Party System Change in South India: Political Entrepreneurs, Patterns and Processes 9781135182021, 1135182027

Table of contents :
Book Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Maps and tables
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
1 Political entrepreneurs and explanations of party system change
2 Conflict, cleavages and political parties in south India
3 Evolution of a party system
4 Political leaders as political entrepreneurs
5 The PMK: Re-opening a caste cleavage
6 The DPI and Dalit mobilization
7 The PT and caste politics in southern Tamil Nadu
8 Hindu nationalism in south India
9 Using populism to build a broad coalition
10 Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Party System Change in South India

This book provides a systematic exploration of party system change. By applying the concept of political entrepreneurship and using a detailed case study of the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, it demonstrates how party leaders can exercise their agency and drive party system change. Recent developments in Tamil politics are taken into account in the light of the literature on party systems, achieving a classification of the party system and revealing patterns of change. The author explains the process of the change by comparing the careers of successful and failed party leaders, thus identifying the factors that enabled some political entrepreneurs to successfully found political parties and contribute to the process of party system change. Examining issues such as regional parties, political entrepreneurship, social change, caste and religious nationalism, the book illustrates the key forces shaping contemporary Indian politics, and presents an example of how the trend towards identity politics and the rising influence of regional political parties are fashioning a new Indian polity. With a broad cross-disciplinary appeal, the book will be of interest to students of South Asian politics, comparative politics, sociology and anthropology. Andrew Wyatt is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics, University of Bristol. His research interests lie in the areas of comparative politics, political economy, party systems, Indian politics and the politics of Tamil Nadu.

Routledge advances in South Asian studies Edited by Subrata K. Mitra South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany

South Asia, with its burgeoning, ethnically diverse population, soaring economies and nuclear weapons, is an increasingly important region in the global context. The series, which builds on this complex, dynamic and volatile area, features innovative and original research on the region as a whole or on the countries. Its scope extends to scholarly works drawing on history, politics, development studies, sociology and economics of individual countries from the region as well as those that take an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the area as a whole or to a comparison of two or more countries from this region. In terms of theory and method, rather than basing itself on any one orthodoxy, the series draws broadly on the insights germane to area studies, as well as the tool kit of the social sciences in general, emphasizing comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes, and the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. The series welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from young authors who have recently completed their doctoral dissertations. 1. Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia The Compound Crisis of 1990 P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Philip Cohen 2. Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism Edited by Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez 3. The Puzzle of India’s Governance Culture, context and comparative theory Subrata K. Mitra 4. India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security Karsten Frey 5. Starvation and India’s Democracy Dan Banik

6. Parliamentary Control and Government Accountability in South Asia A comparative analysis of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka Taiabur Rahman 7. Political Mobilisation and Democracy in India States of emergency Vernon Hewitt 8. Military Control in Pakistan The parallel state Mazhar Aziz 9. Sikh Nationalism and Identity in a Global Age Giorgio Shani 10. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile Politics at large Stephanie Roemer 11. Trade Policy, Inequality and Performance in Indian Manufacturing Kunal Sen 12. Democracy and Party Systems in Developing Countries A comparative study Clemens Spiess 13. War and Nationalism in South Asia The Indian state and the Nagas Marcus Franke 14. The Politics of Social Exclusion in India Democracy at the crossroads Edited by Harihar Bhattacharyya, Partha Sarka and Angshuman Kar 15. Party System Change in South India Political entrepreneurs, patterns and processes Andrew Wyatt

Party System Change in South India Political entrepreneurs, patterns and processes Andrew Wyatt

First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 Andrew Wyatt All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Wyatt, Andrew Party system change in South India : political entrepreneurs, patterns, and processes / Andrew Wyatt. p. cm. — (Routledge advances in South Asian studies; 15) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Political parties—India, South—Case studies. 2. Political leadership—India, South—Case studies. 3. Tamil Nadu (India)—Politics and government. 4. Political parties—India—Tamil Nadu. 5. Political leadership—India—Tamil Nadu. 6. India, South—Politics and government. I. Title. JQ539.A45W93 2009 324.254'011095482—dc22 2009025900 ISBN 0-203-86220-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–40131–3 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–86220–1 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–40131–9 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–86220–9 (ebk)

To Mary, Rosy and Jonathan

Contents

List of maps and tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1 Political entrepreneurs and explanations of party system change

x xi xiv 1

2 Conflict, cleavages and political parties in south India

17

3 Evolution of a party system

49

4 Political leaders as political entrepreneurs

82

5 The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage

97

6 The DPI and Dalit mobilization

116

7 The PT and caste politics in southern Tamil Nadu

133

8 Hindu nationalism in south India

151

9 Using populism to build a broad coalition: Vijayakanth

166

10 Conclusions Notes Bibliography Index

181 186 194 222

Maps and tables

Maps 2.1 3.1 3.2 5.1 9.1

Administrative Districts of Madras State Concentrations of electoral support for the DMK in 1989 Concentrations of electoral support for the AIADMK in 1980 Concentrations of electoral support for the PMK in 1991 Concentrations of electoral support for the DMDK in 2006

25 74 75 103 177

Tables 2.1 The orientation and relative strength of parties in contemporary Tamil Nadu 46–47 3.1 Elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly, 1937–1946: seats and votes won by party 56 3.2 Elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly, 1952–1962: seats and votes won by party 59 3.3 Elections to the Madras/Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1967–1977: seats and votes won by party 62 3.4 Elections to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1980–1996: seats and votes won by party 65 3.5 Lok Sabha results: 1996, 1998 and 1999 69 3.6 Elections to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 2001 and 2006: seats and votes won by party 72 3.7 The number of parties with seats in the Tamil Nadu Legislature: 1957–2006 78 3.8 Effective number of parties contesting State Assembly Elections, 1957–2006 79 5.1 Seats and votes won by the PMK in assembly elections 101 5.2 Number of Legislative Assembly seats where the PMK won more than 5 per cent of the vote 106 6.1 Support for the DPI and its allies in the assembly segments/ constituencies in Chidambaram Lok Sabha constituency, 1999–2006 120

Acknowledgements

I have been immensely stimulated by the research involved in writing this book and I have learnt a great deal from those who have gone before me. I have been very fortunate to have been able to make six trips to Tamil Nadu while working on this project. My debts in Tamil Nadu are extensive. Numerous individuals gave generously of their time, often several hours, and offered hospitality as we discussed various aspects of south Indian politics. Some even consented to being interviewed a second and third time. I am hugely indebted to those individuals. All, except those who asked not to be named, are listed at the end of the book. N. Ram, editor of The Hindu newspaper, offered knowledgeable observations and practical help at the close of the remarkable 2006 assembly election. The extensive online archive of The Hindu, which nudges close to 3,500 editions as I write, is a boon for any scholar of Indian politics. For coverage of the pre-online period I am grateful to N. Ravi for permission to use the Index at The Hindu newspaper in early 2000. I am very grateful to Mukund Padmanabhan, Deputy Editor of The Hindu newspaper, who has contributed greatly to this study, facilitated numerous interviews, shared his deep knowledge of Tamil politics and encouraged me from the very beginning of this study in February 2000. Also I am very grateful to M. Vijayabaskar of the Madras Institute of Development Studies who has done much to educate me in the informal aspects of party politics in the state, helped with interviews and provided data. Syed Anwar very graciously gave up time to help me seek out wall paintings, posters and discuss Dalit politics in Tamil Nadu. I am grateful to Professor K. Prasad of the University of Madras for helpful advice and warm encouragement. Professor K.A. Manikumar of Manonmaniam Sundaranar University in Tirunelveli offered detailed information and helped me to locate a good deal of difficult to find material. Similarly I am grateful to S.V. Rajadurai for a lot of information and patient replies to obscure email queries. Professor Aruldoss of the American College in Madurai has also been hugely helpful. I greatly appreciate my home department at the University of Bristol, which esteems the study of both comparative politics and the politics of South Asia. I have discussed aspects of this project numerous times with fellow comparativists Magnus Feldmann, Fiona Ross and Mark Wickham-Jones. Vernon Hewitt, erstwhile PhD supervisor and fellow South Asianist, has always been available for sage advice and encouragement. The extensive private libraries held by Drs Hewitt and

xii Acknowledgements Wickham have been at my disposal. I was helped by a period of departmental study leave, and a University Research Fellowship. I am very grateful for support from Terrell Carver, Anthony Forster, Judith Squires and Michelle Cini in their capacities as Head of Department. I also benefited from two longer-term visitors to Bristol: Muthiah Alagappa and Thiven Reddy. Both took time to talk through aspects of this project. Teaching has also helped the book along, with ideas being tried out and tested in lively classroom interactions. This project benefited greatly from the NETSAPPE networking conferences sponsored by the Ford Foundation and driven forward with great energy by Ashutosh Varshney. I am grateful to participants in those conferences for very useful comments. In particular, James Manor and Atul Kohli very generously took time to comment in great detail on several draft chapters in one of the sessions in 2004. Their comments helped me substantially rework the book into one that speaks to a wider set of concerns. I would also like to acknowledge the comments made by three anonymous referees, which I found very useful when thinking about the structure of the book. I have also been encouraged and ably assisted by several colleagues who have read chapters and offered specific comments. Katharine Adeney provided me with detailed comments on Chapters 1 and 4. Magnus Feldmann gave me thought-provoking feedback on Chapter 4. Hugo Gorringe provided useful comments on early drafts of Chapters 6, 7 and 9. Barbara HarrissWhite looked in detail at an early version of Chapter Eight. Lars Svåsand offered supportive comments on Chapter 1. I am very grateful indeed for these comments but ultimate responsibility for the rendering of the chapters (and most especially any errors contained in them) must be mine. I have valued the moral support and encouragement of other scholars working on the topics covered in this book, including Mukulika Banerjee, Ram-Prasad Chakravarthi, James Chiriyankandath, John Harriss, Alistair McMillan, David Mosse, E. Sridharan, Ashutosh Varshney and John Zavos. They have been generous with advice, recommendations and early sight of their work. I am very grateful to those who have made unpublished theses available for me to consult. Namely, Katharine Adeney, Pushpa Arabindoo, Joe Arun, Hugo Gorringe, Narayan Lakshman, Anand Pandian, Gareth Price, Carole Spary and Arun Swamy. In addition I have found Ingrid Widlund’s published thesis a valuable resource. Each of these works contains much interesting and original material. Raj Dasgupta and Mat Hope provided excellent research assistance. Both helped me locate and collate data. Carole Spary very generously supplied me with a good number of relevant articles since beginning, and completing, her PhD in the Department of Politics. I am very appreciative of this help. The editorial team at Routledge, including Subrata Mitra and Dorothea Schaefter, Tom Bates and Suzanne Richardson, have been forbearing and supportive throughout. Drew Ellis and Anona Lyons provided excellent service with their map drawing. Parts of this manuscript were presented at various seminars and conferences. I am grateful to David Washbrook for an invitation to present material at St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford. A declaration of intent was offered in a paper given at the Heidelberg gathering of the European Conference on Modern

Acknowledgements xiii South Asian Studies behind which Subrata Mitra was the moving force. A draft of Chapter Nine was presented at an extremely productive workshop organised by Pamela Price and Arild Ruud of the University of Oslo. Fragments of the book were presented at a conference on State Politics in India organised by Neera Chandhoke and John Harriss. I am grateful to participants at all of these events for helpful comments. One of my longer trips to south India in 2003 was generously funded by a grant from the Society for South Asian Studies. Warm thanks are due to my parents and parents-in-law who have helped me in so many practical ways, freeing up time and space (literal and metaphorical) to work on this project. Rosy and Jonathan are both younger than the lifespan of this project and have cheerfully encouraged me to finish up. Mary, on the other hand, has helped me throughout the project. This book would not have been done otherwise. Can I thank you enough? Andrew Wyatt Bristol, June 2009

List of abbreviations

AIADMK BJP BSP CPI CPI(M) CRC DK DMDK DMK DPI DKVF GoTN INC IUML KNMP LTTE MBC MDMK MGR MLA MMK MTD NDA OBC PMK PT RSS SC SMSP TMC VC VCK VHP VK

All-India Anna DMK Bharatiya Janata Party Bahujan Samaj Party Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Congress Reforms Committee Dravida Kazhagam Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (also known as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal) Devendra Kula Vellalar Federation Government of Tamil Nadu Indian National Congress Indian Union Muslim League Kongu Nadu Munnetra Peravai Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Most Backward Classes Marumalarchi DMK M.G. Ramachandran Member of the Legislative Assembly Moovendar Munnetra Kazhagam Makkal Tamil Desam National Democratic Alliance Other Backward Classes Pattali Makkal Katchi Puthiya Thamizhagam Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Scheduled Castes Single member, simple plurality Tamil Maanila Congress Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi Vishva Hindu Parishad Vivekananda Kendra

1

Political entrepreneurs and explanations of party system change

Political leaders make defining contributions to political parties. As well as leading parties, individuals sometimes form new parties. Leaders are considered an asset or a liability when parties compete with other parties. In spite of their importance leaders are frequently pushed into the background in the literature on party system change. The emphasis tends to be on the sociological forces that parties are supposed to represent or the institutional rules which are said to shape patterns of competition between parties. The omission of leaders may be the consequence of the methods used to study party systems. Comparative studies that manipulate large amounts of quantitative data are common but they are limited by the availability of numerical data that can be used to represent explanatory variables (Lane and Ersson 1994: 97–8).1 It is difficult to see how the quality of leadership could be assigned meaningful numerical values and analysed using a large-n comparison.2 In this book I explore the theoretical claim that entrepreneurial political leaders cause party system change. I suggest they do this by two means. First, I argue that emerging political entrepreneurs do this by forming new parties. This is the main focus of the book but I do not overlook the contribution that established political entrepreneurs can make to party system change. A second mechanism that can be used to bring about less obvious party system change is alterations to existing political parties. I explore the claim that political entrepreneurs cause party system change by presenting a generalized specific explanation (Van Evera 1997: 16). I conclude the book by stating there are good grounds for considering this to be a valid theoretical claim that needs to be tested in relation to a wider range of cases. I present my explanation by looking in detail at changes to the party system in the state of Tamil Nadu in south India in the period since 1989. The system has made the transition from a two and a half party system to bi-polar multipartism. I acknowledge the existing comparative politics literature, which emphasizes the importance of social and institutional influences, by giving consideration to these factors as antecedent phenomena (ibid: 9–10). Certain social or institutional circumstances enable political entrepreneurs to be more effective in the task of party formation. Or conversely inhibit their activity. As new parties have been fairly successful in Tamil Nadu since 1989, which seems a counter-intuitive outcome, I use the conclusion to reflect again on variations in the antecedent conditions to see what these variations might tell us about the formation of new parties and party system change.

2

Explaining party system change

The term ‘political entrepreneur’ is strongly associated with rational choice theory. I find the term to be very useful, as well as some other insights from rational choice theory but I am not wedded to rational choice orthodoxy. Rational choice theory provides a useful starting point for thinking about party system change because it directs attention towards individual political actors (or political entrepreneurs) and the motivations of those actors (which are often quite instrumental). The rational choice approach also offers a framework for thinking about the emergence of new parties. However, my use of these insights reflects a ‘non-mainstream’ reading of rational choice theory (Ward 1995: 92–3). For example, I assume that voters and political entrepreneurs are capable of basing their actions on a broad notion of rationality that goes beyond self-interest and includes a reasoned commitment to values (Varshney 2003: 86–7). I am keen to show that political entrepreneurs are creative and innovative individuals, rather than automatons responding mechanically to externally defined incentives. In Chapter 4 I write more about how political entrepreneurs innovate and shape politics. The accounts of political leaders in later chapters also illustrate my contention that leaders can be extremely innovative entrepreneurs. In formal terms I provide an explanation of a process of change whereby the dependent variable, the party system, is seen to respond to the independent variable of political leadership. While I emphasize the contributions made by political leaders I do take account of the background impact of several factors that can be grouped under the headings of institutions and structure. Institutional factors that constrain or enable a political leader include the electoral system, the structure of government, rules within legislatures and the internal organization of parties themselves. In the study of party system change structural factors are commonly taken to mean what Lane and Ersson refer to as ‘enduring social classifications’ such as class and religion (1994: 159).3 Economic factors also can be factored into explanations of party system change (Haeusler and Hirsch 1989; Hug 2001: 97–8; Roberts 2003: 46–53). Under this heading I also take account of what Price calls ‘structures of meaning’ (1989: 560). Existing assumptions about political values held by voters and politicians shape patterns of mobilization, as well as creating opportunities and challenges for ambitious political entrepreneurs. In my analysis I review the contributions made by political leaders in the context of structural and institutional factors and ask to what extent leaders are limited (or assisted) by these factors. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In next passage, section two, I link the activity of political entrepreneurs to the functions of political parties. In section three I define what I mean by the term ‘party system’. In section four I sketch the broad contours of the literature on party system development and change. In the penultimate section (five) I elaborate on my methodological approach and analytical framework before concluding with an overview of the remaining chapters.

Political entrepreneurs and political parties Politics is a social activity based on ordering principles that bring coherence out of conflicting opinions and values. Liberal democratic states use formal institutions to

Explaining party system change 3 reconcile conflicts and provide government. These institutions remove most people from direct participation in governing. The institutions of government need coordination to function and do not automatically connect with the wider electorate. Rational choice approaches to politics put political entrepreneurs in this coordinating role. Entrepreneurial leaders aggregate opinion, mediate disputes and make decisions on behalf of the governed. These leaders are rewarded for providing ‘political services’ that help societies resolve the collective action problem of governing (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1978: 68; Laver 1997: 68). Laver defines political entrepreneurs as individuals who provide political services. These services go beyond the coordination of government (ibid: 70–1). Political entrepreneurs also coordinate activity among the electorate and in doing so provide the service of leadership. Political entrepreneurs form groups within the electorate and articulate the demands of those groups. Political entrepreneurs also act as mediators. They may mediate on behalf of a group, between individuals, or between individual citizens and the state. I develop this theme in Chapter 4.4 Individual political entrepreneurs often conclude that they have a better and sustained chance of achieving their ambitions when they work collectively. They can provide better services and compete for elected office more effectively if they cooperate (ibid: 85). In other words political entrepreneurs frequently combine to form political parties (Aldrich 1995: 25–6). Political parties in modern India take a variety of forms. Many parties in India began as mobilizing movements seeking social transformation and some still have a strong movement orientation (Desai 2003: 171–2). Movements usually use extrainstitutional methods to achieve their objectives but they also frequently engage with the formal political process (Goldstone 2003: 1–2). The Congress Party, the Communist parties and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) all had connections with movements at their inception. This was also the experience of the south Indian regional party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), about which more will be said later. Other parties are more straightforwardly organizations designed to win elections and gain office. The splinter parties that have populated party systems across in India in recent decades are more likely to fall into this category (Wyatt 2001a). I follow the terminology of Aldrich and define political parties as organizations that are created and maintained by individuals who need an institution to help them achieve a range of goals, of which winning elections and holding office, are an important subset (1995: 14, 21). Among other things parties also help individuals to promote particular ideas, represent a community and achieve policy change. Winning elections is a helpful, but not essential, means for achieving some of these objectives. The definition of a party that I use provides room for the movement-party overlap and avoids being prescriptive about the form that parties take or the functions they should perform (Mitra 2006: 195; McCargo 1997: 115–17).

Party systems: the relational character of party politics Interactions between political parties have a systemic character. Such party systems are described by Chhibber and Kollman as ‘an enduring pattern of electoral

4

Explaining party system change

competition between parties for public office’ (2004: 4). Pennings and Lane are a little more expansive, defining party systems as ‘structures of party competition and cooperation’ (1998: 5). A party system takes substance in three key features of party politics: the number of parties in competition, the ideologies held by the different parties and the affiliations that voters have to competing parties (Pennings and Lane 1998: 5; Tromp 1990: 82; Maor 1997: 18). Reflecting on this trinity of party numbers, ideology and voter affiliations draws attention to the relational character of a party system and demonstrates why party systems matter. The number of parties in a system will shape the pattern of competition or cooperation between parties. Sartori argues that the number of parties in a system, or its ‘format’, will affect the ‘mechanics’ of the party system and the political system as a whole (1976: 128–9). In an established two party system competition will take on a ‘strict’ or a zero sum character as parties attempt to steal support away from the opposition party. In a new party system an emerging second party can mobilize support among groups of citizens that do not have links to a party. Parties can pursue more sophisticated tactics in a multiparty system (Ware 1996: 155–6). Coalitions and electoral alliances become options when there are more than two parties in a system. In a game with two players the focus is on superior strategy. The addition of another player, or party, allows one of the original players to supplement their strategy with an alliance (Riker 1962: 35). The addition of further parties opens up the possibility of more complex alliances and tactics. Competition can go in other directions as well and so, for example, a leading party might encourage a trailing party that will take support from a major opponent. The numbers of parties in a system may have an impact on the style of government with a two party system usually ruling out government by coalition and a multiparty system making coalition government more likely (Sartori 2001: 101). The pattern of ideological differences between parties can have implications for the stability of a party system (Sartori 1976: 126–9). A system with large ideological differences between parties will create centrifugal competition. This is likely to create an unstable system in which coalition formation becomes difficult. The presence of anti-system parties might well undermine a political system altogether (ibid: 156–63; Ware 1996: 153–4). On the other hand limited ideological distance between parties, as has been the case at the national level in India during most of the post-Independence period, tends to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime (Sridharan and Varshney 2001: 215–7). Parties and their ideologies are shaped by ideas, disciplines, social forces and subcultures specifically linked to their own organization. However, parties are also shaped in their interactions with other parties. This interaction is both competitive and cooperative. Parties may change their ideological orientation and/or their mode of operation in order to compete better with other parties. In short, being aware of the party system draws attention to some important exogenous forces that shape the ideas espoused by individual parties. Voters matter in a party system because parties achieve stability by developing long-term partisan relationships with voters (Roberts 2005: 23). Parties try to insulate and protect their links with their supporters (Wohlgemuth 2000: 282–3). However, opposition parties seek to usurp existing partisan loyalties and so change

Explaining party system change 5 the pattern of electoral competition. New parties in particular may cause existing parties to reorient their tactics or the strategies that they use to connect with voters (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 336–7). A party system can make a political system more plural and responsive to voters. As Sartori argues, parties become more attentive to voters when alternative parties offer voters the chance to exit from an existing partisan relationship with a party (1976: 58, 65–6). Relationships between parties and voters are formed, and re-formed, in the context of electoral competition. Locating parties in a systemic context provides a broader understanding of parties and the forces that shape them.

Political entrepreneurs and party system development As we shall see later in this chapter there is considerable debate as to how party systems come into being and change over time. Accounts centred on political leadership see competition between political entrepreneurs as a source of dynamism in a party system (Aldrich 1995: 13). Politicians might be tempted to shirk and not honour election promises. Laver argues that the risk of shirking is reduced by two factors. First, political entrepreneurs are anxious to nurture a reputation for effective action. The prospect of re-election makes reputation an important asset. Second, the existence of competing political entrepreneurs keen to hold office means that voters have an alternative if promises are broken (Laver 1997: 81; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1978: 80). The competition between political entrepreneurs means that the interactions between parties are dynamic. New parties are likely to emerge when political leaders see that parties are overlooking important issues and when the careers of political entrepreneurs are blocked. A relatively recent contribution to the literature on new parties by Hug (2001) outlines a model of new party formation based around the idea of strategic interaction. Aspiring groups keen to exploit new issues make decisions about the formation of a new party based on the response of established parties to demands made by the aspirant group. This model provides useful insights, many of which I use, but it does not unpack the contribution of political entrepreneurs and individual agency to the process of party formation. E.E. Schattschneider’s book The Semisovereign People (1960) provided an early insight into the possibility that political leaders can re-direct the development of a party system (Ware 1996: 197–8; Mair 1997b). Schattschneider frames his book very broadly as a study of the politicization of conflict and argues that defining the lines of conflict is critical as ‘(w)hat happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc.’ (italics in the original, 1960: 62). Schattschneider applies his argument to the study of party politics noting that parties by virtue of their organizational resources are well placed to shape conflict and ‘(s)ince the development of cleavages is a prime instrument of power, the party which is able to make its definition of the issues prevail is likely to take over the government’ (ibid: 76). Schattschneider gives a dynamic account of political competition as existing parties seek to preserve lines of conflict, and define the opinions held by a majority

6

Explaining party system change

of the voting electorate in a way that suits their interests, while new parties act to open new lines of conflict (ibid: 75). Leadership, especially elite action that defines political conflict, is very important in Schattschneider’s account of mass democratic politics (ibid: 138). In doing so his conclusions coincide with some of those found in the earlier work of Schumpeter (Mair 1997b: 950), though Schattschneider, unlike Schumpeter, does not denigrate the political capacity of ordinary citizens. Schumpeter’s notion of an entrepreneur, as a risk taker willing to break down existing traditions and seek out new opportunities, complements Schattschneider’s account of party encouraged development of cleavages. These Schumpeterian political entrepreneurs are keen to shape preferences and are willing to disrupt existing patterns of party competition in a party system (Brechtel and Kaiser 1999: 21). Torcal and Mainwaring use the case of Chile to demonstrate how party elites can obscure certain cleavages, such as class and religion, and emphasize the social and political divisions that work to their advantage (2003: 82–4) Other writers have also made space for political agency in accounts of party system change either explicitly or implicitly (Kenney 2003: 1231–4; Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 319; Chhibber 1999: 218). However, for the most part the literature on party system development and change has not concentrated on the contribution made by innovative political entrepreneurs. Sociological and institutional approaches have dominated the literature. Rational choice theorists have tended to concentrate on the incentive structures that are created by formal institutions. Sociological approaches to the study of party systems Sociological approaches link social structures to the pattern of party politics. Party systems, in such approaches, are formed around key dividing lines in society such as class, ethnicity, or religious affiliation. Fundamental to sociological approaches to party systems is the notion of a cleavage. A cleavage indicates a political divide and so is more than a social division. Not all social divisions have consequences for party politics. A social group may be numerically small or one form of identity might be overshadowed by other identities. The social hierarchy of caste in India is a good example of this. There are thousands of subcaste groups, or jatis, which signal important social divisions in everyday life. However, it is only in certain circumstances that a caste identity is used to set a group apart in the process of political mobilization or in other words become a cleavage. Other identities, such as religion and language, might overshadow caste differences in the electoral arena (Chhibber and Kollman 2004: 42–3). Or a group might be too small or geographically dispersed to be influential. Political parties usually institutionalize social differences but cleavages can be articulated by other institutions, such as civil society associations (Mair 1997a: 65).5 Lipset and Rokkan offered an early and influential account that explored the relationship between social forces and party systems in Europe. They argued that political development in Europe was profoundly influenced by two revolutions. The first was the national revolution in which centralizing forces moved to consolidate

Explaining party system change 7 their power within a national territory. This was frequently resisted by groups in the periphery and institutions, such as the church, marginalized by national bureaucracies and newly powerful legislatures. The second major line of conflict was associated with the industrial revolution. Economic change sharpened differences between town and countryside. This was epitomized in the conflict between urban, industrial interests that favoured free trade and agricultural interests that feared competition from imports. Industrialization also meant that conflicts between owners of capital and workers became more important political issues. Lipset and Rokkan outlined a framework in which lines of cleavage would be strongly influenced by structural changes in the character of the state and the economy. Timing was also important. They identified the early phase of competitive politics as a critical juncture during which a party system meshes with the cleavage structure of society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 51). They went on to argue that party systems remained remarkably stable once established. Lipset and Rokkan provide an explanation of party system formation but, with the emphasis on the freezing of cleavages, they provide less insight into subsequent changes in party systems. Lipset and Rokkan do not outline a simple structuralist approach and they are open to the possibility that ‘alignments by strictly political criteria of membership’ might emerge (ibid: 3). They also acknowledge that wellorganized parties can reduce the amount of space available for new parties to mobilize in (ibid: 51–2).6 Notwithstanding this, the emphasis in the contributions to Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal volume is placed on using exogenous social variables to explain the shape of party systems and patterns of political development (Rokkan 1967: 403–36). The Lipset–Rokkan framework has been much debated since the 1960s with the freezing hypothesis attracting particular attention (Mair 1997a; Randall 2001). The subtlety of the framework and the recognition of the historical aspect of party system development mean that the work of Lipset and Rokkan continues to attract attention (Allardt 2001). Bartolini and Mair present a mediated view of social structure when they argue ‘cleavages cannot be reduced simply to the outgrowths of social stratification; rather, social distinctions become cleavages when they are organised as such’ (1990: 216). A stronger structuralist argument that intersects with the Lipset and Rokkan approach is presented in Luebbert’s study of regimes in inter-war Europe. In this treatment of the parties that represented working class interests Luebbert argued that political leaders were extremely constrained in their choices and that the regimes that emerged were based on clearly identifiable social alliances (1991: 156–8, 306–7).7 Institutional approaches to the study of party systems Scholars favouring an institutional approach draw attention to the institutional factors that help to structure party formation and competition. There are several areas of interest which include electoral rules, constitutional structures like federalism, rules that govern party interaction within legislatures and the rules used by individual parties to regulate their own affairs (Ware 1996: 195–6).

8

Explaining party system change

Electoral rules Duverger famously made the strong claim that ‘the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system’ (italics in the original, 1964: 217). Parties appreciate that the rewards allocated to the winning party are highly disproportionate in this type of electoral system and this encourages them to merge with other parties or form ‘an alliance very like fusion’ or the ‘electors will gradually desert it, and the two-party system will be restored by elimination’ (ibid: 224). Duverger asserts that there are two types of pressure that eliminate smaller parties that remain outside of alliances. The first, the ‘mechanical effect’, acts on the party as a single member, simple plurality (SMSP) system allocates seats disproportionately to the winning party. The second placed party is obviously disadvantaged by this but it will usually win some seats. However, the third placed and lower placed parties are crushed by this mechanical effect as they fail to win seats (Duverger 1964: 225–6). The second pressure of the voting system, termed the ‘psychological effect’, is said to work itself out through the perceptions of voters. After a while it becomes apparent to followers of smaller parties that their votes are not helping their preferred party to win. To avoid their votes being wasted they transfer their vote to the party, closest to their views, that is likely to win (Riker 1982: 765). This psychological effect takes slightly longer to have an impact as it takes time for voters to realize that their preferred party has ceased to be a likely winner (Duverger 1964: 226). Or as Gaines expresses it ‘Duverger’s law can be interpreted as a dynamic prediction, that the number of parties should decline during a series of elections to an equilibrium level of two’ (1999: 845). The role of parties, that form alliances ‘very like fusion’, is much less discussed in the general literature that followed Duverger. The terminology is somewhat unclear with the word ‘fusion’ suggesting a close relationship between parties, such as that between the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the UK in the 1980s or, to use an Indian case, the long standing Left Front in West Bengal. However, alliances, whatever their ultimate status, do have the crucial effect of allowing multiple parties to contest an election while reducing the number of serious competitors, to perhaps only two, in each constituency. Duverger’s law has been extensively discussed and tested in the literature on party systems (Chhibber and Murali 2006; Sartori 2001; Rae 1971: 92–5; G. Cox 1997). Modifications have been suggested by developments in two party systems since the 1950s when Duverger first outlined his law. Minor parties with concentrated geographical support have contributed to party system change in the United Kingdom and Canada (Webb 2000: 4–14). Nationalist parties have made a particular contribution to party system change in Scotland and Wales. However, it is not just parties with regional concentrations of support that offer exceptions to Duverger’s prediction. The resurgence of the Liberal tradition, in its various incarnations, has made an important contribution to the trend away from the two party pattern in Britain since the 1960s (Chhibber and Kollman 2004: 199; Gaines 2006: 8–9).

Explaining party system change 9 The national party system in India also has fragmented (Sridharan and Varshney 2001). This is in spite of an SMSP electoral system. Researchers have turned their attention to lower levels of the electoral system arguing that the effects identified by Duverger work themselves out at the constituency level (G. Cox 1994; Gaines 2006: 8). In a federal system a national party might face strong opposition from a series of regional parties. This would allow for a series of two party contests at the state and constituency levels, as a national party faces a regional party specific to each state, but create a multiparty outcome when the election results are aggregated at the national level. However, there are still a number of states in the Indian federal system that do not have two party systems. Even at the constituency level in the Indian states, a proportion of contests do not conform to the predicted two party pattern (Chhibber and Murali 2006: 6). In summary it can be said that Duverger’s proposition is not fully proven, given the number of exceptional cases, but his suggestion that the electoral system has an influence on the shape of a party system retains some explanatory usefulness. Studies that devote considerable attention to the Duvergerian approach look to variables other than the electoral system to round out their explanations of outcomes in party systems. Thus some sociological factors are reintroduced to the discussion (Ware 1996: 192) and other institutional factors are drawn in (Chhibber and Kollman 2004: 223–4; Gaines 1999: 836). State rules regulating parties Formal rules governing the access of parties to the ballot constitute barriers to entry for new parties, which if set sufficiently high, as they are in the United States of America, can reduce the numbers of new parties formed (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 505; Hug 2001: 99–101; Tavits 2006: 109). Access to the ballot is relatively straightforward in India. Requirements for deposits and correctly submitted nomination forms do not deter large numbers of routinely unsuccessful independent candidates from contesting elections. Rules on political finance can be written so as to limit, or enhance, the influence established parties can gain from advantageous access to money. If the rules are loose they can make it difficult for new parties to get established. There is evidence that the rules on campaign spending in India are broken and that established parties do have an advantage (Sridharan 2001; Samy 2006). However, the continual formation of new parties suggests that financial resources are not an obstacle that deters all aspiring political entrepreneurs. Rules within legislatures can have consequences for party cohesion and system stability. The Indian case provides a good example with the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which limits the circumstances where parties can be formed by legislators splitting away from their parent party. If properly implemented the law disqualifies individual members of national and state legislatures who cross the floor (Nikolenyi 2005).8 The rules should limit the fragmentation of a party system during the lifetime of a legislature and confine defections to the period immediately before an election.

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Explaining party system change

Internal party organization The formal and informal rules that are used to shape the internal structure of political parties can have important consequences for the wider party system. Where the nomination of candidates for elected office is centralized the movement of office seekers between parties is eased. If the party leader dispenses nominations ambitious politicians do not necessarily have to spend time building a reputation inside the party or have close links to a local party organization. This increases the potential for volatility in a party system (Rakner and Svåsand 2004: 63). Chandra argues that the ability of existing parties to incorporate aspiring politicians regardless of their ethnic background has important consequences for a party system as ‘(p)arties with competitive rules for advancement are able to continually incorporate new elites, while keeping old ones acquiescent. Such parties are stable parties, better able to retain the allegiance of elites during lean periods when they are out of government.’ Conversely, parties with centralized rules for advancement are unable to incorporate rising elites from different ethnic backgrounds and thus ‘are unstable, deeply vulnerable to defections by old elites when they are out of power’ (K. Chandra 2000: 837). Chandra makes a vitally important point with regard to the calculations of ambitious politicians and the operation of the Duvergerian mechanisms. If the dominant parties in a party system do not accommodate aspirants from certain social groups there is little incentive for them to join those parties. There is also an incentive for them to remain in a smaller party even if that means they have limited opportunities for office holding (ibid: 865). The structure of government Federalism is a key variable used by Chhibber and Kollman to explain the formation of national party systems. They argue that candidates direct their attention at the level(s) of government where substantive decisions are made. Where substantial power is devolved to state governments, as it is in the Indian federal system, this will encourage candidates to tilt their efforts accordingly. Forming a party that competes at the national level becomes less important (Chhibber and Kollman 2004: 18–20). I also explore the impact of federal institutions, especially as the practice of federalism in India has shifted. I argue that the opportunities, and dangers present in federal institutions, allow political parties an additional range of tactics to use in inter-party competition and offer incentives that political entrepreneurs find attractive. The implications of the sociological and institutional approaches for this study An elegant synthesis of the institutional and sociological approaches to party system change can be found in some of the literature on Latin American political development. Lipset and Rokkan’s notion of a ‘critical juncture’ is an important element in these comparative historical approaches (1967: 47). Structural factors are considered to have an impact but there are moments of exceptional political

Explaining party system change 11 openness when determined elite agents can fashion, or re-fashion, political institutions that sustain the legacy of the foundational critical juncture (Collier and Collier 1991: 27–39). An important advantage of applying this approach to the study of party system change is that it provides a framework that can take account of structure, agency and institutions (Roberts 2005: 33–4). As far as this study is concerned the critical juncture approach should remind us to take account of exogenous shocks to a party system. The period between 1996 and 1999 was a moment of important transition in national party politics in India. It was a period of political uncertainty and instability as the Congress Party went into sharp decline and was forced to accept that it had lost its status as a majority ruling party (Wyatt 2001b). However, the process of political change was not always as marked in the individual states of the Indian federal system. At this level political change proceeds at a more gradual process which is not consistent with the decisive break that is taken to be the hallmark of a critical juncture (Collier and Collier 1991: 29–31). This study takes the agency of political leaders very seriously but I do not assume that agency is unfettered. Structure provides a context in which actions are taken by agents. The account of structure and agency given here builds on a framework developed collaboratively and applied to the problem of democratization (Adeney and Wyatt 2004). I work with a framework that treats structures as both social and discursive. I assume that structures impose constraints on political actors and they are relatively durable. However, structures can be changed by determined collective action (R.W. Cox 1995: 33). Lewis provides this lucid justification for taking such an approach arguing that (p)re-existing social structures, bequeathed to the current generation of actors by actions undertaken in the past, constitute the conditions in which current action takes place and so shape (without determining) the latter. In turn, the (reproduced or transformed) set of structures which are the product of current behaviour form the context for the next round of action. (Lewis 2002: 21) In summary, I am aware that agency, the ability of political actors to determine outcomes, occurs in a structural context. The political leadership variable has demonstrated a high degree of variation in Tamil Nadu in contrast to relative stability of the social and institutional antecedent conditions. There certainly have been economic and social changes in Tamil Nadu since the 1970s, and I do account for the impact of some of these on party leaders, but what is striking is the way in which existing parties have been able to absorb most of these changes. What is striking is that the social factors that have caused most problems for existing parties, especially caste, were often associated with political mobilization at earlier points in time. The formal institutional context has remained fairly stable with no substantial changes to the Indian constitution, electoral rules, and electoral boundaries. The only exception to this is the changing practice of Indian federalism, which has been heavily influenced by the formation of a series of national coalition governments since 1996. Regional parties have

12

Explaining party system change

played an important part in all of these coalitions. This change is an important factor that I take account of. It is also a change that, while working to the benefit of politicians in Tamil Nadu, was ultimately beyond their control.

The analytical framework Detailed studies of party system change that draw on contemporary Indian experiences need to pay serious attention to the federal nature of the Indian party system (Chhibber and Nooruddin 1999: 53). The national party system is an aggregate of party systems in individual states in much the same way that the party system of the United States is an aggregate of many state-based competitions. Even in national elections in India political competition is dominated by regional factors (Wyatt 2001b). Strong regional political parties are the balancing force in the national parliament and national electoral alliances are a patchwork of mini-alliances formed in individual states. The party systems in individual states are much more coherent than the fragmented national party system that is an aggregate of the outcomes in the individual states. This creates a strong presumption for studying a state party system when studying party system dynamics in India. This introduces some additional complexity, derived from the impact of national political developments, that needs to be accounted for, but working with a state based party system allows for an unmediated account of party competition, which would not the case with a narrative based on the national party system. I selected the case of Tamil Nadu because the party system has achieved a degree of maturity and it offers a large number of potential observations with a good number of political entrepreneurs forming parties (many of whom have failed). The process of change has been orderly and the party system has not been especially volatile since 1980. Party leaders have generally been willing to compromise in the process of electoral alliance formation and the state has avoided the immobilism that has, for example, accompanied the fragmentation of the party system in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (Wyatt 1999). The prominent position of Tamil politicians in all national governments since 1996 provides an incidental element of interest in a detailed treatment of party politics in Tamil Nadu. The success of the regionally oriented ‘Dravidian’ parties in the 1960s and 1970s created a centripetal pattern of party competition. These parties seemed very successful at preventing social tensions from escalating into political conflict. The alternation in power of two robust Dravidian parties, and the corresponding weakness of the Congress Party, between 1967 and the early 1990s, suggested Tamil Nadu was not a state in which party system fragmentation seemed likely. The return to overt, caste-based politics and the accommodation in the late 1990s of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by other parties in the state are counter-intuitive outcomes that draw attention to the state. Recent events have confounded the expectation that voting along caste lines would be disrupted by economic and social change (Hardgrave 1966). I review the historical origins of party politics in Tamil Nadu but I have concentrated on the period since 1989 because it is in this period that a clear change in the party system becomes obvious and it is a

Explaining party system change 13 period of change that has not been extensively treated in the literature on Tamil Nadu. There are already a number of very good studies that document and explain the emergence of the Dravidian political parties (M.R. Barnett 1976a; M.S.S. Pandian 1992; Subramanian 1999, 2003; Swamy 1996a). Walch (1976a) provides a book length comparative account of party systems in south India. He also uses the terminology of Lipset and Rokkan to map the salient political cleavages in the Tamil speaking part of south India (Walch 1976b). However, the conclusions drawn from Walch’s findings did not anticipate the significance of two strong Dravidian parties for the state party system of Tamil Nadu. Carefully contextualized case studies of district level politics are offered by Weiner (1967), Kohli (1991), and Widlund (2000). The state party system is not the explicit focus of the studies by Subramanian and Swamy but their detailed treatments of political parties mean that they each provide an implicit treatment of the party system that followed the period of Congress Party dominance. Subramanian (1999) treats the mobilizing strategies employed by the Dravidian parties and details the subcultures and partisan identities that these parties promoted. Swamy concentrates on intra-party competition and among other things draws upon the ideas of Schattschneider to discuss elite manipulation of political conflict (Swamy 1996a: 53). I concentrate on the experience of one party system in transition using a qualitative approach. This has the advantage that the contribution of a variety of leaders can be analysed. Another advantage is that the process and character of party system change can be described and analysed in some detail. This builds an element of thick description into the analysis. This would not be possible if a number of leaders from different party systems were profiled in a single volume study. A single case can offer a wide range of observations and allow for detailed interrogation of the empirical evidence (Rueschemeyer 2003: 318). The case of Tamil Nadu provides sufficient empirical data on successful political entrepreneurs to allow for comparisons within case. Confining the study to one party system also offers the advantage of greater homogeneity between the units being compared (King et al 1994: 91–3). The issue of selecting a case that exemplifies the dependent variable needs to be acknowledged but it is not an insuperable problem for this study (Hug 2001: 70–2). As well as a relative abundance of successful political entrepreneurs a good number of unsuccessful political entrepreneurs have launched parties in Tamil Nadu. These unsuccessful political entrepreneurs provide observations that can be analysed and are instances in which the outcome differs from the dependent variable of party system change. Processes of party system change are complex and the causal relationships involved need some disentangling. The qualitative nature of this study means that it is difficult to judge the precise impact of the leadership variable and the conclusions made in this book remain subject to an element of uncertainty that is a common problem in qualitative research (Collier and Collier 1991: 20; King et al 1994: 82). This seems a reasonable tradeoff given that a quantitative approach would in all likelihood provide a more impoverished analysis of the impact of political agency on party system change.

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Explaining party system change

Another aspect of the complexity of party system change lies in its chronological character. In some cases a single re-aligning election might be the focus of study but party system change is more likely to take place over a number of years and involve a number of parties. This raises the question of how an analysis of the process might be structured. There are good reasons for a chronological analysis as well as good reasons for looking at the impact of individual leaders and parties. The latest phase of change in the Tamil Nadu party system began in 1989 and is still underway. A stage wise chronological analysis, which uses individual elections as a unit, provides a way of taking account of the information made available to aspiring and actual political entrepreneurs by the outcome of each election. A chronological assessment also helps account for the dynamism of competition as parties adjust their strategy and tactics in the light of new developments. It also helps provide a sense of the strategic interaction between parties (Hug 2001). However, an election-by-election analysis fragments the narrative relating to individual leaders and parties complicating attempts to present a sustained analysis of the contributions made by particular leaders. It is not practical to present both a detailed chronological account and a separate analysis of the contribution of political leadership. I have overcome this dilemma by concentrating on cases, analysing leadership in the latter half of the book. In Chapter 3 I give some, though not exhaustive, treatment to the temporal and cumulative aspect of party system change in the Tamil speaking part of south India. Explaining the emergence and the success of political parties Party system change, in terms of the changing number of parties in a system, is a compound of the two processes: the emergence of new parties and their success. Hug (2000) considers these two features of party formation to be related but in need of separate analytical treatment. Indeed as will become clear in later chapters, political entrepreneurs are encouraged, at least in part, by the perception that there are factors that will favour their nascent political party. However, leaders form new parties without any assurance that the factors that imply success will actually enable their party to be successful. The factors that encourage a party to emerge are not identical to those that enable it to be successful. This can be illustrated with reference to one of the ‘push’ factors that encourage party formation in Tamil Nadu. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 formal rules do not determine opportunities for advancement in the two main political parties in the state. Leadership turnover at the very top is a rare event and there is great uncertainty about the protocol for succession. This uncertainty about opportunities for advancement encourages political entrepreneurs to form new parties but it does not contribute substantially to the likely success of their new parties. For the purposes of this study I have defined a successful party as one that has made itself relevant to the process of alliance formation or altered the pattern of competition within the party system. By extending the notion of a coalition to the formation of alliances before an election (Wyatt 1999), I have stated a looser form of Sartori’s standard of relevance. Sartori deems that a relevant party should have

Explaining party system change 15 the potential to participate in a governing coalition or affect the pattern of party competition (1976: 121–4). A successful party would have an impact on at least two of the three facets of a party system mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: party numbers and voter affiliations. A successful party would most likely contribute to ideological diversity as well, but it is possible for a new party to shadow the ideology of an existing party in the system. Using a strong notion of relevance to count the number of parties in the party system of Tamil Nadu would remove some new parties from consideration. For the reasons discussed above I do examine some smaller parties, which might be considered ‘irrelevant’ in other studies, as a way of garnering information about the dynamics that produce party system change. In order to analyse the success and failure of new parties I examine five parties in detail and consider how political entrepreneurs have attempted to insert their party into the state party system. In each case I begin with a chronological account of the party’s evolution. Next, I assess the antecedent conditions with separate treatments of social structure and institutional factors. I divide the analysis of institutional factors between an evaluation of formal state institutions and an account of the significance of existing political parties for the emergence of the new party. I then consider how the leadership factor contributes to the success of the party. These cases are analysed individually and where appropriate, comparatively. Some are analysed in paired comparisons, such as the caste parties discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Other parties that have no obvious comparator, such as the BJP in Chapter 8, are considered individually (King et al 1994: 45).

An outline of the book The book is divided into two parts. The first part is broadly concerned with explaining the contribution of political entrepreneurs to the emergence of new parties in Tamil Nadu. The second part is concerned with explaining the success of these new parties. Chapter 2 outlines the leading lines of cleavage that have been manipulated by a variety of political entrepreneurs in the Tamil speaking area of south India, referred to as ‘Tamilnad’. These cleavages give the parties signifiers that their leaders hope will establish their relevance among the voting public. These signifiers are sometimes used in overlapping ways and the interpretation of each signifier is a subject of contestation by competing political entrepreneurs. Chapter 3 begins by providing a synoptic account of party system development in Tamilnad since 1937. This includes brief commentary on early Congress dominance, the rise of the DMK and the subsequent split which saw the formation of the Anna DMK. The classification of Congress as a ‘half party’ in a two and a half party system leads into a more substantive election-by-election analysis of the emergence of new parties that have helped to convert the Tamil Nadu party system into a multiparty system. Chapter 4 expands on the concept of political entrepreneurship and links the concept to the literature on political leadership in India. This provides the basis for the analytical framework used to analyse the impact of a range of political entrepreneurs.

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Explaining party system change

The chronology of these chapters overlaps but I follow a largely chronological order in terms of the party’s initial impact on the party system. They use a standard set of sections that profile the impact of leadership, the significance of the party for the system as a whole, the ways in which political entrepreneurs exploit social structure, and the consequences of key institutions for the party in question. This provides for a consistent approach and facilitates the concluding discussion in Chapter 10. Chapter 5 details the political mobilization of the influential Vanniar caste group in northern Tamil Nadu. The chapter also includes a comparison with the powerful Thevar caste cluster in southern Tamil Nadu and considers why independent parties linked to this group have not had more impact on the party system. Chapter 6 considers the case of the Dalit Panther movement that has enjoyed some electoral success in the northern part of the state. Chapter 7 reflects on the attempt to introduce Dalit political concerns in southern Tamil Nadu into the state party system. Chapter 8 examines the trajectory of the BJP and analyses the reasons for its limited electoral success in the state. Chapter 9 provides an account of the formation of another regional party, the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK), by the filmstar-politician Vijayakanth. This chapter considers how the success of the filmstar-politician M.G. Ramachandran (MGR) in the 1970s and 1980s serves as a template for other aspiring actor-politicians. Chapter 10 draws the argument together and considers how the findings might be applied to other cases of party system change.

2

Conflict, cleavages and political parties in south India

Party systems are built around the conflicts, or cleavages, that divide parties from each other. Political leaders and party organizers highlight values and divisions of opinion in order to define their following. In other words political entrepreneurs help define the profound disagreements, or cleavages in political opinion, which become the object of competition between political parties. Social divisions provide raw material that political entrepreneurs use to construct narratives of political conflict that work to their advantage. One way of organizing competition is for a political party to seek support from a well defined social group. The group might be defined by a shared cultural characteristic, such as religion or language, or a social marker like class. A political divide corresponding to a social divide is described by Allardt and Pesonen as a structural cleavage in contrast to non-structural cleavages built on differences in political opinion (1967: 326). Structural cleavages do not automatically shape a party system. Political entrepreneurs have to make a social divide politically relevant. Otherwise a social division may remain latent, felt, but not expressed politically. Political entrepreneurs have to persuade followers that a social or cultural distinction is of primary importance. A cleavage needs to be an organized expression of difference (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 216). This chapter shows the multiple ways in which political conflict has been expressed in the Tamil speaking areas of modern south India. Various political entrepreneurs have sought to define political conflict in their own terms. In many cases the potential for division has been realized with some impact briefly being felt on the party system. However, only in a very few cases have cleavages endured over a significant period of time. Those related to the centre-periphery divide have been most robust in the Tamil speaking areas of south India. Some cleavages, notably those relating to caste, went into decline after their initial emergence only to be revived later. Overall I argue that political entrepreneurs shape party systems by defining the terms of political conflict and forming cleavages that divide parties and voters. Part of the process of cleavage formation is cultivating a political identity which voters find plausible. This might be done by fostering cultural sensibilities or making a selected social marker salient. Identities can be more political in nature and may not map straightforwardly onto single markers of social difference.1 Cultural revival was an important element in the growth of the Dravidian movement that had a foundational impact on south Indian politics. The term ‘Dravidian’ is applied to

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Conflict, cleavages and political parties

the main languages, including Tamil, spoken in south India. The term is sometimes taken to suggest a common racial heritage among the people of south India (Irschick 1969: 275). Dravidian identity illustrates the way in which political identities can be forged. Notionally Dravidian identity could be shared by the substantial population of the whole of south India, an area that is currently divided between the four states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Some advocates of the Dravidian movement intended this to be the case. In practice the idea of Dravidian identity has been of greatest political significance among the Tamil speaking population living in the south eastern part of India. The Dravidian movement produced a selection of overlapping narratives, the strongest versions of which called for south Indian secession from the rest of India. The emphasis in the Dravidian movement changed according to the priorities of its leaders. At times it was directed inwardly at the pattern of hierarchical social stratification produced by the caste system (Subramanian 1999: 101–13). At other times the Dravidian movement adopted broader objectives, such as the cultural nationalism which generated demands for greater autonomy for the Tamil speaking area in the Indian federal system (Barnett 1976a: 304–6). These examples demonstrate the impact that political entrepreneurs can have on the formation of political identities. There are seven significant social and cultural markers around which political conflict could be organized in the Tamil speaking part of south India. These are caste, religion, language, region, class, gender and the town–country divide. This chapter follows this order and so provides a roughly chronological account of cleavage development in Tamilnad. As we shall see each marker can be used in multiple ways. Emerging political entrepreneurs often do not accept established political divisions and as Schattschneider (1960) predicted, attempt to make their own interpretation of conflict prevail. In doing so, an exceptional political entrepreneur may reset the terms of political engagement and assemble a new winning coalition behind their preferred view of politics (McLean 2001: 231). These interpretations might be complex and confusing to the casual observer. So for example, political entrepreneurs may define political conflict in ways that bring several social markers together. In the case of south India, tensions that pick up the label ‘regional’ are often a compound of several lines of social division. Before I look at these seven social markers I say a little more about the key political parties in Tamilnad that have been associated with the cleavages discussed later in the chapter.

Party politics in Tamilnad: an overview Tamil Nadu is one of the states in the Indian federal system. In this form it is a relatively recent unit, named as such in January 1969. I use the term ‘Tamilnad’ when I refer to trends in the Tamil speaking area of south India that can be observed over a longer period of time. This rendering of the term Tamil Nadu (Tamil nation) was in widespread use before 1969. Sumathi Ramaswamy comments of the renaming ‘after more than a decade of petitioning and debating, and after many centuries of having been a literary and a cultural reality, “Tamilnadu” became a political reality

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 19 as well’ (1997: 157). The history of the region can be traced back to polities that helped advance Tamil culture, including the kingdoms ruled by the Chola and Pandya dynasties before the latter was incorporated into the empire of Vijayanagar in the fourteenth century (Swamy 1996b: 192). The cultural legacy of the Chola period is particularly notable. Tamilnad had an informal existence during the British colonial period when most of south India was governed by the Madras Presidency. The colonial authorities did not recognize Tamilnad as a territorial unit, and indeed some Tamil speakers lived in adjacent princely states, but it was the Tamil speaking area that was the most cohesive part of the presidency (Arnold 1977: 10). The regional dynamic was reflected in the decision to create a separate unit of the Congress movement in Tamilnad. With the end of colonial rule the presidency was replaced by Madras State into which several princely states were absorbed. During the 1950s Madras State was reduced in size, excluding some areas in which non-Tamils lived, and re-designated as a state for Tamil speakers. Still known after its capital city, Madras, it was this unit that was re-named Tamil Nadu in 1969. The city of Madras was renamed Chennai in 1996. The Congress nationalist movement, formally known as the Indian National Congress (usually called ‘Congress’), was active in south India during the late nineteenth century. After 1916 Congress was opposed by the Justice Party, which was a moderate part of the Dravidian movement. The rivalry between the two parties ended in the late 1930s as the Justice Party went into sharp decline. Congress established itself as the leading political party in Tamilnad in 1937 when it won the elections for the Madras Legislative Assembly and formed the provincial government until 1939. The wider Dravidian movement also had an impact on political opinion during this period. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, was a notable Dravidian thinker and propagandist. Initially a member of Congress he withdrew from the movement, protesting at its conservative approach to social reform (Barnett 1976a: 37). He began organizing the Self-Respect Movement in 1925, using it to promote social reform and Dravidian ideas. In 1938 he was given the title ‘Periar’ (esteemed) and it is by that name that he is more popularly known (ibid: 54). Among the more controversial claims made by many members of the Dravidian movement was the popular idea that the Dravidian people of south India had been oppressed in their own land by Aryan invaders (Dirks 2002: 238), whose latter day descendents were both north Indians and upper caste Tamil Brahmans. Periar formed the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) in 1944. The DK was intended to be a popular successor to the Justice Party but Periar did not let the organization participate in the elections held in 1946. The DK split in 1949 and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) (Dravidian Progressive Federation) was formed. Under the leadership of C.N. Annadurai the DMK established itself as a viable regional party. Congress ruled in Madras between 1946 and 1967. The opposition was divided between the Communists, Socialists, small caste parties, independents, the conservative Swatantra Party and the DMK. Of all the parties the DMK ran the most effective propaganda campaigns and in 1967 defeated Congress. The DMK split in 1972 when the charismatic filmstar and politician M.G. Ramachandran (MGR) was ejected from the party. MGR responded by establishing a new party, the Anna

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DMK based around his fan clubs. The party, renamed the All-India Anna DMK, cut into the support of both the DMK and Congress and won the state assembly elections of 1977, 1980 and 1984. The AIADMK, the DMK and Congress had to make room for new parties from the late 1980s onwards. In 1989 a caste party, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), was formed. In 1994 a break away faction of the DMK formed another Dravidian party, the Marumalarchi DMK (MDMK). Congress split in 1996 and the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) was formed. In the late 1990s two Dalit organizations – the Puthiya Thamizhagam, or new Tamil Nadu (PT) and the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (DPI) – entered electoral politics. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP became more active in the state during the 1980s. In 2005 another filmstar-politician, Vijayakanth, formed a new regional party, the DMDK. Political parties and associated movements have construed political conflict in Tamilnad in many different ways. Political entrepreneurs have highlighted issues related to caste, religion, language, region, class, gender and the town–country divide.2 The issue of caste has been extremely important in political narratives in Tamilnad. Caste has been used to define political cleavages in a number of ways. The issue of caste is one that political entrepreneurs have opened up and closed down at various points in the political history of modern Tamilnad. Other conflicts have often been related to the politics of caste. Given its early and enduring place in political narratives it is only fitting to begin the discussion of political conflict in Tamilnad with reference to caste.

Caste and political conflict in Tamilnad Caste is an important organizing principle in Tamil society. It is a complex form of social stratification in which groups seek to maintain or improve their status. This status can be determined by notions of ritual purity with higher status groups regarding others to be a potential source of pollution. Caste identity is inherited from the kinship group into which an individual is born and marriage usually takes place within that caste group. Notionally caste has a systemic character because of social differences observed between caste groups but in practice the caste ‘system’ is quite fragmented. Caste customs tend to vary according to local custom and subordinate groups do not necessarily accept their low status. At the base of the caste ‘system’ are relatively small groups, known as kulam in Tamil, but more frequently referred to in academic literature by the Hindi word jati. It is at the local level that ritual differences between caste groups are upheld (Béteille 1965: 46; Moffatt 1979: 154–5; Mines 1996: 120–2). Endogamy often operates at the micro-level as well. Marriages are often arranged below the level of the kulam and involve partners from different sub-divisions, known as kuttam (Hardgrave 1969: 36–7). In very broad terms the caste system in Tamilnad can be said to have a compact structure. This contrasts with north India where the varna typology gives a more complete summary of the ritual ranking of different caste groups. A key distinction in the varna classification divides the so-called twice-born upper caste categories (Brahman, Vaisya and Kshatriya) from the lower status Shudra category.3 The

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 21 Vaisya and Kshatriya categories have little meaning in Tamilnad where the key distinction is made between the ritually superior Brahman castes and all other groups. This leads to the controversial inference that all caste Hindus in Tamilnad who are not Brahmans fall into the Shudra category. This distinction is a source of resentment, especially among castes that have high ritual status but are regarded as inferior to the Brahmans (Barnett 1976a: 16–18 and 22–3). Since the 1950s many of these middle castes have been described as ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBC) by the state and the terms OBC and backward castes are used interchangeably in the English language press. As we shall see below the relative status of Non-Brahman castes was the source of considerable political conflict in the early twentieth century. From this conflict emerged a politically informed categorization of caste in Tamilnad which acknowledges three broad groups: upper caste Brahmans, Non-Brahmans and Adi-dravidas (original Dravidians). The latter are groups that suffer the stigma of untouchability and are referred to as the Scheduled Castes (SC) by the central government. The Marathi term ‘Dalit’, literally meaning crushed or oppressed, is popular among activists and is widely used in the English language press. A wide cultural gap separates the small but ritually esteemed Brahman minority from other high (and low) status caste groups. It is reckoned that the Brahman minority constitutes approximately three per cent of the population, the Non-Brahman castes about 67 per cent and the Scheduled Castes 19 per cent of the population of Tamil Nadu.4 Caste is a sociological formation but it also has to be understood as a (changing) political formation because it makes such an important contribution to determining the status, power, wealth and exclusion of individuals and groups. The political aspect of caste has a long history. For example, Moffatt provides a historical summary of the practice of caste segregation in south India since pre-colonial times. He notes the early residential separation of polluting groups in a cheri or quarter distinct from the main area of settlement (1979: 36–53). The social distinctions that separate caste groups are deeply resented. Caste has been linked to patterns of economic accumulation in Tamilnad (Harriss-White 2003: 176–99). There is a strong connection between poverty and lower caste status, with Dalits being strongly disadvantaged by the contentious assumption that they are agents of ritual pollution (Gorringe 2005: 148–51). Movements for social reform and more recent social movements have to be understood as political phenomena. The micro-politics of caste persists as local struggles over the definition of social values and practices continue though this form of politics is unevenly connected with the activity of political parties. Even though the social practice of caste is intimately associated with politics it does not transfer automatically into party political divisions. This is partly because most of the jatis are small and have little electoral influence. It is also the case that caste practice, in India more generally and Tamilnad in particular, has changed and some distinctions have softened (Mayer 1996; Mosse 2006).5 Political entrepreneurs have seen the possibilities of caste as a form of political identity. In the pursuit of categories that will mobilize a large number of voters the minutiae of local caste practice are unhelpful. Voters have often colluded with leaders and accepted broad political identities of various kinds that bring them together with

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‘caste fellows’ with whom they have little contact, or would not interact with, in other social activities (Gorringe 2005: 57). A process of caste ‘fusion’ enabled social identities to be put to political use. This was a process, much noticed in the late nineteenth century, whereby caste groups with similar social status affiliated with each other so that they would be better placed to negotiate with the state (Hardgrave 1969: 126). Caste sangams or associations formed, often based at the district level, to coordinate this interaction (Balasubramanian, 1991; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). British colonial rule exacerbated caste tensions. The census recorded details of caste background and this provided an opportunity for caste groups to demonstrate their unity and press claims for higher status. Representative institutions based on a limited franchise gave power to individuals from upper caste backgrounds and encouraged leaders from numerically larger lower status groups to lobby for recognition. Associated with the process of caste fusion has been a change in caste identities that make caste a more plausible basis for organized politics in modern India. A process of caste substantialization provided more flexible ways for individuals to understand caste through an ‘apparent shift to an idea of inherent and fixed caste substance’ (Bayly 1998: 310). The basis of caste identity shifted away from codes of behaviour towards descent reducing the need to observe minor distinctions among members of caste group. This enables a corporate caste identity to emerge that is very useful as a basis for collective action in economic and political matters (Barnett 1977: 400–1). Referring to Tamil Nadu, Gorringe argues that substantialization ‘has expanded the local basis of the community and transformed the internal organization of each caste, and caste now functions more like ethnicity than the traditional system of stratification’ (2002: 87). Caste and political cleavages There are five notable ways in which caste has been used by political entrepreneurs in modern Tamilnad to mobilize support and introduce a cleavage in the party system that would work to their advantage. The first of these to be discussed is the Brahman–Non-Brahman divide which cultivated the perception that Brahmans were unduly advantaged in the public life of the Madras Presidency. The Justice Party owed its existence to this interpretation of political conflict. A second line of conflict, based on intra-Non-Brahman divisions, emerged as the so-called ‘forward Non-Brahmans’ were alleged to have gained most benefit from the Justice Party. A third possible basis for mobilization was to articulate the ambitions of a single caste group, perhaps by forming a caste-based party. A fourth option has been the construction of an organized alliance that recognizes the ambitions of individual caste groups. A fifth possibility is emphasizing the solidarity of those who suffer the stigma of untouchability as a way of transcending separate caste identities. The advocates of Non-Brahmanism drew attention to the success enjoyed by Brahmans in the fields of higher education and government service. The NonBrahman Manifesto, published in December 1916, expressed concern also at the relative absence of Non-Brahmans in the politics and the press in the Madras

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 23 Presidency (Irschick 1969: 47–8 and 358–9). The Justice Party developed this manifesto into a successful political strategy. The Congress movement responded rather ambivalently to the attempt to develop the Brahman–Non-Brahman divide. At times it decried the communal approach of the Justice Party and stated its identification with the entire Indian people. At other times Congress seemed to locate itself on the Brahman side of the divide. For example, between 1923 and 1927 Congress politicians opposed Justice Party proposals for temple reform that were seen as an attack on Brahmanism (Arnold 1977: 96–7). Brahman politicians, including Rajagopalachari, were prominent in Congress in the 1920s and 1930s though the movement successfully attracted members from a range of backgrounds in that period.6 The Congress ministry formed after the 1937 provincial elections was criticized by Periar for its exclusive Brahman membership (Devanandan 1959: 9). Advocates of the Non-Brahman cause introduced a compelling narrative of conflict into the politics of Tamilnad and constructed a rhetorical separation between a tiny Brahman elite and the majority of the population. In the context of universal male suffrage, which, ironically arrived after the demise of the Justice Party, open advocates of Brahman political interest were at a huge disadvantage. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the Congress Party in the mid-1950s dramatically dispelled the suggestion that it favoured Brahman interests and the party came to be dominated by senior politicians from more modest backgrounds (Swamy 1996a: 178–9). For its part, the Justice Party did not become a strong Non-Brahman political entity. Non-Brahmanism was a political identity that did not displace local caste identities and the Justice Party was too elitist to be able to popularize the concept of Non-Brahmanism (Barnett 1976a: 316). Furthermore ‘[t]he term “nonBrahmin” masked economic, social and cultural heterogeneity that was difficult to bridge’ (ibid: 57). The Justice Party seemed little interested in the large Adi-dravida minority (Gupta 1985: 232–3), causing the prominent leader M.C. Rajah to withdraw his support from the Justice Party (Irschick 1969: 191–2). Others from lower caste backgrounds were disaffected too. In the 1930s, a group of ‘backward classes’ identified themselves and opened up a division in the Non-Brahman camp. Critics of the Justice Party pointed out that the party was dominated by leaders from a small group of relatively privileged ‘forward castes’ including the landowning Naidus, Reddys and Vellalas (Arnold 1977: 155). It was argued that the majority of the population came from less privileged or ‘backward’ castes that were referred to, confusingly, as ‘backward classes’. Proponents of backward ‘class’ politics argued that Hindus from modest caste backgrounds were overlooked in the allocation of benefits and lacked political representation. A Backward Classes League was formed in 1935 to champion the interests of lower caste Non-Brahmans and protest against the tendency of reserved appointments, intended to limit Brahman dominance, to go to members of the forward Non-Brahman castes (Radhakrishnan 1996: 118–19). Supporters of the Backward Classes League were critical of Congress and the Justice Party and in the mid-1940s suggested that an alternative political party be formed to ensure that the backward classes were adequately represented. They also argued that a proportion of government jobs be reserved for members of the backward classes in the

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same way that the Justice Party had argued for the larger Non-Brahman category (Barnett 1976a: 57–60). The forward–backward divide did not become the basis of a formal divide in the party system in Tamilnad. However, the sense of injustice nurtured by the Backward Classes League has not been overlooked by political parties in Tamilnad. After 1947 the Government of India picked up the backward class terminology and allowed state governments to provide benefits for the Other Backward Class (OBC) category (Galanter 1984). The Government of Tamil Nadu has certainly made generous provision for the backward classes, such that some of its policies have been deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (Radhakrishnan 1999). More recently a refinement of the backward classes cleavage has been stated, invoking the idea of the ‘Most Backward Classes’ (MBCs). Again the complaint has been that the MBCs, a less privileged subset of castes in the backward class category, were overlooked in the allocation of benefits by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The potential for a backward class/caste bloc that would exclude the Forward Non-Brahman castes has not been realized. In part this is because it has not found favour among those who speak in terms of Dravidian regional sentiments. It has proved possible to incorporate backward caste aspirations within broader ideological formations. It is also the case that some political entrepreneurs from the larger backward Non-Brahman castes dropped the backward class label in favour of promoting the fortunes of their own caste group. A third possible cleavage has been the organization of political parties and organizations to represent an individual caste group. In areas where a particular caste comes close to being a majority of the population it is feasible for a party to identify with one particular caste. In northern Tamilnad the demographic concentration of the Vanniar caste created just such a possibility. They have a substantial presence in the old districts of North Arcot, South Arcot, Salem and Chingleput (see Map 2.1 for the location of the districts). In 1937 Vanniar politicians attempted to use the People’s Party as a vehicle for their community (Arnold 1977: 155). In the early 1950s two parties, the Commonweal Party and the Tamilnad Toilers, enjoyed much more success. The tradition was revived in the late 1980s with the formation of the PMK as a party claiming to represent a Vanniar community. This style was mimicked, without success, by a number of smaller parties in the 2001 assembly elections. Individual caste parties are difficult to sustain. Voters are receptive to a range of ideological appeals and it is not possible to assume that caste groups vote uniformly along caste lines (Hardgrave 1966). Also, it is relatively easy for ruling parties to absorb such parties and demographic concentration of large caste groups is not that common in Tamilnad. The individual caste cleavage has been an intermittent feature of the party system in Tamilnad. However, in a fragmented party system where electoral alliances are the norm it is possible for individual caste parties to find a niche. The argument that a caste group is best represented by leaders from that background has strong intuitive appeal (K. Chandra 2004). It is unsurprising that political entrepreneurs regularly return to this theme. A variation on this narrative of political conflict is embedded in the inter-caste alliance.

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 25

Chingleput North Arcot

Salem

Madras City

South Arcot

Nilgiris

Coimbatore Tiruchirapalli Thanjavur

Madurai

Ramanathapuram

Tirunelveli

Kanniyakumari

Map 2.1 Administrative Districts of Madras State

An alliance of castes can be used to create one side of a dividing line in a party system. It is possible to mobilize support for a party by building support among an alliance of castes.7 In the 1950s the Congress leader Kamaraj cultivated relationships between his party and several influential caste groups. In the southern districts of Ramnathapuram and Tirunelveli Kamaraj forged an alliance between the Nadar and Pallar caste groups and so confronted the powerful Thevar caste cluster (Forrester 1970: 55–6). In the northern districts of Madras State, Kamaraj obliged the party to accommodate leaders from the numerically dominant Vanniar caste group in an overt attempt to incorporate the group into Congress. However, the Madras Congress of the 1950s used a combination of methods to mobilize voters and does not illustrate the caste alliance as well as other cases in north India.8 In the

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1990s the AIADMK claimed to be the representative of the Thevar caste group but once again the party uses various methods to mobilize votes and the special attention given to one group creates an asymmetry that makes it inappropriate to talk of a cross-caste alliance. Dalit solidarity offers a fifth possible way of using caste to define conflict between parties. Those suffering the stigma of untouchability have a strong sense of grievance which has suggested to a number of political entrepreneurs that the general principle of social and ritual exclusion can be converted into a clear line of division in a party system. The Scheduled Castes form a significant minority which carefully organized has the potential to be very influential. Several serious leaders, movements and parties in Tamilnad have claimed to act as representatives of the Adi-dravidas, the Scheduled Castes and more recently the Dalits. M.C. Rajah presented himself as a leader of the Adi-dravidas and the depressed classes in the 1920s and 1930s. Ambedkar’s Scheduled Castes Federation and its successor the Republican Party of India, were both briefly active in Madras State. The DPI was a very successful social movement that emerged in Tamil Nadu in the 1980s. The recent attempts to promote independent Dalit politics are examined in more detail in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. It is worth noting here that just as Dalit political entrepreneurs have attempted to develop an account of political conflict based on caste exclusion larger parties have attempted to reduce the salience of the caste HinduDalit cleavage. In the 1930s Congress emphasized the conflict with the British as the only relevant political division in India while also campaigning against untouchability in Tamilnad (Swamy 1996a: 171–2). The term Adi-dravida was viewed by Congress leaders as an expression of ‘communal feeling’ that ran counter to the unified national identity that they wished to project (Geetha and Rajadurai 1998: 179–80). Rajagopalachari was stirred into action on the question of untouchability following the Poona Pact in 1935. Arnold considers this ‘Harijan’ campaign carried out by Congress to have been a political success. Substantive reform to relieve the economic and social pressure on the Adi-dravidas did not follow but Congress had gained important allies (Arnold 1977: 146–7). And, one might add, the likelihood of an independent Adi-dravida political movement was accordingly reduced. Other parties have attempted to draw in Dalit voters using various means to recognize the aspirations of Dalit voters while addressing a broader range of issues. The Communists in Thanjavur campaigned against untouchability as well as the working conditions experienced by Adi-dravida labourers (Gough 1981: 148; 1989: 185). The AIADMK under the leadership of MGR made concessions that drew Scheduled Caste voters to his party. The caste Hindu-Dalit cleavage is a very good example of the way in which conflicts are politically constructed and managed. The terminology is deeply contested. There is no sense in which we are discussing a primordial identity. Part of the reason why it has been so difficult to open up this cleavage in the party system is that it requires a massive effort to generate a sense of collective identity among disparate caste groups. However, the extent of social alienation, the size of the minority affected by the stigma of untouchability and the palpable sense of grievance encourage political entrepreneurs to return to an account of caste conflict that attempts to bring various excluded caste groups together.

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 27 In concluding this section I must emphasize again that caste is a very important social marker in Tamil society and that there is no single way of defining caste conflict. Some of the narratives associated with each version of conflict come into sharp conflict with each other. They deny the logic of alternative conceptions of caste politics and seek to submerge other constructions of salient political conflict. Most backward caste assertion sits uneasily with Non-Brahmanism, for example. Political entrepreneurs have also attempted to use caste in combination with other social markers. The Communists bought together the overlapping themes of caste and class in the 1950s. Religious belief and practice, discussed in the next section, are also intertwined with the politics of caste.

Religion Religion is an important part of social life in south India. The majority of the population of Tamil Nadu follow Hindu traditions. The 1921 census identified the largest religious groups of the Tamil speaking districts as Hindu (92 per cent), Muslim (4.2 per cent) and Christian (3.7 per cent) (Census Commissioner 1922a: 347–9). The 2001 census, which covered a slightly different geographical area, gave the largest religious groups as Hindu (88.1 per cent), Muslim (5.6 per cent) and Christian (6.1 per cent) (Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) 2007). There are three obvious ways in which religious identity could, or has become a source of political conflict. First, the way Hindu traditions in Tamilnad are organized is a potential source of inter-group conflict among the majority of the population that adhere to these traditions. Second, political parties might mobilize on the basis of support from religious minority communities. Third, political entrepreneurs can seek support for parties that defend the interests of the religious majority as a unified group. Political conflict associated with the Hindu traditions in Tamilnad Hindu religious practice in the region follows diverse patterns and traditions. Some aspects of Hindu religious practice in Tamilnad are divisive and have the potential to become the object of wider political controversy. While there is no single source of religious authority in Tamilnad, temples are usually a focus of significant material and spiritual power. The temple trusts hold substantial assets, including approximately half a million acres of agricultural land (Presler 1983: 234–5). The larger temples are important economic hubs in the localities in which they are based. The scale of religious activity, and the substantial resources involved, provided the colonial state and state governments since 1947 with a justification for regulating religious activities (Presler 1978: 111–12). The large temples are likely to be dominated by one of the two ‘great traditions’, Vaishnaivism and Saivism. The senior functionaries are influential and highly regarded as they preside over various family rituals. Temples in important pilgrimage locations, including those at Chidambaram, Srirangam and the Minakshi Temple in Madurai, are vital elements in the cultural heritage of Tamilnad. The resources controlled

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by temple trusts are a potential source of patronage which deepens political interest in the control and regulation of such funds (Irschick 1969: 251–7; Fuller 2004: 121). The wealth and social influence of larger religious institutions means that spiritual leaders can be drawn into politics (Fuller 2004: 117–18). Indeed these figures have the potential to act as political entrepreneurs providing collective goods to their followers. The Shankaracharya of Kanchipuram has been a notable spiritual leader in Tamilnad since the mid-twentieth century (ibid: 126; Harriss 2003: 354). The senior Shankaracharya, Jayendra Saraswati, did much to build the profile of his office and the Kanchipuram Mutt (monastery). He built links with politicians, acted as a willing patron of various causes, and supported various Hindu nationalist campaigns (Mines and Gourishankar 1990; Hancock 1995: 908–9). Saraswati was an influential figure and politicians from various parties were keen to associate with him. The extent to which he had built political links came to light, and was undermined, when he was arrested in sensational circumstances in September 2004 (Frontline 2004e). Political entrepreneurs have drawn religious issues that are controversial among Hindus into narratives of conflict. One line of attack has been to target traditions that can be depicted as alien to Tamilnad. Thus the religious and regional cleavages are joined together. Some activists articulating Dravidian views have argued that within Hindu religious practice in Tamilnad is a barely concealed subjugation of indigenous Tamil traditions in favour of alien ‘Aryan’ traditions (Thirumaavalavan 2003: 165–8). Saivite traditions have featured in some narratives. Saivite traditions draw on, among other things, the contribution of Tamil poets, and it is argued, are truer to the Dravidian sentiments of south India than other Hindu belief systems which are less obviously located in regional culture. Some have taken an interest in the Saiva Siddhanta system because they see it as a more authentic Dravidian tradition given that it relies on Tamil sources as opposed to Sanskrit texts, such as the Vedas (Irschick 1969: 292–4; 1986: 13–14; S. Ramaswamy 1997: 29–34). The little traditions of popular Hinduism in Tamilnad also are politically relevant. The Amman tradition is followed in many smaller temples that are popular with lower status groups and have often been sponsored by Dravidian politicians (Kalpagam 2006: 4598). Anticlericalism has been a feature of politics in Tamilnad. Periar advocated a rationalist approach and directly attacked forms of religious practice that he regarded as obscurantist and oppressive. He and his followers mocked certain Hindu deities and ridiculed many Hindu rituals. Subramanian argues that Periar focused his attention on Brahmanic religious practice as a way of advancing a wider critique of caste (Subramanian 1999: 107–10 and 113–19). The current Chief Minister of Tamil, M. Karunanidhi, also identifies himself as a rationalist (Frontline 1997a: 120). However, direct attacks on religious practice have not usually been judged electorally popular. Political entrepreneurs have tended to articulate anticlerical politics in more subtle ways. Priestly privilege is a theme that has often been taken up by the Dravidian movement and the DMK. This issue makes connections with a number of social markers

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 29 as it impinges on questions of caste as well as the regional aspect mentioned in the paragraph above. The rituals in most large temples are conducted in Sanskrit by Brahman priests who are also influential in the running of the temple trusts (Fuller 2004). The dominance of an upper caste, hereditary priesthood remains a political issue and it is a plausible one because it keys into other resentments associated with language, region and caste. The access to temples granted, or not granted, to Dalits is another area in which the politics of religion is intimately linked to the politics of caste. Caste-based roles in religious festivals are often invidious and have attracted the attention of political entrepreneurs. Political parties have supported, and opposed policies, that speak to some of the conflicts associated with Hindu religious institutions and practice. Arnold sees political motivation in legislation on religious endowments favoured by the Justice Party in the 1920s as the ‘enormous wealth and influence of Hindu temples and monasteries along with the power Brahmins derived from them made the endowments an obvious target for the Justicites’ (1977: 96). The DMK made a much more pointed attack on priestly privilege in 1970 when it took steps to open the priestly profession to individuals from any caste background. The DMK introduced legislation to abolish hereditary offices and issued an administrative order to strengthen the position of Tamil as a ritual language (Presler 1978: 106–9, 116 and 126–7). The controversy surrounding the policy abated after the Supreme Court intervened and softened the impact of the legislation. The issues of Brahmanic religion, priestly privilege and the state regulation of religious endowments have been, and continue to be, sensitive topics but they have not defined a major cleavage in the party systems of Tamilnad. The potential for an intra-Hindu religious cleavage in Tamil politics has not been fully developed. This is partly because of a strong under current of popular devotion that makes the strong rationalist beliefs of some Dravidian activists appear an extreme position (Fuller 2004: 118). It is also the case that Dravidian political entrepreneurs have not attempted to build a clear line of cleavage solely on the basis of religion. Instead resentments around religious privilege have been integrated into a more complex Dravidian political cleavage that brings together issues of language, religion, region and caste. Mobilizing minority co-religionists Political mobilization on the basis of shared religious background was strongly encouraged by the institutions put in place by the British in the first half of the twentieth century. The 1909 Morley–Minto reforms conceded separate representation for Muslims and this principle was worked into the electoral system that followed the 1919 reforms (Indian Statutory Commission 1930: 118 and 137–8). In the Madras Presidency this resulted in 13 of the 98 elected seats being reserved for Muslim candidates elected by separate electorates in 1920. This was a proportion (13.3 per cent) rather higher than the 6.7 per cent of the population of the Madras Province recorded as Muslim in the 1921 Census (Indian Statutory Commission 1930: 189). A further five seats were reserved for Indian Christians.9 This

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disproportionate representation was maintained following the 1935 Government of India Act. The number of seats reserved for Muslims in the new 215 seat Madras Legislative Assembly was raised to 29, including one for women, and Christian representation was raised to nine seats, including one for women. For the most part Christians reconciled themselves to working with the larger parties, the Justice Party suited some in the 1920s but Congress was a more attractive option during the 1930s (Arnold 1977: 155). By the end of the 1920s a number of Muslim politicians began to consider the possibility of independent participation in electoral politics. Muslim parties did indeed form to contest the 1937 election (Arnold 1977: 154). The Muslim League in Madras won seats in 1937 and formed the second largest party after the 1946 assembly election. The re-named Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) carried on this tradition in the 1950s but the party split and generally failed to make headway at that point in time (Wright 1966: 583–5). Attempts by political entrepreneurs from minority backgrounds to secure an independent following by appealing to the religious loyalties of their co-religionists have been met in two ways by larger parties: electoral alliance and conscious representation of minorities within the larger party. Muslim parties have often been included in electoral alliances. In 1951 Congress leaders considered an alliance with the IUML but settled for a resolution from the Madras State Jamiat-eulema calling upon Muslims to support Congress (Nayar 1956: 93). The DMK worked nimbly with the IUML in the 1960s rewarding electoral support in the 1962 assembly election by securing a seat in the Rajya Sabha in 1964 for a Muslim League member. Congress appeared to respond to the DMK–IUML alliance by bringing a Muslim into the state cabinet in 1962 (Wright 1966: 593). The IUML has periodically formed alliances with the DMK since then. Larger parties have also attempted to counter mobilization on the basis of minority solidarity by absorbing the cleavage and making minority religious identity a minor part of a broader mobilization. Domesticating the politics of religious affinity might take the form of promoting leaders with minority backgrounds. This strategy might also marginalize aspiring political entrepreneurs leading minority-based parties or encourage them to defect to a larger party with a better chance of success. So for example, in 1957 Kamaraj responded to the unwillingness of the IUML to form an alliance by getting four Muslim candidates elected to the state assembly and two Muslims elected to the Lok Sabha (Wright 1966: 584). The minority religious cleavage has likewise been absorbed by the DMK where Muslims participate in the party (Mines 1975: 409–10), and a Muslim Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) has often held a state cabinet post when the DMK has been in power. Likewise some Christian politicians from southern Tamilnad have made their way in the Congress and the DMK. Muslim parties are now minor players in state level electoral alliances. The IUML gained a seat in the Lok Sabha by allying with the DMK in 2004 and 2009. The main parties have demonstrated that they are able to secure seats for religious minorities and have not been seriously challenged by political entrepreneurs seeking to open up a cleavage by claiming that religious minorities are not effectively represented.

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 31 Defending the religious majority? Some political entrepreneurs have sought to defend the interests of the Hindu majority of Tamilnad and have been amenable to Hindu nationalist ideas. The presence of two notable minorities provides raw material for assertive majoritarians to work with. The institutions emerging from the series of constitutional reforms advanced by the British drew attention to minority groups and could plausibly be said to have favoured the minorities. There were tensions between religious groups in Tamilnad during the colonial period (Irschick 1986: 237). However, the relationship between religion and politics much was less charged in south India during the lead up to partition. The Muslim communities of south India had a lower profile, usually spoke local languages in preference to Urdu, and in the Tamil speaking areas were a proportionately small group (Wright 1966: 580). An important exception to this general pattern of demography is the Kanniyakumari district in the southernmost part of the state. Here the Christian population form a large, and often prosperous, minority. This unusual demography makes claims made by Hindu nationalists that Christians threaten the Hindu community more plausible (Mathew 1983: 413–16). A number of attempts, discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, have been made to portray religious minorities as outside the mainstream of Tamil society but with some notable exceptions these claims have lacked widespread credibility. Religious practice and religious identity have been drawn into processes of political mobilization in Tamilnad over the course of the twentieth century. Mobilization solely on the basis of religious affiliation has only been occasionally successful. The termination of colonial schemes of separate electorates considerably reduced the salience of this cleavage. Different interpretations of Hindu tradition, and the social implications of religious practice, especially as it relates to caste, are recognized as controversial political issues. Dravidian and Dalit activists have linked the politics of caste and the politics of religion. Hindu nationalists have attempted to define political conflict in terms of religion, and have strongly opposed the framing of religious issues in the caste terms favoured by Dravidian and Dalit political entrepreneurs. Religion is an important background theme in the politics of Tamilnad, religious issues are taken seriously and are a source of some localized conflict, but it has been difficult for political entrepreneurs to define a political cleavage solely in terms of religion.

Language Tamil speakers form a massive majority in the state of Tamil Nadu – 85 per cent of the population claims the language as their mother tongue (Swamy 1996b: 192). This very asymmetry makes it difficult to translate language into a permanent division around which partisan loyalty can be established but it has been an important issue in the politics of modern Tamilnad. There are five significant ways in which the issue of language has been given political emphasis in Tamilnad. First, Tamil has been incorporated in projects to promote a Dravidian identity that in its

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strongest form suggests a distinct Tamil national identity. This narrative was associated with the early DMK and other radical Dravidian activists. Second, Tamil has been used in a softer way to recognize a distinctive regional identity which was a feature of the Tamilnad Congress. Language is linked to other social markers and it can be used to emphasize those divisions. So third, the style of Tamil usage has been given additional emphasis to give a linguistic twist to caste differences. Fourth, language use is a way of distinguishing different class backgrounds, with fluency in English connoting higher status. Finally there has been much conflict over the possible status of Hindi as the official language of India. Tamil language was studied with renewed interest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The promotion of the Tamil language was in part encouraged by visceral anxieties about the marginalization of other Indian languages by ‘classical’ Sanskrit. Tamil too is a classical language, and is often praised by political leaders as a unique classical language, as it remains in daily use. This linguistic interest was linked to a concern that Dravidian culture should not be obscured by studies of Indian civilization that over concentrated on north Indian, Aryan and Sanskrit sources (S. Ramaswamy 2001: 19). The Dravidian Association was formed in 1910 to promote the study of Dravidian culture (Devanandan 1959: 2–3). The celebration of Tamil was often a political act. Leaders of the Dravidian movement were known to be scholars of Tamil culture and celebrated for their literary abilities. Tamil helped identify a south Indian, Dravidian community joined together by language.10 The Tamil language was an iconic element in constructions of Tamil nationalism (S. Ramaswamy 1997; Swamy 1996b: 196 and 216–17). Dravidianists argued that the Dravidian community shared a distinctive cultural heritage passed down from its forbears through works of literature and popular culture in the Tamil language. In this way language became ‘a shorthand for so many cultural memories’ (Ryerson 1988: 129), and helped animate a strong Dravidian regional identity. Emphasizing Tamil can be a way of recognizing regional distinctiveness, a position that falls well short of making a claim for regional autonomy, advocating cultural nationalism or even favouring secession. The Congress nationalist movement strengthened its links with the region as it began making much greater use of Tamil as a medium for communication from 1916 onwards (Irschick 1969: 305–7). Linguistic sentiments were given priority by Congress in various ways. Its Madras unit was re-organized along linguistic lines and a Tamil Nadu Congress Committee was formally acknowledged in 1921 (Arnold 1977: 47). Various Congress politicians published work in Tamil and the value of using Tamil for communicating political propaganda also was recognized. Congress politicians took the opportunity to spread the use of Tamil in government business (Irschick 1986: 214–16). Taking a pragmatic pro-Tamil position helped Congress compete with the Justice Party. The BJP has taken a similar position as it has attempted to expand its presence in Tamil Nadu in the late 1990s (M.S.S. Pandian 2000c). The links between caste and language were politicized as Dravidian activists directed attention towards Brahman attachment to Sanskrit, which was depicted as an alien north Indian and ‘Aryan’ language distinct from ‘Dravidian’ Tamil. The DMK gained further advantage by favouring and popularizing a form of Tamil

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 33 which diminished the use of words with Sanskritic origins and was closer to the language used by the middle castes, as opposed to ‘Brahman’ Tamil (Ryerson 1988: 127–9; Béteille 1965: 53–5). In terms of class there was potential for tension between privileged speakers of English and that ‘segment of the middle class which was more comfortable with Tamil’ (Swamy 1996a: 173). However, English was an important element in strategies used to confront the imposition of Hindi and so this tension did not develop in the way that anti-English sentiment did in north India (ibid). Placing a heavy emphasis on Tamil meant that the Dravidian movement and the DMK were able to appeal to a broader segment of Tamil society than the Justice Party. The status of Hindi has been the source of bitter conflict in Tamilnad. Congress underestimated the extent to which Hindi was an issue that divided south India from the Hindi speaking parts of north India. Gandhi considered that using English reinforced the power of the colonial authorities and proposed resisting it by the widespread adoption of Hindi. When Congress formed the provincial government in 1937 the policy was taken forward. Hindi was introduced as a compulsory subject in 125 secondary schools. The policy was strongly opposed by a range of Justice Party leaders and Dravidian activists. The anti-Hindi protests gained momentum and the Congress government responded with strong police action, arrests and imprisonment of some protestors (Irschick 1986: 117, 216–23). The introduction of Hindi was portrayed as an assault on the Tamil language and the ‘superficial manifestation of the sinister penetration of Aryan ideas into Tamil culture through the political control of the Brahmins’ (Barnett 1976a: 53). The Hindi issue came up again during the drafting of the 1950 constitution but it was defused by a formula which kept English as a link language and postponed the introduction of Hindi as the official language for 15 years. The issue had economic as well as cultural significance. Non-Hindi speakers felt they would be substantially disadvantaged if English was no longer used as a link language in the institutions that tie India’s federal polity together. If Hindi was adopted as the official language an obvious advantage would be handed to Hindi speaking candidates for public service jobs. The language issue was politicized very effectively by the DMK in 1960 when it campaigned against the planned move to Hindi in 1965. Nehru gave various re-assurances but his intentions were overlooked after his death. In January 1965 Hindi was adopted as India’s official language. In subsequent weeks the Madras unit of the Congress Party was kept on the defensive over the language issue because elements within the national party continued to favour Hindi. The strength of feeling in Madras State was unanticipated even by the leaders of the DMK and the Congress state government struggled to cope with the disorder (Barnett 1976a: 119–22, 130–5; Hardgrave 1965c). A compromise formula was put together by the central government as it became clear how unpopular the policy was. By this time the DMK had located itself on the winning side of the argument against adopting Hindi as the official language. The Dravidian movement and the DMK exploited the issue of language with great skill. During the mid-1960s the DMK gained an important competitive advantage from the anti-Hindi protests. However, the DMK’s control over the

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language issue was temporary. In 1972 the AIADMK emerged as another regional party coming from the Dravidian tradition and it emphasized the language issue in ways that blurred the racial and caste dimension of DMK propaganda (Barnett 1976a: 303). When in government both the DMK and the AIADMK have pursued policies that favour Tamil (Swamy 1996b: 217). In 2004 a number of smaller parties and organizations came together to take up the banner of Tamil protection, demonstrating that the main Dravidian parties could not take the issue for granted. Language has at times been a potent issue. However, it has not been the basis for a sustained singular cleavage in Tamil politics. Its importance lies in the way that it has been linked to other social markers to produce rich, composite expressions of regional political identity. This is the theme taken up in the next section of the chapter.

Region The political, economic and cultural status of the region was a fundamentally important issue in the formation of the party system in Tamilnad. The national leadership of the Congress movement was primarily interested in the fate of the Indian nation as a whole and this commitment to an Indian nation was shared to a varying extent by members of the Tamilnad Congress. In the Madras Presidency Congress was opposed by rivals who took a secondary interest in the fate of the Indian nation and were much more concerned about the fate of their own region. After 1947 important tensions developed between the centre and the periphery as Congress engaged in the nation-building process. There is an interesting echo here of Lipset and Rokkan’s prediction that the process of national consolidation will be met by resistance in peripheral regions that are obliged to conform to central dictates. They also note that a centre-periphery divide is likely to be reflected in the ‘joint operation’ of cleavages (italics in the original, Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 41). In this section of the chapter I review four prominent approaches to the regional aspect of politics in Tamilnad. For reasons of space I do not discuss that aspect of Tamil politics concerned with inter-regional conflicts, and I pick up the theme of sub-regional assertion in a discussion of the newly formed Kongu Nadu Munnetra Peravai (KNMP) in the final chaper.11 Of the four types of conflict I discuss here, the first is the moderate Dravidian approach of the Justice Party which was concerned with politics in the larger Madras Presidency as well as Tamilnad. The second is the soft regionalism favoured by some Congress politicians in Tamilnad. This contrasts with a third approach found in the secessionist demands of the Dravidian movement. A claim for a separate Dravida Nadu was raised by Periar in 1938 and taken forward by the DMK in the 1950s. A fourth narrative can be found in what Barnett (1976a) describes as the cultural nationalism of the DMK after it gave up its secessionist demands.12 The cultural nationalist approach does not make claims for territorial independence and can be found, with different inflections, in the populist styles preferred by the DMK and the AIADMK. These populist formulations incorporate a range of cleavages but at their inception the politics of

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 35 Tamil nationalism and region were prominent. The regional element in these populist formulations has become much less significant since the 1960s. One reason for this is that the two main competitors in the state party system are regional parties who have much less need to demonstrate their differences with a national party. However, both parties remain regional parties. The moderate Dravidianism of the Justice Party made its strongest claims with regard to the caste structure of south Indian society and did not articulate a clear sense of south Indian nationalism. That said, the claims about caste were justified with reference to a racial and regionally specific narrative detailing the hegemony of Aryan Brahmans over the Dravidian Non-Brahmans. A Justice Party representative, K.V. Reddi Naidu, articulated these claims in evidence to the Joint Select Committee in 1919. Underlying his extensive commentary was an assumption that the Madras Presidency was a province that was significantly different from other parts of India (Irschick 1969: 150–1). A distinctive aspect of this phase of moderate Dravidianism is that it was usually assumed that the Dravidian region extended beyond the Tamil speaking areas to incorporate the broad swathe of south India populated by speakers of the four Dravidian languages. The Justice Party argued for the interests of south India but for the most part it did not see these interests served by political independence though Justice leaders argued for greater provincial autonomy (ibid: 216). At its formation the party was committed to the political stability of the region, accepting ‘the influence and authority of the British Rulers’ who ‘hold the scales even between creed and class’ (Irschick 1969: 364). After a poor showing in the 1926 elections the Justice Party wavered and accepted that some members might wish to take a nationalist position and also join Congress. However, after this brief wobble, the Justice Party, a strongly provincial party, continued to provide an alternative to the nationalist movement in south India until the late 1930s. The soft regionalism favoured by some Congress politicians offered an alternative to moderate and radical Dravidianism. In the 1920s and 1930s Congress was engaged in a twofold struggle, attempting to best both the British and the Justice Party (Arnold 1977: 141). Congress both denigrated the Justice Party, deeming it a communal organization, and imitated it. Congress absorbed some of the policies, tactics and ideas favoured by the Justice Party. In the 1950s and 1960s Congress was keen to minimize the advantages of its Dravidian rivals. Nationalist views differed within the Tamilnad Congress. Some advocated a strong integrationist position whereas others favoured Indian nationalism with a regional flavour. The latter position had the advantage of negating some of the advantage gained by the Justice Party, and its successors, from favouring regional issues. Strong versions of Indian nationalism favoured by some Congress members argued for the integration of all Indians into a larger national whole. National convergence was to be encouraged through an economic project to modernize India (Wyatt 2005). Regional differences were unevenly recognized and an important method of ‘assimilation within a pan-Indian culture’ was the promotion of Hindi (Subramanian 1999: 127, 134). Not all members of the Tamilnad Congress were comfortable with aggressive integration which was easy to criticize for its insensitivity to Tamil culture. Many

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members of the Congress movement were also Tamil patriots and enthusiastic advocates of Tamil language and culture. There were intellectual precedents for this. Influential figures both supported the Congress movement and celebrated Tamilness. Representative individuals include the pioneering journalist Tiru V. Kaliyanasundara Mudaliyar (1883–1953), and the poet Subramania Bharati (1882–1921) (Ryerson 1988: 62–5; Ludden 1973; Irschick 1969: 307–8). Among Congress leaders, Rajagopalachari was one of those who were keen that the movement remain in touch with the Tamil cultural milieu though ironically he also helped spark the 1938 anti-Hindi protests (Irschick 1969: 303–5; Subramanian 1999: 127). In the 1950s and 1960s Kamaraj, an unpretentious figure from a modest caste background, helped Congress to better identify with the region (Barnett 1976a: 165). As well as giving Congress a leader closer to the people, Kamaraj also re-positioned Congress in relation to the political style of the Dravidian movement. As well as forming an alliance with the DK he ‘coopted many of the more emotive symbols of Tamil nationalism, including using the name Tamilnad for internal administrative purposes’ (Swamy 1996b: 198–9). Until the DMK victory in 1967 it appeared that the soft regionalism favoured by some in the Tamilnad Congress was an effective way of containing the centre-periphery cleavage in Tamil politics. A secessionist variation of the centre-periphery cleavage was introduced by Periar when he took over the leadership of the Justice Party in December 1938. A demand for a separate Dravida Nadu was formally stated on 1 July 1939 (Barnett 1976a: 51–3). A short while later Periar supported the formation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland along with a Dravidistan in south India. The secession demand was endorsed again when the DK was formed in August 1944. The regional narrative was intertwined with advocacy of radical social reform. When the DMK was formed in 1949 the secessionist demand was included in the objectives of the new political party. The question of secession created a stark divide between Congress and the DMK. At times Dravida Nadu was seen as a Tamil homeland (Irschick 1969 346–7). At other times the boundaries were extended to include all of south India. One contemporary observer felt able to comment that in the late 1950s the DK and the DMK were ‘consistently carrying on propaganda for the establishment of the separate State of Dravidastan for the non-Brahmins of South India, which would include all those who speak the four Dravidian languages’ (Devanandan 1959: 1). The issue was clarified by wider developments. With the linguistic re-organization of the states in the 1950s it became very clear that the Dravidian movement had strongest support in the Tamil speaking areas and it was in Madras State that ‘the movement’s de facto transformation from a South Indian (Dravidian) to a Tamil vehicle became formalized’ (Swamy 1996a: 178–9). The DMK put great emphasis on Dravida Nadu, arguing in the mid-1950s that it was only in an independent state that the party could achieve the goals of social reform (Barnett 1976a: 92–3). The secessionist stand distinguished the DMK from Congress but it was also a difficult position to sustain within a larger Indian state, governed by a nationalist party anxious to maintain India’s territorial integrity. In the early 1960s the DMK began to articulate a form of cultural nationalism in which territorial claims were given up. In this weaker formulation a symbolic issue

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 37 retained by the DMK was the demand to rename Madras State, and adopt the term ‘Tamil Nadu’ (Swamy 1996b: 197). The secessionist claim was formally rescinded in 1963. Annadurai gave up the demand for a separate Dravida Nadu in his pamphlet ‘To My Friends’ (Barnett 1976a: 127). This re-interpretation of conflict helped remove the impression that the DMK was a marginal party advocating radical minority views. It was at this time that the party was able to identify itself much more closely with the concerns of the ordinary Tamil people (Barnett 1976a: 100–1). Other important elements in the Tamil nationalist narrative were reworked. The racial element of earlier narratives was diluted. In the late 1950s the idea that Tamil Brahmans were racially Dravidian gained currency, separating them from north Indian Aryans. The DMK also downplayed its anti-Brahman position, arguing that it only advocated anti-Brahmanism. A simpler differentiation between north and south India was made. Adversarial relations between north and south India were described in more specific terms that emphasized the contrast between ‘northern prosperity and southern neglect’ (ibid: 102). The DMK saw a solution in terms of state autonomy, with power shifting from the centre to the states. The DMK argued for cultural recognition of regional diversity and proposed a list of 14 official languages including Tamil (ibid: 304–10). The DMK claimed that it represented the aspirations of the ordinary Tamil people, though this definition of ordinariness was by no means universal. The DMK had a particular affinity with backward caste aspirations which influenced the way the party appealed to the ‘common man’. However, Barnett argues that considerations of caste took a secondary place in the construction of cultural nationalism. She suggests that the ‘symbols of caste society’ were co-opted into nationalist ideology which was sufficiently strong to support a new form of Tamilian identity in which the Tamil nation had ‘an intrinsic legitimacy of its own’ (Barnett 1976a: 164). The DMK articulated a persuasive form of cultural nationalism which is neatly summarized as a belief ‘that all Tamils (alternatively, all south Indians) participate in the same Dravidian culture, casteless and classless in its pristine state in ancient Dravidanadu, so the argument goes, and that this culture provides an overriding and basic identity for all Tamils.’ (Barnett 1977: 403) The AIADMK fashioned a looser version of cultural nationalism as it developed as a party in the early 1970s. Swamy argues that the AIADMK saw political advantage in de-emphasizing the centre-periphery cleavage in Tamil politics and bringing welfare politics to the fore (1996a). That said the AIADMK was still a regional party intimately associated with Tamil Nadu (in spite of the phrase ‘All-India’ being added to the party’s title). The anti-Brahmanism of the DMK meant much less to the AIADMK, with a prominent Brahman politician, H.V. Hande, joining the party in 1973 (Barnett 1976a: 303). The subsequent elevation of Jayalalithaa Jayaram, a Brahman, to the post of party leader in 1989 confirmed this trend. The AIADMK also distanced itself from calls for state autonomy, arguing instead for what Barnett terms ‘responsive federalism’ (ibid: 304). The cultural policy of the AIADMK helped burnish the party’s regional credentials. In common with the DMK, the party has supported Tamil scholarship and funded World Tamil Conferences when it has been in power (Swamy 1996b: 217).

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Tensions between centre and periphery were extremely important in the development of the party system in Tamil Nadu. The DMK gave this theme prominence in the nationalist ideology it used so successfully to challenge Congress in the 1960s. However, it needs to be emphasized that this ideology acknowledged conflicts arising from other social markers as well. The pattern of competition changed in the decade after 1967. New parties emerged and other issues came to prominence in competition between parties. Tensions between centre and the periphery eased over time. The DMK adjusted to the novelty of holding office and governed using a populist political style. After its formation in 1972 the AIADMK identified itself with a different populist style. We can identify the influence of the centre-periphery tension on these populist styles. Before discussing the relationship between region, populism and party competition I will consider how cleavages based on class, gender and the town–country divide have been managed in Tamil politics.

Class Party politics in Tamilnad has tended to avoid overt discussion of class. However, some political entrepreneurs have attempted to mobilize on this basis while their opponents have attempted to blunt the appeal of class politics or build cross-class coalitions. Two notable approaches to class politics in Tamilnad can be identified. The first is the mobilization on the basis of class solidarity, placing economic interests at the forefront of party appeal. A variation on this is a cross-class alliance of classes with overlapping interests. An alternative is the oblique appeal to class interests which is arguably present in the populist political styles favoured by the Dravidian parties. Direct appeals to class solidarity were made in the 1950s by leftist parties like the Communist Party and the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). The PSP directed its appeals at the working class and its strategies for mobilization included use of trade union networks to seek support in industrial areas. The party was not notably successful in Tamilnad and took an unpopular position favouring Hindi as a national language (Ramaswamy 1977: 139–52). The Communist Party highlighted class differences as it moved to mobilize support. The Communists attempted to build alliances among difference class segments that it considered to be in adversarial relations with capital. A locally successful mobilization among poor tenants and labourers in Thanjavur is discussed in Chapter 3 (Gough 1981: 147–50). However, Communist politics in Tamilnad was successfully opposed by other parties and overt appeals to class have not produced a deep and lasting cleavage in the party systems of Tamilnad. Those hostile to class politics have responded by emphasizing themes that transcend class, such as the nationalist struggle against the British in the case of Congress (Ramaswamy 1977: 139). The early DMK favoured rhetoric that suggested socialist leanings but did not encourage class confrontation. The decline of leftist politics based on overt class cleavages is partly a consequence of the attitude of the Dravidian parties, as ‘the DMK when it was in power between 1967 and 1975 and the Anna DMK since 1977 have generally been repressive toward the organized working class’ (Harriss 1991: 83). Another problem with building a class

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 39 cleavage is that class dividing lines in the countryside are far from clear. The development of agrarian capitalism in modern Tamilnad has done much to blur class boundaries, which inevitably complicates attempts to outline a class project (ibid: 81). Oblique appeals to class sentiments are an alternative to narratives of political conflict stated in terms of stark confrontation between oppressing and oppressed classes. The populist styles of the DMK and the AIADMK are opposed to overt class politics but it is possible to see in each approach a muted appeal to class considerations. The DMK linked its fortunes to intermediate and moderately well off groups. Barnett argues that the DMK presented itself as the champion of the ‘common man’, an image that would appeal variously to ‘the rising urban lower middle class, the educated, unemployed youth, the middling farmer, and particularly the backward castes’ (1976a: 318). The AIADMK differentiated itself from the DMK in a number of ways. When in government the AIADMK attempted, though not very successfully, to reduce the entitlement of wealthier recipients to state provided benefits. Caste employment quotas were subject to a means test, though this policy was withdrawn following protests. Agricultural policy was targeted at owners of smaller farms (Swamy 1996a: 206–9). The AIADMK made a more explicit attempt to target the poor with its policies. The AIADMK identified itself with various marginal groups and expressed some of their needs in both socioeconomic and psychological terms. However, the AIADMK provided leadership ‘for’ rather than leadership ‘by’ subaltern groups, and it should be said the poor were not always identified in class terms but with reference to other markers including age and gender. MGR was presented as the protector of the poor rather than a leader promoting the long term and organized incorporation of weaker groups into the state party system. In the case of the AIADMK the appeal to class solidarity is presented in terms that do not empower the class groups being addressed, but makes them an object of political mercy. The DMK has at times moved towards the welfarist approach favoured by the AIADMK. For example, the DMK manifesto for the 2006 assembly election offered attractive benefits, including cheap rice and free televisions, for poorer voters. The oblique appeals to class, articulated with reference to vague socio-economic categories in sweeping populist appeals means that competition between the DMK and the AIADMK has not produced a class cleavage within the Tamil Nadu party system. Support for both parties cuts across class lines. Opinion poll evidence in the 1980s showed that the AIADMK enjoyed a strong lead over the DMK among poorer votes but also among most categories of wealthier voters as well (Swamy 1998: 129). A study by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) at the time of the 2001 assembly election which used broader categories revealed that the AIADMK and its allies led by 12 percentage points among voters of low economic status but the gap was only three percentage points among those of a middle and high status (Frontline 2001d: 116). Other observers have noted that support for each party cuts across class lines (Harriss 1991: 83). In his study of Madurai in the late 1980s Kohli concluded that ‘[n]either caste nor class can provide a ready basis for aggregation of political interests in contemporary Madurai’ (1991: 179). Trade

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unions in the city, though largely class rather than caste-based were divided by loyalties to different parties (ibid: 177–8). Neither of the populist styles preferred by the two Dravidian parties is overtly class-based but they do appeal, among other things, to broad socio-economic categories which mean that considerations of class, though not well displayed, are incorporated into a politically constructed, but hazy, cleavage that separate two alternatives in the party system in Tamil Nadu.

Gender Political divisions and conflicts based on gender have had an interesting trajectory in the politics of modern Tamilnad. This social marker has been emphasized, or deemphasized in four ways. First, the early period of party politics was one in which most institutions created male dominated political spaces. Second, some Dravidian advocates of social reform recognized the political importance of gender inequality. Third, the re-working of Dravidian ideas after the initial social reform period recognized sexual difference but located it in an overtly masculinized discourse. Fourth, the AIADMK opened up a gender gap in voting patterns in Tamil Nadu in the 1970s by presenting itself as the protector of vulnerable groups, especially women. The political institutions of the early twentieth century had a strong male bias. Women were enfranchised in 1921, so they could participate in elections to the Madras Legislative Council, but the rules were such that female voters were very much in a minority (Irschick 1969: 257). Neither the Justice Party nor Congress seem to have been particularly concerned to include women among their elected representatives and the high politics of the 1920s and 1930s was dominated by wealthy male politicians. This absence of women at senior levels of the Congress movement did not reflect the character of the movement as a whole as women did participate in Congress demonstrations and campaigns in Tamilnad (Arnold 1977: 126). The 1935 Government of India Act increased the size of the female electorate and reserved seats for women in elections to the new Madras Legislative Assembly. Ten women members were returned to the 215 seat assembly by the 1946 elections. The reserved seats were removed after Independence and in 1952 only two women were returned to the 375 seat Madras State Assembly (Nayar 1956: 113). After 1947 the suffrage was extended more equally but it took some time before registration procedures registered women in correct proportion to their presence in the general population (Singer 2006: 79–82). In the early period of party politics in Tamilnad gender was not used by political parties as a basis for defining political conflict or mobilizing political support. The Self-Respect Movement politicized the issue of gender more directly and its members argued in favour of greater equality in the 1920s and 1930s. Women participated in the Self-Respect Movement. Geetha and Rajadurai conclude that by 1928 members of the movement ‘possessed a coherent understanding of gender’ (1998: 381). The Self-Respect marriage promoted by the movement subverted the norms of arranged, caste compatible unions and the ‘marriage vow required man and woman to abide by each other’s views, needs and concerns’ (ibid: 382). Periar

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 41 argued against child marriage and in favour of education, paid employment and equality for women (Swamy 1996a: 169). The Self-Respect Movement argued that widow re-marriage was socially respectable (Devanandan 1959: 17–8). The SelfRespect Movement did not have a direct impact on the incorporation of gender into party politics but it did provide a progressive narrative which could be used to address gender issues. The DMK, for example, granted the Self-Respect marriage status as a legal union (Swamy 1996a: 169). The DMK developed an alternative approach to the question of gender and ‘rearticulated much of the more gender egalitarian ethos of the earlier Dravidian Self-Respect Movement’ in a much more conservative way (Spary 2008: 155). The DMK came to have a more masculine orientation. Rajadurai and Geetha observe that: DMK leaders are thus known in public through honorifics, and all political relationships are recast in terms reminiscent of close-knit kinship relations operative within a familial space. . . . Martial titles are granted to party leaders whose political rhetoric, likewise, breathes blood, vengeance and glory. Virility is projected as an attribute of Tamilness . . . (Rajadurai and Geetha 1996: 568) Others have observed that the DMK tends to function as a male dominated family in which women take a subservient position (Lakshmi 1990 cited in Spary 2008: 149). Great store is set on the feminine virtues epitomized by Kannaki, the goddess of chastity whose story is narrated in the epic poem Silapathikaram (The Epic of the Anklet) (Jacob-Pandian 1977: 56). The epic poem has been put to political use by leaders of the DMK with interpretations that emphasize Kannaki’s chastity and reliance on her husband. The longstanding DMK leader, Karunanidhi, has taken keen interest in the Kannaki epic (Rajadurai and Geetha 1996: 565–6). He was given an ideal opportunity to demonstrate his enthusiasm when a statue of Kannaki was removed from one of the main thoroughfares in Chennai in early 2002. Karunanidhi promised to reinstate this symbol of Tamil culture when returned to power (MT 2002; The Hindustan Times 2006b). The values emphasized in the DMK discourse such as chastity and motherhood suggest vulnerability and the importance of protecting female honour. The ideology of the DMK provided a weak basis on which to promote equality and the party has generally found it easier to gain support from men (Rudolph 1961: 296; Swamy 1996a: 192–6). The gendered discourse of the DMK, with its masculine bias, made it easier for others to politicize gender. The AIADMK gained from the positioning of the DMK. With a subtle twist on the ideology of the DMK, MGR was able to present his party as the protector of vulnerable groups. MGR had a particular empathy with women voters that began with his film persona and developed as his political career progressed (M.S.S. Pandian 1992: 50–2). An observer of the 1977 election commented ‘He is the real-life hero to most common people, the man who will destroy evil, the perennial saviour of damsels in distress. Women throng to his meetings like they do to no other leaders

42

Conflict, cleavages and political parties

[sic]’ (Economic and Political Weekly 1977a: 568). MGR emphasized his close relationship with his mother, noting her vulnerabilities, and took policy positions that made gender a salient issue. The sale of alcohol, and its prohibition, was one such area. MGR strongly opposed the second DMK administration when it lifted prohibition (Barnett, 1976a: 294–5). The AIADMK, elected to power in 1977, reinstated prohibition though the policy was withdrawn in 1981. This policy reversal was followed by the launch of the Chief Minister’s Nutritious Noon Meal Programme. This noon meal scheme was an expansion of an earlier scheme and provided year-round meals for children, poor widows and the elderly. In addition childcare was provided and the additional employment created was kept for poor women. The noon meal scheme offered compensation for the household income women would lose through the consumption of alcohol by male members of their family (Swamy 1996a: 217). The AIADMK kept the gender gap open after the death of MGR. The new party leader, Jayalalithaa, continued to take positions favouring women. Policies of her administration between 2001 and 2006 included reviving the cradle baby scheme to discourage female infanticide, providing free bicycles for Dalit schoolgirls and opening more all women police stations.13 These policies have been integrated with a form of populism that is rather aptly described by Swamy as ‘protection populism’ and by Subramanian as ‘paternalist’ (Swamy 1998: 109; Subramanian 1999: 74–5). The protection approach finessed by the AIADMK has done most to introduce gender as a factor in party competition. Opinion polls and data gathered from gender-segregated polling booths in 1989 demonstrated the AIADMK lead among women voters (Swamy 1996b: 202, 205, 207–8). A CSDS poll conducted before the 2001 assembly elections showed that the AIADMK enjoyed a nine percentagepoint lead over the DMK among female respondents (Frontline 2001d: 116). The DMK has responded to the AIADMK policies at various points by taking more interest in welfare issues. In 2006 the party manifesto included a large number of benefits, well advertised in campaign posters and television advertisements, which gave the DMK the appearance of favouring protection populism.

The town–country divide Another potential cleavage in the party systems of most Indian states is the urban–rural divide. The fact that the majority of the population live in rural areas and that agriculture has dominated economic activity in the countryside of Tamilnad made it likely that political entrepreneurs would seek to politicize the town–country divide. Political constructions of the divide in India have usually concentrated on economic issues related to farming (Varshney 1994: 4). Other points of tension include the cultural distance between town and country and the allegation of relative neglect in the state provision of services and development projects in rural areas. The economic tension between town and country has tended to be presented in terms of sectoral rather than class conflict. The accusation of ‘urban bias’ is easy to make, and has a high degree of plausibility. However, political parties in Tamilnad usually have been adept at managing divisions between

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 43 town and country. Patterns of political support show some variation between urban and rural areas. As the DMK became established it demonstrated strong support in urban areas of the state (Barnett 1976a: 147–9). The AIADMK also gained urban support but it had an edge over the DMK in rural areas. A poll carried out in 1991 by Madras Christian College showed the AIADMK had support of 42.3 per cent and 48.9 per cent of those surveyed in villages and hamlets respectively; whereas the DMK had support from 29.4 per cent and 30.1 per cent in the same locations (Swamy 1998: 128). However, neither party has exclusively aligned itself with either town or country and both parties have shown willingness to accommodate rural interests. In contrast, the Dravidian parties have been criticized for neglecting urban development (Arabindoo 2008: 143–8). The outline of a political cleavage based on rural interests is clearly discernible in Tamil Nadu. A strong farmers’ movement made some impression on state politics in the 1970s, during a critical period in the deepening of capitalist agriculture in Tamil Nadu (Harriss 1982). The Tamil Nadu Agriculturalists’ Association (TNAA) developed into a state wide pressure group advocating farmers’ interests which was regarded respectfully by political parties by 1980 (Economic and Political Weekly 1980: 1042). The price of electricity, a key input for irrigated farms, was a particular focus but the agenda broadened out to cover agricultural taxes, support prices and subsidies. The demands of the TNAA for lower electricity prices met with some resistance from the early DMK and AIADMK administrations (Swamy 1996a: 208–9). The AIADMK attempted to divide the movement. In 1980 it introduced lower charges for smaller farmers. The DMK, hoping to discomfort the AIADMK formed its own farmers’ wing and joined agitations (Subramanian 1999: 293). The farmers’ movement failed to maintain momentum and this gave the state government more flexibility by the mid-1980s. Curiously once the confrontation had passed a number of generous concessions, including the introduction of free electricity for farmers in 1991, have been offered (Janakarajan 2004: 236–41). An attempt by the last AIADMK administration to re-introduce charges was abandoned in 2004 because they were perceived to be an electoral liability. Attempts to launch a farmers’ political party in the 1980s failed (ibid: 240). The potential for conflict persists as the agricultural sector has been under enormous pressure since the late 1990s but this has not translated into decisive interventions in party politics. Political parties have anticipated tension in the countryside by offering strategic concessions to farmers and institutional devices, like party-based farmers’ organizations, complicate attempts to mobilize unified rural movements and parties. Also, the organization of party politics around other cleavages helps suppress a potential cleavage based on a rural or farming identity.

Conclusions In this concluding section I do three things. First, I draw together the discussion of the seven social and cultural markers to show how they have been combined to assemble distinctive political cleavages. This is most notably the case with the populist styles of the two Dravidian parties. Second, I argue that the case of

44

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Tamilnad shows how the cleavages around which party competition is organized are heavily influenced by the actions of political entrepreneurs. I also note that these cleavages do not necessarily conform to social structures. Third, I show how cleavages are related to the contemporary pattern of political competition in the Tamil Nadu party system. I argue that although the centre-periphery cleavage bought to prominence in the 1960s was foundational in the evolution of the party system, and has lingering influence, the party system is animated by different conflicts. Structural cleavages This chapter has shown how caste, religion, language, region, class, gender and the town–country divide have been introduced into the modern politics of Tamilnad. The individual impact of these seven markers has been quite uneven. Very few of them have been used independently to create significant cleavages in the party system. The religious and class cleavages are of primary importance to the BJP and the Communist parties respectively. These parties only have a small following in the state. The town–country divide has been neutralized by the Dravidian parties. The markers of gender and class have been incorporated into the appeals of the Dravidian parties. Caste has been used successfully to create dividing lines in the party system at various junctures in the development of the party system. It is an issue that has been brought back to prominence since the late 1980s. The markers of language and region, supplemented by subtle references to caste and oblique appeals to class interests, were heavily used by the DMK in the 1960s to fashion its distinctive cultural nationalism. The DMK developed a significant centre-periphery cleavage in the Tamilnad party system in the 1960s. As noted above the DMK’s cultural nationalism suited a populist style of politics. Populist politics revolves around the idea of the common people or as Wiles argues, it is a creed or a movement in which ‘virtue resides in the simple people’ (italics in the original, 1970: 166). Populists frequently depict the common people as oppressed and cheated of their natural due by powerful interests. An anti-elitist attitude is another key feature of populist rhetoric (Canovan 1981: 294). Political cleavages Each Dravidian party has been strongly linked to a particular type of populism. The DMK is said to have employed an ‘empowerment’ or ‘assertive’ populism that speaks to the ambitions of a more upwardly mobile section of the electorate. In contrast, the AIADMK has gained strong support using with its ‘protection’ or ‘paternalist’ populism directed at the concerns of women and poorer voters.14 These populist forms are regional in character and set the Dravidian parties apart from Congress which is still a party with a national orientation. Populist politics, practised successfully, can change the pattern of competition in a party system. The case of Tamilnad shows how populists can incorporate several social and cultural markers and create a political cleavage in a party system. As

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 45 Swamy notes, ‘The Dravidian movement provides an excellent example of empowerment populism’s ability to combine several sources of grievance into a single identity, and to shift meanings among diverse elements as political circumstances change’ (1996a: 148). These examples of populist mobilization show how the activity, or agency, of political entrepreneurs can fundamentally shape a party system. The cleavages that divide the DMK and the AIADMK from each other, and other parties, are political constructions. The ideology of the Dravidian movement drew on categories such as Aryan and Non-Brahman. These categories are not primordially tied to existing social identities. They were concepts that were made to be politically relevant, and were re-defined, or de-emphasized as time passed. If populist political entrepreneurs can make their definition of conflict prevail, structural cleavages linked to social markers, like class, will be obscured. Populists emphasize unity among the people, and in doing so blur many of the lines of conflict defined by social markers. Conflict may very well be directed outside of a political system, towards north India for example, or at a small privileged out group, such as the north Indian owners of local businesses. The agency of political entrepreneurs has had a decisive impact at key moments in the evolution of the party system in Tamilnad. The rout of the Justice Party in the 1937 elections marked the beginning of a lean period for those with a regional political orientation. Periar’s leadership sustained the Dravidian movement between 1938 and the formation of the DMK in 1949. In 1934 Congress attempted to bring Periar and the Self-Respect Movement back into its nationalist movement. Subramanian offers the counterfactual suggestion that had this happened the DMK might not have emerged after 1947 (1999: 126). Much the same could be said about MGR’s decision to leave the DMK in 1972. It is impossible to envisage the existence of the AIADMK without MGR’s leadership. Cleavages and the party system The contemporary party system can be divided between three broad categories (see Table 2.1). The two Dravidian parties have controlled all elected state governments since 1967. They also lead election winning alliances and always oppose each other. A number of smaller national parties participate in elections. A third group of parties are those that represent various caste cleavages. This constellation of parties is nominally divided between national and regional parties but the relationship between the centre and the periphery is no longer the leading source of contention among parties in contemporary Tamil Nadu. This requires some explanation. The working out of centre-periphery tensions in the 1960s resulted in the emergence of the DMK as a party of government, from which the AIADMK later emerged. The AIADMK also became a party of government. The result was a party system in the 1970s and 1980s which was divided between national parties and regional parties. The DMK and the AIADMK have survived even though the basis of competition has moved since the 1960s. The continuing regional orientation of the AIADMK is

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Table 2.1 The orientation and relative strength of parties in contemporary Tamil Nadu Party

Date of Likely share Relationship to cleavages formation of the vote in assembly elections* (per cent)

National parties Congress 1885

8

BJP

1951

2

CPI CPI(M)

1923 1964

1 1

Parties linked to the region DMK 1949 30–35

AIADMK 1972

33–35

MDMK

1994

4

DMDK

2005

10

Caste parties PMK 1989

5

PT

1998

0.4

DPI

1982

1.6

KNMP

2009

2

Stands for a national perspective on politics and is sometimes linked to privileged class and caste groups. With only remnants of earlier support it depends on alliances with Dravidian parties. Attempts to develop a religious cleavage and deepen sympathy for Hindu nationalism. Attempts to promote class solidarity among labourers, tenant farmers and industrial workers have been undermined by Dravidian mobilization. Pioneering Dravidian party that still stands for a distinctive Tamil identity. Struggles to gain support among subaltern strata but remains prominent by strategic formation of electoral alliances. Formed by the actor-politician MGR causing a split in the DMK. Gains strongest support from women and poorer voters. Formed amidst complaints about dynastic tendencies in the parent DMK. Describes itself as the ‘renaissance’ DMK and takes some strong Tamil nationalist positions. Vehicle for the actor-politician Vijayakanth. Follows MGR’s political style showing sympathy for women and the lower classes. Inherits a tradition of activism by the ‘most backward’ Vanniar caste group. Also advocates strong Tamil nationalist positions. Campaigns against discrimination towards Dalits. Targets support among the Pallar caste group in southern Tamil Nadu. Originally a social movement campaigning against discrimination towards Dalits. Has strongest support in northern Tamil Nadu and has recently argued for Tamil protection. Linked to the caste association of the Kongu Vellala Gounders this party argues for the development of the western sub-region.

Conflict, cleavages and political parties 47 Table 2.1 Continued Forward Bloc

1948

0.3

Closely identified with the Thevar caste cluster in southern Tamil Nadu.

Notes * The figures for most of the smaller parties have been derived from the most recent assembly election they contested independently: BJP (2009), MDMK (2001), DMDK (2009), PMK (1991), PT (2009) and the Forward Bloc (2006). The DPI gained 1.6 per cent of the vote with minimal support from allies in the 2004 Lok Sabha election. The AIADMK alliance gained 34.8 per cent of the vote with minimal support from other parties in the same election. The AIADMK contested the 2006 election with relatively few allies, mainly the DPI and the MDMK, and the alliance gained 40.1 per cent. This suggests support for the AIADMK in recent elections of between 33 per cent and 35 per cent. The discussion towards the end of Chapter 3 supports the estimates given for Congress, CPI, CPI(M) and the DMK.

partly a legacy of its formative period. The AIADMK had to differentiate itself from the DMK and two Congress factions. The AIADMK showed itself to be different from the DMK by favouring welfare policies. In doing so it appropriated some Congress policies and many Congress supporters. The AIADMK showed itself to be different from the two Congress factions by associating with a weaker version of the regional sentiments promoted by the DMK. Now that Congress is substantially weakened, and is not a realistic contender for office in Tamil Nadu, the most intense conflict takes place between the DMK and the AIADMK, both of which are located on the Dravidian/regional side of the centre-periphery cleavage. Dravidian ideas are now taken for granted, with some arguing that these ideas constitute the common sense of the state (Rajadurai and Geetha 1996: 550–1). The political culture of Tamil Nadu is not exclusively Dravidian but it is certainly heavily influenced by ideas of Tamilness. Conflict is now denominated in a variety of ways. The main cleavage in the party system is a political one that divides two regional parties. Partisan differences between the well-established DMK and AIADMK account for the main divide in the electorate. Further divisions within the Dravidian bloc were introduced by the MDMK in 1994 and the DMDK in 2006. Conflict with the Congress is rather muted as resentments against the centre are much less marked, and Congress is a valuable ally, but we can still discern a partisan division which results in important minority support for the national party. In recent years caste cleavages have been re-introduced to the party system with a number of smaller parties presenting themselves as alternatives to both Dravidian and national parties. Party politics in Tamil Nadu is inconceivable without reference to the regional sentiments which were so strongly stated by the DMK in the 1960s. Since the 1960s the centre-periphery cleavage has been displaced as the primary focus of political conflict. The decline of Congress meant that in the 1980s and 1990s the primary conflict in the party system occurred between two regional parties. Since the 1990s the two leading regional parties have been challenged by a number of parties but the DMK and the AIADMK remain the largest parties. It could be said that the party

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Conflict, cleavages and political parties

system is frozen or, more accurately, partially frozen as the two largest parties owe their existence to the centre-periphery issue, an issue that has ceased to be the source of serious conflict in the party system of Tamil Nadu.15 At election time the main contest occurs between two electoral alliances. However, this is insufficient to deem the current Tamil Nadu system a two party system. There are important ideological differences between parties and each of the parties listed in Table 2.1 has a partisan following. In short the electorate does not divide between two camps. Even though parties may cooperate at election time there are periods of interaction in the long periods between elections. So parties might compete with each other for advantage even though they might be formal allies. In summary a more nuanced pattern of competition occurs in a multiparty system in which two Dravidian parties are prominent. In the next chapter I say more about the evolution of the party system in the light of the cleavages that have been discussed here.

3

Evolution of a party system

The previous chapter reviewed a range of potential social and political divisions in Tamilnad that political entrepreneurs could use to mobilize a following. There was no inevitable outcome in the development of the party system in south India. If linguistic re-organization had not occurred the dynamic of the party system may have been very different. The heterogeneity of south India offered a range of possibilities that political entrepreneurs could develop. This chapter shows how the party system in Tamilnad has remained dynamic since the early twentieth century. The party system has not divided between two obvious ‘alternatives’ separated by a key cleavage. It needs to be remembered that during an important part of the period discussed below Tamilnad was part of a larger unit, the Madras Presidency. It was only in 1957 that a general election was held within a unit that recognized Tamil speakers as a majority. However, divides in Tamil political opinion were expressed by movements and parties well before 1957 and party politics was shaped by earlier developments. Key political figures from a range of parties gained their initial experience of politics well before 1947. Even in the absence of mass suffrage political entrepreneurs experimented with political narratives and attempted to divide, or unite, society to their advantage. This chapter reviews the development of the party system chronologically. The discussion is largely concerned with regional elections. Before 1937 the apex of electoral politics in the Madras Presidency was the Legislative Council. In 1937 the first elections to the Madras Assembly were held. After independence in 1947 the Madras Presidency was replaced by Madras State. The assembly was reduced in size to accommodate the formation of linguistic states in the mid-1950s. I concentrate on two analytical themes in this chapter. First, I detail important institutional changes that have had an impact on the development of the party system. Second, I give an account of the strategic interaction between parties that by turns compete and cooperate with each other. Elections provide parties with important information about the disposition of the electorate and the tactics of opposing parties. This review of the period from 1916 to 2006 reveals the dynamism of the party system. Since the 1960s alliance formation has been a distinctive feature of the party system, though the composition of the alliances has changed. While incumbents use alliances to maintain a privileged position, new parties have been able to emerge,

50

Evolution of a party system

such that a large number of viable parties can be found in the contemporary state party system. The trend towards alliances and the increasing number of parties has changed the pattern of interaction between parties in Tamil Nadu. Competition is much more focused as parties identify their principal adversary. Established parties seek to retain their core support and are much less inclined to seek out new support. Electoral alliances allow a range of parties to be accommodated and the two largest parties, which act as alliance gatekeepers, gain important advantages from this approach. The large parties are under much less pressure to mobilize new support as they can supplement their support by the addition of smaller parties to their alliance. The first section of the chapter reviews the early period of electoral politics between 1916 and 1937 which includes the formation of the Justice Party and the reaction of the already formed Congress movement. The second section of the chapter gives an account of the period between 1937 and 1967 when Congress dominated politics in south India. The third section of the chapter deals with the period between 1967 and 1980 during which Congress experienced important electoral decline. It was also the period in which Dravidian politics came to dominate state politics with the coming to power of the DMK in 1967 and the subsequent split and formation of the AIADMK in 1972. The decline of Congress was matched by the rise of the AIADMK. The fourth section of the chapter narrates and analyses changes in the party system between 1980 and 1996, a period in which the weakened Congress Party was usually the balancing force between the DMK and the AIADMK. The fifth section of the chapter examines the period after 1996 in which the number of parties proliferated. The sixth section provides a short account of the electoral geography of the party system. Before I conclude the chapter I summarize the recent changes in the party system.

1916–1937: An incipient party system The period between 1916 and 1937 was extremely important for the development of a party system in Tamilnad. British constitutional reforms allowed for more political participation after 1919. Ambitious politicians responded to these opportunities and politics in the Madras Presidency began to involve political parties competing for office. The main protagonists were the Justice Party and the Congress movement. The Justice Party won the 1920 election to the Madras Legislative Council and formed a provincial government under the limited terms permitted by the 1919 Government of India Act. The Justice Party won sufficient seats to form governments in 1923 and 1930. In 1926 Congress emerged as the largest party and kept the Justice Party out of office (Arnold 1977: 101–5). However, a full party system did not develop and it is more accurate to talk of an incipient party system in this period. Political parties were weak. It is not possible, for example, to present a concise table with meaningful party strengths as I have done for later sections of this chapter.1 Many in the Congress movement were wary of being pulled into party politics and office seeking, seeing it as a distraction from the larger task of opposing the British colonial regime. That said, not all Congress

Evolution of a party system 51 politicians took this view and at times there was sufficient support from the movement for Congress to act as a political party. Party politics in the Madras began to take on some systemic qualities in the decades of the 1920s and 1930s. At times parties competed with each other for political office and other political conflicts were expressed by electoral means. Politics encompassed a wider public as the 1930s progressed. As we shall see the weakness of the political parties meant a full party system did not emerge but the two decades before the 1937 election were important for the development of later party systems in Tamilnad. Institutional context In the early twentieth century the Congress movement and British colonial institutions offered two poles around which political activity could cluster. It was in this context that the 1919 Government of India Act introduced important changes in the system of government. Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly were intended to provide a national focus for politics in India. Important changes in the provinces included the expansion of provincial legislative councils and the granting of substantial responsibilities to ministers based in the legislatures (Brown 1985: 198–9). British colonial officials retained important powers, and hence the term ‘dyarchy’ was used to describe the system of dual responsibility. The division of political authority between elected and non-elected officials diluted the power of party leaders. The impact of this on party politics is taken up below. The earliest political parties to form in India did so in the context of limited suffrage. The Simon Commission estimated that 11.6 per cent of adult males and only 1 per cent of adult females were eligible to vote in elections to the Madras Legislative Council in 1926 (Indian Statutory Commission 1930: 191). The British were anxious to keep political mobilization within well-defined limits and preserve political stability in the Madras Presidency. Controlling mobilization meant both suggesting a limit to the size of the population involved in elected politics and encouraging ambitious politicians to debate ‘safe’ topics that would not encourage political instability. The institutions created by the 1919 reforms privileged certain cleavages, and obscured others. Some aspects of the caste system were officially recognized as a source of disadvantage and special measures were used to compensate groups designated as disadvantaged. British officials were receptive to the claim that Brahmans were highly advantaged and acted on pleas for special representation made by Non-Brahmans. A quota in the Madras Legislative Council was introduced with 28 out of the 56 general seats being reserved for Non-Brahman candidates before the 1920 election (Rajaraman 1988: 154–9). Religious criteria were also used to reserve seats in the legislative council. Five seats were reserved for Indian Christians and 13 seats were set aside for Muslim candidates. This eventually contributed to party fragmentation as separate groups of Muslim and Christian legislators formed in the legislative council in the 1930s. The limited suffrage de-emphasized other cleavages, most notably class, by excluding the least wealthy from participating in the system. In contrast 11 seats were reserved

52

Evolution of a party system

for candidates with a background in landholding, commerce and industry (Arnold 1977: 56). Early strategic interaction: stumbling towards party politics Neither Congress nor the British were ready to lead a diverse Tamil society in 1919. British administrators tended to be reactive and only dealt with social issues in an ad hoc fashion. Congress had gained a reputation for being an elitist organization that was dominated by Brahman politicians.2 Brahmans were also perceived to have done very well in competition for government jobs (Baker 1976a: 27–31). Particularly aggrieved were the forward castes that had economic resources but not the social status of the Brahmans (Swamy 1996a: 159–63). These resentments were codified in the Non-Brahman manifesto published in November 1916 and taken forward by the South Indian Liberal Federation, popularly known as the Justice Party. The British were receptive to the grievances of the Justice Party and instituted a quota system under Government Order 122 in 1919. Out of every 12 administrative appointments Brahmans would be limited to only two and five were reserved for Non-Brahman candidates (Barnett 1976a: 39–40). The Justice Party developed a caste cleavage in the politics of the Madras Presidency. Dravidian ideas began to gain currency as some members of the Justice Party took an interest in ideological alternatives to Congress (Irschick 1969). In response Congress articulated its own account of political conflict which gave primacy to the conflict between British colonial rulers and Indian nationalists. The British saw political conflict rather differently. Indeed they hoped that competing for office would distract Congress politicians from the larger nationalist cause. Lord Goschen, Governor of Madras from 1924 to 1929, hoped for the emergence a two party system divided between progressive and conservative opinion (Arnold 1977: 99–100). Politics in the period after 1917 began to approximate a party system. Parties formed and expressed political divisions. Parties contested elections and competed for office. The Justice Party was cohesive enough to be able to form administrations in 1920, 1923 and 1930. Parties responded to competition. For example, Congress countered the Justice Party by putting up many Non-Brahman candidates in the Tamil area of the Presidency for the 1926 election (Rajaraman 1988: 221). Congress developed as a political movement while it also performed many of the functions of a political party. Congress offered a party label that was attractive to ambitious politicians. Its relatively stronger organization was a useful tool in electioneering. However, the party system Goschen hoped for did not emerge out of the competition between the Justice Party and the Congress movement in the 1920s. The extent of competition fluctuated as parties and individuals became accustomed to the new arrangements. It was not unusual for candidates to be elected to the Madras Legislative Council unopposed. The Congress movement was divided on the issue of participation in elections to the Legislative Council. Some in Congress, who picked up the Swarajist label, were keen to participate in the legislatures while the ‘no-changers’ wanted to boycott institutions they considered to be

Evolution of a party system 53 a distraction from the larger objective of Indian self-rule (B. Chandra et al 1989: 235–45). Congress was officially opposed to participation in the 1920 elections. At the national level Congress reversed its position and permitted the Swaraj Party to contest the elections of 1923 and 1926. The Justice Party was given an easy run in 1930 when Congress decided to boycott the elections again. The Justice Party also limited the development of the party system. It did not develop its membership and was little interested in the mass politics and street agitations Congress developed in the 1930s (Baker 1976a: 64–8). The leadership of the Justice Party did not use their control of office to build broad support for their party. They either failed to cultivate or alienated Non-Brahmans from more modest backgrounds (Irschick 1969: 13–15). The party was dominated by wealthy notables, often elected from tiny uncompetitive constituencies. For these individuals the party was hardly essential for electoral success and it was impossible to maintain party discipline. Overall the Justice Party was poorly placed when politics became more competitive in the mid1930s. In addition to factors internal to political parties, the design of the formal institutions of government also had an inhibiting effect on the development of a party system in the Madras Presidency. The limited franchise meant that parties had little incentive to face outwards towards a mass electorate. Weak links with the electorate allowed new parties to form in the legislature after elections had been held. So the Congress Swarajists, elected in 1923, opted to join a larger group of opposition members called the United Nationalist Party in March 1924. This party faded out as most members joined Congress before the 1926 elections. The United Nationalist Party was revived in 1930 to constitute a party capable of usurping the Justice Party ministry. As Congress looked likely to prosper under the new arrangements introduced by the 1935 Government of India Act, most of the United Nationalists joined Congress in 1936 (Arnold 1977: 89, 101, 131–2, 153). The forward–backward divide discussed in Chapter 2 emerged in the legislative council in the mid-1930s and the Backward Classes League was formed in 1935 to protest against the perceived elitism of the Justice Party (ibid: 153). The dual authority in government established by the 1919 Government of India Act meant that party leaders had fewer resources than is usually the case in democratic legislatures. Important powers were reserved and the unelected Governor was an important figure who could be approached for political favours that would, in other circumstances, be in the gift of the party leader. The Governor, concerned to preserve the stability of the colonial regime, was not a disinterested participant in the process of party politics. The system of dual authority was used to weaken the cohesion of the Justice Party in 1925–6. Politicians would sometimes disassociate themselves from a party label in order to ingratiate themselves with the Governor, who would very likely shape future administrations and influence the allocation of portfolios (Baker 1976a: 72–3). In the terms used by Aldrich (1995), parties were only of limited use for politicians seeking to achieve their objectives in Tamilnad in the 1920s and 1930s. Where that objective was office holding there were other routes for ambitious politicians to follow. The British authorities had a view about the development of the party system and were not always comfortable with the

54

Evolution of a party system

‘communal’ orientation of the Justice Party. When the assembly was hung, the powers granted by the 1919 reforms allowed the Governor to disrupt, if not exactly re-engineer, the fledgling party system. The limited party system changed substantially in the mid-1930s. Congress gained new energy in the early 1930s while the Justice Party seemed to wane. The outcome of the 1934 Central Legislative Assembly elections marked a turning point. The Justice Party performed very poorly (Rajaraman 1997: 120–1). Congress, with many successes across India, gave the appearance of being the natural party of government. The formation of the Justice Party was a seminal development in the evolution of party politics in Tamilnad. The party did not mature into an effective organization but it gave early organizational expression to ideas and sentiments that proved to be of enduring importance. As Irschick concludes, ‘the effect of both the Justice Party and the Congress in the Tamil Region was to broaden the area of political discourse and participation’ (1988). The Justice Party showed office-minded Congress politicians the rewards that could be gained from participation in electoral politics. Once in the electoral arena Congress proved that it could be a very effective political party. A stable party system did not emerge from the expansion of electoral politics under the 1919 Government of India Act. However, we can see the beginnings of a party system with the limited expression of cleavages and the initial mobilization of electors.

A predominant party system 1937–1967 The party system in Tamilnad between 1937 and 1967 can be characterized as a predominant party system (Sartori 1976: 192–200). I have chosen to describe the interactions between parties in a broad account of the 1937 to 1967 period. In a longer account I would want to discuss the period between 1937 and 1953 as a distinct party system separate from the period 1953 to 1967. However, a distinctive political dynamic was already evident in the Tamil speaking areas by the late 1930s that carried over into the 1950s. The linguistic divisions in the larger Madras Presidency defined important sub-regional differences and much of the competition between parties occurred within the different linguistic areas. The boundary changes certainly introduced important political changes in the 1950s but Congress was organized on a linguistic basis well before 1937 and the outlines of Dravidian political opposition to Congress in the Tamil speaking areas were clearly apparent by the late 1930s. Likewise, the Communist movement had a different dynamic according to region within the larger Madras Presidency. Congress won absolute majorities in four out of five of the elections in the period 1937 to 1962. In 1952 Congress fell short of a majority in the Madras Legislative Assembly but being far and away the largest party, it was able to co-opt allies and continue ruling in the state. In short, only one party, Congress, controlled the government but other parties were active. Stability in the state legislature was not matched by a tranquil party system. I deal with Congress dominance in two parts: the period before 1947 and the period after independence was gained. Important institutional changes changed the context in which the party system developed in

Evolution of a party system 55 both periods. The 1937 and 1946 elections were held in an institutional context shaped by the 1935 Government of India Act. After 1947 mass suffrage was introduced and the geographical boundaries that divided south India were substantially redrawn. Institutional changes preceding the 1937 provincial elections The 1935 Government of India Act introduced institutional changes which were favourable to the development of party politics. The reforms transferred a much wider range of powers to ministers in the elected provincial legislatures and reduced the powers of the Governor (Coupland 1942: 133–6). The franchise was also extended. Provincial legislatures were re-organized and the new Madras Legislative Assembly had a larger number of seats (215) with which to represent the enlarged electorate. Just under half (106) were constituencies located in Tamilnad (Arnold 1977: 172). The granting of provincial autonomy made Congress politicians much more inclined to participate in electoral politics (ibid: 151). Increasing the size of the electorate also gave Congress, with a stronger organization, an advantage over other parties. Electoral qualifications included a literacy qualification and status as a taxpayer produced a largely male electorate. The new rules increased the electorate from 3.1 per cent under the 1919 rules to 14 per cent of the population in 1937 (Irschick 1986: 197–8). The principle of special representation was a continuing feature of provincial politics, with 99 constituencies reserved so that the groups mentioned earlier in the chapter continued to have special representation in 1937. Electoral politics before Independence: the 1937 and 1946 Elections The 1937 elections re-oriented the electoral politics of the Madras Presidency. Well before the election there was a widespread expectation that Congress would win. The membership of the movement expanded dramatically and a good number of established politicians defected to Congress (Baker 1976b). Another development was the emergence of parties representing Muslim voters. Prior to the 1937 elections Congress and the Justice Party made overtures to Muslim leaders and incorporated them in various ways. However, a number of Muslim politicians affiliated with the All-India Muslim League in the lead up to the 1937 elections. They calculated that this party affiliation would help them exploit their advantage in seats reserved for Muslim candidates. Being present as a bloc in the new legislative assembly would give them greater bargaining power if Congress had difficulty assembling a majority (Arnold 1977: 153–4). In the event Congress won a landslide victory and the Justice Party fared poorly. Congress was easily able to form a ministry. The electoral dominance of Congress should not be allowed to obscure the expression of other political ideas that would later have an impact on the party system. The Communist movement emerged as a political force in Tamilnad during the 1940s being notable for its strength in the countryside, especially the Thanjavur

56

Evolution of a party system

Table 3.1 Elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly, 1937–1946: seats and votes won by party Congress

Justice party

Seats Votes Seats 1937 1946

159 165

64.5 68.3

21

Muslim League

Votes Seats 9 29

Communists Votes Seats 9.6

— 2

Independents/ Total Other seats

Votes Seats 11.6

26 19

Votes 10.4

215 215

Sources: 1937: Baker (1976a: 311–12); Coupland (1943: 16); Secretary of State for India (1937). 1946: Government of India (1948).

delta region. Activists with Communist sympathies were active in Tamilnad before the formation of the Communist Party of India in 1923. Beginning in the late 1930s the Communists began to mobilize support in Thanjavur (Gough 1981: 147–50). The property qualification disenfranchised many Communist sympathizers but the party still gained a respectable share of the vote in 1946 across the whole of the Madras Presidency (see Table 3.1). The Self-Respect Movement was another political force that had an important influence on political opinion, even though it was not an electoral organization. The Self-Respect Movement did have some influence on individuals in the Justice Party. After the resounding defeat of the Justice Party in 1937 the two organizations became closer. Periar became president of the party in 1939 but proved unable to revive its fortunes. The Justice Party was relaunched as the Dravida Kazhagam (Dravidian Federation) (DK) in 1944 (Hardgrave 1965a: 28). The founding resolutions were designed to displace the wealthy elite that had dominated the party and create a new mass-oriented party. It was intended that the new DK would lose the elitist image of the Justice Party and become more attractive to the backward castes (Barnett 1976a: 66–7). Even though the DK replaced the Justice Party, its leader, Periar, was not inclined towards participation in electoral politics. This made it easier for the Congress movement to remain the leading political party in the Madras Presidency during the 1940s. In 1946 Congress did not face strong opposition in the elections and won a clear majority in the Madras Assembly. The Communists trailed a distant second in terms of votes polled (11.6 per cent). The Muslim League, with fewer votes than the Communists, won more seats. The party system was still evolving and one sign of its undeveloped state was the uneven competition between parties. In 1937 there was no contest in 23 seats. The decline of the Justice Party and the rising fortunes of Congress in their struggle with the British contributed to an even less competitive election in 1946, when no less than 94 out of 215 members of the Madras Legislative Assembly were returned unopposed (Government of India 1948: 58). In terms of party politics the period between 1937 and 1946 was a curious one. Congress established its pre-eminence in the 1937 election and formed a ministry, fulfilling the hopes of British constitutional reformers keen to draw Congress into participation in government and thereby moderate its ambitions. Congress withdrew from this process when the Viceroy declared war on behalf of India in 1939. Nevertheless by the time of independence politics had changed in Tamilnad. Office

Evolution of a party system 57 seekers, never absent from the Congress movement, were increasingly vocal. Politicians from lower caste backgrounds were becoming more influential inside Congress. The Dravidian movement was gathering momentum and it was increasingly clear that politics was a domain in which the masses could participate. Institutional changes after 1947: linguistic re-organization and an extended franchise The period between 1947 and 1967 was a critical one in the development of the party system in Tamilnad. Congress controlled the government throughout the period giving a superficial appearance of stability in a party system that was developing quite rapidly. Congress itself changed in important ways as it adapted to the new context of mass politics. The opposition was initially fragmented but as time advanced the DMK demonstrated its cohesiveness as a political party. The transition to self-rule in 1947 provided a context in which party systems could develop in India. This was true of national politics, where Congress towered over all comers, and was also true of the new sub-national states where distinctive regional party systems were emerging. In Tamilnad several important institutional changes contributed to the process of party system formation. First, the restrictive franchise operated by the British was abandoned, the electorate was expanded substantially and a new wave of mobilization started. The elections held in 1951 and 1952 were seen as an opportunity by new and existing parties to extend their support.3 It became more difficult for wealthy notables to dominate politics as competing political entrepreneurs could target new voters from a wide range of backgrounds. Second, the system of communal representation was largely dismantled. A modified system of representation for the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes and Anglo-Indians was put in place. Separate electorates for religious minorities were withdrawn. The Muslim League was particularly hard hit by this change. Third, during the 1950s the boundaries of Madras state were re-drawn in several stages to produce a linguistic state for Tamil speakers.4 The relatively strong Muslim League and Communist party gained support from peripheral areas of the larger Madras Presidency. Many of these areas were allocated to the new states of Andhra in 1953 and Kerala in 1956 leaving both parties correspondingly weaker in the smaller Madras State. The boundary changes clarified matters and confirmed existing trends. The old Justice Party gained support from both Tamil and Telugu speakers whereas the DK and the DMK were oriented towards the concerns of Tamil speakers. Cultural identities can more easily be linked to the administrative unit in a linguistic state. This identification of a dominant culture with state boundaries obscured the extent to which the new units were not absolutely homogenous. As noted in Chapter 2, not all of the population of the new Madras State could be described as native Tamil speakers. The institutional character of Congress was altered after India achieved independence in 1947. Congress lost much of its movement orientation as the organization became preoccupied with holding office and contesting elections. Congress in Tamilnad did not adapt easily to genuine mass politics after 1947. It was caught

58

Evolution of a party system

out by its orientation towards propertied voters. The tendency to nominate candidates from privileged castes did not prove popular (Barnett 1976a: 77–8). There was a feeling that the Congress Party had been unresponsive to public opinion while it governed the state after 1946 (Nayar 1956: 115). The party seemed inward looking and preoccupied with the type of internal politicking that had been a feature of the Tamilnad Congress movement in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the newly enfranchised lower caste groups were keen that Congress should ensure proportionate representation for them. In northern Tamilnad, representatives of the Vanniar caste group were particularly vocal and well organized. When they were rejected by the Congress leadership two independent parties were formed to contest the 1952 election (Rudolph and Rudolph 1960: 16–17). Congress predominance and its discontents A fragmented opposition meant Congress was not strongly challenged as it adapted to the institutional changes of the late 1940s. Dravidian political ideas were dramatically expressed by Periar during the 1940s but he kept the DK away from party politics. Tensions between Periar and other leaders developed over this and other issues. In 1949 the DK split and a separate organization, the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (Dravidian Progressive Federation) (DMK) was formed. The DMK took with it about three quarters of the membership of the parent organization (Barnett 1976a: 72–6). A tiny fragment of the Justice Party lingered on and nominated a few candidates in 1951. The 1952 election result reflected the challenges faced by Congress in Madras State. Mobilization of the electorate was far from complete, turnout was only 56.4 per cent, but Congress was better placed than other parties. Congress, with 152 seats, did not win a majority in the 375 seat assembly but it was saved from complete embarrassment by the weakness of the opposition. As the largest party, Congress was in a position to seek out pliant allies among the smaller parties. The election results also concealed the potential for the development of the regional cleavage in Tamil politics. The DMK leadership felt the party was not ready to participate in the 1952 election. The DMK was hostile to Congress and supported independents and the two Vanniar parties during the election campaign. The DK also offered support to the Communists and these alliances appeared to benefit the opposition (Hardgrave 1965a: 40–1). The DMK realized the inadequacy of this arrangement when their Vanniar allies deserted them for the ruling Congress Party shortly after the election (Barnett 1976a 78–9). The dynamics of the party system changed in important ways in the mid-1950s. The leadership of Congress passed from Rajagopalachari to Kamaraj in 1954. Kamaraj did much to change the pattern of strategic interaction between parties and ambitious political entrepreneurs. He moved Congress away from some of its more privileged supporters. No Brahmans were included in the new state cabinet formed in 1954. Kamaraj aligned the party with various backward caste groups. He added a second Vanniar politician to the cabinet and encouraged the Vanniar parties to merge with Congress. Kamaraj also reached out to various other caste groups of

1952 1953† 1957 1962 1967

45.3 46.1 41.1

62 22 4 2 13

34.9

152 118 151 139 51

13.2 — 7.4 7.7 5.9

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats 35 13 2 0 4

Seats 9.0 — 2.6 1.3 0.9

Votes

KMPP/PSP — — 15 50 137

Seats

DMK — — 14.6 27.1 40.7

Votes — — 14 6 20

Seats — — 9.6 7.8 5.3

Votes

CRC/ Swatantra 62 37 15 5 6

Seats 23.8 — 18.4 5.3 5.0

Votes

Independents 64 40 4 4 3

Seats

Others 18.7 — 2.1 1.8 0.8

Votes 375 230 205 206 234

Total seats

Notes * The figures for 1952 include a number of non-speaking Tamil areas. † There was no state-wide election in 1953. In October 1953 Telugu speaking areas were ceded to Andhra State resulting in a smaller re-organised Madras Legislative Assembly. The composition of this assembly gives a better sense of party strength in Tamilnad. Parties: the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party and the Socialist Party merged after the 1952 election to form the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). The Congress Reforms Committee (CRC) ceased to be a force by the 1962 elections. The Swatantra Party absorbed some, but not all, of its leading members. The CPI split in 1964. The figure given for 1967 is a composite figure. The CPI won two seats and 1.8 per cent of the vote and the CPM won 11 seats and 4.1 per cent of the vote.

Sources: 1952: (ECI n.d. a: 13); 1953: (Government of Madras n.d.); 1957: (ECI n.d. b: 9; Hardgrave 1965a: 59); 1962: (ECI n.d. c: 9); 1967: (ECI n.d. d: 10).

*

CPI/CPM

Congress

Table 3.2 Elections to the Madras Legislative Assembly, 1952–1962: seats and votes won by party

60

Evolution of a party system

modest standing (Forrester 1970). Kamaraj favoured more progressive policies than his austere predecessor (Swamy 1996a). In short, Congress changed the basis on which political calculations would be made. A strong message was sent to Vanniar leaders that Congress would represent their interests and that independent parties were a less reliable route to preferment. Suitably accommodated, members of both Vanniar parties joined Congress (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 57–8). Kamaraj pushed Congress towards mainstream opinion in Tamilnad and alienated many of his own party members from upper caste backgrounds. Some opted for political careers with other parties, including the dissident Congress Reforms Committee (CRC) which contested the 1957 elections in opposition to Congress (Hardgrave 1965a: 57–9).5 Under the leadership of Kamaraj Congress became a formidable competitor in the Tamilnad party system. Small parties struggled when competing with the incumbent party. For example, Congress outbid the Communists by offering rural tenants generous concessions just before the 1957 election (Rudolph 1961: 293). Congress faced a divided opposition in 1957 and was returned to office with a large majority of seats. Opposition votes were fairly evenly divided between the Communists (7.4 per cent), the DMK (14.6 per cent) and the CRC (9.6 per cent). Congress continued to dominate the party system in the approach to the 1962 election. Ideologically it was opposed from both the left and the right. The Swatantra Party formed in 1959 as a national party favouring conservative policies. Swatantra mopped up former members of the CRC. Rajagopalachari’s leadership made it an attractive option for Brahman voters (Erdman 1967: 111). The Communists were the strongest party on the left but they were pushed into the background by the popular appeal of the DMK. In 1962 Congress targeted seats where opposition parties had been successful in 1957 and was remarkably successful, winning back 47 of the 54 lost at the earlier election (Hardgrave 1965b: 409). Strong anti-Congress sentiment encouraged a partial alliance between the Swatantra Party and the DMK. Nevertheless, Congress recorded another impressive election victory in 1962 winning 139 seats in a 206 seat assembly. The DMK moved from 15 to 50 assembly seats. The Communists performed poorly, winning only two seats, and began to warm to the idea of an anti-Congress alliance (Hardgrave 1965a: 79). A further challenge was the national split in 1964 which saw the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)). The DMK learnt from its interaction with other parties. Rivalry with Congress was bitter in the 1950s. Party members participating in protests were arrested and the work of DMK ideologues was subject to censorship (Barnett 1976a: 79–80; Pandian 2000a: 82–9). Towards the end of the 1950s the DMK began to soften its radical image in order to be able to attract voters deterred by a strong social reform agenda (Barnett 1976a: 93). Congress, under Kamaraj, conformed to much of the Non-Brahman ethos favoured by the DMK (Walch 1976b: 106). The DMK was a lively and imaginative party. It stated its ideological positions in a compelling and attractive way. The DMK emerged as an authentically Tamil party as its propaganda became ever more effective in the 1960s. Ultimately Congress could not disown its national orientation and it was awkwardly placed when the issue of Hindi

Evolution of a party system 61 as a national language was taken up by the national government in the 1960s. The emphatic majorities won by Congress in the Madras State assembly elections of 1957 and 1962 present a somewhat misleading picture of the party system. Congress had the advantage of incumbency and had a robust political network. While the DMK had a powerful message Congress struggled to articulate a compelling political narrative that would persuade voters (Weiner 1967). The party system in Tamilnad developed rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s. In the shadow of Congress dominance new parties emerged and voters became accustomed to electoral politics. The intensification of party activity encouraged participation and voter turnout reached 76.6 per cent in 1967, having been only 49.3 per cent in 1957 (Barnett 1976a: 141). Initially, Congress faced a fragmented opposition. This changed in the 1960s as the DMK intensified its propaganda efforts and developed its organization. In the 1950s Kamaraj was able to present Congress as a moderate national party strongly identified with Tamilnad. Opposition to Congress was expressed through a range of narratives that identified caste, class and region as the basis of political conflict. As the 1960s advanced the DMK narrowed the terms of political conflict, doing all it could to depict Congress as a national party out of touch with the aspirations of ordinary Tamil people. The DMK was assisted by the political misfortunes of the Madras unit of the Congress Party. In the case of the 1965 language riots Congress politicians in Madras State were placed in an invidious position of being associated with national policies they opposed. Congress attracted public resentment over food shortages in 1966 while the relevant portfolio at the centre was held by C. Subramaniam, a well known Congress politician from Tamilnad. The DMK were not slow to publicize this irony (Swamy 1996a: 158 and 181).

Unstable multipartyism, 1967–1980 A more united opposition and the growing strength of the DMK ended the period of Congress predominance. The DMK, at the head of an opposition alliance, won an impressive majority for itself in 1967. The DMK looked to have re-oriented the party system. At the time of the 1967 election the key cleavage in the party system was a political one dividing a national and a regional view of politics. However, developments internal to both Congress and the DMK resulted in a period of unstable multipartyism that closed in 1980. The defeat in Madras in 1967 was only one of a series of state-level upsets for Congress that contributed to instability in the national party. Kamaraj, was a leading member of the old guard opposed to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In 1969 Congress split. Those loyal to Indira Gandhi, including most Congress MPs in Delhi, formed the Congress (R). However, a large number of party members, including many officeholders in the party organization, chose to associate with Congress (O). In Tamil Nadu the majority of the party and legislators stayed with Kamaraj leaving a very weak Congress (R) in the state. The split helped the DMK consolidate its position. Indira Gandhi took the view that getting the maximum number of Congress MPs elected to the national parliament from Tamil Nadu was her key objective. An alliance was formed between the DMK and

51 — 27

41.1 — 17.5

137 184 48

40.7 48.6 24.9

Votes — — 130

Seats — — 30.4

Votes

AIADMK

— 15 —

Seats — 35.0 —

Votes

Congress (O)

Sources: 1967: (ECI n.d. d: 10); 1971: (ECI n.d. e: 10); 1977: (ECI n.d. f: 10).

1967 1971 1977

Seats

Seats

Votes

DMK

Congress/ Congress (R) 11 0 12

Seats

CPM

4.1 1.6 2.8

Votes

20 6 10

Seats

5.3 3.0 16.7

Votes

Swatantra/ Janata

Table 3.3 Elections to the Madras/Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1967–1977: seats and votes won by party

15 29 7

Seats

8.5 11.6 7.8

Votes

Independents/ Other parties

234 234 234

Total seats

Evolution of a party system 63 Congress (R) with this end in view. Congress (R) did not contest any seats in the 1971 assembly election in return for support in the subsequent Lok Sabha election. Support from Congress (R) helped the DMK to a 184 seat landslide victory in 1971. In 1972 a split in the DMK created further flux in the party system and contributed to the emerging multiparty system. The filmstar-politician M.G. Ramachandran (usually known as MGR) was suspended from the party on 10 October 1972. MGR formed a new party, the Anna DMK (ADMK), on 18 October 1972 (Sastry 1974). The name of the new party made a conscious link with the late DMK leader, Annadurai. The party was later renamed the All India ADMK (AIADMK). The potency of the ADMK was demonstrated by a startling by-election victory in May 1973. The ADMK won the Lok Sabha seat of Dindigul with 52.5 per cent of the vote, beating the DMK and both Congress factions (Forrester 1976: 290). This four-way contest was replicated in the 1977 assembly election which the AIADMK also won. Congress (R) regained strength as the 1970s progressed while the political space occupied by Congress (O) contracted. Roughly half of Congress (O) re-joined Congress (R) after Kamaraj’s death in 1975 and the remainder subsequently merged with the new national Janata Party to contest the 1977 general elections (Subramanian 1999: 242–3 and 275). In the Lok Sabha elections of January 1980 Janata polled 8 per cent of the vote. The DMK and the re-united Congress, in alliance, secured a combined 54.6 per cent of the vote and 36 out of 39 seats. The decline of the Janata Party meant that the three strongest parties in the state were the AIADMK, the DMK and Congress. The two leading regional parties regarded each other as the main rival and competed aggressively with each other. Congress was the third placed party. The national–regional divide in Tamil politics was increasingly obscured by a division between two regional parties. The Congress leadership in Delhi contributed to this change by giving priority to election of national representatives from Tamil Nadu and neglecting the state assembly. Institutional change: federalism and Congress decline The key institutional change in this period was in the area of federalism. The 1950 constitution created a strong centre. As well as the power to direct resources through the federal revenue sharing system (Echeverri-Gent 2002: 35–6), the centre had extraordinary powers that could be used to intervene in the states. These powers were not used extensively while Nehru was prime minister. It was already known in the 1960s that the centre was a potential source of largesse. Increases in the allocation of funds through the planning system and central government approval for the Salem steel plant in 1970 appeared to be a reward for DMK support for the minority Congress government at the centre (Walch 1976b: 117). During the 1970s politicians in Tamil Nadu became strongly aware of the coercive aspect of centre-state relations. The device of President’s Rule was used to unseat a large number of state governments in the late 1960s and the 1970s. President’s Rule was used 116 times between 1951 and 2005, a figure which includes 46 uses in the decade of the 1970s (Adeney 2007: 185–9). The DMK government in Tamil Nadu

64

Evolution of a party system

was dismissed in January 1976. The AIADMK state government was similarly dismissed in February 1980. The leaders of both Dravidian parties feared the power of the centre and also understood that the centre could be a useful ally in intra-state disputes (Kohli 1991: 162). The excessive use of President’s Rule encouraged undue deference towards the centre. Relations between the centre and the regions were highly uneven until the mid-1990s. Alongside the formal institutional changes were important changes in the Congress Party. It was observed of Congress generally that it went into institutional decline in the 1970s. The various splits in the party contributed to declining membership and a weakened organization in relation to a dominant leader who concentrated power at the apex of the organization. In Tamil Nadu the majority of the party membership followed Kamaraj into Congress (O). The decline of Congress (O) was not followed by a revival in the local organization and local leaders remained heavily dependent on the national leadership (ibid: 166–70).6

A two and a half party system: 1980–1996 The assembly elections held in May 1980 confirmed the collapse of the multiparty system with the Janata Party winning two seats and a mere 2.8 per cent of the vote. The AIADMK, allied with several small parties, beat a Congress–DMK alliance (Economic and Political Weekly 1980: 1043). This signalled the beginning of a more stable two and half party system in Tamil Nadu. In a two and half party system the ‘half party’ lacks the electoral support to be able to form a government by itself. A half party may help swing the outcome of elections in a two and a half party system. A single party majority is a likely outcome but a hung assembly is also possible (Siaroff 2003: 272). Half parties enjoy qualified influence in a party system as is illustrated by the case of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the West German party system (Ware 1996: 164). The Congress Party in Tamil Nadu between 1980 and 1996 conforms to this classification. The AIADMK and Congress reached an accommodation in the early 1980s. The AIADMK was anxious that the Congress would not use its powers at the centre to dismiss the state government. The Congress leadership in New Delhi coveted the MPs that could be returned from Tamil Nadu. The AIADMK was content to concentrate on seeking office in the state. Mutually beneficial electoral alliances were formed under what became known as the ‘MGR formula’. Congress would get the majority of seats, and AIADMK support, in elections to the Lok Sabha. In return the AIADMK would get the majority of seats, and Congress support, in state assembly elections. Congress–AIADMK alliances were formed to fight the 1984 elections, the 1989 Lok Sabha election, the 1991 and 1996 elections. Congress attempted, and failed, to win power on its own in the 1989 assembly elections, and reverted to an alliance with the AIADMK in the Lok Sabha elections later that year. Congress acted as the ‘half party’ in the state party system, unable to form a government on its own, but sufficiently influential to keep the smaller parties in a marginal position. The national leadership of Congress attempted to re-use the MGR formula in 1996 and formed an alliance with the AIADMK to contest the 1996 national and

31 61 26 60 0

20.9 16.3 19.8 15.2 5.6

37 24 150 2 173

22.1 29.3 33.2 22.5 42.1

Votes 129 133 31* 164 4

Seats 38.8 37.2 31.0* 44.4 21.5

Votes

AIADMK

6 2 — — 39

Seats 1.7 0.6 — — 9.3

Votes

GKC/TMC

9 2 3 1 8

Seats

CPI

2.7 2.6 1.2 1.2 2.1

Votes 11 5 15 1 1

Seats

CPM

3.2 2.8 3.5 3.2 1.7

Votes — — — 1 4

Seats

PMK

— — 5.9 3.8

Votes

11 7 9 5 5

Seats

10.4 9.8 10.2 5.0 6.8

Votes

Independents/ Other parties

234 234 234 234 234

Total seats

Note The figure given is a composite figure for the factions of the AIADMK that contested the 1989 election. The Jayalalithaa faction won 27 seats and 21.2 per cent of the vote. The Janaki faction won two seats and 9.2 per cent of the vote. Four unaligned AIADMK candidates also contested. Two were successful.

Sources: 1980: (ECI n.d. g: 10); 1984: (ECI n.d. h: 10); 1989: (ECI n.d. i: 10); 1991: (ECI n.d. j: 10–11); 1996: (ECI n.d. k: 11–12).

1980 1984 1989 1991 1996

Seats

Seats

Votes

DMK

Congress (I)

Table 3.4 Elections to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1980–1996: seats and votes won by party

66

Evolution of a party system

state assembly elections. However, the AIADMK was mired in corruption allegations and members of the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu considered such an alliance foolhardy (Rubinoff 1997). Senior state leaders formed their own splinter party, the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), which entered an alliance with the DMK and the role of the half party passed briefly to the TMC. The AIADMK, allied with the rump of the Congress Party, was comprehensively defeated in 1996 as the DMK–TMC alliance won all of the Lok Sabha seats in Tamil Nadu. In the assembly elections the AIADMK won a mere four seats and Congress none at all. The oligopoly of the AIADMK, the DMK and Congress which operated between 1980 and 1996 obscures other developments in the party system. A notable development, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, was the formation in 1989 of the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), a party dedicated to the interests of the Vanniar caste group. The forces behind the PMK created a political crisis in Tamil Nadu in 1987 and the party itself won 5.9 per cent of the vote in the 1991 assembly elections. The party contested fewer seats in the 1996 elections and won four seats and 3.8 per cent of the vote. However, the PMK was unable to penetrate the alliance system and was irrelevant to the outcome of those elections. As we see below, the PMK contributed to the breakdown of the two and a half party system from 1998 onwards. Institutional changes that weakened the two and a half party system Institutional changes within parties contributed to the breakdown of the two and a half party system. It became clear from the mid-1980s onwards that neither of the Dravidian parties had rules for preferment which satisfied ambitious political entrepreneurs. During the 1970s the question of party leadership was pushed to the forefront of Tamil politics. Personal rivalry between Karunanidhi and MGR contributed to the formation of the AIADMK. It was unsurprising that the AIADMK was focused on its leader given that the catalyst for the formation of the party was the suspension of MGR from the DMK and that MGR’s fan clubs provided a core around which the membership was built. Competition between the DMK and the AIADMK took a very personal form as the DMK sought to disadvantage the new party and discredit its new leader (Forrester 1976: 290). When MGR became ill in the mid-1980s the AIADMK struggled with the issue of succession. After he died in 1987, the party split over the question. The split was so serious that the Congress government at the centre was able to dismiss the AIADMK government and rule by proxy under the terms of President’s Rule. After two factions of the AIADMK were heavily defeated in the 1989 assembly elections, most of the party re-united under the leadership of Jayalalithaa who had performed more strongly in the assembly election (Widlund 2000). It is still difficult for ambitious politicians to progress in the AIADMK. Their prospects frequently have been disrupted by reshuffles of the cabinet. It is not uncommon for senior party members to be expelled from the party (Widlund 2000: 225–6), and sitting representatives to be denied re-nomination for election (The Hindu 2006g).7 On more than one occasion in the 1990s a senior AIADMK politician, S. Thirunavukkarasu, formed his own party, the

Evolution of a party system 67 MGR–ADMK, as a protest against the party leadership and as a way of pushing forward his own political ambitions. Not long after the 1996 election he left the AIADMK for the last time. The early DMK was a well institutionalized party with a formal organizational structure. The current party leader, M. Karunanidhi, succeeded to the leadership through a relatively orderly process in 1969 (Barnett 1976a: 289–90). The party still has a clearly identifiable structure and office holders tend not be subject to capricious re-shuffling. The district secretaries of the DMK are influential figures in their localities and are substantial figures in the party (Subramanian 1999: 237). Seniority is another consideration in the DMK and more important cabinet portfolios and party posts have regularly been held by men with party experience stretching back to the 1960s. However, as Karunanidhi consolidated his position in the DMK he was able to exert strong personal control over the party. Members of his family gained senior positions in the party which discomforted some party members. It is also assumed that progression to posts such as senior party secretary is primarily determined by proximity to the family of the current party leader (India Today 1993e; Rajappa 2003). The manner in which the succession to the post of party leader will be managed is uncertain as there has been no vacancy for over 40 years. Karunanidhi’s son, M.K. Stalin, is assumed to be the frontrunner for this post (Rajaraman, interview, 6 August 2007). This assumption has not been accepted without difficulty in the party leader’s family. After the 2009 Lok Sabha elections the allocation of ministerial posts in the union cabinet was used as a way of soothing intra-family tensions. A long serving DMK cabinet minister was obliged to stand aside so that this could take place (Indian Express 2009; Times of India 2009). The combined effect of these informal rules determining progression has been to limit opportunities for very ambitious politicians in Tamil Nadu and build up discontent among senior politicians. These politicians have the motivation to move parties or even form new parties. Politicians may move parties from one party to another, either because they have been pushed out or because they sense better prospects elsewhere. In the early 1990s some DMK members feared that the party was taking a dynastic turn and expressed their discontent. A leading critic of this development, V. Gopalsamy, was expelled from the DMK in late 1993. Gopalsamy, or Vaiko as he is popularly known, formed a new party, the Marumalarchi (renaissance) DMK (MDMK) in 1994. The party recruited a fair number of DMK cadres and middle level officials and succeeded in establishing itself as a registered party. The MDMK has participated in various electoral alliances since 1998 and its MPs have at times held ministerial office at the centre. The once coercive federal context has also changed. Most of the variation has been in the operation of the system rather than formal rule changes. Events that occurred in 1989 marked a watershed in party politics in India. Since then regional parties have come to see national politics differently. Prior to 1989 regional parties had a precarious existence. With support confined to one state they lived in the shadow of an imperious Congress Party that dominated the central government. Even though regional parties had representatives in the Lok Sabha, participating in government at the centre seemed a fairly abstract possibility.

68

Evolution of a party system

In 1989 Congress was defeated in the national elections by an alliance led by the Janata Dal. The DMK supported the minority government that was formed and a senior party member Murasoli Maran joined the government as a minister. No single party has won a majority at the national level since the Congress landslide in 1984. The series of coalition and minority governments since 1989 have helped make federal relations less coercive and more favourable to the states. The absence of a ruling party with a majority and the participation of regional parties in the national government made it less likely that President’s Rule would be used. The last application of President’s Rule in Tamil Nadu occurred in controversial circumstances in 1991 (Tummala 1992: 541–4). The Bommai judgement of the Supreme Court in 1994, setting conditions on the use of powers granted by Article 356, also makes it more difficult to use President’s Rule for partisan purposes (Adeney 2005: 110–11). The electoral decline of Congress means that national coalition governments have become a standard feature of national politics. Regional parties occupy a space between the two largest parties, Congress and the BJP, and they are integral to the formation of governing coalitions. Regional parties act as kingmakers and have been well rewarded with cabinet posts in the governments formed in 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009. The certainty of hung parliaments means that small to medium-sized parties have a reasonable expectation of participating in coalition governments. The federal context in which regionally based parties operate has become far more benign and the incentives for forming new parties have improved substantially. A return to multipartyism, 1998– National and state elections in Tamil Nadu had been in close proximity between 1971 and 1996, in spite of the de-linking of elections in 1971. The instability of national coalition governments after 1996 allowed elections to get out of step and important changes in the state party system were revealed by early elections to the Lok Sabha in 1998. The AIADMK was shaken by its crushing 1996 defeat and battled its way back into contention by forming a multiparty alliance with a number of smaller parties to fight the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. Multiparty alliances were not a new feature of state politics, what was different was the perception of a leading party being dependent on its junior allies. The AIADMK front, including the BJP, the PMK, and the MDMK, confronted a TMC–DMK alliance. The election was notable also for the developments beyond the two main alliances. Unusually the official national Congress Party was not a part of a major alliance. A new caste party, the Pudhiya Thamizhagam (PT), made its first foray into electoral politics. The party got strong support from a Dalit caste group, the Pallars, concentrated in relatively large numbers in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. The 1998 election was hugely significant. The largest Congress fragment, the TMC, suffered a humiliating loss in alliance with the DMK. The PMK and the MDMK proved themselves to be election-winning allies. The first BJP MPs from Tamil Nadu were elected. The PT won 4.7 per cent of the vote in the 15 constituencies it contested and contributed to the defeat of the DMK alliance in a number of

Evolution of a party system 69 Table 3.5 Lok Sabha results: 1996, 1998 and 1999 1996

1998

1999

Party

Seats

Votes

Seats

Votes

Seats

Votes

AIADMK BJP Congress CPI CPI(M) DMK MDMK MGR-ADMK PMK PT TMC DPI/VCK Other parties Independents

0 0 0 2 0 17 0 — 0 — 20 — — 0

7.8 2.9 18.2 2.3 1.8 25.6 4.5 — 2.0 — 27.0 — — 3.0

18 3 0 1 0 5 3 0 4 0 3 — 1 1

25.9 6.9 4.8 2.4 0.6 20.1 6.3 1.1 6.0 1.8 20.2 — 1.0 2.5

10 4 2 0 1 12 4 1 5 0 0 0 — 0

24.8 7.1 11.1 2.6 2.4 23.1 6.0 1.5 8.2 2.1 7.1 * — 1.3

Sources: 1996: (GoTN n.d.); 1998 and 1999: calculated by the author from individual constituency returns reported on the website of the Election Commission of India immediately after each election. Notes * The DPI contested using the TMC symbol so votes for these candidates are included in the share given for the TMC.

key southern constituencies. Congress won less than 5 per cent of the vote, proving how reliant the national party was on local allies to get any MPs elected. In 1998 it was clear that Congress, in either of its incarnations, had lost its status as the balancing half party. A multiparty system had emerged. The AIADMK supported the national government in 1998. When the BJP proved unwilling to use President’s Rule to topple the DMK state government, the AIADMK helped bring the national government down in 1999. Further changes were introduced into the state party system. The DMK saw an opportunity to protect itself from further interference and allied with the BJP and the other small parties from Tamil Nadu that supported the national government. The issue of caste was given further profile in the party system when a Dalit social movement, the DPI or Liberation Panthers, decided to contest the 1999 elections. The DPI, the PT and the TMC formed a third front. The DMK alliance performed well and the alliance parties were variously rewarded with posts in the new BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government at the centre. The outcome of the 1998 and 1999 elections signalled a number of changes in the party system in Tamil Nadu. The terms on which strategic interaction between parties could take place were changing and this encouraged the formation of new parties. The elections demonstrated the weakness of Congress as an electoral force in Tamil Nadu. The elections also suggested that the Dravidian parties were weaker than they were previously. The AIADMK had come a long way from the moment when MGR won the 1980 assembly election with the support of only a few small parties. In short, a winning alliance had to include more than Congress and one

70

Evolution of a party system

Dravidian party. A more competitive party system meant that there was room for small parties as junior alliance partners. If the small parties were on the winning side in Lok Sabha elections they could negotiate for cabinet posts at the centre. The 1998 election demonstrated that overt appeals to caste identities could be used to mobilize votes in sufficient numbers to determine the outcome of an election. The PMK was already successful but the PT extended the principle. In 1999 the DPI followed the path taken by the PT though the impact of the DPI was modest.8 The results of the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections suggested a more open and competitive party system, and raised the hope that the 2001 election might produce a hung assembly and a state-level coalition government. The 2001 assembly election promised to be close but the DMK looked very well set given that it had the support of the BJP, the PMK and the MDMK. The election generated a good deal of interest among aspiring politicians. The outcome of the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections suggested that there might be room for even more new parties, especially if they could tap into support from numerically significant caste communities. A number of political entrepreneurs formed new parties and signalled their availability to the larger parties. These included the Puthiya Needhi Katchi (New Justice Party) led by A.C. Shanmugham who made a pitch for votes among the Mudaliar caste groups. S. Kannappan formed the Makkal Tamil Desam (MTD) on the basis of his Yadava caste affiliation (The Hindu 2001k). The former Union Finance minister, P. Chidambaram, split from the TMC expressing his discomfort with the proposed alliance with the AIADMK (Frontline 2001c). He later formed his own party, the CJP. In February 2001 the PMK suddenly switched alliances and deserted the DMK for a place in the AIADMK alliance. The MDMK also withdrew from the DMK alliance and contested independently. This dramatic shift in the alliances provided opportunities for the newly formed parties. The DMK recognized its weakness and joined with a number of these parties. However, the AIADMK had the stronger of the alliances and inflicted a humiliating defeat on the ruling DMK in the state assembly elections in the May 2001 elections. The 2001 election was not a landmark election in the way that the 1998 election was. However, expectations were shaped. The 2001 election seemed to be determined by the relative strength of the alliances rather than the voters’ verdict on the incumbent regime. The PMK proved it was a very useful alliance partner and its switch was seen as a decisive turning point. The influential position of the PMK was widely recognized and it became a sought after alliance partner. The PT and the DPI were accorded the status of alliance partners in one of the main alliances even though DMK supporters were less than enthusiastic about associating with Dalit parties. Most of the new caste parties were unsuccessful and demonstrated a temporary limit to the expansion of the party system (The Hindu 2001o). As Table 3.6 shows there was some consolidation in the party system between the 2001 and the 2006 assembly elections. The leadership of the DMK took the view that most of the new parties were of little value as alliance partners and most of these parties subsequently faded away. The challenge for small parties that wish to join an alliance is to establish their electoral usefulness to the senior party forming an alliance. National parties can

Evolution of a party system 71 boost a weak local presence by making available national resources (such as the promise of portfolios in the national cabinet). Small state-based parties lack this option. Demonstrating a core vote by contesting independently is one way of establishing relevance in alliance formation. Then the junior party has to be able to persuade its partners that it can ‘transfer its vote’ to the alliance during the election. Establishing exactly what each party brings to an alliance is difficult to do. A retrospective benchmark is the extent to which candidates from junior parties win more than the mean average vote for the alliance in all constituencies (Mrug 2001). It is a crude measure which does not take allowance of local conditions or the possibility that partisan supporters of the senior party may not transfer their vote to a junior alliance partner. This was the case in 2001 when DMK activists declined to canvas for Dalit candidates from other parties. Some of the political entrepreneurs who set up new parties found places in larger parties. The TMC merged with its parent party in August 2002. The leader of the MGR-ADMK merged his party with the BJP in 2002. The leader of the MTD, Kannappan merged his party with the DMK prior to the 2006 assembly election and was rewarded with a DMK nomination. Chidambaram dissolved his outfit and returned to the Congress Party in 2004. The 2004 Lok Sabha election was dominated by two main alliances though a weak third front was also formed. The DMK disassociated itself from the BJP towards the end of the NDA term in office. The AIADMK allied with the BJP but was unable to attract much other support. The DMK retained its other allies and joined hands with Congress to form a strong alliance which also included the PMK, the MDMK, the CPI and the CPI(M). The Dalit parties were ignored by the two main alliances and they opted for a front of their own. The majority of the votes (92.2 per cent) were collected by the alliances led by the DMK and the AIADMK. The DMK alliance won all of the seats in the state which added an extremely useful 39 seats to the Congress coalition. The Congress allies were extremely well rewarded. No less than 12 ministerial seats were given to MPs from Tamil Nadu (The Hindu 2004g). The alternative front performed poorly. It was not able to put up a candidate in all of the 39 seats and won only 3.1 per cent of the vote. The 2004 election confirmed expectations about the usefulness of alliance formation. The DMK coordinated the process of alliance formation with skill whereas the AIADMK struggled to locate allies. The PMK and the MDMK continued to serve as useful junior partners. It was assumed that each bought about 4–5 per cent of the state wide vote to the alliance, though the PMK with its support concentrated in northern Tamil Nadu was in a stronger position. The place of the Congress and the BJP in the state party system is denominated less by the votes they can mobilize, though Congress has more support than the BJP, than the resources they control as the leading parties in national coalition governments. The 2004 elections offered little for the two Dalit parties who showed a limited ability to mobilize voters.9 A few months after the election the DPI and the PMK began to coordinate their activity over issues of mutual interest and together formed the Tamil Protection movement. Overall the 2004 election suggested that the politics of alliance was bringing a degree of stability to an expanded party system and that weaker parties were being pushed out.

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Evolution of a party system

Table 3.6 Elections to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 2001 and 2006: seats and votes won by party 2001

2006

Party

Seats

Votes

Seats

Votes

AIADMK BJS/BJP Congress CPI CPI(M) DMDK DMK Forward Bloc MDMK MGR-ADMK PMK PT TMC DPI/VCK Independents

132 4 7 5 6 — 30 1 0 2 20 0 23 1 3

31.5 3.2 2.5 1.6 1.7 — 30.9 0.1 4.7 0.5 5.6 1.3 6.7 *— 6.2

61 0 34 6 9 1 96 0 6 — 18 0 — 2 1

32.6 2.0 8.4 1.6 2.6 8.4 26.5 0.3 6.0 — 5.7 0.8 — 1.3 3.0

Sources: 2001: (ECI n.d. l: 11–12); 2006: (ECI 2006b: 11–12). Notes * The DPI contested using the DMK symbol so votes for these candidates are included in the share given for the DMK.

The 2006 assembly election was interesting because it defied the trend towards consolidation and the party system was further fragmented. The filmstar-politician, Vijayakanth, discussed in detail in Chapter 9, formed a new party, the DMDK, in September 2005. Vijayakanth styled himself after MGR, forming a party around a network of fan clubs. The process of alliance formation was marked by a degree of uncertainty. Vijayakanth declined to lead the DMDK into an alliance. The AIADMK succeeded in luring the MDMK away from a fairly comfortable position in the DMK-led alliance. Negotiations between the AIADMK and the caste-based Forward Bloc ended acrimoniously. The Forward Bloc contested the election independently. The DMK succeeded in holding on to the PMK and its other allies. The DMK did not allow the DPI to ride into the alliance on the coattails of the PMK. The DPI, now a formally registered party known as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), joined the AIADMK alliance. The DMK grabbed attention with a series of well-defined manifesto promises that targeted poorer voters, which was a group among whom the AIADMK usually prospered. The DMK alliance won, which confirmed some assumptions about the utility of alliances. However, the DMK fell short of an overall majority and relied on Congress support to form a government. Some Congress politicians felt a coalition government should be formed but the national leadership demurred. The DMDK made its mark, securing the election of its leader, and winning 8.4 per cent of the vote. The PT, supported by the north Indian BSP, contested independently but failed to win any seats. The outcome of the 2006 elections raised a number of issues that will be factored

Evolution of a party system 73 into future strategic interaction between the parties in Tamil Nadu. The DMDK won a sizeable chunk of the vote and if Vijayakanth remains popular the party could be a valuable alliance partner. The DMDK polled well in some of the constituencies where the PMK had been strong since 1989 (The Hindu 2006ak). This raised the question of whether or not the PMK was losing ground and might be a less valuable ally in future elections. The DPI proved to be a valuable ally for the AIADMK, which gained votes in northern Tamil Nadu, where support for the DPI is concentrated. The DPI, often treated as a marginal entity, has joined the established parties as a recognized and respected participant in alliance politics. The DMDK’s breakthrough led to a reduction in the share of the vote won by the two main alliances from 92.2 per cent in 2004 to 84.7 per cent in 2006. Finally the stark fact of the DMK forming a minority government with only 96 seats in the assembly (22 short of a majority) means that other parties are thinking about the possibility of a coalition government in the not too distant future. Some of the implications of the 2009 Lok Sabha election, which saw another drop in the vote share received by the Dravidian alliances (79.9 per cent), are discussed in the conclusion.

The electoral geography of the party system The growth of the DMK reshaped the electoral geography of Tamilnad. Prior to the formation of the DMK, and its entry into electoral politics in 1957, the Congress Party had mobilized support across the whole of Tamilnad, though with varying degrees of intensity. Faced by weak opponents Congress mobilization was incomplete and weakly organized in some areas. Voter turnout was low (only 49.3 per cent in 1957). Barnett’s analysis shows how the DMK gained support by mobilizing new voters and to a lesser extent by drawing away Congress supporters (1976a: 138–40). The DMK was initially successful in urban constituencies but extended its support in rural areas as the 1960s progressed. The DMK performed particularly well in the northern districts in 1967 and 1971, though it recorded victories in the south and the west as well (ibid: 145, 147–9). This pattern of early mobilization has left its mark on the electoral geography of the state with the DMK continuing to register strong support in the northern districts (see Map 3.1). Judging the extent and location of support for the main Dravidian parties is difficult given their preference to contest elections as part of an alliance. The 1989 result is interesting in this regard as the DMK contested an unusually high number of seats (84.6 per cent) and was supported by minor parties only. This provides a fairly clear picture of support for the main party at that point in time. During the 1970s the remaining Congress strongholds in the south and the west came under further pressure as the AIADMK mobilized support in these regions. The AIADMK picked up support across the state. Initially support for the AIADMK was fairly evenly spread across the state as Narendra Subramanian shows using the five ecological zones he devised. In the 1977 assembly election the AIADMK recorded support in the ecological zones as follows: Northern Plains (33 per cent), Kaveri Valley (23.8 per cent), Tamiraparani Valley (29.5 per cent), Western Plains (31.4 per cent), and the Southern Plains (31.1 per cent)

74

Evolution of a party system

DMK wins more than 42.5 per cent of the vote

15 31

16

29

Chennai 32 30 28 34 33 27 26 38 35 47 21 50 25 49 39 74 22 46 77 23 52 51 40 41 24 76 78 75 45 42 54 53 81 55 44 56 79 43 83 59 82 80 58 57 Puducherry 71 73 60 62 63 84 85 86 87 64 61 89 122 72 91 92 100 90 88 69 65 125 66 93 121 70 94 128 68 99 124 123 160 95 67 169 98 126 163 120 127 157 161 119 101 102 171 96 164 118 97 170 104 116 162 185 188 172 103 106 115 156 158 152 117 159 187 173 107 114 153 155 184 183 186 Coimbatore 113 151 174 165 168 108 (105) 182 178 175 112 181 191 150 177 109 190 130 154 176 179 111 129 148 192 180 110 149 189 147 131 Tiruchirappalli 194 139 140 193 (166 and 167) 195 146 133 135 138 145 198 196 132 141 137 199 136 134 Madurai(142 143 144) 197 204 208 206 200 201 203 209 207 205 202 214 3 212 210 17 1 213 215 5 211 2 6 4 216 217 18 7 11 218 8 226 227 221 220 219 10 12 9 224 19 225 222 13 233 232 Chennai 14 231 228 223 234 230 20 229 37

36

48

Source: Calculated by the author from Election Commission of India (n.d. i) Map 3.1 Concentrations of electoral support for the DMK in 1989

(Subramanian 1999: 22–4). As time passed the AIADMK deepened its support in the west and the south at the expense of Congress. The strongest victories won by the AIADMK in 1980, shown in Map 3.2, are consistent with this trend. In 1980 the AIADMK contested 75.6 per cent of the assembly constituencies with support from minor parties. By 1989 the falling off of Congress support was substantial with the party showing greatest weakness in the Western Plains where support had fallen to 18.6 per cent of the vote from 48.7 per cent in 1962. The combined vote for the AIADMK factions was highest in the west and the south in 1989 (ibid 1999: 21–7).

Evolution of a party system 75

AIADMK wins more than 53.37 per cent of the vote

15 31

16

29

Chennai 32 30 28 34 33 27 26 35 47 21 50 25 49 39 74 22 46 77 23 52 51 40 41 24 76 78 75 45 42 53 54 55 81 44 56 79 43 83 59 82 80 58 57 Puducherry 71 73 60 62 63 84 85 86 87 64 61 89 122 72 91 92 100 90 88 69 65 125 66 93 121 70 94 128 68 99 124 123 160 95 67 169 98 126 163 120 127 157 161 119 101 102 171 96 164 118 97 170 104 116 162 185 188 172 103 106 115 156 158 152 117 159 187 173 107 114 153 155 184 183 186 Coimbatore 113 151 174 165 168 108 (105) 182 178 175 112 181 191 150 177 109 190 130 154 176 179 111 129 148 192 180 110 149 189 147 131 Tiruchirappalli 194 139 140 193 (166 and 167) 195 146 133 135 138 145 198 196 132 141 137 199 136 134 Madurai(142 143 144) 197 204 208 206 200 201 203 209 207 205 202 214 3 212 210 17 1 213 215 5 211 2 6 4 216 217 18 7 11 218 8 227 226 221 220 219 10 12 9 224 19 225 222 13 233 14 232 Chennai 223 231 228 234 230 20 229 37

38

36

48

Source: Calculated by the author from Election Commission of India (n.d. g) Map 3.2 Concentrations of electoral support for the AIADMK in 1980

Change in the party system Voters The transition away from the two and a half party system was a result of important changes in the electorate. Between 1980 and 1996 the two Dravidian parties won a large majority of the vote. The Congress Party took a large portion of the remaining vote. Subramanian estimates support for that party at about 17–20 per cent during the

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Evolution of a party system

1980s (2003: 62). One opinion poll in 1993 recorded support as high as 24.7 per cent for Congress in March 1993 (India Today 1993d). The formal figures for the assembly elections give an indication of Dravidian dominance. The combined votes given by the Election Commission for the assembly elections are 1980 (60.9 per cent), 1984 (66.5 per cent), 1989 (63.5 per cent), 1991 (66.9 per cent) and 1996 (63.6 per cent). It is very likely that support for the Dravidian parties was somewhat higher. The DMK was generous in the allocation of seats to allies and so its share of the vote is certainly understated in the figures for 1980 and 1984. The split in the AIADMK explains part of the dip in the combined Dravidian vote in 1989. Subramanian suggests that during the 1980s support for the two Dravidian parties was ‘well over 70 per cent of the electorate’, inferring this from opinion poll evidence and elections where Congress was not in alliance with the Dravidian parties (1999: 32). A poll conducted by Madras Christian College in December 1991 put the combined support for the AIADMK and the DMK at 72.7 per cent (Swamy 1998: 127). Since the early 1990s the vote for the Dravidian parties has weakened. This is partly because of shortcomings in the Dravidian parties and partly because of the formation of the new parties discussed in later chapters. Subramanian explains in some detail how the Dravidian parties ceased to mobilize the electorate and the leadership of each party variously dented the image of their own party in the 1990s (2003: 64–9). Support for the AIADMK plummeted in 1996 to 21.5 per cent in the assembly election. Its support recovered after 1996 though one poll recorded the combined support for the two Dravidian parties to be only 48.8 per cent during the 1998 Lok Sabha elections (ibid: 93). In September 2001 a senior AIADMK member judged support for his own party to be 30–32 per cent which is consistent with the outcome of the 2001 assembly election (K. Malaisamy, interview, 1 September 2001). Since 1996 each Dravidian party has completed a full term in office, followed by defeat at the hands of a stronger electoral alliance. These periods in office have confirmed the ability of the Dravidian parties to deliver stable government even as they have not been able to win re-election on the basis of their record in government. Opinion poll responses suggested broad satisfaction with the performance of the 1996–2001 DMK government, with 31 per cent describing themselves as ‘very satisfied’ and 36 per cent saying they were ‘somewhat satisfied’ in the CSDS post-poll survey in 2001 (Frontline 2001d). The DMK alliance, with support from minor parties, secured 38.7 per cent of the vote in 2001 at the end of a term in office (Mrug 2001). The 2001 CSDS poll cited above, with an error in favour of the DMK alliance of 4 per cent, returned a figure of 39 per cent support if the DMK had contested alone. Taken together this implies support for the DMK of about 35 per cent of the electorate in 2001. The same poll, with an error in favour of the AIADMK alliance of 1 per cent, returned a figure of 36 per cent support if the AIADMK was contesting alone (Frontline 2001d). In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections the AIADMK alliance won 34.8 per cent of the vote. The only significant parties in the alliance were the BJP and the AIADMK. Two years later the AIADMK alliance, with the MDMK and the DPI as junior partners, won 40.1 per cent of the vote in the 2006 assembly election. A much stronger DMK alliance secured 44.8 per cent of the vote. This was sufficient for victory but seems to confirm the

Evolution of a party system 77 opinion poll finding that a new party, Vijayakanth’s DMDK, took votes disproportionately from parties in the DMK alliance (The Hindu 2006ak). Taken together this evidence suggests support for the AIADMK seems to have settled in the range of 33–35 per cent and in the range of 30–35 per cent for the DMK. Overall support for the Dravidian parties has declined from over 70 per cent in the 1980s to the region of 65 per cent in the 2000s. Though the fall has not been precipitous it is enough to make electoral contests more open and make electoral alliances essential for parties seeking to govern the state. In 1980 the AIADMK, with very little support, succeeded in beating off a strong alliance between Congress (I) and the DMK. Such a scenario seems implausible now. The Dravidian parties have lost the energy they exuded in their early elections. Partisan ties between parties and voters have a different intensity. Voters are bound to the Dravidian parties by weaker ties than was the case in the past. Subramanian reports the declining proportion of poll respondents reporting strong identification with the party they support between the 1980s and the late 1990s (2003: 80). This is consistent with press reports which record strong dissatisfaction with governing parties. The filmstar-politician Vijayakanth appealed to this sentiment with strong attacks on the two main Dravidian parties. Condemning their governing record, he promised clean government and decisive leadership. That the DMDK polled 8.4 per cent of the state-wide vote in its first election suggests that Vijayakanth connected with voters who were losing faith with established parties. The period of transition in the party system in Tamil Nadu was associated with changes in patterns of political participation. Subramanian presents data for the Lok Sabha elections in Tamil Nadu and argues that ‘a decline in enthusiasm for the major parties brought with it a decline in vote participation rates in the 1990s’ (Subramanian 2003: 80). Similar patterns can be observed in participation in assembly elections with only 59.1 per cent turnout for the 2001 assembly elections. This changed significantly in 2006 when turnout reached 70.8 per cent. The presence of the DMDK and its vigorous campaign for support contributed to a competitive election and increased participation. Electoral geography The emergence of new parties since 1989 has contributed to some change in the electoral geography of the state. There have been some shifts as well. The AIADMK performed particularly well in Chennai constituencies in the 2006 assembly elections, it won seven out of the 14 seats in the city. However, it is less clear that the party has made substantial gains in the northern districts (The Hindu 2006ak). Support for the 68 AIADMK candidates in the other constituencies in the 9 northern districts was 40.3 per cent of votes cast, only marginally higher than the overall state wide share for the alliance (40.1 per cent). A better sense of the changing electoral geography can be derived from the mapping the areas in which the new parties have had success. It is a fair surmise that support for the DMK has been diminished in the northern districts where the PMK has mobilized since 1989

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(Subramanian 2003: 66). The distribution of support for the PMK is heavily concentrated in the northern districts of Tamil Nadu (see Map 5.1). The MDMK diverted support away from the DMK and made a small contribution to changing the pattern of voting. The 4.6 per cent of the vote won by the MDMK in the 2001 assembly election was fairly evenly spread across the state but there was an element of concentration. The party contested 211 seats and won more than 10 per cent of the vote in 22 constituencies. The party performed best in nine constituencies in the southern districts. The PT had a decisive impact on the 1998 Lok Sabha elections, also in the southern districts, but its support has fallen away since then. The DPI has carved out a niche for itself in the Cuddalore and Perambalur districts where it demonstrated support in the 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections. In 2001 and 2006 the DPI and its senior allies performed well above the alliance average in the assembly constituencies that fell in the Chidambaram Lok Sabha constituency. This serves to illustrate a wider point that the electoral geography of the state is now influenced by the composition of alliances which frequently change between elections. Party numbers The number of parties in the state party system has shown an increasing trend since the 1980s. A simple count of parties shows the number peaked in 2001 and remained high in 2006 (see Table 3.7). The trend is also upwards if a threshold of 3 per cent of seats is used to count ‘relevant parties’.10 This reflects the fact that the distribution of seats in the legislature is more even with the multiparty system. Under the two and a half party system the winning alliance tended to achieve a landslide and deny the second largest party (in terms of vote) the position of official opposition party. In 1984 the DMK won 29.3 per cent of the vote and 10.3 per cent of the seats, in 1991 the DMK won 22.5 per cent of the vote and less than 1 per cent Table 3.7 The number of parties with seats in the Tamil Nadu Legislature: 1957–2006 Year

1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980

Parties with:

Year

more than 1 seat

more than 3 per cent of seats

7 6 7 7 7 8

3 2 4 3 5 5

1984 1989 1991 1996 2001 2006

Parties with: more than 1 seat

more than 3 per cent of seats

7 8 9 10 12 9

3 4 2 3 4 5

Notes These figures were calculated by the author using the Election Commission reports for the relevant years. These reports are cited in detail in the tables above. The official reports for 1957 and other years do not show all the parties contesting. This is because smaller parties often contest using the election symbol of a larger party. A number of small parties, including the DPI and the CJP, contested the 2001 election using the DMK symbol and so are not shown in the official report (but are included here). Alternative figures for 1957 are provided by Hardgrave (1965a: 59).

Evolution of a party system 79 Table 3.8 Effective number of parties contesting State Assembly Elections, 1957–2006 Year

Effective number of parties

Year

Effective number of parties

1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980

3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 4.6 4.0

1984 1989 1991 1996 2001 2006

3.8 4.7 3.6 4.1 4.7 5.0

Sources: The data used in the calculations is derived from the following sources: 1957: (ECI n.d. b: 9; Hardgrave 1965a: 59); 1962–1991 (Butler et al 1995); 1996: (Government of Tamil Nadu n.d.); 2001 and 2006: calculated by the author from individual constituency returns reported on the website of the Election Commission of India immediately after each election. Notes Calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera index whereby 1.00 is divided by the sum of the squares of each party’s share of the vote.

of the seats. Similarly, the AIADMK won 21.5 per cent of the vote less than 2 per cent of the seats in the 1996 assembly elections. The effective number of parties index also shows a positive trend upwards (Table 3.8). This index, developed by Laakso and Taagepeera (1979), counts the number of parties while taking account of their different sizes. This approach uses the share of the vote and overcomes some of the distortions when seats are used as the basis of calculation. This index gives an indication of how parties have proliferated and offers a summary that can be used for comparing Tamil Nadu with other cases. However, this index has limitations (Saez 2002: 48–9; Sartori 2001). For example, the index returns the same figure (4.7) for both the 1989 and 2001 assembly elections. In 1989 the election was contested by four larger parties with other smaller parties in alliance or contesting separately. In contrast two blocs, each consisting of a large party with several smaller allies, as well as several smaller unaligned parties contested the 2001 election. The number of parties in a party system matters but it is also important to get a sense of how parties compete and cooperate. Ideology and competition The pattern of competition between parties has changed. In the 1960s the DMK competed with the Congress Party by a number of means. The DMK presented an ideological alternative to Congress. It targeted some appeals at existing Congress voters attempting to persuade them that Congress supported social hierarchy. The DMK also sought out support from those who did not participate in politics (Barnett 1976a: 138–9). As noted earlier, Congress retaliated by seeking to win back seats where the DMK had won previously. In the 1970s the AIADMK banked heavily on MGR’s popularity and sought out voters from poorer backgrounds, often competing for traditional Congress support. Access to power enabled

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governing parties to distribute patronage and implement policies that would attract support. Subramanian argues persuasively that the Dravidian parties scaled back their efforts at mobilization by the early 1990s and relied more on tactical alliances. He also argues that the Dravidian parties introduced fewer populist policies which might attract support. In contrast new parties like the PMK have been much more active, mobilizing support and shaping political debate (Subramanian 2003: 64–9). The DPI also stands out as a party organizing support and seeking to disrupt partisan links between voters and established parties (Gorringe 2006a). Electoral alliances are the key way in which the Dravidian parties have responded to changing political circumstances. The Dravidian parties have considerable advantages as the largest parties in the system and they are the parties that coordinate the alliance formation. The alliances have so far been manipulated to ensure that the Dravidian parties gain sufficient seats to form a government. The DMK attempted, unsuccessfully, to gain advantage by allying with a number of new caste parties in 2001. The two and a half party system resulted in fairly straightforward alliances that resulted in victories for the Dravidian party, usually the AIADMK, able to reach an agreement with Congress. The situation is now more complex. Mrug expresses it well: Unlike in the past where Congress enjoyed a solid block of 18 per cent to 20 per cent of the vote, there are now a host of parties competing for about 35 per cent of the votes not committed to either of the Dravidian parties . . . the battle is now for every extra fraction of the vote (represented by the smaller parties) that can drive you a few seats ahead of your rival. (Mrug 2001) While the Dravidian parties are in a strong position their advantage is not absolute. The smaller parties are not always malleable and alliance negotiations have to be conducted with skill. The PMK in particular has been adept at seeking out the most advantageous position. Competition has not been entirely about electoral alliances. Competition has been often been leader-oriented with much promotion of the merits and reputations of party leaders. Leaders from opposing parties are subjected to harassment, literal and metaphorical attacks (Padmanabhan 2004). Between 1991 and 2001 both parties were keen to moderate the process of economic reform so that it did not become politically disruptive by creating a large numbers of losers from the process. Indeed Kennedy (2004) argues that the nature of the party system, which gives space to lower status groups, helps explains the relative caution of political parties in Tamil Nadu. The Government of Tamil Nadu was also able to attract inward investment while the economy of the state as a whole experienced growth. After 2001 the AIADMK attempted some fairly ambitious economic reforms but retreated from the unpopular measures in 2004 after losing the Lok Sabha elections (The Hindu 2004e). In 2006 the DMK changed its strategy by favouring populist policies that reached out to women and poorer voters, groups not as strongly associated with the party as the middling strata. The 2006 manifesto, and its subsequent implementation, were

Evolution of a party system 81 potentially important developments for the DMK. The policies have been presented as policies of the DMK government and the ruling party may gain additional supporters as a consequence.

Conclusions The party system in Tamilnad has an interesting trajectory. The system began to develop in the larger Madras Presidency under an incomplete suffrage. A conclusive struggle with the Justice Party saw Congress emerge as the predominant party between 1937 and 1967. The victory of the DMK in the 1967 assembly elections opened a period of multiparty politics in which the Congress party declined in the state while remaining a powerful national party. During the 1970s the nationalregional cleavage was reduced in importance as two regional parties came to dominate political competition. From 1980 until 1996 a diminished Congress party was an influential half party in a two and a half party system. By 1998 the growth of new parties, a weakening of the regional parties and further Congress decline contributed to the emergence of a multiparty system. This multiparty system has bipolar tendencies because of the regular formation of electoral alliances. The transition to multiparty politics has changed the character of state politics but it is important not to overstate that change. The DMK and the AIADMK are still the largest parties and a government without one of them is inconceivable. Each of them can still muster around 30 per cent of the vote, though this is less than the 70 per cent plus the parties could mobilize in the 1980s. Alliance formation has long been a feature of electoral politics in Tamil Nadu. However, the decline of Congress and the entry of a number of smaller parties make the process of alliance formation more complex. The results from the 2009 Lok Sabha election suggest alliance formation will be even more complex before the next assembly election. There has been a subtle evening up of relations between the parties in the system. Smaller parties are able to make and unmake winning alliances. The decline of Congress in the latter half of the 1990s introduced a new element of fragmentation into multiparty politics in the state. Alliance formation cannot be dictated by the larger parties and smaller parties can extract substantial concessions from the alliance leaders. The old Congress–Dravidian Party oligopoly has been broken up and multiparty politics has arrived. This context is conducive to the formation of new political parties. Forming a party and achieving electoral success is still a formidable task but the examples given by a number of new parties gives aspiring political entrepreneurs models to emulate.

4

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs

In Chapter 1, I reviewed theories of party system change noting that explanations tend to focus on institutional and sociological factors. I drew attention to the possibility of a third factor that might shape a party system: the agency of individual political entrepreneurs. I briefly discussed the essential contribution that political entrepreneurs make to the process of government and the conduct of politics. I defined political entrepreneurs as individuals who provide political services without specifying in detail what those services might be. In this chapter I elaborate on the contribution that political entrepreneurs make and give substance to the anodyne term ‘political services’. I categorize the services provided and detail who they are provided for. I consider in what ways these goods might be collective or private goods. I discuss the rewards that political entrepreneurs gain in return for providing political services. I have taken an inductive approach and in doing so I address the potential objection that rational choice theory might be culturally inappropriate for studying cases in south India.1 My analytical approach is informed by the existing literature on leadership in India. Accounts of political entrepreneurs influenced by rational choice orthodoxy set up a theoretical expectation of ways in which they expect politicians to behave. Political entrepreneurs are shadowy figures who respond to incentives. In short political entrepreneurs are, a priori, ruled out as the cause of anything. Or, to put it formally, they cannot be an independent variable doing the causing. Political entrepreneurs are assumed to respond predictably to certain incentives (Geddes 1994: 100; Quinn 2004: 3–4). This deductive approach, of bringing theory to the case, is attractive for its parsimony. If political entrepreneurs are eliminated as an independent variable a theory focusing on a narrower set of independent variables can be developed. I have worked more inductively. I have looked at the evidence and come back to the rational choice literature concluding that it offers a useful starting point from which to begin framing an analysis. A good deal of elite political behaviour takes the form of strategic interaction. Politicians respond to, and anticipate, the actions of other political actors. This is especially the case when it comes to the formation of electoral alliances. Instrumental calculations are particularly obvious at the critical points of alliance formation as political leaders bargain over the allocation of constituencies and the formation of governing coalitions. The evidence shows that it is important not to rule out political entrepreneurs as a potential cause

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 83 of party system change. Working inductively suggests that political entrepreneurs are more rounded figures. They may act rationally but they are not mere incentive takers. I take the idea of rational action to include calculations made on the basis of normative belief or self-seeking instrumentalism. Actions based on a mixture of both cannot be ruled out either. The evidence shows that political entrepreneurs have agency, that they are able to shape outcomes. The cases I have examined show that political leaders are able to innovate and defy convention, attributes often associated with the term ‘entrepreneur’. Political leaders are not identical. Some are more skilful than others and some work from more advantageous circumstances. I do not assume political entrepreneurs are completely free to shape party systems but the cases profiled in the following chapters show that some individuals are more influential than others. I take into account structural and institutional influences on individual action. However, I do not begin by narrowing down the range of preferences an individual might have (Geddes 1994: 100). In the first section of the chapter, I categorize the services that political entrepreneurs offer to potential followers. In the second section of the chapter I discuss the possible motivations and incentives that political entrepreneurs work with. In the third part of the chapter I review the literature on political leadership in India. In the fourth and final part of the chapter I show how this literature can be used to create an analytical framework to investigate how political entrepreneurs might have an impact on party system change in the case of Tamil Nadu.

Political entrepreneurs and collective goods In Chapter 1, I restated Laver’s definition of a political entrepreneur as an individual who provides political services.2 Important among these services are the coordination of government and political leadership among the electorate. Political entrepreneurs also mediate among their followers, between different groups and between the state and its citizens. In carrying out these activities political entrepreneurs structure the way in which they compete with each other. One facet of an outstanding leader is the political judgement that enables them to see opportunities for re-working the terrain of politics (Colton 2008: 450; McLean 2001: 231). If political entrepreneurs prove themselves to be skilled or innovative in the delivery of political services they can contribute to the process of party system change. An emerging political entrepreneur may make a space in the political market for a new party. Alternatively established political entrepreneurs may act to realign the pattern of political competition. This may strengthen their party and/or eliminate a competitor. The political entrepreneurs who do not belong to parties or do not intend to form parties are likely to make only background contributions to the context in which party systems operate. These individuals are often local brokers and while they provide vital political services (Manor 2000), they contribute more to the maintenance of a party system. However, other political entrepreneurs, especially those that lead parties or have ambitions in that direction, can contribute substantially to change in a party system. I concentrate on the latter.

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The services provided by political entrepreneurs Political entrepreneurs who hold office or are members of the party controlling government are in a strong position to provide political services. However, as we shall see below, creative political entrepreneurs outside of government can find other ways of making themselves relevant. The rational choice literature on political entrepreneurs pays close attention to the collective goods that they supply. Collective goods can be defined as non-excludable goods so that ‘if one individual receives them, other individuals will also receive them’ (Frohlich et al 1971: 30). Collective goods correctly attract attention in the rational choice literature because they are highly valuable and difficult to organize. The provision of law and order fits this description (ibid: 1). The principle of non-excludability applies to many of the political services provided by political entrepreneurs. For example, a political party might provide effective opposition to the ruling party. All voters enjoy the benefit of greater democratic pluralism regardless of whether they support the opposition party or not (Laver 1997: 79–81). Collective goods are not all the same because some of them, such as the provision of law and order, can also be provided, albeit at great cost, as private goods. There are also goods provided collectively to groups which are a subset of a larger population. Political entrepreneurs also supply services that are only available to individuals. In the rest of this section I summarize the political services provided by political entrepreneurs under the four headings of the coordination of government, political leadership, mediation, and direct services. This categorization begins from Laver’s outline of political services (1997: 70–1), makes use of the conceptual work of other authors which is cited below, and has been expanded inductively by using empirical observations of political entrepreneurs at work in south India. Coordinating the activity of government Political entrepreneurs, organized into political parties, can be very effective at winning elections and coordinating the activity of government (Aldrich 1995: 26–7). Coordinating government is a very substantial political service. Once a party has been in office voters can make an estimate of its future usefulness and likely orientation in government. Emerging parties have to work harder to build expectations and convince voters that they too could run a government. Party labels are very useful for voters because they can use them as an ‘information shortcut’ to get a quick sense of the likely behaviour of individual candidates once in office (Roberts 2005: 23). A related service is the opposition provided by parties that are not in government. An important element in rational choice accounts of political entrepreneurship is the mechanism of competition. Democratic politicians usually ‘face explicit threats of replacement’ (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1978: 80). These threats condition their behaviour and help produce a political market whereby politicians compete for votes and offer their political services to voters. The certainty of an upcoming election encourages politicians to keep in touch with the wishes of voters. If

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 85 politicians take their support for granted or fail to govern effectively they risk getting voted out of office. Of course, governing effectively is not an objective category and political parties will project their own interpretation of effective government. As we shall see, a key task political entrepreneurs carry out is the creation and leadership of a constituency. These constituencies might have quite different perceptions of effective government. An opposition party might be able to gain considerable support by claiming that the group they represent is neglected by the ruling party. Political leadership Leadership is a complex task that is discussed again at length towards the end of the chapter. The preliminary discussion here is organized around five types of contribution leaders can make. First, leaders identify a gap in the political market that they can make their own. Second, leadership involves the identification and recruitment of followers. Having done this, leaders usually attempt to protect this relationship and insulate their followers from claims made by rivals. Third, leaders may use institutional means to project their claims for pre-eminence and this can be done by creating and maintaining an institution. Fourth, leaders make claims to represent their followers. Leaders may represent their followers by aggregating the views of voters from various social backgrounds or they claim only to represent followers from a particular social background. Fifth, leaders may speak to, or define, the psychological needs of their followers. These categories overlap but are sufficiently distinct to helpfully clarify the task of leadership. It should also be noted that some of these functions, such as aggregation or institutional maintenance, can be provided by an individual leader or delegated to other members of a party or an organization. I address these five types of activity in the rest of this section. An aspiring political entrepreneur needs to state a compelling political narrative that justifies giving them support. They need to offer a superior version of an existing political product or a new product entirely. The narrative will draw attention to the superior qualities of that individual as well as a cluster of contested or overlooked issues. As discussed in Chapter 2, these issues might be derived from a particular social marker, as a political entrepreneur attempts to develop a structural cleavage. Alternatively a political entrepreneur might combine a selection of markers and issues to produce a political or non-structural cleavage. When political entrepreneurs introduce a new cleavage into a party system they resemble an entrepreneur in the Schumpeterian sense of a mould breaking innovator rather than the incentive taking economic actors associated with public choice theory. Even when political entrepreneurs revive dormant cleavages there is a degree of creativity as they seek to change the way in which voters interpret politics. These active entrepreneurs are not Downsian ‘politicians who take citizens’ preferences as given’ (Wohlgemuth 2002: 227–9). Leaders contribute to the definition of political identities and set boundaries between groups. Leaders can make a defining contribution to organizing political competition in mass societies when they label the groups between which political conflict is said to take place (Schattschneider

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1960: 62). This is one area in which political entrepreneurs can profoundly re-direct the pattern of party politics. Seeking followers is a fundamental activity of leadership. As we have noted, political entrepreneurs seek to create a space for themselves in a political market and define the groups that are in conflict. Having done that, leaders establish a followership by persuading people that this identity is of primary importance. Leaders have to establish a connection with their followers. This might be done by public campaigning, by the leader or his lieutenants seeking out voters. In Tamil Nadu it is expected that leaders make themselves available to their followers and personal contact is an important way of doing that (Gorringe 2005). The provision of services, discussed in the next two sections is another way of establishing efficacy among potential followers. A shared identity makes collective action among the followers easier to carry out. Entrepreneurial leaders can revive dormant political identities and build an electoral base for a political party. The case of the PMK mentioned in connection with the Vanniar caste in Chapter 2, demonstrates this process at work. Leaders can also re-work identities in support of a political project. Softening divisions between groups to build a coalition of support behind a party is an alternative to particularistic mobilization.3 The various iterations of Dravidian regional identity discussed in Chapter 2 show how entrepreneurial leaders in south India tried to re-model the boundaries of groups that support them. In a competitive environment political entrepreneurs need to continually assert a group identity to prevent its political relevance being obscured by alternative narratives of conflict that emphasize cross-cutting identities. Institutions can be very useful devices in the ongoing assertion of group identity. Forming and maintaining institutions is another facet of political leadership. In a positive sense an institution can be used to amplify a leader’s impact in a mass society. Mines and Gourishankar (1990), discussed in more detail below, show how individual leaders do this in south India. Institutions are important to leaders for defensive reasons too. The political history of modern India has made it abundantly clear that small parties and fledgling movements are vulnerable to larger parties seeking to eliminate them or co-opt their leaders. This has been particularly true of caste-based parties and movements. Strong leadership and effective organization enhance the chances of survival. Organizations help to insulate a leader’s supporters from claims made by rivals and facilitates the task of representation. Leaders represent their followers in a number of ways. Leaders may represent the policy preferences of their followers, which involves aggregating opinions or even preference formation. Alternatively, or additionally, leaders might hail from the same social background as their followers and so provide microcosmic representation. The politics of microcosmic representation has been extensively developed in Tamil Nadu in the last two decades. Indeed it is not unusual for several individuals to make competing claims to represent a single group. Other individuals or organizations may claim to represent an assortment of groups. Kanchan Chandra distinguishes between ethnic parties that represent a single group and multiethnic parties that claim to represent a range of groups (2004: 3–4). The leaders of separate

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 87 organizations identified with a particular group can make intuitively appealing claims to be the champion of only one group. When a leader is from the same social background as the group they claim to represent they can claim a unique bond of kinship with their followers. This claim is usually accompanied by a narrative that explains how governing parties fail to truly represent certain groups. The neglect of minorities in the provision of government services is one such issue of contention. The PMK again offers an excellent example of this approach to political competition. In connection with the claim to represent a group, political entrepreneurs provide a range of political services that are linked to the group they seek to lead. Political entrepreneurs coordinate collective activity on behalf of the group. This may include devising strategies to advance group interests, organizing campaigns, lobbying, and gathering resources to pay for these activities. Finally leadership may involve fulfilling the psychological needs of followers. This might be a consequence of rhetorical skills used to articulate the anxieties and aspirations of their followers. Alternatively an individual’s exceptional persona may fulfil a similar purpose. This is another area in which leaders may be especially innovative if they are able to create an emotional formation that transcends or re-forms existing political divisions. The filmstar-politician MGR comes to mind as an example of a leader well-versed in the politics of emotion. A leader’s political achievements also may be psychologically important for their followers. Followers are likely to be motivated by actions that demonstrate a leader’s continuing efficacy. Mediation Political entrepreneurs function as mediators. If they are figures of stature within a particular group they have the authority to mediate disputes among individual group members or between factions within the group. There is frequently a need for individuals to negotiate with the state. This might be as mundane as filing loan applications for illiterate clients (Gorringe 2005: 31), or the more involved task of lobbying for a development project (Manor 2000: 821). In order to do this type of work an entrepreneur needs to be recognized as a broker but does not need to hold elected office or be known as the leader of a group (though either of these qualifications would be very useful). This service might be a collective good if the mediator acts on behalf of a group or it might be a private good if it is a representation on behalf of an individual. Political entrepreneurs with a credible claim to lead a group can also mediate between their own group and other equivalent groups. In the context of alliance politics described in Chapter 3, political entrepreneurs bargain with other parties to secure benefits for themselves and for their followers. Political entrepreneurs are in a much stronger bargaining position where they can demonstrate decisive leadership of their constituency. Direct services Political entrepreneurs provide a range of other direct services according to their own skills and the needs of their followers. The provision of direct services can be

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a way of funding a larger political enterprise or getting material rewards for the entrepreneur. Gaps in the provision of services provided by the state give entrepreneurs opportunities to attract support by providing services. Powerful political entrepreneurs often present themselves as protectors of their supporters. Political entrepreneurs may represent themselves as guardians in a metaphorical sense but protection can literally be a service provided to followers of the leader. In situations where the police abuse their coercive power or fail to provide adequate enforcement, a political entrepreneur might organize communities to protect themselves or organize protests to highlight crimes that have not been investigated. The Dalit political entrepreneurs, Krishnaswamy and Thirumavalavan, have been very active in this way. Krishnaswamy has made frequent use of the courts as a source of redress. The DPI, symbolized by Thirumavalavan’s image and speeches, are regarded as a source of protection for the party’s followers who are at the risk of caste discrimination and victimization (Arun 2003: 156). Some political entrepreneurs may have coercive resources and be able provide an alternative to state provided services of law and order. A leader willing to operate at the margins of legality is able to mediate informal contract disputes and enforce the outcome of the mediation. The ability to coerce also opens up the possibility of a parallel system of taxation or extortion (Frohlich et al 1971: 54). In Tamil Nadu some notable individuals with resources have been able to provide rudimentary welfare services or financial support to followers (Widlund 2000: 251–3). Political entrepreneurs holding elected office can also provide political favours in a way that becomes a private good. Politicians from the ruling party can skew the provision of state services to their supporters or prospective supporters. However, converting collective goods into private goods, or interfering with due process in the allocation of services, is not without risk. Incumbents can acquire a reputation for indulging in corrupt behaviour and suffer at the subsequent election. Office holders are also vulnerable to competition if they provide goods which are provided on a one off basis (Frohlich et al 1971: 55–6). For example, government jobs are difficult to rescind once given. This example reveals other considerations that political entrepreneurs are aware of. Posts in government are costly to provide and there are only a limited number available to distribute as patronage. Office holders have an incentive to provide services that can be widely consumed and continually provided so that the entrepreneur is considered essential to their ongoing provision. This imperative pulls entrepreneurs back towards the provision of collective goods but it certainly does not rule out the provision of direct services as a supplementary activity if this can be done without the appearance of venality.

Entrepreneurial motivation The term political entrepreneur is a useful one for a study of party systems in south India. In addition to the innovative leadership discussed above, the term ‘entrepreneur’ draws attention to the structure of political careers and obliges us to recognize the material side of politics in south India. It is certainly the case that aspiring

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 89 politicians, like business entrepreneurs, take great risks, spend time, money and resources building a political career in the face of considerable uncertainty about the likely outcome. For example, political activism may be used as a way of demonstrating leadership potential and building up goodwill and support for a later entry into formal politics (Alm 2006: 2–4). Dickey describes the way in which film fan clubs offer a route into politics (1993: 359–63). Widlund provides an interesting account of how one DMK MLA built his reputation by generously offering his services as a lawyer (2000: 213–15). The rational choice approach draws attention to the instrumental behaviour of politicians. The language used is heavily laden with market terminology and a key assumption is that political entrepreneurs find their activity profitable (Frohlich et al 1971: 75; Laver 1997: 77). As noted I argue for a broader view, a theme I develop in the next section, but it would be naive to overlook the instrumental aspect of party politics in Tamil Nadu. It is certainly the case that politics can be financially profitable. The issue of rewards received by political entrepreneurs is extremely interesting to voters, the media as well as to those who receive the rewards. Routinely, it is an area of public controversy. It is not an effectively regulated area with political entrepreneurs often deciding how they receive these rewards (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1978: 78). These rewards can be broadly divided between the satisfaction gained from office holding and the opportunities for financial gain from office holding. The satisfaction gained from office holding might result from the prestige of the job; or it could be the sense of efficacy derived from determining political outcomes (McLean 2001: 232). Alm notes how some local political brokers get a great deal of satisfaction from being regarded as a person of influence in their locality (2006: 10). The financial rewards of office also come in a variety of forms. Some are licit and some are not. At a minimum, elected officials obtain immediate benefits in the form of a salary and the perks of office. There are many permutations of illicit reward. Elected officials may charge constituents and lobbyists when they take up issues with the state administration (Widlund 2000: 253–5, 269–70). Another possibility for a governing party is the extortion of campaign finance from businesses by informal taxation. The allocation of public contracts and the sale of government land create opportunities for receiving illegal commission. The auction of licences to sell alcohol may be fixed in favour of bidders who have bribed the politicians directing the process (The Hindu 2003f). It is also possible for elected officials to gain income by directing the distribution of state benefits or even pocketing the benefits themselves (Suresh 1992: 2313–14). The illicit nature of this activity makes it impossible to be certain how much of these rewards are for personal enrichment and how much is invested in the political careers of individual politicians. Election campaigns are expensive to conduct and incumbent politicians may well attempt to accumulate surpluses to see them through periods when they will be out of office. A more ambiguous reward is that which a political entrepreneur gains from the skills or reputation developed during a political career. An enhanced public profile can be used for business purposes. Frohlich et al refer to the possibility that an entrepreneur’s

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Political leaders as political entrepreneurs activities in supplying collective goods generate externalities that make it profitable for him to supply the members with such private goods. His organization, for example, may give him an advantage either in the manufacture or in the distribution of a particular private good. (Frohlich et al 1971: 56–7)

In Tamil Nadu a number of political entrepreneurs have broadened their interests into media businesses. The DMK and the AIADMK are each associated with cable television companies. The cable company that broadcasts Sun-TV had offices in the DMK party headquarters and was jointly owned by members of Karunanidhi’s joint family until recently (Indian Express 2005; Rediff 2006). The opportunities open to successful political entrepreneurs are partly determined by the institutional makeup of the Indian state. The deepening of alliance politics described in Chapter 3 has allowed state level politicians who are not members of national parties to participate in national coalitions. The allocation of powers in India’s federal system means that ambitious political entrepreneurs have good reasons to focus their efforts on state politics. Despite the centralized political structure of the Indian Union, state governments have extensive powers that politicians are anxious to control (Manor 1995b: 48–51). The states have major responsibilities in the areas of agriculture, health, education, roads, and law and order. State governments are important regulators of economic life, being able to make industrial policy, allocate land for development, and levy taxes. This role has been enhanced by the reforms to the economy since 1991 (Jenkins 1999). The scale and type of resources, including land, controlled by state governments provide opportunities for senior politicians to enrich themselves (Pani 2006). Participation in state politics is made relatively more attractive because India’s size and social diversity makes organizing a bid to take national power extremely difficult. The linguistic re-organization of the Indian states in the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the logic of state level mobilization. These changes gave the federal system greater stability and reduced the significance of language as a divisive issue (Adeney 2003: 191). The new states were more likely to be culturally homogenous, which favoured the formation of a regional identity and a state level political culture. The reorganization of the states also created some units in which caste-based competition became a more obvious way of mobilizing support (Chhibber 1999: 56–7). The combination of these factors makes regionally based parties attractive to aspiring political entrepreneurs. Other rewards and motivations The terminology of the market needs to be used with care to avoid a distorting portrait of political interaction. This especially the case with narrow assumptions about rational action that imply political entrepreneurs act in an entirely self-serving and instrumental way. It is, for example, implausible to suggest that many of the important political entrepreneurs of modern Tamil Nadu were largely motivated by a desire for personal enrichment. Three prominent figures from an earlier generation

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 91 who contributed much to the shaping of the party system, Rajagopalachari, Kamaraj and Annadurai, established reputations for personal probity. There are good reasons for taking ideological motivation into account (Irschick 1975; Varshney 2003). If one takes a wider view of motivation, as I do here, we can talk of rational behaviour motivated by values other than direct material benefits to the individual. Assumptions about voter rationality can be broadened out to include the idea that voters make reasoned decisions on the basis of values or affective links to political parties that are not necessarily predicated on notions of narrow self-interest. Political entrepreneurs can incorporate a variety of social markers into narratives of problems in need of political resolution. As discussed in Chapter 2 in Tamil Nadu these include caste status, class, language, religious affiliation, regional pride and gender. It is not intuitively obvious which of these divisions should take priority. The varied planes along which mobilization can take place means that there are ample opportunities for value based mobilization. The resolution of genuine problems associated with each social marker could be a reasonable motivation for political entrepreneurs to act. It is of course possible that political entrepreneurs associate with a political conflict for personal gratification or are motivated both by a desire to shape political outcomes and enrich themselves. The issue of motivation is not the ultimate problem under examination here. The focus is on party system change and the extent to which it is driven by political agents (however motivated). That said, the issue of motivation is not irrelevant given the focus on the actions of political entrepreneurs. Being attentive to the issue of motivation helps give a rich sense of what it means to be a political entrepreneur. We can observe the impact of ideas on politics as well having a sense of how instrumental gain shapes political behaviour. In the preceding sections I have elaborated on the functions performed by political entrepreneurs detailing how they provide collective goods, seek followers, compete for the responsibility of governing, mediate and provide direct services. I have sketched out the rewards that can reasonably be expected from a political career. I have tried to avoid the impression that political entrepreneurs simply respond to a range of incentives before them. My account has been informed by concepts taken from rational choice literature and re-worked with reference to cases examined elsewhere in the volume. In the rest of this chapter I review the literature on political leadership in India with particular reference to Tamil Nadu. The purpose of this review is to get a sense of how leadership is exercised. A contextually sensitive understanding of the mechanisms of leadership enables me to set out an analytical framework that is applied to political entrepreneurs profiled in later chapters.

Agency, structure and leadership Much of the literature on political leadership in India and Tamil Nadu either emphasizes the role of individual agency or depicts leadership as heavily shaped by structural factors. This survey begins with authors who have more to say about

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agency before considering several interpretations that link patterns of leadership to various structural factors. Manor has drawn attention to the way in which state chief ministers are able to shape political processes and outcomes. His work suggests that politicians have more room for manoeuvre than is commonly assumed. Manor characterizes chief ministers, including Digvijay Singh in the state of Madhya Pradesh, as innovative risk-takers able to alter the direction of government policy (Manor 2004). Manor’s forthright assessments of inept and corrupt chief ministers also suggest ways in which a lack, or misapplication, of political skills make a difference to political outcomes (2000: 833–4). Manor also sees outcomes influenced by the quality of political institutions available to chief ministers. Robust political parties are important but a possible alternative lies in the activity of ‘lower-level activists’ or non-party political fixers who mediate between the state and civil society. However, agency cannot be overlooked because, as Manor argues, chief ministers still have to make skilful use of institutional resources (1995b: 70–2). Mines and Gourishankar, writing about leadership in a broad sense, but in a way that is highly relevant to party politics, argue that skill is an essential attribute of individuals who achieve pre-eminence in south India. They further argue that these ‘big-men’ (and women) amplify their eminence through institutions that they control. The emphasis is strongly on agency as these institutions expand and contract according to the activity of the leader and Mines and Gourishankar note that ‘even hereditary leaders have few followers when they lack charisma and skill’ (1990: 762). The agency of leaders is not absolute as they have to take some care to respond to the expectations of their followers (ibid: 775). Using the case of the religious leader Kanchi Shankaracharya, discussed in Chapter 2, they show how leadership roles, and the institutions headed by the leader develop. Mines and Gourishankar argue that the office ‘is what the incumbent is able to make of it, in part activating, renewing, and protecting rights his predecessors have won, and in part reaching out to acquire new rights’ (ibid). Dickey applies this model persuasively to the case of the filmstar-politician MGR showing how satellite institutions, in particular his fan clubs, reproduced the image of a generous leader (1993). Some of the wider literature on leadership in South Asia recognizes that political leaders can perform the affective function of articulating the anxieties of their followers. Exceptional leaders find powerful ways to speak to the concerns of a broad audience. Gandhi was an adept ‘innovator and synthesizer of diverse political and philosophical traditions’ (M. Hasan 1998: 587). C.N. Annadurai, the founding leader of the DMK, also demonstrated a knack for connecting with, and leading, the emotions of ordinary Tamil citizens. Irschick comments of Annadurai’s newspaper that ‘it was unlike any other journal that had been started in Tamilnad. Its Tamil editorials were elegant without being formal, yet it used alliteration in a way which could immediately be appreciated by people of little education’ (1986: 261). Price argues that leadership in India is frequently shaped by ‘structures of meaning’ in the form of ‘political values with roots in precolonial political formations and culture’ that echo historical models of kingly behaviour (P. Price

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 93 1989: 560). Key elements of this kingly behaviour include acts of generosity towards one’s followers. In these kingly models ‘we seem to find, on the one hand, cultural sources for preoccupation with personal prestige on the part of some politicians, and on the other, susceptibility to the charisma of a leader at some times and in some parts of the subcontinent’ (P. Price 1989: 571). The case of MGR, a figure who was seen as both dazzling and generous, is used to illustrate the argument. In a subsequent study Price explored the cultural legacy of the DMK, and argued that party propagandists put in place a set of values that have been used to justify the superior standing, and often the wealth, of elected politicians in Tamil Nadu.4 A successful candidate elected to the state assembly gains prestige from association with the state and ‘his capacity to make himself – and possibly others – wealthy’ (P. Price 1996: 378).5 In a manner resembling the kingly model, Members of the Legislative Assembly acquire a responsibility for those who have elected them. Rajadurai and Geetha provide an account of the re-interpretation of Tamil history and epic literature by the leadership of the DMK. They argue that the objective of the DMK leaderships was to create ‘a line of unbroken continuity with the distant past’ (Rajadurai and Geetha 1996: 566). During the 1940s Annadurai, who went on to become the leader of the DMK, wrote plays that gave a distinctive political edge to well known myths (Sivathamby 1971: 213–14). The DMK leader Karunanidhi, identified senior party figures with characters from the courts of former Tamil kings. The overall effect was to invest ‘political leaders with a certain mythical appeal by cleverly inserting them within an already legitimate epic framework’ (Rajadurai and Geetha 1996: 567). Hansen, using the case of Shiv Sena in western India, argues that leadership has a performative aspect, an important element of which is the staging of spectacles that raise the profile of an emerging leader or help persuade followers of the continuing importance of an existing leader. A leader ‘seeks to become a tangible embodiment of the ‘community’ or the locality he seeks to represent – or better still, he tries to express and create community and locality through the very act of representation’ (Hansen 2004: 22). Spary develops this argument further showing the ways in which performativity is presented and assessed in gendered terms (2006: 14). Again these accounts can be located in structures of meaning that are either pre-existent or re-interpreted by innovative leaders. Swamy outlines a stronger argument in his account of party competition and policy formation in India. For him a key element of leadership lies in the area of ideas and, following F.G. Bailey, Swamy argues that ‘political leadership plays a critical role in defining people’s beliefs about their interests’ (1996a: 49). Gorringe provides another account, using cases of Dalit leaders in Tamil Nadu, with a stronger structural emphasis. In common with Price, he attributes importance to structures of social meaning. Gorringe follows Geertz, who understands charisma as the ability of leaders to align themselves with prevailing cultural values, ‘by articulating the concerns, fears and injustices that confront their constituents, they become central to the aspirations of their followers’ (2005: 246). Gorringe also emphasizes the ‘social relations of leadership’ which means that leaders are closely tied to their followers and possess legitimacy because they

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resemble their followers as well as representing their concerns. In this view leaders cannot get too far ahead of the members of the movement that they lead or else they will lose support. Leaders are in a reciprocal relationship with their followers which obliges them to maintain links to the membership by being available through public meetings and other events. One observation I flag here, and explore later, is that the cultural values described by Gorringe are not identical to the values prevalent in other party subcultures. This means that the context in which leadership is exercised shows some variation for the political entrepreneurs and parties discussed below. Hart and Herring, as mentioned above, provide a stronger structuralist account that ties leaders and followers together. This connection is made in a comparative study of land reform in Kerala and Maharashtra. They reflect on the notion of political will and argue the power of the chief ministers in question ‘would dissolve quickly if they embarked upon a line of policy inconsistent with the expectations of their rural followers and the configurations of rural political power’. They then add: ‘Those outside, or above, the State arena cannot act; those in the arena have entered preprogrammed to a particular direction of tenurial policy’ (Hart and Herring 1977: 283). The chapter also reflects on the formation of state party systems in the terms set out by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Hart and Herring see possibilities for change and the impact of agency but only at special points of critical juncture when the political system and political attitudes are malleable. I respond to this caging of political agency with two observations. First, the degree of political agency varies across policy areas and the case of land reform is probably an area where leaders have least autonomy. Second, several party systems in the Indian states, including Maharashtra, have experienced change since the 1970s. A synthesis and a framework for analysis The survey of the literature on leadership provides rich material that has been used to give an expanded account of what political services might be. The literature also helps us understand why political entrepreneurs might or might not be successful. This material also anticipates the criticism that the idea of a political entrepreneur is deductively constructed and brings with it game theoretic assumptions that are not applicable to the south Indian case. The literature summarized above gives a good sense of how we might expect leaders to operate and the ways in which their leadership is understood. In particular Mines and Gourishankar (1990) provide a clear view of how leaders exert their agency in an institutional context. They note how the context both amplifies and constrains a leader’s agency. Thus leadership exercised in an institutional context is assisted where that institution generates resources that can be distributed as patronage. However, leaders are also constrained by the weight of followers’ expectations. Mines and Gourishankar, writing at length, give a good sense of the privileged status of the leader and how a leader might exploit that position. Political entrepreneurs need to be found plausible by their followers. There are two obvious routes to this objective. First, successful political entrepreneurs are

Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 95 perceived to be special individuals. Prospective supporters are interested in what makes a leader pre-eminent or a unique individual (ibid: 762–3). Social background might, or might not, be an important consideration. As Gorringe notes it is critical for an authentic Dalit leader to have the appropriate caste background in Tamil Nadu (2006b: 15). The same qualification would apply for leaders of other caste based parties such as the PMK. Caste identity is far from irrelevant for leaders of other parties but it is not always an essential mark of authenticity nor does it operate in the precise way that applies among Dalit movements. So for example the current leader of the AIADMK, Jayalalithaa Jeyaram, is from a Brahman background and while it is remarked upon by commentators it seems not to be a political liability. In terms of personal distinctiveness a leader needs ‘a widely familiar, politically attractive image’ (Dickey 1993: 368). While Dickey’s comment echoes a Weberian notion of ‘charisma’ I am attentive to objections to an excessively leader centred notion of charisma. Gorringe is critical of the Weberian perspective arguing that an exclusive focus on a leader’s personal qualities obscures the agency exercised by their followers (2005: 245). Spary argues that Weber does not consider the extent to which a leader’s legitimacy is constructed according to gendered notions of authority (2006: 12–14). I take these arguments to be useful correctives while continuing to argue that it is still important to take account of the factors that make a leader an exceptional individual. The personal qualities that a leader possesses are important, especially if a leader can exploit those resources effectively. An important lesson I take from the social relations approach is that leadership is not exercised in a vacuum; the ability of followers to express dissent or withdraw support makes leadership an ongoing task. The second aspect of being a plausible leader is the continual persuading of supporters to support their leader’s party. Winning elections or coming a respectable second, as Duverger would confirm, enhance the credibility of a party. The winning party has particular advantage as it gains office and has an opportunity to implement popular policies. However, given the limited opportunities for controlling the state government, or even gaining second place in an election, leaders have to be creative in defining what supporters understand by ‘winning’. One option, which is certainly used in Tamil Nadu, for demonstrating the leader’s relevance, is a turn towards performativity (Spary 2006: 14). There is a long tradition of emerging parties engaging in agitational politics or as Gorringe puts it, drawing on established repertoires of action (2005: 104). The activities of numerous political entrepreneurs are explored throughout this book and they will be assessed in the light of the two sets of literature I have reviewed in this chapter. Consideration will be given to the ways in which leaders are seen to be exceptional and distinctive individuals. Some comparisons will be made with leaders who have been unsuccessful. I will comment on the following themes when assessing leadership in subsequent chapters. First, I will assess the skill with which each entrepreneur has developed their party. Second, I assess the institutions which each leader has used to nurture their party. Third, I will consider how some of the leaders have been able to embed themselves in existing structures of meaning in the political culture of the state. I am careful not to automatically

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describe this as Dravidian political culture. While Dravidian ideas and sentiments are generally dominant in Tamil Nadu they are not universally accepted and it is important to be sensitive to elements of divergence or resistance. The impact and following of the Dravidian movement has often varied according to geography and social background (M.S.S. Pandian 1994). Changes in the party system have reinforced some elements of Dravidian political culture and brought others into question. Fourth, I consider the key structural factors that have enabled or inhibited the emergence and success of each party/leader. The relative weakness of state and party political institutions in south India creates opportunities political entrepreneurs can exploit. Unevenly responsive state institutions give relevance to mediators willing to help citizens to access state services. Political entrepreneurs can provide services where state institutions function intermittently. The heterogeneity of Indian society also provides multiple ways for leaders to build new constituencies or revive dormant political identities. Reviewing the literature on political leadership makes clear that the notion of entrepreneurship, especially one that takes into account value based motivations, resonates very strongly with contemporary politics in Tamil Nadu. It is a term that captures very many of the facets of political mediation carried out by individuals at several levels of the political system in Tamil Nadu and South Asia more generally (Ruud forthcoming). The next three chapters examine how differences based on caste have been used to reshape the party system in Tamil Nadu.

5

The PMK Re-opening a caste cleavage

The PMK has contributed a great deal to the recent process of party system change. Its formation in 1989 can be identified as a hinge moment in the politics of Tamil Nadu. The party has strong support from the Vanniar caste group concentrated in northern Tamil Nadu. Since 1998 the PMK has been a pivotal player in the formation of electoral alliances. The party leader, Dr S. Ramadoss, is a tough negotiator who has been prepared to spring surprises on his allies. The PMK was on the winning side in each of the five elections held in Tamil Nadu between 1998 and 2006. The PMK’s tactical astuteness was well rewarded. It gained legislative seats at the state and national level. The PMK participated in all three national coalition governments between 1998 and 2009, giving the party a string of ministerial posts. The PMK has had a significant impact on the state party system. In terms of party system change the PMK has added another party to the system, promoted an alternative ideology and created new partisan alignments with an important minority of the electorate. The PMK has also altered the calculations political entrepreneurs might make about the likely costs and rewards of forming a new party. The roots of the PMK go back to late nineteenth-century attempts to create a corporate identity for a Vanniar community. The Vanniars were among those dissatisfied enough with the privileged position of the forward Non-Brahman castes to argue for special measures for the Backward Classes in the 1930s. This aspiration was partially met in November 1947 when the quota of jobs reserved for Non-Brahmans was divided. Out of every 14 jobs two would go to the backward Hindus, six to forward Non-Brahmans and two to Brahmans (Radhakrishnan 1996: 121). When this was ruled unconstitutional the Central government introduced an amendment that permitted the Government of Madras to reserve 25 per cent of government posts for the Backward Classes and 15 per cent for the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ibid). Parties representing the Vanniars were successful in the early 1950s but a tradition of independent representation was forestalled as Congress incorporated these parties within its ranks. The DMK was also mindful of the sizeable Vanniar community as it stepped up its mobilization in the 1960s. Dr Ramadoss inherited memories of group mobilization and was able to cultivate a number of shared grievances when he began organizing Vanniar opinion in the 1980s. In the next section of the chapter, I outline how the PMK has had an impact on electoral politics in Tamil Nadu since 1989. In the second section of the chapter, I

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discuss in more detail the structural factors that the PMK has used to its advantage. In the third section of the chapter, I show how institutional factors work to the advantage of the PMK. In the fourth section of the chapter, I explore in more detail how the leadership style of Dr Ramadoss has had an impact of the success of the PMK and consequently the party system in Tamil Nadu. In the fifth section of the chapter, I assess the impact of the PMK on the party system in Tamil Nadu. In the sixth section I compare the trajectory of the PMK with that of the Forward Bloc, a party linked to the Thevar caste cluster. This comparison shows the importance of effective leadership in maintaining the influence of a smaller political party in the alliance politics of Tamil Nadu.

The emergence of the PMK Violent demonstrations pushed caste back up the political agenda in Tamil Nadu in September 1987. The Vanniar caste group gained national attention with a sustained protest, beginning at midnight on 17 September. The northern districts of Tamil Nadu were bought to a standstill for a week. Trees were felled to obstruct roads. Trucks being used by DMK activists were stopped and set on fire. Hundreds of Dalit homes were set alight by protesting Vanniars (India Today 15 October 1987: 32). Police attempting to clear the roads fired on protesters and killed over 30 people (Suresh 1992: 2317). The protesters were objecting to the allocation of government benefits, especially jobs and scholarships, among the backward castes of the states. The attacks on Dalits were motivated by various factors including the concern that Dalits were using government benefits to enhance their status vis-à-vis the Vanniars (Vincentnathan 1996: 500). Vanniar leaders claimed that the administration of the Other Backward Classes (OBC) quotas allowed the more prosperous backward castes to get most of the benefits while less well-off and more deserving groups were overlooked. The solution, they argued, should be the creation of sub-quotas to prevent the most affluent backward class groups from monopolizing the benefits at the expense of the more backward groups. The caste association behind the protests provided the nucleus of a political party, the PMK, formed two years later. Dr Ramadoss had been active with the Vanniar Sangam since 1980 but earlier Vanniar mobilization had demonstrated the viability of a single caste party. In the 1952 assembly elections the Commonweal Party and the Tamilnad Toilers Party won six and 19 seats respectively. The parties later merged with Congress. S.S. Ramaswami Padayachi, leader of the erstwhile Toilers, justified his position in Congress to a Vanniar Sangam conference in 1955 in terms of the scholarships and reserved jobs that were now available to the community. While a separate caste quota did not exist it is quite possible that Padayachi was able to influence the allocation of benefits to the advantage of his caste fellows (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 59–60). In 1957 the Vanniars were courted by both Congress and the DMK. They were nominated in large numbers by both parties. A few years later Padayachi left Congress to join the Swatantra Party. By 1961 he was leader of the party in South Arcot district. The Vanniar vote was divided between three parties for the 1962

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 99 state assembly election. Prior to the 1967 election Padayachi revived the Tamilnad Toilers Party but he was spurned by the DMK alliance and the revived party failed to make an impact. As with the Congress earlier the DMK was able to convince enough Vanniar voters that it looked to their interests. It was estimated that the combined number of Vanniar legislators in the DMK and Congress exceeded 10 per cent of the total (ibid: 89–90). The death of MGR in December 1987 complicated the state response to the demands of Vanniar Sangam. The AIADMK had been unreceptive to the demands of the Vanniar Sangam prior to the protests. The two commissions established to consider the administration of backward class reservations were not taken seriously by the state government (India Today 1987: 32). The Vanniars were concentrated in northern constituencies where the AIADMK was weaker and prior to the 1987 protests the community was considered to lean towards the DMK. The Vanniars’ allegation of bias in the administration of reservations was more of a political problem for the DMK rather than the AIADMK. When President’s Rule was imposed on the state after the death of MGR the Congress Party decided to respond to the reservations problem.1 The state Governor proposed the principle of ring-fenced reservations for members of the most backward castes in December 1988 (Radhakrishnan 1996: 128). The DMK won the 1989 assembly elections and shortly afterwards the DMK made a concession to the Vanniar Sangam and declared that 20 per cent of the existing 49 per cent reservation for the backward classes would be a Most Backward Classes (MBC) quota. The Vanniar Sangam did not receive the move positively, claiming the benefit to Vanniars would be diluted by listing a total of 107 eligible groups. Dr Ramadoss conducted a vigorous campaign against the DMK government and its leader Karunanidhi. In July 1989 the PMK (the toiling people’s party) was formed and the party contested the Lok Sabha elections in November that year. The party won 5.8 per cent of the vote (Suresh 1992: 2317). The PMK did not to ally with either the AIADMK or the DMK to contest the 1991 election. The AIADMK formed an alliance with Congress and the DMK made do with the support of a few smaller parties. The PMK was at the head of a third front in alliance with a number of smaller parties (ibid: 2317). While not being a member of a large alliance meant immediate electoral success was unlikely it did give the PMK another opportunity to prove its strength. The party won 5.8 per cent of the state-wide vote but only one seat. The PMK cut into the DMK vote in the northern districts and might have given some the AIADMK–Congress some limited assistance but the size of the landslide meant the impact of the PMK was marginal. The AIADMK alliance won 59.6 per cent of the state-wide vote and only in a few constituencies did the vote share dip below 50 per cent. Even in the PMK stronghold of South Arcot district the party struggled in the face of a dominant AIADMK–Congress alliance. In only five out of 19 seats won by the AIADMK alliance in the same district did the PMK hold the balance of votes (ibid: 2314). The PMK emerged out of the dramatic protests against the policy of the state government in September 1987. The party continues to be associated with this style of politics even though it has been active for 20 years. PMK activists have

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participated in a wide range of protests and direct action. Some of them, such as bus burning and the defacing of non-Tamil street signs echo modes of protests used by other political movements. The PMK is distinctive for the range of protests and the continuing demands even as it has been elevated to the status of a regular alliance partner and thus a part of the political establishment. In September 1992, just over a year after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, PMK volunteers participating in a rally in Madras expressed their support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Some of the volunteers carried portraits of the suicide bomber, Dhanu, who detonated the bomb that killed Rajiv Gandhi. Expressions of support for the cause of Eelam have been made at subsequent conferences though contact with Congress through electoral alliances since 2001 seems to have encouraged PMK leaders to be more guarded, though far from silent, on the issue (Parthasarathy 2001). In 2002 Dr Ramadoss called for dividing the state of Tamil Nadu. The plan outlined a unit that would favour the Vanniars by selecting a number of key districts in northern Tamil Nadu (Frontline 2002a). The PMK can be an intimidating rival. In 2002, Dr Ramadoss questioned whether the on screen behaviour of the filmstar Rajnikant was setting an appropriate moral example for young people. Shortly afterwards there were clashes with Rajnikant fan clubs and the filmstar agreed to compensate owners of cinemas where his current film was withdrawn from viewing (The Hindu 2002e, 2002g). A similar standoff involving street skirmishes occurred when the filmstar Vijayakanth made provocative remarks about the PMK in 2004 (Frontline 2004d). In 2005 the PMK censured remarks made in a magazine interview by the actor Kushboo (Anandhi 2005; The Hindu 2005o). The protests and strident demands ensure that the party attracts a good deal of media attention. The constant activism, a theme developed below, is a way that the PMK can assert its distinctiveness. Gaining a place in alliance politics: the PMK 1996–2009 The PMK was not admitted to the main alliances formed to contest the 1996 elections. The AIADMK was confident and considered the support of the national Congress Party to be sufficient (even after Congress split because of the alliance). The DMK allied with the Congress splinter, the TMC, and campaigned vigorously against the AIADMK. The PMK formed its own alliance with a Congress splinter party, the AIIC (T) led by the Vanniar politician Vazhapadi Ramamurthy, and nine other small parties (The Hindu 1996). The PMK’s share of the vote held up in the smaller number of seats it contested (Table 5.1) but it had no discernible impact on the outcome of the election. The DMK and the TMC together won 51.4 per cent of the state-wide vote. The outcome of the 1991 election was reversed. In 1996 the DMK won 173 seats and the TMC won 39 seats. The PMK revealed one of the quirks of the SMSP electoral system. It won 3.8 per cent of the vote, and four seats, equalling the number of seats won by the AIADMK, which won 21.5 per cent of the vote. The breakthrough election for the PMK was the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. The party was assisted by the weakening of Congress. The TMC was in some difficulty

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 101 Table 5.1 Seats and votes won by the PMK in assembly elections

1991 1996 2001 2006

Seats Contested

Seats won

Votes won

Votes won in seats contested

199 116 27 31

1 4 20 18

5.9 3.8 5.6 5.6

7.0 7.6 46.8 43.4

Sources: 1991: (GoTN 1996: 156); 1996: (ECI n.d. k: 11); 2001: (ECI n.d. l: 11); 2006 (ECI 2006b: 11). Note The PMK was allied to a number of smaller parties in 1991 and 1996. In 2001 the PMK was a member of the AIADMK alliance and in 2006 the PMK was a member of the DMK alliance.

and was troubled by tensions with the ruling DMK. The parent Congress Party was widely out of favour. Nationally it was riven by splits that threatened to destroy it as a national party. The AIADMK was chastened by its defeat in 1996 and enlisted a larger number of allies. Allies of the AIADMK included the BJP, the MDMK and the PMK. The PMK offered its support to the AIADMK in return for five seats. It won four. The BJP-led alliance proved able to form a minority ruling coalition at the centre. The allies from Tamil Nadu joined this government. The PMK was rewarded with a cabinet post for one of its MPs. Another early Lok Sabha election was called in 1999. The DMK replaced the AIADMK as the local leader of the NDA alliance in Tamil Nadu. The former junior allies of the AIADMK, including the PMK, remained with the NDA coalition. The PMK accepted an improved offer of seven seats from the DMK and won five of them. The PMK took up the offer of ministerial posts at the centre but relations within the NDA were frequently tense. The PMK was not always willing to support the cautious policy towards Sri Lanka favoured by the BJP and the DMK (Frontline 2000a). The leadership of the Tamil Nadu unit of the BJP was uncomfortable with what they considered to be the partisan handling of ministerial portfolios and was especially piqued by Ramadoss’ candid support for the cause of Tamil Eelam (The Hindu 2000i). Relations between the DMK and the PMK were often tense. The PMK was keen to protect its special link with its Vanniar base and viewed links between the DMK other Vanniar politicians with suspicion. In early 2001 the PMK left the NDA alliance in order to join the electoral alliance that was being formed by the AIADMK to contest the 2001 election. The DMK’s position was immediately weakened and it attempted to compensate by making alliances with a number of new caste parties that had formed (Harriss 2002: 97; Wyatt 2002a). The AIADMK had the stronger alliance and benefited from the support of the PMK. The PMK won a respectable number of seats in the assembly, its tally increased from four to 20. Dr Ramadoss parted ways with the AIADMK within weeks of the election outcome. He rejoined the NDA and PMK MPs were readmitted to the Union council of ministers. As a vital electoral ally the PMK’s rapid movements between alliances were tolerated by the Tamil members of the NDA. The PMK remained in close touch with the DMK after 2001. When, in

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December 2003, the DMK decided to break with the BJP and leave the NDA, the PMK and the MDMK followed suit. With Lok Sabha elections due in 2004 the DMK allied itself with the Congress Party. It was joined by the PMK and other parties from Tamil Nadu. In a reversal of the 2001 elections the AIADMK was stranded with no substantial allies in Tamil Nadu. The Congress alliance, the UPA, swept all of the seats in the state and the PMK had five MPs returned to the Lok Sabha. The alliance arrangement also included the allocation to the PMK of a seat in the indirectly elected upper house, the Rajya Sabha. The PMK was again well rewarded. Anbumani Ramadoss, son of the party leader, was appointed to the important post of Union Minister of Health. A junior ministerial post was allocated to another PMK MP, R. Velu. The PMK remained with the UPA during the 2006 assembly elections. The DMK put together an alliance that included the PMK. The PMK was given a slightly increased number of seats to contest and was once again on the winning side. The election produced a hung assembly but as the Congress Party was willing to support a minority DMK government there was no opportunity for the PMK to join another coalition government. The outcome of the 2006 election was not entirely satisfactory for the PMK (The Hindu 2006ak). The formation of the DMDK in 2005 produced a party that emphasized themes relevant to the PMK’s core support. The DMDK leader Vijayakanth attacked politics based on caste identities and identified himself with the needs of poor and rural voters. The pattern of support for the DMDK, detailed in Chapter 9, suggests that the PMK may have lost some ground to the new entrant.

Structural factors that favour the PMK The PMK benefits from the caste demography of Tamil Nadu. The Vanniars form the largest caste group in the state and taken together the group has a modest status that can be translated into a political grievance. The Vanniar ‘caste’ refers to a cluster of castes that are affiliated and include the Naicker, Padayachi, Vanniar and some Gounder caste groups (Barnett 1976a: 84–5). On the basis of projections from the 1931 census figures the Vanniars have been estimated to constitute approximately 12 per cent of the state population (Vidyasagar 1988: 507; Radhakrishnan 1989a: 508). They are concentrated in what the press refers to as the ‘Vanniar belt’ that runs across the northern part of Tamil Nadu. Figures for the 1921 census figures show the Vanniars as the largest caste group in the Tamil speaking districts (12.7 per cent). The Vanniars were the largest group in the former districts of North Arcot (25.0 per cent), South Arcot (23.2 per cent) and Salem (31.3 per cent). They were also shown as second largest caste group in the district of Chingleput (20.8 per cent) (Census Commissioner 1922b: 121). Later projections show lower figures for three of these districts and a higher figure for South Arcot (36.9 per cent) (Vidyasagar 1988: 507). In the absence of a recent caste census it is impossible to be sure of the precise demography. However, the pattern of electoral support for the PMK is consistent with a concentration of the Vanniar population in these areas of the order of 25–30 per cent. The electoral significance of this concentration is shown in Map 5.1.

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 103

PMK wins more than 10 per cent of the vote 15 31

16

29

Chennai 32 30 28 34 33 27 26 38 35 47 21 50 25 49 39 74 22 46 77 23 52 51 40 41 24 76 78 75 45 42 53 54 55 81 44 56 79 43 83 59 82 80 58 57 Puducherry 71 73 60 62 63 84 85 86 87 64 61 89 122 72 91 92 100 90 88 69 65 125 66 70 94 93 128 121 68 99 124 123 160 95 67 98 126 163 169 120 127 161 157 119 101 102 96 164 188171 170 118 97 104 172 162 185 156 158 103 106 115 116 152 159 117 187 173 107 114 153 155 184 183 186 Coimbatore 113 151 174 165 168 108 (105) 182 178 175 112 181 191 150 177 109 190 130 154 176 179 111 129 148 192 180 110 149 189 147 131 Tiruchirappalli 194 139 140 193 (166 and 167) 195 146 135 133 138 145 198 196 132 141 137 199 136 134 Madurai(142 143 144) 197 204 208 206 200 201 203 209 207 205 202 214 3 212 210 17 1 213 215 5 211 2 6 4 216 217 18 7 11 218 8 227 226 221 220 219 10 12 9 224 19 225 222 13 233 232 Chennai 14 231 228 223 234 230 20 229 37

36

48

Source: Calculated by the author from Government of Tamil Nadu (1996) Map 5.1 Concentrations of electoral support for the PMK in 1991

In ritual terms the Vanniars have very low status. Although they are only just above the Dalits in the caste hierarchy it is a superiority that is noted and cherished. The Vanniars, or the Pallis as they were then known, attempted in the course of the nineteenth century to get official recognition of higher status. This effort at persuading the colonial authorities failed – it was merely noted in the 1901 census report that ‘they claim for themselves a position higher than that which Hindu

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The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage

society is inclined to accord them’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 49–51). However, the efforts of the caste associations to achieve social mobility did achieve some success through the promotion of education and the acquisition of a new name (the Vanniya kula (fire) Kshatriyas). The Vanniakula Kshatriya Maha Sangam was sufficiently organized to be able to lobby the government of the Madras Presidency from the late 1930s onwards (Radhakrishnan 1996: 116–18). The economic fortunes of the Vanniar castes have been mixed. A survey of a number of village studies shows that the out migration of traditional landowners has allowed some Vanniars to gain control of land, improve their economic position and enhance their political influence (Vidyasagar 1988: 508–9). A study of the links between caste and economic status carried out by Barbara HarrissWhite in the market town of Arni in Tiruvannamalai district testifies to this.2 She records that the Vanniars made up nearly 30 per cent of the population of the town and while most work as labourers, at best at the low end of repairs and engineering, and as marketplace porters . . . [t]he elite vanniars run lorries and their caste-cumtrade associations regulates and organizes the collective bribery needed for distribution to checkpost guards and the police. (Harriss-White 2003: 188) It is an upwardly mobile caste group represented by associations that seek to project the fortunes of the Vanniars (ibid: 186). It is important to emphasize that the Vanniar caste group is internally stratified. While some are in a comfortable position there are also Vanniars who have not experienced prosperity. There is a substantial overlap between the class position of the poorest Vanniars and the majority of the Dalit Paraiyars that live in the same localities. Members of both communities experience the grinding poverty that comes with the life of a landless labourer. In a village I visited in the Villupuram district the Vanniar section of the village was not substantially different from the area in which the Paraiyars lived. Brick built houses, indicating an improved economic situation, predominated in the village but older thatched houses were not confined to the Dalit streets. The system of SC reservations has also blurred the perceived socio-economic boundary between the two groups. A minority among the Dalits living in northern Tamil Nadu is well educated. Some Dalits have secured government jobs.3 This has become a source of resentment, especially among poorer Vanniars, even though the number of jobs in question are quite small and a proportion of those jobs remain unfilled (Vincentnathan 1996: 497). In summary the Vanniar caste group enjoys mixed economic fortunes and is not ritually privileged. The size of the caste group and a range of unsatisfied demands provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs to exploit. The Vanniar Sangam and the PMK under the leadership of Dr Ramadoss have been able to translate these social conditions into a divide in the party system. Prior to this the larger parties had for the most part kept the Vanniar cleavage dormant.

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 105 To what extent is the PMK a single caste party? The PMK identifies closely with the Vanniar caste group though this link has to be made carefully. Vanniar support has always been integral to a party that was formed by the leader of the Vanniar Sangam. The PMK continues to be associated with the sangam. On 20 March 2006 the leader of the PMK was honoured at the silver jubilee celebrations of the Vanniar Sangam. At this event Dr Ramadoss was credited with having campaigned successfully for the Most Backward Classes quota for the benefit of the Vanniar community.4 The PMK monitors the representation of Vanniars in public life and it was a matter of concern for some in the party that the only PMK minister in the Union cabinet in 1998 was not a Vanniar (Rediff 1999a). It has been noted that no Vanniar has acted as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The PMK proposal that the state be divided into two spoke to community pride (Frontline 2002a). The close ties between the PMK and the Vanniar caste group need to be put in context. The PMK has at various points attempted to win wider support. Not long after the party was formed the PMK appeared to be building a coalition of lower status groups, including Dalits, and its posters would include images of Periar, Ambedkar and Marx (Thirunavukkarasu 2001). In the 1991 assembly campaign Ramadoss promised that the chief minister would be a Dalit if the PMK won the election (Frontline 1991c) The PMK has recruited and promoted some Dalit politicians. This approach has a strong electoral logic given the large Dalit population in the same districts where the Vanniars are concentrated and the system of reserved representation means the PMK is obliged to field a minimum number of Dalit candidates. In 2003 the suggestion that the PMK was a Vanniar party was firmly rejected by the party spokesman who explained that the party represents a range of communities and that this was reflected in the allocation of key posts in the party. Of the three key posts of Party President, Treasurer and General Secretary one is reserved for a Dalit and another is reserved for a candidate from a religious minority (M. Ramadoss, interview, 27 June 2003). The first ministerial post given to the PMK when it joined the NDA coalition government was allocated to Dalit Ezhilmalai.5 Another Dalit MP, E. Ponnusamy, was subsequently given a cabinet post in 1999 (The Hindu 2002d). However, the attempt to broaden the base of the PMK was not entirely successful. Social relations between the Vanniars and Dalits were often tense as Vanniars attempted to preserve their higher social standing (Vidyasagar 1988: 510). When the DPI began to mobilize Dalit voters tensions deepened. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections the DPI made an intensive effort to get their leader elected from the Chidambaram constituency which includes areas in the old South Arcot district where Vanniars are concentrated. Supporters of each party clashed violently, suggesting the PMK was essentially a Vanniar party, and the DPI the champion of the Dalits (The Hindu 2002c). The two parties reconciled in 2004 and have cooperated in a number of joint campaigns (The Hindu 2006w). Since 2004 both parties have taken to emphasizing issues, such as the protection of Tamil or expressing social conservatism, that do not directly tie them to a narrow social base. However, the continuing links of the PMK to the Vanniar Sangam and

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The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage

its dependence on a core constituency of Vanniar voters make it difficult to see the party as having succeeded in its attempt to assemble a broad social coalition. There is little evidence that the PMK has been able to build support outside of the areas where the Vanniar population is concentrated. Indeed when rivals press the PMK on the issue of the MBC quota (The Hindu 2008a), and make competing claims to represent Vanniar voters they are also depicting the PMK as a single caste party and implicitly contesting the PMK’s claim to represent a broader coalition of voters.

The institutional context There are a number of institutional factors that favour the PMK. I will give an account of state institutions, examine how party structures in other parties have an impact on the PMK and consider internal features of the PMK that make it more or less likely to be successful. As a small- to medium-sized party the PMK has to overcome the obstacle of the SMSP electoral rules that favour the largest parties. The very small number of seats won by the PMK in the 1991 and 1996 assembly election demonstrate Duverger’s mechanical effect at work (Duverger 1964: 224–5). The PMK is relatively well placed as a smaller party because its support is geographically concentrated but its support is not sufficiently concentrated for the party to win very many seats when it contests alone. In 1991 the party won one assembly seat and in 1996 it won four. The degree of concentration is shown in Table 5.2. The PMK won over 30 per cent of the vote in seven constituencies in the 1991 assembly elections and six in the 1996 elections. In order to gain from its relative concentration of votes the PMK has to form an alliance. The increasing fragmentation of the party system in Tamil Nadu has made the PMK an attractive alliance partner. When the party system was cohesive, as was the case with the two and a half party system between 1980 and 1996, smaller parties were marginal to outcomes. When two of the larger parties, such as the AIADMK and Congress in 1991, were able to win over 50 per cent of the vote the relative concentration of support for the Table 5.2 Number of Legislative Assembly seats where the PMK won more than 5 per cent of the vote Vote range

1991 election

1996 election

5–9.9 10–19.9 20–29.9 30–39.9 40–49.9 Total

28 39 10 7 0 84

23 18 5 4 2 52

Sources: Calculated by the author from official election returns (GoTN 1996: 156; GoTN n.d.). Note The PMK contested both elections allied with minor parties. In 1991 the PMK contested 199 seats and in 1996 only 116.

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 107 PMK made little difference. That said, in a fragmented party system, SMSP rules do give important advantages to parties like the PMK that can concentrate support. This is reflected in the outcomes of alliance negotiations. The MDMK, formed in 1994 after a split with the DMK, makes for an interesting comparison. The MDMK, contesting alone, won 4.6 per cent of the state-wide vote in 2001 but its vote is much more evenly distributed across the state. The MDMK has participated in a number of electoral alliances but is not able to concentrate its vote and shape electoral outcomes like the PMK. The ability of the PMK to concentrate its support is shown in Table 5.2. The PMK was able to win more than 10 per cent of the vote in 56 constituencies in 1991 (these are shown on Map 5.1). In 1996, contesting roughly half the number contested by the MDMK in 2001, the PMK won more than 10 per cent of the vote in 29 seats. The MDMK only won more than 10 per cent of the vote in 22 constituencies when it contested alone in 2001. Unsurprisingly, the MDMK has been less central in the politics of alliance formation than the PMK. The federal nature of the Indian political system has helped the PMK demonstrate to its supporters that it is an effective party. The PMK would like to hold office inside Tamil Nadu. The two Dravidian parties are equally determined not to share office at the state level, though some concessions have been offered at the municipal level. The lack of obvious influence in Tamil Nadu has been a source of discontent among some cadres in the PMK. The frustrated ambitions of the PMK can be compensated at the federal level. It is at this level that the PMK has had a share in power, holding ministerial office and participating in the national coalition government, between 1998 and 2009. Ministers return to the state, sometimes in an official capacity, and demonstrate how their actions bring benefit to Tamil Nadu (The Hindu 2007). State level alliances are formed bearing in mind the federal dimension of politics. The PMK was very useful to both Congress and the DMK in 2004 and 2006. Congress was happy to get PMK support in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and the DMK was keen to get support from the PMK in the 2006 assembly elections. With the turn towards national coalition politics the Dravidian parties have an important secondary interest in participating in national governments. Their influence is enhanced if they can assemble state-level alliances, supported by parties like the PMK, which bring MPs into a national coalition. The PMK has accordingly been introduced to sharing power at the national level. The internal institutional dynamics of political parties inside Tamil Nadu has been exploited by the PMK. The leadership structure of the DMK, which privileges the party leader’s extended family, begs the poignant question of whether or not a leading Vanniar politician could progress to the post of party leader, and hence become chief minister. It is also not at all clear that the AIADMK offers a clear route for ambitious Vanniar political entrepreneurs to follow. The rules for progression are not substantially different within the PMK.6 This makes it likely that ambitious politicians are continually assessing whether their political fortunes are best served within their own party or elsewhere, and this consideration applies to the PMK as well as the two largest Dravidian parties. The leadership of the PMK has kept on the offensive and directed difficult questions at its rivals. A narrative that suggests that the largest caste community in

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The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage

Tamil Nadu has been deprived of its political due is easy to assemble. It is plausible to argue that the largest parties in the state do not favour the Vanniars. The early Vanniar parties dissolved in the 1950s as the party leaders were induced into the Congress Party with offers of important cabinet posts. The political aspirations of the Vanniars were not neglected after that decade, but neither have the Vanniars achieved as much they might have hoped. The routes by which ambitious politicians might progress within the leading parties in the state narrowed over time. The paths of political succession discussed in Chapter 3 offer little hope that a Vanniar might succeed to the leadership of either of the Dravidian parties. This gives the complaint that there has never been a Vanniar chief minister added piquancy. Whether or not Vanniars have been disadvantaged by the larger political parties is a moot point. In the 1980s the Vanniar Sangam protested against a widely held perception that government posts were going to members of more privileged backward caste groups (Subramanian 2003: 65–6). The DMK introduced the MBC quota in response to demands and protests by the Vanniar Sangam. Congress, the DMK and the AIADMK select candidates from Vanniar backgrounds. There are senior leaders from Vanniar backgrounds, such as Veerapandi S. Arumugam and Durai Murugan, in the DMK. In spite of this the PMK has been able to sustain a credible claim that Vanniars are more effectively represented by their own party. The varying degrees of opacity regarding the rules of progression and succession operated by other parties give that claim credibility.

Political leadership The PMK is strongly identified with the leadership of Dr S. Ramadoss. Ramadoss re-invigorated a tradition of community organizing by bringing together 27 local organizations to form the Vanniar Sangam in 1980 (Vidyasagar 1988: 510).7 Ramadoss came to prominence in state politics during the 1987 demonstrations described earlier in the chapter. He is an entrepreneurial leader prepared to take risks. He invested his time and resources building a profile as a community minded individual long before he emerged as a party leader. In the rest of the section I analyse his leadership by looking at the exceptional qualities that set him apart as a leader. I then look at the ways in which Ramadoss has established the efficacy of his leader before looking at the ways in which his leadership is rooted in various structures of meaning. Dr Ramadoss began his career as a doctor and earned a reputation for generosity by dispensing free medical treatment to his poorer patients in the Chingleput and South Arcot districts in the late 1970s (M. Ramadoss, interview, 27 June 2003). He is strongly identified with the Vanniar community and Ramadoss has established a reputation in service of that community over a substantial period of time. Ramadoss comes from a Vanniar farming family and maintains a link with the land. The symbolic link is maintained by keeping the party head quarters in the countryside and rejecting the option of a base in Chennai. Most other parties prefer to keep a metropolitan office whereas the PMK has its head quarters in the Villupuram district which is key part of the ‘Vanniar belt’. Ramadoss is based in a low key residence situated

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 109 next to the PMK’s training institute in the village of Thailapuram, not far from Pondicherry. This decision reflects a confident leader closely in touch with his supporters. Unlike other party leaders he has not succumbed to the temptation of a base in the state capital (Rediff 1999e). Ramadoss is an extremely active leader who is unafraid of controversy. He secures his party a great deal of media coverage by regularly engaging with current issues and creating debates around issues of concern to the PMK. Ramadoss has personally participated in this activism and demonstrated personal courage. In an interview in 2003 one commentator, hostile to the PMK, recalled that on at least one occasion Ramadoss had courageously led a Dalit funeral procession along a route forbidden to it by other non-Dalit villagers. On other occasions Ramadoss has been arrested. In late November 1997 Ramadoss was arrested for burning photos of the Jain Commission on Anna Salai in Chennai (The Hindu 1997b). A few months earlier he had been arrested along with party activists for defacing English signboards on the same road (The Hindu 1997a). In personal interaction Ramadoss demonstrates the generosity and affability often associated with leading politicians in Tamil Nadu.8 At the same time Ramadoss is known as a strong leader. A particular inflection is given to the character of that leadership. As explained by his spokesman, Ramadoss rejects the label of ‘politician’, preferring to be known as a leader passionately committed to social justice. In this narrative a leader looks to the needs of the next generation while politicians look no further than the next election. Politicians are office seekers whereas leaders make sacrifices for their movements, as was the case with Gandhi. Ramadoss has vowed not to seek elected office but to provide leadership in the Vanniar cause. He does not hold the post of party president (Dr S. Ramadoss, M. Ramadoss, interview, 27 June 2003). Ramadoss clearly dominates the PMK and is held in high regard by ordinary party members. A series of senior leaders have left the party but they have not done the party serious damage.9 Dr Ramadoss has worked hard to establish the efficacy of his leadership. The electoral successes discussed above demonstrate to his supporters that the PMK is able to ‘win’. The party has won state assembly seats and seats in the national parliament. The PMK has earned the grudging respect of other parties in the state. Ramadoss is a skilled negotiator prepared to spring surprises on his allies. The switch between alliances in 2001, from the NDA coalition government to the AIADMK and back to the NDA coalition, enabled the PMK to keep its ministerial posts at the centre and get a good number of legislators elected to the state assembly. Ramadoss has also showed great determination in steering an independent course. He has kept the PMK as a separate party, assisted by the taking of strong positions which discomfort his allies, and rejected the lure of office holding that would follow from merging his party with one of the larger parties. By doing so, Ramadoss has avoided the accusations of personal ambition and betrayal that sullied the reputations of earlier leaders. Ramadoss has not been without his critics in the party. However, these criticisms have been muted. Some discontent reflects the thwarted ambitions of senior party leaders hoping for ministerial office (The Hindu 2002d). Ramadoss’ forthright contributions to political debate demonstrate his close affinity with ordinary party cadres who are not enamoured of the main

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Dravidian parties. Part of the efficacy of his leadership comes from continually persuading his wider following that he is a leader of standing. This is reflected in the character of a party that is restive and unsatisfied with the status quo. The leadership of Dr Ramadoss keys into a number of structures of meaning and is well understood by his followers. Under his leadership the PMK has followed a well-established path taken by most of the mainstream parties in the state whereby they expressed their demands in a dramatic and sometimes violent fashion. Protests in Tamilnad often draw on ‘repertoires of action’ so that using ‘standard forms of protest is a means of claiming legitimacy by following in the footsteps of past political movements. The history of the nationalist, non-Brahmin and sub-nationalist movements has provided a diverse palette of organizational possibilities for collective actors to select from.’ (Gorringe 2005: 104) For example, members of the PMK have emulated the anti-Hindi protesters of the 1960s. The 1987 protests involved the well-known tactic of burning buses. Some politicians argue that these modes of protest are a ‘loud message’ needed to announce the political arrival of subordinate caste groups. The implication being that parties will settle down once they have consolidated their position (Rediff 1999e). More recently Ramadoss has drawn upon the ideas of the Dravidian movement to inspire his activism and rhetoric. In addition to his campaign for ‘social justice’ on behalf of the Vanniars, he continues to argue the case for the Tamil language. This has been taken up with intensity since 2004 when the Tamil Protection Movement was formed (The Hindu 2004j). He also supported the cause of Tamil Eelam. This political style is not linked to the Vanniar community in particular and keeps open the possibility that the PMK might be able to build a broader coalition of support.

Impact of the PMK on the party system The impact of the PMK on the three key system dimensions of party numbers, ideology and voters is significant. The durability of the PMK has added an influential medium sized party to the party system. The party had 20 and 18 legislators elected to the state assembly in 2001 and 2006 respectively. Initially the PMK was a marginal force but the weakening of Congress and the inability of the Dravidian parties to increase their electoral support made the PMK a key alliance partner. The PMK does not have what Sartori would call coalition potential in the state assembly but it has demonstrated this power in the process of alliance formation. The PMK has demonstrated blackmail potential (Sartori 1976: 123), by changing the pattern of competition, altering the way in which the politics of caste is profiled in competition between parties. In terms of the numbers of parties in the system the PMK has had an impact on the formation of new parties. The PMK has shown how attaining the status of a junior alliance partner can bring rewards. In other words the context of strategic interaction in which political entrepreneurs decide on the merits of forming a new party has been changed by the PMK. The PMK changed the ideological basis of competition by privileging the identity of an individual caste group. This contradicted the ideas favoured by the larger

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 111 parties in the state party system. The populisms of the Dravidian parties discussed in Chapter 2 were predicated on ideas of larger communities bought together by shared social and cultural markers. Interestingly the PMK has appropriated some of these Dravidian ideas so that it mixes an appeal to community pride with rhetoric that might appeal to a broader constituency. Once again the PMK created a demonstration effect and since the formation of the PMK a number of other political entrepreneurs have sought to connect their political ambitions to the aspirations of an individual caste group. In 2001 the DMK allied with 16 parties, a majority of these were parties with links to particular caste groups (Thirunavukkarasu 2001: 2486). Most failed to win seats and were not re-engaged as alliance partners. Finally, the impact of the PMK on the voting aspect of the party system is notable. The PMK shifted partisan alignments by re-orienting a segment of the electorate away from existing parties. Both the DMK and Congress have connections with the Vanniar caste group. Each party can identify a number of leaders from that community within their own ranks but they have struggled to hold onto Vanniar votes. The PMK drove a wedge between the existing parties and Vanniar voters. The DMK has used a variety of devices in an attempt to rebuild its support among the Vanniars. It has attempted to project existing DMK leaders who are Vanniars. Another approach has been to cultivate dissident PMK leaders and other Vanniar politicians. This has been less than successful. The leader of the breakaway Tamil PMK, Dheeran, was cultivated by the DMK and ultimately given an assembly seat to contest in 2001. The DMK also defied Dr Ramadoss and kept open relations with the Vanniar politician Vazhapadi Ramamurthy, a former Congress politician, and onetime ally of the PMK. Ramadoss regarded these links as an indication of hostile intent on the part of the DMK. The PMK claimed that these intrigues made its position in the DMK-led alliance untenable and claimed this was a reason for breaking off the alliance with the DMK (The Hindu 2001d; 2001b). Ramadoss has worked hard to insulate the links between the PMK and its Vanniar supporters.

A contrasting case: the Thevars in southern Tamil Nadu The efficacy of Dr Ramadoss’s leadership is highlighted when the success of the PMK is contrasted with the recent activity of the Forward Bloc, a party associated with the ambitions of the Thevar caste cluster. The Thevars, also referred to as the Mukkulathors, are a composite group consisting of Kallar, Agamudiar and Maravar caste groups (Barnett 1976a: 85). The numerical size of the cluster was estimated in the 1980s to be six per cent of the state population (Radhakrishnan 1989a: 508). The size of the cluster and its geographical concentration helps make it politically influential and sets the Thevars apart from other smaller caste groups. There is also a distinct caste tradition that political entrepreneurs can cultivate and exploit by validating that caste culture with symbolic or actual rewards. The Thevars have a reputation as an aggressive and powerful caste group (Weiner 1967: 403). They received the close attention of the colonial enforcers of law and order throughout the nineteenth century and were designated a criminal tribe by the

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British in 1918 (Pandian 2005). The powerful image lives on. It is not unusual for Thevar men to be depicted as physically powerful, wearing a generous moustache and bearing a firearm or an aruval (sickle).10 Filmmakers have cultivated the image. The film Thevar Magan was notable for its popularity and the explicit reference in the film’s title to a particular caste group. The film, directed by Bharathan and starring Kamal Hassan, was released in 1992. Thevar Magan also achieved notoriety for what many see as its celebration of Thevar masculinity, an identity defined by the intertwined values of aggression and honour (Krishnan 2008: 151). Songs from the film also celebrate Thevar dominance and become a source of tension when they are played at public events to cultivate caste affinity (Nambath 2003). As with the Vanniars the economic fortunes of the Thevars have been mixed. Some Thevars have moved from being tenants to the outright owners of land and employers of landless Dalit Pallar labourers (Manikumar n.d.: 16–17). Maravar tenant farmers were beneficiaries of the limited land reform of the 1950s and were further assisted by state subsidies of key agricultural inputs. Political connections have helped some Maravars to make rapid progress in business but most continue to work as agricultural labourers or in other forms of waged employment (Manikumar 1997a). In Madurai, where the Thevars are the second largest caste group, Kohli noted economic differentials among the community were not wide and that the majority were employed in working class occupations (1991: 176). The political potential of the caste has often been recognized. The most notable independent party to advocate the political ambitions of the Thevars was the Forward Bloc. Muthuramalinga Thevar was a leader in the Congress movement but he left the nationalist movement in 1948 and formed the Tamilnad unit of the Forward Bloc. I confine my comments here to the Tamilnad section of the party. The Forward Bloc enjoyed some electoral success in the 1950s. Muthuramalinga Thevar was elected to the Lok Sabha three times and the party also won three assembly seats in 1952, 1957 and 1962. The Forward Bloc was hemmed in by the caste-based strategy devised by Congress and was only able to win seats where the Thevar vote was most concentrated (Hardgrave 1969: 223–5). The Forward Bloc worked closely with the Swatantra Party in the early 1960s and wavered ‘for a time on the brink of merger’ but the union did not take place (Erdman 1967: 112). The party was dealt a heavy blow by the death of its leader in 1963. However, the Forward Bloc maintained an independent identity and underwent something of a revival under the leadership of Mookiah Thevar in the 1970s. The party subsequently went into decline and it was viewed as a very weak junior partner in alliance politics. The party has been weakened by splits and the ability of the main Dravidian parties to portray themselves as representatives of the Thevars. A sign of the weakness of the Forward Bloc were the terms on which it allied with the AIADMK in 2001. The party was allocated, and accepted, one seat to contest the assembly election. Other organizations claiming to represent the Thevars have emerged. The Thevar Peravai, a caste association made some impact, but it became ensnared in internecine legal disputes in the late 1990s that rendered it ineffective.

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 113 An alternative and more aggressive alternative is the Thevarkula Koottamaippu (Thevar Federation) but it is not positioned to act a formal political intermediary (Frontline 1998b). The Moovendar Munnetra Kazhagam (MMK) is another Thevar political party but it has a fairly low profile. In 2001 it allied with the DMK to contest the assembly election, being allocated the Tirumangalam seat which it failed to win. The MMK remained close to the DMK after the election but it was not allocated any seats in 2006. The MMK then allied with the BJP but its five candidates did not attract significant support, the highest vote share being 6.5 per cent in the Tirumangalam constituency. Some of the leadership of the Forward Bloc attempted to revive the party by appointing the well known actor, Karthik as party leader in January 2006. The Forward Bloc split over this decision with the party’s lone MLA, Santhanam, being suspended from the party. Attempts to negotiate improved alliance terms with the AIADMK failed and the AIADMK reached an agreement with Santhanam’s faction of the party (The Hindu 2006m). The campaign did not go well for the Forward Bloc. Events revealed a party organization without the capacity to fight a tough campaign in the challenging environment of the southern districts. The party announced 74 candidates on 10 April, but not all of those candidates contested the election (The Hindu 2006p). Karthik stated that he kept a number of candidates in a safe house in Madurai to prevent them from being intimidated (The Telegraph 2006). In the 60 seats where candidates contested using the party symbol, the Forward Bloc polled only 0.3 per cent of the statewide vote. Even though the AIADMK alliance lost many seats in the southern districts it was only in three seats that the Forward Block made the decisive contribution to that defeat by winning more votes than the margin of defeat. The poor return achieved by the Forward Bloc in 2006 placed it in a very weak situation with regard to future alliance negotiations. The contrast between the PMK and the Forward Bloc is revealing. Both parties have the potential to work independently of the main Dravidian parties. Both can point to a long tradition of caste-based mobilization. The Thevar caste cluster is not as large as the Vanniar caste group but it is highly influential in the southern districts. In the 1950s Muthuramalinga Thevar demonstrated the electoral potential in the Ramanathapuram district. The party was able to win three seats outright and there was the obvious implication that this could be converted into useful support in a larger alliance. In 1971 Mookiah Thevar capitalized on this as he took the Forward Bloc into an alliance on quite favourable terms. Since then leaders of the Forward Bloc have lost the ability to mobilize Thevar voters and have not been able to demonstrate the independent strength of the party. A robustly organized party would be able to form an alliance with either of the main Dravidian parties. Both the MMK and the Forward Bloc were accepted into alliances in 2001, and the Santhanam faction was accepted by the AIADMK in 2006. A sticking point for independent Thevar parties is demonstrating that they have strong leadership and confirmed support. A counterfactual scenario for the Forward Bloc would have seen a change in leadership well before the 2006 assembly election followed by extensive activity to mobilize support around the issue of community pride. It is

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certainly the case that Thevars are represented in the main Dravidian parties, but then Vanniar politicians also hold senior positions in the Dravidian parties and Congress. The key is establishing a plausible narrative. Karthik demonstrated some potential in 2006 claiming that Thevar pride was at stake. The MMK has argued that not all Thevars are included in the Most Backward Community list (The Hindu 2009a). Neither party has articulated their narrative of political conflict with the energy and focus of the PMK.

Conclusions Political entrepreneurs assess the opportunities available to them in state and national politics. These have shifted since the 1950s. When the Vanniar leaders of the 1950s decided to join the Congress Party they gained the benefit of fighting elections with the support of a party that dominated the party system. They also gained influence over policy implementation but they had to sacrifice the political autonomy offered by their own caste parties (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 88–9). In the contemporary multiparty system with two leading parties the range of opportunities is wider, both at the state and the national levels. The gains available to junior alliances partners have changed and determined negotiators can net substantial rewards. The crucial decisions about participation within existing parties or forging out alone are not functions of caste structure. Political entrepreneurs certainly get some advantage from existing social conflicts, which they may well exacerbate, but they have to exploit those conflicts with skill. In order to succeed political leaders have to prepare well, articulate a plausible narrative and organize their followers. They have to demonstrate the support of their followers. It is insufficient for a party to merely assert the ambitions of a powerful social group. Alliance negotiations have to be completed carefully. Leaders of small independent parties play a difficult two-level game. They have to nurture a cleavage among their followers but also be able to cooperate with their notional, or actual, enemies in other parties. Long-term cooperation runs the risk that support might transfer from the junior to the senior partner in an alliance. The junior partner has an interest in maintaining their independence so that they do not lose ground in alliance negotiations. There is a risk that becoming too comfortable in an alliance devalues the value of a party in alliance negotiations. This was the predicament of the Forward Bloc in 2001. It is also possible that a difficult smaller party might be declared surplus to a minimum winning coalition. There are genuine dilemmas for smaller parties participating in electoral alliances. As we shall see in Chapter 7 the PT appears to have been excessively assertive and failed to be sufficiently flexible in its relations with larger parties. There is an alternative route into alliance politics which involves the junior partner being very respectful of the alliance hierarchy. The IUML seems to have followed this path with the DMK. In interviews with senior members of the state unit of the CPI in February 2000 it was made clear to me that they regarded themselves as supplicants in the process of alliance formation. It was assumed the largest party would lead the process. In this case the party has some protection against co-option by

The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 115 being part of a larger national party. The assertive leadership of the PMK has prevented the party from being co-opted. Political entrepreneurs need to demonstrate their efficacy when they launch a party and they also need to maintain its efficacy and its independence over the longer term. Comparison with the Forward Bloc shows that it is possible for a party to weaken its bargaining position if its leadership is not vigilant. Dr Ramadoss has been able to barter and trade on behalf of his supporters. The returns that he has achieved so far are probably as much as any small party could hope for. Ramadoss has achieved: reservations for the MBCs, national representation (seats in the Lok Sabha after each election since 1999 and a seat in the Rajya Sabha seat in 2004), Union cabinet posts and a significant number of MLAs elected in 2001 and 2006. Perhaps most importantly of all, given that Vanniar assertion is a vital part of the PMK’s identity, is the grudging respect and careful treatment offered by the other political parties in the state. The PMK was a very influential party in state politics between 1998 and 2009. It was not precisely a pivot party in the electoral coalitions but it came close to that status. However, the leadership of the PMK was caught out by the outcome of the 2009 election. Paper calculations suggested that the PMK had joined the strongest alliance to contest the 2009 election. Based on the figures given in Table 2.1 the AIADMK alliance might have hoped to win about 47 per cent of the vote and beat a DMK alliance with about 42 per cent of the vote. The outcome of the election defied this calculation and the PMK lost heavily. The DMK alliance won 42.5 per cent and the AIADMK alliance 37.3 per cent. The PMK is still an influential party but its image has been dented. In the next chapter, I examine the trajectory of the DPI, an organization that is also active in the caste politics of northern Tamil Nadu.

6

The DPI and Dalit mobilization

A recurring controversy in party politics in Tamilnad is the status of those marginalized by the caste system. Established parties have been accused on numerous occasions of ignoring the concerns of Dalits and denying them positions of importance in party hierarchies. A number of political entrepreneurs have suggested that the best solution is independent representation by a party devoted to Dalit interests. Others have argued for grassroots political action and development work that can get around the obstacles presented by unresponsive political parties and indifferent state institutions. Two organizations decided to follow the electoral route in the late 1990s. The PT fielded candidates in the 1998 Lok Sabha election and the DPI joined the electoral contest in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. Whether or not each party represents the Dalit population of Tamil Nadu as a whole is a contested point. However, both organizations were headed by notable individuals who have brought Dalit politics into the dynamics of the state party system. Thol. Thirumavalavan is considered a dynamic and inspiring leader of the DPI. Dr K. Krishnaswamy founded the PT and skilfully bought local caste issues in the southern districts into state politics. I deal with the DPI first because it has a longer history as an organization and it represents a wider social constituency than the PT. It is logical to make some general comments about caste alienation in this chapter before moving on to a more specific discussion of the social alienation experienced by supporters of the PT in the next chapter. The DPI is both a movement and a political party. It is, somewhat confusingly, referred to by a variety of names. As well as the acronym DPI, explained below, the movement was referred to as the ‘Viduthalai Chiruthaigal’ (Liberation Panthers). As part of the preparations for the 2006 assembly elections, a party, known as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK), was formally registered. I use both terms, but mainly ‘DPI’ as this was the term most common used in the press until recently. The movement leader has also changed his named. Initially he was known as R. Thirumavalavan, with the ‘R’, which abbreviated his father’s name (Ramasamy), being changed in 2002 to ‘Tholkappian’, routinely abbreviated to ‘Thol.’ The DPI sits in a tradition of arguing for the interests of all of those affected by the stigma of untouchability, regardless of their individual caste background. In principle it seeks to bring into play a variation of the Scheduled Caste cleavage discussed in Chapter 2. The social roots of this tradition are often shallow, as

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 117 individual caste identities have generally not been displaced by a broader sense of Dalit identity, but the general issue of untouchability has drawn the attention of a large number of activists and political entrepreneurs who do make use of the term. Within Tamilnad the issue was taken up with the colonial authorities as early as 1799 and activists lobbied using the term ‘Adi-Dravida’ as an alternative to other demeaning caste names that connoted untouchability (Racine and Racine 1998: 8; Dirks 2002: 240). In the mid-twentieth century Dr Ambedkar emerged as a national figure attacking the practice of untouchability and arguing for interests of the Scheduled Castes. In May 1974 Sathyavani Muthu, a senior DMK leader, resigned from her party claiming that it neglected the interests of the Adi-Dravidas (Barnett 1976a: 299). Dalit political entrepreneurs face a recurring dilemma. The social constituency they represent is a minority and without proportional electoral rules it is very hard for them to win elections, except in a highly fragmented party system. Yet the size of the Dalit minority means they are potentially influential. One option for a political entrepreneur is to follow a career inside an existing party with the knowledge that they are unlikely to proceed to the highest levels of the party. Many Dalit political entrepreneurs settle for this. Another option is to establish an independent party but under the two and a half party system such a party was likely to have limited success. The multiparty alliance system that developed in Tamil Nadu after 1998 meant there was more potential for parties run by Dalit political entrepreneurs to gain influence and win elections. A key concern was protecting the independence and integrity of the party. The experience of other Dalit parties, such as the Republican Party of India in northern India, was that the parties could lose their independence and their leaders defect to larger parties. Dalit activists resent the subordination inherent in the caste system and are determined to resist this in the political arena. Hence, gaining an independent voice in party politics is particularly valued by Dalit activists. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the emergence of the DPI as a social movement and its entry into electoral politics in 1999. In the second section of the chapter I discuss the structural factors that make the political activity of the DPI possible but also constrain an independent political party. In the third section I discuss the institutional factors that influence the activity of the DPI. In the fourth section of the chapter, I explore the impact of the leadership of Thol. Thirumavalavan on the DPI. In the fifth section of the chapter, I assess the impact of the DPI on the state party system.

The emergence of the DPI Ironically, the DPI springs from an ethos of movement organizing hostile towards established political parties and suspicious of electoral politics. The DPI was formed in Tamil Nadu in 1982 as a conscious echo of the Dalit Panthers of India that was formed in Maharashtra in the 1970s (Gorringe 2005: 53). The movement is loosely organized with the leadership incorporating clusters of local activists seeking the assistance or protection that comes from being part of a larger movement. The DPI has campaigned against caste discrimination and has publicized caste atrocities. The

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movement acquired an image, partly cultivated by its members, of being youthful, radical, assertive and potentially violent. The acronym ‘DPI’ is an abbreviation for the Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (movement) rather than the Dalit Panthers of India that is sometimes reported in the English language press. Movement activists often use the acronym DPI (Gorringe 2005: 27). The leadership of the movement rested with a Dalit lawyer Malaisamy until his death in September 1989 (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). The leadership then passed to R. Thirumavalavan, a young activist who was building a reputation as a dynamic leader. The movement has grown exponentially since the early 1990s (Gorringe 2002: 12–14). Under Thirumavalavan’s leadership the DPI engaged in a prolonged boycott of elections (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). In 1999 the DPI entered electoral politics and fielded candidates in the Lok Sabha elections. The decision was controversial within the movement though the mobilizing activity of the DPI certainly meant it was well placed to canvas for votes. The motivations are unclear, given the earlier boycott of elections, but a number of factors should be considered. The radical image of the DPI meant that it was subject to a good deal of surveillance and harassment. In an interview, Thirumavalavan alleged that the DMK administration used the anti-goonda act and the National Security Act to detain DPI cadres (interview, 22 February 2000). Participating in elections signalled a move towards the mainstream and hence greater freedom to operate (Gorringe 2005). The early success of the PT, a potential competitor, may also have spurred action. It is also the case that Dalit activists in Tamil Nadu were well aware of developments in Dalit politics in north India where the BSP secured enough support to determine election outcomes (Thiagaraj 1998: 7). The BSP also fielded candidates in 10 constituencies in Tamil Nadu during the 1998 Lok Sabha election. The DPI joined the third front that contested the 1999 Lok Sabha election. The senior party in the front was the TMC, which under the leadership of G.K. Moopanar, was unwilling to follow the DMK into an alliance with the BJP. As the TMC had been formed in opposition to the AIADMK in 1996 many in the party, especially Chidambaram, felt it could not ally with that party either (Frontline 2001c). The TMC thus became the senior party in an alternative alliance, called the People’s Progressive Front, which drew in a number of smaller parties and organizations including the DPI. The front provided an easier route into electoral politics because the DPI remained relatively independent and was not treated as an obviously junior partner of the parties they had previously opposed. Thirumavalavan was able to claim that the DPI entered politics because for decades the Dravidian parties had exploited the Dalits ‘as their votebanks and “palanquin bearers”’ (The Hindu 1999c). Moopanar made a statement that acknowledged the importance of Dalit voters declaring the front a ‘joint crusade by the downtrodden, socially marginalized people and the minorities’ (The Hindu 1999f). The TMC shared its election symbol, the bicycle, and contributed a small amount to the campaign expenses of the smaller parties (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). The focus of the 1999 election campaign for the DPI was the contest in the Chidambaram constituency where Thirumavalavan was the candidate. A Dalit

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 119 leader of stature who represented an independent party was a novelty. He was strongly opposed by the PMK that was in close touch with the dominant Vanniar caste in the constituency. Thirumavalavan received substantial support from volunteer helpers and DPI activists travelled from across the state to the constituency to campaign for their leader. Thirumavalavan proved popular in the constituency with Dalit voters expressing delight that for the first time they could vote for their own candidate (Gorringe 2005: 310–11). However, the election in the Chidambaram constituency was marked by violence and electoral malpractice (Frontline 1999c: 45). The PMK took strong exception to the presence of the DPI in the contest and many Dalits voters experienced intimidation on polling day.1 The intimidation continued after polling day as Dalits were subject to an economic boycott in some villages. Significantly the violence was not one-sided and there were reports of Dalits intimidating Vanniars, indicating a new mood of assertiveness among Dalits (Gorringe 2005: 305). Observers considered that the authorities failed to ensure a fair election. A few days after polling closed a fact finding team sent by the CPI(M), a member of a competing front, reported that Dalit houses had been burnt and that many Dalits labourers were being denied employment. They also observed that a number of Vanniar houses had been burnt (The Hindu 1999h). Even though the PMK candidate won the Chidambaram seat the outcome of the election strengthened Thirumavalavan’s standing in state politics. He polled an impressive 225,768 votes (31.2 per cent of valid votes cast), more than any other candidate in the front, and pushed the AIADMK alliance candidate into third place. However, the dismal performance of the front overall, it gained 9.2 per cent of the state-wide vote, indicated that the DPI had not made a breakthrough on the scale of the PMK in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections. The DPI and the PMK emerged from the 1999 elections as strong rivals and this worked its way into party propaganda directed against the Vanniars (Arun 2003). Participation in the third front meant only minimal compromise for the DPI. While the DPI was allied with a number of other parties, it retained a good deal of autonomy and was given a respectable number of seats to contest. Relations between the parties in the alliance were cordial. The leading party in the alliance, the TMC, did not make heavy demands of its junior partners. This contrasted with the alliances led by the Dravidian parties that were more hierarchical. Entering these alliances was more problematic given that the Dravidian parties were also governing parties. Dalit activists considered that these parties either neglected, or were actively hostile towards Dalits. The DPI continued to campaign and organize vigorously after the 1999 election, which improved its value as a potential ally. Entering the main alliances The DPI faced some difficult choices in the lead up to the 2001 assembly election. The possibility of another third front dissolved as the TMC indicated its willingness to enter an alliance with the AIADMK. The DPI was still positioned in an antagonistic relationship with the PMK. When the PMK joined the AIADMK, the DPI lost another alliance option. The memories of the violent clashes with PMK

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supporters in 1999 were still fresh and the DPI would damage its credibility by becoming alliance partners with the PMK in 2001, even if the AIADMK were willing to admit the DPI to its alliance. An alliance with the DMK was not straightforward given the very critical attitude taken by movement activists against a party that they considered to be complicit in the caste oppression of the Dalits. The DMK alliance also included the BJP, a party that had been sharply criticized by the DPI (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). The DMK did not present itself as a party sympathetic to Dalit interests in the 1999 election, but it had so few allies in early 2001 that it was prepared to spread its net wide. The leadership of the DMK experimented with a number of alliances with new caste parties. The Dalit parties, identified with a substantial minority, were potentially valuable allies. The leadership of the DPI faced a dilemma. If they allied with the DMK some movement activists would consider that Thirumavalavan had sold out. If the DPI contested without allies it faced ignominious defeat. It was in these circumstances that the DPI entered an alliance with the DMK to contest the 2001 assembly elections. The DPI was allotted seven constituencies to contest (The Hindu 2001c). It was expected that the members of the alliance would work for the benefit of other parties in constituencies where they did not contest themselves. The DPI was not a registered party at this stage and so its presence in the official statistics is concealed because its candidates contested using the DMK party symbol. The outcome of the alliance was mixed. The DPI confirmed its utility in the vicinity of Cuddalore district where Thirumavalavan had contested in 1999. Thirumavalavan won the seat of Mangalore that he contested and other candidates in the DMK alliance were strongly supported by DPI activists in the area. In the six assembly constituencies that fall in the Chidambaram Lok Sabha constituency, the DMK alliance candidates enjoyed a good level of success. The levels of support detailed in Table 6.1 exceeded the 38.7 per cent average vote won by alliance candidates across the entire state (Mrug 2001). Table 6.1 Support for the DPI and its allies in the assembly segments/constituencies in Chidambaram Lok Sabha constituency, 1999–2006 Assembly segment/ constituency

Kurinjipadi Bhuvanagiri Kattumannarkoil (SC) Chidambaram Virudhachalam Mangalore (SC)

1999 Lok Sabha election

2001 state assembly election

2006 state assembly election

Votes won by the DPI

Parties allied with the DPI

Votes won

Parties allied with the DPI

Votes won

29.2 33.5 32.7

DMK MTD DMK

55.8 41.5 55.4

MDMK AIADMK DPI

44.1 51.2 51.5

35.5 19.9 37.8

DMK DMK DPI

52.7 44.9 47.8

AIADMK AIADMK DPI

50.7 23.6 43.7

Sources: 1999: Tamil Arasu (1999); 2001: Election Commission of India (n.d. l); 2006: Election Commission of India (2006b)

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 121 Activists in the DPI felt that they had worked hard for the DMK alliance but with little reward. The figures in Table 6.1 for the 2001 elections in the DPI stronghold of the Chidambaram constituency illustrate this. The candidates for the DMK alliance gained very strong support but the DPI was only allocated one seat in the area in which they were most likely to win. In addition some DMK activists were hostile to the Dalit parties in the alliance and were unwilling to canvas for the Dalit candidates supported by the alliance (The Hindu 2001n). Support for DPI candidates among DMK partisans seemed lukewarm at best and in at least one case a disgruntled DMK member ran as an independent against the official alliance candidate. This was the case in the Nannilam reserved assembly seat. DMK voters deserted another DPI candidate, Radhamani, in the constituency of Avanashi where, even with the ‘support’ of a major party, she won only 13.9 per cent of the vote (The Hindu 2001h). An independent farmers’ candidate won 31.2 per cent of the vote. Tada Periyasamy contested the Harur reserved seat on a DMK symbol. Periysamy won 27.8 per cent of vote, a proportion well below the average won by candidates contesting on a DMK symbol. Periyasamy shared the experience of other DPI candidates when an independent candidate entered the contest and won a significant share of the vote (10.4 per cent). In Samayanallur constituency the DPI fielded Kasthuri Sivasamy, a daughter of the prominent Congress politician Kakkan, and in this case DMK party workers were reported to have given up canvassing in favour of supporting a party candidate in the neighbouring constituency (The Hindu 2001n). The 2001 election did not bring many tangible gains for the DPI. However, the party demonstrated that it was a reliable junior ally capable of mobilizing Dalit votes for a larger alliance. It is difficult to estimate the extent of that support, and subsequent events showed that the larger parties did not consider it to be anywhere near as strong as the PMK. After the 2001 assembly election the DPI continued its political campaigning and mobilizing activity. It protested vigorously against the anti-conversion bill introduced by the AIADMK government in 2002. In 2003 members of the DPI engaged in a mass protest by changing their names (The Hindu 2003b). The DPI remained fairly close to the DMK. However, the DMK chose not to include the DPI in the alliance formed to contest the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. In response, Thirumavalavan resigned his assembly seat in protest and complained of ‘humiliating’ treatment (The Hindu 2004a). The DPI formed a new third front called the ‘People’s alliance’ along with the Janata Dal (U), the Indian National League and the Makkal Tamil Desam, the party of the former AIADMK cabinet minister S. Kannappan. George Fernandes’ Janata Dal (U), hardly a force in the state, provided the alliance with moral support and a party symbol (the arrow). The alliance had hoped to contest 30 seats of the 39 seats in the state. However, the alliance, without a large party to subsidise the campaign (as had been the case with the TMC and the third front in 1999), was only able to put up 20 candidates and collected a meagre 3.1 per cent of the state-wide vote (compared with 9.2 per cent for the third front in 1999). The DPI came closest to success as Thirumavalavan was again the strongest candidate in the front contesting in the Chidambaram constituency. He did not win but he took a respectable second place and improved on the share of the vote gained in 1999 (from 31.2 per cent to 34.4 per cent).

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In the latter part of 2004 the DPI and the PMK began a process of rapprochement. In September 2004 the DPI and the PMK, joined by N. Sethuraman of the MMK, formed the Tamil Padukappu Iyakkam (TPI – Tamil Protection Movement) as a way of drawing attention to the language issue (The Hindu 2004j). Close cooperation between the DPI and the PMK raised the hope that the two parties might be absorbed in a modular fashion into future electoral alliances. Alliance with the AIADMK: the 2006 Assembly Election The DPI, now officially recognized as the VCK, hoped that it would be able to rejoin the DMK-led alliance in order to contest the 2006 election. The close relationship between the PMK and the VCK, and the centrality of the PMK in the DMK-led alliance, gave Thirumavalavan grounds for hoping that Karunanidhi might not repeat the 2004 decision to exclude the VCK. However, once again the DMK proved indifferent to the wishes of the VCK. The entreaties of the PMK on behalf of the VCK were met with the suggestion that Ramadoss could allocate seats to VCK candidates out of the PMK quota. The VCK sought an alternative alliance with the AIADMK and was allocated nine seats (The Hindu 2006c). As the AIADMK alliance included only three well recognized parties the VCK had a relatively high profile during the campaign for the 2006 assembly elections. Thirumavalavan campaigned energetically for the alliance and was welcomed in constituencies by AIADMK candidates fighting a challenging election against a strong DMK alliance. He campaigned in support of high profile candidates AIADMK including Nainar Nagendran in Tirunelveli and S. Ve. Sekhar in Mylapore (The Hindu, 2006ag). Thirumavalavan’s image was also put to good use in AIADMK campaign publicity and posters in selected constituencies (The Hindu 2006k; personal observations April–May 2006). His oratory was a recognized asset and Thirumavalavan lived up to his reputation. His criticism of the DMK leadership was forthright; early in the campaign he quipped: ‘The people of Tamil Nadu could live like a single family but a single family should not rule the State’ (The Hindu 2006l). Later in the campaign, Thirumavalavan accused the DMK and its allies of buying votes by giving voters cash and gifts (The Hindu 2006ah). However, the recognition given by the AIADMK to the VCK was carefully qualified. Jayalalithaa did not schedule any campaign rallies where the status of the VCK leader would be recognized by sharing the platform with the other party leaders (Frontline 2006c).2 In alliance with the AIADMK the VCK won two assembly seats, including the Kattumannarkoil seat contested by D. Ravikumar, and 1.3 per cent of the state-wide vote. However, these slender gains came at a high price with movement activists continuing to agonize over the compromise with the AIADMK. The goal of Dalit autonomy and independent political power seemed further away than ever (Gorringe 2006b). The AIADMK lost the election and the VCK was distant from the ruling coalition. It was felt that the AIADMK had not treated the VCK with sufficient respect; the failure of Jayalalithaa to share a campaign platform with Thirumavalavan was identified by activists as a poignant symbol of this

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 123 (M. Vijayabaskar, personal communication, 13 May 2006). The alliance concealed the extent of support for the VCK but there was little to suggest that it had expanded its electoral network beyond its pockets of strength in the Cuddalore district. The VCK also faced some competition from the filmstar-politician Vijayakanth, who opted to contest from the Vriddhachalam constituency. Vijayakanth received a mixed reception from Dalit voters. Some actively supported him while others complained about his neglect of their neighbourhoods (Outlook 2006). The tense relationship with the AIADMK was soon terminated after the 2006 assembly election. The VCK reconciled with the DMK in time to join an alliance to contest the municipal elections held in October 2006 (The Hindu 2006an). This brought the party a few gains as the alliance coordinated to reduce competition in the election and after the polls coordinated voting secured the election of five VCK chairmen to various local bodies (New Indian Express 2008). After these elections the VCK remained linked with the DMK. The DPI and the PMK continued to coordinate on issues of mutual interest including the Sri Lankan issue and Tamil protection. The VCK was favoured by developments in the DMK alliance in the lead up to the 2009 Lok Sabha election. The MDMK remained outside of the DMK-led UPA alliance and kept close to the AIADMK from 2006 onwards. The two Communist parties also left the UPA as part of a national move to form a third front. At the very last minute the PMK also opted out of the UPA leaving the DMK short of allies. So, in contrast to the 2004 Lok Sabha elections when the DMK was replete with allies, there was space for the VCK in the UPA alliance that contested the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. The VCK was allotted two seats and Thirumavalavan won the Chidambaram seat on his third attempt.

Structural factors that constrain and enable the DPI The Dalits of Tamil Nadu are at the bottom of the ritual and social hierarchy in the localities in which they live. Not all Dalit caste groups are identically situated with Pallars tending to have a higher status than Paraiyars, and Arunthathiyars having the lowest status of all. Varying notions of ritual pollution are applied to these groups with Paraiyars losing status from the assumption that they eat beef. The Arunthathiyars, who are also known as Chakkiliyars, are said to be stigmatized because of an association between their caste group and a traditional occupation of leatherworking (Moffatt 1979: 59–61). Regardless of the veracity of these myths the Dalit groups of Tamil Nadu experience various forms of social exclusion. This exclusion includes residential segregation that might take the form of a separate hamlet or cheri set at a distance from the main village where those considered untouchable are expected to live (Kapadia 1995: 235). Segregation can also occur in urban areas with separate districts or housing developments being exclusively populated by Dalits (Punitha Pandian, interview, 24 April 2006; Gorringe 2005: 193). The economic position of Dalits tends to reflect their ritual standing. The polluting status of the Dalit castes is sometimes taken as a qualification for carrying out demeaning work including clearing human waste and moving dead bodies. More

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commonly Dalits tend to work as agricultural labourers as the majority of Dalits do not own land (Gorringe 2005: 154). This insecure occupation means that Dalits are over-represented among the poor of Tamil Nadu. However, the local variations that are a feature of the caste system also apply to Dalit caste groups. Ritual practice is conditioned by economic status and demographic presence. Groups that are wealthier and/or form a larger proportion of the population of their locality are better able to resist discrimination. Education provides some hope of social mobility and a minority of the Dalit population have enjoyed degrees of economic prosperity. Some own land and others have benefited from the reservation policies of the state and central governments. Arun’s ethnographic work in Chengalpattu district profiles a community of Paraiyars who are assertive, have alternative sources of income other than agricultural labour and have good access to education (2003: 58, 62). The social disadvantages experienced by the Dalits of Tamil Nadu has mixed consequences for political entrepreneurs seeking to open up a cleavage between those that suffer the stigma of untouchability and the wider population. To the extent that political mobilization is affected by the availability of material resources, independent Dalit politicians are constrained. Their supporters can only offer minimal financial support meaning that political campaigns have to be run by volunteers with few employed party workers being available. Economic vulnerability makes many Dalits reluctant to participate in political actions that would meet with the disapproval of their higher caste employers. Politically active Dalits have been subject to violent repression and social boycott that cuts them off from jobs and local services (Gorringe 2005: 117, 124–5). Established parties have more resources and are able to generate a significant presence during elections using posters, campaign vehicles and by giving gifts to voters. Media access is heavily skewed towards the two Dravidian parties who use cable and satellite channels to publicise themselves and their allies. Dalit voters are vulnerable to social pressure from politicians aligned with locally dominant caste groups. Finally, the Dalit cleavage, initially discussed in Chapter 2, is difficult to sustain because this constituency is divided between caste groups that do not easily mix. The DPI makes a reasonable claim to be a Dalit party but, for reasons discussed below, it has so far struggled to fulfil this claim. Difficult social and economic circumstances, rather perversely, also work to the advantage of Dalit political entrepreneurs. Pervasive caste discrimination fosters a sense of unfairness and injustice on the part of Dalit voters. Kapadia reports this sense of injustice, noting that Pallar labourers ‘whose labour actually produces the finest rice in Tamil Nadu, have to live on the worst rice the state produces – the irony is striking and not unnoticed by them’ (1995: 206). The physical and social segregation that is part of observing caste creates a sense of separation and difference. This applies to established political parties, which Dalit activists regard with contempt, and also the state. State institutions, including the police, are considered to be indifferent to Dalit needs or even actively hostile towards them (M.A. Britto, M. Bharathan, interviews, 14 July 2003). Acts of violence against Dalits heightens the sense of vulnerability and fosters a desire for protection. These circumstances

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 125 work to the advantage of political entrepreneurs who can make the plausible claim that caste is the main source of conflict in Tamil society. Political entrepreneurs are able to express and empathise with multiple anxieties. In cases of caste violence political entrepreneurs can offer a degree of protection and put pressure on state institutions to act impartially. A broad process of social change has made it easier for political entrepreneurs to mobilize support. Younger Dalits tend to be more politicized than older generations. This is partly a consequence of the greater take up of education. Education facilitates communication, the sharing of ideas and creates ambition. Students returning to their villages after a period of education in the cities see the social status of their families in new ways (Syed Anwar, interview, 26 August 2001). They feel and express profound resentment at the lack of respect given to the Dalits in a caste conscious society. Arun talks of a ‘younger generation who are assertive and articulate, decently dressed and educated. … These Paraiyars want to form a different identity from that which their forefathers have had for centuries’ (2003: 39). Education, if it leads to salaried employment enables some young Dalits to leave their home village. However, education does not automatically lead to employment and the unemployed, carrying a heavy burden of frustration and sensitive to caste inequality, are available for mobilization (M. Bharathan, interview, 14 July 2003). The caste demography of Tamil Nadu gives some assistance to the leadership of the DPI. The Dalit population of the state is a significant minority which is somewhat larger than the 19 per cent of the state population recorded as being in the Scheduled Caste category in 2001. This is because a large proportion of the Christian minority in the state continue to experience the stigma of untouchability (Wyatt 1996; Jayakumar 1999). The Dalit population is not evenly spread through the state. The districts that run from the Thanjavur delta to Chennai have Scheduled Caste populations ranging from 25.1 per cent to 32.4 per cent of the population (GoTN, 2004, Table 28.1).3 The occupational structure of the Dalit population, skewed towards agricultural labour, is reflected in a higher concentration in the countryside. The two largely rural districts at the upper end of the range bear this out, Kanchipuram (37 per cent) and Tiruvarur (36.7 per cent). This demography is consistent with Moffatt’s observation that many villages in the north and eastern parts of the state had Dalit populations of up to 40 per cent and in a very few cases were a majority (Moffatt 1979: 61). In some of the reserved constituencies Dalits make up a third of the electorate (Gorringe 2005: 307). Who does the DPI represent? A serious challenge for the DPI is the existence of the three caste groups among the Dalits mentioned at the beginning of this section. It is well known that the DPI draws strong support from the Paraiyars, which are the largest Dalit caste group in Tamil Nadu. This raises the awkward question of whether or not the DPI is a single caste party that represents the Paraiyar caste group. The party leader Thirumavalavan is from a Paraiyar background and unlike some Tamil politicians

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does not conceal the fact though he does not present himself as a community leader. When asked which leaders he regarded as iconic he made an interesting reference to Iyothee Thass who he noted ‘hailed from Paraiyar community, he was the first leader of our community’ (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). Inspite of the close connection with the Paraiyar community the DPI does not present itself as a single caste party and it developed as a political party from a social movement that promoted an alternative, Dalit perspective on Tamil politics and society. In keeping with Dalit organizations elsewhere this involved adopting a much more assertive attitude towards caste discrimination and its perpetrators. Terms considered derogatory or patronising, like ‘Paraiyan’ or ‘Harijan’, are strongly rejected. Dalit ideology argues for social equality and assumes that solidarity between those that experience the stigma of untouchabilty is a desirable outcome. The DPI has attempted to promote unity among Dalit caste groups (Gorringe 2005: 64, 257–8). That said, the Pallar, Paraiyar and Arunthathiyar caste groups do not mix easily and differences in status are observed between them. This complicates the work of the DPI. Gorringe summarizes the situation neatly when he concludes that the DPI appeals ‘mainly to Paraiyars, but the determination to resist being branded as a caste movement has meant that significant numbers of Chakkiliyars and Pallars have been drawn into the organization’ (ibid: 55). The DPI mobilized across a large area of Tamil Nadu. It has followers in the northern districts, where Paraiyars are the largest Dalit caste group, and it also has a following in the southern city of Madurai and surrounding areas, where the Dalit population is much more mixed (ibid). The limits to the social constituency of the DPI were partly determined by other organizations. The PT, under the leadership of K. Krishnaswamy, performed fairly well in the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. Krishnaswamy, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, uses the term ‘Dalit’ with great frequency but he also speaks openly for the interests of the Pallars, using the more dignified caste title ‘Devendrakula Vellalar’. In the late 1990s the DPI did not face such a strong challenge from an Arunthathiyar organization but it proved difficult to develop the movement in western Tamil Nadu where that caste group is concentrated (ibid: 60), though in the last few years Arunthathiyar organizations have become more active. In conclusion it is fair to say that the DPI is not a single caste party, but it is limited by important divisions among the Dalits of Tamil Nadu. These divisions, and the presence of competing Dalit organizations linked to the Pallars, made it difficult for the DPI to develop an even level of support among all of the Dalits of Tamil Nadu.

Institutional factors The DPI has emerged in a challenging institutional context. Key state institutions include the electoral system, which includes rules to guarantee the election of Scheduled Caste legislators, and the federal system of government which structures the ambitions and operation of political parties in Tamil Nadu. The non-state institutions that condition the functioning of the DPI include the existing political parties in the state.

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 127 The DPI has struggled to gain sufficient support to be able to win elections under the SMSP rules. The party has lost all of the by-elections it has contested independently and has not performed well when allied with other small parties. The simple majority electoral rules require the DPI to concentrate support in geographical constituencies. The combination of these rules and the operation of electoral alliances mean the DPI would need to gain the support of close to 40 per cent of the voters in order to win seats independently.4 It has not been able to do this. The system of reserved representation for the Scheduled Castes does not modify the geographical basis of the electoral system and discourages candidates from identifying very strongly with Scheduled Caste voters who are a minority among the electorate (McMillan 2005: 296). This system offers no advantage to the DPI and, furthermore, it acts to disrupt the development of collective Dalit interventions in politics. Established political parties generally assume that by putting up candidates in reserved constituencies they have fulfilled their obligation to nominate Scheduled Caste candidates. It is rare for Dalit candidates to be fielded in non-reserved constituencies (ibid: 321). This also applies to parties in alliances in Tamil Nadu. The handful of DPI candidates in the 2001 and 2006 elections were assigned reserved constituencies. The combined effect of the rules for reserved representation and the behaviour of political parties is the funnelling of Dalit politicians into contests against each other. The DPI gains seats at the expense of Dalit politicians in the main parties. The elections themselves pit Dalit politicians against each other. In 2001 the DPI candidate, P. Sakthivel, contesting the Nannilam reserved assembly seat on the DMK symbol was opposed by a dissident DMK independent, M. Manimaran who was the sitting MLA for the DMK. The beneficiary of this rivalry was the RPI leader C.K. Tamizharasan supported by the AIADMK alliance. The federal structure of India’s governing institutions has not assisted the DPI. The relative weakness of the DPI meant it was not able to secure a place in a major alliance, and hence a nomination, during the 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections. This means that the DPI had no national representation and was automatically ruled out from participation in national coalition governments. Unlike the PMK, or the MDMK, the DPI has not been able to compensate for its inability to participate in state government with gains at the national level. Overall, the DPI has had very limited opportunities to demonstrate its efficacy by electoral success. Thirumavalavan’s victory in the 2009 Lok Sabha election came after a very long haul. The institutions internal to political parties work to the advantage of the DPI. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the rules for advancement operate with varying degrees of opacity in the two main Dravidian parties. Dalit politicians do not appear to prosper in either the DMK or the AIADMK. The tendency to reward seniority in the allocation of second level posts in the DMK has not resulted in the elevation of a Dalit politician with stature in the DMK for a very long time. The last such leader in the DMK was Sathyavani Muthu, who resigned from the party in May 1974 complaining that the party was doing little for those affected by untouchability (Barnett 1976a: 299). Dalit politicians do not have prominent positions in the AIADMK. Indeed they would appear to be marginalized in the party more generally with one AIADMK source noting that there was not one district secretary who was a Dalit in

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1995 (Frontline 1995b: 111). Dalit politicians have been assigned cabinet posts in the governments formed by the DMK and the AIADMK but these are not prestigious posts. This pattern of preferment works to the advantage of the leadership of the DPI. Thirumavalavan faces no rival of stature in either party. The Dalits who have found a niche in the Dravidian parties, often helped by the system of reserved representation, are depicted as ineffectual. DPI activists go further and describe such Dalit politicians as selling out and indulging in ‘suitcase politics’ (Gorringe 2006a: 4–5). The DPI can make very credible claims that the failure of the main parties to incorporate strong Dalit leaders makes independent representation necessary. Interestingly, the DPI sustained itself for ten years in spite of a general lack of electoral success. In part the DPI has been helped by the involuted nature of its opponents and their inability to provide Dalit leadership. The DPI has some institutional resources that give it resilience. The movement ethos of the DPI has helped sustain the party. The DPI is also able to establish its efficacy by participating in street politics. Local political activity reflects well on the DPI. Its members are known to be bold and prepared to retaliate if Dalits are treated disrespectfully. The activists have gained credibility by confronting authority and having cases booked by the police was regarded positively by sympathizers. This assertiveness is said to have deterred would-be harassers from targeting Dalits (Fr Zacharias Devasagayaraj, interview, 10 July 2003). The movement also makes it mark on public spaces with flags and signboards in the way that other parties and organizations do (Gorringe 2005). In 2006 the movement had sufficient resources to provide substantial publicity for its candidates standing in the 2006 assembly elections. There is an important performative aspect to the politics of the DPI and its leader helps create a sense of expectation and interest in the party.

Political leadership Thirumavalavan established himself as a leader while the DPI was a social movement engaged in extra-institutional political activity. He gained prominence on the basis of his strong oratory and organizing activity (Gorringe 2002: 12–14). The DPI has remained under the leadership of Thirumavalavan since it entered electoral politics in 1999. He has become a recognized state level leader who is demonstrably popular among his followers. Thirumavalavan is revered within the movement and has a strong personal presence, interacting warmly with followers and outsiders. Thirumavalavan is referred to respectfully in the movement as ‘annan’ (elder brother) (Gorringe 2005: 241). Thirumavalavan’s background gives him additional authority. He describes his family’s background as modest. He was born in 1962 in Anganoor village in the Madurai district where his father was an agricultural labourer. Thirumavalavan was the only child in the family to be educated. He completed three degrees in succession, the last a law degree from Madras Law College, and began his political activism while a student (New Indian Express 2008). His first contact with the DPI came via a fellow student who was a brother of the current DPI leader. After graduation Thirumavalavan secured a job in government

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 129 service, working as a scientific assistant (grade two) in the Tamil Nadu forensic science department. In addition to his government job he was deeply involved in campaigning and organizing with the DPI. He became leader of the DPI in 1990, shortly after Malaisamy died. Involvement in political activity resulted in Thirumavalavan being suspended from his government job in early 1997. In August 1999 he formally resigned his post in order to contest the 1999 Lok Sabha elections (R. Thirumavalavan, interview, 22 February 2000). Thirumavalavan’s skilled oratory had helped establish his reputation both within the DPI and in wider state politics. This ability gives him a strong presence at political events. One observer of his speeches commented that Thirumavalavan’s words enthral the audiences. While Thirumavalavan’ speeches would stir the emotions of his listeners they were also closely reasoned and advocated clear values, reminding listeners of their innate dignity and their entitlement to equality. Thirumavalavan would ask Dalits to cease begging for favours and instead demand their rights. The speeches were reinforced by Thirumavalavan’s reputation for being involved in local disputes and the fact that the police have registered cases against him (Fr Zacharias Devasagayaraj, interview, 10 July 2003). Thirumavalavan’s public speaking ability gives him the potential to connect with a wider audience as his political style replicates elements of Dravidian political culture (C. Lakshmanan, interview, 24 April 2006). Part of Thirumavalavan’s appeal is his close identification with the lives of his followers. This gives substance to his rhetoric – as Gorringe observes that ‘[i]t is seen as vital for the leader themselves to have experienced what it means to be a Dalit’ (2005: 253). He does not stand apart from his followers and he is known to be accessible. Thirumavalavan is a bachelor which is taken as a sign of his personal sacrifice by his followers, as indeed was his decision to resign a secure government job (New Indian Express 2008; Gorringe 2005: 255).

The impact of the DPI on the party system During the 1990s the DPI established itself as an important social movement in Tamil Nadu and, after entering electoral politics, it has had some impact on the party system. This impact can be assessed in terms of the three key facets of a system: numbers, ideology and voters. The DPI has added another party, albeit a small party, to the state party system. In this sense Thirumavalavan can be described as a successful political entrepreneur. The DPI has demonstrated endurance and has so far survived ten years in fairly unpromising circumstances. Its cumulative haul of seats in the state assembly is a very modest three and the DPI gained no seats in the 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections, though it won one in 2009. The DPI has yet to reach its full potential. The DPI is notionally important because it claims to represent the large Dalit minority in the state, which constitutes more than 20 per cent of the population. For a number of reasons, some of which are discussed in more detail below, this claim has to be treated with scepticism. In practice the DPI does not have a state-wide presence or have uniform support from all Scheduled Caste groups. Other parties and organizations, most notably the PT, make competing

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claims to represent the Dalits or particular Dalit caste groups. The DPI, somewhat inaccurately, is perceived to be a party of the Paraiyar caste group that is particularly numerous in the northern districts of the state. That the DPI has not yet achieved its potential is revealed by comparison with the PMK. If we momentarily accept the contentious claim that the DPI is a single caste party, it has a connection with the largest Dalit group in the state, constituting about 11 per cent of the population, which is a proportion not much smaller than the Vanniyar caste group organized by the PMK. The PMK demonstrated an ability to mobilize a large proportion of the Vanniar community when it made its debut in the 1989 Lok Sabha election winning 5.8 per cent of the vote in Tamil Nadu. The PMK followed this up with in 1991 with 5.9 per cent and 3.8 per cent in 1996 (when it contested fewer seats). With these results the PMK appeared able to mobilize about half of the Vanniars who voted. The DPI has not contested a major election without an ally and in the elections when it had relatively weak allies the cumulative total of the alliance was modest. A good proportion of the 9.2 per cent won by the third front in the 1999 Lok Sabha election has to be attributed to the TMC and the PT. In 2004 the 3.1 per cent won by the third front was much less than the share of the vote won in early elections fought by the PMK. In the 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections the only DPI candidate to gain substantial support was the party leader, Thirumavalavan. Give the size of the Paraiyar population the DPI could, in theory, be on a par with the PMK. So far the DPI has not proved it has a following that would make it as valuable an alliance partner as medium sized parties like the PMK and the MDMK. That said the DPI has found a niche in the alliance system because its geographical concentration of support is very similar to that of the PMK. The DPI is an alternative to the PMK and they ‘have become a natural second choice if an alliance with the PMK fails (Gorringe 2006a: 9, italics in the original). The modest status of the DPI in the alliance politics of the state echoes is noted with sensitivity by Dalit activists already alienated by social discrimination. Dalit parties have reacted against the hierarchy implicit in electoral politics in the state whereby the main Dravidian parties assume a dominant position. This attitude was displayed during the 1999 election when Karunanidhi closed some bantering among senior DMK leaders about its electoral alliance with the suggestion that with a sound motherly instinct his party ‘knows what to keep and what to give away’ (The Hindu 1999e). Likewise the AIADMK leadership was unhappy about talks between Congress (I) and the PT on alliance formation in July 1999. It was made clear that the AIADMK would have a ‘final say’ on the ‘nature and shape’ of any alliance of which it was a part (The Hindu 1999b). The DPI is perhaps most important for its ideological contribution to state politics, even though this intervention has not been straightforward. Prior to the 1990s the political parties of Tamilnad tended to avoid normative discussions of caste and untouchability (Washbrook 1989: 207–8). Marguerite Ross Barnett concluded her book on Dravidian politics noting the marginal position of Adi-Dravidas in the Tamil polity (1976a: 327). In 1999 the DPI was known for its strong position in opposition to caste discrimination and the practice of untouchability. The movement called for equal treatment of Dalits and adequate representation in the

The DPI and Dalit mobilization 131 political system. Among new entrants to the state party system the DPI gave the strongest appearance of being an anti-system party as it entered electoral politics. The movement boycotted elections and its rhetoric was decidedly hostile towards the established political parties. The imagery deployed in DPI wall paintings and on painted boards erected by DPI activists was intended to establish a link between the DPI and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Syed Anwar, interview, 26 August 2001). In the film Anbu Thozhi the DPI leader played the minor role of a rebel leader (New Indian Express 2008). It is unlikely that substantial links existed between the organizations but it suited the DPI to style itself in a manner that evoked the LTTE, a movement actively fighting for liberation and for which there was much public sympathy. Gorringe comments on this radical atmosphere and recalls meeting several activists who carried photos of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran (Gorringe 2002: 13). The radical image of the movement and an ambivalent attitude towards political violence suggested a party that might be difficult to accommodate. However, the DPI quickly reconciled itself to the exigencies of party politics including the formation of alliances with the despised Dravidian parties. That said the DPI, along with the PT, gave the issues of untouchability, discrimination and caste equality greater prominence in the state party system. For the most part, other political parties in the state ignore these issues. Ideologically the DPI has moved towards the mainstream of state politics. Thirumavalavan has integrated his anti-caste ideas with Tamil nationalist ideas. Participation in the Tamil Protection Movement symbolizes this change. Demands have included comprehensive implementation of the 1956 Tamil Official Language Act and making Tamil the medium for education at all levels (The Hindu 2005a). Thirumavalavan and the PMK leader, Ramadoss attracted extensive media coverage by also putting pressure on the film industry to avoid using English words in the titles of Tamil films and by resorting to actions redolent of earlier anti-Hindi protests. On 6 December 2002, Thirumavalavan changed his name to a Tamil name ‘Tholkappian’. The name change was partly in protest at state government legislation on religious conversion but it also signalled a growing interest in the Tamil language issue (Thirumaavalavan 2003: 164). Thirumavalavan has emphasized progressive themes taken from Dravidian ideology. Curiously he has also taken some quite conservative positions, most notably when he entered a controversy over comments made by the actress, Kushboo (The Hindu 2005o). The ideological orientation of the DPI has changed significantly since 1999 but a continuing legacy is a party system that is less exclusive than it was in 2001 when interactions within the DMK alliance paralleled the caste-based exclusions that limit Dalit ambitions in other settings. The DPI has not achieved the density of support that it would like, even in the northern districts of the state. In addition to the comments made earlier in this section it can be added that the DPI does not appear to have much support in the districts adjacent to Chennai which also have a large Dalit population. In May 2005 the DPI put up two candidates in by-elections in the Gummidipundi and Kancheepuram constituencies who secured only 2 per cent and 1.2 per cent of the vote respectively (The Hindu 2005c). However, the qualitative impact of the DPI is

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notable. Subramanian distinguishes the DPI from established parties because of a demonstrated ability to mobilize voters (2003: 70). Ethnographic research provides evidence that the DPI has created a distinctive subculture whereby its activists and sympathizers are highly sceptical of claims made by the established Dravidian parties (Gorringe 2006a). The strong movement culture of the DPI is an important asset that helps secure substantial volunteer support even though this support has not achieved a critical mass outside of a few constituencies.

Conclusions The DPI has made a tortuous journey from its early beginnings as a social movement. There was no guarantee that the party would find a place in the party system and even now it is not completely secure. A tilt of the alliances could see the DPI on the losing side in the next assembly election. The Lok Sabha victory in 2009, at a time when the PMK won no seats at all, has boosted the credibility of the party. Thirumavalavan’s leadership has been extremely important for the DPI. He is a popular leader and has kept a following even while making the controversial move into electoral politics. The DPI has helped to change the dynamics of the party system. The established parties have grudgingly accepted that Dalits can have separate representation. Thirumavalavan has a better platform from which to promote the interests of his followers. It remains to be seen if the DPI can expand its support to include a larger proportion of the Dalit population in the state. Another unresolved question is whether the DPI and the PT will evolve a closer working relationship. The PT has taken up the issue of untouchability in the southern districts and its attempt to penetrate the party system is explored in the next chapter.

7

The PT and caste politics in southern Tamil Nadu

The Puthiya Thamizhagam (PT) did much to make caste a contentious issue in state politics in the late 1990s. The party leader, Dr K. Krishnaswamy, was deeply involved in the turbulent, and often violent, politics of southern Tamil Nadu from the mid to late 1990s. The party burst into electoral politics during the key 1998 Lok Sabha elections. The PT made a strong demand that Dalit issues be recognized as politically important. The PT was part of the third front that contested the 1999 elections and was recognized as one of the more important parties in the DMK alliance in 2001. The PT is strongly associated with the political ambitions of the Pallar or Devendrakula Vellalar caste group. This group has suffered the stigma of untouchability and in numerical terms is the second largest Dalit caste group in Tamil Nadu. The Pallars are most numerous in southern parts of the state, where they are often the largest Dalit caste group. The Pallars have articulated their grievances against caste exclusion at various points. In the 1940s and 1950s the Congress Party was the political party closest to their community. This was confirmed by a series of events in 1957 in Ramanathapuram district which included the murder of Immanuel Sekharan, a Pallar leader. This incident was followed by serious rioting, police fire and further deaths. These events attracted national attention and brought the Pallars and Congress closer as the state government offered the Pallars official protection (Forrester 1970: 55–6; Hardgrave 1969: 228). As time passed the Pallars were less effectively represented by the larger parties in Tamil Nadu and sought out alternatives. In the 1980s Dr K. Krishnaswamy presented himself as a political entrepreneur willing to articulate the ambitions of the Pallars. In the first section of this chapter, I trace the electoral trajectory of the PT since its formation in 1998. In the second section of the chapter, I outline the structural factors that influenced the formation of the PT. In the third section of the chapter, I analyse the institutional context in which the PT operates. In the fourth section of the chapter, I assess the impact of Krishnaswamy’s leadership on the development of the PT. I conclude with an evaluation of the PT’s impact on the party system.

The PT and party politics in Tamil Nadu A number of political entrepreneurs have attempted to develop a single caste cleavage, based around the political grievances of Pallars in southern Tamil Nadu. As

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well as general frustration with caste discrimination many Pallars are disappointed that the state and political parties are unresponsive to their concerns. The larger political parties do not generally promote Pallar leaders. There are very few Pallars who are prominent in public life, including the state bureaucracy. State institutions are considered to be indifferent to Pallar needs, and in the case of the police actively hostile to the community. There is particular tension between the Pallars and the Thevar caste group, which is a dominant group in many localities. In the 1970s a number of Pallar independent candidates were fielded in the assembly elections, and though they did not win any seats, they secured enough votes to be noticed. In the early 1980s John Pandian, leader of the All India Devendra Kula Vellalar Munnetra Sangam, emerged as a political leader. His aggressive championing of Pallar causes, and the numerous criminal cases registered against him, gave him a certain popular notoriety among Pallars in the southern districts. Pandian was known as Pallar Padai Thalapathi (commander of the Pallar force) and canvassed for the AIADMK politician R.M. Veerappan during the Tirunelveli by-election in 1986. He stood as an independent candidate in the 1989 assembly elections, winning 11.9 per cent of the votes in the Ottapidaram constituency. The issue of caste conflict came to state-wide attention following riots in Bodinayakkanur in 1989. Pandian made an indirect contribution to these riots when a controversial speech of his was recorded and subsequently replayed in the area on 10 September 1989 (Ganeshram 1989: 2640). His local profile encouraged the PMK to adopt him as a candidate in the 1991 assembly elections (Manikumar 2001: 75–6). John Pandian stood in the Mudukulathur assembly constituency and came second with 30.2 per cent of the vote. In the mid-1990s Pandian was pushed to the background of Pallar politics by a different type of leader, Dr K. Krishnaswamy. Krishnaswamy formed the Tamilnadu Federation of Devendrakula Vellalar Sangams in 1985 (Manikumar 2001: 77). This organization is more commonly referred to as the Devendra Kula Vellalar Federation (DKVF). Krishnaswamy’s rise to political prominence followed an outbreak of violence in the southern districts of Tuticorin and Tirunelveli in July and August 1995. In late July 1995 a relatively minor incident – an argument between a Dalit bus driver and some Thevar students in Veerasigamani village in Tirunelveli district – was followed by an attack on a statue of Muthuramalinga Thevar in the same village. This escalated into a series of violent clashes in nearby areas between Dalits and Thevars in which eighteen people were killed. As well as the intensity of the violence the episode was notable because Dalits retaliated against the Thevars, a group to whom it was presumed the Dalits were subordinate. The violence culminated in a police attack on Dalits in the village of Kodiyankulam on the night of 31 August 1995. It was said that the police suspected some of the wealthier members of the Dalit village of supporting the perpetrators of the violence and wished to undermine support for the disorder (Frontline 1999e). What was less contested was the scale of the damage caused to the village. An official enquiry, the Gomathinayagam Commission, later exonerated the police involved. However, the state government felt the need to pay compensation to individuals in Kodiyankulam, a fact highlighted by Krishnaswamy in 1999 (Frontline 1999e).

The PT and caste politics 135 Furthermore, a senior police officer, who visited the village on 5 September, continued to insist after the publication of the Commission’s report that police had ‘ransacked houses’, damaged property belonging to Dalits and poured diesel in the drinking water well (Frontline 1999d). Dr Krishnaswamy was well placed to emerge as a serious political leader at the time of these incidents. His standing was enhanced by his professional qualification as a doctor and the identification of the DVKF with Pallar demands for fair treatment. Krishnaswamy was also assisted by the fact that his main rival, John Pandian, was in prison at the time of the 1995 incidents (Manikumar 2001: 77). In the months following the August 1995 attack the Dalits of Kodiyankulam village campaigned vigorously against the AIADMK government. Krishnaswamy took a prominent part in this campaign. He filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court and called into question the independence of the state government enquiry (Frontline 1999e). Krishnaswamy’s actions strengthened the resolve of local Dalits who refused to participate in the proceedings of the enquiry. His participation coincided with a new mood of assertiveness among many Dalits in the southern districts who resolved to resist attempts to abridge their constitutional rights and hold them in coercive relations. He advocated a robust Dalit response to Thevar dominance and caught the mood among younger Dalits in the southern part of the state (The Times of India 2001a). Krishnaswamy was therefore a very credible figure in the locality when he decided to stand as a candidate in the 1996 assembly election in the Ottapidaram constituency in which Kodiyankulam is located. Krishnaswamy stood as a Janata party candidate, though the party affiliation mattered less than his personal stature, and he won the seat with 27.3 per cent of the vote. Continued caste violence and the consolidation of Krishnaswamy’s leadership Tensions between Dalits and Thevars re-surfaced in May 1997 when the DMK government implemented a decision, announced by the previous AIADMK administration, to give the name ‘Sundaralingam Transport’ to part of the state transport corporation. This honoured the memory of the Pallar hero Veeran Sundaralingam, who participated in Katta Bomman’s revolt against the East India Company.1 The decision was resented by some Thevars, who considered the decision an insult to their caste pride (Vaasanthi 2006: 214). Violence broke out in Virudhunagar district following Thevar demonstrations against the decision. Krishnaswamy was arrested on 2 May, the day after the transport corporation was inaugurated. He was detained for three days for allegedly making inflammatory speeches. Protests against his arrest occasioned further violence (Human Rights Watch 1999: 84–5). In the months following the renaming of the transport corporation there were ‘periodic eruptions of violence and the forced displacement of thousands of Dalits from their homes’ in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu (ibid: 85). In the same year Krishnaswamy championed another Dalit cause in the village of Kandadevi in the southern district of Sivaganga. The right of Dalits to pull the temple car during the annual festival was disputed. Krishnaswamy moved the courts and has taken a regular interest in the festival, which has either been suspended or

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held under tight security since 1998 (Frontline 2003). The ongoing dispute is another indication of an assertive mood among Dalits. That court orders upholding the right of Dalits to participate have not always been implemented indicates the depth of caste tension in the locality. In 2005 Krishnaswamy was placed under preventive detention on the day of the festival to prevent his appearance in the village (The Hindu 2005e). The formation of the PT In 1998 Krishnaswamy used the Devendrakula Vellalar Federation as the basis for the formation of a new political party. The Puthiya Thamizhagam (PT) or new Tamil Nadu, was formed in time to contest the 1998 Lok Sabha elections. The PT contested 15 seats in the 1998 Lok Sabha election and won 1.7 per cent of the statewide vote. Its strongest performances were in the southern constituencies. The party did not win any seats but it polled more than the winning margin in four seats, and was reckoned to have deprived three parliamentary candidates in the TMC–DMK alliance of sufficient votes to ensure their defeat (Rediff 1998d). The election results, continuing caste violence and Krishnaswamy’s high-profile activities, attracted a good deal of media attention. Krishnaswamy enhanced his leadership credentials through involvement in the Manjolai tea plantation dispute. The plantation is located in the Ambasamudram assembly segment of the Tenkasi parliamentary constituency that Krishnaswamy contested in 1998. The workers were unhappy with their wages and welfare provisions but got little help from the unions affiliated to established parties. The PT formed a union, the Puthiya Thamizhagam Tea Estate Workers Union, and helped to organize the workers. When mediation failed the PT supported a lengthy strike that commenced in August 1998 (Frontline 1999a). The BJP coalition government at the centre collapsed in April 1999. The electoral alliances in the state were quickly reformed which provided the PT with an opportunity to contest another election under more favourable circumstances. The PT joined the third front, the People’s Progressive Front, which included the TMC and the DPI. The front suited the PT because it allowed the participating parties a degree of independence and Krishnaswamy was not required to engage in awkward compromises with the Dravidian parties that he had previously denounced. He was also an important figure in an alliance of relatively minor parties. The front also encouraged some united action on the part of the participating Dalits parties which along with the DPI included the Republican Party of India led by C.K. Thamizharan (The Hindu 1999c; C.K. Thamizharan, interview, 17 February 2000). Krishnaswamy engaged in tough negotiation. He only reluctantly accepted Moopanar’s leadership of the front and secured ten seats for the PT at the close of the alliance negotiations (The Hindu 1999g). Preparations for the election took place in a charged atmosphere. On 23 July a group of striking workers were protesting in the city of Tirunelveli when the police forcefully dispersed them causing injuries to 15 protestors. Another 17 people died by drowning after they were chased along the riverbank by the police (Frontline 2001a). Krishnaswamy was

The PT and caste politics 137 present at the demonstration and subsequently challenged the post-mortem findings and called for judicial intervention. The response of the DMK leadership seemed to be shaped by the approaching election. Remarks made by the Chief Minister were antagonistic towards the Dalit organizations that were protesting against the police action and suggested sympathy towards backward caste supporters of the DMK in the southern districts. Karunanidhi rejected calls for action against district officials on the grounds that it would meet objections from members of the ‘backward classes’ (Frontline 1999b). The DMK found it difficult to accept the emergence of independent Dalit parties. Karunanidhi suggested that the new Dalit parties were promoting caste tension commenting that Mahatma Gandhi had never provoked violence in his attempts to promote Dalit ‘uplift’ (The Hindu 1999e). Keen to maintain an independent identity for his party Krishnaswamy called into the question the idea of a permanent third front, even before the results were declared. He talked about cooperation between parties on the basis of individual issues and commented that ‘electoral understandings were just a phase in the life of a party’ (The Hindu 1999i). The Progressive Front (and the PT) failed to win any seats but it captured 9.2 per cent of the vote and polled more than the winning margin in 24 out of the 39 seats. The vote held up in the constituencies where the PT had already contested but the failure to win seats meant that enthusiasm on the part of the other parties for an independent third front waned. Barely a few months after the Lok Sabha elections the front agreed to support AIADMK candidates for three assembly by-elections held in February 2000. The PT put up its own candidates for the by-elections. The PT and alliance politics After the tension surrounding the 1999 election subsided the DMK made some attempt to cultivate the PT. In April 2000 the Law Minister, Aladi Aruna, attended a state organized function in the village of Gavarnagiri where Veeran Sundaralingam was born (The Hindu 2000c). A few months later the Chief Minister, Karunanidhi, and several other senior DMK leaders, adopted a more emollient tone towards the PT in public comments. At the opening of the Ambedkar Mani Mandapam in Chennai on 11 June 2000, at which Krishnaswamy was present, the Chief Minister spoke at length on the subject of untouchability reminding listeners that in 1989 he had supported the renaming of Marathwada University after Dr Ambedkar. Stalin, then Mayor of Chennai, spoke of Periar and Ambedkar’s shared antipathy towards untouchability. The speeches were not without subtext however. The Chief Minister took the opportunity to call for an end to inter-caste violence and the DMK education minister Anbazhagan remarked that some of Ambedkar’s philosophy reaffirmed the spirit of the Dravidian Movement (The Hindu 2000e). The PT formed an alliance with the DMK to fight the 2001 assembly elections. Krishnaswamy once again maintained a robust attitude in negotiations and succeeded in getting 10 seats allocated to his party. The alliance with the DMK involved several complications. Krishnaswamy’s general discontent, discussed

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above, with the legacy of the Dravidian movement was well known. In one interview in 1998 he commented ‘(t)he Dravidian movement is an utter failure now’ (Rediff 1998f). More specifically, the PT had been in confrontation with the DMK state government at a number of points in connection with the Manjolai estate protests and over the general issue of policing in the southern districts (Vaasanthi 2006: 209). The DMK also included the Moovendar Munnetra Kazhagam (MMK), a party that represented the interests of the Thevar Peravai, in the alliance. The general secretary of the MMK, N. Sethuraman, had earlier been involved with confrontations with Dalits in the southern districts and was generally dismissive of their concerns (Human Rights Watch 1999: 86 and 89). Finally, even though Krishnaswamy had earlier indicated his hostility towards Hindu nationalism he was obliged to contest the election alongside the BJP (Frontline 1998a). The alliance with the DMK obliged Krishnaswamy to change tack. In place of his strong attack on the decay of the Dravidian parties he stated ‘[w]e feel the principles of the DMK are on par with ours’ and on the issue of joining an alliance that included the BJP he explained ‘[r]eligion has been a part of life for thousands of years, but corruption is a main issue that has to be tackled by the state’ (Rediff 2001b). The AIADMK allied with John Pandian’s outfit, the Tamizhaga Munnetra Kazhagam. Interestingly he was nominated as the AIADMK candidate for the Egmore constituency, in Chennai, rather than a constituency in the southern districts. Pandian came within a hundred votes of winning the seat and was also arrested on polling day following an attack on the offices of the DMK candidate (The Hindu 2001m, 2001p). Krishnaswamy was somewhat unlucky to lose the Ottapidaram seat in May 2001. Supported by the DMK and other allies he pushed his share of the vote up to 42.6 per cent but the AIADMK won the seat with 43.3 per cent of the vote. Krishnaswamy may have been undone by another Pallar candidate, Pasupathy Pandian, standing as an independent. Pasupathy Pandian denied that he was encouraged to stand by the AIADMK (The Hindu 2001l). The votes he won exceeded the margin of victory gained by the AIADMK candidate over Krishnaswamy. This defeat was taken by some as an early indication that Krishnaswamy’s political influence was in decline. Some supporters who had participated in a spirited campaign in 1996 refused to canvas for the PT in 2001, and Krishnaswamy’s AIADMK opponent was described by one observer as a ‘nonentity’ (K. Manikumar, interview, 14 July 2003). In retrospect, the 2001 assembly campaign can be viewed as the high water mark of Krishnaswamy’s influence. The PT was given a larger number of seats to contest than the DPI, which was only allotted seven seats, and most other small parties (The Hindu 2001c). Krishnaswamy was accorded recognition by the Chief Minister’s presence at a function organized by the PT in honour of the Pallar hero Veeran Sundaralingam in 2001. Karunanidhi promised a memorial in honour of Sundaralingam in the event of a DMK victory (The Hindu 2001e).2 Senior DMK leaders were also very keen to have the PT leader join them when they campaigned in their southern constituencies (The Hindu 2001g, 2001i; Times of India 2001b). However, the same could not be said always of lower level leaders and DMK

The PT and caste politics 139 party workers in the southern districts who were concerned that close cooperation with Dalit parties would alienate backward caste supporters of the DMK. One DMK candidate admitted to avoiding Dalit neighbourhoods in the campaign and there were reports of DMK cadres refusing to engage in reciprocal campaigning for the PT and DPI candidates in their localities. The PT argued that it generated disciplined support for the DMK among Pallar voters but that this support was not reciprocated by backward caste partisans of the DMK (The Hindu 2001n). The DMK fought the 2001 assembly elections in difficult circumstances. It was short of allies and it experimented with alliances with minor parties. By 2004 the DMK was in a much stronger position having detached itself from the BJP while keeping hold of its junior allies, the PMK and the MDMK. In addition the DMK could count on the support of Congress and the left parties. The DMK decided that it did not need an alliance with the Dalit parties to secure victory in the Lok Sabha elections and did not offer them any seats, though it hoped for their support. This offer was taken as a snub by the two Dalit parties who once again formed a third front (Frontline 2004c). The PT did not prosper in the 2004 Lok Sabha election. Overall the PT candidates performed poorly with the front as a whole gaining only 3.1 per cent with the majority of those votes going to candidates of the DPI and the MTD.3 The share of the vote won by the PT slipped back. Krishnaswamy won only 14.2 per cent of the vote in the Tenkasi Lok Sabha constituency which was less than the 27.9 per cent won when he contested in alliance in 1999 or the 19.1 per cent won when the PT contested alone in 1998. Krishnaswamy’s electoral fortunes in his favoured Lok Sabha constituency of Tenkasi in Tirunelveli district reflect the wider difficulties faced by the PT. During the 2004 Lok Sabha election campaign Dalit communities that had been solidly behind the PT, and blocked party workers from other parties from sending workers into their villages, were allowing CPI activists to canvas in their villages (The Hindu 2004c). Prior to the 2006 assembly election the PT was considered to be available for an alliance with a major Dravidian party. For its part the DMK considered it had a robust alliance and did not seek to renew the alliance with the PT that had been formed for the 2001 assembly election. The AIADMK allied with the DPI but did not extend the invitation to the PT (The Hindu 2006ae). Instead the PT allied with a national party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), using its election symbol, and the nationally renowned leader of the party, Mayawati campaigned in the state for six days (The Hindu 2006af; 2006ai). Using the election symbol of the BSP was taken as an indication that Krishnaswamy would formally merge the PT with the national party.4 During the election campaign the media coverage of the PT, which Krishnaswamy had attracted with ease in the late 1990s, was minimal even with the support of one of India’s best-known national politicians. 164 candidates contested using the BSP symbol. Krishnaswamy put in a respectable performance, winning 29.8 per cent of the vote in the constituency of Ottapidaram (the same constituency that he won, with 27.3 per cent of the vote in 1996). However, the overall performance of the PT/BSP was disappointing. The party did not win a seat and only three candidates won more than 10 per cent of the vote. The PT won only 0.8 per cent of the state-wide vote.

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The intimations of a merger with the BSP remained just that. Krishnaswamy kept up his agitations after the 2006 election and did not merge with the BSP. In late 2008 it was made clear that the DPI and the PT would cooperate to oppose the expansion of the BSP in Tamil Nadu (The Hindu 2008b). The PT maintained an electoral presence by putting up candidates in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. The party only fielded three candidates, including Krishnaswamy in the Tenkasi seat. The PT’s share of the vote shrank further to just 0.4 per cent of the state-wide vote; however, Krishnaswamy retained some credibility by winning 116,685 votes (or 15.6 per cent of the vote) in his personal contest.

The implications of social structure for the PT The Pallars are the largest Dalit group in the area that is encompassed by the boundaries of the old Tirunelveli and Ramanathapuram districts (Moffatt 1979: 60–1). There are substantial numbers of Pallars living further north of this area but it is in the southern areas of concentration that they have made the clearest impact on party politics. The 1921 census recorded the Pallars as 4.1 per cent of the population of the Tamil speaking districts of the Madras Presidency. The Pallars were notable minorities in the districts of Madurai (7.4 per cent), Ramanathapuram (9.2 per cent) and Tirunelveli (10.3 per cent). In some constituencies the proportion of Pallars is higher than the district figure (Hardgrave 1969: 224). The widely used term ‘Pallar’ has been called into question by members of the community seeking a name without the connotations of low status and untouchability. The title Devendrakula Vellalar, with connotations of higher status, is one of the preferred alternatives. This title makes a link to the deity, Devendra, and has been woven into a narrative of high-born origins. Since the 1920s a variety of caste associations have promoted the self-improvement and the interests of the Devendrakula Vellalars. Over time these associations have been drawn more closely into party politics (Manikumar 2001). The formation of Devendrakula Vellalar identity is an ambitious project and it allows a large number of Pallar subcastes to unite under one label. The divisions among Pallar subgroups are extensive. Ramaiah reports ‘over 84 branches among Pallars’ (2004: 4). Manikumar does not offer a number but refers to a Tamil proverb ‘one can count the varieties of paddys and not the subgroupings of Pallars’ (2001: 66). The term ‘Devendrakula Vellalar’ is politically significant because it is a form of identity that submerges the various Pallar subgroups and provides a basis on which unified political action can be taken (Manikumar n.d.: 16). The new title implies ‘an alternative, superior, non-untouchable identity’ and carries an implicit claim for a higher social status (Mosse 2006: 12). The Pallars are regarded as having the highest status among the major Dalit caste groups in Tamil Nadu and these distinctions between the different Dalit groups are often observed (Ramaiah 2004: 8–11). M.S.S. Pandian offers a critical view, arguing that ‘[t]he newly-acquired self-definition of the Pallars as Devendra Kula Vellalars and its sanctification by the PT mark out the Paraiyars and Arunthathiyars as caste inferiors’ (2000b: 514). While Pallar leaders reject notions of untouchability it is clear that many caste Hindus do

The PT and caste politics 141 not recognize Pallar claims of higher status. Many of the general disabilities, described in the previous chapter in relation to Dalits in general, also apply to Pallars who are often subjected to degrading and humiliating discrimination. An emblematic issue is the persistence of the two tumbler system in some parts of the southern districts whereby Dalits, including Pallars, are served separately using a different set of utensils at tea stalls. Other restrictions include prohibitions on using certain streets and benches at bus stops (Manikumar 1997a: 2242) The Pallars have experienced the most social mobility among the Dalits of Tamil Nadu with a minority gaining from formal education and subsequent government employment. A comparative study carried out by Ramaiah in Ramanathapuram district reveals significant local variations in the experiences of the Dalits surveyed, in this case mainly Pallars. In one village, where only a few Pallars lived, they were lived in social isolation and were subject to degrading discrimination. However, his second village study shows how a larger group of Pallars, many of whom own land or are well-educated, have steadily reduced the amount of discrimination they face. Not only do the latter group consider themselves equal to the caste Hindus but also they are able to take steps to assert that equality without fear of the consequences (Ramaiah 2004: 7). Some Pallars have also experienced the benefits of owning land and there have been some gains from the repatriation of income from overseas migrants (Manikumar 1997b: 26). A relatively recent study, carried out in 2001, of two groups of Pallars in Kailasapuram and Keelakottai villages in Tuticorin district presents an interesting picture of social change. Keelakottai has become the satellite settlement largely populated by Pallars though some Pallars also live in the main village. The study follows up on an earlier survey in 1961 and reveals improved levels of literacy, nutrition, housing and some ownership of consumer durables. However, relative differences are still notable with the Dalit settlement having lower quality amenities when compared with the larger neighbouring village mainly populated by caste Hindus. Some of the Pallars in these villages continue to experience extreme poverty but some have also improved their standing with the number of landowning Pallars actually having increased (Manikumar n.d.: 13–14). Another study, summarized by M.S.S. Pandian, provides details of substantial educational and professional achievements among Pallars in some villages in Ramanathapuram district. Education and salaried employment have loosened the grip of Thevar landlords who no longer determine the economic fate of the Pallars in the way that they used to in earlier decades. The educational achievements of the successful Pallars have become a symbol of resentment on the part of some Thevars, especially among those who continue to work as agricultural labourers (Pandian 2000b: 502–3). Manikumar confirms the interweaving of class and caste tensions, observing that affluent Thevars do not confront the Pallars, stating that conflicts are between those who have ‘nothing to lose’ (interview, 14 July 2003). It is difficult to generalize about the social existence of the Pallars, or any caste group for that matter, but it is generally agreed in the literature cited here that most Pallars experience some form of discrimination because of their supposed untouchability and that a significant minority of Pallars have been upwardly mobile. A number of political entrepreneurs have taken up these grievances as they have sought support.

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These material conditions have enabled some Pallars to resist discrimination and make articulate claims for equal treatment. Inspite of economic differences among the Pallars a sense of identity has emerged which is another valuable political resource. These developments make it easier for political entrepreneurs to seek political support. The PT: a Pallar party? The PT is closely aligned with the Pallars of southern Tamil Nadu. Krishnaswamy has been criticized for being a caste leader though he vigorously contests the charge that he is ‘casteist’ (The Hindu 2005g). However, he is loyal to the Pallar community that has supported the PT since the 1990s. This is the implication of his comment in a 1998 interview that he wanted a casteless society ‘but not at present’ (Gorringe 2005: 256–7). M.S.S. Pandian is direct: ‘Krishnaswamy avoids the inclusive term Dalit and instead refers to each Dalit caste by its name. This is an obvious move to distinguish himself as the leader of the Devendrars’ (2000b: 514). This is an overstatement as Krishnaswamy does use the word Dalit in his engagements with the English language press,5 but it is certainly the case that Krishnaswamy’s engagement with Dalit issues is subtly qualified. Krishnaswamy gave this careful answer when I asked him if he considered Ambedkar to be an inspirational figure: ‘Immaneval Sekharan was brutally murdered in 1957, September the 11th, in Ramnad. . . . who was at a young age opposed diverse atrocities. He was the inspiration. And then only Ambedkar’ (interview, 28 February 2000). Shortly after the 2004 Lok Sabha election he called for the inclusion in the Union cabinet of an individual from southern Tamil Nadu describing the exclusion of both ‘Dalits’ and ‘Devendrakula Vellalars’ from the south (The Hindu 2004i). The origins of the PT are similar to those of other caste parties in Tamil Nadu. It was preceded by a Devendrakula Vellalar caste association. Krishnaswamy has made some effort to broaden the appeal of the PT. At one point Krishnaswamy advocated Dalit-Muslim unity that suggests a possible social coalition that would support a party able to win a third of the vote and be competitive in a three sided electoral contest (Frontline 1998a). The PT made some attempt to broaden its appeal during the 1999 election by fielding non-Dalit candidates outside of the constituencies reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates (The Hindu 1999d). In Uttar Pradesh the BSP began with Dalit voters and was able to add other groups to its coalition by strategic selection of candidates from a range of social backgrounds (K. Chandra 2004; Jaffrelot, 2003). This ‘Dalit plus’ strategy has yet to work in Tamil Nadu. The PT is presented as a Dalit party by its leadership but its support is predominantly from one caste group, and the ambitions of this caste are overtly expressed to a greater extent than is the case with the DPI.

Institutional factors and the PT The PT operates in a difficult institutional context. The SMSP electoral rules set a very high bar for a small party. The PT gains some advantage from the fact

The PT and caste politics 143 that state and non-state institutions are frequently unresponsive to the Pallar community. The operation of the electoral system disadvantages the PT in much the same as it constrains the DPI. The PT gains some benefit from the geographical concentration of Pallar voters but not enough to enable the party to be able to win independently apart from in exceptional circumstances. In 1996 Krishnswamy won his assembly seat with 27.3 per cent of the vote in a competition between four relatively strong candidates. The operation of bi-polar electoral alliances tends to reduce the number of strong candidates. Where the PT puts up a viable candidate this produces a contest between three candidates and keeps the threshold for victory at close to 40 per cent of the vote. The PT has not been able to secure that level of support when it fields candidates on its own. The PT was not able to gain a place in the alliances run by the Dravidian parties to contest the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections and so the PT, unlike the PMK, has not been able to gain any profile or patronage resources by participating in national politics. The institutions of the large established political parties are not considered to be responsive to Pallar interests. Manikumar provides a representative comment in a summary of one village survey saying that on ‘many fronts the Pallars have grievances and strongly feel that all mainstream politicians have betrayed their interests’ (n.d.: 17). The two main Dravidian parties have not given prominence to politicians from Pallar backgrounds. The new AIADMK government in 2001 was criticized by the Devendra Kula Vellalar organizing committee in the following terms: ‘[W]e condemn vehemently that in Chief Minister Jayalalithaa’s cabinet there is no representative from the Devendra Kula Vellalars so we are asking the quarter crore Devendra race to be ready for the next agitation’ (poster pasted in the grounds of the Ambedkar Law College in Chennai).6 In contrast, the two Dravidian parties have been very keen to court the Thevar caste group which is also concentrated in southern Tamil Nadu. This further alienates the Pallars from the mainstream political parties given the powerful, and sometime dominant, position of the Thevars. The failure to incorporate the Pallars has helped the PT in its attempt to develop a caste cleavage in the southern districts. It has not been difficult to locate the Dravidian parties on the side of the cleavage opposed to the Pallars. Krishnaswamy has actively cultivated this grievance and done much to highlight the antagonism between the Pallars and the Thevars that is reflected in the division of political spoils within the Dravidian parties. The PT has not built up strong countervailing institutions that could be used to make the party more effective and reduce some of its institutional disadvantages. The party is a very leader centred institution, as is the case with many parties in Tamil Nadu. Krishnaswamy is the undisputed leader of the party. He catches the media attention and it is not clear who is available among the second rank leadership should the need for succession arise. Other office bearers do not have a media profile though Krishnaswamy does talk of consultations inside the party. There have been occasional reports of splits in the party but they have not obviously undermined the electoral standing of the party (The Hindu 2002b; The Hindu 2005l). The PT gains some strength from the way it has been positioned in relation

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to other parties. Krishnaswamy esteems the independence of the party and has learnt from the experience of Dalit parties and organizations that have been coopted or bought off by larger parties.7 The sharp rhetoric and calculated hostility towards the Dravidian parties helps the PT maintain its independence. The PT has distinguished itself from the left as well as the Dravidian parties. Krishnaswamy describes caste as a deeper social division than class arguing that ‘in India you cannot separate class from caste. It is caste that has created class here’ (Vaasanthi 2006: 201). This has implications in terms of political strategy and Krishnaswamy states: I believe in class struggle but Marxism is not class struggle alone. Dalits’ problems can be solved by none other than Dalits. Before going in for class struggle, caste problems should be solved. . . . Only unity among equals will be effective and lasting. (Frontline 1998a) Krishnaswamy is alert to the psychological importance for the Dalits of creating their own autonomy and preserving their identity. He argued that other parties like the Communist Party ‘would deprive them of their adaiyaalam, identity’. His view was that the PT would do this but more importantly would promote the ‘human rights and dignity’ of the Dalits (Vaasanthi 2006: 201). When discussing the challenges of electoral alliances Krishnaswamy and his uneasy relations with the TMC in 1999 he argued: ‘We need to keep our Dalit identity. This is most important. We have our independence and have to maintain it. . . . when we tie up we lose our leadership and our identity’ (K. Krishnaswamy, interview, 28 February 2000). In summary, the PT gains little assistance from institutional factors, with the exception of the indifference of mainstream parties to Pallar interests. The electoral system ultimately limits the influence of Pallars and makes the maintenance of an independent party especially challenging. What is notable is that the PT has survived given its inability to win elections or influence the outcome of elections. Krishnaswamy’s leadership is an important factor when it comes to explaining the trajectory of the PT.

The leadership of Dr K. Krishnaswamy Dr K. Krishnaswamy, who is a Pallar, practised as a doctor before turning full-time to politics.8 Krishnaswamy has long been interested in politics. He admits to have been a member of the students’ wing of the Marxist-Leninist movement but denies having been a member of the armed Naxalite wing. One of the legacies of his early contact with Marxism, while at school, is a continuing commitment to atheism. He was imprisoned during the Emergency in 1976, after being arrested putting up posters condemning the policy of forced sterilization (Rediff 1998e). By this time he was apparently a member of the DMK (Vaasanthi 2006: 204). In an interview with the writer Vaasanthi he claimed to be a founder, along with Malaisamy, of the Dalit Panther movement in the state in 1982. He went on to imply that he had a status separate from the DMK by 1984, stating: ‘In 1984 I contested the Parliamentary

The PT and caste politics 145 election from Pollachi. Then the DMK and we were in the same alliance’ (ibid: 202).9 In the same interview Krishnaswamy stated, without elaboration, that he left the Dalit Panthers when ‘the Paraiyars of the north refused to cooperate’ (ibid: 204). Part of Krishnaswamy’s image coincides with the style of those politicians who are happy to be seen enjoying the fruits of office. This has not gone unnoticed in the press. Vaasanthi mentions that she conducted a recent interview with him ‘at his residence-cum-office at Mylapore, just a few yards from Poes Garden, where his political foe Jayalalithaa resides’ (2006: 199). In another interview Krishnaswamy was put on the defensive over the question of whether or not he should stay in an expensive hotel (Rediff 1998f). When campaigning he is driven in a Toyota Qualis. Krishnaswamy’s sartorial image is distinctive: he has shunned the conventional male politicians’ preference for the combination of a neatly pressed shirt and veshti in favour of a smart casual western-style and has made running shoes his trademark style (The Times of India 2001a).10 The presentational style of Dr Krishnaswamy is distinctive. He deals confidently with the media and his carefully chosen comments have the effect of creating a political space for the PT. Krishnaswamy nurtures a common grievance of Dalit activists, namely that representation of Dalits in Tamil society is inadequate. A shared sense of alienation is sustained by the party leader’s repeated assertions that other parties fail to represent the interests of the Dalits, and more particularly the Pallars. This failure to provide adequate representation is said to be substantive, as policies fail to promote equality, and symbolic in that the ruling parties do not appoint Dalits to senior posts in the party and government. As is common among Dalit activists and politicians Krishnaswamy is unhappy with the electoral system. As discussed in Chapter 6, the system of reserved constituencies is considered by Dalit activists to be a flawed way of ensuring meaningful representation of Dalits. Krishnaswamy argues in favour of either separate Dalit electorates that would negate the problem of politicians from reserved constituencies being beholden to the majority of the non-Dalits in their constituency, or an electoral system based on proportional representation (Rediff 2004a; The Hindu 2006al). Krishnaswamy links this failure to represent Dalits to a critique of the Dravidian movement: There has been no movement that has done more harm to the Dalits than the Dravidian movement. It was projected as a war against hierarchy . . . But we were fooled and cheated. It is not we who benefited but the other backward classes. (Vaasanthi 2006: 19) Krishnaswamy argues that the hegemonic ambitions of the backward classes were institutionalized by the political parties that sprung out of the Dravidian movement saying: [T]he big parties were for the rich and high caste people. That is why we were forced to start a party. The situation arose because the middle order and

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The name of the party is a reminder of the view that the Dravidian movement has failed and that a new Tamil Nadu has to be created instead. The radical opinions of many Dalit activists, the profound indignity of the continuing practice of untouchability and the deep alienation of many younger Dalits means that Dalit political entrepreneurs cannot afford to appear to be too moderate (Gorringe 2005: 255). There are potential challengers to Krishnaswamy who are aware of this. The PT’s main competitor at the grassroots, especially among younger Pallars, is John Pandian who is more directly identified with violent retaliation and confrontation with the state. The very large number of court cases booked against Pandian is considered a sign of the leader’s efficacy by his supporters (Mosse 2006: 12).11 Krishnaswamy often uses a more formal approach, such as litigation, but also practises the politics of confrontation. He has gained useful publicity by his involvement in street protests, forthright criticism of the state and occasional arrests. The qualified references to Marx and class, combined with Krishnaswamy’s earlier links with the left, help to give the impression that the PT has a militant edge. Krishnaswamy’s ambivalent treatment of the topic of violence also helps to sustain the image of the PT as a radical party. For the most part he advocates selfdefence but his remarks, frequently ambiguous, seem to go beyond that. In one interview in November 1998 he said: ‘We are not for positive violence. It is only defensive violence. I tell them to take up arms to protect themselves. I tell them, don’t be unarmed.’ Later in the same interview he argued that Dalits have felt most of the pain and suffering and it would be helpful if the experience was more equally shared. Thus he reasoned: Even a pinprick can cause so much of suffering but we have suffered from aruval [machete], lathis, knives, bombs and bullets. I only want to show the other brothers that even a pinprick can be painful. Our intention is not to injure the others but to show them how much even a pinprick hurts. (Rediff 1998f) Assertiveness would encourage the few ‘backward people’ attacking the Dalits to desist (ibid). Krishnaswamy adopted a similarly robust tone in another interview given in 1998 when he commented that ‘Dalits are confident of protecting themselves from atrocities’ and that with regard to the caste violence in the southern districts he would prefer to call the Dalit involvement a ‘Dalit defence’ (Frontline 1998a). This assertive approach is particularly appealing to younger Dalits who are inclined to resist caste discrimination (The Times of India 2001a). That support for the PT consolidated in the wake of outbreaks of caste violence involving Dalits encouraged some to speculate that the incidents have been utilized for political purpose with the violence in Virudhunagar in 1997 being followed by

The PT and caste politics 147 incidents in the Ramanathapuram district in 1998 (Rediff 1998c). The precise role of the PT in the caste clashes of the late 1990s is unclear. I have come across no reports that suggest that Krishnaswamy has been directly involved in instigating caste violence. Though it is certainly the case that Krishnaswamy’s ambiguous references to violence, and references to Dalit self-defence in press interviews, do not help dispel insinuations against him. Vaasanthi writes of the party leader, somewhat disingenuously: ‘It is hard to imagine that he, as the leader of his Puthiya Thamizhagam party, is the author of many vitriolic speeches and instigator of violent caste clashes’ (2006: 199). One interpretation would suggest that the PT did not instigate violence but was well placed to gain publicity from incidents after they occurred. This construction would fit the events that took place in the Ramanathapuram district in late 1998. The PT appears to have been on the periphery of the incident. Krishnaswamy was said to have made an ‘allegedly provocative speech’ on 11 September. However, the violence occurred nearly a month later, on 4 October, and followed a deliberate pattern that appeared to be an attempt to diminish the presence of the PT in the area (Frontline 1998b). The clashes occurred in the run up to a counter-rally organized by the Thevar Federation. The conference was widely advertised and light policing of visiting ‘delegates’ appears to have allowed confrontations to occur in Ramanathapuram town and surrounding villages. Some of the visitors bearing firearms were alleged to have attacked Dalit villages, using petrol bombs. This was followed by Dalit attacks on local Thevar villages (ibid). Krishnaswamy was quick to condemn the attacks on the Dalits afterwards (Frontline 1998a). The number of caste clashes in the southern districts declined from 1999 onwards. The reasons for this are not entirely clear but it coincides, though there is nothing to suggest it is more than a coincidence, with the PT’s entry into alliance politics.12 The policing of incidents where caste violence looks a likely outcome has been significantly re-organized so that the response is much more likely to be prompt and effective (S. Annamalai, interview, 29 April 2006). Krishnaswamy is not afraid of controversy and has highlighted numerous issues that draw interest towards his leadership. At various points he has campaigned on the two tumbler issue (The Hindu 2001j, 2002f, 2003d). Krishnaswamy also made clear his support for the cause of Tamil Eelam whereas Congress, the BJP and the two largest Dravidian parties generally avoided the topic (Frontline 2000b; The Hindu 2006am). In March 2000 he objected to the film Maayi because of its portrayal of Immanuel Sekharan, the Pallar hero murdered in 1957 (The Hindu 2000a). In May 2003 Krishnaswamy launched a more sustained campaign against a film being made by the actor-director Kamal Hassan. The film, with the proposed title Sandiyar, was set against the backdrop of recent violence in the southern districts. Krishnaswamy objected to the title pointing out that the term ‘sandiyar’ is used to describe the ‘rogues’ who initiated the caste violence in the southern districts. He also objected to the glorification of the sickles that have been used to perpetrate acts of caste violence (Rediff 2003; The Hindu 2003c). The protests, and fears that the PT might disrupt filming, obliged the director to drop the proposed title and rename the film Virumaandi when it was released in 2004.

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Krishnaswamy is very effective as a leader of agitations. He is articulate and makes good use of the media. He has a good knowledge of legal procedure and the administrative aspects of state policy towards the Dalits. He is said to have acquired many of these skills during his early involvement with the left. A fair assessment of Krishnaswamy’s leadership is that he is very good political tactician (C. Lakshmanan, interview, 24 April 2006). His demand for a white paper, published in 2000, on the implementation of Scheduled Caste reservations put the DMK on the defensive (The Hindu 2000d; 2005p). In another case Krishnaswamy obtained some precise data on under-recruitment of the Scheduled Castes in the state transport corporation and used it to telling effect (C. Lakshmanan, interview, 24 April 2006). However, it is less clear that Krishnaswamy has succeeded in attaching his leadership to a strong institution that would sustain the PT in his absence.

Party system impact In this section I assess the impact of the PT on the party system in Tamil Nadu according to the dimensions of party numbers, ideology and voters. So has PT increased the number of parties in the state party system? The short answer is: only briefly. The PT has not won any seats in the state assembly since its formation and it has not gained a regular place in the main alliances. Using the definition of a successful party given in Chapter 1, that a party is relevant to the process of alliance formation or has altered the pattern of competition in the party system, I have to judge that the PT has failed. It demonstrated coalition potential between its first election in 1998 and 2001. By 2004 the PT was considered to be irrelevant to the two main alliances. The party shifted the pattern of competition slightly between 1998 and 2001 but there is no longer any evidence that other parties are adjusting their tactics in response to the PT. The PT has had some impact on the ideological orientation of the party system by helping to shift the terms of political debate in Tamil Nadu. The issue of caste was submerged by the Dravidian parties, but this changed in the late 1990s as the DMK government was obliged to acknowledge the issue of caste inequality and its implications for civic peace. The PT continues to put the issue of caste on the political agenda by its frequent agitations. However, the electoral decline of the PT means that it is no longer able to oblige other parties to pay attention to the issue as they compete with each other. As Sartori would have it political parties do more than transmit information, they ‘transmit demands backed by pressure’ (italics in the original, 1976: 28). The partisan base of the PT is very weak. The party gained strongest support in the 1998 and 1999 Lok Sabha elections. Its support has fallen dramatically since then and in recent elections has not done much more than hold on to some core support in the constituency where its leader stands for election. In 1999 the PT won 1.7 per cent of the state-wide vote without the support of any allies. In 2009 the PT put up three candidates for the Lok Sabha elections and secured 0.4 per cent of the statewide vote. This contraction of support means that Krishnaswamy has little to trade

The PT and caste politics 149 with when it comes to alliance formation but he is not completely without resources. In 2006 PT/BSP candidates did poll more votes than the winning margin in 18 assembly constituencies, the DMK alliance won ten of those seats and the AIADMK alliance won the remaining eight. This partly reflects the fact that the 2006 elections were very competitive. In explaining the limited success of the PT it would appear that structural and institutional factors have constrained the PT. The Pallar population is not as large as the Vanniar or even the Thevar caste groups. The Pallars lack other resources which might augment their numbers. The Thevar caste group gains influence from its size, its physical assertiveness and its economic standing. However, a comparison with the case of the DPI suggests that it was not inevitable that the PT was squeezed by the alliance structure. The Paraiyars may be a larger group than the Pallars but the DPI has not demonstrated that it has the support of a majority of Paraiyar voters. The DPI focused attention on a small area of the northern districts. It also demonstrated organizational depth and provided benefits that give its supporters more than electoral reasons for affiliating with the DPI. The DPI has been slightly more diplomatic in its interaction with the DMK since its entry to electoral politics and has accepted most of the constraints of being a junior ally. The PT has been punished by an electoral system that rewards the largest parties and the PT has not been able to demonstrate its efficacy in the electoral arena. Superficially this would appear to support the operation of Duverger’s mechanical and psychological effects. However, this leaves the puzzle of Krishnaswamy continuing to win substantial support in the constituencies where he is a candidate while the vote subsides elsewhere. If the PT was able to extend this support across a slightly broader area it would be in a similar negotiating position as the DPI in the northern districts. If Krishnaswamy’s narrative is energetically promoted, and it is the case that other parties do not favour the Pallars, then there are good reasons for Pallars to continue to support the PT, even if it does not win in the short term. Another variable is the effectiveness of Krishnaswamy’s leadership. In retrospect his strategic choices have not helped make space for the PT. First, Krishnaswamy made a very strong claim for independence and was more assertive than is normally considered acceptable for a weak junior ally. Second, Krishnaswamy positioned his party in opposition to the powerful Thevar caste. In 2001 Krishnaswamy claimed that the Pallars could act as a counterweight to the Thevars, estimating that the Pallars constituted about 20–25 per cent of the electorate in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu (Rediff 2001b). His claim was an overstatement, the Pallar population is not such a large group, and stating his position so starkly left his party dangerously isolated given the strong links that both Dravidian parties have with the Thevar caste group. The DPI was in a similar position with regard to the Vanniar caste in 2001 but has since succeeded in re-positioning itself as an ally of the PMK. Krishnaswamy is in a more difficult position given the lack of a powerful independent Thevar leader with whom he could cooperate. Finally there is the question of organizational leadership. The PT does not have obvious institutional strength and questions have been asked about the efficacy of Krishnaswamy’s routine management of the party. In the lead-up to the 2006

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assembly election his visits from Coimbatore, a core political activity, to key constituencies in southern Tamil Nadu were said to be infrequent (K. Manikumar, interview, 26 April 2006).

Conclusions There are multiple competitors for Dalit votes in southern Tamil Nadu. The Communist parties have been active, campaigning against caste indignities and Congress at points sided with Pallars in their contest against their Thevar rivals. The AIADMK, especially under the leadership of MGR, demonstrated an interest in poor Dalit voters. Parties might choose to act on behalf of the Dalits but a question is always raised about the legitimacy of their intentions if they do not also incorporate Dalit leaders of stature in their party structures. The PT showed considerable potential in 1998. Krishnaswamy successfully established himself as a credible political entrepreneur among the Pallars in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. He continued to nurture the conviction among many Pallars that the DMK and the AIADMK did not represent them and presented himself as an alternative leader. He also weakened the ability of Congress to represent Dalit voters by cutting into their support in the southern districts (Manikumar n.d.: 16).13 Krishnaswamy established a political space for his party by establishing differences with rivals seeking Pallar support. He has shown little enthusiasm for establishing a cleavage which would separate Dalits from the rest of Tamil society, preferring instead to emphasize the particular needs of the Pallars. However, after a decade of agitation Krishnaswamy proved unable to persuade most of his supporters that the PT could bring them sufficient substantive or psychological benefits to justify their support. The PT failed to win any seats in the assembly and after 2001 was unable to form alliances with the major parties that might have brought the PT the benefit of representation in the legislature. The party has not achieved its potential and leads a bare existence. That said the party is still able to field candidates and maintains an independent identity, but for the moment its impact on the party system is negligible.

8

Hindu nationalism in south India

Political parties espousing the ideas of Hindu nationalism have struggled to make an impact on politics in Tamilnad. This appeared to be changing in the 1990s. In the early 1990s the AIADMK began to favour a religious agenda that met with the approval of Hindu nationalist organizations. In 1998 the BJP formed an alliance with the AIADMK to contest the Lok Sabha elections and its first MPs were elected from Tamil Nadu. This alliance was short-lived and there was some surprise when the DMK, a party known for its rationalist inclinations, linked up with the BJP to contest the 1999 Lok Sabha election. This alliance proved much more durable. DMK support enabled BJP candidates to win elections to the Lok Sabha in 1999 and the state assembly in 2001. The BJP and allied organizations were upbeat about the prospects for the party and were hopeful that the party could gain a stronger presence in state. The BJP was formed as a national political party in 1980 and picked up the tradition of Hindu nationalist politics that the Bharatiya Jan Sangh had pioneered until it merged into the Janata Party in 1977. The BJP was initially unsuccessful, across India as a whole, but picked up momentum in the late 1980s. This was largely as a consequence of the popular campaign by various Hindu nationalist organizations to build a temple in honour of Lord Ram on a site that was then occupied by a mosque, the Babri Masjid. The party also gained momentum in north India by opposing the proposal to implement the Mandal commission. The BJP emerged as the largest party in the Lok Sabha in 1996, though it won no seats in Tamil Nadu, but it was unable to form a government as many parties were wary of its extremist image. The BJP brought a number of regional parties, including the AIADMK, into the alliance it formed to fight the 1999 Lok Sabha elections and was then able to form a national government for the first time. The government was supported by parties from Tamil Nadu and a number of BJP MPs were elected from Tamil Nadu. The BJP has to be understood as the party political element of a broader Hindu nationalist project that is pursued by a wide range of organizations. The core entity in the Sangh Parivar, the family of Hindu nationalist organizations, is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS was founded in 1925 and aims to build a strong Hindu India. It disdains conventional party politics and works indirectly to achieve its objectives. The RSS prefers to talk in terms of a cultural mission and building the character of individuals who will strengthen the Hindu nation

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(Lochtefeld 1996: 101–2; Zavos 2000: 183–97). Affiliated organizations, several of which are discussed below, work in different but usually complementary ways to achieve a transformation of Indian society. Many of the senior leaders of these organizations are RSS members and are intuitively aware of the common objectives they are working towards (Andersen 1990: 234). The BJP works under particular pressure as it is limited by legal and electoral imperatives (Lochtefeld 1996: 102). The strategy of the BJP has varied over time but since the early 1990s it has felt the need to present itself as a moderate, responsible and popular party that can win elections (Jaffrelot 2005: 248–9). Within Tamil Nadu determined efforts have been made to advance the cause of Hindu nationalism since the early 1980s. The RSS appears to have enjoyed rapid growth in the state especially in the southern districts (Spitz 1997; Shanmuganathan, interview, 2 March 2000). This is reflected in the vigorous activities of affiliated organizations in Tamil Nadu. On first inspection the state of Tamil Nadu appears to be an environment that would inhibit the growth of Hindu nationalism. The BJP is part of a nationalist movement that emerged in an upper caste north India milieu. One could hardly conceive of a combination more at odds with the assumptions that constituted the Dravidian political culture that dominated Tamil Nadu in the second half of the twentieth century.1 The Dravidian movement defined Tamils as a nation under threat from an Indian state beholden to north Indian and upper caste interests. Prominent among the assumptions favoured by the leadership of the DMK were a suspicion of Brahmanic Hinduism and the advocacy of the interests of the backward castes. Yet the Hindu nationalist movement has persisted in its attempts to mobilize support in Tamil Nadu. It needs to be emphasized that this mobilization is carried out by a broader movement that is keen for the BJP to make progress but also esteems any social change that brings their vision of a strong Hindu society closer to realization. In the first section of this chapter, I outline the various methods that have been used to promote the Hindu nationalist cause in Tamil Nadu. Included in this wider discussion is an account of the electoral fortunes of the BJP. The second section of the chapter considers the structural factors that have assisted Hindu nationalist mobilization. The third section of the chapter addresses the question of political leadership. The fourth section of this chapter assesses the institutional advantages and constraints that affect the progress of the BJP. I argue that that institutional factors have been especially limiting on the BJP. I show how existing parties have limited attempts by the BJP to define its own version of a religious cleavage in Tamil society. In the fifth section of the chapter, I analyse the impact of the BJP on the state party system.

The rising influence of the BJP in Tamil Nadu The BJP’s efforts in Tamil Nadu have been well supported by various elements in the Sangh Parivar. Members of the RSS were active in the state prior to the formation of the BJP in 1980. The BJP’s predecessor, the Jan Sangh, was notably unsuccessful in the elections that it contested in Tamilnad, as indeed was the BJP

Hindu nationalism in south India 153 until 1996 (Manor 1992: 1267). The popular religious thinker Swami Vivekananda provides a focus for Hindu nationalist activity in the southernmost part of Tamil Nadu (Mathew 1983: 415). The senior RSS leader Eknath Ranade took an interest in promoting Vivekananda’s Hindu revivalist ideas. He successfully lobbied for permission to build a memorial to the Swami on an island just off the coast at Kanniyakumari. The elaborate Vivekananda Rock Memorial was inaugurated in 1970 with a number of swayamsevaks active on the governing body (Andersen and Damle 1987: 137–9, 154–5). Ranade also founded the Vivekananda Kendra (VK) that acts as a ‘service organisation’ and a holy order that promotes the revivalist ideas of the Swami. The headquarters of the organization are located on a substantial plot of land just outside of Kanniyakumari town. The VK welcomes pilgrims to Kanniyakumari. The narrative used to place Kanniyakumari in India’s spiritual geography glosses over its location in Tamil Nadu and celebrates it as a national symbol: The mighty Himalayas to the far north have been the symbol of India and her focus of national inspiration during all these millennia of our history . . . Today we have another symbol and centre of inspiration for India in this Kanyakumari in the far south, impressively situated at the confluence of the three oceans. (Vivekananda Kendra 1994: 43) Through its visitor centre and publications the VK makes links between the Swami’s ideas and Hindu nationalist ideas (personal observation, 13 July 2003). The VK also runs development projects in the four southern districts of Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi, Kanniyakumari and Ramanathapuram. The organiszation also runs a number of day schools in the state (Vivekananda Kendra 1994: appendix). The VK remains a small organization in comparison with other RSS affiliates but it demonstrates the diverse methods used to cultivate sympathy for Hindu nationalism (Andersen and Damle 1987: 139). In February 1981 several hundred Dalits converted to Islam in the village of Meenakshipuram. The conversions became the source of a national controversy and debate. The Hindu nationalist movement was especially incensed by the incident, though its response showed that it recognized a significant opportunity to mobilize in southern Tamil Nadu. The rapid mobilization against conversion in 1981 took a number of forms. At the state level it provided an opportunity to draw Hindu organizations and establishment figures into a campaign organized by the RSS. The Hindu Ottrumai Maiyum (Centre for Hindu Unity) was formed to coordinate the activities of various concerned organizations. The Hindu Munnani or ‘Hindu Front’ was formed also, according to its leader Ramagopalan, ‘as a fallout of the Meenakshipuram conversions’ (Rediff 1998a). Two Hindu Solidarity Conferences were held in July 1981 the first apparently in Meenakshipuram and the second at Ramanathapuram. The objective of the conferences was to promote ‘the campaign for awakening the Hindu People to close up their ranks, eradicate social perversions such as untouchability, and create conditions for not only stopping

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further conversions to alien faiths but also for reclaiming those who had forsaken their ancestral faith’ (Seshadri 1981: 30). The activities of the RSS affiliates were also intended to mobilize local people to encourage reconversion and prevent further conversions. The Hindu nationalist response to the conversions developed a familiar theme of minority stigmatization (Jaffrelot 1996: 78). Religious minorities and conversions were linked to a series of threats to the Indian nation. Religious conversions was described as a threat to national security: ‘It is also on the cards that [a] rise in Muslim population in any part leads to violent, anti-Hindu attacks, creating lawlessness and anarchy there’ (ibid: 33). Invidious references were made to the economic achievements of newly prosperous Muslims. Including the claim that ‘by a large scale acquisition of property in dominant Hindu localities the Hindu houses have been outnumbered and a famous Mahadana Street – a speciality in Tanjore Town – renamed as Madeena Street’ (Seshadri 1981: 5). It was frequently suggested that the conversions were induced with the assistance of money emanating from the Gulf. These allegations were given a gendered twist when it was alleged that women were coerced as ‘normally the last thing that our women of the villages would like to lose is their ancestral faith in which they consider their honour, life and everything to be entrenched’ (Seshadri 1981: 9). The post-Meenakshipuram campaign was broadened out to draw attention to the issue of Christian conversions. In the RSS fact finding report it was alleged that the Douglas Charity was running an orphanage with the objective of ‘conversion of Harijans to Christianity’ and stirring up caste tensions that would create among Dalits ‘an atmosphere of alienation from the Hindu society, which is necessary for conversions’ (Seshadri 1981: 6). Christians are present in significant numbers in the southern districts of the state and have at times acted collectively to protect their interests. The institutional influence of Christians can be seen in numerous churches, schools and medical institutions. Christians are also active in politics and public life in the southern districts of Tamil Nadu. In Kanniyakumari district returns in 2001 Christians made up 44.5per cent of the population compared with a Hindu population of 51.3 per cent (Census of India n.d.). This makes claims that the Hindu majority is embattled more believable (Mathew 1983: 413–17). Tension escalated in March 1982 when Catholic fishermen obstructed devotional activities near the Mandaikadu Temple. In the Hindu–Christian riots that followed the RSS was alleged to have escalated the violence. The RSS and the Hindu Munnani argued that the tensions were created by conversions to Christianity and claim vindication in the findings of the Justice Venugopal Commission of Inquiry into the riots (Seshadri 1988: Ch. 3; The Hindu 2002i). The success of these campaigns was reflected in the election of an independent Hindu Munnani candidate from the Padmanabhapuram constituency in the 1984 assembly elections. The markedly increased votes gathered by BJP candidates in assembly and national elections in southern constituencies in the first half of the 1990s also reflects the intensive local organizing of members of the Sangh Parivar. In the 1991 assembly elections a number of the BJP candidates in the southern districts, including those in the Nagercoil and Kanniyakumari seats, picked up over 15 per cent of the vote. In 1996 the BJP

Hindu nationalism in south India 155 came second, with 30.25 per cent of the vote, in the Nagercoil Lok Sabha constituency and in the neighbouring constituency of Tiruchendur the BJP came third with 13.82 per cent of the vote. After the BJP, the Hindu nationalist organization with the highest public profile in Tamil Nadu is the Hindu Munnani. It seeks to define and defend the Hindu interest in the state. Key demands of the Munnani include ending government control over temple trusts and a ban on religious conversion. Its propaganda directly targets religious minorities, one leaflet claimed that ‘Because they can have so many wives, no family planning and also due to conversions, the Muslim and Christian populations are increasing at a demonic rate’. The same leaflet proposed that ‘[f]amily planning must be enforced on all people of all religions’ (Frontline 1991d: 103). The Munnani has generated a great deal of publicity for itself. Fuller describes the Munnani as a ‘semiunderground organization’ and states that it has ‘considerable support among Brahmans, but also draws support, albeit unevenly, from across the whole caste and class spectrum, and it is active in many though not all parts of Tamilnadu’ (2004: 132). Its leader Rama Gopalan is quite comfortable taking controversial positions and leading acts of symbolic protest that attract media coverage. Its existence as a front organization allows it to engage in a wide range of activities and take controversial positions that the BJP, concerned to appear as a responsible party, could not. Rama Gopalan explained the Munnani’s support for the BJP, stating: ‘Politics is not for us, but we will support anyone who accepts our 13-point demand, relating to conversions, cow protection, extension of minority rights to Hindu-run schools, and the like . . . Only the BJP has accepted it, and we support the BJP’ (Rediff 1998a). Rama Gopalan offered support for the AIADMK when it was in government between 1991 and 1996, and again after the 2001 assembly election, which was consistent with the interest taken in religious issues adopted by the leader of the AIADMK. Relations between the Munnani and the DMK were more difficult between 1996 and 2001 as Rama Gopalan criticized the religious policy of the DMK government (Fuller 2004: 134–5). Members of the Tamil Nadu BJP are keen to foster a respectable and moderate image appropriate for a party of government. Also, the state unit was keen not to destabilize the alliance with the DMK. These inhibitions did not apply to the Munnani, an organization that sees itself as a robust defender of the general Hindu interest. The Hindu Munnani has especially come to public attention through its promotion of the Vinayaka Chaturthi festival. In 1983 the Munnani pioneered the public celebration of the Vinayaka festival in the style of the Ganesh processions in Maharashtra where images of the elephant god are immersed in water at the end of a festive procession. These processions have drawn in the participation of a wide range of people such that the festival now has a momentum of its own (Fuller 2001). A number of the processions sponsored by the Munnani in Chennai have been extremely controversial because they have followed routes close to mosques and become the pretext for communal clashes. In 1990 two young men were killed in violence at the time of the processions and in 1991 some of those in the procession called out provocative slogans claiming Hindu supremacy (Frontline 1991d:

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102–3). In 1995 scuffles broke out as the police attempted to regulate the movement of the procession past the Ice House mosque and scores were injured in the clash (Frontline 1995a). Attempts by the police to re-route the processions have provided opportunities for symbolic confrontations with the police and state government (The Hindu 2000f). The strident positions taken by the Munnani, and its separate status from the BJP also worked in favour of the DMK. When in government the DMK could take firm action against the Munnani while not directly confronting the BJP and gave Karunanidhi the basis on which to claim that ‘the DMK, truly upholding the secular tradition of the Dravidian movement launched by Periyar, was even prepared to lose some votes, but wished to give no quarter for any religious tension or confusion in Tamil Nadu’ (The Hindu 2000g). The Hindu Munnani campaigns on traditional issues of concern that the BJP in its current phase of moderation might find too extreme. Symbolic acts of protest, such as burning an effigy of Periar (The Hindu 1999j), that would be too controversial for the more respectable BJP, are part of the Munnani’s repertory. The Munnani kept up pressure on the issue of conversions, and it called on the Chief Minister to save Kanniyakumari from the conversion activities of Christian missionaries (The Hindu 2000b). Rama Gopalan gave an enthusiastic welcome to the AIADMK government’s ordinance against religious conversion (The Hindu 2002j). The Munnani raised the spectre of Islamic terrorism in the state and its leader talked frequently about the question of Muslim fundamentalism (The Hindu 1999a). The Munnani was drawn into conflict with Muslim extremist organizations in the state (Outlook 1998a; Frontline 1997b). The city of Coimbatore was a particular site of communal strife in the 1990s with various groups claiming to be defenders of their religious community. Early activities of the Munnani were said to have encouraged a response from militant Muslims. A group called Al-Umma was formed in 1987 and after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992 the group became stronger, taking direct action to protect Muslim areas in Coimbatore (Outlook 1998a). Al-Umma was alleged to have played a part in a bomb attack on the Madras office of the RSS in August 1993 in which 11 were killed (Frontline 1997b). The Hindu Munanni office was bombed in April 1995. In early January 1997 three Hindu nationalist activists, including a member of the Munnani, were murdered. This was followed in late January by the murder of the founder of a militant organization, the Jihad Committee, which was followed in turn by other killings (Frontline 1997b). In December 1997 an outbreak of rioting in the Coimbatore led to the death of more than 20 Muslims (Outlook 1997a). Allegations that the Munnani were involved in the violence were strongly denied by the organization’s district secretary M. Selvam, though a BJP official did not condemn the Dalit perpetrators of the violence, commenting: ‘Dalits are by nature courageous. They feel Muslims are going beyond all limits and they took up the task of teaching Muslims a lesson’ (The Week 1997). A sequel to these riots was the series of bombs detonated in Coimbatore to coincide with the visit of the senior BJP leader, L.K. Advani, in February 1998. The bombs killed 56 people and were followed by riots and attempts by Hindu nationalists to implicate the entire Muslim population of the city in the bombing (Outlook 1998a). While the full extent of the activities of these

Hindu nationalism in south India 157 shadowy organizations remains unclear the tense communal atmosphere within the city provided the pretext for extremist activity and provided a credible background for the stigmatization of the city’s Muslim population and allegations that the DMK was soft on minorities (Vaasanthi 2006: 185). Communal violence creates a sense of fear and insecurity. Political entrepreneurs that promise revenge or protection expect to gain support in these circumstances. The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) has pushed forward the Hindu nationalist agenda with reference to a number of religious issues. The VHP claims to have been active in the state since 1966 with the objective of unifying and strengthening the Hindu community. The VHP has engaged in welfare activities, opposed conversions, promoted certain religious practices, trained village priests and seeks to inculcate religious values among the young people of the state (The Organiser 2003). In the early 1980s the VHP took up the issue of the Meenakshipuram conversions and launched a tour of villages in Tamil Nadu and Kerala to reach out to Dalits in an attempt to forestall further conversions. The centerpiece of this effort was the Gnana Ratham or ‘chariot of wisdom’ that functioned as a mobile temple open to Hindus of all castes (McKean 1996: 106–7). This was followed up by a Sakti Ratham, which entered service in 1984 and is a mobile Mariamman temple (Hancock 1995: 920). These mobile temples have been used in ongoing activities. The VHP has also taken up the question of Christian conversions among the Badaga community in the Nilgiri hills (K. Muthaiyan, interview, 21 July 2003). The VHP also campaigned on the Ayodhya issue in Tamil Nadu, raising funds for 14,000 bricks to be used in the construction. The VHP achieved a degree of coordination with the Kanchi Shankaracharya, working to win incorporate Dalits into mainstream Hindu activity (The Organiser 2003).2 Hindu nationalist organizations, including the VHP, were said to be running about 150 schools in 2004. Among other things they provide religious education and are thought to help recruit new members for the RSS (Frontline 2004b: 11). The VHP has attempted to influence religious practice in the state through the activities of the Gramak Kovil Poojarigal Peravai which runs a scheme to train village priests and improve their livelihoods (S. Vedantam, interview, 3 March 2000). The VHP has also campaigned to get the state government to provide pensions for these poojaris. It is hoped that in addition to the cultural impact of these activities the BJP will also have access to key opinion formers at election time. Vedantam, a leading figure in the VHP in Tamil Nadu, notes the Kanchi Shankaracharya’s upbeat assessment which ‘compared these village temple poojaris to the soldiers engaged in protecting the country’s border. They have earned the reputation of having saved the Hindus from the evils of atheism and anti-nationalism’ (The Organiser 2003). Critics of the scheme argue that the training was done with an eye to gaining control of village temples (Frontline 2004b: 11). As a political party, the BJP struggled to gain support in south India generally and in Tamil Nadu in particular. In the 1990s issues that gave the BJP immediacy in north India, such as the campaign to build a Ram Temple in Ayodhya and the status of religious minorities, had a lower salience in the region. South India was still considered an important area in which the BJP was keen to build support, and

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determined efforts were made to mobilize voters. In the early 1990s an alliance with the AIADMK was seen as an efficient way of overcoming the party’s weakness in Tamil Nadu (India Today 1993c: 42–4). The policies of the AIADMK government on religious issues after 1991 suggested convergence between the BJP and the AIADMK (India Today 1993a: 61). Jayalalithaa expressed support for the campaign to build the Ram Temple in a meeting of the National Integration Council in November 1992, shortly before the Babri Masjid was demolished (Frontline 2004b: 10). Jayalalithaa rejected the rationalist element of Dravidian politics and showed considerable enthusiasm for promoting religious causes. In 1991 she established a new administrative structure that allowed her to become personally involved in temple renovation projects. The government also provided funds so that a large number of temples would be able to conduct a daily act of worship (Fuller 2004: 119–24). While the BJP would have been very happy to ally with the AIADMK, Jayalalithaa eventually decided not to ally with the BJP, preferring to contest the 1996 elections in an alliance with the Congress Party. This could not avert an electoral disaster for the AIADMK. The BJP showed some improvement and gathered 2.9 per cent of the state-wide vote in the state assembly election. Before the 1998 Lok Sabha election the AIADMK finally formed an alliance with the BJP. The DMK government suffered the embarrassment of the spectacular bomb attack in Coimbatore shortly before the elections. The alliance with the AIADMK helped the BJP win three Lok Sabha seats in Tamil Nadu. Difficulties with the AIADMK resulted in another early election, and this time the DMK allied with the BJP. In the 1999 elections the BJP won a respectable four seats with the support of the DMK. This second alliance proved more durable and the continuing alliance with DMK helped the BJP to win four seats in the 2001 assembly elections. The BJP won a number of posts in the municipal elections held later that year (Thirunavukkarasu 2002). The alliance with the DMK was seen by many as an awkward pairing, given that the DMK is considered to be more committed to Dravidian ideas. Many take Dravidian political ideas to encourage scepticism towards religion which a few take as far as resolute atheism (Frontline 1997a). For others Dravidianism implies discomfort with Brahmanical Sanskritic Hinduism. For a holder of any of these views an alliance with the BJP required ‘ideological contortions’ and Fuller reports satisfaction on the part of Munnani and BJP activists that the DMK had moved closer to their position (2004: 135). The AIADMK took decisive action after it failed to win a single seat in the 2004 assembly election. Jayalalithaa gave up the controversial anti-conversion measure (The Hindu 2004e). It was felt that the AIADMK had sacrificed the support of the religious minorities and was cool towards the BJP. The sensational arrest of the Kanchi Shankaracharya on murder charges in late 2004 created further tension between the AIADMK and the BJP. The AIADMK declined to ally with the BJP to fight the 2006 assembly election (Indian Express 2006a). The BJP was only able to ally with minor parties, many of which used the BJP election symbol. The 225 candidates using the BJP symbol won 2.0 per cent of the state-wide vote. The alliance options for the BJP remained limited after the 2006 elections. The DMK, running a minority government in the state, was locked in a tight embrace with Congress. The

Hindu nationalism in south India 159 AIADMK decided to contest the 2009 Lok Sabha elections as part of a nationally organized third front, which would give it great flexibility in negotiations to form a national coalition government. The BJP once again had to contest elections without a major ally. It fielded 18 candidates and won 2.3 per cent of the vote. The BJP appeared to have advanced very little since 1996.

Structural factors One might expect the depth of popular religious feeling in Tamil Nadu to work in favour Hindu nationalist mobilization. There is little evidence of social change moving in a secular direction (Harriss 2003). Indeed there is evidence of a trend in the opposite direction. The economic prosperity of the expanding urban middle class has been accompanied by a growing interest in religious practice (Fuller 2004: 122). More specifically, the Dravidian scepticism towards Brahmanic Hinduism has not displaced its prominence in the hierarchy of religious values and institutions in Tamil Nadu. Fuller observes that the rising Non-Brahman middle class that has been favoured by the ruling Dravidian parties have ‘also been adopting Brahmanical cultural values as part of a process of upward social mobility, because even today elite culture in Tamilnadu is predominantly identified as Brahmanical and Sanskritic’ (ibid: 118). Despite the large Hindu majority – 88.1 per cent of the population were recorded as adherents of Hindu traditions in the 2001 census – the state of Tamil Nadu presents difficult terrain for Hindu nationalists to work on. There is still strong interest in the little traditions that are far from identical to the Sanskritic north Indian traditions which many in the national movement associate with most easily. Opponents of the BJP have not been slow to point out the differences between south and north Indian traditions (Thirumaavalavan 2003: 165). Hindu nationalists working in the state have been obliged to make adjustments and adapt to local traditions (M.S.S. Pandian 2000c). The relationship between the Hindu majority and the religious minorities in the state is another consideration. The basic demography of the state with two small religious minorities, and its distance from the deeper communal politics of parts of northern India, should generate a sense of security among the majority community (if indeed the majority community sees itself as a religious community). The minority populations are small, with Christians and Muslims making up 6.1 and 5.6 per cent respectively of the state population. Each census minority category is internally differentiated by combinations of language, caste, class and denominational affiliation. The Muslim and Christian minorities do not have a high profile in the politics of the state. Christians have tended to find places in larger political parties. The separate parties and legal organizations that represent Muslims have only limited influence and tend to conduct themselves in a low-profile way. The Muslim League settled into a close alliance with the DMK between 1962 and 1974 (Subramanian 1999: 202–4). Political parties, most notably the DMK, court the ‘Muslim vote’ but its influence is not decisive, with the minority being considered to have the deciding vote in about a dozen assembly constituencies (Frontline 1991b: 119).

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A variation of the pseudo-secularist critique used against the Congress Party in north India has been used by Hindu nationalists to condemn the state government, with particular reference to the DMK, alleging that the ‘Tamilnadu government, like the Indian central government, treated the Hindu majority like a despised minority, while the Muslim and Christian minorities are treated like a privileged majority’ (Spitz 1997: 9). Also, the Hindu nationalist movement often depicts the minority populations as a potential or an actual source of social disharmony (Frontline 1991d: 103). As described above, this narrative has been developed alongside significant communal disturbances in Kanniyakumari district and Coimbatore. That the BJP records a degree of electoral support in these areas suggests that in a few localities the Hindu nationalist movement has been able to make a credible claim that it is a protector of the majority community. In the 2009 Lok Sabha elections the BJP recorded votes above its state-wide average of 2.3 per cent in the Coimbatore constituency (4.6 per cent) and the Kanniyakumari constituency (33.2 per cent). It is less clear that narratives invoking a threatening minority are considered plausible or important to the Hindu population at large. The discussion of cleavages in Chapter 2 showed how political entrepreneurs can gain an advantage when one or more social markers are brought together to produce reinforcing cleavages. In their north Indian heartlands the Hindu nationalist organizations developed a worldview contingent on religious ideas and sentiments shared among upper caste, middle class groups (Jaffrelot 1996). This milieu was self-limiting and the BJP has had to find ways to build a broader social constituency. Nevertheless, this segment provided essential core support for the BJP and provided a base from which to expand outwards (Heath 1999: 2511). In Tamil Nadu the BJP is still striving to bring together reinforcing cleavages. The BJP has inherited some of the (non-religious) tradition of conservatism cultivated by the Swatantra Party in Tamil Nadu. Some former members of that party have joined the BJP (B. Venkataswany, interview, 23 February 2000). The Swatantra Party picked up support from Brahman voters and the BJP speaks to the concerns of this constituency too, but owing to unfavourable demographics in Tamil Nadu, overtly aligning with an upper caste constituency will not take the BJP very far. The leadership of the state unit denies that caste is a factor in their electoral strategy (L. Ganesan, interview, 23 February 2000), but there have been attempts to broaden the social base of the party. Senior members of the Hindu nationalist movement have been among the VIP guests at the annual ceremony celebrating the birth anniversary of Muthuramalinga Thevar on the 30 October each year (The Hindu 2003e). It has been argued that this iconic figure is increasingly depicted as a Hindu patriot (Jeyaranjan and Anandhi 1999: 16–17). Whether or not this is the case, the celebrations affirm the importance of the powerful Thevar caste in southern Tamilnadu and politicians seeking Thevar support pay their respects every October. Another social group that the Hindu nationalist movement has attempted to mobilize are the Dalits of Tamil Nadu. The VHP claims to have built 120 temples in Dalit neighbourhoods (Frontline 2004b: 11). Anandhi S. has documented in detail the means used to co-opt Dalits in Madras slums into Hindu nationalist activity (1995: 36–40). These volunteers have been encouraged to participate in the

Hindu nationalism in south India 161 Vinayaka processions and to confront Muslims with an uncompromising version of Hindu identity. In the Tirunelveli district Hindu nationalist volunteers have carried out similar work. The focus has been on the lowest status Dalit group, the Arunthathiyars, who have been offered opportunities to worship with using the kuthu vallakku lamp (M. Bharathan, interview, 14 July 2003).

Leadership gap The importance of a leader-figure in Tamil political culture is a particular challenge for the BJP. One way or another, political leaders are a focus in the mobilizing activity of most political parties in Tamil Nadu (Racine 2009: 453). They are a vital asset in developing partisan relations with voters. The BJP in Tamil Nadu does not have a leader who acts as a personal representation of the party. Prime Minister Vajpayee offered a useful focus for the national party between 1998 and 2004 which is a consideration during national elections in Tamil Nadu, but the lack of a local figurehead cannot be glossed over and it is a gap that the national party has acknowledged (India Today 1993c: 44). It is an issue that the state unit of the BJP has discussed, and is obviously a sensitive issue given that there are a number of experienced leaders in the state who share responsibility for presenting the party to the public. A suggestion emanating from the national party, that the state unit of the BJP should bring the former finance minister, P. Chidambaram into the party, met with a hostile response from local BJP leaders (The Hindu 2000h). Even so, leaders from outside of the party were bought into the party before and after this discussion. In 1997 the BJP adopted Rangarajan Kumaramangalam, a former junior minister and member of the Congress Party, and placed him in the union cabinet after the 1998 election (Frontline 2000c). In February 2002 S. Thirunavukkarasu merged his own party, the MGR-ADMK, with the larger BJP (The Hindu 2002a). Thirunavukkarasu was given a cabinet post at the centre shortly afterwards. The BJP gained another MP in the state. Thirunavukkarasu is a political leader with unusually strong links to his district (Thirunavukkarasu, interview, 1 March 2000).3 The lure of tickets to contest parliamentary seats seemed to draw a number of minor political leaders into the BJP just before the 2004 elections. Not all were favoured but two new entrants appeared on the BJP list. The disaffected P.D. Ilangovan, formerly of the PMK, was nominated by the BJP for the Dharmapuri seat, and D. Periyasamy, formerly of the DPI, was nominated in the Chidambaram reserved constituency. While the figures just discussed may have been assets to the party they have not obviously changed the character of the BJP in Tamil Nadu. The most notable leader, Thirunavukkarasu, has strengthened support for the BJP in his home district but he has not emerged as a leader with the stature to rival the notable leaders of other political parties in Tamil Nadu.

Institutional factors In some respects the BJP shares the institutional constraints faced by other small parties in Tamil Nadu. The electoral system does not work to the advantage of the

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BJP in Tamil Nadu (though it does in some other states). In contrast the BJP gains an advantage from the federal structure of the Indian political system. It can trade with parties in Tamil Nadu on the basis of its national strength. On a related point, the BJP has institutional depth that provides some compensation for other disadvantages. Unlike the other small parties the BJP does not gain an advantage from the institutional involution of the main Dravidian parties. The Dravidian parties seem to have adapted quite flexibly to the challenge of the BJP and have prevented it from become a serious threat to their position. The BJP in Tamil Nadu is hemmed in by the electoral system and only on very rare occasions has it been able to win elections without the support of one of the two main Dravidian parties. The BJP has achieved some of the concentration of the vote that SMSP rules require in the Ramanathapuram and Kanniyakumari districts. It is in the latter district where the BJP comes closest to achieving the votes needed to win a three cornered contest. The 1996 assembly election witnessed a BJP victory in the Padmanabhapuram constituency in the Kanniyakumari district in a contest in which it faced four relatively strong candidates. However, the party has not been able to push its support towards the winning threshold in that area. Indeed the 2006 and 2009 results in Kanniyakumari district seem to suggest an element of tactical voting from voters keen to defeat the BJP in a three way contest. For example, in 2009 support for the sitting MP and AIADMK alliance candidate in that constituency plunged to 11.2 per cent. Where the BJP has contested elections as a member of one of the two strong alliances it has gained benefits from the SMSP system. The BJP is, or was, counted as a valuable electoral ally in Tamil Nadu because of its ability to form a national government and the powers that flow from holding national office. The BJP, as a relatively strong national party, gains influence as a consequence of the federal organization of India’s political institutions. I pick up this theme in my discussion of the impact of the BJP on the state party system. In terms of non-state institutions the state unit of the BJP has the advantage that it is a very well resourced party. The party has the funds to pay for full-time workers and plenty of publicity materials. Beyond this, the BJP has the advantage that various Hindu nationalist organizations are carrying out parallel mobilizing work and their volunteers and sympathizers can be called on at election time. Earlier chapters have noted that the institutional weakness of the Dravidian parties encourage political entrepreneurs to defect to other parties. Emerging parties have portrayed the Dravidian parties as neglecting key issues or key social groups. They have enjoyed some success with these claims. The BJP and its allied organizations have made similar claims in policy areas identified with religion, including the treatment of minorities, regulation of religious activity and the practice of secularism. The poor electoral showing indicates that the BJP has not been able to make this an election winning issue. Part of the reason for this is that the BJP has not been able to take sole possession of the issue of religion or make its definition of the cleavage the dominant one. The BJP and its allies have not convinced voters in Tamil Nadu that religion is the issue of contention in Tamil society. Where Hindu nationalists have achieved support for local campaigns in Tamil Nadu they have struggled to make connections to a wider range of local concerns

Hindu nationalism in south India 163 (Fuller 2004: 142). The Dravidian parties, as I discuss below, have their own narratives in this area which compete for credibility with the positions taken by the BJP.

Party system impact The BJP has few electoral achievements to its credit in Tamil Nadu. The BJP performed creditably when in alliance with one of the Dravidian parties. Thus it won Lok Sabha seats in the 1998 and 1999 national elections. The BJP also won assembly seats in 2001. However, the BJP currently has no MPs from Tamil Nadu in the Lok Sabha and failed to win any assembly seats in 2006. The BJP had most influence on party politics in Tamil Nadu when it was leading the national coalition government. In 1998 the AIADMK hoped that in return for its support for the BJP-led coalition at the centre the DMK state government would be dismissed using the mechanism of President’s Rule. When this did not happen the AIADMK withdrew support from the national government (Padmanabhan 2004). The DMK saw an alliance with the BJP as a useful protection against the misuse of President’s Rule (Aladi Aruna, interview, 18 February 2000). The BJP also was able to dispense patronage in the form of posts in the national cabinet. This aspect of the federal political system gives a very small party like the BJP, or a medium-sized party like Congress, greater weight in the state party system than a simple reading of the party’s electoral support would suggest. The BJP’s distinct lack of electoral success in Tamil Nadu since 2001 raises the question of whether or not it should be counted as a relevant party in the state party system. Two claims for relevance can be made. The first, taken up in more detail below, is that the treatment of religion in party competition underwent important modification between 1991 and 2004. Second, the BJP has coalition potential that might increase sharply if the national fortunes of the party improve. At the current moment prospects for the BJP look poor. It cannot make an alliance with the DMK given the interlocking dependence of the DMK and Congress. The DMK relies on Congress support to govern in the state and that is reciprocated at the national level where Congress takes support from the DMK. In 2009 the AIADMK chose not to ally with the BJP preferring a link with the national third front of regional and left parties. Had the BJP performed well enough nationally, the AIADMK would have opened alliance negotiations after the election. It may well be that the BJP has to perform well at the national level before it can regain a place in the alliances in Tamil Nadu. The response of the Dravidian parties to the growing influence of the BJP has been interesting. The AIADMK, as mentioned above, declared itself in favour of positions close to the preferences of Hindu nationalists in Tamil Nadu between 1991 and 1996. The extent of the policy changes moved one writer to observe that the AIADMK regime ‘actively promoted Brahmanical Sanskritic Hinduism, almost as if it were the official religion of Tamilnadu’ (Fuller 2004: 124). Following its election victory in the 2001 assembly elections the AIADMK developed further policy initiatives, including a state law against forcible conversion in 2002 and the Annadanam scheme to feed poor Hindus through temples (Frontline 2002b). Both initiatives were popular with Hindu nationalist activists.

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Jayalalithaa’s advocacy of these policies was so persuasive that it helped destabilize the BJP–DMK alliance, with members of the state unit of the BJP expressing a preference for a renewed alliance with the AIADMK (Frontline 2004a). The DMK was more cautious but it too responded to the religious issue in an interesting way from the mid-1990s onwards. When it was returned to power in 1996 the DMK did not reverse all of the policies of the AIADMK. Some policies, such as temple renovation, were continued or even, it was claimed, expanded by the DMK (Fuller 2004: 125). Karunanidhi, known for his astringent comments on Hindu religious belief, softened his image in this regard, taking to wearing a yellow shawl that ambiguously suggested some superstitious belief. Also, it became common knowledge he was very happy to tolerate the religious activity of the women in his household (Vaasanthi 2006: 179–80). Some senior members of the DMK, including the Chief Minister’s son Stalin, either became less coy about their religious beliefs or saw advantage in making public displays of Hindu devotion (India Today 1997). The DMK did not give up its secular image entirely. The Vinayaka Chaturthi processions were policed vigorously, for example. Rather the DMK took a pragmatic position and kept away from a hard line position in either direction when it came to policy on religious matters. The BJP can take some credit for encouraging a shift in policy positions on religious issues in Tamil Nadu since 1991. The policies were influenced by social developments in the state, including a growing interest in religious observance, but it is also the case that policies were developed with an eye on the preferences of the BJP. This was most obviously the case after 2001 when the AIADMK government acted boldly to align itself with Hindu nationalist sentiments.

Conclusions The BJP has had a qualified impact on the party system in Tamil Nadu. There were reasons to expect that the BJP might be able to grow its support in the state. A period in national government and the novelty of elected representation in the state improved the public profile of the BJP in Tamil Nadu. Ambitious political entrepreneurs had something to gain from associating with the national party of government. Furthermore the energetic work of allied Hindu nationalist organizations, and public participation in activities like the Vinayaka Chaturthi, suggested growing public sympathy for the BJP. However, there is little other evidence that the BJP has expanded its support in the state. The 2006 and 2009 elections produced figures showing levels of support remarkably similar, in aggregate, to those recorded in 1996. So far the BJP has failed to make religion the defining issue in Tamil politics. To have done so would have fundamentally re-aligned politics in the state. Such an outcome appears very unlikely. The Dravidian parties demonstrated that the BJP does not have exclusive possession of the issue of religion in Tamil Nadu. The AIADMK did the most to develop this cleavage for itself until 2004. However, both the DMK and the AIADMK seemed to have concluded, in 2003 and 2004 respectively, that doing would not give them a decisive advantage given the offsetting

Hindu nationalism in south India 165 cost of losing the votes of minority groups (Frontline 2004a; The Hindu, 2004e). So far the BJP has lost the strategic battle to define politics in terms that work to its advantage in Tamil Nadu but the continuing national importance of the BJP means that whereas other small parties might fall by the wayside, the BJP should be able to preserve a niche of its own in the state party system.

9

Using populism to build a broad coalition Vijayakanth

On the 14 September 2005 the filmstar-politician Vijayakanth launched a new party, the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK). The launch rally was a glittering spectacle held on a site covering 74 acres of private land outside Madurai (Frontline 2005). Vijayakanth arrived in the old blue van used by MGR for campaigning. The van was said to be a gift from MGR’s widow Janaki. The stage from which Vijayakanth addressed the crowds was decorated with images of the actor himself, Annadurai, Periar, Kamaraj and MGR (India Glitz 2005). The Dravidian colours, black and red, used in the party flag, were much in evidence. Images of MGR were a common sight, including a montage that depicted the social service activities of both MGR and Vijayakanth. Party sources claimed that 200,000 people attended the rally (Times of India 2005). The 2006 assembly election in Tamil Nadu generated considerable interest. The DMK had what was on paper the strongest alliance. The governing AIADMK had avoided major scandal of the type that had damaged its image in 1996. In an impressive display of responsiveness Chief Minister Jayalalithaa reversed a series of painful economic reforms in May 2004 and made amends to groups that had been antagonized by the regime during the reform period. The entry of Vijayakanth’s party complicated alliance calculations and added uncertainty to the contest. Vijayakanth generated an air of expectation and excitement about the election. He also revived a broad populist approach to politics after a number of years in which that approach had been neglected. Vijayakanth presented himself as an important political leader, showcasing himself as a potential chief minister, and by the end of the campaign he had emerged as a substantial figure in state politics. Vijayakanth is an entrepreneurial political leader who has invested considerable time, energy and money in building his political party. His central claim is that the political parties that have ruled Tamil Nadu have failed voters and that he can provide an alternative. Vijayakanth’s approach to politics is noteworthy because he runs against the trend in new party formation in Tamil Nadu since 1989. Rather than appealing to particular interests Vijayakanth seeks to bring together a broad constituency in a manner remarkably similar to the ‘protection’ or ‘paternalist’ populism articulated by MGR (Swamy 1998: 109; Subramanian 1999: 74–5). Vijayakanth is a very popular filmstar. This needs to be taken seriously but I do not take the view that his impact on the party system is the consequence of a

Using populism to build a broad coalition 167 suggestible Tamil electorate that succumbs easily to the glamour of celebrity candidates (Vaasanthi 2006: 66–7). Instead I argue that Vijayakanth’s leadership needs to be located in a widely understood and accepted style of politics that had been practised in Tamil Nadu since the 1970s. In the rest of this chapter, I analyse Vijayakanth’s entry into party politics and the impact of his party on the state party system. It is certainly the case that his persona contributes to his credibility as a leader but it is also clear that Vijayakanth is an able political tactician who organized his entry into politics with considerable skill. In the next section of the chapter, I give an account of the participation of the DMDK in the 2006 assembly elections and the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. In the second section of the chapter I assess the personal contribution Vijayakanth’s leadership has made to growth of the DMDK. In the third section, I analyse the impact of institutional factors on the trajectory of the DMDK. In the fourth section of the chapter, I consider the impact of social structure on the politics of the DMDK. In the fifth section of the chapter, I assess in more detail the impact of the DMDK on the process of party system change in Tamil Nadu.

The DMDK and party politics in Tamil Nadu Vijayakanth is a popular figure in Tamil Nadu. He has enjoyed a substantial career in Tamil cinema having acted in 148 films by early 2006 (Frontline 2006a). Vijayakanth is also known as ‘The Captain’, a popular nickname coined from his 1991 hit Captain Prabhakaran (The Hindu 2002k). An indicator of Vijayakanth’s popularity is the numerous fan clubs that follow his films and celebrate his image. He prepared carefully for a political career and has converted his highly successful film career into an extremely valuable political asset. Vijayakanth has a media profile and an intimacy with ordinary people that most aspiring political entrepreneurs lack. His film persona and his public appearances create a powerful image of a heroic and good-natured individual. Vijayakanth’s profitable film career has provided substantial funds for his political party. Well before the formation of the DMDK in September 2005, Vijayakanth began to transform himself into a politician. Even though his mother tongue is Telugu, Vijayakanth’s Tamil credentials are not weak. He has concentrated on making films in Tamil and he demonstrated his enthusiasm for Tamil interests by intervening in the Cauvery dispute with Karnataka in 2002 (Frontline 2004d). Vijayakanth gained a leadership position in the film industry by serving as the elected president of the industry association, the Nadigar Sangam (South Indian Film Artistes Association), between 2000 and 2006.1 This position gave him opportunities to appear as a patron and conciliator in an industry noted for political divisions (The Hindu 2002h and 2002k). The Nadigar Sangam serves as a formal pressure group taking up issues with the state government and as a forum for airing complaints between different elements of the film industry. The Sangam also provides welfare for retired and ailing employees of the industry. Vijayakanth has coordinated some of this largesse and made personal and public contributions to the Sangam’s welfare funds (My-Tamil 2003; The Hindu 2005d). Vijayakanth’s fan clubs were organized so that they could be quickly converted into a political party. The fan

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clubs were encouraged to engage in welfare activities well before the party was formed (The Hindu 2002k). Some of the fan clubs were functionally organized, including a youth and a farmer’s wing, and resemble the fronts employed by other parties in Tamil Nadu (The Hindu 2005b). In August 2005 the fan clubs were put on notice, with Vijayakanth asking his fans to resign other party memberships (The Hindu 2005i). The visual paraphernalia used by the party were visible in posters and wall paintings several years before the party was formed. After the formal launch of the DMDK in September 2005 Vijayakanth busied himself with preparations for the 2006 assembly elections. He toured the state repeatedly in 2005 and 2006, and he also persuaded local candidates to contribute towards campaign expenses (Krishnan 2006: 2414). The DMDK was carefully positioned to appeal to a wide range of voters. The name of the party, its visual presentation and Vijayakanth’s emulation of MGR feeds off the Dravidian tradition in Tamil politics. While imitating the style of the Dravidian parties, and especially the AIADMK, Vijayakanth has so far maintained distance from both parties, denouncing them for failings in office (The Hindu 2006s and 2006t). While the DMDK is an obvious competitor with the Dravidian parties, Vijayakanth nods in the direction of supporters of national parties like Congress and the BJP. He takes a soft line on the issue of Hindi, and Vijayakanth has let it be known that he comes from a Congress family. The word ‘Desiya’ in the party name implies that this regional party can also take a national view of politics (Frontline 2005). Shortly before the 2006 assembly elections Vijayakanth was reported to have explored the possibilities of an electoral alliance but set his terms very high (Chennai Online 2006b). He opted instead to campaign as the strong leader of an independent party. The DMDK fielded a candidate in 232 out of 234 constituencies in the state. Vijayakanth surprised commentators by opting to contest from a modest rural constituency, Vridhachalam in the Cuddalore district, when he might have selected a constituency closer to his home city of Madurai. Contesting from Vridhachalam enabled Vijayakanth to identify himself with voters from lower social strata (The Hindu 2006i). Seeking election from Vridhachalam gave Vijayakanth an opportunity to challenge the DPI and the PMK, parties that also seek, though on very different terms, the support of poor, rural voters. Vridhachalam was also selected because box-office takings suggested the actor was especially popular in the area, beginning with record takings for his 1984 hit Amman Koil Kizhakale.2 Vijayakanth was an active campaigner, making notable campaign promises that strengthened his image as a generous protector of the poor and vulnerable. He assailed both the Dravidian parties for their failures in government. Vijayakanth also alluded to the seamier side of alliance politics alleging that parties were being paid to change alliances. Vijayakanth stated that like MGR he had started the party with his own funds and said: ‘If I were to make money, I would have taken “suitcases” and compromised for a few seats in some alliance’ (The Hindu 2006s and 2006u). The DMDK was at something of a disadvantage in the campaign as it did not get as much media coverage as the two main alliances in the assembly election. This

Using populism to build a broad coalition 169 was largely determined by the dominance of Sun-TV and Jaya-TV that concentrated news bulletins and programme coverage on the activities of the alliances they were associated with (M. Vijayabaskar, personal communication, 13 May 2006). Vijayakanth also complained that the print media only provided partial coverage of his campaign and overlooked attempts by the larger parties to interfere with his campaign (The Hindu 2006ad). However, Vijayakanth’s film career ensured instant name recognition and the glamour of his candidacy undoubtedly attracted more print media coverage than other new parties have gained in recent years. The DMDK also engaged in extensive street campaigning, which suggested that the party was a serious entrant into state politics. Its flags, party offices, wall paintings, posters and campaign vans were obviously present across the state. The political ephemera of the DMDK were nearly as ubiquitous as those of the DMK and the AIADMK. The effectiveness of the DMDK’s network was demonstrated when its election symbol was awarded late in the campaign (The Hindu 2006aa). The symbol allotted, the murasu (drum), was quickly daubed on walls and inserted into posters (personal observation, April–May 2006). The DMDK was squeezed by the alliances of the two main Dravidian parties and it only won one seat, the one contested by Vijayakanth. However, the DMDK picked up a respectable share of the state-wide vote (8.4 per cent). The DMDK equalled the share of the votes won by Congress and exceeded the vote of smaller parties including the PMK and the MDMK. The DMDK won more votes than the margin of victory in 144 out of the 234 constituencies in Tamil Nadu. The implication was that the DMDK could be a very influential ally in future contests. The DMDK followed up on its performance in the state assembly election with a similar result in the local body elections in October 2006. The DMDK won fewer seats than the DMK and the AIADMK but more seats than any of the other minor parties who were part of the two alliances (Tehelka 2006). The DMDK also improved its share of the vote in the Madurai by-election coming close to pushing the AIADMK into third place. After these results were declared Chief Minister Karunanidhi recognized the DMDK’s ‘appreciable improvement’ (The Hindu 2006h; Frontline 2006d). The importance of the DMDK was also acknowledged when the AIADMK subsequently attacked Vijayakanth’s character and dismissed his association with MGR (Tehelka 2006). The DMDK fielded a candidate in all 39 Lok Sabha constituencies in 2009 and Vijayakanth campaigned vigorously for his party. The party improved its share of the vote, gaining 10.1 per cent of the state-wide vote. In 24 seats the DMDK vote exceeded the winning margin suggesting that if the DMDK had participated in one of the main alliances it would have had a decisive impact on the outcome.

Vijayakanth’s leadership Vijayakanth has shown himself to be an effective political leader capable of attracting party members and gaining substantial electoral support. In this section I assess how he has constructed this leadership. I begin by examining in a little more detail how Vijayakanth’s film career has been exploited to create an image of him as an

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attractive, heroic figure. I then argue that his leadership has to be understood in the context of other actor-political entrepreneurs who have raised expectations about their political ambitions but failed to emerge as credible politicians. I move onto to consider how Vijayakanth’s leadership is consistent with established structures of meaning in Tamil politics. The former leader of the AIADMK, MGR, helped create and confirm many of the expectations that Vijayakanth also seeks to fulfil. Vijayakanth routinely played the part of an action hero who thwarted the designs of terrorists, criminals and corrupt politicians. He has been consistent in his choice of characters, favouring heroic roles and avoiding playing the villain. There is no ambiguity about Vijayakanth’s on-screen persona. Other filmstar-politicians, who have been less discerning, entered politics with a more ambiguous image (Krishnan 2006: 2415). In the film Sudesi (2006), Vijayakanth forced a corrupt chief minister to govern responsibly. In the film Vanchinathan (2001) Vijayakanth plays a principled policeman who confronted a scheming newspaper proprietor. Accounts of the film’s production suggested convergence between Vijayakanth’s on-screen and off-screen persona. It was reported that the producer sacked the director, Shaji Kailas, but Vijayakanth was able to get him reinstated as director (Rediff 2001a). Vijayakanth’s films are popular among a mass, rather than an elite audience, and are deliberately marketed in the so-called B and C theatres. The action films have an obvious appeal to a young male audience but Vijayakanth’s film persona also has some appeal among women (M.Vijayabaskar, personal communication, 13 May 2006). Vijayakanth’s political activity has been directed at appealing across gender boundaries in much the same way as MGR’s protection populism (Swamy 1998: 141–3). In summary, the scripts present Vijayakanth as an ‘honest, courageous and forthright person who would not be cowed down’ and his off-screen public image is also that of an upright and munificent individual (The Hindu 2006 2006q). MGR also developed cinematic and political images that converged to confirm his heroic persona (Outlook 1996a). Vijayakanth’s entry into formal politics was facilitated by the dwindling political fortunes of another prominent Tamil filmstar, Rajnikant. The two actors share a certain amount in common both having intimated a long-term ambition to enter party politics. Rajnikant famously opposed the AIADMK in 1996 and endorsed the DMK-TMC alliance (Frontline 1996b: 29; Outlook 1996b). This intervention raised the expectation that Rajnikant might pursue a more substantial political career. Rajnikant’s extensive fan clubs were considered to be a valuable political resource and a number of parties attempted to link their fortunes to his great popularity. The PMK, with some success, attempted to weaken his political position. In retaliation Rajnikant encouraged his fan clubs to work against the PMK and decided to back the BJP in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The BJP, in alliance with the AIADMK, was roundly defeated and this seemed to put an end to Rajnikant’s political ambitions (Frontline 2004d). Rajnikant’s enigmatic political career floundered but he proved that the cinema was still a valuable resource that could be exploited by individuals seeking an alternative route into party politics. Leadership is a central element in the political culture of Tamil Nadu (Barnett 1976a: 184). Party leaders are accorded a great deal of respect by party cadres.

Using populism to build a broad coalition 171 Charismatic leaders attract the admiration of supporters of other parties. Opinion poll respondents holding MGR in high regard exceeded the number voicing support for the AIADMK (Swamy 1996: 121). The emergence of MGR in the 1970s could be taken as demonstrating the furthest limits of personal appeal (M.S.S. Pandian 1992; Dickey 1993). However exceptional MGR’s leadership might have been, his career reminds us of the importance of leadership in Tamil Nadu, even if the imprint of personality is felt in different ways in different parties. Jayalalithaa, whose image has been carefully cultivated (Jacob 1997: 160–1), remains a popular figure among the voting public (Banerjee 2004). Karunanidhi, also a notable figure, is most effective at inspiring the cadres of the DMK that service the party’s superior organization (Widlund 2000). Vaiko of the MDMK gives the impression of a leader of integrity and courage. Thirumavalavan of the Dalit Panthers cuts a striking figure in his representations on wall paintings that depict him as handsome, resolute and determined. Vijayakanth is a distinctive and well-known figure in Tamil Nadu. He conforms to many of the expectations held about leaders in the state. Vijayakanth has, in part, achieved this by linking himself to the style developed by MGR. In the prelude to his party political career, Vijayakanth became well known for playing heroic figures which echoed MGR’s image as defender of the poor and vulnerable. Vijayakanth continues the tradition of the generosity for which MGR was renowned (Hardgrave 1973: 298; N. Rangaraj, interview, 23 August 2001). Shortly before the DMDK was launched Vijayakanth marked his birthday in August 2005 by giving gifts to poor school children and college students. He gave away 2.5 million rupees in scholarships, uniforms and books (The Hindu 2005i). As with MGR these acts were reflected in the social activities of Vijayakanth’s fan clubs. The actor Karthik, who took over the leadership of the Forward Bloc in 2006, also encouraged his fan clubs to participate in acts of social welfare prior to announcing his entry into party politics (The Hindu 2005k). The connection with MGR was reinforced as Vijayakanth began his formal entry into party politics. The launch rally, as mentioned above, emphasized Vijayakanth’s intention to bid for MGR’s legacy. In posters produced for the DMDK, Vijayakanth is often associated with MGR either by including a picture of MGR or showing Vijayakanth in poses that evoke MGR’s image (The Hindu 2005m and 2006ao). Vijayakanth has been known to hug old women at political meetings, a gesture of personal warmth for which MGR was also known (Krishnan 2006; The Hindu 2005i and 2006ao). Vijayakanth is lauded as Karuppu MGR or Black MGR by some of his supporters. The film Sudesi, starring Vijayakanth, released just before the 2006 assembly election campaign also intertwined the fortunes of the two leaders with images of MGR interwoven into the film (The Hindu 2006d). Publicity material for the 2006 assembly election campaign included posters of Vijayakanth wearing a fur cap similar to the one that MGR used to wear for his public appearances as chief minister. During the assembly election there were reports that voters noted with approval the similarities to MGR that Vijayakanth was attempting to establish (Indian Express 2006b).

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During the 2006 assembly election campaign his policies focused on the needs of the poor. Vijayakanth’s identification of vulnerable groups emulated MGR’s differentiation of poor groups in Tamil society. Vijayakanth promised homes for the elderly, 15 kilos of free rice for those below the poverty line and delivery of goods from ration shops to customers. He reached out to women, promising monthly income support to poor women and payments for families with female children (The Hindu 2006n). Vijayakanth also advocated the reservation of seats for women in the state assembly (Frontline 2005). Then shortly before the election Vijayakanth announced that 40 to 50 per cent of the DMDK candidates for the assembly election would be women (The Hindu 2006f). Vijayakanth has made very creative use of MGR’s leadership style and has emerged as a persuasive populist leader of the protection/paternalist type. Vijayakanth is not the first to exploit MGR’s image. The AIADMK continues to use MGR’s image and reminds voters of Jayalalithaa’s connections with MGR though over time the party’s iconography has brought the current leader into the foreground (Jacob 1997). Politicians such as R.M. Veerappan of the MGR, even Kazhagam and Thirunavukkarasu of the MGR–ADMK established parties that make strong links with MGR (Outlook 1996a), but Vijayakanth surpassed both of them, appearing as the live embodiment of the former AIADMK leader.

Institutional factors The DMDK faces similar institutional challenges to those faced by smaller parties discussed in earlier chapters. The electoral system does not work in its favour. The DMDK gains some benefit from the weakness of existing party institutions, but as the DMDK is not an identity-based party Vijayakanth does not have the advantage of the sharply focused grievances that other political entrepreneurs have been able to exploit. Vijayakanth has been able to compensate for some of these disadvantages by having an unusually strong institutional base of his own. Support for the DMDK is relatively evenly spread. In 2006 the party was only able to win one seat with 40.4 per cent of the vote. Support for the party in the other 231 constituencies where it fielded candidates was in the range 1.3 per cent to 21.1 per cent. In other words, the vast majority of DMDK candidates fell far short of the share of the vote needed to win seats in a three cornered contest under SMSP electoral rules. The DMDK had a similar experience in the 2009 Lok Sabha election where support for the party fell in the range 5 to 16.3 per cent. It will be difficult for the DMDK to succeed as an independent party unless it can achieve geographical concentration of support. However, the DMDK has a great deal of coalition potential that it could develop. The party has demonstrated substantial support and could make an important contribution to a larger alliance, especially if the next assembly elections are contested under a bi-polar alliance structure. This judgement needs to be followed by three comments. First, Vijayakanth may not be able to transfer his votes en bloc. He has campaigned vigorously against the two ruling parties and he may damage his credibility by being to be seen to be too eager to join them in alliance. The PMK and the DPI have finessed this problem but it may be easier for

Using populism to build a broad coalition 173 them to do so in the context of thicker identity-based ties. Even so the DMDK should be able to transfer a good proportion of support and voters in Tamil Nadu are accustomed to rapid shifts in allegiance (Frontline 2001d: 117). Second, the level of support achieved by the DMDK means it will be an awkwardly sized partner inclined to demand a substantial share of assembly seats in an alliance. In alliance negotiations in early 2006 Vijayakanth was reported to have asked for 80 seats from the AIADMK and declined an offer of 30 (Chennai Online 2006b; 2006e). The scale of Vijayakanth’s ambition was reflected in a bid, that if accepted, would have exceeded the status given to Congress in all alliance negotiations since 1984.3 If the DMDK won a good number of seats it may qualify for entry into a coalition government. This would be difficult to accommodate given the strong preference of the Dravidian parties to govern alone (The Hindu 2001a). The current position of Congress in the state legislature illustrates this point. The ruling DMK does not have a majority in the state assembly and Congress is the pivot party able to tip support from one coalition to another. Congress is technically entitled to a place in a state coalition government but has deferred to the DMK’s wish to govern alone. In return the DMK offers steady support for the Congress coalition government at the centre. Depending on the outcome of alliance negotiations the DMDK may be difficult to refuse. Third, it is not completely certain that a bi-polar structure alliance structure will be in place for the next assembly election. Either of the two main Dravidian parties might experience a succession crisis that disrupts the alliances (much as happened in 1989). In such circumstances the DMDK would be very influential, both as a party that has already proved it is the third largest in the party system in terms of votes and as a party presenting a credible alternative candidate for the post of chief minister. The relative weakness of the main parties in Tamil Nadu provides the DMDK with some advantages. The rejection of particularistic identity politics means the DMDK does not gain support on the basis of disappointed political aspirants from disadvantaged caste groups. The DMDK focuses instead on issues of governance and can claim with some credibility that the ruling Dravidian parties have failed to govern effectively on behalf of lower status groups in the state. This is consistent with Subramanian’s argument that the ruling Dravidian parties demonstrated substantial weaknesses, including limited ability to mobilize support, in the 1990s (Subramanian 2003: 64–9). Some of these weaknesses have been rectified, doubtlessly encouraged by the disciplining effect of electoral competition and routine rotation in office since 1996, but other weaknesses remain. Vijayakanth picks up on, and cultivates, popular perceptions of corruption and political enervation. In the terms used in Chapter 4, Vijayakanth presents himself as a competing political entrepreneur able to provide more effective services than those currently provided. There is a segment of the electorate that find this claim to be convincing. Vijayakanth has a number of institutional advantages of his own. These were very useful to him at the start of his career as a party leader in 2005. First, he was already an acknowledged leader in the film industry and was able to exploit networks inside the film industry for political purposes. Disaggregated records of his film takings were used as an alternative form of opinion polling to get a sense of

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concentrations of popularity (Indian Express 2006a). Vijayakanth was also able to call on the services of members of the film industry. Some stood as candidates and others supported him through personal appearances. Second, Vijayakanth had built an organizational base through his fan clubs that was quickly converted into a political party. The fan clubs that follow filmstars can be a very important political resource. Dickey’s study of MGR’s fan clubs reveals how this resource can be exploited. Above all the fan clubs provide a network that connects a state level leader with the locality (Dickey 1993: 357; The Hindu 2005f). The fans are available to canvas at election time and between elections they often carry out acts of charity or social service. In doing so they re-enact on- and off-screen acts of generosity performed by the leader (Dickey 1993: 352–3). The activities of fan clubs can overlap with functions carried out by the party when they recruit activists and provide opportunities for lower level leaders to learn their craft (ibid: 357). Vijayakanth’s fan clubs have performed all of these functions and more. Prior to the formation of the party district level committees were formed (Krishnan 2006: 2415). Wings that represented students, women and young people were formed in 2005. A security wing was established using trained volunteers from among his fans. Vijayakanth’s supporters claim that he has around 35,000 fan clubs (Frontline 2005). This number is impossible to verify and seems at odds with the four to five thousand claimed for MGR’s fan clubs (Hardgrave 1973: 303), but it is certainly the case that the DMDK had a very visible presence across the state during the 2006 assembly campaign. This publicity, along with an extensive network of volunteer workers helped demonstrate to voters that Vijayakanth was a serious political leader when he first campaigned for office in 2006. Whether the DMDK party organization promotes institutional pluralism remains an open question. Second rank leaders interact with the press but it is not clear whether a plurality of opinion is tolerated inside the party. The leader is an exalted figure and the party is built around the persona of one individual. The campaigning of DMDK candidates emphasized the person of the party leader over the party label (The Hindu 2006ac). This is an important consideration for the longerterm strength of the party. One of the reasons why the party system in Tamil Nadu has been subject to change is that existing party institutions are not effective at retaining senior leaders. It would be ironic, but not unexpected, if the DMDK reproduced the same institutional tendencies that assisted its formation.

The DMDK and social structure Vijayakanth is from a Telugu Naidu background, which is not an obvious electoral asset (Indian Express 2006a). The community is relatively small, geographically dispersed and has already provided one state level leader, Vaiko (Pandian 1994: 222). There was some speculation that Vijayakanth would emerge as a sectional leader appealing to the Telugu Naidu community and he was portrayed as a rival to Vaiko (Chennai Online 2006a). The Naidu caste group, popularly depicted as privileged by business and landowning activity, are sometimes the focus of resentment

Using populism to build a broad coalition 175 from lower status groups. This issue was raised in the Cuddalore district, where Vijayakanth was also a candidate. The suggestion was made that he would continue the Naidu ‘exploitation’ of the lower caste Vanniars (M. Vijayabaskar, personal communication, 22 November 2006). However, Vijayakanth emphasized his opposition to caste-based parties and to the discomfort of the DPI and the PMK obtained support from Dalit and Vanniar voters. The drum, an instrument traditionally played by Dalits, was allocated as the DMDK’s party symbol and it seemed to reinforce empathy between Vijayakanth and some Dalit voters (Gorringe 2006a: 10). There was a report of tension between Dalit voters and DMDK party workers in Cuddalore district and subsequent discontent among Dalit activists that Dalit office holders were dismissed from the DMDK prior to the October 2006 municipal elections (Outlook 2006; M. Vijayabaskar personal communication, 22 November 2006). Vijayakanth’s fan clubs and electoral support in Vridhachalam point in the other direction. Vanniars are reckoned to constitute the majority of the population in this constituency which has routinely returned a Vanniar MLA to the state assembly (Sify 2006). So far Vijayakanth has been able to avoid the issue of caste background and represent himself as a leader who rises above sectional interests. In class terms Vijayakanth is also from a minority background. He has substantial wealth that can be applied to the expensive business of electioneering. Vijayakanth’s father was a ‘prosperous rice mill owner’ (The Hindu 2002k). Vijayakanth prospered in his film career and has diversified his business interests. He and his wife, Premalatha, declared wealth of 125 million rupees in the affidavits submitted with election nomination forms submitted in April 2006. These assets included agricultural land and shares in a substantial marriage hall in Chennai (The Hindu 2006v). Premalatha also chairs the trust that runs the Shri Andal Alagar College of Engineering (SAACE) founded by Vijayakanth in 2001. Academic activities at the college are supplemented by some welfare activities (SAACE 2005). Vijayakanth has downplayed his privileged class status and fosters the image of an individual in touch with the aspirations of ordinary people. He is proud of his roots in ‘rural Madurai’ and claims to be in close touch with the aspirations of ordinary Tamils stating that ‘all my close friends came from the lower strata of society like rickshawallahs and ordinary labourers’ (The Hindu 2002k). MGR also esteemed rickshaw men. He bestowed acts of charity on them and perhaps paying the ultimate compliment MGR played just such a part in Rickshawkaran (1971). The attention was reciprocated, as many were ardent fans of the actor (Hardgrave 1973: 298; Pandian 1992: 39). Some of Vijayakanth’s claims to be close to the ordinary people may seem contrived but there is no denying that he is extremely popular among a mass audience. Media reports suggested Vijayakanth built a good rapport with his audiences during the campaign and that he handled informal interactions with a mixture of authority and good humour (The Hindu 2006s). In contrast to Vijayakanth’s well-developed connections with popular understandings of leadership, the links between his successful leadership and social

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structure are less direct. By this I mean that there is no direct link between his political project and the interests of a particular caste or class group. Vijayakanth’s populist style transcends a variety of particular social divisions as he attempts to build a broad coalition of support. Social structure is far from irrelevant but it has to be seen as a force that enables or constrains, rather than directs action. Social structure is relevant to Vijayakanth’s leadership in two ways. First, his privileged class status gives him resources to build party institutions and fund electioneering. Second, Vijayakanth addresses the social and economic vulnerability of the poorer strata of Tamil society. Once again Vijayakanth echoes the leadership of MGR. It would be misleading to describe the DMDK as a class based party as I clarified with regard to the other Dravidian parties in Chapter 3. Vijayakanth’s policy proposals are directed at the amelioration of poverty rather than structural changes that would transform the livelihoods of subaltern groups in the Tamil Nadu.

The impact of the DMDK on the party system Vijayakanth was not deterred by the alliances that allow the two main Dravidian parties to dominate state politics. As a notable competitor the DMDK introduced change to the Tamil Nadu party system, which is no mean achievement. Vijayakanth has drawn support away from the Dravidian parties and if he maintains or improves his position he will have further contributed to the process of change that has been underway since the late 1980s. The geographical spread of support for the DMDK in the May 2006 assembly elections was relatively even and spread widely across the state. The main exceptions to this trend were the southernmost districts of Kanniyakumari, Tuticorin and Tirunelveli where the DMDK performed poorly. Only in two of these 24 constituencies did the DMDK vote exceed the party’s mean average state-wide share of the vote of 8.4 per cent. The DMDK also did not perform strongly in the cities of Chennai and Coimbatore where again the party rarely exceeded 8.4 per cent of the vote. However, it is worth stating again that the DMDK won more votes than the margin of victory in 144 out of the 234 constituencies establishing it as party of state-wide importance. A sense of the concentration of the vote is given in Map 9.1 which shows the 62 constituencies in which the DMDK won more than 10 per cent of the vote. This map shows clusters of concentrated support around Vijayakanth’s home city of Madurai and some of the western districts – both areas of traditional AIADMK strength. In addition, the DMDK performed well in the northern districts of Villupuram and Cuddalore where the PMK established a strong following in the 1990s. The concentrations of electoral support, for the most part in less prosperous rural constituencies, correlate with Vijayakanth’s perception of himself as an entertainer, and more lately a spokesman, for non-elite audiences. He contrasts himself with ‘a city bred person’ and claims to have a special understanding of the ‘lower strata’ (The Hindu 2002k). In terms of the party system and the pattern of competition Vijayakanth established himself as the leader of a party with broad support. He did not emerge as

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DMDK wins more than 10 per cent of the vote

Source: Calculated by the author from Election Commission of India (2006b) Map 9.1 Concentrations of electoral support for the DMDK in 2006

a particularistic competitor drawing votes away from only one party in spite of the expectation that by emulating MGR, Vijayakanth would draw a larger proportion of votes away from the AIADMK. The Hindu-CNN-IBN exit poll carried out by CSDS showed that over two-thirds of his supporters among the respondents voted for the DMK alliance in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and less than 25 per cent for the

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AIADMK alliance (The Hindu 2006ak). This proportional divide was not that far out of line with the 2004 Lok Sabha result in which the DMK alliance won 57.4 per cent and the AIADMK alliance won 34.8 per cent of the vote and suggests a breadth of appeal. The DMK was cushioned by the depth of its alliance and its close ties with the Congress Party at the centre. Far from promoting segmented competition Vijayakanth shifted the pattern of competition back towards an established tradition of assembling a broad coalition of support from a range of caste and class backgrounds. Vijayakanth’s formation of a political party introduced an element of uncertainty into political calculations in Tamil Nadu which is consistent with the prediction of formal models of party competition that state that ‘[e]ntry and the threat of entry have the effect of modifying the policy packages proposed by existing parties’ (Laver 1997: 125). It is also possible that Vijayakanth’s presence encouraged the DMK to emphasize themes in the 2006 assembly election campaign that mimicked the protection populism traditionally favoured by the AIADMK. The DMK certainly took the initiative with its bold manifesto promises in late March 2006 and could claim that other parties followed its agenda. However, DMK strategists would have anticipated that Vijayakanth, in the style of MGR, would position himself as a protector and provider for the poor and may very well have acted with its manifesto to pre-empt both the AIADMK and the DMDK.

Conclusions Vijayakanth is an intriguing leader. He appeared very much an outsider to state politics and unlike some other political entrepreneurs he did not develop his career inside a political party. He is not a skilled orator and does not use the ‘ornamental and alliterative Tamil’ usually favoured by Dravidian politicians (Frontline 2006b). Being an outsider helps Vijayakanth to present himself as an alternative to existing parties. He has continued to present himself in these terms (The Hindu 2006ao). While Vijayakanth’s experience of party politics may be limited he proved very adept at the practical business of politics. His political persona is similar, but not identical, to his film persona. Vijayakanth needed to nurture an image as a political leader. He may have emulated MGR but there was no guarantee that he would be successful. Other prominent actors have failed to translate their widespread popularity into an electoral asset. Rajnikant and Sivaji Ganesan both attempted to develop political careers (Frontline 1991a). Actors cannot automatically transfer their cinematic charisma into politics. A political leader has a subtly different image which has to be cultivated. A leader has to be able to persuade fans and voters that they are credible politicians. Fan clubs have to be fashioned into an effective political organization. Filmstar-politicians have to be skilful politicians and be able to demonstrate their efficacy as leaders. Vijayakanth has demonstrated the efficacy of his leadership in a number of ways. Vijayakanth made sufficient headway in the 2006 assembly election to maintain his electoral credibility in the short term. Vijayakanth’s decision to contest a seat himself contrasted with the leaders of other smaller parties, including the DPI, the

Using populism to build a broad coalition 179 MDMK and the BJP, who did not participate in constituency contests. Ostensibly this was done to free senior leaders for the task of state-wide campaigning but it also ensured they avoided the taint of losing an election. The location of the Vijayakanth’s contest in an obscure rural constituency helped strengthen his leadership profile. The 2009 Lok Sabha election result also helped to confirm Vijayakanth’s efficacy and suggests he has the political stamina that will take the DMDK into a very interesting state assembly election in 2011. Tamil Nadu has an abundance of political parties and no shortage of able political leaders. Since 1989 the circumstances have been fortuitous for ambitious political entrepreneurs seeking to form and sustain new parties in Tamil Nadu. At a time when the market seemed saturated the filmstar-politician Vijayakanth has formed another substantial party. Vijayakanth demonstrated the weaknesses in the other parties. The two main Dravidian parties have responded to changes in the state party system by variations in their political tactics since the late 1980s. Superior alliance building has been the favoured technique though it is widely believed that underhand tactics are used to attract talent or distort opposition alliances. The defection of the actor Sarath Kumar from the DMK to the AIADMK shortly before the May 2006 assembly election attracted a good deal of comment (Krishnan 2006: 2414–15). Vijayakanth’s campaign references to suitcase politics have already been mentioned. The assembly election campaign in 2006 provided an interesting insight into the politics of cleavage manipulation in the state. The DMK’s populist manifesto was cleverly conceived and the AIADMK struggled to respond to it (Chennai Online 2006d). There is no doubt that Vijayakanth would have announced similar policies regardless of the DMK’s manifesto though media coverage suggested that the DMK set the agenda of the campaign. The end result was that the AIADMK, Vijayakanth’s DMDK and the DMK strongly committed themselves to the paternalist/protectionist populism favoured by MGR. Vijayakanth went further than the DMK by emulating the actions and the sentiments of MGR. This strategy of promoting populist welfare provision ahead of particular caste identities is one way of building a cross-caste coalition and attempting to neutralize the cleavage based strategy used by caste-based parties. This is not to suggest that techniques of identity-based mobilization were not used by these three parties but rather that for the most part they were secondary tools. The DMDK is significant because it is an attempt at broad, cross-caste mobilization and it has established itself as a third force in Tamil politics. In July 2005, shortly before the DMDK was launched, Vijayakanth asked his fans to resign from other parties and in particular from caste-based parties (The Hindu 2005h). There have been clashes, both before and after this statement, between Vijayakanth’s fans and the cadres of the PMK and the DPI. The HinduCNN-IBN exit poll showed that roughly 10 per cent of Vanniar respondents voted for the DMDK. The same poll suggested that support for the PMK appeared to sag with Vanniar voters giving strong support to the AIADMK alliance in some northern districts in the state (The Hindu 2006aj). This falling support for direct caste-based appeals was consistent with Vijayakanth’s victory in Vridhachalam, a

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constituency in which Dalits and Vanniars are a majority. Data from polling booth returns in the same constituency suggest that Vijayakanth picked up strong support from both of these lower status groups (Indian Express 2006d). Taken together this evidence suggests that protection/paternalist populism continues to resonate with voters in Tamil Nadu and is correspondingly feared by those who mobilize along caste lines. In terms of agency it is clear that Vijayakanth does not have unlimited options and that existing structures, both in terms of meaning and social divisions, offer political options to him. However, Vijayakanth has demonstrated considerable skill in making choices, organizing his party and presenting himself as a plausible leader. The failure of Rajnikant, Sivaji Ganesan and Karthik show that filmstars cannot easily transform themselves into political leaders (Krishnan 2006). Vijayakanth’s entry into politics was carefully planned and well-orchestrated. His fan clubs are well organized in contrast with the loose structure of the Rajnikant fan clubs (Outlook 1996b). Vijayakanth’s fan clubs were engaged in welfare activity well before the formal political party was launched (The Hindu 2002k). Vijayakanth is a political entrepreneur who has engaged in the politics of cleavage manipulation. He has attempted to close off certain avenues of political conflict, especially along caste lines, and defined politics in very broad terms. There was no inevitability about his emergence as a political leader. The outcome of the 2006 assembly election in Tamil Nadu demonstrated that elite agency, even when constrained by existing structures and institutions, can contribute to party system change. The changes discussed above were not fundamental in the sense of a profound re-alignment in the party system, such as those generated by the DMK and then the AIADMK in the period 1967–1977. However, the DMDK has the strongest electoral support of any new party that has emerged since the formation of the AIADMK. The insertion of the DMDK into the state party system revealed that the trend toward identity politics in Tamil Nadu is not inexorable. It is still possible for skilful political entrepreneurs to aggregate votes and shift the terms of political discourse, even if that shift involves returning to an existing, if somewhat neglected, vocabulary of politics.

10 Conclusions

In early 2009 another new party formed in Tamil Nadu. The Kongu Nadu Munnetra Peravai (KNMP) is based in the Kongunad region of western Tamil Nadu. The party is unusual among the new parties that have formed since 1989 because it identifies itself with a region. The KNMP put up 12 candidates to contest the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. The leadership of the KNMP campaigned on issues of general interest in the region. They argued for more concessions for farmers, for lifting the ban on tapping toddy palms (to make country liquor), and more economic development in the region. The KNMP threatened that if these demands were not addressed the party would campaign for the formation of a new state. The party was relatively successful in its first election. It won 1.9 per cent of the state-wide vote and significantly this vote was quite concentrated. The KNMP won more than the winning margin in four seats it contested. The leadership of the party is already talking of the 2011 assembly election (The Hindu 2009c). The party leaders are well placed to follow the path taken by a number of new parties in Tamil Nadu since 1989. It will be interesting to see if they make their way into one of the main alliances that will contest the next assembly election. The KNMP encapsulates many of the claims made about political entrepreneurs in this book. E.R. Easwaran, the party leader, is prominent in the party. The leadership variable appears significant because this not the first attempt at forming such a party. In 2001 the newly formed Kongu Nadu Makkal Katchi contested the assembly elections in alliance with the DMK but the party was judged to have failed by the alliance leaders and subsequently faded away. In retrospect it may well have been a strategic error to have entered politics as part of an alliance before having established the independent strength of the new party. In 2009 the KNMP contested without a major ally and made a much more determined attempt to win election. The party leaders have engaged in astute cleavage manipulation. The KNMP is strongly associated with the Vellala Gounder caste, a group which is both numerous and economically powerful. The KNMP has the support of a Gounder caste association and favours policies that would be well received by members of that caste. The party has already had some success at opening up an individual caste cleavage in the party system that the established parties have kept closed until now. Some opponents have denounced the KNMP as a simple caste party and deny the relevance of individual caste interests (The Hindu 2009b). While the KNMP seeks

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to benefit from that social marker it does not want to be limited by it. The party has raised issues relevant to the region, of interest to farmers and of different class groups. It would be fair to say that while the KNMP is primarily exploiting a caste cleavage it also hopes to benefit from drawing attention to several other cleavages that overlap. Many political entrepreneurs have formed political parties in Tamil Nadu since 1989. A notable few have contested elections independently and demonstrated that they have significant support. They have then negotiated with the leaders of existing alliances and if sufficiently persuasive they have assumed the role of junior allies with a good chance of winning at least a seat or two. Individually the parties secure a fraction of the overall vote. Taken together they can gain the support of at least one-third of the electorate and are influential in determining which alliance wins an election. Recent elections in the state have been dominated by bi-polar alliances and adroit moves by the Dravidian parties have avoided the formation of coalition government. With the emergence of two new parties since 2005 it remains to be seen if a governing coalition can be postponed indefinitely.

Party system change: expanding the view The dominant approaches to party system change assert either sociological or institutional factors as the key independent variable. Sociological and institutional approaches implicitly treat political leaders as an antecedent condition and look for variation in sociological or institutional variables. In this book I have inverted this approach. This throws up several useful insights and new ways of looking at wellknown issues. In the rest of this section I elaborate on my findings by examining three areas in which paying closer attention to the activity of political entrepreneurs would change the way party system change is explained. First, the experience of Tamil Nadu since 1989 reveals that party system change can be a cumulative process. Simply put, the successful entry of a new party into a party system sends out a strong signal of encouragement to other political entrepreneurs considering forming a party. There is some agreement in the literature on new party formation that parties form out of a process of strategic interaction (Hug 2001; Tavits 2006). Hug considers the possibility that party system fragmentation might be a factor determining party formation but does not consider it significant (2001: 112–15). The approach I have taken, where the focus is on the unit of the party system rather than on new parties in general, allows for the process of strategic interaction to be traced over time and supports a hypothesis that the success of a new party inspires imitators. It is important not to overstate the impact of this cumulative interaction. System change may alter the perception of benefits from forming a party, but political entrepreneurs that enter electoral politics still need to act and act in a skilful, and un-predetermined, way, in order for party system change to occur. A second important finding to emerge from this book concerns the status of contentious issues in a party system. I argue that issues do not simply emerge in party systems. I have shown how political entrepreneurs attempt to shape the pattern of

Conclusions 183 competition and move the contest towards issues that they prefer. Even more significantly, political entrepreneurs can change the pattern of competition by opening up and closing down cleavages. I have referred extensively to the social cleavage of caste earlier in the book and introduced another at the beginning of this chapter. Political entrepreneurs also develop non-structural political cleavages. This is consistent with Schattschneider’s expectation that conflicts would be manipulated for party political advantage. This ability to manipulate issues has also been recognized in the rational choice literature using the term ‘heresthetic’ (McLean 2002). It is worth returning to the issue of religion for one last example of how political entrepreneurs can manipulate an issue to their advantage. The BJP can take some credit for giving religious issues higher salience in the party system of Tamil Nadu but introducing an issue is only part of the process of shaping political competition. Political entrepreneurs need to keep an issue relevant, they need to show why it is of fundamental importance and demonstrate why they are especially qualified to take the issue forward. The BJP failed to persuade voters that their main policy area was sufficiently importantly. The BJP also failed to control the issue. Initially, the policies of the BJP were equalled by the AIADMK government between 1991 and 1996. After 1996 the DMK tilted towards Hindu sentiments and offered a diluted version of the BJP’s political narrative. Between 2002 and 2004 the BJP was subject to outbidding as the AIADMK implemented tougher policies than the national coalition government. After 2004 the AIADMK reverted to its policies between 1991 and 1996. The DMK succeeded in outflanking the BJP entirely in 2006 as it moved welfare issues to the top of the political agenda. That the Dravidian parties kept ahead of the BJP is not surprising given their electoral strength and frequent control of government. What is more surprising is that the Dravidian parties have struggled to keep up with the political entrepreneurs who have formed new parties since 1989. As I elaborate below it was as recent as 2006 that the DMK appeared to have evolved a formula for becoming more competitive. This ability to manipulate issues needs re-examination by those seeking to model strategic interaction in the process of new party formation. The assumption that issues are exogenous to the party system and are a simple function of external social or economic conditions cannot be sustained (Hug 2001: 89–99). Skilled political entrepreneurs generate political narratives of their own and make issues relevant. They are of course assisted, as Hug acknowledges, when established political entrepreneurs neglect important problems (ibid: 3). A third theme that emerges from this study is that institutions are important antecedent conditions in the process of party system change. Formal state bodies and political parties have been kept in view as institutional factors that political entrepreneurs encounter. I have not overlooked the insights from Duverger; there is evidence of the mechanical effect at work in the Tamil Nadu party system which is reflected in the bi-polar alliance systems. However, I am not convinced of the full extent of his claims. A party system does not begin and end with elections. Parties interact at other times and have distinct identities that usually survive entry into an alliance. Some alliances last for the duration of the legislatures, but many do not. Incipient conflict between parties may be a feature of an alliance and individual

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parties are keen to protect links to their supporters in the electorate, which can be a source of tension inside an alliance. The electoral system in Tamil Nadu has not produced dualism in political opinion in the state or alliances with stable membership. Also, political entrepreneurs decide how to negotiate around institutional obstacles or take advantage of opportunities offered by institutional configurations. The case of Krishnaswamy and the PT is interesting here. While the PT has so far failed to make an impact on the party system it still remains active. Krishnaswamy faces great institutional obstacles and though he has not dealt with them as effectively as he might have, there are four plausible options he might have exercised. The first three follow from the logic outlined by Duverger (1964: 224–6). The first option is for Krishnaswamy to merge his party with a national party and use the resources available from the larger party to strengthen his local following. Merger with the BSP was suggested in 2006 but did not occur. A similar option was taken by Thirunavukkarasu of the MGR–ADMK in 2002. A second option that Krishnaswamy might have exercised was to use his status and following as a bargaining chip for entry into another political party on favourable terms. This was the option taken by Kannappan of the Makkal Tamil Desam in 2006. A third option would be to withdraw from active politics. A fourth option, which Krishnaswmy has opted for, is to carry on political activity in spite of the lack of electoral success. Within this broad option there is a range of possibilities that includes strategies used to strengthen the party institution or build links with other social groups or parties. The energy with which Krishnaswamy pursues his leadership will be critical to these outcomes. An important subset of the institutional antecedent conditions are the institutions of existing parties. Most of the parties in Tamil Nadu have serious weaknesses in relation to rules for succession and the distribution of authority at the most senior level of the party. Not all parties are the same and power is more evenly distributed in some than others but there is a general trend towards involution in the parties of the state. A consequence of this is that middle level political entrepreneurs are attentive to new political opportunities. The procedures that determine promotion and succession at the very top of the party are important factors to be considered when looking at the impact of political entrepreneurs on change in other party systems (K. Chandra 2000: 864–5). The cases examined here show that it is not just overlooked issues but overlooked careers that have an impact on the formation of new parties. This research could be scaled up in a number of ways. Comparisons between states in India would offer useful findings as the research design would gain from the consistency of many institutional variables. Comparing change in the party systems of different states over the same period would be one possibility. Some states, such as Maharashtra, Karnataka and West Bengal, have experienced changes in their party system systems, albeit in different ways. Other states, for example Andhra Pradesh, have been relatively resistant to fragmentation. A research project of this type would allow for comparisons between similar types of political entrepreneur and party. Another possibility would be a comparison of rates of new party formation between different Indian states. Finally, the experience of failed entrepreneurs, treated relatively briefly in this book, could be investigated in more detail.

Conclusions 185

In summary In this book I have outlined an alternative approach to party system change. Most of the literature assumes the key variables are either sociological or institutional, and attempts to link variations in those factors to the dependent variable of party system change. The impact of political entrepreneurs on party system change is overlooked. In contrast I have the examined variations in the leadership variable. The cases considered in this book range from very successful political entrepreneurs who have contributed significant change, to failed entrepreneurs who have made no lasting impact on the party system. The leaders of new parties are important but so are the leaders of existing parties. Acts of omission on the part of established political entrepreneurs can encourage new parties to form. Alternatively, established political entrepreneurs can act decisively to block the threat of a new party or re-orient competition so as to undermine another established party. Skilled political entrepreneurs manoeuvre their party to keep it relevant, and this may involve diverting economic and social pressure away from the party system. The ways in which the Dravidian parties responded to important changes in agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s illustrate this approach. Skilled politicians adapt to new challenges. Party system change catches our attention but we should not overlook areas of stability. Skilled political entrepreneurs also contribute to party system maintenance. The evidence reviewed here shows that political entrepreneurs mediate the impact of social factors on party politics. They might do this by attempting to open up a structural cleavage, as has been the case with the caste-based parties. Alternatively, political entrepreneurs might articulate political cleavages that seek to contain or channel divisive social forces. Rather belatedly the Dravidian parties have returned to this task as a way of fending off competition. In these various ways political entrepreneurs compete with each other and build links to the electorate. The most skilful political entrepreneurs are more than mere incentive takers. They seek to change the terms in which politics is discussed and bring new or neglected conflicts to the fore. In doing so, political entrepreneurs make decisive contributions to the development of party systems.

Notes

1 Political entrepreneurs and explanations of party system change 1 The data used by Hug to represent the new issues that encourage the emergence of new parties illustrates this general point about the bluntness of quantitative variables (2001: 89–99). Tavits points out that only one of the five variables used reflects the homogeneity of a society and the variables only indicate the ‘probability of new issues emerging’ (2006: 103). This is not the same as showing that new issues have emerged or explaining the circumstances under which new issues emerge. The latter point is important for this study. Social diversity is one source of the raw materials which political entrepreneurs fashion into ‘new’ issues. 2 van der Brug and Mughan use statistical methods to gauge the direct impact of a populist leader’s charisma on voters using the case of The Netherlands. They find that populist leaders are as likely to influence voters’ decisions as much as a leader of any other party. They suggest that a leader may have more impact by the indirect route of framing the terms of political debate (van der Brug and Mughan 2007: 44–5). However, they do not attempt a cross-country comparison. 3 I do not dwell at length on the extent to which these might be considered objective or constructed social structures. I make it quite clear in later chapters that political entrepreneurs have their own opinions on such categories, and attempt, more or less successfully to work with definitions that work to their advantage. I find R.W. Cox’s suggestion that structures function as widely held intersubjective meanings to be helpful (1995). 4 While I use of the term ‘political entrepreneur’ and discuss their political activity I do not evaluate their normative contributions to public welfare in this book. 5 Chhibber argues that the dominance of political parties and the state over civil society makes this unusual in India (1999: 8, 13–14). 6 This provokes an interesting insight into the process of mobilization in modern Tamil Nadu. The DMK brought new groups into politics as it sought to outflank the Congress Party in the 1960s. In the process electoral turnout increased significantly from 49.3 per cent in 1957 to 76.6 per cent in 1967 (Barnett 1976a: 141). The All-India Anna DMK (AIADMK) in turn intensified mobilization in areas of Tamil Nadu where the DMK only had shallow roots (Subramanian 1999). However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this mobilization, especially among Dalit voters, was not as effective as it might have been. This left open the possibility of new parties organizing among Dalits, which has now happened. In other words the apparently thorough mobilization of the electorate did not close the support market to other political entrepreneurs. 7 Haeusler and Hirsch (1989) offer an alternative structuralist account of party system informed by regulation theory which posits that a party system can be significantly destabilized by changes in the mode of accumulation. This contrasts with other accounts of

Notes 187 regulation theory that give more room for agency through the political regulation of accumulation. 8 The rules were tightened again in 2003 (Adeney 2005: 102–3, 112–13). 2 Conflict, cleavages and political parties in south India 1 In India more generally the Hindu nationalist movement provides a good example of the construction of a transcending political identity. Hindu nationalism does not spring from a homogenous body of religious practice or belief. Nationalists have to work hard to invoke a unified Hindu identity (Zavos 2000). Cultural revival has been put to political uses in numerous cases, with one notable Indian example being the nationalist movement in Assam (Price 1997: 174–80). 2 Walch uses a variation of the Lipset and Rokkan typology to account for cleavage development in Tamilnad (1976b: 102). Walch presents a clear summary and provides a useful starting point for discussion but he does not fully account for the overlapping evolution of the cleavages and does not give sufficient space to the issue of religion. 3 In some parts of north India the twice born castes are numerous enough to enjoy electoral influence, as well as economic and social power (Hasan 1998). 4 The Ambasankar Commission, reporting to the Government of Tamil Nadu in 1985, estimated the backward caste population to be 67 per cent of the state population. Radhakrishnan estimated that the 201 communities on the Backward Classes (BC) list in 1989 constituted 55 per cent of the state population. Of the 201 BC communities 39 were also defined as Most Backward Classes and were estimated to constitute 24 per cent of the state population (Radhakrishnan 1989a: 508). The Department of Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes and Minorities Welfare recognized 142 groups as backward and 41 groups as most backward in 2005 (GoTN 2005b and GoTN 2005c). The figure of 19.0 per cent is the 2001 census enumeration of the Scheduled Castes of Tamil Nadu (GoTN 2005a: 1). 5 The notion of caste in which jatis were understood to operate as endogamous units in a particular locality does not provide an adequate account of how caste provides a social and political identity. Caste has exhibited considerable dynamism in south India. Dirks argues ‘caste has been strengthened and reshaped in southern India. In particular, caste now refers to macro categories of social classification – especially around the distinction between Brahmans and Non-Brahmans – in ways that can be explained by the historical process and can also be seen to shape the very character of politics and history.’ (1996: 271) Endogamy in south India has been redefined so that marriage partners can be taken from a wider circle and various caste distinctions have been diluted (ibid: 269). The progression of the Nadar caste group since the nineteenth century illustrates how caste is far from being an unchanging primordial identity (Hardgrave 1969; Dirks 2002: 239). The high status Vellalas were also notable for having enhanced their status by ‘sanskritising’ or emulating Brahmanic practices (Dirks 1996: 285). 6 Baker charts the social background of winning candidates in the 1937 election to the Madras Legislative Assembly. All but two of the 37 Brahman legislators returned were Congress candidates. Brahmans won 27 per cent of seats they were eligible to contest Brahmans were a smaller proportion of the assembly because 78 seats were set aside for various minority groups (Baker 1976b: 586). 7 A related alternative is an alliance between a caste and other social groups. The Samajwadi Party built its success in the 1990s on a combination of backward caste Yadav and Muslim votes in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. 8 The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has core support from the Chamars, a Dalit caste that is fairly populous across north India. Initially the party concentrated its efforts on this group. Since 1998 the BSP has very deliberately built up a cross-caste alliance by nominating candidates from selected castes (K. Chandra 2004; Wyatt 1999).

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9 In addition the Madras Corporation after 1923 had a system of rotating the post of Mayor between representatives of different caste and religious ‘communities’ which ensured the periodic representation of Muslims and Christians (Wright 1966: 592). 10 At one point Periar argued that Tamil was the Dravidian language that united the entirety of south India and denied the existence of the three other Dravidan languages (S. Ramaswamy 1997: 241). 11 Considerations of space have limited a discussion that would include the tension between the Tamil and Telugu speaking areas in the politics of the presidency before 1946 and the ongoing disputes with Kerala and Karnataka over water. The former tensions caused problems for both the Justice Party and Congress but each party sought support from both sides of the divide. The water disputes have also been contained by the existing parties. 12 Subramanian (1999: 126–9 and Ch. IV) presents an account of evolving ‘populist ethnonationalism’ which covers the narratives that I describe separately as secessionism and cultural nationalism. I prefer to consider the narratives sequentially because of the important changes in the structure of the narrative, particularly over the question of secession. 13 These and other policies were listed in a two page advertisement placed by the Government of Tamil Nadu in the news magazine Frontline on 14 September 2001. All of the accompanying photographs, ten in all, include women or girls (mostly receiving gifts from Chief Minister Jayalalithaa). I am grateful to Katharine Adeney for providing me with this material. 14 The AIADMK has not had exclusive control over the paternalist style. While leader of the DMK, Annadurai favoured a broad populist approach that incorporated paternalist and assertive elements. After his death the DMK de-emphasized paternalist policies (Subramanian 1999: 216–18), though it has returned to some of these policies in an effort to compete with the AIADMK. During the 2006 assembly election the DMK showed strong interest in paternalist policies. In the same election the newly formed DMDK also emulated the populist style of MGR. 15 Lipset and Rokkan noted that in many European party systems, political parties persisted even though the cleavage they were originally associated with had gone into decline. They referred to this as the freezing of a party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50). 3 Evolution of a party system 1 Party alignments could change quickly after the legislature was convened, which was the case after the 1923 election and candidates did not always publicize their party affiliation. Rajaraman considers that some legislators in 1926 concealed party links because they were reluctant to rule themselves out of government office by aligning themselves with a party known to be unpopular with the Governor (1988: 222 and 235). The Governor’s initial assessment of the 1926 election was ‘that twenty-three of those returned were firm Congressmen, seventeen definite Justicites and 58 others floated in between’ (Baker 1976a: 72). The relative ease with which the Governor subsequently was able to put together and maintain a non-party administration gives an indication of the weakness of party identification (ibid: 72–9). 2 Arnold provides a sense of the social profile of leading politicians in Congress, not all of whom were Brahmans, in short biographical summaries of key figures in presidency politics in the 1920s and 1930s (1977: 232–7). 3 The elections are sometimes referred to as the 1951–1952 elections because nominations occurred in 1951 and voting took place in January 1952. 4 Prior to these boundary changes, parties had to contend with the extensive and linguistically diverse territory of the Madras Presidency. Cleavages tended not to coincide with the entire territorial unit. Tensions inside a party between politicians with Telugu and

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5

6

7

8 9

10

Tamil affinities were not uncommon. The Justice Party struggled to maintain a balance between regional interests. Similar tensions were present within Congress. The Congress movement re-organized itself on a linguistic basis with the formation of an Andhra committee in the Telugu districts and the Madras committee was confined to the Tamil speaking areas by the Nagpur Congress and re-named the Tamil Nadu Congress Committee in 1921 (Arnold 1977: 47). The CRC, later known as the Indian National Democratic Congress (INDC), won 14 seats and 9.6 per cent of the state-wide vote in the 1957 assembly election (Hardgrave 1965a: 59). The INDC faded away as the DMK and the Swatantra Party gave the impression that they were better placed to compete with the Congress Party (Rudolph 1965: 983–4). Many ordinary members resent the dominance of the national party and allege that the state unit is run for the convenience of a clique of MPs elected to the Lok Sabha (Alphonse, interview 16 February 2000). In 2004 Mani Shankar Aiyar, the Congress MP for Mayiladuthurai, candidly admitted that his nomination in 1991 was the result on intervention by Rajiv Gandhi and that some local party members resent his having been ‘helicoptered in’ (Rediff 2004b). Eight of the 10 sitting AIADMK Lok Sabha MPs were denied party nominations shortly before the 2004 Lok Sabha election (Daily Excelsior 2004). Without explanation the finance minister in the 2001–2006 AIADMK government was removed from his party post and excluded from the list of assembly candidates for the 2006 assembly election (Indian Express 2006b). The DPI did not win any seats but the party leader, Thirumavalavan, took second place in the Chidambaram constituency. The performance of each party leader showed that each had some electoral weight. Thirumavalavan of the DPI won an increased share of the vote in his constituency, 34.4 per cent compared with 31.2 per cent in 1999. However, Krishnaswamy of the PT won only 14.2 per cent of the vote in the Tenkasi Lok Sabha constituency, less than he had won in either the 1998 or the 1999 elections. Alan Ware suggests a threshold of three per cent of seats in the legislature as a possible numerical measure of relevance (1996: 158). This winnows out some of the smaller parties but the operation of the SMSP systems means that some parties that command a respectable share of votes are excluded. The DMK, one of only two parties to govern the state since 1967, ceases to be ‘relevant’ using this measure in 1991 (it won two seats and 22.5 per cent of the vote in that year). Likewise the AIADMK drops out in 1996 when it won only four seats but 21.5 per cent of the vote.

4 Political leaders as political entrepreneurs 1 Some readers might be resistant to the term ‘political entrepreneur’ because of its associations with deductively constructed theories elaborated in a western context alien to the Tamil case. A review of the empirical evidence reveals a good deal of entrepreneurial activity in the politics of south India. This review of the evidence, a large part of which is detailed in the chapters in the second half of the book, is used in this chapter to show how the concept can be elaborated. 2 Frohlich and Oppenheimer provide another definition: ‘A political entrepreneur is an individual who invests his own time or other resources to coordinate and combine other factors of production to supply collective goods.’ (1978: 68) However, the definition is not immediately illuminating.The authors acknowledge that collective goods are difficult to define concisely (ibid: 34–5). Many goods are not ‘pure’ collective goods because there is a private good dimension to them or they are only available to a particular group and not all of the public (Aldrich 1995: 35–6). Political entrepreneurs are also very well placed to provide private goods but this dimension of their activity have sometimes been

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excluded from discussion for reasons of analytical simplicity (Frohlich et al 1971: 56–8). I prefer the term ‘political services’ used by Laver for its relative clarity and because it allows for political entrepreneurs who provide both private and collective goods (Laver 1997: 71). 3 The BSP offers a very good example of the definition of group boundaries by skilled political entrepreneurs. Until 1998 the BSP concentrated on getting support in much the same way as the earlier Republican Party of India, namely mobilizing the minority of Dalits (K. Chandra 2004: 148–58). A re-alignment of the party with various caste groups helped it to win the 2007 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh (Verma 2007). 4 The softening of the social reform ideology of the DMK from the 1950s onwards meant that the party was less uncomfortable with differences than its radical image might have suggested. Barnett comments that ‘[i]nstead of the destruction of the caste system and implementation of a new principle of societal organization, social reform came to mean betterment of the condition of those groups at the bottom within the old system’ (1976a: 99). 5 Price’s account is consistent with Swamy’s observation that populist movements ‘tend to attack “illegitimate” privilege and success rather than privilege per se’ (1996a: 69). 5 The PMK: re-opening a caste cleavage 1 Under President’s Rule the Governor is supposed to rule impartially and senior bureaucrats make day-to-day decisions. In this case it was widely understood that Congress, in power in New Delhi, was using the period of President’s Rule to prepare the way for a Congress bid to win the state assembly elections (de Wit: 1996). The period of central control was imposed in January 1988 and lasted until January 1989. 2 The data was gathered in several rounds of fieldwork with last one being concluded in 1997 (Harriss-White 2003: 179). 3 Though it has to be stressed that this is very much a minority and few Dalit children from the villages make this kind of progress. 4 The DMK is keen to take credit for making the actual decision when it was in government. 5 Ezhilmalai has since left the PMK and joined the AIADMK. 6 Ramadoss has not neglected the political career of his son, Anbumani Ramadoss even though it has been a source of tension inside the party (The Hindu 2002d). A doctor, like his father, Anbumani was engaged in ‘social work’ with his own NGO prior to being elected organizing secretary of the PMK (The Hindu 2004g). A key element of the alliance agreement brokered with the DMK was the allocation of a Rajya Sabha seat to the PMK when a vacancy became due in June 2004. On the strength of this Anbumani was included in the Union cabinet after the 2004 Lok Sabha election. 7 Organizations bearing similar names were active before 1980. Radhakrishnan records a Vanniyakula Kshatriya Maha Sangam as having been founded as early as 1888 and comments on the Vanniyakula Kshatriya Maha Sangam statewide conference held in 1951 (1996: 117, 122). 8 MGR epitomized this generosity and many other leaders exemplify it. MGR’s reputation as a generous host is remembered, with it being said that no one came away from a visit at his residence without being offered a meal (R. Rangaraj, interview, 23 August 2001). 9 The strength of Dr Ramadoss’ grip on the PMK is illustrated by the failure of several defectors to diminish the influence of the party among the electorate. P.D. Ilangovan serves as a general illustration. He joined the BJP in time to be allocated the Dharmapuri Lok Sabha seat for the 2004 election. He had first won as a PMK candidate in 1999 and was known as an established leader in the PMK. However the PMK (with the support of the DMK alliance) won the seat back. Ilangovan’s share of the vote (26 per cent)

Notes 191 was well below the AIADMK statewide average. The message was clear – the party organization in Dharmapuri was intact and remained with Dr Ramadoss (Outlook, n.d.). 10 During a visit to Tiruppudaimaruthur village in Tirunelveli district in April 2006, the author noted a substantial house decorated with just such a statuette and a hand-painted picture of the actor Karthik who was leading the All India Forward Bloc (AIFB) in the assembly election campaign. In numerous places in that part of the district, election art depicting Thevar caste symbols could be seen. Visual references included the peacock, a representation of Murugan, and the lion that is the AIFB party symbol. I am grateful to M. Vijayabaskar for this observation and also for drawing many of the Thevar symbols to my attention. 6 The DPI and Dalit mobilization 1 Dalit activists recall that relations between the PMK and the DPI were initially cooperative. Dalit voters would support the PMK and appreciated the high profile of some Dalits in the party. However, relations seemed to degenerate as the DPI became more successful in areas where the PMK also enjoyed strong support (Gorringe 2005: 316–17). 2 The MDMK, the other junior partner of the AIADMK, was also denied this mark of respect. However, the Chief Minister did visit Vaiko’s ancestral home during the campaign. This was interpreted as a symbol of reconciliation following the Chief Minister’s earlier detention of the MDMK leader under the Prevention of Terrorism Act following (The Hindu 2006o). 3 These districts are Kancheepuram (25.1 per cent), Villupuram (27.4 per cent), Cuddalore (27.8 per cent), Nagapattinam (29.6 per cent), and Tiruvarur (32.4 per cent). The Nilgiris is another district with a high Scheduled Caste population (31.23 per cent) that is somewhat at odds with Moffatt’s emphasis on their concentration in the lowlands (1979: 61) 4 In theory the DPI could win a three-sided contest with just over a third of the vote, especially with a few independents picking votes. In practice the distribution of votes is rarely that even and support for the third candidate falls off. Thus Thirumavalavan was unable to win his Lok Sabha contest when he won 34.4 per cent of the vote in 2004. 7 The PT and caste politics in southern Tamil Nadu 1 M.S.S. Pandian observes that the DVKF had been pressing for official recognition of Immanuel Sekharan who had battled against caste inequality but the state government preferred an anti-colonial hero ‘thus recognizing the Devendrars and at once not acknowledging their desire for caste equality’ (2000b: 515). 2 The AIADMK government subsequently organized a function to commemorate Sundaralingam’s birth and began the construction of the memorial at Gavarnagiri towards the end of its term in office (Government of Tamil Nadu 2005f; 2006c). 3 Of the 3.1 percent of the votes won by the alliance the DPI candidates picked up 1.6 per cent and Kannappan of the MTD gained 0.3 per cent. 4 In 1998 when the PT looked set to re-order electoral politics in the state Krishnaswamy was critical of the BSP, considering the BSP’s alliance with the BJP to be against the Dalit interest (Outlook 1998b). 5 In September 2002 Krishnaswamy pointed out that there was only one Adi-Dravida vice-chancellor leading a university in Tamil Nadu. Krishnaswamy used a broad mix of terminology, initially complaining about the under-representation of Dalits but then adding that the next vacancy should be given to either an Arunthathiyar or a Devendra Kula Vellalar (The Hindu 2002f).

192

Notes

6 I am very grateful to Syed Anwar for drawing this poster to my attention (Chennai, 26 August 2001). 7 Gorringe profiles a number of organizations, like the Ambedkar People’s Movement, that have lost support as activists were disillusioned by a lack of radicalism on the part of their leaders (2005: 255). 8 Some sources describe him as a cardiologist (Frontline 1998a; Gorringe 2005: 251). Another source describes him as ‘qualified allopathic doctor’ (Rediff 1998e). Yet another states that he had been ‘running a nursing home in Coimbatore’ (Outlook 1998b). Not all of these statements are mutually exclusive. 9 The Election Commission report for 1984 lists Krishnaswamy as a DMK candidate though the report does not state whether he was an official candidate or given use of the DMK symbol (Election Commission of India n.d. g: 356). 10 There is an established tradition in Indian of political leaders using dress to form a bond with their followers. While politicians like Karunanidhi and Chidambaram may wear a veshti to emphasize their connection to the ordinary people, Krishnaswamy’s sartorial style reflects the desire for upward mobility on the part of his followers. Arun comments that Thirumavalavan’s preference for a trousers and a shirt affirms the ambitions of many ordinary Paraiyars who see this style of dress as an assertion of superior status (2003: 41). However, Thirumavalavan is no longer exclusively seen in this attire, which coincides with his involvement in the Tamil Protection Movement. 11 John Pandian was convicted on a murder charge on 6 January 2003 and had, up to that point, 42 cases registered against him by the police (The Hindu 2003a). 12 For its part the AIADMK depicted the period between 2001 and 2006 as one of communal harmony in its election propaganda (The Hindu 2006r). 13 This was symbolized by developments in the Tenkasi constituency. In 1998 Krishnaswamy stood for election and while he came third he diverted votes away from the incumbent MP, M. Arunachalam, who had been a longstanding member of the Congress and then the TMC. Arunachalam, lost his seat in 1998 and was again disappointed in 1999 when Krishnaswamy was adamant in alliance negotiations among members of the Progressive Front that the seat be given to the PT. Bitterly disappointed, Arunachalam resigned from the TMC. Krishnaswamy did not simply win a battle for the right to contest a constituency; he also undermined a leading Dalit in the TMC (Rediff 1999b). 8 Hindu nationalism in south India 1 Interestingly Subramanian argues that the radical differences between Dravidianism and Hindu revivalism conceal certain similarities. For example he draws attention to Periar’s acceptance of a Hindu community of Tamils and his ambivalent attitudes towards religious minorities (1999: 108–9). M.S.S. Pandian has similarly argued that ambiguities in the Dravidian movement’s view of Hinduism provide the basis for Hindu nationalists to claim that their activity is largely consistent with elements of the Dravidian tradition (2000c). 2 The Shankaracharya has supported some Hindu nationalist causes but was keen to maintain some independence from the Sangh Parivar. Interestingly he also met resistance from temple priests in his own attempts to gain influence over temples in the state (Fuller 2004: 126). 3 The AIADMK did not permit the BJP to contest Thirunavukkarasu’s Pudukottai seat in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. Furthermore it was strongly rumoured that the AIADMK insisted that he was completely excluded from the BJP’s list of candidates from Tamil Nadu (Deccan Herald 2004).

Notes 193 9 Using populism to build a broad coalition: Vijayakanth 1 Sarath Kumar, who defected from the DMK to the AIADMK shortly before the May 2006 assembly election, stood for the same post in 2006 and was elected unopposed. Vijayakanth congratulated Sarath Kumar afterwards and is reported to have said ‘I am against mixing politics with films. People should stand united irrespective of the party they belong to and fight for the welfare of the industry’ (India eNews 2006). 2 The plot echoes were also promising, in 1984 he played ‘a rustic hero shunned by citybred heroine’, in 2006 his overtures for an electoral alliances were rejected by the leader of the AIADMK (The Indian Express 2006c). 3 The AIADMK gave Congress 73 seats to contest in 1984, 65 in 1991 and 64 in 1996. The DMK gave the TMC 40 seats in 1996 and Congress 48 in 2006. To get a number higher than 80 we have to go back as far as 1980, when the DMK gave Congress 114 seats.

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Index

Adeney, K. 11, 63, 68, 90, 187n8 Adi-dravida 21, 23, 26, 117, 144, 205; see also Dalit agency 5–6, 11, 13, 45, 82–3, 91–2, 94, 95, 180, 182–5 Agamudiar caste group see Thevar caste cluster Aldrich, J.H. 3, 5, 53, 84 Ambedkar, Dr B. 26, 105, 117, 137, 142 All-India Anna DMK (AIADMK) 20, 26, 34, 37, 38, 39–40, 43, 45–8, 50, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71 72, 79, 80, 81, 90, 95, 99, 100–1, 146, 166, 168, 170, 179, 180; alliances 119–20, 122–3, 127, 138, 139, 149, 158, 162, 163, 164, 169, 170, 173, 178, 179; Dalits 42, 127–8, 150; gender 40–2, 44; government 135, 143, 168; Hindu nationalism 151, 155, 156, 158, 163–4, 158, 183; MGR 172; support for 73–5, 76–8, 171, 176; see also Anna DMK and MGR Anandhi, S. 160 Anna DMK (ADMK) 15, 19–20, 63; see also All-India Anna DMK Annadurai, C.N. 19, 37, 63, 91, 92, 93, 166 Annamalai, S. 147 Arnold, D. 19, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 35, 40, 50, 52, 53, 55 Arun, J. 88, 119, 124, 125 Arunthathiyar caste group 123, 126, 140, 161 backward castes 21, 23–4, 37, 39, 56, 58, 98, 108, 137, 139, 152, 187n4; see also backward classes and Other Backward Classes backward classes, 23, 24, 53, 97, 98, 99, 137, 145–6, 187n4; see also Other Backward Classes Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 72, 118, 139–40, 142, 149, 184 Baker, C.J. 52, 53, 55, 56 Banerjee, M. 171

Barnett, M.R. 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 52, 56, 58, 60, 61, 67, 73, 79, 102, 111, 117, 127, 130, 170 Bartolini, S. 7, 17 Béteille, A. 20, 33 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): alliances 12, 68–9, 70, 71, 76, 101–2, 113, 118, 120, 138, 139, 158, 161, 163, 170; caste 160; cleavages 46; government 136; Hindu nationalist movement 3, 151–8; institutions 161–3; language 32; leadership 161, 178–9; MGR-ADMK 71, 161; national party 46, 152, 168; party system 20, 163, 164; religion 44, 159, 163–4, 183; Sri Lanka 101, 147; see also Hindu nationalism Brahmans 20–1, 60, 95, 97, 155, 160; Brahmanic Hinduism 28–9, 152, 158, 159, 163; rhetorical attacks on 22–3, 32–3, 35, 37; social and political prominence 22, 37, 51, 52, 58, 187n6, 188n2 Brown, J.M. 51 caste 6, 12; caste system in Tamilnad 18, 20–2, 103–4, 117, 123–4, 140–1; cleavages 17, 21–7, 35, 37, 39–40, 44, 45, 52, 58, 60, 61, 70, 91, 98, 112, 113, 116, 133–4, 179–80, 182–3; caste parties 20, 46–7, 68, 69, 70, 72, 86, 90, 95, 101, 102, 105–6, 110–11, 116, 125–6, 142, 175, 179, 185; employment reservations 39, 51, 98, 148; jati 6, 20, 21, 187n5; language 32–3; religion 28–9, 31, 157 Chakkiliyars see Arunthathiyar caste group Chandra, K. 10, 24, 86, 142 Chennai 19, 41, 74, 75, 77, 103, 108, 137, 138, 155, 175, 176; see also Madras Chhibber, P.K. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 90 Chingleput district 24, 25, 102, 108 cinema 100, 112, 131, 147, 167, 170, 178 class: cleavage 2, 6, 17, 18, 20, 27, 37, 38–40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 51, 61, 91, 144, 145, 146,

Index 223 160, 176, 178, 182; middle class 33, 39, 159, 160; social marker 32, 33, 104, 141, 155, 159, 175; working class 7, 3, 112 cleavage 6, 13, 20, 29, 34, 42, 46–7, 49, 54, 81, 97, 104, 114, 116; defined 6–7, 17; manipulation 5–6, 17–18, 22–6, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38–40, 51, 52, 58, 124, 133, 143, 150, 152, 162, 164, 179–80, 181–2; political 34, 43–5, 47–8, 61, 85, 185; structural 7, 17, 44, 85, 183, 185 Coimbatore 25, 150, 156, 158, 166, 176 collective goods 28, 84, 87–8, 90, 91, 189n2 Commonweal Party 24, 98 Communist Party of India (CPI) 46, 59, 65, 69, 71, 72 Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) 60, 65, 69, 71, 72, 119 Communists 19, 26, 27, 38, 44, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 123, 144, 150 Congress movement see Indian National Congress Congress Party 23, 34–6, 58, 66, 71, 98, 99, 106, 108, 114, 121, 150, 160, 161; alliances 30, 66, 68, 71, 72, 76, 80, 81, 99, 100, 102, 130, 139, 158, 173, 178; central government 67, 36, 190; decline 11, 12, 63, 64, 81, 101, 110; dominance 13, 58–61; gender 40; language 30, 33, 36, 61; national party 46, 68, 168; origins 3, 46; party system 20, 50, 58–61, 64, 71, 79, 81, 163; region 34–6, 38, 44–5, 47; support for 20, 25, 46, 56, 59, 62, 65, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 111, 133, 168; Sri Lanka 100, 147; state government 19, 32, 33, 58; see also Indian National Congress and Swaraj Party Congress Reforms Committee (CRC) 59, 60 conversions see religious conversions Cox, G. 8, 9 Cox, R.W. 11 Dalit Panther Iyyakkam (DPI) 80, 105, 116–17, 118; alliances 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 119–23, 136, 149, 172; caste 26, 118–19, 124–6, 142, 179; gender 131; institutions 126–8; language 71, 122, 123, 131; leadership 88, 117–19, 128–9, 161, 179; origins 117–18; party system 129–32; social structure 124–5; support for 46–7, 69, 72, 78, 139, 149, 175; see also Viduthalai Chiruthaigal and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi Dalits 21, 42, 98, 103, 105, 109, 175, 180; attacks on 98, 124–5, 134–6, 146–7; gender 42; Hindu nationalism 153, 154, 156, 157, 160–1; leadership 88, 93, 95, 118–19, 127, 128–9, 133, 135–6, 144–8, 150, 171; parties and movements 16, 20,

26, 46, 68, 69, 71, 105, 116–17, 119–22, 136–7, 139, 150; religion 29, 31; relations with Vanniars 104, 105, 119; socioeconomic status 104, 105, 112, 123–5, 140–2; see also Dalit Panther Iyyakkam, Pallar caste group, Paraiyar caste group and Puthiya Thamizhagam Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK) 46, 166–7; alliances 72, 73, 77, 169; caste 173, 175, 176, 178, 179–80; class 175, 176, 178; gender 170, 172; institutions 172–4; leadership 167–8, 171, 174; party system 176–80; region 167, 168; social structure 174–6; support for 72, 102, 169, 172 Devendra Kula Vellalar Federation (DKVF) 134, 136 Devendrakula Vellalar caste group 126, 133, 140, 142, 143; see also Pallar caste group Dickey, S. 89, 92, 95, 171, 174 Dirks, N.B. 19, 117 Dravida Kazhagam (DK) 19, 36, 56, 57, 58 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 3, 45, 90, 108, 144–5, 163, 169, 179; alliances 30, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69–73, 99, 100–2, 107, 111, 113, 114, 115, 118, 120–1, 122, 123, 131, 133, 138, 151, 158, 159, 163, 164, 166, 170, 178, 180; caste 44, 97, 98, 150; class 38–40, 44; Dalits 70, 71, 117, 118, 120, 127–8, 137, 139, 146, 148; formation 19, 58; gender 41–2; institutions 67; language 32–4, 57, 61; leadership 67, 92, 93, 117, 171; party system 45–8, 61–3, 66, 76–81, 148, 180; region 34, 35–8, 44, 45, 47–8; religion 28–9, 30, 152, 155–6, 157, 158, 160, 164, 183; splits 19–20, 63, 67; support for 59, 60, 62, 65, 69, 72, 73, 74, 178; town-country divide 43, 185 Dravidian 24, 28, 29, 37, 47, 52, 58, 86, 129, 131, 158, 159, 166, 166; defined 17–18; identity 31–2; movement 17, 18, 19, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 45, 57, 96, 110, 137, 138, 145, 146, 152, 156 Duverger, M. 8–9, 10, 95, 106, 149, 183, 184 Echeverri-Gent, J. 63 electoral geography 73–8 Forrester, D.B. 25, 60, 63, 66, 133 forward castes 22, 23, 24, 52, 53, 97 Frohlich, N. 3, 5, 84, 88, 89–90 frozen party system 7, 48, 188n15 Fuller, C.J. 28, 29, 155, 158, 159, 163, 164 Ganesan, Shivaji 178, 180 Geddes, B. 82, 83 Geetha, V. 26, 40, 41, 47, 93

224

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gender, 40–2, 44, 91, 93, 95, 154, 170 Gopalsamy, V. (Vaiko) 67, 171, 174–5 Gorringe, H. 21, 22, 80, 86, 87, 93, 94, 95, 110, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 142, 146, 175 Gough, K. 26, 38, 56 Gourishankar, V. 28, 86, 92, 94 Government of India Act (1919) 29, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55 Government of India Act (1935) 30, 40, 53, 55 Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN), 24, 80 half party 64, 66, 69, 81; see also party systems Hansen, T.B. 93 Hardgrave, R.L. 12, 20, 22, 24, 33, 56, 58, 59, 60, 78, 79, 112, 133, 140, 171, 174, 175 Harmel, R. 5, 6, 9 Harriss, J. 28, 39, 43, 101, 159 Harriss-White, B. 21, 104 Heath, O. 160 Herring, R. 94 Hindi language controversy see language Hindu Munnnani 153, 154, 155–6 Hindu nationalism 28, 31, 46, 138, 151–61 Hug, S. 2, 5, 9, 13, 14, 182, 183, 186n1 ideology 4, 15, 24, 37, 38, 41, 45, 48, 52, 60, 79, 91, 97, 110, 130, 126, 131, 148, 158 Indian National Congress (INC): movement 19, 23, 26, 30, 34, 35–6, 40, 45, 50–8, 112 Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) 30, 114; see also Muslim League Irschick, E.F. 18, 23, 28, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 40, 52, 53, 54, 55, 91, 92 Jaffrelot, C. 142, 152, 154, 160 Janakarajan, S. 43 Jayakumar, S. 125 Jayalalithaa see Jeyaram, Jayalalithaa Jenkins, R. 90 Jeyaram, Jayalalithaa 37, 42, 65, 66, 95, 122, 143, 145, 158, 164, 166, 171, 172 Justice Party 19, 22–4, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 45, 50, 52, 53–4, 55, 56, 57, 58, 81 Kallar caste group see Thevar caste cluster Kamaraj, K. 25, 30, 36, 58, 60–1, 63, 64, 91, 166 Kanchi Shankaracharya 28, 92, 157, 158 Kannappan, S. 70, 71, 121, 184 Kanniyakumari 25, 31, 153, 154, 155, 156, 160, 162, 176 Kapadia, K. 123, 124 Karunanidhi, M. 28, 41, 66, 67, 90, 93, 99, 122, 130, 137, 138, 156, 164, 169, 171 Kennedy, L. 80

King, G. 13, 15 Kohli, A. 13, 39, 64, 112 Kollman, K. 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 Kongu Nadu Munnetra Peravai (KNMP) 34, 46, 181–2 Krishnan, R. 112, 168, 170, 171, 174, 179, 180 Krishnaswamy, Dr K. 88, 116, 126, 133, 134–40, 142–8, 149–50, 184 Laakso, M. 79 Lakshmanan, C. 129, 148 language 29, 31, 34, 90, 91, 159; English 32, 33, 109, 131; Hindi 33, 35, 36, 38, 60, 110, 131, 168; Tamil 18, 28, 29, 31–4, 35, 36, 37, 110, 122, 131, 159 Laver, M. 3, 5, 83, 84, 89, 178 leadership see political leadership Liberation Panthers see DPI Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 100, 131 see also Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka linguistic re-organization 36, 49, 54, 57, 90 Lipset, S.M. 6, 7, 10, 13, 34, 94 Luebbert, G. 7 Madras city 25, 100, 156, 160; see also Chennai Madras Presidency 19, 22, 29, 43, 35, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 81, 104, 140 Madras State, 25, 26, 30, 33, 36, 37, 40, 49, 57, 58, 61 Madurai 25, 27, 39–40, 112, 113, 126, 140, 166, 168, 169, 175, 176 Madurai district 128 Mainwaring, S. 6 Mair, P. 5, 6, 7, 17 Makkal Tamil Desam (MTD) 70, 71, 120, 121, 139, 184 Manikumar, K.A. 112, 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 143, 150 Manor, J. 83, 87, 90, 92, 153 Maran, M. 68 Maravar caste group see Thevar caste cluster Marumalarchi DMK (MDMK): alliances 68, 70, 71, 76, 101, 102, 107, 123, 130, 139; leadership 171, 179; origins 20, 67; support for 46–7, 69, 72, 78, 169; see also Vaiko McLean, I. 83, 89, 183 McMillan, A. 127 Meenakshipuram 153, 154, 157 MGR (Ramachandran, M.G.) 19–20, 26, 39, 41–2, 45, 46, 63, 64, 66, 69, 72, 79, 87, 92, 93, 99, 150, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179 MGR-ADMK 67, 69, 71, 72, 161, 172, 184; see also Thirunavukkarasu, S.

Index 225 Mines, M. 20, 30, 28, 86, 92, 94 Mitra, S.K. 3 Moffatt, M. 20, 21, 123, 125, 140 Moopanar, G.K. 118, 138 Moovendar Munnetra Kazhagam (MMK) 113, 114, 122, 138 Mosse, D. 21, 140, 146 Most Backward Classes (MBC) 24, 27, 99, 105, 114 movements 3, 20, 21, 26, 44, 86, 94, 100, 110, 116; see also Dalit Panther Iyyakkam, Dravidian, Hindu nationalist movement, and Indian National Congress Mrug, J. 71, 76, 80, 120 Mukkulathor caste group see Thevar caste cluster Muslim League 30, 55, 56, 57, 159; see also Indian Union Muslim League National Democratic Alliance (NDA) national parties 9, 35, 45–7, 60, 61, 70–1, 81, 90, 101, 161, 162, 164, 168 Nilgiris district 25, 157 Non-Brahman 21, 22, 23–4, 27, 35, 45, 51, 52, 53, 60, 97, 159 North Arcot district 24, 25, 102 opinion polls 39, 42, 76, 77, 171, 173 Oppenheimer, J.A. 3, 5, 84, 88, 89–90 Other Backward Classes (OBC) 21, 24, 98, 145 Padmanabhan, M. 80, 163 Pallar caste group 68, 123, 144; attacks on 135, 147; leadership 126, 138, 145, 148; parties and movements 46, 133, 139, 142–3, 144–6, 149–50; relations with Thevar caste cluster 25, 112, 140–2; socioeconomic status 112, 124, 134; see also Devendrakula Vellalar caste group Pandian, A. 112 Pandian, M.S.S. 13, 32, 41, 60, 96, 140, 141, 142, 159, 171, 174, 175 Paraiyar caste group 104; attacks on 140; leadership 125–6; parties and movements 125–6, 130, 145, 149; relations with Vanniar caste group 104, 119; socioeconomic status 124, 125 party system change 1–2, 10–11, 13–16; institutional approaches 8–10; political entrepreneurs 5–6, 11, 45, 82–3, 180, 182–5; sociological approaches 6–7; in Tamilnad 54–6, 58, 61–3, 64–70, 75–81, 97, 110–11, 129–32, 148–9, 163–4, 176–8 party systems 1–2, 3–5; Indian 12; institutions and 7–11; social structure and 6–7, 17; two party 4, 8, 9, 48, 52; two and a

half party 64–8, 75, 78, 80, 81, 106, 117; multiparty 1,4, 9, 61–3, 64, 68–73, 78–81, 114, 117; predominant 54–61; see also party system change Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) 134, 168, 170; alliances 68, 70, 71, 101–2, 119–20, 139, 149, 172; caste 24, 70, 86, 97, 119, 121, 122; gender 100; institutions 106–8, 127, 143; language 122, 131; leadership 87, 95, 108–10, 114–15, 131; origins 98–9; party system 66, 80, 97, 111–12; social structure 102–4; Sri Lanka 100, 101, 123; support for 46–7, 65, 72, 73, 77–8, 103, 105, 130, 169, 175, 176, 179 Periar 19, 23, 28, 34, 36, 40, 45, 56, 58, 105, 137, 156, 166 political entrepreneurs 1–3, 5–6, 9, 10, 13–14, 15, 28, 57, 59, 66, 70, 71, 81, 86–91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 104, 107, 110, 129, 133, 141–2, 146, 150, 162, 164, 167, 170, 172, 173, 178, 179, 182–5; cleavage manipulation 17–18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30–1, 38, 42, 44, 45, 85–6, 111, 116–17, 124–5, 133, 160, 180, 181–2, 183; defined 3, 83; rational choice theory 82–5, 90–1 political leadership, 85–8, 91–6, 108–10, 128–9, 142–8, 161, 169–72 political parties 1, 2–4, 6, 10, 14–15, 17, 24, 51, 81, 84, 91, 148, 183 President’s Rule 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 99, 163 Presler, F.A. 27, 29 Price, P. 92–3 private goods 82, 84, 87, 88, 90 Puthiya Thamizhagam (PT) 68, 70, 116, 118; alliances 69, 70, 72, 114, 130, 132, 137–40; caste 70, 126, 129–30, 133–5, 142; institutions 142–4, 184; leadership 135–7, 144–8, 149–50, 184; social structure 140–2; support for 46–7, 68–9, 72, 139, 140 Racine, J. 117, 161 Radhakrishnan, P. 23, 24, 97, 99, 102, 104, 111, 187 Rajadurai, S.V. 26, 40, 41, 47, 93 Rajagopalachari, C. 23, 26, 36, 58, 60, 61 Rajah, M.C. 23, 26 Rajaraman, P. 51, 52, 54, 67 Rajnikant 100, 170, 178, 180 Rakner, L. 10 Ramachandran, M.G. (MGR) see MGR Ramadoss, A. 102 Ramadoss, Dr S. 97, 98–9, 100, 101, 104, 105, 108–10, 111, 115, 122, 131 Ramaiah, A. 140, 141 Ramanathapuram district 25, 113, 133, 140, 141, 147, 153, 162

226

Index

Ramaswami Naicker, E.V. see Periar Ramaswamy, S. 18, 28, 32, 38 Randall, V. 7 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 151–4, 156, 157 rational choice 2–3, 6, 82, 84, 89, 91, 183 regional cleavage 28–9, 32, 34–6, 44, 45–8, 54, 58, 61, 64, 81, 86, 90, 91, 181; see also regional parties regional parties 9, 11–12, 34–8, 45–7, 63, 67–8, 90, 151, 163, 168, 181 religion, 27–31; see also Hindu nationalism and religious conversions religious conversions 121, 131, 153–4, 155, 156, 157, 158, 163 Riker, W.H. 4, 8 Rokkan, S. 6, 7, 10, 13, 34, 94 Rudolph, L. 22, 41, 58, 60, 98, 104, 114 Rudolph, S.H. 22, 58, 60, 98, 104, 114 Ruud, A.E. 96 Ryerson, C.A. 32, 33, 36 Saez, L. 79 Salem district 24, 25, 102 Sangh Parivar 151, 152, 154; see also Bharatiya Janata Party Sartori, G. 4, 5, 8, 14, 54, 79, 110, 148 Schattschneider, E.E. 5–6, 13, 18, 85–6, 183 Scheduled Castes (SC) 21, 26, 57, 97, 104, 116–17, 125, 126, 127, 129, 142, 148; see also Adi-dravidas and Dalits Schumpeter, J. 6, 85 Sekharan, Immanuel 133, 142, 147 Shankaracharya see Kanchi Shankaracharya Siaroff, A. 64 Singer, W. 40 single member, simple plurality (SMSP) 8, 9, 100, 106, 107, 127, 142, 162, 173 South Arcot district 24, 25, 98, 99, 102, 105, 108 Spary, C. 41, 94, 95 Sridharan, E. 4, 9 Sri Lanka 101, 123; see also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Stalin, M.K. 67, 137, 164 Subramanian, N. 13, 18, 28, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, 45, 63, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 108, 132, 159, 166, 173 Svåsand, L. 5, 6, 10 Swamy, A.R. 13, 19, 23, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 52, 60, 61, 76, 93, 166, 170, 171 Swaraj Party 52, 53 Swatantra Party 59, 60, 62, 98, 112, 160 Taagepera, R. 79

Tamil Eelam 101, 110, 147 Tamil language see language Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) 20, 65–6, 71; alliances 66, 68, 70, 100–1, 118, 119, 121, 130, 136, 144, 170, 192, 193; support for 65, 69, 72 Tamilnad Toilers Party 24, 98–9 Thanjavur district 25, 26, 38, 55–6, 125 Thevar, Muthuramalinga 112, 113, 134, 160 Thevar caste cluster 25–6, 47, 98, 111–14, 134, 135, 138, 141, 143, 147, 149, 150, 160 Thevar Magan 112 Thirumavalavan, R. see Thirumavalavan, Thol. Thirumavalavan, Thol. 28, 88, 116–17, 118–19, 120, 121, 122–3, 125–6, 127, 128–9, 130, 131, 132, 159, 171 Thirunavukkarasu, S. 66, 105, 111, 158, 161, 172, 184 Tirunelveli 122, 134, 136 Tirunelveli district 25, 134, 139, 140, 153, 161, 176 Torcal, M. 6 town-country cleavage 42–3, 44, 176, 185 United Nationalist Party 53 Vaasanthi 35, 138, 144–5, 147, 157, 164, 167 Vaiko (V. Gopalsamy) 67, 171, 174–5 Van Evera 1 Vanniar caste group 24, 102, 103; leadership 108–10; parties 25, 46, 58, 60, 66, 86, 97, 98–9, 100, 101, 105–6, 107–8, 111, 114, 115, 119, 130, 149, 175, 179–80; socioeconomic status 104 Varshney, A. 2, 4, 9, 42, 91 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal (VC) 116 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) 69, 72, 116, 122–3 Vijayabaskar, M. 123, 169, 170, 175 Vijayakanth 20, 46, 72, 73, 77, 100, 102, 123, 166–8, 169–72, 173–80 Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) 157, 160 Vivekananda Kendra (VK) 153 Walch, J. 13, 60, 63, 187 Ware, A. 4, 5, 7, 9, 65 Washbrook, D. 130 Weiner, M. 13, 61, 111 Widlund, I. 13, 66, 88, 89, 171 Young, O.R. 84, 88, 89–90 Zavos, J. 152, 187n1