Peace Figuration after International Intervention: Intentions, events and consequences of liberal peacebuilding 2016000840, 9781138938472, 9781315675633

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction: figuring out peace
Part I Foundations of peace figuration
2 How do we know peace? Rethinking liberal and critical epistemologies of peacebuilding
3 Peace figuration: towards a new framework for analysis
Part II Peace figuration in practice
4 Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 Peace figuration in Kosovo
6 Peace figuration in Timor-Leste
7 At peace’s end: disfiguring the impact of liberal peacebuilding
Index

Citation preview

This excellent volume brings new insights into one of the defining international challenges of our time: how to support peace and reconstruction in post-conflict societies in a way that is both effective and legitimate. The idea of ‘peace figuration’ takes the debate forward into new theoretical directions, and the book draws upon important empirical illustrations. It is highly recommended to researchers and students alike. Edward Newman, University of Leeds, UK Gëzim Visoka’s achievement is to reconceptualise peacebuilding as relational processes. Peace Figuration analyses a Clausewitzian clash of relations in which the best laid strategies and expectations, posited as common interests in a clear victory for peace, are constantly jeopardised by frictions. Visoka challenges the problem-solving, lessons-learned approach to peacebuilding by identifying the sociological essence of peace and the huge significance of unintended outcomes. Many of these outcomes lie in the uncertain futures of war-affected societies, likely to rebound disconcertingly against ‘liberal’ power. This absorbing analysis will engage a wide readership of students and policy-makers. Michael Pugh, Emeritus Professor, University of Bradford, UK Critical thinkers have long been calling for an empirical analysis of the sociology of peace interventions, as well as their relationality with the subjects of those interventions. Visoka’s book moves the debate further in this direction with a fascinating analysis of key aspects of international peace interventions in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo and Timor Leste, measuring intentionality against outcomes. Visoka’s superb book illustrates how consequences flow from such interventions, often undermining their attempts to achieve specific goals, and placing political development upon an alternative trajectory. Oliver P. Richmond, University of Manchester, UK Gëzim Visoka has made a major contribution both theoretically and empirically to the study of liberal peacebuilding. Theoretically, he takes further the recent application of Norbert Elias’s sociological ideas to the field of international politics (thus also helping to rescue sociology from its increasingly narrow, domestic, short-term and policy-orientated foci). And his case studies explain the unpredicted outcomes of three well-intentioned interventions. Stephen Mennell, Professor Emeritus, University College Dublin, Republic of Ireland

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Peace Figuration after International Intervention

This book examines the adverse impacts of liberal peacebuilding in conflictaffected societies. It introduces ‘peace figuration’ as a new analytical framework for studying the intentionality, performativity, and consequences of liberal peacebuilding. The work challenges current theories and views, and searches for alternative non-conflicted research avenues that are suitable for understanding how peacebuilding intentions are made, how different events shape peace outcomes, and what are the consequences of peacebuilding interventions. Drawing on detailed case studies of peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and TimorLeste, the book argues that attempts to build peace often fail to achieve the intended outcomes. A figurational view of peacebuilding interventions shows that post-conflict societies experience multiple episodes of success and failure in an unpredictable trajectory. This book develops a relational sociology of peacebuilding impact, which is crucial for overcoming static measurement of peacebuilding successes or failures. It shows that international interventions can shape peace but, importantly, not always in the shape they intended. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding, peacebuilding, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR. Gëzim Visoka is a Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland.

Routledge Studies in Intervention and Statebuilding Series Editors: Aidan Hehir and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert Founding Editor: David Chandler

New Agendas in Statebuilding Hybridity, contingency and history Edited by Robert Egnell and Peter Haldén Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding Peace from the ashes of war? Edited by Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić Semantics of Statebuilding Language, meanings and sovereignty Edited by Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Nicholas Onuf, Vojin Rakić and  Petar Bojanić Humanitarian Crises, Intervention and Security A framework for evidence-based programming Edited by Liesbet Heyse, Andrej Zwitter, Rafael Wittek and Joost Herman

Security and Hybridity after Armed Conflict The dynamics of security provision in post-civil war states Rens C. Willems International Intervention and Statemaking How exception became the norm Selver B. Sahin Rethinking Democracy Promotion in International Relations The rise of the social Jessica Schmidt The Politics of International Intervention The tyranny of peace Edited by Mandy Turner and Florian P. Kühn

Internal Security and Statebuilding Aligning agencies and functions B.K. Greener and W.J. Fish

The Practice of Humanitarian Intervention Aid workers, agencies and institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Kai Koddenbrock

The EU and Member State Building European foreign policy in the Western Balkans Edited by Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan

Peace Figuration after International Intervention Intentions, events and consequences of liberal peacebuilding Gëzim Visoka

Peace Figuration after International Intervention

Intentions, events and consequences of liberal peacebuilding Gëzim Visoka

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Gëzim Visoka The right of Gëzim Visoka to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Visoka, Gëzim, author. Title: Peace figuration after international intervention : intentions, events and consequences of liberal peacebuilding / Gëzim Visoka. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge studies in intervention and statebuilding | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016000840| ISBN 9781138938472 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315675633 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Peace-building. | Peace-building–Bosnia and Herzegovina. | Peace-building–Kosovo (Republic) | Peace-building–Timor-Leste. Classification: LCC JZ5566.4 .V57 2016 | DDC 341.5/84–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016000840 ISBN: 978-1-138-93847-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-67563-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To Grace

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Contents

1

Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

x xi

Introduction: figuring out peace

1

PART I

Foundations of peace figuration

15

2

How do we know peace? Rethinking liberal and critical epistemologies of peacebuilding

17

3

Peace figuration: towards a new framework for analysis

44

PART II

Peace figuration in practice

73

4

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

75

5

Peace figuration in Kosovo

103

6

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste

132

7

At peace’s end: disfiguring the impact of liberal peacebuilding

160

Index

187

Acknowledgements

A number of people deserve special acknowledgement for their indispensable support and encouragement while writing this book. John Doyle has been a great mentor and a continuous supporter of my academic work during and after my doctoral studies. My wife, Grace Bolton-Visoka has been the source of inspiration and a remarkable enabler. Without her all-encompassing care, support, and dedication I would not have been able complete this book. Nicolas LemayHébert deserves a special recognition for believing in this project and for supporting me throughout the writing process. Elvin Gjevori, Walt Kilroy, Gary Murphy, Eileen Connolly, Maura Conway, Karen Devine, and Ken McDonagh have been great colleagues at Dublin City University during the completion of this book. I am also in debt to great scholarly interactions over the years with Oliver P. Richmond, Roger Mac Ginty, Edward Newman, Michael Pugh, David Chandler, and Aidan Hehir. Family and friends in Kosovo and Ireland have also been greatly supportive. My family and especially my parents, Tahir and Nexhmije Visoka, deserve special recognition for their love, care and support from distance while completing the book. Ivan and Hilda Bolton deserve my sincere thanks for their generosity, kindness, and support. I am grateful to the many people who supported me altruistically during my field research in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Timor-Leste. I am also grateful to many friends who have helped me over the years, including: Rand Engel, Adem Beha, Karmit Zysman, Madeleine Mosse, Ramadan Ilazi, Roland Gjoni, Ilir Hoxha, and many others that I am not able to list here. At Routledge, I am grateful to Andrew Humphrys and Hannah Ferguson for helpful and efficient support during the production of this book. Finally, none of this would be possible without the generous financial support of the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction and the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University in Ireland.

Abbreviations

BiH CIVPOL CNRT CSDG D4D DPA EC EEAS ESDP EU EULEX EUPM F-FDTL FALENTIL FRETILINI HR ICO IDP IFOR INTERFET IOM IPTF KFOR KIPRED KLA LDK NATO NGO OHR OIOS OSCE PDK PIC

Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Civilian Police National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction Conflict, Security and Development Group Democracy for Development Dayton Peace Accords European Commission European External Action Service European Security and Defence Policy European Union The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo European Union Police Mission Defence Force of Timor-Leste The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste High Representative International Civilian Office Internally Displaced Person The Implementation Force International Force for East Timor International Organisation for Migration International Police Task Force Kosovo Force (NATO) Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development Kosovo Liberation Army Democratic League of Kosovo North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation Office of the High Representative Office of Internal Oversight Services Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Democratic Party of Kosovo Peace Implementation Council

xii

Abbreviations

PISG PNTL RS SAA SDS SFOR SRSG TLAVA UN UN-DPA UN-DPKO UNDP UNGA UNHCR UNMIBH UNMIK UNMISET UNMIT UNOSEK UNOTIL UNPOL UNSC UNSG UNTAET

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government National Police of Timor-Leste Republika Srpska Stabilisation and Association Agreement Serb Democratic Party The Stabilisation Force (NATO) Special Representative of the Secretary-General Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment United Nations Department of Political Affairs Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Development Programme United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Kosovo The UN Office in Timor-Leste United Nations Police United Nations Security Council United Nations Secretary-General United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

1

Introduction Figuring out peace

The argument of this book International intervention and peacebuilding has become one of the main approaches for preventing, managing, and mitigating global insecurities, dealing with the humanitarian consequences of civil wars, and expanding democracy and neo-liberal economic regimes. Peacebuilding comprises of a wide range of interventionary components, such as imposing and incentivising rules, norms, and conditions to govern post-conflict transitions in the area of elections and institution-building, security sector reform, economic reconstruction, promotion of civil society, rule of law and justice, reconciliation, and transitional justice. The growth of peacebuilding operations in the past two decades has raised substantial debates on the paths, strategies, and implications of international interventions after violent conflicts. Although peacebuilding has envisaged forming institutions that are based on consensual and wide representation politics, ruled by the law, and function on the principles of democratic governance, societies subjected to external peacebuilding continue to suffer from fragile peace, authoritarian regimes and dysfunctional institutions, and social inequality. Scholarly debates on peacebuilding interventions are caught on never-ending disagreements regarding the successes and failures of peacebuilding, which ultimately risks bypassing important micro-sociological aspects that shape peace after violent conflicts. It is therefore of critical importance to examine the possibilities and impossibilities surrounding peacebuilding endeavours. What are the dynamics that constitute and shape peacebuilding interventions in conflictaffected societies? How can we make sense of the wider impacts of peacebuilding? What are the constitutive aspects of a reality-congruent analysis of peacebuilding interventions? This books answers these questions in a reflexive and systematic fashion, combining figurational sociology with peacebuilding debates to develop a new analytical framework for studying peace figuration in societies that have experienced international peacebuilding after violent conflicts. The argument in this book is straightforward. In most cases, attempts to build peace often do not manage to achieve the intended outcomes. Peacebuilding intentions differ from actions, events unfold in an unexpected manner, and the outcomes do not satisfy

2

Introduction

the expectations of either local or foreign actors. A figurational view of peacebuilding interventions shows that post-conflict societies experience multiple episodes of success and failure in an unpredictable trajectory. The societal fabric in conflict-affected societies is not a product of what is intended, rather more a reflection of what both insider and outsider agents involved in peacebuilding processes fail to achieve. Therefore, social actualities in post-conflict societies are mainly dominated by various unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences as emerging features of incompatible intentions, multiplicity of uncontrollable events and interactions of agents with different powers and positionalities operating in the institutional, public, and everyday realm of postconflict habitus. All peacebuilding interventions have been dominated by unplanned outcomes. However, what have shaped our understanding of peacebuilding impacts are the ways how success and failure of peacebuilding is inter-subjectively constituted by epistemic and practitioners’ communities. What is intended as a liberal solution of peacebuilding after conflict often gives rise to other problems that trigger new illiberal responses. Successes of certain peacebuilding actors constitute failures for others, and vice versa. Often peacebuilding intervention can have a reversal effect and generate peace-breaking dynamics, which delay prospects for establishing a sustainable peace. De-facing and disfiguring the power of peacebuilding interventions shows that the state of peace in conflict-affected societies represents the influence of everybody and nobody. This makes us live in a world of our unmaking, revealing the limits of rationality, power, and knowledge; unearthing the power of errors, unknowns, uncertainty, and unlearning. Figuring out how these positionalities unfold in different contexts is crucial for developing a more nuanced understanding of peacebuilding interventions. Through the combination of suitable conceptual tools it is possible to make sense of peacebuilding complexity, and identify multiple pathways and processes that shape peace. However, such endeavours require both rethinking the existing peacebuilding theories, and offering new conceptual approaches for studying peacebuilding interventions.

Making peace between peace theories Peacebuilding interventions have been subject to extensive academic research and have generated controversial scholarship among its supporters and opponents. Identifying the successes and failures of interventions and peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies, and the question of how to improve them have been among the most pertinent areas of focus for ‘peace-writers’. Two major epistemological strands dominate research on peacebuilding: liberal-interventionist and critical-emancipatory epistemologies of peace. Liberal-interventionist peacewriters undertake positivist research and develop problem-solving and policyoriented heuristics that support interventions to impose a liberal peace and seek to portray them as successful stories (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Ghani and Lockhart 2009). They search for causal explanations for the positive impacts of

Introduction

3

peace interventions. The success of peacebuilding is located in prioritising internal and external security, building democratic institutions, promoting economic reforms, and transforming social relations (Call and Wyeth 2008; Diehl and Druckman 2010). These claims derive from standardised indicators and epistemic blueprints, leaving unexplored important nuances and processual aspects that shape peacebuilding. This is also evident among the practitioners of peace, where the politics of chasing success and the interference of techno-political factors impede appropriate assessment of the wider impacts and outcomes of peacebuilding. On the other hand, critical-emancipatory peace-writers, take postpositivist research to develop critical accounts of peacebuilding failures (Chandler 2010). They question the methods and intentions of external interventions and provide both discursive and empirical explanations for the limits and backlashes of peacebuilding operations (see Tadjbakhsh 2011). While critical peacewriters often focus on why peacebuilding does not work, some also provide alternative accounts, involving counter-factual claims to the mainstream theories and practices of peacebuilding, of when and how peacebuilding would work (see Richmond 2014). Despite these paradigmatic differences, both liberal-interventionist and critical-emancipatory strands promote a politics of possibility for building peace. For liberal-interventionist peace-writers, the possibility of peace and the success of peacebuilding are located in the reconstruction of state institutions and in reengineering structures of societal peace by implanting external ‘pacifying’ rules, norms, institutions, and conditions and by suppressing ‘violent’ local actors, cultures, and practices (Paris 2004). It involves giving priority to security and stability over justice and reconciliation. This operates on the logic of methodological holism, whereby investing in top-down institutions, empowering ethnic elites, undertaking structural reforms of economy, and investing in selected groups of civil society enable governing the wider society and plant the seeds of peace through these agents of multiplication. For critical-emancipatory peace-writers, the possibility of peace lies on bottom-up and critical local agencies that emerge during and after failed peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions (Richmond 2011). Peace is possible only when it is rooted in local legitimacy, is representative of local culture, needs and perspectives, and emerges as a result of local political (non-violent) struggle (Richmond 2011). Critical peace-writers emphasise the importance of justice, equality, welfare and inclusive politics over institutional governmentality. They operate on the logic of methodological individualism, emphasising the role of agency in shaping peacebuilding endeavours (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). On the surface, this epidemic diversity seems to deepen our specific knowledge. However, it risks missing out on the interconnectivity and complexity of peacebuilding interventions. Most importantly, the onto-politics of each epistemic camp has ignored studying properly the wider consequences of peacebuilding. Among liberal-interventionists, the discussion of peacebuilding outcomes and impacts seeks to neutralise blame of failure by treating them as unintended consequences, thus attributing the responsibility for such outcomes

4

Introduction

to the local dynamics (Aoi et al. 2007). One strand of critical-epistemologies disregards examining consequences because collectivising blame undermines their criticality (Chandler 2014). Others take consequences as verification of the failures of liberal peacebuilding, and use them as a departure for developing alternative accounts (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015). What is missing currently from these debates is an integration of these epistemic fragmentations to make sense of the complexity of peacebuilding in practice. The never-ending quest for knowledge production within the peace-writing industry risks bypassing crucial properties and dynamics that shape peace after international intervention. Hence, new epistemological pathways are required to make peace between peace theories, and to generate more reality-congruent research outside the existing paradigmatic contours. Non-conflictual pathways of research would be beneficial to overcome paradigmatic contempt, bypass methodological holism and individualism, and make space for conciliatory heuristics and reality-congruent inquires (see Archer 1995). Such efforts require accounting both for agency and structure without privileging one over the other, exploring both insider and outsider ontologies of peace, and disentangling multiple interconnected processes, relations, and actors in peacebuilding endeavours. Despite extensive research, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of the twisted, messy, and unknown dynamics of peacebuilding, the multiplicity of intentions, events, and outcomes that shape peacebuilding efforts, and most importantly, the side effects, reversal effects, and the harmful effects of well-intended intervention strategies. What the research on peacebuilding currently lacks is conceptual tools that, in an integrative manner, examine: the intentionality of peacebuilding that play a formative role over actions; the events that play a performative role in building and breaking peace; and the spectrum of consequences that emerge distinctively from the interactions of intentions, actions, and events.

Peace figuration after international intervention This book turns to the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias to develop a new analytical framework to study various figurations of peace after international intervention. While Elias is known for his study of civilising processes and state formation, his most relevant contribution is the study of human figuration and interdependencies that consist of agential assemblages, structural contingencies, and unexpected consequences. Elias considered the primary focus of sociological analysis to be ‘the relationship between intentional, goal-directed human activities and the unplanned or unconscious process of interweaving with other such activities, past and present, and their consequences’ (Smith 2001: 1). Building on Elias’s sociology, this book introduces ‘peace figuration’ as a new analytical framework for studying the intentions, events and consequences that shape peace after violent conflict. The concept of figuration signifies processes, actions, relationships, dynamics, and structures of mutually oriented and dependent people with different intentions, power ratios, and the interweaving of intentional human

Introduction

5

actions with unintended outcomes (Elias 1994; Mennell 1992). Establishing a connection between intentions, events, and consequences of peacebuilding is a more reality-congruent approach for tracing a contextual figuration of peace and for understanding the politics and normative validity of international interventions. The resemblance of peace is not static, but constantly changes in unexpected directions. Looking at the conversion of intentions into actions and the emergence of a spectrum of events and consequences provides a processual analysis of peacebuilding impact, as well as avoids static and normative measurement of peacebuilding effectiveness. Such a view bypasses the paradigmatic contempt in peacebuilding research and promotes methodological pluralism. Semantically, peace figuration enables conceptual advancement from multiple meanings of peacebuilding, which is simultaneously used to signify both practices of building peace and the field of peacebuilding studies. Peace figuration is not a theory of action, but an integrative conceptual framework for studying the metaphysics, processes, liquidity, discontinuities, and legacies of peacebuilding interventions. It does not suggest how to ‘build peace’, rather it helps understanding in retrospect how peace is built and broken after violent conflicts by looking at the interconnected role of language, performances, and consequences as key properties for constituting the reality of post-conflict societies. This book combines critical discourse analysis, practice theory, and process tracing as adequate epistemological and methodological pluralist approaches to studying the figuration of peace after international intervention. It disentangles the figuration of peace in three detailed case studies of conflict-affected societies where the international community has deployed a wide range of peacebuilding and interventionary measures. Critical discourse analysis is used to elaborate peacebuilding intentions by looking at official UN documents and other strategic documents. In the second stage, practice analysis is used to identify peaceshaping events based on their relation with declared intentions and the spectrum of consequences they have produced. In the third stage, process tracing is used to analyse the spectrum of consequences by looking at UN periodical reports on each of the three country case studies: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. These official discourses are triangulated with relevant media reports and independent studies and assessments, and extensive targeted field research with key local and international governmental and non-governmental actors. Based on this methodological pluralist approach, the peace figuration framework is applied to police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a case study, with particular focus on the intentions of the UN and EU for peacebuilding to examine the spectrum of subsequent unintended consequences and how they have shaped peace in the country. In Kosovo, the critical agency of Serb parallel governance structures in the north of Kosovo is examined, with particular emphasis on the unprevented consequences of UN peacebuilding in the country. In the case of Timor-Leste, security sector development and reform are examined to explore the figuration of liberal peace intentions, critical events and the emergence of unanticipated consequences that caused collateral damage to peace, democratic governance, and development of the country. These three

6

Introduction

detailed case studies provide new empirical and conceptual material for expanding our knowledge about peacebuilding and its long-term effects. The first aspect of figurational view of peacebuilding interventions is the intentionality of international and local actors involved in the peacebuilding process. Intentions are the ‘original sin’ against which the success and failure of peacebuilding interventions is measured. There are multiple types of intentions, including declared, shared, mixed, and hidden intentions. Analysing the declared intentions articulated publicly and in policy documents helps elucidate the discourses and positionality of peacebuilding protagonists. Intentions are important for capturing various discourses and rationales shaping peacebuilding practices. They help delineate the relational nature of peacebuilding achievements, where the failure of certain actors to realise their intended goals represents the successful satisfaction of other actor’s intentions. However, capturing intentions is problematic as they enshrine multiple layers of reasons that could also be euphemisms – i.e. declaring one thing and performing another, thus camouflaging prior actions. At best, intentions are situational approximations of practical reasoning. What we refer to here as declared intentions are defined in policy circles and academia as peacebuilding mandates, goals, and objectives (Diehl and Balas 2014). Despite these challenges, focusing on declared intentions is a more suitable approach for capturing the problematic and fluid nature of rationales that guide peacebuilding and for showing the multiple layers of intentions that could be also euphemisms – declaring one thing and performing another, and camouflaging prior actions. The declared intentions of peacebuilding operations represent a conglomeration of collective normativity of peacebuilding organisations and the open or hidden motives of its member states and other interested parties. The multiplicity of intentions often forces UN officials to undertake ad hoc actions, rather than actions based on clearly defined policy, as the process of forming and agreeing upon collective intentions would paralyse the entire peacebuilding enterprise. The co-existence of conflicting intentions often it is portrayed as a lack of political will. Declared intentions are nothing more than self-referential node points of foreign interveners. They signify a ‘global newspeak’ for understanding and making sense of what they are doing, which is mainly oriented towards convincing external audiences, satisfying external hierarchies of power, and justifying interventions to their domestic public. Declared intentions are constantly negotiated, modified, and changed in the course of peacebuilding interventions. They are aspirational statements as well as ambiguous reference points to justify intervention, to measure progress, and exercise control over the local subjects. Nevertheless, studying the multiplicity of intentions helps elucidate the relational nature of peacebuilding, whereby failures for certain peacebuilding actors are scored as successes for other actors. As demonstrated over the course of this book, the wording of peacebuilding mandates has far-reaching implications. Often peacebuilding mandates are written under urgent circumstances and are grounded on superficial fact-finding missions. They are often intended to end conflicts, thus not foreseeing the array

Introduction

7

of complications that could emerge at the later stages of peace implementation. Exploring the implementation of declared intentions reveals the formative agency of text in shaping peacebuilding actions and in producing a wider range of consequences. For example, the particular framing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) resulted in establishing a decentralised structure of police forces that later became one of the main obstacles for implementing other aspects of settlement in the country. It took the UN and EU nearly two decades to reform the police structures and make them compatible with desired policing standards. Moreover, the incompatibility of intentions among peacebuilding actors can amplify those efforts that aim to either disrespect the peace agreement or undermine its implementation. In Kosovo, the post-conflict transition has experienced distorted intentions whereby the international community has utilised peacebuilding to satisfy the Kosovo Serb community and reduce their peace contestation while using statebuilding to satisfy and delay the Kosovo Albanian community’s desire for independence and sovereign statehood. The ambiguous and timeless nature of peace intentionality has generated multiple local peacebreaking dynamics, which have undermined prospects for a sustainable peace, strengthened ethno-nationalism, and prolonged international presence in the country. Similarly, the change of declared intentions guiding peacebuilding activities in some contexts can be necessary to rescue peace while in other cases it can break peace. In Timor-Leste, the UN formulated its declared intentions drawing on the UN mandate in Kosovo and under internal tensions including the short time for preparing the mission. This de-contexualisation of supposedly universal liberal intentions did not correspond with local expectations and context in Timor-Leste. The analysis in this book assesses the relationship between declared intentions, performances of peacebuilding organisations, and their farreaching impact in post-conflict societies. The second aspect of a figurational view of peacebuilding interventions is the events that shape peace. What we encounter as peacebuilding processes occur under the auspices of events (Visoka 2016). Located between intentions and consequences, events are an important category for disentangling peace figuration. Translation of intentions into action produces events, which then inevitably produce consequences. For an event to occur there must be an assemblage of material and discursive elements to construct its performative occurrence. In peacebuilding practices, the politics of making and unmaking events play a significant role in the construction of discursive figuration of peace. The registration of events is closely connected with the compatibility of those performative acts with agents’ intentions and its desired outcomes. This book shows that the UN has constantly avoided reporting about its failures, wrongdoings, and the side effects that have emerged from its direct actions or inactions in a particular peace-related context. Instead, the majority of the reporting focuses on their processual successes, or blames local actors and dynamics for regress in peace implementation. Often, unwelcome events are reduced to ‘non-events’, creating discrepancies between local complex truths and global narratives mediated by the liberal peace apparatus. Therefore, it is important to excavate beyond what is

8

Introduction

registered as important peacebuilding events in post-conflict societies, and eventualise those ignored and marginalised events that are also significant in shaping peacebuilding processes and outcomes. Contrary to what we often assume, peace is also shaped by dislocated and dissociated events and unintentional interactions within and beyond peacebuilding scope of engagement, and it is determined by local agents directly and indirectly involved in peacebuilding endeavours. Empirical chapters in this book examine a broad variety of events that have shaped peace to reveal the unpredictable flow of developments that guide the success and failure of peacebuilding interventions. Translating intentions into events is likely to be disturbed by a collusion of interacting forces within everyday and institutional settings of postconflict actualities. When we talk about the failures of peacebuilding and statebuilding we often ignore the possibility of ‘peace-breaking’ dynamics during and after international intervention. Discussion of challenges and setbacks in the peace process are often discussed as part of the challenges to peacebuilding process, perceiving them as an impediment to sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is constantly interrupted by unplanned events. This phenomenon will be described in this book as ‘peace-breaking’ to illustrate the setbacks and nonlinear dynamics of peace processes, and the non-compliance with the provisions of peace agreement by all sides. As illustrated over the course of this book, the majority of peacebuilding efforts are not dedicated to addressing the root causes of conflict but are caught in a struggle to correct inadequacies of peace-making, legacies of interventions, and consequences of earlier mistakes of peacebuilding missions. The third and final aspect of a figurational view of peacebuilding interventions is the spectrum of consequences. Measuring the impact of peacebuilding only on the normative validity of good intentions and performativity without looking at the broader consequences is incomplete. Examining the spectrum of peacebuilding consequences helps in exploring the cascading logic and nonlinearity of peacebuilding processes, and in exploring the presence of path dependence evident in the complex sequences, embedded influence of early decisions and actions, and their imposition on later developments and outcomes. The philosophy of consequences enshrines aspects of allocating responsibility and encouraging precautionary action. The figurations of peace identified by discorded networks of interdependencies between foreign interveners and local stakeholders with different power ratios, basis of legitimacy, distinct agendas, and geo-spaces of agency are likely to produce a spectrum of consequences that go beyond the intended or hybrid outcomes. In this realm, disfiguring peacebuilding intentions and events enables establishing whether the consequences of peacebuilding actions were intended or not and, more importantly, if they could have been anticipated and prevented. While unintended and unanticipated consequences are widely used in social theory, ‘unprevented consequences’ are introduced here for the first time to show that certain consequences could have been prevented but were intentionally and knowingly ignored. Consequences have a structuring agency and represent the net result of all peacebuilding and

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9

peace-breaking dynamics. They transcend the fields of interventions to indirectly affect other fields as well. Hence, peacebuilding consequences are not an exception, but play a central role in peacebuilding interventions. However, the examination of negative consequences is unwelcome in policy circles. It is perceived as self-defeating and unacceptable, with the potential to reduce credibility and funding prospects and damage the future role of particular agencies and agents in engaging with conflict situations. The perpetual constitution of peace through the spectrum of consequences triggers constant adjustment and adaption. When peacebuilding practices succeed they are declared afterwards as intentional actions, whereas in the case of failure they are attributed as unintended effects. This makes peace a liquid ‘creature’ – something of our own unmaking that does not entirely satisfy our purposes. While the causation for peacebuilding consequences is often attributed to the complexity and double effects of social interactions, this book suggests observable critical encounters that could shed light on the prevalence of peacebuilding consequences. First and foremost, the ontological quest for triumphalism and avoidance of responsibility among peacebuilding actors has left no room for the proper recognition of peacebuilding consequences. In reality, most of the consequences have emerged as a result of the inability of international peacebuilders to anticipate and prevent the harmful effects of their prior, purposive actions. Therefore, peacebuilding consequences should not be seen as abstract entities and the tactical depersonalisation of responsibility. The temporality of peacebuilding missions shapes the attitude of peacebuilders regarding the consequences of their actions. Short-term peace operations and the constant renewal of mandate can create unwanted consequences as their focus is on immediate results without consideration for long-term implications. However, ignorance of wider consequences has paved the way for failure of many peacebuilding endeavours. In turn, the emergence of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences prolongs international peacebuilding missions, deepens the hostile relations with local stakeholders, and weakens local legitimacy and acceptance of international authority. These revelations point out that peacebuilding interventions have been and continue to be in crisis. Paradoxically, it is this crisis of not managing to archive the sustainable peace that constitutes the very reason why new forms of intervention are invented, and why peacebuilding is still accepted internationally. The empirical chapters in this book show that peace is often delayed by the very acts that attempt to bring it. The spectrum of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences do not contribute towards establishing a sustainable peace, as they can delay the consolidation of peace, cause local harm, and prolong international dominance. The inadequacies of peace-making and peacebuilding after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have unintentionally led to the creation of multiple decentralised, ineffective and politicised police structures; breeding of informal policing and police support for criminality; establishment of police forces in service of protecting war criminals and obstructing interethnic reconciliation; and breeding of chronic human insecurity. In Kosovo, the

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contestation of international statebuilding and the emergence of Serb parallel structures led to the creation of a frozen conflict in the north of the country; delayed the establishment of effective and functional institutions; hindered the establishment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation; and undermined socioeconomic development. In Timor-Leste, the development and reform of the security sector led to multiple unanticipated consequences such as the confrontation between police and defence forces and the institutionalisation of an abusive and unaccountable security apparatus. Beyond these negative dynamics, the spectrum of consequences as emergent features of peacebuilding counter-balance the power of peacebuilding organisations in favour of local agency, thereby transforming the performance of foreign interveners, and readjusting the terms and tactics of peace implementation. Unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences are what the reality of post-conflict societies is made of. Unpacking such dynamics is crucial for understanding the complexity of peacebuilding interventions. Therefore, this book analyses how peacebuilding organisations cope with a mismatch between intentions and outcomes, and it examines how peacebuilding consequences constitute in an uncontrollable fashion the reality in post-conflict societies. The arguments of this book can be useful to different audiences. This book provides an original contribution to contemporary debates within peace and conflict studies. It is also the first attempt to bring figurational sociology to peace and conflict studies. Rooted in epistemological pluralism, the book contributes to merging sociological accounts with international relations debates and increasing interdisciplinary dialogues (Linklater 2011; Albert et al. 2015). For peacebuilding scholars, the book seeks to promote a new thinking about how we think about peacebuilding. The book harnesses the complexity of contemporary peacebuilding which is entering an age of liquid modernity where intentions do not match actions taken, consequences remain unaccounted for, and appropriate assignment of responsibility is almost inexistent. It shows that peacebuilding interventions are self-perpetuating. International peace-builders and local powerholders cannot alone control peacebuilding. Their agency is limited. At best they can only shape peacebuilding processes. It is the totality of entire interactions, events, non-events, and spill over consequences that constitute the figuration of peace in a given post-conflict society. Integration of the metaphysics, performativity, and consequentialism of peacebuilding helps demystify the figuration of peace. Thus, peace figuration provides a more adequate framework for capturing the self-perpetuating nature of peacebuilding and peace-breaking dynamics. The book illustrates that peacebuilding interventions are profoundly embedded in eventuality, uncertainty, and unlearning, thereby contributing to multiple possible futures. The book develops a relational sociology of peacebuilding impact in conflictaffected societies, which is crucial for overcoming the solidity surrounding the measurement of peacebuilding successes or failures. As the analyses in this book show, peace figuration captures a full episode of peacebuilding – from the time of intervention to the end of missions and its immediate aftermath. Despite this

Introduction

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focus, peace processes do not have a definitive beginning and end. Today’s failures can become tomorrow’s successes. Such a processual view of peacebuilding provides a more realistic understanding of the constitutive nature of peacebuilding possibilities and impossibilities. For area studies specialists, the book offers a new reading of peacebuilding dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. The cross-case comparison examines how peacebuilding missions generate adverse effects by trying to transfer knowledge to, or impose universal blueprints on, different societies. For security studies and international relations scholars, the book offers a micro-sociology of the restrains of external interveners in shaping peace and security in post-conflict societies. The multidisciplinary frameworks used in this book to understand peace figuration after international interventions offer a new pluralist onto-epistemology of peace. Finally, for the policy community the book offers a different perspective of the unexpected impacts that peacebuilding interventions can have in conflictaffected societies. It shows that liberal peacebuilding’s failure to achieve the expectations has affected the international legitimacy of American and Eurocentric order, permitting the emergence of alternative, multiplex and transitional orders. The book does not provide policy recommendations or lessons for future peacebuilding interventions. In fact, a message that the policy community can get from this book is that lessons learning, knowledge transfer, and policy blueprints do not, as predicated by scholars and policy-makers, work in practice. Conversely, attempts to use universal and solid understanding of how to build peace can have adverse effects. Peacebuilding is deeply local and fluid by nature. The external forces can only shape peace, not control the way they want it.

Organisation of the book This book is divided into two parts. The first part (Foundations of peace figuration) after this introduction looks at the prospects and limits of current theoretical approaches to peacebuilding, and provides the conceptual foundations of peace figuration. Chapter 2 explores the existing liberal-interventionist and critical-emancipatory epistemologies of peace and scrutinises their paradigmatic stances on the success, failure and consequences of peacebuilding practices. The chapter suggests new research avenues for making peace between peace theories to better capture the figuration of peace in post-conflict societies. Chapter 3 introduces an analytical framework of peace figuration based on the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias. The framework elaborates three key aspects of peace figuration: intentions, events, and consequences. Meanwhile, to facilitate the empirical application of this typological framework, this chapter elaborates a methodological conglomeration of critical discourse analysis, practice, theory and process tracing. The second part of this book (Peace figuration in practice) applies the concept of peace figuration to three conflict-affected societies that have experienced protracted international interventions. Chapter 4 explores peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina by looking at the intentions, events, and the

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unintended consequences of police reform after the conflict. Chapter 5 examines peace figuration in Kosovo by focusing on the intentions, events and unprevented consequences of UN’s efforts to establish rule of law in the country and cope with parallel governance structures and local resistance. Chapter 6 explores peace figuration in Timor-Leste by examining intentions, events and the spectrum of unanticipated consequences that have shaped security sector development and reform after the conflict. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, brings together in a thematic and conceptual fashion the key findings from both parts of the book and draws a number of contingent conclusions. It also discusses potential research avenues for future peace figurational studies, which could expand epistemological perspectives within peace and conflict studies, and more broadly within security studies and international relations.

References Archer, M. (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Albert, M., Buzan, B., and Zurn, M. (eds) (2015) Bringing Sociology to International Relations: World Politics as Differentiation Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aoi, C., de Coning, C., and Thakur, R. (2007) (eds) Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo: United Nations University. Call, C. T. and Wyeth, V. (eds) (2008) Building States to Build Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Campbell, S., Chandler, D., and Sabaratnam, M. (eds) (2011) A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, London: Zed Books. Chandler, D. (2010) International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance, Abingdon: Routledge. Chandler, D. (2014) Resilience: The Governance of Complexity, London: Routledge. Diehl, P. F. and Balas, A. (2014) Peace Operations, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity Press. Diehl, P. F. and Druckman, D. (2010) Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Doyle, M. W. and Sambanis, N. (2006) Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Elias, N. (1994) The Civilizing Process, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009) Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linklater, A. (2011) The Problem of Harm in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mac Ginty, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2013) ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34(5): 763–783. Mennell, S. (1992) Norbert Elias: An Introduction, Dublin: University College Dublin Press. Richmond, O. P. (2011) A Post-Liberal Peace, London: Routledge. Richmond, O. P. (2014) Failed Statebuilding: Intervention, the State and the Dynamics of Peace Formation, New Haven: Yale University Press. Richmond, O. P. and Mac Ginty, R. (2015) ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ Cooperation and Conflict, 50(2): 171–189.

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Smith, D. (2001) Norbert Elias and Modern Social Theory, London: Sage Publications. Tadjbakhsh, S. (ed.) (2011) Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives, Abingdon: Routledge. Visoka, G. (2016) ‘Peace is what we make of it: Peace-shaping events and “non-events” ’, Peacebuilding, 4(1): 54–70.

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Part I

Foundations of peace figuration

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2

How do we know peace? Rethinking liberal and critical epistemologies of peacebuilding

Introduction Peacebuilding has been a leading approach for managing post-conflict transitions after international intervention. Peacebuilding has also become a major epistemological subject within peace and conflict studies and within broader debates in international relations and security studies. In the past two decades, violent conflicts have taken place in the global south while peace is written in the global north. This has significant implications for our peace knowledge and the conceptual approaches we use to analyse peacebuilding. Evidently, writing about peacebuilding is not an isolated epistemic activity; rather, it is deeply rooted in making and unmaking knowledge, discourses, assemblages, and approaches to thinking about and acting on peacebuilding. Therefore, to elucidate how we know peace, it is crucial first to explore ‘peace-writing’ – the epistemological enterprise for producing policy-relevant and critical knowledge about peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. This chapter examines existing scholarship on peacebuilding and elucidates how peace-writing conceptualises the possibility for building peace – namely how the success, impact, and consequences of peacebuilding are conceived in the literature. Understanding the impact of peacebuilding is crucial as conflicts are not decreasing in number, and peacebuilding efforts are not succeeding in establishing sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. An overview of the existing scholarship is crucial for identifying the merits and shortfalls of peacebuilding knowledge, and for exploring new, more realitycongruent, research avenues. The industry of peace-writing about peacebuilding has produced a vast amount of scholarship, loosely organised around certain paradigms and research programmes. At present, there are two broad identifiable epistemological strands that theorise about international interventions and peacebuilding: the liberalinterventionist and the critical-emancipatory epistemologies of peace. The liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace rooted in problem-solving and policy-relevant logic argue that building peace is possible through external interventions. Critical epistemologies of peace, on the other hand, negate such perspectives and offer alternative understandings of peacebuilding that conceive peace as possible only when it emerges from the bottom up. These epistemological

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strands cultivate a culture of theorising embedded in perennial disagreement, competition, and reification at the ontological, epistemological and methodological levels. Both epistemological camps try to stabilise their theoretical solidity at the expense of other paradigms. In examining the effectiveness of peacebuilding, liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace have focused on conceptualising, measuring, and evaluating the success of external interventions for building a sustainable peace. Critical-emancipatory epistemologies, on the other hand, have focused mainly on exploring and conceptualising the failure of peacebuilding. The measurement of peacebuilding success varies from minimalist to maximalist criteria. While minimalists equate success with ending violence and the return of security, maximalists view success in terms of eradicating the underlying causes of conflict. Critical peace-writers divided between those who provide critique-as-alternative and those that provide critique-with-alternative have focused on identifying the failure of peacebuilding. The causation of peacebuilding failure is located within the norms, discourses, and practices that underpin peacebuilding interventions. The assessment of peacebuilding impact is undertaken mainly for policymaking purposes and often ignores the broad impact of peacebuilding interventions. Similarly, the paradigmatic division between proponents and opponents of liberal peace has excluded the appropriate examination of the wider consequences of peacebuilding. Existing accounts of peacebuilding consequences are conceptually and empirically vague and seek to evade responsibility for the outcomes. The success and failure of peacebuilding should not remain only an epistemic aspiration detached from the particularities and contingencies of peacebuilding practices. The epistemological binaries between the successes and failures of peacebuilding interventions risk creating static understandings of peacebuilding performances. As a result of these epistemological binaries, less reflexive work is done on the relational understanding of the broad impact that every form of peacebuilding knowledge or practice can have in post-conflict societies. Thus, the conditions of existing epistemologies of peacebuilding are incapable of capturing the complexity of the peacebuilding metaphysics, performativity, and consequences. This chapter argues that there is a need to rethink existing epistemologies of peace and bring new sociological perspectives into the debate to provide more reality-adequate analysis of peacebuilding interventions. The chapter makes a case for embracing epistemological fluidity rather than the epistemological solidity that underlines current peacebuilding debates. The main challenge for the next stage of the research is to make peace between peace theories by constructing conciliatory and ‘post-Lakatosian’ peace research rooted in the principles of epistemological and methodological pluralism and consilience of knowledge. The discipline can be rescued only if it remains reality-congruent and avoid epistemological adventures. This chapter first surveys existing epistemologies of peace by focusing on the key peacebuilding convictions and approaches propagated by proponents and gatekeepers of liberal peace, and it explores the responses of critical peace-writers. Next it analyses how liberal and

How do we know peace? 19 critical peace-writers conceive the success, impact, and consequences of peacebuilding. The chapter concludes with a number of observations on how to redefine and advance existing epistemologies of peace.

Understanding peace epistemologies The organisation of knowledge in peacebuilding studies is mainly arranged around broader epistemological strands, which follow different convictions on how peacebuilding is possible in conflict-affected societies, what approaches are more successful and effective, and what the desired impact of international interventions is. Existing epistemologies of peace are influenced by the broader organisation of knowledge in international relations and social sciences around paradigms and research programmes, which operate in confliction, exclusion and differentiation from one another. Thomas Kuhn (1996: 10) relates the concept of a paradigm to coherent scientific research that incorporates the shared consensus among membership of a particular scientific community on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects of a body of knowledge. The arrangement of academic knowledge around ‘paradigmatic loyalties’ is one of the main reasons why cross-disciplinary dialogue and complementarity are obstructed. While Kuhn conceives the emergence and the end of paradigms, Imre Lakatos (1970) argues that scientific progress should be seen as a competition of research programmes rather than as successive periods of normal science (paradigms). According to Lakatos (1970: 132), a research programme ‘consists of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of research to avoid (negative heuristics), and others what paths to pursue (positive heuristics)’. Heuristics, as the key properties of research programmes, in essence promote competition and conflict with other research programmes. However, both Kuhnian paradigms and Lakatosian research programmes are characterised by insufficient analytical and methodological flexibility to overcome entrenched logics of research, and strengthen the division and grouping of scholars wedded to particular set of ideas and theoretical commitments. The peace-writing industry is caught in similar dynamics, which risk creating knowledge for the sake of disagreement rather than in correspondence with the practical world. In peacebuilding studies, there are two broad epistemologies of peace that dominate the field: liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace and criticalemancipatory epistemologies of peace. Proponents of liberal-interventionist peace research programme undertake and develop positivist arguments about the democratisation and marketisation of post-conflict societies as a peacebuilding strategy, which are mainly related to causality, and are problem-solving and policy-oriented invocations (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Paris 2004). On the other hand, critical approaches dominated by critical-emancipatory peace arguments take a post-positivist and discursive stance, and seek to provide alternative views by focusing on emancipation, culture, resistance, non-linearity, complexity, resilience, and non-interventionist peace strategies (see Richmond 2011; Chandler 2010b; Mac Ginty 2011). Although these two theoretical research

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programmes are part of the broader peace and conflict studies, at present they both operate in dichotomous theorising logics, and have developed their protective belts by clearly delineating their positive and negative heuristics whereby solutions for one epistemological strand represent problems for the other. The positive heuristics of liberal-interventionist peace have been mainly related to undertaking research that illustrates why democratisation, securitisation, institutionalisation, and marketisation of post-conflict societies contributes to sustainable peace (Call and Wyeth 2008). While there certainly is research using positivist qualitative methodologies, liberal peace as a research programme leans mainly towards positivist quantitative approaches (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). In terms of negative heuristics, liberal peace proponents have avoided exploring themes that reveal the shortcomings and normative and operational inconsistencies of liberal peace, the spectrum of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences, the limits of liberal interventionism, and the broader implications it has for justice, accountability, and sustainable development (Aoi et al. 2007). On the other hand, critical-emancipatory peace research programmes have mainly leaned towards post-positivist approaches, making the failures, flaws, and inconsistencies of liberal peace their research focus (positive heuristics). They have developed their positive heuristics around the excavation of bottom-up and local forms of peace, emancipation, resistance and hybridity, and resilience (Richmond 2010). The critical-emancipatory camp has tried to avoid exploring its negative heuristics, such as successful examples of liberal peace, inevitability of international intervention as last resort, exclusionary practices of local resistance, emancipation, and agency, post-interventionary implications, and the embedded euro-centrism in criticising mainstream liberal peace practices (Visoka 2011). Over the years, both epistemological camps have institutionalised their scholarship by publishing in different journals and creating separate academic networks and associations, through gatekeeping and often discouraging the emergence of a space in-between. This conflicting logic of peacebuilding inquiry has implications for how we conceptualise and understand peacebuilding. Most significantly, evaluating the success of peace operations remains one of the most controversial aspects of peacebuilding research. Paul D. Diehl and Alexandru Balas (2014: 111) argue that ‘[j]udgements of success measured according to the different interests . . . could yield very different outcomes. Indeed, success for one stakeholder could undermine success in the eyes of another.’ Proponents of liberal peace have focused on devising particular measurements of success to ensure a positive outlook for peacebuilding. Critical scholars, on the other hand, have focused on counter-balancing policy-oriented perspectives and generating ‘peace-failure’ analysis. Paradigmatic contempt between the proponents of liberal peace and critical scholars has also affected how effectiveness of peacebuilding is measured and what is considered as success or failure in peacebuilding endeavours. While liberal-interventionist and problem-solving peace-writers focus on the success of peacebuilding, critical-emancipatory peace writers focus more on the failures of peacebuilding. With some exceptions, the two strands develop

How do we know peace? 21 different epistemological narratives on the possibility for peace after violent conflicts. Liberal peacebuilding in a nutshell The liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace seek to explain and sometimes defend attempts by the international community to establish a political, economic and social order based on externally imposed norms, rules and practices in a post-conflict society or in a fragile state as a pathway to a sustainable peace. However, liberal peace is not a unified and consistent body of knowledge. It entails discourses, practices, and events. Some of the key constitutive elements of the expanded agenda of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict societies include: reforming the security sector; creation of power-sharing institutions and determining electoral choices; establishing rule of law and justice systems; building a new liberal civil society; and establishing a market-based economy. Liberal peace operates on a number of Western self-mirroring assumptions such as: democracies tend to be more peaceful; free elections produce democratic practices and political stability; establishing rule of law promotes effective governance; power-sharing arrangements promote ethnic reconciliation; a neoliberal economy promotes a free-market and economic growth; and a vibrant civil society promotes human rights and social inclusion (see UNSC 2012). These dimensions of liberal peace derive from multiple ideological sources and interests, and have been applied universally with slight contextual nuances, while being reformed and reproduced in the course of multiple trials and failures. They are mainly a self-reflection of Western political systems converted into global blueprints imposed on conflict-affected societies. The universalist ontology of liberal peace serves as a justification for intervention, which over the years has taken the shape of international governance, regulation, and coercion of societies shattered by violent conflicts (Caplan 2005). International interventions operate on the logic that non-liberal governments are aggressor regimes; they pose threats to local subjects by suppressing human rights and liberties, and to the outside world by exporting violence and instability. Liberal peace-writers consider building democratic institutions as a crucial policy choice for transforming violent conflicts and building a stable peace. Democratically elected leaders are perceived as less likely to engage in warfare because of political accountability and fear of losing domestic support (Doyle 2005). Hence, democratic institutions are considered appropriate forums for peaceful resolution of conflict by channelling political interests through institutionalised processes, encouraging debate and promoting compromise under democratic rules and regulations (Paris 2004: 159). Moreover, liberal peacebuilding plays an important role in setting policy rules and legal frameworks for organising political institutions, such as: writing a new constitution based on the peace settlement provisions; changing the electoral system to support power sharing for more inclusive, consensual politics; and establishing legal and political order to regulate the functioning of governmental sectors (Bastian and

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Lackham 2003; Hehir and Robinson 2007). Oisin Tansey (2009: 31) argues that the extensive authority and good intentions of international administrations can ‘create opportunities for successful democratisation that would otherwise not have existed’. Moreover, democracy is considered a suitable political regime as it improves living conditions, quality of life and choices, guarantees human rights and promotes individual and collective responsibility (Bastian and Lackham 2003). The international community favours power-sharing arrangements because the stakes are high for excluding ex-combatants and potential peace spoilers who may trigger a return to violence and disturb required stability during the post-conflict institutional and social recovery period (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). Prior to the institution-building process, the establishment of security infrastructure is considered fundamental for ensuring the stable consolidation of state institutions, as well as for post-war social and economic recovery (Muggah 2009). Effective security is considered necessary to carry out credible elections. Equally, electing legitimate political leadership is seen as crucial for establishing a credible security system. As part of security sector reform, the UN and other peacebuilding organisations have undertaken activities to reform the police sector, establish new security forces, reform the intelligence sector, train border and prison guards, and develop other necessary public security providers (UNGA and UNSC 2013). Among the most important aspects of security sector reform is effective disarmament, demilitarisation and reintegration of former combatants, a process seen as crucial for ensuring rule of law based reform, civilian control and democratic accountability (Berdal and Ucko 2009). The rule of law is seen as an essential part of liberal peacebuilding. The UN defines the rule of law as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. (UNSC 2004: 4) Thus, establishing the democratic rule of law through the establishment and enforcement of state-based structures such as judicial, penal and police bodies is considered essential for consolidating social trust and stability, promoting security and justice, and establishing democratic governance. In other words, establishing the rule of law aims to replace local transitional, indigenous and customary laws and practices on the grounds that they are violent, illiberal, suppressive, unequal, and embedded in power structures (Bull 2008). Although the rule of law is seen as important in post-conflict societies, primacy is given to stability and peace over justice and reconciliation. Another important dimension of liberal peacebuilding is the construction of a liberal civil society that is considered instrumental for facilitating the implementation of a peace settlement and peacebuilding agenda. An active civil society is seen as a guardian of democratic governance, and a promoter of human rights

How do we know peace? 23 and social emancipation. The development of civil society in post-conflicts societies follows a Western conception of civil society seen as a generator of social capital and an important partner of democratic governance. The role of civil society in consolidating democracy is seen as helping to hold government accountable, represent citizen interests, mobilise, channel and lead citizens’ collective problems, bolster an environment of pluralism and trust, and create platforms for democratic citizenry where members socialise and promote collective responsibilities (Diamond 1999). It is also seen as a platform for legitimising liberal intervention and its statebuilding and peacebuilding strategies. However, liberal-interventionist approaches, such as the one propagated by Roland Paris (2004: 194–199), believe that certain groups that inflict hatred and are not ‘good’ should not be permitted to operate as part of the civil society community during transition to democracy. Finally, one of the core attributes of liberal peacebuilding is the economic reconstruction and marketisation, which assumes that economic interdependence and open markets lead to sustainable peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Economic recovery is considered critical in creating broad popular support for international peacebuilding efforts, and in legitimising their direct involvement in running the domestic affairs in post-conflict societies. Post-conflict economic reconstruction includes a wide range of activities such as: rehabilitation of basic services and rebuilding of physical and human infrastructure; stabilisation and structural reform policies, creation of a market economy and reactivation of investment; and regulation of institutional and legal aspects of economic activity, privatisation and the fiscal system. Graciana del Castillo (2008: 29) argues that, in postconflict countries, economic reconstruction should differ from normal development and economic growth strategies undertaken in the global south, entailing a holistic approach of placing economy as an instrument of building sustainable peace and democratic polity. In terms of economic development and structural adjustment, international community has favoured installing a market economy that reflected not just their strategic self-interests but also the hope for democratisation through marketisation and economic reforms (Kapoor 2008). The economic assistance provided by the international community has come with economic and political conditionality. The structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) and World Bank are often imposed on post-conflict societies as part of liberal peacebuilding, as is evident from the establishment of short-term stabilisation policies to address balance of payments and trade deficits, currency devaluation, and price controls. Such interventionary practices include also downsizing the civil service, cuts to social spending (e.g. health and education), privatisation of ‘inefficient’ public sector firms, and promarket tax and investment measures (World Bank 1994). These components of liberal peacebuilding are de-contextualised and assembled from various epistemic disciplines as well as trials and failures in different peacebuilding missions. Building on this discussion, the following section explores how the liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace focus on exploring the success of peacebuilding and constantly seek to generate knowledge that make peacebuilding

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look triumphant, followed by a discussion of how critical-emancipatory epistemologies focus on exploring peacebuilding failures. Liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peacebuilding success It is a common expectation that members of a research programme promote positive heuristics of a research programme (Elman and Elman 2003). In the case of liberal peacebuilding, a main focus of its proponents is to defend the claim that liberal peace contributes to sustainable peace more than other forms. Hence, the success of international interventions and liberal peace has become one of the key areas of inquiry in peacebuilding studies. The liberalinterventionist debates that evaluate the success of peacebuilding range from minimalist to maximalist standards (Call 2008a). Minimalist standards take the non-recurrence of civil war and the prevalence of order and stability as determinants of the liberal peacebuilding success. Michael W. Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis (2006: 60) argue that the success of peace operations ‘can be measured in terms of the degree to which the mandate was implemented and by whether or not a stable peace was attained’. Doyle’s most recent work defines the success of peacebuilding in terms of ending large-scale civil war and achieving ‘very modest’ democratic rule (2015: 179). These perspectives are identical with the UN’s definition of successful peacebuilding, which entails: ‘consolidating internal and external security; strengthening political institutions and good governance; and promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation’ (UNSC 2001: 4). The UN (2009) has gradually started to consider the local political commitment to the peace process, and a clear UN mandate with sufficient resources and supportive engagement by neighbouring states are key features of a successful peacebuilding operation. However, Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2005: 175–176) argue that measuring the success of a peace operation based on fulfilling the mandate is problematic as the political goals set in the mandate are often vague. On the other hand, the maximalist measurements consider achieving a stable and lasting peace through addressing the underlying causes of conflict the ultimate success of peacebuilding (Call and Wyeth 2008). For instance, Richard Caplan (2005: 251) relates the success of peacebuilding to ‘substantial progress towards eliminating or significantly reducing the threat of violent conflict, achieving a durable political settlement, and establishing viable state or territorial institutions’. Much of the evaluation of peacebuilding success has used positivist and quantitative analysis, with causation and causal inference at the heart of the struggle to isolate the outcomes and effects directly attributable to peacebuilding missions. Evidently, most measurements of peacebuilding success tend to find that peacekeeping and peacebuilding have made a positive impact in postconflict societies; at least in preventing the recurrence of conflict and building basic structures of governance. For a while, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) was the major reference point for statistically illustrating that peacekeeping and peacebuilding works. Recently attention has shifted to Virginia P. Fortna (2008) who

How do we know peace? 25 renews the same narrative that peace interventions make a difference and contribute to building a sustainable peace. In most cases, this type of research, as expressed by Fortna (2008: 4, 17) ‘aims to have a direct impact on policy debates’ and ‘improve the international community’s efforts to maintain peace in states turned by civil war’. Similarly, Paris (2010: 362) maintains that despite many shortcomings, liberal peacebuilding has met the minimalist conditions of halting the recurrence of war, and reducing human and developmental costs. These standardised measurements of peacebuilding seek to provide blueprints to be applied universally and serve as best practices for scholars and practitioners (Diehl and Druckman 2010). However, Charles T. Call (2008: 191) rightly points out that ‘[a]lthough international organisations benefit greatly from developing standardised indicators and templates for efficiently responding to problems in numerous countries, the logic of such cosmopolitan approaches contradicts locally specific cultural exigencies’, though Michael W. Doyle (2015: 188) has recently admitted that ‘formulae cannot be abstractly applied – each conclusion is case specific’. Beyond the quantifiable measurements of peacebuilding success, there is also qualitative research still rooted in liberal-interventionist logics of inquiry. Diehl and Balas (2014: 111–130) argue the success of peace operations depends on three broad strands of factors: (1) on operational factors, such as the organisation and execution of peace operations, including here the adequacy of mandate; (2) on contextual or environmental factors, such as the, history, nature, geography, demography, political economy of conflicts, as well as governance capacities; and (3) on behavioural factors, such as the cooperation of primary disputants and the involvement of third-party states. Oisin Tansey (2014) uses a positivist causal inference to look at certain domestic factors to explore the legacies of statebuilding. His inferences pardon the failures of external actors involved in a peace process, maintaining that we can only judge the success or failure of an international mission when we are confident that the domestic political events we are using as indicators of success or failure are the legacies of the international mission rather than other [domestic] factors. (Tansey 2014: 174) The most recent work of Severine Autesserre (2014) represents a new turn among those embedded within liberalist-interventionist epistemologies to provide a situation-specific definition of peacebuilding effectiveness by exploring the everyday practices, habits, and narratives of field-based interveners. Early work by Autesserre (2010: 80) held that ‘international efforts can reach their full potential only when intervening structures rely on in-depth local expertise to complement thematic competencies’. She claims that ‘improving the effectiveness of external efforts can significantly increase the prospects for peace’ (Autesserre 2014: 8). This would require revising existing top-down policies, increasing involvement of local actors, breaking boundaries between

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interveners and local counterparts, increasing socialisation, acknowledging local communities, and planning long-term involvement (Autesserre 2014: 258–272). These two types of research represent attempts by liberal peace proponents to fuse the levels of analysis (such as the everyday, narratives, and practices) with critical approaches in order to rectify some of the claims of critical-emancipatory peace-writers (see Visoka 2015). The prevalence of blueprints and standardised indicators for measuring the success of peacebuilding often leaves unexplored important aspects and nuances of peacebuilding interventions. Steven R. Ratner (1995) was one of the first to argue that the success of peace operations should be measured based on the longand short-term impact on the beneficiary country. Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2010) argue that evaluations of long-term peacebuilding success operate on different indicators compared to those short-term assessments. Their analyses show that contemporary qualitative thresholds and standards for measuring peacebuilding success are too modest and do not capture the dislocated and hidden consequences that peacebuilding creates, based on which the true impact can be inferred. However, a major problem with the existing way of finding out the effects of peacebuilding is the donor-driven and inadequate methods of assessing the impact of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies. Impact assessment is one of the most difficult and complex types of evaluations. A majority of peacebuilding evaluations are conducted mainly as a procedural requirement by donors, and the evaluation of performance is often the only element incorporated in such assessments. Peacebuilding evaluations often follow confirmation bias and overlook broader factors, alternative indicators, evolving actors, processes, and structures, unintended effects, and alternative implementation options (see EuropeAid Co-operation Office 2006: 59–81; OECD 2002). Within the process of performance evaluation are subverted aspect of impact assessment and lesson learning, which when jointed together can reduce the possibility of seeing the wider complex picture of peacebuilding impact (see UNGA 2009b). Impact assessments of peacebuilding interventions only look at the microlevel of peacebuilding interventions and do not connect or look for their broader adverse effects. Such assessments of peacebuilding impact are interested to know how interventions have improved the situation and look at the elements that account for the success or failure (Diehl and Balas 2014: 105). Most of the impact assessment is conducted within the framework of projects, which are seen as universal, template-like, concrete and measurable units of activities limited in goals, activities, beneficiaries, time, and intended outcomes (Mac Ginty 2012). The quantifiable indicators and short-term results are widely used to measure the impact of projects as they are seen as more appropriate, universal and neutral (Autesserre 2014: 242–245). The UN’s internal auditing looks at the performance of peacebuilding missions, not their wider impact. Often driven by confirmation bias, the internal and external evaluation of peace operations have a tendency to seek out evidence that is supportive of the tools and strategies applied by the intervening parties. Evaluations rarely question or

How do we know peace? 27 disprove the logic of intervention. The spectrum of consequences that emerges from peacebuilding operations is often excluded from the measurement indicators. The UN and bilateral donors do not include in their reporting impact assessments and the spectrum of consequences that emerge as a result of their actions and non-actions. At best, what can be observed is the categorisation of risks that can impact mandate, operations or reputation of UN, arising from inadequate planning, governance of operations, disregard of UN rules, mismanagement of funds, ineffective implementation of mandates (UNGA 2009a: 9–20). However, the most recent UN Secretary-General report on peacebuilding admits ‘[e]xperience has shown that quantifiable evidence of peacebuilding impact can appear elusive’ and calls for paying more attention to ‘intangible outcomes that target the drivers of conflict’ (UNGA and UNSC 2014: 7). Similarly, UNDP (2012: 113) has started to realise that ‘[f]ormulaic, template-driven, and technical approaches can unintentionally trigger instability and renewed violence’. The scope of events this type of evaluation involves is largely limited and the evaluation is often conducted immediately after the completion of the project. The contemporary politics of impact assessment dictated by the material dominance of donors and power holders coupled with an inadequate assessment of peacebuilding consequences have contributed to neglect of different types of wider consequences that peacebuilding interventions have produced in conflict-affected societies. Critical-emancipatory epistemologies of peacebuilding failure In response to the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding in practice, including failures and different spectrums of consequences, critical scholarship has emerged that seeks to examine the performance, effectiveness, and implications of mainstream peacebuilding praxis. Critical approaches refute inconsistent performances of liberal peacebuilding, particularly the contrast between its proclaimed goals and unfulfilled promises, and its failure to provide a sustainable peace. They provide a different ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspective, which indicates the emergence of a new alternative research programme, and a new mode of peacebuilding, thereby starting a new generation of epistemological research (Richmond 2010). Peacebuilding failures have been an implicit and explicit subject of inquiry among critical peace-writers. Critical approaches to peacebuilding often focus on revealing the weaknesses of liberal peacebuilding and rarely provide alternative peacebuilding solutions, which are often counterfactual solutions to those of mainstream peacebuilding theories and praxis. At the heart of critical epistemologies of peace is the local legitimacy of peacebuilding interventions. Richmond (2013: 382) argues that the liberal peace project has resulted in ‘failed statebuilding’, which has caused ‘fatal flaws in externally driven statebuilding processes, and weaknesses in their local legitimacy, peace dividend and redistributive capacity’. Liberal peace-writers have identified ‘material constraints, lack of national interest, and organisational constraints and interests’ as causes of peacebuilding

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failures (Autesserre 2010: 23). In contrast, critical peace-writers have provided different explanations of why liberal peacebuilding has failed. Some critical peace-writers highlight the antecedent condition that either enable or contribute to failure, while others consider specific failures to prevent, act and understand particular phenomenon as the starting point for the emergence of negative peacebuilding outcomes. Unlike positivist efforts to bring some standardised conception of failure, critical epistemologies invoke counterfactual inference that attached to a particular context. Early critiques of peacebuilding related to the creation of an environment for delaying sustainable development by imposing good governance and a democratisation agenda and by challenging local processes through imposition of external conditionality that reflects normative incoherence under the conditions of contested legitimacy (see Zaum 2007; Heathershaw 2008). Edward Newman, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond (2009) argue that the problematic nature of liberal peacebuilding and its adverse effects such as the exacerbation of social and economic tensions, political conflict and sectarian division, as well as the contested value system, top-down governance approach, and misunderstanding of local context, have undermined local agency and avoided addressing underlying sources of conflict. Simon Chesterman’s (2004: 246) critique of UN transitional administrations maintains that ‘[a] lengthy international presence will not ensure success, but an early departure guarantees failure’. On the other side of the spectrum, Richmond (2013: 378) considers the failure of statebuilding to be a consequence of international actors’ reliance on ‘externalised systems, legitimacy and norms rather than a contextual, critical and emancipatory epistemology of peace’. There are different types of critiques of liberal peacebuilding. David Chandler (2010b) categorises them into power-based critiques affiliated with more radical perspectives, and ideas-based critiques which are more practical and policy-oriented. More recently, the critique is being conceived as northern/ euro-centric and southern-centric perspectives on peacebuilding (Sabaratnam 2013). A sequential view of critical peacebuilding debates provides a more adequate understanding of the dialogical development of critical epistemologies and illustrates how it has constantly shifted from one variation to another. Using a sequential logic, two waves of critique can be distinguished: critiqueas-alternative and critique-with-alternative. Putting emphasis on alternatives is a core idea of scientific progress, be that of generating positive or negative heuristics towards different research programmes. Hence, for the critique-asalternative camp, critiques is an end point, critiquing for the sake of critiquing, thus following the quest for the impossible and incomplete. Only the text and subtext of critique represent the alternative. They have described building peace in the present actualities as attempting the impossible. On the other hand, the critique-with-alternative camp invokes critiques as a process and pathway for coming to an alternative solution without denying the importance and immanency of critique. The alternative is clearly stated, which in certain cases already exists in practice, or is a product of philosophical reasoning or intellectual novelty.

How do we know peace? 29 The critique-as-alternative strand has concentrated largely on ‘revealing the implicit political underpinnings of international peacebuilding, and demonstrated their flaws’ (Tadjbakhsh 2011: 6), such as ideological inconsistencies and flawed sources of legitimacy. An example of critique-as-alternative is Chandler’s work (2010a, 2014a) on ‘post-liberal governance’ and more recently his critique of resilience. For Chandler (2010a: 15), the post-liberal governance framework does not operate based on the principles of human rights, political legitimacy and the social contract but instead it seeks, as he asserts, ‘to secure stability through balancing internal and external interests and concerns as matters of technical and administrative competences in the formulations of good governance’. He defined this type of international regulation of non-Western states and societies as ‘empire in denial’, where ‘the new forms of international control attempt to evade responsibility and accountability for the exercise of power’ (Chandler 2006: 10). Building on this early work, Chandler (2013a: 9) has recently returned to resilience, where he argues that resilience in the international statebuilding context has emerged as an ‘apologia for the limits of international interventions’, and as an attempt to evade their responsibility for the outcomes of statebuilding interventions. As a result of this shift, local capacities, vulnerabilities, and agencies have been the target of intervention and research, and consequently the field of intervention is a societal re-engineering rather than a regime change. Chandler’s critique uses discursive methods to decouple the weaknesses of mainstream thinking, but intentionally does not provide any alternative solution apart from implicitly favouring the human agency and political autonomy of the state as a form of political community. Accordingly, his work resists providing alternatives and preserves the permanent quest for the impossible. The critique-as-alternative has been criticised by Paris (2010: 362) for being exaggerated, unconvincing, and mis-characterising. He argues that there is no ‘convincing rationale to abandoning liberal peacebuilding or replacing it with a non-liberal or ‘post-liberal’ alternative’ (Paris 2010: 340). However, Paris remains aware of the necessity to broaden liberal peacebuilding by accommodating different internal peacebuilding variations and adjusting context-relevant modalities that would, among others, promote emancipation, inclusion and social justice. A new type of critique-with-alternative has emerged in recent years from the response to this approach by liberal peace gatekeepers, practitioners and other normative-interventionists. Vivian Jabri (2010: 55) argues that ‘any critique of the liberal peace must in itself provide alternative conceptions of how to respond to conditions that precisely target populations and categories thereof ’. The critique-with-alternative first seeks to decouple the shortcomings of democratisation and marketisation policy in an attempt to suggest some modifications and alternative solutions. The attempts made by critique-with-alternative to provide alternative solutions to the shortcomings of democratisation vary from those favouring inaction and non-intervention to those suggesting limited and alternative forms of engagement (Tadjbakhsh 2011). These critical epistemologies have constructed their theoretical claims using the dimensions most ignored by the epistemic gatekeepers of liberal peace, such as ‘the local, the everyday,

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culture, identity, welfare and non-liberal politics, as well as non-problemsolving methodologies’ (Liden et al. 2009: 592). This strand of critical scholarship calls for incorporating non-western ontologies and epistemologies in order to ‘reconstruct a more politically hybridised form of peacebuilding, and certainly one that is better at representing, providing for and respecting the rights and needs of post-conflict societies and communities’ (Liden et al. 2009: 594). Concerning the marketisation policy, critique-with-alternative strand argue there is no standard model of economic growth and therefore neo-liberal economic models do not work in many post-conflict societies, suggesting that some degree of protectionism is necessary to protect vulnerable societies from the uncertainties of liberalising markets and privatising economic enterprises. Kristoffer Liden (2009) proposed ‘social peacebuilding’ as an alternative to different variations of liberal peacebuilding, which propagates non-interference in political organisation of local societies while still accepting socio-economic conditionality for inter-ethnic cooperation and reconciliation. Therefore, the critique-with-alternative advocates for societies and political communities to play a greater role in deciding economic priorities and in protecting local economic activities from the negative effects of neo-liberalism and globalisation. It also advocates for mixed economic models that adjust to post-conflict situations and build on social welfare models. Critical peace-writers such as Oliver P. Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty (2015: 183) have tried to avoid ‘recommending, let alone imposing, alternatives on those in conflict-affected areas’. However, they have also provided alternatives in their own criticality. This is evident from Richmond’s work on post-liberal peace and peace formation, and Mac Ginty’s work on hybrid peace and everyday peace indicators. Richmond (2011: 3–10) argues that as a result of focusing on peace at the international, regional, and state levels, liberal peacebuilding has failed to engage with the local context and to explore the everyday forms of peace, care, empathy and emancipation. Accordingly, he argues that ‘without an engagement with needs and welfare, peacebuilding will not lead to a sustainable outcome because there are few peace incentives for citizens or elites’ (Richmond 2010: 34). As an alternative theory, Richmond (2011) defines as a ‘post-liberal peace’ the transformation of liberal peace to engage proactively with the local, to recognise their needs and seek their support and consent. For him, ‘post-liberal peace’ has a transitory and fluid nature, which seeks to emphasis ‘the everyday’ ‘local agency’ and ‘local context’ as a convenient space that reclaims a new social contract that recognises the plurality of peace, remains open to customary governance, and prioritises social welfare and empowerment. Building on this, Richmond has suggested ‘peace formation’ as the derivative product of hybrid forms of post-liberal peace, which emphasises the primacy of local legitimacy and perspectives in conjunction with facilitative and constructive international engagement (see Richmond 2013, 2014; Richmond and Mitchell 2011). Another strand of critical epistemologies of peace focuses on hybridity to describe the inter-action between top-down and bottom-up agencies in a peacebuilding process (Mac Ginty 2011). Epistemologies on hybrid peace seek to

How do we know peace? 31 provide new empirical and comparative evidence from post-conflict societies, illustrate the limits of external and imposed liberal peace, and emphasise the power and agency of local agents and structures (Visoka 2012). While from the liberal peace perspective hybrid peace outcomes might be unintended, from critical perspectives they represent a chance to take into account local agency and work through it to build a sustainable peace. Richmond (2010: 687) uses the notion of ‘local-liberal hybridity’ to describe the interaction between local and the international, where both co-exist rather than assimilate or dominate, and where the local resist, modify or adapt to the liberal peace. He maintains that the local-liberal hybridity can lead to positive or negative hybrid peace (Richmond 2011: 18–19). Despite its problematic nature, Mac Ginty (2011: 90) argues that ‘a hybrid peace tends to prevail in societies that have been subject to liberal intervention’ which ‘offers the possibility of sustainability and local acceptance in peace’. Building on the critique-with-alternative, Mac Ginty (2013) has recently proposed a number of everyday peace indicators, which seek to overcome the technocratic and route measurements of peacebuilding performance and outcomes. However, within the critical peace-writing community there is also disagreement on the criticality of peacebuilding critiques. Chandler’s recent work is indicative of this epistemic tension. He maintains that interventionist discourses now have shifted from state to societal-based approaches, evident with ‘problematising local practices and understandings as productive of risks and threats and as barriers to liberal progress’ (Chandler 2013a: 276). Building on this, Chandler (2010: 146) criticises the critique-with-alternative camp for being uncritical about their ‘critique of liberalism in post-conflict societies’ and for creating a consensus framing that the problem of statebuilding and peacebuilding intervention is a ‘problem of the relationship between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other’. He argues that the return to non-linearity, the local, and inter-subjective understandings of practices move away from the structuring economic and social relations, such as ‘market inequality’ and ‘structuring asymmetries of intervention’ (Chandler 2013b: 24–25; 32). He adds that ‘the non-linear discourses of local ‘hidden’ agency neither create the basis of any genuine understanding of the limits to liberal peace nor provide any emancipatory alternative’ (Chandler 2013b: 31). Meera Sabaratnam (2013) has also argued that the Eurocentric orientation of critical peace debates has narrowed down their ontological and epistemological horizon for engaging properly with peacebuilding consequences. While criticising the Eurocentric critique of peacebuilding, Sabaratnam (2013: 270–273) suggests decolonising the critique of liberal peace by problematising what Eurocentric thinking discounts, repoliticising the post-conflict field of studies, promoting positional critique, and by bringing up the materiality and material impact of peacebuilding processes. Responding to this criticism, Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015: 185) have remained ‘suspicious about ontological or epistemological claims that do not include the potential for emancipatory peace systems along with other claims’. However, they admit that ‘[p]erhaps the single greatest failing, and one that the

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secondary critique does not dwell on, is that much of the debate on the liberal peace has been restricted to academics, policymakers and students within the global North’ (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015: 183). Similarly, Richard Jackson argues for giving ‘non-Western agency and structural explanations an equal place in any research agenda’ (2015: 33). Critical peace-writing is caught in an inter-disciplinary disagreement and in a permanent quest to differentiate from mainstream liberal peace thinking. Consequently, discussion on the wider effects of peacebuilding has been insufficiently studied by critical peace-writers, largely because they are often associated with the ‘dilemmas debate’ initiated by a certain faction of liberal peace-writers (see Paris and Sisk 2009; Tadjbakhsh 2011). Critical peace-writers have moved in the direction of exploring alternative approaches for studying peacebuilding, one that is rooted in immanent critique and the other that offer alterative peace theories (Visoka 2015). The consequences are seen only as misguided symptomatic analysis that could disguise the true causal and structural factors that underpin present regimes of intervention and governance. The distorted epistemology of peacebuilding consequences In a number of limited studies, the notion of peacebuilding consequences has been discussed, but mainly in ambiguous, implicit, and semantic terms. Policymakers invoke the notion of consequences to issue an unattributed apology, to emphasise the otherness of their agency, and to avoid responsibility. Insufficient examination of consequences is shaped by a number of complex technical and political factors. Technically speaking, tracing unintended consequences, side effects, and adverse outcomes is difficult as it requires in-depth analysis, for which there have not been clear methodological instructions to date, and the evaluation aspects of key actors are not equipped with adequate and capable people to undertake such an analysis (Andersen et al. 2014). Furthermore, such a process is time consuming and requires a long-term perspective and thorough examination, which international actors are not keen on due to their focus on short-term results and politics of reporting (Francis 2010: 44). Politically speaking, an examination of negative effects is unwelcome because it is perceived as self-defeating and unacceptable as it could potentially reduce credibility and funding prospects, and damage the future prospects of particular agencies and agents engaging with conflict situations. In addition, revelations of negative impacts raise questions of the attributability, answerability, and accountability of peacebuilding organisations (Visoka and Doyle 2014). However, studying consequences is important because social change is a result of outcomes that are unintentional, uncontrollable, unintentional, non-teleological, and unpredictable by nature (Archer 1995: 165). In academia, when the notion of consequences is invoked, in most cases no explanation or reference is provided as to how they are defined and no criterion is used to guide how certain consequences are identified and analysed. Often, the notion of unintended and unanticipated consequences is used semantically and

How do we know peace? 33 inter-changeably as an empty signifier. This makes it necessary to carefully explore the context and subject of discussion to implicitly excavate the meaning, causal relation, and the assignment of responsibility. For example, Paris (2004: 15) invokes the notion of ‘unanticipated consequences’ to describe pathologies arising from democratisation and marketisation policies undertaken by the international community to build sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. The invocation of the notion of unanticipated consequences is not supported with any evidence of the absence of anticipation, foresight, and predictability among peacebuilding organisations. In another study, Paris and Sisk (2009: 309) invoke interchangeably the concepts of consequences and shortcomings and the notions of dilemmas and contradictions. In certain contexts, it is affiliated with the ‘do no harm’ approaches (Anderson 1999; Gibbs 2009). Similarly, the OECD (2002) does not make any reference to the criteria and definitional conditions for invoking the notion of unintended consequences. In other instances, unintended consequences are equated with wider negative impacts. An edited volume published in 2007 by Chiyuki Aoi, Cederic de Coning and Ramesh Thakur marks the first explicit and systematic attempt to shed light on the unintended consequences of peacekeeping in post-conflict societies. They define unintended consequences as ‘acts that were not intended when these mandates were adopted or when they were executed’ (Aoi et al. 2007: 6). They explicitly distinguish unintended consequences from the failure to achieve intended goals, as well as from mixed motives of the interveners. This narrow definition of unintended consequences enables them to identify a number of consequences, such as: corruption and criminal activities, human trafficking and sexual violence against local women and children; human rights violations, unaccountable practices of peacekeepers; distortion of the host economy; and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although this study invokes a narrow definition of unintended consequences and disqualifies a large number of peacebuilding outcomes from being considered as failures, it is an important pioneering study, which has influenced subsequent narratives of unintended consequences of peace interventions (see Diehl and Balas, 2014: 148–150). However, various contributors to Aoi et al. (2007) volume define unintended consequences differently depending on their topic of study, thereby failing to bring conceptual clarity and provide useful guidance on how to trace and study the consequences of peacebuilding. Moreover, as they focused on looking at peacekeeping operations they left unexplored important aspects more distinct in those cases that have experienced protracted and extensive peacebuilding interventions. The spectrum of solutions on how to deal with peacebuilding consequences mainly accept that potentially negative consequences occur, and engage in developing instrumental mechanisms to manage the consequences rather than prevent their occurrence in the first place. Michael W. Doyle (2015: 148) argues that ‘consequences count: even well-intended interventions can produce more harm than good’. Other liberal peace-writers, such as Paris, accept that liberal peacebuilding has suffered from a number of ‘real’ shortcomings, which he tends to justify by arguing that ‘peacebuilding is tremendously complex and prone to

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unanticipated consequences, yet it is also too important to lose or abandon’ (2010: 364–365). Similarly, Aoi et al. (2007) describe the study of unintended consequences as instrumental for improving the overall effectiveness of peace operations. Indeed, such a reductionist conceptualisation of unintended consequences leaves aside potentially important consequences and legacies that direct the intentional action of international peacebuilding in practice. Supporters of liberal peacebuilding identify the following main sources that give rise to unintended consequences: lack of planning and coordination; insufficient resources; lack of multilateral commitment to transform promises into practices; and insufficient understanding of local context. Consequently, mitigating these weaknesses is considered a recipe for containing, managing, and reducing unintended consequences. Aoi et al. (2007: 268) suggest that although unintended consequences are inherent weaknesses of peace operations, we should ‘enhance our capacity to prevent, contain and manage potentially negative unintended consequences by improving our understanding of how they come about and by exploring ways in which we can improve our ability to anticipate and counter them’. Along the same line of reasoning, Ulrich Schneckener (2010: 77) holds that ‘unintended consequences are a frequent feature of international statebuilding efforts and are hard to avoid’. He suggests managing these unintended consequences by gradually reducing international engagement, showing a willingness to evaluate and learn from processes, and advises remaining flexible by trusting local actors to manage state structures and affairs (Schneckener 2010: 77–79). In another study, Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (2009: 309) argue that unintended consequences can be managed, if not resolved, by understanding local contexts and by paying attention to the long-term consequences of shortterm stabilisation and recovery efforts. While analysing the political economy of peacebuilding, Salil Tripathi (2008: 65) comes to a similar conclusion that ‘coherent conflict prevention also requires ably planned, implemented and coordinated strategies in order to anticipate and avoid, to the extent possible, unintended consequences that exacerbate rather than alleviate the causes of violent conflict in a given context’. Stephen Stedman (1999: 26) identifies as the solution to managing unintended consequences increased strategic planning, and he initiates a debate on ‘the ethics of choice among tools, approaches, and cases of intervention – and the interests that are at stake’. In addition, James Mayall (2005: 52–53) argues that ‘respect for the law of unintended consequences requires that those involved in post-conflict reconstruction should pay close attention to the particular cultural and historical conditions of the societies in which they operate’. Similarly, Diehl and Balas (2014: 149–150) argue that understanding the context and responding to the needs of local population can alleviate the problem of unintended consequences. On the other hand, the invocation of unintended consequences by critical peace-writers represents a carefully worded attribution of negative effects of peacebuilding, which represent a balanced quest to reveal weaknesses and delegitimise contemporary peacebuilding practices in order to open up spaces for

How do we know peace? 35 alternative forms of peacebuilding. Chandler (2006: 190) explicitly examined how the international community exercises extensive authority without responsibility towards the targeted subjects to ‘develop a broader understanding of the negative and unintended effects of these practices’. Michael Pugh (2010) equates unintended consequences with the negative impact of liberal peacebuilding, arguing that neoliberal policies of self-reliant welfare, together with the marketisation and privatisation of socially owned enterprises, result in a number of unintended exacerbations. These consequences include: expanding the class of uninsured ‘bare lives’; encouraging informal economic activity; providing selective services to few communities based on the sphere of influence; and ignoring the entire population due to lack of capacity, mandate or incentives (Pugh 2010: 268). While Richmond (2008: 462) recognises the fact that unintended consequences are never-ending processes that occur in any type of power relationship, he suggests engaging with bottom-up social ontologies to understand the local context, and engage with the difference and hybridity of social practices. Richmond’s position represents a more balanced, adequate, and realistic attribution of unintended consequences than those previously discussed. A general trend that can be observed among critical approaches to peacebuilding is the examination of unintended consequences as an empty signifier and as a safe way of criticising without antagonising the mainstream peacebuilding machinery. In so doing, they unintentionally neutralise blame and responsibility for the consequences of the intentional actions of liberal peace. The paradigmatic contempt between liberal and critical approaches has affected their ontological positionality, and has determined what counts as consequences. Liberal peace writers have used the discourse of unintended consequences to neutralise blame for the failure of liberal peacebuilding interventions, as well as to create an ontological view of the necessity for coexisting with uncertainty and complexity in peacebuilding endeavours. The critique-as-alternative side of thinkers have focused on peacebuilding failures and their side-effects to collectivise the blame for the outcomes, which has unintentionally evaded the specific responsibility of power-holders. On the other hand, the critique-with-alternative strand has taken a more pragmatic view of peacebuilding consequences, considering them as the starting point for rejuvenating new emancipatory epistemologies of peace that tend to recognise local agency and promote peace formation processes. Existing critical epistemologies consider the failure of liberal peacebuilding as the verification of their theoretical ‘forecast’. They consider the emergence of unintended consequences as a constraint of external power relations, domination and control, and as an opportunity to build alternative conception of peace possibilities. Both strands of epistemologies of peacebuilding invoke unintended consequences in a way that moves them from being categorical exceptions to normal and acceptable phenomena. While the emphasis on consequences is important, it should not make us lose sight of the causes and facilitating factors that have led to such adverse outcomes. Furthermore, existing discourses on the unintended consequences of peacebuilding interventions ignore the role played by purposive actions of external interveners.

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The quest for understanding the causation of peacebuilding consequences is oriented towards broader collective structures, habitus, and practices, rather than tracing more precisely the agency, intentions, and events that led to those unintended consequences. As Chandler (2014b: 453) maintains, ‘[t]he unknowability of the outcomes of our action does not remove our ethical responsibility for our actions, it, in fact, heightens our responsibility for these second-order consequences or side effects’. Therefore, the study of the consequences of peacebuilding should be taken more seriously to make sense of the entangled complexities of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.

Conclusion: rethinking the epistemologies of peace The paradigmatic division between proponents and opponents of liberal peace has excluded the appropriate examination of intermingling factors, processes, events, and agencies that shape peace prospects in the long run. The liberal peace research agenda is more prone towards tackling questions related to the removal of obstacles and creating conditions for enforcing the liberal peace than towards looking for alternative perspectives, or critically engaging with the harmful consequences of peacebuilding interventions. On the other hand, critical approaches to peacebuilding have focused on decoupling the shortcomings of liberal peace, setting a new expanded interdisciplinary peace research programme, and undertaking an emancipatory perspective to empower local agency. This struggle for generating solid theoretical knowledge represents an epistemological modernity, whereby both critical and mainstream approaches try to make the world more manageable and compatible with their conceptual contours. This has significantly affected the development of different positionalities on how peace is possible, how the success of peacebuilding can be measured, and how to approach peacebuilding consequences. The super-fast production of peace knowledge risks bypassing and ignoring important dynamics that shape peacebuilding. As illustrated in this chapter, both liberal and critical epistemologies operate based on conflictual theorising logics that simultaneously reduce certain ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects in order to privilege others. The one-sidedness of conflictual theorising operates within the logic of research programmes whereby certain groups deal with different elements of social reality and try to reduce certain elements and aspects at the cost of others (Archer 1995). Within critical approaches to peacebuilding, local agency is made primitive in relation to domestic and international structure. Within liberal peacebuilding, structural aspects evident in the ideological commitment and the international interests for maintaining peace and stability, expanding democracy and market economy, have overly reduced the importance of local agency, consequently distancing international agents from local knowledge and societal processes. Most notably, the quest for never-ending knowledge-production is gradually pushing critical peacebuilding debates towards meta-theoretical and post-empirical discussions. Ian Angus (2000: 258) argues that discourse theories have lost touch with reality as they consider discourses and language as disembodied representation of reality

How do we know peace? 37 rather than means for ‘understanding them as figuration of praxis’. He suggests that ‘in order to clarify these figurations as they operate within praxis, the activity of philosophy must be a move against the grain, a regressive dis-figuration’ (Angus 2000: 258). This is evident with the recent attempts to displace peacebuilding and statebuilding discussions to broader philosophical debates, thus losing any relevance to the original purpose of peacebuilding and its grounded understanding of violent conflicts. If this trend continues, the question is no longer how to save liberal peacebuilding, but how to rescue critical approaches from becoming postempirical and post-epistemological adventures of thinking. Often, liberal peace proponents focus their analyses at the macro-level and favour methodological collectivism, looking only at the structural aspects of peacebuilding. On the other hand, critical scholars often prefer methodological individualism, taking local agents and their agency as unproblematic and uncontested, and seeing people as independent from social context and as the ultimate constituent of social reality. The existing attempts to reconcile the different forms of knowledge in peacebuilding are often unaware of crossing their traditional epistemological lines, and promote pluralism as an adequate pathway of examining real world problems arising from new empirical evidence and analytical openness. Therefore, new directions in peacebuilding research are needed to move beyond methodological holism and methodological individualism, and explore the potential of methodological relationalism and non-conflictual theorising. Non-conflictual theorising considers social phenomena as distinct and irreducible, but also recognises the interdependency and inter-relation between them. As Margaret Archer (1995: 6; 64) maintains, non-conflicting theorising is possible ‘only through analysing the processes by which structure and agency shape and re-shape one another over time that we can account for variable social outcomes at different times’. Thus, the self-defeating, ontological and epistemological monisms surrounding research in peacebuilding have obscured the complex nature of post-conflict societies; the absence of ‘chastened reason’ has made them indirect partners in unmaking peace and producing harmful and bad consequences in conflictaffected societies (see Levine 2012). The struggle to normalise certain knowledge and marginalise other types of knowledge has impeded the appropriate study of wider effects of peacebuilding. Changing this would require a postparadigmatic logic, which entails utilising pluralist epistemologies and methodologies to generate reality-congruent knowledge about conflict-affected societies and the broader politics of international interventions. This should not be seen as an attempt to discipline the discipline of peacebuilding studies. On the contrary, it seeks to break the disciplinary entrenchments that have impeded better understanding of complexity in post-conflict societies. It is an attempt to avoid the normalisation of entrenched research programmes and open up the politics of knowledge-production towards new non-conflictual and reality-congruent modes of thinking about peacebuilding. This non-conflicting pathway of theorising in peacebuilding research would entail breaking away from the Lakatosian logic of research and exploring

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conceptual and empirical complementarity. For instance, liberal-interventionist epistemologies often treat international agents, structures, and institutions as primary in relation to the local context of peacebuilding, whereby Eurocentric blueprints, rights, and interests prevail over other alternative views. On the other hand, critical-emancipatory perspectives focus on local agency, indigenous and traditional structures, resistance, collective rights, and resilience. Hence, conciliatory heuristics between these two perspectives would further the knowledge of how local and international structures, agencies, and positionalities interact in a particular time and place. The non-conflictual approach takes a more neutral standpoint to treat both international agency and structure and the local structure and context as equally important and relevant factors in influencing the dynamics of peace in post-conflict societies. This is congruent with methodological relationism, which allows studying relations and interactions between agents and social structures, and between material and ideational aspects of society, instead of privileging one over the other. Applying non-conflictual approaches to postconflict societies allows valuable insights into the nature, dynamics, agents, and processes that shape peace. The underlying logic of non-conflictual perspectives in peacebuilding is the disentanglement of the complex interactions between various levels of local and international agents and structures, which are interdependent on each other and mutually constitutive directly and indirectly. It recognises multiple vertical and horizontal levels of analyses, which go beyond conventional logic of the unit-system dichotomy. This is primarily determined from the ontological and epistemological position, which takes agency and structure as autonomous and yet mutually constitutive, and looks at plural forms of knowledge and agency. Non-conflictual pathways of research would be beneficial to overcome paradigmatic contempt, bypass methodological holism and individualism, and make space for conciliatory heuristics and reality-congruent inquires (Archer 1995: 64). Such efforts require accounting both for agency and structure without privileging one over the other; they require exploring both insider and outsider ontologies of peace; and they require disentangling multiple interconnected processes, relations, and actors in peacebuilding endeavours. Non-conflictual theorising is line with the ‘engaged pluralism’ proposed by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2010: 207) as an alternative to methodological diversity, which ‘seeks neither to maintain different methodological traditions in their splendid isolation from one another nor to rest content with an eclectic assemblage of the notions and concepts drawn from different cells in the typology of philosophical-ontological wagers’. Jackson (2010: 207) argues that ‘there is no reason why a single published work cannot contain multiple independent arguments, even if those arguments are themselves drawn from different methodologies’. Theorising about the impact of peacebuilding should recognise the epistemological temporalities upon which the research it is founded on. The conciliatory and complementarity nature of the research would require combining suitable methodological approaches, whereby different methods can be employed within a compact study to enrich the empirical and analytical potential of peace research. Displacing the question

How do we know peace? 39 from pre-determined onto-epistemologies of peacebuilding success and/or failure into the terrain of complexity and contingency does not merely require reflection on the existing peacebuilding knowledge; rather it requires rethinking, in a diffractive sense, the intelligibility of peacebuilding practices. This is the challenge that the next chapter focuses on by offering an alternative epistemological pathway for studying peacebuilding interventions and overcoming some of the tensions addressed in this chapter.

References Angus, I. (2000) (Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics, London: Verso. Anderson, M. B. (1999) Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Andersen, O. W., Bull, B., and Kennedy-Chouane, M. (2014) Evaluation Methodologies for Aid in Conflict, London: Routledge. Aoi, C., de Coning, C., and Thakur, R. (2007) (eds) Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, Tokyo: United Nations University. Archer, M. (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, S. (2010) The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Autesserre, S. (2014) Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bastian, S. and Lackham, R. (eds) (2003) Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Turn Societies, London: Zed Books, 2003. Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D. (2005) ‘Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations’, International Security, 29(4): 157–195. Berdal, M. and Ucko, D. H. (eds) (2009) Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, violence and transition, London: Routledge. Bull, C. (2008) No Entry Without Strategy: Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional Administration, Tokyo: UN University Press. Call, C. T. (2008) ‘Knowing Peace When You See it: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success’, Civil Wars, 10(2): 173–194. Call, C. T. and Wyeth, V. (eds) (2008) Building States to Build Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Caplan, R. (2005) International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chandler, D. (2006) Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, London: Pluto Press. Chandler, D. (2010a) International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance, London: Routledge. Chandler, D. (2010b) ‘The Uncritical Critique of “Liberal Peace” ’, Review of International Studies, 36(S1): 137–155. Chandler, D. (2013a) ‘International Statebuilding and the Ideology of Resilience’, Politics, 33(4): 276–286. Chandler, D. (2013b) ‘Peacebuilding and the politics of nonlinearity: rethinking ‘hidden’ agency and ‘resistance’’, Peacebuilding, 1(1): 17–32. Chandler, D. (2014a) Resilience: The Governance of Complexity, London: Routledge.

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Chandler, D. (2014b) ‘Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics in a World of Complexity’, International Politics, 51(4): 441–457. Chandler, D. (2014c) ‘International Statebuilding and Agency: The Rise of Society-Based Approaches to Intervention’, Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies, 6(1): 1–20. Chesterman, S. (2004) You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Oxford: Oxford University Press. del Castillo, G. (2008) Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenges of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. Diehl, P. F. and Balas, A. (2014) Peace Operations, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Polity. Diehl, P. F. and Druckman, D. (2010) Evaluating Peace Operations, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. Doyle, M. W. (2005) ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, American Political Science Review, 99(3): 463–466. Doyle, M. W. (2015) The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect, New Haven, CO: Yale University Press. Doyle, M. W. and Sambanis, N. (2006) Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Elman, C. and Elman, M. F. (2003) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. EuropeAid Co-operation Office (2006) Evaluation Methods for the European Union’s External Assistance: Methodological Bases for Evaluation, Vol. 1, Brussels: European Union. Fortna, V. P. (2008) Does Peacekeeping Work: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Francis, D. (2010) From Pacification to Peacebuilding: A Call to Global Transformation, London: Polity Press. Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. (2009) Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbs, D. N. (2009) First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. Heathershaw, J. (2008) ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36(3): 597–621. Hehir, A. and Robinson, N. (2007) State-Building: Theory and Practice, London: Routledge. Jabri, V. (2010) ‘War, Government, Politics: A Critical Response to the Hegemony of the Liberal Peace’, in Richmond, O. P. (ed.) Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Jackson, P. T. (2010) Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, Abingdon: Routledge. Jackson, R. (2015) ‘Towards Critical Peace Research: Lessons from Critical Terrorism Studies’, in Tellidis, I. and Toros, H. (eds) Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition, Abingdon: Routledge. Jarstad, A. K. and Sisk, T. D. (eds) (2008) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kapoor, K. (2008) The Postcolonial Politics of Development, London: Routledge. Kuhn, T. S. (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 3rd edn, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

How do we know peace? 41 Lakatos, I. (1970) ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levine, D. J. (2012) Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Liden, K. (2009) ‘Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping 16(5): 616–634. Liden, K., Mac Ginty, R., and Richmond, O. P. (2009) ‘Introduction: Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?’ International Peacekeeping, 16(5): 587–598. Linklater, A. (1998) The Transformation of Political Community, Cambridge: Polity Press. Mac Ginty, R. (2011) International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mac Ginty, R. (2012) ‘Routine peace: Technocracy and peacebuilding’, Cooperation and Conflict, 47(3): 287–308. Mac Ginty, R. (2013) ‘Indicator+: A Proposal for Everyday Peace Indicators’, Evaluation and Program Planning, 36(1): 56–63. Mac Ginty, R. and Richmond, O. P. (2013) ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda For Peace’, Third World Quarterly, 34(5): 763–783. Mayall, J. (2005) ‘The Legacy of Colonialism’, in Chesterman, C., Ignatieff, M., and Thakur, R. (eds) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance, Tokyo: UN University Press. Muggah, R. (ed.) (2009) Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, London: Routledge. Newman, E., Paris, R., and Richmond, O. P. (2009) (eds) New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokyo: UN University Press. OECD (2002) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Paris: OECD. Paris, R. (2004) At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paris, R. (2010) ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, 36(2): 337–365. Paris, R. and Sisk, T. (2009) The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-War Peace Operations, London: Routledge. Pugh, M. (2010) ‘Welfare in War-torn Societies: Nemesis of the liberal peace?’ in Richmond, O. P. (ed.) Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ratner, S. (1995) The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War, New York: St. Martin’s. Richmond, O. P. (2005) The Transformation of Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Richmond, O. P. (2008) ‘Reclaiming Peace in International Relations’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 36(3): 439–470. Richmond, O. P. (2010) ‘Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 38(3): 665–692. Richmond, O. P. (2011) A Post-Liberal Peace, London: Routledge. Richmond, O. P. (2013) ‘Failed Statebuilding versus Peace Formation’, Cooperation and Conflict, 48(3): 378–400. Richmond, O. P. (2014) Failed Statebuilding: Intervention, the State and the Dynamics of Peace Formation, New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Richmond, O. P. and Franks, J. (2009) Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Richmond, O. P. and Mac Ginty, R. (2015) ‘Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ Cooperation and Conflict, 50(2): 171–189. Richmond, O. P. and Mitchell, A. (2011) ‘Peacebuilding and Critical Forms of Agency: From Resistance to Subsistence’, Alternatives, 36(4): 326–344. Russett, B. and Oneal, J. (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, New York: W. W. Norton. Sabaratnam, M. (2013) ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace’, Security Dialogue, 44(3): 259–278. Schneckener, U. (2010) ‘Unintended Consequences of International Statebuilding’, in Daase, C. and Friesendorf, C. (eds) Rethinking Security Governance: The Problem of Unintended Consequences, London: Routledge. Stedman, S. J. (1999) International Actors and Internal Conflicts, New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Tadjbakhsh, S. (2009) ‘Conflicted Outcomes and Values: (Neo)Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping, 16(5): 635–651. Tadjbakhsh, S. (ed.) (2011) Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives, London: Routledge. Tansey, O. (2009) Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tansey, O. (2014) ‘Evaluating the Legacies of State-Building: Success, Failure, and the Role of Responsibility’, International Studies Quarterly, 58(1): 174–186. Tripathi, S. (2008) ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, in Pugh, M., Cooper, N., and Turner, M. (eds) Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. UN (2009) ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting the New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’, New York: United Nations. UNDP (2012) ‘Governance for Peace: Securing Social Contract’, New York: UN Development Programme. UNGA (2009a) ‘Peacekeeping operations: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’, A/63/302(Part II), 23 February, 2009. UNGA (2009b) ‘Programme evaluation of the performance and the achievement of results by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire – Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’, A/63/713, 9 February, 2009. UNGA and UNSC (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August, 2000. UNGA and UNSC (2013) ‘Securing States and Societies: Strengthening the United Nations Comprehensive Support to Security Sector Reform’, UN Doc A/67/970S/2013/480, 13 August, 2013. UNGA and UNSC (2014) ‘Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict’, UN Doc A/69/399S/2014/694, 23 September, 2014. UNSC (2001) ‘No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, UN Doc S/2011/394, 20 April, 2011. UNSC (2004) ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc S/2004/616, 23 August, 2004. UNSC (2012) ‘Peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict: Report of the SecretaryGeneral’, UN Doc A/67/499-S/2012/746, 8 October, 2012.

How do we know peace? 43 Visoka, G. (2011) ‘International Governance and Local Resistance in Kosovo: The Thin Line between Ethical, Emancipatory and Exclusionary Politics’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 22(1): 99–125. Visoka, G. (2012) ‘The Levels of Hybridisation Practices in Post-conflict Kosovo’, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 7(2): 23–36. Visoka, G. (2015) ‘Peace/Knowledge: The Promise of New Epistemologies of Peace’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 9(4): 542–550. Visoka, G. and Doyle, J. (2014) ‘Peacebuilding and International Responsibility’, International Peacekeeping, 21(5): 673–692. World Bank (1994) Managing Development – The Governance Dimension, Washington, DC: World Bank. Zaum, D. (2007) Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3 Peace figuration Towards a new framework for analysis

Introduction The main attention of peace-writers over the past decade has been dedicated to generating and criticising various peacebuilding approaches in theory and practice. Much less attention has been paid to expanding the epistemological perspectives on the metaphysics, practices, and consequences of peacebuilding. Existing debates on peacebuilding are often caught up in perennial discussions on: the merits and limits of liberal peace; the limits of power-based and valuebased critiques; the necessity for constructing new peace approaches more receptive to local communities; the difference; and on non-Western ontologies of peace, while immanently questioning any production and application of Western and Eurocentric knowledge. The repertoire of various peacebuilding missions, as exemplified by Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq, shows that liberal peacebuilding is currently in deep crisis. Certain strands of literature have concluded that liberal peacebuilding has failed to build sustainable peace in these conflict affected-societies, has proven to be unfit for purpose due to organisational and normative inconsistencies, and has been incompatible with local needs, interests, and perspectives (see Paris 2004; Richmond 2014). However, there is less reflexive work on the adverse impact that every form of peacebuilding knowledge or practice can have in postconflict societies. This chapter proposes a new epistemological alternative to study the impact of post-conflict peacebuilding. It elucidates the usefulness of the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias for re-examining the relational impact of peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. Figurational sociology is concerned with the study of social complexity, agential assemblages, structural contingencies, and unintended consequences. Figurational sociology provides an opportunity to undertake a non-conflicting conceptualisation of peacebuilding practices and bypass some of the epistemic inadequacies discussed in the previous chapter. Most importantly, it offers a fresh opportunity to look at the long-term peace processes, and study more adequately the discourses, events, and outcomes that shape peace after violent conflict. In capturing the relational nature of peacebuilding interventions, this chapter introduces peace figuration as a new

Peace figuration 45 framework for analysing the intentions, events and consequences of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict societies. An analytical framework as the one outlined here helps identify important categories of research inquiry; it helps organise the information in a particular order; and also disentangles relationships among various categories (see Anderson 1999: 95). New concepts are important to unearth invisible social practices that are often ignored or overlooked in policy and scholarly discussions. Drawing on figurational sociology and other pluralist epistemologies and methodologies, peace figuration provides that in order to understand and capture the complex factors that shape peace processes, it is essential to: (1) focus on the intentionality of peace discourses; (2) examine the events that build and break peace; and (3) identify the unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences of peacebuilding interventions. The linkage between intentions, events, and consequences is crucial as it captures the profound figuration of peace in post-conflict societies, and disentangles the complexity of peacebuilding and peace-breaking dynamics. Compared to existing knowledge, peace figuration does not seek to mediate knowledge about various actors and structures, nor does it seek to undertake social re-engineering. Rather, it aims to serve as an intermediary body of knowledge between the occurrence of acts and their complex normative interpretation. Peace figuration is not a theory of action; it is an evaluative and conceptual assemblage for studying the normative, praxeological, and situational aspects of peace after intervention. As Bruno Latour (2005: 58) has argued, ‘figuration and theory of action are two different items . . . and should not be conflated with one another’. In the same logic, peace figuration seeks to break away from static assessment of peacebuilding impact and rather embrace temporalities and contingencies underpinning any peace intervention. Peace processes are open systems with undefined boundaries. What peace figuration framework seeks to do is to capture a full figurational sequence of peacebuilding from the end of conflict to the exit of international interveners and beyond. Along with this conceptualisation of peace figuration, it is crucially important to assemble adequate methodological approaches for understanding how peacebuilding intentions are formed, how peace-related events are socially constructed, and what the intended and unintended consequences of peacebuilding have been. In undertaking this task, this chapter highlights the epistemological and methodological pluralist approach that peace figuration is embedded, through combining critical discourse analysis, practice approach, and process tracing. This methodological conglomeration is suitable for exploring the textual aspects of peacebuilding intentions, the performativity and practices of local and international peacebuilding actors, and also for tracing the spectrum of consequences. This chapter first outlines Elias’s figurational sociology and its usefulness for peacebuilding studies. The chapter then explores in detail key conceptual components of peace figuration, namely the intentions, events, and consequences of peace. The third part outlines the methodological and practical aspects of peace figuration.

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Bringing figurational sociology to peacebuilding studies While sociology has played a formative role in different debates of peace and conflict studies – especially in the early work on peace research and conflict resolution – it is only recently that it has started to play a more prominent role in peacebuilding debates. Recent work of Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (2012) seeks to consolidate a political sociology of statebuilding and intervention in post-conflict societies. Daria Isachenko (2012) used Elias’s conception of figuration to study the making of informal states and statebuilding in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestria. This follows a similar trend in International Relations theories, which increasingly use sociology to study world politics (see Albert et al. 2013). There is also an increased interest in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and international political sociology (see Bigo 2011). However, relational and interactionist sociology are widely ignored. Building on the conclusions of the previous chapter, a suitable intellectual avenue for expanding the epistemological frontiers of peacebuilding is to bring to peacebuilding studies the work of Norbert Elias, known for his original and valuable contribution to figurational and process sociology, which are part of broader relational sociology that focuses ‘on fluid social processes rather than isolated individuals or external and solid social structures’ (Depelteau and Powell 2013: xv). Elias’s theoretical position consists of five elements, as summarised by Robert van Krieken (1998: 47): (1) an understanding of social life as the unplanned and unintended outcome of the interweaving of intentional human actions; (2) an approach to human beings as interdependent, forming figurations or networks with each other which connect the psychological with the social, or habitus with social relations; (3) a focus on relations rather than states; (4) a related concern with dynamic processes of development and change, rather than static structures; and (5) an approach to sociology as the attempt to develop as ‘adequate’ a relation to the real world as possible, namely one which ‘works’ best in the solution of basic problems of human existence and maximizes collective control over the human world. Central to Elias’s work is the concept of figuration. Semantically, the notion of figuration indicates the form, figure, and shape of something, or the resulting figure or shape of something. Nadia Urbinati (2014: 1) portrays the figure as ‘a shape that is externally identifiable, a composite of observable characteristics’. In the work of Elias and other figurational sociologists there is no single precise definition of figuration, rather there are multiple interpretations of its meaning. In a nutshell, the notion of figuration signifies the zone where social structures, practices, and facts interweave with the networks of relationships between human beings. Elias (1978: 103; 1994: 213–214) defined society as ‘the processes and structures of interweaving, the figuration formed by the actions of interdependent people’. The main reason why Elias preferred the notion of figuration over other concepts such as systems, structures and agency was to illustrate

Peace figuration 47 the interdependent and interconnected nature of individual and society, agency and structure, power and resistance, rationality and blindness without having to reduce these notions to static states of being, detached from their dynamic and ever-changing character (Quilley and Loyal 2004; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 52). Latour (2005) also uses the notion of figuration when studying different explanations of human agency in the context of actor network theory. Figurations signify the processual and dynamic nature of human interactions characterised by interdependence and asymmetrical power balances (Mennell 1992: 251–252). Elias conceived figurations as rooted in competition and unequal ratios of power. Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom (1998: 124) equate figurations with an ‘ordered network . . . interpreted as continuing the interweaving process and forming a part of the future interweaving of actions’. According to Elias, the order that emerges from interdependent human interactions is a specific kind of order, an ordered network or figuration, within which no action by either side can be regarded as the action of that one side alone. It must rather be interpreted as continuing the interweaving process and forming a part of the future interweaving of actions made by both sides. (Mennell and Goudsblom 1998: 124) In a similar vein, Eric Dunning and Jason Hughes (2013: 52) maintain that figurations direct ‘attention towards shifting patterns, regularities, direction of change, tendencies and counter-tendencies, in webs of human relationships that are always changing over time’ (see also: Salumets 2011). Beyond humancentred conception of figuration, Dennis Smith (2001: 1) argues that Elias’s notion of figuration also entails ‘complex networks linking people, groups and institutions’. Building on this relational conception of society, Elias and other figurational sociologists have mostly focused on understanding how human figurations work and what type of sociological knowledge is required to understand human figurations. Elias (2012: 127) considers figurations to be temporary, changeable by nature and full of tensions, highlighting thus the presence of figurational sequences and changes in social relations as a result of figurations changes. He suggests ‘human societies can only be understood as consisting of long-term processes of development and change, rather than as timeless states or conditions’ (van Krieken 1998: 6). Elias uses the notion of ‘sociogenesis’ to discuss the changes of social relations. As argued by van Krieken (1998: 64), Elias considered that ‘any given sociological problem is seen as the outcome of some long-term process of development, if we trace its sociogenesis’. Elias treated figurations as the ‘plurality of processes, all of which interweave with each other, with no causal primacy being given to any of them’ (van Krieken 1998: 65). However, he argued that intentional actions of human interactions most often lead to unplanned and unintended outcomes, maintaining that social life is constituted of the interweaving of intentional human actions, which produce

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unplanned and unintended outcomes (Elias 1997). Elias maintains that people contribute to the constitution of social formations, but do not control them (van Krieken 1998). Consequently, the unplanned social order that emerges from interwoven human interactions determines the course of historical change (Elias 1982: 258). Whereas most classical sociologists would situate unintended consequences in the realm of exceptional social phenomena, Elias considers them as common and ‘universal in social life’ and explainable developments (Mennell 1992: 258). Elias (1991: 49) holds that ‘the distribution of power and the structure of tensions’ within mobile human network are the main forces for producing unplanned effects. He considered ‘the dynamics of competition, conflict and interweaving which constitutes the “blindness” of social development and restricts the effectivity of human agency’ (van Krieken 1998: 77). Elias’s sociology is situational and bound to the context of its occurrence. Elias (1982: 84) argued against ‘investigating knowledge independently of the situation in which it is obtained’, maintaining that we must ‘consider the situation in which people find themselves’. His work is often considered as a postphilosophical sociology, as he opposed philosophical investigations on abstract and theoretical grounds that lacked empirical foundations. He questioned the validity of truth claims conceded on non-empirical basis, considering knowledge to be situated in a particular empirical context in a ‘time-bound world’ (Kilminster 2011: 93). Criticising the recent movement in social science that utilises critique as a code word without much sensible substance, Richard Kilminster (2011: 108) argues that ‘Elias has provided the most constructive, useful, but challenging, alternative to deal with the issues of human bonding and orientation that are hidden beneath the sweeping “critical” calls for emancipation, freedom and liberation’. Similarly, Elias’s figurational sociology rejects causality and positivism because he opposed the law-like conception of social life. Elias (1987: xxiv) held that ‘[p]rocesses can only be explained in terms of processes. There are no absolute beginnings.’ The outcome of these processes is not caused by a single causal factor, but can only contribute to the emergence of unintended and unplanned outcomes. In response to these concerns, Elias developed a sociology of knowledge for studying social life which he conceptualised around the principles of involvement and detachment, and rational and reasonable investigation (Elias 1956). He illustrates this epistemological commitment when arguing that ‘the primary focuses of sociological analysis is . . . the relationship between intentional, goaldirected human activities and the unplanned or unconscious process of interweaving with other such activities, past and present, and their consequences’ (Smith 2001: 1). In this regard, Elias believed people have the potential to increase their capacity to exercise control over the social processes and figurations that shape their social existence in a rational and reasonable way. Elias favours scholars’ detachment from the detailed and emotional dimensions of social life to properly investigate human figurations. Elias refers to this type of detachment as reality-adequate thinking. Such thinking challenges the postpositivist approach of seeing knowledge, the subject of study and the research

Peace figuration 49 closely interlinked with certain subjective and normative commitments. Similar to Pierre Bourdieu (1990), Elias believed agents have some space for strategising, which is primarily related to the practical evaluation of actions, its anticipated consequences, and the likelihood for success in a given situation. Most of these aspects of figurational sociology are relevant for peace and conflict studies. Tatiana S. Landini (2013: 27) recently argued that the notion of figuration ‘can be applied to topics and countries or regions never studied by Elias’, as ‘interesting instruments to look at the social world and improve our understanding of it’. However, the figurational sociology developed by Elias has been ignored by debates exploring post-conflict peacebuilding. In a recent study on statebuilding and international interventions, Elias is mentioned very briefly and only in the context of state formation (see de Guevara 2012: 7). The only recent study that seeks to bring Elias’s work to International Relations is Andrew Linklater (2011) who connects the work of Elias to the English School of IR and its examination of global civilisation processes. Linklater (2011: 61) briefly mentions that Elias’s work could be suitable to understand the development of liberal peace, but does not explore how process sociology would engage with peace studies. Undoubtedly, the neglect of Elias’s work in peace studies has been a missed opportunity for using his valuable sociological ideas in studying contemporary peacebuilding and statebuilding. His work is especially valuable in exploring the long-term processes in post-conflict societies; in studying more adequately unintended consequences; in tracing de-pacification and peacebreaking practices; in emphasising the importance of relations and practices over static conception of agency and structures; and in tracing complex pathways for making and unmaking social and political reality in post-conflict societies. Another relevant aspect of figurational sociology is the ability to account for both agency and structure without reducing one to another (Quilley and Loyal 2004: 3). As discussed in the previous chapter, peacebuilding studies are affected by the agency-structure problem. Liberal peace proponents mainly favour structure over agency when it comes to peacebuilding, whereas critical perspectives emphasise agency more than structure in their accounts of how to build sustainable peace. Hence, bringing in figurational sociology would allow the generation of knowledge that would provide space for both agency and structure when describing the process of peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. Figurational sociology is against reducing social relations to states, objects or things. This is relevant to peacebuilding debates because the notions of peacebuilding and statebuilding themselves are beginning to be perceived and invoked as solid and static conditions, hiding thus the relational and processual aspects of it.

Conceptualising peace figuration The discussion so far in this book suggests the necessity for expanding new pathways for studying peacebuilding interventions and for overcoming the limitations of existing framework of analysis and exploring new research avenues. In particular, the notion of figuration is useful to capture in an integrated way

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multiple dimensions ignored by existing research on peacebuilding. It bypasses the juxtapositions between ideal versus material and conventional versus critical, bringing to the forefront contextual articulation of particular regimes of practices. Elias (2012: 126) argues that the concept of figuration ‘can be applied to relatively small groups just as well as to societies made up of thousands or millions of interdependent people’. Therefore, Elias’s conception of figuration can be used to study multiple actors, institutions, events, and processes that shape peacebuilding interventions. It can be used also as a useful metaphor to describe the liquid nature of peace in the aftermath of violent conflict. Building on Elias’s figurational sociology, ‘peace figuration’ is introduced in this book as a new conceptual framework for studying the relational nature of peacebuilding and peace-breaking dynamics as essential properties for figuring out post-conflict peace processes. Elias (2012: 156–157) maintained that in retrospect it is just as feasible to examine the range of potential outcomes as it is to discover the particular constellation of factors responsible for the emergence of this one figuration rather than any other of other possible alternatives. Highlighting the importance of tracing back figurational change, Elias (2012: 156–157) has argued that [w]ithout referring back to the figurational flow which produced them, it would be impossible to understand or explain the interdependence of all the positions in a figuration at a particular time, or the disposition of the people whose socially regulated mutual directedness gives these positions their significance. He maintained that figurational analyses often show the discrepancy between ‘intentions and actions of the individuals constituting the figuration’, and ‘the form the figuration takes will nevertheless not be determined by the deliberate plans and intentions of any of its members, nor by groups of them, nor even by all of them together’ (Elias 2012: 159). Therefore, one way to capture the figurational sequences of peace processes is to trace the intentions, events and consequences, as well as the setbacks and reversal effects of international interventions. The ontological position of peace figuration is that post-conflict peace processes are confined to intentions that guide the actions of agents that are translated into events, which ultimately produce consequences that are fundamentally non-linear and outside the realm of planned conduct. Such a view goes against the commitment of key peace epistemologies’ search for peacebuilding success. The integration of intentions, events and consequences resonates with Hannah Arendt’s (1998: 184–185) work, which argues that speech acts define ‘the realm of human affairs’ and events can help ‘isolate agents’ and agency, but the ‘eventual outcomes’ can never be attributed to the true author. In essence, peace figuration provides an

Peace figuration 51 account of how certain peace intentions are translated into practice and utilised by different agents, and how they are mediated via socially constructed events, which produce various outcomes that may be the unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences of human interdependencies and interactions. In other words, figuring out peace after violent conflict requires engaging in disfigurations understood as atypical analysis of praxis to reveal their paradoxes (Angus 2000: 258; Urbinati 2014: 2). Integrating these aspects and disentangling figurational sequences are not the same as tracing causality or causal mechanisms in the positivist sense. Rather, they are to identify and analyse the presence and absence of contributing factors, triggers, ontological entities, structures, relations, conditions, and processes that contribute to the particular figuration of peace (see Kurki 2008: 295). Peace figuration focuses on tracing more carefully a particular dimension and objective of peacebuilding as opposed to providing an overall assessment of all dimensions of peacebuilding in a particular country case study. Aware that peace processes are the product of previous, domestic and international, peace figuration focuses in capturing a major figurational sequence of peacebuilding – that of the lifespan of peacebuilding interventions from the launch to exit from conflictaffected societies – and trace the implications of peacebuilding in the aftermath of interventions. The notion of peace figuration is useful in differentiating the study of peacebuilding from peacebuilding as a practical approach and an interventionary mechanism for addressing the root causes of conflicts. Often peacebuilding is used as an academic field and the line between concept and practice is blurred. Peace figuration is a conceptual framework for examining peacebuilding-aspractice. Whereas peacebuilding emphasises the necessity for intervention to change agents and social structures through different mechanisms, peace figuration is different. It is an evaluative framework that disentangles the character of peacebuilding dynamics, as well as the key intentions, events, and outcomes that shape it. Theorising about various ways of peacebuilding in advance means basically imposing a social world on a society that may not fit the contingent, complex, particular, and contradictory identities of peoples, groups, and culture. Compared to existing knowledge on peacebuilding, peace figuration does not seek to mediate knowledge about various actors and structures, or to undertake social re-engineering. On the contrary, peace figuration serves as an intermediary body of knowledge between the occurrence of acts and their interpretation in a complex, both associative and dissociative manner, to present the complex figuration of peace by looking at the intentions, events, and consequences in a particular post-conflict place and time. Therefore, peace figuration does not try to impose a special ontological order on post-conflict societies, but only explicates and interprets it by disentangling the figuration of multi-layered intentions, agencies and structures, events, and consequences. It is conceptually flexible to permit a dose of imprecision, which is necessary for capturing nuances that shape peace after violent conflicts (see Law 2004). Peace figuration seeks to account also for peace-breaking intentions, events and processes that signify

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reversal of peacebuilding efforts. In a way, peace-breaking bears similarities to Elias’s decivilising processes, which according to Stephen Mennell (1990: 205) means ‘what happens when civilising processes go into reverse’. Peacebreaking as a discursive representation does not mean that there is no progress in implementing peace agreement; it means that the peace process is impeded, shaped, deviated, and transformed in new unexpected directions. This conceptual fluidity permits understanding, explaining, observing, and criticising peacebuilding interventions in a new sociological fashion. Peace figuration seeks to bring to the forefront agential pluralities, multiple interdependencies, and the various ways in which post-conflict subjects manage to shape the peace process. Peace figuration explores the interdependencies between insider and outsider actors in post-conflict peacebuilding processes to illustrate how they shape each other and what type of consequences they produce. Peace figuration seeks to illustrate that in peace processes the identity of insider and outsider agents is shaped by the process of trying to resolve, transform, or obstruct the socio-political dimensions of disagreement in post-conflict societies. The interaction dynamics give meaning to the actions of insider and outsider agents, and in return forms their political interests and the situational meaning of peace. This does not exclude the possibility that agents have embedded identity and interests. However, it emphasises the impact of intersubjectivity on ordering post-conflict dynamics and on the prospects for sustainable peace. Peace figuration is also useful for disentangling power in peacebuilding contexts, which is possible only by conceiving power not as static and monolithic, but as relational, multidimensional, and dynamic. Peace figuration reveals the horizontal and fluctuating nature of power, signifying thus that power relations, institutional design, cooperation and conflict, compliance and resistance, and political influence and agential autonomy are dynamics of interagential relations between insider and outsider agents operating in a particular post-conflict society and context. Both international and local actors are interdependent with different power ratios derived from structural, discursive, material, and situational factors. The next section in this chapter elaborates three distinct conceptual aspects of peace figuration: intentions, events, and consequences. Peacebuilding intentions Intentionality behind peacebuilding endeavours is the first foundational stage of peace figurational analysis. The launching of peacebuilding missions and the formulation of intentions for intervention in post-conflict societies represent a breaking point between war and peace. This does not mean that violence ends, but the dynamics and relations, between warring parties and external interveners, transform, modify, if not entirely change. Therefore, intentions are not the starting point of interactions related to peacebuilding, but they represent the formative discursive point which, for the sake of analysis, appears as useful for studying the ‘teleology’ of peacebuilding. Analysis of intentions is crucial for assessing the impact of peacebuilding. Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas (2014:

Peace figuration 53 103) argue that when assessing the success of peace operations ‘one must account both for the goals associated with those missions that the operation does perform and concordantly those that it does not’. Intentions have a central role in understanding social life as they are supposed to be the essential guidance of human conduct and the substance of the articulation of agency (Searle 1983: 79–80). They are seen as the normative, intellectual, and principal feature of the human ability to act in accordance with certain present goals, ideas, desires, and objectives that guide one’s actions. In a correlative sense, intentions shape human subjectivity and social actions, produce consequences, and serve as the basis upon which responsibility can be assigned (Searle 2010; Onuf 2002). Intentions are closely related to a wider network of other intentions and require the possession of abilities and capacities to apply them into actions. It is assumed that if an agent has a reason for acting and acts for that reason, then she or he acts intentionally. This implies that behind each action there is a degree of intentionality, influenced by previous knowledge, experiences, and events, that represents the starting point of any social interaction. Intentions play an important role in political psychology and, within International Relations they have been widely debated by rationalists who consider them as a problematic source for assessing threats and understanding the behaviour of states (Stein 2013). While sometimes it is possible to determine actors’ intentions, such a process is considered rare and remarkably difficult due to the potential for misrepresentation of perception, limited knowledge, and deceiving behaviour. Political psychologists, such as Leonie Huddy et al. (2013), are sceptical of the concept of intentions, precisely because actors’ preferences are not stable and can change over time. These concerns notwithstanding, intentions can be assessed empirically by tracing other associative aspects of agency, such as declarative commitments and performative acts (Stein 2013: 366). While there are multiple types of intentions – such as individual, shared, collective, open and secret intentions – declared intentions are relatively more credible source of references (Chant et al. 2014). The notion of ‘declared intention’ is also used in Zygmunt Bauman’s most recent work on the state of crisis (see Bauman and Bordoni 2014: 141) Hence, declared intentions will be used in the context of peace figuration to signify those shared, present and future oriented intentions that are made public, and are incorporated in policy and legal documents to officially guide the actions of collective agents. The analysis in this book will focus on the declared intentions of peacebuilding organisations as collective agents. Toni Erskine (2003) argues that institutions as organisations embodying a set of norms and practices can be considered agents due to their capacity to form intentions and undertake purposive actions. Declared intentions are created through a speech act and linguistic process, which are also conditioned by pre-existing ideational and material aspects. However, they are essential for guiding what Searle (2010: 11) calls the ‘word-to-world’ – constituted in the first place by the reversed dialectic of forming intentions from experience. Declared intentions can be both of short-term and long-term in nature, and are often defined and developed in the course of social interactions.

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In the context of liberal peacebuilding, sources of declared intentions are collective intentions prescribed in peace agreements, UN resolutions, and other policy documents, which constitute their ideological bedrock and represent the reference point against which peacebuilding performativity takes place. Collective intentions are related to the joint commitment of international organisations and their members to building peace. As Dorothy E. Smith (2005: 226–227) holds, texts ‘constitute and regulate institutions, establish agency, that is, textually specified capacities to control and mobilise the work of others’. Typical examples of declared intentions in liberal peacebuilding are: restoring security and permitting humanitarian action; building democratic institutions; strengthening civil society; establishing the rule of law; promoting human rights and good governance; and fostering market economy (see UNGA and UNSC 2009). These intentions seek to establish a new social contract, by imposing state and social rules prone to peace and encourage non-occurrence of domestic, regional and international violence. Though declared intentions reflect collective intentions, they implicitly contain strategic and hidden intentions of different peacebuilding actors and organisations. As much as liberal peacebuilding intentions represent a collective will and desire to contribute to peacebuilding in a post-conflict society, they also represent the self-interest of outsider agents. The superficially consensual nature of peacebuilding intentions hides deeply rooted disagreements, which affects the political will, the adequacy of actions, and levels of concern for potential consequences. This does not exclude the option that peacebuilding intentions could also be euphemisms, stating something that is neither truly intended nor expected to be achieved. Such declared intentions represent, in an Orwellian (1968: 137) sense, a ‘clear language of insincerity . . . when there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims’. For instance, discourse on the rule of law, democratic policing, sustainable peace, and justice is often invoked broadly to leave space for manoeuvring and modifying the measurement of progress and success. They are more reflections of what ought to be said rather than what is truly intended. This creates confusion on the extent to which the social and political outcomes of actions are products of intended and anticipated actions. As admitted recently by the UN High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, ‘[t]oo often, mandates and missions are produced on the basis of templates instead of tailored to support situation-specific political strategies’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 9). Peace figuration framework does not only examine the declared intentions of external peacebuilding organisations, but also explores the declared intentions of local actors. Kenneth E. Boulding (1978: xi) argued that first parameter of stable peace is ‘a declaration of intent to pursue a peace policy’. Only by examining jointly the multiplicity of intentions of insider and outsider agents can we make sense of the frictions, contentions, and limitations of peacebuilding interventions. While the declared intentions of external interveners are more universal by nature, the local intentions are deeply contextual and do not necessarily correspond to the liberal peacebuilding agenda. The intentions of local actors can range from building a stable peace and reconciliation to more precarious desires for

Peace figuration 55 ethnic partition or domination. Often the intentions for peacebuilding collude, which represents the basis for the emergence of peace-breaking events and unwanted consequences. Most importantly, the examinations of local intentions for peacebuilding elucidate the possibility that the failures of external actors in fulfilling their peacebuilding goals represent victories for local actors and satisfactory fulfilment of their intentions. Therefore, multi-dimensional study of peacebuilding intentions provides a more reality-congruent approach for understanding the impact and legacies of peacebuilding interventions. Although intentions are a good starting point for assessing the impact of peacebuilding, they should be approached with caution because often there are gaps between intentions, actions, and outcomes. Peace cannot be measured only on good faith, political commitment, and detached practices. It is thus important to look widely at various types of events and how they are retrospectively linked to particular intentions. The non-linearity of processes should be taken into account throughout the entire process of exploring peace figuration. It is for this reason that there is a need to triangulate intentions, events and consequences, and in so doing get a more complex, yet clearer, understanding of peace figuration. Building on this, the empirical chapters of this book explore the declared intentions of both international peacebuilding organisations and local stakeholders to draw a situational matrix of different positionalities in the peacebuilding process. Peacebuilding and peace-breaking events The second aspect of peace figuration seeks to analyse peacebuilding and peacebreaking events and their productive role in the emergence of peacebuilding consequences. According to Elias, in order to trace long-term processes of social development, one needs to engage with the ‘blind’ aspects of intentions and events. Congruent with figurational sociology, studying complex peace figurations consisting of multiple actors and relationships with different ratios of power over a long period of time requires capturing certain formative events that link interdependencies among different components of figurations. In peacebuilding practices, events are considered those important moments around which peace implementation takes place. Events are one of the most popular epistemological categories for explaining and understanding individuals and societies. They are located in the trajectory between intentions and consequences. They are affiliated with happenings, agency, action, and change (Mele 2005: 351). Events are considered ‘a fundamental unit of experience’ and are demarked by a reference to a place and time (Shipley 2008: 4–6). While events are the basis according to which past is organised, they are also the basis for making plans and anticipating futures. Thomas Shipley (2008: 8) argues that ‘[w]e perceive events in order to anticipate the future, and we use information available in the present to guide future action; in this way we attempt to maintain a perfect coordination of our actions with the world’. Therefore, events serve as positive and negative analogies for constructing social blueprints and preventive mechanisms for dealing with possible recurrence of similar events.

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However, social reality is messy, and does not come organised in events with clearly demarked boundaries. Robert Schwartz (2008: 55) argues that events ‘are not simply out there and ready-made, waiting to be seen, recognised, or described; they are what we make of them’. Events do not have clearly demarked beginnings and ends. Alain Badiou (2006; see also Wright 2008: 73–92) considers events ahistorical, socially made truths and inconsistent multiples, represented and interpreted by ordering and arranging their constitutive and expressive elements contingent to particular non-ontological situational law. From Badiou’s perspective, for an event to be recognised as a happening there must be a decision taken to interpret it and relate it to the world. He holds that ‘only an interpretive intervention can declare that an event is presented in a situation’ (Badiou 2006: 181). As Jackson (2006: 494) argues, ‘events, and sequences of events are thus generated by a set of theoretical commitments, rather than by the putatively innate character of reality itself ’. Similarly, Arendt (1998: 192) equates events with stories and argues that ‘even though stories are the inevitable results of action, it is not the actor but the storyteller who perceives and “makes” the story’. However, the occurrence of consequence that affects a particular situation is key to making events (Livington 2008: 227). The significance of events can be determined by the consequences they produce (Mead 1959). Naming events based on their consequences is crucial for rescuing their disappearance from social registers. As Michel Foucault (1997a: 160–164) stated, history is not ‘written as a great totality of monumental high point’, hence it is crucial to explore the ‘discontinuities rather than continuity’. However, such a process of ‘eventing’ should be seen in the context of cultural production and reproduction of the contours of events in the present (Jackson 2006: 494). Events that occur in the aftermath of a conflict are an important category for analysing the politics of peacebuilding that take place under the auspices of the eventual (Visoka 2016). What counts as an event for peacebuilding is rooted in power relations and the dominance in producing knowledge about events, and controlling how they are used and abused to construct the state of peace. In a Schmittian sense, liberal peacebuilders are often those who hold the ‘exception’ to decide what counts as a peace event. However, the politics of event-making reveals that peacebuilding events are always for someone and for some purpose. In other words, policy-makers’ part of the peacebuilding apparatus try to register those events that signify progress and make them look successful, while other more negative events and consequences are often ignored, denied, and reduced to ‘non-events’. Within the institutional realm of liberal peace, events include the organisation of elections, the creation of new institutions, the passing of laws and policies, and the development of a visible architecture for enforcing law and order, and making key political decisions. In the securitisation wing of liberal peace, key events include the disarmament of insurgent and guerrilla forces, establishing and reforming security institutions, large-scale acts of resistance, protest and boycott, events of large-scale ethnic or inter-communal violence, and other attacks that are deemed as important and relevant for peacebuilding process. Finally, in the area of marketisation, considered as key events are donor

Peace figuration 57 conferences, decisions on currency, privatisation of socially-owned enterprises, and the IMF and World Bank assessment of unemployment and fiscal stability. These events are often assembled around the justification of the fulfilment of peacebuilding intentions and are portrayed in a language that considers them as important benchmarks towards a lengthy road to peace, stability, and development. In the context of peace figuration, the analysis of events also focuses on analysing what Foucault (1972: 27) called ‘discursive events’ articulated through political statements. The idea of incorporating events in peace figuration also corresponds directly to Foucault’s understanding of events as processes. Foucault (2000: 226–227) spoke of eventualisation rather than events, defining them as a ‘breach of self-evidence’ and ‘multiplication and pluralisation of causes’ to rediscover ‘the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary’. This would mean not only to follow what Jens Bartelson (1995: 8) calls ‘an exemplary history’ which is ‘based on the possibility of finding general rules for particular cases, and particular cases for general rules’, but also account for the broader and distant events triggered by foreign interveners, which fall outside the peacebuilding intentionality that is often reduced to ‘non-events’. This is a recognition that social change does not occur only through events that are visibly perceived as shaping rules, structures, and norms that govern the world. However, non-events, both as non-occurrences and denied occurrences, play a significant role in making the social world. Thus, non-events need to be deconstructed and ‘eventualised’ to highlight the power of those ignored events in shaping social complexities. Based on this discussion, the main criteria of a figurational analysis of peacebuilding events should focus on the key areas of international intervention as well as explore the wider events and processes that directly and indirectly play a role in influencing the peace prospects, both in a positive and negative sense. In other words, figuring out peace requires exploring those events that are described as contributing to the implementation or obstruction of the peacebuilding agenda, as well as investigating multiples sequences of major or marginal events which have played a significant role in shaping the peace processes. Peacebuilding consequences One of the most significant aspects of Elias’s figurational sociology is his conception of unplanned and unintended emergence, development and disappearance of figurations, as well as the outcomes and consequences of social processes. Recognising the power of unplanned outcomes and unintended consequences, the third and most important segment of peace figuration is the disentanglement of various peacebuilding consequences. Figurational sociologists submit that ‘human societies can only be understood as consisting of long-term processes of development and change, rather than as timeless states or conditions’ (see van Krieken 1998: 6). Elias considers that the primary focus of

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sociological analysis should be ‘the relationship between intentional, goaldirected human activities and the unplanned or unconscious process of interweaving with other such activities, past and present, and their consequences’ (Smith 2001: 1). Elias maintained that figurational analysis often show the discrepancy between ‘intentions and actions of the individuals constituting the figuration’, and ‘the form the figuration takes will nevertheless not be determined by the deliberate plans and intentions of any of its members, nor by groups of them, nor even by all of them together’ (2012: 159). The role of knowledge production, according to Elias, is to explore over a long period of time the mechanism of how these intentional actions produce unintended patters of social life. His entire philosophy is that to better understand social figurations and the entire conception of society, we need to explore consequences, which are often unplanned outcomes of individual intentional actions. As early sociologists, W. I. Thomas rightly argues, ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (cited in Merton 1995: 384). In other words, consequences are what make reality accurate (Mennell 1992: 258). Every intentional action creates unintended consequences. While this might be obvious, peacebuilding literature does not sufficiently examine how such paradoxical unfolding of reality shapes peace in conflict-affected societies. The spectrum of peacebuilding consequences remains invisible without a discursive interpretation. Policy-makers often prefer the discourse of risks as opposed to consequences, because such framing permits intervention without causation. Consequences are more directly linked to certain triggers and actions and entail allocation of responsibility. In this book, peacebuilding consequences refer to the state of affairs that have evidently taken place during the peacebuilding process by local and international actors. Although peace figuration does not engage explicitly with consequentialist accounts (Hurley 2009), peacebuilding consequences are examined based on the premise that peacebuilding agents will perform their acts to realise the declared intentions. In the context of conflictaffected societies, the state of peace represents the influence of everyone and nobody, whereby various consequences take the form of social unknowns, surprises and the prevalence of errors, and an incomplete trajectory from will to effect. Arendt (1998: 190) argued that ‘consequences are boundless, because action . . . acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new processes’. This makes the disentanglement of peacebuilding consequences possible, but it requires constellations of knowledge with both conceptual clarity and empirical processual rigor. The emergence of consequences shows the complex figuration and hybridisation of peacebuilding processes. The spectrum of consequences occurs in a cascading logic of emergent features. They follow a non-linear pattern between the intended impact and the consequences that emerge, often transcending the social field and affecting other fields of social interactions. The processes are not influenced and driven by international actors alone; local actors and factors also play an essential role in shaping the nature of processes. The remoteness of the spectrum of consequences does not necessary affect and harm only local subjects in

Peace figuration 59 post-conflict societies – sooner or later those consequences will haunt and strike back at foreign interveners. Consequences are products of relationships and simultaneously produce relationships. Hannah Arendt (1998: 183) argues that ‘it is because of the . . . existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that actions almost never achieves its purpose’. Translation of intentions into actions produces certain outcomes, which then shape directly and indirectly other peace-related processes, jointly producing outcomes often different from those intended. Consequently, peacebuilding organisations often witness the emergence of effects they do not want, do not have the ability to know, and cannot prevent. In essence, peacebuilding consequences are the result of the results of results. As Ulrich Beck (1992: 187) has argued: ‘[w]hat we do not see and do not want is changing the world more and more obviously and threateningly’. Thus, peacebuilding consequences represent the invisible constitution of peace and troubles in conflict-affect societies. The previous chapter established clearly that peacebuilding consequences are often ignored by peacebuilding organisations, and that the existing scholarship examines them inadequately. The main reason for ignoring the spectrum of consequences is related to the desire to preserve the undeserved moral legitimacy of peacebuilding organisations while suppressing true encounters of failure, and the desire to exercise power, maintain dominant hierarchies of order, and to achieve externally constructed intentions. Reality is often different. The social world is constructed in the negation and collusion of individual and collective intentionality, through the interaction of agents with different discursive figurations, power ratios and material strengths. Due to the desire of international peacebuilding actors to reach their intended outcomes and control peace events, the broader, distant, and unwanted results triggered by peacebuilding actions and events are often dismissed as unintended and unanticipated consequences. This leaves social and political actualities in post-conflict societies with a huge discrepancy between local complex truths, and those that are mediated, acknowledged and recorded by the peacebuilding apparatus. Therefore, in order to understand better the figuration of peace in practice, the consequences of peacebuilding should be studied more systematically. Examining the ability and/or inability of liberal peace to produce the intended consequences is a more realistic and appropriate form of a situated analysis, which assesses success based on what it preached and practiced, rather than on detached normative or analytical categories often seen in the critique of peacebuilding. Hence, rather than criticising immanently peacebuilding practices on dissimilar and unrelated criteria, the agency, seriousness, and normative entitlements of liberal peacebuilding could be more appropriately examined in a relational sense by looking at their ability or inability to reach their intended goals, to anticipate and prevent negative and harmful consequences. Therefore, differentiation and pluralisation of consequences is essential for reconstructing theoretical and empirical knowledge on the spectrum of consequences (see Buzan and Albert 2010). It is not a mere reflection of the existing conception of consequences, but rather it is a diffractive approach for figuring out the unknown

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legacies of peacebuilding that take place during and after the end of international interventions. Based on this logic, three types of consequences can be unpacked: unintended consequences, unanticipated consequences, and unprevented consequences. This typology of consequences does not mean it will manage to capture the entire spectrum of consequences in all its complexity, but it will serve as a useful way of making sense of the messy reality of post-conflict societies. As Beck (1992: 22) has argued, ‘in the risk society the unknown and unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and society’. Similar logic takes place in peacebuilding contexts. While unintended and unanticipated consequences are widely used in social theory, unprevented consequences are introduced here for the first time to delineate an important dimension of peacebuilding consequences. Unintended consequences are the most well-known of all types of consequences. Raymond Boudon (1982: 5) defines unintended consequences as perverse effects that include ‘individual and collective effects that result from the juxtaposition of individual behaviours and yet were not included in the actors’ explicit objectives. Robert Jervis (1997) considered the complex interconnectedness of units within a system as a prerequisite for unintended results. On the other hand, Mohammed Cherkaoui (2007: 7–9) argued that unintended consequences are caused by a mismatch between the means and ends of purposive action, interdependence between actors, spill-over effect of purposive action, and the conflict between different values and spheres of social life and values. In the context of peace figuration, unintended consequences can be defined as those consequences that emerge as a result of direct action by peacebuilding organisations that are not congruent with the expected outcomes; though unintended consequences can be also desirable and positive consequences. Describing an outcome or effect as an unintended consequence creates tremendous challenges for understanding the factors behind unintentionality. Unless the unintended consequence is traced back to the responsible agent and the actions and decisions taken by them, and unless the scope and conditions of unintentionality are verified, there is a high risk that the unintended consequences will not be adequately identified and accounted for. Unintended consequences can be traced through the failure to fulfil the intended goals of peacebuilding actors. They can emerge during or after the lifespan of peacebuilding interventions. Unanticipated consequences can be defined as those consequences that were not anticipated by the peacebuilding organisations. Compared to unintended consequences, unanticipated consequences are easier to trace, as the scope of factors that influence their occurrence is more evident. The pioneering work of Robert Merton (1936: 898–902) shows that unanticipated consequences of purposive actions can be triggered by five factors: a lack of knowledge; ignorance of the consequences; errors in the process of foresight; primacy of immediate interests over long-term effects; and self-defeating prophecies and premature pre-emptive actions. Beyond the negative connotation of the spectrum of consequences, unanticipated consequences can be seen as positive and desirable outcomes

Peace figuration 61 (Finnis 1991: 34). An unanticipated consequence does not mean it is unpredictable. The anticipation and predictability of consequences is an extremely difficult assessing task due to the agent’s self-reflective character and capacity to change its position and behaviour during the course of interaction with other agents, other sources of knowledge and experience (Monteiro 2012: 345). Based on this discussion, there are at least five conditions that facilitate the identification of unanticipated consequences: lack of context-relevant knowledge; ignorance of signals of peace-breaking events; erroneous assessment of peace and conflict conditions; mixed motives; and prioritising of immediate interests over future consequences. Preventing conflicts before and after their violent escalation is supposed to be at the heart of peacebuilding organisations’ mission to maintain international peace and security. However, preventive action often remains unattractive to policy-makers, especially when they do not represent immediate threats. This causes a perennial gap between early warning and early preventive action. A similar story often takes place during the peacebuilding process – the unfolding of violent events and emergence of deviance do not trigger appropriate reactions, often for the sake of maintaining stability and fragile peace, and ignorance of conflict prevention during the peacebuilding process can lead to undesired consequences. As introduced in this book, unprevented consequences refer to those consequences that occur as a result of inaction by the agents of peacebuilding, either at the stage before the effect is created or during an early stage of development, when the consequence would have been preventable and avoidable. Hence, unprevented consequences are similar to missed opportunities, which refer to a mismatch between the availability of early warnings and effective responses (George and Holl 2000: 22). Unprevented consequences can arise from inadequate analysis and inaccurate forecasts of consequences; ignorance of early warnings; and from slow, inefficient, and ill intended responses to peacebreaking developments. The unpreventability of consequences is measured and assessed within the agential realm and possibility of the agents, which includes the availability of authority and the presence of alternative possibilities for action (Widerker and McKenna 2006). Inaction can be intentional or unintentional, as well as motivated by the individual, collective, or strategic interests of international and local peacebuilding agents. While any purposive action can generate unintended consequences, the failure to react and prevent certain effects before they take place can generate unprevented consequences. The examination of these three types of consequences requires tracing back key triggering actions and the degree of intentionality behind each action, which represents the starting point of a circle influenced by previous knowledge, experiences, and events. The identification of consequences enables a retrospective examination of the factors that shape peace, especially the presence of intentionality, anticipation, and preventability. This helps to explain social actualities and attribute specific and relational responsibility for the consequences to responsible agents as individuals and collectives (see Visoka and Doyle 2014). It is important to note that the attribution of the spectrum of consequences is

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related to, and contingent upon, the normative position taken and the social functions performed. In this book, unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences are elaborated in relation to the declared intentions of international peacebuilders. However, seen from a different perspective, these consequences can also be intentionally produced by other (local) actors. For example, while we may consider that a particular failure of the international community led to unintended consequences, local actors may have perceived such consequences as their successful achievements. The same logic can apply to the cases of unanticipated and unprevented consequences. The disordered nature of peacebuilding is an opportunity for local agency to flourish, both in its positive and negative mutations. While the identification of peacebuilding consequences and attribution of responsibility marks the ending of figurational analysis in this book, certainly new figurations of peace continue to emerge with refined intentions, new events, liquid forms of interventions, and new emerging consequences. Therefore, the framework introduced in this chapter can be applied also for studying new phases after intervention and peacebuilding, which are likely to produce new figurations of actors, power, relations, and states of peace. While the theoretical contribution of peace figuration lies in promoting epistemological pluralism and non-conflictual theorising in peacebuilding studies, it is interesting to situate it within broader debates of peace in international relations. Oliver P. Richmond (2008) has undertaken one of the most comprehensive studies of peace in IR, which serves as a useful basis to compare the ontological and epistemological tenets of peace figuration with other IR theories. Richmond (2008: 154–156) shows that majority of theories of peace within the sub-fields of IR primarily deal with the question of peace, security, and conflict at the international level and often ignore theorising about domestic processes. This book adds to these debates that peace is an uncontrollable process, yet a relational product of situated and dislocated intentions, events, and consequences influenced by internal and external factors. Peace figuration rooted on epistemological pluralism contains elements of constructivism, critical and normative theory, feminism, and post-structuralism. While some of the convictions of peace figuration bear similarities to critical realism and constructivism in social theories (see Joseph and Wight 2010), the conceptual framework developed here draw mainly on Elias figurational sociology supplemented with other social theories and first-hand observation of peacebuilding interventions. Peace figuration’s relationality and its stance towards the inter-subjective nature of peace, power, and identity bear similarities to constructivism in IR. The critical and normative aspects are evident with disentangling of the discursive and praxeological inconsistencies of peacebuilding interventions. Highlighting the spectrum of consequences resonates similarities to different strands of feminism, especially with regard to the human calculus and politics of care about the impact of any social action. The convergence between peace figuration and post-structuralism is on the contingencies, temporalities, and impossibilities of peacebuilding. As peace figuration merges international and domestic levels of analysis, breaking away from positivist and

Peace figuration 63 post-positivist divides, and exploring the sociological dynamics of peacebuilding and peace-breaking, it has the potential to make a contribution to international political sociology. Beyond these convergence points, the strength of peace figuration is its potentiality for accounting about the most ignored and complex aspects of peacebuilding interventions, thus enhancing both scholarly debates and empirical knowledge about peacebuilding in violent conflict.

Tracing peace figuration in practice Examining peace figuration requires first-order observation and excavation of empirical sites, which raises essential questions about the appropriate methodological tool for studying peace figuration in practice. The peace figuration framework requires combining theoretical, sociological and praxeological aspects. Andrew Linklater (1998: 10) argues that ‘normative arguments . . . are incomplete without a parallel sociological account of how they can be realised in practice . . . and normative and sociological advances are incomplete without some reflection on practical possibilities’. Capturing the complexity of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict societies requires an exploration of aspects such as: the metaphysical dimensions of peacebuilding; undefined social practice; interjections between discursive and material aspects of social life; a multiplicity of networks of actors with distinct agendas; and peripheries and the displacement of events and outcomes. Tracing and understanding these aspects of the figuration of peace in conflict-affected societies require epistemological pluralism. Obviously, peace figuration requires a combination of methods that embrace complexity and contexts, avoid reductionism, and permit contingent generalisations. As post-conflict societies are the main fields of inquiry for peace figuration, case study research is the most suitable methodological choice. Case study research provides the necessary flexibility and opportunity to examine in-depth a number of contextual factors that provide fertile grounds for further generalisations (Yin 2003: 13–14). As Orum et al. (1991: 6) hold, case studies ‘provide information from a number of sources and over a period of time, thus permitting a more holistic study of complex social networks and of complexes of social action and social meanings’. Case study research provides the opportunity to account for embedded practices, and capture their meaning in a specific social context. This study focuses on three post-conflict societies that have experienced extensive and consecutive peacebuilding interventions. These types of case studies provide sufficient observable evidence to capture the figuration of peace after violent conflicts (Gerring 2007). Accordingly, this book will focus on three post-conflict societies: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. These three societies have experienced protracted and extensive international involvement, which provides sufficient evidence to study the impact of peacebuilding in practice. They have been some of the most distinctive proto-type cases of liberal interventionism in the dawn of twenty-first century. The analysis will focus on various aspects of peacebuilding, but security aspects are given more attention ‘owing to its potential to disrupt peace in many

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countries’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 13). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, police reform is taken as a case study to which the peace figuration framework of analysis is applied with particular focus on the intentions of the UN and EU for peacebuilding. It examines the spectrum of unintended consequences that emerged afterwards and how they have shaped peace in the country. In Kosovo, the critical agency of Serb parallel governance structures in the north of Kosovo is examined to highlight the unprevented consequences of UN peacebuilding as key properties that have shaped the figuration of peace in the country. In Timor-Leste, security sector development and reform is chosen to examine the figuration of liberal peace intentions, critical events, and the emergence of unanticipated consequences, which had collateral damage for peace, democratic governance, and the development of the country. While the analyses focus on one particular silent aspect of liberal peacebuilding, they can serve as illustrative examples of wider dynamics within these societies and beyond. Elias argued that human figurations could be captured through qualitative research rooted in contextual and empirical analysis while permitting a degree of interpretive generalisation. Hence, an appropriate conglomeration of qualitative methods would be to combine aspects of critical discourse analysis with practice theory and process tracing. In this methodological conglomeration, interpretive aspects are provided through critical discourse analysis, performative aspects and events are captured through analysis of practices, and peacebuilding consequences are examined through process tracing. This is similar to what Vincent Pouliot (2015: 237–238) calls ‘practice tracing’, which is a ‘hybrid methodological form’ and a ‘methodological middle ground’ between process tracing and interpretivism to account for how ‘social causality is to be established locally, but with an eye to producing analytically general insights’. While most discourse approaches concentrate on textual analysis, Norman Fairclough’s (1995) discourse method is more appropriate for peace figuration as it takes an interdisciplinary perspective that combines textual, societal, and cultural processes and structures. Ruth Wodak and Michael Mayer (2009: 2) reiterate this when they argue that critical discourse analysis study ‘social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach’. Fairclough applies the concept of discourse across three dimensions: discourse as text, discursive practice, and social practice. At the textual level, the content and form of expression are analysed to examine how content is organised in particular forms, and how different contents imply different textual forms. The function of discourse practices, seen as processes related to the production and consumption of the text, mediate the relationship between texts and social practice and, as such, can be seen in the function of a hegemonic struggle to transform the order and power relations of discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). The notion of intersubjectivity between text and context connects to the dimension of social practices, which seeks to explore the institutional context, and the wider group or social context. Of relevance, Fairclough seeks to combine different inference logics: the textual level involves description, whereas discourse practice follows an interpretive approach and social practice and context follow an explanatory approach.

Peace figuration 65 Therefore, critical discourse analysis can be used to identify and critically elaborate peacebuilding intentions through textual analysis of the official documents and other policy documents of peacebuilding organisations. As critical discourse analysis allows for examining discourses both at the textual level and as social practices, it enables identifying multiple intentions between insider and outsider agents as well as allowing the capture of how they interplayed in practice and produced consequences. They are identified through triangulation of textual interpretations and field research. Parallel to the textual analysis, discursive practices are essential to verify the following issues: the extent to which international and local actors were aware of the spectrum of consequences of their actions; the level of their contextual knowledge; their understanding of their expectations; subjective articulations of achievements and success; and the methods and technologies used to neutralise and dilute responsibility (Reckwitz 2002). The practice approach is adequate for capturing performances and interactions of peacebuilding protagonists within and outside institutional practices. Bourdieu (1990) defined practices as central for understanding the social world, social interactions, and social behaviour (see also Jenkins 1992: 41–45). Practices are not consciously organised and orchestrated. However, they may be a patterned way of doing things in a particular fashion. They are characterised by fluidity and indeterminacy where there is no prescribed recipe of rules or normative models of behaviour. Practices are both structural and agential as they occur within a social structure and they enable agents to form intentions and perform acts, while being shaped by the knowledge and context the agents possess (Schatzki 2001: 11; Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6). Practices produce social effects and thus possess causal power in a non-linear and unpredictable pattern. As Pouilot (2015: 241) argues ‘practices form a basic constitutive process of social life and politics, being a concrete, social flow of energy giving shape to history’. For example, practice such as arresting spoilers after conflict, introducing a law, meeting former foes for peace talks, the resistance of opposition groups, or demilitarising ex-combatants, produce different social effects in the form of reactions, changes in practice, or enforcement of law and order. Hence, observing the complexity of multiple actions, events, and the emergence of the spectrum of consequences through the lens of practice, provides a more effective, reality-adequate analysis. Practices capture the performance of peacebuilders, they enable looking at how a certain practice produces events, and how events shape practice, which result in unplanned outcomes. Nevertheless, as Pouilot (2015: 250) holds, ‘accounts of practices are interpretations of interpretations, they are fundamentally reconstructive’. In this sense, a suitable way of capturing practices in the context of peacebuilding is through interviews with stakeholders and, when possible, through various forms of observation of texts, events, and performances to ensure a balance between practice and abstraction. Finally, process tracing provides the opportunity to contextualise social events and investigate the emergence of the spectrum of consequences in a processual and systemic manner. Process tracing examines how certain outcomes

Identification of peacebuilding intentions. Elaboration of the declared intention of international and local actors.

UN official texts. Strategic policy documents. Policy statements. Memories and interviews.

Critical discourse analysis.

Analytical focus

Objects and sources of analysis

Methodological tools

Intentions

Table 3.1 Tracing peace figuration in practice Consequences

Practice theory.

Official texts. Legal and political documents. Archival records. Independent studies. Media texts and videos. Field research and interviews.

Process tracing.

Official assessments and evaluation texts. Opinion polls. Independent studies and assessments. Media texts and videos. Field research and interviews.

Identification of liberal peace events. Tracing a broad variety of consequences Examination of reasoning, actions, and by analysing the outcomes of the interaction of actors. implementation of declared intentions Examination of peacebuilding practices, and the particularities surrounding controversies and challenges. peacebuilding and peace-breaking events. Elaboration of the scope of consequences and the multiple implications.

Events

Peace figuration 67 have been influenced by certain causal factors, either in the form of initial and independent triggering conditions or in the form of intervening conditions that occur during an evolutionary stage before a particular outcome has taken place (George and Bennett 2005: 206). In exploring peace figuration, process tracing is used as a non-linear genealogical approach, which captures fragments of discursive formations and practices, power dynamics, and dominant events that lead to multiple and dislocated consequences (Foucault 1977b: 139; Milliken 1999: 243). Process tracing explains ‘why a particular outcome happened in specific cases’ (Mahoney 2010: 141). After utilising critical discourse analysis for examining peacebuilding intentions, process tracing can be used to examine, for instance, periodical reports on each country case study triangulated with relevant media reports and independent studies, and interviews with key local and international actors involved in this process. Table 3.1 above outlined more precisely the objects and sources of analysis, and specifies the methodological tools applied to different aspects of peace figuration. To disentangle declared intentions, a textual analysis is undertaken of the official discourse where the objects of analysis are the resolutions, mission statements, and other policy and strategic documents of peacebuilding organisations. Inter-textual analysis of the official discourses facilitates the identification of declared intentions and to situate the discourse in a language that corresponds to reality. This approach also provides a lens through which events can be analysed and the spectrum of consequences can be disentangled. Nevertheless, the narrative of the spectrum of consequences in each case can be developed through the analysis of multiple sources of information that include: official discourses, media reports, discourses of political opponents, sources of factual local knowledge, civil society perspectives, as well as marginal discourses of excluded groups (see Hansen 2006: 53–57). The combination of these methodological approaches provides the space for reflexive and systematic analysis of peacebuilding impact, as it provides the framework for engaging with multiple sources of knowledge, combining text and observation of practices with process-tracing of key events in making and unmaking post-conflict actuality. At best, it helps makes sense of certain fragments of social reality that are almost incomprehensible through any other type of research inquiry.

Conclusion This chapter introduced peace figuration as a new framework for analysing the intentions, events, and consequences of peacebuilding interventions. The reasoning for proposing peace figuration comes from the inadequacy of existing literature to explore sufficiently the effects of peacebuilding. As illustrated in the previous chapter, within peace and conflict studies both liberal and critical approaches to peacebuilding have not yet been able to address appropriately the consequences of peacebuilding due to paradigmatic contempt and epistemological differences. This chapter illustrated the usefulness of intellectual pluralism by bringing the work of Norbert Elias on figurational sociology to peacebuilding

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studies and showed how some of his key tenets would be useful for reconstructing the analytical approaches to studying peacebuilding after international interventions. As shown in this chapter, the linkage between intentions, events, and consequences is crucial as it captures the intentionality, performativity, and consequentialism of peacebuilding interventions. This does not make peace figuration a melting pot of multiple concepts and approaches, rather a well-calibrated framework for disentangling the complexity of peacebuilding interventions. The examination of consequences requires a situational critique, thus tracing back key intentions and events. Behind each action there is a degree of intentionality, which represents the starting point of a cycle influenced by previous knowledge, experiences, and events. The complex interaction of these aspects enables us to embrace and harness the complexity and discontent of contemporary peacebuilding actualities, where intentionality does not match with actions taken, the consequences remain unaccounted for, and the appropriate assignment of responsibility is almost non-existent. The next three chapters in this book will provide detailed empirical examinations of peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste. The framework of peace figuration does not have pre-determined expectations as to what the empirical findings will be. While the framework contains certain conceptual contours, the figuration of peace in each post-conflict society is different, which reveals that peace figuration is not a theory of action that can be chopped down into policy actions and translated into practice. It is, rather, a relational and evaluative framework for peacebuilding interventions. Every empirical application of peace figuration is likely to produce different findings. This is primarily because intentions, events, and consequences are not static; they are deeply situational, fluid, and contingent to the particular constellation of relations between the multiple actors performing within a particular figuration. Therefore, the added value of peace figuration is in breaking away from the conventional modes of theories – both in liberal-interventionist and criticalemancipatory epistemological camps – to generate new, more reality-adequate and situated knowledge about peacebuilding interventions.

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Part II

Peace figuration in practice

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4

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction The previous chapter provided a conceptual framework for disentangling peace figuration after international intervention in conflict-affected societies. This chapter is the first of three case studies of peace figuration in the peacebuilding context, which explores the intentions, events, and consequences of police reform undertaken by the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Police reform in BiH was the first such experience for the UN and the EU in a post-conflict peacebuilding context. Police were viewed as the main actors in extensive human rights abuses during and after the conflict, as their primary role was to enforce ethnic partition and incite political violence. Reforming police structures as part of security sector reform has been one of the main components of liberal peacebuilding in BiH (UNSC 2002: 3; Okuizumi 2002). It was part of the international efforts to monopolise the use of violence in a socially and politically legitimate manner to ensure social pacification after the violent conflict. Both the UN and the EU missions have been declared successfully completed and were highly praised for their performance. While police reform in BiH is extensively researched in peacebuilding studies, the spectrum of consequences they produced is largely overlooked. Applying the framework of peace figuration enables us to capture the complexity of police reform and its role in peacebuilding by looking at the multiplicity of intentions of local and international actors, the key events that shaped the process, and the spectrum of unintended consequences that have resulted from failed police reform in BiH. This chapter argues that international efforts to build peace in BiH have unintentionally institutionalised ethnic factions in the country, which in turn have jeopardised peacebuilding efforts. BiH today remains a dysfunctional state with stalled prospects for ethnic reconciliation, an ineffective government and economy, and a restricted perspective for European integration. It was this very attempt to solidify peace in BiH that has resulted in impeding any chance for sustainable peace and the removal of destructive ethno-nationalists politics as well as paralysing the prospects for reconciliation and the functioning of state institutions in BiH. The dynamics of peace figuration in the country question the dominant discourses perceiving

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the international community as a controller of the peacebuilding processes and the local actors as disempowered voices. Instead, the peacebuilding process is less predictable and the power relations constantly shift, which effectively shape peace in unwanted directions. A figurational analysis of Bosnia’s police reform shows the process was prone to failure because of divergent perspectives on how to govern security, which was enabled by a power struggle between the international community and mono-ethnic political factions. The permanence of crisis was the legitimising source for both international and local actors (Chandler 2014: 121). The foundational problem of troubled peacebuilding in BiH was the persistence of different intentions behind police reform. This incompatibility represented the local choice of power over peace. The three main ethnic groups represented by nationalist factions tried to use police reform not as an instrumental mechanism for establishing the rule of law and order in the country, but more as a means of controlling post-conflict processes. On the other hand, the international community tried to impose a new culture of so-called ‘democratic policing’, free from political interference and in defence of the law and citizens. However, the international presence in BiH has constantly changed the intentionality of police reform – perceiving it initially as crucial for peacebuilding and statebuilding and later as the main condition for European integration. This deviation of intentionality alongside the conflicting agenda of local actors weakened the bargaining power and credibility of the international community in BiH and entrenched mutual distrust and uncooperative relations. As illustrated by the analysis of the multiplicity of events, these divergent intentions have complicated and jeopardised police reform for more than fifteen years. The regional nature of the Bosnian conflict led to a complex peace settlement that gave extensive powers to entitybased institutions and executive powers to the High Representative. Contrary to many critical views, it was the ethnic obstructionism and local resistance to the peace process that intensified the High Representative’s policy of imposing rules and conditions for enforcing the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) (Leroux-Martin 2014). Hence, UN- and EU-led police reform was caught in a power struggle to remove the local institutional and political ownership of the peace process, and create a peaceful and viable state. This shared ownership of security sector reform paralysed police reform for more than a decade, which resulted in multiple unintended consequences. Beyond these structural aspects of resistance and contestation, the examination of some of the key events that have shaped the police reform process illustrates the limited capacity and strategic ineffectiveness of the international peacebuilders in handling this aspect of security sector reform. The first stage of police reform, which took place between 1996 and 2002, was carried out by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF ). It focused on certifying and structuring police forces without challenging the operation of multiple, overlapping, and fragmented police forces at the entity and cantonal level. The resulting police forces were fragmented, overstaffed, and subject to structural political interference and

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 77 control. The rushed process for certifying police officers failed to exclude individuals with criminal records and a background of illegal activities. After 2003, when the UN handed over the process to the EU, the main challenges of police reform included how to make the police forces work together; to remove them from political control; to make the police more accountable; and increase their coordination and effectiveness. The EU Police Mission (EUPM), which operated between 2002 and 2012, attempted to centralise the operation of multiple police structures and reduce political control over the rule of law through a protracted police reform process. With its non-executive mandate, the EUPM was unable to make the police more accountable, better structured, and compliant with European policing practices. Consequently, the main challenge for EUPM and the OHR was the attempt to make multiple police forces more centralised and unified under state-level institutions, and less dependent on nationalist leaders and ethnic political factions. While exploring intentions and events provides revealing insights on peace figuration, it is the examination of broader consequences that provides the added value of a figurational analysis of peacebuilding interventions. Police reform was a highly unpredictable process. Jarrett Blaustein’s (2015: 9) most recent ethnographical work on police reform in BiH reaches a similar conclusion that ‘one cannot simply assume that the policy outputs which result from policy translation processes structure policy outcomes in predictable ways’. While peacebuilding is prone to unintended and unpredicted consequences, it does not mean that they cannot be observed and studied post hoc. Mistakes made by the international administrators and the ethno-nationalist protagonists with regard to police reform have haunted Bosnian society for many years. The UN, driven by a stabilisation and conflict containment policy, decided to legitimise the existing mono-ethnic police structures through a problematic selection process. This consequently permitted local political leaders to institutionalise their control over police forces and use them to advance mono-ethnic political agendas. Police forces were among the main obstructers to implementing various aspects of the DPA. Local police forces played a direct role in undermining peacebuilding in BiH by instigating inter-ethnic fear and provocation, delaying refugee return, and failing to protect human rights. The decentralised figuration of the police sector in BiH delayed the identification and prosecution of war crimes suspects throughout the country and obstructed inter-ethnic reconciliation. Police forces became part of the organised crime and corruption networks in BiH, which undermined institution-building, economic development, and human security. This spectrum of consequences shows that the police as perceived enforcers of stability became the key un-makers of sustainable peace in war-shattered BiH. While these adverse outcomes were not intended by the international community, it shows that when intervention in one sector, such as in police reform, interacts with local particularities, far reaching negative effects can be produced. This chapter is organised as follows. First, divergent peacebuilding intentions are examined to figure out how the intentions behind the declared intentions of all parties involved in the peacebuilding have shaped the

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peace process in BiH. The chapter then undertakes a processual analysis of key events that have shaped police reform in BiH from 1996 to 2008. The third and main part of the chapter explores the spectrum of unintended consequences of the failed police reform in BiH. The chapter concludes with a number of reflexive observations that can be extracted from the figuration of peace in BiH.

Figuring out intentions behind intentions Exploring the intentions of actors involved in peace processes is a difficult task as they are often hidden, change in the course of performative actions, and could be delusional. However, despite the criticism of intentionality being associated with rationality and modernity, the examination of intentions expressed as discursive statements or grouped heterogeneously in the form of dispositifs is crucial for structuring the analysis of peace figuration. What is interesting regarding peacebuilding intentions in BiH is not so much the declared intentions, but the intentions behind the declared intentions. This section identifies the key declared intentions of peacebuilding actors and points out observable aspects of the inconsistencies and incompatibilities among the intentions. The multiple international organisations involved all had their own distinct intentions, often incompatible with each other. The entire police reform process is characterised first by the absence of shared intentionality among the international community, and then by the absence of collective intentionality of all the local and international actors to make BiH a peaceful and viable state. The overarching document that solidified the declared intentions for peacebuilding in BiH was the DPA and its eleven annexes, which regulated the security, political, economic, and humanitarian aspects of the post-conflict peace process. The main constitutional texts incorporated later in the DPA were drafted and adapted during the final stages of the conflict. The DPA annexes form the basis of all international intentional actions in BiH since the war ended in 1995, alongside specific modifications introduced continuously since then by the Peace Implementation Council and the Office of the High Representative. The overall peacebuilding intentionality in BiH consisted of: re-establishing security; creating institutional and political conditions for stability; establishing democratic governance through elections; establishing federalised power-sharing system; reforming the economy; and promoting human rights and human security.1 These enlisted intentions represent the assembled package of liberal peacebuilding agenda, often mutated and reproduced across different conflict-affected societies. Most importantly, the security sector reform was considered crucial for implementing all other aspects of the peace settlement.2 The international community identified five security-related areas that required intervention: the establishment of an InterEntity Boundary Line; managing the army’s disintegration, disarmament, and defence reform; managing police reform; and the establishment of institutional architecture for security institutions in the country.3 In this realm of multiple intentions, police reform emerged as a crucial priority in providing public

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 79 security and stabilising the situation, building institutions, engaging in ethnic reconciliation, and enabling socio-economic recovery. What underlined police reform was an attempt to ‘change the mindset of the locally responsible people and to create a new culture of governing’ (Muehlmann 2007: 376). Moreover, strengthening the management capacity of the police force to implement appropriate policing tasks, aimed to bring BiH closer to democratic societies that uphold and enforce law and order in an impartial way (Dorn and King 2005: 74). In more practical terms, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as the lead international civilian authority in BiH perceived police reform as part of the overall implementation of the DPA, as an effort to strengthen Bosnian joint institutions, and for the prosecution of war criminals who were protected by obstructive politicians and police forces, mainly in the Republika Srpska (RS). Following the inability of the IPTF to successfully reform police forces and establish solid structures for democratic policing in BiH, the EU launched its first police mission abroad in 2003 to address this issue in BiH. The declared intentions of the EUPM were aimed at ‘mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police service operating in accordance with best European and international standards’ (EU Council 2005). The EU’s guiding premise has been that establishing and strengthening security institutions would make the police forces efficient, functional, and accountable, as well provide support for the European integration process of BiH. However, the EU had its own collective strategic and self-interested intentions beyond these declared intentions. The EU used police reform in BiH to prevent the spread of organised crime in the Balkans and the EU. In addition, as the EUPM was the first mission launched abroad by the EU the stakes were high for the EU to make it succeed at any price. Both the UN and the EU formulated these declared intentions based on short-term fact-finding missions prior to the deployments, which failed to grasp the complexity of the issues or to take into account local perspectives. While it is widely perceived that the international community has successfully implemented the DPA, the substance of this agreement was profoundly shaped by the political interests of neighbouring Serbia and Croatia. Both countries had territorial aspirations for dividing BiH, however they made a trade-off with the international community to respect BiH territorial integrity in exchange for Croatia gaining control of East Slavonia; removal of sanctions on Serbia; and for devising a complex power-sharing agreement that would preserve extensive powers for Bosnian Croats and Serbs (Leroux-Martin 2014: 151). Against this background, mono-ethnic police forces were crucial for each side to safeguard their pre- and post-war nationalist interests. Accordingly, after intervention, Bosnian Serbs considered the police reform an attempt of internationals and Bosniaks to weaken and abolish the entity-based de-centralised power-sharing system. The reform is perceived as an almost existential challenge to preserve their political autonomy and political and security control over RS. On the other hand, Bosniaks saw police reform as an opportunity to strengthen the state-level institutions and thus

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centralise Bosnian sovereignty over security affairs.4 Bosnian Croats have hidden behind the Bosnian Serbs’ obstruction to maintaining a neutral and balanced position despite their desire to preserve control over police forces in their areas of domination. These intentions behind official intentions have undermined the efforts to build democratic police forces and have provided opportunities for ethno-nationalist political leaders to exploit this process for their own agendas. Identifying these diverse intentions is important because it helps elucidate how local and international actors in BiH approached peacebuilding with different end goals, which certainly represents a predictable discrepancy of the entire police reform process and its potential consequences. In theory, intentions guide actions and produce intended effects. At least this is the rational constitutive logic of human agency. However, in the context of peacebuilding, declared collective intentions of international organisations and those of local parties have unravelled in a paradoxical mutation. The instrumentality behind the declared intentions for police reform in post-conflict BiH has been a performative disguise. While in some instances police reform was considered to be the goal to establish the rule of law, in other instances it was presented as a means to preserve stability, facilitate refugee return, protect minorities, weaken nationalist and obstructionist factions in all sides, and advance EU integration processes. On the other hand, the declared intentions for police reform were related to reforming police structures that would improve the rule of law, free police from political interference, and increase accountability. In practice, however, the entire police reform process tackled political issues such as the constitutional rearrangement of entities, the centralisation of power, and the side-lining of nationalist factions. Consequently, the international attempts to make constitutional changes and impose police reform were ineffective and further encouraged local resistance (Tolksdorf 2013: 24–25). This transformation of intentionality has resulted in weakening the bargaining power, seriousness, and credible commitment of the international community in BiH (Bassuener 2005: 124–125). Most importantly, this dynamical multiplicity of intentionality sourced on past, present, and future related intentions have unfolded an unexpected course of events, producing unintentional outcomes.

Making, breaking, and remaking police reform in BiH The majority of declared intentions elaborated above presume some form of action, which, in essence, constitutes the intentionality-performativity nexus. While intentions are an important starting point for analysing peace figuration, they are insufficient without process tracing of the events that surround the struggle for performing these incompatible intentions in practice. Thomas Muehlmann (2007: 378) righty argues that ‘[p]olice reform with the ultimate aim of creating a healthy interaction between the political elite and the police is not an event, but a process – in particular under such difficult starting conditions as in Bosnia’. In understanding what shaped police reform in BiH, it is important to capture the struggle between local politicians and external peacebuilding actors

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 81 in shaping the institutional and performative character of police forces. As this section illustrates, there were two major stages that have been crucial in shaping police reform in BiH. Whereas the first stage illustrates the UN’s efforts to reform the existing police structures and make them work in service of peace and stability in the country, the second stage focuses on the EU’s efforts to remake police forces in BiH. The making, breaking, and then remaking of police reform in BiH provides important insights for understanding how confrontations between foreign interveners and ethno-nationalist factions have shaped peace in this war-shattered and ethnically-divided society. UN-led police reform: from communist to democratic policing? The first most important event was the end of the war and the signing of the DPA, whereby all parties agreed that a new police system would be introduced to institutionalise the ethnically-divided police forces that operated separately during war time. The responsibility for running police affairs in accordance with internationally recognised standards was delegated to entities, cantons, and their respective ministries of interior. In such a widely decentralised police system, with thirteen law enforcement agencies, no authority was vested in state-level institutions. The decision for immediate transfer of policing authority to local counterparts was taken by the US and European partners who could not agree on granting the International Police Task Force (IPTF ) an executive mandate and the authority to arrest people, fearing that this would trigger destabilisation and ethnic violence (Holbrooke 1998: 221). The key architect of the DPA, Richard Holbrooke, admitted that ‘IPTF was entirely our fault . . . this was simply a failure within the American and European alliance. The Europeans refused to have the IPTF authority to arrest people, they would just not agree, and this was a mistake’.5 The failure to pursue a more centralised police system in BiH had tremendous implications for forming peace and consolidating the new political institutions in the country. Some of the DPA provisions did not lead to a more self-sustaining peace. Rather, they instituted a self-sustaining impediment to peace in BiH. To assist in reforming the police, the international community agreed to establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF ) that operated as a civilian police component, managed by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) (UNSC 1995). In essence, the IPTF had fewer than 2000 international police officers, a broad and vague mandate, limited resources, and unqualified international personnel who had to deal with decentralised police structures entrenched in their political strongholds and uncompromising attitudes toward change and reconciliation (UNSC 1996). To achieve the broad mandate, the IPTF focused its work in selecting, certifying and de-certifying, and restructuring the police forces to make them operate free from political interferences and in line with human rights standards. (UNSC 1997a: 1). However, the IPTF lacked effective mechanisms to sanction non-compliance of local police forces, apart from rhetorically rebuking them for the failure to provide public security in

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BiH (Holbrooke 1998: 324). Weak authority granted to the UN mission in BiH meant that local political factions disregarded most of the international efforts to reform police after the war. Any attempt to challenge this figuration of power resulted in institutional confrontation, disregard of international authority, as well as open and hidden resistance. One of the major challenges for the IPTF was the completion of a full screening and certification of law enforcement personnel. From 44,000 personnel, UNMIBH registered 23,751 officers of which 481 officers failed to pass the certification procedure (UNSC 2002: 3–4). For those who failed certification, an independent review panel was created to handle appeal cases. The panel had no overruling authorities but could suggest that the IPTF Commissioner reconsider his decision in case any additional information or evidence was not included in the certification process. The strategy of the international community was to filter and reconstruct the police forces, remove the deviant and spoiler elements, and ensure compliance with international policing standards by vetting and screening local police forces (Vejnović and Lalić 2005). This process took effect only in late 1998 when the IPTF was granted executive authority to investigate human rights abuses of local police forces (Donais 2006: 177). It was effectively the local resistance to international peacebuilding efforts that gave rise to more robust and interventionary forms by the High Representative. The more power the High Representative had and the more resistance local actors showed the narrower became the space for dialogue, compromise, and fulfilment of peacebuilding goals. Between 1996 and 1997, the IPTF was mainly involved in observing the security situation, improving the freedom of movement, and monitoring the performance of local police forces regarding the return of refugees, early elections, and public order (Pejanović 2007). However, the IPTF had no clear strategy for ensuring that the rule of law contributed to peacebuilding and the post-war stabilisation of BiH. As the efforts for implementing security aspects of the DPA were underway and the inter-boundary lines were being set, the challenge of working with local police forces became more obvious as they either withdrew from supporting international efforts, or became active protagonists of obstruction. One of the main reasons why police reform was a difficult process was ‘the tight relationship maintained between political power and the law enforcement apparatus’ (Leroux-Martin 2014: 19). As the IPTF was vulnerable when facing local actors, they patrolled with NATO peacekeepers (IFOR and later SFOR) for protection and enforcement. As a result of these anomalies, the relationship between local and international actors was gradually ruined and mutual distrust underlined most political interactions. The final aspect of police reform included capacity-building and training for all certified police. UNMIBH also established two police academies in BiH to train police and new cadets, including minority police. Parallel to police restructuring, UNMIBH worked in strengthening police components within the criminal justice system, including creation of various institutional mechanisms to foster cooperation between police and judicial bodies in BiH, and consolidating effective state law enforcement institutions and inter-police cooperation

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 83 mechanisms such as an integrated State Border Service to manage the land and airspace borders in the whole of BiH (UNSC 2002: 5). As part of this goal, UNMIBH also helped strengthen capacities for combating organised crime and human trafficking. However, a shortage of resources and professional trainers obstructed the complete fulfilment of this goal. The IPTF provided short training courses, which consisted of information about police reconstruction, human dignity, and community policing (Day 2000: 157–160). The UN-led police reform in BiH took place at a time when the nationalist parties among the three constitutive ethnic groups managed to win the local and national elections and consolidate their political power. Most of the international attention was dedicated to early elections as an exit strategy, which left security sector reform behind. Multiple electoral cycles in BiH intended to establish democratic structures, which resulted in numerous irregularities that produced ‘ethnocracies’ enshrined in undemocratic and illiberal policies. As Muehlmann (2007: 380) argues ‘the absence of new democratic structures comparable to Western standards exposed that inherited problems of governance had a direct impact on policing’. Hence, possession of centralised and mono-ethnic police forces was instrumental for local political factions to defend their interests. At the time, indicted war criminals were still free and they exerted strong political influence over the electoral dynamics, undermining any chance for democratic processes in the entity. The constant election irregularities and attempts by nationalist factions to dominate them forced the international community to remove party members from election competition as a remedial measure to discipline political behaviour and maintain peace and stability at any price. Effectively, ‘[l]ocal politicians, police chiefs, and party leaders who owed their wealth and influence to the legacy of ethnic cleansing remained unchallenged’ (Stewart and Knaus 2011: 202). This power struggle directly influenced the police reform process, and entrenched distrust and hostile relations between the international actors and local political representatives. EU-led police reform: from peacebuilding to European integration When the IPTF completed its mission, it did not challenge the de-centralised, politicised, and ethnically-organised multiple police forces in BiH. Aware that police reform in BiH was far from being complete when the IPTF ended its operation in 2002, the EUPM was established on 1 January, 2003, as a temporary mission with non-executive powers. The EUPM was the first EU mission abroad under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (EU Council 2002). The main challenge for the EUPM was to restructure the fragmented, overstaffed, and financially unviable police forces in BiH.6 The EUPM had to deal with the legacies of the IPTF ’s ineffectiveness, implementing a nonexecutive mandate, and merging European police serving within the IPTF. As opposed to the UN, the EU used its foreign policy tools, aid conditionality, and enlargement leverage as ‘carrots and sticks’, by making police reform one of the main conditions for advancing BiH’s European integration process (Merlingen

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and Ostrauskaite 2006). The EUPM took on a major challenge to restructure and centralise police forces, but did not anticipate the complexity, political resistance, and longevity of the process. To operationalise its mandate of reforming BiH’s police forces for the second time, the EUPM focused on four areas: ‘police independence and accountability; organized crime and corruption; financial viability and sustainability; and institutional capacity-building at management level’ (EU Council 2002). While the main preoccupation of the EUPM was police reform, their efforts to fight organised crime were limited only to providing institutional support to Bosnian police authorities. Regarding organised crime and corruption, the EUPM mainly assisted local police in developing technical capacities and supported them during major crime investigations. The EUPM engaged in soft approaches by trying to coordinate all local and international actors, networking and exchanging information, and promoting partnership with civil society. However, multiple structural constraints effectively weakened the EUPM’s ability to make a positive contribution. With regard to the goal of police independence and accountability, the EUPM was unable to reach this strategic priority due to structural factors and negative legacies of fifteen police forces at the entity and cantonal level, which had their separate and complex sets of laws and practices deeply entrenched in politicised and mono-ethnic networks. As the appointment of senior police officers was based on political affiliation and support from political parties, the EUPM was unsuccessful in depoliticising the police forces. The police restructuring process was at the centre of EUPM activity in BiH. As the international community was tired with the hopelessness of discourse on peacebuilding, the EU tried to reenergise the police reform process by placing it at the heart of BiH’s European integration conditionality. The EU’s rationale behind police reform was to reduce complex political processes to technical issues. The EU perceived the decentralised, fragmented, and politicised police structures as an impediment to BiH’s EU and NATO integration, an obstruction to war crimes prosecution, as well as an impediment to the implementation of the peace agreement (European Commission 2003). Moreover, the idea was to get political leaders to agree among themselves to a model of policing without political interference (Muehlmann 2007: 378). In December 2003, the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board welcomed the intention of the High Representative (HR) ‘to focus on implementing the effectiveness of the police in Bosnia, in close cooperation with EUPM’ (PIC 2003). Following this, HR Paddy Ashdown took measures to establish an internationally-led commission with the primary mission to create ‘a single structure of policing in BiH under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in the Council of Ministers’ (OHR 2004: 2). This aimed both to address the failure of the IPTF to build an effective police service in BiH, and to respond to the growing demands from the PIC Steering Board to urgently implement systemic changes in security and law enforcement structures. It followed the logic of resolving issues through commissions applied during earlier reforms of tax administration, and defence and intelligence services.

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 85 The EU emphasised that a successful police restructuring in BiH should centralise the competence for police matters, including legislation and budgeting, to the state level. Political oversight of police was envisaged to be exercised by the Ministry of Security at state level, and the size and shape of local policing regions were to be determined according to criteria that ensured effective policing beyond local political agendas (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012). The EU sent a letter to the Bosnian government stating that ineffective law enforcement in BiH threatened the EU’s internal security, and that the EU could not consider as partners police forces that did not broadly share the same competencies as police elsewhere in Europe (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012: 56). Police reform was one of the areas where local political forces had constitutional powers, vested in them by the DPA, to resist international community and counterbalance the unstoppable policy for war crime prosecution and sacking of ‘undisciplined’ political leaders. Among Bosnian Serbs, the perception that the deal between OHR and the EU Commission made police reform a criterion for BiH’s eventual entry to the EU, triggered negative reactions and mobilised Serb factions to criticise the transformation of the deal into an official policy.7 Moreover, several EU ambassadors in BiH discouraged Serb politicians from following the police reform dynamics set by HR Ashdown. Former BiH Prime Minister, Adnan Terzic, testified that several ambassadors were against the EU principles (Lindvall 2009: 114). A US report revealed that Bosnian interlocutors complained that ‘EU mixed messages on SAA conditionality and shifting OHR approaches have hindered the conclusion of a police reform package, and have made it more difficult for us to follow a constantly changing EU lead’.8 Ultimately, the more the police reform negotiations failed, the more Serb nationalist parties gained political and popular legitimacy to resist international stakeholders and further centralisation of police structures.9 HR Paddy Ashdown’s decision to link police reform with EU enlargement conditionality was considered a mistake because it reduced his own leveraging role and also endangered the EU integration process for BiH (Metz 2010: 89). The attempt to reduce a highly sensitive political process to a technical process resulted in a number of problems that undermined prospects for a solution on police restructuring. Local leaders involved in the police restructuring process opposed the working methodology and the limited space for shaping the restricting process. Nationalist factions intentionally delayed the police reform process by exploiting the legal provisions of the DPA, and by rejecting any attempt that would lead to strengthening the unity of BiH (UNSC 1997: 3). Local political parties exploited the regular occurrence of elections as a pretext to delay police reform, arguing that police reform, minority recruitment, and refugee return would harm their election campaigns. These endless negotiations enabled the previously moderate opposition to exploit the reform process to change their political discourse, and gain political power by radicalising and rejecting the police restructuring. In other words, police reform took place during a time when local leaders were tired of international supervision and wanted to conduct their own affairs.

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In 2004, the police restructuring commission issued the final report recommending either the centralisation of police forces under the control of the state institutions, or a variety of options for territorial re-organisation of police (OHR 2004). While there was complete international consensus for the single structure of police, representatives from the RS rejected most recommendations for creating a single state structure, as they would lose direct political control over police operations in RS. They constantly used their entity parliament to contest the decisions of political representatives and those of the HR. In a deeply hostile, ethnically divided society, political compromise did not increase their local legitimacy. On the contrary, it created space for new nationalist figures to obstruct the peacebuilding process. While police reform has been one of the less sensitive pathways for implementing the DPA, it took place parallel to the failed constitutional reform process, which aimed at finding an alternative arrangement for the state and entity level institutions for a more centralised, harmonised, and efficient state administration (Sebastian 2010). Following the Serbian blockage of the police reform process, the HR strongly condemned the Bosnian Serb leadership for using the DPA as an impediment to reforms and the European future of BiH (Dnevni Avaz 2005). Similarly, while not directly related to police reform, the indication from the West that Kosovo deserved independence, increased Serbia’s and Russian interference in Bosnia to oppose the powers and decisions of High Representative, affected the police reform process (Leroux-Martin 2014: 30–41). This indicates that peacebuilding is not only affected by micro-political dynamics at the epicentre of developments, but also by detached and unrelated events and geopolitical interests. After nearly two more years of negotiations, the HR who acted also as EU’s Special Representative endorsed the option of partial centralisation of police competences (Bassuener 2005: 124–125). The stalemate was overcome only after the EU increased its pressure by making the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) conditional on accepting police reform. However, as Roberto Belloni argued, ‘the EU never fully identified with the police reform pursued by the High Representative’ (2009: 365). In addition, the EU accepted such a compromise solution due to fears that the breaking up of Montenegro from the union with Serbia in 2006 and the determination of Kosovo’s final status would undermine stability in BiH. Consequently, one month later, the RS National Assembly accepted the agreement on restructuring of police structures and opened the path for transferring all the competences over police legislation and financial matters to the state level. This victory was short-lived as the implementation of police reform reached a new significant obstacle after the 2006 general elections in BiH. Milorad Dodik, who was elected as a new prime minister of the RS, immediately changed the policy he signed in 2005 agreeing to a single police structure and took a strong stand against it. The EUPM and international actors had not expected that a change of government would affect the police reform process. Consequently, a new negotiation process lasted almost eight months until an agreement was reached in October 2007 with the so-called ‘Mostar Declaration’, whereby all parties reaffirmed the commitment to ‘establishing a functional, multiethnic and

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 87 professional police . . . which shall guarantee the security of all citizens and goods on the entire territory of BiH’ (OHR 2007a). The police reform legislation adopted in April 2008 marked the end of the longest and most difficult reform talks in the post-Dayton history of BiH, and the beginning of the complex implementation of police institutions and operational architecture. The Head of the EUPM, Brigadier General Vincenzo Coppola, declared that: The adoption of the police reform legislation is of major importance for BiH as it not only moves the country out of the police reform deadlock, which represented a major obstacle on BiH’s path towards Europe, but also represents a step forward towards the creation of a more efficient police structure (EUPM 2008) Despite the official conclusion of police reform, police forces continued to operate based on the existing constitutional arrangement in BiH and did not achieve greater centralisation of police structures. Autonomous cantonal police forces are still supervised by entity police structures, parallel to the existence of state-level police institutions.10 The package of laws continues to be partially implemented and police agencies at the state level remain weak and ineffective (Flessenkemper and Helly 2013). The former Head of European Commission Delegation in BiH openly admitted that police reform was weakened and its implementation was uncertain (Humphreys and Jelišić 2010: 451). The Head of the EUPM, General Vincenzo Coppola, admitted that in terms of police reform, ‘it is not a secret that we did not reach our goals entirely’ blaming the top-down approach of the international community in BiH, which had its limitations, and admitting that bottom-up approaches would have been more beneficial (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012: 77). In the end, the EUPM admitted that the timing of police reform was inadequate and that the scope was ambitious. The process was proposed at a time when there was insufficient political agreement among the political leaders. Related to this, the police reform was held hostage to failed constitutional reform, and effective police reform in BiH is dependent on the modalities of constitutional changes that have not occurred for almost twenty years after the end of the Bosnian war. Accordingly, this marked a failed decade of police reform in Bosnia, which ultimately did not achieve the declared intentions, but rather triggered multiple unintended consequences. As Blaustein (2015: 10) pointed out, ‘the international community’s role in governing security in BiH has, at times, undermined the prospect of establishing “democratically responsive” police institutions in weak and structurally dependent societies’.

The unintended consequences of the police reform process in BiH The discussion of police reform in BiH so far reveals how the international community’s peace-making intentions to accommodate the positions of three different

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ethnic groups in BiH resulted in the formation of new police structures, which were decentralised, mono-ethnic, and subject to political control from national factions. In the past two decades, police reform being at the heart of peacebuilding process in BiH has encountered constant local resistance, and served as retaliatory mechanisms of the High Representatives. Despite the limited achievements, the UN declared the IPTF in 2002 a successful mission that managed to reform, downsize, reshuffle, train, monitor, and empower the local police forces (UNSC 2002). The UN praised its ability to ‘complete a complex mandate in accordance with a strategic plan and within realistic and finite time frame’ (2002: 8). The UN went as far as to argue that ‘by improving public security and reforming and restructuring the police, UNMIBH helped lay the foundations for post-war recovery and development’ (UNSC 2002: 9). The EU also declared the police reform process successful in 2008. Former HR and EU Special Representative for BIH, Mirsolav Lajćak (2012: 2–4) argued that the EUPM is ‘a clear success within the CSDP’ claiming that the EUPM ‘was successful in helping to change Bosnian political mentalities and brought the institutions and practices in line with EU-standards’. Former international workers in BiH that have written about police reform highlight their personal observations of the process and immediate outcomes, while evidently blaming local actors and local culture without paying much attention to the broader consequences of police reform (see for example: Muehlmann 2007; Humphreys and Jelišić 2010; Leroux-Martin 2014). The impact of failed police reform in Bosnia is often related to broader structural anomalies of the DPA as well as to the dynamic and processual factors that have underlined international efforts to impose a particular model of policing and to the local ethno-nationalist resistance (Leroux-Martin 2014: 197). However, the broader and unintended consequences of police reform in BiH remain largely unexplored. The former High Representative in BiH, Paddy Ashdown (2007: 108) admitted that ‘unless you are prepared to look at the question holistically, success will not be possible’. The discussion of unintended consequences highlights both the limits of peacebuilding in BiH as well as uncovers the camouflages of failures under the register of unintentional outcomes of complex interactions with local actors. The spectrum of consequences that emerged during and after failed police reform in BiH has undermined the implementation of peacebuilding agenda in BiH, as well as complicated further the possibility of a durable peace and functioning state institutions. By agreeing to preserve old policing structures, and failing to reform police forces, the UN and EU peacebuilders unintentionally contributed to practices such as: allowing political interference into law enforcement structures; informal policing and cooperation with criminal groups; protecting war criminals and obstructing transitional justice; and spreading human insecurity, human rights abuses, and discrimination against IDPs, minorities, and women. Moreover, the police reform process led to the nurturing of political confrontation and exclusionary politics, the strengthening of nationalist factions and suppressed political moderation, as well as the discouraging of cooperation and promotion of obstruction. The remainder of this chapter elaborates some of the most significant unintended consequences of police reform in BiH.

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 89 Multiple decentralised, ineffective, and politicised police structures The first unintended consequence of police reform under the UN and the IPTF was the entrenchment of a decentralised, ineffective, and politicised police structure. The DPA provisions on security established a complex police structure with multiple interior ministries at the entity and cantonal level and weak state-level cooperation and coordination. Nationalist factions in each entity had the authority to control cantonal and entity-based ministries of internal affairs, as well as police structures. The budget and oversight for police were left in the hands of cantonal and entity based parliaments, which again were controlled by nationalist parties. Although the architects of the DPA intentionally agreed to leave the police competences to entity governments, they did not intend to entrench an ineffective and politicised policing system. Paradoxically, the very structures that the international community established in the DPA became the main constraints to implementing it. As a sign of dissatisfaction with the international peacebuilding project, the leadership of ethnic communities in BiH demonstrated a lack of commitment to improve law enforcement and the judiciary and to implement the peace agreement. First and foremost, the formation of decentralised police structures left room for political interference and control over the operation of police forces, and the instrumentalisation of police to impede the implementation of DPA provisions. Immediately after the conflict, local police forces, mainly in the Serb and Croat dominated regions of BiH, manned illegal checkpoints, which aimed to obstruct minority returns, inter-entity freedom of movement, and harass citizens on an ethnic basis (UNSC 1997a: 2). On many occasions, local police forces, guided by municipal authorities, failed to respond to IPTF requests that high-ranking officials act to halt the organised patterns of preventing the return of displaced persons and orchestrating crimes against them and their property (UNSC 1997a: 4). Preserving decentralised police forces consequently provided space for creating parallel, unofficial, and ethnically based police structures, which impeded the necessary cooperation for investigating ethnically motivated crimes and obstructed minority return (UNSC 1998a: 2). Mono-ethnic police structures significantly increased insecurity in places that were ethnically mixed. The attempts of the IPTF to integrate police officers from minority communities faced resistance and disobedience in the Croat-controlled areas of the Federation and in the RS (UNSC 1998b: 15). It seems that the writers of the DPA ignored the fact that ‘the ethnic rivalries meant there was no functioning police to protect minorities after Dayton’ (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 270). The rushed process for completing the certification of police officers in numerous cases disregarded the criminal records and illegal activities of local police officers. As early as 1996, Holbrooke confessed that the main obstacle to implementation of the DPA’s civilian aspects was the presence of Serb ‘secret police’ under the stewardship of Radovan Karadzic who interrogated and threatened civilians and politicians that cooperated with the international presence after the war (Holbrooke 1998: 338). Until 1998, Bosnian Serb police loyal to

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Karadžić continuously worked against the implementation of the DPA and defied the IPTF and other international organisations operating in BiH. An extensive number of police officers on all sides occupied houses and properties of displaced people, thereby complicating the return process and sending an inappropriate message from supposed law enforcers (Crisis Group 2002: 27–54). Examples of the involvement of local police in criminal networks and abusing minorities reflected negatively on the IPTF ’s ability to monitor the local police forces’ compliance with international human rights standards. There were also cases of police arresting each other on war crimes allegations issued by ethnically affiliated courts (Dziedzic and Bair 1998: 285). The IPTF mainly investigated these irregularities and pleaded with the parties to comply voluntarily with democratic policing standards. Due to these circumstances and their lack of professionalism, IPTF monitors were constantly discredited by different local police forces. Even after passing the screening and certification process, local police were reluctant to investigate criminal offences and human rights abuses committed against minority returnees.11 These examples illustrate that police reform and the institutional design of the security sector were unsuccessful in developing a professional and accountable police service in BiH. Beyond their mono-ethnic loyalties, police officers in BiH were poorly paid and continued to engage in corruption, human trafficking, drugs, and other illegal activities (Donais 2003). This unfortunate situation was exacerbated by reports of UN personnel frequenting brothels and nightclubs and tolerating the operation of trafficking networks (Human Rights Watch 2002). The politics of human insecurity Finally, failure to reform the police forces resulted in deepening ethnic insecurity, led to human rights abuses against the minority returnees, impeded the formation of new mixed and secure communities, and delayed the provision of basic public order and safety essential for social peace, political freedom, gradual reconciliation, coexistence and economic development. The IPTF and UNMIBH dealt with over 1,000 cases of alleged police human rights abuses annually (UNSC 1998c: 5). The mono-ethnic and politicised character of police forces led to chronic local insecurity, unsatisfactory election process, inter-ethnic tensions, delayed minority return, and a failure to protect human rights. As early as 1997, the UN openly blamed local political structures for these consequences, claiming that [f]or almost two years, the authorities in the RS have followed a policy of minimum implementation of the peace agreement. They have done little or nothing to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing and to return refugees to their homes, (UNSC 1997b: 10) Ethnic imbalances within the police affected the return of refugees and the overall security of minority communities. In other words, the mono-ethnic

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 91 composition of police forces also unintentionally shaped the mono-ethnic composition of communities, thus entrenching ethnic division (Crisis Group 2005). Despite the police reform process, no progress was made by 1998 on dealing with police crimes against minority returnees. After 1998, the de-certification policy was slow and resistance from high-ranking local police officials constantly delayed the resolution of cases of police involvement in crime. The return of refugees and displaced persons in BiH has been one of the most challenging tasks facing international peacebuilders. The process experienced many difficulties, including: the extensive number of refugees and IDPs, which exceeded over a million persons; resistance from nationalists and entity institutions; technical and material difficulties; and a lack of coordination and cohesion among the responsible international agencies. It is also commonly agreed that the return of refugees was influenced by the limited freedom of movement; deep ethnic divisions and insecurity; the presence of land mines; the absence of housing and sheltering; property disputes; and limited resources (UNSC 1996: 11). However, the overarching impediment to the return process during this period was a security problem caused by local police forces, resistance and non-cooperation of local authorities, and ineffective police services. The fragile conditions on the ground, which were preserved and orchestrated by the local police forces, and the failures of the IPTF and IFOR/SFOR, made impossible the return of nearly two million refugees and IDPs to their original municipalities during 1996. This was reflected during the first elections where most IDPs were forced to vote in the district of their temporary residence, thereby solidifying the territorialisation of ethnicity in favour of extreme nationalist parties, and de facto ratifying the ethnic cleansing carried out during the war (Bieber 2006: 89). During this initial phase, UNHCR discouraged refugees and IDPs from returning to their place of origin, and IFOR/SFOR obstructed their return on the grounds that such processes would increase ethnic confrontation and cause tensions, challenge the fragile peace and stability, and harm the post-conflict recovery process. One approach used to reduce the security threats was to create multi-ethnic and mixed police services, and send minority police officers to guard minority returnees. However, at that time the UN reported that, ‘there are still numerous instances where local police throughout BiH do not operate according to the principles of democratic policing, especially in areas designated for the return of minority refugees and displaced persons’ (UNSC 1998a). The same report reveals cases of police beatings, failure to issue identity cards to minorities, house burnings, and property cases related to returning minority displaced persons and refugees. In pursuit of the goal of creating a multi-ethnic police force as a precondition for ensuring the security of returnees, the UNHCR in cooperation with the IOM encouraged refugees, who were former police officers, to return to BiH, assisting them to re-settle in their homes of origin, and arranging for the exchange of serving officers between the RS and the Federation (UNSC 1999b). In 2002, Crisis Group (2012: ii) reported cases where ‘local police, prosecutors and courts often fail[ed] to bring those responsible for nationally motivated violence to book’.

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Police reform in BiH predominantly focused on tackling ethnically sensitive aspects, trying to reintegrate and restructure the various deviant political factions and ensuring their basic compliance with democratic policing. However, this strategy unintentionally overshadowed the gender dimension and quotas within local police forces and among international police monitors. An unintended consequence of the insufficient integration of female police was the failure to address widespread cases of domestic and gender-based violence in BiH, as it was believed that a male-dominated local police force would not be sensitive and empathetic enough to investigate such crimes (Cordone 1999: 196–197). This failure arose due to the ethnicity-based criterion for organising the police, as well as a lack of awareness among the UNMIBH in the early stages of the importance of including a gender dimension in BiH’s police reform. Moreover, the emphasis on recruiting minority police officers based on ethnic background unintentionally enforced the ethnic identity of police forces and jeopardised merit-based and professional capacity, which are essential for effective policing. Driven by the tendency to assume that female police officers would be weak and face discrimination and harassment from radical factions in society, the longterm need to include women in community policing was unintentionally ignored (Celador 2005: 371). On the other hand, international police were not the best example for mainstreaming gender in law enforcement, as there are examples of IPTF police getting involved in trafficking women for sexual exploitation in BiH, in close cooperation with local police forces (Murray 2003: 503–504). These criminal acts alongside lack of accountability significantly downgraded the image and credibility of the UN and other major international actors in BiH. Police forces in service of protecting war criminals and obstructing inter-ethnic reconciliation Another unintended consequence that emerged from police reform was the exploitation of police forces by nationalist factions to protect war criminals, obstruct inter-ethnic reconciliation, and delay transitional justice (Human Rights Watch 2006). The UN’s failure to tackle police reform effectively in the early stage meant that many indicted war criminals were hidden within new police structures, which provided protection to nationalist leaders and superior war crimes fugitives, such as Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess 2009: 5). A Crisis Group (1999: 43) report noted in 1999 that ‘police forces maintain a reputation for corruption, brutality, lawlessness, and often, as the private armies of ruling ethnic parties’. A network of war fugitives infiltrated the local police forces, despite the IPTF screening and certification process and the EUPM involvement in mentoring and advising these police structures (Ivanišević 2009: 38). A well-known example of the police protecting war criminals in the RS was the case of Dragomir Andan, a senior police officer who was forced to resign in 2007 and accused of participating in wartime atrocities, protecting former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladić, and cooperating with organised crime networks (OHR 2007b). The Chief Prosecutor

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 93 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in her address to the UN Security Council during 2004 reiterated the connection between police restructuring and arresting war criminals: [The fact] that nine years after Dayton, the authorities of Republika Srpska have not apprehended a single individual indicted by the ICTY . . . confirms the existence of fundamental systemic weaknesses built into the law enforcement and security structures of BiH, and in particular Republika Srpska. (UNSC 2004: 12) Numerous other examples point out the failure of local police to execute court orders, apprehend, and arrest war crimes suspects. Amnesty International (2003: 21) reported that ‘enormous problems remain with police investigations of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’. Of particular importance, the report highlights that ‘the presence and influence of present or former police officers may seriously undermine and compromise police investigations into war crimes carried out in the police area of responsibility where they are or were serving’ (Amnesty International 2003: 21). Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2004: 5) reported that ‘[p]olice assistance to war crimes prosecutors and investigative judges remains half-hearted at best, in part because police officers are often themselves implicated in the commission of war crimes’. The lack of interentity police cooperation, as well as the absence of standardised legal provisions across the country, resulted in a poor track record on war crimes cases. Local police constantly failed to provide witness protection, which is essential for advancing war crimes cases. The OSCE (2005: 13) survey of war crimes trials in BiH showed that some prosecutors confessed ‘it is very difficult to trace defendants’ because ‘cooperation between entity police is not on a high level which has a considerable impact upon the ability to discover the defendants’. Decentralised police structures complicated the exchange of information on war crimes cases between entity police services and their respective ministries of interior. Direct linkages between inadequacies of police reform delayed transitional justice and protracted ethnic division. The desire to resolve an aspect of peacebuilding (police reform) had the unintentional spill-over effect of delaying the prosecution of war criminals and serving justice for the victims and their families – essential aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation (Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 27). While the IPTF managed to remove fewer than forty police officers on the grounds of involvement with war crimes, the presence of war criminals within the police reduced public confidence in the police, especially among the minority returnees (Naarden 2003). This unintended consequence captures the spill over effect of one aspect of peacebuilding – namely police reform, to another aspect, which is undermining transitional justice.

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A fragile rule of law, widespread organised crime, and corruption An unintended consequence of the prolonged and unresolved police reform process has been a fragile rule of law and widespread organised crime, corruption, and informal economic practices whereby police forces, in cooperation with ethnic elites, have been involved in criminal activity. The police were politicised during the Bosnian war and their collusion with organised crime followed after the war. The IPTF screening and certification process was insufficient to reduce police involvement in hidden and complex networks of organised crime (Brady 2002: 14). While statebuilding and peacebuilding remained a priority for the international community in BiH, the problems of criminality, corruption, and unemployment represented major security concerns for the ordinary citizens in the country. Police reform was not in the interest of key political parties, who were deeply connected with organised crime groups and the unreformed police force played an important role in maintaining these power structures.12 Consequently, the political dependency of the police on the key nationalist leaders facilitated a flourishing of organised crime and illegal economic activity in BiH. The UN Secretary-General argued that ‘[i]n order to create basic trust between citizens and State security institutions, there must be improvements in the provision, quality and governance of security services’ (UNSC 2013: 2). Police reform in BiH had a counter-effect. Rather than increasing the confidence in security institutions, the misconduct of local police forces increased fear and distrust. The deeply fragmented, uncoordinated, and decentralised police forces were directly involved in numerous criminal networks that smuggled narcotics, petroleum, and people. A former EUPM officer admitted there was a direct connection between traffickers, local police, and the judicial system (Brady 2002: 19). Similarly, reports from US Embassy in Sarajevo revealed there was an ‘overlap between the Serbian war criminal support network, nationalist Serbian politician, RS police, SDS party and Serbian organized crime’.13 As early as 2000, various reports illustrated that criminal leaders, many of whom are closely linked to ruling political parties, are ready to threaten judges, prosecutors, police officers, lawyers, or witnesses with violence, even death, to act in a particular way. Such influence over the courts often prevents cases involving organized crime and corruption from being heard. (Johnson 2000: 4) In 2003, it was estimated that almost 50 per cent of the BiH’s economy was based on the black market (Brady 2002: 18). The politicised police forces remained dependent on ethnic elites who had not invested in the professional development of police, or in developing internal disciplinary mechanisms or effective investigative capacity (Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo 2010). Effectively, the police had no capacity to control the situation and tackle organised crime systematically.

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 95 The inability of the IPTF and the EUPM to create a single police force, due to local political resistance, reduced the ability of the state security apparatus to exercise its constitutional and legal obligations of enforcing the law and promoting justice in BiH. The failure to reform the police system meant the harmonisation of legislation and criminal codes was impossible and police cooperation remained unregulated. The lack of institutional cooperation between security forces made law enforcement efforts weak and incapable of tackling the problem of organised crime. Delays in establishing joint border police left the territory of BiH vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity. BiH is considered a major route for organised crime in the Balkans. Lack of cooperation between police, judiciary and prosecutors played a role in this situation, directly linked to the failure of BiH’s international administrators to reform police structures (Transparency International 2013). Transparency International’s (2007: 17) National Integrity System for BiH reported that communication and cooperation between different police structures in the country has ‘inhibited substantial systemic reforms’. This clearly suggests that inadequate police reform and restructuring has resulted in an ineffective police system that protects criminals and undermines the rule of law. Failure to reform police structures and make the police more accountable has unintentionally permitted police engagement in bribery and corruption. In 2013, Transparency International showed that around 30 per cent of people had paid bribes to the police for their services. A World Bank (2005: 2) report showed that an overwhelming majority of Bosnians ‘believe that corruption is endangering the security of the BiH government, limiting foreign investment, causing rising inequality, and leading to increases in crime’. The situation remained the same as late as 2012, when the EU’s progress report found that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is still at an early stage in the fight against corruption’, and little progress was achieved in fighting organised crime (European Commission 2012: 15–55). The report also highlighted that law enforcement agencies needed to improve systematic cooperation among themselves and with prosecutors and the wider judicial system. Subsequently, the presence of organised crime directly affected societal security, foreign investments, and economic development, as well as BiH’s EU integration dynamics. Between 1998 and 2013, the High Representative has removed and suspended from office 200 governmental officials, many on grounds of corruption and bad governance. Although the international administrators used corruption as a discursive justification to delegitimise local political factions and simultaneously legitimise their political interference, the discourse on anti-corruption and good governance unintentionally strengthened the popular support for nationalist factions (Chandler 2006: 85–99). The inability to create depoliticised police structures unintentionally left room for entity governments to appoint loyalists from the ruling political parties to key policing positions. Structural and legal impediments to tackling corruption and organised crimes are directly linked to the dysfunctional reform of police structures.

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Conclusion The internationally-led police reform in BiH tried to build a democratic police, downsize the police forces, ‘Westernise’ the local culture of policing, and build an independent and publically accountable police structure. However, achieving these goals became problematic as they were implemented in an institutional and political environment created by the DPA, which signified a distinct figuration of peace allowing the exploitation of political institutions by nationalist factions to halt progress, jeopardised the fate of an integrated Bosnian state, and resisted through institutional means the international peacebuilding agenda in the country. This made the state of affairs in BiH operate in a constant institutional and diplomatic insurgency between local and external actors. The structural constraints of the DPA prolonged the fate of police reform and eventually provided institutional incentives for non-cooperation (Bose 2002). This struggle for police reform and the backlashing resistance of ethno-nationalist factions illustrate how fluid power is. Local actors exploited provisions of the DPA as a weapon to defend against any externally imposed change in the structure of the BiH’s federalised state. They invoked administrative and institutional resistance against the decisions of the HR, and fuelled nationalist populism to generate domestic legitimacy and preserve political power. Blaustein’s (2015: 9) ethnographical study of police reform in BiH showed that ‘the outcomes and the outputs’ that police reform efforts ‘generate inevitably come to reflect the culturally and historically structured interests and understandings of actors involved with different stages of the policy translation process’. Such figuration of power dynamics in BiH provided space for the HR to expand its authoritarian rule over Bosnian society by imposing laws, removing democratically-elected local politicians, and imposing external blueprints for governing Bosnian society. A recent UN report claims that ‘measuring the impact of security sector reform programmes is a complex process that is intrinsically linked to national ownership’ (UNGA and UNSC 2013: 23). Contrary to the claims that local ownership of security sector reform is central to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding, the Bosnian police reform case shows how problematic it can be when local actors have ownership of the security sector, despite powers vested among the external interveners. Local ownership over the police forces in BiH has been a source of non-violent campaign of local actors to defend the mono-ethnic and decentralised character of BiH’s state as a recipe for holding power, controlling constituencies, and seeking revenge for war-time hatred. This problematic manifestation of power relations in BiH’s police reform context points to the contentious dilemmas of intentions and authority in peacebuilding. The UN-led police reform had a weak mandate, which proved to be problematic in enforcing the police reform, and in the adherence of human rights standards in local policing practices. Driven by a desire for short-term involvement and avoidance of dependency, the EU’s police mission also had a nonexecutive mandate, which was problematic in implementing police reform.

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 97 Related to this was the constant changing of intentionality and rationales for police reform. Initially it was justified by the international community as being a necessary process for implementing the security provisions of the DPA, and later this discourse related police reform to the failure of local authorities to capture key war crimes fugitives. Afterwards, police reform was justified as being crucial for establishing a functioning state and for advancing the European integration agenda. The transcendence of intentionality reduced the performative power of the original declared intentions for police reform in BiH. This represents a paradoxical situation, whereby amendable mandates can overcome practical aspects during the enforcement stage, but at the risk of losing local legitimacy and credibility. The exogenous and continuous transformation of declared intentions for police reform in BiH reduced the normative power of peacebuilding, encouraged local resistance, and opened up avenues for contesting peacebuilding activities. Relevant to the BiH case, pre-determined outcomes of the police restructuring and rigidly clear and fixed intentions were precursors to local institutional resistance. The politics of intentionality and the discursive warfare between various actors need to be studied more thoroughly in the peacebuilding context to understand how text makes and unmakes political institutions and constructs new social realities. A figurational analysis of the failed police reform process in BiH shows how a spectrum of unintended consequences emerged. The first unintended consequence of police reform under the UN and the IPTF was the entrenchment of a decentralised, ineffective, and politicised police structure. The second unintended consequence discussed in this chapter was the exploitation of police forces to protect war criminals, obstruct inter-ethnic reconciliation, and delay transitional justice. The third unintended consequence was the failure to establish the rule of law and the associated flourishing of organised crime and corruption. The fourth unintended consequence was the failure to provide sufficient human security to the population, especially to minorities, vulnerable and displaced persons and women. These unintended consequences show that citizens of BiH are the main victims, as they were subjugated to a power struggle between insider and outsider agents. Discussion of consequences reveals that what is counted as a short-term success can be seen in the long term as a failure. Similarly, failure can transcend into a successful endeavour after a certain period of time. Both the UN and the EU officially declared their missions in BiH successful. The discussion of the key events and the unintended consequences shows that police reform was not a successful endeavour. It is becoming a practice of the UN that during transitions and institutional-building phases they withhold criticising their own policies. However, after their exit from the country they invoke a more critical attitude towards the same local institutions that they once established and ran. For example, in the 2015, HR’s report to UN Security Council admitted that ‘the practice of political interference in operational policing remains a serious challenge’ (OHR 2015). It has also become a practice among policy-makers and certain problem-solving scholars to normalise failure and squeeze from them

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lessons for future interventionary practices. Dominik Tolksdorf (2012: 24) captures this epistemological trend when he argues that ‘although the EU was not successful in forging a comprehensive police reform in Bosnia, it has over the years demonstrated an ability to draw lessons from its activities and its presence in the country’. While the DPA was designed as a deal to end the war, it had the unintended consequence of becoming the structural obstacle to rebuilding a functional state and a stable peace.

Notes 1 ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Ohio, Dayton, 14 December, 1995. See also: PIC London Conclusions, 8 December, 1995. Full text available online at: www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5168 2 Interview by author with a local officer of OHR, Sarajevo, 24 May, 2012. 3 ‘The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Ohio, Dayton, 14 December, 1995. 4 Ibid. 5 Cidnamn, ‘Envera Selimovic: Richard Holbrooke – To End a War’. Online video clip, June 1998. Available online at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFYfDNf-VTg 6 Interview by author with EUPM officer, Sarajevo, 23 May, 2012. 7 ‘Bosnian Police Reform: A Troubled Process Comes Down To The Wire, Agreement Not Likely Soon’, US Embassy in Sarajevo Cable, 27 November, 2007. Available online at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06SARAJEVO2999.html 8 ‘Bosnian Police Reform: A Troubled Process Comes Down To The Wire, Agreement Not Likely Soon’, US Embassy in Sarajevo Cable, 27 November, 2007. Available online at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06SARAJEVO2999.html 9 Interview by author with a EUPM officer, Sarajevo, 24 May, 2012. 10 Interview by author with local officer of OHR, Sarajevo, 24 May, 2012. 11 Interview by author with a EUPM officer, Sarajevo, 23 May, 2012. 12 Interview by author with a civil society activist, Sarajevo, 24 May, 2012. 13 ‘Bosnia: Organized Crime and Corruption’, US Embassy in Sarajevo cable, 25 July, 2006. Available online at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06SARAJEVO1664. html

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EU Council (2002) The Joint Action of the Council of the European Union, 11 March 2002, on the European Union Police Mission (2002/210/CFSP), Brussels: European Commission. EU Council (2005) Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 November, 2005 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Official Journal of the European Union, L 307/55. EUPM (2008) ‘General Coppola Welcomes Adoption of Police Reform Laws’, Press Release, 16 April, 2008, Sarajevo: EU Police Mission. European Commission (2003) ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilization and Association agreement with the European Union’, Brussels: EU, 18 November, 2003. European Commission (2012) Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 Progress Report, Brussels: European Commission. Flessenkemper, T. and Helly, D. (eds) Ten Years After: Lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002–2012, Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2008) ‘National War Crimes Strategy’, Sarajevo. Holbrooke, R. (1998) To End a War, New York: Random House. Human Rights Watch (2002) Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls in PostConflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution, New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch (2004) Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials In Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, 16–7(D), London: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch (2006) Looking for Justice: The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Volume 18, No. 1(D), Sarajevo: Human Rights Watch. Humphreys, M. and Jelišić, J. (2010) ‘A Missed Opportunity: State Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina (October 2002 to October 2006)’, in Blockmans, S. et al. (eds) The European Union and Peacebuilding: Policy and Legal Aspects, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. Ivanišević, B. (2008) The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Hybrid to Domestic Court, New York: International Centre on Transitional Justice. Johnson, H. J. (2000) Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington: US Congress. Lajćak, M. (2012) ‘Statement by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic’, Seminar: The Impact of the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002–2012, Sarajevo, 8 June, 2012. Available online at: www.mzv.sk/ App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_550ED7D30484BA3AC1257A17002FCB07_ SK/$File/120608_prejav_Lajcak_EUPM.pdf (accessed 26 October, 2015). Leroux-Martin, P. (2014) Diplomatic Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, New York: Cambridge University Press. Lindvall, D. (2009) ‘The Limits of the European Vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the Police Reform Investigations’, PhD Thesis, Stockholm University. Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaite, R. (2006) European Union Peacebuilding and Policing: Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy, Abingdon: Routledge. Metz, C. (2010) ‘The Role of the International Community in the Police Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2004–2008, Vienna: Austrian National Defence Academy. Moratti, M. and Sabic-El-Rayess, A. (2009) Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, New York: International Centre on Transitional Justice.

Peace figuration in Bosnia and Herzegovina 101 Muehlmann, T. (2007) ‘International Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Issue of Behavioural Reforms lagging behind Structural Reforms, including the Issue of Reengaging the Political Elite in a New System’, European Security, 16 (3–4): 375–396. Murray, J. (2003) ‘Who will Police the Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 34(475): 475–527. Naarden, G. L. (2003) ‘Non-Prosecutorial Sanctions for Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Wartime Conduct of Bosnian Police Officials’, The American Journal of International Law, 97(2): 342–352. Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo (2010) The Missing Peace: The Need for a Long-Term Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: Nansen Dialogue Centre. OHR (2004) ‘Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative. OHR (2007a) ‘Declaration on honouring the commitments for implementation of the police reform with aim to initial and sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement’, 29 October, 2007. Available online at: www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/prc/prckey-doc/default.asp?content_id=40748 (accessed 14 June, 2015). OHR (2007b) Decision to remove Dragomir Andan from his position as Deputy Head of Administration for Police Education of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative. OHR (2015) 47th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 11 May, 2015. Available online at: www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp? content_id=49127 (accessed 28 August, 2015). Okuizumi, K. (2002) ‘Peacebulding Mission: Lessons from the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Human Rights Quarterly, 24 (3): 721–735. OSCE (2005) War Crimes Trials before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress and Obstacles, Sarajevo: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Osmanović-Vukelić, S. (2012) 10 Years of EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: European Union Police Mission. Pejanović, M. (2007) The Political Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the PostDayton Period, Sarajevo: Sahinpasić. PIC (1995) London Conclusions, 8 December, 1995. PIC (2003) Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board, 11 December, 2003. Sebastian, S. (2010) ‘Statebuilding in Divided Societies: The Reform of Dayton in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4(3): 323–344. Stewart, R. and Knaus, G. (2011) Can Intervention Work?, New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Tolksdorf, D. (2013) ‘Police Reform and Conditionality’, in Flessenkemper, T. and Helly, D. (eds) Ten Years After: Lessons from the EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002–2012, Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Transparency International (2007) National Integrity System – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007, Sarajevo: Transparency International. Transparency International (2013) ‘B&H Continues to Stagnate in the Fight against Corruption’. Available online at: http://ti-bih.org/bih-i-dalje-stagnira-u-borbi-protivkorupcije/?lang=en Transparency International (2013) National Integrity System – Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013, Sarajevo: Transparency International.

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UNSC (1995) Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), UN Doc S/1995/1031, 13 December, 1995. UNSC (1996) Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1035 (1995), UN Doc S/1996/210, 29 March, 1996. UNSC (1997a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1997/468, 16 June, 1997. UNSC (1997b) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1997/694, 8 September, 1997. UNSC (1998a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1998/227, 12 March, 1998. UNSC (1998b) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1998/491, 19 June, 1998. UNSC (1998c) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1998/862, 16 September, 1998. UNSC (1999a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1999/989, 17 September, 1999. UNSC (1999b) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/1999/1260, 17 December, 1999. UNSC (2002) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc S/2002/1314, 2 December, 2002. UNSC (2004) Provisional Verbatim of the 5086th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.5086, 23 November, 2004. UNGA and UNSC (2013) ‘Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform: Report of the SecretaryGeneral’, UN Doc A/67/970–S/2013/480, 13 August, 2013. Vejnović, D. and Lalić, V. (2005) ‘Community Policing in a Changing World: A Case Study of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Police Practice and Research, 6(4): 363–373. World Bank (2005) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption, Sarajevo: World Bank.

5 Peace figuration in Kosovo

Introduction The previous chapter examined the UN’s and the EU’s inability to achieve their peacebuilding agenda in BiH, thereby highlighting how a spectrum of unintended consequences has shaped peace figuration in the country. This chapter examines how peace was shaped in Kosovo under the conditions of conflicting political agendas of local and international actors. It poses the question of what happens when the UN and other peacebuilding organisations know that they are failing to implement their mandate and what are the consequences for the longterm prospects of peace. Over the past two decades, Kosovo has experienced protracted and extensive international intervention missions that have tried to build a stable peace and create a new multi-ethnic state from scratch. Key peacebuilding activities included engineering multi-ethnicity as Kosovo’s collective identity, supporting local civil society, facilitating the return and reintegration of refugees, and fostering multi-level inter-ethnic dialogue (UNSC 1999b). On the side of statebuilding, the international community built state institutions in Kosovo and installed a neo-liberal economy with a political system based on power-sharing, and gradually transferred governing powers to locally-elected representatives, which calibrated both moderate and ex-combatant factions of Kosovo Albanians. The UN’s former head of peacekeeping operations, JeanMarie Guehenno (2015: 240) recently stated that ‘The UN is not particularly well-suited to the role of colonial administrator . . . yet it was done in Kosovo, not with great elegance, but more successfully than one might have imagined’. Contrary to such views, this chapter argues that the ‘will to peace’ under these conflicting agendas of each of these aspects undermined the peace process itself, leaving both external and local political agendas incomplete, fragmented, and subject to constant contestation. It examines the figuration of peace in a postconflict society with multiple and co-existing authorities that have constantly tried to delegitimise each other and disobey hierarchies of power, rules, and orders. As the sole goal of peace figuration is to explore the micro-dynamics that have shaped peacebuilding efforts, this chapter examines the UN’s efforts to establish the rule of law in Kosovo and its indifference to the knowledgeability

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of failure to fulfil its mandate. While statebuilding in Kosovo has been extensively studied by scholars and former policy-makers (see King and Mason 2006; Weller 2009; Hehir 2010; Capussela 2015), the impact of multiple and contested governance structures in Kosovo remains under-researched. These resistance groups, supported by the Serbian government, created their parallel security, justice, education, healthcare, and administrative services (OSCE 2003). While the UN and NATO had the knowledge, authority and resources to prevent the emergence of these Serb parallel structures, they did not challenge them for the sake of stability and strategic counter-balance to Kosovo Albanians majoritarian victor’s peace. Instead, UNMIK (the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) chose to focus on those areas that it considered good examples of the successful implementation of its liberal peacebuilding agenda in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006). This chapter argues that the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo constitutes an unprevented consequence of international peacebuilding in Kosovo. One of the primary goals of the international presence in Kosovo after 1999 was the establishment of security, justice, order, and stability throughout Kosovo as a precondition for establishing and nurturing a stable peace in the country. However, lack of local consensus on peacebuilding in Kosovo nurtured local resistance as exemplified by the activities of Serb parallel structures, which essentially undermined international and domestic efforts to build peace, consolidate state institutions, and find common grounds for ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo after 1999. The examination of various events between 1999 and 2014 shows how the international community had the opportunity to dismantle these structures, and clearly illustrates how the lack of sensitivity to the consequences created a mess – despite the availability of authority, resources, and knowledge – and ultimately failed to achieve its peacebuilding intentions. International actors were more concerned with short-term stability than with the long-term impact. However, UNMIK’s early inaction later became the main barrier to peacebuilding in this conflict-shattered society. Ignoring the long-term impact and consequences of peacebuilding paves the way for failure of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies and delays the consolidation of peace at the expense of the local population. The examination of key events and consequences surrounding these structures in Kosovo shows that these state contestation groups effectively prolonged the international presence, delayed the establishment of effective and functional institutions, hindered the establishment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation, and undermined socio-economic development. The UN ignored these multiple consequences, which were preventable but, intentionally, were not. These consequences significantly shaped peace figuration in Kosovo – becoming obstacles that led to other consequences, thereby creating a predictable pattern of processes where in many instances the key agents became mere spectators of their own doings and undoings. Despite their negative impact on the peace process in Kosovo, these parallel structures are being dismantled and integrated within Kosovo’s institutions as part of the agreements reached through the EU-facilitated

Peace figuration in Kosovo 105 dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. This shows that, in the long-term, immediate success can produce failures, while these failures in the long-term can transcend to become something else, which in a relational perspective could be considered as successes. What follows next is a brief examination of different peace intentions in Kosovo. Then the chapter focuses on examining key critical events that have shaped peace prospects in Kosovo. The remainder of the chapter explores multiple unprevented consequences that have emerged from the particular figuration of peace in Kosovo.

Intentional asymmetries, asymmetric intentions In figuring out what shaped peace in Kosovo it is crucial to disentangle first the intentionality of key internal and external actors involved in the peace process. The story of international involvement in post-conflict Kosovo is a story of parallel struggles between externally set peacebuilding and statebuilding, challenged by Albanian state formation and Serbian state preservation dynamics. In the context of post-conflict Kosovo, peacebuilding and statebuilding choices have emerged as a contextual and conciliatory alternative between Serbian claims for state preservation and Albanian claims for state formation, both rooted in violence, ethno-nationalist identity, power, and materiality (Covey et al. 2005). Hence, peacebuilding was devised to transform and appease ethnic hostilities and protect minorities, while statebuilding was dedicated to controlling and conditioning Kosovo Albanians to strive for statehood. When UNMIK was established in Kosovo following NATO’s first major military operation, the local struggle was appeased through peacebuilding and statebuilding endeavours. The basis of the internationally declared intentions in Kosovo is the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), outlining a detailed peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. It was unprecedented for a single Resolution to incorporate such an extensive and timeless set of intentions for peacebuilding as provided in the case of Kosovo. In a nutshell, UNMIK was charged with the responsibilities of: restoring public security; establishing the rule of law; demilitarising armed forces; organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement; facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status; supporting economic reconstruction; promoting and protecting human rights; and facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs (UNSC 1999b). This extensive mandate was granted to UNMIK both for contextual reasons and as an attempt to ensure that mistakes made in BiH with a fragmented international presence would not be repeated in Kosovo. In 2003, UNMIK modified the peacebuilding intentions in Kosovo and deployed a new policy titled ‘Standards for Kosovo’ which included: establishing functioning democratic institutions; strengthening the rule of law; making possible freedom of movement; creating conditions for sustainable return of minority communities; establishing a competitive market economy; resolving property rights; engaging in dialogue with Serbia; and controlling

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ex-combatants transformed into a civilian emergency organisation (UNSC 2004a). However, the actual intention behind these normative benchmarks was to delay further the resolution of Kosovo’s future status, given the insufficient international consensus on the issue (Guehenno 2015: 241). UNMIK led its peacebuilding efforts in Kosovo in close partnership with the EU, the OSCE civilian presence, and NATO peacekeepers, alongside a wide network of other foreign governmental and non-governmental agencies. After Kosovo’s independence in 2008, the international presence was reconfigured to correspond to the changing circumstances on the ground. A new International Civilian Office (ICO) and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) overshadowed UNMIK and OSCE in Kosovo (Visoka and Bolton 2011). This organisational shift transformed UNMIK from a main stakeholder into a peripheral mission in denial that struggled to find and adjust its role in Kosovo after independence. UNMIK’s strategic goal became promoting ‘security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo and in the region’ (see UNSC 2015: 1). In determining the UN’s peacebuilding in Kosovo, local perspectives were not taken into consideration. Jock Covey (2005: 80–81), the first deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General of UNMIK, reveals that each state and organisation involved in Kosovo tried to advance their national interests either through funding conditionality or, indirectly, through their people that were part of UNMIK structures. The presence of multiple, often conflicting, intentions, and self-interested motives behind UN’s actions in Kosovo significantly undermined the legitimacy of peacebuilding in Kosovo. As Iain King and Whit Mason (2006: 233) argue, ‘[v]ague mandates did not just obscure the international community’s performance, they also affected it’. The international peacebuilding agenda imposed on Kosovo initially was not received well by the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs as all parties had different intentions and agendas regarding the fate of post-war Kosovo.1 While Kosovo Albanians wanted to establish an independent state immediately, Kosovo Serbs propagated the return of Kosovo to Serbia. Consequently, Albanians formed a provisional government under the leadership of war-related political groups, while Serbs gradually consolidated parallel structures in the area of security, justice, education, healthcare, and public services. However, the Albanian governance parallelism quickly dissolved and was integrated within new institutions created by UNMIK, while the majority of local Serbs remained divided – one faction joined the new UN-supervised structures and the other decided to boycott them and form parallel structures instead. Since the early days, Kosovo Albanians emerging from a struggle for liberation and independence were dissatisfied with UNMIK’s extensive and timeless mandate. Local political groups in Kosovo never expected such a large-scale international administration in Kosovo. During the Ramboulliet peace talks, Kosovo Albanian representatives favoured an international protectorate, but not in the form of a timeless UN transitional administration. Challenging international authority, a provisional government comprising of pacifists (LDK and others) and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) factions started to operate as a

Peace figuration in Kosovo 107 normal government in Kosovo immediately after the war, and, on its own, passed provisional laws and appointed local mayors (Crisis Group 1999; Perrit 2008). The intention behind this provisional government was to put pressure on UNMIK to find a solution for immediate co-governance with the UN in the path to independence.2 The desire of Kosovo Albanians for ownership was very much rooted in the aspiration of capturing local power and advancing the project of statehood regardless of international constraints. However, these expectations were not met as UNMIK decided to dismantle these Kosovo-Albanian political structures and incorporate them within its new consultative bodies until the conditions became conducive to local and national elections. This marked the de facto end of Kosovo Albanian resistance towards the UN in Kosovo, and the beginning of a gradual incorporation into newly formed state institutions in Kosovo. This strategic move is regarded by Paris (2004) as an effective step for delaying elections until conditions were in place for political moderation to emerge. However, despite this acceptance of the UN-led provisional institutions in Kosovo, Albanian political elites in Kosovo exploited subserviently UN-led statebuilding for state formation purposes. On the other hand, the Government of Serbia did not welcome the UN Administration as it was affiliated with NATO’s intervention and removal of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo (Janjić 2007: 269). Nevertheless, there is evidence that, at the height of the Kosovo conflict, Serb military intelligence favoured an international protectorate for Kosovo (Ministry of Defence of Serbia 1998: 3). However, they hoped to reach another more favourable political settlement that would grant Kosovo an extensive autonomy within Serbia and remove Kosovo from the international agenda. While Serbia was largely against the NATO and the UN presence in Kosovo, the local Serb community saw the UN peacebuilding as an opportunity to secure their collective existence and prevent recursive ethnic revenge, hoping to eventually re-incorporate Kosovo within Serbia main (UNMIK 2000). As these intentions did not find support among the international community and the Kosovo Albanian majoritarian community in Kosovo, Serbia’s strategic intentions in Kosovo changed in favour of contesting the UN-led statebuilding process in Kosovo and preventing the formation of a new state in their territory. As part of this plan, Serb authorities started to establish and support Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. While the emergence of Serb parallel structures was a tactical reaction to the power shift in Kosovo, which resulted in the empowerment of Kosovo Albanians political stance to control UN-led transition in Kosovo (Government of Serbia 2003a), these parallel structures became one of the main obstacles to international peacebuilding and statebuilding in the country Seen from a Serbian perspective, these parallel institutions in Kosovo primarily served the purpose of protecting the national existence of Serb people in post-conflict Kosovo. The displacement of Serbs from Kosovo and their organisation in mono-ethnic enclaves pushed for a self-regulatory system of governance very similar to the Albanian civil resistance in Kosovo during the 1990s (Bataković 2007). Nevertheless, beyond these justifications, preserving Serb

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parallel structures in Kosovo was part of a more thoughtful political plan in Serbia, revealed in 2004 by former prime minister Vojislav Kostunica, who explicitly proposed the use of Serb institutions in Kosovo to create an ‘autonomy-within-autonomy’ providing Serbs with substantial autonomy within Kosovo, while granting Kosovo as a whole a territorial autonomy within Serbia (Government of Serbia 2004). This plan aimed at dividing Kosovo into regional cantons with extensive political, economic, and cultural autonomy for Serbs within and outside these regions. Therefore, Serbia’s funding of parallel structures served three purposes: ‘to encourage them to remain in Kosovo; to provide visible evidence of the Serbian state’s continued presence; and for politicians to maintain control through patronage networks’ (Crisis Group 2009: 15). The political ‘instrumentalisation’ of Serb parallel structures became evident during the EU-facilitated Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, whereby Serbia bargained its EU accession talks with dismantling of these structures in Kosovo. The different intentions and different visions for peace in Kosovo significantly shaped peace in Kosovo. While the international community was interested in maintaining a fragile peace and stability, Kosovar authorities demanded independence and statebuilding, allowing Belgrade to exploit the opportunity created by this dual agenda to promote its own national interests in the bargaining process towards EU integration. Among these messy dynamics, the emergence and persistence of Serb contestation of peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo represent a crucial case for capturing the complexity of the peace process in post-conflict Kosovo, the power and shortcomings of international governance, and the spectrum of unprevented consequences that emerged afterwards.

Events that made and unmade Serb parallel structures in Kosovo To understand how Serb parallel structures shaped the peacebuilding process in Kosovo and what sort of consequences they produced, it is crucial to explore some of the events that triggered their emergence, development, and disintegration between 1999 and 2014. There are two major phases that made and unmade Serb parallel structures. The first phase started immediately after NATO’s intervention and the UN’s deployment, followed by various events that undermined the core peacebuilding project in Kosovo until independence in 2008, which gave a new momentum to the international and local struggle for shaping peace in Kosovo. The second phase illustrates the agency of Serb parallel structures in contesting international governance and claims for statehood, thus forcing a direct dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia to renegotiate the status of Serbs in Kosovo and appease Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo’s statehood. The sequential analysis of events reveals episodes of success translated into failures and later revived as successes in the long run, which signify that the static measurement of the impacts of peacebuilding is unable to account for the dynamic nature of success and failure in peacebuilding contexts. Various

Peace figuration in Kosovo 109 events clearly illustrate the dilemmas of the UN in Kosovo and their constant approximation to local circumstances, showing how peacebuilding missions, although sourced on universalist rationales, are deeply contingent on unplanned local dynamics. From NATO intervention to Kosovo independence Immediately after NATO’s ground deployment in Kosovo, Serb military and police forces left Kosovo, as stated in the Kumanovo Agreement in June 1999. This historic event was followed by the return of over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sheltering in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. The devastating conflict, extensive human losses, and material damages triggered a wave of revenge by Kosovo Albanians against minority communities, targeting both suspected collaborators with the former regime and innocent victims (Judah 2000). The deployment of a UN civilian presence and NATO peacekeepers in June 1999 delayed the operationalisation of their missions in the north of Kosovo for nearly a year. Most importantly, UNMIK was unable to immediately deploy an international civilian police force to restore order in post-conflict Kosovo. NATO peacekeepers were considered inefficient and incapable of preventing ethnic crimes, which undermined their trust among minority communities. This context provided solid grounds for the mobilisation of remaining Serb military, police and political factions in pursuing ethnic division and avoiding interaction with Kosovo Albanians. As the post-conflict ethnic crimes in Kosovo increased hostilities between both ethnic groups, Serb enclaves became safe zones against the anarchic transition in Kosovo. Ultimately the figuration of ethnic enclaves necessitated parallel governance structures as a self-coping mechanism. One of the most significant events that shaped ethnic politics and peace prospects in Kosovo was the decision to divide the city of Mitrovica in two parts, the south populated with Albanians and the north with the Serbs. During February 2000, there were a number of demonstrations and confrontations between Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica, killing eight people and causing serious injuries to thirty (UNSC 2000a: 5–6). These events triggered the expulsion of 1650 Kosovo-Albanians from northern Mitrovica, the isolation of Serbs in enclaves, and increased attacks against KFOR (Kosovo Force) peacekeepers and UNMIK police (NATO 2001). UNMIK police and KFOR had no contingency plan on how to respond to widespread civil disorder and interethnic violence. At the political level, UNMIK was faced with incompatible priorities: maintaining peace and stability or establishing justice and the rule of law. KFOR had the primary responsibility to provide security and maintain the rule of law in the Mitrovica region. At that time, NATO had around 57,000 peacekeepers in Kosovo but lacked political will to use measured violence and enforce the peace (Dziedzic 2006). Despite sporadic ethnic violence in early 2000, NATO’s Secretary-General rushed to pronounce KFOR a successful mission (NATO 2000). However, UNMIK did not operate at full capacity until 2002 and could not effectively handle the continuing unrest in Kosovo and the threat posed to

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the peace process by extremist groups. UNMIK had insufficient police, judges, and prosecutors to establish the rule of law across the whole territory of Kosovo. This was delayed by the slow recruitment of police, the reluctance of troopsending states, bureaucratic procedures, and donors’ slow financial support (UNSC 1999a: 7). This power vacuum enabled local self-regulation, and a crackdown on UN authority in Kosovo. In light of these events, Serb parallel security structures started to emerge in Mitrovica, such as Bridge Watchers whose activity was to obstruct the return of Albanian IDPs in the northern part of city and protect the local Serb population. The division was driven by a small group of nationalists who pressured Albanians to leave the north and threatened the local Serb population not to cooperate with Albanians.3 Weaknesses among the international community conveniently allowed local resistance groups to exploit such loopholes and advance their own goals. UNMIK lacked resources to control the north of Kosovo in terms of police and civil administration. KFOR did not lack resources, but it lacked the political will to act. Following the inability of UNMIK and KFOR to handle ethnic violence and pursue effective peacebuilding, Serb parallel structures expanded their activities to the fields of justice, education, healthcare, welfare, and public services. These structures operated under the stewardship of the ‘Coordination Centre for Kosovo and Metohija’ as part of the Government of Serbia. Some measures were taken to include members of Bridge Watchers in the Kosovo police service; however, due to vetting and recruitment criteria many of them eventually did not join the police force (Crisis Group 2002). These structures were considered as illegal, a violation of UN Security Resolution 1244 (1999), and a direct challenge to UNMIK’s authority in Kosovo. UNMIK did not anticipate the emergence of inter-ethnic and political violence in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo. Instead, UNMIK and KFOR were expecting more resistance from Serb forces (Dziedzic 2006: 328). Nevertheless, UNMIK knew about Serb parallel structures, but tolerated them due to sporadic ethnic violence committed by Kosovo-Albanians, the hesitancy of the Kosovo-Albanian leadership to integrate Serbs before resolving Kosovo’s final status Kosovo-Albanian, and the lack of security and space for joint co-existence and integration.4 As early as 2001, KFOR started compiling a detailed dossier of Serb parallel structures and their criminal activity in Kosovo; however, it tolerated their activities mainly in the name of preserving stability and the fragile peace in Kosovo. Driven by naivety, the UN considered these structures as only ‘phantom administration’ (Guehenno 2015: 239). To pinpoint exactly the responsible actors, it was French NATO peacekeepers who tolerated these parallel structures by setting up a de facto boundary in Mitrovica to prevent the further expulsion of Kosovo-Serbs and to prevent a situation of reverse ethnic cleansing, which would have defeated the whole purpose of NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.5 While this decision might have had immediate strategic benefits, it contravened the entire purpose of UNMIK to establish the rule of law, security, and justice throughout Kosovo.6

Peace figuration in Kosovo 111 UNMIK attempted to address the issue of political conflict and ethnic division in Kosovo by establishing temporary local consultative bodies that tried to promote local ownership in UNMIK’s decision-making processes (Crisis Group 2005). As part of joint administrative structures, UNMIK managed to bring Kosovo-Albanian and a faction of Serb leaders together in a transitional council. However, these inclusive bodies divided the Serb leadership in Kosovo, with some groups joining these structures, and others becoming part of parallel structures. Beyond Belgrade’s interference, sporadic and (un)orchestrated acts of violence on the ground against Serbs deepened political distrust among the ethnic political leadership (King and Mason 2006). In the first municipal elections organised in October 2000, less than a year after UN intervention, UNMIK failed to establish local government in the north of Kosovo due to a widespread boycott of elections by Serb local leaders. When UNMIK tried to establish local authorities in the Mitrovica region outside the electoral process, local Serbs refused to serve alongside Albanian members who constituted the overall majority in the town. This resulted in the emergence of a parallel state in that part of Kosovo, challenging thus the authority of transitional administration and the new local institutions. UNMIK was unable to convince local Serbs that the international statebuilding process was not a disguised project for granting Kosovo earned sovereignty and conditional statehood. As argued by Guehenno (2015: 241), ‘many Serbs actively resisted participating in the PISG [Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo], which they saw – rightly, as it turned out – as the embryo of a future government of an independent Kosovo’. After 2001, attempts by UNMIK and KFOR to deal with Serb parallel structures were insufficient. Attention thereby shifted to consolidating Kosovo’s new state institutions, supporting economic recovery, and civil society development. An opportunity arose in 2001 to resolve the issue of parallel structures when UNMIK entered into dialogue with Serbia to increase mutual cooperation (UNMIK 2001). However, dismantling Serb parallel structures was not explicitly discussed in a common document agreed by UNMIK and Serb authorities. Despite these efforts, Belgrade withdrew its cooperation with UNMIK on the grounds that the latter had not made sufficient progress on Serb returnees and on ensuring security for Serb minorities in Kosovo. On the other hand, the fall of the Milosević regime and the democratic transition in Serbia did not change Serbia’s stance on Kosovo. In 2000, Serbia’s new President, Vojislav Koštunica, approached Kosovo’s first post-conflict President, Ibrahim Rugova, to discuss modalities for granting Kosovo extensive autonomy under Serbia. However, this initiative failed as Kosovo demanded to have negotiations with Serbia only as two independent states (Kosovo Information Center 2000). In a rather unproductive discourse, President Rugova claimed that enclaves were the best solution for Kosovo Serbs until the conditions for multi-ethnicity and reconciliation gradually emerged (Kosovo Information Center 2000). This certainly did not contribute to building confidence between the Kosovar and Serbian leadership after the fall of the Milosevic regime. However, the bargaining power of Kosovo Albanians was weak compared to Serbia, which explains why negotiations at

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that stage could not find a desirable solution for the majority population of Kosovo. Fragile ethno-political dynamics in Kosovo gradually started to threaten stability in the territory, resulting in direct clashes and the recurrence of violence. Most notably, in March 2004, a series of incidents of ethnic violence erupted in Kosovo resulting in the death of nineteen civilians, the destruction of dozens of Serb churches, and ethnic clashes in mixed communities. While the murder of two Albanian children in the northern part of Kosovo is claimed as the trigger of these events, Kosovar media fuelled tensions further, and the UN and NATO peacekeepers failed to perform well in preventing and de-escalating the violence. Most notably, the eruption of violence in the divided city of Mitrovica damaged further prospects for ethnic peace in Kosovo and expanded the grassroots power of Serb parallel structures, making them the most reliable and trustworthy structures in Serb-populated areas of Kosovo (CDA and CARE International 2006). These violent events amplified further the activity of Serb parallel structures. The parallel security structures effectively replaced UNMIK’s presence in Serb populated areas. The parallel court system operated throughout Kosovo in areas populated by the Serb community, using the Serb government’s jurisdiction system. UNMIK courts were dismantled in 2007 after a confrontational riot between Serb and Albanian groups in Mitrovica. The Serb court system continued to overlap UNMIK courts, and in some cases shared the same building, such as in Zubin Potok (OSCE 2007: 17). Administrative structures also operated throughout Kosovo, issuing decisions regarding property rights and other civil documents on behalf of Serb government. In response to these developments, UNMIK and Kosovo authorities focused their efforts on trying to address Serb parallel structures through the decentralisation of power to local authorities, which aimed at integrating Serb communities within Kosovo’s institutional system (UNSC 2004b: 3). However, opening of the talks to define Kosovo’s future political status overshadowed such efforts. Despite its negative impact, the violent events of March 2004 had a strong performative effect pushing the UN to start the negotiation process for determining Kosovo’s future political status, as the status quo threatened to undermine the entire international investment in Kosovo. Meanwhile, UNMIK’s ‘Standards for Kosovo’ policy stated that in establishing functioning democratic institutions in Kosovo, the Kosovo authorities should ‘develop a strategy to reduce demands for and dismantle parallel structures and integrate them into PISG structures’ (PISG 2004). However, this normative agenda did not produce any result as ‘it was a bluff ’ (Guehenno 2015: 241). The Kosovo Albanian political leadership began to see the international efforts for building a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo without resolving the political status as efforts to undermine the Kosovo majority’s desire for independent statehood (Demaçi 2004). The resolution of Kosovo’s political status was also one of the main declared intentions of international presence in Kosovo, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). However, in practice, what Kosovo’s final status would be ‘was left unexplained by the Security Council, for the simple reason that the council

Peace figuration in Kosovo 113 itself had no idea – or, at least, no single idea its members could agree on’ (Guehenno 2015: 241). The final status negotiations began in February 2006 and lasted for fourteen months, comprising seventeen rounds of direct talks between Kosovo and Serb delegations at the highest level, and twenty-six expert missions undertaken by Martti Ahtisaari, UN’s Special Envoy to Kosovo (UNOSEK), as part of his shuttle diplomacy to facilitate the negotiations (UNOSEK 2007b). However, both parties remained divided on Kosovo’s political status. Serbia’s desired outcome throughout the negotiations was extensive autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. On the other hand, Kosovo Albanians demanded full independence from Serbia, with institutional safeguards for minorities, including extensive decentralisation for Serbs in Kosovo (Weller 2009). Despite OSCE’s (2007: 53) suggestion to include parallel structures in the final talks, they were not explicitly mentioned or discussed during the final status negotiations, which later proved to be a mistake with multiple consequences. However, Andrea L. Capussela (2015: 80) provides a different perspective, arguing that ‘consensual partition of Kosovo – to wit, its secession from Serbia and the parallel separation of the north – was informally discussed during the 2005–2007 talks, but this option evaporated when the negotiations failed’. Foreign diplomats expected to dismantle Serb parallel structures more gradually and replace them with legitimate local Serb authorities. It was also expected that Serbia would stop supporting these structures once Kosovo’s final status was resolved and a compromise solution reached. On the contrary, Serbia kept the parallel structures active to assure the eventual partition of Kosovo, or to use as bargaining chips in gaining as much as possible from the decentralisation process by expanding the number of new Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo, which effectively meant converting villages into new municipal units.7 As the demands for statehood became more prevalent in Kosovo, so did the resistance of parallel structures in deepening ethnic division in Kosovo. Sovereignty as a norm of modern statehood overruled other norms of international society, therefore the formation of new sovereign political communities as a pragmatic solution to secure peace in Kosovo was considered. These events marked the end of UN extensive governance in Kosovo, where many opportunities were missed to build peace and address local ethnic grievances. From Kosovo independence to the normalisation of relations with Serbia In March 2007, the UN’s Special Envoy for Kosovo made public his comprehensive status settlement, concluding that ‘[i]ndependence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo’ (UNSC 2007: 4). His proposal sought to resolve multiple outstanding issues such as the problem of Serb parallel structures, the inaccessibility of the north for Kosovo’s authorities, and KFOR’s inability to provide sufficient security through the extensive decentralisation of local government, guaranteeing special rights and protection for Serb

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communities and other institutional and political privileges. However, Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari proposal on the grounds that Kosovo’s independence breached Serbia’s sovereignty, it was against international law, and it would set a negative precedent for other contested territories (Government of Serbia 2007). Another round of negotiations led by US, EU and Russian representatives did not change Serbia’s position. Accordingly, this led to the declaration of Kosovo independence on 17 February, 2008 (Assembly of Kosovo 2008). One day after Kosovo’s coordinated declaration of independence, the Government of Serbia adopted a decision to annul the decision, which failed to prevent immediate recognition of Kosovo independence by over fifty states (Government of Serbia 2008). Subsequently, after failing to prevent Kosovo’s independence Serbia turned to its local parallel structures in Kosovo to contest the independence from inside through proactively disobeying Kosovo authorities and preventing the extension of domestic sovereignty throughout the territory. In the north of Kosovo the situation worsened and Serb parallel structures gained new momentum, strengthening and institutionalising their operations, thereby creating serious challenges for the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal (New York Times 2008). After Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the majority of local Serbs boycotted Kosovo institutions, creating further institutional fragmentation and crises, particularly in relation to the police force and the judiciary. The district court in Mitrovica ceased operations as the Serbs working there boycotted Kosovo’s new institutions. During 2008, Serb members of the Kosovo police suspended their cooperation with the Kosovo police commanders in Pristina. Along with these local developments, the international community was divided on the question of Kosovo independence. UNMIK, OSCE and the EU remained status-neutral. The newly established International Civilian Office (ICO) was the only entity supportive of Kosovo’s independence (Visoka and Bolton 2011). This new figuration of the international position towards Kosovo certainly played a negative role with regard to advancing peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo. In June 2008, trying to avoid the partition of the north of Kosovo, the UN SecretaryGeneral suggested that in police, courts, customs, border, and religious sites, Serb-majority areas would enjoy total autonomy would remain under UNMIK’s supervision (UNSC 2008: 6–7; Guehenno 2015). As rightly admitted by the ICO (2012: 14), ‘[t]he international community did not speak with one voice or find unanimity on the most appropriate approach to the north and prevent further destabilization of the situation’. A Strategy for the North of Kosovo was presented in 2010 by the ICO and Government of Kosovo, which emphasised its joint commitment and close cooperation with the international community to extend Kosovo’s sovereignty in that part of Kosovo, to increase economic development, and to establish the rule of law and democratic order there (ICO 2012: 43–45). However, the strategy received limited support from UNMIK, EULEX, and OSCE. UNMIK declared they had been ‘neither consulted in the drafting of the strategy nor included in its planned implementation’ (UNSC 2010: 3–4). Most significantly, Serb authorities and strong local Serb parallel structures objected to this strategy considering it

Peace figuration in Kosovo 115 an attempt to provoke violence (UNSC 2011a: 2). The failure of this strategy made Kosovo authorities change their approach to dealing with Serbia’s obstruction by invoking reciprocal economic measures and blocking Serb products from entry into Kosovo territory. From 2008, Serbia blocked all Kosovo products, after customs changed its stamps from those issued with UNMIK seal to the new one that reflected Kosovo independence. The fragile operation of two border gates in the north of Kosovo became the main route for illegal entry of Serb products to Kosovo. Furthermore, the increasing calls in Serbia for the partition of Kosovo prompted Kosovo authorities to undertake preventative measures. At that time, foreign diplomats considered the north of Kosovo to be the greatest threat to peace and security in the country. Therefore, in an attempt to establish and maintain reciprocal relations with Serbia and set the rule of law in the northern region, the Government of Kosovo on 25 July, 2011 authorised an unexpected police operation to regain control of two border crossings in the north of Kosovo. The presence of special police forces in the north of Kosovo received a highly negative reaction from Serb political leaders and the wider community. This intervention triggered a violent reaction against Kosovo police and customs officers at the border crossing with Serbia, which resulted in the complete demolition and burning of border points, as well the death of a Kosovo police officer. Serbian parallel structures used explosives, automatic weapons, and snipers to shoot at Kosovo police, EULEX police and KFOR (UNSC 2011b). The resistance took a new momentum and spread throughout northern Kosovo, resulting in road blockages, civil disobedience to EULEX and KFOR orders, and opening of more illegal and informal border crossings with Serbia. Though UNMIK tried to maintain a status-neutral position, the rejections by Kosovo authorities made them turn to Serb parallel structures and work with them in the north of Kosovo as community representatives, making a role for the UN as a protector of the minority in Kosovo. The absence of any communication between Kosovo and Serbia after independence increased international fears that the fragile situation in the north of Kosovo could escalate, thereby delaying the European perspective for both countries and undermining the entire international investment in the region. The EU utilised this critical momentum to take a pro-active role and facilitate a dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The essence of this process was to find a mutually agreeable solution to the question of Serbia’s removal of its parallel institutions in Kosovo and de facto acceptance of Kosovo’s sovereignty both as sole legal and political authority in the territory of Kosovo in exchange of integrating Serb parallel structures in Kosovo political system and expanding the autonomous self-governance for Serb community in Kosovo (Visoka and Doyle 2016). This new peace process revealed that over the years Serbia had used the presence of parallel structures to increase its bargaining power in Kosovo: shaping several decentralisation plans, fostering the return of Serb refugees, securing special protection for Serb Orthodox Church sites in Kosovo, and ensuring special rights and privileges for the Serb community within Kosovo’s central and local institutions.

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The normalisation process was structured around technical and high-level political dialogue. Between March 2011 and October 2012, the dialogue involved talks on resolving outstanding technical issues between two states, such as in the area of regional cooperation, freedom of movement, and rule of law, which were set by the EU as essential conditions for the region’s European perspective (EEAS 2011). Accordingly, the technical dialogue resulted in reaching a number of important agreements on: regional cooperation and representations; integrated border management; the regulation of customs steps; the return of cadastral records and the civil registry; and the recognition of university diplomas. The technical dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia played a facilitating, transitory, and confidence-building role and paved the way for high-level political dialogue. After October 2012, the nature of dialogue was upgraded to the highest political level, which concluded with the initialling in April 2013 of The First Agreement Governing the Principles for Normalisation of Relations. This agreement envisaged establishing: an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo; Kosovo police representation and authority in the north of Kosovo; regulated the organisation and activity of judicial bodies and courts in the north of Kosovo; outlined the organisation of local elections in the north of Kosovo; and highlighted mutual support for the EU integration path. In return, Serbia agreed to dismantle its parallel structures in Kosovo after fifteen years of illegal operation in the country. This came as a direct demand from Kosovo that there could be no normalisation of the situation in the north of Kosovo for as long as Serb parallel and illegal structures in the north of Kosovo were present to undermine Kosovo’s authority (Visoka and Doyle 2016). The multiplicity of events examined here illustrates the complex figuration of post-conflict processes where the emergence and the development of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo served the purpose of contesting post-conflict peacebuilding more than advancing the peace in Kosovo. The international peacebuilding and statebuilding mechanisms in Kosovo operated as a loose network of organisations with distinct intentions, which explains their figuration in Kosovo and their inability to establish the rule of law and peace for everyone in Kosovo. Often, the international community has intentionally downplayed the significance of Serb parallel structures to avoid the responsibility for failing to prevent their creation and expansion over the years. While the flow of events in post-conflict Kosovo has been unplanned and unpredicted, the operation of multiple figurations of power centres and different political agendas provides solid grounds for disentangling their role in shaping peace in Kosovo and producing unwanted outcomes. Although Serb parallel structures have de facto been dismantled as of 2015, it is important to explore their legacies: especially the broader consequences of constant frictions between local and international actors in Kosovo; and how the possibilities for preventing negative consequences were in place but due to lack of political will and fear of destabilisation UN, NATO and EU tolerated these structures, thus make them co-producers of peace in Kosovo. The remainder of this chapter illustrates how distinct intentions and unplanned events have produced unprevented consequences in Kosovo.

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The unprevented consequences of peacebuilding in Kosovo The theoretical discussion in the first part of the book examined how inconvenient and unwanted consequences of peacebuilding interventions are represented as unintended and unanticipated consequences. The reduction of agency to achieve the intended outcomes is tactically pursued to avoid responsibility and preserve moral and political authority regardless of failures and unlearnings across several cases of interventionism. A careful analysis of the linkage between peacebuilding intentions and events in Kosovo point out that the presence of Serb parallels structures in Kosovo is a typical case of the occurrence of unprevented consequences. As the evidence suggests below, UNMIK was well aware of these challenges posed by Serb parallel structures. However, the immediate interest for preserving stability and avoiding inter-ethnic confrontation led UNMIK to tolerate their operation in Kosovo. As argued by Covey (2005: 93), UNMIK ‘embraced the principle of cultivating ambiguity about power sharing to reduce potential threats to Kosovo’s political transformation’. Unprevented consequences have significantly shaped the figuration of peace in Kosovo. This section discusses how Serb parallel structures have created a frozen conflict in the north of Kosovo, obstructed the integration of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo’s new institutions, brewed organised crime and insecurity, obstructed the implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo and, finally, how they have solidified ethnic division and delayed political and societal reconciliation in Kosovo. Exploring these consequences reveals how constant, yet avoidable, failures of peacebuilding endeavours did not bother UNMIK and other international organisations as they prolonged the UN’s presence, gave it a purpose to exercise its authority, and served the purpose of certain UN member states to keep Kosovo in limbo without clear political status. Failures became normal in Kosovo and were constantly utilised as opportunities for rejuvenating international experimentation with peacebuilding and statebuilding. Creation of ‘frozen conflict’ in the north of Kosovo One of the most alarming aspects of peacebuilding in Kosovo was the fear of a protracted ‘frozen conflict’ in the north of Kosovo, facilitated by Serb parallel structures with the goal of impeding international peacebuilding, and creating the conditions for either partitioning Kosovo or gaining a special political status (Haug 2011). The origin of the problem is rooted in the slow deployment of international police, judges and prosecutors in the north of Kosovo, which significantly hindered the security situation, enabling a lawless environment that facilitated the emergence of Serb parallel structures. The frozen conflict in the north of Kosovo was manifested in the absence of a democratically elected government (neither UNMIK or Kosovo government), the persistence of insecurity evident in the inter-ethnic confrontation, attacks against civilians, expelling of local population, the absence of socio-economic interaction (apart from smuggling), and the physical separation of communities. Over the years, the UN and

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other international organisations were aware of the operation of these parallel structures, but they tolerated this local resistance considering it a sensitive political issue, and fearing that a reaction would destabilise Kosovo. The former head of KFOR in Kosovo, French Army General Yves de Kermabon, admitted that ‘[t]he KFOR, UN and the entire community was aware of the illegal and criminal activity of Serb parallel structures in the north of Kosovo, and the usage of local population as a hostage’.8 He also admitted Belgrade supported the parallel structures, which meant confronting Serb parallel structures in Kosovo would have had repercussions from Russia in the UN Security Council. However, de Kermabon considered the persistence of these structures for over thirteen years as being due to the fact that ‘the international community was not sufficiently strong to say that we will never accept the partition of Kosovo’.9 He accepted that ‘from very beginning there was some ambiguity to this. Serbs always were thinking about partition and it was always on the table. So this created the illusive intention, for which they fought all these years’.10 The Serb parallel structures in Kosovo were temporary political creatures that emerged during the UN’s governance of Kosovo to become one of the main peace-breakers for nearly a decade. In his memoirs on Kosovo, UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner (2004), blamed NATO peacekeepers for not assisting UNMIK’s deployment in the north, thereby acknowledging that such a political mistake led to the division of Kosovo, triggered reciprocal population displacement, and provided Serbs with an unexpected territory of their own on the border with Serbia. On the other hand, Wesley Clark, a former US Army General, attributed this failure to political problems and disagreements within NATO and the EU on how to approach the parallel structures in Kosovo (Kosova Press 2012). In early 2013, a former KFOR Commander who served in 1999 and 2000, General Klaus Reinhardt, revealed to the Kosovo media that ‘the partition of Mitrovica came as a consequence of international politics’, while stating that he – a military officer – was powerless to prevent it (Bota Sot 2013). General Reinhardt admitted that the north was intentionally divided, leaving the puzzle unsolved when he stated that ‘unfortunately it was a state that obstructed the greater presence in the north of Kosovo, and for this reason we have missed the opportunity to improve the situation there, and I think it won’t be resolved for a long period of time neither’ (Bota Sot 2013). A confidential UNMIK report sent to the UN Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations in October 2007 admitted that ‘the spread of parallel structures contravenes UNMIK’s authority to implement its mandate, thereby violating SCR 1244 and establishing preconditions for a de facto partition of Kosovo’ (UNMIK 2007: 1). This report stated that ‘[a]ccelerating partition prejudices on-going political developments by creating a fait accompli where the K-Serbian-inhabited areas of Kosovo are both separate from the rest of Kosovo and made increasingly reliant on Belgrade’ (UNMIK 2007: 1). The same report admitted that Serb parallel structures were undermining the rule of law in Kosovo, but ‘UNMIK’s ability to respond to this situation is limited due in large

Peace figuration in Kosovo 119 part to our reliance on the willingness of KFOR participating states to utilize force to achieve objectives beyond providing a safe and secure environment’ (UNMIK 2007: 1). As Capussela (2015: 69; 73) argues ‘the West did not use force to prevent or reverse its separation . . . because using force could have destabilized the region’. Despite acknowledging the consequences of these structures, UNMIK did not develop a concrete action plan or strategy on how to handle them. So, even though the international peacebuilding organisations did not intend declaratively the de facto division of Kosovo, they contributed to this unprevented consequence through their non-actions. Accordingly, the non-action of UN peacebuilders and NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo with regard to Serb parallel structures significantly undermined the prospects for peacebuilding in Kosovo. One convincing explanation of UNMIK’s non-action lies in the obstructive influence Russia had on UNMIK, exploiting its powerful position within the UN Security Council and the UN Secretariat to question and harass most of the actions of UNMIK, downgrade their efforts, and support every move that concerned Serbia and its quest for jeopardising statebuilding (Covey 2005: 89–90). Effectively, UNMIK’s silence was maintained by the fact that Russia had a strong role in shaping the senior appointments within UNMIK structures in Kosovo. What was considered as a failure of peacebuilding at the field-based level, was celebrated as a success at the international level. At the local level, the UN’s failure to establish the rule of law in Kosovo helped certain local actors succeed in their pursuit of informality, patronage politics, and clan-based authority. After independence, the international community saw the situation in the north of Kosovo as one of the key issues obstructing effective statebuilding. They gradually realised that it was ‘imperative to forestall three catastrophic scenarios in northern Kosovo: armed conflict, frozen conflict or partition’ (ICO 2012: 41). As the north of Kosovo remained ‘de-facto divided’ this was perceived as a risk that could undermine ‘all the successes’ in the rest of Kosovo (KIPRED 2012b: 2). Obstruction of Serb integration in Kosovo’s institutions and society While Serb parallel structures were created as a response to the lack of early benefits for Serbia from post-conflict peace- and institution-building in Kosovo, their existence by default undermined international efforts to build inclusive political institutions, to pursue minority integration, and eventually to achieve ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo. Over the years, the hostile attitude of Serb parallel structures towards UN-led peacebuilding and statebuilding kept the local Serb population hostage to ethno-nationalist destructive politics, thereby impeding prospects for ethnic co-existence and eventual reconciliation (UNDP 2003: 15). The presence of UNMIK administration alongside Serb structures created confusion among the local population regarding the responsible authority for running local affairs. Most importantly, the political agency of the Serb population in Kosovo was centralised and controlled by Serbia’s government, which intentionally prevented the activities of more moderate political factions within

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Serb communities. Nevertheless, the Kosovo Albanian elite was preoccupied with the struggle for independence therefore it did not do much to promote multi-ethnicity and co-existence after the conflict. After 2001, parallel structures impeded the proper utilisation of new power-sharing institutions established by the UNMIK in Kosovo, which undermined the prospects for creating multiethnic institutions. The existence of Serb parallel structures created problems with the operation of double justice systems, incompatible issuance of decisions and their enforcement and recognition, multiple education curricula, incompatible healthcare systems, and the possession of contested documents. Serbia’s support for its structures in Kosovo undermined the capacity of the UN and Kosovar authorities to build local stable institutions. Besides undermining the functionality and integrity of international and local institutions in Kosovo, Serb parallel structures were alleged for being involved on organised crime (US Embassy Pristina 2010). The figuration of institutional parallelism in the fields of public administration, judiciary, education, and healthcare further nurtured social divisions, undermining any chance of conflict transformation and societal healing. However, the Government of Serbia justified this support for Serbs in Kosovo by citing the failure of UN and Kosovo authorities to facilitate favourable socio-economic conditions, freedom of movement, and political space for Serbs to exercise their rights in Kosovo (Government of Serbia 2003b). As Capussela (2015: 68) argues, ‘north Kosovo has lived in almost complete isolation from Pristina thanks to the financial and political it received from Belgrade covert or informal support’. Serbian authorities provided salaries and other benefits to Serb civil servants that were highly attractive compared to the lower salaries provided by the UNMIK and Kosovo institutions (European Stability Initiative 2004). Serbia spent approximately €200 million annually to maintain its parallel structures in the north of Kosovo (Visoka and Beha 2013). This incentivising mechanism proved to be effective for many years, but undermined prospects for peace and stability in Kosovo. To avoid international criticism, Serbia has tried to hide how such aid was sent from Serbia to its parallel structures in Kosovo. As the socio-economic conditions of Kosovo Serbs remained poor, the funds given by governments in Pristina and Belgrade to buy the loyalty of local Serbs empowered a group of Serb leaders who controlled Serb enclaves in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the sporadic violence against the Serb minority in Kosovo caused by damaging their property, attacking churches, attacking school buses, and threatening returnees increased Serb grievances and impeded their integration into the interim administrative structures (UNSC 2001: 3). Conveniently, they turned to the emerging Serb parallel structures at that time for help and for the consolidation of autonomous structures. Gradually, Serb factions in Kosovo consolidated their parallel justice system, using the Serbian legal framework and receiving administrative and financial support from them. This was also related to UNMIK’s delay in establishing local courts in the north, which forced the local population to use parallel courts. Consequently, the operation of multiple courts in Kosovo led to confusion, whereby the same criminal and civil cases

Peace figuration in Kosovo 121 were prosecuted and dealt with by Serb parallel courts and UNMIK courts at different times, neither recognising the other’s jurisdiction (OSCE 2003). The judicial mess in Kosovo further damaged UNMIK’s legitimacy and popular support, and undermined its declared intention to establish the rule of law throughout the country. Other administrative activities such as the cadastral also had a negative impact, whereby property disputes increased when two conflicting decisions were issued by the Serb parallel structure on the one hand, and the UNMIK and Kosovo authorities on the other. The efforts of UNMIK to secure freedom of movement for Serb enclaves, guard minority communities, and deliver basic services were insufficient to restore ethnic confidence and reconciliation. Instead, Serb parallel structures provided subsistence services in the sectors of security, justice, education, public administration, and healthcare. While in relation to the Kosovo political system these structures represented institutional parallelism, from Belgrade’s perspective these institutions were part of Serbia’s legal and administrative system, and operated according to the principles of legality, accountability, and legitimacy (OSCE 2003). The Serb parallel schooling system operated separately from the internationally supported and Kosovo-run education system (OSCE 2003), using different textbooks and issuing diplomas. They were formed as a response to the immediate insecurity prevalent in Kosovo and the lack of joint education systems. The lack of protection for minority communities and inadequate social conditions for teaching minority languages and distinct cultural aspects served as legitimate reasons for forming an alternative education system among the Serb population. However, the segregated education system with unrecognised diplomas certainly had a negative effect on the process of learning each other’s languages, and severely affected cross-community communication and employment. Similarly, in the healthcare sector, Serb parallel structures operated in Serb-populated regions of Kosovo, mainly in the north, and relied on medical supplies and financial support from the Serb authorities in Belgrade (Government of Kosovo 2011a). UNMIK and Kosovo authorities did not make any attempt to integrate Serb medical staff into facilities administered by the new public institutions in Kosovo. The Serb parallel structures also exercised control over non-dominant minorities in the north of Kosovo, such as the Roma community who were forcefully stationed in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in a region with high levels of pollution, inhumane living conditions, and constant insecurity. The level of lead found in the IDP camps in the north of Kosovo was several times higher than acceptable levels of exposure, raising serious risks for a potential health catastrophe in a UN-administered refugee camp (Human Rights Watch 2009). Following international criticism, UNMIK tried to accommodate Roma IDPs elsewhere. Serb parallel structures, however, forced camp leaders to reject the international resettlement proposal, fearing that such a resettlement would provide the opportunity for UNMIK and Kosovo institutions to extend their authority in the north and take hold of strategic locations around the divided zones of the city of Mitrovica.11 Hence, such local destructive agency showed

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that local resistance can also have exclusionary effects by subordinating minorities within communities and expanding the hierarchies of domination. These consequences illustrate that UNMIK’s efforts to achieve stability undermined reaching both sustainable peace and stability in Kosovo. Failure to implement the Comprehensive Status Settlement in the north of Kosovo The inability to implement UN’s Comprehensive Status Settlement in the north of Kosovo was primarily attributed to the Serb parallel structures. The failure to resolve the fate of these structures during the final status and Serbia’s rejection of Kosovo independence radicalised their activity in opposing UN’s peace proposal. Beyond these political reasons, Serb parallel structures rejected the UN’s peace proposal, fearing that establishing the rule of law and shifting the allegiances of local Serbs to Kosovo institutions would weaken their political and economic privileges.12 The greatest challenge for the ICO, a new entity established by the international community to supervise Kosovo’s independence, was the establishment of a new municipal unit in the northern part of Mitrovica (ICO 2012: 125). All the other municipal units dedicated to minority-populated regions within Kosovo were successfully established and functional. Practically speaking, local support for creating a new municipality was low, as administrative needs were already fulfilled by Serb parallel municipal structures in the north of Mitrovica. The ICO also had difficulties finding adequate and locally supported candidates to run for municipal elections in the north of Kosovo. Serb political parties, such as SLS (Liberal Independent Party) that participated in Kosovo’s government, did not have any presence in the north as their attempts to create branches had failed due to conflicting interests between locals and Serb parallel structures. Consequently, the contentious politics that Serb parallel structures used to obstruct the extension of Kosovo’s authority in the north were gradually normalised and accepted by all sides in the peacebuilding process. Serb parallel structures consistently obstructed Serb participation in Kosovo institutions, orchestrated violence against Albanian minorities in the north, and resisted the work of EULEX and KFOR regarding the rule of law, justice, customs, and public order. Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Serb parallel structures strengthened further their internal structure by creating in June 2008 an ‘Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija’, which consisted mainly of Serb-dominated municipalities in the north and representatives of Serb parallel structures that operated throughout Kosovo. The primary purpose of this re-configuration of Serb parallel political structures was to fortify their ties and representation in opposition to Kosovo’s independence, which was openly supported by Belgrade. The extension of Serb parallel administrative structures into the political field further entrenched the separation of the north from the rest of Kosovo. An OSCE (2010: 12) report highlights that ‘[s]ince 17 February, 2008, the separation of the Kosovo Serb community increased through the establishment of parallel political

Peace figuration in Kosovo 123 institutions and the strengthening of parallel social institutions such as education, health care, social welfare and pensions’. The same report admitted that ‘[w]hile the Kosovo government showed some effort to integrate Kosovo Serbs in the civil service, overall there has been no significant progress in socially integrating the Kosovo Serb community’ (OSCE 2010: 9). The lack of support for the Kosovo Strategy for the north and the subsequent Kosovo police intervention in July 2011 intensified the political and violent confrontations in the north of Kosovo. The impacts of the failure of the international community and Kosovo authorities to stop and dismantle the activities of the Serb parallel structures were significant. A UN report highlighted that [h]alf of all inter-ethnic incidents, including all serious ones, disturbances and mass protests, continued to take place along the Ibër/Ibar River, where the situation remains fragile and both the Kosovo Serbian and Kosovo Albanian communities react instantly to what they consider a provocation by the other community. (UNSC 2011c: 5) The EU’s Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) operationalised after Kosovo independence was significantly hampered by the on-going roadblocks in the north of Kosovo. EULEX was unable and incapable of conducting trials at the Mitrovica District Court, and the EULEX police were unable to monitor the work of local Serb police that were a de facto part of the Kosovo police. Consequently work on the rule of law and justice remained unaccomplished due to resistance from the Serb population, explicitly orchestrated and manipulated by the Serb parallel structure for narrow political and material interests (European Commission 2011: 12). Several attempts by KFOR to remove the barricades proved unsuccessful, as the revolt of the local population was more visible than the readiness of KFOR to enforce freedom of movement in that part of Kosovo. On a few occasions NATO peacekeepers were seriously wounded, triggering strong reactions and condemnation from the EU and the wider international community. The barricades were gradually removed after proactive persistence and pressure by the German government on Serbia, which made the EU integration progress conditional on the dismantling of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo. After Kosovo’s independence, the Serb parallel structures became one of the main obstacles to peace and stability in Kosovo. Other problems included high unemployment, endemic corruption, and partial international isolation. The failure of the international presence to take early action empowered these structures to challenge international authority beyond that anticipated. International non-action gave these structures the grounds and power to resist and defy peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo. It also antagonised Kosovo institutions and alerted that failure to resolve the dispute over the north of Kosovo would increase regional instability. Failing to take adequate measures at an early stage had a spill-over effect and created path dependence where, no matter how effective later efforts are, they might be constrained by new developments, transformed intentions, and

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an acceptance of the new reality, which was not in line with the initially declared intentions. The political economy of ethnic division Finally, Serb parallel structures did not contribute to improving inter-ethnic relations, co-existence, and reconciliation in Kosovo. Instead, they often reinforced fear, mistrust, misconceived prejudices, and entrenched in-group pressure and control (ICO 2010). Ethnic violence in Kosovo hindered ethnic confidence and discouraged political participation and dialogue. It has been observed that ‘most inter-ethnic contacts occur in private individual relations as well as in business and trade’ (KIPRED 2012a: 11). Inter-ethnic cooperation occurred only among Albanians and Serbs working for local and international NGOs, and among those who engaged with joint civil society activities or illegal businesses. The operation of Serb parallel structures significantly damaged the Kosovo economy due to the uncontrollable flow of goods, the operation of organised crime networks, and the flow of transnational illegal trafficking enabled by uncontrollable northerner border points. Accordingly, criminal groups in the north of Kosovo ‘consolidated and vested interest in resisting the imposition of any form of state authority in the north’ (Capussela 2015: 68). The political economy of informality in the north of Kosovo was maintained by Serb parallel structures that also hosted multiple networks of organised crime. The northern side of Mitrovica was characterised by lawlessness during the postconflict decade. With a backlog of between 100,000 and 140,000 cases, the court system in the north was not providing justice to defendants (Visoka and Beha 2013). A former head of KFOR in Kosovo admitted, ‘behind [Serb] nationalists, was a network of organized crime, which cooperated also with the Albanians in the south of Kosovo’.13 A large percentage of Serb citizens living in the north of Kosovo believed organised crime networks were in charge of running local affairs (Kosovo Stability Initiative 2009: 7). In 2011 it is estimated that half the products arriving in Kosovo came through informal and illegal routes (Government of Kosovo 2011b). In 2012 around 35 per cent of Kosovo’s economic activity belonged to informal and illegal practices, and the main reason for this was the fragile security situation and the absence of the rule of law in the north of Kosovo (Briscoe and Price 2011: 12). Lack of control over the border in the north of Kosovo was a major concern for the business environment in Kosovo. Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo led to an arrangement whereby goods and capital that entered Kosovo from Serbia were not taxed on either side of the boarder. This lack of regulation provided a safe haven for smugglers and illegal traders, who benefited from the informality that prevailed in this part of Kosovo. Following the demolition of border points in the north, Serb parallel structures and their networks managed to exploit systemic loopholes to promote informality in the north of Kosovo. The inability of the international community and the Kosovo government to establish the authority and the rule of law in the north of Kosovo increased

Peace figuration in Kosovo 125 tension and radicalisation among Kosovo Albanian groups in the country. For example, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-determination) suggested on several occasions that the Government of Kosovo should take over control of the north through coercive measures, by deploying police and security forces there (see Visoka 2016). Following the Kosovo police intervention in July 2011 in the north, KLA veterans strongly supported the government’s action and offered support to Kosovo authorities in restoring the rule of law and order in the north of Kosovo. They also highlighted that KLA veterans are always ready to rise up and defend the sovereignty of Kosovo. These associations blamed KFOR, UNMIK, and EULEX for failing to dismantle the illegal and parallel structures in the north of Kosovo responsible for violently expelling thousands of Albanians from the northern municipalities after the 1999 war. They explicitly demanded that the responsible authorities in Kosovo return all Albanian inhabitants to their homes in the north. KLA war associations also issued the implicit threat that if KFOR, EULEX, and the Kosovo government did nothing, the KLA war associations would lead an uprising. In that situation, they highlighted, those responsible would be the security authorities who brought the situation to that point through their non-action (KLA War Associations 2012).

Conclusion Attempts to build a liberal peace in Kosovo did not manage to achieve the desired peace. Instead they produced a localised figuration of peace caught inbetween local state formation and state contestation dynamics. The conflicting peace agendas in Kosovo shaped peace prospects resulting thus in the failure of all parties to fully achieve their intended goals. The UN and NATO peacekeepers failed to build a sustainable peace and a functioning democracy for more than fifteen years. At best, they succeeded in the fragile stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the country. Kosovo Albanians managed to form their independent statehood; however, Serbia’s rejection of independence placed Kosovo in a complex road to international recognition, domestic stability, and regional peace and membership in the international organisations. On the other hand, Serbia managed to obstruct political developments in Kosovo and provide ethnic security to its compatriots through parallel structures, while failing to keep Kosovo under its control. However, the persistence of these distinct agendas and the failure of the international community to deal appropriately with local resistance and contestation produced a number of negative, yet preventable, consequences which shaped a negative hybrid peace in Kosovo. This chapter focused on exploring only one of the many silent political issues that have shaped peace in Kosovo. The failure to prevent the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures led to the creation of a frozen conflict in the north, where UNMIK failed to extend its authority and the rule of law, and KFOR was unable to maintain security and ensure freedom of movement. Consequently, this institutional and legal parallelism created social disobedience, disorder, and informality. Moreover, the activity of Serb parallel structures

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undermined international and domestic efforts to build peace, consolidate state institutions, and find common ground for ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo after 1999. These dynamics overshadowed a meaningful transition from ethnic hostility to sustainable peace. The return of refugees to this part of Kosovo also became impossible, and the participation and integration of Kosovo-Serbs in newly established institutions was obstructed. Furthermore, the emergence of Serb parallel structures led to the creation of institutional and legal parallelism, which created social confusion and chaos, social disobedience and disorder, and informality. These consequences significantly shaped political developments in Kosovo – becoming obstacles that led to other consequences, thereby creating a predictable pattern of processes where the key agents became, in many instances, mere spectators of their own doings and undoings. The internationally set agenda and principles for the final status negotiations explicitly excluded the discussion of Serb parallel structures, as they meant to address this problem through the question of the status of Serbs in Kosovo and by pursuing extensive decentralisation. However, the failure to reach a mutually agreed settlement resulted in the failure to implement the Ahtisaari proposal in the north of Kosovo, and led to the institutionalisation and radicalisation of the Serb parallel structures. In other instances, these structures obstructed the integration of Serbs into Kosovo’s political life, divided the international presence, and expanded lawlessness, criminality and informality in the north of Kosovo. Thus the previous non-actions created a new chain of consequences, which multiplied, became more complicated, and reduced the prospects for considering international peacebuilding in Kosovo a success. Some of the consequences examined here significantly shaped political developments in Kosovo, whereby previous non-actions created a new chain of consequences, which multiplied, complicated, and constrained further peacebuilding opportunities. Accordingly, unprevented consequences prevented peacebuilding in Kosovo. Such unprevented consequences effectively prolonged the international presence in Kosovo, undermined their authority and legitimacy, delayed the establishment of effective and functional institutions, hindered the establishment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation, and undermined socio-economic development. The failure of the international community to take preventive measures illustrates how the lack of sensitivity towards the consequences, despite the availability of authority, resources, and knowledge, created a mess and ultimately failed to achieve their declared intentions.14 The emergence of these consequences was intentionally not prevented, revealing the morale and seriousness of peacebuilding, as well as the weak agency of the UN, NATO, and EU to remain loyal to the declared intentions and obligations undertaken on behalf of the international community and the local population. It shows ‘the triumph of the lack of will’ to take timely and appropriate measures to prevent negative consequences in their field of responsibility. While the UN might have chosen non-action to prevent any larger scale conflict, this has counter-intuitively prevented peace in the long run. In this case, post-conflict ‘conflict prevention’ became ‘peace prevention’.

Peace figuration in Kosovo 127 The logic that conflict prevention comes before peacebuilding in the sequential order of interventionism cognitively limits the option of considering preventive responses to conflict-sparking developments during and after peacebuilding. As shown in this chapter, the UN’s politics of prevention during and after peacebuilding remain problematic and widely ignored in peacebuilding debates and praxis. The UN peacebuilding architecture has failed to prevent the relapse of societies into conflict. In principle, there is support for conflict prevention within the UN, as exemplified with the 2015 UN review of peacebuilding agenda, but when it comes to practice the UN institutional architecture and internal bureaucracy significantly impedes the UN’s ability to perform conflict prevention after failed peacebuilding. Similarly, the EU’s review of its security strategy recently called for combining ‘early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding in a coherent whole’ (EEAS 2015: 18). Experience from Kosovo shows that the international peacebuilding bureaucracy often prioritises responding to crises after the damage is done rather than properly handling early signals and peace-breaking events. Short-term preventions have undermined efforts to layout the foundations of the structural prevention of conflicts. The analysis of unprevented consequences of peacebuilding in Kosovo shows that the presence of authority, clear intentions, and knowledge but without political will and strong oversight and accountability for peacebuilding missions leads missions to deviate, lose control, remain in a permanent state of transformation, lose direction, fail to achieve their goals and, above all, cause bad consequences (Visoka and Doyle 2014). King and Mason (2006: 239) argue the ‘international community was very successful where there was a strong and united international will’. The liberal peace impetus and praxis have not produced the intended outcomes, thereby contributing directly and indirectly to a world of its unmaking which is made of consequences that are shaped by liberal peace and local agency around critical turning points, events, and remote nonevents. Each post-conflict society develops a different figuration of peace, which comes as a result of the interaction between insider and outsider forces, both at the intentionality and praxis levels, but also in terms of the unplanned consequences they produce, which can often be harmful to the peace process.

Notes 1 Interview with a senior politician in Kosovo, Pristina, July 2012. 2 Interview with a former Kosovo Albanian politician, Pristina, September 2012. 3 Interview by author with a former Commander of KFOR in Kosovo, Brussels, 15 October, 2013. 4 Interview by author with a former UNMIK Regional Administrator for Mitrovica, Washington DC, June 2013. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Interview by author with a former adviser to the UN for final status talks, Brussels, November 2013. 8 Interview by author with a former Commander of KFOR in Kosovo, Brussels, 15 October, 2013.

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9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Interview by author with a former international aid worker in Kosovo, Pristina, November 2013. 12 Interview by author with a Kosovo Serb civil society activist, Mitrovica, November 2013. 13 Interview by author with a former Commander of KFOR in Kosovo, Brussels, 15 October, 2013. 14 Ibid.

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Peace figuration in Kosovo 129 EEAS (2011) ‘Statement by the spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative on the start of the Belgrade – Pristina dialogue’, A 094/11, Brussels, 8 March, 2011. EEAS (2015) The European Union in a Changing Global Environment, Brussels, 30 June, 2015. ESI (2004) Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvecan, Berlin: European Stability Initiative. European Commission (2011) Kosovo 2011 Progress Report, SEC(2011) 1207 final, 12 October, 2011. Government of Kosovo (2011a) Report on Parallel Institutions on North of Kosovo: Belgrade – With a Foot on the North and an Open Hand in Brussels, Pristina: Government of Kosovo. Government of Kosovo (2011b) Strategy for the Development of SME in Kosovo 2012–2016, Pristina: Government of Kosovo. Government of Serbia (2003a) Statement by Dr Nebojsa Covic at the session of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia Belgrade, 27 August, 2003. Available online at: www.arhiva.serbia.gov.rs/news/2003-08/28/330616.html (accessed 28 August, 2014). Government of Serbia (2003b) Statement by Dr. Nebojsa Covic, UN Security Council, 6 February, 2003. Available online at: www.arhiva.serbia.gov.rs/news/200302/07/327650.html (accessed 28 August, 2014). Government of Serbia (2004) A Plan for the Political Solution to the Situation in Kosovo and Metohija, Belgrade: Government of Serbia. Government of Serbia (2007) Address by Prime Minister of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica to the UN Security Council, 3 April, 2007. Government of Serbia (2008) ‘Decision on the annulment of the illegitimate acts of the provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo and Metohija on their declaration of unilateral independence’, 18 February, 2008. Available online at: www.srbija.gov. rs/kosovo-metohija/index.php?id=43159 (accessed 20 September, 2014). Guehenno, J. (2015) The Fog of Peace: Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Haug, H. K. (2011) ‘Kosovo in Serbian Politics since Milosevic’, in Listhaug, O., Ramet, S. P., and Dulić, D. (eds) Civil and Uncivil Values: Serbia in the Post-Milosevic Era, Budapest: CEU Press. Hehir, A. (ed.) (2010) Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International community and the Transition to Independence, Abingdon: Routledge. Human Rights Watch (2009) Poisoned by Lead: A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Mitrovica’s Roma Camps, New York: Human Rights Watch. ICO (2010) Report of Focus Groups with citizens in northern Kosovo, Pristina: International Civilian Office. ICO (2012) State Building and Exit: The International Civilian Office and Kosovo’s Supervised Independence 2008–2012, Pristina: International Civilian Office. Janjić, S. (2007) ‘Chaos and Disorder: Kosovo and Metohija Four Years Later’, in Bataković, D. T. (ed.) Kosovo and Metohija: Living in the Enclave, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Judah, T. (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven: Yale University Press. King, I. and Mason, W. (2006) Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. KIPRED (2012a) Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo, Policy Paper Series 2012/03, Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development.

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KIPRED (2012b) The Unsupervised States: Internally Divided, Internationally HalfLegitimate, Policy Brief, No. 1/12, Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development. KLA War Association (2012) Open letter directed to the responsible authorities for security in Kosovo, 11 April, 2012. Kosova Press (2012) ‘The problem of the north, caused by fragmentation within NATO’, 18 October, 2012. Available online at: www.kosovapress.com/archive/?cid=1,86,154423 (accessed 18 September, 2014). Kosovo Information Center (2000) Rugova: with Kostunica we can talk only as two independent states, 09 December, 2000. Available online at: www.kosova.com/arkivi1997/ i001209.htm (accessed 18 September, 2014). Kosovo Stability Initiative (2009) ‘Mitrovica: One City, Two Realities’, Policy Briefs, Pristina: Kosovo Stability Initiative. Kouchner, B. (2004) The Warriors of Peace, Paris: Grasset. Ministry of Defence of Serbia (1998) ‘Order to smash DTS/sabotage and terrorist forces/ and armed rebellion forces in Kosovo and Metohija’, DT/state secret/no. 6034–7/1, 29 July, 1998. NATO (2000) ‘Statement to the Press by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, following NAC Meeting on Kosovo’, Press Release (2000)018, 25 February, 2000. Available online at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-018e.htm (accessed 25 October, 2014). NATO (2001) ‘Statement by the Secretary General’, PR/CP(2001)021, 16 February, 2001. Available online at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-021e.htm (accessed 25 October, 2014). New York Times (2008) ‘In a Divided Kosovo City, a Resounding Vow to Remain Part of Serbia’, 19 February, 2008. Available online at: www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/ world/europe/19serbs.html?_r=0 (accessed 3 November, 2014). OSCE (2003) Parallel Structures in Kosovo, Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo. OSCE (2007) Parallel Structures in Kosovo 2006–2007, Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo. OSCE (2010) Kosovo Communities Profiles 2010 – Kosovo Serbian Community Profile, Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Paris, R. (2004) At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Perrit, H. H. (2008) Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency, Illinois: University of Illinois Press. PISG (2004), Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, Pristina: Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. UNDP (2003) The Kosovo Mosaic: Perceptions of local government and public services in Kosovo, Pristina: UNDP Kosovo. UNMIK (2000) ‘Joint UNMIK-SNC Understanding on the Participation of the SNC in the JIAS’, 29 June, 2000. Available online at: www.kosovo.net/snc-unmik.html (accessed 23 August, 2014). UNMIK (2001) UNMIK-FRY Common Document, Belgrade. UNMIK (2007) Development of new Parallel Structures in Kosovo – Serbian inhabited areas, UNMIK Outgoing Code Cable, UNMIK-159, 15 October, 2007. UNOSEK (2007a) Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 2 February, 2007. UNOSEK (2007b) Vienna High-level meeting concludes 14 months of talks on the future status process for Kosovo, UNOSEK Press Release, UNOSEK/PR/19, 10 March, 2007.

Peace figuration in Kosovo 131 UNSC (1999a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/1999/987, 16 September, 1999. UNSC (1999b) UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc S/RES/1244, 10 June, 1999. UNSC (2000a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2000/177, 3 March. UNSC (2000b) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2000/1196, 15 December, 2000. UNSC (2004a) Provisional Verbatim of the 4910th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.4910, 6 February, 2004. UNSC (2004b) Provisional Verbatim of the 5089th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.5089, 29 November, 2004. UNSC (2005) ‘Statement by Dr. Nebojša Čović, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and President of the Coordination Center of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohia’, 24 April, 2005. UNSC (2006), Provisional Verbatim of the 5373th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.5373, 14 February, 2006. UNSC (2007) The Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, UN Doc S/2007/168, 26 March, 2007. UNSC (2008) ‘Letter dated 12 June 2008 from the Secretary-General to His Excellency Mr. Boris Tadić’, UN Doc S/2008/354, 12 June, 2008. UNSC (2010) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2010/169, 6 April, 2010. UNSC (2011a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2011/43, 28 January, 2011. UNSC (2011b), Provisional Verbatim of the 6604th Meeting, S/PV.6604, 30 August, 2011. UNSC (2011c), Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2011/43, 28 January, 2011. UNSC (2015) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2010/579, 30 July, 2015. US Embassy Pristina (2010) ‘Transcript: Ambassador Dell – Interview with Jeta Xharra’, 16 February, 2010. Available online at: http://pristina.usembassy.gov/dell_statements/transcriptambassador-dell--interview-with-jeta-xharra-feb.16-2010 (accessed 8 October, 2015). Visoka, G. (2016) ‘Peace Multitudes: Liberal Peace, Local Agency, and Peace Formation in Kosovo’, in Richmond, O. P. and Pogodda, S. (eds) Post-Liberal Peace Transitions, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Visoka, G. and Beha, A. (2013) ‘Clearing up the Fog of the Conflict: Actor-based Mapping of the Disputes in the North of Kosovo’, Policy Study No. 1/2013, Pristina: Kosovo Institute of Peace. Visoka, G. and Bolton, G. (2011) ‘The Complex Nature and Implications of International Engagement after Kosovo’s Independence’, Civil Wars, 13(2): 189–214. Visoka, G. and Doyle, J. (2014) ‘Peacebuilding and International Responsibility’, International Peacekeeping, 21(5): 673–692. Visoka, G. and Doyle, J. (2016) ‘Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Forthcoming. Weller, M. (2009) Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6 Peace figuration in Timor- Leste

Introduction Timor-Leste represents one of the most interesting cases for exploring the dynamics of peace figuration after violent conflict. UN involvement in TimorLeste dates back to 1999 when almost three decades of Indonesian repression and systematic human rights abuses against the Timorese people ended as a result of an international humanitarian intervention. Between 1999 and 2012, the UN deployed six consecutive missions with different degrees of power, which focused on building a state from scratch by trying to replace traditional modes of governance, justice, and economy with modern liberal state approaches focused on building institutions, laws, and codified rules. Until 2006, Timor-Leste was praised as a success story of UN peacebuilding and statebuilding after conflict. The UN leadership went as far as to say ‘[i]n peacekeeping anthologies there is no doubt that UNTAET will be recorded in the column of the most successful peacekeeping operations ever’ (McNamara 2003: 34). The UN (2013) considered its peacebuilding missions as ‘duty completed’. However, contrary to such claims, what characterised peace figuration in Timor-Leste was a situationally-embedded complex entanglement of different local and international actors with varying degrees of power, incompatible intentions, different cultures of governance, different modes of knowledge, different bases of legitimacy, and different styles of performativity. These entanglements were in constant flux and changed gradually by the imposing force of liberal peace and the resisting and co-opting forces of local agencies, which resulted in multiple consequences. To examine peace figuration in Timor-Leste, this chapter explores the UN’s efforts to develop and later reform the police and defence forces as a primary pillar of liberal peacebuilding. Securitising Timor-Leste through developing new police and defence forces was seen as a major component of the UN peacebuilding project, a gradual exit strategy for international police and military forces, and a means to make Timor-Leste a viable post-conflict state. The UN peacebuilding in Timor-Leste intended to change the local figuration of political and socio-cultural relations by introducing an outlandish project of modernity. The main events that shaped the security sector development and reform in TimorLeste involved profound disagreements on recruitment policies, institutional

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 133 setting of defence and police forces, and the lack of sufficient international and local political support to create depoliticised and effective security institutions in the service of peace, order, and development. This figuration of incompatibilities from the outset triggered small-scale confrontational ‘non-events’ between defence and police forces, which were utilised by key political factions to safeguard or gain political power and were, at best, neglected by the UN presence. This chapter argues that the UN’s good intention to bring security and longterm stability to post-conflict Timor-Leste by developing defence and police forces produced multiple unanticipated consequences that adversely contributed to the prolongation of instability and insecurity, created unaccountable and authoritarian police and defence forces, and developed institutionalised sources of conflict. The culminating event was the 2006 confrontation between police and defence forces, which significantly undermined peacebuilding efforts and showed the fragility of state institutions. The UN’s peacebuilding intentions in Timor-Leste did not produce the intended effects, and the outcomes and impacts were largely unanticipated. While all contributed to this theatre of performative peacebuilding, the outcomes and consequences of such intentional actions have been beyond the scope of what was intended and expected to be achieved. Peacebuilding efforts turned peace upside down, thus creating the structural ingredients for peace-breaking. The police and defence forces became the main sources of insecurity in Timor-Leste. The UN was unprepared to undertake sufficient actions and make decisions informed by strategic and anticipatory systems in order to ensure that its endeavours did not create multiple adverse consequences. The multiple cycles of attempts and failures to build effective security institutions consequently required the renewal and reconfiguration of UN missions, which resulted in shifting power relations where local actors ultimately rejected the UN’s agency in reforming security institutions. This illustrates the limits of the UN’s power to change the course of events, processes, and structures in postconflict societies, while unearthing the power of peripheral events and the prevalence of unanticipated outcomes. This chapter is organised as follows. The first section disentangles the transcended nature of the UN’s intentionality for peacebuilding and statebuilding in Timor-Leste, and analyses the origin of incompatible rationales of international and local actors for securitising TimorLeste. The second section traces the key events that shaped, and most importantly, undermined peacebuilding efforts. The third section analyses the spectrum of unanticipated consequences that determined the fragile figuration of peace in Timor-Leste.

Shared versus divergent intentions The UN involvement in Timor-Leste is characterised by multiple missions, which modified their mandates six times within thirteen years. The UN initially engaged in facilitating a popular consultation on the political status of Timor-Leste through the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). However, a violent reaction to the overwhelming support for consensual secession from pro-autonomy militia groups

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and Indonesian forces resulted in a large-scale conflict that triggered an international military and civilian intervention to restore peace and prepare the country for independence (Kingsbury 2009). The unexpected violence that occurred in the summer of 1999 left the UN with a very short time to plan the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and to envisage potential challenges in the transitional path to independence (CSDG 2003: 16). The UN formulated its peacebuilding intentions for Timor-Leste largely according to ‘template logic’, drawing on the UNMIK structure in Kosovo, under internal pressure due to the short time available for preparing the mission, with shortage of staff within the UN Secretariat, and among disagreements between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (UN-DPA) over the internal responsibilities within the UN. Contrary to Kosovo, the UN in TimorLeste was a strong supporter of independence and not an obstacle to it. In line with liberal peacebuilding intentionality, the overarching priority for the international community in Timor-Leste was to develop stable security institutions that would contribute to the new country’s stability, promote security, enforce the rule of law, and protect democratic institutions (UNSC 1999b). Contrary to the Bosnian incremental mandate approach, UNTAET enjoyed supreme authority in all areas of post-conflict transitional governance of the territory. UNTAET enjoyed extensive authority and took a leading role in determining the nature of new East Timorese polity, establishing consultative mechanisms with the local political leaders, writing a new constitution and setting the electoral rules, as well as in governing the entire political, economic, and judiciary affairs. As admitted by senior UN officials, ‘this was a UN trusteeship to run a territory but without the expertise needed to do so’ (McNamara 2003: 35). As part of UNTAET’s mandate ‘to provide security and maintain the law and order throughout the territory of East Timor’, they prioritised establishing a new local police service and defence forces (UNSC 1999b: 2(a)). Although the UN did not originally have a mandate to develop the defence forces, the UN Transitional Administrator took the decision to establish the defence forces, following consultations with Timorese political elites (La’o Hamutuk 2005). Often, UN peacebuilding mandates are broad and vague and it is left to middle range or field-based UN personnel to figure out how to translate them into actions, which is where mistakes with deleterious consequences are often made. The UN’s official goal was to develop a police service that would reduce crime, maintain public order, and improve the safety of Timorese people while remaining efficient, accountable to the public, and free from political interference (Azimi and Lin 2003: 71; Rees 2002). While for many Timorese military leaders the development of the defence force served to ensure the survival of the FALENTIL (The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of TimorLeste), the UN saw the new defence force as an opportunity to transform and reintegrate ex-combatants. Equally, the UN perceived developing local police and defence forces as necessary to tackle the illegal and cross-border violence, smuggling, and provocation emanating from Western Timor, where a large number of pro-Indonesian refugees, ex-militia, and spoiler groups were placed

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 135 in refugee camps (Kingsbury 2009). The UN in Timor-Leste did not represent unified and consolidated interests and intentions. There was a multiplicity of interests of contributing states and multilateral organisations to advance their own interests, which impacted on the security sector reform. In addition, countries such as Australia, Indonesia, and China, among others, had geopolitical and economic interests, which were reflected in the security-development nexus of UN peace operations in Timor-Leste. Following independence, three consecutive UN missions were established to strengthen institutions and ensure overall stability in Timor-Leste. This signified a rare UN commitment to adapt its strategy in response to the local context. This persistence is often referred to as the UN’s optimal will to succeed. In achieving this, UN missions provided expertise and technical assistance to promote good governance in the newly established institutions, and provided police and military observers to strengthen the rule of law in the country. The primary purpose of the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1410 (2002) was to ‘provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor’ (UNSC 2012). Subsequently, the main role of the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) was to strengthen the rule of law, including justice and human rights, and provide support for the Timor-Leste police (UNSC 2005). For both of these missions, the intention was to strengthen capacities to prepare for the UN’s successful exit from the country after creating stable and functioning institutions. Following the violent events of April 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was given primary responsibility for reforming the police and defence forces (UNSC 2006b). The transition from one UN mission to another one and their transformation of intentions was basically a façade because, throughout the years, the international police and civilian staff remained pretty much the same in spite of changing mission names. This is crucial because the continuation of the same UN personnel meant that relationships had not changed. More importantly, such frequent renewal of UN peace mandates meant there was no space for a longterm view of the peace process. During this second stage of security sector reform, the UN entered into a complex arrangement with the Timorese government, which involved screening and certifying all police officers to address past misconduct, restructure the PNTL command and control structures, and provide a comprehensive review of the security situation in the country. The UNMIT Mandate Implementation Plan set out six related tasks involving: a comprehensive review of the security sector; monitoring and analysis of developments in the PNTL and the F-FDTL; liaison with bilateral donors; and coordinating advisers placed within the institutions (UNSC 2006a). The mandate of UNMIT was extended on an annual basis, but its goals and underlying intentions remained the same. Towards the end, the discourse shifted more towards invoking normalcy and self-sufficiency as an indicative benchmark of progress and to prepare an exit strategy.

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The figuration of the intentions of local actors was situated in a tripartite trajectory between nation-building, statebuilding, and welfare-building. Local representatives considered the UN’s involvement in facilitating these three aspirations crucial. While the UN prioritised statebuilding, such a process did not foster nation-building and improving socio-economic conditions as demanded by the local population. In formulating UN peacebuilding intentions, local actors were extensively excluded from the planning and decision-making process (Azimi and Lin 2003: 29). The Timorese leadership protested against this policy of exclusion, demanding the broader involvement of local actors in designing the post-conflict transition. A Timorese minister stated that ‘[f]rom the very beginning, no action plan was ever formulated by the UN for the transition period. If it was, it was not shared with the Timorese leadership’ (Rodrigues 2003: 29). UNTAET intentionally decided to keep local stakeholders away from the mission planning process and the formulation of the peacebuilding agenda because they wanted to avoid being influenced by local political dynamics, which they feared would complicate the decision-making process, and also lead to a time-consuming consultative process, which would delay the immediate deployment of the international military and civilian troops (CSDG 2003: 19). This in turn led to incompatible intentions that often translated into tensions and mutual non-cooperation. To foster nation-building, local stakeholders demanded the ‘Timorisation’ of statebuilding as capacity-building for both performing as a young sovereign nation-state and for delivering on the socio-economic needs of the war-shattered society. As the international community works with templates, they intentionally ignored local practices. While the purpose of peacebuilding in Timor-Leste was turned towards resolving the problems of conflict, facilitating the transition to independence, and creating new political institutions, the process of how such intentions were formed became contested by the divergent visions of how to govern this territory in the aftermath of violence. The conglomeration of multiple perspectives on peacebuilding shaped in an unpredictable manner the course of events, some of which are examined in the next section.

Events of securitisation and insecuritisation in Timor- Leste Following the 1999 referendum for independence, the military intervention, and the deployment of UN civilian administration, establishing public order and security was considered as critical for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. The vast majority of events this section examines are problems the UN encountered and created as part of the establishment and development of defence and police forces in Timor-Leste. The UN’s approach to post-conflict security and the rule of law was rooted in the militarisation of peace, the primacy of stability, and the desire to establish a law-abiding society. This disregarded local culture and context and imposed external security sector design, which did not fit Timorese needs and demands. The ideological struggle between meritocracy and favouritism in the selection of new security structures proved to be one of the major issues that dominated post-conflict political scenery in Timor-Leste. Early

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 137 mistakes in the selection and institutional organisation of police and defence forces haunted the UN for more than a decade. Furthermore, the failure to separate responsibilities between police and defence forces and much more clearly regulate a civilian oversight of security forces came at an expensive price for Timorese security and wellbeing. UN-led militarisation of peace Following the establishment of UNTAET, the Timorese political leadership was excluded from early decision-making processes. This created a complex figuration of power relations in the war-torn territory and initiated the fragmentation of relations between international and local actors. One of the major events that shaped post-conflict security in Timor-Leste was the UN’s removal of excombatants from the public and political scene fearing they would hinder the post-conflict reconstruction process. The logic was to clear the post-conflict stage from local power-holders in the hope it would ease engagement in the social and political reengineering of Timor-Leste. During its short period of planning, UNTAET did not have a clear idea of how to handle FALINTIL, the main Timorese resistance movement. Designated officials in UN-DPKO instructed the UN Transitional Administrator to treat all local leaders and factions equally to avoid alienating anyone in the country (Power 2008: 306). The intention to control ex-combatants arose from the desire to avoid repeating the UN’s mistake in Kosovo of allowing KLA factions to dominate post-war developments, which deepened ethnic violence. Consequently, when the INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) arrived in Timor-Leste in 1999, one-third of the FALINTIL forces (around 500) were interned in the Aileu region outside the capital city and treated as potential peace spoilers, while the rest were disarmed and sent back to their home communities to reintegrate into civilian life (Kingsbury 2009). INTERFET disarmed ex-combatants without a clear mandate (La’o Hamutuk 2005: 5). During the containment of FALINTIL ex-combatants, the UN reported that ‘difficult living conditions, lack of supplies and lack of clarity about their current and future role have recently led to concerns over discipline and morale’ (UNSC 2000: 8). This event started to create negative perceptions among local stakeholders regarding the true intentions of the international presence, shifting their image from liberators to overlords.1 The UN’s attempt to transfer knowledge from one mission to another did not contribute to achieving the intended goals. Although UNTAET was not keen to build an armed force, and was more interested in developing a new police service, the persistence of key local leaders obliged the UNTAET to change its course of action and find a solution for the ex-combatants by including them in the new defence force. Two discursive events contributed to this shift in intentions. First, local political representatives demanded more ownership of the peacebuilding and statebuilding process. For instance, the leader of Timorese resistance, Xanana Gusmao, accused UNATET of cultivating neo-colonialist attitudes towards the East Timorese, and for

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seeking to install Western standards and values, claiming that most of the UNTAET contributing states did not practice such democratic standards themselves (Philpott 2006: 212; Chesterman 2007: 212). Second, the situation of disparity within various parts of the FALINTIL forces, together with the fragile situation along the border with West Timor caused by militia elements located in refugee camps, and the lack of security across the borderline, created a new political consensus among the international and local actors that it was necessary to establish new local security structures after the proclamation of independence and withdrawal of international presence (Simonsen 2009: 579). Responding to local criticism, UNTAET gradually initiated the process of creating local consultative mechanisms, such as the National Consultative Council, which later became a larger and more authoritative National Council to include district representatives, representatives from civil society, and political parties (UNTAET 1999: 2). However, this partnership between UNTAET and local dominant factions such as CNRT (National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) and FRETILINI (Revolutionary Front for an Independent TimorLeste) excluded other moderate and independent voices from the statebuilding process, which later became the basis of new political fragmentation within the political and military groups (Tansey 2009: 95). This shows that, often in postconflict societies, international actors do not grant ownership of local political processes but that local actors, via different cooperative and resistance means, grab it. The radicalisation of ex-combatants came as a result of UNTAET’s exclusionary practices towards the former members of FALINTIL and divergent visions for the post-independence development of Timor-Leste (CSDG 2003: 27). The decision to delay the establishment of defence forces came as a result of institutional ambiguity within the UN and shortages of qualified international staff to continue developing the force. Certainly this delay ‘had negative repercussions on the relationship with the Timor-Leste leadership and resulted in a loss of credibility of UNTAET’ (CSDG 2003: 32). In January 2001, UNTAET established the Defence Force for Timor-Leste (F-FDTL),2 tasked to provide military defence for Timor-Leste’s people and territory, and to provide ‘assistance to the civilian community at the request of the civilian authorities during natural disasters and other emergencies’ (UNTAET 2001b). Timor-Leste’s Transitional Cabinet endorsed an option for an armed force comprised of 1,500 soldiers and 1,500 volunteer reservists, where priority was given to FALINTIL as the core force (Center for Defence Studies 2000). Edward Rees (2002: 152) argues that UNTAET intentionally ‘agreed that the FDTL selection process would remain an internal FALINTIL matter’, considering it a gesture of local ownership. The F-FDTL was considered key to the stability of the country because of the widespread popular legitimacy and institutional sympathy it enjoyed in the country.3 However, as most of the FRETELIN military commanders were from the eastern part of the country, when the F-FDTL was formed the main senior positions were given to eastern commanders while low-ranking positions were left for the westerners.4 The lack of a participatory and inclusive process when planning and forming Timor-Leste’s

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 139 armed forces later created discrepancies and dissatisfaction among the veteran groups with regard to the non-recognition of their contribution in the liberation of the country (CSDG 2003: 40). The UN Secretary-General considered the involvement of UNTAET as ‘[a]nother innovation . . . in the creation of the Timor-Leste Defence Force as a consequence of its responsibility to prepare Timor-Leste for independence’ (UNSC 2001: 9). The UNTAET regulation did not allow for the F-FDTL to be mobilised for internal public order, police issues, or social conflicts, but rather envisaged that the defence force would act in accordance with international human rights law. There was also no naval component developed which was vital for Timor-Leste’s exposure to human trafficking and illegal smuggling. The defence force was placed under the direct control of the UNTAET Transitional Administrator who acted as the supreme command, control, and administrative authority (UNTAET 2001b). However, in practice the administration of the defence force was left to the Timorese government, and the majority of funding came from bilateral donors, which created overlapping institutional assistance and lacked a clear political framework for developing the defence force (East West Center 2009). Most notably, UNTAET Regulation No. 2011/21 failed to establish civilian oversight mechanisms within the new Timorese defence structures (CSDG 2003: 40). For instance, no ministry of defence was established during the first three years, which significantly affected the administrative and institutional development of the F-FDTL as well as its political responsibility and obligation to be subject to civilian oversight. Little was also done to transform the guerrilla operations logic of the F-FDTL into the mentality of a modern army, which adhered to the law and respected civilian command.5 These issues were left to be resolved later by the Timorese institutions after the UN’s exit from the country. The second major event in security sector development was the establishment of a national police force. In August 2001, UNTAET established the TimorLeste Police Service (PNTL) for the purpose of maintaining law and order in the territory of Timor-Leste in line with international democratic policing standards (UNTAET 2001a). Initially, an international police commissioner was put in charge of leading the PNTL. While UNTAET left the recruitment and selection of defence forces to local political representatives, it decided to coordinate the recruitment of the new police by itself, without involving the transitional government (Rees 2004). The UN and bilateral donors intentionally invested more in the police and less in the defence fearing that the latter comprising of former guerrilla fighters might militarise the new states and support an authoritarian regime.6 Driven by professional criteria of police recruitment, the UN decided to recruit former police officers that had served under the Indonesian regime.7 However, the UN ignored the fact that some of these members of the police had committed serious human rights abuses, were widely rejected by the local communities, and had often served as double agents during the Indonesian occupation. Former Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, linked the failure of the UN to build a successful security sector in Timor-Leste to the ‘wrong basis of taking the former Indonesian police on board’.8 Unaware of the political consequences, the

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employment of former Indonesian police officers marked the beginning of fragmentation within and between police and defence forces. During the first few years, the PNTL remained institutionally weak and under-resourced largely due to the inadequate planning and deficient mission design of UNTAET, weak and inadequate UN police leadership, and the UN’s failure to involve local stakeholders in building an effective police service (Hood 2006: 70). The UN did not have a strategic plan of how to build a new police service from scratch, and the UN civilian police were considered inexperienced and unprepared to develop an indigenous police service in the country. It remains uncertain, though, how a strategic response would have shaped the reality in light of multiple frictions with local actors. A former UN deputy commissioner of police in Timor-Leste confessed that ‘language barriers have been a problem for the development of ETPS, as well as in the relationship between international police and Timorese police’, which ‘created some obstacles in police operations and training’ (Elias 2003: 82). Moreover, unresponsive UN leadership and inadequate UN police commissioners were unable to institutionally develop the police service in Timor-Leste. For almost two years, UNTAET delayed developing legislation on the police. The entire local police structures were under the direct control of the Police Commissioner and the UNTAET Deputy SRSG. When the country gained independence in 2002, a Ministry of Interior was established that gradually began playing a role in police management and oversight. The strategy of subsequent UN missions was to support the strengthening of democratic governance in Timor-Leste through the provision of assistance in establishing an institutional and legislative framework that would regulate and facilitate the work of East Timor’s government. This assistance was provided through a small number of international experts located in a number of ministerial sectors, tasked to mentor and supervise the work of local institutions, and to provide technical assistance in drafting policies and developing local capacities. However, policing practices and doctrines of training provided by the UN police were not coherent, as each UN police contingent used different police training methods. Moreover, the UN civilian police did not interact much with local police due to language barriers (Peake 2012: 32–35). After independence, the Timorese government avoided defining the distinct responsibilities of police and defence forces regarding internal security. It also failed to develop a clear policy, legal framework, and institutional mechanisms to coordinate activities between the two security segments. Similarly, the UN did not succeed in promoting inter-institutional cooperation as it pursued a strategy of supporting the police, defence, and justice institutions separately.9 The absence of these necessary measures left the security sector vulnerable and exposed to confrontation. Multiple important, yet small-scale, events took place during this period, which were not taken seriously by UN peacebuilding missions and were eventually reduced to non-events. For instance, there was a tendency by the Ministry of Interior to make the PNTL a personal security agency rather than a non-partisan and impartial institution. The local police were heavily armed and formed rapid special units which made the defence force worry about

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 141 such developments. One of the reasons for this militarisation of the police was a growing fear among the high-ranking politicians from the western part of TimorLeste that they were underrepresented as major government positions were given to easterners who led the resistance movement. These ‘non-events’ led to other small-scale violent events, which were not taken seriously. As the UN was preparing for departure from the country, it did not undertake sufficient measures to build dialogue between parties in resolving accumulated local grievances. In the midst of these troubling developments, Timor-Leste’s government passed two decree-laws for the FDTL and the PNTL in 2004. The government’s lack of will to establish genuine accountability and civilian oversight mechanisms was demonstrated by the fact that the entire regulation of defence and police forces was done at the level of presidential decrees, which bypassed parliamentary debates and approvals (Crisis Group 2008: 9). Decree-Law No. 7/2004 of 5 May, 2004 on the Organic Structure of the F-FDTL tried to clarify the command structure and institutional communication mechanisms. However, the issues of inter-institutional cooperation and the discipline of the armed forced were not sufficiently dealt with, and were left to be regulated by secondary legislation. Despite these anomalies, the UN decided to gradually downsize and initiated an early handover of security responsibilities to the Timorese authorities, which was later considered a premature move. The UN’s withdrawal was not based on domestic progress and institutional stability but on their desire to show to the world that Timor was a UN success story. The Deputy UN Police Commissioner argued: ‘the UN rushed to consider UNTAET Police component as a success based on the absence of serious security incidents on the ground, development of local police forces, and hand-over process’ (Azimi and Lin 2003: 79–80). The UN told local leaders that the fragility of security institutions was a Timorese problem and that the Timorese themselves should find a Timorese solution.10 The development of police and defence forces took place at the same time as democracy promotion and political institutions were taking shape in TimorLeste. Many argue that the UN’s ‘good intentions’ to establish a sustainable peace in East Timor fell short because it prioritised institution-building over the developmental and economic needs of the people, which resulted in installing an elitist political system that encouraged social fragmentation (see Chopra 2002; Richmond and Franks 2008). The centralisation of the democratisation process to a small, privileged and influential elite, and developing institutional capacities only in the capital Dili, failed to develop inclusive governance structures that would give meaning to the new state in East Timor, and deliver public services to local communities across the island. This effectively created a discontent and distancing of people from the new state, whereby local remote communities were unaware of the political development occurring in the capital as they were largely ignored by both the UN transitional administration and the new local political elite. The exclusion of local structures and peripheral districts from the statebuilding and peacebuilding process enabled the persistence of clan-based and traditional governance of local affairs, including justice, order, and informal

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economic practices. The exclusion of the local population certainly negatively affected the legitimacy of new state institutions, and created the impression among people that external statebuilding had neglected their needs, triggering thus new forms of social unrest and defiance towards the new state institutions and rules in East Timor, such as public administration, taxation, public order, and the rule of law. An early response to this discontent arising from the difference between people’s needs and expectations and the East Timorese exclusionary governance was a public protest held immediately after independence in December 2002, whereby dissatisfied groups of people attacked and looted public buildings and foreign owned property, as well as attacking the homes of the prime minister and his relatives (Kingsbury 2009: 112). Timorese police and military: from security-providers to peace-breakers After Timor-Leste’s independence there were a number of confrontations between police and defence forces, which provided solid grounds for anticipating an eventual large-scale outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste. These incidents were reduced to ‘non-events’ and were kept outside the serious decision-making processes. The chain of non-events and inadequacies surrounding the formation and development of police and defence forces led to one of the most dramatic and violent event in the post-conflict Timor-Leste: a deadly confrontation between police and defence forces that took place between April and May 2006, resulting in the deaths of over thirty persons and a wide range of damages to property. Although low-level violence was on-going, the catalyst to widespread violence occurred when 594 soldiers from the F-FDTL were dismissed for abandoning their service. They then organised a number of antigovernment protests that turned into violent riots. The group, known as the ‘petitioners’, consisted of soldiers coming mainly from the western part of Timor-Leste who claimed to suffer from long-standing discrimination, suppression and unequal treatment within the FDTL (UN 2006: 30–33). This dissatisfaction stemmed from the UN’s decision to leave the recruitment of defence troops to one political faction, which favoured ex-combatants from the eastern regions of the island and marginalised the western regions. The Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste called in the F-FDTL to restore public order, which triggered more confrontation, especially between defence and the police forces that were already disintegrating. This led to violent clash among factions within the army and police who remained loyal to the government and those who rebelled to express embedded grievances. The peak events of violence took place during April 2006, when the armed forces opened fire on the police, resulting in the death of eleven policemen, who at that particular time were under the protection of UN police. Despite its situational aspects, this confrontation came as a result of overlapping roles of the F-FDTL and the PDTL, as well as from differences over the legitimacy of Timor-Leste’s leadership and the role each force played during the protracted resistance under the Indonesian occupation (UN 2006: 41).

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 143 These events had the performative function of reshuffling and changing political, economic, and social relations in the country. The violence escalated further when gang warfare between groups, either loyal to the deserters or the F-FDTL, spread in the capital and other rural districts (UN 2006: 65). Embedded grievances from unresolved land and property disputes prompted people to attempt to reclaim their lost property, seek revenge, or to destroy others’ property.11 The violence resulted in thirty-eight fatalities, the burning of 1650 houses, and the internal displacement of around 150,000 people (Scambary 2011: 66). These violent events provided an opportunity for people to settle by force intercommunal disputes dating as early as 1999 when the UN intervened. It also triggered confrontation between regional groups to gain control over economic resources and employment. As a consequence of these events, the government fell, leading to early elections and a power shift in the subsequent elections. The society-wide violence undermined international peacebuilding in the country as well as marked a serious reversal in the country’s post-conflict recovery, economic stability, and social reconciliation. The events after 2006 also worsened the relations between the Timorese authorities and the international community. On the other hand, the crisis provided an opportunity for many international organisations to renew their missions and compete with other organisations for developmental funding.12 Some accounts go so far as to argue that the crisis provided an opportunity for local communities to rise up and go out in the streets in the hope of creating the conditions for the international community to come back so they could prolong benefiting economically from renting houses and trade.13 Following the 2006 crisis, the UN’s main concerns in Timor-Leste were to restore security and reform the security institutions, and undertake a comprehensive security sector review. For almost two years after the start of the crisis, Dili was a battlefield of constant political, communal and gang violence. Multiple sources confirm that around 150 persons died as a result of this small-scale but repetitive cycle of violence. With the permission of the Timor-Leste government, a new UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was launched, enjoying ‘all police powers which are conferred on and enjoyed by PNTL police officers by and pursuant to the national laws of Timor-Leste’ (UNMIT 2006). After the invitation by the Timorese government, Australia and New Zealand deployed military troops ‘to assist Timor-Leste in the restoration of security, confidence and peace in Timor-Leste including through assisting in re-establishing and maintaining public order’ (Government of Timor-Leste 2006), However, it took the UN almost a year to deploy its police, which left Timor-Leste without an effective law enforcement agency on the ground for nearly a year during which time crime and violence were widespread (Wilson and Belo 2009). Although the Timorese government invited the UN to restore stability in the country, once the emergency phase concluded their desire for national ownership and embedded distrust of the UN returned (Peake 2009: 223). It is often perceived that the change of UN peacebuilding missions and their mandates within the same country may result in reshuffling relations. This has not been the case in TimorLeste. Multiple reconfigurations of UN missions have changed the name and

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mandate, but ultimately did not change the cultures of interactions with local counterparts. After 2006, the F-FDTL developed its capacities without much involvement or assistance from UNMIT, mainly through bilateral military cooperation programmes. However, both national and international actors failed to address properly the accountability for the 2006 violence instigated by the F-FDTL members (Ministry of Defence of Timor-Leste 2006). The support and contribution of UNMIT military liaison officers was peripheral and insignificant. Instead, the focus was on reforming police forces. The initial assessment of the PNTL revealed institutional, policy and capacity weaknesses. Even six-month long training programmes provided by UNMIT police were insufficient in helping over half of the national police to pass the final certification test (UNSC 2007b: 8). The key challenges to the security sector, identified by UNMIT, included ‘the need to improve relations between the security forces, strengthen the legal framework, increase operational capabilities and enhance civilian oversight’ (UNSC 2007b: 9). During this process, strong disagreements arose between UNMIT advisers and the Ministry of Interior on the technical and administrative capacities of the PNTL, including internal accountability mechanisms (Wilson and Belo 2009: 3). The UN police rarely interacted with local police, as they could not communicate in local languages. There were no joint patrols, and community policing was very weak (Peake 2012: 32–35). One of the reasons for this was that a large number of UN personnel, including international police, continued from one mission to another thus dragging on the embedded and emplaced relationships with local actors which, in the case of Timor-Leste, lead not to more cooperation but to distrust and non-cooperation. Reconfiguration of the UN’s intentions effectively ignored important aspects in the country such as justice and socio-economic development. Moreover, UNMIT was unable to resolve multiple rounds of human rights abuses and injustice that took place in Timor-Leste after the violent conflict of 1999. The UN tried to discipline the local police forces by imposing a screening and mentoring process during 2007, which required the vetting of 3,110 police for previous activities and alleged criminal records. However, the vetting and screening process was slow due to technical and staff limitations within the UN police, which frustrated the national police as well as governmental officials. The UN police antagonised the PNTL by undertaking police screening for all districts, despite the fact that the 2006 crisis and police misconduct was centred mainly on the Dili region. Accordingly, those who worked in peripheral districts felt they were being punished. Another problem was that local police who could understand English and/or Portuguese were passing the screening process more quickly, while those who were potentially more professional but only spoke Tetum faced a prolonged verification and certification process. The mentoring was conducted according to multiple modes, standards, and criteria, which led to different assessments and incoherent certification dynamics. The frequent rotation of UN police further complicated the mentoring process, undermining institutional continuity, consistency, and coherence. Frustrated with the process, in

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 145 late 2006 the Ministry of Interior of Timor-Leste initiated its own parallel vetting process, which created conflicting, dual and overlapping outcomes. Parallel to UNMIT’s engagement in the security sector review, bilateral donors established their own programmes to assist the police and the defence forces, which were loosely coordinated among them. In 2008, a UN expert mission found multiple problems with the certification process, criticising the process for being ‘relatively unsystematic’ and lacking a ‘clear certification strategy that outlined target numbers over a defined period of time and did not prioritize the certification of commanding officers’ (UN 2008a: 11). Consequently, the screening and mentoring process did not have a corrective impact, as multiple cases illustrate police misconduct, abuse of power, and threats against civilians by the very same police that successfully underwent the reform process. A major development after 2006 was the comprehensive review of the security sector, which was not implemented as expected. Although the Timorese government formally led the process, UNMIT also claimed ownership of it, while blaming the government for the delay (UNSC 2007a). The review process required finding ways to ‘improve inter-operationability between the security institutions, increase operational capabilities, strengthen legal frameworks, and enhance civilian oversight mechanisms’ (UNSC 2007a: 9). A major problem with the review process was a lack of clarity regarding what to review and how to do it. To establish how to handle the security sector review, UNMIT established a Security Sector Review Unit (SSRU), which was not functional until August 2007 due to delays in recruiting international staff. By the time the unit was established, national actors had lost their interest in reviewing the security sector. For almost six years, the security sector in Timor-Leste was handled loosely through weak cooperation between governmental ministries in charge of defence, police, and security, the F-FDTL, the PNTL, and the international presence (Peake 2009). In December 2009, an internal UN audit revealed that the support provided by UNMIT to security sector review and reform in TimorLeste was not fully effective (OIOS 2009). A major deficiency was the recruitment of inadequate international advisers who were unable to provide support to the national government, while the latter had intentionally tried to keep them away from any consultative or joint collaborative process. Although security sector reform was a priority for UNMIT and Timor-Leste’s government, during a personal visit to Dili UN’s Assistant Secretary-General, Dmitry Titov, admitted the concept and activities were elusive, that the government did not have clarity on the need to undertake a comprehensive and holistic security sector review, and that the undefined role between the F-FDTL and the PNTL ‘may present a long-term security danger’ (UN 2008b: 2). Another UN technical assessment mission in 2010 concluded that the comprehensive review of the security sector had progressed slowly and there were insufficient results regarding civilian oversight, the formulation of national security policies, the delineation of roles between the F-FDTL and the PNTL, and institutional and logistical capacities remained weak (UNSC 2010: 9). The Timorese did not appear to understand security sector reform and the UN failed to reform the

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security sector.14 Most senior civilian personnel in the Timorese government still did not understand the meaning of a security sector review.15 Members of parliament understood little about security and defence affairs, partially because they did not have security related backgrounds and were excluded from the consultative processes by the UN and the Timorese government. While civilian oversight aims to reduce and address the abuse of power, this mechanism was not developed in the Timorese case. Security sector reform has taken place in a context where the international and local actors have operated in different zones of reality, with a degree of contact but fundamentally rooted in different understandings of how to manage the security sector in Timor-Leste. Facing growing dissatisfaction with the ineffective police reform process and slow progress on security sector reform, UNMIT prematurely transferred responsibilities to the PNTL in early 2009 on the grounds that the police certification had progressed, the PNTL had been reformed, and the rule of law had improved overall in Timor-Leste (UNSC 2007b: 14–15). The UN SecretaryGeneral explicitly admitted that ‘the resumption of responsibilities does not mean that the national police has successfully completed its development, or that it is prepared to take on those responsibilities without continuing international assistance’ (UNSC 2008: 7). By 2012, when UNMIT ended its mission, the security sector review was incomplete, the civilian oversight of security forces remained ineffective, and the command and control structures remained highly politicised. Despite the fragile security institutions, a 2012 UN Security Council mission found national consensus among all Timorese interlocutors that UNMIT should conclude its mandate and no longer needed to be on the UN Security Council agenda (UNSC 2012: 5). From the Timorese perspective, the country would have an unstable image as long as the UN was there.16 As part of its departure, UNMIT claimed that it had succeeded in stabilising internal security; re-establishing police activities; certifying PNTL members; transferring policing responsibilities; securing the 2007 electoral processes; and restructuring the PNTL in 2012 (UN 2013). These highlights serve more as indicators of input rather than impact. In reality, the UN’s exit from Timor-Leste in 2012 and their proclaimed success in reforming the security sector for the second time was a symptom of withdrawal before more negative legacies of their consequent peacebuilding missions could come out and further discredit the UN’s peacebuilding track record. The remainder of this chapter provides a different account of the peacebuilding impact in Timor-Leste by looking at a spectrum of unanticipated consequences that have emerged in the process of developing and reforming the police and defence forces in Timor-Leste.

Unanticipated consequences of security sector reform in Timor- Leste The discrepancy between the UN’s ambitious and ambiguous mandate to build ‘a credible, professional and impartial police service’ (UNSC 1999a) and the vastness of local evidence to the contrary created the impression that multiple

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 147 negative legacies of international involvement in Timor-Leste were unanticipated consequences. Therefore, it is important to explore how the interactions between different intentions, events, and positionalities shaped the playground of peace in Timor-Leste and what unforeseeable impact they have had. From the discussion in the preceding section it is undisputable that, while the sole purpose of creating defence and police forces was to provide security and order in post-conflict Timor-Leste, these two forces ultimately became among the main sources of insecurity, destabilisation, and violence, culminating in the 2006 crisis and state failure. While the low level of involvement of local actors in shaping the early process of the security sector reform played a formative role, it was later developments that provided strong ingredients for unanticipated consequences. Local ownership did not resolve the problem of security sector reform in Timor-Leste. In fact, the centralisation of democratisation and statebuilding efforts to a small, privileged and influential elite in the capital Dili failed to develop effective inclusive governance structures that would give meaning to the new state in East Timor, and deliver public services to local communities. The lack of early communication between the UN and the local leadership created mutual misunderstandings, which, as expected, reduced their ability to anticipate the outcomes of each action undertaken. Equally, the constant evaluation and reconfiguration of the UN’s peacebuilding mandate in Timor-Leste had not managed to reduce, let alone eliminate, the spectrum of consequences that have occurred during and after the interventions. In addition, UNTAET’s strategic direction for developing the security sector was hindered due to a lack of understanding of local language and culture, as well as due to ignorance of local power dynamics. From this discussion, three major areas can illustrate some of the unanticipated consequences of international peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, which have played a formative role in the figuration of peace in Timor-Leste during the first decade of Timor-Leste independence. From statebuilding and state failure Despite the fact that the UN considered Timor-Leste a success story, the country was on a brink of civil war in 2006 due to the very forces that were supposed to have provided public order and security. In retrospect, the UN’s analysis of the cause of state failure in Timor-Leste is attributed to the procedural failures of local institutions. A UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for TimorLeste concluded that the 2006 crisis came as a result of ‘the fragility of State institutions and the weakness of the rule of law’ (UN 2006: 3). While the UN’s entire purpose in Timor-Leste was to build self-sufficient state structures, these very structures nearly turned the state and society upside down. The 2006 crisis was primarily attributed to political conflict between state institutions and the police and defence forces. Its violence revealed the fragility of state institutions, evidenced by a lack of loyalty to the authority and hierarchy as well as the constitutional rules. Solutions to manage the crisis were sought outside the legal and

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institutional framework. The UN’s failure to develop applicable legal frameworks and institutional mechanisms for the police and military between 2001 and 2005 played a strong role in the 2006 violence. The early problems of the F-FDTL related to the recruitment and the exclusion of sectors of society, as well as limited resources, were later exacerbated ‘by the failure to develop a legal framework governing its activities, mechanisms for civilian oversight and an overarching national security policy’ (UNSC 2006a: 17). Furthermore, the exclusionary process of developing the defence and police forces, as well as the inappropriate provision of security and enforcement of the rule of law, triggered the emergence of a large number of spoiler groups consisting of disaffected former FALENTIL fighters intermeshed with military groups which threatened everyday peace, undermined state institutions, and nurtured communal divisions and conflict (Scambary 2011). The failure of UNMISET and the Timorese Government to develop a legal framework for defence and police forces kept the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior underdeveloped. Such dynamics then prevented any opportunity for effective civilian institutional oversight. This left the institutional roles of police and defence unclear, and subject to possible overlap, friction, and disagreement (Ishizuka 2003). Consequently, the defence forces that were mobilised during the 2006 crisis took uncoordinated and misinformed collateral actions and decisions against the police based on rumours that the police were shooting F-FDTL soldiers (UNSC 2006b: 26). The 2006 crisis illustrates the failure of UN-imposed statebuilding in TimorLeste. Although the UN did not have a direct role in the 2006 crisis, such outcomes were products of a policy of short-sightedness and failure to take into account the possible long-term consequences of their purposive actions. While anticipation does not make statebuilding or peacebuilding better, it can play a role in reducing external imposition, and strategically reduce regimes of external governmentality in favour of facilitating local solutions. Some argue that the UN was aware of the consequences their actions and non-action could produce, but decided to ignore them.17 Others suggest the international presence in TimorLeste had no clue what was going to happen in 2006 because they were focused on interaction with the local elite and remained detached from everyday dynamics in the country.18 In trying to redistribute the blame for failure, the UN pointed out that Timorese institutions failed to develop an institutional framework for the PNTL, leaving its affairs to be governed by personal and situational circumstances without a legal framework or standardised procedures. However, a UN report clearly admitted that ‘the provision of international assistance to PNTL since 1999, although substantial, was insufficiently coordinated and not tailored to adequately support its institutional development in the longer term’ (UNSC 2006b: 18). These weaknesses played a negative role during the 2006 cycles of violence where police commanders gave inadequate orders and did not manage to keep the situation under control. The police structures dissolved and regrouped around certain cleavages determined mainly by geographical identity, political affiliation with certain political leaders, and narrow material interests. The UN

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 149 mission at that time had no clear strategy on how to approach local authorities in managing the crisis (UNSC 2006b: 49). Nevertheless, the violent events of 2006 and 2007 were products of events that could have been anticipated. The multiplicity of events surrounding local resentment regarding the composition of the police and defence forces, the poor resources and unprofessional conduct of police, and the weak institutional mechanisms for civilian oversight of security sector provided strong bases for anticipating possible disastrous consequences in the future. Small-scale confrontations between police and defence forces were intentionally ignored and inadequately addressed by the UN and local authorities (Rees 2004: 32; Amnesty International 2003: 2). After 2006, the relationship between UNMIT and the Timorese government, including the F-FDTL and the PNTL, was fragile and extensively damaged. This is largely due to the fact that a significant portion of responsibility for these persisting weaknesses within the police could be attributed to the UNMIT police, who lacked police trainers and advisers. An unanticipated consequence of the prolonged process of police certification and reform was the increased resentment among local police commanders who considered the delay to their operational policing as having weakened public trust in the police (UNSC 2007c: 3). Due to the subordinated position of local police, the relationship between the PNTL and UNMIT police remained fragile throughout the certification and reformation process. Such a fragile relationship weakened the impact of UNMIT police training, capacity building, and institutional development (UNSC 2007c: 8–9). Equally, frustration was present among international actors who blamed local actors for not showing the expected commitment and desire to create a functional state.19 A direct consequence of the damaged relationship and distrust between UNMIT, UNPOL and the Timorese authorities was the limited leverage and impact that UN advisers placed within these institutions could play in the long run. UNMIT staff who were working on justice and security, and as human rights advisers, were not given sufficient access to Timorese institutions. Distrust at the highest political level resulted in an early exit of the UN from the country in spite of the limited progress achieved after 2006. After the departure of UNMIT in 2012, the remaining UN agencies suffered from the legacies of previous UN missions in Timor-Leste, as the national authorities did not cooperate sufficiently with them due to the distrust and antagonistic relationship developed with UNMIT.20 Consequently, the legacy of the decade of the UN’s heavy footprint presence in Timor-Leste resulted in shifting attitudes towards the UN, through which local actors regained confidence to manage their own country and society by themselves.21 Institutionalised conflict between police and defence forces One of the major consequences of the UN-led security sector development and reform has been the institutionalisation of conflict between police and defence forces in Timor-Leste. While the police normally deal with maintaining public order and law enforcement, and the defence forces remain responsible for

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dealing with external threats, in Timor-Leste the police has continued to have special rapid response units, while the defence force has active military police sections. Decree-Law No. 9/2009 on the Organic Law of the PNTL redefined the police as ‘a security force whose mission is to defend democratic legality, guarantee people’s security and property, and safeguard citizens’ rights in accordance with the Constitution and the Law’ (Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste 2009). Although it explicitly referred to past mistakes, the decree-law maintained that the PNTL ‘shall have the characteristics of a community police, its nature shall be identical to that of the military insofar as its organisation, discipline, training and personal status are concerned without however constituting a force of a military nature’ (Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste 2009). The PNTL decree-law authorised the PNTL to use force and weapons in self-defence and in special circumstances when facing ‘illegitimate’ public resistance. A special police unit with military attributes was regulated to function as part of the PNTL. As a result of these changes, the military leadership of Timorese defence forces viewed the PNTL as a threat to the army and to the wider Timorese society (Belo et al. 2011: 12). These unbalanced capabilities between the police and defence forces raised new institutional and security dilemmas. Blurring the lines between security institutions left room for confrontation and interference in each other’s primary responsibilities. These anomalies resulted in another attack in 2008 against the President and Prime Minister, orchestrated by an armed group led by fugitive Alfredo Reinado, the former Military Police Commander of the armed forces of Timor-Leste (UNMIT 2008: 3). The assault resulted in the death of Reinado and serious injuries to the President. This constituted one of the gravest threats to the country’s peace and security since independence in 2002. Following the attack, a state of siege was announced, which limited freedom of movement and imposed a widespread curfew. A joint command between the F-FDTL and the PNTL was established to restore peace and stability after the assassination attempt. It was largely considered effective. While the handling of the situation was praised as a successful example of cooperation between security forces and a positive indicator of resilience within Timorese institutions, the state of siege resulted in violations of civil rights and sparked fear among people. UNMIT human rights observers reported ‘excessive use of force and intimidation, against civilians during operations by the Timor-Leste security forces in the aftermath of the attacks’ (UNMIT 2008: 3). Almost twelve years after the establishment of security institutions in TimorLeste, the rules and protocols of cooperation and coordination between police and defence remained undefined in case crisis situations arise again. No secondary legislation was enacted to address these issues. The Deputy-Chief of the F-FDTL admitted that, theoretically, the relationship between the F-FDTL and the PNTL was very good, while admitting that the relationships need to improve, further stating that ‘the original sin in the security sector in Timor-Leste is leaving unclear the responsibilities between police and defence forces’.22 In December 2008, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for the rule of law concluded that ‘despite

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 151 progress made recently, the country remains weak and a potential for rapid deterioration is still there’ (UN 2008b: 1). Regarding security institutions, the report concludes that ‘major underlying fault lines persist, albeit at a diminishing level’, while highlighting that ‘the mistrust between the F-FTDL and the PNTL is still obvious, with the former claiming that the police are not yet ready to resume responsibility for law and order’ (UN 2008b: 2). Diplomatic reports portrayed the PNTL as having an institutional culture in which accountability is less important than political and/or personal interests; a politicised police force where commanders, particularly at the district level, are beholden to their political masters; and regional divisions that emerged last year as the destructive east versus west dynamic shows signs of becoming entrenched.23 However, local political leaders exploited the blurred lines of responsibility between police and defence forces for political and instrumentalist purposes to safeguard their power and to ensure that a militarised force would defend their interests. The UN’s early failure to effectively divide the roles and create institutional safeguards undermined its own efforts in establishing the rule of law in the Timor-Leste. Persistence of police impunity What came out of the UN’s efforts to build a professional police was an ineffective police service, which engaged in controversial, abusive, and unaccountable practices. The police force effectively became a serious human rights problem in Timor-Leste, despite the UN’s extensive governance authority and their leading role in creating the police service. Violent police practices included arbitrary detention, excessive use of force and torture against suspects, unauthorised use of firearms, and impunity for rape (Human Rights Watch 2006: 16–37). This situation arguably is linked to the poor training provided by UNTAET and UNMISET, the failure to develop accountability and oversight mechanisms for police, the failure to implement the PNTL Code of Conduct, and the lack of institutionalised responses to police brutality even six years after the formation of the PNTL. This police violence significantly eroded public respect and support for the police and damaged public faith in Timor-Leste’s state institutions (The Asia Foundation 2014: 44). As the UN started to delegate policing responsibilities to local structures it also started to report on police misconduct in Timor-Leste. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported on human rights abuses in the country and the absence of adequate accountability mechanisms (UN 2005). The UN failed to develop ineffective mechanisms within the new police service for dealing with internal inspection and disciplinary measures (UNSC 2004: 9). This contributed to the presence of impunity and human rights abuses perpetrated by police officers on the civilian population. Police with no formal education and only three months of training were

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unable to comprehend what was expected of them. Since laws were written mainly in Portuguese, police were often unfamiliar with the legislation and thus violent conduct was deemed normal for them.24 At best, their logic of policing was an improvisation of the Indonesian authoritarian regime of policing and situational responses to individual cases. Police impunity persisted further as local communities feared reporting cases or registering complaints. Despite international efforts to professionalise the Timorese police, local policing practice in Timor-Leste included the culture of verbal orders, especially related to arrests, and the authorisation and dissemination of ammunition (TLAVA 2008: 7). Three UN missions in a row (UNTAET, UNMISET, and UNOTIL) failed to create a police force that observed democratic policing standards. What they did create was a police service that promoted fear and violence. UNTAET shared the responsibility for failing to create an unpoliticised police and avoid the creation of a situation whereby one group would dominate other groups (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 295). The institutional structure to oversee the security sector in Timor-Leste was poorly organised by the UN and the subsequent Timorese governments (Rees 2006: 12). Police impunity regarding misconduct, abuse of power, and violations of human rights was related to contextual factors, but also to the process of how the UN police trained and monitored these forces. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted that ‘the number and quality of police officers in East Timor was far from adequate . . . there were different policing doctrines and procedures at work simultaneously, which hampered the unity and effectiveness of the force’ (Azimi and Lin 2003: xxvii). While the UN did not intend to create a violent and abusive police service, the trajectory of local police performance and possible development of a violent and unruly police force was certainly known to the UN. However, no action was taken to change police impunity when it was still possible. This shows that anticipation without affirmative action is only partially useful, and does not serve the purpose of preventing harmful effects. Another major problem with regard to law enforcement in Timor-Leste has been the incoherence between police and courts. Often law enforcement agencies in Timorese did not understand what laws they are enforcing. Many cases were rejected in courts, as there was insufficient evidence collected by the police. On the other hand, the lack of legal experts, experienced judges and prosecutors complicated the work of police forces. The insufficient presence of judicial staff in the districts has maintained the use of the customary system for settling social disputes. The local systems of law are seen among the Timorese as more accessible as they are more sensitive to the local context and acceptable to the local people (Grenfell 2006: 318–319). Most of the Timorese continue to rely on traditional law as they are familiar with its norms and applicability. The traditional system enjoys continuity, flexibility, and consistency compared to the weak and unpopular legal and formal justice system. A nationwide survey conducted in 2004 revealed that less than 9 per cent of East Timorese had direct experience with the courts (The Asia Foundation 2004). UNMIT observers reported in 2008 that ‘court hearings in the districts were often cancelled due to the non-appearance of victims, defendants

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 153 or witnesses’ (UNMIT 2008: 10). Despite the widespread popularity of traditional law, the new constitution of East Timor favoured a formal, Western-style civil law system, which is also in accordance with the international human rights covenants (Zaum 2007: 202–206). The UN was aware of the consequences of UNTAET’s failure to develop an appropriate judicial system in the country (Elias 2003: 83). After the 2006 crisis and the multiple lessons learnt, UNMIT was unsuccessful in its attempts to reform the Timorese police. The screening, training, and certification process of local police forces has been inconsistent, ineffective and unproductive. The handover process was premature and undermined the reforms initiated after 2006. These inadequacies encouraged local police forces to continue abusing their authority and abuse the human rights of civilians. In 2013, the main security challenges in Timor-Leste continued to be land disputes, domestic violence, and assaults. Even after a decade of international statebuilding, Timorese people do not request the support of modern police to resolve their personal or community disputes, as they are deeply dependent on customary conflict-resolution rituals, protocols, and social relationships (Peake 2012: 34). As Deborah Cummins (2013: 145) rightly argues ‘[f]or most people in East Timorese communities, lisan is the primary source of governance, law and authority’. In enforcing this customary law, the UN-formed police does not have a role to play, making them unnecessary at the community level. A public opinion poll from 2013 showed that ‘a majority of victims who sought police assistance were referred back to community leaders for the eventual resolution of their cases, and only a small fraction of cases was carried forward through the formal justice system’ (The Asia Foundation 2014: 10). Accordingly, the UN’s investment in the security sector in Timor-Leste and the traditional rule enforcement did not hybridise, but stood worlds apart. This wide discrepancy between external expectations and local realities creates the impression of failures and negative impact.

Conclusion This chapter discussed how the UN’s efforts to develop and reform the national police and defence force have shaped peace figuration in Timor-Leste. The UN’s declared intention to build state institutions and establish the rule of law in Timor-Leste through the development of police and defence forces did not achieve the intended results. The UN’s will to succeed in Timor-Leste remained a will but not much else. The good intentions to establish a security infrastructure in Timor-Leste were not translated into adequate actions where the negative consequences were not anticipated and prevented during the preventable stages. Instead, the securitisation of peace in Timor-Leste worsened the security situation, deepened and broadened the confrontation between uniformed forces, and failed to develop the political and institutional framework for a security infrastructure that served the safety of citizens and the rule of law, rather than powerholders and clan-based groupings. Peacebuilding organisations are often prone to declaring their missions as successful, regardless of their impact on long-term

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legacies. In Timor-Leste, the language of international reporting was vague, multi-meaning, self-justificatory, confusing, and dedicated mainly to external audiences and consumption. Preaching ambiguity as an art of political conduct, the first UN Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello concluded in 2003: Let me be clear: it is my opinion that UNTAET was a success – relative, for sure, and I have always been the first to point out its shortcomings – but a success nonetheless . . . but no success is total and we should be equally clear on that: mistakes were made, things could have been done better, and opportunities were missed. We should acknowledge these (Azimi and Lin 2003: 16) The UN in Timor-Leste is the most typical case of unlearning in the peacebuilding industry. It had all the predispositions necessary for a political and social learning process. It had extensive authority and support from the UN Security Council and wider donors. It changed the name of missions and reconfigured the mandate six times in over a decade. However, it constantly pursued pathways of unlearning, captured in the following understandings. While the Timorese leadership were struggling to consolidate their national unity for making independent statehood work, the UN peacebuilding by default cracked down on this unity, promoted diversity, imposed blueprints, and encouraging competition. This was a ‘transferable’ learning from Kosovo, where the UN tried to abolish the institutional parallelism of pacifist and war-related structures that wanted independence instead of UN trusteeship. However, as the UN was supporting of Timor-Leste’s independence, non-cooperation with the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) jeopardised the entire post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding process. Unequal partnership increased the gap between the UN and local leadership and shifted local attitudes towards the UN from seeing it as a liberator to viewing it as a neo-coloniser. This became an expensive unlearning with serious repercussions. As recognised by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, ‘an overly technocratic focus on capitals and elites’ can risk ‘unintentionally exacerbating divisions’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 12). The UN personnel had inadequate knowledge and insufficient desire to engage profoundly in supporting Timorese institutions and people in building their political community. The UN constantly sent civilian police who were unable to communicate and work effectively with local police. At best, they were situated in ivory towers in the capital and struggled to register their illusionary successes. The UN treated local resistance groups as spoilers from the outset, and disregarded local culture and tradition. Keeping ex-combatants away from the post-conflict scenery backfired in Timor-Leste and created more local resentment, which later took the form of collective violence. Despite multiple failures, the UN pursued the policy of intervention in Timorese society, not working through locally acceptable norms and practices, but through external

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 155 blueprints. Such endeavours backfired and the liberal rule of law system did not manage to find societal acceptance over the much stronger role of traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms and community-based justice systems. The UN blamed a lack of local capacity for the failure to establish the rule of law, while local actors blamed the UN’s lack of desire to build capacities. Reality was constituted through the dislocation of responsibility as a coping mechanism for furthering agential performance. Lack of engagement with local needs, context, and culture reduced the UN’s ability to capture local dynamics and strategically orient its actions towards the avenues that would produce the desired peace. This revelation should be approached with caution as it makes engaging with the local actors not only an instrumental goal of foreign interveners to ensure they achieve their objects, but also a realisation that sustainable peace demands local legitimacy and tangible incentives for securing local compliance in the peacebuilding process. The extensive international assistance to Timor-Leste has not resulted in improving the socio-economic condition of the majority of the population. Indeed, the most convincing indicators of the failed post-conflict socio-economic development in Timor-Leste and the long-term implications of neo-liberal economy are the shrinking socio-economic conditions, the deepening of the poverty, and the expansion of the inequality gap nearly a decade since its independence. Often the basis for social dissatisfaction is rooted in material inequality and injustice. The UN failed to give sufficient consideration to the socio-economic agenda in Timor-Leste, and instead it decided to pursue the statebuilding agenda, which lacked local legitimacy and the material basis to become locally owned and conducive to the much needed justice and equality in this conflict-shattered society. The UN had the illusion they were in charge of post-conflict politics. They were wrong. Local factions and their political and military networks controlled politics and shaped the agenda of peace, development, and security in the country. This mistake was repeated again when the UN regained more power after the 2006 violence and tried to impose similar blueprints for security sector reform that had failed in the past and had served as precursors to interinstitutional conflict between different political groups and their allegiances within police and defence forces. In each UN mission in Timor-Leste there had been a prolonged time gap between declared intentions and their implications. This in turn meant local loss of confidence in the UN’s ability to deliver, and opened the space for alternative political arrangements to take over. This intentionality-performativity gap and lost momentum were the main reasons why UNMIT failed to review and reform effective police forces after the 2006 violence. Furthermore, the ‘permanent temporality’ of the UN consecutive missions reduced the desire and ability of agents to foresee the consequences of their actions. The 2006 violence was not anticipated clearly by the UN’s contingency planning and exit strategy. Though most of the consequences were not anticipated, there was evidence that early acts of violence and confrontation between the police and defence forces, as well as the poor institutional and operative performance of the police, left room for acts of violence to be insitgated. Ignoring

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these acts had detrimental effects on the state of peace in Timor-Leste. These are not merely unlearned lessons; they are profound reflections that social action is not guided by transferable knowledge, but is very much ingrained in the performative renewal and redefinition of intentions and choices for action, which make unlearning the structuring agency. Lessons can be registered and translated into blueprints, but their decontextualised application will not result in the desired outcome because of the interference of other actors, relations, processes, and structures.

Notes 1 Interview by author with Vice Chief of F-FDTL, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 2 Later the name of defense forces was changed to ‘F-FDTL’, signifying the legacy of FALENTIL’s in the new defense force. 3 Personal interview with the director of local think-tank, Dili, 9 September, 2013. 4 Interview by author with a UNDP justice specialist, Dili, 11 September, 2013. 5 Interview by author with a civil society activist, Dili, 9 September, 2013 6 Personal interview with the director of local think-tank, Dili, 9 September, 2013. 7 Interview by author with former chief of intelligence in Timor-Leste’s government, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 8 Interview by author with Mari Alkatiri, former Prime Minister of Timor Leste, Dili, 13 September, 2013. 9 Interview by author with a former UN employee in Timor-Leste, New York, 23 August, 2013. 10 Personal interview with a Timorese civil society activist, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 11 Interview by author with a UNDP justice specialist, Dili, 11 September, 2013. 12 Personal interview with a Portuguese consultant, Dili, 8 September, 2013. 13 Personal interview with a Portuguese consultant, Dili, 8 September, 2013. 14 Interview by author with a former UN employee in Timor-Leste, New York, 23 August, 2013. 15 Interview by author with a senior Timorese government official, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 16 Interview by author with an advisor to the President of Timor-Leste on strategic issues, Dili, 13 September, 2013. 17 Personal interview with a Timorese civil society activist, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 18 Personal interview with a former UN employee in Timor-Leste, New York, 23 August, 2013. 19 Personal interview with an Australian diplomat stationed in Dili, 7 September, 2013. 20 Interview by author with a UN officer, Dili, 12 September, 2013. 21 Ibid. 22 Interview by author with the Vice Chief of F-FDTL, Dili, 10 September, 2013. 23 ‘Politicization, Cronyism Persist in National Police’, US Embassy in Dili cable, 5 July, 2007. Available online at: http://wikileaks.cabledrum.net/cable/2007/06/07 DILI219.html 24 Interview by author with a director of local think-tank, Dili, 10 September, 2013.

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Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 157 East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference, UNITAR and IPS, Leiden: Mariunus Nijhoff Publishers. Belo, N., Mark, R., Koenig, M., and Everett, S (2011) Institutionalizing Community Policing In Timor-Leste: Exploring the Politics of Police Reform, Dili: The Asia Foundation. Bowles, E. and T. Chopra (2008) ‘East Timor: Statebuilding Revised’, in Call, C. and Wyeth, V. (eds) Building States to Build Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Centre for Defence Studies (2000) Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste, London: King’s College London. Chesterman, S. (2007) ‘East Timor’, in Berdal, M and Economides, S. (eds) United Nations Interventionism 1991–2014, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chopra, J. (2002) ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, 33(5): 979–1000. Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste (2009) ‘The Decree-Law No. 9/2009 of 18 February, 2004 on Organic Law of PNTL’, Dili: Government of Timor-Leste. Crisis Group (2008) Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report No. 143, Dili/ Brussels: International Crisis Group. CSDG (2003) A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change – Timor-Leste Study, London: Conflict, Security and Development Group. Cummins, D. (2013) ‘A State of Hybridity: Lessons in Institutionalism from a Local Perspective’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 37(1): 143–160. East West Center (2009) Discussion with UN Special Representative and Head of UNMIT Dr. Atul Khare, 13 February, 2009. Available online at: www.eastwestcenter.org/ewc-inwashington/events/previous-events-2008/feb-13-dr-atul-khare (accessed 24 January, 2014). Elias, L. M. A. (2003) ‘Mission Implementation: Security and Maintenance of Law and Order’, in Azimi, N. and Li Lin, C. (eds) The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference, UNITAR and IPS, Leiden: Mariunus Nijhoff Publishers. Government of Timor-Leste (2006) ‘Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste concerning the restoration and maintenance of security in Timor-Leste’, 25 May. Grenfell, L. (2006) ‘Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law in Timor Leste’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19(2): 305–337. Hood, L. (2006) ‘Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste, 1999–2004’, International Peacekeeping, 13(1): 60–77. Human Rights Watch (2006) Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in Timor-Leste, New York: Human Rights Watch. Ishizuka, K. (2003) ‘Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Experience of UNMISET’, International Peacekeeping, 10(3): 44–59. Kingsbury, D. (2009) East Timor: The Price of Liberty, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. La’o Hamutuk (2005) ‘An Overview of FALINTIL’S Transformation to F-FDTL and its Implications’, La’o Hamutuk Bulletin 6(1–2). McNamara, D. (2003) ‘Introductory Remarks and Keynote Address’, in Azimi, N. and Lin L. C. (eds) The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference, UNITAR and IPS, Leiden: Mariunus Nijhoff Publishers. Ministry of Defence of Timor-Leste (2006) Force 2020: Strategic Blueprint for the Development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste 2005–2020, Dili: Government of Timor-Leste.

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OIOS (2009) ‘Audit Report: Management of the Security Sector Support Programme in UNMIT’, UN Doc AP2009/682/02, 23 December, 2009. Peake, G. (2009) ‘A Lot of Talk But Not a Lot of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in Timor-Leste’, in Born, H. and Schnabel, A. (eds) Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, DCAF Yearbook, Berlin: LIT Verlag. Peake, G. (2012) ‘Playing Pool in Hard Rock Coffee’, Local-Global: Identity, Security, Community, 11: 32–35. Philpott, S. (2006) ‘East Timor’s Double Life: Smells like Westphalian Spirit’, Third World Quarterly, 27(1): 135–159. Power, S. (2008) Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World, London: Penguin Books. Rees, E. (2002) ‘Security-sector reform and transitional administrations’, Conflict, Security & Development, 2(1): 151–156. Rees, E. (2004) Under Pressure – Three Decades of Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste 1975–2004, Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Richmond, O. P. and Franks, J. (2008) ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor-Leste: The Emperor’s New Clothes?’ International Peacekeeping, 15(2): 185–200. Rodrigues, R. (2003) ‘Introductory Remarks and Keynote Address’, in Azimi, N. and Lin L. C. (eds) The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2002 Tokyo Conference, UNITAR and IPS, Leiden: Mariunus Nijhoff Publishers. Scambary, J. (2011) ‘Anatomy of a conflict: The 2006–7 communal violence in TimorLeste’, in Harris, V. and Goldsmith, A. (eds) Security, Development and NationBuilding in Timor-Leste: A Cross-sectoral Assessment, Abingdon: Routledge. Simonsen, S. (2009) ‘The Role of Timor-Leste’s Security Institutions in National Integration – and Disintegration’, The Pacific Review, 22(5): 575–596. Tansey, O. (2009) Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Asia Foundation (2004) A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice in East Timor, Dili: The Asia Foundation. The Asia Foundation (2007) Conflict Management and Prevention in Timor-Leste, Dili: The Asia Foundation. The Asia Foundation (2014) A Survey of Community-Police Perceptions in Timor-Leste 2013. Dili: The Asia Foundation. TLAVA (2008) Dealing with the kilat: An historical overview of small arms availability and arms control in Timor-Leste, Issue Brief, Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment, No. 1, Dili: Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment. UN (2005) ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical cooperation in the field of human rights in Timor-Leste’, UN Doc E/ CN.4/2005/115, 22 March, 2005. UN (2006) Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2006/822, 2 October, 2006. UN (2008a) Report of the expert mission to Timor-Leste on policing, UN Doc S/2008/329, 17–27 March, 2008. UN (2008b) Mission Visit to Timor-Leste and Australia, OASG/OROLSI/DPKO, 1 December, 2008. UN (2013), ‘Special Timor-Leste Edition: Duty Completed’, UN Police Magazine. Available online at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_10.pdf (accessed 14 June, 2014).

Peace figuration in Timor-Leste 159 UNMIT (2006) ‘Arrangement on the Restoration and Maintenance of Public Security In Timor-Leste and on Assistance to the Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding of the Timorese National Police (PNTL) and the Ministry of Interior’, Dili, 1 December, 2006. UNMIT (2008) Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor-Leste: The security sector and access to justice 1 September 2007–30 June 2008, Dili: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. UNGA and UNSC (2015) Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, UN Doc A/70/95-S/2001/446, 17 June, 2015. UNSC (1999a) Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/1999/1024, 4 October, 1999. UNSC (1999b) Res 1272, UN Doc S/RES/1272, 25 October, 1999. UNSC (2000) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2000/738, 26 July, 2000. UNSC (2001) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2001/42, 16 January, 2001. UNSC (2004) Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor’, UN Doc S/2004/888, 09 November. UNSC (2005) Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, UN Doc S/2005/99, 18 February, 2005. UNSC (2006a) Report of the Secretary-General on Timor-Leste pursuant to Security Council resolution 1690 (2006), UN Doc S/2006/628, 8 August, 2006. UNSC (2006b) Res 1704, UN Doc S/RES/1704, 25 August, 2006. UNSC (2007a) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2007/50, 1 February, 2007. UNSC (2007b) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2007/513, 28 August, 2007. UNSC (2007c) Report of the Security Council mission to Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2007/711, 6 December, 2007. UNSC (2008) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2008/501, 29 July, 2008. UNSC (2010) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UN Doc S/2010/85, 12 February, 2010. UNSC (2012) Report of the Security Council mission to Timor-Leste, 3 to 6 November 2012, UN Doc S/2012/889, 28 November, 2012. UNTAET (1999) Regulation 1999/2, On the Establishment of National Consultative Council, UN Doc UNTAET/Reg/1999/2, 2 December, 1999. UNTAET (2001a) Regulation No. 2001/22, On the Establishment of the Timor-Leste Police Service, UN Doc UNTAET/REG/2001/22, 10 August, 2001. UNTAET (2001b) Regulation No. 2001/21, On the Establishment of a Defence Force for Timor-Leste, UN Doc UNTAET/REG/2001/1, 31 January, 2001. Wilson, B. and Belo, N. (2009) ‘The UNPOL to PNTL ‘handover’ 2009: what exactly is being handed over? Dili: Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum. World Bank (1999) East Timor Building a Nation: A Framework for Reconstruction and Development, Dili: World Bank. Zaum, D. (2007) The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

7

At peace’s end Disfiguring the impact of liberal peacebuilding

This book set out to explore peace figuration after international intervention. The puzzling question of how peacebuilding interventions impact conflict-affected societies was approached through the development of an integrative-evaluative framework for disentangling the intentionality, performativity, and consequences of liberal peacebuilding. The liberal peace figure is often observed as ethically right, normatively powerful, and empirically successful. This figuration of liberal peacebuilding is observable in the declared intentions for building democracy and promoting human rights, rebuilding the economy, and in establishing the rule of law and good governance. This triumphant figure is also evident in the liberal peace events surrounding key benchmarks for launching, implementing, and ending peacebuilding missions. This book has exposed the distress caused by the multiplicity of incompatible intentions that have conditioned post-conflict dynamics, the unexpected flow of events that have defined peacebuilding processes, and the spectrum of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences that have profoundly shaped the political and social fabric of peace after conflict. Figurational analyses in this book have disfigured liberal peacebuilding by showing that it is not capable of reaching its intended goals, or of anticipating and preventing the undesirable consequences of its actions. Peace is delayed by the very acts that try to bring peace. Instead, the book has revealed peace multitudes, alternations, and the adaptability of post-conflict societies to adverse conditions. Understanding the figuration of peace and its legacies requires revealing its disfigurations, at both the conceptual and practical levels. Hence, this book concludes with a discussion of the key thematic and empirical findings of this study and draws a number of forward-looking epistemological and empirical observations.

The promise of peace figuration This book is one of the first attempts to bring Norbert Elias’s underestimated figurational sociology to peace and conflict studies. Although Elias’s work is popular in sociology for his conception of civilising processes and state formation, this book has utilised his concept of figuration to identify contextual figurations of peace in post-conflict societies through exploring the intentions, events,

At peace’s end 161 and consequences of peace interventions. Figurational sociology is distinct for being able to overcome paradigmatic contempt between different theories of knowledge. Elias’s work aimed to end the paradigm wars and point them in a more constructive direction. As identified in Chapter 2, one of the major paradigmatic tensions in peacebuilding debates is between problem-solving and policy-relevant knowledge on the one hand, and emancipatory and critical knowledge on the other. The prevalence of paradigmatic contempt between liberal and critical peace-writers has guided contemporary studies of peacebuilding and statebuilding in the direction of normalising the permanent state of theoretical disagreement regarding peacebuilding after violent conflicts. The politics of impacts of peacebuilding is a relevant example of this conflictual theorising. Liberal-interventionist epistemologies ignore peacebuilding consequences because they reveal the weaknesses of power-holders, and fear taking responsibility for harmful outcomes. On the other hand, critical epistemologies of peace ignore unintended consequences because they are perceived as bearing the capacity to deflate the critique of international interventions and weaken the attributability of blame for failure to liberal-interventionist approaches to peacebuilding. The main problem of this epistemic disarray is the curse of epistemological progress, and the quest for never-ending knowledge-production, which is gradually pushing critical debates on peacebuilding towards meta-theoretical and postempirical discussions. This is evident from recent attempts to displace discussions on peacebuilding and statebuilding to broader philosophical debates losing any relevance to the original purpose of peacebuilding. Therefore, the question is no longer how to save liberal peacebuilding, as attempted by Paris (2010), but how to rescue critical approaches to peacebuilding from becoming post-empirical and post-epistemological adventures of thinking. The discipline of peacebuilding needs to be rewritten in order to become more reality-congruent and prone to more legitimate foundations for theorising and critiquing discourse, practices, and agencies involved in peacebuilding endeavours. One possible venue for saving the critique of peacebuilding is for critical scholars to remain empirical and redefine their social critique of peacebuilding interventions, while preserving critical and normative commitments. Peacebuilding studies require a sustainable critique and a ‘philosophical-normative sensibility’ to capture the real-world material and ideational dimensions, and to conduct inquiry with reflective self-regard and chastened reason (see Levine 2012: 19). In the context of peacebuilding studies, a sustainable critique would require reality-congruent analyses that highlight the politics of reality construction, the performative aspects of agency, and the normative and ethical implications and consequences of any type of peace intervention. Drawing from Elias’s figuration sociology, peace figuration was proposed in this book as an alternative non-conflictual framework to study the impact of peacebuilding in a relational and entangled manner. Rather than presuming success or failure against any static indicator or logical framework of measurement, peace figuration considers the impact of peacebuilding to be episodic, thus

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temporary in nature and contingent on contextual and relational situations. As Deborah D. Avant et al. (2010: 370) argue, ‘assessments of success, failure, benefit, loss, or dysfunction depend upon the context as well as what the actors themselves were hoping or trying to accomplish’. What can be defined presently as the success or failure of peacebuilding should be open to re-evaluation against other empirical scrutiny. Therefore, the evaluation of peace is fundamentally disordered and any static view of peace is an arbitrary imposition. From a figurational point of view, peacebuilding dynamics are peculiar. They are subject to unplanned developments, which distort any pre-determined or pre-conceived understanding of peace. Under such situations, peacebuilding in practice is not informed either by theories or by patterned practices (represented as lessons learnt or best practices). Rather it is a product of situational and relational interactions within certain figurations of power and interdependencies. Peace is liquid – it is in a constant state of transition, challenged by internal and external forces. The state of peace is the state of the figurational composition of relations between internal and external forces that have vested interests in a particular conflict-affected society. Peace figuration has tried to develop a post-paradigmatic logic by utilising pluralist epistemologies and methodologies to generate reality-congruent knowledge. As applied in this book, this complementarity required a combination of suitable and multiple epistemological approaches within a compact research project to enrich the empirical and analytical aspects. This was made possible by using the categories of intentions, events, and consequences, which captured the metaphysics, performativity, and the legacies of peacebuilding. Looking at the conversion of intentions into actions and events, and then the emergence of a spectrum and consequences, provides a processual analysis of peacebuilding impact, thus avoiding a static and de-ontological measurement of peacebuilding effectiveness. Theorising about the impact of peacebuilding should recognise the epistemological temporalities upon which the research is founded. Figurational views of peacebuilding oppose static measurement of the impact of peacebuilding, be it failure or success, thus opening up the discipline to new perspectives on peacebuilding. This book showed that peacebuilding efforts often have peacebreaking effects. Liberal peacebuilding can build an illiberal peace, dominated by ethno-nationalist entanglements and political structures without domestic legitimacy and external dependency. As shown in all three case studies, securitisation efforts have increased insecurity in conflict-affected societies. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the net result of international efforts to build a stable political order has been the institutionalisation of instability and disorder. This shows that peace-making can undermine peacebuilding, and then peacebuilding can impede sustainable peace. These diffractive and mutative practices represent the irreconcilable paradox of political action in the contemporary peacebuilding practices. The discussion in Chapter 2 has already elaborated the limitations of mainstream and critical approaches in studying peacebuilding consequences. The claim of liberal-interventionist scholars that unintended consequences can be

At peace’s end 163 prevented, mitigated, and handled is problematic and highly contested. The analyses in this book have shown clearly that, first, peacebuilding organisations are not preoccupied with the consequences of their doings, and, second, in cases when they try to manage consequences they have failed to do so for operational and normative reasons. While local ownership is often perceived as a solution to democratic peacebuilding, local legitimacy, and sustainable peace, this book has shown that local owners of peace are often ex-combatants, pseudonationalists, and corrupted political factions, who prioritise political power over peace and common good. Paradoxically, peace without the political is impossible, but it is organised politics that sparks social fragmentation rather than dialogue and reconciliation. Moderate political voices and liberal civil society generally lack popular legitimacy in post-conflict societies. Under such circumstances they often move in the direction of more radical politics and change their political identity. For this reason, propositions such as institutionalisation before liberalisation and strategic peacebuilding are unlikely to achieve the goal of durable peace. Displacing the question from pre-determined onto-epistemologies about the success and failure of peacebuilding and moving it into the terrain of unknowns, complexity, and contingency does not merely require reflection upon, or based on, existing peacebuilding knowledge. It requires rethinking, in a diffractive sense, the intelligibility of peacebuilding practices. Static measurements of peacebuilding impact often fail to recognise the temporary and uncertain nature of peace. For what once might have been considered ‘peace decay’ can be part of processes that can lead to a better reconfiguration of peace. Relational assessments of peacebuilding interventions are more likely to capture the conditions of peace. For example, this book has illustrated the liquid nature of interventionism and peacebuilding, whereby the end of peacebuilding missions does not end international interventions in the recipient society. Such liquid interventions continue to shape peace, politics, and democracy in conflict-societies for a long period of time. This rectifies the policy-driven thinking on sustainable, durable, lasting peace, showing that peace should not be seen through the ontological prism of solidity but of flexibility and fluidity. Accounting for such limits of peacebuilding provides a more reality-congruent view of peacebuilding actualities, thus destabilising modernist certainties about the onto-epistemological premises of peace and conflict, and showing the patterns of difference and the subtle nature of peace. Although this book has mainly explored the negative impacts of peacebuilding, it has been a source of a productive and generative drive for expanding our knowledge about peacebuilding interventions. The remainder of this conclusion highlights a number of cross-case comparisons and contingent generalisations that derive from the theoretical and empirical discussions made so far in this book.

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Absurdities of peacebuilding intentionality The first aspect of figuring out the legacies of peacebuilding is the declared intentions of key international and local actors. As the analysis has dealt mainly with examining the legacies of liberal peacebuilding, its focus was to show the relational nature of intentionality by tracing how liberal peace intentions were formulated, implemented, and to explore what sort of outcomes they produced. Declared intentions are the closest approximation one can have for understanding the motivations behind international peacebuilding. When the declared intentions of liberal peacebuilding are disfigured, they reveal a multitude of second order intentions that represent disjoined, conflicting and transgressing motivations, objectives, and rationales behind the performativity of peacebuilding. As illustrated in this book, declared intentions of peacebuilding over time lose their original meaning and gradually enter different semantic fields of becoming empty signifiers and euphemisms. Vague notions such as enhancing the rule of law, building democratic institutions, stability and promoting reconciliation become normative rationales utilised by both international and local actors to articulate their power and advance hidden intentions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OHR continuously changed the focus of the discourse on the rule of law to the point that respecting the rule of law itself became the impediment to advancing the peace. For example, under the guise of the rule of law, local ethno-nationalist factions in Bosnia utilised the legal rights and institutional spaces enshrined within the DPA to challenge international authority and prevent the transformation of peace in the country. This triggered an international response, thus making the rule of law ‘the rule of the ruler’ against local ethnonationalist political structures. In Kosovo, the UN bent the rule of law to the extreme by tolerating institutional parallelism and the operation of different conflicting jurisdictions in Kosovo. The rule of law resembled more closely the rule of stability. In Timor-Leste, the rule of law was conceived as the rule of the deal, signifying the informal transactions among and between international and local actors during the UN administration of the country. Declared intentions are the ‘original sin’ of many political confrontations between local and international actors, which shape peace processes in unplanned and unintended directions. They represent a calculated rational decision for desired actions and outcomes based on prior interactions and social experience. In the peacebuilding context, intentions are often not congruent with local expectations and tend to represent external needs and interests, translated as conditions imposed over local actors for changing existing political, economic and social figurations in conflict-affected societies. Peacebuilding mandates are often written under urgent circumstances and grounded on superficial fact-finding missions. They are more intended to end conflicts than attuned towards peacebuilding. For this very reason, liberal peacebuilding intentions are often unattainable because they lack local legitimacy and dialogic necessity for ensuring local compliance and, most importantly, they are designed to respond to external needs for security and stability, regime change, and neo-liberal economic exploitation. The wording of peace intentions has

At peace’s end 165 far-reaching implications. In Kosovo, the UNMIK’s declared intentions for undertaking peacebuilding actions and hidden intentions for delaying the determination of Kosovo’s political status were not welcomed by Kosovo Albanian political representatives who wanted the immediate formation of an independent state and a small assistive international presence. The UN’s conflict-containment policies in Kosovo triggered local resistance, which was articulated through institutional parallelism, inter-ethnic revenge and confrontation, and whole-hearted non-compliance with externally imposed norms, rules, and institutions. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, the UN avoided consulting local actors when it formulated the declared intentions for post-violence deployment. That disengagement was later changed in favour of local ownership, which anyhow increased distrust of the international community and enabled impunity among local security structures. The analyses in this book show that both agential and structural aspects influence the changing meaning of peacebuilding purpose. Martha Finnemore (2004: 142) argues that ‘social purpose can change only through a combination of agent action and structural transformation’. In peacebuilding literature, it is often suggested that the intentions of liberal peacebuilding are formulated in Western metropolises prior to an intervention by agents who are detached from the place and context of engagement, thereby operating with insufficient knowledge regarding cultural sensitivity and local dynamics. Contrary to such views, declared intentions are relational to a particular place and time. They may contain universal counters, but the substance and meaning are determined locally. Across many post-conflict societies, the purpose of peacebuilding is set by external actors using hard and soft power, which is legitimised by a UN Security Council mandate and is based on global peacebuilding blueprints. However, the modification of peacebuilding intentionality is largely influenced by local actors, events, and unexpected outcomes during the peacebuilding process and post-conflict interactions. The UN’s peacebuilding intentions in Kosovo were influenced by both domestic and international structural factors, such as a lack of international consensus on Kosovo’s political status and the local legacies of conflict. Over the course of peacebuilding, local resistance and many unplanned events managed to change the UN’s purpose in Kosovo. The violent events of March 2004 played a crucial role in shaping international policy on Kosovo, moving from the status quo to seeking a political solution for this statehood-aspiring territory. After Kosovo’s independence, international structural factors and Russia’s rejection of ending UNMIK’s mandate in Kosovo reshaped the UN’s peacebuilding agenda and prolonged its presence without any functional role on the ground. Under these international structural factors, UNMIK’s mandate in 2014 is as vague as it could get: ‘ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo and advance regional stability in the western Balkans’ (UNGA 2014: 3). In BiH, the purpose of interventions has changed over the years, from a peacebuilding to an EU integration agenda. The obstructionist actions of local factions, together with weak agency of UN and EU police missions, effectively formed the structural impediment to reaching the original peacebuilding goals.

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This ‘necessitated’ using EU conditionality and subversion of the political dispute into technical processes to ensure the political existence of a unified BiH (OHR 2012). In Timor-Leste, the purpose of peacebuilding was mainly shaped by domestic factors, whereby the design of declared intentions represented the external perception of the Timorese’ needs for building a functional state. However, regional interests profoundly directed the economic orientation and strategic alignment of this new fledgling state. The three case studies point out to a common pattern, which is the liquidity and indeterminacy of peacebuilding purpose. While declared intentions in their textual articulation represent both desired and pre-determined outcomes, the field of peacebuilding praxis shows that the meaning, formation, and the transformation of declared intentions change over time, which has numerous implications for peace figuration. So does the political will of external and internal actors. Hence, it is not just the ‘lack of political will’ but also the shift of political will that causes turbulences during peacebuilding intervention. While changing the declared intentions reduces the credibility of international peacebuilding organisations, such change and transformation are sometimes essential for adapting to the evolving circumstances and preventing the spectrum of consequences. The exogenous and continuous transformation of declared intentions for police reform in BiH reduced the power of the normativity of liberal peace, encouraged local resistance, and opened up avenues for contesting peacebuilding activities. Portraying police reform in BiH as a policy action to create a functional state compatible with EU standards often ignores the underlying rationales of police reform as a necessity to mitigate the harmful effects of politicised and mono-ethnic police forces on societal reconciliation. These practices show that international peacebuilding organisations do not transfer local ownership but local actors, through both peaceful and forceful means, grab it. While local actors are not involved in writing peacebuilding intentions, they profoundly shape them, thus opening up space for renegotiating and redefining the character of peace to respond to the local context. Hybridisation of intentions rearranges power relations, transforms agents’ identities, and breaks the boundaries between local and international actors. Paradoxically, neither divergent nor shared intentions between international peacebuilders and local stakeholders throughout the peacebuilding process can ensure mutual cooperation and coordination of actions and tackle the question of local resistance and spoiling behaviour. Peace-making and peacebuilding interventions seek to generate shared intentions (e.g. all parties in the conflict have come to a compromising deal to end conflict and ensure the existence of their ethnic communities). However, shared intentions are also problematic. Change of the original custodians of peace makes the transcendence of shared intentions into collective (and durable) actions difficult. On the other hand, the prevalence of incompatible intentions deriving from previous shared intentions or ontologically disjoined intentions, as illustrated in this book, poses significant challenges to the peace process and, most worryingly, is a catalyst for the emergence of harmful consequences. In between these two options, the UN started rethinking

At peace’s end 167 its strategy by proposing to devise ‘a nimble, flexible United Nations presence able to go quickly where it is needed and adapt to evolving tasks’ (UNSC 2015: 9). However, flexible mandates and revised priorities can lead to new forms of interventionism that ensure the UN’s success in achieving its limited and attainable intentions, but at the expense of leaving the root triggers of conflict unresolved, and without supporting the local potential for the peaceful figuration of peace. Therefore, this diffraction of intentionality in the context of peacebuilding should not be underestimated nor taken for granted. This book has illustrated that intentionality expressed textually through policy documents and discourses constitutes the normativity of peace, which consists of values, beliefs, and purposes that aim to be implanted, implemented, and sustained in postconflict societies as foundations for new state structures, the rearrangement of social relations, and integration into broader global structures, processes, and dynamics. The normativity of peace will remain fragmented and unstable even when there is wide consensus on the intentionality and conditions of peacebuilding. Declared intentions attached to institutional and policy mechanisms cannot preserve their original meaning and resist new interpretations. They are emplaced and embodied temporalities that constantly change. As examined in this book, while the fabric of declared peacebuilding intentions belongs to liberal ideology, their tailoring and texture is contingent on local and contextual circumstances. The discussion of declared intentions of peacebuilding in this book reveals the power of language and text in ordering social relations and guiding institutional action. Declared intentions have a performative power as can be captured by the events and consequences they produced. Wording peace plays a productive role in worlding peace. The semantics of peacebuilding need to engage more thoroughly with the meaning-producing practices and the normative representations underlining the intentionality of any type of universal or particular peacebuilding.

Peace-shaping events The events surrounding peacebuilding processes are an important epistemic category to make sense of the complexity and interconnectivity between different intentions, agencies, and the consequences as emerging features. As Elise Boulding (1990: 7) argues ‘[t]he shaping process is conflictual, since many different perspectives are at work’. The figurational analyses of events in this book provide some useful insights into the relational and contingent nature of intentions, agency, power and the progressive and recursive dynamics that determine the battlefield of peacebuilding after violent conflicts. Impact assessments of peacebuilding interventions based on selected events and limited samples are unlikely to capture the full figurations of peace. What can be perceived as a success in a particular period of time can easily turn into a failure later and vice versa. There are endless episodes of social articulation that are not predetermined, but subject to the particular ordering of figurations and the dynamics

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of agencies within such interactions. Therefore, we will never be certain about the impact and legacies of peacebuilding. However, what we can observe is some of the contingent aspects of events that have shaped peace interventions. This book has shown that problems affiliated with the dynamics of imposed peace-making have a formative role in post-conflict peacebuilding. Arrangements made as part of the DPA in BiH to accommodate a decentralised police structure in the later stages of peacebuilding efforts produced peace-breaking events and consequences. The unsettling of Kosovo’s political status after NATO’s 1999 intervention brought temporary local compliance, but it triggered parallel state formation and state contestation dynamics, which did not improve the peace dividend. In Timor-Leste, imposing specific arrangements for defence and police forces facilitated local resistance and inter-institutional conflict. Violent conflicts have a productive function, as they provide the opportunity to reshuffle political, economic, and social relations, often reversing the discriminatory and exclusionary practices and making the oppressed become new oppressors. The habitus of post-conflict societies immediately after violent conflicts provides narrow opportunities for changing the order of things, including social structures, power relations, and the dynamics of peacebuilding. Some of these aspects were discussed earlier in this chapter and more extensively throughout the case studies. The evidence suggests that the UN is inappropriately equipped to exploit the narrow windows of opportunity to change the course of events, processes, and structures in post-conflict societies before local power is reshuffled and entrenched. Initial conditions, which set the course of developments on an unpredictable trajectory, can include slow deployment, constrained authority, unclear intentions, and lack of inter-agency coordination and cooperation. Failure to operate due to the initial conditions narrows down the window of opportunity to achieve the desired change, and offers the opportunity for local actors to exploit the weaknesses of the system to their advantage. The absence of credible commitment among the international community has significantly undermined durable peace. The chain effect of missed opportunities that produce certain consequences creates other layers of consequences. Understanding peace figurations requires exploring the lineages and interconnectivity between related and unrelated events in the long run to account for the success or failure of peace interventions. According to Mennell (1990: 201), Elias ‘stressed that the process is reversible . . . there are many counter-spurts within the process, so that the main trend is visible only in the long view’. Observing the success of peacebuilding interventions based on a number of selected events or through the temporary outcomes of a particular peace mission can capture only one figurational episode of peace processes. For instance, UNMIBH staged its exit from BiH in 2002, declaring as successful its mandate of reforming the police structures and supporting overall stability of the country. However, this assessment was not reality-congruent because, when the preceding events and consequences are examined, they showed that the UN complicated the EU’s mandate to reform, centralise and democratise the police forces again. At different stages of the UN’s administration of Kosovo, the destructivity

At peace’s end 169 of Serb parallel structures was covered by episodes of compliance and cooperation with the international community. However, the examination of events with different magnitudes of publicity reveals their peace-breaking role in Kosovo. If the analysis of Serb parallel structures takes as an ending stage the first agreement between Kosovo and Serbia to normalise relations reached in 2013 it would be misleading, as these structures continued to operate in different mutations and shaped ethnic politics in Kosovo after their official dismantling. Past events are present in the future in different mutations. In Timor-Leste, the analysis of peacebuilding until 2005 portrayed the country as the most successful example of the UN’s involvement after conflict. However, when the later events are attached, this assessment is not reality-congruent as the country came to the brink of civil war several times afterwards. Therefore, it is this fluctuation of peacebuilding processes that makes static and policy-oriented impact assessments ultimately incapable of capturing the broader and processual figuration of peacebuilding interventions. In practice, not all events in post-conflict societies are about building peace. Usually there is an extensive gap between intentions, expectations, and their realisation. Post-conflict processes are often dominated by events aimed at changing and breaking peace. In fact, once the violence ends, the political agenda in post-conflict societies shifts from peace to power. This has been recognised recently by the UN’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations highlighting the ‘worrisome reversal’ effects in post-conflict societies (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 9). The majority of peace-shaping events in conflict-affected societies represent clashes and resistance to the efforts to preserve and change the nature of peace. The examination of multiple events after international intervention in this book points to some of the key peace-breaking dynamics. One such dynamic is expressed through the attempts of local actors to preserve the original power figuration set in the peace agreement and resist external attempts to modify the terms of peace. For example, peace-breaking dynamics were practiced by Bosnian Serbs who aimed at destabilising and paralysing Bosnia’s multi-layered institutions, and disregarded the authority of the High Representative to implement civilian aspects of the DPA. Another type of peace-breaking dynamics involved breaking away from the original provisions of the peace agreements. For example, Bosnian Muslims, together with the international community, were engaged in peace-breaking dynamics by trying to reform the Dayton Peace Accords and effectively break away from the original powersharing provisions, which were seen as constraints to Bosnian’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Similar dynamics also took place in Kosovo. The activities of Serb parallel structures in Kosovo are clear examples of peace-breaking, as they operated against the UN authority and the laws of Kosovo. The reason for peace-breaking was the dissatisfaction of Serbs with international support for Kosovo’s statebuilding and independence. Similarly, the intervention of Kosovo police in 2011 in the north of Kosovo to establish the rule of law and crush local resistance represents a peace-breaking event, in the sense that it disturbed the fragile peace

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that dominated for over fifteen years in that part of Kosovo. In Timor-Leste, examples of peace-breaking include the 2006–2007 cycle of violence and the efforts of excluded local groups to change institutional arrangement in the country. As these examples show, the majority of peacebuilding events are not about resolving the root causes of conflict but about addressing the consequences of peace agreements and local power entanglements. Peace-breaking dynamics can be triggered by embedded hostilities not addressed by peacebuilding or they can be a product of new hostilities created during and after peacebuilding interventions. Often, the international community fails to respond to local demands, which encourages the generation of violence and crisis as a tool to increase political agency and bargaining, and shape the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. Ultimately, non-action by international community forces local protagonists to use force as a solution in achieving their political goals. Such peace-breaking logics have strong performative functions and often ruin international investment and reverse the peacebuilding process. Peace-breaking dynamics are a testimony of how the premature declared successes of peacebuilding can turn into failure in the long run, and vice versa – where immediate failures are turned into long-term successes. Peace-breaking dynamics are starting to occur more often in those conflict-affected societies that have benefited from peacebuilding interventions. The return of violence in Burundi during 2015 is illustrative of peace-breaking dynamics, and highlights the limits of the premature assessment of peacebuilding success, which is generally measured on minimum criteria and based on input, not outcomes and wider impact (Vircoulon 2015). Therefore, it is important to explore more widely the peace-breaking effects of both peace-making and peacebuilding efforts. Elias’s figurational sociology considers humans as autonomous yet interdependent subjects, thus contesting the static conception of societies and identity, which could be beneficial for overcoming the existing notions that delineate local and international agents in peacebuilding interventions. The sociology of peacebuilding shows that the habitus of post-conflict societies shapes the identity of foreign interveners, revealing thus the changing relations and power ratios between the established and the outsiders throughout the lifespan of peacebuilding interventions. In the peacebuilding context, the ‘will to power’ is not established a priori. It emerges from the dynamics and relations that take place during the peacebuilding process. The practice of executive power in BiH by the HR emerged as a contextual response to local non-compliance with the peace agreement. More generally, the exercise of power is related to the personality of the international peacebuilders and the field-based leaders of peacebuilding missions, and the type of relationships they develop with local actors. The hierarchy of liberal peacebuilding is more decentralised than we often think and the power of interveners has more complex figuration than it is often acknowledged. For example, the agency of the field-based staff of peacebuilding missions or diplomatic representations is often reduced to technocratic representation of centralised policies, overlooking their quintessential role in knowledge-production and shaping upwards and downwards peace policies.

At peace’s end 171 Therefore, micro-sociological and Psychosocial analysis of the role of the personal in shaping the societal and the global should be studied further to develop new practice-based accounts of agency and power in the peacebuilding context. The involvement of external actors in peacebuilding, and their association with the state and the monopolisation of violence, makes them part of the domestic conflicts and subsequently producers and reproducers of new forms of power, violence, and peace. Often the impossibility of reaching their peacebuilding goals and the affiliation with the state apparatus makes external interveners locally unacceptable, which comes with the cost of local resistance and rejection of external norms, rules, and practices. Similarly, local actors as co-producers of events are not static, but constantly change their identity and positionality towards peace. Peacebuilding practices constantly search for local leaders to invest in them in order to generate local partnership and compliance for peace implementation. The politics of searching for local partners sometimes focuses on the most radical and powerful faction with the goal of moderating them, while in other cases it focuses on marginal factions to counter-balance the perceived peace spoilers. The ‘pacification’ of local actors can take place before or after the involvement in the peacebuilding process. However, the possibility of ‘de-pacification’ is always there, whereby moderate leaders turn to stage peace-breaking endeavours as a survival strategy. It can happen that those local leaders that are supported by the international community later turn against the foreign interveners. The institutional resistance of Bosnian Serbs against the power of the High Representative produced new exclusionary and discriminatory practices against minorities in BiH. In Kosovo, both local Albanian and Serb political leaders, who became moderate voices during the transition, later returned to their radical roots, becoming critical voices against the political order established by the international community. These local political leaders have used democratic processes and nationalist discourses to generate popular legitimacy, which they have used explicitly against peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. As such peace-breaking dynamics engage in exclusionary practices, they can easily return to ethnic hostilities. This book has focused on the ways local political elites, namely ethnonationalist factions, have dominated the local politics of peacebuilding. The analyses have shown that they have often articulated destructive agency towards the liberal peacebuilding agenda. While this indicates that local agency should not be romanticised, it also points out that liberal peacebuilding by privileging ethno-nationalist elites has suppressed and undermined more pro-peace and grassroots local actors. The focus of peacebuilding on building institutions, and imposing new laws, norms and practices of governance, has ignored the peacebuilding potential of civil society, grassroots groups, and constructive local agencies. New studies suggest that peacebuilding interventions have been more successful when they have provided support for a local, non-violent, grassroots infrastructure for peace (Visoka 2016). When peacebuilding interventions tackle issues of reshuffling local structures of power, resistance emerges which turns

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the peacebuilding process into a battle for shaping peace to gain power. Hence, those local agencies that do not compete for political power, materiality, and other conflict-seeking sources have the potential to contribute to peacebuilding processes more than it is often recognised by the peacebuilding organisation. Nevertheless, such examples of local agency should be approached in their own temporality and avoid generalisations because figurational changes within certain societies can ultimately disappear such positive potential for peace and replace it with other destructive modes of local peacebuilding. These examples show that accounting for local perspectives, identity, and agency should be congruent to recognising this temporality and should trace its change over time to understand how they shaped peace. Where there is power there is not only resistance but also subordination propagated in the name of emancipation. Events as socially constructed and written practices tell us much about peacebuilding; however, without the study of their wider effects, they remain mere social facts without a role in making sense of the world, both in its intelligibility and stupidity. Therefore, the structuring agencies of consequences that emerge from the multiplicity of events are a much-needed component for studying the fragments of peace figurations.

The structuring agency of consequences The consequences of peacebuilding interventions play a crucial role in disentangling peace figuration after violent conflicts. A figuration of peace is fluid and changes all the time as a result of consequences. Contrary to existing views, consequences are not an expectation of peacebuilding interventions, but they play a central role in shaping peacebuilding and peace-breaking processes. The outcomes of post-conflict peace processes, negotiations, and confrontations are predominantly the unintended consequences of an individual actor’s purposive actions. Power as a ‘field of possibility . . . [that] facilitates and constrains social action’ (Heyward 2004: 30) is not only shaped by responsible agents who use power, but also by other remote and unintended actions. Accordingly, social elaborations and structures are unintentionally produced by individual actions, illustrating the character of post-conflict societies being a product of everyone’s doings, yet attributable to nobody. This book has illustrated that it is possible, and above all necessary, to tackle the most ignored dimension of peacebuilding – the consequences of peacebuilding – in a systematic way, supported by solid theoretical and methodological grounds and rooted in extensive empirical evidence. As illustrated through the critique of literature in Chapter 2 and extensively explored in the three case studies, international peacebuilders try to avoid encountering the unintended and negative impacts of their actions. The ontological politics of ignoring the consequences of peacebuilding are related to the desire to preserve the authority and legitimacy of peacebuilding organisations, to maintain dominant hierarchies of order, and to achieve externally constructed intentions at the expense of distorted local peace. Ignoring the registration of

At peace’s end 173 peacebuilding consequences leaves social events poorly explored, excludes impunity from responsibility, and dismisses the meaningful and corrective reformation of individual and collective agency. This indeed constitutes the immorality of peacebuilding – a particular form of governing post-conflict societies without care and self-constraint about the consequences of their intentional conduct. Therefore, the entirety of peacebuilding consequences calls into question the utilitarian good that liberal peacebuilding brings to post-conflict societies, revealing the disproportionality of good intentions and harmful consequences. The emergence of consequences shows the complex figuration and hybridisation of peacebuilding processes. They show the unrealisability and the openendedness of peace. The spectrum of consequences occurs in a cascading logic of emergent features. They represent a disorderly yet explainable complexity. Peacebuilding consequences follow non-linear patterns, often transcending the social field and affecting other fields of social interactions. The processes are not influenced and driven only by the international actors, but local actors and factors play an essential role in shaping the nature of processes. Consequences are products of relationships and simultaneously produce relationships. According to Hannah Arendt (1998: 183), this is ‘because of . . . [the/an] existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose’. Translation of intentions into actions produces certain outcomes that directly and indirectly shape other peace-related processes, jointly producing outcomes often different from those intended. Peacebuilding organisations often witness the emergence of effects they do not want, do not have the ability to know, and cannot prevent the occurrence of. In essence, peacebuilding consequences are the result of the results of results. The possibility of success and failure should never be eradicated. If this is the case, then any static conception of peacebuilding success or failure is unsustainable, because there could be forthcoming episodes of events and consequences that can overturn existing assessments of peacebuilding interventions. Rather than criticising immanently peacebuilding practices on dissimilar and unrelated criteria, the agency, seriousness and normative entitlements of liberal peacebuilding could be more appropriately examined in a relational sense by looking at their ability or inability to reach their intended goals, and deal with the negative and harmful consequences. Across all three case studies, we have seen the broad range of unintended, unanticipated, and unprevented consequences that have taken place during peacebuilding interventions, which all had a negative effect on the peace dividend. The inadequacies surrounding police reform in BiH have resulted in establishing multiple decentralised, ineffective, and politicised police forces who, rather than working to secure peace, became implicit in maintaining ethnic division and insecurity. The attempt to install democratic policing standards was overruled by the local culture of policing and allegiance to ethno-nationalist loyalty. The fragile peace provided opportunity for local groups to utilise the peacebuilding process for resolving, on their own terms, ethnic hostilities rooted

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before, during, and after the conflict. However, multiple flaws on the side of the UN and the EU facilitated further these local agendas for building the peace they wanted to have, not the one imposed from outside. The police provided the most suitable force for all sides to redraw the geography and demography along the lines of ethnic identity. Effectively, the desire to reform the security sector had a spill over effect in other areas of liberal peacebuilding, such as the return of refugees, the rule of law, democratisation, transitional justice, and the protection of human rights. This shows that the potential for durable peace is not only undermined by pre-determined local structural, intergroup, and inter-personal hostilities, but also affected horizontally by other parallel peacebuilding activities. The analysis in the case of Kosovo clearly illustrates the implications of compromising certain aspects of peacebuilding for immediate political interests. The UN transitional administration and NATO peacekeepers tolerated the emergence and development of local parallel structures – that clearly operated against international authority and peacebuilding and statebuilding – for the greater good of preserving the fragile peace and stability. This discrepancy later not only undermined stability in Kosovo but also infected and undermined other peacebuilding sectors, such as the establishment of multi-ethnic political and social institutions, ethnic reconciliation and dealing with the past beyond coercive transitional justice mechanisms, and the full implementation of the UN-sponsored comprehensive settlement after Kosovo independence. These consequences could have been prevented, but the UN and other peacebuilding organisations during their transitional rule in Kosovo intentionally chose conflict containment rather than conflict prevention and resolution. Conflict containment logics supported the ethnic division of Kosovo, which runs against the logic of peacebuilding as an approach that aspires alleviating the root causes of conflict. Finally, in the case of Timor-Leste the inability of five consecutive UN missions to deal with early signs of violence reoccurrence and persistence of policy impunity in post-conflict Timor-Leste is a clear indication of the myth of anticipatory governance, early warning systems, and lesson learning in the context of peacebuilding. The international attempts to securitise this fledgling country resulted in producing local security forces that produced instability instead. This led to confrontations between police and defence forces evident in the institutionalisation of conflict between the two institutions and the persistence of impunity for misconduct. These consequences that resulted were nothing but anticipated consequences of the failed security sector development and reform. However, as with all other UN peacebuilding missions, rarely do they admit the responsibility for failure and long-term harm. The examination of peacebuilding intentions, events, and consequences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste highlights a number of critical encounters that have contributed to the emergence of a paradoxical gap between good intentions and bad consequences. Timing plays a crucial role. The temporality of peace operations, and the short-term involvement of agents, does not provide space for the clarity and stability essential for predictability,

At peace’s end 175 planning, and cautious operations. The contingency and short time frame of operations in post-conflict societies gives insufficient attention to the spectrum of consequences, especially to the anticipation and prevention among peacebuilding organisations. Against this background, short-term consequences are more important than the long-term impact. This logic is based on the need to provide evidence for good performance, which can be measured with reference to short-term objectives and achievements. Consideration of long-term performance and quality assurance is compromised due to the need for results that can be measured immediately. Tomorrow’s consequences are ignored. Thinking about the long-term impacts of peacebuilding is overshadowed by the realisation of the inability to predict the future and have solid progression. A pre-occupation with entry strategies and the establishment and maintenance of peacebuilding missions arguably overshadows concerns about long-term consequences. However, as the empirical evidence in this book has showed, ignoring the longterm impact and consequences of peacebuilding paves the way for the failure of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies, and delays the prospects for consolidating peace. There is a dialectical relationship between the duration of peacebuilding and the spectrum of consequences. The duration of UN peacebuilding operations has an impact on the willingness of international actors to care about the consequences of their actions, the establishment of relations with local political factions, and how they approach the local context, culture, and needs. The collateral scope of the spectrum of consequences prolongs the efforts for peacebuilding and exhausts the constructive conflict resolution momentums. While the ambiguity and contingency of short-term missions produces certain consequences, a long-term presence creates consequences related to creating a culture of dependency, externally generated local political legitimacy, and the promotion of irresponsible politics. On the other hand, the spectrum of consequences examined in this book has effectively prolonged the international presence, undermined their authority and legitimacy, delayed the establishment of effective and functional institutions, hindered the establishment of civic peace and ethnic reconciliation, and undermined socio-economic development. The longer the problems dragged on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, the higher the costs became for the international presence in these countries. Peacebuilding organisations have largely ignored local knowledge, considering it primitive, illiberal, and not useful for building peace in post-conflict situations, as it is rooted in divided cultures and ethnicities that were the source of conflict in first place. The dislocated loyalty, absence of empathy with local people and their culture, as well as the primacy of materialism (concerns for professional career and salaries) all serve as distractions that undermine the potential for peacebuilding. Foreign workers frequently see post-conflict societies as an attractive career move bringing high salaries, and diplomatic privileges and immunities. They often do not interact with insider agents in an empathetic manner, but typically behave as privileged individuals who believe themselves superior to insider agents, thereby undermining local cultural practices and ignoring local knowledge.

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Foreign interveners often create their own habitus in post-conflict societies, interact only among themselves, and avoid the everyday life and complex reality of postconflict people. However, they are primarily interested in advancing the interests and agenda of their respective institutions or seconding states, with little empathy for the legacies they leave behind in post-conflict societies. Under such conditions, consideration for the potentially harmful effects of peacebuilding decisions and actions are virtually nonexistent. Moreover, when peacebuilding organisations are removed from the local communities, they have weaker local knowledge, lower capacity and less ability to anticipate, prevent, and reduce the harm of peacebuilding interventions. The spectrum of consequences also emerges from short-sightedness and historical routines of thinking and acting within the same repetitive dynamic for different types of situations and circumstances. The contemporary culture of peacebuilding and its ignorance of local cultures often reduces the chances of reflecting critically and caring about harmful consequences. The hierarchies of bureaucratic decision-making reduce the ability to engage in heuristic thinking, exploring alternative pathways, or anticipating the possible consequences of peacebuilding interventions. Uncertainty regarding peacebuilding consequences cannot be tackled by formality, because consequences are dislocated across a broad network of social fields, which are difficult to capture within routine and formalised procedures. The emergence of unanticipated consequences can be facilitated by a number of factors, including: faulty assumptions; the ‘template’ logic of problem-solving; the tendency for universal application and decontextualisation of policy tools and mechanisms; inaccurate information; and flawed situational and analytical knowledge. The processes of adaptation, learning, and change are often very slow and are not often a part of peacebuilding practices. When transferred to a different post-conflict society, best practices and lessons learnt from other contexts might not work as intended and expected.

The world of our unmaking One important aspect that needs to be addressed in this conclusion is with the puzzling question of who ought to be held responsible for the consequences of peacebuilding interventions. Or to put it differently: is the question of responsibility irrelevant in light of this messy unfolding of peacebuilding interventions? Power, agency, and responsibility are intimately intertwined. In his early normative work, William E. Connolly (1983: 213) defined agents as being ‘capable . . . of autonomous action, self-restraint, and coherence, and worthy, because of these capacities, to be treated as responsible agents’. Organisations that embody persistent set of norms and practices can be considered agents due to their capacity to form intentions and undertake purposive actions (Erskine 2003). This implies that agents who possess power are held morally responsible for the effects, thus making a connection between the attribution of power and moral accusation. However, current peacebuilding organisations have rejected taking responsibility for the spectrum of consequences arising from their purposive

At peace’s end 177 actions and have shown little concern for their wrongdoings and the mess they leave behind in post-conflict societies. This is evident from the absence of appropriate mechanisms to address the responsibility for taking wrong decisions and actions, for failing to uphold their obligations, and for causing social harm. For example, the international presences in BiH, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste are typical cases of extensive and protracted post-conflict international governance, which did not have appropriate responsibility mechanisms and have denied taking responsibility for their bad consequences (Visoka 2012). These examples signify the nature of post-conflict governance where democracy is preached but not practiced by the international community and where authority is exercised without taking responsibility for the consequences. The responsible agents (collective and individual) are not held responsible for the consequences. The politics of unaccountable international governance derive from diplomatic privileges and immunities, which protect actors from legal and political responsibility, and from the indirect political power they exercise over internal and external forces. Beyond this, the paradox is that the UN and other peacebuilding organisations operating on the logic of neoliberal governmentality have promoted individual responsibility for the actions and consequences of local actors through transitional justice mechanisms or other political means (see Joseph 2011: 42). The absence of responsibility mechanisms can ultimately contribute to the emergence of negative consequences, as international power-holders know they are exempted from responsibility in cases of negligence or harmful decisions and actions. At best, the UN peace operations form societies of individuals that are exempted from the responsibility of their undertakings. These practices suggest there is a case to redefine the nature of UN responsibility by reducing the normative entitlements and making the legitimacy of international peacebuilders conditional on their willingness to accept responsibility for the spectrum of consequences produced by their purposive decisions and actions. In the context of peacebuilding, learning from past failures has taken the shape of disguised apology and tactical avoidance of responsibility. The absence of accountability has given failure a different connotation. Instead of sanctioning it, failure has served the purpose of learning lessons, and has provided opportunities for renewing cooperation and partnership among the international community. The UN has issued several reports in the past two decades comprising of lessons from its own failures and inabilities to maintain international peace and security – ranging from the most extreme cases such as Srebrenica and Rwanda to the less dramatic examples of civil wars and non-interventions (see UNGA 1999). The belief in the human ability to control and mitigate unintended outcomes through learning and strategising processes has often been placed at the heart of this delusionary view of peacebuilding. For instance, Lisa Morje Howard (2008: 14) argues that a ‘factor for success is the ability of the UN Secretariat operations to learn during the process of implementing peacekeeping mandates’. The logic of learning is perplexing because it is often assumed it becomes formative in new intentions, which then guide corrected action and avoid precarious

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mistakes. When it comes to the question of lesson learning in the UN’s context, Michael W. Doyle (2015: 185) argues that ‘[w]ith the slow buildup of lessons – what worked and what did not – multilateral intervention has acquired the tools to avoid both political relapse and dependency. It learned, moreover, how to help build self-sustaining, self-determining peace’. While the majority of liberalinterventionist peace-writers invoke this fertile claim and rarely provide substantial evidence of the positive impact of knowledge transfer, what stands true from Doyle’s claim is the self-determining nature of peace – namely, peace outcomes are not determined by international and local actors solely but shaped by unplanned outcomes and harmful consequences. However, Arendt (1998) argues that performative action is constitutive of agency, not intentions or pre-existing identities. She maintains ‘the fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable’ (Arendt 1998: 178) Situating Arendt’s view on unlearning to the peacebuilding context, one can argue that unlearning is, by default, the process which happens as a result of the constant changes of peacebuilding agents, and the necessity for improvisation in situational challenges. In Arendt’s philosophy, unlearning is perhaps the most pragmatic way of coping with extreme situations (Knott 2011: xi). Despite these limitations, failures in the UN context have had the productive and generative function of reenergising interventionism. In a more critical sense, failure has served as a mechanism of disguising power and revealing intentionally the limitations of the peacebuilding possibility to justify careless interventionism in the future. This book has showed that lesson learning, best practices, and strategising often do not work because each conflict has its own distinct and incomprehensible particularities, different figuration of power and constantly changing interdependencies, and rationales of action are not always rational and planned in advance. In other words, universal peacebuilding lessons are fallacious. Oliver P. Richmond (2008: 164) suggests that ‘peacebuilding actors should not work from blueprints but should develop strategies based upon multi-level, multi-issue consultation in each case’. Every attempt at learning has an unlearning effect. The reality it seems is dominated by unlearning processes, and the banality of not caring about the effects of peacebuilding. The UN has tried to transfer the knowledge from one mission to another, as one of the pragmatic approaches for addressing the mistakes and shortcomings of previous interventions. For example, when the UN launched its mission in Kosovo it tried not to repeat the mistakes made in BiH with regard to the design, scope, and authority of international peacebuilding missions. UNMIK has had a unified structure. However, the unified structure of international intervention did not help UNMIK generate the political will to prevent the emergence and development of Serb parallel structures or co-option of statebuilding processes by Kosovo Albanians for state formation purposes. Similarly, the UN in Timor-Leste excluded ex-combatants from the peace process in an attempt to correct the mistakes made in Kosovo, where the UNMIK and KFOR tolerated the involvement of KLA ex-combatants in looting, social chaos, and revenge against minorities. These examples

At peace’s end 179 illustrate that knowledge transfer is more likely to cause adverse damage to peacebuilding processes than improve on previous mistakes. Mistakes are what peacebuilding interventions are made of. Unlearning is part of UN culture. In 2009, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services found numerous repetitions of mistakes in different UN peace operations that increased the risk for failure (UNGA 2009). The circulation of UN staff from one mission to another creates a culture of detachment from local culture. Global blueprints on peacebuilding encourage unlearning by discouraging in-depth engagement with local knowledge to design peacebuilding projects through a participatory, inclusive, and bottom-up approach. Principles of neutrality and impartiality promote the emotional and relational distancing of the local, which discourages empathy with local needs and perspectives. Linguistic, social and material gaps between foreign interveners and local actors increases the chances for unlearning and expands the knowledge gap. Failure to hold UN staff accountable for their wrongdoings discourages learning from mistakes, thus promoting unlearning and the repetition of harmful practices. These constraints turn ‘learning from failures’ into ‘learning how to fail again’. The current practices of the UN learning from its own successes and failures resonates with what Zygmunt Bauman (2000: 38) refers to as fluid modernity, which holds that ‘through trial and error, critical reflection and bold experimentation, we would need collectively to learn to tackle collectively’. However, he also points out that ‘history is a process of forgetting as much as it is a process of learning, and memory is famous for its selectivity’ (Bauman 2000: 127). The constant circulation of UN human capital and the logic of fluid realities of post-conflict societies are making forgetting more important than learning as a guiding process of future interventions. Despite this, the spectrum of peacebuilding consequences is not entirely independent from the liberal peace agency – it is also related to the lack of political will among external actors to engage substantively in achieving desired outcomes, in adjusting to the context, and in reducing harmful practices. Peacebuilding organisations register selectively their collective memory, which is destined to repeat the mistakes of previous interventions, but as the shape of peacebuilding intentions, events, and consequences will be different every time a new intervention takes place, such repeated mistakes and failures will be represented as if they are never been seen before. To maintain political agency and avoid responsibility, peacebuilding organisations tend to reduce their failures into unintended consequences caused by multiple agencies, into unanticipated consequences caused by unlearning processes, and into unprevented consequences caused by limited capacities and resources. These contradictory entanglements make us live in a world of our unmaking, whereby peacebuilding actors shape the reality in negation of what it is intended and preached.

Future research The analysis in this book has illustrated how peace figuration can serve as an alternative explanatory framework of the existing gap between the unexplained

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messy reality of peacebuilding interventions and the conflictual debates between liberal-interventionist and critical-emancipatory epistemologies of peace. While the contribution of peace figuration within peacebuilding debates has been elaborated so far, it is important to situate the key findings of this book with broader debates in IR, peace and conflict studies, and sociological studies of conflict. First and foremost, this book has the potential to make an important scholarly contribution by consolidating an international figurational sociology of peacebuilding and peace-breaking in the contemporary age. The existing accounts of the international political sociology of peace are still at an infant age. They are primarily concerned with the questions of security, state, boundaries, and governance, and less with the micro-dynamics of peacebuilding. Within security studies, Didier Bigo has developed an international political sociology of security practices. His work illustrates how internal and external practices of security lead to (in)securitisation, unease and narrow of freedom (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Joel S. Migdal has contributed to the development of an international political sociology of state through the study of dynamics of state formation, instability of state boundaries, and the ambiguities of state as practices and images (see Migdal 2001; Migdal and Schlichte 2005). The key tenets of peace figuration developed in this book provide a good basis for consolidating further an international figurational sociology of peace. As shown in this book, the liquid and unpredictable nature of post-conflict peace is increasingly alerting policy-makers to search for new forms of interventions, which could be the focus of future research on an international figurational sociology of peace. Contrary to what we often know, the exit of peacebuilding operations does not represent the end of international intervention in these societies. As noted by Michael W. Doyle (2015: 186) ‘[t]he age of intervention is far from over . . . [a]nd the record of interventions is far from consistent’. This shows that existing global normative and political conditions permit both intervention and non-intervention regardless of the inability to succeed in achieving the desired outcomes and causing harmful consequences. From direct and shared governance the modes of interventionism are becoming more hidden, structural, and liquid in nature. Because the foreign interveners know that they cannot build and keep peace in the shape they want, all they can do is influence it. Knowing the limits of past interventions, evident in the prevalence of uncertainty and unlearning, external actors seem to be shifting towards what we may call ‘liquid interventions’, which are rooted on precautionary logics, situational vigilance, and perpetual muddling through – in an attempt to avoid and mitigate the exposures of the past. Liquid modernity is a sociological theory developed by Bauman (2000), which illustrates the fluid forms of governing contemporary social, political, and economic affairs. In the context of peacebuilding, liquid interventions as a rebranding of previous extensive and protracted interventions have started to operate as a remote and networked society of interveners spread across international organisations, diplomatic services of states, non-governmental and philanthropic community, and business consultancy. As these trends need further examination, Elias’s figurational sociology and Bauman’s liquid sociology can

At peace’s end 181 provide adequate conceptual directions for studying the figuration of liquid interventionism in world politics. While it is true that we are experiencing a shift from reactionary to preventive interventions, from external assistance to local resilience, it might be too early to call these shifts ‘post-interventionary paradigms’ (Chandler 2012), or conceive the failure of statebuilding as the birth of ‘post-liberal’ forms of peace (Richmond 2011). Liquid interventions represent a renewed modernity of international biopolitics and governmentality of security, risks, and difference. What humanitarian interventions and the infant doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have done is that they have normalised the possibility of intervention and non-intervention at the same time in turbulent societies. Liquid interventions now represent the simultaneous choice of invoking both of them without conceiving interventions as interventions. Local agency has the potential to shape peace more often than perceived in peacebuilding literature, but it is those very acts of contentious and subaltern politics which have transformed interventions into liquid and never-ending transformative processes. In liquid interventions there is no permanent attachment to a cause, intention, or policy. The rule is to develop the ability for instant sentimental and strategic attachment and detachment from anything that is related to peace and conflict. Liquid interventions are against long-term engagement to address the root causes of conflicts. They are about instantaneity and short-term achievements. Physical detachment is replaced with remote attachment, through drones, surveillance techniques, and big data that seek to perform even great accuracy and precision in pre-emptively guiding the governance of the unknown. The nearness and remoteness of peacebuilding actors can profoundly shape peace prospects in different ways, reshuffle the legitimacy and authority of remote peacebuilders, and raise multiple questions on the ethics and praxis of what we might refer to as ‘disengaged engagement’. Therefore, remote peacebuilding can be a potential area for future research. Preliminary policy and empirical evidence suggest that there is a strong case for studying further liquid interventions through the prism of figurational sociology. The 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) represents an indicative policy statement of the new interventionist fluidity that the UN is aspiring to deploy in conflict-affected societies. The HIPPO report calls for adapting to ‘new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use in future’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 9). Central to this shift is blurring the lines between different types of peace interventions. The HIPPO report recommends that ‘the sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and special political missions should give way to a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 10). The discourse of fluidity and contextualism is evident also in the call of HIPPO that ‘the full spectrum of United Nations peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 10). Finally, the HIPPO report recommends that ‘sequenced and prioritized mandates will allow missions to develop over

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time rather than trying to do everything at once, and failing’ (UNGA and UNSC 2015: 10). Hence, the UN’s new liquid interventions are embedded in the following five principles: adaptability, flexibility, contextualisation, sequencing and blurring of peace operations. Liquid interventions destabilise instability by making it untraceable, changes the way in which the success or failure of international interventions is measured, and evades the question of who ought to be responsible for the consequences. Liquid interventions mask who does what and why. While the three post-conflict societies examined in this book show symptoms of the presence of liquid interventionism, Kosovo is an illustrative case. Between 1999 and 2008, the UN, together with NATO, the EU and OSCE, enjoyed extensive authority in governing Kosovo. The declaration of independence in 2008 did not bring political independence in running Kosovo’s internal and external affairs, as shown by the reconfiguration of UN and EU missions in the country and the creation of supervisory entities, such as the International Civilian Office. However, as the Kosovar institutions seemed to be in the driving seat, more covert international interventions became common. The existing discourses on local ownership, political maturity, and local responsibly hid new modes of dependency towards external actors. Since 2012, new forms of interventionism have been taking place in Kosovo, led by foreign diplomatic circles. Publically, intervention is denied but under the surface there is a complex technology of domestic micro-management of political decisions, followed by conditionality and threats to withdraw support (US Department of State 2010). This is evident in international interference in: the election of the Kosovo president in 2012; foreign ambassadors’ interference in micro-managing ethnic relations in Kosovo; interference in determining the strategic direction of Kosovo’s economy and foreign policy; conditionality over supporting Kosovo’s diplomatic recognition campaign; pressure to accept the agreement with Serbia in 2013; passing of sensitive legislation on special war crimes court and in extending EULEX’s mandate in 2014; as well as hidden intervention in forming the new government in 2014 (see Phillips 2012; Capussela 2015). In all these examples, the US and the EU’s powerful states have claimed that they do not intervene in Kosovo and that local institutions are mature enough to handle their domestic affairs themselves (D4D 2014). However, the truth of the matter is that the legacies of extensive interventionism in Kosovo have created a local political elite that is more dependent on external legitimacy than on domestic democratic processes. Another significant area for further research would be the fluidity of local resistance towards, first, the internal politics, as a response to ethno-nationalist and authoritarian practices and, second, the external actors, in the quest for expanding political independence and reducing international fluid interventions. In the past two decades, local resistance in post-conflict societies has been mainly organised around ethno-nationalist ideologies mixed with social welfare factions. The key features of this resistance have been its ability to operate within institutions through new political parties with militancy background and outside institutions through social movements and interest groups, such as

At peace’s end 183 veteran associations. While this duality has permitted some fluid resistance, it has not been very difficult for external interveners and local governments to understand organised resistance, and accordingly constrain them through diplomatic pressure, external conditionality, political exclusion, and public delegitimisation campaigns. While the organised resistance has partially nursed the emergence of more fluid forms of interventions, they have neither emancipated the local subject’s socio-economic conditions nor empowered their political agency and fulfil peoples their needs (Visoka 2016). Thus, local subjects are realising that partisanship promotes mono-ethnic political commitments and effectively contributes to social division. Some of the consequences of such local politics have already been examined in this book. However, future research should explore the changing nature of local resistance – from collective and organised resistance to individualised and unorganised resistance. Preliminary examples of such processes are migration flows, ad hoc protests, everyday forms of resistance and informality, and horizontal movements without leadership and ideology. Hence, it is important to explore further the local, regional, and international implications of this unorganised politics and their role in shaping peace in the age of liquid interventionism.

Conclusion This book has tried to broaden our understanding of the impacts of peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict societies. It has provided an alternative account of what happens when external actors come between parties in conflict and try to influence, modify, and settle the differences that have triggered the violent conflict in the first place. The proposed framework of peace figuration has shown that good intentions for building peace do not flow seamlessly into good peacebuilding actions, and even less seamlessly into good peacebuilding outcomes. Regardless of who is to be held responsible for such dialectics, the spectrums of consequences that have emerged from peacebuilding interventions have undermined the prospects for sustainable peace. The rocky road to sustainable peace is dark and full of bends, twists, and turns. The current cultures and practices of peacebuilding enshrined in Western ontologies, and the patronising and self-interested attitudes towards local subjects, are careless about the consequences of their actions and shun responsibility for any harmful consequences. Liberal interventions are prone to delay peacebuilding. Liberal intentions are not translated into liberal effects. The liberal ‘will to peace’ remains immanently incomplete. Surveying the mess created by international attempts to build peace, it is difficult to justify liberal peacebuilding. A logical conclusion would be to suggest adapting a culture of precautionary and chastened reasoning when writing about and practicing peacebuilding. If one follows what the majority of problem-solving thinkers in the field do, a natural recommendation would be to suggest thinking about the potential consequences of peacebuilding before, during, and after peace interventions. However, as peacebuilding consequences are deeply contextual, standardised lesson learning, and best practices, may not be an effective tool for sharing knowledge, anticipating

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troubles, and preventing consequences. On the other hand, critical peace-writers would suggest that the contextual understanding of the complexities of the consequences produced by any peacebuilding actions could lead to improving ethical practices and could increase the likelihood of delivering on the declared intentions. We have seen that local politics are controlled by power-grabbers and not true local peacebuilders, which are often nothing more than imaginary subjects in the minds of critical thinkers. The normative view would hold that considering the risk of producing unintended harmful consequences could mobilise the ability of peacebuilding actors and organisations to anticipate, prevent and, when necessary, change or reverse their purposive course of actions to avoid producing unintended consequences and the liability thereafter. Knowing the current and possible future architectures of peacebuilding, such normative and utilitarian moves are unlikely to take effect. Unconventional as it may be, based on the above, the most accurate conclusion is an inconclusive one. Peacebuilding after international intervention is one long, non-linear episode, which does not have a clear beginning and definitive ending. While legacies of conflict play a formative role in peacebuilding, so do the intentions, events, and consequences of peacebuilding in the postintervention stages. What we define as failure today, in a longer sequence of events, can be perceived relationally as a success. All we can do under such circumstances is to trace the never-ending circulation of intentions, events, and consequences in building and breaking peace. Conflict-affected societies will continue to guide their actions though different intentions, be spectators and actors in making and unmaking events, and suffer and enjoy the multiplicity of wanted and unwanted consequences. The social and material construction of peace is often guided by unlearning and the fluid circulation of power that comes with benefits and uncertainties. What this book has shown is that the figuration of peace after intervention can be understood, to a certain degree, to make sense of the entangled reality of conflict-shattered societies. Despite these grim conclusions, this book should not be seen as a paralysis theory of peacebuilding. Rather the study has showed that by focusing on processes, dynamics, and the transformation of peace and its associative conception of success, failure, benefit, and dysfunction, we can generate more sustained, yet fluid, accounts of peacebuilding interventions beyond static, mono-epistemological, and conflictual ways of thinking and knowing peace. Compared to problemsolving research, generalisations, and monolithic critical discourses, the knowledge that results from the figurational analysis of peacebuilding interventions and their outcomes is more likely to deepen our understanding of the complex processes that shape peace. Peacebuilding should be understood not only normatively and politically, but relationally as well – what intentions actors have, how events unfold and who shapes them, and what unexpected outcomes purposive actions have are deeply contentious issues that reflect peace figuration beyond the dominance of singular agencies, power basis, resources, and rationalities. International interventions can shape peace but not keep it in the shape they want. We are all coshapers of peace, but never sole creators of peace.

At peace’s end 185

References Arendt, H. (1998) The Human Condition, 2nd ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Avant, D. D., Finnemore, M., and Kell, S. K. (2010) ‘Conclusion: authority, legitimacy and accountability in global politics’, in Avant, D. D., Finnemore, M., and Kell, S. K. (eds) Who Governs the Globe?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bigo, D. and Tsoukala, A. (2008) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11, Abingdon: Routledge. Boulding, E. (1990) ‘The Dialectics of Peace’, in Boulding, K. E. and Boulding, E. The Dialectics and Economics of Peace, Occasional Paper 3, Fairfax, VA: Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Capussela, A. L. (2015) State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans, London: I.B. Tauris. Chandler, D. (2012) ‘Resilience and Human Security: The Post-Interventionist Paradigm’, Security Dialogue, 43(2): 213–229. Connolly, W. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. D4D (2014) ‘Ian Cliff in Tuesday Salons’, 23 September, 2014. Available online at: http://d4d-ks.org/video/ian-cliff-in-tuesday-sallons/?lang=en (accessed 24 July, 2015). Diehl, P. F. (2014) ‘Behavioural Studies of Peacekeeping Outcomes’, International Peacekeeping, 21(4): 484–491. Doyle, M. W. (2015) The Question of Intervention: John Stuart Mill and the Responsibility to Protect, New Haven, CO: Yale University Press. Erskine, T. (ed.) (2003) Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Finnemore, M. (2004) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Heyward, C. R. (2004) De-Facing Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Howard, L. M. (2008) UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joseph, J. (2011) ‘Governmentality of What? Populations, States and International Organisations’, in Kiersey, N. J. and Stokes, D. (eds) Foucault and International Relations: New Critical Engagements, Abingdon: Routledge. Knott, M. L. (2013) Unlearning with Hannah Arendt, trans. D. Dollenmayer, New York: Other Press. Levine, D. J. (2012) Recovering International Relations: The Promise of Sustainable Critique, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mennell, S. (1990) ‘Decivilising Processes: Theoretical Significance and Some Lines of Research’, International Sociology, 5(2): 205–223. Migdal, J. S. (2001) State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Migdal, J. S. and Schlichte, K. (2005) ‘Rethinking the State’, in Schlichte, K. (ed.) The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. OHR (2012) ‘The “5 + 2” Agenda’, 1 January, 2012. Available online at: www.ohr.int/ ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=46773 (accessed 20 July, 2015).

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Paris, R. (2010) ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, 36(2): 337–365. Phillips, D. (2012) Liberating Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy and U.S. Intervention, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Richmond, O. P. (2008) Peace in International Relations, Abingdon: Routledge. Richmond, O. P. (2011) A Post-Liberal Peace, Abingdon: Routledge. UNGA (1999) ‘The fall of Srebrenica: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35’, UN Doc A/54/549, 15 November, 1999. UNGA (2009) ‘Peacekeeping operations: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services’, A/63/302(Part II), 23 February, 2009. UNGA (2014) ‘Budget for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015’, UN Doc A/68/701, 10 January, 2014. UNGA and UNSC (2015) Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: Politics, partnership and people, UN Doc A/70/95-S/2001/446, 17 June, 2015. UNSC (2015) Special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya, UN Doc S/2015/113, 13 February, 2015. U.S. Department of State (2010). Report of Inspection: Embassy Pristina, Kosovo. Report No. ISP-I-10–38A. Available online at: https://oig.state.gov/system/files/141666.pdf (accessed 12 August, 2015). Vircoulon, T. (2015) ‘Burundi: How to Deconstruct Peace’, IPI Global Observatory, 24 November, 2015. Available online at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/centralafrica/burundi/op- eds/2015/vircoulon- burundi-how- to-deconstruct- peace.aspx (accessed 12 December, 2015). Visoka, G. (2012) ‘The ‘Kafkaesque Accountability’ of International Governance in Kosovo’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6(2): 189–212. Visoka, G. (2016) ‘Peace Multitudes: Liberal Peace, Local Agency, and Peace Formation in Kosovo’, in Richmond, O. P. and Pogodda, S. (eds) Post-Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Peace Formation and State Formation, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Index

accountability 20; Bosnia and Herzegovina police 84, 96; UN 177, 179 actor network theory 47 Adler, E. 65 agency 3, 20, 32, 47, 48, 50, 53, 55, 161, 170–1, 176, 178; local 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 171–2, 181; and structure 4, 37, 38, 47, 49 Ahtisaari, M. 113, 114, 117 Albanians see Kosovo Albanians Albert, M. 10, 46, 59 Alkatiri, M. 139 Amnesty International 93, 149 Andan, D. 92 Andersen, O. W. 32 Anderson, M. B. 33, 45 Angus, I. 36–7, 51, 161 Annan, K. 152 answerability 32 Aoi, C. 4, 20, 33, 34 Archer, M. 4, 36, 37, 38 Arendt, H. 50, 56, 58, 59, 173, 178 Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste see FALINTIL Ashdown, P. 84, 85, 88 attributability 32, 161 Australia 135, 143 Autesserre, S. 25–6, 28 Avant, D. D. 162 Azimi, N. 134, 136, 141, 152, 154 Badiou, A. 56 Bair, A. 89, 90 Balas, A. 6, 20, 25, 26, 33, 34, 52–3 Bartelson, J. 57 Bassuener, K. W. 80, 86 Bastian, S. 21, 22 Bataković, D. T. 107 Bauman, Z. 53, 179, 180

Beck, U. 59, 60 Beha, A. 120, 124 Bellamy, A. J. 24 Belloni, R. 86 Belo, N. 143, 144, 150 Bennett, A. 67 Berdal, M. 22 best practices 25, 176, 178, 183 Bieber, F. 91 Bigo, D. 46, 180 Blaustein, J. 77, 96 Bolton, G. 106, 114 Bordoni, C. 53 Bose, S. 96 Bosnia and Herzegovina 162, 170, 175, 177, 178; and Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) 78, 79, 81, 98, 164, 169; elections 78, 83, 85, 91; informal economy 94; justice system 82; Office of the High Representative (OHR) 78, 171; overall peacebuilding intentionality 78; Peace Implementation Council 78, 84; power-sharing 78, 79, 169; security sector reform 78; see also Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 11–12, 63, 64, 75–102, 165–6, 173–4; and capacity-building 82–3, 84; centralisation of police forces 77, 86; and constitutional reform 87; and Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) 7, 76, 77, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 96, 97, 168; and decentralised, ineffective, and politicised structures 89–90, 93, 97; and ethnic division 89, 90–1, 93; and EU integration agenda 76, 80, 83–4, 85, 97, 165, 166; and EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 85, 86; EU-led 7, 64, 75, 76, 77, 79, 83–7, 96,

188

Index

Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform continued 97, 98, 165, 168; gender dimension in 92; and human insecurity 88, 90–2, 97; and human rights 88, 90, 96, 174; and human trafficking 83, 90, 94; intentions 5, 7, 64, 75, 76, 77, 78–80, 96–7, 165–6; and International Police Task Force (IPTF) 76, 79, 81–2, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92; key events 80–7; and minority communities 88, 89, 90–1, 97, 171; Mostar Declaration (2007) 86–7; and nationalist factions 77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96; and NATO integration 84; and Office of the High Representative (OHR) 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 88, 96, 97; and organised crime and corruption 83, 84, 92, 94–5, 97; personnel selection 77, 82; police independence and accountability 84, 96; and refugees and displaced persons 80, 82, 85, 88, 89, 90–1, 174; and rule of law 80, 82, 94–5, 97, 164, 174; and State Border Service 83; training of personnel 82, 83; and transitional justice 88, 92, 93, 97, 174; UN-led 7, 64, 75, 76, 77, 81–3, 88, 89–90, 92, 96, 97, 165, 168; unintended consequences of 9, 64, 77, 87–95, 97–8; and war crimes prosecution 84, 85, 88, 92–3, 97 Bosnian Croats 79, 80 Bosnian Serbs 79, 80, 85, 86, 169, 171 bottom up peace 17, 20, 179 Boudon, R. 60 Boulding, E. 167 Boulding, K. E. 54 Bourdieu, P. 46, 49, 65 Bowles, E. 152 Brady, S. 94 Bridge Watchers, Kosovo 110 Briscoe, I. 124 Bull, C. 22 Burundi 170 Buzan, B. 59 Call, C. T. 3, 20, 24, 25 capacity-building, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 82–3, 84 Caplan, R. 21, 24 Capussela, A. L. 104, 113, 119, 120, 124, 182 case study research 63 causality 48, 51 Celador, G. C. 92

Chandler, D. 3, 4, 19, 28, 29, 35, 36, 75, 95, 181 Chant, S. 53 Cherkaoui, M. 60 Chesterman, S. 28, 138 China 135 Chopra, J. 141 Chopra, T. 152 civil service 23; Kosovo 123 civil society 3, 21, 22–3, 54, 163, 171; Kosovo 103, 111 civil war, non-recurrence of 24 civilising processes 4, 52, 160 Clark, W. 118 CNRT (National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) 138, 154 collective intentions 54 collective responsibility 22, 23, 61 collective rights 38 Comprehensive Status Settlement, Kosovo 122–4 conditionality, external 23, 28 conflict prevention 24, 61, 127 Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) 134, 136, 138, 139 Connolly, W. E. 176 consequences 4, 5, 8–10, 27, 45, 50, 57–63, 65, 66, 68, 161, 162, 172–6, 183, 184; and relationships 59, 173; responsibility for 10, 22, 23, 61, 62, 176–7; short-term versus long-term 175; unanticipated 2, 9, 10, 20, 32–3, 32–6, 34, 45, 51, 59, 60–1, 62, 64, 160, 176; unintended 2, 3–4, 5, 9, 10, 20, 32–3, 34–6, 48, 51, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 160, 161, 163, 172, 179, 184; unprevented 2, 8, 9, 10, 20, 45, 51, 60, 61, 62, 160, 179 constitutions 21; Bosnia and Herzegovina 87 constructivism 62 coordination 34 Coppola, V. 87 Cordone, C. 92 corruption, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 84, 94–5, 97 court systems: Kosovo 112, 114, 116, 120–1, 124; Timor-Leste 152–3 Covey, J. 105, 106, 117, 119 crime see organised crime Crisis Group 90, 91, 92, 107, 108, 110, 111, 141 critical discourse analysis 5, 45, 64, 65 critical theory 62

Index critical-emancipatory epistemologies 2, 17, 19–21, 34–5, 36, 37, 38, 68, 161, 180; critique-as-alternative 28, 29, 35; critique-with-alternative 28, 29–30, 31, 35; and dilemmas debate 32; ideasbased critiques 28; of peacebuilding failure 3, 4, 18, 20, 27–32; power-based critiques 28 Croatia 79 Croats, Bosnian 79, 80 Cummins, D. 153 Day, G. 83 Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) 7, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 96, 97, 98, 164, 168, 169 de Coning, C. 33 de Guevara, B. B. 46, 49 de-pacification 49, 171 decivilising processes 52 Defence Force for Timor-Leste see F-FDTL defence forces, Timor-Leste; see also Timor-Leste security sector reform del Castillo, G. 23 Demaçi, A. 112 demilitarisation 22 democracy/democratisation 19, 20, 21–2, 23, 24, 28, 29, 33, 36, 160; Timor-Leste 134, 141, 147 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 106 Depelteau, F. 46 Diamond, L. 23 Diehl, P. F. 3, 6, 20, 25, 26, 33, 34, 52–3 disarmament 22, 56 discourse: as text 64; theories 161; see also critical discourse analysis discursive events 57 discursive practices 64, 65 displaced persons see refugees and displaced persons Dnevni Avaz 86 ‘do no harm’ approaches 33 Dodik, M. 86 Donais, T. 82, 90 donors, peacebuilding evaluations 26, 27 Dorn, A. W. 79 Doyle, M. W. 2, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 32, 33, 61, 115, 116, 127, 178, 180 Druckman, D. 3, 25, 26 Dunning, E. 47 duration of peacebuilding 175 Dziedzic, M. J. 89, 90, 109, 110

189

East Slavonia 79 East Timor see Timor-Leste economic reform/recovery 3, 23, 30, 160; Kosovo 103, 105, 111 education 23; Kosovo 104, 106, 110, 120, 121, 123 elections/electoral systems 21, 56, 85; Bosnia and Herzegovina 78, 83, 85, 91; Kosovo 107, 111, 116; Timor-Leste 134, 143 Elias, L. M. A. 140 Elias, N. 4, 5, 44, 45, 46–9, 50, 52, 55, 57–8, 62, 64, 160, 162, 168, 170, 180 Elman, C. and Elman, M. F. 24, 67–8 emancipation 19, 20 empowerment 30 epistemologies of peace 17–21; see also critical-emancipatory epistemologies; liberal-interventionist epistemologies equality 3 Erskine, T. 53, 176 ethnic cleansing 83, 90, 91, 110 ethnic division/violence: Bosnia and Herzegovina 89, 90–1, 93; Kosovo 109, 110–11, 112, 124–5 Euro-centrism 20, 28, 31, 38 EuropeAid Co-operation Office 26 European Commission 84, 95, 123 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 83 European Union (EU) 114; and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 7, 64, 75, 76, 77, 79, 83–7, 88, 96, 97, 98, 165–6, 168; and Kosovo–Serbia dialogue 115, 116; Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 106, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, 182; security strategy 127; Serbian accession to 108, 123 European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 77, 79, 83–4, 87, 88, 92 events 4, 5, 7–8, 45, 50, 51, 55–7, 65, 66, 68, 160, 162, 167–72, 184; discursive 57; non-events 7, 10, 56, 57; as processes 57 everyday peace indicators 30, 31 F-FDTL (Defence Force for Timor-Leste) 135, 138–9, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148; confrontation with police force (PNTL) 142–3, 147, 149–51, 155, 174 failure see peacebuilding failure Fairclough, N. 64 FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste) 134, 137, 138, 148

190

Index

feminism 62 figuration 46–7, 49–50; see also peace figuration figurational sociology 1, 4, 10, 44–5, 46–9, 55, 57–8, 67–8, 160–1, 162, 170, 180 Finnemore, Martha 165 Finnis, J. 61 Flessenkemper, T. 87 Fortna, V. P. 24–5 Foucault, M. 56, 57, 67 Francis, D. 32 Franks, J. 141 FRETILINI (Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste) 138 George, A. L. 61, 67 Gerring, J. 63 Ghani, A. 2 Gibbs, D. N. 33 globalisation 30 good governance 28, 29, 54, 95, 160 Goudsblom, J. 47 governance: good 28, 29, 54, 95, 160; post-liberal 29; structures of 24; top-down 28 Grenfell, L. 152 Guehenno, J.-M. 103, 106, 110, 111, 112–13, 114 Gusmao, X. 137–8 Hansen, L. 67 Haug, H. K. 117 healthcare sector, Kosovo 104, 106, 110, 120, 121, 123 Heathershaw, J. 28 Hehir, A. 22, 104 Helly, D. 87 heuristics 19, 20 Heyward, C. R. 172 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 181 High Representative (HR) 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 86, 88, 95; see also Office of the High Representative Holbrooke, R. 81, 89 Holl, J. E. 61 Hood, L. 140 Howard, L. M. 177 Huddy, L. 53 Hughes, J. 47 human insecurity, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 88, 90–2, 97 human rights 21, 22, 54, 75, 160; Bosnia

and Herzegovina 88, 90, 96, 174; Kosovo 105; and PNTL (National Police of Timor-Leste) 151–2, 153 Human Rights Watch 90, 92, 93, 121, 151 human trafficking, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 83, 90, 94 Humphreys, M. 87, 88 Hurley, P. 58 hybrid peace 30–1 ICO see International Civilian Office ideas-based critiques 28 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 23, 57 immorality of peacebuilding 173 impact assessments 26–7 Indonesia 135 informal economy: Bosnia and Herzegovina 94; Kosovo 124 institution building 20, 21–2, 24, 56, 171; see also statebuilding intelligence sector 22 intentionality 45, 61, 68; collective 54; and performativity gap 155 intentions 4–5, 10, 45, 47–8, 50–1, 52–5, 58, 65, 66, 68, 162, 183, 184; conflicting 6; declared 6, 7, 53–5, 58, 67, 160, 164–7; hidden 54, 164; local 54–5; shared 166; strategic 54 inter-subjectivity 2, 31, 62, 64 interactionist sociology 46 interdependencies, insider-outsider 52 INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) 137 International Civilian Office (ICO), Kosovo 106, 114, 119, 122, 124, 182 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 23, 57 International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 91 International Police Task Force (IPTF) 76, 79, 81–2, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 international political sociology 46, 180 International Relations (IR) theory 46, 49, 53, 62, 180 Interventionism 117, 127, 163, 167, 178, 180–2 Isachenko, D. 46 Ishizuka, K. 148 Ivanišević, B. 92 Jabri, V. 29 Jackson, P. T. 38, 56 Jackson, R. 32 Janjić, S. 107 Jarstad, A. K. 22

Index Jelišić, J. 87, 88 Jenkins, R. 65 Jervis, R. 60 Johnson, H. J. 94 Jørgensen, M. 64 Joseph, J. 62, 177 Judah, T. 109 justice 3, 20, 22, 54; see also transitional justice justice systems 21, 22; Bosnia and Herzegovina 82; see also court systems Kapoor, K. 23 Karadzić, R. 89–90, 92 Kermabon, Y. de 118 KFOR (Kosovo Force) 109, 110, 111, 113, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125, 178 Kilminster, R. 48 King, I. 104, 106, 111, 127 King, J. 79 Kingsbury, D. 134, 135, 137, 142 KLA see Kosovo Liberation Army Knaus, G. 83 Knott, M. L. 178 knowledge transfer 178–9 Kosovo 9–10, 63, 86, 103–31, 137, 154, 168, 169–70, 175, 177; Albanian provisional government 106–7; Bridge Watchers 110; civil service 123; civil society 103, 111; court systems 112, 114, 116, 120–1, 124; economic reform/ recovery 103, 105, 111; education 104, 106, 120, 121, 123; elections 107, 111, 116; ethnic division/violence 109, 110–11, 112, 124–5; EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in 106, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, 182; final status negotiations 112–13, 122, 126; healthcare sector 104, 106, 110, 120, 121, 123; human rights 105; independence 106, 113–14, 122–3, 125, 182; informal economy 124; intentions for peacebuilding in 105–8, 165; interethnic dialogue 103; International Civilian Office (ICO) 106, 114, 119, 122, 124, 182; key events shaping peace prospects 108–16; Kumanovo Agreement (1999) 109; Mitrovica city 109, 110, 112, 118, 121, 122; NATO intervention in 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 116, 119, 123, 126, 174, 182; northern region 114–15, 116, 117–19, 120–5, 169–70; organised crime 120, 124; police force 110, 114, 116, 123;

191

power-sharing 103, 120; property rights 107, 112, 121; Ramboulliet peace talks 106; refugee returns and displaced persons 103, 105, 121, 126; rule of law 103–4, 105, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124–5, 164, 169; Serb parallel governance structures 5, 10, 12, 64, 104–5, 106, 107–16, 110, 111, 112, 114–15, 117–25, 165, 169, 174, 178; and Serbia relations 105, 107–8, 111–12, 113, 114–16, 119–20, 125, 169, 182; statebuilding 103, 104, 105, 111; and UN Comprehensive Status Settlement 122–4; UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) 105, 110, 112; United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) 103–4, 105–7, 109–11, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117–19, 120, 121–2, 125, 126, 127, 165, 168–9, 174, 178; unprevented consequences of peacebuilding 104, 117–27 Kosovo Albanians 7, 103, 104, 105, 106–7, 109, 110, 111–12, 120, 125, 165, 171, 178 Kosovo Force see KFOR Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 106–7, 125, 137, 178 Kosovo Serbs 7, 105, 106, 107–8, 110, 111, 113–14, 115, 116, 117, 119–21, 122–3, 126, 171 Kosovo Stability Initiative 124 Kostunica, V. 108, 111 Kouchner, B. 118 Kuhn, T. S. 19 Kumanovo Agreement (1999) 109 Kurki, M. 51 Lackham, R. 22 Lajćak, M. 88 Lakatos, I. 19 Lalić, V. 82 Landini, T. S. 49 La’o Hamutuk 134, 137 Latour, B. 45, 47 Law, J. 51 LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo) 106 legal frameworks 21 Leroux-Martin, P. 76, 79, 82, 86, 88 lesson learning and unlearning 176, 177–9, 183–4 Levine, D. J. 37, 161 Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Movement for Selfdetermination) 125 liberal peace 5, 7

192

Index

liberal peacebuilding 3, 4, 11, 21–5, 27–30, 33–7, 44, 54, 59, 64, 75, 78, 104, 132, 134, 160–2, 164–5, 170–1, 173–4, 183 liberal interventionism 20, 63 liberal-interventionist epistemologies of peace 2–3, 3–4, 17, 18–24, 33–4, 35, 36, 37, 38, 68, 161, 163, 180; and peacebuilding success 23–7 Liden, K. 30 Lin, C. L. 134, 136, 141, 152, 154 Lindvall, D. 85 Linklater, A. 10, 49, 63 liquid interventions 163, 180–2 liquid modernity 179, 180 Livington, P. 56 local actors 3, 25–6, 58–9, 166, 170, 171, 173; exclusion from peacebuilding agenda, Timor-Leste 136, 137, 138, 141–2, 154–5, 178 local agency 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 171–2, 181 local context 28, 30, 34, 35, 166 local intentions 54–5 local knowledge 175, 179 local legitimacy 27, 163, 164 local ownership 163, 166, 182; Bosnia and Herzegovina 96; Kosovo 111; TimorLeste 138, 147, 165 local resistance 38, 56, 182–3 Lockhart, C. 2 Loyal, S. 47, 49 Mac Ginty, R. 3, 4, 19, 26, 30, 31–2 McKenna, M. 61 McNamara, D. 132, 134 Mahoney, J. 67 mandates, peacebuilding 6–7, 24, 25, 164 marketisation 19, 20, 21, 23, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 54, 56–7 Mason, W. 104, 106, 111, 127 Mayall, J. 34 Mayer, M. 64 Mead, G. H. 56 Mele, A. R. 55 Mennell, S. 5, 47, 48, 52, 58, 168 Merlingen, M. 84 Merton, R. K. 58, 60 methodological holism 3, 37, 38 methodological individualism 3, 37, 38 methodological pluralism 5 methodological relationalism 37 Metz, C. 85 Migdal, J. S. 180

Milliken, J. 67 Milosevic, S. 111 minority communities, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 88, 89, 90–1, 97, 171 Mitchell, A. 30 Mitrovica 109, 110, 112, 118, 121, 122 Mladic, R. 92 Monteiro, N. P. 61 Montenegro 86 Moratti, M. 92 Mostar Declaration (2007) 86–7 Movement for Self-determination (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje) 125 Muehlmann, T. 79, 80, 83, 84, 88 Muggah, R. 22 Murray, J. 92 Naarden, G. L. 93 nation-building, Timor-Leste 136 National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) 138, 154 National Police of Timor-Leste see PNTL nationalist factions, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96 NATO 82; and Bosnia and Herzegovina 84; and Kosovo 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 116, 119, 123, 126, 174, 182 neo-liberalism 21, 30, 35, 164 New Zealand 143 Newman, E. 28 non-conflictual theorising 37–8, 62 non-events 7, 10, 56, 57 non-interventionism 19, 29, 181 normative theory 62 Office of the High Representative (OHR) 77, 79, 84–7, 92, 97 Okuizumi, K. 75 Oneal, J. 23 Onuf, N. G. 53 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 26, 33 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 93, 104, 106, 112, 113, 114, 121, 122, 123, 182 organised crime: and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 83, 84, 92, 94–5, 97; Kosovo 120, 124 Orum, A. M. 63 Orwell, G. 54 Osmanović-Vukelić, S. 85, 87

Index Ostrauskaite, R. 84 paradigms 19 Paris, R. 3, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33–4, 44, 107, 161 peace: everyday forms of 30, 31; hybrid 30–1; as liquid 162; post-liberal 30 peace figuration 4–11, 44–5, 160–7; conceptualisation of 49–63; in practice 63–7 Peace Implementation Council, Bosnia and Herzegovina 78, 84 peace-breaking 8, 10, 49, 50, 51–2, 55, 162, 169–70, 171, 180 peace-writers 2–3, 18, 19, 20–1, 26–8, 30–3, 44, 161, 178, 184 peacebuilding failure 59; criticalemancipatory epistemologies of 3, 4, 18, 20, 27–32 peacebuilding mandates 6–7, 24, 25, 164 peacebuilding organisations, self-interest and sense of superiority 175–6 peacebuilding success 18, 20; behavioural factors 25; contextual/environmental factors 25; donor-driven assessments 26, 27; impact assessments 26–7; liberalinterventionist epistemologies of 23–7; long-term versus short-term assessments 26; maximalist measurements of 24; minimalist measurements of 24, 25; operational factors 25; premature assessment of 170; qualitative analysis of 25–6; quantitative analysis of 24–5; UN definition of 24 Peake, G. 140, 143, 144, 145, 153 Pejanović, M. 82 performativity 8, 45, 54, 68, 80, 132, 160, 162, 164; and intentionality gap 155 Perrit, H. H. 107 Phillips, D. 182 Phillips, L. 64 Philpott, S. 138 planning 34 PNTL (National Police of Timor-Leste) 135, 139–41, 146–7, 148; certification process 135, 144, 145, 149, 153; Code of Conduct 151; command and control structures 135, 140; conflict/ confrontation with defence force 142–3, 147, 149–51, 155, 174; and court system 152–3; decree-laws 141, 150; establishment of 139; as human rights problem 151–2, 153; militarisation of 140–1, 150; presence of impunity for

193

misconduct 151–2, 174; recruitment 139–40; screening and mentoring process 135, 144–5, 153; training 140, 149, 151–2, 153 police forces 22; Kosovo 110, 114, 116, 123; Timor-Leste 132–3, 134, 137, 153; see also Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform; PNTL (National Police of Timor-Leste) political psychology 53 positivism 48 positivist research 2, 19, 20, 24, 62–3 possibility of peace 3 post-liberal governance 29 post-liberal peace 30 post-positivism 48–9 post-positivist research 3, 19, 63 post-structuralism 62 Pouliot, V. 64, 65 Powell, C. 46 Power, S. 137 power 47, 52, 59, 169, 170–1, 172, 176 power-based critiques 28 power-sharing 21, 22; Bosnia and Herzegovina 78, 79, 169; Kosovo 103, 120 practice theory 5, 45, 64, 65 practice tracing 64 Price, M. 124 privatisation 23, 30, 35, 57 problem-solving 2, 17, 19, 20, 97, 161, 176, 183 process sociology 46, 49 process tracing 5, 45, 64, 65–6 property rights, Kosovo 107, 112, 121 protectionism 30 Pugh, M. 35 Quilley, S. 47, 49 Ramboulliet peace talks 106 Ratner, S. R. 26 reality-adequate thinking 48–9 Reckwitz, A. 65 reconciliation 3, 22, 30 Rees, E. 134, 138, 149, 152 refugees and displaced persons: and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 80, 82, 85, 89, 90–1, 174; Kosovo 103, 105, 121, 126 regime change 29, 164 Reinado, A. 150 Reinhardt, K. 118 relational sociology 46

194

Index

Republika Srpska (RP) 79, 86 research programmes 19 resilience 19, 29, 38 resistance 19, 38, 47, 56, 182–3 responsibility 10, 22, 61, 62, 176–7, 183; collective 22, 23, 61 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 181 Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (FRETILINI) 138 Richmond, O. P. 3, 4, 19, 27, 28, 30, 31–2, 35, 44, 62, 141, 178, 181 rights, collective 38 Robinson, N. 22 Rodrigues, R. 136 Roma community, Kosovo 121 Rugova, I. 111 rule of law 21, 22, 54, 160; and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 80, 82, 94–5, 97, 164, 174; Kosovo 103–4, 105, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124–5, 164, 169; Timor-Leste 134, 135, 153, 155, 164 Russett, B. 23 Russia 86, 118, 119, 165 Rwanda 177 Sabaratnam, M. 28, 31 Sabic-El-Rayess, A. 92 Salumets, T. 47 Sambanis, N. 2, 19, 20, 24 Scambary, J. 143 Schatzki, T. R. 65 Schlichte, K. 180 Schneckener, U. 34 Schwartz, R. 56 Searle, J. R. 53 Sebastian, S. 86 securitisation 20, 56, 162 security 3, 54, 164 security sector reform 21, 22; see also Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform; Timor-Leste security sector reform Serbia 79, 86, 104, 119; and EU integration 108, 123; and Kosovo relations 105, 107–8, 111–12, 113, 114–16, 119–20, 125, 169, 182 Serbs: Bosnian 79, 80, 85, 86, 169, 171; Kosovo see Kosovo Serbs Shipley, T. F. 55 side effects 4, 7, 32, 35–6 Simonsen, S. 138 Sisk, T. D. 22, 32, 33, 34 Smith, D. 4, 47, 48, 58

Smith, D. E. 54 social inclusion 21 social peacebuilding 30 social practice 64 social relations, transformation of 3 social welfare 3, 30 sociogenesis 47 Srebrenica 177 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), EU–Bosnia Herzegovina 85, 86 statebuilding 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 46, 49; Kosovo 103, 104, 105, 111; see also institution building Stedman, S. 34 Stein, J. G. 53 Stewart, R. 83 structural adjustment policies 23 structure, and agency 4, 37, 38, 47, 49 success see peacebuilding success sustainable development 20, 28 Tadjbakhsh, S. 3, 29, 32 Tansey, O. 22, 25, 138 tax 23 temporality of peace operations 174–5 Terzic, A. 85 Thakur, R. 33 The Asia Foundation 151, 152, 153 Thomas, W. I. 58 Timor-Leste 175, 177; assassination attempt on President and Prime Minister (2008) 150; Council of Ministers 142, 150; democracy 134, 141, 147; elections/electoral systems 134, 143; independence 134; local actors exclusion from peacebuilding agenda 136, 137, 138, 141–2, 154–5, 178; local consultative mechanisms 134, 138, 147; nation-building 136; National Consultative Council 138; post-conflict violence 133, 142–3, 147–9, 155–6, 170; socio-economic conditions 155; state failure 147–9; statebuilding 136, 141–2, 147–8, 155; traditional governance systems 141–2, 152–3, 155; UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry 147; welfare-building 136; see also Timor-Leste security sector reform Timor-Leste security sector reform 5, 10, 12, 63, 64, 132–59, 168; and defence forces 132–3, 134, 135, 137–9, 140–1, 142–3, 144, 147, 148, 149–51, 153, 174 (see also) F-FDTL; FAlINTIL;

Index ex-combatants exclusion from 137, 154, 178; and intentions for peacebuilding 64, 133–6, 155, 165, 166; key events 64, 136–46; and police force 132–3, 134, 137, 153, (see also) PNTL; and rule of law 134, 135, 153, 155, 164; UN missions 132–3, 153–6, 169, 174 (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 135, 143–6, 148–9, 150, 152–3, 155; UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) 133; UN Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) 135, 148, 152; UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) 135, 152; UN Security Council mission (2012) 146; UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 132, 134–5, 136, 137–41, 147, 152, 154); UN police force and 144, 149, 152; unanticipated consequences of 64, 146–53 Titov, D. 145 Tolksdorf, D. 80, 98 transitional justice 177; and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 88, 92, 93, 97, 174 Transparency International 95 Tripathi, S. 34 Tsoukala, A. 180 Ucko, D. H. 22 United Nations 22, 24, 26, 27, 127, 166–7, 177; accountability and responsibility 177, 179; definition of rule of law 22; definition of successful peacebuilding 24 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO) 134, 137 United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UN-DPA) 134 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 27, 119 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 26, 27, 54, 64, 96, 154, 165, 169, 177, 179, 181, 182 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 151 United Nations High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) 54, 169, 181–2 United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste 147 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 135, 143–6,

195

148–9, 150, 152–3, 155; Security Sector Review Unit (SSRU) 145 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 103–4, 105–7, 109–11, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117–19, 120, 121–2, 125, 126, 127, 165, 168–9, 174, 178 United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 7, 64, 75, 76, 77, 81–3, 88, 89–90, 92, 96, 97, 165, 168 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) 133 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) 135, 148, 152 United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services 179 United Nations Office of the Special Envoy to Kosovo (UNOSEK) 113 United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) 135, 152 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 21, 27, 54, 64, 167, 169, 181, 182; mission to Timor-Leste (2012) 146; reports on Bosnia Herzegovina 75, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 96, 97; reports on Kosovo 103, 106, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 123; reports on Timor-Leste 137, 146, 154; Resolution 1244 on Kosovo (1999) 105, 110, 112; Resolution 1410 on Timor-Leste (2002) 135 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 132, 134–5, 136, 137–41, 147, 152, 154 United States (US) 182 Urbinati, N. 46, 51 van Krieken, R. 46, 47, 48, 57 Vejnović, D. 82 Vieira de Mello, S. 154 Vircoulon, T. 170 Visoka, G. 7, 20, 26, 31, 32, 56, 61, 106, 114, 115, 116, 120, 124, 125, 127, 171, 177, 183 war crimes prosecution, and Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform 84, 85, 88, 92–3, 97 Weller, M. 104, 113 Western Timor 134–5 Widerker, D. 61 Williams, P. D. 24

196

Index

Wilson, B. 143, 144 Wodak, R. 64 women police officers, Bosnia and Herzegovina 92 World Bank 23, 57, 95 Wright, C. 56, 62

Wyeth, V. 3, 20, 24 Yin, R. K. 63 Zaum, D. 28, 153