Perspectives For A European Security Strategy Towards Asia : Views from Asia, Europe and the US [1 ed.] 9789054877769

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EU_Security.book Page 1 Tuesday, September 20, 2011 11:17 AM

Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia Views from Asia, Europe and the US

EU_Security.book Page 2 Tuesday, September 20, 2011 11:17 AM

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Gustaaf Geeraerts and Eva Gross (eds.)

Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia Views from Asia, Europe and the US

Brussels University Press

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Institute for European Studies – publication series, nr. 18 The Institute for European Studies is a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. It promulgates European Studies in general, and studies of European and Comparative Law, Environment, Media, Migration and Regional (European) Integration specifically. The IES is an education and research centre, carrying out research on various European issues relating to the EU in international affairs, and responsible for the Masters of European Integration and Development, and for the internationally renowned LL.M of International and European Law (formerly PILC programme). Institute for European Studies (IES) Vrije Universiteit Brussel Pleinlaan 2 B-1050 Brussels [email protected] http://www.ies.be Cover design: Koloriet, Leefdaal Book design: Crius Group, Hulshout Print: Flin Graphic Group, Oostkamp © 2011 VUBPRESS Brussels University Press VUBPRESS is an imprint of ASP nv (Academic and Scientific Publishers nv) Ravensteingalerij 28 B-1000 Brussels Tel. + 32 (0)2 289 26 50 Fax + 32 (0)2 289 26 59 E-mail [email protected] www.vubpress.be ISBN 978 90 5487 776 9 NUR 754 Legal Deposit D/2011/11.161/002 All rights reserved. No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

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Table of Contents

1.

Introduction Gustaaf Geeraerts and Eva Gross

7

Part I. EU Interests and Policy Options 2.

Defining the EU’s Security Interests in Asia Guibourg Delamotte

19

3.

The EU’s Soft Power: Does it Work in Asia? Alain Ruche

33

4.

Russia Looks East – Implications for the EU Fraser Cameron

53

5.

Pakistan on the Brink: How the EU Can Bolster Reform and Fight Extremism Shada Islam

6.

69

Africa and the Asia Nexus: Policy Options for the EU Andebrhan Welde Giorgis

91

Part II. Asian Interests, Perceptions and Policies 7.

The EU’s Relations with China, Japan and North Korea Implications for the EU’s Role and Engagement in Asian Security Axel Berkofsky

113

8.

China in Africa: From Engagement to Partnership Chris Alden

149

9.

The Rise of Russia, Sino-Russian Relations, and U.S. Security Robert S. Ross

169

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Perspective for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia

10. The EU-India Strategic Partnership: Exploring the Security Paradigm Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay

189

11. East Asia Views the EU – Hard Power, Soft Power, and Strategic Thinking Quansheng Zhao

209

Part III. The Way Forward 12. The EU and Asia in a Changing Global Order James Moran

231

List of Contributors

241

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1. Introduction Gustaaf Geeraerts and Eva Gross

Over a relatively short period of time EU-Asia relations have moved to the top of the Brussels policy agenda. The rise of China has added momentum to the EU’s aspirations towards strengthening its strategic relationships with emerging powers in general and China but also India in particular. Beyond strategic engagement, concrete security threats emanating from Asia – including nonproliferation, state failure and terrorism – directly affect the EU. Given the nature of contemporary security threats, and in light of its own increasing global reach and aspirations, the EU also can no longer afford not to get involved in matters pertaining to the security of its citizens. EU-Asia relations, and indeed the EU’s relationship with the emerging powers in general, have gained momentum since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s growing capacity for action. The rising profile of China and India in international organizations and emerging forums of global governance including the G20, has increased the EU’s focus on the emerging powers in Asia. Both President van Rompuy and High Representative Ashton have recently stressed the importance of the EU’s strategic relationship with Asian powers. The importance attached to the October 2010 ASEM summit further illustrates Brussels’ mounting commitment towards its political relationship with Asia. The topic of EU-Asia relations is extremely timely and politically urgent. However, strengthening this relationship is made difficult by a lack of strategic thinking on the EU’s relationship towards the broader region but also towards individual countries in Asia. There is some way to go in filling EU-Asia relations with political content, in formulating strategic goals and interests towards the region, its individual countries – in and linking these with specific challenges emanating from and affecting individual countries in the region. This book seeks to address this gap. Its contributors not only survey the field of EU-Asia relations and identify strategic interests, policy options but also take a close look at the internal and external obstacles that make the formulation of a European security strategy towards Asia difficult. 7

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Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia

Individual chapters also deliver a timely analysis of key policy areas in EUAsia relations. They address broad strategic questions but also specific issues, such as instability in Pakistan and the respective development policies pursued by China and the EU. Contributors hail from Europe but also from Asia, and adopt one of two analytical angles: EU interests and policy options; and Asian perceptions, interests, and options. Structurally, this book seeks to establish a dialogue between these two parts – with the view to drawing some conclusions over the current state of EU-Asia relations but also its future potential.

1.

EU interests and policy options

Such a dialogue is critical because of the dynamic political developments in Asia and the EU’s growing profile in foreign and security policy. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) the EU will over time grow into a more coherent, visible and capable actor – and an actor that needs to formulate and implement policies and strategic policy objectives far beyond its immediate neighborhood. The five chapters in the book’s first part thus set out to define the EU’s security interests. They also inquire as to the nature of EU power as it is applied in Asia and touch on the theme of current and future policy impact that resonates with Part Two of this book. Guibourg Delamotte rightly notes that security has only recently been incorporated in the EU’s approach towards Asia. The region’s combined economic weight, along with EU security interests that include regional instability and non-proliferation can be expected to lead the EU to greater engagement in Asia. Delamotte argues that in developing EU policy towards Asia, great emphasis should be placed on values. These values should not only be reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), but should also lead the EU to seek closer relations with countries with whom it shares similar values. For Delamotte, this points towards the EU’s relationship with Japan – a relationship that has been overlooked but that has potential on account of a shared definition of security and common concerns over specific issues. Guibourg Delamotte’s emphasis on shared values resonates with the second contribution by Alain Ruche. Ruche poses the question of whether or not EU soft power – that is, the EU’s ability to attract and persuade others to adopt its goals – works in Asia; and whether indeed one can speak of EU ‘smart power’. Ruche comes to a mixed conclusion. He notes that the biggest tool of soft power – the prospect of accession – does not apply to 8

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Introduction

Asia; but nevertheless finds a number of examples that demonstrate EU soft power in the region. These derive from the EU’s policy instruments that include civilian CSDP missions, and include the EU’s involvement in Aceh, Indonesia. They also include the EU’s involvement in non-traditional approaches to security such as disaster preparedness, avian influenza and maritime security. Placing EU soft power in comparison with that of the US, Ruche concludes that there is an appreciation for EU soft power in Asia. Ruche is clear, however, that improvements have to be made if the EU wants to turn its soft power into smart power. These improvements could include support for deeper cooperation and dialogue with its strategic partners, and to successfully induce member states to support the EU’s missions and policies. Ruche concludes that the post-Lisbon era will make it possible for the EU to improve upon its mix of instruments in pursuit of smart power and provide a ‘quiet army of 21st century diplomats, enlightened businessmen, and open-minded and well-informed citizens’. The two contributions by Delamotte and Ruche highlight the importance of values, and their projection as a means but also an end in EU foreign policy. The contribution by Fraser Cameron takes a slightly different approach and focuses on EU interests; specifically the impact of Russia’s increasingly assertive engagement in Asia and the implications this has for EU interests. Cameron notes that Russia’s main interests lie in protecting current power structures, and in asserting Russia’s role on the world stage. Russia’s new assertiveness has implications for the EU, which prioritizes strengthening a multilateral system, and which seeks to forge common and strategic policies with respect to contemporary challenges including energy security. In Central Asia, where the EU has become increasingly active as of 2007, Cameron characterizes Russian attempts to increase its influence as being motivated by a desire to revive former influence and to seek benefits from energy sources. He also notes that the EU’s Central Asia strategy has to date yielded mixed results at best. For Cameron, compared to the EU’s relations to the main powers in Asia, the potential for EU-Russia rivalry is most developed in Central Asia. The following chapter analyzes the challenge of formulating interests, options and a foreign policy strategy towards Pakistan, a country where the EU is only slowly developing a common policy. Shada Islam approaches EU-Pakistan relations from two distinct angles. She discusses the challenges facing Pakistan, but also the ways in which Pakistan is moving up the EU’s foreign policy agenda. For Islam, the challenge is for the EU to translate its increasing awareness of the importance of Pakistan into a coherent foreign policy that moves away from treating Pakistan as a developing country but rather as a country in transition that requires 9

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assistance in modernizing its economy, its political institutions, and the rule of law. What is needed, argues Islam, is a multi-faceted strategy that can address the multiple and complex challenges facing Pakistan. The obstacles she lists as standing in the way of formulating such a policy resonate with those identified by other contributors in this volume. They include EU member states that are slow to conceptualize strategic interests towards Pakistan; but also the EU itself, which has policy instruments in place but does not utilize them to their full extent to address the challenges facing Pakistan. According to Islam, the first ever EU-Pakistan summit that was held in 2009 went some way towards addressing this lacuna, although more could be done to formulate a stronger and more comprehensive role for the EU in Pakistan. Islam is realistic – as are the other chapters in the book – about the role the EU is likely to play in Pakistan in comparison to that of the US, but does formulate a number of policy recommendations for the EU to improve its approach towards Pakistan both in the long and in the short term. The final chapter in the section on EU interests in Asia returns to the theme of competition between the EU and other actors – but in a geographical arena outside Europe. Andebrhan Welde Giorgis addresses the challenge for the EU to develop policy options and positions towards China’s increasing engagement in Africa. For Europe, which has enjoyed a near monopoly on relations, Chinese engagement poses a challenge both in the context of increasing strategic economic but also security interests. In the context of the scope and diversity of interests and challenges in Africa, Giorgis notes the increasing involvement of Asian powers in Africa in general, among which China has provoked the most intense interest on the part of the EU. Many commentators see China as a competitor rather than a potential cooperator. This chapter de-constructs the broader field of EUAfrica-China cooperation, and identifies the challenges facing Africa in developmental, environmental and security terms. Importantly, however, Giorgis’ analysis emphasizes not just avenues for cooperation but also the principles of African ownership and responsibility.

2.

Asian interests, policies and perceptions

The second part of the book in some way represents a response to themes raised in the first part, and the two should be read as the beginning of a dialogue between Europe and Asia, European experts and Asian experts, interests and values.

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Introduction

Axel Berkofsky analyzes the EU’s political, economic and security relations with Japan, China and North Korea and reaches a somewhat skeptical conclusion of the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security. Berkofsky characterizes EU-Japan security cooperation over the past decade as one of lost opportunities. Very little of what was envisioned in terms of bilateral ‘soft’ security cooperation has actually been realized. Security cooperation with Tokyo has not delivered the European ‘entry ticket’ into Asian security that European policymaking circles hoped for after the signing of the EU-Japan Action Plan back in 2001. Tokyo for its part has remained relatively disinterested in including Europe and the EU in its regional security policy thinking and strategies. The bilateral EUChina agenda will continue to be dominated by ‘bread-and-butter’ issues such as the EU’s trade deficit with China, intellectual property rights, and market access obstacles for European business in China. Berkofsky doubts that the EU-China ‘strategic partnership’ will evolve along the notion of ‘strategic’ in a security sense. Instead, ‘strategic’ will continue to stand for ‘comprehensive’ in the context of bilateral relations. The ‘EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)’ is planned to be the next ‘event’ on the bilateral agenda, which Brussels has been announcing for more than 5 years by now. While intended to take EU-China relations to the ‘next level’, there is very little indication on how bilateral relations will change in scope and quality once the PCA will be in place. To be sure, when adopted, the PCA will not result in any additional EU-China security cooperation. The EU’s initial willingness to engage North Korea politically and economically as well as its contributions to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the mid-1990s have not convinced interested parties (US, South Korea, Japan) that the EU is ‘qualified’ for a role in solving ‘hard security’ issues on the Korean Peninsula. To be sure, Brussels has not sought such a role and has never requested to become a member of the 6-Party Talks – thereby confirming its lack of interest and capabilities in investing resources and energies into a forum where US and Chinese influence dominate. All in all, Berkofsky’s analysis of the EU’s relations with Japan, China and North Korea indicates that the EU’s strategic role and engagement in Asian security is bound to remain very limited and will continue to take place on an ad-hoc basis in the years ahead. The next chapter in this section indirectly addresses an additional question of EU involvement vis-à-vis China – that of the implication of China’s increasing involvement in Africa. Chris Alden considers the historical trajectories of China’s increasing involvement in Africa and traces new 11

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trends in this relationship. His focus on engagement but also the question of partnership resonates with Andebhran Welde Giorgis’ emphasis on African ownership. Emphasizing China’s attitude of non-interference in domestic affairs when it comes to its Africa policy, Alden first presents the sources of Chinese engagement in Africa. These are driven in large part by resource security (including food security); to sustain Chinese economic growth and to respond to changing consumption patterns as a result of the gradual introduction of market capitalism in China. Beyond resource security, Alden also underlines that commercial interests represent a second and increasingly important reason for Chinese engagement in Africa. Alden argues that two political implications arise for China due to its forays into the resource sector but also its increasing commercial engagement: not only have Beijing’s activities challenged the prevailing interests of the US, France and Great Britain, China is also confronting political objectives and constraints, including emerging pressures on China to play a greater international role; closer to home, China also confronts Taiwanese diplomacy of recognition in Africa. Alden then focuses his analysis particularly on the multi-lateral platform created to manage the regional regulation of the China-Africa relationship, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Alden terms as striking the gradual convergence of African development needs and Chinese economic interests in Africa. However, he also identifies two weaknesses in FOCAC – first, that the diversity of Chinese actors in Africa poses a challenge for the structuring and the management of the relationship, but also that the exclusion of nonstate actors in the process – particularly the input of civil society – risks replicating features of China’s domestic setting, including a lack of transparency in business practices. These two weaknesses, for Alden, represent one of the key challenges for future Chinese engagement in Africa – an engagement that he terms overall positive: Chinese engagement has provided African countries with opportunities to achieving economic development. Robert Ross explores the implications of Russia’s reemergence as a European great power for great power politics both in Europe and Asia. He argues that, as Russia’s military capabilities develop Moscow will become increasingly proactive in asserting its strategic interests. This will elicit both heightened security concerns and revised security policies from the other great powers and from smaller regional actors. In this respect, within the next decade Russia will become a major actor in European balance of power politics and its policies will contribute to the prospects for worldwide stability and instability. The United States and China will be 12

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Introduction

especially affected by Russia’s reemergence. Not only can improved Russian capabilities affect their immediate security interests, but how Russia deploys its improving capabilities and how it prioritizes its security interests will likely lead to distinct and countervailing effects on U.S. and Chinese security concerns and on regional security developments in Europe and East Asia. And because the United States and China directly affect each other’s vital security interests in East Asia, distinct outcomes from Russia’s reemergence will have a significant impact on the U.S.-China strategic relationship, on the long-term prospects for U.S. security and for U.S. capabilities as global actor with far-flung interests and strategic commitments. For the United States to minimize the potential high cost of Russia’s reemergence, the best option is to accommodate of Russian legitimate security interests as it has the potential to both integrate Russia as great power into the European balance of power and mitigate the potential for heightened great power conflict reflecting aggressive Russian revisionism. Alok Mukhopadhyay considers the security component in the EU-India relationship and thereby provides a broader strategic framework to Shada Islam’s considerations on EU-Pakistan relations – after all, Afghanistan, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region but also state weakness and terrorism in Pakistan are not only primary concerns for India but also for the EU. Given its increasing involvement in Afghanistan, and the threats identified in the ESS, the EU is required to rethink its strategy towards the region and its specific policies towards individual countries and conflicts in the region. Mukhopadhyay also notes, however, that the framework of EU-India relations – the ‘strategic partnership’ – has not quite lived up to its name; and that it is necessary to in fact view the EU-India partnership through strategic eyes. Rather than a whole of government approach however, Mukhopadhay identifies a different set of 3-Ds: difficult, distant and different – and adds 2 more for good measure: diverse and disunited. There is some way to go, then, before the EU will be perceived as a strategic actor by India. When it comes to the possibility of a EU-US-India triad, Mukhopadhay is equally doubtful given the nature of the EU’s global ambition and the nature of its policy making. To fill the strategy with content, therefore, the EU but also India should move beyond declarations. Given that both partners have common threat perceptions and interests, the EU would do well to explore ideas for cooperation, and India to raise awareness about the EU – but, importantly, the onus is on both partners to maximize the relationship. Quansheng Zhao investigates the perceptions of the EU in East Asia, especially China, Japan and South Korea. Undoubtedly the EU figures high 13

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in importance in East Asia. Still, it seems like the EU’s role is more significant in the economic dimension but less significant in the political and strategic dimensions. Therefore one may wonder whether the future of the EU will follow the path of Japan, that is, an economic giant but politically and diplomatically remain a medium influence. If the EU is to increase its image as a global power, then it will have to get its act together, so it may have a more unified and assertive voice in its foreign policy. If successful this would increase the EU’s soft power and turn it into smart power. The final two chapters, then, particularly resonate with analyses and calls for ‘smart’ power in Asia. This is because they highlight the role of perception in international politics in general and EU-Asia relations in particular. The EU, either by virtue of the absence of either clearly formulated strategic goals and instruments to implement them, or the capacity to communicate these goals and interests to its Asian partners, does not yet play a political-strategic role in Asia that matches its economic reach.

3.

The way forward

In thinking ahead of what an EU-Asia strategy in real terms could look like it is helpful to start with James Moran’s overall assessment of EU-Asia relations as a basis for analysis. He argues that much of what the EU is doing now, in terms of the enhanced engagement on security, democracy, the environment, trade and development should be strengthened. However, in doing so policy makers should be aware of the fact that while Europe today is seen in Asia as something more than a market and an aid donor, it is still not regarded as a fully-fledged political actor in the region. That said, it is also true that Europe does not go unnoticed in the region. The EU continues to be seen by many in Asia as a source of inspiration for those who wish to go forward with reconciliation and regional integration. To enhance its credibility as a partner in the region the EU has to consider a number of steps. First, the EU needs to energetically engage Asia on the response to the financial crisis, and – as has been done in the field of climate change – lead by example. A good start on this was made at the ASEM summit in Beijing in October 2008, especially in terms of agreeing the need for better regulation and fiscal stimuli. Europe should be prepared to make the adjustments necessary to accommodate the new economic and financial 14

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Introduction

strength of China and other emerging economies in the region within the IFI’s, so as to lend more credibility and arrest the decline of their influence in financial markets. One thing is certain: the advent of the G20 means that the two sides have a greater interest than ever in cooperating together. Second, the EU needs to deepen its transatlantic engagement on Asia, focusing on issues such as the security and development challenges posed in Afghanistan and Pakistan and climate change, where there could be possibilities for more effective trilateral alliances. The same goes for our relations with Japan, and with Australia, which is a regional power in its own right and has recently been taking positions that are close to the EU. Third, and this could be more difficult given the current economic climate, the EU should maintain its focus on open markets, and avoid protectionist approaches that will not only stunt world growth but endanger relations with Asian countries. At the same time, Europe needs to keep up its efforts to ensure that Asian WTO commitments are fully complied with and that its offensive issues such as government procurement, competition and IPR are pursued with vigour. Finally, Europeans need to make greater efforts to better understand Asian culture and aspirations and to encourage more parliamentary and people to people contacts. Among other things, this involves enhanced support for academicians and civil society but also consideration of the approach to visa policy, especially for business people and legal migration in general. Together with the structural improvements of EU foreign policy as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, these evolving policy interests and activities can be expected to increase in the future. One, because the EU’s engagement with the emerging powers China and India will remain high on the political agenda; but also because the regional security interests and threats identified in these chapters –Pakistan, terrorism, nonproliferation but also the challenge inherent in economic developments – will continue to constitute policy goals for the EU. How the EU addresses these goals and values remains to be seen, but it seems natural to suspect that the relationship between interests and values has to be harmonized and made explicit. To shirk engagement on account of insufficient influence or appetite for political engagement is not likely to remain a route available for the EU; but in order to be effective in the pursuit of its policy goals the EU will have to ensure that its values and interests are made explicit to prevent them from clashing through different policies pursued.

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Part I. EU Interests and Policy Options

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2. Defining the EU’s Security Interests in Asia Guibourg Delamotte

1.

Introduction

Though the EU has sought to define its security interests in Asia and has established a number of strategic partnerships and an interregional dialogue through the Asia-Europe Meeting, it remains relatively absent from the resolution of regional crises and does not seek to promote its values in Asia. In dealing with Asian states and defining its security interests in Asia, the EU faces inherent challenges which the Lisbon treaty should help overcome. Tighter collective discipline in dealing with China would enhance the EU’s credibility and influence. The EU should also seek to strengthen its relationship with such ‘natural partners’ as Japan, with whom it shares a wide-ranging definition of security and a common interest in using respect for human rights as a diplomatic tool. East Asia accounts for more than a quarter of the European Union's global trade. China is now the EU's second largest trading partner after the United States, and the EU, China’s largest trading partner.1 Asia not only has tremendous economic significance. It also matters – or should matter – to the EU for security reasons in the narrow meaning of security. Indeed, two of the permanent members of the UN Security Council are either Asian or closely connected to Asia, which also contains five of the world’s nuclear states, all of which could be caught in regional crises (Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan and India). The combination of Asia’s economic weight and regional volatility of itself should suffice to draw much attention from the EU. Yet, the implications of Asia’s political and military environment for the EU have not caught as much attention as the commercial aspects of EU-Asia relations. Only recently has security been integrated in the EU’s approach of Asia. This stems largely from the European construction’s original emphasis on trade, from the gradual development of the EU’s external action beyond the

1.

Council on the European Union 2007.

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Common Commercial Policy and the notion that the EU’s primary interests lied in the stability of its immediate vicinity.

2.

How does the EU deal with Asia?

2.1. EU-Asia relations In dealing with Asia, the EU’s original emphasis has been on economic relations and improving business opportunities. That this should have been the case comes as no surprise: the EU’s political identity on the international scene has only gradually asserted itself and the process is not yet complete. Economic and trade relations have been central to the EU’s relations with Asia via ASEM, the Asia-Europe Meeting, launched in 1996, and will remain an essential aspect of EU-Asia relations as Asia’s share of world GDP continues to rise. In the past ten years or so, cultural and academic exchanges have received some attention. The Commission has sought to strengthen ‘people to people’ ties since the end of the 1980s by encouraging exchanges between journalists, researchers, business people and students. Young European scientists have been awarded grants since 1986. A Japan-EU Centre for industrial cooperation was created in Tokyo in 1987. Regarding academic exchanges, pilot projects have been conducted with Japan and Australia since 2002 and the Republic of Korea since 2008, based on the model of student exchanges implemented with the US and Canada since 1995. In Asia, the Commission will contribute € 3.6 million to 11 projects in 2009 (with the partner countries providing match funding): the projects involving 75 institutions will support the mobility of nearly one thousand students. Friendship weeks and People-to-people years between the EU and Asian partner countries further help develop grassroots links. Cooperation and development have been the EU’s other traditional link to Asia. € 5 billion have been allocated to Asia for the years 2007-2013 in order to address common challenges such as climate change, sustainable development, security and stability, governance and human rights, as well as prevention and response to natural disasters. Since the beginning of the 1990s,2 relations have developed in other directions as well as it appeared that establishing political relations might improve economic ones. A first attempt at adopting a coherent overarching 2.

European Community 1991,

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Defining the EU’s Security Interests in Asia

approach to the region was made in 1994, with such areas as arms control, non-proliferation and human rights established as discussion topics.3 The 2001 Communication established six objectives to strengthen the EU’s political and economic presence in Asia. Among those objectives were contributing to peace and security regionally and globally by a broader engagement in the region; promoting development and democracy; building global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries in appropriate international fora ‘to help address both the challenges and the opportunities offered by globalisation and to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues.’4 Indeed, since 2002, ASEM includes dialogues on terrorism;5 since 2004, the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, energy and climate change, as well as socio-political subjects such as employment,6 education and interfaith dialogue.7 Statements issued at the end of the meetings reveal the extent to which the political and security dialogue has developed since the 1996 statement, which had only referred specifically to non-proliferation and disarmament. The ASEAN Regional Forum of which the EU is a dialogue partner discusses a wide range of security issues, most notably maritime security.

2.2. The EU’s approach to security The EU takes a ‘broad approach to security’, which in Asia as elsewhere includes the preservation of peace and international security; the promotion of a rule-based international system; the promotion of regional integration; the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; the promotion of cooperative and sustainable policies to meet global challenges such as climate change, energy security, environmental protection, poverty, economic imbalances, and health issues; the promotion of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.8 This approach initially resulted from the failure of attempts to create a unified defence policy, while the foreign policy was developing. As a consequence, the EU’s approach to security is ‘multifaceted’ and admits to ‘linkages’ 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

European Commission 1994. European Commission 2001 ASEM 4 2004. ASEM 5 2004. ASEM 6 2006. Council of the European Union 2007.

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between the political, economic, social, environmental sectors – a reference to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde’s work.9 Adopting a narrower definition of security, the 2003 European Security Strategy10 did, however, identify key threats facing Europe – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. It identified a number of strategic objectives to protect its security: addressing those threats by tackling terrorist financing and activities (through the European Union arrest warrant for instance), by pursuing policies against WMD proliferation and by promoting good governance; stabilising its neighbourhood; developing multilateral institutions. Working more closely with partners was among the policy implications derived from these objectives. Those considerations drove the establishment of strategic security dialogues with India, China and Japan in 2005, and Australia in 2008.

2.3. The EU’s Asian partners The EU-India Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan of September 2005 covers such issues as cooperation in the field of peacekeeping operations (including the training for military and civilian components of peacekeeping missions and the exchange of trainees and instructors between Peacekeeping Training Centres of India and EU Member States), non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism. The 2002 communication from the Commission stressed the need to engage China ‘through an upgraded political dialogue’.11 A Declaration on non-proliferation was adopted at the seventh EU-China summit in December 2004, which led to the organisation of Sino-European workshops on export controls. The fourth round of EU-China strategic talks took place in January 2009.12 An Australia-EU Partnership Framework was also launched in October 200813 aiming at reinforcing the role of the UN as a guarantor of international peace and security, continuing information sharing on the foreign policy and security issues, or identifying shared security interests between Australia and the EU including in the field of European Security 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Buzan et al. 1998. Council of the European Union 2003. European Commission 2002. Embassy of the Czech Republic in Beijing 2009. Delegation of the European Union to Australia and New Zealand 2008.

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and Defence Policy. Arrangements relating to travel-document data and cooperation with Europol were also agreed on. Relations with Japan were first given a political dimension with the Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan, in 1991.14 An Action plan, Shaping our Common Future, was prepared under the French presidency of the EU in 2000 and adopted in 2001, along with a Joint Declaration on Terrorism. The 2004 EU-Japan summit took place against the background of ‘recent dynamic developments’ including the EU’s enlargement and adoption of the since abandoned Treaty establishing a Constitution, the expansion of Japan’s role in international challenges and its economic recovery (a recovery which turned out not to be quite as sustainable as one then hoped).15 The summit leaders (Jun’ichirô Koizumi and Bertie Ahern) stressed ‘the importance of forging a solid strategic partnership’ between Japan and the EU and issued a Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and NonProliferation along with documents aiming at improving two-way investment, technological cooperation and the protection of Intellectual Property rights in Asia.16 Over the years, much progress has been made in EU-Asia relations, which have gradually expanded from interregional to EU-to-country relations and from trade to strategic issues. Nonetheless, the EU struggles to gain visibility and influence in Asia.

3.

Why is it difficult for the EU to deal with Asian states?

3.1. Institutional challenges which the Lisbon Treaty helps overcome The confusion over the ratifications of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (with the French and Dutch ‘nos’ of May and June 2005, respectively) and the Lisbon Treaty (first rejected by the Irish in June 2008) were probably not quite well understood in Asia. They did serve to remind Asian countries of the specificity of the European construction and the efforts it takes to achieve. In dealing with other states or regional organisations, the EU has inherent challenges to overcome. The EU’s external action suffers from the EU’s lack of legal personality, the existence of the EC alongside the EU and the pillar 14. European Community 1991. 15. The Economist 2009. 16. European Commission 2004.

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structure, the ensuing plurality of the decisional framework according to the fields of the EU’s foreign policy (the European Foreign and Security Policy, the Common Commercial Policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian action, the European Neighbourhood Policy) and the fact that few are of exclusive community responsibility. Bilateral relations prevail in most instances. Furthering the EU’s security interests through enhanced dialogues would imply the ability on the part of Member states to come up with coordination mechanisms to overcome these institutional shortcomings and help avoid lack of cooperation stemming from illinformed choice.17 Regarding China in particular, a recent report emphasised the detriment suffered collectively from lack of Member state coordination.18 The Lisbon Treaty is a step in the right direction.19 It acknowledges the EU’s legal personality, removes the pillar structure, inserts a new part on External Action in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union containing provisions currently split in several parts of the Treaty on the European Community (specific provisions on Foreign and Security Policy remain in the Treaty on the European Union with the general provisions on the EU’s external action). In the TEU, general provisions define the principles guiding the EU’s external action (among which the promotion of democracy and human rights) and its general objectives. Among the general objectives which must guide the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy are safeguarding its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity. The creation of the post of President of the Council, elected by qualified majority vote for a renewable mandate of two years and a half; and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stands to further improve the EU’s international visibility. The Treaty also creates a European External Action Service to improve cooperation between the Member states. Increasing cooperation between Member states will also be an important task of the High Representative. The Treaty therefore provides a framework for increased cooperation. It is not perfect and leaves much room for interpretation and political manoeuvring (with respect to foreign policy, for instance, which authority prevails, that of the President or of the High Representative?). It will not of

17. For further developments on this point, see Jervis 1999. 18. Fox and Godement 2009. 19. Dony 2008.

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itself allow divergences of interests between Member states to vanish, but it provides incentives for cooperation.20

3.2. National diplomatic agendas prevail EU member states seldom resist the temptation of making solo moves. France was glad to be the first European signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), an accession which President Jacques Chirac announced in Thailand in February 2006. In July 2006 EU Member states agreed to initiate proceedings towards the accession of the EC to the TAC, which first needed to be amended to allow for the accession of non-states. Other EU Member states decided to follow France in signing the treaty bilaterally. A concerted signature of all EU states together from the inception would have conveyed greater symbolic significance. A unified approach is particularly important in dealing with China to deprive its leaders of the political card, which discrepancy between Member states provides. Uncoordinated action in fact fails to produce the benefits sought after, as a comparison of French, German and British diplomacy towards China illustrates. In 2008, for instance, European leaders could not agree on a unified position regarding their participation to the Beijing Olympics. In the context of a crackdown on Tibet in April, President Sarkozy said he would not go to the Beijing Olympic Games unless China agreed to a dialogue with the Dalai Lama. He did eventually go to the Games, but angered Chinese leaders when he met the Dalai Lama in August in France and again in Poland in December. A few days before the EU-China summit was due to start in Lyon that month, Beijing called it off. Premier Wen Jiabao avoided France during a European five-day tour at the end of January 2009, which included Brussels, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as Davos. China had announced that Hu Jintao would not meet with Nicolas Sarkozy on the side of the G20 in April, but a communiqué from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasising that France did not support Tibet’s independence allowed reconciliation. Hence, the French president had to relinquish his initial but belated firmness. For her part, German Chancellor Angela Merkel took a clear stance as soon as she succeeded Gerhard Schröder in March 2008. She refrained from going to the Games and met with the Dalai Lama in her office in September, yet her firmness had no long-term consequence on 20. A view backed by Martha Finnemore’s study on how international norms shape state interests (1996). The spill-over effect which Ernst Haas (1964) identified would also come into play and take the process a step further than initially intended.

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German-China trade which increased in 2008.21 Conversely the UK government’s recognition of China’s full sovereignty over Tibet has not lead to improved trade relations.22 Lack of coordination allows the Chinese government to play one country against another. European governments in fact reap little benefit from pursuing unilateral diplomatic lines: in spite of their strong political statements, Chinese leaders adjust their policies pragmatically.

4.

What should the EU do to further its security interests?

4.1. The EU should show greater interest in Asian crises The EU should get more involved in Asian crises resolution and security issues for a variety of reasons: to increase the EU’s international visibility, turn its economic power into political leverage, strengthen its ability to outline a foreign policy which will enable it to gain influence and counterbalance US power when deemed appropriate (provided they can agree on the assessment of their interest to do so), and so that its vision of international security prevail, its environmental, developmental, social and legal norms spread and increase world stability. Diverging national agendas and remaining territorial and historical disputes continue to divide Asian neighbours. The EU has served as an integration model to the region, though Asian states always took a more flexible approach to regionalisation. Japan’s newly elected Hatoyama government is an advocate of increased regional integration, including through the establishment of a single currency.23 EU integration, regardless of Asia’s specific approach, remains a reference. Much of the EU’s experience is of relevance to Asia – the regional reconciliation based on the French and German one; the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki process. Asia raises particular concerns with respect to proliferation. China has now adhered to most international instruments in the field (though not the Non-proliferation initiative) but still contributes to proliferation.24 North Korea is the imminent concern. Though proliferation is an issue which the 21. Germany’s exports to China increased by over 14 % in the period from January to November 2008 as compared to the same period in 2007. Destatis 2009. 22. As emphasized by Fox and Godement 2009. 23. New York Times 2009. 24. US Congress 2006.

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EU and its Asian partners address in multilateral fora or within the context of their strategic dialogues, the EU has played little role in the negotiations on and with North Korea. It was involved in the financing of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation established in March 1995, which terminated the Light-water reactor project in May 2006 ‘based on the continued and extended failure of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to perform the steps that were required in the KEDO-DPRK Supply Agreement for the provision of the LWR project’.25 It was not invited to join the Six-Party Talks framework initiated by China in August 2003. Six-Party Talks matter because they may provide a solution to the North Korean issue, but more importantly because they may develop into a new framework dedicated to security issues – particularly if it lead to some progress as far as North Korea went. Paradoxically the EU as a whole is less present diplomatically in regional dispute resolution than is Norway, who has acted a mediator on a number of occasions.

4.2. The EU should also ensure that its values are turned into Common Foreign and Security Policy guidelines The EU should come up with a unified China policy, most notably with respect to Human rights, in particular in relation with Tibet or African countries. This would deprive China of the latitude it now enjoys of playing one against the other. Adopting a unified policy regarding China would allow EU Member states to be prepared in the event of radical moves on the part of the regime, such as repression against human rights activists. Though Article 11 of the Treaty on the European Union claims that promotion of Human rights is an objective of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU Member states rarely agree on the extent to which values should serve as guidelines of their foreign policy. Going back to April 2008 and the suppression of the Tibetan upheaval, the Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso called for constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Yet, Member states could not agree on the attitude to take with respect to the highly symbolic opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. Unity is hard to achieve because though leaders agree in theory that human rights and democracy should be promoted, they hesitate between engagement and containment, encouragement and sanction. Disagreements can exist within Member states: though Angela Merkel would not attend the Games, her predecessor Gerhard Schröder did, for he considered engagement the better option. Expecting Member states to 25. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (Kedo) 2010.

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agree on a course of action in dealing with specific governments and situations can seem rather illusory under such circumstances, but hence, the importance to reach an agreement in abstracto before such situations arise.

4.3. Lastly, the EU should seek to develop further its relations with countries with which we share the same values In this respect, it should endeavour to deepen its relations with Japan in particular. Why seek to improve our relations with Japan specifically? Japan certainly is the world’s second economic power and Asia’s oldest democracy. But more importantly, the EU and Japan share the same security standards in the wider, comprehensive sense of security as including environmental and social dimensions. Japan’s comprehensive approach to security dates back to in 1979 and the Premiership of Ôhira Masayoshi, in the context of the second oil shock. Having renounced the use of force under its Constitution, Japan adheres to a vision of power and security that is largely non military. Though the government’s interpretation of the Constitution has evolved over time, it remains eager to preserve some degree of consistency between its diplomatic moves and the constitutional provisions. To this day, Japan intervenes only reluctantly in peace-keeping or international operations and ensures its troops are not involved in direct use of force. As an essentially civilian power, the EU shares this conception of security as being not simply military, but as implying economic, energy, environment and human dimensions. In spite of this common approach to security, the EU and Japan do not share the same threat perceptions: Japan does not share its prevailing security concerns with the EU. Japan is concerned by China’s military rise primarily, though it mentions more willingly North Korea’s nuclear programme. The China ‘threat argument’ first appeared in the second half of the 1980s. Today, it extends to environmental considerations, as the China-imported gyôza food poisoning episode illustrated in 2008. Social considerations also come into play: China-observers in Japan are aware of the tremendous social pressure caused by economic change and the risks it poses in terms of power stability. Japanese China specialists express concern at China’s regime stability’s dependence on economic growth and the imbalances and social risk the latter contained. Lastly, China’s double-digit military budget increases over two decades and the lack of transparency in China’s defence budgets is a concern to Japan as it is to the US. The issue of China’s military

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rise is addressed by Japanese experts in roughly the same terms as it is in the US: lack of transparency associated with the assumed scale of defence budgets is the problem. Meanwhile, Japanese business have made use of China’s cheap labour force and growth, by ensuring sensitive technologies and qualified jobs were kept at home. The EU for its part perceives China almost exclusively as an economic threat, in particular with respect to its textile and shoe industries, the trade imbalances the EU’s imports from China generate and the competition on costs they create for national industries. The safety of electronic parts and devices produced in China is a concern for European consumers and authorities. Lastly, the lack of adequate protection of intellectual property rights is a major issue, shared with Japan but only marginally connected to security considerations. The debate of the lifting of the arms embargo illustrated that most European countries consider China as less of a threat than Japan or the US do, though EU member states gave in to US arguments against lifting the ban. Based on a political declaration of 27th June 1989 adopted after the Tienanmen crackdown and on a Code of conduct on Arms exports on 8th June 1998, the embargo has been applied differently, raising questions as to its efficiency.26 French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (against his majority of Greens and Social-Democrats) were particularly favourable to lifting the ban. EU Member states agreed in December 2004 that the ban should be lifted and the Code of conduct reinforced, but postponed doing so in April 2005 after the adoption by China of an Anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan. The United-Kingdom had voiced concerns earlier on. The issue is likely to be raised again in the future. North Korea is Japan’s other major security concern. Japan is within immediate reach of North Korean missiles and considers its nuclear and ballistic programme as the region’s primary source of instability. As far as Europeans go, North Korea is a problem in terms of proliferation, but no direct threat, whereas Japan could in the long run be a target of a nucleararmed Korean missile. Also, Japan now has at heart to solve the issue of its ‘kidnapped citizens’ of the 1970s and 1980s. The EU used to lack credibility in the eyes of Japanese leaders. The essentially administrative character of trade relations (in spite of their political repercussions) also made the EU’s structure and its political ambition difficult to grasp. This situation changed substantially with the 26. Council of the European Union 2005.

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creation of the Euro. Unfortunately, European states today turn their attention to China and the improvement of relations with Japan is no longer considered a priority. Japan’s approach to the EU and EU Member states’ policy towards Japan remains bilateral with respect to political and strategic issues, for the reasons mentioned above. The lack of problems within EU-Japan relations, now that the EU’s biggest trade deficits are with China, has almost become a problem, as French diplomats comment: the relationship with Japan is sometimes said to be shallow, concerned only with either the US or China. EU-country policy makers have much to learn from Japan’s China experts. Hence dialogue with Japan on China is actually sensible. Nonetheless, the current state of EU-Japan relations does not reflect their fundamental common ground in historic, political, economic, social and environmental terms (regardless of their economic competition). From the point of view of the EU’s security policy, discrepancies in threat assessments with the US and Japan, should lead to increased discussions between them. The change of administrations in the US and in Japan should provide new opportunities for their international policies to converge. To a certain extent both Asia and Europe can be thought to represent some aspect of the world’s future. Europe because of the ideal and hope it conveys, and the innovation it represents in terms of regionalisation and interstate relations; Asia, because of its recent and expected economic dynamism. The relative emptiness of their security relationship, in the strict sense, stems from the fact that EU Member states have not yet taken steps to show an understanding of Asian countries’ security concerns and a willingness to address them. This role has been left for the US to play. In particular, the EU has failed to show some understanding of a number of Asian states’ uneasiness with respect to China’s defence policy. In this respect, the potential of the Japan-EU relationship has been underestimated in spite of the fact that the EU shares with Japan the same, broad definition of security, and a common concern for (if not always a common approach to) specific issues such as climate change, proliferation and the protection of intellectual property rights.

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References ASEM 4. 2004. Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism. Copenhagen, 22-24 September. http://www.aseminfoboard.org/ content/documents/Declaration_on_ Cooperation_against_International_Terrorism.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010). ASEM 5. 2004. Chairman’s statement. Hanoi, 9 October. http://www.aseminfoboard.org/content/documents/ chairmans_statement_asem_5.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010). ASEM 6. 2006. Chairman’s statement, Helsinki, 10-11 September. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Chairman_s_statement.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010). Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Riener. Council on the European Union. 2007. Guidelines on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ misc/97842.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010) Council of the European Union. 2005. Fact sheet – EU arms and dual use exports policy and EU embargo on China. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ FACTSHEET_ON_THE_EU_AND_CHINA.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010). Council on the European Union. 2003. A secure Europe in a better world – European security strategy, Brussels, 12 December. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010) Delegation of the European Union to Australia and New Zealand. 2008. http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/EU_and_Australia/ PartnershipFramework/PartnershipAgreement2008_forweb.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010) Destatis. 2009. Press release of 26 January. Dony, Marianne. 2008. Droit de l’Union européenne, Éditions de l’université de Bruxelles. The Economist. 2009. Asia’s suffering. 31 January.

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Embassy of the Czech Republic in Beijing. 2009. http://www.mzv.cz/beijing/en/news_events/the_4th_round_of_the_eu_ china_strategic.html (Accessed on 2 September 2010) European Commission. 2004. 13th EU-Japan Summit – 22 June 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/japan/summit_en.htm (Accessed on 2 September 2010) European Commission 2002. EU strategy towards China: implementation of the 1998 Communication and future steps for a more effective EU policy, COM (2001) 265 final. Brussels, 15 May. European Commission 2001. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, Brussels, COM (2001) 469 final. Brussels, 4 September. European Commission 1994. Towards a New Asia Strategy, COM (1994) 314 final. European Community. 1991. Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/japan/docs/joint_pol_decl_en.pdf (Accessed on 2 September 2010). Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Fox, John and François Godement. 2009. A Power Audit of EU-China Relations. European Council on Foreign Relations. Haas, Ernst. 1964. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42-63. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (Kedo). 2010. Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Beyond. http://www.kedo.org/au_history.asp (Accessed on 2 September 2010). New York Times. 2009. A New Path for Japan. August 26. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27ihtedhatoyama.html?_r=1 (Accessed on 2 September 2010). US Congress. 2006. China’s proliferation to North Korea and Iran, and its role in addressing the nuclear and missile situations in both nations. Hearing before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 109th Congress, Second session. Washington, 14 September. 32

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3. The EU’s Soft Power: Does it Work in Asia? Alain Ruche

1.

Introduction

Considering soft power as ‘the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals’1 it appears that development and humanitarian assistance were the basis of the emerging EU soft power in the eighties in Asia. Only in 1994 and in 2001 did the EU formulate its first strategies towards the region aiming at strengthening its political and economic presence commensurate with its global weight. An impressive range of instruments was developed in Asia including for Least Developing Countries, which illustrate the EU attractiveness. There are significant examples of the EU soft power in Asia. The remarkable success in Aceh (Indonesia) has marked the doctrine. The key role played by the EU in the shift towards a non traditional approach of security in South East Asia is illustrated in disaster preparedness, maritime security and the fight against pandemics. It will probably extend further. The impact of the EU soft power in human rights, rule of law and democracy is more difficult to assess given its value component. The EU could listen more to what the Asians think of Europe. As a whole there is a great demand for Europe in Asia in the field of economics, culture, diplomacy and development assistance. The right cocktail of EU smart power should consist of a quiet army of 21st century diplomats, enlightened businessmen and openminded European citizens with only the military component to make it globally effective. Maybe switching from a power-based approach towards a way-based approach opens new avenues for the future.

2.

What are we speaking about?

How to define Asia has been under discussion for many years. The debate is still open between geographers, economists, historians and political scientists. In spite of the amazing diversity of this region most foreign 1.

Nye 2004, 17.

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affairs ministries in the world have an ‘Asia’ department and an ‘Asia’ policy. Private companies, universities, think tanks and also citizens have the feeling that Asia simply exists as an entity which embraces Central Asia to Japan and Australia. Let’s align on this common sense position even if the emphasis in this paper is on China and South East Asia. Again simplicity is useful when using the EU – standing for the European Union – as a generic designation for this peculiar international setting under constant transformation and which includes – for the moment – twenty seven European countries as members of a club of which the final aim still appears unclear, and might remain so. The reference to the EC – standing for the European Commission – will thus not be made unless necessary for understanding.

3.

EU soft power: more than semantics

According to its inventor, ‘soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals’.2 However, Joseph Nye himself recently referred to the ‘layers’ of soft power: from military power (where the US is number one), to economic (multipolar power) and international relations (cross border issues like climate change, pandemics and drugs) where power is chaotically distributed. Nye himself admitted that ‘there is only a difference in degree between soft and hard power, they are related’. In 2009 former EU High Representative J. Solana identified ‘five lessons in global diplomacy’3 inspired by the EU experience as a major soft power: the solution of a problem is always political; foreign policy is all about the domestic policy of others; personalities and trust are essential; no single country – even the US – can solve problems on its own; almost all problems are regional; and the best time to deal with a problem is the moment it arises. Some Euroskeptics may question that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is one of the areas where the EU has made most progress. The fact is that CSDP is not about militarizing the Union. The EU added value rather lies in a set of civilian and military capabilities, new institutions and decision-making mechanism including the experience of joint exercises and missions, which places it in a position to better match its responsibilities. So the EU military power only exists to make it a more credible and efficient civilian power. Contrary to what is commonly 2. 3.

Nye 2004, 17. Solana 2009.

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thought, strict EU military power is not used in Afghanistan. Rather, EU member states contributed with troops through NATO. Furthermore several member states are neutral or have no military capability. Afghanistan illustrates the growing importance of soft power. This ‘impuissance de la puissance militaire’4 has even gained NATO, which has become a precinct for political debates and has incorporated the concept of human security. This shift might further complicate the EU set-up for CSDP and crisis management, and in the end the functioning of the EU soft power. Is the EU too soft and not smart enough? Among progress made, the strongest EU contribution is again in the doctrine side through a shared strategic outlook adapted to the new paradigm of threats. The EU is ideally positioned to bridge the worlds of diplomats, troops, and development and security experts. On the operational side, the growing willingness to deploy EU missions with broader scope materialized in more than twenty CSDP missions, of which only a couple are military missions, the others being under a police, rule of law or border assistance scheme. With regard to capabilities when seeing the recurrent difficulties of mobilizing helicopters for the battle ground, nobody can question that there is still a long way to go. While about 180 billion Euros per year are spent on defence by EU member states, this budget might not be spent on the right things. So the real challenge is to improve EU’s core strength- blending civilian and military instruments centering on EU civil/military cell, crisis prevention and management, stabilization and reconstruction. This is to be done against the goals defined and in effective partnerships with other parties; in particular the US, Russia, NATO, the UN and OSCE. The EU considers the ‘quiet success of European Defence’5 as one of the major EU assets of the recent years. But up to which point can the EU further integrate its military capabilities through the CSDP without improving its political integration in foreign relations remains an open question.6 The picture gets also more complicated as what is naturally considered as soft power – like supporting human rights and democracy – can become hard power when sanctions (restrictive measures) are associated (as in Myanmar/Burma). Likewise the concepts of soft and hard can be voluntarily mixed in a policy context, as in the recent call on China by Deputy Secretary of State J. Steinberg to provide ‘strategic reassurance’ that its intentions are peaceful.7 4. 5. 6. 7.

Adam 2009. Solana 2007. Santopinto 2007. Shen Yi 2009.

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4.

The emergence of EU soft power in Europe and in Asia

By itself European integration started as an inward-looking venture.8 Its foundations were built following the Second World War aiming at peace and reconciliation in a new Europe. The external situation was taken as a parameter. So retrospectively, it can be argued that the EU was a soft power. Historically the EU was first centered on its internal built-up and further on its enlargement, which illustrates the attractiveness of the integration process to the candidate countries and their decisions to act accordingly, in particular through the adoption of the ‘acquis communautaire’. As a matter of fact, enlargement policy has been the most successful foreign policy of the EU. Later on a growing emphasis was put on values and rules as opposed to narrowly defined interests. What has been since called the ‘European cooperation’ started in the fifties and followed the colonial rule in Africa. Assistance to Latin American and Asian countries – the so-called ALA countries – started in mid-seventies under a separate format. UK accession to the Union did not make Asian countries member of the ACP Club (African, Caribbean and Pacific), not least for political and financial reasons. Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance form the basis of the emerging EU soft power in Asia in the eighties. Everybody would tend to agree that ‘Europe must unite and increasingly speak with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world’. This quotation from the Declaration on European identity in 1974 (!) shows that for many years the EU has been identifying itself with the expression of a single set of ideas and beliefs. The constructivists will find here a good argument to claim this centrality of values in the development of EU foreign policy as being a salient feature of the EU foreign policy. As a matter of fact this cohabitation of a powerful economic identity with a weak political and security structure inspired Duchêne in his denomination of Europe as a ‘civilian power’ as soon as in 1972. Be it for an awareness of the European added value, the UK ‘leaning’ or the commercial German appetite, a growing consciousness that the EU must cooperate with Asia appeared in the early nineties. The question arose on what the EU wanted in Asia. The EU’s sui generis mix of interests, values and responsibilities in the world came to the forefront. The first ever EU strategy towards Asia, issued in 1994, stated two soft objectives: to raise the EU’s profile in the region and to improve mutual understanding. In 2001 the EU defined a strategic framework for enhanced partnerships with a 8.

Tsoukalis 2009.

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wide Asia from Central Asia to Japan and New Zealand. The goal was ‘strengthening its political and economic presence in the region commensurate with its global weight following enlargement’. Except security, all specific objectives of this policy were ‘soft’ as they referred to governance and rule of law, investments, global partnerships and alliances, poverty reduction, mutual awareness, regional integration and effective multilateralism. More recently the priority given to energy and climate change was added to policy areas where the EU soft power has a concrete meaning. The 2001 policy document ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership’9 has not been updated and still constitutes the general framework for EU-Asia relations. Instead the EU has followed the path of issuing country or sub regional policy papers for India, Japan, China and South East Asia, which are also basically soft in their approach. The first policy document on Asia within the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP, December 2007) was another significant guideline. This policy paper is geared towards North East Asia illustrating the shift of EU’s interest to the East, or rather, the absorption capacity of this subregion.

5.

EU soft power in Asia: an impressive – or excessive? – range of EU instruments?

The EU has become aware of the re-emergence of Asia as one of the most significant developments of this new century. Yet the EU cannot continue to treat China as the emerging power it used to be but rather as the global force it is.10 The way the EU will come to terms with it will have an impact on the daily life of its citizens. So Asia is really important to the EU and an impressive range of policies and instruments are now present in the EUAsia relations, at country, regional and global level. Development cooperation based on strategy papers and multiannual programming has become more sophisticated and effective. The EU is an active player in crisis prevention and response through its humanitarian office ECHO, the Joint Research Center (JRC), civil security policy under the innovative Instrument for Stability and actions of civil protection. On the political side, CFSP instruments are widely used in Asia: common positions, regular summits with strategic partners, ministerial meetings and joint 9. European Commission 2001 10. Fox 2009.

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cooperation committees, political dialogues and dialogues on human rights, actions in UN bodies and expert level meetings. On the trade side, negotiations of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) are going on with several South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, and also China and Mongolia). The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has just been signed with South Korea, and a FTA is under negotiation with ASEAN and India. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) remain beneficiary to the unilateral and privileged status they have under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme which gives them nearly free access to the EU market. The EU has been actively supportive of regional integration in Asia from the nineties, in particular with ASEAN publishing its Charter and adopting institutions inspired from EU experience like COREPER and council working groups. Sectoral dialogues with all Asian partners have extended and deepened illustrating EU leverage as a normative power and an active player on the world stage through the external aspects of its internal policies. The EU is also most involved in promoting good governance, rule of law and human rights in Asia. The current international crisis gives an opportunity to the EU to contribute to effective multilateralism in Asia though a new G20 format and a growing role of emerging countries in governance. Why Asian partners are attracted by the EU soft power has much to do with the European added value in the region: key contributor to multilateralism, major donor of development and humanitarian assistance, single market and first trading power, comprehensive approach in conflict management and crisis prevention, source of inspiration for regional integration and inter regionalism, and presence in virtually all countries. The flexibility and differentiation inherent in EU policies are illustrated by the broad range of instruments, which allows an adaptation to specific situations and countries in Asia, from Afghanistan to Singapore. This capability of the EU is appreciated in particular by Least Developed Countries like Cambodia, Laos and Nepal. The regional and cultural diversity as an asset in the European process of integration is most valued in the Asian mosaic which opens a bright future for programmes like Erasmus Mundus and the regulatory approach of the Bologna process. The source of EU inspiration sometimes lies in its internal policies as shown by the interest expressed by China in the EU regional and social inclusion policies. A balanced and simultaneous approach of strategic partners by the EU is appreciated in Asia even if doubt remains regarding the real added value of this concept. The attractiveness of the value driven component of EU policies, in particular regarding human rights is squeezed between contradictory forces: on one side the progressive convergence of Asian countries towards

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political regimes based on a common ground compatible with the rule of law, human rights, solidarity and democracy; on the other side the persisting debate between European and Asian values. Finally the EU as a civilian actor provides valuable insights for a region where the traditional military force is still viewed as an asset in itself.

6.

What about the soft power of others?

The US has always based their policy in Asia on a hard component of bilateral military alliances anchored on a limited number of countries, like the Philippines. This classic policy led them to overlook the regional aspects of Asia as illustrated by the disdain expressed towards an increasingly relevant ASEAN. Even if there is a feeling that Hollywood, Harvard and the Fulbright might matter more than the Pentagon, ‘there are more people playing in military bands than Foreign Service officers’.11 Whether this situation is recommendable is now openly questioned by the new US administration. State Secretary H. Clinton at her hearing at the Senate used more than thirteen times the word ‘smart power’ as the new basis of the US diplomacy. She clearly said that ‘we must choose the right tool, or the right combination of tools (of smart power), the best adapted to each situation’. The shift towards soft power is not unilateral though: ‘We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist’ said President Obama. We are witnessing a paradigmatic shift in US foreign defence and security policy which might open significant opportunities for EU-US cooperation, in particular in Asia.12 Defence Secretary R. Gates explained the new military approach to ensure a more balanced approach to so-called ‘stability operations’, which become a ‘core military mission’. This new (smart) thinking means improving material conditions in regions that are most vulnerable to recruitment of enemies. This approach is getting closer to the EU comprehensive and smart approach. The soft power of Japan has always suffered from the lack of postwar reconciliation with China and from some inwards tendency proper to this country. The core elements of Japanese soft power – development assistance and economic strength – have been eroded in the nineties due to internal and international events. More cultural attractiveness has

11. Nye 2008. 12. Baker and Glosserman 2009.

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continued to slowly invade consumption pattern at world level including in Asia. Design, food, music, cartoons and architecture are good examples. Whatever Chinese leaders claim the military build-up of their country is a fact illustrated by the double-digit growth for many years in their – declared – defence budget. For many decades to come the Chinese military power will remain limited in absolute terms and not comparable to the pure US hard power. However believing that China’s rise is inevitable is not the same as liking it. This is the case of course for the US, Japan and South Korea but also for Indonesia and Vietnam. More interesting is the dramatic increase in Chinese peacekeeping deployments to the UN, be it through police, military observers, engineering battalions and medical units. Actually the increase has been twenty-fold since 2000 and has much reinforced the image of China as a soft power through its contribution to global peace and security, and its active participation in disaster preparedness, humanitarian relief and counter piracy. This peacekeeping role brings military implications and lessons for China including responsiveness, riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergency command systems and ability to carry out ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW) actions at home. The rise of soft power of China is cohabiting with this country’s reluctance to assume international responsibilities, in spite of its extraordinary economic growth.13 This position has several roots, starting from Deng Xiaoping’s admonition that China should adopt a low profile and never take the lead, and has remained in spite of its extraordinary economic rise. The relation between soft and hard power can also be analyzed in terms of formal or informal alliances between powers. The vital relationship between Europe and the US is the best example of this.14 The new strategic concept adopted by NATO in 1999 expressed the necessity to face risks and threats all over the world and thus beyond the ‘Atlantic’ zone. The NATO is getting closer of a policy of common and collective security policy with the rest of the world. Some analysts refer to this situation with the US becoming ‘smart power’ and the EU basically being ‘soft power’.15 Actually well before the US the EU adopted the expression of ‘smart power’ as a right combination between soft and hard power. The recent stop over of Secretary of State Clinton in Indonesia during her first trip to Asia, more than giving importance to the most populated Muslim country in the

13. Snyder and Glosserman 2009. 14. Korski and Gowan 2009. 15. Adam 2009.

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world, expresses the acknowledgment that Indonesia has not been given the strategic importance it deserves in Asia.

7.

What Asians think of the EU

As soft power combines both attractiveness and corresponding action, it is relevant to know what the Asians think of the EU. Surveys show a particular low degree of knowledge of the EU among citizens of emerging countries.16 Only a minority of those who have an opinion on the EU believe it is a politically effective and credible international actor – with the exception of global peace. Most recurrent images of the EU relate to EU’s trade power. The EU is often associated with peace building and promotion of democracy. EU multilateral approach is praised in various fields – like environment and human rights – but this perception is ambivalent: does the EU promote multilateralism or multipolarism? As expected the EU is viewed everywhere as the most successful actor of regional integration. Meeting and exchanging views with several actors of the civil society – universities, decision makers, employers, trade unions, and think tanks – are a sensible way to analyze perceptions and their impact on policy making. According to many Asians the EU is unable to speak with one voice and is always preoccupied with its internal business. This reflects an expectation from the EU acting like a state, while the fact that twenty seven member states agree on so many issues is by itself rather remarkable. Now it will be the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. It is not perceived as an independent or powerful actor in the world or even on the Asian scene, except on the trade side where it has a protectionist image. Sometimes the EU is also said to be ‘preaching’, like in the field of human rights and the rule of law, while having double standards regarding countries involved. With reference to the assumption of a link between attractiveness and ability to influence others it is not clear how far Asians do act following EU soft power. Considering for example Chinese policy in the field of human rights, trade or even multilateralism, several observers raised doubt in this respect.

16. Lucarelli 2008.

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8.

Significant examples of EU soft power in Asia

8.1. Success story in Aceh (Indonesia) Much has been written on the impact of the EU soft power in the Aceh province of Indonesia. The EU was instrumental in reaching a peaceful settlement of a long standing local conflict. Among the aspects which were not sufficiently highlighted in the analysis of this experience, the deep commitment of all parties involved towards a solution and the EU role limited to monitoring the implementation of the agreement are salient. The progressive adhesion of ASEAN countries to the case is interesting. At first Indonesia was somehow reluctant to accept an outside action in the name of the traditional argument of non interference. Then five ASEAN countries got involved to form with the government of Indonesia the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) which was a civilian mission comprising 250 unarmed personal deployed in Aceh. Joint EU-ASEAN missions elsewhere in the world were even proposed as a follow-up. The EU’s support to the peace process went beyond the key demobilization and disarmament phase successfully monitored by the AMM. The EU also put in place a special programme supporting the political normalization of the province and democracy building with the aim of establishing a strong foundation for sustainable peace and development in the region. This programme had five components: reintegration of prisoners and ex-combatants, local elections, governance, police reform and justice sector reform. The EU potential in replicating this successful experience should not be exaggerated as long as the conditions are not met, like in Southern Thailand or the Philippines. An intriguing question is why the EU soft power was so appreciated in Aceh: was it because of its inherent attractiveness and invitation to Asian partners to act? Or because of its weakness which makes it an acceptable actor? The US considered the Aceh case a purely local and did not see any problem to EU entry, moreover praised it afterwards. Japan and Australia did not share the same view as they could see this initiative as potentially eroding their power in the region. Timing is also a critical issue in peace building and institutional building. The Aceh story is not over and the EU is busy with supporting the capitalization of the success.

8.2. ‘Securitization’ in South East Asia The EU played a key role in the shift towards a non-traditional approach of security in South East Asia (in the way the distinction between traditional

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and non-traditional security issues is still relevant), as illustrated by its action in disaster relief, on avian influenza, and maritime security. Partisans of the constructivist theory in international relations will find a good case to sustain that the EU’s talk was key in broadening the security concept in a region where traditional military policy is considered as the only basis of power. The efficiency of the EU leverage seems to be related to its regional approach in the context of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF). A lot of change has occurred in the short time between the ARF seminar in Ulaanbaatar in June 2005 on ‘Evolving changes in the security perceptions of the ARF Countries’, and the recent seminar on disaster relief preparedness in Phnom Penh. There is probably no region in the world where security concepts have changed so dramatically as in Europe during the last sixty years and the common fundamental underpinnings of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and their subscribing to the 2003 – and recently updated – European Security Strategy. This illustrates the interest of a soft and embracing approach of security policy. What matters is not only the security of the state but also the security of the people – human security. Security is an inclusive concept: one’s security is served by the security of others, not by their insecurity. Optimal security is not reached by keeping all options open, but rather by accepting an international order based on the rule of law. It is impressive how most countries rate non-traditional threats as the main issues for their security. A good example is Indonesia that considers natural disasters as the greatest threat to national security. Regarding avian influenza the EU has also adopted an approach based on human security. Since the beginning of the crisis, the major impact, often insufficiently reported, has been socio-economic, in particular for the poultry sector and backyard farmers whose livelihood and food security have been seriously affected. An ad hoc innovative study found a gender dimension in the impact. In the response to the crisis, an overall institutional approach was adopted to work with partner countries and regional institutions, opening further the way to a policy covering both human and animal health. The Commission played a leading coordinating role in this respect, at global level, supported by a massive pledge of European funds, all in grants. At the same time EU member states maintained a more traditional approach of avian influenza with an angle geared towards security against the occurrence of a pandemic and the protection of their citizens. From a coordinated response centered on avian influenza in 2005-2006 the emphasis shifted in 2007 towards an approach of cross-border cooperation on highly-pathogenic animal and human diseases. Recently a more comprehensive ‘One Health’ approach was 43

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endorsed as an integrated and global framework to health focusing on risks at the intersections between human health, animal health and ecosystems. This step confirms the integration of human security and EU policies for crisis prevention. The ‘One Health’ concept is linked to livelihoods and equity. It acknowledges that diseases affecting animal production or labour force have a negative economic and social impact. This way of thinking fits with EU objectives of promoting global security, social justice, international cooperation, multilateralism and poverty alleviation showing how in a couple of years the EU soft power had a major impact in this respect and acted as a federative catalyst. The EU has gone further into this securitization policy in Asia organizing a seminar on maritime security in the context of ARF. Two interesting facts in this respect are the strategic role of Malacca’s straits for China and Japan and the recent initiative to send military naval missions to the Indian Ocean to protect commercial vessels in international waters ahead of Somalia. The EU finds natural allies in this move. For example seven Chinese merchant ships were attacked by pirates in 2008, and the government’s inability to protect them and their workers has generated domestic criticism. As a matter of fact the EU cannot be dragged in a never ending securitizing process which would lead to a melting pot where human security would not fit anymore. Sustainable well-being citizenship cannot disappear in front of security. Maybe there will be a need for a ‘desecuritization process’ in a near future like Intellectual Property Rights in a knowledge economy and given the rise of social platforms. The recent decision of pharmaceutical multinationals to renounce to their rights for drugs related to the AIDS/HIV is an example of this process. The EU securitization process takes place in a complicated institutional context and sometimes a grey zone.17 The CFSP and the CSDP have created community competences in defence and security without taking substantial powers from member states. When the CSDP was created its mandate covered not only military crisis management but also some civilian management activities: rule of law, administration, civil protection and the police. The evolution towards non-traditional concept of security has given the European Commission a growing role like sector security reform in the instruments for development cooperation and for stability. Given the leading role of the Commission in climate change and the recognition of this sector being a ‘threat multiplier’ this trend can only accelerate. At the same time the Commission continues to be active in fields such as conflict prevention, human rights, rule of law, 17. Santopinto 2007.

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democratization, disarmament, demobilization and reconstruction, and post-conflict reconstruction. This overlap of competences for civilian crisis management makes EU coherence even more critical.

8.3. Human rights policy The impact of EU soft power in the field of human rights, rule of law and support to democracy is more difficult to assess as it has a strong value component. The scope of instruments available is large at multilateral, regional and country level: political dialogues, dialogues on human rights, activities with United Nations, Human Rights Special Representatives, clauses negotiated with partners in the context of bilateral agreements and also the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aimed in particular to stimulate the participation of the civil society in a context independent from the consent of third country governments and other public authorities. According to the EU there is an impact but still much is to be done in particular for minorities, refugees, freedom of expression and support to judiciary sector. There are obvious situations where the EU soft power has very limited effect like Burma/Myanmar and North Korea, and as it appears, Afghanistan. In a lesser extent this is the case with Cambodia – where widespread corruption and trafficking of human beings remain, and Vietnam – where freedom of expression and religion is still weak in spite of progress. As a matter of fact, as told by President Sarkozy at European Parliament, ‘we cannot boycott a quarter of humanity’. In other cases EU soft power had impact. Pessimists will say that at least the EU has been active. It is the case at (sub) regional level and also in Indonesia – through an active dialogue on human rights, with the civil society in particular the media; in the Philippines – abandonment of death penalty and investigations of extra-judicial killings; in Nepal – support to the peace process; in Thailand – starting monitoring in the South. There is also the active support to the electoral observation process in several countries: Cambodia, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a good chance that the EU support to democracy contributed to the political convergence and common playing field in line with general democratic principles which took place in the last years in Asia. At the same time the argument that Europeans are ‘preaching’ is often heard in Asian circles on EU human rights policy. The standard clauses on human rights – and on the International Criminal Court – incorporated as an essential element in the negotiations of agreements with Asian countries puts the EU in a less competitive advantage vis-à-vis the US and China. The 45

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question is not to renounce to one core EU value but to assess whether this is the best way to promote it. The EU is aware of this and a more flexible and realistic approach could be contemplated, like model instead of standard clauses. The clauses on human rights might have more impact on the delay and complication of the negotiations rather than in their implementation. Actually this Sword of Damocles was never used in Asia. So the question arises whether EU human rights policy is or not part of EU soft power, in particular the embargo on arms against China and the persisting sanctions against Burma. Currently there is a tendency for realism to prevail. President Obama recently said that ‘in delivering a better life for people on the ground, one should be more concerned with substance than with the form’.

9.

Good prospects for EU smart power in Asia if …

A realistic position would be not to have too many expectations regarding the greater capability for the EU to speak with one voice in a foreseeable future even if the recent visit of President Obama in Europe puts the EU under pressure by its consensual, listening and multilateral approach. The excesses of the Bush policy led the EU to form in the last eight years a relatively coherent front. With President Obama the EU is faced with its real responsibilities including the necessity of better speaking in one voice. Public diplomacy has become a core foreign policy tool. The EU needs to explain better its global ambition and how it can be accomplished. Though the instrument for stability is innovative and most useful the Common Security and Foreign Policy is still too reactive and lacks of anticipative capacity. This shows how soft power resources are difficult to control. The external field is where the Lisbon Treaty induces most change in the EU. More consistency, coherence, visibility in a context taking into consideration the external aspects of internal policies and a postWestphalian concept of diplomacy are welcome changes. This will impact positively on the EU soft power and will increase the already widespread support in public opinion for a multipolar world and a greater role for ‘herbivorous powers – countries not perceived as military powers.18 Better taking into account the perceptions of Asians regarding Europe through mutual understanding appears an avenue for success. Perceptions influence policy-making. The EU needs to listen more. Money is not the most valuable EU ingredient in EU-Asia relations. Innovative practices 18. Krastev and Leonard 2007a

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must be put forward in a flexible way: effective multilateralism, constructive engagement, partnership, regional integration and institutionalization. However being ‘different’ does not mean to be a ‘better’ global actor. Eurocentrism should be avoided. Nobody is at the center: it is time for a global reconciliation of ‘the geography of thought’.19 Programmes like Erasmus Mundus contribute to mutual understanding and the number of Europeans students, researchers, and academics going to Asia should greatly rise. Contacts between European and Asian civil society should intensify. The knowledge economy which was part of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 has somehow been put aside while the new paradigm of knowledge being applied to knowledge has continued to penetrate our society. This implies systemic changes including in the field on international relations where the EU has comparative advantages as a postmodern actor given its social values and its cultural diversity.20 Some analysts, as H. Maull, even consider that ‘as a post-modern force, rather than a modern power, the EU exercises its influence and shapes its environment through what it is, rather through what it does’. They see the EU as a passive force and not as an active power.21 The ability to share knowledge and information – and to be believedbecomes an important source of soft power hence the critical role of credibility and legitimacy. ‘Sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also to increase their inclination to do so. Power flows from that attraction’.22 A vast majority of European citizens are in favour of a common foreign policy, a common defence and security policy and a single European currency. There seems to be an overall agreement that whatever the EU does, it needs to focus on what it does best through alliances, partnerships and multilateral institutions while keeping its specificities.

10. EU soft power in Asia: does it work? Googling this question gives 258 000 answers. ‘EU soft power in Asia’ gives 1,4 million so there is not much to expect from an algorithmetic approach. A ‘yes’ or ‘no’, even a ‘maybe’ or ‘maybe if’ answer would be naïve. There is no certainty it is a powerful question. As a matter of fact, there is only a difference in degree between soft and hard power. Soft power is dispersed, sometimes confused and can hardly be assessed. It has longer and indirect 19. 20. 21. 22.

Nisbett 2003 Ruche 2008. Santopinto 2007. Nye 2004.

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effects. We need indicators to assess the impact of power and only elementary efforts have been made so far in that direction. The equivocal talk about war does not help in particular the US positive talk about war as a show of strength, even of justice and progressive. The expressions launched by several presidents are illustrative in this respect: the ‘War on Poverty’ of L. Johnson, the ‘War against Communism’ of R. Nixon, or the ‘War on Drugs’ of Bill Clinton. This vocabulary has pervaded the EU in some areas since 9/11 – like the ‘War against Terrorism’, though in a much lesser extent. On the substance, the EU soft power is appreciated in Asia and there is a clear demand for Europe in the region. There are more world citizens who want to see an increase in the power of the EU than any other great power.23 Of course popularity is different from power but nobody questions that the EU made a real difference in Aceh (Indonesia) and that this has potential for replicability. The reason why it is so is less clear. The EU diplomacy can promote effective multilateralism with its 40 000 diplomats in the world, and is meant to be able to deploy 10 000 police officers to faraway theatres. The EU economic role has a huge impact not only through trade but also through technology, and the EU soft power at regional level has a significant added value. As the first world aid donor and second donor of humanitarian aid the EU benefits of a good image in the world and in Asia, region still home to two thirds of world’s poor people. The cultural component of the EU soft power appears most critical as long as eurocentrism is avoided, mutual understanding is cultivated and the EU assets in a knowledge society are used. How to use smart power to make the EU a political actor corresponding to its role as a global and regional actor is a question that has been raised for decades. It is still a core objective of the EU policy in Asia. Is the smart EU power good enough to make it ‘fit for purpose’ in the new interpolar world of this new century?24 What matters is not the answer to the question: it might simply not be relevant given the sui generis character of the European integration process and of the EU essence as a post- Westphalian (postmodern) actor on the international scene. How can we creative enough to formulate the powerful question? Maybe switching from a ‘power-based’ approach to a ‘way-based approach’: How then can the EU and Asia ways joint forces to contribute to a global and sustainable well-being? In spite of different perceptions of the 23. Krastev and Leonard 2007a. 24. Tsoukalis et al. 2009.

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positions and the way to deal with specific issues, there is unanimity on the need to increase cooperation and dialogue to address global issues in a coherent way. There is an accepted need to focus on addressing problems in a common way without focusing on irritants or seeking unanimity of views. Finally the EU can also invite and support a deeper political cooperation between strategic Asian partners themselves. Indeed East and South Asia’s rapid economic growth is fostering economic integration between China, India and Japan, but the divisions within Asia are as deep as the divisions between the emerging Asian powers and the West. Here again the position of China – an outlier that could converge later, or an alternative model? – is strategic and will test the marked continuity in the maturing and growth of democracy in a number of (East) Asian countries. The case of Asia illustrates that to prepare a good cocktail of EU smart power, the soft – the civilian – ingredient should remain overwhelmingly preponderant. It should also be more real. Respected voices refer to ‘worthy intentions, broken promises: the member state problem’.25 As a matter of fact, the challenge is pressuring member states rather the EU itself. Speed (of staff deployment), security (of mission members) and selfsufficiency (of civilians) are key factors. Building on success – and also learning from failure – is critical, like training civilian planners, avoiding an over-reliance on military planning methodologies, engaging host governments, and better integrating the Commission’s planning processes with that of the Council.26 The reluctance of some NGOs to work with the military needs to be overcome. The military force should only be used to ensure credibility and effectiveness to the civil component of the EU policy under a clear political hat. To face today’s challenges, civilian and military forces have to work increasingly hand in hand, often using the same equipment with only slight modifications.27 For example, 28 000 planes take off and land in Europe every day, and military air forces, commercial airlines, and private pilots all share the same sky, all with specific needs and constraints. So coming back to the question asked by J. Nye regarding the right proportion of diplomats and military people, there should be a very small military band supporting a quiet army of multi-track 21st century diplomats, enlightened businessmen, and open-minded and well informed European citizens. That is, unless the concept of power itself becomes pointless. In that case, the real question will be whether we – human beings – will have the wisdom to face peacefully the current challenges. And those that are coming. 25. Korski and Gowan 2009: 12. 26. Ibid. 27. Security and Defense Day 2009.

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References Adam, Bernard. 2009. OTAN: Vers un nouveau concept stratégique. Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security. April 30. http://www.grip.org/fr/siteweb/dev.asp?N=simple&O=712 (Accessed September 8, 2010) Baker C. and Brad Glosserman. 2008. From kinetic to comprehensive: new thinking in the US military. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. PacNet Newsletter #57, October 31. http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-57-october-31-2008-kineticcomprehensive (Accessed September 8, 2010) Bello, Walden. 2008. Afterthoughts – Toward a 21st Century Relationship between Asia and America. Inquirer.net, October 9. http://opinion.inquirer.net/viewpoints/columns (Accessed September 13, 2010) Charmelot, Jacques. 2009. Le ‘smart power’ américain, un défi pour l’Europe. Fondation Schuman. Questions d’Europe n°127, February 9. http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-127 (Accessed September 8, 2010) Cossa, Ralph A. and Brad Glosserman. 2009. Needed: A New Asia-Pacific Strategy Report. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. PacNet Newsletter #20. March 10. http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-20-march-10-2009-needed-new-asiapacific-strategy-report (Accessed September 8, 2010) CRIS-United Nations University. 2009. The Power of Europe – Affirming the EU as a Global Actor. Paper presented at International Conference, Egmont Palace, Brussels, May 7-8. European Commission. 2001. Communication from the Commission. ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership’. Brussels, September 4. http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/strategy_asia_2001 _en.pdf (Accessed October 1, 2010). European Council on Foreign Relations Press. 2007. EU must become a superpower. Centre for European Reform, October 23. http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/pr_soft_power/ (Accessed September 8, 2010) Fierke, K. M. 2007. Constructivism. In International Relations Theories, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Forsberg, Tuomas, Timo Kivimäki and Liisa Laakso, eds. 2007. Europe in Context – Insights to the Foreign Policy of the EU. Helsinki: Finnish International Studies Association. The Foundation for Foreign Policy Research. Gill, Bates and Huang Chin-Hao. 2009. China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. PacNet Newsletter #7, February 2. http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/mar2009 (Accessed September 8, 2010) Korski, Daniel and Richard Gowan. 2009. Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe’s civilian capacities. European Council on Foreign Relations, October. www.ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/civilian-crisis-report.pdf (Accessed September 8, 2010) Krastev, Ivan and Mark Leonard. 2007a. The world’s choice: super, soft, or herbivorous power? Open Democracy, October 26. http://www.opendemocracy.net (Accessed September 8, 2010) Lucarelli, Sonia and Furio Cerutti, eds. 2008. The Search for a European Identity: values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union. London: Routledge. Nisbett, Richard. 2003. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently ... and Why. New York: The Free Press. Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2004. The Benefits of Soft Power. Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge for Business Leaders, February 8. http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html (Accessed September 8, 2010) Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2008. Using American Power Smartly: Advice to the Newt U.S. President. Issues and Insights, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, February. http://csis.org/publication/issues-insights-vol-08-no-02 (Accessed September 8, 2010) Ruche, Alain. 2008. Why could EU’s cultural diversity be an asset in new international relations? Paper presented at Salzburg Global Seminar, April 2008. Santopinto, Federico. 2007. Why the EU needs an institutional reform of its external relations. Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security, June 19. http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1081.htm (Accessed September 13, 2010)

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Saunders, Phillip C. 2009. Uncharted Waters: the Chinese Navy Sails to Somalia. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. PacNet Newsletter #3, January 14. http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-3-january-14-2009-uncharted-waterschinese-navy-sails-somalia (Accessed September 13, 2010) Security & Defence Day. 2009, EU smart power: towards a better integration of European civilian and military dimensions, Brussels, November 18. Shen Yi. 2009 The cornerstone of strategic reassurance, Centre for Strategic & International Studies. PacNet Newsletter #73A, November 12. http://csis.org/publications (Accessed September 13, 2010) Snyder, Scott and Glosserman, Brad. 2009. Not Too Fast with China. Global Security, 13 November. http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/091113506-not-too-fast-withchina.htm (Accessed 1 October 2010) Solana, Javier. 2007. The Quiet Success of European Defense. Schlossplatz Issue 2, Spring. Berlin, Hertie School of Governance. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ esdp/93753.pdf (Accessed October 1, 2010) Solana, Javier. 2009. Five Lessons in Global Diplomacy. Financial Times, January 20. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ articles/105395.pdf (Accessed October 1, 2010) Tenzer, Nicolas. 2009. Where is soft power? Open Democracy, January 28. http://www.opendemocracy.net (Accessed September 13, 2010) The Associated Press. 2007. Survey: 40 percent of world population wants U.S. to have less say in global affairs. International Herald Tribune, October 24. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/24/Europe/EU-GEN-EU-GlobalSurvey.php The Millennium Project. Global Challenges for Humanity. http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/challenges.html (Accessed September 13, 2010) Tsoukalis, Loukas, Olaf Cramme and Roger Liddle. 2009. An EU ‘fit for purpose’ in the global age: can we rise the challenge? Policy Network. http://www.policy-network.net/content/330/The-future-of-the-EU (Accessed September 13, 2010) Werz, Michael. 2009. Foreign Policy and War. Is Barack Obama an ‘Obamacon?’ Heinrich Böll Stiftung, January 25. 52

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4. Russia Looks East – Implications for the EU Fraser Cameron

1.

Introduction

Both the EU and Russia are seeking to increase their influence on the world stage. In recent years both have looked East for new partners and relationships. With the advent to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the new President was determined to reverse the policies of ‘the lost decade’ under Boris Yeltsin and restore Russian influence as a major power. One of the key regions that witnessed the change in policy was Central Asia. The twin driving forces of the new Russian policy were the desire to secure new energy resources and the wish to develop a new security structure to counter growing threats such as terrorism. Putin also moved to strengthen ties with China, to maintain good relations with India and to seek ways to improve the difficult relationship with Japan. During the same period, the EU also moved to deepen its relations with Central Asia, agreeing a new strategy towards the region in 2007, a policy promoted in particular by the German EU Presidency.1 Energy was also a prime motive for the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. The EU also declared China, India and Japan to be ‘strategic partners’ and spent considerable efforts to deepen ties with all three countries. Inevitably the EU and Russia would pursue different Eastern strategies as their interests occasionally overlapped but would often differ. This chapter considers the implications for the EU of Russia’s new assertive approach towards Central Asia and East and South Asia. It also touches on the role of other actors such as the US, Turkey and Iran.

2.

Russian and EU priorities

For the EU and Russia, the number one priority is tackling the global economic crisis that threatens to undermine existing political and 1.

European Commission 2007.

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economic systems. In both Russia and Europe, protectionism is rising, with an obvious danger of nationalist forces gaining strength. Russia’s main interests are the preservation of the current power structures, headed by the Putin-Medvedev tandem, and asserting Russia’s power on the world stage. Both leaders underestimated the impact of the global economic crisis and the political and economic situation in Russia today is more fragile than at any time during the past decade. Putin was rather lucky as president. As former prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, put it ‘it is nice ruling Russia when oil is $ 140 a barrel – not so nice when the oil price is at $ 40 a barrel’.2 In 2009 and for much of 2010 Russia faced an economic recession, capital flight, mounting debts, and rising unemployment. Given the absence of any real democratic outlets, it is difficult to predict future developments in Russia. Some argue that the crisis will propel Russia back into an authoritarian and protectionist shell. Others consider that the crisis provides an opportunity for Russia to open up to the world and embrace a more liberal path.3 With the return to high oil prices in early 2011 it seems that a reinforced status quo may be the most likely outcome. For Putin, foreign policy is viewed as a means to revive and project Russian power using all available tools, and especially its vast energy resources.4 Russia’s principal focus is the US, followed by Europe and Asia. It paid little attention to Central Asia in the 1990s and only slowly began to recognize the importance of re-establishing good relations with the region. There is no intention of trying to reincorporate any of the former Soviet republics within Russia but Moscow would like recognition of its privileged status in the region.5 Although Russia is now back as a main player the Central Asian republics are reluctant to place all their eggs in the Russian basket. In recent years, they have wooed a number of actors, including the US, China and the EU. Russia has an advantage over the EU in that it is a unitary actor compared to the 27 member states of the EU who often struggle to reach a common position on foreign policy issues.6 Furthermore, Russia does not have to contend with concerns over the lack of democracy and human rights in Central Asia or China. Traditional political and business ties, linguistic and cultural links also give Moscow a certain advantage over the EU in Central Asia. Russian is still the preferred language of all elites. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Gaidar 2009. Centre for European Reform 2009. See EU Russia Centre Review VIII at www.eu-russiacentre.org for an assessment of Russian foreign policy. Sushko 2008. Cameron 2007.

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EU leaders in 2011still attach importance to strengthening the multilateral system, preventing protectionism and clinching a Doha trade deal. EU member states played a key role in the successful outcome of the G20 summits in London in April 2009 and Seoul in November 2010. The EU is also struggling to come to terms with the institutional changes provided under the Lisbon Treaty and tackle the huge challenges posed by climate change and energy security. Another priority is restoring close ties with the US under Obama. But in terms of where the EU devotes most of its attention, it is to its immediate neighbourhood – Turkey, the Western Balkans, Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa. In Asia, China, India, Japan have all been designated strategic partners without much thought having been given to what is meant by the term. Much further down the priority list come the countries of Central Asia.7

3.

Russia and Central Asia

Russian policy towards Central Asia has undergone several changes since 1991, ranging from total indifference to the present efforts to increase Russian influence and cooperation, particularly in increasing institutional ties and in the oil and gas sectors.8 At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was so beset with internal problems that it sought to rid itself of ‘the burden’ of Central Asia.9 It reduced its military cooperation and left the countries of the region to cope on their own with the threats emanating from war-torn Afghanistan. Russia also did little to maintain the common economic zone, forcing the republics out of the rouble zone. By deliberately turning its back on Central Asia, Russia could not have been surprised at losing influence in the region. From the mid 1990s, Russia tried to develop a new approach to Central Asia based on its concept of ‘multipolarity.’ Russia tried to regain its lost influence as a Eurasian great power by seeking to develop closer cooperation in the defence and security sectors, and also by exploiting its monopoly in the transit of Central Asian energy products to external markets. Economic cooperation, however, continued to be neglected. During the later 1990s, Russia began to attach increasing importance to the stability and security of Central Asia. This was mainly due to a new strategy devised by Prime Minister, Yugeny Primakov, and an increasing 7. 8. 9.

See Council of the European Union 2008. For an overview see Laurel 2008. Derived from conversation with Yegor Gaidar, Brussels, 10 March 2009.

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understanding in Russia that there was a threat to its own security from Islamic fundamentalism. By 2000, when Boris Yeltsin relinquished the presidency, there was still little to show for the changed emphasis in Russian policy. Tajikistan had accepted a significant number of Russian forces to help protect its borders. There were some energy deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and various declarations about the need to develop closer cooperation with each other. The accession to power of Vladimir Putin marked a turning point in Russian policy towards Central Asia. Another important event was 9/11 and the US request for Russia to support the provision of American air bases in Central Asia. Putin was willing to assist President Bush but also concerned at US forces encircling Russia. He was annoyed when, after the initial first year lease expired, President Bush did not consult him or seek his support for an extension.10 In the early 2000s there developed a more intense rivalry between the US and Russia. The US pressed for democratic and market economy reforms in Central Asia. In Russian eyes, the Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan, following similar coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, were dangerous developments that could ultimately affect the power elite in the Kremlin. But after the brutal government repression of the opposition in Uzbekistan, the US seemed to lose interest in the region and the governments of the five Central Asian states reacted by diversifying their political contacts. The main American interest now is transit routes to Afghanistan, a card that Russia also plays for its own political purposes.11 American involvement in the region, however, is still viewed with suspicion by Moscow. In March 2009, Defence Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, stated ‘America's aspirations have been aimed at getting access to mineral, energy and other resources of CIS countries, and it has actively supported processes aimed at ousting Russia from the area of its traditional interests.’12 Putin was greatly helped by the high energy prices that accompanied his two terms as President. The increased revenues allowed Putin to allocate resources to support a new flexible and pragmatic foreign policy, including efforts to re-establish Russian influence in Central Asia. One of the main aims was to develop institutional cooperation through bodies such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Central Asian 10. Ibid. 11. President Medvedev assured President Obama at the G20 summit in April 2009 that he would be sympathetic to US requests for transit of supplies to Afghanistan. 12. Reuters 17 March 2009.

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Cooperation Organisation (CACO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). In 2007, at the heads of state summit meeting in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), there was agreement that the CSTO would cooperate with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), thus bringing China into the equation. Russia had been a founding member of the SCO (comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and in 2005, it prompted the SCO to issue a statement denouncing the American military presence in the region and requesting the US to withdraw. But apart from a few joint anti-terrorist activities the SCO has not proved a very dynamic organisation. Cooperation with the countries of the region in defence and security matters (training, establishment of a rapid reaction force, defence equipment, etc) is regarded by Moscow as the main vehicle for projecting its influence in the region. In second place comes economic cooperation, especially the energy sector, where most Russian investment has taken place. The Central Asian countries were aware and are still aware of their need for cooperation with Russia in order to kick-start the process of economic integration and to create a stable system of regional security. Russia helped persuade Uzbekistan to leave GUAM and join EurAsEC. It also befriended Turkmenistan which was heading for international isolation. In 2005 Uzbekistan decided that the American air base, which had operated near Karshi since 2001, should be withdrawn, and in June 2006 Uzbekistan joined the CSTO. Kyrgyzstan also closed the Manas air base to US forces in spring 2009 after Russia had agreed to provide it with over $ 2 billion in assistance and credits. Russia has recently proposed a $ 10 billion stabilization fund for the region, for which it will contribute three-quarters. The countries that stand to gain are of course those that demonstrate the correct political attitude towards Moscow. In the Kremlin a special unit has been created to identify assets for sale in neighbouring countries. The financial crisis may be affecting Russia in a major way but it has not stopped the Kremlin looking for political and economic opportunities to increase its influence. The refusal of the Central Asian states to follow Russia and recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia also reveals the limits of Russian influence. Russia was also reluctant to become involved in the civil unrest in Kyrgystan in 2009. Moscow’s attempts to increase its influence has not matched up with the expectations of the Central Asian countries that Russia could and should be doing more to support them. There is a general feeling in Central Asia that Russian policy is designed more to revive its former glory and seek exclusive energy benefits than to help them directly. This has led the Central Asian countries to seek other partners, including Turkey and Iran, 57

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as well as the US, China and the EU. Thus Kazakhstan is proposing to send not less than twenty percent of its oil exports to China and twenty-five percent to Europe via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkmenistan is also planning to export at least forty percent of its gas by 2010, bypassing Russia, including ten percent for Iran, and about thirty percent to China. It has also promised supplies to the EU. The rich mineral resources of the region are already witnessing strong competition by outside powers. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that Russia, with its raw-material based export economy and its weakened industrial and technological position, will win this competition. There is still an impression in some Russian ministries that Central Asia could become an expensive burden again. The future of relations between Russia and Central Asia will depend mainly on how Russia weathers the global economic crisis and to what extent it continues to devote attention and resources to the region. There is an argument that Russia can only be secure in Central Asia if it is active in helping to develop the region's economic, scientific and technical potential, rather as the Soviet Union helped the region to progress post 1945. At present, there remain some suspicions on both sides and while Russia is well placed to increase its influence it is by no means certain that this will happen. At the same time, Russia has one major advantage over the EU in that it does not question the state of human rights in the region. Authoritarian leaders in Central Asia ‘appreciate the way Russia rebuffs western criticism over democratic credentials and take it as an example not to give in to western pressure.’13

4.

The EU and Central Asia

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU found itself marginalised in the region, with the ascendance of Turkey and later the US, China and the return of Russia. A series of annual gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine helped focus EU minds on the potential of Central Asia as an energy supplier. In 2005, the EU created the position of EU Special Representative for the region and appointed Pierre Morel as the first occupant of this post. The EU also negotiated PCAs with each of the countries, modelled on the Russian text, and allowed them to benefit from the Tacis programme of technical assistance.

13. Boonstra 2008.

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There followed an EU strategy paper, agreed in 2007 under the German Presidency, which was designed with numerous aims in mind. It was felt that it would bring Europe and Asia closer together, help tackle many common challenges and improve the EU’s access to secure alternative energy supplies. It included seven priority themes (human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation; education; economic development, trade and investment; energy and transport; environment and water; common threats and challenges; and intercultural dialogue).14 The EU also stated that it would lend its political support and assistance to Central Asian countries in developing a new Caspian Sea – Black Sea – EU energy transport corridor. The EC assistance budget to Central Asia would also be significantly increased under the new financial perspectives 20072013 to a total of € 750 million. The strategy paper stated that it was essential to cooperate bilaterally on political and economic issues while the regional approach was more suitable for tackling challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, energy, environment, water management, and migration. The EU supported the removal of trade barriers between the Central Asian states and also supported their WTO accession. The strategy also noted the importance of the ‘development and consolidation of stable, just and open societies adhering to international norms’ as being ‘essential to bring the partnership to full fruition.’ This emphasis on human rights was to be a source of contention. In its first annual report on the strategy, the EU side noted ‘a new quality of cooperation’ that had led to an increase in political contacts and a structured human rights dialogue. Two ministerial meetings were held, one under the French Presidency and another under the Swedish Presidency. But the results of the first year and a half of the EU’s Central Asian strategy remained mixed at best.

5.

EU-Russia rivalry and cooperation in Central Asia

The area of greatest rivalry between the EU and Russia in Central Asia is the energy sphere. Russia was quicker than the EU to recognize the importance of the region’s energy resources and was able to bring Gazprom into the game ahead of any EU rival. The Russian focus has been on Kazhakstan and Turkmenistan with its massive gas reserves. While Russia has signed long-term deals to import Turkmen gas, the EU has been struggling to catch up, eventually realizing that Turkmen gas was essential for the success of the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Construction costs vary 14. European Commission 2007.

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between four and seven billion euros. It was difficult to justify such outlays when the gas price was in the region of $ 75 per unit. Now, the idea of an environmentally hazardous pipeline that imposes transport costs of around 50 % of the net supply price has lost much of its raison d’être. In March 2009, however, the European Council agreed to offer € 250 million to support the Nabucco project. President Barroso and Energy Commissioner Oettinger also visited Turkmenistan in February 2011 to secure support for the Nabucco project. The EU and Russia have also been competing for political influence in Central Asia. With its long-standing connections to the region, Russia has been far better placed than the EU to win friends and influence people. But because of its sometimes high-handed attitude it has not always been able to get its own way. To date, there has been no direct cooperation between the EU and Russia in Central Asia. But this could change, especially in the wake of the global economic crisis. The EU and Russia both have common interests in fighting terrorism and drugs, creating political stability and developing energy resources. They do have differing views on the politics of the region and they are rivals for energy resources. But water management is one area worth studying for a potential common effort. The EU’s experience in managing cross-border projects could be of considerable value in this regard.

6.

EU and Russian relations with Asia: China, Japan, India

The history of Russia’s engagement with Pacific Asia extends back to the 17th century when it founded the first seaport at Okhotsk in 1647. But in the past three centuries Russia has traditionally regarded the region as an area of secondary importance, with Europe the first priority. Since 1991, Russia’s interest and influence in Asia has further weakened. But now Russia is seeking to increase its influence in Asia. This aim is not driven by military and ideological considerations, as was the case during the Cold War, but on an assessment of Russia’s economic interests, especially its wish to position itself as a future strategic transit link between Pacific Asia and Western Europe, and a major supplier of much needed energy resources. In 2010 Russia was admitted to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and attended the summit held in Brussels in October that year. To achieve its Eastern strategy Russia plans to modernise its transport and energy infrastructure. In September 2008, Russia and South Korea announced plans to connect the Trans-Korean railway with Russia’s TransSiberian railway, thus creating a strategic link between Europe and the 60

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Pacific. There are plans to modernize the main ice-free ports, including Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochny, and Khasan. In October 2008 Russia opened the first stage (1,105 km) of the 4,200 km-long strategic pipeline network ‘Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean’ (ESPO), which started to transport oil and gas from Eastern Siberia to China in late 2010. Russia is also acquiring a fleet of very large crude and LNG/LPG carriers from Japan and South Korea and upgrading their Far Eastern oil and gas processing facilities. In 2009 the first LNG exports from Sakhalin were sent to Japan. Russia has also announced plans to address some urgent problems such as population decline and underdeveloped regional infrastructure in the Far East. In 2008, a five-year programme was approved with a budget of 500 billion roubles to fund new initiatives. About a quarter of the funds will be spent on the development of Vladivostok, the host city of the 2013 APEC summit. Russia has also made some efforts to improve its military capacity in the Pacific although the financial crisis has slowed down plans to build some new submarines. The resumption of bomber patrols in the Pacific can be viewed as a signal of Russia’s ability to protect the supply of strategic raw materials and to show existing and potential partners (including members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)) and other players Russia’s capacity to project power and offer military support if necessary. If the financial crisis continues to limit Russia’s spending plans in the Far East, then it will remain a marginal player and largely ineffectual in the region. It has some cards to play on the global stage, including as a newly enriched energy supplier and a traditional arms supplier, but those cards will buy it relatively little influence in Asia. The EU, as opposed to its member states, is a relative newcomer to the Asian region. It has produced several policy papers on Asia but struggled to increase its influence over the past decade. This is partly because of the difficulty in reaching common positions on sensitive issues (e.g. arms embargo, Tibet) and partly because of fundamental disputes with Asian governments on issues such as human rights. These disputes have affected ASEM and EU-ASEAN summit meetings in a negative manner. In December 2007, the EU published a paper on East Asia Policy Guidelines that suggested the EU should focus on defending and promoting its economic interests. The main threats were North Korea, Taiwan, and ‘competitive nationalism.’ The EU should promote regional cooperation, confidence building measures, dialogue on global issues and maintain its commitment to promote democracy, human rights. There

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would also be regular consultations with the US, especially on China. There was no mention of Russia in the paper.

6.1. China The relationship between Russia and China can be described as an ‘axis of convenience.’15 Relations are probably better now than ever before but they are based on expediency and pragmatism rather than common values or shared strategic interests.16 In early 2009, China provided Russia with a $ 25 billion loan in return for oil deliveries from East Siberia. Both sides also gain from banding together against ‘US hegemony’ but this card may be more difficult to play now that Obama has taken over from Bush. Russia is also concerned at the implications of China’s steady economic rise which Moscow believes could weaken Russia’s influence. Russia is also worried about growing Chinese influence in Siberia, illegal migration and potential border claims. There is a certain rivalry in Central Asia and East Asia. China did not follow Russia in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. At the same time, stable Sino-Russian relations are good for the EU (and US). EU-China relations have also been developing rapidly. China is now viewed as a strategic partner as well as the EU’s second trading partner. Perhaps the highlight of the EU-China honeymoon was in 2003 when China praised the EU as an important counter to US hegemony. But in subsequent years, praise turned to disappointment because of the failure to lift the arms embargo, the failure to grant China market economy status, an increase in anti-dumping measures, and disputes over Tibet and human rights. In December 2008, the Chinese cancelled a planned EU-China summit at the last minute in protest at President Sarkozy meeting the Dalai Lama. The current negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) are proving difficult and little progress was made at the summits in 2009 and 2010. But in the present global economic crisis both sides need each other to help recover from the recession.17 There are no obvious areas for cooperation or rivalry between the EU and Russia as far as China is concerned. Moscow occasionally threatens the EU with re-orientating its energy sales towards China but it is most unlikely that Russia would wish to allow a potential enemy (and that is how China is viewed in Moscow) to gain substantially from oil and gas exports. Russia 15. Lo, 2008. 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2001. 17. Machada 2008.

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sells large amounts of arms to China, something the EU does not do. Russia and China are both in the six party talks on North Korea. The EU is an interested spectator. Russia and China engage in discussions on global affairs at the UN. The EU has little visibility at the UN. China is involved in Africa while Russia is largely absent from the continent. The EU and China have more disputes than the EU and Russia as regards Africa. China is also a potential alternative buyer of Russian energy resources but there are two drawbacks for Beijing. The first is the lack of pipelines and as noted above the second is the reluctance of Russia to sell too much energy to a possible adversary.

6.2. Japan Relations between Russia and Japan are still hampered by the dispute over the Kurile Islands which the then Soviet Union occupied in the last days of the second world war in 1945.18 In 2010 both Putin and Medvedev visited the islands much to the fury of the Japanese authorities. There have been constant divisions within the Japanese bureaucracy on how to deal with Russia. Some suggest that the dispute over the islands be put to one side, while others maintain that there can be no meaningful relations with Russia until the dispute is resolved. In February 2009, President Medvedev met with Prime Minister Tara Aso in Sakhalin. Although billed as a ‘get to know you’ meeting, the two leaders agreed to try and solve the islands dispute ‘in our generation.’ There was also an agreement to supply Japan with seven percent of the LNG exports from the Sakhalin II gas field. EU-Japan relations are characterized by their relative harmony. The two sides agreed an Action Plan in 200119 that regulates the bilateral relationship. There are many shared interests and goals e.g. Kyoto, support for multilateral institutions, soft power. There are close economic and trade relations. But Japan has been disappointed (like India) at the lack of EU support for Japan to have a permanent UNSC seat. Seen from Tokyo, the EU does not give Japan the attention it deserves. There are no points of friction or cooperation as regards EU and Russian relations with Japan. The EU has a far bigger trading relationship than Russia and is generally regarded by Japan as a like-minded partner. The Japanese suspicions and concerns about Russia are partly shared by the EU.

18. For a history of the dispute see http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/kurile.htm 19. European Commission 2008.

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But the EU has not wished or been asked to become involved in the dispute over the Kurile Islands.

6.3. India Russia has enjoyed close relations with India since its independence in 1947. It valued India’s leadership of the non-aligned world and there were few rivalries between the two powers. Russia is the dominant supplier of arms to India and it has shown no ambitions in South Asia where India is the dominant power. Both share the multipolar world concept and both are reluctant to bring human rights issues to the fore in relations with third countries. EU relations with India have suffered from neglect in recent years.20 Both sides have much in common. They are both multi-state, multi-ethnic and major democratic actors. They are both committed to the multilateral system, although there have been disputes over India’s attempts to join the UNSC and Doha. Another dispute is over the attempt to promote democracy and human rights. While the EU attaches importance to promoting its normative values, India does not appreciate what it considers the EU’s ‘preaching attitude.’ Economic relations have been developing fast but there remain problems over a free trade agreement and also the nuclear deal with the US. Some EU member states have been highly critical of India’s nuclear status. The EU and Russia do not rub up against each other in India. The EU does not compete with Russia in arms sales. The EU is split on the wisdom of India’s nuclear status and subsequent deal with the US. Russia has not offered any criticism of India’s nuclear status.

7.

US Role

It is important to discuss the role of the US in Asia and Central Asia because despite the deep impact of the financial crisis, the US remains the dominant global power. With the election of Barrack Obama, the US was able to improve its image overseas, after the very negative Bush years. During Hillary Clinton’s first visit to Asia in February 2009 she revealed a pragmatic approach. In Beijing she did not lecture the Chinese on human rights but pressed them to continue buying US Treasury bonds. President 20. Pant 2008.

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Obama took a similar line when President Hu visited the US in January 2011. With regard to Russia, Obama has started to press the reset button. The US is keen to have Russian support in dealing with Afghanistan and Iran. In April 2009, President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to start negotiations on further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. These negotiations were successful and ratification took place in February 2011 in the margins of the Munich security conference. As regards the US and Central Asia, the region has been important mainly as a staging post for US forces and supplies en route to Afghanistan. US efforts to establish bases in the region, initially supported by Moscow, have now run into trouble, although the Russians have agreed to allow US supplies to transit Russia. A secondary US interest has been energy resources, followed by the desire to balance Russia and Chinese influence. There are no serious conflicts of interest between the EU and US in Central Asia or East Asia. The EU has no military pretensions in the region and has bowed to US pressure not to lift its arms embargo on China.

8.

Conclusion

It is not an exaggeration to speak of a world in transition. All powers have been and continue to be affected by the global economic crisis. While the US remains the ‘indispensable nation’ it inevitably will have to reduce its global commitments. Russia, China and Japan have all been hit by the crisis, albeit in different ways. Russia has suffered more than others because of its reliance on energy exports. China seems to have weathered the storm better than other major players by boosting domestic demand. Meanwhile the relatively poorer countries of Central Asia have become poorer and are slipping back into authoritarian patterns. 2009-2010 were also difficult years for the EU with confusion over the fate of the Lisbon Treaty and then a major debt crisis which threatened the stability of the euro. Looking to the future, the EU is unlikely to devote much attention to Central Asia, apart from in the energy field. Russia will also likely give the region reduced attention but it has many more cards to play than the EU. If Russia continues to support governments in difficulty – like Kyrgyzstan – then it will certainly increase its influence in Central Asia while the EU is forced to look on. But both the EU and Russia will have to take into account a substantial Turkish presence and a growing Iranian presence in the region. Turkey has a strong business presence and the densest aviation network. Iran has strong religious ties. 65

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Afghanistan could be a wild card. No one can predict how long the US/ NATO forces will remain there. Public opinion is not supportive of the war and Western forces might be forced to pull out in the not too distant future. Depending on the balance of political and military forces in Afghanistan this could have an impact on Central Asia. Russia already suffers from a huge narcotics problem, mainly from sources in Afghanistan. Moscow would not wish the Taliban to take power in Afghanistan for fear of it influencing radical Islamists within Russia’s borders. In terms of cooperation, the EU and Russia could work together on a few issues. These might include climate change and the security aspects of such. Water management in Central Asia could be another area of cooperation. There could also be scope for fleshing out the rather vague Medvedev proposals on European security and linking them to the future of the OSCE. The EU and Russia are more likely to be competitors for influence in Central Asia than in East Asia/South Asia. The EU will always have to play the game with one hand tied behind its back because of its promotion of democracy and human rights. Russia also has more of a stranglehold on the vital energy resources of the region. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are dependent on pipelines via Russia to Western markets. Russia is already buying significant amounts of gas from Turkmenistan to fulfil current contracts. Most analysts do not think that the EU is really in the game and that the Russian-backed South Stream is likely to come out on top against the EU-backed Nabucco scheme. As regards the prospects for EU and Russian cooperation in East and South Asia, they would appear to be minimal. The EU and Russia do partner with Japan at the G8 and with China and India at the G20 where global issues are discussed. On economic and trade issues, the EU and Russia are competitors, although the EU is a far more important trading partner than Russia for all Asian counties. On major strategic issues there are no major clashes. At the six party talks on North Korea, Russia has a seat at the table; the EU does not. But both oppose North Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon. Both support a One China policy. The EU and Russia would find a dialogue on China (and India and Japan) very interesting but for political sensitivities it is unlikely to happen. In the final analysis much will depend on internal developments within Russia as well as the willingness of the EU to maintain a steady commitment to Central and East Asia. How strong and united is the Medvedev-Putin ‘dream team’? What will be the impact of the current crisis on Russia’s ability to project influence abroad when it is beset by problems 66

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at home? What are the limits of the energy weapon? Is the EU likely to be able to use its unique mix of instruments to gain some permanent influence in Central Asia? Will the EU be able to develop a more coherent approach to East Asia? Answers to these questions will reveal who will gain the upper hand in the 21st century version of the Great Game.

References Boonstra, Jos. 2008. Russia and Central Asia: From Disinterest to Eager Leadership, EU-Russia Centre Review VIII. http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/review_viii_ final_13_10.pdf (Accessed September 22, 2010). Cameron, Fraser. 2007. An Introduction to European Foreign Policy. London, Routledge. Centre for European Reform. 2009. CER seminar 'The economic crisis in Russia, and what it means for politics and foreign policy' with Igor Yurgens. London, 20 February. Council of the European Union. 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. Providing Security in a Changing World. Brussels, 11 December. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_EU%20Security%20 Strategy.pdf (Accessed September 22, 2010). European Commission. 2007. Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the period 2007-2013. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf (Accessed September 22, 2010). European Commission. 2008. Delegation of the European Commission to Japan. EU-Japan Action Plan. http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/related_items/en/EU-Japan%20Action %20Plan.php (Accessed September 22, 2010). Gaidar, Yegor. 2009. Remarks at the EU-Russia Centre Conference, Brussels, 12 March 2009. http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/eu-russiacentre-news/gaidar-eventrelease-eurussia-centre-conference-march-9th.html (Accessed September 22, 2010).

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Laurel, Marlène. 2008. Russia’s Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nationalism. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/srp/08/ml08russiacentral.pdf (Accessed September 22, 2010). Lo, Bobo. 2008. Axis of convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the new geopolitics. London, Chatham House. Machada, Joao. 2008. Speech at the ECAN annual conference. Brussels, December 2008. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2001. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Moscow, 16 July. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm (Accessed September 22, 2010). Pant, Harsh. 2008. India and the EU: A directionless courtship. Rediff, 7 October. http://in.rediff.com/cms/print.jsp?docpath=//news/2008/oct/07guest1.htm (Accessed September 22, 2010). Reuters. 2009. Russia to rearm military as NATO expands: Medvedev. Moscow, 17 March. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52G2VX20090317 (Accessed September 22, 2010). Sushko, Oleksandr. 2008. The end of ‘International order-1991’: Impact of 2008 Russia-Georgia war on Ukraine. Heinrich Böll Stiftung Warsaw, November. http://www.boell.pl/downloads/Georgia_war_from_UA_perspective_by_ O.Sushko.pdf (Accessed September 22, 2010).

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5. Pakistan on the Brink: How the EU Can Bolster Reform and Fight Extremism1 Shada Islam

1.

Introduction

Pakistan stands at a critical crossroads. The country faces a fierce insurgency, spreading from the northern tribal areas to other parts of Pakistan. Terrorism, suicide bombings and sectarian violence cast a dark shadow over a political landscape marked by rivalry and squabbles between leading politicians. Anti-government protests dominated the domestic landscape in 2007 and 2009 amid fears the chaos would spark another army coup. Meanwhile, unsuccessful peace deals struck by a weak civilian government with increasingly emboldened and confident Taliban militants, followed by army counter-offensives of varying success, have brought the country to the brink of chaos. The picture is not universally bleak, however. A vibrant and dynamic civil society, including lawyers’ groups, human rights and women’s rights activists as well as an independent media, is stepping up the struggle for a secular and democratic Pakistan. A survey by the International Republican Institute published on May 12, 20092 but conducted in March found ‘rising concern over terrorism in general’, with the number of people feeling threatened by religious extremism – and calling for a military response – to be at a historic high. When asked if they felt that religious extremism was a serious problem in Pakistan, 74 percent replied yes, the highest percentage since September 2007. The highest percentage yet, 69 percent, agreed that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan was a serious problem, while 45 percent said that they supported the Pakistani Army fighting the extremists in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, another all-time high.

1. 2.

Research on this chapter was completed in October 2009. Stack 2009.

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In mid-May 2009 as the Pakistani government finally launched an all-out assault against Taliban holdouts in Swat and Buner, public opinion3 appeared firmly behind the army action. There was growing concern, however, at the civilian death toll and the displacement of thousands of people. As Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani insisted, the army offensive would result in the defeat the Taliban but Pakistan would lose the public relations war if it failed to help the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the fighting. Pakistan needs help as it struggles to confront the enormous, uphill struggle to restore international confidence in a country often described as the ‘world’s most dangerous place’.4 Consolidating democracy while fighting an increasingly violent insurgency will be long and painful. It will require sustained and determined domestic action both by the civilian government and the army but also strong political, economic and military backing and support from allies and friends, including the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan and Arab states. A start has been made. Breaking with a past quasi-exclusive focus on Afghanistan, a new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan unveiled on March 27, 20095 puts efforts to stabilise Pakistan centre stage. The US blueprint provides for a three-fold increase in aid to bolster the country’s flagging economy, help to develop tribal border regions plagued by violence as well as counter-insurgency training for the army. It also calls on other international players, including the European Union to step up engagement with Pakistan. Presenting the new approach, US policymakers have been blunt about the danger facing Pakistan – and posed by Pakistan. The country is confronted by an ‘existential threat’ from Islamic militants,6 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 2009, adding that the nuclear-armed nation represented a ‘mortal threat’ to the United States and other countries. Equally grimly, only a day later, President Barack Obama described the Pakistani government as ‘extremely fragile’,7 and accused Islamabad of failing to recognise the gravity of the Taliban threat because of an ‘obsession with India’. The Pakistani government was unable to provide basic services to its people, including education, healthcare and a widely accepted system of law and judicial administration, said Mr Obama, 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Constable 2009. Moureau and Hirsh 2007. US Department of State 2009. Richter 2009. Nicholas 2009.

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adding: ‘And so as a consequence, it is very difficult for them to gain the support and the loyalty of their people.’ The president, however, expressed confidence that Islamabad's nuclear weapons would not fall into Taliban or terrorist hands because the Pakistani army ‘recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands.’ As this chapter will illustrate, Pakistan is slowly but surely moving up the EU foreign and security policy agenda. However, critical gaps remain. Much more needs to be done to translate the pro-Pakistan rhetoric into real action and policies. The EU needs to be more innovative and creative in forging a new strategy which looks at Pakistan not merely as a developing country, requiring traditional development aid actions, but as a country in transition which needs help and assistance to modernise and reform its economy, political institutions and to strengthen the rule of law. At the same time, Pakistan’s army and security services need counter-terrorism training to tackle the insurgency and fight radicalisation. In short, Pakistan must no longer be seen as a sideshow to the international stabilisation effort in Afghanistan. The EU and its member states must invest time and effort in crafting a multi-faceted strategy capable of responding to the multiple and complex challenges facing Pakistan.

2.

Defining EU interests

The last five years have seen increased EU attention on Pakistan. A firstever EU-Pakistan summit was held on June 17, 20098 and EU foreign ministers agreed details of future action on Pakistan at a meeting held in Luxembourg on October 27.9 Prior to this, a much-delayed EU-Pakistan cooperation agreement had finally entered into force in 2004,10 setting the scene for improved relations. Other important milestones in relations included a joint declaration issued at an EU-Pakistan ministerial troika in Berlin on February 8, 200711 which promised the development of a broad, formalised political dialogue, including regular ministerial and expert-level meetings to discuss inter-faith dialogue, counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights and good governance. An even more detailed statement by EU foreign ministers on December 8, 2008 outlined further steps to strengthen

8. 9. 10. 11.

Council of the European Union 2009a. Council of the European Union 2009b. European Commission 2008. Council of the European Union 2007.

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relations, including the possibility of an ad hoc summit in the first half of 2009.12 Despite the public statements, however, many European governments have been slow to recognise the strategic importance of Pakistan and the danger of allowing the country to descend into chaos. Critically, European leaders have been unwilling or unable to make a forceful case for investing more funds into Pakistan’s counter-terror efforts as a means of ensuring Europe’s security. Exceptionally, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned in May of the need to ‘break the chain of terror starting in the mountainous region and ending in capital cities worldwide.’13 But while the UK seems to have taken a view that there is a very real threat to Europe posed by insurgents operating in Pakistan and Pakistan – and British politicians make the case regularly to the public – there is remarkably little sensible public discussion on such matters from other European capitals.14 Most EU governments, in fact, have largely failed to recognise that a nuclear-armed Pakistan, at the cross roads of Central Asia, the Middle East and South Asia should be much higher up on their foreign and security policy agenda. It cannot be ignored and neglected. In addition to the security argument, it is also important to note that the battle for the soul of Islam, with repercussions across the Muslim world, is being played out in Pakistan through almost daily confrontation between Wahabism and Sufism, Shias and Sunnis, modernists and conservatives. Clearly the US will remain the key foreign player in the country. But it is in Europe’s vital interest to step up its engagement with Pakistan, including at a political level and through increased aid and more generous trade concessions. A fractured or incapacitated Pakistan would threaten European interests as well as those of the US. Stronger EU engagement in Pakistan will contribute not only to stabilising the country itself but also have far-reaching, positive repercussions on the future of neighbouring Afghanistan. In addition, transatlantic relations are at stake. An EU failure to respond effectively and rapidly to US concerns about Pakistan will almost certainly strike a blow to Europe’s hopes of crafting a strong new strategic partnership with Washington. Given Europe’s ambition of expanding its global outreach, a stronger EU effort to stabilise Pakistan will do much to determine Europe's credibility as a global security actor and its ability to 12. Council of the European Union 2008a. 13. BBC News 2009. 14. Pantucci 2009.

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leverage non-military ‘soft power’ tools of aid, trade and diplomacy to stabilise troubled nations.

3.

Forging a policy

The EU has so far had a distinctly different approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A large majority of EU states have sent troops to Afghanistan and are pumping in millions of euros to bolster that country's fragile economy – although this has not translated into political influence. By contrast, Europe's relations with Pakistan remain low-key and technical, with an emphasis on traditional development aid rather than on meeting the country's insurgency and governance challenges. This is an out-dated and mistaken approach. Instead, Europe must act urgently to forge a pro-active new strategy which responds to both the development and security challenges facing Pakistan. Europe has key assets that it can leverage in Pakistan. For one, European countries are regarded by many in Pakistan with less hostility than America whose reputation in the country has been tarnished by public outrage at U.S. drone attacks on insurgents in the tribal areas and the Bush Administration's support for former President Perwez Musharraf. Second, the EU has built up credit among Pakistan's political elite – including lawyers, human rights activists and pro-democracy groups – by focusing on the need to hold free and fair elections, insisting on the independence of the judiciary and concentrating on the building of stronger civilian institutions.15 The EU can therefore play a key role in helping – as well as prodding and pushing – Pakistan in the right direction. European aid to Pakistan has so far focused on health, education and rural development. These sectors will continue to demand attention. However, the EU must also move beyond traditional aid programmes to a broader platform of assistance to ensure political, economic and social renewal. This will require setting aside more funds for Pakistan despite other demands on the EU’s external budget. While clearly still a developing country in need of help to fight poverty, Pakistan should also be viewed as a country in transition. The EU should seriously consider the application in Pakistan of its know-how in reforming the economic, political and social infrastructure of former communist nations of Eastern Europe as well as similar efforts being under taken in the Balkans and in North Africa. Such expertise, as well as 15. Islam 2008.

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European experience in helping to reform and modernize dynastic political parties, fight corruption and promote good governance, could prove invaluable to Pakistan’s reformers. The EU has a role to play in helping Pakistan’s increasingly dynamic civil society groups. The focus should be on ensuring media independence and providing support for groups that advocate human rights, including the protection of women, children and support for marginalised communities. EU encouragement for promoting Pakistan's long-standing Sufi traditions would help counter the spread of the cruel Taliban interpretation of Islam. The Pakistani government needs advice on crafting a new counterterrorism strategy which strives to combat extremism through development, not just military deployment. Building democracy in Pakistan will require urgent and sustained EU action, with the priority on helping Pakistan tackle its twin challenges of building a functioning democracy and defeating religious extremism. Both require time, effort and continuity. Despite Pakistan's chaotic politics, the European Commission and individual governments must keep channels of communication open with its democratically-elected leaders, however weak they may be. Democracy in Pakistan is above all conditional on the army's retreat from political life. No encouragement should be given to suggestions that the army meddle in politics as another military coup would not only undermine civilian institutions but also undercut efforts to curb the insurgency and fight terrorism. Pakistan's friends must shift from backing the country's political personalities to helping build strong institutions. There is much room for improvement in the EU’s trade and aid ties with Pakistan. EU aid to Pakistan is a fraction of the $ 10 billion dollars in US assistance that Pakistan has received since 2001. Europe’s trade relations with Pakistan are uneasy. The EU is Pakistan's largest trading partner, with EU imports mainly of textiles and clothing currently valued at about € 3.5 billion a year. But a spate of EU anti-dumping investigations, and the removal of Pakistan from the EU's special duty-free scheme for developing countries, coupled with Brussels' reluctance to start negotiations on a free trade agreement with Islamabad, have strained the trading relationship. This needs to change, with the EU forging a new trade strategy to help boost Pakistan’s exports to Europe. Bringing Pakistan back from the brink is not going to be easy or quick. Political turmoil, civil war and chronic institutional crises have plagued the country for most of its turbulent 61-year old history. Pakistan went through a traumatic break-up in 1971 when, after a disastrous conflict, its 74

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former eastern wing seceded as Bangladesh. Long bouts of military rule have been interrupted by short-lived civilian governments. Pakistan was catapulted to the front line of the Cold War in 1979 when Pakistani-trained and US-funded ‘mujahideen’ or freedom fighters drove out the Soviet army from Afghanistan. The country’s regional and global significance increased even further after September 11, 2001, when President Musharraf agreed to join the US-led ‘war on terror’, reversing Islamabad’s earlier policy of tolerance for the Taliban. A lethal mix of political violence and religious extremism resulted in the tragic assassination in December 2007 of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Decades of military rule have resulted in weak civil institutions, a fragile judicial sector and a largely ineffective national parliament. The country is plagued by graft and nepotism. Pakistan’s politicians have a reputation for being corrupt and inefficient and political institutions have further weakened since President Musharraf’s coup in 1999. The ruling Pakistan People’s Party is being run by Benazir Bhutto’s unpopular widower Asif Ali Zardari and her 20-year old son Bilawal, a student in Britain. For all its popular appeal and socialist, secular message, the PPP retains its feudal roots. The Muslim League, led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, is equally in need of change and modernisation. Former President Musharraf’s dismissal of Pakistan’s Supreme Court chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in March 2007 and the subsequent imposition of emergency rule and suspension of civil rights led to months of street protests and demonstrations by the country’s lawyers and civil rights activists. President Musharraf finally stood down as president in November 2007,16 ending almost nine years of military rule. Democracy in Pakistan remains fragile, however, conditional on the army’s retreat from political life. General Ashfaq Kayani, who took over as army chief from Musharraf, took the right steps by ordering soldiers to stay out of politics and to give up jobs in the bureaucracy. However, according to Pakistani analysts,17 the formidable military machine controls business assets of roughly $ 20 billion, a third of all heavy manufacturing in the country and up to 7 per cent of Pakistan's private assets. Legislative elections held on February 18, 2008, which brought a civilian government to power, led to hopes of a radical change in the country’s political landscape. However, the PPP-dominated civilian government soon engaged in endless squabbles with the opposition, the economy was 16. BBC News 2008. 17. Siddiqa 2007.

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hit by rising food and fuel prices and mass protests erupted in early 2009 across the country over President Zardari’s failure to reinstate Chief Justice Choudhry and other judges who had been summarily sacked by Musharraf in early 2007. The chief justice was reinstated in March 2009 after months of civil strife and a debilitating power struggle between Mr. Zardari and PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif. As an editorial in the Financial Times pointed out,18 ‘the issue at stake – the principle of an independent judiciary – is very important. But the way it is being tackled by Pakistan’s political elite – looking for factional advantage while jihadis and insurgents overrun swaths of the country – is breathtakingly irresponsible.’ Pakistan is the biggest victim of the militant tide.19 In addition to the growing number of people displaced by fighting in the tribal areas, Pakistan has suffered over 60 suicide-bombings in each of the past two years, on hotels, restaurants and mosques in Peshawar, Lahore and Islamabad, and on army facilities. Pakistan’s failure to tackle the insurgency with serious determination is not the fault of the civilian government alone. The country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has long faced accusations that it has nurtured, equipped and financed the Taliban to fight proxy wars and engage in power struggles in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir.20 The army, meanwhile, has been accused of not paying due attention to counter-insurgency actions because it considers India, against whom it has fought three full-scale wars, to be its main enemy.21

4.

Changing attitudes – trade and development

As noted above, the EU has been slow to acknowledge and provide a strategic response to Pakistan’s problems. This appears to be changing, however. A first-ever EU-Pakistan summit was held in Brussels on June 17 2009. The summit signalled strong EU support for consolidating democracy and fighting extremism in Pakistan. The meeting brought together Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari with President Vaclav Klaus of the Czech Republic, representing the then EU presidency, as well as Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European

18. 19. 20. 21.

Financial Times 2009. The Economist 2009. Kaplan and Jayshree 2007. The Economist 2009.

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Commission and Javier Solana, High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. EU leaders promised to look at a free trade agreement with Pakistan as an ‘option in the long term’ and said the focus would also be on short term measures to help Islamabad diversify exports and attract investments. Both sides agreed to start a ‘dialogue’ to improve Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities, notably in the field of law enforcement and criminal justice. They agreed that it was particularly important to support Pakistan’s police forces. A six-page joint statement issued at the end of the meeting said that the EU and Pakistan recognised that ‘terrorism, extremism and militancy represent serious threats to international peace and security and should be eliminated and terrorist organisations prevented from recruiting.’ EU leaders acknowledged ‘the resolve and the sacrifices which the Pakistani people and security forces are making in confronting these issues’, and expressed confidence that a ‘successful outcome of the security and law enforcement operations would help assure prosperity to the people of Pakistan and greatly strengthen the democratically elected government in achieving its political and development objectives.’22 The statement underlined the importance of an integrated long term strategy, which includes social economic development, civilian law enforcement structures and the rule of law, ‘in order to secure the gains of the present security measures on a permanent basis.’ Help for Pakistan's police forces was underlined, with both sides agreeing to start a regular Pakistan-EU Counter-Terrorism dialogue. In addition the parties also acknowledged the great significance of countering extremism, particularly through education, civil society and mass media communication. Recognising the challenge posed by the millions of people displaced by the current Pakistani military offensive against the Taliban, EU governments agreed on the need for more humanitarian and development assistance for Pakistan. The two sides discussed the need for a comprehensive rehabilitation and reconstruction plan, with EU leaders assuring Pakistan that they stand ready to provide further assistance, in their relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. Talks included the need for greater regional cooperation to combat terrorism, the importance of encouraging intra-regional trade and the 22. Council of the European Union 2009a.

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normalisation of ties with India. stronger action to integrate women and minorities in the country's social, economic and political structures. Discussions on trade did not result in any major breakthroughs although the EU did promise to jointly work with Pakistan ‘towards further liberalisation of trade in goods and services with the aim to mutually enhance market access and convergence on regulatory matters.’ According to the statement, they also agreed to ‘step up a dedicated dialogue alongside existing working level contacts in order to enhance the bilateral trade relationship including through a possible free trade agreement.’ ‘In the short-term, the EU and Pakistan will continue to review trade obstacles, and the EU will continue to assist Pakistan to meet the EU’s sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements for fishery and other products’, the statement said, adding: ‘The EU will explore how aspects of the EU's preferential tariff regime (GSP Plus) might be looked at in the context of the preparation of the next GSP Regulation, thereby allowing new beneficiaries, including possibly Pakistan, to take advantage of this scheme.’ A second summit of the two sides’ leaders is expected to be held under the EU’s Spanish presidency in the first half of 2010. Just before the meeting, at an international Donor Conference on Pakistan held in Tokyo in April 2009, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner insisted that the European Commission was committed to building a strong relationship with Pakistan by engaging on all fronts. ‘I am fully aware that Pakistan is facing immense challenges in combating terrorism and countering the negative effects by the current global economic and financial crisis’,23 said Ferrero-Waldner. The EU Commissioner promised that the Commission and the European Investment Bank combined expected to be able to contribute a total of around € 485 million (US $ 640 million) over the period 2009-2013, most of this as grants. This contrasts with € 500 million in EU aid for Pakistan since 1976. ‘Rural development and education will remain the focus of our assistance’, Ferrero-Waldner said. The EU aid package includes aid for farmers coming from the Global Food facility as well as an EIB loan for activities in the renewable energy sector. Ferrero-Waldner also underlined the need for regional cooperation, saying: ‘We stand no chance of eradicating international terrorism and extremism unless all countries in the region

23. Delegation of the European Union to Australia and New Zealand 2009.

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work hand in hand. Pakistan and its neighbours should launch a serious initiative on deepening regional cooperation, including on trade and transit.’ The overall aims of the European Commission’s current support to Pakistan are set out in the EU-Pakistan Country Strategy Paper,24 and include the combat against poverty and helping the country to achieve sustainable growth. The strategy sets out two main priority areas: 앫 Rural development and natural resources management in North West Frontier Province and Balochistan, with particular emphasis on the deteriorating state of the environment and declining water resources. The objective is to improve livelihoods, income-generation and employment in rural communities, including those affected by refugees. 앫 Education and human resources development, with the focus on increasing access to basic education and helping improve the quality of education and human-resource development in support of the country's goal of becoming a knowledge-based growth economy. The EU is clearly right to focus on these two areas. The northern tribal belt of Pakistan – the seat of the insurgency – and Balochistan are one of the most under-developed regions of Pakistan. In addition, the long-standing conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan, followed by the arrival of so-called ‘Pakistan Taliban’ has had a deep impact on economic and social development in this area. However, a more targeted approach that is centred on winning hearts and minds is now needed to bring development to the arid and mountainous northern regions. A focus on education is also crucial. Despite government promises, the country’s education system remains in shambles. Pakistan spends only 2.3 per cent of GDP on education, the lowest level of any country in South Asia, compared to military spending which accounts for 3.5 per cent of GDP. Adult literacy is only 50 per cent compared to 60 per cent in India and 92 per cent in Sri Lanka.25 While state schooling is poorly funded, madrassas have flourished – some incubating the Taliban militants now destabilising both Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. However, Pakistan must also invest in developing better job training programmes for the region's young men who often migrate to the Gulf states in search of employment. EU aid has also been used to boost financial sector reform and to promote small and medium-sized

24. European Commission 2007. 25. United Nations Development Programme 2009.

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businesses. In addition, emergency assistance worth € 95 million, including humanitarian aid and reconstruction support, was agreed in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake in the country’s northern regions. The EU and Pakistan have strong trade ties. The EU is Pakistan's most important trading partner.26 The EU represented around 20 % of Pakistan's total trade in 2007. EU-Pakistan trade has increased by almost 8 % annually between 2003 and 2007. EU goods exports to Pakistan in 2007 totalled € 3.8 billion, while EU goods imports from Pakistan 2007 were valued at € 3.4 billion. Textiles and clothing as well as leather products account for 70 percent of Pakistani exports while Pakistan’s imports from the EU mainly comprise mechanical and electrical machinery as well as chemical and pharmaceutical products. In 2007, the EU imported textiles and clothing articles from Pakistan worth € 2.6 billion, of which around 80 % entered the EU at a preferential tariff rate. Around a quarter of these imports were bed linen, table linen and toilet and kitchen linen. Since relying so heavily on one product category carries risks, trade diversification programmes have therefore been launched to reduce Pakistan's reliance on the textiles and clothing sector. A large percentage of Pakistan’s exports enter the EU at reduced tariffs under the Generalised System of Preferences. Almost 20 % of Pakistan's exports enter the EU at zero. However, Islamabad is angry at its removal from the EU’s special tariff concession scheme known as ‘GSP Plus’ under which countries have complete duty-free access to the EU market. The EU revamped the system after India won a World Trade Organization dispute panel against Pakistan’s inclusion in 2005. Since then, the European Commission has excluded Pakistan from GSP Plus status arguing that its economy is too developed to qualify for a programme meant to help the least developed nations and because Islamabad has also not ratified all the necessary labour treaties. Pakistan argues, however, that it faces higher tariffs on its exports of textiles and other key products than other South Asian countries which benefit from lower duty schemes. Unless the EU ensures a ‘level playing field’ for all South Asian exporters, Pakistani officials warn that European investors and importers will shift business from Pakistan to other countries, including Bangladesh, which has duty-free access to the EU market, and India, which is negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU.

26. European Commission 2010.

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A study on the ‘impact of trade policies on Pakistan’s preferential access to the European Union’ published by the Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration of Sussex (CARIS)27 agreed that EU preferences in the textile sector for Turkey, India and Bangladesh ‘could have some negative impact on Pakistan’s top 15 exports to the EU’ which include textiles and clothing. ‘Clearly … if India were to sign an FTA with the EU, there would then be a potentially important change in preferences that would favour India’, the study said. The EU and Pakistan agreed in May 2007 to set up a Sub-Group on Trade under the auspices of the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission to further promote the development of two-way trade. The EU argues that regulatory barriers continue to hold Pakistan back from developing its full trade potential: High costs of doing business, complex regulation and infrastructure bottlenecks all have a detrimental effect on trade and growth. Pakistan's trade regime and regulatory environment still remain comparatively restrictive and in 2008 the World Bank has ranked Pakistan 76 (out of 178 economies) in terms of the ease of doing business.28 As pointed out above, relations between the EU and Pakistan could certainly do with a boost. Contacts between the two sides have blown hot and cold over the years, depending on whether Pakistan is under military or civilian rule. The relationship now needs to be put on a more solid and sustained footing. Just such a reinforcement of ties was promised by EU foreign ministers meeting on December 8, 2008.29 The statement said that the EU was ready to strengthen bilateral relations with Pakistan and to look for possible ways of increasing its financial assistance to the country. Significantly, EU ministers also underlined the importance of improving relations between Pakistan and its neighbours, notably India and Afghanistan, and said Europe would fully endorse bilateral and international initiatives aimed at strengthening regional cooperation. Ministers urged Pakistan to step up its efforts to counter the menace of terrorism and extremism, also recognising ‘the sacrifices made by the Pakistani people in the struggle against terrorism and extremism’ and added that given the increase of terrorist attacks throughout the region, it was necessary to enhance regional cooperation against terrorism.

27. Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS). 2008. 28. European Commission 2010. 29. Council of the European Union 2008a.

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5.

Governance

Setting out a list of priority actions, EU foreign ministers30 agreed in April 2008 that Europe should focus on providing support for democratisation, good governance and the rule of law in Pakistan. Recommendations of the Election Observation Mission31 for changes in the electoral system provided a basis for further political reform, they said, adding: ‘The European Union stands ready to support the Government of Pakistan in the implementation of these recommendations to assist reform to strengthen Pakistan’s democratic institutions.’32 Pointing to future areas of cooperation, ministers said they were ready to jointly explore with Pakistan ‘how to intensify dialogue in the areas of trade and development, intercultural exchange, non-proliferation, human rights, migration, counter-terrorism and radicalisation and education.’ Significantly, the statement took note of Pakistan’s request to start negotiations on an EUPakistan Free Trade Agreement and measures to promote trade liberalisation in South Asia, particularly with India and Afghanistan. As pointed above, the EU has been persistent in demanding that Pakistan hold free, fair and peaceful elections and continue the fight against terrorism. In a meeting with former Pakistani President Musharraf in January 21, 2008, then-EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, made the point that Pakistan must have a ‘government according to the will of the people’ so that the country could ‘move forward on the path of reforms and on the path of the rule of law’.33 The future development of EU-Pakistan relations depended on the outcome of the elections, Solana added. The Pakistani elections on February 18, 2008 were indeed deemed to be ‘competitive’ and ‘an important step in the democratic development of Pakistan, despite significant problems with the election framework and environment’, according to a statement by EU foreign ministers on March 10, 2008.34 ‘The EU will support Pakistan in strengthening democratic institutions, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as combating extremism’, the statement added. Solana repeated his promise to forge a stronger and more comprehensive relationship with

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Council of the European Union 2008b. EU Election Observation Mission 2008. Council of the European Union 2008b. Council of the European Union 2008c. Council of the European Union 2008d.

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Pakistan during a visit to Islamabad on April 22, 200835 where he also stressed the need for Pakistan to continue reforms and strengthen the rule of law. The EU wanted to step up its engagement with Pakistan in order to promote regional and domestic stability, encourage democracy and help consolidate its position as a moderate Muslim state, Solana said.

6.

Conclusion and recommendations

Words of EU support must now be followed up by an urgent revamp of policy.The US will continue to loom large on the Pakistani political landscape but given the high stakes, EU policymakers should waste no time in beginning the gruelling task of exploring new ways of consolidating democracy and ensuring stability in the country. This will require setting aside more funds for Pakistan, not an easy move given other demands on the EU’s external budget. The assistance package must be better targeted and financial aid backed up by technical assistance. This is especially necessary because foreign aid programmes to Pakistan continue to be riddled by inefficiency and corruption. As emphasised earlier, in the absence of an EU role in providing military support, the EU can only exert limited influence on setting the agenda for international engagement with Pakistan. However, Europe can be an important niche player. More generally, short-term action is needed on several fronts, and the EU should act urgently in the following sectors: 앫 Raise Pakistan to the top of the EU and global agenda, including in talks with key partners such as the US, Canada, Japan and Arab states. 앫 Encourage cooperation and discussion between Pakistan and its neighbours. 앫 Provide support – financial assistance and verbal backing – to the country’s civilian government. It is true that political parties in the country have a history of internecine quarrels. As such, the EU and European governments must encourage inter-party reconciliation and cooperation. The credibility of the civilian government must be reinforced by providing targeted assistance to avoid a collapse of state services, including the provision of security, electricity and clean water. 앫 There must be no encouragement for any idea that a military government would be a better alternative to the civilian government. As such, no encouragement should be given to suggestions that the army meddle in politics. Another military coup would not only undermine 35. Islam 2008.

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앫

앫

앫 앫

앫

36. 37. 38. 39.

civilian institutions but also undercut efforts to curb the insurgency and fight terrorism. Provide help in developing an effectual counter-terrorism strategy which emphasises police and legal action rather than exclusively military efforts. The EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove has said that the EU should and can help Pakistan shift from a military approach in dealing with terrorism to a police and law enforcement one.36 Better governance and a functional judiciary are also very important. ‘Most of the terrorists arrested – if not all of them – have been released because the police were unable to collect the right evidence’, de Kerchove said, adding that the EU could help Pakistan to train police forces on how to collect evidence and better co-ordinate with other state actors. Step up emergency lending: the economy is in dire straits and needs to be bolstered through injections of quick-moving assistance such as the recent $ 5.5 billion aid package agreed by the donors conference in Tokyo37 and assistance announced by the US and the EU.38 The funds should come with some key conditions attached but these should not be too rigid. The focus should be on making sure that the government continues the fight against terrorism, that Pakistan remains a democracy and that there is accountability for the use of funds. More stringent conditions would make utilisation of the funds extremely difficult. Increase economic aid coordination with other international and bilateral donors as well with other EU member states to make sure that there is no duplication of projects. Emergency aid must continue for people displaced the fighting between the Pakistan army and the Taliban. The EU has made a good start by announcing a 5.5 million humanitarian aid package, with a promise of more funds to come.39 Such an effort should continue to avoid further destabilisation in what are Pakistan’s most deprived regions. Improve access to the EU market for Pakistani exports through the establishment of a new tariff reduction scheme to replace the end of a previous GSP plus regime. Increased access to trade financing is also necessary to ensure a continuation of exports despite the financial crisis.

Pop, Valentina 2009. Government of Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press release 2009. The Daily Times 2009. Islam 2009.

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The EU must also identify medium and long-term policy actions. 앫 Aid to Pakistan should be increased on a multi-annual basis to allow for a real impact on Pakistan’s political and economic development agenda and facilitate reform and modernisation. The aid should come with conditions – but these should not be too rigid. 앫 The EU should move away from traditional development aid which is better done by World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The focus should instead be on: 앫 Reform – police, judicial independence, political party modernization. There should be an increase police salaries and action to upgrade the protection of police stations and efforts to improve coordination between the armed forces and the police. 앫 Counter-terrorism and deradicalisation. The visit to Pakistan by Gilles de Kerchove should be followed up by the deployment of EU experts in the Pakistani Interior Ministry and Justice department to provide advice on crafting a new counter-terrorism strategy which strives to combat extremism through development, not just military deployment. 앫 Trade: The EU must listen carefully to Pakistan’s requirements and, despite current misgivings, explore the pros and cons of opening negotiations on a FTA with Pakistan. 앫 Boosting Pakistan’s private sector: According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Pakistan’s private sector is by far the biggest contributor to GDP and is the biggest employer in the country. A December 2008 ADB assessment of the private sector40 notes that 77 percent of the commercial banking sector, all of the textile and telecommunications sectors and significant parts of the cement, sugar, automobile and fertiliser sectors are privately owned. The private sector also contributes to power generation and electricity distribution. Total foreign investment rose from $ 559 million in 2003 to over $ 8 billion in 2007, decreasing to just over € 5 billion in 2008 following political turmoil in the country.41 The EU should seek to help remove bottlenecks which prevent the emergence of a more effective and vibrant private sector. EU aid delivery should be revised to form greater partnerships with local communities and organisations. 앫 More generally, Pakistan's friends must shift from backing the country's political personalities to helping build strong institutions and invest in Pakistan's vibrant civil society which is vibrant, dynamic and modern and eager for change as well as committed to democracy. Groups which deserve such support include lawyers' organisations, women's groups, 40. Asian Development Bank 2008. 41. Bajoria 2009.

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앫 앫

앫

앫

앫

human rights activists and the media where the focus should be on ensuring media independence, ethical journalism training. In fact, through most of 2007 and 2008, Pakistan's vibrant civil society proved its value and essential role in deepening democracy in the country.42 Over the years as large areas of Pakistan have suffered from no government services or protection of basic rights. NGOs have filled the void by vaccinating babies, feeding the population and building schools that teach math and science. Even during the dark days of military dictatorship, Pakistan's civil society has kept alight the flame of rule of law and human rights. EU encouragement for promoting Pakistan's long-standing Sufi traditions would also help counter the spread of the cruel Taliban interpretation of Islam. Provide reassurances to the Pakistan army on the long-term Western commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as moves to provide training, equipment and financial help so that the military machine can switch from fighting India to fighting an internal enemy. Urgent action should be take to reform the Security Services and put them under civilian control.43 As Frederic Grare argues, ‘Pakistan’s civilian government would be wrong to ignore the need to decisively establish its supremacy over the intelligence community. Reducing the role of the military in intelligence should be a priority not only because it will help the government consolidate itself domestically but also because the perception abroad of Pakistan’s emerging democracy and consequent foreign support will be shaped by its capacity to impose its authority on the intelligence agencies’ activities ranging from domestic terrorism to foreign policy. The EU, given its experience in overcoming national animosities can play a role in rebuilding India-Pakistan relations in the wake of the attacks in Mumbai and rivalries in Afghanistan. Efforts should also be made to encourage stronger Pakistan-Afghanistan contacts in areas such as transit. The focus should be on quiet overtures rather than megaphone diplomacy. Based on the recommendations of the EU Election Observation Mission, the EU should approach the Pakistani authorities to explore jointly ways to support strengthening of democratic institutions, the electoral framework with particular focus on institution building, legislative reform and voter participation. Progress in that sector is essential to the security and long term stability of Pakistan.

42. Murphy 2009. 43. Grare 2009.

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Clearly the EU’s approach to Pakistan remains a work in progress. Fragile state institutions, weak leadership and inadequate resources limit the ability of Islamabad to fight militancy and foster moderation. The EU and its member states need to pay more attention to Pakistan, not just because of its key role in stabilising Afghanistan but also given the strategic importance of the country. Hard work is required on both sides to overcome a current trust deficit in relations. The EU must ensure engagement with new civilian leaders and work on a new long-term strategy for a stronger, more pro-active and multi-faceted role in Pakistan.

References Asian Development Bank. 2008. Private Sector Assessment Pakistan. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Assessments/Private-Sector/PAK/PrivateSector-Assessment.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2010). Bajoria, Jayshree. 2009. Stabilizing Pakistan: Boosting its Private Sector. Washington, DC, Council on Foreign Relations, 30 April. BBC News. 2009. Brown urges firmer Pakistan links. London, 27 April. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8021146.stm (Accessed 2 September 2010). BBC News. 2008. Pakistan's Musharraf steps down. London, 18 August. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7567451.stm (Accessed 2 September 2010). Centre for the Analysis of Regional Integration at Sussex (CARIS). 2008. The impact of trade policies on Pakistan's preferential access to the European Union. Brighton, December. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141703.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2010). Constable, Pamela. 2009. Taliban-style Justice Stirs Growing Anger. The Washington Post. May 12 Council of the European Union. 2009a. Joint Statement EU-Pakistan Summit. Press release 11117/09 (Presse 182). Brussels,17 June 2009. Council of the European Union. 2009b. General Affairs and External Relations Council. Press release 14658/09 (Presse 299). Luxemburg, 27 October.

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Council of the European Union. 2008a. General Affairs and External Relations, Press release 16863/08 (Presse 360). Brussels, 8-9 December 2008. Council of the European Union. 2008b. General Affairs and External Relations, Press release 8619/08 (Presse 105). Brussels, 29 April. Council of the European Union. 2008c. EU High Representative for the CFSP met President of Pakistan. Press release S018/08. Brussels, 21 January 2008. Council of the European Union. 2008d. General Affairs and External Relations. Press release 7425/08. Brussels, 10 March. Council of the European Union. 2007. EU-Pakistan Joint Declaration. External Relations, Press release 6174/07 (Presse 21). Brussels, 8 February. The Daily Times. 2009. US House okays $1bn for Pakistan. 16 May. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2009%5C05%5C16%5Cstory_16-5-2009_pg1_3 (Accessed 2 September 2010). Delegation of the European Union to Australia and New Zealand. 2009. European Commission underpins its substantial assistance to Pakistan. 28 April. https://promo-manager.server-secure.com/em/message/email/ view.php?id=107186&u=1002559 (Accessed 2 September 2010). The Economist. 2009. Pakistan and the Taliban: A real offensive or a phoney war. 2 May: 23-26. EU Election Observation Mission. Pakistan 2008 Final Report. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/ eu_election_ass_observ/pakistan08/final_report_en.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2010). European Commission. 2007. Pakistan – European Community Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013. http://eeas.europa.eu/pakistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2010). European Commission. 2010. Trade. Bilateral Relations Pakistan. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/ countries/pakistan (Accessed 2 September 2010).

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European Commission. 2008. Cooperation agreement on partnership and development between the EU and Pakistan. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139805.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2010). Financial Times. 2009. Burning Pakistan. London, March 12. Government of Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2009. Co-Chairs' Statement Pakistan Donors Conference. Press release. 17 April. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pakistan/meet0904/statecochair.html (Accessed 2 September 2010). Grare, Frederic. 2009. Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Islam, Shada. 2008. ‘EU seeks stronger ties with new govt, says Solana.’ DAWN Newspaper 22 April. Islam, Shada. 2009. ‘Focus on June summit.’ DAWN Newspaper 16 May. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/thenewspaper/editorial/focus-on-june-summit-659 (Accessed 2 September 2010) Kaplan, Eben, and Jayshree Bajoria. 2007. The ISI and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations. Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org (Accessed 2 September 2010). Moureau, Ron, and Michael Hirsh. 2007. Where the Jihad Lives Now. Newsweek 29 October http://www.newsweek.com/id/57485 (Accessed 2 September 2010). Murphy, Damian. 2009. ‘Pakistan's Genuine Democrats in Peril.’ The Huffington Post. 5 May http://www.huffingtonpost.com/damian-murphy/pakistans-genuinedemocra_b_197024.html (Accessed 2 September 2010) Nicholas, Peter. 2009. ‘Obama injects message of hope into 100-day speech.’ Los Angeles Times 30 April. Pantucci, Raffaello. 2009. Europe's Threat from Pakistan. EU Observer 12 May. http://euobserver.com/?aid=28103 (Accessed 2 September 2010)

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Pop, Valentina. 2009. EU-Pakistan summit to focus on counter-terrorism. EU Observer 11 May. http://euobserver.com/22/28104. (Accessed 2 September 2010). Reuters. 2009. 5 Pakistan will defeat Taliban, must win hearts – PM. 14 May. http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSISL425112._CH _.2400 (Accessed 2 September 2010). Richter, Paul. 2009. Hillary Clinton warns of ‘existential threat’ in Pakistan. Los Angeles Times 29 April. Stack, Liam. 2009. Pakistanis Worried about Taliban. Christian Science Monitor. 12 May. http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0512/p99s01-duts.html (Accessed 2 September 2010). Siddiqa, Ayesha. 2007. Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London, Pluto Press. United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Pakistan. http://www.un.org.pk/undpnew/ (Accessed 2 September 2010). US Department of State. 2009. President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy. Washington, DC, 27 September.

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6. Africa and the Asia Nexus: Policy Options for the EU Andebrhan Welde Giorgis

1.

Introduction

Their immense diversity notwithstanding, Africa, Asia and Europe are inexorably linked by geography, history and culture. They share an ever shrinking global village and face similar regional and international security challenges. They are vulnerable to the consequences of climate change and, in these turbulent times, to security threats emanating from Europe’s still unresolved issues in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Asia’s various hotspots and Africa’s several troubled regions. The EU and China have strategic economic and security interests in resource rich Africa and, therefore, significant stakes in its development. Both are heavily engaged in and maintain strategic partnerships with the continent in pursuit of mutual interests. The EU is a traditional actor while China is a new player on the African scene. China’s rising new role poses a challenge to the EU’s traditional hegemony in Africa. But, Africa also offers them an opportunity to work together. Common security interests and global objectives make it imperative for both China and the EU to cooperate in a potentially win-win tripartite partnership in support of Africa’s development. In making this brief presentation on Africa and the Asia Nexus in the context of Perspectives for a European Security Strategy Towards Asia, I would like to begin by sounding a word of caution. In speaking of Africa, Asia, the European Union or their constituent states here, I wish to underscore the immense diversity of these geo-political entities. The interaction among the three continents, as well as that obtaining among their respective component states and non-state entities, involves a multiplicity of actors, driven by different motives and pursuing divergent objectives, at the global, regional, national and local levels. Africa, for instance, is a vast continent comprising fifty three disparate countries, five distinct regions and presently plagued by no less than

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twenty five violent and/or simmering conflicts. Furthermore, African states differ in the levels of their natural endowment and socio-economic development as well as their importance to and engagement with Asia and Europe. By comparison, Europe is much less varied and becoming more homogeneous while Asia is even more diverse than Africa. It would thus be important to bear in mind the considerable abstraction and attendant risk of oversimplification inherent in this commentary. As the emerging ‘global village’ becomes increasingly more compact, interdependent and interactive, it is imperative that European security strategy towards Asia be geared to meet global security challenges that originate and reach beyond Europe and Asia. Some of the major threats to global security today, such as nuclear proliferation and al-Qaida style terrorism, emanate from hotspots in Asia with potential linkages to troubled and volatile regions in Africa. Extremist religious fundamentalism continues to stir up trouble and stoke violence in parts of Africa, Asia and even Europe. Piracy has long scourged international shipping in the Straits of Malacca and other south-east Asian waterways and recently emerged as a serious menace in the vital sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden at the foothills of the Red Sea and the north-western Indian Ocean. Furthermore, Asia and Africa, in particular, face additional security challenges, namely, interstate and intrastate conflicts, fragile and/or failing states, extreme poverty, food insecurity and pandemic diseases. These threats and factors of regional insecurity lend Africa and the Asia Nexus a special significance in devising and operationalising an effective European global security strategy. In this context, does China’s rising role in Africa pose a challenge or offer an opportunity for EU-Africa cooperation? Would Europe’s regional and global security objectives be better served by the EU viewing China as a rival and rising up to the growing challenge of competition or considering it as a potential partner and seizing the opportunity to develop a new paradigm of cooperation with China in support of Africa’s agenda? As a corollary, would competition or cooperation between China and the EU be more conducive to addressing the key challenges facing Africa today?

2.

Asia in Africa

Trade relations and commercial exchanges between Africa and Asia have existed for millennia. This is particularly true with the Arabian Peninsula, India and China. These historical relations have, however, taken a new 92

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turn especially during the last decade and a half, signalling a marked increase in Asia’s interest, presence and activities in Africa. A number of Asian countries, including industrially developed Japan and emerging China, India, South Korea and Malaysia, have established burgeoning political, economic and commercial relations with several African countries. Even though less noticeable, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Malaysia have also strengthened their political ties, increased their economic, commercial and investment activities and enhanced their influence in certain parts of Africa. In 1993, Japan launched the First Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD I) and convened TICAD IV in May 2008. The principal pillars of the TICAD process are ‘African ownership’ of its development agenda and the ‘building of a genuine partnership with the international community in pursuit of that agenda’. It aims to ‘build bridges between Asia and Africa’, provide a forum for sharing ‘relevant aspects of the Asian development experience’ and promote ‘triangular cooperation involving Japan and other African countries’.1 Today, the TICAD process has evolved into a major international forum of policy dialogue, resource mobilization and Japanese assistance for African development. China and India have also shown a special interest in Africa. Following in the footsteps of Japan and the EU, the two countries have established similar forums of cooperation with Africa and organized their respective summits or mini-summits with African heads of state and government. Both countries have embarked on new programmes of strategic partnership to boost their political, economic, trade and security ties with the continent. The establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000 launched a formal framework for mutual consultation, dialogue and joint planning, heralding a significant rise in Sino-Africa relations in a context of South-South cooperation. Its inaugural ministerial conference adopted a declaration of ‘common understanding on major international and political issues’ and a ‘new partnership’ based on ‘equality and mutual benefit’ as well as a programme for long-term Sino-African cooperation in various areas of ‘economic and social development’.2 This was followed by the Addis Ababa Action Plan issued by its second ministerial conference held in December 2003.3 FOCAC’s third ministerial conference coincided with its Beijing Summit in November 2006. With its 1. 2. 3.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2009. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2000, 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2003, 1.

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main focus on aid, investment and trade, the November 2006 FOCAC Summit ushered in a quantum surge in the magnitude and diversity of Chinese development cooperation with Africa. The fourth ministerial conference, FOCAC IV, convened in November 2009 at the Egyptian Red Sea resort, adopted the Sharm el-Sheikh Declaration and Action Plan (2010-2012). The Declaration specifies ‘the guiding principles for China-Africa co-operation and reflects the views of China and Africa on key global and regional issues’ and provides a ‘political framework for the broadening and strengthening of Sino-African relations over the next three years’ while the Action Plan ‘outlines the guidelines, objectives and plans for Sino-African co-operation.’4 The Action Plan identifies key priority areas to advance Sino-African cooperation. These include increasing high-level exchanges, promoting regional peace, enhancing links with African sub-regional organisations, reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and co-ordinating on climate change, global trade and financial issues, In turn, the India-Africa Forum Summit, convened in April 2008, aimed to create, very much like the EU-Africa Summits of April 2000, December 2007 and November 2010, a strategic economic partnership between Africa and India and forge common positions on a range of issues of bilateral, regional and international interest to both sides. These issues include UN reforms, climate change, WTO negotiations and the fight against terrorism. The Summit also drew up a framework for closer Indo-African cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, education, health, science and technology, agriculture and food security designed to promote true partnership for the achievement of the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs).5 The Summit underscored India’s significant resource, security and commercial interests and correspondingly growing activities in Africa. Partly driven by rivalry with China, India’s economic, commercial and defence relations with Africa have been steadily increasing. In just four years, for instance, the volume of bilateral trade between India and Africa grew by 285 % to a record US $ 25 billion, boosting Africa’s share in India’s overall world trade from 5.8 per cent in 2002-2003 to 8 per cent in 2006-2007.6

4. 5. 6.

Shelton, Garth, FOCAC IV – New Opportunities for Africa, 22 December 2009. http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/t647035.htm India-Africa Forum Summit 2008. Xinhua 2008, 1.

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India’s engagement in Africa extends beyond commerce to the areas of peace and security. India has long been a major troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations in the continent.7 It maintains cooperative ties with several island and littoral African states along the western rim of the Indian Ocean. It has berthing rights in Oman, a high-tech naval monitoring station in Madagascar, a project for a similar listening post in Mauritius8 and sizeable naval assets in the Gulf of Aden9 to protect its political, economic and military interests in Africa. Furthermore, India has deployed naval forces and initiated talks with the countries of the Indian Ocean Region for a ‘collaborative arrangement’10 to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The second India-Africa Forum Summit is scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa in May 2011. The Summit is expected to review the evolution of India-Africa cooperation over the past three years and come up with renewed Indian commitment to advance Africa’s development agenda. New undertakings in Indo-Africa relations are likely to focus on the expansion of bilateral trade, coordination on UN reform, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and enhancement of the Pan-African e-network project designed to provide tele-medicine and tele-education to the continent. It is quite evident then that the multiple and often competing pillars and levers making up the Africa-Asia nexus pose a critical challenge to European global security strategy. As a premise, the EU would need to make the strategic choice of whether to seek cooperation or to join in competition with Asia’s rising players in Africa. The path chosen by the EU is bound to have profound implications not only for its relations with these powers but also for European security policy and Africa’s development. The adoption of a cooperative approach would carry the potential to build convergence of action on regional and global issues of mutual concern and initiate dialogue to narrow down areas of divergence in the pursuit of common regional objectives and global security interests.

3.

China and Africa

Of all the Asian players in Africa, Chinese engagement seems to have provoked the most apprehensive and critical reaction, especially from the 7. 8. 9. 10.

Beri 2008. Indian Express 2007. Boloji.com. 2008. ThaIndian News 2008.

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Global North. This is perhaps due to a sense of a new threat invoked by China’s rapid rise as a world power, the speed and scale of its thrust into the African scene, the force of example of its development model, and the special attraction of the Beijing consensus to African states as an alternative to the Washington consensus. But, there is also genuine concern that China’s rising influence and ongoing policy of non-interference in African affairs and unconditional cooperation with repressive regimes could undermine the drive to promote democracy, good governance and human rights in Africa. Viewed from the conventional prism of rivalry, China’s dramatic global ascendance and its increasing interest in and successful economic penetration of Africa represent a serious challenge to the West’s hegemony in Europe’s traditional sphere of exclusive preserve. Given a cooperative stance, however, this offers EU security strategy an opportunity to engage and tap China’s rising role in the world and Africa, in particular, to advance Africa’s development agenda and better promote regional and global security. On account of these factors, my short commentary will focus on the Chinese dimension of the Africa-Asia nexus in EU security policy. Since the creation of FOCAC at the turn of the New Millennium, China’s relationship with Africa has gained a new impetus and rapidly changed from its earlier mainly defence and security orientation to an expansive economic focus. Over the last decade, China has successfully operated to strengthen its bilateral relations, multiply the scale of its economic cooperation and enhance its overall role in Africa. The last five years, in particular, have seen a huge surge in the levels of Chinese aid, investment and trade in the continent. Indeed, the statistics of China’s involvement in Africa tell quite an impressive story. First began in 1956, China’s economic assistance to Africa had topped US $ 5.7 billion by May 2006.11 As of mid-2006, China had extended over US $ 12.5 billion in infrastructure loans to Sub-Saharan Africa.12 The Middle Kingdom delivered on its pledge, made during the November 2006 China-Africa Summit, to double its assistance to Africa by 2009. This included availing US $ 3 billion in preferential loans, US $ 2 billion in preferential buyers’ credits, and US $ 5 billion in China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) resources, and cancellation of African debt.13 Angola alone, for instance, received US7.4 billion of concessionary 11. Wang 2007. 12. Broadman 2007. 13. Xinhua, Fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC Opens, 9 November 2009. http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/t625618.htm

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loans between 2004 and 2007 to finance public projects mainly in infrastructure, telecommunications and agro-businesses.14 China has also provided debt relief worth US $ 2.6 billion to 33 heavily indebted and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa between October 2000 and mid2007.15 The scale of China’s investments in Africa is even more impressive and continues to soar. China had, by 2006, already invested over US $ 8 billion in oil exploration contracts in the Sudan16 and, in the same year, sealed a deal with Nigeria for a US $ 4 billion investment in the oil sector.17 This was followed by the signing of an agreement, in 2008, with the Democratic Republic of Congo to invest US $ 9 billion in infrastructure and mining projects18 and the acquisition of a 20 per cent stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank at a cost of US $ 5.6 billion.19 China has bolstered the CAD Fund by an additional US $ 2 billion, boosting opportunities for more investment in Africa. Within a year of its establishment in 2007, the staterun equity fund invested US $ 400 million in 20 projects, raising cumulative investment by Chinese firms in Africa to about US $ 2 billion.20 Trade represents the lion’s share of the economic relationship between China and Africa and it is booming. The volume of bilateral trade has risen from US $ 39.7 billion in 200521 to US $ 107 billion in 2008,22 almost tripling within three years. This has surpassed, two years in advance, the target of US $ 100 billion by 2010 set during the November 2006 Summit23 when trade volume stood at US $ 50 billion.24 The increase in the number of export items from African LDCs with diplomatic relations with China that receive zero-tariff access to the Chinese market from 190 to over 440 during the same period25 must have contributed to such a phenomenal rise in two-way trade. The Action Plan adopted at FOCAC’s fourth summit undertakes to reinforce Sino-African cooperation through the extension of US $ 10 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Campos and Vines 2008. Wang 2007. Brookes and Shin 2006. Manji and Marks 2007, 7. Farmer, John and Ann Talbot 2008. SAinfo Reporter 2007. PRNewswire Asia 2009. Manji and Marks 2007, 9. Xinhua 2009. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2006. Brautigam and Gaye 2007. Manji and Marks 2007, 9.

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billion in concessional loans to Africa by 2012 and enhanced trade via increased tariff free access to the Chinese market and building improved African export capacity. China has also pledged new partnerships with Africa designed to address climate change, promote the transfer of technology, and step up assistance for agricultural development, medical services and education. Furthermore, China has offered 5 500 scholarships to enable Africans to study in China to boost human resources development.26 The trend of rapid growth in Chinese aid, investment and trade continues amid a mix of concern and criticism from the ‘Global North’: concern that China is endangering Western interests and criticism that it is using ‘soft power’ to seal ‘hard deals’, ignoring human rights, environmental standards and international opinion in doing business without any conditionality with repressive regimes in Africa. Leading media outlets like the BBC in Europe and think tanks like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace27 in the US have echoed this stance.

3.1. The view from the Global North The principal economic powerhouses of the Global North, namely, the US, Japan and the EU, tend to view China as a major competitor and its robust engagement in Africa as a strategic design to secure, at their expense, longterm supplies of minerals, energy and other raw materials as well as a reliable market essential to sustain the rapid growth of its economy. This has led to a growing concern particularly in the EU, by far Africa’s largest trading partner, that Asia’s rapidly rising power is encroaching on its traditional African preserve and emerging as the chief rival for influence and access to Africa’s resources and markets. Africa is richly endowed with natural resources, including extensive mineral and oil reserves. It holds a substantial share of many of the world’s principal mineral reserves: 89 per cent of platinum, 60 per cent of diamond, 53 per cent of cobalt, 38 per cent of zirconium, 28 per cent of gold, 23 per cent of vanadium, 15 per cent of uranium, 14 per cent of manganese, 10 per cent of titanium, etc.28 Africa also possesses substantial quantities of the world’s proven reserves of fossil oil and natural gas. The

26. Xinhua, 9 November 2009. 27. Kurlantzick 2006. 28. Jonah 2005, 19.

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Africa Report estimates that the Gulf of Guinea alone will generate at least one of every five new barrels of oil entering the world market by 2010.29 It is such endowment that at least in part has drawn Europe into Africa from times past and now attracts China and the rest of the world to the continent. Yet, despite its natural wealth, chronic underdevelopment has relegated contemporary Africa to the lowest rungs of the global development ladder and the African peoples into abject poverty. The development gap between Africa and the rest of the world has steadily widened and the continent’s marginalization vis-à-vis the world economy continues unabated. This predicament could be correctly ascribed, at least in part, to the combined impacts of the slave trade and the continent’s brutal colonial history. Under the circumstances, there are those in the Global North, journalists and policy makers included, who warn that history is repeating itself, portraying China as a portent of a ‘new imperialism’ in Africa. They contend that China today is following in the footsteps of ‘successive colonial powers’, subjecting Africa to ‘one of the most sweeping, bareknuckled and most ingenious resource grabs the world has ever seen’. In their view, Africa, ‘Left behind in the dust of globalization, hungry for cash, trade, investment and infrastructure and powerless to negotiate strategically, is ‘up for grabs to the highest bidder’. According to this perspective, China, ‘much as successive colonial powers have done over the centuries’, is invading Africa like a tsunami and depleting its resources, just as a pathogen invades a human body, absorbs the nutrients of its host and spews its toxin to weaken and emaciate its victim.30

3.2. Some comparisons of Europe and China in Africa I have deliberately focused on the West’s more critical view of the current China-Africa debate in order to put this discourse in perspective without delving into the polemics of its merits or demerits. I would now turn to a brief overview of Africa’s current global trade profile and a comparison of Europe’s past deeds and China’s present activities in Africa. 3.2.1. Africa’s global aid and trade relations The EU and its member states together provide the biggest development assistance to Africa. The EU is also the largest export market for Africa’s 29. The Africa Report 2006. 30. Behar 2008.

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products, importing, for instance, around 85 per cent of the continent’s exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables.31 The implementation of the First Action Plan of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership32 and the expeditious conclusion of the still pending Economic Partnership Agreements would help synergise Africa’s development, build its export capacity, avail African goods greater access to the EU market and significantly enhance EuroAfrican trade. Trade profile statistics for 2006, the most recent comparative data I could find, show that the EU remains the largest single market for Africa’s exports and imports, at 32.0 per cent and 29 per cent of total, respectively, followed by the US at 29.5 per cent and 5.6 per cent, and trailed by China at 12.6 per cent and 8.9 per cent.33 However, the statistics also show that the EU and the US shares of Africa’s market, though still predominant, are declining while China’s share is increasing. Besides, the bulk of China’s trade with Africa is carried out with a few countries, with the top ten trading partners accounting for 79 per cent and the top five for 61 per cent of total two-way trade for 2008.34 Likewise, EU trade with Africa rose steadily between 2004 and 2009 and displayed concentration with a few countries, with the top three partners representing 49 per cent of the Union’s total imports from Africa in 2009.35 The consistently rising trend of Africa’s trade in goods with both China and the EU was, however, significantly dented by the global economic crisis. China’s trade with Africa grew by 25 per cent between 1995 and 2009, with imports and exports increasing by 27 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively, while it declined by 16 per cent from about US $ 106 billion to about 90 billion between 2008 and 2009.36 The same data show that Chinese imports from Africa declined by 24 per cent (US $ 13 billion) while exports decreased by 6 per cent (US $ 3 billion). Similarly, the value of EU trade with Africa showed considerable decline between 2008 and 2009, with imports falling by 33 per cent, from € 158 billion to € 106 billion, and exports diminishing by 10 per cent, from € 119 billion to € 107 billion, generating a small surplus of € 0.8 billion

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

European Commission 2007. Ibid. US Department of Commerce 2008. George 2009, 1-6. Eurostat, Africa-EU – Economic Indicators, Trade and Investment, November 2010. Tralac, Africa-China Trading Relationship, 2010. http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/ images/1694/tralac_Africa-China2010.pdf

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in Africa’s favour for the first time in a decade.37 It is expected that global economic recovery would restore the pre-crisis trends and patterns of African trade with China and the EU. 3.2.2. Europe’s record and China’s present activities in Africa There may well exist substantive similarity in the underlying economic motives of Europe’s colonial conquest as well as post-colonial domination and China’s present interest and involvement in Africa. It is quite evident that the continent’s rich natural resources and vast market are the core attraction. Nevertheless, there are significant differences that should not be overlooked. On close scrutiny, the analogy between China’s strategy, objectives and consequences of its behaviour in Africa today with those of the successive colonial powers of centuries past, European included, does not seem to hold much water. Evidently, there are no conquering Chinese armies marching across Africa, collecting slaves for trade, sowing death and destruction in their trail, grabbing land and resources from their rightful owners under the barrel of a gun, and conscripting Africans to fight in their wars. Nor are there Chinese viceroys and high officials, busy setting up administrative structures of colonial domination, oppression and exploitation over parcelled out African territories. 3.2.3. Africa’s need for due diligence I hasten to stress, however, that African states, in all their diversity, must heed the warning and undertake due diligence to avert potential pitfalls in and harmful consequences from the new relationship with China. They need to clean house, get their acts together, prioritise development objectives and ensure transparent and accountable use of availed resources in order to best benefit from Chinese cooperation. They must make sure that Chinese trade, aid and investments operate not to stifle the growth of Africa’s manufactures but to accelerate local value addition; not to aggravate the domestic income divide but to boost development and improve the people’s wellbeing. China’s operations, which are driven by diverse actors and motives, should desist or be restrained from taking advantage of the structural weaknesses and internal divisions plaguing African states at the continental, regional, national and local levels and end up benefitting just its operators and the ruling national elites.

37. Eurostat, Africa-EU – Economic Indicators, Trade and Investment, November 2010.

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African leaders and actors have the primary responsibility to insist on the transparent and accountable management of resources and ensure that China’s activities yield mutual benefit and help create and sustain African employment, growth and wealth. At the same time, China’s leaders and operators have the secondary responsibility to do the same and desist from business as usual and corrupt practices to prop up repressive regimes as well as cajole and bribe their African interlocutors into doing their bidding. Both sides must proactively cooperate to spare Africa from becoming a dumping ground for cheap sub-standard Chinese export commodities that operates to depress demand for local products, kill small scale industries, feed unemployment and siphon national wealth. It is also imperative that China does not replace Switzerland to become a new haven for Africa’s stolen and illegal capital flight by certain kleptocratic regimes. African and Chinese leaders, as well as the players acting under their tutelage and with their blessing and benefaction, should adhere to a code of conduct, with accountable and transparent modus operandi at its core, to make sure that the fruits of Sino-African cooperation, investment and trade are equitably shared between Africa and China. It is imperative that African states use the growing partnership with China as an opportunity to diversify their global relations and multiply their access to resources, markets, technology and capacity building to effectively advance the development of their countries and the wellbeing of their peoples rather than as a refuge from Western aid conditionality and due criticism of their failings. Even more importantly, it behoves Chinese leaders to act in the same vein. Both sides have a stake in the success of the partnership. The litmus paper of the success or failure of China’s engagement with Africa, in general, and with individual African states, in particular, should be whether it advances or undermines economic growth, responsible governance and the wellbeing of the people. Surely, the long term viability of Afro-Chinese cooperation will depend on the extent to which the levers of this cooperation are used to help address Africa’s pressing development challenges and lift the African peoples from the abyss of chronic underdevelopment and rampant poverty.

3.3. The imperative for EU-Africa-China cooperation At this juncture, I wish to underscore that, despite their cultural diversity and different levels of socio-economic development, Africa, Asia and Europe are interconnected by geography, linked by shared history, bound

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by a common destiny, and face similar security challenges in the rapidly emerging global village of the twenty-first century. Under this global reality, the promotion of their respective regional interests and common security objectives would require them to cooperate rather than compete in Africa. One area of increasing common concern and potential cooperation is the international effort to combat maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The EU has deployed a naval task force, Operation Atalanta; EU member states are actively engaged with NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield as well as the multilateral Combined Naval Task Force (CTF-151); and Japan, India, China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia have deployed naval forces under their own respective national commands. The effort, however, has yet to deliver. The rather mixed results achieved so far point to the need for effective operational coordination among the various naval contingents engaged in the endeavour to curb maritime piracy. The fact that all the warships share access to a secure internet-based communication system (Mercury) is a good start that could be built upon to forge greater international and EU-China cooperation, in particular. Against the backdrop of these general remarks, I would like to pose three thematic questions whose substantive answers would have implications for European security policy regarding Africa and the Asia Nexus. First, what are the most pressing challenges facing Africa today and how could better triangular coordination and closer cooperation between the EU, Africa and China help more effectively tackle these problems? Second, what are the implications of China’s growing role in Africa for the EU-Africa relationship? More specifically, do China’s rising role and influence in Africa present a challenge or an opportunity for the longstanding relationship between the EU and Africa? And Third, would a new EU-Africa-China trilateral partnership mediate the lingering tension that underlies the EU’s predominant historical position and China’s rising nascent role in Africa and render EU-China relations more conducive to Africa’s development? Let me briefly deal with these questions and try to highlight their policy implications.

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4.

The key challenges facing Africa

It is no exaggeration to state that Africa today faces a myriad of challenges. No doubt, extreme poverty remains one of the most daunting of these challenges. Other pressing challenges include wars and conflict, climate change and pandemic diseases. One could also plausibly add dictatorship, tyranny and state fragility and/or failure to the list.

4.1. Conflict Africa is beset by multiple wars and violent conflicts. Despite the scant media coverage, Africa stands out as the most war-torn, conflict-ravaged and crisis-ridden continent. From the Maghreb to Zimbabwe, from Somalia to Cote d’Ivoire, from Darfur to the Kivus and from the Ogaden to the Niger Delta, there are some 25 active or simmering conflicts of varying intensity. These wars and conflicts entail immense loss of life, huge destruction of property and lost opportunity for development. According to a UN report,38 Sub-Saharan Africa lost over 1.5 million people between 1990 and 1999 as a result of armed conflict. The consequences of violent conflict are pervasive and long lasting. They exert a devastating impact on the most vulnerable members of society, especially women, children and the elderly, with children making up half of all civilian war casualties in Africa.39 The 2002 UN Development Report provides an estimate of the global magnitude of the tragedy involved for the same period: about 2 million children killed, 6 million permanently disabled or seriously injured, 1 million orphaned or separated from their families, 20 million forced to flee their homes to live as IDPs or as refugees, and 10 000 killed or maimed by landmines every year.40

4.2. Climate change Climate change is a serious global problem and its consequences affect all humanity. In Africa, climate change is effecting variations in rainfall patterns, causing the expansion of the Sahara Desert, destroying biodiversity and damaging the natural environment. Massive deforestation, land degradation, and increasing aridity are threatening to disrupt 38. UNDP 2002. 39. Food 4 Africa 2009. 40. UNDP 2002.

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traditional subsistence farming and pastoral grazing in much of the Sahel region. Indeed, climate change is worsening the vulnerability of rural communities subsisting precariously on what they grow supplemented by what is available in their immediate environs.

4.3. Poverty Fifty per cent of the people in Sub-Saharan Africa live on less than a dollar a day while 33 per cent of the continent’s people suffer from malnutrition.41 An estimated 20 000 Africans die every day due to extreme poverty.42 Mainly the consequence of general underdevelopment but largely fed by economic mismanagement and rampant corruption, extreme poverty in Africa is manifested in chronic food insecurity, debilitating malnutrition and constant hunger. It is also made worse by wars and conflicts, climate change and contagious diseases. The scourge of poverty locks hundreds of millions of people in large parts of Africa in a fierce daily struggle for survival, competing for increasingly scarce resources to eke out the food, water and energy needed to sustain life at the very margins of death.

4.4. Pandemic diseases The World Bank estimates that pandemic diseases like HIV/AIDS, malaria, respiratory infections, tuberculosis, measles, etc., decimated about 10.8 million lives in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2000.43 Millions of Africans continue to perish from preventable diseases. When not instantly fatal, these diseases, abetted by hunger and mal-nutrition, emaciate bodies, waste lives, destroy livelihoods, devastate families and wreck communities. These problems are often compounded by the malaise of dictatorship, tyranny and corruption in a number of failed, failing or fragile states. Undemocratic governance, both political and economic, and its dire effects remain key drivers of continued underdevelopment, chronic poverty and perennial food insecurity in several African countries. Despite the positive changes taking place in a few countries, it is as if much of Africa continues to rotate in an axis of irresponsible governance and revolve around a vicious cycle of wars and conflicts breeding underdevelopment, environmental degradation, poverty and diseases. 41. Food 4 Africa: Facts on Poverty in Africa, 2009, 1. 42. The Foundation for Community Inspiration 2010. 43. World Bank 2010.

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5.

China in Africa: a challenge or an opportunity for EUAfrica cooperation?

There is no denying that China’s rising role and influence in Africa, allowing it to access the continent’s vast natural resources to help fuel its rapid economic growth, pose a serious challenge to the EU’s traditionally predominant relationship with the continent. Viewed through the prism of old style rivalry and zero-sum game, China’s advances would be seen as EU’s reverses and its gains as the EU’s losses. In such a scenario, Africa would become a new arena of Sino-European competition and, in the event of Chinese ascendance, would merely exchange the EU for China as its chief external interlocutor without much benefit or gain to show for it. However, a different scenario more conducive to tackling Africa’s pressing challenges is not only possible but also preferable. A rising China has staked a growing interest in Africa, including in its natural and mineral resources and huge potential market, to continue to fuel its rapid economic growth, raise its international profile and buttress its global standing. It has established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that embraces economic, political, diplomatic, trade, development and military dimensions designed to cement a strategic partnership with the continent. The EU has a strategic stake in helping Africa address its pressing problems. This is embodied in the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. Africa, China and the EU have thus a common stake in working together to address Africa’s key challenges and promote shared regional security interests. That is why there is a need for a paradigm shift in the conventional mind set to turn the challenge into an opportunity for a win-win calculus for all stakeholders, namely, the EU, China and Africa. Indeed, there is room for a proactive policy of trilateral coordination between the EU, Africa and China on a number of crucial regional and global issues. While it is plausible that Africa could reap certain marginal short-term benefits by playing the EU and China against each other, its strategic long-term interests and those of its partners are more likely to be better served by cooperation among the three. To be effective, however, such an EU-AfricaChina trilateral partnership should seek to calibrate and align Chinese and EU intervention in Africa to promote common objectives and deny wiggle space to repressive regimes that seek refuge from EU criticism and aid conditionality for undemocratic governance, corruption and human rights violations in China’s hitherto seemingly uncritical embrace.

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The EU already maintains a Strategic Partnership with Africa, incorporating close cooperation in the areas of peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade, regional integration and infrastructure; energy; and climate change.44 EU-Africa Strategic Partnership also aims to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and promote Africa’s sustainable development. China and Africa have also established a strategic partnership to foster broad cooperation in political, economic and international affairs as well as social development.45 Furthermore, the China-Africa Strategic Partnership is committed to achieve the MDGs and seeks to promote peace, development and cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and global security. There thus already exist common grounds on which a trilateral EU-Africa-China partnership could be built to advance Africa’s development agenda. Agreement on such shared objectives would make it possible for the EU and China to set their rivalry aside and work together with Africa in pursuit of common interests and global challenges in a flexible and pragmatic manner. China’s recent moves regarding Darfur and Southern Sudan point in this direction. More significantly, the European Commission’s June 2008 proposal46 to develop trilateral dialogue and cooperation to improve coordination of EU and Chinese activities in Africa is a commendable initiative which could help accelerate Africa’s development. The proposed areas for joint action, which also make up common elements of the respective strategic partnerships, include peace and security, infrastructure, natural resources management, climate change, agriculture and food security, MDGs and sustainable development. If put in place, such a triangular cooperation could develop an effective institutional, technical and operational response capability to potential or emerging situations of political instability and violent conflict in Africa. The proposal holds considerable promise, indeed. Over time, China is bound to become a team player and align its rules of engagement in Africa with those of the EU as its political space also opens up in response to its growing economic pluralism. The recent adoption of the Lisbon Treaty is bound to promote a more coherent common foreign and security policy leading to more effective EUAfrica dialogue at the regional and national levels and enable the EU apply its considerable leverage to help Africa tackle its most pressing challenges. 44. European Commission 2007. 45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2006. 46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2006.

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Given political will, the EU has the capacity to engage more proactively at the bilateral and regional levels, build wider coalitions with the new US administration, within the UN Security Council and China, in particular, to promote regional peace, security and sustainable development in Africa. An EU-Africa-China trilateral partnership, with African ownership and responsibility at its core, as envisioned in the Commission proposal, holds strategic promise. It could help African states get their acts together and generate greater synergy in tackling Africa’s chronic crises. In the long run, a coherent trilateral coordination could prove more effective in the pursuit of democratic governance, the prevention and resolution of conflict, the promotion of durable peace and security, the eradication of poverty and the attainment of sustainable development in Africa. In a nutshell, China’s rising role and influence in Africa offer more of an opportunity than a challenge for EU-Africa cooperation. Furthermore, EUChina cooperation rather than competition would be more conducive to addressing the key challenges facing Africa today. The EU would do well to seize the opportunity to develop the new paradigm of cooperation with China in support of Africa’s development agenda. Such a triangular cooperation would also better serve Europe’s regional and global security interests.

References The Africa Report. 2006. March. Behar, Richard. 2008. Special Report: China Storms Africa. Fast Company 12 June 1:1-3. Beri, Ruchita. 2008. India’s Role in Keeping Peace in Africa. Strategic Analysis 32 (2): 197-221. Boloji.com. 2008. Indian Navy to deploy more ships in the Gulf of Aden. Today’s News, November 20: 5. Brautigam, Deborah and Adama Gaye. 2007. Is Chinese Investment Good for Africa? Online Debate, Council on Foreign Relations. February 12 – 20. Broadman, Harry G. 2007. Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Brookes, Peter and Ji Hye Shin. 2006. Chinese Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States. Backgrounder #1916. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation. 108

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Campos and Vines 2008 Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership. Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, ‘Prospects for Improving U.S.-China-Africa Cooperation’, December 5, 2007. London, Chatham House, March. European Commission. 2007. EU-Africa Relations: First Action Plan (2008-2010) for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. Eurostat, Africa-EU – Economic Indicators, Trade and Investment, November 2010. Farmer, John and Ann Talbot. 2008. China Steps up Investment in DRC as War in East Continues. The Intelligence Daily News Service, July 15. Food 4 Africa. 2009. Facts on Poverty in Africa. http://www.food4africa.org/index.asp?pgid=42 The Foundation for Community Inspiration. 2010. Factsheet. George, Mark. 2009. China Africa Two-Way Trade – Recent Developments. Policy Analysis, UK Department for International Development (DFID). London, 30 January. India-Africa Forum Summit 2008. Delhi Declaration. 9 April. Indian Express. 2007. India activates first listening post on foreign soil: radars in Madagascar. 17 July. Kurlantzick, Joshua. 2006. China’s Charm: Implications of China’s Soft Power. Policy Brief 06/47. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Manji, Firoze, and Stephen Marks, eds.2007. African Perspectives on China. Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu. MediaClubSouthAfrica.com. 2009. 23 March. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. 2006. Documents of Beijing Summit and Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. 2003. Documents of the 2nd Ministerial Conference. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. 2000. Documents of the 1st Ministerial Conference. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2009. TICAD IV Annual Progress Report 2008: 1-24.

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PRNewswire-Asia. 2009. China-Africa Development Fund Opens First Office in Africa. 16 March SAinfo Reporter. 2007. China Buys into Standard Bank. October 26. Shelton, Garth, FOCAC IV – New Opportunities for Africa, 22 December 2009. Thaindian News 2008. India Seeks support of Indian Ocean countries to fight piracy. 21 November 21. Tralac, Africa-China Trading Relationship, 2010. UNDP. 2002. UN Human Development Report 2002. US Department of Commerce. 2008. International Trade Administration: US-Africa Trade Profile. 1 October. Wang, Jian-Ye. 2007. What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa? IMF Working Paper 07/211. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Xinhua 2009. China-Africa trade up 45 % in 2008 to $107 billion. February 11. Xinhua. 2008. India-Africa Summit Concluded in New Delhi. April 9.

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Part II. Asian Interests, Perceptions and Policies

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7. The EU’s Relations with China, Japan and North Korea Implications for the EU’s Role and Engagement in Asian Security Axel Berkofsky

1.

Introduction

Despite strong economic and business interests in Asia, there is near consensus amongst scholars and analysts that the EU remains reluctant (and unable) to develop a security profile in Asia in accordance with its business and economic interests and influence in the region. This, as EU policymakers usually point out, is not least due to the fact that the EU institutions’ mandate and authority to implement foreign and security policies on behalf of EU 27 Member States are too limited to ‘do’ more with regards to global security, including in Asia. If that is true (and EU policymakers insist it is), then the EU Commission and EU Council do all they ‘can’ or all they are ‘allowed’ to do with regards to (hard) Asian security which translates into a very limited or even a ‘nonrole’ in Asian hard security. The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and the emerging and recently intensifying ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Southeast Asia1 are ‘reminders’ of the ‘realist’ character of Asia’s security environment and suggests that the EU will continue to have a fairly limited role contributing to the resolution of these and other ‘hard security’ conflicts in Asia. To be sure, the EU’s so-called ‘soft security’ policies in Asia are a very different matter even if this sort of engagement does not make it to the front pages of the international press.

1.

Recommendable are IISS scholar Tim Huxley’s writings on recent and emerging ethnic and other conflicts in Southeast Asia; see http://www.iiss.org/about-us/ staffexpertise/list-experts-by-name/tim-huxley/

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The EU is the biggest donor of global humanitarian, food and development (providing more than 50 % of the total) and Brussels’ so-called ‘capacitybuilding’ policies (e.g. technical assistance, technology and know-how transfers etc.) in many Asian countries have without a doubt contributed to peace and stability in Asia in recent years and decades. Despite its shortcomings (above all the EU Commission’s insufficient capacities to monitor and supervise the distribution of funds and the implementation of humanitarian and technical assistance projects on the ground)2 there is generally agreement amongst Asian policymakers and analysts that a more prominent and visible European engagement in Asian ‘hard security’ issues could never be as constructive and promoting security as Brussels’ ‘soft security’ policies in Asia. This chapter will provide an analysis of the EU’s political, economic and security relations with Japan, China and North Korea, or: What does the EU ‘do’ or does not do in terms of politics, economics and security with Japan, China and North Korea? While seeking to provide an overview of the EU’s political, economic and trade and security relations with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang, it will at the same time be sought to draw conclusions on the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security, or: What does EU security co-operation with Japan, China and (to a lesser extent North Korea) say and not say about the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security? This author is aware that this kind of approach of seeking to qualify and quantify the overall EU security involvement in Asia has its limits: The analysis of the EU’s relations with three Asian countries in general and security ties in particular can naturally not provide results and conclusions regarding all issues and aspects of European security involvement in Asian security. In other words: The analysis of the EU’s security relations with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang is not necessarily representative of everything the EU ‘is’ and ‘does’ in terms of Asian security. However, what this approach and the analysis below can seek to do is to provide (at least in parts) an analysis of the nature of security cooperation

2.

In essence, the EU Commission does not always have enough personnel and funds to supervise whether the funds allocated to aid and technical assistance projects actually ‘reach’ the institutions and individuals in charge of implementing the projects on the ground.

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between the EU and Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang and what it says about the quality of the EU’s overall engagement in Asian security. In this context an effort will be made to assess whether the EU’s approach and policies towards Asian security relations point to the existence of a coherent and clear-cut overall strategy towards Asia in general and Asian security in particular. The conclusions of this exercise are somewhat sobering: The EU’s relations in general and security ties with Tokyo, Beijing and Pyongyang in particular do not necessarily enable one to detect common and recurring patterns of EU security policies towards Asia. Instead – and this does necessarily not come as a surprise in view of the EU Commission’s fairly limited mandate to formulate and implement foreign and security policies on behalf of all 27 EU Member States – individual European governments will continue to formulate and implement their ‘own’ national foreign, foreign economic and security policies towards Asia competing with or worse contradicting EU Commission Asia policies. The controversy (or from an EU and European policymaking perspective the ‘debacle’) surrounding the EU and European policies and approaches towards the EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 demonstrated this ‘impressively.’ The EU Commission’s position on the lifting of non-lifting of the weapons embargo back in 2004 and 2005 lost much of its credibility when EU Member States chose (without consultation with the EU Commission) to advocate and implement their weapons embargo positions and policies individually (and there contradicting official EU positions).3 The structure of this chapter is as follows: The EU’s relations with Japan, China and Pyongyang are being dealt with separately covering political, economic and trade as well as security relations. This analysis will be followed (separately for each of three countries) by conclusions and 3.

During the height of the weapons embargo controversy in 2004 and 2005 hardly a day went by when EU Commission and EU Member States contradicted each other on whether and when to lift and not to lift the weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989; while some Member States (above all the Scandinavian countries) urged the EU Commission to leave the weapons embargo in place other EU Member States frequently changed their position on the embargo, especially those under Chinese pressure to lose out on business opportunities in China if opposed to the lifting of the embargo (Germany, France and the UK). Worse from an EU policymaking perspective, the statements regarding the possible lifting of the weapon coming from the EU Council were not always compatible with the official EU Commission positions.

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assessments what in this author’s view the relations with the three respective countries mean and do not mean (within the above mentioned limitations) for the EU’s overall role and engagement in Asian security.

2.

EU-Japan relations4

Joint European-Japanese global policies and policy initiatives go usually unnoticed and very rarely (i.e. almost never) get coverage by the international press. Put bluntly, EU-Japan relations and policies are not ‘front page material.’ Back in 2001 Tokyo and Brussels had very ambitious (on paper) plans as regards international economic, political and security co-operation when adopting the so-called ‘EU-Japan Action Plan for Co-operation’ in 2001 (also ‘EU-Japan Action Plan’, for details see below). However, very few of the envisioned joint policies have actually been implemented and even if political rhetoric voiced during official EU-Japan encounters suggests otherwise, this is unlikely to change in the years ahead-not least in view of a lack of urgency to upgrade and intensify concrete EU-Japan co-operation in international politics and security. On a positive note, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last ten years established a framework for regular consultations and bilateral meetings, including regular consultations ahead of the annual session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Furthermore, the EU and Japan are jointly supporting international initiatives to achieve global nuclear disarmament and efforts to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This was accompanied by jointly signing various international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols.5 To be sure, jointly signing nuclear disarmament protocols was one thing, following up on the signatures and implementing joint policies quite another as it turned out. In other words: The EU and Japan citing their joint signatures under international disarmament and non-proliferation protocols as achievements of bilateral policies in the areas of international politics and security have only so much credibility if these signatures do lead not and 4. 5.

For further details see Berkofsky 2008a and Berkofsky 2007a. See European Commission 2004.

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result in joint policies with a concrete and measurable impact on international security.

2.1. Tokyo’s ‘EU Factor’ in the 1990s Following the EU-Japan ‘The Hague Declaration’ in 1991 a so-called ‘EU factor’ made it into Tokyo’s policymaking circles when identifying Japan’s foreign and security policy partners in a post-Cold War era. The Japanese (at least on paper) motivation for expanding its relationship with the EU in the early 1990s was to ‘diversify’ its regional and global security policies, which throughout the Cold War had been defined and limited by its security alliance with the US. Intensifying relations with the EU, it was announced in Tokyo back then, should in the post-Cold War era balance Japan’s global foreign and security policies, making it less dependent on US regional and global foreign and security policy strategies. This announcement to make Japanese foreign and security policies less focused on the security alliance with the US resulted in the establishment of the ‘Task Force on Foreign Relations’, a body set up by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002. The November 2002 task force report identified the EU as a ‘strong partner’ in selected areas of cooperation arguing that ‘In a new world order Japan needs to have a strong partner according to individual issues. In some issues, Europe can be a rational choice as such a partner.’ Co-operating with the EU in ‘some issues’ (as opposed to ‘many’), however, did not necessarily suggest that Japan was willing to embrace the EU as important global foreign and security policy partner. Indeed, the report did not result in any new EU-Japan policy initiatives, which could have been understood as a (partial) ‘diversification’ of Japanese foreign and security policies.6 In reality, the opposite took place when Junichiro Koizumi took office in 2001: After the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001 Japan intensified its security and military cooperation with the US which amongst others led to a Japanese a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in support of US military in Afghanistan and the deployment of 1000 Japanese military troops to Iraq in 2004 to provide humanitarian and medical aid.

6.

See also Gilson 2002. For a critical Japanese perspective see Tsuruoka 2004.

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Furthermore, Tokyo expanded its security cooperation with Washington in Asia officially signing up for the co-development and co-deployment of a regional missile defense system to counter the threat posed by North Korean Nodong and Taepodong missiles. Also in 2005, Washington and Tokyo decided to revise the 1997 so-called US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which for the first time (at least on paper) would give Japan an active (as opposed to a role centered around providing logistical and other forms of back-up support) military role in a regional contingency, including one in the Taiwan Straits. Leaving current US-Japan friction on the US forces re-alignment plans for Japan7 and Tokyo’s new government’s alleged ‘new assertiveness’ to make the security alliance with the US ‘more equal and less asymmetrical’ aside, the security alliance with Washington will in the years ahead continue Tokyo’s main remain Tokyo’s main reference to its regional security policies and strategies.

2.2. The EU-Japan Action Plan8 In December 2001, the EU and Japan adopted the ‘Joint Action Plan for EUJapan Cooperation’ which identified more than 100 areas of bilateral cooperation, ranging from joint peacekeeping and security cooperation to strengthened economic and trade cooperation.9 Today and nine years later it is widely agreed that the action plan suffered from a lack of focus listing far for too many areas of bilateral co-operation to be tackled with the limited available resources. This is reflected by how little Brussels and Tokyo were actually able to ‘do’ (as opposed to signing protocols and documents) with regards to international politics and security over the last nine years. And this is despite the fact that the action plan committed the EU and Japan to coordinate their respective development, humanitarian and peacekeeping policies, and intensify cooperation in areas such as conflict prevention, non-proliferation, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and assistance in Europe and Asia.

7. 8. 9.

For details see Berkofsky 2009a. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2001. The plan is divided into four main sections: ‘Promoting peace and security’, ‘Strengthening the economic and trade partnership’, ‘Coping with global and societal changes’, ‘Bringing together people and cultures’.

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Very recently, the EU and Japan have started working on a new EU-Japan action plan, which is likely to be adopted in 2011. There is a consensus amongst policymakers in Brussels10 (and probably also in Tokyo) that a new action plan will have to cover far fewer areas and issues of cooperation in order to ‘produce’ tangible results and provide policymakers in both Brussels and Tokyo with guidelines and policy recommendations in the areas of the envisioned cooperation.11 However, it remains to be seen whether the political will and probably more importantly the resources in Brussels and Tokyo are sufficient to make a second EU-Japan Action Plan more successful and result-oriented than the first one. In Brussels, China and not Japan will continue to remain the EU’s foreign and foreign economic policy priority in the years ahead and judging by Japan’s newly-elected Prime Minister’s foreign policy announcements and initiatives, Tokyo is planning above all to intensify the country’s Asian policy agenda, including the resumption of Japan’s leadership role as regards regional economic and political integration.12 Japanese officials and bureaucrats in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs working on Europe and relations with the EU are outnumbered by their ministry colleagues working on the US (or China for that matter). This defacto and on a day-to-day basis means that the ministry’s resources dedicated to working on and implementing the EU-Japan Action are fairly limited and indeed too limited to dedicate sufficient resources and energy to the (on paper) very ambitious action plan. The situation in the European Commission is similar: Not nearly enough officials work in the Commission’s Japan desk to dedicate enough resources and manpower towards a result-oriented implementation of an ‘EU-style’ action plan, i.e. a plan that is far too ambitious somehow reading like a ‘shopping list’ of

10. This author’s conversations with EU Commission officials directly involved in the drafting of the new action plan confirm this. Conversations with Japanese scholars who are part of a so-called ‘wise men group’ to provide Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs with advice on the new envisioned action plan, agree that a new version of such a plan must be much more focused. 11. This author is part of a group of scholars invited to EU Commission-sponsored brainstorming meetings (the first took place in October 2009, the second taking place in February 2010) dealing with EU-Japan relations in general and a new EU-Japan Action Plan in particular. 12. The Prime Minister is particularly keen on putting Japan to the forefront of the promotion and the envisioned establishment of the so-called ‘East Asian Community’ (EAC), a (yet vaguely defined) ‘community’ comprising states in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia as well as Australia and New Zealand.

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unresolved international issues,13 unless a new action plan with Japan will indeed list far fewer issues and areas of envisioned bilateral cooperation.

2.3. EU-Japan security cooperation-scope and many limits EU-Japan co-operation on security issues focuses on non-military (or what is referred to as ‘alternative’) security co-operation, i.e. security cooperation using financial and economic resources to contribute to peace and stability through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of development and financial aid.14 In the 1990s, Tokyo contributed significantly to the reconstruction and pacification of the Western Balkans. Tokyo channelled its assistance to the reconstruction of the Western Balkans through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), of which it became a ‘Partner of Cooperation’ in 1998.15 Since the 1990s to the present, Japan has contributed roughly $ 2 billion to the reconstruction of the Western Balkans. Up to date, both independent and government-sponsored Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to operate in the Balkans, providing financial, developmental and technical support and assistance. However, non-military security cooperation with the EU continues to complement Tokyo’s close military security cooperation with the US in a very limited fashion. From a Japanese perspective, the EU can contribute very little, if anything at all, to the country’s security given the security environment in Tokyo’s immediate geographical neighbourhood. Close defence ties with the US, supported by roughly 50 000 US troops on Japanese territory, Japan’s political mainstream and defence establishment maintain, is what keeps North Korea from attacking Japanese territory with conventional ballistic missiles or worse.

13. The EU’s action plan with India e.g. is only but one example of the EU’s action plans with other countries or regions are typically listing too large a number of issues and areas of envisioned cooperation for policymakers to follow-up on and implement. 14. See Hughes 2004 15. European Commission President Jacques Santer and Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu held their first talks on possible Japanese involvement in Central and Eastern Europe through its participation in the CSCE at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1994, for the first time, Japan took part in the CSCE meeting in Budapest before becoming a ‘Partner for Cooperation’ in 1998

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Japan’s focus and dependence on the US for its national security notwithstanding, Brussels and Tokyo have over the last 10 years undertaken a number of bilateral and initiatives and established bilateral dialogue forums to deal with international non-proliferation and security issues. These included:16 앫 Joint promotion of the reform of the Conventional Weapons Protocol on anti-personnel landmines 앫 Jointly signing the ‘Joint Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation’ in June 200517 앫 Joint adoption of a declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation in 2004 promoting the acceleration of the UN Action Plan on small arms and light weapons 앫 Joint implementation and co-ordination on small arms and light weapons in Cambodia 앫 Co-operation on the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2003, 2005, 2007 앫 Cooperation on the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) 앫 Biannual meetings of the Japan-EU Troika Working Group on Human Rights since 2003 앫 Co-sponsorship of North Korea human rights resolutions 앫 Co-chair of the Ministerial Conference on Peace Consolidation and Economic Development of the West Balkans in Tokyo (April 2004) 앫 Co-operation on the reconstruction and rehabilitation in Southeast Europe by supporting projects through the United Nations Human Security Trust Fund 앫 Launch of the EU-Japan Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia with 5 meetings from 2006 to 2008 앫 Joint financial sponsorship of the International Criminal Court (ICC)18 Jointly signing non-proliferation and disarmament protocols, however, is not the same as implementing joint policies as a follow-up of signatures 16. Information provided by Japan Desk, European Commission, Brussels September 2009. 17. The goal of this agreement is to support the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Main Battle Tank and Light Armor Weapon Law and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols. 18. There is agreement that European and Japanese financial contributions over the years turned out to be vitally crucial for the ICC to operate and function.

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under international non-proliferation and disarmament protocols and EU policymakers do indeed admit that much more – to put it bluntly – has been done on paper than on the ground over the last decade between the EU and Japan.19

2.4. Discussing East Asian security In 2005 Brussels and Tokyo started to discuss Asian regional security issues on a regular institutional basis by launching the ‘EU-Japan Brussels Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’ in September of that year. The establishment of the ‘EU-Japan Dialogue on East Asian Security’ was preceded by the establishment of the EU-US Dialogue on East Asian Security in 2004’ and given that EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 was at all times the central issue on the dialogue’s agenda,20 it is probably fair to assume that the motivation for Tokyo to initiate regular exchanges on East Asian security was identical to Washington’s motivations in 2004: Putting and keeping up pressure on Brussels to leave the weapons embargo imposed on China after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 in place. Throughout 2004 and 2005, Tokyo and Washington were concerned (unnecessarily as it turned out as the embargo is still in place and nowhere near the top of Brussels’ China agenda) that the EU would lift the embargo, and resume weapons and military technology exports to China actively supporting Beijing’s efforts to modernize its armed forces. In retrospect (and in view of the fact that neither Tokyo nor Washington ever sought to include the EU in its security strategies for East Asia beyond informal consultations) it can be concluded that neither Tokyo nor Washington would have suggested to set up a dialogue on East Asian security without the possible lifting of the embargo on the agenda.21 Before the embargo issue was discussed in 2004, Washington and Tokyo have essentially not shown any interest in discussing Asian security with Brussels and neither the US nor Japan e.g. have never advocated a more prominent EU role in solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula

19. Author’s conversations with EU Commissions policymakers in Brussels October 2009. 20. If not the only relevant issue for the US and Japan. 21. EU policymakers, of course, would disagree with this conclusion and argue (as they did when speaking with this author) that both Japan and the US were interested in discussing their respective regional security policy strategies with the EU.

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such as encouraging or inviting Brussels to become a member of the socalled 6-Party Talks, the multilateral forum to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization.22

2.5. Trade and business ties In 2008, bilateral EU-Japan trade amounted to € 117 billion,23 down from € 121 billion in 2006. Like in the years before the EU in 2008 reported a trade deficit with Japan amounting to € 32 billion in that year.24 Among the EU27 Member States, Germany (€ 12.8 billon or 30 % of the total EU-Japan trade) was the largest exporter to Japan in 2008, followed by France (€ 5.6 billion or 13 %), the UK (€ 4.6 billion or 11 %) and Italy (€ 4.3 billion or 10 %). Germany (€ 17.4 billion or 23 %) was also the largest importer, followed by the Netherlands (€ 11.5 billion or 15 %), the UK (€ 9.6 billion or 13 %) and Belgium (€ 8.4 billion or 11 %). Even though the EU’s trade deficit with Japan remains a concern to EU and European economic policymakers, given the relatively limited scale (limited as compared with China above all, see below), the trade deficit does no longer (like in the 1970s and 1980s) feature on top of Brussels’ trade agenda with Japan. In recent years, the EU and Japan launched and held a number of dialogues, either to increase bilateral trade and investments or (probably more importantly) to help each other protecting themselves from intellectual property rights’ or patent right violations. These dialogues are: 앫 The High-Level Trade Dialogue25 앫 EU Industrial Policy Dialogue 앫 Japan-EU Policy Dialogue on the International Patent Agenda (since November 2005 앫 EU-Japan Energy Policy Dialogue (since 2007) 22. 6-Party Talks: A multilateral forum hosted by China and aimed at de-nuclearizing North Korea. The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 and the participating nations are the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea 23. See Europa Press Releases Rapid 2009. 24. Most Member EU States recorded trade deficits with Japan in 2008. The largest in the Netherlands ?(€-8.5 billion), Belgium (€-6.2 billion), (UK €-4.9 billion), Germany (€-4.6 billion) and Spain (€-2.4 billion). The only significant surpluses were registered in Denmark (€+1.1 billion), Ireland (€+0.9 billion) and Finland (€+0.5 billion). 25. For more information see also European Commission 2009a.

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In 2007, Brussels and Tokyo adopted the EU-Japan Action Plan on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection and Enforcement, a plan to strengthen und coordinate European-Japanese cooperation on IPR at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.26 This dialogue was established not least due to the common problems Europe and Japan are confronted with when doing business and investing in China. Unsurprisingly Beijing called that dialogue targeted at China and Chinese business when the dialogue was launched.27 In the 1990s, the EU and Japan established the EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue28 aimed at facilitating European exports to Japan burdened by red tape and a complex and above all expensive Japanese distribution system. Many industry and trade sectors in Japan are still subject to regulations and, in Brussels view, excessive rules and requirements for foreign investors, including agriculture, food safety, transport services, telecommunications, public construction and the financial services sector. What is more, foreign investors in Japan are still confronted with a number of barriers, including taxes on ‘unrealised’ capital gains made by foreign companies through mergers and acquisitions in Japan. In 2006 the Japanese government announced to review the way all-share mergers (cash-free mergers of companies) involving non-Japanese companies are taxed. This policy review was preceded by a Japanese initiative, which lifted the restrictions limiting all-share acquisitions to domestic companies, which makes it easier for foreign investors to acquire Japanese companies. Background of that policy review was former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s plan to achieve a 100 % increase of European foreign direct investment (FDI) into Japan by 2010.29 Despite the obstacles for European business operating in Japan, the EU was Japan’s main foreign investor in recent years with investments amounting 26. ‘Target’ from a European-Japanese perspective of this dialogue of this dialogue is without a doubt China which has after the establishment of the dialogue voiced claiming that Brussels and Tokyo are ‘ganging up’ on China and its difficulties implementing intellectual property rights in China 27. And which in China was perceived as EU-Japan dialogue ‘aimed’ at China as the author’s recent interview with Chinese officials indicate 28. For details see European Commission. EU-Japan Regulatory Reform Dialogue. 29. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2004.

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to an average $ 5.5 billion per year, driven by investments in telecommunications, car manufacturing, retail and insurance sectors. European business leaders and business associations based in Japan,30 however, argue that European FDI to Japan could and indeed should by now be much higher if it were not for the continuous existence of obstacles and regulations distorting competition and rendering investments in Japan unnecessarily costly.

2.6. Conclusions The EU’s December 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) envisioned a strategic partnership with Japan (as well as with China, see below).31 Until today, however, it is not entirely clear what exactly the ‘strategic’ dimension of bilateral ties is and why the EU and Japan are the ‘natural allies’ the EU Commission refers to Japan as when describing ties with Tokyo at official encounters. Not least because too little of what Brussels and Tokyo and Brussels were planning to do on paper over the last decade with regards to international politics, economics and security got actually done and the EU-Japan Action Plan envisioned much more of what Brussels were able and willing to do, particularly in the area of security. In view of the action plan’s limited tangible results, it is in many ways an example of how not to codify bilateral cooperation in international politics, economics and security. EU-Japan security cooperation over the last decade is a decade of many lost opportunities. Very little of what was envisioned to take place in terms of bilateral ‘soft’ security cooperation in the framework of the EU-Japan action plan (beyond the signing of disarmament and non-proliferation protocols) has actually taken place. As regards the above mentioned EU-Japan ‘Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security, almost five years after its launch, the dialogue remains hardly known outside of Brussels and will very likely continue not to lead to joint EU-Japan Asian security policies. To be fair, European and Japanese officials counter criticism on the lack of results coming out of the 30. Author’s conversations with European business leaders in Tokyo in December 2009 suggested this and is in line with what the EU Commission in Brussels argues as regards the obstacles to European investments in Japan. 31. As well as with India, Russia, Canada; for details see Council of the European Union 2003.

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dialogue by arguing that the dialogue was not supposed to produce joint EU-Japan policies, but is instead to be understood as an instrument and forum to inform each other on respective security policies in East Asia. As regards EU-Japan cooperation in Afghanistan, the Japanese Prime Minister has late last year announced to assign additional $5 billion in civilian aid for Afghanistan and some of the funds are envisioned to be spent on projects jointly implemented with the EU. There is without a doubt scope for further EU-Japanese cooperation in Afghanistan, but it remains to be seen – to put it bluntly – whether policymakers in Europe and Japan will put the money and cooperation where their mouth is, i.e. whether the envisioned civilian cooperation in the months and years ahead will actually take place in 2010 and beyond. Furthermore, the Japanese Prime Minister announced during his speech at the UN in New York shortly after taking office last September that Japan plans to increase cooperation with the EU on global environment and climate issues (which as it is now widely agreed amongst analysts and policymakers have at least indirect implications on global security). However, the recent UN climate summit in Copenhagen did not experience a noteworthy increase in EU-Japan cooperation with regards to climate change and so far the conclusion is that intensification of EU-Japan cooperation on climate change issues as envisioned by Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama takes place on paper and paper only. Again, 2010 and beyond will show whether political rhetoric will be able catch up with political reality of EU-Japan cooperation on climate change. In conclusion, from a European perspective security cooperation with Tokyo has yet not turned out to be a European ‘entry ticket’ into Asian security as it was hoped in European policymaking circles after the signing of the EU-Japan Action Plan back in 2001. Tokyo for its part remains relatively disinterested in including Europe and the EU in its regional security policy thinking and strategies, unless EU Asian security policies towards Asia have a potentially direct impact on Japanese security as it could have been the case if the EU had decided to lift its weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989.

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3.

The EU and China-Strategic partners with ‘issues’32

Leaving controversial areas like human rights, the EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989, the ever growing trade surplus in China’s favour aside, the expansion of EU-China institutional links and bilateral cooperation (at least on paper) has been second to none in recent years.33 The 50 so-called EU-China ‘sectoral dialogues’ are part of this and take place on either working or ministerial levels covering areas such as energy, environmental protection, consumer product safety, civil aviation, competition policy, education and culture, employment and social affairs, intellectual property rights (IPR), consumer product safety, maritime transport, regulatory and industrial policy and others.34 Various stakeholders are involved in these dialogues, including officials, politicians and business. The dialogues take the form of working groups, conferences, annual formal meetings or regular informal meetings and representatives from nineteen Directorates General in the European Commission and their respective counterparts in China are involved in these dialogues. Although not the same level of progress is being achieved in all dialogues yet (essentially none for example in the one on human rights, see below), some of them have in recent years produced concrete and relevant results, such as the one on the environment: EU-Chinese talks on car exhaust emission standards recently resulted in Beijing adopting EU rules and standards in this area. To be sure, Chinese officials continue to point to the allegedly ‘informal’ (as opposed to ‘legally-binding’) character of those dialogues when refusing to meet European demands voiced e.g. in the sectoral dialogues dealing intellectual property rights and market access in China. The EU-China Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) sets out three main areas for cooperation and the multi-annual indicative program is allocating € 128 million for the first four years (2007-2010).35 These funds will be invested in areas covered by EU-China policy dialogues, including the ones dealing with trade, socio-economic development, support for China’s internal reform process, climate change, the environment and energy.36 In 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

For a very critical assessment on the EU’s ties with China see Berkofsky 2008b. For a recent analysis see also Grant and Barysch 2008. See http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/sectoraldialogues_en.pdf For details see European Commission 2010, as well as European Commission 2007. For further details see e.g. European Commission 2007.

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addition to the EU’s assistance and aid programs a number of EU Member States run individual assistance programs in the areas of poverty reduction, energy, healthcare, rule of law, environment and others.

3.1. No one voice The EU Commission’s mandate and authority to implement one ‘set’ of European policies towards China on behalf of the Union’s 27 Member States is limited and there is very little institutionalized coordination between the EU Commission (in charge of the Union’s overall trade and economic policies) on the one and the EU Council (in charge of the EU’s foreign and security policies) on the other hand. Indeed, there are no inner-EU mechanisms and forums coordinating respective Commission and Council policies towards China. Apart from the fact that the lack of inner-EU policy coordination slows down the Union’s decision-making process, it has in the recent past resulted in at times inconsistent and contradictory EU China policies. The controversy and inner-European disagreements in 2004 and 2005 over the EU weapons embargo imposed on China after Tiananmen in 1989 is an (infamous’) example in this context.37 European inconsistencies and contradictions on whether or whether not the weapons embargo should be lifted led Beijing to claim (and complain until the present day)38 that the EU is not a credible foreign and security policy actor and consequently not ‘worthy’ and qualified to implement the so-called ‘strategic partnership’ with China. Leaving aside that Beijing was (and still is) exploiting the inner-European disagreements and controversy on the weapons for its own purposes, EU and European weapons embargo policies were an example of how not to recommend itself as unified foreign and security policy actor. Beijing’s policymakers and its Brussels-based diplomats are of course well aware of and well-informed on the EU’s problems and complexities with regards to decision-making and inner-EU policy coordination and are 37. The controversy surrounding the weapons embargo has led to the establishment of the so-called EU-US (2004) and EU-Japan (2005) so-called ‘Strategic Dialogue on East Asian Security’ 38. Until today, Chinese officials and scholars likewise typically and persistently urge Brussels to lift the 1989 weapons embargo and end, as Beijing puts it, the ‘political discrimination’ against China at EU-China track (i.e. official) and track II (nonofficial) meetings

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without a doubt taking advantage of them. Beijing and their representatives in Brussels have over recent years made it a habit pointing out and complaining about the inner-European policy inconsistencies. Whether Beijing really pursues a strategy of creating divisions amongst EU Member States (as some scholars such as François Godement together with John Fox argue ‘get what it wants’ from Europe is debatable, but as long as EU Commission and EU Council (not to mention EU institutions and EU Member States’ governments) do not to coordinate their EU China policies on a regular basis, Brussels will remain ‘vulnerable to criticism from Beijing of not speaking with one but several (contradictory) voices on the same issue, be it on the weapons embargo or more recently EU tariffs imposed of shoes and footwear imported from China. Beijing is very likely to continue to choose dealing with either EU institutions or individual EU Member States’ governments according to what suits its interests best, as a European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) April 2009 paper authored by François Godement and John Fox argues forcefully.39 EU Member States for their part will like in the past continue to implement their ‘own’ individual China policies as they see fit regardless of the fact that these policies are not necessarily in compliance or worse contradict the EU Commission’s China policies. EU-China security cooperation (or the lack of it) The EU-China sectoral dialogues mentioned above do not cover security in general and Asian security in particular – not least because Beijing is not interested in discussing Asian security with the EU and does not consider the EU (as opposed to individual EU Member States such as the UK, France and probably increasingly Germany due to its engagement and troops’ presence in Afghanistan) to be a security actor in Asia. The EU weapons embargo imposed on China in 1989 is another reason (maybe for Beijing still THE reason) for China not to cooperate with EU in the area of security. Furthermore, and this has become increasingly clear over recent years, the EU and China have and pursue fundamentally different approaches towards security, be it East Asia, Central, Africa and elsewhere. 39. See Godement and Fox 2009. The paper, this author learned through various conversations with EU officials, has been perceived fairly negatively by policymakers in charge of the EU’s policies towards China at the EU Commission as the paper argues that the EU does not only not have a coherent strategy towards Beijing but also because it is unable to have one in view of the EU Member States’ competing China policies

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While the EU claims to formulate and implement (at least on paper) its policies taking into account the protection of human rights, democracy (or willingness to democratize), accountability and transparency in countries it is getting engaged in (above all in the fields of financial and development aid as well as technical assistance), China is being accused of conducting so-called ‘value-free diplomacy’, implementing economic and foreign economic policies regardless of political oppression or human rights violations (or both) in countries it is doing business in. This accusation has (in Europe and the US) in recent years in particular been voiced in the context of China’s energy and energy security policies in Africa and Central Asia as well as in parts of Southeast Asia, i.e. Burma). What Europe and the US refer to as ‘value-free diplomacy’ is what Beijing for its part calls policies along the lines of what it calls the ‘principle of noninterference’, i.e. policies which do not ‘interfere’ with domestic politics in countries China is doing business in. To be sure, the credibility of Beijing’s ‘principle of non-interference’ is debatable (or non-existent) in the context of Beijing’s policies towards Burma, Sudan and North Korea. Economic, political, financial support for oppressive regimes (and in the case of Burma for a military junta) must realistically be defined as interference in the affairs of the countries – in this case at the expense of the population obliged to live under oppressive regimes. The EU does not have a position on the ‘Taiwan issue’ beyond declaring that Brussels is supporting a peaceful solution of Chinese-Taiwanese disagreements over the status of Taiwan being opposed to the use of force between Taipei and Beijing. Brussels’ refusal to have e.g. a an outspoken position (beyond being ‘concerned’ on paper) on the number of (reportedly still growing number) of Chinese missiles directed at Taiwanese officially is to be understood in this context. EU-Taiwan trade amounted to roughly € 27.5 billion in 2009 making Taiwan the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in Asia (after China, Japan, South Korea and India).40 In view of these significant trade ties (plus in view of the fact that roughly 10 000 Europeans live and work in Taiwan)

40. Which is roughly 8.2 billion Euro less as compared to 2008. For details see European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations, Taiwan.

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Brussels should (at least in theory) be more interested in and concerned about stability of cross-straits relations.41 To be sure, leaving the existence of Chinese ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan aside, current cross-strait relations and the current quasi-absence of Chinese-Taiwanese tensions related to Taiwanese independence do not (at least not for now) necessarily ‘require’ a more outspoken EU opinion, which from a European perspective would (as this what the EU Commission worries most about) ‘upset’ Beijing’s policymakers.42

3.2. Human rights The EU discusses human rights with Beijing twice a year, in the framework of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue. The results of this dialogue, EU Commission officials involved in the dialogue admit, must be described as very limited at best, not least because Brussels and Beijing do not agree on what exactly constitutes human rights. Whereas freedom of speech and expression, political and civic rights fall under the EU’s definition of human rights, Beijing typically defines human rights above all as so-called ‘economic rights’, i.e. the right to leave poverty behind and prosper economically. What’s more, Beijing has in the past been very clear about its limits to talk about human rights with others. Back in April 2007, Beijing e.g. decided to unilaterally cancel the track II (i.e. the non-official and socalled ‘Experts Seminar’) part of the EU-China human rights dialogue after the EU and Berlin invited a Beijing-‘blacklisted’ NGO, the Hong Kongbased China Labour Bulletin, an NGO publishing regular reports on the conditions and problems of Chinese labourers.43 The cancellation of the EU-China summit in December 2008 in Lyons44 again demonstrated that Beijing remains very sensitive about what it considers to be interference in its ‘internal affairs’ and European ‘advice’ on 41. For a critical assessments see e.g. Berkofsky 2006a and Berkofsky 2006b. 42. Any time in the past when the ‘Taiwan issue’ made it onto the agenda or even to it in the context of EU-China exchanges-be it track I or track II, the Chinese side (scholars usually included) reacted fairly strongly typically forbidding itself any what it refers to as ‘interference’ in China’s internal affairs 43. See China Labour Bulletin 2009. 44. In protest over France French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to meet the Dalai Lama in the city of Gdansk on 6 December 2008, when Poland marked the 25th anniversary of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Lech Walesa; already in October 2008 the EU ‘offended’ Beijing when the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to imprisoned Chinese political activist Hu Jia. See European Parliament 2008.

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human rights in China clearly falls into the category of such ‘interference’.45

3.3. Trade ties Europe became China's biggest trading partner in 2004, but the EU still exports more to Switzerland than to China, which is not least a result of market access obstacles for European business in China as the EU Commission argues. In 2009, the EU imported € 215 billion worth of goods from China making China the Union’s biggest source of manufactured imports. Europe exported roughly € 81.7 billion worth of goods to China in 2009. The EU’s overall trade deficit with China (including services) in 2009 amounted to € 128 billion.46 However, approaching the EU-China deficit in isolation, economists argue is not doing justice to the quality and scope of Beijing’s trade surplus with Brussels. Asia’s share of EU imports has remained stable at 20-25 % over the past decade and the growing trade deficit with China can to some extent be explained by the fact that exports from China have partly been replaced exports from other Asian countries. Besides, foreign multinational companies (many of them European) are responsible for roughly 60 % of exports out of China, de-facto meaning that Europe (and ultimately European consumers who enjoy the cost benefit of products made in China) contributes to or indeed ‘produces’ a large of the EU’s trade deficit with China.

3.4. Market access obstacles, IPR and counterfeit products Intellectual property rights (IPR) violations in China are a European concern and EU statistics indicate that European business has lost up to € 20 billion in China through copyright and trademark infringements in 2008 alone.47 Beijing has in recent years adopted a number of (at least on 45. China, the official rhetoric in Beijing indicates, refuses to get involved in internal political affairs of states it is doing business with. This explains e.g. the fact that Beijing has no problems with actively expanding political and economic ties with Sudan, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Burma. For critical assessments see e.g. Dosch 2007; Restall 2007; Berkofsky 2007b. 46. For further details see European Commission 2009b. 47. For further details European Commission 2006. For a critical assessment of the EU’s China October 2006 trade paper see also Berkofsky 2007c; also Berkofsky 2007d.

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paper) effective laws and regulations related to the protection of intellectual property rights, but the enforcement process in China remains slow and only partly transparent, as European continues to maintain. 60 % of counterfeit and pirated products sold in Europe are still made in China, the EU Commission points out on a regular basis. EU business and its representatives in Beijing – above all the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing – complain in regular reports48 about a number of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers on exports from Europe, as well as restrictions on investment in manufacturing and services. In non-compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regulations, the Chamber’s 2008 ‘EU Business in China Position Paper’ argued, Beijing continues to maintain a number of high tariffs in industries of particular importance such as textiles, clothing, footwear, leather and ceramics. As regards Chinese non-tariff barriers, European exporters are according to the EU Chamber of Commerce facing an increasing number of non-tariff barriers such as product certification, labelling standards, import-approval requirements and customs clearance delays.49 Brussels and the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing also request Beijing to abolish government-initiated so-called ‘China-first approaches’ in what Brussels and the chamber refer to as ‘key sectors, such as steel, automobiles, shipbuilding and semiconductors’. However, given that China has only recently introduced these policies aimed at aiding and protecting local industries and limiting EU (and US) exports in the above sectors it remains yet unlikely that Beijing will abolish them any time soon as requested by the EU (and the US). While the process of enforcing intellectual property rights in China will continue to be slow, the EU will continue filing anti-dumping cases against China at the WTO in Geneva on a (fairly) regular basis. The EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue Mechanism (HLM)50, inaugurated in Beijing in April 2008, was envisioned to deal with 48. For details on EU complaints with regards to what the EU refers to as unfair trade, investment and business practices see European Business in China 2008/2009. 49. For the most EU’s most recent (September 2009) request towards China to abolish trade barriers restricting EU investments in China see Europa Press Releases Rapid 2009. See also e.g. Thornhill 2008. 50. For details, see Europa Press Releases Rapid 2008. In fact 9 EU Commissioners led by Commission President Barroso traveled to Beijing for the dialogue’s inaugural session in Beijing last year.

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market access obstacles, IPR and other problems related to EU investments in China. While the EU Commission stresses the promotion of trade and investment cooperation, technology transfer trade and trade facilitation as the rationale of that dialogue, the EU Delegation in Beijing has in its statements on the dialogue been more upfront about what European business investing in China wants the dialogue to be: A forum to remove the remaining WTO non-compliant market access obstacles confronting European businesses in China. The HLM’s function and importance will continue to be perceived very differently in Brussels and Beijing. While Brussels hopes that the dialogue will eventually lead to concrete and measurable progress on the above mentioned issues (just like the US hopes (so far in vain) that the so-called ‘US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue’51 will turn into an instrument to achieve progress on the same issues), Beijing on the other hand stresses the HLM’s informal (as opposed to legally-binding) character of that dialogue.52

3.5. Conclusions The bilateral EU-China agenda will continue to be dominated by ‘breadand-butter’ issues such as trade deficit in China’s favour, intellectual property rights, market access obstacles for European business in China and most recently the controversy centred around the EU extension of additional tariffs on shoes made in China (with the EU accusing China of dumping Chinese-made on the European market, i.e. selling (supported by subsidies provided for by the Chinese government) Chinese-made shoes below the price of production in China).53 The EU’s above mentioned timid position on the so-called ‘Taiwan question’ and Brussels’ decision not to ‘rock the boat’ by e.g. urging Beijing to reduce the number of Chinese missiles directed at Taiwanese territory is an indication that Brussels is not willing to get further involved in Asian hard security, especially if one of the concerned parties is China. To be sure, Beijing will continue not to have to ‘worry’ about too much EU interest in the so-called ‘Taiwan issue’ with Brussels ‘obeying’ China 51. U.S. Department of the Treasury 2010. 52. For a very critical assessment of that dialogue see Sally 2009 and Berkofsky 2008c. 53. A very controversially discussed issue inside of Europe, mostly because China is designated as ‘non-market’ economy meaning hat the prices of Chinese shoes are compared with prices in a third country, in this case Brazil. See also Beattle 2009.

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declaring its commitment towards to the so-called ‘One-China-principle’ (acknowledging Beijing as the sole of all Chinese people, including those in Taiwan) at some point during every official EU-China encounter. The EU-China ‘strategic partnership’ (proclaimed in 2003) will continue not to include the notion of ‘strategic’ in a security sense (even if the US and Japan initially thought and feared so, especially when the possible lift of the EU weapons embargo made it to the top of the EU-China agenda in 2004/2005). Instead, ‘strategic’ will continue to stand for ‘comprehensive’ in the context of bilateral relations, amongst others reflected by the number of the steadily increasing number of the above mentioned ‘strategic dialogues.’ The ‘EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)’ is planned to be the next ‘event’ on the bilateral agenda, Brussels has been announcing for more than three years.54 However, apart from reading on the official record that the PCA will take EU-China relations to the ‘next level’, there is very little information available on how bilateral relations will change in scope and quality once the PCA gets adopted.55 To be sure, when and if adopted, the PCA will not result in any additional EU-China security cooperation.

4.

The EU’s relations with North Korea

North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 200956 (the first one took place in October 2006) confirmed that the EU’s role to denuclearize North Korea will be the same as the in the years before: Providing however-shaped ‘political support’ for the so-called 6-Party Talks while continuing a very limited engagement course towards North Korea through equally limited and sporadic humanitarian and food and economic engagement activities. The EU’s current relative inactivity on the Korean Peninsula stands in contrast to the Union’s economic and political engagement policies towards North Korea of the early 2000s. 54. There is yet very limited (essentially none) information available on the new envisioned partnership agreement other than announcing that the new agreement will according to EU officials take EU-China relations to (a yet to be defined) ‘new level’ as this author has learned through conversations and interviews with EU officials over recent years 55. See also Berkofsky 2008. 56. Which led to the reinforcement of existing EU sanctions against North Korea. See e.g. EU Business 2009a and EU Business 2009.

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In May 2001, the EU established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and many EU Member States followed the EU example in 2001 and 2002. Today, 26 out of 27 EU Member States (except France which cites North Korea’s human rights situation as obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang) maintain bilateral diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.57 The establishment of EU-North Korea diplomatic relations, however, has not led to increased EU influence on politics and security in North Korea (as it was hoped in Brussels in the early 2000s), not least because Brussels did not turn into a ‘counterweight’ of US policies towards North Korea as it was initially hoped in Pyongyang.58 After the detection in 2002 of what was believed to be a clandestine North Korean nuclear program, Brussels instead followed almost immediately (and without spending much time to verify whether what US spy satellites have detected was indeed a secret North Korean nuclear program) Washington’s lead to interrupt economic and political engagement with Pyongyang.

4.1. The EU and the 6-Party Talks59 The so-called 6-Party Talks were established in 2003 after US reconnaissance satellites in October 2002 detected a clandestine North Korean nuclear program producing nuclear weapons-grade highly enriched uranium. The talks gained additional relevance when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006 and declared itself a defacto ‘nuclear state.’ The talks continued despite the nuclear crisis eventually leading to the ‘February 2007 agreement’ which codified the provision of economic, financial and energy aid for North Korea in return for the verifiable and sustainable end of Pyongyang’s nuclear programs (and eventually dismantlement of all North Korean facilities). 57. While seven EU Member States (Germany, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Great Britain, Poland and Hungary) maintain embassies in Pyongyang, the other Member States have themselves represented by either their embassies in Seoul or Beijing. The EU itself does not maintain an embassy in Pyongyang and is (depending on the issue and the political circumstances) represented by its ambassador in Seoul. 58. Various conversations with North Korean officials in 2003, 2004, 2007 and 2008 confirm this. 59. A multilateral forum hosted by China and aimed at de-nuclearizing North Korea. The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 and the participating nations are the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea.

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Brussels has never publicly requested a seat at the 6-Party Talks negotiation table in Beijing either and has until the present day essentially limited itself to offering verbal ‘political support’ for the 6-Party Talks.60 In a speech at the European Parliament on 11 October 2006, the EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner mentioned EU ‘political support’ for the 6-Party Talks, but did not quantify and qualify what kind of ‘political support’ the EU is willing and able to offer to a forum and a negotiation process it is not part of.61 However, not being invited to Beijing was not necessarily a disadvantage according to Robert Carlin, visiting fellow at the Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and former senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (2002-2006): ‘The 6-Party Talks were always going to be a dead end, and it never made any sense to me why the Europeans would want to tie themselves to the mast of a ship that was so clearly doomed.’ ‘The talks, were based on the entirely false premise that the 1994 Agreed Framework62 ‘had failed because it was a bilateral arrangement, and the way to hem the North Koreans in was to surround them at the negotiating table with five other parties.’

4.2. No say, no pay? After Pyongyang agreed in February 2007 to disable and dismantle its plutonium-producing reactors in return for the provision of energy and financial aid, Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) announced that the EU would from now on request to be a ‘player’ as opposed to only ‘payer’ in a post-nuclear North Korea. Glyn Ford, former member of the European Parliament and frequent visitor to North Korea calls this Brussels’ ‘No-say-no-pay’ approach towards North Korea in his 2008 book ‘North Korea on the Brink-Struggle for Survival.’ The EU and Solana, Ford writes in his book, were planning to 60. For details on the EU’s position on and approach towards the 6-Party Talks see e.g. Council of the European Union 2008; for a critical assessment of the EU’s ‘non-role’ in North Korea see also Berkofsky 2009b. 61. Ferrero-Waldner 2006. 62. A bilateral deal between the US and North Korea by which Washington offered energy and aid in return for Pyongyang foregoing its nuclear ambitions)

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take North Korea’s (at least on paper) willingness to make progress with regards its denuclearization process as an opportunity to define and formulate a new and possibly expanded EU role in a post-nuclear North Korea. ‘After February’s deal in Beijing (2007), the spokesperson of Javier Solana, the High Official for the CFSP, speaking to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee made it clear that this time around the EU wanted to be a player not a payer in any final accounting.’63

However, these plans have never materialized and the EU Council and Solana have never followed up on that rhetoric which back then indeed sounded like a ‘new’ and decisively more active EU security policy approach towards North Korea.

4.3. Food and humanitarian aid From 1995 until 2005, the EU has provided North Korea with humanitarian aid worth roughly € 370 million even if the EU’s most recent notable provision of food aid for North Korea dates back to November 2006.64 What’s more, transport costs to and distribution costs in North Korea are included in the overall amount provided for humanitarian aid significantly reducing the actual money available for actual food and humanitarian aid such as medicines and medical supplies. Through the EU Food Security program the EU is funding NGO projects over the period 2007-2010 out of a € 35 million budget set aside for the DPRK in 2002, but for the time being the EU has no plans to provide North Korea with additional humanitarian and food aid arguing that North Korea’s current humanitarian and food situation does not require additional large-scale food aid. The World Food Program (WFP) does not share that assessment and maintains that North Korea’s 2008 harvest is the worst in a decade. What’s more, malnutrition amongst infants, children and women is still and as ever above 30 % and more than 50 % of North Korea’s population,

63. See Ford 2008 64. See European Commission 2006.

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the WFP states in a report on North Korea, does not have access to basic medical services and supplies.65

4.4. Past EU economic engagement policies As formulated in the EU’s 2002 North Korea Country Strategy Paper (CSP) a total of € 35 million had been set aside for EU technical assistance projects until 2006.66 The CSP-together with the EU's National Indicative Program (NIP) for North Korea-set out the framework and objectives for technical assistance projects in North Korea. At the time, this made the EU the only substantial donor of technical assistance to North Korea and the CSP and NIP were to provide for training in market economic principles and projects designed to support and promote sustainable management and the efficient use of natural resources and energy in the DPRK, as well as institutional support and capacitybuilding. The Country Strategy Paper (2002)67 foresaw the following areas of cooperation: 앫 institutional support and capacity building 앫 sustainable development and use of natural resources including access to sustainable energy sources 앫 sustainable transport sector and rural development.68 Basis for the aid and projects formulated in the CSP was the EU’s assessment that support for North Korea’s industrial sector (above all coal, steel) as opposed to support for the agricultural sector is crucial for a possible economic recovery in North Korea. Back then Brussels concluded that the structure of North Korea’s economy is similar to the structure of many Eastern European economies of the 1990s (as opposed to the structure of fellow Asian economies with and large and developed agricultural sectors.) Consequently, EU aid and technical assistance in 2002 focussed on North Korea’s industrial sector such as coal and the heavy industry. 65. Furthermore, the WFP estimates that 2008 could have been the worst harvest in North Korea for more than a decade. According to WFP there is a deficit of 1.6 million tons of grain and crops meaning that up to 7 million North Korean could suffer from acute hunger in the years ahead; for details see World Food Programme; see also Haggard et al. 2008. 66. European Commission. North Korea Country Strategy Paper. 67. See also Berkofsky 2003a. 68. See also Berkofsky 2003b.

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Initially, North Korea seemed willing not only to accept EU economic and financial aid but also to learn from Europe how to run and manage an economy in need of economic and structural reforms.69 Amongst others, Pyongyang sent a group of senior officials to Europe in 2002 to learn about EU economic policies and models and welcomed the EU Parliament’s initiative to establish regular exchanges between the European Parliament North Korea’s political leadership. Precondition for the successful implementation of European aid and technical assistance programs was Pyongyang’s willingness and efforts to implement economic and structural reforms. Initially, North Korea’s political leadership seemed prepared to implement fairly and (by North Korean standards) wide-ranging economic reforms and in 2002 and partially liberalized wages and prices to enable farmers to make and increase profits.70 Many of Pyongyang’s economic reforms, however, have been interrupted and (at least for now) terminated indefinitely as Leonid Petrov, Research Associate at the Australian National University in Canberra, argues. ‘In 2004, North Korean government officials and the army were told that market liberalism was a temporary phenomenon and would not be tolerated in the future. The economic policy of partial liberalization started in July 2002 was gradually abandoned and old patterns of central economic planning, public distribution system, and strictly controlled market activity were being reintroduced.’

Although the outbreak of the nuclear crisis in 2002 put an end to the implementation process of the EU’s North Korea CSP, Brussels has not suspended all economic assistance and engagement activities in North Korea. In 2004, 2005 and 2007 e.g. EU Commission delegations visited North Korea to hold seminars on EU-North Korea relations and economic reforms in North Korea.

4.5. (Very) limited trade The EU-North Korea trade volume is negligible and given its very small volume it does not even feature on the website of the Commission’s Directorate-General for External Trade (DG Trade). The most recent data of bilateral trade available on EU Commission websites dates back to

69. On North Korea’s economic reform process and later its interruption, see e.g.Babson 2006. See also Berkofsky 2007b; Frank 2005. 70. See Babson 2006. See also Berkofsky 2007b.

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2002.71 According to more up to date (non-EU) sources the bilateral EUNorth Korea trade volume between 1995 and 2005 fluctuated between $ 200 and 400 million annually representing an almost irrelevant share of the EU’s overall external trade. North Korea’s overall external trade volume – mainly thanks to its booming bilateral with China –, however, has increased in recent years. Bilateral trade between China and North Korea in 2007 amounted to $ 1.7 billion and China is by now far the largest investor in North Korea. Roughly 150 Chinese companies are operating in North Korea and more than 80 % of consumer goods sold in North Korea originate in China.72 In 2008 trade with China amounted to more than 70 % of North Korea’s overall external trade. The modest EU-North Korean bilateral trade volume notwithstanding, European business does not shun North Korea completely. Recent European-North Korean business cooperation include the PyongSu pharmaceutical joint venture (JV)73 (which produces generics like aspirin for the North Korean domestic market) a Polish-North Korean shipping joint venture and a partnership in IT services between the Korea Computer Centre (KCC) and a German partner company. The most successful joint ventures, however, are probably tobacco and beer. The British American Tobacco (BAT) plant close to Pyongyang is operating profitably and the North Korean Taedonggang Brewery shipped stock and barrel from Trowbridge in the UK to North Korea to open up a brewery in Pyongyang.

4.6. Conclusions The EU could have continued its economic engagement towards North Korea in spite of the nuclear revelations offering North Korea and the international community an alternative approach of how to deal with a failing state on the brink of going nuclear. However, Brussels has chosen to follow the US lead back in 2002 and suspended its originally ambitious and comprehensive economic engagement programs towards North Korea as soon as Washington

71. More up-to date are e.g. to be found on the website of the European Union Delegation to South Korea; see also Schmidt 2006. 72. For more and analysis on China-North relations see International Crisis Group 2006. 73. This enterprise was founded in 2004, a joint project between North Korea’s Ministry of Health and Swiss Inter Pacific Holding which operates through the North Korea Development Corporation it supports financially

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announced that is reconnaissance satellites have detected a clandestine North Korean nuclear programme. Brussels’ initial willingness to engage North Korea politically and economically as well as its contributions to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the mid-1990s have not convinced interested parties (US, South Korea, Japan) that the EU is ‘qualified’ for a role in solving ‘hard security’ issues on the Korean Peninsula. To be sure, Brussels has not sought such a role and has never requested (at least not officially) to become a member of the 6-Party Talks, thereby probably confirming its (and its Member States’) disinterest in investing resources and energies into a forum dominated by US and Chinese influence. Accordingly, limiting itself offering to the above mentioned ‘political support’ for the 6-Party Talks stands for the EU’s de-facto decision to exclude itself from solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

5.

Conclusions

The above analysis of the EU’s relations with Japan, China and North Korea provided us with some conclusions on why the EU’s role and engagement in Asian security is bound to remain very limited and will continue to take place on an ad-hoc basis in the years ahead. Not least – or probably above all in terms of day-to-day-politics – because Brussels is faced with the challenge of seeking to initiate and implement security cooperation with states and governments with different political cultures, political systems and different levels of preparedness to cooperate on (sensitive or controversial) security issues with others, including the EU. While security cooperation with democracies (e.g. Japan, South Korea, India) should be (at least on paper) comparatively unproblematic (or at least possible), the same cooperation with authoritarian regimes and nondemocracies is inevitably more difficult or more often than not even impossible, especially (as this is e.g. the case with Beijing on the above discussed ‘Taiwan question’ and with North Korea on the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula) if the partner envisioned for security cooperation is part of a security conflict or contingency in question. The above mentioned inner-European conflicts and problems with regards to the formulation and implementation of European foreign and security 142

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policies towards Asia aside, Asian security (as opposed to security closer to ‘home’ such as in Eastern and Central Europe and Russia) will continue not to be a priority on the EU’s external relations agenda in the years ahead, despite of strong European trade and business ties in and with Asia. Concluding on a positive note, the EU will continue to remain Asia’s main provider of ‘soft security’ such as food, humanitarian, economic and financial aid thereby contributing more to Asian regional peace and stability than involvement in Asian security ever could.

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Godement, François, and Fox, John. 2009. A Power Audit of EU-China Relations. Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009. http://ecfr.3cdn.net/532cd91d0b5c9699ad_ozm6b9bz4.pdf Grant, Charles, and Barysch, Katinka. 2008, Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order? London: Centre for European Reform, 2008. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_837.pdf Haggard, Stephen, Marcus Noland, and Eric Weeks. 2008. North Korea on the Precipice of Famine. Policy Brief. Peterson Institute. May 28. Hughes, Christopher W. 2004. Japan’s Security Agenda – Military, Economic & Environmental Dimensions, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Huxley, Tim. 2006. On recent and emerging ethnic and other conflicts in Southeast Asia. http://www.iiss.org/about-us/staffexpertise/list-experts-by-name/timhuxley/ International Crisis Group Asia. 2006. China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Report No. 112, February. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920&l=1 Michito, Tsuruoka. 2004. Why the EU-Japan partnership cannot flourish, paper, British International Studies Association Conference, University of Warwick, December, 2004. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2008 Policy Brief, May. http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08042HaggardNolandWeeks.pdf Pyongyang Pharmaceutical Factory. http://www.pyongsu.com Restall, Hugo. 2007. China’s Bid for Asian Hegemony, The Far Eastern Economic Review. May. Sally, Razeen. 2009. The EU’s View of China, East Asia Forum, December. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/24/the-eus-view-of-china/ Schmidt, Hans-Joachim. 2006. Peace on the Korean Peninsula-What can the EU Contribute to the 6-Party Process?, Report No. 75, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt PRIF. http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif75.pdf Solana, Javier. 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy, European Council, Brussels, 12 December. http://www.ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf

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European Chamber of Commerce Beijing. 2008/2009. The European Business in China Position Paper. http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/view/media/publications Thornhill, John. 2008. Trading Strains, The Financial Times, October 1. U.S. Department of the Treasury. US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue; http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/ World Food Programme. Where We Work, North Korea; http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=408

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8. China in Africa: from Engagement to Partnership Chris Alden

China’s engagement with the African continent, built upon their historical support for the struggle for independence and increasingly the economic power wielded by Beijing, has helped re-ignite continental economies through new investment and trade opportunities as well as restore African political agency within the international system. Led by state owned enterprises, generous financial support and a rising tide of Chinese migration, China’s presence in Africa is fast becoming a fixture across all sectors and countries in the continent. For the leading industrialised economies of the North, their initial praise of China’s gradualist shift to a market economy has evolved into a chorus bemoaning the Chinese impact on their trade competitiveness and growing concern as they are upstaged internationally by Beijing. These developments are most clearly visible in Africa, a once-forgotten continent that had been languishing on the margins of international interest since the ending of the Cold War. This chapter will examine the China’s engagement with Africa by looking, first, at the sources of Chinese engagement with Africa; secondly, the proliferation of Chinese actors on the African continent; thirdly, the FOCAC process, the diplomatic cornerstone of the relationship; and concluding with an assessment of the new trends in the relationship.

1.

The sources of Chinese engagement with Africa

Since the onset of economic reform in 1978, China has had an unmatched record of sustained growth that has transformed key sectors of its economy into the globe’s leading site for manufacturing and production. To keep the high levels of domestic output, seen to be crucial not only for the Chinese economy but for overall social and political stability in this authoritarian state, the economy needs critical energy, mineral and others resources from

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abroad.1 The promulgation of the government’s ‘going out’ strategy, whereby ultimately over a hundred restructured state-owned enterprises were given the legal and administrative means, preferential access to finance, and diplomatic support necessary to break into markets outside of China, has been the main policy response to this need. Given the financial resources of what, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, had become the world’s largest holder of capital with over US $ 2.4 trillion in foreign reserves and applying these to the problem of carving out a position in the energy and strategic minerals markets was, in retrospect, fairly straight forward in a capital-starved African environment. Concurrently, the willingness of the Chinese government to provide a whole package of inducements alongside any leasing or supply agreements for resources, aimed at elite defined needs ranging from presidential palaces to large-scale infrastructure projects, has proved to be crucial to securing deals in Africa.2 Underlying this approach is a highly publicised provision whereby the Chinese government forswears any interest in the domestic affairs of African governments, in direct contrast to the European Union (EU) or the United States (US), both of whom have selectively applied conditions to their development assistance programmes and even some investments. In parallel with this state-led drive for resources abroad is a search for new markets aimed at expanding the investment and trade opportunities for Chinese firms though the relatively small size of the African market poses some constraints on Chinese ambitions. And, finally, there is a diplomatic imperative ties to the decades of competition between Beijing and Taipei over official recognition with countries in Africa being particularly targeted.

1.1. Resource security China’s position within Africa’s resource sector has surged in the last decade and a half, from that of a marginal player to holding significant interests in oil leases from Angola to Sudan and mining concessions from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to South Africa. Its two way trade with Africa, reaching exceeding US $ 106 billion in 2008, is overwhelmingly based on the extraction of oil, strategic minerals and a few raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods.3 Reflecting these 1. 2. 3.

Downs 2004, 21-41; Soares de Oliveira 2008, 83-109. Alden 2007, 11-36. Pinaud et al 2006.

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trends, in 1993 China went from leading Asian oil exporter to, a few years later, the second largest world consumer (2003) and third global importer (2004). This fact alone justifies the reallocation of energy security to the core of Beijing’s foreign policy formulation since not only is China’s continued economic growth dependent on securing resources supply but also its social stability and ultimately the survival of the Communist Party of China (CPC).4 Despite being among the major oil producers (4,8 % share of world’s production)5 and being second only to the US in refinery capacity and output (8,5 % and 8,7 % respectively),6 China is only able to provide for less than half of its domestic oil needs. China’s oil consumption has doubled in the last decade and according to OPEC China’s oil demand will show the world’s fastest growth rate in the coming decades, doubling again by 2030.7 Although China became a net oil importer in 1993 it was not until the new century that energy security became central to the political debate. Uneasiness over this topic among the political elite continues to grow as illustrated by the creation of the Energy Leading Group in 2005 (coordination body headed by premier Wen Jiabao), the publication of a White Paper on Energy (‘China’s Energy Conditions and Policies’)8 in December 2007 and the White Paper on Diplomacy in July 2008.9 In addition to oil and in order to sustain its economic growth, China also became externally dependent on other sectors of the extraction industry, further justifying its growing economic interaction with the African continent in the new century. Over the past decade China surpassed the US to become the world leading consumer of most base metals. Chinese demand has been growing at a rate over 10 % a year since 1990 having even intensified in recent years10 and being the major driver behind the soaring prices of metals in the international market. China is the world’s largest consumer and producer of aluminium, iron ore, lead and zinc and holds significant shares in all other minerals supply and demand markets. Finally, food security itself is becoming an area of great concern for China. The years of rapid economic development have, for the first time in decades, exposed China to vagaries of supply and market constraints in 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Zweig and Jianhai 2005. BP 2008, 9. BP 2008, 18. Idem, 47. China.org.cn The Jamestown Foundation 2008. The Raw Material Group 2006.

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agricultural commodities. In terms of overall agricultural imports, China leads the region with its import share of 44 % of the world’s soybeans, 35 % of the world’s cotton, 20 % of the world’s palm oil and 2.5 % of the world’s rice, with Japanese, Indian and South Korean demand trailing in its wake. Consumption patterns in China have changed dramatically since the gradualist introduction of market capitalism and Chinese total caloric intake has risen to levels equivalent to the US. And while rising domestic demand would have been expected to open up opportunities for expanding local agriculture by Chinese farmers, China’s physical constraints – despite its geographic size, it has only 7 % of the world’s arable land – and the fact that rapid industrialisation and accompanying urbanisation over the last few decades has removed tens of thousands of hectares of fertile land from production. The result has been a steady rise in food imports which, in combination with Chinese (and Indian) energy needs, has pushed up food prices world-wide. For China in particular, the fear that inflation and dwindling supplies could contribute to periodic waves of domestic unrest that had begun to gather force was underscored in a report issued by the State Council on food security in 2005, the first year China became a major importer of food since the CPC took over. Following up on this, the National Development Reform Committee produced a 20 year Food Security Strategy whose preliminary findings were released in November 2008, setting out the parameters of food security for the country as being met first and foremost through the maintenance of 125 million hectares of arable land and 95 % self-sufficiency in grains.11

1.2. The African resource bounty Against this backdrop, Africa has assumed a critical role in China’s search for resource security. The African continent possesses a generous endowment in natural resources, namely hydrocarbons, minerals and timber, which remain mostly untapped due to decades of political instability, poor infrastructure and lack of investment. However, Chinese foray into this sector had to take into account the prevailing dominance of established interests, primarily from the US, France and Great Britain, all of which produced a pattern of investment that replicated colonial era divisions refracted through the politics of the Cold War. With the end of the bipolar conflict, economic interests rapidly pushed to the forefront and the geographic spheres of influence which had shaped energy investment gave way to direct competition between, for instance, French and 11. Kelley European Union Committee testimony 2009, 94.

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American interests in West Africa.12 Among the most prominent newcomers are Asian states (China, India, Malaysia and Singapore) and Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). This scenario sets the ground for growing competition for economic and political influence over the continent in the coming decades, which is particularly astounding if one considers that less than a decade ago the African continent was suffering from a sharp decline in interest by its traditional Western partners. In regional terms Africa possesses the third largest oil reserves, an estimated 9,5 % of global known deposits in 2007, behind the Middle East (61 %) and North America (11,6 %) and ahead of South and Central America (8,5 %). Noteworthy is the fact that Africa boasts the fastest growth rate in oil reserves, having doubled in the past two decades.13 In sub-regional terms, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa account each for half of the continent’s known reserves. Libya (35 %), Nigeria (31 %), Algeria (10 %), and Angola (8 %) possess the largest reserves. As for production, Africa comes fourth with a share of 12,5 % of world total but the ranking changes a bit with Nigeria as the main African oil producer (25 %), followed by Algeria (21 %), Libya (20 %) and Angola (18 %).14 In recent years Northern African countries production is showing signs of stabilisation while SSA countries have been expanding their share. For instances, Angola has registered the fastest growth rate in production during the past decade, having even overtaken Nigeria as SSA major oil producer in mid 2008 Angola.15 Africa’s endowment in non fuel minerals further complements the attractiveness of this picture in which South Africa appears as a prize since it sits on one of the world’s richest mineral beds. Among other minerals, South Africa is leading producer of platinum (80 % of total production and 90 % of world reserves) and manganese (holds over ¾ of worlds reserve base) and second world gold mine producer (overtaken by Australia in 2007. Moreover, South Africa is a major coal producer and has developed the world’s leading technology in converting coal to synfuels, introducing new possibilities for the coal-rich Chinese state. Recognition of this has factored into the joint venture between two Chinese firms and the South African parastatal, Sasol. By way of contrast, despite decades of neglect and 12. 13. 14. 15.

Schraeder 2000, 395-419. BP 2008, 6 BP 2008, 8 Although Angola’s production has been increasing exponentially, this situation is partly due to increasing unrest in Nigerian southern oil fields.

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internecine conflict, the DRC’s mineral wealth is notoriously unexploited. Even so, the DRC is the leading cobalt mine producer (36 %) possessing half of world’s known reserves and also number one diamond producer (1/ 3 of total). Together with South Africa and Botswana they account for over half of global diamond mining output and 60 % of known deposits.16 Among other African countries that possess significant reserves of minerals which attracted Chinese interest are Gabon (manganese), Zambia (copper and iron ore), Zimbabwe (platinum) and Angola (diamonds, copper and iron ore). Finally, African agriculture and forestry resources remain underdeveloped. According to the FAO, only 14 percent of Africa’s total 184 million hectares of available land is under cultivation, with 93 percent of that dependent upon rainfall and fertiliser usage is low.17 African agriculture, which continues to serve as a mainstay of employment in most African countries, suffers from low productivity, chronic under-investment and difficulties in accessing potential foreign export markets. To be sure, the environmental constraints on agriculture in much of the continent are considerable, though viewed from a Chinese perspective, these sort of impediments are familiar ones. Private Chinese farmers have already set up farms in Uganda, South Africa and Zambia (23 in the latter case)18 while larger agricultural firms are in negotiations with African governments to lease larger tracts of land for production. In terms of forestry, hundreds of thousands of square kilometres of virgin timber abound in parts of tropical Africa and have inspired China’s small and medium sized companies to set up logging – both legal and illegal – operations across the continent. Building on these economic complementarities is the dramatic surge in trade. Recent flows illustrate the vast complementarities that uphold this thriving relationship. Between 1995 and 2000 commercial exchanges more than doubled from US $ 4 billion to $ 10 billion, having quadrupled in the following five years (US $ 42 bn in 2005) and the figure surpassed US $ 106 bn in 200819 – a year before the 2010 target established by Hu Jintao during the FOCAC III summit in Beijing in 2006. Even if in relative terms Africa represents only a meagre 3 % of China’s overall foreign trade, it shows the highest growth rate among all regions. While Africa’s share in Chinese exports grew from 1,7 % in 1996 to 2,7 % in 2006 the share in

16. 17. 18. 19.

USGS 2008. Diouf 2008 Spieldoch and Murphy 2009, 42. Chinese Ministry of Commerce and WTO.

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imports expanded from 1 % to 3,6 % in the same decade,20 revealing the nature of exchanges. At the same time, the onset of the world’s worst economic crisis since the Great Depression has challenged the new-found certainties of Chinese engagement in Africa. Some are already declaring the withdrawal of dozens Chinese firms from the mining sector and Beijing’s push to re-open negotiations on the purported US $ 9 billion investment package in the DRC as a sign that the high water mark of China-Africa economic ties has been reached. This proposed loan to the DRC has itself been the subject of intense criticism by Western donors and the IMF, who were able to pressure Kinshasa and Beijing to get it revised downward to US $ 6bn in February 2009.21 This pessimistic interpretation is, however, misplaced: China’s involvement in Africa remains a priority, albeit one which is subject to changing international and domestic economic circumstances as well as the emergence of a reconsideration of risk in selective African environments.

1.3. New markets and diplomacy Though resource security impulses are at the forefront of the contemporary push into Africa with China’s energy SOEs taking the lead, the desire to take advantage of commercial opportunities by expanding trade into African markets has also played an important role. In part, the policy of using Chinese finance to support Chinese construction firms building infrastructure in Africa represents a concerted strategy of risk mitigation and, concurrently, provides incentives for domestic firms to ‘go out’ and seek opportunities abroad. Indeed, survey data suggests that once established in the African market, Chinese firms ‘anticipated that they will secure further contracts.’22 The over-supply of infrastructure firms and labour within China itself provides an additional rationale for this expansion into new markets. The appeal for African governments of this approach, despite the concerns around the use of Chinese labour voiced in some circles, was these were ‘turnkey’ operations that placed few demands on the African recipients and produced in short order a relatively inexpensive and functioning road, railroad, bridge or dam.23

20. 21. 22. 23.

World Trade Data 2007. Lokongo 2009. Davies and Corkin 2007, 246. Fletcher 2010, 7.

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Another driver is the need by Chinese manufacturing firms to find new outlets for their products, especially those at the low end of the consumer market (which were losing favour domestically and held little appeal in the more sophisticated Western markets), contributed to a surge in two-way trade.24 With manufacturing accounting for 32 % of China’s GDP and 89 % of its merchandise exports by 2005, the importance of opening up new opportunities abroad was paramount.25 At a different level, a new wave of Chinese migrants to the continent have opened up wholesale and retail shops across the continent, bringing low cost goods to the African consumer and contributing to a boom in the purchase of items such as bicycles, radios and watches that were once out of reach of ordinary Africans.26 And, the more traditional concerns around diplomacy featured as well in the Chinese contemporary movement into Africa. These included the longstanding diplomatic recognition competition with Taiwan, which had been able to retain or win recognition from a number of African states over the years.27 Beijing’s drive to isolate the rebel province internationally meant that it actively sought to provide inducements for African governments to reconsider their links with Taipei. And, finally as pressure on China to play a more activist role on the global stage increased, the need to seek out partnerships with like-minded states became an imperative. Africa’s position as a friendly environment for Beijing was underscored by its unwillingness to join in the Western sanctions campaign that followed in the wake of Tiananmen Square and its support for China in international forum as varied as the International Olympic Committee (where African votes helped secure Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics) and the UN’s Human Rights Commission. Sharing a common view on sovereignty and human rights – though one that was arguably in the process of changing through the African Union and the emergence of R2P – enabled China to work in tandem on many issues with the largest regional voting bloc in the UN.28 To address these complex diplomatic ends, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the multilateral Forum for China-Africa Cooperation in 2000.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Broadman 2007. Biacuana et al. 2009, 10. Dittigen 2010; Park 2009; Dobler 2008. Rawnsley 2000. Alden 2007, 16.

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2.

The Chinese in Africa: from state owned enterprises to retail shopkeepers

Capturing the diversity of China’s engagement in Africa is necessary to achieve any understanding of the complex and sometimes contrary reactions that its presence inspires across Africa. Ranging from global parastatals like CNOOC to thousands of retails shops, the Chinese have made inroads in the economic life of ordinary Africans in an extraordinary short period of time. Moreover, the rapidity with which these Chinese actors adapt to changing circumstances in Africa – in some part a product of the fast pace of change in China itself – continually challenges assumptions about their standing in Africa. At the sharp end of China’s engagement in Africa are a host of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which have sought to gain access to resources and markets formerly dominated by Western and South African firms. Using a package of high-profile diplomatic and substantive financial incentives, these SOEs have been able to secure leases for oil in Angola, Sudan and Nigeria as well as deals gaining access to strategic minerals in countries such as Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. The proximity of top management of these SOEs to leading party officials, according to one study ‘affords certain strategic SOEs vial political connections and a measure of input into foreign policy decisions pertaining to their particular business interests’.29 For developmentallyminded African leaders, the attractiveness of Chinese support for infrastructure development, an area neglected by traditional Western donors in recent decades, is rooted in the visible and immediate impact provisions for transportation and communication has on enhancing the economic potential in their respective countries as well as improving livelihoods within affected communities. These ‘resources for infrastructure’ deals, often involving billions of dollars worth of low concessional loans by China ExIm Bank, have been carried out for the most part by Chinese construction firms whose use of contracted labourers and even basic supplies has been criticised in some African circles. Moreover, the overall competitiveness of Chinese firms has meant that, once exposed to the African environment, they have been able to capture a growing portion of the open tenders for infrastructure projects. According to one study, Chinese construction firms have succeeded in recent years in winning 30 % of the combine value of infrastructure contracts tendered by 29. Jakobson and Know 2010, 26.

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the African Development Bank and World Bank.30 This trend is evident in the conduct of Chinese infrastructure and engineering firms operating in Africa as early as 1988 where in countries like Liberia, for example, the China State Construction Engineering Corporation was able to stay on and win contracts from the Liberian government to renovate the local hospital.31 Contemporary examples of Chinese construction firms entering African markets via a Chinese financed project and winning public tenders abound. And, as their personal contracts are completed, an undetermined number of Chinese labourers brought in to work on these construction projects have stayed on in Africa to seek out employment opportunities or open up small businesses. Indeed, while Chinese SOEs captivate the attention of the international media, there is an equivalent drive by small and medium enterprises into the continent which is as prevalent and arguably making as much of an impact than the aspiring multinationals. Many of the medium-sized companies are drawn from the ranks of rehabilitated SOE sector, which has been undergoing a painful structuring process that has cut it back from 300 000 to 150 000 firms over the last decade.32 In some cases, these businesses were motivated by a desire on the part of a relatively large Chinese company to establish foreign subsidiaries so as to guarantee access to Western markets should protectionism take root.33 For many smaller businesses, the motivation, as noted above, is to make use of China’s competitive advantage relative to the African companies where they possess relatively advanced technologies and cost-effective production that gives them a competitive edge over locals and foreign firms.34 This marketseeking impulse is borne out in surveys conducted of 80 Chinese SMEs working in Africa which ranked gaining access to the continent’s markets as their top rationale.35 At the same time, the poor conduct of some Chinese firms operating in Africa has threatened to tarnish the overall reputation of China. For instance, the willingness to ignore basic health and safety regulations, local labour laws and even environmental standards within the industry by a number of Chinese mining companies based in Katanga province, DRC, has brought down a rain of criticism.36 The fact that the collapse in 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Foster et al. 2007, 5-6. Brautigam 1998, 214. CSIS/IIE 2006, 23-24. Hong and Sun 2006, 624. Hong and Sun 2006, 625. Jing, 570-585. Clark et al. 2008.

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commodity prices in late 2008 caused many of these companies to pull out of the DRC only highlights their opportunistic and exploitative character. And, in Zambia, for many Chinese an exemplary African partner, the poor practices of a leading Chinese mining firm have resulted in a flurry of accidental deaths in 2006 and, most recently, the shooting of African labourers by Chinese managers during a labour dispute and caused the opposition to use anti-Chinese feelings as a mobilisation strategy in their election campaigns. Finally, growing trend of Chinese migration in parts of Africa has not passed unnoticed in communities unaccustomed to hosting foreigners from beyond the continent. Much of the Chinese immigration has been undocumented, leading to wild speculation as to the numbers of Chinese settling in the continent, a situation further compounded by the African tendency to identify all non-Indian Asians as being ‘Chinese’. Within the continent’s leading migration destination, South Africa, the Chinese community has surged from 80 000 in the 1980s to an estimated 350 000 in 2006, though overall migration to Africa is declared by Beijing to be only 750 000 (with other estimates higher).37 Concurrently, the evident lack of financial means and weak skill base of many of the migrants has raised concerns amongst educated Africans and small business owners alike. The proliferation of Chinese retail shops in urban and rural communities, bringing access to low-cost consumer goods in African markets for the first time, nonetheless is driving Africans out of the retail trade and in so doing, spurring resentment in these circles. In short, during the last decade and a half, the Chinese presence in Africa has been marked by diversity in composition and depth, defying the easy stereotypes that have accompanied many portrayals in the Western and even African media. This spectrum of Chinese actors has been further matched by changing approaches to Africa at the highest levels by authorities in Beijing and, more prosaically, by individual migration strategies. Africa’s resources may be the instigator of Chinese interests but it is clear that China’s ties with the continent are increasingly set to be anchored by an expanding cast of characters and changing relationships.

37. Park 2009, 3.

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3.

The diplomatic cornerstone of the relationship: the FOCAC process

A special dimension of China’s engagement with the African continent has been the founding of a regionally-tailored multilateral platform, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This regularized structure provides a public setting for celebrating the achievements of the relationship, an opportunity to formulate a raft of economic targets aimed at fostering mutual development interests and recalibrating policies to match these as well as stage to endorse common perspectives on global issues. At the same time, while multilateralism characterizes this public diplomacy of the China-Africa relationship, most of the substance of economic ties (notably aid and investment agreements) continues to be rooted in bilateral relations between China and individual African states. The origins of the FOCAC process are to be found in a variety of converging factors. As noted above, the economic context of China’s ‘going out’ strategy was significant, bringing with it a need for key resources which Africa could readily supply. Politically, there was a renewed push to counter Taiwan’s so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’ on the continent, which had succeeded in winning back official recognition from a number of African states by the early 1990s. This corresponded with the broader aims of revitalizing diplomatic ties with the developing world in the wake of Tiananmen and the accompanying Western opprobrium and sanctions. However, the specific shape of Chinese engagement in the form of a large multilateral regional gathering with Africa was apparently derived from a desire to emulate Japan’s TICAD process which, as interpreted by the CPC’s Central Committee, had found what was deemed to be a successful way of responding to the African requests for changes to aid policy.38 This initiative came against the backdrop of the longstanding Franco-African Summit process and a new US led approach that culminated in a ministerial conference on Africa in 1999 and a widely touted continental tour by US President Bill Clinton. It was during the 1996 trip that Chinese President Jiang Zemin promoted the idea of establishing the Forum. The African ambassadors in Beijing served, along with their counterparts in what was initially an ad hoc unit within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a de facto secretariat for organising the first FOCAC ministerial meeting held in Beijing in 2000. The agenda was decidedly mixed, with a commitment to increase trade, 38. Jin 2010, 13.

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provisions were made for strengthening development co-operation through expansion of Chinese credit facilities, and a commitment to monitor and reduce the flow of Chinese small arms, all contained in the final conference declaration. The second FOCAC ministerial meeting took place in December 2003 in Addis Ababa and produced a firm commitment to raise two-way trade to US $ 30 billion by the next FOCAC meeting, the forgiving of debt owed by 31 African countries and to combat ‘hegemony’ in international affairs. It was, however, FOCAC III – designated a ‘summit’ by Chinese and Africans due to the invitation and participation of top political leadership – held in Beijing in November 2006, that attracted world’s attention by bringing together the largest number ever of African leaders in a summit outside the continent. And indeed in that same year many developments have signalled the rising importance of the continent to China aside from FOCAC III summit, namely the issuing of the first ever ‘White Paper on China’s Africa Policy’ (January 2006) and the visits the Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, paid to the continent in April and June 2006 respectively. The final declaration of FOCAC III called for an increase in trade to US $ 100 billion by the next ministerial meeting as well as commits to reduce tariffs on 440 items produced by Africa’s least developed countries, the creation of a US $ 5 billion investment fund and numerous small grant and training programmes. More recently, FOCAC IV, held in Egypt in 2009, included a commitment to a US $ 10 billion package of concessional loans, commitments to raise African agricultural productivity, to reduce or eliminate tariff barriers for Africa’s poorest countries, build hospitals and schools, new or expanded training programmes to address human development, provisions for 100 clean energy projects and greater support for peace and security. What is striking about the contents of the FOCAC IV declaration is the degree to which, building upon the first three FOCAC meetings, this process reflects a growing and deliberately constructed convergence between African development needs and Chinese economic interests. For instance, in agriculture – a sector long recognised to be an area where Africa’s potential comparative advantages have remained under-invested and under-utilised (and one in which the Chinese have provided technical assistance since the 1960s) – the Chinese propose to introduce new techniques, seed varieties and training programmes which are derived from their own experience of raising productivity amongst their farmers.39 To facilitate this process, the Chinese government is rolling out an additional 39. Brautigam 1998.

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ten agricultural training centres across the continent in countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Senegal. Coupled to this are additional financial means aimed at providing financial support for commercial enterprises. Raising Africa’s agricultural productivity will not only dramatically enhance the livelihoods of rural communities in Africa through improvements in income generation and employment, but it can address a growing problem of food security in China itself. Another example is the targeting of Africa’s small and medium enterprises for development and growth through a special US $ 1 billion special fund. Moreover, signalling that they understand that a focus on the supply side is not enough to make real development gains, Beijing has agreed to scrap tariffs on 95 % of all products from Africa’s less developed countries. This decision to open up China’s market to African commerce has the potential to, when linked with the support for African business, set off a virtuous chain of development. This redirecting of African capabilities towards the accessing the Chinese market could lay the foundation for a more balanced, long term trading relationship than has been the case so far. At the same time, it bears mentioning that it could end up like the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which gave preferential access to the American market in sectors like clothing that contributed to a surge not so much in African but rather Asian based investment. Africans will nevertheless have to be nimble investors to make the most out of what seems to be genuinely liberal terms on offer. Indeed, they may even find that they are competing with the growing Chinese communities within their midst who proven entrepreneurial acumen and understanding of the Chinese domestic market has fuelled China’s own economic transformation. Moreover, the diversity of Chinese actors in Africa – contrary to the presumptions of the notion of ‘China-Africa’ as two unitary entities – poses a dilemma in structuring and managing the relationship. Once shaped and led at the top by Beijing’s political elites at the top in conjunction with their African counterparts, the steady diffusion of economic power to semiautonomous State Owned Enterprises, provincial authorities and a sometimes rapacious profit-seeking private sector has introduced diversity of interests and practice that are as often at odds with Chinese foreign policy aims as they are contiguous to them. The actions of murky investment houses like the China International Fund and the state-owned national oil company, Sonangol – a joint venture effectively marrying Hong Kong based finance to Angolan political ambitions which has sought to secure a huge stake in the illegal military regime in Guinea – raises troubling questions about the aspects of the long term impact of China’s 162

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role on the continent. Operating on the margins of respectability, these sort of organisations can damage the positive intentions on display at FOCAC IV in their unwavering pursuit of profit and wilful distain for African sensibilities (as was the case in Guinea). This situation also highlights one of the most notable gaps in the FOCAC process that is the role of actors formally outside of the state. While much of the media attention was focused on what happened within the halls of the FOCAC ministerial and the press conferences, the FOCAC Business Forum met on the fringes of the event. Missing, however, was the once mooted inclusion of a parallel Chinese-African Civil Society process. In the Western context, the role of guardian of the underlying values which inform national foreign policies is partially played by a vibrant and active civil society operating both in the West and in Africa. Unabashedly critical of the state and private capital – and undoubtedly the bane of authoritarian and, at times, democratic governments alike – these sometimes selfappointed ‘voices of the people’ nonetheless serve a tremendously important function in re-asserting the moral purpose of foreign policy actions. In Africa, China has seemingly exported many features of its domestic setting (such as opaque business and financial practices) and this includes a weak civil society whose boundaries of action are circumscribed to varying degrees by the state. Whether the current situation, which places the burden of responsibility solely on the party leadership and bureaucracy to anticipate, manage and ameliorate the conduct of a plethora of Chinese actors in Africa, is sufficient remains to be seen.

4.

Conclusion

China’s emergence as a leading trade and investment partner with Africa has had a number of impacts upon the continent. China’s economic engagement has revived the flagging fortunes of Africa’s resource-based economies, providing new investment and new markets that have contributed to the global commodity boom. China’s interest in resources has helped drive up the prices while its focus on infrastructure has brought about a renewal of donor interest in financing vital improvements in that neglected sector. At the same time, the Chinese approach to financing its expanding role in the resource sector through provision for hard infrastructure, it could be argued, is crucially dependent upon the very dearth of that in the target country. As the example of South Africa demonstrates, middle income countries with a reasonably well-developed infrastructure, coupled to existing local company expertise, strong labour 163

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unions and an established regulatory environment, can be less attractive investment destinations. However, other Chinese actors – notably those in the financial sector – are drawn to these settings as they provide a stronger institutional framework which supports their pursuit of profits. In political terms, the African example suggests that China can provide a welcome alternative to the established sources of trade and investment, not the least because they are less concerned with using the development process as an instrument for the imposition of normative transformation on target states and more to serve mutual economic interests. The revival of African economic fortunes has had a direct impact on the international stature of African leaders, allowing them to challenge the certitudes that informed the approach adopted by the OECD ‘donor cartel’. The result is not, as some critics have feared, a shift away from the North but rather a diversification of development partnerships that – at least in those African countries with sound and committed political leadership – offers an unprecedented opportunity to use all means available towards achieving development. Change and adaptability remain the hallmarks of China-Africa relations and, to the credit of the Chinese government whose willingness to revisit and revise specific initiatives in light of experience on the ground, give the relationship a dynamism lacking in many other trans-regional initiatives. China’s experience in Africa has in many ways provided a short, sharp lesson in the ease of breaking into the relatively neglected African terrain and, at the same time, increasingly the difficulties in securing its interests over the long term. China’s willingness to maintain its focus on building a long term economic relationship with the African continent, despite obstacles encountered on the ground and more recently the adverse global economic climate, should be welcomed by Africa which has long complained about the limited interests of traditional investors. But coming to terms with the diversity of Chinese actors and their narrower, and often self-serving, interests are a challenge to ensuring that this carefully constructed relationship with this developing region stays on course.

References Alden, Chris. 2007. China in Africa. London: Zed. Although Angola’s production has been increasing exponentially, this situation is partly due to increasing unrest in Nigerian southern oil fields.

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Biacuana, Gilberto, Tsidiso Disenyana, Peter Draper and Nkululeko Khumalo. 2009. China’s Manufacturing Exports and Africa’s Deindustrialisation. SAIIA report: 10. BP. Review of World Energy. 2008. http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId =7044622 Brautigam, Deborah. 1998. Chinese Aid and African Development. Exporting Green Revolution. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Brett, Damien and Ericsson, Magnus. Oct. 2006. Chinese Expansion to create new global mining companies’, Commodities Now: 22. http://www.rmg.se/RMG2005/pages/attachments/COMMODITIES_NOW _2006_Oct,_Chinese_Expansion_to_Create_New_Global_Mining_Comp anies.pdf Broadman, Harry. 2007. Africa’s Silk Road. Washington DC: World Bank. China.org.cn, White paper on energy. 2007. http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm Chinese Ministry of Commerce http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/ie/200802/ 20080205371690.html and WTO http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ statis_e/its2006_e/appendix_e/a14.xls Clark, Simon, Michael Smith and Franz Wild. 2008. China Lets Child Workers Die Digging in Congo Mines for Copper. Bloomberg.com. CSIS/IIE. 2006. China: the Balance Sheet. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies/Institute for International Economics: 23-24. Davies, Martyn and Corkin, Lucy. 2007. China’s Entry into Africa’s Construction Sector: the case of Angola. In China in Africa: mercantilist predator or partner in development?, edited by Pere, Garth le, 246. Midrand: SAIIA/IGD. Diouf, Jacques. 19 June 2008. www.allafrica.com Dittigen, Romain. 2010. From Isolation to Integration? A study of Chinese retailers in Dakar. SAIIA Occasional Paper 57. China in Africa Project. Dobler, Gregor. 2008. Solidarity, Xenophobia and the Regulation of Chinese Businesses in Nambia. In China Returns to Africa: an emerging power and a continent embrace, edited by Chris Alden, Dan Large, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. London: Hurst. 165

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Downs, Erica. 2004. The Energy Security Debate. China Quarterly, 177: 2141. Fletcher, Henry. 2010. Development Aid for Infrastructure Investment in Africa: Malian relations with China, the European Commission and the World Bank, SAIIA Occasional Paper 58. China in Africa Project. March 2010: 7. Foster, Vincent, William Butterfield, Chuen Chen and Nataliya Pushka. 2007. Building Bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier in Africa. Washington, DC. Hong, Ensuk and Laixiang Sun. 2006. Dynamics of Internationalisation and Outward Investment: Chinese corporations’ strategies. The China Quarterly. 187: 624. Hsiao, Russell. 2008. Energy security the centrepiece of China’s foreign policy China Brief, 8 (16). Jakobson, Linda and Dean Know. 2010. New Foreign Policy Actors in China. SIPRI Policy Paper 26. September 2010: 26. Jin, Ling. 2010. Aid and Africa: What can the EU, China and Africa learn from each other? SAIIA OP: 13. Jing, Gu. 2009. China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development’, European Journal of Development Research. 21(4): 570-585. Kelley, James 30 April 2009. Testimony before the European Union Committee, International Institute for Environment and Development, House of Lords. 7 (2) evidence: 94 Lokongo, Antoine Roger. 2009. Sino-DRC contracts to thwart the return of Western patronage. Pambazuka News 11 March: 423. www.pambazuka.org Park, Yoon. 2009. Chinese Migration in Africa. Occasional Paper 24. China in Africa Project. SAIIA, Braamfontein: 3. Pinaud, Nicholas et al. 2006. The Rise of China and India: what’s in it for Africa? Paris: OECD. Rawnsley, Gary. 2000. Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Schraeder, Peter J. 2000. Cold War to Cold Peace: explaining US-French competition in francophone Africa. Political Science Quarterly, 115 (3): 395-419.

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Soares de Oliveira, Ricardo. 2008. Making Sense of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa. In China Returns to Africa: an emerging power and a continent embrace, edited by Chris Alden, Dan Large, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 83109. London: Hurst Spieldoch, Alexandra and Murphy, Sophia. 2009. Agricultural Land Acquisitions: implications for food security and poverty alleviation’, in Land Grab? The Race for the World’s Farmland edited by Michael Kugelman and Susan Levenstein, 42. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre. The Jamestown Foundation. 2008. www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374346 (accessed November 6, 2008). USGS. 2008. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2008. US Geological Survey. US Department of Interior. World Trade Data. 2007. China Africa’s top 20. Zweig, David, and Jianhai, Bi. 2005. China’s Global Hunt for Energy, Foreign Affairs, 84

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9. The Rise of Russia, Sino-Russian Relations, and U.S. Security Robert S. Ross

1.

Introduction

Russia’s re-emergence as an influential European great power is all but inevitable. It possesses the underlying natural and human resources and the political will to develop the military capabilities necessary to determine independently its security environment. Russia’s conflict with the Ukraine, its military intervention in Georgia, and its hardening resistance to U.S. missile defence cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic and to U.S. cooperation with Central Asian countries are all the early murmurs of a revived Russian great power presence in international politics. Russia’s determined re-emergence as a European great power will necessarily have fundamental strategic significance for great power politics both in Europe and elsewhere. As Russia’s military capabilities develop, it will become increasingly proactive in asserting its strategic interests and it will elicit both heightened security concerns and revised security policies from the other great powers and from smaller regional actors. In this respect, within the next decade Russia will become a major actor in European balance of power politics and its policies will contribute to the prospects for world-wide stability and instability, including the likelihood of crises, arms races, and war. The United States and China will be especially affected by Russia’s reemergence. Not only can improved Russian capabilities affect their immediate security interests, but how Russia deploys its improving capabilities and how it prioritizes its security interests will likely lead to distinct and countervailing effects on U.S. and Chinese security concerns and on regional security developments in Europe and East Asia. And because the United States and China directly affect each other’s vital security interests in East Asia, distinct outcomes from Russia’s reemergence will have a significant impact on the U.S.-China strategic relationship, on the long-term prospects for U.S. security and for U.S.

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capabilities as global actor with far-flung interests and strategic commitments.

2.

Russia’s re-emergence as European great power

Russia’s re-emergence as a European great power is all but assured. Russia has experienced repeated failures and set-backs in European great power politics, and after each setback, it re-established its great power status. It suffered great losses during the Napoleonic wars, but recovered to become a major player in the Concert of Europe. It suffered a major defeat during the Crimean War, but it quickly recovered and reasserted its authority in the Southeast Europe. It against incurred heavy losses in the ground campaigns during the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war, but soon reasserted its authority in both Europe and in its expansion into Northeast Asia. Soon, however, Russia’s advance into Northeast Asia was reversed by the Japanese destruction of the Russian Navy and ground forces in the Russian Far East during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. Russia then rebuilt its forces and it played a major role in European politics prior to World War I. But the costs of World War I, the Russian revolution, and the Russian civil war combined to weaken Russian military power, compelling it to withdraw from the war. Nonetheless, Russia was a major force in the European diplomacy prior to World War II and then a critical actor in determining Germany’s defeat. The losses Russia suffered during World War II were severe, but Russia quickly recovered and contended with the United States first in Europe and then as a superpower. The Soviet Union’s Cold War defeat in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 was simply the latest decline of Russian power. And, as in the past, Russia will re-emerge and challenge a European regional order premised on prior Russian weakness. Russian re-emergence as a European power will not require significant recovery of the Russian economy or significant advancement in Russian military technologies. This is because Europe is a ‘low-tech theatre’. Russian presence in Europe and its proximity to Europe’s other major states minimizes the necessity for advanced power projection capabilities in war-fighting. In Europe, a large but basic ground force capability is sufficient to both challenge regional stability and pose the threat of largescale war. In only a few years after it had suffered its devastating losses during World War II, the Soviet Union possessed the ability to dominate the European peninsula. In the early twenty-first century, Russia can re-

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establish its ground force capability primarily with improved funding, training, and discipline. The long-term decline of the Russian population poses a challenge not only to Russian economic development but also to its great power prospects. According to some estimates, the Russian population will decline from 140 million in 2008 to approximately 100 million in 2040.1 Nonetheless, the demographic trends of the major West European states are equally discouraging for their own security. Germany, for example, is also experiencing significant population decline. Moreover, most of the Russian population will reside in European Russia, west of the Ural Mountains, and thus in proximity to the European theatre, so that even with just 100 million people, Russia will have the largest population in Europe and, in combination with a reconstituted ground force capability, it will have both the demographic and strategic resources necessary to challenge the security of its immediate neighbours and European stability. Russian economic dependency on oil exports will pose problem for broadbased development of the Russian economy, but it will not necessarily inhibit military modernization. The Soviet Union’s economic system was ineffective in generating comprehensive economic development, but it generated sufficient government revenues to enable considerable expansion of its military capabilities. Contemporary Russian central government revenue from oil production can be similarly sufficient to sustain low-technology ground force modernization, if complemented by low-cost organization reform of the Russian military.2 This is especially the case when military modernization is supported by both Russian nationalism and Russian resolve to reverse the strategic trends on Russian borders since the 1990s. In contemporary Russia, there exists both resolve and growing nationalism. In 2009 Russia announced a 26 per cent increase in its defence budget.3 In August 2008, even a poorly equipped and poorly trained Russian army could effectively wage war against the Georgian army and compel European and U.S. acquiescence to Russian use of force against a potential candidate for membership in NATO. NATO and the United States have also acquiesced to Russian coercion against Ukraine. Moreover, Moscow’s reminder of its formidable conventional ground force capabilities contributed to Polish reluctance to participate in the U.S. missile defence 1. 2. 3.

Boston Globe 2008; Voice of America News 2008. For recent discussion of the strengths and weakness of the Russian economy, Meister 2009, 4. ITAR-TASS 2009a.

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system and to the Obama administration’s decision to end U.S. efforts to persuade Poland to accept U.S. missile defence deployments on its territory. As Russian capabilities continue to develop, its ground forces will have improved ability to challenge the status quo throughout Eastern Europe.

3.

Russian strategic priorities in the twenty-first century

Russia’s re-emergence as a European great power will necessarily affect U.S. security, insofar as the United States possesses significant security interests and alliance commitments in Europe. The United States not only has treaty commitments to defend its traditional NATO allies, but also treaty commitments to defend those NATO members admitted after the Cold War, including the Baltic states and Poland, the Czech Republic, and other East European countries. Improved Russian capabilities will necessarily challenge the security of these states. But the full implications of Russia’s re-emergence will reflect how Russia prioritizes its security interests and the corresponding implications for Russian challenges to the status quo both in Europe and in other regions on the Russian periphery. There are three distinct military theatres on the Russian periphery – Europe, the Caucuses and Central Asia, and Northeast Asia, including the Sino-Russian border region in the Russian Far East and the maritime region in northwest Pacific Ocean. As Russia re-emerges, it will be unable to devote equal attention and allocate equally its limited resources to each of its three theatres. It will have to prioritize its defence interests, based both on the relative importance of each theatre for Russian security and on Russia’s different abilities to project power into each distinct theatre. Russia’s foremost strategic priority is its European theatre. European Russia is Russia’s strategic core, possessing its critical concentration of key industries and population. With the exception of the Mongol armies, Russian adversaries have invaded Russia from Europe. The proximity of the European theatre to Russian strategic core is thus both a vulnerability requiring the greatest Russian strategic attention and it is an asset that facilitates the re-emergence of Russian power. Moreover, strategic trends in the European theatre pose the greatest challenge to Russian security. PostCold War NATO expansion was not an effort to promote democracy or economic development. It was a focused effort to fill the vacuum in Eastern Europe created by the demise of the Warsaw Pact and to bring superior American military power to Russian borders. U.S. interest in missile defence cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic during the 172

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George W. Bush administration was a political effort to consolidate U.S. military presence on Russian borders. Given Russia’s interest in secure borders, the strategic importance of the European theatre, and its emerging ground force capabilities, Russia’s foremost strategic priority is revision of the European status-quo and removal of U.S. power from its European borders. Moscow’s concern for expanded NATO presence on Russia’s periphery informed it decision to invade Georgia and its continued preoccupation with its insecure European borders will require it to focus Russia’s limited financial resources on developing capabilities that will enable it to challenge U.S. defence commitments to Russia’s European neighbours.4 Russia’s second defence priority is the Caucuses and the Central Asian theatre. Central Asia possesses a considerable concentration of strategic resources, especially oil, that are valuable both to Russian security and to the global economy. Russia has a national security interest in the disposition of these resources. This region also poses border security concerns for Russia. These are difficult borders to patrol and defend, especially in Central Asia, in that the terrain is poorly suited for traditional ground force defence operations. Moreover, trans-border Islamic populations create the potential for the emergence of separatist movements that could challenge Russian territorial integrity. Russia must remain wary of the prospect of future Chechnyas. These security concerns combine with the proximity of much of this theatre to Russia’s population and industrial centres and the vulnerability of many of these small states to Russian power to enable Russian leaders to envision reassertion of Russia’s regional political authority, particularly in the Caucuses and western Central Asia, where the Russian military faces minimal challenges from other great powers. Russia’s 2008 military incursion into Georgia and its periodic manipulation of oil supplies to Ukraine reflect both Russian security concerns and Russian capabilities. Russia’s third strategic priority is its Northeast Asian theatre. This relatively low strategic priority primarily reflects Russia’s inability to defend its security interests in Northeast Asia. Despite Russia’s geographical presence in Northeast Asia, Russia has a brief history as a Northeast Asian great power. Rather, most of Russian history in Northeast Asia has been characterized by Russian strategic irrelevance. Russia’s enduring weakness has reflected the distance of the Russian Far East from Russia’s population and industrial centres west of the Ural mountains, the 4.

Betts 2009, 100; Grygiel 2009, 25. For an analysis of Russian discussion of the United States as the primary threat, see OSC doc. no. CEF2080801517001.

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inhospitable climate of the Russian Far East, the presence of more capable great powers in Northeast Asia, and Russian preoccupation with more pressing security challenges in the European theatre. Russia’s eastward demographic and political expansion into the Russian Far East in the decades following the Crimean War encountered minimal resistance. China was already in rapid decline; its backward military had been defeated during the Opium War and the dynasty was challenged by major domestic civil and military instability. Thus, by the late 1880s Russian power had reached the northwest Pacific Ocean, the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast China with relative ease.5 But as soon as Russia encountered a serious strategic challenge in Northeast Asia, it suffered major a setback. After Japan began its naval build-up following the 1894-1895 SinoJapanese war, it quickly attained naval and ground force superiority in the northwest Pacific. Its naval capabilities and its proximity to mainland Northeast Asia enabled it to inflict devastating maritime and ground force defeats on the Russian military during the 1904 Russo-Japanese war. In contrast to Japan’s regional advantages, Russia’s possessed only a tenuous presence in the region. Whereas the U.S. migration westward encountered the welcoming climate of California, so that American westward migration has continued into the twenty-first century, Russian migrants encountered the frozen tundra of Siberia, so that settlement of the Russian Far East primarily depended on forced migration. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 80 percent of the civilians in Vladivostok were Chinese and Korean. As late as 1912, Russians were only 58 per cent of the Vladivostok population. Demography and climate and the resulting inadequate infrastructure and economic development also influenced Russia’s ability to support maritime power projection in Northeast Asia. In 1877 the Pacific Squadron, to avoid total dependence on foreign merchants in Vladivostok, purchased coal directly from suppliers in San Francisco and used repair facilities in Japan. In 1885 it still depended on imported coal as well as winter anchorages in Nagasaki.6 Much of Russian late nineteenth century expansion into Northeast China reflected its search for a warm-water port in Northeast Asia. In contrast to Russia’s European experience, in which each military setback was followed by a timely re-emergence, following its defeat in the RussoJapanese War, Russia did not recover its great power presence in Northeast 5. 6.

For a comprehensive and authoritative account of Russia’s eastward expansion and its encounter with China, see Paine 1997. Stephan 1994, 84-85; Wolff 1995, 42.

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Asia until the later stages of the Cold War in the 1970s. During the long intervening period it was preoccupied by more pressing strategic challenges in the European theatre. In the early twentieth century Russia focused its resources on countering the rise of German power.7 Following its communist revolution and its recovery after World War I and the civil war, the Soviet Union once again focused Russian capabilities on German power. After World War II and until the mid 1960s, the Soviet Union focused its capabilities on American power in Europe. During the 1950s, Sino-Soviet cooperation was premised as much on Russian weakness in Northeast Asia as it was on common Chinese and Russian interests vis-àvis the United States. Sino-Soviet cooperation was easy not only because of shared Chinese and Russian in opposing the United States but also because when there were few Russian ground forces in China’s border regions or Russian ships in China’s coastal waters. The Soviet Union’s late Cold War experience as an East Asia great power was brief and ended in failure. By the mid 1970s it had deployed sizeable numbers of ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border, advanced strategic aircraft and intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Russian Far East, and began development and deployment of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, including initial development of an aircraft carrier capability. But its relative capability in its Northeast Asian theatre was once again constrained by the challenges of deploying its armed forces in multiple theatres and by distance and climate. The Soviet Union began to expand its conventional and strategic deployments in the Far East capabilities and opened its military front with China just as the Reagan administration reengaged the United States in escalated Cold War U.S.-Soviet competition in Europe and in nuclear and advanced technology weaponry. Moreover, the proximity of the large Chinese population to the Soviet Far East enabled China to deploy large numbers of troops on the Soviet border at less expense to China’s other priorities, despite China’s economic backwardness and the political instability of the Cultural Revolution. And the Soviet Union’s effort to develop a major surface fleet based at Vladivostok failed to provide the Soviet Union with competitive maritime power. Rather its naval ambitions in the western Pacific Ocean and its access to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in part elicited the U.S. naval build-up, the Reagan administration’s 600 ship navy, and imposed a significant burden on Russian finances, contributing to the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. 7.

The exception was the Soviet defeat of Japanese forces at Manzhouli/ Nomonhan. But the battle took place far from Japanese supply routes and Tokyo had denied local offers’ request for additional supplies and had ordered its forces to withdraw rather than engage Soviet forces. See Coox 1989.

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Finally, by the end of the Cold War, Russia had yet to overcome the harsh climate of the Russian Far East and develop a regional infrastructure able to support power projection to its Northeast Asian borders. Its Pacific fleet was the weakest Soviet fleet and the second railway the Soviet Union constructed to connect the Russian heartland with the Far East remained of limited use through the end of the Cold War. Russia’s experience as a Northeast Asian great power is anomaly rather than the norm in Russian diplomatic history. Russia’s contemporary second-rank regional status reflects the enduring constraints imposed on Russian capabilities by its preoccupation with it security in more pressing theatres and its relative weakness compared to the East Asian great powers whose resources lie in close proximity to the region, including contemporary China. There is no reason to expect that well into the twenty-first century Russia will be any better able than in the past to prioritize its Northeast Asian security interests so that it will be able to devote the resources necessary to contend as a great power in regional security affairs.

4.

Sino-Russian competition in central Asia

Russia’s concern for its Central Asian security interests and its relatively ability to project power across its Central Asian borders suggests that it will be sensitive to great power challenges to its regional authority. The rise of China in Central Asia presents the greatest challenge to the regional status quo and to Russian regional security interests. Thus far, however, Russia has been unable to develop an effective response to expanded Chinese presence throughout much of Central Asia. China possesses a number of significant competitive advantages over Russia in certain sectors of Central Asia. The Chinese military dominates eastern Central Asia. Its armed forces border Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Of these three countries, Russian forces only border Kazakhstan and its air-lift capability is primitive, so that China dominates the strategic environment of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and it can be confident in their cooperation with Chinese security interests. Although both Russia and China border Kazakhstan, Chinese ground forces are better equipped and better trained than Russian ground forces, so that China also dominates Kazakhstan’s strategic environment. Thus, in the eastern sector of Central Asia, the rise of China challenges the status quo and undermines Russian influence. Elsewhere in Central Asia, however, China’s military capability is much more limited. The rest of the region is 176

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either contiguous to Russia or much closer to Russian borders than to Chinese borders, so that distance and terrain combine to limit Chinese power projection and military influence in western Central Asia. Economically, Chinese influence pervades most of Central Asia. Trade trends favour China. Eighty per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s trade is with China and China dominates Tajikistan’s foreign trade, as well. Kazakhstan continues to trade more with Russia than with China, but trends suggest that China will soon become Kazakhstan’s most important trading partner. Chinese aid and investment also contribute to Chinese political influence. In Tajikistan Chinese aid and private investment fund construction of railways, electric power plants, and agriculture development and private companies invest in mining and other industries. In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan China is funding development of an east-west road network to promote Chinese trade and investment throughout Central Asia. China is also active in funding infrastructure development in Kyrgyzstan.8 A major source of Chinese economic influence in its immediate neighbours and further afield in Central Asia is its energy diplomacy. Chinese energy cooperation with the local states is rapidly expanding, as China funds development of a Central Asian energy infrastructure that can enable secure Chinese access to regional energy resources. China’s initial focus on energy in Central Asia was toward Kazakhstan. Its investment in the Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil fields and then the completion in 2004 of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline not only contributed to Chinese energy security, but also enabled Kazakhstan to reduce its dependency on the Kazakhstan-Russian pipeline for revenue from energy exports. Since then China has signed additional energy contracts with Kazakhstan, further contributing to reduced Kazakh dependence on its Russian pipeline. In the first ten months of 2007, Chinese oil imports from Kazakhstan increased by 380 per cent.9 China is also constructing a second Central Asian pipeline that will connect Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with Shanghai and Guangdong and that will similarly reduce their dependency on Russia. Moreover, China is planning a third Central Asian pipeline.10 China’s economic penetration of Central Asia is region-wide and multifaceted and current trends suggest a determined erosion of Russia’s ability 8.

On Tajikistan, see President of Tajikistan. 2009, Faraj 2008, Agence France Presse 2008. On the Chinese presence in Kyrgyzstan, see Allen 2008. 9. Bloomberg News 2007. On competition in Central Asia. Also see Lo 2008. 10. ‘Central Asia: Turkmenistan-China Pipeline Project Has Far-Reaching Implications’, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 2006. The second and third pipelines are discussed in Xinhua 2009b. Also see Turkmen TV Altyn Asyr 2009; Xinhua 2009a.

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to rely on economic influence to promote the political cooperation with the Central Asian states. And Moscow has no response to Chinese economic diplomacy. The expansion of Chinese economic influence has reflected Chinese government and state industry funding of infrastructure projects that benefit both the Central Asian states and Chinese economic and security interests. Thus far, Russia has not had the financial resources to compete with Chinese government infrastructure assistance and regional private sector investments. On the contrary, to develop its own domestic oil and gas pipelines, Russia has depended on loans and investment from importing states. The Chinese government provided loans to Russia for the construction in 2009 of the oil pipeline from the Russian Far East to Northeast China.11 The delay in the development of the gas pipeline from the Russian Far East to China or to Russia’s Pacific Ocean coast reflects in part Chinese and Japanese reluctance to invest in uncertain gas fields in a region with inadequate infrastructure. The combination of Chinese military influence in eastern Central Asia and China’s economic influence throughout the region challenges Russian security. Moscow is clearly apprehensive. In 2009 Russia urged Kazakhstan to improve energy cooperation with Russia, yet Russian leaders acknowledge Chinese advantages.12 Over the long term Russia will not be able to offset the rise of Chinese economic power. Ultimately, much like the former Soviet Union, Russian influence over its neighbours in most of Central Asia will be increasingly dependent on the proximity of coercive military power and on heavy-handed diplomacy. Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia and its overt pressure on Kyrgyzstan in early 2009 to demand the United States leave its Manas air facility reflected Russia’s limited tools to assert influence on its periphery. Whether and how Russia uses this capability in the future could influence Chinese energy security and the course Sino-Russian relations.

5.

Sino-Russian strategic trends in Northeast Asia

In contrast to the situation in Central Asia, where China and Russia uneasily coexist, in Northeast Asia there is minimal tension. On the contrary, despite increasing Chinese influence, Russia has accommodated Chinese presence and China has welcomed stable Sino-Russia cooperation. This situation reflects Russia’s enduring weakness in the Russian Far East, 11. Strait Times 2009. 12. OSC. doc.no. FEA20090103803396.

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its near complete inability to compete with China, and its preoccupation with developments in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in the Caucuses and Central Asia. The sources of contemporary Russian weakness in Northeast Asia are the same as those of prior periods of Russian history – climate, distance, and diversion of strategic resources to multiple fronts. But in the early twentieth-first century Russia’s situation in the Far East is worse than at any time since World War II and regional demographic and economic trends are suggestive of the regional trends of the late nineteenth century. Demographic trends in the Russian Far East are devastating for Russian power projection capability. At the end of the Cold War there were 14 million Russians in the Far East. In 2009 there were approximately 7 million Russians in the region. In the absence of Soviet-era controls over population movement, the better educated Russians are leaving the region.13 More serious for Russian interests is that the younger generation is leaving the Far East, so that among the remaining residents, very few are of child-bearing age. Hence, post-Cold War demographic trends in the Far East are likely to continue for many decades. Meanwhile, some Russian sources indicate that each year there are over 100 000 new foreign migrants into the Russian Far East and that over 90 per cent of these migrants are Chinese. In 2009 as many as 300 Chinese cross the border each day looking for work.14 Even allowing for considerable Russian exaggeration of Chinese immigration, these trends suggest that the demography of the Russian Far East is gradually returning to the situation of the late nineteenth century, when ethnic Russians were the minority. The climate as well as the demography of the Russian Far East continue to impede Russian regional infrastructure development. There remains only one railway line connecting the Far East to western Russia. The regional road network is skeletal and primitive. There is minimal electric power generation throughout the Far East. These conditions explain in part Chinese and Japanese reluctance to invest in a Russian Far East gas pipeline. There remains inadequate infrastructure to support the exploitation of the potential gas reserves and the construction and maintenance of a pipeline. Russian military presence in the Far East has not yet begun to recover from the depths of Russia’s post-Cold War decline and, reflecting Russia’s strategic priorities, Russia’s Far Eastern ground forces are the weakest and lowest-funded of all of Russia’s ground forces. Its Far Eastern forces cannot 13. BBC Monitoring 2008b. 14. ITAR-TASS 2009a; BBC Monitoring 2008a.

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adequately defend Russia’s border and control illegal immigration from China. The Russian Pacific Fleet has been openly criticized by senior Russian defence officials for lack of professionalism. It has only 18 oceangoing ships, nearly all of which are obsolete. In 2008 the Russian Navy put to sea a Kilo submarine for the first time since the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian air presence in the Far East is equally troubled. The Chinese Air Force has purchased more modern aircraft from the Russian defence industry than the Russian Air Force.15 In all respects, Russia is not a Northeast Asian great power and is unlikely to remerge as one for many, many decades. Whereas Russia has yet to be able to manage the geography of the Far East, China does not confront any similar geographic impediments to power projection into mainland or maritime Northeast Asia. On the contrary, just south of the Sino-Russian border in northeast China is one of China’s most vibrant industrial and agricultural centres and a population of over 150 million people, all integrated by an increasingly dense infrastructure web of modern highways, railways, airports, seaports, and telecommunication facilities. Deployed throughout this region are Chinese grounds forces supported by capable logistical networks and well-supplied military bases, many of which contribute to border defence. Just as the European theatre is a low-tech ground force theatre, so too is the mainland Northeast Asian theatre. Even discounting the modernization of Chinese airpower, given its dependency on Russian aircraft and engines, the proximity of a vibrant and populous Chinese economic region to the Russian Far East and the modernization of Chinese ground forces yields China great power status throughout mainland Northeast Asia. They also provide China with overwhelming strategic dominance over the SinoRussian border. And given the contrary trajectories in the trends in Russian and Chinese demography, economic development, and military modernization, and the trends in cross-border migration, it is not exaggeration to conclude that the Russian Far East is Russian because of Chinese forbearance.16

15. Yezhednevnyye Novosti 2008; BBC Monitoring 2008c. On Chinese and Russian aircraft, see Air and Cosmos 2008. 16. Cf. Lo 2008.

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6.

Russia’s re-emergence and Sino-Russian cooperation

Russian preoccupation with U.S. forward presence in the European theatre and its extreme vulnerability in the Far East to Chinese power compels Russian cooperation with China. Chinese leverage is simply too great to ignore. In these circumstances, as Vladimir Putin has developed a more proactive Russian security policy in Europe and challenged the United States on multiple issues, he has preserved Russian cooperation with China. Putin has not behaved as an ideological Russian nationalist, but as strategic tactician able to choose his battles and secure his Central Asian and Far Eastern fronts while challenging the European status quo. Thus, even as China challenges Russian security, Moscow is consolidating economic and military cooperation with Beijing. Despite the recent slow-down in Russian arms sales to Beijing, the prospects for continued robust defence cooperation are good. In an important respect, the slow-down in Russian arms sales reflects a new era in Sino-Russian defence ties, reflecting Chinese modernization of its indigenous capabilities and its interest in more advanced Russian systems and greater access to Russian technology. Yet these issues will not necessarily cause a long-term reduction in Russian arms sales. Russia still needs arms exports to finance its defence industry and China still needs advanced Russian weaponry and technology.17 Rather, as these new issues have emerged, Moscow and Beijing have had to revisit the terms of trade and engage in extensive and difficult negotiations to reach an agreement reflecting China’s changing defence requirements. Moreover, in early 2008 and 2009 Russia and China concluded an agreement for the sale of 100 Sukoi aircraft engines and surface-to-air missiles to China and are negotiating the transfer of other important arms and military equipment, including of heavy-lift helicopters and advanced radar systems. Since late 2010 Moscow and Beijing have been engaged in negotiations for Chinese purchase of Moscow’s advanced Su-35 multi-purpose fighter. There is also the likelihood of a large Russian sale of Su-33s to China. Russia wants China to agree to a large order of the aircraft and China will require the Su33 if it plans to build an aircraft carrier that can deploy jets, rather than helicopters. Thus far the two sides have not been able to agree on the number of aircraft that China will buy and the extent of technology

17. See the discussion of the difficult financial situation in Russia’s defense industry in OSC. doc. no. CEF20081208177002.

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transfer. But the negotiations were continuing.18 Sino-Russian military cooperation is also reflected in continued participation in joint ground force exercises. In 2009 the two armies will conduct their second largescale military exercise in northeast China. Moscow and Beijing also continue to conduct joint anti-smuggling and anti-terrorist exercises along their eastern border.19 Sino-Russian energy cooperation continues to develop. Although there has been no agreement on a natural gas pipeline from Russia to China, in 2009 the two sides reached agreement on Chinese loans to Russia for the completion in 2010 of East Siberian oil pipeline that will initially deliver to China 15 million tons of oil per year, approximately a 60 percent increase in annual Russian oil exports China. In August 2010 Russian Prime Minister Putin officially opened the Russian section of the pipeline. In September in Beijing, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed additional agreements for significant Russian oil exports to China. There is planning for a second East Siberian oil pipeline branch to China and for additional oil sales of 30 million tons per year and that could potentially provide China with 25 percent of its total oil imports in 2014. Moreover, during the September 2010 Beijing summit China and Russia made progress in their negotiations for Russian construction of a natural gas pipeline to China, which could include a large Chinese loan to Russia’s state-owned natural gas company Gazprom.20 Bilateral trade and investment also contributes to cooperation. In 2008 China was Russia’s second largest trade partner. It was also the second largest source of foreign investment in Russia and thus a major contributor to Russian employment, especially in the Far East.21 There is also ongoing Sino-Russian diplomatic and security cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation organization remains a robust institution facilitating development of Sino-Russian confidence building measures along Central Asian borders, anti-smuggling exercises, and cooperative anti-terrorist measures directed at disaffected Islamic minorities in China’s 18. Regarding the SU 35, see ITAR-TASS 2010; Chan 2010. On the Sukoi engines, see Kommersant-Vlast 2009a; ITAR-TASS, 2008. On the helicopters, see Wang 2009. The air defense systems and the radar systems are reported in Kommersant-Vlast 2009b. The negotiations on the SU-33 are discussed in Moscovskiy Komsomolets 2009; Interfax-AVN Online 2009b; Janes’s Defense Weekly 2008; Chan 2010. 19. RIA Novost 2009. For a discussion of bilateral anti-smuggling and anti-terrorist exercises, see ITAR-TASS 2009b; ITAR-TASS 2009e, OSC. 20. Interfax 2009a; ITAR-TASS 2008, OSC; Strait Times 2009; Associated Press 2010; China Daily 2010; Wang 2010; Shiji Jingji Baodao Online 2010; Prime-Tass 2010. 21. Xinhua 2008.

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Xinjiang Province. And despite Chinese dismay at Russia’s invasion of Georgia during the Beijing Olympics, China managed to balance its interest in avoiding any suggestion of Chinese alignment with Russia against the United States and creating U.S.-China friction and any suggestion of Chinese encouragement of military intervention in support of a secession movement with its sympathy for Russian resistance to U.S. ‘hegemony’ and its contribution to constraining U.S. strategic activism. Its balanced position enabled China to avoid entanglement in U.S.-Russian conflict while allowing Moscow to assume Chinese tacit support for Russian resistance to the expansion of U.S./NATO influence on its borders.22

7.

The rise of Russia, Sino-Russian relations, and U.S. security

As Russia recovers its great power status, there is little likelihood of escalated Sino-Russian tension that will require either country to devote significant resources to either the Central Asian theatre or the Northeast Asian theatre. On the one hand, Russia does not and cannot pose a threat to core Chinese interests anywhere along the Chinese border. On the other hand, Russia lacks the wherewithal to contend with the Chinese challenge to Russian security in the Far East. Russia thus faces the imperative of cooperation with China and Russian vulnerability in the Far East enables China to hold the Russian Far East hostage to Russian cooperation in Central Asia. Moreover, not only do both Russia and China have little incentive for increased bilateral tension, but they both also consider superior U.S. military capability the foremost challenge to their security. This common security perspective contributes to the prospect of continued Sino-Russian cooperation. The re-emergence of Russia as a European great power and the emergence of U.S.-Russian conflict tension are not matched by the emergence of SinoRussian conflict, but by cooperation. There will be Sino-Russian bilateral conflicts of security and economic interests and ongoing competition in Central Asia. Yet conflict and competition is expected in any great power relationship, including among close allies. Amidst their conflict and cooperation, the dominant trend in Sino-Russian relations is cooperation.

22. See Chinese scholar Zhu Feng’s analysis of Chinese policy (Zhu 2008).

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In an important respect, the early twenty-first century global balance of power increasingly resembles the initial post-World War II global balance of power. Following World War II, the United States was the world’s sole superpower. It was balanced by Soviet power in Europe and Chinese power in East Asia. Two regional balance of power systems balanced U.S. global power; despite the absence of a ‘peer competitor’ or a single global balance of power, balance of power politics prevailed and U.S. power was balanced in that the United States had to contend with two regional great powers on two different fronts simultaneously. As in the 1950s, in the twenty-first century Russia will focus its strategic resources on U.S. capabilities in Europe and China will focus its strategic resources on U.S. capabilities in East Asia. Active Sino-Russian cooperation will not be necessary to constrain U.S. power. In a reversal of the pattern of 1950s Sino-Soviet relations, in the early twenty-first century China will be reluctant to become entangled in U.S.-Russian conflict over Eastern Europe, in contrast to Soviet reluctance in the 1950s to become entangled in U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. Whereas Russia faces considerable border insecurity in Eastern Europe, Chinese borders are secure along its entire mainland periphery. Nonetheless, despite the limits to active Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, the mere emergence of great power challengers on multiple fronts will be sufficient to challenge U.S. security. The combination of Russia’s re-emergence and the rise of China pose a serious security challenge to the United States. The major strategic difference between the early twenty-first century and the early Cold War is that China is not ruled by an ideological leader determined to keep China backward and strategically impotent, but rather a pragmatic leadership that has enabled China to become the most economically dynamic country in the world. In contrast to Maoist China, when Chinese rhetoric was more threatening than Chinese capabilities, contemporary China is developing the economic foundation to enable sustained development of advanced military capabilities. Meanwhile, the United States economy in the early twenty-first century is not nearly as robust as it was during the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, it is not possible for the United States to disengage from long-term potential conflict with China. Having withdrawn from Indochina, reduced its presence on the Korean peninsula, and cooperated with Taiwan accommodation of PRC interests, America’s security in East Asia is increasingly reliant on its maritime presence in the western Pacific Ocean and in the South China Sea. There is no strategic fall back from this position. For the United States to minimize the potential high cost of Russia’s reemergence, it can quietly disengage from its treaty commitments to defend 184

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Russia’s immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe from Russian power.23 This will not be easy. Treaty commitments should not be entered into lightly and they cannot be lightly dismissed. But strategic accommodation between the new NATO members in the Baltic and in eastern Europe will be critical to make manageable the cost of NATO expansion to U.S. security in Europe as the United States simultaneously contends with the rise of China in East Asia. Moreover, twenty-first century Russia lacks both the capabilities and the ambitions of Cold War Soviet Union. This reduces the risk of U.S. accommodation of Russian security. Diminished Russian capabilities and intentions also allows the United States to rely more on European countries to sustain the European balance of power. American Accommodation of Russian legitimate security interests has the potential to both integrate Russia as great power into the European balance of power and mitigate the potential for heightened great power conflict reflecting aggressive Russian revisionism. The likely strategic alternative for the United States to accommodation of Russian security interests is a two-front escalated conflict with two formidable regional great powers – Russia in Europe and China in East Asia. This strategic environment would be far more harmful to U.S. security and economic health and to the security of America’s NATO allies than accommodation of Russian security interests along its borders and establishing a negotiated and legitimate European security order.

References Agence France Presse. 2008. August 30. OSC, doc. no. CPP20080830968110. Air and Cosmos. 2008. November 28. OSC, doc. no. EUP20081208177002. Allen, Daniel. 2008. China Strengthens its Role in Kyrgyzstan, Asia Times Online. August 1. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JH01Ad01.html Associated Press. 2010. August 29. BBC Monitoring. 2008a. September 21. OSC, doc. no. CEP20081007950269. BBC Monitoring. 2008b. November 16. OSC, doc. no. CEP20081124950332. BBC Monitoring. 2008c. December 8. OSC, doc. no. CEP208120895008.

23. Also see Betts 2009, 100.

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Betts, Richard K. 2009. The Three Faces of NATO, National Interest, March/ April 2009. Bloomberg News. 2007. December 7. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601072&sid=apEo _TyBgH5U&refer=energy Boston Globe. 2008. May 4. p. 8. Chan, Minnie. 2010. Russia Will Sell Beijing Hi-Tech Jets, Reports Say, South China Morning Post Online, December 2, 2010. OSC doc. no. CPP20101202715035. China Daily. 2010. September 28. Coox, Alvin.1989. Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, New York: Columbia University Press. Faraj. 2008. August 28. OSC, doc. no. CEP20080912950167. Grygiel, Jakub. 2009. Russian Strategy toward Central Europe, Report no. 25, October, Center for European Policy Analysis, 2009. Interfax. 2009a. February 17. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090217964095. Interfax. 2009b. March 10. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090310950119. ITAR-TASS. 2008. February 4. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090204950104. ITAR-TASS. 2009a. February 21. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090221950034. ITAR-TASS. 2009b. February 26. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090226950021. ITAR-TASS. 2009c. March 17. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090317950310. ITAR-TASS. 2009d. March 18. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090318950434. ITAR-TASS. 2009e. March 22. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090322950095. ITAR-TASS. 2010. November 16. OSC doc. no. CEP20101116950266. Jane’s Defense Weekly. 2008. October 28. Kommersant-Vlast. 2009a. March 9. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090310358001. Kommersant-Vlast. 2009b. March 9. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090310358002. Komsomolets Moscovskiy. 2009. March 10. OSC, doc. no. CEP20090312358007. Lo, Bobo. 2008. Ten Things Everyone Should Know about the SinoRussian Relationship. Policy Brief December Center for European Reform.

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Meister, Stefan. 2009. Growth without Sustainability: What the Financial Crisis Says about Russia’s Economy. DGAP Analyse, no. 4, German Council on Foreign Relations, January. OSC. doc. no. CEF20081202514001. OSC. doc. no. CEF2080801517001. OSC. doc. no. FEA20090103803396. OSC. 2008. September 2. OSC, doc. no. FEA20080909767513. President of Tajikistan, February 18, 2009, OSC. doc. no. CEP20090218950165. Prime-Tass. September 29, 2010. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. 2006, Central Asia: Turkmenistan-China Pipeline Project Has Far-Reaching Implications, April. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067535.html RIA Novost. 2009. March 18. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090318/120624128-print.html Paine, S.C.M. 1997. Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Shiji Jingji Baodao Online. 2010. September 10, OSC doc. no. CPP20101001047003. South China Morning Post Online. 2010, December 28. Stephan, John J. 1994. The Russian Far East: A History. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press. Strait Times. 2009. February 5. OSC, doc. no. CPP20090205094001. Turkmen TV Altyn Asyr. 2009. February 26. OCS, doc. no. CEP20090226950351. Voice of America News. 2008. May 29. (accessed LexisNexis). Wang, Xiaoming. 2010. New Pattern in Sino-Russian Energy: Oil for Loans Falls into Place Three Months Hence. China Daily, September 28, 2010. Wolff, David. 1995. Russia Finds its Limits: Crossing Borders into Manchuria. In Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian far East, edited by Kotkin Stephen, and David Wolff. Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Xinhua. 2008. March 19. OSC, doc. no. CPP20090319968105.

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Xinhua. 2009a. February 7. OSC, doc. no. CPP20090207968084. Xinhua. 2009b. March 6. OSC, doc. no. CPP20090306136020. Yezhednevnyye Novosti. 2008. November 28. OSC, doc. no. CEP2081202330001. Zhongguo Wang. 2009. March 12. OSC, doc. no. CPP20090313701004. Zhu, Feng. 2008. Russia-Georgia Conflict: Testing China’s Responsibility?, Freeman Chair in China Studies, November, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

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10. The EU-India Strategic Partnership: Exploring the Security Paradigm Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay

1.

Introduction

In December 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) envisaged India as becoming one of the EU’s strategic partners. Prior to the institutionalisation of the European Union (EU)-India strategic partnership in 2004, security had always been an important pillar in the EU-India dialogue as well as a crucial area for future cooperation. Given a fast-changing global security scenario both India and the EU have been focusing increasingly on the security aspect in their dialogue. In the beginning of 2010 most of the European nations have their armed units posted in Afghanistan and an early exit strategy from there is the European mood of the day. The last few years have experienced an increasing European interest in engaging India as an important neighbour of Afghanistan as well as a regional power. EU member countries have not only been extremely concerned about the security situation in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, which severely impedes the operations of multinational forces in Afghanistan, but also the terrorist infrastructure on Pakistani soil and their global networking which would threaten the European security as well. The Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 26-28, 2008 (or 26/11 as a neologism in the global dictionary of terror) in which some European nationals lost their lives and the lives of some European lawmakers were endangered, reemphasised the need for an enhanced EU-India security cooperation. Terrorism has always been a crucial component in EU-India security dialogue since the inception of the EU-India partnership, but the need is felt for a more dynamic initiative. Though the institutionalisation of a EU-India security dialogue has already taken place, nonetheless recent official deliberations and resolutions from the European side do underscore that much still need to be done. This chapter is an attempt to curve out the current security situation prevailing both in Europe and India and to find the common ground and 189

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address the common challenges where both the strategic partners can cooperate at the level of the individual member states as well as at the level of the EU as a collective. As the developments in India and its neighbourhood do manifest serious concerns for regional security, Europe has also been facing serious security challenges both at home, in its immediate neighbourhood as well as in far abroad. At the outset this chapter provides backgrounders of the security scenario both in India and South Asia punctuated by crucial developments with regional and international implications and would underscore some specific instances with wider ramifications. The backgrounder is divided into two parts where the first part will deal with the security situation in South Asia and the second part will deal with the security situation in Europe. As the term ‘strategic partnership’ between EU and India and its actual significance in the present context has been questioned time and again, the next section will devote on defining a true strategic partnership. Under the broader framework of the EU-India strategic partnership, the present nature of the strategic partnership with the security component after eleven annual EU-India summits will also be discussed. Recent analyses and suggestions emanated both from India and Europe pertaining regional security would also be prognosed against the backdrop of current developments and the general overview of EU-India partnership. The uniqueness of the EU as a ‘security provider’ for the world and particularly in South Asia will be discussed in the next section. In the concluding remarks, the establishment of the new EU diplomatic service, European External Action Service (EEAS), its ambition to speak in a single voice and present itself as a single actor at all global fora as well as the future trajectory of the EU-India strategic partnership would be deliberated upon.

2.

Regional security in India and Europe

A continuum of terrorist incidents has engulfed India in the last few years. Not only have Indian metropoles like Delhi and Mumbai been attacked but small Indian cities and towns also face the challenge of ‘hinterland terrorism’. The terror trend observed in last few years is not only ‘from centre to periphery’ but in the opposite direction also and even against Indian interests abroad. On July 7, 2008, terrorists attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul leaving senior embassy officials and security personnel dead including Afghan nationals. Ethno-nationalist terrorist incidents specifically in the North-East region and Maoist attacks on the security personnel in the heartland of India have also claimed lives of several 190

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people. A detailed narration of ‘successful’ terrorist attacks and numerous foiled attacks in India, which reached its climax with the attacks in Mumbai on 26/11 and lasted for several hours, may be repetitive but it is essential to provide a brief account of the continuum pertaining regional security. More than one year later, terror was again back in the night of February 13 in the Indian IT hub of Pune where a restaurant frequented by foreigners was attacked and amongst others the terror claimed the life of an Italian national.

2.1. South Asia Developments in India’s neighbourhood are not at all promising for a stable and peaceful South Asia but fraught with violent conflicts, fragile peace and armed uprising of security forces. Most of the Indian neighbours presently face tremendous security challenges and internal turmoil. In April 2008 Nepal abolished its monarchy and conducted general elections. But the relative peace in Nepal after decades-long armed clashes between the government forces and the Maoists has to be carefully monitored. All the stakeholders in Nepal have to find out a common ground for the reconstruction of a post-conflict society. After the absolute decimation of the rebel organisation of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the neutralisation of its rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and the core leadership, Sri Lanka stands at the crossroads. The immediate task before the Sri Lankan political and military leadership after the total devastation of Sri Lankan civil society and mutual distrust, is to choose a careful and inclusive agenda so terrorism never finds its raison d’être in the country. But again the political developments in Sri Lanka after the general elections have been watched with concern by the observers. After years of military-supported administration, Bangladesh has returned to democracy through a general election with an overwhelming participation. The Bangladeshi electorate has unambiguously rejected Islamists of different hues, whose fulminations and anti-India rabid rhetoric had been almost synonymous with the political discourse in Bangladesh for last few years. Bomb attacks on political meetings and killings of political leaders, armed clashes amongst the students’ organisations in university campuses have also been brought under control. But before Bangladesh was totally able to bring her own house in order, the armed uprising in February 25, 2009 from the ranks of her own border security organisation, Bangladesh Rifles

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(BDR),1 seriously put the issue of regional security into question. Nevertheless, it is indeed reassuring for the Indian security establishment that when the Awami League, the ruling party in Bangladesh, has met the long-standing Indian demand of handing over the top leadership of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) to Indian authorities. Upon the return of the ULFA leadership the Indian establishment has started talks with them so that peace should return in the state and the process should be all-inclusive. The situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan deserves special mention here. Incidents like the crisis situation like the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) at the heart of Islamabad in July 2007, assassination of the former Prime Minister and the Opposition leader, Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 and the suicide bombing of Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on September 20, 2008, plunged Pakistan into an existential crisis. Nonetheless a newly elected civilian government in Pakistan was a sign of optimism in the subcontinent with the hope that it would lead to a decrease in hostilities with its neighbours and the peace process with India would be strengthened. However the regional developments have indicated the opposite. After much criticism from all quarters, the Pakistani armed forces launched military operations against the Taliban forces in the Swat valley, but terror has already reached the heartland of Pakistan. Latest developments also show that it is not only the terrorism alone but the overt religious intolerance within the faith and towards the minorities in Pakistan do pose the gravest challenge to its own civil society and the future of democratic debate, if the two assassinations of prominent Pak politicians, Salman Tasser and Shahbaz Bhatti, within a short span are any indications. On the Indian side, the terrorists behind the gruesome 26/11 attacks virtually waged a war against the Indian state. Their carefully chosen targets like the Leopold Café, which is frequented by European and American tourists and the Nariman House, the seat of the Jewish ChabadLubavitch sect, signified a sinister terror strategy of bracketing India at par with the US, Europe and Israel – and branding India as a conduit of a larger, global ‘Zionist conspiracy’. On the other hand, attacks were to destroy the economic icons of India, to make India unsafe for tourists and most dangerously, to foment communal passion. The Indian government did accept the flaws in its security apparatus and the lack of coordination 1.

Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) is one of the oldest para-military units in the sub-continent raised in 1795. The is 67 000 -strong BDR is controlled by the officers deputed from the Bangladesh Army. After the subsequent revamp following the mutiny, the organisation was renamed as Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) in December 2010.

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amongst Indian security and intelligence agencies. Remarkably, Indian media opinion and public pressure on the government in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks demanded that India should have been more belligerent with Pakistan than it already was in its public posture. Even after the conclusion of the general elections in India in May 2009, the media is persistent in its demand of reforming the internal security set up as well as the armed forces which the re-elected United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has also given top priority. The reform of India’s security apparatus, intelligence machinery and Counter-Terrorism coordination has remained the recurring theme in Indian media in the immediate aftermath of 26/11. The general consensus about India’s internal security situation is that though the involvement of actors across the border is established in all terrorist attacks, putting the own house in order has to be completed rapidly.

2.2. Europe If this is the present security situation in India surrounded by a very difficult neighbourhood, the internal security situation in Europe and external developments with European ramifications are also grim. In the end of 2003 the ESS specifically identified five major challenges: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, State Failure, Regional Conflict and Organised Crime,2 however observers of European internal security in the last six years would agree that terrorism has significantly preceded other threats. It would not be a reiteration here if we look back at the terrorist incidents in Europe since the ESS has been implemented. The terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 in Madrid, the killing of the controversial Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 in Amsterdam and the suicide bombings in the London Metro on July 7, 2005 and numerous foiled plots before executions like the July 21, 2005 and the bombings of transatlantic flights in August 2006 at Heathrow airport or missed attacks like the Glasgow incident on June 30, 2007, do represent a new variant of terrorist attacks which are entirely different from the traditional European terrorist groups like the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or various derivatives of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Incidents like the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in the Danish daily, Jyllands Posten, have also been either exploited by terrorist networks in Europe and Pakistan or influenced young individuals to perpetrate terrorist attacks. Failed bomb attacks at the German railway 2.

Council of the European Union 2003.

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stations of Dortmund and Koblenz by two Lebanese students studying in Germany in the summer of 2006, the attack by a Pakistani student to kill the editor of Die Welt newspaper office in Berlin in March 2006 and the terrorist attack against the Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, 2008, are significant cases in point. In some measure the common cause of these attacks is the quick and silent radicalisation of a part of the younger second and third generation of the Muslim diaspora, converts and students from Muslim-dominated countries residing in Europe, who have either been radicalised by hate preachers, critics of regimes from West and South Asia and Radical Islamist organisations in Europe and have been recruited by transnational terrorist networks. Factually in the post-9/11 scenario most of the rabid hate preachers, itinerant exiles, refugees and Imams who have been accused of fomenting religious hatred have either been deported to their countries of origin, placed under strict observation by government agencies or are facing trials in Europe. Same is the case of the Radical Islamist organisations, which have either been prohibited by some European governments or placed under stricter scrutiny, or they have disbanded themselves or significantly toned down their virulent Islamist propaganda. One could sum up in the words of the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair after July 7 bombings in London that ‘the rules of the game are changing'. However, the threat of the radicalisation and recruitment has not decreased though some effective counter-measures at the national and EU level have been adopted. The suicide car bombing attempted in Stockholm in December 2010 and the shooting at the Frankfurt airport claiming the lives of US servicemen in March 2011 are the latest grim reminders of the fact. Effectively, the internet has been playing the role of a recruitment-multiplier and radicalising tool, and research has persistently attempted to dissect the radical Islamist phenomenon in Europe and the increasing role played by the Internet.3 Although the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of December 2008 has clubbed Terrorism and Organised Crime together and explicitly identified three additional key threats, Cyber Security, Energy Security and Climate Change, the threat of terrorism was overwhelmingly present in the report and it was accepted, ‘progress has been slow and incomplete’.4 On the external plane, EU also faced a crisis during the short-lived RussiaGeorgia conflict in August 2008. It appeared that the Georgian crisis not 3. 4.

See Emerson 2009; King’s College London 2007; Neumann 2008; Neumann 2009; Kužvart 2009; Noivo and Domnigues 2009. Council of the European Union, 2008.

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only brought back the Cold War-type high politics to EU’s table but an indication of future as well that the centre of gravity of the Union would still lie in Western Europe but the centres of activities will be the new Central and East European countries (CEEC). At this time, it could be concluded that the issue of Georgia is linked with larger strategic issues like further expansion of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the resurgence of Russia, Russia’s relations with the NATO and the EU, especially the new member countries and above all, the US-Russia relationship. These issues would require time and long deliberations and engagement amongst the regional actors. However attention is here invited to a more crucial prevailing threat to European security. European security today is intertwined with the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. As mentioned earlier that the armed forces of almost all the European countries have been posted in Afghanistan and the continuous stay of the European armed forces have increased the process of radicalisation of a part of the younger Muslim generation in Europe substantially. Factually even before the attacks of September 11 terrorists from the European Muslim communities had been found in different conflicts of theatre like Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine. Though the trend still exists and European terrorists have been found in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is a matter of urgent concern for the European governments that the European soldiers have in fact been fighting European terrorists in Afghanistan as it has recently been found in some member countries like in the UK and Germany. The EU Terrorism and Situation Report (TE-SAT 2008), a compilation prepared by Europol from all the Annual Reports of intelligence and security services of the member states for a specific time period, has exhaustively dealt with the Pakistan-Afghanistan region as well as the threat of Islamist Terrorism. A relevant part may be quoted here to illustrate the current threat. ‘An increasing number of EU nationals attended training in Pakistan and were later involved in, or suspected of, terrorist offences in the EU … Al-Qaeda and affiliated pro-Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan are increasingly recognised as one of the main drivers of Islamist extremism and terrorism in the EU.’5 Observers of European affairs were therefore not surprised when in the aftermath of Mumbai Attacks the visiting British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown stated in Islamabad that three-fourth of the major terror plots investigated in the Britain has Pakistani linkages. Taking the grim security 5.

European Police Office. 2008, 22-4.

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situation both in India and Europe in consideration, the Implementation Report of the ESS was correct when it decided to strengthen the capacity of EU’s partners in South Asia. Even the TESAT Report of 2009 has observed the same trend, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan seem to have replaced Iraq as preferred destinations for volunteers wishing to engage in armed conflict.’6 Hence it was almost a foregone conclusion that the EU would have to engage Pakistan at the level of the Union and thus the first-ever EUPakistan summit took place in June 2009. Though the EU has stressed upon the increase in trade relations with Pakistan, undoubtedly it is the issue of terrorism which has necessitated the first EU-Pakistan summit. From the Pakistani leadership’s point it is quite perceivable that they do not want to be identified as a part of the problem of the main European concern of Pakistan-Afghanistan region but as a responsible nation like India.7 However it is almost likely that the present EU endeavour in Pakistan would primarily be to ensure that European security should not be threatened from the Pakistani soil. Similarly, if the statement after second EU-Pakistan summit in June 2010 is analysed minutely, the oblique reference of the role of Pakistan in sponsoring terrorism and the dismantling of terror networks cannot be overlooked, as it underscores. The leaders (Pak and EU) acknowledged that the threat of terrorism was global, regional and local which goes beyond boundaries. They stressed the imperative of closer cooperation by all countries to eliminate terrorism and to dismantle terrorist networks and prevent them from recruiting, funding terrorist organisations and sponsoring of terrorist acts.8 However, what would be the more concerning for the European security agencies are the developments taken place by the end of 2009 which indicate a very bleak scenario in which the major European airports simultaneously would have to be shut down and not only trans-Atlantic but the global air traffic as well would also be thrown into total disarray if simultaneous terror attacks could be apprehended as it already happened at Heathrow in 2006, at Glasgow in 2007 and the incident when a young Nigerian national has been charged for blowing a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in. As already mentioned in the beginning that after more than one year terror has again struck at one of the Indian cities, which again 6. 7. 8.

European Police Office. 2009, 7. Yahoo News 2010. Council of the European Union 2010. p.2. (Italics added). Observers of EU affairs would also agree that it is the security imperative which may have critically influenced Catherine Ashton to appoint, Ambassador Lars-Gunnar Wigemark, EC’s security policy chief to appoint asc the new ambassador to Pakistan. See Mukhopadhyay 2010 and European Voice 2010.

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underscore the need of close security cooperation especially in the realm of counter-terrorism with all strategic partners and thus makes it imperative to not only redefine a strategic partnership which should not be merely declaratory but true in nature.

3.

Defining a true strategic partnership

The term ‘strategic partnership’ is an often-used one. In the context of the EU-India relations and since the institutionalisation of the EU-India strategic partnership questions have often been raised about the nature of a strategic partnership. While some of the commentators are of the opinion that the EU-India relationship is ‘a directionless courtship’,9 ‘lacks real substance’10 or ‘uneasy’11 or some even question its ‘strategic relevance’,12 most of the commentaries are momentary and less sophisticated in nature as they generally appear before or immediately after the annual EU-India summits primarily to quench the media thirst and most of them are generally not from the long-time observers of EU-India affairs. The present author has earlier attempted to define a strategic partnership as such, ‘While there is an increasing trend in present day’s media, official parleys and declarations to unnecessarily depict any summit – bilateral, regional and global – or any bilateral relationship as ‘the reaffirmation of civilisational ties’, ‘bondings between common friends’, ‘natural affinities’ and ‘strategic ties’ which reduce the gravity of a strategic partnership. It could be generally agreed that a strategic partnership is based on a set of core values, belief system and world views which transcend the narrow Tagespolitik of both the partners. A strategic partnership is capable of absorbing the changes in political leadership and the regimes in both the countries. Besides, both the partners thrive on mutually using their natural and human assets. Thus a strategic partnership evolves as a comprehensive relationship by involving not only the foreign policy-makers, strategic experts, academia and media but the civil society as well.13 Fraser Cameron is also of the same opinion that ‘... a strategic partnership depends not only on common values and interests. It should be for the long-term, be able to withstand ups and down in the relationship, and it also implies some

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Pant 2008. Barber 2008. Kapur 2006, 10. Hughes 2005. Mukhopadhyay 2007.

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coordination before major decisions and a high level of interaction.’14 While Cameron has concluded that given his criteria, the EU-India relationship has to traverse a long way before its proper realisation to be called as a strategic partnership. Annegret Bendiek and Heinz Kramer have provided us a comprehensive definition of a strategic partnership. Bendiek and Cramer have also observed ‘an inflationary usage of the strategic vocabulary’ and put it forward as such: ‘in the common usage of language ‘strategy’ is understood as a considered aspiration of a certain long-term goal or as a thoughtful realisation of a certain long-term interest. Therefore three characteristics mark a strategy: a clearly delineated objective, a certain (long-time) timeframe and planned process’.15 Though the authors in the context of EU’s strategic partnership with India and China have observed that both India and China have rather contrasting positions in various global issues and fundamental differences to achieve the strategic objectives of the EU, here it is argued that the EU-India strategic partnership has however the best possibility to be termed as a true strategic partnership in making. Though given the diametrically opposite stances in some global issues hold by EU and India, it shows a gradual transformation where both the partners first of all have accepted to jointly address the global challenges of a multipolar order. The EU-India Joint Action Plan adopted in 2005 has been continuously revised to be in touch with the continuously changing reality. In the very beginning of the reelected UPA government in May 2009, the new Indian Foreign Minister reaffirmed to further consolidate the strategic partnerships with all major powers and EU has not been overlooked. But the observers of the EU-India strategic partnership would agree, especially after the conclusion of the 10th summit in New Delhi when the Indian media virtually ignored it, the focus of the incumbent Swedish presidency was predominantly environmental, that it is the time to ‘de-bureaucratise’16 the EU-India Strategic Partnership and it ‘should tap its full potential’.17 Hence it is needed to examine the EU-India strategic partnership through strategic eyes.

14. 15. 16. 17.

Cameron 2009, 225. Bendiek and Kramer 2009, 9 (author’s translation). Sachdeva 2009. Srichandan, 2009.

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4.

EU-India strategic partnership: through strategic eyes

At the outset we must agree here with the evaluation of a leading Indian observer of EU affairs that, ‘In fact, they (Most Asian specialists on the EU) confront the 3Ds (difficult, distant and different) in trying to understand the strange political and economic animal that the Union is’.18 The present author would like to add two more Ds with the above-mentioned assessment in the light of the on-going developments in the organisational life of the EU. These additional 2Ds are: diverse and disunited. Starting with the struggle for finding a common EU position on the upheaval in Lhasa and the adjoining areas in Tibet in March 2008 and a subsequent thought to boycott the Beijing Olympics, then the Georgia issue and finally the economic slump and the prescribed measures, have time and again brought forth the European disunity. The Georgia crisis and even the issue of Islamic Radicalism in Europe also depict that different regions in the continent have diverse perceptions of security. During the Georgian conflict while the new member countries in the CEE and obviously the UK, which is most Atlanticist in approach and critical of Russia, large member countries in continental Europe prefer a balancing act between the US and Russia because of Europe’s energy dependence on the latter. In fact, the year 2008 may be remembered as the ‘re-nationalization of European security efforts’ as this year Britain has come out with its National Security Strategy, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared to rejoin the command structure of NATO after more than four decades and the French White Paper on Defence and National Security has been presented for debate and discussion. Similarly, the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) combine in Germany formulated ‘A Security Strategy for Germany’, a document which somehow unheard of in post-Cold War Germany. While some commentators have dismissed the role of EU as a strategic actor, in contrast with some big member states, European think tanks suggest that though the EU can never achieve the role of a strategic actor like an individual nations but a ‘broad agreement’ on ‘strategic achievements’ and coherence of policies are indeed essential to realise the goal of the ESS. Similar is the issue of Terrorism and Radical Islam in Europe while the industrialised founder members of the Union seriously attempt to address the challenge of Radical Islam which is related with the diaspora communities from South Asia, Caribbean, Maghreb and Turkey, Radical Islam, per se, is not considered to be a problem to reckon with in the new 18. Jain 2008, 135.

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member countries as the Muslim communities there are small in number, static in nature, have been well-integrated generations ago as well as religion does not essentially form their identity especially for the younger generation. Even the Bosnian conflict did not leave a permanent footprint or residual radicalisation on the Muslim communities there. It is also a reality that some major EU countries like the UK would not be very interested to share intelligence with India which might antagonise Pakistan. Other member countries would be willing to have an effective counter-terrorism cooperation with India however their expertise and experience of the South Asian region and Pakistan in particular is rather limited. This disunity in approach and divergence of interests would influence the partners of the EU, like India, in their view of the Union as a serious ‘security provider’. It is right that the security dialogue, Counter-Terrorism cooperation is adequate with the individual member countries, which have indeed been intensified after 26/11. But prospective focused security cooperation with the EU as a collective is at this juncture is rather conceptual. While it is true that the recently-agreed Lisbon Treaty is a milestone in the path of the Union’s road ahead and the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) has come into being to represent the Union not only at all global fora but in major countries, the basic contradiction to project the EU as a global power is best described by Günter Verheugen, ‘(I)n 10 or 20 years, Europe will be forced to compete with new economic superpowers which will also have their own political agendas. And at that point, we won't be able to play an equal role if we do not have a single EU representation in international organizations such as the IMF or the UN Security Council and are hence unable to speak with one voice … I believe that having a global role won't be possible as long as Europe continues to see itself exclusively as a ‘soft power’. It's an illusion to think that you can conduct global politics just with humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. One also needs to have the means to enforce your decisions.’19 If this would be the observation of a departing EU policymaker after a decade of experience in shaping what the EU is today, the importance of the EU in the strategic thinking of one of its strategic partners like India which neither shares a common boundary with the Union nor imminent security threat from its neighbourhood could easily be comprehended. However as mentioned earlier, though at the conceptual level security analysts have been discussing a EU-US-India triad to address the common 19. Verheugen 2010.

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challenge like in Afghanistan, the possibility of triad of this nature is discussed in the next section.

5.

A US- EU-India triad?

At the outset it would again be a cliché to reiterate here the disunity of the Union in foreign policy making and prioritising strategic areas. Observers of European affairs are well aware of the Union’s initiatives in CounterTerrorism initiatives and joint intelligence activities. The EU agencies like the Europol, Eurojust, FRONTEX or the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator’s Office are rather new. Most of the organisations and offices have come into being only after 9/11 and some even after the Madrid attacks. Member states are still ambivalent about providing more teeth and muscle to these new organisations and even some of the agencies have remained leaderless for months until the major EU members have agreed to find a consensus candidate. Hence, giving too much importance to the Union’s military and counter-terrorism capability would not be justified. At present the idea of EU as a security provider in this region seems to be abstract and dissimilar with the expectations of some strategic experts in India and Europe. It would also be a false hope as one foremost Indian strategic analyst expects, ‘We should have appropriate interfaces between various arms of our strategic, foreign policy and intelligence establishments and their counterparts in the US and the EU. The Pakistani Taliban and jihad challenge can be met only with the US, the EU and India developing a strategy of containment of Pakistan. Unfortunately, America and the EU have not yet realised the full extent of the threat posed by a Talibanised Pakistan.’20 One European expert proposes, ‘The present crisis should inject the EU’s strategic dialogue with India with a new sense of urgency – and it might be the basis for closer cooperation … But the contrast between the American and European positions reflected the fact that the US has made most progress in building a strategic partnership with India in recent years … But for now, Europe, the U.S. and India share immediate common interests in stemming the growing crisis in Afghanistan.’21 However, as of the beginning of 2010, the patience of the European nations seemed to have run out vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Some even needed to back their armed forces back at home for internal security duty but only have to 20. Subrahmanyam 2009, 12. 21. Gowan 2009.

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stay in Afghanistan as only showing the solidarity with the US or the commitment towards their newly-acquired EU and NATO membership. Asmus and Lindberg may be provocative and rhetorical in their observation but their assumption seems to be correct though it is made about one of the smaller but founder members of the union, ‘What is the point of the Belgian army today? It is not to defend Belgium, since no one is going to attack it. Rather it is to demonstrate a sufficient commitment to ‘the West’ that friends and allies, above all the United States, will be there if Belgium should ever need help.’22 Some reasons could be presented why the EU cannot become a third pillar of this triad. Firstly, for the EU the transatlantic partnership is supreme, then comes it’s large Eastern neighbour Russia and then the immediate neighbourhood. Before the EU nations have committed their armed forces for Afghanistan, barring a few most of them have scant knowledge about the region and neither history of longtime engagement nor experience of stationing armed units in conflict zones. Asmus and Lindberg are right in their prognosis, ‘In contrast to Iraq, the war in Afghanistan is one Europeans deemed from the outset to be necessary and just. They committed themselves to it through NATO, perhaps with a premature view of an Afghanistan that would mainly need peacekeeping and reconstruction following the US military intervention to oust the former regime in Kabul, rather than combat forces ready to engage a resurgent Taliban.’23 Therefore, the unwillingness, the growing domestic pressure to withdraw from Afghanistan and a likely exit would not make the Union a viable future partner in the US-EU-India triad. Secondly, the European ambition of being a Weltmacht in being a provider of ‘security in a changing world’ as the Implementation Report of the European Security Strategy of 2008 proudly claims, is not reflected in the present European reality. Research showing the statistical strength of the EU as whole in the region diplomatically as well as militarily prima facie seems to be sufficiently impressive to consider the EU as a power in the region – but the lack of political will, disunity and supporting the US in all major policy decisions would again not present the Union as an independent actor.

22. Asmus and Lindberg 2008, 15. 23. Ibid., 7 (Italics added).

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6.

Concluding remarks

The attempt in this chapter has been to provide some common security challenges both the strategic partners have been facing and are likely to face in the coming years. As the developments since the institutionalisation of the EU-India strategic partnership have been indicative enough that the common security problem both EU and India would face in the coming years is terrorism. This type of terrorism in the name of Islam and the ongoing phenomenon of Islamic political radicalism is global in scope. In the West it has already transcended the traditional diasporic links and created complex trans-national connections which are extremely difficult to monitor by the security agencies. Consequently both the strategic partners, EU and India, though without having geographical proximity have to address this global challenge at a global level, at the level of the EU as well as the level of individual member states. Therefore closer security cooperation is indeed imperative. Though a robust counter-terrorism capability cannot be expected from the EU and it is absolutely necessary that any kind of security cooperation should carefully be insulated from outside influence. Because of the inherent sensitive nature of any Counter-Terrorism cooperation, intelligence exchange, information about the specifics should not be discussed in public. Nonetheless as the EU-India Joint Action Plan has decided to activate the cooperation between the Europol and the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), we must take into consideration that in the post-Mumbai scenario Indian security and investigating agencies have been going through a structural revamping. When not only newly dedicated agencies like the National Investigating Agency (NIA) have been established but also inter-agency platforms like Multi-Agency Centres (MAC) at the central level and State Multi-Agency Centres (SMAC) have been reenergised. Plans like induction of more personnel in the ranks of the agencies have been sanctioned. However as increase in manpower is not the only solution but it is also required to enhance the professionalism of the members who are and will be at the cutting edge of national security. Thus expertise and continuous developments are definite prerequisites. Though the EU has also been developing its own security structure and counter-terrorism capability, both the EU and India can think of joint efforts in order to maximise professionalism. Some possible areas of cooperation with the EU may be contemplated. Firstly, EU and its member states can offer invaluable trainings in rescue, evacuation and traffic management in the case of terrorist attacks especially chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. 203

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Secondly, in the post-Lisbon Treaty scenario, the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN) at the EEAS under the direct control of Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign & Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission (EC), has gained importance and a new director has also been appointed in December 2010.24 Though, the European media talks about a ‘European CIA’ in the offing,25 it appears that the revamped centre at present would only concentrate on confidential analyses provided by the member states as well as open-media sources. Nonetheless it would aspire to be an independent intelligence analysis centre of the Union. Thus the SITCEN and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) of India may undertake joint analyses of crucial global issues. Thirdly, both India and the EU have diverse borders. The Indian Border Security Force (BSF) can offer its rich experience to the fledgling EU agency, FRONTEX. Thirdly, online radicalisation is a menace difficult to track, a high-security portal, ‘Check the Web’, was formed to facilitate all the 27 members of the EU, the Union may provide its research findings to Indian counterparts and may invite Indian experts. Finally, Indian security analysts and scholars might be included in the Recognising Radicalisation (RECORA) which is funded by the European Commission. Experts from both the sides can exchange their views on the phenomenon which is generational in nature. Lastly, the most acute threat which both the partners must ponder over is the counter-piracy operations off Somalia as India has already proven its mettle to combat the menace and similarly the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia is mandated by the European Council to continue its operations till 2012. Both EU and India may consider institutionalising the cooperation in counter-piracy operations. As both the Indian and EU leadership have continuously been underscoring the need for an ‘intensified’ and ‘meaningful’ security cooperation, it has to be observed that security cooperation should not be limited to statements, joint post-summit communiqués and the mutual visits by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and his counterpart. It should also not be presidency-specific though in the post-Lisbon Treaty scenario the EEAS aspires to be most influential arm of the deciding the projectile of Union’s strategic partnerships and thus the agenda of the annual summits. The weakness and limitation of EU’s counter-terrorism 24. European Union 2010 25. Wirtschaftswoche, German Foreign Policy. 2010.

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capability is much discussed but it has been observed that in the short time span the EU has also started to institutionalise its memory and started assessing pan-European threat perceptions. India, on her part, should also take concrete measures to increase its strategic awareness about the EU and build a future indigenous gene pool of Indian experts and diplomats on EU affairs. Every EU-India summit should not only infuse fresh energy to the strategic partnership but evolve as a ‘true’ one as well. The onus lies on both the partners.

References Barber, Tony. 2009. EU-India ties need a boost. Financial Times. September 22. Bendiek, Annegret and Christian Wagner. 2008. Prospects and Challenges of EU-India Security Cooperation. In EU India relations: a critique, edited by Shazia Aziz Wülbers, 153-168. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. Bendiek, Annegret and Heinz Kramer. 2009. Die EU als globaler Akteur: Unklare ‘Strategien’, diffuses Leitbild. SWP-Studie, S12, April, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. Cameron, Fraser. 2009. India and the EU: A Long Road Ahead. In Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, edited by Harsh V. Pant. 209-227. London et al: Routledge. Council of the European Union. 2003. European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better World. Brussels, December 12. ---------------------------------------- 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World [2008] S407/08. Brussels. December 11. --------------------------------- 2010, Second EU-Pakistan Summit, Joint Statement, PRESSE 163, 10692/10 June 4. Emerson, Michael, ed. 2009. Ethno-religious conflicts in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe’s Muslim Communities, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. European Police Office. 2009. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. The Hague: (Europol). European Police Office. 2008. EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. 2008. The Hague. 205

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EUROPEAN UNION, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints Director of the European Union Situation Centre (SITCEN) for the External Action Service Brussels, December 17, A 265/10. European Voice. Ashton names EU ambassadors. 2010. September 15. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/09/ashton-names-euambassadors/68862.aspx (Accessed on March 28, 2011). Gaens, Bart, Juha Jokela & Eija Linmell eds. 2009. The Role of the European Union in Asia: China and India as Strategic Partners. Surrey & Burlington: Ashgate. German Foreign Policy. 2010. Eine europäische CIA. September 27. http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/57873 (Accessed on March 28, 2011). Gowan, Richard. 2008. The Trouble with India. European Voice, September 29. Hughes, Kirsty. 2005. EU-India: Blossoming Partnership or Strategic Irrelevance? Economic and Political Weekly, October 8, 4392. Jain, Rajendra K. 2008. Teaching the EU in India. In The Future of European Studies in Asia, edited by Martin Holland, Silviu Jora and Peter Ryan. 124137. Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation et al. Kapur, Harish. 2006. The uneasy India-EU relationship, EU-Asia News. November-December: 10. King’s College London. 2007. Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement In Europe. A Study carried out by King’s College London for the European Commission (Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security), London: King’s College, University of London. December 2007. Kužvart, Jan. 2009. Countering Jihadist Ideology by the EU: European War of Ideas against Radical Islam, Policy Paper 2/2009. Prague: Association for International Affairs. February 2009. Ministry of External Affairs of India. 2009. Statement by External Affairs Minister Shri S.M. Krishna on assumption of office. 23 May. http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=550314922 (Accessed on March 28, 2011). Mukhopadhyay, Alok Rashmi. 2007. Need for Multiple Bridges. Debate. India-EU Strategic Partnership. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 2(4): 26-32.

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--------------------------------------- 2010. The EEAS and the EU-India Strategic Partnership, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA) Comment, July 22. http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ TheEEASandtheEUIndiaStrategicPartnership_armukhopadhyay_220710 (Accessed on March 28, 2011). Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action, London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. January 2009. Neumann, Peter R. 2008. Joining al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe, Adelphi Paper 399, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Noivo, Diogo and João Domnigues. 2009. Combating Complacency: The International Islamist Threat and Portuguese Policy. IPRIS Viewpoints. Lisbon: Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS). July 2009. Pant, Harsh V. 2008. India and the EU: A directionless courtship, rediff.com, October 27. Ronald, Asmus and Tod Lindberg. 2008. Rue de la Loi: The Global Ambition of the European Project. Working Paper. Muscatine, Iowa: The Stanley Foundation. September 2008. Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2009. India and the European Union: Time to DeBureaucratize Strategic Partnership. Strategic Analysis, 33(2): 202-207. Sandhu, Joel. 2009. EU-India relations: from blind spot to strategic engagement, euobserver.com, January 9. Srichandan, Shakti Prasad. 2009, India-EU-Relationship Should Tap Its Full Potential, August 27. Berlin: Atlantic Community. http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/ India-EU-Relationship_Should_Tap_Its_Full_Potential Subhan, Malcolm. 2004. Europe’s ‘strategic’ relationship with India? EUAsia News. May-June: 3-5. Subrahmanyam, K. 2009. The Tab is on us. Times of India. March 9. Verheugen, Günter. 2010. The EU 'Has No Vision of Where We Are Heading. Spiegel Online. February 9. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676784,00.html (Accessed on March 28, 2011).

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Wirtschaftswoche, Europäischer CIA. 2010. September 23. http://www.wiwo.de/politik-weltwirtschaft/europaeischer-cia-441615/ (Accessed on March 28, 2011). Yahoo News. 2010. Gilani urges EU to treat Pak at par with India. February 14.

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11. East Asia Views the EU – Hard Power, Soft Power, and Strategic Thinking Quansheng Zhao

1.

Introduction

In analyzing East Asian perspectives on the European Union (hereafter the EU), this chapter focuses on the issues concerning hard power, soft power, and strategic thinking. The empirical cases will primarily rely on three East Asian nations, namely China, Japan, and South Korea. Other parts of Asia, such as Southeast Asia and South Asia, will also be briefly brought into discussion. East Asia has a long history of interaction with the European continent. The most well-known historical memory is the famous Silk Road from several thousand years of history, which ran from the heart of the Asian continent to Europe and the Middle East. Without getting into details, the ancient memory gives one distinguished character Europeans have of Asia, which is that it really is a remote area. That sense of distance has remained until today. As Bates Gill and Melissa Murphy state in their comprehensive study, China-Europe Relations, ‘For much of the post-war period, the ChinaEurope relationship was best characterized as ‘weak’ and ‘far away,’ as the two sides considered themselves to be ‘distant neighbours’.’ In recent years, however, the two sides (EU and China) have tried hard to develop a new relationship, namely that of ‘strategic partners.’1 I will elaborate on that point later in this chapter.

2.

Europe’s traditional images

Over ancient and modern history Europe’s image in East Asia has had both positive and negative sides. Among many aspects we will emphasize the following four points representing Europe’s traditional image in Asia.

1.

Gill and Murphy 2008, 4-9.

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First, Europe represents another ancient civilization. Asia has always been proud of its own civilization tradition, particularly with China-centred and India-centred civilizations along with some smaller civilizations such as Japan and Southeast Asia.2 People in Asia have always been fascinated with Europe’s civilization traditions, particularly with Ancient Greece, which has been regarded as the cradle of modern civil societies. That image made Asians view Europeans more as spiritual brothers in terms of connections of traditions, giving Europe a more superior position than other latedeveloped countries, such as the United States as a latecomer. The second image of Europe is as the birthplace of major contemporary political ideas, with democracy on the one hand, and communism/ socialism on the other. Europe has produced modern democratic values and the practice of democracy in Ancient Greece has become a source of admiration for many Asians. This image has time and time again placed Europe at a moral high point. When people argue about whether globalization is equal to westernization, one of the schools of thought is that the West developed democratic values; therefore it has become a role model for the whole mankind. The birth of civil society and the increasingly active role of non-governmental groups have facilitated the formation of political parties, and ultimately led to the establishment of the modern parliamentary system. The other side of the coin is the birth of communism by European thinkers, starting with Karl Marx and later developed by Vladimir Lenin, which led to the establishment of the first socialist country – Soviet Union and the East socialist block. Although communism failed in Russia and East Europe, the influence of socialism as an idea has remained as one of the major political thoughts in today’s world. The influence of Marxism can still be seen in East Asia, particularly in China, North Korea, and Vietnam. In this sense, contemporary Asian thinkers have been heavily influenced by the dual ideas of Europe – democracy and socialism. The third image of Europe in East Asia is that Europe is the original land of industrialization. This is particularly true for early industrialized countries such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and then France, Germany and Italy. The blue water adventure spirit, the innovation of electricity and modern transportation, and the development of early industry sectors all impressed Asians as a model for them to follow. As a matter of fact, Japan’s early slogan during the Meiji Restoration of 1868, datsu-a nyu-o (moving out of Asia and join Europe), reflects its long

2.

Sung et al. 2009, 53-64.

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admiration of European achievements. Moreover, spill over in other dimensions followed industrialization, such as higher education and the modern university systems, and the blossom of cultural activities based on the Renaissance, becoming the subjects of much admiration from Asian societies. During China’s May Fourth Movement of 1919, Chinese students raised a slogan of ‘studying with De Xiansheng and Sai Xiansheng (Mr. Democracy and Mr. Sciences)’ reflected a similar admiration with Europe’s achievements. The fourth image is that Europe is the home of imperialism and colonialism. The ‘unsinkable sun’ – Great Britain – has colonized a vast territory globally, including not only Asia but also Africa and the Americas. Needless to say, other European powers such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal also practiced this imperialism. Latecomer powers including the United States and Russia also became one of those imperialistic countries. The majority of Asian countries suffered from imperialist invasions and colonial rule. The first example was India; China soon followed. China’s experience was different from India’s, which was colonized by a single power, Great Britain. China, however, was divided by several Western powers. The United States later joined Europe and obtained its own colony – the Philippines (by defeating Spain). In the late 19th century even industrialized countries in Asia themselves, such as Japan, also imitated the Europeans in becoming imperialist. As one can see, among the four images there are both positive and negative sides, each rooted deeply in history. Therefore, one cannot say that all traditional images of Europe are positive. It is easy to notice that the Europeans themselves have severely criticized their own imperialist and colonial past, and have been making efforts to correct their historical mistakes, such as through decolonization.

3.

Post-war development – EU’s secondary position

The degree of the EU’s influence on Asia very much depends on the overall strategic configuration and the evolution of hard power. During the Cold War era in the immediate period after World War II, Europe’s influence in Asia had an unbalanced picture. In the 1950s and 1960s, because of the structure of a bipolar world in a global setting, Western Europe and NATO clearly sided with the United States, confronting the Communist block led by the former Soviet Union in both Europe and Asia. Therefore Europe’s influence in Asia can be characterized as a secondary position after the two

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superpowers.3 In Asia, Japan and South Korea, being military allies of the United States, had much closer ties with Western Europe (and later the EU) at the time. China on the other hand regarded the United States as its rival and Europe as a follower of the U.S. Economically, Mao Zedong advocated a slogan, chaoying ganmei, meaning to bypass Britain and catch up with the United States. Politically, in Mao’s Three World theory, West Europe was regarded as a force of Second World in between China (a part of the Third World) and the United States (the First World, together with another hegemony – the Soviet Union).4 This picture has significantly changed, beginning with the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, which started with US President Richard Nixon in his historical visit to Beijing in 1972. The trend of reconciliation between China and the West was further consolidated during the post-Cold War era. With China’s effort toward its modernization, the EU has become much more positive; therefore its influence is on the rise. As one can see from Table 1, the EU has enjoyed a relatively positive image in East Asia, particularly in Japan and South Korea. Although in China the positive views are comparatively lower, they are still more positive than those toward the United States. One of the reasons according to Jing Men is that ‘there is almost no strategic conflict between the EU and China.’5 Table 1: How China, Japan and South Korea View the EU (2010) China

Japan

South Korea

Favourable Unfavourable Favourable Unfavourable Favourable Unfavourable EU

47 %

39 %

73 %

16 %

75 %

14 %

Compiled from: http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=28&survey=10&response=Unfavorable &mode=chart http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=28&survey=10&response=Favorable &mode=chart

Needless to say, the perception is mutual. Table 2 provides a picture of the perceptions of China and Japan from Britain, France, and Germany. European perceptions toward Japan are much more favourable than toward China.6 3. 4. 5. 6.

Yahuda 1995, 265-282. Zeng 2004, 191. Men 2006, 804. d’Hooghe 2010, 1- 37.

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Table 2: How the EU (Britain, France, Germany) Views China and Japan (2010) Britain

France

Germany

Favourable Unfavourable Favourable Unfavourable Favourable Unfavourable China

46 %

35 %

41 %

59 %

30 %

61 %

Japan (from 2007)

72 %

17 %

89 %

8%

88 %

8%

Compiled from: http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&response=Unfavorable http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=10&response=Favorable &mode=chart http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/6/1174186_828.html http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/6/1174186_828.html

4.

Economic interdependence

In pre-modern history, Asia was in the lead in the world economy, but when industrialization took place in Europe, Asia was in decline. For quite a long time, Asia was economically insignificant to Europe. The picture began to change starting with Japan’s industrialization in the late 19th Century and its economic miracle starting in late 1950s. In the post-war era, Japan not only quickly recovered its economy, but also caught up with other industrialized countries. In the 1970s, Japan bypassed European powers and became the number two economy in the world. By following examples of the West, Japan has started its own official development assistance program (ODA) for developing countries. Following the flying geese theory, other Asian countries quickly followed suit. The four little dragons, including South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, moved quickly into the industrialized societies. Other Asian countries also followed, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The most significant economic miracle perhaps is the rise of China. For the past three decades beginning in 1978, the Chinese economy continuously rose and kept an average of a 10 % growth rate, an unprecedented economic performance in the contemporary world. China not only passed major European powers in its economic output, such as Germany, the UK, and France, but is also getting ready to overtake Japan around 2010. Furthermore if China’s momentum continues, it is projected to bypass the United States around 2040. All brought significant increases in terms of foreign trade. All of this created economic interdependence between East Asia and the EU. One can 213

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see from Table 3, the EU remained one of the biggest trading partners for East Asia. EU ranks first for China with 17.3 % of its total trade, number three for Japan with 12.2 %, and number two for South Korea with 11.0 %. Table 3: Top 10 Trading Partners of China, Japan, and South Korea (2009)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

China EU United States Hong Kong Japan South Korea Australia Singapore

8 Malaysia 9 India 10 Russia

17.3 % 15.1 % 11.5 % 10.5 % 6.9 % 2.8 % 2.3 %

Japan China United States EU South Korea Australia Thailand Saudi Arabia

2.1 % Hong Kong 1.8 % Indonesia 1.8 % Malaysia

South Korea China 20.9 % EU 11.0 % Japan 10.7 % United States 10.2 % Saudi Arabia 4.3 % Singapore 3.9 % United Arab 2.8 % Emirates 3.1 % Australia 2.8 % 2.9 % Hong Kong 2.7 % 2.7 % Indonesia 2.3 %

21.5 % 14.5 % 12.2 % 6.4 % 4.4 % 3.5 % 3.2 %

Data compiled from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113403.pdf http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113448.pdf

With the rise of China for the past decade, the increase of China’s trade with the EU has been magnificent. In 2009, for example, China replaced Germany and became the number one trading power in the world. It is only natural that EU’s trade relations with China are becoming more and more important. Interestingly, one can see from Table 4, EU’s trade with China has bypassed that with the United States since 2006.

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Table 4: China’s Total Trade with the EU and the United States 450 EU

400 Billion US dollars

350 300 United States

250 US’ balance with China

200 150 100

EU’ balance with China

50 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Source: China Customs Statistical Yearbook (various years); China Customs Statistics Monthly Report (December 2008); Quoted from: Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erick, and Hong Wai Mun, ‘EU-China Relations: Economics Still In Command?’ EAI Background Brief, No. 484, National University of Singapore, October 15, 2009, pp. 1-15. p. 2

East Asia also figured prominently in the total trade of EU. According to a recent EurActiv article, ‘In the first 10 months [of 2010] bilateral trade between Europe and China grew by nearly 33 % year-on-year to $ 338 billion, an 8 % increase compared to the same period of 2008.’7 The same article estimated that by the end of 2010, the ‘figure would top $ 450 billion.’8 From Table 5, one can see that China is EU’s number two trading partner, accounting for 12.9 % of total trade, Japan is number 6 with 4.0 %, and South Korea is number eight with 2.3 %.

7. 8.

EurActiv 2010. EurActiv 2010.

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Table 5: Top 10 Trading Partners of EU (2009) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

US China Russia Switzerland Norway Japan Turkey South Korea India Brazil

15.9 % 12.9 % 7.9 % 7.1 % 4.6 % 4.0 % 3.5 % 2.3 % 2.3 % 2.1 %

Data compiled from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf

One other significant development is the rise of India, but because there is another chapter specifically dealing with the case of India and this paper is primarily focused on East Asia I will not spend more space on the case of India. Moreover there are some traditional economic markets for Europe perhaps as historical legacies, just to name a few, the Netherlands with Indonesia, Britain with Malaysia and Singapore, France with Vietnam, and Spain with the Philippines. The historical legacy is also reflected in China: Germany in Shandong Province, Britain in the Yangtze River and Pearl River regions, and Portugal in Macau. Those historical ties more often than not play active roles in enhancing economic ties between Europe and Asia. Besides historical economic ties to the region, according to a New York Times article, ‘there is growing sense within the [EU] that China’s rise needs to be met with a more coordinated trade and foreign policy, to better protect European interests.’9 Also according to the same article, the EU is ‘already China’s biggest trading partner, and China has long wanted the [EU] to play a bigger role on the world stage, to counterbalance what it sees as U.S. unilateralism.’10 An overhaul of the EU’s foreign policies and trading strategies will most likely begin with designing a unified policy toward China, due to its dramatic economic upswing and growing influence throughout the world. 9. The New York Times 2010. 10. The New York Times 2010.

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In the post-Cold War configuration of global structure, one can see multipolar development and further intensified economic interdependence. This new development has brought Europe even closer to Asia. At the same time, Europe’s soft power influence has also increased as it will be discussed below.

5.

Soft power: value and culture

The development of the concept of soft power primarily emphasizes culture, value, and political influence, or non-material powers. This paper, therefore, will look at the interactions between the EU and East Asia in terms of people’s perception and mutual cultural influence. As mentioned above, with its largely positive image and historical heritage, Europe in many ways has functioned as a role model for East Asia, particularly in economic development and political institutions. This reflects the influence of the EU’s soft power with Asia, which can be seen from at least the following five aspects. First is related to democracy and human rights. As perhaps the founding place of contemporary democratic values, in many ways the EU has high moral standards, particularly when dealing with human rights issues. Some well known principles such as constitutional rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly developed into a way of democratic governance, namely a parliamentary political system. But, one cannot assume Asia will completely copy the example of Europe. Specifically, there are two contending points. First is Europe’s own past of imperialism. The invasion of Asian countries and accompanying violent actions, the most notorious of which was the British and the French armies’ burning and looting of Yuanming Yuan Palace, is still a fresh and raw memory for many Chinese people. The second argument is regarding the debate between universal versus Asian values. Whether Asian societies can completely adopt a Western way of governance, including democracy, is still an ongoing debate among scholars and practitioners.11 One of the current central goals of the EU is to force China ‘to ratify the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Human rights are central to the EU identity, complicating relations with the authoritarian Chinese state’, according to Sebastian Bersick, a lecturer at the University College Cork, in Ireland.12 11. Duchatel et al. 2008, 1-11; Bell 2006. 12. The New York Times 2010.

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The second point is that Asia tends to learn from the West the principle of the rule of the law. This specifically refers to the establishment of a set of political institutions and mechanisms that would ensure justice, efficiency, and fairness. For example, there is much criticism over the British colonial rule of Hong Kong, but many Chinese people, particularly people in Hong Kong, recognize that one of the major legacies left by the British governing body after the handover to China in 1997 is the principle of the rule of law.13 With the new government of the Hong Kong special administrative region (HKSAR), this principle is still largely observed. The third example of Europe being a role model is the case of regional integration, represented by the evolution of the European Union. Asian people have actively tried to ‘find out why the supranational institutions can develop and exist in Europe.’14 East Asian countries, especially in recent years, are all actively seeking the establishment of an East Asia community. Almost like a chorale, countries and regional organizations such as Japan, China, South Korea, and ASEAN have voiced in different times their desire to have such a community. It is virtually a hunger for them to learn good experience and lessons from their European counterparts. Although many people argue that the EU example cannot entirely be applied to the Asian context, it is nevertheless desirable for Asians to learn as much as possible from the EU. One question, for example, that always hangs over East Asian people is how European societies could remove their mutual hatred caused by past wars, especially between Germany and France, among others. As the past wars between Japan and its East Asian neighbours, China and Korea in particular, this has been a significant obstacle in the construction of East Asian regionalism.15 It is a particular need for them to seek for other examples. Take textbook issue for example, there has been constant dispute about Japanese textbooks, some of which were criticized as beautifying Japan’s war past, causing much protest from China and Korea. The experience between Germany, France, and Britain to work collectively on objective textbooks has become a good model for China, Japan, and South Korea. Indeed, most recent developments among the three countries have followed this route. The fourth element is the EU’s cultural pluralism. Recognizing that there are still problems, the EU has nevertheless developed one of the most comprehensive ways of dealing with foreign workers and immigrants. The very fact that the EU has abolished border control and used a unified 13. Chan 2007, 245-273. 14. Men 2006, 788-806. 15. Foreign Affairs and He 2009.

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currency has demonstrated its tolerance toward different peoples, cultures, religions, and racial groups. This becomes an important foundation not only for the community building process, but is also crucial for Asia to learn. Finally, the flourishing of international education of EU countries has a high point for meetings the challenge of globalization. Aided by English becoming the virtually universal working language, the EU is one of the most ideal places for international students to have overseas experience, perhaps only after the United States. All major countries in Europe, such as Britain, France, and Germany, have become main destinations for Asian students. Take China for example, as of 2007 there were 170 000 Chinese students studying at European universities, with approximately 75 000 of those in the United Kingdom, higher than the 67 000 Chinese students in the United States in the same period.16 The above five elements have remained major points for the EU to exercise its soft power to enhance its influence in Asia. Furthermore, Europe has always been one of the most attractive areas for tourists, which is one of the most significant means for Europe to exercise its soft power. Traditionally, Europe is a favourable tourist destination for East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea. Since the 1990s, Chinese tourists have increased significantly. From Table 6, one can see that Europe, although still small in portion, is already a major tourist destination for Chinese ahead of the Americas. Table 6: Chinese Outbound Travel Destinations (2007) Destination Asia Europe Americas Oceania Africa TOTAL

Number of outbound travellers in 2007 36.3 Million 2.0 Million 1.0 Million 0.5 Million 0.3 Million 40.95 Million

Increase compared to 2006 20.1 % 7.4 % 9.8 % 11.5 % 36.2 % 18.6 %

Source: COTRI, Data: CNTA. Quoted from: http://www.china-outbound.com/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110:currentsituation&catid=91:currentsituation&Itemid=103

16. Bates and Murphy 2008, 28.

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According to statistics, Asia (such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand) remained as the top destination for Chinese tourists; but, Europe is getting increasingly popular. The ranking of leading destinations in terms of holiday travel suggests that Germany, France and Italy are the most popular destinations in Europe.17

6.

Strategic involvement, diplomacy, and Europe’s voice

Despite heavy historical involvement in East Asia, Europe’s influence has declined since World War II. This is true as discussed earlier in the Cold War era when world attention was dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. It has continued to be true in the post-Cold War era when the United States became the only superpower. All other powers, no matter in Europe or in Asia, became secondary, including the EU, Russia, China, and Japan. World attention has also increasingly moved to Asia, as there have been continually rising momentums – first Japan, then four little dragons, and more recently China and India. Europe’s position in world political economy and its involvement in East Asian affairs have therefore become less significant. Although NATO forces participated in the Korean War of 1950-1953, it did not play a significant role in the settlement of the Korea problems in the 1950s. It is particularly true in the most recent North Korea nuclear crisis started in the 1990s. China and the United States have played leading roles in the on-and-off six-party talks, which include China, the US, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas. There have been debates among European states regarding whether the EU should be the seventh participant in the six-party talks (then should be seven-party talks), but so far most European countries have preferred to stay away. On the other hand, there has been great effort from the EU to engage with Asia, not only in economic terms, but also strategically. One particular effort is the development of so-called ‘new inter-regionalism’ between the EU and East Asia. According to Julie Gilson, there are two interregional mechanisms that deserve close attention, namely the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) and EU-ASEAN dialogue.18 There are, however, strategic competitions between EU and East Asia, particularly with China, the rising power of the region. A number of studies revealed this newly emerged

17. World Tourism Organization and European Travel Commission 2008. 18. Gilson 2005, 307-326.

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competition in a previously unlikely region such as Central Asia19 and Africa.20 The EU’s demand for the improvement of human rights in China has also gone through controversial stages. French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s criticism over China’s policy toward Tibet and his threat of boycotting the Beijing Olympic opening ceremonies in 2008 all caused unpleasant results with the Chinese. Sarkozy’s ultimate decision to go to Beijing to attend the Olympic Games made him seem immature in many Chinese eyes. A similar example was Britain’s policy toward Hong Kong. When the UK demanded the immediate open election of the position of HKSAR chief executive, while Beijing preferred an incremental process, it was not difficult for Beijing to pinpoint that Britain did not employ democratic principles during its own colonial rule of Hong Kong for the past 100-plus years until 1997. This has caused many Chinese to criticize Britain as hypocritical. Both cases caused EU’s relatively immature image in many Chinese eyes and the counterproductive part of their policy toward China. Nevertheless, the EU’s demands regarding human rights have provided the necessary pressure for China to improve its domestic political environment. As being discussed later, EU’s decision on the arms embargo with China was based on human rights considerations.21 Despite its increasing influence in some major issues of global affairs, the EU’s leadership role has been hindered by several negative aspects. The first one is that there are always different voices among its member states; in other words, there are no unified policies in several major foreign policy issues. This has more to do with internal conflicts than external pressure. As Yong Deng points out, ‘the EU’s quest for a unified, independent voice in the international arena is hampered by its continuing struggle to reconcile its super-national entity with the sovereignty of the 27 member states, especially when the interests of the big three (Britain, France, and Germany) diverge.’22 For example, we can discuss the issue of arms embargo with China, which was imposed in 1989 directly following the Tiananmen incident. By 2004 with bilateral relations warming up, EU began to consider lifting the embargo. Interestingly, this was initiated by the big three at the time, Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder, France’s Jacques Chirac, and Britain’s Tony Blair. Some smaller states were initially

19. 20. 21. 22.

Kavalaski 2007, 839-856. Wissenbach2009, 662-674. Kreutz 2004, 43-58. Deng 2007, 892.

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reluctant, but eventually went along with the big powers.23 (As indicated later, the initiatives failed due to the rejection of the US.) Similarly, there has been dissent on issues of human rights. At different times EU member states have different voices. It has reduced their effect on China’s position because Beijing can simply play economic and political cards with different individual European countries. For example, after Nicolas Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao deliberately skipped France during his trip to Europe in late 2008 while visiting other countries for major business deals. Examples like this are abundant, as the EU and China differ greatly on important issues such as human rights. These differences in concerns result in different voices, weakening EU’s influence within China a great deal. Examples of conflict management can also be found in other fields, such as climate change and the energy crisis. During the spring of 2010, the officials and representatives from the EU and China met in Copenhagen to discuss policy changes and diplomatic ties. According to a report by the East Asia Forum in March 2010, ‘before Copenhagen, European thinkers still believed that they could use soft power to influence China on a host of issues that Europe believed were mutual to both. After Copenhagen, European attitudes have hardened and governments are reconsidering their approach to China.’24 According to the article, as a result of the Copenhagen conference, Europe ‘will have to learn to work around China’, as the EU has learned Beijing will not budge on certain key issues.25

7.

The role of the United States

As the only superpower in the post Cold War era, the United States has naturally become the most important target in virtually every country’s foreign policy. The evolution of U.S. foreign policy has inevitably had profound impact on both the EU and China. It is argued, for example, China and the EU emerged as ‘global power beneficiaries of American coalition-building in the “war against terrorism”’ when entering the 21st century.26 Strategically the EU is still a loyal partner of the United States, despite some frictions over time between the EU and the US. Being both important 23. 24. 25. 26.

Brodsgaard and Kia 2009, 9-10. East Asia Forum 2010. East Asia Forum 2010. Dellios and Field 2002, 83-98.

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members of the west, as William Callahan pointed out, the US and EU share some common policies toward China, namely ‘both seek to integrate China into the international system.’27 There are, of course, different views as well. As Ming Wan argues, ‘great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for plenty.’ Therefore, ‘Europe, which is distant from East Asia, has a weaker sense of responsibility for Asian security measures’ compared with the United States and Japan.28 One early mentioned example is debates among EU members regarding to the arms embargo on China. China has consistently demanded that the EU lift this embargo.29 In a January 2011 tour many of the EU states including Germany, Spain, France and the UK, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang pushed for a lift of the arms and technology embargo once again. ‘For the EU, it should recognize China's full market economy status as soon as possible and relax restrictions on high-tech exports to China’,30 said an article in China Daily. EU’s ongoing debates among its members have become controversial, and as mentioned earlier, at one point the EU almost decided to meet the Chinese demands, but these initiatives were severely criticized by Washington on the grounds that such action ‘could allow China access to military and dual-use technologies that would help China improve current weapon systems … and could also remove implicit limits on Chinese military interaction with European militaries.’31 The US even threatened that if the embargo was lifted, Washington would reduce its cooperation with Europe in dual-use technology.32 It is only natural that both East Asia and the EU regarded each other as important partners, but only after their relations with the United States. In this sense, they are each playing a secondary role to the other side. Based on the power transition theory, the United States has placed much importance on increased interests in East Asia, particularly in China.33 The trans-Pacific trade of the United States has long bypassed its trans-Atlantic trade. With prepared power transition in the remainder of this century, the US has specifically adjusted its policy toward China, even during the George W. Bush period. The United States has downplayed its relations 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Callahan 2007, 803. Wan 2007, 417. Huaping 2009, 19-23. China Daily 2011. Archick et al. 2005, 24-25. Federaton for American Scientists 2005 Zhao 2005, 1-27.

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with Taiwan by emphasizing its recognition that the issue of Taiwan is the core national interest of China. This has led to a co-management situation over the Taiwan Strait between the two powers. This tendency has become even more obvious under the Obama administration, as demonstrated by Obama’s visit to China and other parts of Asia in November 2009. With China’s continued rise, the United States has begun to prepare to accommodate this power transition development. By the same token, Japan under the Hatoyama administration made significant adjustments with its China policy. Every power has been in the consideration of the so-called ‘correct’ side of history. The EU is definitely in the process of formulating its own strategic thinking, adjusting its foreign policy toward Asia, particularly toward China. But given the divided nature among its member states it seems it would take more time for that. In order to gain ground with China, particularly in promoting its own ideals and values, the EU should develop a united policy toward the rest of East Asia. Presently, the EU has little to no influence in Japan and South Korea, and according to an East Asia Forum article, ‘the EU would do well to cultivate relations with these states, as well as ASEAN, the regional body in South East Asia.’34

8.

Future directions

Undoubtedly the EU has figured high in importance in East Asia, perhaps only after the United States. According to a China Daily article, ‘the strong economic complementariness between China and the EU augurs broader prospects for bilateral industrial and investment cooperation. China is now striving to transform its economic development model, set up a modern industrial system and sharpen the core competitiveness of its enterprises. It is also committed to building a green economy and low-carbon society. All this leaves a wide space for expanded cooperation with EU countries.’35 On the other hand, it seems like the EU’s role is more significant in the economic dimension but less significant in the political and strategic dimensions. Therefore one may wonder whether the future of the EU will be like the future of Japan, that is, an economic giant but politically and diplomatically remain a medium influence. If the EU would like to increase its image as a global power, then it will have to facilitate the process of being more united, so it may have a unified voice in its foreign policy.36 In

34. East Asia Forum 2010. 35. China Daily 2011. 36. The Times 2009.

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this sense it can increase its soft power and move it into so-called smart power. Recent issues can be called into focus to demonstrate the EU’s unrelenting stance toward China. By keeping the arms embargo in place despite massive investments by China into EU markets, the EU has demonstrated that they will continue to hold out for diplomatic influence, rather than succumbing to China’s ever growing global economic domination. According to an EU Observer article, a British diplomat stated, ‘There remains a broad consensus within the EU that the time is not right to lift the arms embargo. We need to see clear progress on the issues that necessitated the embargo in the first place, namely on civil liberties and political rights.’37 Also, China’s reaction and imprisonment of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo has hindered talks on the removal of the arms embargo. There are increasing discussions about co-management of great powers when facing global challenges.38 Among many proposals is a recent advocacy of the G2 idea,39 namely the United States and China should play a joint leadership role in dealing with major issues not only regionally such as with the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but also globally, such as terrorism, global economic crisis, climate change, and energy shortage. Although both Washington and Beijing did not accept the G2 proposal, other global powers such as Russia, Japan, and the EU, regardless of whether they like it or not, may have to put this element into its own consideration. As a matter of fact, the EU has been recognized as a major advocate of multilateralism.40 When facing China’s emergence as a global actor there is a serious dilemma for the EU. As Pierre Defraigne suggested, ‘either it chooses to act as just an economic subsystem of a US-led OECD mechanism and under a regional security system within US-led NATO – thus paving the way towards a G2; or it means to assert its own unique development model with a higher level of solidarity and environmental sustainability, as well as more strategic autonomy, so as to project its own vision of a multilateral world order in a G3-plus rules-based multi-polar world.’41 Ultimately, global issues cannot be settled by G2. The EU should and will be a crucial member of the co-management of great powers. Close

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

EUobserver 2011. Zhao 2006, 39-78. Foreign Affairs 2009. Lin 2009, 7-10. Defraigne 2009, 7.

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interaction and cooperation between the EU and East Asia will be inevitable for the years to come.

References Archick, Kristin, Richard F. Grimmet, and Shirley Kan. 2005. European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32870.pdf. CRS Report for Congress. (Accessed on May 27, 2005). Ashton, Catherine. 2009. Quiet Diplomacy will Get Our Voice Heard. The Times, December 17. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/ article6959513.ece?print=yes&randnum=1261100064515 Asian Journal of Political Science 14(1): 1-27. Bell, Daniel A. 2006. Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erick, and Lim Chee Kia. 2009. EU-China: Managing a Strained Relationship. EAI Background Brief 483. National University of Singapore: 1-12. Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erick, and Hong Wai Mun. 2009. EU-China Relations: Economics Still In Command?. EAI Background Brief 484. National University of Singapore: 1-15. Callahan, William A. 2007. Future Imperfect: The European Union’s Encounter with China (and the United States). The Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4-5): 777-807. Chan, Kenneth Ka-Lok. 2007. Constructing Relations with Hong Kong under ‘One Country, Two Systems’. Prospects for the European Union. European Journal of East Asian Studies 6(2): 245-273. d’Hooghe, Ingrid. 2010. The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe: Beijing’s Public Diplomacy Puzzle. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Defraigne, Pierre. 2009. Bretton-Woods III Needs a G3-Plus. EU-China Observer 6: 2-7. Dellios, Rosita and Heather Field. 2002. China and the European Union: potential beneficiaries of Bush’s global coalition. Australian Journal of International Affairs 56(1): 83-98. 226

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Deng, Yong. 2007. Remolding Great Power Politics: China’s Strategic Partnerships with Russia the European Union, and India. The Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4-5): 863-903. Duchatel, Mathieu, Francois Godement, and Thibaud Voita. 2008. China Analysis: Playing with Europe’s Soft Agenda. European Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Centre 20: 1-11. Economy, Elizabeth C. and Adam Segal. 2009. The G-2 Mirage. Foreign Affairs. http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/649946 (Accessed May/June 2009). EUobserver.com. http://euobserver.com/884/31592 (Accessed May 1, 2010). Gill, Bates and Melissa Murphy. 2008. China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies. Gilson, Julia. 2005. New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia. European Integration 27(3): 307-326. Hemmings, John. 2010. EU-China Relations: Disappointment after Copenhagen. East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/01/eu-china-relationsdisappointment-after-copenhagen/ (Accessed March 1, 2010. Huaping, Liu. 2009. EU Re-regulates its Arms Exports. Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 3: 19-23. Kavalski, Emilian. 2007. Partnership or Rivalry between the EU, China and India in Central Asia: The Normative Power of Regional Actors with Global Aspirations. European Law Journal 13(6): 839-856. Kim, Sung Won, David P. Fidler, and Sumit Ganguly. 2009. Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security. World Policy Journal: 53-64. Kreutz, Joakim. 2004. Reviewing the EU Arms Embargo on China: the Clash between Value and Rationale in the European Security Strategy. Perspectives 22: 43-58. Lin Lin. 2009. The Concept of Multilateralism in EU’s Diplomacy. Guo Ji Zi Liao Xin Xi 2: 7-10. Lind, Jennifer. 2009. The Perils of Apology: What Japan Shouldn’t Learn from Germany. Foreign Affairs. http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/64945 (Accessed May/June 2009). 227

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Men, Jing. 2006. Chinese Perceptions of the European Union: A Review of Leading Chinese Journals. European Law Journal 12(6): 788-806. Pei, Minxin. China, the world, and China. Foreign Policy Magazine. Rettman, Andrew. EU to Keep China Arms Embargo despite Massive Investments. Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. 2010. Building Up Connections with China. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/world/europe/20iht-letter.html?_r=1 (Accessed August 19, 2010). Wan, Ming. 2007. The United States, Japan, and the European Union: comparing political economy approaches to China. The Pacific Review 20(3): 397-421. Wissenbach, Uwe. 2009. The EU’s Response to China’s Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-operation Match Needs? European Journal of Development Research 21: 662-674. World Tourism Organization and European Travel Commission. 2008. The Chinese Outbound Travel Market with Special Insight into the Image of Europe as a Destination. Xianping, Xu. 2011. Li's visit pushes China-EU ties toward new stage. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/04/ content_11789223.htm (Accessed January 4, 2011). Yahuda, Michael B. 1995. China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship. In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, edited by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh. New York: OUP: 265-282. Yinan, He. 2009. The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and GermanPolish Relations Since World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zeng, Huaqun. 2004. Promoting a New Bilateral Legal Framework for China-EU Economic Relations. Chinese Journal of International Relations 3(1): 189-226. Zhao, Quansheng. 2005. America’s Response to the Rise of China and SinoUS Relations. Zhao, Quansheng. Moving toward a Co-Management Approach: China’s Policy Toward North Korea and Taiwan. Asian Perspective 30(1): 39-78.

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Part III. The Way Forward

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12. The EU and Asia in a Changing Global Order James Moran

Let me say at the outset that for the purposes of this piece, ‘Asia’ includes the great arc of land from the Mongolian-Russia border in the north to the Iran/Afghanistan border in the west. That includes three distinct subregions, namely South, Northeast and Southeast Asia, each with a population rather larger than the EU itself, and each with its own set of dynamics, albeit with growing linkages between them. For once, the EU is somewhat easier to define: and its own diversity rather pales when compared to the myriad linguistic, cultural, spiritual and historical divides that characterise Asia. So much for defining the terms. What I would like to do here is first to take a brief look at where the Asian order is today, to identify some of the new trends, and then to see how the EU relates to that, both bilaterally and in the wider global context. Finally, some of the key challenges that Europe faces for the future will be discussed.

1.

A dynamic region

Some aspects of regional situation have been with us for many years. Probably the most obvious is the extraordinary economic growth that has continued for decades now, pausing only during the Asian financial crisis of the late 90’s, and, closely associated with that, the continuing rise, or reemergence of China and India, with all that implies for the regional dynamics. Not to be forgotten is the longstanding US presence in the region, with its military deployments and system of alliances. That of course is a crucial factor when we consider the long divided Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the cross-strait complex and in Japan’s approach to the region, and it remains a fundamental in terms of the maintenance of overall security. A sizable educated middle class has come into being and arguably, there is a fairly well-established trend toward more democratic forms of government: India is of course the world’s largest democracy, Pakistan has

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recently shrugged off its military regime and Bangladesh has returned to the fold. Even the Maldives have recently made the transition to multiparty democracy. In the East, Indonesia and Korea come to mind, although there are of course exceptions, China, Burma/Myanmar and the DPRK being perhaps the most evident. That said, whatever the nature of governance, nationalism in Asia remains as potent as anywhere in the world, driven variously by a combination of pride in economic achievement, historic ethnic or territorial rivalries and claims, the lack of an effective postcolonial or post-war reconciliation and the memory of colonisation, not least of the European variety. These factors form the backdrop to developments since the turn of the century. To name a few: 앫 rapidly growing economic interdependence within the region and the ‘China factor’ has led to an explosion of regional initiatives in the East, such as the moves within ASEAN toward a new charter and a single market, the setting up of an East Asia Summit, and the so-called ‘noodle-bowl’ of East Asian FTA’s with its sometimes baffling array of nomenclature; 앫 a resurgent India, whose economy has more than doubled in size since 2000 and which has emerged as a major economic force in its region and the world; 앫 the emergence of new hard security threats such as the rise of militancy in a number of Muslim countries and areas of the region and the refocusing of military efforts on fighting insurgency and/or terrorism, and the six party process on the DPRK nuclear issue; 앫 the leading role that Asia has played in progress toward meeting the challenge of the Millennium Development Goals, even if poverty remains persistent in many countries; 앫 growing awareness by governments and society at large of environmental issues and related threats: three countries in the region, China, India and Indonesia, are in the top six emitters of greenhouse gases and while self-assessment of responsibility varies, climate change is now recognised as a major challenge to growth and indeed longer term stability. This has both external and domestic consequences. For example, the majority of recorded civil disturbances in China can be attributed to environmental disputes; 앫 the rise of civil society, which now plays a significant role across the continent; and 앫 last but by no means least, the fast-growing interest of other major global players in the region, notably the US, Russia and of course an

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enlarged European Union of 27 States, all of which are becoming ever more interdependent with Asia, both economically and politically.

2.

The EU’s response

Over the last decade, Europe’s political engagement with the region has developed enormously, both at EU level and bilaterally through the Member States. Asia includes three of the EU’s six strategic partners, China, India and Japan, and annual summits are held with them, as well as with Korea. Moreover, the EU held a first ever summit with ASEAN Leaders a year ago. Strategic or security dialogues have, since 2005, been a regular feature with China, India, Japan and the US. The Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM) process has been enlarged to include the new EU member states, as well as India, Pakistan, Mongolia and the ASEAN secretariat. The EU has become an observer at SAARC and also wishes to become an Observer in the East Asian Summit. The Commission has developed comprehensive policy papers for China, India and South East Asia, and within the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the first ever guidelines for EU policy in East Asia were published late last year. New Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are under negotiation with China, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines and over the last seven years, the network of Commission Delegations in the region has expanded to cover most of the area, with new or upgraded missions opening up in a further eight countries and territories.

2.1. But why all this activity? First, Asia as a whole has recently surpassed NAFTA to become the EU’s main trading partner, accounting for more than a third of our total external trade flows, and continues to grow apace. China alone is Europe’s second largest trading partner after the USA, albeit with a major deficit. Japan is in the top five, ASEAN as a whole would there too, and trade with India is growing rapidly. EU FDI in Asia is also considerable, and now makes up over a quarter of total external European investment and, again, is growing rapidly. Incoming investment, especially from India, is also on the rise. The level of interdependence is now at unprecedented levels, with European supply chains across the board locked in to Asian platforms, and – as reconfirmed by the current economic crisis – Asian exporters as dependent as ever on the European market. So it is not surprising that getting trade 233

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and investment relations with the region right is one of the EU’s top external policy priorities. Naturally, the preferred framework must be the multilateral one, namely a successful DDA outcome, but the EU needs to work on all fronts and negotiations on FTA’s with India, South Korea and ASEAN are well underway. Partnership and Cooperation talks with China also include a substantial trade component, and our regulatory reform dialogue with Japan has been an important channel for trade issues for well over a decade. Europe has recognised that Asia is a critical factor in its security agenda: apart from the need to ensure that commercial relations are not disturbed, success in global efforts to curb non-proliferation and terrorism at home and abroad will not be possible without more effective engagement with the countries in the region. That is why the EU has been increasingly active in NATO and civilian efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, where the member states and Commission have spent some € 8 Billion since 2002 and where the EU is a key actor in the law, police and justice sectors. And it is why Europe has raised its game in Pakistan through the tripling of EU aid, working in frontier areas and supporting democratisation. There are very active security dialogues with India, China and others, the EU is a major contributor to the JCLEC anti-terror centre in Indonesia, and includes commitments on the fight against terrorism and weapons proliferation in all PCA negotiations and dialogues. While Europe’s role as a security actor in the region should not be exaggerated – it cannot be compared to the US, for example – it is true to say that the last few years have seen significant operational developments, perhaps the best known example being that of quelling the conflict in Aceh, where an EU monitoring mission played a fundamental part in the settlement of a dangerous conflict close to one of the world’s most important sea lanes, and where through its aid programmes and continuing presence on the ground Europe remains fully engaged in the consolidation of that important process. Aceh is a good example of where the EU, which is generally seen by Asians in a less ‘threatening’ light than powers such as the US or China, can add significant value as a force for peace. In Afghanistan, the EU plays a leading role in the crucial reform of the law & justice sectors, has set up the EUPOL police mission and is the main donor for police salaries, and works closely with member state militaries through provincial reconstruction teams. The EU also contributes funding through its stability and development programmes to efforts to mitigate conflicts in Mindanao and Southern Thailand, and to new regional initiatives to enhance nuclear and maritime security.

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So far as broader human security considerations are concerned, the EU has been at the forefront in the fight against world public health threats such as Avian flu, something which remains a serious threat in East Asia, where it appears to have originated. Here, the Commission has been a leader in international coordination and financing and as elsewhere, the EU is always a prime contributor to disaster relief and reconstruction, e.g. the tsunami efforts, where € 2 Billion has been spent since December 2004. An increasingly important part of the EU’s work in Asia is concerned with the external projection of its internal policies, such as environment, regulatory matters, standards and migration. There are a host of sectoral dialogues and support programmes underway. One prominent example is the bilateral and regional engagement on climate change and energy conservation. The full participation of China, India, Indonesia and others in the post-Kyoto process is a sine qua non for success, and the EU engages on this at summits and all levels to that end. This is complemented by constant efforts to push forward with bilateral climate change programmes, e.g. in China, a joint near-zero coal emissions programme is under development and India, where for the first time a work plan on climate was agreed at the Marseille summit in 2008. For all the economic progress, Asia is still a significant repository of world poverty, and in line with its global commitments, the EU remain a major aid donor to developing countries in the region, especially when it comes to the MDGs, the fight against poverty and helping with integration into the world economy. A strong effort has been made to work more closely with longstanding and emerging Asian donors, notably Japan and China. The European Investment Bank is also increasingly active in developing Asia and has a number of projects in fields like SME financing, renewable energy, environment and climate change (significant loans have been signed for this purpose with China & India over the last 12 months) and that contribute to this effort. As said, there has been a trend toward greater democratisation in the region, and in line with EU treaty objectives, Europe has in recent times been very active in giving support: election observer missions in Indonesia have contributed significantly to the remarkable progress that the country has made since the fall of Suharto, and the EOM in Aceh was a key part of the operation there. The recent EOM in Pakistan, the only one to stay for the duration, despite the very real risks to life and limb – helped to spur the re-emergence of civilian government there. On human rights, there have regular dialogues with China, India and many others. These, along with political dialogue have also contributed to 235

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progress, for example the recent ending of the death penalty in the Philippines. And the EIDHR programme supports HR projects with civil society throughout the region. Last but not least, Europe provides political inspiration and practical assistance to the moves toward greater regional integration all over the region, particularly with ASEAN. The EU has also become an observer in the South Asian SAARC.

3.

Global issues

What of Asia’s role in the world? Many observers, not least in Asia itself highlight the appearance of China as a new superpower, with its rapidly developing global interests and, some say, its aspirations to match or even surpass US and western ‘hegemony’. It is certainly true that the writ of the ‘G8’ today is not what it was. Indeed, these days this gathering usually includes China, as well as India and other emerging powers, in its deliberations, knowing that there is almost no global issue, whether climate change, UN reform, the financial crisis or the fight against terror that can be meaningfully discussed without such broader participation. The fact that the G20 format has recently emerged front and centre for cooperation on the financial crisis is very much a case in point. Half of its membership is made up of the EU, four of its member states and five Asian countries. That said, there is a danger that Westphalian thinking focussing on the global balance of power misses much of the point when we look at Asia’s role in the world. As I noted earlier, the region includes political and ethnic diversity on a grand scale, and while there are nebulous feelings of pride in being ‘Asian’, a light scratch of the surface reveals widespread internal tensions, rivalries and contradictions that soon give the lie to Huntingtonian clashes of civilisations between geopolitical blocs. It is also important to remember that for all the economic growth and rising military budgets, outside of Japan, Korea and a few small states and territories, the majority of Asian countries are in the DAC ‘lower middle income’ category, with per capita incomes far below those of the west, and likely to remain so for many decades to come. Moreover, even on the most alarmist estimates, Chinese military expenditures, although rising fast are less than a sixth of those of the US, or a tenth of those of NATO, and the ability of China to project military force beyond its immediate neighbourhood, while growing, remains very limited.

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But more important than economic strength and military capability are values, interests and intentions. There is little evidence that the rise of Asia necessarily poses some sort of threat to European aspirations or way of life. In some ways, the contrary applies: it is of course true that the EU has important differences with some on some basic values, such as democracy and human rights. But who would seriously argue that Mao’s ideal of world revolution is alive in China today? Perhaps more to the point, when we look around Asia, we see that those countries and territories that have become part of the developed world, starting with Japan, which is after all the world’s fourth largest democracy, have by and large embraced democracy as their system of choice. And there are others, such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Mongolia who are still very much part of the developing world, but who have also chosen a democratic path, and whose views on human rights often strike many chords in Europe. This does not always mean that there is a true convergence of values, but it does indicate that there are significant parts of the region where Europe is are to find common political ground. As to interests, most countries of the region, including China & India are increasingly integrated into the international economic system, whether through the WTO or the UN and given that they have perhaps been among the most prominent beneficiaries of globalisation, have a strong interest in strengthening open markets and rules-based collaboration. That integration is however less than complete, not least within the international financial system, where – for example – reform of the IMF and World Bank needs to take more appropriate account of Asia’s economic weight if the region is to play a greater part in restoring financial stability. Indeed that reform is now one of the subjects at the top of the agenda in terms of dealing with the financial crisis, and it is to be hoped that we will finally see some action on it soon. Failure to do this could well result in an Asian-led effort to create alternative structures that might lead to fragmentation. It is not enough to extol the virtues of ‘responsible stakeholderism’: the west must also be prepared to actually give partners a stake that reflects their true role in the world economy. On other key global issues dear to European hearts, such as climate change and non-proliferation, the picture is more varied, although domestic pressure within the region on governments to engage more effectively on climate is growing strongly as farmers, businesses and urban dwellers from Harbin to Mumbai suffer the negative effects of emissions, whether from coal-fired power stations or forest fires. Finding a balanced approach that accommodates those famous ‘differentiated but common responsibilities’ is certainly a challenge, but Asia surely has a clear interest in engaging fully 237

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on that in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. On non-proliferation, while challenges remain there is substantial common ground, with many Asian partners sharing European preoccupations. Dialogues with some of them have begun, as well as real cooperation on matters such as improving arms export controls. And as regards intentions, the main concerns of course centre on China, given its growing military profile. Worries about future Chinese force projection continue to dominate much strategic thinking on both sides of the Atlantic, and I daresay in the Kremlin. However there is not much evidence that China wishes any time soon to move toward regional, let alone global hegemony. Efforts to protect their economic interests, such as the recent deployment of warships to counter piracy off Somalia should not be confused with global ambitions. That said, the ‘pax Americana’ in East Asia that has prevailed since 1945 is something that China is often uneasy about, and this may well lead to some tectonic frictions in the years to come, as indeed it has in the past, most recently in 2002. And Chinese intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan are always a potential flashpoint, although the current rapprochement with the new KMT authorities augers well. One thing that China does need to do to allay suspicion is to inject greater transparency in its decision-making process reporting of military and overseas aid budgets, all of which remain rather opaque.

4.

Challenges for the future

I would argue that much of what the EU is doing now, in terms of the enhanced engagement on security, democracy, the environment, trade and development should be strengthened. However, while Europe is today seen in Asia as something more than a market and an aid donor, it is true that it continues to have difficulties with fulfilling its potential as a political actor in the region, and its influence is not perhaps what it should be. Some of that has naturally to do with the EU’s internal coherence. Some of it has to do with suspicions about its transatlantic relationship and agenda. And some of it has to do with certain Asian views that Europeans, and the wider west have somehow forgotten the virtues of hard work and are doomed to economic decline. But there is also a strong demand for Europe in the region: The example of the EU itself is often held up as totem or model for all those who wish to go forward with reconciliation and regional integration; the open and single European market remains a great attraction; the EU’s inclusive approach to democracy and human rights often strikes a chord; its 238

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multilateralist approach to global issues is widely admired; and most Asians regard Europe as a benign and non-threatening influence in their regional and wider security, some seeing it as a positive in terms of a more multipolar world, whether it be in China, with its eyes on the US and Russia, or elsewhere, with their eyes on China itself. Given this, how can Europe enhance its credibility as a partner in the region and forge stronger alliances in the global arena? First, there is no doubt that the passage of the Lisbon treaty would help the EU to be, and to be seen to be, a more coherent partner for East Asia. Lisbon would not necessarily solve all of the difficulties with the CFSP, but it should assist in avoiding fractious debates such as that in 2003-2005 over lifting the arms embargo on China, where the lack of proper preparations to achieve consensus among member states and in dealing with the US and Japan and other regional actors led to negative perceptions around the region, whether they were for or against such a move. Lisbon should also help in developing a credible medium and long term strategy involving all aspects of EU action, joining up the political and security dimensions with trade, environmental, regulatory and development matters in a more operational way than is possible today. And above all Lisbon should enhance the ability to speak with one voice, thus making the European case easier to understand. Second, the EU needs to energetically engage Asia on the response to the financial crisis, and – as has been done in the field of climate change – lead by example. A good start on this was made at the ASEM summit in Beijing in October 2008, especially in terms of agreeing the need for better regulation and fiscal stimuli. Europe should be prepared to make the adjustments necessary to accommodate the new economic and financial strength of China and other emerging economies in the region within the IFIs, so as to lend more credibility and arrest the decline of their influence in financial markets. One thing is certain: the advent of the G20 means that the two sides have a greater interest than ever in cooperating together. Third, with the new US administration likely to be more interested in more inclusive approaches, the EU needs to deepen its transatlantic engagement on Asia, focussing on issues such as the security and development challenges posed in Afghanistan and Pakistan and climate change, where there could be possibilities for more effective trilateral alliances. The same goes for our relations with Japan, and with Australia, which is a regional power in its own right and has recently been taking positions that are close to the EU.

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Fourth, and this could be more difficult given the recession, the EU should maintain its focus on open markets, and avoid protectionist approaches that will not only stunt world growth but endanger relations with Asian countries. At the same time, Europe needs to keep up its efforts to ensure that Asian WTO commitments are fully complied with and that its offensive issues such as government procurement, competition and IPR are pursued with vigour. And last but not least, Europeans need to make greater efforts to better understand Asian culture and aspirations and to encourage more parliamentary and people to people contacts. Among other things, this involves enhanced support for academicians and civil society but also consideration of the approach to visa policy, especially for business people and legal migration in general.

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List of Contributors

Chris Alden is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Axel Berkofsky is Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Milan-based Instituto per Gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). Fraser Cameron is Director of the EU-Russia Centre and an Adjunct Professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. Guibourg Delamotte is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Japanese Studies, National Institute of Oriental Studies (Inalco, Paris); Research Fellow, CEJ; and Adjunct Fellow, CRCAO and Asia Centre. Gustaaf Geeraerts is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Andebrhan Welde Giorgis is undertaking doctoral research at VUB. He served as President of Asmara University, Governor of the Bank of Eritrea, Ambassador to the EU and Senior Advisor on Africa for International Crisis Group (ICG). Eva Gross is Senior Fellow at the Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Shada Islam is Head of the Asia Programme, Friends of Europe. James Moran is Director for Asia, European External Action Service (EEAS). Alok Mukhopadhyay is Research Coordinator at Policy Research Group, Delhi. Robert Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College. Alain Ruche is Principal Administrator, Strategic Planning Division, European External Action Service (EEAS) Quansheng Zhao is Professor of international relations and Director of Center for Asian Studies at American University in Washington, DC.

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