Personal Policy Making : Canada's Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution 9780313011054, 9780313321078

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Personal Policy Making

Personal Policy Making Canada’s Role in the Adoption of the Palestine Partition Resolution Eliezer Tauber

Contributions to the Study of World History, Number 96

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Recent Titles in Contributions to the Study of World History The Persistence of Victorian Liberalism: The Politics of Social Reform in Britain, 1870–1900 Robert F. Haggard The Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process Herbert Druks A Lust for Virtue: Louis XIV’s Attack on Sin in Seventeenth-Century France Philip F. Riley Family Dynasty, Revolutionary Society: The Cochins of Paris, 1750–1922 Laurence H. Winnie The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community Frederic J. Fransen We Built Up Our Lives: Education and Community among Jewish Refugees Interned by Britain in World War II Maxine Schwartz Seller Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans Victor Roudometof Diplomats Without a Country: Baltic Diplomacy, International Law, and the Cold War James T. McHugh and James S. Pacy Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases C.X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, editors By the Sword and the Cross: The Historical Revolution of the Catholic World Monarchy in Spain and the New World, 1492–1825 Charles A. Truxillo Passion, Politics, and Philosophie: Rediscovering J.-P. Brissot Leonore Loft Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Diplomatic Policies and Economic Realities in Relations Between Japan and South Africa Masako Osada

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ta’uber, Eli’ezer. Personal policy making : Canada’s role in the adoption of the Palestine partition resolution / Eliezer Tauber. p. cm.—(Contributions to the study of world history, ISSN 0885–9159 ; no. 96) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–32107–8 (alk. paper) 1. Canada—Foreign relations—Palestine. 2. Palestine—Foreign relations—Canada. 3. Canada—Foreign relations—1945– 4. Palestine—History—Partition, 1947. 5. Pearson, Lester B. 6. Diplomats—Canada—History—20th century. 7. United Nations. General Assembly—History—20th century. 8. Humanitarianism —Political aspects—Canada—History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series. F1029.5.I7T38 2002 327.7105694—dc21 2001050131 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by Eliezer Tauber All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001050131 ISBN: 0–313–32107–8 ISSN: 0885–9159 First published in 2002 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction

ix

Abbreviations

xi

1.

The Special Assembly

1

2.

UNSCOP

11

3.

The Ad Hoc Committee

27

4.

Subcommittee 1

37

5.

In the Working Group

43

6.

Back to the General Assembly

51

7.

Personal Policy Making

63

8.

Lobbying Activities

97

vi

9.

Contents

Canada’s Role in Jewish, Arab, and Canadian Eyes

109

Conclusion

117

Notes

119

Bibliography

155

Index

165

Acknowledgments I began the research preceding this book during my sabbatical in Ottawa in the 1994–95 academic year under the auspices of the Canada-Israel Foundation for Academic Exchanges. Afaculty enrichment award granted to me in 1996 by the Canadian embassy in Tel-Aviv assisted me in completing the research. Additional assistance was rendered by the Israel Association for Canadian Studies. My sincere thanks to all of them are hereby acknowledged. Also, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Teitelbaum family of Ottawa, which was always glad to extend a helping hand. Finally, a special note of appreciation goes to my mother, whose devotion has always been a source of strength to me.

Introduction In a book he wrote in the early 1950s on the establishment of the state of Israel, David Horowitz, the first director-general of Israel’s ministry of finance and the founder and first governor of the Bank of Israel, stated: “It may be said that Canada, more than any other country, played a decisive part in all stages of the U.N.O. discussions on Palestine.”1 In February 1947, after almost three decades of British presence in Palestine, the British gave up and decided to share the solution of the Palestine problem with the United Nations. Attacks on their forces stationed there, the internal conflict between Jews and Arabs, which seemed insoluble, and finally the failure of a conciliation conference in London earlier that month, brought the British government to the decision to refer the Palestine mandate to the United Nations. During the following ten months the Palestine problem was internationalized, and on 29 November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly decided to partition Palestine into an independent Jewish state and an Arab one. The purpose of this book is to study the crucial role played by Canada at this juncture of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Three studies have been written so far on the Canadian attitude toward Palestine in that period, by Zachariah Kay,2 Anne Trowell Hillmer,3 and David Bercuson.4 Kay wrote his book before the 1947 documents were opened to research. Hillmer was much influenced by Elizabeth

x

Introduction

MacCallum, an External Affairs official whose distinct attitudes toward Arabs and Zionists will be discussed later on. Bercuson, also an admirer of MacCallum (“a great lady by any measure”), subtitled his book A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy, trying to prove that the entire Canadian involvement in the Palestine affair was based on Canadian national interest—“Serving the National Interest” he titled an earlier article about this subject.5 It is the intention of this book to prove exactly the opposite: not only that Canada had played a major role in the adoption of the partition resolution, but that it was a matter of personal policy making by a small group of Canadian foreign service officials determined to promote the idea, which seemed to them morally right.

Abbreviations Ad Hoc Committee

United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question

AUSSEA

Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs

CJC

Canadian Jewish Congress

CO

Colonial Office

CRO

Commonwealth Relations Office

CZA

Central Zionist Archives

DEA

Department of External Affairs

Debates

Official Report of Debates—House of Commons

DO

Dominions Office (CRO)

First Special Session

Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly

FO

Foreign Office

FRUS

Foreign Relations of the United States

ISA

Israel State Archives

JPL

Jewish Public Library

MG

Manuscript Group

RG

Record Group

xii

Abbreviations

Second Session

Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly

SSEA

Secretary of State for External Affairs

Third Session

Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNSCOP

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

USSEA

Under Secretary of State for External Affairs

Weekly Bulletin

United Nations Weekly Bulletin

WIA

Weizmann Institute Archives

Yearbook

Yearbook of the United Nations

1

The Special Assembly On 2 April 1947, Louis St. Laurent, Canada’s secretary of state for external affairs, received a telegram from Victor Hoo, acting secretary-general of the United Nations, to the effect that Britain had approached the secretary-general earlier that day informing him about its decision to refer the Palestine question to the United Nations. The British overture included a request to summon a special assembly of the organization in order to set up and instruct an inquiry commission to be sent to Palestine and prepare a report for discussion at the next regular session of the United Nations. Hoo’s telegram was cabled to all the fifty-five member states of the organization, whose governments were asked to convey their opinion about the British proposal. According to United Nations procedures, it had to secure a simple majority within thirty days in order to be carried out. Ten days later St. Laurent wired back Canada’s agreement with the British request, thus making Canada the twenty-seventh state to approve. Majority was achieved the next day with an affirmative twenty-eighth response arriving from the Philippines. Next, an official invitation to the special assembly was sent to all the member states, informing them of its opening on 28 April.1 Canada never had any distinct policy toward Palestine; Prime Minister King always perceived it as a British problem. By 14 April the cabinet de-

2

Personal Policy Making

cided that it would be enough for Canada to send a small delegation to New York, headed by a senior foreign service official. King, who would have preferred to evade the issue altogether, probably felt that it would be better for Canada to be represented by a mere civil servant than by St. Laurent himself. On the very same day St. Laurent informed the parliament of the cabinet decision, naming his under secretary of state, Lester Pearson, as the head of the Canadian delegation to the special assembly.2 Then came the time to formulate a policy. In a memorandum addressed to St. Laurent, Pearson expressed the hope that no substantial issues would be raised in the coming assembly. If such issues were discussed, “we should try to keep out of it.” If there were no alternative but to say “something,” this something “should, at this stage, be confined to noncontroversial general observations.” As for the composition of the suggested inquiry commission, he mentioned a proposal that it should comprise fourteen states, including the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and China. Britain, as the mandatory power of Palestine, would be invited to name “an accredited representative” to participate in the commission without voting rights. St. Laurent’s reaction to this was that “It would be embarrassing to us to be that representative.” A few days later, George Ignatieff, a member of the Canadian permanent delegation to the United Nations, came from New York and confirmed that Canada was expected to be put under pressure to participate in the commission.3 Four days before the opening of the assembly St. Laurent convened his officials for a comprehensive discussion about which policy to follow at the assembly. Pearson reiterated his opinion that it was better for the Canadians to keep silent. If silence proved to be too difficult, then a short statement that the United Nations should be “really doing something” toward finding a solution to the Palestine problem would be in place. He mentioned an American suggestion that the powers and Arab states should be excluded from the proposed commission. For Canada it would be better not to participate; however, if put under continuous pressure, it might become difficult to explain a refusal. St. Laurent thought that by the same token the Arab states should not participate since they were a concerned party; in addition, the British dominions should also not participate. Gerry Riddell, chief of the first political division of the department, said that participation of the powers in the commission would ease the dilemma of Canadian participation. To this Pearson retorted that it might be difficult for Canada to tip the scale in case of American and British disagreement. The absence of the powers from the commission would be in Canada’s interest.4 The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly was opened on 28 April 1947 in Flushing Meadows, New York. The British

The Special Assembly

3

wanted Pearson to be elected president of the special assembly. However, in a meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council several days earlier it had been decided to choose Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil for the position, while agreeing to nominate Pearson as chairman of the assembly’s First Committee responsible for political matters. At the first meeting of the First Committee Pearson’s candidacy was put forward by the Chinese and Greek representatives, and with no competition he won the position. The British found Pearson’s election potentially “helpful.”5 The first task of the assembly was to determine its agenda. First there was of course the British proposal to set up an inquiry commission, approved by the assembly’s General (steering) Committee on 29 April. However, a week before the opening of the assembly, five Arab states, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, posed another proposal, to vote for “The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence” as an Arab state. The General Committee discussed the Arab proposal at length, the American representative opposing it at the outset. Pearson, participating in the committee in his capacity as chairman of the First Committee, shared the American position. He held that the assembly’s task was a mere procedural one—to set up an inquiry commission and instruct it. Substantial issues should be discussed only in the next session after receiving the commission’s report; therefore, the Arab motion was beyond the scope of the current discussion. Furthermore, the Arab proposal was already a solution to the problem, which was only one out of many possible solutions. To include it on the agenda would be, therefore, “prejudging the issue.”6 It appears that Aranha also shared these views. After two days of discussions he insisted that the Arab proposal either be withdrawn or put to a vote. The Arabs, fearing defeat, responded that they did not ask for a vote at this stage; yet, they also refused to withdraw the proposal. Aranha found this answer unsatisfactory and forced a vote. The only vote in favor was that of the Egyptian representative, the only Arab with a voting right in the committee in his capacity as chairman of the assembly’s Third Committee. Eight, Pearson inclusive, voted against. Five abstained. But the Arabs did not give up and the next day they put their motion to the vote in the General Assembly, where it was defeated again with 15 votes for, 24 against and 10 abstentions.7 The next issue for the assembly to decide was which committee should discuss the Palestine inquiry commission. Pearson suggested that it should be the General Assembly itself that should discuss the matter in order “to hasten the proceedings.” Aranha was of the opinion that Pearson’s own committee should discuss the matter and prepare a resolution for the as-

4

Personal Policy Making

sembly: “the committee which will make the report is the First Committee, presided over by the Canadian representative who does not want to consider this matter. I am very pleased that this matter is going to his committee.” With no alternative, Pearson accepted, making it clear that he considered his task a mere procedural one—only to set up and instruct the inquiry commission.8 On 6 May the First Committee started to discuss the Palestine issue. In his opening speech Pearson urged the participants to conclude their assignment quickly and efficiently. Not only did the Palestine situation demand it, so “the prestige and reputation of the United Nations itself.” It was the first time that one of the assembly’s committees handled such a complicated question, and a failure would discredit the entire organization. Exploiting the discussion for propaganda purposes or “long but needless arguments” would harm the interest of both Palestine and the United Nations. The committee’s agenda, according to Pearson, was limited. It was not the Palestine problem that had to be discussed, but only the issue of setting up a commission to look into the Palestine problem. Therefore, the two issues to be discussed were: (a) the commission composition and (b) its terms of reference. And in order to accomplish this promptly, “we must keep our remarks short and to the point; by ‘to the point’ I mean pertinent to the immediate problem before us.”9 However, the proceedings did not progress the way Pearson wished. The Jewish Agency asked to be granted a hearing before the assembly, backed by the Polish and then by the Czech delegates, who suggested that its representatives appear in a plenary session. Once again, the General Committee was called in to make a decision. In a meeting of that committee Pearson opposed the suggestion, arguing that it was an unnecessary precedence, as it did not correspond with the assembly’s agenda, to constitute the inquiry commission. There was no point in hearing evidence about the substantive issue at this stage, which would only delay the proceedings. It was intended for the inquiry commission to present its findings at the September second regular session. However, if such delays started occurring, then the commission’s conclusions could be expected no earlier than the third regular session in 1948, and certainly no one wished for this outcome. It was for the inquiry commission to hear any relevant evidence.10 Pearson’s opinion was not accepted. Although the Polish and Czech proposals were rejected by the General Committee, an American suggestion to refer the Jewish Agency and any other interested party to the First Committee was accepted. It was up to that committee to decide whether to hear them. The General Committee’s decision was then backed by the General Assembly, which recommended that the First Committee grant such

The Special Assembly

5

hearings. Thus, against Pearson’s opinion, the First Committee decided to hear the representatives of both the Jewish Agency and the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee. Representatives from these organizations appeared before the committee during the coming days and laid their arguments. At least on one occasion did the simultaneous presence of Jews and Arabs necessitate the chairman’s intervention. Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency mentioned that the Mufti of Jerusalem had collaborated with the Nazis in exterminating European Jewry. At this Emil Ghuri of the Arab Higher Committee retorted that the Jews, crucifiers of the founder of Christianity, had no right to criticize a spiritual leader. Pearson promptly silenced Ghuri, warning him not to speak like this again and expressing his sorrow at the words, which contradicted the United Nations’ spirit and principles.11 After the hearings the committee returned to discuss the two initial tasks. It was decided to deliberate the commission’s terms of reference first, which was achieved relatively promptly and without too much controversy, to the effect that the commission should investigate the situation in Palestine and offer solutions by the following September. Deciding the commission’s composition was, on the other hand, a completely different story, certainly with regard to Canada. As early as the second week of April, the United States conveyed its opinion that the expected commission should comprise eleven “neutral” states without interests in Palestine; that is, excluding the powers and the Arab states. Canada was the first on the United States list, which was not alphabetical. (In an inner memorandum sent to President Truman, the State Department was willing to consider a second option—of a commission comprising the five powers and six middle powers. Canada was the first on the latter list, which also was not alphabetical.) The British were happy about this. Canada “would probably be friendly,” said Lord Inverchapel, the British ambassador to Washington. “We shall be lucky if we get both Canada and New Zealand,” said Alexander Cadogan, the British permanent delegate to the United Nations.12 The Canadians were less happy. In a telegram sent to Norman Robertson, Canada’s high commissioner in London, and forwarded to the British, “misgivings” were expressed at any proposal that excluded the powers from the commission. Indeed, Britain had to be a nonvoting member, but any report prepared without its participation and that of the United States would be unworkable. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union would be represented by one of its satellites, no Western state would take it upon itself to represent the Foreign Office or the State Department. In sum, the super-

6

Personal Policy Making

powers should not be allowed “to evade their responsibility” with regard to the Palestine question. A similar telegram was sent to Washington.13 In Washington, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Canada’s ambassador Hume Wrong that a small commission of seven “neutral” states might be advisable for a “sane” study of the issue. It was preferable that any such state should have no prior commitments concerning Palestine, and no “large and active Jewish community” within it. Canada and the Scandinavian states were offered as potential candidates. A counteroffer by Wrong and Prime Minister King that the commission comprise “outstanding world citizens,” was brushed aside by Acheson for “reserve.”14 In early May the American delegation to the United Nations informed Pearson unofficially that they intended to propose Canada as a member of the inquiry commission. The complete updated list of the Americans also included Holland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, India, Peru, and Uruguay. Pearson tried to duck out, claiming that according to the proposal there were too many states in the commission and too many states from one bloc. The Americans answered that even if taking Pearson’s observations into account, they would still be interested in Canadian participation. When reporting this to Ottawa, Pearson pointed out that if the Canadian objection to participate still held, it was better to announce it unofficially before Canada’s nomination became official. Australia, interested in participating, should be proposed instead as a Commonwealth representative in the commission.15 In a phone call from Ottawa, Pearson was instructed to try his best to stay out of the commission, “if it were possible decently and honourably to do so.” If Canada found itself compelled to participate, he should make it clear to the British and the Americans that the Canadian delegate would participate in an independent capacity. “In other words we would not endeavour either to direct or instruct any Canadian who sat on this Committee.” In a telegram sent to the Canadian ambassador to Washington, it was explained that the independence of such a delegate would “relieve the Government of pressure directed towards influencing Canadian policy.” Two days later the Americans showed Pearson a draft of their official proposal to the First Committee, with Canada leading the list.16 At this instant, Pearson did not object, though he promised his minister that in the likely case of Australian participation, Canada would be able to cancel its candidacy “at the appropriate moment.” With the evolvement of discussion in the First Committee, however, Pearson reached the conclusion that they should tell the United States explicitly that Canada “prefer not to serve.” They should insist that Canada had already taken its proper share in the Palestine debate, by his being chairman of the First Committee,

The Special Assembly

7

“and that we thought responsibility should be passed around.” If Canadian participation would become an issue, however, they would be left with no choice but to participate. St. Laurent, too, was of the opinion that it would be “more convenient” for Canada to stay out, although, of course, the Canadians did not want “to shirk responsibility for things which had to be done.” Such a participation “would be a considerable strain on the Department.” And since Canada had already played “a creditable part,” he adopted Pearson’s stand “that responsibility should be passed around.”17 The Americans, however, were not willing to let go. Former Senator Austin, head of the American delegation, approached Pearson “putting pressure” on him that Canada participate. Pearson responded that he was just following instructions. If the Americans wanted the instructions to be changed, they should approach the Canadian government. The very same day, Julian Harrington, the American minister in Ottawa, approached St. Laurent advising him that Austin was “very anxious” that Canada adhere to the American stand. But St. Laurent refused to change the instructions, stressing that it would be difficult for Canada as a member in the commission to prove that it was not “merely acting as a spokesman for the United Kingdom and the United States.” Pearson would continue, therefore, to evade participating in the commission, “if possible.” If there were no alternative, Canada would appoint a prominent Canadian to the job, “whom we would expect to act in an independent capacity.”18 As early as 6 May, when the First Committee first started the Palestine debate, the United States officially put forward its seven-state proposal (with Iran replacing India). The very same day, Argentina proposed an eleven-state commission, including the permanent members of the Security Council and even an Arab state. On 13 May the committee started to discuss the commission’s composition. Chile offered to add Guatemala and Yugoslavia to the United States’ list. Argentina announced the withdrawal of its proposal, on the ground that the Jewish Agency opposed British participation in the commission and that there was no point in antagonizing any of the concerned parties. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, submitted two proposals: either that the commission would comprise all the members of the Security Council, or only the five permanent members and the rest according to a regional representation. There was also a Polish proposal, of an eleven-state commission, similar to the second Soviet proposal, including an Arab state. Finally, there was an Australian proposal, that the commission comprise eleven states, excluding the five permanent members of the Security Council.19 The opinions on the commission’s composition were basically divided between those who wanted to evade power politics and interests and there-

8

Personal Policy Making

fore opted for “neutral” states and the exclusion of the permanent members, and those who claimed that the latter’s inclusion would facilitate adoption of the commission’s recommendations. Pearson, who wanted to conduct an orderly discussion, pointed out that in practice the committee faced three questions: (a) whether to include the permanent members, (b) whether to choose the commission’s members according to geographical regions, and (c) how many states should the commission comprise. Cadogan remarked that a negative vote on the first question would practically eliminate the Soviet proposals. Andrei Gromyko, head of the Soviet delegation, protested against the idea of disqualifying the permanent members, defining it as a punishment. “I would be the last person to propose punishment for the permanent members of the Security Council,” Pearson said and canceled his preliminary questions altogether, which had “been interpreted in such a drastic way.”20 Both Soviet proposals were put to vote and defeated. The Polish proposal failed as well. The Australian proposal, on the other hand, passed with 13 for, 11 against and 29 abstentions. Gromyko protested once again, this time against accepting a decision with such a majority. Could this be called a decision? Pearson, who abstained in all four votes, immediately retorted that according to procedures, the decision was properly accepted. Next, the identity of the participating states had to be decided. Pearson suggested a decision on a basis of “equitable geographical distribution.” The Bolivians then suggested accepting the United States list with the Chilean amendment. This suggestion won the vote. Since according to the Australian proposal eleven states had to be elected, it was decided to add one state from the Pacific region and one from Asia. For the first seat, Australia barely overcame the Philippines, while on the second India defeated Siam. The vote on the commission’s composition was over. Canada was in.21 On 15 May the recommendations of the First Committee were adopted by the General Assembly. The first recommendation with regard to the commission’s composition was voted on separately and adopted with 40 for (Canada inclusive), 0 against, 13 abstentions, and two states absent. Hence, the complete list of the commission’s membership included Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Holland, India, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The very same day they all were officially informed of the resolution. Pearson had now to provide an explanation for the Canadian presence in the commission. He telegraphed St. Laurent that he could not find the appropriate opportunity to resist the American proposal to include Canada: “In my opinion to have withdrawn our candidature at this moment might have been misinterpreted and have had an adverse effect on the discussion. For this reason I did not intervene.”22

The Special Assembly

9

Pearson’s performance in the First Committee was praised by many of the delegates. The British rated him “top.” Even Gromyko told him—privately—that he appreciated his objectivity.23 Maybe he was not aware of it at this stage, but this prestige and his very unanticipated involvement in the Palestine question were about to bind him to the Arab-Israeli conflict for years to come.

2

UNSCOP Following the special assembly’s decision, Trygve Lie, secretary-general of the United Nations, officially approached all the states expected to participate in the Palestine commission, asking them to nominate “high moral” representatives with “recognized competence” in international affairs and able to act “impartially and conscientiously.” Pearson, it turned out, started to find the Palestine question of interest and offered himself as Canada’s representative. However, resenting the idea of Pearson being absent from his duties in the Department of External Affairs, Prime Minister King consulted St. Laurent for other options. He told him that both Canada and the questions at stake deserved the best possible candidate, someone of outstanding ability and position. St. Laurent put forward several names, of which King found Justice Ivan Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada “easily the best.” Rand was reluctant to accept the position, however, having his summer vacation already arranged, but he eventually gave his consent, subject to government approval. On 22 May the cabinet approved the appointment, adding Léon Mayrand of External Affairs as Rand’s alternate. St. Laurent delivered an official statement in parliament to that effect.1 Ivan Rand, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1943 (until 1959). In 1946 he arbitrated a long and bitter labor dispute at the Ford Motor Company in Windsor, Ontario. The

12

Personal Policy Making

solution he found for the conflict, later named “the Rand Formula,” established that all employees in a factory had to pay union dues, but they did not have to be union members against their will, in which case they would not need to pay the union entrance fee. His reasoning was that while all employees benefited by the union efforts, and therefore had to pay the union dues, actual membership in the union had to be voluntary. He also ruled that all employees, whether union members or not, would have the right to vote before strikes could be declared by the union. Rand’s “Solomon judgment,” as it was perceived by the Canadians, left both parties partly satisfied and marked a new phase in labor-management relations in Canada. It won him countrywide prestige, not only within the juridical circles but also among the general public in Canada.2 When Rand was chosen as Canada’s representative in the Palestine commission, it was claimed that he was “fresh” to international problems in general and to the Palestine question in particular. Yet, already by March he got acquainted with Zionism when he published a review article on Justice Louis Brandeis in The Canadian Bar Review. Apparently, he admired both him and Justice Felix Frankfurter, both prominent among the Zionist movement in the United States. When appointed, Rand started to read about Palestine and Zionism, including the Peel Commission report, which in 1937 had recommended partition as the solution for the Palestine problem. He also consulted External Affairs officials about the proceedings of the special assembly and other aspects of the issue, and did not refrain from lunching with Lionel Gelber, a Canadian-born adviser to the Jewish Agency. The latter heard from him that while he did not consider visiting the displaced persons camps in Europe “imperative” for the commission, “Nobody, he said, with the slightest acquaintance with the world scene can be unaware of the connection” between the Jewish refugees there and the question of Palestine.3 Léon Mayrand, Rand’s alternate, was a French-Canadian diplomat specializing mainly in European affairs, who had formerly served in the Canadian embassy in Moscow. Since his wife was of Turkish origin, he traveled a lot in the Middle East and had the opportunity to read on its countries. According to his own words, he helped several Jewish families escape from Austria to Britain and then to Canada. Mayrand was enthusiastic about his coming mission, and in a letter to Gelber told him that he had read Richard Crossman’s Palestine Mission, “in which I recognize many of my own impressions when approaching the problem.” (Crossman, an Englishman, participated in the 1946 Anglo-American Commission to Palestine and turned into a staunch pro-Zionist.)4

UNSCOP

13

Choosing a jurist of such stature as Canada’s representative in the Palestine commission was intentional. The Canadian government wanted to publicly establish that Rand was acting “in his personal capacity,” without receiving any instructions or political guidance. Thus, the government would both be free of political pressures and not be bound to associate itself at a later stage with any recommendations he might offer. When asked in parliament, St. Laurent stated that Rand was free to act “impartially and conscientiously” as required by the secretary-general of the United Nations and by the very principles and aims of that organization. In any case, Rand was not prepared to obey directives from anyone, determined to follow his conscience alone, which he had made clear when being commissioned. Even when he conversed with External Affairs officials before setting out, no one could determine his ultimate attitude. During the commission’s work he never consulted Ottawa, and when he came back from Palestine, he did not bother to give an official report to any of the government departments about his membership in the commission.5 Not everyone in Canada was happy about the appointment. Opposition member John Hackett of the Progressive Conservatives asked in parliament the reasons for this appointment, which meant, according to him, involving a judge of Canada’s highest court in “a political controversy in which Canadian opinion is sharply divided.” King angrily retorted that Hackett’s question was of an “irregular” nature, not intended to acquire information but to express his political opinions, “which are of very doubtful value.” Rand was appointed to the position because he was considered the best choice, an opinion widely shared by the Canadian people.6 Mayrand was the first to leave Ottawa for New York, arriving there on 26 May, and a week later was joined by Rand. Already by his arrival, Rand had the opportunity to demonstrate his authoritative personality. Some of the commission members, Rand among them, met privately to discuss the commission’s chairmanship. They agreed to elect Chief Justice Emil Sandström of Sweden to the position. However, at the commission’s formal meeting, Enrique Rodriguez Fabregat of Uruguay put forward the candidacy of his Guatemalan colleague, Jorge García-Granados. While neither of them attended the former meeting, they were immediately supported by Vladimir Simic of Yugoslavia, who attended the meeting. A confusion of a few moments followed, then Rand put forward Sandström’s candidacy, which won a majority of seven. Eight days later, on 10 June 1947, what was then officially known as the “United Nations Special Committee on Palestine” (UNSCOP) set out for Palestine.7 Immediately upon their arrival, the UNSCOP members had to face the Palestine situation. Three members of the underground Jewish “Irgun

14

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Zva’i Le’umi” organization had been sentenced to death by the British for their part in an attack on the Acre prison. Their relatives now asked UNSCOP to intervene on their behalf. In the ensuing argument, Rand opposed the view that the pending executions might obstruct the commission’s work; it was a matter of the internal administration of Palestine. Eventually, it was decided that the commission should issue an official statement expressing “concern” about the executions, which Rand was to formulate. Then a new argument began, whether it should indicate that “some” of the members were concerned, or the “majority.” An actual vote became necessary, and this time Rand found himself in the minority, with six for “majority,” three against (including Rand), and two abstaining.8 Another issue requiring a vote was whether to visit the internment camps in Cyprus, where illegal Jewish immigrants caught by the British were being held. In a private talk between Mayrand and a local Jew, the former argued that there was no need for such a visit. First, they already had the relevant material collected by the 1946 Anglo-American Commission. Second, while they were aware of the hardships facing the internees, their task was to find a solution to the Palestine question. When voted by UNSCOP, a majority of six, Rand inclusive, opposed the proposal to send a subcommittee to Cyprus. Furthermore, a majority of five, Rand inclusive, voted against even hearing representatives of the internees (four were for and two abstained).9 Then there was the question of whether to agree to the British request that the commission hear the representatives of the Palestine government on camera for security reasons. Granados of Guatemala, an ardent opponent of the British, warned of “political implications” that might arise if the commission agreed to hear the British behind closed doors, and a demand was therefore put forward to hear their evidence in public. Rand, however, was of the opinion that against the background of the British request, they had a choice of either acceding, or not hearing them at all. Some of the other delegates agreed with him, and eventually an Australian suggestion was accepted, that UNSCOP issue a press notice that it was meeting the British on camera only because of security reasons and not in order to hear classified information.10 On 18 June UNSCOP started touring Palestine with a visit to the holy places in Jerusalem. The next day, on their way to Haifa, Rand invited David Horowitz, a liaison officer from the Jewish Agency, to join him in his car. During their following eleven-hour conversation Horowitz related to Rand the tragic past of the Jews and their aspirations. Rand expressed understanding concerning the connection between the Holocaust and the Palestine problem, especially with regard to the immigration question. When

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Horowitz reviewed the possible solutions to the problem, Rand showed a special interest in the partition option. He asked Horowitz about the nature of a potential Jewish state, to which Horowitz responded that the Jews simply wanted to live in peace with their neighbors. They had no interest in being involved in international matters and were fed up with being fuel for other nations’ fires. Relates Horowitz: “I sensed that the idea of Partition was coalescing in his mind as the only means to an objective solution. . . . It was evident that the reservations concerning our movement which he had brought to the country were rapidly disappearing.” It was only the first of many conversations to be held between the two.11 But the Jews were only one side of the Palestine conflict, and the very same day the commission was expected to visit an Arab tobacco factory. Although the Arab Higher Committee, which opposed the entire idea of an inquiry commission, forbade any Arab from officially meeting with UNSCOP, informal visits were not prohibited. However, when the commission arrived at the factory, it was informed that the building was off limits to Jews. Horowitz had to stay outside. Rand was incensed. But the worst from the Arab viewpoint came when the commission entered the building and got acquainted with the poor working conditions and the exploitation of children labor. The delegates left the factory with bad feelings about the social backwardness of the Arabs. Rand conveyed to Horowitz his “disgust” at his exclusion, which he considered as emanating from “racial and national discrimination,” which he “loathed.”12 The final stop on that day’s journey was on Mount Carmel. Horowitz showed Rand the illegal immigration ships intercepted by the British and concentrated in Haifa’s harbor, and explained to him the Jewish struggle for free immigration. On their way back to Jerusalem, Horowitz pointed at the detention camp in Latrun, and told Rand about the arrest by the British of Moshe Shertok and other Jewish leaders the previous year. “I fully appreciate that you’re fighting with your backs to the wall,” said Rand.13 Rand and Mayrand’s opinions about the Jewish effort in Palestine were to find expression several times during UNSCOP’s tours. Following a private tour by Sandström, Rand, and a couple of other delegates to the laboratories of the Sief Institute in Rehovot and the home of Chaim Weizmann, the Institute director and a past president of the World Zionist Organization, Sandström and Rand said: “Well, that’s really a great man.” In a reception held in the house of Moshe Shertok, and after hearing an informal overview of the Palestine question by David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, Rand was anxious to learn how the Jews would react to a proposal of partition with economic union. A discussion on the constitutional and territorial aspects of the idea followed. When visiting an

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exhibition in Tel-Aviv, Mayrand was reported to carefully examine photographs of Jewish refugees absorbed in Palestine. And then, when he visited the Negev and saw the reservoirs and the irrigated fields, he told a Jewish escort: “Here you have a very strong argument on your behalf.”14 Not less important than the tours were the official hearings conducted by UNSCOP during its visit to Palestine. Contrary to the other delegates, who directed many questions to the witnesses, Rand hardly interfered during the hearings. He posed questions only four times, but in retrospect one could discern in these interventions the seeds of the partition plan he had started to contemplate. On 7 July Rand asked Ben-Gurion about the stand of the Jewish Agency on the idea of partition. Ben-Gurion answered that they were willing to consider it. He further asked him whether the Jewish plans for immigration and expansion entailed external protection by the United Nations. Ben-Gurion answered that even without the United Nations, the Jews in Palestine would be able to manage. It would be hard, but they would bring more immigrants, defend themselves with their own means, and never give up. (Later on, Rand was to say to Horowitz that Ben-Gurion’s words that he ploughed the land with a rifle on his back “greatly impressed” him.)15 Two days later, he questioned Horowitz, in his capacity as an economic expert on behalf of the Jewish Agency, about the mutual economic relations between the Jews and Arabs. Horowitz explained that any attempt to describe a trade balance between the two would be to the former’s disadvantage. The Jews were buying agricultural produce from the Arabs but had never sold anything to them. They were buying construction materials from the Arabs and employing them in the construction itself, but never the opposite. The acquisition of lands was one-way, too, from Arabs to Jews. The result was that Jewish funds were moving in one direction only, to the Arabs. Furthermore, the rapid Jewish development in Palestine entailed massive purchasing in the neighboring countries, while the Arab boycott was preventing export to these countries. Rand asked him if at least there was reciprocity in manufactured goods, to which Horowitz answered that the Jews were selling such goods to Arabs and not buying, but that it was marginal in the overall balance. He had to admit though, following Rand’s final question, that they were buying Arab tobacco . . . 16 However, it was the argument that developed between Rand and Professor Magnes, president of the Hebrew University, that was the most outstanding encounter during the hearings. Magnes, representing the “Ihud” association, which advocated the establishment of a Judeo-Arab binational state in Palestine, was asked by Rand if the fact that the two nations were

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Semitic would facilitate cooperation between them. Magnes answered that indeed the common origin of the two nations might prevent racial animosity. An Arab would not say to a Jew that he had a big nose, because “a lots of Arabs have bigger noses,” while a Jew would not say to an Arab that he was too clever a merchant, because “we have very clever merchants among ourselves.” Then Rand asked about the development of nationalism among Jews and Arabs, to which Magnes retorted, “If you knew a way of wiping that problem out.” But Rand pressed to know how sensitive the problem was. “Very sensitive,” answered Magnes, and rising.17 Next to testify on behalf of “Ihud” was Dr. Moses Reiner, who examined the practical disadvantages of partition, especially in the economic field. Rand asked him if a binational state was a prerequisite for handling all matters that required common management. Was it not possible to have territorial partition and at the same time joint management in certain fields? Reiner answered that while it was possible with regard to water issues, for example, it would not solve problems in other areas, such as customs. “But could you not have a central administrative power with limited jurisdiction, and all powers of a State residing in partitioned sectors?,” insisted Rand. At this juncture Magnes again intervened that while partition with joint administration was more sensible, the opposition existing among both Arabs and Jews to partition would undermine their readiness to abide by such a joint authority.18 But Rand asked if one of the meanings of nationalism was not that a nation would have an exclusive area “where you can stand upon it, or kneel upon it, or kiss it, as you like . . . a sort of sacred national soil.” Magnes’s proposal excluded that possibility. Magnes retorted that he, too, was attached to every square foot in Palestine, even to Jenin, which was not to be part of the Jewish state. But Rand wondered if there were a central administrative authority, who was to prevent Magnes from visiting Jenin. At this point, Magnes was no longer sure that he understood the essence of Rand’s concept of central authority. Would it be the real supreme authority in the country? No, Rand said, jurisdiction over matters of land and immigration would be in the hands of the two states. The powers of the central authority would be in customs, foreign trade, communications, and other such joint matters.19 Rand found it hard to understand why Magnes was opposed to minimizing the powers of the central authority. What did he have against having two governments? It would segregate Arabs and Jews, said Magnes. It would cause “chauvinism” and “irredentism.” The supporters of partition among the Jews, when trying to convince their listeners, argued that borders were not eternal. In other words, borders were bound to be fought

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over. According to his plan, there would be no need for a passport to move from one place to another in Palestine. Rand retorted that neither would there be according to his plan. Immediately Magnes asked if Rand’s freedom of passage would be accompanied by freedom of land acquisition. Rand responded in the negative. Freedom of passage—yes, but each state should administer its own lands and immigration to them.20 Magnes opposed this. He hoped for a situation in which he and also every Arab would be able to purchase land everywhere. Rand agreed that this was a desirable situation, however not a very practical one, and that there was a need to find the “least objectionable” solution. Magnes warned that any solution adopted would have to be enforced. Partition was unenforceable and would provoke war. A binational state, on the other hand, already existed in Palestine. And what about “the more or less universal objective or dream or, you might say, spiritual aim of the Jewish people to have some part of this earth’s surface which it might say was its own exclusively,” asked Rand. If I could, I would establish a Jewish state, answered Magnes, but the situation in Palestine was not “tabula rasa.” There were two peoples there, and it was a mistake to think that partition would answer “the century-long yearning of the Jewish people for a niche in the world, for a home, for their own State.” Such a state would be too small and have too many Arabs. If all of Palestine were given to the Jews, it might satisfy some of them, but to partition such a “tiny” territory?21 “What you say is that that yearning must remain forever unsatisfied,” Rand said. Magnes retorted that what he said was that so long as two people were living in Palestine, the Jewish people would have to get along without a state, as it had done since centuries. The argument between Rand and Magnes finished with disagreement, and High Commissioner Cunningham reported to London that “Dr. Magnes’s plea for a bi-national State . . . seems to have failed to carry conviction with the Delegates.”22 The final time for Rand to actively interfere in the hearings was in a closed meeting where the representative of the Custos of the Holy Land gave evidence. Rand asked about the status of the Christian institutions in Palestine and the legal basis for their jurisdiction. The representative responded at first that it was based on a status quo of hundreds of years, but finally had to admit that it had been the Turkish rule that determined the rights of every Christian congregation. Rand’s conclusion, reluctantly confirmed by the representative, was that the existing rule would have the right to introduce changes in the status quo.23 At the conclusion of UNSCOP’s visit to Palestine, the commission continued on to Lebanon, where it heard several leading statesmen from the neighboring Arab states. Some of its members also traveled to Amman,

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Transjordan, to meet with King ‘Abdallah. By late July the commission arrived in Geneva, where it was supposed to discuss its findings and draw conclusions. The first decision made by the commission in Geneva was to send a subcommittee to the Jewish displaced persons camps in Germany and Austria to be apprised of their wishes with regard to “resettlement, repatriation or immigration into Palestine.” The decision passed with a majority of six (Rand inclusive) against four and one abstaining. It was also agreed that the subcommittee would mostly comprise alternates, so that the main delegates would be able to continue the commission work. The subcommittee set out on 8 August and returned a week later. Mayrand, representing Canada, and the rest of the members returned from the journey profoundly moved by the plight of the Jewish refugees, on the one hand, and their determination to reach Palestine, on the other hand.24 Another issue for the commission to decide upon before reaching conclusions was whether again to invite representatives of Britain to present their viewpoint. Rand “strongly” opposed this, claiming that such a rehearing was superfluous. Furthermore, since Britain was an interested party, inviting its representatives at this stage would undermine the commission’s neutrality. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of UNSCOP’s deliberations in Geneva, Rand had expressed the opinion that the British mandate over Palestine had failed and had to be terminated. A representative of the most important British dominion, his words in this regard had a profound impact on the rest of the commission members, who started to join his opinion that the days of the British mandate over Palestine were numbered.25 In a conversation with a Jewish journalist, Rand established that the British record in Palestine was “abominable.” He related that after reading all the relevant documents, he had ascertained that Britain had simply “turned her back to all her promises” to the Jews. “The British are slow in settling matters. They always come too late. So it was in the Boer problem, in the Indian issue and in Ireland.” It was beyond him why the British did not admit the illegal immigrants of the “Exodus” ship into Palestine, thus causing “fuss,” alienating the Jews, and undermining the likelihood of reaching a solution. He also could not understand why they had to keep forty to fifty thousand soldiers in Palestine. When the journalist updated him that the correct number was 100,000, Rand was astounded. It was “outrageous and ridiculous.” How could they afford it when there was such an economic crisis in Britain itself? He concluded that the “trouble-makers” in London were the cause behind all this; the egocentricity of Foreign Secretary Bevin and his obsession over Palestine. Therefore, there was no alternative but “a clear-cut solution.”26

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Rand also had a long talk with Horowitz, who followed him to Geneva. The opinions he expressed in this meeting and the questions he asked attested to the general outline of the solution he was going to offer UNSCOP. He told Horowitz that he did not believe Arab threats to invade Palestine; at most, there would be an infiltration of volunteers. When a settlement was decided upon, the Arab states would acquiesce. Their real fear was that the Jews would expand beyond the frontiers determined for them. Indeed, the Jews needed a territory that would not be “a mockery,” where they would be able to absorb immigration. However, they should cooperate with the proposed Arab state in their common interests, such as selling it manufactured goods while buying agricultural produce from it. A customs union was therefore essential. For cases of disagreement, an arbitration committee was due, consisting of a Jew, an Arab, and a United Nations representative, or all three from the United Nations. Rand was actually proposing a supreme authority of some sort, to control peace between the two states and their joint interests. But, Rand was afraid that the Arab state would not be economically viable. Horowitz, fearing that Rand would suggest Jewish subsidies to the Arab state, immediately insisted that it would be viable and that subsidies from one state to the other would be a constant source of friction. Rand was also worried that the Arabs would not have the proper personnel for administering their state. Horowitz noted that the other Arab states were run by people “in no way” superior to the “quite intelligent” Palestinian Arabs. Rand was also anxious to understand the reasons for the high Arab birth rate in Palestine. He put forward the suggestion that formal authority over the Jewish state should be assumed by the Jews only when they became a majority there. But “We are a majority in the area which we claim,” said Horowitz in astonishment. Not if Jerusalem with its 100,000 Jews would be internationalized, responded Rand. Bevin’s policy toward Palestine was also discussed by the two. Rand agreed with Horowitz that he was obsessed and blind to reason. Bevin, according to Horowitz, had staked his entire career on solving the Palestine problem, and when “these stiff-necked obstinate Jews did not want to submit,” he took it as a personal insult. Not to say that he was also anti-Semitic, and that being Russo-phobic he wrongly connected Jews with Bolsheviks. But what about terror, asked Rand, “Terror is quite harmful to your cause.” They knew that, answered Horowitz, but whenever the Jews were trying to curtail their terrorist organizations, the British would do something that sabotaged such efforts, like what happened to the “Exodus” ship. He explained to Rand the standpoint of these organizations, that the British rule in Palestine was illegal. Rand wondered whether the Jews had a tendency

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to solve problems by force. “Definitely not,” answered Horowitz, it was only during the past decade that Jews had started to use force. And “What about the Maccabeans?,” asked Rand. “That was a long time ago,” answered Horowitz. Up to recently Jews were being criticized for being slaughtered without resistance like cattle.27 As early as the beginning of UNSCOP’s discussions in Geneva, it was clear that Rand advocated establishing two politically separate states, but with certain shared services in order to preserve the economic unity of the country. Joint management of railways, custom tariffs, and even currency, was mentioned by him as essential. He presented these views in a formal meeting held by UNSCOP on 5 August, stressing the broad authorities the two states would enjoy, especially with regard to immigration laws. At one point he even suggested that both states should have representation in the United Nations, but withdrew the proposal when he realized its unpopularity. When the other delegates conveyed their opinions, it soon became clear that the differences of opinion were so acute that it was decided to suspend formal meetings and start informal consultations to discuss the various options.28 In the first informal meeting, Rand reiterated that vast autonomy had to be given to both Jews and Arabs, stressing the rights the Jews had in Palestine and that they should be fulfilled “to a certain degree.” Soon it became clear to the commission members that they had before them four options: a unitary state, entirely Arab or entirely Jewish over all of Palestine; a binational state; partition; and a federation. First to be discussed was the unitary state, and the first to speak was Rand. He strongly opposed the possibility of an Arab unitary state, which according to the Arabs themselves would not be viable, and which would constitute “betrayal of the Jewish people and violation of international agreements.” On the other hand, to give all of Palestine to the Jews would be betraying the Arabs. The delegates agreed that a unitary state was unacceptable. Then came the turn of the binational state. Rand was again the first to speak. It would lead to a “deadlock,” he claimed, and deny both peoples of their right to a state. Maybe it was a fine ideal, but not a practical one; both sides would remain unsatisfied. The binational idea was abandoned as well.29 Then came Rand’s turn to present his own proposal for settlement. He envisioned two independent states with open borders, subject in certain areas such as customs, currency, communications and irrigation to a central government, in which both Jews and Arabs and the superpowers would be represented. Thus, he claimed, the economic unity of the land would be maintained. The central government would also administer Jerusalem, be guardian of the religious interests in Palestine, and protect the entire coun-

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try against external or internal aggression. A foreign neutral force would assist in this. Matters of immigration and land acquisition, however, would remain in the hands of the two states themselves. At this stage, Rand’s program did not win substantial support, and it was decided to discuss it in detail later, after he had put it in writing. In fact, the chairman asked all interested delegates to submit written memoranda on their proposals.30 Several memoranda were handed in, including the chairman’s own, but it was Rand’s that finally came to constitute the basis for UNSCOP’s majority recommendations. According to his memorandum, the question of Palestine’s future was “primarily” the manner in which the essential interests of the Jews arising under the Mandate were to be accomplished with the least impact upon the Arab population. The Jews wanted self-government in a specific territory, which they would be able to enter freely. They also had to fulfil their psychological need that part of Palestine be returned to them, to be considered their regained homeland or state. On the other hand, Palestine’s economic unity had to be preserved. Therefore, the proper solution was to partition Palestine into three independent states: Jewish, Arab, and a state of Jerusalem. They all would enjoy full political sovereignty and be democratic republics guaranteeing individual rights and the rights of minorities. They would have no armies, and it would be up to Britain to continue to maintain forces in the Jewish and Arab states in order to assist them in keeping law and order. At the states’ request, however, these forces might be substituted by an international force. The three states, continued the memorandum, would be associated in “the Commonwealth of Palestine,” to be headed by a central authority to look after their common interests. These would include interstate highways, railways, ports, postal services, telephones and telegraphs, customs, foreign trade, and so forth. The central authority was not to be considered a state; however, it might be decided that it would govern the state of Jerusalem. It would comprise an equal number of Jews and Arabs, and in order to avoid an impasse another three men appointed by the two ethnic states, or in case of disagreement by the United Nations. In the transitional period necessary for the establishment of the states, no less than a year, Britain would continue to rule Palestine. Thereafter, authority would be passed to the states at their request. Finally, the memorandum established that immigration into the Jewish state would be administered by the Jewish Agency. “The White Paper of 1939 should cease to apply to the territories of the proposed Jewish State.” On the other hand, no additional Jews would be permitted permanent residence or land acquisition in the Arab state.31 Not all the ideas in Rand’s plan were to the liking of the Jews. What mostly annoyed them was the “formidable” powers assigned to the central

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authority, especially in the economic field. They considered it an instrument to transfer Jewish money to Arab hands, as there was no other way to achieve equal levels of Arab and Jewish economies. Criticism of the too strong status of the central authority in relation to the states was also expressed by Ralph Bunche, UNSCOP’s secretary. “It is useless to propose granting independence with one hand and taking it away with the other,” he noted in his papers. Also among the delegates there were those who criticized the many conditions in Rand’s plan, which might make it “unworkable.”32 Indeed, ultimately Rand’s proposal was to crystallize a majority among the UNSCOP delegates, but not until the problematic element of central authority was taken out. Triple partition would remain, but with no supreme central authority. By 16 August, already eight of the UNSCOP members supported the idea of establishing independent Jewish and Arab states with economic reciprocity. Three members, the Indian, the Iranian, and the Yugoslav, opposed partition and were to formulate an alternative plan of a federal state. Rand, for his part, mentioned no more his opinions concerning the central authority in that day’s meeting. He reiterated his opinion that Britain had to administer Palestine in the transitional period, being the expert in the Palestine situation, and was willing to extend this period to three years.33 Eventually, the UNSCOP majority report established a transitional period of two years, shortened further by the General Assembly to two months, due to the practical complications involved. The next issue on UNSCOP’s agenda was the economic one. Rand was very active on this, stressing the expected deficit of the Arab state and proposing that the financial system in Palestine be arranged in a manner so that the Jewish state would be able to cover this deficit. The representatives of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, although in principle opposing partition, supported this idea.34 The partition plan finally adopted included economic union, but no Jewish subsidies to the Arab state. The status of Jerusalem and the holy places in the future settlement was one of the sensitive issues the partition supporters in UNSCOP had to deal with, and a special subcommittee of alternates was set up to discuss it. Some were of the opinion that Jerusalem had to be included in the Arab state, some supported its partition, while some were in favor of making it a small enclave belonging to neither state. Delegates of the Jewish Agency, Horowitz among them, tried to convince Mayrand that there was no possibility to fulfil Zionism without Zion (that is, Jerusalem) and that there would be no Jewish support for a partition plan excluding Jerusalem. Mayrand tended to agree and supported also partitioning Jerusalem in recognition of the religious and spiritual bond of Judaism to it. The rest of the

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alternates, however, thought differently and eventually he found himself joining the alternates of Australia, Holland, Peru, and Sweden, in recommending a compromise proposal of turning Jerusalem into an internationalized small enclave, sort of a free city. The recommendation was duly adopted by the main delegates.35 However, it was the borders question that sharply divided the partitionist camp itself. While Rand’s approach was to grant the Jews the maximum territory with a maximum economic connection to the Arab state, the Peruvian García-Salazar advocated complete independence for the Jewish state, with no limiting connections, but in the smallest, actually symbolic territory. Salazar’s territorial approach was considered extremist by most of the partitionists, yet they could not reach a decision on the matter. When Fabregat of Uruguay presented his maximized boundaries for the Jewish state, chairman Sandström rebuked them for being “immoral,” as they included more territory than demanded by the Jews themselves. Fabregat protested the insult and was immediately seconded by Rand, who denounced Sandström’s censorship. In a following tirade he claimed that since Britain had not fulfilled its obligations to the Jews, they deserved to be compensated by the United Nations. A compensation in territory and immigration would be appropriate. He therefore supported Fabregat’s proposal.36 By 20 August it was clear that UNSCOP would not be able to produce a unanimous report, so it was decided to set up three working groups—two partitionist and one to discuss the federal state option. The first partitionist working group was to discuss the fundamental issues of partition, while the second discussed border issues. Rand, taking part in the first, tried once again to promote his central authority idea by suggesting to grant it the authority to confiscate lands for public needs. However it was Granados’s proposal, to grant this authority to the two states themselves, that was accepted. Finally, after several informal meetings, “the plan of partition with economic union” was completed. The border debate among the partitionists, nonetheless, continued. Rand, Fabregat, and Granados wanted to include both the entire Galilee and most of the northern Negev in the Jewish state. Sandström and the Dutch were in favor of the Galilee, but against the Negev. The Peruvian was against the Galilee, but in favour of part of the Negev. Eventually, in order to avoid a stalemate, a surprising compromise was reached: The western Galilee went to the Arab state, while all of the Negev was given to the Jewish state.37 UNSCOP’s plenary meetings on 27 August were the most crucial in forming the final character of its report. Rand tried to convince the supporters of the federal state that there was no substantial difference between

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their plan and the partition proposals. Both sought a certain distribution of powers while preserving the economic unity of Palestine. However, according to the federal version, the Arab majority would have “the ultimate power” in various fields, immigration, for example, by means of the federation’s general government. Clearly, no Jewish state would agree to this. Then, if the powers of the general government would be limited to the economic area, nothing would distinguish it from partition. Partition, however, would grant both peoples “a sense of national independence,” which was very important to them. Furthermore, federation had to be acceptable to both peoples, or be unfeasible. Partition, on the other hand, could be accepted by one people alone, thus solving this people’s problem; thus, only the remainder of Palestine would have to be further dealt with. In other words, with partition “you may get started,” while the federation plan was bound to “simply die,” to “be an abortion.”38 Rand, therefore, expressed his support for political partition and economic unity, indicating that Jerusalem should be given a special status in order “to be preserved for the world at large.” As for borders, he insisted on giving the Negev to the Jews, “which would otherwise remain sterile and unused.” If the Jews were not able to develop it, it would remain useless as nobody else would develop it, but if they succeeded, it would benefit everyone. Consequently, they must be given the chance. He was seconded by Fabregat, who clarified that partition meant two independent states with one economic system, and by Granados, who found himself “in complete agreement” with Rand, especially concerning borders and “his conciliatory attitude” to Jerusalem.39 Then came the vote. Seven members, the Canadian, the Czech, the Dutch, the Guatemalan, the Peruvian, the Swede, and the Uruguayan, voted for partition. Three members, the Indian, the Iranian, and the Yugoslav, voted for a federal state. One member, the Australian, up till then considered a partitionist, surprised everybody when he refused to join the majority recommendation. He was to append an explanation to the commission’s report, that since no “decisive” majority was achieved for either solution, all options had to be presented before the General Assembly, with no indication of preference; it was up to the General Assembly to decide which solution to adopt.40 Partition won the majority, but there were still fears in the Jewish camp about the size of the proposed Jewish state. Horowitz was afraid that at the last moment some of the partitionists might back off and compromise on the Peruvian proposal to establish a Jewish state the size of a “token.” A few minutes before UNSCOP’s final meeting, he approached Rand and warned that accepting Salazar’s proposal would not only “doom” the Jews, but also

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the prospects of solving the problem. Such a proposal would never win the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, and the Palestine problem would remain insoluble. He reminded Rand of his words that the Jews were fighting with their backs to the wall. “I won’t allow you to be placed in a territorial ghetto,” answered Rand. Indeed, during the meeting Rand stressed that the promise to establish a Jewish national home had never been fulfilled. Immigration and land acquisition had been artificially limited in the past decade, causing the Jewish community in Palestine to remain in a static condition. Were it not for the White Paper and the land legislation, the number of Jews there would significantly increase. Nothing more was said about the plan of a “truncated” Jewish state.41 On the night of 31 August 1947, the last day allotted to UNSCOP’s work by the special assembly’s decision, the UNSCOP report was sealed, with majority and minority recommendations. Mayrand could cable his minister with satisfaction that “Justice Rand was by far the main contributor to the partition scheme with economic union.”42

3

The Ad Hoc Committee Two days after the completion of UNSCOP’s work, in a meeting of division heads of Canada’s Department of External Affairs, Gerry Riddell, chief of the first political division, reminded those present that the time had come for Canada to form its policy on Palestine. Did Canada have to follow the UNSCOP majority recommendations? Although Rand had participated in the commission as a Canadian, Riddell pointed out, he had not been instructed by the Canadian government on which policy to pursue, as had been publicly stated. Therefore, the recommendations he had supported “did not necessarily represent the views of the Government, which might not associate itself with these findings.”1 Riddell’s observations were in fact those adopted by the cabinet some ten days later, to the effect that the Canadian delegation to the second regular session of the General Assembly should not feel bound by UNSCOP’s report, even though its majority recommendations were signed by a Canadian. The delegation would have to study the report carefully and to support only solutions with “reasonable evidence” to their effectiveness. There was no point in adopting decisions, “no matter how great their merit,” that both Jews and Arabs would oppose. And since the government had not yet had an opportunity to study the report itself and to consult some “most directly concerned” governments, “It will probably be necessary, therefore,

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for the delegation to seek instructions” as the discussion in the United Nations evolved.2 The most “directly concerned” government was, of course, that of the mandatory power, Britain. Indeed, a few days later a telegram was received from the Commonwealth Relations Office informing Canada (as well as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) that the British would not be prepared “to accept responsibility of imposing a settlement in Palestine by force of arms.” Britain had made it clear already at the special assembly that it kept the right “to decline task of implementing proposals which would demand use of force and which could not be reconciled with our conscience.” As a matter of fact, they had not committed themselves even to passively accept the recommendations of the General Assembly. They did not want to fail the expected session of the United Nations by not accepting its recommendations, but they felt the most important issue to be discussed was that of “enforcement.” In case no solution agreeable to both adverse sides in Palestine could be found, the British would simply withdraw from there.3 On 16 September 1947, the second regular session of the United Nations General Assembly was opened in Lake Success, New York, with Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil presiding. Secretary of State St. Laurent heading the Canadian delegation could attend only the opening session due to his obligations in Ottawa, and was replaced by Justice Minister James Ilsley as acting head, with Pearson as alternate and Riddell as principal adviser. Also participating were George Ignatieff of the permanent delegation and Elizabeth MacCallum, the department expert on Middle Eastern affairs, both as advisers, and a few so-called parliamentary advisers of both the Liberal governing and the opposition parties. Since contrary to the special assembly, this session was to deal with many other topics besides Palestine, it was suggested by the General Committee that an ad hoc committee be formed to concentrate on the Palestine issue alone, and thus free the rest of the assembly’s committees to attend to other matters. All members of the United Nations were to commission delegates to participate in that committee.4 The question, however, arose of who would chair the ad hoc committee. Lester Pearson, chairman of the First Committee in the special assembly, was considered by many the best choice for the position, and he apparently also wanted it. Prime Minister King, however, was less enthusiastic. He was of the opinion that Canada should keep itself aloof from the Palestine problem. When Pearson related to him the “pressure” laid on him and St. Laurent that he become chairman, he “strongly” advised him not to accept the position. He agreed that St. Laurent would return to Ottawa and let

The Ad Hoc Committee

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Pearson look after the delegation for a while, but Pearson had to tell St. Laurent about the “unwisdom” of his becoming the chairman. Canada had to be careful of not “unnecessarily taking on more than she should.” King, it turned out, did not have much faith in Pearson (“I have the feeling that Pearson is much tempted by it . . . though he says he would prefer not to”), and he reiterated his words to St. Laurent himself. It was “quite wrong” to let Pearson be the chairman at a time when King was about to leave for Europe (to attend Princess Elizabeth’s wedding) and St. Laurent had to deputize him. Pearson had to be available at home. St. Laurent promised King that he would see to it that Pearson would not accept the chairman position.5 Immediately upon the arrival of the Canadians in New York, St. Laurent convened a press conference in which he publicly declared that he did not want Pearson to become the ad hoc committee chairman. “We feel that we cannot dispense with his services for the length of the time it would take to handle that assignment,” he said. Canada preferred that somebody else be found for the job. It was clear that the foreign service officials who accompanied the delegation were “regretful” at this “somewhat abrupt” approach of their minister. St. Laurent, however, insisted in a delegation meeting that he needed Pearson at his side when King was going to London. (One of the delegates was to write in his diary that the argument “did not go over,” as everybody knew that King had at first asked Pearson himself to accompany him to London.) Thus, Pearson found himself forced to declare “exceedingly plain” that “he does not want the job.” Eventually, with American support, Australia’s foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, was elected to the position.6 On 25 September the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question started its deliberations with three issues on the agenda: (a) Britain’s original overture, (b) the UNSCOP report, and (c) a proposal put forward by Saudi Arabia and Iraq to establish a unitary Arab state in Palestine. Interestingly, no discussion was to be held about the UNSCOP minority recommendation to establish a federal state; the two competing options were: partition, according to the UNSCOP majority recommendation, or a unitary Arab state over all of Palestine. The Jewish Agency unreservedly backed partition. The Palestinian Arab Higher Committee wanted to hear about nothing but a unitary Arab state.7 At the beginning of the Palestine debate in the ad hoc committee, the position of the Canadian delegation was not to commit itself to any stand before the position of the superpowers could be ascertained, and whether there was any correlation between them. They found it especially important to know the Americans’ position, without whose cooperation they be-

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lieved no proposal could win the necessary two-thirds majority. (“[We] will have nothing to say until after the United States has spoken.”) When the Americans were delaying in conveying their position, Pearson thought that they had to be pushed to do so, as they were the ones who had always complained about the British attitude toward the Jews.8 On 26 September British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech-Jones, delivered a statement to the effect that Britain was determined to terminate its mandate over Palestine and withdraw its forces as soon as possible. Britain would not be prepared to militarily coerce a settlement that would not be acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. On 11 October the American delegate, Herschel Johnson, announced the United States’ support for partition following the lines of the UNSCOP majority recommendation. The United States was of the opinion that it should be the mandatory power that implemented partition, with economic and other support from the United Nations during the transition period. A constabulary force of volunteers was mentioned to assist the British in maintaining law and order. (The Canadians were of the opinion that the American statement was “vague” and “most non committal.”) Finally, there was a Soviet statement, made by Semen Tsarapkin on 13 October, that the Soviet Union supported partition and recognized the rights of the Jews to a state of their own. It also mentioned the need to form some sort of authority to implement partition after the termination of the mandate.9 The British were not satisfied by the American position and, following a suggestion by Evatt, convened “a secret conference” of the Western Commonwealth delegations. Ilsley and Ignatieff represented Canada. Creech-Jones stressed that the American suggestion that Britain be responsible for implementation of partition during the transition period was unacceptable. “To the surprise of those who attended the meeting,” he declared his intention to ask his government to immediately announce the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine by the following spring. The British decision to relinquish the mandate was “absolute,” he said. When asked by him about the Canadian position in this regard, Ilsley responded that it was the first time for Canada to be involved in the Palestine problem and that his delegation was still awaiting instructions from Ottawa. Furthermore, he pointed out, it did not seem “reasonable” for the British to expect the Canadians to define their position toward partition while they themselves “refrained from taking a definite position.” Yet, he could predict that Canada would eventually support the “main principles” of the UNSCOP majority recommendation.10 Harry Lawrence, head of the South African delegation, suggested that “the Commonwealth should speak with one voice.” However, when he

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added that the British mandate was not a failure, it was British Minister of State, Hector McNeil, accompanying Creech-Jones as an alternate, who immediately retorted that the British had failed to work the mandate and for that reason were laying it out. Creech-Jones concluded the meeting by anticipating “trouble” if partition were adopted, which meant more responsibility on Britain’s shoulders. Therefore, they had to bring the United States into “sharing responsibility” for Palestine. He also expressed the hope that when the British announced the evacuation of Palestine, it would be accepted “sympathetically” by the Commonwealth governments. And as he had promised, immediately after the meeting he cabled London that “the time has come” for announcing the date of withdrawal, and he asked for authority to do so.11 Within two days the secretary of state for commonwealth relations informed the prime ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa of the British displeasure at the American position, laying all the responsibility on Britain until a new regime was established in Palestine. Even in the days of the League of Nations, which decided on the mandate, Britain could not be forced to continue the mandate “indefinitely” against its will, not to say now that the League was no longer in existence. Britain, therefore, considered its stay in Palestine voluntary and would remain there only if both Jews and Arabs agreed to the settlement adopted by the assembly. Otherwise, Britain would withdraw and did not even promise to participate in an international force formed to force such a settlement. The American proposal of a constabulary force was not serious. Large forces, and for a long period, would be needed to coerce partition against Arab will. Furthermore, both states established according to UNSCOP’s majority plan would not be viable, the Jewish strategically and the Arab economically. It was important, therefore, not just to look for a solution, but also for the means of implementing it.12 Contrary to British expectations, the Canadian delegation criticized the British stand to withdraw in case no agreement between Jews and Arabs was found and to reserve the right of choosing whether to accept or decline the General Assembly’s decision. Some members thought of approaching their British colleagues in order to convince them that Britain had to stay in Palestine if only to prevent the creation of a vacuum, likely to be filled by the Soviet Union. But the British insisted on their stand and informed the Commonwealth governments about their intention to assume “a somewhat passive role” in the Palestine debate, and to be careful “not to become prematurely associated with any specific proposal.”13 One step taken by the British, however, was to propose international cooperation to solve the problem of “distressed European Jews.” They were

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of the opinion that illegal immigration into Palestine only aggravated the situation, while “certain states” did not take any measure to stop it. Therefore, they suggested that every member of the United Nations should agree to urgently admit an appropriate share of “non-repatriable persons” into its territory. The International Refugee Organization was mentioned as an instrument for developing a comprehensive solution to this problem. Asked to support this proposal, the feeling in the Canadian delegation was that it was “rather in the nature of red herring which would serve only to confuse the real issues and would not succeed in expediting the discovery of a solution.” It was decided to tell the British delegation that it was undesirable to separate the Jewish refugee problem from the general one, as it would only reopen the bitter debate about the displaced persons issue.14 After ascertaining the positions of the superpowers with regard to Palestine, the time had come for the Canadian delegation to state its own. For most of the members of the delegation it was clear that Canada was going to support the UNSCOP partition plan, as they found it the only option to hold any promise for a settlement. However, when Riddell, in consultation with Pearson, prepared a speech in this spirit for Ilsley to deliver as the acting head of the delegation, the latter was “greatly concerned” that it did not try to meet the “very strong moral and political claims” of the Arabs. Riddell claimed that Canada had not taken part in any of the conflict’s historical events and therefore was not bound to pass a judgment on all the historical arguments that were put forward. Another member noted to Ilsley that Britain’s past promises to both sides might have been conflicting (“he agreed that these things do happen”). Ilsley’s opposition was overcome, and the next day the government’s approval for the speech was also secured. The cabinet, though, pointed out that any resolution passed had to be “the collective responsibility” of all the United Nations members.15 On 14 October Ilsley presented the official Canadian stand in the ad hoc committee. He opened by stating that Canada had no former commitments when discussing the Palestine question as Justice Rand had been at liberty to use his own judgment and to reach independent conclusions with no instructions from his government. After carefully studying the UNSCOP report the Canadian government had decided to support its recommendations “in principle.” The mandate had to be terminated; Palestine had to be granted independence; the displaced persons problem should be solved by a concerted international effort. The debate held in the ad hoc committee until then had confirmed the main arguments for supporting partition with economic union. Although strong arguments had been advanced by both Jews and Arabs, the main issue was to enable both peoples living in a small geographical region to coexist freely.

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Ilsley continued describing the Canadian experience of “a nation of two peoples with two cultural traditions,” which bore some resemblance to the Palestine situation. In Canada, “a satisfactory working arrangement” of a federal state had finally been reached. “Confederation in Canada, however, was based on agreement,” and there had been no evidence up till then that Jews and Arabs were willing to accept unity in one single state; they had rejected even the federal plan proposed by UNSCOP’s minority. Therefore, in these circumstances, “we have been led to accept, somewhat reluctantly, the majority proposals for partition as a basis for discussion.” Since the mandatory power announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine, it was urgent for the committee: (a) to work out a settlement for Palestine; (b) to determine who would take over the responsibility for administering Palestine after the British had left; and (c) to decide how to enforce the assembly’s resolutions in case the Jews and Arabs refused to accept them. As to the first issue, it was imperative that the partition plan be workable. As to the second and third—the United States offered to assist in economic and financial problems and suggested that a special volunteer constabulary be formed to maintain law and order in the transition period. The authority of the United Nations to form such a force had to be established beyond doubt. It was also mentioned that the Security Council might be the appropriate organ for implementation. It was advised, therefore, to form a special subcommittee to study the various issues related to the administration of Palestine after the withdrawal of the mandatory power and to the implementation of the plan adopted. Ilsley concluded his speech by emphasizing the need for the United Nations collectively to support the decisions reached.16 The authority of the United Nations to take over Palestine was one of the fundamental issues raised by Ilsley. In a note written by Ignatieff on this issue, he pointed out that the General Assembly had no powers in this matter, except through the agency of an international trusteeship. However, since according to Chapter 12 of the United Nations Charter a trusteeship agreement required the consent of “the states directly concerned,” one could expect the Arab states to claim to be such states. Furthermore, it would probably be difficult to find a state that would agree to take it upon itself to administer Palestine on behalf of the United Nations during the trusteeship period, not to mention the time it would take to arrive at such an agreement. Ignatieff’s opinion was seconded by Max Wershof, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, who emphasized that according to Articles 11 and 14 of the Charter, the General Assembly could only offer recommendations, but could not create states. However, if partition were recommended, and then at the end of a transition period new states

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would emerge and be recognized by other states, they would be considered existing “as far as international law is concerned.”17 One could argue, continued Wershof, that the Security Council was “better equipped” to handle the vacuum created in Palestine with the withdrawal of Britain. Chapter 12 gave it “ample powers” to administer Palestine, and certainly the British withdrawal would create a situation of a “threat to the peace,” which according to Article 39 required the council’s intervention. However, the question was how effective the Security Council could be—one should remember the veto possibilities, for example. Indeed, a trusteeship agreement seemed to be the best possible solution for the transition period. However, since it was expected that no state would volunteer to administer Palestine according to a trusteeship agreement, the United Nations would find itself obliged to do it itself. The question of whether it practically could was far more than just a legal question.18 Pearson was anxious to understand what the “exact legal position” of postmandatory Palestine would be, to which Wershof answered that in case Britain retreated with no trusteeship, “there will be no ‘exact legal position.’” “There will be anarchy” from the international law viewpoint—no state, no government, but just people fighting each other. It was, therefore, “useless to define the exact legal position” in such an unprecedented situation, uncovered by any legal instrument. Wershof anticipated a “terrible” eventuality, where the assembly’s recommendations would just promote anarchy, as according to the Charter it did not have the authority to enforce them. However, if the assembly would decide to eliminate the transition period and secure Britain’s agreement to transfer the government directly to the two new states, it might be “legally workable.” In such an eventuality, even if the Arabs would claim to govern the entire Palestine, it should not prevent the British from giving them authority over the Arab region alone.19 The Canadians did not have much time to contemplate legal aspects. The American and Swedish delegations put forward a draft resolution to the effect that UNSCOP’s majority recommendations be adopted by the ad hoc committee as a basis for its own recommendation concerning Palestine’s future. An American offer to the Canadians to join the motion was declined by the latter, although they intended to support it in the vote. There was, however, no vote about this proposal, as the Americans themselves concurrently put forward another draft resolution, eventually the one to be put to the vote, to set up a subcommittee to draw up a detailed plan following the UNSCOP majority plan. This plan should duly be adopted by the ad hoc committee as its recommendations.20

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The Canadian delegation, however, was of the opinion that there was no point in discussing a solution without attending to the question of its enforcement. Therefore, it suggested an amendment that the proposed subcommittee also consider “the exercise of administration responsibility in Palestine during the transitional period” and the “methods by which [the] recommendations . . . would be put into effect.” The British, much concerned about the transition period, were in favor of the amendment; the Americans thought otherwise. General Hilldring of the American delegation tried to convince Pearson that their resolution “embodied in itself” the essence of the Canadian amendment, and that the latter dealt with “facets of the Palestinian problem which should not be over-emphasized.” Pearson, however, considered as “extremely unrealistic and impractical” the American assumption that all the United Nations members would cooperate with the assembly’s decision, and that Britain, too, would agree to suppress ensuing disturbances. He therefore insisted that the questions of enforcement and responsibility for Palestine during the transition period be expressly mentioned in the subcommittee’s guidelines.21 On 21 October the American resolution with the Canadian amendment was put to the vote and passed with 35 for, none against and 8 abstentions. A Syrian resolution to set up a second subcommittee to study the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq to establish a unitary Arab state also passed, with 30 for, 10 against and 6 abstentions. Athird subcommittee for “conciliation” was also formed, but practically to no avail.22 The next step was to decide who would participate in each of the subcommittees. For several days the Canadian had been suspicious that the Americans would try to avoid participation in the first subcommittee. They decided to “strongly” oppose any such attempt to shirk responsibility, and when chairman Evatt approached them regarding the subcommittee composition, he was told that Canada would participate only if the Americans did. Evatt, for his part, proposed a nine-state list, including the United States and the Soviet Union (and Canada), but some of his nominees declined the offer. A Soviet proposal to include all the members of the Security Council also fell through. Finally, it was decided to give Evatt the authority to decide on the identity of the participants after consulting the various delegations.23 Nine states were chosen by Evatt for Subcommittee 1, all express proponents of partition: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Nine states were chosen to Subcommittee 2, eight of them Muslim: Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The Colombian delegate, representing the only non-Muslim state, was to

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chair that subcommittee, but he soon announced his resignation in protest against Evatt’s refusal to include additional “neutral” states in the subcommittee. The resignation impressed no one, and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan was elected chairman in his stead.24

4

Subcommittee 1 On 23 October 1947, Subcommittee 1, the partition subcommittee, held its first meeting, electing Ksawery Pruszynski of Poland as chairman. Some “interested members” of the Canadian delegation who analyzed the meeting afterwards reached the conclusion that the discussants had tended to ignore problems related to the transition period and the implementation of partition. It was therefore up to the delegation to attract their attention to this.1 On 2 November, the Americans put forward their version of how to implement partition. Herschel Johnson suggested elimination of the transition period by establishing the independent Jewish and Arab states simultaneously with the termination of the mandate. The date of 1 July 1948 was proposed for the transfer of authorities. The General Assembly was expected to guide and assist the process by means of a three-member United Nations commission sent to Palestine to help in the transfer of powers. The British army was counted on, for its part, to continue maintaining law and order until the 1st of July. In a private talk with the Canadians, the Americans insisted that no responsibility in this matter should be placed on the Security Council, in an effort to deny the Soviets the opportunity of intervention. They were afraid that in the latter case, the Soviets would start exercising their veto right to achieve their own interests.2

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The Canadians realized that the American proposal relieved any other state, besides Britain, of direct intervention in the region—but this was exactly what the British had explicitly objected to. They felt that the Americans were “perhaps somewhat too optimistic” in assuming that all sides involved would cooperate with their plan. No methods were proposed to cope with the potential difficulties in the transfer of powers that might arise from the moment such a plan was adopted until the actual establishment of the new states. Furthermore, they had doubts about the legal basis of the suggestion that it be the General Assembly that was to arrange for the transfer of authorities. Indeed, the American proposal did not require the approval of the superpowers. But in practice it was the Security Council that was responsible for maintaining world peace, and therefore with no advance assurances of its efficient treatment of the matter, “it would be foolish” to go into such a plan. Following the American proposal without the prior agreement of the Jews, Arabs, and British might therefore lead to “an unsatisfactory situation.”3 The next day, it was the Soviets who offered their version of how to implement partition. Semen Tsarapkin suggested termination of the British mandate on 1 January 1948; British withdrawal by 1 April 1948 at the latest; a short transition period, no later than 31 December 1948. It would be up to the Security Council to administer Palestine during that period by means of an eleven-member commission. This commission would delimit the borders of the Jewish and Arab states and guide their provisional governments, which were to hold elections to constituent assemblies within six months. The constituent assemblies, in their turn, were to formulate constitutions and elect permanent governments. Internal security during this period was to be maintained by local armed militias, formed by the provisional governments but supervised by the commission.4 Following Tsarapkin’s speech, Pearson posed several “preliminary” questions to him: (a) If, in accordance with his proposal, the British were to withdraw by 1 April, would there be enough time to set up the local militias intended to replace them? And if, in the meantime, the proposed commission would need its own forces to maintain order until the end of 1948, what kind of forces were intended to be placed at its disposal? (b) Since the Soviets had suggested a commission on behalf of the Security Council, did they intend it to have the same powers as the council? And would the “unanimity rule” of the council apply also to the commission? (c) How exactly was the commission to appoint the provisional governments? The Soviets had mentioned a consultation with the existing democratic parties and social organizations. To which democratic parties and organizations had they referred? And how had they intended to secure the democratic nature of

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the elections to the constituent assemblies? Pearson also noted his reservation at the long transition period proposed by the Soviets. In any case, for the time being, he got no response to his questions.5 Throughout this time the British kept their “official attitude of detachment” (as put by the Canadians) and refrained from intervening in the debate or expressing their official opinion on partition. Pearson tried to convince them to be more cooperative, in order to make the American proposal feasible. In fact, Johnson asked him to make use of his good relations with them in order to reach an Anglo-American collaboration intended to block any Soviet intervention in the Palestine question. The British, however, following Bevin’s instructions, insisted that they would agree to the American proposal only if it was accepted by both sides concerned. In private talks, though, the British warned that partition would lead to a continuous bloodshed. They argued that partition would play into Soviet hands, but could not convince the Canadians how Soviet intervention was to be averted if no step was taken by the United Nations. When asked about the inconsistency between their detached position and the fact that they had been the ones to submit the question to the United Nations in the first place, they admitted to regret at bringing the matter before it, now that they had already decided to withdraw.6 It was at this stage of the discussions that Pearson started to take an increasingly “active part.” There was a feeling among the Canadian delegates that a statement of their own was in place, in order “to assist in giving direction to the discussion and avoid some of the confused thinking which is becoming evident.” They favored the American thinking that authorities should be transferred directly to the new states on the termination of the mandate, but only if this was a part of “a fully practicable plan.” They felt that “The sooner the people of Palestine accept direct responsibility for their own Government the better.” Great troubles were expected in case of “a disturbed interim period,” no matter under which kind of international authority. Effective international administration could be achieved only through the Security Council, which meant the potential use of Soviet forces, or through trusteeship, necessitating the unlikely agreement of all parties concerned.7 Therefore, they asked St. Laurent’s permission to state that the American proposal or any other would be assessed by the delegation according to its ability to cope with the practical difficulties anticipated. An “impracticable” plan was unacceptable. They would state that they favored the idea of not having a transition period after the termination of the mandate, but also that ways to overcome the potential difficulties to arise until the termination of the mandate had to be looked for. One way to transfer authorities to

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the new states was through trusteeship, but they were also willing to consider a United Nations commission, so long as the British cooperated and the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to it. Harmony in the Security Council was imperative, so that no veto would be exercised. St. Laurent found the delegation observations reasonable, but cautioned that the deligation be “very careful” before proposing solutions to difficulties, as “No one else seems prepare to prescribe and I am not sure enough about our diagnosis to be ready to do so.” Furthermore, if eventually there would be a commission, it was better for Canada not to be “so prominently identified” with it and then becoming “stuck with having to serve on the commission.”8 On 4 November Pearson read a long prepared statement before Subcommittee 1, in which he analyzed the partition proposals presented till then, pointed out their weaknesses, and offered “informal and tentative” suggestions “without committing” his delegation to them. He noted that although the Canadian delegation had some proposals of its own, which “might serve to bridge the gap between other proposals,” it preferred to submit them “at the proper time,” namely, after getting some answers to questions posed “to another delegation.”9 The guideline of his statement was that any plan eventually adopted should pass three tests: It had to be “constitutionally sound, practicable and effective.” The legal vacuum expected following the British withdrawal had to be filled in the manner contemplated by UNSCOP’s majority, but considerate of the possibility that the settlement would not work out peaceably. The United States’ suggestion to skip the transition period altogether was agreeable, but not its proposal that it should be the General Assembly, or any organ on its behalf, that would force the settlement. According to the Charter, the General Assembly could only recommend and not command; therefore, any settlement recommended by it was dependent on the agreement of all sides involved, or liable to fail. Other possibilities for consideration were trusteeship or implementation by the Security Council. Trusteeship involved the difficulty of identifying the “states directly concerned.” However, if there was going to be no transition period, trusteeship would be unnecessary. Security Council implementation, suggested by the Soviets, could be a practicable solution, but only if prior agreement of all the permanent members was guaranteed. They would all have to agree both that the situation in Palestine constituted a “threat to the peace” and on the measures to be employed in order to restore “international peace.” Pearson concluded his speech stressing that “we must scrutinize carefully any plan we contemplate in order to antici-

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pate the difficulties it may create.” Therefore, all proposals put forward had to be discussed further before final positions were adopted.10 Already by the morning of that day it was decided to set up an informal working group, composed of the American and Soviet delegates and Granados of Guatemala, to investigate the implementation options and find some compromise between them. (Granados, too, had presented an implementation proposal before the subcommittee.) Following Pearson’s speech, the representative of Venezuela in the subcommittee suggested that Canada also participate in the proposed working group. The suggestion was endorsed by both the Americans and the Soviets, with the former hoping that Canada would function as a “link” between the working group and Britain. Pearson, for his part, noted that he had not made his observations in order to be included in the working group, but if the subcommittee so wanted he was willing to comply.11 Seven working groups were formed by Subcommittee 1 to expedite its work: on holy places, citizenship, international treaties and financial commitments, economic union, borders, implementation, and the city of Jerusalem.12 It was the working group on implementation that was to become the most important.

5

In the Working Group When joining the working group on implementation, the Canadian delegation had three aims in mind: (a) to furnish the settlement with an adequate juridical basis in order to anticipate future doubts about the authority of the United Nations to implement it; (b) to emphasize that the peoples of Palestine themselves should be given the responsibility of administering it, and not the United Nations or any international force on its behalf—in case a situation beyond their abilities developed, it should be declared a “threat to the peace” and handled by the Security Council; and (c) to ensure that Britain’s views were taken into account, especially with regard to the termination of the mandate, the withdrawal of British forces, and the transfer of authorities.1 On its first day, Pearson presented the working group with a list of implementation suggestions, “to be regarded merely as points for discussion” and not as “proposals put forward formally by the Canadian Government.” A copy was also delivered to the British. According to this paper, if partition (with no transition period) was adopted, the General Assembly should immediately declare the situation in Palestine a “threat to the peace” and ask the Security Council to take the following steps: (a) to arrange for the emergence of the two new states on the day the mandate would terminate; (b) to ask the Jewish Agency to form a government in the

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proposed Jewish state; (c) to ask the Arab League to form a government in the proposed Arab state; (d) to assist Britain in maintaining security during the period prior to its withdrawal; (e) to appoint a “Preparatory Economic Commission” for building up economic cooperation between the two states; and (f) to arrange for the establishment of the government of Jerusalem. Any attempt to alter this settlement by force would be considered by the Security Council a “threat to the peace” and an “act of aggression.”2 Since any implementation proposal was dependent on British cooperation, Pearson arranged a meeting in his hotel suite with Johnson and Hilldring representing the Americans and Alexander Cadogan, the British. Pearson updated Cadogan on the deliberations in the working group and the various positions concerning implementation, while Johnson inquired about British readiness to cooperate. Cadogan responded that until further instructions were received from London, he could give no definite answer, but he could say that the British were determined to withdraw and that no complication caused by a United Nations decision would hinder them from doing so. They would withdraw gradually, relinquishing responsibility for law and order in the areas evacuated. If trouble occurred in these areas, and trouble “will occur,” they had no intention to return. At this point Pearson asked Johnson if the United States was willing to assist if the British remained until independence, and he asked Cadogan if the British were willing to remain if such commitments were given. Johnson answered that the United States would agree to send experts and advisers, but no American troops. No further answer was given by Cadogan.3 However, the problems facing the working group were beyond just British reluctance. Both Americans and Soviets were entrenched in their positions. The Americans insisted on 1 July 1948 for the transfer of authorities, with the British forces remaining in Palestine until then and a commission on behalf of the General Assembly supervising the process. They held that the General Assembly was qualified to recommend partition, and that such a recommendation would put a “strong moral obligation” on the member states to assist in its implementation. They did not seem to be bothered by the possibility that Britain or the local peoples of Palestine would not accept the recommendation. The Soviets insisted on the termination of the mandate by 1 January 1948 with the British out of Palestine by 30 April. Their version of a United Nations commission was of one with administrative powers on behalf of the Security Council. An American compromise proposing that the supervising commission appointed by the assembly also report to the council was deemed unacceptable by the Soviets. “The Soviet representative is immovable,” reported Pearson, and feared that eventually several plans would be submitted, which meant majority to none.4

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It was a deadlock and Pearson came to the rescue. He asked Johnson if the Americans would agree to the termination of the mandate on 1 January instead of 1 July, if the British agreed to look after Palestine until the establishment of the new states in July. He then asked Tsarapkin if the Soviets would agree that Britain take upon itself “certain responsibilities” in Palestine, “as agent of the United Nations,” for the period January-July, if the mandate was to terminate on 1 January. Then he asked if instead of an eleven-member commission on behalf of the Security Council, as suggested by the Soviets, or a three-member commission on behalf of the General Assembly, as proposed by the Americans, both would agree to a three member commission appointed by the assembly but responsible to the council. Granados immediately supported Pearson’s suggestions, but it was not up to him. But to Pearson’s surprise, both Johnson, somewhat reluctantly, and Tsarapkin, more favorably, said that his suggestions were negotiable. Still they asked for a twenty-four–hour recess to consult their governments. Pearson begged that if a compromise was reached, it should be presented “as a U.S.-U.S.S.R. proposal, not a Canadian one.”5 The British told Johnson privately that the time allocated for them in Pearson’s proposal until the termination of the mandate was too short. However, in a plenary meeting of the American delegation, Johnson stressed that the Americans were pushed against the wall by Pearson’s proposal, and if they persevered in their position, in the end they would be the ones blamed for a potential failure to adopt partition. He proposed therefore to adopt Pearson’s compromise with certain modifications, subject to Soviet agreement. A hot debate developed, with some members of the delegation supporting Johnson’s opinion and others insisting on the original American stand. Finally, it was decided to accept the date of 1 January if the British would agree to administer Palestine until the actual establishment of the two states. Furthermore, Johnson was authorized to reach decisions in the working group itself, according to the evolution of circumstances and subject to possible instructions from Washington.6 As for the Soviets, they simply wanted to get the British out of Palestine as soon as possible and realized that this could be achieved only through partition, the only option that could mobilize the necessary two-thirds majority. They were not willing to risk this majority, possible only through the support of both blocs, because of details. Furthermore, Pearson’s compromise adopted their stand with regard to the formal date of the termination of the mandate, and was also considerate of their view of the status of the Security Council. Therefore, eventually, they were prepared to listen to him.7

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On 10 November a compromise was achieved. Tsarapkin revealed an unprecedented leniency and his new stand, in fact built on Pearson’s proposals, enabled conversations to proceed “in friendly and accommodating manner.” Johnson, too, was prepared to change his original positions. The compromise reached was even better for the American side, as the Soviets agreed to the termination of the mandate on 1 May, which was four months later than their original stand and only two months earlier than the American. Britain was expected to continue maintaining security in Palestine until the termination of the mandate, but to complete its withdrawal by 1 May. The independence of the two states was fixed for 1 July at the latest. Responsibility for administering Palestine between May and July, and for implementing partition, was to be laid on a three- to five-member “small power” commission “appointed by the General Assembly,” but acting “under the authority and guidance of the Security Council.” On the very same day the compromise was adopted by the plenary subcommittee. Pearson could tell his colleagues that “Through force of circumstances the implementation section of the Palestinian report was largely the work of the Canadian delegation.”8 Some in the American press criticized Pearson for going too far toward the Soviets. Pearson did not have too good an opinion on the Americans either. The Canadian delegation held that according to the Charter it was up to the superpowers to maintain order in Palestine, “a responsibility which they must accept.” But the United States, Pearson felt, were trying “to shirk responsibility for implementation” or, as he put it later, “to escape as much responsibility as possible,” while obliging Britain “to accept as much responsibility as possible.” The British, for their part, consistent in their refusal to accept responsibility for a settlement not agreeable to both Jews and Arabs, were also “losing much sympathy,” he argued. After all, it was they who had brought the issue before the United Nations, “so they surely cannot completely wash their hands of the matter.” Pearson felt that if both Americans and British continued to withhold cooperation, all was bound to be “futile.” Yet, although not “too optimistic,” he was still convinced of the necessity to do every effort for eventually reaching a solution.9 “Unrealistic arrangements,” responded the British. The timetable did not correspond with their withdrawal plans. A resolution not based on agreement would involve British forces in coercing partition, which was “unacceptable.” Cadogan made it clear in the subcommittee that they expected all proposals to correspond with Creech-Jones’s former declarations; Pearson invited him to appear before the working group and underline the British reservations. In the coming days, the Western Commonwealth prime ministers were informed of Britain’s intention to con-

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clude the withdrawal from Palestine by 1 August 1948. This did not mean, however, the continuation of British administration until that date or use of British troops to coerce partition. Furthermore, Britain was maintaining the right to terminate the mandate immediately, the moment it decided that the assembly had failed to reach an agreed settlement. In such an eventuality, the British forces in Palestine would look after their own safety alone. It was British soldiers who served in Palestine, so Britain had to be careful not to risk them. This was the reason for Britain’s “somewhat negative attitude” in the United Nations, not an “unco-operative spirit.”10 The British further pointed out their opposition to run Palestine alongside a United Nations commission. Such a commission would be permitted to enter Palestine only after or close to the termination of the mandate. Should the United Nations insist on its early arrival, Britain would relinquish all responsibilities for Palestine immediately. Cadogan was instructed to clarify this in the ad hoc committee and to make it clear that the most Britain could promise was not to actively obstruct a decision reached in the assembly with a two-thirds majority. He did so in a statement delivered before Subcommittee 1 on 13 November, when he officially announced Britain’s intention to finish its withdrawal by 1 August and its opposition to the compromise achieved in the working group. Britain would not become a tool in coercing partition. British forces would maintain law and order only in regions under their control until their withdrawal, where the United Nations commission would not be allowed to enter. It was clear to all those present that the working group would have to review its decisions, especially with regard to timetables.11 At this stage the Canadian delegation was of the opinion that the British did not really want a workable solution to be found for Palestine. Their noncooperation was incomprehensible. It seemed, thought Pearson, that they wanted to be left to handle the Palestine problem themselves. Instead of helping to solve all the practical problems, such as timetables, they kept their “detached attitude,” convinced that the United Nations’ efforts were “doomed to fail,” as some of their delegates had said. The result would be that Britain was to be blamed “entirely” for any potential failure. He and Riddell talked with two members of the British delegation and learned that they themselves did not have adequate information about London’s plans for withdrawal. Pearson urged them to cooperate, at least concerning the coordination of timetables, but they were unable to help, even unofficially. Riddell got the impression that Britain simply did not want to consider any plan not to its liking. At any rate, it was clear that it opposed partition.12 Pearson felt sorry that “all the heat” would be turned on Britain, while the Americans, who “had not been taking a very constructive or satisfac-

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tory part” either, “would escape the censure they deserve.” He was “perplexed” by the Americans, who throughout the discussions showed an “unrealistic attitude of easy optimism, brushing aside difficulties.” They took British cooperation for granted, did not bother to conceive of a plan acceptable to the British, or to consult them, and did not show any readiness to actively assist in solving potential problems. They had even declined his proposal to accept responsibility as “a good member of the United Nations” in case disturbances were to follow partition. The Soviet delegate, on the other hand, he considered at times “cooperative and constructive,” while at other times “obstinate, unrealistic and impractical.” Indeed, attending the working group was no easy task. “Here I am,” Pearson wrote to a friend, “in the middle, between an obstinate Russian and a not too skillful American, and it has been about the most exhausting experience of my life.”13 In the meantime the working group convened to discuss the legal basis of the implementation compromise. Riddell, representing Canada, stressed that the assumption that a General Assembly recommendation would provide such a basis was dependent on the consent of all parties involved. If force had to be used for implementation, however, its legality would be “very obscure.” Only the Security Council could provide such a basis, according to his opinion. The American representative immediately opposed this, not out of legal arguments, but because of a fundamental American opposition to give the council such powers. Riddell, feeling the debate was “confused and unproductive,” retired after a while, stating that they were getting nowhere.14 Riddell’s views were backed by Ross Hopkins, chief of the legal division of the Department of External Affairs, who cabled him that the legal vacuum expected in Palestine could only be filled by one of the following: an ex post facto recognition of the new states, a trusteeship, or an “interim responsibility” by the Security Council or an organ on its behalf (assuming a “threat to the peace” situation). He dismissed the American fears of giving the council such powers—this was no precedent, the Palestine situation was unique. It was bizarre to consider the council “incapable” even in such a situation. The General Assembly, on the other hand, was not in a position to exercise legal sovereignty over Palestine, even through a commission. Such a commission would perhaps be able to advise the emergent states, but no more, as far as legality was concerned. Hopkins was cautious to remark that “Whether or not in the unique circumstances of the Palestine situation, it would be politically feasible or desirable to take the action suggested without a fine regard for the Charter, is not for me to say.”15

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For the continuation of debate in the working group, Riddell prepared a memorandum for Pearson, in which he pointed out several “objectionable elements” that needed cure. According to the working group compromise, there had to be a transition period, during which the United Nations would exercise sovereignty over Palestine and its commission would actually be expected to govern it. Furthermore, since, according to Cadogan’s statement of 13 November, the British would continue to rule only the regions of their location, it meant that the commission would have to rule some regions even before 1 May. These problems could be amended either by eliminating the transition period through declaring the independence of the new states simultaneously with the termination of the mandate, or by granting the commission advisory powers alone and leaving administration in the hands of Britain and later of the new governments. However, British cooperation was a prerequisite, and in order to guarantee cooperation, a promise to assist Britain until the termination of its mandate was in place. Another option was to ask the Security Council to delegate the commission, but this was bound to be opposed by the Americans.16 On 18 November the working group unanimously adopted a new proposal for implementation brought by Pearson the day before. It was mainly intended to solve the timetable problems caused by Cadogan’s statement. According to the new version, the mandate over Palestine was to be terminated on a date agreed by both Britain and the United Nations commission, but no later than 1 August 1948. Britain would inform the commission in advance about its withdrawal plans from each region. The two states would be granted independence no later than 1 October 1948. Palestine’s administration in the transition period (August to October) would be entrusted to the (five-member) United Nations commission, which would be appointed by the General Assembly and follow its recommendations but be guided by the Security Council. In other words, the commission would have to implement both the recommendations of the assembly and the instructions of the council. Reports on the commission’s work would also be delivered to both.17 Before the dispersion of the working group, Pearson once again expressed his concern about the commission having sovereignty over Palestine for two months. It seemed to him that the General Assembly did not possess the legal authority to grant such a sovereignty even for a short while. He was afraid that a settlement lacking adequate legal basis would attract opposition. This was too much for the Soviet delegate. Pearson’s insistence on legal issues could “undermine our whole work.” He wondered whether Pearson had “some obscure purpose” for raising this issue. For him, legality constituted “no problem at all”: the situation called for “con-

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structive measures.” He therefore brushed Pearson’s concern aside “without a moment’s hesitation”: of course the assembly had such an authority—the Charter had to be interpreted constructively. Pearson found Tsarapkin’s attitude interesting. On other occasions the Soviets had not been so lenient about the Charter. Johnson suggested that a two-thirds majority would accord the assembly’s recommendation “the force of law,” thus solving the legality issue. Pearson, at any rate, felt at this juncture that he had done enough, and should not develop the legal question further.18

6

Back to the General Assembly Subcommittee 1 decided to adopt the working group plan for implementation. It also suggested that the five states to make up the United Nations commission would be Guatemala, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Uruguay. When preparing the preface to their report, members of the subcommittee wanted to include a sentence that Britain’s “firm intention” to withdraw was taken into account. Pearson objected. There was no need “to overestimate British understatements,” he argued. His opinion was accepted, and no “firm intention” was mentioned, just Britain’s announcement about its expected withdrawal.1 Britain’s “firm intention,” however, was to be expressed sooner than Pearson could have anticipated. On 19 November the reports of Subcommittees 1 and 2 were presented before the ad hoc committee, the former by Fabregat of Uruguay, who commended the working group for solving “an extremely difficult problem,” and the latter by Muhammad Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan. The next day, Evatt asked Pearson to elaborate on the implementation element in the report of Subcommittee 1.2 Pearson opened by reminding the ad hoc committee that the Canadian delegation had always emphasized that any plan eventually adopted had to be workable. The partition plan resolved by Subcommittee 1 was workable, at least on paper. An important aspect of the plan was to entrust Pales-

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tine’s administration during the transition period to a commission appointed by the General Assembly and guided by the Security Council. It was agreed that the council instructions to the commission would have to correspond with the assembly’s recommendations, and that the council would not interfere in the commission’s daily work. Another important aspect was the timetable for establishing of the two states, in which full consideration was given to Britain’s intention to withdraw by 1 August. The termination of the mandate would, therefore, occur no later than that date, when the commission would take over Palestine through “provisional Councils of Government.” The independence of the new states would take effect after their constituent assemblies had been elected and their provisional governments taken office, on 1 October. During the period from the adoption of the plan and until the completion of the British withdrawal, there would be dual responsibility for Palestine’s administration. The British forces would withdraw gradually, maintaining law and order in the areas under their control and progressively transferring authorities to the provisional councils of government in the areas they had evacuated. Immigration and land regulation in the latter areas would be in the hands of the provisional councils. It was hoped that by 1 February there would already be enough territory, including a port, under the control of the Jewish provisional council to enable substantial immigration into it. However, Pearson refused to refer to the legal basis for the commission’s authorities, a question raised by the representative of Pakistan. It was other members of the working group who were convinced of the legality of the plan according to the Charter. Therefore any questions in this regard should be addressed to them.3 On the very same day the British reaction was expressed. In a speech to the ad hoc committee, Cadogan declared that the proposals of Subcommittee 1 were incompatible with Britain’s intentions. Mentioning Creech-Jones’s statement of 26 September, he once again stressed that Britain would not cooperate in coercing a settlement not acceptable to both sides; its troops were not to become a tool in the hands of the United Nations. Furthermore, since the subcommittee established that the transitional period was soon to begin, it was necessary to make it clear that Britain intended to retain all powers in Palestine until the termination of the mandate. It would not allow the United Nations commission to set up governments or military forces in any region still under British control. Britain was willing to consider United Nations arrangements, but to transfer authorities to the provisional councils meant involving it in the implementation of partition. Therefore, Britain would at most transfer authorities to the commission, for it to transfer them further. Cadogan also

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emphasized that it was up to the British alone to decide when the mandate was actually going to terminate.4 Pearson asked Cadogan whether there was a contradiction between his statement that Britain would retain all powers until the termination of the mandate and his further statement that it would transfer authorities to the United Nations commission. Cadogan answered that there was no contradiction since in practical terms Britain might announce the termination of the mandate very soon, possibly even before its withdrawal had begun. At that date its administration over Palestine would also terminate, although it might exercise military rule in the regions where British troops still remained. At this juncture, Evatt suggested that the two subcommittees be reconvened in order to study Cadogan’s statement and decide whether to modify their reports accordingly. Subcommittee 1 was going to do so.5 When Subcommittee 1 reconvened, Cadogan admitted that he did not know when exactly the mandate was going to terminate, but stated that it would be soon. British withdrawal would be gradual and an effort would be made to inform the commission of its stages in advance. Areas evacuated would be turned over to the commission without asking it what it intended to do with them. Nonevacuated areas would remain under British military rule. Following Cadogan’s elaborations, Pearson and others suggested several revisions to the partition plan in order to “remove inconsistency” between it and the British attitude. The alterations accepted were minor, mainly wording changes to establish that Britain would transfer authorities to the commission and not directly to the provisional councils; that until the termination of the mandate all authorities would remain in its hands; and that military responsibility for regions not yet evacuated would remain in British hands even after the termination of the mandate. A suggestion by Pearson to add a sentence that Britain “shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation” of the partition plan by the commission was not accepted.6 Another problem facing Subcommittee 1 was a list of questions delivered by Zafrullah Khan, chairman of Subcommittee 2, regarding the source in the Charter of the powers it attributed to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and of the legislative and administrative tasks intended for the commission. Pearson proposed to apply Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, according to which the council could empower the commission to implement the assembly’s recommendations. (Johnson “smelt a rat” in Article 39.) Fabregat suggested that they announce that all subcommittee members believed that there was a legal basis for their plan, although they disagreed what this basis was. Pearson remarked that it was better to declare that there was more than one legal basis to choose from. Chairman

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Pruszynski finally asked them not to give the press the feeling that they had doubts about their position; he would ultimately find some answer.7 On 22 November Pruszynski presented the revised report of Subcommittee 1 before the ad hoc committee. His presentation was followed by a speech by Pearson about the alterations introduced into the report, which would improve cooperation between Britain and the commission. According to the amended version, the date for the termination of the mandate was practically to be decided by Britain alone. Although this date was not yet known, it was expected to be near, probably before the completion of the British withdrawal. Responsibility for Palestine after the termination of the mandate would be shared between Britain and the commission, “as the former progressively withdraws and the latter takes over.” Pearson was confident that the solution offered by Subcommittee 1 was “the most practicable” one under the circumstances, and provided a mechanism for “a peaceful and orderly transfer of power.” He counted on the cooperation of Britain and the active backing of the permanent members of the Security Council, and hoped that a plan adopted by a two-thirds majority would eventually be accepted by the peoples of Palestine themselves. It was “a calculated risk,” but also “the best chance of bringing peace and order” to Palestine.8 However, there was also the report of Subcommittee 2 to discuss in the ad hoc committee. Subcommittee 2 in fact submitted three separate proposals to the ad hoc committee: (a) to refer the Palestine question to the International Court; (b) to resettle the Jewish refugees elsewhere, and not in Palestine; and (c) to establish a unitary (Arab) state in Palestine. At first, Pearson thought that the idea to refer the matter to the International Court had some legal basis and deserved a careful and objective consideration. However, delegates of the Jewish Agency, horrified by the idea, explained to him that this was just a stratagem on the part of the Arabs to prevent the assembly from reaching a decision. Finally, the Canadian delegation decided to oppose it. While in theory it was “desirable,” in practice it would delay the solution for years and the British were not going to wait. Subcommittee 2’s second proposal, considered by the Canadians as racial discrimination against the refugees, was also opposed by them.9 As for the proposal to establish a unitary state, Pearson asked the members of Subcommittee 2 if they believed their solution could be achieved peacefully and if, according to them, there was a juridical basis in the Charter for the assembly to establish that state. Zafrullah Khan answered on the first question that only the people of Palestine could answer that. It was dependent on their will to cooperate. On the second question he answered that the League of Nations had already recognized the partial independ-

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ence of Palestine by committing it to a mandate, which meant that it had only needed administrative assistance from a mandatory power to reach full independence. This assistance was no longer needed, and would terminate anyway; and therefore, Palestine’s partial independence should turn into full independence. Pearson’s reaction to these explanations was that they had convinced him that Subcommittee 2’s plan “does not really mean anything at all.” It was a mere impractical recommendation. On 24 November all three proposals of Subcommittee 2 were rejected by the ad hoc committee.10 The debate on Subcommittee 1’s report, on the other hand, continued. Several amendments were put forward, among them a Canadian one regarding citizenship. It established that “Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for the citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.” As hardly any Jew was expected to live in the Arab state, the intention of this amendment was clear: to prevent the large Arab population living in the Jewish state and expected to opt for Arab state citizenship from taking part in the Jewish state political life. Tsarapkin wondered whether it was possible for Arabs living in the Jewish state as citizens of the Arab state to participate in elections held in the Arab state. Pearson answered that it was only fair to let everyone participate in the elections of his own state regardless of where he resided. Practical difficulties could be overcome “on the spot.” The Canadian amendment was accepted.11 Another amendment was submitted by the Dutch delegation to the effect that land sales by Arabs living in the Jewish state (and vice versa) were to be forbidden unless the owners and their tenants had alternative land to provide for their subsistence. The practical import of this amendment was a restriction on land acquisition by Jews. Pearson objected, arguing that it contradicted the article in the partition plan establishing that the provisional councils of government would have full authority over their territories with regard to immigration and land regulation. The Dutch did not share his opinion, although eventually, due to the opposition, they withdrew the amendment.12 During this final stage of the debate in the ad hoc committee, Pearson once again expressed his doubts about the legality of a commission appointed by the assembly to have sovereignty over Palestine even for a short while. If the Security Council had announced that the situation in Palestine was a “threat to the peace” and empowered the commission to take the nec-

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essary steps, all legal difficulties would be removed. Once again Johnson opposed, this time arguing that it was “politically undesirable” for the new states to be born in an atmosphere of war (“scarcely an auspicious omen”). Furthermore, it might also imply that Britain was a “disturber of the peace,” being the one expected to maintain law and order there.13 However, Pearson was to get help from another quarter. The Danish delegation put forward an amendment that it would be up to the Security Council to study the situation during the transition period and consider whether it constituted a “threat to the peace.” In the latter case, it would supplement the authority the assembly had granted the commission by empowering it, according to Articles 39 and 41, to take the necessary measures to implement the assembly’s decisions. The council, for its part, would consider a “threat to the peace” and “act of aggression” any attempt to change by force the settlement that had been reached. The Americans could live with the proposal as it did not subject the commission to the council in advance and it clearly defined when the latter could intervene. Pearson, of course, considered the Danish amendment valuable. It would strengthen the commission exactly when needed, without granting the council greater powers over it than originally planned (“but rather supplementary powers”). Adopting this amendment would, therefore, “dispel” the doubts that the Canadian delegation still had. The Danish amendment was put to the vote and accepted.14 On 25 November, immediately after the adoption of the Danish amendment, the revised report of Subcommittee 1 on partition with economic union was put to the vote. It was adopted by the ad hoc committee with 25 for, 13 against and 17 abstentions.15 Immediately thereafter, Pearson returned to Ottawa to attend to his duties in External Affairs. Ilsley was to represent Canada during the remainder of the Palestine debate. As early as 19 November Ilsley informed St. Laurent that the Palestine debate had reached the point where the Canadian delegation had to decide whether to support partition or not. Ilsley, who was never really fond of partition, reminded St. Laurent that the Canadian position had been to help in formulating the partition plan while not being committed to support it in the end. In his speech of 4 November Pearson had stated that the delegation would support only a “sound, practicable and effective” solution. It now had to be decided whether the plan submitted by Subcommittee 1 had such a satisfactory basis. He mentioned Pearson’s doubts about the “judicial basis” of the United Nations commission, which had not yet been met, and that it was not clear whether Britain was going to cooperate with partition. As St. Laurent was serving then as acting prime minister—King attended Princess Elizabeth’s wedding—Ilsley was waiting for his instructions.16

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However, there was another problem. The Americans, not happy about the makeup of the five member commission suggested by Subcommittee 1, wanted to include Canada. When they found the Canadian delegation disinclined, they decided to approach Ottawa directly. Ray Atherton, the American ambassador, told Escott Reid, chief of the second political division of the Department of External Affairs, that the State Department was hoping that Canada serve in this “watch-dog” commission. The role played by Canada and Pearson during the debate convinced everyone of Canada’s integrity and impartiality. Its participation, therefore, would “greatly” strengthen the commission. Reid promised him to convey the message to St. Laurent, although warned not to pin too much hope on it. When reporting this to St. Laurent, Reid reminded him of the “very strained” resources of the department. St. Laurent thought it would be “unwise” for any Commonwealth member to participate. Canada, anyhow, would not want to be put in a position where it might have to criticize Britain, or to avoid such criticism because of being a member of the Commonwealth. He asked what Pearson and Wrong (the ambassador to Washington) had to say about it.17 Pearson responded with a list of pros and cons. The suggested makeup of the commission was indeed weak but Canadian participation could strengthen it. Moreover, the commission members would have to be not just capable but also able to communicate with the British. A Canadian would have an advantage in this respect, as the British would trust him. There were, however, some weighty reasons for not participating in the commission: The effort invested up till then by the Canadians might “justifiably be regarded as having fulfilled our obligation to the United Nations.” Moreover, they had already been serving in the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Korean Commission, and the Interim Committee. And as belonging to the Commonwealth, they would be perceived as prejudiced in favour of Britain. Therefore, Pearson concluded, Canada “would certainly not be embarrassed” if it did not participate in the commission. Wrong, for his part, added that it was more important for Canada to concentrate on its relations with Britain and the United States than to take upon itself this additional responsibility.18 When St. Laurent read Pearson’s arguments, he noted that it involved far more than Canada being perceived as prejudiced in favor of the British. If they dared to criticize Britain about Palestine, it would cause a “terrible storm” within Canada, as many would find it “presumptuous” for them to criticize a state with a thirty–year experience there. Furthermore, the Canadians were perceived, “rightly or wrongly,” as “having espoused the Jewish cause.” Therefore, the Arabs would consider them a hostile element in

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the commission. But what really concerned St. Laurent was the thought that if force was needed to implement partition, the participating states would be expected to provide it, namely, to supply troops. Reid immediately phoned Pearson informing him of their minister’s opinion. Pearson answered that he could promise St. Laurent that Canada would not participate. (“The delegation had let it be known that Canada was not available.”) St. Laurent, at this stage, decided to convene the cabinet to discuss the Palestine situation. Ilsley was still waiting for instructions.19 The cabinet met on 25 November, but no debate or decision was to take place about the fundamental issue of whether to support partition. The way St. Laurent conducted the meeting, voting for partition was taken for granted, and the remaining question was only whether to participate in the commission or not. St. Laurent explained to the ministers that partition was “the only feasible solution.” However, due to the efforts Canada had invested in the Palestine debate to reconcile the various positions, it was expected to be asked to participate in the commission. A refusal would meet criticism. But, on the other hand, Canada’s human resources were already strained, as it was participating in many other United Nations bodies. Furthermore, a Canadian participant might criticize Britain, “a situation which in itself would be unfortunate domestically,” and be considered hostile by the Arabs, as “Canada was looked upon as having taken up the Jewish cause.” And finally, Canadian participation might also mean an eventual need to send troops. As expected, the cabinet decided to refuse participation in the commission. It was eventually to include Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines.20 Toward the final phase of the Palestine debate Riddell prepared a list of arguments to support partition. First of all, there was no practicable alternative. The unitary state had no chance to win a two-thirds majority, “and no chance of peaceful acceptance.” Partition, consequently, “however dangerous and provocative it may be,” constituted the only option for preventing a breakdown in Palestine. It was also the only solution that could secure Soviet support without Soviet intervention. A failure to reach a settlement would grant the Soviets a pretext for intervention. However, if disorder was to follow partition, the entire United Nations would intervene. Albeit partition might indeed lead to disturbances or even war on the part of the Arabs, a failure to adopt it would discredit the Jewish Agency and “will play into the hands of Jewish extremists who are said to be prepared to seize the whole of Palestine by force.” This would further strain Anglo-American relations and best serve Soviet interests. Partition, on the other hand, would create a progressive Jewish state with close economic

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and cultural ties to the West, which might “be of very great consequence to us in the future political development of the Middle East.”21 Riddell pointed out that while, according to the Jewish Agency, the Jews were able to maintain law and order in their territory and defend it against Arab attacks, “In the Arab areas greater confusion may accompany the establishment of government.” This, however, was up to the Arabs to solve; the alternative, in any event, did not ensure peace and order. He felt that the partition plan suggested was “constitutionally sound, practicable and effective,” and that without the Canadian assistance in its formulation, it would have been “much less practicable and defensible.” Furthermore, if the American-Soviet support would win it the two-thirds majority, it was reasonable to suppose that Britain would agree to cooperate. Riddell apparently understood the nondiplomatic tone of some of his arguments. Although he suggested that his paper be put forward, he concurrently asked that it not be distributed until a decision about this had been accepted.22 Indeed, when Ilsley was going to deliver Canada’s final speech in favor of partition, hardly any of Riddell’s arguments were to be utilized. Instead, they were to be utilized when Pearson and Riddell later had to explain the policy they pursued with regard to Palestine, as will be discussed below. On 26 November the plenary General Assembly resumed the discussion on Palestine with a presentation of the report of the ad hoc committee. Shortly thereafter Ilsley delivered the concluding statement by Canada in justification of its forthcoming support for partition. The core of his speech was a survey of all possible options concerning Palestine in order to establish why partition was “the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives.” Not approving of any plan was unacceptable. It would be an “abdication,” a “shirking” of responsibilities, and would probably result in bloodshed. A unitary Arab state could emerge, had it not been for the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate terms, and a well-rooted community of nearly 700,000 Jews that had followed. This solution would not be championed except by a minority, and was “beyond the realm of the practical.” The federal state, recommended by UNSCOP’s minority, had made no highway since then, received but little support, and did not even warrant the formation of a subcommittee. Although it bore some “attractiveness” for Canadians, resembling their own national development, “Palestine is not Canada” and both the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee rejected it. What was left was partition, “which we have decided to support as the least objectionable of the four. We support this plan with heavy hearts and many misgivings.” They were sorry to hear “the threats of reprisals and all the talk of fire and sword” if partition was to be adopted, but they were con-

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vinced that if one of the other alternatives were to be adopted, disorder would be “not less but greater.” “The air is heavy with gloomy forebodings,” but something had to be done. And “full of difficulties as the Partition solution is, any other solution would be worse.” Furthermore, “of all the solutions proposed, Partition alone has received the support of the two greatest world powers.” The Canadian delegation had, “as this Assembly knows,” taken its “full share of responsibility” in the Palestine debate, “throughout the entire session.” They had worked “unremittingly” to obtain a “practical and workable” solution, and they intended now to vote for it.23 However, Canada’s name was to be heard once more during the debate. Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan delivered an impassioned speech questioning the sincerity of the humanitarian motives of the partition supporters. “Those who talk of humanitarian principles, and can afford to do most, have done the least at their own expense to alleviate this problem. But they are ready—indeed they are anxious—to be most generous at the expense of the Arab.” Australia, Canada, and the United States were opposed to returning the Jewish displaced persons to their countries of origin. But were they ready to absorb them themselves? “Australia, an over-populated small country with congested areas, says no, no, no; Canada, equally congested and over-populated, says no; the United States, a great humanitarian country, a small area, with small resources, says no.” This was their contribution to the humanitarian principle, while stating at the same time: “let them go into Palestine, where there are vast areas, a large economy and no trouble; they can easily be taken in there.”24 The British, for their part, tried at this stage to sort out the various positions of the Commonwealth states in order to anticipate their vote. South Africa was “almost certain” to support partition, they estimated. Australia might abstain because Evatt had chaired the ad hoc committee. The Canadian delegate took “an active part” in the debate, and they might therefore vote for partition. New Zealand’s prime minister had said that they should support partition, but his representative had said that he could not vote for a proposal lacking an orderly implementation and protection for the inhabitants. Pakistan was committed to support the Arabs. India was also “likely” to do so. King was in London at that time attending Princess Elizabeth’s wedding. An official in the Foreign Office thought it might be advisable for Bevin to intimate to King that “we propose either to abstain or to vote against.” Another official reading this proposal crossed the words “either” and “or to vote against” out, which left the suggestion as “we propose to abstain.” A third official added the remark: “Too late.”25 Indeed, for Canada’s position it was too late.

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What really bothered the British, however, was the expected arrival of the United Nations commission in Palestine, if partition was adopted. At this stage they already knew that they were going to terminate the mandate on 15 May 1948 (although they were not to announce it publicly until 11 December), and they were anxious that the commission would arrive no earlier than a fortnight before that. They expected the commission’s arrival to have a “disturbing effect” on the Arab populace and to undermine their ability to continue administration for more than two additional weeks. Therefore, reaching an understanding with the United Nations about the commission’s arrival was a necessity. Cadogan was asked to informally approach the delegations of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—but not of India and Pakistan—and ask them to take the consequences of such a premature arrival into account, although “in no way attempting to influence their attitude towards the question of partition.” It was “entirely for them to vote as they think right on this question,” but Britain would be “glad” if they could see to it that the commission’s arrival would be precoordinated with it.26 But the story was not over yet. On 28 November the French suggested a twenty-four–hour recess as a last attempt to reach an agreed settlement; they claimed that a certain flexibility on the Arab side was discerned. The Americans and Soviets wanted to get it over with, but the proposal passed with twenty-five against fifteen (Canada supporting it). The fateful vote was to take place the next day.27 On 29 November 1947, the final day for the second session of the United Nations General Assembly, resolution 181 (II) to partition Palestine was put to the vote. Thirty-three states voted for, 13 against, 10 abstained and one state was absent. The two-thirds majority was achieved. Partition was adopted.28 For the Jews it meant the first Jewish state to be established for 1,800 years. For the Arabs it meant casus belli, an act justifying war.

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Personal Policy Making Canada had nothing to do with the Palestine problem, nor had it any interest in the Middle East. So, why did it have to intervene? In his final speech, Ilsley admitted sharing the feelings of those nations “far removed from Palestine, which had no part in the events leading up to this denouement, which made no promises to the Arabs and no promises to the Jews, least of all to both,” and which therefore found it “difficult to see why there should be thrown upon their shoulders a profoundly disturbing responsibility for grave and far-reaching decisions.” Indeed, when Britain decided in early 1947 to refer the Palestine question to the United Nations, the Canadians were caught “totally unprepared,” as George Ignatieff, then serving in the permanent delegation, later put it.1 When the Canadians prepared for the special assembly, Pearson advised his colleagues not to speak at all. Only if silence proved to be too difficult should they declare “something” noncommittal, such as that the United Nations “really” had to do something with regard to Palestine. Nothing more than “noncontroversial general observations.” Canada certainly was interested in ensuring that no “substantive” issues would be raised during the debate. King, for his part, in a politically cautious move, decided that Canada should be represented by the civil servant Pearson rather than by Secretary of State St. Laurent.2

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When the Canadians realized that they were going to participate in UNSCOP, Riddell wrote to Wrong that the nomination of an independent Canadian, acting on his own merit, “would relieve the Government of pressure directed toward influencing Canadian policy.” When Justice Ivan Rand was chosen to be that representative, it was done intentionally, to publicly establish that the Canadian delegate was acting “in his personal capacity,” and not receiving any instructions or political guidance from the government. Consequently, the Canadian government did not consider itself later on “bound” to UNSCOP’s majority recommendations, which Rand had joined and actually initiated.3 During the second session of the General Assembly the avowed Canadian policy toward Palestine was one of pragmatism. In the instructions that the cabinet gave the Canadian delegation before it set out, it was permitted to support any settlement bearing “reasonable evidence” that it could be put into effect. Then again, before Ilsley was to make his first speech, the cabinet agreed to accept the principle of partition as it was “the only solution practicable at the moment.” When it was decided to set up a subcommittee to study partition, the Canadian delegation insisted that it should also investigate the implementation options of partition—no solution could be adopted before checking its feasibility. In his speech before Subcommittee 1, Pearson called for a “constitutionally sound, practicable and effective” settlement. And when joining the working group, he told St. Laurent that he considered his main task to remove the “impractical and ineffective elements” from the American and Soviet plans. Finally, when Ilsley defended the Canadian vote in favor of partition, he described partition as the only practicable alternative offered. So it was also introduced by St. Laurent before the Canadian cabinet.4 One of the main elements, according to the Canadians, in making the settlement practicable was to provide it with “a proper juridical basis.” In both Subcommittee 1 and the working group, Pearson pressed for furnishing the settlement adopted with such a basis, preferably by declaring the situation in Palestine a “threat to the peace,” which, according to Article 39 of the Charter, would permit the Security Council to intervene. The Canadians feared that a settlement without an adequate legal basis would induce future doubts about the authority of the United Nations to implement it, and give states an excuse for avoiding participation. Toward the end of the discussion in the working group, Pearson expressly warned that a legally inadequate basis for the settlement adopted would enable the opposing states to attack it.5 Making the settlement juridically sound through the intervention of the Security Council could solve another problem for Canada: It would relieve

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it of the risk of being directly involved in Palestine in the framework of an international force. “It seemed essential” to the Canadians to avoid any such idea, which would leave “Canada or other smaller states involved in the operation of a plan to which the permanent members of the Security Council did not give united support.” According to their understanding, Article 106 of the Charter established that it was “entirely” up to the permanent members to maintain international peace—“a responsibility which they must accept.” “I, for one, would welcome a declaration from the permanent members of the Security Council that they are willing and determined to stand behind any action” needed to back up the work of the proposed commission, Pearson said. However, Pearson argued on many occasions that there was another option for implementation: to transfer the authority after the British withdrawal to “where we think it should lie, that is, with the people of Palestine themselves.” “The sooner the people of Palestine accept direct responsibility for their own Government the better.”6 When the Canadians were referring to the permanent members, they basically meant the United States and the Soviet Union. The task of the Canadian delegation at the beginning of the debate in the ad hoc committee was to ascertain the positions of the superpowers and whether any correspondence existed between them. They realized that only a solution acceptable to both could win the necessary two-thirds majority. Therefore, when differences of opinion between the two superpowers became apparent, the Canadians found themselves mediating, trying to break deadlocks and to formulate a plan agreed to by both superpowers. Partition, Pearson was to write, was the only solution supported by both; thus, it prevented a confrontation over Palestine between them. If no settlement was agreed upon, a unilateral Soviet intervention in Palestine might occur. Partition adopted by the United Nations in cooperation with the Soviets was to prevent such an eventuality. Furthermore, the Jewish state to emerge following partition was expected to be in close relations “with the West generally and in particular with the United States.”7 Canada’s relations “in particular with the United States,” on the one hand, and with Britain, on the other hand, were another overt concern. As a leading member of the Commonwealth and a close neighbor of the United States, good relations between Britain and the United States were essential for Canada. Furthermore, a discord between the two over Palestine could undermine the global effort of forming NATO, thus playing into the hands of the Soviets. In a speech delivered several months later, Pearson brought up the Palestine crisis as an example of Canada’s fears of disagreements growing between Britain and the United States. The greater the discords were, “the more cautious Canada became in supporting one side or the

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other.” For him it was proof that no matter how confident Canada became in itself, “almost automatically, we stop playing the triangle in the international symphony when the British and American instruments are out of harmony.” If partition was not adopted, the tension in Anglo-American relations was bound to increase, Pearson felt. Therefore, “well behind the scenes,” the Canadians “struggled valiantly” to bridge the gaps between the Americans and the British.8 The Canadian delegation kept “in as close touch as possible” with the British delegation, and tried to make sure its views were taken into account “whenever possible.” It was of special importance during the working group phase, where the British did not attend even as observers. Not only did the Canadians find it imperative to be considerate of Britain’s views with regard to termination of the mandate, its withdrawal, and the transfer of powers, they also tried to make the United Nations assist the British in running Palestine until their withdrawal. Still, although the Canadians did their best to keep the British up to date, they found it “difficult” to learn what the British intentions toward Palestine were. Potential differences of opinion between the Canadians and the British were among the main reasons for the Canadian cabinet to oppose Canadian participation in the United Nations commission for Palestine. St. Laurent understood only too well the domestic problems that might arise due to such conflicts, as many of the English-speaking Canadians sympathized with the British.9 Another factor recurrent in the Canadian argumentation when dealing with Palestine was the need to protect the prestige of the United Nations. It was said that Pearson wanted to internationalize the problem and make use of the organization as an instrument for peacefully solving such problems. Thus, when preparing for the special assembly, Pearson remarked to his colleagues that a failure by the United Nations to handle the issue would first harm the organization itself. And when chairing the First Committee, he explicitly stated in his opening speech that “the prestige and the reputation of the United Nations itself” demanded an efficient treatment of the question, or they would both “suffer.” Even King, when discussing with St. Laurent Canada’s nominee for UNSCOP, felt that “the case was so important to the world and to the future success of the United Nations, that we should give the best possible person we could.” Later on, in Subcommittee 1, Pearson reiterated his belief that “it was urgently necessary . . . for the whole United Nations that we find a solution.” Then, in the working group, he warned against “almost a fatal blow” to the organization’s prestige if they failed. The United Nations was likely to be “greatly discredited” in such an occurrence.10

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These were all the apparent arguments for Canada to intervene in the Palestine problem. However, already during the evolvement of events some started to wonder whether “serving the national interest” was all that stood behind the Canadian policy making with regard to Palestine. “The suggestion has been made that we were acting from purely altruistic motives in a manner which did not directly concern Canada,” Pearson was to write. “To the delegation, of course, the situation seemed far otherwise.” But the insinuations reached the point that St. Laurent found himself compelled to declare in parliament that the partition plan “was not initiated by the Canadian government.” The Canadians in Lake Success had only tried to make it more realistic and practicable.11 In order to defend their stands during the Palestine debate, and justify the very essence of the Canadian intervention, Pearson and Riddell prepared a memorandum entitled “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly.” Although claimed to be prepared “in the Department,” the memorandum was basically the work of Pearson and Riddell alone, and included an almost verbatim citation of Riddell’s list of arguments for supporting partition, prepared by him earlier. It was sent to King, to St. Laurent, and to other high-ranking foreign service officials. In a letter accompanying the copy sent to St. Laurent, Riddell explained that the memorandum was intended to be “an indication of the way in which the matter appeared to the delegation at various stages and the reasons which led the delegation to act as it did.” In a letter accompanying the copy sent to Norman Robertson, Canada’s high commissioner in London, Pearson wrote that “The memorandum was prepared for the purpose of indicating that the delegation acted on the basis of practical and realistic considerations in the Palestine discussions.”12 This memorandum was later almost literally inserted into the annual volume of Canada at the United Nations for the year 1947, in the subchapter explaining “The Canadian Attitude” toward Palestine. It ended with “Whenever the delegation took part in the discussion of the Palestine question, it was with these objectives in view,” basically referring to the arguments listed in the past few pages.13 It was such wording that misled future historians to believe that these were the sole reasons for the Canadians to intervene in the Palestine problem and to follow the policy they did. However, the reasons were much deeper, as will be shown in the rest of this chapter.

RAND AND MAYRAND “Canada was known as Britain’s most loyal Dominion,” David Horowitz of the Jewish Agency was to write; therefore, no one could

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charge its representative in UNSCOP with anti-British prejudice. In fact, there were those in the Jewish Agency who initially believed that as a Canadian, Justice Ivan Rand was bound to be pro-British (and consequently, one thought, also pro-Arab). Little hope was pinned on Rand from that quarter. It was precisely because of this perception, shared not just by Jews but by all other parties concerned, UNSCOP’s members inclusive, that Rand’s influence over the results of the UNSCOP chapter was so decisive. True, there were two other pro-Zionist members in UNSCOP, Granados of Guatemala and Fabregat of Uruguay, but they were publicly identified as such, while he was not (Granados was also considered anti-British due to the dispute between Guatemala and Britain over British Honduras). This “impartial” position of Rand enabled him to bridge these two and the group of Sandström, Blom (the Dutch), Lisicky (the Czech), and Salazar (the Peruvian), thus consolidating UNSCOP’s majority in favor of partition.14 Yet contrary to what had been expected, Rand proved to be a sharp critic of Britain. The British record in Palestine was “abominable,” according to him. Britain simply “turned her back to all her promises” to the Jews. “What a fuss” the British were making about Jewish illegal immigration into Palestine! It was all because of the “trouble-makers” in London—the egocentricity and obsession of Bevin. Rand opposed the invitation of British representatives to submit their views before UNSCOP in Geneva, stating that such a rehearing was “unnecessary.” By and large, Rand was of the opinion that the British mandate over Palestine had been a failure. In a letter to a Jewish friend a decade later, he ironically pointed out that Israel was basically the “creation” of the British government. It was just that the British had “betrayed their solemn obligation.”15 Rand’s plan for partition constituted the nucleus of UNSCOP’s partition plan. However, not only had he formulated the basic conceptions of political partition and economic unity, he also struggled for the extent of the Jewish state, trying to grant the Jews the maximum territory possible. For example, he strongly insisted on the inclusion of the Negev in the Jewish state, and if it had been up to him, he would also include the Galilee. Another achievement for the Jews attributed to him was the elimination of the word “confederation,” which up to the last phases of UNSCOP’s discussions defined the stand of the partitionists, to differentiate them from the supporters of the federal state. A Canadian Jew remarked that confederation in the case of Canada meant that since 1867 a tight form of a federation had begun. It certainly did not mean sovereign states. Therefore, the elimination of this word from UNSCOP’s final report was to prevent future ambiguity when the Jewish state would apply for United Nations membership.16

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Rand interfered several times in favor of the Jews during the final phase of UNSCOP’s debates. Besides fostering the partition idea, he was the first to oppose the unitary state option (“a betrayal”), the first to oppose the binational state idea (“a deadlock”), and a staunch opponent of the federal state (“an abortion”). A few minutes before UNSCOP’s final meeting he was approached by Horowitz, who begged him to fight Salazar’s proposal to establish a Jewish “token” state. “I won’t allow you to be placed in a territorial ghetto,” promised Rand, and during the meeting he took “a staunch position” and managed to convince his colleagues to abandon the truncated Jewish state plan.17 It should be noted, though, that not everything Rand did in the framework of UNSCOP was in favor of the Jews. He opposed interfering on behalf of the three members of the “Irgun Zva’i Le’umi” organization condemned to death (apparently, as a judge, he did not want to interfere in legal procedures; he also abhorred terrorism). He opposed sending a subcommittee to Cyprus to visit the internment camps or even hearing representatives from the internees (Mayrand explained that they already had the relevant data, and that their job was to concentrate on the Palestine issue). The “formidable” powers Rand assigned to the central authority in his plan also worried the Jews. They felt that he wanted to broaden the joint enterprises of the two states to the maximum. They especially did not like his ideas about the Jewish state financially subsidizing the Arab state.18 Eventually, no central authority nor subsidy from the Jewish state were included in the partition plan. But the overall account was clear. “Justice Rand was by far the main contributor to the partition scheme with economic union,” Mayrand said. “Everyone surmised correctly that Ivan Rand had turned the scales,” Horowitz said. “The steady hand of Mr. Justice Rand has been not indiscernible in the making of the United Nations Committee’s Palestine Report,” said Gelber (also serving in the Jewish Agency), and he added: “in Geneva Mr. Justice Rand dominated the Inquiry Committee proceedings . . . it was his resolution for partition which carried the day and brought some concrete result.”19 Joseph Bradette, chairman of the external affairs committee of the Canadian House of Commons, was sure the Canadian government was going to support the UNSCOP majority recommendations (“There can be no question”) because of its pride in Rand’s “achievement and his wisdom.” As stated, the Canadian government thought otherwise, however, as Rand was not considered an official representative. Indeed, everything Rand did in UNSCOP was of his own accord. He was prepared to obey directives from no one, determined to follow his conscience alone. He never con-

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sulted Ottawa during the discussions; even when he had conversed with some foreign service officials before setting out, no one could determine his ultimate attitude. And when he came back, he never bothered to give any official report about his membership in UNSCOP.20 But why did Justice Rand, a Canadian, choose to side with the Jews in the conflict over Palestine? In a letter he sent to King shortly before leaving for Palestine, Rand wrote: “Our object seems to me to be quite clear: to satisfy, not the Jew nor the Arab, but the enlightened and intelligent conscience of mankind as represented by the United Nations. . . . the highest morality will ultimately prove to be the highest strategy.” This wording could misleadingly suggest that Rand set out with no “predetermined solution,” as a future historian was to put it. Elizabeth MacCallum, the pro-Arab and anti-Zionist External Affairs expert on the Middle East (about her, see below), correctly assessed, however, that “Rand began with a Zionist bias.”21 Prior to his departure, the British assessed that “Rand is fresh to problems of Palestine.” However, Rand, a pious Protestant with a reverence for the Bible, for whom Palestine was not just another country but the Holy Land, was willing to learn. Already before his appointment he had written a review article on the Zionist American Justice Louis Brandeis, whom he admired (as well as another Zionist American Justice, Felix Frankfurter). After being appointed he started to read books about Palestine and Zionism, including the 1937 Peel Commission report, which favored partition. As a result, later on he could surprise Horowitz with his knowledge of the Maccabeans. Furthermore, Rand was not the type of a person to give priority to political or administrative considerations. For him, the moral aspects, truth and justice, and a humanitarian attitude, were far more important. Values like liberalism, democracy, and freedom, were appreciated by him. And this was the way he was going to evaluate the Palestine question—certainly not just as a mere legal issue.22 During his visit to Palestine Rand was deeply impressed by the development and progress he saw in the Jewish community. He was later to relate about the advanced industry he had seen, the laboratory in Rehovot, the orchestra in Jerusalem, the Hebrew University, and the Hadassah Hospital. The Jews, he said, “with galvanized energies released,” drained swamps into fruitful soil, made the desert flourish, and Palestine “blossom like a rose.” Furthermore, the Jews were establishing a democratic and efficient regime, based on the foundations of social progress and liberalism. They possessed all the prerequisites for independence, whose quality would be higher than in some already independent states. He was also “greatly impressed” by Jewish leaders such as Weizmann (“really a great man”) and Ben-Gurion (“I shall never forget listening to him as he told how he had

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worked his land with a gun slung over his shoulder”). And then there was Horowitz, who resourcefully acquainted Rand with the miseries of the Jewish people, also by the hands of the British, and with their aspirations. “I fully appreciate that you’re fighting with your backs to the wall,” Rand told him.23 The Arabs, on the other hand, boycotted UNSCOP, and when they took the trouble to meet the commission, they caused their position more harm than good. A visit of UNSCOP to an Arab tobacco factory, where Horowitz, as a Jew, was forbidden to enter, resulted in Rand being “especially upset” and “disgusted” by this behavior, considered by him “loathed” racial discrimination. The poor working conditions in the factory itself, and the exploitation of child labor, convinced Rand and other delegates of the Arab social backwardness. Later, in a conversation with Horowitz in Geneva, Rand was fascinated to learn that the Arabs were buying their brides; since prices in Palestine were higher, brides were smuggled from the neighboring states. When Rand returned with UNSCOP to New York, he severely criticized the way the Arabs had treated the commission, which only strengthened the Jewish stands in its eyes. He compared the democracy he had found among the Jews with the backward regimes of the neighboring Arab states, and described the Arab leaders the commission had met (excluding ‘Abdallah) as nonrealistic and impractical.24 At the beginning of the memorandum detailing his version of partition, Rand stated his conviction that “It is the uniqueness of this land as well as that of the Jewish people and their relation to it, that in large measure justifies the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate of 1922.” He frequently reminded his colleagues that Britain did not fulfil its obligations to the Jews, and therefore the United Nations owed them compensation in the form of territory. Otherwise, it would be “a violation of international agreements.” The Palestine question “is primarily that of the manner in which the interest of the Jews arising under the Mandate is to be accomplished in its essential elements,” he wrote. It was a matter of fulfilling the “psychological” needs of the Jews by returning them part of Palestine, to be looked upon “as their homeland regained.” “An exclusive area where you can stand upon it, or kneel upon it, or kiss it . . . a sort of sacred national soil,” he told Magnes. A fulfillment of “the more or less universal objective” of the Jewish people “to have some part of this earth’s surface which it might say was its own exclusively.” Only partition could answer the need for “statehood,” the yearning for “national independence.”25 Another reason behind Rand’s approach to the Palestine question was his belief that it was not detached from the fate of European Jewry. There was a connection between what had happened in World War II in Europe

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and the Palestine situation, especially concerning immigration. “Nobody,” he said, “with the slightest acquaintance with the world scene can be unaware of the connection.” For him, the creation of the Jewish state meant the opportunity to live in freedom for tens of thousands of people who had witnessed “a sinister malevolence never exceeded on earth.” Once, when he flew over Palestine and saw the serpentine windings of the Jordan River, he thought to himself: “these are the wanderings of the Jews, but I fervently hope they won’t end up, like the river, in the Dead Sea.” It was for this reason that he always insisted that matters of immigration into each state should remain in its own hands. There was a need to absorb the Jewish refugees, and no one could expect any Jewish state to agree to foreign control over its immigration.26 Rand continued to show an interest in the fate of the Jewish people for the rest of his life. In a letter to Horowitz, several days after partition had been adopted by the General Assembly, he wrote: “The moment was, as you say, historic for the people for whom you have given so much. I hope that nothing will prevent the realization of the last stages of your weary journey.” In a speech he delivered before Canadian Jews on the occasion of Israel’s anniversary, he stated that the establishment of the state of Israel was a historical event not just for the Jews but for all “civilized mankind.” It was the first significant collective effort for the sake of “international justice to an oppressed people,” which reached the “highest level of international ethics.” He praised the Jews for making the “not particularly inviting land” of Palestine blossom, and urged his audience to send donations to assist the Israelis in building their state. Such donations would be “material and spiritual investment from which you will receive deep satisfactions.” He himself started to send constant donations to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem to support needy students.27 “Anything I did was simply what I thought should be done and for that I could not claim any credit,” Rand wrote to a Jewish friend. But the Jewish congregation of Winnipeg thought otherwise, and in 1954 planted a forest in his honor in Israel. In his words of thanks, Rand said: “After 1800 years of banishment, the Jewish people return to their homeland . . . They are in full career of rebirth . . . Henceforth that land will take on new uniqueness from the nature and pangs of its birth.” Then, in 1958, he was invited as a guest of honor to a luncheon in Ottawa to commemorate Israel’s tenth anniversary. In his speech he recalled how he had told his colleagues in UNSCOP “that only one group of people on earth could ever carry such a task to successful accomplishment.” When one saw the achievements of the Jews thus far, one could be sure that they would turn their land into “an anchorage of all the best qualities of our Western civilization.”28 In 1968 Rand was awarded

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an honorary doctorate by the Hebrew University and a chair in his name was inaugurated in its Faculty of Law. Léon Mayrand, Rand’s partner on his trip to Palestine, sided with the Jews no less. He, too, felt compassion toward the Jewish refugees. For example, to a Jewish escort he related that he had helped several Jewish families escape from Austria to Britain and then to Canada. By the end of the war, serving as chargé d’affaires in Moscow, he sent a report to Ottawa written by a Soviet inquiry commission on the atrocities committed in the Auschwitz death camp. His appointment to UNSCOP excited him. Married to a woman of Turkish origin, he was already familiar with the Middle East. He read about Palestine, including pro-Zionist Richard Crossman’s Palestine Mission, in which he recognized “many of my own impressions when approaching the problem.” Like Rand, he was impressed by what he saw in Palestine. “Here you have a very strong argument on your behalf,” he told a Jewish escort when he saw the reservoirs and irrigated fields in the Negev. Spending a night in a Jewish residence in the Galilee, he explicitly told his host his good impressions and support for the Jews. He also took much interest in learning how Jewish refugees were absorbed in Palestine, and was profoundly moved by his later visit to Jewish displaced persons camps in Europe.29 Mayrand continued his contacts with Jewish representatives after the completion of his UNSCOP mission. Thus, for example, when a map of UNSCOP’s partition was later needed, he told Ignatieff he could secure one from the Jewish Agency. However, it was a memorandum he prepared during the Palestine debate in the second assembly that unequivocally attested to where his sympathies were. It started with an expression of satisfaction at the Jewish Agency’s approval of the UNSCOP majority plan—this was already “very gratifying,” since “acceptance of any report by the two interested parties was clearly an impossibility.” As for the Arabs, “They were bound to shout loud.” Yet, he continued, “I am not inclined to take them seriously,” as most of the Palestinian Arabs were just “incited by the menaces of a few feudal chiefs whose main interest is the maintenance of their privileges and their continuous exploitation of their lower classes.” The Jews would be able to withstand them, if only conceded “the right to use force”—the Arab armies were “not at all imposing.” Furthermore, “the Arab chiefs could be appeased through concessions of a financial nature,” especially if clarified that a settlement would be forced anyhow.30

KING, ST. LAURENT, AND PEARSON For William Lyon Mackenzie King, Britain was the “Mother Country.” He supported British policy in principle and with regard to Palestine in

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particular. The British were the experts and therfore had to be followed. On one occasion, he did not hesitate to rebuke one of the senior External Affairs officials whom he suspected of criticizing Britain for not following the American pro-Zionist lead concerning Palestine (which was a false accusation with regard to that particular official). In fact, King thought Palestine was a British problem that did not concern Canada. Canadian intervention in such remote conflicts would just complicate things for Canada domestically and externally. A “hands-off” policy was better. This isolationist attitude, which also applied to the Jewish refugee problem, was to guide him throughout the Palestine debate. As a matter of fact, he hardly knew anything about the conflict, nor was he interested to learn. “Riots in the Far East [sic] between Jews and Arabs” were expected as a result of partition, he wrote in his diary. When invited to London to attend Princess Elizabeth’s wedding, he warned the British not to draw him into problems like India and Palestine, “which he wants to keep clear of.”31 The British high commissioner in Ottawa, in reporting this attitude of King to London, explained that it was also emanating from King’s poor health. He had aged considerably during the passing year, he reported, and the doctor had told him to be cautious as his heart condition was not “too good.” It reached the point where it became hard for King even to deliver speeches, as he was quickly getting tired. Therefore, he insisted on limiting his schedule in London to a minimum, and not bringing up any new issues. King, toward the end of his final term as prime minister, apparently realized that he was gradually losing the reins of government. In December, after it was all over as far as Canada’s intervention in the Palestine conflict was concerned, he wrote in his diary: “I must take my share of the blame for all this; where I have given in has been the result of fatigue and over-weariness and exhaustion.”32 King would have skipped participation in the special assembly altogether, but since the British had asked for it, Canada approved. A small delegation, headed by a civil servant, was enough for him. He would also have preferred that Canada not be elected for UNSCOP, but when the Americans pressed, he submitted. Moreover, he even told St. Laurent that it was their obligation to both Canada and the issues at stake to choose the best possible man. “The case was so important to the world and to the future success of the United Nations,” he wrote in his diary, “that we should give the best possible person we could . . . someone of outstanding ability and position.” Pearson wanted to be the man, but King refused, resenting the idea of his being absent from External Affairs for too long. Rand was chosen, and King energetically defended it in parliament when an opposition member tried to question the nomination. Choosing the jurist Rand was to relieve Can-

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ada of political pressures and of being committed to his conclusions. However, when the result turned out the way it did, King regretted the moment he had let Rand participate. “I remember trying to persuade St. Laurent it was better for us to keep out,” he wrote, which of course was inaccurate.33 Cautiously enough, the Canadian delegation to the second assembly was ordered by the cabinet “to seek instructions” on the Palestine issue “as the discussions develop.” However, the main predicament facing King at the beginning of the session was whether to let Pearson chair the ad hoc committee on the Palestinian question, as many delegations, and Pearson, wanted. He “strongly advised” Pearson not to accept the position. It would be unwise, he told him. Canada “would be unnecessarily taking on more than she should,” he thought. In the long run it would minimize Canada’s influence “should she take on something that we would not be able to succeed with in the end.” Not to mention that Canada had its own problems to attend to. The most King was prepared to agree, therefore, was to let Pearson stay in New York for a few days, while St. Laurent returned to Ottawa.34 However, since King suspected Pearson’s plans for the position (“Pearson is much tempted by it,” “I could detect a readiness on his part to accept that post”), he pressured St. Laurent himself that it would be “quite wrong” to let Pearson become chairman. Pearson had to assist St. Laurent at home while King was likely to be absent abroad for more than a month. The Canadians were beginning to feel that “too many Ministers were away.” It was time, therefore, that “we began to look after our own affairs and let some others have to do with saving the world.” Furthermore, any action taken by Pearson as chairman of the committee was certain to offend one section of the public opinion or another, which would consequently resent him in the future.35 St. Laurent promised King to see to it that Pearson did not become chairman, and he kept his promise. In a press conference in New York he announced that Pearson was not available for chairmanship. “We feel that we cannot dispense with his services for the length of the time it would take to handle that assignment,” he explained. “It would be almost impossible to let him go.” This “abrupt” attitude of St. Laurent surprised the rest of the delegation, who found it hard to accept his arguments; the accompanying External Affairs officials were clearly “regretful.” Pearson was compelled to declare that “he does not want the job,” though he evidently thought otherwise. “I was immensely relieved,” wrote King in his diary when he heard that Evatt had been elected chairman of the ad hoc committee, and not Pearson. It saved St. Laurent and the government a potential “embarrass-

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ment,” carrying only “little likelihood of success,” and Pearson “a very grave mistake in his career.”36 King left Ottawa for London on 30 October, leaving St. Laurent as acting prime minister. When he returned on 4 December, it was already too late as far as Canadian policy toward Palestine was concerned. Had he been the secretary of state, “I would not have permitted our side to take any steps,” he wrote in his diary. Pearson, “being young and no doubt feeling his ability in these matters,” was being used by others in this Palestine affair, he thought. “I am terribly afraid we have gone too far in the prominent part we have allowed our own people to play at the expense of our own affairs,” he remarked. He told Pearson that “he should put his emphasis now on developing his own staff at home.” King, at this juncture, opposed any attempt to coerce partition, which might entail sending Canadian troops to Palestine. He therefore made it clear “in emphatic terms” that Pearson would not be available for the chairmanship of the Palestine commission. “I really feel that in these international matters, matters of government, there is far too much left to a man like Pearson . . . and that the real function of the Cabinet is being sacrificed to some of the ambitions of younger men,” he concluded in his diary.37 While King’s faith in Pearson was deteriorating, St. Laurent relied heavily on him. After the opening session of the second assembly, St. Laurent returned to Ottawa to attend to his duties there, leaving behind him Justice Minister Ilsley as the delegation’s acting head. It was Pearson, however, who directed the delegation’s policy in practice. MacCallum, attached to the delegation as an adviser, was convinced that St. Laurent “wanted LBP to exert his influence in autumn ‘47 session.” One of Pearson’s biographers thinks that the Department of External Affairs “deliberately” kept King uninformed. Ignatieff, on the other hand, told a Jewish representative that Pearson “had during the General Assembly stuck his neck out further than the Cabinet wished him to do.” He cautioned his interlocutor that during the next stage, of implementing partition, “Pearson’s part would have to be an inconspicuous one; it must not be said by Parliamentary critics . . . that a civil servant had pushed the country into onerous commitments abroad, warlike operations and possible loss of personnel.” Pearson’s future activities over Palestine, he said, “will be behind the scenes.”38 It was risky for Pearson’s career to act as he did, at least as far as King was concerned. King thought that Norman Robertson, then serving as Canada’s high commissioner in London, should succeed St. Laurent as secretary of state, not Pearson. King found Robertson’s discretion in international affairs more sound than Pearson’s. Robertson was “less fond

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of speaking or of travelling or of participating in the United Nations, etc. Less likely to get the Government into trouble,” he thought. Thus, St. Laurent found himself acting as a buffer between his deputy and King. At times it was embarrassing. For example, Escott Reid, chief of the second political division of the department, relates an occasion where, in his presence, King approached St. Laurent and started a harsh tirade on Pearson’s activities over Palestine: “Look where his ignorant activities have got us! Why does he think he knows anything about the Palestine problem? Why hasn’t he enough sense to follow the lead of the British with their long and profound knowledge of the Near and Middle East?” It was clear, adds Reid, that by this King was also rebuking St. Laurent, for failing to curb Pearson’s activities.39 Contrary to King, and for obvious reasons, Britain was no “Mother Country” for French-Canadian Louis Stephen St. Laurent. Secretary of state since September 1946, he had many other issues to attend to, such as the Cold War, which at times entailed global considerations. Still, with regard to Palestine, he eventually embraced Pearson’s approach. Paul Martin, then minister of national health and welfare, was certain that St. Laurent had been influenced by Rand’s views. Also, MacCallum thought that Rand would have much influence over St. Laurent in favor of partition, since both had been associated on the Canadian bench. Joseph Bradette, chairman of the external affairs committee of the House of Commons and a member of the delegation, declared his confidence the day the second assembly was opened that St. Laurent would support UNSCOP’s majority recommendations. Also, Ignatieff was later to convey his opinion that St. Laurent agreed with Pearson that only partition could solve the Palestine problem. In any case, when Creech-Jones tried to convince St. Laurent at the beginning of the session to delay the Canadian first statement in favor of partition, St. Laurent declined the overture.40 “Discretion did not sit well with Pearson in the case of Palestine,” Pearson’s son wrote many years later. On the other hand, St. Laurent’s attitude to the problem was one of caution. He tried to avoid Canadian participation in UNSCOP, “if it were possible decently and honourably to do so.” While he did not want Canada to be looked upon as shirking its responsibility “for things which had to be done,” he had a lot of arguments for why they should not participate. To start with, the Canadians had already contributed their share by Pearson chairing the First Committee. Then, by the same token that the Arab states were excluded for being an interested party, the British dominions should also be excluded. Canada, anyhow, was bound to be blamed for being merely a “spokesman” for the British and Americans. Finally, such a participation “would be a considerable strain on

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the Department.” It would be “more convenient” for Canada to stay out. But St. Laurent was not resolute in his resistance. He allowed Pearson to use his own discretion in the matter, and eventually Canada was in.41 During the debates in the working group, St. Laurent cautioned Pearson to be “careful” about proposing solutions. “No one else seems to be prepared to prescribe and I am not sure enough about our diagnosis to be ready to do so.” He feared that if eventually there would be a commission, Canada might be “stuck with having to serve” in it, if they were too much “identified” with the idea. Once again he had lots of arguments for why not to participate. It was “unwise” for any Commonwealth state to participate, but for Canada it might mean being put in a position where it might have to criticize the British, which might cause a “terrible storm” within it. Moreover, “rightly or wrongly,” the Canadians were perceived as supporting the Jews, and were therefore bound to be considered hostile by the Arabs. Also, if Canada was to participate in the commission, Pearson would have to chair it, yet his services in Ottawa could not be dispensed with. Finally, if force was needed to implement partition, the participating states would be expected to send troops. Canada had already done more than anyone else. As participation would expose it to serious difficulties, it was preferable for Canada to stay out, even at the price of being criticized for not doing more.42 Pearson was heavily engaged in explicating his doings to St. Laurent. He could not find the proper opportunity to resist Canadian participation in UNSCOP, he explained at the end of the special assembly. To withdraw their candidature at that stage “might have been misinterpreted and have had an adverse effect” and “For this reason I did not intervene.” He described his statement in Subcommittee 1 as a mere analysis of the difficulties in the other plans proposed—there was no justification for the New York Times to refer to it as a “Canadian plan.” His activity in the working group was by no way mediation between the Americans and Soviets—he was just trying to remove the “impractical and ineffective elements” from their plans, which could implicate Canada “in a most unsatisfactory manner.” He even promised to try to “extricate” himself from the working group.43 But Pearson did not do so, and when his role there became crucial, he hastened to warn St. Laurent of the forthcoming press reports about what was happening, which might be “exaggerated and misleading.” He asked his colleagues in the working group to present the compromise reached “as a U.S.-U.S.S.R. proposal, not a Canadian one,” but to his anguish the United Nations Press Division announced that a Canadian compromise proposal was put forward before the working group. Immediately, Pearson convened the press to put things right. He was relieved to read the next day in

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the Sunday New York Times that his compromise was described as one put forward by him “in a personal capacity” and not as an official plan proposed by the Canadian government. In any case, he promised St. Laurent that Canada would not participate in the proposed commission, “having already played a quite sufficient part in the Palestine business.”44 Pearson also actively tried to persuade St. Laurent that his initiatives were “useful.” It was of the utmost importance to make any effort to find a solution to the Palestine problem. “Almost a fatal blow will be struck” at the United Nations’ prestige if the organization failed in this. It was for this reason that he was asking St. Laurent to concur that the delegation would do “anything it possibly can” to assist in finding such a solution. It would not “prejudice” nor “commit” the government to eventually accept any proposal or to participate in its implementation, and would not involve Canada “in any additional responsibilities.” St. Laurent answered that he was “favourably impressed” by the steps Pearson had taken and urged him to contribute further to finding a solution to the problem.45 However, St. Laurent’s most distinct contribution to the promotion of the partition option was when he brought the issue before the government for decision. Ilsley asked him on 19 November to instruct the delegation whether to support partition or not. But when St. Laurent convened the cabinet on 25 November in his capacity as acting prime minister, he did not put this question to a vote at all. Partition was “the only feasible solution,” he told the ministers. The question for the cabinet to discuss was only whether to participate in the commission or not, which was decided in the negative. Apparently, it was a practice for St. Laurent. Martin later related that St. Laurent was used to come to the cabinet and after a short review say: “I have to get a decision on this.” Those who would find the certain issue of interest would usually confer with him before the meeting. “The rest would abide by his recommendation.”46 In April 1948, in a discussion in parliament on “world affairs,” St. Laurent justified the Canadian decision to support partition. It was the only plan that could secure the necessary majority, and the Canadian delegation contributed to making it as practicable as possible. In the past, there had been no need to discuss Palestine’s fate as Britain had been willing to administer it. But Britain was no longer able to continue, and the question arose of what to do instead. Trusteeship was declined by both UNSCOP and the assembly. An Arab unitary state meant betraying the many promises given to the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine. Partition, on the other hand, was “the least unsatisfactory of the alternatives,” “the least unjust and least impracticable solution to a problem where, hon. members

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must realize, justice and practicality are so difficult to reconcile or even to discover.”47 St. Laurent was well aware of the significance of the Canadian contribution to partition. In a speech he delivered in 1956 in a plenary session of the Canadian Jewish Congress, he reminded his listeners that the Canadian government “has had a certain part to play” in the creation of the state of Israel. “Although the main impetus towards the creation of a Jewish state, apart from that given by persecution, has always come from within the Jewish communities themselves, and it is to Jewish initiative, Jewish sacrifices and Jewish endeavour that Israel chiefly owes its being, a considerable amount of outside help has also been contributed, through the United Nations and otherwise. Where Canada is concerned, this help has been given gladly. I believe the aid Canada has been able to give has been appreciated,” he concluded.48

PEARSON, RIDDELL, AND IGNATIEFF “Circumstances threw me into the midst of that involvement,” wrote Pearson in his memoirs. “Almost by accident,” his son said. Pearson’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict began in late April 1947. Representing Canada in the special assembly and chairing its First Committee were to integrate him into the conflict for years to come. The beginning, however, was different from what developed. Before he left for New York, Pearson held that it was better for Canada to keep a low profile in the assembly—not to say anything, or at most some “noncontroversial general observations.” At this stage, he also opposed Canadian participation in the intended inquiry commission. In the assembly, he tried to prevent granting the Jewish Agency a hearing, arguing that there was no point in discussing the substantive issue at that merely procedural stage. When such a hearing was granted, however, he resolutely defended the Jewish Agency representative, when the latter was verbally attacked by an Arab delegate after accusing the Mufti of Jerusalem of collaborating with the Nazis in exterminating European Jewry.49 Pearson’s role in the second assembly was a completely different story. Initially, he intended to remain in New York for two to three weeks at most, to deal with some other matters such as setting up the Little Assembly, and to devote his last “day or two” to the Palestine problem. But it turned out otherwise. Naive and irresolute Ilsley, officially acting head of the delegation, was no match for Pearson, who soon became the prominent spokesman of the Canadians. Despite being a mere civil servant, Pearson started to direct the delegation’s policies. “Asserted full control,” one of his biogra-

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phers put it later. “Running everything on his own,” a journalist wrote. Norman Lambert, chairman of the external affairs committee of the Canadian Senate and a member of the delegation, complained that Pearson “goes out and lays down policy and commits Canada to anything he pleases without telling.” It reached the point, Lambert continued, that “They never heard of Canada plan for Palestine till they read it in the papers.” But “The hockey player [Pearson] is so very able and so nice that no one would think of checking up on him or asking him anything,” he concluded.50 It was in Subcommittee 1 that Pearson started to take an “active part” in the deliberations. In his statement of 4 November he analyzed all the available implementation plans and pointed to the weaknesses “in all of them.” Upon the creation of the working group he presented it with a list of proposals of how to implement partition. It called for the assembly to consider the situation in Palestine a “threat to the peace,” and for the Security Council to establish the two states immediately upon the termination of mandate. In order to anticipate future opposition, it was important for him to provide the settlement adopted with an adequate legal basis. He believed that both the Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab states would try to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state by force. Therefore, it was imperative for the United Nations to adequately cope with this challenge to its authority, or the precedent set by the Arabs would eventually turn it into another futile League of Nations. Apparently, legality for itself did not interest him, just the consequences. However, when he tried to secure legality, and was opposed by the Soviets, he found their attitude surprising: Usually they followed the Charter to the letter.51 Pearson’s major contribution to the eventual adoption of the partition plan was, however, the compromise he managed to devise between the Americans and the Soviets concerning implementation. It was “the turning point of the Palestine debate.” Both superpowers were willing to modify their original stands and compromise on both the date for the termination of the mandate and the role to be played by the Security Council. (Pearson took care that what had been agreed “meant the same thing to all parties.”) Pearson’s idea that the commission should be appointed by the General Assembly (meeting the Americans), but be responsible to the Security Council (meeting the Soviets), was an ingenuity. One should remember, though, that while Pearson usually coordinated his moves with the Americans, in his previous support for Security Council intervention he was actually closer to the Soviets. He was therefore the appropriate person to suggest the compromise, which was needed as both superpowers under-

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stood the necessity to secure a two-thirds majority to pass the resolution, attainable only through the support of both blocs.52 “Through force of circumstances the implementation section of the Palestinian report was largely the work of the Canadian delegation,” Pearson later said. It was “a result of the tireless efforts of Lester B. Pearson,” said the New York Times. But it was not over yet. Twice, on 13 and on 20 November, Cadogan delivered statements on behalf of the British government that seemed to obstruct the entire effort. On both occasions Pearson retook the initiative and introduced changes intended to meet the British reservations, each time having to secure American-Soviet agreement. He became so identified with it that the chairman of Subcommittee 1 asked Pearson to explain the implementation aspect to the ad hoc committee in his stead. Pearson not only defended the report of Subcommittee 1 (“the best chance of success . . . the best chance of bringing peace and order to that torn and troubled country”), but also did his best to belittle the competing report of Subcommittee 2 (“merely a recommendation out of the blue and into the blue”).53 Throughout the Palestine debate Pearson did his best to keep in contact with the British delegation, update them, and make sure their reservations were taken into account. It started well—when in the special assembly he was elected chairman of the First Committee, the British considered it “may be helpful.” Although he fulfilled this job impartially and declined British overtures to influence him, they still were of the opinion that “Mike Pearson came out top” out of the special assembly. During the second assembly, Pearson frequently delivered documents to the British, at times met with them privately to ascertain their opinions, and generally tried to mediate between them and the Americans to achieve a more or less unified Western stand. But his efforts were in vain.54 Pearson found it hard to comprehend the British position. They were the ones who had brought the problem before the United Nations in the first place, and now, instead of helping to find a solution, they seemed to be interested that no solution be found at all. They refused to cooperate even when asked. For example, they insisted on not divulging the exact date of the termination of their mandate, claiming that they had not yet had time to decide it, but they did declare it publicly a fortnight after partition was adopted (on 11 December). Had they announced it a few days earlier, it could have facilitated everything. While Pearson was willing to accept that this “completely detached” and “reluctant” attitude stemmed from the fact that it was their soldiers who were serving in Palestine, he was convinced that the political reasoning behind it was their will to maintain good relations with the Arabs. And “for this reason they seemed to hope that the

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United Nations would fail to reach any agreement whatever on the Palestine question.”55 Pearson was convinced that he had worked “long and hard” to make the settlement adopted “less offensive” to the British. While they clearly opposed partition, without his efforts to meet their demands, their opposition would have been greater. However, the British perceived the situation differently. In a letter to Robertson after it was all over, Pearson advised him that “we incurred a certain amount of unpopularity amongst the junior members of the United Kingdom delegation for our part.” There was even some talk “that we had been ‘disloyal’ and had worked against the interests of the United Kingdom in a most deliberate and offensive way.” He even heard that such “criticisms” were circulating in London. How could he be “abused” for “abandoning” the British line, “when it was quite impossible for anyone, in public or private, to discern what that line was?” The New York press already intended to make a story out of the tension prevailing between the British and Canadian delegations, and Riddell was obliged to warn the British not to pursue this line. They agreed, and in a meeting arranged between Cadogan and Ilsley, the former “was at some pains to deny that his delegation had any feeling of animosity.”56 But why did Pearson need all this, to strain his relations with the British, to risk a potential confrontation with King, and to jeopardize his career for an issue that was none of his concern? Of course, there are the realpolitik arguments: that Pearson strived to make Canada a middle power involved in international affairs—a mediator state; that he wanted to make the United Nations an instrument for peacefully solving international conflicts; that he was “fascinated” to find out that both superpowers would support partition, which would at least prevent a direct confrontation between them over Palestine (or that he even intended to use this opportunity to bring them nearer— MacCallum suggested); that he was worried that the Palestine situation would strain Anglo-American relations to a point that might put Canada in straits.57 While all this may apply, it still does not explain why he resolutely chose to side with the Jews in the conflict over Palestine. The reasons for this were much deeper. Paul Martin later wondered whether Pearson was influenced by Rand. As it turned out, Pearson himself explicitly said later that Rand “was influenced by the same principle of action that subsequently influenced the Canadian Government in formulating its policies on Palestine.” In fact, at the beginning of the Palestine debate in the second session, he wanted Rand to provide the delegation with a memorandum conveying his views “as to what we should say here.” Rand did not, but already before that he had sent Pearson his UNSCOP memorandum. “There could have been no more

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complicated or difficult political and diplomatic problem,” Pearson thought, “where passions between the contending parties could have been deeper or more bitter.” In an off-the-record speech delivered in early 1948, he said: “I would have liked in this Palestine issue to have taken a strong independent stand for what we thought was the proper and right solution.” Evidently, Pearson found Zionism to be the “just cause,” and he plainly asked the representatives of the Jewish Agency not to hesitate to approach him “whenever his counsel and help were needed.”58 But why? It was “out of religious exaltation,” MacCallum said. “What it must have meant to him to be a person to be in a position to give real help to the Jews to ‘return’ etc.” As it happened, Pearson himself confessed this feeling in his memoirs, although claiming it to be “an ancillary factor”: “I must admit that I became emotionally involved in a very special way because we were dealing with the Holy Land—the land of my Sunday School lessons. . . . it made the dispute much more real in my mind than, for instance, Korea. I do not recall ever getting very worked up about Korea when I went to Sunday School.”59 However, there were more specific reasons than just “religious exaltation.” Pearson was serving in the Canadian embassy in Washington when in late 1944 it sent a report to Ottawa on the American findings about the Auschwitz and Birkenau death camps. It contained eye-witness testimonies and an estimation that more than 1,765,000 Jews had been exterminated there between April 1942 and April 1944—”the most appalling document ever published on the perpetration of organized atrocities.” The impact of the Holocaust was to become a leading factor in Pearson’s approach toward Palestine. “The new Jewish state will bring a large measure of relief to those elements of world Jewry which have suffered so terribly,” he wrote in late 1947. Partition won in 1947, he later said, “because of an underlying feeling that it had been made necessary by the slaughter of Jews in Europe during the Second World War.” It seemed imperative “after the annihilation of six million Jews in various countries in Europe, that arrangements should be made in at least one country in the world for the Jewish people to be definitely freed from the limitations and the fears imposed by minority status.” “The malevolence of Hitler’s racial policies . . . had made clear the imperative need for a Jewish state. Otherwise the vote in that year for the partition of Palestine might not have been obtained.”60 One of the consequences of the Holocaust was the remaining 200,000 European Jews living in camps and elsewhere as displaced persons and forbidden by the British to enter Palestine according to the White Paper of 1939. Their plight also became a major factor in Pearson’s approach. When he prepared for the special assembly, Pearson noted to St. Laurent that the

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Jewish refugee problem might arise concurrently with the Palestine problem. Therefore, he asked Hugh Keenleyside, the deputy minister in the Department of Mines and Resources, also responsible for immigration matters, to supply him with statistics about Jewish immigration into Canada in the years 1933–1947 as background material for the delegation. The numbers were shameful, especially with regard to the first half of 1940’s, the peak of extermination of European Jewry. In 1940–1941, 284 overseas Jews were admitted to Canada; in 1941–1942, 111 overseas Jews; in 1942–1943, 31; in 1943–1944, 56; and in 1944–1945, 93.61 At the beginning of the Palestine debate in the second session, the delegation asked for further up-to-date information about Jewish immigration and for “a confidential statement” of how the changes lately introduced into Canadian immigration policy could affect the issue. In other words, how many Jews were expected to arrive in Canada among the overall number of displaced persons admitted. This was after the British had suggested that every member of the United Nations should resettle in its territory an appropriate share of Jewish displaced persons as an “indispensable” part of solving the Palestine problem. Pearson wanted to know if the changes in Canadian immigration policy had met the British suggestion. The Immigration Branch answered that a total of 20,000 displaced persons were allowed to immigrate into Canada, but found it hard to predict how many of them would be Jewish. It could surmise that 1,000 of them would be Jewish garment workers and another 750 Jews from other professions. A special Order-in-Council to admit 1,000 Jewish orphans was also mentioned, and that a “considerable number” of Jews would possibly be admitted on the basis of kinship.62 Evidently none of this was very promising for the 200,000 Jewish refugees in Europe. Pearson realized that there was only one sensible solution for them: Palestine. In the statement he delivered on 20 November regarding implementation, he fully cited the paragraph in Subcommittee 1’s report, which established that “The Mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.” And for anyone who might not understand it, he added: “it means that by 1 February 1948 it is to be hoped there will be sufficient area under the control of the provisional Council of the Jewish State to admit of immigration into that area.”63 Pearson’s conclusion from all this was that there could be no solution to the Palestine problem without the establishment of an independent Jewish state. In a speech delivered in 1949 he pointed out that all other solutions

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were unsatisfactory as none of them gave “the 750,000 Jews who had been permitted, and even encouraged, to settle in Palestine, an opportunity to control their own affairs and to work out their future freely and independently.” The great accomplishments achieved by the Jews in Palestine during the mandate entitled them to this right. In his memoirs Pearson was to write that “I have never wavered in my view that a solution to the problem was impossible without the recognition of a Jewish state in some form in Palestine. To me this was always the core of the matter.” “A Jewish state in Palestine, a ‘national home,’ something which I felt was a sine qua non for any settlement.”64 Indeed, during the proceedings, Pearson unremittingly reminded both the delegates and his minister that “the sooner the people of Palestine accept direct responsibility for their government, the better.” Authority by the termination of the mandate had to be “unequivocally” transferred to “where we think it should lie, that is, with the people of Palestine themselves.” When partition was adopted, he was convinced that the settlement would “work out in the Jewish areas”—the Jews already had a nucleus of an administration and an army that would be able to enforce it. With regard to the Arab areas, however, he envisaged that “a serious problem will undoubtedly arise.”65 Pearson returned to Ottawa “having been dubbed by Canadian Zionists as ‘the Balfour of Canada,’” as put later by a Canadian historian. Apparently, he was well aware of the significance of the role he had played. “I have had a great deal to do with Canadian policy in regard to Palestine during the past two years,” he said in a speech in 1949. He was also well aware of where his sympathies lay. He was cited as referring to himself as “Rabbi Pearson.”66 Gerry Riddell, chief of the first political division in the Department of External Affairs and principal adviser to the Canadian delegation, was Pearson’s close partner in the Palestine debate and shared his convictions. As a chief of a division responsible for international organizations he showed a special interest in the United Nations’ success and believed that it was imperative for the organization to reach a recommendation with regard to Palestine. However, as in the case of Pearson, the reasons for Riddell’s attitude were much deeper than that. He had “great personal sympathy” with the Zionist position, said MacCallum, and was even “more exalted” in this than Pearson. He, too, was morally concerned about the fate of European Jewry after the Holocaust, which apparently made him a sort of an “anti-anti-Semite,” to use MacCallum’s words.67 Riddell was a gifted speech writer, and he was the one to prepare Ilsley’s statement of 14 October. When Ilsley protested against the one-sided na-

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ture of the statement, which did not meet the strong arguments, according to him, of the Arabs, Riddell appeased him by saying that he should not feel bound to judge all the historical arguments put forward—Canada had not taken part in any of these historical events. Riddell was also closely associated with Pearson when the American-Soviet compromise was devised in the working group, and he composed several memoranda to justify and promote the partition idea. “There is no practicable alternative,” he wrote; the unitary state plan would never pass. Furthermore, if partition would not be adopted, “it will discredit the Jewish Agency, and will play into the hands of Jewish extremists who are said to be prepared to seize the whole of Palestine by force.” Partition, on the other hand, “gives the Western powers the opportunity to establish an independent, progressive Jewish state in the Eastern Mediterranean with close economic and cultural ties with the West,” whose existence “may be of very great consequence to us in the future political development of the Middle East.”68 Riddell claimed that the proper way to handle the situation was by abolishing the transition period and declaring the independence of the new states simultaneously with the termination of the mandate. Like Pearson, he believed that the establishment of the Jewish state was only a natural result of the prevailing situation. Like him he believed in the ability of the Jewish Agency to maintain law and order in its territories and to defend the Jewish state from an attack by the neighboring Arab states. (He just “shrugged his shoulders” when MacCallum tried to warn him of the imminent Arab attack following partition.) In the Arab areas, however, he expected “greater confusion” to occur, but it was up to the Arabs to solve this problem.69 Finally, like Pearson, Riddell apparently was well aware of the accusations against them, that they had been pursuing their own private policy with regard to Palestine. In a trans-Canada radio broadcast, he tried to establish that “it is the responsible representatives of the Canadian people who determine policy for Canada in the General Assembly of the United Nations.” While everyone in the delegation could democratically express his opinion, the final decision remained, “as it should,” in the hands of the accredited members of the delegation. The advisers just supplied background material and explained the technicalities. “But when it came right down to saying what the Government of Canada, and through it the Canadian people, wished to say or to do, the officials remained silent. At that point, only the ministers could speak and it was they who finally took the decision.”70 George Ignatieff, serving as an adviser in both assemblies, although playing a relatively minor role, definitely shared Pearson’s and Riddell’s

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opinions. His family history was problematic as far as the Jewish people were concerned. Count Nikolay Ignatiev, Russia’s interior minister in the early 1880s, was a notorious anti-Semite, responsible for the initiation of various regulations against Russian Jewry. George’s father, however, Russia’s education minister during World War I, practically abolished the discriminations against Jews that existed in the Russian educational system. As many of the Jewish Agency representatives in the United Nations were also of Russian origin, they would talk to Ignatieff in their mother tongue and, according to his own evidence, he soon became their “go-between” in the corridors of the organization. “It is a strange paradox that whenever Jews and Russians get together, they usually seem to be able to face [each other] and feel a kinship of some sort because of certain historic, though very unsatisfactory, relations,” Ignatieff was to say. “They therefore assumed that I was their ally,” he wrote in his memoirs, “which was essentially true.”71 Ignatieff was not unaware of the Arab demands, he said, or that contradictory promises of Palestine had been given to both peoples (he had though a low opinion of the Arabs’ ability to present their stand, contrary to the Jews). At one time he even reprimanded the Jews’ inability to curb terrorism in Palestine. But in 1947, he was to write in his memoirs, “the humanitarian aspect of the problem—the horrors of the holocaust and the plight of Jewish refugees who had nowhere else to go—seemed to me to overweigh all other considerations.”72 Ignatieff continued his contacts with Jewish representatives after partition had been adopted. In a conversation with Gelber, he advised him how the Jewish Agency should behave if it wanted a Security Council intervention. It had to remind them that Britain had announced its intention to continue to sell weapons and ammunition to the Arab states according to its existing contracts, which meant “equipping potential aggressors.” The Jews, on the other hand, faithful to the United Nations’ resolution, were “hamstrung” by the American arms embargo. Furthermore, not yet a state, they were deprived of the financial and political advantages of their adversaries. Ignatieff was of the opinion that it was the American inactivity since partition had been adopted that encouraged Arab aggression. He suspected that, like the British, the Americans were interested in cultivating Arab good will. On 11 May 1949, Ignatieff represented Canada in the General Assembly discussion on the admission of Israel to the United Nations. In his speech of support, he welcomed Israel as a peace-loving state anticipated to contribute to the realization of the principles of the United Nations Charter.73

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There were other pro-partition Canadian statesmen and officials. The delegation also included Joseph Bradette, chairman of the external affairs committee of the House of Commons, who on the day the second session opened declared that Canada was going to support the UNSCOP majority report. In the Department of External Affairs, Ross Hopkins, chief of the legal division, read in 1945 the report sent by Mayrand from Moscow on the atrocities committed in Auschwitz. “This all sounds nightmarish, but I have reason to suppose it to be basically true,” he remarked. He was later appointed secretary to a war crimes advisory committee, where he studied the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in Poland. In the Canadian cabinet, Paul Martin, minister of national health and welfare, admitted to being influenced by Rand’s opinions. He also “felt very strongly that what Pearson was doing was right.” He was considerably moved (and other ministers as well, he believed) “by the sufferings of the Jewish people.” “Mankind owed the Jewish people a great deal for the terrible cruelty inflicted on them by Hitler and by the anti-Jewish campaigns that existed in many parts of the world.” “Here was an opportunity of compensating for great injustice.”74

ILSLEY AND MACCALLUM Inexperienced in United Nations maneuvers, James Lorimer Ilsley, Canada’s justice minister and acting head of the Canadian delegation to the second assembly, was driven by the resolute Pearson to a relatively secondary role. Ilsley did not like the pro-Zionist attitude prevailing in the delegation. Concerned about the contradictory promises given to Jews and Arabs, he believed that the rights of both had to be taken into account, or at least be heard. (“The conscience of the delegation,” MacCallum called him; “A person with a super sensitive sense of justice,” said Ignatieff.) He wanted to know all the facts before pleading for partition. He read the entire literature about the question Ignatieff had collected for him (and also Lawrence of Arabia) and wanted to know what MacCallum, the delegation Middle East expert, had to say. In a meeting of Commonwealth delegates he pointed out that the Arabs had strong arguments, to which Evatt retorted that, on the other hand, there was the Balfour Declaration. But the British commitments to the Arabs preceded the Balfour Declaration, thought Ilsley; besides, there was the essential right of the local people to self-determination. The Arabs would apply violence to resist UNSCOP’s recommendations, he feared.75 When Riddell prepared the first Canadian statement in support of partition, to be delivered by Ilsley in the ad hoc committee, Ilsley was “greatly

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concerned” that no effort had been made to attend to “questions of principles.” No attempt was made in it to meet “the very strong moral and political claims” of the Arabs, “in spite of the fact that we are making a decision essentially against their interests.” He insisted that he not deliver the speech “without knowing the right and wrong.” Riddell responded that he should not feel bound to follow all the historical arguments presented, especially since Canada had taken no part in any of these historical events. Another member of the delegation remarked that “the Old Country might have been promising both sides something that could be delivered to neither.” Ilsley agreed that “these things do happen,” but he still doubted whether they should forego the unity option. “Unity had often been imposed without consent—sometimes, as in the United States, with successful results.” He wanted to know MacCallum’s opinion about the speech, which was negative (see below), and finally insisted that his reservations be communicated to St. Laurent.76 Ilsley’s protests were ignored. When he delivered the speech, he stressed that “strong arguments have been advanced in support of both Zionist and Arab positions.” But with no feasible alternative, his delegation, “somewhat reluctantly,” had been led to accept UNSCOP’s proposals for partition “as a basis for discussion.” When the Palestine debate neared its completion, and Ilsley was asking St. Laurent for instructions, he reminded him that although the Canadians had taken part in the formulation of the partition plan, they had never committed themselves to support it. Pearson’s failure to make the plan judicially sounder was also mentioned by Ilsley, as well as Britain’s reluctance to cooperate and his doubts whether partition would win the two-thirds majority. But St. Laurent decided to support partition, and again Ilsley was compelled to speak for it. The “least objectionable” option, Ilsley called it in his final speech. “We support this plan with heavy hearts and many misgivings,” he added. A unitary Arab state was the “normal and natural” course for Palestine if not for the Balfour Declaration, the mandate, and the very existence of the Jewish community there, which constituted “a fatal flaw in the otherwise unanswerable Arab case.”77 At the end of his speech Ilsley expressed his frustration at needing to reach a decision on this issue at all. Far removed from Palestine, taking no part in the events leading up to this “denouement,” promising nothing to Arabs or Jews, and not involved in these politics, why should “a profoundly disturbing responsibility for grave and far-reaching decisions” be thrown upon Canada’s shoulders? Ilsley basically believed that whatever decision was made, justice would not be served, and it weighed heavily on

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his conscience.78 The case was different with his copartner MacCallum, who believed that a just solution could be reached, but differently. Elizabeth P. MacCallum was “the Middle East desk” of the Department of External Affairs. Born in Turkey to missionaries, she was fluent in Turkish and Arabic. In 1925 she quit her Ph.D. studies at Columbia University and started to work for the New York Foreign Policy Association, where she published many papers on the Middle East during the coming years, including a volume on the Syrian revolt of 1925–1927. In 1942 she joined the Canadian foreign service as a research assistant and became a staunch protectress of Arab interests whenever needed. MacCallum opposed partition. According to her, Palestine was an Arab land, and there was no place there for a Jewish state. While she perhaps was the only expert on the Middle East in the Canadian foreign service, she definitely was not a “bona fide” one, as described later on.79 At the beginning of the second assembly MacCallum was asked to be responsible for documenting the work of the ad hoc committee, and Pearson even suggested that she prepare a draft statement about Palestine to serve the delegation as a basis for discussion. This harmony, however, was soon to end when it became evident where the sympathies of each side lay. “Off the record,” MacCallum was to relate to an interviewer that Pearson tried to take advantage of her impaired hearing, which caused her to become weary in late hours, scheduling the delegation meetings for the evenings, in the hope that she would not attend and thereby save the delegation her antipartition views. Ilsley opposed this arrangement. However, it was Riddell, MacCallum argued, who was convinced more than anybody else in the delegation that she was “on the wrong track.”80 When Ilsley resisted the speech prepared for him by Riddell, MacCallum backed him tenaciously, soliciting to modify it according to his views. “Democratic principles are to some extent disregarded” in UNSCOP’s majority recommendations, she argued. Questions would be raised whether it was justified to force partition against the will of the Arab population and also of some of the Jews (as Professor Magnes had testified). When hostilities would erupt as a result of partition, it would therefore be difficult to justify sending Canadian soldiers to coerce it. “The United Nations cannot allow Zionist organizations to expand their demands in relation to the Jewish National Home to a point which will involve the world in another general war.” In such a war, the Jewish national home itself would probably disappear, and with it the security enjoyed by Jews in other countries. Therefore, even to the disappointment of Zionist leaders, the United Nations should stick to the White Paper of 1922, “slowing up the pace of Jewish immigration to a point where it will cease to be

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provocative.” Canada should support a solution that would preserve Palestine undivided, under trusteeship of the United Nations, instead of tying itself to partition.81 When Ilsley delivered the speech, MacCallum insisted that it just committed Canada to accept partition as a basis for discussion, not for recommendation. (Actually, it was McCallum who inserted the limiting “as a basis for discussion” into the speech.) A few days later Chaim Weizmann pleaded for the Zionist cause before the ad hoc committee, using Ilsley’s words to justify the Zionist stand. MacCallum was quick to notice that his citation was inaccurate. Weizmann said: “The distinguished delegate of Canada uttered a profound truth when he said that ‘unity cannot be imposed without consent.’” But Ilsley had actually said: “The representative of Pakistan has said here that partition should not take place without consent but the question arises as to whether it is any better to try to maintain unity without consent.” So Pearson was compelled to send a polite letter to Shertok that although he was sure Weizmann did not intend to mislead, it would be appreciated if the inaccuracy were corrected. Shertok promised to do so “in the records,” leaving MacCallum unsatisfied. The incorrect citation had already appeared in the press, and “it may be a little difficult to catch with the consequences” as Jewish publications were likely to spread it “all over the continent.”82 At the beginning of November MacCallum participated in a meeting of several delegates to discuss suggestions by the Jewish Agency to modify the northern borders of the Jewish state. MacCallum opposed ameliorations in favor of the Jews in the Galilee, stressing that the Druzes living there considered themselves siding with the Arabs. The Druzes had been the spearhead of the “Arab nationalists’ rebellion” in Syria (in 1925–1927), she added. She also convinced General Hilldring of the American delegation to present a map before Subcommittee 1, prepared by a Swedish delegate, that would reduce the Arab population in the Jewish state from 400,000 to 293,000 by cutting down the Jewish state from 65 percent of Palestine to 47 percent. Hilldring noted that as a soldier “there was only one thing he could say about the proposed boundaries of the Jewish and Arab States: ‘Neither of the two proposed States can ever be defended.’” For MacCallum it was another proof against partition: The only member in the subcommittee expert on military matters had ruled that “strategically the States are not viable at all.”83 Throughout the debate MacCallum tried to convince her superiors that partition would not win the necessary two-thirds majority. While it was not certain that this majority could be secured, it seems that MacCallum deliberately exaggerated her pessimistic reports. On the eve of the American

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statement in the ad hoc committee, for example, she claimed that unofficial polls proved that partition would not win a two-thirds majority even if it was supported by the four powers and Britain abstained. The fate of federation, cantons, or a binational state would be the same, she added, but kept silent about the odds of a unitary state. At the end of the general debate in the ad hoc committee, she claimed that there actually was a majority against partition. When the support of both superpowers for partition had already become a fait accompli, she tried to persuade (citing a British official) that there was a common interest among the Soviets and the Jewish Agency that partition would win the two-thirds majority. For the Soviets it meant a precedent that a “dissident minority” had the right to sovereignty, which would be “useful” for them in Eastern Turkey, Northern Greece, and elsewhere.84 Like Pearson, Riddell, and Ignatieff, MacCallum, too, referred to the Jewish refugee problem, but differently. She was of the opinion that the Zionists were trying to confuse the humanitarian issue with the political problem of Palestine. Therefore, what had to be done was to grant the Jews equality in their countries of origins, in the social and professional fields “and in business.” Then, all the members of the United Nations had to cooperate in solving the refugee problem, and secure the prompt evacuation of the displaced persons centers in Europe. She cited the editor of the London Jewish Chronicle, who called for the immediate implementation of the UNSCOP recommendations regarding the Jewish refugees, which mentioned an international cooperation to solve this problem. Absorbing of the Jewish refugees by the various members of the United Nations would create a better atmosphere that would facilitate finding a solution for Palestine.85 MacCallum also tried her best to discredit the lobbying activities in favor of partition. Thus, for example, she told Pearson that the members of the World Committee for Palestine and the Canadian Palestine Committee, both pro-Zionist organizations (about them, see the next chapter), lacked any knowledge of the Middle East and accepted the words of the Jewish Agency “at face value.” They had never considered the British standpoint, or that of the Arabs, or even that of non-Zionist Jews. Their call for the abolition of land regulations in Palestine meant the likely deprivation of many Arabs of land. At times MacCallum tried to convince Jewish activists themselves to change their policy. Zionist Canadian judge Harry Batshaw was struck to hear from her that “we should not ask our Government to support the majority decision [of UNSCOP] but rather to make peace between the Jews and Arabs!” It seems, however, that not everyone correctly assessed the extent of her opposition to Zionism. Among the latter was Horowitz,

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who wrote on her in his memoirs that “I found no hostility in her attitude towards us. . . . [she] had no rooted prejudices . . . [and] showed every desire to study the problem impartially.”86 However, MacCallum lost the case. The government decided to ignore the Arab standpoint, so “What could EPM do?,” she told an interviewer many years later. The affair ended with MacCallum convinced that Canadian support for partition was rendered “because we didn’t give two hoots for democracy.”87 Another antipartitionist member in the delegation was Walter Harris, St. Laurent’s parliamentary assistant and a parliamentary adviser to the delegation on behalf of the Liberal Party. His opinions found expression in a diary he wrote on his stay in New York. The speech delivered by the Arab representative in the ad hoc committee was “a simple but fairly convincing historical review,” he wrote, and it was all “very true.” Dr. Silver, speaking for the Jewish Agency, then “gave us fifty minutes of everything in the book.” Silver confessed that the Arabs had lived in Palestine for 1,300 years, but pointed out “with great scorn and contempt” that they had produced nothing during this entire period. “This, however,” noted Harris, “seemed like pleading for the Jew as being the brighter of the two, and not necessarily an historical argument in favour of the Jew.” Silver had to argue on an emotional basis, thought Harris, as Zionism was “only a recent historical ambition.” Yet, admitted Harris, Silver “certainly touched the listeners more effectively than did the Arab.”88 Both Arabs and Jews reproved the British, each side accusing them of helping the other. “It was encouraging,” however, Harris cynically wrote, that both sides were reserving their “sacred right” to self-defense, that is, to fight “if they don’t get their way.” As there were 1,200,000 Arabs in Palestine and additional millions in the neighboring states, and only 600,000 Jews, “it would seem that the outcome of this conflict could only have one result,” he concluded. His solution for the Palestine question was federation, according to UNSCOP’s minority, although he was aware that the Jews were bound to oppose it, as it would enable the Arab majority to stop immigration. All this did not prevent Harris, the professional politician, from later telling some Jewish constituents that he hoped partition would work and that the future decisions of the Canadian delegation on Palestine would continue to please them. He described Pearson’s behavior in this respect on this occasion as “exceptional leadership.”89 Harris mentioned in his diary two other opponents of partition, both parliamentary advisers to the delegation. The first, Progressive Conservative John Hackett, was the member of parliament who questioned Rand’s appointment to UNSCOP on the ground that it involved a judge in “a polit-

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ical controversy in which Canadian opinion is sharply divided” (incensing King). Hackett was of the opinion that “any partition in history has resulted in a running sore.” The second, Solon Low, was a leader of the Social Credit party, whose attitude toward the Jews was problematic, to say the least. He shared Harris’s conviction that federation was the appropriate solution for Palestine.90 At any rate, representing opposition parties in the delegation, these two enjoyed no influence whatsoever.

8

Lobbying Activities When Dean Acheson contemplated before the special assembly which states would suit the proposed inquiry commission for Palestine, he thought about Canada, because, he said inter alia, there was no “large and active Jewish community” in it.1 There were some 180,000 Jews in Canada in 1947. Their influence on Canadian public life was limited; the presence of the Palestine problem in domestic politics was almost nonexistent. If at all, many of the English-speaking Canadians sympathized with the British and with their difficulties in Palestine. Nevertheless, Canadian Zionists tried their best during that year to influence Canadian policy makers to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Their copartners in accomplishing this task were the emissaries of the Jewish Agency. The main target of Zionist lobbying was the Canadian delegates themselves. During the special assembly, Lionel Gelber, a Toronto-born adviser to the Jewish Agency, was in “close touch” with Ignatieff, and also maintained good relations with Pearson. Also Eliahu Epstein, the director of the Washington office of the Jewish Agency, kept in “constant contact” with the Canadian delegation and, in his own words, even befriended MacCallum.2 When UNSCOP was still in New York, before leaving for Palestine, Gelber met with Rand in person and sent material about Palestine to Mayrand. However, it was Horowitz, who later considered Rand “his spe-

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cial preoccupation.” He, too, sent Rand a book (Cecil Roth’s The Jewish Contribution to Civilisation), but it was their personal contact that was to bear some concrete results. On the second day of UNSCOP’s tours in Palestine, Horowitz accompanied Rand for eleven hours, apprising him of the tragic fate of the Jews and their aspirations. On Mount Carmel, Horowitz showed Rand the illegal immigration ships detained in Haifa’s harbor, and explained the Jewish struggle for free immigration. On the way to Jerusalem, he pointed at the detention camp in Latrun, and told Rand about the arrest of Moshe Shertok and other Jewish leaders the previous year. Shertok himself later invited Rand and the other delegates to an “informal dinner” in his home, as did Chief Rabbi Herzog; the former reception was used by Ben-Gurion to informally present the Jewish perception of the problem.3 During UNSCOP’s discussions in Geneva Horowitz frequently sent notes to Rand and the other delegates about the various desiderata of the Jews. In a “Note on Jerusalem” he stressed that the inclusion of its Jewish part in the Jewish state was “an integral part of an effective partition settlement.” He and a couple of other Agency delegates also tried to persuade Mayrand of the impossibility of fulfilling Zionism without Zion (Jerusalem), and pointed out that the Jews would never support a partition plan that would exclude Jerusalem. In a meeting with Rand, Horowitz tried to persuade him to include the Negev and the Galilee in the Jewish state. Further, in a note about “The Viability of the Arab State,” Horowitz tried to convince the UNSCOP delegates that the Arab state would be able to sustain itself economically, and that, therefore, there was no need for the Jewish state to subsidize it. Finally, shortly before UNSCOP’s final meeting, Horowitz begged Rand to fight the idea of a Jewish “truncated” state, which he did. It was not for nothing that Shertok later wrote that Rand was Horowitz’s “greatest conquest.” “By three things we won this man—by what he had seen in Palestine, by his own conscience, and by Dulik H[orowitz]’s influence on him,” Shertok said.4 During the second assembly, the Jewish Agency emissaries continued to keep in close contact with the Canadian delegates, especially with Pearson. MacCallum related that Shertok would wait for him every day and “was wrapping LBP around his finger.” Shertok even arranged a special dinner in his honor, at the end of which Pearson asked the Agency delegates to address him “whenever his counsel and help were needed.” Also, Gelber continued his “constant touch” with Pearson (Mike, he called him). Pearson was “wooed” by the Zionist lobby, MacCallum said, corroborated in this by Ignatieff, who remembered Pearson to be “under very strong Jewish pressure.” It reached the point that Ignatieff had to “candidly” hint to Gelber after partition had been adopted that in the future “we should not

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try to drag him [Pearson] out into the open.” Ignatieff himself was in continuous contact with Shertok and Epstein, both Russian-born like him, and with Gelber, and according to his own description he served as their “ally” and “go-between” in the United Nations. He actually was counseling Gelber on when and how to approach other Canadian officials, and when the Agency’s “easy approach to Cabinet Ministers and officials” had to be modified.5 The Jewish representatives approached the Canadian delegation constantly during the second session. For example, when the ad hoc committee was contemplating the removal of displaced persons from Germany to ease the pressure of immigration to Palestine, they warned the Canadians that this was just a “diversionary move.” When the Canadians were concerned about the legality of implementation, Gelber delivered Ignatieff a memorandum written by the Agency’s legal adviser, to the effect that the General Assembly had the authority to implement partition or to appoint an organ on its behalf to carry it out in practice. Through Pearson (and Granados) the Agency suggested various amendments to the proposals discussed in the working group. The Agency also approached the Canadians about the makeup of the intended Palestine commission, although in this case the Canadians revealed to them that Canada would not participate. Finally, when Pearson tended to consider referring the entire question to the International Court, they promptly explained to him that this was just an Arab stratagem to delay a real solution, which would complicate the Palestine situation and aggravate the Jewish refugee problem.6 While the Jewish Agency people concentrated on the Canadian delegates in New York, the Zionist activists in Canada tried to influence the policy makers in Ottawa. On the eve of the special assembly, Samuel Zacks, president of the United Zionist Council of Canada, and Ellsworth Flavelle, chairman of the Canadian Palestine Committee, sent a lengthy letter to St. Laurent, stressing the need to normalize the Jewish situation and establish a Jewish national home. They underlined Britain’s inability to run the mandate and the misery it was causing the Jewish refugees by forbidding them to enter Palestine. As this situation was likely to create friction between Britain and the United States, an early solution to the problem was in Canada’s interest. In practical terms, they asked St. Laurent to see to it that no interested parties (the Arab states) would participate in the proposed inquiry commission, to pressure Britain to increase the quotas of Jews admitted to Palestine, and to support the establishment of a Jewish state as a fulfillment of the mandate.7 After the majority recommendations of UNSCOP became known, the Zionist activists in Canada tried to convince the government to adopt them.

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“A historic victory for Zionism,” they were called in a statement issued by the United Zionist Council. Rand’s and Mayrand’s contribution was a source of “gratification” for all Canadians, it declared, and “a special sense of pride” for King, who had chosen them. The Canadian government was called upon to support UNSCOP’s majority and to advocate for an early termination of the mandate in order to both alleviate the Jewish problem and lighten the burden for the British people. This was followed by a letter to King, in which Zacks asked for an audience to discuss the UNSCOP report; King was too busy to meet, but Zacks was promised that his request “will be kept in mind.” Also, the Canadian Jewish Congress commended Rand’s role and called on the government to support the UNSCOP majority. In a cable to St. Laurent, Samuel Bronfman, the Congress’s president, expressed his confidence that Canada would follow the majority recommendations, the only feasible solution for Palestine. Both organizations welcomed Ilsley’s statement in support of partition—a reflection of the Canadian government’s fairness, Zacks called it.8 Another form of lobbying was to approach members of parliament and ask them to advocate for partition. These, in turn, would approach King and St. Laurent and apprise them of their constituents’ opinions. Apparently, it had some influence. In one instance, Bruce Claxton, minister of national defense, told Ignatieff that “I don’t mind how you vote but . . . Don’t forget that I have no Arabs in my constituency and I have forgotten how many hundred Jews.”9 Finally, there were also ordinary people who considered it their duty to appeal to the policy makers to promote the Jewish cause. Their influence, at least on an emotional level, was sometimes more noticeable than that of professional lobbyists. A former student of Pearson wrote to him that he remembered him as a conscientious “square shooter.” With one third of world Jewry killed by the Germans, and with Canada and all other havens closed to them, “don’t stop the Jews from surviving in Palestine.” “Now that you share the power to decide . . . Don’t do anything you won’t be able to live with after you’ve retired from public life.” Pearson answered that he hoped to do nothing that would “to use your own words, prevent me from living with myself after I have retired from public life.” Another letter apprised Pearson of the plight of 2,000 Jewish children, survivors of Nazi camps, interned by the British in Cyprus. They needed supportive surroundings to get rehabilitated, which could only be obtained in Palestine. They were “the responsibility of all of us,” as the democratic world knew the nature of Nazism, but did nothing. Pearson agreed that only by returning the children to normal conditions could the impact of their miseries be removed.10

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The Canadian contribution to partition was eventually far beyond what the lobbyists could expect. When partition was adopted, there came thanksgiving. Sometimes it was for the right people, as when it referred to Rand’s “credit” or to Pearson’s “skilful guidance”; many letters were sent to Pearson himself commending him for his “steadfast efforts” and “tireless leadership.” On other occasions, it was a bit misdirected, as when it referred to King or Ilsley (“We know what a great satisfaction it must be to you,” Zacks wrote to King). Special thanks were expressed also for the efforts of the Canadian Palestine Committee to promote the Zionist cause.11 The Canadian Palestine Committee was a special enterprise to enlist non-Jewish Canadians for the Zionist cause. Founded in 1943, it comprised influential Christians, politicians, journalists, businessmen, and clergymen, who believed in the Zionist viewpoint regarding Palestine and volunteered to present it before the Canadian public opinion. It was chaired by Ellsworth Flavelle, a staunch adherent of Zionism, while the executive director was Herbert Mowat, a former Anglican preacher. Since late 1945 the organization also held an office in New York, under the name World Committee for Palestine, intended to function as the international parallel of the Canadian committee. The latter organization was also run by Flavelle and Mowat, who in September 1947 practically moved to New York to operate its lobbying activities in the United Nations. Although officially independent, for all practical purposes the Canadian Palestine Committee was directed by the United Zionist Council of Canada. “A façade,” Judge Batshaw called it later, “they were an instrument to mobilize Christian support for Zionism.”12 The committee’s convictions found clear expression in early August, after the “Irgun Zva’i Le’umi” had hanged two British sergeants as a reprisal for the execution of three of its members by the British. Although Flavelle previously had denounced Jewish terrorism, at this juncture the committee published a special release accusing Britain of what happened—it turned Palestine into “a police state.” Although the hangings were “detestable,” if the British had commuted the executions into life imprisonment, the sergeants would still be alive. The committee proved to be a loyal ally for the Jewish Agency during both the special and the second assemblies. Mowat was assigned to contact Pearson, and also kept in touch with Ignatieff, Bradette, and Ilsley, informing them of his organization’s support of partition. After Ilsley had stated Canada’s support of partition, Flavelle cabled King and St. Laurent to congratulate them. When partition was adopted, he told a Zionist leader how happy he was for the Jews; he would be even happier had he worked harder for “the great cause of Zionism.” Mowat was then asked by Zacks to return to Canada to help in public relations, since

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“the government went so far out and was a little ahead of public opinion.”13 Zacks, when visiting New York during the second assembly, kept in contact with the Canadian correspondents there, explaining to them the Jewish position. Terror activities in Palestine generated negative reactions in the Canadian press. Yet in general, when dealing with the Palestine issue, the Canadian newspapers seemed to favor the idea of establishing a Jewish state. As early as the beginning of April, the Montreal Herald considered partition the “fair and logical” solution for Palestine. Following the special assembly the press favored the Canadian participation in UNSCOP. On the eve of and during the second assembly, UNSCOP’s majority recommendations in favor of partition were supported in many editorials. Even the pro-British Globe and Mail concluded that the mandate had to terminate. Following Weizmann’s speech in the ad hoc committee, even the Montreal Daily Star, not considered particularly sympathetic to the Zionists, reached the conclusion that there was no escape from partition.14 Another aspect of Jewish lobbying in Canada was to fight the Arab lobbying. Information about Arab activities in Canada was sent by Batshaw, vice-president of the Zionist Organization of Canada, to Epstein, director of the Washington office of the Jewish Agency. Furthermore, Jesse Schwartz, national executive director of the Zionist Organization, was trying to persuade Pearson during the last phase of the Palestine debate to ignore the protests against Canadian policy in favor of partition, uttered by Muhammad Said Massoud, president of the Canadian Arab Friendship League. This organization existed only on paper, Schwartz maintained, and even the few Arabs living in Montreal, where Massoud operated, were not affiliated with it.15 In 1947 only about 12,000 Arabs lived in Canada. As early as 1938 the Arabian Muslim Association was established in Edmonton, Alberta, by a group of local merchants of Arab origin for the purpose of building a mosque. The mosque, inaugurated in November of that year, was the first to be established in Canada. However, it was only in the early 1940s that Arab lobbying started to be noticeable in Canada as a reaction to Zionist lobbying. In 1944 the Canadian Arab Friendship League was founded in Montreal by Muhammad Said Massoud, a Druze emigrant from Lebanon. Massoud, a wealthy merchant who arrived in Canada in 1909 at the age of sixteen, became involved in lobbying activities, according to his own evidence, as a result of an offensive article published in the Montreal Daily Star by a Jewish rabbi. It described the Arabs as lazy people who had dried up Palestine into a desert—the Jews, on the other hand, would make it flour-

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ish. Massoud responded with a counterarticle and soon a press campaign between him and the Zionists began.16 A short while later Massoud decided that more significant action was needed to promote the Arab cause and make Canadian public opinion aware of it. He established the league with a national headquarters in Montreal and some small branches in other cities. Its declared purpose, according to the first article of its constitution, was “To promote, encourage and propagate friendship and understanding between Canada and the Arabic speaking nations of the world.” In order to accomplish this, the league would hold meetings and approach politicians and newspapers (mainly the Daily Star, where Massoud had some friends), combating and protesting against the Zionist propaganda, particularly when it offended the Arab image. The league also set up the “Canadian Arab News Service,” a nonprofitable organization intended to “better relations between Canada and the Arab world.” It was subsidized by Massoud, who also started to collect all news related to Arabs from many North American newspapers, sorting and indexing them, and responding when needed. A weekly “Arab-Canadian Newsletter” followed, published by Massoud and sent gratis to Canadian newspapers and leading Canadian personalities.17 However, it was the mimeographed Canadian Arab magazine (“a link of friendship between Canada and the Arab world”), published by Massoud between May 1945 and December 1947, that was the most significant enterprise of the league. It was intended to refute Zionist arguments regarding Palestine and prevent Canadian public opinion sympathetic to the establishment of a Jewish state. The magazine, in English but with the editorial translated into Arabic, was distributed gratis to politicians, religious leaders, university lecturers, teachers, lawyers, businessmen, and libraries, and its circulation in 1947 reached 4,000 copies. It included news, political essays, protests, correspondence, and historical lectures, and in 1947 it became the spearhead of the league lobbying.18 After the special assembly the Canadian Arab warned that a Jewish state would be “the surest and quickest road to another World War,” as the Arabs were determined to defend “Southern Syria” (that is, Palestine, “as it is known today”). One democratic state was the solution for Palestine, not partition. After UNSCOP had presented its recommendations, the magazine expressed shock, warning that there would never be peace in Palestine if the Zionists continued their threats. It was the duty of the United Nations to prevent violence, which could only be achieved if it succeeded in resisting Zionist dictatorship—otherwise the future would be smeared with the blood of millions. When partition was adopted, the magazine warned the United States, the Soviet Union, and Canada that their support of the Jews

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would entangle the world in war; the West had ignored the good will of the Arab world. Palestine, torn to pieces as a result of this “shameful decision,” was about to become “the scene of the most terrible atrocities.” As Canadians of Arab origin, they were especially disappointed at the role played by Canada—Pearson and Rand had no right to represent Jewish interests as they did.19 In a league meeting following the special assembly, Massoud described it as “a series of insults and threats” to the Arab nations. He was also unhappy about the manner in which the Canadian press was reporting the discussions in the second assembly: “sensationalism,” he called it, intended to serve the Zionist cause. In another meeting he warned that the Arabs were ready to take up arms to prevent partition (“this is the opinion of most Canadian Arabs”). And on the eve of the adoption of partition, he issued a statement comparing it to the Japanese treachery of Pearl Harbor. The “peace-loving Arab peoples” would never honor such a decision, and despite their “wholehearted” support of the United Nations’ ideas, they would fight it their best. Massoud denounced the Canadian support of partition and called for an eleventh-hour solution of one democratic state, as in Canada. What would the Canadian delegates say “if French-speaking citizens of Canada desired to secede from the rest of the English-speaking provinces? . . . A vote for partition of Palestine will leave Canada no choice but to accept Quebec’s demands.” Furthermore, failing partition was imperative if Canada wanted to hold the Commonwealth together.20 When partition was adopted and it was all over, Massoud could only threaten in a speech he delivered in Montreal that “the Arab world would ‘remember’ Lester B. Pearson and Justice Rand,” who “did their utmost to impose upon Arabs the infamous partition scheme.” He expressed his conviction that the two had “changed the official opinion of our Government” and therefore, “The Arab world, I am sure, will remember them.”21 The Arabs also used to cable various policy makers trying to influence them. For example, in April Massoud wired both the Canadian delegation and the General Assembly’s president, apprising them of his league’s opposition to partition. In May he again cabled Aranha, calling on the United Nations to prevent another world war “which can only serve the interest of a small minority.” In September he cabled the chairman of the parliament external affairs committee, expressing surprise at the “incomprehensible” negative attitude of the Canadians in UNSCOP, and protesting against the harm done to both Canada and Britain. In November he warned External Affairs that their attitude toward Palestine meant “friendship or war” between the Canadian and Arab peoples. But if Canada took a new course, all the Arabs would admire it, “like we are doing in Canada during every elec-

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tion.” When he concluded that Pearson was “appeasing the Russian government at the expense of Britain and the Arabs,” he cabled both External Affairs and Bevin, stating the Arab distrust of Pearson. The Canadian government was required to support Palestine’s independence according to the White Paper of 1939, and to instruct its delegation “not to increase the danger of war in the Near East.”22 Massoud was not the only one to use this method. In September, a Lebanese acquaintance of his from Nova Scotia sent a telegram to King, St. Laurent, and Minister of Veteran Affairs Ian Mackenzie, in protest against the Canadian support of partition in UNSCOP. He asked them to use their influence to change the Canadian policy toward Palestine, as it was “vital” for all Canadians. He also phoned Massoud, gave him a list of addressees, and proposed that he send the same protest to all of them. A reference to Arab support of the present government in elections was also made. In November four telegrams reached St. Laurent simultaneously, expressing their senders’ apprehensions of the damage Pearson was causing Commonwealth-Muslim relations. Canada was advised to follow Britain’s lead, rather than embarrassing it in its difficult hour. While the telegrams were supposedly sent from four different people, among them member of parliament Norman Jaques, the president of the Arabian Muslim Association, and the secretary of the Edmonton branch of the Canadian Arab Friendship League, they were, in fact, all cabled from Edmonton within five minutes, as the originals could attest.23 Massoud also kept in contact with the various Arab delegates to the United Nations—in one instance he asked the Syrian delegate to send him the text of a speech he had made to be reprinted in the Canadian Arab. In August, one of the delegates of the Arab Higher Committee asked him to arrange for him a tour of lectures in Ottawa and Toronto to counter Zionist propaganda; a similar request was sent to Jaques, to arrange meetings with members of parliament. Massoud revealed utter incompetence at handling this and eventually turned him down. On the other hand, Massoud suggested to the Syrian and Egyptian delegates that they arrange a meeting with Jaques, when he visited the United Nations during the special assembly: “Mr. Jacques is personally interested in our cause and could be of tremendous service to all Arab delegates.”24 Norman Jaques, a member of parliament from Alberta on behalf of the Social Credit party, was doubtlessly the most anti-Semitic member in the Canadian parliament in those days. He would deliver frequent speeches against international conspiracies, pointing at the Jews as the common denominator of all forces striving for world domination. He accused the Zionists of collaborating with the left and of manipulating the United Nations,

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and considered the struggle for Palestine the key to world control. By the end of the special assembly he tried to persuade parliament that the Jews wanted the British “driven into the sea.” He then tried to prove that “political Zionism” was generating animosity between the British and the Americans by means of the “most violent and virulent” propaganda, whereas world peace was dependent on friendly relations between the English-speaking peoples. Zionist propaganda, basing its case “on racial, cultural and commercial superiority,” was the greatest threat to the peace. Furthermore, the pressure laid “by this small minority of political Zionists who seem to have political control, not only in the United States, but in Great Britain and in Canada,” was driving the Arabs into the hands of the Soviets.25 Jaques kept in close contact with Massoud, informing him of his “evident friendly relations with the Arab delegates” when he had visited the United Nations, and about his intention “to oppose Zionism at my meetings and in my articles as, in fact, I always do. Shall do same in H[ouse] of C[ommons].” But the House of Commons was not in session between mid July and early December, namely, during the entire period of the second assembly. So in the meantime Jaques used the Canadian Social Crediter to prove that “International Finance, International Political Zionism and International Socialism” stood behind all international organizations. He furthermore blamed “Shylock and Marx,” the internationalist pagans, for smearing the Christian nationalists by accusing them of anti-Semitism.26 When parliament resumed, Jaques forcefully denounced partition, reprimanding the Canadian government for defying the British. Partition was adopted “under threat and by force,” he argued. The Zionists were economically destroying any Christian, or Jew, who dared to oppose their positions. He presented proof that the United States had secured the two-thirds majority by pressuring delegates and states; Pearson “powerfully” assisted the Americans in this, he insisted. The United Nations had thus been turned from an instrument of justice into “a vehicle of torture.” Furthermore, the Arabs had already done enough. They had absorbed 600,000 Jews in their little Palestine. There was no reason for one small state to solve the entire Jewish problem by itself. Moreover, partition meant not only antagonizing Islam, but relinquishing that part of the world to communism—everywhere, socialists and communists sided with Zionism. The course taken by the United Nations was bound to lead to a world war. Hence it was time to stop submitting to a “small but ruthless and unscrupulous minority.” “We must stop deciding international questions at the dictation of powerful minorities, for purposes of vote catching, or economic advantages.”27

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Jaques was always fearful that the Zionists would succeed in silencing him. Eventually, because of his blatant anti-Semitic remarks, radio stations in Edmonton refused to broadcast his speeches, which served him as proof of the Zionist conspiracy to hush up his revelations. When he died in early 1949 of a heart attack, while some of his colleagues of the Social Credit just pinned it on the tension inherent in his crusades, others blamed his allegedly pro-Zionist doctors for his early death. In any case, it was not for nothing that Massoud was later to write about Jaques that he “sided with truth, inspired by his conscience and by human justice.”28 There were other antipartitionist members in the Canadian parliament, such as John Hackett, whose opposition to Rand’s appointment has already been mentioned, or T. L. Church, whose objection was of a broader nature, emanating from his opposition in principle to the disintegration of the British Empire. (Both were Progressive Conservative.) When on one occasion the speaker did not let the latter express his opinions about the Palestine question, Church retorted that “The empire is being given away every day, and we do nothing about it.”29 To sum up, the Jewish lobbying activities had some influence, especially when direct connections on the individual level were involved, certainly in the case of Rand and apparently, to a certain extent, also in the case of Pearson and his colleagues. Yet one may wonder whether the outcome would have been different if there had been no such lobbying. It seems that Pearson and the others operated according to their own conscience and perception of the situation, and eventually the decisions they reached emanated from what they believed was the right thing to do and not from outside influences. The Arab lobbying activities, in any case, bore no influence at all. As Ignatieff related in a later interview, the Canadian delegates “were clearly more responsive . . . to Jewish pressure and influence than they were to Arabs.”30

9

Canada’s Role in Jewish, Arab, and Canadian Eyes Jacob Robinson, an employee of the World Jewish Congress and a legal adviser to the Jewish Agency during the special assembly, wrote about the Canadian behavior during this assembly that it had been “restrained and detached.” “While relatively passive they favored a restrictive interpretation of the agenda and avoided prejudging the issues.”1 While Robinson’s assessment of Canada in the special assembly was to no small extent accurate, the Jewish appraisal of the Canadian role during the next stages of the Palestine debate was to change dramatically. “The Canadian contribution to the Palestine problem has suddenly and unexpectedly become a major one,” said Gelber. “The steady hand of Mr. Justice Rand has been not indiscernible in the making of the United Nations Committee’s Palestine Report,” he reported to the Jewish Agency. And he added: “Rand dominated the Inquiry Committee proceedings . . . it was his resolution for partition which carried the day.” “The forthright attitude which Mr. Justice Rand has taken is a tribute to his acumen and prescience,” cabled Bronfman to St. Laurent on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress. The Canadians should be proud of the work done by Rand and Mayrand, stated Zacks on behalf of the United Zionist Council of Canada. The two had made “notable contributions” to UNSCOP’s report, he added. Without Rand’s “patience and understanding it is fair to say that the UNSCOP re-

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port would not have seen the light of day,” declared in parliament the Jewish representative from Toronto, David Croll.2 Similar expressions also applied to Pearson after partition had been adopted. His “skilful guidance” brought Rand’s work “to realization,” stated Zacks. Canada’s role would be remembered for a long time to come, he added. Pearson’s “able and steadfast efforts” would never be forgotten, wrote the vice-president of the Zionist Organization of Canada. “Outstanding role,” added the chairman of the Labour Zionist Movement in Montreal. “A special reference was made to your tireless leadership in the solution of the Palestine problem,” reported the executive director of the Canadian Jewish Congress to Pearson. “Canadian Jewry is indebted to Pearson,” told the president of Mizrachi’s Women in Canada to King. “It is heart-warming to Canadians to have history record that Canada played a most important part” in leading to partition, Bronfman stated. The Canadians had “a fine record to maintain,” Gelber later on told Ignatieff. He duly noted to his superiors that what happened proved that Canada was “not held in line by considerations of unity which derive from British Commonwealth ties or even any broader Anglo-American solidarity.”3 The leaders of the Jewish Agency were no less aware than the Canadian Zionists of the role played by Canadians in the process. “The Canadian delegate [Rand], who is no less British than the British, stands up and declares that there should be a Jewish state,” said Ben-Gurion in early August, even before the UNSCOP work had been completed. “The ‘conversion’ of this old man was of the utmost importance,” wrote Shertok, precisely because Rand was a delegate of the British Empire; Pearson, too, “was alert regarding the Jewish cause,” he added. Also Beryl Locker, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive who visited Montreal in December, noted in a speech the “significant, if not decisive, role” played by the Canadians in leading to partition.4 Horowitz, who served as a liaison officer to UNSCOP on behalf of the Jewish Agency, described Rand in his memoirs as UNSCOP’s conscience, enabling it “to throw off the shackles that were preventing its stepping out of the royal road to a solution.” “Everyone surmised correctly that Ivan Rand had turned the scales. Canada was known as Britain’s most loyal Dominion and could not be charged with having anti-British prejudice. Its seal on the report was regarded by all as being a powerful factor in the UNSCOP chapter.” Horowitz also attended the second assembly, and discovered that “Pearson’s tranquilizing effect over all differences was immeasurable. He always found the proper device in all circumstances to help the two big contestants find common ground.” “His adherence to the pro-Partition fold was an important turning-point. His influence, as one of the foremost

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figures at U.N., was tremendous.” Horowitz therefore concluded that “It may be said that Canada, more than any other country, played a decisive part in all stages of the U.N.O. discussions on Palestine. The activities in Lake Success of Lester Pearson and his fellow delegates were a fitting climax to Justice Rand’s beneficent work on UNSCOP.”5 Epstein, director of the Jewish Agency’s Washington office, who also attended the second assembly, described Pearson in his memoirs “as one of the most prestigious and influential delegates in the General Assembly who sided with us in our struggle.” Being the most active member in the working group, “he did not spare his time and energy to compel his colleagues to be flexible in their search for efficient measures to implement partition.” In the days following Cadogan’s statement of 13 November, he acted as a mediator between the Americans and Soviets trying to find solutions, and eventually it was he who brought forward the amended version of the implementation proposal. Pearson was, concluded Epstein, “one of the most dedicated and faithful supporters of the partition plan and of the idea to establish a Jewish state.” Also, Abba Eban, a political adviser to the Jewish Agency during the second assembly, pointed out in his autobiography that the compromise finally adopted on the implementation of partition was Pearson’s work.6 The same picture of Canada’s involvement grasped by Canadian Zionists and by the Jewish Agency’s men during the occurrence of events later found expression in some of the publications by Canadian Jewry related to Zionism. In an article entitled “History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada,” published in 1963, the author, Bernard Figler, pointed out that it was Rand’s “understanding and judgement” that influenced UNSCOP’s members to recommend the establishment of a Jewish state. He also noted that the formula finally adopted in the second assembly “was universally ascribed to Canada’s brilliant statesman,” Pearson. In a book published in 1979 by the Canada-Israel Committee, entitled Canada-Israel Friendship: The First Thirty Years, Rand’s influence on UNSCOP was considered “all important.” Pearson was described as the one who at the last moment managed to devise the compromise between the Americans and Soviets. His later words that the annihilation of six million Jews necessitated the creation of a state where Jews would be able to live fearlessly, were described as a “highly developed sense of moral imperative,” which thereafter marked Pearson’s attitude toward Israel.7 It turns out that the Arab perception of the Canadian role, both during the events and thereafter, was similar to that of the Zionists. However, the Arab expressions were, of course, the reverse of those of the Zionists. Massoud protested against the “negative and incomprehensible attitude”

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of the Canadians in UNSCOP. The Canadian attitude was harming Arab-British relations he later on told External Affairs. Canadian Arabs were “confused” by the silence of their government on Pearson’s “personal opinions”; his conciliation work was only to increase Arab suspicions of him. After the partition plan had been adopted, Massoud attacked Pearson and Rand for being its “authors”—they had no right to represent Jewish interests as they did. Canadian Arabs were disappointed by the role Canada played in the United Nations, he maintained. The Arab world was to “remember” the two, who “did their utmost to impose upon Arabs the infamous partition scheme,” and who “changed the official opinion of our Government.” Pearson, for his part, mentioned in his memoirs his unpopularity among the Arab delegates, “some of whom did not hesitate to tell me at the time what they thought of my views and of the policy of my government.”8 In a book he published in the early 1970s in Beirut, Massoud complained of Pearson that he “did not follow human justice and was inclined to the Zionists against the Arabs.” He helped Zionism actively; the Zionists infected his mind with “malignant diseases.” He was “one of the instruments” that brought about the creation of the state of Israel. Massoud was not the only Arab to complain about Pearson’s role. In a book published in Amman in 1968, Pearson was cited as stating publicly that “Politics recognizes conscience and law only when they are accompanied with force,” when it was contested that partition contradicted conscience and law. While there is no evidence in the records that Pearson ever said that, it gives a clear notion of how his role was perceived by the Arabs.9 In 1969 the Middle East Research Centre in Ottawa published a booklet by Ali Dessouki on Canada and the Palestine problem, stressing the decisive role played by Pearson, although “in a personal capacity rather than in the name of his government.” Pearson’s compromise between the Americans and the Soviets, “the turning point of the Palestine debate,” was also mentioned. A year later an enlarged version of the booklet was published in Arabic in Beirut by the research center of the Palestine Liberation Organization, intended to prove that while Canada was pretending to be neutral it actually favored Israel. “The role played by Canada with regard to the partition resolution and the establishment of Israel passed through history without the Arabs paying attention to it,” Dessouki stated. He stressed Rand’s role in UNSCOP, citing Figler’s appreciation of him, and listed the “important roles” Pearson played during the various stages of the Palestine debate (the compromise inclusive). Dessouki considered Ilsley’s words about Canada’s support of partition “with heavy hearts and many misgiv-

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ings” a camouflage. He did not realize that Ilsley meant what he had said, just that it was not up to him.10 Tareq Ismael, an Arab professor teaching in the University of Calgary, also referred to Canada’s role in some of his publications. Rand was defined by him as either “an ardent pro-Zionist” or “an ardent admirer of the Jewish people.” Pearson was described as playing a prominent role in wording and clarifying the partition plan; he was “a priori” in favor of partition, Ismael contended. “Through the untiring efforts of these two eminent men, Canada is said to have played a decisive role” in the partition of Palestine, concluded Ismael.11 It seems that the Canadians themselves were also well aware of the import of their role in arriving at partition. “Justice Rand was by far the main contributor to the partition scheme,” Mayrand stated. He made “invaluable contributions” to UNSCOP’s work, noted Pearson in his memoirs. Rand worded “a considerable part” of the partition plan, wrote Riddell. “The leadership in the Committee exercised by Mr. Rand has produced a valuable influence for Canada in United Nations circles,” said Bradette to Mowat of the Canadian Palestine Committee. (Mowat himself was of the opinion that everyone who had observed Rand’s performance in UNSCOP “realized that he was the outstanding member of the Committee.”) Rand’s appointment to UNSCOP was “a very significant one,” said Paul Martin in an interview, confessing to be influenced by Rand’s opinions.12 Pearson was “running everything on his own,” wrote Bruce Hutchison, a Canadian journalist then visiting the United Nations. He cited Norman Lambert, chairman of the senate external affairs committee and a member of the Canadian delegation, as complaining that Pearson “goes out and lays down policy and commits Canada to anything he pleases.” Pearson himself wrote in his memoirs that “We had been prominent in the partition debates, often at the very centre of things.” But apparently he was well aware that it was more than just that, as he was cited to refer to himself as “Rabbi Pearson.” Walter Harris, who for several days substituted for Pearson in the subcommittee when Pearson was occupied with the Little Assembly, wrote about him that he had given “exceptional leadership in the making of the final decision.” The Canadian press also attributed the formulation of the Palestine settlement to Pearson, describing his compromise as “one of the brightest among many pages of the Holy Land’s tragic past.” “The most influential member” in the ad hoc committee, he was called. Finally, St. Laurent also reached the conclusion that “rightly or wrongly” Canada was perceived as “having espoused the Jewish cause.”13 Most Canadian writers who reviewed the Canadian involvement in the United Nations in the late 1940s seemed to have grasped the true nature of

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Canada’s role in the Palestine question. In an article published in 1948 in the International Journal of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Canada was described as playing “an extremely active and perhaps decisive part.” Pearson was described as breaking the “deadlock” with his compromise, thus winning “a major success,” although doing it “in a personal capacity.” The partition plan finally adopted included many of Pearson’s ideas, the author concluded. In a book published in 1956 on Canada and the United Nations, the authors, one of them president of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and himself a delegate to the United Nations, contended that Canada, while sympathizing with the British, did not feel itself committed to support Britian’s policy in the Middle East. Rand, according to them, “was one of the most influential members” of UNSCOP, while Pearson “played a prominent part in the [ad hoc] committee and subcommittee discussions at the second session, particularly in the working group of four . . . that hammered out the basic proposals at that session.”14 Robert Spencer, who wrote the 1946–1949 volume of the Canada in World Affairs series, assessed that “Canada’s role in the Second Assembly was . . . marked contrast to the modest part played in the second part of the First Session. Instead of avoiding issues, there was a real willingness to stand up and be counted. Instead of shrinking from responsibility, there was usually a disposition to accept commitments. Instead of following cautiously, there was an occasional desire to lead. Mr. Pearson’s part in the Palestine question was the outstanding instance of Canada’s contribution.” Rand was described by Spencer as “by all odds the outstanding member” of UNSCOP. Pearson was praised by him especially for his efforts to break the “deadlock” in the working group—“thanks to his energetic intervention by November 10 it had hammered out a compromise.” Then, when the British disapproved, “Mr. Pearson was again active in seeking to reconcile objections.” “In the struggle to secure acceptance of the partition plan, his influence had been of importance, and in the crises of November 4–10, and 20–22, it was perhaps decisive,” Spencer concluded.15 John English, who in the late 1980s published a voluminous biography of Pearson, devoting several pages to Pearson’s 1947 intervention in the Palestine affair, also assessed that Pearson believed in partition “tenaciously.” He fought Ilsley who opposed it, wrote English, and finally “asserted full control” over the Canadian policy in this issue.16 One may conclude therefore that there was a uniformity of opinion among all parties involved, Jews, Arabs, and Canadians, with regard to Canada’s role. However, this harmony disintegrated when the subject started to be studied scholarly. Three scholars devoted full-scale research to

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investigate the issue: Zachariah Kay, Anne Trowell Hillmer and David Bercuson; the first and third wrote books while the second prepared an M.A. thesis. The closest of the three to accurately describe what had happened was Hillmer—a Canadian foreign service official herself—precisely because she was much influenced in her writing by MacCallum, who had actually suggested that she write about it. MacCallum, gravely frustrated by her inability to influence Canadian policy in favor of the Arabs, apprised Hillmer to the best of her ability of the realities of what had happened—and the realities were that “Rand began with a Zionist bias” and that “the departmental sympathy shifted perceptibly towards the Zionist position.”17 Kay, too, correctly assessed that Rand played a key role in UNSCOP’s work and in the formulation of its majority report,18 but his general theme was that Canada’s policy toward Palestine was one of “Non-Commitment,” as the subtitle of his book attests. Yet Kay could be excused by the fact that he wrote his book before the relevant 1947 documents were declassified. It was Bercuson, however, who wrote the most extensive research about this subject so far, based on many archival sources, which completely deviated from the realities, trying to prove that Canada’s Palestine policy was a matter of “Serving the National Interest,” as he titled an early article about it. Bercuson first tried to diminish the significance of Rand’s role, arguing that UNSCOP’s majority plan was a combination of Rand’s and Fabregat’s plans.19 It is true that Fabregat was exceptionally pro-Zionist, as was Granados, but their influence was limited. It was precisely Rand, representing a British dominion and not publicly identified as pro-Zionist, although he definitely was, who was in a position to consolidate UNSCOP’s majority in favour of partition. Bercuson also tried to prove that Pearson was just following the policy of his superiors. While admitting that Pearson had stated in his memoirs “many years later” that the establishment of a Jewish state was imperative, Bercuson found it “inconceivable that Pearson would have pursued a policy he believed was not in Canada’s interests; nor would he have pursued a policy because of his sympathy for the Zionists.” In any case, Bercuson continued, “his influence in the policy-making process was limited until he became secretary of state in September 1948.”20 It seems that these assertions cannot stand criticism and do not correspond with the findings of the present book. Canada’s national interest with regard to Palestine was to keep a low profile, as had been advocated by King, but Pearson decided to pursue a different course.

Conclusion Canada’s role in the formulation and adoption of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) to partition Palestine was crucial. Pearson’s unremitting interventions during the Palestine debate secured the compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union on the implementation of partition, thus providing the support of both world blocs in the adoption of partition. No two-thirds majority could have been achieved without it. Pearson and his colleagues pursued this policy of their own accord, and not as representatives of an official Canadian foreign policy. It was certainly against the express will of Prime Minister King, taking advantage of his absence from Ottawa in November 1947. Furthermore, Pearson, Riddell, and Ignatieff pursued this line of action not out of considerations of realpolitik, but out of humanitarian concerns. It was the impact of the Holocaust and the plight of the Jewish refugees that convinced them that the establishment of a Jewish state was “a sine qua non for any settlement.” On the morning of 30 November 1947, Israel’s war of independence began, first against the local Arabs, and since 15 May 1948, against the invading Arab armies. When the war was over, Israel expanded far beyond the borders assigned to the Jewish state according to the partition plan. An Arab state did not emerge.

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About this development, Canada’s new secretary of state, Lester Pearson, told the First Committee of the General Assembly on 22 November 1948, during the third regular session in Paris: “We must deal with the fact that a Jewish state has come into existence and has established its control over territory from which it will not be dislodged.” Israel’s provisional government took control over a large part of Palestine, and there seemed to be no likelihood that this control would be taken from it. Even if the Arabs believed that an injustice had been done, he continued, to revert meant a greater injustice in light of “recent history.” It might be difficult for the Arab states to accept this, but it was ill advised for them to expect the United Nations to change the situation, and they had better realize the “futility” of continuing their threats to extinguish Israel and start negotiating with it.1 Israel’s declaration of independence was immediately recognized by the United States, followed by the Soviet Union and Guatemala. King’s Canada, on the other hand, “moved carefully” (as Pearson put it later), especially after being intimated by Britain that there was no reason for such recognition. In November 1948 St. Laurent succeeded King as prime minister, which opened the door for the eventual recognition of Israel. A de facto recognition was granted in late December at Pearson’s suggestion (as a “compensation” for not supporting Israel’s admission to the United Nations several days earlier in the Security Council, said MacCallum). In March 1949 Canada supported the admission of Israel to the United Nations in the Security Council, and in May cosponsored a similar proposal to the General Assembly. It was up to Ignatieff to argue in the plenary assembly on behalf of Canada for Israel’s admission. Its vote for Israel’s admission was considered by Canada a de jure recognition. In August the first Israeli consul arrived in Canada.2 Pearson apparently considered his intervention in the 1956 Suez crisis the peak of his Middle Eastern involvement—the chapter dealing with it in his memoirs encompassed also the 1947 story. Indeed, it won him the Nobel Peace Prize, rendering him worldwide recognition and contributing to his later election as prime minister. Yet there was no peaceful solution to the 1956 crisis, just a dictate of the superpowers, and the United Nations Emergency Force posted to the Sinai Peninsula proved useless in the 1967 war. It seems that it was rather Pearson’s 1947 intervention that most significantly contributed to the evolvement of Middle Eastern history. There was no peaceful solution to the 1947–1948 situation either, and eventually only one, a Jewish state, emerged as a result of the partition resolution. Yet in Resolution 181 (II) the world community recognized the establishment of a Jewish state in the core of the Arab world, and thus inevitably affected the history of the modern Middle East for years to come.

Notes Telegrams sent from the United Nations to Ottawa were transmitted via the Canadian consulate-general in New York. They were given a double number code in which the first number referred to the consulate-general serial number of telegrams and the second number indicated the United Nations delegation serial number of telegrams. The abbreviation ASDEL before the second number stood for Assembly Delegation. The same applied to telegrams sent from Ottawa, which had the abbreviation DELAS.

INTRODUCTION 1. David Horowitz, State in the Making (New York, 1953), p. 280. 2. Zachariah Kay, Canada and Palestine: The Politics of Non-Commitment (Jerusalem, 1978). 3. Anne Trowell Hillmer, Canadian Policy on the Partition of Palestine 1947 (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1981). A concise summary of Hillmer’s thesis may be found in idem, “‘Here I Am in the Middle’: Lester Pearson and the Origins of Canada’s Diplomatic Involvement in the Middle East,” in David Taras and David H. Goldberg (eds.), The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Kingston, Ont., 1989), pp. 125–143. 4. David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1985).

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5. Idem, “Serving the National Interest: Canada’s Palestine Policy 1940–1949,” Middle East Focus, 6:5 (1984), pp. 12–16, 26–27.

CHAPTER 1 1. Letter, Alexander Cadogan (New York) to Victor Chi Tsai Hoo (Lake Success) 2 April 1947, cited in First Special Session, vol. 1, p. 183. RG 25/3831: tel. 53, Hoo to SSEA (Ottawa) 2 April 1947. RG 25/5745: tel. 17, SSEA to Secretary General, UN (Lake Success) 12 April 1947. CZA S25/5362: “The Summoning of the First Special Session of the General Assembly,” by Trygve Lie 25 April 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 15, 22 April 1947, p. 423. Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations: Prelude to Solution ([Washington, DC, 1947] rep. Westport, CT, 1971), pp. 50–52. In his memoirs, Lester Pearson, then Canada’s under secretary of state for external affairs, described the British overture as if Britain had said about its Palestine mandate: “Here it is. We can’t deal with it. We have tried and we have failed. You take it on.” See: Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto, 1973), vol. 2, p. 212. 2. RG 2/2640: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 14 April 1947. Debates 1947, vol. 3, p. 1999. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 212. Shira Herzog Bessin and David Kaufman (eds.), Canada-Israel Friendship: The First Thirty Years (Toronto, 1979), p. 17. 3. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for Mr. St. Laurent,” by Lester B. Pearson 19 April 1947, and minute by Louis S. St. Laurent; memo, “Likely Procedures at Special Session of the United Nations Assembly,” by Elizabeth P. MacCallum 24 April 1947. It seems that the Canadian press was aware of the government reluctance to discuss “substantive” issues in the assembly. See Montreal Star, 28 April 1947, cited in Robert A. Spencer, Canada in World Affairs: From UN to NATO 1946–1949 (Toronto, 1959), p. 143. 4. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for File,” by MacCallum 25 April 1947. 5. CO 537/2336: tel. 1234, FO to Permanent UK Representative to UN (New York) 24 April 1947. FO 371/67586: tel. 1263, Permanent UK Representative to UN to FO 25 April 1947, and minute 2 May 1947. MG 26J1/428: Pearson, in tel. 499 ASDEL 4, New York to SSEA 29 April 1947. First Special Session, vol. 3, p. 1. 6. Letter, Mahmud Hasan (Washington) to Lie, UN 21 April 1947; letter, ‘Ali Jawdat (Washington) to Lie 21 April 1947; letter, Qustantin Zurayq (Washington) to Lie 22 April 1947; letter, Charles Malik (Washington) to Lie 22 April 1947; letter, Asad al-Faqih (Washington) to Lie 22 April 1947, all cited in First Special Session, vol. 1, pp. 183–186. Pearson’s speech, 29 April 1947, cited ibid., vol. 2, pp. 25–26. FO 371/67586: tel. 1296, Permanent UK Representative to UN to FO 30 April 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 18, 13 May 1947, pp. 494, 502. Benjamin Shwadran, “The Special Session of the United Nations on Palestine,” Palestine Affairs, 2:5 (May 1947), p. 45. Robinson, pp. 75–76. 7. MG 26J1/428: Pearson, in tels. 511 ASDEL 6 and 517 ASDEL 8, New York to SSEA 1 and 3 May 1947. First Special Session, vol. 1, pp. 59–60, vol. 2, p. 81. Weekly

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Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 18, 13 May 1947, p. 494. Shwadran, “Special Session,” p. 46. Robinson, pp. 78–80. 8. FO 371/61776: tel. 1316, Cadogan to FO 3 May 1947. RG 25/4218: Pearson, in tel. 524 ASDEL 12, New York to SSEA 5 May 1947. Robinson, pp. 80–82. 9. RG 25/4218: Pearson, in tel. 538 ASDEL 17, New York to SSEA 7 May 1947. Pearson’s speech, 6 May 1947, cited in First Special Session, vol. 3, p. 2. Robinson, p. 200. Pearson was about to repeat this kind of remarks many times during the committee’s discussions. Cf. the next day meeting: “our subject of discussion is the constituting and instructing of a special committee, and only that.” See: First Special Session, vol. 3, p. 80. 10. Pearson’s speech, 2 May 1947, cited ibid., vol. 2, pp. 118–120. The Polish and Czech proposals are cited ibid., pp. 129–130. 11. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 126 (text of the American proposal, p. 130), vol. 3, pp. 78, 367. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 18, 13 May 1947, p. 494. Eliahu Elath, Ha-Ma’avaq ‘al ha-Medina: Washington 1945–1948 (Tel-Aviv, 1979, 1982), vol. 2, p. 102. 12. CO 537/2335: tel. 2194, Lord Inverchapel (Washington) to FO 11 April 1947. FO 371/61773: tel. 1173, Cadogan to FO 15 April 1947. Memo, Secretary of State [written by Dean Rusk] (Washington) to President Truman 17 April 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1070–1071. 13. FO 371/61773: letter, Norman A. Robertson (London) to Eric Machtig (DO) 19 April 1947. Bercuson, “Serving,” p. 14. 14. RG 25/1048: H. Hume Wrong to Pearson, in tel. WA1245, Ambassador (Washington) to SSEA 23 April 1947. RG 25/4218: memo, “Likely Procedures at Special Session of the United Nations Assembly,” by MacCallum 24 April 1947; “Memorandum for File,” by same 25 April 1947. 15. RG 25/4218: Pearson, in tel. 514 ASDEL 7, New York to SSEA 1 May 1947. FO 371/61775: tel. 1325, Cadogan to FO 3 May 1947. 16. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum to Mr. Beaudry [and] Mr. Reid,” by R. Gerry Riddell 3 May 1947; Riddell to Wrong, in tel. 1172, SSEA to Ambassador (Washington) 3 May 1947; Pearson, in tel. 524 ASDEL 12, New York to SSEA 5 May 1947. See also FO 371/67587A: “United Nations Palestine Assembly,” by R. H. Hadow 17 May 1947, enclosed with letter 29/12/47, Hadow (Washington) to Paul H. Gore-Booth (FO) 17 May 1947. 17. RG 25/4218: Pearson, in tel. 524 ASDEL 12, New York to SSEA 5 May 1947; Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 443, SSEA to New York 7 May 1947; Riddell to Wrong, in tel. 1219, SSEA to Washington 9 May 1947. 18. RG 25/4218: Riddell to Wrong, in tel. 1219, SSEA to Washington 9 May 1947; “Note for Mr. Beaudry,” by Riddell 9 May 1947. 19. CZA S25/5364: “Delegation of the United States: Draft Resolution Concerning the Establishment of a Commission of Inquiry on Palestine” 6 May 1947 (also in First Special Session, vol. 3, pp. 366–367); “Delegation of Argentina: Draft Resolution Concerning a Special Committee on the Question of Palestine” 6 May 1947 (also ibid., vol. 3, pp. 365–366); “Delegation of Chile: Amendment to the Draft Resolution Submitted by the Delegation of the United States Concerning the Es-

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tablishment of a Commission of Inquiry on the Question Palestine” 13 May 1947 (also ibid., vol. 3, p. 371); “Delegation of U.S.S.R.: Proposals Concerning the Composition of the Special Committee of Investigation on the Question of Palestine” 13 May 1947; “Delegation of Poland: Proposal Concerning the Composition of the Special Committee on the Question of Palestine” 13 May 1947; “Delegation of Australia: Proposal Concerning the Composition of the Special Committee of Inquiry on the Question of Palestine” 13 May 1947. First Special Session, vol. 3, pp. 317, 320–321, 323, 348. Yearbook 1946–47, pp. 295, 300. Shwadran, “Special Session,” p. 49. In his memoirs, García-Granados, head of the Guatemalan delegation, who was to play a key role during the coming proceedings, noted that the composition of the American list did not bode well: Canada, Holland, and Sweden were friendly to the British; Peru was conservative; Muslim Iran’s stand was clear. See: Jorge García-Granados, The Birth of Israel: The Drama As I Saw It (New York, 1948), p. 5. 20. First Special Session, vol. 3, pp. 316, 322. Yearbook 1946–47, p. 295. 21. First Special Session, vol. 3, pp. 343–346, 351, 353, 356. Yearbook 1946–47, pp. 300–301. Shwadran, “Special Session,” p. 50. Herbert V. Evatt, The Task of Nations (New York, 1949), pp. 124–125. 22. RG 25/4218: “Resolution Adopted by 79th Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly” 15 May 1947 (also in United Nations, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its First Special Session from 28 April to 15 May 1947, Lake Success, New York, 1947, pp. 6–7); Pearson, in tel. 579 ASDEL 26, New York to SSEA 15 May 1947. First Special Session, vol. 1, pp. 174–177. Debates 1947, vol. 4, p. 3315. See also FO 371/67587A: “United Nations Palestine Assembly,” by Hadow 17 May 1947, enclosed with letter 29/12/47, Hadow to Gore-Booth 17 May 1947. 23. FO 371/67587A: letter 29/12/47, Hadow to Gore-Booth 17 May 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 124. For an American evaluation see: Bercuson, “Serving,” p. 13.

CHAPTER 2 1. MG 26J4/310: “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” by John W. Pickersgill 16 May 1947. MG 26J13: King Diary 16 and 19 May 1947. RG 2/2640: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 22 May 1947. RG 25/4219: note, “United Nations Palestine Committee; Canadian representation” 22 May 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter, Lionel Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. RG 25/4219: memo, “Special Committee on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly—Canadian Participation” (DEA) 18 June 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Herbert A. Mowat] 16 September 1947. Debates 1947, vol. 4, p. 3315. 2. FO 371/61783: Extract from Canada Opdom, no. 21, 28 May 1947, and Extract from tel. 31 Saving (Opdom no. 2), UK Representative, Canada to DO 5 Feb-

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ruary 1946. For short biographies of Rand until 1947, see CZA S25/5963: UNSCOP—Release no. 4, by Information Officer (Jerusalem) 9 June 1947, and Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3, 15 July 1947, p. 112. 3. MG 30E77/7: Ivan C. Rand, “Louis D. Brandeis,” The Canadian Bar Review, 25 (March 1947), pp. 240–250. In this article Rand appreciated Brandeis’s views against economic feudalism. About Brandeis and Zionism, see ibid., p. 249. FO 371/61773: tel. 472, Canada (H. C.) to DO 24 May 1947. FO 371/61783: Extract from Canada Opdom, no. 21, 28 May 1947. ISA 93.03/2266/24: letter, Harry Batshaw (Montreal) to Gelber (New York) 30 May 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter, Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “Further Conversation about Mr. Justice Rand,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 16 July 1947. 4. FO 371/61773: tel. 472, Canada (H. C.) to DO 24 May 1947. CZA Z5/487II: letter, Léon Mayrand (New York) to Gelber 30 May 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter, Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. CZA S25/5375: letter, Y. Tshernovitz (Jerusalem) to Walter Eitan (Political Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine) 27 June 1947. 5. RG 25/4219: memo, “Special Committee on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly—Canadian Participation” 18 June 1947. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “Further Conversation about Mr. Justice Rand,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 16 July 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 September 1947. RG 2/2640: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 11 September 1947. MG 32B12/139: Montreal Daily Star, 24 September 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947; “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” by Pearson 17 February 1948. Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs For the Year Ended December 1947 (Ottawa, 1948), p. 11. Horowitz, p. 162. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 18. It is interesting to note that the British expected the lines taken by Rand and the Australian representative “to be dictated by the policy of their Governments rather than by their own personalities.” See FO 371/61783: letter, John A. Walsh (CRO) to M. G. L. Joy (FO) 25 July 1947. 6. Debates 1947, vol. 4, pp. 3512–3513. RG 25/4219: memo, “Special Committee on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly—Canadian Participation” 18 June 1947. There were doubts also in Jewish quarters about the Canadian participation in the commission. Moshe Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, told his colleagues that “the imperial couple [Canada and Australia] would certainly support Britain; maybe the Australian will be more receptive to us.” David Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, later said that they had been sure Canada would be just a cloak for British and Foreign Office presence in the commission. See CZA S100/51: protocol of plenary meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Jerusalem) 15 June 1947, p. 12301, and speech by Ben-Gurion 9 August 1947, cited in David Ben-Gurion,

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Pe’amey Medina Zikhronot min ha-’Izavon: Mars–November 1947 (Tel-Aviv, 1993), p. 281. See also: Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 18. 7. FO 371/61779: tel. 1517, Cadogan to FO 2 June 1947. MG 26J1/426: Mayrand, in tel. 665, New York to SSEA 3 June 1947. Yearbook 1946–47, pp. 303–304. 8. Granados, pp. 50, 57, 59–60. CO 537/2338/1: letter, Donald C. MacGillivray (Jerusalem) to John M. Martin (CO) 7 July 1947. 9. CZA S25/5374: letter, Ruben Triffon (Haifa) to Moshe Shertok 3 July 1947. CO 537/2338/2: Release no. 25, by Information Officer, UNSCOP (Jerusalem) 8 July 1947. Despatch 123, Robert B. Macatee (Jerusalem) to Secretary of State 14 July 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 1127. 10. CO 537/2338/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting (Private)” 16 June 1947. 11. Horowitz, pp. 167–168. A full list of all of UNSCOP’s tours in Palestine is available in UNSCOP, Report to the General Assembly (Lake Success, New York, 1947), vol. 2, pp. 4–5. 12. Horowitz, pp. 168–169. 13. Ibid., pp. 169–170. 14. CZA Z5/3097: Palcor News Agency Cables, vol. 14, no. 116, 24 June 1947. CZA S25/5375: letter, Tshernovitz to Eitan 27 June 1947. Horowitz, pp. 176–177. 15. CO 537/2338/1: “UNSCOP Session of 7th July, 1947. Questions on Evidence of Jewish Agency.” UNSCOP, Report, vol. 3, pp. 66–67. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Conversation between Justice Rand and D. Horowitz” 6 August 1947. 16. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 3, pp. 101–102. 17. Ibid., pp. 177–178. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 5, 29 July 1947, p. 158. 18. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 3, pp. 183–184. 19. Ibid., p. 184. 20. Ibid., pp. 184–185. 21. Ibid., pp. 186–187. 22. Ibid., p. 187. CO 537/2339: tel. 1372, Alan Cunningham to Secretary of State for the Colonies 19 July 1947. 23. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 4, pp. 16–17. 24. CZA S25/5441: “Special Committee on Palestine—Subcommittee Three: First Report” 2 August 1947. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 182, Canadian Trade Delegation (Geneva) to SSEA 9 August 1947. “Report of Sub-Committee 3 on its visit to certain assembly centres for Jewish refugees and displaced persons in Germany and Austria” 20 August 1947, cited in UNSCOP, Report, vol. 2, pp. 14–17. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 7, 12 August 1947, p. 235; no. 8, 19 August 1947, p. 237; no. 9, 26 August 1947, p. 269. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 229. Granados, pp. 212–213. Bercuson, Canada, p. 99. 25. FO 371/61876: MacGillivray to Martin, in tel. 1162, UK Delegation (Geneva) to FO 31 July 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “The United Nations Committee on Palestine, Situation Report,” by Aubrey S. Eban 4 August 1947. Horowitz, p. 187. Granados, pp. 233–234.

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26. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Minute of a Conversation between Mr. Radak and Mr. Rand” 11 August 1947. Horowitz, p. 200. 27. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Conversation between Justice Rand and D. Horowitz” 6 August 1947. Horowitz, p. 186. 28. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “The United Nations Committee on Palestine, Situation Report,” by Eban 4 August 1947. CZA S25/3890: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 5 August 1947. Spencer, p. 143. 29. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 6 August 1947; “Minutes of UNSCOP’s private meetings” 7 August 1947. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 182, Geneva to SSEA 9 August 1947. Granados, pp. 236–238. 30. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 7 August 1947. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 182, Geneva to SSEA 9 August 1947. CO 537/2341: letter, MacGillivray (Geneva) to Trafford Smith (CO) 11 August 1947. Horowitz, p. 196. 31. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum by Mr. Rand” n. d., enclosed with letter, Rand (Ottawa) to Pearson 12 September 1947. 32. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Pitfalls in Rand’s Project” n. d.; “Some Items from the UNSCOP Meeting” 14 August 1947. For Bunche’s opinion, see: Martin Jones, Failure in Palestine: British and United States Policy after the Second World War (London, 1986), p. 275. 33. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 16 August 1947. 34. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 18 August 1947. 35. CZA S25/5970: “Talks about Jerusalem,” by D. H[orowitz] 19 August 1947. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 210, Geneva to SSEA 25 August 1947. CO 537/2341: letter, MacGillivray to Smith 25 August 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 229. Granados, pp. 243–244. Horowitz, p. 213. In justifying this solution, the alternates of the five states mentioned the need to preserve Jerusalem’s unity; the fact that it was a metropolis for all three religions and that some of its holy places were sacred to more than one religion; the need to rule it impartially in order to keep the peace and its accessibility to all the religions; and finally, the fact that a dispute over Jerusalem could stir international tension, which could better be prevented by having an international authority over it. See ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Annex 3: Recommendation regarding the Special Zone of Jerusalem proposed by the Delegates of Australia, Canada, Netherlands, Peru and Sweden,” in UNSCOP—Subcommittee Four, “First Report—Report of the Subcommittee on Religious Interests and Holy Places” August 1947. 36. CZA S25/3965: letter, Leo Kohn (Geneva) to Golda Myerson 18 August 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 19 August 1947; “Conversation with Mr. Sisto” 22 August 1947. Horowitz, p. 215. 37. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 20 August 1947. CO 537/2341: letter, MacGillivray to Smith 21 August 1947. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 210, Geneva to SSEA 25 August 1947. CO 537/2342: MacGillivray, in tels. 1415 and 1427, UK Delegation (Geneva) to FO 30 August 1947. CZA S25/5991: letter, Moshe [Shertok] to Golda [Myerson] 7 September 1947. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 1, p. 47.

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38. CZA A366/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting (Private)” (Geneva) 27 August 1947. In a draft Rand prepared apparently for this meeting, he stressed that territorial partition would fulfil the wishes of both Jews and Arabs for “statehood.” Economic unity in Palestine was to be administered, according to this document, by a mere “Joint Economic Board,” responsible for solving economic discords alone. He was aware of the problems facing partition, but hoped that eventually Jews and Arabs would cooperate. And even if all hopes were “vain speculations,” it would not be partition that would fail them. See MG 30E77/2: “A Commentary on Partition” n. d. 39. CZA A366/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting (Private)” 27 August 1947. 40. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 220, Geneva to SSEA 1 September 1947. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 1, pp. 47, 59, vol. 2, p. 23. For the Australian abstention, see also CO 537/2342: letter, MacGillivray to Smith 27 August 1947. The author of this letter believed that the Australian preferred to abstain in order not to commit his government in the future discussions of the issue at the General Assembly. 41. Horowitz, pp. 218–220. 42. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 220, Geneva to SSEA 1 September 1947.

CHAPTER 3 1. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 September 1947. 2. MG 26J1/429: draft letter, William L. Mackenzie King (Ottawa) to SSEA 10 November 1947. RG 2/2640: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 11 September 1947. RG 25/1054: “Statement, approved by the Cabinet on September 11, 1947, for the guidance of the Canadian delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” 3. DO 114/115 and RG 25/1048: tel. D777, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 20 September 1947. In a preceding telegram to Australia, it was also indicated that the British delegation to the second session would “look forward to close co-operation with Australia and other British Commonwealth Delegations on all aspects of Palestine question.” See FO 371/61948: tel. 569, CRO to Australia (H. C.) 28 August 1947. 4. Second Session, pp. 272, 275. Second Session—Annexes, p. 1445. 5. MG 26J13: King Diary 19 and 22 September 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. MG 26L/345: London Free Press, 26 November 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 245. 6. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Walter E. Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. MG 26L/345: Ottawa Morning Citizen, 16 September 1947. MG 32B12/139: Montreal Daily Star, 24 September 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 245. As for Evatt’s attitude toward the Palestine ques-

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tion, one may quote from his memoirs that “I regard the establishment of Israel as a great victory of the United Nations.” See: Evatt, p. 173. 7. Ad Hoc Committee, p. xix. Department of External Affairs, Canada at the United Nations 1947: Report on the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Held in New York September 16–November 29, 1947 (Ottawa, 1948), pp. 41–42. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 235. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 213. 8. RG 25/3694: Charles M. Drury to Pearson, in tels. 1296 ASDEL 137 and 1303 ASDEL 142, New York to SSEA 11 October 1947. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 45–46. 9. Creech-Jones’s speech, 26 September 1947, cited in Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 2–4; his speech may also be found in Great Britain Foreign Office, Report on the Proceedings of the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Held in New York 16th September-29th November, 1947 [Cmd. 7320] (London, 1948), pp. 56–57. Johnson’s speech, 11 October 1947, cited in Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 62–64. Tsarapkin’s speech, cited ibid., pp. 69–71. See also: RG 25/1056: Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 1297 ASDEL 138, New York to SSEA 11 October 1947. RG 25/3694: Drury to Pearson, in tel. 1303 ASDEL 142, New York to SSEA 11 October 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 46. Besides the American proposal to establish a constabulary volunteer force, there was a suggestion to form an international force of “small nations,” about which Pearson remarked that he was “glad to think that Canada was a big nation.” See: T. R. Little, “How Partition Was Adopted,” Arab News Bulletin, no. 54, 16 January 1948, p. 8. The British, for their part, were not surprised at the Soviet support of partition. It was a basic Soviet doctrine to support the independence of minorities, they claimed. Furthermore, partition would prevent both Britain and the United States from establishing bases in the region, as each state would oppose the existence of such bases in the territory of the other. It might even be that the ultimate Soviet object was to establish a communist state, at least in the region of the Jewish state, they conjectured. See FO 371/61881 and RG 25/1049: tel. D853, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 24 October 1947. 10. RG 25/1049: memo by George Ignatieff 13 October 1947, enclosed with tel. 1326 ASDEL 159, New York to SSEA 14 October 1947. It was not the first time the British tried to ascertain the Canadian position. As early as the beginning of the session, Creech-Jones approached St. Laurent with the suggestion “not to hurry” to declare support for the UNSCOP majority recommendation as any such support would just increase tension among the Arabs and undermine the ability to implement any plan eventually adopted by the General Assembly. See: Elath, vol. 2, p. 310. 11. FO 371/61791: Arthur Creech-Jones to Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in tel. 2898, UK Delegation to UN (New York) to FO 13 October 1947. RG 25/1049: memo by Ignatieff 13 October 1947, enclosed with tel. 1326 ASDEL 159, New York to SSEA 14 October 1947. At the end of the meeting Creech-Jones was very optimistic about the attitudes of the Commonwealth delegations. None of

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them would question the decision to withdraw from Palestine, he reported to London. It was generally agreed that a firm British stand would force both the United States and the United Nations to adopt a more realistic approach to the problem. (See the above telegram.) The future was to refute his suppositions. 12. DO 114/115 and RG 25/3694: tels. D822 and D823, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 15 October 1947. 13. RG 25/3694: Drury to Pearson, in tel. 1330 ASDEL 163, New York to SSEA 14 October 1947. FO 371/61881 and RG 25/5745: tel. D843, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 24 October 1947. 14. RG 25/1054: “Summary of Discussion at the Delegation Meeting,” by Drury 8 October 1947. DO 114/115 and RG 25/3694: tel. D823, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 15 October 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 236. 15. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs,” by Pearson 13 October 1947; note, “United Nations Assembly; Palestine; Canadian statement on policy” 14 October 1947. RG 2/2640: Cabinet Conclusion—Meeting 14 October 1947. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 47. 16. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on October 14, 1947 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by the Rt. Hon. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 84–86. FO 371/61882: tel. 2916, UK Delegation to UN to FO 14 October 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 17, 21 October 1947, p. 536. 17. RG 25/1049: “Note to Mr. Pearson,” by Ignatieff 16 October 1947; memo., “Legal Aspects of Action on Palestine by United Nations,” by Max H. Wershof 17 October 1947. 18. Ibid. 19. RG 25/1049: “Supplementary Memorandum Regarding Legal Aspects of Palestine Question,” by Wershof 21 October 1947. 20. RG 25/3694: “Draft Resolution on Acceptance of Basic Principles of the Unanimous Recommendations and the Majority Plan of the Special Committee on Palestine. Proposal Submitted by Sweden and the United States of America” 13 October 1947 (also in Ad Hoc Committee, p. 229); “Draft Resolution on Procedure of Ad Hoc Committee. Proposal Submitted by the United States of America” 13 October 1947 (also ibid., p. 227). RG 25/1054: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1338 ASDEL 167, New York to SSEA 15 October 1947. RG 25/1049: letter, MacCallum (New York) to Escott M. Reid (Ottawa) 16 October 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, p. 127. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 236. 21. RG 25/3694: “Amendment to the United States Draft Resolution on Procedure of Ad Hoc Committee. Proposal Submitted by the Canadian Delegation” 15 October 1947 (also in Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 227–228). RG 25/1049: letter,

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MacCallum to Reid 16 October 1947; MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1385 ASDEL 205, New York to SSEA 17 October 1947. FO 371/61883: “Note on the suggested attitude to be adopted by the United Kingdom Delegation towards various resolutions on Palestine,” by John G. S. Beith 23 October 1947. RG 25/3694: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1454 ASDEL 257, New York to SSEA 26 October 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 47. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 236. 22. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 127, 136–137. RG 25/3694: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1454 ASDEL 257, New York to SSEA 26 October 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, pp. 237–238. 23. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tels. 1347 ASDEL 175 and 1408 ASDEL 225, New York to SSEA 16 and 21 October 1947; MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1454 ASDEL 257, New York to SSEA 26 October 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 137, 139. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 238. 24. FO 371/61879: “Statement By Dr. Evatt, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine” 22 October 1947. RG 25/3694: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1454 ASDEL 257, New York to SSEA 26 October 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 19, 4 November 1947, p. 602. L. Larry Leonard, “The United Nations and Palestine,” International Conciliation, 454 (October 1949), p. 641.

CHAPTER 4 1. RG 25/3694: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1454 ASDEL 257, New York to SSEA 26 October 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 238. Leonard, p. 641. 2. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947. RG 25/1049: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Sub-Committee I—Implementation,” by MacCallum 10 November 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 47–48. Maurice Western, “Canada’s Role in the Second Assembly,” International Journal, 3:2 (Spring 1948), p. 127. Elath, vol. 2, p. 364. 3. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 4 November 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 47–48. When Pearson was afterward to criticize the American proposal publicly, St. Laurent told him that his criticism was “wise,” but cautioned him against “suggesting how these obvious and serious difficulties can be overcome, particularly as no one else seems able to prescribe.” See RG 25/1049: tel. 1301 DELAS 255, SSEA to New York 5 November 1947. 4. RG 25/1049: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Sub-Committee I—Implementation,” by MacCallum 10 November 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 48. Western, p. 127. 5. RG 25/1049: “Summary of Questions Asked by the Canadian Delegation Following the Speech of the U.S.S.R. Delegate in Subcommittee One of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question on Monday, November 3, 1947” 4 November 1947. FO 371/61886: tel. 3190, UK Delegation to UN to FO 3 November 1947.

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RG 25/1054: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1544 ASDEL 319, New York to SSEA 4 November 1947. RG 25/1049: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Sub-Committee I—Implementation,” by MacCallum 10 November 1947. 6. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 48. Elath, vol. 2, p. 371. 7. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947. RG 25/1054: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1536 ASDEL 312, New York to SSEA 3 November 1947. It should be noted that already by 27 October, before the American speech, the Canadian delegation considered the elimination of the transition period altogether. They thought then to suggest that handing over the authorities, but only this, would be arranged by the Security Council. See RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1463 ASDEL 262, New York to SSEA 27 October 1947. 8. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947, enclosed with memo, Laurent Beaudry to SSEA 3 November 1947; minute by St. L[aurent] 4 November 1947. 9. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on November 4, 1947 in Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” FO 371/61886: tel. 3206, UK Delegation to UN to FO 4 November 1947. RG 25/3694: tels. 1550 ASDEL 321 and 1551 ASDEL 322, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947. When, the next day, the New York Times described Pearson’s statement as a Canadian “plan,” the delegation hastened to cable Ottawa that it was just an “analysis” of the difficulties observed in the other proposals and no more. See RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1554 ASDEL 324, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947. 10. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on November 4, 1947 in Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 25/3694: Press Release by UN Press Division 4 November 1947. FO 371/61886: tel. 3206, UK Delegation to UN to FO 4 November 1947. RG 25/1049: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Sub-Committee I—Implementation,” by MacCallum 10 November 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 21, 18 November 1947, pp. 656–657. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 48. Western, pp. 127–128. The Americans were not happy about Pearson’s suggestion to employ the Security Council, which meant Soviet involvement. They also thought that he was too hasty to give up the trusteeship option—the difficulty of the “states directly concerned” could be solved by considering the mandatory power the only “directly concerned” state. See: letter, Gordon P. Merriam (Washington) to Fraser Wilkins 5 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1239–1240, and New York Times, 5 November 1947. 11. FO 371/61886: tel. 3206, UK Delegation to UN to FO 4 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Press Release by UN Press Division 4 November 1947; tel. 1550 ASDEL 321, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947; Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1554 ASDEL

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324, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 21, 18 November 1947, p. 657. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 48. Elath, vol. 2, p. 372. 12. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 238. Benjamin Shwadran, “The United Nations Partitions Palestine,” Palestine Affairs, 2:12 (December 1947), p. 124. Leonard, p. 641.

CHAPTER 5 1. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 48–49. Spencer, p. 145. 2. RG 25/1049: “Suggestions on implementation of the Assembly plan for the future Government of Palestine,” enclosed with letter, MacCallum to Martin (New York) 4 November 1947. FO 371/61886: tel. 3217, UK Delegation to UN to FO 5 November 1947. 3. “Memorandum of Conversation,” by Wilkins [New York] 7 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1244–1246. FO 371/61887: Cadogan, in tel. 3249, UK Delegation to UN to FO 7 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1593 ASDEL 354, New York to SSEA 8 November 1947. Granados, p. 253. Following this meeting, British Minister of State Hector McNeil reported to London that as the Commonwealth delegations awaited “a further lead from us,” it was advisable to keep at least Evatt and Pearson informed of Britain’s intentions, even if no public statements were to be made about this. See FO 371/61794: Minister of State to Foreign Secretary, in tel. 3270, UK Delegation to UN to FO 9 November 1947. 4. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947. RG 25/1054: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1590 ASDEL 352, New York to SSEA 7 November 1947. “Memorandum of Conversation,” by Wilkins 7 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 1245. FO 371/61887: Cadogan, in tel. 3249, UK Delegation to UN to FO 7 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson to E. Ross Hopkins, in tel. 1622 ASDEL 376, New York to SSEA 11 November 1947. CO 537/2351: memo, “The Palestine Question at the Second Annual Session of the General Assembly,” enclosed with letter, Harold Beeley to Martin 17 December 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 21, 18 November 1947, p. 655. Granados, p. 252. Elath, vol. 2, p. 374. Pearson promised St. Laurent that whatever kind of a commission would finally be decided upon, the delegation would decline Canadian participation (unless it included all the Security Council members). See Pearson’s first telegram above. 5. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947. FO 371/61887: tel. 3280, UK Delegation to UN to FO 8 November 1947. Western, p. 128. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 374–375. 6. Tel. 1198, Warren R. Austin (New York) to Secretary of State 11 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 1250. Elath, vol. 2, p. 375.

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7. For an analysis of the Soviet stand see: Yaacov Ro’i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel 1947–1954 (New Brunswick, 1980), pp. 94, 97. See also CO 537/2351: memo, “The Palestine Question at the Second Annual Session of the General Assembly,” enclosed with letter, Beeley to Martin 17 December 1947, and Elath, vol. 2, p. 374. 8. CZA S25/5353: “U.N.O.—Palestine” 10 November 1947. CZA A366/2: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Subcommittee 1—Working Group on Implementation” n. d. FO 371/61887: tel. 3307, UK Delegation to UN to FO 11 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1624 ASDEL 377, New York to SSEA 12 November 1947. FO 371/61888: tel. 3407, UK Delegation to UN to FO 16 November 1947. RG 25/1060: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Report of Sub-Committee 1” 19 November 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 December 1947. CO 537/2351: memo, “The Palestine Question at the Second Annual Session of the General Assembly,” enclosed with letter, Beeley to Martin 17 December 1947. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 21, 18 November 1947, pp. 655–657. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 239. Granados, pp. 253–254. Elath, vol. 2, p. 377. Shwadran, “United Nations,” p. 124. Thomas J. Hamilton, “Partition of Palestine,” Foreign Policy Reports, 23:23 (15 February 1948), p. 288. Spencer, pp. 145–146. To St. Laurent Pearson reported that his major effort was to see to it that all texts agreed and “meant the same thing to all parties and that proposals took into account realities of the situation.” See Pearson’s telegram above. 9. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947; Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1620 ASDEL 374, New York to SSEA 11 November 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 December 1947. Western, p. 128. Pearson had a better opinion of the Soviet delegate, who “had tried to be helpful.” But he was well aware that the Soviet approach was motivated by “consideration of selfish national policy alone,” rather than “a sincere attempt to secure a satisfactory solution.” See his words in the above-mentioned meeting of heads of divisions. 10. FO 371/61881 and RG 25/1049: tel. D862, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 7 November 1947. FO 371/61887: tels. 3325 and 3328, UK Delegation to UN to FO 11 and 12 November 1947; minute by Beith 13 November 1947. DO 114/115 and RG 25/5745: tels. D877 and D881, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa 12 and 14 November 1947. FO 371/61887 and RG 25/1056: tel. D894, same to same 18 November 1947. 11. FO 371/ 61887: “Statement to be made by Sir Alexander Cadogan in Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 13 November 1947; tel. 3354, UK Delegation to UN to FO 13 November 1947. DO 114/115 and RG 25/5745: tel. D881, CRO to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa 14 November 1947. Tel. 1213, Austin to Secretary of State 14 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1260–1261. RG 25/1060: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Report of Sub-Committee 1” 19 November 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 239. Granados, p. 254. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 378–379.

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12. RG 25/5745: memo by Riddell 16 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tel. 1692 ASDEL 427, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947; Pearson to Robertson, in tel. 1699 ASDEL 431, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947; Drury to AUSSEA, tel. 1706 ASDEL 435, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. Also, the Soviets, as well as other delegations, were suspicious of the British attitude, and did not believe that they could not withdraw earlier than 1 August. The Soviets also claimed that no fair elections could be held in Palestine so long as the British forces remained there. See FO 371/61888: tel. 3406, UK Delegation to UN to FO 16 November 1947. 13. MG 26N1/10: Pearson to Vincent Massey (Port Hope) 16 November 1947. FO 371/61888: tel. 3406, UK Delegation to UN to FO 16 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tel. 1692 ASDEL 427, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947; Pearson to Robertson, in tel. 1699 ASDEL 431, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947; see also tel. WA3642, Ambassador (Washington) to SSEA 19 November 1947, about Hume Wrong sharing Pearson’s opinions about the American and British attitudes. 14. RG 25/3694: Riddell to Hopkins, in tel. 1631 ASDEL 384, New York to SSEA 13 November 1947. 15. RG 25/3694: Hopkins to Riddell, in tel. 1381 DELAS 306, SSEA to New York 13 November 1947. 16. RG 25/3694: Riddell to Hopkins, in tel. 1654 ASDEL 402, New York to SSEA 14 November 1947. Hopkins raised another theoretical option, that complying with an assembly recommendation, it would be the new states to grant the commission its authority until they were able to function by themselves. But he admitted that it would be “pretty optimistic” to expect this. See RG 25/3694: Hopkins to Riddell, in tel. 1410 DELAS 326, SSEA to New York 17 November 1947. 17. FO 371/61888: tel. 3423, UK Delegation to UN to FO 17 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tels. 1708 ASDEL 437 and 1709 ASDEL 438, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947; Riddell to Hopkins, in tel. 1710 ASDEL 439, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947. RG 25/1060: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Report of Sub-Committee 1” 19 November 1947. Yearbook 1947–48, pp. 239–240. Elath, vol. 2, p. 380. 18. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tel. 1708 ASDEL 437, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947; Riddell to Hopkins, in tel. 1710 ASDEL 439, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson (Ottawa) to John W. Holmes (Moscow) 30 December 1947. Hopkins was also of the opinion that the delegation had to decide how advisable it was to pursue the legal issue. However, with regard to Johnson’s observation, he could not see how a two-thirds majority had more “juridical force” than a simple majority. See RG 25/3694: Hopkins to Riddell, in tel. 1427 DELAS 334, SSEA to New York 19 November 1947.

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CHAPTER 6 1. RG 25/1060: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Report of Sub-Committee 1” 19 November 1947. FO 371/61889: tel. 3454, UK Delegation to UN to FO 19 November 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 380. 2. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 144–147. 3. RG 25/3695: “Text of Statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, on the report of Sub-Committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, delivered in the Ad Hoc Committee” 20 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 147–148. FO 371/61889: tel. 3472, UK Delegation to UN to FO 20 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1750 ASDEL 463, New York to SSEA 21 November 1947. 4. FO 371/61889: “Text of a speech to be delivered by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question” 20 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 153–155. FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1273–1274. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 243. Evatt, p. 143. Elath, vol. 2, p. 412. 5. FO 371/61889: tel. 3471, UK Delegation to UN to FO 20 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, p. 155. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 243. 6. CZA A366/2: “Suggested Revisions in Part I of the Plan of Partition and Economic Union” 20 November 1947; “Suggested Revisions in Part I of the Plan of Partition and Economic Union Submitted by Canada” n. d. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 265–266 (the alterations accepted in the partition plan). FO 371/61889: tel. 3475, UK Delegation to UN to FO 20 November 1947. Tel. 1244, Austin to Secretary of State 21 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1276–1277. FO 371/61889: tel. 3497, UK Delegation to UN to FO 22 November 1947. 7. FO 371/61889: tel. 3490, UK Delegation to UN to FO 21 November 1947. 8. RG 25/1049: “Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, delivered in the night session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 22 November 1947. FO 371/61795: tel. 3512, UK Delegation to UN to FO 23 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, p. 159. 9. “Report of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question” 11 November 1947, cited in Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 270–307. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1755 ASDEL 467, New York to SSEA 22 November 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 42. Elath, vol. 2, p. 392. 10. RG 25/1049: “Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, delivered in the night session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 22 November 1947. FO 371/61889: tel. 3510, UK Delegation to UN to FO 23 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 166–167, 203–206. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 42–43. 11. RG 25/1060: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Amendment to Report of Sub-Committee I, Submitted by the Delegation of Canada” 24 November 1947. RG 25/3694: “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question” 25 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 212–213. 12. CZA S25/5465: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Amendments to Report of Sub-Committee I, Submitted by the Delegation of

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the Netherlands” 22 November 1947 (also in Ad Hoc Committee, p. 267). Ibid., p. 220. 13. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1759 ASDEL 469, New York to SSEA 22 November 1947. Hamilton, p. 292. 14. CZA S25/5465: “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Amendment to the Draft Resolution Proposed by Sub-Committee 1, Submitted by the Delegation of Denmark” 24 November 1947, and “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question—Revised Version of the Amendment to the Draft Resolution Proposed by Sub-Committee 1, Submitted by the Delegation of Denmark” 25 November 1947 (also in Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 266–267). FO 371/61890: tel. 3538, UK Delegation to UN to FO 25 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 220–222. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 23, 2 December 1947, p. 743. New York Times, 26 November 1947. The Soviets abstained in the vote, protesting that the Danes had also mentioned the Trusteeship Council as an option for handling the Palestine situation during the transition period. As the Trusteeship Council was not mentioned in the recommendations of the working group, and since the Soviets were boycotting it in those days, they conceived the American support of this, without first consulting them, as a conspiracy. Still, getting the British out of Palestine was apparently too important for them to risk the entire settlement by an objection. (Also Pearson and Granados were angry with the Americans about this.) See: Elath, vol. 2, pp. 416–418. One who ardently objected to the amendment was Zafrullah Khan, who considered it “adding zero to zero and pretending that the result was positive.” See: Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 23, 2 December 1947, p. 743. 15. RG 25/3694: “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question” 25 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 222–223. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 43. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 245. Elath, vol. 2, p. 423. 16. RG 25/3694: letter, James L. Ilsley (Lake Success) to St. Laurent 19 November 1947. 17. RG 25/3694: memo by Reid to SSEA 21 November 1947; minute by St. Laurent 22 November 1947; Reid to Pearson, in tels. 1453 DELAS 355 and 1458 DELAS 358, SSEA to New York 21 and 22 November 1947. Bercuson, Canada, p. 128. 18. RG 25/3694: Pearson to SSEA, in tel. 1763 ASDEL 471, New York to SSEA 22 November 1947; Wrong to Reid, in tel. WA3673, Ambassador (Washington) to SSEA 22 November 1947. Pearson brought up the idea of having the commission composed of only the United States, the Soviet Union, and a third, “neutral” state. He privately consulted with the British about this and procured a firm Foreign Office response that any proposal involving the Soviets in the Palestine commission was “most undesirable.” See FO 371/61889: tel. 3518, UK Delegation to UN to FO 24 November 1947; tel. 4073, FO to UK Delegation to UN 24 November 1947. 19. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs—Palestine,” by Reid 24 November 1947.

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20. RG 2/2641: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 25 November 1947. Second Session, p. 1428. 21. RG 25/1049: memo, “The Plan of Partition for Palestine,” by Riddell 21 November 1947. 22. RG 25/1049: Riddell to Jake H. Warren, in tel. 1746 ASDEL 461, New York to SSEA 21 November 1947, enclosing memo, “The Plan of Partition for Palestine,” by Riddell 21 November 1947. 23. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations” (also in Second Session, pp. 1317–1320). FO 371/61890: tel. 3553, UK Delegation to UN to FO 27 November 1947. Second Session, pp. 1311–1312. Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 24, 9 December 1947, p. 774. 24. Second Session, pp. 1368–1369. 25. FO 371/61890: “Votes of Commonwealth Countries on Palestine” 24 November 1947, and minute 25 November 1947. King left Britain on 26 November by sea and reached Ottawa only by 4 December. 26. FO 371/61795: tel. 4125, FO to UK Delegation to UN 27 November 1947. 27. RG 25/3694: Sidney A. Freifeld to Pearson, in tels. FALEO7 and FALEO8, Information Division (New York) to SSEA 28 November 1947. Second Session, p. 1410. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 43. 28. Second Session, pp. 1424–1425. “Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question,” Second Session—Resolutions, pp. 131–150, including “181 (II). Future government of Palestine” 29 November 1947, ibid., pp. 131–132, and “Plan of Partition with Economic Union,” ibid., pp. 132–150. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 43. Yearbook 1947–48, p. 247.

CHAPTER 7 1. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Ignatieff is cited in Peter Stursberg, Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma (Toronto, 1980), p. 69. 2. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for Mr. St. Laurent,” by Pearson 19 April 1947; “Memorandum for File,” by MacCallum 25 April 1947. Spencer, p. 143, citing the Montreal Star, 28 April 1947. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 3. RG 25/4218: Riddell to Wrong, in tel. 1172, SSEA to Ambassador (Washington) 3 May 1947. RG 2/264O: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 11 September 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. 4. RG 25/1054: “Statement, approved by the Cabinet on September 11, 1947, for the guidance of the Canadian delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 2/264O: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 14 October 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on November 4, 1947 in

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Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947. RG 2/2641: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 25 November 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 47, 50. 5. RG 25/3694: tel. 1550 ASDEL 321, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947; Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947; Pearson, in tel. 1708 ASDEL 437, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 49. Report of the Secretary of State, p. 11. Western, p. 127. Hamilton, p. 292. 6. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947; Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947; tel. 1620 ASDEL 374, New York to SSEA 11 November 1947. RG 25/1049: “Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, delivered in the night session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 22 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Robertson 30 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 49–50. Hamilton. p. 292. Little, p. 8. Following the same logic concerning the responsibility of the superpowers, Ottawa at first opposed the idea that the superpowers would not participate in UNSCOP. The superpowers had not to be given the opportunity “to evade their responsibility” with this regard. See FO 371/61773: letter, Robertson to Machtig 19 April 1947. 7. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 45, 50. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 214. Spencer, p. 145. Cf. also Ilsley’s words in his closing speech: “of all the solutions proposed, Partition alone has received the support of the two greatest world powers.” RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” 8. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. “Some Principles of Canadian Foreign Policy,” a speech by Pearson, January 1948, cited in Lester B. Pearson, Words and Occasions (Toronto, 1970), pp. 70–71. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 214. Spencer, p. 97. John English, Shadow of Heaven: The Life of Lester Pearson (Toronto, 1989), vol. 1, pp. 324–325. For Wrong’s opinion that the relations

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with Britain and the United States were more important than the Palestine problem, see RG 25/3694: Wrong to Reid, in tel. WA3673, Ambassador (Washington) to SSEA 22 November 1947. 9. RG 25/3694: tel. 1551 ASDEL 322, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947. RG 2/2641: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 25 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 49. Gwendolen M. Carter, “The Commonwealth in the United Nations,” International Organization, 4:2 (May 1950), pp. 256–257. Spencer, p. 145. 10. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for File,” by MacCallum 25 April 1947. First Special Session, vol. 3, p. 2. MG 26J13: King Diary 19 May 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on November 4, 1947 in Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947; Pearson, in tel. 1692 ASDEL 427, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, p. 50. English, vol. 1, p. 325. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 11. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Robertson 30 December 1947. Debates 1948, vol. 4, p. 3445. 12. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Robertson 30 December 1947; “Memorandum for Mr. St. Laurent,” by Riddell 3 January 1948. 13. DEA, Canada at the UN 1947, pp. 45–50. Also in the annual report of the secretary of state for the year 1947, actually prepared by Pearson, Canada’s role was summarized in: “Canada, concerned to see that there should be a proper juridical basis for the partition plan and that sufficient authority should be provided for its implementation, was instrumental in resolving a number of differences between the Great Powers directly interested in this question.” See: Report of the Secretary of State, p. 11. 14. ISA 93.03/2269/21: memo, “Re: Special Committee on Palestine,” by M. Kahany (New York) to Executive of the Jewish Agency 4 June 1947. CZA S100/51: protocol of plenary meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Jerusalem) 15 June 1947, p. 12301. CZA S25/5991: letter, Moshe [Shertok] to Golda [Myerson] 7 September 1947. Horowitz, pp. 170, 225. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, pp. 18–19. 15. FO 371/61876: MacGillivray to Martin, in tel. 1162, UK Delegation (Geneva) to FO 31 July 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Minute of a Conversation between Mr. Radak and Mr. Rand” 11 August 1947. MG 31H91: letter, Rand [to Jesse Schwartz (Montreal)] 13 November 1947. Granados, pp. 233–234. Horowitz, pp. 187, 200. Also the British opinion of Rand was not of the best. “Disappointing,” said MacGillivray of the Palestine government, “too impulsive in his decisions, too downright and with little diplomatic sense,” “the principal stumbling block,” “determined and dogmatic.” CO 537/2338/1: letter, MacGillivray (Jerusa-

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lem) to Martin 7 July 1947. CO 537/2342: letter, MacGillivray (Geneva) to Smith 27 August 1947. 16. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 19 August 1947. CZA A366/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting (Private)” 27 August 1947. CZA S25/5991: “Zionist Public Relations and the Inquiry Committee Report—The Need for Immediate Action,” by Gelber 3 September 1947. Horowitz, p. 215. 17. Granados, pp. 236, 238. Horowitz, pp. 218–220. 18. CZA S25/5374: letter, Triffon to Shertok 3 July 1947. CO 537/2338/2: Release no. 25, by Information Officer, UNSCOP (Jerusalem) 8 July 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Pitfalls in Rand’s Project” n. d. CZA S25/3965: letter, Kohn to Myerson 18 August 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Meeting of UNSCOP” 18 August 1947. Granados, pp. 57, 60. Also the British felt that Rand was leaving too many authorities with the central authority—Ralph Bunche had to say about it that “It is useless to propose granting independence with one hand and taking it away with the other.” See CO 537/2342: letter, MacGillivray to Smith 27 August 1947, about the British opinion, and Jones, p. 275, about Bunche’s. 19. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 220, Geneva to SSEA 1 September 1947. Horowitz, p. 225. CZA S25/5991: “Zionist Public Relations and the Inquiry Committee Report—The Need for Immediate Action,” by Gelber 3 September 1947. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “The Canadian Government and the Majority Proposals: Recent Developments,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Jewish Agency Executive 11 September 1947. 20. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “Further Conversation about Mr. Justice Rand,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 16 July 1947. MG 32B12/139: Montreal Daily Star, 24 September 1947. MG 26J4/310: “Memorandum for the Prime Minister,” by Pearson 17 February 1948. Horowitz, p. 162. 21. MG 26J1/428: letter, Rand (New York) to Prime Minister 8 June 1947. Bercuson, “Serving,” p. 14. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 68 (Hillmer interviewed MacCallum). 22. FO 371/61773: tel. 472, Canada (H. C.) to DO 24 May 1947. MG 30E77/7: I. C. Rand, “Louis D. Brandeis,” The Canadian Bar Review, 25 (March 1947), pp. 240–250. CZA S25/5374: letter, Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Conversation between Justice Rand and D. Horowitz” 6 August 1947. Horowitz, pp. 162, 167. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 187, 195. Bernard Figler, “History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada,” in Eli Gottesman (ed.), Canadian Jewish Reference Book and Directory 1963 (Montreal, 1963), p. 92.

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23. MG 30E77/7: a speech by Rand n. d. (probably 4 May 1949). MG 31H91: letter, Rand to Schwartz 14 October 1955. Horowitz, pp. 167, 169–170, 177, 186. Elath, vol. 2, p. 195. 24. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Conversation between Justice Rand and D. Horowitz” 6 August 1947. Horowitz, pp. 168–169. Elath, vol. 2, p. 195. 25. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum by Mr. Rand” n. d. ISA 93.03/2270/1: “Minutes of UNSCOP’s private meetings” 7 August 1947; “Meeting of UNSCOP” 19 August 1947. CZA A366/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting (Private)” 27 August 1947. MG 30E77/2: “A Commentary on Partition” n. d. UNSCOP, Report, vol. 3, pp. 184, 186. 26. CZA S25/5374: letter, Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. CZA A366/2: “Special Committee on Palestine—Verbatim Record of the Forty-Sixth Meeting (Private)” 27 August 1947. MG 30E77/7: a speech by Rand n. d. (probably 4 May 1949). Horowitz, pp. 167–168, 200. 27. ISA 93.03/2266/24: letter, Rand to Horowitz (New York) 9 December 1947. MG 30E77/7: a speech by Rand n. d. (probably 4 May 1949). MG 30E77/6: letter, Lawrence Freiman (Ottawa) to Rand 6 December 1949; letter, Allan Bronfman (Montreal) to Rand 18 November 1965. 28. MG 31H91: letter, Rand to Schwartz 5 June 1952. MG 30E77/2: “Canada Salutes the State of Israel,” by Canadian Committee for Israel’s 10th Anniversary Celebration (Montreal) [1958]. Figler, p. 93. 29. RG 25/4171: despatch 227, Mayrand (Moscow) to SSEA 14 May 1945. CZA Z5/487II: letter, Mayrand (New York) to Gelber 30 May 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter, Gelber to Officers of the Jewish Agency Attached to the Committee of Inquiry 5 June 1947. CZA S25/5375: letter, Tshernovitz to Eitan 27 June 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter, Triffon to Shertok 3 July 1947. Bercuson, Canada, p. 99. 30. RG 25/3694: Mayrand to Ignatieff, in tel. 1069, Mayrand (Ottawa) to New York 8 October 1947; memo, “Note on the present Palestine Situation at the United Nations Assembly,” by Mayrand 10 October 1947. Mayrand later contacted Horowitz asking him for information on the Jewish forces in Palestine. As it was a few days after the adoption of the partition resolution by the General Assembly, he concluded his letter by “I imagine that the definite prospects of a Jewish State will now refresh your enthusiasm and energy.” See ISA 93.03/2266/24: letter, Mayrand to Horowitz 9 December 1947. 31. DO 127/70: letter, Alec Clutterbuck (Ottawa) to Machtig 8 October 1947. MG 26J13: King Diary 3 December 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Batshaw (Montreal) 17 July 1980. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 212. Escott Reid, Radical Mandarin: The Memoirs of Escott Reid (Toronto, 1989), p. 252 (Reid was the official rebuked by King). English, vol. 1, p. 324. Geoffrey A. H. Pearson, Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson and Crisis Diplomacy (Ottawa, 1993), p. 24. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, pp. 13, 16.

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32. DO 127/70: letter, Clutterbuck to Machtig 8 October 1947. MG 26J13: King Diary 6 December 1947 (also in J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, Toronto, 1970, vol. 4, p. 121). 33. MG 26J13: King Diary 16 and 19 May and 6 December 1947 (the latter also in Pickersgill and Forster, vol. 4, p. 121). FO 371/67587A: “United Nations Palestine Assembly,” by Hadow 17 May 1947, enclosed with letter 29/12/47, Hadow to Gore-Booth 17 May 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. Debates 1947, vol. 4, pp. 3512–3513. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, pp. 17–18. 34. RG 25/1054: “Statement, approved by the Cabinet on September 11, 1947, for the guidance of the Canadian delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” MG 26J13: King Diary 19 September 1947. 35. MG 26J13: King Diary 19 and 22 September 1947. See also CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. 36. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. MG 26L/345: Ottawa Morning Citizen, 16 September 1947. MG 32B12/139: Montreal Daily Star, 24 September 1947. MG 26J13: King Diary 22 and 25 September 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 245. The arguments for preventing Pearson from becoming chairman failed also to convince a Jewish representative, who noted that it was “absurd for them to suggest that the Department of External Affairs cannot get on without him.” See CZA Z5/487I: letter, Gelber to Batshaw 12 November 1947. 37. MG 26J13: King Diary 6 December 1947 and 5 February 1948 (also in Pickersgill and Forster, vol. 4, pp. 121, 157–158, respectively). Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 215. 38. Memo, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive 29 January 1948, cited in State of Israel, Israel State Archives, and World Zionist Organization, Central Zionist Archives, Political and Diplomatic Documents, December 1947–May 1948 (Jerusalem, 1979), p. 264. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. English, vol. 1, p. 325. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 39. Pickersgill and Forster, vol. 4, p. 161. Reid, pp. 252–253. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 40. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Paul Martin (London) 2 August 1979. George Ignatieff, The Making of a Peacemonger (Toronto, 1985), p. 103. Elath, vol. 2, p. 310. Bercuson, Canada, p. 113. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 16. Judge Harry Batshaw, a Canadian Zionist, also estimated that St. Laurent

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supported Zionism. See JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Batshaw 17 July 1980. Eliahu Epstein, then director of the Washington office of the Jewish Agency, assessed, on the other hand, that St. Laurent’s personal attitude toward Zionism was colder and more reserved than Pearson’s. See: Elath, vol. 2, p. 310. 41. Pearson, Seize the Day, p. 23. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for File,” by MacCallum 25 April 1947; “Memorandum to Mr. Beaudry [and] Mr. Reid,” by Riddell 3 May 1947; Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 443, SSEA to New York 7 May 1947; “Note for Mr. Beaudry,” by Riddell 9 May 1947. 42. RG 25/3694: minute by St. L[aurent] 4 November 1947. RG 25/1049: tel. 1301 DELAS 255, SSEA to New York 5 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Reid to Pearson, in tel. 1458 DELAS 358, SSEA to New York 22 November 1947; “Memorandum for the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs—Palestine,” by Reid 24 November 1947. MG 26L/18: letter, [St. Laurent] to Edouard Rinfret (Montreal) 25 November 1947. 43. RG 25/4218: Pearson, in tel. 579 ASDEL 26, New York to SSEA 15 May 1947. RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1554 ASDEL 324, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947; Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947. 44. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947; “Memorandum for the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs—Palestine,” by Reid 24 November 1947. It is interesting to note that the Canadian delegation also related to a Jewish representative “that Pearson’s latest activities had to be personal ones because of objections in Ottawa.” See CZA Z5/487I: letter, Gelber to Batshaw 12 November 1947. 45. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947; Beaudry to Pearson, in tel. 1356 DELAS 291, SSEA to New York 10 November 1947. 46. RG 25/3694: letter, Ilsley to St. Laurent 19 November 1947. RG 2/2641: Cabinet Conclusions—Meeting 25 November 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Martin 2 August 1979. 47. Debates 1948, vol. 4, p. 3445. 48. MG 26L/290: “Address by Rt. Hon. Louis S. St-Laurent, M.P., Prime Minister of Canada to the Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal” 19 October 1956. See also: Figler, p. 93. 49. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 212. Stursberg, p. 72. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for Mr. St. Laurent,” by Pearson 19 April 1947; “Memorandum for File,” by MacCallum 25 April 1947. First Special Session, vol. 2, pp. 118–119. Elath, vol. 2, p. 102. When he was awarded an honorary fellowship by the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, Israel, in 1968, Pearson said about his unexpected involvement in the Palestine problem: “Through the accident of diplomatic circumstances, I was closely associated with the final stages of those dramatic and historic developments at the United Nations.” See WIA: “Address by the Hon. Lester Bowles Pearson at the Ceremony of Honorary Fellowship conferred on him by the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot” 3 December 1968.

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50. MG 26N1/10: Pearson to Massey 16 November 1947. English, vol. 1, pp. 325–326, citing “Memo from New York,” by Bruce Hutchison 15 November 1947. 51. RG 25/1049: “Suggestions on implementation of the Assembly plan for the future Government of Palestine,” enclosed with letter, MacCallum to Martin 4 November 1947. RG 25/3694: tel. 1551 ASDEL 322, New York to SSEA 5 November 1947. FO 371/61886: tel. 3217, UK Delegation to UN to FO 5 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tel. 1708 ASDEL 437, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Holmes 30 December 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 372. Hamilton, p. 292. 52. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tels. 1599 ASDEL 360 and 1624 ASDEL 377, New York to SSEA 10 and 12 November 1947. CO 537/2351: memo, “The Palestine Question at the Second Annual Session of the General Assembly,” enclosed with letter, Beeley to Martin 17 December 1947. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 372–374. Western, p. 128. Spencer, pp. 145–146. While Pearson suspected the Soviet readiness to support partition, and was sure that the Soviets wanted to profit from the situation—a communist state in Palestine? he wondered—he still remarked that “taken at its face value,” there was no proof of “a deliberately obstructive or anarchic policy” on their part. Talking with Jewish Agency representatives about the Soviet approach, he said that even if it was too early to assess Soviet motivation, it was still very important for partition due to the uniqueness of this East-West harmony involved. See MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Holmes 30 December 1947. Elath, vol. 2, p. 289. Bercuson, Canada, p. 124. 53. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 December 1947. New York Times, 11 November 1947. RG 25/3694: Pearson, in tels. 1708 ASDEL 437 and 1709 ASDEL 438, New York to SSEA 18 November 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of Statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, on the report of Sub-Committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, delivered in the Ad Hoc Committee” 20 November 1947. Tel. 1244, Austin to Secretary of State 21 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, p. 1276. RG 25/1049: “Text of Statement by Lester B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, delivered in the night session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 22 November 1947. Ad Hoc Committee, p. 147. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 380, 413. Spencer, p. 147. 54. FO 371/67586: minute 2 May 1947. FO 371/67587A: letter 29/12/47, Hadow to Gore-Booth 17 May 1947. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 123–124. For documents delivered to the British, see, e.g., RG 25/1049: letter, MacCallum to Martin 4 November 1947, and FO 371/61888: tel. 3406, UK Delegation to UN to FO 16 November 1947. For Pearson’s meetings with the British, see, e.g., “Memorandum of Conversation,” by Wilkins 7 November 1947, cited in FRUS 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1244–1245, RG 25/3694: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1593 ASDEL 354, New York to SSEA 8 November 1947, RG 25/5745: memo by Riddell 16 November 1947, and Elath, vol. 2, p. 371.

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55. RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1599 ASDEL 360, New York to SSEA 10 November 1947; Pearson, in tel. 1692 ASDEL 427, New York to SSEA 17 November 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 December 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Robertson 30 December 1947. The British, for their part, insisted that “far from obstructing the work of the Assembly or, as has been suggested, taking a special delight in refusing all cooperation,” they in fact clarified their position as early as possible. It was only that the other delegations “appeared resolutely to disregard the declared attitude of HMG,” and as a result the British delegation had to interfere in the discussions “so frequently.” They did not intend to cause any difficulties, but just to indicate that the plans discussed in the assembly were “inconsistent” with the declared intentions of Britain. See CO 537/2351: “Brief for S of S for Debate—Action at the General Assembly (September to November, 1947)” 11 December 1947. 56. MG 32B50/4: letter, Pearson to Robertson 30 December 1947. MG 26J4/310: “The Policy in Regard to Palestine of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly” 27 December 1947. One should note though, with regard to Pearson’s attitude to the British, that in a meeting with Jewish Agency representatives he told them that the Jews had already won a moral victory by the fact that most of the Commonwealth states (excluding Muslim Pakistan and India) did not back the British approach to the problem. See: Elath, vol. 2, pp. 289–290. It seems that at least with regard to Pearson, the British were right when they later asserted that the dominions were not influenced by them at all concerning partition, “one way or the other.” See FO 371/61893: letter, G. E. B. Shannon (CRO) to B. A. B. Burrows (FO) 15 December 1947. 57. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 214. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. English, vol. 1, pp. 323–324. Horowitz, p. 280. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 58. RG 25/3694: letter, Rand to Pearson 12 September 1947, enclosing “Memorandum by Mr. Rand.” RG 25/1054: “Memorandum for Mr. Riddell,” by Pearson 7 October 1947. “Some Principles of Canadian Foreign Policy,” a speech by Pearson, January 1948, cited in Pearson, Words, p. 71. MG 26N9/2: a speech by Pearson 16 May 1949. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Martin 2 August 1979; interview with Batshaw 17 July 1980. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 212. Elath, vol. 2, p. 290. 59. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 213. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. 60. RG 25/3034: despatch 2730, Embassy (Washington) to SSEA 5 December 1944, enclosing report by Executive Office of the President—War Refugee Board, “German Extermination Camps—Auschwitz and Birkenau.” RG 25/3694: letter, Pearson to Saul Hayes (Montreal) 30 December 1947. JPL, Israel—Pearson, Lester B.: “Israel’s Answer to Racial Persecution—A speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr L. B. Pearson, delivered at a meeting of the Jewish community of Toronto” 1 June 1952. MG 26N9/7: “Statement by the President of the United

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Nations General Assembly in Connection with the Radio Programme of the American Zionist Council—Celebration of the Fifth Anniversary of Israel’s Declaration of Independence” 19 April 1953. English, vol. 1, p. 324. 61. RG 25/4218: “Memorandum for Mr. St. Laurent,” by Pearson 19 April 1947; letter, Hugh L. Keenleyside (Department of Mines and Resources) to Pearson 29 April 1947, including table of Jewish immigration into Canada for the period 1 April 1933 to 31 March 1947. English, vol. 1, p. 324. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 17. Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933–1948 (New York, 1983), p. 278, citing Liberty, 12 February 1947, note that there were those in Canada who became concerned about the potential need to absorb Jewish refugees in Canada in case they were not admitted to Palestine, which might create problems with Quebec, reluctant to admit immigrants of a different persuasion. 62. RG 25/1048: tel. 1275 ASDEL 120, New York to SSEA 9 October 1947, and draft. RG 76/444: letter, Pearson to Director of Immigration (Department of Mines and Resources) 11 October 1947. RG 25/3694: tel. 1125 DELAS 133, SSEA to New York 16 October 1947. RG 76/444: letter, A. L. Jolliffe (Immigration Branch) to USSEA 30 October 1947. RG 25/1049: tel. 1338 DELAS 281, SSEA to New York 8 November 1947. In an article published in 1948, Keenleyside tried to prove that Canada “has admitted more D.P.’s than all other non-European countries combined.” See: Hugh L. Keenleyside, “Canadian Immigration Policy,” International Journal, 3:3 (Summer 1948), pp. 234–235. While not very convincing, and referring more to future possibilities of immigration absorption, it was anyhow no more relevant to the Jewish refugees, as at this stage another state was already available for absorbing them: Israel. 63. RG 25/3695: “Text of Statement by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Representative of Canada, on the report of Sub-Committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, delivered in the Ad Hoc Committee” 20 November 1947. Pearson also showed interest in the plight of the Jewish children interned by the British in Cyprus. It seems that he was touched by a letter he received from Toronto about these children, survivors of Nazi camps. He agreed that only by returning them to normal conditions could the impact of their sufferings be removed, and expressed his conviction that the United Nations commission would enable their rehabilitation. See RG 25/3694: letter, Pearson to Helen E. Coleman (Toronto) 8 December 1947. 64. MG 26N9/2: a speech by Pearson 16 May 1949. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, pp. 214, 217. 65. RG 25/3694: tel. 1525 ASDEL 304, New York to SSEA 2 November 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on November 4, 1947 in Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 25/3694: Pearson to St. Laurent, in tel. 1566 ASDEL 333, New York to SSEA 6 November 1947. RG 25/3814: “Meeting of Heads of Divisions,” by DEA 2 December 1947.

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66. Spencer, p. 147. MG 26N9/2: a speech by Pearson 16 May 1949. Stursberg, p. 71 (the “Rabbi Pearson” reference). 67. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. Bercuson, Canada, p. 112, citing MacCallum. Bercuson, “Serving,” p. 15. 68. RG 25/1049: Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 1316 ASDEL 150, New York to SSEA 13 October 1947. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs,” by Pearson 13 October 1947. RG 25/1049: memo, “The Plan of Partition for Palestine,” by Riddell 21 November 1947. Memo, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive 29 January 1948, cited in Israel, Documents, p. 265. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980; interview with Ignatieff (Toronto) 24 November 1980. 69. RG 25/3694: Riddell to Hopkins, in tel. 1654 ASDEL 402, New York to SSEA 14 November 1947. RG 25/1049: memo, “The Plan of Partition for Palestine,” by Riddell 21 November 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980; interview with Ignatieff 24 November 1980. 70. RG 25/3831: tel. FLOTT36, Freifeld to S. F. Rae (DEA) 28 November 1947 (transmitting a talk by Riddell to the Trans-Canada Network of the Canadian Broadcast Corporation 27 November 1947). One should mention in this regard also Riddell’s participation in the memorandum he and Pearson prepared toward the end of the year to justify their policy with regard to Palestine. 71. Ignatieff, p. 102. Stursberg, p. 69. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Ignatieff 24 November 1980. 72. Ignatieff, pp. 102–103. Stursberg, p. 71. CZA Z5/485II: memo., Gelber to Members of the American Section, Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 16 July 1947. 73. Memo, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive 29 January 1948, cited in Israel, Documents, pp. 262–263. Third Session, Part II, p. 317. 74. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. RG 25/4171: note by E. R. H[opkins] n. d. [May 1945]. RG 25/3034: letter, Hopkins (Secretary, War Crimes Advisory Committee) to Sonia Roskes (Montreal) 15 June 1945. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Martin 2 August 1979. 75. CZA Z5/471: “Confidential Memorandum from H. A. Mowat” 25 September 1947. RG 25/1049: memo by Ignatieff 13 October 1947, enclosed with tel. 1326 ASDEL 159, New York to SSEA 14 October 1947. RG 25/3694: Drury to Pearson, in tel. 1330 ASDEL 163, New York to SSEA 14 October 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980; interview with Ignatieff 24 November 1980. Ignatieff, p. 103. Stursberg, p. 70. English, vol. 1, p. 325. Bercuson, Canada, p. 111. For Ilsley’s biography until 1947 see: Weekly Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 18, 28 October 1947, p. 561. 76. RG 25/1049: Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 1316 ASDEL 150, New York to SSEA 13 October 1947. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Secretary of State for Exter-

Notes

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nal Affairs,” by Pearson 13 October 1947. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. RG 25/3694: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1401 ASDEL 219, New York to SSEA 21 October 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. 77. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement made on October 14, 1947 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, by the Rt. Hon. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” RG 25/3694: letter, Ilsley to St. Laurent 19 November 1947. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” After his October speech Ilsley was temporarily recalled to Ottawa. Pearson “engineered” it, MacCallum claimed, so that he would be able to replace him as the delegation’s acting head. See: Hillmer, “Here I Am,” p. 130, based on an interview with MacCallum 22 February 1977. 78. RG 25/3695: “Text of a Statement on Palestine made in Plenary Session on November 26, 1947, by Mr. J. L. Ilsley, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Bercuson, Canada, p. 111. 79. Elizabeth P. MacCallum, The Nationalist Crusade in Syria (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1928). Anne Trowell Hillmer, “A Remembrance: Elizabeth Pauline MacCallum,” Bout de papier, 3:2 (1985), pp. 14–15. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Batshaw 17 July 1980; interview with Ignatieff 24 November 1980. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 17. Bercuson, Canada, pp. 23, 113. Idem, “Serving,” p. 12. For more about MacCallum, see Eliezer Tauber, “Elizabeth P. MacCallum and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Journal of Israeli History, 19:2 (1998), pp. 93–107. 80. RG 25/1054: “Note for Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Carter, Major Clarkson, Mr. Grande, Mr. Williams, Miss MacCallum,” by Drury 6 October 1947; “Memorandum for Mr. Riddell,” by Pearson 7 October 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. 81. RG 25/1049: Riddell to Pearson, in tels. 1316 ASDEL 150 and 1319 ASDEL 153, New York to SSEA 13 October 1947 (the second included a “comment” by MacCallum). RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Secretary of State for External Affairs,” by Pearson 13 October 1947. Also in a report to Ilsley about a meeting she had with some “authorities” on the Middle East, MacCallum stressed that all had agreed that UNSCOP’s plan was unfeasible without the consent of both sides, and that eventually the extremists of both sides would seize power. This would cause “a serious deterioration of the position of the Jews elsewhere in the world.” See RG 25/5745: “Note for Mr. Ilsley,” by MacCallum 3 October 1947. 82. RG 25/1049: letter, MacCallum to Reid 16 October 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/2: “Text of Statement of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, Former President of the Jewish Agency, Before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question” 18 October 1947. RG 25/3694 and ISA 93.03/2266/24: letter, Pearson to Shertok (New York) 19 October 1947. RG 25/1049: letter, Shertok to Pearson 20 October 1947. RG 25/3694: letter, MacCallum to Reid 20 October 1947; tel. 1399 ASDEL 217, New

148

Notes

York to SSEA 20 October 1947; MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1401 ASDEL 219, New York to SSEA 21 October 1947. Hillmer, “Here I Am,” p. 142. 83. RG 25/1049: “Note for Mr. Mayrand,” by MacCallum 2 November 1947. RG 25/1054: Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1536 ASDEL 312, New York to SSEA 3 November 1947. 84. RG 25/1056: Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 1297 ASDEL 138, New York to SSEA 11 October 1947. RG 25/1049: MacCallum to Reid, in tel. 1385 ASDEL 205, New York to SSEA 17 October 1947. RG 25/5745: “Conversation with Mr. Harold Beeley at Lunch November 15, 1947,” by MacCallum 19 November 1947. 85. RG 25/3694: “Note for Mr. Ilsley—Palestine,” by MacCallum 2 October 1947. RG 25/1049: Riddell to Pearson, in tel. 1319 ASDEL 153, New York to SSEA 13 October 1947, including a “comment” by MacCallum. Bercuson, Canada, p. 113. 86. RG 25/3831: “Memorandum for Mr. Pearson—World Committee for Palestine,” by MacCallum 12 June 1947. CZA Z5/487I: letter, Batshaw to Gelber 18 September 1947. Horowitz, p. 280. Cf. also Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 19: “For every persuasive, well-written brief the Zionists presented to officials in External Affairs, she [MacCallum] prepared a detailed, convincing counter-balancing memorandum on the subject.” 87. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. 88. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. One should not conclude though that Harris was pro-Arab, like MacCallum was. When reporting in his diary on a reception on behalf of the Arab League he had attended, he noted that on such occasions it was not desirable to talk too much to any lady, as she might “happen to ‘belong’ to an Arab.” 89. Ibid.; letter, Harris (Ottawa) to Branch no. 97, Canadian Legion (Montreal) 12 December 1947. 90. MG 32B50/4: “Memo of Trip to Canadian Delegation to the United Nations,” [by Harris] 15 September-15 October 1947. Debates 1947, vol. 4, pp. 3512–3513.

CHAPTER 8 1. RG 25/1048: Wrong to Pearson, in tel. WA1245, Ambassador (Washington) to SSEA 23 April 1947. 2. CZA Z5/456II: “Chart—Diplomatic Interviews” n. d. CZA L35/72: letter, Eliahu Epstein (Washington) to Batshaw 20 May 1947. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 69–70. 3. CZA Z5/487II: letter, Mayrand (New York) to Gelber 30 May 1947. CZA S25/5374: letter of invitation, Head of Political Department of the Jewish Agency to Rand 29 June 1947; letter of invitation, Eban to Rand 29 June 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/12: letter, Horowitz to Rand (Geneva) 26 August 1947. Horowitz, pp. 167, 169–170, 176. Elath, vol. 2, p. 186. Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York, 1977), p. 83.

Notes

149

4. CZA S25/5970: “Conversation with Mr. Rand” 12 August 1947; “Talks about Jerusalem,” by D. H[orowitz] 19 August 1947. ISA 93.03/2270/12: “Note on Jerusalem,” enclosed with letter, Horowitz to Rand 19 August 1947; note, “The Economic Viability of the Arab State in Part of Palestine,” enclosed with letter, same to same 20 August 1947. CZA S25/5991: letter, Moshe [Shertok] to Golda [Myerson] 7 September 1947. Horowitz, pp. 218–220. 5. CZA Z5/487I: letter, Gelber to Batshaw 12 November 1947. Memo, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive 29 January 1948, cited in Israel, Documents, pp. 264–265. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980; interview with Ignatieff 24 November 1980. Ignatieff, p. 102. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 203, 289–290, 381. Stursberg, pp. 69, 71–72. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 175. Also Samuel Zacks, the president of the United Zionist Council of Canada, kept in constant contact with the Canadian delegation, as did his vice, Judge Harry Batshaw. The latter actually talked with MacCallum for an hour. See CZA Z5/487I: letter, Batshaw to Gelber 18 September 1947, and Kay, Canada, p. 119. 6. RG 25/3694: Drury to Pearson, in tel. 1281 ASDEL 125, New York to SSEA 9 October 1947; letter, Gelber to Ignatieff 20 October 1947, enclosing memo, “The Powers of the General Assembly of the U.N. to Assume Responsibilities in regard to the Implementation of a Recommendation for the Solution of the Palestinian Question”; Drury to AUSSEA, in tel. 1724 ASDEL 447, New York to SSEA 19 November 1947. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 376, 392. 7. ISA 93.03/2266/24: letter, Samuel J. Zacks and Ellsworth Flavelle (Toronto) to St. Laurent 17 April 1947. 8. RG 25/3694: “Statement Issued by United Zionist Council of Canada,” by Zacks 5 September 1947. MG 26J2/498: letter, Zacks to King 14 September 1947; letter, G. J. Matte (Ottawa) to Zacks 18 September 1947. CJC, BA/1: “Minutes of the Meeting of the National Executive Committee” 21 September 1947. CJC, FA2–101: “Inter-Office Information,” nos. 235 and 236, 23 and 25 September 1947. RG 25/1049: letter, Saul Hayes (Montreal) to Secretary-General, Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations (New York) 15 October 1947. RG 25/3694: letter, Zacks (Montreal) to St. Laurent 16 October 1947. 9. RG 25/4219: letter, Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg) to St. Laurent 2 September 1947. MG 26J2/497: same to King. MG 26L/18: letter, Jean T. Richard (Ottawa) to St. Laurent 24 September 1947. MG 26J2/497: same to King. MG 26L/18: Edouard Rinfret (Montreal) to St. Laurent 25 November 1947. Stursberg, p. 72. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 175. 10. MG 26N1/64: letter, I. M. Gringorten (Toronto) to Pearson 9 May 1947; letter, Pearson to Gringorten 14 May 1947. RG 25/3694: letter, Helen E. Coleman (Toronto) to Pearson 26 November 1947; letter, Pearson to Coleman 8 December 1947. 11. RG 25/3694: statement by Zacks 30 November 1947, enclosed with letter, Schwartz to Pearson 1 December 1947. MG 26L/18: same to St. Laurent. MG 26J2/498: same to King. CJC, FA2–101: “Inter-Office Information,” no. 279, 1 December 1947. RG 25/3694: tel., S. Hart Green (Winnipeg) to Pearson 2 December 1947. MG 26L/18: same to St. Laurent. MG 26J2/498: same to King. RG 25/3694:

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tel., M. Dickstein (Montreal) to St. Laurent 3 December 1947. MG 26J2/498: extract of letter, Zacks to King 18 December 1947. RG 25/3694: letter, Hayes (Toronto) to Pearson 20 December 1947; letter, Rachel Bessin (Ottawa) to King 30 December 1947. CZA S5/787: The Canadian Zionist, vol. 15, no. 1, January 1948, pp. 12, 16. 12. CZA S5/787: letter, Leon Cheifetz (Montreal) to L. Lauterbach (Jerusalem) 14 March 1947. RG 25/3831: “Memorandum for Mr. Pearson—World Committee for Palestine,” by MacCallum 12 June 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Confidential Memorandum from H. A. Mowat” 25 September 1947; Bulletin Letter From: World Committee For Palestine (New York) 1 October 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Batshaw 17 July 1980. Figler, pp. 91–92. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, p. 15. 13. CZA Z5/471: Canadian Palestine Committee—Supplement to August 1st, 1947 Release, “The Reprisal Tragedy” 7 August 1947. CZA Z5/456II: “Chart—Diplomatic Interviews” n. d. RG 25/4218: letter, Ignatieff to Pearson 3 September 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947; “Confidential Memorandum from H. A. Mowat” 25 September 1947. RG 25/3694: tels. Flavelle (New York) to St. Laurent and to King 16 October 1947. CZA S5/787: letter, Flavelle (Toronto) to Schwartz 10 December 1947, cited in The Canadian Zionist, vol. 15, no. 1, January 1948, p. 16. CZA Z5/471: letter, Mowat (New York) to Gelber 16 December 1947. Zachariah Kay, “The Canadian Press and Palestine: A Survey, 1939–48,” International Journal, 18:3 (1963), p. 369. 14. CZA S5/787: letter, Cheifetz to Lauterbach 14 March 1947. CJC, ZA1947/8/81: “Memorandum on Publicity” 2 April 1947, citing the Montreal Herald. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “The Canadian Government and the Majority Proposals: Recent Developments,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Jewish Agency Executive 11 September 1947, citing the Montreal Star and the Globe and Mail. CZA Z5/487I: letter, Batshaw to Gelber 18 September 1947, citing the Toronto Star. ISA 93.03/2274/53: letter, Zacks to Arthur Lourie (New York) 29 October 1947, citing the Montreal Daily Star; letter, Lourie to Zacks 3 November 1947. Kay, “Canadian Press,” p. 370, citing the Winnipeg Free Press. Elath, vol. 2, p. 310. 15. CZA L35/72: letter, Epstein to Batshaw 20 May 1947. RG 25/3694: letter, Schwartz to Pearson 21 November 1947. 16. Muhammad Said Massoud, I Fought as I Believed: An Arab Canadian Speaks Out on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Montreal, 1976), pp. 11–13. Baha Abu-Laban, An Olive Branch on the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada (Toronto, [1980] rep. 1985), pp. 57, 88–89, 139, 147. For Massoud’s biography see: Massoud, I Fought, pp. 3, 5–9, and Muhammad Sa’id Mas’ud, Al-’Arab wal-Quwwat al-Ajnabiyya (Beirut, [1973?]), pp. 11–13. 17. Massoud, I Fought, pp. 13, 15, 18, 183. “Constitution of the Canadian-Arab Friendship League: Aims, Objectives and Purposes,” cited ibid., pp. 14–15. Mas’ud, Al-’Arab, p. 53. Abu-Laban, Olive Branch, p. 147.

Notes

151

18. Massoud, I Fought, pp. 17–18. Letter, Muhammad Said Massoud (Montreal) to ‘Adil Arslan (New York) 23 October 1947, cited ibid., p. 185. Mas’ud, Al-’Arab, p. 138. Abu-Laban, Olive Branch, pp. 147, 152. 19. Canadian Arab, vol. 3, no. 1–2–3, April–June 1947, pp. 2–4; no. 4–5–6, July-September 1947, pp. 2–4; no. 7–8–9, October–December 1947, pp. 2–3. 20. Ibid., no. 1–2–3, April–June 1947, p. 14. The Gazette, 31 October 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, p. 108. La Presse, 3 November 1947, cited ibid. The Gazette, 28 November 1947, cited ibid., pp. 110–111. 21. Canadian Arab, vol. 3, no. 7–8–9, October–December 1947, p. 12, citing The Gazette, 18 December 1947. 22. Tel., Massoud to Canadian Delegation to the Special Assembly of the United Nations (New York) 28 April 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, p. 176. Tels., Massoud to President of the General Assembly 30 April and 29 May 1947, cited in Canadian Arab, vol. 3, no. 1–2–3, April–June 1947, p. 13. Tel., Massoud to Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons 10 September 1947, cited ibid., no. 4–5–6, July–September 1947, p. 5. RG 25/3694: tels., Massoud to DEA 4 and 14 November 1947. FO 371/61888: tel., Massoud to Ernest Bevin (London) 14 November 1947. Massoud, I Fought, pp. 106–107, citing The Gazette, 28 April 1947; p. 106, citing The Gazette, 6 November 1947; p. 109, citing The Gazette and Montreal Daily Star, 15 November 1947; p. 110, citing La Presse, 15 November 1947. 23. RG 25/4219: tels., John E. Seaman (Liverpool, Nova Scotia) to King and to St. Laurent 18 September 1947. MG 26L/18: same to Ian Mackenzie (Ottawa). Tel., Seaman [to Massoud?] September 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, p. 131. Letter, Norman Jaques (Mulhurst, Alberta) to Massoud 7 November 1947, cited ibid., pp. 186–187. RG 25/3694: memo, Warren to St. Laurent 8 November 1947, enclosing tels. from Jaques, D. M. Teha, Roy H. Ashby and A. Shaben (and originals of same, sent from Edmonton on 6 November 1947). 24. Tel., Massoud to Qustantin Zurayq and Mahmud Hasan (New York) 29 April 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, pp. 129–130. Letter, ‘Isa Nakhla (New York) to Massoud 19 August 1947, and letter, Massoud to Nakhla 29 August 1947, cited ibid., p. 183. Letter, Massoud to ‘Adil Arslan (New York) 23 October 1947, cited ibid., pp. 184–185. 25. Debates 1947, vol. 4, p. 3087; vol. 6, pp. 5114–5116. Alan Davies (ed.), Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation (Waterloo, Ont., 1992), pp. 179–181. 26. Letters, Jaques to Massoud 9 May and 7 November 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, pp. 176–177, 187. Davies, p. 181, citing The Canadian Social Crediter, 9 October 1947. 27. Debates 1948, vol. 2, pp. 1391, 1393; vol. 4, pp. 3507–3508; vol. 5, pp. 4581–4582. 28. Davies, p. 181. Mas’ud, Al-’Arab, p. 99.

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29. Debates 1947, vol. 4, pp. 3369, 3512–3513. RG 25/4219: memo, “Special Committee on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly—Canadian Participation” (DEA) 18 June 1947. 30. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 175, based on an interview with Ignatieff.

CHAPTER 9 1. Robinson, p. 245. 2. CZA S25/5991: “Zionist Public Relations and the Inquiry Committee Report—The Need for Immediate Action,” by Gelber 3 September 1947. CZA Z5/485II: memo, “The Canadian Government and the Majority Proposals: Recent Developments,” by Gelber, to Members of the American Section, Jewish Agency Executive 11 September 1947. CZA Z5/487I: letter, Gelber to Norman A. M. MacKenzie (Vancouver) 23 September 1947. CJC, FA2–101: “Inter-Office Information,” no. 236, 25 September 1947, citing tel., Samuel Bronfman to St. Laurent. RG 25/3694: “Statement Issued by United Zionist Council of Canada,” by Zacks 5 September 1947. MG 26J2/498: letter, Zacks to King 14 September 1947. Debates 1948, vol. 2, p. 1666. 3. RG 25/3694: statement by Zacks 30 November 1947; tel., Green to Pearson 2 December 1947; tel., Dickstein to St. Laurent 3 December 1947; letter, Hayes to Pearson 20 December 1947; letter, Bessin to King 30 December 1947. CJC, FA2–101: “Inter-Office Information,” no. 279, 1 December 1947, citing Bronfman. Memo, Gelber to Jewish Agency Executive 29 January 1948, cited in Israel, Documents, pp. 263–264. Gelber also noted Riddell’s role in helping Pearson devise the American-Soviet compromise. See: ibid., p. 265. 4. A speech by Ben-Gurion 9 August 1947, cited in Ben-Gurion, Pe’amey Medina, p. 285. CZA S25/5991: letter, Moshe [Shertok] to Golda [Myerson] 7 September 1947. Moshe Sharett, Be-Sha’ar ha-Umot (1946–1949) (Tel-Aviv, [1958] 1966), p. 62. CZA S5/787: The Canadian Zionist, vol. 15, no. 1, January 1948, p. 7, citing Beryl Locker. In Palestine, a Hebrew daily wrote a fortnight after partition had been adopted: “There is no doubt that the compromise achieved by Lester B. Pearson of Canada, who mediated between the United States and the Soviet Union, was one of the glorious pages of the tragic history of Eretz Yisra’el.” Ha-Aretz, 12 December 1947. 5. Horowitz, pp. 187, 225, 280, 290. 6. Elath, vol. 2, pp. 336, 374, 380, 392. Eban, p. 95. In 1968 Pearson was awarded an honorary fellowship by the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, Israel. Meyer Weisgal, president of the Institute, called him “The man who played so signal a role as one of the architects of the 1947 United Nations Partition Resolution.” See WIA: “Remarks by Mr. Meyer W. Weisgal on the Occasion of the Conferment of an Honorary Fellowship of the Weizmann Institute of Science on the Rt. Hon. Lester Bowles Pearson” 3 December 1968. 7. Figler, p. 92. Herzog Bessin and Kaufman, pp. 19, 21–22.

Notes

153

8. Tel., Massoud to Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons 10 September 1947, cited in Canadian Arab, vol. 3, no. 4–5–6, July–September 1947, p. 5. RG 25/3694: tels., Massoud to DEA 4 and 14 November 1947. The Gazette, 15 November 1947, cited in Massoud, I Fought, p. 109. Canadian Arab, vol. 3, no. 7–8–9, October–December 1947, pp. 2, 12 (citing The Gazette, 18 December 1947). Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 217. 9. Mas’ud, Al-’Arab, pp. 66, 68, 102. ‘Arafat Hijazi, 15 Ayyar ‘Amm al-Nakba ([Amman, 1968]), p. 39. 10. Ali Dessouki, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Palestine Problem (Ottawa, [1969]), p. 5. ‘Ali Hilal al-Din [Dessouki], Kanadah wa-Qadiyyat Filastin: Dirasa fi Siyasat Kanadah al-Kharijiyya tujaha Qadiyyat Filastin (Beirut, 1970), pp. 19–20, 23–24, 27–29, 45. 11. Tareq Y. Ismael, “Canada and the Middle East,” in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.), Canada and the Third World (Toronto, 1976), pp. 241, 243. Idem, “Canada and the Arab World: A Diplomatic History,” in idem (ed.), Canadian Arab Relations: Policy and Perspectives (Ottawa, 2nd ed., 1984), pp. 10–11. Idem, Canada and the Middle East: The Foreign Policy of a Client State (Calgary, 1994), pp. 10, 13. 12. RG 25/4219: Mayrand, in tel. 220, Geneva to SSEA 1 September 1947. RG 25/4218: letter, Ignatieff to Pearson 3 September 1947. CZA Z5/471: “Memorandum on an Interview with Joseph Bradette, M.P., Chairman of the External Affairs Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, Member of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly of the UN,” [by Mowat] 16 September 1947. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with Martin 2 August 1979. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 213. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, p. 86 (citing Riddell). 13. “Memo from New York,” by Hutchison 15 November 1947, cited in English, vol. 1, p. 325. RG 25/3694: “Memorandum for the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs—Palestine,” by Reid 24 November 1947. MG 32B50/4: letter, Harris to Branch no. 97, Canadian Legion (Montreal) 12 December 1947. MG 26L/345: Ottawa Morning Citizen, 25 November 1947, and London Free Press, 26 November 1947. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, p. 217. Stursberg, p. 71. 14. Western, pp. 126, 128. Frederick H. Soward and Edgar McInnis, Canada and the United Nations (New York, 1956), pp. 109, 112. Heath Macquarrie, a Canadian politician and past university lecturer, distinguished between Rand and Pearson, believing that while Rand was operating on his own, Pearson was following the instructions of his government. Nonetheless, “Both the instructed and the non-instructed won the accolades of the Jewish agency,” he concluded. See: Heath Macquarrie, “Canada and the Palestinian People 1948–1983,” in Tareq Y. Ismael (ed.), Canadian Arab Relations: Policy and Perspectives (Ottawa, 2nd ed., 1984), p. 62. 15. Spencer, pp. 96, 143, 145–147. Spencer too was a member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 16. English, vol. 1, p. 325.

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Notes

17. Hillmer, Canadian Policy, pp. v, 19–20, 68. See also: idem, “Remembrance,” p. 15 for MacCallum’s influence over Hillmer. 18. Kay, Canada, p. 131. 19. Bercuson, Canada, p. 105. 20. Ibid., pp. 230, 233. See also: idem, “Serving,” p. 12.

CONCLUSION 1. MG 26N9/2: a speech by Pearson 16 May 1949. Third Session, Part I, p. 691. Robert A. MacKay (ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy 1945–1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto, 1971), pp. 142, 144. 2. MG 26N9/2: a speech by Pearson 16 May 1949. Third Session, Part II, pp. 307, 317. JPL, Bercuson 9: interview with MacCallum 25 July 1980. Pearson, Mike, vol. 2, pp. 216–217. Figler, p. 92. Spencer, p. 151. Bercuson, “Serving,” p. 16.

Bibliography DOCUMENTS Canada The National Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 26J: King, William Lyon Mackenzie MG 26L: St. Laurent, Louis Stephen MG 26N: Pearson, Lester Bowles MG 30E77: Rand, Ivan Cleveland MG 31H91: Schwartz, Jesse MG 32B12: Martin, Paul MG 32B50: Harris, Walter Edward RG 2: Records of the Privy Council Office (Cabinet Records) RG 14: Records of Parliament RG 25: Records of the Department of External Affairs RG 76: Records of the Immigration Branch Jewish Public Library, Montreal. Bercuson, David Jay

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PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS The Canadian Arab (Montreal), vols. 1–3, May 1945–December 1947. Department of External Affairs, Canada at the United Nations 1947: Report on the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Held in New York September 16–November 29, 1947 (Ottawa, 1948). Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates—House of Commons. Third Session—Twentieth Parliament, 1947 (Ottawa, 1947–48) Fourth Session—Twentieth Parliament, 1948 (Ottawa, 1948)

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BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND DISSERTATIONS Abella, Irving and Troper, Harold, None Is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe 1933–1948 (New York, 1983). Abu-Laban, Baha, “Arab-Canadians and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 10:1 (1988), pp. 104–126. ———An Olive Branch on the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada (Toronto, [1980] rep. 1985). Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969). ‘Ali, ‘Ali Muhammad, Filastin bayna ‘Usbat al-Umam wal-Umam al-Muttahida (Cairo, 1962). Avizohar, Meir and Friedman, Isaiah (eds.), ‘Iyunim be-Tokhniyot ha-Haluqa, 1937–1947 (Sede Boqer, 1984). Azmi, Mahmoud, “La Question Palestinienne devant l’Assemblée des Nations Unies,” Politique Etrangère, 13:5–6 (December 1948), pp. 403–408. Bain, Kenneth Ray, The March to Zion: United States Policy and the Founding of Israel (College Station, 1979). Ben-Gurion, David, Ba-Ma’arakha (Tel-Aviv, 3rd ed. 1951), vol. 5. ———Pe’amey Medina (Zikhronot min ha-’Izavon: Mars–November 1947) (Tel-Aviv, 1993). Bercuson, David J., Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto, 1985). ———“Canadian Policy in Historical Perspective,” Middle East Focus, 11:3 (1989), pp. 18–20, 30. ———“Serving the National Interest: Canada’s Palestine Policy 1940–1949,” Middle East Focus, 6:5 (1984), pp. 12–16, 26–27. ———“The Zionist Lobby and Canada’s Palestine Policy 1941–1948,” in Taras, David and Goldberg, David H. (eds.), The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Kingston, 1989), pp. 17–36. Bethell, Nicholas, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle Between the British, the Jews and the Arabs 1935–48 (London, 1979). Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945–1951 (Oxford, 1985).

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Index ‘Abdallah, 19, 71 Acheson, Dean G., 6, 97 Acre prison, 14 Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 28–29, 32, 34, 47, 51–52, 54–56, 59–60, 65, 75, 82, 89, 91–94, 99, 102, 113–114; Subcommittee 1, 35, 37, 40–41, 47, 51–57, 64, 66, 78, 81–82, 85, 92, 114; Subcommittee 2, 35, 51, 53–55, 82 Afghanistan, 35 Alberta, 102, 105 American delegation to the UN, 3, 6–7, 30, 34–35, 37, 41, 44–45, 48, 92, 135 American State Department, 5, 57 Amman, 18, 112 Anglo-American Commission, 12, 14 Anti-Semitism, 20, 86, 88, 105–107 Arab boycott, 16

Arab Higher Committee, 5, 15, 29, 59, 105 Arab League, 44, 148 Arab lobbying, 102–105, 107 Arab-Canadian Newsletter, 103 Arabian Muslim Association, 102, 105 Aranha, Oswaldo, 3, 28, 104 Argentina, 7 Atherton, Ray, 57 Atomic Energy Commission, 57 Auschwitz, 73, 84, 89 Austin, Warren R., 7 Australia, 6–8, 24–25, 28–29, 31, 60–61, 123, 126 Austria, 12, 19, 73 Balfour Declaration, 59, 71, 89–90 Batshaw, Harry, 93, 101–102, 141, 149 Beirut, 112

166

Ben-Gurion, David, 15–16, 70, 98, 110, 123 Bercuson, David J., ix-x, 115 Bevin, Ernest, 19–20, 39, 60, 68, 105 Blom, Nicolaas, 68 Bolivia, 8, 58 Bolsheviks, 20 Bradette, Joseph A., 69, 77, 89, 101, 113 Brandeis, Louis, 12, 70, 123 Brazil, 3, 28 Britain, 1–2, 5, 7, 12, 19, 22–24, 28–32, 34–35, 38, 41, 43–47, 49, 51–54, 56–59, 61, 63, 65–68, 71, 73–74, 77, 79, 83, 88, 90, 93, 99, 101, 104–107, 110, 118, 120, 127, 131, 138, 144 British delegation to the UN, 32, 39, 47, 66, 82–83, 126, 144 British Foreign Office, 5, 60, 123, 135 British government, ix, 68, 82, 144 British Honduras, 68 Bronfman, Samuel, 100, 109–110 Bunche, Ralph, 23, 139 Cadogan, Alexander, 5, 8, 44, 46–47, 49, 52–53, 61, 82–83, 111 Canada and the United Nations, 114 Canada at the United Nations, 67 Canada in World Affairs, 114 Canada-Israel Committee, 111 Canada-Israel Friendship: The First Thirty Years, 111 Canadian Arab, 103, 105 Canadian Arab Friendship League, 102–105 Canadian Arab News Service, 103 Canadian Bar Review, 12 Canadian consulate-general in New York, 119 Canadian delegation to the UN, 2, 27–29, 31–32, 35, 37, 39–40, 43, 46–47, 51, 54–57, 60, 64–66, 75–76, 79–80, 82–83, 86–87, 89,

Index

91, 94, 97–99, 104, 107, 113, 119, 130–131, 133, 142, 147, 149 Canadian Department of External Affairs, 11–13, 27, 33, 48, 56–57, 74–76, 78, 86, 89, 91, 104–105, 112, 115, 141, 148; First Political Division, 2, 27, 86; Legal Division, 48, 89; Second Political Division, 57, 77 Canadian Department of Mines and Resources, 85; Immigration Branch, 85 Canadian embassy in Washington, 6, 84 Canadian government, 1–2, 6–7, 11, 13, 27, 32, 43, 58, 64, 66–67, 69, 75–77, 79–80, 83, 87, 89, 93, 99–100, 105–106, 112, 120, 153 Canadian House of Common. See Canadian parliament Canadian immigration policy, 85, 145 Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 114, 153 Canadian Jewish Congress, 80, 100, 109–110 Canadian Palestine Committee, 93, 99, 101, 113 Canadian parliament, 2, 11, 13, 69, 74, 77, 79, 89, 94, 100, 104–107, 110 Canadian senate, 81 Canadian Social Crediter, 106 Canadian Zionists, 86, 97, 110–111 Carmel, Mount, 15, 98 Chile, 7–8 China, 2 Church, T.L., 107 Claxton, Bruce, 100 Cold War, 77 Colombia, 35 Commonwealth, 6, 30–31, 46, 57, 60, 65, 78, 89, 104–105, 110, 126–127, 131, 144 Commonwealth Relations Office, 28, 31

Index

Communism, 106, 127, 143 Creech-Jones, Arthur, 30–31, 46, 52, 77, 127 Croll, David, 110 Crossman, Richard, 12, 73 Cunningham, Alan, 18 Custos of the Holy Land, 18 Cyprus, 14, 69, 100, 145 Czechoslovakia, 6, 8, 35, 58 Dead Sea, 72 Denmark, 56, 58, 135 Dessouki, Ali, 112–113 Displaced persons, 12, 19, 32, 60, 73, 84–85, 93, 99, 145. See also Jewish refugees Druzes, 92 Eban, Abba, 111 Economic and Social Council, 57 Edmonton, 102, 105, 107 Egypt, 3, 35 Elizabeth, Princess, 29, 56, 60, 74 English, John, 114 Epstein, Eliahu, 97, 99, 102, 111, 142 Evatt, Herbert V., 29–30, 35–36, 51, 53, 60, 75, 89, 126, 131 “Exodus” ship, 19–20 External Affairs. See Canadian Department of External Affairs Fabregat, Enrique Rodriguez, 13, 24–25, 51, 53, 68, 115 Figler, Bernard, 111–112 Flavelle, Ellsworth, 99, 101 Flushing Meadows, 2 Ford Motor Company, 11 Foreign Office. See British Foreign Office Foreign Policy Association, 91 France, 2, 61 Frankfurter, Felix, 12, 70 Galilee, 24, 68, 73, 92, 98

167

García-Granados, Jorge, 13–14, 24–25, 41, 45, 68, 99, 115, 122, 135 Gelber, Lionel, 12, 69, 88, 97–99, 109–110, 152 General Assembly, ix, 2–4, 8, 23, 25–28, 31, 33, 37–38, 40, 43–46, 48–49, 52–53, 59, 61, 64, 67, 72, 76, 81, 87–88, 99, 104, 111, 117–118, 126–127, 140; First Committee, 3–9, 28, 66, 77, 80, 82, 118, 121; General Committee, 3–4, 28 Geneva, 19–21, 68–69, 71, 98 Germany, 19, 99 Ghuri, Emil, 5 Globe and Mail, 102 Greece, 93 Gromyko, Andrei, 8–9 Guatemala, 7–8, 14, 35, 41, 51, 68, 118 Hackett, John, 13, 94–95, 107 Hadassah Hospital, 70 Haifa, 14–15, 98 Harrington, Julian, 7 Harris, Walter E., 94–95, 113, 148 Hebrew University, 16, 70, 72–73 Herzog, Chief Rabbi Isaac, 98 Hilldring, John H., 35, 44, 92 Hillmer, Anne Trowell, ix, 115, 154 “History of the Zionist Ideal in Canada,” 111 Hitler, Adolf, 84, 89 Holland, 6, 8, 24, 55, 122 Holocaust, 14, 72, 84, 86, 88, 111, 117 Hoo, Victor, 1 Hopkins, E. Ross, 48, 89, 133 Horowitz, David, ix, 14–16, 20–21, 23, 25, 67, 69–72, 93, 97–98, 110–111, 140 House of Commons. See Canadian parliament Hutchison, Bruce, 113

168

Iceland, 51 Ignatieff, George, 2, 28, 30, 33, 63, 73, 76–77, 87–89, 93, 97–101, 107, 110, 117–118 Ignatiev, Nikolay, 88 Ihud association, 16–17 Ilsley, James L., 28, 30, 32–33, 56–59, 63–64, 76, 79–80, 83, 86, 89–92, 100–101, 112–114, 137, 146–147 India, 6–8, 19, 23, 60–61, 74, 144 Interim Committee, 57 International Court, 54, 99 International Journal, 114 International Refugee Organization, 32 Inverchapel, Lord, 5 Iran, 7–8, 23, 122 Iraq, 3, 29, 35 Ireland, 19 Irgun Zva’i Le’umi, 13, 69, 101 Ismael, Tareq, 113 Israel, ix, 9, 68, 72, 80, 88, 111–112, 117–118, 127, 145; 1948 war, 117; 1956 war, 118; 1967 war, 118 Israel, Bank of, ix Jaques, Norman, 105–107 Jenin, 17 Jerusalem, 14–15, 20–25, 41, 44, 70, 72, 98, 125 Jewish Agency, 4–5, 7, 12, 14–16, 22–23, 29, 43, 54, 58–59, 67–69, 73, 80, 84, 87–88, 92–94, 97–99, 101–102, 109–111, 123, 142–144, 153 Jewish Chronicle, 93 Jewish Contribution to Civilisation, The, 98 Jewish illegal immigration, 14–15, 19, 32, 68, 98 Jewish refugees, 12, 16, 19, 32, 54, 72–74, 85, 88, 93, 99, 117, 145. See also Displaced persons

Index

Johnson, Herschel V., 30, 37, 39, 44–46, 50, 53, 56, 133 Jordan River, 72 Kay, Zachariah, ix, 115 Keenleyside, Hugh L., 85, 145 King, William L. Mackenzie, 1–2, 6, 11, 13, 19, 28–29, 56, 60, 63, 66–67, 70, 73–77, 83, 95, 100–101, 105, 110, 115, 117–118, 140 Korea, 84 Korean Commission, 57 Labour Zionist Movement, 110 Lake Success, New York, 28, 67, 111 Lambert, Norman P., 81, 113 Latrun, 15, 98 Lawrence, Harry G., 30 Lawrence of Arabia, 89 League of Nations, 31, 54, 81 Lebanon, 3, 18, 35, 102 Liberal Party, 28, 94 Lie, Trygve, 11 Lisicky, Karel, 68 Little Assembly, 80, 113 Locker, Beryl, 110 London, ix, 5, 18–19, 29, 31, 44, 47, 60, 67–68, 74, 76, 83, 93, 128, 131 Low, Solon, 95 MacCallum, Elizabeth P., ix-x, 28, 70, 76–77, 83–84, 86–87, 89–94, 97–98, 115, 118, 147–149, 154 MacGillivray, Donald C., 138 Mackenzie, Ian, 105 Mackenzie King, William L. See King, William L. Mackenzie Macquarrie, Heath, 153 Magnes, Judah L., 16–18, 71, 91 Martin, Paul J. J., 77, 79, 83, 89, 113 Massoud, Muhammad Said, 102–107, 111–112, 150

Index

Mayrand, Léon, 11–16, 19, 23, 26, 69, 73, 89, 97–98, 100, 109, 113, 140 McNeil, Hector, 31, 131 Middle East, 12, 59, 63, 70, 73, 77, 87, 89, 91, 93, 105, 114, 118, 147 Middle East Research Centre, 112 Mizrachi’s Women, 110 Montreal, 102–104, 110 Montreal Daily Star, 102–103 Montreal Herald, 102 Moscow, 12, 73, 89 Mowat, Herbert A., 101, 113 Mufti of Jerusalem, 5, 80 NATO, 65 Nazis, 5, 80, 100, 145 Negev, 16, 24–25, 68, 73, 98 New York, 2, 13, 28–29, 71, 75, 80, 83, 91, 94, 97, 99, 101–102 New York Times, 78, 82, 130 New Zealand, 5, 28, 31, 60–61 Nobel Peace Prize, 118 Norway, 51 Nova Scotia, 105 Ottawa, 6–7, 13, 28, 30, 56–57, 70, 72–76, 78, 84, 86, 99, 105, 112, 117, 119, 130, 137, 142, 147 Pakistan, 35–36, 51–52, 60–61, 92, 144 Palestine Liberation Organization, 112 Palestine Mission, 12, 73 Panama, 58 Paris, 118 Pearl Harbor, 104 Pearson, Lester B., 2–9, 11, 28–30, 32, 34–35, 38–41, 43–59, 63–67, 74–87, 89–94, 97–102, 104–107, 110–115, 117–118, 120–121, 127, 129–133, 135, 138, 141–147, 152–153 Peel Commission, 12, 70

169

Peru, 6, 8, 24–25, 122 Philippines, 1, 8, 58 Poland, 7–8, 35, 37, 51, 89 Progressive Conservatives, 13, 94, 107 Pruszynski, Ksawery, 37, 54 Quebec, 104, 145 Rand, Ivan C., 11–27, 32, 64, 68–75, 77, 83, 89, 94, 97–98, 100–101, 104, 107, 109–115, 123, 126, 138–139, 153 Refugees. See Jewish refugees Rehovot, 15, 70, 142, 152 Reid, Escott M., 57–58, 77, 140 Reiner, Moses, 17 Resolution 181 (II), 61, 117–118 Riddell, R. Gerry, 2, 27–28, 32, 47–49, 58–59, 64, 67, 83, 86–87, 89–91, 93, 113, 117, 146, 152 Robertson, Norman A., 5, 67, 76, 83 Robinson, Jacob, 109 Roth, Cecil, 98 Russia, 88. See also Soviet Union Salazar, García-, 24–25, 68–69 Sandström, Emil, 13, 15, 24, 68 Saudi Arabia, 3, 29, 35 Schwartz, Jesse, 102 Security Council, 3, 7–8, 33–35, 37–40, 43–46, 48–49, 52–57, 64–65, 81, 88, 118, 130–131 “Serving the National Interest,” x, 115 Shertok, Moshe, 5, 15, 92, 98–99, 110, 123 Siam, 8 Sief Institute, 15 Silver, Abba Hilel, 94 Simic, Vladimir, 13 Sinai Peninsula, 118 Social Credit party, 95, 105, 107 South Africa, 28, 30–31, 35, 60–61

170

Soviet delegation to the UN, 8, 38, 41, 44–45, 48–49, 133, 135 Soviet Union, 2, 5, 7, 30–31, 35, 40, 65, 103, 105–106, 117–118, 127, 132, 135, 143, 152 Spencer, Robert, 114, 153 State Department. See American State Department St. Laurent, Louis S., 1–2, 7–8, 11, 13, 28–29, 39–40, 56–58, 63–64, 66–67, 74–80, 84, 90, 94, 99–101, 105, 109, 113, 118, 127, 129, 131–132, 141–142 Suez, 118 Sunday New York Times, 79 Sweden, 6, 8, 13, 24, 34, 92, 122 Syria, 3, 35, 92, 103 Tel-Aviv, 16 Toronto, 105, 110, 145 Transjordan, 19 Truman, Harry S., 5 Trusteeship Council, 135 Tsarapkin, Semen K., 30, 38, 45–46, 50, 55 Turkey, 93 United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations. See names of specific bodies United Nations Charter, 33–34, 40, 46, 48–50, 52–54, 56, 64–65, 81, 88 United Nations Emergency Force, 118 United Nations Press Division, 78 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. See UNSCOP United States, 2, 5–8, 12, 30–31, 33, 35, 40, 44, 46, 57, 60, 65, 90, 99,

Index

103, 106, 117–118, 127–128, 135, 138, 152 United Zionist Council of Canada, 99–101, 109, 149 UNSCOP, 13–16, 18–27, 29–34, 40, 59, 64, 66, 68–74, 77–79, 83, 89–91, 93–94, 97–100, 102–105, 109–115, 127, 137, 147 Uruguay, 6, 8, 13, 24, 35, 51, 68 Venezuela, 35, 41 Washington, 5–6, 45, 57, 97, 102, 111, 142 Weisgal, Meyer, 152 Weizmann, Chaim, 15, 70, 92, 102 Weizmann Institute, 142, 152 Wershof, Max H., 33–34 White Paper of 1922, 91 White Paper of 1939, 22, 26, 84, 105 Windsor, Ontario, 11 Winnipeg, 72 World Committee for Palestine, 93, 101 World Jewish Congress, 109 World War II, 71 World Zionist Organization, 15 Wrong, H. Hume, 6, 57, 64, 133, 137 Yemen, 35 Yugoslavia, 7–8, 13, 23 Zacks, Samuel, 99–102, 109–110, 149 Zafrullah Khan, Muhammad, 36, 51, 53–54, 60, 135 Zionism, x, 12, 23, 70, 84, 93–94, 98, 100–101, 106, 111–112, 142 Zionist lobbying, 97–102, 107, 148 Zionist Organization of Canada, 102, 110

About the Author ELIEZER TAUBER is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern History at Bar Ilan University. His studies focus on the history of the modern Arab states and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the first half of the twentieth century. He has published five books and more than forty professional articles in leading academic journals. His books include: Azia Bek: Intelligence and Espionage in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine during the World War (1991); The Emergence of the Arab Movements (1993); The Arab Movements in World War I (1993); Secret Societies and Resistance Movements in the Fertile Crescent, 1875–1920 (1994); and The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq (1995).