Pedro Da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics (Age of Descartes, 8) [1 ed.] 2503599990, 9782503599991

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Introduction
Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho
Pedro da Fonseca: A Sixteenth-Century Humanist and Metaphysician*
Section I: Fonseca and Jesuit Pedagogy
Pedro da Fonseca
Humanism and the Jesuit Quest for a Philosophical Pedagogy
Cristiano Casalini
Pedro da Fonseca’s Presence in the ‘Coimbra Jesuit Course’
A First Assessment
Mário S. de Carvalho
Section II: Disputing on Fonseca
Pedro da Fonseca’s Doctrine on the Middle Knowledge
João Rebalde
Fonseca’s Halfway Reductionism of Internal Senses
In Light of Mastri and Belluto’s Critique
Daniel Heider
Section III: Fonseca’s Metaphysics in Context
Pedro da Fonseca on the Scope and Unity of Metaphysics
Victor Salas
Fonseca on Categorical Relations
António Manuel Martins
Fonseca on Causation
Giuseppe Capriati
The Transcendental Properties of Ens and the Doctrine of Unum in Pedro da Fonseca
A Perspicuous Case of Neglected Platonic Origins of The Metaphysica Generalis
Igor Agostini
Fonseca on Substance, Subsistence, and Supposit
Simone Guidi
Bibliography
Index Nominum
Index Rerum

Citation preview

pedro da fonseca

The Age of Descartes Descartes et son temps

Volume 8 Centro Dipartimentale di Studi su Descartes ‘Ettore Lojacono’ Università del Salento Series Editor Giulia Belgioioso (Università del Salento) Editorial Board Igor Agostini (Università del Salento) Roger Ariew (Tampa University, Florida) Jean-Robert Armogathe (Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres) Carlo Borghero (Università di Roma, La Sapienza) Vincent Carraud (Sorbonne Université) Alan Gabbey (Barnard College) Daniel Garber (Princeton University) Tullio Gregory † (Accademia dei Lincei) Jean-Luc Marion (Académie française)

Pedro da Fonseca Humanism and Metaphysics

edited by Simone Guidi, Mário S. de Carvalho

F

© 2023, Brepols Publishers n. v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2023/0095/96 ISBN 978–2-503–59999-1 eISBN 978–2-503–60000-0 DOI: 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.128852 ISSN: 2736-7010 eISSN 2566-0276 Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

Table of Contents

Introduction Pedro da Fonseca: A Sixteenth-Century Humanist and Metaphysician Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho

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Section I Fonseca and Jesuit Pedagogy Pedro da Fonseca Humanism and the Jesuit Quest for a Philosophical Pedagogy Cristiano Casalini

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Pedro da Fonseca’s Presence in the ‘Coimbra Jesuit Course’ A First Assessment Mário S. de Carvalho

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Section II Disputing on Fonseca Pedro da Fonseca’s Doctrine on the Middle Knowledge João Rebalde

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Fonseca’s Halfway Reductionism of Internal Senses In Light of Mastri and Belluto’s Critique Daniel Heider

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Section III Fonseca’s Metaphysics in Context Pedro da Fonseca on the Scope and Unity of Metaphysics Victor Salas

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Fonseca on Categorical Relations António Manuel Martins

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Fonseca on Causation Giuseppe Capriati The Transcendental Properties of Ens and the Doctrine of Unum in Pedro da Fonseca A Perspicuous Case of Neglected Platonic Origins of The Metaphysica Generalis Igor Agostini

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Fonseca on Substance, Subsistence, and Supposit Simone Guidi

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Bibliography

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Index Nominum

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Index Rerum

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Simone Guidi and M ário S. de Carvalho

Introduction Pedro da Fonseca: A Sixteenth-Century Humanist and Metaphysician*

This is the first book ever written in English to address the thought and the oeuvre of the Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca (1527–99), also known as the Aristoteles Lusitanus. The current state of the art, along with the vastness and the complexity of Fonseca’s major works, did (and still does) not allow anyone to produce a systematic and thorough presentation of his production. Even after the present attempt, much research needs to be done — nevertheless, a sense of ‘innovation’ and ‘perplexity’ crossed the minds of the authors of all chapters ahead — and this is why the editors do hope that such editorial breakthrough may stimulate competent further inquiries. After all, the idea of this book comes from the finding that Fonseca has often been neglected by secondary literature. Even if his name is constantly mentioned in the great historical memories of European Jesuitism, as well as in general reconstructions of the late scholastic scenario — save the remarkable exception of Charles Lohr, who did not include Fonseca’s works in any of his Latin Aristotle Commentaries — it is quite rare to find scholarly production focusing on the Portuguese Aristotle alone. This is especially true if one looks outside Portugal, where in fact Fonseca aroused the attention of relevant scholars such as Cassiano Abranches, Amândio Coxito, Miguel Baptista Pereira and, more recently, of António M. Martins and Mário S. de Carvalho. The outputs of these two scholars especially have finally crossed the national boundaries and fed a new interest in Fonseca, which yet often turned to him especially as a reference for Suárez or Descartes, less frequently focusing on the very thought and works of the Portuguese Jesuit. However, relevant works from all around the world have reconstructed some shreds of Fonseca’s philosophy. Let us mention especially those of Jennifer E. Ashworth, Dennis Des Chene, Robert Pasnau and Helen Hattab in the United States, Kazimierz Gryżenia’s in Poland,



* This work is founded by national funds through the FCT — Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I. P., under the project UIDP/FIL/00010/2020. Simone Guidi  •  National Research Council of Italy, Institute for the European Intellectual Lexicon and History of Ideas Mário S. de Carvalho  •  Universidade de Coimbra Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 7-17 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131756

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and the studies led by Cristiano Casalini and (much more recently) Simone Guidi, respectively between Italy and the United States, and between Portugal and Italy. These works sketched important reconstructions of Fonseca’s intellectual life and thought, notably his role as a humanist, his philosophy of language, his theory of universals, his truth theory, some aspects of his metaphysics, and his hylomorphic theory. But still, a whole book in English still remained a desideratum for scholars working in this field. Although Fonseca should be included in two major chapters of the history of philosophy, i.e. Logic and Metaphysics, the former has here received less consideration than the latter, and books four, five, and six of his Commentary on Metaphysics received the greatest attention from the nine scholars who have gathered together around this project. This approach may seem to reflect a peculiarity of current academic studies on early modern scholasticism, usually more interested in analysing how certain aspects of modern metaphysics have been shaped by late scholasticism, rather than reconstructing the development of the scholastic philosophy of language, dialectics, and logic. Yet, such has been the specific focus the editors wanted for this volume, which aims to present Fonseca’s pedagogic ideal, his role in the production of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, and above all his effort as a commentator of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Indeed, whereas Fonseca’s Instructions and Isagoge have benefitted from complete translations into Portuguese and English, his major philosophical work was never translated, and remains inaccessible if not for a small group of scholars specializing in late scholasticism. Hence, this book is meant to be a research tool, useful to have a clear albeit partial portrait of Fonseca as a metaphysician, of his methodology, and his influence. *** Before briefly discussing the content of each chapter in this volume, and leaving the reader to its scrutiny, it is surely worth providing some biographical elements about Fonseca himself. Born in Proença-a-Nova, Portugal, Pedro da Fonseca joined the Society of Jesus on March 17, 1548, after spending a period of ‘six or seven months’ in the College of Arts in Coimbra. In what is the most comprehensive biography of Pedro da Fonseca published so far,1 Mário S. de Carvalho also mentions Fonseca’s stay in the Monastery of Sanfins de Friestas, but he does not forget to mention the difficulties of tracing Fonseca’s biography in the’50s, as well as the need of an objective overall biography of this important character. The Fifties are nonetheless a period when historians usually identify Fonseca in too many places (Sanfins, Spain, Évora, and Lisbon), and for a short time of his life. As a matter of fact, however, in October 1552 Fonseca is the first to teach ‘almost the entire Logic’ to the Jesuit novices in Coimbra’s College of Jesus. Still a student in theology at the time, he lived in Évora for a while (some historians also place him in Lisbon), then working as a philosophy lecturer



1 See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Fonseca, Pedro da, in Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia, ed. by Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Simone Guidi, 10.5281/zenodo.2563270, latest revision: January, 29th, 2020.

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for almost two years in the Jesuit College which had been pragmatically established in Coimbra on 13 June, 1542 by Simão Rodrigues. Surely, the fact that Fonseca was already studying theology and had acquired experience in reading philosophy, explains why he was one of the four Jesuits chosen to teach at the College of Arts when in 1555 King John III handed it down to the Society of Jesus. One year later, on September 9, 1556, the King ordered the University Rector to concede the M. A. degree to Pedro da Fonseca, as well as to other Jesuit colleagues. Fonseca thereby lectured at the Royal College of Arts the 3rd and 4th courses (1555–57), and an entire teaching course (i.e. three years and a half), from 1557 until 1561. What Fonseca might have done between April 1561 (the month and year when he left teaching at the Royal College) and October 1564 (the month and year he began to lecture speculative theology at the Jesuit University of Évora, founded in 1559), is not well known yet. It is universally acknowledged that, during his visit to Portugal (1561), Fr. Jerome Nadal instructed Fonseca to lead a team in order to deliver a Jesuit written course to the Press. It is plausible that Fonseca did comply with that mission in five years but the reasons why he could not take it to its end are still being debated. During the last years of the Sixties, Fonseca became the eighth Rector of the Coimbra College of Arts (1567–69), having to deal with the entire official administrative duties that task entailed, and taught theology at the College of Jesus. An extant manuscript dealing with usury explicitly mentions Fonseca’s name (De utio usurae in mutuis a P. D. Pedro da fonsequa Anno 1569). In addition to that, on December 19, 1569, Fonseca left his notes contrasting the higher level of the theology taught at the College of Jesus (en casa: at home) with the lower teaching quality of the Chair of Prima at the University. In March 1570 Fonseca received his Ph.D. from the University of Évora, where he replaced Luis de Molina for a short time. On his return from his fourth stay in Évora (April 1570), Pedro da Fonseca spent a period in Lisbon’s surroundings (Charneca da Caparica) where he committed to the study of metaphysics, this being the subject matter that some Portuguese Jesuits then believed ought to be at at the beginning of every philosophy course. Pedro da Fonseca had already published the Institutiones Dialecticae (1564) at the time, which were then recommended by several versions of the Jesuit Ratio studiorum, including the final and official one (1599), and in August 1570 he finally began the first volume of his masterpiece, the Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The four volumes of his Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics would be published between 1577 and 1611 (the last two posthumously), a work whose philosophical standing surely derives from the Roman period of Fonseca’s life. In December 1572, while attending the provincial congregation in Évora, Fonseca was forced to go to Rome as a delegate, replacing Gonçalves da Câmara. He lived there for almost ten years (1573–82). Due to its relevance in Fonseca’s intellectual biography this span of time should lead to a systematic investigation in Roman archives. Once he came back to Portugal (1582), Pedro da Fonseca headed the Lisbon Jesuit house of Saint Roque — this occupation led him to suspend the final draught of his metaphysical project, which he unfortunately never completed — and intervened in the process that led to the publication, by Manuel de Góis, of the Coimbra Jesuit

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Course. At the same time, he occupied his already busy days following the growth of the Society of Jesus in Portugal as well as several of its Province affairs. Fonseca frequently received consultations from Brazil, India, and Japan, and several items of the chronology given by Carvalho provide various references to some types of important religious duties across the decade. King Philip chose Fonseca to integrate the Reformation Table, to be one of the executors of the Infanta Dona Maria, and he even had the idea of giving him the bishopric of Japan. Despite all these political and administrative tasks, during this last period of his life Fonseca did not only manage to write the second volume on the Metaphysics (on book V), which was eventually published in Rome in 1589, but he also worked on several further improvements and foundations in the city of Lisbon, such as the Convent of Saint Martha, in 1583, and the College and Seminar for the Irish Catholics, founded in 1590. In his obituary, Fonseca is praised for having called priests from Italy, Ireland and the Flanders to assist religiously their countrymen living in Portugal. In 1589 Fonseca can be also found in Madrid, protesting before the King against the University of Coimbra’s pretensions of inspecting Jesuit schools, and eventually refuting a Jesuit affair related to a libel written by Gaspar Coelho and Luís de Carvalho. The publication of the booklet Isagoge in Lisbon — conceived to replace Porphyry’s similar title — in 1591 is a good indication that, during all these political, bureaucratic and administrative duties, he never abandoned his philosophical interests. Thanks to a letter by Francisco de Gouveia, written in December 1594, we know that Fonseca was then still working on a larger project on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and on a compendium thereof to be used in Schools. Allegedly, the compendium counted on the aid of the controversial Pedro Luís but, unfortunately, it did not see the light of the day. Fonseca achieved the third volume of the Metaphysics (on books VI–IX) at the end of 1594. From a testimony by Baltasar Barreira dated from 1596, we know that Pedro da Fonseca regretted that Francisco Suárez was then still refusing to come to Coimbra as a tenured professor in the Chair of Prima. After returning from his sixth visit to Évora, where he had prepared the publication of the third volume of the Metaphysics, Fonseca got sick (1598). His own and authorized philosophical masterpiece would thus remain unfinished, since its last volume does not offer the commentary on the Aristotelian text, but it sticks to the explanation (explanatio) of books X to XII and to the edition and translation of the remaining book and chapters. After enduring a one-year illness Pedro da Fonseca died in Lisbon at 5 a.m. November 4, 1599, at the age of seventy-one. His body was buried in Saint Roque Church, burial plot number 15. *** In light of Fonseca’s prominent historical role, the first section of this volume focuses especially on his effort within Jesuitic humanism and culture. The chapter Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and the Jesuit Quest for a Philosophical Pedagogy, by Cristiano Casalini, aims at reading some aspects of Fonseca’s oeuvre as an example of the impact humanist culture had on the teaching of philosophy, under the lenses of philology, style, relation to philosophical authorities, teaching method, and epistemology. Casalini begins by recalling the three occasions in Fonseca’s life when he was exposed

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to humanistic culture, i.e. as a student when he attended the Coimbra College of Arts; as a teacher, in the schools of the Society of Jesus in Portugal; and, finally, during his later stay in Rome as a Portuguese delegate to the General Congregation. Against this background, Fonseca managed to produce a clear humanist commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and a translation which was very much appreciated by his contemporaries, mostly by Francisco Suárez. Pedro da Fonseca’s purpose and method in editing the Commentaries was nonetheless aligned with the humanist emphasis on philology, being his Roman period of major importance to that particular kind of work, a feature already emphasized by Ramón Ceñal. Also, the presence of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the method of reading Aristotle’s intentio are said to be other Roman marks in Fonseca as a humanist. Besides writing the Dialectical Instructions and the Metaphysics to different kinds of students, as Casalini points out, Fonseca’s independent mind is clear as for the definition of the subject of dialectic. Unexpectedly, Casalini concludes, Fonseca’s closeness to Ramus’s definition — the subject of dialectics is the modus disserendi –, led him to a ‘nuanced’, and ‘for certain aspects, original’ position that ‘seemed to balance Toletus’s opinion with a definition of dialectic that was actually held by humanists’. It was already mentioned that Fonseca had an important role in the publication of the Coimbra Jesuit Course. In his chapter Fonseca’s Presence in the ‘Coimbra Jesuit Course’. A First Assessment, Mário S. de Carvalho deals with all the explicit references to Fonseca made by the three major authors of the Course — Manuel de Góis, Baltasar Álvares, and Sebastião do Couto — in order to weigh Fonseca’s presence in that huge and tremendously influential publication. Carvalho’s paper departs from his recent work, Dicionário do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense (Dictionary of the Coimbra Jesuit Course), and some of his conclusions in this volume are worth being noticed. Notably, that Fonseca’s irregular presence in the Coimbra Jesuit Course is weaker in Álvares than in Couto, and that Góis’s Physica II seems to prove particular attention was paid by Góis to Fonseca’s Metaphysics V. However, among the three players of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, Couto is the only one whose work shows the most extensive knowledge of Fonseca’s Metaphysics. Overall, these Jesuits share the same conception of objective reality, of intermediate concepts, of the formal concept of being, of the number of the internal senses, and of causality. If some of the chapters of this book — especially Heider’s and Capriati’s — will insist on some of these topics, examining them in the stricter limits of Fonseca’s thought, Carvalho’s essay nonetheless provides textual evidence that may confirm and explain why, differently from Pedro da Fonseca, Manuel de Góis sees natural philosophy, and not metaphysics, as the right key to open every formal inception in Jesuit philosophy. The second section of this volume is devoted to the role played by Fonseca in two different but very impactful debates in early modern scholasticism, namely those about the scientia media and the topology of the internal senses. In Pedro da Fonseca’s Doctrine on the Middle Knowledge, João Rebalde summarizes some of the major arguments related to the old and unsolved dispute on the authorship of the doctrine of the middle science, ‘a heated discussion [...] which lasts to this day’. Accepting Rabeneck’s views in favour of the independence of Molina in this issue — namely, that the Spanish Jesuit did not accept the intuitive way of divine

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knowledge of future contingents based on the argument of eternity — Rebalde points to other significant differences between the two Jesuits. Even though the author of this chapter puts forward the idea that middle knowledge ‘was born in the theoretical dynamics of the colleges of the Society of Jesus and that subsequently Fonseca and Molina defined it in their classes and in their works’, his contribution analyses five key issues in book VI of Fonseca’s Metaphysics that may highlight the Portuguese Aristotle’s view on the problem of contingent futures’ divine knowledge. These issues correspond to the definition of free agent and the efficacy of the divine will, the intuitive way of divine knowledge, the abstract way of divine knowledge, and the need for a compound or conditional knowledge in God. Rebalde’s conclusion is that Fonseca ‘reconciles, orders and synthesizes different and contrary responses’ of Augustine, Boethius, Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, and the subsequent Thomist commentators, meaning that he follows the innovative approach which was being developed within the Society of Jesus. Then, in Fonseca’s Halfway Reductionism of Internal Senses in Light of Mastri and Belluto’s Critique Daniel Heider suggests that, as for the doctrine of the twofold internal sense, Fonseca’s theory was a pivotal reference point for the two Scotists. In this chapter, Heider deepens and enlarges upon one of his latest philosophical interests and historical research, the problem of knowledge in late scholasticism. Criticizing Aquinas’s view, Fonseca came to identify the cogitative (estimative) power with memory, and, in the context of his rejection of Galen’s position, Fonseca also denied the real distinction between the powers of memory and phantasy. Although Mastri and Belluto refer to Fonseca only once, they employ the very same arguments Fonseca applied more than half a century before in the Commentary on the fifth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Mastri and Belluto also employed many of the reasons for identifying phantasy, memory (reminiscence), and the cogitative (estimative) power that had been introduced by Fonseca. However, as opposed to Mastri and Belluto’s (and Suárez’) theory, since it assumes a second internal sense, Fonseca’s view is significantly more open to the adoption of the Neoplatonic metaphysical axiom — evident in the Commentary on Metaphysics as well as in the Isagoge — according to which the highest part of the lower faculty ‘touches’ the lowest part of the higher faculty. An axiom denied by Mastri and Belluto (as well as by Suárez) in the field of the human internal sense’s radius operandi. Despite his reduction of the number of the internal senses, Fonseca was not willing to leave out a typical doctrinal feature of Aquinas’s theory, and he endorses the theory of the elevated internal sense’s radius operandi in rational animals, as compared with that of nonrational animals. The third and longest section of this volume finally deals with major topics in Fonseca’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, most of which refer to books IV and V, probably the apex of Fonseca’s work. Victor Salas’s chapter, Pedro da Fonseca on the Scope and Unity of Metaphysics, argues that transcendentality forms the foundation upon which Fonseca crafts his understanding of being and thus of metaphysics. Salas follows a theme put forward by Jan Aertsen but, following the research trends that made him a recognized expert on metaphysical issues, he highligths Fonseca’s place thereon. At least with respect to organizing a metaphysical science within the parameters of his commentarial project itself, and even though

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Fonseca does not explicitly advert to the term ‘transcendental’ in defending his thesis, Salas notes, the subject matter of metaphysics is the issue underlying this chapter that reads mostly book IV of Fonseca’s Metaphysics. Aiming at maintaining a realist, transcendental metaphysics, and unwilling to move metaphysics in the direction of supertranscendentality, Fonseca restricted the subject matter of metaphysics to real being as common to God and creature, albeit problematically (the same issue is analysed in the final chapter by Guidi, though in a different perspective). Firstly, Salas claims that Fonseca’s understanding of the analogical relationship between proportion and attribution vis-a-vis the God-creature relationship seems to be predicated on a purely extrinsic structure, and that being as common to God and creatures is in fact the adequate subject. Secondly, in order to explain Fonseca’s rejection of supertranscendentality, Salas dwells on how Fonseca understands and constructs analogy, following, with some minor differences, Cajetan’s distinctions on the matter. Salas’ methodology closely follows Fonseca’s text on the key differences between the analogy of attribution and of proportion, and dwells on the primacy of analogy of attribution, whose ‘tensions’ lead Salas to ask if Fonseca is not ‘simply reinventing the meaning of attribution and proportion or at the very least overlooking a number of their defining features’. In addition to that, he blatantly questions Fonseca by asking: ‘if attribution can function in an intrinsic manner’, ‘would it not be more economical to simply do away with proportion?’. The author of a relevant monograph on Fonseca published in Portuguese, as well as of many papers on the Portuguese Jesuit, António M. Martins offers an insightful and detailed analysis of Fonseca’s account for the category of relation, in light of several crucial texts and authors, both preceding Fonseca or writing after him. Reading book V of Fonseca’s Metaphysics closely, Martins maintains that the Jesuit’s contribution to this matter is ‘one of the most extensive and robust’. Moreover, he considers the approach to the relatives as ‘far more detailed and systematic’. Hence, Pedro da Fonseca on Categorical Relations provides an exposition of the core of Fonseca’s ‘realism about relations’ and addresses the topic of ‘relation as a primary genus’ against the widespread Nominalistic doctrine that advocated an anti-realistic understanding of the categories. Confirming that Fonseca’s realistic view, although not entirely original, is connected with a metaphysical interpretation of the categorial relation that deserves further inquiry, Martins’ chapter concludes by mainly paying attention to some aspects of the most important texts devoted to relations after Fonseca’s ones, especially Suárez’s Disputation XLVII. While Martins underlines the need for a deeper inquiry on the semantic and logic presuppositions of Fonseca’s text, he also points out that such limitations could only be overstepped thanks to a new overall approach to a philosophical category theory. The comparison with Suárez ideally continues in Giuseppe Capriati’s Fonseca on Causation, which challenges the common historiographical view that attributes to the Spanish Jesuit a crucial reformulation of the problem of causation in late scholasticism, and even depicts him as a precursor of early modern conceptions thereof. Convincingly, Capriati states that Fonseca’s treatment of causation, although it represents ‘a rather confusing and disjointed treatment’, is however among the most important and detailed in early modern scholasticism, and it may very well

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be the first with such a degree of complexity in scholasticism altogether, as far as metaphysics is concerned, at least. Paying close attention to book V of Fonseca’s Metaphysics mostly, Capriati looks at the Portuguese Jesuit as one of the most radical advocates of causality as a specifically metaphysical problem. Moreover, the author defines Fonseca’s conception of general causality as ‘transcendental, in that it is inherently tied to being and metaphysics, and it focuses on causation as transcending any specific kind (natural, supernatural) or genre (material, formal, efficient, final) of causality.’ The chapter thoroughly follows Fonseca’s doctrine on the individual genres of causes, though not overlooking the three different courses Fonseca pursues to understand causation, the number of its genres, and its features. One may note how Capriati justifies the different versions of the latter issue here, separated by a period of twelve years i.e. — the first four books of the Metaphysics were published in 1577 and the comment to the fifth and following books dates to 1589. Fonseca’s treatment of efficient causality is subtle and extensive but his conception of final causation stands up mainly due to its dual ‘ontological status’. Even though in the debate thereon Fonseca is following Cajetan’s conciliatory solution, Capriati claims the most original conclusion in Fonseca’s account of causation is linked to the fact that ‘real existence’ must be understood not as actual existence, but as virtual existence. Since causation and metaphysics are not only concerned with actual being, but also with possible being, it is necessary to underline Capriati’s final words: ‘Fonseca’s conception of final causation is so modern that it even surpasses his ontology, inclining toward an ontological dilatation the likes of which will only be seen in Protestant scholasticism a few decades later.’ Dealing with Fonseca’s doctrine of unum, relating it both to its historical context and to its legacy in Suárez, Igor Agostini’s chapter is also undoubtedly innovative. In The transcendentals properties of Being and the doctrine of Unum in Pedro da Fonseca. A perspicuous case of neglected Platonic origins of the Metaphysica generalis”, Agostini reaches a threefold conclusion. First, that Fonseca lies at the origin of Suárez’s subsequent reduction of the transcendentals. Second, that he is a part of that Thomistic tradition asserting the primacy of unum over the transcendentals — a doctrine which would be received by Suarez. Third, that Fonseca constitutes the main polemical objective of Suárez’s account for the formal reason of unum. Starting from Fonseca’s revision of the canonic list of six transcendentals and its reduction to four basic properties, Agostini does not only stress that ‘Fonseca’s treatise on unum constitutes, in fact, a true mise au point of the entire doctrine of the transcendentals or, at least, of its basic points’, but he also reckons that it exhibits an original feature, for Fonseca explicitly relates that doctrine both to Aristotle and Plato’s Parmenides. As a matter of fact, the ‘first great Jesuit commentator of Aristotle’s Metaphysics strongly defends the long-standing idea of Plato’s superiority over Aristotle’. Finally, Agostini focuses on the main point of disagreement between Suárez and Fonseca, i.e. the latter’s negative definition of the formal reason of unum as ‘undivided being.’ Identifying Fonseca’s account of unum with a broader development of Cajetan’s view, Suárez would challenge the most original feature of Fonseca’s doctrine. However, following the debate on unum in Baroque scholasticism, Fonseca will ‘continue to be seen as the eminent advocate of the doctrine of unum as a negation’.

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The volume closes with Simone Guidi’s chapter, Fonseca on Substance, Subsistence, and Supposit. Having recalled the general foundations of Fonseca’s doctrine of categorial ens, Guidi thoroughly reconstructs Fonseca’s questions about substance in general, primary substance and, above all, the notion of ‘supposit’. Treating these issues, the Jesuit’s attitude towards a terminist approach to metaphysics — often ending up in tangled terminological analysis — which is conciliated with both the aim of philosophizing at the service of the fundamental doctrines of Christian faith, here Trinitarianism, and with a strong defense of ‘existential integralism’, i.e. the ontological preeminence of primary substance over everything else existing, is particularly evident. As Guidi underlines, Fonseca follows Aquinas and anticipates Suárez in maintaining that substantia can be analogically attributed both to God and created beings, even though with important differences; but he also thinks of ‘primary substance’ within the need of keeping different semantic ranges of this concept and those of ‘nature’, ‘hypostasis’, and supposit’, so as to guarantee a terminological distinction which would allow us to talk of God’s one essence and his three persons. Likewise, Guidi emphasises how Fonseca’s theory of the metaphysical nature of the ‘supposit’ (an incommunicable primary substance) is entirely thought of so as to save a conceptual distinction between primary substance, nature and supposit, which plays different roles in God and his persons, but ultimately coincides in the human person and in overall created supposits. According to this reconstruction, Fonseca maintains that a primary substance is not just a nature singularized by the principle of individuation (for the Jesuit, Scotus’ haecceitas), but also a nature made incommunicable by a further principle. Drawing from the Thomistic tradition, but reinterpreting it in light of the actual identity of essence and existence, Fonseca holds that the very existence of the supposit as such is the element which ‘supposits’ or ‘personalizes’ nature, bestowing a specific mode of being on it and hence making it a primary substance. *** The whole composed by the chapters of this book is perhaps still incomplete, as many aspects of Fonseca’s thought which did not find room here deserve further investigation, however. Despite that, it is worth trying to draw some conclusions about the way Fonseca’s philosophy appears in the analyses put forward in the following pages. Pedro da Fonseca was not only an influential figure in Jesuitic humanistic culture and pedagogy, given his tireless effort for the development of the Society and his being a great representative of its humanistic stance. Fonseca was also a remarkable figure for the Renaissance and early modern metaphysics, as far as he represented one of the greatest restorers of Aristotelian philosophy in the sixteenth century. Extensively discussing each aspect of Aristotle’s text, and simultaneously drawing from three major scholastic traditions — Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism — Fonseca’s work conceptually laid the groundwork to let Suárez and many others rethink of first philosophy as separated from the traditional form of the commentary. Also, the role played in the genesis of the Cursus Conimbricensis contributed to making the Portuguese Jesuit a key figure in the development of early modern scholasticism and philosophy,

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as many of his ideas circulated also via these widely known texts, especially Couto’s Dialectics, a philosophical bestseller in seventeenth century Europe and not only. But what are the overall traits of Fonseca as a scholastic, and at least as a metaphysician, resulting from the many portraits contained in this book? If it is still hard to get definitive conclusions, one could say that Fonseca was a true scholastic of his time, and his thought is characterized by putting forward an effective compromise between the reasons of metaphysics and the truths and the instituted doctrines of theology. If more than a work has stressed out in the last few years the ultimately theological orientation of Suárez’s metaphysics, this conclusion is even truer when it comes to Fonseca. For the Portuguese Aristotle, human reason can build networks of concepts and doctrines so as to develop the ability to speak of being and its foundations, but such discourse does not cease to be an attempt to grasp something that our intellect is not allowed to experience directly. On the one hand, following a famous ban of the Aristotelian tradition, man cannot directly grasp what is truer and simpler, the pure forms and the pure metaphysical, universal truths of being. On the other hand, the human mind can however try to approach them exerting and perfecting discursive reasoning, the tools of dialectics, and bringing about an intense confrontation between the authorities of philosophy and theology. Therefore, first philosophy as a science is a linguistic and dialectical effort, but it is also grounded on solid humanistic and pedagogic bases, namely the teaching and the restoration of logical and dialectical techniques, as well as the seek for a kind of dissonant polyphony between the major masters of scholastic philosophy. This is why Fonseca’s work for reorganizing the Aristotelian dialectics in his Instructions is directly connected with his subsequent metaphysical enterprise. In addition, albeit dealing with countless topics in his Metaphysics, Fonseca constantly shows a significantly recurring approach there. The latter mainly consists in following the great defenders and commentators of Aquinas (Capreolus, Javelli, Cajetan, Silvestri) while understanding their accounts in light of a terministic approach, i.e. seeking for proper definitions that express their rationale, conceived as the ultimate solution to the issues at stake. Fonseca thereby operates by dwelling on thorough lexical distinctions especially, as well as by delving into endless lists of different doctrinal positions. He then constantly endeavours to reduce these elements to each other, or to find what he needs as the doctrinal anchor to develop his own account further therein. Such methodology confirms Fonseca’s aforementioned attention for dialectical reasoning, but it also stems from two additional aspects of his thought. Indeed, his adherence to the Thomistic tradition (similarly to many of his later Jesuit fellows) is grounded on explicitly non-Thomistic bases, given that Fonseca does not refrain from sympathizing with some positions of Scotus, the Nominalists and sometimes even with Renaissance Platonists, rejecting the real difference between essence and existence, conceiving the principle of individuation as haecceitas, understanding the one as a negation alone, and even while pledging to reconcile Scotus’s doctrine of the common nature and moderate realism on the problem of universals. In all of these cases, Fonseca has to rethink, often via complex reformulations of the original Thomistic lexicon, the doctrines he found among the Dominicans in order to keep them consistent with his entire metaphysical edifice. Yet, despite this approach, another emerging aspect of Fonseca’s metaphysics is a remarkable sense of constant transcendence, which crosses his entire philosophy

i nt ro d u ct i o n

and thus many of the chapters of this volume. Indeed, Fonseca never dismisses that strong foundational difference between the uncreated and the created being, the cause and the caused, which was the cornestone of medieval scholasticism. For Fonseca, it remains the primary relationship at the very ground of the world, and which human intelligence can somehow infer from visible and sensible effects. Finitude is the starting point for grasping, albeit confusedly or analogically, the infinite; as well as our understanding of created reality is the window through which what is uncreated can be glimpsed. Fonseca’s re-elaboration of the doctrine of the analogical predication of ens reflects this very idea of a ‘direct’ metaphysics as an impossible science, which comes to be naturally possible for man only by approximation. Although it might appear incoherent with a genuine intention of guaranteeing a metaphysical science, such a picture actually constitutes its basis, being then the starting point for other late scholastic attempts to refound first philosophy. While Fonseca is aware that metaphysics strives to approximate human intellect to God, he also knows that an intellect tied to a body never really goes beyond that special compound of sensory perception, language and concepts that our intelligence is. And it is exactly on this point that the Portuguese Jesuit, one of the harshest opponents of Platonism, even reveals historical and theoretical awareness about the possibility that, within the boundaries of scholasticism, Aristotelianism could be conciliated with a Neoplatonic vanishing point. Although reality is granted and founded elsewhere, namely in an entirely transcendent dimension which is unattainable for us, nonetheless our limited intellect has to go so far as to grasp it negatively, confusedly, and analogically, so as to ‘touch’ with words and concepts what it cannot touch with the senses or direct intuitions. This specific synthesis of medieval trends and traditions is what Fonseca seems to offer to the early modern age. And this is probably what the early modern age will also have to reject itself, in its attempt to attain — and even to demonstrate — the truths of metaphysics directly.

Abbreviations For the sake of brevity, the following abbreviations will be used in all chapters: CMA

Pedro da Fonseca, Commentariorum In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros (the edition used by the author of the chapter will be indicated therein). Institutionum Pedro da Fonseca, Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo (the edition used by the author of the chapter will be indicated therein). Isagoge Pedro da Fonseca, Isagoge philosophica (the edition used by the author of the chapter will be indicated therein). DM Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, in Francisco Suárez, Opera Omnia, 28 vols. (Paris: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856–78), vols 25–26 (first ed. Salamanca 1597). ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Leonine edition, vols 4–12).

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Section I

Fonseca and Jesuit Pedagogy

Cristiano Casalini

Pedro da Fonseca Humanism and the Jesuit Quest for a Philosophical Pedagogy

Introduction The influence of humanism on early Jesuit culture was strong. This is particularly true for the models of education they developed for their schools once Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the order, decided that the Society could get involved with the ministry of educating youth. In the educational panorama of sixteenth century, which was dominated by the two alternatives of humanistic schools and universities, the Jesuits were among those who tried to bridge such alternatives with a model where the culture of humane letters was considered a strong core of their pedagogy.1 The humanist influence so powerfully informed Jesuit pedagogy, that it has been noted that the early Jesuits did not need to provide a ‘philosophy of education’ because they drew such a philosophy directly from humanists.2 Aspects of such an influence have been widely studied and assessed by scholarship, especially with respect to the pedagogy of the humanities (grammar, humane letters, and rhetoric). These courses were the best attended at Jesuit schools, and they were the principal attraction drawing students to Jesuit instruction. But humanist culture had an impact on the Jesuit teaching of philosophy, as well. The relevance of philology, the relation to philosophical authorities, epistemological issues about the order between and within disciplines and their scopes and limits, the order of teaching and how to organize the philosophical course with respect to





1 See John W. O’Malley, ‘How the First Jesuits Became Involved in Education’, in The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th Anniversary Perspectives, ed. by Vincent J. Duminuco (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 56–74; Paul F. Grendler, Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning 1300–1600 (Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Grendler, The Universities of the Italian Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); and Grendler, The Jesuits and Italian Universities 1548–1773 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2017). 2 See O’Malley, ‘How Humanistic Is the Jesuit Tradition? From the 1599 Ratio Studiorum to Now’, in Jesuit Education 21: Conference Proceedings on the Future of Jesuit Higher Education, 25–29 June 1999, ed. by Martin R. Tripole (Philadelphia: Saint Joseph’s University, 2000), pp. 189–201. Cristiano Casalini  •  Institute for Advanced Jesuit Studies, Boston College Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 21-37 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131757

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explaining the text, lecturing, and disputing were among the most relevant themes that would reveal humanist concerns in the Jesuit philosophical program. Although bound to follow the doctrines of St Thomas Aquinas in theology and Aristotle in philosophy, many Jesuits developed interests and features for their scholastic philosophy that reflected the background culture of the environments in which they operated. In places where humanist influence was strong, such as the Italian peninsula or centers where humanists had operated colleges or academies with success, humanist traits, themes, method, and even controversies helped shape Jesuits’ philosophy and teaching.3 One of such cases of Jesuits was Pedro da Fonseca, whose distinctiveness in the domain of philosophy has been often associated with his reputation as ‘the Portuguese Aristotle’ and as an author capable of a Latin prose that was not so typical in the late scholastic debate.4 His Institutiones Dialecticae (1564) were recommended by several versions of the Jesuit Ratio studiorum, including the final and official one (1599), and new editions and reprints of it kept appearing throughout the early modern period. Fonseca’s reputation is also linked to his major work, the Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, whose four volumes appeared between 1577 and 1611 (the last two been published posthumously). To conclude what seemed to be a consistent plan of research, Fonseca published his own Isagoge (1591) to replace Porphyry’s.5 Fonseca’s name is also connected to the editorial history of the Cursus Conimbricensis, a project he would eventually abandon, leaving it to be completed by Manuel de Góis.6 Fonseca had been exposed to humanistic culture on at least three occasions: when he attended the Royal College of Arts in Coimbra as a student; then as a teacher; and finally during his later stay in Rome as a Portuguese delegate to the General Congregation. In the last instance, his stay extended to ten years beyond the congregation.7 He would be praised both by contemporaries and by later historians of philology and philosophy for the humanist features of his work in both his dialectical and metaphysical writings.

3 The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms trans. by George E. Ganss (St Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1996), pp. 182–83. However, the passage does not specify any manner in which Jesuit lecturers ought to follow these authorities. 4 See José Vaz de Carvalho, ‘Fonseca, Pedro da’, in Diccionario histórico de la Compañía de Jesús. Biográfico-Temático, ed. by Charles E. O’Neill, S. J. and Joaquín Mª Domínguez, S. J. (Madrid-Rome: Universidad Pontificia Comillas-Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 2001), 2: 1478; Amândio Coxito and Maria Luísa Soares Couto, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, in História do Pensamento Filosófico Português, ed. by Pedro Calafate, vol. II (Lisbon: Edições Caminho, 2001), pp. 455–502. 5 In every edition of any of his previous works, Fonseca advises his readers about his plan to publish, after his Institutiones Dialecticae, a Metaphysics and an Isagoge. 6 See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Fonseca, Pedro da’, Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia, ed. by Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi, doi: 10.5281/zenodo.2563270, latest revision: January, 29th, 2020. 7 As this paper was written during Covid-19 pandemic, it was impossible to conduct the necessary archival research to have biographical details finally emerge on Fonseca’s exposure to humanistic culture. I regret to defer such an inquiry to better times.

pe d ro da fo nseca

But where exactly can we track humanist influences in Fonseca’s works? And how? The present study aims to consider the text and context of Fonseca’s writings in relation to humanism, under the categories of philology, style, relation to the philosophical authorities, teaching method, and, finally, epistemology.

1. Philology and Latin Style A clearly humanist trait can be tracked in the philological accuracy with which Fonseca edited Aristotle’s text in his commentaries.8 This is most evident and has been noted many times by scholars: Fonseca’s commentaries offer a dual language edition with the Ancient Greek on the odd page and its Latin translation on the even one, both surrounded by a rich explanatio that often lingers on philological speculations.9 In the sixteenth-century panorama of editions and — most of all — translations of Aristotle’s texts, Fonseca’s own edition and translation came late and with clear signs of his philological awareness. As historians of Renaissance philosophy noted, one of the major influences of the humanist movement back in late fifteenth century was that of triggering the publication of an incredible number of editions and translations of ancient Greek authors.10 Although emphasis has been often put on authors that were not mainstream in university curricula, such an editorial endeavor included pillars of the university philosophical cultures such as Aristotle and the Arab medieval commentators themselves, so often blamed by humanists for their lack of knowledge of ancient Greek. Establishing the original text and purifying it of spurious readings and later corruptions meant offering the possibility of interpreting what Aristotle really meant, over against erroneous commentaries and hermeneutic traditions. This does not mean that the mastering of ancient Greek and the presence of the Greek texts became mainstream in the editions of the sixteenth-century commentaries, however. Latin translations were provided especially during the first half of the century with the intent of finally overcoming the de verbo ad verbum method that had

8 Cf. Miguel Baptista Pereira, Ser e Pessoa. Pedro da Fonseca I — O Método da Filosofia (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1967), pp. 339–40. Earlier, Cassiano Abranches praised Fonseca’s commentary for his critical and philological sensitivity, qualities that, as Abranches wrote, ‘put it closely to modern commentaries and critical editions.’ Abranches, ‘Pedro da Fonseca: Valor e projecção da sua obra’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 16 (1960), p. 120. 9 See Severiano Tavares, ‘Pedro da Fonseca: Sua vida e obra’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 9 (1953), pp. 344–53; Ramon Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599). Su Critica del Texto de la Metafísica de Aristóteles’, Revista de Filosofia 2/4 (1943), pp. 125–46; Carvalho, ‘Tra Fonseca e Suárez: una metafisica incompiuta a Coimbra’, Quaestio, 9 (2009), pp. 41–59. 10 Literature on this topic is vast. See P. O. Kristeller, The Classics and Renaissance Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); J. Monfasani (ed. by), Kristeller Reconsidered. Essays on His Life and Scholarship (New York: Italica Press, 2006); John Monfasani, ‘Toward the genesis of the Kristeller thesis of Renaissance humanism: four bibliographical notes’, Renaissance Quarterly, 53 (2000), pp. 1156–73. Studies by Cesare Vasoli, Remigio Sabbadini, Eugenio Garin, Charles Lohr, Charles Schmitt, and Paul Grendler to mention but a few are milestones in such historiography.

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been employed by medieval translators. Controversies and debates arose upon what kind of language and vocabulary had to be used to establish the true meaning of the ancient Greek text, but one thing was common: previous translations were based on inaccurate ancient Greek texts and their Latin was confused, ugly, and often wrong.11 Fonseca’s purpose and method in editing his Commentaries was aligned with the humanist emphasis on philology. As his monumental endeavor of publishing four volumes of commentaries fell short — he died before publishing the third volume and completing the fourth one — scholars have been able to make hypotheses on Fonseca’s method: establishing the ancient Greek first, translating and explaining it, and finally producing his personal commentary. In fact, the fourth volume — the symbol of what has been called ‘the unfinished Metaphysics’ — lacks questions and comments, offering only the texts and explanation.12 A comparative analysis of the explanations in the four volumes allows also for making hypotheses on the impact of Fonseca’s presence in Rome on his text criticism. The first two volumes offer insights on the availability of codes (one of which can probably be tracked to the Vatican Library and its erudite environments) that allowed Fonseca to distance his text from the majority of other current editions, while philological, comparative notes such as these are almost completely lacking in the explanatio in the third volume, which was apparently drafted once Fonseca got back to Portugal.13 In particular, a note in the explanation of Aristotle 984b 19, revealed Fonseca’s philologically original approach with respect to that one of Basil Bessarion, Joachim Perion and John Argyropulos, that is, the major editions available at the time. The conflicting renditions of this line by these three most renowned editors and translators pushed Fonseca (‘scrupulum evulsit’) to consult what he considered a reliable and philologically authoritative manuscript held by Cardinal Guglielmo Sirleto, at the time custodian of the Vatican Library, and provide a different version, which would prove to be the one followed in later and modern editions of the text.14 In explaining other lines (1014a 43 and 1016b 17–18), Fonseca would rely again on the same code to check on and confirm the versions of another renowned humanist and editor, Guillaume Budé, and would make use of other manuscripts and codes whenever the occasion would require an accurate assessment of the original text.15 11 See Anthony Grafton, ‘The Availability of Ancient Works’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 777; Brian Copenhaver and Charles Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 12 António Manuel Martins, ‘A metafísica inacabada de Fonseca’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 47 (1991), pp. 526–27; and António Manuel Martins, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’s Unfinished Metaphysics: The First Systematic Jesuit Metaphysics before Suárez’, Jesuit Philosophy in the Eve of Modernity, ed. by Cristiano Casalini (Boston: Brill, Leiden), 2019, pp. 327–46. 13 See the accurate essay on this by Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, p. 130. 14 Cf. Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, pp. 131–32. 15 As an example, when commenting on the line 1023b 27, Fonseca opposes a code from the library of Caterina de’ Medici, queen consort of France from 1547 until 1559. Cf. Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, p. 141.

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Fonseca often alludes to manuscript ancient Greek codes in plural terms as available to him in order to show the comparative method through which he was calibrating his text criticism. As Ceñal remarked, such text criticism would seldom abandon the most accepted rendition of the text (as in the Aldine edition princeps), except when forced by contextual necessity, as in the case of evident typos or the uncertainties and ambiguities as in the interpretation of the lines I mentioned above.16 As for the Latin translation, Fonseca’s work appeared remarkable in the eyes of his contemporaries, particularly Francisco Suárez, who would praise his fellow Jesuit’s prose as ‘so elegant and clear, that practically anyone can understand it almost without any explanation’.17 Suárez’s appreciation highlighted both style and accuracy in Fonseca’s Latin, qualities that he evidently found neither in the widespread works of Argyropulos and Bessarion, nor in the Ciceronian versions of Joachim Perion or Denys Lambin. With respect to such predecessors of his, Fonseca much preferred making references to Argyropulos and Bessarion rather than to Perion, whose style Fonseca rejected on more than one occasion.18 It is clear that the two aspects of style and precision are of primary concern for Fonseca himself. In his Admonitio to the reader in the first volume of his commentaries, he provides a methodological statement about his interpretation: We have first tried to achieve a rendering of Aristotle that is both faithful and serviceable. For the literal interpretations that are being circulated, while they aim at fidelity, are not intelligible in many passages. And since they are speaking Greek in Latin words, they often replace various ideas with different ones. However even if we find greater intelligibility in those statements that are more manageable, we still have less confidence [about their meaning], especially among those whose authors put more effort into polishing the speech (something the Philosopher does not really care about) than in extracting and rendering the true meaning. Then in the explanation of those things said by Aristotle, we have endeavored to use all the best authors, especially Aristotle himself, if he has anywhere seemed to us to have been an interpreter of himself. Still, we have done this in such a way that we have not so much set forth what that man ought to have thought as what he actually did think. That is the only relevant method of exposition.19

16 Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, pp. 135–36. 17 DM, Index Locupletissimus, I, 6, p. iv: ‘legantur expositores, et praesertim Fonseca, cujus translatio tam est elegans et dilucida, ut fere sine expositore a quovis intelligi possit’. 18 Criticism to Perion had been previously raised by Nicolas de Grouchy among others. Grouchy taught at the Royal College of Arts in Coimbra when also Fonseca was a student there. 19 ‘Illud primum efficere conati sumus, ut contextum Aristotelicum & sincere ad veritatem, & commode ad usum verteremus. Namque interpretationes ad verbum, quae circumferuntur, dum fidem servare loquantur, non intelliguntur plurimis in locis; et, cum Graece et Latinis verbis loquantur, nonnunquam aliam sententiam pro alia subijciunt. In ijs autem, quo magis sunt tractabiles, et si maior intelligentia, minor tamen fides cernitur; in ijs praesertim, quarum auctores plus studij in poliendo sermone (quod Philosophus non valde curat) quam in vero sensu eruendo, & reddendo ponunt. Deinde in explanatio eorum, quae ab Aristotele dicuntur, dedimus operam, ut praecipuis quibusque, auctoribus uteremur, ipso praesertim Aristotele, sicubi sui interpres nobis fuisse usus

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Fonseca’s cautionary warning reflected the humanist dismay for the de verbo ad verbum method, a tradition that tracked back to William of Moerbeke. Many scholars criticized this method both because those who employed it had failed to master the Greek language and because they distorted the original meanings by juxtaposing individual Latin words to Greek ones. On the other side, Fonseca thought that Renaissance translators such as Perion would equally betray Aristotle’s text by forcing it into an eloquent Latin style that did not have philological, historical roots in the original. As Fonseca believed, Aristotle was not that flumen eloquentiae (at least, not in his Metaphysics) that others had believed he was. The result of Fonseca’s middle way was a faithful translation that aimed at convincing because of its philological accuracy. In this sense a product in the line of Argyropulos and Bessarion’s translations with the improvements that an attentive work of text criticism would have brought.20 Providing his own edition of the Greek text, Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614) would repeatedly engage with Fonseca’s editorial solutions and Latin version.21 At the same time, Fonseca’s care for an accurate language won the reputation of an eloquent great Latin writer, another typical mark of humanist praise. In his De cultura ingeniorum, the first chapter in the Bibliotheca Selecta (1593), Antonio Possevino lists Fonseca among those theologians of the Society of Jesus whose doctrines were coupled with a fluent Latin prose–evidence that Possevino brought to counter Juan Huarte’s denial that intellectual skills could come together with literary style.22 In book XIII of his Bibliotheca Selecta (‘De Philosophia’), Possevino would mention Fonseca again among the philosophers of the Society of Jesus who commendably est: quo dita tamen fecimus, ut non tam exponeremus quid ille sentire debuerit, quam quid re vera senserit; quae sola est germana explananda ratio’. CMA (Romae: apud Francisum Zanettium et Bartolomaeum Tosium, 1587), Admonitio, s.n. 20 An example of Fonseca’s inclination in terms of vocabulary and style is the beginning sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which deals with the desire of knowing that is connatural to human beings, and which Fonseca renders with ‘omnes homines natura scire appetunt’, instead of adopting the verb ‘desiderant’ which can be found in many other translations of the time. The same expression is adopted by Agostino Nifo in his Augustini Niphi… Expositiones in Aristotelicis Libros Metaphysices (Venetiis: Hieronymus Scotus, 1559), p. 1. Bessarion’s translation used ‘desiderant’ instead. 21 For Casaubon’s engagement with Fonseca’s work, see Ceñal, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, in particular pp. 136–45. 22 ‘Petrus Fonseca (de quo post, cum philosophica suo loco attingam) Benedictus Perrerius [sic], Gregorius Valentia, Franciscus Ribera, qui in duodecim Prophetas scripsit, Petrus Ribadeneyra, Iosephus Acosta, & ceteri an Latine scripserint, nemo tam rudis est, quin sentiat”. Antonii Possevini Bibliotheca Selecta (Romae: ex typographia Apostolica Vaticanae, 1593), I, p. 28. It is interesting to note that Possevino here enthusiastically refers to the completion of the Cursus conimbricensis, the first part of which had only been published at that time. ‘Collegium Societatis nostrae Conimbricense in Lusitania Philosophiae curriculum novissime edidit, quo nescio an quidquam vel acriori iudicio, vel aptiore dicendi, vel sinceriore philosophandi genere umquam ad nos manarit’. (Bibliotheca Selecta, p. 28). Why Possevino dropped this final praise of the cursus from his text in the Italian edition of his De cultura ingeniorum is something worth to be further investigated. Certainly, that was not caused by simple neglect. In fact, Possevino refined this passage very carefully, as the insertion of Juan de Maldonado and Juan Azor in the theologians’ list seem to indicate. Cf. Antonio Possevino, Coltura degl’ingegni, ed. by C. Casalini and L. Salvarani (Rome: Anicia, Rome), p. 144.

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interpreted Aristotle. When referring to the recently published commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Possevino claims that Fonseca’s merit consists in his covering almost all the questions pertaining to philosophy in such a way as to combine doctrine and piety.23

2. Authorities The range of authorities that Fonseca references includes, of course, humanists and authors that the humanist editorial endeavor had brought to the fore in the philosophical conversation of the sixteenth century. To the list of humanist editors and translators of Aristotle’s corpus mentioned above (Argyropulos, Bessarion, Perion, Budé), it is interesting to note that Fonseca makes a reference to Erasmus, although a critical one.24 As the opinions with which Fonseca engaged in his Institutiones Dialecticae opened upon the broader Greek and Latin traditions (Cicero, Boethius, Plato, Alcinous in addition to St Augustine and St Thomas), with the remarkable addition of the humanist Rodolphus Agricola,25 Metaphysics commentaries are usually expected to be confined within the boundaries of the scholastic tradition. Of course, Thomas Aquinas recurs as a milestone, especially when a topic combines matters of faith and theology (in the second volume of his Metaphysics the humanity of Christ and the nature of God are extensively treated). Opinions by William Durand of SaintPourçain, Hervaeus Natalis, and other medieval commentators are often reported, sometimes with criticism. Greek and classical authorities are particularly present in the first volume of Fonseca’s commentaries to Metaphysics, although this fact does not make this work distinctive within the scenario of sixteenth century Aristotelianism. Hesiod and Homer, Socrates, the Stoics, and Cicero among others are given more than simple mentions, while Plato’s doctrine on ideas is analyzed at length. Alexander of Aphrodisias is praised by Fonseca as interpretum Princeps, a twofold expression that points to both the fact that Alexander was the first to collect and comment on Aristotle’s works, and the accuracy of his works: 23 ‘Sed in Metaphysicen Aristotelis Petrus Fonseca novissime Commentarios, hanc ipsam rationem secutus, emisit: quibus quoniam quaestiones pene ad omnem Philosophiam spectantes complexus est, uberem ac doctam ad enodandos plerosque nodos cum pietate materiam praebet’. Possevino, Bibliotheca Selecta, I, p. 105. 24 The Jesuit attitude toward northern Europe humanism has been widely and accurately assessed by Paul Grendler in Grendler, ‘The Attitudes of the Jesuits Toward Erasmus’, in Collaboration, Conflict, and Continuity in the Reformation. Essays in Honour of James M. Estes on his Eightieth Birthday, ed. by Konrad Eisenbichler (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2014), pp. 363–85; and Grendler, ‘The Attitudes of the Jesuits toward Vives’, in Neo-Latin and the Humanities. Essays in Honour of Charles E. Fantazzi, ed. by Luc Dietz and others (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2014), pp. 123–42. 25 See Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, ‘Pedro da Fonseca, Sixteenth-Century Portuguese Philosopher’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1966), p. 636.

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Ita paucis quibusdam verbis excerptis, de quibus haud magnopere pugnandum est, nihil pene cum in aliis, tum in hoc etiam volumine reperias, quod ex aliis eiusdem Philosophi locis confirmari non possit.26 If seen in the light of the Jesuit philosophical environments, this praise by Fonseca is remarkable. The name of Alexander of Aphrodisias was in fact often associated with the controversies that his interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology had triggered earlier on at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Council Lateran V intervened to reject those who, in the name of the double truth theory, could go as far as to deny that individual, rational souls were immortal. Both Averroists and what came to be called ‘Alexandrists’ were perceived as the main target of the Bull Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo.27 The question that the Bull posed particularly to Aristotelian philosophers was about how far their interpretation of Aristotle’s text could be pushed in terms of orthodoxy to the detriment of what the original text apparently meant. Among the variegated ways Renaissance Aristotelians reacted to this challenge, one was that of dismissing the effort of ‘christianizing’ Aristotle, and contributing to build a ‘pious Christian philosophy’ which considered including authorities other than Aristotle alone. To this end, the typically humanist cultivation of Platonic traditions, cabbalistic culture, and ‘Mosaic philosophy’ offered a variety of new sources to which Catholic philosophers, among whom there were also some prominent Jesuits, looked in order to overcome the impasses that their reading of Aristotle led them to face in terms of faith. A clear example of this attitude is represented by Benet Perera, philosopher and theologian who taught at the Collegio Romano from 1558 till the end of his life. His attitude toward Aristotle and his commentators and his method of teaching raised a famous controversy at the Collegio in the 1560s, and it was not still entirely settled when Fonseca moved to Rome and published his Institutiones Dialecticae. In several respects, Perera’s position echoed Fonseca’s: 1) Aristotle must be preferably read in ancient Greek; 2) one must preferably interpret Aristotle through Aristotle rather than through commentators; 3) medieval commentators did not know ancient Greek so they could make terrible mistakes; 4) the best commentators of Aristotle were the Greek ones, Alexander of Aphrodisias in particular; 5) some theories by the best

26 CMA I, Proemium, p. 8. 27 On the impact of the Apostolici regiminis on philosophers see M. D. Price, ‘The Origins of Lateran V’s Apostolici Regiminis’, Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum, XVII (1985), pp. 464–72; Grendler, The Universities, pp. 281–89; E. A. Constant, ‘A Reinterpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council Decree Apostolici Regiminis’, Sixteenth Century Journal, 33 (2002), pp. 353–79; and N. H. Minnich, ‘The Role of Schools of Theology in the Councils of the Late Medieval and Renaissance Periods: Konstanz to Lateran V’, in I Padri e le scuole teologiche nei concili, ed. by J. Grohe and others (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), pp. 84–88. See the more recent Christoph Sander, ‘In dubio pro fide. The Fifth Council of the Lateran Decree Apostolici Regiminis (1513) and its Impact on Early Jesuit Education and Pedagogy’, Educazione. Giornale di pedagogia critica, 3/1 (2014), pp. 39–62; and Grendler, ‘Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo: Italian Preachers Defend the Immortality of the Soul’, Alle ricerca di soluzioni: Nuova luce sul V Concilio Lateranense. Studi per ii 500 anni del Concilio, ed. by Nelson Minnich (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2019), pp. 273–303.

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commentators of Aristotle are controversial in matters of faith, so they cannot help with building a Christian philosophy. 6) since philosophical authorities are human beings, they can be mistaken, so one has to stick to truth.28 In his teaching, Perera became known for organizing the order of questions to be addressed differently than they were presented within Aristotle’s text, a method that he would take further in his masterpiece De communibus rerum omnium principiis (Rome, 1576) and one that Suárez would adopt and perfect in his Disputationes metaphysicae. Yet, Perera’s doctrines and method were met with opposition from Achille Gagliardi, a fellow Jesuit teaching at the Collegio Romano, and — most of all — Diego de Ledesma, the influential prefect of studies. This controversy, which began in the mid 1560s, went on for years and was barely settled when Fonseca moved to Rome.29 After Ledesma’s death and Gagliardi’s move to northern Italy, Perera was appointed to the prestigious Chair of Sacred Scripture at the Collegio Romano, a position that he held until he died. This could mean nothing other than a victory for his approach. Lohr noted that the conclusion of this controversy also marked a shift in the overall climate of Jesuit philosophy with respect to the call of the Apostolici regiminis sollicitudo, and he remarked that Fonseca’s commentaries on Metaphysics reflected, from a philological point of view, such a shift: The abandonment of Ledesma’s attempt to identify vera philosophia and philosophia secundum Aristotelem implied, on the one hand, a new attitude toward Aristotle’s text and, on the other, a new conception of the philosopher’s task. The commentary of Pedro da Fonseca on the Metaphysics represents the philological side of this option, Suárez’ independent treatise the philosophical.30 If Lohr is correct, then one should understand Fonseca’s warning that in his work Aristotle was interpreted for what he really meant and not for what he ought to mean as a philological reflection of the newly-assumed irreconciliability between the entirety of Aristotle’s metaphysics with Christian faith. In this light, Fonseca’s praise of Alexander of Aphrodisias echoes an attitude that was shared at least by leading figures of Jesuit philosophy in the Roman environments while Fonseca stayed there.

28 Christoph Sander and I have edited and commented on a crucial source by Perera on these issues. See Casalini and Sander, ‘Benet Perera’s Pious Humanism. Aristotelianism, Philology and Education in Jesuit Colleges. An Edition of Perera’s Documenta quaedam perutilia’, History of Universities, 30, 1/2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1–42. On Perera, see Paul Richard Blum, ‘Benedictus Pererius. Renaissance Culture at the Origins of Jesuit Science’, Science and Education, 15, 2–4 (2006), pp. 279–304; and the most exhaustive Benet Perera (Pererius, 1535–1610). A Renaissance Jesuit at the Crossroads of Modernity, ed. by Marco Lamanna and Marco Forlivesi, special issue of Quaestio. Journal for the History of Metaphysics, 14 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014). 29 Sander, ‘The War of the Roses. The Debate between Diego de Ledesma and Benet Perera about the Philosophy Course at the Jesuit College in Rome’, Quaestio, 14 (2014), pp. 42–44; see also, Marcus Hellyer, Catholic Physics: Jesuit Natural Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), in particular Part 1. 30 Ch. Lohr, ‘Jesuit Aristotelianism and Sixteenth-Century Metaphysics’, in Paradosis: Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain, ed. by Harry George Fletcher and Mary Beatrice Schulte (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), p. 218.

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Another sign of this shared culture is provided by the two critical warnings that Fonseca gave his readers in advance. On one hand, he said his Commentaries would avoid the fussy diligence of the medieval commentators (‘declinaremus molestam Latinorum Scholasticorum diligentiam’), for they overshadow the explanation of the context of the authors with redundant distinctions and sub-subdivisions; on the other hand, the Commentaries would avoid the articulate expositions of the Greek commentators, whose abundant eloquence often prevented grasping the real order of reasoning (ordo doctrinae) of Aristotle’s text. This methodological vindication of Fonseca’s own clarity and usefulness is combined with a refusal to claim any ultimate philosophical authority. Fonseca states this with the same words Perera used, words drawn from Horace: ‘ut in nullius verba doctoris, cum de rebus philosophicis agitur, iurandum putavimus, ita nullius vel inferior notae Philosophi sententiam reiecimus, quae nobis cum vero maxime consentire videretur; agnoscentes plane, veritatem, a quocunque dicatur, a prima veritate profectam esse’.31

3. Intended Readers An interesting perspective on Fonseca’s works is that of his intended audience. The Institutiones Dialecticae, which the Ratio studiorum of the Society of Jesus recommend as a textbook for all Jesuit schools, were meant in fact as a contribution to the pedagogy of the Royal College of Arts in Coimbra, an institution that was entrusted to the Jesuits by King John III of Portugal but was not a Jesuit institution per se. In his Preface, Fonseca tracked the origins of his work back to the decision by the University of Coimbra to eliminate the habit of teaching Aristotle by means of summulae and questions (perhaps his target was Peter of Spain in particular) and texts that had been prepared in the past, and to embrace the method of privileging the direct exposition of Aristotle’s text.32 Fonseca praises such a decision, deploring past practices with a typically humanist rebuke: Adeo inops fuit politioris Literaturae superior aetas, ut cum omnes, qui Philosophiae studia consectabantur, Aristotelici haberi vellent, paucissimi essent, qui Aristotelem evolverent.33 Yet, even good decisions can bring problems. In fact, as Fonseca admits, this policy boosted the practice of teachers dictating in class, a practice that involved a lot of time and inevitably squeezed the time that would have been better spent in lecturing and disputing.34 Such a waste of time had a further negative impact: teachers of arts were 31 CMA, Admonitio, s.n. [2]. 32 CMA, Admonitio, s.n. [1]. 33 Institutionum, ‘Praefatio’, Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo. Auctore Petro Fonseca ex Societate Iesu (Olyssipone: J. Blávio, 1564), s.n. [1]. 34 ‘Verum haec docendi ratio, & si longe melior, & utilior, quam illa superior habebatur, tamen ob assiduum scribendi laborem, incredibilem discipulis (ut de praeceptoribus taceam) molestiam, difficultatemque afferebat’, ibidem. The growing dissatisfaction with dictating at universities was at

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impeded from going through the entire books that the plan of studies required and an insufficient sliver of time was left to exercising students in disputations. For these reasons, as Fonseca recollects, the superior general of the order asked him to compose a brief and insightful explanation of those books that the bad practice of dictation denied to the students of philosophy. Therefore, the first audience of the Institutiones is constituted by students of humanities who, before progressing to philosophical studies, can benefit from an introductory knowledge of those dialectics which they would not learn once entangled with the pedagogy established for philosophy by the university. Moreover, Fonseca affirms that he was all the more willing to write the Institutiones because the best talents whom he saw studying at the Royal College of Arts used to move directly from humanities to the courses of Law, skipping philosophy altogether. The Institutiones were thus meant for humanities students who may have shown no interest in philosophy at all. Eo autem libentius hoc quasi integrum Dialecticae corpus confeci, quod videam multos praeclari ingenij iuvenes ab humanioribus literis ad iuris peritiam statim commigrare, qui, si vel hac institutione prius imbuantur, multo maiores facturi sint in illis literis progressus.35 Fonseca also offered a more detailed timetable, for he did not intend that this entire book should be used and taught before Porphyry’s Isagoge (which was normally considered as the introductory text to Aristotle’s Logic). Fonseca recommended that the first three months of schools be spent in providing a general description of dialectic and picking several questions from the Institutiones that could help to that purpose. Then, in what seems like an astonishing change of pace, the first six out of the 8 books composing the Institutiones were to be explained between late October to Christmas day; less than two months. The final two books should be postponed, as Fonseca says, to the summer period, for they could be of help to introduce students and the Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations which were normally taught at the beginning of the academic year. As for the audience of the commentaries on Metaphysics, it has been noted that Fonseca did not write these volumes with the practical purpose of teaching,36 and that this explains the epistemology behind his work. In fact, Fonseca’s tone in his defense of the wide array of questions his commentaries would cover, so potentially eliciting objections and criticism from both ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ disciplines, betrays the fact that an extensive use of his work was prohibitive for teaching. At the same

the base for the development of textbooks and manuals as a literary genre. See Casalini, Aristóteles em Coimbra. Cursus Conimbricensis e a Educação no Colegium Artium (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 2016). 35 Institutionum, Praefatio, s.n. [3]. 36 See Carvalho, ‘Fonseca,’ and António Manuel Martins, Lógica e Ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca (Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994). Such an attitude of Fonseca has been explained in terms of ‘methodological turn’, as the Preface to the second edition of the Institutionum would prove with Fonseca’s critical reference to the Summulae teaching method of the university of Coimbra. It seems to me, though, that such remarks were already present in the Preface of the 1564 Lisbon edition.

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time, such a monumental endeavor responded to the need that Fonseca felt for establishing his Metaphysics within clearer epistemological boundaries, a need that would become a real program with Suárez’s disputations. Such boundaries are set by Fonseca around the nature of Metaphysics as philosophia prima, an expression which he interprets: 1) as containing the most common questions pertaining to all disciplines (hos opus omnibus disciplinis commune est); 2) as appropriately addressing questions that it shares with other disciplines but can best and most accurately address; 3) as legitimately advocating questions that are normally treated by lower disciplines because of its superiority and greater dignity. At the same time, Fonseca reclaims for the metaphysicians the opportunity to treat questions that are commonly explained by the theologians through natural reasons and that perhaps involve the defense of the true Christian faith from pagan (Ethnici) opinions.37 The contours of this epistemology seem to point to a learned reader who has already completed his courses of study rather than a class of philosophy students in Jesuit schools. Still, the address to the Philosophiae studioso of the second volume of Fonseca’s commentaries makes clear mentions of considering this Metaphysics as an integral part of the course of Philosophy — mostly referring to the enterprise of the Cursus Conimbricensis that would be taken up by Manuel de Góis. Such mentions pertain to several indexes that Fonseca thought it expedient to produce, so as to help readers to orient themselves and explore the commentaries at various stages of their studies: Porro ut facilior esset usus nostrae huius commentationis in toto progressu cursus Philosophici, attexendum curavimus, indici alphabetico huius voluminis proprio, alterum indicem utrique volumini commune; in quo, servato ordine eorum, quae Philosophia auditoribus explicari solent, indicantur ea quae nos de eisdem rebus in hoc opere disputamus. Fecimus item adiungi tertium ad usum Theologorum.38 In sum, Fonseca intended that his Metaphysics be available for a variety of scholars, something that made his commentaries a sort of epistemological and educational in-between that did not necessarily fit the timetable and program of the classes of philosophy. At the same time, as most of Fonseca’s emphasis was put on the edition of the text and its explanation, that part of the work could hardly be intended for students, for their philological skills (particularly those in ancient Greek) were normally barely sufficient to make a direct use of it.

4. Humanist Influences in Theory? Another possible way to track Fonseca’s relation to the humanist culture is to check on whether the content of his works reflected issues as brought to the philosophical

37 All quotations in this paragraph are in CMA, Admonitio, s.n. [2–3]. 38 CMA, Philosophiae Studioso, s.n.

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fore by humanists during the sixteenth century. An example of such issues was the controversy that was raised by Petrus Ramus with his logic.39 Given the popularity Fonseca’s Institutiones enjoyed, especially within Jesuit schools and eventually with the official recommendation by the Ratio studiorum, one should conclude that this work must have seemed a standard in the philosophical environments of the Society of Jesus. This fact is confirmed by Jennifer Ashworth, who included Fonseca among the authors of ‘traditional logic’, a group that included Crisostomo Javelli, Agostino Nifo, and Francisco de Toledo — a Jesuit fellow of Fonseca — during the period 1530–1600.40 In fact, with respect to Ramus’s method, the structure of the Institutiones followed rather a traditional order, beginning with terms up to enunciation, propositions, syllogisms, and ending with confutations and suppositions. What distinguished Fonseca’s doctrine from the rest of traditional logicians, though, was his definition of the subject of dialectic, which brought him closer to Ramus’s definition. As could be expected, the scholastic debate around the definition of dialectic (and logic) eventually produced a significant number of distinctions. In his monumental introduction to logic — which appeared in 1622 — Paolo Valla, renowned Jesuit teacher of logic at the Collegio Romano, listed at least six distinguished positions, among which Fonseca’s was one. The question on the definition of the subject of dialectic rotated around the epistemological issues of whether dialectic and logic were to be held as arts or sciences, and — if they were not considered sciences — were their subjects necessary or not, and what were they exactly. Javelli somehow reinforced Aquinas’ definition with Albert the Great’s emphasis on argumentation, claiming that dialectic was scientia rationalis discretiva verum et falsum, to be distinguished from arts and sciences that dealt with real beings. As for ‘rationalis’, Javelli meant that its subjects were beings of reason (ens rationalis). To distinguish dialectic from other rational sciences, such as grammar, rhetoric, and poetry, Javelli specified that the goal of dialectic was help the intellect determine whether a discourse (sermo and oratio) is true or false. This emphasis on truth and falsity put Javelli’s opinion in the line of those who held that argumentation was really the core of the dialectical investigation, and — although he admitted that generically (universalissime) logic as rational science particular rational sciences such as grammar, rhetoric, and argumentative logic —, the most proper definition of logic is this latter.41

39 See Walter J. Ong, Ramus. Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958); and Ramus, Pedagogy and the Liberal Arts: Ramism in Britain and the Wider World, ed. by Steven J. Reid and Emma Annette Wilson (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 40 Jennifer E. Ashworth, ‘Traditional Logic’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 143–72. Significantly for the issues I am dealing with here, the structure of this volume mirrored a chapter on ‘traditional logic’ to another one on ‘humanistic logic’ by Lisa Jardine. 41 Crisostomo Javelli, Compendium Logicae, Isagogicum ad eam quae est aput Aristotelem, in Cristostomo Javelli, Opera, I (Lugduni: Bartholomeus Honorat, 1580), tract. 1, cap. 3, p. 6.

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Toletus, who taught at the Collegio Romano, published his Introductio ad Logicam just three years before Fonseca’s Institutiones. Given the reputation of Toledo and the topic, it is unlikely that Fonseca did not have Toledo’s work in mind, especially for what concerns the definition of dialectic and its subject. Toledo distinguished three kinds of arts that human beings invented according to the operations of the intellect: mechanical (mechanicae), discursive (sermocinales), and methodological. Dialectic is the only art belonging to this latter group, as it provides the method of proper reasoning for scientific investigation. For this reason, Dialectic should be called ‘the instrument, organ, and way of knowing’ (instrumentum, organum scientiarum, et modus sciendi).42 It should be noted that the definition of dialectic as an instrument and modus sciendi had been recently put forward by Antonio Bernardi della Mirandola in his Institutio ad Logicam (Basel, 1545),43 a position that would be echoed by Jacopo Zabarella’s emphasis on the instrumental, non-metaphysics role of logic.44 Fonseca was very aware of these recent developments, as his reference to recentiores holding such an opinion demonstrates. He does not mention specifically Bernardi or Toletus, but his nuanced — and for certain aspects, original — position seems to balance Toletus’s opinion with a definition of dialectic that was actually held by humanists such as Ramus. When dealing with the definition of the subject of dialectics, Fonseca does not mention any scholastic position, but refers to Cicero and Varro who held slightly different opinions on the nature of the oratio (speech) that proceeds from the known to the unknown. Fonseca objects that both opinions have ‘something of obscure in themselves’, but adds that there are more recent authors (recentiores) who believed that the subject of dialectics is the modus sciendi. Fonseca’s opinion on this particular position held by certain recentiores does not amount to a complete rejection of the argument, for he considers the modus sciendi as a twofold expression. In a broad sense, modus sciendi is an ambiguous expression to mean all sorts of speeches that proceed deductively. In a specific sense, the modus sciendi is just one of the possible ways for speeches to proceed from the known to the unknown.45 Fonseca agrees that dialectic deals with the broader meaning of the modus sciendi, and to avoid any confusion that

42 Francisco Toledo, Introductio ad Logicam (Venetiis: Aegidius Regazola, 1574), p. 8. 43 The book reflected the courses of logic Bernardi previously held at the university of Bologna. His doctrines upon the definition of logic and the exclusion of the Categories from Aristotle’s Organon raised some controversies. See Antonio Bernardi della Mirandola (1502–1565). Un aristotelico umanista alla corte dei Farnese. Atti del convegno Antonio Bernardi nel V centenario della nascita (Mirandola, 30 novembre 2002), ed. by M. Forlivesi (Florence: Olschki, 2009). The second edition of Bernardi’s Introductio was published in 1562. In logicam vniuersam institutio Antonii Bernardi Mirandulani nuper ab ipso emendata, & aucta (Romae: Paolo Manuzio, 1562). 44 See Jacopo Zabarella, Opera Logica (Venetiis: Apud Paulum Meietum, 1578). Curiously, Valla would miss to refer to Toletus’s position when focusing on Antonio Bernardi as to explain the position of those who define Dialectic as modus sciendi. Cf. Paolo Valla, Logica Paulii Vallii Romani, Duobus Tomis Distincta (Leuven: Ludovicus Prost, 1622), Proleg. pars 2, quaest. 3, cap. 6, p. 79. Valla devoted an entire chapter (cap. 7) to Zabarella’s opinion. 45 ‘Neque enim omnis oratio, quae ex notis ignotum aliquid patefacit, scientiam parit, cum saepe opinionem, aut quadam aliam cognitionem, efficiat’, Institutionum, p. 3.

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the overlapping expression might cause, he prefers to stick to a definition of dialectics that had been actually the starting point for Ramus, among others; that is, that the subject of dialectics is the modus disserendi.46 Fonseca is well aware of the issues that such a definition — which he puts under the authority of Plato, Cicero, Augustine, and Porphyry — might raise, as it cannot be demonstrated through the explicit authority of Aristotle’s text.47 Nevertheless, he points out that the incongruities that one might find between Fonseca’s definition of dialectics and Aristotle’s mostly derive from the fact that Aristotle limited his definition and treatment of dialectic to a specific part of it, leaving the general meaning of dialectics and those parts that Aristotle do not treat aside. In fact, Fonseca holds that the parts of dialectic are definition, division, and argumentation. Aristotle leaves the former two aside, claiming that Socrates and Plato had already dealt with them satisfactorily, and concentrates on the argumentative part.48 Still, for Fonseca these two parts are to be included within the definition and treatment of dialectic. It was this inclusive definition of dialectic that made it possible to speak of it as a ‘quasi-art’, and his subject as a ‘quasi-instrument’.49 A similar pattern is shown by Fonseca when dealing with the parts of logic, that is, invention (inventio) and judgment (iudicium). By building on Agricola’s division and order of logic, according to which invention was pivotal to the study of logic and had to come first, Ramus had reintroduced judgment as an important component of logic, although students were to be introduced to it only after having dealt with inventio. As Ramus’s division of judgment into three parts (syllogistic, method, and a kind of doctrine of ideas) became controversial, he adjusted his doctrine eliminating the third part but maintaining that judgment (meant as dispositio) had to come after the study of inventio. Fonseca acknowledges that this doctrine — which he thought was held by many authors (plurimi) — derives from Cicero, but he admits his reluctance to accept it straightforwardly, calling for Aristotle as a supportive authority in this case.50 He gives then a twofold definition of iudicium, one that deals with the understanding of how to build single arguments, and one that deals with the method on how to properly order arguments related to the same topic. Given this definition, Fonseca argues for the first meaning to be addressed in logic before the treatment of inventio. As for the second meaning, though, ‘nisi potest inventionem, tradi non posset’ (it cannot be explained if invention is not explained first).51 Valla, who was unsympathetic to Fonseca’s idea of dialectic as modus disserendi, would criticize Fonseca for what appeared to him to be a confusing and contradictory

46 Institutionum, p. 3. 47 To this end, he says that one might refer to Topics 1.1, interpreting Aristotle’s opinion to define dialectics as ‘methodus, sive ars ratiocinandi’. Cf. Institutionum, p. 2. 48 Institutionum, pp. 3–4. 49 ‘Aptissime igitur definitur Dialectica Disserendi doctrina, quasi Ars, quae docet omnes formulas disserendi, hoc est, incognita ex cognitis oration patefaciendi’. Institutionum, p. 1r. 50 ‘Quibus ergo cum Aristotile non prorsus assentior’. Cf. Institutionum, VI, c. 7, c. 110v. 51 Institutionum, VI, c. 7, c. 111v.

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way of overcoming the limitations of the concept of modus sciendi.52 In sum, he criticized Fonseca for criticizing the supporters of the modus sciendi without truly offering a different view of it. But Valla’s work — which was published only in 1622 — likely derived from his teaching at the Collegio Romano, which occurred between 1587 and 1590, more than twenty years after Fonseca’s publication of the Institutiones, and few years after Zabarella’s work. Valla’s most current concern was to address Zabarella’s views, and he was probably less attracted from to nuanced influences that the Ramist debate could have had on his fellow Jesuits’ definition of dialectics.53 The very fact that Fonseca’s opinion stood out to him as much as the original so as to deserve an individual criticism seems to prove that such an influence had an effect on a work that was and remained intended as a ‘traditional’ introduction to logic.54 The example of the definition of dialectic shows a Fonseca who was sensitive to humanist influence with respect to content and theories. Stretched between the following of Aristotle as per mandate of the Constitutions of his religious order and the provocations of humanist logic that he might have encountered as early as his time as a student of the Royal College of Arts in Coimbra, his effort to claim dialectic as a quasi-art whose subject was the modus disserendi certainly put his Institutiones in a distinctive, somehow original position. But also this put him in conflict with certain explicit doctrines to be found in Aristotle’s text, a conflict to which he reacted ‘humanistically’, that is, following loosely the philosophical authority of Aristotle while often leaning on Cicero and sometimes on other humanists’ favorites like Plato, Varro, and Quintilian to introduce students to the quasi-art of discoursing (disserendi).

Conclusion Fonseca’s works reveal a humanistic influence that shows itself in the method and content of his scholastic teaching. The philological emphasis on the editing of the original ancient Greek text of Aristotle, along with an accurate use of codes and manuscript sources, an attentive comparative approach with the editions available at his times, was certainly the outcome of humanist stimulations that Fonseca brought with him perhaps from his tenure at the Royal College of Arts in Coimbra, which could not but have been boosted in the erudite Roman cultural environment. Certainly, philological accuracy was also a key component in his Latin translation of Aristotle, as well as in his prose in general.55

52 Valla, Logica, Proleg. II, quaest. 3, c. 19, p. 93. 53 To assess the fading of Ramist influence on the structure of logic textbooks and commentaries toward the end of the sixteenth century, see Jennifer E. Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht-Boston: Springer, 1974), pp. 16–17. 54 To underline the distinctiveness of Fonseca’s Institutionum in the sixteenth-century scenario of traditional logic, Ashworth points out that — along with Toledo’s work — ‘in tone and approach they are much closer to the textbooks of the first half of the seventeenth century than those of the early sixteenth’. See Ashworth, Traditional Logic, p. 163. 55 Cf. António Freire, ‘Pedro da Fonseca, humanista e Filósofo’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 50 (1994), p. 144.

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Such a philological endeavor aligned with Fonseca’s goal of rendering the true meaning of the original Aristotle, rather than forcing his doctrines to fit undue interpretations. Such a pillar in his method pushed Fonseca to keep a critical attitude toward commentators and interpreters, and — by extension — to any philosophical authority, as his warning to never swear in verba magistri seems to prove. This very attitude can be found in the Institutiones Dialecticae and in his Isagoge, where the goal was not that of reproducing the true meaning of an author, but of providing a solid, Christian base for the investigation of the boundaries between logic and metaphysics. The readership which Fonseca explicitly addressed in his works, which encompassed students of humanities willing to progress directly to Law without philosophical studies and learned scholars interested in the crossroads of the philosophical and theological inquiry, seems to extend the scope of Fonseca’s intended audience beyond the limits of scholastic pedagogy, contributing to make his works appear as a ‘Baroque synthesis of genre’.56 Certainly Fonseca was not the only Jesuit philosopher to be sensitive to humanist stimulation, as the cases of Benet Perera and the Jesuit philosophers at the Collegio Romano clearly show. Fonseca participated in the quest of contributing to the same pious Christian philosophy that fellows such as Perera tried to build for natural philosophy by reclaiming the importance of a philological approach and classical sources for such a quest.57 When Francisco Suárez arrived in Rome, Fonseca’s explanations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics were a ‘bulky text’ that ‘represented a philosophical breakthrough that he was unable to ignore’, and that in fact had a deep impact upon the development of his celebrated Disputationes metaphysicae.58 At the same time, the history of the fortune of his dialectics demonstrates how deeply his approach would influence the education of generations of philosophy students throughout the early modern period.

56 See Martins, Lógica. Quoted by Carvalho, ‘Fonseca’. 57 In his address to the reader of his Isagoge, Fonseca hopes that his book would expel Porphyry from the schools of ‘Christian philosophy’: ‘ut a Christianae Philosophiae scholis perfidi desertoris Christianae fidei liber exploderetur’. Isagoge (Lisbon: Antonio Alvarez, 1591), Author Philosophiae Studiosis, s.n. [1–2]. 58 (Salamanticae: apud Ioannem et Andream Renaut fratres, 1597) Cf. Martins, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, p. 330. See also Eleutério Elorduy Maurica, ‘Influjo de Fonseca en Suárez’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 11 (1955), pp. 507–19; Martins, ‘Pedro da Fonseca e a recepção da ‘Metafísica’ de Aristóteles na segunda metade do séc. XVI’, Philosophica, 14 (1999), pp. 165–78.

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Mário S. de Carvalho

Pedro da Fonseca’s Presence in the ‘Coimbra Jesuit Course’ A First Assessment

Introduction Enthusiastic, as a student in Coimbra, with the courses in Scripture, and Morals, as I had the opportunity to recall in my tentative biography of Pedro da Fonseca,1 the destiny of this major figure in the intellectual history of the first Jesuits, as well as in the history of Western metaphysics, will be known mostly for his contributions to logic, and metaphysics. Fonseca’s legacy to philosophy will also be related to another important philosophical oeuvre, the Coimbra Jesuit Course (1592–1606). The recent publication of the Dicionário do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense is a valuable tool to any research trying to highlight the relationship between Pedro da Fonseca, the mentor of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, and its authors.2 Previous to the publication of the Dicionário, as well as to two of my papers, only five more scholars had contributed to clarify the sources of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, namely Banha de Andrade, Silva Dias, Serhii Wakúlenko, António M. Martins, and Simone Guidi.3 Only the last three



1 Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Fonseca, Pedro da’, Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia, ed. by Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi, latest revision: January, 29th, 2020. 2 Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Dicionário do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020). 3 Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Presenças franciscanas no Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Para uma cartografia do escotismo português moderno’, Itinerarium, 62: 215–16 (2016), pp. 485–97; Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Tentâmen de sondagem sobre a presença dos platonismos no volume do De Anima do primeiro Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense’, in Idade Média: tempo do Mundo, Tempo dos Homens, Tempo de Deus, ed. by J. A. de c. R. de Souza, (Porto Alegre: EST Edições, 2006), pp. 389–98; António A. B. de Andrade, ‘A Renascença nos Conimbricenses’, Brotéria, 37/4 (1943), pp. 271–84, and Brotéria, 37/6 (1943), pp. 480–501; José Sebastião da S. Dias, ‘O cânone filosófico conimbricense (1592–1606)’, Cultura-História e Filosofia, 4 (1985), pp. 257–330; Serhii Wakúlenko, ‘As fontes dos Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societatis Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Statigiritae (1606)’, Philosophica, 26 (2005), pp. 229–62; António Manuel Martins, ‘A causalidade em Pedro da Fonseca’, Veritas, 54/3 (set./dez. 2009), pp. 112–27; Simone Guidi, L’Angelo e la macchina. Mário S. de Carvalho  •  Universidade de Coimbra

Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 39-60 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131758

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have paid some kind of attention towards the presence of Fonseca’s texts and ideas in the Coimbra Jesuit Course. Elsewhere I have emphasized, on the one hand, Fonseca’s fingerprint in the Coimbra Academy — which I have called his ‘Aristotelian turn’ –, and, on the other hand, the philosophical clash separating Manuel de Góis, the true and main author of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, from Pedro da Fonseca. In one of the two appendixes to the volume on De Anima, the Treaty of the Separated Soul by Baltasar Álvares, Fonseca is quoted as well, but Álvares follows a method of work distinct from Góis’s, for he writes a treatise, not a commentary on Aristotle. If one sticks to Álvares’s title, perhaps it could be said that he would not accompany Fonseca’s ‘Aristotelian turn’. This situation significantly changes with the other relevant author of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, Sebastião do Couto. He appears to be philosophically closer to Fonseca than Góis or Álvares, but aligned with Góis in adopting the method of commenting Aristotle. When he had a different option to name his book, as shown, for instance, by the case of the contemporary and akin Logica Furtiva, Couto chose to use the same Latin word as Fonseca for his work on logic, dialectica.4 Between Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, the choice of the term ‘dialectic’ may, of course, translate a personal understanding of philosophy, its practice and purpose, but the choice in the title — dialectica — was not unusual then. Yet, the role of logic in scientific discovery (qua incognita ex cognitis aperiantur)5 was conveyed using Fonseca’s ‘Aristotelian turn’, meaning by replacing the method he employed in the Institutiones Dialecticae (1564) with the one he will use in the Metaphysica (1577, 1589).6 Following the path opened by Fonseca’s to the Coimbra Academy, the two major authors of the Coimbra Jesuit Course — Manuel de Góis and Sebastião do Couto — did put the Aristotelian text at the root of their philosophical lessons. Surely Couto, as well as Góis (the former in some books of the Organon and the latter in his ‘minor’ works, viz. Parva Naturalia, Meteorologica), do not completely refuse the systematic approach to Aristotle’s works but what truly made the fame of the Coimbra Jesuit Course were the volumes that applied the commentary style, viz. the Physica, De Caelo, De Generatione, De Anima and significant parts of the Dialectica. Only these five titles followed the method Fonseca recommended in 1564 and that he himself used from 1577 onwards. Sulla genesi della ‘res cogitans’ cartesiana (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2018), pp. 153–61, and 192–99. More recently, Hélène Leblanc, Théories sémiotiques à l’Âge Classique. Translatio Signorum (Paris: Vrin, 2021), pp. 107–11. 4 Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Didacus Gomez Loureiro, 1606), Proemium q. 4, a. 1, p. 21: ‘… ob causam Petrus Fonseca lib. 2. Metaph. cap. 3. q. 1. sect. 2. ait se libentius uti nomine Dialecticae quam Logicae’. As regards the Logica Furtiva, almost simultaneously published in Venice, Hamburg and Cologne (1604), see João Pereira Gomes, Os Professores de Filosofia da Universidade de Évora (Évora: Câmara Municipal, 1960), pp. 192–97. 5 CMA (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetnzeri, 1615–29; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), II, c. 3, q. 1, s. 2, col. 487; see Lucien Petrescu, ‘Scholastic Logic and Cartesian Logic’, Perspectives on Science, 26: 5 (2018), p. 538. 6 For a different interpretation of this issue, see chapter 2 above.

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Of course, Pedro da Fonseca turns out to be only one of the thousands authors quoted by the Coimbra Jesuit Course. And he is far from being the most quoted, never reaching the Course’s top ten list of sources. The response to the Society of Jesus’s order to comment Aristotle was unwittingly seen by the various authors of the Coimbra Jesuit Course as an opportunity to show off their astonishing erudition and to produce a kind of work already called ‘hypertext’.7 Indeed, one of the most striking features of the Course resides in the abundance of thousands of names cited against or in favour of the theses discussed therein. Yet, I believe that the Coimbra authors are more interested in discussing ideas than in boasting names. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Pedro da Fonseca is just one of those names, since he became responsible, to some extent, for the publication of the Course, it is not at all irrelevant to dwell on his presence therein. It is still impossible to have a clear picture of the relations of the Jesuits who were the authors of the published Coimbra Jesuit Course with their senior colleague, Fonseca. Born in 1527, Pedro da Fonseca was sixteen years older than Manuel de Góis, thirty-three years older than Baltasar Álvares, and forty years older than Sebastião do Couto. This paper will only represent a first contribution to a future dossier about Fonseca’s ‘influence’ upon the Course or its authors but the method I now shall adopt expands the survey begun by the Dicionário do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense. As it will be obvious later, my choice presents some limitations to the needed dossier: that is the reason why I shall be very cautious in the final conclusions, sticking mainly to one issue — the doctrine of causality — uniting and dividing Fonseca and Góis at the same time. After a brief reference to Fonseca’s presence in the three mentioned authors of the Coimbra Jesuit Course (§ 1),8 this chapter dwells on the presence of Fonseca in Góis, and almost exclusively on the doctrine of causality (§ 2).

1. 1.1. Fonseca by Álvares

Baltasar Álvares’s life in Coimbra mostly coincides with Fonseca’s stay in Rome. Nevertheless, the echo of the latter’s authority and prestige would arrive to Portugal and inevitably to the young students’s ears. The subject matter of Álvares’s contribution to the Course had been conceived earlier by Góis,9 but the death of

7 Serhii Wakúlenko, ‘Enciclopedismo e Hipertextualidade nos Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra 1606)’, in Enciclopédia e Hipertexto, ed. by Olga Pombo et al. (Lisbon: Edições Duarte Reis, 2006), pp. 302–57. 8 I did not find any allusion by the fourth author of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, Cosme de Magalhães, to Fonseca; see Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Cosme de Magalhães’, Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia, latest revision: February, 14th, 2019. 9 See In librum de Memoria et Reminiscientia, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in libros Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia appellantur (Lisbon: S. Lopes, 1593), c. 2, p. 5: see also O Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo I: Comentários aos Livros Denominados ‘Parva Naturalia’ (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2020), p. 68–69.

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the latter did not allow the editorial plan to be fulfilled. It is a surprise to verify that in a title explicitly pertaining to metaphysics such as Álvares’s, only three explicit references are made to Fonseca: in the third dispute, dealing with the cognition of the separated soul ‘per modum actus primi’, where Álvares quotes Fonseca twice, in a kind of an antinomic procedure;10 in the fourth dispute, dealing with the same type of cognition, in act though, where he merely mentions, in a marginal note, a section of the first chapter of Metaphysics II, question 6;11 and finally, in the sixth dispute, related to the motion of the separated soul, where Álvares mentions two sections of book V of Fonseca’s Metaphysics.12 Only the first among these three quotations has a very precise indication, thus revealing that Álvares has the recent original edition by Fonseca at his desk. The last one of these quotations is too wide in scope. It concerns the dispositions needed by the souls in order to become informed, but highlights an observation by Fonseca (ut annotavit Fonseca) dealing with the interference of the ‘potestas absoluta’ in the physical or natural order. The presence of the theme of the ‘potestas absoluta’ is paramount throughout all the Coimbra Jesuit Course but did not yet receive any attention. There are other particularities. The first and the second quotations are related to chapter 1 of book II of the Metaphysics where Fonseca deals with the access to the truth by the separated substances during their present or historical life. Álvares quotes Fonseca to underline that immaterial beings cannot produce intelligible species in the human’s intellect, a thesis whose development Fonseca postpones to book XII. It is well known that Fonseca never completed this book but Álvares does not seem to be also acquainted with other books beyond book V. The two sections’s topic he quotes from book V is causality, a subject matter I shall return to in part 2. The second quotation by Álvares is more interesting because it is related to Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the univocal being, if we are to follow Fonseca’s version at least. The reason why Álvares quotes Fonseca is different in its scope now. It concerns the defence of the cognition in act by the separated souls and, to be more precise, lies upon a ‘Thomist’ thesis (Divi Thomae Schola) that attributes a higher status to the ‘acquired species’ of the angels over the mere ‘given species’ of human cognition (species animae separatae donatas diversi ordinis esse ab acquisitis).13 The consequences derived from this diversity to knowledge would be an issue to be further discussed by Fonseca in book XII. As Scotus claims that God and creatures share the same

10 Tractatus de Anima Separata in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: António Mariz, 1598, pp. 441–536), d. 3, a. 4, p. 495: ‘Atquem hanc sententiam non est improbabilem iudicat Fonseca lib 2. Metaphysicorum cap. 1, quaest. 2, sect. 7 ad 6. Contraria tamen pars omnino certa […] ut longe probabiliorem tandem asseruit Fonseca lib. 5. Metaphysicorum c. 14, q. 1, sect. 4 ad finem…’ 11 Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 4, a. 2, p. 509: ‘Ut Fonseca 2. Metaphysicorum c. 1, q. 2, sect. 6.’ 12 Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 3, p. 530: ‘… animas, videlicet rationales certa sibi corpora ad dispositiones vendicare, quae si desint informandi munus obire nequaeant, nisi vero, Dei absoluta potestate physicam normam superante, ut annotavit Fonseca lib. 5. Metaphysicorum cap. 2, q. 14, sect. 2 & 3.’ 13 Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 4, a. 2, p. 509.

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quiditative knowledge of being, Scotus’s thesis would strike a blow in the difference claimed by the Thomists. The blow is omitted by Álvares but its discussion is perhaps presupposed since he does point to Fonseca’s version. It would be interesting to turn over the method I am following now and compare all the references to the separated soul by Fonseca with the doctrine taught by Álvares. Unfortunately, it is not possible at this moment to do it. If one exclusively sticks to the references, as I shall, according to the method chosen for this first assessment, it goes without saying that Baltasar Álvares seems to be a poor reader of Fonseca’s Metaphysics. The publications of books II and V of the Metaphysics date from 1577 and 1589, respectively, and Álvares was probably writing the sections of his Treaty of the Separated Soul around 1594/98.14 Almost twenty or even just ten years would have given him the necessary time to reflect upon and take advantage of Fonseca’s work. Álvares does quote Fonseca more than once in one page only.15 Here, the problem is if the intelligible ‘species naturally flow (fluant) from the intellect of the separated soul’, just like the intellect comes from (dimanarat) the essence of the soul in the moment of its creation. This will be denied, provided that the flow is understood as an efficient process. A close attention to issues related to the various kinds of causation will be a constant feature, as it will be seen below. Álvares sides the quotation from Metaphysics II with Thomas Aquinas’s authority (Contra Gentiles III, 7) to convey one opinion about the mere probability of an affirmative answer to the question under examination. At least, Álvares notes here, Fonseca considers this opinion as not improbable (non improbabilem). Contrariwise, the quotation from Metaphysics V sustains the negative answer to which Álvares gives his full support (sententia... verissima est). Álvares considers this last opinion as a modern one because Fonseca stands among other recent names (alii recentiores) sustaining it, such as Francis Sylvester of Ferrara and Luis de Molina. Even if Fonseca’s name appears mixed among other authorities, it is no less true that his text is clearly used in a context where a conflict of interpretation turns around Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, the key to solve the conflict comes from Francis Ferrara’s reading of Aquinas’s Summa and Commentary on the Sentences. Briefly put, Álvares follows what one might call ‘the angelic species pattern’, meaning a move to reinforce the spiritualization or the dematerialization of the cognition proper to the separated soul. Despite this being an important issue in the whole of Álvares’s contribution, these quotations are not enough to affirm that Álvares’s appreciation of his compatriot parallels the appreciation he shows of Suárez. Just remember that the Treaty of the Separated Soul quotes Francisco

14 On this particular work by Álvares, see Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Beyond Psychology — The Philosophical Horizon of the ‘Coimbra Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima’ (1598)’, in Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism, ed. by Daniel Heider (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2016), pp. 67–95; see also Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Baltasar Álvares’, Conimbricenses. org Encyclopedia, latest revision: February, 12th, 2019. 15 See Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 3, a. 4, p. 495: CMA II c. 1, q. 2, s. 7 ad 6 and CMA V c. 14, q. 1, s. 4 ad finem.

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Suárez ten times, not to mention the fact that the Portuguese became the editor of the Spaniard’s oeuvre.16 A parenthesis is now mandatory. The name of Luis de Molina was mentioned above, and the dispute about the authorship of the doctrine of the ‘scientia conditionata’ still divides scholars. This is not the place to figure out the part of the authorship that pertains to Fonseca or Molina,17 but the following is obvious: just as it happens with the ‘potentia absoluta’, the ‘scientia conditionata’ pierces several discussions portrayed in the Coimbra Jesuit Course. However, without splitting up and canvassing all references to Fonseca and Molina — in other words, without applying to Molina the same research I am now doing on Fonseca — one should refrain not to weigh whether the burden of authorship derives more from Fonseca’s or Molina’s texts. 1.2. Fonseca by Góis

Manuel de Góis seems to pay more attention to Fonseca’s Metaphysics than Baltasar Álvares does. Surely, the volume on De Anima by Góis only mentions Fonseca once — precisely on an issue far from being irrelevant, i.e. the reduction of the number of the inner senses, taught by Fonseca18 — but the total sum of the times Fonseca’s Metaphysics is quoted in Góis’s Physica is conspicuous (seventeen times, extended from pages 44 to 662). Furthermore, and as it will be seen with more detail in Part II, Góis shows some esteem towards Fonseca’s contribution to Metaphysics. This is relevant, because it is now certain that Góis intended to comment on that Aristotelian masterpiece too. Let us stick to some figures, by now, before discussing below one or two issues that may be extracted from some references on the following list. Góis does not mention Metaphysics book II, but he quotes book I three times.19 Books III and IV are only mentioned once20 but 16 Perhaps it will be helpful to give all the quotations of Suárez (DM), according to Álvares’s own terms (Tractatus de Anima Separata): DM XXXIV, s. 1 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 2, a. 1, p. 472); DM XLIV, s. 7, ad calcem: Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 2, a. 3, p. 480; DM XXIII, s. 1, ad finem (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 4, a. 1, p. 506; DM XXIII, s. 2 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 4, a. 2, p. 509); DM XXXV, s. 6, n. 18 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 1, p. 520; DM XLIII, s. 2 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 2, p. 522); DM XXXV, s. 6, n. 23 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 2, p. 524); DM XLVIII, s. 4 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 3, p. 528); DM V, s. 6 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 3, p. 529); DM XXXV, s. 6, n. 24 (Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 6, a. 4, p. 530). 17 See section 2.1. in Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Manuel de Góis’, Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia, latest revision: September, 11th, 2020; see also the chapter 4 of this volume. 18 Tractatus de Anima Separata, d. 3, c. 3, q. 1, a. 3, p. 304: ‘Caeterum alia quaedam est opinio, etsi non antiquitati, ut quibusdam videtur, certe veritati magis consentanea, quam praeter alios nostrae aetatis nobiles philosophos, defendit Fonseca […] asserens duas tantum esse potentias sensitivas internas, sensum communem et phantasiam’, quoting CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4. See Guidi, L’Angelo e la macchina, p. 193. 19 See Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1592), I, c. 1, q. 4, a. 3, p. 83; II, c. 7, q. 1, a. 3, p. 262; II, c. 7, q. 4, a. 2, p. 271. 20 See In Octo Libros Physicorum, proemium, p. 44, and II, c. 7, q. 23, a. 2, p. 344 respectively.

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the presence of Metaphysics V is exceptional.21 As it will be seen, this book also stands in Couto’s case. Only in book VIII of the Physics is Fonseca’s Metaphysics absent. Contrariwise, the major presence of Fonseca’s Metaphysica in book II of Góis’s Physics (six times) is patent. The number of these presences decreases in book I (four times), and IV (two times), and books V, VI and VII mention Fonseca’s Metaphysics only once. Let us repeat that in Góis’s Physics II the presence of Fonseca’s Metaphysics scores the highest value (six times in number). Just recall that Physics II 7 deals with the doctrine of causality, and, as a consequence, one might expect that causality, according to Góis, would import a high metaphysical outlook. In Part II I shall return to this assumption. By now, let us only remember that in question one of Physics II 7, Góis asks if the Aristotelian definition is correct; in question four, he asks if the exemplar is truly and properly a cause pertaining to the formal cause; in question five, if every cause is nobler than its effect; in question fifteen, if the first cause determines the action of the second, or the former the action of the latter; and, finally, in question twenty-third, he asks if the final cause acts according to the intelligible being or according to the thing’s being of existence instead. It is only fair to say, then, that Góis mentions Fonseca on very important issues of the doctrine of causality. This is an interesting situation, not the least because a contemporary exeget rightly pointed out that Fonseca’s (1577) and Góis’s (1592) discussions on causality are prior to Suárez’s (1597) pages about the same subject matter.22 Besides, as the chapter in this volume by Capriati shows, Fonseca’s doctrine of causation is of paramount relevance. Three more remarks may still be added. Most of the times Fonseca’s texts are recommended by Góis, as a sort of further reading for students,23 and on occasions his theses are mentioned expressing broad approval.24 Last but not the least, one may conjecture that Góis also worked with one unpublished version of Fonseca’s Metaphysics for he praises a critical dialogue of the latter with Hervaeus Natalis, based on Domingo de Soto, deleted from the

21 Here are all the quotations from CMA V made by Góis: In Octo Libros Physicorum, I, c. 9, q. 5, a. 3, p. 177; VII, c. 1, q. 1, a. 3, p. 662; I, c. 9, q. 11, a. 4, p. 201; II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 3, p. 310; IV, c. 12, exp. p. 532; VI, c. 2, q. 1, a. 4, p. 614, V, c. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 582; IV, c. 14, q. 3, a. 1, p. 551; II, c. 3, exp. 245; I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 55; II, c. 7, q. 5, a. 2, p. 275; III, c. 2, q. 2, a. 2, p. 390, and finally Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1598), III, c. 3, q. 1, a. 3, p. 304. 22 Martins, ‘A causalidade’, p. 114, and p. 116–19. The need to always consider Suárez’s dialogue with Fonseca was underlined by Simone Guidi, Baroque Metaphysics: Studies on Francisco Suárez (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020), p. 12. 23 See In Octo Libros Physicorum I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 55; I, c. 1, q. 4, a. 3, p. 83; I, c. 9, q. 5, a. 3, p. 175; I, c. 9, q. 11, a. 4, p. 201. 24 See In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 1, a. 3, p. 262 (‘uberior et illustrior explicatio tradita est a Fonseca’), In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 4, a. 2, p. 271 (‘accurate pertractat’); II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 3, p. 310 (‘ut docte explicat Fonseca’); IV, c. 12, exp, p. 532 (‘graviter et accurate pertractat Fonseca’), V, c. 4, q. 2, a. 2, p. 582 (‘ut recte sentit Fonseca’).

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published version. It appears that the text deleted occurs precisely in the context where Henry of Ghent’s ideas were being discussed.25 To sum up, the old Góis seems to be a better reader of Fonseca than the young Álvares who, nevertheless, was summoned to finish Góis’s enterprise. But neither of them may be considered an explicit follower of Pedro da Fonseca. I will return to the limitations of this method of approach. 1.3. Fonseca by Couto

The image Sebastião do Couto might have had of Fonseca is that of a respected metaphysician, and ‘the complimentary way in which Fonseca is invariably treated by Couto agrees with the latter’s evident reluctance to engage in discussions with the former, even in the case of clear doctrinal disagreements’.26 Couto repeats Fonseca’s words saying that all men are capable of learning.27 Also, and that is a rare procedure specially used to mention Greek and Latin Fathers, as well as Saint Thomas Aquinas, in the Coimbra Jesuit Course, Couto almost always addresses Fonseca with the honorary title of ‘Doctor’.28 During a short period of his life, Couto acted as Fonseca’s secretary in Lisbon, and during that time Couto was working on the critical revision of Góis’s Physica.29 Arguably, this is a crucial period, for it joins two intellectual players

25 In Octo Libros Physicorum, IV, c. 12, exp, p. 532: ‘Sotus doctrinam esse Aristotelis connexiones propositionum, quae simpliciter necessariae sunt, ut hominem esse animal particeps rationem, diametrum esse incomensurabilem costae, non cadere sub mensura temporis, sed perpetuas esse et sempiternae veritatis. Quam sententiam graviter et accurate pertractat Fonseca lib. 5 Metaph. cap. 5, q. 1 contra Hervaeum quodlib. 3, q. 10.’ It goes without saying, but I shall return to Henry of Ghent ahead, that Hervaeus was an important critic of Henry’s doctrine of knowledge, see P. Stella, ‘La prima critica di Herveus Natalis O. P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: il De intelectu et specie del cosidetto De quattuor materiis’, Salesianum, 21 (1959), pp. 125–70. 26 Wakúlenko, ‘As fontes’, p. 242. John Doyle also acknowledges that in ‘citing Fonseca by name here [i.e. In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, in In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae pp. 11–69, I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 2, p. 9] and elsewhere, Couto highlights the distinction between himself and his teacher’. See The Conimbricenses. Some Questions on Signs. Translated with Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee Wis.: Marquette Univ. Press, 2001), p. 184. 27 Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra; Didacus Gomez Loureiro, 1606, pp. 55–225); Proemium, q. 1, a. 2, p. 64; see Pedro da Fonseca, Instituições Dialécticas. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, II, 2, introdução, estabelecimento do texto, tradução e notas por Joaquim Ferreira Gomes (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1962), p. 97. 28 See In universam Dialecticam, Proemium, q. 4, a. 5, p. 33; Proemium, q. 5, a. 3, p. 42; Proemium, q. 6, a. 2, p. 49; Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 1, a. 5, p. 70; Proemium, q. 3, a. 2, p. 83; Proemium, q. 4, a. 3, s. 2, p. 95; Proemium, q. 6, a. 2, p. 122; Proemium, q. 6, a. 3, p. 125; Proemium, q. 6, a. 4, p. 127; c. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 155; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 2, p. 9; Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Didacus Gomez Loureiro 1606, pp. 285–524), I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 5, p. 370; Commentarii in librum primum Topicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Didacus Gomez Loureiro 1606, pp. 525–36), p. 536. 29 Carvalho, ‘Couto, Sebastião do’.

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distancing themselves from Manuel de Góis’s major intellectual achievement within the Society of Jesus. Unfortunately, Couto’s working manuscript pertaining to that period is not known by us. For four times Couto seems to merge onto Fonseca’s wavelength. First, acknowledging Fonseca as a translator of the Metaphysics; second in a complimentary reference to the Dialectical Instructions;30 thirdly, praising his companion for a philosophical breakthrough I shall return on later; last but not the least, recognizing that Fonseca played a seminal role in the study of logic in Coimbra Academy (primum lac Dialecticae suis studiosis haec instillat Academia).31 Yet, if one sticks to Couto’s explicit mentions of Fonseca, the latter’s contribution to logic appears to fall short of the one to metaphysics. Despite early Roman decisions putting side by side Fonseca’s and Toletus’s authority on logic, one may affirm that Fonseca’s titles related to logic were not mandatory for Portuguese Jesuit Colleges. Couto quotes Fonseca’s Isagoge philosophica only once,32 but the situation changes with the latter’s Institutiones Dialecticae, which receive fifteen references.33 It is known that books VII and VIII of the Institutiones Dialecticae could be complementary text for the first-year logic students.34 With one exception in the Topics, the majority of the references to Fonseca’s Institutiones Dialecticae sprout in the commentary on the 30 See, respectively, In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 3, a. 1, p. 27: ‘…pro conceptibus ex libro quarto Metaphysicorum capite septimo, ubi iuxta versionem Petri Fonsecae ait’; II, c. 3, pp, 163–64: ‘…quoniam nihil desiderari putamus in libro 3. Introductionum Petri Fonsecae, quem non immerito huius Conimbricensis cursus partem censemus cum in hac Academia ante annos viginti Philosophiae auditoribus in ipso statim Philosophici cursus vestibulo explicetur’. 31 In universam Dialecticam, p. 2, Ad Lectorem, with no indication of the number of the page. 32 Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 1, a. 5, p. 70. 33 Commentarii in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis Stagiritae, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Didacus Gomez Loureiro 1606, pp. 226–416), I, c. 1, exp, p. 230: ‘…de prioribus dictum est in libro institutionum’; I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 232: ‘…ac prout nominibus accomodatur exposita est in institutionibus’; I, c. 3, exp, p. 254: ‘De quibus plura in 6. libro institutionum dicta sunt’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 1, a. 2, p. 9, on instrumental signs, in lib. Introduct. [I c. 8]; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 1, p. 13: ‘Ut videre est lib. 1 Dialect. instit. cap. 8’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 3, p. 18: ‘colligitur ex 1. lib. introductionum cap. 1. ubi confessi sumus…’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 3, s. 2, p. 24, on the intermediate concept, according to [Institutionum, I, c. 11]; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 3, a. 4, p. 35 on those who read Latin letters not understanding them and nevertheless forming a concept of the words, in Introductionum I c. 10; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 2, p. 57: ‘in cap. 10 lib. 1 Institutionum…’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 4, q. 2, a. 3, s. 1, p. 77 on ‘de appellatione’, in Institutiones VIII c. 41 or Fonseca’s doctrine according to which the various meanings of ‘appellatio’ do not change the ‘formale significatum’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, II, Proemium, p. 149: ‘traditur in tertio libro Institutionum huius Accademiae’; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, II, c. 3, p. 163–64, mentioning Introductionum III; Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Priore Resolutione, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Didacus Gomez Loureiro 1606, pp. 170–284), I, c. 1, p. 181: ‘…traditum est in tertio Institutionum libro cap. 5’; I, c. 2, q. 1, a. 2, p. 201: ‘ut latius explicatum est in libro tertio Institutionum Dialecticarum’; Commentarii in librum primum Topicorum, p. 536: ‘…factum sit a D. Petro Fonseca in aureo introductionum libro’ (see also above, note 26). 34 Commentarii in librum primum Topicorum, p. 536: ‘…ut si auditores Dialecticos volunt, septimum et octavum introductionum libros in fine primi anni non omittant’.

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Interpretation. But at the same time, this is the title where Couto quotes Fonseca’s Metaphysics the least.35 Since Fonseca’s Metaphysics stands in Couto’s commentary on the Posterior Analytics, it would be an easy temptation to jump to the conclusion that whereas Couto’s commentary on the Interpretation envisages Fonseca the logician, Couto’s commentary on the Posterior Analytics envisages Fonseca the metaphysician. A first joint assessment of the two logicians has already been made,36 and other studies have spoken about one or two debts of Couto towards Fonseca in other specific logical domains.37 Moreover, if more than thirty quotations of Fonseca’s oeuvre by Couto have already been counted,38 present and future research needs to pay attention to latent presences, a method that, despite its toughness, is worth pursuing.39 That number of quotations is relevant enough, and surpasses by far that of any other player of the Coimbra Jesuit Course. Could this mean that Fonseca’s authority was growing as the new century was approaching? Or that his importance was only due to conjoined biographies? Just as it happened with Góis’s dependance on Fonseca’s reduction of the number of the inner senses, Couto’s doctrine on intermediate concepts (or the concept of the word which is spoken), explicitly admits to follow Fonseca’s more probable authority.40 Couto also sticks to Fonseca on how logic is related to philosophy.41 Another particularity founded in Couto has to do with Fonseca’s Metaphysics VI. This is the last of the fourteen Aristotelian books of the Metaphysics to be mentioned by the Coimbra Jesuit Course but only Couto does so. This is easy to explain because book VI belongs to the third volume of the Commentary on Metaphysics posthumously published in 1602 (and thus unknown by Góis, for instance). As my Fonseca’s biography indicates, 35 As it is evident, the third quotation (In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 3, p. 18) in the previous note puzzles any reader, hence the following remark by Doyle: ‘This appears to be evidence that Fonseca was the original author of the present work [meaning, the Interpretation]’. (See The Conimbricenses, p. 187). Note, however, that Doyle’s remark is not supported by all other allusions to Fonseca, see, for instance, notes 26 above, and 39 below. 36 Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Reading Philosophy from a Dialectical Point of View: Pedro da Fonseca’s and Sebastião do Couto’s Philosophical Stance on Aristotle’s Organon’, in Jesuit Logic and Late Ming China: Lectures on the Cursus Conimbricensis, ed. by Cristiano Casalini (Boston: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2019), p. 19–39. 37 See Jennifer E. Ashworth, ‘La doctrine de l’analogie selon quelques logiciens jésuites’, in Les Jésuites à la Renaissance, Système éducatif et production du savoir, ed. by Luce Giard, (Paris: PUF, 1995), p. 120 note 56; Leblanc, Théories, p. 107–11. 38 See Wakúlenko, ‘As fontes’, p. 252; Wakúlenko, ‘Enciclopedismo’, p. 304, pp. 310–11, p. 313, p. 321, p. 338. 39 For instance, dealing with the doctrine of signs, Leblanc has suggested, in a very convincing way, how ‘…le texte de Fonseca [sc. the Dialectical Instructions I, 8–9] est bien à considerer comme un modèle pour les ‘Quaestiones’ au ‘Peri Hermeneias’ de Couto. Pourtant, là où ce dernier justifiait et défendait la division entre signe instrumental et signe formel, Fonseca démontre à son égard une tolérance fort limitée’ (see Leblanc, Théories, p. 109). 40 In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 3, s. 2, p. 24. See The Conimbricenses. Some Questions on Signs, p. 187, and Wakúlenko, ‘Enciclopedismo’, p. 338. In Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 5, a. 2, p. 114, Couto mentions Fonseca’s doctrine on the reduction of the number of the inner senses as well. On this particular issue, see chapter 5 below. 41 In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, Proemium, q. 4, a. 4, p. 30–31; CMA II c. 3, q. 3, s. 3.

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the work for the third volume was probably accomplished between December 1594, and February 1596, and so it is not absurd to think that Couto may have known book VI at least (until question 4 of chapter II?) in his capacity of Fonseca’s aid in 1592. On November 8, 1602, writing to Rome, the provincial João Correia praises Fonseca’s third volume. This year coincides with the beginning of Couto’s revision of Góis’s Physica, and dates only one year after the conclusion of the latter’s teaching at the Coimbra College of Arts. Two questions of book VI are quoted three times, all of them in the Posterior Analytics. The first, and more important, where — commenting chapter 7 — Couto asks ‘if the material object of a science must be necessary, perpetual and universal’, deals with the distinction between the act of knowing (actus sciendi) and the acts of faith and opinion.42 The second deals with the relation between the act of knowing and the conclusion and premises in the process of demonstration.43 The other quotations by Couto are from books I, II, III, IV, and V.44 Besides being quoted in the Posterior Analytics (five times), Fonseca’s Metaphysics is also quoted by Couto in the Isagoge (nine times), in the Categories (six times), in the Dialectics’s ‘Proemium’ (four times),45 and in the Interpretation (only once). For three times in this list, Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae appear side by side with Fonseca’s Metaphysics.46 I believe this kind of parallelisms should be studied thoroughly, but this is not the place nor the time to do it.

42 CMA VI c. 1, q. 1, s. 4 (Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 7, q. 2, a. 4, p. 435). 43 CMA VI c. 1, q. 4, s. 4 (Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 1, q. 4, a. 4, p. 336); CMA VI c. 1, q. 4, s. 2 (Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I. c. 1, q. 4, a. 5, p. 341). 44 Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 1, q. 3, a. 4, p. 324, for book I; In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, Proemium, q. 4, a. 4, p. 30–31, Proemium, q. 5, a. 3, p. 42; Proemium, q. 4, a. 2, p. 25, and Proemium, q. 6, a. 2, p. 49, for book II; Proemium, q. 4, a. 5, p. 33, for book III; Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 6, a. 4, p. 127; Commentarii in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis Stagiritae, c. 1, q. 1, a. 3, p. 239; c. 1, q. 1, a. 3, p. 243; c. 1, q. 1, a. 3, p. 245; Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 2, q. 3, a. 3, p. 381; In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, I, c. 4, q. 3, a. 2, p. 96; I, c. 4, q. 4, a. 1, p. 102, and Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 1, q. 2, a. 5, p. 370, for book IV; Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 1, a. 5, p. 70; Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 1, q. 4, a. 2, p. 330; I, c. 23, q. 1, a. 2, p. 482; Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 6, a. 2, p. 122; Proemium, q. 4, a. 2, p. 91; c. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 155; Commentarii in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis Stagiritae, c. 7, q. 1, a. 4, p. 348; c. 7, exp, p. 334; c. 7, q. 2, a. 1, p. 351, Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, c. 2, q. 2, a. 2, p. 179; Proemium, q. 3, a. 2, p. 83; Proemium q. 6, a. 3, p. 125, and Proemium, q. 4, a. 3, s. 2, p. 95, for book V. 45 Recently, Petrescu (‘Scholastic Logic’, p. 538) claimed that Fonseca’s Metaphysics III c. 3 was transposed by Couto’s ‘preliminary questions on the status of logic and on what is the adequate subject of Dialectics’. 46 See Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Proemium, q. 4, a. 3, s. 2, p. 95, here Suárez DM V, s. 7, n. 9; Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore Resolutione, I, c. 23, q. 1, a. 2, p. 482, here Suárez DM XLIV, s. 11, per totum expresse nº 61; In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae, Prooemium, q. 4, a. 5, p. 33, here, the recentiores are Fonseca and Suárez (DM XXXIX, initio). Couto quotes Suárez’s Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam once: Commentarii in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis Stagiritae, c. 10, q. 1, a. 5, p. 409.

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At first sight, one of these references emerges among all others because it explicitly acknowledges a personal contribution and advancement to the field of philosophy by Fonseca. In the Categories Couto writes that Pedro da Fonseca overcame Thomas Cajetan’s distinction between ‘perfect’, and ‘imperfect concept’ by advancing a new solution (novum modum satis metaphysicum), viz. the ‘conceptus unus’, called a metaphysical mode of unity. Following Fonseca, Couto will distinguish the two aspects of this metaphysical mode of unity: the qualitative, accidental, or ‘psychological’ one (re), say, and the intentional or ‘representative’ one (ratione). Indeed, in book IV chapter 2, Fonseca is at the core of metaphysics, for he is dealing with the formal concept of being (de formali conceptu entis), and analysing its double aspect. The unity or uniqueness of the formal concept rests exclusively on its psychological aspect (conceptus unus re et non ratione)47 whose structure is explained by a modern interpreter as follows: A formal concept can be psychologically (re) distinct from another one if two acts or psychological qualities numerically distinct are the case. […] A formal concept is intentionally distinct (abstract, in other words) from another one if the representational (ratione) aspect of the first one does not include nothing proper to, and characteristic of, the second one. […] From the psychological (re) unity of the concept nothing can be concluded in relation to the unity of the objective concept which is its real noematic correlate. [...] From the unity and the diversity of the intentionally representative aspect of the formal concept, it is possible to conclude the unity and the diversity of the objective concept, since there is a rigorous noetic-noematic parallelism between them.48 This is the only occasion, in the whole of the Coimbra Jesuit Course, where Fonseca is unequivocally praised for introducing a novelty (investigavit novum modum). I will not address the issue regarding the alleged novelty of Fonseca’s thesis here, divided between Thomas Cajetan and Jean Capréolus, but this is quite interesting because the Jesuits were not encouraged to step out of the ‘filum doctrinae’, and would qualify the praise we make nowadays to theoretical breakthroughs as sheer vanity. One more note: if one considers the already mentioned Álvares’s inclusion of Fonseca’s name amid the most modern authors (recentiores), this does not come close to Couto’s more explicit, and much more enthusiastic reverence for Fonseca.

2. Fonseca’s presence in Góis’s several contributions to the Coimbra Jesuit Course will be now assessed from a different angle. Just like his colleagues, Góis had his own 47 See Commentarii in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis Stagiritae, c. 1, q. 1, a. 3, p. 245; CMA IV c. 2, q. 2, s. 5 [col. 719]. See Miguel Baptista Pereira, Ser e Pessoa. Pedro da Fonseca I — O Método da Filosofia (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1967), p. 343 note 252. Commentariorum In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964. 48 Pereira, Ser e Pessoa, p. 343 note 252. The author does not name the first aspect (re) as ‘psychological’, but as ‘psíquico’, in Portuguese, a word possessing an ambiguous sense in English language.

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image of Fonseca that could depend on an effective acquaintance with the latter’s metaphysics (if not with the book, at least with the doctrine). When the young Manuel de Góis entered Coimbra, Pedro da Fonseca was lecturing theology, and he was somehow immersed in what was to become the Coimbra Jesuit Course. Also, it may be remembered that the former’s PhD in Évora will coincide with Góis’s teaching period in Coimbra. It is only fair to say, then, that Góis could not escape from seeing Fonseca as a key scholar within the Society of Jesus, not to say the Portuguese Province. Curiously, Góis quotes Fonseca’s Institutiones Dialecticae only once.49 This is not relevant in itself. If, as already seen, this picture changes in Couto’s Dialectica, what appears to be the distance of Góis regarding logic cannot be totally cogent, regardless of the fragility of an argument ‘a silentio’. Besides, it is no need to recall here that, as far as it is known, Góis did not make any contribution to logic in the context of the Coimbra Jesuit Course.50 As the lists in Part I clearly show, Metaphysics V was a key book for Manuel de Góis as well as for Sebastião do Couto. Both authors quote it the same amount of times (twelve times), but Álvares does it only once. The reason explaining the numerous presences of Metaphysics V lies surely in the nature of the book intertwining logic and metaphysics. Besides being mandatory on the exam to the bachelor’s degree, book V was also a kind of philosophical dictionary. The relevance of philosophical themes as language, logic and knowledge in post-sixteenth century philosophy may have had one of its nests in that particular outlook of Metaphysics V. Nevertheless, paying attention to the number of times a text is quoted by an author is not a fruitful method per se. That is why Part II adopts a distinct procedure and purpose. In what follows a closer attention to causality over other philosophical topics will be paid, and it may be read in the wake of my previous papers or, in certain cases, taking their outlook into consideration.51 To begin with, it is interesting to note that in Physica II Góis mentions Fonseca precisely in relation with Aristotle’s text and its interpretation. What above has

49 In Octo Libros Physicorum, III, c. 2, exp, p. 382, quoting Fonseca, Institutionum Dialecticarum VI c. 24, ed. by J. F. Gomes, (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964). 50 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the following puzzling allusion by Fonseca: ‘Nam quæ de relatorum attributis in Prædicamentorum librum priuatim scripseramus, in communia commentaria huius loci paucis omissis (ut fere alia) translata sunt: nec satis cum instituto huius operis congruere uidentur, tametsi in eis nonnulla sunt, quæ si nunc ad incudem reuocaremus, iis, quæ nunc de relatis diximus, accommodanda essent’. (see CMA V c. 15, q. 6, s. 6, col. 863). It is only fair to say that Fonseca is regretting that the ‘common commentaries’ have misused and misinterpreted his doctrine of relation; does this mean that in 1598 a course on Logic was ready to integrate the Coimbra Course? I thank António Martins for calling my attention to this particular text by Fonseca; see also Chapter 7 below. 51 See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘As palavras e as coisas. O tema da causalidade em Portugal (séculos XVI e XVIII)’, Revista Filosófica de Coimbra, 19 (2009), pp. 227–58; and Carvalho, ‘Inter Philosophos non mediocris contentio. A propósito de Pedro da Fonseca e do contexto medieval da distinção essência/existência’, in Quodlibetaria. Miscellanea studiorum in honorem Prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno iubilationis suae offertae Conimbrigae MCMXCV, ed. by Mário Santiago de Carvalho and José F. Meirinhos (Porto: Fund. Eng. António de Almeida, 1995), pp. 529–62.

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been called Fonseca’s ‘Aristotelian turn’ finds one of its various materializations here. Explaining (explanatio B) chapter 3, and more in particular pages 194b 26ff, Góis says that Fonseca corroborates this passage as Aristotle’s first mention to the exemplar cause (formam et exemplar). There is no doubt in my mind that in the ‘explanatio’ (page 245 of the editio princeps) Góis definitively envisages Fonseca’s translation and reading of 1013a 26ff: ‘tò eidos kai tò parádeigma/Alio forma et exemplar’. Previously, in relation to 194b 24, Góis had declared that in chapter 2 of Metaphysics V — ‘caput in quo omnes caussarum modos recenset’ as he elliptically writes52 — Aristotle had introduced and reviewed the various types of causes. As in the sixteenth century, the parallelism between Physica II and Metaphysica V is common place in modern Aristotelian exegesis,53 but one may conjecture why Góis does not dwell on Metaphysics V here. The reason why he points to Metaphysics I (chapter 7) instead may be explained by Fonseca’s similar move. In spite of the probable move, it is patent that Fonseca points to section 2 of question 1 (ad solum metaphysicum spectare tractationem de causis), whereas Góis chooses section 3 instead (quid causa et qua ratione spectetur, cum philosophi agunt de caussis ut caussa sunt).54 This can be variously explained. Maybe Góis is writing a commentary that belongs to natural philosophy, not metaphysics; maybe he is dealing with the various definitions of cause given by philosophers in general (notably Durandus, Capréolus, and Silvestri) and their correction; maybe he is paying respect either to one of the twenty-two commonplaces (loci) Fonseca had listed in his Dialectical Instructions, i.e. the human authorities, or to the epistemological rule of ‘passing from one genus to another (metábasis eis allo génos)’.55 Indeed, Góis acknowledges that Fonseca thoroughly and clearly explained (uberior et illustrior) the analogical nature of ‘cause’,56 but the study of causality, according to Góis, ought to have its roots in natural philosophy. In what follows I hope to illustrate other possible occurrences related to the difference of philosophical scope dividing the two Portuguese Jesuits. It is my hope that going deeper into this issue may further explain why it was due to something more than mere chance that Fonseca began to philosophize with metaphysics, whereas Góis decided to do it with physics.57 Differently from the option of the latter, and its more conventional appearance, the decision of the former could represent a slight variance in interpreting the future text of the Ratio studiorum. Let me now stick to a few cases in which the name of Fonseca is explicitly mentioned by Góis with a caveat concerning my methodological choice. All these texts

52 See In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 3, exp, p. 245 (= explanatio A). 53 See Andrea Falcon, ‘Aristotle on Causality’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, URL = . 54 CMA I c. 7, q. 1, s. 3; In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 1, a. 3, p. 262. 55 See Institutionum VII c. 11 D (ed. Gomes, p. 480); see also Carvalho, ‘Reading Philosophy’, p. 21, and p. 33. 56 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 1, a. 3, p. 262. 57 On the issue above see Carvalho, O Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense (Coimbra-Lisbon: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra–Imprensa Nacional, 2018), p. 44.

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and authors share a ‘common doctrine’ — indeed, all authors are keen on admitting it — and are said to cultivate an eclectic philosophy. Moreover, the Society of Jesus, as any other religious Order, favoured identity or systematicity (filum doctrinae). Yet, one must always be cautious not to rush into an explanation based on doctrine dependency when authors could have only been walking on common ground. Just to give one illustration underpinning the caveat, it is indisputable that Fonseca and Góis shared the same doctrine on imaginary space and time.58 Still, it is not possible to affirm that the older Jesuit has influenced the younger one. Before the so-called ‘common manuscripts’ belonging to the prehistory of Coimbra Jesuit Course have been studied, I believe one should refrain from immediately seeing a direct influence where a common teaching may be the case. Meanwhile, either similarities or differences among our texts should be simply acknowledged. A first passage in Physica II envisages the exemplar cause, and inevitably compels Góis to cope with metaphysical issues. Scrutinizing the real nature of the exemplar cause, namely if it could be considered a true and proper cause, to which he answers with a qualified ‘yes’, Góis puts Fonseca’s authority side by side with Henry of Ghent’s.59 Before continuing to read the explicit mentions of Fonseca’s name, since the strange Fonseca/Henry pair reappears at least three more times, I believe such a frequency deserves a brief detour. Historically speaking, the link between the Ghentian master and the Portuguese Jesuit is bizarre, at least by present standards.60 Since our authors had the duty to comment Aristotle and follow Aquinas, one may bear in mind that the Ghentian master was the first theologian to gain distance from Aquinas’s teaching. Yet, Pedro da Fonseca and Henry of Ghent appear together several times in Góis’s texts. This happens, for instance, when Góis mentions Henry’s Quodlibet III, qu. 5, and Fonseca’s Metaphysics V chap. 28, or Quodlibet IX, qu. 2, and Metaphysics I chap. 1. Just like in the thirteenth century, when Henry of Ghent’s distance meant some sort of philosophical criticism of Thomas Aquinas, a decisive historical and philosophical turnaround is at stake in the sixteenth century. Fonseca inaugurates or at least continues a metaphysical move, and, seemingly, Góis shows to be on the older colleague’s same wavelength. Unequivocally, the option for an essentialist outlook in philosophy by our Jesuits goes further back than Scotus’s input, and reaches the Ghentian master. This is not the place to dwell on the difference between the two medieval theologians, but, at least once, Fonseca critically alludes to one precise interpretation of Henry of Ghent

58 See Carvalho, ‘Exposição metafísica do Espaço-tempo imaginários em Pedro da Fonseca e Manuel de Góis’, Revista Filosófica de Coimbra, 29 (2020), pp. 131–46. It is almost a common place to assert that our Jesuits read several points of Aquinas’s theology with the lenses of John Duns Scotus, but other multiple ‘dialogues’ were common then, just like the majority of the contributions to this book testify to; of course, this is not to imply that the practice of philosophy, by its own terms, among authors sharing a ‘common doctrine’, would preclude their individuality and fingerprint. 59 See In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 4, a. 2, p. 271. 60 See however, Birgitta Hachmann and Carvalho, ‘Os Conimbricenses e Pedro da Fonseca como leitores de Henrique de Gand (I)’, Mediævalia. Textos e Estudos, 3 (1993), pp. 207–12.

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by Duns Scotus.61 If one is to uncritically read the Portuguese authors, it seems like Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Pedro da Fonseca and Manuel de Góis shared the conviction that all things acquire their real being or essence (esse reale actuale), due to their participation of divine ideas, from eternity.62 This is far from being sound Aristotelianism and puts the two Jesuits back to the trails of a Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Pseudo-Dyonisian, or even Avicennian trend. Moreover, Fonseca somehow confirms it, for he would not discard to be seen as a scholar joining (concilantur) Plato and Aristotle together sometimes and, indeed, such had been the Ghentian purpose. Even if there is no time to dwell on this issue here, it is my firm belief that a thorough research about the presence of Neo-Platonism(-s) in the Coimbra Jesuit Course can indeed pay off. Being this as it may, all indicates that the authority of that ‘reputed author among the ancient scholastics’, Henry of Ghent,63 being summoned more than once by Fonseca, as well as by Góis, is equivalent to a readoption of the conception of reality framed by a metaphysical and essentialist turnover. Let us briefly have a look at it. According to our Jesuits, Henry’s Quodlibet IX, qu. 2 teaches five causes and denies the possibility of reducing the primary cause, or the exemplar, to the efficient and the internal formal cause. Just recall that in that particular text, Henry asked ‘if God could have created various creatures in specie, provided He did not possess a plurality of ideas’.64 Yet, if one is to embrace the best contemporary exegesis, Henry of Ghent was opening up a notion of reality (realitas) different from Aquinas’s there: reality or ‘real being’ is ‘pure possibility’, something more akin to an objective (Sachheit) than to an effective content (Wirklichkeit).65 Despite the lack of rigour underpinning my following parallelism, but for the sake of clarity, all this could be put using the motto Spinoza will make famous: the Jesuits were reading the theme of that precise question by Henry of Ghent ‘sub specie aeternitatis’, from the perspective of the universal and eternal true. Is it, nevertheless, possible to check if Fonseca’s doctrine on causality, as Góis reads it, is something more than a repetition, a tacit agreement or a follow up? It would be shallow to say that Góis is just following Fonseca’s steps. So, in spite of a common ground, the task ahead will stick to looking for textual motives, in the allusions of Góis to Fonseca, that may witness Góis splitting from Fonseca. It is my

61 See CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 5, col. 321: ‘…si Scotus recte eius [Henrici de Gandavo] opinionem interpretatur…’ 62 See CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 5, col, 321. 63 See CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 5, col. 325: ‘…Henricum Gandavensem ex veteribus scholasticis egregium auctorem…’ 64 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, qu. 2, ed. by R.Macken (Leuven: Leuven, University Press, 1983), p. 25. 65 Pasquale Porro, ‘Possibilità ed esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand’, in Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293), ed. by W. Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), p. 241: ‘La considerazione assoluta delle essenze — l’ideale della conoscenza scientifica secondo l’epistemologia enrichiana — coincide in practica com il punto di vista di Dio sulle essenze stesse: punto di vista che è mentale in Dio, e reale invece nelle creature’.

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intention to do it, without going beyond the relations between the Aristotelian causes and the eventual place that, among them all, the exemplar cause is supposed to have. Firstly, Góis says that Fonseca correctly assessed the issue under discussion (totam hanc controversiam accurate pertractat): the exemplar cause pertains directly (non reductie sed directo) to the genus of the formal cause, meaning that even if both causes may convene in their notion they differ in the way they are causes (notione conveniant, differunt tamen […] caussandi modos).66 Therefore, Góis enumerates the three attributes that distinguish the exemplar from the formal cause: (i) each one causes in a particular way (secundum speciales caussandi modos); (ii) the exemplar cause is prior to the intervention of the formal (praeit causalitatem formae informantis) by its own nature; and (iii) the exemplar cause is endowed with a prototypical feature (prototypa ratio essentiae rei). Differently, Fonseca had asked about the number of the causes (qu. 1) and, even if he wished to be seen as an orthodox Aristotelian, he had introduced the following operative distinction: there are four causes, provided one conceives the exemplar ‘in common’, as well as the internal formal cause, but their number may differ, provided one conceives them in particular (in specie). Using his preferred method, to which I shall return, Fonseca invokes various authors who have spoken about a reduced relation (reduci) of the exemplar cause either to the final (Alexander), or the efficient (Scotus, Stoics), or even the formal cause (Aquinas, Cajetan). Clearly, Fonseca and Góis want to put off any possible way of conceiving the ‘exemplar’ as a mere architectural plan, but only Fonseca brings the discussion to its metaphysical core. In books V and VII he writes about the ‘exemplar’ as ‘a common and universal concept of the thing to be done by some kind of art, without having the condition of representing (representat) that thing, but the one of substituting the objective common nature (vicem natura communis obiecta) the artist is supposed to imitate’.67 To state the difference between human’s and God’s art (discrimen inter nostram artem et divinam), i.e. a difference between an artificial and a true exemplar, is to call one’s attention to the vicarious character of ‘art’, and introduce the obvious lesson of the true exemplar’s superiority over the human one. This is totally coherent with the appeal for Henry of Ghent. It is nevertheless obvious that Góis’s lesson and purpose differs from Fonseca’s approach. The latter’s wider outlook, I submit, derives first and foremost from his working method. It would not be far fetched to call on the Platonic method of discussing things under their widest perspective (Rep. II 368d) and put it in parallel with Fonseca’s. Yet, sticking to his research — is the exemplar cause a true one? — Góis dwells only on the various modes of causation, as a natural philosopher would do. As Martin Heidegger once called to our attention, the inquiry in Aristotle’s Physica is more of an ontological than an ontic nature.68 A metaphysical, say ontological,

66 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 4, a. 2, p. 271; see also Martins, ‘A causalidade’, p. 117, and note 8. 67 CMA I c. 7, q. 1, s. 5, col. 321. 68 See Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotles’s Physics B 1’, translated by Thomas J. Sheehan, in Wegmarken (1919–58). Translated as Pathmarks, ed. by William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 198.

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input is also inevitable when the Portuguese Jesuits comment that Aristotle’s title, but this cannot blind anyone for the obvious fact that the Jesuits were sensitive to the distinction between a physical and a metaphysical approach. Fonseca’s metaphysical approach seems so wide that it could even interfere with the way Góis would define his deontological and epistemological frame. This happens in a very typical question by Fonseca, which is also quoted by Góis, and where the former is methodologically wider enough to cover up matters pertaining to physics, theology and to the intersection of logic with metaphysics. Could not this mean that Fonseca looked at Aristotle’s Metaphysics as fundamental to deal with the whole of philosophy? Curiously, the first topic, linking physics to ‘accidental dispositions’, does not appear in Góis, who is nevertheless commenting Aristotle’s Physica; the second topic introduces an issue belonging to the theme of the separated soul, more suitable to Álvares; and the last equates the problem of definition with the meaning of the ‘quod est’ (the individual substance) and the ‘quid est’ (the specific nature), a crucial kernel in any schoolbook related to metaphysics. Let me return to Fonseca’s text and Góis’s quotation thereof. The cause/effect relationship is now under examination and it is questioned if the cause is always superior (nobilitas) to the effect. Significantly, Góis acknowledges that this is a problem crossing physics and metaphysics, since it faces the nature of the singulars and its perfection. To be precise, the question relates to the perfection of the univocal efficient cause and its effect, either as regards its specific or its individual nature (caussam efficientem univocam eiusque effectum, tam secundum naturam specificam, quam individuam, aequele inter se obtinere perfectionem).69 Any reader may believe to see the same wider approach characteristic of Fonseca in Góis. But this would not be entirely correct in relation to Góis’s procedure. He admits that just like Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Thomas of Strasbourg (Argentina) and Paul Soncinas, Henry of Ghent taught that the singulars of the same species do not differ in the grade of their essence. As it usually happens with our Jesuits, the theme of the singulars opens the door to read Aquinas’s heritage through the lens of Duns Scotus who had been a systematic reader of Henry of Ghent. Still, Góis is clear enough in remarking that the Physica is not the place to further inquire the matter, and explicitly admits that it suffices to mention Fonseca’s opinion.70 The mere appointment to Fonseca as an authority gives the indication that Góis is sensitive to the distinct philosophical horizon dividing the two authors. Moreover, he is aware of the limitations of his own domain, and respectful of the Society’s rules that forbade the ‘metabásis eis allo génos’. And indeed, Fonseca’s version is wider: Dominic Soto, Marcantonio Zimara, Saint Augustine (among several other Fathers) and Saint Thomas Aquinas, in part, appear to contradict Capréolus, and mostly Cajetan, that is, some Thomists as well. They all embraced the opinion according to which there are more perfect individual forms than others by their substance in the human species (sub specie humanae dari formas individuas alias aliis secundum substantiam perfectiores). It goes without saying that Fonseca (and Góis too) does not agree with those Thomists’s fringe, and teaches

69 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 5, a. 2, p. 275. 70 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 5, a. 2, p. 275: CMA V c. 28, q. 16 [s. 2], col. 1088–94.

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that the differences existing in individuals do not come from their particular natures but from their accidental dispositions (non id ad naturas eorum particulares sed ad dispositiones accidentarias, defectumque aut redundantiam materiae perspicue refertur).71 Above I have underlined that Góis saw this problem intertwining physics with metaphysics, and thus he would be tempted to agree with Heidegger’s remark, but, and returning to the three intersections detected by Fonseca, I believe that the omission of the first issue, by Góis, is conspicuous, though perhaps it may be explained by his independence. It may be recalled, and this is significant as far as Góis’s independence of his antecedent ‘model’ is concerned, that Fonseca had invoked ‘a common sentence by the natural philosophers’ (commune physicorum proloquium), meaning that agents always produce their effects as similar to them.72 Of course, Fonseca introduced this common sentence to contradict the idea of inequality among perfect individuals. A few paragraphs earlier, he had also introduced another perspective that Góis could attend to, for it would be suitable for a natural philosopher: if some individuals were more perfect than others of the same species this would clash with another common philosophical idea, viz. that the world is perfect. As I already stated elsewhere, Góis’s tendency to insert anthropology in cosmology would give him the opportunity to turn Fonseca’s mention into a prominent issue, but nowhere in Góis’s Physica is that text of the Metaphysics invoked by his colleague. And if we are to turn to the various textual places where Góis could introduce a similar discussion — viz. De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, Ethica, De Anima, and Parva Naturalia, — Fonseca’s text remains absent.73 This being said, I would not like to forget that arguments ‘a silentio’ are not sound enough. One last quotation may now be assessed.74 In an explicit way, Góis compliments his older colleague and rival philosopher, Fonseca, for having wisely explained (docte explicat) in Metaphysics V 5 why a negative answer should be given to the question concerning the essences’s relation to efficient causality. Since only in the third and last of Góis’s assertions is Fonseca’s explanation praised, let us, first, enumerate Góis’s assertions: (i) the action of the first cause is determined, as far as the species is concerned, by the action of the second cause for, according to Dionysius, diversity comes from second causes; (ii) the action of the second cause is determined per se by God, first, as singularity is concerned; (iii) the singularity of the actions and the effects, which are not predetermined by God, as such, cannot be put in parallel with the individual difference, as an effect attributed to God.75 The last assertion scrutinizes God, the creator, in the realm of causality though; created singulars, and their actions and effects; the individual differences among singulars; and the distinction between

CMA V c. 29, q. 16, s. 2, col. 1089. CMA V c. 29, q. 16, s. 2, col. 1090. For a precise identification of the references in the texts above, see Carvalho, Dicionário, p. 225. In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 2, p. 310 quoting CMA V, c. 5, q. 1, s. 4. It is here that we find one of Góis’s allusions to his future Commentary on Metaphysics; see Carvalho, O Curso Aristotélico, pp. 138–54. 75 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 2, p. 310: ‘…sciendum actionum et effectorum singularitatem non ita a Deo praefiniri, quasi tantum ab eo individualis differentia effective tribuatur’.

71 72 73 74

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God’s predetermination (praefiniri) and effective attribution (effective tribuatur). Heidegger’s concerns apart, Góis could hardly escape to any sort of metaphysics, ignore the ‘scientia conditionata’, or even Henry of Ghent’s difference between the ‘esse essentiae’ and the ‘esse existentiae’, not to mention Fonseca’s metaphysical doctrine here at stake. Yet, as Góis usually does, he is giving nature the autonomy it should have, despite (or because) of adopting a broaden Neo-Platonic frame. To put it shortly, both authors are on a different wavelength again, and the attention given to second causes, plus the assertions (i) and (ii), clearly pertain to natural philosophy. Looking through a natural philosopher’s looking glass, Góis faces the intrinsic relations of the first and second causes and, whereas Fonseca questions if, besides God, there is any sort of real being necessarily simple (necessarium simpliciter), and explains the very core of the essence of things (explicatio sempiternitatis connexionum per se), Góis compliments Fonseca’s most important contribution but little more. The latter is praised for having taught that necessary or essential connections of things are identity relations or better still fundamentally negations of the diversity (non sint aliud formaliter quam relationes identitatum, fundamentaliter vero negationes diversitates, ut docte explicat Fonseca).76 This admission equates dialectics (relationes/ negationes) to its metaphysical extension or ground (connexiones rerum), but could hardly be a matter for a natural philosopher. I shall not deal here with the relation of this particular Fonseca’s new thesis with the so-called problem of the universals.77 Arguably, Góis is reading and closely following Fonseca’s section 4.78 Even the more technical terms and the examples he uses are shared by the two authors; for instance: ‘connexiones essentiales’, ‘relationes identitatum’, ‘negationes diversitatis’ or the example of man and animal as participants of reason and capable of education. Let me insist on the core of Fonseca’s capital teaching. He is reporting his doctrine about the ontological structure of objective reality,79 and he does so crossing a path from dialectics to metaphysics; the former, when speaking about fundamental essential identities (identitates fundamentales); the latter, when speaking about ‘connections of things’ (connexiones rerum), meaning the essentialist structure of reality. Putting the whole of his doctrine in detail, thus allowing one to see the sequence of the dialectic/ metaphysics layers: (i) there is a type of identities of subjects with predicates (identitates quasdam subiectorum cum praedictis), which are, in certain cases, essential relations; (ii) but these identities are not formal identities; (iii) they are certain negations of the diversity of subjects and predicates instead; (iv) the negation of these diversities may be privative (privativas) or purely negatives (pure negativas); (v) absolute necessity (necessarias simpliciter) lies in negative, not privative connections, which have an eternal essence of their own (connexiones necessarias simpliciter suo modo fuisse ab aeterno esse negativas, non privativas).80 The region of purely negative connections 76 In Octo Libros Physicorum, II, c. 7, q. 15, a. 2, p. 310. 77 Carvalho, ‘The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals (1577–1606)’, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 18 (2007), pp. 531–43. 78 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, cols 321–27. 79 See Pereira, Ser e Pessoa, pp. 358–60. 80 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, col. 323.

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coincides with the dialectical region of those beings that do not differ by their essential predicates and properties, and cannot but exist (semper suo modo existerunt, nec possunt ullo modo non existere) or, better still, are endowed with an essential being.81 Such is the case of the proposition ‘Man is not a stone’, for it has a metaphysical priority of its own (existere sine operatione intellectus).82 Pure negations of this kind do exist by the mere non-existence of what is denied, and by themselves (ex seipsis) do not fall short of the existence of their extremes.83 Fonseca underlines that he itemizes ‘by themselves’ because in the cases of matters of contingency (esse existentiae) the existence of the extreme terms is required, either really or objectively. The logician and metaphysician Fonseca knocks on theology’s door, I sustain, when he attains the notion of a virtual (virtute) existence, an important key to enter into the theology of Creation. Created things cannot be considered perfect if they do not virtually exist in the first efficient,84 and Góis would said ‘in the prime mover’.85 Clearly, Fonseca’s metaphysical exposition would not fit in Góis’s more physical architecture. No doubt, he presupposes that doctrine, he considers worthy of compliment and endorsement, but he eventually finds no place in his pages for dwelling on it. Anyone wishing to pursue the line of inquiry I have inaugurated here,will certainly be able to see what could be Góis’s horizon of the philosophy of nature, or its didactical exposition among hundreds of questions and thousands of articles in closer detail. Let metaphysics be to metaphysicians could be Góis’s motto as a committed philosopher of nature. If it (luckily) lacks Rudolf Carnap’s future, severe and dismissive epistemic attitude towards metaphysics,86 Góis’s motto certainly derives from his personal respect for the epistemological frontier that the majority of the Jesuits did not wish to see trespassed.

Final Remarks The scope as well as the method of the present research is too narrow to allow anyone to get a decisive picture of Fonseca’s presence in the Coimbra Jesuit Course. Yet, some until now unidentified but explicit references made by the Course to Pedro da Fonseca were enumerated for the first time. Understandably, nowhere the authors of the Coimbra Jesuit Course explicitly diverge from Fonseca, which they seem to do though.

81 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, col. 323: ‘Ratio vero est, quia non possunt non existere, nisi per existentiam oppositorum diversitatum, quare tamen existere nullo modo possint. Purae enim negationes, etiam pure negativae existunt, id est per solam non existentia eorum, quae negant’. 82 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, col. 323. 83 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, col. 324. 84 CMA V c. 5, q. 1, s. 4, col. 325. 85 In Octo Libros Physicorum, VIII, c. 6, q. 1, a. 2, p. 775; In Octo Libros Physicorum, VIII, c. 6, q. 1, a. 3, p. 777 and so on. 86 Rudolf Carnap, ‘Pseudoproblems in Philosophy’, in The logical structure of the world and Pseudoproblems in philosophy. English translation by Rolf A. George (Chicago and La Salle [Illinois]: Open Court, 2003), pp. 305–43.

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For the time being, this will be an open issue, for attention was paid only to explicit allusions to Fonseca by Góis, Álvares, and Couto here. The method employed here allows the following general conclusions. Firstly, to state the obvious, meaning that Fonseca is far from being a relevant name in the Course, if one sticks to the number of times his name is referred to through more than three thousand published pages at least. A deeper research must be made to canvass shared ideas but this must be done with a cautious approach, as indicated above. Secondly, Fonseca has an irregular presence in the three main authors of the Course and it appears that all of them reveal considerable philosophical independence from the first mentor and paladin of the Coimbra Jesuit Course. Far from being a key authority to Baltasar Álvares, Fonseca’s explicit appearance in the Treaty of the Separated Soul is meagre and not decisive even if (or because) he appears in so crucial matters as the causality and the knowledge of the separated soul. A tricky but unanswerable question will remain: would it be possible to read Álvares’s contribution to the Course as a substitute to Fonseca’s book XII of the Metaphysics? Or, conversely, would things have been different, and would the minor presence of Fonseca in Álvares’s Treaty have grown if the latter could have ever seen the former’s book XII (provided the former had finished it)? The explicit presence of Fonseca in Couto’s contribution to the Jesuit Coimbra Course outnumbers that of all other authors. This was not the occasion to fully examine it yet but, besides personal relations uniting both Jesuits, it is obvious that Couto shows a patent sympathy towards Fonseca’s epistemological and metaphysical lessons which he praises more than once. This study has highlighted the importance of Fonseca’s doctrine on intermediate concepts and on the formal concept of being in Couto, but Couto is the only one of the three players of the Coimbra Jesuit Course to show the most extensive knowledge of Fonseca’s Metaphysics. Comparing the first published volume by Góis (the Commentary on Physics) with the last one (the Commentary On the Soul), Fonseca’s relevance seems to decrease. In the former’s De Anima there is only one reference to the latter but it is an important one, since it acknowledges and follows Fonseca’s doctrine on the number of the inner senses. The presence of Metaphysics V — ‘Fonseca’s most systematic treatise on the causes’87– is quite relevant in Góis’s Physica II and this may be indicative of the fact that Fonseca’s doctrine on causality received much more attention from Góis than any other subject matter. Also, the authors of the Coimbra Jesuit Course shared several items related to the doctrine of knowledge and the objective reality with Fonseca. Lastly, with the analysis of all the references to Fonseca’s doctrine of causality I believe I have provided textual evidence that may confirm and explain why Manuel de Góis chooses to publish first on natural philosophy, and not on metaphysics. It would be Góis’s own way to state how every Jesuit student should start a course in philosophy. This was a clear divide between Góis and Fonseca, and it witnessed the growth of Jesuit critics (in Portugal as well as abroad) of Manuel de Góis’s enterprise.

87 Martins, ‘A causalidade’, p. 116.

Section II

Disputing on Fonseca

João Rebalde

Pedro da Fonseca’s Doctrine on the Middle Knowledge

1. The Controversy about the Authorship of the Concept of Middle Knowledge Fonseca deals with the question of divine science and future contingents in the third volume of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Commentariorum in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae) which was written in 1596 and published posthumously in 1604. It is indeed in the third volume of his commentary that he introduces the concept of compound or conditioned knowledge to explain divine knowledge, perfect and true, of future contingents, and the compatibility of this knowledge with human free will. Yet in the section of the text where he introduces the explanation of this knowledge, he adds that he was the first to teach this doctrine thirty year earlier,1 indicating the exact date in which he was by then writing, that is, in

* Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto (Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, Via panorâmica, s/n, 4150–564 Porto, Portugal; [email protected]); IR of the Project Does God know the contingents? The origin in the 16th century of the middle knowledge doctrine (EXPL/ FER-FIL/1410/2021). The revision of the article is funded with National Funds through the FCT/ MCTES — Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia/ Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior (Foundation for Science and Technology / Ministry for Science, Technology and Higher Education — Portugal), in the framework of the Project of the Institute of Philosophy with the reference UIDB/00502/2020. I would like to thank Professor Paula Oliveira e Silva (Universidade do Porto) for her precious suggestions and invaluable help in the review of this article. 1 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 119A: ‘Ante anos triginta, quam haec scriberemus (scribimus autem anno Domini nonagesimo sexto supra millesimum et quingentesimum) cum materiam de providentia divina, et praedestinatione in publicis lectionibus essemus ingressi; multaeque, ac graves difficultates; quae in ea occurrunt, se nobis obiicerent, nulla faciliori via, et ratione putabamus explicari omnes posse, quam constituenda ea distinctione, quam paulo ante fecimus duplicis status eorum contingentium, quae re vera futura sunt, absoluti scilicet, et conditionati, asserendaque certitudine divinae cognitiones circa illa in utroque statu; prius quidem in conditionato, deinde vero in absoluto. Quae distinctio et utriusque certitudinis confirmatio, ita nobis omnium pene obiectarum difficultatum tenebras depellebant, ut nova quaedam lux nostrae mentis oculis oborta videretur. Ea enim distinctione hac in re usurpanda, et cum veritate sacrorum voluminum cohaerere João Rebalde  •  Universidade do Porto* Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 63-85 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131759

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1596. However, in the marginalia of this page he mentions Luis de Molina, Francisco Suárez, Gabriel Vázquez and Alfonso Mendoza.2 The problem of the authorship of middle knowledge doctrine is even more intriguing because Luis de Molina, in the early edition (1588) of the Concordia liberii arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione (Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination and Reprobation), also states that he was the first to teach the theory.3 Moreover, in the Commentaria in primam Divi Thomae partem (Commentaries on the First Part of St Thomas’ Summary of Theology) (1592) Molina states that he was the first to teach this doctrine thirty years earlier, both in public and in private acts, and twenty years earlier in lectures.4 From these

videbantur omnia, et cum verae Philosophiae dogmatis de arbitrii libertate mirifice consentire, et non mediocre solatium anxiis mentibus afferre, dum nosse percupiunt, quanam faciliori ratione infallibilis Dei praescientiae, ac providentiae certitudo nullam creatis voluntatibus in agendo necessitatem afferre intelligatur: eas enim semper nobis persuasimus non ab alio physice, (hoc est vera, et reali actione), sed a se ipsis ad actus liberos determinari, ad operationes quidem naturae, cum concurso Dei generali; ad operationes autem gratiae, cum concursu eiusdem speciali. Unum illud scrupulum iniiciebat, ne hac ratione novum aliquid fortasse induceretur, quod non omni ex parte cum communi Patrum doctrina, aut diligenti scholasticorum examine, et accurata lima conueniret. Neque enim quisquam erat, qui hoc pacto libertatem arbitrii nostri cum divina praescientia, aut providentia aperte, et (ut dicitur) in terminis conciliasset. Sed cum re bene perpensa omnia eorum dicta hoc pacto melius et explicari, et conciliari viderentur, nihil antiquius habuimus, quam ut praedictam distinctionem futurorum persequeremur, et divinae cognitionis in utroque eorum statu certitudinem confirmaremus’. All references to CMA are from Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964). 2 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120. 3 Cf. Ludovico Molina, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione, et reprobatione, ad nonnullos primae partis D. Thomae articulos (Olyssipone: Antonium Riberium, 1588), q. 23, a. 4–5, d. 1, m. 11, p. 492; Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia, q. 23, a. 4–5, d. 1, m. 14, 12, editionem criticam curavit Iohannes Rabeneck (Oniae–Matriti: Collegium Maximum S. I.–Soc. Edit. ‘Sapientia’, 1953), p. 587. 4 Cf. Molina, Commentaria in primam Divi Thomae partem (Cuencae: ex officina Ch. Barnabae, 1592), q. 14, a. 13, d. 18, m. 2, cols 663–64, b-d. ‘Parvi pendunt etiam, quod tam dilucide cum praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione, et reprobatione, libertas eadem, ex capite certitudinis scientia mediae, a nobis fuerit conciliata. Imo inde reiiciendam censent mediam scientiam, quod tam facile ac dilucide ex eo capite omnia consentiant: cum tamen sancti patres tantopere in illis conciliandis laboraverint, semperque exactam libertatis arbitrii cum illis quatuor, et cum divina gratia conciliationem tamquam unum e difficillimis existimaverint. At profecto, cum verum vero consonet, a falso autem cito discrepet verum, quod tam facile ac perspicue illa quatuor ex capite praescientiae mediae cum arbitrii libertate cohaereant, signum est manifestum, nos integram legitimamque rationem conciliandi ea omnia tradidisse. Quod si a fidei dogmatibus, a sanctorum patrum, doctorumque Catholicorum intento, aut ab eorundem indubitatis sententiis, vel tantil[l]um in nostra hac via ea omnia conciliandi discreparemus, iure sane suspecta haberi posset. Caeterum quod in labores eorum introeuntes totque concertationibus et egregiis aliorum dictis atque inventis illustrati, dilucidius aliquantulum radicem attigerimus unde haec omnia consentiant, et unde difficultates omnes facile enodantur, atque a triginta annis in privatis et publicis disputationibus, a viginti vero in nostris ad primam partem commentariis eam sub nomine scientiae naturalis idcirco tradiderimus, quod libera in Deo non sit, omnemque divinae voluntatis liberum actum antecedat, novissime autem exactius quam umquam antea, sub nomine scientiae mediae eandem in nostra

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testimonies, a heated discussion has developed about the true authorship of middle knowledge doctrine, which lasts to this day.5 When Fonseca claims the authorship of the doctrine on middle knowledge, the doctrine had already acquired unexpected notoriety throught Molina’s works, whose writings were being read, discussed and sold at a good price.6 Fonseca in his turn was a profound connoisseur of Aristotle’s works, a prominent theologian in the Society,

docuerimus Concordia: nemo sane potest iure id nobis vitio vertere. Praesertim cum sancti patres, quamvis neque distinctione scientiae liberae et naturalis in Deo, quod recorder, sub eis verbis fuerint usi, neque item scientiae mediae inter liberam et mere naturalem, unanimi tamen consensu docuerint, ea contingentia futura, quae a nostro arbitrio pendente, non idcirco futura esse, quia a Deo futura praesciuntur, sed idcrico Deum, quia Deus est, hoc est, altitudine sui intellectus supra illorum naturam illa futura cognovisse, quia ita pro arbitrii libertate erant futura, ut disputatione praecedente a nobis relatum est: et cum iidem etiam patres ex hoc ipso capite unanimi consensu nostri arbitrii libertatem cum divina praescientia cohaerere docuerint, si tam, quae disputatione praecedente, quam quae disputatione et alibi, ex ipsismet patribus relata sunt, consulas; quae plane non aliud sunt, quam scientiam mediam, si non nostris verbis, re tamen ipsa, affirmare’. See also Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia (Antuerpiae: ex Officina J. Trognaesii, 1595), q. 14, a. 13, d. 53, m. 2, p. 253; Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, q. 14, a. 13, d. 53, m. 2, 22, pp. 377–78. 5 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II, 1: The Doctrine of God (London–New York: T&T Clark International, 2003), spec. p. 569; João Madeira, Pedro da Fonseca’s Isagoge Philosophica and the Predicables from Boethius to the Lovanienses, Ph.D Dissertation (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, November 2006), pp. 5–6; Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi, ‘Augustinisme et science moyenne’, Revue d’études augustiniennes et patristiques, 57 (2011), p. 112 ff; João Rebalde, Liberdade humana e perfeição divina na Concordia de Luis de Molina (Famalicão: Húmus, 2015), pp. 30–39 (regarding the controversy about the authorship of middle knowledge, I return to and modify in this article some commentaries I then included in the work mentioned); Thomas Marschler, ‘Providence, Predestination, and Grace in Early Modern Catholic Theology’, in Ulrich L. Lehner, Richard A. Muller and A. G. Roeber (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600–1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 97–98. For an overview of the middle knowledge doctrine, see William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 1988). On De auxiliis controversies, see Edmond Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme’, in Alfred Vacant, Eugene Mangenot and Émile Amann (eds), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 10–2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 2094–2187; Vicente Beltrán de Heredia (ed.), Domingo Bañez y las controversias sobre la gracia. Textos y documentos (Salamanca: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1968); Robert J. Matava, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice. Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited (Boston: Brill, 2016) (see, pp. 29–31); Sydney Penner, ‘Free Will’, in Henrik Lagerlund and Benjamin Hill (eds), The Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy (New York–London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 508–14; Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi, Thomisme et théologie moderne. L’école de saint Thomas à l’épreuve de la querelle de la grâce (XVIIe–XVIIIe siècles) (Paris–Perpignan: Artège–Lethielleux, 2018); Matthew T. Gaetano, ‘The Catholic Reception of Aquinas in the De Auxiliis Controversy’, in Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 255–79; David Torrijos-Castrillejo, ‘Berlarmino y las disputas “de auxiliis”. Acerca de un manuscrito inédito sobre la ciencia media’, Estudios Eclesiásticos. Revista de investigación e información teológica y canónica, vol. 97/380 (2022), pp. 181–215; Paolo Broggio, ‘Grace’, in Harald E. Braun, Erik De Bom and Paolo Astorri (eds), A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2022), pp. 115–33. 6 Geschichte des Molinismus, vol. I. Neue Molinaschriften, ed. by Friedrich Stegmüller (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1935), p. 739.

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whose influence within it was considerable. Fonseca’s claim had consequences: it spread the idea that he was the creator of the doctrine and that Molina had later developed it and given it the name by which it became known. Molina would thus be a mere follower of Fonseca’s ideas, although with the merit of having developed and spread them. However, this assumption is not unanimously accepted by the scholars nor does it seem that it would have been accepted by Molina himself. In 1645 François Annat wrote an important work about the doctrine of the middle knowledge where he argues that Fonseca was its author.7 Francesco Amico, in his treatise on divine science, states that it is consensual that the first person to use conditioned knowledge was Fonseca and that the second one was Molina. Both, Fonseca and Molina, would have later been followed by other Jesuits, such as Suárez or Vasquez.8 In line with this opinion is Nathaniel Southwell, whose bibliographical encyclopedia of 1676 brought together the works and contributions of notable Jesuits. Southwell considers Fonseca to be the first author of the doctrine of middle knowledge, basing his opinion on the information this Jesuit provides in his work, adding that he would later be followed by Molina and others.9 The subject is also referred to in the work Image of Virtue at the Novitiate of the Society of Jesus (1719), written by António Franco. In the information about Fonseca’s life, Franco states that by the year 1566 Fonseca was already teaching the doctrine of middle knowledge.10 In the second volume of the aforementioned work, in a reference to Molina’s life, Franco adds that there was a letter written by Molina to Fonseca, in Coimbra’s Registry that had been sent to François Annat. In this letter, which either never reached its destination, or was much later delivered to Annat, Molina supposedly asked Fonseca some questions about the doctrine of middle knowledge claiming that he had learned it from him. However, despite António Franco’s meticulous efforts to find it, he admits that he did not find this document among Molina’s letters.11 7 Francisco Annato, Scientia media contra novos eius impugnatores defensa (Paris: Sebastianum Cramoisy, 1662), pp. 26–44. 8 Francisco Amico, Cursus theologici iuxta scholasticam huius temporis Societatis Iesu methodum. Tomus primus: de Deo uno et trino (Duaci: Baltazaris Belleri, 1640), d. 12, s. 11, n. 161, pp. 215–16. 9 Nathanaele Sotvellus, Bibliotheca scriptorum Societatis Jesu (Romae: I. A. Lazzaris Veresii, 1676), p. 672b. 10 António Franco, Imagem da virtude em o noviciado da Companhia de Jesus, tomo I (Évora: Universidade de Evora, 1719), p. 394, b. On Fonseca’s he writes: ‘Mestre de Philosophia mui celebrado no mundo entre os sábios pella sua Methaphysica, que imprimio em quatro tomos. Assim mesmo ensinou Theologia com fama de Mestre esclarecido. Elle foi o primeiro, que no anno de mil quinhentos sessenta, e seis, como tem a Bibliotheca da Companhia, ensinou nas nossas escolas a Sciencia Media, como o mesmo Padre o significa em suas obras, ainda que nesta materia foi mais celebrado o Padre Luis de Molina, que a tratou, e imprimio sobre ella muito de preposito, como digo em sua vida’. 11 Franco, Imagem da virtude, II, p. 622, a. On Molina’s he writes: ‘Imprimio huns Comentarios sobre a primeira parte de Santo Thomas. Mais a Concordia da graça, e livre alvedrio. Na qual obra tratou da Scientia Media; a quem deu os mais fortes alentos. No Cartorio de Coimbra nos consta havia huma carta sua, cujo treslado se mandou ao Padre Francisco Anato Francez da nossa Companhia, que mandou saber a esta Provincia os documentos do primeiro Author da Scientia Media. A tal

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Francisco Rodrigues, in his well-known history of the Society of Jesus in Portugal (1938), writes some interesting and revealing lines on the subject. After describing Molina’s difficulties in publishing the Concordia, he states that the doctrine expounded in this work was not new. He concludes that the Spanish Jesuit only gave it the name, based on the characteristics of the knowledge it provides. Molina disseminated it widely through his printed works and defended it with great expertise in the face of its adversaries. The doctrine would have been taught for the first time in the colleges of the Society in Coimbra and Évora and its creation, coordination and application was due to Fonseca. The central argument he uses for ascribing the authorship to Fonseca is the fact that it is Fonseca himself that asserts this in his Metaphysics. Rodrigues is aware that Molina claims the opposite and that he has not been corrected by his contemporaries. By attributing the authorship to Fonseca, Rodrigues tries to solve the problem based on three arguments: 1) he interprets the words of the Spanish Jesuit in the sense that no other writer had ever dealt with the doctrine of middle knowledge in published works; 2) he sets aside the possibility that a figure such as Fonseca, because of his character, could be lying on a question of this relevance; 3) he refers to Molina’s autographed letter, quoting the manuscript of Pierre Poussines’ Historia Controversiarum (History of Controversies)12 where he supposedly assumed to have received the doctrine from Fonseca and asked him for new arguments to defend it against its opponents.13 The letter he refers to is the one sent to François Annat mentioned by António Franco. However, and this is noteworthy, in Rodrigues’ report there is no mention either to the fact that Franco himself searched for the letter and could not find it, or to his testimony assuring that the letter did not reach François Annat, to whom it had been sent.

carta continha, em como o Padre Molina perguntava ao Padre Pedro da Fonseca cousas sobre a Scientia Media, que delle aprendera. O Padre Francisco da Cruz, que foi Mestre do Serenissimo Rey Dom João o Quinto de Portugal, e o Padre Doutor Andre Cardozo, que morreo Cancellario na Universidade de Evora, tiraram esta carta do tal Cartorio, e mandaram o treslado ao dito Padre, como mo contou hum Padre da nossa Companhia, a quem o Padre Francisco da Cruz o referio. Esta carta não devia chegar as mãos do Padre Anato, ou chegaria tarde. Por ella fiz exactas diligencias no dito Cartorio, onde a não encontrei, ainda que achei outras do Padre Molina. E della se infere, que a dita opiniam tem por primeiro Author ao Padre Doutor Pedro da Fonseca, como tem a Biblioteca da Companhia porem o Padre Molina foi, o que a imprimio, e contra quem se armou a escola Thomistica, o que tudo foi em maior honra, e nome do Padre Molina’. 12 Pierre Poussines, Historia controversiarum quae inter quosdam e Sacro Praedicatorum Ordine et Societatem Iesu agitatae sunt ab anno 1548 ad 1612 (Universidad de Salamanca, MSS. 11073). 13 Francisco Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na assistência de Portugal, vol. II (Porto: Livraria Apostolado da Imprensa, 1938), pp. 156–57: ‘Advirtamos, porém, que Fonseca escreveu aquele seu testemunho oito anos depois da publicação da Concordia, e quatro depois da impressão dos Comentários à Primeira Parte, e, não obstante, cita a Molina, sobre a mesma questão da sciencia média, sem fazer nenhum reparo às afirmações do teólogo castelhano. Podemos bem crer que Fonseca não as teve por injustas a seus direitos de prioridade histórica naquela teoria da sciencia média. De feito as expressões de Molina admitem outra interpretação, se lhe damos o significado de que nenhum escritor até àquele tempo tratara da sciencia media em obras publicadas pela estampa. Por outro lado, não podemos supor que o filósofo português, com a honradez do seu caráter nobilíssimo, descesse a usurpar falsamente a glória, que a seu Irmão pertencesse’.

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Another relevant contribution is that of Théodore de Régnon. In Bannésianisme et Molinisme he states that because of the polemics surrounding Molina’s texts the theory of middle knowledge is applied to him, but that the real founder of the theory is Fonseca. Régnon also explains that Fonseca was Molina’s master and a much better metaphysician. He also states that Fonseca’s explanation was less successful within the Society.14 One of the authors who most deeply studied the issue was José de Oliveira Dias, following his doctoral thesis and the diatribes he had, particularly with Johannes Rabeneck and Severiano Tavares. Oliveira Dias covers the subject at different times. In 1928, he published an article in the journal Brotéria, where he brings forward a set of arguments to resolve the question of authorship in favour of Fonseca.15 The core of Dias’s statements is that the only existing element to evaluate this question is the written testimony of the two Jesuits. However, this testimony should not be read as if it were an exact mathematical time reference: the thirty years, according to Dias, are an approximation. The statement of Fonseca dates from 1596 and so if we go back thirty years in time this would bring us to year 1566. According to Dias’s research, there is no recording that in this year Fonseca taught or commented on the theological treatises on providence and predestination. Therefore, the date referred to by Fonseca would be closer to 1564, the year in which we have recordings that he actually taught these treatises. In turn, Molina’s claim dates back to 1593. Now, going back exactly thirty years, this would place us in 1563, at the beginning of his teaching career. Applying the same principle of approximate calculation, Oliveira Dias thinks that only in 1564 did Molina begin teaching for the first time, and at best only in this year could he have taught this subject in the course of philosophy. Therefore, he anticipates two years for Fonseca and moves back between one to three years for Molina, depending on the editions and approvals of the works under consideration. In addition to the chronological argument, Oliveira Dias proposes an interpretation of the statements of the two Jesuits in an attempt to make them compatible. According to his interpretation, what Fonseca said was that he knew of no one before him who had taught the doctrine while Molina stated that he knew of no one who had taught it in writing.16 To put it briefly, Oliveira Dias assumes that the doctrines of the two Jesuits are identical. He added that the veracity of Fonseca’s statement should not be called into question17 and that Molina had never refuted it. As a consequence of the reasons given, Oliveira Dias attributes but a secondary importance to the

14 Théodore de Régnon, Bannésianisme et Molinisme, Première partie établissement de la question et défense du Molinisme (Paris: Retaux-Bray, 1890), p. 104. 15 José de Oliveira Dias, ‘Um centenário. O P. Pedro da Fonseca, ou Pero de Affonseca, da Companhia de Jesus (1528–1928)’, Brotéria, 7 (1928), pp. 137–47, pp. 205–72, pp. 342–54. 16 Dias, ‘Um centenário’, pp. 270–72; Dias, ‘Ainda a controvertida paternidade da chamada Ciência Média’, Verbum, 18 (1951), p. 374–76. 17 Dias, ‘Um centenário’, p. 76: ‘a prova única é o testemunho insofismável, infalsificável e indestrutível de Fonseca’.

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role played by Molina in the history of Molinism.18 In the articles of 1951 (written to criticise Johannes Rabeneck) and in those of 1954 and 1955 (against Severiano Tavares) Oliveira Dias restates the arguments proposed in 1928. However, because of the exchange of arguments with his opponents, he reformulated some important details to the issue. One is them is the acknowledgement that in addition to the year 1564, there is a recording that Fonseca also taught theology in Évora in 1570. However, Oliveira Dias refuses to consider this year among the possible estimated dates because he thinks it is outside the chronological scope outlined by Fonseca.19 Another great polemicist on the issue is Severiano Tavares. He also attributes the authorship to Fonseca, but uses different arguments, which he develops in two articles. In the first, written in 1953, he argues that Fonseca’s testimony is apodictic and precise, while Molina’s is confusing and gave rise to later polemics. He concludes that Fonseca was 1) the first to create the doctrine of middle knowledge, about which he wrote only later, referring to it as conditioned knowledge; 2) he taught it in 1566 in public classes in the College of Évora when he was teaching theology; and 3) from those public classes the new doctrine became quickly known and many, among them Molina, followed and developed it. Regarding Molina’s statements, he interprets the words of the Concordia only as stating that until 1588 no one had written about the doctrine20 and, concerning Molina’s claims on the Commentaria (1592), calls into question the possibility of Molina having taught the doctrine in private and public disputes in the year 1562, when he was not yet a teacher and was still preparing for theology degrees in Évora. Severiano Tavares notices the progress of the doctrine in Molina and concludes 1) that his reference is only approximate, since he was not very precise with dates, as evidenced by the fact that he did not change them by the time of the second edition in 1595;21 and 2) that his words must be understood as only claiming for the authorship of the name of middle knowledge and for the further development he gave to the doctrine. In 1955 Tavares wrote a second article on the same controversy against Oliveira Dias, where he maintains the same arguments, but more clearly establishes his interpretation of the compatibility between the testimonies of the two Jesuits. Molina would have defended the divine knowledge of future contingents drawing on natural knowledge, while Fonseca would have

18 Dias, ‘Um centenário’, p. 138: ‘o verdadeiro fundador da theoria da scientia media, não é Molina, mas sim Pedro da Fonseca. Aquele não foi mais que o vulgarizador da doutrina que d’este apprendera. Quando se falla de molinismo, Molina é como se fosse um pseudonymo de Fonseca ou pouco mais’. 19 Cf. Dias, ‘Em torno do duelo Fonseca-Molina, uma argumentação sucinta’, Verbum, (1954), p. 59: ‘ora, o ano escolar de 1564, segundo os catálogos oficiais da sua Ordem foi o único em que ensinou teologia. E não há documentos coevos, que afirmem o contrário. É certo que também a ensinou em Evora durante a quaresma de 1570. Mas esse ano está já fora do âmbito cronológico por ele traçado. E sendo em 1654, podia muito bem dizer em 1596, falando humano modo como costumamos falar: há uns 30 anos que…’. 20 Severiano Tavares, ‘Fonseca e a ciência média’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 9 (1953), p. 427: ‘[Molina] afirma simplesmente, em 1588, que até essa data ninguém tinha escrito sobre essa matéria, o que não destrói a afirmação de Fonseca’. 21 See n. 4.

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created the new doctrine of conditioned knowledge. And, between 1572 and 1588 Molina would have accepted Fonseca’s solution, commenting on it and naming it ‘middle knowledge’.22 Therefore, the way to make the statements compatible consists in attributing to Fonseca the priority of oral teaching and to Molina the priority of written teaching, as well as the creation of the name with which the doctrine would be historically known.23 One of the great scholars of Fonseca’s metaphysics was Miguel Baptista Pereira. The work he wrote in 1967 contributes to the question, despite not specifically discussing the problem of authorship. One of his main contributions to the issue here at stake is the rejection of Klaus Reinhardt’s statement that Fonseca evolved in his ideas about future contingents and established the doctrine of middle knowledge only in 1596. What Pereira intends to show is that although having been written later, the doctrine of the middle knowledge is presupposed from the beginning as a logical development of Fonseca’s system and methodology.24 Therefore, Fonseca’s work is a broad project, with a well-defined consistency, where middle knowledge has a logical and coherent place and is not a foreign, superfluous element or a simply latter addition. Pereira’s contribution to the subject is more philosophical and less historical, thus offering, from a different perspective and without stating it explicitly, another element that corroborates or at least authorizes the attribution of the authorship to Fonseca.25 A similar position which aggregates Pereira’s analysis and Tavares’ arguments, is found in a 1998 article by Manuel Ferreira Patrício. He considers it unnecessary to re-examine the attribution to Fonseca. Patrício argues that Fonseca would have been the first to think about the doctrine of middle knowledge and Molina the first to write about it, giving it a systematicity and a development that it had not had until then.26 On the opposite side of the question, although in smaller numbers, are those who defend Molina’s priority. A paradigmatic example is that of Gabriel Henao, in his work Scientia media historice propugnata (An Historical Defense of Middle Knowledge). He criticises authors such as Francesco Amico and questions the ascription of authorship to Fonseca. His main argument is based on an accurate control of the dates of the testimonies of the two Jesuits, concluding on the chronological priority of Molina’s. In his calculation, he considers that the thirty-year evocation

22 Tavares, ‘A questão Fonseca-Molina. Resposta a uma crítica’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 11 (1955), p. 85. 23 Tavares, ‘A questão Fonseca-Molina’, pp. 84–85. 24 Miguel Baptista Pereira, Ser e pessoa. Pedro da Fonseca. I — O método da filosofia (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1967), p. 336: ‘Portanto a ciência média que agitará gerações de teólogos, repousa na ordem e na classificação das regiões de objectos do conhecimento divino, recortadas numa visão essencialista do ser, que orienta o ideal metodológico de Fonseca’. 25 Pereira, Ser e pessoa, p. 326, n. 190. 26 Manuel Ferreira Patrício, ‘A doutrina da ciência média de Pedro da Fonseca a Luis de Molina’, in Luís de Molina regressa a Évora. Actas das jornadas (Évora, 13 e 14 de Junho de 1998), ed. by I. Borges-Duarte (Évora: Fundação Luís de Molina, 1998), p. 181. See also the statements by Joaquim Chorão Lavajo, ‘Molina e a Universidade de Évora’, in Luís de Molina regressa a Évora. Actas das jornadas (Évora, 13 e 14 de Junho de 1998), ed. by I. Borges-Duarte (Évora: Fundação Luís de Molina, 1998), pp. 112–15. A significant part of the studies in this volume recognizes Fonseca as the creator of middle knowledge.

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should be situated in 1561, because the Commentaria were ready to be examined in 1591 and had been given permission to be printed. According to Henao’s view, Molina would have formulated the new doctrine when he was finishing his theology course in Évora. This circumstance would have contributed to his reflection around theological problems.27 In the same way of thought is Johannes Rabeneck who deals with the subject in a 1955 article28 with two objectives: 1) to reject the idea that Molina was a disciple of Fonseca’s; and 2) to refute the attribution to Fonseca of both the creation of the theory of middle knowledge and of the paternity of what was later called Molinism. In accordance to these objectives he argues that 1) Molina has never come to be Fonseca’s student because his formative path never coincided with the courses the latter taught. Therefore, Molina neither received nor continued a theory that had been transmitted to him in classes taught by Fonseca; 2) continuing Henao’s ideas and based on the testimonies of both Jesuits, he places the origin of the theory in Molina around 1561, that is, when he was in the final phase of his theology course. This circumstance favored the reflection on the questions of divine science and grace, of providence and predestination; 3) taking into account the chronological data, the priority is always given to Molina, either in face of the statements of both Jesuits or of the dates they refer to; 4) Molina did not respond to Fonseca’s statement because he died before the publication of Fonseca’s work; 5) Molina’s experience in teaching theology was much greater than Fonseca’s, as is the number of pages the former wrote in the field; 6) far from being an isolated theory in Molina’s work, the theory of intermediate knowledge follows on from a systematic work that encompasses theories on divine grace, providence and predestination; 7) the theory of middle knowledge is not entirely similar between the two authors, particularly because of Fonseca’s assumption that God has an intuitive knowledge of future contingents; 8) if the doctrines were similar and Fonseca was recognized as the author of the theory, he would have had the same problems that Molina had with Censorship and would also have engaged in the subsequent controversies. From these arguments, Rabeneck concludes that there is no basis for considering Fonseca as the creator of the doctrine and that the priority is Molina’s.29

2. Some Remarks on Pedro da Fonseca’s Doctrine of Middle Knowledge and on the Question of Authorship Much has been written on this issue and it is not our goal to make an exhaustive review of all the literature. Here we only intend to summarize some of the most 27 Gabrielis de Henao, Scientia media historice propugnata (Dilingae: J. Caspari Bencard, 1687), pp. 320–22, 1236–41. 28 Johannes Rabeneck, ‘Antiqua legenda de Molina narrata examinantur’, Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 24 (1955), pp. 295–26. 29 Rabeneck, ‘Antiqua legenda’, p. 324: ‘Et sic antiqua illa legenda Molinam didicisse scientiam mediam a Fonseca, sibi autem ut primo ascripsisse eius inventionem omni fundamento caret’.

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significant arguments of this controversy.30 Considering the multiple facets of the polemic and the available data, we believe that, individually, the personal statements of Molina and Fonseca cannot be considered clear evidence, although they are fundamental to the question and provide historical and hermeneutical elements for its understanding. Hadn’t Fonseca claimed in 1596 that he was the first to teach the doctrine, there would have been no room for this polemic. Indeed, the inclusion of conditioned knowledge in his Commentaries on Metaphysics does not seem to have raised theoretical problems, also because in the marginalia Fonseca himself refers to Molina, Suárez, Vásquez and Mendoza. Therefore, the controversy only arises from the brief statement of authorship made by Fonseca. Apart from the personal statements of the two Jesuits, we do not have many other evidence to explore the question. The hypothetical letter mentioned by António Franco, in which Molina supposedly recognizes Fonseca’s priority and asks him for advice to face the criticisms of the opponents, seems to have been lost and was never found by the biographer. However, there are other letters that help to reconstruct the relationship between Molina and Fonseca. And in Molina’s letters we understand that the relationship between the two Jesuits was not at its best. Rabeneck has correctly shown that Molina was not Fonseca’s student and we can add that he does not seem to have been his disciple, either in the sense of a theoretical closeness or in that of personal understanding. In a significant letter to General Claudio Aquaviva Molina complains that his Arts course was not published because of Fonseca’s reluctance.31 He also states that in his Commentaries on the Metaphysics Fonseca took advantage of Molina’s Arts and theology writings.32 In a further letter also addressed to Aquaviva in the same date, Molina is even more incisive. He confides he feels that Fonseca

30 See also Valentinus de Herice, Quatuor tractatus in primam partem Sancti Thomae (Pampilone: ex Officina Caroli a labaien Typhographi Regni Navarrae, 1623), I, d. 7, cap. 1, p. 130; Livino de Meyer, Historiae controversiarum de divinae gratiae auxiliis sub summis pontificibus Sixto V, Clemente VIII, Paulo V, ab objectionibus R. P. Hyacinthi Serry vindicatae libri tres (Bruxellis: Typis Antonii Claudinot, 1715), II, cap. IV, spec. pp. 129–31; Gerardus Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia. Initia et progressus (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1881), cap. 7, pp. 161–79. 31 Letter of 29 August 1582 from Luis de Molina to Claudio Aquaviva: ‘Aora a diez y nueve años se me ordenó leiese un curso de artes. El qual leí, compuniendo glosas y dictandolas de verbo ad verbum conforme a el estílo de acá. Y por muchos años que avia gastado en exercício de disputas y en continuo presidir en artes y theulugia, examinar y substituir, y ser como un centro a quien los hermanos y otras personas acudian a resolver sus dudas, y por ser ya formado en theulugia, y sustituir en ella, y tener hecho assiento y resolucion de muchas dudas, hize a juizio de thodos unos dictados aventajados de quanto hasta entonces avia impresso y dictado em cosas de artes, y quienquiera que los viere creo que hallará ser muy dignos de imprimirse. Mas como el Padre Pedro de Afonseca tenia ya el assumpto de escrevir en artes, y nunca sentí favor para imprimirse mis cosas, quedaron sempre asi’. Cf. Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus, p. 550. 32 ‘Poco despues de yo aver leido el curso, se ordenaron unas glosas por donde se a leido hasta agora, que en gran parte furon sacadas de las que yo hize, cortando muchas cosas, y metiendo opinions que se experimentaron assaz duras. Y hallaronse aquellas glosas no tener las cosas coherentes como convenia. Y bien creo que quinquiera que sin pasion las cotejare con las que yo hize, las hallará notablemente inferiores, y ser menos a proposito para armar despues sobre los principios dellas la theulugia escolastica. Mas siempre callé y dexe hazer. Y si lo que el Padre Pedro de Afonseca

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was an obstacle to the publication and recognition of his writings.33 These letters, which represent only Molina’s version, indicate a difficult relationship between the two Jesuits, and record Molina’s relevant charges against Fonseca to the General. This fact is significant. In our view, to investigate the question of authorship and the origin of the doctrine, it will be fruitful to study in more detail other Fonseca academic relationships, namely with Jorge Serrão and with the Generals Everardo Mercuriano and Claudio Aquaviva. Molina was close to Serrão and Aquaviva and was somewhat protected by them. It is under Aquaviva’s generalate that Molina begins to publish his works. We will not go further into the analysis of this question, but the study of this network of relations may eventually offer additional interesting materials to better understand the problem of authorship. Along with the facts described, the difficult political circumstances between Portugal and Spain in that period should not be overlooked. Molina was Spanish and his letters reveal complaints related to the issue of nationality.34 As we have seen, M. B. Pereira did not directly discuss the problem of authorship in his study on Fonseca’s metaphysics. However, he has contributed to showing that the doctrine of middle knowledge is presupposed in Fonseca’s system, being part of a theoretical, coherent and justifiable whole. Nevertheless, we do not think that Pereira’s conclusions on this issue can guarantee that the idea of a middle knowledge capable of solving the problems presupposed in Fonseca’s system was not based on Molina’s works. Molina’s writings are undoubtedly characterized by both a refined and meticulous work and a long experience in the intricacies of various and complex theological problems. In fact, we have evidence of the interest in the question of divine science in the early texts of young Molina. He actually explains the question of future contingents in his commentary on De interpretatione (On

imprimó en metaphysica se cotejare con lo que en artes y theulugia yo tengo leido y dictado, creo que se hallarán muchos de mis trabajos en ello, y de lo que nuestro Senor fué servido que yo hiziese’. Cf. Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus, pp. 550–51. 33 Letter of 29 August 1582 from Luis de Molina to Claudio Aquaviva: ‘el Padre Pedro de Afonseca fué él que en gran parte procuró que yo leiese el curso de artes. […] Y su intento fué para que pusiese por escrito mis conceptos y ayudarse dellos. Y salieron tales mis escritos; que fueran occasion dél aver tardado lo que a tardado, porque haziendo la dialectica y quiriendose apartar de lo que yo avia dicho, no salió acertada. Y asi dexó de imprimilla. Y de ay tomó pasarse a la metaphysica, y tomar otro metodo. Muchos años a, que sento en el Padre Pedro Afonseca aversion y desfavor a mis cosas. Y siempre temí que en quanto estuviese en Roma avia de estorvar que se imprimiesen, por grandes motivos y muestras que avia para ello, y por lo que interesava de ir sus cosas adelante y no mostrarse quanto se aiudava de mis trabajos. […] Parece que teme el Padre Pedro de Alfonseca que con imprimir yo la primera parte y lo del curso, se oscurezca su metaphysica, o aparezca lo que se a ayudado de nuestros dictados. Y lo que estotro dia me acometió el Padre Provincial, si podia rever el curso leiendo, apuntandome quales otros me parecia que lo podian hazer, no me parece que fué con intento que yo lo hiziese, mas para con suavidad excusarme dello, y dallo a algun otro portugues que nada a hecho dello. Y no ay duda sino que el Padre Provincial está muy unido y dependente de lo que quiere el Padre Afonseca, cum alias lo experimenté est’. Cf. Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus, pp. 558–59. 34 Irene Borges-Duarte, ‘Prefácio’, in Luís de Molina regressa a Évora, p. 9.

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Interpretation),35 which is part of the course of Arts which he tried to publish without ever succeeding, as he mentions in the letters cited above. The manuscript of his De interpretatione dates from 1563, which is precisely the first year of Molina’s teaching in Coimbra. The commentary culminates in the question of divine knowledge of futures contingents and of its compatibility with the indifferent action of free causes. There, the problem that the doctrine of middle knowledge seeks to solve appears clearly outlined. Molina closes this commentary with the reference to Aquinas’s argument of the vision of things that are present to God in eternity.36 However, he anticipates the critique of the argument and announces that he will examine and discuss the question more extensively further.37 He does it in the Concordia. There, the passages where he discusses middle knowledge and the references to his early commentary on the De interpretatione show the follow-up of ideas between these two works.38 Therefore, his De interpretatione already contains the preliminary elements of the Concordia and shows the existence of a theoretical plan from very early, on which the concept of middle knowledge seems to be already designed, although not yet referred to.39 The doctrine of middle knowledge is thus also presupposed from the beginning in Molina’s works, corroborating the intuition of those who consider that the years in which he studied theology were decisive for the emergence of the theory. As tradition has observed, Fonseca was a profound scholar and a remarkable metaphysician. In the analysis on divine science and future contingents these qualities are manifest. The identification in God of a compound or conditioned knowledge, which Fonseca describes as ‘middle’, is the result of an analysis that has the same structure and textual sources that Molina follows. However, Rabeneck noted important differences in the doctrine of the two Jesuits, namely the fact that Molina did not accept the intuitive way of divine knowledge of future contingents

35 Biblioteca Pública de Évora, MSS. 118–1–6. Cf. Molina, ‘Quaestio de futuris contingentibus’, in Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus, pp. 1–9. See Maria Teresa Santos, ‘O ensino da filosofia na segunda escolástica: o manual inédito de Luís de Molina’, in Atas do XI Congresso Luso-Brasileiro da História da Educação (Colubhe). Pensamento Pedagógico, 2016, pp. 18–31. http://web3.letras.up.pt/colubhe/index.php/atas/ [consulted on February 7, 2022]. For a contemporary discussion about Molina’s doctrine on future contingents in this commentary see Alfred. J. Freddoso, ‘Introduction’, in Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge. Part IV of the Concordia (Ithaca–London: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 165–66, n. 4, and p. 193, n. 67–68; Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, especially p. 190 and further; Richard Gaskin, ‘Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 32–4 (1994), pp. 551–71; Jean-Pascal Anfray, ‘Molina and John Duns Scotus’, in Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele (eds), A Companion to Luis de Molina (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), p. 354 ff. 36 Molina, Quaestio de futuris contingentibus, p. 9; ST I, q. 14, a. 13. 37 Molina, Quaestio de futuris contingentibus, p. 9: ‘Alii existimant, id provenire ex eo, quod Deus non solum cognoscit causas contingentes sed etiam ea omnia, quae vel impeditura sunt, ne causae operentur, vel determinatura sunt causas ipsas, ut operentur. Sed haec latius examinare et discutere ad alium locum pertinet’. 38 See e.g. Molina, Concordia, d. 52, 15; d. 53, 12. 39 See Lavajo, ‘Molina e a Universidade de Évora’, pp. 114–15.

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based on the argument of eternity, and suggested the independence of one text from the other.40 We can add, from the study of Fonseca’s texts, that despite the similarities in structure, textual sources and some definitions, there are significant differences that should be taken into consideration, including Fonseca’s defense of the intuitive way based on the argument of God’s eternity, the conception of the knowledge of simple intelligence, the way in which the natural and free knowledge are identified and the theoretical elements that support the introduction of middle knowledge. From these differences one might think that the works of the two Jesuits are two distinct versions of the same doctrine thought and written in approximately the same period. To clarify this question, further investigation of the conditions under which this doctrine emerged in the context of the colleges of Coimbra and Évora would be important. One hypothesis that can be put forward is that the general idea of a middle knowledge was born in the theoretical dynamics of the colleges of the Society and that subsequently Fonseca and Molina defined it in their classes and in their works. In any case, even though an important part of the tradition attributes the authorship to Fonseca, his work has been sidelined within the scope of studies on the doctrine of middle knowledge and Molinism. However, his texts contain valuable elements for a better understanding of this doctrine and the logical clarity of his exposition contributes to showing the basis of the fundamental ideas that sustain it. This is why, in the following paragraph of this paper, I shall delve into Fonseca’s theory, presenting his position in detail.

3. The Doctrine of Pedro da Fonseca on Middle Knowledge 3.1. The Problem of Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents

Pedro da Fonseca addressed the question on divine science and the problem of its compatibility with human freedom on his commentary to Book VI, 2 of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle analyses the possibility of a science of accidents.41 Fonseca thus includes in this passages of his commentary the discussion about the problem of future contingents as it appears in Aristotle’s De interpretatione 9. Also, 40 Rabeneck, ‘Antiqua legenda’, p. 326. 41 See on this subject António Manuel Martins, ‘Liberdade e destino em Pedro da Fonseca’, in Congresso de História no IV Centenário do Seminário de Évora. Actas, I (Évora: Instituto Superior de Teologia — Seminário Maior de Évora, 1994), pp. 93–104; Amândio Augusto Coxito and Maria Luísa Couto Soares, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’, in História do Pensamento Filosófico Português, Volume II: Renascimento e Contra-Reforma, ed. by P. Calafate (Lisbon: Caminho, 2001), pp. 455–502; Petr Dvorak, ‘Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingentes and Necessity’, in Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele (eds), A companion to Luis de Molina (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 55–87; Carlos Frederico Gurgel Calvet da Silveira and Sergio de Souza Salles, ‘Providência divina e liberdade humana na filosofia da redenção da segunda escolástica’, in Redenção e Escatologia. Estudos de Filosofia, Religião, Literatura e Arte na Cultura Portuguesa, II, 1: Idade Moderna, ed. by Samuel Dimas, Renato Epifânio and Luís Lóia (Lisbon: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Lisboa 2017), pp. 315–30.

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it is within the same metaphysical discussions that Fonseca examines philosophical and theological problems that, going far beyond Aristotle’s texts, have as their main textual basis the works by Thomas Aquinas and the questions about divine science and providence. At the beginning of Book VI of his Metaphysics, Aristotle deals with the division of sciences according to their object. He attributes to metaphysics the primacy among the theoretical sciences and therefore states that metaphysics is understood as theology because it is concerned with eternal and separate substances. In Book VI, chapter 2, Aristotle draws a distinction between four meanings of ‘being’ to explain the nature of accidents and the possibility of a science of accidents. He distinguishes between beings that are necessarily and always in the same way, and that cannot be different from what they are, and beings that are the same way only most of the time, and thus may be different from what they are.42 The later are the cause of the accident, since accident is precisely that which does not happen in all cases nor most of the time.43 Aristotle thus concludes that there can be no science of accidents, because science can only be of that which is repeated always or in most cases, the regularity of which can thus be comprehended.44 Aristotle’s statement on Metaphysics VI, 2 is consistent with the discussion of future contingents as it occurs in De interpretatione 9. Here Aristotle analyses the conditions under which a statement about future events is true. Even if the statements regarding the past and the present are determined and accepted as true or false according to the way they refer to actual events, the same is not applicable to statements concerning the future, which have an indeterminate object. This is because they refer to what has not yet happened, and thus can either happen or not, or happen in different ways. Admitting both the validity of the logical principle of bivalence and the existence of limited possibilities for what can happen, there is an irreducible accidental and contingent condition of the events that makes it impossible an exact science of future events. This problem is exemplified by Aristotle in the well-known example of the sea battle.45 Now, the main consequence of Aristotle’s solution is that the denial of the possibility of an exact, true science of accident and contingency calls into question divine prescience and providence. The philosophical tradition had been faced this problem over time and so does Fonseca.46 To overcome this difficulty, he seeks out for a solution that maintains the two conflicting poles of the question on the compatibility between human freedom and contingency and divine prescience and providence.

42 43 44 45 46

Metaph. 1026b26–1026b30. Metaph. 1027a15–1027a17. Metaph. 1027a20–1027a22. De interp. IX, 19a35. See Simo Knuuttila, ‘Medieval Commentators on Future Contingents in De Interpretatione 9’, Vivarium, 48 (2010), pp. 75–95; Calvin Normore, ‘Future contingents’, in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg and Eleonore Stump (eds), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 358–81.

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In order to delimit the question and to criticize some of the answers given to this problem by traditions other than the Christian, Fonseca, like other Jesuits, relies on the well-known book V of Augustine’s City of God47 and the Homilies on the Gospels Gregory the Great.48 Fonseca makes use of these sources to establish a distinction between fate (fatum) and providence (providentia) and to criticize what he considers to be erroneous solutions: those put forward by astrologers, by Stoics and Manicheans, by Cicero, and more recently, by the Reformers. Astrologers associate fate with the positions and movements of the celestial bodies and subordinate the actions of free causes to them.49 Stoics, Manicheans, the Reformers and philosophers like John Wycliff, to ensure an absolute order in the universe established by the will of God, subjected free causes to an inexorable fate.50 And, to safeguard human freedom, Cicero denied the knowledge of the future, as well as divine foreknowledge.51 Following Augustine, Fonseca seeks for a middle ground between the positions above mentioned and demonstrates the need of divine foreknowledge to guarantee providence and prophecy.52 In addition to the aforementioned erroneous doctrines, Fonseca also does not accept the Aristotelian position which advocates the impossibility of a science of future contingents. He maintains the impossibility of an exact science of future contingents related to human knowledge, but assures God’s absolute and infallible knowledge of these contingents, regardless of whether or not they are produced by free causes.53 Therefore, Fonseca rejects naturalism and philosophical-theological necessitarianism, but modifies the Aristotelian basis of the argument making it possible both to recognize the nature of contingency and the free acts of causes, and to incorporate providence and divine foreknowledge. Following Thomas Aquinas,54 Fonseca understands contingent effects as those that, since they are not necessary, cannot be known in advance from their causes. In his explanation, he differentiates contingent effects that occur rarely or by chance which are extraordinarily produced by natural causes, from contingent effects that derive from the action of free causes, namely those produced by human free will.55 Based on this distinction, he concludes that even if the effects of natural causes that happen by chance could be attributed to conditions related to matter,56 the same cannot be true for the effects of the free acts of created causes, which cannot be reduced to material conditions. 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Augustinus Hipponensis, De Civitate Dei, V, c. 1 and 9. Gregorius Magnus, Homiliae in Evangelia, X. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 2, s. 5, coll. 86B–87A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 2, s. 5, col. 87A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 1, col. 101B, and further. See James Wetzel, ‘Predestination, Pelagianism, and foreknowledge’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 49–58. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 1, col. 102A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 2, s. 8, col. 92A. ST I, q. 14, a. 13. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 1, s. 2, cols 78–79. Metaph. 1027a13–1027a14.

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3.2. The Definition of Free Agent and the Efficacy of the Divine Will

The definition of free agent given by Fonseca is a structuring element for the theoretical elaboration and explanation of the above mentioned problems. In Fonseca’s commentary on Metaphysics book VI, 2 the definition of a free agent is presupposed, but he develops the question further in the commentary on book IX, 2.57 In this text, when Fonseca explains freedom as opposed to necessity he gives the following definition of free agent: ‘free agent it the one who, once all the requirements [to act] are met, can either act indifferently, or act or not act, and choose between opposites’.58 Fonseca’s definition is very similar to that proposed by other Jesuits, such as Molina and Suárez.59 This definition was criticized by Domingo Báñez and other Dominicans, because they find that it moves away from Aristotle, Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine, and comes close to Almain and the Nominalists.60 However, although the definition used by the Jesuits may have a nominalist influence, as in the use of the term ‘requirements’, it is not as distant from Thomas Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition as the critics try to show. Fonseca holds that freedom is formally found in the will, but the root of freedom is in the judgment and agency of the intellect which precedes the acts of the will. Therefore, according to him the faculty of free will derives from a conjunction between the intellective and volitional faculties, where the intellective part is prioritized. In fact, more than Molina’s, Fonseca’s definition stresses the possibility that free will can act indifferently and seeks to integrate a greater number of doctrines of other authors, such as Aquinas61 and later Thomists like Caetano,62 and that of Scotus.63 57 CMA IX, c. 2, q. 1–8, cols 556–619. See António Manuel Martins, ‘Liberdade e autonomia em Fonseca’, Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos, 7–8 (1995), pp. 515–27. 58 CMA IX, c. 2, q. 2, s. 2, col. 562A. 59 On this subject see e.g. Molina, Concordia, d. 2, 3: ‘agens liberum dicitur quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere aut ita agere unum ut contrarium etiam agere possit’. On this conception of freedom and on the freedom of indifference in these authors, see Jacob Schmutz, ‘Du péché de l’ange à la liberté d’indifférence. Les sources angélologiques de l’anthropologie moderne’, Les études philosophiques, 61 (2002), pp. 169–98; Tobias Hoffmann, ‘“Liberté de qualité” et “liberté d’indifférence” chez Thomas d’Aquin’, in Michael S. Sherwin and Craig Steven Titus (eds), Renouveler toutes choses en Christ: vers un renouveau thomiste de la théologie morale: hommage au P. Servais Pinckaers O. P. (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009), pp. 57–76; Alexander Aichele, ‘The Real Possibility of Freedom: Luis de Molina’s Theory of Absolute Willpower in Concordia I’, in Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele (eds), A Companion to Luis de Molina (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 4–54; Alexander Aichele, ‘Luis de Molina: The Metaphysics of Freedom’, in Cristiano Casalini (ed.), Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity (Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 297–324; Olivier Ribordy, ‘Quelques différences sur l’indifférence. Réflexions suaréziennes sur les fondements anthropologiques de la liberté’, in Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Manuel Lázaro Pulido and Simone Guidi (eds), Francisco Suárez. Metaphysics, Politics and Ethics (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 2020), pp. 195–228. 60 Domingo Báñez, Apologia fratrum praedicatorum in provintia hispaniae professorum sacrae theologiae, adversus quasdam novas assertiones cuiusdam Doctoris Ludovici Molina, c. 12, 1–2, in Vicente Beltrán de Heredia, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia. Textos y documentos (Salamanca: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1968), pp. 115–380. 61 ST I, q. 83, a. 1 and a. 2. 62 Thomas de Vio Caetano, Commentaria in S. Thomae Summam theologiam, I, q. 83, a. 1. 63 Iohannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio (Vatican edition), I, ap. A, p. 2, d. 38–39, q. 1–5.

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To Fonseca, as to other Jesuits, the proof of the existence of free will is rooted in the basic and personal experience of the possibility of acting indifferently and of acting or not acting. This experience is of concrete and undeniable evidence64 and contradicts any attempt to reduce human action to freedom of servitude (servo arbitrio), as Martin Luther and other reformers claimed.65 This is true even in cases where the intellectual faculty is somehow compromised, as it happens in the cases of childhood, sickness and sleep. Nevertheless, the possibilities of action of free causes are part of the order of the universe and this order is not separated from divine will. The order, constitution and arrangement of the universe is composed by both natural causes which act in a necessary way and by free causes which can either act indifferently or act or not act, and choose between opposites. This order results from divine will, that is, from God’s free choice, who created the present, specific order from among the infinite possibility of existent orders and dispositions. Therefore, the free will of created causes, insofar as it is part of the order of the universe, is ultimately an effect of the divine free will. Although we cannot delve into the problem of divine freedom here,66 it is important to say that Fonseca draws on Scotus to demonstrate that God is free.67 It is also relevant to question to what extent free acts of divine will are effective, that is, to what extent these acts impose necessity on the effects produced by second causes and suppress their autonomy and freedom. To answer this questions Fonseca’s explanation is based on that of Thomas Aquinas’s.68 The arguments of the Dominican have two particularly relevant strands. On the one hand, he states that divine will is totally efficacious and that everything must happen both as God wills and in the way God wills. On the other hand, he argues that the free and efficacious will of God is the cause of the existence of both necessary and free causes. Therefore, it is the cause of the existence of contingency. Thus, divine efficient will does not affect with necessity the totality of created causes. On the contrary, it is divine efficiency that ensures the existence of contingency. Although the argument of Thomas Aquinas has fostered interpretations that value more one side or the other of the problem, in Fonseca’s view, created causes do not produce the effects that God wants necessarily them to produce, but those that they want to produce by themselves. Moreover, that these causes can produce their effects by themselves and contingently is precisely the result of divine will. If all contingency is rooted in God as first cause, the free second causes and the relations they establish with the other causes are the other roots of contingency. That is to say that free causes are responsible for their own actions and that within the created world all the means are available for them to act freely.

64 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 2, s. 1, col. 82B; Scotus, Ordinatio, I, ap. A, p. 2, d. 38–39, q. 1–5. 65 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 2, s. 1, col. 82B. 66 On this subject, see Ramón Ceñal, ‘A doutrina de Pedro da Fonseca: sobre a Liberdade Divina’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 9 (1953), pp. 375–95. 67 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 3, s. 1, col. 95B. 68 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 3, s. 1, col. 95A-B; and ST I, q. 19, a. 8.

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3.3. The Intuitive Way of Divine Knowledge

In criticizing Cicero, supported by Augustine Fonseca observes that it is necessary to affirm the existence of foreknowledge in God and states that God knows all future things in the present.69 He then goes on to analyze the well-known argument that attributes to God an eternal, present and simultaneous knowledge of things that happen in time succession.70 This argument is based on the fundamental distinctions between eternity and time, the former proper to God and the latter to creatures. The argument carries a long and controversial historical background, and the Jesuit gives a brief explanation of the thesis of those who reject it, as is the case of Scotus, and those who defend it, such as Augustine, Boethius or Aquinas.71 In question 14, article 13 of the Summa theologiae (Summary of Theology), Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two meanings of the term ‘contingent’. One that corresponds to the contingent when it is in act and is known as something that is present. The other corresponds to the contingent as it is in its cause and is something future. While anyone capable of intellection can have access to an exact knowledge of the former, of the latter only a conjectural knowledge is possible. The argument that explains God’s foreknowledge based on the way God knows things in eternity aims precisely to ensure that since God knows the contingent in act in the present, he has an exact, perfect knowledge of it.72 To state that God has this kind of vision is to attribute him a science of vision which consists in an intuitive knowledge of things themselves. Fonseca accepts the existence of this science in God and claims that, since it is a knowledge of what is present, this science should not even be called prescience.73 By this knowledge God knows all things as they are in their existence, in a real way, in act, in themselves and at once.74 Had God not known things in the present of eternity and had known them either intuitively or abstractedly, according to the division of time, God would undergo some kind of change.75 But divine knowledge is not changeable. To better clarify this form of knowledge Fonseca draws an analogy. What happens with the science of vision is similar to the vision from a very high tower, from which it would be possible to see the position of all passers-by in any direction. This analogy is based on an example given by Aquinas76 and intends to show how God knows at once the positions of all things according to their real and actual existence in all different spaces and times.77 69 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 1, col. 102A. 70 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 2, col. 104A. 71 See Harm J. M. J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Nijmegan–Leuven: Thomas Instituut Utrecht–Peeters, 1997); Gareth B. Matthews, Augustine (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2005), p. 100 ff.; John Marenbon, Le temps, l’éternité et la prescience de Boèce à Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 2005). 72 ST I, q. 14, a. 13. 73 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 2, col. 106A. 74 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 2, col. 105A. 75 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 2, col. 105A. 76 ST I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3. 77 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 3, col. 108B.

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The analysis made by Fonseca on divine knowledge aims to explain the nature of divine foreknowledge in such a way that it can be understood as compatible with free will. Divine knowledge does not impose necessity on the actions of free causes precisely because what God knows is what derives from the autonomous and free determination of the causes themselves. Therefore, Fonseca states that the contingent effects of free causes depend not only on divine knowledge or will, but on creatures’ own acts of free will.78 3.4. The Abstract Way of Divine Knowledge

Although in Aquinas’ Summa theologiae the intuitive way of divine knowledge is a central argument in the discussion of divine knowledge of future contingents, the Dominican also refers to a second form in the way God knows the futures, stating that everything that exists is also present through ideas in God’s eternity.79 However, Aquinas does not explain in detail the meaning of this form of knowledge. And so it is necessary to analyze to what extent this form of knowledge is compatible both with intuitive knowledge and with the freedom of second causes. Fonseca does not accept that God knows the future actions of second causes abstractly and through effective concurrence determined by his will, as if these causes produced their actions by a divine prior decree. If this was so, the efficacy of divine will would make future events necessary, including all those produced by free causes, since it would not be in the power of such causes to do anything different or opposite to what divine will had determined them for. If that were the case free causes would not act differently from natural causes. And, since second causes would act by necessity, God, as the cause of their actions, would be responsible for the sins they would commit. Therefore, second causes must be able to determine themselves, only aided by divine general concurrence, having the power to dissent from divine will,80 without this supposing, as a contrary consequence, that it is the creature who determines God. Again, Fonseca’s analysis follows closely that of Aquinas’s and holds that the acts of divine will concerning free, created second causes are approving when the later act righteously and make use of divine concurrence to do it so. On the contrary, God’s will is only permissive when free creatures act badly, using divine concurrence to do it so.81 Therefore, God approves or permits free acts, making his general concurrence available so that free causes may act indifferently. On this subject Duns Scotus has a dissimilar position. Contrary to Aquinas, he does not accept the argument of God’s knowledge in eternity of future contingents which supports the existence in God of an intuitive knowledge.82 Scotus puts the priority

78 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 4, col. 111A. 79 ST I, q. 14, a. 13. 80 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 6, col. 115A–B. 81 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 6, col. 116A. 82 Scotus, Ordinatio, I, ap. A, p. 2, d. 38–39, q. 1–5.

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of divine will at the core of the question on divine knowledge of future contingents83 and argues that God cannot know things without a previous determination of the divine will. Without this determination nothing can come into existence. Therefore, a previous act of divine will is necessary so that divine intellect knows concrete things, and not only possibilities. According to Scotus, God knows in this way all future contingents, without a need of supposing any discursiveness in divine intellect.84 Fonseca’s view point is that the arguments of Scotus entail the same consequences as the defense of an efficacious determinative divine will over second causes.85 God does not know contingent futures only by determinative acts or by approving and permissive acts. Fonseca relies on Bonaventure86 and Caetano87 to argue that God has an exact knowledge of contingent futures because he possesses in himself the ideas by which he knows future things as if they were present. All future things, including the future effects of second causes, must be absolutely known by God before any act of his will. This knowledge is necessary for God to produce acts of approbation or permission. Moreover, divine ideas must be capable of representing all true futures, whether necessary or contingent, in the whole of their relations, both the real and the possible ones. So, to conveniently explain the way God knows the future, two ways of understanding futures must be distinguished: an absolute one, and a conditioned one. The former refers to true futures, while the latter refers to merely possible futures, that is, futures that only may happen depending on conditions.88 Bearing in mind the divergence between Aquinas’s and Scotus’s explanations and the consequences of both theories to a compatible solution, Fonseca concludes that in divine ideas there must be represented all things that happen at all times, whether they are necessary or contingent, and that in them there must also be supposed the approving or permissive act of the divine will. However, these acts of divine will cannot ensure the exact knowledge of contingent futures, because they are not determinative. They are conditional acts which depend on the acts performed by free causes. Now, the later can always act indifferently, act or not act, and choose between opposites in the various circumstances and conditions in which they are placed. Hence, it is necessary to explain how divine ideas can provide God’s exact knowledge of conditional futures, while still affirming that the acts of divine will neither determine nor predefine in an absolute way the acts of free causes.89 83 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 6, col. 114A. On this subject see Gloria Frost, ‘John Duns Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins: A Test-Case for God’s Knowledge of Contingents’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 48, (2010, 1), pp. 15–34. See also Marco Forlivesi, ‘Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un’introduzione e una nota’, in Stefano Perfetti (ed.), Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2008), pp. 239–81; Anfray, ‘Molina and John Duns Scotus’, pp. 325–64. 84 Scotus, Ordinatio, I, ap. A, p. 2, d. 38–39, q. 1–5. 85 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 6, coll. 114A–116A. 86 See, Bonaventura de Bagnoregio, In primam sententiarum, d. 39, a. 2, q. 3. 87 Thomas de Vio Caetano, Commentaria in S. Thomae summam theologicam, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. 15, and further. 88 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 7, col. 116A. 89 CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 7, col. 118B.

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3.5. The Need for a Compound or Conditional Knowledge in God

Given the difficulty of explaining how divine ideas can ensure exact knowledge of conditional futures, Fonseca concludes that it is necessary to identify in God a kind of conditional knowledge that grants God’s true foreknowledge of all future acts produced by free causes and of all the consequences of these acts. This kind of God’s knowledge supports all approving or permissive divine acts, the aids of grace, and the order both of providence and predestination. All this without suppressing the free will of second causes. Such a knowledge will have to be part of God’s abstractive knowledge and should be placed midway between intellectual divine knowledge and the determinations of God’s will. Based on an analogy with the activity of human intellect Fonseca develops a theory of divine knowledge and comes to distinguish seven degrees of knowledge in God. These degrees result from the different ways ideas are represented in divine intellect.90 In the first degree, God knows either the nature of all things represented as formally distinct, or everything that he has done and will do, as well as all possibilities of what he can do. In the second degree, God knows all contingent things in themselves. In the third degree he knows the essences of singular things by the order of their genera, species, and individuals. In the fourth degree he knows the possible connections between things, both necessary and contingent. In the fifth degree he knows all conditional connections and how things will be, if they will be, and how they will happen. In the sixth degree he knows future contingent connections, no longer in the conditioned state, but in the absolute, that is, the connections derived from things themselves, where it is already presupposed the act of God’s will allowing these future effects. Finally, in the seventh degree he knows all things, past, present, and future as existing in act, due to the fact that they are since ever present to God in eternity. The different degrees stated by Fonseca ensure the primacy of both the intellect over the will and of the abstractive way over the intuitive way. This demonstrates that the science of simple intelligence allows that God knows all possible things in an abstract way,91 before intuitive knowledge proper to the science of vision.92 Thus, the six first degrees correspond to the science of simple intelligence whereas to the science of vision corresponds only the last degree.93 The sixth degree does not belong to the science of vision because in it things are represented in the future. The identification of these different degrees of knowledge allows Fonseca both to establish a correct distinction between natural and free knowledge in God and to identify conditional knowledge as a third science among them. This third science is called by Fonseca ‘compound or conditioned knowledge’. By natural knowledge, God knows all things according to the first four degrees94 in such a way that he cannot not know them. God therefore knows all divine power and all individual things according 90 91 92 93 94

CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120A–B. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120B. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120B. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120B. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120B.

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to their nature, and in any order or condition. Therefore, God’s natural knowledge comprises both the distinction between necessary and contingent things and the totality of possible connections between them. Through free science, God obtains a true knowledge which might not be this if his will was different, but since his will is as such he cannot not know what he knows. Free knowledge corresponds to the last two degrees.95 By means of this science God knows future contingents as they will be after the free act of divine will. Finally, the third science, which Fonseca calls compound or conditioned,96 ensures that God has a knowledge that he would not have if free causes determined in a different way by their autonomy and freedom. The compound or conditioned knowledge corresponds to the fifth degree.97 This science allows the knowledge of all future contingents, individually or together, in all orders or circumstances in which they could be placed. It also allows the knowledge of all future determinations of free causes in any disposition, as well as that all of merely conditional events, as is the case of those that actually do not happened, because their conditions have not occurred.98 Given the place compound or conditioned knowledge occupies in the degrees of divine knowledge, Fonseca states that this is a middle knowledge between natural knowledge and free knowledge.99 This is so because this science is between previous and posterior degrees that allow different kinds of knowledge, all of them being complementarily and indispensable for the perfection of divine science. Conditioned knowledge, therefore, cannot by itself ensure a full knowledge of true future contingents, because it is a kind of knowledge prior to the act of divine will, which is a condition for the achievement of these futures. However, conditioned knowledge is necessary so that God can exercise his will having perfect knowledge of the choices of free causes. It should be noted that, despite the analogy between the degrees of divine knowledge and those of the human intellect, divine science is wholly simple, as Fonseca remarks.100 Although Fonseca’s explanation presupposes a sequence expressed in the anteriority and posteriority of the degrees, it is true that divine science is simple and eternal. Nevertheless, it is also true that God’s perfect knowledge cannot be understood without the logical connection the different degrees convey. Moreover, the identification of a conditioned knowledge in God does not mean that divine knowledge can either change or be affected by error. True knowledge of future contingents is due to the infinity, eminence and perfection of divine science, which infinitely can know with certainty that which is uncertain, and surpasses both the limits of human knowledge and temporality. Nevertheless, the immutability and infallibility of divine knowledge does not impose any kind of necessity on the actions of second causes. What God knows is achieved by second causes themselves, according 95 96 97 98 99 100

CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 121A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 121A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 121A. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 121A; see for example the well-known passage from Matt. 11:21. CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 121A (my emphasis). CMA VI, c. 2, q. 4, s. 8, col. 120B.

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to their autonomy and freedom. Therefore, if the future effects produced by these causes were different, God’s prior conditioned knowledge would also be different. 3.6. Final Considerations on Fonseca’s Theory on Middle Knowledge

The theory of divine knowledge that Fonseca develops in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics reconciles, orders and synthesizes different and contrary responses that tradition has elaborated, in particular through Augustine, Boethius, Duns Scotus, Thomas Aquinas and the subsequent Thomist commentators. The conclusions reached by Fonseca on the various degrees of knowledge in God, and the identification of a compound or conditioned knowledge, follow the innovative approach which was being developed within the Society of Jesus. Regardless of the discussion about the authorship of middle knowledge, and of whether or not Fonseca is the author of this kind of science, his work on building an explanation that combines God’s perfect knowledge of the contingents and the real effectiveness of human free will led to the attainment of one of the boldest and most complete defenses of this doctrine.

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Fonseca’s Halfway Reductionism of Internal Senses In Light of Mastri and Belluto’s Critique

Introduction It has been recently shown that in the issue of the number of internal senses early Jesuits aimed at their significant reduction. While in Avicenna we encounter five post-sensory modalities, sc. the common sense, the retentive imagination, the cogitative power alias compositional imagination, the estimative faculty and the memory, in Aquinas we find four, viz. the common sense, the phantasy alias imagination, the cogitative power and the memory alias reminiscence.1 Francisco de Toledo endorsed three, the Coimbran Manuel de Góis endorsed two and Francisco Suárez endorsed a single ‘sense of the brain’.2 Moreover, in the first half of the seventeenth century the theory of the single internal sensory modality was regarded as the most widespread





* This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation as the project GA ČR 20–01710S ‘Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism’. 1 For Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s theories of the internal senses, a classical point of departure for the debates about the interior senses, and their criteria of multiplication, see Avicenna Latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus I–II–III, ed. van Riet, Pars Prima, c. 5, pp. 85–90; for Aquinas, cf. ST I, q. 78, a. 4, pp. 255–57. Description of these theories is a set agenda in the secondary literature on the scholastic theories of the internal senses. Among others, see Deborah L. Black, ‘Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations’, Topoi, 19 (2009), pp. 59–60; Juhana Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden-Boston: Brill-Leiden, 2013), pp. 231–45, Simon Kemp and Garth J. O. Fletcher, ‘The Medieval Theory of the Inner Senses’, The American Journal of Psychology, 106/4 (1993), pp. 561–65; and many others. 2 For their reductionist theories, see Daniel Heider, ‘The Internal Sense(s) in Early Jesuit Scholasticism’, Filosofický časopis, special issue 2 (2017), pp. 133–48; Daniel Heider, ‘Suárez on the Functional Scope of the Imaginative Power’, Cauriensia. Revista de ciencias eclesiásticas, 12 (2017), pp. 135–52; and recent Daniel Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism: Francisco Suárez’s Philosophy of Perception, (Cham: Springer, 2021), pp. 230–40; for Suárez’s and Góis’s views, cf. José Filipe Silva, Stop Making Sense(s): Some Late Medieval and Very Late Medieval Views on Faculty Psychology, in The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition, ed. by S. N. Mousavian and J. L. Fink (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 45–67; for Suárez, see J. B. South, ‘Suárez on Imagination’, Vivarium, 39 (2001), pp. 119–58; cf. also Simone Guidi, ‘Reason, Phantasy, Animal Daniel Heider  •  Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 87-103 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131760

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view. Antonio Rubio,3 Girolamo Dandini,4 Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza,5 Rodrigo de Arriaga6 and many other Jesuits regarded this view as true or as the most probable one.7 Even more, this tenet was not restricted to philosophers of the Society of Jesus. With the exception of Thomists and a few other authors, this position was espoused by members of other ecclesiastical orders too.8 The ‘Scotistarum princeps’ Bartholomaeus Mastrius and his work fellow Bonaventura Belluto expounded this theory in In libros de anima (published in 1643, Venice) too. At the same time, both were well familiar with the arguments for the less parsimonious theories including the doctrine of two internal senses, sc. the common sense and the phantasy, which was embraced by ‘the Portuguese Aristotle’.9



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Intelligence. A Few Remarks on Suárez and the Jesuit Debate on the Internal Senses’, in Suárez em Lisboa — 1617–2017, ed. by P. Caridade de Freitas et al. (Lisbon: AAEDL Editora, 2019), pp. 417–20. Antonio Rubio, Commentaria in libros Aristotelis De anima, III, c. 2–3, Tractatus de natura & ratione, ac numero internorum sensuum (Lugduni: I. Pillehotte, 1613), p. 603: ‘Ultima sententia unicum tantum ponit sensum internum pro illis omnibus officiis […] Pro haec sententia nullus ex antiquioribus citari potest, sed eam tenent ex recentioribus multi […] ex omnibus duae videntur probabiliores, videlicet prima, quae est D. Thom. & haec ultima recentiorum, quam sequimur, quia pluribus placet, & plausibilior facta est’. Hieronymus Dandinus, In tres Aristotelis libros de Anima, lib. III, Digressio XV: De interiorum sensuum numero, in De corpore animato lib. VII, Luculentus in tres de anima libros commentarius peripateticus, (Parisiis: apud c. Chappeletum, 1610), p. 889: ‘Ego vero docere pergam quod aggressus sum, unicam esse facultatem, quae ut alias atque alias functiones habet, aliis atque aliis vocibus appeletur.’ Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Universa philosophia, De anima, d. 17, sect. 8, § 52 (Lugduni: L. Prost, 1624), p. 683a: ‘Concludo, sensum communem cum sit unus numero, multipliciter nominari, & concipi propter numera multiplicia, quibus fungitur…’. For Hurtado’s view, see also Daniel Heider, ‘Hurtado on External and Internal Senses’, forthcoming in Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641): System, Sources and Influence, ed. by L. Novák and D. Novotný (Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2023, forthcoming). Rodrigo de Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus (Antwerpiae: B. Moreti, 1632), De anima, d. 5, sec. 4, § 69, p. 721: ‘Licet dentur hae diversae operationes internae, unicus tamen est sensus principium omnium illarum’. For these and other authors who advocated this unified view, see Bartholomaeus Mastrius de Meldula and Bonaventura Belluto, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, vol. 3, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 282, p. 124: ‘unicum tantum ponit sensum internum qui varios actus habet exercere, & ex illis varias deinde sumit denominationes […] estque communior apud Recentiores’. Eustachius a S. Paulo, one of the few scholastics read by Descartes, who entered the Feuillants, a Cistercian order, defended this opinion in his Tertia pars Summa Philosophicae, tomus posterior, t. 3, d. 3, q. 1 (Parisiis: c. Chastellain, 1609), p. 391–94. At any rate, as regards the very late scholastics of the first half of the seventeenth century, it is not entirely correct to say that a unified model of the internal senses was ‘an alternative model of the internal senses, according to which unity and simplification trumps plurality’ (Silva, ‘Stop Making Sense(s)’, p. 66). It was rather a pluralist account that represented an alternative model at that time. To my knowledge, there is only a single more detailed presentation of Fonseca’s theory of the internal senses, namely the chapter ‘Fonseca on Internal Senses’, in João Madeira, Pedro da Fonseca’s Isagoge Philosophica and the Predicables from Boethius to the Lovanienses, dissertation (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit, 2006), pp. 122–39; URL: https://documents.pub/document/ tese-sobre-pedro-da-fonseca.html.

fo n s ec a’s h al fway r e d u ct i oni sm o f i nt e rnal se nse s

The main goal of this paper is to lay out Fonseca’s theory of the internal senses in light of the critique of Mastri and Belluto. In light of their comments Fonseca’s view can be seen as a theory that stayed halfway in the reduction of the interior senses. Although within the query about the number of the internal senses the Scotists refer to him only once, in the introductory overview of the various positions arranged according to the number of the senses, in their presentation of the theory of two internal sense they employ the very same arguments as Fonseca did more than half a century before. Mastri and Belluto also employed many of the reasons for the identification of the phantasy, the memory (reminiscence) and the cogitative (estimative) power that had been introduced by Fonseca. This suggests that regarding the doctrine of the double interior sense Fonseca and his theory constituted an important referential point for the Scotists.

1. Internal Senses and Fonseca’s In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis In Fonseca’s monumental four-volume In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis the topic of sensory cognition makes only a marginal issue.10 Indeed, it is no more than an archipelago in a metaphysical sea. One of such islands is the topic of the number of the internal senses, which is ex professo presented in the question ‘Whether All of the Interior Senses or Only One of Them is Proximately Instrumental to the Intellect’ in the twenty-eighth chapter of the Commentary on the fifth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, published in the second volume in 1589.11 It was about fifteen years after the publication of Toledo’s Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis De anima and Suárez’s Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, and nine years before the Coimbrans headed by Manuel de Góis published their In tres libros De anima. The entire volume, comprising 1142 column pages, contains only an exposition and a commentary on the fifth book of the Stagirite’s Metaphysics. This makes Aristotle’s sophisticated philosophical lexicon by far the most commented upon book of all the books

10 With the exception of Isagoge philosophica, I will take into account only the second volume of CMA (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1615–29). I leave aside the manuscript cod. 2399 of the General Library of the University of Coimbra, a Commentary on De anima regarded by some as Fonseca’s genuine work, for this opinion has been seriously challenged by Paula Oliveira e Silva and João Rebalde, ‘Doctrinal Divergences on the Nature of Human Composite in Two Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (Anonymous, Cod. 2399 BGUC and Francisco Suárez): New Material on the Jesuit School of Coimbra and the Cursus Conimbricensis’, in Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Jesuits and the Complexities of Modernity, ed. by R. A. Maryks and J. A. Senent de Frutos (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 378–410. 11 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, cols 1004–18: ‘Omnesne interiores sensus, an unus tantum intellectui proxime ministret?’. For a historical context and structure of the four-volume Commentary, see António Manuel Martins, ‘Pedro da Fonseca’s Unfinished Metaphysics: The First Systematic Jesuit Metaphysics before Suárez’, in Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity, ed. by Cristiano Casalini (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 327–46.

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of the Metaphysics. This unprecedented extent shows that Fonseca was far from only paraphrasing and explicating Aristotle’s text. True, as in all other volumes, this fascicle introduces the Greek text and the Latin translation, and, with the exception of the last two books XIII and XIV, this philological fragment is followed by Explanationes, closely following the Stagirite’s litera. However, unlike the last five books constituting the subject-matter of the last volume, these Explanationes are also supplemented by the autonomous and systematic Quaestiones. It is in these Quaestiones that Fonseca’s independent and original mind finds its clearest manifestation. The twenty-eighth chapter of the fifth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is dedicated to the notion of ‘genus’. The twenty quaestiones dealing just with this philosophical entry extend to almost two hundred column pages. The main theme of the chapter is the classical topic of universals.12 But since the Aristotelian metaphysics of universals cannot be detached from the psychological topic of abstraction, Fonseca is obliged to delve into this issue too. And since beside the intellect Aristotle’s moderate realism assigns an important role in the formation of universals to the inner senses, the theory of the internal senses must be also included. Starting from a pluralist view of the interior senses, Fonseca spells out his main question as follows: Which of the inner senses does immediately concur with the intellect in the production of the intelligible species?13 The majority of the autonomous quaestiones are further divided into sections. Some questions comprise even more than ten sections. The question examined here comprises five. The first and the last are directly related to the title question. In the first Fonseca presents arguments for both potential conclusions, sc. for the upshot that all interior senses are proximately instrumental to the intellect’s abstraction and that only a single sense is instrumental to the intellect in this way. In the last section he replies to the arguments for the first view that he considers to be false and confirms his tenet of two internal senses by claiming that only the phantasy proximately concurs with the agent intellect in the production of the intelligible species. Accordingly, the core of his theory of the internal senses can be found in the second, third and fourth sections of the question.

12 For Fonseca’s theory of universals, see Madeira, Pedro da Fonseca and Daniel Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism. A Comparative Study with Focus on the Theories of Francisco Suárez S. J. (1548–1617), João Poinsot O. P. (1589–1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O. F. M. Conv. (1602–1673)/Bonaventura Belluto O. F. M. Conv. (1600–1676) (Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014), pp. 37–41. 13 A similar question can be found also in Manuel de Góis In tres libros de anima III c. 5, q. 6, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros de anima (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2009), pp. 453–58 (‘Num omnes interni sensus, & quo nam causae genere cum intellectu agente concurrat ad producendas species intelligibilies’). Fonseca deals with the second question from this title in the following eighth question. Clearly, the first question does not make sense to those who deny a pluralist view of the internal senses. We will not find this question in Suárez, among others.

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2. Phantasy, Cogitative Power and Memory as One Internal Sense Although Fonseca opens the second section with a brief presentation of the theories of five internal senses advocated by Avicenna and Albert the Great, the real starting point for him is Aquinas’s view. In the second section of the sixth question he characterizes the organs and functions of Aquinas’s four internal senses. The first sense, which is placed in the frontal cavity, is the common sense. It is called the first sense because it functions as a centre and common arbiter for all the external senses’ operations. In Isagoge philosophica Fonseca notes that the common sense is only partly interior. In its distinct part it is also external. Considering its location, it is internal, as regards its function, it is external. In this regard it is external since it perceives only the objects existing hic et nunc.14 It not only distinguishes all the external senses’ objects but apprehends their operations too. Its radius operandi is not limited to a single proper sensible, such as colour, sound, etc. It is not ‘common’ because it abstracts the common sensibles, such as size, shape, etc., from the proper sensible objects. It is common because it perceives all the external senses’ proper sensibles and the differences between them. As a centre of the external senses it cannot apprehend anything common and universal either. Nor can it perceive anything in its absence. It works only in tandem with the external senses. The second sense Fonseca introduces is the phantasy alias imagination. This power is placed in the second ventricle of the frontal cerebral part. Its function is to retain the sensible species and produce its acts in the absence of the sensibles represented by the species. Moreover, it operates by dividing and composing. By combining and dividing it creates new images, such as chimeras composed of two essentially distinct essences of brutes.15 Again, this capacity can never abstract a common nature from individual differences. It always sticks to singulars. The third sense the Jesuit enumerates is located in the third (middle) sinus. It is the estimative power (in brutes) or the cogitative power (in humans). As he stresses, the latter is also called particular reason (ratio particularis). It is particular since it does not operate with universals as such but only with particular intentions, such as incidental sensibles. Its main function, however, is to produce non-sensed species representing the ‘intentions’ not perceived by the phantasy or the common sense, such as the hostility of a wolf or the harmfulness of a plant. While in brutes this faculty operates only by instinct, in humans (though often moved by instinct too) it proceeds largely discursively. The last of the internal senses is the memory alias reminiscence. It is placed in the posterior ventricle called cerebellum and its main function is to conserve the non-sensed species and produce abstractive acts 14 Isagoge, ch. 4, p. 21. 15 As is well-known, Aquinas does not accept Avicenna’s criterion of multiplication based on the distinction between active and passive powers. He takes his retentive and compositional imagination to be one and the same power called imagination sive phantasy. ST I, q. 78, a. 4, p. 256: ‘Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit formas imaginatas, ut patet cum ex forma imaginat auri et forma imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa’.

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from them. Beside the production of acts of remembering this capacity can also discursively investigate items that have been forgotten. Fonseca makes clear that this capacity, like all other internal senses, cannot abstract universals.16 Following Aquinas’s ‘deduction’ of these interior senses necessary for the preservation of animals, in the second section of the seventh question Fonseca introduces three back-up criteria for the multiplication that corresponds to this view.17 (1) There are four distinct senses since there are four brain cavities, of which the first two are located in the anterior part, the third in the middle and the fourth in the posterior cerebellum.18 (2) There must be really distinct powers apprehending their specifically distinct objects via distinct kinds of species. These items are the sensed and the non-sensed objects which are represented by the sensed and the non-sensed species. (3) Powers apprehending objects intuitively and those that cognize them abstractively must be distinct. This criterion is often correlated with (1) or, more precisely, with the ventricles’ different material dispositions. While cavities with prevalent humidity are better for reception (water or wax are better for reception than a stone), those with dominant dryness are more fitting for retention (for retention a stone is better than water or wax). Combining these three criteria we get four senses: (1) The power apprehending the sensed objects in their presence (the common sense located in the anterior cavity with a prevalence of humidity), (2) the faculty that retains the representational items of the sensed objects (the phantasy in the second cavity in the anterior part of the brain with a prevailing dryness), (3) the capacity which is cognitive of non-sensed objects in their presence (the estimative or the cogitative power in the middle with a dominant moist), and (4) the power conserving the species of non-sensed sensibles (the memory in the cerebellum with a prevalent dryness). In his critique of this view Fonseca starts by rejecting the supposedly evident anatomical confirmation. Following Galen’s De usu partium corporis humani, in which the account differs from that of De differentiis symptomatum,19 Fonseca notes that the middle cavity is not a distinct sinus but rather a ‘doorway’ or way (ianua or meatus) to the cerebellum.20 Moreover, he is also sure that the two cavities in the anterior part of the brain should be taken as a single part. Anticipating his theory of the double sense, by referring to ‘the Spanish Galen’ Francisco Vallés and Andreas 16 CMA V, c. 28, q. 6, s. 2, cols 1002B–4B. 17 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 2, cols 1007C–8B. 18 Considering that Avicenna divided the brain into five cavities, Averroes and Aquinas divided the brain into four sections, Galen once advocated three ventricles and at another time took the middle cavity to be a ‘gate’ going from the frontal part, being the organ of olfaction, to the cerebellum (for these two Galen’s views, see below), this argument from distinct brain chambers does not seem to be particularly strong. This is confirmed also by Mastri and Belluto who complain that ‘Nec minor dissensio est inter hac sententias, ut assignent organa uniuscujusque potentiae; hinc cellulas cerebri ad libitum assignant’. Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 282 (Venetiis: Pezzana, 1727), p. 124. 19 For his account in De symptomatum differentiis, see below. 20 For this, see Claudius Galenus, De usu partium corporis humani, bk. 8, c. 11, pp. 480–84.

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Vesalius, Fonseca says that anatomical knowledge shows that there are two, rather than four internal senses.21 He rejects the argument based on the cavities’ distinct organic dispositions by stating that one and the same power can be better in reception in one of its parts and another part of the same organ can be more suitable for retention. Heat is better conveyed in a deeper part of a ventricle, rather than on its surface. One and the same organ can well make a required difference. Moreover, ‘to retain easily’ and ‘to retain with difficulty’ cannot be taken as sufficient signs of the powers’ specific difference. Following the activist line in cognitive theory Fonseca says that since our cognition does not lie in the mere reception and retention of the species but rather in their active use, our specification and differentiation must not be based on this ‘passivist’ criterion.22 However, if the distinction between receiving and retaining is understood in such a way that some senses only receive but do not retain species and other receive and retain, Fonseca agrees that this distinction can result in a differentiation of the senses, namely in the distinction between the common sense and the phantasy. However, he disagrees that this standard can be used as all-inclusive. He denies that it suffices for the distinction between the aestimativa and the memory. Not only the memory but also the cogitative power must receive and retain species. In harmony with the Thomistic account Fonseca highlights the cogitative power as the most noble of the human senses.23 At the same time, unlike Suárez, he does not deny the existence of distinct non-sensed species.24 The cogitative power’s main function is to elicit these non-sensed species from the sensed ones that have been the principles of the external senses, including the common sense. However, following the argument from the desideratum of perceptual unity, Fonseca argues that one and the same power must produce the non-sensed species from the sensed one and conserve and connect both. It is part of our experience that in our memories we often move from sensed to non-sensed objects, from persons to their intentions toward us, such as sympathy, antipathy, etc. This discursive retrieval, however, requires a conservation of both species. If this preservation were not a function of a single power, sc. of the cogitative power’s radius operandi, the acquisition of the non-sensed species would be unexplained. Either we would have to say that the memory both conserves and apprehends these objects, or that the cogitativa claims the species back from the memory. Both is absurd and discredits the cogitative power’s privileged position.25

21 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 2, col. 1007B–C. 22 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 2, col. 1008B–D. 23 For a crucial epistemic role of the vis cogitativa (and reminiscence) in Aquinas’s philosophy of perception, see Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Perception: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 24 For Suárez’s claim that these non-sensed species cannot be distinct from the sensed species but can be construed as merely their modes, see Suárez, Commentaria una cum questionibus de libris Aristotelis De anima, II, ed. S. Castellote, d. 6, q. 2, n. 15, p. 492; see also Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, pp. 228–30. 25 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 2, col. 1008D–9B.

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Fonseca also disputes Galen’s doctrine of three interior senses. In his De symptomatum differentiarum the ancient physician states that the brain is divided into three ventricles, i.e., the front, the middle and the rear cavity. These cavities are the seats of three distinct interior senses, the phantasy sive common sense, the cogitative power sive intellect (in his ‘opinio impia’ Galen conceives the intellect as a corporeal power) and the memory.26 The main rationale for this localization lies in Galen’s experimental medical knowledge concerning the correlation of the physical damages of particular cavities and the corresponding cognitive disorders. Lesion of the front ventricle causes error in apprehension. Someone hallucinates to see a flautist in the corner of a house where there is none. Injury in the middle ventricle results in incorrect judgment. Although someone can see and remember well, say, the name of a thing, she may still reason about it incorrectly. Lastly, damage of the rear ventricle eventuates in bad memory. Accordingly, since the interior powers are located in distinct cavities, they must be taken as really distinct faculties.27 In his reply to this theory of Galen’s Fonseca starts from Francisco Vallés’s physiological views. Vallés, whom the Jesuit values highly as ‘an erudite man of experience not only in the art of medicine but also with great merit in noble philosophy’,28 substantially relativizes Galen’s theory of three distinct chambers in which three distinct powers are located.29 For Vallés all the powers can be located in a single part of the brain. Fonseca justified this by referring to the external senses. Touch as the universal external sense exists in the same parts in which the other sensory modalities also exist. The powers’ organs can well overlap and co-exist in the same organ.30 Leaving aside Galen’s (for Fonseca, false) identification of the common sense and the phantasy, the Portuguese Aristotle shows that three kinds of cognitive disorders do not entail the existence of three distinct powers. Preferably, they are to be attributed to one and the same power. As two distinct kinds of act, sc. an act of understanding and an act of memory, pertain to one and the same power, namely to the intellect, so the three operations should be ascribed to one and the same sensory faculty too. Due to various dispositions that can lie on its side or on the side of the sensory powers or of the appetite, one and the same intellectual power regarding apprehending, judging and memorizing can be differently related to its acts and objects. Moreover, even the operation of a single kind can be variably related to its objects. For example, one can have a good memory for names and a bad memory for faces. One can judge well with respect to theoretical things but not with respect to practical matters. Accordingly,

26 See Galenus, De symptomatum differentiis, 3.9–13, ed. B. Gundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), pp. 225–27. 27 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1009C–E. 28 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1009C: ‘vir sane doctus nec solum de Medicinae arte ac peritia, sed de nobiliori quoque Philosophia benemeritus…’ For the importance of Vallés’s theory of the internal senses for Fonseca, see Madeira, ‘Francisco Valles Covarrubias: o galenismo renascentista depois de Andreas Vesalius’, Veritas, 54, 3 (2009), pp. 71–89. 29 Francisco Vallés, Controversiarum medicarum et philosophicarum, II, c. 23, p. 99: ‘Sed tamen ego non video, ex quo Galeni loco collegerint hanc locorum differentiam’. 30 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1009E–10A.

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it is false to say that distinct cognitive disorders necessarily entail the existence of distinct organs and distinct powers. One and the same power in a single organ can be damaged in manifold and for us unknown ways and cause a wide range of disorders with regard to one and not another cognitive operation.31 I have shown that while criticizing Aquinas’s view Fonseca comes to identify the cogitative (estimative) power with the memory. In the context of his rejection of Galen’s position he also denies the real distinction between the powers of memory and phantasy. In his reasoning for this identification he refers to the first treatise of Aristotle’s On Memory and Recollection where the Stagirite states: ‘It is obvious, then, that memory belongs to that part of the soul to which the imagination belongs’.32 Fonseca argues that since an act of remembering is nothing else than looking at images, it would be false to posit the existence of two distinct powers of phantasy and memory. Wherever Aristotle claims that the senses and sensible species are instrumental to the intellect, he always calls the latter phantasms. This shows that there is no other power between the common sense and the intellect than the phantasy.33 But if the memory and the phantasy are identical, and if it holds that the cogitative power is identical with the memory, on the basis of the law of transitivity, the phantasy must be one and the same with the cogitative power too.34

3. Common Sense and Phantasy as Two Distinct Powers Fonseca indicates that the theory of two really distinct senses — the common sense and the phantasy — is the theory fuse taught by Aristotle. In On the Soul III.3 he famously characterizes imagination as ‘a movement produced by sensation actively operating’.35 Although Fonseca follows Vallés in his rejection of Galen’s location of the three internal senses in the three distinct ventricles on the basis of their various injuries and the corresponding mental disorders, he significantly deviates from his exposition of Aristotle’s definition of imagination. For Vallés, Aristotle’s characterization aims to say the following: In the third chapter of the third book of On the Soul, where Aristotle discussed the topic of the essence of imagination, he added: If, then, imagination involves nothing else than what we have stated, and is as we have described it, then it must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating. Unfortunately, these words have been drowsily neglected by all. Clearly, they mean nothing else than that imagination is an action that pertains to the same power to which an act of this sense pertains. But this one and the same power that is the sense operative

31 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1014A–C. 32 De mem. et rem., I, 450a23–24; ed. On the Soul. Parva naturalia. On Breath, trans. W. S. Hett (Cambridge-Massachusetts-London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 293). 33 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1011A–C. 34 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1011D–E. 35 De anima, III, 3, 429a1–2, p. 163.

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with present things is the common sense, and when it composes true and false objects it is the phantasy.36 Vallés is clear that Aristotle endorsed the identity of these two powers. By referring to the Greek and Latin texts, sc. ‘ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη’ and ‘Phantasia motus fuerit a sensitivam operante, seu facto in esse’, Fonseca, on the contrary, does not take the statement to be one of identity, but only one of causality. The common sense is not identical with the phantasy, but as being moved from the external senses it moves the phantasy by imprinting to it phantasms of the external sensibles similar to those that have been received from the external senses. The common sense through its sensible species is the cause of the phantasy’s sensible species and not the proximate subject in which phantasms inhere.37 Fonseca also reinterprets another well-known formulation from the first chapter of On Memory and Recollection in which Aristotle seems to identify the common sense and the phantasy: ‘...the image (phantasma) is an affection of the common sense. Thus it is clear that the cognition of these belongs to the primary sense-faculty’.38 At the end of this chapter, when he has proved the identity of the phantasy and memory, Aristotle seems to confirm this identification: ‘[Memory or remembering] pertains to the primary sense-faculty [the common sense], i.e., that with which we perceive time’.39 As in the previous exegesis, Fonseca understands these formulations in a causal sense: ‘To be an affect of the common sense’ is equivalent to ‘to be caused by the common sense through a species imprinted from it’.40 Beside this reasoning based on Aristotle’s texts Fonseca substantiates his tenet of the real distinction between these two senses also ‘ex ratione’. He distinguishes two main genera of arguments. One concerns the criterion of location. Regardless of the abovementioned relativization of the differences in the material dispositions of the cerebral parts, Fonseca after all comes to employ this reasoning in the differentiation of the common sense and the phantasy. He claims that the common sense is placed in the anterior part of the brain, which is characterized by prevalent humidity. The nerves from the organs of the external senses are directed at this sense, which at the same time is their common root from which the animal spirits flow to the organs. The phantasy, on the other hand, is placed in the remaining part of the brain and the cerebellum, even though it is especially in the cerebellum where phantasms are retained at best and where the phantasy’s operations are most quietly (quietius)

36 Francisco Vallés, Controversiarum et medicarum et philosophicarum, II, c. 22, p. 99: ‘Tertio libro de anima cap. 3 cum de imaginationis essentia multa disputasset Aristoteles ad finem capitis addit: Si igitur nihil aliud praeter imaginationem habet ea quae dicta sunt, sitque; id ipsum quod diximus, imaginatio motus profecto fuerit, sensus iam operantis. Quae verba oscitanter omnes praetereunt. Constat tamen illis nihil aliud significari, quam Imaginationem actionem esse eiusdem potentiae, cujus est sensus actus. Sed hanc eandem potentiam quae sensus est, cum rebus praesentibus operatur, sensum esse, cumque vera componit: cum vero falsa, phantasiam’. 37 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1010C–F. 38 De mem. et rem., I, 450a10–11, p. 293. 39 De mem. et rem., I, 451a16–17, p. 299. 40 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1014C–15A.

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exercised. Despite his reservations regarding the criterion based on the different material dispositions of the different cerebral parts, he recurs to this standard when contrasting the common sense and the phantasy.41 The second kind of reasoning is related to the criterion of the common sense’s and the phantasy’s distinct operations (officia), first of all based on intuitive and abstractive cognition.42 Although Fonseca regarded the application of this criterion as merely ‘accidental’ (ex accidenti)43 and, as we have seen, he did not employ it in the case of the aestimativa and the memory, he does employ it in his differentiation of the common sense and the phantasy. He makes it clear that while the common sense apprehends the sensibles only together with the external senses and cognizes them intuitively as being locally and temporally present (perhaps with the exception of brief afterimages44) to the power, the phantasy perceives them as being distant both locally and temporally. The second criterion is based on the distinction between the acts related to the sensed sensibles and those related to the non-sensed intentions. Employing this criterion again suggests that Fonseca did not abandon entirely the traditional criteria of the multiplication of the internal senses as formulated by Avicenna and Aquinas, even though using this argument can be indicated as only ‘ex accidenti’. As such this distinction is not a criterion that would tout court differentiate the sensory powers because it does not do so in the case of the vis cogitativa and the phantasy. Nevertheless, Fonseca employs it in his differentiation of the common sense and the phantasy: While the common sense perceives only the sensed objects, the phantasy attains also the non-sensed intentions. While cognition of the non-sensed intentions is admitted in the phantasy, it is ruled out in the common sense. Accordingly, only the phantasy can proceed discursively from sensed to non-sensed objects.45 Beside the distinction in the formal objects of the common sense and the phantasy, Fonseca spells out their distinction also with respect to the manner in which these two senses are intentionally affected (modi immutandi). The two senses must be really distinct since while the phantasy is affected by the external senses mediately, i.e., it is immuted only through the common sense, the common sense is affected by them immediately. Just this criterion of mediated and immediate affection is crucial for Fonseca’s reply to the main query stated in the seventh question. The common sense differs from the external senses since the former is moved by the external sensibles 41 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, cols 1012E–13F. 42 Also in this context Fonseca refers to Aristotle, sc. to De anima, III, 2, even though he should have rather referred to the third chapter, in which imagination is treated ex professo (CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 3, col. 1013A). In the third chapter (428a5–8) Aristotle says the following: ‘It is clear from the following considerations that imagination is not sensation. Sensation is either potential or actual, e.g., either sight or seeing, but imagination occurs when neither of these is present, as when objects are seen in dreams’. 43 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1008D. 44 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1008D–E. Mastri and Belluto refer to Fonseca as to someone who held that the sensible species, especially the visual ones, can, at least for a while, be naturally conserved without a present sensible object represented by the species. See Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 4, q. 5, art. 3, § 85, p. 77. 45 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1013A–B.

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only through the external senses, while the latter are affected by them immediately. This is also why it is only the phantasy, and not the common sense, that proximately concurs with the agent intellect in its abstraction and in the production of the intelligible species. The common sense concurs in this process only mediately, i.e., through the phantasy. Importantly, what Fonseca means is not a physical proximity but a functional proximity. Not everything that is physically proximal to something is also proximately instrumental to it. Although touch and sight are located in the same organ and thus are physically close to each other, the former is not proximately instrumental to the latter.46 Although there are only two really distinct internal senses, Fonseca allows for a talk in a higher plural. Following Aquinas’s De veritate q. 10, art. 3, c.47 he distinguishes between two meanings of the term ‘power’. First, in the strict sense, a power can be regarded as a principle of operation. In this sense intellectual understanding and intellectual memory are one and the same power. Second, it can signify a faculty’s property. Accordingly, understanding and intellectual memory differ since they constitute two distinct properties of a single power. Only in this sense of the single internal power’s property can we speak in the plural and say that the phantasy, the cogitative power and the memory are three senses. Only according to this functionalist understanding can it be said that the first sense is a capacity that apprehends the sensed object in absentia (phantasy), the second is a faculty that judges and discursively elicits the non-sensed items (the estimative capacity) and the third is a power that retains the species and proceeds inferentially from something familiar to something as yet unknown (the memory alias reminiscence).48

4. Mastri and Belluto’s Critique of the Theory of the Two Internal Senses In the beginning of the fifth article ‘On the Number of the Interior Senses’, the eighth question ‘On the Internal Senses’, the fifth disputation ‘On the Sensory Powers in Particular’ of the Cursus philosophicus, Mastri and Belluto introduce the theory of the two internal senses as a position embraced, among others, by Fonseca and the Coimbrans.49 In the longest segment of the article they formulate the arguments for this view, to which they append their critical notes.

46 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 4, col. 1015D–E. 47 Speaking about the real identity between the intellectual memory and the intellect qua the capacity of understading (intelligentia prout intelligentia) Aquinas admits that we can, in a way, say that these are two intellectual powers. They can be distinct since the former is related to the cognition of objects that exist in the mind habitualiter, while the latter concerns objects that exist actualiter. For this see Aquinas, De veritate, q. 10, art. 3 (ed. Leonina, vol. 22, 2/1), p. 305. 48 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 5, col. 1017C–F. 49 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 282, p. 124. It is not surprising to see that Manuel de Góis follows Fonseca’s theory of the double sense (In de Anima III, c. 3, q. 1, a. 3, p. 394): ‘Caeterum alia quaedam est opinio, etsi non antiquitati, ut quibusdam videtur, certe veritati

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They start by saying that there are two kinds of arguments introduced for this view by their advocates — ‘ex authoritate’ and ‘ex ratione’. (1) The first comes from Aristotle’s abovementioned definition of phantasy in which a phantasy (or, as the Scotists say, rather an act of phantasy) is defined as that which is caused by the really distinct sense that is actively operating. This actively operating sensation is taken by its adherents to mean not only the external senses, but also the common sense. If they had in mind only the external senses, this characterization would be applicable to any of the internal senses. As such, this description would not specify a single interior sense, which would not be in line with Aristotle’s intention. (2) The reasoning ‘ex ratione’ for the theory of the double internal sense can be divided into four arguments. The phantasy and the common sense must be really distinct because they are (a) differently affected by sensible objects, (b) have different formal objects, (c) have different organs, and (d) generate different adequate acts. (a) While the common sense is immediately moved by the external senses, the phantasy is moved by them only mediately, i.e., through the common sense. (b) Whereas the common sense perceives the sensibles as existing hic et nunc, the phantasy abstracts from their presence and absence. These manners of apprehension assume the existence of two distinct formal objects, which correspond to two distinct powers. An object qua abstracting from presence and absence is more abstract and immaterial than one that does not abstract from these. (c) Since the anterior part of the brain is moister and better at receiving than the posterior ventricle, the common sense must be located in this frontal part. The phantasy, on the contrary, which is better at retention, must be posited in the posterior parts where the quality of dryness prevails. (d) From these the last reason is clear: The different formal objects emit distinct species which differ according to a degree of abstraction and co-cause the specifically distinct adequate acts that cannot pertain to one and the same power. One and the same material power is not able to use the species of such a distinct abstraction as can be found in intuitive and abstractive cognition.50 As we have seen, all these arguments had been employed by Fonseca. Mastri and Belluto leave no doubt that all these arguments are not cogent. In the reply to the first argument they refer to the abovementioned formulation from the first treatise of On Memory and Reminiscence.51 In this treatise phantasms, or the phantasy’s sensible species, are assessed as affections of the common sense. They are clear that the inherence of the so-called species phantastica in the common sense shows that the phantasy must be identical with the common sense. In line with this statement, which they find clearer than the one from the definition in the On the Soul, they reinterpret Aristotle’s definition from the latter text as being related only to the magis consentanea, quam praeter alios nostrae aetatis nobiles Philosophos defendit Fonsc. lib. 5 Metaph. cap. 28 quaest. 7 sect. 4 asserens duas tantum esse potentias sensitivas internas sensum communem & phantasiam. Quae sententia sic tuenda a nobis est…’. Mutatis mutandis, it may be said that from the viewpoint of Mastri and Belluto’s criticism, Góis’s theory also stayed halfway in its reductionism. 50 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 284, p. 124. 51 See note 38.

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phantasy’s functions (operation), and not to the power. If the common sense and the phantasy are considered in the sense of a principle of operation, they constitute the same power. However, if we take them according to their functions, or as second acts (as they were conceived by Aristotle), the operations of judging and discerning between the proper sensibles and imagining absent objects can be conceived as really distinct acts without a necessity to multiply the senses.52 In their reply to (2a) they flatly deny that the common sense and the phantasy are affected differently. For them, one and the same power that receives the sensible species from the external senses retains them after the external senses have ceased to operate. In this context they deny the criterion based on the distinction between intuitive and abstractive acts. Cognitio intuitiva, unlike cognitio abstractiva, is a cognition that terminates in the objects themselves, not in the species.53 However, they make clear that the common sense’s apprehension terminates immediately in the species (as they say, in an object that shines in the species), not in external objects. Therefore, properly speaking, the common sense’s cognition is abstractive. As they say, its cognition is only concomitantly intuitive. What does it mean? At the same time when the common sense (as a reflective power) perceives its object in a species, it also apprehends and connotes the actual operation of the external senses. More importantly, the allegedly distinct affection of the two powers must be denied on the basis of the following reductio: If these powers were really distinct and were distinctly affected, the produced species in the phantasy would have to be (i) of the same kind as the sensible species inherent in the common sense, or (ii) of a different kind. Neither of these is tenable, though. The first option is not viable because two distinct cognitive powers must be determined through specifically different intentional species. If the second alternative were advocated, we would have to say that the species phantastica is more perfect than the species of the common sense. However, if this were the case, it would be difficult to explain the origin of this more perfect species phantastica. This more perfect species could not be produced by a less perfect entity, such as the common sense’s species, since what is less perfect cannot give rise to what is more perfect. Therefore, for such a species to be produced an additional agent sense (sensus agens) would have to be posited. Only such an ‘elevating’ power could ‘purify’ the common sense’s species and bring about the more perfect species of the phantasy. Although Fonseca’s exposition of the issue of the production of 52 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 285, p. 124. Suárez also argued for the identity of the common sense and the phantasy by referring to this passage. See Suárez, Commentaria una cum questionibus de libros Aristotelis De anima, III, d. 8, q. 1, n. 21, p. 40. 53 For a topic of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition ‘ex parte principii’ (while in intuitive cognition the motive cause is an object or a special species of the external senses that depends in its becoming and being on the sensibles from which it is emitted, an intelligible species and a species of the interior senses do not depend on their objects in this way) and ‘ex parte termini’ (while the former terminates in an extramental object, the latter terminates in the species in which an object ‘shines’), cf. Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 6, q. 11, § 334, p. 200. For these two kinds of notion in Mastri and Belluto, see Claus Andersen, ‘Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition, “praecisiones obiectivae”, and the Formal Distinction in Mastri and Belluto and Later Scotist Authors’, Archivum franciscanum historicum, 108 (2015), pp. 183–247.

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the species phantastica in his In metaphysicam Aristotelis is fragmentary, from his abovementioned causal interpretation of Aristotle’s formulations we may infer that the theory of the agent sense is not an open alternative for him. However, if neither (i) nor (ii) represent a tenable option, there must be only a single species caused by external sensations, which inheres in a single sense, sc. in the common sense alias phantasy. Accordingly, the only distinction that can be considered here is a ‘functional distinction’, which for the Scotists is grounded in the formal distinction.54 Insofar as this single sense has intuitive connotative cognition of the external senses’s acts it is called the common sense; insofar as it separated from this apprehension it is called the phantasy.55 In line with the critique of (2a), the argument (2b) is easy to reject too. We have seen that for Fonseca the common sense’s acts differ from those of the phantasy because they have the distinct formal objects. It is not the case that the common sense apprehends a sensible only in its presence and existence and the phantasy only independently of its presence and existence. Their object is the same. Both apprehend its object abstractively, i.e., in a species. The only difference lies in the (dispensable) connotation of the external senses’s operation in the case of the common sense’s intuitive cognition. While the common sense exercises its functions while intuitively apprehending the acts of the external senses, the phantasy performs them without this connotation of intuitive cognition. Moreover, like Fonseca, the Scotists employ the analogy with the intellect, which they consider to be a model for their reductionist project. As one and the same intellect can be related to specifically distinct objects, sc. those cognized in their presence and those apprehended in their absence, one and the same common sense alias phantasy can intuitively apprehend the acts of the external senses, if they exist, and abstractively through the species, if they do not. There is no distinction in formal objects between these two powers that would necessarily lead to a postulation of a real distinction between them.56 In the reply to (2c), Mastri and Belluto deny that the common sense and the phantasy require an organic distinction in terms of different first qualities. It is not necessary to assume the existence of two substantially distinct material dispositions in two parts of the brain corresponding to two powers in order to explain the reception and retention of the species. They argue that no part in the brain is drier than the nerves. But the nerves (together with skin and flesh) constitute the tactile organ.57 The nerves receive the species emitted from the tangibles. Therefore, even if the organ of phantasy were drier than the cavity where the common sense is located, the former could easily receive the sensible species too since, no doubt, the organ of phantasy would be still moister than the partial organ of touch, sc. the nerves. Accordingly, its dryness cannot be a reason for denying its reception of species. As soon as the external

54 For their theory according to which the powers are mutually distinct and distinct from the soul only formaliter, see Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 2, q. 1, art. 2, p. 44–46. 55 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 286, p. 124–25. 56 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 287, 125. 57 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 6, art. 1, § 186, p. 108.

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senses perceive their sensibles, assuming the powers’ attention, the internal sense and the intellect perceive it and receive the species too. Moreover, even if we allow for a substantial diversity in the material dispositions of the brain parts, we would not be justified to conclude that this corresponds to a specific difference between the powers. Again, the comparison with the sense of touch is telling. Although touch is composed of various dispositions accordant with nerves, flesh and skin, all of these still constitute the sensorium of the single sense.58 From all of these critical replies to (2a)-(2c), the reply to (2d) is clear as well. One and the same power is moved by the same sensible species that represent the external objects that have been perceived by the external senses. Accordingly, the acts of the common sense and the phantasy are not adequate acts in a manner that would entail the existence of diverse sensory powers. Their acts are inadequate, i.e., they can be generated by one and the same power. They can be subsumed under the operations of the single power.59

Conclusion While it may seem that the doctrinal distinction between Fonseca’s and Mastri and Belluto’s theories is insignificant since it consists merely in the difference of a single power and, accordingly, that its systematic consequences are of no importance, the opposite is true. Contrary to Mastri and Belluto’s (and Suárez’s) theory, since it assumes a second internal sense, namely the distinct power of the phantasy, Fonseca’s view is significantly more open to the adoption of the Neoplatonic metaphysical axiom according to which the highest part of the lower faculty ‘touches’ on the lowest part of the higher faculty, whereby the former gets epistemologically elevated in its operations.60 It is symptomatic that Fonseca refers to this principle in the first section of the twenty-eighth question, in which he presents the arguments for his position, namely for the conclusion that not all the internal senses equally (proximately) concur with the agent intellect in the production of the intelligible species.61 In his later Isagoge philosophica he is even more explicit. There he stresses the functional proximity and connection of the human phantasy and the intellect by explicitly attributing proto-intellectual operations, such as the apprehension of incidental sensibles (material substances), perceptual judgments proceeding componendo and dividendo and discursive operations to the phantasy.62 All of this provides us with evidence that despite his reduction of the quartet of the internal senses, as we find it in Aquinas, Fonseca was not willing to abandon a typical doctrinal feature of Aquinas’s

58 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 288, p. 125. 59 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 5, § 289, p. 125. 60 For this principle, which is highly operative in Aquinas and Thomism, see Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, ch. 7, § 3, p. 79. For the importance and application of this principle in Aquinas, see B. Montagnes, ‘L´axiome de continuité chez Saint Thomas’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 52 (1968), pp. 201–21. 61 CMA V, c. 28, q. 7, s. 1, cols 1005F–6A. 62 Isagoge, c. 4 (Olyssipone: A. Alvarez, 1591), p. 21A.

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theory.63 Due to this proximity, in line with Aquinas, Fonseca endorses the theory of the elevated internal sense’s radius operandi in rational animals, as compared with that of nonrational animals. This can be a fortiori seen in the conclusions formulated by Mastri and Belluto (and, again, by Suárez), i.e., of those who advocate the theory of the single sense. Regarding judgments proceeding componendo and dividendo and discursive operations, both Mastri and Belluto and Suárez (in his Commentary on On the Soul), whom they often follow,64 are sure that the internal sense can produce these elevated operations neither in brutes nor in humans. Accordingly, both deny the relevance of Dionysius the Areopagite’s axiom in the field of the human internal sense’s radius operandi and approximate it to that of brutes, thereby ‘dualizing’ human nature.65

63 For Aquinas, see ST I, q. 78, art. 4, co., p. 256. For a rational seeing in humans (as substantially distinct from that of brutes) connected with the conception of rationality that transforms the operations of the sensory soul in Aquinas, as being contrasted with the additive view of rationality that leaves the acts of the sensory soul more or less unaffected through this rationality, see Dominik Perler, ‘Rational Seeing: Thomas Aquinas on Human Perception’, in Medieval Perceptual Puzzles. Theories of Sense Perception in the 13th and 14th Centuries, ed. by E. Băltuță (Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2020), pp. 213–37. 64 Marco Forlivesi, ‘Mastri, Bartolomeo’, in Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by M. Sgarbi (Cham: Springer, 2014), p. 6: ‘However, one should not believe that Mastri’s interpretation of Scotus’ thought was accepted without opposition. As stated above, this interpretation was a synthesis of the views of a minority line of Scotism and the positions of Francisco Suárez’. 65 Mastrius and Belluto, In libros de anima, d. 5, q. 8, art. 3, § 265, p. 121. For Suárez, see Commentaria una cum questionibus de libris Aristotelis De anima, II, d. 5, q. 6, n. 15, pp. 432 ff. It has been recently argued that the main rationale for the reduction of the internal senses is ‘associated with perceptual activity and the level of awareness implicated in this activity’ (Silva, Stop Making Sense(s), p. 66). I agree. However, this does not seem to be the whole story. For a number of reductionists this numerical diminution went hand in hand with a notable downplaying of the scope of the internal senses’s cognitive and affective functions in favour of intellectual and volitional operations. This no doubt bears upon a certain dualization which is supposed to back up the reasoning for the immortality of the human soul, as this was a hot issue in the scholastic philosophy of both the sixteenth and the seventeenth century.

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Section III

Fonseca’s Metaphysics in Context

Victor Sala s

Pedro da Fonseca on the Scope and Unity of Metaphysics

1. Introduction Pedro da Fonseca’s commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is a remarkable work, not least of all for its establishing a critical edition of the Greek text — a rare achievement for a commentary — together with a Latin translation but also, and perhaps more significantly, because of its presentation of the status quaestionis regarding the sundry metaphysical topics debated within the schools at the time. But Fonseca does not merely provide a disjointed catalogue of disputed questions. Rather, he introduces order where order is missing. Though the text of the Metaphysics is disparate and, one might say, haphazardly arranged, metaphysical science itself cannot admit such disarray, and it was to the elucidation of that science that Fonseca devoted his efforts. Systematic presentation, even when couched within the confines of a commentary, simply could not be avoided. It would have been relatively simple enough — even if daunting in other ways — to abandon the text of the Metaphysics and construct one’s own textual project. Such would be Francisco Suárez’s strategy in 1597 when he published his Disputationes metaphysicae. To follow that path, however, would be to abandon the commentarial project that had been the animating drive of the Conimbricenses, and which had been so dear to Fonseca. Thus, though forced to follow the circuitous route of the Aristotelian text, Fonseca did manage to forge a quasi-systematic presentation of metaphysical thought — however incomplete.1 Crucially, his systematizing efforts are at work when attempting to determine just what constitutes the subject matter of metaphysics, which question the fourth book of the Metaphysics occasions. In what follows I turn to Fonseca’s account of the scope and unity of metaphysics and argue that his conception of metaphysics,



1 On this matter, see Mário S. de Carvalho, ‘Tra Fonseca e Suárez: una metafisica incompiuta a Coimbra’, Quaestio, 9 (2009), pp. 41–59. Victor Salas  •  Sacred Heart Major Seminary Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 107-123 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131761

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like so many others throughout medieval and late scholasticism, is transcendental.2 Yet, as we shall see, when the Portuguese Jesuit attempts to articulate a unifying principle in terms of analogy, tensions begin to emerge.

2. The Scope of Metaphysics Fonseca’s first task — at least with respect to organizing a metaphysical science within the parameters of his commentarial project — is to determine what exactly constitutes the subject matter of metaphysics. While all (Aristotelian) sciences are alike in that they search for causes and first principles, what renders each distinct is its unique subject matter. Since metaphysics, as Aristotle explains, is the most general and universal of all the sciences, it would seem that its subject matter would be equally as universal.3 Yet, here the text of the Metaphysics is vague, which poses interpretive difficulties for the commentator. As is well known, Aristotle presents at least two different accounts of what constitutes the subject of metaphysics. In the fourth book of the Metaphysics we are told that being insofar as it is being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν) is the subject of metaphysics,4 whereas book six holds that separate substances (i.e., the gods) form the proper subject matter.5 Each interpretive tradition since late antiquity has had its own approach to the dilemma, but the debate became all the more acute in the Middle Ages with the famous dispute between Avicenna and Averroes.6 To compound the difficulty further, for the Christian thinker, such as Fonseca, relating God to metaphysics presented certain challenges. The creator-God is utterly unique and transcendent, and so to subsume God under any category — even one as sublime and expansive as being — would seem to threaten divine transcendence and reductively place the Creator on an equal footing with the created. Fonseca, like so many other Christian thinkers who had already confronted the question of metaphysics’ subject matter, was only too aware of what was theologically at stake in his determination of the question. Accordingly, he found himself in the following



2 As is well known, Jan Aertsen has made the claim that medieval metaphysics is constituted by various efforts to come to terms with the transcendental character of being. Fonseca is no exception to this. See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2012). 3 Metaph. IV, 1. 4 Metaph. IV, 1. 5 Metaph. VI, 1. 6 Albert Zimmermann’s work remains helpful for addressing the manner in which this debate unfolded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See his Ontologie oder Metaphysik? die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jarhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Leiden: Brill, 1965). A more current work that addresses these same issues is Olivier Boulnois’s Métaphysiques rebelles: Genèse et structures d’une science au Moyen Âge (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013). For a specific treatment of Aristotle’s metaphysical thought as it was received in the Arabic world, see Amos Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’ (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

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situation: first, he had to make sense of what the Aristotelian text teaches; second, he had to remain faithful to the Aristotelian principles at work within the text (especially the requirements for a science); third, he had to remain faithful to an overarching Christian theological vision; and, fourth, what he presented had to cohere with itself. Difficulties, as we shall see, emerge on this final point. In examining Metaphysics IV, Fonseca asks, ‘whether being [ens], inasmuch as it is common to God and to creatures, is the subject of metaphysics?’7 The importance of this question cannot be underestimated — nor can the answer that Fonseca gives it — for it asks nothing less than: can the chasm between the infinite and the finite be spanned by a single (human) science? In a certain sense, this is a question to which Fonseca already knows the answer. St Paul — to whom the Jesuit refers in his commentary8 — teaches in Romans 1:20 that the invisible things of God can be known from the visible things He has created. In other words, by faith, Fonseca holds that the human intellect, taking creation as its point of departure, can eventually arrive at a natural or, what is the same, scientific knowledge of God. But if one can have scientific knowledge of God on the basis of creation, this can only be on account of some sort of community between the two. For Fonseca, then, metaphysics must have as its subject matter being as is common to God and creatures, which subject would function as a middle term, so to speak, whereby a transition from creation to divinity can be achieved. To reject such a common subject, he thinks, would be to embrace equivocity and forsake all natural knowledge of God. 2.1 The Objections

Fonseca’s thesis is, as he himself knows, not without certain difficulties that must be overcome. Those difficulties were, in part, the reason why other thinkers advanced contrary theses (S = sententia), which Fonseca must also confront. He identifies four: the first thesis (S1) maintains that God is the proper subject matter; the second (S2) asserts that separate substance is the subject of metaphysics. The third (S3) argues that substance in common is the subject, and the fourth (S4) holds that the proper subject is finite being. Of these four theses, S4 advances the greatest theoretical challenge to Fonseca insofar as it establishes its position and its leverage on the basis of what is required for a science — as articulated in the Posterior Analytics.9 If metaphysical science, which considers being as common to God and creatures, is at all possible, then Fonseca’s response to S4 will be crucial. I therefore restrict my discussion to Fonseca’s treatment of S4. While the Jesuit does not attribute any specific patronage to S4, which holds that finite being is the subject matter of metaphysics, S4’s conclusion stands in close 7 CMA (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetnzeri, 1615–29; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), IV, c. 1, q. 1, col. 637: ‘Utrum ens, quatenus est commune Deo & creaturis, sit Metaphysicae subiectum’. 8 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 705A. 9 S1, S2, and S3 trade upon the etymology of the term ‘metaphysics’ and the need to establish a distinction between what both physics and metaphysics consider. For S1 see CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 1, cols 637–38; for S2 see cols 638–39; for S3 see cols 639–40.

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accord with Thomas Aquinas’s claim that ens commune (i.e., created being) is the subject matter of natural theology or, what is the same, metaphysics. God relates to metaphysics, not as falling under its subject, Thomas insists, but only as the transcendent creator-cause of its subject (i.e., ens commune).10 S4 itself marshals four arguments against Fonseca’s claim that being as common to God and creatures can serve as the subject of metaphysics. First, if being as common to God and creature were the subject of metaphysics, then metaphysics would attempt to arrive at some cause of being, for it is proper to every science to seek the cause of its subject.11 But if it were the case that being as common to God and creatures has a cause, then God would Himself have a cause, which is absurd. To deny that metaphysics pursues causes would simply be to abandon its scientific status. Certainly no one operating within the Aristotelian tradition, such as Fonseca, would be willing to undermine the scientific status of metaphysics. In order to preserve its scientific character, then, metaphysics must be restricted to a study of that which can admit of having a cause, namely, finite being.12 Second, and still arguing on the basis of metaphysics’ scientific status, S4 holds that if being common to God and creatures were the subject of metaphysics, then such being should have principles and passiones which could be demonstrated of that subject. But, again, it is incongruous with the nature of God that the divine being should have any principles or passiones. Therefore, it cannot be the case that being common to God and creatures is the subject of metaphysics, but only finite being.13 Third, S4 argues from the perspective of divine preeminence and transcendence. If it were the case that being as common to God and creature formed the subject of metaphysics, then there would be something ‘prior by nature’ to God (viz., the concept of being). But to admit that something can be ‘prior by nature’ to God would ultimately result in the elimination of divine transcendence or, what is the same, the reduction of God to the metaphysical plane of creation. From the theological perspective of a committed Christian thinker as Fonseca, such a conclusion would be abhorrent.14 Finally, S4 makes an interpretive maneuver and points out that immediately after Aristotle’s book-four claim that being as such is the subject matter of metaphysics, in book five the Stagirite subdivides such being into the ten categories. S4 takes this to mean that Aristotle intends to restrict the subject matter of metaphysics to finite

10 See Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4; In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, Prooem. 11 An. Post. I, 2. 12 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 1, col. 640F. 13 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 1, col. 641A. 14 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 1, col. 641B. This same kind of argument strategy persisted well beyond Fonseca. The seventeenth-century Jesuit Rodrigo de Arriaga, who goes so far to describe being as a ‘genus’, complains that so many are ‘scandalized’ when God and creature are ranked under the same category. See Rodrigo Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus (Lugduni: I. A. Huguetan & G. Barbier, 1669), Logica, disp. 11, sec. 9, n. 74 f. 186.

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being.15 Yet, almost in homage to Thomas Aquinas, Fonseca points out that some authors supporting S4 think that ‘God is not excluded from the consideration of this science’. Though God does not fall under the subject, they think He is treated as that subject’s ‘first cause and principle’.16 This, again, is similar to Aquinas’s position as found in both the preface to his Commentary on the Metaphysics and his Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate. Metaphysics, for the Dominican, is restricted to the study of ens commune, which is simply finite being, and only reaches God obliquely as its conclusion, that is, as the ultimate cause of created being.17 2.2 Fonseca’s Thesis

Despite the preceding arguments, which Fonseca thinks yield an overly restrictive subject for metaphysics, the Jesuit argues that being as common to God and creatures is in fact the adequate subject. In order to support his claim, Fonseca not only has to establish his thesis on its own terms; he also has to respond to the counter-positions of the four sententiae, especially those that S4 presents. Not surprisingly, Fonseca first appeals to the ‘common opinion’ of those who have purportedly maintained the same thesis as he, namely, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, Albertus Magnus, Averroes, Giles of Rome, John of Jandun, and Soncinas.18 How faithful an interpreter Fonseca is of these authorities can rightly be called into question but the strategy of citing authoritative support is not uncommon among scholastics. Be that as it may, Fonseca advances his thesis with four arguments, which we can sketch here briefly before moving onto a consideration of how he meets the objections S4 poses. What is important to note is that, though Fonseca does not explicitly advert to the term ‘transcendental’ in defending his thesis, transcendentality forms the foundation upon which the Jesuit crafts his understanding of being and thus of metaphysics itself. First, Fonseca turns to a transcendental consideration of the nature of being. That is the first and adequate subject of metaphysics, he argues, to which the most general attributes (maxime generales passiones) or properties are coordinate (conveniunt) or of which they can be demonstrated. If metaphysics, as Fonseca maintains, is concerned with being as common both to God and creature, then the attributes referenced would have to pertain to every being precisely insofar as it is being and not as this or that kind of being or on the basis of some categorial determination. While S4, we recall, argued that it would be absurd to claim that God has any passiones — presumably because God would then be a subjectum modified by those passiones — the Jesuit points out that the passiones he has in mind here are the ‘one, true, good, and

15 This maneuver is slightly disingenuous inasmuch as Aristotle did not operate with a positive conception of ‘infinite being,’ since only matter is infinite. 16 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 1, col. 641C–E: ‘Addunt tamen huius opinionis auctores, non propterea se excludere Deum a consideratione hius scientiae: fatentur enim in hac scientia vel maxime agi de Deo: caeterum non agi de illo, ut de re, quae contineatur sub eius subiecto, sed ut de prima illius causa, ac principio…’ 17 Cf. n. 10 supra. 18 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, col. 642A.

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[whatever] others of such kind’.19 But unity, truth, and goodness are simply the traditional transcendentals commonly discussed in scholastic metaphysics.20 That is, the passiones that metaphysics treats are not predicamental or categorial, which S4 mistakenly takes to be the case, but transcendental. As such, one can maintain without absurdity that these transcendental attributes pertain both to uncreated being and to created being whether incorporeal substance, substance in common, or finite being.21 Accordingly, being as common to God and creature, when considered from a transcendental perspective, can form the subject matter of metaphysics and, important for Fonseca’s Christian sensibilities, allows one to move from created to uncreated being. Second, Fonseca argues that the same conclusion can be drawn from the amplitude of natural cognition. Again, convinced of the theological claim that God can be known from creation, Fonseca holds that such a claim entails that being as common to God and creatures can be known by the ‘natural light’ of reason. Indeed, certain attributes (affectiones) that pertain to God and creature per se can be demonstrated of them, which demonstration does not pertain to any other science. The reason for this last claim stems from the fact that the other sciences examine being only insofar as it is contracted to a certain genus. Therefore it falls to metaphysics to investigate uncontracted being or, what is the same, being according to its transcendental structure, which is the most universal perspective possible. Interestingly Fonseca adds, ‘Nor is there discovered anything more common that would allow them [i.e., God and creature] to be treated’.22 Unlike later Jesuit scholastics, Fonseca halts metaphysical inquiry at the foot of transcendental being and does not turn first philosophy into a supertranscendental science, which would also include non-being or impossible being.23 I shall return to this last point momentarily. Third, Fonseca explains that metaphysics considers adequately ‘all parts of being’ (omnes partes entis) common to God and creatures. God and creatures are treated not as principles, causes, or properties, but rather as subjects of which certain properties are sought and demonstrated.24 Indeed, soon after giving the four arguments in support

19 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, col. 642C: ‘… ut unum verum, bonum, & si quae sunt aliae huiusmodi…’ 20 The traditional number of transcendentals is six and mnemonically captured by the term ‘reubau,’ which stands for res, ens, unum, bonum, aliquid, and veritas. See, e.g., Soto, Summulae, lib. 1, c. 6, n. 4 (Salamancae: Andrea de Portonariis, 1554). The locus classicus where Thomas Aquinas discusses these transcendental terms is De vertiate, q. 1, a. 1. Duns Scotus represents a dramatic development in transcendental theory with his addition of disjunctive transcendentals and pure perfections. Many thinkers in Baroque scholasticism, such as Suárez, rejected Scotus’s innovation and even reduced the traditional six transcendentals to three verum, bonum, and unum. For Suárez, see DM III, s. 2. n. 3. 21 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, cols 642 B–C. 22 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 2, col. 642 D: ‘Nec enim aliquid aliud commune reperitur, quod ab ea tractari possit’. 23 For late scholastic Jesuit accounts of supertranscendentality, see John P. Doyle, On the Border of Being and Knowing: Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being, ed. Victor M. Salas (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012). 24 CMA IV 4, c. 1, q. 1, sec. 2, col. 642E.

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of his own thesis, Fonseca goes on to point out that metaphysics not only treats God as the principle and universal cause of all things, but also as a subject of whom certain attributes can be demonstrated. What particular attributes he has in mind are not identified within the present context, but insofar as those attributes demonstrated of God follow upon being which is common to creatures as well, they could only be transcendental passiones. Moreover, further supporting the just-mentioned second argument, if metaphysics does not consider God absolutely or secundum se, then God would not be considered by the natural light of human understanding in any other science, which Fonseca complains is absurd.25 Once again Fonseca’s epistemological optimism regarding successful natural knowledge of God functions as a given in light of his theological commitments. Finally, Fonseca points out that, according to Aristotle, metaphysics, dialectics, and sophistics (sophistica) consider the same thing. But as dialectics and sophistics concern both created and uncreated things, so too does metaphysics. Fonseca again concludes that being, common to that which is created and uncreated, is the subject of metaphysics.26 2.3 Fonseca’s Response to the Objections

Having established that transcendental being, which is common to God and creatures, serves as the subject of metaphysics, Fonseca must now overcome the objections that the contrary theses — especially S4 — advanced. We recall that S4 argued against Fonseca’s thesis on the basis of what is required for a science, namely, that, as a science, metaphysics must pursue the principles and causes of its subject matter. If God were to fall under common being, then it would seem that one would be committed to the absurd claim that God has a cause.27 Not surprisingly, the Jesuit responds to the objection by marking a distinction with respect to what is meant by ‘cause.’ First (α), there is ‘cause properly said, the meaning of which is manifest’.28 Admittedly, Fonseca’s explanation here is terse, but, in light of the distinction that he will further make, what he seems to have in mind is ‘cause’ as bringing about the very being or existence of some effect. Second (β), ‘cause’ can be taken as an ‘a priori medium’ of demonstration. As an example of β, Fonseca tells us that God’s eternity and immutability can be demonstrated, not a posteriori from His relation to effects, but presumably a priori, from the fact that God is just being itself.29 In his Disputationes metaphysicae Francisco Suárez addresses the same objection that confronts Fonseca and marks the same distinction with respect to ‘cause.’ Suárez

25 CMA IV 4, c. 1, q. 1, sec. 2, col. 643D. 26 CMA IV 4, c. 1, q. 1, sec. 2, col. 642F. 27 Francisco Suárez, who, like Fonseca, thinks that common being is the subject of metaphysics faces the same objection as the Portuguese Jesuit. Suárez also offers a similar answer and capitalizes upon the same distinction that Fonseca draws. See Suárez, DM I, s.1, n. 29. 28 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 653D: ‘… duobus modis posse accipi nomen caussae: uno, pro caussa proprie dicta, quae significatio aperta est…’ 29 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 653D.

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describes this distinction as one that divides principles into those of being and those of cognition.30 These two kinds of principles map onto α and β respectively. When Aristotle claims that metaphysics pursues ‘causes,’ Fonseca understands ‘cause’ in the broad sense so as to involve not only α but also β.31 As such, S4’s objection that being as common to God and creatures cannot have a cause does not hold since certain attributes can in fact be demonstrated of God in terms of β. Here, the transcendental character of being comes into play, for unity, truth, and goodness, which are the first attributes of being, can in fact be demonstrated of God ‘to whom the nature [ratio] of being agrees maximally’.32 Indeed, Fonseca’s distinction between α and β and subsequent appeal to β likewise allow him to overcome the second objection (viz., that God cannot have principles or passiones) that S4 raises.33 Yet, one might object, as Fonseca notes, that ‘beings, insofar as they are beings, have a true cause…; therefore every being has a true cause, which is absurd’.34 Obviously, this objection trades upon an understanding of ‘cause’ in terms of α. So understood, the objection reasonably maintains that the conclusion is absurd because it would entail the consequence that God, precisely insofar as He is being, has a cause. Fonseca, in fact, also denies the consequence, but for different reasons. Only in an instance of univocal causality, he says, would it be the case that all beings have a cause on account of ‘indefinita reduplicativa’. In the case of analogically related beings, however, the same inference cannot be made. For example, while it is the case that all accidents, insofar as they are beings, depend upon substance, it is not the case that every being, precisely insofar as it is a being, also depends upon substance.35 Obviously, what is at stake here is the nature of analogy, to which I shall turn in the next section. With respect to the third objection that S4 levels against Fonseca, the Jesuit argues that to say that being as common to God and creature is ‘by nature’ prior to both misunderstands the nature of the ‘priority’ in question. The priority here is not a priority by nature but a conceptual priority. That is, when being (ens) is conceived, it is conceived confusedly (confuse) such that no specific grade of being is identified.36 Fonseca argues that transcendental being is not like a separate Platonic Idea in which both God and creature participate, for, ‘transcendentals are analogical, nor do they signify some singular nature, which would be common to God and the first genera

30 See DM I, s. 1, n. 29. 31 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 653E. 32 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 653E–F: ‘… etenim non solum de aliis rebus, sed etiam de Deo potest aliquid hoc modo per causam demonstrari, ut quod sit quiddam unum, verum, bonum: quae cum sint primae entis passiones, de quavis re per rationem entis demonstrari possunt, maxime aute[m] de Deo, cui maxime convenit ratio entis’. 33 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 654D. 34 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 654B: ‘Quod si quis obijciat, entia, quatenus entia, habent veram caussam, ut ais; igitur omnia entia habet veram causam, quod falsum est…’. 35 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 654B. 36 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 8, col. 655C.

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of beings’.37 Accordingly, the objection confuses an epistemic or cognitive priority with a metaphysical priority, which Fonseca rejects with respect to the subject matter of metaphysics. Finally, concerning S4’s last objection, Fonseca argues that Aristotle’s division of being into the categories in Metaphysics V is not meant as an exhaustive division of all being. As the Jesuit points out, there are many realities that are not properly placed under any of the categories, for example, differentiae, matter, substantial forms, motion, and many ‘other incomplete beings’ (alia entia incompleta). Nevertheless, all of these are contained under the subject of metaphysics. To maintain otherwise would be to hold that only finite and ‘complete’ being serves as the subject of metaphysics, which, Fonseca points out, no one wishes to argue.38 As such, S4 simply misreads Aristotle’s intentions in book five. Having articulated his position regarding the subject of metaphysics, at least two questions remain for Fonseca: First, if being under its most general consideration serves as the subject matter and thus unifying principle of metaphysics, is there any limit to the generality of being? That is, while Fonseca argues against overly restrictive accounts of metaphysics, is there any limit to the scope of metaphysics? Does metaphysics rightly consider beings of reason or being per accidens? Aristotle himself, after noting the various senses of being — among which included τὸ ὂν ὡς ἀληθές and τὸ ὂν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς — rejects these divisions of being and restricts metaphysics to an examination of being in the categories (i.e., real being).39 Medieval theologians were, by and large, content to follow Aristotle’s move and restricted metaphysical science to a study of real being.40 In short, as mentioned above, the question here is: should metaphysics, on Fonseca’s understanding, be construed as a transcendental or a supertranscendental science? Second, what is the nature of the unity of the being that serves as the subject matter of metaphysics? I have already alluded to the fact that Fonseca understands being as analogical, but the question now is: how does he construe such an analogy? Whatever the answer, it will be paramount for him to articulate an analogical understanding of being capable of embracing both God and creature, and which retains a unity sufficient to allow for metaphysical science. 2.4 Fonseca’s Rejection of Supertranscendentality

With respect to the first question regarding the extent of being, Fonseca himself is aware of the potential concern and raises a dubium whether or not ‘being most commonly taken’ (ens communissime sumpto) extends beyond real being so as also 37 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 4, col. 650A: ‘… transcendentia sunt analoga, nec naturam aliquam unam significant, quae communis sit Deo & primis generibus entium…’ 38 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 6, col. 652A-C. 39 Aristotle Metaphysics 6.2.1026a33–1026b2. 40 Thinkers after Suárez (e.g., Hurtado de Mendoza) were content to subsume even ens per accidens and ens rationis under the adequate object of metaphysics. See Hurtado, Universa Philosophia (Lugduni: L. Prost, 1624), Metaphysica, d. 1, s. 2, ss. 1, n. 51.

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to include being per accidens and beings of reason.41 If it is the case that being so abstractly taken does include being per accidens and entia rationis, is it the case that they would also fall under the subject matter of metaphysics? Again, that is to say, should metaphysics be construed as a supertranscendental science? Though the Jesuit does not advert to the term ‘supertranscendental’ within the present context of establishing the subject of metaphysics, he does discuss the nature of supertranscendental terms in his Institutionem dialecticarum libri octo.42 Beyond the six traditional, transcendental terms (ens, unum, verum, bonum, aliquid, and res), Fonseca explains that there remain those ‘which are called by recent authors supertranscendentals, as the opinable, thinkable, apprehensible, and if there are others, which are not only of all true things, but also of anything whatsoever that true affirmation can be made’.43 Cognoscibility, to which Fonseca here alludes, is the chief hallmark of supertranscendentals which later scholastic authors, such as Antonio Bernaldo de Quiros44 and Maximilian Wietrowski45 — to name only a few — would go on to make explicit.46 In considering the dubium Fonseca examines several arguments in favor of expanding being most commonly taken beyond real being. The seventh and final argument argues precisely in terms of cognoscibility: If metaphysics is wisdom simpliciter, it should not ignore those things that can be known by a certain cognition: but beings per accidens and those which are called of reason, can fall under a certain cognition, at least in common: therefore there is no doubt, in fact that the subject of metaphysics encompasses all beings, not only [being] per accidens but also [beings] of reason.47 Nevertheless, Fonseca rejects the idea that being per accidens and entia rationis fall under the subject of metaphysics. He is clear: ‘the subject of metaphysics is being per

41 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 645B. 42 Jan Aertsen complains about the uncertain provenance of the term ‘supertranscendental’ and wonders who its proponents were. See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought, p. 636. Nevertheless, as Aertsen himself points out Domingo de Soto also adverts to the notion of supertranscendentality. More recently, the work of Claus Andersen has discovered the term in Pere Daguí’s Tractatus de differentia. See Pere Daguí, Tractatus Formalitatum Brevis/ Tractatus de Differentia, Bibliotheca Philosophorum Medii Aevi Catalonae, ed. Claus A. Andersen (Barcelona: Santa Coloma de Queralt, 2018), p. 120. 43 See Fonseca, Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo (Coloniae: apud Maternum Cholinum, 1586, f. 48), I, c. 28: ‘Reliqua iuxta hanc sententiam sunt non tra[n]scentia: in quibus numerantur ea, quae a recentioribus dicuntur supertranscendentia, ut Opinabile, Cogitabile, Apprehensibile, et si quae sunt alia, quae non tantum de omnibus rebus veris, sed etiam de quibuscunque aliis vere affirmantur’. 44 Antonio Bernaldo de Quiros, Opus philosophicum (Lugduni: Philippe Borde, 1666, f. 65), tr. 2, pars 1 de prooem. Log., d. 10, s. 8. 45 Maximilian Wietrowski, Philosophia disputata (Pragae: Typis Univ. Car. Ferd., 1697), pars I, Ex Logica, Concl. 13, c. 2, § 1, n. 251, f. 83. 46 Again, see Doyle, On the Border of Being and Knowing. 47 CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 646C: ‘Si Metaphys[ica] est sapiens simpliciter, non ignorare ea debet, quae certa cognitione sciri possunt: at entia per accidens, & quae rationis vocantur, sub certam cognitionem cadere possunt, saltem in commune: non est igitur dubium, quin subiectu[m] Metaphysici complectatur entia omnia, cum per accidens, tum etiam rationis’.

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se, and real’.48 His position is in keeping with what the vast majority of the preceding tradition had held,49 and it would also be followed by Suárez.50 Interestingly, Fonseca does not deny the counter-position’s claim that being taken most commonly includes both being per accidens and entia rationis. Also, he does not deny the further claim that analogy extends to the latter two as well. Rather, what Fonseca rejects is the notion that ens communissime sumpto can be the subject of metaphysics and that that analogy which ranges over such being is broader (latius) than that analogy which pertains to the subject of metaphysics.51 What is at issue here is a metaphorical analogy (analogia per translationem) that is different, as we shall soon see, from the analogy that pertains to the subject of metaphysics.52 Be that as it may, curiously, Fonseca never directly addresses the counter-position’s appeal to a cognitive community that obtains between real being and entia rationis which could serve as the subject of metaphysics. Suárez, however, supplies a more direct response to this very issue. Like Fonseca, Suárez holds that the adequate subject of metaphysics is ens in quantum ens reale from which being per accidens and entia rationis are excluded.53 He also faces the same counter-position as Fonseca, namely, that ens abstractissime sumptum — which includes entia rationis — serves as the subject of metaphysics.54 Against that claim, however, Suárez argues that beings of reason are not actually knowable per se — for they are not ‘true beings’ — but, rather, only in relation to true or real being.55 Accordingly, beings of reason and real being do not share the same ratio, which ratio could then serve as a subject for a supertranscendental science.56 Just as much as Fonseca, Suárez is committed to a transcendental metaphysics that has real being as it subject matter. The two Jesuits disagree, however, concerning the nature of the unity of such being, which leads us to the second question (raised above) regarding analogy.

3. The Unity of Metaphysics: Analogy Given that one of the requirements for an Aristotelian science is that its subject matter has sufficient unity, establishing the nature of the unity of being was of paramount importance for medieval metaphysicians.57 They typically had recourse either to univocity — championed chiefly by the Scotists — or analogy. With some exceptions, most thinkers dismissed the claim that being is equivocal for

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 648C: ‘subiectum Metaphysicae esse ens per se, ac reale…’ CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 646E. See, e.g., DM I s.1, n. 26. CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, col. 647E. CMA IV, c. 1, q. 1, s. 3, cols 647F–648A. DM I, s.1, n. 26. DM I, s.1, n. 2. DM LIV, proem. 1. DM LIV, s.1, n. 9. Metaph. III, 2.

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the reason that, given such a presupposition, nothing could then be known about God from creation.58 Univocity, however, approached the opposite end of the spectrum in Fonseca’s estimation, since it committed one to the claim that being is a genus.59 No doubt, Scotists would have ready responses to such an objection since Scotus himself, while maintaining univocity, also rejected the idea of being as a genus.60 Later Jesuit scholastics, such as Rodrigo de Arriaga, would have no problem with the claim that being is a genus.61 Be that as it may, owing to limitation in space, I must pass over Fonseca’s critique of univocity to focus instead on his account of analogy. Almost as contentious as the debate between univocity and analogy was the debate over the nature of analogy. Since the appearance of Cajetan’s De nominum analogia (1498), the distinction between an analogy of attribution and that of proportionality formed the dominant backdrop against which late scholastics would develop their competing analogical theories. Fonseca, with some minor differences, follows Cajetan’s distinctions on the matter but is especially attuned to the original Greek meaning of ἀναλογία, which signified a four-term proportional relationship.62 The Jesuit points out that within the Latin schools, the term ‘analogia’ is used not only to signify the same proportional relationship as ἀναλογία, but also the πρός ἐν relations that Boethius had spelled out in terms of relations ‘ad unum’, ‘ab uno’, ‘similitudo’, and ‘proportio’.63 Interestingly, Fonseca confesses that Aristotle himself never referred to those relations of attribution in terms of ‘analogy.’64 Accordingly, the Latin ‘analogia’ is broader in extension than the Greek ἀναλογία, for, as Fonseca points out, ‘analogia’ embraces all the divisions that fall under aequivoca concilio. Aequivoca concilio, as Boethius explains, are not so signified by chance, as is the case with aequivoca casu, but on the basis of some sort of relationship.65 The question, then, is: what is the nature of the relations that give rise to analogical terms? This question becomes all the more acute when the concept of being is at stake.

58 Thomas Aquinas himself articulates this objection in his Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 5. See CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 3, col. 694F. 59 Fonseca thinks, for example, that if the concept of being were univocal, then being would be a genus, which is a problematic conclusion. ‘Si ens esset univocum, necessario esset genus, atq[ue] non potest esse genus, no[n] est igitur univocum…(col. 696A)’. For Scotus, univocity functions at the conceptual level as is clear from his definition of univocal concepts. Being itself, however, is not, for Scotus, univocal and much less is it a genus. See Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 26. 60 See John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 113. In that passage Duns Scotus gives a transcendental explication of being that makes clear being is ‘outside of every genus’. 61 See Rodrigo Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus (Lugduni: I. A. Huguetan & G. Barbier, 1669), Logica, d. 11, s. 9, n. 77, f. 187. 62 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 702A. 63 For a discussion of these distinctions see Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, PL, 64 (col. 166B-C); see also Joseph Owens, On the Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), c. 3. 64 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 702A. 65 Institutionum I, c. 20, f. 33.

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3.1 Divisions of Analogy

Before addressing the nature of the analogia entis, Fonseca first marks important differences between analogies of attribution and of proportion. Apart from the terminological differences just mentioned, Fonseca points out that in the case of attribution there is always presupposed one and the same ratio by which the other analogates are so designated (nominentur).66 But, that ratio pertains chiefly or principally to one of the analogates and only derivatively or secondarily to the rest. The Jesuit cites the familiar examples of ‘health’ (sanum) and ‘medical’ (medicus) that Aristotle had introduced in the Metaphysics. Something is called ‘healthy’ with respect to an animal, the subject of health, or something is called ‘medical’ with respect to a physician. In both cases, the animal and the physician function as ‘prime analogates’ (principale significatum) to which the other analogates stand in some ordered relation on account of which the latter are also signified as ‘healthy’ or ‘medical’ respectively.67 Following Thomas Aquinas, Fonseca remarks that an analogy of attribution occurs in two ways: an analogy of ‘one to another’ (unius ad alterum) and an analogy of ‘two to a third’ (duorum ad tertium).68 Regarding the first, the ‘another’ (alter) functions as the prime analogate to which the ‘one’ (unus) refers. To use Aquinas’s example, ‘healthy’ is predicated of both ‘medicine’ and an ‘animal’ insofar as medicine is related as a cause (of health) to the animal. With respect to an analogy of two to a third, one can similarly consider ‘healthy’ in relation to urine and medicine relative to a body. Here, urine (a sign of health) and medicine (a cause of health) both relate — albeit diversely — to the health of body.69 In contrast to attribution, an analogy of proportion does not involve diverse relations to some one and the same ratio or prime analogate. To use Fonseca’s example, ‘principium’ can be said of a principle of nature, a beginning of time, the start of a path, etc. It is not the case that the start of a path, for example, is called a ‘principium’ because of a subordinate relationship to some one and the same analogical ratio of principiatum found in a prime analogate. Nor is it the case that any of the principia is less a principium than the others. In short, with proportion no prime analogate exists in relation to which the other analogates are denominated.70 Given the dynamics relative both to analogies of attribution and of proportion, it is not surprising that another point of distinction between the two is that formal perfection signified by the analogy is intrinsic to all the analogates involved in proportion but not all the analogates in attribution. In an analogy of attribution, the formal perfection exists intrinsically only in the prime analogate and the others are designated according to an extrinsic denomination. To return to our example, the ratio of health exists as an intrinsic quality of an animal, but food, urine, medicine, 66 67 68 69 70

CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 702C–D. CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 702C. CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 702F; for Thomas Aquinas see Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 5. CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 703A–B.

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air, are all called ‘healthy’ only in relation to the animal as that which sustains, is a sign of, or causes health.71 Such extrinsic denomination is not at play in proportion, however, since the form signified exists intrinsically within each analogate: ‘For principle signifies the nature of a principle existing in everything, which is called a principle…’72 Fonseca also observes that while in analogies of attribution the primary analogate necessarily enters into the definition of the other analogates, such is not the case with respect to an analogy of proportion. In an analogy of attribution an animal’s pulse, for example, is defined as healthy precisely with respect to the animal itself (i.e., the prime analogate). But in an analogy of proportion the other proportional relations do not enter into the definition of a particular analogical structure. Thus, the start (principium) of time, for instance, is not defined by the starting point (principium) of a journey or vice versa. Finally, and important for the manner in which Fonseca will spell out his understanding of the analogy of being, it must be pointed out that, at times, both proportion and analogy can be integrated. For example, ‘ridens’ is analogical according to proportion in relation to a human being, a meadow, and fortune. But a meadow and fortune are said to smile (ridere) because they imitate a human being’s smile, which is to say, there is a relation of attribution relative to a prime analogate: the smiling person.73 3.2 The Analogy of Being

Having established these key differences between analogies of attribution and of proportion, the question now is: in what manner is real being as common both to God and creatures (i.e., the subject of metaphysics) analogical? Or, what is the same, what manner of unity obtains within being such that it can serve as the subject of an Aristotelian science? After presenting a number of arguments why being cannot be analogical according to attribution based on exigencies of attribution itself, Fonseca explains that being is actually analogical according to both attribution and proportion.74 His theory seems to be a synthesis of what Cajetan (who favors proper proportionality over attribution75) and Suárez (who rejects proper proportionality and adopts attribution76) espouse. That being is analogous according to proportion is easily established, Fonseca thinks, since clearly as God stands in relation to His being, so does a created substance stand in relation to its being. Curiously, Fonseca admits that such a proportional relation

71 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 703D–E. 72 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 703E: ‘Nam principium significat naturam principia existentem in omnibus, quae dicuntur principia…’ 73 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 703C. 74 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 6, col. 705B. 75 See Cajetan, De nominum analogia, c. 3. 76 See DM XXVIII, s. 3, n. 16.

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even exists between real being and beings of reason.77 ‘For neither are beings of reason less dependent upon real being, than accidents upon substance’.78 Locating beings of reason within an analogy of proportion, however, is curious for two reasons. First, the analogical unity of being is meant to accommodate the demand for that unity which metaphysics, as a science, requires. In extending analogy to entia rationis it would seem that Fonseca has surreptitiously included beings of reason into the scope of metaphysics. At the very least, in extending analogy to entia rationis Fonseca no longer seems to have a principled means of excluding them from the subject of metaphysics. Second, unlike attribution, proportion designates a form that is intrinsic to the analogates, a claim that Fonseca reaffirms in the present context.79 But how can that which is nothing (i.e., entia rationis) be the subject of an inherent form?80 Be that as it may, with respect to God and creature, Fonseca maintains that being is analogical according to proportion and attribution. Created being is no less dependent upon God as upon an exemplar, efficient, and final cause than an accident is dependent upon created substance for its own being. Yet, accidents depend upon substance for their being through attribution in the same way that a created being depends upon God, ‘for it [the creature] would not be a being unless through attribution to [God]’.81 Accordingly, being is also said to be analogical according to an attribution of ‘one to another’ insofar as creatures participate in God. Being is attributed to God according to His very essence but to creatures only through participation.82 As Fonseca sees it, proportion follows from attribution. When ‘being’ is said of God, it is said of Him per essentiam signifying the totality of what God’s essence is. Unlike God, creatures do not enjoy being per essentiam but per participationem and, therefore, through attribution to God. Each and every creature, through its participation in God, shares some likeness — however remote — to the fullness of being that God is per essentiam. Fonseca concludes, ‘It is clear, being [ens] is analogical with respect to God and creatures through an attribution of one to another’.83 Through an analogy of attribution, creatures are ‘extrinsically denominated’ ‘being’ with respect to God, 77 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 705C–D: ‘qua denique ratione entia realia, eadem quoque entia rationis, est enim in omnibus aequa proportio: quamvis res ipsae, & ipsae entia existentiae per se sumptae diversae admodum sint’. 78 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s, 7, col. 706E: ‘Neque enim entia rationis minus pendent ab ente reali, quam accidentia a substantia’. 79 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 705E: ‘entitas autem, quae est forma nomine entis significata, necessario inest omnibus entibus, igitur omnia entia, quatenus entia sunt, conveniunt secu[n]dum analogiam proportionis’. 80 While it might be pointed out that Suárez also extends an analogy of proportion to both ens reale and entia rationis (cf. DM LIV, s. 1, n. 9), proportion, for the Doctor eximius, is entirely extrinsic. That is, the analogy of being, on the Suárezian view, is constituted by an intrinsic analogy of attribution from which entia rationis are excluded. 81 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 706F: ‘… accidens ita pendet a substantia creata, ut sit ens per attributionem ad substantiam, igitur & ens creatum ita pendebit a Deo, ut non sit ens, nisi per attributionem ad illum’. 82 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 707E. 83 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 707E: ‘Ita patet, ens esse analogum respect Dei, & creaturae per attributionem unius ad alterum’.

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who is their final, efficient, and exemplar cause. But creatures are also called ‘being’ through proportion to God, who formally and essentially enjoys His own being, while creatures enjoy being according to their own proper modes. Again reinforcing the primacy of attribution, Fonseca argues that creatures and God agree according to proportion only because creatures relate to God through an attribution of one to another.84 He is clear: ‘the analogy of attribution precedes the analogy of proportion’.85 Yet, a tension seems to emerge in according primacy to attribution. Proportion, which involves the intrinsic possession of some analogical ratio, is ultimately resolved in terms of attribution, which Fonseca, following Cajetan, admits is a matter of extrinsic attribution. How can that which is intrinsic (proportion) be predicated upon that which is merely extrinsic (attribution)? Indeed, the very example that Fonseca cites (viz., pedalitas) to establish the interconnection between proportion and attribution reinforces the extrinsic character of attribution, which itself involves an extrinsic form of proportion. Proportion is always discovered with an attribution of one to another, holds the Jesuit. As a foot (pes) is with respect to an animal, so is it proportionally with respect to a couch (lectus). In that proportional relation there is simultaneously thought a relation of imitation between the foot of a couch and that of an animal. The former imitates the latter, which is to say, it enters into a relation of attribution. But more than that, Fonseca holds that the form signified by ‘pedalitas’ exists intrinsically within both the animal and the couch. Two points need to be made here. First, it is not clear if the intrinsic character of the form is a function of attribution or proportion. The comments Fonseca makes in his inference regarding how entitas is in creatures through extrinsic denomination owing to attribution would seem to support the claim that the intrinsic character of pedalitas is a function of proportionality. Second, and following from the first, the fact that a couch is an ens per accidens which lacks any per se nature or unity makes it difficult to understand how pedalitas could even exist as an intrinsic form according to proportion. In short, Fonseca’s understanding of the analogical relationship between proportion and attribution vis-à-vis the God-creature relationship seems to be predicated on a purely extrinsic structure. We have already seen the extrinsic character at play in the example of ridere. A smiling flower is said to imitate a smiling face through attribution, on account of which the proportional analogy exists. But ‘smiling’ does not exist intrinsically in a flower. Therein is the difficulty: how can the fundamentally intrinsic reality of being be determined in its analogical unity according to a purely extrinsic dynamic? Is it any wonder, then, that Fonseca would seem to admit beings of reason, which are extrinsically denominated in relationship to a knower, into a proportional analogy? If the basis of analogy is not an intrinsic principle, then what is to prevent metaphysics from sliding into the realm of extrinsic relations, the culmination of which is cognoscibility? Yet, if cognoscibility provides the analogically unifying structure of metaphysics, what is to prevent its lapse into supertranscendentality?

84 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 708E. 85 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 1, s. 7, col. 708F: ‘… analogiam attributionis praecedere analogiam proportionis’.

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4. Conclusion In the end, there remain tensions within Fonseca’s account of the scope and unity of metaphysics. In keeping with the tradition that preceded him, the Jesuit intended to preserve metaphysics as a real, transcendental science. It was for the sake of accommodating the scientific requirements of metaphysics that Fonseca had recourse to analogy as a means of securing a much-needed unity. But, here, in attempting to balance the competing accounts of analogy, Fonseca appears to break with the traditional understanding of the different kinds of analogy and their role in unifying being. Is Fonseca not simply reinventing the meaning of attribution and proportion or at the very least overlooking a number of their defining features? If attribution can function in an intrinsic manner — as it does in Aquinas’s mature writings,86 as well as with Suárez87 — then why is proportion still required? Would it not be more economical simply to do away with proportion? Whatever the case, perhaps the divergent strands of philosophical perspectives on the Aristotelian metaphysics proved too much for Fonseca to address within the confines of a commentary, even one as magnificent as his. The Jesuit knew what general position he wanted to maintain: that is, a realist, transcendental metaphysics. But the problem of how to maintain it and simultaneously balance the dynamics of metaphysical science, remained. Fonseca, who was certainly well aware of supertranscendentality, had no desire to move metaphysics in that direction. He restricted the subject matter of metaphysics to real being as common to God and creature. But in articulating the unity of that analogy, he left a door open to supertranscendentality. If analogy is built upon an extrinsic denomination, then it can no longer claim to be moored to the real structures of being. The structure of metaphysics was stressed, and, as the history of later scholastic metaphysics shows, eventually buckled.88

86 Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles I, c. 34; De potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 7; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 5. 87 DM XXVIII, s. 3, nn. 16–17. 88 See John P. Doyle, On the Borders of Being and Knowing (Ithaca-New York: Cornell University Press, 2012) for detailed history of the manner in which Jesuit scholastic metaphysics eventually transformed into a supertranscendental science.

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Fonseca on Categorical Relations

1. Context Fonseca could not ignore the long tradition dating back to Aristotle. Aristotle’s work is the main background text for the discussion of relatives. Anyway, he could not help confronting the main discussions held in the late Middle Ages and still standing during his lifetime. Many medieval authors discussed the questions related to the category of relation in a theological context. One of the classic places was precisely the commentary on the first of Peter Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences.1 This tradition continues until the seventeenth century, mainly in Theology faculties. In Fonseca’s time, the revival of Aristotelian studies emphasised the practice of the commentary on Aristotle’s works on logic and metaphysics.

2. Terminology In the late sixteenth century, several terms were used to refer to the category of relation: the Latin translation of the Aristotelian term pros ti, ad aliquid (toward something,



1 A good overview can be obtained in Jeffrey Brower, ‘Medieval Theories of Relations’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), ed. By Edward N. Zalta, URL = and Mark Henninger, Relations: Theories 1250–1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). See also the special issue on Relations in the Medieval Traditions of Logic and Metaphysics, ed. by John Marenbon in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24: 3 (2016), as well as Marenbon, ‘Relations in Earlier Medieval Latin Philosophy: Against the Standard Account’, Enrahonar, 61 (2018), pp. 41–58. On the ‘invention’ and discussion of the ontological status of categorical relations in 12th century see Christopher Martin,, ‘The Invention of Relations: Early Twelfth-Century Discussions of Aristotle’s Account of Relatives’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24:3 (2016), pp. 447–67. For the theological context with special attention to Fonseca and Suárez, see Thomas Marschler, Die spekulative Trinitätslehre des Francisco Suárez S. J. in ihrem philosophisch-theologischen Kontext (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007). António Manuel Martins  •  Universidade de Coimbra https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0383-8397 Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 125-143 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131762

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that which is to something), relative (relatiuum) and relation (relatio). In the Institutiones Dialecticae (II, 13) Fonseca briefly explains the meaning of the notion of ‘relation’, as it appears in the text of Categories VII. He lists the main types of relatives and points out the three properties of relative things. First: ‘all things are said to be related to those that convert with them’; second: ‘everything relative is simultaneous, naturally, to what it refers to’; third: everything relative is of such a nature that, if you know yourself, you will also know what you are referring to, and vice versa.2 Fonseca ends his brief explanation of relatives according to Categories VII with an endnote using the common medieval distinction between relations merely according to speech (relata secundum dici) and relations according to nature or being (relata secundum esse). Only the relatives according to nature belong to the latter. All the other relatives that can be explained by some relation, are not relatives without qualification only as they can be qualified so according to speech.3 The approach to the relatives in the second volume of Fonseca’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, published in Rome in 1589,4 is far more detailed and systematic. It has its natural place in the six quaestiones discussed after the commentary to the text of Metaphysics V, 15. The text focuses on explaining relatives exploring the existence of real relations as the first hypothesis. In this first question, Fonseca clarifies the current terminology and the traditional distinctions between relatives secundum dici and secundum esse, transcendent and non-transcendent, mutual and non-mutual.5 This issue is the most important one because it lays the theoretical basis for all the debate in questions two to six. Before we move on to a more detailed analysis of the first question, we shall list the titles of questions two to six. After explaining the meaning of the principal terms used in this theoretical context (relation, relative, correlative, extreme/subject, foundation, grounding reason, terminus6) in the first question, Fonseca asks, in the

2 Institutionum II, 13 (Coloniae: Colinus, 1591), p. 75. 3 Institutionum II, 13, p. 76: ‘Alia sunt, quae relatione aliqua explicantur, ipsa tamen ad hoc praedicamentum non pertinent. Atque hæc a Dialecticis relata quidem appellantur, uerum non simpliciter, ac proprie, sed cum adiectione, relata secundum dici, quasi dicas, quo ad naturae explicationem duntaxat, non quo ad ipsam naturam: qualia sunt, habitus, scientia, et alia huiusmodi’. 4 CMA (vol. 1, Romae: apud Franciscum Zanettium et Bartolomaeum Tosium, 1587; vol. 2, Romae: ex Officia Iacobi Tornerij, 1589). As many readers still use the Cologne edition (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetnzeri, 1615; repr. Olms Verlag, 1964) more often, I posted a correspondence table between the pages of these two editions for easier identification in an appendix. 5 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1: ‘Num dentur relationes reales’ (8 sections), pp. 680–94. 6 Fonseca gives in section 3 of the first question (CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 3, p. 684) a very brief description of the terminology used in this theoretical context: 1. ‘relation (relatio) is that for which reason something is related’ (relatio dicitur id quo aliquid formaliter refertur); 2. ‘relative is what is usually explained by a relation to other’ (relatiuum, lato accepto uocabulo, dicitur id, quod explicari solet relatione ad aliud); 3. ‘correlative is the relative corresponding to another relative’ (correlatiuum est relatiuum quodlibet quatenus alteri relatiuo ex altera parte respondet, ut pater filii et filius patris); 4. ‘Extreme/subject is what is designated by the relation’ (extremum, quod etiam subiectum dicitur, est id quod a relatione denominator - Fonseca notes that the term subject is adequate just in those cases where the first category is involved. Otherwise one should use extreme (extremum) as the proper term. 5. Ground (fundamentum) explains why the extreme/subject is related (fundamentum est id

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next question (q. 2), how to distinguish real relations and foundation.7 He analyses six theses on this topic, eventually accepting the sixth opinion already defended by Javellus and Soto. The next issue has to do with the nature of relations. The question (q. 3) is whether relations are the perfection of anything.8 The existence of relations implies termini (the other things towards which they are). What is not clear is if the terminus of a relation must be absolute or not. This is a long debate between followers of Aquinas and followers of Duns Scotus that Fonseca resumes in question 4.9 The next question (q. 5) is about the individuation of relations:10 are there simultaneously several relations in the same subject or just one? The last question discussed by Fonseca in this context will be: is there any supreme genus under a categorical relation?11 Let’s compare Fonseca’s text on the category of relation with the treatment of the same issue in authors who preceded it in the sixteenth century and in some of those who wrote shortly afterwards from a purely quantitative point of view. We can say that Fonseca’s approach is one of the most extensive and robust. Among the authors who wrote texts more directly related to Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics before Fonseca, we shall mention the following: Chrysostomus Javellus, Paulus Barbus (Soncinas), Philipp Melanchthon, Agostino Nifo, Domingo Soto, Franciscus Toletus. Of all these authors, Fonseca is the one who dedicates the largest number of pages (the equivalent of a small book) to the discussion of categorical relations.12 Suárez’s best-known discussion of categorical relatives corresponds to metaphysical Disputation 47 of his widely known Metaphysical Disputations.13 Analysing the first German edition, published in 1600, we realise that Disputation 47 occupies 58 large

quod extremo seu subiecto est causa ut referatur); 6. Grounding reason (ratio fundandi) or reason of founding, is a sine qua non condition of the relationship, given its foundation. For this reason, it was also designated by many as a proximate foundation; 7. The terminus, finally, is the other thing toward which the relation tends (id ad quod relatiuum directo ac primo refertur). 7 CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, pp. 694–705: ‘Quo pacto relatio realis distinguatur a fundamento’ (7 sections). 8 CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, pp. 706–10: ‘Sint ne relationes perfectiones aliquae rerum’(3 sections). 9 CMA V, c. 15, q. 4, pp. 710–25: ‘Terminentur ne relations terminis absolutis an relatiuis’ (7 sections). 10 CMA V, c. 15, q. 5, pp. 726–32: ‘Num idem relatiuum una numero relatione na pluribus ad plura referatur’ (3 sections). 11 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, pp. 732–43: ‘Detur ne in hoc praedicamento genus summus’(6 sections). 12 Fonseca’s treatise on relations occupies 60 pages in the second volume of his Commentary (CMA II, pp. 681–42). This contrasts with Javellus’s nine pages: In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita (Venetiis: Bonellus, 1555), pp. 117–26; Soncinas 13 pages of his Quaestiones metaphysicales (Lugdunii: c. Pesnot, 1579), pp. 76–89; the near 10 pages of Philip Melanchthon’s in his Erotemata dialectices, continentia fere integram artem, ita scripta, ut iuventuti utiliter proponi possint (Vitebergae: ex officina Iohannis Lufft, 1548), ff. 29–39; the 8 pages of Agostino Nifo work on Metaphysics, Dilucidarium Metaphysicarum Disputationum (Venetiis: H. Scotum, 1560), pp. 148–56; Domingo de Soto’s 13 pages in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias commentaria (Venetiis: Guerraei, 1573), pp. 203–16; and with Toletus 8 pages of his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, In librum Cathegoriarum Aristotelis (Venetiis: Juntas, 1580), pp. 70–78. 13 For a useful edition of the translated Latin text, see: Francisco Suárez, On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica. XLVII), trans. by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006).

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pages.14 A few years after the publication of Suárez’s Disputationes, Rubio publishes a lengthy treatise on the category of relation — 96 pages — in the Cologne edition of his Logica Mexicana.15 The widely known commentary on Aristotle’s Logic by the Conimbricenses, published shortly after, discusses the issues connected with this category over three quaestiones (22 pages).16

3. Fonseca’s Realism about Relations Fonseca deals with relations from a philosophical point of view, specifically in the framework of metaphysics. Therefore, the first thesis that should be confronted is the one of those who deny the existence of real relations. The reason why is simple. If the reasons given are convincing, it means that there is no place, in metaphysics, for a chapter on relations. If, on the contrary, there are real relations, it is appropriate to explain their nature thoroughly since their ontological status may offer some difficulties in understanding. The main one would be that relations have a minimal or very tenuous degree of entity.17 The very simplicity of the notion makes it hard to be grasped. Fonseca briefly presents five arguments supporting the thesis of those who deny the existence of real relations. The first one is semantic. If a relation signifies a comparison, it is evident that it cannot occur without any intellect’s intervention. The second argument revolves around the notion that a real relation implies an extra-mental effective cause. Playing with Aristotle’s contention that there is no motion in respect of relation (224b11) the argument goes on to infer that it is impossible to name an efficient cause in relations such as resemblance or equality.18 The following two statements also play with the notion of cause and examples of similarity and

14 DM (Moguntiae: Lippius, 1600), II, pp. 540–99. 15 Antonio Rubio, Logica Mexicana siue Commentarii in universam Aristotelis Logicam (Colonia Agrippina: Mylius, 1605), cols 950–1139. This amounts to 95 pages approximately. The first edition was published in Spain two years before, with the title: Commentarii in universam Aristotelis dialecticam una cum dubiis et quaestionibus hac tempestate agitare solitis in duas partes distributi: par prior, cum duplici indice (Compluti: ex Officina Iusti Sanchez Crespo, 1603). 16 Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagirita (Conimbricae: ex Officina Didaci Gomez Loureyro, 1606), pp. 337–59. 17 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 1, p. 680: ‘Si enim nulla est relatio, quae ab operatione intellectus non pendeat, ea paucis explicata, quod nec per se in Praedicamentorum ordines redigatur, nec a primo Philosopho nisi quasi per transennam tractanda sit, ad alia huius scientiae magis propria properandum erit. Quod si re uera dantur relationes reales, operae pretium erit in earum explicatione aliquantulum immorari; praesertim cum ipsa relationum natura tenuis admodum entitatis sit, et quae uix cadat sub intelletus aciem’. 18 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 1, p. 681: ‘Deinde, quia si relatio aliqua esset realis, haberet sane extra intellectum causam effectiuam; ita similitudo et æqualitas, quæ haud postremo loco uidentur numerandæ in realibus, ab aliquo agente efficerentur: at uidemus rem unam nulla re prorsus in eam agente fieri similem aut aequalem maxime distanti rei. Hinc enim probat Aristoteles 5. Phys.cap. 2 ad relationem non esse motum; quia accidit, inquit, ut alterum relatiuum dicatur altero tantum mutato, id est, accipiente aliquid ab agente, ut superius interpretati sumus [Met. V, cap. 13, quaestio 9]’.

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equality relations. What is new is the introduction of the idea of a relation’s ground. The last argument listed by Fonseca applies to the relation of parts to a whole. This relation could only be real if we dared to admit an infinite number of actual accidents in a whole.19 Fonseca does not intend to make an exhaustive retrospective of the mentalist thesis supporters’ arguments. The fact that there were proponents of this thesis long before the controversy in the medieval university from the thirteenth century is something clear to Fonseca. To back this information, he cites Averroes and Avicenna’s texts, which refer to supporters of this thesis. Among the theologians of the fourteenth century, Fonseca underlines Petrus Aureolus’s anti-realistic position regarding the category of relation. He adds that this perspective concerns Aureolus’ view only on a strictly philosophical level. As a Christian theologian, Aureolus cannot fail to defend the thesis that the relations among divine persons (dogma of the Trinity) are real.20 Fonseca argues it is well known that there are real relations in any of the three types of relatives Aristotle mentions.21 Some things are bigger than others, they are closer to A than to B, they are more similar to A rather than B. In the context of causes, there are necessary causal relations, whether any mind is concerned or not. Finally, in the field of knowledge, the existence of sciences whose object is real, as is the case of natural science or physics, cannot be denied. This ends the current section appealing to an argument of authority, invoking Plato, Aristotle

19 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 1, p. 682: ‘Postremo, quia relatio totius ad partes, quae in realibus etiam numeratur, non uidetur dicenda realis, nisi quis in eodem toto admittere audeat infinita accidentia realia. Nam cum pleraque tota infinitis partibus constent, si relationes totius ad partes sunt reales, erunt in quolibet toto eius generis infinitae relationes reales’. Fonseca quotes Capreolus’ discussion in the commentary to distinction 30 of Lombard’s Sentences First Book. There, the context is clearly theological and deals with the Christian doctrine of creation. The question is: can there be any real relation between God and creatures? In this context, the theses defended by some anti-realistic theologians are analyzed: Petrus Aureolus, Occam and Gregorius Ariminensis. Fonseca’s presentation is primarily philosophical, more synthetic and does not follow Capreolus’s reconstruction of the argumentation of each of the authors mentioned exactly. Cf. Capreolus, Defensio Theologiae, d. 30, q. 1. 20 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 2, p. 682: ‘Veteres nonnulli, quorum meminit Auerroes in Commentariis 12.libri huius operis [ad Tex 19], & Auicenna lib. 3 sua Metaphysicae [cap. 10], propositis fortasse aut aliis similibus argumentis permoti, negatiuam partem huius quaestionis amplexi sunt, quos ex recentioribus secutus est Aureolus, ut habes apud Capreolum ad distinctionem trigesimam libri I.Sent. Negant enim omnes relationem ullam esse realem formaliter, hoc est, ut distinguitur a fundamento, nisi quod Aureolus id intelligit in relationibus creaturarum: non enim negat relationes, quibus personae diuinae distinguuntur, esse reales’. As a matter of fact, Avicenna’s text quoted by Fonseca speaks of ‘some people’, ‘a second party’ without indicating any names. See, for Avicenna: Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. I–IV, ed. by S, Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden: Peters-Brill,, 1977), pp. 178–79. On the ontological status of relations in Petrus Aureolus and other 14th century authors see: T. Dewender, ‘Der ontologische Status der Relationen nach Durandus von St.-Pourçain, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli’, in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. by Stephen F. Brown and others (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009), pp. 287–307. 21 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 2, pp. 682–83: ‘At dari relationes reales praeter diuinas illas, quae sine iniuria fidei orthodoxae negari non possint, plane constat in omnibus is tribus generibus relatorum, quae ab Aristotele in contextu proponuntur’.

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and all the most influential philosophers and theologians: all of them accepted, as a self-evident truth, that existing entities (entia realia) encompass absolute entities and relative entities. He presents the three theoretical sciences of the Aristotelian classification as real sciences (scientias reales). Interestingly enough, in this context Fonseca characterises metaphysics as dealing with the ‘order of everything’. He, therefore, assigns it an eminently relational structure.22 After a summary of the most common termninology and the main distinctions between various types of relatives, Fonseca presents the main rules for distinguishing real relations from relations of reason.23 We will not delve into the explanation of this terminology. Still, it will be necessary to return to it to clarify Fonseca’s position compared to other authors, even his closest ones. For a deeper understanding of Fonseca’s position, we will next introduce the propositions that synthesise his point of view on this matter. After clarifying the terminology and exposing the most common theses on the category of real relations, Fonseca condenses his position into five propositions. Proposition 1: In an act, it is impossible to carry into effect a real relation between two extremes unless both are real entities, genuinely distinct and existing.24 Proposition 2: For a relation to be real, its foundation must be real and effectively different from the foundation/ground of the relation corresponding to the other part.25 Proposition 3: For a relation to be real, it is unnecessary that its proximate foundation or grounding reason be a real entity or occur in the same entity in which the relationship occurs. It is only necessary that such a grounding reason is not dependent on an activity of the intellect.26 Proposition 4: Relations that are appropriate both for things that do not exist and for those ones that exist, are not actually real but relations of reason.27 Proposition 5: There can be no real relation of God to creatures.28

22 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 2, p. 683: ‘Accedit Aristotelis, Platonis, et grauissimi cuiusque seu ueteris seu recentioris Philosophi ac Theologi sententia, qui omnes quasi per se notum accipiunt entia realia diuidi in absoluta et relata: ac de relatis multas scientias reales ex instituto agere dicunt ut Physicam de mutuo causarum respectu; Mathematicas de aequalitate et inaequalitate magnitudinum, de similitudine et dissimilitudine figurarum, de distantiis et propinquitatibus corporum; et ipsam primam Philosophiam de ordine rerum omnium inter se, qui in compluribus realis est, et cuius esse ab operatione intelIectus neutiquam pendet.’ 23 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 3–6, pp. 683–88. 24 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 689: ‘Primum documentum. Non potest relatio realis actu exerceri inter duo extrema, nisi ambo sint realia, re omnino distincta et uere existentia’. 25 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 690: ‘Secundum documentum. No potest relatio esse realis, nisi eius fundamentum sit reale, et re distinctum a fundamento relationis ex altera parte respondentis’. 26 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 690: ‘Tertium documentum. Ut relatio sit realis non opus est, ut ratio fundandi, seu fundamentum proximum sit ens reale, neque item ut sit in eadem re, in qua est relatio, sed ut non pendeat ab operatione intellectus’. 27 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 691: ‘Quartum documentum. Relationes, quae aeque conueniunt rebus cum actu non existunt, atque cum actu existunt, non sunt reales, sed rationis’. 28 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 692: ‘Quintum documentum. Nulla relatio Dei ad creaturas realis esse potest’.

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Let us now examine how Fonseca justifies these five complex propositions. The first proposition establishes three conditions for a relation to be considered real. They all refer to the relation’s extremes (the subject of a relation and the object ‘toward which’ it is related): a) they must be real; b) really distinct and c) existing in act. With the first condition, Fonseca excludes from real relations: privations such as deafness or blindness, the relations between beings of reason (for example, between subject and predicate) and the relations between or with fictional entities such as the Minotaur of Greek mythology. The second condition excludes real relations’ numerical identity and any relation between entities distinguished only formally or through a minor distinction. Finally, the third condition excludes the possibility of a relation between human beings living at a given time and their ancestors and generations to come. This exclusion is stated and not justified, convenient in paternity/maternity relations, for example.29 Underlining his realistic position, Fonseca says that these three conditions are necessary but not sufficient for a real relation. Fonseca distances himself from many past authors to distinguish between relation and foundation (of the relation). It is critical to clearly distinguish between the foundation of the relation and the proximate foundation. The foundation of the relation defines its ontological status. If this is real, then the relation can be real. But this is not enough. It must also be distinct from the foundation of the relation corresponding to the other extreme. This is the point of Proposition 2. Fonseca stresses that it is not enough to say that there is an aptitude to do something. This aptitude has to be some ‘real power that is a true quality or entity’. As it happens, for instance, when one assumes that the power to generate is the foundation of fatherhood.30 The same proposition indicates that the relation (of similarity) between two white paper sheets is not a real relation but of reason. It does not meet the condition required by Proposition 2 as the basis or foundation of the similarity relation, the white colour, is identical in both.31 Propositions 1 and 2 establish the conditions and criteria for a relation to be considered real. And they concern, first of all, the extremes and the foundation of the relation. The proximate foundation is a necessary condition without which a relation is not possible. Fonseca tells us that such a necessary condition doesn’t need to be a real entity, with Proposition 3: ‘It is only necessary that such a grounding reason is not dependent on an activity of the intellect’.32 This is an important qualification of 29 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 690: ‘Defectu tertiae conditionis non est relatio realis inter entia realia, quae actu non existunt, ut inter Iudam et Antichristum; neque inter res existentes et non existentes, ut inter homines, qui nunc extant, et eos, qui diem obierunt, aut nondum nati sunt’. 30 CMA V, ch 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 690: ‘…sed siquando Philosophi dicunt aptitudinem aliquam esse fundamentum alicuius relationis realis, accipiendum esse nomen aptitudinis pro facultate aliqua reali, quae sit qualitas, aut aliqua alia uera entitas: ut cum dicimus potentiam generandi esse fundamentum paternitatis, intelligenda est uis naturalis ad generadum, aut ipsa substantia rei, quae eam uim habet’. 31 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 690: ‘Ex posteriori colliges, hanc papyrum candidam, et hanc eius superficiem candidam non esse similes reali aliqua relatione, quia candor, qui est fundamentum similitudinis, non distinguitur re in utraque, sed est unus et idem numero’. 32 See note 18.

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Fonseca’s realism. The last two Propositions (4 and 5) complete this effort to clarify his realistic position regarding the ontological status of relations. Proposition 4 explains the criterion established by Proposition 1, mentioning another condition to be met by real relations. According to it, the circumstance that one of the extremes was not a real being was enough so that the relation could not be a real one but a relation of reason. Here the text plays with cases where the same relation applies both to existing and non existing things. The following appear as examples of this kind of relations: relations of generic specific and analogical identity, relations of contrariety and relative opposition.33 Here Fonseca uses generic and specific identity materially and not in a formal sense. Only in a material sense (materialiter) can we say that there is no intervention of the intellect. For him these relations are not real but of reason, although they apply to things without any operation of the intellect. As a matter of fact, the three conditions of proposition 1 are necessary but not sufficient for a relation to be real. Proposition 4 demands that, in order to be real, a relation cannot be appropriate both to existing and non-existing things.34 Proposition 5 excludes the possibility of a real relation of God to creatures. This proposition coincides with a traditional doctrine common among Christian theologians. It was defended by Thomas Aquino and Scotus, among others. The common root is the theological essential of creation. Justification varies according to the theoretical framework in which the doctrine of relations develops. Fonseca presents this proposition as a conjoint result of proposition 1 and the radical contingency of every creature. Other more specific arguments invoke some traces of God’s nature as presented in that time’s theological and philosophical literature. A new relation in God seems to imply the power to act so as to bring about a new relation. This is not possible, Fonseca goes on, because ‘God is not in potency to any real act, being pure act’.35 Only

33 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 691: ‘Colligimus similiter, relationes identitatis tum specificae, tum genericae, adde etiam et analogicae, et oppositarum diuersitatum esse rationis; quia res non minus sunt eaedem in naturis communibus, et diuersae in propriis, cum non existunt, quam cum existunt. Idem dicendum de relationibus contrarietatis, oppositionis relatiuae, et oppositionis in communi. Nec loquimur hic de identitate generica et specifica formaliter, quia res non sunt eaedem, nisi cum conceptu generico aut specifico apprehenduntur; sed de identitate generica et specifica materialiter, qua res sunt eaedem in natura generica aut specifica sine ulla intellectus operatione’. 34 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 691: ‘Quocirca minus recte uidentur sentire [D. Thomas 1.p. q. 28, art 1, Capreolus in I d. 30, q. unica, ad 5 Gregorii argumentum, Caiet. In locum citatum primae partis, Soncinas 5 Metaphys. q. 35 et coeteri Thomistae…] qui asserunt, huiusmodi identitates esse relationes reales, huic argumento innixi, quia conueniunt extremis realibus, realiter distinctis, et in rerum natura existentibus sine ulla operatione intellectus, quae sunt conditiones in primo documento explicatae. Quod enim id non recte colligatur, ex eo patet quia etsi haec tria necessaria sunt, ut relationes sint reales, non tamen sunt satis; oportet enim, ut non aeque conueniant rebus, cum non existunt, atque cum existunt’. 35 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 692: ‘Deinde, quia Deus non est in potentia ad ullum actum realem, cum sit actus purus realiter ac in se, licet nostra cogitatione ac denominatione sit in potentia ad multa, quæ intellectus ei tribuere potest creaturarum comparatione, aut imperfecto intelligendi modo: at si relatio aliqua realis esset in Deo comparatione creaturæ, cum illa sit actus quidam realis; sane Deus antequam creasset mundum, fuisset in potentia ad actum realem, atque ita non esset actus purus’.

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within the limits of human thought and language can we say, with no accuracy, that God is ‘in potency’ to many things according to our way of seeing the world. Finally, a new relation in God would imply a genuine change in God. This is not compatible with divine immutability.36 Fonseca is aware that many scholastics — famously all Nominalists — contend there is a real relation of God to creatures. But this is so because they have a different concept of relation, totally incompatible with Fonseca’s realism. The arguments against Nominalists appear in question 2, explaining why there is a distinction between relation and foundation. Famously, Ockham insists that a real relation does not have a foundation and that the phrase ‘foundation of relation’ is totally missing in the Aristotelian corpus.37 He denies that relations exist as additional realities to things that are related. In this sense, only absolute, individual things exist properly. Fonseca begins question 2 by presenting six opinions about the real distinction between relation and foundation. First, the Nominalist thesis, accepting only a distinction under consideration, i.e. a distinction of reason based on things.38 The second opinion, attributed to older Thomists such as Capreolus, Caietanus, Ferrariensis, teaches that a real relation is always really distinct from its subject and its foundation.39 The third opinion, attributed to Durandus, defines a middle ground between the first and the second opinion. Accordingly, there are two kinds of real relations. Those that are true dispositions (habitudines) or real respects (respectus) — that imply a modal distinction from their foundations — while the second kind of real relations are not real respects but real denominations.40 Fonseca

36 CMA V, c. 15, q. 1, s. 7, p. 692: ‘Postremo, quia alioqui mutaretur Deus, cum incipit nouam relationem realem habere ad creaturam, non mutatione quidem, quae sit uerus motus, aut uera actio et passio, sed mutatione, quæ satis esset ad hoc, ut uere dici posset Deum aliter nunc se habere per aliquid, quod est in ipso, quam prius habuit: quod etiam genus mutationis diuinæ immutabilitati repugnat’. For a brief comment on the way Thomas Aquinas sees the relation Creator-creature, see Henninger, Relations, pp. 37–39. Thomas M.Ward, ‘Relations Without Forms: Some Consequences of Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Relations’, Vivarium, 48 (2010), pp. 293–301 tries to defend some sort of real relation God-creature(s) compatible with Aquinas’s metaphysics. 37 William of Ockham, Quodlibet, VI, q. 10, Ad argumentum principale, in Opera Theologica, IX, ed. by Ph. Boehner and others (St Bonaventure N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1980), p. 624: ‘Similiter dico quod relatio non habet fundamentum, nec invenitur illud verbum ‘fundamentum relationis’ in philosophia Aristotelis nec est verbum philosophicum’. More information on Ockham’s approach to categorical relations in Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 268–76; Henninger, Relations, pp. 119–49, and Alessandro D. Conti, ‘Realism vs Nominalism: The Controversy between Burley and Ockham over the Nature and Ontological Status of the ad aliquid’, Quaestio, 13 (2013), pp. 243–64. 38 CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 1, p. 694: ‘Qua in re sunt qui absolute pronuncient, nullam relationem realem distingui a suo fundamento nisi conlideratione’. 39 CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 1, p. 695: ‘Alii contrariam omnino sententiam probantes asserunt omnem relationem realem (diuinis tamen exceptis) re ipsa a suo fundamento esse distincta’. The names of those who supported this opinion come later, in section 3 of q. 2, in CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 3, p. 697: ‘Secunda opinion est Caietani, Capreolous, Ferrariensis et fere antiquorum Thomistarum, quam iidem Diuo Thomae attribuunt’. 40 CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 1, p. 695: ‘Sunt etiam qui media quasi incedant uia, nec tamen eodem modo sentiant. Nam quidam existimant duo esse genera relationum realium:unum earum, qua sunt reales habitudines, siue respectus per se uel per accidens consequentes fundamenta, quo pacto inhaerentia

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rejects Durandus’s solution arguing that to speak of a modal distinction explaining the meaning of a real distinction of a relation from its foundation is an abuse of the phrase ‘real distinction’ and, in the end, it is no solution at all.41 Fourthly, let Scotus’s opinion on the link between relation and its foundation be analysed. Fonseca rejects Scotus’s separation argument to justify the thesis that categorical relations are really distinct from their foundations, arguing that a modal distinction would satisfy the condition upon which that argument is built.42 A fifth opinion is attributed to ‘more recent authors’ (recentiores) arguing that the category of relation should be seen as a perfection and a pure mode of being.43 There is no clear indication of any name that could come under the more recent authors’ designation. But Fonseca’s question 3 discusses the perfection thesis mentioning, in that context, the names of the recentiores Bartholomaeus Torres and Michael Palacio.44 Fonseca presents the sixth opinion as the thesis he defends and one coherent with Thomas Aquinas’s position following Javellus and Soto’s interpretation. Categorical relations are formally distinct from their foundations.45 Fonseca argues that a

41 42

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per se conuenit quantitati, per accidens autem tangere aliam quantitatem: atque has dicunt realiter distingui a fundamentis; non tamen ut distinctas entitates, sed ut modos essendi, seu habendi se distinctos ab entitatibus fundamentorum; alterum earum, quae non sunt respectus reales, immo ne respectus quidem, sed reales denominationes relatiuae desumptae ex pluribus rebus, ut esse aequale, uel simile…’ Fonseca identifies Durandus a S. Porciano as the chief author defending this thesis (CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 4, p. 700): ‘Tertiae opinionis auctor est Durandus ad 30. Distinctionem primi Sent. tametsi illud de denominatione relatiua desumpta ex pluribus rebus absolutis accepit ab Herueo quodlib 7, q. 15 et quolib. 10, q. 1 quod idem postea Nominales approbarunt. Confirmatur autem sententia haec a suis auctoribus fere impugnatione aliarum, ut non necesse esse hic fit pro ea ulla argumenta proponere’. On Durandus’ view of relations see Henninger, Relations, pp. 177–79 and Rolf Schönberger, Relation als Vergleich: die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik (Leiden: Brill, 1994), pp. 125–31. CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 4, p. 701: ‘Postremo quod abutitur nomine distinctionis realis: distinctio enim modi essendi qui non est formaliter res ulla ab ea, cuius est modus, non est distinctio realis, sed modalis.’ CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 4, p. 701: ‘Quarta sententia est Scoti in 2, d. 1, q. 5 et in 3, d. 8, q. 1 cuius praecipuum fundamentum illud ipsum est, quod in ea proponenda tetigimus. Quorum, inquit, unum perire potest manente altero, ea distingui realiter, quorum autem non potest, ea non distingui realiter. Sed non est firmum fundamentum, cui innititur. Nam cum sola distinctio modalis satis sit, ut alterum suo modo pereat manente altero (quod patet in ueste actu induente, quae eadem manens, si detrahatur a corpore, iam desinit esse actu indumentum) multo satius erit distinctio formalis, quae distinguit entitates, quarum quelibet suum peculiare esse habet: quare siue relatio distinguatur a suo fundamento, ut modus essendi purus ab eo, cuius est modus, siue ut entitas ab entitate, nihil habet firmitatis ratio, qua suam Scotus sententiam communit’. On Scotus theory of relations see Henninger, Relations, pp. 68–97 and Schönberger, Relation als Vergleich, pp. 151–73. CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 5, p. 701: ‘Opinio eorum qui sentiunt relationem a fundamento distingui modali distinctione dumtaxat, ita ut omnis relatio praedicamenti Ad aliquid nihil sit aliud quam purus quidam essendi modus, recentiorum quorundam est propria’. CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, s. 1, p. 706: ‘Bartholomaeus Torres de Trinitate q. 33 in commentarium art. secondi. Michael de Palatio in 1. Sent. D. 16, disput 2 et alii plerique’. CMA V, c. 15, q. 2, s. 5, p. 703: ‘Nobis tamen magis placet, relationes reales ad hoc prædicamentum pertinentes uniuerse distingui a fundamento formali distinctione, quae erat sexta opinio, ita ut omnes habeant proprium ac peculiare esse tum essentiae, tum existentiae distinctum ab esse fundamenti; quam sententiam plerique Thomistarum, ut sui Auctoris placitum, ueterumque

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relation has its being that is distinct from the being of its foundation. In this formal distinction, each extreme is a genuine entity. The being of the foundation is absolute, whereas the being of a relation is a being that consists of a disposition (habitudo) toward something else, as is clear from Aristotle’s definition. Some Jesuits who wrote in the last decade of the sixteenth century did not positively receive the formal distinction defended by Fonseca. In 1597, Suárez did not directly contest Fonseca’s arguments but the very notion of a formal distinction as an intermediate distinction between the real and the modal distinction.46 Writing almost in the same years, Antonio Rubio, in his Logica Mexicana, claims that Fonseca’s opinion should be counted, if understood correctly, among the defenders of a real distinction.47 The commentary published in 1606 by the Conimbricences, In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis, gives no information about Fonseca’s opinion on that point because the discussion of this question belongs to metaphysics and not logic.48 Despite what we think about the rejection of the formal distinction, it seems out of doubt that Suárez’s interpretation of Fonseca’s position is more based on the texts than Antonio Rubio’s. Most authors, according to Fonseca in question 3 on the relation — whether it is perfection or not — would opt for the negative answer. But the related justification, as well as its quality, would be very different in each author.49

cum philosophorum tum theologorum doctrina merito amplectuntur. ‘We could not follow the historical track of this discussion but could find a clear statement of Domingo Soto in line with what Fonseca claims: ‘Relatio formaliter distinguitur ab eius fundamento, atque adeo a coeteris omnibus praedicamentis tanquam ratio specialis entis’. Domingo de Soto, In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias librosque de Demonstratione Commentaria (Venetiis: Guerraei, 1573), p. 215F. 46 See DM XLVII, in a convenient edition with translation by John Doyle, On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII) (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 2006). There Suárez claims not to understand Fonseca’s distinction, a middle distinction between real and modal: ‘Ego tamen imprimis non percipio distinctionem hanc mediam inter realem et modalem, quae sit vera distinctio actualis in re, et multo major quam distinctio rationis, cum dicatur etiam esse major quam modalis’. (see DM XLVII, s. 2, n. 8). Besides, arguing from his doctrine of distinctions (Disputatio VII), he claims that there is no room for further types of distinctions (real, modal and of reason exhaust all possibilities). 47 In the Commentary to Categories VII, q. 14: ‘Opinio huic opposita relationum et fundamentum distingui statuit reali distinctione […]. Hanc sequitur tota ferme D. Thomae familia […] et in eadem absque dubio est Magister Sotus quaestione 2. huius praedicamenti, nam licet ea impugnare prius videatur in fine tandem quaestionis statuit praedicamenta omnia distingui ex natura rei, et citra operationem intellectus, neque diuersa debet reputari ea, quam sequitur P. Fonseca 5 lib Metaphysicae cap. 15. q. 2. sectio 1, affirmans relationem ex natura rei, et ante opus intellectus distingui a fundamento, licet negare videatur distinctionem realem, quam intellectus non facit’. Cf. Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 1114. The first edition was published in 1603 in Spain under the title Commentariorum in vniuersam Aristotelis Dialectiam (Compluti: ex officina Ioannis Gratiani, 1603). 48 Accepting the existence of real relations, the text of the Conimbricense goes on: ‘Haec posterior sententia ut uerissima defendenda est, quicquid interim sit de distinction relationis a suo fundamento, de qua in praedicamentis Metaphysicis est disserendum’. See Commentarii, 1606, p. 422. 49 CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, s. 1, p. 706: ‘Alii omnes quotquot legerim, negatiuam partem quaestionis approbant; quamquam enim unus aut alter uerbo aliquo affirmatiuam uidentur ampleti; tamen ubi de re et ex instituto agunt, negatiuae praecipue adhaerent; non omnes tamen eodem modo suam sententiam confirmant’.

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He recognises the relevance of the reasons invoked by the negative thesis’s defenders, although he says that the arguments they use are not always the best. But on the other hand, he cannot fail to admit the strength of the main idea in favour of the positive thesis. They cannot fail to possess some perfection to the extent that they are something endowed with form. For various reasons, theologians and philosophers neglected a more subtle analysis of the relation’s true nature. Depending on how you understand the notion of formal perfection, this will lead to a more differentiated response. Fonseca admits that, in its most common meaning, formal perfection (as an ability to act) does not apply to categorical relations. But he introduces an unusual notion of ‘quasi-idle’ perfection. This notion would apply to the category of relation and allow us to reconcile the two theses.50 To those who argue that if the relation is formal perfection with such ontologic lightness, then it means that it is not in a subject, he replies that this is not true. The categorial relation implies these two dimensions of being toward and of being in a subject.51

4. Relation as a Primary Genus of Being Being one of Aristotle’s categories and occupying a privileged place in that list, it seems natural to view relation as a suitable candidate to the status of a supreme or primary genus of being. One might wonder why Fonseca felt it necessary to discuss this topic in detail asking if there is a primary genus in this category.52 In general, he mentions many doubts about this category since antiquity. However, the most pressing reason for discussing this topic seems to be linked to the widespread nominalist theses that advocated an anti-realistic understanding of categories. The realistic view defended by Fonseca is associated with a metaphysical interpretation of the categorial relation. For this reason, he will invoke the very general notion of category, understood from Aristotle’s texts, to justify, as a thesis, the positive answer to the initial question.

50 CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, s. 2, p. 707: ‘Ac missa perfectione transcendente, de qua non disputamus […] duobus modis uerum est quod tota schola pronunciat, relationes inquam non esse perfectiones formales, de quo genere perfectionis tota est controuersia […]. Altero si perfectio formalis sumatur pro ea qua forma ad agendum accipiendumue aliquid idonea est: nulla enim relatio est principium aliquid agendi aut patiendi accippiendiue, ut omnes fatentur. Quod si perfectio formalis sumatur pro ea quae nec actiua nec passiua est, sed quasi otiosa, hoc tantum habet muneris ut det aliquid esse subiecto (quam pure formalem appelare possumus), non dubium esse debet quin relationes huius praedicamenti sint perfectiones rebus additae; dant enim rebus, quibus insunt aliquod esse. De quo tamen genere formalis perfectionis, saltem quatenus in relationibus cernitur, parum et quasi nihil siue Philosophi siue Theologi curarunt’; see also CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, s. 2, p. 708. Italics added. 51 CMA V, c. 15, q. 3, s. 3, p. 710: ‘Quod autem adiungitur, si relatio perfectio est (nimirum formalis) fore ut actus aliquis non insit, negandum id est. Nam relatio ea de qua loquimur non solum ad aliud refert sed etiam inest, ut superius ostendimus’. 52 That is the title of his last question on categorical relations, q. 6: ‘Detur ne in hoc praedicamento genus summum’; see CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 1, p. 732.

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If there are predicates that are classifiable in the relation category, then there must be a supreme genre in that kind of predicates. But he goes even further when he characterises it as a univocal relation, predicable of all its subordinate relatives and relations.53 He first shows the points where most authors agree and then explains the differences that separate them. There are two or three exceptions to the broad consensus on this topic. Some philosophers deny the existence of relations in nature (all relations being the result of intellectual activity). On the other hand, Nominalists consider relations to be mere extrinsic denominations. To these, we must add the authors who reduce relations to pure modes of being (puros essendi modos). The rest of them claim that the supreme gender of this category is a real relation.54 Fonseca mentions Albert the Great’s observation in the treatise on categories, according to which the most accurate designation for this category would be ad aliquid or relative and not relation.55 The truth is that he devalues Albert position and continues to use the term relationship as perfectly suited to speak of this category. Fonseca also knew that Aristotle’s text uses the term preferred by Albert the Great

53 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 1, p. 733: ‘Quod tamen uel abstracte, uel concrete, uel utroque modo dandum sit, ipsa praedicamenti ratio ostendit. Est enim praedicamentum quaedam generis summi et eorum, quae sub ipso sunt naturalis dispositivo, ut alibi diximus [Lib 2, Institutiones Dialect. c. 8] quo fit, ut si ullum predicamentum relationis datur, aliquod genus summum in eo dandum sit. Hoc etiam argumento idem perspicue uidetur concludi. Hae praedicationes sunt uniuocae et in quaestione quid est; haec relatio est relatio, illa item est relatio, eodemque modo in caeteris abstractis; itemque hoc relatum est relatum, illud etiam est relatum, et sic in aliis concretis (modo relationem et relatum pro relatione reali et relato reali accipias) igitur datur relatio communis uniuoca, quae in quaestione Quid est de omnibus particularibus relationibus huius praedicamenti dicatur, relatumque commune, quod de omnibus relatis eodem modo enuncietur, quae haud dubie genera summa esse necessario dicenda sunt. Praeterea, ab omnibus particularibus relationibus potest abstrahi communis relatio relictis omnibus differentiis quibus tum indiuidua inter sese, tum etiam species distinguuntur; ex relatione autem communi fit commune relatum, ut dictum est, ergo datur utrumque commune genus huius praedicamenti et abstractum et concretum’. 54 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 2, pp. 733–34: ‘Quod ergo attinet ad genus abstractum, quod est relatio, nulla pæne inter eos qui rectius philosophati sunt, contentio est. Nam missa opinione eorum, qui dicunt nullam relationem natura constare, sed omnes fieri collatione intellectus comparantes res alias cum aliis, proinde ea, quæ ad aliquid dicuntur, non constituere nouum praedicamentum, sed aliis omnibus commisceri, ad eaque reuocari, (…) … relicta etiam sententia Nominalium dicentium relationes nihil esse aliud, quam denominationes extrinsecas a rebus absolutis, prætermissis quoque iis, qui relationes uolunt non esse entitates, sed puros quosdam essendi modos, reliqui omnes affirmant huius prædicamenti genus summum proprie ac per se esse relationem realem’. 55 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 2, p. 734: ‘Nam quod Magnus Albertus ait in Prædicamentis capite 2. generalissimum huius prædicamenti magis propre esse Ad aliquid, seu relatiuum, minus autem proprie relationem, eo spectat, ut significet se loqui de his quoad prædicationem de primis substantiis, de quibus quidem concreta prædicantur in recto, abstracta in obliquo’. Cf. Albert the Great, De praedicamentis, tr. 4, c. 2 (Alberti Magni, De Praedicamentis, ed. by Manuel Santos Noya and others (Münster: Aschendorff, 2014), p. 83, 62–64: ‘Generalissimum autem in huius praedicabilis coordinatione est ad aliquid vel relativum vel minus proprie, ut dicunt quidam, relatio’.

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and speaks of the relatives almost always in the plural. He seems to be quite aware that all those subtle distinctions are not in Aristotle’s text. But he insists on clarifying his interpretation of the categorial relation’s univocity and his articulation with the subordinate relata in a complex semantic framework.56 Fonseca ends his exposition with the traditional satis superque formulae indicating the relative completeness of his treatment of this category. However, he adds something that suggests here he used materials he had previously prepared for his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. This last sentence of question 6 could be of interest for the record of his planned cooperation in the famous Cursus Conimbricensis: Nam quæ de relatorum attributis in Prædicamentorum librum priuatim scripseramus, in communia commentaria huius loci paucis omissis (ut fere alia) translata sunt: nec satis cum instituto huius operis congruere | uidentur, tametsi in eis nonnulla sunt, quæ si nunc ad incudem reuocaremus, iis, quæ nunc de relatis diximus, accommodanda essent.57 We interpret this phrase as revealing that Fonseca even wrote some texts intended initially for the Coimbra commentary. It is hard to say when he wrote the first draft of this text, but we, however, do know the publication date of this volume of Fonseca’s Commentary on Metaphysics. In 1589, two years before the publication of the first volume of the Cursus Conimbricensis on Aristotle’s Physics and seventeen years before the last book of the Coimbra Course on Aristotle’s Logic.

5. Reaction to Fonseca’s Approach Finally, we will make some brief remarks about some works published shortly after Fonseca’s text. Suárez’s Disputatio XLVII is the most important text on relation published after the second volume of Fonseca’s commentary. We will not make

56 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 6, p. 742: ‘Animaduerte igitur, relationem, quæ uniuoce et in quaestione Quid est prædicatur de omnibus indiuiduis relationibus, non esse relationem, quæ est proximum respiciendi principium (talis enim relatio est analogum quippiam, quemadmodum quoddam animal) sed esse relationem, quæ est primum ac remotissimum principium respiciendi: non tamen sub ratione remotissimi principii (quia hoc pacto non dicitur de inferioribus relationibus) sed sub hac ratione, quatenus est id, quo aliquid secundum suum esse ad aliud referri potest: quae ratio omnibus relationibus conuenit, quatenus communem naturam relationis participant, ut perspicuum est. Idem porro dicendum est de relato reali. Nam quod uniuoce et in quaestione Quid est praedicatur de omnibus relatis singularibus, non est relatum, quod proxime refertur (est enim analogum, ut ea relatio, a qua denominatiue dicitur) sed est relatum, quod primo ac remotissime refertur: non tamen sub ratione primi et remotissimi relati, ut de relatione dictum est, sed sub hac ratione, quatenus est id, quod secundum suum esse ad aliud referri potest, uel quod denominatiue a relatione dicitur. Quæ ratio conuenit omnibus relatis, quamquam relata, quæ proximo respiciendi principio constituuntur, hoc habent, ut non solum ad aliud referri possint, propter communem relatorum naturam, sed etiam ad aliud actu referantur propter peculiarem ac propriam’. 57 CMA V, c. 15, q. 6, s. 6, pp. 742–43.

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a systematic and exhaustive confrontation between Fonseca’s text on categorical relations and Suárez’s Disputatio XLVII. Still, only a few explicit remarks to Fonseca and some aspects of Suárez’s text, related to quotes from Aristotle and other authors, will be commented on. We take Doyle 2006 edition of Disputatio XLVII as the starting point of our analysis. In his Introduction, Doyle does not refer to Fonseca or other historically closest authors to explain the status quaestionis. In some explanatory notes, he makes several references to Fonseca. One of the most relevant of these references concerns Suárez’s use of Fonseca’s translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It seems clear that Suárez used Fonseca’s translation — which he praises as being elegant and accurate — with one, apparently not justified, exception.58 Discussing various opinions about the question ‘Whether the Formal Terminus of a Relation is another Relation or some absolute nature (ratio)’, Suárez quotes Fonseca in n. 11 of section 16: Finally, Fonseca, [in commenting on Metaphysics], Book 5, Chapter 15, Question 5 [sic], Section 4, has found another argument, in which he says that a relation of reason, even if it does not actually exist, can actually belong to, for example, the creator, that is, [belong] in its own way, objectively in the intellect, and /col. b/ that this is enough in order that a real relation be terminated at it. For by the very fact that there is a real relation in a creature, a relation of reason belongs to God, even if it does not actually exist. But he proves that these two things are separable because to be an animal actually belongs to a man even if he does not exist. But this answer is not any more probable than the rest.59 We cannot discuss this criticism of Suárez in detail. Fonseca’s statement regards essential predicates. And he cites the case of human beings to whom, necessarily, the predicate ‘being animal’ belongs, as an example. We can say the same about the creature’s relation to God.60 Using Suárez’s words, we would say that the whole 58 First Doyle’s general appraisal: ‘He [Suárez] refers to Fonseca’s edition as ‘elegant’ (DM, Index locupletissimus, I, c. 7, p. iv) and in those passages from Metaphysics V, c. 15, which he has translated in Disputation 47 he has followed Fonseca. But as for Fonseca’s commentary, he can take it or leave it in different contexts, as will be apparent from reading Disputation 47’; see Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 18, n. 35. Doyle continues to underline Suárez’s use of Fonseca’s translation in Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 182, nn. 21, 22, p. 185; n. 3, p. 186; n. 5; p. 187, n. 9. At p. 192, n. 7 we find the only case reported by Doyle where Suárez does not follow Fonseca’s translation. It is a translation of Metaphysics 993b30–31. Doyle admits that Suárez’s version is not exact but gives no possible explanation for this fact: ‘While Suárez’s version may catch Aristotle’s intent, it is not exact’. Doyle, On Real Relation. In DM XLVII, s. 15, n. 1, Suárez speaks of a class of relatives called by some authors ‘relatives of non-equiparence’. In a footnote explaining this terminology that dates back to Scotus, Doyle quotes Fonseca in order to explain the use made by ‘recentiores’ (Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 197, n. 1). 59 DM XLVII, s. 16, n. 11. In the quotation above we use Doyle’s translation. In footnote he corrects Suárez (mis)quotation: CMA V, c. 15, q. 4, s. 4, cols 832–33. This corresponds to pp. 715–16 of the first Edition published in Rome. See Doyle, On Real Relation, pp. 226–27. 60 CMA V, c. 15, q. 4, s. 4, p. 716: ‘Tota igitur difficultas in hoc posita est, qui fieri possit, ut relatio rationis non existat actu, et tamen actu conueniat rei, ad quam realis opposita refertur. Nam etsi prædicata necessaria, siue realia sint, siue rationis, conueniunt actu, etiam cum ipsa actu non

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discussion ‘contains a great equivocation’ because there is not enough terminological common ground to both. The simple fact that both use the same or very similar words to signify the key concepts used in the discussion is one more reason to be careful in evaluating their arguments. The same goes with other places where Suárez quotes and discusses Fonseca’s positions.61 But we can also see Suárez agreeing with Fonseca. In Disputatio XLVII, section 17, he analyses categorical relations’s common properties. One of them is the power to receive more or less. Discussing the way this can occur, Suárez continues in n. 4: ‘But this more or less is not on account of their intension, but on account of their variation, as Fonseca noted well in his [Commentary on] Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, Question 5, Section 2’.62 John Doyle makes a helpful brief characterisation of Suárez account on categorical relations: But even as we say this, it is important once again to note that real relation extends beyond the category of relation and also that in the Second Section, Paragraph 22, of Disputation 47 Suárez will come exceedingly close to a reduction of real relation to a simple act of the knower, that is, a connotation.63 Finally, a brief comment on the authors quoted both by Fonseca and Suárez: they cite basically the same authors, although Fonseca includes more references to sixteenth-century texts.64 An interesting example regards the (pseudo-)Augustine text on the Categories. Both quote the same text with the difference that Fonseca’s quotation is larger and reliable, while Suárez’s is not exactly so, as Doyle had already

existunt, ut homini esse animal, et aptitudo ad ridendum, generique referri ad speciem; tamen prædicata contingenta non uidetur actu conuenire unquam subiectis actu existentibus, nisi cum ipsa etiam actu existunt, ueluti Grammatica Socrati existenti, nisi cum ipsa etiam Grammatica Socratis actu existit’. 61 In s. 17, n. 17, Suárez quotes an opinion of Fonseca rejecting it as not proven: ‘But others say that there is one relation to both parents, even if the father actively and the mother only passively concur. And at the same time they say that the relation remains completely identical and unchanged, even if one parent dies. Fonseca says this in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, Question 5, Section 3. But both points are hard for me to believe’. (see Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 259). We have already mentioned Suárez’s discussion and rejection of Fonseca’s distinction between relation and foundation in s. 2, n. 7 of his DM XLVII. Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 150. 62 Fonseca’s text: ‘Verum hoc pacto maior similitudo aut dissimilitudo no n est relatio aliqua conflata ex pluribus relationibus minoris similitudinis aut disimilitudinis, quia relatio minoris similitudinis aut dissimilitudinis non permanet cum relatione maioris sed perit succedente illa, cum tamen gradus praecedentes, ex quibus constatur accidens, quod intenditur et remittitur, simul permaneant cum sequentibus’. CMA V, c. 15, q. 5, s. 2, p. 730. 63 Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 26. For a different approach to categorial relations in Suárez, see Jorge Secada, ‘Suárez on the Ontology of Relations’, in Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays, ed. by Daniel Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 62–88, and Sydney Penner, ‘Suárez on the Reduction of Categorical Relations’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 13 (2013), pp. 1–24. 64 To name just a few: Miguel Palacio, 1574 (quoted in CMA, p. 706), Bartolome Torres 1567 (quoted in CMA II, p. 706) and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias (quoted in CMA, pp. 676, 794).

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remarked.65 This misquotation is more noteworthy as it shows that Suárez had Fonseca’s text before his eyes.66 Besides Suárez, another interesting case of the discussion of Fonseca’s thesis in later scholastic work is Antonio Rubio. Rubio stands out among Jesuit philosophers. He lived in New Spain (Mexico) from 1576 to 1600, where he wrote a famous treatise of Logic known as Logica Mexicana (1603). Contrasting with Suárez, in his Logica Mexicana Rubio frequently cites Fonseca, to whom he refers in various ways as Fonseca noster, Pater Fonseca or Doctor Fonseca, although rarely engaging in a detailed argument.67 Then, we have already mentioned a few citations and references to Fonseca’s views on relations in the Coimbra Commentay on Dialectics (1606). As

65 After quoting Suárez citation (it is true what Augustine said in the book, On the Categories, chapter 11: ‘In special cases and as a rule, in order that this category be more evidently known, “toward something” is rightly said only when a singular is related to a singular’) Doyle says that ‘Suárez’s quotation is substantially accurate but not exactly so’. (Doyle, On Real Relation, p. 248, n. 9). In CMA II, p. 738, Suarez could find Fonseca’s quotation that is coincident with the modern Oxford critical edition: ‘Ut haec categoria manifestius dignoscatur, haec uia est, qua debemus aduertere, non recte dici ad aliquid nisi cum καθέκαστον πρὸς καθέκαστον ἀναφέρεται, hoc est singulare ad singulare refertur. Similiter cum dicimus duplum, sine dubio non generaliter, sed specialiter hoc duplum dicimus, et huius simpli duplum dicimus; ac propterea tunc uere ad aliquid categoria est, quoties u. g. Socratem Chrysippo dicimus esse uultu consimilem etc.’ [Aristoteles Latinus, I, 1–5, pseudo-Augustini paraphrasis Themistiana, ed. by L. Minio Palluelo (Bruges-Paris: Desclée de Broouwer, 1961), 99, p. 155] Doyle does not make any reference to the modern critical edition quoting Migne’s Patrologia Latina. 66 As a global characterisation of the mood ‘Suárez against Fonseca’, we would like to quote Stephen Menn, ‘Suárez, Nominalism, and Modes’, in Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discover, ed. By K. White (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p. 242: ‘Fonseca is the closest to Suárez, in his general approach to philosophy and on many particular questions. It is easy to miss this affinity, since Suárez cites Fonseca rather infrequently, and often to disagree; but by pursuing some crucial references and comparing the projects of Fonseca’s Questions on the Metaphysics and Suárez Disputations, we can see that Fonseca was in fact a model for the whole Disputations. Even so, Suárez’s disagreements with Fonseca are important and systematic’. 67 There are numerous references to Fonseca in this work of Antonio Rubio. Here are some citations directly related to Fonseca’s questions on categorical relations: ‘Doctor Fonseca 5. metaphysic. cap. 5. quaest. 1, sectio 8 [sic] aliud est dominium, et seruitus in creaturis in titulo naturali fundatan nempe in potentia reali ad coercendum subditos…’ (Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 982); ‘Pater Fonseca 5 metaphysic. cap. 25 quaest. 6. sectiones 2. et 3 oppositum ex diametro modum dicendi sequitur, nempe relationem proprie et per se supremum genus praedicamenti esse relatiuum, vel aliquid minus propriè, et quasi per reductionem’. (Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 986); ‘et iuxta illam relatiuum in communi a relatione vt concepta constitutum quasi inchoatiue et in potentia refertur, constitutum autem a relatione vt exercita, quasi iam natum actu atque proxime, hunc modum dicendi tenet Doctor Fonseca. 5 metaphy. cap. 15, quaestione 6, sectione quarta, et quinta, et iuxta illum eadem prorsus ratione argumentum soluitur, ac iuxta primum’. (Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 990); ‘Propter hoc argumenta tenuit hanc partem Doctor Fonseca. 5 lib. met. c. 15, q. 5, sect. 3 docens pluribus quidem relationibus ordinari parentes ad filium, partialibus quidem et incompletis, ex quibus una totalis et completa coalescit, cui etiam in filio una etiam totalis, et completa correspondet sub duplici ratione partiali considerabilis’. (Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 1015); ‘…ergo huismodi relationes identitatis, non sunt reales, sed rationis. Hanc sententiam acerrime defendit P. Fonseca 4. lib, metaph. cap. 2, quaestio 7, sectio 8 et lib. 5, cap 15, quaest. 1, sect. 7’. (Rubio, Logica Mexicana, col. 1075).

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of that date, references to this text are increasingly less frequent and summary. But it is important to remember that we are really facing a vast unexplored territory here.

6. Conclusion Fonseca’s realism about categorical relations is not an original position, but his defence in the framework of the Aristotelian system of categories has original traits that deserve further inquiry. The semantic and logic presuppositions of Fonseca’s text could bring some light to the main issues involved. Naturally, there are some limits Fonseca’s approach has in common with many other texts on categorical relations that can only be surpassed in the context of a new approach to a philosophical category theory.

Appendix

68

Correspondence between the pages of the 1st Edition of Fonseca’s CMA, volume two, and the columns of the Cologne edition 1615, volume two (reprint Olms) On Relation: 680 = 793 A-C 681 = 793 D-F 682 = 793F–794F 683 = 795A–796A 684 = 796B–797B 685 = 797B–798C 686 = 798D–799C 687 = 799C–800E 688 = 800F–801F 689 = 802A–802F 690 = 803A–804A 691 = 804B–805C 692 = 805C–806C 693 = 806D–807E 694 = 807E–808E 695 = 808E–810A 696 = 810A–811A 697 = 811B–812B 698 = 812C–813D 699 = 813D–814D 700 = 814D–815D 701 = 815D–816E 68 See above note 4.

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702 = 816F–817A 703 = 817A–819A 704 = 819B–820B 705 = 820B–821B 706 = 821C–822C 707 = 822D–823D 708 = 823E–824E 709 = 824F–825E 710 = 825F–827A 711 = 827A–828A 712 = 828B–829B 713 = 829C–830C 714 = 830D–831D 715 = 831D–832E 716 = 832E–833F 717 = 833F–835A 718 = 835A–836B 719 = 836B–837C 720 = 837C–838D 721 = 838D–839D 722 = 839E–840E 723 = 841A–841E 724 = 841F–843A 725 = 843A–844B 726 = 844B–845C 727 = 845C–846D 728 = 846D–847E 729 = 847E–848F 730 = 848F–850A 731 = 850A–851A 732 = 851B–852B 733 = 852B–853B 734 = 853B–854D 735 = 854D–855E 736 = 855E–856F 737 = 856F–858A 738 = 858B–859A 739 = 859A–860B 740 = 860B–861C 741 = 861D–862D 742 = 862E–863E 743 = 863E–864F

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Fonseca on Causation

1. Introduction Pedro da Fonseca’s account of causation has received far less scholarly attention than it would deserve, especially when compared to other scholastics of his era such as Suárez.1 As a matter of fact, conception of causality in early modern scholasticism usually comes into play only in the context of far wider studies on the history of causation, as a sort of anticipation of later philosophical and scientific developments in the notion of cause. From this perspective we may understand why there is only room for one scholastic thinker to be mentioned as a precursor for early modern theories of causation — scholasticism is full of technicalities and is quite complex in itself, so comparing scholastic theories can be space-consuming and requires special expertise. As a result, scholars are usually content with only delving into Francisco Suárez’s monumental exposition in his Disputationes metaphysicae. Sometimes even famed scholars tend to think that Suárez can be used as a sort of encyclopedia of early modern scholasticism, a summa of all the debates and solutions of his time.2 This is debatable, however, not only because Suárez is far from adopting the neutrality of an encyclopedia, but also due to the fact that there was much less consensus in early modern scholasticism than historians of philosophy would have it. Suárez’s account of causation has been recently described as ‘the longest and most meticolous such tract in the history of scholasticism’.3 This judgment has been acritically



1 An exception to this rule is a concise yet useful introduction to the theme of causality in Fonseca’s thought by António Manuel Martins, ‘A causalidade em Pedro da Fonseca’, Veritas, 54/3 (2009), pp. 112–27. 2 Even a scholar of the caliber of Étienne Gilson went as far as to state that ‘Suárez enjoys such a knowledge of medieval philosophy, as to put to shame any modern historian of medieval thought. On each and every question he seems to know everybody and everything, and to read his book is like attending the Last Judgment of four centuries of Christian speculation by a dispassionate judge’. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p. 99. 3 Alfred J. Freddoso, ‘Suarez on Metaphysical Inquiry, Efficient Causality and Divine Action’, in Francisco Suárez, On Creation, Conservation and Concurrence. Metaphysical Disputations 20–22, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso (South Bend: St Augustine’s Press, 2002), p. xxvii. Giuseppe Capriati  •  Università degli Studi di Bari Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 145-172 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131763

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repeated countless times by other scholars, and it is latent in the methodological choice of equating Suárez with early modern scholasticism and vice versa. At least with regard to causality, however, this assumption just does not hold true, and just a simple look at Fonseca’s titanic tract on causation in his commentaries to Aristotle’s Metaphysics is enough to prove this. In terms of length and detail, Fonseca’s account has nothing to envy to the Disputationes. In fact, Suárez sometimes imported whole quaestiones from Fonseca, complete with the main opinions available and even solutions that often are exactly the same as Suárez’s. The reasons behind this scholarly privilege of Suárez are too complex to expound here, but the most objective of them all is that the Disputationes metaphysicae are a systematic treatise of metaphysics in the modern sense, while Fonseca’s account was included in a commentary to Aristotle. This is not only less ‘modern’, but it also causes some undeniable coherency issue between the sparse loci in which Fonseca deals with causation. Nevertheless, Fonseca’s treatment of causation is one of the most important and detailed in early modern scholasticism, and it may very well be the first of such a degree of complexity in scholasticism altogether, at least as far as metaphysics is concerned, and many later scholastic accounts of causation will draw from it. Here, we will try to present its crucial features in the hope that this preliminary analysis may spark the interest of scholars to further pursue the investigation.4

2. General Causality In Early Modern scholasticism, general causality is a clearly defined sphere dealing with everything involving causes before they are divided in their different typologies (natural, supernatural), kinds (primary, secondary), and genres (material, formal, efficient, and final). In scholastics commentaries, autonomous treatises, and later Cursus, discussion of general causality usually involved several quaestiones (sometimes even dedicated sections) and was placed before descending to special causation. Within this field, scholastic thinkers dealt with what they called the communis ratio causae, the notion of cause in general or inasmuch as it is common to each and every subdivision of causes. Suárez devoted three metaphysical disputations to general causality (XII, XXVII, XXVIII). The Disputationes metaphysicae, however, were an autonomous treatise, and the problem Fonseca had to deal with when writing his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics was to find a systematic place where to dwell on general causation.5 His solution was to spread his account among



4 For an in-depth study of Fonseca’s theory of causation in general and final causation in particular, with references and comparisons with other early modern scholastic thinkers, see: G.  Capriati, Causa e causalità finale nella scolastica gesuita dell’età moderna, Ph.D. diss., 2020 (http://www.cartesius.net/dottorato-di-ricerca/tesi-di-dottorato/ item/giuseppe-capriati-causa-e-causalita-finale-nella-scolastica-gesuita-dell-eta-moderna). 5 This issue was easier to solve in commentaries to the Physics, where Aristotle dealt with causation in general in one book (the second) and two chapters (third and seventh).

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several books of his commentary, resulting in a rather confusing and disjointed treatment. Fonseca deals with general causality both before (in book 1) and after (in book 5) special causation,6 mirroring the sparse order of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Suárez’s (and more generally, early modern scholasticism’s) choice to abandon the commentary form in favor of an independent metaphysical treatise can be illuminated by casting an in-depth look at Fonseca’s extensive but dispersive treatment of causality. Fonseca is one of the most radical advocates of causality as a specifically metaphysical problem. At his time, that was not an undisputed claim as it may seem. Determining which science had the right to deal with causation in the most appropriate way had been a thorny issue at least starting with Aristotle himself, who had treated general causality both in the Physics (II, 3) and the Metaphysics (V, 2), and in the exact same way,7 thus suggesting that there was no difference between the physical and metaphysical consideration of causes. His interpreters diverged on the topic. In the Middle Ages, the dominant positions were those held by Avicenna and Averroes. While the former thought that causality was a purely metaphysical topic, reasoning that causation was intimately tied to being and thus to its science, the latter stated that as far as Aristotelian causality was concerned, its most exhaustive consideration could only be found in physics, because metaphysics abstracts from matter (and thus from material causality) and it only deals with efficient causation as a cause of being, and not as cause of motion. I have dwelt on the history of this problem in greater detail elsewhere.8 Here it suffices to say that Fonseca decidedly sides with Avicenna, and he even pushes himself a little further when he states, as the title of the dedicated sectio, that ‘treatment of causes only belongs to the metaphysician’. Fonseca’s stance is actually a little more moderate: metaphysics is the only science with the right to deal with causes as causes (causae ut causae sunt). That does not mean that only the metaphysician can treat causes in a wider sense; physics deals with causes all the time, since causation is ubiquitous in the physical world, but it only concerns itself with the causes of motion, that is, under a special ratio; and logic does the same, but it is interested in causes as tools of scientific demonstration (another ratio specialis). Metaphysics deals with causes in themselves, under the most general ratio possible, analyzing the number of their genres and their ratio communis, that which all causes have in common regardless of their genre.9 The metaphysic consideration of causes abstracts from their matter, conjunction with motion, and



6 We only consider the thematic discussions of general causality, and not linked problems, repetitions, or particular applications to other themes. 7 Aristotle repeats almost verbatim the analysis of causality from Phys. II, 3 in Metaph. V, 2. He also deals with causation in general in other works, such as An. Post. II. 8 Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 26–187. 9 CMA (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetnzeri 1615–29; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964) I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 2, col. 314: ‘dixi de causis, ut causae sunt, quia de causis, ut sunt coniunctae cum motu, aut sub alia speciali ratione pertinente ad subiectum alicuius particularis scientiae, non dubium est, quin eadem ipsa particulartis scientia agere possit ac debeat’.

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with scientific demonstrations, thus mirroring the metaphysic approach to ens in quantum ens. Fonseca holds that those who stated that physics deals with causae ut causae sunt merely hallucinated.10 Causality and metaphysics share a deep bond. Not just because, as al-Ghazali and Avicenna had already claimed, cause/effect is one of the main distinctions of being (every being is either cause or caused),11 thus dividing the subject of metaphysics itself, but also because both the ratio causae communis and metaphysics abstract from matter.12 Aristotle did not introduce any significant variation in his metaphysical presentation of causality because he focused on the kind of causes we know best: natural causes. But if we want to turn his causes into specifically metaphysical causes we just need, according to Fonseca, to substitute motion with action, and to understand ‘action’ as any kind of operation.13 Causation is essentially operation, with or without motion. Fonseca’s conception of general causality can be defined as transcendental, in that it is inherently tied to being and metaphysics, and it focuses on causation as transcending any specific kind (natural, supernatural) or genre (material, formal, efficient, final) of causality. 2.1 Cause, Causality and Cause-Effect Relationship

In order to understand Fonseca’s detailed account of causation, it is useful to introduce an important distinction right at beginning. According to Fonseca, when we talk about causes, there are three different ways we may understand that notion: 1. 2. 3.

Pro re Relative Modo medio

A cause pro re is the being causing an effect — e.g. the Sun, or a man; unsurprisingly, the relative sense indicates the relation between a cause and its effect; lastly, the modo

10 Cf. CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 2, col. 314. 11 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 2, col. 313: ‘… causa et effectus sunt primae et adaequatae differentiae entis…’ This division transcends the subject of any other particular science and it is a specific task of metaphysics to deal with the divisions of being. 12 This does not mean, as some Averroists had thought in the Middle Ages (Siger of Brabant, to mention one), that metaphysics cannot deal with material causality. Quite the contrary, in fact: according to Fonseca, knowledge of material causality is required in metaphysics, otherwise metaphysics would not be able to provide physics with its subject. Without material causality there is no way to distinguish the region of material being (realm of physics) from that of immaterial being (realm of theology): metaphysics deals with both, and with their distinction. Cf. CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 1, col. 311. 13 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, coll. 315–16: ‘quanquam vero Aristoteles vix unquam, nisi per motum et mutatione, causas explicat, quod maxima ex parte loquatur de causis rerum naturalium, quae nobis sunt familiars, ex ii stamen definitionibus eliciendas vult, et abstrahendas eas, quae mutationem non includunt. Quod facillimum est, substitute nominee actionis in locum motus et mutationis, sumptaque actione in commune, prout omnes operationes complectitur’.

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medio refers to what we may call causality, that which makes a being (the Sun, a man) a cause14 — and for Fonseca, that is dependence. In a later passage from book 5, Fonseca clarifies that causality or ratio causandi is not the res quae causat itself, but the causing being insofar as it causes in act, that is, a cause considered under its causing power upon the effect.15 This is an important distinction to keep in mind, because priority, one of the crucial elements of causation, is only applicable to causes understood modo medio: neither the causing being, nor the cause-effect relationship can be said to imply priority. In the first case (pro re) cause and effect are not even compared, while priority entails comparison; in the second case (relative) cause and effect are understood as simultaneous, because every correlative pair is so. 2.2 Causation as Dependence

As for causality, Fonseca conceives it as ontological dependence: a cause is a being upon which another being (the effect) depends. This is clear in Fonseca’s definition of ‘cause’ as id, a quo aliquid per se pendet16 and should not be understood as something Fonseca takes for granted or inherits from his Aristotelian legacy — in fact, that is the outcome of a knowledgeable debate with the scholastic tradition that will continue far beyond Fonseca. Suárez’s definition of the cause as principium influens esse in aliud is perhaps the most (in)famous,17 partly due to Leibniz mentioning it as the paragon of scholastic jargon.18 Within the scholastic context, however, Fonseca’s definition was at least as influential as Suárez’s, and the Doctor Eximius himself went to great lengths in order to ensure that his definition was compatible with Fonseca’s.19 Influxus and dependentia quickly became the key causal concepts for the Coimbran

14 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, coll. 316–17: ‘… animadvertendum est, tribus modis posse causam accipi. Uno, pro re, quae denominatur causa, omnino tamen absolute accepta, ut pro sole, aut homine. Altero, relative, hoc est, quatenus significat relationem ad effectum, quo pacto est simul natura cum effectu. Tertio, quatenus ab ea pendet effectus, qui modus medius est inter duos traditos: atque hoc pacto non dubium est, quin causa sit prior effectu’. 15 CMA V, c. 2, q. 13, s. 3, col. 193: ‘… rationes causandi esse res ipsas, quae denominantur causae, non absolute tamen, sed quatenus actu concurrunt ad sua effecta. […] Utimur autem in hac conclusione metaphorico concurrendi verbo, quia nullum est proprium, quo causarum exercitium significetur’. 16 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, col. 316: ‘licet autem causam hunc in modum clarius describere. Causa est id, a quo aliquid per se pendet’. 17 DM XII, s. 2, § 4, p. 384b: ‘Causa est principium per se influens esse in aliud’. 18 Gottfried W. von Leibniz, Dissertatio preliminaris, in Marii Nizolii de veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos libri IV, in Die Philosophischen Schriften, ed. by c. I. Gerhardt, Berlin; Weimann, 1875–1890; rep. Hildesheim–New York: Georg Olms, 1978), vol. IV (1880), p. 148: ‘… Suarez non quidem ingeniosior, tamen audacior fuit, ed adhibito callide influxus vocabulo, causam definivit: quod influit esse in aliud, barbare satis et obscure’. Suárez’s definition is also the one which gained the most scholarly interest in recent years: for a full list of studies, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, p. 319. 19 Cf. DM XII, s. 2, § § 6–9. Here Suárez tries to prove that while Fonseca’s definition as far as its meaning is concerned (quod ad rem spectat), is indeed correct, Fonseca’s dependency vocabulary rises some thorny theological issues that are better solved by choosing the word ‘influxus’.

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and Roman models of causation respectively20 — it should come as no surprise, then, that the Coimbran authors of the Cursus conimbricensis supported Fonseca’s dependence model, thus making its scope and renown much wider, allowing it to extend its reach to natural philosophy.21 Fonseca’s dependence-based definition has several remarkable features. First, it is a fully metaphysical definition: it is conceived with metaphysical causation in mind, although it can be applied to physical causation as well. As a result, Fonseca’s definition is universal, and it includes any kind of cause, both natural and supernatural: dependency can explain everything from physical generation (the son depends upon the father) to creatio ex nihilo (the world depends on God’s creative act). Second, the definition provided by Fonseca views causality from the perspective of the effect: instead of emphasizing the action of the cause on the effect (as the influxus definition does), it focuses on the point of view of the effect, stressing its dependency from the cause. Third, Fonseca’s definition implicitly contains many crucial elements of sixteenth-century Jesuit causality such as priority (see 2.1); the essential distinction between a cause and its effect,22 which allows Fonseca to solve the thorny issue of inter-Trinitarian causation (the Father is not the cause of the Son even though the Son depends upon the Father for his being because there is no numerical distinction between the Father and the Son); the exclusion of accidental causes from the realm of proper causation through the particle per se, enabling Fonseca to rule out privations and conditiones sine quibus non (such as time and space) which are conditions but not causes of what depends from them.23 Pairing this with what we said about the numerical distinction as a requirement for causation, we can infer that dependence, in itself, does not necessarily entail causation: there can be forms of acausal dependency such as inter-Trinitarian generation and accidental causes, but every cause implies some form of dependence. As a result, dependence, as a notion, is a wider than causation. The specific form of dependence implied in causality is non-accidental (per se) dependence between two numerically distinct beings.24 Despite providing a univocal definition for it, Fonseca is well aware that ‘cause’ is an analogous term — that is precisely the reason why Aristotle never defined

20 See Capriati, ‘Quid est causa? The Debate on the Definition of ‘Cause’ in Early Jesuit Scholasticism’, Vivarium, 58/1–2 (2019), p. 122. For an in-depth discussion, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 275–77. 21 Manuel de Góis, Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae II c. 7, q. 1, a. 1, p. 241. For the attribution to Fonseca, see Góis, Commentarii II c. 7, q. 1, a. 3, p. 242: ‘causae definitionem, cuius multo uberior, et illustrior explicatio tradita est a Fonseca’. 22 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, col. 316: ‘cum dicitur, a quo aliquid pendet, satis declaratur, aliud esse causaum, aliud effectum’. Fonseca’s reasoning is that what depends upon something must be numerically distinct from it, otherwise it would only depend upon itself, but nothing can be self-dependent in this way. 23 Effects still depend upon their condition, but not directly or per se. 24 As we can see, Fonseca’s definition leaves much unsaid, at least explicitly, and it requires a dedicated explanation: this will be one of the main criticisms it will face in the ensuing debate.

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the cause in general, contenting himself with describing its main meanings (the four genres: material, formal, efficient, final). Fonseca also believes that those who attempted such a definition before him made several mistakes: his critique of classical definition of ‘cause’ as id, ad quod aliud sequitur will become a staple in the Early Modern scholastic debate, and will be regularly repeated by his successors.25 Fonseca’s definition assumes this awareness as both a starting26 and ending point,27 allowing him to conclude that there are as many rationes of ‘cause’ as there are ways for an effect to depend upon its cause28 — namely, four of them, the four genres of causes Aristotle had already established. 2.3. Fourfold Causality

Fonseca briefly deals with the ongoing scholastic dispute on the genres of causes. In his time, Aristotle’s causal pluralism was widely accepted, so causality was considered as a common concept referring to different kinds of causation — there was no univocal notion of cause. The Aristotelians generally agreed that four was the right number when it came to causality:29 the material, formal, efficient, and final causalities were regarded as the proper genres of causes. Why four? Because Aristotle himself had considered causality to be fourfold, of course, but also due to logic: according to Fonseca and most of his scholastic contemporaries, there could be neither more nor less than four genres of causes. Not more than four because all candidates for that fifth spot (such as exemplary causes and instrumental causes) could be subsumed under one of the four existing Aristotelian causes;30 but neither less than four, because neither material nor final causality31 (those usually under

25 For a detailed analysis of Fonseca’s critique, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 250–55. 26 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, col. 315: ‘… cum causae nomen sit analogum, ut Philosophi placet, nec una omnino ratione definiri queat’. 27 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, col. 316: ‘est tamen definitio haec analoga, etiam ratione ultimi verbi’. 28 Fonseca is much more radical than his followers (such as Suárez) in claiming the analogous nature of the name ‘cause’. He goes as far as to state that it not even possible to abstract a single ratio dependendi which is common to all genres of causes (cf. CMA I, q. 1, s. 3, col. 316). Under this regard, he stays truer than his epigones to Aristotle’s causal pluralism. 29 The Jesuits in particular considered the four causes as a pillar of their philosophy, as the Decretum Borgianum (1565) makes clear: this list of five guidelines and seventeen theses prescribed by Francesco Borgia included, at number two, the most straightforward support to the Aristotelian fourfold causality model. It stated: ‘Nihil defendatur quod sit contra axiomata recepta philosophorum; qualia sunt: tantum sunt quatuor genera causarum; tantum sunt quatuor elementa, et tria principia rerum naturalium’, in Monumenta paedagogica Societatis Iesu, ed. by L. Lukacs (Romae: Monumenta historica Societatis Iesu, 1974), vol. III, p. 383. 30 Under which cause specifically these causes were to be subsumed, however, was another story, and not one of widespread consensus. While instrumental causes were almost always thought to be a specific kind of efficient causes (CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 5, col. 320: ‘revocantur […] instrumenta ad causam efficientem principalem, quia illi ad agendum subserviunt’), or not considered as causes in their own right at all, the status of exemplary causation was a matter of controversy, as we will see when dealing with the formal cause (see above 3.2). 31 We will see more about the causal status of the end below, in 5.3.

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attack by reductionists) could really be declared acausal or fully reducible to other genres of causes. Causal reductionism was not unheard of, at least since the Stoics had advocated for a reduction of causation as a whole to just efficient causation.32 Occasionally, the monocausal theory had resurfaced, even in scholasticism, and it will in fact undergo a dramatic resurgence with Descartes and other Early Modern thinkers.33 Despite what some scholars think, however, it seems that causal reductionism was not a popular option in pre-cartesian scholasticism, even with regards to Suárez,34 at least explicitly.35 And in fact, Fonseca openly states that ‘the genres of causes are four, no more and no less’, and they are exactly ‘those indicated by Aristotle, not others’.36 2.4. Five Features of Causation

Twelve years separate Fonseca’s comment to the first four books of the Metaphysics (1577) and his comment to the fifth and following books (1589). It is more than enough time for reconsiderations and changes of mind to build up — and this becomes apparent even just considering the sheer number of inconsistencies between the books. As far as causality is concerned, in his commentary to book 5 of the Metaphysics, Fonseca lists five properties allowing us to distinguish a principle from a cause:37 1) Real being: Causes are always real beings, principles are not. Privations are principles, but they are not real beings, so they are not causes strictly speaking.38 2) Essential alterity: Causes are always something different from their effects, they have a numerically distinct essence compared to the essence of their effects. A principle, on the other hand, is not always essentially distinct from its principiatum,

32 Cf. Michael Frede, ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, in Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 125–50; Robert J. Hankinson, ‘Efficient Causation in the Stoic Tradition’, in Efficient Causation. A History, ed. by T. Schmaltz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 479–512. Fonseca himself is aware of this Stoicorum opinio, but he even traces it back to Plato’s Hippias Major: cf. CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 1, col. 311. 33 See Vincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez a Leibniz (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frances, 2002); Tad M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 34 Both Gilles Olivo, ‘L’efficience en cause: Suarez, Descartes et la question de la causalite’, in Descartes et le Moyen Age, ed. by J. Biard and R. Rashed (Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp. 91–105, an Vincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio, have claimed that Suárez actually reduces causality to efficiency. 35 It is one thing to say that Fonseca or Suárez reduced causality to efficiency, and another to state that such a reduction is implicit in their thought. While both positions need textual evidence, the latter leaves way more open space for interpretation. 36 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 4, col. 317: ‘iam quatuor esse causarum genera, non plura, nec pauciora, nec vero alia, quam quae ab Arist. traduntur’. 37 According to the scholastics, every cause is a principle, but not vice versa. Causes are a subset of principles, namely principles having the five features explained above. 38 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, col. 51: ‘principium et causa hoc primum differunt inter sese, quod omnis vera causa est ens, quemadmodum et omne id quod est vere causatum: non omne autem principium est ens, quemadmodum neque omne principiatum, ut patet in privatione, et in spatio extra coelum’.

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as Trinitarian relationships reveal: the Father and the Son are not numerically distinct, but the Father is the principle of the Son.39 3) Reception of being: Any effect receives its being from its causes, but a principiatum does not. Privations, for example, cannot give being to what follows from them, since they don’t have any to give in the first place, yet something is principiated by them.40 4) Essential dependence: Effects must depend upon their causes, while principiata don’t necessarily depend upon their principles. Depending is something more than just ‘receiving being from’, so the same examples seen above apply.41 5) Natural priority: Causality implies natural priority, has we have seen; ‘principiality’ does not require priority, as it is clear with Trinitarian relationships once again, since the Father cannot be said to be naturally prior to the Son (they have the same nature).42 Only three of these features were mentioned by Fonseca in his commentary to Book 1 (essential alterity, essential dependence, and natural priority). While reception of being can be seen just as the reverse side of the dependency coin, or a generalization of it, the first feature (real being) rises the issue of inner coherency. Did not Fonseca say that esse, insofar as causation is concerned, must be understood as common to both real and intentional being due to the peculiar ontological implications of final causation? How can real being be a prerequisite for causation then? Fonseca here is not thinking about the four causes; he is dealing with the distinction between causes and principles. The specification about the common concept of being must have been lost in the process. But that was an important specification indeed, one with crucial consequences on the relationship between being and causality, and thus metaphysics and its consideration of causes. This is a clear example of all the risks implied in a non-systematic discussion of causes such as Fonseca’s.

3. Intrinsic Causality: Material and Formal The five features of causality posed in Book 5 should at least be compatible with Fonseca’s treatment of special causality. But how that can be true when essential

39 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, coll. 51–52: ‘differunt deinde, quod semper causa est aliud ab effectu, hoc est, essentiae diversae numero, principium autem non necessario est diversae numero essentiae ab eo, cuius est principium, potest enim esse vel eiusdem numero essentiae, ut in divinis personis: vel saltem non diversae, ut in principiis, quae non habent rationem entis’. 40 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, col. 52: ‘differunt tertio, quod ab omni causa habet aliquod esse, id cuius est causa: non item ab omni principio, id cuius est principium: quod item patet in privatione formae, et in generatione ipsa, cuius privatio est principium: privatio enim, ut nullum esse habet, ita nullum dare potest’. 41 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, col. 52: ‘differunt quarto, quod ab omni causa pendet modo aliquo in suo esse, id cuius est causa (quod plus est, quam habere esse ab illo) non item ab omni principio id cuius est principium, quod in superioribus exeplis cerni potest’. 42 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, col. 52: ‘postremo differunt […] quod omnis causa est prior natura suo effectu: non item omne principium eo, cuius est principium: quod etiam patet in personis divinis producente, et producta, in privatione formae, ac generatione: et aliis plerisque’.

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alterity is a common property of every cause and, at the same time, intrinsic causality (material and formal) is a full-fledged form of causality itself? Is the matter of a thing something different from the thing itself? Does Socrates have a numerically distinct essence from his body? Or from his soul? Jesuit Aristotelianism has a strong predilection for extrinsic causation, and this is clear enough in their conception of general causality, that seems to rule out intrinsic causality outright. But as we have seen, Jesuits made a point of keeping the number of causes to four just as Aristotle did. But how can an extrinsicist view of causality in general be reconciled with material and formal causation? Fonseca thinks that no univocal answer can be provided to such a question without delving deep into the rationes causandi43 pertaining to individual genres of causes. 3.1. Material Causality

In order to understand material causality44 we must take a look at what matter is. According to Fonseca, matter comes in two types: prime matter and secondary matter. Prime matter is the subject (subiectum) of the substantial form, that which the substantial form ‘informs’; secondary matter, on the other hand, is the substantial composite inasmuch as it is the subject of accidental forms. Now, which one of the two is the proper ratio causandi of matter? It must be said that it is not only possible, but needed, to assign a general ratio causandi to matter, and that cannot be anything but sustaining the form, inasmuch as it exerts the function of the form, that is, insofar as it informs something.45 The causality of matter consists in sustaining (sustenere) the form, that is, in acting as the substrate of the form’s information. This is a correlative definition: the causality of the material cause cannot be understood without its relation to the form. Without the form, matter is purely passive, and cannot cause anything (let us remember that Fonseca equated metaphysical causation with operation in the first book). If we compare Fonseca’s definitions of the material cause and causality in general, we immediately spot a problem, though: how can something depend per se upon matter, if according to Fonseca (who follows Aquinas on this point) matter in itself is a potentia passiva? How can matter cause anything at all if it is completely passive 43 A cause’s ratio causandi is nothing else than its causality. Cf. CMA V, c. 2, q. 1, s. 2, coll. 72–73: ‘… ratio causandi, quam recentiores causalitatem appellant, nihil aliud [est], quam id, quo causa actu ac formaliter causat (quo pacto ratio causandi agentis non est vis, qua agere potest, sed dici solet actio ipsa, qua actu et formaliter agit, et a qua formaliter denominatur agens)’. 44 We cannot dwell, here, on the many specific quaestiones pertaining to material causality. To name but one of them, the Aristotelian tradition always had its fair share of troubles including material causality in a metaphysical account of causes: that was precisely the reason why Averroes thought that the physical consideration of causes was more universal than the metaphysical one, since metaphysics cannot deal with causes that include matter (according to Averroes, the subject of metaphysics is immaterial being, after all), while physics can. 45 CMA V, c. 2, q. 1, s. 3, col. 74: ‘Dicendum est igitur unam generalem causandi rationem in materia non solum assignari posse, sed etiam debere, eamque nihil esse aliud, quam sustinere formam, quatenus exercet officium formae (seu quod idem est) quo ad informationem’.

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on its own? More generally: how can we reconcile the activity implied in causation with the passivity entailed by matter? … since matter is a passive power, its ratio causandi must consist in this, namely that its action depends upon matter itself as sustaining [the form] (in fact, there is no other way for an act to depend upon a passive power, inasmuch as it passive).46 Matter seems to be just a condition for formal causation, since it is causal only insofar as it sustains the form and allows the action (performed by the form) to take place. This is a rather circular definition, which immediately prompts us to further investigate the causality of the form. 3.2. Formal Causality

According to Fonseca, form can be understood in two senses: intrinsically, as informing form, and extrinsically, as exemplary form.47 ‘Form, or action, or perfection (all these terms actually mean the same thing) is double: one exemplar, the other informing. The exemplar is the form that gives being through its participated similitude; the informing is the form [that gives being] through a real conjunction with its subject’.48 This is a result of Fonseca’s inclusion of exemplar causality within formal causality, one of the most studied and original aspects of his account of causation.49 Setting exemplary causation aside for the moment, we will focus on the informing formal cause, and particularly on the causality of the substantial form — this is the Fonseca’s

46 CMA V, c. 2, q. 1, s. 3, col. 74: ‘Praeterea, cum materia sit potentia quaedam: ex ordine ad actum vendicare sibi debebit rationem causandi, quemadmodum caeterae potentiae: cum illa igitur sit potentia passiva, in eo consistere debet eius causandi ratio, quod eius actio pendeat ab illa ut sustinente (neque enim aliter actus potest pendere a potentia passiva, ut passiva est) atqui non omnis actus materiae, quem formam appellamus, pendet a materia, ut a qua sustineatur quoad existentiam, ut patet in forma humana: et tamen omnis forma pendet ab ea quo ad informationem: igitur hoc ipsum est, in quo eius causandi ratio consistit’. 47 The informing form is further divided in substantial and accidental form: cf. CMA V, c. 2, q. 2, s. 1, col. 77. 48 CMA V, c. 2, q. 2, s. 1, col. 77: ‘Forma sive actus, sive perfectio (idem enim haec omnia significat) duplex est: una exemplaris, altera informans. Exemplaris est, quae sui participata similitudine dat esse: informans, quae per realem sui coniunctionem cum subiecto’. 49 Fonseca’s conception of exemplar causality has gained a remarkable (yet justified, on the grounds of its originality) amount of scholarly attention. This allows us not to focus too much on this theme here, saving space for more uncharted areas of Fonseca’s thought. For details, see: Cassiano Abranches, ‘A Causa exemplar em Pedro da Fonseca’, in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 14/1 (1958), pp. 3–10; Cristiano Casalini, Aristotele a Coimbra. Il ‘Cursus Conimbricensis’ e l’educazione nel ‘Collegium Artium’ (Roma: Anicia, 2012), pp. 217–25; Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘As palavras e as coisas: o tema da causalidade em Portugal (seculos XVI e XVIII)’, Revista Filosofica de Coimbra, 36 (2009), pp. 227–57, in part. pp. 231–35; Michael Renemann, Gedanken als Wirkursachen. Francisco Suarez zur geistigen Hervorbringung (Amsterdam-Philadephia: B. R. Gruner Publishing Company, 2010), pp. 59–78.

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focus as well, since he believes that the ratio causandi of other kinds of form can be later deducted from the causality of the substantial form itself. The ratio causandi of the form will then consist in actualizing matter per se, that is, through its real conjunction with matter, form communicates it some perfection.50 The substantial form causes by communicating some form or perfection to matter, which makes the latter actual and thus enables it to cause while at the same time constituting the composite, which will also have a causality in itself. Exemplar causes have a different causality grounded on imitation and similitude.51 The circularity in the definition of the rationes causandi of the two intrinsic causes still has to be solved, however. If matter depends upon form in order to exert some form of causality, does form depend upon matter too? Apparently, without a matter to actualize, the form’s causal power would have no subject to inform. The problem can even be generalized, asking if matter depends upon form also for its being, and if the same holds true for the form with regards to matter. Fonseca devotes a whole quaestio to this theme.52 In short, he thinks that matter and form have a dual causality: in themselves and as one. Matter and form exist before their actual conjunction in a composite.53 Our question can thus be understood with respect to the aptitudinal being (esse essentiae as abstracted from esse existentiae) or the actual being of a thing. As far as the former is concerned, Fonseca thinks that matter and form have a mutual essential dependence upon one another.54 Things are a little bit more complicated with actual being. Here there is one preliminary decision to make about matter’s existence: if matter needs form in order to exist, it would not exist ex sese, as claimed by Aquinas, Cajetan, the Ferrariensis, Capreolus and Durand de Saint–Pourçain, among others. On the other hand, according to some Scotists and Nominalists ( John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, John Major, Gabriel Biel), matter has its own existence independently and separately from form. Fonseca does not take sides here, but

50 CMA V, c. 2, q. 2, s. 2, col. 77: ‘Erit ergo ratio causandi formae in eo sita, ut per se ipsam actuet materiam, hoc est, per realem sui coniunctionem cum materia illi communicet aliquam perfectionem’. 51 CMA V, c. 2, q. 2, s. 2, col. 78: ‘… atque adeo ipsius propriam, dixi: per se ipsam, realemve sui coniunctionem, ut excluderem formam exemplare, de cuius ratione causandi non agimus hoc loco, nam etsi principalis forma est, non tamen actuat per se ipsam, realique sui coniunctione cum rebus informatis, sed per partecipatas sui similitudines’. 52 CMA V, c. 2, q. 3. This is erroneously classified as q. 4 in the edition I am using. 53 Cf. CMA V, c. 2, q. 2, s. 2, col. 79. 54 CMA V, c. 2, q. 3, s. 1, coll. 79–80: ‘si esse formae, ac materiae sumatur pro esse aptitudinali, ut vocatur, id est pro esse essentiae abstrahentis ab esse existentiae, perspicuum est materiam pendere in suo esse a forma, et vicissim formam a materia: quandoquidem materia est essentialiter propensa ad formam, et forma ad materiam, ita ut quoad huiusmodi esse in diverso genere causae mutuo respiciant essentiali respectu, quem transcendentem appellant: materia quidem formam, ut causam suam formalem aptitudinalem: forma vero materiam ut causam suam materialem subiectivam, aptitudinalem tamen, non actualem’.

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he will in his commentary to Book 8:55 since it is pure power, matter cannot exist in act without form. Within the ordinary course of nature, matter depends upon form as the real cause of its actual being for both its production (in fieri) and conservation (in conservari).56 Without form, matter would be idle, since it cannot act in any way on its own. But since nature does nothing without a purpose, it is necessary that matter has some kind of operation to justify its existence, and this operation needs the information of the form as its source.57 A finalistic tenet is used here to solve a delicate issue. One could see this as a workaround, since Fonseca has not yet demonstrated that nature does nothing in vain, but we will come to that. For now, we should note that final causality, or a consequence thereof, seems to be at least partially needed to ground material causality. As for form’s dependence upon matter, the problem gets even more complicated. If we only consider substantial forms, it is easy to say, for the reasons explained above, that they actually depend upon matter for their actual being. The problem is whether substantial form depends upon matter only for its production, only for its conservation, or for both. Those forms that cannot be separated by matter — both corruptible, as the form of horse or lion, and incorruptible, such as the form of celestial bodies — clearly depend on matter both for their production and their conservation. Forms that can be separated from matter, however, add another layer of complexity. These are forms that in nature can exist on their own, such as the rational soul. These forms clearly do not depend upon matter in fieri, absolutely speaking. There would be no point in delving deeper in this sophisticated quaestio. The causal outcome of this debate is all that matters for our purposes. After our short overview, we can conclude that matter and form are both true causes, so much so that their causality is even double: upon matter depend both the form and the composite, and upon form depend both matter and the composite.58 55 Cf. CMA VIII, c. 1, q. 1, cols 441A–445A. On the existence of matter separately from form in medieval (and partly Early Modern) scholasticism, see: Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes. 1274–1671 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 35–40; Dennis Des Chene, ‘Descartes and the natural philosophy of the Coimbra commentaries’ in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, ed. by S. Gaukroger and others (London-New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 29–45, in part. pp. 30–37. 56 CMA V, c. 2, q. 3, s. 2, col. 81: ‘… dicendum est, materiam naturaliter pendere in suo esse actuali a formis substantialibus, et in fieri, et in conservari’. 57 CMA V, c. 2, q. 3, s. 2, col. 81: ‘cuius rei haec est generalis ratio, quia ea, quae per se naturaliter existere non possunt, necessario indigent aliquo cuius vi et quasi adminiculo existant: materia vero cum sit pura potentia, et ideo per se nullam operationem habere valeat, non potest per se existere esset enim ociosa, quod ne accidat, tota natura refugit. Cum igitur omnis operatio materialis sit a forma informante, necessario efficitur, nullam materia aut fieri, aut conservari posse sine forma, nisi Deus peculiarem concursum formae suppleat in ea causanda et conservanda’. 58 CMA V, c. 2, q. 3, s. 2, col. 83: ‘… si animadvertatur in ratione causandi materiae duo reperiri, licet non respectu cuiusvis formae, unum quod sustineat esse formae in informando, et (quod hinc sequitur) concurrat cum ea in constituendo composito: alterum, quod sustineat esse formae simpliciter et absolute. Similiter autem in ratione causandi cuiuslibet formae duo cerni: unum, quod informet materiam, et ex consequenti cum ea constituat compositum: alterum, quod concurrat ad aliquod esse actuale materiae, simpliciter et absolute sumptum’.

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4. Efficient Causality The Early Modern age of philosophy is usually associated with a strong privilege of efficient causation. The new scientific paradigm imposed a shift in causal models, leading many to move away from Aristotle’s multi-causal system to a reductionist approach to causality where the only causes worth investigating, from a scientific point of view, are efficient causes. Although this was never a unanimous decision and many thinkers strived to defend the pertinence of material, formal and final causation, as a matter of fact, even within early modern scholasticism, efficient causes gained the upper hand and were considered as causes per antonomasiam. This privilege can be observed in its nascent phase in late sixteenth-century scholasticism, when thinkers such as Suárez will devote hundreds of pages to the efficient cause, now thought of as the paradigm for causation as a whole. Fonseca’s treatment of efficient causality is no exception to this general tendency. His analysis of efficient causes is subtle and extensive, and more than any other genre of causes, it seeps into several connected quaestiones outside of the inquiry on causality. Creation, providence, predestination, fate, necessity and contingency, grace, free will: all these crucial problems in early modern scholasticism were based on one’s conception of efficient causation. It is plain to see, then, why Jesuit schoolmen devoted so much attention to this cause. It has been said much about Suárez’s conception of efficient causes.59 Fonseca’s analysis, on the other hand, gained significantly less scholarly attention, although it clearly anticipated many of the questions and solutions that Suárez himself will be concerned with. Fonseca’s approach to efficient causation is one of the direct sources of Suárez’s discussion, but it has been given less credit than it deserves by scholars. Although we cannot hope to deal with all of the themes connected to efficient causation here, neither can we trace Suárez’s theses back to Fonseca’s conclusions in a systematic manner,60 a mere overview of Fonseca’s conception of efficient causality will be more than enough to show its relevance in early modern thought.

59 Cf. Jacob Tuttle, ‘Suárez’s Non-Reductive Theory of Efficient Causation’, in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. by R. Pasnau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 125–58; Stephan Schmid, ‘Efficient Causality. The Metaphysics of Production’, in Suárez on Aristotelian Causality, ed. by J. L. Fink (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 85–121; Schmaltz, ‘Efficient Causation: From Suarez to Descartes’, in Efficient Causation. A History, ed. by T. M. Schmaltz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 139–64; Carraud, Causa sive ratio; Olivo, ‘L’efficience en cause’. 60 For a first attempt at this, see Eleuterio Elorduy Maurica, ‘Influjo de Fonseca en Suárez’, in Actas do I Congresso Nacional de Filosofia, in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 11 (1955), pp. 507–19. With regards to causality, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, where I argue against Maurica, who claimed that Fonseca’s influence on Suárez is not tangible in the disputations about causes, explaining: ‘no me ocurre otra explicacion de esta escasez, que la gran novedad introducida por Suárez en la filosofia escolastica en este importante tratado’ (p. 516). The point is that Suárez does mention Fonseca in the causal disputations, but does so indirectly, as he usually does with contemporary authors. E.g., when Suárez reports Fonseca’s definition of the cause in DM XII, he attributes it to aliqui moderni,

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4.1. Different Types of Efficient Causes

Efficient causes come in two types: primary and instrumental. Primary efficient causes are the ones we properly attribute action to, while instrumental causes are used by primary efficient causes in order to produce their action.61 Here we will focus on primary efficient causes, as Fonseca himself does. In order to distinguish them from instrumental causes, Fonseca offers a simple rule: the truly efficient cause is the one that ‘touches’ the effect, the most proximate one.62 Many causal processes involve multiple efficient cause, which may act together in order to produce and effect or be subordinate to one another: the efficient cause, in those cases, is the proximate cause. It is worth noting, however, that primary efficient causes can be further divided into several subtypes: truly efficient and moral efficient causes; univocal and equivocal efficient causes; mediate and immediate causes; total and partial causes, and so on. Another important distinction is between causes of motion and efficient causes in the proper sense. Although this difference was made canon by Avicenna,63 Fonseca dates it back to Aristotle himself (Met. II, 5, 2). One thing is to be the cause of the motion of something, and another is to be the cause of its being. Since any cause of motion produces something in the subject by introducing a form in it,64 any cause of motion is an efficient cause as well. Efficient causes in the strictest sense, however, are only those that produce the esse of their effect. ‘Efficient’ can thus be understood as a general label including both causes of motion and causes of being, or — in a stricter sense — only as a cause of production. 4.2. Efficiency, Action, Influxus

When it comes to defining the causality or ratio causandi of the efficient cause, Fonseca is aware that there can be many. An efficient cause can produce an effect (agere, sive efficere aliquid) or act on it (agere in aliquid); it can draw out (educere)

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without mentioning Fonseca directly. That this was Fonseca’s definition was however clear to the scholastic reader, and made explicit by other scholastic thinkers such as the Coimbran authors of the Curso Conimbricensis. CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 1, col. 92: ‘Efficiens causa duplex est, principalis et instrumentalis. Principalis est, cui proprie ac simpliciter attribuitur action. Instrumentalis, qua principalis ad agendum utitur’. CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 1, col. 92: ‘Causa vere efficiens est, quae vere attingit effectum, ut faber, ut securis’. Étienne Gilson, Avicenne et les origines de la notion de cause efficiente, in Atti del XII congresso internazionale di filosofia, 9 (1958), pp. 121–30; Gilson, ‘Notes pour l’histoire de la notion de cause efficiente’, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 37 (1962), pp. 7–31; rep. in Gilson, Etudes Medievales (Paris: Vrin, 1986), pp. 167–91; Jean Jolivet, ‘La repartition des causes chez Aristote et Avicenne: le sens d’un deplacement’, in Lectionum varietates. Hommage a Paul Vignaux, ed. by J. Jolivet and others (Paris: Vrin, 1991), pp. 49–65; Carraud, Causa sive ratio, pp. 72–74; Kara Richardson, ‘Avicenna’s Conception of the Efficient Cause’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21 (2013), pp. 220–39; Richardson, ‘Efficient Causation from Ibn Sīnā to Ockham’, in Efficient Causation. A History, ed. by T. Schmaltz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 105–31. CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 1, col. 93: ‘Omnis enim causa, quae movet, seu mutat, subiectum efficit, compositum aliquod ex subiecto, et forma, quam in illud inducit’.

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the form from matter’s potentiality, or it can bring the form into (inducere) matter; it can also operate on the basis of something preexisting (ex aliquo) or come from nothing (ex nihilo), such as creation. To bring unity to this multiplicity, Fonseca initially resorts to the notion of action: Action is the general ratio causandi of the efficient cause; accordingly, every agent is said to formally act through action, whether it is considered as it produces something, or as it acts on something; inasmuch as it draws out the form from the potentiality of matter […], or inasmuch as it brings the form in [the matter]; as it produces something out of nothing, or from something.65 Action is what holds all the particular rationes causandi of efficiency together. But here immediately arises a problem: already in the first book of his commentary, Fonseca clearly stated that the metaphysical conception of causality can be obtained by substituting motion with action.66 Should we conclude, then, that the ratio causandi of the efficient cause can be used to refer to causality as a whole? Is Fonseca a causal reductionist in disguise? Does he think that the efficient cause in the only true cause? Of course not. Fonseca goes to great lengths to defend Aristotle’s causal pluralism. In the first book of his commentary, he specified very clearly that action can be understood as an equivalent for causation in general only under the condition of taking ‘action’ as meaning ‘any kind of operation’. When he writes about the efficient cause, however, this specification is nowhere to be seen, and intentionally so, because the ratio causandi of the efficient cause is action insofar as it produces (efficit) something. There are, however, other reasons to reject action as the causality of efficient causes, and they will eventually lead Fonseca to abandon this route. Fonseca mentions Hervé de Nédellec (Hervaeus Natalis), Paolo Barbo (Soncinas), and other unspecified Thomists as the main adversaries of action as the ratio causandi of the efficient cause. We can summarize their position in the three following arguments: 1. Since action essentially depends upon the agent, it is an effect of the efficient cause; but the ratio causandi of a cause cannot be its effect, because causality must be prior to the effect, otherwise the effect itself would not exist in the first place. 2. Action and the thing produced through it cannot be really distinguished, except for a different grade of perfection. The heat in the act of producing heat is not something else from the heat as a produced thing. So, if action was the causality of the efficient cause, there would be no way to distinguish the effect of the efficient cause from its ratio causandi, because they would be one and the same. 3. Creation is an instance of efficient causation, but it takes place without any action. Also, action implies a pre-existing subject to act on, but creation happens ex nihilo.

65 CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, col. 94: ‘actionem esse generaem rationem causandi causae efficientis; siquidem omne agens per actionem dicitur formaliter agree: sive spectetur, quatenus agit aliquid, sive quatenus agit in aliquid, sive quatenus educit forma ex potentia materiae subiective cuiuscunque, sive quatenus rem efficit ex nihilo, sive quatenus ex aliquo’. 66 Cf. CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, cols 315–16.

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Fonseca finds these arguments to be sound. In the ordinary language, actio refers to an operation of an agent that supposes a subject. But as we have seen, this rules out some legitimate instances of efficient causation such as creation and also creates other priority issues. As a result, Fonseca thinks that when we use actio as a ratio causandi for the efficient cause, we must understand it as an influxus through which something goes from potency to act.67 This influx is the defining element of efficient causation: when there is influxus there is also an agent that is actually acting to keep it in place, while when there is none, there is not efficient causation whatsoever, because there is no agent causing. So, when it is said that efficient causation is the first source of change, what it really meant by that is that causal influx, as brought about by the agent, is the source of change.68 It is this influxus, then, the true causality of the efficient cause. As we can see, Suárez was not inventing anything, as Leibniz said, when he used an influxus terminology to describe efficient causation. This conclusion raises an interesting point. As it is well known, Francisco Suárez will define causality in general through the notion of influxus. Naturally, he will reserve a stricter sense of influxus to the efficient cause, but this does not prevent efficient causation to take the throne of causa per antonomasiam, the causal genre that expresses causality more properly. In light of this, we can interpret Fonseca’s influxus-based conception of efficient causation as a way out of causal reductionism. As we have seen, Fonseca had said in Book 1 that action, understood in the most general sense as any kind of operation, is the ratio causae communis, the common concept that holds together all four genres of Aristotelian causes in their metaphysical sense. By opting for influxus as the causality of efficient cause after explaining that influxus is but a certain kind of action, Fonseca dodges the trap of causal reductionism and is able to stay true to his original multi-causal intention. His account of efficient causation does not suggest (as will Suárez’s) the reduction of causality to efficiency altogether, and so manages to cling more firmly to the Aristotelian tradition while still acknowledging the importance of the efficient cause. 4.3. Occasionalism, Creationism, Concurrentism

Having dealt with the defining elements of efficient causation, we can now briefly touch upon three of the most important related themes in early modern scholasticism. Our aim is not to provide an extensive analysis of problems that take up several quaestiones each and certainly deserve a dedicated study, but to quickly hint at Fonseca’s solution to them in order to see his conception of efficient causation at work. God’s causal presence in the world is a vital tenet of any early modern scholastic philosophy. The world depends upon God for both its creation and conservation. That God was the first cause of motion and being in the world had been proved with countless demonstrations. But what about created beings? Can they cause

67 CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, coll. 95–96: ‘cum actio dicitur ratio causandi, crediderim actionis nomen accipiendum esse pro influxu, quo aliquid potentia ad actum perducitur’. 68 CMA V, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, col. 96.

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independently from God? Do they have a causal power on their own? The status of secondary causes will be matter of debate well into early modern (even non-scholastic) philosophy, and it had been so at least starting from al-Ghazali and his renowned occasionalist view, according to which only God causes in the strict sense, while created things just give God an occasion to exert causal power. When Fonseca asks himself Num res aliae infra Deum aliquid agant, he is essentially interrogating the causality of secondary causes. That was a vexata quaestio in his time already: Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and many others had contended with it in the past, but in recent times, some recentiores such as Pierre d’Ailly (Petrus Aliacensis) and Gabriel Biel had inclined toward that direction. Occasionalists believe that ‘any acting power should be negated to things other than God, and only God acts’.69 In Fonseca’s view, however, occasionalism is outright absurd: even Aquinas, who used to be so measured in his reproaches to false theories, defined occasionalism as foolish.70 There is nothing more ‘clear and evident’ than that fire heats, water cools, the Sun illuminates.71 The occasionalists think that fire is not but the occasion for God to heat, but that just is not true. God is present in any form of causation, but not as the only causal power involved. Granting causal power to secondary causes does not mean, however, that they have enough to create. Here the adversary is Avicenna, who tried to solve the atavistic tension between causality and transcendence of God by resorting to a theory where God only creates the first intelligence directly, and then the first intelligence goes on to create the rest of created being.72 Fonseca is firmly convinced that this is not true: no creature has creation in its power, neither as a primary nor as an instrumental cause.73 Created beings can cause, but cannot create: they can only exert some forms of efficient causation, not all of them as God can. Furthermore, created causes always need God’s cooperation in order to cause. Here, Durand de Saint-Pourçain is the main opponent: this controversial French Dominican thought that created beings could act without God’s concursus, that is, in virtue of their own causal power without any external aid. Fonseca sharply examines Durand’s arguments,74 whose ramification went as deep as to touch crucial theological issues such as predestination, grace, and free will (humans are secondary causes, and the way their actions should be judged hinges upon this delicate matter). Fonseca’s opinion is aligned with the shared Jesuit theory: secondary causation happens

69 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 1, col. 113: ‘Non defuerunt, qui rebus aliis infra Deum omnem agendi vim negandam esse putaverint: solumque Deum aliquid agere crediderint’. 70 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 2, col. 115: ‘Sed adeo absurda est haec opinio, ut merito eam D. Thom. alioqui in reprehendendo modestissimus, in 2. sent. d. 1, q. 1, art. 4 stultam appellet’. 71 CMA V, c. 2, q. 7, s. 2, col. 115: ‘Primum enim negat sensum. Quid enim clarius et evidentius, quam quod ignis calefaciat, aqua refrigeret, Sol illuminet, lapis percutiat, et similia?’. 72 Cf. CMA V, c. 2, q. 8, s. 1, col. 122. 73 CMA V, c. 2, q. 8, s. 2, col. 124: ‘Dicendum tamen est nullam creaturam create posse sive principaliter sive ut instrumentum’. 74 Cf. CMA V, c. 2, q. 9, s. 1.

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through concursus. God cooperates with the created being in causal processes,75 but the primary cause of this causal process is the created cause, not God himself. The production of an effect is the result of a combined effort of God and the causing creature, a concursus. God’s cooperation, however, does not make the action double: God concurs with the secondary cause by cooperating in the action of the secondary cause itself, not with a numerically distinct action.76 God’s concursus is not mediated by other causes, but is not necessary for any single instance of causation: for example, when the fire ignites the wood, if the fire is close enough to the wood, combustion happens even without God’s concurrence. If the right conditions are met, God’s concursus is not always necessary,77 although the actions of both intellect and will usually involve God’s concurrence.

5. Final Causality Final causation was topic of debate throughout medieval and early modern scholasticism. Although it was included in Aristotle’s four causes, there was a growing tendency to question its causal status due to the intentional nature of finality. Such an attitude was especially widespread in physics, where Aristotle’s finalistic view of natural processes had started witnessing assaults since the time of (at the latest) Jean Buridan. Early modern non-scholastic philosophy will do away with final causation, at least until thinkers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Robert Boyle tried a last stand in its favor, reopening a debate that is still alive today in biological sciences: is teleology required to explain natural phenomena? Here, we are not specifically concerned with the problem of teleology understood as natural finalism.78 Fonseca, as most of his scholastic peers of the late sixteenth-century, did not question the traditional axiom according to which everything in nature 75 CMA V, c. 2, q. 9, s. 2, col. 124: ‘… omne ages creatum ideo dicitur agere, quia simul cum Deo et dependenter ab illo concurrit ad eundem effectum, hoc est, ad suum, quod fieri nequit, nisi Deo immediate concurrente…’ 76 CMA V, c. 2, q. 9, s. 3, col. 143: ‘Dicendum est igitur, Deum agere cum creatura eadem numero actione, quae creatura agit’. 77 CMA V, c. 2, q. 9, s. 3, col. 143: ‘etsi Deus per seipsum potest movere creaturam etiam corporalem ad aliquid agendum, quo pacto quidam Philosophi volunt illum sine ministerio alterius movere primum mobile, et saepe re vera movet intellectum et voluntatem, aliquid in eis imprimendo; tamen eo motu non movet Deus omnia. Neque enim Deus sic movet ignem, ut comburat, si iam proximus est materiae combustibili, nec lapidem ut descendat deorsum, si iam subtactum est impedimentum…’ 78 For a detailed study of this problem, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale. Cf. also Stephan Schmid, ‘Finality without Final Causes? Suárez’s Account of Natural Teleology’, Ergo. An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 16 (2015, 2), pp. 393–425; Schmid, Finalursachen in der fruhen Neuzeit, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011); Jeffrey K. McDonough, ‘The Heyday of Teleology and Early Modern Philosophy’, in Early Modern Philosophy Reconsidered, ed. by J. Carriero, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 35 (2011), pp. 179–204; Margaret J. Osler, ‘Whose Ends? Teleology in Early Modern Natural Philosophy’, Osiris, 16 (2001), pp. 151–68; Des Chene, Physiologia. Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca-London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Anneliese Maier, ‘Ursachen

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happens according to an end (as we have seen above, he even resorts to it when proving material causality). Panfinalism, the idea that everything acts for the sake of an end, was tied so intimately with the scholastic view that it was inseparable from it. For the scholastics, the end of all things was, of course, God: for some, such as Aquinas and his followers, this ultimate end was the knowledge of God (at least for rational beings); for others, such as many Franciscans, it was loving God. Regardless, virtually every scholastic thinker held that everything was ultimately ordered toward God as its final end. This overarching teleological framework is rooted in a series of interconnected problems which will be the focus of our attention here: what is an end? Is the end a cause? And if so, how does it cause? All these questions were matter of controversy at Fonseca’s time. Although very few scholastic thinkers dared to depart so radically from Aristotle as to outright deny causal status to the final cause, many (especially among the Nominales) had radically undermined the consensus on the causality of the end, pointing to its moral nature, its connection with knowledge and therefore arguing that final causes could only apply to rational beings such as humans. Fonseca’s discussion of the final cause takes up two entire quaestiones of his de causis treatise developed while commenting on chapter 2 of Book 5 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In q. 10, after an overview of the distinctions of the end (s. 1) and of the end’s effects (s. 2), Fonseca devotes three sections to the causality of the end: in the first one (s. 3) he explains and refutes some opinions on this topic, in the second one (s. 4) he offers his own solution of the problem, and in the last one he solves two difficulties stemming from his opinion. The following quaestio (q. 11) is wholly devoted to the ontological status of the final cause, that is, whether the end causes through its intentional or real being. 5.1. The End in Cause

Fonseca defines the end as ‘that for the sake of which something is done’ (id, cuius gratia aliquid fit). This is a standard scholastic definition, inherited from the medieval tradition. Just like formal and efficient causes, the end has its fair share of subdivisions: a study of these subdivisions would take us too far into the depths of scholastic terminology and distinctions.79 Suffice it to say that, according to Fonseca, something can be an end of something else in a variety of ways, the most relevant of which are as a goal (finis cuius) or as a beneficiary (finis cui). The finis cuius is the end an agent tries to achieve with its action,80 while the finis cui is the agent itself as the ultimate

und Krafte’, in Die Vorlaufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhunderts (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949), pp. 53–78; Maier, ‘Finalkausalitat und Naturgesetz’, in Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1955), pp. 273–335. 79 For an in-depth look at these distinctions in the whole Jesuit tradition, see: Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 421–81. 80 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 1, col. 153: ‘Finis cuius dicitur id, cuius consequendi aliquid fit, sive id sit res aliqua, quae per actionem fiat, veluti domus, cuius aedificandae gratia artifex operatur, sive actio immanens, per quam nihil alium fiat, veluti contemplatonione, sine usus aut fruitio rei, ut habitatio

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end of the action.81 For example, if I build a house for myself to find shelter from the elements, my action of building the house has two ends: the actual construction of the house (finis cuius) and my personal safety (finis cui). Now, according to Fonseca, any goal (finis cuius) has always a beneficiary (finis cui) for the sake of whose interest it is sought after,82 while the beneficiary itself may not be subordinated to another end. This does not mean, as Ockham claimed, that only the beneficiary is a true end. Both finis cuius and finis cui are ends, because they both are that for the sake of which something is done, so the definition of the end can be applied to both.83 Fonseca does not take a reductionist approach to ends, so he considers non-ultimate ends as ends in the proper sense. Can the end understood in this way be conceived as having causal power? Is there such thing as a final cause? Unlike many other scholastics, who had dedicated quaestiones for this problem, Fonseca believes that the only way to get an answer is to analyze the causality of the end: only after determining how the end may cause, we can consider if it actually does or not. 5.2. The Causality of the End

The general consensus, among the scholastics, was (and will be) that the causality of the end consists in a metaphorical motion (motio metaphorica): the end causes by moving its effect in a metaphoric manner, that is, without physically moving it. The motion, and thus the causality, of the end would then be to move the agent to act. The end acts as the purpose for the action, and no action can take place without an end. This is again the teleological view surfacing, and it bonds final and efficient causes tight together: no efficient cause acts blindly (temere, without an end), and no final cause can have an effect without an efficient cause taking it as its purpose. Efficiency and finality are interdependent, similarly to how material and formal causes depend on each other to ground their respective causalities. One can understand how this might result in a reductionist claim by those interested to rule the end out of causality’s realm. The way most understood the motio metaphorica of the end was that the final cause exerts an attraction of the agent, leading it to love and desire the end and act accordingly in order to achieve it. The end is thus the object of will. Unsurprisingly, such a conception paved the way for those who claimed that final causation can only apply to rational beings: the will does not want anything without knowing it before (I cannot want a cake, if I do not know what a cake is); so the end must be known beforehand, and then can become the object of the will. So, for the end to exert its causality, the agent in question must be rational. domus, aut voluptas, quae ex contemplatione percipitur…’ 81 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 1, col. 153: ‘Finis cui, dicitur id, in cuius gratiam aliquid fit, quo pacto is, qui aegrotat, est finis curationis’. 82 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 1, col. 153: ‘… finis Cuius semper dirigitur in aliquem finem Cui. Finis autem Cui ex ratione sua non necessario dirigitur in alium finem’. 83 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 1, col. 154: ‘… utrumque genus in finibus simplicitier numerari posse, cum uterque illorum dicatur id, gratia cuius agens operatur…’.

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This was a delicate question. Natural finalism was paramount to scholastic theology and philosophy, and no one was ready to fully dismiss it. Those critiques made its justification even harder though: how can a non-rational being such as any natural being act according to an end if it cannot know it? Can the end still attract an irrational being to act? Are the actions of natural beings (i.e. an animal, but also fire, a stone, etc.) intentional in some way? The common solution to these difficulties was artificialism: it is God who knows the end of natural beings, and he created them accordingly, so that they pursued their ends even without knowing them on their own. Nature acts for the sake of ends because it was created by God and ordered in such a way that everything seeks its own good. Artificialism led many to criticize the use of final causes in science: conceded that ends exist in nature, if they are God’s end, we cannot hope to know them anyway, because they exceed our rationality — expecting to divine God’s ends would be foolhardy, as Descartes will say.84 So even if final causes have an ontological foundation (they exist, things in nature have ends), they are of no use to our understanding of the world. Essentially, final causes lost their explanatory power outside of theology and ethics.85 As it can be seen, all this debate is based on motio metaphorica as the causality of the end, a widespread solution that was adopted by the vast majority of scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages and the early modern period. Among its supporters we find some illustrious names: Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Francisco Suárez, and many others. Surprisingly, however, Fonseca takes a completely different path and begins with denying that metaphorical motion can be the causality of the final cause. Several renowned authors, among which are Saint Thomas […], Scotus, […] Avicenna […], and others of the same level, thought that the ratio causandi of the final cause consists in moving the efficient cause so that it achieves the final cause itself through a metaphorical or figurative (translatitium) motion, […]. However, it seems like those authors were not talking about the final causal universally, but only with respect to created efficient causes.86 84 Descartes uses this expression while answering to Gassendi’s objections: ‘Quaecunque deinde affers pro causa finali, ad efficientem sunt referenda; ita ex usu partium in plantis, in animalibus etc., effectorem Deum mirari, et ex inspectione operum cognoscere ac glorificare opificem, par est, non autem quo fine quidque fecerit divinare. Ac quamvis in Ethicis, ubi saepe conjecturis uti licet, aliquando sit pium considerare quem finem conjicere possimus Deum sibi in regendo universo proposuisse, certe in Physicis, ubi omnia firmissimis rationibus niti debent, est ineptum. Nec fingi potest aliquos Dei fines, magis quam alios, in propatulo esse; omnes enim in imperscrutabili ejus sapientiae abysso sunt eodem modo reconditi. Nec etiam fingere debes neminem mortalium causas alias posse intelligere; nulla enim non est cognitu multo facilior quam Dei finis; et eas ipsas quas in exemplum difficultatis proponis, non nemos existimat se novisse’. (AT VII, pp. 374–75). 85 For a more detailed account of this problem, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 802–1031. 86 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 3, coll. 159–60: ‘Multi magnique nominis auctores, in quibus sunt Divus Thomas […], Scotus […], Avicenna […] aliique eiusdem classis, in eo videntur rationem causandi finalis causae constituere, quod motu metaphorico, sive translatitio moveat efficientem causam, ut sui obtinendi gratia aliquid agat, […]. Videntur tamen hi auctores non de ratione causandi finalis causae universe loqui, sed tantum respectu efficientis creatis’.

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Metaphorical motion can at best describe final causation when rational agents are involved. Fonseca acknowledges this, and defends his scholastic predecessors by limiting the application of their statements on the causality of the final cause to the field of rational agency (if that was their original intention is, however, another story). Does this mean that motio metaphorica is adequate to explain the causality of the final cause with respect to rational agents? Fonseca does not say it explicitly, but the framework of his metaphysical causality would not allow that. As we have seen, so long as we conceive causation in terms of motion, we are talking only about physical causation. Metaphorical motion can therefore at the very best be the way in which physics deals with final causation in rational agency. But this is not Fonseca’s area of interest. In metaphysics, causation must be understood as operation and do away with motion. Metaphorical or not, any causality depending upon motion is rather physical than metaphysical. If metaphorical motion cannot be accepted as the metaphysical causality of the end, final causality must be reinterpreted. To Fonseca, however, this is not a daunting task: one needs to look no further than the definition of the end itself. The end causes by being that for the sake of which something is done.87 This causality applies to any agent (be it rational or not), does not include motion, but it does include action (to do something is to act), and encompasses all possible forms of dependence upon the end. This solution also solves a thorny theological issue: supporters of the metaphorical motion theory had to rule out not only irrational created beings, but also the uncreated being, God, for a simple reason: God cannot be moved by its own will, otherwise we would be admitting causation and change within God, which is absurd, since God is uncreated and unchanging by definition. God’s actions do not depend upon God’s ends, or at least they cannot if we interpret final causality as motio metaphorica: there cannot be any motion whatsoever in God, not even metaphorical motion. Fonseca also proposes a simplification of his solution: the causality of the end is the propter quid of an action, the reason why an agent does something.88 It is then clear how final causation can apply to God’s actions: every divine action has a reason why and happens propter quid. 5.3. The Ontological Status of the Final Cause

Since the end causes by being the reason why an action is made, it seems still dubious whether it causes as a real or intentional being. The problem of the ontological status

87 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 4, col. 160: ‘Non est igitur nobis longius ab ipsa finalis causae definitionie discendendum, ut eius causandi rationem quaeramus: quod etiam in aliarum causarum generibus fecimus. Itaque dicimus, nullam esse aliam rationem causandi finalis causae, quam esse id, cuius gratia aliquid fit…’ 88 CMA V, c. 2, q. 10, s. 4, col. 161: ‘Hoc, quod ex definitione finalis causae collegimus, ex ipso etiam Cur, seu propter quid (quem titulum proprie soli finali causae tribuimus) intelligi potest. Nihil enim alium his verbis quaerimus, nisi qua rationem aliquid agatur’. As Fonseca explains, in a sense propter quid can be used to refer to any genre of causation. In a narrow sense, however, it applies specifically to final causation.

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of the final cause is different from that of the end itself, because it is centered on the end in a particular state, that is, when it is actually causing something. It is worth mentioning that this problem was usually posed in the perspective of final causality as metaphorical motion, thus focusing on the following question: does the final cause (metaphorically) move the efficient cause in its extramental being or rather in its conceptual being? As we have seen, Fonseca does not adopt the motio metaphorica as the causality of the end, so he reformulates the problems as ‘if the end is a cause on the basis of is intentional being, as they call it, or rather its real being’.89 The starting point of this dispute is the double ontological status of the end. The res which is the final cause can indeed have two distinct modes of being: one in the mind of the agent, and this is an intentional or objective being, and the other outside of the mind of the agent, in rerum natura, and this is a real being. The problem is on the basis of which of these beings does the end exert its causality. This was a vexata quaestio, and virtually any scholastic thinker had taken sides on it. There was no general consensus, but the prevailing opinion was that the end caused in its real being. The realist party could count Averroes, Scotus, Ockham, Hervaeus Natalis, Jean de Jandun, Iavellus, Gabriel Biel, Domingo de Soto, Francisco Toledo, and Benet Perera among its supporters, with Aquinas and Cajetan leaning towards it in the majority of their writings. After Fonseca, this position will be upheld by the Collegium Conimbricensis, Suárez, Vázquez, Raffaele Aversa, Bartolomeo Mastri, and many others. The intentionalist position had been championed by Avicenna and supported in recent years by Capreolus and Soncinas. In some passages, Aquinas and Cajetan seemed to tend toward it. After Fonseca’s time, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza will defend it too.90 Already while dealing with the general definition of ‘cause’, Fonseca made clear that the inclusion of final causation within the realm of causality requires a crucial ontological widening in the conception of causation itself, which cannot be understood with regard to just real being, but must go as far as to include intentional being too.91 The notion of being that causation is tied to is common to both real and intentional being — something that alludes to the birth of ontology in early modern scholasticism. Here Fonseca seems to anticipate an intentionalist position. He however sides with the realists in the dedicated quaestio: another coherency issue in his commentary? As we will see after dealing with Fonseca’s solution, this is not the case. Fonseca expounds four arguments for each position. Beginning with the intentionalist position, Fonseca presents some arguments that were common in medieval and Renaissance scholasticism. 1. Actuality argument — Only what exists in act can exert an actual motion. The end, however, does not necessarily exist in act outside of the mind when it 89 This is the title of c. 2, q. 11 of CMA V: ‘Num finis sit causa secundum esse intentionale, quod vocant, an vero secundum esse reale’. 90 For an in-depth at the debate, see Capriati, Causa e causalità finale, pp. 627–801; for a list of authorities, see Appendix D. 91 CMA I, c. 7, q. 1, s. 3, col. 316: ‘si […] esse sumatur ut commune est esse reali et intentionali, recte habebit definitio’. Fonseca here is trying to save the classic definition of cause as id, ad cuius esse aliud sequitur by explaining that the ‘esse’ must be understood as common to real and intentional being.

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moves the efficient cause, as demonstrated by all those ends that are produced through the action of the efficient cause and hence do not pre-exist to it, such as health, which is the end of the physician but is produced in act by his cure. When final causation occurs, the end does not always exist in its extramental being. However, it does always exist in its intentional being, because otherwise the agent would not act at all, since it would have no end to act for. The end in its intentional being need not to be in the acting agent itself, but can be contained in a superior directing agent, such as God with respect to natural beings. The end must exist in act in some agent, however, to cause. But since extramental being is not always in act and intentional being is, the latter is responsible for the actual motion exerted by the end on the agent, and thus for its causality. 2. Priority Argument — The end moves the efficient cause by preceding it: the end is causa causarum, a cause of all other causes. In its real being, however, the end is not always prior to the efficient cause; in fact, sometimes it is even posterior to it, since it is an effect of the efficient cause, as seen in the previous argument. On the other hand, the end in its intentional being is always prior to the efficient cause: the order of intention comes always prior to the order of execution, and while the latter is associated with efficient causation, the forms is linked to the finale cause. The end in its real being (the health as the effect of the cure of the physician) is last in execution, because it comes after a series of efficient causes that produce it; the end in its intentional being, on the contrary, is first in intention, because it is the first thing the agent conceives (the physician would not cure a disease if he did not have the health of the patient as his end) and so comes prior to any efficient causation. 3. Cessation Argument — One acts for the sake of an end only when it is not already possessed. When an end exists in its real being, however, it has already been achieved, and so it ceases to attract the agent, and with this its causality ends as well. By exclusion, the end must then cause in intentional being. 4. Repugnance Argument — Many ends are repugnant to real existence: if I wanted to measure the diameter of a side, this would be my end, but this end could not possibly exist outside of my mind. That end can, however, exist in its intentional being, and it would be enough to lead me at least to try and measure the diameter of a side. And the same goes for impossible or false ends, such as when one acts for the sake of something that he thinks is good, but in fact is not: that good intentionally exists in the mind of the agent, but not outside of it, but it causes nonetheless. So intentional being is sufficient for final causation. On the opposite side, Fonseca presents four more arguments. 1. Appetition Argument — The end moves through the same being on the basis of which it is desired or wanted; but the end is wanted in its real being, not in its intentional being, as can be proved in the example of health, which is desired by the physician and the ill as a real being outside of their minds, and not just as something which is known. A simple apprehensio of the end does not sate the appetite, so it cannot be the causality of the end.

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2. Achievement Argument — The causality of the end consists in moving the agent, but the end moves the agent by attracting the agent to achieve the end itself. This attraction does not make the agent want to achieve the end in its intentional being, because the agent is already in possession of the end in this sense, since it is already in its mind when it moves to action. The end attracts the agent on the basis of its real being, so the end causes in its real being. 3. Futility Argument — The end moves the agent according to that same being on the basis of which, if it is not obtained, it can be said that the agent acted in vain (frustra). The agent, however, through its action, can only achieve the end in its real being, because the intentional being of the end is already possessed by the agent when the action begins (otherwise, the agent would not act at all). 4. Propriety Argument — All the proprieties usually attributed to the end only make sense if we refer them to the end in its real being: being that for the sake of which something is done, being superior to the means used to achieve it, being the last in execution, and making the action cease once it is achieved. Even the intentional priority of the end (primum in intentione) belongs to its real being, since what is intended first is what is realized last, but what is realized last is the end in its real being. After explaining the two main positions, Fonseca considers two options that allow to conciliate them. The first one was already mentioned by Chrysostomus Javellus, and it posits two distinct causalities for the end: one consisting in moving the agent and the other in satiating the agent’s desire. According to this theory, the end causes in its intentional being as it moves the agent, and in its real being as it satiates the agent’s appetite. Fonseca finds this solution unsatisfying, because there is no point in distinguishing such a double causality for the end: the end satiates the agent’s appetite under the same regard in which it moves the agent. This is not really a conciliation, since the causality of the end would consist only in the intentional being of the end. The second conciliatory position is the one Cajetan proposed, and this time Fonseca agrees with it. The solution is as follows: the problem of the ontological status of the final cause changes sense according to the way we interpret the term ‘secundum’. If we understand it as expressing a condition of causality, then the end causes secundum its intentional being, because the intentional presence of the end in the mind of the agent is a necessary condition for final causality (no one acts for the sake of something which is not known). If we understand ‘secundum’ as that according to which the end formally causes, attracting the efficient cause into acting, then the end causes in its real being.92 92 CMA V, c. 2, q. 11, s. 3, coll. 166–67: ‘potius ergo conciliandae sunt partes huius quaestionis distinctione verbi secundum, ut eas conciliat Caietanus 1.2, art. 1, q. 1 et alii nonnulli. Si enim sumatur, ut significat solam conditionem, sine qua finis non movet, neque omnino causat, prior pars quaestionis vera est. Neque enim finis movet causam efficientem ad agendum, nisi apprehendatur vel ab ea, vel ab alia superiori, a qua efficiens dirigatur, ut diximus. Nam quemadmodum causa efficiens indiget certa propinquitate ad veram actionem: ita finis indiget apprehensionem sui ad metaphoricam illam, quam vere suo modo causat. Si vero sumatur, ut significat: id, quo finis formaliter causat,

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Fonseca’s own solution is the same as Cajetan’s, and so it should be counted as a conciliatory one, although it implies a strong privilege of the realist position. In truth, even though both positions of the quaestio are properly and simply true, on the basis of the double sense of the word ‘secundum’, the latter […] is far more worthy as far as a philosophical answer goes, inasmuch as it does not explain a condition of the end, but that through which the end formally causes.93 The quaestio asks about the causality of the end, and to that question we must answer that the end formally causes in its real being. This does not prevent the end’s intentional being from playing a crucial role in final causation by being a necessary condition of it, but at the same time it does not change the fact that the causality of the end consists in its real being. We can now raise two problems. Fonseca has reconstructed and solved the whole question as though everything he had just said about the causation of the end simply was not there. We have seen him follow his fellow scholastics in attributing the causality of the end to its motion of the agent, but in previous sections he had stated that motio metaphorica is not the right way to understand the causality of the end. Most likely, since Fonseca here is trying to solve a traditional question, he is also resorting to its concepts, and taking for granted something that he actually thinks has a much more limited validity than his predecessors thought. Actually, the whole dispute seems to be centered on rational agency: it would make no sense to suppose that the intentional being of the end might be the reason why natural beings act in a certain way. Even though Fonseca does not explicitly say it, it is very likely that the focus of the inquiry has silently shifted to create rational agency. This means that the whole dispute is only applicable to that field, and does not include final causation as a whole. Fonseca never excluded that motio metaphorica can be the causality of the end in human actions. He simply stated that it was not a universal enough definition in metaphysics. The second doubt is greater: as we have seen, Fonseca said that the simple fact of having to include final causation widens the ontological spectrum of causation in general to the point of including both intentional and actual being. What is the need of such a statement when the end causes in its real being? One simple answer would be that the intentional being of the end is still required as a condition for its causality in rational agents. Fonseca, however, offers us an even better reason: the real being

efficientemque causam ad agendum allicit: non dubium est, quin posterior pars sit vera: id enim, quo agens formaliter allicitur ad agendum, est ipsum esse reale rei, quam consequi desiderat. Hoc igitur modo conciliari possunt huiusce quaestionis partes, quae alioqui pugnare videntur, quicquid senserint auctores, qui hanc vel illam amplexi sunt. Eademque distinctio verbi secundum adhiberi potest vocibus Ut, Qua, Quatenus, et similibus’. 93 CMA V, c. 2, q. 11, s. 3, col. 167: ‘Verum, etsi utraque pars quaestionis proprie ac simpliciter vera est, iuxta duplicem sensum verbi secundum, tamen posterior (si altera tantum in respondendo reddenda est) longe dignior videtur philosophica responsione: quandoquidem non explicat conditionem finis, sed id, quo finis formaliter causat’.

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he has been attributing to the final cause should not be confused with actual being. While confuting the repugnancy argument, Fonseca makes an important observation: In this quaestio by ‘real’ we mean that which in any way happens, or can happen, or looks like it could happen, inasmuch as it can be intended by an agent.94 Real existence, with regard to the end, must be understood not as actual existence, but as virtual existence: for an end to cause, it suffices that it is deemed to have a real being, and it is not necessary that it actually exists outside of the mind. Ultimately, the end causes by not being impossible. Only what is deemed impossible is unable to move the agent as an end. This is perhaps the most original conclusion in Fonseca’s account of causation. It must be taken with caution, without generalizing it, because it clearly refers only to created rational agency. But even then, the general consensus of scholasticism is that human agency is the most important application field of final causation. So, in the end, the final cause does impose an ontological widening in causation, and therefore in metaphysics. Both causation and metaphysics are not only concerned with actual being, but also with possible being. Even ‘possible’ must be understood in the widest sense possible, as that which does not seem impossible.95 It is worth noting that Fonseca does not say that impossible things cannot exert final causality. In fact they can, as long as they are deemed possible by the agent. So, ultimately, final causes can be almost anything, at least metaphysically speaking. Not the most incoherent of views, in a metaphysical theory that strives to conceive being in its widest universality without losing a privileged reference to real being. In fact, Fonseca’s conception of final causation is so modern that it even surpasses his ontology, inclining toward an ontological dilatation the likes of which will be seen only a few decades later, in Protestant scholasticism.

94 CMA V, c. 2, q. 11, s. 4, col. 169: ‘Sumimus enim in hac quaestione reale pro eo, quod quomodocunque evenire, aut potest, aut videtur posse quandoquidem id omne intendi potest ab agente’. 95 CMA V, c. 2, q. 11, s. 4, col. 169: ‘Illud etiam adverte, possibile tam late quoque intelligendum hic esse, ut etiam pro eo accipi debeat, quod non videtur impossibile’.

Igor Agost i n i

The Transcendental Properties of Ens and the Doctrine of Unum in Pedro da Fonseca A Perspicuous Case of Neglected Platonic Origins of The Metaphysica Generalis

The best-known treatise in early modern scholasticism devoted to the question of the transcendental properties (passiones) of being (ens) is contained in Francisco Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae. It is characterised by a preliminary decision, i.e. the elimination of res and aliquid from the class of the six transcendentals enumerated in Thomas Aquinas’s famous passage in De veritate, q. 1, art. 1. According to Suárez, there are only three transcendental properties of ens: ‘Passiones entis tres tantum’, since res and aliquid are, in fact, synonyms of ens.1 To this decision, widely celebrated by today’s scholarship,2 another one follows: unum is the first of the transcendentals after ens.3 The order of treatment of the transcendentals is based on such a primacy, i.e. the first transcendental property (passio) the metaphysician has to deal with after ens is unum.4 And also this second point too has been well highlighted by scholars.5 The importance of these two theoretical decisions is also due to the large influence that they will exercise both in Catholic6 and Reformed scholasticism.7 However,

1 DM III, s. 2, n. 3, in F. Suárez, Opera Omnia, 28 voll. (Parisiis: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856–1878), p. 108a; nn. 6–7, vol. XXV, p. 109ab. 2 See, especially, Jean-François Courtine, Suárez e il sistema della metafisica. Tradizione aristotelica e svolta di Suárez, ed. by Costantino Esposito (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1999), pp. 522–23; Víctor Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana de los trascendentales’, Anuario Filosófico, 25 (1992, 2), pp. 403–20, and Rolf Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 142–83. 3 DM III, s. 2, n. 8, p. 109b. 4 DM IV, prologus, p. 115a: ‘Primum de unitate tractandum est, quia cum entitate maxime est coniuncta et caeteris passionibus quodammodo supponitur’. 5 Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, pp. 186–90, speaking of Die Primat des Eines. 6 Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana’, pp. 404–05. 7 See Franco Burgersdicus, Institutionum metaphysicarum libri duo. Opus posthumum, I, c. 10, thesis 5 and 6 (Lugduni Batavorum: apud Hyeronimum de Vogel, 1640), p. 60: ‘Hisce quatuor transcendentibus sunt qui Rem et Aliquid enumerant, sed perperam’; ‘Ex tribus illis affectionibus Unitas primum locum obtinet’. Igor Agostini  •  Università del Salento Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 173-192 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131764

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the historical context preceding Suárez — and within which the choices of the author of the Disputationes metaphysicae must be placed — has not been explored in detail yet.8 Despite the recent contributions on the history of the problem of the transcendentals by Jan Artsen, and by other scholars before him (including Piero Di Vona)9 a thorough study of the immediate pre-Suárez context is still lacking. Such a study would allow us to identify the originality of the Suarezian moment better — since Suárez inherited those two decisions from the tradition before him — as well as to appreciate the role played in this tradition by Pedro Fonseca, a role which is recognized by Suárez himself. The goal I will be working to achieve in this study is to analyse Fonseca’s doctrine on unum, relating it both to its historical context and to its legacy in Suárez.10 I will proceed in three steps. First, I will focus on Fonseca’s revision of the canonic list of six transcendentals and its reduction to four basic properties. Secondly, I will delve into Fonseca’s doctrine of the primacy of unum. In these first two steps, I will argue that Fonseca’s theses are in fact endorsed by Suárez. However, especially on the second point, I shall stress the presence of an originary Platonic component in Fonseca, which Suárez abandons when transferring this issue in his Disputationes metaphysicae. Suárez actually avoids to incorporate this component in his synthesis, rather tracing back to a solid Thomistic tradition. Third, I will focus on the main point of disagreement of Suárez with Fonseca’s position: this concerns Fonseca’s negative definition of the formal reason of unum as ‘undivided being’, then challenged by Suárez but perhaps constituting the most original feature of Fonseca’s doctrine — the one that would be bound to his name both by Suárez himself and, often, in the following discussion on unum in late scholasticism.

1. On the Reduction of the Transcendentals Fonseca dwells on the discussion on the transcendentals in the fourth book of his Commentariorum in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae tomi quatuor, and in particular in his comment to the second chapter, which was a canonical place of

8 See, anyway, the various remarks in Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana’, and Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, pp. 139–41 in particular, and passim; Paul-Richard Blum, Ideen und Transzendentalien bei Francisco Suárez im Kontext der Renaissancephilosophie, in Der Aristotelismus an den europäischen Universitäten der frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Rolf Darge and others (Stuttgart: Verlag w. Kohlhammer, 2010), pp. 15–31. 9 Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval philosophy as transcendental thought: from Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012) and Piero Di Vona, Studi sull’ontologia di Spinoza. 2: Res ed ens, la necessità, le divisioni dell’essere (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969). 10 Also concerning Fonseca’s doctrines of the transcendentals, the state of the art is still quite poor. There are no systematic studies on this subject, though the pages devoted to it in António Manuel Martins, Lógica e Ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca (Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994), pp. 235 ff.) are of notable utility. See also David Svoboda, ‘Francisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the Many’, Studia Neoaristotelica, 4 (2007), pp. 158–72.

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medieval speculations on the relation between ens and unum and, more generally, on the whole discussion on the transcendentals.11 The thesis that Aristotle enunciates in this chapter — namely the identity between ens and unum12 — leads his commentators to the discussion on the other properties of ens. This explains why the discussion of the transcendentals had always found its natural place in this section of the comments on Metaphysics. Relevant examples — just to remain on a clear source of Fonseca — are Soncina’s Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae, the text recommended by Francisco de Toledo for the Jesuits’ cursus studiorum before the publication of Fonseca’s volumes.13 Here the entire discussion on the transcendentals is opened by question 17 Utrum ens habeat veras passiones de ipso vere demonstrabiles.14 Unlike Soncina, however, Fonseca’s treatment of the transcendentals is in good part internal to the question on unum, and entitled Sitne unum vera passio entis.15 This explains why Fonseca’s treatise on unum constitutes, in fact, a true mise au point of the entire doctrine of the transcendentals or, at least, of its basic points. Here, after having established that ens has true and real properties, Fonseca addresses the question whether res and aliquid should be considered among these properties. Fonseca starts with a historical remark: the account of the recent scholastics (recentiores) contrasts with the thought of the ancients (veteres), who used the names aliquid and res as synonyms of ens; the recentiores, on the contrary, argue that res and aliquid are distinguished from ens and from one another, and therefore enumerate them among the true and real properties of ens. Fonseca does not identify the names of these recentiores explicitly, but it is quite probable that he is making reference to Chrysostomus Javelli’s De Transcendentibus, published in Venice in 1564. In this work — one of the most influential treatments of the transcendentals in sixteenth-century scholasticism before Suárez, and certainly one of the sources quoted by Fonseca in his discussion — Javelli had distinguished six transcendental properties — ens, unum, aliquid, res, verum, bonum — and developed a separated discussion for each of them.16 11 The case of the transcendentals offers a very perspicuous example of the difficulties of disposition of the metaphysics topic in the context of the literary genre of the commentaries: the discussion on Unum absorbes, at least in part, the discussion of the others transcendental properties, on the difference of what happens in the Disputationes metaphysicae, where there is a special section for each property. 12 Metaph. IV, 2, 1003b22–23. 13 Mário Santiago de Carvalho, ‘Tra Fonseca e Suárez: una metafisica incompiuta a Coimbra’, Quaestio, 9 (2009), p. 181. 14 Paulus Barbo (Soncinas), Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae, nunc demum ab erroribus plurimis expurgatae, et ita accuratius excusae, vt longe illustriores sint. Cum triplici earum indice, quorum primus, quaestionum titulos promiscue: secundum ad hos, iuxta librorum et alphabeti seriem simul materiam: tertius vero digna notatu circa haec omnia, demonstrat (Lugduni: sumptibus Petri Landry, 1586), IV, q. 17, pp. 28b–30b. 15 CMA (Coloniae: sumptibus Lazari Zetnzeri, 1615–29; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964), IV, c. 2, q. 5, cols 761–85. Two other questions follow on verum and bonum: CMA IV, c. 2, q. 6, cols 785–818 (Sitne verum passio entis propria); coll. 818–40 (Sitne Bonum propria entis affectio). 16 Crisostomo Javelli, Tractatus de Transcendentibus praevius Metaphysices, in Epitome in universam Aristotelis philosophiam naturalem quam transnaturalem (Venetiis: apud Ioannem Mariam Bonellum, 1564). On Javelli’s treatise and his influence on Suárez, see Daniel Heider, ‘Suárez and Javellus on

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This historical point is the first argument used by Fonseca to establish his solution to the question, which is a negative one. Three more arguments follow. The second argument is that whenever one of these transcendental terms is predicated on another one, a clear triviality (nugatio) is committed, unless these terms are understood like pronouns (particularitatis nota), just like when one says ‘some being’ (aliquod ens) or ‘something’ (aliqua res); but, in this case, these terms simply refer to some kind of being, and they do not indicate a transcendental property. The third argument is that, if ens and res are distinguished by the mere fact that the first one means the act of being and the second means the essence, whenever ens is understood as essence the distinction between ens and res would collapse. Now, this is exactly what happens when the term ens is used to designate the subject of metaphysics, as occurs most of the times in Philosophy. The fourth argument is that it is not true that the word aliquid derives from alietas or from diversitas, which would be equivalents. Indeed, hearing the word aliquid, no-one would think of diversity. Therefore, the meaning of the term aliquid is not alietas, but either the opposite of nihil — and whatever existence can be called aliquid in this case — or, more properly and usually among philosophers, entitas (i.e. actually ens). In addition, diversum, according to the advocates of the distinction between aliquid and ens, is not considered as a simple property of ens, but rather as a member of its disjunctive property idem/diversum. Now, if by the term alietas one means the foundation (fundamentum) of alietas, i.e. division, thereby diversity will ultimately be founded in division. However, at that point, for that very reason, it will be included in unum. Fonseca’s conclusion is therefore that ens, aliquid and res are identical to one another and cannot be distinguished, save for the fact that the terms ens and aliquid are often taken in common, so that they can be predicated on both real beings and beings of reason. However, the name res is always taken for the real ens: Dicendum est igitur, Ens, Aliquid, et Rem, idem prorsus esse, nec ullo pacto distingui inter se, nisi quod nomina Entis et alicuius saepe sumitur in commune, ut dicuntur de entibus realibus et rationis (ut cum Ens aut Aliquid in reale et rationis distinguitur) nomen autem Rei semper sumitur pro ente reali.17 According to Fonseca, the term res always signifies the ens reale, unless it is added something to it, as it happens when one speaks of res depending on the operation of the intellect. The denominations deriving from the name res (reale, realiter, realitas), very popular among the recentiores, show this effectively: Id quod satis declarant denominationes et inflexiones ex nomine rei factae, ut Reale, Realiter, et Realitatis vocabulum quibus Recentioribus potissimum utuntur.18

Transcendentals and Divisions of Being’, in Universalità della Ragione. Pluralità delle Filosofie nel Medioevo, XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia Medievale, Palermo, 17–22 settembre 2007, ed. A. Musco and others (Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 2012), pp. 849–59. 17 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 2, cols 764–65. 18 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 2, col. 765.

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This means that the denotation of ens and res is identical. Fonseca argues, on this point, against the doctrine defended by Averroes in his Epitome. Here Averroes contended that the term res has a broader meaning than ens, because it can be predicated of everything that can be conceived (even the chimera), whereas ens is said of true things only.19 Fonseca disagrees: in fact, fictions (figmenta) are not true things (res), but fictitious things (res fictitiae); and it is only under this specification, fictitiae, that they could be called entia as well as res. For this reason, whenever one speaks of the real ens, it is clear that there is no distinction between ens, aliquid and res, unless aliquid is meant, somewhat improperly, as identical with diversum. This is followed by a key conclusion: since it is clear that the first two transcendentals, among the five alleged by the recentiores, are not distinguished from ens, the doctrine of the transcendentals will concern only unum, verum, and bonum.20 Fonseca had not been the first author to reduce the transcendentals to four but, despite this, he would always be recognized as having an important role in the history of this classification. Immediately before Suárez, this is attested, in 1587, in the Metaphysica disputatio de ente of the Dominican Diego Mas, perhaps the first great treatise on general metaphysics of early modern scholasticism. Mas is the great absent in the history of the transcendentals by Jan Aertsen, but his importance, which had already been stressed by Max Wundt and others,21 is unquestionable. Mas’s thought

19 According to Averroes, the word ‘thing’ is predicated of whatever the word ‘being’ is predicated of. But it can also be predicated in a broader sense than the one predicated by the word ‘being’, that is, all things conceptualized in the soul, whether or not these things exist outside the soul (such as the goat-stag and the sphinx). In this respect, a thing is either existent or non-existent. In the latter case, the term ‘thing’ applies to what is stated in untrue propositions, whereas the term ‘being’ does not apply to this. See Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venetiis: apud Iunctas, 1526–74; reprint: Minerva, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, f. 170ra): ‘Haec dictio Res arabice ‘alsciai’ dicitur de omni eo, quod dicitur dictio entis. Et quandoque dicitur de communiori, scilicet de omni re concepta in anima, sive ita se habeat extra animam, sive non, ut hircocervus, chimera. Et ideo debemus dicere haec res vel est vel non est, et ideo nomen rei transumitur ad falsas proprositiones: quod tamen non facit nomen entis’. English Translation in Averroes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. An Annotated Translation of the So-called ‘Epitome’, ed. by Rüdiger Arznen (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2010), p. 35. This thesis can only be found in the Epitome, where Averroes includes three paragraphs on notions not discussed in his comment to the Metaphysics, namely, ‘thing’, ‘matter’, and ‘form’: see Arznen, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Averroes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, p. 8. Averroes’s doctrine is at the origins of the doctrine that will become widespread in the history of post-Suárezian ontology (and that will reach Kant through Wolff), according to which aliquid (and res) is broader than ens insofar as it is predicated of non-existing things. See, on the post-Suárezian developments of the doctrine, Courtine, Suárez e il sistema della metafisica, pp. 210 ff. 20 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 2, col. 765. 21 Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tubingen: Nachdruck der Ausgabe, 1939; reprint: Olms, Hildesheim, 1992), pp. 39–40. See also Di Vona, Studi sull’ontologia di Spinoza 2, pp. 5–6; 98–99; Di Vona, I concetti trascendenti in Sebastiàn Izquierdo e nella scolastica del Seicento (Naples: Loffredo, 1994), p. 19; Di Vona, I trascendentali nell’età moderna, in Le problème des transcendentaux du XIVe au XVIIe siècle, ed. by G. Federici Vescovini (Paris: Vrin, 2002), pp. 221–22; Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, p. 140 and n. 6; Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana’, pp. 404–05; Leopoldo López Prieto, ‘Res, aliquid y nihil en Suárez y la filosofía moderna’, Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, XXX (2013), n. 1, pp. 54–55.

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is especially interesting for the present reconstruction given that, in his reduction of aliquid and res to ens,22 he claims Fonseca’s authority (along with Johannis Baptista Montolorius’s).23 This shows that the identification with Fonseca of the immediate historical antecedent of that reduction of the transcendentals, which would be found in Suárez later, is not the consequence of a retrospective interpretation; it was already acquired by Suárez’s own contemporaries. Some scholars have already highlighted this point.24 Yet, I think we should go further by identifying with Fonseca — if not Suárez’s ultimate source — at least one of the most authoritative advocates (according to the author of the Disputationes metaphysicae) of the reduction of aliquid and res to ens. For Suárez adopts the argument that we have found in Fonseca, and he explicitly claims Fonseca’s authority: Et ita opinatur de hoc attributo Fonsec., IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.25 But there is another relevant aspect that is worth pointing out. This aspect is suggested by Mas’s analysis, which I reckon to be much more telling than scholars have believed so far. As a matter of fact, presenting his work in the Praefatio of the

22 Didacus Mas, Metaphysica disputatio de ente et eius proprietatibus, quae communi nomine inscribitur de transcendentibus, in quinque libros distributa, lib. 1, cap. 2 (Valentiae: apud viduam Petri Huete, 1587), p. 8: ‘Horum tamen Philosophorum opinio, etiam nobis displicet, ex eo quod asserunt, rem, et aliquid, esse transcendentia ab ente distincta, cum revera ab eo nullo modo differant; sed sint nomina synonima, cum eo eandem naturam explicantia’. 23 Johannis Baptista Monlorius Canonici Oriolani was a commentator of Aristotle’s logic. Mas refers to Monlorius, De universis copiosa disputatio, in Perfectissima in Aristotelis Analyticorum priorum, seu de ratiocinatione libros duos, latinitate a se donatos, cap. 7 (Francofurti: In officina Typographica Johannis Wecheli, 1593), p. 463: ‘Connumerentur inter ea res et aliquid, quae vere transcendentia non sunt, nec unquam ab Arist. inter affectiones entis ponuntur, affectiones enim entia debent rationem habere diversam ab ente, et inter se; haec autem duo nullam habent diversam, sed sunt synonyma cum ente, ut vestis et indumentum’. Mas, moreover, also noted, as Fonseca had done before him, that this doctrine had a much older origin: for this purpose, he recalled the authority of Alexander Hales, Thomas of Strasbourg, Thomas Aquinas himself and Capreolus. 24 See, Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, pp. 140–41 and 149–51; Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana’, pp. 404–05. See, Prieto López, ‘Res, aliquid y nihil’ who, however, at p. 55 reverses shockingly the chronology: ‘también Pedro de Fonseca, en una obra posterior a las Disputationes de Suárez, critica la opinión de quienes mantienen el número de cinco trascendentales’. 25 According to a first etymology, says Suárez, aliquid indicates anything featuring some quiddity; now, whether this is the original derivation of the term or not, it is clear that this is the most common meaning of this term, according to which aliquid and nihil are opposed to each other as contradictory terms. Now, nihil means exactly the same as non ens, that is, anything with no entity whatsoever. Aliquid, therefore, is anything with some entity or quiddity. Therefore, according to this etymology, aliquid is not a property, but a synonym of ens. The formal reason of ens and aliquid is consequently the same. Cf. DM III, s. 2, n. 5, p. 108b–109a: ‘Rursus aliquid duplicem etymologiam seu interpretationem habere potest. Una est quod idem sit aliquid quod habens quidditatem aliquam; sive enim haec fuerit prima derivatio vocis sive non, tamen iam in communi usu in hoc sensu accipi videtur; aliquid enim et nihil contradictorie seu privative opponi censentur; nihil autem idem significat quod non ens vel non habens entitatem ullam; aliquid ergo idem est quod habens aliquam entitatem vel quidditatem. In hac ergo significatione constat aliquid non esse passionem, sed synonymum entis; idemque censetur etiam secundum formalem rationem et conceptum dicere de aliquo esse aliquid et dicere ens, et ita opinatur de hoc attributo Fonsec., IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 5, sect. 2.’

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Metaphysica disputatio, Mas is aware of the originality of his enterprise, which deals with metaphysics themes independently of the form of the commentary to Aristotle. Despite this, however, Mas acknowledges his debt especially towards two works: Javelli’s De Transcendentibus, and Pico della Mirandola’s De ente et uno.26 Now, the importance of Fonseca’s reference to Pico’s cannot be underestimated. After Pico’s death in 1494, and before Burckhardt’s and Gentile’s studies, most people took into account mainly Pico’s biography, as well as his Christian Kabbalah and his attack on astrology. Yet — also due to the fact that, just like the Oratio, this treatise was printed posthumously — the De ente et uno exerted a relevant influence on the discussion of these topics in early modern scholasticism. In particular, it played a crucial role — acknowledged by the schoolmen of the age — in late scholastic debates on the transcendental properties of ens, as well as in the reduction of the six canonical properties to four. However, the historiographical oblivion of Pico’s legacy within the context of Baroque scholastic metaphysics must be traced back to this very same context, and notably to Suárez’s elimination of any Platonic component from the doctrine of the transcendentals properties of ens. I will argue for these points as follows. As far as Mas is concerned, he not only sees in Pico — ‘an outstanding ornament’ (as Mas would qualify him) of the Dominican family, whose habit he wore just before his death — his own source, but he also seems to suggest that Pico’s treatise constitutes the very point of origin of the reduction of the transcendentals, at least as regards Fonseca. For Mas is explicit in claiming that Fonseca’s doctrine must be traced back to Pico on this point: Hanc opinionem secutus fuit Picus Mirandulanus, vir celeberrimi ingenii, de omni parte Philosophiae benemeritus, et nostrae familiae Praedicatoriae insigne ornamentum (etenim ipsum ante obitum) sacram familiam prefessum fuisse, testatur in eius vita Franciscus Mirandulanus, illius ex fratre nepos) in opusculo aureo, de Ente et Uno, cap. 8 eandemque amplexus est Petrus Fonseca.27 Eandemque amplexus est Petrus Fonseca. According to Mas, Fonseca follows a path that had been forged by Pico’s De ente et uno. However, Mas’s argument is not based on a doctrinal convergence only, but on Pico’s tardive affiliation to the Dominican order also. Mas can therefore establish the existence of a Thomistic line of thought– Pico/Fonseca/Montelorius — from which he allows to ground the reduction of the transcendentals on a solid authoritative basis. Now, integrating Mas’s analysis with the later theoretical developments of Suárez, it is possible to trace a real genealogy of the reduction of the transcendentals, reaching Suárez from Pico via Fonseca. 26 Mas, Metaphysica disputatio de ente, ‘Praefatio’: ‘Ex his qui hoc argumentum explicandum susceperunt, praeter Chrisostomum Iavellum in sua tractatione de transcendentibus et Picum Mirandulanum in libello de Ente et Uno, habui neminem’. This point has been highlighted by Di Vona, Studi sulla scolastica della controriforma: l’esistenza e la sua distinzione metafisica dall’essenza, (Florence: La nuova Italia, 1968), p. 2. See also Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, p. 140. The De ente et uno, composed in 1490, was published in 1496 in the first edition of Pico’s writings. 27 Mas, Metaphysica disputatio de ente, lib. 1, cap. 2, p. 9.

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However, Mas was right in arguing that Pico was in fact a source of Fonseca’s doctrine of unum. But there is even more than this, since Fonseca makes Pico say much more than what Mas made him say, as I will show just below.

2. Fonseca’s Doctrine on Unum According to Fonseca, the solution to the question of whether unum is a transcendental property requires the solution of a preliminary question: what does unum add to ens? Fonseca identifies three doctrines here. The first doctrine affirms that unum adds something positive to ens. This is the position held by Scotus (hence the title of the section: Quid Scotus et alii Scholastici sentiant de formali significatione Unius), certainly in the fourth book of his commentary on the Metaphysics, but also, for Fonseca, in one famous and discussed passage of the commentary on the first book of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae. Some maintain that Scotus has changed the view of his commentary on Metaphysics here, since he claims that ens is not predicated quidditatively on its properties. From this statement, however, it does not follow, in Fonseca’s reconstruction, that the properties of ens express only a negation or a relation of reason. Therefore, Scotus has never changed his mind on this point and he has also been followed widely. Despite the success of his account, however, his arguments are, for Fonseca, not conclusive, even though they correctly assume that the unity of true things does not depend upon the operation of the intellect, and in this sense, such unity is certainly real.28 Against Scotus’s view, others claim that unum adds nothing to ens save for a negation of the division; in such a way, however, that it formally signifies not only a negation, but the ens itself also. This opinion, albeit with some differences from one another, was defended by John of Jandun, Soncina, Crisostomo Iavelli, and John Capreolus. All of these authors are reduced to a common Thomistic matrix by Fonseca, both qualifying this position in the marginalia as Sententia Ianduni et multorum thomistarum, and observing that this is widely acknowledged to be the very opinion of Aquinas himself. In many passages of his work, indeed, Thomas does not only assert that unum, as unum, is undivided, but he claims also that unity itself is the undivided essence. Also in this case, Fonseca states that, true or false this doctrine may be, the arguments put forward by the authors evoked to support it are weak.29 28 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, cols 766–68. On Fonseca’s references to Scotus, see Johannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super Metaphysicarum IV, q. 2, nn. 13–28, in Johannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, ed. L. Wadding, 11 voll. (Lugduni: sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639, IV 583b–588b; reprint: Olms, Hildesheim, 1968); Ordinatio, I, d. 3, pa. 1, q. 3, in Johannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, studio et cura commissionis scotisticae ad fidem codicum, ed. c. Balić (Civitas Vaticana: typis polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), III 814–12; 833–54. On Scotist doctrine of the transcendentals, the bibliography is vast: see, at least, Aertsen, Medieval philosophy as transcendental thought, pp. 372–432, and on the convertibility between unum and ens in Metaphysics, pp. 418–26. 29 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, cols 768–69. Fonseca quotes, among other texts, Sententiae, I, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad primum, éd. P. Mandonnet (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929), vol. I, p. 576: ‘Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod unum dupliciter dicitur. Est enim unum quod convertitur cum ente, et est unum quod est principium numeri. Loquendo de uno quod convertitur cum ente, non est determinatum

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One can identify, then a third opinion, affirming that unum adds to ens a negation of the division after the manner of a privation, but in such a way that it does not mean formally, but only connotatively (connotative), ens itself.30 This is the opinion Fonseca endorses. In order to account for it, he proposes to articulate it in six conclusions: 1. In reality (in re), unum is distinct from ens; 4. Unum is not completely identical with ens, both in reality (in re) and in mind (ratione); 5. Unum does not add to ens anything that is real, positive and formally distinguished from ens itself; 6. Unum adds to ens a negation or a relation of reason; 7. Unum adds to ens the negation of a division after the manner of a privation, in such a way, however, that it does not formally include ens; 8. To be unum reale per se, absolutely (absolute) and in itself (in se), is a true property of ens, considered as the object of metaphysics.31 I will focus on the last conclusion here. Fonseca claims that this conclusion needs more an explanation than a demonstration. In order to do that, he develops its single components. Unum, taken communissima ratione, is nothing but indivisum secundum aliquam rationem entis. The addition ratio entis, instead of gradus entis, is necessary here, because analogous beings (analoga) and accidental beings (entia per accidens) are undivided not by virtue of a common degree of entity, but according to any reason of entity including them all (secundum qualemcumque rationem entis complectentis omnia). Unum, taken as real (reale), is a thing whose unity can exist independently from any operation of the intellect, such as the unity of an angel or of a stone. Thus, the term ‘real’ excludes any other ‘one’ whose unity cannot exist without the operation of the intellect, such as the unity of the predicate, subject, genus, or species. As concerns the term per se, it excludes what is ‘one by accident’ (unum per accidens) in a broad sense, but not in a strict sense. The ‘one by itself ’ (unum per se), indeed, can be understood in two ways. Sometimes, and more strictly, it is taken as being constituted by one essence only, whether it is simple or composed; in this sense, it is opposed to the ‘one by accident’ commonly taken. Sometimes, however, it is taken more widely, as being constituted by many ‘one by itself ’ bounded and arranged together, even though not making a true essence. For instance, a ship or an army, which are effective examples in this sense, are in turn opposed to the ‘one by accident’ taken

ad genus quantitatis, immo invenitur in omnibus entibus: et ideo sicut Deus est ens non aliquo esse quod non sit ipse, ita etiam est unus non aliqua unitate quae non sit ipse, sed per essentiam suam; et ideo maxime unum est. Loquendo autem de uno quod est principium numeri, non potest transumi in divinam praedicationem quantum ad genus suum quod est quantitas, sed quantum ad differentiam suam quae ad perfectionem pertinet, sicut indivisibilitas et prima ratio mensurandi vel aliquid hujusmodi’. 30 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 3, col. 768: ‘Alii denique dicunt, unum addere enti solam negationem divisionis per modum privationis: ita tamen ut non significet formaliter ipsum ens sed solum connotative’. 31 Cf. CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 4, respectively, cols 769; 769–70; 770–71; 771–72; 772–77; s. 5, cols 777–85.

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more strictly, i.e. that one which does not really have a single essence, and neither composed out of a multiplicity of ‘one by itself ’ ordered together e.g. a crowd made of many individuals. And it is only this more radical acceptance of ‘one by accident’ which is excluded, in the sixth conclusion, by the occurrence of the term per se. As concerns the word ‘absolutely’ (absolute), it must be understood in comparison with ‘respectively’ (respective). To be one respectively means to be one with something. For example, Socrates is numerically one with himself, one specifically with Plato, one generically with Bucephalus, and one by analogy with size or figure. This way, what is one for species and genus is not taken formally (formaliter), but fundamentally (fundamentaliter), so as not to reduce it to a unit dependent upon the operation of the intellect. On the contrary, to be one absolutely means to not be one with another, that is, independently from any comparison. This way, ‘animal’ is one, quasi momento naturae, insofar as it is not compared with another one being, neither by itself nor by accident. And it is in this sense only that unum is understood in the sixth conclusion. It is in fact necessary that unum, which must be the first property of ens, belongs to every being before any multitude arises. As concerns the word ‘in itself ’ (in se), it means that something is ‘one’ by virtue of its own and peculiar reason, and not by virtue of a superior or an inferior nature, or of an accident. For example, animal is animal not qua living being, or qua man, or qua Socrates, but qua animal. Now, it is clear that unum must be taken in this sense because the units belonging to inferior natures through superior natures and vice versa, or to the subjects through accidents and vice versa, do not belong primo and per se. The sixth conclusion, after being thus explained, is then confirmed by a series of arguments. First of all, as stated in the beginning, ens qua ens has real properties. However, there is no property belonging more properly to ens than unum reale et per se. Furthermore, unum is necessarily convertible with ens since it is nothing but ens undivided as undivided; therefore it follows from the very nature of ens. Moreover, Thomas Aquinas contended that each ens is unum: every being, he argued, is necessarily either simple or composed. Now, what is simple is undivided32 both in act and in potency (e.g. an angel); what is composed, on the contrary, is undivided in act although it is divided in potency (e.g. a man). Such an argument is also suggested by Aristotle in the tenth book of Metaphysics, when he asserts that ‘that which is indivisible, or undivided is called one’.33 32 The text has divisum, I think it is a typographical error for indivisum. 33 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, coll. 779–80. On Thomas’s references, see ST I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, p. 68b: ‘Ad primum ego dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et potentia: compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam essentiam: non autem bona, ut ostensum est’; ST I, q. 11, a. 1, p. 107a: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem divisionis: unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam unitatem’. As for Aristotle, see Metaph. X, 3, 1054a.

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As in the case of the reduction of the transcendentals, Fonseca is far from being the first philosopher in subscribing to the primacy of unum. This was indeed a widely spread doctrine, as attested by Suárez.34 Immediately before Fonseca, the primacy of unum was nevertheless affirmed both by Javelli and Soncinas.35 Suárez, in his own turn, follows this view, grounding it on the argument, already employed by Fonseca, that unum is a property pertaining to all beings: unum is the first property of ens because it belongs to every being ex se, and not by an extrinsic denomination, nor by relation to other, as it happens for verum and bonum, which always include a relation to other beings. Absolute properties, in a word, always precede the relative ones; and unum is the only absolute transcendental property.36 The primacy of unum, as found in Suárez later, is therefore the expression of a consolidated tradition within the scholastic thought, grounded on the idea that unum is a property universally convertible with ens.37 And, within this tradition, Fonseca is just one of the many voices. However, Fonseca’s doctrine of unum reveals a quite original trait that should be pointed out. A first relevant question to rise, here, is whether there is a source of Fonseca’s doctrine. Now, the text of the commentary on the Metaphysics contains a crucial indication, which is not mentioned by Suárez, but allows us to unequivocally identify, if not the sources of Fonseca’s position, at least its conceptual and philosophical background. Fonseca affirms indeed that the convertibility between ens and unum is not only asserted by Aristotle when the latter says that ens and unum follow each other;38 but also by Parmenides, as Plato himself witnesses in the Parmenides: ‘Neque enim ens uni, neque unum enti deest, sed duo haec potius per omnia coaequantur’.39 This reference to the Parmenides is a crucial one.40 For, as in the case of the reduction of res and aliquid to ens, it authorizes to look for the ultimate philosophical component of Fonseca’s doctrine in Pico della Mirandola. Mas, on this point, does not provide

34 ‘Colligunt auctores, ex his tribus passionibus unitatem esse primam’ (DM III, s. 2, n. 8, p. 109b). 35 Javelli, Tractatus de Transcendentibus, tract. 1, pp. 26–27; Soncinas, Quaestiones metaphysicales, lib. 4, q. 24, pp. 37b–38a. 36 DM III, s. 2, n. 8, p. 109b: ‘Qualis inter passiones entis ordo servetur. — Atque hinc colligunt auctores, ex his tribus passionibus unitatem esse primam, quia est absoluta; convenit enim omni enti ex se, et non per denominationem ab alio extrinseco, neque proprie per relationem ad aliud, quam significant aliquo modo verum et bonum, quatenus convenientiam cum alio dicunt; absoluta autem sunt priora respectivis ex genere suo’. 37 See Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, pp. 186–87. 38 Metaph. IV, 2, 1003b. 39 Platonis dialogi graece et latine, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekker, Pars primae, volumen alterum (Berolini Oxoniae: Impensis Ge. Reimeri–Apud I. Parker, 1810), p. 39. The relatively unacknowledged fact that the Parmenides circulated and was debated also in the context of Baroque scholastic texts is attested by the large discussion devoted to it by Benedictus Pererius: see B. Pererius, De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus, libri quindecim, IV, c. 14–16 (Romae: apud Franciscum Zanettum, et Bartholomaeum Tosium socios, 1576), pp. 152–57. On this, see Paul Richard Blum, Studies on Early Modern Aristotelianism (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 161–63. 40 After the closure of the Academy of Athens, the Parmenides experienced a long period of oblivion in the Middle Ages. Only the complete translation of the text into Latin by Giorgio di Trebisonda and then by Marsilio Ficino, in the Renaissance, brought the text back to the top in Western culture. On

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further indications, and he is not explicit. Yet it is precisely Fonseca’s reference to Plato’s Parmenides which authorizes us to look in the direction of Pico. For the fundamental and well-known thesis of Pico’s De ente et uno lies in claiming the convergence between the positions of Plato and Aristotle on the thesis of the coextensiveness of ens and unum. This view was established by Pico in polemic with the interpretation of the Academy, who had placed unum above ens.41 For Pico, this alleged superiority is the main obstacle to the harmonization of Plato and Aristotle; from which the need to establish their equivalence against the supposed primacy of unum over ens follows. This is the main theme of the second chapter of Pico’s work, focusing on the Parmenides: ‘In quo quaerit ubi Plato de ente et uno sit locutus ostenditque illus verba favere potius sententiae dicenti unum et ens aequalia, quam his qui volunt unum esse ente superius’.42 In sum, one can identify a very precise philosophical matrix, which has to be identified in the De ente et uno — where, against the primacy of unum over ens claimed by Academics, Pico della Mirandola had established the coextensiveness of unum and ens — at the basis of Fonseca’s doctrine of unum as the first property of ens. And it is this very tradition which, through Fonseca, finally reaches Suárez. Nevertheless, every evidence of this tradition is lost in Suárez. In fact, defending the thesis of the primacy of unum, he omits any reference to Plato, and all the authorities invoked in support of the primacy of unum are traced back to the strictly Thomistic canonic list: Thomas Aquinas, Soncina and Javelli.43 This way, that primacy of unum in which Fonseca saw — in line with Pico della Mirandola, and with explicit reference to Plato — the point of intersection between Aristotelianism and Platonism, would be presented by Suárez as the fruit of a speculative path entirely rooted in the heart of Thomism itself. Suárez, however, does not ignore Plato’s Parmenides and his relevance for the doctrine of the transcendentals completely, but he is far from acknowledging it the same importance given here by Fonseca. In discussing the question if unum is an adequate property of Being, and in order to argue for the affirmative answer, Suárez quotes the very same passage of the Parmenides quoted by Fonseca, but he understands this claim as a consequence of the primacy of unum, and not as a premise to argue for this primacy, as it was in Fonseca.44 Accordingly, the Platonic instance that was at the core of Fonseca’s reflection becomes peripheral, and the importance

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the fortune of Parmenides in the Renaissance, see the classic Raymond Klibansky, ‘Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance’, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, I (1943), pp. 281–330. A study of the legacy of the Parmenides in the context of second scholasticism is still lacking. Academia in this context almost certainly means the immediate successors of Plato, especially Speusippus and Xenocrates. See Amos Edelheit, Pico and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2–1498 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2008), p. 350. Cf. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Dell’ente e dell’Uno, ed. by Raphael Ebgi and Franco Bacchelli (Milan: Bompiani, 2010), p. 208. DM III, s. 2, n. 8, p. 109b: ‘Itaque Aristoteles, IV Metaph., c. 1, unum coniungit cum ente tamquam primam passionem; et D. Thom., I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4, sentit post ens unum esse quod prius de unoquoque ente cognoscitur, quae latius tractant Soncin., IV Metaph., q. 24, et Iavel., tract. de Transcendentibus’. DM IV, s. 4, n. 3, p. 132a.

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of the convergence between Aristotle and Plato is strongly reduced as well. Suárez does not feel comfortable with Pico’s inspiring idea, and it is worth noting that in the only quotation of De ente et uno in the entire Disputationes, Pico is assimilated to Platonics, and his doctrine is clearly not endorsed.45 This way, in Suárez’s Disputationes — the great founding work of the shortcoming metaphysica generalis — the insistence made by Fonseca on the Platonic component of the primacy of unum among the transcendental properties as he follows Pico’s path, is completely ruled out. The constitution of the doctrine of the transcendentals is traced back, by Suárez, to a monolithic Thomistic tradition. And this is a perspicuous case of Suárez’s distancing from Fonseca, which should be put in connection with another case, whose importance shall never be underestimated: Fonseca, who is the first great Jesuit commentator of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, strongly defends the long-standing idea of Plato’s superiority over Aristotle. Indeed, in a paragraph expressly dedicated to the Comparatio Platonis cum Aristotele contained in his Proemium to the commentary on book one of the Metaphysics, Fonseca endorses the consolidated opinion that Plato philosophised much better than Aristotle in divinis, and that Plato’s intelligence [ingenium] was superior to Aristotle’s.46 This idea would be also present in the Conimbricenses,47 but not in Suárez.

3. The Negativity of Unum As already seen, the fifth of Fonseca’s six theses runs as follows: unum adds to ens the negation of a division after the manner of a privation, in such a way, however, that it does not formally include ens. Fonseca appeals to three arguments to defend this claim. First, an affection cannot have as much reality as the thing it affects.48 This means that if unum added something to ens, it would be more perfect than ens itself, and this is impossible.

45 The context is the discussion of the analogy of being and, in particular, the Platonic doctrine that God is ‘over being’ (Deum platonici qualiter dicaret non ens, sed supra ens) to which Suárez clearly associates Pico: ‘Adeo ut in hoc rigore loquentes interdum sapientes dicant Deum non esse ens, sed supra ens, ut egregie declaravit Picus Mirand., opusc. de Ente et uno, c. 3 et 4, ex nonnullis platonicis […] Tamen, quia ille modus significandi revera non refunditur in rem significatam neque ei imperfectionem attribuit, ideo ens absolute significat id quod est, et hoc modo propriissime et principaliter dicitur de Deo, absque ullo ordine ad creaturam’. (DM XXVIII, s. 3, n. 13, p. 17ab). Here it is clear that Suárez, though paying homage to Pico and the Platonics, holds that God must be defined as ‘being’ with respect to the res significata. In this move, he implicitly but clearly criticises Pico and the Platonics: they did not distinguish the res significata from the modus significandi. As a more general point, this text shows that Suárez sees Pico essentially as a Platonic thinker, and that he has substantial reservations towards the Platonic component of his thought. 46 CMA I, Proemium, cols 14–15. 47 Carvalho, ‘Tra Fonseca e Suárez’, p. 192. 48 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, cols 775: ‘Primum, quia nunquam affectio rei tantae perfectionis est, quantae est res ipsa, cuius est affectio’.

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Furthermore, unum can formally include ens unless it were essentially included in it, as ‘man’ is included in ‘animal’ or in ‘rational’. Now, unum cannot be essentially included in ens, nor be composed of it. For no affection flowing from a subject can be constituted by it, otherwise the subject would come from himself, and it would be posterior to himself.49 Finally, if unum was constituted of ens and the indivision, the indivision, rather than the whole composite, would be a property of ens.50 It cannot be objected that unum is not a composite of ens and of the indivision, and that it is a tertium quid. For if this tertium would be a real being, ens would be said of unum quidditatively, but this has been excluded by the third argument adduced above. Neither can it be a being of reason because, in this case, unum would be a relative being, and this contrasts with the first part of the conclusion. Therefore unum is something negative, which is Fonseca’s thesis. And the only negation that unum can express is the negation of the division.51 Moreover, the fact that Thomas Aquinas affirms in some texts that unum does not express only indivision, but the substance itself or the being of the thing, is unproblematic.52 Indeed, for Fonseca, Aquinas is speaking not of the formal meaning of unum, but of its connotation, the way it is commonly said that blindness does not signifies the negation of sight only, but as it also connotates the eye, to which it is inherent.53 Neither could it be objected that, since unum is in reality the same as ens (as stated above by the first conclusion), unum cannot be a negation. Such an objection does not stand because in the first conclusion it has not been established that ens and unum are really identical, but rather that unum is not really distinct from ens, which is a very different statement.54 In any case, had it even be asserted that ens and unum were really identical, no nonsense would have followed, since this is however true in a negative sense, i.e. in the sense that they are not different in reality: Verum est in sensu negativo: quasi dicas, non est aliud reipsa.55 This way, Fonseca resolutely affirms the negativity of unum. Formally speaking, unlike ens, unum is purely negative. Its positivity is only connotative, in the sense that it always refers to a being it is inherent to. Fonseca’s idea, in sum, is that unum, insofar as it is a negation, is always parasitic of ens. 49 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, cols 775: ‘Deinde, quia unum posset unum [sic] includere formaliter ens, nisi ei essentialiter subiiceretur, ut homo animali, aut rationali, vel alia ratione ex eo constitueretur, ut Socrates ex materia et forma. At unum non potest essentialiter subiici enti, ut patet ex concl. 3. 3. 3. Nec item ex eo componi: quia nulla affectio, quae fluit ex subiecto, potest ex eo constitui alioquin iam subiectum ex se ipso flueret, et seipso esset posterius’. 50 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, cols 775: ‘Postremo, quia si unum constituitur ex ente et divisione, quasi affectione adiuncta, potius indivisio dicenda erit passio entis, quam totum compositum. Aptius enum affectio demonstratur de subiecto, quam totum compositum de parte’. 51 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, cols 775–76. 52 See, infra, footnote n. 64. 53 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, col. 776. 54 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, cols 766–67. 55 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 5, s. 5, col. 767.

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It is exactly on this point that Suárez distances himself from Fonseca. Suárez refuses to reduce the positivity of unum to its connotative meaning. According to him, unum is in some sense positive according to its formal meaning also. On the one hand, Suarez moves on the same line as Fonseca, explicitly referring to him (together with a large group of authors including Thomas) and asserting, in section 1, that unum does not add anything positive, real or rational to ens, and that it is distinct from ens, either ex natura rei or ratione.56 This is an openly anti-Scotistic decision. On the other hand, however, in section 2, Suárez makes a move which is obviously against Fonseca. The question here concerns the formal statute of unum: does unum state the negation it adds to ens only in a formal way or anything else? (Utrum Unum de formali dicat solam negationem quam addit supra ens, vel aliquid aliud). The whole section is actually a debate over the thesis of the negativity of unum, and Fonseca is not only explicitly identified as one of the supporters of this opinion, but he is however the main polemical objective of Suárez’s discussion. Indeed, the ratio dubitandi, exposing the reasons to support the opinion that unum formally signifies only negation, reproduces the very same arguments adduced by Fonseca. First, unum formally signifies only what distinguishes it from ens, and this is nothing but a negation.57 Second, each property only signifies anything it adds to its subject; now unum is a property of ens. Therefore, it formally signifies only its additions beyond ens, and it adds, in fact, only a negation.58 Third, if ens signifies something beyond negation, this must be either ens or something else. But this second hypothesis is impossible, for if this addition is not a bare negation, it must be positive. However, as this positive addition cannot be a mere being of reason (positivum rationis), but a real being, it must include ens, as established against Scotus above. These arguments are contrasted by the advocates of the opposite view, according to which unum formally signifies ens reale. However, various inconsistencies are the consequence of this doctrine: first, ens would be included quidditatively in one of its properties, and this contradicts both the nature and property of a subject. Furthermore, an endless process would occur, since what unum formally means is still unum. Again, the formal meaning of unum would coincide with its adequate meaning, for it would include the material meaning. Finally, unum would formally include all the perfection of ens, and consequently, a property would have the same perfection as its subject.59 56 DM IV, s. 1, p. 115b–122b. 57 DM IV, s. 2, n. 1, p. 122b–123a: ‘Ratio dubitandi est, quia ex dictis sectione praecedenti videtur plane sequi unum dicere de formali solam negationem, quia id dicit de formali in quo distinguitur ab ente; sed distinguitur tantum in negatione quam addit; ergo illam solum dicit de formali’. 58 DM IV, s. 2, n. 1, p. 123a: ‘Secundo, quia unaquaeque proprietas seu passio id dicit de formali quod addit suo obiecto; sed unum est passio entis; ergo de formali dicit id solum quod addit supra ens; sed addit solum negationem; ergo’. 59 DM IV, s. 2, n. 1, p. 123a: ‘Tertio, quia si ultra negationem dicit aliquid, vel illud est ens, vel quidpiam aliud; hoc secundum cogitari non potest; nam si illud est aliud a negatione, positivum esse debet; non potest autem esse positivum rationis, ut supra ostensum est; oportet ergo ut sit positivum reale, et consequenter ut includat ens, iuxta superius dicta contra Scotum. Si autem dicatur primum, scilicet, id quod unum dicit de formali includere reale ens, sequuntur omnia incommoda et argumenta supra

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After referring the different arguments in support of the two opinions, Suárez focuses on them in more detail. The first argument states that unum formally signifies a mere negation. Suárez attributes this doctrine to Cajetan and Fonseca. However, while Cajetan only suggests it (insinuat),60 it is Fonseca who fully develops it. Thomas Aquinas himself inclines (favet) towards this view in the reply ad primum of article 3 of question 6 of the first part of the Summa, where it is said that unum does not imply a ratio perfectionis, but only a ratio divisionis.61 From Suárez’s state of the art, it is clear that he sees in Fonseca a distinguished, if not the most distinguished, advocate of the doctrine of the unum as a formal negation. Indeed, Fonseca sets out more broadly and clearly a point which is only outlined by Cajetan and Aquinas (latius et clarius eam docet Fonseca). And, effectively, Suárez adopts exactly the same terminological and conceptual apparatus used by Fonseca to expound this position, i.e. the inclusion/connotation couple. According to Fonseca, unum, in its formal meaning, does not include ens, but only connotes it (connotare): Fundamenta huius sententiae sunt in principio posita, quibus concludi videtur unum in suo significato formali non includere ens, sed tantum connotare illud, et consequenter de formali dicere solam indivisionem seu negationem.62 As concerns the second opinion, Fonseca affirms that unum formally signifies not only a negation, but also ens beneath negation. This is, he notes, the most common opinion among the commentators of this section of the fourth book of the Metaphysics: Soncina, Javelli, Dominic of Flanders, John of Jandun, as well as Capreolus and Soto. But Thomas Aquinas inclines to it as well. For in the Sententiae he says that the very essence of the created being, insofar as it is undivided in itself and divided from other beings, consists in its unity63 and that unum includes the ens commune in its

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facta contra opinionem asserentem unum addere positivum supra ens, scilicet, ens quidditative includi in passione sua, quod est contra rationem subiecti et passionis. Item sequitur processus in infinitum supra illatus, quia id quod de formali significat unum, etiam erit unum, etc. Denique sequitur formale significatum unius esse omnino idem cum adaequato significato, ut etiam includit materiale. Ac denique sequitur passionem unius includere totam perfectionem entis formaliter, et consequenter passionem esse aequalis perfectionis cum subiecto suo’. Suárez refers to Cajetan’s commentary to the first article of question 11 of the Prima pars. See Thomas De Vio ‘Cajetanus’, Commentaria in primam partem Summae theologiae I, q. 11, a. 11, in ST (Leonine, vol. 4), p. 108b: ‘Ad secundum vero dicitur, quod unum formaliter non est magis extra nihil quam alia privativa seu negativa in genere. Est ergo extra nihil sic: et tunc negatur consequentia’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 2, p. 123a: ‘In hac re duae sunt opiniones. Prima affirmat unum de formali dicere solam negationem superius explicatam. Hanc sententiam insinuat Caietan., I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2 Scoti, dum ait unum formaliter non esse magis extra nihil quam alia privativa, seu negativa. Latius et clarius eam docet Fonseca, dicta q. 5, sect. 5, et favet D. Thomas, I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 1, quatenus dicit unum non importare rationem perfectionis, sed indivisionis tantum’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 2, p. 123a. The reference is to Sententiae, I dist. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2um, éd. Mandonnet, vol. I, p. 481: ‘Cum enim unum sit quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, unumquodque autem creatum per essentiam suam distinguatur ab aliis; ipsa essentia creati, secundum quod est indivisa in se et distinguens ab aliis, est unitas ejus’.

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concept, to which it adds the ratio privationis.64 And in the De potentia he argues that unum does not only mean indivision, but ens too.65 However, as Suárez points out, in these last two passages Thomas is dealing with the adequate meaning of unum only, and not with its formal meaning, as Fonseca explains (ut Fonseca exponit66). With his usual conciliatory stance, Suárez observes that the difference between the two doctrines concerns the modus loquendi more than the thing itself. For everyone agrees that unum, in its total and adequate meaning, expresses nothing but undivided ens, and that indivision adds to ens only the negation of the division. As a consequence, everyone should acknowledge that, in the concept of unum, there is nothing that is outside (extra) of the reason of ens beneath negation. Consequently, unum can be called a property of ens only because of the negation it adds to ens, for it is a property of ens only to the extent to which it expresses something beneath ens.67 Therefore, the question remains open only with regard to the impositio nominis. Now, both views are probable, and based on the meaning of the word unum. According to the first opinion, unum is constituted only by the negation added to ens reale; and for this very reason unum is said to express such a negation here only in a formal way. According to the second view, far from being a mere privation added to ens, unity participates in the very same nature of ens. The only difference is that unity qua being or essence constitutes ens, while unity qua undivided being constitutes unum.68

64 The reference is to Sententiae, I, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, c., éd. Mandonnet, vol. I, p. 582: ‘Unde ens et unum convertuntur, sicut quae sunt idem re, et differunt per rationem tantum, secundum quod unum addit negationem super ens. Unde si consideretur ratio unius quantum ad id quod addit supra ens, non dicit nisi negationem tantum: et eadem ratione multitudo non addit supra res multas nisi rationem quamdam, scilicet divisionis’. 65 DM IV, s. 2, n. 3, p. 123ab: ‘Secunda sententia est, unum de formali non dicere negationem solam, sed entitatem ipsam sub negatione, quae est communior sententia scribentium hoc loco IV Metaph.; Soncinas, q. 3, a. 8; Iavellus, q. 5 et 8; Flandria, q. 3, a. 8; Iandun., q. 4; tenet etiam Capreol., In I, dist. 24, q. 1, ubi circa primam conclusionem adducit Avicennam, III Metaph., c. 3, dicentem: Unitas est esse quod non dividitur; ita quod esse est de essentia unitatis, et non subiectum ei; unitas enim substantialiter est ipsum esse quod non dividitur. Et significat Soto, in Log., c. de Prop., q. 2, ad 2. Favet D. Thomas, In I, dist. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2, dicens quod ipsa essentia entis creati, secundum quod est indivisa in se, et distincta ab aliis, est unitas eius; et dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ubi dicit unum claudere in intellectu suo ens commune et addere rationem privationis; et de Potentia, q. 9, a. 7, ubi ait unum non significare indivisionem tantum, sed ens cum ipsa’. 66 DM IV, s. 2, n. 4, p. 123b. 67 DM IV, s. 2, n. 6, p. 124a: ‘Existimo sane diversitatem inter has sententias magis esse de modo loquendi, quam de re. Quia in re omnes conveniunt, unum in toto et adaequato suo significato, nihil aliud dicere quam ens indivisum, et indivisionem nihil addere enti nisi negationem divisionis; et consequenter necesse est ut omnes fateantur in uno nihil esse extra rationem entis, ut sic, praeter negationem solam; quia totum quod est ens, praeter id quod ei additur, est de essentiali ratione eius; sed sola negatio est quae ei additur; ergo illa sola est extra rationem eius; unde fit ulterius ut unum solum possit dici passio entis ratione negationis quam superaddit enti, quia solum est passio secundum quod dicit aliquid extra rationem entis’. 68 DM IV, s. 2, n. 6, p. 124a: ‘His autem in re positis, reliqua quaestio de significato formali videtur solum esse de impositione nominis. In qua utraque opinio citata probabilis est, fundaturque in probabili modo concipiendi significatum huius vocis, unum. Nam quidam concipiunt, supposito ente reali, sola negatione divisionis illi superaddita constitui unum, et ideo dicunt unum de formali

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Now, according to Suárez, this last view is closer to the truth and, as a consequence, the second view is to be preferred. First, for the reason Aquinas outlined in the Summa: unum, formally, expresses real unity; now real unity is not a pure negation. Therefore, unum is ens itself, but conceived under a negation.69 Second, because unum is not univocally predicated of ens rationis and ens reale, while the negation, considered precisely, can be attributed to both ens rationis and ens reale; and this is the sign that unum does not formally express a negation only.70 Third, unum, as a trancendendental property, does not formally signify something that ens supposes and that is adjacent to it as ‘white’, for example, signifies ‘whiteness’ instead. A thing, in fact, is not called ‘one’ in the same way as it is called ‘white’: for it is ‘one’ by virtue of its own being, while it is called ‘white’ by virtue of the shape that is added to ens. And this shows that unum does not formally signify a negation only, but also the same intrinsic undivided being.71 At this point, Suárez states that what is left to do is only to respond to the rationes dubitandi. Now, it is important to underline the fact that, as previously discussed, these are actually Fonseca’s arguments. Once this is understood, it is easy to realize that this entire sectio ultimately constitutes a showdown with Fonseca. Suárez’s reply to Fonseca’s first argument is grounded on a basic distinction: radicaliter (so to speak, he says), unum is distinguished from ens by virtue of the negation it adds to ens. Formally, however, unum is distinguished from ens insofar as it is an undivided being. This way, ens formally signifies being as such, while unum signifies the undivided being.72 As for the second argument, the statement that each property signifies only what it adds to the subject is true exclusively of real properties taken in the strict sense, and adding to something really distinct from the subject to it. This is not true of the transcendental properties, which add nothing real to the subject. For although they

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solum dicere praedictam negationem. Alii vero concipiunt unitatem non esse veluti quamdam privationem adiunctam enti, sed esse ipsam rei naturam seu entitatem, quae entitas vel essentia constituit ens; ut vero est entitas indivisa, constituit unum ens’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 7, p. 124ab: ‘Et hic modus concipiendi videtur mihi similior vero, ideoque posteriorem sententiam simpliciter probandam censeo. Primo propter rationem nunc tactam et insinuatam a D. Thoma, In I, loco supra citato, quia unum de formali dicit unitatem realem; sed unitas realis non est sola negatio; ergo est entitas ipsa sub negatione’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 7, p. 124b: ‘Secundo, quia unum non dicitur univoce de ente rationis et reali, ut per se notum est; et tamen, si praecise consideres negationem, aeque potest attribui et denominare ens rationis, sicut reale; ergo signum est unum non dicere de formali solam negationem’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 7, p. 124b: ‘Atque hinc sumi potest tertium argumentum, quia unum prout est transcendens non dicit de formali aliquid supponens ens, et quasi adiacens et adveniens illi, sicut album dicit de formali albedinem; non enim sic intelligitur res esse una sicut alba; est enim una intime per suammet entitatem, alba vero est per formam supervenientem alteri entitati; ergo signum est unum non dicere de formali solam negationem, quasi superadditam entitati, sed ipsam intrinsecam entitatem indivisam’. DM IV, s. 2, n. 8, p. 124b–125a: ‘Ad primum respondetur unum distingui ab ente radicaliter quidem (ut sic dicam) ratione negationis quam superaddit enti: formaliter vero non distingui per negationem tamquam per formam unius, sed per entitatem indivisam; itaque ens de formali dicit entitatem ut sic, unum vero dicit de formali eamdem entitatem ut indivisam’.

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are not mere negations, or beings of reason, and even if they express a real property, it is necessary that they somehow include entity in their formal meaning.73 The reply to the third argument is based on the distinction between unum and unitas. Unum is a concrete term which signifies being as undivided, while unitas is an abstract term which signifies entity as undivided, and this is the unity formally signified by unum. No inconvenience follows from the fact that ens, taken concretely, can be quidditatively predicated of its properties taken concretely. In this sense bonum, as well as verum, is ens. I will not delve into Suárez’s analysis (although it still continues for a few paragraphs) in great detail here, since the point I endeavoured to make should be now sufficiently clear: in spite of his usual conciliatory approach, Suárez elaborates his doctrine on the formal constitution of unum in contrast to Fonseca. Suárez identifies in Fonseca’s account of unum the broadest development of Cajetan’s ideas. This is a crucial point which many scholars have missed.74 Moreover, those who have identified the difference between Suárez’s and Fonseca’s accounts have not sufficiently emphasised the extent to which Fonseca is involved in Suárez’s elaboration of his conception of unum: all about the argument in support of the doctrine of the formal negativity of unum has to be traced back, as seen, to Fonseca. As a consequence, Suárez’s articulated discussion of these arguments must be ultimately read as a direct confutation of Fonseca’s.75 There is not much discussion, in critical literature, on Fonseca’s posterity. However, I think that a detailed analysis of the legacy of his doctrine on unum in Baroque scholasticism will confirm the basic point that this study has established concerning Suárez: through the whole seventeenth century, Fonseca will continue to be seen as the eminent advocate of the doctrine of unum as a negation. On the basis of Di Vona’s work, it is clear that this is Fonseca’s interpretation given, among others, by Francisco de Araujo.76 And this was, and will remain, a topos for a long time.77

73 DM IV, s. 2, n. 9, p. 125a: ‘Ad secundum respondetur assumptum illud esse verum in proprietatibus realibus propriissime sumptis et addentibus subiectis aliquid ex natura rei distinctum ab illis; in his enim verum est nomina significantia tales proprietates solere de formali significare praecise id quod proprietas addit subiecto; in his autem proprietatibus transcendentalibus quae non addunt aliquid reale, non oportet id observare; nam, ut non sint negationes tantum, vel omnino entia rationis, sed aliquo modo proprietatem realem significent, necesse est ut aliquo modo in formali suo significato includant entitatem ipsam’. 74 P. Di Vona, Spinoza e i trascendentali (Naples: Morano editore), p. 101 (who does not distinguish Suárez’s position from Fonseca’s, but only claims that Suárez has less to say than Fonseca on this point); Martins, Lógica e ontologia, pp. 269–71. 75 Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, pp. 218–19. 76 Francisco Araujo, Commentariorum in Universam Aristotelis Metaphysicam tomus primus, quinque libros complectens lib. 4 . q. 4 a. 3 (Burgis et Salmanticae: ex officinis typographicis Ioannis Baptistae Varesii, et Antoniae Ramirez viduae, 1617) p. 532b. See Di Vona, Spinoza e i trascendentali, p. 106. 77 Just to remain within the Dominican order, still at the end of the century, it would be sufficient to see the commentaries on the Summa theologiae by Nicolaus Arnu and Vincent Ferre: Cf. Nicolaus Arnu, Dilucidum philosophiae syntagma […] Tomus septimus Theologiam Naturalem, seu Metaphysicam

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Conclusion Three conclusions emerge from this study. First, Fonseca is at the origin of Suárez’s reduction of the transcendentals. Not only does Fonseca precede Suárez, but he is one of his main sources and he influences his speculation. This is also confirmed by later scholastics thinkers, who will constantly collocate Suárez in the tradition of those authors who saw Fonseca as Pico della Mirandola’s heir, and both of them as the heirs of old scholastics. Second, Fonseca is a part of that Thomistic tradition asserting the primacy of unum over the transcendentals that would be received by Suarez. The study of Fonseca’s position on this point, however, also reveals an original doctrinal background, given that Fonseca explicitly relates this doctrine both to Aristotle and Plato’s Parmenides. Fonseca seems to endorse Pico’s idea of a concordance between Platonic and Aristotelian ontology and, in particular, he seems to present the primacy of unum as a common doctrine for both Platonism and Aristotelism. This background of Fonseca’s doctrine would become peripheral in Suárez, who traces the primacy of unum back to a solid Thomistic tradition, neutralising every Platonic element in his own doctrine of the transcendentals. Third, Fonseca constitutes the main polemical objective in Suárez’s solution of the long-standing question of the formal reason of unum. In fact, he is seen as the eminent representative (the one who develops a position only sketched in Cajetan) of the doctrine of the (formal) negativity of unum. Suárez, therefore, elaborates his doctrine on this very precise point by opposing Fonseca. Fonseca, for his part, will continue to be identified, in the continuation of the debate on unum in Baroque scholasticism, as the eminent representative of the formal negativity of unum.

complectens q. 6, a. 1, cap. 1 (Patavii: ex typographia Petri Antonii Brigoncii, 1686), p. 334; Vincent Ferre, Commentaria in Divum Thomam. Tomus primus tract. 2, q. 9, § 2 (Osnaburgi: sumptibus Joh. Georgii Schwänderi, 1680), p. 313.

Simone Guidi

Fonseca on Substance, Subsistence, and Supposit

Introduction: Categorial Being, Ens, Substance Twenty years before Suárez’s Metaphysicae disputationes, Pedro da Fonseca offered one of the most impressive modern attempts to reorder Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the present chapter, I will endeavour to show how insightful Fonseca’s effort truly was, by dealing with his ousiology. I will focus especially on the Jesuit’s account of three pivotal concepts in the scholastic theory of substance, i.e. Divine Substance, created substance and prime substance, or supposit. These notions are primarily metaphysical, but — according to a long-standing scholastic framework — are also deeply indebted to Patristic Trinitarianism. As I shall argue, this is especially true for Fonseca, who welcomes and defends the idea of a conceptual unity between ontology, ousiology and Trinitarism he received from a centuries-long tradition. Although Aristotle most notably dealt with the concept of substance in Metaphysics Z, Fonseca’s more complete treatment of this issue can be found in his commentary on Metaphysics Δ. This commentary occupies the entire second volume of his masterpiece. Here, Fonseca presents one of the most extensive and profound scholastic discussions on the problem of οὐσία in the Early Modern Age, which is itself worthy of study both for its own sake and as a source of the later metaphysical debate on substance. In the following paragraphs, I will endeavour to reconstruct Fonseca’s quaestiones in their original order, highlighting the peculiar perspective of the Portuguese Aristotle. Now, note that Fonseca’s discussion — both textually and theoretically — follows up on the previous questions where he dwelled extensively on several notions discussed

Simone Guidi  •  National Research Council of Italy, Institute for the European Intellectual Lexicon and History of Ideas Pedro da Fonseca: Humanism and Metaphysics, ed. Simone Guidi and Mário S. de Carvalho, Turnhout, Brepols, 2023 (DESCARTES, 8), p. 193-223 © BREPOLS PUBLISHERS 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.131765

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in Metaphysics Γ and Δ. They are those of ‘principle’,1 ‘cause’,2 ‘one’,3 ‘truth’,4 and notably, the problem of the division of the ens into the categories.5 As for the latter problem (which of course is strictly connected with that of οὐσία) Fonseca establishes some pivotal principles while commenting chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ. It is worth recalling them since they shape the subjacent theory of categorial being, which is the background of the subsequent discussion on substance. For Fonseca, the categories are precisely those ten indicated by Aristotle,6 and distinct from one another.7 Though, such a distinction is neither real nor formal, but rather depends directly on the mode of being and being predicated of primary substances.8 This means that categories are not independent metaphysical beings, but rather stable predications, whose stability is entirely borne by the positive existence of primary substances and their essences. As for secondary substances, for Fonseca they exist in re only through the existence of primary substances (even though he does not subscribe entirely to the classical model of moderate realism).9 1 CMA (vol. 2, Rome: ex Officina I. Tornerij 1589), V, c. 1, qq. 1–7. 2 CMA V, c. 2, q. 1–18. See António M. Martins, ‘A causalidade em Pedro Fonseca’, Veritas, 54 (2009, 3), pp. 112–27, and Giuseppe Capriati’s chapter in this volume. 3 CMA IV (vol. 1, Romae: apud Franciscum Zanettium et Bartolomaeum Tosium, 1577), c. 2, q. 5. See Igor Agostini’s chapter in this volume. 4 CMA IV, c. 2, q. 6. See Simone Guidi, ‘La quaestio veritatis in Pedro da Fonseca: il problema della simplex apprehensio e la fondazione delle identità logiche’, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia (2020, 1), pp. 51–80. 5 CMA V, c. 7, qq. 1–9, p. 363–418. See António M. Martins, Lógica e Ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca (Lisbon: Gulbenkian 1994), pp. 56–60. 6 CMA V, c. 7, q. 2. 7 CMA V, c. 7, q. 3, s. 2, p. 389. 8 CMA V, c. 7, q. 3, s. 2, p. 389: ‘Praedicamenta non distinguuntur per quovis modos essendi et praedicandi, sed per modos essendi et praedicandi in primis ac de primis substantijs. Haec conclusio ex eo patet, quia cum attributorum distinctio ex vario modo respiciendi subiecta sumenda sit; primae autem substantiae sint prima subiecta et quasi fundamenta, quibus attributa omnia quae in Praedicamentis locum habent innituntur’. 9 See infra. On Fonseca’s (and the Conimbricenses’s) doctrine of Universals, see especially Amândio Coxito, ‘O problema dos universais no curso filosófico conimbricense’, Revista dos estudos gerais universitários de Moçambique, 5 (1966, 3), pp. 5–62; Mário S. de Carvalho, ‘The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals (1577–1606)’, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 18 (2007), pp. 531–43, and Daniel Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism. A comparative study with focus on the theories of Francisco Suárez S. J. (1548–1617), João Poinsot O. P. (1589–1644) and Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola O. F. M. Conv. (1602–1673) / Bonaventura Belluto O. F. M. Conv. (1600–1676) (Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins 2014), pp. 37–43. See also the perspicuous remarks by Ester Caruso, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1979), pp. 30–34. From the point of view of the ontology of Universals, Fonseca can be defined as a supporter of ‘moderate realism’ (secondary substances only exist via the existence in act of primary substances and, as universals, only via the intellectual operation of abstraction), even though he is very much a realist from the perspective of the unity and universality of the common nature. As Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism stresses, Fonseca ‘says that universal unity can pertain to universal things only insofar as they precede contraction by (in) particulars. He makes clear that as particularized they necessarily lose any aptitude (capability) to being in the many. Thus, e.g., the nature of man as such can neither per se (as an essential predicate) nor as a necessary accidental predicate (a well-known example is risibility) require universal unity called by Fonseca ‘unity of precision’ (unitas praecisionis)’ (p. 38). Such a concept of ‘unity of precision’ is likely Fonseca’s most relevant contribution to the late scholastic debate and it allows him to retrieve a

fo n s ec a o n s u b s tan c e , s ub si st e nce , and su ppo si t

Regarding the subsequent problem of substance, however, the relationship between categories and ens is extremely important. For Fonseca, only real beings, and indeed the real per se and complete beings, ‘take place’ within the categories.10 This is why Fonseca, according to a widespread scholastic view, excludes non-beings,11 accidental beings,12 beings of reason13 and incomplete beings14 from among those beings which participates in categorial being.15 All of these kinds of non-categorial beings can effectively be traced back to correspondent real, complete, and per se beings that take place in the categories, and whose primary existence constitutes the basis of the existence of all others.16 According to this definition, categorial being only consists of those beings that can be defined as primary substances. For Fonseca, only primary substances or individuals are, indeed, properly complete and take place per se within categorial being; whereas secondary substances are complete just secundum quid (i.e. through the completeness of other primary substances) and just secundum quid, they acquire access to the category of substance.17 Hence, only individuals (primary substances)

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version of Scotus’ realism of the ‘common nature’ which is relatively compatible with moderate realism. Carvalho, ‘The Coimbra Jesuits’ Doctrine on Universals’, describes it as follows: ‘Unity of precision, a position developed both by Fonseca and Couto, but ignored by Toledo and criticised by Suárez [see Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism, pp. 41–43], was therefore generally taught by the Coimbra Jesuits. Formal unity is insufficient, it is said, and, apparently, only unity of precision confers true and absolute unity or indivisibility (which is the same) upon universals. In the discussion on the various types of unity, unity of precision appears as a unity surpassing ‘formal unity’. Of course, formal unity is not denied, since any universal is in itself a true being and not a numerical unity. Nevertheless, formal unity appears to undermine the difference between the universal and the particular. Thus, unity of precision appears as an intermediate type of unity. In between radically or simply numerical unity (proper to singulars) and formal unity (proper to universal things absolutely taken) there is a kind of unity pertaining to a universal thing that is numerically one. In other words, unity of precision, like numerical unity, cannot be really divided into itself or into its inferiors, but, as happens with formal unity, although differently from it, it has got the aptitude for being divided’ (pp. 8–9). Fonseca sets out this concept especially in the Isagoge Philosophica (Lisbon: A. Alvarez, 1591) c. 6: ‘Dicitur vero praecisionis, quia non convenit rei universali in quocunque statu sumptae (quo pacto ei convenit unitas formalis, quae semper rem comitatur, sive antequam ad sua particularia contrahatur, sive cum iam in eis contracta est, sive postquam est ab illis abstracta, et quasi avulsa per intellectum) sed praecise in eo statu, in quo apta est, ut ad sua particularia descendat, et in ea dividatur ac multiplicetur. Quatenus enim res apta est ut sit in pluribus, in eaque dividatur, et multa dici possit, necdum tamen naturae ordine divisa et multiplicata est; eatenus est indivisa in illa, ac proinde unum quid, hac praecisionis unitate. Alioqui si sumatur ut iam est in suis particularibus, in eisque divisa et numerabilis, iam est multa, et non unum, hoc unitatis genere.’ See also CMA V, c. 28, q. 3, s. 2, p. 821–23; q. 5, s. 3–4, pp. 851–55. CMA V, c. 7, q. 4, s. 2, p. 395 and q. 5, s. 2, p. 397. CMA V, c. 7, q. 4, p. 394–95. CMA V, c. 7, q. 5, p. 396–02. CMA V, c. 7, q. 6, p. 402–09. CMA V, c. 7, q. 7, p. 409–12. Accordingly, he rejects ‘supertranscendentalism’. See Victor Salas’ chapter in this volume. CMA V, c. 7, q. 9, p. 416–18. It is worth reading these interesting lines from Fonseca’s commentary on Metaph. V, 7: ‘Certainly, the complete being (ens) is being (ens) primarily and simply, since it does not pertain to the constitution of any being per se. […] And from here, it is clear that neither the ultimate difference (both universal or individual), nor the integral parts of a being per se, nor matter or form, nor movement […], are complete beings. It is clear that only individuals (individua) are simply complete, because all common

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are also naturally complete substances,18 which Fonseca defines as ‘complete being[s] that, because of [their] peculiar nature, claim to not exist in a subject’.19 In sum, complete primary substances are the basic constitutive of the ontic world. Within such conceptual parameters, Fonseca addresses Metaphysics Δ, 8, at the bottom of which he comments on Aristotle’s20 fourfold sense of substance.21

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things pertain to the constitution of some being per se. Besides that, it is clear that only the genera and the species of those things that are simply complete are complete secondum quid […]. Both kinds of complete beings [individuals and their genera and species] must be conceived in this way [i.e. as complete beings]. Indeed, if complete beings in the first sense are placed in the categories, complete beings in the other sense must also be placed [there], since categories do not just consist of individuals, but also of the species and of their genera. And yet, it is clear that complete beings in the first sense are placed directly in the categories, since they are all excellent beings, in which all the others are contained; not in whatever way, but in act and according to the essence, as is evident. Wherefore, those which are called primary substances, for this reason are called [complete beings] primarily and especially, since they are not parts of other substances.’ (CMA V, c. 7, q. 7, s. 2, p. 410–11: ‘Ens completum, primo quidem ac simpliciter es tens quod ad nullius entis per se constitutionem pertinent; ut hic homo, hic candor […] Hinc patet nec differentiam ullam, five universalem, sive individualem; nec partes integrantes entium per se; nec materiam, formamve; nec motum […] esse entia complete. Patet etiam sola individua esse complete simpliciter, quia omnia communica pertinent ad constitutionem alicuius entis per se. Patet item, sola genera et species completorum simpliciter, esse completa secundum quid […]. Utrumque autem geus completorum entium in hac conditione necessario intelligendum est. Nam si completa prioris generis directo ponuntur in Praedicamentis, necesse est ut completa etiam posterioris ponantur: siquidem Praedicamenta non constant solis individuis, sed speciebus etiam eorum ac generibus. Quod autem completa prioris generis directo ponantur in Praedicamentis, ex eo patet, quia sunt omnium entium praestantissima, et in quibus caetera omnia non quomodocunque, sed actu, et secundum essentiam continentur, ut perspicuum est. Quocirca eae, quae primae substantiae appelantur, propterea primae ac praecipuae dictae sunt, quod non sint aliarum substantiarum partes’). Regarding the duo complete / incomplete substance, see Simone Guidi, L’angelo e la macchina. Sulla genesi della res cogitans cartesiana (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2018), pp. 372–75, where I refer especially to Suárez’s account in DM XXXIII, s. 1, nn. 4–11. For Suárez complete substance ‘dicitur quae est aut intelligitur per modum totius seu integrae substantiae, quae sola interdum quasi per antonomasiam substantia appellari solet’, whereas incomplete substance ‘dicitur […] illa quae pars est substantiae vel ad modum partis concipitur, quo modo materia et forma substantiae sunt.’ (DM XXXIII, s. 1, n. 4). However, substance can be complete or incomplete in several different ways. It can be such physically (n. 6) or metaphysically (n. 15), or always-composed (n. 7) or perfect (n. 9). CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 428. Metaph. V, 1017b10–26: ‘We call substances (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them. (2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of animals. (3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things. (4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.’ In his textual Explanatio of Metaphy. V, 8, Fonseca accepts only two of the four senses of ‘substance’ enumerated by Aristotle. On the one hand, the qualification of ‘substance’ is attributed to those simple bodies (elements) which are not predicated in a substrate. According to Fonseca, this

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His discussion follows the branches of a Porphyrian tree. Fonseca discusses the difference between uncreated and created substance, and within the latter, he addresses the problem of the principle of differentiation between substances, the substantiality of matter and form and the substantiality of pure forms, i.e. angels. Finally, Fonseca dwells on a very complex analysis of the pivotal concepts of ‘supposit’ and ‘primary substance’. In the following paragraphs, I will follow the order of Fonseca’s discussion, so as to reconstruct his entire metaphysical theory of substance.

1. Divine Substance: Can God be Placed under the Category of Oὐσία? Is God a substance? As Fonseca himself acknowledges, many theologians in the scholastic tradition replied in the affirmative. They can be found especially among the Nominalists (Gregory of Rimini and Gabriel Biel), who maintained that God ‘properly and per se is placed within the category of substance’, as well as in those of relation and action.22 According to these authors, the predication substantia is univocal in God and in creatures, due especially to the fact that a substance is a being that exists by itself (per se), and that the spiritual, incorporeal substance (which God is) however constitutes a species of the supreme genus of substance. Although God is absolutely simple and infinite, in the Nominalists’ view, these features do not prevent him from being categorized as a substance, given that other beings are simple (for instance, an angel), or infinite (for instance, a line), being at the same time predicable under the categories. Against these arguments, Fonseca supports the more traditional idea that God cannot be said to be a substance, ‘neither per se, nor reductitie’.23 Yet, he does not at ‘vulgar and obvious’ definition embraces ‘all the sensible bodies, and those which can be pointed out by a finger’, but it does not imply the qualification as substances of the corporeal bulk of bodies ‘insofar as they are quantities’. Rather, substances are ‘those things which substantiate them’, and which are not said to exist in any other subject, both in the sense of inhesion or predication. Likewise, such a sense of substantia does not include spiritual substance (since Fonseca, with Aristotle, rejects their corporeal nature), but it does include matter, in which all bodies dwell as their ultimate subject (CMA V, c. 8, Explanatio, p. 419). On the other hand, ‘substance’ is the same as ‘the thing’s essence or quiddity which can be explained by a definition’, such as it happens in the case of common natures (CMA V, c. 8, Explanatio, p. 419). For Fonseca, the essences of singulars are not included within such a sense of substance (i.e. they are not substances), save in the case of spiritual, immaterial substances. At the same time, Fonseca discards two possible senses of substantia: the one according to which substance is only form, and the one (attributed to Plato and Pythagoras, for which the mathematical-geometrical principles of the sensible bodies (lines, planes, points, etc.) are substances. 22 CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 1, p. 420. 23 CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 421. Fonseca argues for this truth through four arguments: 1) Ex simplicitate divina: God’s absolute simplicity is not compatible with God being subject to whatever category. Indeed, everything which is subject to a category is composed of a genus and a difference, but God is absolutely simple (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 421–22). 2) Ex infinita Dei perfectione: God

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all reject the attribution of substantia to God. Echoed by Suárez24 and Descartes25 in the following decades, he indeed allows for the analogical attribution of this category to God and creatures,26 which he understands as being opposite to the does not and cannot share His essential attributes to the same degree with any creature. So, he cannot be predicated under any category whatsoever, since, in that instance, He would share some attribute with creatures to the same degree (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 422). Moreover, any category is potential and imperfect with respect to difference; so, existing within any category would entail some imperfection and potentiality in God (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 423). 3) Ex necessitate divinae naturae: if some category contained God, this category must be a being which is necessary by itself or a being which is not necessary by itself. If a category is necessary by itself, it must include its ultimate difference, to be in its ultimate act; but, a genus including its ultimate difference is not a genus. By contrast, if the category is not a necessary being, God is composed of non-necessary and necessary parts, which is impossible (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 425. This argument is taken from Iohannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in primum librum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia [ed. Wadding, Vivès, Paris, 1891–95, 26 vols] I, d. 8, q. 3, p. 597). 4) Ex ipsa ratione praedicamenti substantiae: all substance which can be placed under the category substantia by itself stands under accidents. But, God does not stand under any accident (here Fonseca refers to Metaph. III, 1073a13–1073a21: ‘there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has also been shown that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible. For it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power. And while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all. But it is also clear that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior to change of place. It is clear, then, why the first mover has these attributes.’). Moreover, God is neither a primary substance nor a secondary substance (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 2, p. 426). 24 DM XXXII, s. 1, n. 9: ‘Deus extra omne genus seu extra omne praedicamentum existit; unde, licet aliquo modo conveniat in ratione substantiae cum aliquibus entibus creatis, non tamen univoce, sed analogice.’ 25 AT VIII–1, p. 24 (Principia, I, § 51): ‘Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursus Dei existere posse percipimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiae non convenit Deo et illis univoce, ut dici solet in Scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus nominis signification potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creaturis sit communis.’ As is known, Jean-Luc Marion discussed Descartes’ definition in Jean-Luc Marion, ‘Substance et subsistance. Suárez et le traité de la substantia — Principia Philosophiae I, 51–54’, in Jean-Luc Marion, Questions cartésiennes II (Paris: PUF 1996), pp. 85–115 (see also Jean-Luc Marion, ‘A propos de Suárez et Descartes’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 50, [1996, 195], pp. 109–31). Here, Marion compares Descartes’ and Suárez’s theories and argues that the former ‘upsets’ the latter in rejecting the analogical attribution of substantia to God. According to Marion, Descartes simply treats God as an external, effective concursus which is impossible to ‘analogize’ with created substance. But, the analogical attribution of substantia to God is not unique of Suárez, as this position was commonly accepted by the Schools (as Descartes himself remarks: ‘ut dici solet in Scholis’). Above all, it seems quite evident that Descartes does not reject, but rather embraces, the analogical attribution (‘nomen substantiae non convenit Deo et illis univoce’, does not at all imply that he rejects the analogical attribution) he found in the scholastics of his age. 26 However, Aquinas already opened up to this account in In Sent. (ed. Mandonnet) I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1: ‘…dicendum, quod Deus simpliciter non est accidens, nec tamen omnino proprie potest dici substantia; tum quia nomen substantiae dicitur a substando, tum quia substantia quidditatem nominat, quae est aliud ab esse ejus. Unde illa est divisio entis creati. Si tamen non fieret in hoc vis, largo modo potest dici substantia, quae tamen intelligitur supra omnem substantiam creatam, quantum ad id quod est perfectionis in substantia, ut non esse in alio et hujusmodi, et tunc est idem

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Nominalists’ doctrine of a univocal attribution to both. The basis for such a possible attribution is negative, i.e. the ‘negation of existing in a subject’.27 In other words, no substance can inhere in something else, and ‘that which is meant by the name ‘being’ (entis) as well as such an added negation (certainly the essence itself, which vindicates such a negation) can be attributed analogically both to God and the created substances’.28 Indeed, God claims this negation for Himself because of His absolutely simple being, which is neither composed of other entities nor composes another; and, on the other hand, the other substances [claim the same] because of the primary being by which they exist, and those [different] entities cannot univocally and mutually convene [under the same predication], but only analogically.29 Therefore, Fonseca maintains that substance cannot be attributed to God per se and in common with created substance, but God can however be defined as ‘substance’ by an analogical attribution. Nevertheless, from such an admission follows a common definition of substance, which applies to both God and creatures. It proceeds as follows: Substance is the being [ens] (understood as per se and real) which, because of its peculiar nature, claims to not exist for itself in any subject, namely, that it cannot inhere in a subject.30 With some specification, such a definition is even more valid for complete substances31 and for substance as a supreme genus,32 which can be defined by two slightly different definitions.33

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in praedicato et in subjecto, sicut in omnibus quae de Deo praedicantur; et ideo non sequitur quod omne quod est substantia, sit Deus; quia nihil aliud ab ipso recipit praedicationem substantiae sic acceptae, secundum quod dicitur de ipso; et ita propter diversum modum praedicandi non dicitur substantia de Deo et creaturis univoce, sed analogice. Et haec potest esse alia ratio quare Deus non est in aliquo genere, quia scilicet nihil de ipso et de aliis univoce praedicatur.’ See also ST I, q. 13, a. 5, co. CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 427. For other cases of Fonseca’s use of negation, see Igor Agostini’s reconstruction of his theory of unum in this volume, and Guidi, ‘La quaestio veritatis in Pedro da Fonseca’. CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428: ‘id, quod nomine entis et hac negation adiuncta significator, nempe essentiam ipsam, quae huiusmodi negationem sibi vendicat, analogice convenire Deo et substantiis creatis.’ CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428: ‘Deus enim vendicat sibi hanc negationem per suam simplicissimam entitatem, quae nec componitur ex aliis entitatibus, nec aliam componit, caeterae autem substantiae per primam entitatem, ex qua constant, quae entitates non possunt univoce convenire inter se, sed tantum analogice.’ CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428: ‘Substantia est ens (subaudi per se, et reale) quod ex sua peculiari natura sibi vendicat non existere in subiecto, hoc est, non posse inhaerere subiecto.’ CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428. CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428. They are respectively ‘a complete being which, because of its peculiar nature, claims to not exist in a subject’ (according to the definition discussed above) and ‘a finite and complete being, which, because of its peculiar nature [claims to not exist in a subject]’ (CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 428).

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But, is God also the transcendent foundation of created substance? And how could He, since He only falls under that category remotely and analogically? Once more against the Nominalists, Fonseca clarifies this point, by establishing that God is somehow a superexceeding foundation and measure of all the praedicamenta, even though He does not directly pertain to the categories: That which is the proper and peculiar measure of all which is in whatever genus is something that belongs to that genus, at least reductitie. Indeed, whiteness, which is the peculiar measure of all colors, pertains to the genus of colors by itself; and unity, which is actually the peculiar measure of all numbers, belongs reductitie to the genus of numbers, even though numbers by themselves do not belong to any genus. Yet, God is not the proper and peculiar measure of predicamental substances, but the common [measure] of all things, and the superexceeding one of every category. And, one could also say that the name ‘genus’ is not taken here properly and clearly, but widely, and in a way that also includes analogous terms; and, there is no inconvenience in saying that God is in the genus taken in this way, i.e. in the genus of substance insofar as substance is distinguished from the accidents, which is the analogical communication [between God and creatures] in substance.34 Thus, as the transcendent measure and foundation of all praedicamenta, God can be found ‘participatively’ in all categories, even if He does not properly belong to any of them.35 34 CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, pp. 428–29: ‘Id quod est propria et peculiaris mensura omnium quae sunt in aliquo genere, esse aliquid, esse aliquid illius generis, saltem reductitie. Albedo enim, quae est peculiaris mensura omnium colorum, pertinent per se ad genus colorum; unitas vero, quae est peculiaris mensura omnium numerorum, pertinent reductitie ad genus numerorum, si tame numeri in genere ullo per se ponunt: Deus autem non est propria et peculiaris mensura substantiarum praedicamentalium, sed communis rerum omnium, et superexcedens respectu cuiusque Praedicamenti, Dici etiam potest, nomen generis non accipi eo loco proprie, ac presse, sed late, et ut analoga etiam complectitur; neque ullum esse incommodum, si Deus dicatur esse in genere, hoc modo sumpto, hoc est, in genere substantiae, quatenus substantia ab accidentibus distinguitur, quae est analogica communication in substantia.’ 35 Such is also the basis on which Fonseca places his understanding of the claims of the many authorities (especially Augustine, Boethius and John of Damascus) who agreed in attributing the category of substantia to God. Indeed, their attribution was not merely metaphorical, but strongly analogical; and the same applies in the case of other predicates as ens or bonum. See CMA V, c. 8, q. 1, s. 3, p. 429: ‘Speaking of Augustine’s textual place, it should certainly be said that substance and some other categories are said properly, i.e. not metaphorically, of God; though they are said analogically. Indeed, several other predicates are said properly of many and yet, it is not predicated of them univocally, such as “being”, “good”, and many others. On the other hand, Augustine should be understood in this way, [and] he himself in the same place declares [this], when he says: [“]If yet something about that can be said properly by a human mouth[”]. Just as he says that, although something is said about God properly, or not metaphorically, it [is said] much more excellently of God than what is predicated of creatures’ (‘Ad locum Augustini dicendum est, substantiam et alia quaedam Praedicamenta, dici quidem proprie, hoc est, non metaphorice de Deo; sed tamen dici analogice: sunt enim pleraque praedicata, quae dicantur proprie de multis; nec tamen de illis praedicentur univoce, ut ens, bonum, et alia quamplurima.

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2. Created Substance 2.1. The Metaphysical Status of Substantial Difference

Having solved the problem of God’s qualification as substantia, Fonseca addresses created substance, by dealing with a pivotal question: what is the cause of the mutual difference between substances and does this difference pertain to any category by itself (quality, quantity, relation, etc.)? Such a question partially took shape around a widespread doctrine, which Fonseca aims at refuting, i.e. the opinio of those who hold that substantial differences depend on the category of ποιόν, or qualitas.36 According to the Jesuit, this position is ‘openly false, and contrary to Aristotle’s doctrine’, given that everything pertaining to the category of quality is an accident and that accidents necessarily inhere in a subject. How can an attribute, which inheres in a subject, be the cause of the differentiation of a substance?37 Rather, Fonseca subscribes to the position that he attributes to Aquinas, Scotus and many others. According to this view, the differences are neither substances nor accidents, since they are incomplete substances which can only reductitie and indirectly be defined as substances. Moreover, these incomplete substances are not substances according to the category of substantia, which is reserved for complete, primary substances.38 2.2. Matter and Form as Integral Parts vs Spiritual and Incorruptible Substance

As an appendix to this discussion, a fundamental question arises: can matter and form, which are integral parts of material substance, directly be called substances? Augustinum autem hoc pacto intelligendum esse, ipse eodem loco declarant, cum ait; Si tamen de illo proprie aliquid dici ore hominis potest: quasi dicat, etsi quaedam de Deo dicuntur proprie, seu non metaphorice; multo tamen excellentius de Deo, quam de creaturis praedicantur’). Moreover, Fonseca stresses that Augustine does not contradict himself by saying that God is substance, whereas He is such only analogically and by virtue of a transposed expression. For Fonseca, Augustine takes substantia in a rather specific way, which was more common among the Latins; namely, in a more metaphorical sense, such as when one says that God ‘sits’ or ‘speaks’, and it means that God substat by himself. 36 CMA V, c. 8, q. 2, s. 1, p. 430. 37 CMA V, c. 8, q. 2, s. 1, p. 430. Likewise, Fonseca rejects two other positions, that of Ammonius Hermias and that of Simplicius and Boethius. Those who support the first position hold that substantial differences belong directly to primary substance and that they cannot be accidents; so, they are by themselves substances, which directly belong to the category of substantia (CMA V, c. 8, q. 2, s. 2, p. 431) Those who subscribe to the second doctrine maintain that the differences between substances are instead intermediate between substance and quality (CMA V, c. 8, q. 2, s. 2, p. 432). 38 CMA V, c. 8, q. 2, s. 3, p. 432–33. Fonseca does not argue in favor of this view, but rather demonstrates it a fortiori, by showing how paradoxical all the other accounts are: differences cannot be accidents or complete substances, and this entails that they are incomplete substances.

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According to Fonseca, an affirmative reply could only stem from a misreading of Aristotle’s texts, and should thereby be avoided. Indeed, both matter and form are parts of the substantial composite and can in no way be said to be complete beings and substances, if not reductitie. Moreover, matter and form cannot univocally share the same essential nature; otherwise, they could not be two different parts of the composite.39 But, what about separate substances, i.e. angels and celestial bodies? Do they belong directly and per se to the same category of substance to which material composites belong? Regarding this issue, Fonseca has to deal with four different accounts, those of Averroes,40 Plotinus,41 Aquinas,42 and that of ‘several Greek authors’, a group consisting of many Neoplatonists (such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius Hermiae, Simplicius and Dexippus). This latter position is the one which Fonseca supports himself. It claims that the predicamental univocity based on the formal concept (accepted also by Aquinas) entails a common nature between these different kinds of substances.43 Hence, Fonseca not only maintains that spiritual and material substances belong to the same category of substantia from a logical point of view, but also that such predicamental unity reveals the existence of a common nature on a metaphysical level. However, this does not entail that one can consider categories as logical or metaphysical elements indifferently, but rather that one can pass from a logical to a metaphysical consideration of the same category, i.e., that of substance: Since the logician does not look at the intimate natures of things, there were, among the Greeks and the Latins, those who maintained that this common substance, together with the subalternate whole of the genus of the incorporeal thing, being things that are very difficult to seize, should only be addressed by the metaphysician, nor should they take place in logical categories; but such a doctrine, as for this part, should not be approved. Indeed, since the categories are the same for the logician and metaphysician, and since they are taken into account by the latter and the other […], it does not matter that the separate substance, and accordingly the substance in common, abstracted from it and 39 CMA V, c. 8, q. 3, s. 2, p. 434–35. 40 According to the great Arabian philosopher, the whole issue is about the dualism between corruptible and incorruptible; which, for Averroes, requires different genera and so, different categories of substance (CMA V, c. 8, q. 4, s. 1, p. 437). 41 For the Neoplatonic thinker (followed, for Fonseca, by Albert the Great and Giles of Rome), corporeal and incorporeal beings cannot in any way share the same genus, and the genus itself should be neither corporeal nor incorporeal; it is thus impossible that they belong to the same category. CMA V, c. 8, q. 4, s. 1, p. 437. Fonseca’s reference goes to Enn. IV, 1. 42 According to Aquinas (but already to Alexander of Hales), the unity provided by a formal concept is sufficient for the unity of a genus, understood as a logical genus; accordingly, the very concept ‘in common’ of finite and complete substance should be enough to claim that spiritual and incorruptible beings can both be logically traced back to the same category of substance. This does not imply a physical community between the two, given that the latter entails a unity of matter, which is impossible in this case. CMA V, c. 8, q. 4, s. 1, p. 438. Here Fonseca refers to In Met., lec. 12. 43 CMA V, c. 8, q. 4, s. 1, p. 438.

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from the material substances, is cognized with great difficulty. Nor do we say that their discovery, or the explication of their nature, pertains to the dialectical art. Indeed, the former is up to the physician and the metaphysician, and the latter is up to the metaphysician alone.44 Fonseca’s idea is that the very unity of logic and metaphysics45 lies in the doctrine of categories exposed above. Logic and metaphysics deal with the same categories, even if from different perspectives, and both address the concept of substance as the highest and the most comprehensive category of the created world. Yet, whereas the logician deals with categories as predicamental beings, the metaphysician looks at them as related to the essences of things.

3. Supposit, Subsistence and Primary Substance: Terminological Issues Having added these important caveats, Fonseca’s treatise goes on to shed light on a set of terminological problems within the scholastic theory of substance: those of the meaning of suppositum and its possible distinction from the expressions ‘primary substance’ and ‘hypostasis.’ As is well-known, the roots of such distinctions are strictly theological, given that the concepts of ‘supposit’ and ‘hypostasis’ traditionally play an important role in the discussions about how God is simultaneously three different Persons, or hypostases, and one essence or substance. 3.1. Boethius’ and Aquinas’ lexical tangle

It must be stressed that the association of these terms46 (‘supposit’, ‘primary substance’ and ‘hypostasis’) is not at all accidental. Fonseca already found them gathered in

44 CMA V, c. 8, q. 4, s. 1, p. 438–39: ‘An quia logicus non considerat intimas rerum naturas, iccirco sunt ex haec Graecorum et Latinorum calsse nonnulli qui velint, ipsam communem substantiam, totumque subalternum incorporearum genus, quia difficillima sunt cognitu, a solo metaphysico tractari, nec in Praedicamentis logicis locum habere: qua ex parte non est eorum sententia probanda. Nam cum Praedicamenta eadem sint logico, quae metaphysico, solaque diversa consideratione ab hoc et illo spectentur, ut superiori capite probatum est […] nihil refert, quod substantiae separatae, et ex consequenti communis substantia, ab eis et materialibus substantiis abstract, sint cognitu difficillimae. Neque enim dicimus pertinere ad artem dialecticam earum inventionem, aut naturae explicationem; quarum illa a physico et metaphysico, haec ad solum metaphysico spectat.’ 45 See Martins, Lógica e ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca, pp. 46–60. 46 As for the tangled pre-history of the terminology evoked in these paragraphs, see Jean-François Courtine, ‘Essence, substance, subsistance, existence’, in Barbara Cassin (ed.), Le Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, Dictionnaire des intraduisibiles (Paris: Seuil-Le Robert, 2004), pp. 400–14 and Kristell Trégo, ‘Substance, sujet, act. Le première réception latine d’Aristote: Marius Victorinus et Boèce’, Les Études philosophiques, 1010 (2012l 2), pp. 233–56.

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Boethius’ Contra Eutychen et Nestorium47 as well as in Aquinas’s Summa,48 where Thomas discussed the divine persons and Boethius’ definition of persona as ‘an individual substance of rational nature.’ Especially for Aquinas, Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions […]. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is ‘person.’ Thus, the term ‘individual substance’ is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term ‘rational nature’ is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.49 Within this context, Thomas had to solve a particular terminological issue. Boethius stressed that ‘the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature’, i.e. the person, ‘by the name of hypostasis’. Now, since such a term in Latin signifies ‘person’,50 does persona means the same as ‘hypostasis,’ ‘subsistence,’ and also ‘essence’? Aquinas escaped this lexical tangle via the following solution: According to the Philosopher, substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks οὐσία, what we may call ‘essence.’ In another sense substance means a subject or ‘suppositum,’ which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called ‘suppositum.’51

47 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, in The Theological Treatises, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. Stewart and Rand (London-Cambridge: W. Heinemann & Harvard University Press, 1918), especially c. 3, pp. 85–91. 48 ST I, q. 29, art. 2, resp. English translations are from The Summa Theologica, tr. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros. 1947–48). 49 ST I, q. 29, art. 2, resp.: ‘individua substantiae habent aliquod speciale nomen prae aliis, dicuntur enim hypostases, vel primae substantiae. Sed adhuc quodam specialiori et perfectiori modo invenitur particulare et individuum in substantiis rationalibus, quae habent dominium sui actus, et non solum aguntur, sicut alia, sed per se agunt, actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Et ideo etiam inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent singularia rationalis naturae. Et hoc nomen est persona Et ideo in praedicta definitione personae ponitur substantia individua, inquantum significat singulare in genere substantiae, additur autem rationalis naturae, inquantum significat singulare in rationalibus substantiis’ (translations from the 1947–48 edition). 50 Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, c. III, p. 85. 51 ST I, q. 29, art. 2, resp.: ‘secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. Et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum.secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. Et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum’ (translation from the 1947–48 edition).

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For Aquinas, then, ‘substance’ can be taken in a twofold sense. As it means the definition of a thing (‘man is a rational animal’), and coincides with the Greek οὐσία, or ‘essence,’ or rather as it means the primary substance itself, and it is equivalent to ‘suppositum’.52 Yet Aquinas also maintained that ‘substance’ has three further meanings connected with its being a ‘reality’: [Substance] it is also called by three names signifying a reality — that is, ‘a thing of nature,’ ‘subsistence,’ and ‘hypostasis,’ (res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis) according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called ‘subsistence’; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called ‘a thing of nature’; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called ‘hypostasis,’ or ‘substance.’53 Thus, res naturae, subsistentia, and hypostasis are only different faces of a three-sided reality of subsisting substance, taken (1) insofar as it is a determined instantiation of a common nature, (2) as it exists in itself or (3) as it is the ontological substrate of accidents. And the term persona ‘within the genus of rational substances,’ means exactly what these three terms mean with respect to ‘substance’, when the concept of ‘rational substance’ is understood as a subset of ‘substance’ in general. In this part of his comment, Fonseca follows in the footsteps of Boethius and Aquinas, analyzing this terminology as propaedeutic to the subsequent metaphysical discussion. According to the Jesuit, the issue about the meaning of ‘supposit’ cannot be solved if not by way of the previous lexical clarification of its possible synonyms, such as ‘primary substance’, ‘secondary substance’, ‘nature’, ‘hypostasis’ and ‘subsistence’. Let us follow Fonseca’s discussion, analytically summarizing in the next sub-paragraphs the definitions he provides for each of these terms and seeing how he comes by this way to a final metaphysical discussion of the supposit. 3.2. Definitions of ‘Substance’ and ‘Primary Substance’

The first term analyzed by Fonseca is substance (in general). Besides the categorial definition discussed above, substance is, for Fonseca, what subsists beyond the accidents or better, what stands under them.54 The term substantia, however, can

52 See again Courtine, ‘Essence, substance, subsistance, existence’, pp. 406–12. 53 ST I, q. 29, art. 2, resp.: ‘Nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significantibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem considerationem substantiae sic dictae. Secundum enim quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt. Secundum vero quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sic dicitur res naturae; sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae. Secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, dicitur hypostasis vel substantia. Quod autem haec tria nomina significant communiter in toto genere substantiarum, hoc nomen persona significat in genere rationalium substantiarum’ (translation from the 1947–48 edition). 54 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 446.

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be employed in four different senses, ordered hierarchically, from the broader to the most exact. They are as follows: 1. Common definition: Substance means the essence of a thing, taken universally and insofar as one can explain it. 2. Proper definition: Substance means a thing that is not an accident, including incomplete and complete beings. 3. More proper definition: Substance means a complete thing that is not an accident. 4. Absolutely proper definition: Substance means primary substance, as Aristotle established against Plato.55 Therefore, in its true and proper meaning (the fourth), the category of ‘substance’ ultimately and mainly refers to primary substance, which therefore constitutes its ultimate meaning. Still, what does ‘primary substance’ term mean? Consistent with the definition of categorial being, we are told by Fonseca that a primary substance is a finite and complete being, which is ‘[n]either of any subject [n]or in any subject’. Though, by presenting such a definition, Fonseca has to adapt his metaphysical view to one unavoidable consequence about Trinitarianism, which entails a further specification about God’s qualification as a substance. Indeed, Fonseca stresses that primary substance is complete and finite. Finitude is a crucial requirement to limit the sense of primary substance to categorial substance, not mistaking it with the (aforesaid) pre-categorial way in which God is not only a substance, but also a primary substance: if one does not consider the particle ‘finite’, there is no doubt [that], of course, this definition of ‘primary substance’] could not only be attributed to the divine persons, but also to the divine essence, taken both concretely and abstractly. Indeed, just as Socrates, or this stone, or other such things are primary substances (given that they neither say anything about any subject, nor that they inhere in any subject), God and the divine essence [are primary substances]. Indeed, although [the name of] God is said of the three persons, it is not predicated of them as subjects; and even supposing that [God] is said of many [beings] insofar as they are subjects, this is nothing other than predicating many through an essential predication, in which what is predicated is divided and multiplied, [and] in this way God is not in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The explanation of the term ‘primary substance’, used by Aristotle, agrees with that, since he calls ‘substance’ what is primarily, mainly and absolutely said [to be a substance]. Thus, it is especially appropriate to God or to the divine essence. And accordingly, any divine person, or God insofar as He is common to the three persons, is a true primary substance, even if not according to the primary substance according to the categories, but rather, in an absolute sense.56 55 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 446–47. 56 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 447: ‘si non intelligas particulam ‘finitum’ non dubium erit, quin definitio conveniat non modo divinis personis, ut patet, sed etiam divinae essentiae, sive ea concrete accipiatur, sive abstracte. Nam ut Socrates, hic lapis, et caetera huiusmodi sunt primae substantiae;

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Behind these complicated formulations, Fonseca means that Aristotle’s definition of primary substance (a being that is neither of any subject nor in any subject), applies simultaneously to God, His three persons and the created primary substances. Yet, whereas God is a primary substance absolutely, and not insofar as He is predicable under the category of substantia, finite and created primary substances are such through categorial substance.57 3.3. The Meanings of ‘Nature’ and ‘Supposit’

Over the three following sections (2, 3, and 4), Fonseca continues his terminological analysis by addressing another crucial set of distinctions that we found in Aquinas and which allowed the latter to define the supposit; that is, the meaning of and the mutual difference between supposit and nature (here understood as individual nature). As for this problem, it is worth recalling that Aquinas (who does not have a definitive position on this problem) often argued that ‘nature’ and ‘supposit’ (even if understood as three aspects of the same reality of substance) cannot be identified as one and the same.58 The reasons for such a choice were chiefly quia nec de subiecto ullo dicuntur, nec in subsiecto ullo insunt; ita et Deus, sive divina essentia. Quamquam enim Deus dicitur de tribus diinis personis; non tamen de illis praedicatur, ut de subiectis: siquidem dici de pluribus ut de subiectis, nihil est aliud, quam praedicari essentiali praedicatione de pluribus, in quibus id quod praedicatur, divisum sit et multiplicatum; quo pacto Deus non est in Patre, Filio, et Spiritu sancto. Accedit explicatio nominis primae substantiae, qua Aristoteles utitur; cum eam vocat substantiae, quae primo, praecipuae et maxime dicitur; convenit enim potissimus Deo, sive divinae essentiae. Est igitur sive quaelibet divina persona, sive Deus, ut est communis tribus personis, verissime prima substantia; non tamen ut prima substatntia in Praedicamentis ponitur, sed absolute.’ 57 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 447–48. Besides these problems, Fonseca also provides a definition of secondary substance. According to the traditional doctrine of the Categories and the Metaphysics, it is ‘the genera and the species, in which the primary substances dwell, i.e. under which [primary substances] are placed by virtue of an essential subjection’ (CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 449: ‘Secundae substantiae, ut Aristoteles eodem Praedicamentorum loco definit, sunt genera et species, in quibus insunt primae, hoc est, sub quibus collocantur essentiali subiectione; cuiusmodi substantiae sunt animal, et homo. Unde patet, nihil praedicari posse de Deo, quod sit secunda substantia, cum Deus nulli generi aut speciei subijci possit’). Restating his moderate realism (CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 449: ‘Huc accedit quod in Deo nulla omnino entitas reperitur, quae indigeat re aliqua in qua existat; secundae autem substantiae ideo dicuntur secundae, quia indiget primis in quibus existant’), Fonseca remarks that secondary substance needs primary substance to exist; but, he also stresses that this kind of substance cannot be predicated of God in any way. Indeed, the latter cannot be subjected to any genus or species; moreover, it does not require a substance in which to inhere (CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 1, p. 449). 58 ST III, q. 2, a. 2, co.: ‘Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et principia individuantia, sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui.’ See also Thomas de Aquino, Quaestiones quodlibetales (Leonine vol. 25, Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), II, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: ‘non solum in compositis ex materia et forma invenitur aliquod accidens praeter essentiam

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Christological. According to the formulation established against Arians and Nestorians in the first Councils, Christ possesses two natures (the divine and the human), and only one person (the Son); but, since the person is (in Boethius’ definition) ‘an individual substance,’ i.e. a supposit, the supposit of Christ is not its nature(s). Hence, individual nature and supposit are not identical, properly speaking, to each other.59 Fonseca’s discussion is, at this stage, strictly lexical, as he saves a more accurate metaphysical analysis of the relationship between individual ‘nature’ and ‘supposit’ for a subsequent quaestio. He now starts from the concept of ‘nature’, defined (as with Aquinas) as ‘nothing but the essence of a thing, both universal, as “animality” or “humanity”, and singular, as “Platonity” or “Lentulity”’.60 Now, for Fonseca, ‘nature’ agrees with ‘substance’ when the latter is understood as the thing’s essence (as Aquinas stressed, ‘substance is called by the Greeks οὐσία, what we may call “essence”’).61 Yet at the same time, ‘nature’ also differs from substance for its usage in the context of the debate over universals. Indeed, ‘substance’ is mainly used to speak of universals, whereas ‘nature’ can be used to speak of both universals and singulars.62 As for ‘supposit,’ Fonseca defines it as a ‘complete and incommunicable substance, such as are Socrates, Plato and other individual men’.63 So, it is worth stressing that the fundamental feature of the supposit is its incommunicability. This is the reason why ‘supposit’ is used to mean ‘some ultimate verbal term, as far as no lower or more determined predication can be communicated to the subject by virtue of an informing form’.64

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ipsius speciei, sed etiam in substantiis spiritualibus quae non componuntur ex materia et forma; et ideo in utrisque suppositum non est omnino idem quod ipsa natura. Hoc tamen est aliter et aliter in utrisque’. As I will show, Fonseca means to distinguish two terms, but he also wants to argue that there is no real difference between nature and supposit, and likewise, that nothing is added to the nature to have the supposit, if not the supposit itself. A few questions later (see below), Fonseca comes back to these terms, by especially trying to investigate the relationship between ‘nature’ and ‘supposit.’ That issue will reveal the peculiar connection between the nature-supposit relationship and the problem of the composition of esse and existentia. But, for now, Fonseca limits his inquiry to the definition of the two terms. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 450. This term, however, can be understood in a twofold way. On the one hand, both ‘nature’ and ‘substance’ are relative to that of which they are the nature, or the essence. Indeed, ‘humanity’ is not a nature or a substance as such, but rather the nature or substance of human beings. On the other hand, both nature and substance can be conceived by a simple concept (‘humanity’) or definitively (‘this man is Plato, born in Athens’). See CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 450. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 450. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 450. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 451. Anyhow, there are other possible definitions of ‘suppositum’. A second one refers to that which simply disregards the adjective ‘complete’ (thus, ‘incommunicable substance’). A third one stresses that the being in question is a determined substance (thus, ‘a complete substance that is entirely determined in its genus’). A fourth one, more logico, is that which, by contrast, defines the supposit as ‘just the ultimate subject of the predication’, i.e. ‘what in no way can be said of many in natural predication’ (CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 3, p. 452).

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3.4. ‘Hypostasis’ or ‘Subsistence’?

To conclude this lexical tour de force, Fonseca deals with the thorny definition of hypostasis, which bore relevant implications for Greek Patristic Trinitarianism. According to the Jesuit, the Latins took this term to be equivalent to ‘subsistence.’65 Indeed, ‘hypostasis’ is ‘sometimes taken to be the very act of subsisting, sometimes as the very subsisting thing’ (as happens in the case of the word ‘intelligence’, taken either as the act of understanding or as the intelligent thing).66 However, in seeing ‘hypostasis’ as nothing more than a synonym of ‘subsistence’, Fonseca enumerates five ways in which subsistentia can be used. The first two are vulgar uses of the word: 1. ‘Subsistence’ as the true being of a thing 2. ‘Subsistence’ as that which lies on the basis or on the ground of something else Besides these meanings, three further definitions are those employed apud Philosophos (even if, Fonseca specifically means the Theologians by this expression) and are thus more technical usages of the word. They are as follows: 3. ‘Subsistence’ as being per se, i.e. not in a subject of inherence, so that all substance, both complete or incomplete, subsists and is said to have hypostasis and subsistence, and sometimes is simply called hypostasis.67 4. ‘Subsistence’ as being per se, i.e. not in another subject, as a part or as a form, from which it would depend. In this way, as Fonseca points out, secondary substances are not subsistent, since although they exist in the primary ones per modum formarum, they depend on them in their form. Likewise, material forms, whose existence depends upon the matter from which they are drawn, and matter, cannot be qualified as subsistent beings.68 5. ‘Subsistence’ as being per se, namely to be so as a thing is. This definition excludes everything which is a part or a form or an near-form, and coincides with the complete independence of the subsisting being. So, it even excludes the divine essence and the human rational soul, which exists (respectively) per modum formae and in potency.69 Now, Fonseca presents the three latter definitions as propaedeutic to a following Trinitarian discussion, about how many subsistences dwell in God. And, as for this problem, he makes an important remark: it must be animadverted […] that even though the terms ‘hypostasis’ and ‘subsistence’ are equivalent as names (and there is no other difference between

65 66 67 68 69

See already Boethius, Contra Eutychen, ch. 3, pp. 86–89. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 4, p. 453. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 4, p. 454. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 4, p. 454. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 4, p. 455.

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them, save from the fact that ‘hypostasis’ is a Greek name, and ‘subsistence’ is Latin), from the time that it began to be handed down by the way of Theology and by reason — i.e. among the scholastics, as they are called — the same use of both of these terms about the divine being was not accepted. All [the scholastics] indeed deny that the divine essence, which is one, is one hypostasis, and they claim that the three persons are three hypostases. Yet, there is no little debate between them as regards the name ‘subsistence’. Indeed, some — who almost have Durandus as their leader — say that the essential subsistence is one, whereas there is no personal [subsistence]. Others, by contrast, claim that there are three personal subsistences and no essential subsistence [in God]’; [a doctrine] which has been welcomed by several recent [theologians]. Finally, others — among whom is included especially Cajetan — agree with one essential [subsistence] and three personal [subsistences].70 According to Fonseca, if one takes the term subsistentia according to the fifth (the Philosophers’ third) meaning, ‘there is no doubt that [in God] there are three personal subsistences and there is no essential [subsistence]’, because ‘in their meaning, “subsistence”, “supposit” and “hypostasis” (if taken the name “hypostasis” as restricted to the use of Theologians), are the same’.71 On the other hand, some Theologians — including Fonseca himself — take subsistentia according to the fourth definition (the Philosophers’ second). As for this meaning, there remains a crucial dilemma, namely between understanding the name subsistentia concretely (i.e. as if it only pointed out the subsisting being, and not subsistence in itself), or understanding it abstractly (i.e. as the very metaphysical basis of subsistence). For Fonseca, if one agrees with the fourth definition of ‘subsistence’ and takes this concept concretely, all three views mentioned above end up being the same as Cajetan’s position (one essential subsistence and three personal subsistences, ‘i.e. three subsisting and one subsisting’). By contrast, if one agrees with the fourth definition but takes the concept of ‘subsistence’ abstractly, the three above views do not agree each other.

70 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 5, p. 457: ‘Animadvertendum est tamen […] etsi hypostasis et subsistentiae vocabula ex vi nominis idem valent (neque aliud inter ea discrimen cernitur, quam quod hypostasis graecum nomen est, substitentia latinum) ex eo tamen tempore, quo Theologia via et ratione tradi caepit, hoc est apud Scholasticos, ut vocantur, non eumdem usum utriusque vocabuli in divinis esse caepisse. Negant enim omnes divinam essentiam quae unica est, unicam esse hypostasim, et affirmant tre personas esse tres hypostases: at in nominee subsistentiae est non minima apud eos controversia. Nam alii dicunt unicam esse substistentiam essentialem, et nullas personales, in quibus quasi caput habetur Durandus. Alii e contrario volunt tres esse personales, et nullam essentialem, quod plerisque recentioribus placet. Alii denique admittunt unicam essentialem, et personales tres, inter quos praecipue refertur Caietanus.’ 71 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 5, p. 457. This reading nevertheless agrees with the conciliary decrees of the Fathers, who ‘everywhere distinguished subsistence and hypostasis from essence, as a certain personal [subsistence or hypostasis] from the essential, and openly claimed that in God, there is only one essence and a threefold subsistence and hypostasis’ (ibidem).

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In Fonseca’s view, this specific reading alone reveals the actual opposition between the three aforementioned accounts (which otherwise would seem to be the same): 1. Durandus and the others maintain that the divine essence is the ratio subsistendi of both God and of the three persons, denying that the mutual relationship between the three persons can be the foundation of three different subsistences. 2. By contrast, the supporters of the second view hold that the divine essence is almost the root of subsistence in God, but they also maintain that God and the three persons subsist because of the relationships themselves. 3. Cajetan and the others argue that the divine essence is the ratio subsistendi of God and of the essential subsistence of the divine person; but, they also admit that divine relationships are the rationes subsistendi of both the divine persons and the personal subsistence of God’s essence.72 In light of the fourth definition of ‘substance’, Fonseca subscribes to the third account, which he supports with five reasons, three of which are metaphysical (the other two are merely doctrinal). They are as follows: a) From the very divine being: God’s being is twofold — one essential and absolute, another personal and relative — and all God’s being is by itself subsisting and independent. Therefore, there must be two rationes subsistendi in God.73 b) From the divine operation: all operation requires an operating subsistence. In God, there are two kinds of operations: one of God as God, common to the three persons and called ‘operation ad extra’, as it is exercised on creatures; another of the persons as distinct entities, called ‘operation ad intra’. Accordingly, two different kinds of subsistence must be in God, one of God as God, another of the three persons.74 c) From the very definition of subsistence: according to the fourth definition of subsistentia (Philosopher’s second) adopted by Fonseca, subsistence is the same as the being not subsisting in another subject, from which the subsistent thing would depend. Yet, from this definition, subsistence must be attributed to both God and the divine persons insofar as they are persons.75 3.4. Supposit, Primary Substance and Incommunicability

Let us now come back to ‘supposit,’ in order to investigate about its possible difference from ‘primary substance’. As previously seen, Fonseca defined ‘supposit’ as being the same as ‘incommunicable substance.’ Indeed, according to the classic scholastic definition, the supposit is a complete individual, such as Plato or Socrates, characterized

72 73 74 75

CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 5, p. 458. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 7, p. 460. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 7, pp. 460–61. CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 7, p. 461.

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by the fact that it cannot further communicate its essence to others. But, does that meaning of suppositum entirely coincide with that of prima substantia? For Fonseca, strictly speaking, this is not the case, and Aristotle himself is actually responsible for having introduced such an erroneous identification. His error was chiefly due to the fact that he was not acquainted with the mystery of the Trinity, which is the main reason why instead Christian Theologians have to distinguish between these two terms. In fact, Fonseca’s caveat only regards the absolute meaning of these terms, including their analogical extension to God. Indeed, in created beings, ‘supposit’ means exactly the same thing as ‘primary substance,’ and such elements only differ in God. This is nevertheless obvious in light of the previous Trinitarian discussion of divine subsistences: Indeed, we showed that to the extent that God or the divine essence is primary substance, it is not a supposit; by contrast, the divine persons are multiple supposits, but they are not said to be (if not absolutely and simply) many primary substances, but rather only one. From this reason, however, it is clear that they are not distinct in created beings, since all complete, finite and incommunicable substance (which is the reason of created supposit) is a predicamental primary substance; and, in turn, all predicamental primary substance is singular, complete, finite and incommunicable.76 Hence, God’s primary substance is made incommunicable by three different supposits (the persons), such that it subsists and is incommunicable in three different ways. These supposits are distinct from God’s primary substance at least virtually or by reason,77 such that primary substance and supposits are different things in God. By contrast, those two levels overlap in creatures, and thus herein, what makes a thing a primary substance is exactly the same principle that makes it incommunicable and hence, a supposit. But what is such an element that constitutes a primary, created substance as a supposit?

4. Supposit, Singular Nature, and Personality As one can see, this terminological analysis led us to a metaphysical investigation about the principle which bears the distinction or the identity between ‘supposit’ and ‘primary substance’. Fonseca calls it ‘what the supposit adds to the nature of the

76 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 10, p. 465: ‘Ostendimus enim, Deum sive divinam essentiam, ita esse primam substantiam, ut non sit suppositum; contraque, divinas personas ita esse plura supposita, ut non sint dicendae (saltem absolute ac simpliciter) plures primae substantiae, sed unica. In rebus autem creatis ex eo perspicuum est haec non distingui, quia omnis substantia completa, finita, et incommunicabilis (quae est ratio suppositi creati) est prima substantia praedicamentalis, et vicissim omnis prima substantia praedicamentalis, est singularis, completa, finita, et incommunicabilis.’ 77 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 10, p. 468.

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singular,’ and devotes an entire question to explaining this process of addition.78 As it is very important to understand his account of primary substance, I shall reconstruct it in this final paragraph. Though, to rightly understand that problem (and notably the Jesuit’s approach to it), we must first recount another set of arguments by which Fonseca claims that the principle of individuation, the individual itself, and the supposit are one and the same thing in creatures. 4.1. Supposit, Singularized Nature, and Individuation

Fonseca develops his remarks on this point as a reply to a possible objection to his doctrine (i.e. the identity of primary substance and supposit in created substance). This objection again implicitly pivots on the peculiar relationship between nature and supposit in the person of Christ. Indeed, given that a primary substance always stems from the composition of a nature and a principle of individuation which ‘singularizes’ that nature (Fonseca subscribes to Scotus’ account of haecceitas as the principle of individuation79), one could argue that this composition alone (nature plus haecceitas) is not enough to make the substance incommunicable and hence, a supposit. An additional element would be necessary for its being incommunicable, so that primary substance itself would not be the same as the supposit, which would thereby consist of the primary substance caused by haecceitas plus the element causing incommunicability. This objection specifically echoes Capreolus’ account of the problem of the formal constituent of the person.80 Against Scotus, the ‘Prince of Thomists’ argued for an additional positive metaphysical element (identifiable with the very act of being of the supposit), often called ‘personality,’ which would bestow upon it the

78 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, pp. 470–83. As for Suárez’s treatment of the same issue see Francesco Ramella, ‘Il costitutivo formale della persona in Francisco Suárez tra teologia e metafisica,’ in Cintia Faraco and Simona Langella (eds.), Francisco Suárez 1617–2017. Atti del convegno in occasione del IV centenario della morte (Capua: Artetetra Edizioni, 2019), pp. 111–123. 79 Fonseca’s account of the principle of individuation can be found in CMA V, c. 6, qq. 1–5, pp. 310–45. Here (especially q. 5, ss. 1–4, pp. 339–45), the Portuguese Jesuit stands up for Scotus’ famous account of haecceitas as the principle of individuation: ‘universe, principium individuationis es[t] differentiam quamdam positivam, et primo incommuicabilem, quae adiuncta specie, per se constituit individuum. Huiusmodi sunt differentiae, quibus Socrates et Plato prius natura differunt inter se, quam ullo accidentario discrimine: quas differentias alij vocant haecceitates, alij minus barbare haeccitates, quod earum additione natura communis fiat haec; alij tolerabilius differentias individuantes, sive individuales, quod individuorum constitutionem absolvant.’ For more on Fonseca’s principle of individuation, see Miguel Baptista Pereira, O princípio da individuação na metafísica de Pedro da Fonseca (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra 1960). 80 See Umberto Degl’Innocenti, ‘Il Capreolo e la questione sulla personalità’, Divus Thomas, 43 (1940), pp. 27–40; Paolo Carosi, ‘La sussistenza ossia il formale costitutivo del supposito’, Divus Thomas, 43 (1940), pp. 393–420 (esp. pp. 398–99); Francisco P. Muñiz, ‘El constitutivo formal de la persona creada en la tradición tomista’, Ciencia Tomista, 70 (1946), pp. 201–93; Eraldo Quarello, ‘Il problema scolastico della persona nel Gaetano e nel Capreolo’, Divus Thomas, 55 (1952), pp. 34–63; James B. Reichmann ‘St Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the Created Person’, New Scholasticism 33 (1959), pp. 1–31.

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incommunicability of a singularized nature, making it a supposit.81 This is the element that ‘personalizes’ or ‘supposits’ the singularized nature, affording it with a theological and private dimension, that of ‘personality’ or ‘supposality,’ which is the rationale for a primary substance’s ultimate incommunicability. Unlike Capreolus, Fonseca does not require any further principle beyond a primary substance and its principle of individuation82 in order to have incommunicability, and hence the status of a supposit, in a complete primary substance. In accordance with Cajetan,83 he holds indeed that the singularized nature is ‘supposited’ or ‘personalized’ neither by a further element indwelling in the individuating difference, nor by anything really distinct from the nature itself. The very existence of the supposit is, rather, a pure terminus of the already-singularized nature, a ‘conclusion’ which immediately entails incommunicability. Though, to get to this conclusion, one should especially keep in mind the following distinction: the individuating difference, which must always be taken concretely, can be understood in two manners: one, insofar as it is added to the ultimate species (speciei infimae) of the complete substance taken abstractly, and it contracts it

81 Manuel Barbosa da Costa Freitas, ‘Natureza e fundamento ontológico da Pessoa em Duns Escoto’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 50 (1994, 3), pp. 155–63, esp. pp. 156–57, explains the core of the issue very well (even if with reference to Scotus): ‘incommunicability, or the person’s own independence falls under and starts from the individual nature, which erase the multiplication or replicability of the essence or common nature, for instance, humanity for many human beings. Thus, one should ask if the individual incommunicability, that is, its non-multiplication by different individuals, it is enough to make that a specific intellectual nature constitutes itself as a person. Keeping in mind that the human nature of Christ, as well as the soul separated from the body are not persons, Scotus is led to conclude that in addition to the incommunicability ut quod, which is proper of the individual nature, the person also requires an incommunicability ut quo, namely, to not be a form or an integral part of a whole which is different from itself.’ But see also Édouard Weber, La personne humaine au XIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1991), pp. 495–96: ‘The Latin Master had many other notions to designate the singular person. From Boethius, they receive the very term “hypostasis”, a word inherited from the Greek ὑπόστασις, which, in the Patristic Age, became a synonym for another Greek term, πρόσωπον. The tradition provides them with more two notions: suppositum, the supposit, and individuum, the individual, the singular subject. “Supposit” is that which stands under the attribute, first of all in the universal form, what underlies it, and it equally designates the individual subject as a singular reality having a determined nature thanks to its formal part which allows it to be such. If it is a nature composed by matter and form, the supposit and its nature or essence are [mutually] irreducible. “Supposit” thus exactly draws upon the meaning of ‘hypostasis’. Such is the primary sense of the singular subject which defines the expression “this man” (hic homo), so often proposed by Aquinas to argue against the theory of the unique possible intellect for all. “Individual” first of all defines the singular subject of a determined nature which individuates its matter. But, if applied to man, this term has finally retrieved “hypostasis” and was adopted to define a singular being which does not owe its individuation to matter.’ 82 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 10, p. 469. 83 See again Quarello, ‘Il problema scolastico della persona’ and Reichmann, ‘St Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the Created Person’. Cajetan discusses this doctrine in his lengthy commentary on ST III, q. 4, a. 2.

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to the abstract singular nature; another, insofar as it is added to such a species taken concretely, and contracts it to the concrete singular.84 Note that Fonseca does maintain that a primary substance or supposit consists of an ultimate species, i.e. a singularized nature, and the individuating difference which singularizes that nature (‘man’ becomes ‘Plato’). Such a contraction, however, can be understood in a twofold sense. The first ‘manner’ is purely logical: an ultimate species (‘humanity’) is contracted abstractly, i.e. with respect to the form itself, giving rise to an abstract individual (‘Plato’ as a logical supposit, or ‘Platonity’). This is the case meant by the aforementioned objection, which yet is not the way in which the individuating difference actually operates metaphysically. The second ‘manner’ of contraction is concrete and real, i.e. it describes the individuating difference as it inheres in its subject.85 Here, the difference contracts the species (‘humanity’) concretely, i.e. it generates a concrete and real act of existence, which terminates the nature in its ultimate and most singular form. According to Fonseca, if one takes this ‘contraction’ concretely (i.e. according to the second manner), there is no need at all to resort to further additional elements, which would justify a differentiation between primary substance and supposit. The very principle of individuation (haecceitas) also makes the primary substance incommunicable and so, bestows upon it the status of ‘supposit’. Therefore, if [the individuating difference] is considered according to the second way, and not the former, we agree that the primary substance is only constituted by the specific nature and the added individuating difference; though, we deny that a further additional factor is needed to make the substance, so constituted, incommunicable. Indeed, the individuating difference, as it is concretely and specifically added to the individual substance, formally includes that additional element, such that if it is created (and we are speaking of that), makes the substance not only entirely subsistent, but also incommunicable.86 The individuating difference thus plays the twofold role of a principle of individuation and of a principle of incommunicability, ensuring that primary substance 84 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 10, p. 469: ‘differentiam individuantem, quae semper in concreto sumenda est, duobus modis considerari posse: uno, ut additur speciei infimae substantiae completae in abstracto sumptae, eamque contrahit naturam singulare abstractam: alter out additur eiusmodi specie in concreto acceptae, eamque contrahit ad singulare concreturm.’ 85 For Fonseca’s definition of ‘concrete’, see CMA V, c. 7, q. 5, s. 3, p. 399: ‘Dicendum est igitur, huiusmodi nomina [concreta et abstracta] formaliter ac praecipue significare ipsas formas accidentariarias, neque in ea re differre a nominibus abstractis: at materialiter et connotative (quae signification inter insinuatitias numeranda est) significare subiecta: haec autem posterior signification, ex ipso concipiendi modo nascitur: cum enim concipimus formam accidentariam per modum adiacentis (ut dicunt) eamque eo pacto nominamus; tum vocabulum concretum est et connotativum, significans formam adiacentem, et innuens subiectum cui adiacet. Cum autem illa concipiamus quasi per se cohaerentem (quod vocant per modum per se stantis) tum nomen, quo sic illam appellamus, abstractum est et absolutum, solam formam ex ipso concipiendi et significandi modo declarans.’ 86 CMA V, c. 8, q. 5, s. 10, p. 469: ‘Si ergo illa posteriori modo spectetur, non priori; fatemur primam substantiam constitui ex sola natura specifica, et differentia individuante addita; sed negamus opus esse additamento ullo ulteriori, quo substantia sic constituta sit incommunicabilis, differentia enim

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is also a supposit. This happens in particular because the individuating difference does not act on the abstract, logical level, but rather concretely. It contracts indeed the nature in a real individual, the supposit itself, which constitutes the ultimate, incommunicable terminus of the singularized nature. 4.2. Supposit and Nature as Existence and Essence

Only in light of Fonseca’s position that primary substance is also a supposit thanks to the same individuating element (haecceitas), can we address his account of the important problem of ‘personality’, i.e. the issue of the ultimate metaphysical relationship between ‘nature’ (as singularized nature), ‘primary substance’, and ‘supposit.’ That theory shows indeed why Fonseca introduces it in a rather convoluted formulation, i.e. ‘what actually is that element which the supposit adds to the nature’, which should be read as follows: ‘does the supposit, i.e. the primary substance, import something more into the singularized nature than itself, and which causes the singularized nature to be a “supposited” nature’? Hence, having established that haecceitas causes the primary substance also to be a supposit, Fonseca now focuses ultimately on what kind of incommunicability the supposit adds to the singularized nature, i.e. Capreolus’s process of ‘personalization’ or ‘suppositization’ of a nature. From the aforementioned, Fonseca seems to maintain that the very existence of the supposit, insofar as a nature individualized by the principle of individuation, has the power of concretely ‘concluding’ or ‘suppositing’ the individualized nature, bringing it to its most concrete possible form and endowing it with ‘personality’ or ‘supposality’. As I will show, this is not Fonseca’s own doctrine, but rather one he encountered in the late scholastic tradition and partially borrowed from the aforesaid Cajetan’s account of the problem of the formal constituent of personality. However, in order to understand how and to what extent Fonseca rethinks Capreolus’ and Cajetan’s solution, it would be worth saying a few words on his account of the esse-essentia composition. Indeed, Fonseca himself seems to solve the whole problem of ‘supposality’ in light of the esse-essentia composition, and transposes on the former the same account he provided for the latter. This is because, in the Thomistic doctrine reformulated here by Fonseca, the composition of nature and supposit is nothing more than a peculiar case of the composition of essence and existence. Since nature is essence, and since primary substance is the primary form of the existence of a being, their composition is not really different from that of essentia and esse. Signally, it is that specific case where existence enacts and ‘supposits’ one essence until it reaches its minimum and ultimately concrete terminus; that grade at which the essence becomes no further incommunicable and hence, a primary substance.

individuans, ut additur concreto specifico substantiae specialissimo, includit formaliter additamentum illud, quod quidem additamentum, si creatum sit (de quo loquimur) reddit substantiam non solum omnino per se subsistentem, sed etiam incommunicabilem.’

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Now, as António Martins87 very accurately notes, Fonseca rejects the Thomistic doctrine of the real composition of essence and existence. For the Portuguese Jesuit, essence and existence are neither really distinct nor are they exactly the same. Instead, they only differ ex natura rei88 and by a modal distinction. Existence ‘is the ultimate intrinsic mode of entity’, or ‘the ultimate enactment of the whole entity’, such that existence does not add any further reality or being to an essence, if not as an already intrinsic mode which coincides with the ultimate enactment of essence. Reprising Martins’ clear words: existence, understood as the ultimate enactment of a form or an entity, is something that only varies the grade of effectivity or intensity of an entity. From here, the thesis follows that existence is the ultimate intrinsic mode of essence. Ultimately, essence is decisive. […] Existence is conceived as a moment of actuality, which determines the moment of formality (entity/essentiality) of whatever singular subject. This is why Fonseca indiscriminately uses the expressions ‘ultimate enactment of the whole entity’ and ‘ultimate intrinsic mode of whatever entity’ in order to define existence. In particular, it is because existence, as a moment of enactment that is constitutive of the singular being, presupposes the correlative principle of essence as the moment of formality by its own definition that he cannot in any way accept the view of a grammatical distinction [between essence and existence], or any other which would erase the difference between these two moments. On the other hand, given that existence is conceived as a modality (‘the ultimate enactment of whatever entity’), Fonseca clearly cannot admit the view of a real distinction [between essence and existence].89 In general, Fonseca maintains hence that existence is nothing other than a contraction of essence, which reaches its ultimate mode of being as an existing subject. This happens without the addition of anything other than a further mode. Yet such a view should not be seen as claiming that existence is entirely reducible to essence, as if Fonseca would theorize a contraction in actual reality of a logical,

87 Martins, Lógica e ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca, pp. 226–33. 88 The ex natura rei distinction is a characteristic feature of Scotus’ metaphysics. As Caruso (Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento, pp. 32–33) notices, ‘With Scotus, Fonseca agrees, within the ex natura rei distinction, with the distinction he calls ‘formal-essential’, and which is different from both the real distinction and the distinction by reason. By it, natures and essences are distinguished (for instance animal and man) which are really identified in the same individual. Therefore, the metaphysical grades can be considered in themselves and be expressed by a simple suppositio, since they are formally distinct in the things in which they are enacted’ (my translation). Fonseca defines and addresses it in CMA V, c. 6, q. 6, s. 2, pp. 348–49: ‘Distinctio ex natura rei est, qua aliquid ab aliquo distinguitur, praecisa omni operatione intellectus: quo pacto distinguuntur et omnia quae distinguuntur realiter, ut Socrates et Plato, Oceanum mare et Mediterraneum; et plurima eorum, quae non distinguuntur realiter, ut homo et animal, caeteraque omnia inferiora et superiora. Nam praecisa omni operatione intellectus, et Socrater distinguitur a Platone, ut perspicuum est, et inferiora omnia a suis superioribus, quod aliqid suapte natura includant, quod superiora non includunt.’ 89 Martins, Lógica e ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca, pp. 229–30 (my translation).

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potential species. Rather, his theory above all stresses that essence is inseparable from actual existence, which is its ultimate enactment. Just as potency does not exist in act independent of the act which enacts it, no essence can exist without existence. Indeed, in whatever degree, essence always inheres in an existing subject from which it can be separated only ex natura rei. This is the very same account which Fonseca applies to the problem of the ‘supposited nature’, and which we are going to address. 4.2 Supposality, Supposit and Nature

Let us finally deal with the specific problem of the metaphysical relationship that links a supposit and its singularized nature. As usual, Fonseca identifies and discusses it via the analysis of four previous solutions, which can be enumerated as follows: 1. No distinction thesis: this is the view especially supported by Henry of Ghent, Durandus of Saint-Porçain and the Nominalists. They all maintain that the created supposit is only distinguished conceptually (so, by intellect) from the nature, but in re, they are the same.90 2. Double negation thesis: this is Scotus’ account. As is well-known, the Subtle Doctor did not accept any real distinction between essence and existence and his solution is influenced by this previous position. According to this view — which Scotus himself defines as ultima solitudo91 –, the supposit cannot add anything more than a double negation of dependence to the singularized nature or essence (which already coincides with its existence). Hence, ‘personality’ or ‘supposality’ is nothing other than the fact that a nature is not dependent in act upon other beings, and likewise that cannot be such attitudinally.92 3. Incommunicability thesis: this is Capreolus’ view, which I mentioned above, and which is understood by Fonseca in light of the esse-essentia composition. Capreolus maintains that the supposit adds the property of subsistence, i.e. its own act of being (existence), to a nature (essence). For Fonseca, such subsistence can also be defined as existence, if one understands by this that subsistence causes the subsisting being to receive an incommunicable act of being.93

90 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 1, p. 470. 91 See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in tertium librum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia, III, d. l, q. l, pp. 26: ‘Et ita ista negatio scilicet non dependentiae, non quidem actualis tantum sed etiam actualis et aptitudinalis, talis complet rationem personae in natura intellectuali.’ And pp. 44–45: ‘Ad personalitatem requiritur ultima solitudo, sive negatio dependentiae actual is et aptitudinalis ad personam alterius naturae.’ See Freitas, ‘Natureza e fundamento ontológico da Pessoa em Duns Escoto’, and Carmela Bianco, Ultima solitudo. La nascita del concetto moderno di persona in Duns Scoto (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2017). As is well-known, the Subtle Doctor renounced Boethius’ definition of the person as an ‘individual substance of rational nature,’ and instead followed Richard of Saint Victor in defining it as an ‘incommunicable existence.’ See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in primum librum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia, I, d. 23, q. un., pp. 260–61: ‘accipiendo definitionem personae, quam ponit Richardus, 4. De Trinit. cap. 22, quod est intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis existentia, per quam definitionem exponitur vel corrigitur definitio Boetii dicentis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia…’. 92 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 2, p. 471–73. 93 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 3, p. 473–75.

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4. Intrinsic entity thesis: this account can be attributed to Cajetan, even though Scotus and other medieval authorities already knew about and discussed it; indeed, Cajetan is credited for having explained this view better than everyone. According to this view, the created supposit adds some intrinsic entity (entitatem) to the singular’s nature, which pertains to the category of ‘substance’ and is different re ipsa from the nature itself. The scholastics referred to this being as ‘personality’ (personalitas), when it refers to an intellectual nature (a person), and ‘supposality’ (supposalitas), when referring to other natures. These elements are nothing more than conclusive terms of a nature, i.e. what causes it to be complete without yet being the cause of the nature itself. Using an effective analogy by Cajetan, they are like the final point of a line; that is, which makes the line complete without being anything more than a part of the line itself.94 This account is strongly dependent upon Cajetan’s idea that not only are essence and existence really distinct, but also that the supposit is a third element, distinct from those two, and something ‘intermediary’ between essence and existence. Even though he harbors some crucial reservations, Fonseca ultimately aligns with the fourth account, namely, that of Cajetan. What primary substance adds to the singular’s nature is not the supposit itself, but rather a terminus, known as ‘personality’ or ‘supposality’; that is, a ‘conclusion’, a ‘complement’ or a final point added to the nature, which makes it to be ‘supposited’. Thus, for Fonseca, personalities or supposalities are ‘certain positive elements, latent under the existence of the supposits’ and ‘pure concluding elements of the natures which are supposited (suppositatae), and without which they (at least naturally) cannot exist’.95 Still, it is very important to stress that Fonseca — consistently with his accounts of supposit and incommunicability, essence and existence — only agrees with Cajetan by stressing an important caveat. Indeed, as Suárez96 would do a few decades later, he rejects Cajetan’s idea that the ‘personality’ or ‘supposality’ (the terminus) added by the supposit is something really distinct from the nature or essence, and understands such a distinction (as Cajetan did not) as a mere distinction ex natura rei.97 So here, Fonseca applies the exact same view as he does to essence and existence: supposality (existence) is neither wholly the same as nature (essence), as the supporters of the first view maintained, nor is it really distinct. Socrates’ nature is neither the same as its personality or supposality added by Socrates’ primary substance or supposit; nor is Socrates’ nature really different from the primary substance or supposit which imports in it the personality or supposality. Nature and personality or supposality are distinct only ex natura rei. But, how can this happen? As Fonseca argues, personality or supposality are nothing more than a ‘mode’ of being introduced into the nature. The Portuguese Jesuit draws this solution from

94 95 96 97

CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, p. 475–79. CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, p. 476. DM XXXIV, s. 4, nn. 8–41. See below, above 85.

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Giles of Rome, who identified it with the modus essendi that a nature achieves once it is joined with its esse: In his treatise on angelic composition, Giles of Rome claims that [this positive element added by the supposit to the nature] is a mode of being that a nature acquires from the fact that being is attached to it, which is well said. Indeed, the created and complete nature, although it is contingently joined with its esse existentiae, as soon as it is joined with it (both if this happens by generation or by creation), always achieves a mode of being per se. This is because the actions by which something is made per se must end at something existing per se […] and likewise at something having a mode of being which is latent under the existence, and to which that [existence] is owed; whereby, in finite and complete natures, the mode of being completes and accomplishes the ratio of the supposit.98 Following Giles of Rome, Fonseca openly aims at resolving the whole question against the background of the distinction between essence and existence. Personality or supposality adds nothing more to the singular’s nature (the essence) than a specific mode of being (and not a distinct element) which bestows completeness on the nature and generates a mode of being per se.99 Yet, a further and final question arises: could this ‘complement’ be nothing other than the very principle of individuation which makes Socrates ‘this’ instantiation of the nature ‘man’? As for this question, Fonseca retrieves Capreolus’ account for ‘personality,’ even if independently of the Thomistic doctrine of the real difference between essence and existence. He maintains that what ‘terminates’ the essence and concludes the singular’s nature, is a metaphysical element which is different from the principle of individuation. Such ‘complements’ (personality or supposality) cannot indeed be the same as individuating differences, since the latter are already parts and the necessary constituents of the singularized natures that are ‘supposited’.100 Accordingly, that 98 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, p. 477: ‘Aegidius quidem Romanus in tractatu de compositione Angelorum ait, esse modum essendi quem natura consequitur ex eo, quod ipsi esse coniungitur; quod recte dictum est. Natura enim creata, et completa, etsi contingenter coniungitur cum suo esse existentiae, tamen quatenus cum ea coniungitur, sive per generationem id fiat, sive per creationem, semper consequitur modum essendi per se, cum actiones, quius aliquid per se fit, ad aliquid per se existens terminari debeant […] ac proinde ad aliquid habens modum essendi sub existentia latentem, cui illa debeatur; qui modus essendi in naturis finitis et completis, completa ac perficit rationem suppositi.’ 99 Such a mode, Fonseca stresses, is not a ‘pure’ mode of being (CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, pp. 477–78), but rather a substantial or entitative one: ‘Accordingly, the supposits’ complements can be called “modes of being” in creatures […]; but, actually, not “pure,” but rather “entitative” [modes of being], and so [they are called also] “substantial”’ (CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, p. 478: ‘Possunt igitur suppositorum complementa in creaturis modi essendi vocari […]; verum non puri, sed entitativi, atque adeo substantiales.’). Ultimately, in creatures, these complements are entitative or substantial modes of being. But they are not pure, since not only modes of being are added, but also peculiar modes of being generated by something substantial or entitative, such as the supposit is. 100 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, pp. 478–79: ‘inter quae complementa, et differentias individuantes hoc interest; quod differentiae individuantes, cum non sint puri termini naturarum, sed earum partes constitutivae, non dicuntur modi essendi, sed entium differentiae ultimae. Differentiae quoque

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which bestows personality or supposality upon a nature must be something different, respect to which the union with the supposit is contingent and unnecessary. Hence (and here Fonseca especially retrieves Capreolus’ account), this element is nothing other than the ultimate outcome of the act which bestows the being upon an essence, i.e. its very subsistence, taken not as really different from the essence itself, but rather as a ‘mode of being’ that the essence acquires. Thus for Fonseca, in created beings, personalities and supposalities are nothing but the subsistences themselves of beings, taken according to the last definition of subsistentia (something which exist per se) and considered as ‘modes of being’: in creatures, these complements of the supposits are the subsistences themselves, namely the rationes subsistendi taken in the third meaning of Philosophers enumerated above [definition number 5], if the name ‘subsistence’ is taken to mean a mode of being which is latent under an existence entirely per se, and not to mean the very existence entirely per se.101 Out of the complex scholastic language, Fonseca’s account is very simple. He claims indeed that what is added to the singular’s nature not only coincides in re with the supposit itself, but is also the supposit’s very act of existence, understood (unlike Capreolus) as not really different from the essence itself, taken as existing in its ultimate and incommunicable act. Hence, the supposit does not add anything to the singular’s nature but its primary and specific existence, which is by itself a bearer of incommunicability (or, better, a bearer of a mode of being of incommunicability).

5. Conclusion Fonseca’s ousiology is a clear example of how late scholastic metaphysics does not deviate from the medieval debate and indeed, renews its conceptual and methodological instruments. Like the medieval theologians, the Portuguese Jesuit discusses substantia by trying to keep together both the effort of providing a thorough metaphysical discussion and the need of safeguarding an appropriate conception of theological mysteries. In this respect, Fonseca still does not think of substance through the peculiar lens of modern ‘ontology’, namely, the pure science of the ens qua ens. Despite being a great metaphysician, Fonseca, in addressing the problem of substance, also remains a true theologian, as he preserves the scholastic idea that metaphysics should not contrast with Revelation and faith. To use Martins’ lucid

individuantes, necessario et intrinsecus conveniunt iis naturis individuis, quarum sunt differentiae; at complementa suppositorum, etsi conveniunt suppositis necessitate naturali, cum quaelibet individua natura suum sibi vendicet complementum, quod illam naturaliter consequitur: tamen quia illa impediri possunt, et per divinam personalitatem suppleri, non dubium est, quin spectata Dei virtute, dicenda sint contingenter convenire individuis naturis.’ 101 CMA V, c. 8, q. 6, s. 4, p. 479: ‘Atque haec suppositorum complementa in creaturis sunt ipsae substistentiae, seu rationes subsistendi in tertia philosophorum significatione superius posita, si subsistentiae nomen sumatur pro modo essendi latente sub existentia omnino per se.’

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words once more, ‘his metaphysics is conceived as a scientia transcendens […] in such a way that the ens commune still does not remove, at the expense of destroying itself, the asymmetry characteristic of the relationship between Creator and creature.’102 In Fonseca’s metaphysics, God is a structural presence, but He is far from being reducible to the scheme of ontotheology. ‘The God of Fonseca’s metaphysics has, indeed, some primary features that are usually associated with the categories which Christian tradition used to conceive transcendence. His God is not one who rises above the horizon of any philosophical proof or argument whatsoever.’103 This stance is reflected in two complementary faces of Fonseca’s thought, and especially of his understanding of substance. On the one hand, he deals with οὐσία in the wake of a traditional understanding of metaphysics, as metaphysica specialis, the science of the highest immaterial substances. On the other hand, he proves to be influenced considerably by the Nominalistic and propositionalistic approach of his time (notably, that of the School of Salamanca104). For Fonseca, the primary and ultimate aim of a metaphysical inquiry is that of attaining a correct definition, which makes a term able to be included in logical-dialectical arguments and demonstrations. These two sides coexist in Fonseca’s approach, which is characterized by the attempt to analogically and verbally unify that which is uncreated and that which is created under one definition. This is especially true in the case of his ousiology, which seeks to identify a common definition of substance; especially primary substance, under which a metaphysician can unify the understanding of God and creatures as individual existing beings. Nevertheless, Fonseca’s thought shares another important peculiarity with Suárez’s metaphysics:105 the ontological primacy of existence over essence. Both in uncreated and created beings, the notion of substance describes something that is naturally and intrinsically ‘existential’, real and actual. What, for Fonseca, has primary existence is a multiplicity of primary substances, which are intrinsically singular and individual. Their logical unity in secondary substances or universals is, of course, founded in re (and, according to Fonseca’s peculiar understanding, it even exists ante rem); but from an ontological perspective, it structurally depends on the existence of primary substances. Likewise, Fonseca rejects the Thomistic real distinction between esse and essentia, and rather opts for a distinction ex parte rei. Essence is nothing other than the way in which a thing primarily and individually exists in its singularity. Such an account is reenacted by Fonseca in his discussion of a traditional lexical conundrum, namely, that of the meaning of ‘supposit’ and its relationship with nature and hypostasis. Although this coincidence is limited to the case of created

102 António M. Martins, ‘Fonseca e a ontologia moderna’, in Descartes, Leibniz e a Modernidade, ed. by A. Cardoso et al. (Lisboa: Colibri, 1998), pp. 361–68, here 365. 103 Martins, ‘Fonseca e a ontologia moderna’, p. 366. 104 This aspect is especially stressed by Caruso, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e la rinascita del nominalismo nella Scolastica del Seicento. 105 See José Hellín, ‘Existencialismo escolástico suareciano’ (Parts I and II), Pensamiento, 12 (1956), pp. 157–78 and 13 (1957), pp. 21–38. See also José Pereira, ‘The Existential Integralism of Suárez: Reevaluation of Gilson’s Allegation of Suarezian Essentialism’, Gregorianum, 85 (2004, 4), pp. 660–88 and José Pereira, Suárez Between Tradition and Modernity (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006).

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substance, the supposit can be taken as an equivalent to primary substance. Yet this is true, notably because of the conditions for which a primary substance is an incommunicable individual. According to Fonseca, individuation alone cannot explain anything more than the fact that a substance is the individual contraction of a common nature. But, it is necessary to have an incommunicable individuality such that the nature, once contracted in the nature of a singular, is also ‘supposited’ and (so to speak) ‘personalized’ by an intrinsic principle of personalization. In seeking this principle, Fonseca once more reaffirms the primacy of singular existence over everything else. That which makes a nature ‘personal’ or ‘supposited’, and thus incommunicable to others, is something that is not really distinct from the very subsistence of the supposit, taken as a specific mode of being of the essence it makes incommunicable. Individual existence just adds to the singular’s nature a ‘mode of being’, a specific way of existing, which is that of singularity itself.

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Lázaro Pulido and Simone Guidi (eds), Francisco Suárez. Metaphysics, Politics and Ethics (Coimbra: Coimbra University Press, 2020), pp. 195–228. K.  Richardson, ‘Avicenna’s Conception of the Efficient Cause’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21 (2013), pp. 220–39. ______, ‘Efficient Causation from Ibn Sīnā to Ockham’, in Efficient Causation. A History ed. by T. Schmaltz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 105–31. F.  Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na assistência de Portugal, vol.  II (Porto: Livraria Apostolado da Imprensa, 1938). Ch.  Sander, ‘In dubio pro fide. The Fifth Council of the Lateran Decree Apostolici Regiminis (1513) and its Impact on Early Jesuit Education and Pedagogy’, Educazione. Giornale di pedagogia critica, 3/1 (2014), pp. 39–62. ______, ‘The War of the Roses. The Debate between Diego de Ledesma and Benet Perera about the Philosophy Course at the Jesuit College in Rome’, Quaestio, 14 (2014), pp. 31– 50. M. T. Santos, ‘O ensino da filosofia na segunda escolástica: o manual inédito de Luís de Molina’, in Atas do XI Congresso Luso-Brasileiro da História da Educação (Colubhe). Pensamento Pedagógico, 2016, pp. 18–31. V. Sanz, ‘La reducción suareciana de los trascendentales’, Anuario Filosófico, XXV (1992), n. 2, pp. 403–20. T. M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). ______, ‘Efficient Causation: From Suarez to Descartes’, in Efficient Causation. A History ed. by T. M. Schmaltz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 139–64. S.  Schmid, ‘Efficient Causality. The Metaphysics of Production’, in Suárez on Aristotelian Causality ed. by J. L. Fink (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 85–121. ______, ‘Finality without Final Causes? Suárez’s Account of Natural Teleology”‘, Ergo. An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2, n. 16 (2015), pp. 393–425. ______, Finalursachen in der fruhen Neuzeit (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011). J. Schmutz, ‘Du péché de l’ange à la liberté d’indifférence. Les sources angélologiques de l’anthropologie moderne’, Les études philosophiques, 61 (2002), pp. 169–98. G. Schneemann, Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia. Initia et progressus (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1881), cap. 7, pp. 161–79. R. Schönberger, Relation als Vergleich: die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik (Leiden: Brill, 1994). J. Secada, ‘Suárez on the Ontology of Relations’, in Interpreting Suárez: Critical Essays ed. by D. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 62–88. J. F. Silva, Stop Making Sense(s): Some Late Medieval and Very Late Medieval Views on Faculty Psychology, in The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition ed. by S. N. Mousavian and J. L. Fink (Cham: Springer, 2020), pp. 45–67. P. O. e Silva and J. Rebalde, ‘Doctrinal Divergences on the Nature of Human Composite in Two Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima (Anonymous, Cod. 2399 BGUC and Francisco Suárez): New Material on the Jesuit School of Coimbra and the Cursus Conimbricensis’, in R. A. Maryks and J. A. Senent de Frutos (eds), Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Jesuits and the Complexities of Modernity (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2019), pp. 378–410.

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C. F. G. C. da Silveira and S. de S. Salles, ‘Providência divina e liberdade humana na filosofia da redenção da segunda escolástica’, in S. Dimas and others (coord.), Redenção e Escatologia. Estudos de Filosofia, Religião, Literatura e Arte na Cultura Portuguesa, volume II–tomo I: Idade Moderna (Lisbon: Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 2017), pp. 315–30. J. B. South, ‘Suárez on Imagination’, Vivarium, 39 (2001), pp. 119–58. F. Stegmüller, Geschichte des Molinismus, vol. I. Neue Molinaschriften (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1935). ______, ‘Zur Literargeschichte der Philosophie und Theologie an der Universitäten Évora und Coimbra im XVI. Jahrhundert’, Spanische Forschungen der Goerresgesellschaft, 1. Reihe, Band 3 (1931), pp. 385–438. P. Stella, ‘La prima critica di Herveus Natalis O. P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: il ‘De intelectu et specie’ del cosidetto ‘De quattuor materiis’’, Salesianum, 21 (1959), pp. 125–70. D. Svoboda, ‘Francisco Suárez on the Addition of the One to Being and the Priority of the One over the Many’, Studia Neoaristotelica, 4 (2007), pp. 158–72. S. Tavares, ‘Fonseca e a ciência média’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 9 (1953), pp. 418–29. ______, ‘Pedro da Fonseca: Sua vida e obra’ Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 9  (1953), pp. 344–53. ______, ‘A questão Fonseca-Molina. Resposta a uma crítica’, Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 11 (1955), pp. 78–88. J. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2013). D. Torrijos-Castrillejo, ‘Berlarmino y las disputas “de auxiliis”. Acerca de un manuscrito inédito sobre la ciencia media’, Estudios Eclesiásticos. Revista de investigación e información teológica y canónica, 97/380 (2022), pp. 181–215. J.  Tuttle, ‘Suárez’s Non-Reductive Theory of Efficient Causation’, in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. Vol. 4 ed. by R. Pasnau (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 125–58. E.  Vansteenberghe, ‘Molinisme’, in Alfred Vacant, Eugene Mangenot and Émile Amann (eds), Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 10–2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 2094–2187 S. Wakúlenko, ‘As fontes dos “Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societatis Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae” (1606)’, Philosophica, 26 (2005), pp. 229–62. ______, ‘Enciclopedismo e Hipertextualidade nos ‘Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae’ (Coimbra 1606)’, in Enciclopédia e Hipertexto, ed. by O. Pombo and others (Lisbon: Edições Duarte Reis, 2006), pp. 302–57. T. M. Ward, ‘Relations Without Forms: Some Consequences of Aquinas’s Metaphysics of Relations’, Vivarium, 48 (2010), pp. 279–301. É. Weber, La personne humaine au XIIIe siècle (Paris: PUF 1991). J.  Wetzel, ‘Predestination, Pelagianism, and foreknowledge’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 49–58. M.  Wundt, Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, Nachdruck der Ausgabe, 1939; repr. Hildesheim, Olms, 1992). A.  Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jarhundert. Texte und Untersuchungen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965).

Index Nominum*

Ancient, Medieval and Modern Authors Acosta, J.: 26n Agricola, R.: 27, 35 al-Ghazali: 148, 162 Albertus Magnus: 33, 91, 108n, 111, 137, 137n, 162, 202n Alcinous: 27 Alexander of Aphrodisias: 11, 27, 28, 29, 140n Alexander of Hales: 178n, 202n Almain, J.: 78 Álvares, B.: 11, 40, 41-44, 46, 50-51, 56, 60 Amico. F.: 66, 66n, 70 Ammonius Hermias: 201n, 202 Annat, F., 66-67 Aquaviva, C.: 72-73 Araujo, F. de: 191, 191n Argyropulos, J.: 24-26, 27 Aristotle: 7-12, 14-16, 22-23, 24-31, 34-37, 40-41, 43n, 48n, 51-56, 63, 65, 65n, 74-76. 78, 85, 88-90, 94-97, 99-101, 107-108, 110, 111n, 113-116, 118-119, 125-129, 135-139, 146148, 150-152, 154, 158-160, 163-164, 175, 177, 178-179, 182-185, 192, 193-194, 196, 197n, 201-202, 206-207, 212 Arnu, N.: 191n Arriaga, R. de: 88, 88n, 110n, 118, 118n Augustine: 12, 27, 35, 56, 77, 80, 85, 140, 141n, 200n, 201n Averroes: 92n, 108, 111, 129, 147, 154n, 162, 168, 177, 177n, 202, 202n Aversa, R.: 168



Avicenna: 87, 87n, 91, 91n, 92, 97, 108, 108n, 129, 129n, 147, 148, 159, 159n, 162, 166, 166n, 168, 189n Azor, J.: 26n Báñez, D.: 78, 78n, 82n Barreira, B.: 10 Belluto, B.: 12, 88-89, 92n, 97n, 99-103 Bernaldo de Quiros, A.: 116, 116n Bernardi, A.: 34, 34n, Bessarion, B.: 24-26, 27 Biel, G.: 156, 162, 168, 197 Boethius: 12, 27, 65n, 80, 85, 88n, 111, 118, 118n, 200n, 201n, 204, 204n, 205, 208, 209n, 214n, 218n Bonaventure: 82, 133n Boyle, R.: 163 Budé, G.: 24, 27 Burgersdicus, F.: 173n Cajetanus, Th. de Vio: 13, 14, 16, 50, 55-56, 118, 120, 120n, 122, 156, 168, 170. 171, 188, 188n, 191-192, 210-211, 213n, 214, 214n, 216, 219 Capréolus, J.: 16, 50, 52, 56, 129n, 132n, 133, 156, 168, 178n, 180, 188, 213, 213n, 214, 214n, 216, 218 Cardozo, A.: 67n Carvalho, L. de: 10 Casaubon, I.: 26, 26n Coelho, G.: 10

* The Index Nominum does not include the name of Pedro da Fonseca, as well as the names of the editors of volumes, translators, nor the names belonging to titles of books.

24 4

in d e x n o m i n u m

Cicero: 27. 34, 35, 36, 77, 80 Correia, J.: 49 Couto, S. do: 11, 16, 40-41, 45, 46-51, 60, 75, 195 Cruz, F. da: 67n Dagui, P.: 116n Dandini, G.: 88, 88n Descartes, R.: 7, 88n, 152, 152n, 157n, 158n, 166, 166n, 198, 198n, 222n Dexippus: 202 Dominic of Flanders: 188 Durandus of Saint-Pourçain: 52, 56, 129, 133, 134, 134n, 210, 210n, 211, 218 Erasmus of Rotterdam: 27, 27n Ferrariensis, sive Francis Sylvester of Ferrara: 43, 133, 133n, 156 Ferre, V.: 191n, 192n Ficino, M.: 183n Gagliardi, A.: 29 Galen: 12, 92, 92n, 94, 94n, 95 Gassendi, P.: 166n Giles of Rome: 111, 202n, 220 Ginés de Sepúlveda, J.: 140n Góis, M. de: 9, 11, 22, 32, 40, 41, 44-60, 87, 87n, 89, 90n, 98n, 99n, 150n Gouveia, F. de: 10 Gregorius de Arimino: 197 Gregory the Great: 77 Grouchy, N. de: 25n Guillelmus de Moerbeke: 26 Guillelmus Durandus: see Durandus of Saint-Pourçain Hegel, G. W.: 40 Heidegger, M.: 55 Henao, G. de: 70-71 Henry of Ghent: 46, 46n, 53-56, 58, 218 Herice, V. de: 72 Hesiod: 27 Hervaeus Natalis: 27, 45, 46n, 129n, 160, 168 Homer: 27 Hurtado de Mendoza, P.: 88, 88n, 115n, 168, 194n, 217n, 222n

Iamblichus: 202 Javelli, C.: 33, 33n, 127, 127n, 134, 168, 170, 175, 175n, 179, 179n, 180, 183, 183n, 184, 188, 189n John III (King of Portugal): 9, 30 John Buridanus: 134n, 163 John Duns Scotus: 12, 15-16, 42-43, 53, 53n, 54-56, 74n, 78, 78n, 79-82, 85, 103n, 111, 112n, 118, 118n, 127, 132, 134, 139n, 156, 166, 168, 180, 180n, 187, 195n, 198n, 201, 213, 213n, 214n, 217n, 218-219 John of Damascus: 200n John of Jandun: 111 John Wycliff: 77 Kant, I.: 177n Lambin, D.: 25 Ledesma, D. de: 29, 29n Leibniz, G. W.: 149, 149n, 152n, 161, 163, 222n Loyola, Ignatius of: 21 Luís, P.: 10 Luther, M.: 79 Major, J.: 156 Maldonado, J.: 26n Mas, D.: 177, 178, 178n, 179, 179n, 180, 183 Mastrius, B.: 12, 88, 88n, 89, 90n, 92n, 97n, 98, 98n, 100n, 101, 101n, 102, 102n, 103, 103n, 168, 194n Melanchthon, Ph.: 127, 127n Mendoza, A.: 64 Mercuriano, E.: 73 Meyer, L. de: 72n Molina, L. de: 9, 11-12, 43-44, 64-75, 78, 82n Montolorius, J. B.: 178 Nadal, J.: 9 Nifo, A.: 26n, 33, 127, 127n Palacio, M.: 134, 139n Parmenides: 183 Paul (Saint): 109 Perera, B.: 28, 29, 29n, 30, 37, 168

i nd e x no mi nu m

Perion, J.: 24-27 Peter John Olivi: 87n Peter Lombard: 78, 125, 129n, 180 Peter of Spain: see Petrus Hispanus Petrus Aureolus: 129, 129n Petrus Hispanus: 30 Philip II (King of Spain): 10 Pico della Mirandola, G.: 179, 179n, 180, 183-185, 192 Pierre d’Ailly (Petrus Aliacensis): 162 Pitagoras: 197 Porphyry: 10, 22, 31, 35, 37n, 202 Plato: 14, 27, 35, 36, 40, 54, 129, 130n, 152n, 182, 183, 184-185, 192, 197n, 206, 213n, 215 Possevino, A.: 26-27, Poussines, P.: 67, 67n Pseudo-Dionysius: 57, 102n, 103 Quintilian: 36 Ramus, P.: 11, 33-35 Ribadaneyra, P.: 26 Ribera, F.: 26 Richard of Saint-Victor: 218n Rodrigues, S.: 9, 67, 67n Rubio, A.: 88, 88n, 128, 128n, 135, 135n, 141, 141n S. Paulo, Eustachius a: 88n Serrão, J.: 73 Siger of Brabant: 148n Simplicius: 182n, 201n, 202 Sirleto, G.: 24 Socrates: 27, 35 Soncinas, P. B.: 56, 111, 127, 127n, 132n, 160, 168, 175, 175n, 180, 183, 183n, 184, 184n, 188, 189n Soto, D. de: 45, 56, 112n, 116n, 127, 127n, 134, 135n, 168, 188, 189n Southwell, N.: 66, 66n

Speusippus: 184n Spinoza, B.: 54, 174n, 177n, 191n, Suárez, F.: 7, 10, 11-15, 23n, 24n, 25, 29, 37, 37n, 43-44, 45n, 49, 64-66, 72, 74n, 78, 78n, 87, 87n, 88n, 89n, 90n, 93, 93n, 100, 103, 107, 108n, 112n, 113, 115n, 117, 120, 121n, 125n, 127n, 135, 139-141, 145-146, 149n, 151n, 152, 152n, 155n, 158, 158n, 161, 166, 168, 173-175, 177-179, 183-185, 187-192, 193, 194n, 195n, 196n, 198n, 213, 222n Thomas Aquinas: 12, 15-16, 22, 27, 33, 43, 46, 53, 54-56, 65n, 74, 76-82, 85, 87, 91, 91n, 92, 93n, 95, 97-98, 102-103, 110-111, 112n, 118n, 119-120, 123, 127, 133-134, 154, 156, 162, 164, 166, 168, 173, 178n, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 198n, 201, 202, 203-205, 207-208, 214n Thomas of Strasbourg: 56, 178n Toledo, F. de: 33, 34, 34n, 36n, 87, 89, 168, 175 Torres, B.: 134, 134n, 140n Trebisonda, G.: 183n Valencia, G. de: 26 Valla, P.: 33, 34n, 35, 36, 36n Vallés, F.: 92, 94, 94n, 95, 96, 96n Varro: 34, 36 Vásquez, G.: 64, 66 Vesalius, A.: 93, 94n Wietrowski, M.: 116, 116n William of Ockham: 133, 133n, 156, 159n, 165, 166, 168 Wolff, Ch.: 177n Xenocrates: 184n Zabarella, J.: 34, 34n, 36 Zimara. M.: 56

Contemporary Authors Abranches, C.; 7, 23n, 155n Adams, M. Mc.: 133n Aertsen, J.: 12, 108n, 116n, 174n, 177, 179n

Agostini, I.: 14, 194, 199 Aichele, A.: 74n, 75, 78

245

246

in d e x n o m i n u m

Andersen, C.: 100n, 116n Andrade, A. A. B. de: 39, 39n Anfray, J.-P.: 74n, 82n Arznen, R.: 177n Ashworth, E. J.: 7, 33, 33n, 36n, 48n Barth, K.: 65n Bianco, C.: 218n Black, D. L.: 87n Blum, P. R.: 19n, 174n, 183n Borges-Duarte, I.: 73n Broggio, D.: 65n Burckhardt, F.: 179 Capriati, G.: 11, 13-14, 45, 146n, 147n, 149n, 150n, 151n, 158n, 163n, 164n, 166n, 168n, 194n Carnap. R.: 59 Carosi, P.: 213n Carraud, V.: 152n, 158n, 159n Caruso, E.: 194n, 217n, 222n Carvalho, J. V. de: 22n Carvalho, M.S. de; 7, 8, 8n, 10-11, 22n, 23n, 31n, 37n, 39n, 41n, 43n, 44n, 46n, 48n, 51n, 52n, 53n, 57n, 58n, 107n, 155n, 175n, 185n, 194n, 195n Casalini, C.: 8, 10, 11, 24n, 29n, 31n, 155n Ceñal, R.: 11, 23n, 24n, 25, 25n, 26, 79n Constant, E. A.: 28 Conti, A. D.: 133n Copenhaver, B.: 24n Courtine, J.-F.: 173n, 177n, 203n, 205n Coxito, A. A.: 7, 22n, 75n, 194n Craig, W. L.: 65n, 74n, 78n Darge, R.: 173n, 174n, 177n, 178n, 179n, 183n, 191n Degl’Innocenti, U.: 213n Des Chene, D.: 7, 157n, 163n Dias, J. de O.: 68-69 Dias, J. S. da S.: 39, 39n Di Vona, P.: 174, 174n, 177n, 179n, 191, 191n Doyle, J. P.: 46n, 48n, 112n, 116n, 123n, 127n, 135n, 139-140, 141n Dvorak, P.: 75n

Edelheit, A.: 184n Elorduy Maurica, E.: 37n, 158n Falcon, A.: 52n Forlivesi, M.: 82n, 103n Franceschi, S. H. de: 65n Freddoso, A. J.: 74n, 145n Frede, M.: 152n Freire, A.: 36n Freitas, M. B. da C.: 214n, 218n Frost, G.: 82n Gaetano, M. T.: 65n Garin, E.: 23n Gaskin, R.: 74n Gentile, G.: 179 Gilson, E.: 145n, 159n, 222n Gomes, J. F.: 27n, 46n Gomes, J. P.: 47n Goris, H. J. M. J.: 80n Grafton, A.: 24n Grendler, P. F.: 27n, 28n Gryżenia, K.: 7 Guidi, S.: 8, 13, 15, 39, 44n, 45n, 87n, 194n, 196n, 199n Hachmann, B.: 53n Hankinson, R.: 152n Hattab, H.: 7 Heider, D.: 11-12, 43n, 87n, 90n, 93n, 175n, 194n, 195n Hellín, J.: 222n Hellyer, M.: 29n Henninger, M.: 125n, 133n, 134n Hoffmann, T.: 78n Jardine, L.: 33 Jolivet, J.: 159n Klibansky, R.: 184n Kristeller, P. O.: 23n Knuuttila, S.: 76n Lamanna, M.: 29n Lavajo, J. C.: 70n, 74n

i nd e x no mi nu m

Leblanc, H.: 40n, 48n Lisska, A. J.: 93n Lohr, Ch.: 7, 23n, 29, 29n Lukacs, L.: 151n Madeira, J.: 65n, 88n, 94n Marion, J.-L.: 198n Marschler, Th.: 65n, 125n Martins, A. M.: 7, 13, 24n, 31n, 37n, 39, 39n, 45n, 51n, 55n, 60n, 75n, 78n, 89n, 145n, 174n, 191n, 194n, 203n, 217n, 217n, 221, 222n Matava, R. J.: 65n Matthews, G. B.: 80n McDonough, J.: 163n Menn, S.: 141n Minnich, N. H.: 28n Monfasani, J.: 23n Muñiz, P. Fr.: 213n Normore, C.: 76n O’Malley, J. W.: 21n Olivo, G.: 152n, 158n Ong, W. J.: 33n Osler, M.: 163n Owens, J.: 35n

Reid, S. J.: 33n Ribordy, O.: 78n Renemann, M.: 155n Richardson, K.: 159n Rodrigues, F.: 67n Sabbadini, R.: 23n Salas, V.: 12-13, 112n, 195n Salles, S. de S.: 75n Sander, Ch.: 28n, 29n Santos, M. T.: 74n Sanz, V.: 173n, 174n, 177n, 178n Schmaltz, T. M.: 152n, 158n, 159n Schmid, S.: 158n, 163n Schmitt, Ch.: 23n, 24n, 33n Schmutz, J.: 78n Schneemann, G.: 72n Schönberger, R.: 134n Secada, J.: 140n Silva, J. F.; 87n, 88n, 103n Silva, P. de O.: 63n, 89n Silveira, C. F. C. G. da: 75n Soares, M. L. C.: 22n, 75n Stegmüller, F.; 65n, 72n, 73n, 74n Stella, P.: 46n Svoboda, D.: 174n

Pasnau, R.: 7, 157n Patrício, M. F.: 70, 70n Penner, S.: 65n, 140n Pereira, J.; 222n Pereira, M. B.: 7, 50, 70, 73, 213n Porro, P.: 54n Price, M. D.: 18n Prieto López, L.: 178n

Tavares, S.: 23n, 68-70 Toivanen, J.: 87n Torrijos-Castrillejo, D.: 65n Trégo, K.: 203n Tuttle, J.: 158n

Quarello, E.: 213n, 214n

Wakúlenko, S.: 39, 41n, 46n, 48n Weber, E.: 214n Wetz, J.: 77n Wilson, E. A.: 33n Wundt, M.: 177, 177n

Rabeneck, J.: 11, 64n, 68, 69, 71, 71n, 72, 74, 75n Rebalde, J.: 11-12, 65n, 89n Régnon, Th. De: 68, 68n Reichmann, J. B.: 213n, 214n

Vansteenberghe, E.: 65n Vasoli, C.: 23n

Zimmermann, A.: 108n

247

Index Rerum

Abstraction: Divine mind: 81-82; human mind: 91-92; and metaphysics: 116-117; and universals: 194n-195n; Action: 57-58; 77, 79, 81, 148, 159-172, 204, 220; Analogy: of Attribution: 13, 118-120, 122; of Being: 120-123, 185n; of Proportion 119-122; analogical reasoning: 80, 83-84, 101, 108, 182; Aristotelian turn: 40, 52; Authorities: 27-30; Being: Analogy of b.: see Analogy; Categorial b.: 193-197; Science of b.: see Metaphysics; Categories: and Being: see Categorial Being; Reality of c.: 13, 128-136; Relation: see Relations; Causality: as dependence: 149-151; and creationism: 161-163; final c.: and the causality of the end: 163-171; ontological status of: 167-172; formal c. 155-157; efficent c. 158-163; material c. 154-155; metaphorical c. 165-167; Cause: see Causality; Christology: 27, 207-208, 213, 214n;

Cognition: 42-43, 89, 93, 96-97, 98n, 99, 100-101, 112, 116; Cogitative Power: 12, 87, 89, 91-95, 97-98; Common Sense: 87-88, 91-102; Concept: 16-17, 48, 60, 118n; Formal c.: 11, 50, 60, 202, 202n; Objective c.: 50; Concurrentism: 161-163; Coimbra: 8-11, 22, 30, 36, 39-41, 47, 51, 66-67, 74-75; College of Arts: 8-9, 11, 22, 25n, 30-31, 36, 49; Coimbra Jesuit Course (Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societatis Iesu): 8, 11, 15, 22, 26n, 32, 39-60, 138, 150 Creation: see God; Cursus Conimbricensis: see Coimbra Dialectical Instructions (Institutionum Dialecticarum / Institutiones Dialecticae): 8, 9, 11, 16, 22, 22n, 27, 28, 30-31, 33, 34, 36-37, 40, 47, 48n, 51, 52, 126; Dialectics: Invention: 35; Judgment: 35; Subject of d.: 11; Parts of d.: 34-35; and Metaphysics: 37, 56, 202-203; Distinction: 12, 15, 49, 50, 55, 57-58, 76, 77, 83, 84, 91n, 93, 95-97, 100, 100n, 101, 113, 114, 118, 126, 133-135, 140n, 148, 150, 153, 159, 176-177, 190, 191, 194, 203, 212, 214, 217, 217n, 218-220, 222; Efficency: 59, 172n, 159-161; Ens (being): Accidental b.: 181-195;

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in d e x r e r u m

Being per se: 195n, 196n, 209, 220; Beings of reason:33, 115, 116, 117, 121-122, 131, 186, 187, 191, 195; Categorial b.: see Being; Real being: 15, 33, 54, 58, 115-117, 120121, 123, 132, 152-153, 164, 168-172, 176, 186-187, 195; Essence: God’s e. see God; Creatural e.: 15, 16, 43, 54, 56, 58, 83, 152, 154. 176, 180-182, 188-189, 194, 196n, 197n, 199, 203n, 204-206, 208, 208n, 212, 214n, 216-221, 222-223; Estimative Power: 12, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95, 98; Existence: 14-16, 45, 59, 80, 81, 82, 101, 113, 128, 135n, 137, 156, 157, 169, 172, 176, 194, 194n, 195, 203n, 205n, 214-215, 216-223; Évora: City/College/University of: 8, 9, 10 40, 51, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75, 75n; Future Contingents: 12, 63, 65n, 69-71, 73-74, 74n, 75-84; Freedom: Free agent: 12, 78-79; Free cause: 74, 77, 79, 81-84; Human f.: 75-79, 81, 84, 85; Fonseca’s Biography: 8-10; God: Concurrence: 81, 163; Creation: 59, 109-110, 129n, 132, 158, 160, 161-162; Essence: 15, 121, 203, 206, 209, 210, 210n, 211-212; Foreknowledge: see Scientia media Intuitive knowledge: 71, 80-81, 83; Substance: see Substance Will: 12, 77-79, 81-84; Haecceitas: see Individuation; Humanism: 10, 21-37; Hypostasis: 15, 203-205, 209-210, 214n, 222;

Incommunicability: 15, 208, 211-216, 218219, 221, 223; Individuation: 15-16, 127, 213-216, 220, 223; Influxus: 149n, 150, 159, 161; Imagination:: 87, 91, 95, 97n; Isagoge: 8, 10, 12, 22, 31, 37, 37n, 47, 49, 65n, 88, 91, 102, 195n; Logic: Definition of l.: 33, 34n; see Dialectics; Lisbon: 8-10, 46; Memory: 12, 87, 89, 91-98; Metaphysics: Subject and scope of m.: 109-111, 113, 113n, 115-117, 121, 148, 176; Unity of: 117-123; Middle Knowledge: see Scientia Media Mode (Modus): modus disserendi:11, 35-36; modus essendi: 134n, 220, 220n; modus loquendi: 189; modus significandi: 185n; modus sciendi: 34, 36; Nature: Res naturae: 205; Singularization of: 213-216, 218; Negations: 14, 16, 58-59, 180-181, 185-191, 199, 199n, 218; Neo-Platonism: 12, 17, 54, 102, 202; Nominalism: 13, 15-16, 78, 133, 136, 137, 137n, 141n, 156, 197, 199-200, 218, 222; Occasionalism: 161-162; Pedagogy: 15, 21, 30-31, 37; Perception: 93n; Personality: 212-214, 216, 218-221; Phantasy: 12, 87-102; Philology: Humanism and Philosophy: 10-11, 2123, 36-37; and Latin Style: 23-27;

i nd e x re ru m

Physics (natural science): 52, 56-57, 109n, 129, 147-148, 154n, 163, 167; Platonism: 28, 55, 114, 174, 179, 184, 185, 185n, 192; Ratio Studiorum: 9, 22, 30, 33, 52; Ramism: 11, 33, 33n, 34-36, 36n; Reality: Essentialism: 58 Objective r.: 11, 58, 60; Real being / in re: 54, 122, 181, 185-186, 205, 207, 214n, 217; Relations: 13, 58, 82, 118-120, 122, 125-142; Rome: City: 9-11, 22, 24, 28-29, 37, 41, 49, 126; Collegio Romano: 28-29, 33-34, 36-37; School of Salamanca: 222; Scientia media (Middle Knowledge): 1112, 63-85; Scotism: 15, 39n, 89, 99, 101, 103, 117-118, 156, 187; Senses: Common s.: see Common Sense External s.: 91, 93-94, 96-102; Internal s.: see Cogitative Power, Common Sense, Estimative Power, Imagination, Memory, Phantasy; Reduction of internal s.: 12, 44, 48, 48n, 87-103; Soul: 28, 28n, 40, 42-43, 56, 60, 87-103, 157, 177n, 196n, 209, 214n; Species: Intelligible s.: 42-43, 90, 98, 100n, 102; Expressed, impressed, sensed s.: 91-93, 95, 96-102;

Logical s.: 83, 137n, 181-182, 196n, 197, 207n, 214-215, 218; Substance: Analogical attribution to God: 197-200; Complete s.: 196, 196n, 199, 201n, 202n, 208n, 209, 214; Incomplete s.: 196n, 201, 201n, 209; Primary s.: 15, 194-197, 198n, 201, 201n, 203, 205-207, 211, 212-216, 219, 222-223; Secondary s.: 194, 194n, 195, 198, 205, 207n, 209, 222; Separate s.: 76, 108-109, 202; Subsistence: 203-205, 209-212, 218, 221, 223; Supposit: 15, 193, 197, 203, 205, 207-208, 210-223; Supertranscendentality: 13, 112, 112n, 115117, 122-123; Thomism/Thomistic School: 12, 14-16, 42-43, 56, 67n, 78, 85, 93, 102n, 132n, 133, 133n, 134n, 160, 174, 179, 180, 184-185, 192, 213, 216-217, 220, 222; Translation: 10, 11, 23-26, 36, 52, 90, 107, 125, 139, 139n, 166n; Transcendentals: Number of t. and their reduction: 14, 112-113; Transcendentality: 12-14, 108, 108n, 111-117, 118n, 123, 148. 173-185, 190n, 191n, 192; Trinity/Trinitarianism: 15, 129, 150, 153, 193, 206, 209, 212; Truth: 8, 16-17, 28, 29, 33, 42, 112, 114, 130, 194; Unum (One): 14, 112, 114, 116, 173-192, 199n; Unity of precision: 194n-195n; Universals: 16, 58, 58n, 90, 90n, 91-92, 194n-195n;

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