inter­ est in these reactors in India at present. P lu to n io m F ro m P o w e r R e a c to r s T h e transition from peaceful to explosive purposes of n u ­ clear energy occurs via the use to which plutonium (Pu-239) bulit up in the reactor is put. In general, when nuclear po­ wer reactors are in operation for the production of electricity, the plutonium that is produced is “ de-natured” , that is ren­ dered non-fissionable due to presence of various isotopes. It is possible to estimate roughly the amount of plutonium produced in a power reactor. O n an average, one m egaw att of nuclear capacity produces an n u ally 265 gram s of pluto­ nium. As nuclear power generation spreads, stockpiling of plutonium stocks increases.

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Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

B reed er R e a c to r Plutonium can also be used to fuel a new generation of rea­ ctors which generate more fuel than they consume. These are known as breeder reactors. Breeder reactors are of tw o types : the fast breeder and the thermal breeder. Fast bree­ ders are presently in vogue in France and have come in to commercial operation in the 600 MWe range. These are known as the Phenix variety. In this design the abundantly occuring U-23^ can be transferred into fissionable Pu-239 (plutonium). Owing to this, a steadily increasing stockpile of fissionable material can be built up. As a consequence of this, after a period of eight weeks enough fuel becomes availa­ ble to fuel a ne.v breeder of the same size as the previous one. According to some estimates (Stockholm Peace R esearch Institute), In d ia’s plutonium stockpile (not subject to inter­ national ag -e2m 2nts) totals over 200 kg. At K alp ak k am , near Madras there is presently an experimental fast test breeder reactor built along the lines of the French “ R hapsodi” m odel. T he reactor is 30 per cent Indian and French consultancy has been sought when necessary. (Annual Report, Atomic Energy D epartm ent, 1976-77). A test reactor called P urnim a become operaticnal in 1972, an example of a zero energy reactor, since very little power is produced. It was envisaged by the late Dr. Vikram Sarabhai to be the forerunner o f the commercial prototype fast breeder reactor in the 500 M W e range. In July 1977 Prime Minister Morarji Desai announced in Parliam ent that about half a kilogramme of the fissionable isotope U-133 had been obtained by irradiating thorium 232 in. a minibreeder reactor at BARG. Subsequent experiments are to be performed using thorium at the K alpakkam R eac­ tor Research Centre. India’s civilian nuclear strategy has adopted the path of

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first perfecting liquid metal fast breeder reactQr (LMFBR) and generating enough plutonium to breed thorium. As of now, the strategy seems geared towards the late 1980’s (un­ published lectures by R aja R a m a n n a on “ Inevitability of Atomic Energy for In d ia ” delivered on November 30, 1977 at C alcutta). N u clea r E x p lo siv e T e c h n o lo g y T h e three kinds of n u clear material used in fission power reactors are also suitable for making nuclear explosive : U ra ­ nium 235, Plutonium 239, and U ranium 233. An atomic bomb of the kind th a t was dropped on H iro­ shima was a very efficient, reliable and com pact fission explosive. T he design and construction of such weapons of mass destruction in those times was no easy m atter. H owe­ ver, in the present era with nuclear power reactor and their concom itant produce of plutonium , accessibility of nuclear ex­ plosive material m ay become relatively easy. O ne can im agine situations in which subversive elements within a country might procure at least enough m aterial to build a “ crude fission bo m b ” . T h e problem of “ sub-national proliferation” on n u clear terrorism has recently come into vogue in arm s control literature. Sub-national proliferation cannot be checked by a treaty : neither can there be retalia­ tion against it. T he probability of nuclear terrorism is a function of the ease at which fissionable m aterial m ay be smuggled out of a nuclear facility. N uclear terrorism does not appear to have received the undue attention in India w hich it has in the West. P e a c e fu l N u c le a r E x p lo sio n s T he notion of peaceful explosions was first mentioned by the Soviet U nion’s A. Vyshinsky. In early 1957 the United States Atomic Energy Commission began its “ Project Plow­ share” , the n am e “ plow share” derived its nam e from the Biblical words of Isiah : “ They shall beat their swords into

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plowshare; neither shall they learn w ar any more.” T h e objectives of “ Project Plow share” were to put to practical and constructive use the mechanism of nuclear explosions. T he applications of the constructive use of nuclear explo­ sions in the U nited States was at one time vast. These have been detailed with particular relevance to the U nited States by D r. E dw ard Teller in “ T h e Constructive Uses of N uclear Explosives,” (M cG raw Hill, Inc., New York, 1968). Article V of the Non-Proliferation T reaty states that : “ E ach Party to the T reaty undertakes to take appropriate measures that, in accordance with this T reaty, under ap p ro ­ priate international observation and through appropriate inter­ national procedures, potential benefits from and peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be m ade available to non-nuclear-w eapon States Party to the T reaty on a non-discrim inatory basis and th at the charge to such Parties for th e explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development, N on-Nuclear w ea­ pon States Party to the T reaty shall be able to obtain such benefits,pursuant to a special international agreem ent or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon States. Nego­ tiations on this subject shall comm ence a i soon as possible after the T reaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-W eapon States P arty to the T reaty, so desiring, m ay obtain such bene­ fits pursuant to bilateral agreem ents” . O n J u ly 16. 1975, the U S S R ’s representative Aleksey Roschin said a t the Conference of the Committee on Disarm am ent that peaceful nuclear explosions must be carried out within the framework of Article V of the NPT. It is only in the context of the Indian nu clear explosion that the architects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty fail to see the point. India feels that peaceful nuclear explosions should be conducted from domestic and indigenous experience a n d

India's Nuclear Profile

21.r>

not under the auspices of an authority th at appears to legiti­ mise a status quo of “ nuclear weapon powers th at dictates the viability or non-viability of such explosion.” In essence w hat India wants to avoid is “ institutionalisation of com m itm ent” , for the signature of such a com m itm ent reduces the flexibility of m aintaining a policy of “ keeping the option open” . T he latter policy is still m aintained by the Desai Government. Present day political logic refuses to recognise declarations of peaceful intent, for nuclear explosive devices are viewed as per se atom ic bombs. If political argum ents refuse to distin­ guish between explosive devices an d bombs, then one can take recourse to technological arguments. For instance, any country, say India, having dem onstra­ ted the capability for atomic weapons has still to face the problem of “ increaiing the yield to weight ratio.” It is k n o ­ w n that a crude fission device exploding w ith a chem ical equivalent of 20,000 tons of dynam ite (T N T ) had initially a weight of 10,000 pounds. Any country interested in develop­ ing means of delivering the weapons on enemy targets must first contemplate the reduction of yield to weight ratio. In other words, concerted effort must be m ade to integrate the defence and atomic energy establishments. India’s present nuclear program mes have always been delinked from her defence departm ent and, th a t alone is proof that th e interest in peaceful nuclear explosions was the prime motivation. In d ia’s P N E has yet to open the floodgates of n u clear proliferation. T he premise that other threshold countries were waiting for In d ia ’s green signal has to date not proved correct.

T he disadvantage of a nuclear explosion over a chem ical explosion lies in radioactive fallout. T he effects of radioac­ tivity can be minimised if the explosion is very deep, but if

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Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy

the explosion is shallow the chimney formation causes the earth to sag and depending on the depth, the chimney could extend to the surface causing ground cracks and the subse­ quent release of radioactivity into the atmosphere (this pheno­ menon is known as venting). A 25-kiloton nuclear device— equivalent in explosive power to 15,000 tons of T N T —can be placed in a cylindrical hole of diameter less than a metre whilst the same quantity of T N T would require a spherical cavity 30 metre across. Also a one-megaton device, equivalent to one million tons of T N T can be accomm odated in a cylin­ drical hole of the order of one metre in diameter. Nuclear explosives are relatively cheap and the Indian Atomic Energy D epartm ent has estimated the cost of the Pokhran test at $ 400,000 for a 15-20 kiloton device. T his tallies with the US Atomic Energy Commission’s figure o f $ 350,000. S o v iet P a tte r n o f P N E s In d ia’s interest in PNEs even if modelled after the Soviet experience needs an infrastructure which does not exist. A Soviet paper on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions has listed the following applications : a) oil and gas recovery stimulation b) creation of underground reservoirs for natural gas and oil products c) creation of underground storage for wastes harmful to living organisms d) extinction of runaw ay gas and oil fountains e) underground methods of ore recovery f ) preparation of mineral deposit sites for open cast min­ ing—that is, dead rock baring, rock crushing, and construc­ tion of access tracks for taking out ore or coal g) canal construction

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h) construction of dams for hydroelectric pow er stations i ) construction of w ater reservoirs for w ater supply j ) excavation of cuttings and construction of embankments for railw ay an d roads. T h e Indian representative to the l.A.E.A. panel on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions has stressed that the possi­ bility (f ) above is very attractive, for the recovery of metal values from oxidised copper bodies which are considered to be of too low a grade for economic mining by conventional methods. O ne of the major copper areas in India is the 133kilometre Singhbhum belt in Bihar. T here is a vast body of literature on the potential benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions and in this exercise it is impossible to do complete justice to the subject. O nce the results of the Pokhran test are evaluated, it is possible that efforts would be m ade tow ards miniaturisation of devices for insertion of such devices into small holes for the purpose of fracturing oil shales deep underground. This m ay represent one of the applications of PN E ’s relevant to the Indian context. I n d ia ’s N u c le a r P r o file » A D e ca d e In 1970, the C h airm an of the Indian Atomic Energy Com­ mission, Dr. V ikram Sarabhai, had envisioned a nuclear profile over the next decade (1970-80). W h at was envisioned was : a) 2700 M W e of nuclear power to be commissioned before 1980, implying the construction of four new power stations totalling 1/00 M W e : b) Design and construction of advanced therm al reactors of about 500 M W e unit size which would enable lowering o f capital costs of power stations while still producing plutonium for future needs in fast breeder reactors :

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Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

c) Completion of fast breeder test reactor (15 M W e experi­ mental reactor under construction with French collaboration at K alpakkam in Southern India) and experience with tech­ nology of plutonium enriched fuel, its fabrication and repro­ cessing, sodium coolant technology (Liquid M etal Fast Breeder ; LMFBR) and experience with thorium bred U-233 fuel ; d) Augmentation of heavy w ater production of about 30 tons per year to back up the program m e for the use of n atu ral u ranium in power reactors (heavy w ater reactor ; H W R o f the C A N D U variety); e) Design and construction of large 500 M W e prototype fast breeder reactor ; f) Development of gas centrifuge technology for U-235 isotope enrichment. D evelopm ent of special materials inclu­ ding carbon filament structures ; g) Development of the N arw ap h u r U ran iu m Mines and facilities for extraction from low grade ore. Also develop­ ment of process for the extraction of ore from tailing in copper mines; h) Early completion of the N u clear Fuel Complex to m anufacture special materials and fuel elements for power programmes ; i) Widespread application of isotopes in industrial process­ ing, food preservation, sterilisation of medical products, m edi­ cine, and research ; j) Augmentation of the facilities for R & D at the Space Science and Technology Centre to-be able to build scienti­ fic and communication satellites and to environmentally test them ; k) Facilities at the Space Science and Technology Centre for the development of inertial guidance and on-board m ini­ aturised computers ;

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1) Development at the Space Science an d Technology Centre, T a ta Institute of F undam ental Research and the Electronics Corporation of India Lim ited and the construction of high performance missile tracking radars and Pulse Code M odulator com m unication systems for installation at Shreeharikotta Rocket R an g e and a t A ndam ans in the Bay of Bengal for the satellite program m e ; m) Construction of a plant for the m anufacture of large solid propellant blocks at Shreeharikotta Rocket Range and facility for satellite testing of these propellant blocks on the ground an d under high altitude stimulated conditions ; n) Completion of rocket fabrication facility at T riv an ­ d ru m for m anufacture of large size rocket castings and h ard ­ w are for rocket motors, including the development of special m aterials for rocket motor systems ; o) Development of in-fight guidance system for rockets : p) Development by 1974 of a “ Scout” type launcher which has four stages, burning solid propellant, capable of putting into orbit a satellite of about 40 kg payload. T he development of more advanced rocket system capable of put­ ting 1200 kg payloads into synchronous orbits : q) Fabrication of communication satellites by 1975 capa­ ble of providing high quality point to point service between m etropolitan areas and direct broadcast of telivision; r) Development sensing.

of sensors and techniques for remote

I m p le m e n ta tio n T h e strategy envisioned by D r. S arabhai was geared to­ w ards the civil domain. However, it has been suggested by doubting Thomases th a t in it there exists all the necessary in­ gredients for a balanced weapons program m e. Most of the plans are under operation, though not nece­ ssarily on schedule.

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Item (f) for isotope separation has, for some reason, not been im plemented. I f India were to contemplate an explosion o f thermonuclear device, she must have an isotope separation plant. Since Dr. S arabhai’s demise, separate D epartm ents o f Space and Electronics have come into being. But as of now no evidence exists of integration of the activities of these de­ partm ents with those of the nuclear power program mes of the Atomic Energy Commission. Also, the implementation of nuclear power projects in the country has been constrained by difficulties in getting major nuclear components m anufactured in shops within the coun­ try in the time schedule for the project. In spite of plaguing difficulties imposed by the shortage o f heavy water, as a result of the C anadian G overnm ent’s deci­ sion following the Pokhran test, In d ian nuclear scientists have come a long way.

i

G L O SSA R Y

A tom : A particle of m atter incapable of further decom­ position by chem ical means. Atomic bomb : A bomb whose energy comes from the fissi­ on of heavy elements such as u ra n iu m or plutonium. Boiling-water reactor : A reactor in which w ater, used as both coolant and moderator, is allowed to boil in the core. T h e steam produced then drives a turbine. Breeder reactor : A reactor th a t produces more fissionable m aterial than it consumes. Burn-up : A measure of reactor fuel consumption. It can be expressed in terms of (a) the percentage of fuel atoms that have fissioned or (b) the am ount of energy per units weight o f fuel in the reactor. Cascade : A o t e r m i n u s assembly of equipm ent, the effect of which is to m ultiply the am ount present at stage. Chain reaction : ble.

A reaction whereby duplication is possi­

Control rod : A rod, plate, or tube of material that can readily absorb neutrons, used to control the power generation of a reactor. T he absorption of neutrons by a control rod obstructs the neutrons from causing further fission. Convertion ratio : T h e ratio of the n u m b er of new fissiona­ ble m aterial produced in a reactor to the original num ber of fissionable atom destroyed. Coolant : A substance circulated through a nuclear rea­ ctor to rem ove or transfer heat. Core : T h e central part of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements an d the moderator.

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Critical :

Ability to sustain a chain reaction.

Critical mass : T he smallest mass of fissionable material that enables a self-sustaining chain reaction. Decay, radioactive : T he gradual decrease in the radioac­ tivity of a radioactive substance due to nuclear disintegration. Deuterium: An isotope of hydrogen which is twice as heavy as the nucleus of an ordinary hydrogen nucleus. Doubling time : The time required for a breeder reactor to produce as m uch fissionable material as the amount con­ tained in its core, plus the am ount in its fuel cycle (fabri­ cation, reprocessing, and so on). Typically, the time is 10-20 years. Enriched material : M aterial in which the percentage of a given isotope present in a m aterial has been artificially incre­ ased so that the percentage of th at isotope is higher th an th at occurring naturally. Fallout: Airborne particles and other materials of a radio­ active nature falling to the ground after a nuclear explosion. Fast breeder reactor : A reactor that operates with fast neutrons and produces more fissionable material than is con­ sumed. Fast reactors : A reactor in w hich the fission chain reac­ tion is m aintained bv fast neutrons. Fast reactors contain little or no moderators to slow down the neutorons from the speed with which they are ejected from the nuclei. Fertile material : A m aterial which, though not fissionable by therm al neutrons, may be converted into a fissionable one by irradiation in a reactor. Fission : T he splitting of a heavy nucleus into two near­ by equal parts (which are nuclei of the lighter elements) accompanied by the release of a great deal of energy and one or more neutrons. Fission products :

T he nuclie (fission fragment) created by

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the fission of heavy elements, including the nuclides created by decay (radioactive) of fission fragments. Graphite : A very pure form of carbon used as a mode­ rator in nuclear reactors. Heavy Water : W ater containing significantly m ore than the n a tu ra l proportion (one in 6500) of heavy hydrogen (deu­ terium ) atoms to ordinary hydrogen atoms. H eavy w ater is the preferred m oderator in some reactors because it slows down neutrons effectively. Kiloton energy : T h e energy of nuclear explosion which is equivalent to that of an explosion of 1,000 tons of T N T . Light water :

O rdinary water.

Light-water reactor : A reactor in which ordinary w ater is the m oderator and coolant. Megaton energy : T h e energy of a n uclear explosion equi­ valent to th at of an explosion of one million tons of T N T . Spontaneous fission : stimulus.

Fission th at occurs without an external

Thermal (slow) neutron : A neutron in th erm al equili­ b riu m with its surrounding medium. T herm al neutrons are those th a t have been slowed by a m oderator to an average speed of about 2003 metres per second (at room tem perature) from the m uch higher initial speed they h ad when expelled by fission. T N T equivalent : A measure o f the energy released in terms of the weight of T N T (the chemical explosive, trinitro­ toluene). Weapons-grade material : Plutonium containing at least 90 per cent of Pu-239 a n d no more th an 10 per cent of other plutonium isotopes. U ra n iu m enriched to a t least 95 per cent U-235. Yield : T h e total energy released in a nuclear explosion. It is expressed in equil valent tons of T N T .

Chapter 9 DILEMMA WITHOUT ANGUISH : INDIA, MORARJI AND THE BOMB — Bhabani Sen Gupta

All nu clear and n ear-nuclear nations are caught in the N u­ clear D ilem m a or the N u clear T ra p and also in some N uclear Anguish. India is no exception. In d ia ’s dilem m a is however more anguished than the others. India is a nuclear power w ithout nuclear weapons. It would like this as long as possible or necessary. But there is a wide credibility gap bet­ ween India and the rest of the world. T h e nuclear powers are alarm ed at India's dem onstrated capability. Loft unleashed the capability will, thev argue, inevitably h a d to nuclear weapons, breaking the non-proliferation barrier th at has stood its ground since the Chinese explosion of 1964. T hey are therefore pursuing a stick-and-carrot strategy to sccure from India a closure of, or at least reliable yafeguai ds against, the option, offering India at the same time substantial cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. T h e Indian response in the late seventies is suitably am bivalent. India wants the nuclear powers to accept on its face value Prime Minister M orarji Desai's assurance th a t India has no intention to m ake nuclear weapons, and that it will not conduct a secrnd nuclear explosion unless this is absolutely

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essential for the peaceful program m e, and then, too, not in secrecy. Having accepted this assurance, the nuclear powers, India argues, should fulfil their contractual obligations to supply the nuclear fuel that is essential for the im plem entation of the Indian nuclear program m e. While India will accept all bilaterally agreed safeguards, it will not expose its facilities to international inspection except on a reciprocal basis. Nor will In d ia sign the N uclear Nonproliferation T re a ty (NPT) until its discriminatory character is removed and unless the nuclear powers have moved firmly and convinc­ ingly tow ards nuclear disarmament. W hat appears to the Indians to be a perfectly reasonable and responsible position is looked upon with exterme suspicion by the nuclear powers, particularly the U nited States and C an ad a. T heir o u n experience tells them that once a nation has assembled the technological and resource capability to make nuclear weapons, once it has crossed the threshold, the bom b is only a m atter of time and political will. N othing can stop its coming. R hetorical assurances of celibacy given by political leaders have no m eaning because prim e ministers and presidents are mortal and, are not, in any case,always consistent. In a world full of tensions and conflicts, and motored by the volatile fuel of nationalism, governments, arm ed with the means, can always find strong justification to m anufacture the bom b and missiles. Besides, the power charism a of the bom b retains its seductive pull; the bomb means status and respect which all nations always covet. T h e technology, too, creates its own m om en­ tum , especially when it is indigenous, as it is in the Indian case. And finally, the N uclear Club may be limited to five powers, but the nu clear industry of the developed capitalist nations is piivate enterprise fielding for overeas reactor custo­ mers w hen the domestic m arket is shrinking. Largescale horizontal proliferation is certain in the next ten years or so if the nu clear appetite of the developing nations cannot be brought u n d er international regulation and control. T he nu clear powers seem to have fastened upon India as the threshold case. T heir argum ent is that if In d ia c ió l e s the

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R ubicon, the fragile non-proliferation d am will burst, and, at the turn of the century, 20 or more nations will emerge as nuclear weapon powers. H ence the overriding urge to stop India from assembling a major autonom ous capability. T o Indians, the nuclear powers’ arg u m en t sounds arbit­ rary, and does not stand the test of objective reasoning. T h e D ilem m a or the T ra p or the Anguish is th e creation of the nuclear powers, particularly of the U nited States an d the Soviet U nion; more, to put it bluntly, of the former than the latter. Indians m aintain that not only have the super powers not been able to move tow ards nuclear disarm am ent, they are still a considerable distance aw ay from the plateau of stable nuclear arm s control, and, while negotiations for the SA LT series m eander an d often get lost in the smog of power politics, the technology and the p o w er­ ful interests tied with it generate one qualitative nuclear arm s race after another and the super powers are trapped in an a p ­ parently endless vicious circle of vertical proliferation. T h eir moral right to preach nuclear abstinence to the almost-haves and have-nots is no more convincing th an the h arlo t’s avow al of sexual faithfulnes®. T h e argum ent th a t the C lub of Five alone can handle nuclear weapons with a high sense of respo­ nsibility and that the sixth or the tenth possessor of nuclear weapons will be utterly irresponsible is insulting to the nationalist pride of the aspirants, even though it is not altoge­ ther pointless. T he nuclear powers’ policy of nuclear denial to the aspirants is self-defeating because of th eir own failure to bring the Frankenstein under control and because they are finding it increasingly difficult to leash the com­ mercial appetite of the reactor manufacturers. In short, the predicam ent in which they find themselves is of their own making. , Yet they have genuine causes for concern. T h e specture of proliferation which haunts them is not im aginary. T here is no dividing line betw een the peaceful and the warlike atom. As commercial reactors become more and more wide­ spread - with nuclear vendors fast moving a w a y from

India, Morarji and the Bomb severely tight controls - an increasing num ber of nations will cross the nuclear b arrier. T h e US Energy Research Development Administration (ERDA) has a list of 30 Nth countries who “ appear technically capable of detonating a nuclear device.” ERD A predicts that J a p a n and T aiw an could do it within a few months to three years; South K orea a n d Pakistan within four to six years of the decision to do so. An ER D A study of the atom bom b production potential of certain less developed countries in 1990 estimates the an n u al bom b-m arking capactity of these countries as follows: India-544, Taiwan-200, Pakistan an d the Philippines-96 each, Singapore-86, Bangladesh-80, T hailand-74, Hong Kong-64, M alaysia and Indonesia-34 each, an d Vietnam-20. T h e International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in 1974 th at the potential m arket for nuclear plants in Asia would more than qu ad ru p le by 1990-exceeding 100 facilities. Based on Asia’s growing need for electricity, IA E A saw a potential m arket for 18 reactors in In d ia by 19S0, 13 each in South K orea and Singapore, 12 for Pakistan, 11 for T aiw an, 9 each for Bangladesh, Philippines an d T hailand, 7 for Hong K ong, 6 each for M alaysia and Indonesia and 2 for Vietnam . It is widely believed th a t Israel has a modest arsenal of nu clear bombs, and that South Africa is just waiting for an opportunity to declare itself nuclear. PL O can make its own bom b if it so determines or can obtain from, say, Libya. Several countries in L atin America are stepping firmly to­ w ards the threshold. T he b ru tal tru th is th at the making of ti e nuclear bom b is now relatively easy. T he technology is no longer secret, and it only takes 10 kilograms of plutoni­ um or 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to make a small nuclear weapon. T he responsible behaviour theory of the five nuclear powers ja r on the'ears of the non-nuclear nations, b u t the very limited num ber of the C lub and the interm eshing dete­ rren t system have imposed a precarious discipline on the nu clear arsenals of the five countries. A lthough the nuclear

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might has been brandished m any times, it has not been used since the plutonium bombs dropped in 1945 on J a p a n for the simple reason that the might of one is hostage to the might of the other, while none has found the political and other costs of using nuclear weapons in “ local conflicts” acceptable. (President Johnson could not have used nuclear weapons in V ietnam even if he wished to do so because the A.nerican people themselves would not have accepted such extreme measures to win a dubious w ar). At the same time the contenders point out th a t the mere fact th at a nation has a sizeable arsenal and the capability to use n u clear weapons acts as a powerful instrum ent of coercive diplom acy. T he vertical arm s race can go out of hand and plunge the world in a nuclear holocaust. F u rth er­ more, the sheer technological m om entum of the atom is threatening to b lu r the difference between nuclear and con­ ventional weaponry. It is now pretty certain that unless strong mechanisms are found to control the nuclear arm s race between the tw o super powers, nuclear technology will invade conventional w ar machines in the not distant future. T here is some force in the argum ent th a t the possession of n u c le a r weapons by 20 nations qualitatively changes the prevailing scenario of precarious discipline among the N uclear Five. Even a single bomb is enough to drastically shift not only a country’s strategic posture, but also th at of its neighbours, allies and enemies in unexpected an d signifi­ cant ways. T h e Indian explosion at Pohkran in M ay 1974 for instance, has raised In d ia ’s status in the eyes of most, if not all, Asian nations, brought India within sight of the corridors of the Nuclear Club, and, at the same time, generated Pakistan’s nuclear will, pushing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to make the apocalyptic statem ent that Pakistanis would build their ow n nuclear deterrent “ even if they have to eat grass.” It is not entirely bizarre to build a scenario in which extremists of PLO somehow acquire a nuclear bomb and throw it on Israel in utter desparation, or locked in a losing w ar w ith the Arabs, that the Israeli leaders th e m ­ selves mount a nuclear attack on their enemies. Nor is it

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im probable th a t the South African nuclear bomb would propel a num ber of African countries to summon their will and resources to build the necessary deterrent. T here is no doubt, then, that proliferation enhances the danger of nuclear war. It was only because n u clear war is still an abstraction, unexperienced by mankind, that this danger does not weigh heavily on nuclear decision-makers either in the N u clear C lub or among the concenders. Aspirants of nuclear power in India haughtily, and perhaps rightly, reject the suggestion that the nuclear conduct of a bomb-owning In d ia would be less responsible than that of any of the Five nuclear powers. But they cannot be certain th a t a nuclear Pakistan would a c t with the same p a li cast of thought. T he same psychology prevents the Chinese from welcoming the Indian bomb. E ach aspirant nation, then, wants proliferation to stop after it has acquired its own weapon. T h e íeluctance to see proliferation as an invitation to nu clear war is reinforced by the not entirely baseless a r g u ­ m en t that nuclear weapons in the possession of the weak pro­ tect it from the coersive designs of the strong. In the years w hen the U SSR ’s nuclear might was far inferior to A m eri­ c a ’s, it still breathed into US strategic thinking considerable respect for Moscow’s deterrence. T he Soviets did brandish their nuclear might against the Chinese in the Spring and Sum m er of 1969, following the Ussuri river incidents, b u t could not disregard even C h in a ’s infant nuclear capability. I f an d when Brazil and A rgentina acquire nuclear weapons, their ability to hurt the United States is bound to make a difference in the already changing American strategic view o f the Western hemisphere. W ho can say that behind C h in a ’s new-fangled friendship diplomacy towards India, there does not exist some shrewd thinking in Peking that this diplomacy is necessary to soften In d ia ’s n u clear will? T he force o f this deterrent argum ent, is however, easily spent. For while w ar breaks out among the relatively smaller actors in the different regions, there is no guarantee that nuclear weapons, once in possession of the belligerents, will not be used. This is p a rti­ cularly so with regard to conflicts in which the stake o f one

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or the other of the belligerents is extremely high. T h e rulers of Israel may not hesitate to hurl nuclear bombs at the Arabs if the alternative is the eclipse of the Jewish state. T he white racist rulers of South Africa may well runam ock and use nuclear weapons to protect their affluent estate from the exploded w rath of the mass of the African blacks. T he danger of nuclear proliferation is, then, extremely high and p-ilpably present. H j.vevar, to accuse the present governm ent in India of accelerating the pace of proliferation by its refusal to sign the N PT or to surrender its nuclear autonomy is both unfair and unrealistic. Unfair because N P T is an openly discriminating document which dem ands of the nuclear have-nots what the nuclear haves are unwill­ ing to yield. Unrealistic, because no Indian government will give in to international pressure and part with the prize achievement of Indian science and technology, the one Indian achievement that has boosted the country’s world image more than anything else. India's nuclear dilem m a is created by three interlinked phenomena. T he first is the nuclear infrastructure assembled over a period of more than two decades, with international help as well as relying on indigenous resources, and at consi­ derable cost. This infrastructure is now the largest an d the most sophisticated in the T hird W orld outside C hina. It supports a balanced nuclear energy program m e with n u clear facilities, operational, ordered, announced or planned, desi­ gned to create an installed nuclear energy capacity of 2,700 M W e by the mid-1980s (the original dateline of 1980 has now' suffered several slippages). W hen this program m e is im ple­ mented the 2700 M W e would correspond to the production of about 1,000 kg of plutonium per year, a figure of evident m ilitary significance. India is rich in nuclear raw m aterial, has its own reprocessing facilities, and has conducted one underground nuclear explosion. This demonstrated nuclear capability has breathed into the Indian psyche two contra­ dictory urges. T h e first is the original virtue-the comm itment to employ the atom exclusively for peaceful purposes an d not

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to produce nuclear weapons. T he second is the wisdom born o f nationalism, technology and responses to tremendous strate­ gic developments like the Chinese bomb; it tends to dilute the original virtue and nudge India towards the weapons option. T he dilem m a created by these three factors is com­ plicated by the steadily mounting pressure from the Indian elite to protect the option and, if necessary, proceed to a weapons programme, and by the nuclear powers’ reluctance to be satisfied with In d ia ’s unilateral peaceful declarations. Since the viability of In d ia ’s nuclear program m e depends on the iulfilment of contractual supplies of heavy w ater and en­ riched u ran iu m at least for several more years, India is open to pressure from the supplier countries to accept safeguards th a t would compromise its nuclear autonomy. T he Indian nuclear dilem m a took its persent shape during the prime ministerships of Lai Bahadur Shastri and Indira G andhi, both of whom built the option and created the im ­ pression th at India was steadily moving towards the bomb. J a w a h a rla l N ehru had committed “ all future governments” of his country to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear ener­ gy. A mere nine days before his death, N ehru rem ained firm in his com m itm ent that India would “ never” make bomb. But five w^eks afcer the first Chinese explosion in 1964, his successor, Lai B ahadur Shastri diluted that com ­ mitm ent. “ I cannot say th at the present policy (of nuclear pacifism) is deep-rooted, that it cannot be set aside, that it cannot be changed,” he told an incensed parliam ent. During the first years o f In d ira G an d h i’s prime ministership, India took a harder line at the meetings of the 18-Nation D isarm a­ m ent Committee in Geneva and tried for a n N PT th at would ensure its security from the Chinese bomb. In d ia w anted the nuclear powers to comm it themselves not to transfer nucl a r weapons or technology to others, not to use nuclear weapons against countries that did not possess them, and to safeguard the security of countries threatened by a country having n u ­ clear weapons capability or embarking on such capability. W hen the N P T finally emerged without any of these provisi­ ons, India refused to sign it on three grounds : im balance

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of obligations betw< en nuclcar and non-nuclear powers; in ad ­ equate security guarantees, and discrimination in the develop­ ment of peaceful nuclear piogramm es. Non-signature of the N PT predictably reinforced the bomb lobby in India and forced the Government to build a credi­ ble and sophisticated nuclear energy program m e, the core of which would be autonomy. Thus came the “ S arabhai Profile” , which was adopted by the Government only after Mrs. G h a n d i’s missive victory in the 1971 parliam entary election. By adopting the Sarabhai program me, Mrs. G handi was able to mute the dem and for a crash nuclear bom b p ro ­ gram m e. Speaking at Port Louis, Mauritius, in J u n e 1970, she argued th a t India could not affort to build a stockpile in its present economic situation : “ once we launch into making it, we would have to incur heavy expenditure to keep abreast of nuclear weaponry and at the same time m aintain conventi­ onal equipm ent” . M^s. Gandhi, howtver, kept the bomb option open. And in two years, she gave the signal to the nuclear energy establishment to prepare for the first under­ ground explosion. Circum stantial evidence suggests th a t each political deci­ sion towards the bomb has been taken in India by prime ministers in moments of their political weakness. Both Shastri in 1964 and Mrs. G andhi during 1963-70 might have felt th a t by movin ; cautiously towards the bomb they would be able to raise their personal leadeiship stature in the e \ e s o f t h e bomb aspiring elite and also of the world at large. T h e Pokhran explosion in M ay 1974 tends to confirm this theory : it came at a time when Mrs G andhi’s image had struck a new low, and the elite was beginning to lose confidence in her qualities of peacetim i leadership. Although the Pokhran ex­ plosion was projected to the world as a necessary m easure to employ the atom for the purposes of peaceful developm ent, th e secrecy in which it was conducted reinforced internatio­ nal suspicion that a simultaneous objective was to dem onstra­ te In d ia’s capability to make the bomb. T he explosion produced predictable contradictory esults. It lifted the

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spirit of the Indian elite as well as In d ia ’s power image in the eyes of the world; throughout Asia, a certain new respect for In d ia became immediately evident. At the same time, it frightened In d ia ’s sm aller and w eaker neighbours, especially Pakistan, which im m ediately started scouting international help to pace up its own nuclear program m e. T hirdly, it u p ­ set the Sarabhai program m e by alienating the suppliers of essential nuclear fuel. C anada discontinued its collabora­ tion. T h e U nited States froze the fulfilment of contractual obligations. T h e net result of Indira G andhi's nuclear policy and diplom acy was, then, a sharp increm ent in the world view o f In d ia ’s emergence as a clandestine nuclear weapons power. T h e perception becam e even sharper during the Emergency; authoritarian regimes thrive on the staple of power. Most observers of the Indian nuclear scene concluded, rightly or wrongly, th a t Mrs. G andhi would now use her authortarian power to build an arsenal of nuclear bombs. This impression becam e particularly acute in the Asian neighourhood. When this writer travelled in J a p a n and Southeast Asia in the a u tu ­ m n and winter of 1974-75, he witnessed an almost universally shared skepticsm about In d ia ’s affirmation of nuclear pacifism. O n e of the first things J a n a ta Governm ent had to take up after its installation in power in New Delhi in M arch 1977 was to review Indira G an d h i’s nuclear policy with a view to rem oving the distortions and restoring a balanced posture. Since the departm ent of nuclear energy is directly under the prim e minister, this was primarily the task of Morarji Desai. However, he enlisted the cooperation of the minister for ex te rn a l affairs, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who was once a strong advoc c3 te of the bom b. It is rem arkable that between the G a n d h ia n Desai and the*‘pro-bom b" Vajpayee, a new Indian n u c le a r posture has developed rapidly which not only takes into account the domestic and international realities, but also combines dignity and firmness with flexibility and readiness

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to accom m odate as far as possible th e interests and views of others. In a real sense, M orarji Desai has restored the nuclear policy of J a w a h a rla l N ehru, necessarily modifying it, at the same time, in the light of domestic and international realities shaped up since his death. No nuclear policy and diplomacy could be crafted without taking into account the fallowing inputs and outputs of the past 14 years: (1) the high level of In d ia’s nuclear technology and the momentum it au to m ati­ cally builds up; (2) the autonom y an d the dependencies of In d ia ’s nuclear program m e; (3) non-signature to the N PT an d the nuclear option em anating there-fiom; (4) the trad i­ tional nuclear pacifism; (5) the Pokhran explosion and its domestic and international im pact. Mr Desai has been try­ ing to weave all these inputs and outputs together into a nuclear policy which would sound credible both at home and in the world. Credibility at home would call for a viable nuclear programme, bringing in, in the not too distant future, benefits commensurate with the investments and promises m ade, as well as safeguarding the option which has gone deep into the elite psyche. International credibility depends upon a viable nuclear program m e and its m arriage to peaceful intentions. T he other kind of world credibility which can be earned by opting sternly and irrevocably for a weapons program m e regardless of costs and world reactions, has been avoided by all the four successive prime ministers of India. Desai’s nuclear policy stands on five negatives. India, he has affirmed with all the emphasis at his comm and, will 1101 m anufacture nuclear weapons. It will not carry out any more nuclear explosions unless absolutely necessary for its peaceful nuclear program m e; even then, it will not be an ex­ plosion conducted in secrecy: “ we will be open to other people.” India will not sign the N PT until the nuclear po­ wers have moved convincingly towards noncosmetic nuclear arm s control, if not disarmam ent. India will not throw its nuclear facilities to international inspection except on a reci­ procal basis; “ until they allow us to inspect their plants,

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we will not allow ours to be inspected;” and finally, India will not subm it to international pressure to accept a n u clear policy th a t w ju ld h u rt its national pride and its indigenous nuclear energy development program m e. From the fifth negative follows Desai’s assertion in the Lok Sabha on M a rch 23, 1978, th a t in order to avoid the closing down of the T arap u r plant (TAPS), governm ent would turn to other sources of supply of enriched u ran iu m if the U nited States broke its contructual obligations. Desai’s nuclear policy and diplomacy have not caused more th an ripples of criticism at home. T he holistic d eclara­ tion that In d ia will not have the nuclear bomb as long as Morarji Desai remains prim e minister has neither lifted Indian hearts nor sunk them. He has been criticised in and out of parliam ent for subm iting to A m erican pressure; b u t the criticism, w hich cam e mostly from political and intellectual supporters of In d ira G andhi, could not gather m uch of an edge because of Desai’s reputation as a m an who would not yield to arm -twisting. His proposition that India m ight re­ consider its attitu d e tow ards the N P T if the two super powers succeeded in w rapping up a convincing nuclear arms control agreem ent rather th a n an agreem ent for nuclear disarm am ent ( for instance, the stopping of all testing: ) has been interpre­ ted in some circles as a distinct dilution of the In d ian stand on the N P T form ulated during the regime of Mrs G andhi. A more prescient interpretation would be th at Desai is mere­ ly trying to soften the mind of the US atomic energy establish­ ment before the legislation requiring full scope safeguards is passed by the Congress. Som ew hat surprisingly, Desai’s statements have not created an alarm that he is moving to­ w ards opting out of the n u clear option. T h e delay in the im plem entation of the S arab h ai Program m e has somewhat m uted the In u ia n dem and for the bomb. It is now recogni­ sed that India cannot opt for a credible weapons program m e, even if it wants to, before the mid-eighties. W hat is desired by the bom b elite is that the option should outlive Prime M inister who is 83. Thus reassured, the elite is in no mood to cavil at D esai’s nuclear reluctance. O n the contrary, it

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is willing to let him go ahead with his nuclear diplomacy for whatever it may wrest from the supplies of nuclear fuel, Desai has, however, found it difficult to sell his nuclear diplomacy to the hard-nosed and hardened wielders of nucl­ ear power whether they are in Washington or Moscow, While listening to Desai’s affirmations of nuclear pacifism with respect, they recall Mrs. Indira G andhi’s statement to M ohammed Hassen Heykal, former editor of Al Ahram, of Egypt, in 1973 th at “ should conditions require it, India W ' o u l d give s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n to converting its n u c l e a r option into n u clear h ard w are” . To assuage this kind of memory, Desai has publicly criticised the “ manner*’ in which the Pokhran explosion was carried out, implying the surprise and the secrecy normally associated with a weapons progra­ mme. He also transferred from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) its eminent director, Dr. R aja R am anna, to the Defence Ministry as its chief scientific adviser probably b e c a u s e of R a m a n n a ’s close association with the Pokhran ex­ plosion. Inspite of these gestures, it is doubtful if the nuclear powers will be moved by the five negatives of Morarji Desai, which strike them as mainlvj rhetorical and cosmetic. At the time of writing, President C arter is finding it difficult to deli­ ver the promise he had made to Desai during his visit to Delhi in Ja n u a ry 1978 that 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium would be shipped to India under the contractual agreement on TAPS. The supply had been requested well over a year ago and should have arrived in September 1977; in fact, fur­ ther amounts are over due. In spite of Desai’s stoic optimism, it is highly unlikely that the U nited States will maintain the supply of nuclear fuel to an India clinging to its option and refusing to concede to “ full scope safeguards” . At the mostr the US may grant a brief reprive to T arap u r. Americans b e ­ lieve that the fuel supplied by them has been used to feed the autonomous part of the Indian nuclear program me, and may be so used unless they can clamp dependable safeguards ons

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further supplies. Indeed the chances are th a t Desai will soon be hard p u t to safeguard Indo-U.S. friendship from the chill­ ing clouds of a prolonged nuclear impasse between the two countries. T h e viability of In d ia ’s nuclear program m e will, then, depend on New D elhi’s ability to find reliable alternative sources of fuel, and on striking an indigenous technological solution for T a ra p u r an d move vigorously and firmly towards early self-reliance. An alternative fuel supply produced indigenously is not beyond India's reach provided the search for it is conducted with sufficient vigour, urgency and executive support. T he scientific fraternity at BARC seems to be confident that with the infrastructure available at BHEL and in some other enterprises, it is becoming increasingly possible to eliminate the im port of key items required for the erection of nuclear power stations in India. T here have been reports of the possibility of m anufacturing an indigenous “ blended fuel” by mixing natural u ra n iu m with plutonium. Desai in his M arch 23 Lok Sabha statem ent declared th at he would “ strain every nerve to see th a t TA PS does not close dow n.” If the U nited States did cut off fuel shipment, other ways are open to us,” he averrd. He has not however, at the time of writing in M arch 1978, given a ctegorical assurance th a t In d ia ’s n u clear pro­ gram m e will be kept alive an d on-going w hatever be the cost in resources and diplom atic relations with other coun­ tries. O n the contrary, his M arch 23 statem ent hinted at the ominous possibility of TAPS closing down for lack of im por­ ted fuel. He cannot be unaw are of the shifting emphasis, as far as the super powers are concerned, from signatures to the N P T (which may not bind a signing nation for ever to nuclear abstinence) to a w ider an d comprehensive restrictive agree­ m ent which would impose international supervision on all scientific facilities connected with nuclear development.

238

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

Desai is probably banking on the C arter Administration’s failure to impose its nonproliferation concern on the large group of vendors of nuclear software. C arter’s success in this direction has not been impressive, and the international nuclear order he has been trying to knock together may collapse as a result of the laws of competition among the advanced capitalist countries for the growing T hird World market for reactors. With some luck, In d ia ’s own nuclear dilemmas may not get coiled with the far more complicated nuclear dilemmas of the United States and other producers of atomic software. Desai seems to be in no mood to hasten with Indian nuclear programme which has never been given top priority by any prime minister including Indira Gandhi. The programme was not born out of a felt threat to Indian security. It was laun­ ched with lofty idealism to develop atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes. It has never gathered a greater mo­ m entum than other comparable programmes of national development. The nuclear program m e’s contribution to electric power in 1978-79 will be less than one million kw, just about 2.5 per cent of the country’s total power generating capacity of 31 MWe at the end of the Fifth Plan. If every­ thing goes well, it is expected to go up to about 4 per cent by the end of the Sixth Plan and 7 per cent by 1990-91. Desai may have realised that India’s nuclear profile needs to be somewhat lowered if it were to stitch together a new regionalism in South Asia, w'ith Pakistan as a willing coopera­ tive partner. It is evidently with this end in view that India did not vote against the Pakistani proposal at the UN General Assembly in 1977 to declare South Asia as a nuclear free zone-a reversal of the Indian stand during Mrs. G andhi’s time - not without agreeable impact on the Pakistanis, It is also probably in order to assuage Pakistani fear of the Indian bomb that Detai and his government have emphasised In d ia’s conventional (rather than nuclear) defence policy. T h a t a significant section of Indian strategic thinkers is behind the Prime Minister’s wish to reassure Pakistan is

India, Morarji and the Bomb

239

shown by the Director of the New Delhi Institute of Defence Studies an d Analyses th a t India should not go in a big way to acquire deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSA) as this will only lead to an arm s race in the subcontinent. It is conceivable, then, that the J a n a t a G overnment has decided on a som ewhat m uter nuclear policy and mell­ ower nuclear diplom acy as an essential input of the foreign policy it has elected to pursue. D uring the J a n a ta regime therefore the ‘bom b’ recedes som ewhat to the background of In d ia ’s strategic thinking. But the option remains because it is inextricably mixed with the fluid of Indian nationalism. Desai seems to be telling the super powers, “ We cannot give up the option, but it won't lead to proliferation as long as I am a t the helm. If you really W'ish to prevent proliferation, go ahead to stitch a few convincing agreements. If you can create the right kind of am bience I may even be able to persuade my countrym en to give up the option. But if you fail, there will be proliferation, by India or another power. And then the dam will burst. I f you try to h u rt the Indian option w ithout bringing your ow n nuclear might under con­ trol, you will only make India more intransigent.” India, then, has its own N uclear D ilem m a which is p art of the w orld’s, but, except perhaps in Morarji Desai and in some of the vanishing tribe of like m inded thinkers, there is very little of the Anguish. In this analyst’s eye, M orarji is the thin curtain between the Indian option and the Indian bomb, the nuclear super pow er’s last chance to stop the Indian proliferation from coming sometime in the next dec­ ade. But the super powers cannot make use of the chance w ithout paying a price themselves.

Chapter 10 A NUCLEAR MUNICH? —Col.

R. Rama Rao (R etd.)

In d ia’s nuclear policy has bsen clearly enunciated by Prime Minister Morarji Desai : that we will not m anufacture nuclear weapons; will not even test nuclear devices for peace­ ful purpDses ; will not agree to throw open nuclear installa­ tions b-iilt entirely by us unless the nuclears powers agree to submit all their installations for similar inspection ; th at we will retain the freedom to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes (in particular for energy development, p u b ­ lic health and agricultural tasks) and will not accede to the NPT. These postulates are consistent with and give expression to our firm commitment to peace, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, genuine non-alignment as between rival power blocs and groupings, peaceful co­ existence with all countries and the promotion of cooperation wi h all nations irrespective of their political ideologies especially among countries who have yet to cross the poverty barrier. O u r national pre-occupation is now to secure an im m e­ diate improvement in the living conditions of the vast majo­ rity of ov r people for which a broad-based effort is needed

A Nuclear Munich ?

241

encompassing agricultural developm .*nt, re-creation and re-vitalisation of cottage industry, the rapid spread of rural an d small industry an d orderly growth of m edium and heavy industry so th a t the latter m ay provide in increasing measure inputs needed for vitalising and sustaining the grow th of cottage, rural and small industries and service sectors which also would have to grow in step with national economic development. For all this, rapid development of the energy sector is essential. O u r oil resources are negligible a n d our coal reierves none too plentiful. H ence every effort ought to, and would no doubt, be m ade to develop energy potential by utilising to the m axim um extent possible renew able energy resources such as hydro-electric, solar an d bio-genic (eg, fuel, wood, charcoal, processed farm and urban wastes). But because these will take time to develop and in any event are unlikely to meet our entire anticipated requirem ents for the future, it is imperative to develop nuclear technology for energy production. G ranted this, we will have to develop a technology for the optimal utilisation of thorium which is for all practical purposes, only our nuclear resource. As evolved by B habha and restated by S arabhai, our plans are based on the development of breeder reactors, the building up stocks of domestically recovered plutonium from existing nuclear reactor wastes, utilisation of this plutonium for breeding fissile uran iu m (233) from thorium and eventu­ ally using this uranium for further breeding of the same m ater­ ial from thorium and so sustaining our nuclear power re a c ­ tors until we can devise and commission energy systems based on renew able—or virtually inexhaustible-resources. T h e development of breeder reactors and the stockpiling of plutonium are central features of our nuclear energy plans. It would be well if the country’s intelligentsia an d policy j lanners do not lose sight of this basic fact as w ell as of the economic implications of the adoption o f thorium breeders which would ensure m axim um utilisation of thorium . In

242

Perspectives o f India's Nuclear Policy

terms of our plans, plutonium would be bred locally in our own reactors-existing and those due to come up in the Sixth and possibly Seventh plan periods. Prime Minister Desai told the Lok Sabha on November 30, 1977 that it cost us $ 6.5 mn to obtain 18 tons of slightly en­ riched uranium from USA for our T arap u r reactors (for which a further supply of 7.6 tons though long over due has now been rejected by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission). T he 1976/77 costs of three per­ cent enriched uranium thus worked out at $ 361 per kg (excluding frieght and incidentals). O n this basis highly enriched uranium would cost $ 12,000/kg an d plutonium about $ 15-,000/kg. C urrent prices would be higher and mid-Eighty costs, would perhaps be three to five times as much. This gives us a measure of the costs we would have to incur to obtain fuels from abroad for our reactors should we depend on external sources of supply and likewise a measure of the economic returns that a wholly indigenous nuclear energy programme would yield. Besides, there is the unquantifiable cost involved in placing ourselves in a position of perpetual dependence on external sources to meet our basic needs of power. In their efforts to control nuclear proliferation-that is dis­ courage some of the “ threshold” countries from crossing the line, US policy makers are likely to present proposals at the U N Assembly in May 1978 designed to ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium . This proposal, if accepted internationally, would almost certainly call for strict on-site inspection of fissile material production units such as uranium refining and enrichment plants and nuclear reactors-power or research-of all countries including those now participating in the U N Disarmament Committee. By bringing forward such a proposal the USA has indicated its readiness to throw open its own uranium processing installa­ tions and nuclear reactors of all types to international inspection. More importantly it seeks to freeze the invento­ ries of bomb material with various countries at their present

A Nuclear Munich ?

243

levels. It must be noted th at this need not necessarily m ean a freezing of the inventories of deliverable nuclear w ar heads in countries owning the m aterials at current levels, since fissile m aterial from currently stored w arheads can be reprocessed in the light of the most recent advances in weapon technology and the num ber of deliverable war­ heads increased significantly. Even so, it would impose quantitative limits on the nuclear Arsenals of the weapon powers ; an d bar the entry of new members into the nuclear club. H ence non-nuclear W eapon states living with unreso­ lved problems with nuclear neighbours have no reason to welcome the U.S. proposals. The technologically advanced powers-Britain, France, W, ist G erm any a n d J a p a n , am ong them -w ould find difficulty in accepting the U.S. proposals either because they have plans for developing breeder reactors (as Britain and France hiv^) or have facilities for the large scale pcoduction of n u ­ clear reactors which generate plutonium as a by-product. If the latter cannot be recovered an d used as n u clear fuel and if the production of plutonium is to be banned, these countries m ay have to redesign their reactors an d in the interim period lose valuable export business, besides upsetting their own energy production plans. T hus the attitudes o f some of the advanced countries are net at variance with In d ia ’s on this issue of banning the production of fissile m aterial and by implication of breeder reactors. Even though the U.S. proposals m ay result in additional profits to A m erican nuclear equipm ent producers by reducing com petition from European and Japanese nuclear reactor industries, they are essentially arms control measures a n d are in consonance with Kissinger's doctrine (enunciated in his treatise Necessity for Choice, P 215, at seq) th a t “ the goal of responsible arms control measures must be to determine, free from sentimentality, not how to eliminate retaliatory forces but how to m aintain an equilibrium betw een them. It is m ore worthwhile-at least for the im m ediate future-to seek to reduce

244 the incentive it...”

Perspectives of India's Nuclear Poli y to attack

rather

than

the

capacity

for

India’s policy makers cannot afford to ignore these consi­ derations. U nilateral renunciation of the nuclear option would mean -at any rate until the d&wn of the Golden Age w hen countries would agree to live in peace with their neighbours-acceptance of a position of perm anent inferiority for the country in the comity of the nations since a nuclear freeze as now being advocated by the ‘haves’ would only divide the world into the “ nuclear haves” and the“ nuclear have nots” and consign the latter to a position of perm anent inferiority. It would also affect the country’s economic and technolo­ gical growth, which in turn would further underscore the country’s inferior status. Even as a bargaining tactic, the retention of the nuclear option would be the only course open to the country. It would retain for the country the right to devise and use tech­ nology appropriate for making use of its natural resources and furthering its economic growth. No one in the country wants that this freedom should be compromised in any way whether by ill-considered statements of politicians or by behind the scene concessions by bureaucrats at international negotiating forums. There is also the freedom to opt for weapon develop­ m ent should the international situation at some future date forces us to take such a decision. Fortunately, our efforts to normalise relations with neighbours have not evoked any n e g ­ ative reactions. In keeping with our policies and our genuine beliefs we must persevere in our efforts to forge friendship with all our neighbours. Even so, we must retain the option, since that of itself would provide some incentives to others to give up attitudes of hostility towards us. If we surrender the option w-hen some countries retain their arsenals, we will have no bargaining power left. Indeed in order to persuade

A Nuclear Munich ?

245

the Big Five to take effective steps towards attaining the goal of complete nuclear disarmam ent in a m easurable period of time, India must make determined efforts to improve her nuclear technological competence firstly to make the country self reliant in producing nuclear energy equipm ent and m ate­ rials , secondly devise equipm ent and processes for optirral Utilisation of nuclear ore resources and finally to ensure that we retain at least a modest ability to persuade the nuclear haves to heed the call of the T h ird W orld and dismantle their weapon stock piles.

The probable cost : T h e cost of trying to retain a nuclear opiion-even the op­ tion to develop and utilise its own n u c le a r power systems for energy is likely to be very high for In d ia and the public should be u n d er no illusions on the score. By costs, this writer is not thinking of the cost of development, production and operation of the system. They would be less than com pa­ rable power systems. Indeed, that is In d ia ’s m ain argum ent in support of fully retaining the option to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses. T h e costs allu d ed to are political an d the costs the country may incur and in fact is already in­ curring baciuse of organised sabotage to pow er stations, railw ay tracks, other comm unication facilities a n d industrial production centres, not to mention the series of mysterious explosions at the Baroda heavy w ater p lan t and dam age to the nuclear fuel processing complex due to strikes and lock outs. Exercising pressures on threshold countries who may be suspected to h a rb o u r intentions to develop nuclear equipm ent or even retain the option to do so, has been p art of the “ non­ proliferation” strategy of USA for a long time. Even during the late Sixties when USA was asking India to accede to the NPT, there was discreet talk of threatening to supply conven­ tional arm aments-guns, tanks and com bat infantry vehicles* on a massive scale to Pakistan, should India refuse to accede to the N PT.

246

Perspectives o f India’s Nuclear Policy

Joseph Nye, Deputy U nder Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology and an influential mem­ ber of President C arter’s staff, while writing in Foreign Affairs Q uarterly on non proliferation has advanced the argum ent that “ temptations toward proliferation are counter balanced by the cost of disrupting expensive nuclear electric generating systems” . India cannot plead that she has not been warned. T he cost of maintaining independence would be very great indeed. T here would be more extensive sabotage of our industries, power systems, communications and indeed of our entire economy. Political destabilisation also would be attempted concurrently. T he question is : will the Government which was voted to power with the m andate to restore popular liberty and safeguard the people’s right to opt for domestic and inter­ national policies of their choice, cave in to the veiled and not so veiled threats of Great Powers? Any decision involving the signing away of the country’s right to develop nuclear technology in the best interests of the country may turn out to be irreversible. Any decision in favour of retaining our right to develop nuclear technology to suit our needs and the implied decision to reserve our nuclear option will provoke the w rath of a G reat Power and could be coatly; but the cost of surrender would be far greater.

INDEX

Anti-Nuclear Arms Convention views, 110; Political eletes views on, (1962), 108, 110. 110-111; pro-* 104-106; public A psira reactor, Trombey, 14, 54, debate on, 56, 106-106, Press 207; success of 7. reaction, 56> 58; See a/j», India’s Arms Control, 130. nuclear policy. Aryabhalla (1975) launching of, 114. Bombay High, expactation from* 145. Atom bomb, Gandhi's Comment on, 53. Brauch Plan* 155. Breeder Authorization Act (U SA ), Atom for Peace Programme, 153. V eto on, 141. Atomic energy, brief sketch or, Breeder reactor, 11, 12, 212-213. 7-14, new uses of, 17. Atomic Energy Departing ^1954) > Breeder technology, Criticism about American drawbacks in, 140-143. creation of, 53. Atomic Energy Establishment Brezhnev* on Nuclear proliseration, Bombay, 5. 92. Ban—The bomb Programme* Con­ Canada-Indian Reactor (C IR ), 20. Canadian Deutericism Wanium gress Party on, 54, (CANDUy reactor, 183, 211. Bhabha. Dr. H.J., achievements of, 2-14, 75, 114. O n nuclear policy, Carbonate^ type oil deposits experi­ ments, 24-26. 105-106. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Charter, US President, arms policy of, 75-78; On Indian Ocean, 80; and P N E, 127. On the supply of enriched uranium Bhatnagar, Dr. S.S, scientific to India, 137. developm ent role of, 2. Bhutto, Z.A. 73; foreign policy of, Carter's anti—proliferation strategy, 92, 140-143, 181*188. 173-175, on Kashmir, 77-78, On Pakistan’s nuclear policy, 81, Chinese air craft delivery system, 106. 190-191. Bomb manufacture, cost of, 105*106. China's electronic industry, 116. Bomb lobby in India, anti-lobby, China’s guided nuclear missiles, 106* 108-111, arguments in faveur of, 107, China’s ICBM , 106; testing of, 79, debate in parliam ent, 56-58; China’s M RBM s, 106. demands for manufacturing of, China's nuclear weapons, aim of, 104; development of, 55. 55-56; Jana Sangh’s views on, 60-62, 104-105; Janata Party's Policy on, China’s nuclear explosion (1964), 54-56, 97, 104-105; (1^66), 58; total 67; middle of - th e— roaders argu­ number of, 106. ments on, 68-69 military experts *

0

248 Chinese satellite (1970) launching of, 106. CEP (Circular Error Probability), 129. Coal production in India, 145-146. Cold War controntation, 117; 130, 138. Commercial fast breeder Plants, UK and USSR plans to build, HO. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 180; negotiations regarding, 128. Conference of Transfer of Nuclear technology, Iran (1977), 137* Covenant of the League of Nations, 119. Copper ores, discovery methods of, 28-29. Cruise missiles, 131. Desai, Morarji, on India’s nuclear policy, 59-60 101, 174,178 225-226; 234-235; Opposition to NPT, 123, 225. Diego Garcia, US bases in 83-85; See also Indian ocean. Disarmenent negotiations, India’s role, 117. Doctrine o~ deterrence, 131. Dorabs, Tata Trust, role of, 2. Dunn’s proliseration chain theory 1*>0-152; drawbacks in, 153-154. Eastern borders of India, Chinese activities in 78. Electronics production unit, starting of, 3. East Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), Madras, 115. French Faster Breeder Phenix 140. Gandhi, Mrs, On NPT, 63.173; On India’s nuclear policy, 56, 100, 102, 231-233. Gasbuggy explosion experiment, 21-23, 30, 50.

INDEX Geneva Conference f 1955), Bhabha’s Contribution to, 7, 10. Geneva Disarmament Conference (1967) India’s role 173, Indian leaders unammity on, 62. Graphite, piiority to, 3. Great Powers, arms supply policies of. 75-77. Group of 77, 156. Gulf region, US interest in 85-86. Heavy water natural uranium pow­ er reactcrs (CANDU type), choice of; 11. Heavy water plant, 211; Baroda, damage of 114; deal with USSR, 170. 175*176., jetting up of, 12; effort; to minimise dependence on foreign sources, 115. Hydrogen bombs, cost of, 105. Indian armed forces; modest in size; 70; compared with pakistan Armed forces, 70-71. Indian Ocean, and regional powers, 89-90, US interest in, 83-85, 88. India’s defence budget, 70; expend­ ing on 112; two dimension of, 92 Indian economic developement, em ­ phases on, 92. India’s Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), 147-148. India’s national security problem, 92-94; Chinese nuclear threat to 104-105. India’s nuclear device (1974) 14, 158-159. 189. 10; 205, 207, Cost; S, 216, foreign experts reaction, 115, Jana Sangh’s view on, 64-65, Opp­ osition leaders reaction, 63-64, Pak­ istan’s response, 151; Press reaction, 63; Super powers reaction, 100; views on, 93; India’s nuclear energy development of, 195-97; policy of, 145-146. India’s nuclear policy, and Chinese,

INDEX

249

defferences between, 117, backgro­ Kissinger, Henry, on arms supply to Pakistan, 73. und of, 170-171; features of, 101. ‘Desai's Kremmilin speech on, 101; D esai’s shifting stand on, 178-180/ London Club of Suppliers, 133-134, 148-149, 175, 182, 202. Gandhi on, 53, 109 Govt leader's reaction, 59-605 Mrs Gandhi on, 58,* misconceptions about, 118,* Mig-21 planes, 78. Janata partys stand on, 52, 65, 68, MAR Vs, 129. 170-171, 17*-175, 233-235; Nehru MRBMs, 129. on, 53-54, 102-103; Option for, 156- M We nuclear power; 114; US productoin, 139. 160. parties reaction, 59; argum e­ M XICBM , 129. nt, 224-228 Masira, US basses in, 83-35. India’s Nuclear power station, 11. Massive retaliation doctrene, 130India's nuclear profile, 217-219. 131. India’s Nuclear technology, collabo­ Mauritus, US interest in, 88-89. ration with others. 114-115. India’s nuclear weapon developm ­ Midwes Fuel Recovery Plant, Morr­ is, Illinous, 140. ent, constraints of, 111-118, cost Mobile ICBM-the SS-x-16, 129. of, 110-113, techlogical constidents, 11 -116, long- term policy, 146. Moscow Test Ban Treaty (1963); India's signing on. 60« India’s peaceful Nuclear Explosions M ultiple deterrence doctrine, 107, (PN E ), 32-37, 127-128, 172, 215132. 216; on Soviet model, 217-218. Indo-Pak war (1965), 58; factors of. Mutai Aid Pact (M AP). 71. 71-73. Indo-Pak war (1971), Military loss of N R X , Colombo Plan of, 7; Indian scintists interests in, 8 Pakistan in, 72. Narora Power Station; 101. Indo-Soviet Friendship, 107. International Atomic Energy Agen­ National security, concept, of, 70; defination of, 71. cy (IAEA), 119. Naval Agreement, 130, International conference on nuclear Nehru, Jawahar Lai, 4, On the need power and fuel cycle, J977, 148. of Indian armed forces, 71, on International nuclear fuel cycle ev ­ India’s nuclear policy, 102-103,116, aluation programme (INFCEP), 172, 183-184 Neutron bomb, 131. IRBM S,129. Nixon, arms and nucler policy of, ICRMS,129. 72-73. IRBM-che SS-X-20,129. Noel-Baker, philip, opposition to nuclear tests; 117. Janata Party’s nuclear policy, 52f. Non-alignm ent, India’s policy, 92> 65-68; 100-101, 113, 170-171, 233117. 2 4 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 97, 100, Jot nozzle technique, Indo-weat 118-123, Article V of, 214, Chinese German Collaboration, 139, 210. reaction, 123, failure of, 122? Fran­ ce reaction, 122-123; discriminatiry Karachi Nuclear power project, nature of; 121-122; Indian leaders (KANUPP); 193-195.

250

IXDEX

unanimity on, 62-63, India's refu­ Research Centre (AEARC), US and to, 194. sal to sign. 102, 121, 187, 206,326. Gandhi’s stand on; 173Pakistan Atomic energy Programme, NPT Review Conference (1975) setling up of, 193, expenditure on, 132-133. 193-194, collaborative agreements, North-South negotiations, 156. 196-197; research centres set up Nuclear and non-nuclear materials, through, 194-195. Lists of, 134-135. P a k i s t a n ’s F a s t B r e e d e r P r o g r a m m e , Nuclear business, developed nations 82. monopoly over, 138-139. Pakistan's foreign policy, 73-74. Nuclear Club, China member of, Pakistan’s GNP growth for 1977, 138. 201. Nuclear Excavation experiments, Pakistan nuclear fuel re —processing 29, 92, 124; maximum interest in plant, France deal with, 80-81, 182, uses of, 30. 192-193. Nuclear explosive technology, kinds Pakistan nuclear programmes, Can­ of, 213. adian aid to, 194-195; Chinese aid Nuclear fussion, discovery of, 16. to, 196. Nuclear fuel cycle, 207-208. Pakistan’s power capacity consump­ Nuclear fuel com plcx, hyderabad, tion, 200-202. starting of, 13. Pakistan Weather ro ckets experim­ Nuclear haves and haves-not con­ ents, 195. frontation between, 132-133, 144Pakistan-US arms deal, 71; resump­ 145. tion of, 73, US emargo on, 72, tranNuclear M unich, 151* 198. fer of 110 A-7, 76-77. Nuclear power, studies on, 149-150. Paracels Islands, China’s Capture Nuclear reaetor market, U .S. Con­ of, 91trol over, 139. Partial Test Ban Treaty, 129; India’s Nuclear stpckpiles, Big Powers role Contribution to, 172; violation of, in reducing of; 181. 124. Nuclear Test, Country-wfise, 130; Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), India’s role, 117. 123-128; applications of, 21-32, 124Nuclear weapons power, exploitation ¡2 5 ,2 3-214; expenditure device, of, 130-131. 18; feature of, 124; feasibility of; 19-20; notion of 213-214; status of, Oil Consumption in USA and OECD 18-19; In India, 127; in USA, 124, growth rates of, 96. 127; Soviet interest in 125, 127, 206. Oil crisis (1973), impact of, 85, 96. Plutonium in USA; estimates of, Oil stinulation, 124-125. 141, Pokharan Explosion See India’s unclear device (1974). Pakistan uranium deposits in the Gilgit and Dera Ghazi Khan, Pollution problem; enviornmentalits arguments, 143-144. Czech-team study on, 195. Pakistan armed forces, well equip­ Post-Shot drelling operation, 38-40. Power reactor, foreign collaburatiment of, 70. on with, 115. Pakistan Atomic energy Agricultural

INDEX Pugwash movement of World Scien­ tists against nuclear weapons, 117. Radialogical Safety and nature of the explosive device, 30-31. Rare Minerals Division, D elhi, reation of, 3. Reactors, Coice of, 4-6; types of 146, 210 - 211 . Reprocessing Plants, Carter’s dema­ nds against, 183; South Korean Frence deal for, 182; in India, 208209; in USA, 140.

251 Thorium Beryllium priority to, 3. Training School Programme (1957), Starting of, 9. Trivedy, V.C, Contribution of, 172173. Trombay Council, 9. Trombay Scientific Com m ittee,9.

Unilateral disarmament for India, Rajendra Prasad-Nehru clash on, 108-111, Universal oeterrence doctrine, 107. US nuclear umbrella Swatantra Party and CPI stand on, 110-111. Salzaburg Conference on nuclear Uranium enrichment technology, methods of, 209-210 fuel power (1977), .35-436. Underground nuclear explosion, 19, Schlessinger doctrine of 1974, 131. 49, 97. Stthna, Dr. H. N. interest in N R X Underground storage of nutaral gas reactor, 8. experiments. 26-27. Seventh fleet, task force of, 85. Shastri, Lai Bheadur On India’s UN Charter, 119. U N Special Session on Disarmam­ nuclear policy, 56-57, 93, 172. ent, forthcoming session of, 187. Sino-Indian border, rumblings and Universal deterrence doctrine of Chinese threat to, 55. Pierre Gallois, 132. Sino-Indian relations, 93. Sino-Indian war (1962), 55, 103-104; US M inuteman 111 ICBM, 129. political and military reverses in, US 233 Thorium cycle, 146. L S nuclear policy, 148-142, 159, 71. US Nuclear Fuel Servicns plant, Sino-Soviet misunderstandings, 74. 140. Site Selection Committee (1961) Uranium priority, in Indian 3; nucl­ recomendation of, 11. ear power monopoly, 139; suyply to Sri Lanka, US interest in 88. OCED, 139; US prodnciton, 139, SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Uranium Corporations of India Talks), 130, 226 (1967) setting up of, 12. Strategic Bombs, 129. Uranium for Indian reactor, 206SLBMs, 129. 207. Super power Confrontation, 74. Uranium Metal Plant, 7. Tarapore power plant, 10-11, 210, Ussuri Clash of 1969; 72. US Controversy over 136-137, 148, 171, 176-178, 185-188; tripping of, Vajpayee, A.B,, offer to sign a no 114. war pact with Pakustan, on India Tata Institute of Fundam ental Res­ Nucleer policy 233, 78. earch (TIR R ) 17; arms of, 4; char- Variable Energy cyclotron project, terof 2,3. setting up of, 13-14. Third world, US arms policy towar­ V ertical Prolifration. demension of, ds, 75, 78. 129-132.

INDEX

252 Washington Conference o f Internalonal Nuclear Fuel ecycle avaluation (1977), 137-138. West Asian oil; American income from, 86-87. West Asian oil policy, 85-86. We*t German-Brazil nuclear deal,

international

campaign

against*

182. West Germanys East Breeder T eit Reactor, starting, of, 149. World military expenditure, 129. W orld Order, Carter's policy on i/394, 138.